




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THE EUTHYPHRO

OF

PLATO

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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PRECEPTOREM DILECTISSIMUM.



P R E F A C E.

THE value of the *Euthyphro* as a specimen of Platonic writing has been fully recognised by scholars ; its greatest defect being, perhaps, its brevity ; and it has seemed to the writer that, if well mastered, the Dialogue will serve as an excellent introduction to the larger and more advanced compositions of Plato.

The writer of these Notes thanks most sincerely those who have, by their countenance or recommendations, enabled him to give his work to the public ; especially Rev. C. T. CRUTTWELL, Head Master of Bradfield College, Dr. HUCKIN, of Repton School, Dr. BAKER, of Merchant Taylors' School, Dr. GALLOP, of Christ's College, Finchley, and Rev. A. J. CHURCH, of Retford School. He is also much indebted to his colleague, A. D. GODLEY, Esq., for valuable assistance in revision of proofs.

BRADFIELD,

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
TEXT AND NOTES	19
EXCURSUS	65



THE EUTHYPHRO OF PLATO.

INTRODUCTION.

“IN the *Meno*, Amytus had parted from Socrates with the threatening words, that ‘in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier to do men harm than to do them good :’ and Socrates was anticipating another opportunity of talking with him. In the *Euthyphro*, Socrates is already awaiting his trial for impiety in the porch of the king Archon. But before the trial proceeds Plato would like to put the world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in that very matter touching which Socrates is accused. An incident which may perhaps really have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a learned Athenian diviner and soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the discussion.”

In these words Professor Jowett opens his introduction to the dialogue of the *Euthyphro*, one of the smaller but not less interesting dialogues which are concerned with the trial and condemnation of Socrates on a charge of impiety. To grasp the bearing of the dialogue, and to realise fully the circumstances of it, it will be well to glance shortly at the history of Greek religious thought, at the phenomenon of Socrates and his method of inquiry, and at the collision, as Plato

gives it, between the Athenian philosopher and the Athenian Conservatives.

And first, with regard to the origin and progress of religious inquiry in Greece, we must look back to the mythical Greece of Achilles, of Theseus, and of Agamemnon, as a country where the king rules, the priests perform religious offices, and the people obey both, as a matter of course, and as an obedience to tradition. The kings and the priests rule because they have found power placed in their hands, and the people obey because it has never occurred to them to do otherwise, or to question the divine right of kings—

οἷτε θέμιστας
πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται,¹

nor to dispute the propriety of religious observances. They were taught that the man who did his duty to his country and his country's gods was sure to prosper, that he would be θεοῖς φίλος, just as one who trespassed was θεοῖς ἐχθρὸς. Such was the religious attitude, uninquiring and restful.

By far the most important part of religion at this period was the observance of outward forms—forms which marked the worshipper as a true brother and member of the state under whose auspices they were performed ; just as in the subdivisions of the state—the φρατρίαι or *gentes*—there were solemn sacrifices offered at stated times when the presence of all heads of houses—φράτερες or clansmen—was required. In an early stage of civilisation such a mode of expressing confraternity was felt to be necessary, to prevent schism in the state and guarantee security by vows of mutual defence and good offices. This junction of the religious and clannish

¹ *Il.* 1, 239.

sentiment made the former more interesting and the latter more sacred. And such was religion in its civil or political aspect. But if we turn to the side of religion which respected the individual—the subjective side—what do we find? We find that the belief of which these outward forms and observances were the symbols, was—at any rate with respect to the gods—the secondary and the minor consideration. Belief, actively exercised, scarcely occurred to the worshipper of this period; and, if it did occur, had little importance attached to it.

Nor was it required as long as this unquestioning, obedient attitude was preserved towards religion. The prayers and sacrifices were regularly made; and, although certain gods might be less respected than others for their cowardice or lust, still such anthropomorphism made the religion easier of acceptance as a whole. If it had occurred to a Greek of this age we are considering to say, “These gods are nought,” he would have been laughed at, more for his inaptness than his impiety. “At any rate,” the reply would have been, “they are the gods to whom our fathers prayed, and they were prosperous upon the earth: why then should not we follow them? Let well alone.” Such a question was not suited to that age: the mind was not in a stage to receive such a consideration as the existence or non-existence of the gods.

But the inherent activity of the Greek intellect soon began to move from this resting-place, stimulated probably by contact with the culture and science of Egypt. The birth of Thales, commonly known as the first Ionic philosopher, or physicist, an Ionian, is placed about 639 B.C. In him we see the beginning of a new stage of thought, viz. that of scientific inquiry. This inquiry took at first the direction of physics. Such a man as

Thales would have looked round upon the universe and said to himself, "What and whence is all this?" And inquiries of this kind continued to be made with more or less assiduity down to the time we are specially considering and beyond. The question, then arises—"How did such inquiries affect popular beliefs and popular theology?" To answer this question we must ask first—"Who was the embodiment of the old religion? and what was the conception of Deity?" And we shall find that the ultimate authority, the supreme being, of religious contemplation was Zeus, in effect a glorified man, not very remote from the popular conception of a Hercules or a Theseus. True, behind Zeus there sometimes peeped out a still more important authority—Fate, Dire Necessity; but practically the religious horizon was bounded by the conception called Zeus. He was *πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*: and the Greeks said of themselves, Ἐκ Διὸς ἔσμεν. Now when men began to speculate, the authority of Zeus, like the authority of all other matters of traditional acceptance, came to be questioned. And other sources of all existence began to be looked for instead of the god Zeus, the only quality which was preserved from the conception of a god being that of unity. So for cloud-compelling Zeus one physicist substituted *water* as the origin of all things, and another *matter*, a third *air*; again we have a higher ideal of *being*, and of *mind*, of *number*, and of *change*. Ζεὺς ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν,¹ exclaims the chorus of old Argive senators in the *Agamemnon* of Æschylus;—"Zeus whoever he may be," implying an instability of belief in a personal God that seems marvellously out of place in Athens the home of gods—an instability exemplified in many other passages in the earliest writers.

¹ Æsch. *Ag.* 160.

If such speculations, on the origin of existence as affecting popular beliefs and traditions, had been confined to the chamber of the speculator, their result might have been considerably retarded but hardly suppressed. As it was, they were not concealed but given to the world. The men who speculated were generally prominent characters, being attached to the court and person of some tyrant or leading politician; and from such a position the propagation of their ideas was easy. But as long as these ideas were entertained and these inquiries were conducted under the protection and with the countenance of powerful patrons, the propagation was but limited. Such inquiries did not touch the bulk of the citizens, who were not amenable to the philosophers' influence, but were confined to the court of the tyrant or the clique of the minister. They were the relaxation of the learned, not the gospel for the ignorant. Such was the position occupied by the earlier philosophers.

Passing on next to that period when despotism was everywhere making room for democracy, we find philosophy in bad case; and, in this regard, democracy shows more tyrannical than tyranny. For what tyranny had countenanced or encouraged—viz. freedom of speculation—democracy, in its puristic care of the children of the state, would not hear of. Let us illustrate this change of bearing by an example. Anaxagoras, born *c.* B.C. 500, was an Ionian, settled at Athens, and the friend of Pericles. He had elaborated a system of philosophy in his mind which left him no interest in politics. This want of political taste was, as we know, a heinous fault in a Greek state. Even Solon, the equitable lawgiver, had forbidden citizens to "be of no side" in a political contest. although Solon knew well that political contests

frequently were settled only by civil war. In conformity with these facts Anaxagoras was marked out as a man worthy of indictment; and notice what the indictment was. Not merely that he was guilty of impiety—that he had enthroned *Novc* as Lord and Father of all things in the stead of Zeus—but that he was guilty of sedition. He was accused of Medism, *i.e.* of Persian proclivities, when, as Maurice remarks, “probably the fact that there was such an empire as the Persian existing had escaped him.” He was in consequence obliged to fly from Athens, and Pericles’ reputation suffered a temporary eclipse from supposed complicity with the dangerous philosopher.

We have, then, in Greek thought at this time the onward moving and the retarding element. Let us examine them. The Greek word expressing sedition, or revolutionary tendencies, is *νεωτερισμός*; to be a *seditionous* person is *καινίζειν* or *νεωτερίζειν*, *i.e.* a promulgator of new things. This word, bearing as it usually does a bad sense, embodies at once the conservatism (implied in the condemnatory use of the word) and a more important trait of the Greek mind, which we may call the Inquisitive, the Radical, or the Destructive, in whichever light we may regard it. The person who uses the word *νεωτερισμός* disapproves of the *νεωτεριστής*, who is none the less a fact in Greek politics and Greek society. This latter trait was really the stronger, and became ultimately the pervading one in Greece; but the conservative element was strong also and died hard, numbering amongst its defenders such champions as Aristophanes. In a matter of life and death—for such was this struggle regarded at any rate by the Conservatives—it is not to be wondered at if the blows were not always well directed, or if they did not

always hit the mark intended. Such a misdirected blow—to carry on the metaphor—was the prosecution of Socrates for impiety by Meletus, Anytus, and Lyco. These prosecutors were men striking in the dark: they could feel that Socrates was a prominent and an assailable figure, and so they struck, but scarcely knew why. Like Anaxagoras, Socrates was a philosopher; like him, also, Socrates was prosecuted for impiety. But before showing how this dialogue with Euthyphro springs out of the story of Socrates' indictment, we must pause to speak a few words about this unique and soul-stirring character, Socrates.

Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, was an Athenian citizen, born c. B.C. 468. He was of a constitution extraordinarily robust, and of an unprepossessing appearance. He had served with credit in military campaigns at Potidæa, Delium, and Amphipolis; and he had taken part in public trials and in legislation. In the latter department he had gained a character of strict impartiality with some, and of obstinacy with most of the Athenians, owing to his rigorous obedience to his principle. He was, in one word, a man of strong conviction—that is the keynote to his character; and perhaps we shall not err in saying that the strength of his convictions was never surpassed by that of any other man. He attributed this strength of his convictions to a supernatural, accompanying influence, which he called his *δαιμόνιον*, or spirit. What is conveyed exactly by this term is hard to say. Plato's account of it is as follows: that it was a *φωνή*, or monitorial voice, that it had been with him from a child, that it prevented him from taking part in politics, and that it never originated action, but only prevented particular acts. αἰὲ ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. Socrates himself

looked upon it as a direct spiritual deterrent, to guard him from wrong acts which ignorance or rashness might suggest, to the temporary subjection of his better judgment. The Christian will see in it a strong similarity to the voice of conscience. Dr. Riddell's note in his edition of the *Apologia* gives a full account of the passages bearing on the subject, and will be consulted with advantage. Socrates' psychological history was given as follows by himself: he had a great desire for wisdom and knowledge, in the search for which he never rested. But he found it so difficult of acquirement that he was nearly in despair. For in his search, although he approached, as was natural, all kinds of men with reputations for wisdom and for knowledge, scientific and otherwise, he found that—to use his own expression—they all of them knew nothing and yet thought they did. And this discovery, by the way, confirmed his belief in the truth of the Delphic oracle, from which he had learnt with surprise that he was himself the wisest man on earth. "For," he concluded, "if all these would-be wise men say that they know and know not, then I, who do not know, but confess my ignorance, am in this respect wiser than them all." A negative conclusion, and one eminently characteristic of Socrates. He then made it the business of his life in the first place to convict men of their ignorance, and in the second to supply as much positive knowledge as could be educed from conversational intercourse between himself, his followers and friends, and the Athenian public. He did not arrogate the title and position of teacher in these conversations, or rather *conversazioni*; he was rather the director, who encouraged the conversation and pointed out who was on the right track, and where error lay. He met every man on equal

ground, presupposed no superior information in himself, but rather seemed to give others credit for it, and endeavoured by a method of conversational argument, as logical as the age permitted, to set in their true light and reduce to their truest form, any statements that might be hazarded by the speaker or might appear in the course of the conversation. A favourite means of bringing out the ignorance of a dogmatic conversationalist was this affected ignorance of Socrates—his *σιρωρεία*, as it was called. By putting forward his ignorance, he would lead the other speaker on to rash assertions, the falsity of which could be easily demonstrated by a rigorous application of logic, thereby confuting positions which might often have been held by less aggressive advocates of their soundness. Another point of importance in Socrates' method is his recognition of the value of definition. "Define Piety," says Socrates. The answer is, "Piety is doing as I am now doing, viz. bringing a guilty man to justice." "No; that is pious," replies Socrates; "a particular act of piety, not piety itself." In this word-fencing, which bears so conspicuous a part in the dialogues of Plato, Socrates is not always strictly consistent: he is not above using a little quibbling here and there to convict a man of false statement, so long as he is convicted.¹ And to finish our sketch of Socrates as the dialectician, we must not omit a pleasant trait²—his repugnance to the idea of taking money for his teaching; nor his humour;³ nor the unbounded patience with which he brought out a conclusion or demonstrated an error. It remains to say a word upon the outcome of Socrates' practice of conversation in Athens. The immediate outcome was the death of Socrates. And why? We

¹ v. not. ad c. xv.² c. iii.³ ch. i.

have seen the age of inquiry succeeding the age of belief and repose. We hear Athenian νεωτερίζοντες asking of everything—"Why is this so? What authority have we for this statement, that institution?" Socrates lived in the very *mêlée* of such an age. Since the philosophers and poets had first started the ball of inquiry, it had been rolling with ever-increasing velocity, shaking and overturning everything that could not offer a firm resistance. Inquiry is a noble right of mankind, but, like all rights, is liable to perversion. Such perversion follows when the inquirers are unscrupulous, depraved, or ignorant. Socrates represents the enlightened inquirer; he was taken for the depraved one. Of this latter type specimens abounded, who were guilty of the moral iconoclasm, the excesses, the perversions of youth, the stupid insubordination to constituted authority, of which Socrates and his friends were accused, and for which Socrates paid the penalty of death. To conclude: we might not inaptly term the period of Socrates' accusation and death the Athenian Revolution; for in the mental history of mankind it was the culmination of the greatest movement the world has ever seen. At that time philosophy, literature, psychology, and science were receiving a direction and an influence the effect of which has by no means yet ceased to be felt.

✓ Whatever doubts may have been thrown on the authenticity of the *Euthyphro* as a genuine Platonic dialogue can hardly fail to be dispelled on its perusal. In its masterly delineation of character, its perspicacity of style, its grasp of dialectic, and its elucidation of truth by the confutation of error, it is worthy of a place

by the side of the best of Plato's dialogues, and although one of the shortest, it is one of the most typical. Here are the Socratic logic, the Socratic εἰρωνεία, the protest against the popular theology, the conception of unity in plurality, the antagonism against spurious knowledge, and the "conclusion where nothing is concluded"—all embraced in a short conversation of a few pages. The dialogue arises out of the prosecution of Socrates on a charge of impiety by Meletus, Anytus, and Lyco. In the words of Professor Jowett, quoted above, Plato would like to try the world for impiety before the world proceeds to try Socrates. And Plato takes, as a representative of the world, the Athenian world, that is, a man, Euthyphro. His character is best unfolded by the dialogue itself. He is what we might term a religionist—a man of forms and ceremonies, of an antiquated and outrageous theology, and of incurable prejudice. Plato introduces him to us as a prosecutor in a suit of painful grotesqueness—the prosecution of his own father for murder.

To explain this apparently outrageous conception, we must suggest that Plato has taken Euthyphro as a type of the Athenians themselves, and is attempting to put before the Athenians their own inconsistency, and has donned for the nonce the comic mask of Aristophanes. Just as, in the comedy of *The Clouds*, Aristophanes had represented a son beating his father as a result of sophistic teaching, so here Plato would remind the Athenians that their own theology and legislation can be, and is, brought to an absurdity and a caricature in the hands of its bigoted and unthinking professors. Socrates in this dialogue says, in effect: "You persecute me for impiety, so be it; but are you free from

the charge of impiety yourselves, Athenians? The tales, the immoral and blasphemous tales, which make up a large part of your religion, so-called, are impiety, not my teaching, which would drive such abominations out of religion, and which you call radical, unconstitutional, and corrupting."

In *Euthyphro* then we have a picture of the conservative Athenian who is perfectly satisfied with his own religion, no matter into what glaring absurdities it may lead him. Now to see in what manner Socrates encounters this incarnation of bigotry and into what questions he attempts to lead the mind of the bigot. The main idea running through the *Euthyphro* would seem to be of this tenor. To define piety is impossible; we cannot say what is holy, but we can act it; and therefore let every man try to be pious and serve God, and not lay down the law about piety. *Euthyphro*, on the contrary, is quite ready to define piety or anything else with which religion is concerned, and Socrates, in his usual way, humours him and requests a definition. But the definition given is soon shown to be inadequate, and another is requested, and a third. In the first, *Euthyphro* says, "Piety is doing what I am now doing." Next, "Piety is that which is dear to the gods, or to all the gods." Thirdly, "Piety is attention to the gods." And when for the third time he is shown to have given an inadequate rule of piety, he does not take his failure to heart; he does not say, "I confess I know nothing certain about piety; pray teach me." No! he is content to leave certain knowledge alone, and go on in his own pretentious and superficial creed. He goes his way into the law court to contest against his own father the law as he reads it, and Socrates goes his; not however to

contest in a law court, but to search the wide world for an answer to his unceasing inquiry, "What is Right? Is there a man on earth who can tell me?" until the Athenians weary of this questioner who is a reproach to their city and their creed, silencing his eloquent and earnest converse in the tomb.

ANALYSIS.

Eu. What has brought you to the law court, Socrates ?

Soc. An impeachment of corrupting the youth, Euthyphro, preferred by one Meletus, a clever lad ; he is reforming the state, and begins by reforming me. He says I make new gods.

Eu. Ah ! the Athenians will not listen to what I have to say on that subject ; they laugh.

Soc. I wish they would only laugh, if they would hear as well. Well, and what is your suit ?

Eu. I am prosecuting my father for murder.

Soc. Good heavens ! What a theologian, if you can do that without fear of heaven's vengeance !

Eu. My dear Socrates, in a case of right and wrong, relationship has no place. My father killed a hired servant (a murderer himself) by wilfully neglecting him in chains.

Soc. Then if you are so certain that you are right, be my champion and be my reference ; when they prosecute me, I will say, Here is Euthyphro, he knows that I am not wrong ; fight out the question with him. Now tell me what is holiness and unholiness.

Eu. That which I am now doing in my prosecution, Socrates, is holy, just as Zeus acted towards Cronus, and Cronus towards Ouranus.

Soc. Why! do you believe all that? Do you think the gods fought and quarrelled as people say?

Eu. Certainly I do.

Soc. Really. But you didn't tell me what holiness is—you said, "This particular thing is holy." Now that doesn't tell me what holiness is. What is the general definition of holiness?

Eu. Oh! holiness is that which is dear to the gods, and *vice versa*.

Soc. Stay! You said that the gods disputed, did you not? Then how are we to know, if they dispute, what is holy and what is unholy, for they will have different opinions? And it is not on minor questions, just as if you and I were to differ on a question of dates, but on the most important questions of faith and morals that they will differ.

Eu. They could never differ about justice being done, for instance.

Soc. No more do men; they are all anxious for justice to be done. The difficulty is what is the right? what is justice? When they are agreed on that, men and gods, they will do it, and not before. So you have not given me a rule for finding holiness. Shall we say what *all* the gods love is holy, and what they *all* detest, unholy?

Eu. Yes.

Soc. Is the holy loved by the gods because holy, or holy because loved by the gods?

Eu. I don't follow.

Soc. Try in this way: everything borne, led, seen, become, loved, implies something that bears, leads, sees, makes, loves. And this something is prior to the other. Therefore, "the gods love," is a prior notion to "loved by the gods." Therefore also the gods do not love because a thing is god-beloved; they love a thing for

some other reason. And this other reason will imply a notion prior to the gods loving, just as the gods loving is prior to the notion god-beloved.

Then if you grant that the gods love holiness because it is holy, we shall have these three notions in order of priority and extension :—

- (1) Holiness.
- (2) The gods loving.
- (3) God-beloved.

From these we will draw our deductions. And I am proving that holiness is not merely the same as god-beloved, as you say. For,

(1) If holiness and god-beloved were the same,

Then holiness would be a posterior notion to the gods loving ;

But holiness is a prior notion to the gods loving.

Therefore it is not the same with the god-beloved.

(2) If the god-beloved and holiness were the same,

Then the god-beloved would be a prior notion to gods loving ;

But the god-beloved has been proved to be a posterior notion to gods loving,

Therefore it is not the same with holiness.

So that you have not defined me holiness even now.

Eu. You are a Dædalus ; you make the argument act like a moving creature.

Soc. No, it is you ; but let us go on. Justice and holiness are not the same thing, are they ? All holiness is just ; but it does not follow that all justice is holy. Just as it is true that all reverence implies fear ; but not true that all fear implies reverence.

Cannot we then get a definition of holiness, by seeing what part of justice it is.

Eu. Oh, yes; holiness is that justice which attends to the gods.

Soc. Attends to them? As men attend to dogs and horses, &c., to make them better and finer. But how do we make the gods better and finer; or help them to do great deeds, as the physicians' art helps them to cure sick people?

Eu. I don't know. If you do your duty in the way of sacrifices and prayers, you will be prosperous and you will be holy.

Soc. Oh! I see; holiness is the science of giving and taking with the gods, a sort of business?

Eu. Business, if you like—we give them honour and glory.

Soc. Things that please them, in fact.

Eu. Certainly.

Soc. Ah! but we proved that holiness was not that which pleased the gods, the god-beloved, in fact.

Eu. Daedalus again; you have brought it round once more. I must be off. Good morning.

Soc. Alack! alack! I thought I was to be told how to live and please heaven.



ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ.

CAP. I.

Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν Steph. Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις ² περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν; οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοί γε δίκη τις οὔσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

ΣΩ. Οὔτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοί γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, δικὴν αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφήν.

νεώτερον. Stallbaum finds this use of the comparative, *i.e.*, newer than we already have, "novus novius," especially natural to the Athenians, who were always telling or hearing some new thing. But forms like "sæpius" will illustrate it better.

ἐν Λυκείῳ . . . sc. γυμνασίῳ. The colonnades of the gymnasium were the resort of philosophers. This gymnasium was so called from the neighbouring temple of Apollo Lyceus.

διατριβάς. This word seems to combine the meanings of haunts and pursuits. The latter is preferable.

βασιλέως στοάν. The στοά is that of Zeus Eleutherius; the βασιλεύς is that archon whose duties were religious, who pre-

sided over prosecutions for impiety or murder. Compare Theaetetus ad fin., νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν ἣν με γέγραπται. (The Lyceum and Eleutherium were at opposite points of the city.)

καὶ σοί γε . . . οὔσα τυγχάνει. "You have not, I suppose, as well as I . . ."

οὐ . . . δίκη . . . ἀλλὰ γραφήν. γραφή is used only of a public prosecution, under which head fell those tried by the βασιλεύς: δίκη is the general term. Its first sense (which we find in the next sentence) is "bill of accusation," lodged with the magistrate. Thus γεγράφται, "has had a bill entered," middle voice.

ΕΥΘ. Τί φής; γραφήν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπται; οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνωσόμαι, ὡς σύ γε ἕτερον;

B ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΥΘ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὸν ἄνδρα· νέος γὰρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώστ' ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι δὲ τὸν δῆμον Πιπθεὺς, εἴ τινα νῶ ἔχεις Πιπθέα Μέλητον, οἷον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δέ.

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γραφήν σε γέγραπται;

C ΣΩ. Ἦντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννή, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ

B. οὐ γάρ, &c. "For I will not suspect you of bringing an action against any one." Lit., "For I will not think *that* badly of you (as might be vulgarly said) that you are accusing another."

οὖν. If there is any logical sequence in the use of this particle, we must understand some such ellipse as, "You know me well, and *so* cannot suspect me of that," *i.e.* "of course not."

Notice that πάνυ τι is generally found with a negative.

ἀγνώστ', passive, "obscure."

μέντοι, adversative particle.

"But his name . . ."

ἔστι δὲ τὸν δῆμον, called by Jelf (579, 4) the adverbial accusative, because it limits or defines the verbal notion of being. Cf. Her. 6, 83, Κλέανδρος γένος ἐὼν Φιγαλεὺς ἀπ' Ἀρκαδίας.

εἴ τινα νῶ ἔχεις. "If you remember." Thus Socrates in the Republic (490 A), when recapitulating, says ἠγείτο δέ, εἰ νῶ ἔχεις, ἀλήθεια.

οἷον τετ., *i.e.* τοιοῦτον ὅς ἐστι τετανότριξ, cf. Thuc. 7, 21, πρὸς ἄνδρας πολμηροὺς, οἴους καὶ Ἀθηναίους, and Soph. Trach. 443, πῶς δ' οὐ χιτέρας (sc. ἄρχει) οἷας γ' ἐμοῦ. It is a species of the common attraction of the relative to the case of the antecedent.

τετανότ. with long straight hair. οὐ πάνυ εὐγ. implying youth.

ἐπίγρυπον. Cf. 474 Rep. C., τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρύπον βασιλικόν φατε εἶναι.

ἦντινα, &c. Through this statement of Socrates runs a vein of that quiet but suggestive and biting irony in which he is unequalled. This is not

νέον ὄντα τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνωκεναι οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν. ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὡς φησιν, οἶδε, τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς. καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδὼν ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλικιώτας αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου, ὡσπερ πρὸς μητέρα, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεται μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος ἄρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον D ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὅ τι ἄριστοι, ὡσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει, τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησιν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων

εἰρωνεία, which was a dialectical process.

C. τὸ . . . ἐγνωκέμαι. These words form the subject of the sentence: "A young man determining upon such an important step." But translate, "It is no mean enterprise for a young man," &c.

διαφθ. This corrupting influence must usually be taken of the moral side of a man's nature, though it trenches sometimes on the intellectual.

ὡς διαφθ. Understand ἐμοῦ from ἐμὴν.

πρὸς τὴν μητέρα. So Thrasymachus, in the Republic, when he is angered with Socrates for worsting him in argument, says, "Have you a nurse, Socrates?" Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, τίτθη σοί ἐστιν;

πολιτικῶν. Jowett, "our political men." Stallb. and Matthiae, "politics." The latter seems preferable, which will then depend on ἄρχεσθαι.

D. ὀρθῶς γάρ . . . Supply πολιτικῶν ἄρχεσθαι, "For the right way to begin . . . is to . . ."

ἐπιμεληθῆναι. The middle here should be brought out; its force, "apply one's self to," e.g.

ἔσονται. Notice this realistic future (instead of an ordinary conjunctive) pointing to the certain result of a proper training.

εἰκός, sc. ἐστι.

καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος. "Well then, Meletus also," sc. in his moral and political husbandry: the particles mark the transition from the simile to the reality.

ἴσως. Here again the sarcasm peeps out = "no doubt."

τὰς βλάστας. Keeping up the metaphor, "these young sprigs."

ἐκκαθ. This word, from the special sense of cleansing, has come to be applied to any removal of superfluous or objectionable matter, and is used of finishing a statue, ridding a land

ἐπιμεληθεῖς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος τῇ πολει γενησεται, ὡς γε το εἶκος ξυμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένω.

CAP. II.

ΕΥΘ. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὀρρώδῳ, μὴ τοῦναντίου γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀφ' ἐστίας ἀρχεσθαι κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σέ. καί μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιούντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;

B ΣΩ. Ἄτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι. φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινούς ποιούντα θεούς, τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἔνεκα, ὡς φησιν.

ΕΥΘ. Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ

of pests, clearing an account, washing the interior of a corpse for preservation.

τὸ εἶκος. Implying a reference to the particular case in hand: "the natural result," opposed to εἶκος, "likely."

ἀτεχνῶς, "without art," i.e. "simply" or "plainly." With this adverb join ἀφ' ἐστίας. For the expression, compare Ar. Vesp. 846—

ἀλλ' ἵνα

Ἄφ' ἐστίας ἀρχόμενος ἐπιτοίψω
τινά.

τί καὶ π. "Quid tandem facilentem," Stallb. The particle καὶ adds a notion of disbelief in the idea expressed by the word it precedes. In every explanation of a Greek particle, it must be remembered that the voice and gesture accompanying it pro-

bably told much more than the word itself, which was often a mere peg on which they hung.

B, ἄτοπα . . . ἀκοῦσαι. The sense is clear: "A monstrous charge, according to the account we have of it." A similar phrase is ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, "using this expression;" and in the Philebus, 12 C., we have this phrase with the omission of ὡς, ἔστι γὰρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως, ἀπλως ἐν τι. It is called by Matthiae the absolute infinitive.

θαυμάσιε, my fine fellow: lit., "wonderful," "admirable."

ποιητὴν, a side thrust at the poetaster Meletus.

τούτων αἰτ. ἐν. "On these two counts."

Μανθάνω, "I hear" (colloquially), "I understand." For the δαιμόνιον, v. Introduction, p. 7.

δαιμόνιον φῆς σουτῶ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελωῶσιν ὡς μαινομένου· καίτοι οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἶρηκα ὧν προεῖπον· ἀλλ' ὅμως φθονῶσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμόσε ἰέναι.

ἐκάστοτε, “on each occasion.” Thus we find it put in the same sentence with *ἀεί*, Ar. Nub., 1279—

πότ' ἐρα νομίζει καινὸν ἀεί τὸν Δία
 ἕιν ὕδωρ ἐκάστοτ', ἦ . . . (i.e.
 “every time he does rain.”)

This rendering agrees with the intermittent and unoriginative character of the δαιμόνιον.

καινοτομοῦντος. The idea involved in this word is that of cutting *into* something afresh. Observe the vowel variation of this and other roots in different combinations. Thus—

Verb pres.—ει, ε, ο: τέρνω, βάλλω, σπείρω.

Verb aor.—α: ἔταμον, ἔβαλον, ἔσπαρον.

Verb comp.—ο: καινοτομέω, διάβολος, ὁμόσπορος.

In translating, make two sentences of the passage: thus

Jowett, “He thinks you are a neologian; and he is going to have you up before the court for this.”

ὡς διαβαλ . . . ἔρχεται, “He seems to be *going* to play the part of a traducer.”

C. ὧν προεῖπον. A common attraction of the relative to the case of the antecedent. Cf. Thuc. 7, 21, ἄγαν ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἔπεισε στρατιάν.

ἀλλά . . . ἀλλά. The first is adversative of the clause καίτοι . . ., the second of both clauses preceding taken together, and might be translated, “Well! we mustn't pay heed . . .”

ὁμόσε ἰέναι. Latin: *cominus pugnare*, “come to close quarters.” Cf. Thuc. 2, 62, ὁμόσε ἰέναι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, and Ar. Eccl. 863, βαδιστέον ὁμόσ' ἑοσί, and Dem. Dionysod. 12 δδ, 14, ὡς ἑώρα ἡμᾶς ὁμόσε πορευομένους, “When he saw us going straight at him, ready to prosecute,” i.e.

CAP. III.

ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. Ἀθηναίοις γάρ τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται
 D εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

ΕΥΘ. Τούτου οὖν πέρι ὕπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ

ἴσως οὐδὲν πρ. So Gorg. 447, B, οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι.

δεινόν. This word expresses a quality on which the Athenians prided themselves, viz. that of skill and daring combined. Cf. the description of the chariot-race in *Electra*, Soph., 731, γνοὺς δ' οὐξ Ἀθηνῶν δεινὸς ἠνιοστρόφος, "And the daring charioteer from Athens seeing it . . ." Compare the whole description of Athenian aggression and daring in *Thucydides*, I, 68, seqq.

D. μὴ μέντοι διδάσκ. "Provided that he be not anxious to impart his knowledge, learning." μὴ introduces a supposition, not a fact.

ποιεῖν, sc. τοιοῦτον. "But if they think any man of this kind is making others like himself."

εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ. Cf. Pericles' criticism of Athenian audiences, *Thuc.* 2, 35, ὅτε γὰρ ξυνειδῶς καὶ εὐνοῦς ἀκροατῆς τάχ' ἂν τι ἐνδεεστέρως πρὸς ἃ βούλεται τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομίσειε δηλοῦσθαι, ὅτε

ἄπειρός ἐστιν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον εἴ τι ὑπὲρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἀκούοι.

ὃν δ' ἂν . . . θυμοῦνται. Omission of the demonstrative object after θυμοῦνται. We should expect ἐὰν δέ τινα οἴωνται . . . τούτῳ θυμοῦνται. The construction is due to the synthetic tendency which avoids a demonstrative where the sense can be preserved in a continuous relative clause.

ὡς σὺ λέγεις. Here we notice Socrates guarding against a conclusion that is open to question. He never takes anything for granted that admits of question or of further substantiation.

σπάνιον σεαυτ. ποιεῖν. Jowett paraphrases, "You are select in your acquaintance." Lit., "make yourself rare," or "difficult of access."

ὑπὸ φιλ. Explanatory, gives the reason. Lat., quae mea est comitas: it does not strike the Athenians so; it is put in parenthetically so by Socrates to show why he teaches.

αὐτοῖς ὅ τί περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἠδέως, εἴ τις μου ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου καταγελάειν, ὡσπερ σὺ φῆς σαυτοῦ, Εὐθύφρων οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη ἀηδὲς παίζοντας καὶ γελώντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν, εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ὅπη ἀποβήσεται ἀδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσι.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν.

CAP IV.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὲ δη σοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τις ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις;

δοκῶ αὐτοῖς, "I am known,"
"I have the reputation."

ἄνευ μισθοῦ. This was one of the great differences between Socrates and the ordinary sophist. Cf. Rep. 337, D., where Thrasymachus says they cannot expect him to expound his views for nothing. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότισον ἀργύριον.

ἀλλὰ καί. Here we pass into the sphere of the potential: the potential particle ἂν is employed, and the verb historic conjunctive. Expanded, "εἰ τις ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν, μίσθον προστιθεῖ ἂν." Other neuter verbs of the kind are, κερδαίνειν, to gain; συμβάλλεσθαι, to contribute, &c., Stallb.

οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη. Notice Socrates' lofty indifference to human weakness, if he can only obtain any sort of hearing for his gospel.

Ε. ὅπη ἀπόβησεται. Quo scilicet modo eventurum sit.

ἔδηλον, &c. Socrates seems here to betray an expectation that the movement bodes no good to him; veiling it in the usual Greek fashion with a euphemistic obscurity of expression.

φ. αὐτὴν. "Are you being prosecuted in your suit?" Acc. of respect or further limitation. Cf. Ar. Eq., 617, πῶς τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἀγωνίσω; and Dem. 653, 25, γραφὴν ἀγωνίεσθαι. To be engaged in a matter, a trial. So here, "Are you defendant or prosecutor in your suit?" Or, to explain it thus:—In such an expression the acc. will be found to be the case in which the substantive ordinarily occurs in kindred expressions: e.g., δίκην or γραφὴν, γράφεσθαι, &c. And it may then be transferred by analogy to intransitive verbs such as διώκω, φεύγω.

ΕΥΘ. Διώκω.

ΣΩ. Τίνα;

4 ΕΥΘ. Ὀν διώκων αὐ̄ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;

ΕΥΘ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅς γε τυγχάνει
ὦν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΕΥΘ. Ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ σός, ὦ βέλτιστε;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὲ τί τὸ ἔγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΥΘ. Φόνου, ὦ Σωκράτες;

ΣΩ. Ἡράκλεις ἢ που, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀγνοεῖται
ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὅπη ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει. οὐ γὰρ
B οἶμαί γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἶναι ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξει.
ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

ΕΥΘ. Πόρρω μέντοι νῆ Δί', ὦ Σώκράτες.

ὄν διώκων. Notice again this synthetic construction.

πετόμενον. A double sense is here intended. For the word means besides "flying" (the ordinary sense), to move swiftly. Cf. εἰώθαμεν λέγειν ἐπὶ τῶν ταχέως τρεχόντων, ὅτι πέτονται; and Rep. 567, D., πολλοὶ ἤξουσι πετόμενοι, said of people gathering quickly towards an object.

πολλοῦ, gen. privative, acc. to Jelf. Matthiae explains it as a genitive of *distance from*, applicable strictly to the first meaning of the verb, but transferred to its secondary sense. Jowett, "Nay, he is not very *volatile* at his time of life."

ἢ που. "Asseverationem ἢ cum dubitatione που significant," Stallb. "Certainly," or "surely, *I should think*."

ὅπη ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, "what is right." Lit., *where* the case stands right on any occasion (ποτέ). So οὕτως ἔχει, κακῶς ἔχει, &c., &c.

τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος. Cf. Rep. 352, C., οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὕντινα τρόπον χρῆ ἤν. "The question does not treat of a *chance* subject." So here, "a *chance* person," "any one."

B. σοφίας. For this genitive, cf. Lysides, 204, D., πόρρω ἤδη εἰ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος; and Ar. Ran. 35—

καὶ γὰρ ἐγγὺς τῆς θύρας ἤδη
βαδίζων εἰμί.

μέντοι. If we are to find any adversative force in this particle here, we must suppose such an ellipse as, "But (of course *I see*) they must certainly be."

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; ἢ δῆλα δὴ οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὑπὲρ γε ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξήμισθα φόνου αὐτῷ.

ΕΥΘ. Γελοῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἶει τι διαφέρειν εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκείος ὁ τεθνεὺς, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκη ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκη, ἔαν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπεξιέναι, ὅ ἐάν περ ὁ κτείνας συνέστιός σοι καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος ἦ. ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μίasma γίγνεται, ἐὰν ξυνηῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνειδώς, καὶ μὴ ἀφοσιοῖς σεαυτὸν τε καὶ ἐκείνον τῇ δίκη ἐπεξιῶν. ἐπεὶ ὄγε ἀποθανῶν πελάτης τις ἦν.

τῶν οἰκείων τις. For Socrates would not suppose Euthyphro capable of pushing such an accusation against his father unless the plea of family satisfaction at least could be urged.

τεθνεὺς. This participle is formed analogically from a syn-copated form of the perfect. So we find ἔσταμεν, τέθνατον, τέθναμεν, ἐστώς, πεπτῶτος, &c.

Γελοῖον, &c. This sentence requires careful analysis. The words ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, seqq., give *Euthyphro's view of what ought to be done* in the case of a murder, he having dismissed Socrates' suggestion in the words γελοῖον . . . τεθνεὺς. But we must notice that οὐ refers to Socrates' mistaken view of the case, and does not belong to δεῖν φυλάττειν. Leaving it out, we might paraphrase, "Whilst the true course is to notice," &c. For the legal question, v. fin. Note.

ἐάν περ . . . ξυνέστιος . . . The revolting idea of a son proceeding against a father for such a crime will appear less repulsive, though hardly less dreadful, if we call to mind the intense belief of the

Greeks in an actual Nemesis or "providence of retribution." The extreme and typical instance of this is the murder of Clytemnaestra by her son Orestes, which, it will be remembered, was solemnly justified by the testimony of a goddess. Aesch. Eum. Stallbaum adds another motive for the proceeding, viz., the fear of being implicated in the crime; a view which he fortifies with an apt quotation from Hor. 3, i. 11, Od. :—

"Vetabo qui Cereris sacrum
Volgarit arcana, sub isdem

Sit trabibus fragilemve
mecum

Solvat phaselon. Sæpe Diespiter
Neglectus incesto addidit inte-
grum."

ἴσον. Sc. to you as to him.

Ο. ἀφοσιοῖς. Conjunctive *prim.* notice.

πελάτης. These were attached to the soil, not actual slaves, but received a sixth of the produce they raised for their hirers. Hence called ἐκτῆμοροι, ἐργολάβοι, θῆτες, villeins or serfs.

ἐμός, καὶ ὡς εἰσωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευσεν ἐκεῖ παρ ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτόν. ὁ οὖν πατὴρ ξυνδήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, **D** καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δεῦρο ἄνδρα πειυσόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου ὀλιγῶρει τε καὶ ἡμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὄν πρᾶγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν. ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ῥίγους καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνήσκει πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον παρὰ τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὅ τε πατὴρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὔτε ἀποκτείναντι, ὡς φασιν ἐκεῖνοι, οὔτ' εἰ ὅ τι

ἐν Νάξῳ. Such an occupation (of a conquered territory) was called a κληρουχία, and the holder κληρουχός, or γεώμορος. For the account of this colonisation, v. *Thuc.* I, 98, compared with *Plut. Pericl.* ii.

οἰκετῶν. These were the regular bought slaves, domestics.

D. ἐξηγητοῦ. Used of an expounder of oracles in Herodotus. At Athens their duties were monopolised by the Eumolpidae, the guardians of traditional, unwritten law or usage; their nearest counterpart were the jurists of Rome, cf. *Dem. Euerg.* 1160, ἦλθον ὡς τοὺς ἐξηγητὰς ἵνα εἰδείην ὅτι με χρὴ ποιεῖν περὶ τούτων.

ὀλιγῶρει. The latter part of this word is said to be akin to *Lat. cura*. *Gk. οὔρος*, a guard, cf. Ἄρκτουρος, vereor, ward, ware, guard. We can certainly trace other words through exactly the same changes, e.g. :—

Gk.	Lat.	Eng.
οἶνος	vinum	wine
ἰτέα	vitis	withy
	vimen	
	vicio	
αἶ	vae	woe
ἔργον		work

οὐδὲν ὄν π. *V.S.* 3 fin. for the expression: a curious though common absolute accusative construction, paralleled by *Rep.* 426 C. προαγορεύουσι τοῖς πολίταις τὴν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως ὅλην μὴ κινεῖν, ὡς ἀποθανοῦμενον, ὅς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ. See also 604 B, κάλλιστον ἥσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐν ξυμφοραῖς, ὡς οὐδὲν προβαῖνον τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι.

τῶν δεσμῶν, "the manacles he had on him," his chains. So in French, la tête, his head.

οὔτ' ἀποκτείναντι . . . οὔτ', &c. The speaker is here hurried into some confusion of language by his vehement statement. *Lit.* "who has neither killed him,

μάλιστ' ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀνδροφόνου γε ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ υἷον πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξιέναι· κακῶς εἰδότες, ὧ Σώκρατες, τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὀσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ὧ Εὐθύφρον, οὕτως ἄκριβῶς οἶει ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅπη ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὀσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὥστε τούτων οὕτω πραχθέντων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικάζόμενος τῷ πατρὶ, ὅπως μὴ αὖ σὺ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνης πράττων;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τω ἂν διαφέροι Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.

so they say, nor, even if he had, should one give thought to a murderous wretch like the deceased." The second οὔτε begins an entirely fresh sentence, although corresponding logically to the first οὔτε, which stands before a subordinate clause; and so we should expect another dependent sentence after the second οὔτε to this effect: "Nor, even if he had, properly liable to punishment for murdering such a wretch as this." οὐ before δεῖν is merely intensitive according to the common practice of using more negatives to emphasize denial.

Ἐ. πρὸς Διός, "before," *i.e.* "by Zeus."
ὥστε, &c. Notice the sequence;—οἶει ἐπίστασθαι. . . ὥστε οὐ φοβεῖ. . . ὅπως μὴ. . . τυγχάνης.

αὖ, "in your turn," *i.e.* be committing impiety yourself

whilst accusing your father of impiety.

Οὐδὲν γὰρ. Elliptical. "No! For then. . ." The phrase means, "I should be good for nothing," cf. Laws, 856 C, πᾶς δὲ ἀνὴρ, οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, ἐνδεικνύτω ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. The pretence of astonishment on the part of Socrates in the former sentence is meant to draw out from Euthyphro this unqualified assumption of theological omniscience. It is then assumed as a basis for a string of deductions, inevitably ending in the conclusion, "which is absurd," just as Euclid starts with his impossible assumption in a *reductio ad absurdum*. For the use of the proper name instead of ἐγώ, cf. Virg. Aen. i. 48, "et quisquam numen Junonis adoret præterea?" where Juno herself is the speaker.

CAP. V.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μοι, ὦ Θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρον, κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῇ σὺ γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἶδεναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴ με ἐκείνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἔξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητῆς δὴ γέγονα σός· καὶ εἰ μὲν, ὦ Μέλητε, φαίην ἄν, Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς B σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν, καὶ ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζου· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκείνον δὲ νουθετοῦντί τε καὶ κολάζοντι·

Ἄρ' οὖν, nonne? But acc. to Hermann it is a milder, less positive, interrogation than ἄρ' οὖν οὐ.

προκαλεῖσθαι. Like many verbs in Greek and Latin with two accusatives. Others are ἐρωτᾶν, αἰτεῖν, διδάσκειν, ἐννύναι, ἀφαιρεῖν; and to take another example of this verb, ἄπερ καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἤδη προκαλέσαμεθα, Thuc. ii., 72, and below at the end of this passage, ἄ προῦκαλοῦν αὐτόν.

αὐτοσχεδιάζειν. σκεδία is a raft, or piece of light woodwork, knocked up for a passing occasion, hence a "makeshift." Hence the word here means to speak offhand, for the occasion, without sufficient grounds. It is especially applicable, Fischer remarks, to those orators or rhetors who would undertake to speak on any given subject without notice, making up for

solid information by means of fine language.

B. σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα. For this construction compare Xen. Cyr., iii., 3, 9, οἱ στρατιῶται . . . ἐπιστήμονες ἦσαν τὰ προσήκοντα τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστος ὀπλίσει; Æsch. Choe. 21, χοῶς προπομπός, and at the end of this Dialogue, σοφὸς τὰ θεῖα γέγονα.

τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δ. This dative is that of the remoter object, that is the person or thing *affected indirectly* by the action of the verb. It may be called the Dative of Interest, for under such a notion would fall a vast number of examples like the present in Latin and Greek, e.g. οἱ Πλαταιεῖς λαγχάνουσι δίκην τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, Dem. 1378, ii., and αὐτῷ τε Καμβύσῃ ἐσελθεῖν οἰκτόν τινα, Her. 3, 14. What is called Dative of Gratification we should put under this head.

καὶ ἂν μὴ μοι πείθεται μηδ' ἀφή τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντ' ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἂ προῦκαλούμην αὐτόν.

ΕΥΘ. Ναὶ μὰ Δί' ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα ἐμὲ ἐπιχειρήσειε γράφεσθαι, εὔροισ' ἄν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὄπη σαθρός C
ἐστὶ, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος γένοιτο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι, ὃ φίλε ἐταῖρε, ταῦτα γιγνώσκων μαθητῆς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδὼς ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος πού τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὄραν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως ἀτεχνῶς καὶ ῥαδίως κατεῖδεν, ὥστε ἀσεβείας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι, ὃ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι δισχυρίζου· ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς D

ἀφή. Notice this is not an intransitive use. με must be supplied from μοι.

αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν. The construction, which had become quite a direct one after its introduction by ὅτι, ὅτι ἔγωγε, &c., now changes back to the infinitive, depending really upon κράτιστόν ἐστι, at the beginning of Socrates' remarks, as μαθητῆ ἰσφ γενέσθαι did before.

ἂ προῦκ. αὐτόν. For this construction, V.S. The object and effect of this supposed case which Socrates puts forward is to exhibit Euthyphro in the light of the reference and authority upon such questions of religion and morals as are being discussed between the two. Euthyphro takes the bait eagerly. He is quite ready to help Socrates if he is in a difficulty, and does not profess a doubt as to whether he himself can be mistaken, even though an Athenian audience laughs at him. His entire self-confidence shows amusingly,

contrasted with the insinuating and humble professions of Socrates, who will learn anything he can from the omniscient Euthyphro. This is the εἰρωνεία of Socrates, where he causes his companion to believe himself well-informed, whilst he really is not.

C. σαθρός, "unsound."
κατεῖδεν—more than εἶδεν, "see through." So Teiresias to Oedipus—

ὄργην ἐμέμψω τὴν ἐμὴν, τὴν
σοι δ' ὁμοῦ
γαίουςαν οὐ κατείδες.

SOPH. O. T. 337.

διῶσχυρίζου σαφῶς εἰδέναι. Cf. Phaed. 114 D., τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διῶσχυρίζασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν . . . οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι. For the fact, V.S. 4, E., init. ad fin.

D. ποῖόν τι. The force of τι here, though untranslatable, is to imply ignorance, or an undefined notion in the inquirer's mind.

φῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὄσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὀσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν, ὃ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

ΕΥΘ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

CAP. VI.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ ὄσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΥΘ. Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὄσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπᾶς ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι Εἰ ἐπεξίεναι, ἐάν τε πατήρ ὢν τυγχάνῃ ἐάν τε μήτηρ ἐάν τε ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξίεναι ἀνόσιον. ἐπεί, ὦ Σώκρατες, θέασαι, ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ

ἢ οὐ; nonne?

καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ, &c., "whilst the impious, *again*, is that which is contrary to all that is pious, but is still itself like itself . . ."

τινὰ, the indefinite again. Although Socrates postulates one form (*ιδέαν*) for the impious, he purposely avoids defining it—"Some form or other which is one."

κατὰ τὴν ἀνος. "according to," *i.e.* "in virtue of its impiety." πᾶν must thus be taken with αὐτό, although placed at the end of the clause for the sake of rendering clearer the

dependence of the relative clause ὅτι, &c.

Λέγω τοίνυν. Euthyphro here makes an error. Socrates asks in effect, "What is your definition of piety and impiety?" This requires a *general* description or rule whereby we may know the one by the other; but Euthyphro only gives a special or particular instance or two, quite inadequate for the definition Socrates requires. He says, "This and that is impiety," whilst his answer should be couched in the form, "Piety consists in . . ."

νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ και ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον, ὅτι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἶη οὕτω γιγνομενα, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ' ἂν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνη ὦν. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσι νομιζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἄριστον και δικαιοτάτον, και τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς υἱεῖς κατέπιεν οὐκ ἔν δίκη, κακκείνόν γε αὐ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, και οὕτως αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περὶ τε τῶν θεῶν και περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρά γε, ὦ Εὐθυφρον, τοῦτ' ἐστίν οὐ ἔνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φευγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδαν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγη, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; δι' ἃ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτανειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ και σοὶ ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ τῷ εὖ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκη δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, και ἡμῖν ξυγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ και Β φήσομεν, οἷ γε και αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι; ἀλλὰ μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, συ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἠγεί ταῦτα οὕτω γεγονέναι;

Ε. τοῦ νόμου ὅτι, for ὅτι ὁ νομος οὕτως ἔχει. Anglicè, "a proof of the law being so."

ὅτι ταῦτα, &c., "that this would be the right course to take."

ἐπιτρέπειν, "to give in." Cf. Her. 2, 120, τὸν οὐ προσῆκε ἀδικεῖντι τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἐπιτρέπειν.

αὐτὸν γάρ, &c. Stallb. compares for this story Ar. Nub. 903, πῶς δῆτα δίκης οὐσης ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, τὸν πατέρ' αὐτοῦ δῆσας;

αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐν. λεγ. "They contradict themselves," or "stultify themselves."

Ἄρά γε τοῦτ' ἐστ. V. S. 5, init., a speculative, suggestive interrogation. So Jowett, "May not this be?" Stallb. wishes to make it a confident question, giving confirmatory power to γε; but this view hardly suits Socrates' humble approaches to the wisdom of Euthyphro.

Β. ἀνάγκη δὴ, "THEN I must give in." Notice the change to the plural in the pronoun. Stallb. finds in it a humble self-relegation of Socrates to the mass, or vulgar.

Φιλίου, i.e. Ζεὺς φίλιος. Cf. Ar. Ach. 730. Ναὶ τὸν φίλιον.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγεί σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε
 C ἄλλα ἱερά ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ᾧ Εὐθύφρον;

ΕΥΘ. Μὴ μόνα γε, ᾧ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάνπερ βούλη, περὶ τῶν θείων διηγήσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει.

καὶ ἔτι. Again an ellipse of the direct reply. V. S. 4, fin. οὐδὲν γάρ. Translate here, "Certainly, and besides these."

καὶ πόλεμον, &c. The point of this inquiry is to elicit from Euthyphro the admission that the gods dispute among themselves, and if so, what becomes of our ultimate authority for right and wrong, if it is variable, not fixed? In the Republic Socrates comes to a conclusion on this point, viz. that all these stories, representing the gods as either vicious or variable, are entirely wrong, and such stories are accordingly banished from his ideal state. Cf. Rep. 378, a very similar passage to this.

καὶ ὑπό, a break in the construction. Transl., "And the

devices with which (οἷοις if the construction were regular) our other sacred objects are adorned, notably the robe (which) is devoted to Minerva." We should expect some verb like καταπεποικ. after πέτιλος, but we are again surprised. The notion of adornment is put in apposition, viz., μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτ. ποικιλμάτων, and the place of the verb taken by the notion of offering, ἀνάγεται.

C. εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι. A colloquialism; it is equal in value to an asseverative adverb, and like an adverb can be applied to any word in the sentence, e.g. Soph. Ant. 276, πάρειμι γ' ἀκὼν οὐχ ἔκουσιν, οἶδ' ὅτι. So δηλόνοτι, ch. 7, E, fin. infra.

CAP. VII.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν μοι εἰσαυθίς ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσει. νυνὶ δέ, ὅπερ ἄρτι σε ἠρόμην, πειρῶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. οὐ γάρ με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτήσαντα τὸ D ὄσιον, ὅ τί ποτ' εἴη, ἀλλὰ μοι εἶπες, ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὄσιον ὄν, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξιῶν τῷ πατρί.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φῆς εἶναι ὄσια.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελεύομην, ἔν τι ἢ δυο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὀσίων, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ πάντα τὰ ὄσια ὄσιά ἐστιν; ἔφησθα

D. ὅ τί ποτ' εἴη, V. S. note on λέγω τοίνυν. Here Socrates makes the objection there mentioned. "What impiety was generally (ποτε), was my question, but you tell me that this or that (particular case) is impious, which does not help me to a canon of piety and impiety."

καὶ ἀληθῆ. Here Euthyphro misses Socrates' point altogether. Socrates has therefore to bring home the difference between universal and particular by another method.

εἶδος. The best explanation of this term is to be found in the words following:—"By virtue of which impiety is impiety." In other words, that quality or mode of action which makes a word or deed impious, without

which it would not be impious, which is common to and will be found in all impiety. The expression, ὃ πάντα ὄσια ὄσιά ἐστιν corresponds to the expression κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα, in ch. 5, D. fin., "Having one form in virtue of its impiety," *i.e.* presenting the same marks or characteristics of impiety by which it is known for impiety. This εἶδος was in Plato's belief a real, existing essence, the *universal*, whilst particular manifestations of it only existed in an inferior and unreal sense. From which it may be gathered that he looked upon our world and all that it contained as only "the shadow of things perfect." Cf. "Who serve unto the *example and shadow of heavenly things.*"

Ε γάρ που μιᾶ ἰδέα τα τε ἀνόσια ἀνοσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια· ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τίς ποτέ ἐστίν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾦ, ὦν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττη, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σοὶ φράσω.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν βούλομαι γε.

ΕΥΘ. Ἐστὶ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον.

7 ΣΩ. Παγκάλως, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐζήτουν

ἔφησθα γάρ που. An example of Socrates' insinuating use of dialectic. Euthyphro had not actually made this statement. It had been made for him, and put in his mouth by Socrates, V. S. 5 fin., ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα.

Ε. Μιᾶ ἰδέα. Notice where this is tending. It has been granted that the gods dispute, and that therefore right and wrong are not fixed, unvariable; but now we are showing that they *are* fixed, one, and unalterable.

παραδείγματι. So in Republic, τούτῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενος, where *παραδ.* is *complement* to τούτῳ, in apposition to it.

Ἐστὶ τοίνυν. Here Socrates has succeeded in eliciting a general definition of piety and impiety from Euthyphro; whether it is a right one or a wrong one, he says, remains to be seen. It will easily appear

that we are at once involved in a contradiction by this definition. Thus—

The pious is that which pleases the gods.

But the gods differ.

∴ That which pleases one god displeases another.

Again, the impious is that which displeases the gods.

∴ The same thing can be pious and impious at the same time.

This contradiction he now proceeds to draw out.

ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . "Why of course I want to hear." γε implying, "how can you ask?"

θεοῖς προσφιλὲς. It will be noticed that the weak point in this definition, apart from the dilemma about the gods' disputes, is that it presupposes an intimate knowledge of the divine nature unknowable to men. As a definition, therefore, it is of no use.

ἀποκρίνασθαι σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθές, τοῦτο οὐπω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις ὡς ἔστιν ἀληθὴ ἢ λεγεις.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μεν οὖν.

CAP. VIII.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δη, ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τί λέγομεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλῆς ἄνθρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισῆς καὶ ὁ θεομισῆς ἀνόσιος· οὐ ταῦτὸν δ' ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιωτατον τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΕΥΘ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε φαινεται εἰρηῆσθαι.

ΕΥΘ. Δοκῶ, ὦ Σωκρατες· εἴρηται γάρ.

B

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται;

ΕΥΘ. Εἴρηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἢ περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; ὧδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἄρ' ἂν εἰ

δῆλον ἔτι. V.S. on εἰ οἶδ' ὅτι.

B. Δοκῶ, censeo. This personal use is not infrequent. Cf. Soph. 221, A., δοκῶ μὲν, ὅπερ ἄρτι προῦθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ νῦν ἀποτετελέσθαι. In 12 init. we have, Ἐγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μαθάνειν; where the constructions meet halfway.

εἴρηται γάρ. . . . In 5 fin. καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὐτῷ μὲν ὀσίῳ παντὸς ἐναντίον. Euthyphro seems to hint, "As if there could be any doubt about what I have given my assent to!"

ἢ περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ "What is the dispute, and about what do they differ?"

ἄρ' ἂν εἰ. We get ἂν thus early in the sentence to show

that it is to be a potential one, a contingency. So οὐκ οἶδ' ἂν εἰ πείσομαι, Eur. Med. 941, where the potential particle ἂν, as in the present passage, qualifies the verb. So in Timaeus 26 B., οὐκ ἂν οἶδα εἰ δυναίμην ἅπαντα ἐν μνήμῃ πάλιν λαβεῖν; where ἂν must be taken with δυναίμην.

περὶ ἀριθμοῦ, "about number," i.e. "in a question of numbers." In this example Socrates is leading up to the principle, that questions on which we should differ would be the abstruse and complex problems of morals, religion, &c. Hence the differences of the gods must be also concerning the most important and radical principles.

διαφεροίμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ὅποτερα πλείω, ἢ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς
 C ποιοῖ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἂν ἀπαλλαγείμεν;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἐλθόντες ταχὺ πανσαίμεθ' ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἴσταναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθεῖμεν ἂν;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροὶ γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοι
 D ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ τάδ' ἔστι τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχροὺν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι, περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἰκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' ἔστιν αὕτη ἢ διαφορά, ὧς Σώκρατες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.

C. περὶ γε τῶν τ. "In (trivial) matters of this sort."

ἰστάναι, "weighing," lit. "standing" (act.) i.e. "poising," "producing an equilibrium." Hence the name of statics, which is the consideration of bodies *in equilibrium*.

ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσω; "to what tribunal?"

D. τάδ', "these (subjects of dispute)."

γιγνόμεθα. A touch of realism in the middle of an imaginary situation. We should have expected *γιγνοίμεθα ἂν*. As the sentence goes on, we see how the transition takes place in the writer's mind, with the words, *καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι*.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οὐκ εἶπερ τι διαφέρονται, δι' αὐτὰ ταῦτα διαφεροιντ' ἄν;

ΕΥΘ. Πολλή ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε Εὐθύφρων, ἕτεροι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ἐστασίαζον ἀλλήλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο· ἦ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄπερ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἕκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσι, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δέ γε, ὡς συ φης, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα· περὶ ἃ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις. ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως; 8

ΕΥΘ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισεῖται τε ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλή ταῦτ' ἄν εἶη.

ΕΥΘ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἄν εἶη, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΥΘ. Κινδυνεύει.

τί δέ introduces a new step in the argument. "What then?" δι' αὐτὰ τ., "through," *i.e.* "on account of," "in our desire to settle such matters as these."

Ε. οὐ γάρ, &c. That is, "these are the only subjects upon which we can possibly imagine them differing—the highest and most complex questions."

ἄλλα, predicate.

ταῦτα. Notice accent.

τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ. Dativus Modi. Similar examples are τούτῳ τρόπῳ, πλήθει πολλοί. In Latin by a preposition or-ablative, *e.g.*, secundum tuum sermonem. Hoc modo.

κινδυνεύει. It will be well here to review the last section of the Dialogue, which ends at this point. Socrates had asked (cap.

CAP. IX.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ ἠρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὃ θαυμάσιε.
 οὐ γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἠρώτων, ὃ τυγχάνει ταῦτόν ὃν ὕσιόν
 τε καὶ ἀνόσιον· ὃ δ' ἂν θεοφιλὲς ᾖ, καὶ θεομισὲς ἔστιν,
 ὡς ἔοικεν. ὅστε, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν
 πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ
 μὲν Διὶ προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρα-
 νῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἥρᾳ
 ἐχθρόν· καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ
 διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ ταῦτά.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, περὶ γε τούτου
 τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ
 δίκην δίδοναι ἐκείνον, ὅς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.

7 init.) for a general definition of the pious and impious. Euthyphro's definition had been, "That which the gods love is pious; that which they hate is impious." "But," replies Socrates, "you have already allowed that they are not at one with each other on many subjects, and, if so, they will certainly dispute on this one we are considering. Therefore if one god loves the same thing which another hates, your definition will not hold."

ὃ δ' ἂν θεοφ. . . . "But whatever is beloved of heaven, that is also hated of heaven." Notice conjunctive and indicative senses.

B. τῷ μὲν Διὶ . . . For Zeus had set the example of ill-using parents, whilst Cronus and Uranus had been both of them sufferers, and Hephaestus had been expelled by his father from heaven.

καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ ταῦτά. "It will be to them according to the

same," i.e. "there will be the same difference in their case as well." For this dative V.S. note on τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην, 5 ad. med. B.

Ἄλλ' οἶμαι. Euthyphro here starts on a wrong scent. "However they may differ" says he, "in other things, they do not differ on this cardinal point, viz., that justice should be done." "No more do men differ on that point," replies Socrates.

ὡς οὐ δεῖ . . . The οὐ seems redundant to us. But it brings out the differing, the other side of the question to the one usually adopted. It is what the opponent would say. We have οὐ and not μὴ in the dependent sentence because, in the words of Matthiae, the sentence does not express the thought of the speaker (but that of another person), nor has reference to his thought. Or we may look at it merely as the negation of δεῖ, comparing οὐκ ἔω, οὐ φημι.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὧ Εὐθύφρον, ἤδη τινὸς ἤκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὀτιοῦν οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτ' ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἀδικοῦντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὧ Εὐθύφρον, ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὅμως οὐ δεῖν φασὶ σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι. τοῦτο γάρ, οἶμαι, οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδ' ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχί, εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, δοτέον δίκην· ἀλλ' οἶμαι, οὐ φασιν ἀδικεῖν ἢ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἐστίν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.

C. οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται. "On the contrary, they are always," &c. Cf. Soph. O. C. 30, 31.

ΟΙ. ἢ δεῦρο προσστείχοντα καὶ ἄξομα;

AN. καὶ δὴ μὲν οὖν πάροντα.

Oed. On his way towards us?

An. Nay. Just here.

In this reply Euthyphro fails to see the exact meaning of Socrates' question. He has not been asked, "Do men try to get off punishment?" but "Do men openly deny that justice must be done after a crime?" This Socrates puts more clearly in his next question.

ἢ καὶ ὁμολ. "Yes, but do they allow, &c.?" καὶ prefixed to a word thus often implies a belief in the speaker that the thing is not so; V.S. ch. 2, init. τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νέους;

οὐκ ἔρα. "The difficulty is to get them to acknowledge themselves in the wrong.

D. τὸ τίς, &c. A good example of a whole sentence, containing two or three clauses, becoming a noun substantive and being manipulated as such. Cf. Plat. Rep. 327. οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν ἔτι λείπεται τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς, ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφείναι. Here we have the difficulty stated

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθουσιν, εἴπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασιν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασιν; ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε δήπου, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ
 Ε λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκη.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὲ γε κεφάλαιον.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἕκαστόν γε, οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τῶνπραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἀνθρώποι καὶ θεοί, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσι θεοί· πράξεώς τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπραχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως· ἂρ' οὐχ οὕτως;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

in definite language. "Men are ready enough to do justice when they know what it is, especially in its special cases, what and where and when. The difficulty is to know these points."

οὐκοῦν, &c. "Is it not then the same case exactly with the gods too?" Lit. "Do not the gods experience this?" Cf. Rep. 563, C., αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος θαμὰ αὐτὸ πάσχω.

ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. Again, Euthyphro had only had this admission extorted from him. V. S. 8, D.

οὐ φασιν, "negant," i.e. nec—aiunt.

Ε. τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι. Dative of

interest; the person concerned in the δίκης δόσις. V. S. note on 5 B. ad med.

τό γε κεφάλαιον. Jelf describes this as an accusative in apposition; but it is hard to help looking upon it in some passages as a nom., e.g. Theat. 190, B., ἢ καὶ, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, σκοπεῖ εἴ ποτ', &c. Here, no doubt, the accusative sense suits better, like such expressions as ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κήδε' ἕκαστη.

ἕκαστον. Not "every particular," but a "particular case," or "particulars," explained further on by πράξεώς τινος.

CAP. X.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι τοιουν, ᾧ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, δίδαξον καὶ ὁ
 ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν,
 ὡς παντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ἐκείνον ἀδίκως τεθνάναι, ὃς
 ἂν θητεῶν ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθείς ὑπὸ τοῦ
 δεσποτου τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φθάσῃ τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ
 δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ξυνδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν περὶ
 αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου
 δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξιέναι καὶ ἐπισκήπτεσθαι φόνου τὸν
 υἷον τῷ πατρὶ. Ἴθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί μοι σαφὲς
 ἐνδείξασθαι, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται
 ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πράξιν. κἂν μοι ἱκανῶς B

δίδαξ. Euthyphro being probably discouraged by having his mistake thus plainly set before him, has to be reassured by fresh professions of inferior knowledge on Socrates' part.

ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται . . . After these words we have a general description of the occurrence, the words καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου depending on τί τεκμήριον ἐστιν ὡς: "How do you know that all the gods think . . . and that it is right?"

ὅς ἂν θητεῶν . . . φθάσῃ. Socrates puts the case indefinitely, so as to qualify the direct interrogative and soften his apparent incredulity: "Supposing a man to be serving, and were to commit a murder," &c. Hence the employment of the potential ἂν, expressing contingent or possible action, and of the conjunctive. But it is not an entirely imaginary case. Hence the conjunctive is primary.

ἀνδροφόνος γεν. This expression seems to imply possible

innocence of intent to slay. Translate, "committed manslaughter."

φθάσῃ τελευτήσας. Take with πρὶν, "loses his life before . . ." Cf. 4, init., ὅς γε τυγχάνει ὦν εἶ μάλα πρεσβύτης. For this verb, Xen. Cyr. 1, 3, 12. χαλεπὸν ἦν ἄλλον φθάσαι τοῦτο ποιήσαντα, sc. "To do this before he did."

δεσμά. Noun heteroclite.

ἐπισκήπτεσθαι. "Dicitur de iis, quae cum impetu quodam in aliquid irruunt." Stallb. Σκήπτω is used of a darting light in Aesch. Ag. 302, λίμνην δ' ὑπερ Γοργῶπιον ἔσκηψεν φάος. For the gen. φόνου, cf. damnatur carpitis, and carpitis accusare in Nepos.

παντὸς μᾶλλον. The sense of comparison is lost here: "without doubt," "absolutely." Cf. Rep. 555, D., καὶ εἰσδαιέζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίνωνται; to which the answer is, παντὸς γε μᾶλλον

ἐνδείξῃ, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφία οὐδέποτε παύσομαι.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχοιμι ἂν ἐπιδείξαι σοι.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξει δῆλον ὅτι, ὡς ἄδικά τέ ἐστι καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν περ ἀκούωσί γέ μου λέγοντος.

CAP. XI.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀκούσονται, ἐάνπερ εὖ δοκῆς λέγειν. τόδε δὲ σοῦ ἐνενόησα ἅμ' λέγοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ· εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρ' Εὐθύφρονος, τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσιόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισῆς μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶη ἂν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ

B. ἐπεὶ. To this truly mobile particle it is hard to assign a meaning that will serve for more than two consecutive passages. Euthyphro says, "It will likely be a long affair;" and "I could lay the question before you very clearly." What then is the connection between these two remarks? If we look on to Socrates' rejoinder it will seem that he takes Euthyphro's remark to imply, "You will need a lot of explanation," and allows that he is certainly very dense. The full sense would then seem to be, "'Twill be a long business since (you will need it explained very clearly, and this I shall be able, and) feel it my duty to do."

μανθάνω, "I comprehend." Cf. Ar. Birds, 1003, ME. Μανθάνεις; ΠΕ. Οὐ μανθάνω. Others join μανθάνω ὅτι . . .

τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμ. Refers to the words in 3 B., πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος γένοιτο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

C. τόδε refers to what follows.

Εὐθύφρων. The third person here instead of the second gives an additional weight to the statement of the situation, enabling Euthyphro as it were to put himself outside himself, and view the difficulty as a disinterested spectator.

ὡς ἔοικεν, i.e. according to Euthyphro's decision on ground of his own knowledge.

τούτω ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὠρισμένα τὸ ὄσιον καὶ μὴ. τὸ γὰρ θεομισὲς ὄν καὶ θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη. ὥστε τούτου μὲν ἀφήμί σε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ D ἠγείσθωσαν θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισούντων. ἀλλ' ἄρα τοῦτο νῦν ἐπανορθούμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὡς ὁ μὲν ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιόν ἐστιν, ὁ δ' ἂν φιλῶσιν, ὄσιον· ὁ δ' ἂν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφοτέρα; ἄρ' οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὠρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὄσιου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου;

ΕΥΘ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥᾶστά με διδάξεις ὁ ὑπέσχου.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε φαίην ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὄσιον, ὁ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὁ ἂν E πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται; ἢ ἐῷμεν καὶ οὕτως ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μόνον φῆ τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω, ξυγχωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον, τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;

ΕΥΘ. Σκεπτέον. οἶμαι μέντοι ἔγωγε τοῦτο νυνὶ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

οὐ τούτω ἐφ. ἄρτι ὠρ., "These distinctions have no bearing on the definition of piety and impiety."—Jowett.

τὸ γὰρ, subj., θεομισὲς ὄν appo-sitive, καὶ θεοφιλὲς, predicative. ἀφήμί σε, "I let you off from this;" i.e., "You need not concern yourself about proving that to me."

D. ἐπανορθούμεθα, "set up-right afresh;" prove and justify any proposition. Stallb. aptly compares ἐλέγχειν, which combines the two notions of dis-

proving an antagonist's assertion and proving your own. Cf. Ar. Eccl. 485, τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐλεγχθέν.

ὡς ὁ μὲν. The emphatic word in this sentence is πάντες, "What all the gods hate."

οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφοτέρα. Cf. Rep. 555, D, οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρεᾶ, οἱ δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγόνοτες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα.

E. ἡμῶν τε αὐτ. ἀποδεχ... "on our own or other's authority." Cf. Phaed. 92, E., μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι.

CAP. XII.

ΣΩ. Τάχ', ὦ γαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐννόησον
10 γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστι, φιλεῖται
ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιόν ἐστιν;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι·
λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον, καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ
ἄγον, καὶ ὀρώμενον καὶ ὀρῶν· καὶ πάντα τὰ τοι-
αῦτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἢ ἕτερα.

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστι, καὶ τούτου
ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;

*Ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον . . . In other words, "Are these gods with their quarrels and disputes to be the rule for us, or is there a higher basis or sanction of Right which they recognise in their better moments?"

οὐκ οἶδ' . . . Notice Euthyphro's inacquaintance with the logic of the Sophists.

καὶ πάντα, &c. "And that there is a difference in all such things; and where the difference lies."

ἢ, "in what way, manner, or regard." Cf. Lat. *qua*.

οὐκοῦν, &c. The drift of this piece of reasoning requires elucidation. In brief it is this: "All things that are in a particular condition are so because they have been brought into it by a motive power, *e.g.* the carried, the led, the become, the loved, have all had some one to carry, lead, make, or love them. Now Euthyphro and I are asking, Is piety to be defined as 'the loved of the gods?' No. Because we must not say that, because we

find the two (*viz.*, piety and the loved of the gods) roughly corresponding, we are to rest satisfied. Piety may be something more than the loved of the gods. And we know that the 'loved of the gods' implies that the gods love. Now the gods loving is prior to loved of the gods. So we can put our definition back a step and say, 'Piety is found in all cases of the gods loving;' and there may be other cases unknown to us of piety. Clearly, then, Piety, or the Holy, is the larger and anterior notion. For 'Heaven loves' is anterior to 'loved of Heaven.' If a reason or cause is to be found for 'Heaven loves,' we are irresistibly forced back to the principle because it is holy." This, then, is the order: (1) This is Holy; (2) Therefore all the gods love it; so we find that (3) Things holy are god-beloved. Thus does Plato deify the Idea, and rationalise the deity, being driven to his conclusion by the state of the popular theology.

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον, διότι Β
φέρεται, φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ, διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ
ὀρώμενον, διότι ὀράται ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὀρώμενόν γέ ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο
ὀράται, ἀλλὰ τὸναντίον διότι ὀράται, διὰ τοῦτο
ὀρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγε-
ται ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ
διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται,
φερόμενον. ἄρα κατάδηλον, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, ὃ βούλομαι
λέγειν ; βούλομαι δὲ τίδε, ὅτι, εἴ τι γίγνεται ἢ C
εἴ τι πάσχει τι, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι, γίγνεται,
ἀλλ' ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐδ' ὅτι πάσχον
ἐστί, πάσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστίν· ἢ οὐ
ξυγχαρεῖς οὕτως ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενόν τί
ἐστιν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ προτερα·
οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενόν ἐστι, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται,
ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀνάγκη.

B. Οὐκ ἄρα, &c. This is to show that the θεοφιλέσ is not the cause of the gods loving it, but, *e contrario*, the gods loving is the cause of its being θεοφιλέσ. It is not therefore holy, because θεοφιλέσ.

C. βούλομαι λέγειν, "mean." Cf. French "vouloir dire."

Οὐκοῦν . . . "Well, and the loved has become what it is, or is what it is through some agency?"

ὑπὸ ὧν. V. S. note on ὧν προεῖπον, II.

D ΣΩ. Τί δη οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, ᾧ Εὐ-
θίφρον; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν παντων, ὡς ὁ
σὸς λόγος;

ΕΥΘ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;

ΕΥΘ. Οἶκ, ἀλλὰ δια τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Διότι ἄρα ὁσιόν ἐστι, φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι
φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁσιον ἐστιν;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διοτι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν,
φιλούμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλές τὸ θεοφιλές.

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλές ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ᾧ Εὐ-
θύφρον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὁσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλ'
E ἕτερον τοῦτο τουτου.

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δὴ, ᾧ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὁσιόν διὰ τοῦτο
φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διότι φιλεῖται,
ὁσιον εἶναι ἢ γαρ;

ΕΥΩ. Ναιί.

D. ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται . . . *i.e.*
“We have without doubt agreed
that all the gods love it.” The
whole phrase was ἄλλο τι ἢ. So
in Her. I, 109, ἄλλοτι ἢ λεί-
πεται τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν ἐμοὶ κινδύνων
ὁ μέγιστος;

Διότι ἄρα . . . We here as-
sume the major premise, “Be-
cause a thing is holy . . . it is
god-beloved.”

Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλές, &c. The
god-beloved is not therefore the
same thing as the holy, or “The
god-beloved and the holy are not
coextensive and coincident.”

E. ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν . . . In
this chapter Socrates has been
proving two propositions:—

(1) That the θεοφιλές is so
because the gods love it; in
other words, that the gods loving
must be regarded as something
coming before the existence of
the θεοφιλές, or god-beloved.

(2) That the θεοφιλές cannot
with any reason or accuracy be
said to be the same thing as the
ὁσιον. Euthyphro allows that
the gods love a thing because
it is holy—Διότι ἄρα ὁσιόν ἐστὶ
φιλεῖται. This, then, is some-
thing prior to the gods loving,
and if the gods loving is prior
to the god-beloved, then, *a for-
tiori*, the ὁσιον is prior to and
greater than the θεοφιλές.

CAP. XIII.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν, ὃ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, το θεοφιλές καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ ὅσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλές εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν τὸ θεοφιλές· εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ 11 θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλές θεοφιλές ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὅσιον ἦν. νῦν δὲ ὀρᾷς, ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχετον, ὡς παντάπασιν ἐτέρω ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ τί

Ἄλλ' εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν. Again, premising these three steps—(1) The holy is loved by the gods because it is holy; (2) The gods love certain things; (3) The god-beloved is the result of the gods loving—we can argue thus: If the holy and the god-beloved were the same, from (3), then the holy would be the result of the gods loving; but from (1) the holy is the cause of the gods loving, which is absurd. Next: If the holy and the god-beloved were the same, from (1), the god-beloved would be loved by the gods, because it is god-beloved, *i.e.* it would be the cause of the gods loving; but from (3) it is the result of the gods loving, which is absurd.

οἷον φιλεῖσθαι, *i.e.* ὅσιον. “Propter suam ipsius naturam.”—Stallb.

ὅτι φιλεῖται, *i.e.* θεοφιλές: *i.e.* we place it under the holy things, because we recognise in

it the characteristics of the ὅσιον.

τὸ μὲν γάρ . . . A restatement of the position. The one, *viz.*, the god-beloved, being loved, or because it is loved, is lovable, or “of a kind to be loved” (Jowett), while the other is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. In the latter case the lovable qualities are evident, in the former they need to be drawn out.

καὶ κινδυνεύεις . . . “So it appears, Euthyphro, that you will not make known to me the true essence of the holy, but only tell me one of its particular cases or manifestations,” *viz.*, that all the gods love it. V. S. note on 7, εἶδος. Εἶδος and οὐσία are different names for the same thing, viewed in different lights: εἶδος, the true form or model, exemplar; οὐσία, the really existing, opposed to πάθος, what is experienced (πάσχεται) by men.

ποτ' ἔστι, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅ τι πέ-
 Β πονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὄσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὅ τι δὲ ὄν, οὐπω εἶπες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, μὴ με ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἶπέ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ὄν τὸ ὄσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, εἴτε ὀτιδὴ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διοισόμεθα· ἀλλ' εἶπέ προθύμως, τί ἔστι τό τε ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον·

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι εἶπω ὃ νοῶ. περιέρχεται γάρ πως αἰεὶ ἡμῖν ὃ ἀν-
 . προθώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἀν' ἰδρυσω-
 μεθα αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ ημετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἔοικεν
 C εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἴσως ἂν με ἐπέ-
 σκωπτες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυγγέ-
 νειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν τις αὐτὰ θῆ· νῦν δέ — σοὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσιν — ἄλλου δὴ τινος δεῖ σκώμματος. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσί σοι μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ.

ΕΥΘ. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκώμ-
 ματος, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γαρ

ὅ τι πέπονθε τὸ ὄσ... "a particular phase which the holy undergoes," "one aspect of the holy." V.S. note on 9, οὐκοῦν, &c.

B. εἶπω ὃ νοῶ, "express my thoughts."

περιέρχεται. Sc. to the same point.

εἰ μὲν . . . νῦν δε, infra.

ἄρα, "as you say."

τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγ. Cf. Alcib. Maj. 121, A., Soer. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ γενναῖε Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰς Δαίδαλον . . . (ἀναφέρεται).

C. ἀποδιδράσκει. These were certain statues or figures endowed with locomotive power.

σοι, with reference to Euthyphro's words, περιέρχεται . . . ἡμῖν . . . For σοι V. S. note on 5, διδασκάλω.

οὐ . . . ἐθέλουσι μένειν, "show an inclination to be on the move." Jowett.

τὸ γάρ, &c. "For it is not I who worked in this locomotion, this inability to stay in one place . . ."

περιμέναι αὐτοῖς τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγὼ εἶμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σὺ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος· D ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ἔμενέν ἂν ταῦτα οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσοῦτω, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἑμαυτοῦ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἶμι σοφός. ἐβουλόμην γὰρ ἂν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν, καὶ ἀκινήτως ἰδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς E τῇ Δαιδάλου σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων μὲν ἄδην. ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός σοι ξυμπροθυμήσομαι δεῖξαι, ὅπως ἂν με διδάξαις περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ μὴ προαποκάμης.

D. ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα, "as far as I am concerned." Cf. Eng. "for me;" e.g., "You may go for me" = "I will not stop you." So Her. I, 42, τοῦ φυλάσσοντος εἶνεκεν.

δεινότερος τὴν τέχνην. Cf. τὸν δῆμον Πιπθεύς; ch. I and note.

τῆς τέχνης, partitive genitive, "amongst the characteristics of my art this one is the finest."

μᾶλλον ἢ, &c., "rather than to possess the wealth of Tantalus besides the cunning of Daedalus."

E. ἄδην, sc. ἔχομεν. "A truce to this."

τρυφᾶν, "mollem et delicatum te praeberē," Stallb. This verb expresses the feeling of fastidiousness and effeminacy consequent upon indulgence or delicate living, all which is here transferred to the intellectual sphere.

αὐτός σοι, &c. "I will take

pains to help you towards pointing out to me . . ." As it were infuse the healthy desire of imparting real knowledge into one who already has the power, but lacks the inclination. By such an artful manifestation of words does Socrates try to excite Euthyphro to say all he can for the question, drawing him on by this skilful flattery to help the poor stumbler, as he represents himself, along the road of knowledge.

This little diversion concerning Daedalus, with the remarks preceding and following, is thrown in, in a masterly manner, to rest the mind of the hearer between the arguments. Socrates is going to begin another bout on the original question, but gives his companion a short breathing time and a slight refreshment (this little Daedalus episode) before again entering the dialectical lists.

ιδὲ γάρ· οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὄσιον ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὄσιον, ἢ τὸ
12 μὲν ὄσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ὄσιον.
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὄσιον, τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐχ ἔπομαι, ὦ Σάκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γ' ἐμοῦ εἶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ὄσω σοφώτερος· ἀλλ', ὅ λέγω, τρυφᾶς ὑπὸ πλοῦτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ξύντεινε σαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοῆσαι ὅ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητῆς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας

Ζῆνα δὲ τὸν θ' ἔρξαντα, καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντ' ἐφύτευσεν,

Οὐκ ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς.

ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρωμαι τῷ ποιητῆ. ε πω σοι ὄπη;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἵνα δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς. πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι, καὶ νόσους καὶ πενίας καὶ

οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον . . . Socrates is going to extract from Euthyphro the admission that although all things holy are just, it is not true that all just things are holy. This may be thus geometrically represented—

A, things just ; B, things holy.



where we see that though no things holy are not also just, there are yet some just things (A) which are not holy (B).

Hence holiness is a part or species of what justice is the whole or genus.

τὸ δέ τι. The indefinite pronoun is added because it is not known *what* part of justice is covered by holiness, and what by other virtues. So Lucian, D. Mort. 16, 5, εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τις ἐν οὐρανῷ, ὁ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν, σὺ τὸ εἶδωλον, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἐν Οἴτῃ κόνις ἤδη γεγένηται, where ὁ μὲν τις is the (indefinable) divine part of Heracles that has left the earth.

ξύντεινε σ. "brace yourself." ποιητῆς. Stasinus, who wrote the Cypria.

ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες, δεδιέναι μὲν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα, ἃ δεδίασιν. οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἵνα γε αἰδῶς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ἕστις αἰδούμενός τι πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχυρόμενος οὐ πεφύβηταί τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξα πονηρίας;

ΕΥΘ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδῶς, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὲν αἰδῶς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος· οὐ μέντοι ἵνα γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδῶς, ἐπὶ πλέον γάρ, οἶμαι, δέος αἰδούσ· μόριον γὰρ αἰδῶς δέους, ὥσπερ ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵνα περ ἀριθμός, ἔνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττόν, ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμός. ἔπει γάρ που νῦν γε;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἡρώτων, ἄρα ἵνα δίκαιον, ἔνθα καὶ ὄσιον, ἢ ἵνα μὲν ὄσιον, ἔνθα καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ πανταχοῦ ὄσιον. D

ἀλλ' ἵνα μὲν αἰδῶς . . . This will be expressed as above, CC being fear, D being reverence.



All reverence implies fear, but not all fear reverence. And there the poet is wrong, for he makes the two coextensive.

οὐ μέντοι ἵνα γε δέος . . . γε qualifies the whole sentence, being placed as soon as possible after the beginning of the wrong statement, to which it calls attention, or which it stigmatises.

ἐπὶ πλέον, &c. "Fear is a term of wider extension than

reverence, which is a part of fear."

ὥστε οὐχ, &c. "In the same way all number is not odd, but all odd implies number." All this is to show that, though all things holy are just, all just things are not holy—that justice is the larger head under which we can range holiness. Definition, logicians tell us, is *per genus et differentiam*, i.e. by giving the genus or family, and the distinctive marks of the particular member of the family we have in view. Justice is the genus: it remains then to find the differentia, or distinguishing marks of this particular phase of justice called holiness.

μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ἴσιον, οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω. φαίνει γὰρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

ΣΑΡ. XIV.

ΣΩ. "Ορα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με ἠρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δὴ, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἂν, ὅτι ὁς ἂν μὴ σκαληγος ἦ, ἀλλ' ἰσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐμοιγε.

Ε ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι, τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτω λέγωμεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδ' ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή.

ΕΥΘ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τοπερὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

D. τὸ ἄρτιον, even, conn. w. ἄρω, ἄρτι, "fitting exactly;" explained by ἰσοσκελής, equal-limbed, opposed to σκαληγός, halting, or with unequal limbs. These terms are transferred here from geometry to arithmetic.

E. τοῦτο τοίνυν. Socrates at last succeeds in getting a further

definition out of Euthyphro, which he at once proceeds to test. Euthyphro divides justice into two parts, perhaps with the odd and even division of numbers running in his head, into justice with respect to heaven, and with respect to men. The former, he says, is holiness.

CAP. XV.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, φαίνει λέγειν ἄλλὰ σμικροῦ τινὸς ἔτι ἐνδεής εἰμι. τὴν γὰρ θερα- 13
πείαν οὐπω ξυνίημι ἤντινα ὀνομάζεις. οὐ γάρ που λέγεις γε, οἶαί περ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπείαι εἰσι, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεοῦς. λέγομεν γάρ που — οἶον φαμέν, ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἵππικός· ἦ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ που ἵππικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλ' ὁ κυνηγετικός.

ΕΥΘ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.

ΕΥΘ. Πανυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ δὴ ὀσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν; ὦ Εὐθύφρον· οὕτω λέγεις;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταῦτὸν διαπράττεται, οἶον τοιόνδε· ἐπ' ἀγαθῶ τινί ἐστι, καὶ ὠφελεία

ἀλλὰ σμικροῦ. Socrates will not start on the discussion of this definition without having it clearly understood what the words mean.

λέγομεν γάρ που . . . Socrates was going to say, "We understand, do we not, that every θεραπεία has its particular art, and cannot be undertaken ex-

cept by him who is acquainted with that art." But he breaks off with an example, οἶον φαμεν, and proceeds to establish the principle in his usual way by aggregating instances.—Stallb.

B. οἶον τοιόνδε, sc. λέγω, as is shown by Rep. 331 C, οἶον τοιόνδε λέγω, πᾶς ἂν που εἴποι . . .

τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὄρας δή, ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπο τῆς ἵππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ὠφελούνται καὶ βελτίους γίνονται ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐμοιγε.

C ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγετικῆς καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἶει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν θεραπείαν εἶναι ;

ΕΥΘ. Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐπ' ὠφελεία ;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δ' οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὀσιότης θεραπεία οὔσα θεῶν ὠφέλειά τε ἐστὶ θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ ; καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ξυγχωρήσῃς ἄν, ὡς ἐπειδάν τι ὄσιον ποιῆς, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζῃ ;

ΕΥΘ. Μὰ Δι οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οἶμαι σε τοῦτο λέγειν· πολλοῦ καὶ δέω· ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, D οὐχ ἡγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἶη ἂν ἡ ὀσιότης ;

οἱ ἵπποι. These examples from common life are very frequently used by Socrates to establish analogies. Cf. Rep. 335, βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίνονται ; χείρους. ἄρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν ἢ εἰς τὴν ἵππων ; κ.τ.λ.

C. σύ. Perhaps this pronoun has a distinctive force : "You the theologian (who can hardly think so)."

πολλοῦ καὶ δεω. V. S. note on πολλοῦ, ch. iv.

τούτου δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην . . . οὐχ ἡγούμενος . . . "I asked you for this reason, viz., that I wanted your repudiation of such an idea." οὐχ belongs to λέγειν, and ἡγούμενος means more than "thinking,"—"Because I expected."

D. τίς δὴ θ., "quod tandem deorum officium?" acc. of cogitate notion.

ΕΥΘ. Ἦνπερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δούλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω ὑπηρετικὴ τις ἂν, ὡς ἕοικεν, εἶη θεοῖς.

ΕΥΘ. Πανυ μὲν οὖν.

CAP. XVI.

ΣΩ. Ἐχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἡ ἱατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὐσα ὑπηρετικὴ; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἶει;

ἦνπερ . . . θερ. Cf. Rep. 5, 456, D, ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἱματίων ἀμφιέσονται. Matthiae explains such verbs as governing an accusative on account of the active sense implied in them.

ἡ ἱατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ. The art, subservient or auxiliary to healing others, which physicians use. Distinguish this carefully from ἡ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ lower down, which means "the art which others use serviceable to the gods for their own benefit."

There is a transition from one sense of *θεραπεία* and *ὑπηρετικὴ* to another in this passage. The *θεραπεία* of dogs, horses, &c., is directed towards their physical improvement. *θεραπεία* therefore means "care for," without any notion of subservience, but simply the care that every good master or workman gives to the instruments he uses for making a livelihood. But when we come to the answer, *ἦνπερ οἱ δούλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν*, the metaphor changes. It is no longer the mechanic or the herdsman working independently, and giving proper atten-

tion to his tools and his beasts, but a servant attending to the different wants and arbitrary demands of his master. Notice therefore the distinction drawn above. The *θεραπεία ἱατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ* is the course of study and knowledge of detail necessary or ancillary to a physician's right employment of his art; the result of it is *ὑγίεια*, health, to the objects of its attention: whilst the *θεραπεία θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ* is the unreasoning, implicit attention that must be given from an inferior towards a superior in whose service he finds himself. The first *θεραπεία* is objective, directed towards the accomplishment of an external effect; the second is the discharge of a duty. Plato, however, by preserving the same phraseology with really different meanings, drives Euthyphro to seek for some external good effected by our attention to divine worship and other religious duties, for the benefit of heaven; instead of perceiving that the consciousness of rectitude must be the chief result of attention to pious duties.

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἐστίν;

Ε ΕΥΘ. Δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομοῖς γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεία κάλλιστα φῆς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ πρὸς Διός, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρεταῖς χρώμενοι;

ΕΥΘ. Πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ὦ Σώκρατες.

14 ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοί, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥαδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὐ;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ δέ γ' οἶμαι καὶ καλά καὶ οἱ γεωργοί. ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἢ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, ἃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται, τι τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστὶ τῆς ἀπεργασίας;

Β ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ὀλίγον τοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς ταῦτα

ἡμῖν ὑπηρεταῖς χρώμενοι, V. S. ch. 7, E, χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, and note.

τὸ κεφάλαιον. Understand τῆς ἀπεργασίας before αὐτῶν from the next remark of Socrates.

πλείονος ἔργου. This gen. is explained as follows by Matthiae: "The genitive denotes the person or thing in which anything is found, whether as a property or a quality," &c., &c.

πάντα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίσθηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ ὄσια, καὶ σώζει τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δ' ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἀσεβῆ, ἀ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἅπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.

CAP. XVII.

ΣΩ. Ἡ πολὺ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἠρώτων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἶ διδάξαι· δῆλος εἶ, καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦσθα, ἀπετρέπου· ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, C ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὀσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δέ—ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ· τί δὴ αὐτὸ λέγεις τὸ ὄσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὐχεσθαι;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαι ἔστι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δ' εὐχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς;

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς D ἢ ὀσιότης ἂν εἴν, ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ξυνηῆκας ὃ εἶπον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιθυμητῆς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας

Here we may say not a property or a quality, but a species or part of a genus or whole, and refer it to the general head of the partitive genitive, "is a matter of further exertion."

B. σώζει, "saves," *i.e.* from

στασις or dispute, as we see from the corresponding words, ἀνατρέπει καὶ ἀπόλλ.

πολύ, join to βραχυτέρων.

δῆλος εἶ, plane videris.

C. ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦσθα. Cf. Rep. 532, τότε δὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται.

καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ· ὥστε οὐ χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὅ τι ἂν εἴπῃς· ἀλλὰ μοι λέξον, τίς αὐτῇ ἢ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκείνοις;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγε.

CAP. XVIII.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν εἴη, ὧν δεόμεθα παρ' ἐκείνων, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλὰ τί;

ΣΩ. Καὶ αὐτὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ὧν ἐκείνοι τυγχάνουσι δεόμενοι παρ' ἡμῶν ταῦτα ἐκείνοις αὐτῶν ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γάρ που τεχνικόν γ' ἂν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα, ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη, ὧν Εὐθύφρον, τέχνη ἢ ὀσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ' ἀλλήλων.

ΕΥΘ. Ἐμπορικὴ, εἰ οὕτως ἡδίων σοι ὀνομάζειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἡδίων ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνει ἀληθὲς ὄν. φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἢ ὠφέλεια τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὕσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὧν παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσι; ἂ μὲν γὰρ διδῶσι, παντὶ δῆλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἐκείνοι δῶσιν· ἂ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσι, τί ὠφελοῦνται; ἢ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα τὰγαθὰ παρ' αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκείνοι δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐδέν;

D. ἀλλὰ τί. sc. ἄλλο.

E. οὐ γάρ που. . . Cf. Rep. 374, B, ἢ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι; "Is it not of the nature of an

art?" So here, "It does not seem to be of the nature of an art that one should give," &c.

ἔ δέ. . . Omission of antecedent.

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελείσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων, ἃ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τί δήποτ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΥΘ. Τί δ' οἶει ἄλλο ἢ τιμὴ τε καὶ γέρα καὶ ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

ΣΩ. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸ Β ὄσιον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΥΘ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἄρ' ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὄσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

ΕΥΘ. Μάλιστά γε.

CAP. XIX.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, εἰάν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες, ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολὺ γε τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλω περιμόντας ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταῦτὸν ἤκει; μέμνησαι γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν τό τε ὄσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταῦτὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἢ οὐδὲ μέμνησαι;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον φῆς ὄσιον εἶναι; τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται; ἢ οὐ;

τί δήποτ'. "What name shall we give?" "What are we to call?"

B. μάλιστα φίλον. Thereby bringing the question round to its original starting-point. The

question is put in the negative form, that this answer of Euthyphro's may be more emphatic and uncompromising.

C. ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν. Ch. 12 ad fin.



ΕΥΘ. Πανυ γέ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα.

ΕΥΘ. Ἔοικεν.

CAP. XX.

D ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτέον, τι ἐστι τὸ ὄσιον· ὡς ἐγώ, πρὶν ἂν μάθω, ἐκὼν εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μὴ με ἀτιμάσης, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν ὃ τι μάλιστα νῦν εἶπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἶσθα γάρ, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἤδησθα σαφῶς τό τε ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ποτε ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἀνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκᾶσθαι φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεσας παρα-
E κινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσεις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡσχύνῃς. νῦν δὲ εὖ οἶδ', ὅτι σαφῶς οἶε εἰδέναί τό τε ὄσιον καὶ μὴ. εἶπὲ οὖν, ὧ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρον, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὃ τι αὐτὸ ἡγεί.

ΕΥΘ. Εἰσαῦθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες. νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καὶ μοι ὦρα ἀπιέναι.

ΣΩ. Οἶα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβαλὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἣν εἶχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ

D. ὡς ἐγώ, understand ἴσθι. "Be sure I will not . . ."

ἐκὼν εἶναι. Jelf's explanation of this phrase seems scarcely likely: he compares θεῖον ἄριστος, and makes εἶναι = οὐσίαν, "Willing in real earnest." To

this example Matthiae adds θέμις εἶναι, σύμπαν εἶναι, τήμερον εἶναι.

εἴπερ τις ἄλλος. Socrates' last attempt on the self-complacency of Euthyphro.

ἔδεσας. This word must be taken both with θεοὺς and παρακ.

μαθῶν τὰ τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον
 γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκείνω ὅτι σοφὸς 16
 ἤδη παρ' Εὐθύφρονος τὰ θεῖα γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐ-
 κέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ
 περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅ τι ἄμεινον
 βιωσοίμην.

Ε. ἀπαλλάξομαι . . . βιωσοί-
 μην. Schleiermacher and Engle-
 hardt make these two verbs
 depend on εἶχον, as the nearer
 and remoter result, respectively,
 of the indicative proposition "I
 hoped." For this compare the
 well-known passage in Thucy-
 dides—*παρανίσχον . . . φρυκτοῦς*
ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα ἢ, καὶ μὴ
βοηθοῖεν. Stallb. condemns this
 on the ground that we shall have
 a "constructio difficilis et con-
 torta;" and that Socrates will
 be undertaking to live a better
 life than Euthyphro (ἄμεινον
βιωσοίμην), whom he has already
 confessed to be "innocens et

integer" (3 A). But ἄμεινον may
 very well refer simply to an
 improvement in Socrates' own
 moral condition. And as for
 the construction, it must be
 noticed that Stallbaum's is open
 to precisely the same objection
 which he brings against Schleier-
 macher's and Engelhardt's, for
 we have the unusual sequence
 no less, viz. *ἐνδειξάμενος . . . ὅτι*
γέγονα . . . καὶ βιωσοίμην, no
 less "difficilis et contorta."
 And this construction will have
 to be explained in just the
 same way as that of Schleier-
 macher, and with greater diffi-
 culty.



EXCURSUS.

ON THE CHARACTER OF EUTHYPHRO.

IN Greek history there is a certain character of whom the hero of this Dialogue strongly reminds us, and this character is Nicias. Nicias was a man of exemplary piety, and so is Euthyphro. Nicias' actions were almost invariably governed by principle, and the same can be said of Euthyphro. Both were highly superstitious—*δεισιδαίμονες*—in an age when superstition meant rather extreme reverence for everything divine, and was viewed more as a commendable than as a vulgar weakness. And both are presented to our view in situations where their bigotry shows as melancholy as it is preposterous; thus the one refuses to take advantage of the only hope of escape left to a large army reduced to the last extremity of famine, disease, and desperation, because the moon is eclipsed and must be propitiated; whilst the other is calmly proceeding to the arraignment of his own father on a charge of murdering a wretched serf. The serf, it should be remarked, is a murderer himself, and died of exposure (or wilful neglect, as his son Euthyphro no doubt intended to depose before the dicasts).

With this singular plea does Euthyphro first come

before our notice. Let it not be supposed that the idea of such an action at law is absurd, and that we have here only a caricature. Turning to the picture of Athenian neglect or positive ill-treatment of the old, we read in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes as follows :—

οἱ γεροντες οἱ παλαιοι μεμφόμεσθα τῇ πόλει.
οὐ γὰρ ἀξίως ἐκείνων ὦν ἐναυμαχήσαμεν
γηροβοσκόμεσθ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν, ἀλλὰ δεινὰ πάσχομεν.
οὔτινες γέροντας ἄνδρας ἐμβαλόντες ἐς γραφὰς
ὑπὸ νεανίσκων ἔατε καταγελασθαι ῥητόρων.—676, &c.

(the exact case in point).

And again, in *Wasps*, 605, &c., if the father comes home with his fee, well and good, all the family are glad to see him ; and if he comes without it—

κεῖ μὴ με δεήσει
ἐς σὲ βλέψαι καὶ τὸν ταμίαν, ὅπότ' ἄριστον παραθήσει
καταρασάμενος καὶ τονθούσας. ἄλλην μὴ μοι ταχὺ μάξῃ.

i.e. “lest he mix me (ἄλλην μάξαν) a deadly cake.”—Mahaffy. And yet once more, a sad but decisive instance, from the *Clouds*, 844 seqq. :—

οἶμο., τί δράσω παραφρονούντος τοῦ πατρός ;
πότερα παρανοίας αὐτὸν εἰσαγαγὼν ἔλω ;
ἢ τοῖς σοροπηγοῖς τὴν μανίαν αὐτοῦ φράσω ;

“ My father is mad—let me see. Shall I bring him into court, or get a coffin ready for him ? ”

With these instances before us, we can see that this situation, as described by Euthyphro, need not be much exaggerated. Plato has probably given us here a typical and extreme case of unfilial bearing at Athens.

But whilst admitting the case to be an extreme one, we must give Euthyphro his due. Now his self-sufficiency appears by turns absurd, irritating, and impressive. He could no more be persuaded that his course of action admitted of error than he could explain

the nature of Right and Wrong to Socrates. Thus, in Ch. IV. E, when relating how this prosecution of his father did not seem quite justifiable to his relatives, he describes them as *κακῶς εἰδότες τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὁσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου*—"taking a wrong view of divine matters with respect to what is holy and unholy." This is the self-complacency of a man who thoroughly believes in his creed. And so again, in the same chapter, when examined by Socrates as to his confidence in his proceedings, he replies: *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ' τῷ ἂν διαφέρει Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.*

In fact, his knowledge of things divine seems to reach to an extent undreamed of by the ordinary citizen; thus *ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλὰ, ἐάνπερ βούλη, περὶ τῶν θεῶν διηγῆσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εἰ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει.*

To take another instance at once of his self-sufficiency and his immovable religious convictions, in Ch. IV. B, *γελοῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες ὅτι οἷε τι διαφέρειν εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκείος ὁ τεθνεώς.* And again of the former quality Ch. V. C, *εὐροίμ' ἂν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅπῃ σαθρός ἐστι, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος γένοιτο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.* From this we see that his self-reliance extended beyond the sphere of religious dogma to that of forensic contention; for we cannot understand him here as relying merely on his superior knowledge of the subject: the Athenians laugh at that. He himself says (Ch. II. C): "No, he is going to assume the offensive and pick holes in his opponent's case."

But with all this confidence in his argumentative powers we do not find him an apt dialectician. He is unable to see the force of the logical text that, if all *A* is *B* it does *not* follow that all *B* is *A*: Ch. III. A., *Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὄσιον, &c, precc. et. seqq.*

He is also sorely bewildered by Socrates' question, "Is the holy loved by heaven because holy, or is it holy because loved by heaven?" And when that question has been proved the last step has to be explained over again before he can see the bearing of it, Ch. XII. E. In Ch. XIII. B. he is fairly reduced to confusion, and plaintively urges that the argument *will* come round in a circle, and will not stay where it is put. That he has a touch of the rhetor in his character we notice from his paraphrase of Socrates' version of piety in Ch. XVI. A, where he escapes from the logical difficulty (of telling what are the ἔργα of God towards which he is assisted by human attention) under a rather eloquent statement of what he considers piety to be. He is finally wearied of the argument, and escapes by means of the plea of another engagement.

There is a question suggested by the character of Euthyphro with regard to his own profession. Why was he not ἐξηγητής, or expounder of religious legislation? Who so fitted for the task as one ὃς πάντα τὰ θεῶν ἀκριβῶς εἰδέειν? Who could have expounded the will of heaven with such incontrovertible emphasis, such quieting conviction, as Euthyphro? To be sure he was not quite proof against a dialectical attack; but then dialecticians generally managed their own religious affairs, and would not be likely to trouble the state servant. He seems, too, to have been a free Athenian, and presumably of good family. The office of Exegetes seems, however, to have been confined to the noble family of the Eumolpidae. Apart from this restriction, we can imagine no one better fitted for the office than Euthyphro, especially in his own eyes. The most pleasing trait in his character is his unaffected expression of feeling towards Socrates anent his

prosecution by Meletus, of whom he says, *κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σε*. That he was not a man of unkindly feeling is clear from this passage, and the general tone of the Dialogue. This being granted, serves to bring out with greater clearness the extraordinary strength of his creed, requiring as it did the prosecution of his own father for a capital crime, and scattering all such feelings as filial affection to the winds.

Only in Roman history can we find bigotry to parallel Euthyphro's, viz., in the person of Cato the Younger. The two men exhibit the same uncompromising and pre-determined attitude towards any attempt to divert them from their convictions. And herein lies the difference between Euthyphro and Nicias, viz., that whilst opposition to the latter sometimes produced irresolution, it only serves to confirm the former in his purpose. And thus on Socrates proving for the third time that Euthyphro is ignorant of the true nature of Right and Wrong, and calling his attention to the wickedness of prosecuting a father without being prepared to show just ground for such a step, Euthyphro calmly takes down Socrates' appeal for instruction as though it were no hint to himself of his ignorance, and replies, *Εἰσαῦθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες*.

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