

THE APOLOGY

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

AND A DIGEST OF PLATONIC IDIOMS,

BY THE

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ADVERTISEMENT.

COMPLETE in itself, this volume is yet but a fragment of a larger undertaking. In the Oxford series of Plato's works, which commenced with Mr. Poste's edition of the Philebus in 1860, the Apology, Crito, Phædo, and Symposium were undertaken by Mr. Riddell. Had he lived, all four would probably have appeared together. The Digest of Idioms, founded on an examination of all the writings of Plato, which he had prepared to accompany his edition of these dialogues, would not have seemed out of proportion to the other contents of such a volume. His death on the 14th of September, 1866, left the undertaking incomplete. The preparations which he had made for the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium, though extensive and valuable, had not received their final shape. But the Apology seemed to be ready for the press. Its text was settled, a critical and exegetical commentary was written out fair, and a full introduction had been provided, together with an appendix

on the *δαμόμιον* of Socrates. The Digest of Idioms also, to which frequent reference was made in the commentary, appeared to have been transcribed for the printer, although a few pencil notes (which have been printed in this volume at the foot of the pages to which they belong) showed that additions would have been made to it, if the writer had lived to print it himself, and perhaps in some instances a different expression would have been given to the views which it contains. Under these circumstances it has been thought advisable to publish the Apology and the Digest of Idioms by themselves. My task has been only, in conducting them through the press, to remove clerical errors and to verify references.

It may be convenient to state that Plato is cited in this volume according to the pages of Stephanus. In reference to the Orators the sections of Baiter and Sauppe's Zurich edition have been given together with the pages of Stephanus in the minor Orators and Reiske in Demosthenes. In the Dramatists Dindorf's numbers are followed as they stand in the edition of the *Poetæ Scenici* published in 1830. With regard to quotations, the text of the Zurich editions has been used both for Plato and for the Orators, the text of Dindorf (from the edition of 1830) for the Dramatists. Wherever a reading is quoted which is not found in these editions, I have endeavoured to indicate the source from which it has been derived.

The text of the Apology itself is in the main that of C. F. Hermann. Even the punctuation is his. Some of the brackets found in his edition have been silently omitted: but, with this exception, every instance in which he has not been followed is mentioned in the commentary.

EDWIN PALMER.

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INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

I. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING.

THE trial of Socrates took place before a Heliastic court, according to the forms of an ordinary *γραφὴ δημοσία*. The indictment (*ἐγκλημα*) is called *ἀνωμοσία* 19 B, 24 B, and *ἀντιγραφὴ* 27 C,—terms which allude to the proceedings of the *ἀνάκρισις* before the Archon Basileus, before whom both the indictment and the plea in answer to it were presented in writing and confirmed severally by oath. And the terms *ἀντιγραφὴ*, *ἀνωμοσία*, proper at first to the defendant, came to be used of the prosecutor, and even were transferred to the indictment (*ἐγκλημα*) itself, thus presented in writing and sworn to.

2. THE ACCUSERS.

The indictment was preferred by Meletus; see below the form preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and compare Plato's Euthyphro 2 B. Hence it is Meletus who is called on by Socrates to answer arguments as to its words and meaning in the Apology. Hence again Socrates asks why did not Meletus bring witnesses (34 A), and again observes (36 A) that the penalty for not obtaining $\frac{1}{5}$ of the votes would have fallen on Meletus. Little account can be taken of the statement of Maximus Tyrius, Disp. xxxix. p. 228, *Μέλιτος μὲν ἐγράψατο Ἄντρος δὲ εἰσήγαγε Λύκων δὲ ἐδίωκε*. For authors vary on this distinction, and the continuation of the passage—*κατεδίκασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔδησαν δὲ οἱ ἔνδεκα ἀπέκτεινε δὲ ὁ ὑπηρέτης*—shows that these words are, as Stallbaum says, *magis oratorie*

quam vere dicta. See Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Process, p. 709. n. 19.

Of Meletus, the ostensible prosecutor of Socrates, in reality little more than the tool of Anytus, we only know that he was a young tragic poet. He is characterised by Plato (Euthyphro 2 B) as νέος τις καὶ ἀγνός, and is ridiculed as a poet by Aristophanes (Ran. 1302). The Meletus (Andoc. de Myst. 94. p. 12) who was one of the four who arrested Leon (Apol. 32 C) may have been this Meletus' father, who bore the same name, but there is nothing to show it.

Lycon, a rhetorician, is mentioned by Aristophanes (Vesp. 1301) with Antipho.

Anytus was by far the most considerable of the three accusers, whence they are described (Apol. 18 B) as τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, and Socrates is called by Horace (Sat. II. iv. 3) Anyti reus. He was a leather-seller (Xen. Apol. Soc. 29), and had been a rich man. As a sufferer and worker for the popular cause he had earned a reputation second only to Thrasybulus. With Thrasybulus he had fled from Attica, and the Thirty had confiscated his estates and included him in the decree of banishment (Xen. Hell. II. iii. 42). He held a command in the camp at Phyle (Lys. xiii. 78. p. 137), and at the restoration was joint author with Thrasybulus of the Act of Amnesty (Isocr. xviii. 23. p. 375). Plato (Meno 90 B) represents him as high in popular favour. His was nevertheless (Athenæus XII. p. 534 E) not a spotless character. Aristotle moreover (acc. to Harpocration on the word δεκάξειν) says that he was the first man who bribed an Athenian court; and Diodorus, who repeats this (xiii. 64), adds that it was on his trial for treason (Zeller, Philos. der Griech. II. p. 142 n.). As Anytus was the most influential accuser, so there is reason to think he was the most inflamed against Socrates. Meletus and Lycon were actuated at most by a class-prejudice,—if indeed we should not rather regard them as mere tools of Anytus. All three however belonged to classes¹ which Socrates had offended by his incessant censure

¹ Socrates is made by Plato (Apol. 23 E) to represent his three accusers as all actuated by class-feeling in their attack upon him. Ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν

ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ρητόρων. The contrast which is implied in this sentence between ῥήτορες and πολιτικοὶ shows that the words severally denote definite classes

of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account. Nowhere is this cause of offence traced more connectedly than in the Apology itself

of Athenian citizens. There seems no ground for thinking with Wiggers (Sokrates p. 97) and others, who have followed in this view Petitus' Comment. in Legg. Attic. Lib. III. Tit. iii, that there was any order of ῥήτορες, ten in number, appointed yearly, and deriving their origin from Solon. Any such institution could not but have interfered with the ἰσηγορία which even to the time of Demosthenes was the cherished charter of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, even the precedence which was allowed by Solon in the assembly to speakers above the age of 50 seems to have fallen into abeyance. But we find that in the time of the Orators or earlier (see the latter part of Cleon's speech in Thucyd. III. 40) these ῥήτορες had attained a mischievous importance. Æschines speaks of them (iii. 3. p. 54) as δυναστείας ἑαυτοῖς περαιοῦντες, and in Alcib. II. 145 A it is said that ὅσα δὴ ποτε ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ρητόρων ξυμβουλῆς ἅπαντα γίγνεται. To be a ῥήτωρ had become a regular profession. A new art had arisen, designated by the name ῥητορικῆ, which is seen to have been itself a new word from the way in which it is used in the Gorgias (448 D)—τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν. In their capacity of συνήγοροι the ῥήτορες were brought into prominence (Heeren, Polit. Hist. of Anc. Greece, c. 13. p. 232 of Eng. Transl.) by the frequency of state trials in the time succeeding the Peloponnesian war. But it was no less as σύμβουλοι to the Assembly that the ῥήτορες were in requisition. In all questions of legislation and of policy the debate was mainly in their hands. The epoch of this ascendancy is dated by Isocrates

(viii. 121. p. 183, where he calls it τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος δυναστείαν) from the Decelian war, or subsequent to Pericles (ib. 126. p. 184). The two species, συμβουλευτικῆ and δικανικῆ, of Aristotle's triple division of ῥητορικῆ in his treatise correspond with this double scope of the ῥήτωρ's profession. The πολιτικοὶ as a class must have emerged at the same time as the ῥήτορες. In itself πολιτικός means no more than 'Statesman' in the sense in which this term might have been applied to Pericles. But an Athenian of Plato's time, speaking with reference to Athens, would mean by πολιτικοὶ that class of men who made public business their profession,—τοὺς πολιτικούς λεγομένους, Plat. Politic. 303 C. Our conception of the πολιτικοὶ will be best completed by comparing them with the ῥήτορες. Down to Pericles' time there would be no distinction. He united both characters like the great men before him. But afterwards the debates came into separate hands, and the speakers in the Assembly were for the most part no longer the great commanders in the field and the bearers of the highest offices. The fact and the reasons are stated by Aristotle (Pol. V. v. 7), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πηξυμένης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν δι' ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται. At the same time, inasmuch as counsel as well as action was needed for the conduct of the state, those who were engaged in the different branches of this common work were not absolutely contradistinguished: cf. Plato, Gorg. 520 A, Phdr. 258 B, and the general terms in which the ῥήτορες are described—e. g. by Lysias (xviii. 16. p. 150) as οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες.

(21 C—22 C). Illustrations occur also abundantly elsewhere. We see from the Ion (533 E) how poets were brought under this censure for parading inspiration as the substitute for reason. The rhetoricians² again as in the Gorgias were censured for producing persuasion without knowledge. Yet stronger and yet more incessant was the denunciation of the mischievousness and presumptuousness of undertaking politics ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου (Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 3), or without knowledge of principles (Alcib. I. 113 C). But Anytus was actuated, over and above such a class-feeling, by personal animosity. One ground of this has been said to have been his “amor spretus Alcibiadæ³ :” so Luzac and Wiggers. Plato further (Meno 94 E) makes him threaten Socrates with mischief in bewilderment and mortification at being told, in effect, that in teaching⁴ his son the family business he had done nothing towards his real education. These personal motives, however, remained in the back-ground; and so again, if he entertained yet another grudge against Socrates as the teacher of Critias, the avowal of it was incompatible with the Act of Amnesty. Therefore he made the attack under cover of defending the democracy. The ἐπιείκεια of the restored people did not last long (Plat. Epist. VII. 325 B), and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal for their revived popular institutions.

3. NUMBER OF THE JUDGES.

The statement of Wiggers (Sokrates p. 132 note), and of Matthiæ (Miscell. Philol. vol. I. p. 252. note 35), that the number of the judges on Socrates' trial was 556 or 557, has been repeated without question even by Mr. Grote (Hist. Gr. vol. VIII. p. 654, chap. 68). It is, however, as Dr. Cron⁵ remarks (in his note on Apol. 36 A), merely an assumption from the false reading *τρεις* in this passage, taken in connection with the

² The enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates' death to the Socratists (Luzac de Dig. Socr. Sect. II. § 4).

³ The story of this “amor Alcibiadæ” rests on the testimony of Plutarch and of Satyrus apud Athenæum, but is unlikely in itself, and because Plato and Xenophon are wholly silent

about it.—Zeller II. p. 141 note.

⁴ Cf. Xen. Apol. Soc. 29. “Anytus ἀπέκτονέ με ὅτι αὐτὸν τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξιούμενον οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι τὸν υἱὸν περὶ βύρσας παιδεύειν.

⁵ Platon's Ausgewählte Schriften erklärt von Christian Cron und Julius Deuschle.—Teubner, 1865.

statement of Diogenes Laertius (II. v. 40), *κατεδικάσθη διακοσίαις ὀγδοήκοντα μᾶ πλείοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολλουσιῶν*, whence the numbers are supposed to have been 281 for condemnation, 275 for acquittal.

There is no reason (as Mr. Grote allows) for mistrusting the precise statement of Diogenes, nor is there any more reason, if we have regard to Greek habits of expression, for doubt that the 281 represented the aggregate majority, not the amount by which it exceeded the minority.

Hence, accepting the reading *τριάκοντα* here, the whole number cannot have been 556 or 557. An independent argument against such a number would be that it resembles no other recorded numbers on trials. Those which we find, such as 200 (Dem. in Mid. 223. p. 585), 500 (frequently), 700 (Isocr. xviii. 54. p. 381), 1000 (Dem. in Mid. 223. p. 585), 1500 (Plutarch. Vit. Periclis, 72), 2000 (Lysias, xiii. 35. p. 133), 2500 (Din. in Dem. 52. p. 96), 6000 (Andoc. i. 17. p. 3), even if they are only approximate, must stand for something near multiples of 100.

Now Pollux (VIII. 48) mentions 401 and 201 as the numbers in two different cases of *φάσις*, and elsewhere 1001 and 1501. This affords the clue to a conjecture of much probability (Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Process, p. 140), that this was a provision not exceptionally but uniformly for an odd number of judges, (frustrated sometimes, it would appear, by the default of individuals at the last moment), but that the common way of indicating the number was, for brevity's sake, to mention the variable constituent, omitting the invariable 1. And Heffter (Athen. Gerichtsverfassung, p. 55) clenches this by a passage from Ulpian's⁶ Commentary on Demosthenes' oration against Timocrates: *διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ὁ εἰς προσετίθετο αἰ τοῖς δικασταῖς ἵνα μὴ ἴσαι γένοιτο αἱ ψήφοι*. Thus a Heliastic court always consisted of some multiple of 100, + 1.

Accordingly, if we take the total number of Socrates' judges

⁶ [Ulpian's note is on the words *δικαστηρίων δυῶν εἰς ἓνα καὶ χιλίους ἐψηφισμένων* (Dem. c. Timocr. 9. p. 702) and stands as follows: *ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις καὶ ἐσπουδασμένοις πράγμασι συνήγυτο εἰς δύο δικαστηρίων πλη-*

ροῦντες ἀριθμὸν χιλίων καὶ ἑνός. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ὁ εἰς προσετίθετο αἰ τοῖς δικασταῖς ἵνα μὴ ἴσων γενομένων τῶν ψήφων ἐξ ἴσης ἀπέλθοιεν οἱ δικαζόμενοι ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος δόξῃ νικᾶν ᾧ ἂν ἰεῖς προσετέθη.]

as 501 (which is also Heffter's conclusion), and the number of those for condemnation as 281, we have 220 for his acquittal. Then 31 exactly, or 30 in round numbers, changing sides, would have effected his acquittal. Cron, not allowing for the odd 1, reckons 219 for acquittal.

4. FORM OF INDICTMENT.

Plat. Apol. 24 B. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείρων καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζων ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά.

Diog. Laert. II. 40. ἡ ἀνωμοσία τῆς δίκης εἶχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρίωνος⁷, ἐν τῷ Μη-
τρώφ· Τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀνωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιτθεὺς
Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθεν· Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ
πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγού-
μενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.

5. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. ORDER OF THE PLEADINGS.

From Æschines (iii. 197. p. 82) we learn that in a γραφή παρανόμων the time assigned for the trial was divided into three equal lengths: ἐγγείται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὕδωρ τῷ κατηγορῷ . . . τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὕδωρ τῷ τὴν γραφήν φεύγοντι καὶ τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγουσι (i. e. τοῖς συνηγόροις, not the witnesses whose examination was extra to the time allowed for the pleadings: cf. Lys. xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166, 167, καὶ μοι ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ) . . . τὸ τρίτον ὕδωρ ἐγγείται τῇ τιμῇσει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ὑμετέρας (i. e. for the prosecutor to speak *again* on the amount of penalty, and the defendant to reply, and the judges to vote).

The second of these lengths then would be occupied by the defence of the accused and his συνήγοροι, represented by the main part of the Apology, i. e. as far as 35 E. The Xenophontean Apology says (22) that speeches were made ὑπὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ, but the Platonic manifestly would have us think of Socrates defending himself alone.

Then would follow the taking of the votes of the judges, and the announcement of the result, by which the charge is declared proven.

The third length then begins with the second speech of the

⁷ [Favorinus wrote a work on Socrates in the time of the Emperor Hadrian.]

prosecutor in advocacy of the penalty he had named; and the remainder of it would be occupied by Socrates' ἀντιτίμησις, where the Apology again takes up the thread (35 E—38 C). It was open to the prosecutor to ask now for a lighter penalty than that which he had named in the indictment. It was in the defendant's speech on the ἀντιτίμησις that he brought forward his wife and children ad misericordiam.

Then would follow the voting of the judges upon the amount of the penalty.

Here the formal trial would end, and the condemned person would be led away by the officers of the Eleven (cf. Apol. 39 E). This is the moment, however, to which the concluding portion of the Apology (from 38 C) belongs. Whether or not the indulgence of such a concluding address was historically conceded to Socrates, there must have existed sufficient precedent for it to give verisimilitude to the ascription of it to him. The Xenophontean Apology (24) agrees here.

The raised platform, called βῆμα, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses, whence the phrase ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, Apol. 34 A, and similarly Andoc. i. 26. p. 4, καὶ σιωπῶ καὶ παραχωρῶ εἴ τις ἀναβαίνειν βούλεται, and Æsch. iii. 165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ βήματος ἕως ἂν εἴπῃς.

6. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. SPEECHES OF THE ACCUSERS.

We find that speeches were made by all the three. Compare for Meletus Apol. 34 A, and for the other two Apol. 36 B, ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων. It is implied however that Meletus spoke first.

Grote (VIII. 647. c. 68) conjectures that they made a partition of their topics, "Meletus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lycon would dwell on the political grounds of attack." More accurately, Meletus' business would be to support the indictment proper, while the political charges and insinuations would be dwelt on by Anytus as carrying with him ἠθικὴ πίστις in this topic, and by Lycon as familiar with it in his capacity of ῥήτωρ. The only citation in Plato's Apology which is referable to one accuser rather than another is the saying ascribed to Anytus (29 C), εἰ διαφεύζεται Σωκράτης, ἥδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νειεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἅ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται· ἢ οὖν τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ

ἔδει Σωκράτη δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ ἐπειδὴ εἰσηλθεν οὐχ οἰόν τέ ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι.

The other citations are general; e. g. 17 A, *χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν*, and 33 B, *καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἶτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἶτε μὴ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι*—an allusion to the alleged deterioration by him of Critias and Alcibiades, which was made much of by the prosecution according to Xenophon.

In the Memorabilia of Xenophon likewise the citations are all ascribed in general terms to ὁ κατήγορος. Mem. I. ii. 9, Ἴλλα νῆ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν καθεστῶτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων ὡς μωρὸν εἶη τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμου καθιστάναι. . . . τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστῶσης πολιτείας καὶ ποιεῖν βιαιούς. Ib. 12, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὰ γενομένω Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιήσατην. Ib. 49, Σωκράτης. . . . τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε πείθων μὲν τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐξείναι παρανομίας ἐλόντα καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι, τεκμηρίφ τούτφ χρώμενος ὡς τὸν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμιμον εἶη δεδέσθαι. Ib. 51, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς αὐτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὔτε τοὺς κάμνοντας οὔτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὠφελούσιν ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἱατροὶ τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι. ἔφη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εὔνους εἶναι εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνήσονται· μόνους δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι δυναμένους. ἀναπειθόντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτὸν ὡς αὐτὸς εἶη σοφώτατός τε καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς αὐτῷ συνόντας ὥστε μηδαμῶ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς αὐτόν. Ib. 56, ἔφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ ποιηρότατα καὶ τούτοις μαρτυρίους χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακούργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικούς, Ἡσιόδου μὲν τὸ

Ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος ἀεργεῖν δέ τ' ὄνειδος

τοῦτο δὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν ὡς ὁ ποιητῆς κελεύει μηδεὶς ἔργου μήτε ἀδίκου μήτε αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει. . . . τὸ δὲ Ὅμηρου ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος πολλάκις αὐτὸν λέγειν ὅτι Ὀδυσσεὺς

Ὅντινα μὲν βασιλῆα κ. τ. λ.

ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ὡς ὁ ποιητῆς ἐπαυοίη παλεσθαι τοὺς δημότας καὶ πένητας.

7. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. SOCRATES' SPEECH.

(i.) The defence.

Socrates speaks in presence of a large audience of Athenians over and above his judges (cf. Apol. 24 E, where he speaks of οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ in pointed distinction from οἱ δικασταί), but he is addressing professedly his judges alone⁸ (cf. Apol. 17 C, εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι, 18 A, δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή). It is therefore these alone who are designated by the ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι at the opening and throughout: Steinhart observes that the appellation ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί is reserved until the final address to be applied only to the judges who vote for acquittal. For mention of such audiences cf. Lysias xii. 35. p. 123, πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἤκουσιν εἰσόμενοι τίνα γνώμην περὶ τούτων ἔξετε, Æsch. i. 117. p. 16, ὄρων πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν νεωτέρων

⁸ The δικασταί were very animated listeners. They answered speakers on being appealed to: cf. Æsch. iii. 202, p. 82; so Andoc. i. 33. p. 5, εἰ μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς περὶ τούτων ἀπολελογησθαι δηλώσατέ μοι ἵνα προθυμότερον περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολογῶμαι. Or they stopped a speaker to put a question: cf. Andoc. i. 70. p. 10, εἰ τίς τι ὑμῶν ποθεῖ ἀναστὰς ὑπομνησάτω, and Æsch. ii. 7. p. 29. They used the interpellation of κατάβα: Aristoph. Vesp. 979. It seems to have been a common practice not only of political but even of judicial assemblies to express their pleasure or displeasure at what was said. The general word for such expressions of feeling was θόρυβος. That it was a word of medie significationis we see from Plato, Legg. 876 B, δικαστήρια. . . . ὅταν μὴδὲ σιγῶντα ἀλλὰ θορύβου μεστὰ καθάπερ θέατρα ἐπανοῦντά τε βοῆ καὶ ψέγοντα τῶν ῥητόρων ἐκάτερον ἐν μέρει κρίνη, and Æschines ii. 51. p. 34, θορυβησάντων ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν ὡς δεινός τις εἶη καὶ σύντομος τῶν δὲ πλειόνων ὡς πονηρός καὶ φθονερός. The word occurs in an

unfavourable sense in Plato, Protag. 319 C, καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσι, Andocides ii. 15. p. 21, Lysias xii. 73. p. 126, ἐθορυβεῖτε ὡς οὐ ποιήσοντες ταῦτα, 74. p. 127, εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ μέλοι αὐτῷ τοῦ ἐμετέρου θορύβου. It was unrestrained in its nature: cf. Æsch. i. 83. p. 11, μετὰ γέλωτος θόρυβος, 164. p. 23, πολλὴ κραυγὴ παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσεται, iii. 122. p. 70, κραυγὴ πολλὴ καὶ θόρυβος, Isocr. xv. 272, θορύβου καὶ βοῆς ἅπαν ἐμπλήρηται τὸ δικαστήριον. On the other hand it expressed applause unequivocally: cf. Isocr. xii. 264. p. 288, οὐκ ἐθορύβησαν ὁ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν ἐπὶ τοῖς χαριέντως διελεγμένοις ἀλλ' ἀνεβόησαν ὡς ὑπερβαλλόντως εἰρηκότος. The θόρυβος which Socrates deprecates was of the unfavourable kind. This is implied by his urging that it is not his fault if the truth is unpalatable. Θόρυβος would thus seem to be confined to the δικασταί, not joined in by the ἀκροαταί. The word is applied to Meletus in Apol. 27 B merely in the sense of interrupting by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering.

προσεστηκότας πρὸς τῷ δικαστηρίῳ πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος συνειλεγμένους εἰς τὴν ἀκρόασιν, ii. 5. p. 28, ἢ τῶν ἔξωθεν περιεστηκότων (σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι τῶν πολιτῶν πάρεισιν) ἢ τῶν δικαστῶν, iii. 56. p. 61, ὅσους οὐδεὶς πώποτε μέμνηται πρὸς ἀγῶνα δημόσιον παραγενομένους.

Production of witnesses.

It has been questioned by C. F. Hermann whether Plato intended the reader of the Apology to imagine any introduction of witnesses to take place. It can hardly be doubted that he did: it is part of the verisimilitude which characterises the whole speech. At 19 D Socrates, wishing to appeal to the judges as witnesses, employs the common formula for doing so—*μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι*. Cf. *Æsch.* ii. 122. p. 44, *καὶ τούτων ὑμεῖς οἱ τὴν ψῆφον μέλλοντες φέρεω ἐστέ μοι μάρτυρες*. Similarly, when at 21 A—*καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν αὐτοῦ οὐτοσί μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε*—he uses the very circumstantial formula commonly in use in such a case, he must intend us to go on to fill up the picture with the actual production of the witness. And at 32 E *καὶ τούτων ὑμῶν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες* must mean that the production of the witnesses is to follow, coming so near as it does to the common formula *τούτων δ' ὑμῶν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρέξομαι* (cf. e. g. *Antipho* v. 20. p. 131, and *Lysias* x. 5. p. 116). The future consistently used in the two last cases (contrast the present in the first case) would not suit the supposition of mere reference to persons who are not to be produced. Again, 34 A, *τούτου πᾶν τούναντιον εὐρήσετε* is very like an implied promise to produce evidence. Lastly, the employment against Meletus of the common topic (34 A)—‘Why did he not call witnesses who if what he said was true could not have failed to establish it?’—and the subjoining of the conventional challenge *εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο νῦν παρασχέσθω· ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ* would be suicidal in a speaker who forbore to call witnesses himself.

Interrogation of the accuser.

In accordance with the law (*Demosth.* c. *Steph.* B. 10. p. 1131, *τοῖν ἀντιδίκων ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή*), and with the common practice (cf. *Lysias* xiii. 30, 32. p. 132, where spaces are left for a

formal ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ, as for ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ elsewhere, and add *Lys.* xii. 24, 25. p. 122, where a specimen is given at length), Meletus is questioned by Socrates in 24 C and the following paragraphs. In 25 D Socrates himself appeals to the law in support of his right to put such questions—*ἀπόκριται, ὦ γαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι*.

(ii.) Ἡ ἀντιτίμησις.

In the Xenophontean Apology (23) it is denied that Socrates made any ἀντιτίμησις—*οὔτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμήσατο οὔτε τοὺς φίλους εἴασεν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογοῦντος εἴη ἀδικεῖν*. The Platonic ἀντιτίμησις, both of the *σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ* and of the 30 minæ, is (waiving the question of its being historical or not) wholly ironical: there could be no serious expectation that such an offer would be accepted. Diogenes Laertius says that this ἀντιτίμησις turned 80 more of the judges against him—*καὶ οἱ θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν προσθέντες ἄλλας ψήφους ὀγδοήκοντα*.

(iii.) The last words.

The latter part from *τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις* (29 E) we are to imagine as spoken ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἤγουν, and only those who chose would hear it (cf. *παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον*, *ibid.*).

PART II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APOLOGY.

I. ITS ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

- i. Its employment of commonplaces (*τόποι*).
 - ii. The "old accusers."
 - iii. The Delphic response.
 - iv. The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.
 - v. Its dramatic framework.
2. HOW FAR CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCRATES.
 3. ITS ADEQUACY AS A DEFENCE.

I. ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

A close examination of the structure of the Apology resolves the question how far it preserves to us the actual defence made by Socrates. The criticism of Wiggers and Schleiermacher, that the Apology is the purest extant relic of Socrates, falls to the ground before the internal evidence which the Apology itself supplies. Xenophon (*Mem.* IV. viii. 5) tells us that Socrates turned his thoughts away from the preparation of any defence—*ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἠναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον*. Now the Apology is artistic to the core, whether in respect of the recurrence of received *τόποι* of Attic pleaders, or of the arrangement and outward dress of the arguments (observe especially the artifice of "the old accusers," of which presently), or of the tripartite dramatic arrangement of the whole. The art and the manner, worthy as they assuredly are of Plato, are also distinctively characteristic of him. The subtle rhetoric of this defence would ill accord with the historical Socrates, even had the defence of Socrates been as certainly as we know it not to have been the offspring of study and premeditation.

(i.) Employment of commonplaces.

We may trace this in detail through the defence or the first of the three parts of the oration.

The exordium may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators. The imputation of conjoint falsity and plausibility, the denial of being *δεινὸς λέγειν* (cf. *Lys.* xix. 1, 2. p. 152, *Isæus* x. 1. p. 79), the asking pardon for *λόγους πολὺ τῶν εἰθισμένων λέγεσθαι παρ' ὑμῶν ἐξηλλαγμένους* (as *Isocr.* xv. 179 expresses it), the plea of unfamiliarity with law-courts (*Isocr.* xv. 38. p. 318, *οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν*), the begging for an impartial hearing (*Lys.* xix. 2, 3. p. 152), the deprecation of *θόρυβος* (cf. e. g. *Æsch.* ii. 24. p. 31, *ἐπαυῶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅτι σιγῇ καὶ δικαίως ἡμῶν ἀκούετε*), the disclaiming a style unbecoming an old man (cf. *Isocr.* xii. 3. p. 233, *ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ οὐχ ἀρμόττειν*),—these topics, of which the exordium of the Apology is wholly made up, occur continually in the Orators.

Next, in meeting the judges' prejudices, advantage is taken of another common topic—allegation of the existence of *διαβολαί* (cf. *Lysias* xix. 5. p. 152). The way in which the charge of being a *σοφὸς* is dealt with has many parallels: cf. e. g. *Isocr.* xv. *passim*. No accusation was more indiscriminately launched than this, and the answers to it assumed consequently, in great measure, the character of commonplaces.

Socrates twits Meletus with having instituted the whole of the proceedings for his own amusement (24 C); so *Lysias* xxiv. 18. p. 170; and again with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court; cf. *Lys.* xxvi. 5. p. 175, *ταῦτα χρῆ ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ εὐήθεις αὐτῷ εἶναι δοκῆτε*.

Socrates alleges (32 A), though in a refined way, the meritorious acts of his past life;—a common *τόπος*. Cf. *Lys.* xvi. 13, xxi. 1. pp. 146, 161.

Compare again *ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πρόποτ' ἐγενόμην* (33 A) with *Isocr.* xv. 85, *ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδένα πρόποτε φανήσομαι παρακαλέσας ἐπ' ἑμαυτὸν τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὄλην πειρώμαι πείθειν τοιοῦτοις πράγμασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ τε εὐδαιμονήσουσι κ.τ.λ.*

The answer to the charge about perverting the young is

paralleled by Isocr. xv. 240, τοὺς πατέρας ἂν ἐωρᾶτε τῶν συνόντων ἡμῖν καὶ τοὺς οἰκέλους ἀγανακτοῦντας καὶ γραφομένους.

The particular form of challenge is paralleled by Andoc. i. 35. p. 5, τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ μὲν ἤκουσι καὶ εἰσὶν ἐνθαδε τῶν δὲ ἀποθανόντων εἰσὶ πολλοὶ προσήκουτες· ὧν ὅστις βούλεται ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ λόγῳ ἀναβάς με ἐλεγξάτω.

The argument (34 A) καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητων μάρτυρα is a stock argument against an adversary who does not produce witnesses. Cf. Arist. Rhet. I. xv. 17. The avowal of disdaining to solicit compassion is to be compared with Isocr. xv. 321. p. 345, and Lys. xviii. 24, xx. 35. pp. 151, 161.

The leaving the event to God (19 A), τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, and (35 D), ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνειν περὶ ἐμοῦ is not characteristic of Socrates, for it occurs in the typical oration of Antipho (i. 20. p. 113, ἡ δ' αἰτία..... ἔξει [τὰ ἐπίχειρα], ἐὰν ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ θέλωσιν, and *ibid.* 25, 31. p. 114), though indeed sparingly in the Orators generally. The Gods are invoked at the outset of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown (p. 225).

(ii.) "The old accusers."

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (III. xv. 1.) remarks, περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις ὑπόληψιν δυσχερῆ ἀπολύσαιο· οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἴτε εἰπόντος τινός, εἴτε μῆ.

An artifice in the Apology which demands separate notice is the way in which the prejudices of the judges are dealt with. The attack on them is so carefully masked that its point might be missed by a cursory reader. The strength of the prejudice which existed against Socrates demanded that a substantive and prominent portion of his defence should be directed specially against it. He could not hope to combat the charges of his prosecutors on their own merits in presence of a general aversion which was in harmony with these charges. Worst of all, this aversion was too well reflected by the Court itself. It was matter of exigency, therefore, to deal with it at once, and so we find it succeeding the exordium almost hurriedly. But to this was joined the necessity of avoiding both the direct imputation of it to the judges, which would have been to offend

them further, and the designation of it at once as a vox populi, which would have been to acknowledge its weight.

It is therefore introduced to the judges under a disguise. Their attention is drawn to it not as the attitude of their own minds, not as matter of common fame, but as emanating from certain individuals who with time and perseverance have done their work. The calumny, now so wide-spread and influential, is all traceable to them. It is not possible to single them out ("except perhaps a certain play-writer"); in default of which,—the only fair method,—they are individualised in imagination. They are marked off by a special designation,—“the original accusers,”—and their calumny is made more tangible by throwing it into the form of a technical indictment supposed to be preferred by them and read before the Court.

Οἱ πρῶτοι κατηγοροὶ are but a figure for ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή, and what makes the neutralising of this διαβολή at once so necessary and so delicate a matter is that it is that ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε. But these two identifications emerge in one or two places only. Twice only is the reference to the judges pointedly disclosed,—“I hope, if possible, to convert you from a prejudice which you” (the repeated pronoun is emphatic) “have so long harboured” (19 A, 24 A). Immediately, however, after these disclosures, the argument resumes its disguise. In like manner once only, considerably later (28 A), when he notices the inferior importance of the charges of Meletus, which he has just answered, to the older charges, he acknowledges these as vox populi—ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.

The seriousness of tone which marks the answer to “the old accusers,” the ἠθικὴ πίστις which is thrown into it, and the absence of irony, contrast sharply with the banter with which the charges of the real indictment are met immediately afterwards. This earnestness and almost anxiety of tone, the prominent position of this portion of the Apology, the irrelevance of its ostensible reference, the very technicality with which it is drawn up, forbid a more literal acceptance of its drift, and constrain us to find in it a signal exercise of rhetorical art.

(iii.) The Delphic response.

Again, as the objective prominence given to “the old

accusers" is a rhetorical cloak for an attack on the prejudices of the judges, so the prominence given to the Delphic response (20 E sqq.) is a device of a semi-rhetorical character under cover of which Socrates is enabled to avoid an avowal of the real purpose which had animated him in his tour of examination,—which was to effect an intellectual revolution by substituting a sounder knowledge for the prevalent pretensions to knowledge, of the hollowness of which he entertained the deepest conviction. Such an explanation would, to say the least, not have been appreciated. What is to be noticed is, that he does not plead the oracle, (the authenticity of which there is no ground for doubting), as an after excuse for his necessarily unpopular mission,—which would have been natural enough. But he goes beyond this, and represents the oracle as the cause of his engaging in that mission; whereas (as Zeller observes) he must have already been committed to this and already been a marked person, before any such question as that put to the Pythia by Chærephon could have had any point or elicited any such remarkable answer. The representation of the oracle as giving him the first suggestion of his crusade against fictitious knowledge, as having throughout been the lodestar to which he shaped his course, and as having sustained him in the thankless labour of years, is unhistorical; but Socrates employs it in the exposition of his antecedents in a semi-rhetorical spirit, to bring the audience a certain distance on their way without the offence which a direct avowal of his purpose would have aroused in their minds.

(iv.) The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.

Every care has been taken to marshal the topics of the defence to the best advantage. The answer to the indictment itself is placed in the middle of the speech, where least attention naturally falls upon it. The arrangement is the same as that of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown, but the reasons are different in the two cases. In both the technical argument is introduced, where it will least challenge attention; but there because it is the weak point of Demosthenes' case, here because, though easily established, it is comparatively immaterial to the issue. The real effort of the defence needed

to be exerted first in combating the general prejudices which affected Socrates as a reputed Philosopher and Sophist, and secondly in offering a somewhat more particular personal justification of Socrates. Accordingly the portions of the defence which are concerned with these two points, as they are the fullest and most earnest, are also the most conspicuous by position. The first confronts us at the outset, and the other engages us after Meletus has been dealt with.

(v.) Dramatic framework.

The customary procedure of an *ἀγὼν τριμητῶς* has prompted Plato to crown the Apology of Socrates with a further artistic completeness. The oration becomes a drama. An action in three stages passes before us; the tone changes with the action; there is even some change in the dramatis personæ. We take our stand among the listeners who crowd the court. The first Act comprises the defence, with the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus, the voting of the judges, and the declaration of their verdict. The second comprises the *τίμησις* of the prosecutor, Socrates' ironical *ἀντιτίμησις*, the intervention of Plato and other friends of Socrates, the first suspense, and then the final verdict. In the third Act the judges appear before us distinguished into two separate bodies, addressed separately by Socrates, the one his friends, his true judges, the other divested of the name and doomed to the consequences of their unrighteous deed. The tone of apologetic argument in the first Act is succeeded by dignified irony in the second, and this again in the third by a strain of lofty prophecy.

2. HOW FAR IS THE APOLOGY CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCRATES?

Zeller (II. 134. note) insists that there is an absence in the Apology of that free artistic handling which characterises the Dialogues, and claims this as an evidence that Plato has bound himself to follow the line actually taken by Socrates. But the strength of this position is diminished by several considerations. In the first place we have seen how great an amount of art has found its way into the structure of the Apology; we have seen too how that same art has not been

restricted to the arrangement and outward dress of the speech, but so penetrates its very substance, that even here it is impossible to ignore or definitively to limit the rhetorical element. It is only with this considerable abatement that Zeller's assertion of the absence of free artistic handling can be admitted. But, in the second place, so far as the fact remains,—and to a certain extent it does,—it is referable to more obvious causes than that of fidelity to the speech of Socrates. The conditions which Plato had to fulfil were those of a speech in a court of justice, pronounced on a definite historical occasion; he had to consult the exigencies of forensic verisimilitude, and to embody a reply to the definite charges of a well-known indictment. And although with him (as with Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*, though in a different manner,) the main object certainly was the ultimate one of presenting to the world a serious and adequate justification of his adored teacher, yet he was none the less under the necessity of adopting for his framework the circumstances of the actual trial. In the third place,—in presence of little or no independent testimony as to what Socrates actually said,—we have the fact before us that the Platonic Apology was not alone in the field as a professed record of the great teacher's defence. The Xenophontean Apology, devoid as it is of authority, being perhaps a compilation from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* I. i, ii, IV. viii (see Steinhart's *Anmerkungen* I. 2 in *Platon's Sämmtliche Werke* übersetzt von Hieronymus Müller, Leipzig 1851), is a case in point. Had the Platonic Apology been a record of confessed history, is it possible that the Xenophontean Apology should have been so framed as to differ from it not only as to what was said but as to what was done,—as for instance in the statement (22) that Socrates' friends spoke at the trial as *συνήγοροι*, and again (23) that Socrates refused *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι* altogether, both which statements conflict with the Platonic representation? But there were yet other Apologies extant besides these. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (II. xxiii. 13) quotes from a Socratic Apology of Theodectes, as containing the following passage, *εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκε; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν οὐδ' ἡ πόλις νομίζει*; and besides in the same chapter he quotes the following passages without mention of their authors but obviously from similar compositions; *μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ*

περὶ Σωκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν (18), and *τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον καίτοι ὅστις οἶεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἶεσθαι καὶ θεοῦ εἶναι* (8). Once more, it is probable enough, that the story⁹ of Lysias having offered Socrates for use on his trial a defence of his own composing grew out of his having written an elaborate posthumous Socratic Apology.

It is then too much of an assumption, though countenanced by Zeller and Mr. Grote as well as by many older writers on the subject, that we can rely on the Platonic Apology as a substantial reproduction of the speech of Socrates. Independently of Plato's representation we know not what Socrates said, or whether he said much or little, or how far he concerned himself with a direct reply to the charges laid against him; nor, when we have studied that representation, do we know these things any the better. Even if the studied speech of Plato embodied authentic reminiscences of the unpremeditated utterances of his master, to disengage the one from the other is more than we can assume to do.

Notwithstanding, we can seek in the Apology a portrait of Socrates before his judges and not be disappointed. Plato has not laid before us a literal narrative of the proceedings and bidden us thence form the conception for ourselves: rather he has intended us to form it through the medium of his art. The structure is his, the language is his, much of the substance may be his; notwithstanding, quite independently of the literal truth of the means, he guarantees to us a true conception of the scene and of the man. We see that "*liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam non a superbia*" (Cic. *Tusc.* I. 29), and feel that it must be true to Socrates, although with Cicero himself we have derived the conception from Plato's ideal and not from history. We hear Meletus subjected to a questioning which, though it may not have been the literal *ἑρώτησις* of the trial, exhibits to us the great questioner in his own element. We discover repeated instances of the irony, which, uniting self-appreciation with a true and unflattering estimate of others, declines to urge considerations

⁹ Diog. Laert. II. 40, Cic. de Orat. II, Valer. Max. VI. iv. 2, Stob. Flor. I. 54. Quintil. Inst. II. xv. 30, XI. i. VII. 56.

which lie beyond the intellectual or moral ken of the judges. Here we have that singularity of ways and thoughts which was half his offence obtruding itself to the very last in contempt of consequences. Here we have that characteristic assertion of private judgment against authority which declares itself in the words *ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν* (29 D). Here we have also his disapproval of the existing democracy of Athens which he rather parades than disguises. And lastly, the deep religiousness which overshadowed all his character breathes forth in the account he renders of his past life, in his anticipations of the future, and in his whole present demeanour.

Thus while the problem of the relation of the Apology to what Socrates actually said must remain unsolved, there is no doubt that it bodies forth a lifelike representation; a representation of Socrates as Plato wished us to conceive of him, yet at the same time as true to nature as the art of Plato could render it.

3. THE ADEQUACY OF THE APOLOGY AS A DEFENCE.

That the Apology aims at much more than a refutation of the indictment of Meletus is already sufficiently evident. We have seen that the avowed answer to Meletus is that part of the speech which by its position least challenges attention, and which is least characterised by an air of serious concern. The statement is besides repeatedly made, that the real strength of the prosecution lies outside of the indictment, and requires a commensurately wider effort to meet it.

The worth, then, of the Apology as a defence must be measured, in the first instance, if we will, by its sufficiency as an answer to Meletus, but chiefly and ultimately by its sufficiency as a justification of Socrates' whole manner of life.

It will not much affect our estimate, whether we regard the Apology as no more than a defence adapted to the historical occasion of the trial and to judicial ears, or as a posthumous justification of the great master in the eyes of the Hellenic world. Though the more comprehensive aim is doubtless the real one, yet public opinion had undergone¹⁰ so little change

¹⁰ As a matter of fact, the Athenians never repented of Socrates' death. The story of their passionate remorse being evoked by the repre-

in favour of Socrates since his death, that the justification which was most calculated to satisfy it was identically that which would have been most to the purpose at the trial.

First, then, what sort of an answer is offered to the indictment of Meletus?

That indictment divides itself into two allegations, under the heads respectively (as we should say) of religion and of morality. The mischief to morality is the perversion of the youth; the offence against religion is the setting forth of strange gods in the place of those of the state.

Now though these are put into the form of specific charges against Socrates, they are so (all but that of the *κατὰ δαιμόνια*) in appearance alone; they are really selected from the string of imputations currently brought against Philosophers and Sophists. The Philosophers, i. e. Physicists, were popularly associated with atheism, the Sophists with perversion of the youth. The allegations of "the old accusers," to which the Apology first addresses itself, are drawn from the same repertory, and arraign Socrates in like manner under the two heads of religion and morality as Philosopher and Sophist. It is true that the particular complaints there expressed are not the same; but it is not that the charges put forward here are less general than those. They are only omitted there because they were to come under consideration here. In the *Clouds* both these and those are put forward against Socrates, one after the other. And in the Apology itself (23 C—D) "the old accusers" are represented as eventually appending both "perversion of the youth" and "atheism" to their other charges.

The indictment therefore of Meletus contained no charge, save that of *δαιμόνια κατὰ*, which would not be met (so far as might be) by the explanation Socrates had rendered of the deeper and wider and older prejudices, personified in "the old accusers," or by the justification he might be able to offer of the general method of his life.

sentation of Euripides' Palamedes (41 B. n.) is fabulous. Euripides predeceased Socrates by 7 years. Xenophon and Plato would have made the most of any such change of feeling:

whereas we find Xenophon, five years after Socrates' death, dealing with the allegations against Socrates as if still in full possession of the popular mind. See Zeller, II. p. 138. note.

Here therefore Socrates contents himself with a dialectical victory over Meletus; instead of entering into the merits of the question with him, he disposes of him summarily by adding him to the list of pretenders. If the charge of *δαιμόνια καυὰ* is subjected to the same treatment,—a treatment characterised by Döllinger as little better than sophistical,—it is because that charge is itself a sophistical one. It wrests τὸ δαιμόνιον into *δαιμόνια*, the divine agency of which Socrates consistently spoke into divine beings. Socrates therefore is only returning Meletus' sophism upon himself, when he treats the *δαιμόνια* of the indictment as if it had been *δαιμόνια πράγματα*. His whole dealing with the question of heterodoxy has an observable air of carelessness. Though he explicitly disavows atheism, and calls the sun and moon gods, yet he nowhere commits himself to a distinct recognition of the state gods, any more than he repudiates belief in any others. But it must be remembered that in those days few could have cast a stone at Socrates for such reticence: and that if a man's practice was religious, there was little enquiry into his opinions; and that Socrates' character as a religious man, his strictness and frequency in religious observances, was beyond doubt and made proof superfluous,—though the Xenophontean Apology enters into it at length. From the personal imputation of irreligion, in short, Socrates had little to fear, and he could afford to deal with it lightly; whereas to that of perverting the youth he addresses himself twice elsewhere, in addition to the dialectical refutation of it here.

Thus what was really formidable in the indictment of Meletus resolved itself into the more general imputations which connected Socrates with those two suspected classes of men, the Philosophers and the Sophists; and, keeping in view the fact that the Apology addresses itself elsewhere in full to those imputations, any fuller treatment of them under the head of the indictment can be spared.

The remainder of the defence is taken up with two lines of argument: the first, at the outset of the speech, deals with the general prejudices, which existed against Socrates as Philosopher (Physicist) and Sophist; the other, which follows the special reply to the indictment, offers a particular justification for Socrates' manner of life as a citizen.

In the earlier portion Socrates does what he can, first to separate himself from those two suspected classes, and then to explain how the prejudice arose in the public mind, and how it became strengthened by personal animosity.

It is hardly necessary to show that the imputations of "the old accusers" contain nothing of an individual character, but are (as Socrates alleges) mistakenly transferred from the popular notion of the Philosophers and the Sophists. The title *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ*, which Socrates takes such pains to disclaim, is the appellation originally bestowed on the Ionic philosophers, as men whose speculations had fathomed the universe, and from this association was matured that distinction between it and *φρόνιμος* which we find in Aristotle (*Ethic. Nic. VI. vii. 5, Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὐ φασι εἶναι*). It was in connecting Socrates with a supposed class of speculative men that the force and odiousness of the designation *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ* consisted. The imputation contained in the words τὰ μετέωρα φροντίζων or ζητῶν, i. e. τὰ οὐράνια, is equally general. The Scholiast on Aristoph. *Nub. 96* says, *κοινὸν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀπάντων ἔγκλημα*. In 431 B. C. Dioreithes, a fanatical Rhetor, carried the law *εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεία μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας* (*Plutarch. Vit. Pericl. 169 D, Aristoph. Vesp. 380*). Eupolis (*Fragm. Com. ed. Meineke, II. p. 490*) says of Protagoras, *ἀλαζονεύεται μὲν, ἀλιτήριος, περὶ τῶν μετεώρων*. Once more, the reference in τὸν ἤττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων is palpably general. The earlier Sophists, as teachers of pleading, first incurred and perhaps courted the imputation of τὸν ἤττω κ.τ.λ., and from them the imputation was derived to others. Isocrates (xv. 15. p. 313) speaks of the charge being made against himself, *ὡς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἤττους λόγους κρείττους δύναμαι ποιεῖν*, and again (30. p. 316), *ὡς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν*. Odium also attached to the profession¹¹ of an instructor in speaking. Hence Æschines' designation (i. 94. p. 13) of Demosthenes as *λογογράφος*, and (117. p. 16) *ὁ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγελλόμενος τοὺς νέους διδάσκειν*, crowned by the

¹¹ *Λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν* (*Xen. Mem. I. ii. 31*) was a law of the Thirty Tyrants against liberty and freedom of speech. How came the suspicion of *λόγων τέχνη* to survive the Tyranny?

designation σοφιστής (125. p. 17): cf. ii. 165, iii. 173. pp. 50, 78. Hence, weightier for its dispassionateness, a remark of Thucydides (VIII. 68) about Antiphon *ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ πλείστα εἰς ἀνὴρ, ὅσοις ξυμβουλεύσασαί τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν*. This odium, in which the profession was held, was akin to fear; Isocrates (xv. 230) explains it thus, *ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινότης ποιεῖ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἐπιβουλεύειν*.

Thus the charges recited present us with nothing individually characteristic of Socrates, but only (as he himself calls them 23 D) *τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα*. These were the materials for the popular representation of Socrates, which accordingly (like the caricature in the Clouds) is a compound of the conventional lineaments of the Philosopher (Physicist), and of the Sophist. The *μετέωρα φρονιζῶν* is due to the Philosopher, and the *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κ.τ.λ.* to the Sophist, while the title *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ* stands¹² alike for the one and the other.

To relieve himself from the yoke of these imputations Socrates fairly draws attention to the want of connection between himself and these two suspected classes. Of those speculative studies he¹³ denies any knowledge, and as to his having ever discoursed on them to others he courts further the testimony of his judges, of whom many had frequented his society.

The line of argument which he takes in distinguishing himself from the Sophists seems less cogent than it might have

¹² Plat. Apol. 20 A, Evenus is *ἀνὴρ Πάριος σοφός*, Xen. Mem. II. i. 21, *Πρόδικος δὲ σοφός* is mentioned; as on the other hand *σοφιστής* is borrowed to express Philosopher.

¹³ There is no want of harmony between Socrates' disclaimer here and what he tells us in the Phædo of his having taken up physical speculation in early life. He had given it up forthwith, on finding no satisfaction in it; and he could truly say (Apol. 19 C), *ἐμοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν μέτεστι*. Nor again is his disclaimer at variance

with the fact, that he used to call attention to the evidence of design in nature as a help to piety (Xen. Mem. VI. iii. 3 sqq.), that he is in fact (as Zeller remarks, II. p. 117) the parent of the teleological idea which has given unity and ideality to the study of nature ever since his days. This half-religious view of his had nothing in common with those indemonstrable hypotheses, which the Physical Philosophers tried in turn to fit to the universe.

been. He dwells on the most external difference alone. He points to the Sophists giving courses of lectures on various subjects, professing to turn out finished politicians, pleaders, debaters, and the like, pursuing this as a regular trade, and flourishing by it; he flatly disclaims any such characteristics (for even these, it seems, had been attributed to him, *εἴ τινας ἀκηκόατε κ.τ.λ.* 19 D), and so passes on. Here certainly was a sufficiently palpable dissimilitude, demanding no acuteness to appreciate it; but why was it not worth while to clench the argument by going more thoroughly into the contrast? We miss the manifold and deep divergence which might have been traced between a system which relied on the attainment of objective certainty, and one which, while it questioned received opinions, had no interest in either substantiating these, or establishing truer ones in their place; between a system which opened out a method of truth-seeking investigation, and one which, had it prevailed, would have made philosophy thenceforth an impossibility (Zeller, II. p. 130); between a system which proposed to place all human action on an intelligible principle, and one which professed to furnish the intellect alike for any use, regardless of principles. All this and more could have been pleaded in evidence of the wide gulf which separated Socrates from the Sophists; we can only suppose that the Court, or the people of Athens (to which ever we suppose for the moment the justification to be directed), were incapable of appreciating the fundamental unlikeness, and that the dropping of the subject here is at once true to the Socratic irony, and at the same time suggests that the real position of Socrates was never understood by the mass of his countrymen or by their compendious representative the Heliastic Court.

The sequel of this disclaimer of the popular identification is a setting forth of the facts which were the occasion of it. A man who himself exercised no practical profession, was ever showing himself dissatisfied with received empirical rules and maxims, and ever requiring from others a reason forteneets which they had never questioned, while in doing this he evinced matchless dialectical powers and forced a confession of ignorance from men known to be perfectly self-satisfied,—such a man answered sufficiently well the description of Philosopher

and Sophist when once Aristophanes¹⁴ had given the hint. This was the naked explanation of the popular identification, and this it is in fact which lies couched under Socrates' parables of the wisdom which consisted in knowing his own ignorance, the Delphic Response, and the tour of questioning (Apol. 20 D—E, 23 A—B). And this account, which has all the appearance of truth, must stand good, in our estimate of the defence, as a plea which ought to have commanded attention. The speaker himself indeed despairs of its obtaining entrance into minds preoccupied; it was likely, he says (20 D), to sound to them like a jest. But the cause for despair lay not in the insufficiency of the plea, but in the invincibility of the prejudice to be combated. Nor has the whole strength of that prejudice yet been indicated. Had Socrates been really a Philosopher or a Sophist, there would have been nothing to be added; the supposed mischiefs of his teaching would have been alone in the scale. But so far as popularity was concerned, the difference between Socrates and Philosophers or Sophists told against him and not in his favour. The moral suspicion harboured against what he was supposed to be was aggravated by personal animosity against what he was. The ever busy talker, the merciless questioner, who avowed the exposure of self-deceived pretenders to be the mission of his life, and pursued this mission uncompromisingly for a quarter of a century and more in such a narrow society as was comprised within a Hellenic state, without ever even stirring from the midst of them, encountered enmities which never lighted on the head of Philosopher or Sophist; a specimen of which is the individual grudge which Anytus is said to have borne Socrates.

It is then a mistaken moral prejudice, intensified and quickened by the actual smart of personal affronts,—the former refuted to no purpose, the latter absolutely intractable,—which here threatens to overbear the defence. It is this aggravated prejudice, the working of which is foreshadowed in those discerning words (28 A), *καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ*

¹⁴ Zeller remarks that the fact of the Aristophanic caricature having stuck to Socrates to the end of his life shows that Aristophanes hit the

popular conception. May we not rather suppose that he led it, and regard the Apology here as elsewhere as true to facts?

αἰρήῃ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.

On Socratic principles, a defence had discharged its office when it had set before the Court not grounds of feeling but rational grounds for its acceptance. Socrates has hitherto disproved (as fully as the range of the popular mind admitted) the mistaken¹⁵ identification of him with Philosophers and Sophists. He has given the explanation of the mistake, and he has pointed out how that very explanation accounts for the confirming of the mistake irrationally through personal animosity. He has exhausted his armoury; against this animosity itself he has no weapons; if his judges or the public will allow it to affect their verdict, it cannot be helped—*ταῦτ' ἔστω ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τἄληθῆ, καὶ τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς ἀντοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι* (24 A).

Beyond the reply to Meletus' indictment we find a fresh branch of the defence before us. Socrates is no longer overtly answering charges, old or recent, but rather directly justifying the usefulness of his life. He takes a view of himself, as it were from further off, and reviews his whole attitude as a citizen.

The question arises, how this part of the speech serves any direct purpose of the defence.

Of the strong points on the side of the prosecution, one has remained hitherto almost untouched: it is not one which appears in the indictment proper, or in that of "the old accusers;" nor again has it that stamp of inveteracy which would have marked it had it been part of the Aristophanic caricature. But it was the moving cause of the present indictment being preferred at all.

¹⁵ The mob who in 1791 sacked Dr. Priestley's house at Birmingham in consequence of his espousal of the principles of the French Revolution, of which the news had just reached England, proceeded to threaten all with whom Priestley had been associated not in politics or religion but merely by a common devotion to chemistry and invention. "A common cry among the mob was, 'No

"Philosophers!" 'Church and King for ever!' And some persons, to escape their fury, even painted 'No Philosophers' on the walls of their houses! . . . Boulton and Watt were not without apprehensions that an attack would be made on them, as the head and front of the 'Philosophers' of Birmingham."—Smiles *Life of Boulton*, ch. 20.

It is tolerably clear from the accounts of the speeches for the prosecution that political charges entered freely into them. See Xen. Mem. I. ii. 9, 12, &c. To Socrates was there ascribed the evil done to their country by Critias the oligarch and Alcibiades the demagogue; the strange doctrine that the poorer private citizens were a fair mark for ill usage; the unfriendly criticism on election to offices by lot,—which was probably made use of as a special ground in support of the accusation of perverting the youth, since the ventilation of such doctrines tended to make them disloyal or insubordinate. A line of Hesiod was alleged to have been wrested by him to a like purpose, as countenancing rapacity.

There were indeed independent and domestic proofs alleged for perversion of the youth, but those which have been noticed were political. All these topics had been employed by the prosecution, and it is scarcely likely that in addition to them Socrates' abstinence from public affairs, his relations to Charmides, another of the Thirty, and to Xenophon, the friend of Sparta, and under sentence of banishment at the time, and perhaps his depreciating mention of the tradesmen in the Ecclesia (Xen. Mem. III. vii. 6), were not also brought up against him. Such charges and insinuations as these were indeed foreign to the indictment, but they were calculated to have considerable weight with the Court.

For one characteristic of the moment was the keen feeling with which since the restoration of the democracy the Athenians cherished their particular conception of political loyalty. That conception was somewhat narrow and exacting. The primary requisite was not only 'assent and consent,' but enthusiasm towards the letter of the constitution; and second only to this, as the natural reaction from the depression which the usurpation had caused, was a devotion to the material interests of the state, and the display of energy in amassing wealth.

The prosecutors, or at least the leading spirit among them, were no doubt actuated in their institution of the proceedings by the same political sensitiveness which they sought to inspire in the judges and betrayed in their speeches. Anytus was a man of strong political convictions; he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom. And if he

was partly animated by a personal grudge against Socrates, he was none the less the person to take up a political grievance against him.

There must have come to the surface some fresh element for the old prejudice so to pronounce itself. As Sophist or Philosopher, Socrates' cup had long been full; nor was there any reason in that point of view for its overflowing now if it had not before. Aristophanes¹⁶ had ceased to attack him. As a mark for personal enmity¹⁷ he had been more prominent and defenceless either in connection with the Hermæ trials or after the battle of Arginusæ. It would be a difficult problem, why the extreme step was taken now and not till now, did we not take into account the¹⁸ political sensitiveness which, as the offspring of the restored democracy, formed a new element in public opinion as it affected Socrates.

We shall not be unprepared, then, to find that the remaining part of the defence is in some sense political,—as much so, as that of a non-political man could be. It is the defence of a reformer, though not of a political reformer. To ignore the political charge altogether in the defence would have been either a confession of weakness or a dangerous oversight, however fully the indictment might have been disposed of. But, moreover, political insinuations had been pressed into the service of the indictment itself in connection with the charge of perverting the youth.

It is obvious, that Socrates was precluded from meeting these charges in the way which would best have pleased his judges. He could have said that he had never transgressed the laws; he could say (as in fact he does say) that he loved his countrymen intensely; but for the existing constitution he could profess no enthusiasm. Yet here we must observe, that his coldness did not arise from frank political dislike of democracy, nor is his dissatisfaction to be measured by the one or two well-known criticisms which he passed upon it. He cared

¹⁶ [So Stallb. Prolegg. ad Plat. Sympos. p. 28. Zeller (II. p. 150) asserts the contrary and appeals to Aristoph. Ran. 1491 sqq.]

¹⁷ Cf. Zeller, II. p. 142.

¹⁸ Cf. Zeller, II. p. 152. The usur-

pation of the Thirty lasted from June 404 B. C. to February 403. The Archonship of Euclides began in 403 and ended in 402. In April 399 Anytus brought Socrates to trial.

for politics only as involving the interests of the individual (Xen. Mem. III. iv. 12), and it is to his view of individual well-being that we must look, if we would understand the degree or the significance of his reserved attitude towards the constitution. Its faults connected themselves in his mind with other faults at once further from the surface and far graver. To him the alarming symptoms were such as these,—that this system extolled as so perfect could coexist with an utter abeyance of principles; could be carried on by men, who, in knowledge of it, were mere empirical adventurers; that it neither undertook nor directed education; that much might be going wrong within it, without its giving any check or warning; that morality might share the general wreck and not be missed;—and that, all this while, the Athenian mind should throw itself without misgiving into such a system, and find all its wants satisfied, and its self-complacency encouraged; that, while intolerance was stimulated, the belief in any unwritten law of right beyond and above the positive enactments of the state had all but died out, and a belief in divine sanctions was scarcely felt (Apol. 35 D).

It was for these deeper reasons that Socrates was totally out of harmony with the political optimism of his countrymen. Here was the cause of the gravest manifestation of his irony. The discord was the more complete, because it turned upon considerations of the well-being of individuals rather than upon political predilections and fancies. And out of those considerations there rose up before his mind a clear vision of a great need, and of the remedy which would remove it, and of an obligation upon himself to be the applier of that remedy.

The discord had jarred upon the sensitive ear of restored democracy, and filled it with a feeling of offence which presently found interpreters in Anytus and others. The whole deep disharmony did not strike them; but, conscious of its presence, they detected and treasured up superficial results of it, such as the detached adverse criticisms upon the government, and perhaps followed with a like jealousy the abstinence from public life; and they added to these other irrational aggravations, such as the connection with Critias and Alcibiades, and the well-known cry of perversion of the youth. It was the

same offended sense which prompted the decisive step and brought Socrates to trial; and which, while the charges brought were the old and staple cries against the Philosophers and Sophists, aggravated these with a new political stigma.

But it is time to return to Socrates, and to the part of the Apology which still remains to be considered. We are now in a position to judge of it as a political defence, if such it shall turn out to be.

Of the particular political charges we find Socrates here only touching upon one, and that allusively,—the charge of being answerable for the misconduct of Critias and Alcibiades and perhaps others (33 B). The line he mainly follows is general.

We have analysed the attitude of Socrates towards the state of which he was a citizen into the following parts;—first, dissatisfaction, chiefly on moral grounds, with the prevalent state-theory; secondly, conception of the remedy to be applied to it; and, thirdly, conviction that the application devolved upon himself. And in a full general justification of himself in a political point of view, he would have had to expound all these points seriatim. We find him however reticent as to the first point: at most he only hints at it in the simile (30 E) of the high-bred horse, whose greatness of frame makes him somewhat sluggish, and who needs some gadfly to stir his spirit, and in the remark (31 A) that it is an extreme boon to be so roused. He interweaves the second point with the third, yet sparingly, and only in the way of explanation. It can hardly be said that the conception of the remedial plan is completely unfolded; though we find notices of it in the doctrine (29 D sqq.) that the care and improvement of the soul, and the pursuit of wisdom, truth, and virtue, are to be ranked infinitely above the pursuit of riches; the doctrine (36 C) of the need of consciously-possessed principles of individual and political action, tested (29 E, also 38 A) by self-examination; and the doctrine (33 A) of the imperative duty of adhering to what is just, alike in public and in private life. It is the third point, the assumption by himself of this mission, into which the speaker throws his strength: with this he starts, and to this he limits his justification. His first and paramount plea in this justification is that (28 B sqq. and 33 C) the work was under-

taken in obedience to the above-mentioned divine call, i. e. was an indefeasible duty, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences, or counter-inducements, or human inhibition (29 D),—the proof of the divine call, i. e. of the reality of the obligation, being that nothing else would have sustained him in such a course of self-sacrifice (31 B). His other plea is that his assumption of this work was an incalculable benefit to his countrymen. In what remains he sets forth, in answer to supposed objections, first, that to have entered public life in preference to dealing with individuals would have been neither a practicable nor an effective method of pursuing this mission (31 C sqq.); and, secondly, the innocent tendency of his work (inculcating righteousness, not training for professions or imparting knowledge, 33 A), excluding the suspicion of perverting the youth,—a suspicion which is also refuted independently (33 C).

To have enlarged upon the first point would obviously have stood Socrates in little stead. He could not have done so without appearing to admit the political allegations of his accusers in their entire force; and thus the vindication of himself as a reformer lacks the support which it would have gained from a premised statement of the need of reform. But, to pass on from this first drawback to its effectiveness, the actual vindication offered must in itself have seemed to the majority of the Athenians partly paradoxical and partly visionary. In representing himself as having done good service by urging on them the care of their souls, by unswervingly insisting on righteousness in them and in himself, Socrates was traversing ground where they could not follow him. These things had for them no meaning. They required devotion to the letter of their constitution, they were on the verge of a panic at the appearance of disaffection; and this was their righteousness. With this they were content, when the substance of the old religion and the old morality were really departed from them. They were necessarily far from believing that it could be any man's duty or mission to set himself up among them as a preacher of righteousness,—as he himself says expressly in the *ἀντιτίμησις* (37 E—38 A). To us there may seem to be nothing so far out of the common in the moral work of which Socrates claims to be the sole promoter, as to

elevate him to a position of singularity. But it was a novel work enough to his contemporaries. It is a difficulty throughout in the way of appreciating Socrates, that positions, which ever since his time have been household words, not in moral philosophy merely but in common life, were in his mouth, to the men of his generation, original and novel; and that the simple principles he lays down here, so far from being commonplace to his audience, must have rather transcended their moral apprehension.

Nor must it be forgotten that their old distrust of the Sophist came in to the aid of their distaste for the reformer. So far from believing in his principles of moral reformation, they were confusedly identifying these with the old sophistical teaching. Hence it is that the disclaimer *ἐγὼ διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς κ. τ. λ.* finds place here.

There were ample reasons, then, why this part of the defence should fail. Socrates stood before his countrymen a confessed reformer, and they were strangers to the idea of reformation except in a political sense,—a sense in which the Athens of the day had no room for reformers.

But the failure of the defence here urged by Socrates upon his countrymen is to be laid not to his charge but to theirs. The point upon which our whole judgment must turn is this. Was the need of a reformation so urgent as Socrates supposed it to be? If so, then Socrates was no less in the right, no less a benefactor, because they failed to feel the need, and they in crushing¹⁹ him were no less guilty of a national hypocrisy.

There is no need to sum up at any length the results of our

¹⁹ It is a poor sophism to urge that the stages of an *ἀγὼν τιμητός*, or the venality of Athenian jailors, made Socrates' death his own act,—an eventuality which his accusers themselves never contemplated. This last assumption (which Köchly espouses) is directly at variance with the Apology, which (29 C) makes Anytus responsible for the argument that it were better Socrates should never have been tried, than that he should escape with his life. To excuse the judges as having been after the first

step unwilling instruments of a legally unavoidable catastrophe, is a plea which we never think of allowing to the eastern despot, who after betraying his righteous minister "laboured till the going down of the sun to deliver him." The justice or injustice of the catastrophe is involved in that of the first step. The whole responsibility fell upon the judges from the moment when, in affirming the accusation *Σωκράτης ἄδικεῖ κ. τ. λ.*, they gave their voice against the truth.

inquiry into the worth of the Apology as a defence. Its art is consummate; its statements are (as the exordium promised) unalloyed truth; its reticences are condescensions to the audience with whom it deals. It is exhaustive; it lays open by turns²⁰ all the motives and influences which were at work against Socrates; and the more pains we are at to represent these to ourselves by means of an independent investigation, the more reason we shall find to acknowledge that the true clue lay all the while close to our hand in the Apology.

²⁰ That the Sophists had no hand in bringing about the condemnation of Socrates is clear. Anytus was the enemy of Sophists. The Sophists had no political influence, and were them-

selves too much under the same suspicion with Socrates to have dared to inflame that suspicion. Cf. Zeller, II, p. 139.

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.

- V = Vulgar text, settled originally by Stephanus.
 B = Bekker.
 S = Stallbaum.
 Z = Zurich editors.
 H = Hermann.
 Oxon. = the Bodleian MS. known as 'Codex Clarkianus.'

[Dr. Gaisford first published the readings of this MS. in 1820. Mr. Riddell collated the Apology anew for this edition, and also the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium.]

T. I.
 ed. Steph.
 p. 17.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

Ι. Ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόν-
 θατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν
 καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν· οὕτω
 πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καί τοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν,⁵
 οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν
 πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν
 ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δει-
 νου ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα
 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθησονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὴν μηδ' ὅπως-¹⁰
 τιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν
 αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν κα-
 λούσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τού-
 τους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω,¹⁵

A. The
 Defence.
 Exordium.

5. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν] This quali-
 fies the οὐδὲν following, making
 it equivalent to ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν
 below.

8. μὴ — ἐξαπατηθῆτε] This
 sentence is not affected by the
 tense of the main construction,
 because the contingency it ex-
 presses remains still future at
 the moment of its being al-

luded to by the speaker. Digest
 of Idioms, § 90.

14. οὐ κατὰ] A thorough
 litotes: 'far above these.' 'a
 far greater orator than they.'
 Cf. Hdt. i. 121, πατέρα καὶ μη-
 τέρα εὐρήσεις, οὐ κατὰ Μιτραδά-
 την τε τὸν βουκόλου καὶ τὴν γυ-
 ναῖκα αὐτοῦ.

ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκού- p. 17.
σεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ὃ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ
οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμη- c

1. ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν] This form of expression we have from Homer, Od. iv. 80, Ἀνδρῶν δ' ἢ κέν τις μοι ἐρίσσειται, ἢ καὶ οὐκί. So Hdt. iii. 140, ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεῖς. And Eurip. Dan. Fr. vi. Κρεῖσσων γὰρ οὕτως χρημάτων πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ, Πλὴν εἰ τις' ὅστις δ' οὐτός ἐστιν οὐχ ὀρώ.

2. οὐ μέντοι] Opposed to ἀκούσεσθε π. τ. ἀλ.—You shall have the truth entire, *but* not drest up. This contrast is only carried as far as ὀνόμασι after which the idea of the contrast between truth and falsehood is resumed (that is, πιστεύω γὰρ κ.τ.λ. gives the rationale of ὑμεῖς δ'—ἀλήθειαν) and continues to εἰσέναι,—since πλάττοντι λόγους refers not to artificial language but to falsification; a μειράκιον, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric.

3. ὥσπερ οἱ] The nom. is the regular construction, where the noun brought into comparison can be made the subject of the clause introduced by ὥσπερ. The attracted construction, exemplified by ὥσπερ μειράκιον below, is less common. Dig. 176.

4. ῥήμασι . . . ὀνόμασι] What do these two terms mean here? For in Sophist. 262 a, b, they distinctly mean 'verb' and 'noun,' in Cratyl. 399 b, c, as distinctly 'expression' and 'word' (Δὺ φίλος is the ῥήμα,

Δίφίλος the ὄνομα). Now the conjoint phrase seems to have had a familiar rhetorical signification; cf. Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων; 199 b, ὀνόμασι καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων, 221 e, τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα whence we may conclude that the association here is similar. And if we compare passages of rhetorical criticism in the Orators, where these words occur, we shall find the meaning approaches to that in Cratyl. rather than that in Sophist.: cf. Æschin. iii. 72, p. 64, οὐ γὰρ ἔφη δεῖν (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥήμα μέμνημαι ὡς εἶπε, διὰ τὴν ἀηδίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος) ἀπορρηξάει τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν—where the ῥήμα is the whole expression, the ὄνομα is ἀπορρηξάει. Further, as Socrates could not speak without 'expressions' and 'words,' it is the artistic use of them he here disclaims; which, in the case of ὀνόματα, would consist in what Æschines—ii. 153, p. 48—calls ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσις, and also in tropes and other figures of speech, and choice of unusual words, cf. Isocr. ix. 9, p. 190, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξειοῖς τὰ δὲ καινοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς while ῥήματα would extend to whole expressions, cf. Æschines' caricature, iii. 166, p. 77, τὰ μαρὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπίθανα ῥήματα.

p. 17. μένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυ-
χοῦσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω,
καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν
δήπου πρέποι, ὃ ἄνδρες, τῆδε τῆ ἡλικία ὥσπερ μει-
ρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσέναι. καὶ μέν- 5
τοι καὶ πάνυ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι
καὶ παρίεμαι· ἔαν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ
μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὧν περ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν
ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπέζων, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι,
d καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἰο
ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικα-
στηρίον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγυῶς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα.

12. πλείω] Hermann's note may satisfy us here: "Πλείω vel contra Oxon. cum VBS retinere quam cum Turicensibus omittere

4. ὥσπερ—εἰσέναι] Three peculiarities; 1. μειράκιον is attracted into the case of πλάττοντι, cf. Dig. 176; 2. πλάττοντι is attracted into the case of ἡλικία; and 3. the gender of πλάττοντι notwithstanding follows the thought, cf. Dig. 184.
5. καὶ μέντοι] A stronger form of καὶ—δέ. Dig. 145.

7. τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] This has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἔαν ἐν τῷ εἰωθῆτι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. But, as something like this was recognised in ordinary pleadings under the name of ἐρώτησις (see Introd. p. x.), the reference here probably extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 23 c), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled

with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, c).

9. ἀγορᾷ κ.τ.λ.] The passage of Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 10) is well known;—εἰκέινός γε αἰεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερώ. πρῶτ' τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦει, καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν αἰεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι. For τράπεζαι as places of resort cf. Lysias ix. 5, p. 114, κάμοι μὲν τὰ προειρημένα διελεκτο ἐπὶ τῇ Φιλίου τραπέζῃ and shops generally, cf. Lys. xxiv. 20, p. 170.

ὑμῶν πολλοὶ] ὑμῶν is emphatic. As Stallb. remarks, the frequenters of the τράπεζαι would be of the richer class.

10. θορυβεῖν] See Introd. p. xvii. note 8.

11. ἐπὶ δικαστήριον] The prep. has the notion of 'presenting oneself to' the court. Cf. Isæus, Fr. vii. 1. l. 15, λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου. The ἀναβέβηκα refers to the βήμα, cf. Introd. p. xv.

ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ p. 17.
οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὦν, ξυνεγιγνώ-
σκετε δῆπου ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ p. 18.
τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ ἔτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν
5 τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν
τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔᾶν· ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως
δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ
τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ
μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετὴ, ρήτορος δὲ τάληθῆ λέγειν.

First part
of Defence;
—Justifi-
cation of
himself
against the
prejudices
of the
court, and
his coun-
trymen ge-
nerally.

10 II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι,
ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατη-
γορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγορούς, ἔπειτα δὲ
πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ b
κατηγοροὶ γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάσαι πολλὰ ἤδη
15 ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον
φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ

malui, quia doctius additamentum est quam quod ad interpolato-
rem referamus. Immo facile ejici poterat propter Criton. 52 e,
videturque jam Apollodoro ignotum fuisse, qui apud Diog. La. II.
§ 44. ipso septuagesimo ante mortem anno natum statuit; at
duos ut minimum annos adjiciendos esse seite Boecklihus Corp.
Inscr. II. p. 341 probavit, nosque mox comparato Synes. Calv.
Encom. c. 17 confirmavimus; cf. de theor. Deliac. p. 7." Zeller
agrees, but makes 72 years the extreme limit.

5. δίκαιον] 'I request this
of you as a piece of justice.'
Cf. 41 d, χρῆ . . . τοῦτο δια-
νοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, Legg. 795 c,
ταῦτ' ὃν τούτ' . . . ἐν τοῖς ἄλ-
λοις πᾶσι χρῆ προσδοκᾶν ὀρθόν
'as the right thing.'

6. ἴσως μὲν γὰρ] The reason
urged is a general one. The
consideration of style, if al-
lowed at all, will be operative
just in those cases where it
is better or worse than the
case deserves,—just where it

will interfere with true judg-
ment.

9. αὕτη] This represents
the preceding clause αὐτὸ—ἢ
μή· being in fact τοῦτο, at-
tracted into the gender of
ἀρετῆ. Dig. 201.

14. καὶ πάσαι] This καὶ only
emphasises πάσαι. Dig. 133.
And in καὶ οὐδὲν—λέγοντες we
have the common καὶ after πολ-
λοὶ.—It was 24 years since
the Clouds were represented:
Forster.

p. 18. τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὧ ἄνδρες, οἱ
ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες
ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές,
ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τά τε μετέωρα
φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκῶς καὶ 5
ε τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες
'Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκευάσαντες, οἱ
δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται
τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζουσιν. ἔπειτά
εἰσω οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον 10
ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ
λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε,
παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς
ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ

3. μᾶλλον] BS omit: Z retain, and rightly; for the rhythm
would be intolerable without it, or without (which Hermann
would prefer) the three words μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές.

2. τοὺς πολλοὺς] Closely
with ἐκ παίδων. They ἔπειθον
all, but only most, not all, as
children. Cf. below c, παῖδες ὄ-
ντες, ἔνιοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.

3. μᾶλλον] With ἔπειθον and
κατηγοροῦν just in the same
way as πολὺ μᾶλλον [κατηγ.] be-
low, e. Here it is intended to
balance the comparative δεινό-
τεροι—'were more busy in ac-
cusating me and trying to per-
suade you.'

4. σοφός—ποιῶν] This "ac-
cusation," both as given here,
and as repeated with mock
formality 19 b, is nothing more
than a vivid way of represent-
ing, for a rhetorical purpose,
the popular prejudice, in which
the court shared. See Introd.
p. xxiii. The charges it contains

are two-edged, being borrowed
partly from the vulgar repre-
sentation of the Philosopher,
partly from that of the Sophist:
the μετέωρα φροντ. points to
the Philosopher, the τὸν—ποιῶν
to the Sophist. The title σοφός
ἀνὴρ would at once be under-
stood as a class-appellation,—
cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the mean-
ing and associations of Philo-
sopher are uppermost, yet not
so as distinctly to exclude those
of Sophist. See Introd. p. xxxii.
n. 12.

13. παῖδες . . . μειράκια] We
should have reversed the order,
and said, 'when you were all
of you young, and most of you
mere children.'

14. ὁ δὲ—ἔτι] This is not a
changed but an abbreviated

a. Exist-
ence of
such pre-
judices,
and their
nature, viz.
that So-
crates was,
as a Phys-
icist and
a Sophist,
a subverter
severally
of religion
and of mo-
rality.

πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἶόν τε p. 18.
 αὐτῶν εἶδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδιοποιὸς δ
 τυγχάνει ὦν· ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι
 ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους
 5 πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ'
 ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκια-
 μαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδεὸς ἀπο-
 κρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ
 10 λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς κατηγοροὺς γεγονέναι, ἐτέ-
 ρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς
 πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους
 πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων
 πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον

2. κωμωδιοποιὸς] VH; κωμωδοποιὸς BSZ with 2 MSS. B quotes Fischer mistakenly asserting that at Phædo 70 c all the MSS. have κωμωδοπ.; but this is untrue for Oxon. and 6 others. Moeris' assertion that κωμωδοποιὸς is the Attic and the other the common form does not bind us.

construction. In full it would be ὁ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι. Dig. 247.

2. εἴ τις] Aristophanes is named below, 19 c, and is doubtless chiefly meant, but not exclusively. Eupolis had said (Meineke ii. p. 553), Μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην, τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην, ὅς τᾶλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν, ὁπόθεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἔχοι τοῦτου κατημέληκεν. And a play of Ameipsias, represented with Aristophanes' Clouds, was called the Connos, and the Chorus was of Phrontistæ (Athen. v. p. 218). It is likely enough (Zeller, ii. p. 41. note 3), that Ameipsias introduced the same fact, or the same fiction, as

Plato (Menex. 235 e, Euthyd. 272 c), and made the music-master Connus Socrates' instructor.

3. ὅσοι δὲ includes all but the εἴ τις that is, ὅσοι stands for ὅσοι ἄλλοι. Cf. Theæt. 159 b, where πάντα ἄ is equivalent to πάντα τᾶλλα ἄ. This ὅσοι [ἄλλοι] is then subdivided into [οἱ μὲν] φθόνῳ χρώμενοι and οἱ δὲ—πείθοντες. The οἱ μὲν is supplied from οἱ δὲ by anastrophe; Dig. 241. The ἄλλους πείθοντες is put in to make the sense clear, but virtually repeats the idea of ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον it does not affect the regularity of the construction.

p. 18. ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον. εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὦ ἄν-
 p. 19. δρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν
 διαβολὴν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην
 ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο
 οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ 5
 πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ
 χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λαυθάνει οἶόν ἐστιν.
 ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ
 πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἢ κατηγο- 10
 ρία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἢ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ
 b πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.
 εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες;
 ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀνωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνώ-

3. ἔσχετε] BZH; ἔχετε V. The preposition ἐν would be strange with ἔσχετε if the meaning were 'have entertained *during* so long a time.' ἐν means rather 'within the limits of;' and so, with respect to the further limit, 'at the distance of.' Thus ἔσχετε exactly falls into its place; 'ye first came to have so long ago.'

4. ἐν οὕτως] Though this collocation is rarer than οὕτως ἐν ἄλλ., yet it occurs; e.g. below 24 a (where this passage is alluded to); Isæus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, Lysias, xix. 8. p. 152, ἐν οὕτω δεινῷ καθέστηκεν. The rhythm probably determines the order. There is no need for the οὕτως of V.

2. τὴν διαβολὴν] Not the name of σοφός (cf. 20 d, τό τε ἔννομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν, and again 23 a); nor 'calumny' simply (cf. below, ἡ κατηγορία . . . ἐξ ἧς ἢ ἐμὴ διαβολή). but *calumny believed*, i. e. 'prejudice.'

7. οὐ πάνυ here as elsewhere retains its meaning of 'hardly,' 'scarcely;' but this is to be interpreted as a litotes:—'I can hardly say I do not know.' Dig. 139.

11. ἢ δὴ] The antecedent of ἢ is διαβολή. Cf. 28 a, καὶ τοῦτ'

ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, . . . οὐ Μέλητος, . . . ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή.

13. διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες] This fulness of expression is common in Plato, and gives the air of deliberateness. Dig. 262.

14. ὥσπερ qualifies not only κατηγορῶν but also ἀνωμοσίαν and ἀναγνώναι. They are *quasi-prosecutors*; it is a *quasi-indictment*; and Socrates *makes believe* to read it.

ἀνωμοσίαν] So 24 b. This

ναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζῆ- p. 19.
 τῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια, καὶ τὸν ἦττω λόγον
 κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων. e
 τοιαύτη τίς ἐστὶ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν
 5 τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περι-
 φερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολ-
 λὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαρῶντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα
 οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω
 τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 10 σοφός ἐστι· μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τσαύτας

b. Refu-
 tation of
 them.

2. καὶ οὐράνια] So Z; VBSH καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια. 8. μικρὸν]
 According to Mœris, *σικκρός* is Attic. Yet in Æschin. and Isocr.
μικρός occurs uniformly. Below, d, all the MSS. have *σικκρὸν*.
 But to press uniformity would be arbitrary. See Lobeck, Pa-
 thol. Pars II. De Orthogr. Gr. inconst. § 1, who instances pas-
 sages in which both forms occur in close neighbourhood or even
 in the same sentence; Dem. Ol. B. 14. p. 22, Arist. Hist. An. II.
 xv. pp. 506, 507. He quotes from Apollonius (Pron. 63) the
 general principle οὐκ ἐξωμάλιται τὰ τῶν διαλέκτων καὶ μάλιστα τὰ
 τῶν Ἀττικῶν. Cf. Phædo, 90 a. Rhythm must be in some degree
 a guide.

term, like ἀντιγραφὴ 27 a, is
 used to designate the ἐγκλη-
 μα. Both ἀνωμοσία and ἀντι-
 γραφή were properly said of
 the defendant's plea, presented
 in writing and sworn to, in
 the ἀνάκρισις, or preliminary
 proceeding before the Archon
 Basileus. But as the ἐγκλημα
 was likewise then presented in
 writing and sworn to, the same
 words came to be applied to it
 also. See Introd. p. ix.

7. ὧν ἐγὼ] The antecedent
 of ὧν must be the matters in
 the ἀνωμοσία, not the imme-
 diately preceding words.

οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα] Accus. cog-
 nate, not accus. of the object;
 Dig. 6. Ἐπαίω is intransitive.

8. καὶ οὐχ ὡς—ἐστὶ] This is
 well-marked irony. Socrates
 declines here to pronounce,
 before an audience who would
 have welcomed it, a condem-
 nation of studies against which
 at other times he had freely
 declared himself, on the double
 ground (1) that *human* nature
 ought to be studied first, Xen.
 Mem. I. i. 12, and (2) that the
 Physicists got involved in ques-
 tions which were really beyond
 the powers of the human mind,
 ib. 11, and arrived moreover
 at impotent conclusions, ib. IV.
 vii. 6, 7.

10. τσαύτας] 'Upon so grave
 a charge' as that of pronounc-
 ing upon things of which he

p. 19. δίκας φύγοιμι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὧ ἄνδρες
 d Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν
 τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους
 διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πρόποτε ἀκη-
 κόατε διαλεγόμενον· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι· 5
 φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πρόποτε ἢ σικκρὸν ἢ μέγα
 ἦκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγόμε-
 νου· καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ
 τᾶλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὐδέ γ' 10
 εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώ-
 e πους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές.
 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἴός
 τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὡσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ

3. τοὺς] H. brackets. But if we read αὐτοὺς just before, follow-
 ing the weight of MSS., τοὺς is required by the Greek.

was ignorant,—the fault he
 himself so strongly reprobated
 in others.

1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] 'But the truth
 is.' Dig. 147.

3. τοὺς πολλοὺς] A modest
 way of saying 'all of you.' Cf.
 Isocr. xvii. 23. p. 363, τί ἂν ὑμῖν
 τὰ πολλὰ λέγοιμι; and Rep.
 556 a, τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐκουσίων
 συμβολαίων.

ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φρά-
 ζειν] This is a hysteron pro-
 teron: Dig. 308. With φρά-
 ζειν is to be supplied of course
 ἀλλήλους, dropped by an idiom
 of abbreviation: Dig. 233.

14. ὡσπερ Γοργίας] Gorgias
 is spoken of by Isocrates as
 having made greater profits by
 teaching than any other man
 of his profession. Yet the sum
 was but small: ὁ δὲ πλείστα
 κτησάμενος ὧν ἡμεῖς μνημονεύομεν,

Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίως, though a
 single man and unburdened by
 Liturgies, χιλίους μόνους στατήρας
 κατέλιπε. Isocr. xv. 155. p. 83.
 The ὑποκριταί, he says, ib. 157,
 made much greater fortunes.
 Nor indeed is Socrates saying
 that the profits made by the
 Sophists were great. The sum
 which Socrates mentions below,
 20 b, as Evenus' price, 5 minæ
 (500 francs), seems to have
 been above the average: Iso-
 crates, xiii. 3. p. 291, speaks of
 3 or 4 minæ (3-400 fr.) as a
 common price. Isocrates has
 been said, it is true, to have
 taken as much as 10 minæ for
 his rhetorical course; Gorgias
 and Prodicus even 100. But
 what made the frequenting of
 Sophists' courses expensive was
 that people never thought they
 had had enough of them.

Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. p. 19.
 τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὧ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν
 εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν
 ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται,
 5 τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας p. 20.
 σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσει-
 δέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε
 σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ
 προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς
 10 πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου
 τούτου οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε—ὧ
 Καλλία, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰ μὲν σου τὸ υἱέε πῶλῳ ἢ
 μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λα-
 βεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε καὶ
 15 ἀγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἦν δ' ἂν b
 οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ'
 ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐπι-
 στάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρω-
 πίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γὰρ

14. καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ] So Oxon. It seems unnecessary to introduce a synalæpha.

5. τούτους πείθουσι] The construction is changed from the infin. to a finite verb. Dig. 277. The change of construction is not gratuitous, but expresses (ironical) admiration. The passage in Theages, 128 a, is a reminiscence of this passage, including the change of construction.

6. προσειδέναι] The πρὸς stands compounded in its adverbial and not in its prepositional sense. Dig. 129.

7. ἐπεὶ καὶ] The connecting thought is—'and at Athens

there is quite as good a field for professed teachers as elsewhere.'

8. ὃν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην] Socrates implies that he speaks from hearsay when he states ἐστὶν ἐνθάδε.

10. Καλλία] Cf. Cratyl. 391 b, οἱ σοφισταί, οἷσπερ καὶ ὁ ἀδελφός σου Καλλίας πολλὰ τελέσας χρήματα σοφὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι. "Cal-lias fuit omnium Atheniensium suæ ætatis non modo facile dit-tissimus, ita ut simpliciter ὁ πλούσιος diceretur, sed etiam nequissimus suique peculii maxime prodigus."—Fischer.

p. 20. σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτήσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὐνήνος, ἔφην, ὧ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μῶν· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐνήνον c ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ 5 οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυ- νόμην τε καὶ ἠβρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ἀλλ' ὧ Σώ- κrates, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί 10 σοι αὐται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν εἰ μὴ τι ἔπρα- τες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί· λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστίν, d ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. ταυτί μοι 15 δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξει, τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποιήκε τό τε

6. ἐγὼ οὖν] So Oxon. and 2 other MSS. ἔγωγε is not wanted here.

9. Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν] Here Socrates, though still ostensibly occupied with 'the old accusers,' passes from the denial of the imputations current against him as a reputed σοφός to an account of the personal dislike which had befallen him individually. See Introd. p. xxxiv.

10. πρᾶγμα] In the sense of pursuit, or plan of life or study or the like. Cf. Crito 53 d, τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα, Euthyd. 304 a, τοῦτο τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν, ε, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμα ἐστὶν ἡ φιλοσοφία.

The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to

σόν· 'What is it, then, that you (since we are not to identify you with the σοφοί) have been about?'

13. εἰ μὴ—πολλοί] This clause is the double of σοῦ γε—πραγματευομένου an instance of the widely extended idiom which I have ventured to call Binary Structure: Dig. 207. Very parallel is Thuc. V. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἂν παράσχοιτε . . ., εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε,—where εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε repeats διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι. Cf. also Hom. Od. ii. 246, Ἐπερ γάρ κ' Ὀδυσσεὺς κ.λ., ἀλλὰ κεν αὐτοῦ ἀεκέα πότμον ἐπίσποι, Εἰ πλεόνεσσι μάχοιτο.

c. Exposition of the veritable peculiarities in himself, which had been mistaken for those of Physicist and Sophist,—viz. his conviction of the hollowness of the prevalent pretensions to knowledge,

ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν p. 20.
 δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εἶ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ· ἐγὼ γάρ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι'
 οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα.
 5 ποίαν δὲ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρω-
 πίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι
 σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὐς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τιὰ ε
 ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί
 λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις
 10 φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί
 μοι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' εἰ
 δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν

1. ὄνομα] Of σοφός. See note on σοφός, 18 b.

5. ἥπερ κ.τ.λ.] 'My wisdom is precisely (περ) that only wisdom, as I believe (ἴσως), which is possible to man:' namely (21 d, 23 b), knowledge of his own ignorance. Socrates speaks of this as *knowledge* because it implies two things;—(1) the possession of a standard or ideal of knowledge, with the conception of a method for attaining it; and (2) self-knowledge, such as would result from the Socratic system of self-examination (cf. 53 a, note), revealing the amount of actual short-coming. This is knowledge until the positive knowledge is attained, and if that never can be, then this is the only knowledge. Socrates' faith, however, in the partial attainableness of positive knowledge never wavered, and his misgiving here must be restricted to the possibility of complete attainment.

8. ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω] 'Or some wisdom that—I know not how to characterise it.' It is some predicate, alternative with μείζω ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον, which Socrates affects to be at a loss for. The idiom is an expedient for abbreviation; the sentence is hurried to its conclusion *after its point has been expressed*, by a clause superseding the enumeration of further particulars: cf. Dig. 257, where the present passage is especially compared with Gorg. 494 d, (A) Φημί τὸν κνώμενον ἠδέως ἂν βιῶναι. (B) Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κησιῶ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ;

12. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν] Cf. Symp. 177 a, ἡ μὲν μοι ἄρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλὰ Φαίδρου τοῦδε. Cf. also Alc. I. 113 e. The verse in the Melanippe was Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα. So Eur. Hel. 513, Λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐμὸς, σοφῶν δ' ἔπος.

p. 20. λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν
 λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστι σοφία
 καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν
 p. 21. Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμὸς τε
 5 ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε 5
 καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κα-
 τήλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς
 ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμήσειε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς
 ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καί, ὅπερ
 λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὡς ἄνδρες· ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις 10
 ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα

(attested by the enigmatical response from Delphi),

3. μάρτυρα—Δελφοῖς] "There is no need (says Zeller, Phil. der Griechen II. p. 45. note 2), to deny the authenticity of the oracle, but we cannot regard it as having given the primary impulse to Socrates' tour of enquiry. Socrates must have been already a known personage for Chærephon to have put his question to the Pythia, or for her to have taken it up." It is therefore semi-rhetorically that the oracle is here represented as the cause of Socrates' eccentric and unpopular proceeding. The Iambic form,—σοφός Σοφοκλῆς &c.—in which the response appears in Diog. II. 37, and Suid. σοφός, is a later invention—an expansion of the Pythia's simple negative recited here.

6. καὶ ὑμῶν—κατήλθε] This allusion to Chærephon's antecedents is added not without purpose,—to dispose the court to hear more indulgently the story which is to follow.

In detail:—The full point of the phrase πλήθει ἐταῖρος is

to be found in the contrast of the adherents of the Thirty; more especially the ἐταῖροι of the oligarchical clubs, and the body of 3000 hoplites organised by the Thirty from their partisans. φυγὴν refers to the subsequent expulsion of all not included in the 3000 from Athens, and their withdrawal presently after (when they found no safety in Attica) to Thebes, Megara, Oropus, Chalcis, Argos, &c. This flight, as an event still vividly remembered, is called ταύτην, 'the recent.' So Isocr. matches it with the old troubles under the Pisistratidæ;—τὴν δημοκρατίαν. . . δις ἥδη καταλυθείσαν, καὶ τὰς φυγὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα γενομένας, viii. 123. p. 184. With κατήλθε cf. Lysias, x. 4. p. 116, ἐξ ὅτου ἡμεῖς κατεληλύθατε: it is the recognised description of the restoration of democracy and end of the eight months' reign of the Thirty, signalled by the solemn return of Thrasylbulus and the exiles from Piræus to Athens.

σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων περὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν p. 21. αὐτοῦ οὕτως μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω b
5 γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξαι, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτως· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν· τί οὖν
10 ποτὲ λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴπου ψεύδεται γὰρ οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ· καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει, ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τιὰ ἐτραπόμην.
ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς c
15 ἐνταῦθα, εἰ πέρ ποτε, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὕτως ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τούτων—ὄνοματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος
20 ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς

1. ἀδελφός] Chærecrates: Xen. Mem. II. iii. 1.

2. μαρτυρήσει] The μαρτυρία is to be supposed to follow at once. Introd. p. xviii.

10. οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ] Cf. Pind. Pyth. ix. 42, τὸν οὐ θεμὸν ψεύδει θιγείν.

17. τῶν πολιτικῶν] In itself this word means no more than 'statesman,' in the sense in which it might have been applied to Pericles, and is applied, Legg. 693 a, to the old lawgivers and settlers of Hellas. But an Athenian of Plato's time speaking of Athens would

mean by πολιτικοὶ that class of men who made public business a profession,—τοὺς πολιτικούς λεγομένους (Politic. 303 c). As distinguished from the ῥήτορες, they were men who sought appointments to public offices, while the ῥήτορες were professional speakers in the Ecclesia. Cf. 23 c, and see Introd. p. x. note 1.

19. διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι] This inversion of government is of common occurrence among the forms of changed construction: Dig. 271. ἔδοξε is 'I came to think,' as 32 b.

p. 21. ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ· κᾄπειτα
d ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύουσι, ὅτι οἶοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἶη δ' οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπίων ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώ- 5
τερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ
τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι 10
εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δο-
e κούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμε- 15
νος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθάνομην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιείσθαι· ἰτέον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκούντας εἰδέναι.
p. 22. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς 20
ὑμᾶς τάληθῆ λέγειν· ἦ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκίμουσιντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκούντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῶν τὴν 25
ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινας ποιοῦν-

20. νῆ τὸν κύνα] What was meant by this oath is clear from Gorg. 482 b, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίον θεόν,—that is, the jackal-headed Anubis. In Plato this oath is only found in the

mouth of Socrates. In Aristoph. Vesp. 83, a slave, Sosias, uses the same oath.

23. τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς] Cf. Euthyd. 292 c, τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῶν ἐνδεί ἢ ἔτι πλείονος.

τος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ p. 22.
 γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε
 τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς b
 ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος
 5 ἔμαντὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων
 οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πε-
 πραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέ-
 γοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύ-
 νομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες, τάληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ
 10 ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες
 οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποι-
 ήκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ

I. καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος] H's conjecture *κἂν ἐλεγκτός* (1) is mere con-
 jecture; (2) would not give the sense he wishes, since *ἐλεγκτός*
 is not 'contradicted' but 'admitting contradiction;' and (3) if it
 did, would spoil the general meaning, since Socrates' leading
 principle throughout is that the oracle must be *true*, and that
 the proof of this would come out simultaneously with the true
 sense. 12. ἐν ὀλίγῳ] H's conjecture *ἐνὶ λόγῳ* is needless. For
ἐν ὀλίγῳ means the same, viz. 'in short,' not 'in a short time;'
 just like *ἐν βραχεί*, Symp. 217 a, *ἐν ελαχίστῳ*, Isocr. i. 40. p. 11.
 Of course *ἐνὶ λόγῳ* occurs also, e. g. Lysias, xiii. 38. p. 133; and
 H might have argued something from the variation of reading
 between *κατ' ὀλίγον* and *κατὰ λόγον*, Thuc. vi. 34. med.

I. ἵνα μοι — γένοιτο] 'With the object of finding positively
 unimpeachable proof of the divine declaration.' A double
 meaning is wrapped up in *μοι*, —it is both 'by my agency'
 and 'for my satisfaction.' *καὶ* signifies the superaddition of
 demonstration, which all the world must accept, to the cer-
 tainty which had been in Socrates an exercise of faith.
μαντεία signifies (1) the process by which oracles are obtained,
 or (2), as here, and 29 a, the fact oracularly communicated.
 This signification still remains

distinct from that of *μαντεῖον*, which was the *form of words*
 in which the oracle was given; *μαντεία* is the *meaning* of the
μαντεῖον — a distinction to feel which we have only to remem-
 ber that to get at the meaning from the words was in the
 case of oracles a process involving exactly that degree of
 difficulty which suited the god or his prophet.

11. οἱ παρόντες] With Stallb. and against Wolf, we must
 take this to mean 'those present at each several time,' and
 not 'the present audience.'

p. 22. τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἂ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει
 στυγὴ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ
 χρησμοφδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ
 καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι
 ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἅμα 5
 ἠσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα
 σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν
 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι, ὥπερ
 καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνους ἦα 10
 ἐμαντῷ γὰρ ξυνηδὲιν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος
 εἰπεῖν, τούτους δὲ γ' ἦδειν ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ
 καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην,
 ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη
 σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταυτόν 15
 μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ
 οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξερ-
 γάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σο-
 φώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἢ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην
 εἰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν ὥστ' ἐμὲ ἔμαντὸν ἀνερῶ- 20

20. ἀποκρύπτειν] This is the reading of one MS. Φ. The
 dominant reading of the MSS. (including Oxon.) is *ἀποκρίπτει*.
 The editors have espoused *ἀπέκρυπτεν* but such a text would
 not account for such a variant as *ἀποκρίπτει* in the best MSS.
 'Αποκρίπτει itself is scarcely possible (on the principle of *πεπραγ-*

The usage of the orators
 proves this; cf. Antipho ii. A.
 a. 9. p. 116, and (esp.) γ. 5.
 p. 118, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅστις τῶν παρ-
 ὄντων οὐκ ἂν ὀκνηρότερος . . . ἦν.
 Lysias uses in the same mean-
 ing, but without the same pos-
 sibility of question, οἱ παραγε-
 νόμενοι. The expressions used,
 whether for the audience or
 for the court, are different;

e. g. Antipho vi. 14. p. 143,
 πολλοὶ τῶν περισσώτων τούτων
 ταῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστανται,
 Andoc. i. 139. p. 18, οὐδ' ὑμῶν τῶν
 καθημένων οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπιτρέψειε.

16. ἔδοξαν] The nom. is καὶ
 οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί. The force
 of the aor. is, as in 21 c, ἔδοξε,
 'I came to see.'

18. τὰ μέγιστα] Politics are
 especially meant.

τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως p. 22.
ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων
σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ἀ
ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ
5 τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὧ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγόνασιν καὶ p. 23.
οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύνταται, ὥστε πολλὰς δια-
βολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι,
10 σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γὰρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες
ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ
δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι,
καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρω-
πίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ
15 φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεκρησθαι
δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ b
ἂν εἰ εἴποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὧ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός
ἐστίν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς
ἀξίός ἐστι τῆ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ

μάτευμαι, ἀπείρηκα, Phædo 99 d, ὄρω ib. 98 b); but points to ἀπο-
κρίπτειν, which is to be governed by ἐδοξε understood from ἐδοξαν,
which gives also the best sense.

6. ταυτησὶ] The -i is not always strictly δεικτικόν. Lob. Path.
Pars II. p. 230, "Sæpe Oratores, etiamsi de absentibus loquuntur,
quos modo designarunt et auditoribus quasi spectandos propo-
nunt, iota demonstrativo utuntur, et sæpius etiam negligunt, si
de presentibus." Cf. τοῦτι, 37 e. ἐξετάσεως] We cannot fol-
low Oxon. and 3 other MSS. in reading ἐξεως, which is the result
of an old contraction misread. 15. τοῦτ' οὐ] This conjecture
of F. A. Wolf we must needs adopt for τοῦτον of the MSS.

9. ὄνομα δὲ—εἶναι] Lit. 'and
I am called by this name, that
I am wise.' The subject of λέ-
γεσθαι is [ἐμέ], not ὄνομα. And
σοφὸς εἶναι is by attraction for
[τὸ] εἶναι με σοφόν.

11. τὸ δὲ] Accus. of pronoun
neuter, standing for the whole
sentence immediately follow-
ing: Dig. 19.

14. καὶ οὐδενός· 'or nothing':
the καὶ is disjunctive.

p. 23. μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν
θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἂν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν
εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῆ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐν-
δείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς
ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολῆς
γέγονεν ἀξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οικείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενιᾷ
μυρία εἰμι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

c X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες,
οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων,
αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζόμενων τῶν 10
ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται· εἴτ'
ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κάπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐ-
ρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἶδέναι τι
ἀνθρώπων, εἰδόντων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν
οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ 15
αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώ-
d τatos καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδάν τις

1. μὲν ἔτι] Oxon. gives μὲν ἔχω ἔτι, but in the hand of a re-
storer, and not on the traces of the old letters. (Gaisf. wrongly
represents ἔχων as the reading. ἔχων would be redundant, like
ἔχων φλυαρεῖς, &c.) 2. καὶ ξένων] So Oxon. and 3 other MSS.
Edd. καὶ τῶν ξένων. But the variation is in the spirit of Plato:
cf. Dig. 237, and add Phædo 85 a, αὐτῆ ἢ τε ἀηδῶν καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ
ὁ ἔποψ. 11. μιμοῦνται] So Oxon. &c. μιμοίμενοι is a con-
jecture of Hermann.

4. ὑπὸ ταύτης] Later, 31 c,
he gives a second reason for
abstaining from public life.

6. ἐν πενιᾷ μυρία] Cf. Legg.
677 c, the beautiful expression
μυρίαν τινα φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν, Rep.
520 c, μυρία βελτίων.

For the fact, with respect
to Socrates, cf. with Stallbaum
Xen. Econ. ii. 3.

11. καὶ αὐτοὶ—ἐξετάζειν] For-

ster compares Rep. 539 b, οἱ
μερακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων
γεύονται, ὡς παιδιὰ αὐτοῖς κατα-
χρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώ-
μενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέ-
γχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι
. . . . καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε
καὶ τὸ ἅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς
τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληται.

ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται] By practising
upon each other.

and
moreover
gave a pre-
text for
fastening
on Socrates
individu-
ally the
imputation
(previously
only a
class-impu-
tation) of
perverting
the youth;

αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι p. 23.
 μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν
 ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρό-
 χειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ
 5 γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἦττω λόγον
 κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέ-
 λοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται προσποιού-
 μενοι μὲν εἰδέναί, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν, οἶμαι,
 φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντε-
 10 ταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλή- e
 κασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὄτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς δια-
 βάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ

and lastly,
 in com-
 bination

9. ξυντεταγμένως] So BSZ. H with two MSS. ξυντεταγμένως.
 But ξυντεταγμ. means 'in set array:' cf. Æschin. ii. 74. p. 37,
 οἱ ξυντεταγμένοι ῥήτορες.

4. ταῦτα] Latin ista; idio-
 matically expressive of con-
 tempt, Dig. 318.

ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα] Understand
 ζητῶ or the like, by com-
 parison of 19 b.

12. ἐκ τούτων] 'It is upon
 this footing'—namely that of
 an old general prejudice, ag-
 gravated by supervening per-
 sonal animosity,—'that I am
 now attacked by' &c. The
 meaning 'in consequence of'
 would be too strong, both for
 the sense here, and for the
 idiomatic use of the phrase;
 cf. Dig. 116: the meaning
 'upon the strength of' would
 also exceed the warrant of the
 Greek, though not of the sense,
 cf. 19 a, ἢ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέ-
 λητος κ.τ.λ.

καὶ Μέλητος—ῥητόρων] For
 an account of Socrates' three
 accusers and their motives,

and of the classes of per-
 sons called here πολιτικοὶ and
 ῥήτορες, see Introd. p. x.
 note 1.

The δημιουργοὶ are here joined
 with the πολιτικοί, because Any-
 tus represented a trade himself,
 and herein was but one of many
 instances of the same conjunc-
 tion of pursuits in those times
 at Athens. Socrates was wont
 to speak slightly of mechan-
 ical arts (Xen. Œcon. iv. 3),
 —a view which would seem to
 connect itself with his praise
 of σχολή (Diog. ii. 31, Æl. Var.
 x. 14): and a conversation, in
 which he pressed an uncom-
 mercial view of education upon
 Anytus himself with reference
 to his son, seems to have been
 among the causes of Anytus'
 personal hatred of Socrates.
 (See again Introd. p. xii.)

p. 23. Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν
 ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ
 p. 24. τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων. ὥστε,
 ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζομι' ἂν εἰ οἶός τ'
 εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν 5
 οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγонуῖαν. ταῦτ'
 ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς
 οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω
 οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καί τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς 10
 αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὁ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω 10
 b καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἷτια
 ταῦτά ἐστι. καὶ εἴαν τε νῦν εἴαν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε
 ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

with the
 old general
 prejudice,
 had in-
 spired the
 present
 prosecu-
 tion.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι
 κατηγόρου αὕτη ἔστω ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· 15
 πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολι, ὧς
 φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι
 ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων
 ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμο-
 σίαν. ἔχει δὲ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς 20
 τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει
 c οὐ νομίζοντα, ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ
 ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος

Second
 part of
 Defence;—
 Justifica-
 tion of him-
 self as
 against the
 counts of
 the indict-
 ment, sepa-
 rately;—

1. ὑπὲρ] We are to under-
 stand, not that the accusers
 were acting on behalf of their
 respective classes, but merely
 that they were to be regarded
 as representatives of the feel-
 ings of those bodies.

charges.

9. τοῖς αὐτοῖς] Lit. 'through
 the same things:' that is, in
 stating the facts I am virtually
 reiterating and attesting the

11. ἡ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμὴ] Empha-
 sis is of course on διαβολή.
 'This is,'—i. e. 'in this con-
 sists—the prejudice against
 me.'

16. ἀγαθόν] 'Public bene-
 factor.'

20. ἔχει δὲ πως ὧδε] See In-
 trod. p. xiv.

a. Perversion of the youth.

ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους P. 24.
ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται,
ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγ-
5 μάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὧν
οὐδὲν τούτῳ πρόποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως
ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

Two answers (both dialectical); i. the hypocrisy of the charge;

XII. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἶπέ' ἄλλο τι
ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι d
10 ἔσονται; Ἐγώ γε. Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπέ τούτοις, τίς αὐ-
τοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ
σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῆς,
ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελ-
τίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπέ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστίν.
15 ὄρῳς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγῶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καὶ
τοὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον
οὐδ' ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ,
ὦ γαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἄλλ' e
οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἀνθρώπος,
20 ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.
Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ

3. σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται] Oxy-moron: 'is playing off a jest under solemn forms.' The machinery of the law, with all its solemnity of circumstance and all its serious consequences, is set in motion by him for his mere amusement. Cf. χαριεντιζόμενος in the same sense 27 a, where it is explained by παίζοντος.

8. Καὶ μοι κ.τ.λ.] The examination of Meletus by Socrates, which now follows,

though it naturally affords scope for exhibiting Socrates' characteristic talent, is legally speaking the customary ἐρώτησις, to which either party was bound to submit at the requisition of the other. Introd. p. xviii.

18. ἀμείνους] 'Better citizens,—better toward others: whereas βελτίους above means, strictly speaking, better in themselves.

p. 24. Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τε εἰσι καὶ
βελτίους ποιούσι; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ
οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; Ἄπαντες. Εὖ γε νῆ τῆν
Ἦραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελού-
p. 25. των. τί δὲ δῆ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιούσιν, 5
ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βου-
λευταί. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ,
οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ
κάκεῖνοι βελτίους ποιούσιν ἅπαντες; Κάκεῖνοι. Πάν-
τες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κάγαθους ποιούσι 10
πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις;
Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατ-
έγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναί ἢ καὶ περὶ
b ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν· οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποι-
οῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρώποι εἶναι, εἰς δέ τις ὁ 15
διαφθείρων; ἢ ναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ
βελτίους οἷός τ' ὧν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί·
οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρώνται ἵπποις, δια-
φθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ
ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων; πάντως δῆ- 20
που, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε
πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ
εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφε-
c λούσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι
ὅτι οὐδέπποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς 25
ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαντοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέ-
ληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

24. ἀλλὰ γάρ] 'But the truth is;' as above 19 c, &c. Dig. 147.

26. ἀποφαίνεις—ἀμέλειαν] Be- tween ἀμέλειαν and Μέλητε a

play upon words is doubtless intended; see several instances in Plato collected Dig. 324. In this case the probability is strengthened by the constant

2. the
stupidity
of it.

XIII. Ἐπι δὲ ἡμῖν εἶπέ ᾧ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, p. 25.
 πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ
 πονηροῖς; ᾧ τᾶν ἀποκρίναι οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν
 ἐρ τῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς
 5 αἰεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι;
 Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυ-
 νόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελείσθαι; ἀποκρι- d
 ναι, ᾧ ἡγαθέ. καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
 ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε
 10 δῆ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντά τοὺς
 νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;
 Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ᾧ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ
 ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὦν,
 ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργά- e
 15 ζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγα-
 θοὶ ἀγαθόν. ἐγὼ δὲ δῆ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκω,
 ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω
 τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐ-
 τοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς
 20 φῆς σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ᾧ Μέλητε,
 οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ p. 26.
 διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σὺ γε κατ'
 ἀμφοτέρα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιού-
 των καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσά-
 25 γειν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν.

recurrence of the juxtaposition; see 24 c above, and 26 b below.

1. εἶπέ—Μέλητε] The address ᾧ Μέλητε has suffered tmesis by the interlacing of εἶπέ πρὸς Διὸς with it: Dig. 288. See also Rep. 332 c. τί

οἶε, ᾧ πρὸς Διός, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, and 26 e below.

8. ὁ νόμος] See note, 24 c.
 13. τηλικόσδε] Meletus was a very young man: cf. Euthyph. 2 b, c, and below 26 c extr.—Stallb.

p. 26. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ.
 σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ
 οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἔστιν εἰσά-
 γειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν 5
 b δῆλον ἤδη ἔστιν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτω τούτων
 οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πρόποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ
 δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ᾧ Μέλητε,
 τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν,
 ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐδ' ἡ πόλις 10
 νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι
 διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα
 λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ᾧ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν
 θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἔστιν, εἶπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ
 c ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι 15
 μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι
 τινὰ θεοῦς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοῦς, καὶ
 οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτη ἀδικῶ, οὐ
 μέντοι οὐσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ'
 ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους· ἢ παντάπασί με 20
 φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα
 διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις

b. Dis-
belief of
established
gods, and
setting
forth of
strange
spiritual
agencies—
answered
by reduc-
ing Mele-
tus to a
contra-
diction.

2. ἔφυγες] 'Didst decline.'
 Cf. Ar. Ach. 717, Κάξελαύνει
 χρῆ τὸ λουπόν, κἂν φύγη τις ζη-
 μοῦν. With Plato, however,
 this meaning of the word is
 more common in the com-
 pound διαφεύγειν. Cf. Symp.
 174 a. ἔφυγες and οὐκ ἦθ.
 form a hysteron proteron,
 though not a strongly marked
 one.

7. οὔτε—σμικρὸν] Accus.
 cognate after ἐμέλησεν, not

nom. to ἐμέλησεν. Dig. 6.

14. ὧν νῦν] 'Whom the ar-
 gument at present concerns:'
 equivalent to οὓς λέγομεν as
 distinguished from περὶ ὧν λέ-
 γομεν.—Stallb., rightly. Cf.
 Soph. 263 a, σὸν ἔργον δὴ φρά-
 ζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἔστι καὶ ὅτου
 [ὁ λόγος], Legg. 678 a, πόλεως
 καὶ πολιτείας περὶ καὶ νομοθεσίας,
 ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρῆσθηκεν,
 . . . μνήμην εἶναι.

θεούς. Ὡ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; p. 26.
οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεούς εἶναι, ὥσ-^d
περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί,
ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην
5 γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἶε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε,
καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶε αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους
γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξα-
γόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν
λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθηά-
10 νουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίστε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς e

3. Μὰ Δί'] Understand οὐ νομίζει.

5. Ἀναξαγόρου] Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 7, makes Socrates refute the alleged opinion of Anaxagoras, τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι. Anaxagoras' formula was μύδρον διάπυρον, which others took to mean a mass of iron. Of the moon he asserted that it had οἰκήσεις, λόφους, φάραγγας, whence that he believed it to be γῆ was an inference.

8. βιβλία] "Is secundum I.aert. II. iii. 8, et Clem. Alex. ibi ab interpp. laudatum, philosophorum primus βιβλίον ἐξέδωκε συγγραφῆς, librum a se scriptum edidit. Hoc tamen de Anaximandro alii, alii de Pherecyde Syro dicunt."—Forst.

9. καὶ δὴ καί] Ironical: 'and so then.'

10. ἃ—πριαμένους] The doctrines, not the books. ἐνίστε that is, if they should happen to see a play in which these doctrines are promulgated, as in Eurip. Orest. 982, μῦθοιμι τὰν οὐρανοῦ μέσον χθονός τε τετα-

μέναν αἰωρήμασι πέτραν ἀλύσει χρυσέαισι, φερομένην δίναισι, βῶλον ἐξ Ὀλύμπου. Dacier, as Stallbaum observes, curiously mistook the sense of this passage, and imagined that a volume of Anaxagoras might be bought at that time for a drachma. But in fact the price of paper itself was then excessive at Athens. Emile Egger, in a letter to Firmin Didot (Revue Contemporaine du 15 Septembre, 1856), mentions fragments of an account rendered by certain Athenian officers in 407 B.C., in which the price of sheets of paper (χάρται), for writing copies of these accounts (ἀντίγραφα) upon, was 1 drachma and 2 obols each, i. e. 1 fr. 20 cent.—a sum which, according to Boeckh's computation, accepted by Egger, would be equivalent to 4 fr. 80 cent. now.

εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ] 'At the most:' the same expression occurs Alcib. I. 123 c, ἄξιον μὲν πενήκοντα εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, Gorg. 511 d, ἐὰν πάμπαν, . . . δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο. The ut-

p. 26. ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους Σωκράτους καταγελάειν, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ, οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί' οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα 5 μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῶ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωςί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ
p. 27. καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράφασθαι. ἔοικε γὰρ

4. νομίζειν] Oxon. alone has νομίζω, which, though anacoluthic after δοκῶ, has a vividness of its own, and certainly points to the right way of understanding the sentence as an instance of binary structure: see Commentary. But we cannot claim acceptance for νομίζω with such preponderating authority in favour of νομίζειν.

most the θεατρῶνης could demand for any place was a drachma; the price for an ordinary place was two oboli. See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, p. 223. n. 315 of 2nd edition.

2. ἄλλως τε καί] Which the youths must know are not mine, 'to say nothing of their singularity,' which would make the theft still more glaring. Steinhart has well observed that the meaning of ἄτοπα is not 'absurd,' but 'uncommon' or 'peculiar;' etymologically, what cannot be assigned to any known place or origin. He further remarks that neither Socrates nor Plato would have rejected these notions as 'absurd.' Cf. the striking passage in Legg. 886 d, where Plato declines to controvert these positions although he

would uphold the gods.

3. οὕτωςί—εἶναι] The two sentences οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ and οὐδένα—εἶναι are both descriptions of the same fact, the re-statement being the more precise; οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ stands by a sort of attraction for οὕτωςί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ, of which the filling up in the re-statement would have been ἐμὲ οὐδένα—εἶναι. Dig. 207, 208.

5. Ἄπιστός κ.τ.λ.] The question Meletus had answered affirmatively was, not whether Socrates was an atheist, but whether it was his opinion that Socrates was an atheist,—οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ; Socrates' comment on this is 'Very well; nobody else will believe that, and I am pretty sure you do not yourself,' i. e. I am pretty sure you are saying what you know to be untrue.

ὡσπερ αἰνίγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ, ἄρα γνώσε- p. 27.
ται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ
ἐναντί' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ
τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαί-
5 νεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ,
ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νο-
μίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καὶ τοι τοῦτό ἐστι
παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαί-
10 νεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀποκρίναι, ὦ Μέλητε·
ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, μέμνη- b
σθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότῳ τρόπῳ τοῦς
λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε,
ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ
15 οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκριέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ
ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει
εἶναι, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει,
αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν·
εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς

1. διαπειρωμένῳ] 'He is like one, who, by framing a mock-riddle, is trying (as he says to himself) whether will Socrates,' &c. We have here one participial clause (ὡσπερ —ξυντιθ.) within another (διαπειρ.); as Rep. 555 e, τὸν αἰεὶ ὑπεκόντα ἐνέντες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες. Notice, that it is ὡσπερ αἰνίγμα, 'a mock-riddle,' one which has no answer.

2. ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζ.] The use of the genitive, after verbs of knowing, seeing, and shewing, seems to be limited in Attic Greek to a noun joined with a participle. After verbs of men-

tioning, it is not so limited. Dig. 26. Cf. Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 136.

15. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα] Similar expressions are—Euthyd. 273, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες, Phdr. 235 a, ὡς οἷός τε ὦν, ταῦτ' ἐτέρως τε καὶ ἐτέρως λέγων, ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα, 271 d, ἔστιν οὖν εἶδη τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, Legg. 721 b, χρήμασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀτιμία, Phileb. 24 d, τὸ εἰς αὐθὺς τε καὶ αὐθὺς.

16. θορυβεῖτω] Merely by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering;—brawling, as we might say.

p. 27. ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀποκρίναι
c ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαί-
μονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὠνησας, ὅτι
μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν
δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζεις καὶ διδάσκεις, εἴτ' 5
οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω
κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ
ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δῆ-
που πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζεις μὲ ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτως
ἔχει; ἔχει δῆ· τίθημι γὰρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ 10
d οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεοὺς γε
ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆς ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε.
Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν
θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί
σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγού- 15
μενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὐτῷ ἡγείσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ περ
γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὐτῷ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές
εἰσι νοθοὶ τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ὧν
δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας
ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μὴ; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, 20
c ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων

6. δαιμόνιά γε] To make the reasoning sound, δαιμόνια here and δαιμόνια πράγματα above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of δαιμόνια καινὰ was based simply on Socrates' τὸ δαιμόνιον. Now by this Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here

the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adjectival θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον 31 c. See Appendix A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

8. ἀντιγραφῇ] The ἔγκλημα is so called, as it has been already called ἀνωμοσία. See 19 b note.

18. ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων ὧν] That is, ἐξ ἄλλων ὧν τινῶν.

[τοὺς ἡμίονους], ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. p. 27.
 ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ
 ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω [τὴν γραφὴν ταύ-
 την] ἢ ἀπορῶν ὃ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα
 5 ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν
 ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ
 δαιμόνια καὶ θεία ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε
 δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή p. 28.
 ἐστίν.

Third part
 of Defence;
 —Justifi-
 cation of
 the pursuit
 in which
 his life had
 been spent,
 viz., that
 of a moral
 reformer,
 interwoven
 with no-
 tices of
 the reform-
 atory doc-
 trine itself.

XVI. Ἄλλα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν
 ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς
 μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέ-
 χθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εἰ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς
 15 ἐστίν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἕανπερ αἰρή, οὐ
 Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή
 τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγα-
 θοὺς ἀνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσει· οὐδὲν δὲ b
 δειῶν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή. ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις·

6. πείθοις ἂν ὡς οὐ] The οὐ
 is not simply pleonastic, as in
 the case of two negatives in
 the same clause, but it is irra-
 tional. It is a confused anti-
 cipation of the coming negative
 οὐδεμία. Dig. 264.

18. οὐδὲν—στή] 'The rule
 is in no danger of breaking
 down in my case.' This use
 of οὐδὲν δειῶν is idiomatic:
 cf. Gorg. 520 d, οὐδὲν δειῶν
 αὐτῷ μὴ ἀδικηθῆ, 'we need not
 apprehend for him any injury,'
 Phædo 84 b, οὐδὲν δειῶν μὴ
 φοβηθῆ, 'we need not appre-
 hend that the soul will have
 to fear.' The 'apprehension' is

supposed to affect the speaker
 and his hearers, as interested
 in the contingency under dis-
 cussion. So here Socrates is
 speaking half ironically, in-
 teresting himself, as it were,
 for the rule, against himself.
 στή is also idiomatically used,
 as a quasi-impersonal;—that
 is, a vague nominative, such as
 'the course of events,' is un-
 derstood. See Dig. 97; where
 among other parallels is given
 Ar. Eth. Nic. VI. ix. 9, στή-
 σεται γὰρ κάκει. στή is literally
 'come to a stand-still.' Stallb.
 is wrong here.

p. 28. εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα
 ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ
 δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς
 λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι
 τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνᾶναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός
 5 ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη,
 πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἀδίκαια πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ
 c ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ λόγῳ εἶεν
 τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἱ τε
 ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κιν- 10
 δύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομῆναι,
 ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ
 Ἔκτορα ἀποκτείνει, θεὸς οὐσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὡς ἐγῶ-
 15 μαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν
 φόνον καὶ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐ-
 τικά γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἔκτορα πόντος ἐτοῖμος· ὃ
 δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου
 ὠλιγόρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὦν
 d καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίνην
 δίκην ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἀδικούντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω κατα- 20
 γέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ
 αὐτὸν οἶε φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω
 γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐδ' ἂν τις
 ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρ-
 χοντος ταχῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα 25

a. That
 first and
 foremost it
 was under-
 taken in
 obedience
 to the
 already
 mentioned
 divine call,
 and there-
 fore to be
 performed
 without
 respect of
 conse-
 quences
 or counter-
 inducements.

4. ὑπολογίζεσθαι] See be-
 low, d note.

5. ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν] 'A
 man of any worth at all.' This
 idiomatic concurrence of καὶ
 with σμικρὸν τι is frequent:
 Dig. 132.

10. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος] The same

illustration is used Symp. 179
 e. The reference in what fol-
 lows is to Hom. Il. xviii. 90.

23. οὐδ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.] The for-
 mer ἢ in this sentence is hy-
 perbatically postponed to ἑαυ-
 τὸν τάξῃ, which in sense is in-
 cluded under it. Dig. 290*.

κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε p. 28.
ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὧ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, e
5 οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν
Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐδ' ἐκείνοι ἔτατ-
τον ἔμενον ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκιδύνενον
ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθημι τε
καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετά-
10 ζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς p. 29.
ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.
δεινὸν μὲντ' ἂν εἶη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸτ' ἂν με δικαίως
εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι
ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιῶς θάνατον καὶ οἴομενος
15 σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὢν. τὸ γὰρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὧ
ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ
ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε
μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὄν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι
20 δ' ὡς εὐ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστί. καὶ b
τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ

1. ὑπολογιζόμενον] 'Giving any countervailing weight to;' literally, 'reckoning per contra.' The ὑπὸ conveys no image of subtraction, according to our notion of the operation, but the signification of meeting from an opposite direction: see Dig. 131.

5. Ποτιδαία—Δηλίῳ] At Potidæa (see Charm. init., Symp. 219, 220) between 432 and 429 B.C., Socrates rescued Alcibiades but resigned in his favour his claim to the reward of

bravery. Delium, 424 B.C., witnessed his famous retreat, (Symp. 221 a, b, Lach. 181 b). Of his campaign before Amphipolis, 422 B.C., we know less.

10. ἐνταῦθα δὲ] ἐνταῦθα repeats τοῦ θεοῦ τάττοντος κ.τ.λ.—δὲ marks the apodosis.

20. καὶ τοῦτο . . . αὕτη] Not pleonastic; but 'what is this but that very same reprehensible ignorance?' τοῦ οἶσθαι which follows is a genitive epexegetic of ἀμαθία. Dig. 24.

p. 29. τοῦ οἶσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δέ, ὧ ἄνδρες,
τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ
ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδῶς ἰκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου οὐτῶ
καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν 5
τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ
αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα
ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει
οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με
c νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν 10 or human
ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλ- inhibi-
θον, οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λέγων tion;—
πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς

2. τούτῳ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'In this province also [of the unseen] I believe I am distinguished from the mass of mankind herein, and if I were to say I was wiser in any point than any other person, I should say it was herein, that' &c. The former as well as the latter τούτῳ both relate to the same fact, to the same ὅτι,—upon which a strong emphasis is thus made to converge. Cf. Gorg. 484 e, λαμπρὸς τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐπέιγεται, Νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος, Ἴν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὢν. The suppression after τούτῳ ἂν is a graceful evasion of self-assertion. See Dig. 255.

10. ἀπιστήσαντες] 'Disbelieving' the representation urged by Anytus as the reason why Socrates should die; not 'refusing to follow Anytus' counsel' to put Socrates to death.

It is therefore to be connected, not with the words immediately following (ὃς ἔφη—ἀποκτεῖναι με), but with those next to them (λέγων—διαφθαρήσονται). Stallb. differs.

13. ἢ δὲ ἂν] The construction of the fut. indic. with ἂν is abundantly established. ἂν here belongs to διαφθαρήσονται, and to refer it to the part. ἐπιτηδεύοντες is a shift which will not apply to other passages (Dig. 58), and dislocates this. Observe, as to διαφθαρήσονται itself, that its not being affected by the Oratio Obliqua is to be accounted for regularly; it is because the event it denotes is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by Socrates. Plato is never arbitrarily irregular in this class of constructions: Dig. 90. It might be said here, that διαφευξοίμην denotes an event equally in the future. But

ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντά- p. 29.
 πασι διαφθαρῆσονται,—εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἶποιτε· ὦ
 Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφί-
 εμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ
 5 τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἄλῳς
 ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, δ
 ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίετε, εἶπομι' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι
 δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ
 10 οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν
 παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ
 ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι ὦ ἀριστε
 ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖός ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ
 εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν
 15 οὐκ αἰσχύνη ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖ-
 στα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθ-
 είας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ
 ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζει; καὶ εἰάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισ-
 βητῇ καὶ φῆ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν
 20 οὐδ' ἀπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ
 ἐλέγξω, καὶ εἰάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτηῖσθαι ἀρετὴν, φάνα

the plan being, to teach the paramount value of the soul, and the duty of caring for it, and the need of conscientiously-possessed principles of action.

then it is not an event which is assumed as about to happen at all.

4. ἐφ' ᾧτε . . . φιλοσοφεῖν.] For constructions of relative pronouns and adverbs with the infinitive, see Dig. 79.

8. ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ] "Ἀσπά-
 ζεσθαι est aliquem salutare ita, ut eum amplectaris; φιλεῖν ita, ut eum osculeris."—Stallb. Here of course both words are used, by transference, for the feelings which those actions betoken. Note too, that the

transference affects both: it is not that φιλῶ already expresses a feeling, and thus gives the turn to ἀσπάζομαι their coordination in the phrase requires that they should enter into it homogeneously.

πεισομαι—ὑμῖν] The parallel is striking to the declaration of the holy apostles, Acts v. 29, πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις.

14. ἰσχύν] Stallb., after Fischer, "de animi magnitudine et fortitudine."

p. 30. δέ, ὄνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου
 ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φανλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ
 νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω,
 καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου
 ἐγγυτέρῳ ἔσπε γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ 5
 ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν
 γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.
 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων
 ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωματῶν
 b ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω 10
 σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων
 ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς
 χρήματα καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα
 καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων δια-
 φθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δὲ τίς μέ 15
 φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα,
 φαίην ἂν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μὴ, καὶ
 ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος
 c ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλακίς τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' 20
 ἐμμεῖνάτέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς
 ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνή-
 σεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν
 καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς
 ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, εἰάν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοι- 25
 οῦτον ὄντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε

15. ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη] 'If preaching the virtue is perversion, then indeed I am a mischievous person; for I never rest from preaching it.' The ταῦτα is not identical with the ταῦτα of the line before, but is more com-

prehensive; it stands for the whole clause referred to in the phrase ταῦτα λέγων, and means 'this practice of mine.'

24. βοήσεσθε] A stronger expression of feeling than θορυβεῖν.

b. That it was of vital use to his countrymen,—a divine blessing to them,

ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάβειεν P. 30.
οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο d
οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χεί-
ρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μὲντ' ἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξε-
5 λάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος ἴσως οἶεται
καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα
ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύουσι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες
'Αθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολο-
10 γεῖσθαι, ὡς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι
ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ κατα-
ψηφισάμενοι. εἰ γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ραδίως e
ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον
εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ
15 ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθε-
στέρω καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπος τινος·
οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι
τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνει-
δίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὄλην P. 31.
20 πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ρα-
δίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐμοὶ πεί-
θησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθό-
μενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες

5. ἀτιμάσειεν] H substitutes a conjecture of his own, ἀτιμώσειεν, quite needlessly; for ἀτιμάζω, though it properly means to treat or regard as ἀτιμος, while ἀτιμώω is to make ἀτιμος, yet also has this technical sense: cf. Legg. 762 d, περὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ἀρχὰς ἡτιμώσθη πάσας. 23. κρούσαντες] Another unhappy conjectural substitution of H occurs here,—ὀρούσαντες, because (he says)

13. εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον refers not to the words immediately succeeding, namely, προσκείμενον—θεοῦ, but to the simile

which follows them.

23. κρούσαντες] 'With a single tap,'—as you would a μύωψ.

p. 31. ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἄνυτῳ, ραδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε,
εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἂν, εἰ
μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμφει κηδόμενος
ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὡν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπο
b τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόςθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· 5
οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ
ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμε-
λουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν
αἰεὶ, ἰδία ἕκαστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν
πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ 10
μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλανον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβά-
νων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον· νῦν
δὲ ὄρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τᾶλλα πάντα
ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοί
c τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, 15
ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα.
ικανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ἀληθῆ
ὡς λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ

κρούσαντες is 'debile pulsandi verbum.' Such a word however is just what was wanted.

10. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι] H drops the τοι, probably for want of considering that the collocation is hyperbatistical for καὶ μέντοι εἴ τι. Cf. 41 e.

14. οὐχ οἰοί τε] They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d: but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it. That is, grammatically speaking, the primary intention of the sentence ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι — μάρτυρα lies in the participial clause, and not in the verb ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι. See Dig. 303.

19. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν] The dominant reason of Socrates' abstinence from public affairs was not so much the impossibility of maintaining himself in a public position without sacrifice of principle or of life; but rather, that he felt his mission to be a moral and an individual one, and that from his point of view it was infinitely less important to rectify a

as its singularity alone might suffice to shew.

c. (In answer to a

supposed objection) that to have entered public life, in preference to dealing with individuals, was not a method practically possible for a righteous man,

ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλευῶ περιῶν καὶ πολυ- p. 31.
πραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ
πλήθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλευεῖν τῇ πόλει. τούτου
δὲ αἰτίον ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολ-
5 λαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίνε- d
ται φωνή, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδῶν Μέλη-
τος ἐγράφατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμε-
νον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀπο-
τρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ
10 οὐποτε· τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ
πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι·
εἰ γὰρ ἴσταν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαί ἐπε-
χειρήσα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαί ἂν
ἀπολώλη καὶ οὐτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἂν e
15 ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάλθηθι· οὐ

5. γίνεταί φωνή] All MSS. have this φωνή, and all edd. except V bracket it. Needless; Fischer points out the parallel to the next sentence, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη. 9. τοῦτο ὃ ἂν] Edd. prefer τούτου. But ἀποτρέπει πράττειν τοῦτο is a construction borne out by Theæt. 151 a, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνομένον μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποτρέπει ξυνείναι, [Dem.] Procem. xx. p. 1431, δείξας ἃ τότε ἡμάρτετε, νῦν ἀποτρέψω ταῦτα παθεῖν, and analogous constructions such as Xen. An. III. i. 20, πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιστήδεια κατέχουσιν ἡμᾶς. τοῦτο here is the reading of five MSS. besides Oxon. It is moreover less likely to have been invented than τοῦτο. 15. καὶ μοι μὴ] H alters this into καὶ μὴ μοι, comparing Phædo 105 b. But καὶ μοι is a common commencement of a sentence in the Orators.

particular policy, than by laying hold of individuals and making statesmen of them to raise the standard of statesmanship.

2. ἀναβαίνων] To the Pnyx; as in the famous πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἄνω καθήγο, Dem. de Cor. 169. p. 285.

5. θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον] See Appendix A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

6. ἐν τῇ γραφῇ] When he

spoke of the ἕτερα κατὰ δαιμόνια,—a perversion of the truth which Socrates characterises as a caricature by his use of the word ἐπικωμῶδῶν, which seems to mean 'selecting for caricature.' So σκόπτειν is to mock at, ἐπισκόπτειν to mock at some particular trait in a person.

p. 31. γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε
ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ δια-
p. 32. κωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει
γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχοῦ-
μενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον 5
σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἐγῶγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι
τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμάτε, ἔργα. ἀκού-
σατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵν' εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ'
ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπείκῃθιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, 10
μὴ ὑπέικων δὲ ἅμα κἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορ-
b τικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὧ Ἀθη-

11. ἅμα κἂν] This is Ast's conjecture. MSS. are chiefly divided between ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν (which Oxon. exhibits), ἅμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην, and ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅμ' ἂν ἀπ. Of the edd., VSZ have ἅμα καὶ ἅμ' ἂν, B ἅμ' ἂν ἀπολοίμην, H ἅμ' ἂν καὶ ἀπολοίμην. It seems vain to find more than a shadowy justification for ἅμα καὶ ἅμα. The variants may easily have come from ἅμα κἂν, in the form ἅμα καὶ ἂν. My friend Mr. Campbell ingeniously proposes ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἂν ἀπ., 'should be ready to meet death in sundry forms:' cf. Soph. O. T. 661, ὅ τι πύματον ὀλοίμαν. 12. δικανικά] H conjecturally prefixes οὐ, observing "quis credat, Socratem, qui statim a principio se ξένως ἔχειν τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως professus est, nunc judicialia verba promittere?" But equally how then should Socrates know that what he was going to say was not δικανικά? Besides, the speech in point of fact betrays abundant knowledge of technicalities; cf. 34 a, εἰ δὲ τότε κ.τ.λ. See Commentary below.

8. ὁ—ἔργα] 'What your body is wont to appreciate highly, the actions of a life.' ὑμεῖς (says Socrates),—not as individuals, but as representing Athenians generally, when acting as judges in the Ecclesia, or the Heliaea,—'you particularly are susceptible to such appeals.'

Here appears, in a refined form, the common τόπος of rehearsing a man's past services in his defence; of which

practice Lysias, xii. 38. p. 123, says, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει εἰθισμένον ἐστὶ, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν . . . ὡς στρατιώται ἀγαθοὶ εἰσι κ.τ.λ. Whence again Socrates says just below, he is 'about to employ a topic of vulgar use, and one that savours of the law-courts.'

11. μὴ ὑπέικων δέ] 'But would be ready to perish at once as the price of not yielding.'

φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά] φορτικὰ

as experience on two occasions of his life had shewn him.

ναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πρόποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ ρ. 32. πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλευσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς

7. ὑμῖν is retained, in deference to weight of MSS., and with all the edd., against Oxon. and 2 other MSS.: although ἐναντιοῦσθαι does not require a dative of reference, especially in a description of formal proceedings.

stands here in its simple meaning of 'vulgar' in the sense of 'common,'—not as implying (as Fischer and others think) self-assertion or bad taste; a meaning which (1) would make ἐρῶ ὑμῖν sound blunt even to harshness; (2) does not harmonise with δικανικά, for an arrogant tone is not characteristic of persons addressing their judges; and (3) does not suit the parallel passage Gorg. 482 e, *εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικὰ, . . . ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ καλά, νόμῳ δέ δικανικά* is likewise a colourless word;—not 'lawyerlike' in the sense of 'dry,' nor yet 'streitsüchtig' (Steinhart), but simply 'characteristic of speakers in courts of justice.'

3. τοὺς δέκα] Strictly only eight; for Conon was not included, and another of the ten was dead. Xenophon, in one of his accounts (Mem. I. i. 18), speaks with more definite inaccuracy of ἐννέα στρατηγούς.

5. παρανόμως, in two respects; (1) that they were tried ἀθροοῖ (see Thirlwall, Hist. Gr.

vol. IV. App. 2, where it is shewn that this right of separate trial is not to be traced to the decree of Cannonus); and (2) that they were not heard in their own defence; for in the assembly in which the charge was brought first informally, they only (Xen. Hell. I. vii. 5) βραχέα ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὔτεθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον and in that in which they were condemned they were not heard at all.

7. ἠναντιώθην . . . ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην] What is the precise reference of these expressions? Was ἠναντιώθην a refusal to put the question? This is left for uncertain by Mr. Grote, who says that upon Xenophon's shewing 'it can hardly be accounted certain that Socrates was Epistates.' (Hist. Gr. ch. 64.) Again, to what act does ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην refer?

It may be well to give the other accounts of this occurrence at length:—

(a) Xen. Mem. I. i. 18, βουλευσας γὰρ ποτε, . . . ἐπιστάτης ἐν

ρ. 32. νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην, καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων

τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγούς μὴ ψήφῳ ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσειν, ὀργιζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων.

(b) Ib. IV. iv. 2, ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἠναντιώθη τοιαύτῃ ὁρμῇ τοῦ δήμου κ.τ.λ.

(c) Xen. Hell. I. vii. 9-15, ἐντεῦθεν ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν, εἰς ἣν ἡ βουλὴ εἰσήνεγκε τὴν αὐτῆς γνώμην, Καλλιξένου εἰπόντος, τήνδε . . . τῶν δὲ πρυτάνεων τινῶν οὐ φασκόντων προθήσειν τὴν διαψηφισίαν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, αὐθις Καλλιξένος ἀναβὰς κατηγορεῖ αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτά. οἱ δὲ ἐβόων καλεῖν τοὺς οὐ φάσκοντας. οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις φοβηθέντες ὡμολόγουν πάντες προθήσειν, πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου· οὗτος δ' οὐκ ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ νόμον ποιήσειν.

(d) Axiochus, 368 d. . . . οἱ πρώην δέκα στρατηγοί· ὅτ' ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἐπηρόμην τὴν γνώμην· οὐ γὰρ ἐφάνετό μοι σεμνὸν μαινομένῳ δήμῳ συνεξάρχειν· οἱ δὲ περὶ Θηραμένην καὶ Καλλίξενον τῇ ὑπεραιᾷ προέδρους ἐγκαθέτους ὑφέντες κατεχειροτόνησαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄκριτον θάνατον. The word ἐγκαθέτοι is explained by Aesch. iii. 3. p. 54, καὶ ταῦτα ἕτεροί τιες τὰ ψηφίσματα ἐπιψηφίζουσι, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ δικαιότατου τρόπου λαχόντες προεδρεύειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ παρασκευῆς καθεζόμενοι.

(e) Gorg. 474 a, πέρυσι βουλευένου λαχῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνεε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. For this, as Luzac aptly remarks, is the

historical fact before us disguised by Socratic irony.

That Socrates was Epistates is at least a probable conclusion from (a), (b), and (d), to say nothing of (e); in further support of which, (b) and (d) imply that he carried his point, which he could not have done but as Epistates.

The reference of ἠναντιώθην must therefore be to Socrates' refusal to put the question, which resulted, as (d) credibly relates, in the adjournment of proceedings to the next day, when a more pliable Epistates presided.

The other clause, ἐναντία ἐψηφ., is, equally with ἠναντιώθην, in connection with μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων the structure of the sentence points to this inevitably. Now against referring this to the eventual voting in the assembly is (1) the unlikelihood that Socrates should be the only one of the prytanes who voted in the minority, when several of them had come to see that the bill was illegal. And (2) what if he had been the only one? it was no marked distinction: the minority was large, and he and the rest of the prytanes would merely vote as individuals. So likewise to refer it to the stages immediately preceding that final voting, would be in contradiction with the mention made in the accounts of the opposition of others beside Socrates. To refer it, again, to the debate on the bill in the council, before it was adopted as a

ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ρητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν p. 32.

προβούλευμα, would be to lay the scene of it too far from that of ἡναντιώθην ὑμῖν with which it is coupled, and would make μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων flat, since the πρυτάνεις had no prominent functions in the council. The remaining alternative, and this is in itself a plausible one, is to refer it to the first stage of proceedings in the assembly, where, preparatorily to the προβούλευμα being read out by the κήρυξ, it was handed to the proedri, who with the nomothetæ had to pronounce whether it contravened any existing law. Here was the precise moment at which legal provision had been made for entertaining the very objection taken by Socrates. We may then, with at least some probability, refer ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην to Socrates' condemning the bill as illegal when it was referred in due course to the joint consideration of the proedri and nomothetæ. The hysteron proteron is on Greek principles natural: ἡναντιώθην—νόμους precedes, because it, and not the earlier opposition, was the conspicuous and crowning act in Socrates' whole proceeding; Dig. 308.

With Socrates' more glorious refusal to put the question may be compared the conduct contemptuously attributed to Demosthenes by Æschines, ii. 84. p. 40, ἀναγνωσθέντος τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ἀναστὰς ἐκ τῶν προέδρων Δημοσθένης οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ψηφίσμα ἐπιψηφιεῖν· βοώντων δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ τοὺς προέδρους ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα κατ' ὄνομα καλούντων,

οὕτως ἄκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ ψηφίσμα ἐπιψηφίσθη.

The series of checks which the forms of the Ecclesia imposed on bills in progress, with a view to guard existing laws, was as follows:—1. The προβούλευμα was handed to the proedri, who after conferring with the nomothetæ pronounced whether or not it contravened existing laws; and, if they passed it, it was read out by the κήρυξ. 2. After this, it was open to any citizen to stop it by lodging an ὑπομυσία in earnest of his intention to bring against its author a γραφή παρανόμων. 3. Or the Epistates might refuse to put the question—under liability, of course, to ἐνδειξις if he refused improperly. 4. Or the rest of the proedri (by a majority, we may suppose,) might in like manner refuse their consent. See Æsch. ii. 65, iii. 39. pp. 36, 59.—Schömann de Com. Ath. ch. xi.

1. ἐνδεικνύναι καὶ ἀπάγειν] 'To procure my suspension or arrest.' The processes of ἐνδειξις and ἀπαγωγή are often mentioned in conjunction, as here, and Dem. c. Timocr. 146. p. 745, Lept. 156. p. 594, Antiph. v. 8, 9. p. 130, &c., and in the βουλευτικός ὄρκος as it stood after the amnesty. Amid several divergent accounts of these processes, the best is Heffter's (Ath. Gerichtsverf. p. 195). 'Ἐνδειξις might be instituted, among other cases, against any who should hold an office while he owed public money; or (a luculent

p. 32. κελεύοντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ
 ε δικαίου ᾧ μὴν μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ'
 ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα
 δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρα-
 τουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, 5
 οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν
 εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος
 Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἕν' ἀποθάνοι οἷα δὴ καὶ
 ἄλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταπτον, βουλό-
 μνοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι 10
 δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὐ ἐνδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ

instance) against any prytanis or proedrus who in discharge of his function in an assembly of the people should depart from the form of proceeding prescribed by law (Dem. c. Timocr. 22. p. 707). In the latter case, offenders were liable to a fine, and to ἐνδειξις, which ἐνδειξις was not only an expedient for levying the fine, but had the immediate effect of suspending them from office until the fine was paid. The Thesmothetæ had exclusive cognisance of ἐνδειξις. The statement of Pollux, that it pertained to the Archon Basileus, is unsupported; likewise his definition of ἐνδειξις, on which some writers rely,—that it was ὁμολογουμένου ἀδικήματος, οὐ κρίσεως ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας δεομένου,—is called by Heffter 'a mere jingle of words.' 'ἀπαγωγή was of wider application than ἐνδειξις. Moreover, its object was the bringing the offender into custody, which in ἐνδειξις was not the rule.

ἐνδειξις was an interdictory procedure, ἀπαγωγή a procedure of summary arrest. To be liable to it, a person must be taken ἐπ' αὐτοφάρον, in perpetration of an illicit act. The body which had cognisance in ἀπαγωγή was the Eleven, who registered (Heffter p. 210) the apprehension of the criminal and the cause of arrest (Lys. xiii. 86. p. 138), and who further, supposing the arrested person to be already under sentence of law, had charge of the execution of this sentence.

7. θόλον] The building where the prytanes, and while they lasted the Thirty, daily banqueted and sacrificed. It was near the council-chamber.

10. ἀναπλήσαι] This word, like implere in Latin, is used idiomatically of communicating pollution; whence here 'implicate.' See for example Phædo 67 a; and cf. especially with the present passage Antiph. ii. A. a. 10. p. 116, συγκαταπιπλάται τοὺς ἀναίτιους.

θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' p. 32.
 ὅτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι,
 τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ
 ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργά-
 5 σασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν
 τέτταρες ὄχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα,
 ἐγὼ δὲ ὄχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτ'
 ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ e
 τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

d. (In answer to a supposed objection) that the innocent tendency of the reformatory doctrine, which was simply to teach uncompromising adherence to righteousness, and not to train for professions or impart knowledge, excluded the suspicion of perverting the youth, 10 XXI. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγε-
 νέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως
 ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ
 χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐπιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ,
 ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων
 15 οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἴ p. 33.
 πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανούμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς
 οὐτός, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ
 δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς οἱ δια-
 βάλλοντές μέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ
 20 διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τις
 μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμῆ
 ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ
 πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων b

9. ὑμῖν] So MSS. and edd. generally. ὑμῶν is a conjecture of H.

9. μάρτυρες] The μαρτυρίαι are supposed to follow here. In-
 trod. p. xviii.

20. διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς] He means (see b below) that he imparted no μάθημα,—no professional knowledge; even of καλοκαγαθία he never ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι Xen. Mem. I. ii. 3. Cf. his declining ἐπιμε-

λείσθαι Nicias' son, Laches 208 d. What he sought to impart was rather a habit of mind; “not to dispense ready-made truth like so much coin, but to awaken the sense of truth and virtue; not to force his own convictions on others, but to test theirs.”—Zeller.

p. 33. διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ
 πλουσίᾳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἔάν
 τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ
 τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ
 ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην 5
 μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τις
 φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι
 μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. Ἄλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσι
 c τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὧ ἂν- 10
 δρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον·
 ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις
 μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὐσι δ' οὐ ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές.
 ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ
 θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ 15
 παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥπερ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα
 ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὧ
 Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ καὶ εὐλέγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ
 d ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφ-
 θαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι 20
 γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν
 πώποτέ τι ξυμβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας
 ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ
 ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ
 ἀδελφούς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' 25

—a sus-
 picion
 which was
 also re-
 futed inde-
 pendently.

11. εἶπον] So Stallbaum, rightly. εἶπον, Hermann. See
 Commentary.

2. καὶ ἔάν τις] This is a soft
 way of saying, ‘And I am ready
 to question him, if he chooses.’

12. ὅτι ἀκούοντες] Stallb. right-
 ly joins this with ἀλλὰ διὰ τί—
 διατρίβοντες; the ἀκηκόατε—εἶπον

being interjected. Then ὅτι is
 ‘because.’ See the examples
 which Stallb. quotes—Euthy-
 phro 3 b, Rep. I. 332 a, III.
 402 e, 410 d.

ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι, νῦν μεμ- p. 33.
νῆσθαι καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεσι αὐτῶν
πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοί, οὓς ἐγὼ ὀρώ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων
οὔτοςί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου e
5 τοῦδε πατῆρ' ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήγγιος, Αἰσχίνου
τοῦδε πατῆρ' ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὔτοςί,
'Ἐπιγέουσι πατῆρ' ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ
ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γέγονασι, Νικόστρατος, ὁ Θεο-
ζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος

2. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι] BS om.; VZ retain; H brackets. The likelihood is not great that the words have been inserted from the end of the former sentence (H brackets them *there*, by mistake); the rhythm almost requires them; and there is point in attributing the same vindictive feeling to the kinsmen as to the youths themselves. The repetition is like Brutus' repetition of 'for him have I offended,' in Shakespeare's *Jul. Cæs.* Act III. Scene ii.

4. Κριτοβούλου &c.] With Critobulus Socrates holds conversation in *Xen. Mem.* I. iii, II. vi. He is mentioned also in *Athen.* V. 220a, with Æschines, distinguished from others of the name as ὁ Σωκρατικός, the son of Lysanias (see *Diog. Laert.* II. 60), who afterwards became a teacher for money of the Socratic doctrines, and wrote Socratic dialogues (*Schol.* in *Menex.*). He was at variance with Aristippus (*Luzac de Dig. Soc. sect. II. § 2*), and there is a fragment of an invective written against him by Lysias, illustrating the enmity of the Orators against the Socratists: he is of the company named in the *Phædo* (59 b). Epigenes is mentioned *Xen. Mem.* III. xii, 1, and *Phædo* 59 b: his father Antipho is not otherwise known. Demo-

docus, the father of Paralus and Theages, is an interlocutor in the *Theages*. Of *Theages* it is said, *Rep.* 496 b, εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου Θεάγου χαλινὸς οἶος κατασχέιν· καὶ γὰρ Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἣ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπέργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. Adimantus is an interlocutor in the *Rep.* (357-368, 548). Apollodorus appears in the *Phædo* (59 a, 117 d) as passionately attached to Socrates, and in the *Symp.* says of himself (172 e), ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω καὶ ἐπιμελὲς πεποιήμαι ἐκάστης ἡμέρας εἶδέναι ὃ τι ἂν λέγη ἢ πράττει, and is said (173 d) to have got τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὸ μαικὸς καλεῖσθαι. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Æantodorus are only mentioned here.

p. 33. τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ κατα-
p. 34. δεηθείη—, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν
Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος,
οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὔτοςί Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ
'Απολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς 5
ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινὰ ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν
τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα·
εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα-
χωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιούτου. ἀλλὰ τούτου
πάν τούναντιον εὐρήσετε, ὧ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ 10
βοηθεῖν ἐτόιμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργάζο-
b μένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ
'Ανυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν
λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσ-
βύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα 15
ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν
ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευ-
δομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἶεν δῆ, ὧ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' 20
ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως
c τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀνα-
μνησθεῖς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ
ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε
τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε
αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὃ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, 25
καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ

1. καταδεηθείη] The κατα- implies absence of all reserve or modification: here in a bad sense it expresses an unprincipled act. *Dig.* 122.

8. ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ] The full expression occurs Æschin. iii. 165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ

βήματος, ἕως ἂν εἴπῃς. Note by the way, that the examination of witnesses was extra to the time allowed for the pleadings; cf. *Lysias* xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166, 167, καὶ μοι ἐπίλαζε τὸ ὕδωρ.

26. ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρα] 'And then finds that I.'

Conclu- sion;— reason for not en- treating the mercy of the court.

οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, p. 34.
 ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις
 ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη,
 καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θείτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς
 5 τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ d
 μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπικειῆ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς
 τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν
 πού τινες καὶ οἰκείοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ
 'Ομήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέ-
 10 φυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκείοί μοι εἰσι
 καὶ υἱεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον
 ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν' αὐτῶν δεῦρο
 ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί
 δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, e
 15 ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
 θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μῆ, ἄλλος
 λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη
 τῇ πόλει οὗ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν
 ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα,
 20 εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον
 γέ ἐστι τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν

21. τῷ Σωκράτει] VBS τὸν Σωκράτη, ZH τὸ Σωκράτη, both with some MS. authority. The last is worst; for such an emphatic use of the name Socrates palpably requires the article. And

2. ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι] Refers to κίνδυνον, not to ἔσχατον.—'danger, as he would think it.'

5. οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ] γὰρ refers to εἴ—['I say *if*'] for though I do not expect it of you, yet [making the supposition,] *if* it should be so.'

6. ἐπικειῆ] 'Conciliatory.'

9. 'Ομήρου] Odys. xix. 163.

11. εἰς μὲν] Lamprocles (Xen. Mem. II. ii. 1). δύο· Sophroniscus and Menexenus (Phædo 116 b).

15. εἰ μὲν] 'Whether I can look death in the face or not.'—Whewell.

19. τοῦνομα] The name of σοφός· cf. 20 d, and below, εἴτε σοφία εἴτε κ.τ.λ.

p. 35. ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχροὺν ἂν εἴη· οἷουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους 5 πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνῃ τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινα καὶ
 b τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ 10 ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀτιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψη- 15

against both this and τὸν Σωκράτη stands the consideration, that the meaning would be 'people have made up their minds that Socrates *is to* differ;' it is the form of a resolution which *is to* take effect; whereas the meaning required is 'they have made up their minds that Socrates differs' now. τῷ Σωκράτει leaves this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.; and in accepting it we follow Bernhardt (Syntax. p. 94), who supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

2. ἀνδρεία] Oxon. here has ἀνδρία, but is not consistent. Dindorf (on Ar. Nub. 510) says ἀνδρεία alone is the true form,—as proved (1) by the Ionic diaeresis ἀνδρητή· (2) by the fact that in poetry it never occurs where the metre would require ἀνδρία (except in Eur. Herc. F. 475, πατήρ ἐπίργου, μέγα φρονῶν ἐπ' ἀνδρία, which Elmsley has emended εὐανδρία); (3) by the testimony of Etym. M. p. 461. 53, that the traditional orthography was ἀνδρεία till Apollonius invented ἀνδρία· (4) by the preponderating adherence of the MSS. to ἀνδρεία. 13. οὔτε ὑμᾶς] VH ὑμᾶς, BSZ (following 2 MSS.) ἡμᾶς. H says "ὑμᾶς commodum sensum præbet; nec plebem, modo aliquo loco haberi velit, facere, nec si singuli faciant, permittere debere."

3. ἔσονται] 'If we are to given a different turn to the have such conduct on the part meaning of those,' &c. εἶεν would have

φιείσθε τοῦ τὰ ἑλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος p. 35.
καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιούντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυ-
χίαν ἄγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὧ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ
5 δικάσιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ c
δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν.
οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κἀθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ κατα-
χαριζέσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα·
καὶ ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ
10 δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὐκ χρῆ οὔτε ἡμᾶς
ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν, οὐθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέ-
τεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με,
ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν,
ἃ μῆτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μῆτε δίκαια μῆτε ὅσια,
15 ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύ- d
γοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ
πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας,
θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ
ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἑμαυτοῦ ὡς

9. ὁμώμοκεν] Part of the judge's oath was ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως ἀκροάσεσθαι τῶν κατηγορούντων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων. Isocr. xv. 21: p. 314.

χαριεῖσθαι] 'That he will not favour whomsoever he feels inclined to favour.'

10. ἡμᾶς] Defendants in general.

11. ἐθίζεσθαι] 'Allow yourselves to be habituated;' an instance of the semi-middle sense. Dig. 88.

15. ἄλλως—καὶ] 'But, by Zeus, especially, when I am on my trial at Meletus' instance for impiety.' A remarkable

hyperbaton. The phrase ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the μέντοι νῆ Δία (which is also a familiar sequence, Phædo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a), which could have found no other convenient place. What makes such a tmesis possible, without prejudice to perspicuity, is the very fact that ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is a sufficiently familiar phrase to admit of this dismemberment and yet be recognised: Dig. 294. Thus Bekker, in reading arbitrarily ἄλλως τε πάντως νῆ Δία μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ, is wide of the mark.

p. 35. θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δέῃ οὕτως ἔχειν· νο-
μίζω τε γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν
ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ
κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἄριστα εἶναι
καὶ ὑμῖν.

5

e XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
p. 36. ναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε,
ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν
μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθ- 10
μόν. οὐ γὰρ ὄμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσσεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ· νῦν δέ, ὡς εἴκειν, εἰ τριάκοντα

B. The Counter-assessment of the Penalty.

12. τριάκοντα] So ZH; τρεῖς VBS. Of MSS., Oxon. with five others has τριάκοντα which also approves itself independently.

5. καὶ ὑμῖν] The defence of Socrates, which would occupy the second division of the pleadings, being thus concluded, there would follow here the voting of the judges, and the announcement of their verdict, declaring the charge proven. Then would begin the third division of the pleadings, on the side of the prosecution in advocacy of the penalty named, and secondly of Socrates' ἀντιτίμησις, where the Apology again takes up the thread. Introd. pp. vi, xi, xvii.

8. καὶ οὐκ—τούτο] The halting connection (grammatically speaking) between this clause and the preceding part of the sentence is idiomatic. The shortest way is taken to arrive at the particular which is the

point of the sentence: Dig. 258. It is incorrect to supply, as Stallbaum does, καὶ [δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι] οὐκ, κ.τ.λ. Rather there is a substitution of a shorter form of expression, complete in itself, but not agreeing with the plan on which the sentence set out.

11. οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον] Hyperbatical for παρ' οὕτως ὀλίγον. Dig. 298. Lit. 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared: i. e. 'so close.' Dig. 124.

12. τριάκοντα] The number of condemning votes was 281, out of a court of 501: so 30 in round numbers, or 31 exactly, changing sides, would have effected an acquittal. See, for the fuller discussion of this point, Introd. p. xii sqq.

μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέ- p. 36.
λητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα,
καὶ οὐ μόνου ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό
γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορή-
5 σουντες ἐμοῦ, κὰν ὦφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλα- b
βὸν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

a. Proposal
on the
footing of
full justice,
—ironical.

XXVI. Τιμάται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου.
εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὃ ἄνδρες
'Αθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἀξίος
10 εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὃ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ
ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί,
χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ
δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν

The implication in *μόναι* that the majority was small would recommend the corruption of *τριάκοντα* into *τρεῖς*. In Andoc. iii. 4. p. 23, *πεντήκοντα* is a necessary emendation for *πέντε*. Cf. Taylor, Lectt. Lys. cap. vi.

2. ἀποπέφευγα] Half in jest, in allusion to his accusers being three to one, Socrates represents the majority as obtained by the joint influence of the three: supposing then each accuser represented by one-third of the majority, Meletus gets less than 100, i. e. less than one-fifth of the whole. The indictment stood in Meletus' name, but the really formidable accuser was Anytus: see again Introd. p. x.

6. τὸ πέμπτον μ.] Not 'a fifth,' but 'the' indispensable 'fifth.'

10. παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι] A technical legal expression; ἀποτίσαι applies to a pecuniary penalty, παθεῖν to death, imprisonment, or the like. So Dem. Mid. 47.

p. 529, ὅπου ἂν καταγῶ ἢ ἡλιαία, τιμάτω περὶ αὐτοῦ παραχρήμα, ὅπου ἂν δοκῇ ἀξίος εἶναι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι (part of the νόμος ὕβρεως), in Timocrat. 105. p. 733.

ὃ τι μαθῶν] 'For having taken it into my head, in the disposal of my life, to deny myself rest.' ἐν is not 'during.'

13. ἄλλων] Here is the idiomatic use of ἄλλος for 'besides:'. Dig. 46. ἄλλων agrees with all three genitives following: 'and what not besides,—magistracies, clubs, and factions.'

ξυνωμοσιῶν] These associations were as rife at Athens under the Thirty as in the Peloponnesian war.

p. 36. καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησά-
c μενος ἑμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε
εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα, οἷ
ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἑμαυτῷ ἐμμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος
εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν 5
μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα,
ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε
τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδεὶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπι-
μεληθεῖν, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος
ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πό- 10
λεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
d ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἀξίος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὧν;
ἀγαθόν τι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν
ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν
τοιοῦτον, ὃ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ 15
πένητι εὐεργέτη, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμε-
τέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον, ὃ ἄνδρες
'Αθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν
πρυτανείῳ σιτείσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τις ὑμῶν
ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν. 20

5. ἐπὶ δὲ—εὐεργεσίαν] This clause is repeated in the word ἐνταῦθα, and governed by ἦα and the ἰὼν with εὐεργετεῖν is a redundancy. (At the same time probably another clause is confusing itself with this in the speaker's mind, to which ἰὼν would be essential, namely, οἷ δὲ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἐμμελλον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν, i. e. οἷ δὲ ἰὼν ἐμμελλον ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον εὐεργετῶ.)

14. τιμᾶσθαι] 'That I should lay the penalty.'

16. εὐεργέτη] Stallbaum cites Xen. de Vectig. iii. 11, Lys.

xx. 19. p. 159. Add Dem. F. L. 330. p. 446, τί δέ; διοίητ' ἂν ἐν πρυτανείῳ σίτησιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ δωρεάν, αἷς τιμάτε τοὺς εὐεργέτας;

17. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὡς] This is the form of comparison with ὡς, complicated by the redundant insertion of οὕτως. Dig. 164.

20. ζεύγει] Here this word plainly stands for three or four horses. Hesychius in voc. says καὶ ἐπὶ τριῶν καὶ τεσσάρων ἔτασσον.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν [εἶναι], ἐγὼ p. 36.
δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ ε
δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τι- p. 37.
μᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

b. Com-
promise,
ironical
also.

5 XXVII. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παρα-
πλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς
ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ
Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι
ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς
10 τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διει-
λέγμεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὡσπερ
καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν b
μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπέισθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ
ῥάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύ-
15 εσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ
δέω ἑμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐ-
τός, ὡς ἀξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμῆσθαι τοιοῦτου
τινὸς ἑμαυτῷ, τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, οὐ
Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἶδέναι οὔτ' εἰ
20 ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι
ὧν εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος;
πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμοτηρίῳ, c
δουλεύοντα τῇ αἰεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα;
ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ

12. ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις] The Lacedæmonians, for instance. See Thucyd. i. 132.

21. ὧν—όντων] Genitive of a noun with participle after verbs of knowing, &c.: Dig. 26. The clause however is complicated by the presence of ὅτι, indicative of a momentary intention to adopt a

finite instead of a participial construction: Dig. 279.

23. τοῖς ἔνδεκα] εἰς ἀφ' ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἐγένετο, καὶ γραμματεὺς ('secretary') αὐτοῖς συνηριθμεῖτο. Poll. viii. 102. They had charge of the prisons, as well as of the execution of sentences.

p. 37. ταῦτόν μοι ἔστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι
μοι χρήματα, ὀπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμή-
σωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμῆσασθε. πολλὴ
μέντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι,
ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες 5
πολιταί μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς
d διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γε-
γόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ
ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως.
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος 10
εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης
πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὐ
γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροά-
σονται οἱ νέοι ὡσπερ ἐνθάδε· καὶ μὲν τούτους ἀπε-
λαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελωσιν, πείθοντες τοὺς 15
e πρεσβυτέρους· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πα-
τέρες τε καὶ οἰκείοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ
ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἴος τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν
ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τουτὶ δὴ ἔστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον 20
πεῖσαι τινὰς ὑμῶν. εἰάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ
ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστι καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν
p. 38. ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· εἰάν τ' αὖ
λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ
τούτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποι- 25
εῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε

20. τουτὶ] Cf. textual note on ταυτησί, 22 e.

2. ἀλλὰ δὴ] Introduces the last of a series of suppositions. Dig. 142.

9. ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα] Ironical.

11. ἐξελθόντι] 'If I quit the city:' as below e, ἐξελθὼν ζῆν.

20. τουτὶ] Namely, ὅτι οὐχ οἴος τε ἔσομαι.

διαλεγόμενου καὶ ἑμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ ρ. 38. δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ'

I. ὁ ἀνεξέταστος—ἀνθρώπῳ] The interrogatory discipline which Socrates thus extols was that to which he sought to bring all with whom he conversed.

The subject, about which the answerer was questioned, was himself: which is the reason why Socrates always identified the process with the carrying out of the Delphic precept, *Γνώθι σεαυτόν*. The branches of enquiry to which it led were manifold:—

(1) knowledge of one's own natural endowments and position, with a view to living for the greatest good of oneself and others:—ὁ ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος ὁποῖός τις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 25:

(2) review of the actual use to which one has been and is putting one's life—Laches 187 e, *διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὅντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῆ καὶ ὅντινα τὸν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον βεβίωκεν* and below 39 c, *διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου*

(3) examination of one's opinions, — their coherence, their consistency, the history of their formation; of which the results are—consciousness of one's own ignorance, and consciousness of the grounds of one's knowledge: Xen. Mem. III. ix. 6, Soph. 230 b—d:

(4) investigation of the principles of human life and action (for which the knowledge of one's own nature is a prerequisite: Alc. I. 133 c, *ἀρ' οὐν*

μὴ γινώσκουτες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς . . . δυναίμεθ' ἂν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ;)—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16, *περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότες ἠγείτο καλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλησθῶν* and here (just above) *τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκείτης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιείσθαι*.

But this examination was not a mere discipline ending in itself, but a preparation to qualify a man for receiving culture and improvement (Alc. I. 124 d, *ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα*, Laches 188 b, *ἀξιούντα μανθάνειν ἕωσπερ ἂν ζῆ*), for attaining connectedness of knowledge and rational method in action, and for doing the best by himself and the state.

Socrates seems to have employed the strongest terms he could find to assert the indispensableness of this discipline:—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16 (quoted above), III. ix. 6, *τὸ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἶεσθαι γινώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι*, Soph. 230 d, *τὸν δ' ἀνελεγκτον αὐ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνη βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὢν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν κ.τ.λ.*, Hip. Ma. 304 e, *τὸ καλὸν ἀγνοῶν* καὶ *ὅποτε οὕτω διακείσασαι, οἷε σοι*

p. 38. *ἐτι ἦπτον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἄμ' οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἑμαυτὸν ἀξιῶν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν 5 ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσοῦτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμησῶμαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μῶν ἀργυρίου· τοσοῦτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ 10 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἰοῦντος Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μῶν τιμησασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτου, 15 ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεοι.*

κρίττον εἶναι ζῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνάναι; and in the passage before us.

And was there not a cause? The current opinions, drawn from men's practical exigencies, imperfect observation, and debased morality, were no sounder than their sources. It was abhorrence of this mass of error and conventionality (which meanwhile the Sophists were accepting as the material of their system), which impelled Socrates to seek to reconstruct human opinion on a basis of 'reasoned truth.'

3. *καὶ ἐγὼ ἄμ'*] A supplementary reason;—'Were silence possible, it would be no less a κακόν which therefore I should decline imposing on myself.'

6. *νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ*] This combination of particles occurs always in setting aside a hy-

pothetical case which is the opposite of the existing state of the case. The *δὲ* and the *γὰρ* enter simultaneously into the combination, where there is no ellipse nor aposiopesis. Dig. 149.

12. *ἐγγυᾶσθαι*] Governed by an equivalent of 'they say' contained in *κελεύουσι*. Cf. Symp. 213 a, *πάντας οὖν . . . κελεύειν εἰσιέναι καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν*. Dig. 245.

13. *ἀξιόχρεοι*] The third and last division of the pleadings being thus concluded, there would follow first the final voting and then the final verdict of the judges: by which the formal trial would be concluded.

After this, however, some 'last words' are still conceded to Socrates, who continues to address those of his judges

C. Last reflections, addressed to the judges: a. to those who had voted for his condemnation;

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὧ ἄνδρες p. 38.
 Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλο-
 μένων τὴν πόλιν λουδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε,
 ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ
 5 καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίξω. εἰ οὖν
 περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν
 ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι
 πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω
 δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ d
 10 καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τότε πρὸς
 τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴσθε, ὧ ἄνδρες,
 ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκένας τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς
 ἔπεισα, εἰ φῶμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε
 ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία
 15 μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναι-
 σχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα,
 οἷ ἂν ὑμῖν ἤδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ
 ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ e
 καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἶθισθε
 20 ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ᾤθηθη

who choose to remain and hear him.

Whether such a concession was actually made to Socrates, or whether it was only a sufficiently common practice to give verisimilitude to the fiction, is a question which can hardly be determined. See *Introd.* p. xv.

1. οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου] Socrates is telling the Athenians that they would not have had to wait long to be saved the reproach of putting him to death, by letting nature take her own course. 'It was but

a brief space after all, by forestalling which they were entailing on themselves the reproach.' ἕνεκα marks here the efficient not the final cause; the meaning is not 'you will incur reproach for the sake of taking from me a brief remainder of life,'—but 'a brief space will be the cause of your incurring it.' The 'brief space,' accordingly, is not that between the present moment and his execution, but that between his execution and the moment when he would have died in the course of nature.

p. 38. δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πράξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον,
 οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένω, ἀλλὰ
 πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνᾶναι
 ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ'
 p. 39. ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως 5
 ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς
 μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν
 ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἵκετεῖαν τρα-
 πόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί
 εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν 10
 θάνατον, εἴαν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ
 μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπὸν, ὧ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν,
 ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θάπττον γὰρ θα-
 b νάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδύς ὦν καὶ
 πρᾶβυτῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοῖ 15
 κατήγοροι ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξείς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάτ-
 τονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν
 θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὔτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας

7. τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις] Before ἂν VH have ῥᾶον· BSZ reject it. H errs in thinking that ῥᾶον exists in Oxon.—no doubt misled by Gaisf. *Lectt. Plat.*, in whom "p. 39 a 3 ῥαῖον" must be an erratum for "ῥαῖον om."

4. ἐκείνως] Understand ἀπολογησαμένους again.

12. μὴ . . . ἢ] An instance of the *presumptive* variety of the deliberative conjunctive. It is confined to negative sentences. *Dig.* 59 note.

13. θάπττον γὰρ θ. θεῖ] This refers to the reflex effect of wickedness on the evildoer's soul, which it degrades and ruins. Cf. *Crito* 47 e, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου (sc. the soul) ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ

ἄδικον λωβᾶται κ. τ. λ.; *Gorg.* 509 a, μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικούντι. Between danger and death there is many a chance of escape, as Socrates has just before said; but none between the evil deed and its internal consequences. Stallb.'s quotation of *Odys.* viii. 329, Οὐκ ἀρετᾷ κακὰ ἔργα κηχάνει τοι βραδύς ὠκύν' is not to the point.

18. ὑπὸ—ὠφληκότες] 'Sentenced by Truth to receive the penalty of.'—Whewell.

ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ p. 39.
τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μὲν που ἴσως
οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρη-
5 σμωδῆσαι, ὃ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γὰρ εἶμι ε
ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησμοφδοῦσιν,
ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημί γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες,
οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ
τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δί' ἢ οἶαν
10 ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι
ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ

10. οἰόμενοι] After οἰόμενοι H inserts conjecturally μὲν, taking this to be suggested by οἰόμενοί με of some MSS., and by an erased blank in Oxon. The erasure in Oxon. was probably με, for an accent has been erased also from —οι. This however may have been an erasure by the original scribe; such as for instance must have been that at Crito 53 d, where stands δι φθέραν with an erasure between—διφθέραν being plainly the true reading.

1. ἐγὼ τε . . . καὶ οὗτοι] 'I as well as they.' ἐγὼ has the stress, and stands (in accordance with Greek arrangement) first for that reason. Dig. 307.

6. ἐν ᾧ—χρησμοφδοῦσιν] The opinion, which connects prophetic enlightenment with the approach of death, has maintained its hold upon mankind in all ages. Patroclus foretells Hector's death, Il. xvi. 851, and Hector the death of Achilles, Il. xxii. 358: instances to which classical writers often appeal; thus Xen. Apol. 30, ἀνέθηκε μὲν καὶ Ὀμηρος ἔστιν οἷς τῶν ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου προ-
γνώσκων τὰ μέλλοντα, βούλομαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ χρησμοφδοῦσά τι, Cic. De Div. I. 30, Facilius evenit appropinquante morte ut animi futura augerentur; ex quo et

illud est Calani, de quo ante dixi, et Homericus Hectoris qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat. So Shakespeare, Rich. II. Act II. Sc. i. (Gaunt) "Methinks, I am a prophet new inspir'd; and thus, expiring, do foretell of him." And Sir H. Davy ("Remains," p. 311) speaks of himself as "looking into futurity with the prophetic aspirations belonging to the last moments of existence"—in a letter dated just two months before his death.

9. οἶαν] Sc. τιμωρίαν. A virtual cognate accusative after ἀπεκτόνατε. Dig. 1.

11. διδόναι ἔλεγχον] Namely, under the process of ἐξέτασις. cf. 38 a note, and esp. Laches 187 e there quoted.

p. 39. ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλεί-
d ους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον,
ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἠσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται
ὅσφ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.
εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν 5
τοῦ ὄνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρ-
θῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἐστ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε
πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη
καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολοῦειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν
παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα 10
μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος
e ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἠδέως ἂν δια-
λεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῖ πράγματος, ἐν
ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὐπω ἔρχομαι 15
οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὃ ἄνδρες,
παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει
p. 40. διαμυθολογήσασθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν
γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὐσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι
ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες δικα- 20
σταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην
—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἢ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαν-
τικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ
πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιου-
μένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ 25

b. to those who had voted for his acquittal.

15. οἱ ἄρχοντες] That is, οἱ ἔνδεκα.

20. δικασταί] Steinhart remarks that up to this point, where first the true and false judges are separated, the form of the address used has been ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

22. ἢ εἰωθυῖα] 'The direction I am wont to receive from the divine voice.' See App. A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

24. πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς] ἐπὶ separates πάνυ from σμικροῖς, to which it belongs: Dig. 298.

ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἄπερ ὁράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἄ γε δὴ p. 40.
οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι.
ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιώντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θ
θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ
5 δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι
ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με-
ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύ-
την τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδεὺς οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ
ἡναντιώταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω;
10 ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς
τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγόνεναί, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς
ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ ε
τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ
γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἡναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς
15 σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε, ὡς πολλῆ
ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν
ἐστὶ τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἴσθη-
σιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ
20 λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις

5. μέλλοντί τι] This accurately represents the reading of Oxon.,
which stands μέλλοντι ^{τι}. (τί being prima manu), importing that τι
should follow μέλλοντι. Gaisford here is inexact in his repre-
sentation. 7. ταύτην] So VBH; αὐτήν SZ. It is impossible
to find a clear meaning for αὐτήν, which is the reading of Oxon.
and five other MSS. Cf. Phædo 60 a, where Oxon. (alone) has
ταύτην for αὐτήν.

4. ἐνταυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δικ.] An
emphasised equivalent of ἐπὶ
τόδε τὸ δικ. Cf. Legg. 679 d,
κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ, equi-
valent to κατ' αὐτήν μόνον τὴν
πόλιν, Thucyd. vii. 16, τῶν αὐτοῦ
ἐκεῖ δύο προείλοντο, viii. 28, καὶ
ἐς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον
καθιστάσι.

18. οἷον] 'As it were.' Pa-
renthetical to the construction.
The words which it qualifies
are μηδὲν εἶναι. (The subject
of μηδὲν εἶναι is τὸν τεθνεῶτα).
Dig. 16. Cf. below, οἷον ὕπνος,
and again e, οἷον ἀποδημήσαι.

19. τὰ λεγόμενα] In the popu-
lar religious teaching.

p. 40. τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον.
d καὶ εἰ γε μηδεμία αἴσθησις ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος,
ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὄρα, θαυμά-
σιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἰ
τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ἣ οὔτω 5
κατέδαρθεν, ὥστε μηδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντι-
παράθεντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν,
πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης
τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ 10
e ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμή-
τους ἂν εὔρειν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ
νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε
λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται
οὔτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημήσαι 15
ἐστὶν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ
ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθ-
νεῶτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἂν, ὧ ἄνδρες
p. 41. δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄιδου, ἀπαλ-
λαγείς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρή- 20
σει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται
ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς

21. ὡς] So VBS; ZH omit. Oxon. has it above the line but
in first hand. The ὡς is constantly added where it is a popular
appellation of which the propriety is recognised, and is frequently
found after the article, as Phdr. 256 b, τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν,
Rep. 345 e, τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, &c., &c.

1. τῇ ψυχῇ] An intensified
form of the dative of reference,
equivalent nearly to a genitive:
Dig. 28.

12. αὐτὸν] A resumption of
ἰδιώτην τινά and βασιλέα, after
the intervention of εὐαριθμ. ἂν
εὔρειν.

22. Μίνως τε—ἄλλοι] These
nouns are in the nominative
by attraction to the interposed
relative clause, as the nearest
construction: Dig. 192.

Nowhere else does Triptole-
mus occur as judge of the
dead (though in Hom. Hymn.

καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι p. 41.
 ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ
 ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεὶ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ
 καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν
 5 ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ
 ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστῇ
 ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδει b
 καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμώνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν
 παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλ-

Demet. 153 he sits in judgment on earth). Also Plato is the only Greek who styles Æacus judge of the dead, here and Gorg. 523 e; though many Romans mention him thus. But the same principle accounts for the ascription of such a subterranean preeminence to these two, and to the remaining two more widely recognised judicial personages named here. All four were connected with the secret rites, or mysteries, of their native places; Minos with the Cretan mysteries, which through the Orphic influence were widely known. Rhadamanthus, his assessor, is his countryman. Æacus was the hero of Ægina, where there were (Pausan. II. 30, Origen adv. Cels. vi. 290. c. 22, Lucian, Navig. 15) mysteries of Orphic origin. And Triptolemus was connected, of course, with Eleusis. These judges are an instance of the fact that certain features of the Greek mythology were first the product of the mystery-worship, and thence made their way into the popular mind.—Döllinger, Gent. and Jew, Vol. I.

Bk. iii. p. 175. The same account may be assumed to hold of the ἄλλοι τῶν ἡμιθέων, who are subjoined to these four; for very many places had mystery-rites. Rhadamanthus is mentioned in Homer, (Od. vii. 323), and therefore antecedently to mysteries, as a judge, but on earth and not in the nether world.

6. ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ] I. e. 'I should have a pleasure peculiarly my own.'

7. διατριβῇ] Cf. Euthyphro sub init., Legg. I. 625 a.

ὅποτε—τέθνηκεν] This depends upon ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι. The whole sentence ὅποτε—ἀηδὲς εἴη is a re-statement more at length of θαυμαστῇ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβή, which it follows asyndetically, —an instance of Binary Structure: Dig. 207.

9. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι] Socrates' comparison of himself with Palamedes recalls the fable of the representation of the Palamedes of Euripides soon after Socrates' death, when, at the words ἐκάεστε ἐκάεστε τὸν πάνσοφον, ὃ Δαναοί, τὰν οὐδὲν ἀλγύνουσιν ἀηδὲνα Μουσαῖον, τῶν Ἑλλάνων τὸν ἀριστον, the whole

p. 41. λοντι τὰ ἑμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ
 οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς
 ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα
 διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἴεται μὲν,
 5 ἔστι δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, 5
 δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα τὴν πολλὴν
 c στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους
 ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ δια-
 λέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη
 εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ 10
 ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί
 εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον
 ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστίν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασ-
 σταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τι 15
 d τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ
 κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμε-
 λείται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ
 νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δηλὸν
 ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγ- 20

6. ἄγοντα] Edd. ἀγαγόντα. But there is strong syntactical justification (besides the weight of Oxon. and five other MSS.) for ἄγοντα. See Commentary.

audience, reminded of Socrates, burst into tears. Cf. Introd. p. xxviii. note 10.

6. ἄγοντα] Participle of the imperfect, which gives greater fullness and vividness than the aorist would have given. Cf. Legg. 635 a, καθάπερ μάντις ἀπὸν τῆς τότε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὐτά (meaning Lycurgus or Minos), 677 c, Ὡθμεν δὴ τὰς ἐν πεδίῳ πόλεις. . . ἄρδην ἐν τῷ τότε

χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι (meaning at the Deluge).

7. ἢ ἄλλους—εἴποι] The desire for brevity in the summing up of the enumeration breaks off the legitimate plan of the sentence: Dig. 257.

16. ἀληθές] 'As a verity.' See 18 a, note.

20. πραγμάτων] The wants and hardships of old age. Cf. Xen. Apol. 32, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ

μάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμέ οὐδαμοῦ p. 41.
 ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισα-
 μένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω.
 καίτοι οὐ ταύτη τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ
 5 κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ε
 ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσονδε δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν·
 τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἠβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὧ
 ἄνδρες, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύ-
 πουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του
 10 πρότερον ἐπιμελείσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι
 εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίξετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν,
 ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονται τι εἶναι ὄντες
 οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπον- p. 42.
 θῶς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς.
 15 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὄρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανομένῳ,
 ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὀπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ
 ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

6. δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν] Edd. μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι, and so all MSS. except Oxon. But which collocation most exactly suggests the emphasis required? The position of μέντοι has often to be referred to a subtle ear. Cf. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι, and Dig. 294. 17. ἦ] So edd., rightly. The weight of Oxon. with four other MSS., giving εἰ, is diminished by the itacism.

θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέαι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίου τὸ χαλεπώτατον ἀπέλιπε κ.τ.λ.

3. οὐ πάνυ] Here, as elsewhere, οὐ πάνυ marks only a bare denial: Dig. 139. Socrates is satisfied with saying, 'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.' His εἰρωνεία would in no case have suffered him to say, 'I am far from being displeased.'

8. ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες] By plying them unweariedly with warning and remonstrance.

17. πλὴν ἦ] This combination is exactly parallel to ἀλλ' ἢ. The two particles enter the combination coordinately, introducing the exception to the preceding universal negative in their own several ways. πλὴν implies 'it is known to none,—saying that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God; ' ἦ, less harshly, 'it is known to none, or however [only] to God.' See Dig. 148, and cf. Ar. Nub. 360, Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ γ' ἰπακούσαιμεν . . Πλὴν ἢ Προδίκῳ.

APPENDIX A.

Τὸ δαιμόνιον.

THE word δαίμων was used to denote either θεός or a spiritual being inferior to θεός. Its distinctive meaning as applied to either class is that it denotes such a being *in his dealings with men*. From Homer to Plato δαίμων is persistently marked by this meaning¹. Δαιμόνιος therefore denotes a connection with divine agency; and τὸ δαιμόνιον denotes sometimes such an agency, and sometimes the agent itself. So Aristotle (Rhet. II. xxiii. 8), τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἄλλ' ἢ θεός ἢ ² θεοῦ ἔργον, and for this distinction we may compare Plato (Phdr. 242 e), εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὥσπερ οὖν ἔστι θεός ἢ τι θείον δ' ἔρως. When we read in Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 2), διετεθρύλητο ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐαντῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν, both senses of the word are exemplified. Socrates meant by τὸ δαιμόνιον a divine agency; Meletus wrested this into the sense of a divine being. In the Apology Socrates marks the position as a caricature by the expression ἐπικωμωδῶν, and then gives the interpretation consistent with his own meaning—viz. δαιμόνια πράγματα. That Socrates is not speaking of a being is clear from other passages also, as when he says (Apol. 31 c), ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, or (Phdr. 242 b), τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον γίγνεσθαι, or (Euthyd. 272 e), τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον, or (Theæt. 151 a), τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον. Nor does Plato, who recognises the common notion

¹ In Plat. Symp. 202 d — 203 a, this view of δαίμων appears very distinctly, though there, as the doctrine held is that θεός ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται, all μαντικῆ is the province of the

δαίμων.

² Whence the phrase of Æschines (iii. 117. p. 70) ἴσως δὲ καὶ δαιμόνιον τινὸς ἐξαμαρτάνειν αὐτὸν προαγομένον is indeterminate.

of a personal attendant *δαίμων* (Legg. 730 a, Tim. 90 a), ever give this name to the phenomenon in question. Even Theages (as Zeller remarks, II. 65. n. 2) gives no personality to τὸ δαιμόνιον. Ἡ φωνὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου (Theag. 128 e) is ambiguous. Plato's use is sometimes adjectival (e. g. τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον), and sometimes elliptically substantival. Grammatically, Xenophon confines himself to the latter use only,—still merely in the signification of a divine agency. Zeller notices that the interpretation of Socrates' δαιμόνιον as a being remained peculiar to his accusers (Cicero translating it by *divinum quiddam*, Divin. I. 54, not by genius) until it was revived by Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers.

What then were the nature and function of this δαιμόνιον σημεῖον?

Let us first consult Xenophon, in whom the chief passages are these :

Mem. I. i. 2—5, διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐαντῷ σημαίνειν ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν καυώτερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρώνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οἷτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κάκεινος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλείστοι φασὶν ὑπὸ τῶν ὄρνιθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι. Σωκράτης δέ, ὡσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε. τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος. καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.

IV. iii. 12—13, Σοὶ δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκασίην ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι [οἱ θεοί], εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρῆ ποιεῖν καὶ ἅ μὴ. Ὅτι δὲ γε ἀληθὴ λέγω καὶ σύ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμνήσῃς ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῆ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβασθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς.

IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐαντῷ προσημαίνειν ἅ τε δεῖν καὶ ἅ μὴ δεῖν ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος.

IV. viii. 5—6, Ἄλλὰ νῆ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἐρμόγετες, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἠναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπέω, Θαυμαστά λέγεις. τὸν δέ, Θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἤδη;

IV. viii. 11, εὐσεβῆς οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν.

Symp. viii. 5, τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγει μοι τοτὲ δ' ἄλλου τοῦ ἐφίμενος.

To which must be added still from the *Memorabilia*, I. i. 19, Σωκράτης ἤγειτο πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ συγῆ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπέων πάντων.

Thus we see that Xenophon tells us nothing as to the nature of Socrates' δαιμόνιον, save that it was the instrument through which divine intimations reached him unsolicitedly. He adheres (unless we admit as his the θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται in § 12 of the Xenophontean Apology) to the expression σημαίνειν τὸ δαιμόνιον, meaning by this expression (as already said) that τὸ δαιμόνιον is but the instrument, while it is the gods who are the agents, whence in other passages we have as equivalent expressions [θεοὶ] προσημαίνουσι (Mem. IV. iii. 12), τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ (ib. viii. 6), θεῶν γνώμη (ib. 11). Its intimations differ from those obtained by μαντικὴ in being given spontaneously. Socrates is represented as having thought himself singular, as a matter of fact, in possessing this gift. He did not urge others to seek for a similar sign. Although he believed (Mem. I. i. 19) πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι . . . πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπέων πάντων, he seems either to have directed others to μαντικὴ (Mem. I. i. 6), or the oracle (Cic. de Divin. i. 54), or to have given them the benefit of his own divine intimations (Mem. I. i. 4). He however believed that if others had not this gift, it was by their own fault (Mem. IV. iii. 13).

What its function was according to Xenophon, we gather from the identification of its province with that of μαντικὴ, which is defined in Mem. I. i. 6—9, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐποίει καὶ τάδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἂνπραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδῆλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσομένου ἐπεμπεν εἰ ποιητέα· καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ λογιστικὸν ἢ οικονομικὸν ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ αἰρετὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἐαντοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἔφη δὲ δεῖν ἅ μὲν μαθάντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μαθάνειν, ἅ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πνιθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ὄσω ἴλεω σημαίνειν.

This accords with Plato, Apol. 40 a, ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου. It was no such guide in the matter of right and wrong as conscience is; nor yet an universal oracle to reveal truths of science or of futurity. Its function was on the one hand practical

—to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, of which Socrates had cognisance, either as himself a party to it or in the interest of his friends—, on the other hand it pronounced³ not on the morality but on the expediency (in the Socratic sense of what was really for the best) of the proposed course. This would not exclude from its decision moral questions, where the obligation either was obscure or mainly depended on the consequences. It was not a mere pre-sentiment, a foreboding of chance misfortune or of chance success, the mere reflection of a man's own feelings of happiness or gloom while in spite of them he carries out his course of action. It stamped in Socrates' belief a definite character of expediency or in expediency on the course intended, and he never disobeyed it.

In Plato the notable passages are these:—Apol. 31 c-d, *τούτου δὲ αἰτιῶν ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῶν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται φωνή, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδων Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γυρομένη, ἢ ἔταν γέννηται αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. 40 a-b, ἢ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ἀρθῶς πράξειν. νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἄπερ ὄρατε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιώντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἠνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμῶς μέλλοιτί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμῶς περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντιώται μοι.—Euthyd. 272 e, κατὰ θεὸν γὰρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, οὐπερ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ μόνος, καὶ ἦδη ἐν νῷ εἶχον ἀναστήναι· ἀνισταμένου δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμενον.—Phdr. 242 b, ἠνίκ' ἔμελλον, ὠγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο—αἰεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν—, καὶ τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἢ με οὐκ ἐῖ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον.—Alcib. I. init. 103 a-b, τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πέυσαι. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελήλυθα. εὐέλπις δὲ εἰμι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό.—Theææt. 151 a, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν*

³ Wiggers and Zeller have noticed this. Remark the contrast in the Apology. The matter of duty—not to desert the post of preacher to the

Athenian people—is thrown on the divine mission (28 e), the matter of judgment—to abstain from politics—is attributed to the δαιμόνιον (31 d).

μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι ἐνίοις δ' ἐῖ.—Rep. 496 e, τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἢ γὰρ ποῦ τινα ἄλλω ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. The passages in the Theages consist in part of parrot-like repetitions of descriptions of the phenomenon culled from various dialogues, in part of inventions founded on these.

The account in these passages exhibits some additions and variations as compared with that of Xenophon.

As to the nature of the phenomenon, it is explained to be a sign, which consists of articulate words, and the use of which corresponds to the *μαντικὴ* of other men. It is represented as a gift almost peculiar to Socrates, though by him possessed from his childhood upwards.

Its function seems somewhat heterogeneous, compared with what we have found it in Xenophon. Besides giving warnings as to an intended course of action, it reminds of a duty unperformed (Phdr.); or an advantage accrues from obeying it, which has no rational connection whatever with the obedience (Euthyd.). The tales of the Theages dwell on the marvel exclusively; yet, while they leave the *φωνή* unconnected with any act of the judgment, they leave room for supplying such a connection. Plato further tells us that its function was a negative one—*αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε* (Apol.). The importance of this limitation shall be considered presently.

From these data we may now seek to arrive at a conclusion for ourselves. According to both Xenophon and Plato the fact itself, which Socrates accounted for by the *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*, was a sudden sense, immediately before carrying a purpose into effect, of the expediency of abandoning it,—or, Xenophon would add, of prosecuting it. Meanwhile we are not bound to accept Socrates' account of the cause of this sudden feeling; first, because he was no psychologist, and, while in his own belief he was merely describing his own consciousness,—or, as Xenophon says, *ὥσπερ ἐγίνωσκεν οὕτω καὶ ἔλεγε*,—he was really importing into his description an inference of his own; secondly, because he rather diminishes the weight of his own testimony for us, not merely by his attention to dreams (Phædo 60 e), but more by his absolute faith in *μαντικὴ* and its use in obtaining for others the same divine guidance which he obtained unasked through the *σημεῖον*; and, thirdly, because while he believed himself to have detected divine agency here, he was perfectly unconscious of it in its more ordinary province, as the author of “all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works.” If, then,

declining Socrates' account, we are disposed to refer the phenomenon to ordinary psychological causes, we can do so satisfactorily, provided we confine our attention to Xenophon's account alone. All Xenophon's notices of it encourage the view, that it was a quick exercise of a judgment informed by knowledge of the subject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect without consciousness of the process. In a mind so purified by temperance and self-knowledge, so single of purpose and unperturbed by lower aims, endowed with such powerful natural faculties, especially those of observation and of causality, the ability to forecast and forejudge might become almost an immediate sense. But it must be confessed that some of the features in Plato's account are a little embarrassing to this view. The singularity ascribed by Plato (Rep. 496 c) to the gift need not rank among these difficulties, since Xenophon mentions it as a *singular* characteristic of Socrates (Mem. IV. viii. 11) that he was *φρόνιμος ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω, μηδὲ ἄλλον προσδέσθαι ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν*, which is the rationalised description of this very phenomenon. But the statement that Socrates enjoyed the gift from his earliest days is not fully consistent with the explanation just put forward,—with any consideration, that is, of the effect of observation, experience, moral training, or habit of mind. Again, as we have seen, two of the instances of the occurrence of the *σημεῖον* which are related in Plato preclude the explanation of an act of judgment. It is no judgment, however penetrating, which recalls Socrates from the stream he had purposed crossing and brings him back to Phædrus, or which forbids him to leave his seat just before the fortuitous entrance of Euthydemus and his companions. If we are to accept these features as historical, we must give up all attempt to rationalise the phenomenon at all, and fall back upon Socrates' own account as final. But, first, we have seen that there are reasons against accepting his account, and, secondly, against the historical probability of these two instances stands the fact that, though paralleled in Plutarch, they are unlike any other instances given by Xenophon and Plato; for (setting aside the Theages as apocryphal) in all the other instances it is implied that the course of action forbidden by the warning is prejudicial, not through its fortuitous consequences, but through something amiss in itself, and that the course upon which the agent is thrown back leads to the good result by a chain of means and not by a chain of accidents.

We must therefore adopt the alternative which involves less considerable difficulties, and regard Plato as less faithful than Xenophon in his illustration of the phenomenon. It is not difficult to suppose that by tracing it back to Socrates' boyhood nothing more may be intended than that his memory did not serve him to indicate the first beginning of those habits of observation and that moral and mental training from which the faculty grew. And as to the heterogeneous instances of warnings given by it, since as individual instances they are certainly inventions, part of the machinery of the dialogues in which they stand, it is doing no violence to Plato's genius to suppose, that as an inventor he has not scrupled to travesty the character which belonged to the actual and serious use of the gift, and to extend its operation playfully into the domain of chance.

There remains to be noticed in Plato's account the well-known restriction of τὸ δαιμόνιον to negative functions. In describing the sign as a voice, Plato adds (Apol. 31 d), *ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε*. One difficulty lies in the nature of the case. What kind of divine communication or what kind of judgment could that be which yielded only negative utterances? Certainly no act of judgment could be such: the same penetration which could discern the inexpediency of a course of action would serve for the discerning of the more expedient alternative. A divine communication might be imagined under any self-imposed restriction; still the restriction would, in proportion to its arbitrariness, discredit yet more this hypothesis, which we have already seen reason to abandon. Another difficulty lies in the conflict of testimony as to this peculiarity. Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as disapproving force (Mem. IV. viii. 1, *φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἃ τε δεῖ καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ ποιεῖν* cf. I. i. 4, as quoted above). Cicero (De Divin. i. 54) simply echoes Plato. Plutarch (De Socr. Dæm. c. 11. p. 1015), agreeing with Xenophon, represents the sign as *καλοῦν ἢ κελεῖον*.

These are the two difficulties which have to be met. No attempt has been made to meet the first: the second has been met by swallowing the first whole, and supposing Xenophon to be in error in not distinguishing the actual communication made by the sign, and the inference which Socrates made from it, and which might (as in Apol. 40 a) be positive. But we shall meet both difficulties by some such explanation as the following. As to the reconciliation of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say *ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με*, he

describes it by its most perceptible act, for its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable. It was only when the presentiment ran counter to his will that Socrates became distinctly conscious of it. An illustration of this oversight occurs in the statement of some moderns concerning conscience, that it has only a negative function,—as if there were no such thing as “an approving conscience.” In this case also the origin of the misstatement is the same, the more acute and marked character of the negative function. Thus it is the statement of Plato which needs to be supplemented, while that of Xenophon, so far from needing qualification, is alone commensurate with the common sense of the case. As to the fact to which Plato’s notice points, the words *προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε* would seem not to be an idle tautology, a reiteration of what we have seen to be a defective statement, but to mark another feature in the case. The Voice was no *impulse*; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgment on a purpose already in being. Motives, on the other hand, impel the will always in some direction; they cannot be negative. Thus the setting forth the first part of the statement on the negative side only is justified in a way by the antithesis. And the meaning of the two clauses together is, that the Voice is a reflexive judgment on purposed actions, but does not supply motives of action.

The fact which τὸ δαιμόνιον represented was an unanalysed act of judgment,—not on a principle, but on a particular course of action already projected; not on the morality of this, but on its expediency in the Socratic sense of the term. It was *κριτική*, not *ἐπιτακτική*. Whatever connection it might really have with the springs of the will would certainly be left out of the statement by one who could identify virtue with knowledge. It was Socrates’ substitute for *μαντική*. This implies that in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being (as we have seen) the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.

No Christian would be startled by a view which recognised every

part of his mental processes as performed in dependence on God,—nor on the other hand would he be shocked to hear them spoken of as independently and properly his own. So long as each view reached the whole way, he would be satisfied with it, and would comprehend it. What Socrates did was to halve each of these views, and to speak of his mental processes as human up to the point where he could still follow them,—beyond that as divine.