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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO

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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΑΔΗΣ

THE PARMENIDES OF PΛΑΤΩ

AFTER THE PAGING OF THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPT

WITH

INTRODUCTIONS, FACSIMILES, AND NOTES

WILLIAM WARDLAW WADDELL

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ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ

Greek

FEB 1 1941

PREFACE.

THE author first studied the Parmenides in college days long ago, as an exercise in metaphysics; but all such occupations had to be renounced when he took up the practical duties of his calling. As time passed, however, the speculative interest revived, the subject was resumed, and he found himself most unexpectedly committed to publication before he had realized what such a step involved. In the meantime he had become satisfied that the highest manuscript authority for the text was accessible at Oxford, and his leisure moments had now to be given to palaeography. With the zeal of a beginner he decided to reproduce the form of the manuscript, a resolution rendered feasible by the condition of the text. This fixed for him the size of his page; and that in turn suggested facsimiles and a regard to outward appearance. Metaphysics, palaeography, aesthetics—such was the writer's downward course: it remains to hope that the result may justify the undertaking. So far as contents are concerned the work errs both by excess and by defect, and that largely through circumstances. It was compiled in spare hours, at long intervals, while the writer was, if he may so speak, in bondage under the elements of the world. During its progress effort was occasionally misdirected, notes lost their first significance, standpoints had to be abandoned, and the literature of the subject proved unmanageable. And in the end, with no mere affectation of humility, the writer feels that he presents little upon philosophy save τὰ δεδημευμένα περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, while his contributions to palaeography have still to be tested by the

experts. At most he can but rank with the untrained boxers of Aristotle, who περιφερόμενοι τύπτουσι καλὰς πληγὰς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης.

A commentator on Plato must beware of two dangers. If he does not detect in his author the latest developments of metaphysics he may be adjudged ignorant of these ; if he does he may be taxed with a want of the 'historic sense.' The dilemma is not an agreeable one. The writer is perhaps imperfectly informed upon recent metaphysical theories, but his ignorance is not proved by a failure to read all Hegel into the Parmenides. In a parallel case, he might know little of renaissance architecture in Italy, but that could not be properly inferred from his inability to find a place on the Acropolis for half the public buildings of Vicenza. On the other hand, if Plato himself escapes being a Hegelian, it must be granted that the comments of his Neoplatonic followers have a strangely modern character. It is part of the wonderful suggestiveness of Plato's contributions to philosophy that they act contagiously upon the imagination of readers ; and even the Parmenides, perhaps the most 'sawdustish' among them, is no exception.

Toward previous workers in the same field, many of them critics and scholars of the highest rank, the writer is not consciously chargeable with discourtesy or disingenuousness. But if any expression should be thought wanting in respect, or any view appear to be appropriated without acknowledgment, he sincerely desires to recall the one and give up the other. Among his brightest memories will be the days of lovely autumn weather which his work led him to pass, from time to time, among the quiet and impressive surroundings of great libraries. It is no less a pleasure than a duty to acknowledge here the very great consideration and kindness shown him by the authorities of all these noble institutions. In particular, he will always remember with gratitude that at Tübingen the time of the officials was drawn upon and the rules of the library were relaxed to oblige him, and that from Venice, through the personal kindness of Count Soranzo, a photographic negative was received within a fortnight of the date on which the

request for it was posted in Scotland. His thanks are also due for obliging communications from Mr. Warner of the British Museum, and from Professor Mahaffy. While the character of the letterpress is such as to demand most attentive revision, the protracted and fitful progress of the volume made it impossible to ask assistance from friends in looking over the proofs. The printed authorities consulted are all named from time to time in the course of the work, but Professor Schanz calls for special recognition in connection with the manuscripts. The writings of some commentators could not be had separately, and are quoted from the variorum edition of Valpy. Others, cited in turn by these, could not be procured at all. Such are the disadvantages of living in a provincial town. Of English editions of the dialogue the only one used is that of Thomson, published more than a century ago. The writer remembers seeing, when a student, a small modern edition; but he did not note the author's or publisher's name, and has tried in vain to obtain a copy since. He owes very much to all these sources of information. Now that the work is ended, he is satisfied that the standard aimed at is deserving of respect; but when he thinks of the extent to which learning in all branches has latterly become specialized, and of the many pitfalls lying in the path of imprudent amateurs, his satisfaction is tempered with anxiety, and he is almost ready to say with Thomson, '*nec laudem quaero, sed pro laude veniam.*'

STIRLING, October 12, 1894.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION.

I.

IN writing an introduction to the *Parmenides* of Plato it is unfortunately necessary, AUTHORSHIP OF THE WORK. in view of modern controversies, to begin by discussing the authenticity of the work. So far as Antiquity is concerned, no doubt upon the subject would appear to have arisen. The best manuscripts give the dialogue without hinting a suspicion; and these can be traced back, with reasonable certainty, to a common fountain dating from the first thirty-six years of our era. Within that period one Thrasyllus or Thrasyllus drew up an arrangement of all those Platonic writings held by him to be genuine, which seems to be the source of most or all of our existing texts. According to Diogenes iii. 56-61. Laërtius this arrangement took the form of tetralogies, and was as follows:—

I. Euthyphro.	Apologia.	Crito.	Phaedo.
II. Cratylus.	Theaetetus.	Sophista.	Politicus.
III. <i>Parmenides</i> .	Philebus.	Symposium.	Phaedrus.
IV. Alcibiades I.	Alcibiades II.	Hipparchus.	Anterastae.
V. Theages.	Charmides.	Laches.	Lysis.
VI. Euthydemus.	Protagoras.	Gorgias.	Meno.
VII. Hippias major.	Hippias minor.	Io.	Menexenus.
VIII. Clitopho.	Respublica.	Timaeus.	Critias.
IX. Minos.	Leges.	Epinomis.	Epistolae.

καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὕτω διαιρεῖ καὶ τινες. It is indeed indicated by Diogenes in another ix. 37. place that Thrasyllus had doubts about one of these dialogues; but that was the *Anterastae*, not the *Parmenides*.

Immediately after giving this list, however, Diogenes goes on to record a second How far can we trace it back? of a much earlier date. "Ἐνιοὶ δέ, says he, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικός, εἰς *τριλογίας* ἔλκουσι τοὺς *διαλόγους*. According, then, to Aristophanes the grammarian, called 'of Byzantium,' whose prime we may place between 220 and 190 B.C., the order of the dialogues should be this:—

I. Respublica.	Timaeus.	Critias.	III. Leges	Minos.	Epinomis.
II. Sophista.	Politicus.	Cratylus.	IV. Theaetetus.	Euthyphro.	Apologia.
	V. Crito.		Phaedo.		Epistolae.

τὰ δ' ἄλλα καθ' ἐν καὶ ἀτάκτως. In the trilogies, it will be observed, the *Parmenides* does not appear; and we have to consider whether it was likely to be found among 'the remainder which were placed not in groups but singly.' The ordering of the Platonic

writings would seem to have been almost an industry in itself among the scholars who flourished after the founding of the great libraries. First we have Thrasyllus καὶ τινες, next ἔνιοι and Aristophanes; while immediately after the word ἀτάκτως Diogenes goes on ἄρχονται δὲ οἱ μὲν, ὡς προεῖρηται (*i.e.* the ἔνιοι), ἀπὸ τῆς Πολιτείας· οἱ δ' ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ μείζονος· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Θεάγου· ἔνιοι δ' (Thrasyllus and his followers) Εὐθύφρωνος· ἄλλοι Κλειτοφῶντος· τινὲς Τιμαίου· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Φαίδρου· ἕτεροι Θεαιτήτου· πολλοὶ δὲ Ἀπολογίαν τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιοῦνται. His final remark is as follows, continuing from ποιοῦνται: νοθεύονται δὲ τῶν διαλόγων ὁμολογουμένως Μίδων ἢ Ἱπποτρόφος, Ἐρυξίας ἢ Ἐρασίστρατος, Ἀλκυών, Ἀκέφαλοι ἢ Σίσυφος (some read ἀκέφαλοι ἢ Σίσυφος), Ἀξίохος, Φαίακες, Δημοδόκος, Χελιδών, Ἐβδόμη, Ἐπιμενίδης· ὧν ἡ Ἀλκυὼν Λέοντός τινος εἶναι δοκεῖ, καθά φησι Φαβωρίνος ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων. Thus we have got before us a complete deliverance by Diogenes Laërtius upon the canon of Plato's works. Now in the course of this connected and detailed statement he (1) gives a long list of dialogues held to be genuine and arranged by Thrasyllus: (2) a shorter list of those arranged by Aristophanes, after which he says, 'the rest' were placed one by one: (3) enumerates other arrangements; some of which as will be observed, begin from dialogues named in (1) although not named in (2): (4) gives the names of those dialogues, 'the' dialogues, which were 'declared to be spurious by common consent' (the translation is Grote's): and lastly (5) indicates the great importance which was attached to the ordering of these works by the scholars of antiquity. In a word he has the subject fully present to his mind in all its bearings. And the question comes to be—if Aristophanes had omitted from his list the Parmenides, or any dialogue included in the list of Thrasyllus, would Diogenes under these circumstances have failed to say so? That does not seem probable, more particularly since he treats the work as genuine in his Lives of Parmenides and Zeno; and we may thus infer that the Parmenides existed among 'the rest' of Aristophanes at—let us say—210 B.C. We have, moreover, the following very comprehensive decision ascribed by Diogenes to an author who lived half a century or so later than Aristophanes, πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος, etc. This verdict may not include the νοθεύόμενοι, but cannot well exclude any others.

ix. 23, 25.

ii. 64.

It may perhaps be asked at this stage—those copies of Plato's works which formed the text for all this deliberation and arrangement, where were they to be seen? to whom did they belong? Although the conclusion is not based upon positive testimony, it is very generally assumed that the copies were those contained in the Alexandrian, and perhaps in the Pergamene, library. The year 283 B.C. marks the point at which the throne of Egypt passed from the First Ptolemy to the Second; and it appears to be accepted that by this date the library at Alexandria had taken definite form. While owing its origin to the tastes and munificence of the Ptolemies, that great collection seems to have been much indebted for its actual character and contents to Demetrius of Phalerum. Of this man—born in Attica shortly after Plato's death, for years conspicuous and popular at Athens, an orator, a voluminous author, a student of philosophy, and finally a protector of Plato's successor Xenocrates—we do not indeed know, but may with every right assume, that he

was familiar with Plato's Academy when Xenocrates was its head (B.C. 339-314), and that when in later life he had the ear and support of Ptolemy Soter he would be at pains to secure for Alexandria the best copy which care, skill, and money could command of all the Platonic writings. Exclusive of Demetrius, Aristophanes the grammarian, mentioned above, was fifth curator of the Alexandrian collection; and his period of office might date from, we shall suppose, his fiftieth year—that is, from about 210 B.C.

We have just seen what an object of study the Platonic writings were to scholars of this age, and we are at the same time entitled to hold that a copy of them, and that a careful one, existed at Alexandria as early at least as 250 B.C. Plato died in the year 347 B.C., or about a hundred years before. How do we bridge over the interval? Although passages are quoted to prove that Plato despised written, as compared with oral, instruction in philosophy, he was certainly a voluminous author; and both from the style of his works and from familiar anecdotes recorded about him,¹ we are justified in saying that he was a most careful and critical one. He also in middle life founded an institution at the Academy which would have many points in common with a University. Here he lectured to numerous and enthusiastic students; and here beyond all rational doubt would be collected, as they were written, the series of his published works. This would seem to give a greater initial probability of careful transmission than could be affirmed in the case, for example, of Herodotus or Thucydides. But further: on its founder's death the institute passed under the charge of a nephew, Speusippus, and thereafter, as we have seen, of a disciple, Xenocrates; the consecutive presidency of whom brings us to the year 314 B.C. Nor does the career of the Academy seem to have been broken or its abode disturbed until the time of Sulla. On what precise material the works at the Academy when complete were engrossed may be uncertain, but there can be no extravagance in assuming that it was capable of lasting for a century; and if, as seems highly probable, the full list was made up under Speusippus by the year 340 B.C., we would thus have it carried safely down within the period during which Demetrius could have it transcribed for Ptolemy. Few who have read the vicissitudes which have been survived by the Clarke MS. would find any difficulty in accepting the assumption, that at least two well authenticated copies of all Plato's works existed at the year 200 B.C., one at Athens and one at Alexandria. Nay—to judge from the remark of Diogenes in his *Life of Democritus*, that Plato was persuaded not to burn the works of Democritus, because 'many had copies'—the number was probably much greater.

With such an argument as this—indeed it is substantially his—Grote is perfectly satisfied. He considers that few if any authors of the Greek classic age have the authenticity of their writings placed upon so substantial a foundation; and unhesitatingly adopts the entire Thrasylican series, rejecting only the works which in Alexandrian times were 'declared to be spurious by common consent.' And surely his verdict is weighty. Few have had better means of knowing the amount of evidence on which the facts of Greek history depend. It is worth adding that the Scholiast on Aristotle's

¹ Dionys. Halicarn. 'De Compositione Verborum,' ed. Schaefer, Leipz. 1808, p. 243. Also comp. Quint. viii. 6, 64.

Aristotle,
Berlin Edit., vol.
iv. 766 a. top.

Metaphysics—though, of course, he is comparatively late—speaks of τὸν ἐπιγραφόμενον Παρμενίδην ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν τοῦ Πλάτωνος διάλογον. And other passages might be cited. This topic of the spurious dialogues, however, calls for some investigation. With such guarantees for authenticity, how did spurious works come to exist at all? Unless Plato himself left authoritative testimony that he had published all he wrote, or at least had destroyed anything which he did not wish published, it might well enough be affirmed after his death, if any one had an interest in advancing such an assertion, that some hitherto unpublished work had been discovered. A student in the Academy or a contemporary of Plato might do so, if either desired to attack some statement by Speusippus about his uncle's views. But even more unworthy reasons were not wanting.

Galen on Hip-
pocr. de nat.
hom. i. 92: and
Bentley, Phalar.
init.

The passage usually cited in this connection since Bentley's time is from Galen: πρὶν γὰρ τοὺς ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τε καὶ Περγᾶμῳ γενέσθαι βασιλεῖς ἐπὶ κτήσει βιβλίων φιλοτιμηθέντας οὐδέπω ψευδῶς ἐπεγέγραπτο σύγγραμμα· λαμβάνειν δ' ἀρξαμένων μισθὸν τῶν κομιζόντων αὐτοῖς σύγγραμμα παλαιοῦ τινὸς ἀνδρὸς οὕτως ἤδη πολλὰ ψευδῶς ἐπιγράφοντες ἐκόμιζον. Galen certainly lived (130–200+ A.D.) long after the date to which he makes reference: still he was born at Pergamus, which favours the idea that he had local tradition in support of his assertion, while the motive assigned for forgery is unhappily only too probable. Later writers also, unless they derived their authority from this passage, confirm Galen's statement, and even give some details upon the subject. Thus David when commenting upon the works of Aristotle, says,

Arist. Berlin.
Ed., vol. iv. 28 a.
See also notes of
Ammonius and
Simplicius at the
foot.

ἐν οἷς ζητητέον καὶ τὸ γνήσιον διὰ τὴν γιγνομένην νοθείαν νοθεύονται γὰρ τὰ βιβλία πενταχῶς and proceeds to specify these. It will be observed that Galen dates forgeries from the time when libraries had already become recognized channels of royal expenditure. Perhaps it is on this ground that Grote would hold the rejected dialogues to have been set aside simply because of their late admission into the libraries. 'It is the transmission, the externally attested authenticity, of these works that we doubt'—so he seems to make the librarians speak—'and our doubts are based on the fact that our catalogues were completed before they appeared. With their internal character—the presence or absence in them of a "Platonisches Gefühl"—we take no concern.' And this may possibly be so. Nay, the date at which these dialogues appeared might perhaps be brought within narrower compass by the reference of Diogenes quoted above to the judgment of Panaetius. The inference from the words of Panaetius, who died before 111 B.C., would seem to be that he either did not concur in the rejection of the spurious dialogues, or else knew nothing of them—that they had appeared after his death. In this way Aristophanes also would know nothing of them, nor does Diogenes say anything to contradict this. But

i. 60, 61, 64.

on the other hand what is to be said of the following? Διεβάλλετο δ' ὁ Αἰσχίνης (pupil of Socrates) καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ Μενεδήμου τοῦ Ἐρετριέως ὡς τοὺς πλείστους διαλόγους ὄντας Σωκράτους ὑποβάλλοιτο, λαμβάνων παρὰ Ξανθίππης ὧν οἱ μὲν καλούμενοι ἀκέφαλοι σφόδρ' εἰσὶν ἐκλελυμένοι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιφαίνοντες τὴν Σωκρατικὴν εὐτονίαν οὓς καὶ Πεισιστρατος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἔλεγε μὴ εἶναι Αἰσχίνου. καὶ τῶν ἐπτά δὲ τοὺς πλείστους Περσαίος φησι

Πασιφώντος εἶναι τοῦ Ἑρετρικοῦ, εἰς τοὺς Αἰσχίνου δὲ κατατάξαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθέους τὸν τε μικρὸν Κῦρον καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν ἐλάσσω καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ἐσκενώρηται. οἱ δ' οὖν τῶν Αἰσχίνου τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ἦθος ἀπομεμαγμένοι εἰσὶν ἑπτὰ· πρῶτος Μιλτιάδης, διὸ καὶ ἀσθενέστερόν πως ἔχει· Καλλίας, Ἀξίοχος, Ἀσπασία, Ἀλκιβιάδης, Τηλαύγης, Ῥίνων. φασὶ δ' αὐτὸν δι' ἀπορίαν ἐλθεῖν εἰς Σικελίαν πρὸς Διονύσιον, καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν Πλάτωνος παροφθῆναι, ὑπὸ δ' Ἀριστίππου συσταθῆναι [others συστήναι]. δόντα τέ τινες τῶν διαλόγων δῶρα λαβεῖν... Τούτου τοὺς διαλόγους καὶ Ἀρίστιππος ὑπώπτευν. ἐν γοῦν Μεγάρους ἀναγιγνώσκοντος αὐτοῦ φασὶ σκῶψαι εἰπόντα, "πόθεν σοι, ληστὰ, ταῦτα;".... Πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφώντος, Ἀντισθέους, Αἰσχίνου· διστάζει δὲ περὶ τῶν Φαίδωνος (Ueberweg makes the strange mistake of supposing this to be the dialogue called Phaedo, instead of the dialogues written by the person of that name) καὶ Εὐκλείδου, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἀναιρεῖ πάντας:—to which we may add for completeness διαλόγους τοῖνυν iii. 48. φασὶ πρῶτον γράψαι Ζήνωνα τὸν Ἐλεάτην· Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ ποιητῶν Ἀλεξάμενον Στυρέα ἢ Τήϊον, ὡς καὶ Φαβωρίνος ἐν ἀπομνημονεύμασι. δοκεῖ δέ μοι Πλάτων ἀκριβῶς τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα δικαίως ἂν ὥσπερ τοῦ καλλοῦς οὕτω καὶ τῆς εὐρέσεως ἀποφέρεσθαι. From these passages it would seem clear (1) that dialogues existed before Plato was born: (2) that about the time of Socrates' death, there sprang up a perfect literature of them purporting to be his or to embody his teaching: (3) that plagiarism existed and was exposed at the time, in connection with these dialogues: (4) that the tests by which this exposure was effected were—both then and in the time of Diogenes—internal not external: (5) and, finally, that in comparing the list given here with that given above, of the spurious Platonic works, we find that there are certain names common to both, and that a reference to ἀκέφαλοι διάλογοι and ἑπτὰ occurs in each list. From all this it will be seen that a shadow falls upon the argument given but now for the authenticity of the writings ascribed to Plato. Accordingly, in modern times, and more especially since Schleiermacher made his great attempt to construct a self-consistent scheme of reasoned truth from those writings, the whole question of their reliability has been reconsidered. In arriving at a judgment, the tests applied have been both external or historic, and internal or literary and speculative.

On the historic side, the great question has been, Can we find evidence for the existence of Plato's works prior to the time of Aristophanes the grammarian? which again, for practical purposes, resolves itself into the other question, Can we find references to them in the works of Aristotle? It is obvious that an authentic reference gleaned from such a source would be of great authority. At the same time the subject is not without difficulties; for the text of Aristotle is less fully assured than Plato's own. Besides the facts already enumerated in support of Plato's text, we have the further circumstance, that according to the testimony of Hermann and Zeller as quoted by Ueberweg 'in der gesammten alten Literatur, soweit sie uns erhalten ist, keine gesicherte Beziehung auf ein Platonisches Werk sich findet, Is it referred to by Aristotle? Ueberweg, Untersuchungen ueber die Echtheit etc. Platon. Schriften, p. 131-2.

- welches heute nicht mehr existirte'; so that we now possess at least all the genuine works of Plato, whatever those may be. No such affirmation can be made in the case of Aristotle. In the Berlin Edition, among the fragments, quite a considerable list is given of works referred to in ancient writers as by Aristotle, which have not come down to us. Again a considerable quantity of what actually appears under his name is doubtful, either absolutely or else in the precise form in which we find it. Zeller, *Plato, etc.*, p. 54, note 22, Eng. Tr. gives a list of references to Plato in Aristotle which he holds to be discredited on this ground. Let us now take two cases in which clear references do occur. In *De Anima* we have τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ, with which compare *Timaeus* 35 A. Again in the *Politics* we find ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, with which compare *Republic*, Book v. In the case of both these dialogues, references might be multiplied. For us the problem is, Can any similar reference be quoted of which the *Parmenides* is the object? There can not. But it might, of course, happen that Aristotle, while really having in his eye a work by Plato, might be less precise in the form of his allusion, trusting that, from the context or other circumstances, those for whom he wrote would understand his real intention. Accordingly, we find many alleged references to Plato which range through all the grades of likelihood from practical certainty downwards. Here for example is one which has given rise to discussion: in the *Topics*, Aristotle says, ὡς Πλάτων ὀρίζεται φορὰν τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν. No work is cited by name in this instance: but in the *Parmenides* we find κινούμενόν γε [τὸ ἐν] ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἂν, αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. Ναί.... Καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἦτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας.... 'Ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμείβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;... Κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἐν ἀκίνητον. Undoubtedly the sense of the two passages is the same, but there is no verbal identity, while on the other hand there is another similar passage in the *Theaetetus* ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφῃται; 'Εγώ γε. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἑστῷ εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκη δὲ... ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἑτερον εἶδος φάναι κινήσεως; 'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. 'Αναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὴ λέγω τούτῳ εἶδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν. Ueberweg is not sure that any more is meant than a reference to some statement made orally at the Academy; but if a work is alluded to, he thinks that a reference to the *Parmenides* is 'etwas weniger ungenau.' Again, Stallbaum, in his copious and learned introduction to the dialogue, cites various passages from Aristotle, which clearly seem to treat of questions within Aristotle's knowledge, very closely resembling those which are discussed in this dialogue. Of these we may quote two. Controverting the distinction between λόγοι πρὸς τοῦνομα and πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν, Aristotle says, Εἰ δὴ τις πλείω σημαίνοντος τοῦ ὀνόματος οἶοιτο ἐν σημαίνειν, καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος—οἶον ἴσως τὸ ὄν ἢ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν Ζήνων ἐν οἰόμενος εἶναι ἠρώτησε, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἐν πάντα—οὗτος πρὸς τοῦνομα ἔσται ἢ

πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου διειλεγμένος. And again, near the end of the same work, he says, Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῦτὸν σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἔν' οἱ δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύνουσι διὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς φάναι τὸ ἐν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὄν. Undoubtedly there is a strong resemblance here to the course of our dialogue pp. 127-9: but unfortunately neither the dialogue nor its author is named, and the reference is not so close as to satisfy us without that additional security. All that we can do is to point out, as Zeller is careful to do, that allusions in themselves uncertain gain in force from the circumstance that 'the Platonic writings are the only writings of the Socratic school to which he ever refers. This circumstance makes it extremely probable that Aristotle really intends to ascribe all the writings quoted by him in this form (here however the quotation is what is doubtful) to Plato.'

Admitting, however, the absence of a clear reference, we are still entitled to plead, that, as was mentioned above, we do not possess Aristotle's works in a perfect form. Thus we find in the list of lost works tabulated in the Berlin Edition τὰ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν γραφέντα αὐτῷ δύο βιβλία, ἄλλα ὄντα παρὰ τὸ μ καὶ ν καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ συντάξεως (Michael Ephesius in *Metaph. N. VI.* and others). Had we but these two books, the apparent silence of the *Metaphysics* might cause no anxiety. But taking matters at their worst—assuming that he never did refer to the *Parmenides*—we might still meet the difficulty by parallel cases. Thus Zeller, who has carefully treated the question, says, 'Aristotle is not passing judgment on Plato's works as a literary historian who is bound to furnish a complete catalogue of them, ... Nor does he deal with them as a modern writer of the history of Philosophy, whose object it is to combine their whole philosophic content ...; he only mentions them when occasion offers... He owes his knowledge of the Platonic doctrines in the first place to verbal communication and personal intercourse; in the second place only, to the writings of Plato... The metaphysical bases of the system ... are ... searchingly criticised, ... but in by far the greater number of cases on the ground of Plato's discourses ... Only one of the many passages from which we derive our knowledge of the theory of ideas is quoted by him [*Phaedo*, 100 B sq. in *Met. I. 9*, XIII. 5, *Gen. et Corr. II. 9*]; he makes no allusion to what is said on the subject in the *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaetetus*; nor to the explanations of the *Sophist*, *Parmenides*, and *Philebus*, though there was abundant opportunity for it... It is certainly surprising that Aristotle should assert that Plato never enquired wherein the participation of things in ideas consists; while in the *Parmenides* [130 E sq.] the difficulties with which this theory has to contend are clearly pointed out. But it is not more surprising than that he should assail the doctrine of ideas with the question: "Who formed the things of sense after the pattern of the ideas?" [*Met. I. 9*, 991a, 20], though it is distinctly stated in the *Timaeus* [28 C sq.] that the Creator of the world did this in looking on the eternal archetypes. Nor again that he should maintain, notwithstanding the well-known explanation in the *Phaedo* [100 B etc.], often alluded to by himself,—..... that

the final cause is not touched by the ideas [Met. I. 9, 992a 29 οὐδὲ δὴ ὁ περὶ ... οὐθέν ἀπτεται τὰ εἶδη]. We should have expected that in attacking Plato about the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* Aristotle, had he been acquainted with the *Parmenides*, would have referred to the fact that in that dialogue the same objection is raised. But might we not also have expected after the further stricture, "Plato ought then to assume ideas of art productions, mere relations, etc., which he does not," some such remark as this: "In his writings he certainly does speak of such ideas?" Nor is such unexpected forgetfulness confined to Aristotle. Diogenes Laërtius enumerates among certain other facts peculiar to Plato—in whose case, as has been seen, we do not hear of lost works—that *πρωτὸς τε ἀντειρηκὼς σχεδὸν ἅπασι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖται διὰ τί μὴ ἐμνημόνευσε Δημοκρίτου*. The illustration seems very pertinent: it is impossible to suppose that Plato was not well acquainted with the tenets of a man of great celebrity who was his contemporary for some sixty years.

iii. 25, ix. 40.

Berlin Ed.

Scolia 343 b, 37.

Phys. i. 9, 198 b, 35.

Mullach Frgm. of Parmen. 59-64.

156 C-D-B.

But something further may be urged in relation to the question. Thus in his commentaries upon Aristotle's *Physics* Simplicius says, *τάχα λέγομεν ὅτι πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ τῷ Παρμενίδῃ παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένα ἀπετεῖναιτο νῦν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν ὄν ὑποτιθέμενον τὸν Παρμενίδην καὶ ἀποδεικνύντα θαυμάζειν ἔοικεν ὁ Πλάτων*. The words of Aristotle to which Simplicius is referring are *ἡμέτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτεροί τινες εἰσιν αὐτῆς* [sc. *τῆς γενέσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς*], ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱκανῶς. *πρωτον μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἢ Παρμενίδην ὀρθῶς λέγειν*. Simplicius has said that the commentators regard this as a reference to the historical *Parmenides*, and then makes the remark which we have quoted. Certainly *Parmenides* rejected τὸ μὴ ὄν entirely, and contended for a being which had no *γένεσις*, *φθορά*, ἢ *μεταβολή*—ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν—τίνα γὰρ γέννην διζήσεται αὐτοῦ; πῇ, πόθεν αὐξήθην; οὐτ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἰσὼ φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν. We may observe also that Aristotle puts the words *Παρμενίδην λέγειν* under the government of *ἕτεροι ... ὁμολογοῦσιν*, and that the process of becoming and change is discussed more than once in the *Parmenides*, particularly in the argument marked in our marginal summary, III. iii., where the language used is in conformity with Aristotle's observation. We shall venture, however, to take a wider sweep in our reflections. It is conceded that the *Parmenides* is a very important dialogue in connection with the characteristic Platonic doctrine of ideas. It alone has the word *Ideas* included in its title, and some objectors can hardly be alive to the blank which would be caused in our conception of the ideal theory had this work not come down to us. They first read into that theory all the light this dialogue sheds, and then extinguish it, but without forgetting what it has shown them. Let us now, bearing this in mind, reflect for a moment upon the character of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. In composing the treatise of which that work represents all that we possess, Aristotle was perforce led to dwell at length upon the views of Plato, because Plato was in strictness the first of the metaphysicians. His predecessors, with partial exceptions, were more properly investigators of physical facts and causes. Accordingly we find that the doctrines of Plato upon ideas are discussed pointedly and in detail in a

passage which is twice repeated, and that they are over and over again referred to in other parts of the work. And yet, throughout the whole, only two dialogues are named—the Hippias, which is surely not of vital consequence, and the Phaedo. It will not be maintained that the Phaedo is the only dialogue to which a reference would under the circumstances be expected. Even it is referred to only in connection with a special point, and the argument which precedes and follows contains no allusion of a similar nature. Suppose the Parmenides dropt from view for the moment, still why have we no citation from the Meno, the Cratylus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Timaeus—to say nothing of the Sophistes and Politicus, which, like the Parmenides, are suspect? Surely, to repeat the contention of Zeller, with such a series of works unmentioned, the argument from silence loses much of its force. And if we consider the substance of Aristotle's criticisms in the passages just indicated, we are justified in contending that no dialogue which Plato ever wrote would form a more natural and obvious text for them than the Parmenides. Apart now from its controversial portions, what is the character of Aristotle's treatise as a whole? It is not very artistically compacted, but it exhibits several well marked features. (1) It handles repeatedly the conceptions *ἐν*, *ὄν*, *ἀριθμός*. For these we may refer to the Parmenides at large. (2) It defines or describes certain terms liable to be misunderstood, prominent among which—besides *ἐν* and *ὄν*—stand *ἀρχή*, *ταυτόν*, *ἀντικείμενα*, *iv. πρότερα* and *ὑστερα*, *πέρας*, *ἕξις*, *πάθος*, *στέρησις*, *μέρος*, *ὅλον*, *γένος*. Let any one for a moment consider the part played by these ideas in the Parmenides. (3) It emphatically presses, *à plusieurs reprises*, the vital importance of the law of contradiction to metaphysical inquiries, although the natural place for such insistence would be a treatise on deductive logic. Now a prominent objection urged by Grote against the arguments advanced in the Parmenides is, that they constantly violate this law—the one 'is and is not,' 'moves and is still,' 'is like and unlike,' 'one and many.' The law of contradiction had hardly received definite form before Plato's time; but Aristotle might feel all the more bound to give it prominence in view of the—under our supposition—conspicuous instance in which neglect of it in metaphysical investigations had been exemplified. (4) Let any one glance at the vocabulary of the Metaphysics and mark the employment of such words as *ἀκριβές*, *νόημα*, *παράδειγμα*, *πραγματεύεσθαι*, *πραγματεία*, *ἐπιστήμη*, *κίνησις*, *μεταβολή*, taking along with it the well known statement *ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιούσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν*, and then compare the text of this dialogue. It is not meant, by this line of argument, that the Metaphysics is a polemic directed against the Parmenides alone—in that case the dialogue would have been named—but it is meant that the substance of the Parmenides is distinctly included with that of such dialogues as the Republic, Phaedo, and Philebus, in Aristotle's mental picture of Plato's views, and forms a prominent feature in his controversial allusions; and that but for the existence of the Parmenides, the polemic of Aristotle would lose half its point and value.

Yet, probable as these arguments may be, so long as actual demonstration is not reached objections may be raised. The chief of these is that, while the points of relation between the *Parmenides* and the *Metaphysics* are undoubtedly striking, they are due, not to the fact that the author of the latter had the former in his mind, but rather to a very different cause, to wit that the author of the former had either read the latter or had heard Aristotle lecturing, and so could not be Plato. This objection and any answers that may be made to it rest not upon historical but upon internal evidence. In reply we may argue thus—referring to the notes for details.

Does it look
earlier than
Aristotle?
133 C-E.

1. Had the author of the *Parmenides* been a student of Aristotle he would in discussing, as he does, ideas of relation have naturally called them ideas *πρός τι*, which is their technical name in Aristotle's works. He does not do so. But he uses the preposition *πρός* in a less formal way—*πρός ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσιν, πρὸς αὐτάς, πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν*, and so on—a way which suggests that, while the technical phrase was yet unselected, we may have here the very source from which it was drawn. Again, we find scattered through the work such names for the ideas as *αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης, αὐτὸ τὸ ἔν, αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη*. But we do not find the *αὐτὸ* coalescing with the following word in the manner which is familiar to readers of Aristotle, in such words as *αὐτοάνθρωπος, αὐτοζῶον, αὐτοδιπλάσιον, αὐτοδόξα*. Here also the technical terminology of Aristotle seems unknown to the writer of this work. Similarly in the passage where *πρεσβύτερον* is said to be opposed as a *διαφορότης* to *νεώτερον*, and to that alone, there is no allusion to the well-known technical phraseology of the *Categories*, in the chapter upon *πρός τι*, with regard to *τὰ οἰκείως ἀντιστρέφοντα*.

141 C.

Cat. 7. 6h, 36.

138. Comp.
Phys. iii. 1 etc.
Met. x. 9.
144 E-145. Comp.
Met. iv. 26, 1024 a
1. 146 C.

2. And as with the terminology, so with the conceptions, of the dialogue—they seem less developed and analysed than similar conceptions in the works of Aristotle. Thus the discussion of *κίνησις*, which is begun in the first argument and resumed in other parts of the work, does not reveal a logical division of the subject as clear as that which we find in the *Physics*. The same seems to hold good in regard to the relations of *πάν* to *ὅλον* when compared with the treatment of them in the *Metaphysics*. Nor could the argument *ἐτέρωθι δὲ ergo ἕτερον* have been employed by anyone who was familiar with the *Sophistici Elenchi*, particularly chapter v.

But specific evidence is produced, chiefly by Ueberweg, which tends to show that statements in the *Metaphysics* are irreconcilable with the Platonic authorship of this dialogue.

Untersuchungen
176.

Met. i. 6, 987 b 9.

1. Thus Ueberweg quotes the following remark made by Aristotle when speaking of the manner in which, according to Plato, things participate in the ideas *κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων τοῖς εἶδεσιν. Τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοῦνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τοῦνομα μεταβαλὼν. Τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησην, ἥτις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφείσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.* The objection here hinges on the sense of the last clause. Ueberweg gives no verbal translation of the words: but in order to make out a case from them the rendering would need to be that Plato and the Pythagoreans

'were at one in omitting to investigate' the nature of μέθεξις and μίμησις. The opening part of the Parmenides being in express terms a discussion of μέθεξις, the objection comes to a bearing instantly. Now in making this statement mere inadvertent error on Aristotle's part is perfectly possible. A man busy with his own great and somewhat hostile speculations does not always keep in mind all that an opponent has said and done. Any modern philosophic controversy in a magazine might illustrate this. Again such an argument might seem effective if it stood alone, yet be perceptibly weakened by repetition. We would not willingly surrender three dialogues on such a ground; and as a fact Ueberweg has that difficulty to face. Aristotle explicitly states that Plato never investigated the genesis of concrete things, like flesh or bones, but confined himself to that of στοιχεῖα; which is contradicted by Timaeus 73—a work which Ueberweg places first on the list of those authenticated by Aristotle, because of the number of his allusions to it. Here Ueberweg extricates himself thus: 'theils betrifft dies eine Frage von geringerer Bedeutung, so dass ein Uebersehen leichter erklärlich wäre, (surely to Plato it would be a question of μέθεξις in both places) theils bestimmt Aristoteles im Folgenden seine Meinung näher dahin, dass mit Ausnahme des Demokrit keiner seiner Vorgänger etwas wissenschaftlich Bedeutsames darüber gesagt habe.' Again, the nature of μέθεξις is discussed in the Philebus, 'worin,' however, pleads Ueberweg, 'Aristoteles noch kein ζητεῖν finden mochte.' Probably he is contending for a foregone conclusion. But the argument may be attacked on closer grounds. The words ἀφείσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν may possibly be made to bear the meaning above given to them; at the same time one cannot but feel that another is preferable. Aristotle, if fairly understood, simply means that the Pythagoreans and Plato were not wedded to a particular view on this matter. They held the doctrine, believed that it contained the key of their problem, and tried to make their meaning intelligible; no doubt. Yet they acknowledged the overwhelming difficulty of the subject and 'left the matter as an open question to be investigated in common' by philosophers. 'In medio reliquerunt' says the Index of Bonitz under κοινός (though a different view would seem to be taken under ἀφιέναι), and it is satisfactory to find that Dr. Jackson in one of his very able articles translates the passage thus, 'but what this participation or imitation was to be, both Plato and the Pythagoreans left an open question.' With such a rendering there is no difficulty about Plato's discussing μέθεξις in the Parmenides or elsewhere; he may and does discuss it, but he is far from satisfied with his conclusions, and would welcome fresh light from any friendly quarter. Appeal might be made to the Phaedo, especially 100 D, ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαντῶ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωνία, εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη (he had already said διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ) οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά, etc. The objection, in fact, cannot be sustained.

2. Again, it is contended very plausibly by Ueberweg that an argument which is put forward in the Parmenides against the tenability of the ideal theory is

De Gener. et
Corr. I. 2, 315 a
20.
See also Tim.
35-6. Phaedo
103 A-B. 177.

Phil. 15 B.

Berl. Ed. Index
Arist. sub voc.

Jour. Philol.
No. 20, p. 292.

100 D-101.

Read
132 A-B.

Index Aristoteli-
cus sub voc. simply an adaptation of what is called the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* confutation employed by Aristotle, and must therefore have been employed by some forger who had read Aristotle—not by Plato. In Bonitz we find the following cases in which Aristotle makes use of or refers to this argument.

Met. i. 9, 990 b 17. (1) Ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων (*i.e.* of those in which τὰ εἶδη are maintained) οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιοῦσιν ιδέας, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν.

Met. xii. 4, 1079 a 13. (2) Which we place next as a mere repetition of the previous one—Ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστατοι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιοῦσιν ιδέας, ὧν οὐ φασιν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τ. τ. ἀ. λ.

Met. vi. 13, 1039 a 3. (3) Ὅλως δὲ συμβαίνει, εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, μηθὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἶναι μηθενὸς οὐσίαν, μηδὲ χωρὶς ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, λέγω δ' οἶον οὐκ εἶναι τι ζῶον παρὰ τὰ τινά, οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐθέν. Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερόν ὅτι οὐθέν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐθέν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ συμβαίνει καὶ ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.

Met. x. 1, 1059 b 8. (4) Τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδη ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον. Ὅμως δ' ἀπορίαν ἔχει, κἂν εἶναι τις αὐτὰ θῇ, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἔστιν εἶδη. Λέγω δ' ὅτι τὰ μαθηματικά μὲν μεταξύ τε τῶν εἰδῶν τιθέασιν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οἶον τρίτα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τε καὶ τὰ δεῦρο· τρίτος δ' ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ' ἵππος παρ' αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον.

Sophist. Elench. 22, 178 b 36. (5) Ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷδ' εἰσὶ τούτων τῶν λόγων—namely, among others—Καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις τρίτος ἄνθρωπος παρ' αὐτόν (*i.e.* the idea) καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον. This he goes on to interpret.

(6) Alexander commenting upon (1) says, after illustrating how the argument may be conducted, τῇ μὲν οὖν πρώτῃ τοῦ τ. ἀ. ἐξηγήσει ἄλλοι τε κέχρηται καὶ Εὐδήμος σαφῶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ λέξεως, τῇ δὲ τελευταίᾳ αὐτὸς (*i.e.* Aristotle) ἐν τε τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ιδεῶν καὶ ἐν τούτῳ (Met. I.) μετ' ὀλίγον.

Now by any one looking over these passages it will probably be admitted that we have not discovered the origin of the name. The fourth is the only one in which Aristotle speaks in terms which look as if he were making use of the name or the argument for the first time; yet he can hardly be doing so, for this is in the tenth Book, and we see that it already appears in the first and sixth. And in these (we may bracket I. and XII.) he speaks of 'the' τ. ἀ. as of a method of reasoning well known, while in (5) he refers to it as being used quite commonly in a sophistical manner; and finally Alexander says it was used by others as well as by Aristotle. Perhaps however Alexander, in saying it was used by others, is simply adopting the language of the passage (1) on which he is commenting. It is hard to understand how anyone reading Met. I. 9 could assume that the argument called τ. ἀ. originated with Aristotle. It is an argument of general bearing, to which a particular application has given a pithy name. The name may be due to Aristotle, although his existing works seem to give no proof that it is; but of the thing he expressly declares ἔτι δὲ

οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων... τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν. True, the use of the argument in the *Parmenides* is a use with the eyes open to its consequences—not a use which is unconsciously self-destructive, and the destructiveness of which is left for Aristotle to point out. But Aristotle says nothing which should render that an objection; and, as we shall presently see, it applies to other works besides the *Parmenides*. Accordingly we may meet Ueberweg's objection thus:

α. If the τ. ἀ. argument occurs in the *Parmenides* it does not follow that it was derived from Aristotle, since he speaks of that argument as known independently of him.

β. We might even, as has been hinted above, find in the words οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων the missing reference of Aristotle to the *Parmenides*—certainly no more correct description of the dialogue could be given than these words convey; and Dr. Jackson holds that there is no doubt upon the matter. In connection with the expression used by Aristotle it may perhaps be interesting to quote from the dialogue the following phrases: πολὺ αὐτὸ (τὸ γένος ἐπιστήμης) ἀκριβέστερον, ... ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην ... ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία ... ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη. In other respects also the *Parmenides* meets the case. Aristotle declares that these λόγοι of which he is speaking acknowledge the existence of ideas τῶν πρὸς τι, and the definition given of πρὸς τι in the *Categories* enables us to determine that the ideas of ὁμοιότης, μέγεθος, δεσποτεία, στάσις and κίνησις, of which this dialogue speaks, are all ideas of that class. Jour. Phil. 20, p. 255. 132 A-B.

γ. But we may go further: if the *Parmenides* contains the argument in question so does the *Republic*. Plato is arguing about the construction of κλίνας by God and says, δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ πλείους οὔτε ἐφντεύθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ φνῶσιν ... Ὅτι ... εἰ δύο μόνας ποιήσεις, πάλιν ἂν μία ἀναφανείη, ἣς ἐκείναι ἂν αὐτὰ ἀμφοτέραι τὸ εἶδος ἔχοιεν, καὶ εἴη ἂν ὃ ἔστι κλίνη ἐκείνη, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ δύο. So likewise in the *Timaeus* ἀ φροσ of the question whether there are several heavens or one—εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται there must be but one, τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα, ὅποσα νοητὰ ζῶα, μεθ' ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη· πάλιν γὰρ ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ περὶ ἐκείνω δύο ζῶον, οὗ μέρος ἂν εἴτην ἐκείνω, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἐκείνοι ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ περιέχοντι τόδ' ἂν ἀφωμοιωμένον λέγοιτο ὀρθότερον. Here, as before, the argument is weakened by repetition. We might surrender the *Parmenides*; are we to give up the *Republic* or *Timaeus* with it? Fortunately it is not incumbent on us to do so. Already a clear reference to each of them from Aristotle as genuine has been cited, and they stand at the head of Ueberweg's list as being more frequently and clearly referred to by Aristotle than any other Platonic works. And if they stand, then, so far as this argument is concerned, the *Parmenides* may stand with them. x. 597 c. Tim. 31 A. p. vi. above.

Admitting, however, that the work is not proved to be of a date more recent than Aristotle, scholars still maintain on various grounds that it at least could not have been written by Plato. Thus Socher, as Stallbaum points out, considers the work spurious on the ground that while it treats of a subject eminently Platonic, it does so in a trenchantly destructive spirit. "So derb geht doch wohl kein Schriftsteller sich selbst zu Leibe!" (Socher). This is a plausible argument. To anyone who Could Plato have written it? Parmen. Intro. p. 332.

seeks to arrange the works of Plato so as to give a complete and self-consistent scheme of philosophic reasoning, a criticism such as he is here found directing against the basis of his system cannot but cause some embarrassment. And Stallbaum's explanation of the difficulty must be regarded as unsatisfactory. According to him Plato here criticises not the actual theory of ideas but merely something which to an inattentive reader might be mistaken for it. But that Plato should allow views so like his own, yet not his, to appear as if rejected by himself, without clearly indicating their points of divergence, seems very improbable, and amounts almost to deliberate trifling with the convictions of those who were his pupils and devoted followers.

It may be pointed out that there is no exceptional keenness, nothing like *animus*, in the phraseology of the *Parmenides*. It is simply a discussion of the difficulties arising out of a theory of ideas, and an acknowledgment of their gravity. In the *Theaetetus* Plato exhibits as untenable every definition of knowledge; yet he believed in knowledge and in knowledge of ideas. In such a case we must take account of the mental detachment, the humorous sense of self-depreciation, which shows itself at intervals in all Plato's writings. We hear of the irony of Socrates; and no doubt much that Plato writes is written artistically in character. But his artistic success arises largely from personal sympathy with the feeling delineated. Moreover he had a remarkably developed dialectical faculty, and no thinker so gifted could reach middle life without being forcibly impressed by the conviction that in the last resort metaphysical questions must be dropped with a sigh, rather than argumentatively set at rest. 'I thought,' says Prof. Green, an earnest metaphysician if ever one existed, 'I had got hold of a key which I find now will not unlock so much as I fancied it would.' And just as Socrates in the course of conversation playfully made light of his own knowledge, so Plato, when impressed by a sense of metaphysical failure, gives this feeling from time to time ample but also playful expression. If, on the other hand, conviction is strong within him it asserts itself by rising above conscious defects of argument in great declamatory bursts—'I know that my redeemer liveth'—or again by taking refuge in the dogmatism of a professor. As Grote says, 'Plato is, occasionally, abundant in his affirmations: he has also great negative fertility in starting objections: but the affirmative current does not come into conflict with the negative. His belief is enforced by rhetorical fervour, poetical illustration, and a vivid emotional fancy. These elements stand to him in the place of positive proof; and when his mind is full of them, the unsolved objections, which he himself had stated elsewhere, vanish out of sight. Towards the close of his life (as we shall see in the *Treatise De Legibus*), the love of dialectic, and the taste for enunciating difficulties even when he could not clear them up, died out within him. He becomes ultradogmatical, losing even the poetical richness and fervour which had once marked his affirmations, and substituting in their place a strict and compulsory orthodoxy.' And what is here truly said of Plato's life and speculation as a whole is equally applicable to any dialogue wherein destructive criticism is followed by a constructive

Works of T. H.
Green, III. cxxvi.

Plato etc., ii.
pp. 393-4 on
Theaet.

effort. When the latter begins the drama ceases, and the conversation becomes as uninteresting as a catechism. Drop the questions from the catechism of the Westminster Divines and you leave a treatise: omit the answers from the latter portions of the Republic or Parmenides and you have a treatise likewise. Nor must we overlook the fact that while Plato's interest in philosophy was undoubtedly profound, his feeling for and delight in literary expression was a keen rival to it, and perhaps from time to time even took control of the argument. This may be called an external way of putting the case, and it may be urged that in Plato the form is the necessary counterpart of the matter, that the two compose an organism which cannot be severed into its elements. It is doubtful whether this alters the question very much. Philosophic enunciation in early times, partly from its fragmentary and inspired character, partly from the undeveloped state of prose composition, was either aphoristic or poetical. Its next form, during the generation prior to Plato, became in the main that of the dialogue. Plato with his great natural genius had almost no philosophic reading except verse, and for years witnessed the dialogue in the most picturesque and lively operation. The result in his hands was a sort of poetic apotheosis of the dialogue. Yet, soon afterwards, this form of expression ceased from the domain of speculation. That Plato was not straining his convictions when he claimed that dialogue, and even spoken dialogue, was the only true vehicle for speculation we may quite believe. But, on the other hand, Plato we can imagine was sometimes quite aware of his ability to write dialogue, and occasionally, as we cannot but think, must have felt dialogue an artificial encumbrance. At times dialogue runs away with him. At times again he gives us not dialogue but a narrative of dialogue at second, third, or even fourth hand. If at such times his expression is the essential clothing of his thought then at such times his thought must have been itself rather artificial. Let us be frank on this matter. The difficulty that is found in arranging his works may in part be due to the fact that he lectured constantly but published only portions of his views. That, however, does not meet the whole case. Professors do not usually give to the world of their worst. As a rule they publish what has been most carefully matured and has produced in their experience the deepest impression, perhaps even what old pupils urge them to put in a permanent form. Plato may not have done this; but assuredly he was no child in authorship. His works are voluminous, of brilliant ability, and carefully polished. Yet while he is often as detailed as any philosopher who ever lived, and while his works give much more than mere fragments of his views, he has seen fit to leave his writings to the world as if they were in the main mere detached and fortuitous conversations between groups of persons whom accident threw together. Socrates conversed at random. Granted: but Plato was not conversing. Yet his works are in such a state of mutual detachment, that it needs a cumbersome literary finesse in order to allude to one in the other, and after all we are left in doubt which is the referring dialogue and which the object of the reference. Surely if we are

now at issue about the order of his writings and the growth of his views, this is, at least in part, but the penalty justly incurred by Plato the philosopher to Plato the literary man. It is not meant that he was often or consciously sophistical; but it is meant that he was not infrequently artificial. Carlyle in like manner, though pronounced to be 'terribly in earnest,' had a very artificial habit of omitting to specify the persons whose views he was controverting, and of affecting to quote from Sauerteig and Our earnest friend. Leaving this slightly uncongenial argument on one side, then, and accepting Plato as also 'in earnest,' although Johnson does not admit that in regard to Greek thinkers, we have still to remember that his works do not represent even to his own mind an elaborate 'system of reasoned truth,' in which every step is a logical necessity logically made good, where there are no defects and no excrescences, known or unknown to the author, and where the end is clearly in view from the beginning: but that rather they exemplify the lifelong growth of a great mind, which had indeed a prevailing bias and aspiration, but little demonstrable certainty about systematic details, which was always feeling after the truth, yet often confessed that it had failed to find it, which sometimes contradicted itself, sometimes ironically gave up its quest, and sometimes under new circumstances lost faith in old conclusions, which was as much sceptical as it was dogmatic, which was influenced by literary as well as philosophic impulses; but which always strove to be found 'on the side of the angels.' It is a truism to say that no theory of the universe has yet met all objections. Plato might well be sensible that objections could be raised to his, yet cling to it as still on the whole the best; nay, even as an anchor of his soul, although entering into that which was within the veil. 'Behold the cloud,' and again 'behold the cloud,' says Ruskin when called on to explain the ultimate character of geological forces; but he does not therefore dispute the reality of their action. 'The true eye for talent presupposes the true reverence for it—O Heavens, presupposes so many things!' exclaims Carlyle; yet he does not therefore cease to hold that heroes are to be found, and therefore to be sought. We do not then admit that the Parmenides is spurious because it controverts doctrines elsewhere urged by Plato; on the contrary we conclude by citing, in addition to the Theaetetus, other passages indicating a similar tone of mind. In the Sophistes, he contrasts materialists with idealists as two opposing schools, each of which is extreme—the latter *μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται* (against the former), *νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι*. He certainly calls them *ἡμερώτεροι* than their opponents; yet all along he speaks of them critically as from without. Nevertheless, the soundest explanation of the passage is, that he is criticising his own views. The same thing recurs in the Politicus. Again, in the Phaedo he clearly shows that his arguments in favour of the ideas have not laid his doubts to rest. Having already had occasion to quote the striking language in which he there admits his speculative anxieties, we need cite here only the closing words—*οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι*

Boswell, by Hill,
iii. 10.

Mod. Paint. iv.
xii.

Past and Present,
Bk. I. v. 40.

pp. 246-48.

Phaedo, 100-101.

τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά... Τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφ' ἧς ἂν χαίρειν, παρεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκιάν, καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλούς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἂν: and so on. Hereafter we shall discuss in more detail the relation in which the self-criticism of the Parmenides stands to Plato's system as a whole. Apart from this difficulty, there appears to be no good reason of an internal character for doubting the authenticity of the work. It is a philosophical discussion bearing upon a subject intimately associated with Plato's name. In point of importance and character, it is eminently worthy of his reputation. Nor is this a small matter: we can imagine an inferior writer trying to gain currency for a second rate work by assigning it to a great author, but who that could rival Plato would consent to remain unknown? As Mr. Jowett says: 'Shorter works are more likely to have been forged than longer ones... while, perhaps, there is no instance of an ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines great excellence with considerable length. A really great writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the "literary hack" of Alexandria or Athens, the Gods did not grant original genius.' Again, it is in Plato's style, by which are meant several things. Not only is it a dialogue—and no philosophic dialogues have come down to us with any name but Plato's—the type of dialogue likewise, and the characters, are Platonic. It begins in a lively dramatic fashion, such as might be paralleled in many of his works, then, when the theme proper has been introduced, the dramatic character, as was said above, becomes subordinate and ceases to be an essential feature of the composition. So in the Republic; when preliminaries are settled, and constructive work begins, what importance have the answers of Glauco or Adimantus? They simply confirm Socrates, give him an opportunity for restating an argument, save the work from being a mere treatise, and furnish the chief speaker with an ἀνάπαυλα. Such is the service done by Aristoteles in the Parmenides. Even the artificiality of the narrative may be made an argument in its favour. An imitator would hardly be likely to make his work a report of a report of a report.

Plato, 2nd Edit.,
vol. ii. pp. 413-15.

Having now dealt with most of the objections which are raised, let us conclude by asking whether there are any traces in Plato's other works of a reference to the Parmenides. Such references can, as we have seen, be only indirect. Bearing that fact in mind we may place side by side the following passages:—

Does Plato else-
where refer to it?

PHILEBUS, 14 C-15.

Σ. Τοῦτον τοῖνυν τὸν λόγον... τὸν νῦν δὲ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν. ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι. Π. *Ἀρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ, Πρώταρχον, ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει,

PARMENIDES, 129.

Σ. Οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον... εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν;... ἀλλ' εἰ δ

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πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος ... τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία; Σ. Σὺ μὲν ... εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά ... ὅταν τις ἐκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ—.... Π. Σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα ... ἕτερα λέγεις ...; Σ. Ὅπόταν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται ... ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βούν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων ... ἢ πολλὴ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται. Π. Πῶς; Σ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἰ τινος δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὕσας· εἶτα πῶς αὐτὰς μίαν ἐκάστην οὐσαν αἰετὴν αὐτήν ... ὁμῶς εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην· μετὰ δὲ τούτ' ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρὶς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνεται ἂν, ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἅμα ἐν ἐνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι To this might perhaps be added Sophist. 251.

What does the reader think here? Zeller holds that we have a reference directly designed. 'I have already supported this in my *Platon. Stud.* 194, by the argument that the first part of the *Parmenides* is as good as directly cited in the *Philebus*, and this reason I still think is quite valid. Schaarschmidt (*Samml. d. plat. Schr.* 277) also agrees with me; he, however, makes use of this supposition in a different direction'—to discredit both dialogues.

Again, turning to the *Phaedo* we may make a further comparison:

PHAEDO, 102 B.

Καὶ ὁμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τᾶλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν... ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότε εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφοτέρω, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; ... οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίᾳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων.

ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ πολλά ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὐτὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἐν, τούτῳ ἤδη θαυμάσομαι ... εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἶδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τὰναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων ... ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ μου ἔστιν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά Ἐὰν δέ τις ... πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη... εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνη, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων.

Again 131 A, Πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὄν, ἢ πῶς; Τί γὰρ κωλύει; ... Ἐν ἄρα ὄν καὶ ταῦτόν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὐσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη.

PARMENIDES, 130 E.

Δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἶναι εἶδη ἅττα ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα ... γίγνεσθαι. See also the previous quotation.

Under Plato's somewhat affected literary assumption, that the *Philebus*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Parmenides* are all independent colloquies between different groups of persons, could references from one to the other be more direct than these are; does not the wording seem to indicate that the reference is designed? There are but two more quotations of this nature that need detain us:—

THEAETETUS 183 E.

Σ. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοῖός τε μοι ἅμα δεινός τε. συμ- προσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον.

SOPHISTES, 217 C.

Σ. Πότερον εἴωθας ἡδίων αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαντοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ βουλευθῆς, ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόν- τι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου; also 237 A.

The parallel could hardly be more complete.

On the question of authenticity, then, our argument may be summed up thus:

1. There is good ground for believing that this dialogue existed, and was accepted as genuine, in the arrangement of Plato's works made by Aristophanes of Byzantium. Nor does any scholar in antiquity raise an objection to it.
2. While it cannot be proved that Aristotle names the *Parmenides*, it seems at least very probable that the arguments of the dialogue are controverted by him; and they appear to bear internal evidence of priority when compared with his works.
3. There is no reason to doubt the Platonic character of the views and language which the work exhibits, and there is strong reason to believe that Plato alludes to this dialogue in other portions of his writings which are admitted to be genuine.

PARMENIDES, 127 B.

Τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσ- βύτην εἶναι σφόδρα πολὺν, καλὸν δὲ καγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκον- τα ... Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον.

137.

II. Καγὼ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι, πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιούτον τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλήθος λόγων· ... Τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἥκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοί, καὶ ἃ οἶεται μάλιστ' ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλ' ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις.

II.

WHEN we pass from the sufficiently complex problem of authenticity to consider the position which the work is to hold in the series of Plato's writings, the first difficulty is to conquer a feeling akin to despair. What can we say upon this question? What has not been already said? Are we to be launched upon that πολὺ πέλαιος the task of ordering Plato's collective works? Πῶς χρὴ διανεῦσαι τοιούτον τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλήθος

SEQUENCE OF
THE WORK.

127 D.

λόγων; At the outset we are troubled by the consciousness that a work whose authenticity has been gravely questioned is not likely to have its date or sequence very clearly defined. We know, indeed, that it was written after 403 B.C., since the narrator describes Aristoteles, one of the interlocutors, as τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον. And as Cephalus does not mention any attempt to get from Socrates personally a verification of details—a circumstance with which the opening of the Theaetetus may be contrasted—we are left to infer that Socrates was dead. This, however, does not carry us far. Every one would be prepared to assume that the work was of later date than 399 B.C. The field for speculation being thus unrestricted, we have such a crop of theories that even their enumeration would fatigue. To take representative cases: Schleiermacher regards the Parmenides as a rude, unfinished effort of Plato's youth; Zeller holds it to be the 'Philosopher' dialogue which is promised as a sequel to the Sophist and Statesman; while, in a series of articles already referred to, Dr. Jackson contends that it must be placed extremely late, as embodying its author's final views on the ideal theory. Each of these scholars has his following, while other writers adduce reasons for choosing intermediate dates. The disturbing feature in the case is that, as Henry Esmond puts it, 'each has a story in a dispute, and a true one, too, and both are right or wrong as you will.' The various conclusions rest mainly on one or other of three argumentative foundations—that of the style and language of the dialogue, that of what may be called its scenery or setting, and that of its philosophic contents.

Arguments from
Style.

1. It is pointed out that the form of the dialogue is artificial—that of a conversation reported at fourth hand; and the inference drawn is that it is later than those which are more direct and natural; indeed one of the latest of all, inasmuch as there are none whose form deviates more from that of simple dramatic treatment. Well, the 'fourth hand' may by possibility indicate that Plato does not wish to be committed to the historic accuracy of the details, or seeks to give the work the air of an echo from the past, but it gives little clue to the date. The Symposium is at third, the Republic at second, and the Timaeus at first hand: we need say no more. Nay, one might rather ask, would an old man endure the constraint involved in writing large part of a work in complicated oratio obliqua? Again, regard may be directed to style in a stricter sense. It is maintained that as a youthful style is revealed by immaturity and stiffness, or by crude exuberance of language, and by the placing of pictorial and dramatic vividness in the foreground, the Parmenides could not be a youthful work, but might rather, from its command over language, coupled with its comparative indifference to pictorial display, be ranked among the later writings—an elderly man ceasing to think of style and attending more to substance. But answer is plausibly made that Plato is here adopting for the time the style of Zeno and the Megarians, with whose views he is dealing. Independently of that, arguments from style need tender handling. Up to at least middle life a man's mode of writing may vary pretty widely through mere temporary causes, or in conformity with varying subject matter, without any inference about age being worth serious consideration. Even the discovery

that greater conformity to scientific method is to be found, as compared with the freedom of conversational discourse, is no necessary proof of age. It testifies to the mood of the author's mind, if to anything, or may even be explained by the greater or less connection of a given work with Plato's professorial instruction at the Academy.

A further step is taken when vocabulary and turns of expression are put to the proof. Professor Campbell has gone with some minuteness into the question of vocabulary in Plato's writings. He treats the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws* as admittedly late, and tests the other works by comparison with these. As a result he gives for each 'approximately the numerical ratios...according to the number of words at once *common* and *peculiar* to each with' the works just named. In this list the dialogue which stands nearest to the three is the *Politicus*, with a ratio of $1\frac{2}{11}$. The *Parmenides*, with $\frac{1}{4}$, ranks very low, having, besides others, the *Cratylus*, *Protagoras*, *Theaetetus*, *Philebus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Sophistes*, *Phaedrus*, and *Politicus*, in that order above it. But when we perceive that the only works which are apparently less associated than our own with the three latest are the *Charmides*, *Alcibiades I*, and the *Meno*, while the *Laches* and *Lysis* are about one-half nearer, we are constrained to conclude that the list contributes little which can be of service to us. Indeed, it is difficult even to weigh the significance of the evidence. Are we to assume that Plato began authorship with a minimum of unusual terms and gradually advanced to a maximum? Clearly the subject matter would fall to be considered. Professor Campbell himself admits that 'the position of the *Parmenides* in this list, like that of the *Phaedrus*, is partly accounted for by exceptional circumstances.' But by what circumstances?

Another attempt in the same direction is that of W. Dittenberger of Halle, who, after a few separate objections to the authenticity of our dialogue on linguistic grounds, which are referred to in the notes, seems inclined to regard it as doubtful upon a comparison of the use of a series of characteristic phrases—*καὶ μὴν*, *ἀλλὰ μὴν*, *τί μὴν*; *γε μὴν*, and others—in the various works of Plato. The result of his investigation is to throw the works into two great groups—an earlier, with few signs of these expressions; and a later in two divisions, with many. (It ought to be said that, besides rejecting ten dialogues in addition to the spurious seven, he excludes from comparison such as contain small proportions of conversation.) The *Parmenides* stands in the later division of the second group along with the *Philebus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, and *Laws*, and is very heavily weighted for its size. He follows the inquiry up in other directions with much ingenuity and learning. One result which arrests the attention of a reader is that the *Phaedo* stands in the earliest group, while the *Lysis* forms, with the *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Theaetetus*, the first division of the later. The argument has been criticised by A. Frederking, who shows that by dealing with the subject in more minute detail, while employing the same materials, individual books of the *Republic* and *Laws* may be made to stand in different groups. Further, by taking account of the isolated use of the particle *τε*—in such phrases as *σὸν τῶνδ' τε*

*Sophistes and
Politicus, General
Introd. §§ 6-7.*

Hermes, xvi.,
321. 1881.

*Fleckeisen,
Jahrbücher*, No.
125, p. 534, 1887.

ἔργον—he succeeds in placing the *Parmenides*, which has but few cases, in a very early position, while he makes the *Phaedrus* almost take rank with the *Timaeus*. A distinction of Frederking's between *εἶπον* and *ἔφην* is discussed in the notes. With results so conflicting to deal with, it must appear to most readers that the treatment of statistics in language, as in other fields, requires extreme caution, and has not thus far afforded much assistance towards the solution of the question under discussion.

Arguments from
dramatic Setting.

2. Of the argument from scenery or setting one branch is that which deals with the position assigned to Socrates in the several dialogues. It is contended that Socrates has a more prominent rôle in the earlier works, or rather that those works in which he plays such a part are earlier; while his presence tends to become less and less important as Plato's memory of him is effaced by time and by original development. Undoubtedly this seems a reasonable contention, and one in harmony with what would independently appear to be the proper order of many dialogues. But here likewise the question of subject matter might well influence Plato's action. In any case the position of the *Parmenides* in regard to the argument is peculiar. Socrates does not, indeed, occupy the foremost place throughout, but he does hold that position during the very important introductory part, while he is referred to by no means as a thinker whose period had gone by, but rather as one for whom great things were still in store.

Untersuchungen,
222-224.

An interesting train of inference, which deals with the *Parmenides* alone, is based upon consideration of the time which may be assumed to have passed between the various stages suggested to us in the construction of the dialogue—between the original conversation, that is, and the narrative of this by Cephalus, which constitutes the dialogue as we have it. This estimate of time may be viewed either, with Steinhardt, from the final point backward, as suggesting that Plato seeks to make us 'look far back into other years'; or, with Ueberweg, from the starting point forward, as involving a late date for the composition of the work. As Plato might at any period in his literary life feel the boyhood of Socrates to be remote from himself, it is clear that only the latter form of the inference has much practical bearing on our present inquiry. Ueberweg reasons thus. The point of departure is the original conversation, which, on the assumption that Socrates was twenty-five at the time, must have occurred in 446-5 B.C. This point we shall hereafter see reason for placing as early, at least, as 451 B.C. Then comes the period which comprised the repeated rehearsals of the conversation by Pythodorus to Antipho, until the latter had committed it to memory. Conjecture alone can determine the length of this interval, and Ueberweg makes no estimate of it beyond suggesting that it must be considerable. It seems unlikely that it could exceed half a century; for Pythodorus had been the host of *Parmenides*, so that he might have been thirty or so at the time, and fifty years more would make him an old man. This, then, may bring us to 400 B.C. Next comes the narrative by Antipho to Cephalus and his Clazomenian friends, which, as we have seen, Ueberweg places later than 399 B.C. from the circumstance that Cephalus does not think of going

direct to Socrates. Once more we have the interval which extends between that and the repetition of the narrative by Cephalus himself; and finally, says Ueberweg, the space elapsing between this last and the composition of the written work. He makes no attempt to fix the duration of either period, further than by saying that they cannot be very short, since to make them consist of one, or of a very few years 'wäre eine zu auffallende Ungleichmässigkeit' when compared with the preceding half-century. Accordingly he concludes for a 'very late date'—always assuming, which however he does not believe, that the work is genuine. This reasoning might convince, if the whole lapse of time involved were optional. But it is not. The period between the original conversation—if it ever occurred—and the death of Socrates is not subject to Plato's control. To say, therefore, that the remaining intervals must be conceived upon a corresponding scale is tantamount to saying that Plato is by some over-mastering necessity forbidden to make allusion in the framework of a dialogue to such an (assumed) historic event until time has passed sufficient to form a second or third interval artistically proportioned to the first. Further, Ueberweg postulates that the narrative by Cephalus is one thing and the written dialogue another. But they purport to be the same—the narrative of Cephalus *is* the dialogue. The truth is that the period between the youth and the death of Socrates is a historical one, and one to which Plato is free to allude when and how he thinks fit. The facts before us are simple. Cephalus after 399 B.C. hears from Antipho a narrative which he on a subsequent occasion repeats, and this repetition constitutes our dialogue. That is the sum total of our information; and despite Ueberweg's ideas of proportion, 'nur eine oder ganz wenige Jahre' are sufficient to include it all. Once again, therefore, we are deprived of any authoritative basis for determining the date of which we are in search.

3. We have only the philosophic contents of the work to fall back upon, then, Arguments from Contents. as a guide in our inquiry; and, alas, it precisely is from these contents that inferences so widely divergent as those of Schleiermacher, Zeller, and Jackson have been drawn. Of the first of these, the author of which seems to have been governed by procrustian theories about the order of Plato's works, it will be enough to say with Stallbaum—'neque enim Schleiermacheri iudicio licet acquiescere, qui eum (the dialogue) a juvene Platone paullo ante Socratis obitum vel non ita multo post Parmen. Introd. 289. (though this is a question of degree) scriptum esse statuit, adeoque habuit pro opere paene rudi et tantummodo inchoato.' The Parmenides certainly is not written by a mere beginner; and the probability is that it is later by several years than 399 B.C. The authority of Zeller on Platonic questions is such that greater weight may perhaps be attached to his view, in the case before us, than intrinsically belongs to it. One may go a long way with him in associating the Parmenides with the subject matter of the Sophistes and Politicus; but to say that it is the 'Philosopher' dialogue promised in p. 217 of the former, and at the beginning of the latter, is a startling pronouncement. These two works are direct and avowed attempts to discover and define the Sophist and the Statesman respectively, and each receives its title

from that circumstance. To this there is nothing analogous in the Parmenides. That Plato entertains a deep veneration for Parmenides as a philosopher is quite true; and that Parmenides is introduced discoursing of the discipline necessary to all philosophic progress, is equally so. But the method of the work differs fundamentally from that of the others, nor is any conclusion arrived at such as that to which each of them directly leads. If Plato meant this dialogue to be the promised Philosopher why should he not have said so, and coupled it as clearly with the Politicus as he does the latter with the Sophistes? In regard to subject matter one might almost as well pitch upon the Timaeus as the missing work. It is possible that our dialogue represents all that Plato ever wrote as a substitute for the Philosopher; but, if so, his plan has been altogether changed. With regard to the very suggestive argument of Dr. Jackson, in which he views the Parmenides as an exposition of Plato's final and much modified views, it seems to rest in large measure

Parm. 130 C-D.

upon a misunderstanding. It assumes that Socrates had held at one time that there were ideas for 'man, fire, water,' and even for 'hair, mud, filth,' just as there were ideas for 'one, like, good'; but that he had now renounced this hypothesis, and even fled from it as from destruction. The Republic and Phaedo are taken as examples of the views renounced, and the conclusion is drawn that the Parmenides must be a late work. Surely this perverts the sense of the passage appealed to? Socrates in answer to Parmenides describes, not a past and discarded hypothesis, but a present belief. Parmenides tells him that by and by, when he grows older and becomes less sensitive to criticism, he will not be afraid to entertain the thought of ideas for even the most undignified objects—that he will learn to call nothing common or unclean. And this state of mind, predicted as in store for Socrates, is the one which the Republic and Phaedo exemplify; so that these works are later, if not necessarily than the dialogue as a whole, at least than the state of mind depicted in the passage upon which Dr. Jackson relies. He pushes his contention even further, however, maintaining that while the Phaedo reveals no sense of a difficulty about the nature of μέθεξις, or the method according to which objects participate in the ideas, the Parmenides which forcibly presses that difficulty must on that ground be a later work.

Phaedo, 100.

Is this really a possible contention in view of that remarkable passage in the Phaedo, already quoted above, which contains one of the most candid avowals in all Plato's writings, to the effect that, despite the almost overwhelming difficulty which surrounds the doctrine of μέθεξις, he nevertheless despairingly clings to it ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως?

Arguments of
Teichmüller.—
Literarische Fei-
den im vierten
Jahrhundert vor
Chr. Gustav
Teichmüller,
Breslau, 1881.

No observations upon Platonic chronology would be complete which failed to reckon with the arguments of Teichmüller in his 'Literary Feuds.' They are of a nature so striking, and are advanced with such confidence and ability, as to claim special and connected notice, in place of being distributed piecemeal under the various divisions which have just been engaging our attention. Dealing with Plato's writings as a whole, Teichmüller contends that they are for the most part directly contro-

versial, and are to be dated chiefly from a consideration of the writings of men like Xenophon, Isocrates, and Lysias to which they refer, or which in turn refer to them. And such cross references he detects in abundance. On this point much that is of great interest is advanced which it would be impossible justly to controvert, or even to appraise, without a minute and extensive knowledge of the entire literature and literary history of the Platonic era. Such a knowledge we do not possess, and accordingly can only say that all allusions, or seeming allusions, of this nature are suggestive and captivating till we see those that make against the theory. An expert could doubtless collect such. Fortunately the *Parmenides* is not one of the works which Teichmüller has dealt with by this line of argument. Another point on which, theoretically—though, in the work before us, not practically—he lays much stress, as an internal evidence of date, is the progress which may be detected in Plato's views upon the question of *μέθεξις* or *παρουσία*. Undoubtedly this is a weighty subject; at the same time our author's conclusions in regard to it appear to be of a somewhat sanguine character. He seems to find in Plato's works a very complete and satisfying elaboration of the doctrine; a result not altogether in harmony with the language just quoted from the *Phaedo*, but certainly in accord with his own finding upon the philosophic position of Aristotle—to wit, that Aristotle derived most of his conceptions complete from Plato and other predecessors, and deserves credit chiefly for his power of methodizing what these thinkers had supplied. A cardinal feature in Teichmüller's argument is the use which he makes of the statement at the opening of the *Theaetetus* with regard to the composition of that work. The 143 B.C. professed author of it, Euclid of Megara, says that he has purposely left out such phrases as *κἀγὼ ἔφην, συνέφη, οὐχ ὁμολόγει*, and adds that he represents Socrates as actually conversing with Theaetetus and others, rather than as describing his conversation with them. This course is adopted *ἵνα ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις*, and it is represented as receiving the hearty assent of Terpsion. Here, says Teichmüller (following out to some extent, it would seem, a previous hint of Schleiermacher's), we see on Plato's part a new step in authorship. Till now he had followed the method of Socrates in giving his dialogues at second hand by means of *διήγησις*—conspicuous examples of the method being the *Republic* and *Phaedo*. Hereafter there may be some brief prefatory narrative of that kind, but the bulk of each work will purport to be a first hand reproduction of the discussion as it took place. The announcement of this intended change is put into the mouth of Euclid designedly, as an acknowledgement of indebtedness in the matter to the Megarian school. Accordingly we are to understand that as the *Theaetetus* is later than all such works as the *Republic*, so all works which follow its method are in turn later than it. Among those thus marked out as later stands the *Parmenides*, 'denn dass z. B. im *Euthydem* die Disputation erzählt, im *Parmenides* aber Vol. ii. 323. dramatisch behandelt wird, kann doch ein Jeder leicht bemerken.' The first thing which strikes one is that the author is disposed to use this argument in too uncom-

promising a manner. If taken as evidence of a fresh tendency in Plato's mind it may be welcomed. But if we are to accept as binding on us the idea that Plato, after so speaking in the Theaetetus, never could recede from the position thus taken up, we feel that much is expected of us. Plato might appropriate the language and doctrine of King Jamie—'We are a free King,' and not 'thirled' to any system involving mechanical uniformity of style. He was at liberty to write with variety, and to make dramatic apology, as he does in more places than one, for the tediousness of dry details. But granting the most conclusive force to this argument, even so the position of the Parmenides towards it, as towards some others, is exceptional. It is true that in the larger or second part of the dialogue the direct dramatic form is adopted, and that with no such preliminary warning as is given in the Theaetetus. But in the first part, which is nearly one third of the whole, and which consists of a very weighty and careful discussion of the ideal theory, not only are phrases such as 'said he' inserted, but they are inserted at third hand, so that they stand not in the indicative but in the infinitive mood—and, as one might say, in the second degree of that. Thus we have τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι and οὕτω, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα. Nay, such and so embarrassing is the artificial character of the style that it sometimes fairly breaks down, and we have καὶ πῶς ἂν, εἶπεν, instead of εἰπεῖν, while every now and then the εἰπεῖν is involuntarily dropped, as in ξοικεῖν: τὸ ποῖον; If, then, we are to place the Parmenides after the Theaetetus on this ground, we must assume that Plato's Socratic conscience, so to speak, is pricking him, and that he allays his qualms for abandoning his master's method by the penance of walking nearly a third of his prescribed journey with peas in his shoes. But, again, Teichmüller expressly accepts the mention made of Parmenides in the Sophistes as an allusion to the Parmenides dialogue. That being so, what is to be made of the allusion, equally specific, contained in the Theaetetus, and given at length in part I. above? The date of the Parmenides is not, however, discussed by Teichmüller in detail, as those of some other works are; all that we find are incidental allusions to the matter. Thus he holds that it precedes the Laws, and we have seen that he puts it before the Sophistes. Again, he dwells—as Ueberweg also does—upon the appearance of Aristoteles as an interlocutor, and is strongly disposed to assume that we have here an indirect but intentional allusion to the philosopher Aristotle. This leads to the inference that the work must be later than 367 B.C., when Aristotle became known to Plato; and that it was written about 366-65 B.C. With this is intended to accord his assumption that Plato refers to himself when he makes Parmenides plead age as a reason for excusing himself from entering upon a protracted argument. Such a view presents much that is attractive; and we must concede that τῶ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται. At the same time he weakens his case by going on to affirm that this is the work περὶ ψυχῆς from the reading of which by Plato all are said to have withdrawn except Aristotle. By common consent, and in accordance with the title, that work is assumed

131 A.

183 K.

see p. xix.

ii. 24-5.

136 D-E.

to have been the *Phaedo*, a work which Teichmüller places relatively early in Plato's life. Again, as Plato was born about 427 B.C. his age at 366 B.C. would not be very advanced; at all events his activity in authorship lasted considerably longer — on Teichmüller's own showing, he had still to write at least the *Sophistes*, *Politicus* and *Laws*, or about a fourth of his collective works. It must be admitted, however, as a noticeable circumstance, that his age would not fall far short of that assigned to Parmenides in the dialogue. But the assumption that Aristotle is glanced at in the person of the young Aristoteles is surely open to great doubt. Aristoteles is declared to have been one of the thirty tyrants, and we know that Plato introduces more than one public character of that type into his writings—Critias, for example, and Alcibiades. If, then, it had not happened that Plato's greatest scholar proved to be likewise called Aristotle, should we have found anything to attract attention in this circumstance? Had Shakespeare survived till 1645—and he would not in that case have lived much longer than Plato—who would not have maintained, in discussing moot points in his works, that the famous words 'Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition!' had a very different reference from the ostensible one? Again, if Plato meant to refer to the philosopher here, he has not assigned him a very appropriate position. Socrates, although 'very young,' plays a part of great importance in the dialogue: but Aristoteles is a mere lay figure. He elicits nothing, he maintains nothing, he controverts nothing; but merely, by interjecting formal verbal replies, prevents the dialogue from becoming an essay. How Plato could treat a young man whom he viewed as giving promise of ability, we know from the *Theaetetus* and *Charmides*; and that is not how he treats Aristoteles. Nay, it would be a fair contention to affirm that he would not so have represented anyone called Aristoteles had he known the historic Aristotle at the time.

Another argument advanced by Teichmüller is the following, 'Ich erwähne hierⁱⁱ 360. noch, dass der Timaios . . . bei der Erörterung des Begriffs der Zeit eine spätere Untersuchung verspricht, die wir im Parmenides (151 E bis 157 B) vorfinden. Es folgt daraus von selbst die Priorität des Timaios?' The Timaeus gives a promise which the Parmenides fulfils, therefore the latter is the later work. If the premises hold the conclusion is incontestable. But we are entitled to expect that the promise given should be definite and the fulfilment reasonably to the point. The passage referred to in the Timaeus as *pièce justificative* is one in which, after a reference to Time in³⁸ 38. various relations, the remark is made *περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων τάχ' ἂν οὐκ εἴη καιρὸς πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι*. This is all; and from this 'it follows of itself' that because time is discussed in the Parmenides that discussion is a fulfilment, the fulfilment, of the 'promise' made in the words just given. Surely a conclusion like this seems predetermined. And while inherently weak it has to overbear conflicting appearances of some weight. Plato has written much upon ethics and politics, and not a little upon physics and metaphysics: and if we are to take the *Laws* as his last utterance on the former, it seems at least as clear that the Timaeus

gives the furthest development of his views on the latter. It is one long, earnest, almost desperate attempt to elaborate *μέθεξις*, to bridge over the chasm between *εἶδη* and *αἰσθητὰ* which in the *Parmenides* is left yawning. Nor is this Teichmüller's only sanguine inference. He places the *Phaedo*, as we have seen, considerably earlier than the *Parmenides*. One of his arguments we have already given: here is another. Finding reason for considering the *Symposium* a comparatively early work he lays it down that the *Phaedo* follows closely upon it. Everyone will recall the inimitable humour with which the *Symposium* closes. All the other banqueters being 'under the table,' Socrates is left demonstrating to the almost insensible Agatho and Aristophanes that it is the function of the same poet to write both tragedy and comedy: they cannot follow him and drop asleep. Teichmüller regards this as a promise on Plato's part that as he had written a comedy in the *Symposium* he would supplement it by a tragedy; that tragedy is none other than the *Phaedo*, which accordingly we ought to place in the following year. While thus reading promises and specific statements into scraps of artistic by-play, he seems to treat very distinct declarations with but slight regard. The only specific indications which Plato personally supplies in reference to the sequence of his writings are those which mark the intimate connection between the *Theaetetus*, *Sophistes*, and *Politicus* on the one hand, and the *Republic*, *Timaeus*, and *Critias* on the other. These indications Teichmüller would appear to set almost entirely aside. No one who studies his arguments can fail to be impressed by their brilliancy and power, but his key 'will not unlock as many things as he thinks it will.'

ii. 307-9.

Must our conclusion be, then, that no satisfactory data exist from which a reasonable estimate may be formed of the position which the *Parmenides* should occupy among Plato's writings? Some attempt must certainly be made to reach at least an approximate solution of the question: but the undertaking is entered upon in anything but a dogmatic spirit, and with a full consciousness of the conditions—*caedimus inque vicem praebemus crura sagittis*. To enter at this stage upon a detailed analysis of the dialogue would be to anticipate the natural order of inquiry. Some reference, however, to the contents of the work is indispensable to our present object.

Reasons which
should weigh
with us.

127 C.

128 H.

135 C-D.

The dialogue opens with a statement upon the ideal theory which is afterwards subjected to scrutiny. In connection with this opening statement it seems impossible to overlook the emphatic intimation of the youth of Socrates by which it is accompanied. He is described as 'extremely young,' and *Parmenides* treats him as a promising lad who at present is deterred, through boyish fear of established views, from accepting conclusions to which his reason seems to point, and who has, with youthful impetuosity, plunged into metaphysical speculation before passing through such a course of training as alone would fit him for the undertaking. It may, no doubt, be said that Socrates must be represented as young if any regard is to be paid to the assumed date of the meeting between him and *Parmenides*. But Plato

was not tied down to such a method of dealing with the personality and doctrines of Parmenides: the method was of his own choosing. Further, as Socrates never held the views here ascribed to him, we are entitled in the youthful Socrates to perceive the youthful Plato, and to regard the opening statement of the dialogue as an intentional notification by Plato of the character of his own early theorizing upon metaphysical questions. It is consistent with this assumption that the only method urged here as a means of arriving at the conviction that ideas exist is the Socratic ^{132 A.} one, of generalization from the world of experience. That was the path which had led Plato onward, and hence the present allusion to it. Again, while the ideas are treated as realities of some kind affecting our sensible sphere, the first attempt clearly to define their nature is that in which they are called *νοήματα* whose abode is ^{132 B.} *οὐδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς*. Is not this a natural course for one to pursue who had just come from the school of 'general definitions' which Aristotle directly ascribes to Socrates—what could such definitions be but *νοήματα*? We have before us, in fact, *τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίσθαι καθόλου* as Aristotle describes them. And ^{Arist. Met. xii.} when the writer, driven from this, goes on to exclaim that now he thinks he has the ⁴ clue,—that the ideas are patterns set up in nature; we seem to find the decisive step taken which Aristotle proceeds to ascribe to 'those who first pronounced for the existence of ideas,' *ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρισμούς· οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ιδέας προσηγόρευσαν*. Looking next to this first sketch of the ideal sphere we find its scope to be at once restricted and imperfectly defined. The speaker cannot bring himself to recognize the existence of ideas for physical objects, but only for abstract mental and moral conceptions; and even these exist confusedly, without being dominated by any regulative principle. Here the new doctrine stands forth just such as it might have sprung from the unsystematic moral speculations of the historic Socrates. This then, while not the point finally reached in the dialogue, is the condition of things with which the dialogue goes on to deal; and may be described as a somewhat hasty and crude *χωρισμός* of the results reached in the Socratic speculation. It is the treatment which this opening statement receives, to which, if to anything, we must look for assistance in determining the problem before us. Thus far all that we have gathered is that Plato's early views were of a certain character, while we may infer from what follows that they had been exposed to some public criticism.

1. The first comment which Parmenides, or Plato in his person, makes upon the theory put before him, and he makes it indirectly in passing, is that it is incomplete. He implies that it might have been expected to include and account for physical objects, as well as moral or intellectual conceptions; that it will not be complete until it does include such objects, even the most insignificant of them; and that he looks forward to a time when Socrates will so far gain the victory over his boyish aversion as to make that important stride in speculation. If this is a just interpretation ^{130 A. B.} to put upon the language of the text it would seem to follow that the

dialogue can at least be no later than any of those in which ideas for physical objects are accepted by Socrates. Were we to push the argument to its utmost we might even infer that the Parmenides is prior to all such dialogues, inasmuch as it looks forward to a consummation which they embody; and it is obvious that if it be later than none of them it must of necessity be prior to the majority of them. Now all students of Plato's works are aware that those ideas are accepted without hesitation in such works as the Cratylus, Republic and Phaedo. In the Cratylus we have

Cratylus, 387 etc.
... 440 B-C.
Rep. x. 596.
Phaedo, 65 D,
74-78, 100-106.

ὁ ἔστιν ὄνομα, κέρκις, τρύπανον, ὕφασμα, so that even objects of art and manufacture are included, which the human maker fashions πρὸς τὸ εἶδος βλέπων. In the Republic occur among others the well known cases of the κλίνη and τράπεζα; and in the Phaedo repeated reference is made to ideas for various physical objects.

2. Nothing could be more abrupt than the severance which Parmenides and Socrates agree to recognize between the ideas and the world of sense. You may be led by generalization to approach gradually towards the conception of the idea; but when you find it you also find that between you and it there is a great gulf fixed. Nor is there so much as a hint of difference in this particular between one idea and another. Here is the sensible sphere, yonder is the ideal; even God cannot bridge the chasm that yawns between them. All the satisfaction vouchsafed to us in these circumstances is the admission that such a conclusion does appear to be paradoxical, and that it will need extreme skill to deal with that and similar difficulties. It does not seem an unfair inference to assume that on this point Plato was still unprovided with a definite theory, and that any dialogue in which a positive attempt is made to deal with the problem is later than the Parmenides. This would include all dialogues which discuss or accept the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις—for example the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Meno: possibly also those that speak of 'divine madness,' as the Phaedrus and Symposium. It would include the simile of the cave in the Republic, and all those attempts to construct a sort of Jacob's ladder, or graded means of descent from the higher sphere to the lower. Such attempts are to be found in the divided line of the Republic, the construction of ὑπόθεσις above ὑπόθεσις in the Phaedo, and the declaration in the Philebus that we must not proceed at once from the one to the unlimited πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδη τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνός—whatever this description may be held to mean.

Parm. 133-135 C.

Phaedo, 72-76.
Phaedrus, 249 C.
Meno, 81 C-82.

3. Neither in the opening sketch nor in the criticism brought to bear upon it is there any serious attempt to introduce gradation or method into the ideal sphere. The nearest approach to that is to be found in the various groups into which Parmenides throws the ideas in questioning Socrates; and between the two groups which the latter accepts the rationale of the distinction is not very obvious. Once more, then, it would seem a fair argument to maintain that the setting up of one or more dominant or master ideas must indicate a speculative advance in the theory. Now, even granting, which is doubtful, that the 'one' of this dialogue is designed as such a master idea, it would still seem that the ἀγαθὸν of the Republic and the small group of dominant

ideas—*ὄν, στάσις, κίνησις, ταῦτόν, θάτερον*—dwelt upon in the *Sophistes*, are much clearer cases of an attempt in that direction.

4. Near the beginning of the *Parmenides* we have an earnest wish expressed by Socrates to see the process 'mingle, mingle, mingle,' which prevails in the sensible sphere, made applicable to the ideal. Yet in throwing out such a suggestion there is not even a whisper of the restriction 'ye that mingle may'—the expression rather is *τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην*. Nor is any such restriction enforced in the later progress of the argument. It does not appear unnatural to contend that works in which a discrimination on this point is revealed, in which distinctions are drawn between ideas that admit communion and those that reject it, indicate a later stage in the evolution of Plato's views. Here again the *Phaedo* and *Sophistes* are at once recalled to mind.

5. The type of argument which we have just been using may be developed somewhat further. We have above seen some reason to assume that the difference between any given conception in Aristotle and the corresponding one in Plato is largely a question of greater clearness, definiteness, precision. The view of Aristotle is in 'precipitate' what the view of Plato represents in 'solution.' It would naturally follow that if in different works Plato's views in regard to any conception seem to be at variance, the view which is the more clear and definite is the later. Now, in the *Parmenides* we have a somewhat vague and confusing use of the correlative terms 'whole' and 'part.' It is not clear whether the two represent merely a greater and a lesser portion of extended matter, or bear a more logical relation such as that of genus to species or body to member. In the *Theaetetus* we find a very definite distinction drawn between that which as a mere sum of parts is called *πᾶν* and that which as something distinct from such a sum is called *ὅλον*. Theaet. 204.

6. We have seen above, and shall have occasion to see again, that faults appear from time to time in the reasoning. These faults resolve themselves largely into neglect of the law of contradiction and of logical division. We have in the *Parmenides* an indication of the nature of the law of contradiction, but by no means so clear a statement of it as is contained in the *Sophistes*—*ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς (τὰς δόξας) αὐταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐναντίας*. And while *Parmenides* insists strongly on the necessity of method in reasoning, the method of logical division is not consciously and persistently employed as it is in the same dialogue. Parm. 155 κ. Soph. 230 u Soph. 226 etc.

7. But on the question of reasoning a more important point arises. We have already had under review an argument by Teichmüller in which the *Theaetetus* was made a turning point, in consequence of a remark in it affecting the style of composition adopted. That argument is not unimportant, although it cannot be applied safely to the *Parmenides*. But there is a means of inference of an analogous character which will so apply. The great objection which *Parmenides* urges against Socrates and his action is the inconsiderate haste with which he—that is, Plato—had constructed his theory, without anything like the argumentative training which such an attempt re- p. xxv. above. Parm. 135 C-13

quired. Plato had, however, from his youth enjoyed the discipline of the 'Socratic elenchus.' Yet this was not sufficient; he must consent to sit at the feet of Zeno before he ventures upon constructive metaphysics. The point is pressed upon our attention in the utmost detail, and is obviously a question of much greater weight than that of reporting discussions at first or second hand. Here, if anywhere, we have the intimation of a new departure on Plato's part. And it comes in connection with a metaphysical problem. It would appear that while the methods of argument practised by the historic Socrates are sufficient to meet the wants of unsystematic ethical inquiries, they must be supplemented or elaborated if ethics and politics are to be built up firmly upon a basis of reason. And the inference would seem to be that such dialogues as deal firmly with these abstract questions without making special reference to the necessity for preliminary training are written after the experience described in the passage under discussion—after Plato had realized the necessity which he here points out. This would give a fresh reason for placing the *Parmenides* prior to the *Timaeus*, *Politicus*, *Sophistes*, *Theaetetus*, and *Philebus*, and to the metaphysical portions of the *Republic*. The feeling which Plato here indicates is in harmony with the statement of Aristotle about the methods and arguments of Socrates, where he says

Arist. *Metaph.*
xiii. 4.

διαλεκτική γὰρ ἰσχύς οὕτω τότ' ἦν ὥστε δύνασθαι καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ τί ἐστὶ τὰναντία ἐπισκοπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη. We do not contend that Plato henceforth was always just and faultless in his arguments—few even of the most expert dialecticians fail to reason badly at times—but simply that hereafter he was more searching and methodical. We could imagine the *Republic*, for example, begun upon Socratic principles and carried on so far as the point where advantage is taken of the argument from the analogy of a State, but thereafter becoming gradually modified and interpenetrated with fresh metaphysical matter which carried the speculation past the Socratic standpoint into regions of pure thought.

8. While Plato in this dialogue criticises his own early views, and assumes that his readers are more or less acquainted with them, he does not refer to them as matters of public notoriety. On the contrary the phrase used by *Parmenides* after hearing the opening statement of Socrates is interrogative—*καί μοι εἶπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ διήρρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα*; Now that is not the sort of language used under similar circumstances in the *Phaedo*. On the contrary we have such expressions as *ἄπερ αἰεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε ... οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. —εἰμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα*. And we have referred more than once already to the manner in which he alludes to objections which had been raised—*τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία, εἶτε κοινωνία εἶτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δυσχυρίζομαι* etc. It is not unnatural to view such expressions as pointing to a later date for the work in which they occur.

Parm. 130 B.

Phaedo, 100 B etc.

9. The suggestion that the ideas consist of *παραδείγματα* or patterns would seem to be thrown out here for the first time. Where it is mentioned elsewhere the reference is hardly of such a nature, but the subject is touched upon as a thing needing no introduction.

132 D.

Is it not reasonable to infer that such allusions are of later date than this one? Here again the Theaetetus and Republic at once occur to the memory. Rep. ix. 592 B.
Theaet. 176 B.

10. Finally, what has been urged thus far seems to furnish a justification for putting upon the quotations given at the close of Part I. of this introduction, from the Phaedo, Theaetetus, and Sophistes, what is after all their most natural construction—for holding, that is, that they are references, as clear as Plato's mode of authorship will permit, from those dialogues to the Parmenides as a work already given to the public.

Such are some arguments which may be adduced in favour of the view that the Parmenides takes a distinctly early position in the ranks of Plato's metaphysical writings. Whatever may be thought of their force when viewed separately, it will be observed that they are largely cumulative, and present in that light no inconsiderable body of evidence, so that one is reminded of the Aristotelian dictum τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές—The work probably ranks early among the metaphysical dialogues.
Arist. Eth. Nic. i. 8.—with a true theory all the facts of experience harmonize, but with a false theory the truth of fact is speedily at discord. It is true that some discover in the substance of the Parmenides evidence of very late authorship, basing their contention largely on the prominence given in the work to number, in connection with references made by Aristotle to some relation which Plato came latterly to recognize between ideas and number. Met. xii. Undoubtedly the argument contained in the dialogue is throughout of an extremely subtle character. But is it more so than that of Zeno, from which it takes its rise? It is not clear that the scope of it exceeds what might fairly be looked for from the operation of the doctrine of Parmenides and the dialectic of Zeno upon a mind at once so delicate and so powerful as that of Plato. As for the question of number, is that such an exotic in the speculation of the Greeks as to excite suspicions? 'They thought in numbers for the numbers came': long before Plato's time every recess of numerical extravagance in philosophizing had been ransacked by the Pythagoreans. And surely it is sufficiently natural to discuss many points respecting number when the basis of the whole argument is the nature of One. Nor is there anything which can be called a mixing up of number with the ideas in the course of what is said. Our contention, then, is that on the whole it seems most consonant with evidence to assign to the Parmenides a very early place among Plato's ontological speculations: to place it, for example, earlier than the Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Phaedo, Philebus, and Timaeus, and at least not later than the more abstract discussions in the Republic. If scholars are right in speaking of a specially Megarian stage in Plato's intellectual development there is nothing to prevent this dialogue forming a representative product of that period. It is correct to say, as Dr. Jackson does, that the work marks a break in the continuity of Plato's views, and a reconstruction of his ideal system. But while Dr. Jackson represents Plato here as breaking with most of the opinions which we are in the habit of associating with his name, in favour of a theory for which we have little or no documentary evidence, it seems more natural to hold that Plato here parts company with an early

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and immature conception, for which we have little or no documentary evidence, in favour of those more comprehensive and connected doctrines which we are in the habit of associating with his name.

III.

CHARACTER
AND CONTENTS.

Is the dialogue
to be regarded
as historical?

D. L. iii. 35.

Athen. Deipn.
xi. § 113 Tauchn.

Stallb. Parmen.
Introd. p. 23 ff.;
Mullach, Poeseos
Philosoph. quae
supersunt, p. 109;
Clinton, Fast.
Hell. II. Ed. 3.
1841, under dates,
and compare p.
448; Ueberweg,
Untersuch. p. 222.

Syn. Encomium
Calvitii, c. 17.

WE come now to consider the character and contents of the work. The Parmenides purports to be a narrative by Cephalus of a conversation which occurred between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides at a former time, in a specified place. Is that meeting historical, and is the narrative authentic? Plato's account is certainly circumstantial. The transmission, too, of the narrative would seem to be guarded with the most jealous vigilance against the intrusion of foreign matter. But no one can profess a belief that Plato's works are to be judged by a severe historic standard. They may throw light upon historic events and personages, but they are not, by many removes, themselves history. Even in ancient times this was understood, as we learn from the anecdote, whether authentic or not, recorded in Diogenes Laërtius, that Socrates on hearing Plato read the Lysis exclaimed, *Ἡράκλεις, ὥς πολλά μου καταψεύδεται ὁ νεανίσκος οὗτος!* A similar remark is ascribed to both Gorgias and Phaedo by Athenaeus. It may, however, be urged that a basis of fact should be admitted in many dialogues, and that something beyond that may be looked for in those in which a serious profession of veracity is made by the author. There is such a profession here. Plato seems quite grave as he describes the meeting, and gives the respective ages and characteristics of those who were present: nay, as we have seen, he refers to the matter again in two of his other works. But with regard to the last point some deduction must be made. It has been mentioned that in Plato direct references from one work to another cannot occur. Accordingly we do not know whether these allusions constitute a reassertion of a fact, or simply a reference, as perspicuous as the circumstances permit, to a previously-written dialogue. If the latter be the case, then we have one assertion of fact, not three. Were we dealing with a professed historian this might mean little, but we are not. Scholars, however, seem inclined to think that Plato meant to be historical here: Stallbaum, Mullach, Clinton, and Ueberweg are at one so far. But when we come to details difficulties arise. Of the three principal characters in the dialogue the only one regarding whose life we have definite information is the youngest. The birth-year of Socrates lies within the limits 471-468 B.C., with apparently a preference for 469. At the date of the meeting he is described in the several references as *σφόδρα νέον, πάνυ νέος, ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν*, and the whole setting of the dialogue accords with these emphatic phrases. Ueberweg, indeed, considers this to mean that he was young only when compared with the mature or advanced age commonly assigned to him in other dialogues, and cites—though admitting the authority to be second-rate—the statement of Synesius, *Σωκράτης . . . πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς, ὅπηνίκα Παρμενίδης καὶ Ζήνων ἦγον Ἀθήναζε, ὥς Πλάτων φησί, τὰ Παναθήναια θεασόμενοι.* Clinton, Mullach, and Zeller, on the other hand,

agree in rejecting this age as much too advanced: and certainly with justice. Not only does it add to the difficulties of the situation, so far as Parmenides is concerned, but it is intrinsically improbable. Even among ourselves a man could hardly, unless to serve some purpose, be called extremely young as a student of philosophy at five and twenty; and still less among the Greeks. The whole atmosphere of Plato's writings conveys the impression that many of the interlocutors are mere lads, while on glancing at Clinton's tables we find it set down that Pindar was an author at sixteen, that Demosthenes spoke at eighteen, that Epicurus took to philosophy at twelve, and that Arcesilaus, 'if the numbers are accurate,' had won a reputation at seventeen. Democritus, too, is said to have studied theology and astrology *ἐν ταῖς ὥν*. Clinton and Mullach, while extreme on the other side, are much nearer the truth in calling Socrates fifteen. He could not well have been so young—first, because the age is extremely boyish; and, second, because Aristoteles is described as still younger, which on that supposition is hardly credible. If we call Socrates eighteen—the age of the ephēbi—and Aristoteles seventeen, we strike a very reasonable mean. This will assign the meeting to the year 451 B.C., from which, as point of departure, we have to reckon the ages of the other speakers. Zeno is said to be *ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν τετταράκοντα* at the time, so that he would be born about 490 B.C. Our chief external evidence upon the question is the statement of Diogenes Laërtius that he 'flourished about the nine and seventieth Olympiad,' or 464-61 B.C. It seems a fair and moderate calculation to suppose him thirty at that time, which would place his birth somewhere about 492 B.C., a result not out of harmony with Plato's language. With Parmenides the case is less satisfactory. Plato describes him as *περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα*, which would assign his birth to some date about 516 B.C. Here, likewise, our best independent witness is Diogenes, who says that he 'flourished about the nine and sixtieth Olympiad,' or 504-1 B.C. If this be correct it renders the assumption of his birth in 516 B.C., or even (as Clinton gives it) 519, absolutely out of the question. He could not 'flourish' in his teens, and the most favourable view which could be taken—519 for his birth and 501 for his 'floruit'—makes him but eighteen at the time. Even this will accord with our other dates only on the assumption that Socrates was fifteen and Aristoteles fourteen when they met him. If, as seems to be imperative, we make Socrates at least seventeen at the time of meeting, and Parmenides thirty when he 'flourished,' the result can be achieved only by a change in the text of either Plato or Diogenes. To alter texts with the view of harmonizing dates is, while a tempting, an extremely dangerous course. In this case the Clarke Ms. offers no justification for a change, and, so far as can be judged from Huebner's edition, the Mss. of Diogenes furnish no variants, although editors differ freely from the text. Moreover, Athenaeus, who seems to be at least as old an author as Diogenes, rejects the idea of the meeting, and his attitude would rather tell in favour of the text of the latter as it stands. If a change is to be made, perhaps the simplest would be the following. The words *πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα* in the Clarke Ms. are at the end of a rather crowded line. If the circumstances happened to be analogous in the case of some older Ms. from which the Clarke has descended, we might imagine some contraction being

resorted to, so that ἐξήκοντα might by possibility have resulted from the running together of ἐνενήκοντα—two N's when placed sideways very much resembling the majuscule ξ, thus ξ 3. This would give us for the age of Parmenides ninety-five instead of sixty-five: his birth would fall in 545 B.C., and his age at his 'floruit' would be, let us say, forty-two. Nor would there be any impossibility in all this. A glance at the ages of the Greek philosophers will show that they were a long-lived generation. The description, too, of Parmenides as εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην, σφόδρα πολίων, and his professed shrinking from the labour of discussion, agree better with the greater than with the lesser age. The change, however, is quite gratuitous; and it makes Parmenides about forty-five years older than Zeno, which introduces fresh complications. So much for dates. Athenaeus is justified in declaring, Παρμενίδῃ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς λόγους τὸν τοῦ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτην, μόλις ἡ ἡλικία συγχωρεῖ! He does not stop there, however, but regards the topics discussed as equally improbable—οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιούτους εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι λόγους. He rejects the meeting as unlikely; and, in addition, he cannot believe that either Socrates or Parmenides said what is ascribed to him in the dialogue. Socrates is represented as handling familiarly and with ease, although no doubt with a suggestion of youthful hesitancy, conceptions to which, unless our whole modern view of the subject be a delusion, he could advance no claim at any time; to which, on the contrary, Plato himself found his way only after his master's decease. This point we need not labour. In regard to Parmenides something more must be said. That Plato knew what the tenets of Parmenides were does not admit of doubt; he refers to them repeatedly, and even quotes from them. And the relation of the statements here made by Parmenides to those tenets is unquestionably more than merely nominal. Great weight attaches throughout to the doctrine of the One. And we may also catch echoes of Parmenides in points of detail. Take the well-known, although somewhat uncertain, lines—

χρεὼν δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι,
 ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκὲς ἦτορ,
 ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθής.
 ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται ὡς τὰ δοκούντα
 χρὴ δοκίμως γινῶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.

Mullach, *Fragm.* 28-32. (So Mullach, although *χρὴ δοκιμωθῆναι* would be a possible reading, and liker the original *δοκίμως εἶναι*.) Here we seem to find an analogy, and perhaps a hint, for Plato's antithesis between *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα*; while the last line—taken in connection with what Socrates says of the relation between Zeno's method and that of Parmenides—may contain a suggestion of the maxim, so emphatically laid down, about the duty of testing all sides of every hypothesis. Again, the words *εὐπειθέος* and *πίστις*, when coupled with the phrases *πειθοῦς ἐστὶ κέλευθος*, *παναπειθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπὸν*, which immediately follow, and others at intervals, may not have been without some influence upon two passages in the dialogue where, in addition to the general purport, we have the words *ἀπίθανος* and *δυσανάπειστον εἶναι*. So also in two lines of the poem, *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι* and *τῷ τὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκὲν ἐστὶ νόημα*, it is not impossible that we may have the original of

Athen. *Deipnos.*
xi. 113 Tauchn.

Parmenides.
Parm. 128 A,
etc.; Theaet.
152 E, 180 E,
183 E; Sophist.
237 A, 241 D, 242
C, etc.; Sympos.
195 C.

Parm. 136 A-C.

Parm. 133 B, 135
A-B.
Fragm. 40, 94.

Plato's suggestion to name the ideas *νόηματα*. Besides such analogies as these we Parm. 132 B. have various resemblances which are verbal merely, the sense of the corresponding passages being widely divergent—Parmenides speaking of what he accepts, Plato of what he criticises or rejects. It is such passages which, while externally bearing a resemblance, gradually convince us that the tenets of the historical Parmenides have in many cases little or no connection with what Plato feels at liberty to put in his mouth. Many citations might be made: let us take the following. Repeatedly Parmenides affirms that Being alone exists, and that Not-being is without existence, unthinkable, unnamable; and declares emphatically with regard to Being that

ἀγένητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
οὐλον, μονογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἢ δ' ἀτέλεστον·
οὐ ποτ' ἔην οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πάν,
ἐν ξυνεχές.

Fragm. 59-62.

This description is reiterated in varying language, but with unvarying strength of conviction. We gain additional clearness from such phrases as *εἴ γε γένοιτ' οὐκ ἔστι—οὐδὲ διαίρετόν ἐστιν—πᾶν δὲ πλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος—ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει τε καὶ ἀμφὶς ἔέργει—ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές—πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πύντη*. To harmonize these numerous characteristics is no part of our duty: Parmenides is satisfied of their necessary co-relation, and explicitly lays down the dogma that whatever deviates from them, and cannot be included in their scope, is a subject of mere opinion and a branch of the non-existent, *ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα*. Under the head of *δόξα* falls, so far as can be gathered from the fragments, a general survey of physical nature, analogous to that which is met with in most systems of Greek philosophy, including those of Plato and Aristotle. Now a glance through the synopsis of this dialogue, which has been placed in the margin of the text, will suffice to show that Plato ascribes to the One every characteristic which Parmenides thus rejects, in addition, or in alternation, to those which the latter accepts. Again, while we might at first be tempted to suppose that τὰ ἄλλα of which Plato speaks correspond roughly to the Not-being, or to the domain of *δόξα* whereof Parmenides bids us beware; a moment's reflection will recall to our minds the fact that Plato does not assign these ἄλλα or πολλὰ to a sphere of *δόξα* distinct from the region in which the One is found, but that—so far as their truth or falsity, their knowability or unknowability, are concerned—the One and these Others stand upon a perfectly equal footing. In short, we find that Plato while putting his argument into the mouth of Parmenides, from whose thesis it begins, advances in the course of it *πολλὰ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ*, against which the venerable speaker would at once have raised an urgent protest. To what conclusion, then, are we led upon the matter of historic veracity? It is just a possibility that Socrates may as a boy have chanced to meet Parmenides, when (or if) the latter was at Athens, as Scott tells us he met Burns at Edinburgh—'Virgilium vidi tantum.' But it is extremely improbable, all but inconceivable, that the two had any conversation upon philosophy. Plato, however, having, like all contemporary thinkers, a deep veneration for Parmenides, seeks, when

discussing his doctrines, to make that respect manifest, while at the same time giving dramatic force to his work, by dwelling upon this possible meeting, so as to suggest that his own master might advance a claim to be the other's disciple. The thesis of Parmenides is Plato's starting-point, and there is a show of adherence to it throughout; but the adherence is verbal chiefly. Accordingly we need not bind ourselves to historic fact as a test by which to try Plato's assertions, but may deal with the Parmenides freely upon the assumption that it is Plato who speaks throughout, and that the various interlocutors are but his *dramatis personae*.

Zeno. What now of Zeno in the same connection? If we are hampered in alluding to Parmenides by the fragmentary state of his writings, our position as regards Zeno is still more unfortunate. Brief quotations which scarcely profess to be exact, and sometimes mere accounts, avowedly in the language of the narrator, are all that have reached us from this famous fountain-head of dialectic. It is generally assumed that Plato refers to Zeno in the query, τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνη ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα; If that be so, and if the description be designed as historic—though it may well be but another involved allusion to this dialogue—then its resemblance to what Plato puts into the mouths of Zeno and Parmenides in the work before us is very striking. But there is no independent historical corroboration of that. Our authorities tell us that Zeno had two groups of contentions, directed, one against the existence of multiplicity, the other against that of motion. Plato's language in the Phaedrus might cover both, though principally the former. Between the accredited statements of Zeno and the argument in our dialogue the following items of correspondence may be noted. It is a well-known assumption of his that space and extended objects, if such exist, are infinitely divisible. With this we may compare the opening of what Grote calls the Second Demonstration in the Parmenides. Again, Simplicius, in his commentary upon Aristotle, represents Zeno as maintaining that if the Many exist they are both limited and limitless, which corresponds with what we find in Plato, but with a difference. Zeno seeks to make this good with respect to the Many, Parmenides is represented as demonstrating its applicability to the One. Finally, the familiar Achilles paradox, and that of the Arrow flying and at rest, are based, as Simplicius points out, on the assumption that time consists of an endless series of points συμβαίνει δὲ (the paradox is reached) παρὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον συγκείσθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν μὴ διδομένου γὰρ τούτου οὐκ ἔσται ὁ συλλογισμός. This at once recalls two striking passages of the Parmenides. At the same time these arguments of Plato, when viewed in detail, are not quite similar to those of Zeno; while we have also to remember that they are boldly attributed to Parmenides himself, and that they are applied to the One as straightforward reasoning, not to the Many as paradoxical confutation.

Melissus. Plato makes no allusion to Melissus in the Parmenides; but he twice refers to him elsewhere, and in such a way as to indicate a knowledge of his writings—in particular of his view that motion was impossible for lack of empty space. Much of the argument in this dialogue has quite as close a likeness to the tenets of Melissus as to those of Zeno.

Zeno.

Phaedr. 261 D.

Parm. 142 B, etc.

Berlin Aristotle,
Schol. fol. 235 a,
upon Phys. vii. 5.
Comp. Parm.
142-145.

As above fol.
130 b, on Phys.
iv. 1, 3. Comp.
Parm. 152 B,
156 D.

Melissus.

Theæt. 180 E,
183 E.

Thus the reasoning of Melissus that what 'is' cannot 'become,' and therefore has no beginning; cannot 'perish,' and therefore has no end; and as having neither beginning nor end cannot be limited, therefore the One is 'limitless'; recalls at once what we find at the opening of the First Demonstration: while the fallacy of arguing thus from time to space is analogous to the ambiguous use of *ταὐτόν* for the same thing and the same place in the Second. Again, the contention against motion in any form, whether as destruction, or growth, or change, or suffering, on the ground that whatever is so affected cannot be One, finds a parallel in both the First Demonstration and the Third. There is even an echo of the language, although with a difference; for example *εἰ γὰρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἐν εἴῃ τὸ γὰρ ἡντιναοῦν κίνησιν κινεόμενον ἔκ τινος καὶ ἐς ἕτερόν τι μεταβάλλει*: and *εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὼν μὴ ὁμοίον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐὼν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὼν γίνεσθαι* may be compared with the phrases used throughout the Third Demonstration. Yet we feel that in the case of Melissus, as in the cases already touched upon, the divergences are quite as noteworthy as the coincidences. And our general conclusion upon the evidence must be that—so far as can be ascertained from the fragments preserved—Plato treats the works of the three Eleatic philosophers rather as suggestive texts and points of departure, than as systems accepted in their entirety and containing a satisfactory answer to the questions of metaphysics. The Parmenides is after all a Platonic speculation, although resting upon an Eleatic basis. In Plato's view the One 'is and is not' all that the Eleatics ascribed to it and to the Many conjointly.

Of the two great exponents of Platonism for the English-speaking world of our generation the one, while striving to maintain a historic attitude, subjects Plato's works to a scrutiny having for basis a sensational conception of knowledge, and for weapons the laws of formal logic; the other does not shrink from hinting his distrust of metaphysics as anything more than a mental gymnastic, and regards Plato by preference as the untrammelled 'poet or maker of ideas.' The two are agreed, however, in putting aside any suggestion of system in Plato's mind, so far as that is unfolded in his writings; and in regarding each of his works as an independent inquiry undertaken to meet an independent, perhaps even a transitory difficulty. This view, while countenanced, as we have seen, by the peculiar form of authorship which Plato has thought fit to adopt, hardly seems in perfect harmony with the two important facts, that he both strove to get his views embodied in practical legislation, and devoted his best energies to professorial instruction in philosophy. It is doubtless true that he is not systematic after the conscious and pre-determined fashion of Kant or Spenser; yet he is manifestly anxious to consider all aspects of the philosophic problem, as these are successively brought under his notice. He earnestly seeks to attain philosophic certainty on all points, and if he fails, it is less from a want of systematic grasp of the subject, than because, with the means at his disposal, he finds success beyond his reach. He is a consciously unsuccessful seeker after reasoned truth, not a mere—if it be permissible to say 'mere'—metaphysical Ariel singing 'Where the bee sucks there suck I.' The Parmenides alone is sufficient to show that he sought to rectify his own mistakes and make definite progress towards truth. In it we

Mullach, Meliss.
Fragm. § 2.

Parm. 137 D.

Parm. 146 A.

Parm. 138, 156.

Mullach, § 4 and
§ 11.

Parm. 156 B-C.

The contents
and scope of
the work.

find, beyond dispute, an intentional review of past difficulties, and a conscious step in advance, so far as the doctrine of ideas is concerned.

Before entering upon a detailed discussion of the work, it is necessary to explain that no attempt is here made to put before the reader a complete description or co-ordination of the views of previous writers upon the question. The task of reading over all that has been written in explanation of the Parmenides becomes—where time for consideration is limited—confusing rather than helpful to the mind. As little, on the other hand, is any pretension advanced to the merit of originality; to that special information, or clearness of penetration, which might justify the setting of previous expositions aside. The object aimed at has been to acquire, so far as time might permit, a sufficiency of information from authoritative sources, and after assimilating that, to take the course which seemed marked out by personal study of the work.

Part First :
Analysis.
Zeno's problem.
126 129 B.

The dialogue opens with a reference to the speculative relation in which Zeno stands to Parmenides. The former is declared to be the negative, as the latter is the positive, supporter of the thesis that Being is One. Parmenides, as we have seen, in his poem, after setting forth this dogma in detail, feels constrained, like many expounders of the problem of existence, to admit that ordinary experience yields no support to his chosen view. Accordingly in the second part of his poem he takes up the facts of nature as we find them, and offers his explanation of them, just as the physical philosophers had done before him. But the whole of this wide field which rejects incorporation with his doctrine is classified as Not-being, and relegated to the sphere of opinion, while its votaries *φορεῖνται κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φύλα*. It is to the further refutation of the judgments of opinion that Zeno, and Melissus with him, has directed attention. He seeks to prove the doctrine of the One-Being by elaborating the contradictions latent in its counterpart, the Many-Not-Being. To his arguments Socrates is here represented as partly assenting and partly taking exception. The attitude assumed amounts in effect to a 'solvitur ambulando.' Practically Socrates says, I find no difficulty in accepting the statement that sensible objects have what you call the contradictory attributes of many and one; it represents a fact in experience of which we are daily conscious. They *are* many and one, and where is your difficulty? If it exists, is it of essential importance? One might, indeed, at first suppose that Socrates was admitting the unanswerable character of Zeno's reasoning as regards the world of sense; but really that is not so. Virtually he offers a vindication of the sensible, material world against the contention of the Eleatics, as is clear from the statement a little further on, that 'those things which we see must be accepted as existing.' Although the two chief auditors are said to have felt a little annoyed at this line of argument, they are not represented as controverting it. Yet it conflicts with their views, and can hardly be reconciled with Plato's own opinions elsewhere. It follows, however, the objective tendency common among early Greek thinkers, who are prone to reason, like the Scottish school, about an 'external world,' whatever that world may, upon examination, be found to comprise. The same feeling is behind the statement that the ideas are 'set up in nature.' Plato's verdict upon Zeno's

130 D.

130 A.

contentions would seem to be, not that they prove their point, if by proving it is meant abolishing the sensible sphere; but rather that, however ingenious, they have not been applied by their author to the sphere where the results would have greatest value, and involve real argumentative subtlety. Now that sphere can be none other than the sphere of One-Being, to which in Zeno's intention his arguments were to form a sort of phylacteries.

The next stage in the discussion—which arises in connection with the first, and partly overlaps it—is that in which Socrates brings forward the question of ideas. He invites Zeno to say whether he recognizes their existence, and whether he holds that it is from participation of some kind in them that external objects derive their characteristics. To the query it is Parmenides who replies, and he does it Scottish fashion, by putting another. He passes over the question whether he and Zeno hold such a doctrine, and asks whether Socrates himself does so. Receiving an affirmative answer, he goes on to interrogate Socrates upon the scope of his theory. It is probable that Plato designedly suffers the query of Socrates to pass unanswered. He could not truthfully ascribe his ideal theory to the Eleatic thinkers, while to have openly admitted that they did not hold it, would have given rather a shock to the series of assumptions upon which the setting of the dialogue is based. And he might feel that, if not the theory as he held it, at least a germ which could develop into that, was to be found in the views of Parmenides. For the ideal theory is put forward as a simplifying, unifying principle, and the ideas are 'apprehended by the intellect'; in both which respects its affinity to the Eleatic doctrine is obvious and close. The questions put to Socrates by Parmenides in regard to the ideas are four:—

(1.) Are ideas admitted for likeness, one, many, 'and all of the qualities of which Zeno was speaking'? It may be remarked that Zeno has specified only likeness and unlikeness, but has admitted that he is resisting the existence of Many *παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα*. Socrates answers, 'Yes.' (2.) And for all such qualities as the just, the beautiful, the good?—'Yes.' (3.) And for man, fire, water, and the like?—'There I have often felt a difficulty.' (4.) And for all such unworthy things as hair, mud, filth?—'By no means. Indeed, the case of such sometimes makes me tremble even for the others. At present I devote my attention to those just admitted.'

While the scope of the ideal world will be found to be insensibly enlarged as we proceed, it seems that we are to accept this as the original immature conception of it: and in regard to this conception several remarks suggest themselves. First, the object with which it has been referred to at all is, that the dialectic of Zeno may be brought to bear upon it. According to Socrates—that is, Plato—neither advantage nor honour is to be derived from a dialectic treatment of the sensible sphere; what he would wish to see demonstrated is, as we have said above, the existence of a conflicting series of qualities 'winding in all directions' through the ideal region. Next, it cannot but be felt that if the purpose of the ideas is to explain, and almost to create, our ordinary world, the outline here furnished is wholly inadequate. And this inadequacy is due not more to inherent difficulties than to sentiment. Ideas are rejected because of their

unworthiness; and where there is no unworthiness, ideas are readily accepted even when they would seem to be least required. It is conceded at once that there are ideas for intellectual or mathematical, and for moral or aesthetical, conceptions; which conceptions are already themselves abstract and products of the mind. And it is gravely doubted whether there be ideas for even the most important classes of objects associated with physical impressions; while the suggestion of ideas for objects that seem 'common and unclean' is rejected with something like a shudder. To put it otherwise: Plato accepts with greatest pleasure ideas for such conceptions as Socrates had been in the habit of attempting to define, and rejects with emphasis ideas for such objects or impressions as fall within the sphere assigned by Parmenides to opinion. The relation between the One and the ideas thus tends to become closer. It must be said, however, in the third place, that if the domain of ideas, as thus far mapped out, has, in the language of modern diplomacy, an 'intelligible frontier,' it can hardly boast a 'scientific' one. The mere putting of the question whether there are ideas in cases (3) and (4) shows—what the form of rejection confirms—that Plato had come to feel some further step to be a necessity.

Enlargement
of the ideal
sphere.

130 C-B.

And we have evidence that such a step is in contemplation. Parmenides plainly tells Socrates that it is his youth and speculative timidity which disincline him to accept the existence of ideas for the humblest physical phenomena, and that years will bring conviction with them. And gradually as the disputation unfolds itself, we find incidental references to ideas for 'bigness, smallness, equality'; for 'slave and slavery,' 'master and mastery'; for 'science' and 'truth.' This all increases the scope of the theory, alike on the abstract or conceptual, and on the concrete or physical side; while finally the expression *εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου*, with others like it, seems to point, although not with absolute certainty, in the direction of admitting ideas for every clearly distinguishable division into which our experience may be found to part itself. That would, of course, include ideas for man, fire, water, and even for their humbler congeners. At the same time this conclusion is one that is glanced at rather than definitively stated, a fact which, as we have urged above, makes for the view that the work ranks early among Plato's metaphysical writings. For Plato is not here drawing back from a wider conception of the ideal sphere, which he had formerly recognized, to a narrower which he now regards as more correct; but is advancing from the narrower to a wider under a sense of intellectual pressure which he cannot resist but which his fastidious feeling still renders distasteful. While, however, the horizon is undoubtedly expanding we cannot but feel that the features of the landscape are far from clearly defined, or given with a due sense of relative importance. Are we to assume, for example, that there is but a single idea of 'beauty' to which all types of beauty bear a relation—beauty of form, of colour; of man, of animal, of plant; of implement and product? If so, what are we to think of separate ideas for bigness, smallness and equality, where we might imagine a single idea of 'size' more appropriate? The parsimony in the one case hardly accords with the plethora in the other.

Let the scope, however, and the contents of Plato's ideal world be consistent or inconsistent, wide or narrow, one thing about it at least is beyond dispute, that it is a world quite apart from ours. We arrive indeed at a conception of it by means and a process familiar enough. It is clearly laid down that the ideas are 'grasped by reflection'—λογισμῷ λαμβανόμενα. These are the means, and the process is in accordance with them. We proceed by comparison and abstraction. The course of this process is not absolutely clear, and comments are made upon its character in the notes. But so long as it resembles 'abstraction and generalization,' the remark which one is most naturally tempted to make upon it is, that while the process is familiar the result is unique. The process seems quite analogous to that which Aristotle refers to Socrates as its first expositor—'for there are two things which one might ascribe justly to Socrates; inductive trains of reasoning and universal definition.' Acquired by such means, ideas ought to be what we mean when we use the term—that is, νοήματα or notions. To Plato they are something wholly different. Here again Aristotle describes the facts for us: 'Socrates, however, did not make the universals nor yet the definitions separate or transcendental; but *they* (the makers of ideas) did this, and such sorts of entities they named ideas.' Like Jack, we climb up the familiar bean-stalk into wonderland: only that his bean-stalk is itself a wonder, while ours is not. This break is mentioned repeatedly in the dialogue, and the reader can judge whether Aristotle in what we have quoted from him seems to have this dialogue in his mind. Thus *ἐὰν δέ τις... πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῇται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη.—αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐ μετέχοντα;—εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς.* And their characteristic peculiarities are noted in three forms of expression which agree with this act of χωρισμός: we have *αὐτῇ ὁμοιότης, ὃ ἔστιν ἓν*, and as above *εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*. Socrates, then, has got (1) an ill defined and ill regulated world of ideas, which is (2) reached by an intellectual effort of abstraction, but (3) found when reached to be 'like a star that dwells apart.' Parmenides proceeds to interrogate Socrates upon the subject and to raise objections. To his mind a great difficulty is this. Postulating the two spheres, ideal and sensible, fully developed—what must we hold to be the nature of the participation or μέθεξις of the ideas by *τάδε τὰ ἄλλα* or our world of sense? First he asks, do objects of sense share in the whole or in a part of the idea? If in the whole, then is the idea many-whereas at once: if in a part, the effect upon them may be fraught with ludicrous contradictions—a twofold difficulty which Socrates frankly admits. The assumption underlying this dilemma is that the participating object represents, so to speak, a sensible material body of death ready made, into which the idea is supposed to enter. That is, of course, dualism in a pronounced form. The world of sensible objects is somehow already there, waiting for the advent of the intelligible element. And it is noteworthy that Parmenides gives point to the paradox by choosing, to illustrate his argument, the ideas of physical bigness, smallness, and equality. The anomaly resulting from μέθεξις by parts might have escaped notice had justice or

The ideas form
a world apart.

Parm. 130 A.

Met. xiii. 4.

Parm. 129 D.

130 B.

130 C.

129 B.

133 A.

beauty been selected. But absurdity is elicited at once when 'a portion of smallness' is 'added' to 'one of us.' Smallness should be the irreducible minimum of extent; but matter being infinitely divisible you get parts of smallness, and never reach your goal. Again, for the moment, participation is regarded as physical addition, which ought to increase the size of an object; while yet by hypothesis the object should be reduced, if things 'become small by partaking of smallness.' Having thus an easy victory over the doctrine of participation, Parmenides turns to look at the character of the ideas. These are assumed to be a series of ultimate units, each of which has the power of influencing the nature of an indefinite multitude of sensible objects: and each of which is reached, as we have seen, by the process of abstraction and generalization. We are accustomed to draw diagrams of the operation here referred to, which represent a gradual convergence from the many of sense to the one of abstraction, after the fashion of a genealogical tree or the gorgeous tassels of a cardinal's hat. That this progress leads from many to one there is no doubt. But it seems—as is further pointed out in the notes—not to be the progress or the process which Parmenides has in mind. He would appear to imply that the very first step in the generalization includes a comparison of all available physical data, so that you would hope to reach what will prove to be your idea at a single stride. This, however, says Parmenides, you fail to do. What you have now got is a fresh field for comparison—the indefinite mass of sensible things on the one hand, on the other the abstract which you have just made. Compare these two and a third is the result. This process repeats itself indefinitely—'all men,' 'man,' and a 'third man' or *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*—so that the one idea which is supposed to terminate the inquiry is never reached. Whether this contention be just or not, it seems to be a formal rather than a real difficulty. Your first act of abstraction has by hypothesis exhausted the data at command; from *a* you have extracted A. What Parmenides contends is that by comparing *a* with A a new result is obtained. Is that so? You import no new element by your second comparison. It may be that the process admits of indefinite repetition, but what does it yield? It would not prevent you from justly using your first A as a sufficient type for every participating *a*, if participation be itself otherwise feasible. The objection of Aristotle to the doctrine of ideas, that in each case it merely adds one more object to the sensible objects, καὶ παραπλήσιον ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἶοιτο μὴ δύνασθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη, would be doubly applicable to this theory.

Met. xii. 4.

Are the ideas notions?

Parm. 132 B.

Socrates attempts to get rid of this difficulty—this, at least, seems to be what he is meeting, and not the previous question of division through participation—by urging that each idea may be simply a mental conception or notion, and so may be one. A very odd contention indeed; however faithfully it may reflect the 'universal' or 'general definition' of the historic Socrates. These endless comparisons and successive results are possible just on the assumption, and on no other, that each abstraction remains mental and is not converted by *χωρισμός* into an objective

entity or 'thing in itself.' If, as Plato insists, our series of comparisons serves but to point the mind's attention to an idea which is 'set up in nature' and exists *χωρίς*, manifestly indefinite comparison is by that very fact stopped off. That objective thing is wholly independent of any future comparisons into which our ingenuity may seek to inveigle it, and stands there unaffected by our subjective activity. One it is, and one it remains: our comparisons have served only to draw the veil from before it. The fact that we thus discuss it may be a sound reason for doubting that it 'stands there in nature'; but grant such existence to it and our further speculations in its regard will hardly make it uneasy. It and its peers 'still are sitting, still are sitting' like the senate during the Gallic invasion, or like 'dukes, whom we do not criticise, but only contemplate.' It is singular to note, however, that Parmenides is not represented as doubting that if the ideas were but notions his difficulty would be removed. He seeks rather to demolish that suggestion. All conceptions, he says, are conceptions of an object, and that object will in each case be the idea. If it be mental, and all things participate in it, then all things as sharing in thought should have the power of thinking—the contrary would be absurd. A modern idealist finds no difficulty in conceiving all things as built up of connected and coordinated conceptions. But it demands a Greek to urge as necessary sequel that thoughts should be able to think. Would it not be an analogous contention that words should be able to speak? How plausible soever the hypothesis, it is in direct conflict with fact: the Ego alone it is that thinks and speaks. It may be noted in passing, however, that Plato seems to have in the end come gradually round to the view that thought somehow constitutes the universe. This appears to some extent in the *Timaeus*. And the suggestion about thoughts thinking may have helped to persuade him that the universe must in that event be a creature or ζῷον. Parm. 132 B-C.

It is admitted by Socrates that these objections baffle him; and he is thus led to propound what would seem to be his final and abiding view of the nature and function of ideas. 'They are set up as patterns in nature' after the similitude of which sensible objects are framed, 'and the participation of objects in them is none other than that of being likened to them.' It is interesting to note that—as remarked above—this important suggestion seems to be put forward here for the first time, as a novel expedient to meet a pressing difficulty. That fixes the position of the work as earlier than others in which the theory is mentioned. On this new development of the doctrine Parmenides continues his attack. The arguments put into his mouth thus far have had two tendencies. They have exposed the objections to the assumption that objects 'partake of' ideas, and likewise the difficulties besetting the attempt to construct a simplified ideal world aloof from the sensible one. He now urges what takes for a moment the appearance of a new contention, but what is in truth merely an elaboration of the former of these. Between the ideal and the sensible there is, as we know, a great gulf fixed. We are now told in regard to this gulf that God himself cannot bridge it: that he is debarred from The ideas are in truth patterns. 132 D. p. xxxii. 133 A.

contact with the sensible sphere, even to the extent of knowing it. And it is now clearly acknowledged that this is due to the original severance of the two spheres. Nor can the objection be rebutted. The verdict of reason is absolute—let no god join what man has put asunder. The ideal sphere pays the penalty of all privilege, even the privilege of unsullied purity, that it is out of contact with the stream which flows in the river of life: that circumstance too is emphasized just as the sphere is expanding to completeness. It is a perfect and immaculate Constitution, but like the French one it will not ‘march.’ ‘He *shall* march,’ cried my uncle Toby, marching the foot which had a shoe on, though without advancing an inch—he *shall* march to his regiment.—An’ please your honour, said the Corporal, he will never march but to his grave.’ It certainly will, as Parmenides declares, be the work of a man *πανὸ μὲν εὐφροῦς* to bridge over this difficulty, if he goes about it on the foundation here laid down. Yet Plato while clearly alive to the difficulty is far from making it a reason for renouncing his hypothesis. On the contrary he maintains that with the rejection of an intellectual idealistic standpoint the possibility of philosophy and all its rational activity disappears. *Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι*; he exclaims: and in a sense—though scarcely in his—he is perfectly right.

Parm. 135 B-C.

Critical
comments.

Having now reached the end of Plato’s course of self-criticism, which forms the important introductory section of the dialogue, we pause for a little to make one or two remarks upon it, in addition to any that may have been dropped in passing.

Met. I. 9.

1. Reference has been already made to certain objections on the part of Aristotle. Taken as a body his adverse comments are very comprehensive and pointed. The substance of them may be given thus. (α) We do not really reach the ideas by the methods which Plato suggests. And that statement, as we have just seen, is perfectly true, whether our reasons for accepting it are those of Aristotle or not. No advancing chain of abstraction will conduct us logically to another and absolutely separate world, to what moderns would call the sphere of the unconditioned. (β) The character of the ideas is objectionable in various ways. If we are to have, as Plato implies, ideas corresponding to every branch of knowledge we must have ideas of negations (*ἀποφάσεις*) such as ‘unlikeness,’ and of things that have perished; while a prominent feature of the theory is that which comprehends ideas of relations, such as ‘motion,’ ‘smallness,’ ‘truth.’ But if the use of the ideas is that they are to be participated in by objects of sense, they ought to comprise substances (*οὐσίαι*) alone. That we possess ideas in the modern sense, that is conceptions, of unlikeness, motion and all similar things, is quite certain. But to affirm that there is a ‘thing in itself set up in nature’ called motion or smallness, is a hard saying. (γ) The use of the ideas is to constitute, and to aid us in knowing, the world of sense; and they do not fulfil that function. The talk about their being patterns, to be partaken of by sensible objects—that and the like of it *κενολογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικάς*. And we have seen that Plato himself partially suspects this to be so.—Thus Aristotle attacks at once their existence, their character and their function.

2. The world of ideas is to be reached, we are told, by abstraction. By abstraction, then, from what? From the world of ordinary experience; which is said on the one hand to partake in (*μεταλαμβάνειν, μετέχειν*) the ideas, and on the other to be apprehended by sensible perception (*αἴσθησις*), and so to lie outside the sphere of science. Suppose Socrates entering upon his course of procedure by abstracting successive ideas from some sensible object such as a man. He abstracts, we shall say, 'one,' 'limit,' 'shape,' 'bigness,' 'likeness,' 'beauty,' 'justice,' 'goodness,' 'mastery,' and so indefinitely onwards. And when the process exhausts itself what is it that remains, to be apprehended by sense but ignored by thought? Either there must be a primal unmodified matter whose function it is to 'partake of' ideas, and which remains when they are gone; or our sensible world runs serious risk of being 'abstracted' from us and becoming intellectual, or even ideal, before we are aware. Plato does not explicitly pronounce for either alternative, yet he seems to favour the former. His conception, in fact, of what the sensible world actually is resembles in its vagueness and want of consistency the view entertained on the subject by non-metaphysical reflection. He affirms that without the ideas we must sacrifice *τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν*, while again of these ideas he declares emphatically *οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν*. No proof is led that the want of ideas will do away with dialectic and philosophy: this result is assumed without discussion, and it certainly leaves us in a position of some difficulty. In favour of the opposite conclusion we have the following curious deductions from Plato's own line of reasoning—(1) *διάνοια* and *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι* both exist apart from the ideas, and are our means of discovering them: (2) in making that discovery these faculties are employed upon the world of sense, which thus succeeds in furnishing a field of exercise for the speculative intellect: (3) this world of sense contains a sort of science suited to its wants, and to which the only limit is that it cannot know a world which is expressly placed absolutely out of connection with it. In these circumstances do we need the realm of ideas? If they cannot be brought to bear upon the world of sense, and if the latter is sufficient unto itself even in the matter of science, why retain them? Has not Plato over-reached himself in this part of his argument? At the very moment when he seeks to magnify his world of ideas as unapproachably pure, rigidly scientific, without one taint of sense to sully or confuse it—when he seeks to enthrone it as the dominating influence in speculation—has he not been unconsciously enriching the world of sense to an alarming degree with qualities to which it can lay no claim, and which are assigned to it solely because they seem to him unworthy of the other sphere? The contents of the ideal world we have already collected above. What are those of the phenomenal world? They consist of Parm. 129. 'you and me, and the rest of what we call the many,' 'stones and pieces of wood and such things.' To these we add by inference—since there are ideas corresponding to them—'likeness, one, many; justice, beauty, goodness; master, mastery, slave, slavery; science, truth.' Finally, whether or no there may be ideas for 'man, fire, water; hair, mud, filth,' it is certain that they, as we accept their meaning, belong to the sensible

130.

133 D-134 B.

sphere, for Socrates says of them *ταῦτα μὲν γε, ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι*. Such is the world of 'what we call the many,' the world which is 'with us,' which 'partakes, or whatever you call it, of the ideas,' which 'we handle' (*μεταχειρίζομεθα*) and 'see.' And this world we know by the senses: of some parts of it this is expressly affirmed; while for others there are ideas corresponding, whose distinctive feature it is that they are known *λογισμῶ* and *διανοίᾳ*. Such a conception of a world of sense is manifestly untenable; and indeed it speedily breaks down. For when Plato goes on to insist, by the mouth of Parmenides, upon the absolute separateness of the ideal sphere he announces that the latter is known by 'the idea of science,' while the ordinary world is known (not by sense, but) by 'our science,' *τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ*. And it would hardly avail to urge that this latter science is mere 'opinion,' as Parmenides calls it in his poem, or to translate *τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ* into *λογισμῶ τινὶ νόθῳ*, to quote a phrase from the *Timaeus*; because it is by its means that we have discovered the ideas. The fundamental difficulty lies in the relation, or rather want of relation, which is originally assumed as existing between the two spheres. Although Plato would deny that ideas exist corresponding to individual sensible objects, such ideas after all are the goal to which things seem to be tending. He has ideas for the qualities of objects, and ideas for motion and rest; and if he goes on, as Parmenides urges, to admit ideas for man, hair, mud, why should he not translate *εἶδος ἑνὸς ἐκάστου* in its most literal sense and acknowledge the existence of ideas for 'you, and me, and the rest of those present'? An *εἶδος Σωκράτους* would at least not be *ἀτιμώτατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον*; and when we have got that length we should have in the ideal world, what we can hardly help feeling as if we were intended to have, a detailed duplicate of the sensible world complete to the minutest ramification. And do we not seem to attain to this consummation in the latter part of the *Phaedo*? There he launches into a rhapsody upon the future dwelling-place of the soul, which is made to appear as an idealized sensible sphere, where our world is repeated in detail with transcendental attractions. Is this the *τόπος νοητός*? If so, then each blade of grass has an *εἶδος* or heavenly counterpart, as in the land of Beulah. Those there have *αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν* and behold the sun, moon and stars *οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα*. On this assumption our sensible One, which for argument's sake might be supposed to contain but a single quality, could be represented by *q*, and Socrates with his indefinite qualities by *qⁿ*; while over against this would stand the idea of each, represented by *q* and *qⁿ*. And so our worlds would run side by side

<i>q</i>	<i>q²</i>	<i>q³</i>	<i>q⁴</i>	<i>q⁵</i>	<i>q⁶</i>	<i>qⁿ⁻³</i>	<i>qⁿ⁻²</i>	<i>qⁿ⁻¹</i>	<i>qⁿ</i>
<i>q</i>	<i>q²</i>	<i>q³</i>	<i>q⁴</i>	<i>q⁵</i>	<i>q⁶</i>	<i>qⁿ⁻³</i>	<i>qⁿ⁻²</i>	<i>qⁿ⁻¹</i>	<i>qⁿ</i>

If we are to have two worlds with the theory that the one is the model or pattern of the other—then no fitting conclusion but this seems to be possible. What advantage, now, has the world in italics over that in roman type that such pains should be taken in the elaboration of it? 'What's *q* to *q*, or *q* to *q*, that *q* should weep for *q*?' It is not simple as opposed to the other's complexity, it is not pure as con-

trusted with the other's unworthiness, it is not stable as distinguished from the other's mutability—there is actually an *εἶδος κινήσεως*. What then is it? Shall we say it is intellectual as contradistinguished from the other's dependence on sense? Well, after consideration, it is not that either. No: between the two there is indeed a vital distinction. The world in italics is 'The-idea-of-scientifical': the other is 'The-our-scientifical.' This is what comes of having 'made that distinction—on the one side, certain ideas; on the other, things partaking of these': and here for the present we must leave the question. Parm. 130 B.

3. The ideas as patterns are said *εἶσθαι ἐν τῇ φύσει*. What does this mean? One would at first be disposed to fancy that 'nature' could be nothing but the world as we see it: but obviously that sense cannot be the right one. As little can nature mean the human mind; for although it is by the exercise of the intellect that we reach a conception of the ideas, they are in themselves quite separated from us. He speaks repeatedly in the Republic and elsewhere of a *νοητὸς τόπος* as contrasted with the *ὁρατός*. Should we identify that with the mind of the Creator? Even this is not without its difficulties; for the ideas are patterns *πρὸς ἃ βλέπων* the Creator creates, a description which gives them a certain externality and independence even where he is concerned. The *νοητὸς τόπος*, again, and the mind of the Creator are subjects which carry a certain suggestiveness in connection with the question which Plato raises as to whether the ideas are *νοήματα*. What should occupy a *νοητὸς τόπος* if not *νοήματα*? Granting, too, that *νοήματα* must have objects, still we ask—may not such objects, and in the given circumstances must they not, be themselves *νοήματα* or *νοητά*? Nay, even the *αἰσθητὰ* seem not to be perfectly excluded from this intellectual influence. Granting that we perceive them by sense; do we not, even according to Plato, likewise form abstract conceptions of them, when discovering the ideas? And are they not the objects of our thought at that time, and so in his view capable of thinking? Further, of the ideas it is affirmed that they are *λογισμῷ λαμβανόμενα* and the mode of reaching them is *τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα (τὰ ὁρώμενα) ἰδεῖν*. There is also an *ἐπιστήμη* whereby God knows them. Finally we are told that if the ideal theory be abandoned man *οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέφει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει*, and so the possibility of discussion will be absolutely destroyed. Plato is, of course, committed to the position that the ideas are not mere notions in the human mind, but objective entities. We may grant him that; we may even raise no difficulty about their being 'set up in nature.' Still to admit of being discussed at all they must imperatively be either 'mental' or 'physical'; and if physical they are perceived by sense, while, if mental, he grants them the power of thinking. The subject is a supremely difficult one. Probably Plato is all along struggling to say what we also are struggling to say when we speak of things 'unconditioned,' 'in ordine ad universum,' 'seen as they appear to the creative intelligence.' In the Phaedo such expressions occur as *αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν, εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων*, and, as we have seen above, *οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα*. 129-130.
132 A.

Phaed. 102-3.

4. It has been pointed out that the reason assigned by Socrates for raising the question of ideas here at all is that he may see the same contradictory qualities proved to exist in them which Zeno shows to exist in sensible objects. No proof to such effect is forthcoming. All that is said in reference to conflict between ideas has reference to ideas which encounter each other in objects of sense. Doubtless it is shown that there are difficulties in the way of our conceiving an ideal world at all; but these difficulties do not quite involve the fundamental contrariety which Plato through Socrates sees fit to suggest. The argument which most nearly supplies a result of this nature is the one in which it is pointed out that if we reach the ideas by a series of comparisons and abstractions each idea must be many and not one. But this argument is not prosecuted in such a spirit as to indicate that Plato sees in it the presentment of an internecine struggle between 'absolute one and absolute many.' We come more nearly within sight of such proof as we are looking for in the Sophistes, Philebus, and Phaedo, than here. Even in the Phaedo, however, what is pointed out is principally that there are ideas which will not inhabit the same body together, while others do not show a similar mutual repugnance. One explanation of the failure to satisfy expectation may be that the ideas are found to be beyond the sphere of 'our science.' Another seems to lie in the aversion which Plato up till now exhibits against the acceptance of ideas for 'man, fire, water; hair, mud, filth, and such things.' The ease with which contradictory characteristics are shown to exist in sensible objects arises from the complexity of those objects. The difficulty in the case of the ideas is caused by the comparative simplicity of those ideas which are accepted as existing. If Plato accepted ideas for 'man, fire, mud,' he would approximately reach the concreteness of the sensible sphere. The idea of man could readily be shown to be both one and many: and so with others, in proportion to their inherent complexity.

Met. i. 6.

5. Such ideas as these would be ideas of *οὐσίαι*, which according to Aristotle are the only ideas that should be admitted at all. And when their admission would be an advantage, why does Plato raise any difficulty? It is not altogether because of their physical character. Some of those which he admits most readily—'bigness and smallness' for example—are in origin physical. Probably the abstractness of the latter veils to his mind the fact that they are physical, while the concreteness of the former gives that fact full prominence. And we know from Aristotle why it was that Plato felt a distaste for ideas of a concrete physical type. 'Having from his youth become acquainted with Cratylus and the views of Heraclitus, that all objects of sense are in perpetual flux, and that in their regard, science does not exist, he ended by adopting this theory as correct. And accepting as his guide Socrates, who busied himself about ethical questions to the exclusion of nature at large—and in these sought the universal and led the way in turning attention to definitions—on some such ground as this Plato took up the view that all this applied to a separate class of facts, and not to any of the sensible objects, as one could not attain a common definition of

any of them from their ceaseless mutation.' This gives the explanation of the dislike for physical ideas which appears in this dialogue; and it makes still clearer that such was Plato's earlier view, which he finally overcame. One can also see how much more simple it is to accept 'smallness in itself' as an abstract entity than 'man in itself'— q^6 than q^{n-6} , so to speak.

6. The expedient of calling the ideas patterns, an expedient of the utmost significance in Plato's eyes, traces, as we say, its origin to this dialogue. It occurs to Socrates as a sudden inspiration—ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν; and it appears to exercise in the end a potent influence in expanding the contents of the ideal sphere. It is true that in the Republic we are pointedly told that only one couch has been created as a model for all; but in the Timaeus we can observe a Tim. 28-2 change. There is, indeed, still a single pattern, but this is a pattern for the whole world, of which pattern the world is an image. Now a pattern for the world, one cannot but feel, is likely to be a much more complete and comprehensive thing than could be elaborated consistently with the assumption of solitary patterns for vast masses of phenomenal objects. It is quite unnecessary to enlarge upon the difficulties involved in this doctrine of the pattern so far as its application is concerned. But the necessity for postulating a pattern world at all seems inconsistent with philosophic parsimony. The tendency to imitation must indeed be firmly rooted in us if we cannot look at the world without regarding it as a copy, and calling into being another world whose only function it is to act as model for it. Yet like the 'scheme' or 'method' of salvation so dear to the heart of scientific theologians, such a view as this contains much that is attractive and satisfying to the uneasy lay mind. It seems so far analogous to a constitution with two chambers, and possibly on that ground may commend itself as conservative. But how does it add to our security? The world of sense is a fact which we have always with us, and somehow or other we make a shift to know it. That is our *ὅτι*; but apparently we cannot—so long at least as we hold that world to be sensible—rest satisfied without a *διότι*. And so we postulate, deduce, or hypostatize a second world, as a species of pattern-shop or *παραδειγματήριον*, whose function it is to fortify us in our convictions about the first world, by giving it the appearance of being in turn deduced and not a mere fortuitous creation. Such a pattern world is in imminent danger of becoming a museum. So far as Plato's view in this dialogue and in the Republic is concerned—that there is one pattern for many copies—it is certainly, as Aristotle puts it, a mere talking of empty poetical metaphors. All copies of a pattern ought to be exact duplicates of each other. Now the very characteristic of the copies in the case before us is that they diverge widely from each other; and the pattern, if it is to be a pattern for all, must in that very act cease to be a pattern for any. We are reminded, in this view of the subject, of the 'schematism' of Kant. 'There can never, says Kant, be an adequate picture for the notion of a triangle in general. For it would never attain to that generality which enables the notion to hold good of any triangle, right angled, oblique

Kant, Kritik of
Pure Reason.
Translated in
J. H. Stirling's
Text-book to
Kant, p. 251.

angled, etc., but would be limited always to a part of this sphere.' One cannot avoid the suspicion that it is precisely this impossible 'general picture' which Plato's pattern in its present stage aims at being; and that he has been gradually forced onward to this position as a consequence of having made *χωρισμός* of the 'general notion' or 'general definition' of abstract qualities like 'the good' which he received from Socrates. Perhaps a lurking sense of this difficulty may have had its influence in making him averse to admit ideas of 'man, fire, water.'

Resumption of
Analysis.

To resume, then, we see that Plato has made the mistake which later thinkers have repeated without his excuse, and which less disciplined intellects are ever prone to make. He on the one hand refers far more of our world of experience to sense or *αἴσθησις* than actually belongs to it; while he on the other hand feels constrained to place intellect or *διάνοια* in a hostile camp of observation. The result is to him, as to all men so placed, a feeling that contradictions multiply: and his aim is, as is also the aim of such men, to reconcile those contradictions without changing his original position. Mr. Archer Hind appears to contend that he did finally change his standpoint for that of a consistent idealist. Whether or not he may have done this elsewhere, it seems certain that he does not do it here. The dualistic assumption was to him the natural, traditional, unquestioned one. The reconciliation was the great problem presented for discovery: and it was sought for as was the philosopher's stone in a subsequent age—hope never died though fruition came not.

A more searching
method of
investigation
essential.

Parm. 135 D-136

135 C]

In looking about for his solution, he proceeds to advance the contention that dialectic, or discipline in following up trains of reasoning about metaphysical problems, is an essential *προπαρασκευή* towards success. He presses this point with much earnestness and illustrative detail, and his pronouncement upon it seems in effect to be an admission that the Socratic type of inquiry was inadequate for the present need. It is not without a certain significance that Parmenides, in now putting the subject before Socrates, chooses as examples with which to test the method the ideas of 'the beautiful, the just, the good.' Hitherto these have yielded place to others: but we know that they were topics upon which Socrates had been wont to dwell—a fact which is also hinted at in the reference to previous discussions with Aristoteles; and in the words *ὀρίεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τε τί, καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ ἀγαθόν* one almost recalls Aristotle's description of what 'may justly be ascribed to Socrates.' 'But to nature at large' Socrates had not turned his attention. Plato is now discovering not only that 'universal definitions' 'on the ethical virtues' must have a metaphysical basis, but that such a basis cannot be constructed at haphazard, or by taking up any question that chance may suggest, as Socrates had been accustomed to do. This is a point upon which Parmenides—so Plato was beginning to find—might act legitimately as a mentor to Socrates. 'What is the just?' may be a most instructive inquiry; but, if the answer is to be satisfactory, 'What is being?' must precede and support it. There seems no necessity to contend that Plato is discarding the reasoning used in the inquiries of Socrates on moral questions as fallacious in its own sphere, or as ill con-

ducted within its presuppositions. Rather he is feeling that those inquiries had been detached, fortuitous, wanting in system, without a secure foundation; feeling also, it would appear, that his own previous gropings in the metaphysical region had been open to the same objection; and that these defects can be removed only by making a fresh and better advised beginning. That he now proceeds to attempt. The base idea he gets from Parmenides; the method of testing his inferences from Zeno. But to the details of their historic position he is not confined. Not history but expediency leads to the compliment from Parmenides that Socrates has done well in forcing the discussion away from the physical into the metaphysical sphere. To Parmenides 'Being is One' was a faith quite as much as it was an inference, nor had Zeno's support of the doctrine been quite as detailed and many-sided as we are here led to believe. Zeno's dialectic instead of following a four-fold direction had been confined to the single contention 'if the many are, what follows to them?' It appears to be Plato's own advance upon both these thinkers, that on the one hand he applies dialectic to the One itself, and, on the other, recognizes the necessity of dealing in argument with all sides of a question.

We are now more in a position to understand the relation of the second great division of the dialogue to the first. While it is made conversationally to appear an accident, it is in reality part of the design that the argument should from this point onward be devoted to the Parmenidean doctrine or 'hypothesis' of the One. And the connection of that subject with the one hitherto under discussion has been treated as though it were more of a difficulty than it is. If we are to assume, with Grote, that the remainder of the dialogue is simply what it affects to be—an example, namely, of the mental discipline which Parmenides deems indispensable to the philosopher—then its relation to the earlier portion is determined at once beyond the need of argument. But in pressing his view with grave persistency, Grote seems rather to manifest a want of tact. Not only does he miss the literary finesse of the composition; he even raises in a gratuitous manner the question 'si un Grec peut avoir de l'esprit.' What Plato seeks is to reach his real end by apparently accidental steps, to guide the listener to a predetermined issue while seeming to let him wander at his will. The fact that much has been written upon the question is due to a belief, prevalent among students of all ages, that something more and higher is intended than a mere dialectical exercise. In very early times—among Neoplatonists, for example—the remainder of the dialogue was viewed as something allegorical, symbolical, enigmatical, in which hidden meanings lurked. Something analogous, although less credulous and whimsical, has occurred in our own time in the region of comparative mythology. The *Iliad* is a solar myth in which Achilles represents the sun: Antigone is the 'afterglow' of the dying day, who insists on 'burying her brother' in the west; and so in other cases. Apart from any value which may attach to such elucidations, it may be conceded that they are at once most fascinating in themselves and most plausible in their verisimilitude and adaptation to the outlines of the various stories. But they have the

Relation of the
Second Part to
the First.

serious drawback of seeming to support us in making anything out of anything. In like manner, if we are free to regard Plato's discussion as allegorical, sober criticism must quit the field. If such a conception as the ONE is spoken of 'in a mystery,' it will be found equal to any demand that is made upon it. Last century, no further gone, Thomson in his edition of the dialogue—while duly setting aside Neoplatonic extravagances—feels entitled to regard the One as synonymous with the Deity; and assigns his reasons. The One, he says, is here represented as

universitatis unica causa	sine figura
simplex ac perfectum	immobile
sine principio et fine	aeternum
non genetabile nec corruptibile.	

And is not the Deity all these? We must on the one hand begin by discarding all mythic and hidden meanings. Plato introduces myths repeatedly into his works, and when doing so he makes no secret of it. On the other hand we decline to have it exacted of us that we shall show between the two portions of the disputation a connection more precise and intimate than Plato has thought necessary in other writings. What is the proper subject of the Republic, the definition of justice or the construction of a state? How are love and rhetoric connected in the Phaedrus? Why are the Theaetetus Sophistes and Politicus so closely associated by their author? There is nothing in the sequence of parts in the Parmenides which need cause more embarrassment than any of these problems.

Certainly the second part is an exercise in dialectical inquiry, and as such its point seems to be twofold: (1) to show that the very simplest of all conceptions has many aspects from which it may be viewed; (2) to embody a type of inquiry more subtle and abstract than any with which Plato had been familiarized in the practice of Socrates. But everyone must feel that if it be this it is likewise something more. Plato had begun, as we have said, to realize that the Ethical inquiries and definitions of his master stood in the midst of nebulous surroundings. He had tried to render everything clear by the expedient of ideas 'set up in nature': but his first efforts in that direction would not bear criticism. Could any regulative or unifying principal be found which might bind all firmly and harmoniously together, and remove complications? That question seems to represent his present frame of mind. We know from the Phaedo that he had turned to Anaxagoras in search of such a principle, not with perfect satisfaction. Here we find him approaching the problem through the dogma of Parmenides. The former had said *ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος*: the latter declares *πάντων δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκέν ἐστι νόημα*, and *οὐ ποτ' ἔην οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πάν ἐν συνεχέει*. Neither is consistent; neither can elaborate in detail his own convictions: but each gives suggestions for constructive idealism. Plato making confession here of his own shortcomings practically approaches Parmenides with the request, Can you help me? And to whom could he more naturally go than to him who professed to have reduced

the whole problem of Being to Unity? This seems an obvious reason for discussing the nature of the One. Again, however, one of the foremost desires expressed by Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue is to see Zeno's dialectic turned upon the intelligible sphere. And here it is so turned: turned upon Parmenides' own intelligible sphere, which if not ideal in the Platonic sense is at least widely severed from the sphere of opinion, and may be said to be on the way towards idealism. Moreover Socrates was anxious to see the ἀπορία which Zeno had revealed as existing in the sensible sphere running riot ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι: and here something of the kind actually is exhibited. The One may not be a Platonic idea, but it is at least a very abstract conception, and under treatment it presents ἀπορίαι in abundance. Any reader of what remains of the work must feel the full significance of παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, while the result upon the One and the Many is such as can be described only in the complicated sentence with which the dialogue closes. This seems not an unreasonable account of the connection between the two parts. He who demands a 'truer inwardness' in the matter, and seeks for it, may possibly find it; but, if so, will he not find more than Plato is elsewhere in the habit of providing? If indeed we feel compelled to continue the search we might make the connection complete by assuming that the remainder of the work is a practical exemplification of the method according to which the ideal is to be brought into connection with the sensible sphere. The want of such connection has been strongly emphasized, and Parmenides has declared that to supply it is all but impossible. If we are to assume that in the sequel this difficulty is supposed to be surmounted, we must hold that the connection implied between the spheres—which is the question involved in the doctrine of μέθεξις or παρουσία—is one of dialectical necessity, resulting inevitably from the mere action of the laws of thought: must hold that the one factor when clearly realized by the mind postulates the other for its own completeness. 'One' and 'Many' demand each the other as poles or sides of a single complex conception, reminding us of the Unity Plurality Totality which we find in Kant. This surely would complete the connection of parts in a degree satisfactory to the most exacting, and would at the same moment solve Plato's problem for him in a novel and cogent manner. But while a tempting, it is a questionable theory. In the first place it supplies, as substitute for Platonic μέθεξις, a conception which is so modern as to be suspicious upon that ground alone. Even Aristotle's doctrine of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια must be regarded as a falling away from such a standpoint as that. Assuredly it leaves far behind anything else in Plato. In the second place it at once renders nugatory all the intellectual distress which has been lavished upon the difficulty which μέθεξις was found to involve; while at the same time not a hint is given at the close that a problem so remarkable has been deftly and completely dealt with upon a basis which changes the whole aspect of the question. Had Plato really made out such a connection between ideas and sense it seems likely that he would have announced it more explicitly. Finally

Is the One an
idea?

Parm. 129 D-E.

it renders inevitable a conclusion which finds favour with some, that the One represents an idea while the many are the sensible world. Is it the case that the One of this dialogue is to be regarded as an idea? The point is not absolutely clear, but on the whole the answer must be No. Various reasons make for that conclusion. First: the discussion upon the One is undertaken, as we see, just after the decision has been reached that the sphere of the ideas has no connection with ours, and that the science found with us is of a much less exact type than the other. To begin immediately after such a pronouncement a discussion which sets it at naught seems a questionable step. Again: the One is expressly said to be the hypothesis of Parmenides, and although he placed Being much nearer to the ideal region than any of his predecessors had placed their principles, and separated it from the sphere of opinion in a way which must have proved very suggestive for Plato; yet the actual distinction which Plato drew has never been ascribed to him. Moreover we find in Plato's discussion of the One bonds which connect it with space and time, a fact which at once parts it off from the sphere of ideas. Nor do we hear of an αὐτὸ εἶν, ὃ ἔστιν εἶν at this point, where, if the intention was to fulfil the expectation expressed above by Socrates, some reference to such terms seems almost essential. As little do we hear of the difficulties of knowing the One, or of the 'idea of science.' On the contrary we are told that One partakes of various ideas—εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται—like other οὐσίαι, in which respect it occupies a position identical with τὰ ἄλλα. The passage where this statement is made seems to leave no ambiguity, although others are less specific. Finally it is expressly said that both One and Others 'grow older and younger,' 'become and perish' and exhibit other characteristics of sensible existence. From all this the natural conclusion appears to be that the One, Many and Others are notions corresponding to physical originals, and that Plato is dealing with them λογισμῷ and διανοίᾳ but only up to the limits of 'our science.' What he seems to be aiming at is to turn the Parmenidean principle on all sides with the view of ascertaining whether he can incorporate it into his ideal system with advantage. The odd feature of the business upon the other hand is that after disparaging 'our' science as he does he should proceed to a detailed use of that science the course of which tends to enhance our estimation of its efficacy. But we must remember that Plato's theory of ideas is so exacting in its nature and conditions that to maintain a consistent attitude towards it is quite beyond his power. The exigencies of such a position compel him to fall away from his theoretic distinction between two degrees of science, and to go on reasoning with such sublunary intellect as mortals possess, upon topics with which it can deal, and to give this as the best substitute he can supply for a dissertation upon what moderns would call the Unconditioned.

In surveying the second and most important division of the work it will not be possible to enter into every detail. Certain general lines of remark alone can be pursued, lesser issues being dealt with in the notes.

1. As we have already noticed, the first step of Parmenides, on the threshold of the subject, is to insist that any topic chosen for debate must be discussed in a definite methodical manner. This he never did as a matter of historic fact; nor is there evidence that Zeno elaborated any such scheme of inquiry. We must suppose that Plato has himself methodized the investigation while appropriating from Zeno its keen dialectical character. His scheme at its fullest may be formulated thus—

The scheme of discussion adopted in treating of the One.

- | | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|---|
| 1. If A is | what follows in regard | (α) to it, and (β) to not-A? |
| 2. If A is not | „ „ | (α) to it, and (β) to not-A? |
| 3. If not-A is | „ „ | (α) to it, and (β) to A? |
| 4. If not-A is not | „ „ | (α) to it, and (β) to A? |

A moment's reflection will show us that this, while doubtless a symmetrical, is really a redundant form of discussion. Its results may be fully attained without our carrying it further than the first two stages. Nor does Plato, in point of fact, carry it further here. It is true he maps out an elaborate table of eight heads or, as Grote calls them, Demonstrations, which might be supposed to correspond to (1, 2, 3, 4) α and (1, 2, 3, 4) β : with an odd one thrown in after the first two. These have been arranged in our marginal summary in two groups which may be called A and B, having under A Demonstrations I. II. IV. V., and under B, I. II. III. IV.; while the odd one appears as Demonstration A III. But, as will be seen, Demonstrations A I. and II., IV. and V., B I. and II., III. and IV. really exhibit respectively contradictory discussions upon a changed hypothesis. Thus—setting on one side A III.—we have the argument reduced in reality to 1 α followed by 1 β , and 2 α followed by 2 β . Even in this reduced shape its closing divisions are hurried through in a rather perfunctory manner with the remark *καὶ πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦτα ἂν διελθεῖν εὐπετέες ἤδη ἡμῖν*, or again *οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν*. The discussion is indeed protracted beyond these limits; not however from the necessity of the case, but because Plato enters upon what, while nominally a revised statement of each argument, is really a reversal of it arising from a modification in the sense of its terms. Demonstration A II., while professedly a restatement of A I., is in fact a transformation of it covertly brought about; and the same is true of A V., B II. and B IV. when compared respectively with A IV., B I. and B III.

2. The course of the discussion, when these points are cleared up, comes to present on the one hand a deductive, negative, destructive,—on the other an inductive, positive, constructive aspect. Thus

The inquiry and results are partly negative, partly positive.

- a. A I., 'if the One is,' ends by annihilating the One:
- A V., 'if the One is,' ends by cancelling the Others:
- B II., 'if the One is not,' likewise destroys the One: while
- B IV., 'if the One is not,' again does away with the Others.

On reference to the marginal summaries it will be seen that these results are reached in the two former cases through a resolute keeping of the One to its oneness, and in the two latter by an equally tenacious holding of Non-existence to its nothingness.

17 D.

Journ. Philol. xi.
No 22 p. 311.

So rigidly is the One to remain one that it is not allowable to call it even 'the same' as itself; while 'the One is not' is defined to mean utter absence of being in the thing spoken of. And practically the reason assigned for this stern repression of all expansiveness in sense is that, unless we guard ourselves with ceaseless care, the One will reveal such diverse characteristics as to become Many while we are occupied in examining it. Put in terms of Logic, the conclusion thus reached may be called a denial of the possibility of predication, or the concession in the case before us of such predication alone as amounts to the assertion of an identity—'the One is one.' But we must be careful not to make this denial unconditional. Plato makes no declaration against the possibility of predication per se: he merely says that, if we are to be jealous in guarding the absolute unity and simplicity of our conception, the result will be that we can say nothing whatever about it. It is natural that on its way toward this consummation the One should become *ἄπειρον*, or should gradually lose all definite characterization. In terms of Metaphysic, again, our conclusion may be stated thus—that with bare uncompromising oneness Being or positive existence is unthinkable and incompatible. Existence waxes and wanes *pari passu* with complexity: do away with complexity, relationship, multiplicity, and Being is no more. The point thus reached would, were Plato in reality confining himself to the position of the historic Parmenides, form the conclusion of the work. It shows what comes of rigid adherence to a hastily assumed simplicity and unity. As Dr. Jackson says, 'when the Eleatic principle is strictly interpreted it is as complete a denial of philosophy as Heracliteanism or Cynicism.'

β. In A II., 'if the One is,' the result proves that the One 'is and is not' in an indefinite number of ways:

In A IV. a similar result arises in the case of the Others:

In B I., 'if the One is not,' the same conclusion still holds of the One: while

In B III., it arises from this latter hypothesis that the Others 'seem' many contradictory things.

This is the positive or constructive limb of the argument. In it the One forms a centre for multiplex and even conflicting existence. And the principle which underlies the process is the counterpart of that which has led to the negative conclusions. We have simply to concede to the One so much of positive characterization as will save it from extinction, and to the Not-being such a sense as will allow us to speak about it. This slight concession proves to be the letting in of water. Make over but so much to the One as will let you discuss it, and this apparently rudimentary conception will develop a complexity which confounds you, and carries with it attributes as contradictory as Yes and No. For even its Not-being, if a not-being with which you can deal, proves a source of fresh predications—*omnis negatio est determinatio*. Thus, Logically, we reach the conclusion that where predication is possible it is not a mere statement of identity; and, Metaphysically, we perceive that the simplest of entities can have being only as part of a complex whole.

Let us dwell for a moment longer upon this double result: its importance in Recapitulation. Plato's reasoning cannot well be exaggerated. In the former portion of the argument (a) we have an attempt (A I.) to think back, under Parmenidean conditions, to a One which shall prove a 'minimum cogitabile,' or an existence in a state as simple as we can conceive. While this One is assumed to 'be,' its being is suffered to retire into the background, as Plato busies himself in reducing its character to the most naked simplicity with which being may be found compatible. When he has reached this stage, however, he comes to find that being no longer is compatible with it. This minimum cogitabile has become a minimum *incogitabile*, and by the same gate whereby it passes out of thought, it vanishes from existence. When and where qualities cease then and there being leaves us. This result is attained by consistently rejecting from the conception of the One every means by which it might break away from the most rigidly unmodified oneness. He withholds it from any share in parts, whole, inner, outer, change, on the ground that it must be truly one: he will not suffer it to be denoted by the most harmless looking synonym—to call it 'same' involves a 'different.' The One must be, in Bacon's language, strictly a vestal virgin: let it but 'change its name,' so to say, and at once pulcra faciet te prole parentem; or, to vary the figure, it may say 'I secretly laugh at my own cenotaph. . . . I arise and unbuild it again.' Preserve it, on the other hand, immaculate in its vestal condition, and you speedily find that it cannot be, cannot be one, cannot be named, cannot be known. It is gone: and with its own has dragged all other existence (A V.). If this be so when the One 'is,' shall we fare better when it 'is not'? This case is put in B II.: the reasoning is short and has the same result. As he has shut out existence by pressing home the absence of qualities, he now excludes qualities by emphasizing non-existence. If the One is not, nothing is: existence is impossible for anything apart from association with unity. The converse view of the problem is brought out in the latter half of the argument (β), by simply urging that the One must not be pressed out of existence, since in terms of our hypothesis it 'is.' The element of existence being transferred to the foreground a revolution follows (A II.). The One is now no longer the minimum *incogitabile* but the minimum *cogitabile*—and as a consequence it has parts, is a whole, exists in time, and in a word, goes off at once conquering and to conquer in the absorption of characteristics, until we discover that it is the Many or the Others. Would all this be upset, now, should we say again 'if the One is not'? By no means necessarily. Grant but a meaning to that assumption (B I.) and all follows. Give to the non-existent One but definiteness sufficient to admit of discussion and it will give itself variety: let it but have individuality and it will not long want for multiplicity. The whole tendency of the reasoning is very prettily summarized by Plato himself in the Sophistes, καὶ γάρ, ὃ 'γαθὲ, τό γε 59 π πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελές καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου. Τί δὴ; Τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν

ἡμῖν. For τῶν εἰδῶν in this passage read τῶν οὐσιῶν, and for ὁ λόγος put τὸ εἶναι: then from being logical the statement becomes metaphysical without losing any of its value. It is not at all improbable that Plato in the Sophistes has Antisthenes the Cynic in his eye, as the ἄμουσός τις καὶ ἀφιλόσοφος. Nay, the language of Aristotle in regard to him almost suggests that he may be referred to in our own dialogue, διὸ Ἀντισθένης φετο εὐήθως μὴτὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἐνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μὴδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. Certainly the phrase ἐν ἐφ' ἐνός is remarkably apposite when compared with ἀλλὰ ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἔν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἔν, at the opening of Demonstration A II.

Met. IV. 29.

Parm. 142 B.

Relation of the argument to logical rules.

D. ix.

155 B., A. III

Such is the general bearing of the discussion, a bearing which modern metaphysical theory confirms. It by no means follows, however, that each step in the reasoning is a safe one: that the details fully accord with the sketch. Of the two divisions the negative one is that which seems the more cogently put. And naturally so. It is simpler, more human, to take to pieces than to construct, to see flaws in creation than to create, to be deductive than to be inductive, to converge upon a point than to expand over a wide horizon. Such flaws in details of the argument as can be detected will be found mentioned in the notes, but there is a grave drawback to its general character which calls for notice here. This consists, as we have already hinted, in a doubtful attitude towards the logical law of Contradiction. Not only do the statements in the positive limb of the inquiry conflict with those which the negative one seeks to establish—an issue due largely to the ambiguous use of the terms One and Not-being to which we have just referred—but the repeated assertion, which marks the positive limb, that the One 'both is and is not' affected in a given way, seems to clash with what is the earliest accepted and most comprehensive dictum of all formal logic. It is not that Plato was ignorant of this principle—whether technically enunciated or not it must form the basis of all just argument—on the contrary he expressly states it both elsewhere and in this dialogue. Of the series of arguments the two first—A I., II.—are the most elaborately developed, the latter in particular, and at their close Plato seems to realize the difficulty with which he is confronted. In the opinion of Grote it is with the view of clearing this up that he inserts unsymmetrically Demonstration A III. In this he points out that when the One 'becomes' as one, it 'perishes' as many, or whatever the special feature may be; and he leaves the impression that the contradiction involved in 'both becomes and perishes' can be disposed of by this interposition of time. We are here brought into contact with a very important distinction, that between knowledge as a completed result, in which a simultaneous 'becomes and perishes' should be impossible; and knowledge as a progressive acquisition, in which the contradiction is not so easily eliminated. If we are to assume that the One, or any other entity, exists in an unchanging form like one of Plato's ideas, then it comes under the law of identity or contradiction. It is what it is, as a sum total of characteristics, which individually are what they are: time has nothing to do with the matter, and 'is or is not' must

take the place of 'is and is not.' If our knowledge of it is perfect we know it as it is, without ambiguity. But if, on the contrary, we do not actually so know the One, or any other entity; if our knowledge is a growth or activity, which advances from small beginnings towards a fulness never realized, then the One is a centre of shifting characteristics, and each time we deal with it we deal probably with a different group of these. In the main we are likely as we discuss it to be advancing from a view which includes few characteristics to one which includes more. But not necessarily. When we reason deductively we start from what for our purpose is a given sum total of knowledge, as if it were complete, and draw from that conclusions which already lie implicitly in it—we are dealing with our knowledge as if it were acquired and stored up, and are simply satisfying ourselves as to the details which it includes. Here time does not enter, and the formal rules are the sole legitimate guides. When, on the other hand, we reason inductively or synthetically, we advance from a basis confessedly imperfect and strive to enlarge our mental possessions. Here we cannot always speak in terms of 'is' or 'is not': our knowledge does not exist, but is in process of formation: time enters as an element, and the laws of formal logic must be charily applied. And if he would receive it, this is the direction in which Plato would have to look for a reconciliation of the conflict he recognises between *αἴσθησις* and *ἐπιστήμη*. In the former he is at what miners call the 'working face,' and is quarrying out new knowledge from the ungauged sum which lies before him. In the latter he is dealing with the 'bing' of coal already raised to the pit-head, which he weighs and measures as a definite quantum by definite tests and standards. It is patent at a glance that the result in the latter case might from its greater definiteness be called knowledge or science, while that in the former, from its constant incompleteness and confusion, might seem to a methodical mind unsatisfactory in comparison. As time goes on the working face advances, while for each generation the bing represents a different total. The point, for us, is that when knowledge is in process of becoming, its condition at any moment is sufficiently uncertain to render a strict application of the laws of deductive logic uncertain and unfair: and that it is not necessarily to the prejudice of a line of argument, in such circumstances, that it seems technically a little at fault. In arguing thus, however, we are not to be held as admitting that each seeming violation by Plato of the law of contradiction is in reality such. Another glance may be taken at the subject from a somewhat different standpoint. While the laws of formal logic are invaluable as tests of an intellectual conclusion, they may yet be far from conveying a just picture of the activity which leads the mind to the acceptance of that conclusion. They represent the dissecting implements of the anatomist, or the solvent appliances of the chemist, much more than they exemplify the natural process by which is produced the complex organism with which anatomist or chemist has to deal. And if an attempt be made to exhibit that process in operation, the attempt does not at once stand condemned by reason of imperfect conformity to them. That it may be inherently defective as a repre-

sentation is possible enough, but not because it happens to jar with deductive formulae.

The significance
of argument
A III. upon
'process.'

Parm. 127 D.

144 E.

p. xxxviii.

p. xlii., xlix., lii.

130 B.

3. Grote, we have said, regards the argument A III. as an attempt on Plato's part to explain apparent violations of logical law. That is not an unfair account to give of its rather unexpected occurrence in this place; yet it is one that may be overpressed. Plato no doubt feels that his previous arguments seem contradictory, and seeks to elucidate them. But the course he takes partly tends to show that the charge of inconsistency would be in some degree out of place. What he wants us to understand is that he has been dealing with the One as in 'process,' a condition in which contradictory or seemingly contradictory affirmations about it are inevitable. And he is less concerned—though no doubt sincerely concerned—to prove himself a fair reasoner, than he is to account for this phenomenon of process or becoming with which he has to do. It is another manifestation of the influence of Zeno's dialectic upon him. 'The first hypothesis of Zeno's first argument' had been directed against multiplicity. Plato, however, has accepted multiplicity; and what he sees is that his acceptance carries with it the necessity for some theory of change in all its various manifestations. This brings him face to face with another group of Zeno's arguments, that denying the possibility of motion. Zeno endeavours to show that because of the infinite divisibility of space you cannot admit that in any given time a swift runner can overtake a slow runner, as the apparently small space which divides them can itself be so divided as to become infinite. And from this he deduces the impossibility of motion. It may be urged in an *ex parte* manner that if Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise in a limited time, having unlimited space to cover, you can evade the difficulty by dividing the limited time as you do the limited space, and so showing that he has unlimited time in which to do it. As Being and One are equally divided—*οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ' ἐξισούσθον δύο ὄντε αἰεὶ παρὰ πάντα*—so space and time may be equally divided, the one becoming infinite if the other is. But this is not Plato's difficulty. He accepts here the doctrine that time is made up *ἐκ τῶν νῦν*, and has to ask himself how the gaps between these isolated moments are to be bridged. Thus we again see the consequence of beginning by making divisions—*καὶ μοι εἶπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις*—they refuse to reunite. But Plato here offers us his theory in explanation. After the first instant or *νῦν*, during which the moving arrow is at rest, there comes *τὸ ἐξαίφνης* or the momentary suppression of time, in which timeless flash of 'unaccustomed liberty' the arrow (or the One) bridges over the barrier between the first instant and the second, thus making a start; and by similar means it retains its acquired motion through *νῦν* after *νῦν*. And what is true of physical motion is true, says Plato, of other types of change. We thus explain Becoming. This reasoning will at once suggest a comparison with Aristotle's solution of the same apparently unanswerable *λόγος*. And there cannot be a doubt that the latter is the more philosophically matured. There is something almost absurd—unless it is intentionally humorous—in the suggestion that the One

goes, as it were, behind the scenes for a moment to change its dress; and no one knew better than Plato that, however instantaneous he might make it, the period, unless he was able to alter its character by sleight of hand, would still be but a minimum of *time*. Yet when we reflect a little we may see that the two philosophers are substantially at one. Aristotle's reply to Zeno practically is that the latter puts the dividedness of time against its connectedness, so much so as to push the latter wholly out of view, and make us think of time as divided merely, while it is no less truly connected. Now Plato in speaking of time accepts Zeno's view of its dividedness; but he says the separation of moments is overcome by τὸ ἐξάφνης, a something that is not divided nor even divisible. This is but an awkward way of recalling for us the other aspect—the continuous side—of time. We are made to figure time as divided and continuous not simultaneously but alternately. We think of it as discrete—continuous—discrete—continuous, and so ad infinitum; only that he gives to the second limb of the antithesis the name of a timeless 'instantaneous.'

4. It was said above that the divergence in the results between the positive and negative limbs of the argument was due largely to ambiguity in the terms. Foremost among these ambiguous terms is the One itself. Its different meanings in this dialogue are chiefly two. It is used in a more or less logical sense as a unit of measurement, or terminus a quo in speculation: and it is used in a metaphysical sense as an entity whose existence and composition are to be comprehended gradually by research, or as a terminus ad quem. In the former of these senses it is of course quite immaterial to consider the positive character of the One: it may be concrete, it may be abstract in itself. For us it is used abstractly when used as a unit of measurement. It is more important to observe that while such is its function you cannot do with it what, as is to be feared, Plato sometimes assumes the right to do. You cannot divide it and then treat its parts as on an equal footing with itself—as new Ones. The parts of a unit are fractions, and are not to be treated as new units on a level with the whole from which they are taken. It is when viewed as a unit that the One seems to be most simple and elementary in constitution—most really one, with but the single characteristic of unity. If it be used merely as a counter we feel almost entitled to consider that we have reached a One which no argument can prove to be many. It certainly should not *be* many, but it cannot avoid implying or presupposing many. We must remember that even as so conceived it cannot be spoken of save as in relation to other similar ones in endless succession. It forms one of a multitude like itself, and it may be *any* one of that multitude. Plato may be right or wrong in his method of reaching number by 'two twice and three thrice' and 'every combination of even and odd'; but it is true that One carries number with it. To say 'one' involves the mental act of numeration; and numeration is the act of reckoning plurality. In this sense one and many, one and 'limitless multitude' are but the two factors of a single mental process. Each involves the other, and the question Whether One does not come first, is inept. When thought has reached the stage of reckoning

Ambiguous use
of terms.
The One.
p. lvii., 1. 1x.

Parm. 143 E

its impressions, its consciousness that they are many and that each is one constitutes a single simultaneous decision. When it goes on to deal with any given set of impressions and seeks to find how many they are, one, in that sense, or 1, comes before two. But number and the unit of number take form together. Thus we are far removed from perfect simplicity in dealing even with the one of number. Plato admits this in practice, as well as maintains it in theory, by assuming that there are Many or Others standing over against the One from the very threshold of the inquiry.

136 A.

Phys. i. 6.

Act IV., Sc. i.

The Many.

Nor do we mend matters on passing to the metaphysical One, the one of existence, or what we hope may prove the simplest form of Being. In that case we have still to reckon with the problem of numeration, just discussed; and we have added to it the problem of existence, which was there in abeyance. What is Being? At least it is not identical with unity: unity does not carry objective being with it. Plato is quite right in saying that the statement 'the One is' already involves something more than One. As Aristotle points out—whether with this dialogue in his mind or not, readers must decide—even when in search of an ἀρχή or first principle we cannot accept a single one: the case requires several. To judge by Plato's language, the One to him in this aspect consists of a mental picture of a physically existing One—of a One in space and in time. Now the very simplest conception which can be formed of such an entity must treat it as a homogeneous extended thing. But in that case the circumstance that it is viewed as one is not essential; it is accidental. We are in search of the smallest unit of being and have happened to stop at this point. Unlike the unit used as measure this One may be broken up, and each portion may be called One. And such divisibility is co-extensive with thinkability. You may go on dividing so long as what you divide can form an object of thought; while again it is only as an object of thought that you can deal with the matter at all. Thus multiplicity dogs this One out of the confines of existence; we cannot reach it, do what we may. But further, it is certain (unless it be pure space) to have as a physical existence various characteristics in addition to mere extension: and these characteristics will abide with it, like those of water, in the smallest part you reach. Thus in itself, and apart from its further divisibility, this smallest part is not One in the sense of having but a solitary quality or feature. Simplify as we may we cannot arrive at what we seek: to adapt the language of Edgar in *King Lear*, 'the One is not, so long as we can say—This is the One.' Strip it of quality after quality, as we have already stripped it of part after part: still it remains a complex so long as we can form such a conception of it as will admit of discussion. Strive to reduce it step by step to absolutely featureless Being and it vanishes at the back door of thought as Nothing, as the unthinkable. Plato is right as regards the scope of his argument, although he may take doubtful steps from time to time.

The Many also is a term which is not very consistently used. Frequently it is transformed to the Others, a step which, in a work dealing with the most elementary distinctions of thought, it is not permissible to take. By so treating this conception

you acquire greater freedom in developing from it fresh characteristics. The One as opposed to the Many is not identical with the One as opposed to the Others. Plato himself rightly says that only the other can be other than the others: that is, in being opposed to the Others the One sinks its oneness in order to become other than they. But there is a further confusion of thought in this connection. We have noted how Plato accepts almost unconsciously at starting the view that over against the One a body of Many or Others takes its place. The whole mapping out of that model scheme of argument, which ought to form the discipline of the philosopher, is based on the assumption that the One is not all, but has Others with which it is to be contrasted. Now we have also seen that the One itself under treatment develops into Many. What difference is there between the Many into which the One thus changes and the Many originally existing in contradistinction to it? That is not a thing easy to decide. We have a many of ones, any one of which may be fixed upon as the One; this again when we examine it separates into a new Many in our hands. Have we not here, after all, the same Many or Others viewed at two separate logical moments of their existence? The development of these from a careful consideration of all that is involved in the conception of the One gives us what Kant would call the 'deduction' of the Many or Others. The contention that no argument about the One will be complete which fails to ask 'what follows to the Others,' simply exhibits us as assuming without deduction a fact which we are able if necessary to deduce. Yet Plato seems to speak as if this identity between the two sets of Many were not present to his mind. If that is really his mental position perhaps the inconsistency may be due to a cause which produces difficulty in most abstract thinking. One would suppose that discussions about abstractions would be in a sense easy, from the fact that we ourselves choose the qualities which our abstractions shall comprise, and dispense with whatever might prove superfluous. The difficulty is that, abstract as we may, we never can get the existence of these surplus qualities, and of a whole surplus world, swept clean out of our thoughts. This background of superfluous qualities and existences colours our abstraction in spite of our will. The analogies and materials of our ordinary experience, which our abstraction is supposed for the time being to have flung aside, dog our argument like the consciousness of evil deeds, and force themselves surreptitiously into trains of reasoning which purport to disregard them. We cannot keep our thinking consistently at the level of our abstractions. Could we do so we might find arguing about them to be tolerably simple and satisfactory. This line of reflection may partly explain the introduction by Plato of the conception of Others or Many even at the moment when his hypothesis seems to be that the One exists alone, the sophism being partly veiled under the plea that every side of a question must be considered.

Yet another ambiguous term is Not-being. It need not detain us. Sometimes it is used comprehensively as an absolute denial of existence to the subject under review, at other times it is used in a restricted sense as meaning a something which

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is not the same with that subject. In the former case it closes the discussion, in the latter it forms in itself a fruitful theme of discussion. On this topic Plato's views are much more clearly elaborated in the Sophistes. One's first impulse undoubtedly is to think that while Being may be exhibited in many shapes and degrees, Not-being is unvarying, is always *ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ* and has but one signification. But we come to learn that in this as in the popular contrasts between the sexes great error may be committed. It is fallacious in discussing the characteristics of humanity to devote a chapter a piece to the soldier, the explorer, the lawyer, the statesman, the trader, the man of letters, the poet, the man of science, and then to round off the work with a supplementary chapter on woman. 'You clash them all in one, that have as many differences as we,' says Tennyson's prince. And so with each tint of Being a separate shade of Not-being will be found to correspond. In the Sophistes we learn that while each order of Being necessarily *μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος* yet *ἡ θατέρου φύσις* is ever standing by which *ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὄν ποιεῖ*. Nay, while *περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἔστι τὸ ὄν*, it is not otherwise on the negative side—*ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν*. For we have on the one hand *τὸ ὄν*, but on the other *τὰ ἄλλα*, and the number of the latter whatever it be represents the exact number of times that *τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι*. Opposed to *τὸ ὄν* in its most abstract form stands *τὸ μὴ ὄν* in an equally absolute form, and the latter is the negation of existence. But for modified or definite Being you have similar Not-being. The *θατέρου φύσις*, he says, *φαίνεται κατακεκερματίζθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη*—for every 'named variety' of science a suitable variety of negation is told off as partner.

Soph. 256.

What is the One
metaphysically?
An atom?

5. What, we may ask, are the characteristics which as the work progresses come to attach themselves to the conception of the One? When viewed metaphysically it is, as we have said, an extended unit. The characteristics which distinguish it beyond this are few and simple, as will appear from the marginal summary of the text. First it has existence, parts, whole, beginning (in space), middle, end, and shape. Then it has various qualities which Aristotle would describe as *πρός τι*: thus it is same—different, like—unlike, greater—equal—less, fewer—as many—more, older—same age—younger. Again it has position relative to itself and others; thus it touches and does not touch, is still and in motion, in space (*χώρα*); while it has also all the affections incident to existence in time. It would appear then that it is one—and *any* one—of a multitude of extremely elementary homogeneous extended things existing and moving in space and time. While such a One is in certain ways much more than the One of Parmenides, we cannot but feel that in a vital respect it is much less. It has altogether ceased to symbolize the Universe. No one on the other hand can fail to see the strong general resemblance between such a picture as this and the doctrine of the Atomists. True, Plato does not specifically say that space is empty, but his discussions of touch and motion tend in that direction; nor does he set a limit to divisibility, yet neither does he allow division to swallow up the One or the Many. It is impossible to imagine that Plato was ignorant of

the views of his contemporary Democritus—though, as we have seen, he never names p. viii. him—and one is almost tempted to suppose that it was at least one among the objects of this dialogue to show how Zeno's dialectic if perfected and applied to the One would from the Eleatic doctrine develop the Atomistic. An analogy from modern speculation might be found in an attempt to affiliate the Monads of Leibnitz to the Substance of Spinoza.

But if the One is thus reduced in many respects very much to an atom, what, we may still ask, is to Plato the most fundamental requisite of existence for it, or for anything; and how to him does existence develop itself? We cannot single out any one characteristic from which all others are to be traced, but the vital features appear to reduce themselves to three at most: (α) it is in time, (β) it is in space, (γ) it has individuality. From these characteristics the others are variously deduced. Its individuality, however, is very elementary, and is more logical than physical: the One is 'different from the others' and 'one with itself.' In the course of his argument Plato adopts either of those three characteristics which suits him as the fundamental one, and from that establishes the existence or non-existence of others. From his reasoning it would appear to result that the beginning of existence to our minds for anything whatever is the acquisition by it of distinctness in some form or other. And our knowledge of it, or its existence for us, grows with the increasing number of relations in which this distinctness can be affirmed. Of the three characteristics given above we are in the habit of thinking that the order of natural priority is that in which they are named—that quantity has a more elementary character than quality. Plato does not appear to share that preconception. He would seem to imagine that a distinctness of quality or individuality might be to us the primary ground for assigning to a sensation a distinctness of quantity. From having a sensation of such and such a quality we are led to ascribe to it such and such a quantity or succession in space and time. This is not laid down as a principle by Plato, but the course of his argument rests upon a tacit recognition of it.

6. The point at which Plato looks most as if he were going to abolish his units by the process of endless division is in what we call argument B III., which deals with the condition of the Others on the assumption that the One does not exist. On that assumption this argument represents the more favourable possibility for the Others, and it reduces them to an unmanageable phantasmal chaos bordering upon annihilation. In the less favourable possibility which follows in B IV. they are actually done away with, the conclusion being that 'if the One is not nothing is.' This, however, seems rather to be a negative argument in favour of the Democritean contention that division must stop somewhere. Nor is the conclusion unsound, although both Plato and Democritus support it in a somewhat mechanical and materialistic fashion. Stated in terms of modern Metaphysics it would stand pretty much as we have put it already—that simultaneously with the removal of definiteness, numerability, clearness; of τὸ μέτρον, τὸ πέρας, thought and existence vanish. At best there can remain that

chaotic multiplicity which carries with it the possibility of existence, and which, if we please, we may call 'sense,' or in Platonic terms that 'which seems to be One, but is not; to have beginning, middle and end, but has not.'

Summary of
results.

It may be said, then, in general terms, that the work is undertaken in the interests of the ideal theory and consists in an attempt to appropriate to the uses of that theory the doctrine and dialectic of the Eleatic school, as a unifying, regulating, harmonizing and sustaining influence. But the process of appropriation brings into relief a fact startling indeed, yet not unperceived by Plato. This dialectic, when turned upon its own dogma, demonstrates that while unity is beyond doubt a principle essential to the very possibility of thought and being, it is at the same time parent to a complexity of which its sponsors did not dream: the problem of philosophy, even when we seek to solve it with the weapon of unity, unfolds as we deal with it deeps within deeps of unexpected multiplicity and complication. To adapt a familiar and weighty judgment *εἰ οὖν τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐν σοὶ πολλά ἐστι, τὰ πολλὰ πόσα*; We must accept the One, for we cannot dispense with it. But the atomistic element likewise claims a voice in the ultimate conclusion; and, if we are to repose upon the doctrine of Unity, that unity will not be the mere absence of plurality and diversity, but a something capable of reconciling in a new whole such elements as these, and such contradictions as are formulated in the closing sentences of this dialogue. The general scope of the discussion from the beginning, with its successive exponents, may not unfairly be presented thus. ZENO: Can a sensible Many be assumed to exist without involving hopeless contradictions in thought? No: yet what we see does exist. SOCRATES: Can even an ideal Many be postulated without leading to difficulties equally insurmountable? No: yet there it is. PARMENIDES: Setting aside Manies of both kinds, can so simple a hypothesis as the existence of One be maintained without bringing in its train every complication of which its presence is expected to relieve us? No: yet without the One nothing is.

Divergences
from other
commentators.

Dr. Jackson,
Journ. Philol.,
vol. xi., No. 22.

Phileb. 16.

p. lvi.

It has been said above that no attempt is here made to reproduce in orderly sequence the views and reasoning of previous commentators. One or two points of divergence from them, however, may perhaps be referred to. A reader of Dr. Jackson's remarkably acute analysis and criticism of this dialogue will have his attention arrested by the following among other conclusions. The One is regarded as an idea, or as representing the ideal sphere, and there is assumed a graded progress—*ἐν, πολλά, ἀπειρα*—from it through 'kinds' or 'classes' to the 'limitless multitude' of sensible existence. This theory is undoubtedly attractive, especially when read in connection with the statement in the Philebus that we must not proceed at once from *πέρας* to *ἀπειρία*, from *ἐν* to *τὰ ἀπειρα*, but must interpose certain definite *πόσα* as connecting links. But reflection tends rather to discourage belief in this hypothesis. We have already given reasons for questioning the view that the One is an idea: certain of its characteristics seem to preclude that supposition. Again, Zeno at the beginning of the work places *ἐν* and *πολλά* in such contrast as to leave no doubt that in his mind

they comprise jointly all existence. At the close of the first part, Parmenides speaks of *ἐν* and *τὰ ἅλλα* in a similar sense; while throughout the dialogue *τὰ ἅλλα* and *τὰ πολλὰ* are used as convertible terms. Whatever may be symbolized by these expressions, it would be difficult to draw a distinction between either of them and the phrase *ἄπειρα τῷ πλῆθει* which occurs at intervals; nor does Dr. Jackson appear to cite any evidence that *πολλὰ* and *ἄπειρα* differ generically in their use. In other respects also Dr. Jackson is inclined to discover finer and more detailed distinctions throughout the work than in these pages it has been found possible to recognize. This may be natural, even perhaps imperative, from his point of view, according to which the dialogue is a late work; on the opposite supposition, such distinctions are not essential.

Throughout this introduction, the doctrine that the ideas are absolutely severed Zeller. from the sensible sphere has been emphasized, but not more so than the language of Plato, etc., the text would seem to require. Speaking of Plato's works at large, Zeller does not p. 316. regard such a doctrine with favour. He admits, indeed, that many expressions and arguments occur which point towards such a doctrine; but adds, 'We must nevertheless question its correctness.' He goes on to explain his contention by showing that the supposed sensible world is in reality Not-being, and that all Being centres in the ideal sphere. To elucidate his position would lead us far: but when all has been urged in its favour, it still lies open to the objection of not explaining the difficulty so much as explaining it away. Zeller is himself constrained to say 'whether the above-mentioned p. 318. difficulties as to the theory of Ideas do not, after all, reappear in an altered form, is another question.' From what does the necessity for philosophic inquiry, idealistic or other, arise but from a sense of difficulty? When Plato feels that difficulty, he begins like other thinkers by an attempt to solve it. But he is soon led to shake its dust from his feet and flee towards 'a city which hath foundations whose builder and maker is God,' and of which the characteristic is that it shuts the original and now somewhat despised difficulty outside its everlasting doors. Zeller urges that 'these objections p. 317. [in the Parmenides and elsewhere] to the doctrine of ideas would not have been suggested by Plato, had he not been convinced that his theory was unaffected by them,' a view with which Dr. Jackson sympathizes. But is it the case that every thinker, even every great thinker, is fully provided with a reply to all objectors? He is not driven from his position by objections: he feels, it may be, a conviction which objections fail to shake. But he may be sensible that he has not met the objections, nevertheless. Galileo was a very great man, yet when he was questioned about the fact that water would not rise in a pump beyond thirty feet, and reference was made to the doctrine that 'nature abhors a vacuum,' he could but say, half in jest, that nature seemed to abhor only a thirty foot vacuum. It was left for Torricelli to throw light upon the mystery. We must not, then, attempt to explain away what Plato actually says on the ground that it involves difficulties for which we think we have a solution after the lapse of two millenniums.

‘The difficulties reappear in an altered form.’ What difficulties? Those which to the metaphysician spring eternal: those which centre in the relation of subject and object, which are so protean, and of which the solution looks so like juggler’s work, that one almost takes refuge with laughter in Carlyle’s sarcasms about “sum-m-mjects and om-m-mjects” ‘uncertain whether oracles or jargon.’ Perhaps the sharpest form of this contrast with which philosophy is acquainted is that between Plato’s ideas and the many of sense. A less pronounced type of the difficulty is that which arises between the ‘cognitive faculties’ of more modern speculation—what Plato would call ‘our science’—and an ‘external world.’ In the latest stages of metaphysical evolution, the great problem has been to reclaim the external world from its antagonistic externality, to include it in a revised sphere of consistent idealism. But granted that we are right in taking this course, admitting that thought is the parent of all things, even of its own object; still ‘the difficulties reappear in an altered form.’ Why this persistent pronounced unmanageable sense of objectivity and separateness? We demonstrate that sense is swallowed up in thought, and yet suspect that we have achieved but a Pyrrhic victory. What is sense? That is the mystery of mysteries. We may eat away all its substance with our ‘forms of sensible perception,’ and our ‘categories,’ but we cannot lay the spectre—‘expellas furca tamen usque recurrit.’ We have been saying and have seen Plato admitting that the world as we know it cannot be a world of sense. Is it meant then to affirm that sense has no existence? Or are we not rather bound to exclaim *Ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν θαυμαστός ὁ λόγος ἢ, εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποστερήσει τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι?* It is, of course, granted that ‘beauty, goodness, slavery, bigness,’ and even that ‘man, fire, water, hair, mud, filth,’ in their collective sense, are not perceived by the senses. Sense lies in the sphere of ‘you and me, bits of wood and stone.’ Now while ‘beauty’ may comprise many qualities, ‘man’ comprises many more; and ‘you’ still more, more indeed than anything except another you. Do we then approach to sense as we add qualities, and recede from it as we remove them? Not properly. ‘Beauty’ and ‘man’ are simply figments of the mind and have no connection with sense other than this, that they were deduced from the observation of individual ‘sensible objects.’ ‘You’ also can become a figment of the mind when one thinks of, and does not see, you. But it is true that sense attaches only to individual things, to things with a maximum of qualities in their several kinds, in short to existing—as opposed to conceived or imagined—things. Are such things then sensible objects? If not, no other such exist. Let us take a simple case as put by a thinker of anything but transcendental tendencies. According to Dugald Stewart, when you read a letter that which can be referred to sense is—not the comprehension of the contents, but—simply the perception of ‘black marks upon white paper.’ In reality this is much too liberal an allowance. Not by sense but by judgment do we recognize the substance to be paper and the marks to be black upon white. And our judgment would not cease to operate, however visionary the distinction might become, until all distinction had vanished; that is, until sense ceased from exercise for want of any object. The

Life of Sterling,
viii., ‘Coleridge’

p. xlviii.

Parm. 134 E.

very recognition that this state had supervened would itself be a judgment, though it might be delivered with hesitation. In a word so long as consciousness lasts, thought is at work, and the more alive consciousness with a view to detect and expose pure sense may become, the more completely does it fail of its purpose. As we might say, 'had ye but seen, then had ye been without thought; but now ye say "*We see*," therefore your thought remaineth.' All that we can declare about sense is, that it is the vanishing point of knowledge—'who steals my sense steals trash, 'tis something, nothing:' while yet we feel that from that very vanishing point, the guarantee of all knowledge is given—or hear'st thou rather pure ethereal stream whose fountain who shall tell?' Thus we may say that the world of experience, which Plato has been seeking to dominate by his ideas, is all intellectual; if by this we mean that the sensible element in it is reduced to a minimum incogitabile at the start: or alternatively that it is all sensible if by this we mean that it never becomes transcendental. Either view is an advance upon the dualistic hypothesis of a composite world, half 'mind,' half 'matter.' Yet neither solves the problem of Whence all comes, and why this absolute freedom of sense from the control of the will? The sense function is within us like a well of water springing up unto everlasting life. So we must confess: nor is it part of our duty to pursue the inquiry further.

Of the Parmenides it may be said among other things that it forms as it were Conclusion. a vestibule to those vast and mystic halls which are trodden by the metaphysician. And already while passing through it we see the corridors appear which lead respectively to the courts of Being and Becoming. So impressive and intricate are the surroundings that we pause for breath, uncertain whether the building has two great co-ordinate wings, or whether it consists of an inner court approached through an outer. Certainly there are those who have sought a home in each mansion, and the thoughts called forth by the image of either are such as may separately dominate the mind. Few can form, fewer still can convey to others, an adequate conception of the sphere of Being. It is so completely withdrawn from experience. At best we must shadow it forth to ourselves as some Hall of the Chosen, some consistory, so to speak, of Egyptian Deities who have not stirred since time began. In such a picture an 'idea of motion' is a fatal flaw: the stillness there is absolute, and may not be disturbed. But has it not the atmosphere of a museum? In the midst of Being we are in death. It is said that certain subtle poisons kill by preserving the tissues, by stopping the action of growth and also of decay. Are we thereby the gainers? Our gain is loss: our being not-being. Can anyone have in truth seen this hall of Being; or do those who depict it dream that they were there? Not even Parmenides can vivify the description. The other to us seems less remote. It is as though the well of sense bubbled upward through a chink in the floor, bursting into the air and rippling over the pavement with multiplex undulation and ceaseless sound, reflected and reechoed from the roof and walls. To that we have seen something analogous; we are in sympathy with it, if imperfectly. But always the question returns upon us—Wo kommst du her? wo gehst

du hin? And Heraclitus our interpreter cannot tell. What is this Becoming? Is it after all Being, but *κατακεκερματισμένον*? Are we to solve the enigma of Being-Becoming on the analogy of the 'continuous-discrete' in space and time? Or is the antithesis Being and Not-being, with Becoming as bridge? Is *τὸ ἑξάϊφνης*, 'that odd thing the instantaneous,' another name for Becoming? Or are both awkward adumbrations of the Ego—that one among many, that whole among parts, that *πόρος* amid *πενία*? Or does reasoning perhaps end here, and do we in the language of 'divine madness' rave about things unutterable? Finally, does speech fail, and must we wander backward in the expressive silence of *ἀνάμνησις* to God who is our home? Such are among the thoughts which suggest themselves to those who have come under the influence of Platonic speculation: thoughts tinged indeed by modern currents, and pressing forward through modern channels, but not the less truly tracing their source to the great fountainhead of all metaphysics.

THE TEXT.

I.

IN an edition, even of a single dialogue, which bears a relation so unusually close to a special manuscript, some introductory remarks upon the manuscripts of Plato in general, with details in regard to certain of them in particular, are not only natural but will almost be expected. It is hoped that what follows may be of service to beginners in palaeography and in textual criticism. At the same time it is the work not of an expert in these branches of study but of a tolerably instructed layman. The writer knows only six Platonic manuscripts at first hand, and these he has studied under all the difficulties and disadvantages which attend a comparative beginner, and with but a limited time at his disposal.

1. The earliest edition of Plato's works appears to be that of Aldus Manutius, published at Venice in 1513—the year of Flodden—a work which must have cost infinite labour, and in regard to which its editor says that he would wish its errors removed, even at the price of a gold piece each. Perhaps this edition was published too soon: at all events the one which caught the attention of the world of letters was not it but that edited by Serranus and Henricus Stephanus, and published at Paris in 1578, in three volumes folio, with a dedication to Queen Elizabeth. This has ranked ever since as the *editio princeps*, and constitutes the standard of reference for all succeeding scholars. The dialogues are arranged in what the editor calls *συντάξεις*, of which the fifth 'ad quam contulimus Physica et Theologica,' includes the *Timaeus*, *Timaeus Locrus*, *Critias*, *Parmenides*, *Συμπόσιον*, *Phaedrus*, and *Hippias Minor*. The Greek has a Latin version running in parallel columns with it, and the lines of the page are subdivided into successive groups by the letters A, B, C, D, E placed in the margin. It would seem to be the intention that these letters should be placed at intervals of ten lines; but they often stand opposite the space between two lines, and the contents of division E vary considerably, as the Latin and Greek, according as each happens to be the less compact, expand in turn to the whole breadth of the page at the foot. In our text A is omitted, and the other letters are placed opposite those lines which include what seems to be the commencement of each division, so far as that can be determined, in the original. Ste. III. 126 means Stephanus, vol. iii., page 126. These great editions of Aldus and Stephanus—or of Bauldie and Steenie as, with fond familiarity, we may say—are not 'critical editions' in the modern sense of that term. They appear each to be based largely upon one Ms., selected partly

on grounds of convenience—Schneider considers that in the *Laws* at least the original of Aldus was the Venetian Ms. called by Bekker Ξ , No. 184, which has no special authority—and where a difficulty arose any other accessible Ms. was consulted, or resort was had to conjecture, no great care being taken in giving references. Stephanus says that he puts in the margin conjectures that occurred as the book was passing through the press. This somewhat easy-going and self-reliant method of constructing a text appears to have continued till the close of last century, the edition of Heindorf being, according to modern German authorities, a brilliant example of it.

1874-21.

2. Immanuel Bekker represented, if he did not inaugurate, a new era in this respect, alike for Plato and for Greek texts in general. He subordinated conjectural emendation to a thorough-going comparison of manuscript data. Personally he collated with more or less completeness some 77 Mss., and classified their readings in the apparatus criticus of his edition, which was published early in the present century. Of all the important Mss. the only one apparently which Bekker never saw was the Clarke manuscript in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. It had been brought to England a few years before, and Bekker used the collation of it published by Gaisford, saying 'nolui actum agere.' His method seems to be in some sense that of a dispassionate eclectic. He inserts in his text the reading which he considers the best, wherever he may find it, and classifies the others at the foot of the page. No manuscript which he has collated is ignored on the ground that its readings are for any reason valueless. At the same time he clearly indicates that his study of the various codices had led him to place two or three of them on a much higher level than the remainder.

3. Editors since Bekker have largely acted upon the result of the comparison of manuscripts at which he had arrived. They select what they regard as a pre-eminent Ms., constitute their text mainly from it, and use the remainder only in extremity or for purposes of subsidiary illustration. Hermann, for example, selects without hesitation the Clarke Ms. as his authority for all those works which it contains. While Aldus and Stephanus appear to have been guided less by critical principle than by some form of convenience in selecting one codex as their basis, editors like Hermann have reversed the process, and decide entirely upon the apparent strength of the evidence in favour of the manuscript which they elect to follow.

4. Lachmann, who comes rather earlier than Hermann, is referred to by German scholars as the forerunner of yet another method in textual criticism. Good examples of how he deals with Ms. data are to be found in his editions of the *Testament* and of *Lucretius*. There he endeavours to simplify the materials available by classifying the various codices, and affiliating them one to another. On this principle a derived manuscript is at once set aside in favour of its original. Such genealogical groupings of manuscripts may be made with some approach to certainty, and inferences even are possible from existing ones backward to their lost archetypes. According to Schanz and Jordan the critic who first adopted this method in dealing with the text of Plato

was E. Peipers in his *Quaestiones criticae de Platonis Legibus*. Since that work Götting. 1863. scientific simplification of our authorities has been the prevailing tendency in constituting the text of Plato's works.

What, then, are the materials at our disposal? On the mere announcement that the known Mss. of Plato number at least 147, one would be disposed to infer that if a sound text cannot be extracted from such a collection individual conjecture will do little for us. But in reality the number mentioned gives a false view of the position. For no portion of Plato's writings are there nearly 147 independent authorities. Many of these codices consist of mere isolated and constantly varying fragments, bound up in miscellaneous collections. Others again are of very late date, and the probability that such are derived from early originals now lost is extremely remote. Even the seventy-seven collated by Bekker, supposing them to be all independent, do not all cover the same ground. The codices which contain a half or more of Plato's writings number about a score, while those which can be drawn upon to illustrate any given dialogue form an uncertain and shifting quantity. The text of the *Parmenides*, as given by Bekker, is based upon the evidence of seventeen Mss. The number noted by Schanz as available amounts to thirty-two. The number employed or discussed by scholars since Bekker varies between these two totals. From the entire number of 147 three have been pitched upon by the unanimous verdict of scholars as occupying a position of clear pre-eminence. These three, like almost all the large Mss., follow the order of the dialogues given at the beginning of this work as that of *Thrasylus*, and may be briefly described as follows:—


The Manuscripts.
Martin Wohrab
in *Fleckeisen's
Jahrbuch. Sup-
plem. Band 15,
1887.*

Martin Schanz,
*Studien zur
Geschichte des
Platon. Textes*
p. 20. Würzburg.
1874.

Designation.	Abode.	Contents in Tetralogies.
A (Bekker), or 1807.	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.	VIII., IX.
℥ „ or Clarke 39.	Bodleian Library, Oxford.	I.-VI.
t „ or Append., Class IV., 1.	Biblioteca Marciana, Venice.	I.-VIII. (as far as Rep. iii.: the rest of the works by other hands).

It will be seen that ℥ and A contain in the aggregate, with the exception of tetralogy VI., the whole of Plato's works, to which A adds the Definitions and seven Spurious Dialogues, while t gives nearly all, but partly by later hands. The grounds upon which scholars select these three from the mass are several:—(a) Their age: the two first are clearly the oldest in existence, while the third, if younger than these, seems older than almost any other. The transmission of written works, however careful, tends at each fresh step to introduce fresh departures from the original; and the earliest copies reduce that danger to a minimum. (β) The care with which they have been written, taken in conjunction with their age (for texts admittedly late may also be careful): this is a feature which impresses the most casual observer, and tends to inspire great confidence. (γ) The evidence adduced by modern scholars with a view to show that many, if not all, of the remaining Mss. can be traced back to these. The

relative sizes of these very famous codices may be pretty accurately estimated from the following diagram, which represents them at $\frac{1}{8}$ of their actual measurements:—



t f. 197 verso,
col. 2, line 4
from foot.

Stud. p. 24, and
Hermes x, 1876.

Wachsmuth in
Rhein. Mus.
xxxiv, p. 38, 481,
1879. Galen de
placit. Hippocr.
et Plat. viii, 1.
160 D.

Further back in the history of Plato's text we cannot go directly; but ingenious attempts are made to do so constructively. As A and X are among the earliest extant examples of minuscule Mss. it seems not improbable that any Ms. from which they may have been copied would be written in majuscules or capitals. This would tend to increase its bulk, and as each of them is a large volume, it seems very likely that their archetype or archetypes would be in two volumes. Now in t we have at the close of the Menexenus, in the original hand, the words τέλος τοῦ α' βιβλίου: yet this Ms. is in one volume. Schanz cites the same phrase at the same place from Ms. Angelicus C I 4, which also consists of but one volume; from Laurent. 59. 1.; and finally from the Vatican Δ-Θ, Nos. 225 and 226, where, although the Ms. consists of two volumes, the words τέλος τοῦ πρώτου βιβλίου occur on folio 196r. of the second. The inference drawn by Schanz is that we have here an old tradition that the works of Plato had been at some time in two volumes, the first of which contained Tetralogies I.-VII., and the second the remainder. To such a second volume Paris A actually corresponds, while the Clarke Ms. represents the first, save that it would appear to have been taken from a copy from which the short Tetralogy VII., which closes with the Menexenus, had dropped away. Various scholars attempt to fix the probable length of the lines in the early copy or copies now lost, on the basis of what is called stichometry. Mss. were measured by the unit or line in which the earliest copies were written, that is by στίχοι, corresponding to the average length of a hexameter, and Galen is quoted as giving the length of some medical definitions in this way. He says that two, one of thirty-nine, and another of eighty-four syllables, are οὐ πλείονες τῶν ὀκτὼ ἑξαμέτρων. This gives sixteen or seventeen syllables to the line, which is considerably less than the length of line used in the Clarke Ms., but exactly corresponds to that of the passage omitted by this Ms. on page 33 of this edition. But the subject is not without difficulties, and controversy upon it is keenly kept up. Schanz thinks he can form an estimate of the probable date of the archetype in the

following manner. From the uniformity of existing Mss. in certain passages he naturally concludes that they faithfully represent in these the reading of the original. But he finds the passages in question quoted by writers like Eusebius and Theodoretus with words omitted. Accordingly he considers that the archetype cannot have been so old as to have formed the text from which these men drew their quotations, and, therefore, it is more recent than 400 A.D. That may be correct, but it postulates two things, neither of which is quite certain—that there was but one text prior to our existing Mss., and that those Christian writers quoted it with verbal precision. The first of these assumptions is altogether disputed by A. Jordan on the understanding that the second is correct; but both may be erroneous. One scholar alleges that he can detect two features of the archetype of \mathfrak{A} —that it did not belong to the most correct class, and that it was not easily legible.

Fleck. Jahrb.
Suppl. Bd. 7,
1873-5.
J. S. Krüschel
in Fleck. 123,
p. 553, 1881.

Another statement is made by Galen which is very interesting. He refers in his fragment upon the medical passages in the Timaeus to τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἀντιγράφων ἔκδοσις and says that in the Timaeus this edition reads διὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφ' ἐαυτοῦ κινήσεως where 77 B. other authorities give ἐξ for ὑφ'. Upon this has been reared a structure of very tempting hypothesis which may be thus summarized.

Our Mss. all read ὑφ' and thus show their connection with the edition of which Galen speaks. Scholars, including Cobet, are strongly of opinion that Ἀττικῶν is short for Ἀττικιανῶν, and Harpocration refers to readings of Demosthenes found ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικιανοῖς, while Dobree remarks on the resemblance between \mathfrak{A} and codex Σ of Demosthenes, and holds that they are both from Ἀττικιανὰ. Now we find in Lucian Πρὸς τὸν ἀπαίδευτον two references to a very celebrated βιβλιόγραφος called Atticus, whom some hold to be the person here spoken of. Others, among whom are Birt and apparently Cobet, think that T. Pomponius Atticus is meant, and regard the editions here referred to in the light of publications carefully effected by his orders, not copies written by his hand: to which opinion Birt elsewhere adds, that these Attic editions were noted as written in the στίχοι to which reference has just been made, and of which traces are pointed out in the Clarke Ms. The same view has been recently maintained by H. Usener, who constructs in this connection a theory about the transmission of our Platonic texts which is eminently fascinating, but dependent a good deal upon assumptions in excess of his data. It may be well to give on the one hand what seem to be the data, and to add on the other the assumptions.

Dräke on
Philipp. ii.
Fleck. Suppl.
Bd. 7.

Birt, Antike
Buchwesen,
index, Atticus.

Nachrichten v.
der König.
Gesellsch. der
Wissensch.
Götting. No. 6,
1892.

DATA.

1. Apellicon's private library, which comprised those of Aristotle and Theophrastus, was taken to Rome by Sulla, and submitted to the editorial scrutiny of the celebrated scholar Tyrannion of Amisus.

2. Diogenes Laërtius does not really affirm that Thrasyllus invented the arrangement of Plato's works in tetralogies, but only that he adopts it: in any case Diogenes adds words (καὶ τινες) which show that others had a part in it, of whom Albinus names Dercyllides. Again, Varro, when referring to the Phaedo, says, 'Plato in quarto . . .

ASSUMPTIONS.

This library included careful if not original copies of Plato's works.

Varro knew the arrangement of dialogues by tetralogies, and his learned friend Tyrannion was its originator. (We may add that Cobet holds Thrasyllus to be quite distinct 37.

Strabo xiii, p.
608.

Alb. Isagoge.
Varro, L. I. vii,

appellat': and the Phaedo is the fourth in the Thrasylean arrangement. Finally, speaking of the possible origin of this grouping by fours, Usener says (referring to his *Philologie und Geschichtswissenschaft*, p. 22), 'nun kennen wir einen bedeutenden griechischen Grammatiker, der sein noch in vielen versprengten Resten erkennbares System der Philologie mit durchgeführter *Viertheilung* aufgebaut hat. Das war Tyrannion von Amisos.'

3. Atticus was a great scholarly publisher like Aldus, and had in his service a large staff of trained copyists and assistants, either paid or bought.

from the contemporary and friend of Tiberius; so that in the case that he really invented the arrangement, it might still be as old as Varro.)

The ἀντίγραφα Ἀττικιανὰ are his editions: Tyrannion was his editor. Our Mss. of Plato descend through this channel from the library of Aristotle.

How much one desires to accept all this as historical fact! Yet even the initial assumption of an 'Attic' origin for all our Mss. rests on no broader foundation than a single ὕφ' for ἐξ.

To resume: the following are the characteristic titles and endings of the works in the three chief manuscripts. .

A	℥	t
Πλάτωνος	[Πλάτωνος]	[Πλάτωνος]
Πολιτεῖαι ἡ περὶ δικαίου	Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἰδεῶν. λογικός	Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἰδεῶν
A'		
Πολιτείας ἡ περὶ δικαίου A'.	Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἰδεῶν.	Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἰδεῶν.

In ℥ t Πλάτωνος occurs in the case of the first dialogue and is then dropped: but in t it reappears at the Republic as in A, and while the first and third books of that work read πολιτείας, the second gives πολιτεῖαι. We may thus infer (1) that in the original the word Πλάτωνος appeared at the beginning, and at the Republic and Laws which have more than one book: (2) that the adjectives in -ικός, which occur in ℥ unsymmetrically, are not original, but may trace their origin to such a phrase as occurs in t after the title of the Euthyphro, ὁ λόγος ἐριστικός. The kernel of the title lies in the form Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἰδεῶν both at the beginning and at the end of each work; and this exactly corresponds with the description given by Diogenes of the titles employed by Thrasyllus. He says, διπλαῖς δὲ χρῆται ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς ἐκάστου τῶν βιβλίων· τῆς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, τῆς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος. ταύτης δὲ τῆς τετραλογίας, ἥτις ἐστὶ πρώτη, ἡγεῖται Εὐθύφρων ἡ περὶ ὀσίου· ὁ διάλογος δ' ἐστὶ πειραστικός· δεύτερος Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, ἡθικός: and so on. Here it is quite clear that Εὐθύφρων ἡ περὶ ὀσίου is the title from 'name' and 'subject' given by Thrasyllus, while the words ὁ διάλογος δ' ἐστὶ πειραστικός are explanatory words added by Diogenes in giving his account, which dwindle to ἡθικός, λογικός, etc., as the description proceeds. We thus see that the phrase ὁ λόγος ἐριστικός at the beginning of t, and the adjectives in -ικός throughout ℥, have been added to the original titles of Thrasyllus by some

one who had probably read Diogenes. This circumstance strengthens the conviction that all existing texts may be traced back to the Thrasylean recension, but it does not decide the question as to whether there was numerically but one archetype. When one gets so far backwards to an original source, the chances of appreciable divergences between separate copies of it become very small, so that our existing Mss. might be due to different originals of the same edition so to speak, without our being able to detect it from their text. Nay, the evidence rather, if anything, leans that way, since A is written in pages of two narrow columns, and t in larger pages of two broader columns, while \mathfrak{A} is written in smaller pages without columnar divisions.

What now are the materials available for the construction of our text? The Mss. used by Bekker in editing the *Parmenides* are the following, which received their designations from him.

\mathfrak{A} , Oxford: ΓBCDEFHIQ \mathfrak{R} , Paris: Δ, Rome: ΔΞΠΣΥ, Venice. To these must be added t, Venice, which Bekker does not collate for this dialogue; and others which he did not know, as those collated by Stallbaum g, a, b, c, i, Florence, Zittav., α, with Tub., Tübingen, and Ces., Cesena, which have come into notice more recently. Here then, without reckoning one or two others, we have a list of twenty-seven, and the question to be determined is the relation in which they stand to each other. As it happens only the first is dated, and while the subscriptio containing the date tells us as usual something about the writer, his employer, and his pay, it tells us, also as usual, nothing about the place of writing, and nothing of the Ms. copied, two points which for textual criticism would be more important. We are thus left to deal with circumstantial evidence, which, besides its somewhat inconclusive character, has all its value dependent upon the assumption, natural enough no doubt, but not inevitable, that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a Ms. is likely to trace its origin as a whole to a single source, and that thus proofs for parts hold good for the whole. No one can give even a glance at the collation printed in Bekker's edition without being struck by the remarkable recurrence of the group $\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi\mathfrak{D}\mathfrak{R}$ in support of the same readings. Not only do they occur together 85 times alone, but they appear in many other cases along with varying groups of other authorities. It is evident that they are a closely related family. But in that family there appears to be an inner circle. This will be clearer from a glance at the following figures:—

$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi\mathfrak{D}\mathfrak{R}$ + various others occur together many times.			
$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi\mathfrak{D}\mathfrak{R}$	"	"	85
$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi\mathfrak{D}$	"	"	37
$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi$	"	"	36

Manifestly the connection between the first three of these is extremely intimate. Not only the number but likewise the character of their coincidences testify strongly on the point. Now, as is noted by Schanz, there is at the same time quite a different and equally strong bond of union between them. All three give the Theaetetus with

a gap of considerable extent, from 208 D πάνυ μὲν οὖν to 209 A τὸν σὸν λόγον, or nearly half a page of Stephanus. All the rest which contain the Theaetetus, however they may otherwise differ, would appear to agree in not having this gap, and accordingly Schanz here finds proof of the existence of two families tracing their origin to different sources :

a. that of which \mathfrak{A} is the chief member and which has the gap ;

β. " " " " " not the gap.

Tub. does not give the Theaetetus ; but Schanz refers it to family *a* on other grounds. And he says in general, that while family *a* agree closely, family *β* differ widely. In this edition it has not been possible to deal comprehensively with all the existing Mss. The writer's personal study has been confined to $\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi\text{Tub.t.}$ Upon family *β* he takes the testimony of Schanz, which is that all other members can be traced back to *t* as original. Evidence of a very convincing character is given in support of this conclusion, and whether it is actually established or not, there can be no doubt at all that *t* is by many degrees the most important member of the group. In the case of a dialogue which has a text so little injured as that of the Parmenides investigation need go no further. We pass then to the consideration of family *a*. Here also—subject to the exclusion of certain dialogues in certain Mss.—the decision of Schanz is similar. All can be traced back in the last resort to \mathfrak{A} . Let us take them in the order $\Delta\Pi\text{Tub.DRQg.}$ It will be sufficient to give selected specimens of his evidence.

Schanz on the Manuscripts.

Δ . (Our dialogue occurs in vol. Δ of the Mss. $\Delta\Theta$.) This codex, which he places in the 12th century, is, except in tetralogy 1. and the Gorgias, a transcript—though not necessarily direct—from \mathfrak{A} .

Δ 360 verso

361 rect. and

vers.

\mathfrak{A} 184 r. and v.

Steph. 34 E, 36 B.

(1) In the Philebus it has a series of short gaps, filled in by a younger hand, which correspond to similar gaps existing in \mathfrak{A} and caused by injuries to the lines at the outer edge of the leaf. The writer of Δ , or of its original, would seem to have found those injuries and to have left spaces which he thought sufficient for them, and these a later reader of Δ has filled up from another source. \mathfrak{A} itself has been similarly but very coarsely completed since the date of Δ or of its original.

Δ 433 v. 434 r. :

\mathfrak{A} 236, 237.

253 E, 254 E.

(2) In the Phaedrus two similar blanks occur which have never been filled up. They represent an injury in \mathfrak{A} caused by the dropping of some dark acid upon the text. The condition of Δ shows that at the time the injury had affected only the back of the one leaf and the front of the other, since Δ gives the words which were on the other sides of these respectively. In our time the acid has eaten its way through both leaves.

(3) Δ also omits from time to time words which form complete lines of \mathfrak{A} . Examples of this are the following—though the first seems a very long line :

404 B Cratylus, Δήμητρᾷν τε καὶ Ἑραν καὶ Ἀπόλλω καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ Ἡφαιστον καὶ Ἄρη.

123 C Theages, -σθα, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ὄνομα, ἧ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ; καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἐγωγε.

198 D Laches, γέγονεν, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων, ὅπη γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ

Philologus

xxxv, 1876.

All these statements it was intended to verify in Δ , but through unavoidable circumstances the task was omitted. Schanz concludes by giving reasons for holding that the derivation of $\Delta\Theta$ from \mathfrak{A} is mediate rather than immediate.

II.TUB. Schanz held at one time that these Mss., while closely related to \mathfrak{A} , were not directly transcripts from it, but connected with it in some other manner. According to Wohlrab, however, Schanz has changed his opinion and finally holds that both could be directly traced back to \mathfrak{A} , but without stating his reasons.

DR. These Schanz holds to be closely connected with II. D in particular agrees in many ways with II, and where it differs, the difference betrays the connection. A test case occurs in the *Parmenides*, οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ περ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ τᾶλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός [ἐστὶν οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἐστὶν. ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός] ᾗν. The words in brackets are a repetition of part of what precedes. The writer's eye, after he wrote the second ἐνός, seems, on looking up, to have caught the first, and so he repeated the words ἐστὶν. οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἐστὶν: then glancing up again he seems to have caught ἄλλα in place of τᾶλλα, and so he wrote ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός: finally he seems to have caught the second ἐνός, and so he went on ᾗν. This mistake reappears in D, and it seems to originate with II rather than to come from some common source, for II is largely characterized by such blunders which are sometimes corrected and sometimes not. If II be indeed the source, then the younger D by reproducing so peculiar an error reveals its own origin. Now R does not extend beyond the *Parmenides*, and Schanz gives from this dialogue several cases in which IIDR combine to present readings peculiar to themselves, and again other cases in which the two last agree in differing from II. His inference is that D coming from II develops new features of its own, and that R being drawn from D exhibits some of the latter's peculiarities.

Q is a Ms. cited by Bekker in the *Parmenides* as far as to 129 A: of it Schanz merely remarks in a note, Q..gehört zur Sippe D.

g is a Florentine Ms. collated by Stallbaum, which Schanz places in the same group with those of which we have been speaking; but as it contains only a fragment of the *Parmenides*, and is not intrinsically very important, no more need be said of it.

Such then is an enumeration of those codices, which, according to the greatest recent authority upon the question, rank apart as the most reliable guides for the formation of our text. Does a minute study of them in so far as the *Parmenides* is concerned yield any further evidence tending to support, or alternatively to weaken the verdict given by Schanz? They may be dealt with in the same order.

As confirming the division into classes, we may take the following evidence:—

a. τρία δις εἶναι καὶ τρία δίς; so all \mathfrak{A} IIITub.DR.

β. " " " " δις τρία; so t and all its followers. This case is important, because the Mss. appear all to be wrong, the true reading τρία δις εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς; being preserved or suggested very faintly in the margin of \mathfrak{A} , where it has been either overlooked or inserted late. Again we have a. τίνι δῆ; β. πῇ δῆ; and a. ὀξύνοντι, β. ὀξὺ νοοῦντι—which are also noteworthy. Let us now take the members of the a family in order.

Δ. Vat. No. 225. In regard to this codex, various facts are to be noted.

1. For the word Παρμενίδης \mathfrak{A} Δ, and they alone, read throughout Παρμενίδης.

2. In \mathfrak{A} the phrases τί δέ; τί δῆ; τί δαί; all occur as questions or as parts of questions. The last is much the most frequent, occurring twenty times, and being in each case, with a single doubtful exception, a substitute upon an erasure for one of the other phrases. In everything but the erasure Δ faithfully reproduces this peculiarity of \mathfrak{A} .

3. The word αἰ occurs forty-three times. In the first twenty of these it is written αἰεί. In the rest, beginning 147 D, the first ι is erased and the α joined to ε by a longer line than

m

Fresh comparison.
son.
143 B.

139 B, 165 C.

usual, save in the solitary case 147 E where ἀεὶ looks original. Apart from signs of erasure, this striking difference of usage is exactly copied in Δ, only that in one place the word has dropped out.

4. We find a series of patches or mistakes occurring in words at the outer ends of the first lines in the following pages of this edition.

p. 16	-σίας	Δ δ'εἰς	p. 21 μορίω	Δ μορίων.
„ 17	δινοῖν	„ δύο	„ 25 με-	„ patched.
	περ ἀν (l. 2)	„ περ ὁ	„ 28 πον	„ του.

On each of these pages there is, as on many others, a stain at the corner of the Ms. which precisely covers the letters misread.

5. The readings of ΨΔ may be compared in a number of places where they are such as to arrest attention. More examples might be quoted, but the most striking only are given, and for convenience the readings of Π and Tub. are added.

Text.	Ψ	Δ	Π	Tub.
127 C ἀναγιγνωσκομένων -κόμένων	^ο -κόμένων	-γιγνωσκομένων ^ο	γιγνωσκομένων	-γιν-
128 A ὁ περ σὺ,	ὄν περ σὺ,	„	„	„
ἐν φῆς	ἐν ἔφης	„	ἐνέφης	ἐνέφης
129 D ἐρεῖ	ἐρῇ	ἐρῇ	ἐρῇ	ἐρῇ [η for εἰ frequent]. in all.
διαιρῆται	^η -ρεῖται	-ρεῖται	„	-ρῆται.
130 B αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης	αὐτῇ ὁμ.	αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμ.	αὐτῇ ὁμ.	αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμ.
τόν—παρμ.	τόν τε παρμ.	„	(τε erased)	τόν τε παρμ.
C αὐ τῶν τῆδε ὄν	αὐτῶν. ἡ ὄν	„	(ἡ erased)	αὐτῶν. ἡ ὄν
D ταύτῃ ἰστῶ,	ταύτῃ ἰστῶ	„ (patched)	τ. ἰστῶ	„ (a θ on τ).
E αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις	^ω αὐτῶν ἀ.	αὐτῶν ἀ.	αὐτῶν ἀ. (ω patched)	-τὸν ἀ. changed -τῶν
131 B οἶον εἴη ἡμέρα ἡ	οἶονεῖ ἡμέρα εἴη	„	{ οἶον ἡ ἡ. εἴη ἡ μ. κ. αὐ. - as Ψ save οἶ- μία	
C ἡ οὖν ἐθελ.	εἰ ὁ. ἐ.	so all	{ (ἡ on eras.)	
132 A αὐ που μ.	αὐτοῦ μ.	„	αὐ [eras. = 2 letters with δ on it] μ.	as Ψ.
B προσήκη	-κει	„	„	„
C ἐπὸν νοεῖ	εἰπον νοεῖν	„	„	„
133 A ἐκείνῳ τῷ	-νῷ τῷ (ψ on eras.)	-νω	„	„
D παρμενείδην	-νεῖδην	„	-νίδην	-ν ἰδῆ ^ν patched, ε erased.
E δούλου ὁ ἔστι	δούλου ἔστι	δ. ἔστι	adds ὁ later	δ. ἔστι (ὁ later).
135 D οὗτος, εἶπεν,	οὕτως εἶ-	„	„	„
136 B καὶ αὐθις αὐ	κ. αὐτοῖς αὐ	„(contracted)	„	a gap here.
C ὑπερίθεσο ἐάν τε	-θεσθε' ἄντε	„ (no ')	„	„
διόψεσθαι	-σθε	„	„ (αι altered)	-σθε ^{αι} (αι later).
ὑποθέμενος τι ἴνα	-ος· τίνα	-ος τίνα	-ος τίνα (later τίνα)	-ος. τίνα

Text.	℣	Δ	Π	Tub.
D δεόμεθα	δεόμεθα	„	„	„
137 A διανεύσαι	-νύσαι	„	„ (a ~ patched)	„
B πραγματιώδη	„	„	„	-τειώδη
E ἀπέχῃ ;	ἀν ἔχῃ (orig.)	ἀν ἔχῃ	„	„
ἐπίπροσθεν ἤ ;	-σθεν εἴη ;	„	„	„
138 B ἑαυτὸ εἴη.	-τῷ εἴη	-τῷ εἴη	„ (ἡ patched)	„
τι εἶναι μὴ	τι εἴη μὴ	„	„ (εἴη changed to εἶναι)	(ἡ changed to ν, αἰ above later).
D ἀμείβον	ἀμείβων	„	„	„
E ἐγγιγνόμενον ...	ἐνγ- ... ἐν γ- νεται	„	„	„
139 B πῇ δῆ ;	τίνι δῆ ;	„	„	„ (τῇνι divided).
E οὔτε αὐτῷ	οὐτᾶν αὐτῷ (or αὐ.) οὐτ' ἀν αὐτῷ	„	„	„
140 B τὸ ταυτὸν πεπονθὸς τ. ταυτὸ π.	τ. -το\ (ends line) π.	as ℣	„	„
E καὶ ἀνισότητος	κ. ἰσοτ-	„	„	„
141 B διαφέρον ...-φόρου	„	„	„	„
C ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν	ἀ. γὰρ ἀν	„	„	„
142 B φανῇ ;	φανείη ;	„	„	„
οὐ γὰρ ἀν	ἀν omitted	„	„	„
D []	words dotted	undotted	words omitted	words omitted.
143 C τινε ὦ... ἀμφοτέρω: τινέψ ... -τερα :	τινέω ... -τερα :	„	„	τινέω (α added later) -τερα
D σύνδυο	οὖν δύο	„	„	„
147 B μορίων ... μορία	-ίου ... -ίου	„	„	„ (οὔτε twice, αὐτὰ).
148 A τῷ ἀνομοίῳ	τῷ ὅμ	„	„	„
149 E τι [ἄλλο]	τι ἄλλο	„ (τί)	„	as Δ.
150 D ἐν ἔχον	ἐν ἔχτω	„	„	„
152 D τῷ νῦν	τὸ, νῦν	„	„	„
οὐπερ	οὐ περί	οὐ περ ^x (x erasures)	οὐ περὶ	εἰ περιεγ-
154 C νεώτερον δ' αἶ	ν. δ' οὐ :	„	„ (γίγνεται above, later)	„ (γίγνεται in marg., later).
155 A γὰρ αὐτὸ εἰς	γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς	„	„	„
157 C μετέχει αὐ πῃ :	-έχεται πῃ	„	„	„ (πῇ).
158 A αὐτὸ_ἐν	αὐτο_ἐν (ε' erased)	„	αὐτὸ ἐν	as Π.
160 D οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον... εἶναι	γὰρ omitted	as ℣, but in text.	all omitted	as Π.
161 E μετήη	μετίη	„	„ (no ')	as ℣.
162 A τῇ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει so: corr. in marg.	no corr.	„	orig. = τοῦ ^x ἔλ. ἀ. (xeras)	as ℣.
C μεθίστατο	μηθίστατο	„ (-τὸ)	μεθίστατο (ε patched)	μηθίστατο.
163 C ἄρα εἶναι δύνατο	εἶναι omitted	„	εἶναι in marg.	as ℣.
D οὐτ' ἀν λαμβάνοι	οὐτ' ἀναλ-	„	οὔτε ἀναλ-	as ℣.
164 E δόξει, εἴπερ	δόξειεν, εἰ.	„	„	„
165 B τούτου μέσα συμ	τὰ τοῦ -σου and	„	„	„
δὲ διὰ	δὲ omitted	„	„	„

Text.	℥	Δ	Π	Tub.
c ὁξὺ γνόντι	ὁξύνοντι	ὁξύνοντι	as Δ	as Δ.
δεῖ φαίνεσθαι	δὴ φ.	„	δεῖ φ.	as ℥.

Adding this to the evidence which Schanz has produced, readers will be disposed to admit that his case is established—that Δ is derived from ℥. At the same time facts exist which slightly weaken the first vivid sense of conclusiveness. Take the following:—

1. The scribe in Δ in very many cases, though not in all, omits the *ν* at the end of such forms chiefly as *ἐστίν*, *ἔοικεν* when the succeeding word begins with a consonant; although the practice in ℥ is different.

2. A few cases occur in which the verbal endings *ει* and *οι* and similar ones are transposed in the two Mss.

3. A few such divergences as *παρέχεις* for *παρέχει* (middle), *τις* for *τι*.

4. Also mere blunders such as *χρόνον* for *χρόνου*, *ἴσθη* for *ἴσθι*, *ἡδέα* for *ιδέα*, *σωκράτην* for *-τη*, *ται* for *τε*; and varieties of spelling such as, occasionally, *γινωσκ-* for *γιγνώσκ-*.

5. The following small words are left out:—

136 B ἡ [εἰ] μὴ. ὃ τι οὖν ἄλλο [πάθος] πάσ-
χοντος.

E ἐγὼ μὲν [οὖν] ὃ Παρμ.

137 C τὸ [ἐν] ἐκ μερῶν.

D οὐτ' [ἀν] ἀρχὴν. So II.

138 E τὸ [δὲ] ἔξω part of a phrase written on an erasure.

142 C ἄλλο [ἦ] ὅτι.

145 C περιέχοιτο [τὸ] ἐν.

D Ἀδύνατον [γάρ]: ends a line.

148 B δέ [γε] πάθος. δέ γε on a cleaned space II.

149 E ἐστὸν [τέ] τινε. So II.

152 E ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ [νῦν] ὅταν περ ἦ (a νῦν immediately above).

158 C ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς [ἀεὶ] ὀρώμεν.

164 E εἴπερ ἐν [μὴ] ἔσται.

6. Two larger gaps occur:—

150 D After writing the first *ὑπερέχειν* [καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι ... the writer goes on at the second ... *ὑπερέχειν*] μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι: thus omitting nearly four lines.

158 B ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει [αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνει].

7. Two transpositions occur:—

No. 4, p. lxxxii. 142 E τὸ δὲ ἴσχει αἰεὶ for τὸ δὲ αἰεὶ ἴσχει. This ends the third line of 162 recto in ℥ (page 17 of this edition): and as shown above the ends of the two lines preceding it are also patched.

166 B Δ reads ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ δοξάζεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλὰ τὰλλα οὐτε ἔστιν.

Of these we may say that (1) has no significance: a scribe with a bias on the question of using *ν* *ephelestikon* might give effect to his views on principle. The remainder are such slips as occur in every Ms., even the most careful. Some of them easily explain themselves, and might be paralleled from ℥ itself, and they give no suggestion tending against the idea of a derivation from ℥. With regard to the large gap in 150 D, the second *ὑπερέχειν* does not come so nearly below the first in ℥ as to give a ready explanation of the error; but the writer of Δ has, after writing the first of them, to turn his own page, which gives room for a mistake. So too at 166 B after writing *ἔστιν* he has to turn his page, besides which he is hurrying to be done. At the utmost, the errors marked (5), (6), (7) may support the theory of Schanz, that the derivation of Δ from ℥ is at second hand.

II. Ven. No. 185. This Ms. is described in the catalogue as saeculi circiter XII.: it is most carelessly written.

The following facts deserve notice in regard to it:—

1. The title, while omitting ἡθικός, has ornaments and an ornamental initial letter which bear a strong resemblance to those of A.

2. The dialogue opens with three lines which are verbatim et literatim identical with the three first in A—for the writing of π above the τ in του and the omission of ι adscript in τῆδε form no difference. The fourth line is longer by η, the fifth by φω; and then the lines gradually diverge. Yet in spite of gaps in the text they always tend to come back to the original identity; from which they again separate themselves. Thus, taking the paging of this edition, the following lines are identical in the two Mss. :—

PAGE.	LINE.	PAGE.	LINE.
6	12	21	24, 25 last and first of a page.
8	13, 14	22	29
9	22	25	12
10	5, 6	31	32, 33, 34
11	18	32	1, 2, 3
12	30 new page in II.	34	29 new page.
13	20	37	28, 31
17	10, 25		

The opening three and the consecutive six on pages 31-32 are very noteworthy.

3. The spelling παρμενίδης occurs, though in a way that might escape notice, in the title, and twice in 130 A, while the ε of the diphthong is erased in 127 A. Elsewhere the spelling is παρμενίδης.

4. The word αἰ varies its spelling, but not with that adherence to the changes of A which is observed in Δ. We have αἰεῖ 34 times, αἰεῖ with erasure twice, and αἰεῖ seven times.

5. The original hand in A writes almost invariably φάναι (for φάναι), while a later hand corrects it. This accentuation is in II so uniform that after a certain point it ceased to be noted in collation. Much the same holds with ἴσον for ἴσων.

6. A glance at the comparison of readings given above will show that in the great majority of cases II agrees with AΔ; and more might be given.

7. Cases occur in which II differs from Δ but agrees with A:

138 D	ἐν τινι αὐτὸ	αὐτὸ with erasure after ο A.	αὐτῷ II.
139 B	οὗθ' ἔστηκεν	οὗτ' AII.	
143 D	συζυγία	συ ζυγι α' AII, erasures at the gaps and after α.	
152 B	ὑπερβήσεται	ὑπερβ ἴσεται A eras.	II ὑπερβοή- a line through ο from β to ἴ.
155 E	περὶ τὰ ἄλλα	περι τὰ, ἄλλα on erasure A.	περιττὰ α. II.
165 B	ἐν φαίνεσθαι:	ἐμφαίνεσθαι AII.	A patched.

Here again we have very considerable support for the view that II descends from A. It is, however, not quite so strong as in the case of Δ, and the counter evidence is stronger.

1. In every case τί δαί is wanting, being replaced by τί δέ.

2. Exclusive of considerable repetitions and omissions, there are about a hundred small divergences in the text including (α) some small blank spaces or blots, (β) a good many variations in

the use of final *ν* (not always ephelkystikon), (*γ*) some transpositions, (*δ*) several variations in terminations as *εὐθέως* for *-έος*, (*ε*) some patchings, (*ζ*) some omissions of single words, (*η*) a number of obvious blunders, (*θ*) a good many deviations that do not admit of any classification. While many of these differences are of little moment and a good many suggest their own cause, not a few are not easily explicable, nor can it always be determined whether they are due to the original writer or another. At the same time few can be called suggestive or symptomatic. Here is one, however,

137 B καὶ ἄμα ἐμοὶ

καὶ ἄνω ἐμοὶ, changed in different ink to καὶ ἄλλως ἐ. II.

A palaeographer will at once see that the meaningless ἄνω could much more readily be derived from ἄμα (carelessly written or read) in old minuscules than in majuscules, nay, that in minuscules the two words are remarkably similar ἄμα, ἄνω. This makes it at least probable that the original of II was in minuscules, and thus at least improbable that it was older than *℣*.

3. A disproportionately large number of important omissions occur, which will be discussed immediately. If any of these were in the original of II, it could not have been *℣*; and must at least have been a somewhat careless copy of *℣*, if not from a distinct source.

4. The word κατέχον, 148 E, and the phrase οὐδὲν ἥττον γινώσκεται τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, 160 D, which appear in the margin of *℣* are entirely wanting in II, a circumstance which could hardly be accidental.

Of these arguments against deriving II from *℣*, the first and fourth do not count. The word δαί is always on an erasure in *℣*, and the words just quoted are in the margin in an old, but not the original, hand. We have only to suppose that II or its original was copied before these changes were made in *℣*. Arguments (2), (3) are more serious; but they may be greatly weakened by the allegation of downright carelessness in II. Its writing is of very unequal size, and to one who has seen really fine caligraphy, repulsively ill formed. Apart from that, marks of inattention are frequent.

129 D The words ἀμφότερα ἐὰν ... ταῦτα ἀποφαίνειν are written twice, and the two editions differ. The first has καὶ before πολλὰ and -νει, altered -νη, for the infinitive: the second omits καὶ and reads ἐν ταῦτα and -νειν. The second is coarsely scored out. This oscillation between -νει and -νειν helps to explain several cases where *℣* has the infinitive and II the other termination—as in τί χρὴ συμβαίνει. Perhaps the writer intended to insert his *ν* by the familiar — above, and forgot.

130 D εἷς τιν' ἄβυθον—is in II εἷς τινὰ ἄμβυθον. But the *μ* is carelessly written, and may quite possibly be intended for the old minuscule form of *β* which resembles our *u*.

135 A μάλιστα εἶη, πολλή appears as μάλλιστα εἶη, πολλή.

144 E διανενημμένον has one of the syllables νε omitted.

147 D The words προσαγορεύεις ... οὐκ ἐκείνο which form a line in II are written twice, and then, together with half the following line to πολλάκις, are coarsely ruled out. This blunder rather makes p. 21. for a derivation in some form from *℣*. It will be seen from our text that after writing οὐκ ἐκείνο the scribe's eye might very readily be caught by the ἐκείνο above it, which would lead to the repetition.

149 E The following form lines in II:—

τὰ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς [οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἄλλο ἐλάττων ἢ αὐτὰ
ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς] μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἄρα οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν
καὶ τὰλλα ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἄλλο ἐλάττω ἂν

Here the words in [] have obviously been inserted out of place, and the mistake was discovered. They are obliterated by a coarse line and dots. This is another case which rather supports a direct derivation from \mathfrak{A} . Let the reader look at our text. After writing to ἐνὸς the scribe glanced up and his eye caught τοῦ ἐνὸς in the following line. He then wrote on in that line till he reached ἐλάττω when, looking up, his eye caught ἐλάττον two lines above. He then altered ἐλάττω to ἐλάττον—writing ν through the ω—and went on with the words ἢ αὐτὰ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς, where he completed the circle and found out his mistake. It is the double parallel of position in our text

ἐνὸς	ἐλάττον
τοῦ ἐνὸς	ἐλάττω

which speaks for \mathfrak{A} as the original.

152 C ληφθείη in Π is near an injury in the parchment and is written ληφείη.

152 E Π has

οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν
οὐ γάρ: τὸ ἐν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτῷ ἐαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ
ὃν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον

This is repeated with τὸ ἴσον, and the repetition is coarsely cancelled. Here again our text shows how the mistake may have arisen—after writing the second οὔτε πρεσβύτερον the scribe may have reverted to the first, which is directly above in \mathfrak{A} .

157 B Here comes the case cited by Schanz in which D agrees.

164 B For ἄλλον divided between two lines Π gives ἄ-λου.

165 A For φάντασμα Π reads φάσμα which suggests mere inattention.

165 B For πᾶν τὸ ὄν Π gives πᾶν πᾶν τὸ ὄν.

Before dealing with the cases of omission it will be convenient to speak of the next Ms. on our list.

TUB.—This codex, which is also called Crusianus from having been got by Martin Crusius, a professor at Tübingen, in 1560, contains what it calls τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, viz., the Euthyphro, Crito, Phaedo, Parmenides, Alcibiades I. and II., and the Timaeus. The writing which is very neat and carefully formed is regarded by Schanz and Fischer as belonging to the 11-12th centuries, which would make it older than Π. Its numerous omissions are supplied, when they are supplied, by a much later hand. A comparison of the readings given above will show that this Ms. stands very closely related to \mathfrak{A} Π. It is to be added that the name Παρμενίδης is always written with an erasure before the ι, so that the text had originally given the diphthong, which shows a clear connection with \mathfrak{A} . But, on the other hand, evidence may be adduced which tends to show that the connection with Π is still more intimate. Thus we have the following:—

Text.	\mathfrak{A}	Tub.	Π
128 D ὑπο νέου ὄντος	ὑπὸ νέεθ ὄ	... νεύοντος νεοντος δ
129 D ταῦτὰ ἀποφαίνειν	... -νειν	... -νη	... -νει changed to -νη.
130 A τὸν σωκράτη	so	... -την	... -την with ν cancelled.
130 D ταύτη ἴστω	so	... ἴστω (θ later on στ)	ἴστω (above is ἐγω ηκω?).
130 D τιν' ἄβυθον	τιναβυθὸν	τινα ἄβυθον	as Tub. (but β may be μ).
133 D δούλου ὃ ἐστι	ὃ omitted	ὃ added later	as Tub.
135 E εἷας ἐν τοῖς	so	εἶασε τοῖς	letters σεν patched.
136 C οἱ ἀν προαιρή	so	ὀτιοῦν (scrape after ι, and below ~)	ὀτιοῦν.
136 C διόψεσθε		αι put above θε later	θε changed in orig. to θαι or the reverse.

Text.	℥	Tub.	Π
136 D ὑποθέμενός τι ἵνα	... τίνα	-μενος τίνα	as Tub.
136 E συνδέομαι	συν on eras. changed from ^ν συνδέομαι		as Tub.
137 C ἀποκρινουμένων	[^ν -νομένου Δ] -νομένου		„
138 B τῷ γὰρ τι εἶναι	... εἶη	... εἶη, changed to εἶναι	„
141 D τε αὐτοῦ ἄμα	so	τε ἄμα αὐτοῦ	„ (but αὐτοῦ)
142 D [καὶ ... λέγεται]	„	omit	„
148 E κατέχον ἐκείνης ἧ	„	... ἐν ἧ	„
152 B ὑπερβήσεται	-β..η(..eras.) ὑπερβοήσεται		„ (o patched).
154 C νεώτερον δ' οὐ:	so	γίνεται added later in marg.	γίνεται later above.
155 E καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα	τ on eras.	καὶ περιττὰ ἄλλα	„
158 C τὸ ὀλίγιστον	τ. -τὸν	τὸ ὀλιγοστόν	^ο -γιστόν.
159 A ὅμοι' ἂν εἶη	so	ὅμοια ἂν εἶη	„
160 D οὐδὲν ... μὴ εἶναι marg.	„	omit	„
161 B δῆλον: εἶη	„	δηλονότι εἶη	-νοτεῖη (τῇ patched and dots below στ).
162 D τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν	τῷ on eras.	τό γε μ.	„
165 B ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη: ἐν	„	ἐμφαίνεσθαι: ἀνάγκη: ...	„

These striking coincidences are sufficient to establish an unusually close connection between the two Mss. Again, both differ in various ways from ℥ in the use of αἰεὶ, αἰ: and both read τί δέ uniformly for the τί δαί of ℥. Yet if we seek to infer the derivation of either from the other we are met by very serious difficulties. These arise more especially in connection with omissions. We have found reason to regard Π as a very carelessly written codex. Tub., while much more prettily written, gives proof of similar inattention. In ℥ there are but three serious cases of error arising from this source:—a repetition, 142 D, the omission of κατέχον, 148 E, and of a considerable phrase, 160 D. What the condition of Π is with regard to repetitions has been already seen. In Tub. we find, 147 B, οὐτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς μορίου, 150 B, ναί: οὐτε γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει, 156 B, τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, and 161 E, ἧ οὐχ οὕτω; twice written, not to speak of smaller signs of carelessness. It is, however, the question of omissions that is the vital one, and here the Mss. ΠTub.DR are all brought under consideration. The blanks which exist in one or more of these will, for the sake of clearness, be referred to both according to the paging of Stephanus and according to that of this edition. DR are quoted from Bekker.

p. 2. 127 E [τοῦτο δὲ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια]	omitted in Tub.	added later at foot.
3. 128CD [πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ]	„	added later in margin.
4. 129 B [τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ θους αὖ μετέχειν.]	„	added later in margin.
* 6. 131 C [ἧ οὐ τὸ ἧ οὖν ὅλον]	„	not added.
8. 133 E ταῦτ' ἐστίν]	„	added later in margin.

9. 134 A	[οὐ τῆς παρ' -στήμη]	omitted in Tub. Π : added later in marg. of Tub.
9. 134 D	[οὐτ' αν ἡ δεσπόσειεν]	„ Π : added later, brown, in marg.
10. 136 A	[μᾶλλον εἰ βούλει]	„ „ „
• 10. 136 B	[καὶ αὐτοῖς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα]	„ Tub. not added.
11. 137 D	[ἀμφοτέρως ἀν . . . ἀληθῆ]	„ DR.
• 12. 138 A	[οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἀλλῃ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη:]	„ Tub. not added.
12. 138 A	[ἐν ἀλλῃ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον]	„ D.
• 13. 139 B	[οὐκ ἔοικεν : ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ]	„ Tub. added coarse in margin.
13. 139 B	[καὶ οὐκ ἀν εἶη]	„ „ added in margin.
14. 140 B	[ἐστίν ἀνόμοιον]	„ „ added in lower margin.
15. 141 A	? [ἡ [τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ]	„ „ „ „
• 15. 141 B	[τοῦ δὲ γεγονέναι]	„ „ not added: words patched to give sense.
18. 144 A	[καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκεις]	„ „ seems to be noted.
20. 147 A	[ἀλλά πη μὴ ἐν ἡ]	„ „ added later in margin.
20. 147 A	[τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἐν]	„ Π added in orig. (?) in marg.
21. 147 D	[οὐκ ἐκέينو ; -λάκεις]	„ D cf. Π.
22. 148 D	[τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ ἄπτεσθαι]	„ Π added, dark in margin.
• 23. 150 A	[ἐνείη -λου αὐτοῦ]	„ Tub. not added.

256. 152 C	[ἐπειδ' ἂν τύχη γιγνόμενον:]	omitted in Tub.	added late, rude.
* 26. 153 A	[οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν: ὅτι τὰ ἅλλα]	ΠD	not added in Π.
27. 153 D	[πεφυκὺς εἶη γίγνεσθαι: τῶν ἁλλων]	D.	
* 27. 153 E	[ὥστ' εἰ μὴ ἐν]	Tub.	not added.
* 27. 154 A	[οὔτε νεώτερον]	" "	not added.
* 27. 154 C	[οὐ γὰρ οὖν: γίγνεται:]	" "	not added.
29. 156 B	[ὅτ' ἂν δὲ ἀπόλλινται:]	" "	added later in margin.
30. 156 D	[οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς μεταβάλλει]	" "	added late.
* 30. 157 B	[πῶς δ' οὐ; ἐν εἰ ἔστιν]	" "	not added.
31. 158 B	(a gap of three words, but?) μῆτε [ἐν μὴ τε] ἐνὸς	" "	added in margin.
* 32. 159 A	[αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐναντιώτατά τε]	ΠD	not added in margin Π.
* 33. 160 C	The words in margin of 32	ΠTub.DR.	
34. 161 D	[ἔστι γὰρ: * σμικρότης]	Π	added, brown in margin.
35. 162 A	[εὐθὺς ἔσται μὴ εἶναι]	R.	
35. 162 A	how much? [εἰ μέλλει μὴ ὄν,] εἰ καὶ	Tub.	added later, outer margin.
35. 162 B	[φαίνεται μὴ ἔστι:]	" "	added later.
36. 163 B	δὲ οὐ [γίγνεται ἐν μὴ ὄν]	Π	added brown in margin.
* 37. 164 A	[ἡ τὸ τοῦτο]	Tub.	not added.

From this synopsis it seems clear (1) that Π cannot be derived from Tub. since it contains at intervals ten passages at least of which there is in Tub. no trace; (2) that Tub. is not likely to have come from Π since it gives three passages which are not found in Π. It is conceded that 32 is much older than either; and accordingly two conclusions are open to us as alternatives, (α) either Tub. and Π both come from 32, or an early copy or copies of it now lost; (β) or all three descend from one original now lost. In the former case indirect descent seems the more likely, because while all three closely resemble in many ways, the divergences between Π and

Tub., when compared with \mathfrak{A} , do not seem easily explicable on the theory of direct descent. Assuming indirect descent, again, we may justly infer thus much—that the copy or copies from which Π Tub. come must have been taken from \mathfrak{A} at a date

- before 1. $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$; was changed to $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\alpha\acute{\iota}$;
 „ 2. $\alpha\acute{\iota}\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ „ „ $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ from page 147 onward.
 „ 3. $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu$ was inserted in the margin at 148 E.
 „ 4. $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\tau\tau\acute{\alpha}$ was changed to $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ in 155 E.
 „ 5. $\omicron\ddot{\upsilon}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu$... $\lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ $\mu\eta$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ was inserted in the margin at 160 D.

An attempt might be made to reason to the exact connection from the character of the omissions above, but the result is not clear. We should have almost positive evidence of descent from \mathfrak{A} if any of the blanks consisted of an exact line of \mathfrak{A} , not merely the equivalent of a line but a line in point of fact. We have no gap of that character. Our nearest approach to such a gap is the one common to Π Tub. at 134 A, which is the exact equivalent of a line yet not actually one. Such a gap may be suggestive but is no proof. One has only to glance at the various gaps given to see that the mistakes which the eye of a copyist may make, while very generally connected with one another by the bond of a repeated word, come under no rule as regards the relative positions in which the two cases of the repeated word stand to each other. As respects supposition β , there does not appear to be anything which makes against it. But we may say that even if it be the fact that $\mathfrak{A}\Pi$ Tub. come from a common original, the superiority of \mathfrak{A} is so undoubted and the errors in the text of this dialogue are so few and unimportant that reasons for considering the supposed independent evidence of the two latter Mss. are almost non-existent.

What then is to be our verdict upon the authority of the various Mss. of the first family $\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi$ Tub.DR...? Something like this:— \mathfrak{A} is far and away the best, and so satisfactory as to give little occasion for extraneous support: Δ is derived from it, and may be set aside: Π and Tub. are extremely like it, and almost seem to be derived from it, while even if not they are far less valuable: DR—whose case the student may work out for himself—are closely associated with Π but of less value: the remainder besides being of secondary value are mere fragments. Practically, therefore, we rest upon \mathfrak{A} ; but, in as much as a collation of Tub. has not yet been published we give its readings in full. Outside of this circle we appeal to t which in some ways is more careful even than \mathfrak{A} ; and as a last resource in one or two cases we resort to conjecture. Perhaps our adherence to \mathfrak{A} would have been less decided and the results as a whole more in keeping with the character of a 'critical edition,' but that our text is in form so closely connected with that codex. The testimony of C. G. Cobet in favour of A and \mathfrak{A} as the sole satisfactory authorities for those works which they contain is frequent and exceedingly emphatic, even exaggerated, in character. The grounds upon which he bases his decision seem to be two: that these Mss. not only give the soundest text as judged by the test of intelligibility, but likewise preserve more faithfully than others the true Attic forms of many words which scribes had a tendency to modify. Thus, speaking of A—though other passages show that \mathfrak{A} also is to some extent included—he says

Mnemosyne, ix.
1860, p. 337, etc.

Mnem. Nova
Series III. 195.

Namque non tantum locis plurimis manifesto veras lectiones *solus* servavit, sed etiam antiquae dialecti Atticae rationem et usum in iis quae constanter in caeteris scioli et inepti correctores contaminare solent intactam et inviolatam solus omnium ad nos propagavit. Quod quale sit paucis exemplis demonstrare operae pretium est.

Parisinus.	caeteri.
Critias 108 E βασιλῆς	-λαῖς.
109 A ἀνειλλομένη	ἀνειλονμένη, -ελομένη.
109 B νομῆς	-μείς.
109 D σέσονται	-σται.
110 A διασέσονται	„
111 C σᾶ	σῶα.
112 A πύκνα, πυκνὸς	πνύκα, etc. . . .
121 B ἐμπιπλάμενοι	ἐμπιπλάμενοι, etc.

Plusquam perfectum apud Platonem more majorum exibat in -η, tertia persona ante vocalem et in sententiae exitu in -ειν In Platonis Codicibus duobus optimis Clarkiano et Parisino A formae in -η saepe comparent, sed in Parisino futilis corrector *fere semper* -η eraso de suo -ειν substituit

Again he says when criticizing the edition of Schanz:—

Itaque speraveram fore ut in prima Tetralogia, quae prodit, unum solum testem produceret egregium illum Clarkianum B et ex caeteris paucula quaedam sumere satis haberet sicubi boni aliquid aut lacunae supplendae aut ab acuto lectore feliciter emendatum contineret.

Fleck. Jahrb.
Bd. 113, 1876.

A. Jordan likewise uses this argument about old Attic forms as evidence of the superiority of A \mathfrak{A} , while he points out that Schanz on the authority of \mathfrak{A} reproduces the forms *θνήσκω, μιμνήσκω, σφῶ, ζῶον, πρόην, ἄσμενος*, and others. Again, there is the much vexed question of the use of ν ephelkystikon. What we find in regard to this form in \mathfrak{A} is a two-fold peculiarity; the ν is used in many cases where no hiatus would be caused by its absence, and is omitted where a hiatus is the result. This indicates a distinct absence of method when compared with many authorities, and is on that ground regarded as evidence of the age and purity of its source, the tendency of Alexandrian and other early commentators being to establish and adhere to an intelligible rule.

Fleck. Suppl.
Bd. 7, 1873-5,
and as above.

p. lxxvii.

On the other hand, the contention of Cobet that any independent readings found in less valuable Mss. are due to conjecture alone is emphatically put aside by both Wohlrab and Jordan on the ground both of inherent improbability and of the incontestable fact that blanks in the best Mss. have to be supplied from the inferior ones, which must have got the material from a source distinct from that of the others. Again, as we have seen already, it is pointed out that we find Plato cited by authors like Stobaeus and Eusebius who lived long before our earliest Mss. were written, and if the texts of these authors can be relied on, he is sometimes quoted in a form different from the text transmitted by A \mathfrak{A} . Also cases are given in which the 'old Attic forms' have been preserved in the family β when family α , at least as represented by \mathfrak{A} ITub. etc., give an inferior form: thus in certain places t reads *ἀλιῆς* and

ἐμπίμπλησι where \mathfrak{A} gives ἀλιεῖς -πίπλησι. On this and other grounds it is maintained by some that while most Mss. of the β family are inferior to those of the other, this does not at all hold in regard to t the best Ms. of that family, and still less does it hold when the respective sources of the two families are considered. Indeed Jordan quite turns the tables in the following manner. He takes up the text of the Republic for which we possess as authorities both A and t: and after a comparison of these two he comes to the conclusion that t is actually a copy of A. He contends that both in text and scholia the two agree as completely as is humanly possible, while little mistakes occur which tend to show that the writer of t had A before him, but mis-read it. He goes on to infer that in tetralogies I-VII. t is a copy of the lost first volume of A, from which it seems to follow that even for these works it is on the whole to be preferred to \mathfrak{A} , if Cobet's verdict upon the authority of A is accepted. Jordan does not seem quite to accept it, but is content to place At in the same class as contradistinguished from \mathfrak{A} . There is, of course, no proof that A had a first volume.

The latest episode, and one of the most interesting and unexpected, in the history of the Platonic text is that arising from the discovery in Egypt of the Flinders Petrie papyri, which seem to date from the third century before the Christian era. These papyri contain among other things fragments of the Phaedo in a very dilapidated condition, extending over pp. 67 D-69 A, 80 D-84 A of Stephanus. A glance at these documents at once reveals that they differ from the text of our best Mss. both by transpositions, by omissions, and by various readings, while the gaps which occur compel us to infer that the contents destroyed must have been of different extent from the corresponding passages in \mathfrak{A} . Nor are these divergences superficial; they are numerous and striking. Such a discovery tends to make students of Plato most uneasy. Is our text, preserved in three of the most valuable Greek Mss. in existence, so little entitled after all to our confidence and support? One ray of comfort appears in the fact that the differences though numerous do not affect the argument; the substance of Plato's reasoning remains as we have been accustomed to understand it. A further study of the papyrus tends rather to re-assure us. Although in some respects the sense seems slightly to gain by little omissions, the general character of the text is not such as we should be disposed to take in exchange for our own. One is tempted to consider that although an early it is yet a careless transcript, and one feels entitled to wait for much more extensive materials before deciding against the testimony of our highest authorities. Where the value of the latest discovery seems unquestionable is in matters of spelling and pronunciation. Thus we have αἰδῆ -δές for αἰδῆ -δές, οὐθὲν μηθὲν and their cases. For indications of sound again we find ἐμ φιλοσοφία, θεῶν γένος, τούτω μὲν, ὅσοι μὴ, τοσοῦτογ κακόν, ἅμ μάλιστα. These last show how in the writer's time and by persons among whom he moved sounds were assimilated in pronunciation. And they may, though not certainly, represent the actual speech of Plato. On this subject we may refer to Blass and Meisterhans, whose detailed and sometimes even statistical treatment of Greek spelling and pronunciation

Hermes, xiii.
1878.

Early papyri.

Usener, Königl.
Gesellsch. der
Wissensch.
Götting. Nach-
richten,
Nos. 2, 6, 1892.

Blass,
Aussprache des
Griechischen,
1888
Meisterh. Gram-
der Attisch. In-
schriften, 1880.

as exemplified in the inscriptions of the time is most instructive. But assimilation would go further with stone-cutters and scribes than with high-born authors.

II.

DESCRIPTIVE. WE propose now, for the information of any who may take an interest in such matters, to give a more or less detailed description of the three great manuscripts to which reference has repeatedly been made, taking them in the assumed chronological order.

I. PARIS A,
No. 1807.

PARIS A. This volume is strongly and handsomely bound in red leather tooled with gold. On the back it is marked, upon a small round paper label, ^{GR.} 1807; but we find written in the middle of the upper margin of the first leaf of the text an earlier number xciv, while in the outer margin, opposite, 94.2087 appear upon an erasure. Before the text come four plain leaves of vellum. A Latin table of contents on paper is pasted on the face of the first, while near the top of the second face of the fourth is written in a very careless and late hand a πίναξ in Greek. The following are the contents, no attempt being made to reproduce the style of writing. The heading is invariably written in the upper margin of the column in which the dialogue begins, and the text begins with the first line of the column. Pale and rather coarse lines in red ink are made in the margin to receive the title, sometimes 3, one for each line of the title, sometimes 2, the title going above, between and below them.

Contents.

Heading.		Ending.	
Κλειτοφῶν	+ Πλάτωνος + ἡ προτρεπτικός	Κλειτοφῶν ἡ προτρεπτικός small flourish	} 2 vers., c. ii. l. 40. includes flourish.
	ΚΘ		
Πολιτεῖαι Α	+ Πλάτωνος + ἡ περὶ δικαίου scr.	Πολιτείας ἡ περὶ δικαίου Α	} 14 r., i. 44.
	Λ		
B	as above exactly, including scratch	as above exactly	B } 24 v., ii. 12.
	ΔΑ		
Γ	" " no scratch	" "	Γ } 37 v., i. 17.
	ΔΒ		
"	" " "	" "	Δ } 48 v., i. 24.
	ΔΓ		
"	" " "	" "	Ε } 61 v., i. 17.
	ΔΔ		

Heading.				Ending.	
	as above exactly, no scratch			as above exactly	
S	ΔΕ		61 v., ii. 2 red lines as above	S	72 v., ii. 39.
Z	ΑΣ		73 r., i. hangs from 3 red lines	Z	83 v., i. 22.
H	ΔΖ		83 v., ii. red under first and through last	H	94 r., i. 37.
Θ	ΔΗ		94 r., ii. hangs from 3 red lines	Θ	102 v., ii. 15.
I	ΔΘ		103 r., i. as in last	I	114 r., i. 9.
Τίμαιος	+ Πλάτωνος + M η περι φύσεως		114 r., ii. a red line above and below second line of title	Τίμαιος η περι φύσεως	144 v., ii. 44. is darker than others
Κριτίας	as above MA η ατλαντικός		145 r., i. as above	title not repeated The margin of 151 is cut off close to the text, which is slightly injured on both pages.	151 r., ii. 31.
Μίνως	as above MB η περι νόμον		151 v., i. as above	Μίνως η περι νόμον somewhat dark	154 v., ii. 30.
Νόμοι Α	as above ΜΓ η νομοθεσίαι		155 r., i. hangs from 3 pale red lines	Νόμων η νομοθεσίας as above	Α 165 r., i. 40.
B	as above ΜΔ		165 r., ii. as above	as above	Β 173 v., ii. 42.
Γ	ME but darker		174 r., i. as above	Γ	184 v., i. 14.
Δ	as above MS		184 v., ii. 2 red lines	Δ	193 r., i. 11.
E	MZ		193 r., ii. as above	E	202 r., i. 20
S	MH darker		202 r., ii. "	S	216 r., i. 22.

	Heading.		Ending.	
Z	as above, darker MΘ	} 216 r., ii. as above	as above	Z } 231 v., ii. 24.
H	„ „ last word dark N dark	} 232 r., i. „	„ „	H } 241 v., i. 44.
Θ	„ „ „ dark NA	} 241 v., ii. „	„ „	Θ } 255 v., ii. 8.
I	„ „ „ NB	} 256 r., i. „	„ „ dark	I } 267 r., i. 43.
IA	„ „ „ dark NΓ	} 267 r., i. „	„ „	IA } 278 v., ii. 7.
IB	„ „ „ NΔ	} 279 r., i. „	„ „ hangs from a red line: no flourish	IB } 291 r., i. 24.
Ἐπινομίς	+ Πλάτωνος + NE ἡ φιλόσοφος	} 291 r., ii. „	Ἐπινομίς ἡ φιλόσοφος	} 299 v., i. 18.
	as above Ἐπιστολαί IB NS	} 299 v., ii. „		
A	Πλάτων Διονυσίωι εὖ πράττειν	299 v., ii. 1 ends line 25.	Letter A although on the first line of the column has a red line coarsely drawn through the title: Δ has a red line below the first and through the second line of the title: SZ are, like the titles of dialogues, in the upper margin, with red lines.	
B	„ „	300 r., i. 28 „ 15.		
Γ	„ χαίρειν	302 r., i. 18 „ 12.		
Δ	„ Δίωι συρακοῦσιν σίωι εὖ πράττειν	304 r., i. 14 „ 19.		
E	„ Περδίκκαι εὖ πράττει	304 v., i. 22		
S	„ Ἑρμείαι κ, Ἑρά στωι κ, Κορίσκωι εὖ πράττει	305 r., i. } in upper margin, 2 red lines, ends 44.		
Z	„ τοῖς Δίωνος οἰκέ οἰς τὲ κ, ἑταίροις εὖ πράττει	305 v., i. } in upper margin, 2 red lines, ends 317 r. ii. 5.		

Z has what seems to be an ending with the word *εἰρημένα*: on p. 317 r. as noted. But the scribe or his original seems to have had some difficulty at the point, 311 v. 34 (339 B, Hermann, vol. 6), where Plato refers to a letter of Dionysius, as to whether the letter did not there end. A gap of four lines was left which was filled up by putting ÷ ÷ ÷ *πῃ φραζονσα* ÷ ÷ ÷ in line 34, giving twelve ÷ in each of lines 35, 36, 37, and beginning 38 with *Διονύσιος Πλάτωνι τὰ νόμιμα* as if it were the title of a new letter. After *εἰρημένα*, on 317, we have four vacant lines and then *ἀ δ' ἂν διανοηθέντες*, etc., which Hermann treats as the beginning of the letter H, and to which he prefixes a title which is the duplicate of that given to Z above. It is not so treated in the Ms.: nor are the numerical capitals that stand opposite the remaining letters written in the original, but by a later hand.

α δ' ἂν διανοηθέντες κ.τ.λ.	317 r. ii. 10 ends 319 v. i. 13.	Hermann gives five additional
[H] Πλάτων, Ἀρχύται τα ραντίνωι εὖ πράττειν·	} hang from red lines, 319 v. i. 16 ends 319 v. ii. 13.	letters which are not found in this manuscript.
[Θ] „ Ἀριστοδῶρωι εὖ πράττειν·	} 319 v. ii. 16 „ 319 v. ii. 32.	
[I] „ Λαοδάμαντι εὖ πράττειν·	} 319 v. ii. 35 „ 320 r. ii. 9.	
[IA] „ Ἀρχύται ταρὰν τίνωι εὖ πράττειν·	} 320 r. ii. 12 „ 320 r. ii. 35.	
[IB] „ Διονυσίωι τυράννωι σιρακοισσῶν, εὖ πράττειν·	} 320 r. ii. 38.	Πλάτωνος ἐπιστολαί flourish. } 322 r. i. 14.
+ Ὅροι + NZ.	} 322 r. ii. upper marg.	* Ὅροι * flourish. } 324 v. ii. 20.

Each definition ends with : followed by a slight blank.

+ Πλάτωνος νοθευόμενοι·	Above the usual position of the title as if added later by the scribe.	
+ περὶ Δικαίου + NH	} 325 r. i. upper marg. hangs from a red line.	περὶ δικαίου flourish. } 326 r. ii. 40.
+ περὶ Ἀρετῆς + NΘ	} 326 v. i. as above.	π. Ἀ. } 328 r. i. 32.
+ Δημόδοκος ἡ περὶ τοῦ συμβουλευέσθου· Ξ	} 328 r. ii. as above.	Δ. ἡ π. τ. σ. } 331 r. i. 23.
+ Σίσυφος ἡ περὶ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι· ΞΑ.	} 331 r. ii. from 2 red lines.	Σ. ἡ π. τ. β. } 333 r. i. 42.
+ Ἀλκυνών ἡ περὶ μεταμορφώσεως· ΞΒ	} 323 r. ii. as above.	Ἀ. ἡ π. μ. } 334 r. ii. be- low line 44.
+ Ἐρμίας ἡ περὶ πλούτου· ΞΓ	} 334 v. i. as above.	Ε. ἡ π. π. (ἡ ἐρασί, στρατος } 341 r. ii. 27. in outer margin). }

In the middle space opposite the title are to which the words in the margin at the end correspond. $\begin{matrix} \text{ἐν ἄλλῳ} \\ \text{ἡ ἐρασί, στρατ.} \end{matrix}$

In the middle space opposite the title are to which the words in the margin at the end correspond.

+ Ἀξίως	ΞΔ	ἡ περὶ θανάτου	} 341 v. i. as above.	'Α. ἡ π. θ.	} 344 v. i. 27.
---------	----	----------------	--------------------------	-------------	-----------------

So ends the Ms. on line 27 of the first column on the back of folio 344. There is no trace of a name or a date of any kind; but in the outer margin opposite there is a statement by a later hand in smaller style and yellow-brown ink as follows:—

ὠρθώθη ἡ βίβλ^ς αὕτη·

$\text{ἰ} \overline{\omega} \mu \eta \tau \rho \omicron \pi \overset{\circ}{\iota} \epsilon \rho \alpha \pi$ = κωνσταντίνου μητροπολίτου ἱερα(σ)πόλεως

τὸ δὲ ὠνησαμένδ. = τοῦ καὶ

Montf. Ap-
pendix, cf.
Gardth. p. 318.

Authorities differ as to whether the name of the city is one word or two, Cobet being of the former opinion. If he is right it must be the Hierapolis near Laodicea which, according to Le Quien, was erected into a metropolitan see in the 5th century. No Constantine, however, is named as in office there. But we find mention made of *Constantinus sacerdos* and calligraphist, in 1125 A.D., and of another, a presbyter and calligraphist, in 1326 A.D. The text is followed by three clean sheets of vellum, which, like those at the beginning, have probably been inserted when it was last bound.

Style and details.

The codex is in fine preservation; indeed, Cobet says, '*non memini me videre integriorem librum neque emendatiorem.*' It has suffered a little at the beginning by damp creeping in from behind; it has lost the margin of fol. 151, which has slightly injured the end of the Critias and the beginning of the Minos, and in various places small holes have been drilled in the sheets by insects; but for all practical purposes it is as perfect and legible as when it was written,—now more than a thousand years ago. The size of the volume exclusive of the binding is 35.5 × 24.8 × 8.8 centimetres. The material is firm yellowish vellum. The page consists of two columns, each containing 44 written lines, which are bounded perpendicularly by double lines at each side; the length of each col. is 26.5 and its breadth according as both perpendicular lines at each side, or only the inner ones are included, is 8.1 or 6.8, while the free space between the cols. from outer to outer perpendicular line is 2.3 centimetres. The breadths of the free margins are—inner 1.6, upper 3.5, outer 4.8, under 5.7. All these figures, especially the last group, are slightly variable. The vellum is made up in quaternions, that is, sets of four pieces laid together, then folded across and stitched, so as to give 8 leaves and 16 pages; there are 43 quaternions, but the 43rd wants the 8th leaf. Originally each quaternion would be lettered, but the only trace of this which seems to remain is at the outer upper corner of fol. 177 r. where K—the following Γ having been cut off in binding—represents the 23rd; more recently they have been numbered by small figures 2, 3, 4, placed at the inner upper corner. A late reader has carelessly numbered the front side of the leaves: after 243 he puts 245, but there is no gap; and in the third hundred the hundreds figure is often corrected. Each piece of parchment before being folded as part of its quaternion has received a complete set of rulings which are colourless, being, as usual, indented on one side by some blunt pointed instrument so firmly as to project on the other. This ruling seems to have been done on the outer or hair side of the vellum. The bounding lines are the following, on each unfolded piece:—

1. 8 double perpendicular lines to mark off the sides of the four cols.
2. Single perpendicular lines near the outer edge of the two outer margins, 3.8 removed from the outer boundary of the cols.
3. A horizontal line about 1.9 above the writing.
4. Double horizontal lines of which the lower is 2.6 below the writing.
All these are carried from edge to edge of the vellum.
5. 44 lines for writing, which begin at the left side of the first col. and go right across the four cols., ending somewhat unevenly at the outer edge of the fourth.

E. M. Thompson,
Palaeography,
p. 63, etc.

In laying the ruled pieces together for stitching, indented side touched indented, and projecting touched projecting, or, as Mr. Thompson puts it, hair side touched hair side and flesh side flesh side.

The writing hangs from the lines, save that the upper parts of the letters δ ε η θ ι κ φ project above them. The text is written in dark brown ink; the titles and some of the notes are reddish. One commentator writes in dark green.


The text is written throughout by the same scribe, who seems to have added the titles after the body of the work was finished. Sometimes his ink seems to have failed, and he has retouched

letters, as on 184 r., 189 v., 190 r., after refilling his pen. After learning more of \mathfrak{A} , Bekker changed his view that this Ms. was written in the tenth century, saying 'patet Parisiensem primum (A), ^{Index Codicum.} qui omnes habet altioris vetustatis notas, perperam in catalogo Paris. ad decimum seculum referri. Conf. Bast ad Corinth., p. 81.' Bast here speaks of 'praestantissimus Codex 1807 (seculi noni).' ^{Gregor. Corinth. ed. Schaefer, Lipsiae, 1811.} After looking over the plates of the Palaeographical Society and comparing all three Mss. concerned, we have come to the conclusion that the writing which most resembles that of this codex is that of the Clarke Ms. and of the Oxford Euclid, whose dates are fixed at 895 and 888 A.D. respectively. But the Paris one seems to be older than either of these. So far as the capital letters are concerned, a judgment is difficult to form. They are small, erect, and rather stiff, but present no special feature save that A, Δ and Λ do not terminate in a point at the top, but in a short horizontal stroke. In the body of the text, which is in minuscules in all three Mss., we have a better means of reaching a conclusion. At a general glance the first observation that occurs is that in whatever order A and \mathfrak{A} may stand, the Euclid comes between them: this amounts to the verdict that A comes first. The Euclid and \mathfrak{A} differ from A in having their letters of a uniform thickness: A, while using apparently a broader pen, aims at varying his strokes to some slight extent. In all three the writing is most carefully formed and erect, but \mathfrak{A} inclines more than either of the others to round off the angles of letters, while A makes them as abrupt as a continuous stroke will permit. In all, the lines of the letters generally finish in a dot or 'blob,' but in \mathfrak{A} this seems to be often managed by carrying the pen a little back upon its stroke, while in A the scribe ends his lines with a distinctly formed dot. A and Euc. agree in writing σ , ϕ , as $\sigma \phi$; \mathfrak{A} gives $\sigma \phi$. In A ϵ is written ϵ , in \mathfrak{A} it is ϵ .

The initial letters in A stand in the space between the perpendicular lines which bound the columns: like those of the Euc. they are quite plain, and differ from the text only by being considerably larger. There is an even more noticeable formality in the breathings and accentuation. While \mathfrak{A} and Euc. give these with some variety and inattention as seen in the facsimiles, A emphasizes its care by the forms \sim , \sim , \sim , \sim ; and Schanz says that while \mathfrak{A} often omit accents on prepositions before nouns, A never does. Ligature of letters is employed freely: here, for example, is the opening of the Republic, the ligatures being indicated by a closer position of the letters so treated.

Κατεβην χθες εἰ σπει ρ αι α μετα
 γλαυ κω ν ο σ το υ ἄρ ι στω ν ο σπρ ο
 σενξ ο μεν ο σ τε τηι θεω ι και ἄ
 ματην εο ρ την βο υ λο μεν ο σ θε
 ασσθαι.

Composite names in the titles are marked by a line below the junction Κλειτροφῶν: in the text also they are marked when they are divided by the end of a line Θρασύ|μαχος. Ordinary words are not invariably so divided or marked in the text. There is almost nothing ornamental about the Ms. but what occurs at the conclusions of the various works, a sample of which may be given. It is almost uniform throughout.

ἦν διελγύθαμεν εὖ πράττω
 μεν 

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ ἩΠΕΡΙΔΙΚΑΪΣΙ







Notes and hands
in the margin.

We pass now to the margins: i. (1) The speakers are usually named at the beginning of each dialogue, the names being placed as a rule between the columns under the heading ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΔΟΓΟΥΤ | ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ in two lines of small capitals, τοῦ διαλόγου being contracted. The names are in minuscules. Changes of speaker are marked in the text by :, and in the margin by —, between the double bounding lines of the column, while outside these lines the name is generally given, in full for the first appearance, and often, though not invariably, in contracted form afterwards, thus:—

Margin.	Col.	Margin.	Col.
θρασύμαχος *	: καὶ ὁ θρασύμαχος	λ πο	:
πολεμαρχ ^ο	:	κ σω	:

(2) The same hand, or one indistinguishable from it, also puts in the margin a number of scholia and brief notes, and synonyms for words in the text, the spaces for these being sometimes ruled in red. These are in small capitals with ordinary contractions. (3) The same hand has given at intervals various symbols and remarks in the margin. Such are those for Γρ. Πρ. and the following—

- | | | | | | | |
|----|---|---------------------------|-----------|--|--------------------------------|------------|
| 1. |  | = χρησίμη ^{ον} ? | 82 v. ii. |  | = σημείωσαι δι' ὅλον τὸ χωρίον | 318 r. ii. |
| | ΠΑΡΑΙΝΕΣΙΣ | | | Δ | | |
| | Ε, ΤΗΘΗΚΗ | | | Γ' | | |
| | | | | Ο' | | |
| | | | | Λ | | |
| 2. |  | ΤΗΝ 'ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ | 16 v. i. | 8 | | |
| | „ Τὸ ΔΡΙΜΤ̃ ΤΗΣ 'ΕΠΙΒΟΛ | 18 r. ii. | | Τ | | |
| | 'ΑΣΤΕΙΟΝ | 27 r. ii. | | Ο' | | |
| | 'ΟΡ,° ΨΕΥΔΟΥΣ | 24 r. ii. | | Χ | | |
| | | | | Ω | | |
| | | | | Ρ | | |
| 3. |  | = ὥραϊον | | Γ' | | |
| | | | | Ο | | |
| | | | | Ν | | |

Two of these signs may be compared with their counterparts in the margin of our text, pp. 6, 15, 25; and the comparison will strengthen the evidence in favour of the greater age of this codex.

ii. Other hands also appear, but it would need considerable expertness to distinguish them accurately. There appear to be two which use dark brown ink, one small and delicate, the other somewhat larger: both of a date decidedly later than the first. We have seen that the owner of the book claims to have revised it, and there are distinct traces of corrections upon erasures in the text, which are in the same ink as his closing statement, notably a considerable sprinkling of a thin capital Η. Notes of his seem to occur on 10 r. i., 17 r. outer margin, 20 r., 25 v., 131 v. Then there is the green hand already mentioned, and one which makes a few ugly notes in pencil. Schanz points out that the Ms. after being completed has been compared with other texts, and entries appear such as—ἐν ἄλλῳ οὕτως εἶρον, οἶμαι δ' ὅτι καὶ κρείττον τοῦτο.

Errors and
corrections.

While the codex is written with admirable care, one can see on turning over its pages that there are several sorts of errors in it which recur pretty frequently. (a) Omissions inadvertently

made are supplied by running the omitted words out into the margins either by the original or by some of the later hands: cases occur at 24 r. i. 43, 177 r., 185 r. i. 29, ii. 41, 273 r. i. (β) Other errors are corrected by erasures with or without their being replaced: (so far as linguistic forms are concerned, Cobet holds that errors are perpetrated thus:) cases occur 17r. ii., 185 r., 207 r. (apparently by Constantine), 227 v. ii. 44, 231 r. i., and others. The erasure which has most interest for us is that in which the form *τί δαί* is repeatedly substituted in neat small letters for *τί δ...*—the original being indistinguishable: cases occur 25 r. i. twice, 54 v., i. 12, 55 r. i. 21, 56 v. ii. 40, 57 r. i. 16, 184 v. ii. 20 and 35, with not a few others. We have likewise *τίς δαί*, 153 r. ii. 3 and 13, and elsewhere. (γ) In several cases space has been left for words about which for some reason the scribe was uncertain. These are filled in by a species of asterisk (÷), at the rate of twelve to a line: one case is 54 v. i., where five occur, another 227 v., ii. 22, *-μείν ÷ ÷ ÷ τίς οὖν αὐτῇ. καί*, another 240 r. i.; where lines 9, 10 have twelve each, a fourth is the one referred to above in epistle Z; in one case a line is drawn from the word before the space to that after it. The most serious patch in the codex, combining both erasures, blank spaces, and words entered on such spaces, occurs in the last of the spurious dialogues, and extends over eleven lines, the last three of col. i. and first eight of col. ii. in 342 v. It seems clear that here the writer had an incomplete text before him. There are, of course, gaps in the text which only one who has collated it carefully can discover. Schanz has done so, and finds at least the following of 15 letters—*ποῖα δ' ὁποίου βίου* Rep. III., 400 A, and two large gaps from Laws vi., 745 A, *θεοῖς*—745 C, *κλήρους δέ*, and 783 B, *παίδων*—783 D, *καλῶς*, which represent 674 and 699 letters respectively. Taking several of the passages omitted and afterwards supplied, he finds that they contain respectively, 17, 17 or 16, 15, 17, 18, 18 letters. He then assumes that these represent lines of A's original, and that the large gaps represent columns which at the same rate would have about 40 lines. In A the lines are about 21-3 letters, and the page has 44 lines. Schanz thinks that the original was of the same size and arrangement, but written in majuscules and so containing less per line and col. He cites omissions of 46, 41, 39, 37, 35, 39, 48, 46, 44, 35 letters, which seem to him multiples of lines. It is noteworthy that the unmutilated lines in the Flinders Petrie papyri comprise 22-26 letters. It may be added that Graux, a high authority on palaeographic questions, considered that two unsigned Mss. 'savoir ... le *Palatinus* des Paradoxographes (No. 398, à Heidelberg), et le *Damascius* de Venise (*Marcianus* 246)' are by the same hand as Paris A. So far as the latter is concerned, the facsimile given in the 'Mélanges Graux' seems to leave no room for doubt. We conclude our description by giving the contents of one page of the Ms., after Cobet with very slight corrections. It represents the opening of the Critias on the face of fol. 145. At the left side the writing begins uniformly from the inner of the two perpendicular bounding lines of the column, but on the right it stops irregularly at any point between the inner and outer of these lines which may be found convenient. The same holds of all manuscripts as a rule: and the practice is exemplified in our text. But the printed reproductions, as is natural where the letters are of a strictly regulated size instead of being hand-made in each case, exaggerates the inequalities which occur. We do not undertake that the stops are invariably correct. Commas are rarely original; and while there are in use three points, upper, middle and lower (··), the second is not represented here. When letters are not large it is not easily distinguished from the first. In modern times we appear to have inverted what was the original significance of the first and last. The middle one, *μέση στιγμή*, is considered to have been the least forcible, and the comma, for greater clearness no doubt, gradually superseded it.

p. xcii. above.

p. lxxxi. ..

p. xcvi.

Rhein. Mus.

xxxiii. 1876.

Journ. des
Savants, Mai
1881, p. 309.

Paris, 1884

Mnem. Nov.
Ser. iii. 1875.

+ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ +

145

ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ

ΜΑ.

Ἡ ἈΤΛΑΝΤΙΚΟΣ.

¹ Changed to
διαπορίας.

² Should be
μεμνήσθαι,
Cobet.

ὥς ἄσμενος ὦ σώκρατες οἶον ἐκ ΤΙΜ^ο
μακρῶς ἀναπεπαισμένος ὁ
δοῦ νῦν οὕτως ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λόγου
διαπορίας¹ ἀγαπητῶς ἀπὴλ
λαγμαι· τῷ δὲ πρὶν μὲν πάλαι
ποτ' ἔργωι· νῦν δὲ λόγῳι ἄρ
τι θεῶι γεγονότι προσεύχο
μαι· τῶν ῥηθέντων ὅσα μὲν
ἐρρήθη μετρίως σωτηρίαν ἢ
μὴν αὐτὸν αὐτῶν διδόναι· πα
ρὰ μέλλουσιν δὲ εἶτι περὶ αὐτῶν
ἄκοντες εἵπομεν δίκην τὴν
πρέπουσαν ἐπιτιθέναι· δίκην
δὲ ὀρθὴν τὸν πλημμελοῦντα
ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν· ἔν' οὖν τὸ λοιπὸν
τοῖς περὶ θεῶν γενέσεως ὅρ
θως λέγωμεν λόγους, φάρ
μακον ἡμῖν αὐτὸν τελεώτατον
καὶ ἄριστον φαρμάκων, ἐπιστῆ
μην εὐχόμεθα διδόναι· προσει
ξάμενοι δὲ, παραδίδομεν
κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογίας κριτίαι
— τὸν ἐξῆς λόγον· ἀλλ' ὦ τίμαιε Τ
δέχομαι μὲν· οἱ δὲ καὶ σὺ κα
τ' ἀρχὰς ἐχρήσω, συγγνώμην
αἰτούμενος ὥς περὶ μεγάλων
μέλλων λέγειν, ταυτὸν καὶ νῦν
ἐγὼ τοῦτο παραιτούμαι· μείζο
νος δὲ αὐτοῦ τυχεῖν ἔτι μᾶλλον
ἀξιῶ, περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥη
θήσεσθαι· καίτοι σχεδὸν μὲν
οἶδα, παραίτησιν εὖ μάλα φιλό
τιμον καὶ τοῦ δέοντος ἀγροί
κοτέραν, μέλλων παραιτεῖσθαι·
ῥητέον δὲ ὅμως· ὥς μὲν γὰρ
οὐκ εὖ τὰ παρὰ σοῦ λεχθέντα
εἴρηται, τίς ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειεν
ἔμφρων λέγειν· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ῥη
θησόμενα, πλείονος συγγνώ
μης δεῖται χαλεπώτερα ὄντα,
τοῦτο πειρατέον πῇ διδάξαι·
περὶ θεῶν γὰρ ὦ τίμαιε λέγον
τά τι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, δοκεῖν
ικανῶς λέγειν· ῥᾶιον ἢ περὶ

θητῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἢ γὰρ ἂ
πειρία καὶ σφόδρα ἄγνοια
τῶν ἀκούντων περὶ ὧν ἂν οὐ
τῶς ἔχωσιν, πολλὴν εὐπορίαν
παρέχεσθον τῷ μέλλοντι λέ
γειν τί περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ δὲ
δὴ θεῶν, ἴσμεν ὥς ἔχομεν· ἴ
να δὲ σαφέστερον ὁ λέγων δη
λώσω, τῇδε μοι συνεπίσπεσθε·
μίμησιν μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄπει
κασίαν τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν
ῥηθέντα, χρεῖον που γενέσθαι·
τὴν δὲ τῶν γραφῶν εἰδωλο
ποιῖαν περὶ τὰ θεῖα τε καὶ τὰ
ἀνθρώπινα σώματα γιγνομέ
νην ἴδωμεν· ῥαυστῶνῃς τε πέ
ρι καὶ χαλεπότητος, πρὸς τὸ τοῖς
ὀρώσιν δοκεῖν ἀποχρώντως
μεμνήσθαι·² καὶ κατοψόμεθα.
ὅτι γῆν μὲν καὶ ὄρη καὶ ποτα
μούς καὶ ὕλην, οὐρανόν τε καὶ
ξύμπαντα καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν
ὄντα καὶ ἰόντα· πρῶτον μὲν
ἀγαπῶμεν ἂν τις τί καὶ βρα
χὺ πρὸς ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν ἂ
πομιμῆσθαι δυνατὸς ἦι· πρὸς
δὲ τούτοις, ἂν οὐδὲν εἰδότεος
ἀκριβέος περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων· οὐ
τε ἐξετάζομεν οὔτε ἐλέγχο
μεν τὰ γεγραμμένα· σκια
γραφίαι δὲ ἀσαφεῖ καὶ ἀπα
τηλῶι χρώμεθα περὶ αὐτά·
τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα ὁπότ' ἂν τις ἐ
πιχειρήῃ σώματα ἀπεικάζειν.
ὁξέως αἰσθανόμενοι τὸ πα
ραλειπόμενον διὰ τὴν αἰεὶ ξύνοι
κον κατανόησιν· χαλεποὶ κριταὶ
γιγνόμεθα τῷ μὴ πάσας πάν
τως τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀποδι
δόντι· ταυτὸν δὴ καὶ κατὰ
τοὺς λόγους ἰδεῖν δεῖ γιγνώ
μενον· ὅτι τὰ μὲν οὐράνια καὶ
θεῖα ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ σμικρῶς
εἰκότα λεγόμενα· τὰ δὲ θνη

THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPT.—We pass now to what may be called our own manuscript, which is known as ‘*U*’ or ‘Clarke 39.’ Its history has a certain romantic interest. It was written, as we shall see, about a thousand years ago, to the order of a scholarly dignitary of the Eastern Church, and is believed still to bear traces of his ownership. These facts we learn from its own pages. Our first historic trace of it is many centuries later. In the Vatican library there is a codex numbered 1205, of the sixteenth century, which, it appears, contains among other things a catalogue of books with the following title, Πίναξ τῶν ἐν τῇ σεβασμῇ μονῇ τῆς Νήσου Πατμου ἀξιολογωτέρων εὑρισκομένων βιβλίων. Of this catalogue Mai says, ‘confectus fuit hic Catalogus regnante Joanne Palaeologo, qui anno 1355 floruit; nec liber recentior occurrit.’ It gives the names of 58 works (νή.); and among the entries is the following, the only one which corresponds to any item in Clarke’s list,

νέ. Λόγοι Σωκράτους, ὧν ἡ ἀρχή· Εὐθύφρων, ἡ περὶ ὁσίου. Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἄχρι τοῦ Μένων, ἡ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν (sic).

There can be no possible doubt about the identity of the work, and we thus learn that the manuscript was in the library of the Monastery of St. John at Patmos in the middle of the fourteenth century, being then more than four hundred years old. In this library, sad to say, it would probably have been left to rot, had it not, like the Elgin marbles, been carried off by a countryman of our own. At the opening of the present century Dr. Edward Daniel Clarke, in the course of his long visit to the countries lying round the Levant, met with the following incident in the island of Cos:—‘A poor little shopkeeper in *Cos* had been mentioned, by the French Consul, as possessor of several curious old books. We therefore went to visit him, and were surprised to find him in the midst of his wares, with a red nightcap on his head, reading the *Odyssey* of Homer in manuscript. This was fairly written upon paper, with interlineary criticisms, and a commentary in the margin. He had other manuscript volumes, containing works upon rhetoric, poetry, history, and theology. Nothing could induce him to part with any of these books. The account he gave was that some of them were copies of originals in the library at Patmos, and that his father had brought them to Cos. They were intended, he said, for his son, who was to be educated in the Patmos monastery.’ The travellers went on their way to Egypt and the Holy Land; but they did not forget the Patmos library, and in 1801 they were again in Cos and making arrangements to visit it.

‘On Tuesday, October the sixth, as we were sitting with the Governor, a Greek officer of the name of Riley arrived. He conversed with great fluency in the Turkish language. Hearing that we intended to visit Patmos he requested a passage thither. On Wednesday our interpreter, Antonio, returned in a small *caïque*, manned by a single family of the Island of *Casos*. The vessel was old, and the large triangular sails were tattered and rotten. It was, in fact, nothing more than an open boat; a man of middle stature with his feet in the hold had at least the half of his body above the deck. [We are reminded, indeed, of Lord Dundonald shaving on board the *Speedy*, with his looking-glass on deck and his feet in the cabin.] We hired this vessel, and by the next evening we were desired to embark. At eight o’clock we were under weigh: a land breeze drove us smoothly along; and the *Casiots* began their evening hymn. This reminded us of a passage in Longus, who, in the very seas we were now traversing, describes a similar custom: ‘while they rowed, one of the crew sang to them:—

οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ, καθάπερ χορὸς, ὁμοφώνως
κατὰ καιρὸν τῆς ἐκείνου φωνῆς ἐβόων.’

The next morning, October the ninth, SAMOS appeared most beautifully in view, covered by a silvery mist, softening every object, but concealing none. At eleven o’clock A.M. we entered the port of Ia Scala¹ in Patmos. In order to prevent our *caïque* from being fired at, as a pirate

II. CLARKE
MANUSCRIPT.

Migne, Bibl. Pat-
rum Graeca, vol.
149, cols. 1047 ff.

Travels, etc.
E. D. Clarke,
LL.D., Fourth
Ed. vol. III. ch.
vii., p. 263 ff.,
freely condensed.

Discovery of the
Manuscript.
Vol. VI. i. Pat-
mos.

Lib. iii. Paris,
1778.

¹ It may have
been so called
from the steep
ascent to the
Monastery,
which begins at
the landing place.

vessel (which she probably had been), we had hoisted an *English* flag [thus drawing upon themselves the taunts of Frenchmen on their way home from the campaign in Egypt, "Pavillon Anglais! Tremblez, Messieurs!"]. The monastery of the *Apocalypse* is situate two miles and a half from the quay, upon the top of a mountain in the highest part of all the island, close to the town of *Patmos*. We set off, without further delay, for the Convent. The ascent is steep and rugged, but practicable for asses and mules. When we arrived at the monastery, we were quite struck by its size and substantial appearance.' It may be explained that *Patmos* has a west coast running pretty fairly north and south, from the extremities of which two lobes run off irregularly to the eastward, being separated by a deep bay, which almost cuts the island in two, like an ill-shaped sand glass. The very innermost recess of this bay is the harbour of *La Scala*, from which the town and monastery lie due south. Whilst the travellers are enjoying their unequalled prospect we may seize the opportunity of throwing our extracts into such divisions as will contrast the view seen from without with the circumstances existing within.

WITHOUT.—'It is a very powerful fortress, built upon a steep rock, with several towers and lofty thick walls; and if duly mounted with guns, might be made impregnable. According to *Tournefort*, it is said to have been founded by *Alexius Comnenus*, in consequence of the persuasion of *St. Christodulus*; but *Dapper* relates, that the saint himself founded the monastery, towards the end of the *tenth* century, when he retired to *Patmos*, to avoid the persecution of the *Turks*. Nothing can be more remarkable than the situation of the town, built upon the edge of a vast crater, sloping off, on either side like the roof of a tiled house. *Perry* has compared it to "*an asses back*": upon the highest ridge of which stands the monastery. The inhabitants have no space for exercise, they can only descend and ascend to the harbour. On one of the towers of the monastery, a *look-out* is regularly kept for pirates. We returned to enjoy the prospect from this place. The sight was extremely magnificent. We commanded the whole island of *Amorgos*, which is nearly forty miles from the nearest point of *Patmos*: and were surrounded by many of the grandest objects in the *Archipelago*. As we descended from the great monastery of *St. John*, we turned off, upon our right, to visit a smaller edifice of the same nature, erected over a cave, or grot, where the *Apocalypse* is said to have been written. As to the cave itself, it may be supposed that any other *cave* would have answered the purpose fully as well: it is not spacious enough to have afforded a habitation even for a hermit. There seemed to be something like a school held in the *building* erected about this cave; but the only monk who showed the place to us, and who appeared to superintend the seminary, was not much better informed than his godly brethren in the parent monastery. The women of the island, here collected as it were upon a single point, are so generally handsome, that it is an uncommon sight to meet with any who are otherwise. There are several bells at the monastery, which the monks are frequently ringing. The enjoyment of the noise is considered a great indulgence; bells being prohibited by the *Turks*. Perhaps there is not a spot in the *Archipelago* with more of the semblance of a volcanic origin than *Patmos*, the ports of the island have the appearance of craters. In the evening we amused ourselves in fishing. The harbour appeared as literally swarming with the most beautiful fishes, of all colours; the water being as clear as crystal, the fish, tempted from their haunts among the marine plants were seen distinctly whenever they took the snare. We were much struck by the extraordinary intensity of the deep blue colour of the sea, which is as much a distinguishing characteristic of the *Archipelago* as the brightness of its sky.'

WITHIN.—'We were received by the Superior and by the Bursar of the monastery in the refectory. We asked permission to see the LIBRARY, which was readily granted. We entered a small oblong chamber, having a vaulted stone roof; and found it to be nearly filled with

books, of all sizes, in a most neglected state; some lying upon the floor, a prey to the damp and to worms; others standing upon shelves, but without any kind of order. The books upon the shelves were all printed volumes; for these being more modern, were regarded as the more valuable, and had a better station assigned them than the rest, many of which were considered only as so much rubbish. Some of the printed books were tolerably well bound, and in good condition. The Superior said, these were his favourites; but when we took down one or two of them to examine their contents, we discovered that neither the Superior nor his colleague were able to read. They had a confused traditionary recollection of the names of some of them, but knew no more of their contents than the Grand Signior. At the extremity of this chamber, which is opposite to the window, a considerable number of old volumes of parchment, some with covers and some without, were heaped upon the floor, in the utmost disorder; and there were evident proofs that these had been cast aside, and condemned to answer any purpose for which the parchment might be required. When we asked the Superior what they were? he replied, turning up his nose with an expression of indifference and contempt, *Χειρόγραφα!* It was, indeed, a moment in which a literary traveller might be supposed to doubt the evidence of his senses; for the whole of this contemned heap consisted entirely of *Greek* manuscripts, and some of them were of the highest antiquity. What was to be done? We referred the matter to Mr. *Riley*, as to a person habituated in dealing with knavish Greeks; and presently such a jabbering took place, accompanied with so many significant shrugs, winks, nods, and grimaces, that it was plain something like a negotiation was going on. The author, meanwhile, continued to inspect the heap; and had soon selected the fairest specimen of Grecian caligraphy which has descended to modern times. It was a copy of the twenty-four first Dialogues of *Plato*, written throughout upon vellum, in the same exquisite character; concluding with a date, and the name of the caligraphist. It was a single volume in folio, bound in wood. The cover was full of worms and falling to pieces: a paper label appeared on the back, inscribed, in a modern hand, *Διάλογοι Σωκράτους*: but ^{see ciii.} the letters of *Plato's* name, separated by stars, appeared very distinctly as a head-piece to the first page of the manuscript. After removing these volumes all further enquiry was stopped by Mr. *Riley*. He concealed two of the smaller volumes in his *Turkish* habit, entrusting to the honour of the two *Caloyers* the task of conveying the others on board our vessel. The next day we were again admitted to the Library. Some of the inhabitants of the town thought proper to accompany us. The Superior took occasion to assure us, that both he and the Bursar were willing enough to part with the *χειρόγραφα*; but that if it were known to have brought them any gain, the people of *Patmos*, acting as spies for the *Capudan Pasha*, would make it the cause of a very heavy imposition upon the monastery. This day we dined with the monks.

The scene now changes to the deck of the caique. The *Capudan Pasha* referred to, is, no doubt, identical with the *Capitan Pasha* often mentioned in *Finlay's History*. He seems to have been a sort of high admiral with charge of the islands and coasts of the *Aegean*.

'The *Capudan Pasha's* letter enabled us to order bread from the island for our voyage; and this the monks promised to see provided. . . . The whole of Sunday, *October* the eleventh, was passed in great anxiety, being the day on which the Superior had engaged to send the remaining manuscripts. Mr. *Riley* had left and we began to fear, as evening approached, that his absence might become the pretext for a breach of contract. Towards sunset, being upon the deck of our caique and looking towards the mountain, we discerned a person coming down the steep descent from the monastery towards the port: presently, as he drew near, we perceived that he had a large basket upon his head, and that

he was coming towards the quay, opposite to the spot where our vessel was at anchor. Upon his arrival, we saw him making signs for a boat; and we sent to him the little skiff belonging to our caique. As he came alongside, he said, aloud, that he had brought the *bread* ordered for us; but coming upon deck, he gave a significant wink, and told us the Superior desired that we would 'empty the basket ourselves, and count the loaves, to see that all was right.' We took the hint, and hurried with the precious charge into our berth; where, having turned the basket bottom upwards, we found, to our great joy, the manuscript of PLATO, the POEMS OF GREGORY, the works of PHILE, with the other Tracts, the two volumes containing the *Greek Musical Notes*, and the volume of Miscellanies containing the LEXICON OF ST. CYRILL: these we instantly concealed beneath a mattress in one of our cots; and making a grand display of the loaves, returned with the basket upon deck, giving a handsome present to the porter, and desiring he would inform the Superior, with our most grateful acknowledgments, that '*all was perfectly right.*' Having set him again on shore, we gave orders to our captain to have everything ready for sailing the next morning, and to stand out of the port as soon after sunrise as possible; intending to leave *Patmos*. In this design we were, however, disappointed.' When a few days later they insisted on putting to sea, they found, as their captain had predicted, that a furious storm was raging outside. 'We [ch. ii.] passed like lightning within a cable's length of some dreadful rocks, over which the sea was dashing as high as our mast head; until getting under the lee, to the *south* of *Naxos*, we ran the vessel aground, close to a small creek, upon some white sand. Like true shipwrecked mariners, wet to the skin, and without a dry thread on board, we opened all our stores upon the rocks to expose our clothes to the beams of the sun. Every article of our linen was completely soaked; but, to our great joy, the *Patmos Manuscripts* had escaped, and were safe. We had put them into a small but stout wooden box in the stern of the vessel; and had covered this with every article of canvas, etc., that could be collected.' In a note, Dr. Clarke adds, 'This manuscript [the Plato] after the author's return to England, remained in the hands of his friend the late Professor *Porson* until his death.' In 1809 it was bought by the Curators of the Bodleian Library.

Contents.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΙ Κ.Δ.
EYΘ-MENΩN
M.S.
A.C. D.CCC.XCVI.
MS. Clark. 39

The following is Gaisford's entry in the Catalogue of the Library:—

39 CODEX membranaceus ff. 418, anno 896 exaratus
PLATONIS Dialogi xxiv. hoc ordine

then follows the list, to which the scholia are added. The book which is bound somewhat handsomely in leather of a chocolate brown has the annexed title on its back.

The boards are lined with vellum. On the lining of the first are the following interesting entries:—

1. At the top—'Clark 39. Totum hunc codicem ad edit. H. Stephani diligenter contuli. T. G. 31 Aug. 1813.'

Prof. Gaisford published this as *Lectiones Platonicae*.

2. A little lower, apparently by Porson, comes:—

'Idem scriba, qui totum codicem exaravit, tetralogias et dialogos numeravit.'

3. Near the middle, also by him (?) :—

'Numeri, atramento scripti, e registro evanuerunt.' Which seems to refer to the register of quaternions on the flyleaf opposite.

Then follow four leaves of clean vellum, the face of the first being occupied by an index of the dialogues in two columns, and below it the register just mentioned, chiefly in red but with some

black entries. These are most exquisitely written and have at the top this note, apparently by Gaisford :—

‘Tabula quae sequitur, a manu est eruditissimi viri

Ricardi Porson, A.M., Gr. L. Prof. Cant.’

After these leaves come two smaller ones terribly discoloured, and covered with some Aristotelian matter in a late hand, which is discussed by Schanz. We now reach the text, which we tabulate by title and conclusion, premising that the style may be gathered from our facsimiles and that the titles occur at all positions in the page; only the first is designedly in the upper margin, others being there by accident merely.

Title 11.		Π·Λ·Α·Τ·Ω·Ν·Ο·Σ		TETRAL. I.	
top		A			
	Eὐθύφρων	ἡ	π ^ε 'Οσίου πειραστικός	The title is very much faded, the first word having lost all its ink.	
	[A]			The central A marks the tetralogy, the marginal A of the dialogue is gone. Below the flourish after the conclusion stands in the middle of the page a very finely formed Δ, with leaf ornament.	
End 7 v.			Πλάτωνος Εὐθύφρων ἡ π ^ε 'Οσι ^υ ,		
foot					
8 r.	'Απολογία		Σωκράτους ἡθικός	B faint, ἡθικός reddish. Here also follows a beautiful Δ; for ornament see text, p. 29, top.	
top	B				
20 r.			'Απολογία Σωκράτους		
foot					
20 v.			π ^ε Πρακτοῦ ἡθικός	The outer margin of 20 is gone; but there is room for Κρίτων in the title, of which, however, there seems no trace, either directly or by marks of damp ink (as there is of ἡθικός and π ^ε) on next page.	
top	[Γ]			Δ follows again.	
26 r.	Κρίτων		ἡ περὶ Πρακτοῦ	ἡθικός is clearly later, and seems to have been touched before it was dry. Δ again.	
26 r. 27	Φαίδων	ἡ	π ^ε Ψυχῆς ἡθικός		
	Δ				
58 r.			Φαίδων ἡ περὶ Ψυχῆς		
		B			
58 r. 13	Κρατύλος	ἡ π ^ε 'Ονομάτων ὀρθότητος λογικός		Contractions for want of room. Conclusion on a scrape in lower margin: below the usual ornament, whose left side is very elaborate, there is another long scrape.	
	E				
82 v. 34			Κρατύλ ^ο ἡ π ^ε 'Ονομά ^τ ὀρ ^θ		
83 r.	Θεαίτητος	ἡ	π ^ε 'Επιστήμης	The title on a scrape in upper margin has lines ruled for it. A patch at the outer part of the vellum hides any adjective in -κός.	
top	S				
113 r.			Θεαίτητος ἡ περὶ 'Επιστήμης		

II.

113r.21 Σοφιστής ἡ π^ε τοῦ ὄντος λογικ^ο, The adjective is clearly redder than
Z the rest.

136 v. Σοφιστής ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος

136v.30 Πολιτικός ἡ π^ε Βασιλείας λογικ^ο, Second half of title is dark; the
H adjective is as in the last case.

154 r. Πολιτικ^ο ἡ π^ε Βασιλείας

Γ
Θ See the text and facsimile.

III.
The adjective as above.

173r.13 Φίληβος ἡ π^ε Ἑδονῆς ἡθικ^ο, Adjective clearly different ink.
I

198 v. Φίληβος ἡ π^ε Ἑδονῆς

198v.30 Συμπόσιον ἡ π^ε Ἑρωτος ἡθικ^ο, The mark ^ε refers to an alternative
IA title in the outer margin π^ε ἀγαθ^ο
223v.34 Συμπόσιον ἡ π^ε Ἑρωτος flour. which, like the ἡθικός, is reddish.
Four leaf ornaments follow the
conclusion instead of the usual
flourish below.

Λ

224 r. Φαῖδρος ἡ π^ε Καλοῦ ἡθικ^ο, Title in upper margin with a red
top IB line for it. Above it is I^εΔ.
248r.34 Φαῖδρος ἡ π^ε Καλοῦ flour. ἡθικός is faint red. The sign
above καλοῦ has nothing to an-
swer it, as the margin is cut away.
No flourish below the ending.

Δ
248 v. Ἀλκιβιάδης α'. ἡ π^ε Φύσεως ἀνθρώπου μαιεντικ^ο, Title in upper margin with a coarse
top II' red line through it. Above Δ is
263 r. Ἀλκιβιάδ^ε ἡ π^ε Φύσε^ε ἀν^οου a careless IE. The conclusion is
darker than the text.

263r.21 „ β'. ἡ π^ε Προσευχῆς „ The adjective differs and is redder;
ID both title and conclusion are
269 v. β' Ἀλκιβιάδης ἡ π^ε προσευχῆς darker than the text.

269 v. 24	Ἰππαρχος	ἡ	Φιλοκερδής	ἡθικ ^ο ,	ἡθικός differs and is redder.
	IE				
273 r.			Ἰππαρχ ^ο ἡ Φιλοκερδ ^ς		
273 r. 22	Ἐρασταί	ἡ	π ^ε Φιλοσοφίας	ἡθικ ^ο ,	In the margin is ἀντ ^ς εραστ ^ς , which with ἡθικός differs in character from the rest. The conclusion is dark.
	IS				
277 r.			Ἐρασταί ἡ περὶ Φιλοσοφίας		
		E		V.	
277 r. 9	Θεάγης	ἡ	π ^ε Σωφροσύνης	μαιευτικ ^ο ,	In the margin is φιλοσοφί ^ς , which with the adjective is redder than the rest. The conclusion is darker.
	IZ				
282 r.			Θεάγης ἡ περὶ Σωφροσύνης		
282 r. 27	Χαρμίδης	ἡ	π ^ε Σωφροσύ ^ς	πειραστικ ^ο	The adjective differs, and is redder. The conclusion is darker.
	IH				
294 v.			Χαρμίδης ἡ π ^ε Σωφροσύνης		
295 r.	Λάχης	ἡ	π ^ε Ἀνδρίας	μαιευτικ ^ο ,	Title in upper margin with a red line: above it KA slightly dim, by a later hand. The adjective is faint red.
top	IΘ				
307 r.			Λάχης ἡ περὶ Ἀνδρίας		
307 r. 9	Λύσις	ἡ	π ^ε Φιλίας	μαιευτικ ^ο ,	The adjective differs and is redder, the conclusion comes below the flourish, but is in the same ink as the text.
	K				
317 r.			Λύσις ἡ π ^ε Φιλίας		
		S		VI.	
317 v.	Εὐθύδημος	ἡ	Ἐριστικός	ἀνατρεπτικ ^ο ,	Title in upper margin: S of tetralogy in red. This letter, Εὐθύδημος, K and initial T, all leave a clear impression on the next page. The name, whose ink is gone, is carelessly rewritten later in brown. ἀνατρ. resembles the title. The conclusion is below the flourish.
top	KA				
336 r.			Εὐθύδημος ἡ ἐριστικός		
336 r. 7	Πρωταγόρας	ἡ	Σοφισταί	ἐνδεικτικ ^ο ,	The adjective differs.
	KB				
368 v.			Πρωταγόρ ^ς ἡ Σοφισταί		

368v.11	Γοργίας	ἦ	π'Ρητορικῆς	ἀνατρεπτικ ^ο	The adjective differs, and is redder.
	ΚΓ				To get the conclusion into the line the usual preceding :~ has been erased.
405 r.			Γοργίας ἦ	π'Ρητορικῆς	
405r.11	Μένων	ἦ	π'Αρετῆς	πειραστικ ^ο	The adjective differs, and is redder.
	ΚΔ				
418 v.					See facsimile

Here follows the Colophon or
Subscriptio, of which hereafter.

Then come three leaves covered with stains, and 'manibus inelegantissimis polluta in quorum secundo index dialogorum inscriptus est' (Schanz). These have been formerly bound in a reversed position, as some of the letters of the colophon are impressed upon them in that attitude. Finally three clean leaves have been inserted at the end by the binder.

Style and details.

The vellum of \mathfrak{A} is distinctly less robust than that of A, and sometimes rather delicate. Setting aside the binding, the measurements of the codex are $32.2 \times 21.6 \times 7.6$ centimetres, or with the binding, $33.6 \times 23.3 \times 8.9$; in the course of binding some of the leaves have got slightly out of true line laterally or vertically. As will be seen, the writing is not in columns; the written space measures pretty exactly 20.3×14.6 . The widths of the margins are, with slight variations, inner 2, upper 4.5, outer 7, lower 7.6; the upper and still more the lower are curtailed in the facsimiles. The quaternions or, as Porson calls them, plagulae, are 52 and a half. In numbering the leaves Porson has missed two, and afterwards marked them 111*, 359*, so that the total comes to 420: in the table above, the paging is after Porson's. The twentieth quaternion, beginning after fol. 151, has got displaced, and is bound up after the forty-fifth, so as to be numbered ff. 352-59: Porson at first thought it lost, but found out and noted the facts in his exquisite hand. Thus eight leaves in our table, representing, according to Porson, Steph. II. 289D $\chi\rho\eta$ —307A $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha\iota\varsigma$, must be taken from the Protagoras and added to the Politicus. The quaternions were lettered as in our edition, page 29, but very much nearer the outer edge: Porson's list, which gives those that remain in red and those that are lost in black, no longer quite agrees with the facts, which are these:—

1. A has been renewed.
2. IA, IB, ΚΓ, ΔΔ, MS, MZ, MΘ, N, NA, ΝΓ can be read with ease.
MB, ΜΓ, ΜΔ, ME, MH can be read but not easily.
B, H, ΙΓ, KA, KB, ΚΔ, KZ, ΔA, ΔB, ΔΓ, ΔE, M show slight or all but invisible traces.
3. Γ, S, Z, H, ΙΔ, IZ, KE, KΘ, ΔS, ΔZ, ΔΘ, NA, NB, ΝΓ, with others that are legible, show a reversed trace of themselves on the previous page.
4. E, Θ, I, IH, K, KH, ΔH, MA are totally gone, and in the places where Δ, IE, IS, IΘ, KS, Δ were the vellum has become perforated or is otherwise injured. The letters which are entire closely resemble those of the second part of the subscriptio. The margin of 184 is torn away, yet KE show reversed on 183 v., which proves that the injury was later than the lettering.

p. xcvi.

The method of ruling is quite analogous to that of the Paris Ms., but simpler from the absence of columns in the page. In each page there are two double perpendicular lines bounding the written space on left and right. These and the first and last of the lines used for writing extend to the edge of the vellum, while the other lines for writing are drawn exactly on

the principle of those in Paris A. The arrangement of the four pieces in each quaternion is this. The piece containing ff. 1 and 8 is laid with the projecting lines downwards, that containing ff. 2, 7 has them upwards, and the two remaining pieces repeat this arrangement. The writing hangs a little irregularly from the lines, and is of a dark brown in the text, and in most of the marginal additions: there are, however, as we have seen, traces of red in the titles, while some scholia etc. are in black and others in green.

Of the character of the writing the examples will be the best exponents. The following letters have two forms:—

- α = α β the latter rare and generally at the ends of lines.
 γ = γ ρ the latter rare, sometimes marking paragraphs.
 ε = ε ς the latter very rare, cursive; Plate III. foot; a third form Ϸ is used in combination.
 ζ two forms analogous to those of ξ below: see Plate III. 29, 28.
 κ = κ κ both are found; the latter not frequent.
 λ = λ λ both common, singly or double.
 ν = ν ω the latter common after ν, as in οὐν νυν, with which it combines: it occurs Plate III. 2 ἀδύνατον, and elsewhere. This form of ν is almost indistinguishable from β and ν in some cases.
 ξ = ξ Ϸ Plate III. 3, 5; former less frequent. Compare ζ.
 τ = τ γ the latter cursive, chiefly in combination. It is almost identical with γ.

In the cases of α, γ, ζ, κ, ξ, one of the forms is a survival of the older majuscule writing common up to the eighth century. Its forms gradually reasserted themselves in later minuscule Mss.

There is a considerable amount of ligature used in the writing: the connection being specially close between the letters ει, εσ, σπ, εστ. But there is almost no contraction save the usual Ϻ for καὶ, and that generally at the end of a line with a view to economise room. Words divided between lines are not connected in any way, and all consonant groups which can be initial are carried to the next line: even κ in οὐκ is so treated. Iota subscript is always postscript, and sometimes small and dark as if inserted afterwards. Both ι and ν are usually larger at the beginning of a word, and then have as a rule ¨ over them. The letters which project into the left margin indicate that a new paragraph has begun, either with them or in the previous line. They are not, as a rule, majuscules, but minuscules of considerably larger size than the text. While very like the text, they look in a good many cases as if patched on after an erasure; which seems to point to the idea that the constitution of a paragraph in the particular case was an afterthought. Instances are 8 r. 25, 8 v. 31, 9 r. 7, 16, 23, 74 v., 208 r. 29, 220 v. 18 (this is an 'Arethas α'), 231 v. 16, 240 r. 29, 256 v. 14, 257 v. 17, 295 r. 27, 395 v. 8, 400 v. 27. The Ms. is quite appreciably more ornamented than A: this appears not merely in the flourishes which are seen in the facsimiles, but likewise in the initial letters of the dialogues. The first of these is illegible, but most of the others are clear and handsomely formed, although in the usual brown ink of the text. The following general observations on the writing may be useful, while there are minor variations in size, colour, and such matters:—

1. The text seems to be by one hand throughout.
2. The titles, endings, flourishes, and initial letters seem to be by one hand; very likely the original one, but after the text was finished. The concluding adjectives in -κος, however, are by a different hand.

To a very early hand belong also those letters alphabetically arranged in the margin of the Cratylus and Symposium, to which Schanz refers as measures of the contents—similar letters in the Theaetetus he regards as divisions of the argument. They occur at almost equal intervals, varying from 68 to 71 lines, but occasionally including from 72 to 75, which he says mark a uniform quantity in a previous Ms. Supposing the numbering to be at every hundredth line, then the number of letters of text included in each division yields when divided by 100 an average line of $35\frac{1}{2}$ in the Cratylus and $34\frac{1}{2}$ in the Symposium. Now all the known cases, says the late Ch. Graux on this subject, 'donnent régulièrement pour la valeur du stique (or στίχος) de 34 à 38 lettres environ, ce qui revient à quinze ou seize syllabes,' which forms the average length of the hexameter. And Birt considers that this was the normal length in works designed for the great literary market.

ii. Besides the late black and green hands (the latter of which, besides noting the speakers at the opening of the Cratylus, appears on the following pages at least 1 r., 8 r., 13 r., 24 v. 28, 53 r., 60 v., 65 v., 74 v., 83 v., then on 224 v., a long note on 225 v., and next 368 v.), there is a brutal brown hand which inserts in contracted form between the lines the names of the speakers in the Phaedo, Hipparchus, Theages; patches the words which happen to be injured at the outer ends of the top lines; supplies gaps (236-7), and makes notes. His symbols, C⁷^/, etc., seem to begin at 256. It may be said that wherever the speakers are noted it is done by a late hand, which is very different from the practice in A.

iii. The last hand is that of Porson, who uses bright red ink, and adorns the page wherever he touches it. Besides numbering the leaves, he has noted at several points the corresponding pp. of Aldus. Thus, at the beginning, he enters 'PAG 1 ed. ALD.,' on p. 8 r. he has '9 ed. ALD.,' sometimes, as in the Parmenides, he inserts the number of the page alone; finally he points out the misplaced quaternion.

There are also evidences of correction in the manuscript; and here a nice question arises. We have seen above that the dialogues of the first tetralogy are marked at the close with a very elegant Δ. It is clear that this letter is not a numeral, both because of its recurrence and because it has not the usual stroke above it. Does it represent the word διωρθώθη or διώρθωσα? Not improbably. It is a tempting thing to suppose that ΓΔ at the top of 224 r., which precedes the Phaedrus, means 'Ιωάννης διώρθωσα; but this is far from likely. The Δ does not look old, and we must note that above the next dialogue in the same position stands ΙΕ, while above the Laches stands ΚΑ, all which facts point to a numerical signification in this case.

1. As in the Paris Ms., there are additions made in the margins to complete the text where omissions had occurred in transcription. We give noteworthy cases of this without pretending that they form a complete list. While the text is put on that side of the page which corresponds to its position in the original, the marginal additions are distinguished by smaller type.

4 r. 15	τοῦσιν	ἀμφισβη	τοῖσιν ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβη	Caused by the double ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. The addition is in small minuscules inclining to the right: not original.	1. Euth.
5 v. 32 (following the correction στέρξαντα).	Caused by the double αἰδώς. Style somewhat like No. 1.	÷ ἐγὼ οὐκ οὕτως διαφέρωμαι τῷ ποιητῇ· εἰπω σοι ὅτι; πάντες γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἵνα δέος ἔσθαι καὶ αἰδώς·	ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς· ÷ πολλοὶ γὰρ	ἵνα γὰρ δέος·	2. "

3. Apol. 16 r. 15 ὑπεσχόμεν μῆδεν ἢ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα, μήτε ἐδί Small, not very neat,
μηδὲν πώποτε τι μαθεῖν δαξα εἰ δέ τις φησὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ dark red brown.
4. Crat. 22 r. 24 ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν ἴ. οὐδὲ πάντων. Seems to be the same
τὰς δ' οὐ; ἴ. τί φησ. ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν hand as No. 1. (?)
τῶν δ' οὐ;
5. " 24 v. 14 ἴ. • ὅποι ἂν βούληται ἴ. ὑμῶν
Caused by double καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν, τῶν νό
βούληται. Opposite μων ἐμποδῶν ἐστὶ. οὐδ' ἂ-
ll. 16-18: small, and παγορεύει, ἐὰν τε τίς βοῦ
like Nos. 1, 4. ληται
This hand appears twice on 32 r.; on 33 v. it gives a various reading; on 46 v. three short additions; on 48 r. a correction, and appears repeatedly in this dialogue—the Phaedo.
6. Phaedo. 51 r. and v. (34-1) ἴ. οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ ὁ ἂν σώ-
This hand is very νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι δ ἂν ματι τί ἐγγένηται ἴ. περιττὸς ἔσται
small and neat; νόσος ἀλλ' ὧ ἂν πυρετός
it makes many οὐδ' ὧ ἂν ἀριθμῶ τί ἐγγένηται
small changes from
page to page.
7. Cratylus. 58 r. 21 ὁ δὲ ὁμολογεῖ [gap of 6 letters] αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ ὄνομα εἶναι· τί δαί Same as No. 6
8. " 61 r. 14 ἐξαίφνης πεισθῆναι ἀλλὰ δοκῶ μοι ὡς ἂν μᾶλλον πεισθήσεσθαι σε εἴ. Between the ' '
μοι δείξαις is the note. Dots show scrapes. Seems the
same hand, as 6, 7.
9. Theaetet. 91 r. 16 ἡ δὲν. ἡ γιγνόμενον, οὐτ' αὐτῷ λεκτέον, οὐτ' ἄλλον λέγον Same, but less careful.
On 105 v.—106 r. this hand gives three various readings of considerable length, prefacing one by what seems to be ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ταῦτα, and another by ἐν ἄλλῃ οὕτως.
10. Parmen. For this one see our text page 33. It stands below line 26 and on line 27 with a dumb line between on which its first portion rests. It closely resembles No. 3.
11. Philebus. 178 v. 16 ἴ. μᾶλλον διχῇ διαλάβωμεν ἄττα.
Caused by δ' εἰ βούλει· τριχῇ: καθοτι φρά-
λάβωμεν. ζοις ἂν: λαβωμεν
This is the hand
of 6-9, but some-
what rough. On 188 r. the same hand gives a various reading with γρ. At 229 r. there is a long v. r. preceded by ἐν ἄλλῃ: a very fine pen has been used, the writing being smaller and neater than the one on 105-6.

256 r. 24 ἡ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὡς οἱ μὲν ἡρακλέους οἱ δὲ ἀχαιμένους ἐκγονοί· The ink is slightly 12. Alcib. i.
τὸ (ras?) ἀχαιμένους εἰς περσέα τὸ δ' ἡρακλέους τε γένος δ' brighter than the text,
but this looks like the
first hand.

270 v. 31 13. Hipparch.
Ink tawny and ἴ· εἶναι ὠφελεῖσθαι : τι μεν ἴ· βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντας
writing slightly care- οὐδ' ἂν τοῦτο : οὐτι δ' τοδε
less ; last μ γ μ ν αὐτῷ προσωμολογή
in capitals. It σαμεν.
seems early.

371 r., 17 14. Gorgias.
κ' ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ An addition : it is
βουλευτάς· certainly early.

398 v. 5 15. "
α μ α are ἴ· τὴν τέχνην νομικὴν
capitals. ἡ οὐκ ἐπιστά
Certainly early. μεθα.

2. Another form of correction is erasure. We have seen that this occurs in the titles or endings of several dialogues. It also appears in the body of the text, nor is the alteration that frequently occurs upon it always the work of the first hand. Thus in the *Parmenides* and also elsewhere, besides repeated changes of τί δέ into τί δαί, φᾶναι is very frequently altered to φάναι. Of the κ in οὐκ we have already spoken. cxi.

3. Sometimes gaps occur without erasure: thus Schanz says 'in Protagora licet videre lacunas complures manu recentissima suppletas: concludere igitur debes codicem e quo Clarkianus derivatus est hic non potuisse legi. Suppleta autem sunt p. 329 c haec: ἐν τ[ῇ ψυχῇ]; [γὰρ οὐ δ]; πεμ[ψειε]; καὶ [αὖ]—post δικαιοσύνην spatium vacuum; p. 329 d [ἕτερα τῶν]; [ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ]; με[γέθει].' In the same dialogue we have 341 r., 6 οὕτως [space of 3 letters] ἡγοῦμαι.

4. A fruitful source of difficulty is, as under the circumstances was natural, external injury. The codex has received at some time a severe squeeze which has left a bend or 'crumple' in the parchment up the middle of the pages. The outer angles also have both suffered from a 'dog-ear' fold which almost always reaches and has injured the first or last letters in the first and last two lines of the page, which letters accordingly are often patched in a recent hand either brown or black. The injury just noted, especially at the upper corners, is considerably increased by the action of damp, which is traceable all through the Ms., and has often destroyed matter written in the upper margin. From the beginning to fol. 44, and from fol. 413 to the end in particular the leaves are so injured by damp and friction—probably the boards had been lost—that a great deal of recent restoration has been necessary, as may be seen from facsimile 1. of p. 418 v. All the ink is gone from the initial word ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ and only the shapes of the letters remain. The parchment at its thinnest parts has holes which seem original, and which accordingly cause no injury to the text: but a good deal of damage to the thinner sheets has since been done, often accompanied by slight loss to the text. Thus near the foot of fol. 2 there is a hole with this result—

2 r. 32	Euthyphr. 5 B	ἐκείνῳ	2 v. Euthyphr. 6 A	φήσει
33		πρεσβυτεροῦ	6 B	εὐείδοσι
34		διδασκοντα		ἐυχωρεῖν

The gaps (underlined) in l. 33 are supplied in the outer margins, those in 34 below, by the ugly brown hand. Again, we have the part destroyed by a dark acid, which has been referred to in connection with Vat. Δ: this affects both sides of two leaves.

236 r. 9	Phaedr. 252 E	τοιοντος	236 v. Phaedr. 253 E	μετὰ κέντρων
10		τότε ἐπι		ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα
11		μετερχονται		γαργαλισμοῦτε
237 r. 9	„ 254 E	γνάθου	237 v. „ 255 E	παραπλησίω
10		ἐρείσας		-κείσθαι καὶ
11		ὀπνηρόσ		συγκοιμήσει

Of these the second and third passages together with discoloured words in lines 8 and 12 are supplied by a later hand in the outer margin: the first and last are not supplied, which seems to show that the acid had not at the time eaten through the two leaves. Sometimes the injury is made good by adding new parchment and writing upon that. This is so in the outer margin of fol. 20, but the injury is confined to the beginnings of lines 1-17 on the back, and is greatest towards the top. Again, f. 21 (Crito 45 B etc.) is so patched, the injury being at the beginnings of lines 1-6, 8, 9 on the back: f. 35 (Phaedo 73 E etc.) on the front has lost letters at the ends of ll. 1. 3-24, and on the back letters at the beginnings of 1-11: f. 38 (Phaedo 79 c, 80 c) has a hole filled up near the ends of 1-6 on the front, and near the beginnings of 1-7 on the back: f. 83, see title of Theaetetus: f. 178 r. (Phileb. 21 E) 'schedula allita abscondit literas extremas versuum septem ita tamen ut folio contra lucem verso possint legi,' (Schanz): fol. 189 r. (Phileb. 45 E) a patch at the outer side conceals four letters in lines 1, 2, two letters in lines 3, 4, 6, one letter in lines 5, 7, 8, 9. There are also places where the margin is cut or worn away without being replaced: ff. 157, 159 are cut away in the Parmenides but no injury has ensued. The chief scene of such accidents is the Philebus: in f. 184 the text on both sides is injured for 13 lines: in f. 185 for two, 186 for one, 187 for three, 188 for two. Part of a scholium is lost by a cutting of the margin of f. 224 at the beginning of the Phaedrus. A good many yellow spots of wax, cedar oil or some such substance are scattered over the pages of the Ms.

Subscriptio, with notes, chiefly on Arethas, owner of the Ms.

We now come to the Subscriptio. The writing is small majuscules, which are clearer in the original than in the facsimile. The words are as follows, and to these notes are added:—

21. ἐγράφη χειρὶ ἰω καλλιγράφου
εὐτυχῶς ἀρέθαι διακόνωι πα
τρεὶ νομισμάτων βυζαντί
ων δέκα κ' τριῶν μηνὶ νοεμ

The letters αφη χει φου
πα
ντι
οεμ

25. βρίωι ἰνδικτιῶν ἰ.δ. ἔτει κόσμ⁸
ςυδ βασιλείας λέοντος τοῦ φι
λοχ^υ νιοῦ βασιλείου τοῦ ἀειμνήστου:—
θη

β
λο are retouched: and
αφη χει, ντ, οε, β are impressed on the fly-leaf, reversed.

30. ^{πε}υγραφήσ ^{οο}νν ^{η οο}ιγ ^{*}υπεργαμ νν

* Here are some small letters which cannot be read. There is an abrasion at the end.

21. $\bar{\iota}\omega$ καλλ. 'John, calligraphus,' the writer of the Ms. According to Montfaucon the older term γραμματεὺς was out of date in the times of which palaeography chiefly treats, 'sed passim adhibetur καλλιγράφος, *Calligraphus*, ita dictus, διὰ τὸ εἰς κάλλος γράφειν, ob scribendi elegantiam: ut habet Theophylactus Simocatta, qui sub Mauricio et sequentibus Imperatoribus florebat, lib. 8. c. 13 ubi de nece Mauricii verba facit: ἐδέησε γὰρ ἀνδρά Palaeogr. Gr. Lib. i. cap. v. p. 34. τινα τῶν εἰς κάλλος γραφόντων, ὃν ἐν συνθέσει φωνῆς καλλιγράφον ὀνομάζει τὰ πλήθη. Many calligraphi were called John: Montfaucon's list, however, does not include this one. The date of his nearest Joannes is 955 A.D. The next is in 973 A.D. Gardthausen mentions two besides our Joannes, both of whom are dated as 'saec. ix.-x.' If neither A.D. 582-602. Cap. vi. P. G. 325. be the same as ours—and we know nothing of their writing—they would be contemporaries. Of course the Clarke Plato was not discovered when Montfaucon wrote, and it does not appear that John has signed any other Ms. so as to be identified: but on the evidence of the writing the Laurentian Aristides 60, 3 is held to have been written by him. Allen, Notes on Abbreviations in Gk. Mss. 3.
22. ἀρέθαι διακόνωι πατρεί. 'For deacon Arethas of Patrae.' Let us go backward here. 'Πατρεὺς ὁ ἀπὸ Πατρῶν. ἡ δοτικὴ Πατρεὶ' Patrae—in our period Patras—is a very old Suid. s.v. town on the N.W. of Achaea, a few miles west of the promontory of Rhium, which Strabo describes as ἀπέχον Πατρῶν στάδια τεσσαράκοντα, and is about half way between Corinth and Actium. One might almost suppose that the introduction of the silkworm under Justinian had a baleful effect upon Greece. It was preceded by an irruption of 551 A.D. Slavonians and Huns, and followed by terrible earthquakes, by one of which Patras Procopius, Goth. War, iv. 23. was overwhelmed. Yet the town recovered its strength so far as to repulse unaided a siege by the Slavonians in the course of their further aggressions A.D. 807, at which time it was 'the most flourishing harbour on the west coast of Greece.' Ecclesiastically it was the supposed scene of St. Andrew's Crucifixion, and had become a Christian archbishopric, with a cathedral dedicated to St. Andrew, as early at least as 347 A.D. Finlay, Greece under Rom. 412, Byzant. Emp., 122-24. Judging from the places in which inscriptions have been found it must at one time or other have had, besides the cathedral, at least three monasteries and nine churches, one of which was dedicated to St. Basilus Magnus. St. Andrew having visibly interposed during the siege in 807 it pleased the Emperor Nicephorus—and we must remember that Constantinople was the θρόνος... τοῦ πρωτοκλήτου τῶν Ἀποστόλων Ἀνδρέου—to cede his own share of the spoils to the see, and to make various bishops suffragans of Patras. This was confirmed by the Leo vi. of our subscriptio, in whose ordering of the church Patras was clearly recognised as a metropolitan see. By Andronicus ii. Corp. Inscr. Lat. vol. III., part i. 95; and do. Graec. vol. I., p. 715. No. 1553. Codinus, Parisiis, 1648, p. 364. Finlay ut supra. Palaeologus the rank of the see among the metropolitans was lowered— $\lambda\beta'$ οὕσα εἰς 1282-1328 A.D. $\lambda\theta'$ ὑπεβιβάσθη—on the other hand its archbishop is now one of the exarchs under the patriarch of Constantinople. In this list he is classed as $\kappa\theta'$. ὁ παλαιῶν (there was also a New Patras) Πατρῶν, πάσης Ἀχαΐας, and is one of the ὑπέρτιμοι. Here Arethas was deacon. 'The church of the Nicene age was vexed with the peculiar presumption of the order of Deacons.' What their relations to the bishops often were we gather from Montfaucon 'In Actis vero Concilii Nicaeni secundi, quidam diaconus dicitur Νοτάριος Pal. Graec. 35. τοῦ εὐαγούς Πατριαρχικοῦ σεκρέτου.' Later in life, as we shall see, Arethas had himself a deacon who copied Mss. for him; and from what we know of his own tastes he probably acted in this among other capacities when at Patras. In regard to Arethas personally, we know something of his rank, his library, and his literary work.

In the Bodleian Euclid we find in small majuscules ἐγράφη χειρὶ Στεφάνου κληρικοῦ Fol. 387 v. top.
 η μ σεπτεμβρίωι δ ϵ ζ ἔτει κ , | $\varsigma\tau\zeta\zeta$ — This means, as we shall see, that it was written in

Mélanges Graux,
745-56.

888 A.D. E. Maass, who writes with the authority of an expert, but at the same time rather too much in the spirit of a special pleader, considers that these words were written by Arethas. However that may be, there is no doubt about those which follow them,

on line 5 of the same page, ἐκτησάμην Ἀρέθας πατρὺς τὴν παρούσαν βίβλον ^{οο}νν Δ. If not a native of Patras, then, Arethas was certainly a resident there in 888 A.D. and 'got' a beautiful copy of Euclid for a price which we shall not discuss. If he held any office he does not say so. As our subscriptio tells us, he had the Clarke Plato written for him in 895 A.D.: and now he is a deacon. When next we hear of him he has made a vast stride. The fine Ms. of Clement of Alexandria at Paris, commonly called Paris

Pol. 401 v.

451, bears in beautiful small majuscules the following note ἐγράφη χειρὶ Βαάνους ^τνο· |

Oxford, p. vi.

Ἀρέθα ^χ ἀρεπισκ^π, [✓]καίσαρει | [✓]καππαδοκι· ἔτει κόσμ^δ | ^τσυκβ. The contracted words stand for νοταρίου ἀρχιεπισκόπου καισαρείας καππαδοκίας. Dindorf in his edition of Clement says 'Ἀρέθα ἀρχιεπισκόπ^ω sic codex,' but he is wrong. Our note of the words was copied in facsimile from the Ms. Maass also has the genitive. Here we have, in 913-14 A.D., the fact that Arethas had a notary who copied Clement's works for him when he was archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. He now occupied one of the most exalted positions in the whole Eastern hierarchy. Unless he had been made one of the four Patriarchs or had been granted some great office at court he could not have stood higher. The archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia stands first on the list of metropolitans under the patriarch of Constantinople, he has 41 bishops under him, and is styled ὑπέρτιμος τῶν ὑπερτίμων, καὶ ἐξαρχος πάσης ἀνατολῆς. With regard to notaries Montfaucon says 'Aliud scribarum genus erat τῶν νοταρίων καὶ ταχυγράφων ... ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς τάχος γράφειν ... vocantur item ὀξυγράφοι eodem sensu, σημειογράφοι quasi dicas *Notarum Scribae*, unde vox *Notarius*. Erant autem Notarii *arcanorum Scribae*, τῶν ἀπορρήτων γραμμάτων ... Notariorum quidam numerus penes Imperatorem erat.' He goes on to cite this case as proof that archbishops and patriarchs had private notaries. The name Βαάνης is transliterated by Finlay in another connection as Vahan, and oddly we notice in recent papers a reference to one Wahan Effendi. At Moscow there is a Ms. of dogmatic works, the subscriptio to which as given by Maass is Στυλιανὸς διάκονος ἔγραψα Ἀρέθα ἀρχιεπισκόπ^ω καισαρείας Καππαδοκίας ἔτει κόσμ^δ | ^{συμ}ινδικτιώνος πέμ-
πτης μηνὶ | ἀπριλίῳ συμπληρῶ | θέντος τοῦ τεύχους. This is our last certain date in the life of Arethas, A.D. 932. He has now a deacon as calligraphus and his library seems to be taking a clerical turn. Perhaps we may quote, on the chance of its being to the point, the following passage from the subscriptio to Paris 781, a Ms. of John

Codinus, 406.
p. 35.

Chrysostom, ἐγράφη χειρὶ ^{ου}στυλν (Στυλιανού?) τοῦ ^{ου}ταλα· | ^{ου}εὐκλεεστάτῳ ^{ου}Καλοκυρῳ· ^{ου}πρωτο
^{ου}σπ (σπαθαριῳ?) ^{ου}τω παν (-λαβεστάτῳ?) | ^{ου}νομμ ^{ου}βυζαν ^{ου}ξ· ^{ου}μ ^{ου}γανν. ^{ου}ιν ^{ου}ιβ· ^{ου}ἔτει ^{ου}κοσμ ^{ου}γνμξ.
The date is now A.D. 939, and in that year we seem to have a Stylianus writing for a new master and calling himself ὁ τάλας—could it be that Arethas was dead? On the other hand, if Maass is right in reading Στυλιανὸς διάκονος for στυλια ... (τ)ζαούτζ, and ascribing the note in which it occurs in Luciani Cod. Vindobon. to Arethas, it is clear that Arethas survived a person of that name. But he is obviously in error. Du Cange under the word Τζαούτζιοι says 'Officiales Turcici, Transiit a Turcis eadem appellatio, atque adeo dignitas, in Aulam Imperatorum Constantinopolitanorum. Nam—ut omittam Stylianum, cujus filiam Zoen in uxorem duxit Leo Philosophus, quem

Gloss.
Graec.

Στυλιανὸν Τζαούτζαν vocat Leo Grammaticus (ut et Codex Regius 2023 Ζαουτζᾶν Scylitzes et Zonaras) cum incertum sit an cognomen fuerit Styliani an vero nomen dignitatis—scribit Acropolita cap. 60,' etc. This clearly is the person to whom the note ascribed to Arethas refers, and, as he was father-in-law to the Emperor Leo of this subscriptio, Arethas might have alluded to him even before the date at which that was written. According to Gardthausen some 65 dated Greek Mss. have been saved to us up to the period of 1000 A.D. We have now seen that four of these owe their preservation to Arethas.

The Vatican codex contains three epigrams, marked in Anthol. p. 694. Palatina as xv. 32, 33, 34, which are entitled ΑΡΕΘΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΚΟΝΟΥ. To this title a marginal note is appended 'γεγονότος δὲ καὶ ἀρχιεπισκόπου Καισαρείας Καππαδοκίας.' If this is really an early note, based on knowledge, we not only have here three small poems by Arethas, but a strong confirmation of the supposition, on which we have thus far gone, that the person is the same in all the above Mss. It will be seen from the word deacon that these poems must have been written between the years 888 and 913-14 A.D. No. 34 is entitled εἰς φεβρωνίαν μοναχὴν. The other two are epitaphs upon the author's sister Anna who is referred to as a widow of a pure character, and as dying τρεῖς πρὸς εἴκοσ' ἐποικομένην ἐνιαυτούς. There is a family burying-place, and χόρος εὐγενέων στενάχοντες ἀδελφῶν Ἀννης (No. 32). Besides having anacreontic verses ascribed to him referring to the Emperor Leo among others, Arethas wrote or helped to write, when archbishop, at least one treatise. It is on the Apocalypse. In this treatise, of which a small Ms. exists at Oxford, when commenting on the words καὶ εἰληφεν ὁ ἄγγελος τὸν λιβανωτὸν the author observes τούτῳ τῷ Ἀγγέλῳ, Ἀνδρέας ὁ ἱερεὺς κατ' ἐμὲ [κατ' ἐμὲ non est in B, note] Καισαρείας τῆς Καππαδοκίας ἀξίως τὴν ἐφορείαν λαχὼν, ἕκαστον ἱεράρχην παρεικάζει. Cramer, Caten. Graec. Patr. in Nov. Test. 171. Ms. Baroccianus 3, fol. 244v.

Arethas is known to have written marginal notes on the volumes in his possession. In the Ms. of Clement, Paris 451, three such notes have the word Ἀρέθα prefixed to them. 'The name of Arethas, however, is prefixed . . . also to several in the Vatican codices of Aristides, according to A. Maius . . . ' Accordingly, Maass regards—not indeed these Vatican Mss., which are ascribed to the 11th and 12th centuries, but—the Laurentian 60, 3 of the 10th century (which contains the same note as appears in Vat. 1298) as having belonged to Arethas. Pursuing this line of investigation Maass identifies the writing of an undated Ms. of Lucian in the British Museum with that of Baanes in Paris 451, and concludes that it also was written for Arethas. He then compares the Mss. either known or supposed to have belonged to him, and finds that while they differ in themselves, as the works of different scribes, they all contain examples of one particular hand which makes notes in their margins; this hand is very old and writes in small majuscules. Maass holds that it is the hand of the owner—Arethas. In this way he opens up quite a mine of Arethean scholia and says among other things 'Morem sequebatur Arethas cum auctoribus suis colloquendi,' e.g. 'Ad Apologiam 27 D Clarkiano adscriptit Arethas: καλῶς γε συ ποιῶν, Σώκρατες, ὄνοις καὶ ἵπποις τοὺς θεοὺς Ἀθηναίων παραβάλλεις.' This certainly savours of Christian authorship, and there are others like it: in particular Cobet points out that the remark, on Euthyphro, 14 E, πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἐξῆς is really a quotation of the phrase 'every good and every perfect gift,' etc., James i. 17. Although the subject is a fascinating one and treated with the greatest ingenuity, it cannot be pursued here. We may say, however, that long before we knew anything of this question we made copies of words and letters in Paris 451, and recognized on comparing these with the Harleian Lucian that the Harleian, 5694. Mélanges Graux, 758-9.

resemblance is very strong. The scholia too in the margin of that Ms. frequently terminate with the leaf ornament, which Maass identifies with the writing of Arethas. A detailed inspection of this Ms. of Lucian, moreover, brings out a very close resemblance indeed between much contained on its margins and similar notes on the margins of A. The forms of the usual symbols $\sigma\eta\mu\ \acute{\omega}\rho$. etc., the leaf ornament and certain capital letters, as the A and M, could hardly be more alike. At the same time the argument from handwriting is periculosae plenum opus aleae: and Maass proceeds to tie his scribes down to absolute uniformity in order to secure the necessary distinction in favour of this separate hand; while a new quill might make an appreciable difference in the writing of the same man. It may also be pointed out that the occurrence of the name *Ἀρέθα* before a few scholia is rather an argument against the same authorship in the case of those which, while resembling these, bear no signature. Finally, the leaf ornament is not confined to books owned by Arethas but appears elsewhere, e.g. in the codex Alexandrinus.

Thus far we have assumed the existence of but one Arethas: were there several? Some references on the point are given in the margin. Cave cites Coccius to the effect that Arethas, archbishop of Caesarea, flourished about 540 A.D.; but adds that he and his followers 'incertis prorsus nituntur conjecturis.' Cave, Oudin, Fabricius, and Baronius all agree as to the existence and date of our Arethas; and apparently the first three refer to his treatise on the Apocalypse and the debt which it owed to his predecessor Andreas. Cave and Fabricius with Baronius seem to hold that our Arethas may be the same with a presbyter Arethas of Caesarea who wrote homilies or orations 'de translatione Euthymii Patriarchae Constantinopolitani' (who died in 911 A.D.). In that case he must have been translated to Caesarea from Patras as deacon or presbyter. Oudin, while admitting that the dates allow of this authorship, denies that these homilies were written then—'habita illae sunt centum annis postea, Eustathio primo Papa novae Romae praesente; . . . sedit autem post Sergium nominis secundum ab anno 1019 ad annum 1025. Spectant ergo hae homiliae ad Aretham Caesariensis Ecclesiae Presbyterum integro seculo juniorem altero Arethae ejusdem sedis Archiepiscopo.' Accordingly he has an article on this presbyter Arethas, under date 1020, where he returns to the charge. On sentimental grounds it would be pleasant to retain all three Arethae. We should then have the picture of an Arethas family for centuries connected with the greatest see in Asia Minor, one branch or one member of which family had migrated to Patras. In Patras there were several churches called by the name of Basil, one, as we have seen, dedicated to St. Basil, the Great. As St. Basil was both a native and, in later life, an archbishop of Caesarea we catch a glimpse of a possible reason why an Arethas in ecclesiastical employment might pass back and forward between the two cities.

So Par. A: see
xcix. foot.

Oudin, Script.
Eccles. tom. II.
cols. 426, 540;
Cavus, Script.
Eccles. Historia
Literaria, I.
p. 407; Fabricius,
Bibl. Graec. VII.
p. 791: and
Baronius, xv.
312, 564, 567, 602.

Finlay, Byz.
Emp., pref.

23. νομισμα βυζαντ. δεκά καὶ τριῶν. 'For 13 byzants.' The νόμισμα or byzant was a gold coin weighing 'on an average 68 grains.' Finlay gives an example, having *obverse* a bust, bearded and crowned, bearing in the right hand a globe with patriarchal cross, the whole surrounded by the legend in mixed letters ΛΕΟΝ ΕΝ Χ·Ω (Χρίστῳ) ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΠΟΜΩΝ (Ρωμαίων); *reverse*, a female bust with both hands held up as if blessing, and the legend + ΜΑΡΙΑ + Μ·Ρ·Θ·Υ (Μήτηρ Θεοῦ). As this is a coin of Leo VI., it is probable that it was the money actually used in paying for our Manuscript.
24. μηνὶ νοεμβρ. ἰνδικτ. ἰ.δ. ἔτει κόσμ. 504. 'In the month of November of the 14th indiction, in the year of the world 6404.' By Byzantine writers the year of the world when

given was given according to Byzantine reckoning, which assumed the creation to date from September 1, B.C. 5509. Now 6404, less 5509, gives as date for our Ms. the year 895 A.D. The word *indictio* is commonly held to mean the 'announcement' of taxation, but also means the year or cycle of fifteen years over which that taxation lasted. In the history of indictional dating, we may begin with the admitted fixed point 312 A.D. 'The period is calculated from 1st September, 312.' If now we count by periods of 15 from this date, we find that an indictional cycle—the thirty-ninth—closes on August 31st, 897 A.D. ($39 \times 15 = 585$; $585 + 312 = 897$). The '14th indiction' of this period will extend from 1st September, 895, to 31st August, 896, which is exactly what we require. It is obvious, however, that when dealing with Byzantine datings the month is of importance. For any date from 1st September to 31st December we subtract 5509 from the given year of the world; for any between 1st January and 31st August we subtract 5508. Failing to note the importance of *μηνὶ νοεμβρίῳ*, some scholars date our Ms. A.D. 896. As the indictional cycle here under discussion has some palaeographic interest it is given entire:—

From Sept. to Aug.

ινδικτ. α'. = 882-3 A.D.	} Ms. No. 8, Chalke, Συναγωγή κανόνων written 'a. 883.' Gardth.
β'. = 883-4	
γ'. = 884-5	
δ'. = 885-6	Leo vi. succeeds Basil i., March 1, -86. }
ε'. = 886-7	'Laurent. 28, 26 Theon,' }
ς'. = 887-8	written 'a. 886.' Gardth.
ζ'. = 888-9	Bodleian Euclid written September, 888.
η'. = 889-90	Ms. Paris 1470 (and 1476 ?) written April, 890.
θ'. = 890-91	
ι'. = 891-2	
ια'. = 892-3	
ιβ'. = 893-4	
ιγ'. = 894-5	
ιδ'. = 895-6	Clarke Plato written November, 895.
ιε'. = 896-7	

From what has been said it will appear that the dating of the Ms. written for Arethas by Baanes is not explicit to us: *ἔτει κόσμου σνκβ* might mean either 913 or 914 A.D. 26-7. *βασιλείας . . . ἀειμνήστον*:—'of the reign of the most Christian Leo, son of Basil of happy memory.' This is rather a modern rendering, but it pretty fairly gives the sense. For the persons named see *ινδικτ.* δ'. above and the description of Leo's byzant. On the coin the words *ἐν χρίστῳ* correspond to *φιλοχῦ* (*φιλοχρίστου*) here: both being analogous to 'most Christian king,' 'defender of the faith.' In the National Library at Paris there is a gorgeous Ms. 'omnium quotquot in Bibliotheca regia Graeci servantur ornatissimus' of Gregorius Theologus, with comments by Gregorius Nyssenus, Paris DX(=510). which seems to have belonged to Basil i. Facing a full page painting of Christ, it has three full page figures on gold ground, representing *Εὐδοκία Αὐγουστα* with *Λεων Δεσποτης* and *Ἀλεξάνδρος Δεσποτης* on either side. On the second side of the third folio three more figures on gold appear, representing the crowning of Basil by Gabriel and Elias. A note says, 'ex his figuris apparet hunc codicem scriptum esse ante annum Christi 886 quo anno obiit Basilius Imperator cognomento Macedo, maritus Eudociae, Pater Leonis σοφοῦ et Alexandri.'

r

and to the

Ends

άτωνος) — 8 r. ii.

— 14 r. i.

— 16 v. ii.

καὶ δικαίου :

— 31 v. ii.

— 42 v. ii.

— 56 v. ii.

— 67 r. ii.

— 78 v. ii.

— 87 v. ii.

— 97 v. ii.

— 108 v. i.

— 119 r. i.

— 125 r. i.

— 127 v. i.

— 129 r. i.

— 130 r. ii.

— 132 r. ii.

— 137 r. i.

— 141 v. i.

— 145 v. i.

— 152 v. i.

— 163 v. i.

— 178 v. ii.

— 184 v. i.

— 189 v. i.

— 192 r. i.

— 194 v. i.

— 197 v. ii. 44

und in A. The Menexenus comes, in the same hand as βιβλίον :

— 198 v. ii.

— 205 v. ii.

— 212 r. i.

— 212 v. ii.

s άρα ού δέησει Steph. 389 D. δικαίου A and B.

The next portion (t_2) includes the rest of the Republic, 213 r.—255 v.; and the last (t_3) gives the Timaeus, 256 r.—265 v.: so that the Ms. does not contain all that is specified in the $\pi\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\varsigma$. These two portions are clearly distinguishable from the oldest by the character both of the parchment and of the writing: Schanz refers them to the 15th—16th century.

It is with the oldest portion alone that we have to do. The vellum is firm, well preserved, and of the same yellowish tint as that of the other two codices. The dimensions tested by fol. 67 are in centimetres 37.1×28.5 : the length of the writing space in the columns is 25.4, while the breadth of the two columns is 9.3, 9.4: the space between the columns is 2.5. The margins as usual come in the order inner, upper, outer, lower, and the breadth of the two last is considerable, more than 4, but it varies with the cutting and binding in each leaf. The ruling is done much after the fashion described in A, only that the writing lines number 50. All the perpendicular lines, which include one near the outer edge of each outer margin, and the 1st and 50th writing lines, together with two more in the upper and one in the lower margin, are drawn from edge to edge of the vellum; the other writing lines as in A. The leaves have been numbered by a late hand in the outer upper corner after the parts were bound in their present order. Our portion extends over 5212 inclusive, or 208 leaves. This would give 26 quaternions exactly; but that is not quite how they have been arranged. Originally the 1st and 24th had been quinions but have each lost a leaf—the first and second respectively; while the 26th quaternion has its two last leaves cut away. The 208 leaves thus consist of 2 nines, 23 eights and a six. These divisions are—except where injured—lettered in the original hand both on the face of the first leaf and the back of the last in the inner lower corner, and have a small cross in the upper margin. As in the Clarke Ms. the pieces of parchment are laid indented side to indented in pairs, and two pairs are stitched as a quaternion. The lines, as will be seen from the facsimile, almost cut the writing in the middle. While the headings and numerals are, as we have seen, in red, the colour of the initial letters varies between very dark brown, as in the Parmenides, and red as in the Philebus; and the body of the work is in dark brown. Paragraphs are not marked by projecting letters. In point of ornaments and initial letters the Ms. takes a middle place between A and \mathfrak{A} . The character of the writing will be seen from the facsimile. Schanz after a careful study of all three codices is not satisfied with the date assigned in the catalogue, 12th century, and says 'wir haben ein höheres Alter anzunehmen.' The text as incomplete has no date, so that this judgment must be based on the character of the writing. There is certainly a very considerable resemblance in general style between \mathfrak{A} and t , and one may note that in both there are the same double forms for the letters α , γ , κ , λ , ν . At the same time the letters in t are much less neatly finished; while not only have we the modern printed form for π , the c form for σ , and the capitals B, Δ , H, N at intervals in the text, but in addition to the ordinary abbreviation for $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$, which is constant, many contractions are employed which never appear in \mathfrak{A} at all. Thus the facsimile alone gives examples of the following terminations

$\epsilon\omega\varsigma = \epsilon\omega\varsigma$, $-\kappa\eta\nu = -\kappa\eta\nu$, $\tau\omega\nu = \tau\omega\nu$, $\tau\hat{\omega} = \tau\hat{\omega}$, $\tau\acute{\omega}\varsigma = \tau\acute{\omega}\varsigma$: and of some of the following words:—

$\acute{\alpha}\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma$	$= \overset{\Delta}{a\nu}$	$\delta\acute{\epsilon}$	$= \overset{\gamma}{\delta}$	$\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$	$= \overset{\lambda}{\mu}$
$\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\upsilon$	$= \overset{\Delta}{a\nu\omicron}$	$\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$	$= \overset{\gamma}{\epsilon}\overset{\omega}{\nu}$	$\sigma\tau\iota$	$= \overset{\gamma}{\sigma}$
$\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$, $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$	$= \overset{\gamma}{\alpha}\overset{\omega}{\rho}$, $\overset{\gamma}{\alpha}\overset{\omega}{\rho}$	$\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota(\nu)$	$= \overset{\gamma}{\epsilon}\overset{\omega}{\sigma}$	$\omicron\upsilon\nu$	$= \overset{\gamma}{\omicron}$

In the text of the Parmenides the name Socrates appears indifferently as $\Sigma\omega\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\varsigma$, $\Sigma\omega\kappa\rho\alpha$, $\Sigma\omega$, $\Sigma\acute{\omega}$, and many compound contractions such as of $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\omicron\upsilon\nu$, $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\hat{\omega}$ $\delta\nu$, etc. occur. Sometimes either

for convenience or to supply an omission a word or phrase is put below the lowest line of the column, e.g. 32 v. i., 112 v. ii., 113 r. ii. Signs of erasure and of supplements in the margin occur from time to time as in all Mss. The stops are such as in A and \mathfrak{A} , and the breathings and accents which may be seen in the example resemble those of \mathfrak{A} much more than those of A, and are not put with absolute regularity. New speakers are marked by : in the text and — in the margin, save when a double change occurs in one line when — is not repeated. In the first seven dialogues and the two last the interlocutors are named by the scribe at the beginning, either in the outer margin or in the middle space, and usually after the same system as that pursued in A, i.e. the words τὰ τοῦ διαλόγου | πρόσωπα contracted and in small uncials come in two lines, and below follow the names in succession. In the Symposium the names are entered opposite the place where each speech begins. Near the close of the Lesser Hippias, 191 v. i., abbreviated names come in succession down the outer margin. So also, as Schanz points out, contracted names appear from time to time throughout the Gorgias and Republic, while a younger hand puts them in the Sophist, 57 r. Finally, in the Menexenus, fol. 195 r. 1, inner margin, stands ἘΠΙΤΛΨΙΟΣ· opposite the words Ἐργωι μὲν ἡμῖν. Besides other marginal symbols we have the usual σημείωσαι and ὠραῖον in more than one early form, all more or less resembling those in \mathfrak{A} . The expression $\mathfrak{CH} \overset{\alpha}{\Pi}$ appears more than once, e.g. 7 r., 44 v. ii., 54 v. ii.: what it refers to we had not time to note, but it may be = σημείωσαι παροιμία (?), to call attention to a proverb. Again, we have such expressions as \mathfrak{CH} ὁρος λήθης, noting a definition, 105 r. ii., and \mathfrak{CH} τί λέγει· 155 v. i. The ὦρ. is usually neat and small, as 168 r. i., 204 r. i. The scholia and other notes are many, and seem, as Schanz decides, to be in most cases original. Such are the examples in the facsimile. There are other hands, one a very small neat one; and several much later, one which writes two or three notes in green. As in the Clarke Ms. some small diagrams occasionally illustrate the notes, e.g. 121 r. ii. Cases occur of numeral letters in the margin, thus in the Phaedrus they run from A to Θ on 113 r. i. in the Gorgias, from A to Δ, 166 v. i., and in the second book of the Republic, 210 r. i. Whether they represent divisions of the argument or point towards stichometry we had it not in our power to decide, but they seem too close together to warrant the latter supposition. The scholia on the Parmenides will be referred to in the notes.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

NOTE.

THE text is printed line for line, as well as page for page, with the Manuscript. The accentuation is, where necessary, adapted to the orthodox standard, and the punctuation differs to some extent from that of the original: but any divergence of reading which involves a change in letters or words is underlined. It is to be noted that : marks the end of speeches, and ; the same where there is a question. Sometimes the scribe's view on these matters has not been adhered to, and the stops have been changed accordingly. In clear or brief questions—such as $\pi\omega\varsigma\delta\acute{\eta}$:—it has not been thought necessary to put ; if : stands in the original. It will be observed that capitals are not used for proper names.

γίγνεται τὰ πρὶ τὰ πόλιν ἰδίαι καὶ δημοσίαι τοῦτοι μὴ παραγνο-
μεῖν οἱ ἀμφὶ οὐκ ἴδωσιν· πῶς γὰρ οὐ· τοῦτο δὲ τέλος ὑφ' αἵματος ἄ-
νθρωποι καὶ σὺν πολλοῖς γίγνεται φασὶν πολλὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχουσιν τὸ πᾶν
ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες ὁμοῦ ἀνθρώπων ἢ θοῶς ὁ πᾶν ὁμοῖαι καὶ φίλοι
καὶ μὲν ζῶντων ἀνθρώπων αὐτῶν τὸν αἰὶν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἡλικίαν πάντων μετὰ
λοπρῶτα αὐτοῦ ὑφ' αἵματος καὶ ἀριστερὰ τοῦ σώματος ὡς ἂν καὶ μὲν
τοῦ αἵματος ἔσται ἀπὸ λείων πάντων δούλου καὶ ἐλευθέρους ἀμφίσχευ-
σαι σωτῆρι τοῦτοι τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων καὶ ἐκείνων μὲν ἀνδρῶν ὡς ἂν
γίγνεται πόλιν τοῦτο μὴ δαμῆναι μὴ δὲ ἐλάττωσιν ἀρχὴν τῆς καὶ ἐπι-
στατῆς· καὶ μὲν αὐτὸν καὶ μὲν ἀπὸ ἐλάττωσιν ἀνδρῶν ἡμῶν ὡς ἂν
καὶ τὸν πολλὸν τὸν· ~ πολλὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ~

ΠΑΡΜΕΝΕΪΔΗΣ * Η * ΠΙΛΕΩΝ * ΛΟΓΟΣ

Ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτὸς οἱ καὶ ἐκείνων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
τύχῃ μὲν ἄντα μάλιστα καὶ γὰρ καὶ καὶ μὲν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος
ὁ αὐτὸς μάλιστα· καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸν μὲν αὐτὸς
δωκεῖν φράζει· ἀλλὰ μὲν δὲ αὐτὸς πομπὴν πᾶσι μὲν ὡς αὐτὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ
ἡσὶ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ οἱ αὐτὸς ἐκείνων δὲ ἡσὶν· καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς πομπὴν αὐτῶν
φῶν καὶ μὲν αὐτὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοῦ καὶ μὲν αὐτὸς πομπὴν αὐτῶν
πομπὴν ὡς αὐτὸς πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
δὲ ἡδὴ χρόνος ἔστιν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
ὁμοῦ καὶ πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
οἱ δὲ αὐτὸς πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
οὐτοῦ ὡς αὐτὸς πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
τύχῃ καὶ καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου οὐτοῦ αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
μὲν αὐτὸς διδόντες αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
μὴ μὲν αὐτὸς αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
διακρίνουσαι· ἀλλὰ οὐ καὶ αὐτὸς πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
διδόντες αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
ἰσχυρὰ καὶ τὸν πολλὸν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν
ἰσχυρὰ καὶ τὸν πολλὸν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν πομπὴν αὐτῶν



Γ

✕ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΕΪΔΗΣ * Η * Π ΔΕΩΝ ✕ ΛΟΓΙΚΟ

Ἐπειδὴ ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ κλαζομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνε-
 τύχομεν ἀδελμάντῳ τε καὶ γλαύκῳ· καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς
 ὁ ἀδείμαντος, χαῖρ', ἔφη, ὦ κέφαλε· καὶ εἴ του δέῃ τῶν τῇδε, ὧν ἡμεῖς
 δυνατοί, φράζε· ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ, εἶπον ἐγὼ, πάρειμί γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δε-
 ησόμενος ὑμῶν· λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν· καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, τῷ ἀδελ-
 φῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι· παῖς δέ
 που ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα δεῦρο ἐκ κλαζομενῶν, πολὺς
 δὲ ἤδη χρόνος ἐξ ἐκείνου· τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, πυριλάμπης
 ὄνομα· πάνυ γε· αὐτῷ δέ γε; ἀντιφῶν· ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει;
 Οἶδε, εἶπον ἐγὼ, πολῖταί μοι εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι· ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι
 οὗτος ὁ ἀντιφῶν πυθοδώρῳ τινί, ξήνωνος ἐταίρῳ, πολλὰ ἐντε-
 τύχηκε· καὶ τοὺς λόγους οὓς ποτε σωκράτης καὶ ξήνων καὶ παρ-
 μενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ πυθοδώρου, ἀπο-
 μνημονεύει· ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· τούτων τοίνυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα
 διακοῦσαι· ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, ἔφη· μεράκιον γὰρ ὧν αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα
 διεμελέτησεν· ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον, πρὸς
 ἱππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει· ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτόν· ἄρτι γὰρ

† 78 b 2

79 a 1

Cephalus.
 I asked Adimantus, on meeting him and Glauco at Athens, if I and some philosophic townsmen from Clazomenae could hope to hear his half-brother Antipho repeat a discussion which once occurred between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides and which he had committed to memory from the dictation of one Pythodorus, an associate of Zeno's.

Yielding to persuasion Antipho spoke as follows. Zeno and Parmenides came once to the great Panathenaea, Parmenides being about sixty-five and Zeno near forty, and stayed with Pythodorus. Socrates, then very young, and others had gone to hear Zeno's writings; and Pythodorus with Parmenides and Aristoteles entered as Zeno was nearly done reading. S. Do I rightly take you, Zeno, to say that unless existing things are at once like and unlike—which is impossible—they cannot be 'many'; that it is your aim to show thus that they are not many; and that each of your arguments is so much proof to this effect?

79 a 2

ἐνθένδε οἵκαδε οἴχεται· οἰκεῖ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν μελίτῃ. ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν· καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι χαλινόν τινα χαλκῇ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἱ τε ἀδελφοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὦν ἔνεκα παρείμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέν τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καί με ἡσπάζετο. καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥκνει, πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι· ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγείτο· ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφίκοιτό ποτε εἰς παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα ζήνων τε καὶ παρμενίδης. Τὸν μὲν οὖν παρμενείδην εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολινόν, καλὸν δὲ κάγαθόν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα· ζήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν τεσσαράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν· καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ παρμενίδου γεγονέναι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ τῷ πυθόδωρῳ, ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν κεραμεικῷ· οἱ δὴ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι τὸν τε σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλοὺς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ ζήνωνος γραμμάτων· τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων κοιμισθῆναι. σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον. ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν ζήνωνα αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ παρμενείδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὄντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων ἥνικα αὐτός τε ἐπεισελεῖν ἔφη ὁ πυθόδωρος ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν παρμενείδην μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμικρ' ἅττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ ζήνωνος. τὸν οὖν σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι, καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, πῶς, φάναι, ὦ ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, ὥς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὁμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια· τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον, οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια οὔτε τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια οἶόν τε εἶναι· οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; οὕτω, φάναι τὸν ζήνωνα· οὐκ οὖν εἰ ἀδύνατον τά τε ἀνόμοια ὁμοια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴη πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα; ἄρα τυυτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὥς οὐ πολλά ἐστι; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἶε σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ ἡγεῖ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι ὅσους

127

B

C

D

E

περ λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά ; οὕτω λέγεις, ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω; οὐκ, ἀλλά, φάναι τὸν ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται: μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν σωκράτην, ὃ παρμενίδην, ὅτι ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλία βούλεται ὑπεικῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι· ταῦτόν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὃ περ σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἑτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν ᾧ φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται· τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἐν φάναι τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἐκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν, σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταῦτά, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρῆσθαι: ναί, φάναι τὸν ζήνωνα, ὃ σὼκρατες· σὺ δ' οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ἤσθησαι· καίτοι, ὥσπερ γε αἱ λάκαιναι¹ σκύλακες, εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἵχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα ὥστε ἄπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὥς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον. ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι· ἔστι δέ, τό γε ἀληθές, βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμωδεῖν, ὡς, εἴ ἔν ἐστι, πολλά καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὲ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλά λέγοντας· καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοϊότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστίν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίῃ. διὰ τοιαύτην δὲ φιλονεικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καὶ τις αὐτὸ ἐκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλευσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἶτε μὴ. ταύτη γ' οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὃ σὼκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας οἶε αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας· ἐπεὶ ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπείκασας: ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν σωκράτην, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τότε δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰδός τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον; τούτοις δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοις καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἃ δὴ πολλά καλοῦμεν, μεταλαμβάνειν; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι, ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ το-

ᾧς ἡ συνήθεια λακωνικῶς /

Z. You have well caught my purpose. S. I see, Parmenides, that while Zeno has in a sense written the same thing as you, he tries by a change to make us think it different. You say 'the whole is one'; he says 'the whole is not many'. The distinction, if there be one, seems too high for such as we. Z. The ambiguity is accidental. My arguments had the humble aim of supporting Parmenides against the scoffs of opponents, who urge that many absurdities arise if it be 'one'. I say—were their hypothesis of 'many' assumed, the results if followed out must be still more laughable. But the work was written in a fit of zeal when I was young, and some one published it without my sanction. S. I understand. But do not you accept the existence of some absolute *eidos* of likeness, and again of unlikeness; and the fact that we—the many—partaking of these, are like or unlike in proportion?

Nor would there be any wonder did we partake of both; and so with all εἶδη. The strangeness would arise were the pure 'like' or absolute 'one' shown to be its opposite; but not so in the case of mere participants. Of me, for example, it were easy to prove that having left-right, front-back, top-foot I am 'many'; and again that as distinguished from the others present I am 'one.' Such a proof will hold for all natural objects: it proves that 'many' and 'one' exist. But were one first to part off the εἶδη which are apprehended mentally, and next to prove that these are equally subject among themselves to union and severance—then, Zeno, without depreciating your valuable work, I should indeed be filled with admiration. After listening carefully, with what seemed a mixture of annoyance and pleasure, Parmenides said

σοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀντὰ αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά τις ἀποφαίνειτο ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι· οὐδέ γε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ενός, καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὐ μετέχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὐτὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἔν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύτως. εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἶδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τάναντία ταῦτα πάθῃ πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλὰ, τί θαυμαστόν; λέγων, ὅτ' ἂν μὲν βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ μου ἔστιν ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὀπισθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως· πλήθους γὰρ οἶμαι μετέχω· ὅτ' ἂν δὲ ἔν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἐπτά ἡμῶν ὄντων εἰς ἐγὼ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος, μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ενός· ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. εἰ οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρῇ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῦτα ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἔν· οὐδέ τι θαυμαστόν λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῖμεν. εἰ δέ τις ὦν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, οἷον ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλήθος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὦ ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάνυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι· πολὺ μὲντ' ἂν ᾤδε μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην, εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις διήλθετε, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδείξει: λέγοντος δὴ, ἔφη ὁ πυθόδωρος, τοῦ σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν οἶεσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἄχθεσθαι τὸν τε παρμενείδην καὶ τὸν ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδιᾷν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ

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παυσανένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν παρμενείδην· ὦ σῶκρατες, φάναι, ὡς
 ἄξιός ἐστι ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐ-
 τὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα χω-
 ρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί σοι¹ δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ ὁμοιό-
 της χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἐν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ
 καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δὴ ζήνωνος ἤκουες; ἔμοι γε, φάναι τὸν σωκρά-
 τη· ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπεῖν τὸν — παρμενείδην, οἷον δικαίον τι εἶδος
 αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὐ τῶν τοιούτων;
 ναί, φάναι· τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰοι ἡμεῖς
 ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος· ἐν
 ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολλάκις δὴ, ὦ παρμενείδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα,
 πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως· ἦ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε,
 ὦ σῶκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρίξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ
 ρύπος ἢ ἄλλο ὃ τι ἀτιμωτάτον τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ
 φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς, ὃν ἄλλο αὐ τῶν τῆδε ὧν ἡ-
 μεῖς μεταχειρίζομεθα, εἴτε καὶ μὴ; οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν σωκρά-
 τη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν γε, ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν
 οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἦδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε
 μή τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ταυτῶν· ἔπειτα ὅτ' ἂν ταύτη ἴστω, φεύγων οἴχο-
 μαι δέίσας μὴ ποτε εἰς τιν' ἄβυθον φλυαρίαν ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ.
 ἐκείσε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ
 ἐκείνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω· νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν παρ-
 μενείδην, ὦ σῶκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς
 ἔτι ἀντιλήφεται, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν
 δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. τό-
 δε οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἶναι εἶδη ἅττα ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα
 μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος
 μὲν μεταλαβόντα ὅμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους τε καὶ δικαι-
 οσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι; πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη·
 οὐκ οὖν ἦτοι ὅλον τοῦ εἶδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον
 μεταλαμβάνει, ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο; καὶ
 πῶς ἂν; εἶπεν· πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶ-
 ναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὧν, ἢ πῶς; τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη, ὦ
 παρμενείδη, ἐν εἶναι· ἐν ἄρα ὧν καὶ ταυτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὐσιν

79 b 2

+ ἐτάραξε ἠρωχλησε
 eis θυμὸν ἐκίνησε
 τὰς φρενας διέ-
 σεισε

Τ
 ρ

Do you
 then hold that
 'one,' 'many,'
 'likeness,' and so
 on exist as εἶδη
 apart from their
 equivalents
 among us? S. I
 do. P. And
 'justice,'
 'beauty,' 'worth'?
 S. Yes. P. And
 likewise such as
 'man,' 'fire,'
 'water'? S.
 There I have often
 felt a difficulty.
 P. And even in
 the apparently
 absurd cases of
 hair or mud?
 S. Those visible
 objects I accept
 as existing, but it
 seems monstrous
 that they should
 have εἶδη.
 Indeed I have
 sometimes feared
 it might be so
 with all.
 The other
 classes form my
 present study.
 P. Years will
 strengthen in you
 the philosophic
 mind. You hold,
 then, that there
 are εἶδη, and
 that things
 around us derive
 their names from
 participation in
 these—big things,
 for example, from
 'bigness'? S. By
 all means. P.
 That which par-
 takes must do so
 in either whole or
 part of the εἶδος.
 Which do you
 choose? S. Why
 not the whole?
 P. Then while
 itself one and the
 same the εἶδος
 is wholly

in many separate things, and so becomes separate from itself. *S.* How so? Day is everywhere, yet not thus divided. *P.* What! You cover men with a sail—does the whole or a portion rest on each? *S.* A portion. *P.* The εἶδη, then, are divided; and thus things are big or equal when possessing a mere fraction of 'bigness' or 'equality' which cannot be equal to the whole: and when anything has a fragment of 'smallness,' 'smallness' must be larger than this part, while that to which the part accrues is thereby smaller than before! *S.* This cannot be. *P.* But again: do you reach your several εἶδη by comparison—'bigness,' for example, being the appearance common to many big things? If so, taking the bigness thus reached you will always get another by a new comparison; so that your εἶδη in each case will prove innumerable. *S.* What if each εἶδος be a conception existing only in minds?

80 a 1

ὅτι
μὴ

ὅλον ἅμα ἐν ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη: οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἶον εἶη ἡμέρα, — ἢ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταυτὸν εἴη: ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ σώκρατες, ἐν ταυτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἶον εἰ ἱστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον. ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγεῖ λέγειν; ἴσως, φάναι: ἢ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἐκάστω τὸ ἱστίον εἴη ἂν ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ; μέρος: μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ σώκρατες, ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἔτι ἐν ἐκάστω ὅλον ἀλλὰ μέρος ἐκάστου ἂν εἴη: φαίνεται οὕτω γε: ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἐν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ¹ μερίζεσθαι· καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται; οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν: ὅρα γάρ, φάναι, εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φαίνεται; πάνν γ', ἔφη: τί δαί; τοῦ ἴσου μέρους ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει ᾧ, ἐλάττωσι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου, τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῷ ἔσται; ἀδύνατον: ἀλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει· τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος. καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται· ᾧ δ' ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐ μείζον ἢ πρίν: οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτό γε: τίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; οὐ μὰ τὸν δία, φάναι, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι: τί δαὶ δὴ; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις: τὸ ποῖον: οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἶεσθαι εἶναι. ὅτ' ἂν πολλὰ ἅττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τὸ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι: ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι: τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδῆς οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐτῷ που μέγα φανείται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; ἔοικεν: ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτῶν πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκ ἔτι δὴ ἐν ἕκαστὸν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἅπειρα τὸ πλῆθος: ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ παρμενίδη, τὸν σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οἰδαμὸς αὐτῷ προσίκη ἐγγί-

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B

γνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἔν γε ἕκαστον εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι
 πάσχοι ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο· τί οὖν; φάναι· ἐν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων,
 Νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν· ἀλλά τινος; ναί· ὄντος ἢ
 οὐκ ὄντος; ὄντος· οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκείνο τὸ νόημα ἐ-
 πὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὐσαν ἰδέαν; ναί· εἴτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ
 νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, αἰεὶ ὃν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται·
 τί δαὶ δῆ; εἰπεῖν τὸν παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ τᾶλλα φῆς τῶν εἰ-
 δῶν μετέχειν ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν,
 ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον. ἀλλ', ὦ
 Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοι γε καταφαίνεται ὥδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἶδη
 ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις
 εἰκέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὐτῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις γί-
 γνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς· εἰ οὖν τι, ἔ-
 φη, ἔοικεν τῷ εἶδει, οἷόν τ' ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ
 εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὁμοι-
 ον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὁμοιον εἶναι; οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἄρ' οὐ με-
 γάλῃ ἀνάγκῃ ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶδους μετέχειν; ἀνάγκη· οὐ δ' ἂν τὰ
 ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ἦ, οὐκ ἐκείνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος; παντά-
 πασι μὲν οὖν· οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τ' ἐκείνῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος
 ἄλλω· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν
 ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἦ, ἕτερον αὖ· καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶ-
 δος γιγνόμενον ἐν τῷ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὁμοιον γίγνη-
 ται· ἀληθέστατα λέγεις· οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τᾶλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μετα-
 λαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ὃ μεταλαμβάνει· ἔοικεν· ὁρᾷς οὖν,
 φάναι, ὦ σώκρατες, ὅση ἡ ἀπορία, εἴαν τις εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ
 διορίζηται; καὶ μάλα· εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι, φάναι, ὅτι, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐ-
 δέπω ἄπτει αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, ἢ ἐν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων
 αἰεὶ τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις· πῶς δῆ; εἰπεῖν· πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα,
 φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε· εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γινώσκει-
 σθαι, ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἶδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι
 οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν τύχοι ἔμπει-
 ρος ὢν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφνίς, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ
 πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεσθαι· ἀλλ' ἀπί-
 θανος εἴη ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι· πῇ δῆ; ὦ παρμενεί-

It might then remain one. *P.* Yet a conception of something, and of an existent something; in short, of some one feature common to all. *S.* Yes. *P.* Then that feature is an *εἶδος*. And we have this dilemma—all things have conceptive power as sharing in conceptions, or may be conceptions and yet want this power! *S.* I think I have it! The *εἶδη* are patterns set up in nature, and things partake of them simply by resemblance to them. *P.* But thus the *εἶδος* must also resemble the resemblance—must itself be a resemblance—and what they both resemble will now be the *εἶδος*. As this calls up an infinity of *εἶδη* participation by resemblance is hardly possible. *S.* It seems not. *P.* So hard is it even to hold that such *εἶδη* exist! Yet are there difficulties greater far if we emphasize their separateness. *S.* How? *P.* Why, one might say that in such a case they cannot even be known. To answer this objection needs extreme skill. *S.* In what way?

P. Of course
Being which is
absolute has no
place in our
world. Even
those *εἶδη* whose
very essence is
co-relation are
related in their
own world, hav-
ing no connection
with so-called
resemblances of
themselves here.
And the case is
parallel with
these resem-
blances. Human
slave implies
human master ;
mastery *per se* ;
slavery *per se* ;
and the converse.
No crossing of
worlds. S. I
understand.
P. Will not abso-
lute knowledge
then, and all its
sub-divisions,
deal with abso-
lute truth and
all its branches?
S. Of necessity.
P. The *εἶδη* or
γέννη accordingly
are known by the
εἶδος of know-
ledge ; this have
not we ; hence
absolute 'beauty,'
'goodness' and
all such *ιδέαι*
are unknown to
us. S. I fear so.
P. Worse still.
Absolute know-
ledge is more
accurate by far
than ours.

80 b 1

δη, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη: ὅτι, ὦ σωκράτες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις
αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογήσαι ἂν
πρῶτον μὲν μὴδὲ μίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν: πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ κα-
θ' αὐτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν σωκράτη: καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν. οὐκ οὖν
καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἷ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτάς
τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν εἶτε ὁμοιώματα εἶ-
τε ὅπῃ δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα
ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις,
αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὐτά ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἶδη· καὶ ἐαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐ-
κείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως; πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν σω-
κράτη: οἶον, φάναι τὸν παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλός
ἐστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου δῆπου, ὃ ἔστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δοῦλός
ἐστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὃ ἔστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης· ἀλλ' ἄν-
θρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτ' ἐστίν. αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία
αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστίν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως, αὐτὴ δουλεία
αὐτῆς δεσποτείας· ἀλλ', οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔ-
χει, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς
αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς αὐτά. ἢ οὐ μαν-
θάνεις ὃ ἴ λέγω; πᾶν γ', εἰπεῖν τὸν σωκράτη, μανθάνω: οὐκ οὖν καὶ
ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν
ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη; πᾶν γε: ἐκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἢ ἔστιν,
ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη· ἢ οὐ; ναί: ἢ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπι-
στήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὖ ἐκάστη ἢ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπι-
στήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι; ἀνάγ-
κη: ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἶδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε
παρ' ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ οὖν: γινώσκεται δὲ γέ που ὑπ' αὐ-
τοῦ τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα;
ναί: ὃ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν; οὐ γάρ: οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γινώ-
σκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν: οὐ-
κ ἔοικεν: ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν: κινδύ-
νεύει: ὅρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε: τὸ ποῖον: φαῖναι ἂν ἢ
οὐ, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶ-
ναι ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην; καὶ κάλλος καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω;

D

E

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B

C

ναί: οὐκ οὖν, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην: ἀνάγκη: ἄρ' οὖν οἷός τε αὐτῷ εἶναι ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν γινώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων;

Τί γὰρ οὐ: ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ παρμενίδης, ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ σώκρατες, μήτε ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἶδη πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἣν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα: ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα: ὁμολόγηται γάρ: οὐκ οὖν, εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίῃ οὐδὲ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν. ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γινώσκουμεν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐκείνοι τε αὐτὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπότηται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γινώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες: ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη, θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσειε τοῦ εἰδέναι: Ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὁριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὐ τε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴ τε ὁ τι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα: καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τι λέγειν καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δύσανάπειστον εἶναι: καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἕκαστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάσκειν ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον: συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ παρμενίδη, ὁ σωκράτης πάνυ γὰρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις: ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ τις δῆ, ὦ σώκρατες, αὐτὸ μὴ ἐάσει εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδὲ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἕκαστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέφει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστου τὴν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασιν διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθῆσθαι: ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι: τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ τρέψει ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι: πρῶτ' γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ σώκρατες, ὁ-

Now who should have such knowledge if not God? But having it can he know things as they are with us, any more than by absolute mastery he can rule things with us? S. This is too preposterous a conclusion! P. Yet, if we insist upon absolute εἶδη, there are countless such difficulties—very hard to meet, and needing a most gifted opponent. S. I admit it. P. Nevertheless, as you of all men must have realized, he who in consequence denies the εἶδη will have brought to which his intellect can turn, and will thus annihilate the possibility of discussion. S. You speak truth. P. Yes, Socrates; you have been precipitate.

So b 2

While still young you must rack yourself with the type of training which Zeno has illustrated. Yet I admired your forcing the question away from the sensible to the intelligible sphere. S. I did so because it seems so simple to show contradictory qualities in the former. P. Yes; but, if your training is to be thorough, you must follow up the consequences not of one hypothesis alone but of its opposite. Thus you must, in the case of Zeno's hypothesis, ask not only 'if the many are' but 'if the many are not' what follows to them and to the one, both severally and reciprocally. And so with likeness and unlikeness, motion and rest, existence itself and non-existence: in short, with every possible hypothesis.

S. Pray, do you illustrate by some hypothesis of your own.

81 a 1

ρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τε τί καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρῶτον σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ. εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια: Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὦ παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; οὗτος, εἶπεν, ὃν περ ἤκουσας ζήνωνος. πλὴν τοῦτό γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἡγάσθην, εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐκ εἶας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστα τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἶδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι: δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὃ τι οὖν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν: καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τοῦτ' ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἑκάστων ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι: πῶς λέγεις; φάναι: οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλὰ ἔστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν, καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ· καὶ αὖ, εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλὰ, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθείσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· καί, ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὃ τι οὖν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἐν ἑκάστων τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ τι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τὰλλα αὖ πρὸς αὐτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὃ τι ἂν προαιρῇ αἰεὶ, ἐάν τε ὡς ὄν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο· ἐάν τε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές: ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ παρμενίδη, πραγματίαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω· ἀλλὰ μοι τί οὐ διηλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι,

ὦ σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε: ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν σωκράτη, ζήνων, τί οὐ διήλθες ἡμῖν: καὶ τὸν ζήωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι, αὐτοῦ, ὦ σώκρατες, δεώμεθα παρμενείδου· μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον ἢ ὃ λέγει ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἡμεν οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι, ἀπρεπὴ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν ἔχειν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ παρμενίδη, σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου: ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντος τοῦ ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν πυθόδωρον, αὐτόν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ παρμενείδου καὶ τὸν ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι, καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν: τὸν οὖν παρμενίδην, ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καί τοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ ἱβυκίου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, ᾧ ἐκεῖνος, ἀθλητῇ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφ' ἄρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάξων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἵέναι· καγὼ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρή τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος λόγων. ὅμως δέ· δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὦ ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξώμεθα, καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθεσόμεθα; ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδὴ περ δοκεῖ πραγματιώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἀρξῶμαι καὶ τῆς ἑμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἐν ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔν, τί χρή συμβαίνειν: πάνυ μὲν οὖν φάναι τὸν ζήωνα: τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοι ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἢ κιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἃ οἶεται μάλιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαντα ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐκεῖνου ἀπόκρισις: ἔτοιμός σοι, ὦ παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν ἀριστοτέλη· ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων. ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου: εἰεν δὴ, φάναι· εἰ ἐν ἔστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἐν: πῶς γὰρ ἂν: οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι: τί δὴ: τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἐστίν: ναί: τί δαὶ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὐδ' ἂν μέρος μὴδὲν ἀπὴν ὅλον ἂν εἴη; πάνυ γε: ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὃν καὶ μέρη ἔχον: ἀνάγκη: ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἴη ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔν: ἀληθῆ: δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι: δεῖ: οὐτ' ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἔξει, εἰ ἐν ἔσται τὸ

P. It is a prodigious task, and I am old.

S. Zeno, then?

—But Zeno laughing said 'No; we must ask Parmenides. He is old: but we are few and he need not mind.' As the others all joined in the request Parmenides consented.—*P.* I may well recall the saying of Ibycus when venturing thus, at my years, to swim through such a mass of argument.

Let me start, then, from my own hypothesis—the one exists and, again, does not exist: what must follow?—and Aristoteles, as the youngest, shall reply? So.

A. I. If the one is, then, i. The one cannot be 'many': ii. it cannot have a 'part,' nor be a 'whole'; as both these imply many. *A.* It cannot.

81 a 2

P.
 iii. Nor can it have 'beginning' 'end' or 'middle,' these being parts. A.
 Right. P.
 iv. Therefore it is 'limitless'; and also
 v. 'shapeless'; since shape, whether round or straight, needs a middle and ends. A. Right. P.
 vi. Now if it were in another, then were it enclosed in a circle and touched at many points; and if in itself, it would both inclose and be inclosed, thus becoming two. Accordingly it cannot 'be anywhere.' A. It cannot. P.
 vii. Can it then 'be still' or 'be in motion'? If in motion it would be either changed—thus ceasing to be one—: or borne along, in which case—1) if it moved in a circle it would turn on a centre—and 2) as for going from place to place,

ἐν: οὐ γάρ: οὐκ οὖν, εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὐτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἦδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη: ὀρθῶς: καὶ μὴν τελευτὴ γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἐκάστου: πῶς δ' οὐ: ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἐν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει: ἄπειρον: καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα· οὔτε γὰρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέ-
 χοι: πῶς; στρογγύλον γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο οὐδ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχῃ; ναί: καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε οὐδ' ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἐσχάτοις ἐπίπροσθεν —ῇ; οὕτως: οὐκ οὖν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἂν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: οὔτε ἄρα εὐθύ οὔτε Περιφερὲς ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει: ὀρθῶς: καὶ μὴν τοι-
 οὔτον γε ὃν οὐδαμῶς ἂν εἴη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη: πῶς δὴ; ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὃν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἐν εἴη, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἐνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ ἄπτεσθαι: ἀδύνατον: ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν καὶ ἑαυτὸ εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη· ἐν τῷ γάρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον γάρ: οὐκ οὖν ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἅμφω ταῦτόν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἐν, μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐν ὃν: οὐκ ἐστίν: ὅρα δὴ οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἷόν τε ἐστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι: τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ: ὅτι κινούμενον γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοίτο ἂν· αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις: ναί: ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἐν ἔτι εἶναι: ἀδύνατον: οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται: οὐ φαίνεται: ἀλλ' ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι; ἴσως: καὶ μὴν, εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἢ τοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας: ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ᾧ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; οὐδὲ μία: ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμείβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται: εἴπερ γε δὴ: οὐκ οὖν εἶναι μὲν που ἐν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; ναί: ἀρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνα-

τώτερον; οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅτι: εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω
 ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἐτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, ἢ μήτ' ἐτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴ-
 περ δὴ ἐγγίγνεται; ἀνάγκη: εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο κείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκείνο ἀν-
 μόνον πάσχοι οὐ μέρη εἶη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἂν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ
 δὲ ἔξω εἶη ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ
 οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινὸς μήτε ἔξω: ἀληθῆ: οὐ δὲ
 μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήτε ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἐτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγί-
 γνεσθῆαι πῶς, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον; φαίνεται:
 139 Οὐτ' ἄρα ποιῶν καὶ ἐν τῷ γιγνόμενον χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὐτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
 περιφερόμενον, οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον: οὐκ ἔοικε: κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα
 κίνησιν τὸ ἐν ἀκίνητον: ἀκίνητον: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι γέ φαμεν ἐν τινι
 αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον; φαμεν γάρ: οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν: τί δὴ:
 ὅτι ἤδη ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶη ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: ἀλλ' οὔτε
 ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐδέπο-
 182 τε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: οὐκ ἔοικεν: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ' ἔστηκεν: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε: τὸ ἐν ἄ-
 ρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔθ' ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται: οὐκ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται γέ: οὐ-
 δὲ μὴν ταῦτόν γε οὔτε ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, οὐδ' αὖ ἕτερον οὔτε
 αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἐτέρου ἂν εἶη: πῇ δὴ; ἕτερον μὲν πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ὄν ἐνός
 ἕτερον ἂν εἶη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἐν: ἀληθῆ: καὶ μὴν ταῦτόν γε ἐτέρῳ ὄν
 ἐκείνῳ ἂν εἶη, αὐτὸ δ' οὐκ ἂν εἶη: ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως εἶη ὅπερ ἔστιν,
 187 ἔν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐνός: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ταῦτόν μὲν ἄρα ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἕτερον ἐ-
 αυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται: οὐ γάρ: ἕτερον δὲ γέ ἐτέρου οὐκ ἔσται ἕως ἂν ἦ ἐν·
 οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἐτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ, ἄλλῳ δὲ
 οὐδενί: ὀρθῶς: τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον ἢ οἷε; οὐ
 δῆτα: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ οὕτω, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ αὐ-
 192 τό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὄν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον: ὀρθῶς: οὐδὲ
 μὴν ταῦτόν ἐαυτῷ ἔσται: πῶς δ' οὐ: οὐχ ἢ περ τοῦ ἐνός φύσις,
 αὕτη δὴ πῶς καὶ ταύτου: τί δὴ: ὅτι οὐκ ἐπειδ' ἂν ταῦτόν γένηται
 τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται: ἀλλὰ τί μὴν: τοῖς πολλοῖς ταῦτόν γενόμενον
 Πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔν: ἀληθῆ: ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ταῦ-
 τὸν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὅποτε τι ταῦτόν ἐγγίγνετο αἰεὶ ἂν ἐν ἐγγίγε-
 197 το· καὶ ὅποτε ἐν, ταῦτόν: πάνυ γέ: εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταῦτόν ἔσται,
 οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· καὶ οὕτω ἐν ὄν οὐχ ἐν ἔσται: ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀ-

81 b 1

only that which
 has parts can
 come to be in a
 thing into which
 it has not yet
 quite got, and
 wholly outside of
 which it is no
 longer. Thus it
 has no type of
 motion. But we
 showed that it
 was not in any-
 thing, therefore
 it is never in the
 same thing.
 Consequently it
 cannot be still.
 A. So at least it
 would seem. P.
 viii. Nor will it
 be 'different from
 itself'—else
 were it not one:
 or 'the same as
 the different'—
 else were it that
 different thing:
 or 'different from
 the different'—
 since the different
 alone can have
 difference: or
 'the same as
 itself'—for if
 same were iden-
 tical with one,
 what of things
 that are same
 with the many?

So the one is neither 'different' from, nor 'the same,' as, either itself or the different. *A.* No indeed. *P.* ix. Nor will it be 'like' either to itself or the different. For that is like which has been affected by the same, and as the same is distinct from the one, if the one were like it were more than one. Again, since that is unlike which has been affected by the different, the one—being in no way so affected—is in no respect 'unlike' either itself or the different. *A.* So it appears. *P.* x. Now :—if equal to anything it will be of the same measures with that thing, but it has no part in 'the same': and if greater or less, then, however measured, it will have as many parts as measures, and so will not be one: while if it has but one measure it will—which is impossible—be equal to that. Being such as it is, then, it is neither 'equal' nor 'unequal' whether to itself or another. *A.* Clearly so. *P.* xi. Recalling now

81 b 2

δύνατον: ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἡ ἑτέρου ἕτερον εἶναι ἢ ἐαυτῷ ταυ-
τόν: ἀδύνατον: οὕτω δὲ ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταυτόν τὸ ἐν οὐτ' ἂν αὐτῷ οὐτ' ἂν
ἑτέρῳ εἴη: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοίον τινι ἔσται οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε
αὐτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ: τί δὲ; ὅτι τὸ ταυτόν που πεπονθὸς ὁμοίον: ναί: τοῦ
δέ γε ἐνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταυτόν: ἐφάνη γάρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν
εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἐν
τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον: ναί: 'οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταυτόν πεπονθὸς εἶναι
τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐαυτῷ: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδὲ ὁμοίον ἄρα δυνατόν
αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐαυτῷ: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέ-
πονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἐν: πλεί-
ω γάρ: τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἐαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη
ἢ ἐαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταυτόν πεπονθὸς ὁμοίον: ὀρθῶς: τὸ δὲ γε
ἐν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἔστιν
οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοίον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον
οὐθ' ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἐαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν: οὐ φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε
ὄν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνιστον ἔσται οὔτε ἐαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ: πῇ; ἴσον μὲν
ὄν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἴσον ᾖ; ναί: μείζον δέ που ἢ
ἐλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν σύμμετρον ᾖ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα
ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω: ναί: οἷς δ' ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν
σμικροτέρων τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται: πῶς γὰρ οὐ: οὐκ οὖν ἀδύ-
νατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὧν-
τινων οὖν τῶν αὐτῶν; ἀδύνατον: ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὐτ' ἂν ἐαυτῷ οὔτε
ἄλλῳ εἴη, μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν: οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γὰρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν πλει-
όνων γε μέτρων ὄν ἢ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσων περ μέτρων τοσούτων καὶ με-
ρῶν ἂν εἴη: καὶ οὕτω αὐτὸ οὐκ ἔστι ἐν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσα περ καὶ τὰ
μέτρα: ὀρθῶς: εἰ δὲ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἴη, ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ
τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη ἴσον αὐτῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι: ἐφάνη γάρ: οὔτε
ἄρα ἐνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων οὔτε τὸ παρά-
παν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἐαυτῷ ποτέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔ-
τε ἄλλῳ: οὔτε αὐτὸ μείζον οὐδὲ ἐλαττον οὔτε ἐαυτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου:
Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν οὕτω: τί δαί; πρῶτον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν
ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατόν εἶναι; τί δὲ γὰρ οὐ: ὅτι που
ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ
ὁμοιότητος μετέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἐνί, οὔτε ὁμοιότη-

140

B

C

D

E

τος οὔτε ἰσότητος : ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν : καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότη-
 τός τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν : πάνυ μὲν οὖν : πῶς
 141 οὖν οἷόν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἶναι, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡ-
 λικίαν ἔχειν τῷ, τοιοῦτον ὄν : οὐδαμῶς : οὐκ ἄρα ἂν εἴη νεώτερον
 οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἐν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔ-
 τε ἄλλῳ : οὐ φαίνεται : ἂρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύναιτο
 ἂν εἶναι τὸ ἐν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη ; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἐάν τι ἦ ἐν χρόνῳ αἰεὶ
 αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι ; ἀνάγκη : οὐκ οὖν τό γε πρεσβύ-
 B Τερον αἰεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον ; τί μὴν : τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἐ-
 αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλ-
 λει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται : πῶς λέγεις ; ᾤδε. διαφέρον
 ἔτερον ἑτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἤδη ὄντος διαφόρου· ἀλλὰ τοῦ
 μὲν ἤδη ὄντος ἤδη εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ
 μέλλοντος μέλλειν· τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλ-
 λειν οὔτε εἶναι· πῶς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι :
 C ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν : ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεωτέ-
 ρου ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου : ἔστι γάρ : τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ
 γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἅμα ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι : ἔ-
 οικεν : ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον μήτε
 ἐλάττω· ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ
 γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι : ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα : ἀνάγ-
 D κη ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιοῦ-
 του, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν, καὶ πρε-
 σβύτερόν τε αὐτοῦ ἅμα καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι : κινδυνεύει : ἀλ-
 λά μὴν τῷ γε ἐνὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν : οὐ γὰρ
 μετῆν : οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν τινι χρόνῳ :
 οὐκ οὖν δὴ, ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ : τί οὖν ; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ
 ἐγίγνετο, οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονό-
 F τος ; καὶ μάλα : τί δαί ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσε-
 ται, οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μέλλοντος ; ναί : τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνε-
 ται, οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν : εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν μηδαμῇ μη-
 δενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ' ἐγίγνετο οὔτ' ἦν
 ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτ' ἔπειτα γε-
 νήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτε ἔσται : ἀληθέστατα : ἔστιν οὖν οὐ-

what we have said
 about likeness
 and unlikeness,
 equality and
 inequality—
 can it, compared
 either with itself
 or ought else,
 be 'older'
 'younger' or
 'the same age';
 since these imply
 equality etc in
 time? A. It
 cannot. P.
 xii. Hence it
 will not be 'in
 time' at all: for
 so it must always
 get older—and
 if so then like-
 wise younger
 —than itself;
 while yet it
 must ever be
 the same age as
 itself. A. No;
 according to the
 argument. P.
 xiii. But those
 states of being—
 was, has become,
 will be, is, be-
 comes, and so
 on—all indicate
 some participa-
 tion in time.
 That, therefore,
 which in no way
 partakes of time
 has no share
 in these.

82 a 1



ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ.

Thus the one
will not 'be.'

A. It appears
not. P.

xiv. Neither,
then, can it 'be
one.' A. I fear
not. P.

xv. As there can
be nothing either
of or for the non-
existent, so there
can be 'no name
for,' 'no science,
perception,
opinion of' the
one. A. It
seems not. P.
Now are all
these things
possible? A. I,
at least, do not
think so.

II. P. Shall
we then take a
second survey
from the begin-
ning? Our
hypothesis was
that the one *is*.

Now this in-
volves the sepa-
rate existence of
being, for 'the
one is' and 'the
one one' are not
identical. A.
Quite so. P.
i. But if 'is' be
said of the one-
existent and
'one' of the
existent-one—
the two elements
being distinct—
clearly one and
is are 'parts,'
and the existent-
one a 'whole.'

A. Undoubtedly.
P.

ii. But neither
part ever lets the
other go.

σίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; οὐκ ἔστιν: οὐδα-
μῶς ἄρα τὸ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ
ἐν: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἐν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη
δν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ
δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν: κινδυνεύει: ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν τούτῳ
τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἂν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; καὶ πῶς; οὐδ' ἄρα ὀνομά-
ἐστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ
δόξα: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα, οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξά-
ζεται οὐδὲ γινώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται: οὐκ ἔ-
οικεν: ἢ δυνατόν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἐν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; οὐκ οὖν ἔμοι-
γε δοκεῖ: βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλ-
θωμεν, εἴαν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῇ; πάνν μὲν οὖν βούλο-
μαι: οὐκοῦν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, φάμεν τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖα πο-
τε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα· οὐχ οὕτω; ναί: ὅρα δὴ
ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέ-
χειν; οὐχ οἷόν τε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς εἴη ἂν, οὐ ταῦτόν
οὔσα τῷ ἐνί; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκείνο τὸ ἐν
ἐκείνης μετείχεν· ἀλλὰ ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἔν.
οὐν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν
ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτω; πάνν μὲν οὖν: 'οὐκ οὖν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖον τὸ ἔστι
τοῦ ἐν; ἀνάγκη: ἄρα οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἐν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη
Τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδ' ἂν τις συλλήβδην εἴπῃ ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν: πάνν γε:
πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν τί συμβήσεται; σκοπεῖ οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγ-
κη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὃν τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν οἷον μέρη ἔ-
χειν: πῶς; ᾧδε. εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος λέγεται [καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ
ὄντος λέγεται] καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ τε οὐσία
καὶ τὸ ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου, οὐ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος,
ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἐν ὃν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι
μόρια τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι; ἀνάγκη: πότερον οὖν ἐκάτερον τῶν
μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσερούμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε
μόριον προσρητέον: τοῦ ὅλου: καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἔστι ὃ ἂν ἐν ᾧ, καὶ μό-
ριον ἔχει; πάνν γε: τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἐνός
ὄντος, τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἄρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἐν τοῦ εἶναι μόρι-
ον, ἢ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνός μορίου: οὐκ ἂν εἴη: πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων

143

B

O

D

E

ἐκότερον τό τε ἐν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν
αὐ μορίων τὸ μόριον· καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως αἰεὶ, ὅ τί περ ἂν
μόριον γένηται τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ αἰεὶ ἴσχει· τό τε γάρ ἐν τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ ἴ-
σχει καὶ τὸ ὄν τὸ ἐν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη οὐ αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἐν
εἶναι· παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν· οὐκ οὖν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω
Τὸ ἐν ὄν εἴη· ὅμοιον· ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι· πῇ; οὐσίας φαμέν μετέ-
χειν τὸ ἐν, διὸ ἔστιν· ναί· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἐν ὄν πολλὰ ἐφάνη;
οὕτω· τί δαί; αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, ὃ δὴ φαμέν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῇ δια-
νοίᾳ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὐ φαμέν μετέχειν, ἀρὰ γε
ἐν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τούτου; ἐν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε·
εἰδῶμεν δὴ· ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι ἕτερον δὲ
αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἐν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐν οὐσίας μετέσχευ· ἀνάγκη· οὐκ οὖν
εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἢ οὐσία ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν, οὔτε τῷ ἐν τὸ ἐν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτε-
ρον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἢ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ
ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων· πάνν μὲν οὖν· ὥστε οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἐν
οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον· πῶς γάρ· τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν
εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἐν, εἴτε τὸ ἐν
καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀρα οὐκ ἐν ἐκάστη τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθά τι-
νε ὧ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρῳ· πῶς; ᾧδε· ἔστιν οὐσίαν
εἰπεῖν; ἔστιν· καὶ αὐθις εἰπεῖν ἐν; καὶ τούτο· ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ ἐκότερον
αὐτοῖν εἴρηται; ναί· τί δ'; ὅτ' ἂν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἐν, ἀρα οὐκ ἀμφο-
τέρῳ· πάνν γε· οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον, ἢ ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἐν,
Καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἀμφω λέγω· ναί· ὧ δ' ἂν ἀμφω ὀρ-
θῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἀρα οἷόν τε ἀμφω μὲν αὐτῶ εἶναι δύο δὲ
μῇ; οὐχ οἷόν τε· ὧ δ' ἂν δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἐκότερον αὐ-
τοῖν ἐν εἶναι; οὐδὲ μία· τούτων ἄρα, ἐπεὶ περ σύνδυο ἕκαστα συμ-
βαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἂν εἴη ἕκαστον· φαίνεται· εἰ δὲ ἐν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν
ἐστί, συντεθέντος ἐνὸς ὁποίου οὖν ἦτιν οὖν συζυγία οὐ τρία γί-
γνεται τὰ πάντα; ναί· τρία δὲ οὐ περιττά, καὶ δύο ἄρτια; πῶς δ' οὐ;
Τί δαί; δυοῖν ὄντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δῖς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς,
εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δις ἐν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρίς ἐν; ἀνάγκη·
δυοῖν δὲ ὄντων καὶ δις οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δις εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς
οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐ τρία τρίς εἶναι; πῶς δ' οὐ; τί δαί; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ
δῖς ὄντων, καὶ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ τρίς ὄντων, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δις

c

After whatever subdivisions the two still keep fast hold of each other. Now that which always becomes two must be—not one, but—a ‘limitless number.’ A. So it seems. P. iii. Think now of the one apart from being—it and its being are then different. They differ, however, not as being and one, but as different. If so, the different has in turn a distinct existence other than both. Take any pair of these, being-different, being-one, one-different:—they must be spoken of as both, or two. But of two each is necessarily one. Now if to any of these pairs some one be added the result is three: and three are odd, while two are even: and two give twice, and three thrice: so there will be two twice and three thrice, and three thrice.

✓

✓

✓

Ba b 1

δυο τρις

Having, therefore, by the existence of one every combination of even and odd, we have number; and so limitless multitude, whose every portion partakes of existence, which is thus endlessly subdivided into parts. A. That is so. P. iv. But of necessity each of these parts is one. Thus the one clings to every single portion of being, and has as many parts as there are division:—Is, in short, not a whole but a limitless multitude. Accordingly we show not merely the one-existent, but the one itself through the action of existence, to be 'many.' A. Entirely so. P. v. But parts are parts of a whole, which circumscribes them:

8a b 3

εἶναι καὶ τρία¹ δίς; πολλή γε: ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττὰ περιττάκις, καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις; 144
 ἔστιν οὕτω: εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἷε τινα ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; οὐδαμῶς γε: εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἓν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι: ἀνάγκη: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πολλὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὄντων. ἡ οὐκ ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται; καὶ πάνν γε: οὐκ οὖν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχει ἂν αὐτῆς; ναί: ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἡ οὐσία νενομίηται, καὶ οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου· ἡ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐ-
 ρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν ὄντων του ἀποστατοῖ: οὐδαμῶς: κατακεκερματισται ἄρα ὡς οἶόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας: ἔχει οὕτω: πλείστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς: πλείστα μέντοι: τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ὃ ἐστὶ μὲν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος; καὶ πῶς ἂν τοι τοῦτο γένοιτο: ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη: αὐτὸ αἰεὶ, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἦ, ἓν γέ τι εἶναι· μὴδὲν δέ, ἀδύνατον: ἀνάγκη: πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἐκάστῳ τῷ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρόσσεστιν τὸ ἓν, οὐκ ἀπολείπόμενον οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός: οὕτω: ἄρα οὖν ἐν ὃν πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἐστὶ; τοῦτο ἄθρει: ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ, καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον: μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον· ἄλλως γάρ πως οὐδαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασιν τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας μέρεσιν παρέσται ἡ μεμερισμένον: ναί: καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη: ἀνάγκη: οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες ὡς πλείστα μέρη ἡ οὐσία νενομιμένη εἴη· οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω τοῦ ἐνὸς νενομίηται, ἀλλ' ἴσα, ὡς εἴοικε, τῷ ἐνί· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὃν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἐξισούσθον δύο ὄντε αἰεὶ παρὰ πάντα: παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται: τὸ ἐν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλὰ τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος ἐστίν: φαίνεται: οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐν πολλὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενομημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι: παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν: καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλον τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένον¹ ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν· ἡ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια; ἀνάγκη: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρασ ἂν εἴη: πῶς δ' οὐ: τὸ

144

B

C

D

E

145

ἐν ἄρα ὃν ἐν τέ ἐστί που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερα-
 σμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει : φαίνεται : ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπεὶ περ πεπερα-
 σμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; ἀνάγκη : τί δαί ; ὅλον οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ
 μέσον, καὶ τελευτήν ; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων ; κἄν του ἐν
 ὃ τι οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὅλον εἶναι ; οὐκ ἐθελήσει : καὶ
 ἀρχὴν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν τὸ ἐν ; ἔχοι : ἀλλὰ μὴν
 τό γε μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἴη : οὐ
 γάρ : καὶ σχήματος δὴ τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον δὲ μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἐν,
 ἢ τοι εὐθέως, ἢ στρογγύλου, ἢ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν : μετέχοι γὰρ
 ἂν : ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ; πῶς ;
 τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου ;
 οὕτω : πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχεται ; ναί : καὶ μὴν τὰ
 γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐν ἐστί, καὶ οὔτε τι πλεόν οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ
 πάντα : οὐ γάρ : οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν ἐστίν ; πῶς δ' οὐ ; εἰ ἄρα πάν-
 τα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἔστι δὲ τὰ τε πάντα τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅ-
 λον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα· ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἂν περι-
 ἔχοιτο τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη : φαίνεται :
 ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὐ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστίν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔ-
 τε ἐν τινί· εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί· ἐν τινὶ γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὃν οὐ-
 κ ἂν ἔτι που δύναίτο ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάν-
 των ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἐν, πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐν ἔσται :
 οὐδαμῶς : οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἴη
 Τὸ πλεόν ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττω εἴη, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον : ἀδύνατον γάρ :
 μὴ ὃν δ' ἐν πλέοσιν μὴδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ μὴδὲ ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον,
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι ; ἀνάγκη : οὐκ οὖν
 μηδαμοῦ μὲν ἂν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη· ὅλον δὲ ὃν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν,
 ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι : πάνυ γε : ἢ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν·
 ἢ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν
 ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ : ἀνάγκη : οὕτω δὲ πεφυ-
 κὸς τὸ ἐν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι : πῇ ; ἔστηκε μὲν που,
 εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν· ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ ὃν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαίνειν
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ : ἔστι γάρ : τὸ δὲ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ὃν
 ἐστὸς δὴ που ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι ; πάνυ γε : τί δαί ; τὸ ἐν ἐτέρῳ αἰεὶ
 ὃν οὐ, τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀνάγκη μὴδέποτε ἐν ταύτῳ εἶναι ; μὴδέποτε δὲ ὃν

and what circum-
 scribes is a limit.
 One, then, is
 (one-many,
 whole-parts,
 limitless and)
 'limited.' A. It
 seems so. P.
 vi. Thus it must
 have extremities,
 and, as a whole,
 possess 'begin-
 ning' 'middle'
 'end.' A. It
 must. P.
 vii. And so will
 have a 'shape'
 —straight,
 spherical or
 mixed. A. It
 will. P.
 viii. Thus 1), as
 all the parts com-
 pose the whole
 and are contained
 in it, the one
 which is both
 whole and parts,
 is 'in itself':
 2) as the whole
 is not in the
 parts—whether
 all or some or
 one—if it is to be
 anywhere it must
 (viewed as a
 whole) be in the
 different, or 'in
 another.' A.
 Inevitably. P.
 ix. But 1) if
 always in itself it
 is always in the
 same, or 'is
 still': while 2)
 if always in the
 different it is
 never in the
 same,

and so is 'in motion.'

A So. P.

x. Everything is to everything either the same or different, or is part or whole to that which is so: now

1) as the one is not part of itself, nor a whole to itself as part, nor different from the one, it is the same as itself:—

but 2) the one was both in and not in itself, so it differs from itself:—but 3)

that which differs differs from the different; the one, then, differs not from itself but from the others:—4) the different, again, cannot be in either the not-ones or the one, else it were the same with them: will not these,

then, escape altogether from differing? Nay the not-ones, to be truly such, must be without all share in the one—they cannot even be number for that reason—nor can they be parts of the one, or the whole of it, nor the converse.

83 a 1

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; οὕτως: ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ ἐν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, αἰεὶ κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἐστάναι: φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν ταυτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταυτόν τε καὶ ἑτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν: πῶς; πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ᾧδε ἔχει· ἢ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἑτερον ἢ, ἐὰν μὴ ταυτόν ἢ μηδ' ἑτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη: φαίνεται: ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν; Οὐδαμῶς: οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἐαυτὸ μέρος ὄν: οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε: ἀλλ' ἄρα ἑτερόν ἐστιν ἐνὸς τὸ ἐν; οὐ δῆτα: οὐδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἑτερον ἂν εἴη: οὐ μέντοι: εἰ οὖν μήτε ἑτερον μήτε ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ταυτόν εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; ἀνάγκη: τί δαί; τὸ ἐτέρωθι ὄν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος ἑαυτῷ, οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἑτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἔσται; ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ: οὕτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἐν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν ἅμα καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ: ἐφάνη γάρ: ἑτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ταύτῃ ἂν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐν: ἔοικεν: τί οὖν; εἰ τοῦ τι ἑτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἑτέρου ὄντος ἑτερον ἔσται; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν ὅσα μὴ ἐν ἐστὶν ἅπανθ' ἑτερα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν; Πῶς δ' οὐ; ἑτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων: ἑτερον: ὅρα δὴ αὐτό τε ταυτόν καὶ τὸ ἑτερον ἄρα οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσει ταυτόν ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἑτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ποτὲ εἶναι; οὐκ ἐθελήσει: εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἑτερον ἐν ταύτῳ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν τὸ ἑτερον χρόνον οὐδένα· εἰ γὰρ ὄντιν' οὖν εἴη ἐν τῷ, ἐκείνων ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν ταύτῳ εἴη τὸ ἑτερον· οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτως: ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τὸ ἑτερον: ἀληθῆ: οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐνείῃ ἂν τὸ ἑτερον: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐκ ἄρα τῷ ἐτέρῳ γ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνός, ἑτερα: οὐ γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἑτερ' ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐτέρου: πῶς γάρ: εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς ἑτερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ ἐτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἑτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων; ἐκφεύγοι: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἐν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἐν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πῃ ἂν ἐν ἦν: ἀληθῆ: οὐδ' ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἐν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἐν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: τί δαί; τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνός ἄρα μόριά ἐστιν; ἢ καὶ οὕτω μετείχε τοῦ ἐνός τὰ μὴ ἐν; μετείχεν: εἰ ἄρα πάντῃ τὸ μὴ ἐν ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν, οὐτ' ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν τὸ ἐν εἴη οὔτε ὅλον

B

C

D

E

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B

ὡς μορίων· οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς μόρια· οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ
 τῷ ἐνί· οὐ γάρ· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε ὅλα μήτε ἕτερα
 ἀλλήλων ταυτὰ ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις· ἔφαμεν γάρ· φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν
 πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς; φῶμεν· τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ταυτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἐ-
 αὐτῷ· κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἕκ γε τοῦ λόγου· ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὁμοίον τε καὶ
 ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; ἴσως· ἐπειδὴ γ' οὖν ἕτερον τῶν
 ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τὰλλα πού ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη; τί μὴν· οὐκ οὖν οὐ-
 ως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε
 ἥττον; τί γὰρ ἂν· εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον, ὁμοίως; ναί· οὐκ οὖν
 ἢ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτη
 ταυτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὰλλα τῷ ἐνί·
 πῶς λέγεις; φῶδε· ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖς; ἔγω-
 γε· τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποισ ἂν πλεονάκεις ἢ ἁπαξ; ἔγωγε·
 Πότερον οὖν, εἴαν μὲν ἁπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκείνο προσαγορεύεις οὐπὲρ
 ἐστὶ τοῦνομα, εἴαν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκείνο; ἢ, εἴαν τε ἁπαξ εἴαν τε πολ-
 λάκις ταυτὸ ὄνομα φθέγγῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταυτὸ καὶ λέγειν αἰεὶ;
 τί μὴν· οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὀνομά ἐστιν ἐπὶ τινι; πάνυ γε· ὅτ' ἂν ἄρα
 αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, εἴαν τε ἁπαξ εἴαν τε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλῃ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι
 ὀνομάξεις ἢ ἐκείνο οὐπὲρ ἦν ὄνομα· ἀνάγκη· ὅτ' ἂν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι
 ἕτερον μὲν τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, οἷς τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόν-
 τες, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ αἰεὶ λέγομεν,
 ἥσπερ ἦν τοῦνομα; πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἢ ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν καὶ
 τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός· κατὰ τ' αὖ τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ
 ἂν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· τὸ δὲ πού ταυτὸν πεπονθὸς ὁμοι-
 ον· οὐχί; ναί· ἢ δὴ τὸ ἐν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦ-
 το ἅπαν ἁπασιν ὁμοιον ἂν εἴη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἔοικεν·
 ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὁμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον; ναί· οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον
 τῷ αὐτῷ; καὶ τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο γ' ἐφάνη ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἐν τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ταυτόν· ἐφάνη γάρ· τούναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταύ-
 τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων· πάνυ γε· ἢ γε μὴν ἕτερον,
 ὁμοιον ἐφάνη; ναί· ἢ ἄρα ταυτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τούναντίον πά-
 θος τῷ ὁμοιούντι πάθει· ὁμοίου δὲ πού τὸ ἕτερον· ναί· ἀνομοιώσ-
 ει ἄρα ταυτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἐτέρῳ· ἔοικεν· ὁμοιον ἄρα καὶ

83 a 2

But whatever
 was neither part
 nor whole nor
 different was the
 same; so the one
 and the not-ones
 are the same.
 Thus the one is
 both 'different'
 from and 'the
 same' as itself
 and the others.
 A. The argument
 would make it
 seem so. P.
 xi. Will it not
 also be both
 'like' and 'un-
 like' to itself and
 the others? For
 1) the one and
 the others mutu-
 ally differing to
 the same degree
 are like by this
 equal difference
 —difference hav-
 ing the same
 meaning whether
 used of the others
 or of the one.
 And 2) if dif-
 ference give
 likeness same-
 ness must yield
 unlikeness; now
 the one was the
 same as the
 others, therefore
 it is unlike them.

But 3) it was also different from itself, so it is 'like itself'; and 4) the same as itself, therefore finally it must be 'unlike itself.' A. Necessarily. P. xii. Since the one was in itself as whole it touches itself; but being also in the others it touches them likewise. Now to touch itself the one must lie next itself. But this makes it two: as surely as it is one, so surely can it not touch itself. And, as between two things which touch no third can come, two things will yield one touch, and three two touches —always one touch fewer than the things: one thing, no touch.

83 b 1

κατέχων

✓

ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἢ μὲν ἕτερον, ὁμοιον, ἢ δὲ ταυτόν, ἀνόμοιον : ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον : καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει : τίνα; ἢ ταυτόν πέπονθε μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δὲ Πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὁμοιον εἶναι· ἢ ὁ ἄλλο πέπονθεν ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ ὃν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι : ἀληθῆ λέγεις : ταυτόν τε ἄρα ὃν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ κατὰ ἐκότερον ὁμοιον τε ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις : πάνυ γε : οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπεὶ περ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταυτόν ἑαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ ἐκότερον, ὁμοιον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται : ἀνάγκη : τί δαὶ δὴ; περὶ τοῦ ἄπτεσθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι πέρα, πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει : σκοπῶ : αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ τὸ ἐν ἐφάνη ὅν : ὀρθῶς : οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἐν; ναί : ἢ μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτοιτο ἂν ἢ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἄπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅν : φαίνεται : οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἄπτοιτο ἂν τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων : ἄπτοιτο : τί δαὶ τῆδε ; ἀρ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κεῖσθαι ἐκείνῃ οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν ἢ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ἢ ἔδρα, ἢ ἂν κέηται ἄπτεται; ἀνάγκη : καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κεῖσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἢ αὐτὸ ἐστίν : δεῖ γάρ : οὐκ οὖν, δύο μὲν ὃν τὸ ἐν ποιήσειεν ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο· ἕως ὃ ἂν ἢ ἔν, οὐκ ἐβελήσει : οὐ γὰρ οὖν : ἢ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μὴ· τε ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ : ἢ αὐτῇ : ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄψεται : τί δὴ : ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι χωρὶς ὃν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῃ εἶναι οὐ μέλλει ἄψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι : ἀληθῆ : δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλιγοστόν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι : δεῖ : εἰ δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ὅροιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται αἱ δὲ ἄψις δύο; ναί : καὶ οὕτω δὴ αἰεὶ ἐνὸς προσγινομένου μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ὅ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς ἄψις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἄψων πλεονεκτεῖ· ἥδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἅμα ἐν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄψις ταῖς ἄψεσιν : ὀρθῶς : ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶν τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, αἰεὶ μιᾷ αἱ

ἄψις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν· ἀληθῆ· εἰ δέ γε ἐν μόνον ἐστίν, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη· πῶς γάρ· οὐκ οὖν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς οὔτε ἐν ἐστὶν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν· οὐ γάρ· οὐκ ἄρα ἐν-
 ἐστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐνὸς μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν αὐτοῖς· πῶς γάρ· οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε δύο, οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄ-
 νομα οὐδέν· οὐ· τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ἐν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη· οὐ φαί-
 νεται· ἄψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν, δυοῖν μὴ ὄντοι· οὐκ ἔστιν· οὔτ' ἄρα τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπεὶ περ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ οὖν·
 Οὕτω δὲ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἄπτεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἄπτεται· ἔοικεν· ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον, αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; πῶς; εἰ μείζον εἴη τὸ ἐν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἄρα οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄλ-
 λα τοῦ ἐνός οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι [ἄλλο,] ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν¹ πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἐκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχουεν ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος τὰ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἐν σμικρότητα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, ὁ-
 ποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἶδει μέγεθος προσείη μείζον ἂν εἴη, ᾧ δὲ σμι-
 κρότης ἔλαττον· ἀνάγκη· οὐκ οὖν ἐστὸν τέ τινα τούτῳ εἶδη τό τε μέ-
 γεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίῳ τε ἀλλήλοιον εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἐγγιγνοίσθην· πῶς γὰρ ἂν· εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται ἢ τοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐθείη· ἀνάγκη· τί δ' εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγναιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δι' ὅ-
 λου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό; δῆλον δὲ· ἄρ' οὖν οὐ-
 κ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὐσα ἢ σμικρότης τῷ ἐνὶ ἴσῃ ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχου-
 σα δὲ μείζων· πῶς δ' οὐ· δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἴσῃ τῷ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἐαυτῆς; ἀδύνατον· ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη σμικρό-
 της, ἀλλ', εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει; ναί· οὔτε γε ἐν παντὶ αὐτῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ μή, ταῦ-
 τὰ ποιήσει ἄπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζων τοῦ μέρους ἐν ᾧ ἂν αἰ ἐνῇ· ἀνάγκη· οὐδ' ἐνί ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων σμικρότης, μὴτ' ἐν μέρει μὴτ' ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη· οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐ-
 τῆς σμικρότητος· οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐδ' ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐ-
 τῷ· μείζον γὰρ ἂν τι εἴη ἄλλο, καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκείνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὐ ἀνάγκη

Now the others have no connection with the one. The one stands solitary with no two. Touch therefore vanishes: and the one cannot touch the others. It thus both 'touches and does not touch itself and the others.' A. So it seems.

P.

xiii. Again: if the one be greater or less than the others, or they than it, this must arise solely from the possession by either of the *εἶδος* of bigness or smallness. Now 1) smallness cannot appear in the one: for if it extended through the whole it would be equal to it, while if it surrounded it it would be greater; and so likewise if it appeared in a part: but smallness is never equal or greater. Again, if bigness appeared in the one then were the one bigger than it, and that without any smallness to surpass: which is impossible.

83 b *

✓

Since, then, neither bigness nor smallness exists in it the one cannot be either bigger or smaller than the others, nor they than it : hence the one must be equal both to itself and the others. 2) As, however, the one is within, it must also be around, itself; so it must be bigger and smaller than itself. Again : outside of the one and the others nothing exists; and that which exists must be somewhere; and being somewhere it is a smaller within a greater. Clearly, therefore, the one and the others are reciprocally each in the other, and alternately bigger and smaller each than the other. Accordingly the one is 'equal to, greater and less than' itself and the others. A. It seems so. P. xiv. But, if so,

84 a 1

ὑπερέχειν εἰάν περ ἢ μέγα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρό-
της οὐδαμοῦ ἔνι : ἀληθῆ : ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μείζον ἢ
αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ μεγέ-
θους : οὐ γάρ : οὔτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζω τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδ' ἐλάττω, μήτε μέ-
γεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχοντα· οὔτε αὐτὸ τούτω πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἔχετον
τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλή-
λω. οὔτε αὖ τὸ ἐν τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μείζον ἂν οὐδὲ ἔλαττον εἴη,
μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον : οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γε : ἀρ' οὖν
εἰ μήτε μείζον μὴτ' ἔλαττον τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε
ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι ; ἀνάγκη : οὐκ οὖν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέ-
χον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὄν
ἴσον εἶναι : πῶς γὰρ οὐ : καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό γε τὸ ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως
ἂν ἔχοι μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον· οὐτ' ἂν ὑ-
περέχοιτο οὐτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἴσου ὄν ἴσον ἂν εἴη ἑαυτῷ ;
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν : τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἴη : φαίνε-
ται : καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἂν εἴη ἐξῶθεν· καὶ
περιέχον μὲν μείζον ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον. καὶ
οὕτω μείζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐν : εἴη γὰρ ἂν : οὐκ οὖν
καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἐνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων : πῶς
γὰρ οὐ : ἀλλὰ μὴν' καὶ εἶναι που δεῖ τό γε ὄν ἀεί : ναί : οὐκ οὖν τό γε ἐν
τῷ ὄν ἐν μείζον· ἔσται ἔλαττον ὄν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον ἐν ἐτέρῳ εἴη :
οὐ γάρ : ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἐνός,
δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλ-
λα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι ; φαίνεται : ὅτι
μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστιν, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός,
περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἔλαττον τῶν ἄλλων περιεχόμενον· ὅτι
δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ, τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μείζον
ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἐλάττω ; ἔοικεν : τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἴσον τε καὶ
μείζον καὶ ἔλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων : φαίνεται : καὶ
μὴν εἴπερ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειό-
νων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων καὶ με-
ρῶν : πῶς δ' οὐ : ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὄν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττό-
νων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἔλαττον ἂν καὶ πλεόν εἴη αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων, καὶ ἴσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταυτά : πῶς ; ὦν περ

D

E

151

B

C

Μεῖζόν ἐστι, πλείωνον που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν· ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ με-
 ρῶν· καὶ ὧν ἔλαττον, ὡσαύτως. καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταυτὰ: οὕτως:
 οὐκ οὖν ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ὃν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ
 πλείωνον καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν: πῶς
 ὃ οὐ: ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὃν αὐτῷ ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ εἴη,
 πλείωνον δὲ πλεόν, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ:
 φαίνεται: οὐκ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα ὡσαύτως ἔξει τὸ ἓν. ὅτι μὲν με-
 ζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλεόν εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι
 δὲ σμικρότερον, ἔλαττον· ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος
 εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις: ἀνάγκη: οὕτως δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν καὶ ἴσον
 καὶ πλεόν καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων:
 ἔσται: ἄρ' οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἓν, καὶ ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτε-
 ρόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ οὔτε νεώ-
 τερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον;
 πῶς; εἶναι μὲν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει εἴπερ ἓν ἔστιν; ναί: τὸ δὲ εἶναι
 ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος; ὥσπερ τὸ
 ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὐσί-
 ας ἐστὶ κοινωνία: ἔστι γάρ: μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ
 εἶναι: πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; ναί: ἀεὶ ἄρα
 πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον: ἀ-
 νάγκη: ἄρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτε-
 ρον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται; μεμνήμεθα: οὐκ οὖν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύ-
 τερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἓν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρε-
 σβύτερον γίγνοιτο: ἀνάγκη: γίγνεται μὲν δὴ νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρε-
 σβύτερον αὐτοῦ οὕτω; ναί: ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἄρ' οὐχ ὅτ' ἂν κατὰ τὸν
 νῦν χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον, τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πο-
 ρευστόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν: οὐ γάρ:
 ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ἐπειδ' ἂν τῷ νῦν
 ἐντύχῃ, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται ἀλλ' ἔστι τότε ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προῖον γὰρ οὐ-
 κ' ἂν ποτε ληφθεῖν ὑπο τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προῖον οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμ-
 φοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα· τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμε-
 νον, τοῦ δὲ ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον· μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμε-
 νον τοῦ τ' ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν: ἀληθῆ: εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν
 τὸ νῦν, πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδ' ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο ἦ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γί-
 ν

the one will have
 as many
 measures as the
 others and itself,
 and more, and
 fewer; and if
 measures then
 parts, and
 numbers also.
 So it will be
 'equal in num-
 ber' to itself and
 the others, and
 also 'more' and
 'fewer.' A. It
 will. P.
 xv. That the one
 'is' means that
 it shares in ex-
 istence with the
 time that is at
 any moment
 present. Hence
 x) partaking of
 time, and of
 time as it passes,
 it 'becomes,' as
 we argued, at
 once 'older' and
 'younger' than
 itself. But it
 'is' both only
 when, in process
 of becoming, it
 alights at now—
 a point which in
 passing from
 past to future it
 cannot skip.
 Thus, when at
 now, it pauses in
 its becoming

84 a 2

and is both older and younger than itself. And this process it repeats through its whole existence. But it must always be and become the same length of time as itself. Hence the one is neither older nor younger than, but has 'the same age as' itself—whether being or becoming.

s). The others, again, as plural, are more than one—possess more number than the one. But the fewer comes earlier, and the fewest first. So the one, as earlier, is older than the others, and they are younger than it. Again, however, the one had parts, and so a beginning and end and middle: and by its nature the beginning comes first, and the end last;

γινεσθαι, καὶ ἔστιν τότε τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχη γιγνώμενον: φαίνεται: καὶ τὸ ἐν
 ἄρα, ὅτ' ἂν πρεσβύτερον γιγνώμενον ἐντύχη τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν τοῦ γί-
 γινεσθαι, καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον; πάνν μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν οὐπερ_ ἐ-
 γίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν; ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ; ναί: ἔστι δὲ
 τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον; ἔστιν: καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα
 τότε αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ὅτ' ἂν πρεσβύτερον γιγνώμενον ἐντύχη τῷ
 νῦν: ἀνάγκη: τό γε μὴν νῦν αἰὲ πάρεστι τῷ ἐν διὰ παντός τοῦ εἶ-
 ναι: ἔστι γὰρ αἰὲ νῦν ὅτ' ἂν περ ἡ: πῶς γὰρ οὐ: αἰὲ ἄρα ἐστὶ τε καὶ γί-
 Γίνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἐν: εἰκεν: πλείω δὲ
 χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον; τὸν ἴσον: ἀλλὰ μὴν
 τὸν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνώμενον ἢ ὄν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει;
 πῶς δ' οὐ: τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε
 νεώτερόν ἐστιν; οὐ γάρ: τὸ ἐν ἄρα, τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ
 καὶ γιγνώμενον καὶ ὄν, οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ
 ἐστὶν οὔτε γίγνεται: οὐ μοι δοκεῖ: τί δαί, τῶν ἄλλων: οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν:
 τότε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, εἴπερ ἕτερα ἐστὶν
 ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἐνός. ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὄν ἐν ἂν ἦν ἕτε-
 ρα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἐνός ἐστὶ, καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι: ἔχοι γὰρ ἂν:
 πλῆθος δὲ ὄν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἐνός: πῶς
 δ' οὐ: τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγο-
 νέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω: τὰ ἐλάττω: τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα
 Πρῶτον τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἐν. ἢ γάρ: ναί: πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἐν πρῶτον γέ-
 γονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐχόντων ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἀριθμόν, εἴ-
 περ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστὶν: ἔχει γάρ: πρῶτον δέ γε, οἶμαι, γεγονὸς
 πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον: τὰ δ' ὕστερον γεγονότα
 νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος: καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα
 νεώτερα τοῦ ἐνός, τὸ δὲ ἐν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων: εἴη γὰρ ἂν:
 τί δαί τότε; ἂρ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύ-
 νατον: ἀδύνατον: ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἐν: εἰ δὲ μέρη,
 καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον: ναί: οὐκ οὖν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρ-
 χὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων: καὶ μετὰ τὴν
 ἀρχὴν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα μέχρι τέλους: τ'
 φήσομεν ταυτ' εἶναι πάντα τὰλλα τοῦ ὅλου
 νο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἐν τε καὶ ὅλο

24 b 1

τῇ δέ, οἷμαί γε, ὕστατον γίγνεται· τούτῳ δ' ἅμα τὸ ἐν πέφυκε γίγνε-
σθαι· ὥστ', εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τε-
λευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι·
φαίνεται· νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς πρε-
σβύτερα· οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται· τί δαὶ δὴ; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος
ὅ τι οὖν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὅτου οὖν, εἴαν περ μέρος ἢ ἄλλὰ μὴ μέρος,
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε οὖν; ἀνάγκη· οὐκ οὖν τὸ ἐν ἅμα τε
τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνεται· ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐ-
δενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὃ τί περ ἂν προσγί-
γνηται ὅτῳ οὖν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἐν γένη-
ται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς
ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει· ἀληθῆ· πᾶσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν
αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει τὸ ἐν· ὥστ', εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ
ἐν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' ἅ-
μα· καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον
οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν
πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως·
πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός· ἀλλὰ τί αὖ
περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων,
καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός· καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνε-
σθαι; ἄρα ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι
ἔχει, ἢ ἐτέρως· οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοσόδε γε· εἰ καὶ ἔστιν
ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἐτέρου, γίγνεσθαί γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι
ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐκ ἂν
ἔτι δύναιτο, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὃν ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι· ἀνί-
σοις γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτῳ οὖν, ἴσῳ
ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὅσῳ περ ᾗ τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ· πῶς
γὰρ οὐ· οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὃν τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος γίγνεται· ἂν ποτε πρε-
σβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἀλ-
λ' ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον τόδε, νεώτερον δ' αὖ· ἀληθῆ· καὶ τὸ
ἐν ἄρα ὃν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον
γίγνεται· οὐ γὰρ οὖν· ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα
γίγνεται· πῇ δὴ· ἢ τό τε ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ τᾶλ-
λα τοῦ ἐνός· τί οὖν· ὅτ' ἂν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον ἢ πλείω

and only when
the end has come
has the one come;
consequently the
one is younger
than the others,
and they are
older than it.
But the begin-
ning, being one
part, is one—thus
the one becomes
with the first, and
with each succes-
sive part; and so
maintains the
same age with
all the others.
It must, then, be
and have become
of the same age
with them and
different, and the
converse—but
does it become
so? If it was
older—or
younger—at first
it cannot become
more so; for if
equals be put to
unequals these
always differ by
as much as at
first: and equal
times are added
here. But when
the one is older

than the others
it has existed
longer than they,
and if to these
unequals we add
equal times the
wholes will differ
by a less part
than at first.
The one, then,
would always
become less and
less older than
the others ;
that is, would
become younger
in respect to
them, while they
grew older rela-
tively to it. But
though always
having this
tendency they
never *are* so,
since they con-
tinue to differ
by the original
interval, albeit
that interval
forms an ever-
lessening part of
their respective
ages. Thus the
one 'is' and 'is
not,' 'becomes'
and 'does not
become,' 'equal
in age' and
'older' and
'younger' in
regard to the
others—and
they to it. *A.*
Perfectly so. *P.*
xvi. As partaking
of time

84 b 9

που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα: ναί: πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· εἰς πλεονί καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἄρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ διοίσει τὸ πλεόν τοῦ ἐλάττωτος, ἢ σμικροτέρῳ: σμικροτέρῳ: οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται ὃ τί περ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τὰλλα ἡλικία διαφέρων τὸ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλαις ἑλαττον αἰὲ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρότερον. ἢ οὐ: ναί: οὐκ οὖν τό γε ἑλαττον διαφέρων ἡλικία πρὸς τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτο ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, πρὸς ᾧ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον: νεώτερον: εἰ δ' ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον; πάνυ γε: τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς Πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὄν· ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται αἰὲ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως. ἴόντες γὰρ αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις, γίγνεσθαι τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου. γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἶω τε εἶπην· εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ' εἰεν ἂν. ὡς δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἐν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὄν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός· τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα ὅτι ὕστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἴσχει, ἐπειδὴ περ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα: φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω: οὐκ οὖν ἢ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων αἰὲ διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός· ἢ δὲ ἄλλῃ αἰὲ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὕστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτη δὲ ἀνάγκη πρεσβυτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι, τὰ τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: κατὰ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὐτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων: παντελῶς μὲν οὖν: ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ

νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; ἀνάγκη: ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἐν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται, καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται: τί μὴν: καὶ εἴη ἂν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται: πάνυ γε: καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ
καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν: ὁρθῶς λέγεις: καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται: καὶ ὅσα περ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα καὶ περὶ τὸ ἐν ἔστιν: παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως: ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἐν, εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἂρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἐν τε ὄν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἐν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ μετέχειν αὐ ποτέ οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη: ἂρ' οὖν ὅτε μετέχει οἷόν τ' ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει μετέχειν: οὐχ οἷόν τε: ἐν ἅλλῃ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἅλλῃ οὐ μετέχει: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι: ὁρθῶς: οὐκ οὖν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἷόν τ' ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφίῃ: οὐδαμῶς: τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἄρα οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε: τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἂρ' οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; καὶ πάνυ γε: τὸ ἐν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφίεν οὐσίαν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται: ἀνάγκη: ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὄν καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ἂρ' οὐχ ὅτ' ἂν μὲν γίγνηται ἐν τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅτ' ἂν δὲ πολλὰ τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε: ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἂρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλή γε: καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιον γε καὶ ὁμοιον ὅτ' ἂν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι; ναί: καὶ ὅτ' ἂν μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι; οὕτως: ὅτ' ἂν δὲ κινούμεμον τε ἴσσηται καὶ ὅτ' ἂν ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ δεῖ δὴ πού αὐτό γε μὴδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι; πῶς δὴ: ἐστὸς τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἐστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν: πῶς γάρ: χρόνος δὲ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ τι οἷόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἐστάναι; οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν; οὐκ εἰκός: πύτ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς οὖν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτ' ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν: οὐ γὰρ οὖν:

the one 'was' 'is' 'will be' 'was becoming' 'becomes' and 'will become.'
A. How should it not? P.
xvii. And there will be 'science, opinion,' and so on, 'of it': xviii. and 'a name' and other things 'for it.' A. Entirely so.

III. P. But thirdly:
i. The one, being such, must, when one, partake of existence; and, when not, not. Nor can it do both at once. Thus there will be a time at which it takes hold on existence, and one at which it lets go. The one, therefore, 'becomes' and 'perishes.' A. Of necessity. P.
ii. Being both one and many, when it becomes as one it perishes as many, and the converse. In which process it must 'be separated and united'; 'grow like, and unlike'; 'wax, wane and grow equal.' A. Yes. P.
iii. But in passing to rest or motion it suffers change. When changing it is neither in motion nor at rest, and this it cannot be in time.

When changing, then, it must be out of time, and in that odd thing the instantaneous, which hurks between motion and rest apart from time. And when it is out of time it 'neither is in motion nor at rest,' 'neither becomes nor perishes,' nor possesses any other such characteristic. So fares the one, if it is. A. How could it be otherwise?

IV. P. But now, if the one is, what of the others?
I. They are not the one.
A. Right. P.
II. Yet as others they must have parts, else were they completely one: and parts are parts of a whole—a whole which must be one. For they cannot be parts of a many which includes themselves, else were each part part of itself and of each of the others.

85 a 2

ἀρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δὲ τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι ἐστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξύ τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ στάσεως ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδ' ἐνὶ οὐσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι· κινδυνεύει· καὶ τὸ ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ ἔστηκε τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβαλλοὶ ἂν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα· μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφοτέρω ποιοί. μεταβάλλον δ', ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει· καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει ἐν οὐδ' ἐνὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη· οὐδὲ κινεῖτ' ἂν τότε οὐδ' ἂν σταίη· οὐ γάρ· ἀρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅτ' ἂν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβαλλῇ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; ἔοικε γ' οὖν· κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἶόν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἐν οὔτε ἔν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλὰ, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὁμοιον ἶόν οὔτε ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἶόν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξάνομενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἂν· οὐκ ἔοικε· ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἐν, εἰ ἔστιν· πῶς δ' οὐ; τί δαί τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἀρ' οὐ σκεπτέον; σκεπτέον· λέγωμεν δὴ, ἐν εἰ ἔστι τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς τί χρὴ πεποιθέναι· λέγωμεν· οὐκ οὖν, ἐπεὶ περ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἔστι τὰλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἦν· ὀρθῶς· οὐδὲ μὴν στéρεται γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἐνὸς τὰλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει αὐτῇ· πῇ δὴ; ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἐν εἴη· ὀρθῶς· μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾗ; φαμέν γάρ· ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου· πῶς τοῦτο· εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἴη, ἐαυτοῦ τε δὴ που μόριον ἔσται, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων· ἐνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὄν μόριον πλὴν τούτου τῶν

E

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B

C

D

ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἐνὸς ἐκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ δὲ δὲ μόριον
ἐκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὄν, πάντων τούτων
τι εἶναι ὧν οὐδ' ἐνὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι οὖν, ἀδύνατον εἶ-
ναι: φαίνεται γὰρ δὴ: οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόρι-
ον· ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἐνός τινος ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, ἐξ ἀπάντων
ἐν τέλειον γεγονός; τούτου μόριον ἂν τὸ μόριον εἴη: παντάπασιν μὲν
οὖν: εἰ ἄρα τὰλλα μόρια ἔχει κἂν τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνός μετέχοι: πάν γε:
ἐν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός: ἀνάγκη:
καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος: καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
ἀνάγκη μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός. εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριόν ἐστι τό γε ἕκα-
στον εἶναι ἐν δὴ που σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων καθ' αὐτὸ
δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται: ὁρθῶς: μετέχοι δὲ γ' ἂν τοῦ ἐνός δηλον
ὅτι ἄλλο δὲ ἢ ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετείχεν ἄλλ' ἢ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐν· νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι
πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀδύνατον που: ἀδύνατον: μετέχειν δὲ τοῦ ἐνός ἀ-
νάγκη τῷ τε ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὅλον ἔσται οὐδ' μόρια τὰ μό-
ρια: τὸ δ' αὖ ἕκαστον ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου ὃ ἂν ἢ μόριον ὅλον: οὕτως:
οὐκ οὖν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἐνός μετέχει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ: πῶς δ' οὐ:
τὰ δὲ ἕτερα τοῦ ἐνός πολλά που ἂν εἴη· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἐν¹ μήτε ἐνός
πλείω εἴη τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἐπεὶ δὲ γε πλεί-
ω ἐνός ἐστι τὰ τε τοῦ ἐνός μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐνός ὅλου μετέχοντα,
οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτὰ γε ἐκεῖνα τὰ μεταλαμβά-
νοντα τοῦ ἐνός; πῶς; ὅδε εἰδῶμεν. ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἐν ὄντα, οὐδὲ
μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐνός, τότε ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνει; δη-
λαδὴ: οὐκ οὖν πλήθει ὄντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἐνι: πλήθει μέντοι: τί
οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὥς οἱοί τ' ἐ-
σμέν ὅ τι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ
τοῦ ἐνός μὴ μετέχοι, πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἐν; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν,
οὕτως αἰεὶ σκοποῦντι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἶ-
δους, ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς αἰεὶ ὁρῶμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει: παντά-
πασιν μὲν οὖν: καὶ μὴν ἐπειδ' ἂν γε ἐν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον γέ-
νηται, πέρας ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον
πρὸς τὰ μόρια: κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν: τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τοῦ ἐνός συμ-
βαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὥς ἔοικεν,
ἕτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὲ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλ-

Being parts of
one whole, then,
they are in fact
a perfect whole
made up of
parts. A. Of
necessity. P.
iii. So of each
part; for 'each'
implies oneness,
and each is one
separate part of
the whole. Thus
each part of the
others partakes
of the one, while
yet distinct from
it. A. So. P.
iv. But being
more than the
one, and distinct
from it, they are
'unlimited in
number.' Since,
if we cut off in
our mind even
the smallest
portion of that
which has no
share in one, it
will be a multi-
tude. A. Quite
so. P.
v. Yet as all parts
in turn become
one they possess
a limit towards
each other and
the whole, and
conversely. So,
as related to the
one, the others
become different
in themselves

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and produce a
'limit' even
while their
nature is un-
limitedness. *A.*
Quite so. *P.*
vi. And as being
all limited and all
unlimited they
are 'like'—
while, as being
both at once,
they are 'un-
like'—to them-
selves and each
other. *A.* I
fear so. *P.*
vii. And so we
shall find same-
ness and differ-
ence, and all
other contradic-
tory qualities in
the others. *A.*
Right.

V. *P.* Yet again:
i. The one and
the others are
quite separate,
as there is
nothing to con-
tain both. *A.*
Yes. *P.*
ii. The true one
has not parts;
nor is it, as
whole, connected
with the others.
Hence the others
have 'no one'
in them at all.
A. No. *P.*
iii. Nor are they
'many'—for
having no one,
neither have they
two, three. *A.* So.

85 b s



ληλα· ἡ δὲ αὐτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρία; φαίνεται : οὕτω δὲ
τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέ-
ρατος μετέχει : πάνυ γε : οὐκ οὖν καὶ ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλ-
λήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς; πῇ δὴ : εἰ μὲν που ἄπειρά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαν-
τῶν φύσιν, πάντα ταῦτ' ὅντα πεπονθότα ἂν εἴη ταύτῃ; πάνυ γε : καὶ
μὴν εἴ γε ἅπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτῃ πάντ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ὅντα
πεπονθότα; πῶς ὁ οὐ : εἰ δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπει-
ρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πέ-
πονθεν : ναί : τὰ δ' ἐναντία γε ὡς οἶόν τε ἀνομοιότατα; τί μὴν :
κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἑκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὁμοί' ἂν εἴη αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ
ἀλλήλοις : κατὰ δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀ-
νομοιότατα : κινδυνεύει : οὕτω δὲ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτὰ τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλ-
λήλοις ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοι' ἂν εἴη : οὕτω : καὶ ταῦτ' αὖ καὶ ἕτερα
ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκ ἔ-
τι χαλεπῶς εὐρήσομεν πεπονθότα τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ
ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα : ὀρθῶς λέγεις : οὐκ οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν
ἤδη ἐώμεν ὡς φανερά ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐν εἰ ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἢ οὕτω μόνον : πάνυ μὲν οὖν :
λέγωμεν δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός πεπον-
θῆναι; λέγωμεν γάρ : ἄρ' οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων χωρὶς
δὲ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός εἶναι; τί δὴ : ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον,
ὃ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστι τοῦ ἐνός ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτ' ἂν
ῥηθῇ τό τε ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα : πάντα γάρ : οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἔστιν ἕτερον τούτων,
ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἐν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τᾶλλα : οὐ γάρ : οὐδέποτε' ἄρα ἐν
ταύτῃ ἐστὶν τὸ ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα : οὐκ ἔοικε : χωρὶς ἄρα; ναί : οὐδὲ μὴν
μόρια γε ἔχειν φαμέν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν : πῶς γάρ : οὔτε ἄρα ὅ-
λον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρὶς τέ ἐστι
τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει : πῶς γάρ : οὐδ' ἐνὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι
ἂν τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετε-
χοντα : οὐκ ἔοικεν : οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἐν τᾶλλά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς
ἐν οὐδέν : οὐ γὰρ οὖν : οὐδ' ἄρα πολλά ἐστι τᾶλλα. ἐν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἑκα-
στον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου εἰ πολλά ἦν· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐν οὔτε πολ-
λά οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μόρια ἐστι τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδα-
μῇ μετέχει : ὀρθῶς : οὐδ' ἄρα δύο οὔτε τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα,

E

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B

C

D

οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς πανταχῇ στέρεται: οὕτω: οὐ-
 δὲ ὁμοία ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτὰ ἐστὶ τῷ ἐνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν
 ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης. εἰ γὰρ ὁμοία καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐ-
 τὰ εἴη, ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἴ-
 δη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός: φαίνεται:
 ἦν δέ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν ἢ μὴδ' ἐνὸς μετέχει; ἀδύνα-
 τον: οὐτ' ἄρα ὁμοία οὔτε ἀνόμοιά ἐστὶν οὐτ' ἀμφοτέρω τὰ ἄλλα. ὁμοία μὲν
 γὰρ ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἐνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἐτέρου εἶδους μετέχοι, ἀμφοτέρω
 δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοι· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐφάνη: ἀληθῆ: οὐ-
 δ' ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἐστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνό-
 μενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα, οὐδὲ
 ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέποιθε τῶν τοιούτων· εἰ γάρ τι τοιούτον πεπονθέναι ὑ-
 πομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτί-
 ου μετέχει, ὡν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη μετέχειν, τοῦ ἐνός γε πάντη
 πάντως στερομένοις: ἀληθέστατα: οὕτως δὲ ἐν εἰ ἔστιν πάντα τέ
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως:
 παντελῶς μὲν οὖν: εἰεν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἐν τί χρη συμβαίνειν ἄρ' οὐ
 σκεπτέον μετὰ ταῦτα; σκεπτέον γάρ: τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις,
 εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; ἄρα τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν: διαφέρει μέντοι:
 διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ
 εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον: τί δ' εἰ τις λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν
 ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν, ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρα ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἂν δη-
 λοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν; πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅ-
 τι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅτ' ἂν εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν
 ὃ λέγει: ἴσμεν: πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν
 ἄλλων, ὅτ' ἂν εἴπῃ ἐν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡττω γινώσκεται τί
 καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὐ: ἀνάγκη: ὅδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρ-
 χῆς, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τί χρη εἶναι; πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρ-
 χειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μὴδὲ ὅ τι λέγεται γιγνώ-
 σκεσθαι ὅτ' ἂν τις εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν: ἀληθῆ: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ὅτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μὴδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι: πά-
 νυ γε: καὶ ἑτεροειδότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ
 τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτεροειδότητα λέγει ὅτ' ἂν τὸ ἐν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέ-
 γῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου: φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῖ

κ

P.
 iv. Nor are they
 'like or unlike'
 to the one,
 or in themselves.
 For had they
 likeness and
 unlikeness they
 would have in
 them two oppos-
 ing εἶδη; now
 they have no
 two. A. True. P.
 v. Nor are they
 'same or diffe-
 rent,' 'in motion
 or at rest,' 'be-
 coming or perish-
 ing,' 'greater less
 or equal' or any
 such thing:—all
 these needing
 one, two, three,
 odd and even;
 which the others
 have not.
 A. Most true. P.
 vi. Thus the one
 is at once every-
 thing and
 nothing, to both
 itself and the
 others. A. En-
 tirely so.

B. I. P. But now
 'if the one is not'
 what follows?
 To begin with,
 the phrase must
 indicate some-
 thing separate
 and knowable.
 Hence
 i. there must be
 a 'science of it.'
 A. True. P.
 ii. The others
 also must be
 different from it,
 else were it not
 different from
 them; so it has a
 'differentness' of
 its own. A.
 It seems so.

P.
 iii. It must likewise partake of 'that' 'some' 'for this,' and so on, if we may speak of it at all :
 iv. and so, while non-existent, it partakes of 'many.' A. Undoubtedly. P.
 v. It must have 'unlikeness' toward the others—the different are unlike—: and, therefore, 'likeness' to itself. A. It must. P.
 vi. It is not equal to the others—else it would both exist and be (so far) like them—; so partakes of 'inequality, towards them. A. It does. P.
 vii. It, therefore, has 'bigness' and 'smallness': but,
 viii. having these, it must have 'equality,' which lies between them. A. It appears so. P.
 ix. Hence it must somehow partake (even) of 'being':

τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῃ καὶ τούτων, καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ ἂν τι ἦν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῇ μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων : ὁρθῶς : εἶναι μὲν οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ οὐχ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστιν· μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι : καὶ πάνυ γε : καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἔστιν αὐτῷ

Πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα, τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα, ἑτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἂν : ναί : τὰ δ' ἑτεροῖα οὐκ ἄλλοια ; πῶς δ' οὐ ; τὰ δ' ἄλλοια οὐκ ἀνόμοια ; ἀνόμοια μὲν ὄν : οὐκ ὄν, εἴπερ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τὰ γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη : δῆλον : εἴη δὲ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀνομοιότης πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἔστιν : ἔοικεν : ἢ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι ; πῶς ; εἰ ἐνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ ἂν

Που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οἷου τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἐνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐνός : πάνυ γε : οὐ δεῖ δέ γε : οὐ δῆτα : δεῖ ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι : δεῖ : καὶ μὴ οὐδ' ὡς ἴσον ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἴσον, εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὁμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἀδύνατα εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἐν : ἀδύνατα : ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι ; ἀνάγκη : τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα ; ναί : τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα ; πῶς δ' οὐ ;

Καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἐν πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἄνισα : μετέχει : ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γ' ἐστὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης : ἔστι γάρ : ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνὶ : κινδυνεύει : μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλων : πάνυ γε : μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν ἀεὶ ἔστιν : ἔστιν : ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα ; οὐκ· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο : ὅτι ἄρα ἔστιν μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστιν καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ μεταξὺ τούτων ὅσα : φαίνεται : τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετεῖη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος : ἔοικεν : καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ ; πῶς δὴ ; ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ

οὕτως ἔχει οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἐν μὴ εἶ-
 ναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, ὁμολον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; οὐ-
 τω μὲν οὖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι
 καὶ ὄντα λέγειν· ἀνάγκη· ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ
 μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται
 ὄν· παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν· δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶ-
 ναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι,
 ἵνα τελέως αὐτὸ εἶναι ᾗ. οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ
 ὄν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ
 τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ
 μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ τελέως μὴ
 ἔσται· ἀληθέστατα· οὐκ οὖν ἐπεὶ περὶ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ
 ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ ἐνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη με-
 τεῖναι ἐς τὸ μὴ εἶναι· ἀνάγκη· καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν·
 φαίνεται· καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι· πῶς δ' οὐ· οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ
 ἔχον πῶς μὴ ἔχειν οὕτως, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως;
 οὐχ οἷόν τε· πᾶν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω
 τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχη· πῶς δ' οὐ· μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις, ἢ τί φήσο-
 μεν· κίνησις· οὐκ οὖν τὸ ἐν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐφάνη; ναί· οὕτως
 ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται· ἔοικεν· καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα
 τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπεὶ περὶ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ
 μὴ εἶναι ἔχον· κινδυνεύει· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων,
 ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίστατό ποθεν ποι· πῶς γάρ·
 οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινεῖτ' ἂν· οὐ γάρ· οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
 ἂν στρέφοιτο, ταύτου γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπτεται· ὄν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ταυτόν, τὸ
 δὲ μὴ ὄν ἐν τῷ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι· ἀδύνατον γάρ· οὐκ ἄρα
 τὸ ἐν γε μὴ ὄν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ οὖν·
 οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦταί που τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὄν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴπερ ἡλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ
 περὶ ἄλλου τινός· ὁρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταύτῃ στρέ-
 φεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἄρ' ἂν πῃ ἔτι κινεῖτο; πῶς γάρ· τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον
 ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἐστάναι· ἀνάγκη· τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὄν ἐστηκεν τε καὶ κινεῖται· ἔοικεν· καὶ μὴν, εἴπερ γε κινεῖ-
 ται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν τι κινήθῃ κατὰ το-

86 a s

τῇ

for it has these
 qualities which,
 unless we belie
 ourselves, exist.
 So it is non-ex-
 istent. You find
 that being, in
 order to exist,
 must partake of
 not-being; and
 the converse; and
 that the non-
 existent one, if
 properly such,
 must partake
 alike of being
 and not-being.
 A. Necessarily.

P.

x. Now—1) this
 involves change
 from one state to
 the other; the
 non-existent one,
 therefore, has
 'motion'; but
 2), as non-
 existent and
 nowhere, it can-
 not change its
 place; no, nor
 revolve in the
 same place, for
 the same exists;
 nor yet change
 its nature, or we
 should cease to
 talk of the one;
 so it must 'be
 still.' A. Of
 necessity.

P.

xi. The non-
 existent one,
 then, both moves
 or changes,

and is still or
changes not; and,
as changing, it
'becomes' an-
other, and
'perishes' from
its former state;
while, as not
changing, it
'neither becomes
nor perishes.'
A. Inevitably.

If. P. Let us
revise from the
beginning.
i. When we say
'is not' we mean
utter absence of
being in the thing
spoken of: there-
fore the non-
existent one
'cannot become
or perish.' A. It
appears not. P.
ii. It 'cannot
change' in any
way:
iii. it 'cannot
move,' nor yet
'be still':
iv. it 'has not
bigness, small-
ness, or equality':
v. nor 'likeness
or differentness'
either towards
itself or others.
A. Clearly not.

86 b z

σοῦτον οὐκ ἔθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὥς ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως: οὕτως: κινούμενον
δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται; ναί: καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἀν' ἀλ-
λοιοῖτο: οὐ γάρ: εἰ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν ἀλλοιοῦται· εἰ δὲ μὴ κι-
νεῖται οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται: οὐ γάρ: τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοι-
οῦται; φαίνεται: τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον
ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοι-
ούμενον μήτε γίγνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι; ἀνάγκη: καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα
μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον
δὲ οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν μὴ ὄν γίγνεται τε καὶ
ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: αὐθις δὴ
ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν, ὁψόμενοι εἰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανείται ὅπερ καὶ
νῦν, ἢ ἕτερα: ἀλλὰ χρῆ: οὐκ οὖν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, φαμέν, τί χρὴ' περὶ αὐτοῦ
συμβαίνειν; ναί: τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅτ' ἂν λέγωμεν, ἄρα μὴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει
ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι; οὐδὲν ἄλλο: πότε-
ρον οὖν, ὅτ' ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναι φαμεν αὐτὸ πῶς δὲ
εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς
οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν; ἀπλούστατα μὲν οὖν:
Οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναίτο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν:
οὐ γάρ: τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μὴ τι ἄλλο ἢ ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσί-
ας μεταλαμβάνειν τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο: ᾧ δὲ γε μη-
δὲν τούτου μέτεστιν οὔτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό: πῶς γάρ:
τῷ ἐν ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὔτε ἐκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον
οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς: εἰκός: οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται
τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπεὶ περ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας: οὐ φαί-
νεται: οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῇ· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολ-
λύοιτο τοῦτο πάσχον: ἀληθῆ: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ
κινεῖσθαι; ἀνάγκη: οὐδὲ μὴν ἐστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν· τὸ
γὰρ ἐστὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινὶ δεῖ εἶναι: τῷ αὐτῷ· πῶς γὰρ οὐ: οὔ-
τω δὴ αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν μήτε ποτὲ ἐστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν: μὴ γὰρ
οὖν: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν τούτου μετέ-
χον ὄντος οὐσίας μετέχοι: δῆλον: οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε συμ-
κρότης οὔτε ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν: οὐ γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοιότης γε
οὔτε ἑτεροιοτή, οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλα, εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ: οὐ
φαίνεται: τί δαί; τὰλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι;

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οὐκ ἔστιν: οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοία οὔτε ἀνόμοια, οὔτε ταῦτά οὔτε ἑτερά ἐστιν αὐ-
τῷ τὰ ἄλλα: οὐ γάρ: τί δαί; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τοῦτο
B ἢ τὸ τούτου, ἢ ἄλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ, ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν, ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δό-
ξα ἢ αἴσθησις, ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα, ἢ ἄλλο ὃ τι οὖν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ
μὴ ὄν ἔσται; οὐκ ἔσται: οὕτω δὲ ἐν οὐκ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ: οὐκ οὖν
δὴ εὐκέν γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν: ἔτι δὲ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τὰλλα τί χρὴ
Πεπονθέναι: λέγωμεν γάρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ
ἄλλα ἐστὶν οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο: οὕτω: εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ό λόγος τὰ γε ἄλλα ἑτερά ἐστιν· ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο
C καὶ τὸ ἕτερον; ἔγωγε: ἕτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἐτέρου, καὶ
τὸ ἄλλο δὲ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου; ναί: καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι,
ἔστι τι οὐ ἄλλα ἔσται: ἀνάγκη: τί δὲ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐνὸς οὐκ ἔσται
ἄλλα μὴ ὄντος γε: οὐ γάρ: ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστίν. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λεί-
πεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις: ὀρθῶς: κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἕκαστα ἀλ-
ληλων ἄλλα ἐστίν· κατὰ ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἶά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἐνός. ἀλλ' ἔ-
D καστος, ὡς εἰκεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἁπειρός ἐστι πλήθει· καὶ τὸ σμικρό-
τατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβη τις ὥσπερ ὅναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαί-
φνης ἀντὶ ἐνός δόξαντος εἶναι πολλά, καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμ-
μέγεθες, πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ: ὀρθότατα: τοιοῦτων
D ἢ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τὰλλα, εἰ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν: κο-
μιδῇ μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἰς ἕκαστος φαινόμε-
E νος ὧν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται. καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει_,
εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἕκαστον πολλῶν ὄντων: πάνυ γε: καὶ τὰ μὲν δὲ ἄρτια,
τὰ δὲ περιττά, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ
ἔσται: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς
ἐν εἶναι. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν
165 πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων; πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ ἴσος μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς
καὶ σμικρὸς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξισθήσεται εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαι-
νεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δό-
ξειν ἐλθεῖν· τοῦτο δὲ εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος: εἰκός: οὐκ οὖν
καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων αὐτός τε πρὸς αὐτόν, οὔτε ἀρχὴν
οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων: πῇ δὴ: ὅτι αἰὲ αὐτῶν ὅτ' ἂν τίς τι λά-
B βῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὡς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη αἰὲ φαίνεται ἀρ-
χή, μετὰ τε τὴν τελευταίην ἐτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἐν τε τῷ μέσῳ

P.
vi. Nor are the others either 'like or unlike' it, or the 'same or different' from it.
vii. Nor has it 'of that' 'some-thing' 'once' 'science' 'name' or,
viii. in a word, characteristics at all. A. It does not seem to have.
III. P.
Now 'if the one is not' what of the others?
i. They must be 'others'; which,
ii. as there is no one, must be 'other than each other.' But each
iii. must be so 'by multitudes,' even the smallest breaking into countless number and acquiring boundless size.
iv. These will 'seem to be one, delusively';
v. and to 'have number, odd, even,' falsely.
vi. A 'seeming smallest' will 'appear big,' while a phantas- mal 'equal will seem' to come between.
vii. Each bundle will 'seem to have a limit,' yet have no begin-ning or middle;

since these persistently reverse their nature on closer mental scrutiny.

viii. They will also, as regards both themselves and each other, 'seem like or different' according as they are seen far off or at hand.

ix. They will, in short, 'seem the same and different, touching and separate, moving in all ways and standing, becoming perishing and neither'; and all such things; if they exist while the one does not.

A. Most true.

IV. P. Once more and finally:

'If the one is not' while the others are i. they will 'not be one,' nor 'many,' which involves one.

ii. Nor will they 'seem either,' having no connection with the non-existent. iii. There will be 'no opinion or semblance of the non-existent' in them.

iv. They will neither 'seem nor be one or many,'

v. 'like or unlike'

ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τούτου μέσα, σμικρότερα δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνὸς αὐ-
τῶν ἐκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνός: ἀληθέστατα:
Θρύπτεσθαι δὴ, οἶμαι, κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν ὃ ἂν τις λά-
βῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἐνὸς λαμβάνοιτ' ἂν: πάνυ μὲν
οὖν: οὐκ οὖν τό γε τοιοῦτον, πόρρωθεν μὲν ὀρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλύ, ἐν φαίνε-
σθαι ἀνάγκη· ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὀξύ γνόντι, πλήθει ἄπειρον ἐν ἑκαστον
φανῆναι· εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος: ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν:
Οὕτω δὲ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκαστα τᾶλ-
λα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός: δεῖ γάρ: οὐκ οὖν καὶ
ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι: πῇ δὴ: οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα
ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταῦτόν φαίνεσθαι πεπονημένα
καὶ ὁμοια εἶναι: πάνυ γε: προσελθόντι δὲ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα, καὶ
τῷ τοῦ ἐτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτοῖς: οὕτω:
καὶ ὁμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτοὺς τε αὐτοῖς ἀ-
νάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τοὺς
αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ
κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἐστῶτας πάντη, καὶ γιγνομέ-
νους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦ-
τα ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετέες ἤδη ἡμῖν· εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν:
ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν: ἔτι δὲ ἄπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν
εἴπωμεν· ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τᾶλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι: εἴπωμεν
γὰρ οὖν: οὐκ οὖν ἐν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τᾶλλα: πῶς γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν πολ-
λά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἓν. εἰ γὰρ μὴδὲν αὐτῶν
ἔστιν ἓν, ἅπαντα οὐδὲν ἔστιν· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν πολλὰ εἴη: ἀληθὴ: μὴ ἐ-
νόντος δὲ ἐνός ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ἓν ἐστὶ τᾶλλα: οὐ
γάρ: οὐδὲ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλὰ: τί δὴ: ὅτι τᾶλλα τῶν μὴ ὄν-
των οὐδ' ἐνὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲ μίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει· οὐδὲ τι
τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν ἔστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς
μὴ οὖσιν: ἀληθὴ: οὐδ' ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἔστιν οὐδὲ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ
ὄν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται τι
τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἐνός πολλὰ δοξάσαι
ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον γάρ: ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τᾶλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε
δοξάζεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδ' ἄρα ὁμοια οὐδὲ ἀνό-

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C

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B

μοια: οὐ γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν τα αὐτά γε οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ
χωρίς· οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν δηλοῦμεν ὡς φαινόμε-
να αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τᾶλλα, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν: ἀληθῆ:
C οὐκ οὖν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἵπομεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὁρθῶς
ἂν ἔπομεν: παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν: εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι,
ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐν εἰ τε ἔστιν εἰ τε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ
πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἔστι τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ
οὐ φαίνεται: ἀληθέστατα: ΠΑΡΜΕΝΕΪΔΗΣ Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ

vi. 'same or
different,'
vii. 'touching or
separate'; or
anything else
already men-
tioned.
viii. In a word, if
the one is not,
nothing is. A.
Entirely so.

P.
Thus we may say
that, whether the
one is or is not,
it itself and the
others, alike
toward them-
selves and each
other, all and in
every way, both
are and are not,
and seem and do
not seem. A.
Most true.

NOTES.

I. TEXTUAL.

THE following is a detailed presentation of the readings in the Manuscripts \mathfrak{A} TUB. \mathfrak{t} , given line for line with the printed text. The readings of \mathfrak{A} show the points, including punctuation and accentuation, in which these Mss. differ from the text. Those of TUB. give the particulars, not including punctuation but including every divergence of a letter, in which that Ms. is at variance with \mathfrak{A} . The readings of TUB. are in different type from those of the other two. Erasures are shown by a *; while c. after a word means that it is contracted in the Ms. For the usual contractions see pp. cxi. cxxiv. above.

\mathfrak{A} .	TUB.	\mathfrak{t} .	St.
-κοθεν, ' -κόμεθα.	—	-μεθα. κατάγοράν	St. 126 p. 1.
— [small on *]	-τωτε	καὶ c. -κωνε. ' λαβομενος	
-μαντος. χαῖρ' ἔφη ὦ' τῇδε, ἰδ dark,	δέη τῶν τῇδε	-μαντος. χαῖρ' ἔφη ὦ' δέει' τῇδε ὦν	
-τολ. ' μεν δὴ εἶπον ἐγὼ, ' τοῦτο.	-ξε. ' μὲν	-τολ. ' δὴ' ἐγὼ. ' τοῦτο δε-	
ἀν ἔφη τῇν' εἶπον.	ἡμῶν. c. ' -σιν. ' τῷ	ἀν ἔφη' εἶπον.	
-τρίψ. τί ἦν ὄνομα,	no + subs.	τῷ c. ὁμομητρίψ. τί ἦν ὄνομα.	B
ἦν. ' -μενῶν.	το πρότ. ' -μησα ἐκ κλαῖ.	ἦν. ' -μενῶν.	
ἐκείνου κ το ν wide, ' τῷ acc. patched.	τῷ' πατρὶ c. ' -λαμπη	ἤδη χρόνος. ' πατρὶ δοκῶ. [-θάνει :	
δέ γε: ' -θάνει: [III. ' τε,	γι' αὐτῷ δέ γε ' -θάνη :	πάνυ γε ἔφη. αὐτῷ δέγε ἀντιφῶν. ']	
οἶδε εἶπον ἐγὼ, πολίται πολ rough, Pl.	πολίται μοι εἰσι	οἶδ' εἶπον ἐγὼ πολίται τέ μοι εἰσι	
-φῶν. ' τινί, ' ἐταίρψ.	no + subs.	ἀντιφῶν. ' τινί' ἐταίρψ.	
-γους, ' -κράτης. ' ζήνων.	—	καὶ c. [out). c	
-δῶρου. [a little, darker.	-νίδης διαλεχ. last + added?	-νίδης-θησαν. ' -δῶρου (νίδης through.	
-θῇ ἔφη' εἶπον. δεόμ- 'πον. δε' patched	—	-θῇ ἔφη λέγεις: τούτων c. τοίνυν εἶπον.	
-λεπὸν' ὦν. αὐτοὺς εἰ last two words	—	ἀκοῦσαι: ἀλλοῦ χαλεπὸν ἔφη. ' ὦν.	
-νυμον. [patched a little.	—	γε κατὰ ' -νυμον.	
βει. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ. ἴωμεν last curs., see	-κῇ	-τρίβει. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ. ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτὸν.	
-θένδε, ' -γὺς. ' -λίτῃ. [Pl.	μελίτῃ ταῦτ'	μελίτῃ: ' -πόντες. δὲ c.	p. 2.
οἴκοι	-τα. οἴκοι.	οἴκοι. ' τινα	127
-άσαι. ' -λάγη.	—	-ασαι. ' -λάγη.	
παρεῖμεν.	-τῷ' παρήμεν. ' σε τέ	παρεῖμεν. ' -σεν τέ	
-μίας. ' -ξετο.	δι	μίας. καὶ ἡσπάξετο.	
λόγους. ' -νει.	ἐλθάν δι later.	λόγους. ' ὠκνει. ' εἶναι. ' ἐπ-	
-τοι. ' -φῶν, ' tall and narrow. ' -δωρον.	—	ἔφη. ' -δωρον.	

A.	TUB.	t.
μεγάλα. ¹ -νειδης. B -δην. πολίων. ¹ ὄψιν. δέ. ¹ εἶναι. ——— -ναι. ¹ -χους. C -μικρῷ. ¹ εἰ had been ¹ , paler, tall, nar- -λους, [row. ¹ -κέσθαι. ¹ κράτη, -μάτων. ¹ -θῆναι. ——— τότε. ¹ νέον. ¹ -τοῖς, αὐτὸν. ¹ -δην, [neat, and fainter. λόγων. ¹ -κόμένων. ¹ first' and o small, D -θεν. -τοῦ. ¹ -τέλη, ¹ -μενον. γε. ζήνωνος. ¹ -σαντα, -γνώναι. -θείσης. πῶς φάναι ὃ ζήνων. ¹ λέγεις, φᾶναι ὄντα. E δῆ. ἀδύνατον. ¹ ὁμοια. ἀνόμοια. ¹ λέγεις; οὕτω φ. εἶναι. ἀνόμοια ἀδύνατον. ¹ εἶναι. εἶη. ¹ -νατα. -λότι. ¹ -μενα, ἔστι. λόγων. γ = Γ. ¹ ηγεῖ. ¹ -σθαι. p. 3. 128 πολλά. ¹ -γεις. ἦ faint. -θάνω. οὐκ ἀλλὰ. ¹ -νωνα. -μα, ὃ. ¹ -θάνω -τη. ¹ -νειδῆ. ¹ ὅδε, faint [τὸν ὑκειῶσθαι. ὥκ patched, darker. ¹ ταυ- ὄνπερ σύ. ¹ δέ. ¹ -τᾶν, faint. λέγων. ¹ -μασιν. ¹ ἔφη. ¹ πᾶν. B αὐτῷ. ¹ -λὰ φησὶν εἶναι. ——— -πολλα. ¹ -χεται. φάναι. ¹ -λὰ καὶ ακ close and faint. ¹ ——— ταῦτα. λους. ¹ ναὶ φάναι. ¹ -νωνα ὃ -ματος. [faint, reddish, near edge C ὥσπερ γε. ¹ -λακες. The marg. note is -θέντα. ¹ -θάνει. γράμμα. ¹ -θὲν, stops faint.	-θήναι. ¹ -νίδης. -νίδην. ἔξηκοντα ——— ἰδεῖν. ¹ -νίδου πῶθοδάρω -μικρῷ. -τας c. ——— -γινώσκ- αὐτὸν. c. ¹ νίδην -γινωσκομένων. -νῶδην ἄττα ——— ——— ——— ——— φᾶναι ——— gap, see p. lxxxviii ——— ζήνωνα : ——— ἄρα πάντας τὰ αὐτοῦ οἷον changed to οἷοι ἦγῃ -λὰ. ¹ ἦ -νω. ¹ φάναι changed to γράμμα [orig. on * -νῶδην. ¹ no i subscripts. ¹ φιλ- οικειῶσθαι, later ὃ. [later. ὄν περ σύ. so but altered ἐνέφη. so but altered later. ὅδε δέ (* = 2) αὐτῷ changed later to δε αὐτῷ [on *. πάντ' πολλὰ καὶ παμμ. παμμ φάναι changed ὃ. ¹ δὲ μὴ on [λέγειν, same * as above. -τας ταῦτα σωκρατ' ends line. ἦσθησαι. ¹ σαι c. ὃ. on * ¹ σκῶ. ¹ -θᾶς τι. ¹ ιχ. ——— no note in marg. γράμμ-	-κοντό. ¹ -γάλα. ¹ -νίδης. -νίδην. ¹ μάλα ἤδη. ¹ εἶναι. c. πολίων. ¹ κάγαθ. ¹ ὄψιν. δέ. ¹ ἐτῶν c. τεττ. ¹ εἶναι. c. ἰδεῖν. ¹ αὐτὸν. -ναι. ¹ ἔφη. ¹ -δῶρψ -μικρῷ. ¹ -κράτη. πολλοὺς. γὰρ c. ¹ ὑπέκείνων -σθῆναι. τότε. ¹ νέον. ἀναγινώσκαι οὖν c. αὐτοῖς. αὐτόν. ¹ -νίδῃ. ¹ ἐξ ὄντα. -χὺ. ¹ λοιπὸν των c. ¹ -μένων. -ωθεν. -τοῦ. ¹ τὸν τῶν c. ¹ -μενον. ¹ σμικρῷ ἄττα τῶν c. γραμμ. ¹ γε ἀκηκ. ¹ -ωνος. ¹ -σαντα. -γνώναι. -σθείσης πῶς φᾶναι ὃ ζήνων τοῦτο λέγεις. ὄντα. [εγ very like εἰ, so next case. -α. ¹ -νατον. ¹ ὁμοια. οὕτω φᾶναι τὸν c. fainter. ὁμοια εἶναι. ὁμοια ἀνόμοια. ¹ εἶναι. c. εἶη. ¹ -νατα. ἄρα. ¹ σόου* ¹ σ has been π? λόγοι. οὐκ ἄλλο τι. [= τῶνο οἱ? ἔστιν. τῶν λόγων both c., end a line. ¹ -χεσθαι. -γραφας. ¹ ἔστιν πολλά. οὕτως λέγεις. -θάνω. οὐκ ἀλλὰ. ¹ -νωνα [ἦ -νηκας. ¹ -θάνω -τη ὃ -νίδῃ. ¹ ὅδε. [ταυτὸν ὑκειῶσθαι. ὃ had been οἱ? ¹ τῷ c. ¹ τινὰ. ὃ* περ σύ μεταβαλὼν δέ. ¹ -τᾶν. λέγων. ¹ -μασιν. ἐν φῆς. ¹ πᾶν. -έχει. καλῶς γε καὶ εὖ. γε or τε? liker [former. ¹ αὐτῷ, ¹ εἶναι. δέ καὶ c. αὐτὸς. ¹ -χεται. ¹ μὲν φάναι. ¹ πολλὰ. ¹ τῶν c. ——— -τῶν c. ¹ δοκεῖν. ¹ ταῦτα. -λους. ¹ ναὶ φάναι τὸν ζήνωνα, ὃ σῶ; lat. -ματος. ¹ ἦσθη. [ter half of first' darker. καίτοι. ¹ γε. ¹ λακες. -θέντα. ¹ -θάνει. ¹ οὐπαν- γράμμα.

X.

TUB.

ναι·¹ -μενον·¹ -τόμενον· [-θεις. ἀνωθ
 μὲν. has been a blot over word.¹ δὲ¹ -θεις·
 -ματα·¹ λόγῳ, , faint. no ι subs.¹ -νειδου
 κωμωδεῖν· ὡς εἰ ἐν ἐστι. gap.
 λόγῳ, , faint.¹ αὐτῷ· αὐτῷ·¹ γράμ-
 -μα, , faint.¹ -γοντας·¹ ταῦτα, , faint. -δωσι· καὶ πλα-
 -ω. τοῦτο·¹ faint.¹ δηλοῦν· —
 -θεσις·¹ ἐστιν. ἡ¹ ἡ τοῦ ἡ later.¹ ἱκ·
 -κίαν·¹ νέξ ὄντος & light and close on ὑπὸ νέοντος·¹ αὐτῷ
 [*¹ -φῆ·¹ αὐτῷ·¹ had been-τὰ or-τὸν? —
 -φῆ·¹ -γένετο, , faint. —
 φῶς·¹ μή·¹ -θάνει·¹ -κρατες. ταύτη γούν
 -φθαι·¹ faint. -κίας οί· orig. on ·
 ἐπεὶ ὅπερ γ' εἶπον·¹ faint. [εἰπέ· —
 -μαι μ small¹ -κράτη·¹ faint.¹ ἔχειν·¹ εἰπέ·¹ later.
 αὐτῷ, , faint.¹ -ότητος· no ι subs.
 αὐ, ἄλλο¹ -τίον· ὁ ἐστὶν ἀνόμοιον; , , -μοιον·¹ ὄντων > καὶ
 [faint¹ δὲ¹ ἐμὲ καὶ —
 σὲ καὶ τὰλλα·¹ -λοῦμεν τὰλλα
 -βάνοντα·¹ -σθαι·¹ τε. no ι sub.
 -βάνη·¹ -τητος·¹ -μοια· -βάνη·
 -τέρων· -τερα· —
 ἐστὶ·¹ ἀμφοῖν, , , faint. ἔστι τῷ
 αὐτοῖς·¹ -στον·¹ τις αὐτοῖς, ' later.¹ -ατίς
 -μενα, , faint.¹ ὁμοια·¹ ἀν οἶμαι —
 -θότα. last half of a on * —
 ἔμοιγε¹ ζήνων· [ι faint· —
 τις, , faint·¹ ἐνός·¹ ταυτὰ¹ πολλὰ. τῷ ἔπο·¹ ' patched¹ τῷ¹ gap.
 -χειν·¹ ὁ ἐστὶν ἐν, ' -δείξει καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτὰ ' later?
 ἐν·¹ -μαι· [ι faintish περὶ ' later?
 -αὐτως·¹ αὐτοῖς·¹ ταν· εἶδη εἰrough¹ -νοι τάν·¹ later?
 -χοντα. ἐντῆ ends line.
 πολλὰ·¹ -στον·¹ λέγων εἰταν με ends line.
 -φαίνειν·¹ μου ἐστὶν·¹ -τερά· ἐπαριστέρα·
 πρόσθεν·¹ -ισθεν·¹ ἀνω, , very faint. —
 ὅτ' ἀν ' faint.¹ ἐν ἐρη·¹ faint. εἰταν¹ ἐρη
 ὄντων, , faint.¹ -πος·¹ ἐνός· ἀνος¹ ἐνός·
 -τερα·¹ -χειρῇ, [· · · and ' on τὰ faint. -χειρῇ πολλὰ·
 ταῦτα-νεῖν λίθους·¹ ξύλα·¹ τὰ τοιαῦτα. -φαίνη λίθους no stops till
 -νύναι·¹ το¹ πολλὰ·¹ ἐν· -νύναι·
 λέγειν· ἡ [ι faint —
 νύν·¹ ἔλεγον·¹ -ρεῖται·¹ καθ' αὐτὰ. -ρήται·¹ καθ' αὐτὰ
 εἶδη·¹ -τητα, καὶ πληθους. stops faint. —
 ἐν·¹ -νησιν·¹ -αὔτα·¹ · · · faint and -νησιν·¹ orig?
 [crowded.

t.

-ναι·¹ -μενον·¹ -μενον·
 εἶπες·¹ δὲ¹ ἀληθές.
 λόγῳ c.
 -μωδεῖν· ὡσεὶ ἐν ἐστι. D
 τῷ λόγῳ. both c.¹ αὐτῷ· c.
 -γοντας·¹ -διδωσι καὶ [erased.¹ αὐτῷ c.
 -ω. τοῦτο·¹ βου-λοῦν· β patched. qu. v
 -θεσις·¹ ἐστιν·¹ εἶναι·¹ ἱκ· -ξίοι·
 -κίαν·¹ ἐγράφη.
 -ψεν γραφέν·¹ -νετο. E
 φῶς·¹ μή·¹ ταύτη οὖν·¹ -θάνει ὡς ὅτι
 -φθαι·¹ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
 ἐπεὶ¹ εἶπον·¹ ἀλλὰ πο-
 -μαι·¹ -κράτη·¹ ἔχειν· [c.
 καθ' αὐτὸ¹ -τητος·¹ καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ both 129
 (αὐ ο m.) ἄλλο τι·¹ ἀνόμοιον·¹ ὄντων·¹
 [λοῦμεν·¹ -βάνειν·
 τὰ ἄλλα α* δὴ (α widely spaced on *)¹
 -βάνοντα·¹ -νεσθαι·¹ κατατο-
 -βάνη·¹ -τητος. ἀνόμοια· P. 4.
 -τέρων· -τερα·
 -βάνει·¹ ἔστι·¹ ἀμφοῖν. B
 αὐτοῖς·¹ -στον·¹ τις, ἀπέφαινε
 -μενα·¹ ὁμοια·¹ ἀν οἶμαι ἦν·
 -τέρων·¹ -θότα·¹ faint.
 γε ὡς ζήνων ἄτοπον δοκεῖ· οὐδέ γε
 τις·¹ ἐνός·¹ πολλὰ. [αὐτὰ
 -έχειν·¹ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ὅτ' ἐστὶν ἐν, ' -δείξει. καὶ
 ἐν·¹ -σομαι·¹ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. all c.
 -αὐτως·¹ εἶδη. ἐν αὐτοῖς
 -σχοντα·¹ δέ με [στον·¹ λέγων
 καὶ c. πολλὰ ὄντα. (" = transpose)¹
 -φαίνειν·¹ δεξιά μου ἐστὶν·¹ ἐπ' ἀριστερά·
 πρόσθεν·¹ -ισθεν·¹ κάτω,
 πλὴθους c. γὰρ οἶμαι μετέχω·¹ ἐν·¹ ἐρεῖ¹ ,
 -των c.¹ ἀνθρωπος c. [ἡμῶν c.
 -φαῖνοι -τερα·¹ -χειρῇ.
 -φαίνειν·¹ -αὔτα.
 -νύναι·¹ πολλὰ·
 λέγειν. ἀλλὰ περ·¹ -γοῖμεν·
 ἔλεγον·¹ μὲν c.¹ καθαυ-
 εἶδη·¹ ἀνομοιότητα·
 ἐν·¹ κίνησιν·¹ τοιαῦτα.

Ἀ.	TUB.	t.
εἰπέ· ¹ σοι· ¹ φῆς, ¹ ἄττα, fainter. -νοντα, fainter. ¹ -χειν· -βόντα, ὁμοια· ¹ δέ, μεγάλα·, , faint. -νης, ¹ γε φάναι commas very faint. -δους. ἡ μέρους, ¹ -βάνον. ·, faint. -βάνει. ἡ ¹ τίς ¹ -ψις, faint ¹ -οιτο: ἀν ¹ οὖν, , very faint. [καὶ c. ἐν δν. ἡ ¹ faintish. ¹ -λύει φά· ¹ -ράτη -ν*ί*δη ¹ ταυτὸν ¹ -λοις, ¹ οὖσιν· very [faint.	εἰπέ· ¹ φῆς ·· ¹ ἄττα ἰσχαν· — φάναι οὐκὸν ¹ ἡ μέρους· ἡ ¹ -το: εἰπε· ¹ -στω -λων ἐνδὲν ἡ πῶς: ¹ φάναι -ν*ί*δη ἐν εἶναι· ¹ πολλ· ends [line.	σοι ὡς φῆς εἶδη εἶναι ἄττα, αὐτῶν c. ¹ ἰσχει*. [μεγάλα· ¹ δέ καὶ 131 -βόντα, ὁμοια· ¹ μεγεθους δέ. -οσύνης. ¹ -νεσθαι: ¹ γε φάναι τὸν c. σω- οὐκὸν ¹ ἡτοι [κρατ: -βάνει· ἡ ἀλλή ¹ τούτων c. γένοιτο: ἀν εἶπεν: ¹ ὀλοντο τῶν c. πολλῶν c. ἐν δν. ¹ σωκρατ -νίδη ¹ ταῦτδ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ c. χωρὶς B οὖσιν. [Had been ἔνεσ- and αὐτοῦ ἐνέσται· ¹ αὐτοῦ. ¹ οὐκὰν εἶναι φάναι. p. 6.
ἔσται. (or is . meant as a mark over εἶη below?) ¹ αὐτοῦ ¹ ἀν. ¹ φᾶ- οῖον εἰ (· darker, v patched at foot —had been ·?) ἡμέρα εἶη μία καὶ ἡ αὐτῇ, ¹ -χοῦ, ¹ ἐστὶ , , faint. αὐτῆς ¹ -τον· ¹ ·· on αὐτῇ faint.	ἅμα ἔσται· ¹ αὐτοῦ ¹ εἶη: ¹ φάναι Same as Ἀ throughout, save [· and μία·	οἶον εἰ ἡμέρα εἶη μία ¹ οὔσα. ¹ ἐστὶ. ἐστὶ· ¹ τῶν c. εἰδῶν. ἐν ἐν ἡδέως γε φάναι ὦ σωκ. ¹ ἅμα. ποιεῖς· ¹ ἰστ· ¹ ἀνθρωπους, c.
ταυτὸν ¹ γε φά· ¹ ρατες· ἐν, ταυτὸν, [ἅμα, , , faint. ποιεῖς. οἶονεἰ (as in 2) ἰστίω i subs. yellow, squeezed. ¹ -σας* ¹ -πους· ὀλον· ἡ ¹ -ειν: ἴσως φᾶ- ἡ ¹ ἀν. ἡ ¹ ἀλλῃ: ἄρα φά· ¹ -ρατές ἐστιν ¹ εἶδη· αὐτῶν ¹ εἶτε ¹ faint. ¹ ὀλον.	gap. -τω τὸ ἰστίον εἶη ἀν ἡ ¹ -λω: -ρος: ¹ φάναι· -στω φάναι ¹ no i subs. -πᾶν. ¹ φάναι	ὀλον· ἡ οὐτδ ¹ λέγειν: ἴσως φᾶ- c -ναι: ¹ ἐφ' ἐκαστῷ c. τὸ ἰστίῳ εἶη ἀν. ¹ φᾶναι, ὦ σώ ¹ εἶδη· [ἀλλῃ: αὐτῶν c. ¹ μετέχοι· ¹ -στῷ c. ὀλον. ἀν ἐνείη: ¹ ἡ ¹ -σεις ὦ σωκ, φᾶναι τὸ ¹ -ξεσθαι· ¹ ἔσται: -δαμῶς εἰπεῖν: ¹ γάρ φᾶναι· ¹ -ριεῖς·
εἰ οὖν -σεις -τες· φᾶ· ¹ ἔσται; , , faint. -μῶς εἰπεῖν: ¹ γάρ φά· ¹ -ριεῖς· lower [point in : and last . faint.	— φάναι ¹ no i subs. -πᾶν. ¹ φάναι	— στοντῶν c. [τί δαί ¹ 'on ἄλ inserted. D ἔσται· ἄρα, latter half of ~ with , [faint: ¹ πᾶν γ' δαί. -στον, ¹ τι· ¹ ἐξεῖ, φ , , faint.
-λων, ¹ μέρει, ¹ αὐτοῦ , , faint. ἔσται· ἄρα, latter half of ~ with , [faint: ¹ πᾶν γ' δαί. -στον, ¹ τι· ¹ ἐξεῖ, φ , , faint.	-τέρω αὐτοῦ [·φῆ: τί δαί ἄρα ~ dark, patched? ¹ ται; ἴσου μέρους later a faint o on vs ¹ · -βόν, τί ξεῖ α ἴσου ¹ ἴσον τᾷ ἔσται; -τον· — ἔσται· ὡδ ἀν -θη	ἴσου μέρους ἐκαστῷ ¹ τι· ¹ φ ἐλ· ¹ [fainter. ἴσου. ¹ ἴσον τῷ μέρος τίς ¹ ἐξεῖ· ¹ σμικρὸν. ¹ ἔσται· ὄντος· ¹ σμικρὸν. -ρεθὲν τοῦτο. ¹ -ρότερ ¹ ἔσται. ¹ ἡ on * E [and also put in marg.
πρίν; ¹ ἀν -το φάναι ¹ -πον εἰπεῖν , τί ends line, va forgot? -τες· ¹ μέρη· -μενα: οὐ (· faint) ¹ δία φάναι· ¹ faint. -οὔτον, ¹ δαί δὴ, , , faintish.	πρίν; ¹ ἀν, ¹ φά· ¹ γε: τί οὖν ¹ κατὰ τὰ δλα· ¹ -μενα; ¹ δία φά· -ἴσασθαι: τί δὴ πρ ends line.	γένοιτο φάναι. ¹ τρόπον εἰπεῖν ὦ σώκ. ¹ τὰλλα -ψεται· -μενα: ¹ διά φάναι. τί δὲ δὴ πρὸς

91.	TUB.	t.
τόδε. ¹ -οὔδε, , had been .	-χας· τὸ ποῖον :	τοιοῦδε. ἐν ἑκάστῳ
¹³² -ναι, ¹ ἅττα ¹ εἶναι· ¹ τίς	ὅταν πολλὰ ἅττα ¹ δόξῃ α το η, εἶναι· ¹ ἅττα μεγάλα δόξῃ σοι εἶναι· in orig. ? ¹ τις	εἶναι· ¹ ἅττα μεγάλα δόξῃ σοι εἶναι·
-όντι	ἔσ· ¹ ἔσ· ¹ ἰδόντι· ¹ ἡγή	ἔσ· ¹ ἰδέα αὐτῇ ¹ ἰδόντι. [γάλα.
-ναι; ¹ -γεις φά· ¹ -γα, ¹ τὰλλα ¹ -γάλα·	-ναι : λέγ (ends line) φάναι : ¹ λέγεις φάναι : ¹ αὐτὸ τὸ ¹ τὰλλα ¹ με-	αὐτὸ τὸ ¹ τὰλλα ¹ με-
ἰδῆς αὐτοῦ μέγα	no ι subscripts.	ὡσαύτως ¹ ἰδῆς, ¹ αὐ μέγα
ἄλλο	ἄ· ¹ -σθαι; ἔουκεν : ἄλλ' ὁ ἄρα	-νεῖται· ¹ πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγ- -νεσθαι : ¹ [ἄρα ἀνάγκη so our notes.
		-σεται ¹ -γονός.
B ἕτερον.	ἄ	ἕτερον.
ἔσται.	οὐκίτι· ¹ -τον σοι	ἔσται· ¹ τῶν c. ¹ ἔσται.
ἀλλὰ φάναι· ¹ -νείδη ¹ -κράτη· faintish	-θος· ¹ φά· ¹ -ν*ἔδη	ἀλλὰ φάναι ὦ -νείδη ¹ -κράτη·
αὐτῷ· προσήκει· faintish.	ἡ ¹ -τω ¹ ἔγγι.	ἕκαστον τούτων c. ἡ νόημα· προσήκει
P. 7. -λοθι· ¹ εἴη· ¹ ἄν ἔτι ¹ faintish. A stain	-θι· ¹ ἡ ψυχῆς·	ἄλλοθι· ¹ ἐν τε ἑκάστων εἴη· ¹ ἄν
[on ἔτι which is patched.		
-χοι, faintish ¹ οὖν φά· ¹ -μάτων·		ἐλεγχο· ¹ οὖν φάναι· ¹ τῶν c. -μάτων·
νόημα ¹ -τον εἰπεῖν : ἀλλὰ τινός : ναι :	-νος : ¹ τινός ; ¹ ἡ	-δενός : ¹ -νατον ¹ ἀλλὰ τινός : ¹ ἡ
όντος· ἡ ¹ on ἡ has first half faint.		
C οὐκ ὄντος· ¹ ὁ ¹ εἰπον νοεῖν,	-τος· ὄντος· ¹ -νός τινός· ¹	οὐκ ὄντος· ¹ τινός· ¹ ἐ- (next line)
εἶτα· ¹ seems crowded in.	-εῖν· ¹ ἰδέαν :	πὸν νοεῖν This νοεῖν nearly above
		next, but error unlikely at a distance of 6 lines. ¹ ἰδέαν;
ἐπι	[ἀνάγκη ¹ φῆς ἐπὶ ¹	εἶναι· ἀεὶ ¹ πᾶσιν :
δαί (rough, no patch ?) δὴ ¹ -δην· ¹	τί δὲ δὴ ¹ -ν*ἔδην· ¹ ἡ τὰλλα φῆς	τί δὲ δὴ ¹ -νείδην· ¹ ἀνάγκη ἡ τὰλλα φῆς
ἡ ¹ εἶναι, , faint. ¹ νοεῖν·	ἡ	μετέχειν· ¹ -μάτων c. ¹ εἶναι· ¹ νοεῖν·
ἡ ¹ εἶναι : τοῦτο φάναι ¹ λόγον ἀλλ' ὦ	ἡ ¹ φά· ¹ λόγον :	όντα· ¹ εἶναι : ἀλλοῦδὲ τοῦτο φάναι ¹ [λόγον· ἀλλ' ὦ
D -δη· ¹ -νεται, , faint. ¹ τα	-ν*ἔδη· ¹ ἄδε ¹ τὰ	-νείδη· ¹ -φαίνεται· ὦδε ἔχειν·
ταῦτα· ¹ φύσει· ¹ ἄλλα, , faint.	τῇ [line. ταῦτα· ¹ φύσει· ¹ ἄλλα.	
-κέναι· ¹ αὐτῇ, , faint	-κέναι ¹ εἶναι ὁμοίω*τατα· ¹ ends	-ματα·
εἰδῶν, ¹ τίς· ¹ τί ἔφη	ἡ [εἶδος· μὴ	εἰδῶν· οὐκ ἄλλη τις· ¹ τι ἐ-
εἶδει· ¹ ἐκείνο· ο faint on * ¹ εἶδος,	-κε ¹ no ι subs. ¹ τε ἐκείνω τὸ	φη ¹ εἶδει· ¹ εἶδος.
καθόσον ¹ ἡ ἔστι τις -νῇ, *'', faint.	καθ' ὅσον -τὰ ¹ ἡ	καθόσον ¹ -ώθη· ¹ ἡ ἔστιν τις -χανῇ.
-ον, ¹ εἶναι : τοδὲ ¹ ὁμοίω· ἄρ', faint.	no ι subs. ¹ -ναι; ¹ ἀρὸς	εἶναι ὁμοιον : ¹ ἔστιν : ¹ ὁμοίω· ἄρ'
E -κη, ¹ οὐ δ' ἄν, ^'', faint.	εἶδ-'' later ? ¹ οὐ δ' ἄν	ἀνάγκη· ¹ -τέχειν : ¹ ἄν· accidental?
ῆ· faint.	ῆ· ¹ αὐτὸ εἶδος :	-χοντα· ὁμοια· ῆ· οὐκεκ- ¹ εἶδος :
μεν ¹ εἶναι·	μὲν ¹ τῷ	εἶναι·
μῆ· ¹ -ται εἶδος· [αἶ.	-λω : εἰ	μῆ· ¹ εἶδος αἰεὶ ¹ εἶδος· καὶ ἄν
¹³³ ἐκείνῳ (φ rough) τὸ ὁμοιον, ῆ, faint. ¹	-νω	ῆ ¹ αἶ· ¹ αἰεὶ
-μενον, , faint.	γῆγ· ¹ τῷ (N.B.—Such absence of ι subs. will not be further noticed.)	-μενον, ¹ τῷ c.
τὰλλα	τὰλλα,	τὰλλα

Ἰ.	TUB.	t.
-βάνει· τειν, faint. οὖν	ἀλλὰ τῷ· να; ὁράς	-βάνει· delicate ἡγεῖν· ἑοικεν : [ὕρᾱς οὖν
φάναι· -τες· καθάυτᾳ 'faint.	φά· καθ' αὐτὰ	φάναι ὁ σωκ· ἀπορία· τις ὡς εἶδῃ·
ἴσθαι φάναι· ὅτι· εἰπεῖν, faint.	-ται· ἡν ἴσθι φά·	ἴσθι φάναι· ὅτι ὡς· εἰπεῖν·
αὐτῆς, ῥία· ἡ ὄντων, , faint.	ἄπτη· ἡ ἐν	ἀπορία· εἰ ἐν· τῶν c. ὄντων. B
δὴ εἰπ· ἄλλα	-ριῦ·	αἰεὶ τι -ζόμενος· δὴ ἄλλα.
φάναι· δὲ· τόδε· μὴ δὲ . . (ἡ) faint.	φά·	φάναι· δὲ τόδε· φαίη. [λέγοντι.
-σθαι· -αὐτα, οἶα φαμέν· εἶδῃ· λέ·	-γοντι	-σθαι· ταιαῦτα, οἶα φαμέν· εἶδῃ·
-ξασθαι, -δεται, faint. [γοντι.	εἰ	ἂν ἔχοι· -δεται· πολλῶν μὲν τύχοι
ἀφύης·	ἀφύης.	-φωβητῶν. c. ἀφύης·
εἶη, δὴ	πῇ· -νῖδῃ (will note now only where no patch.)	-θανος ἂν εἶη· αὐτὰ ἀναγκάζων· δὴ C
δὴ ὅτι· -τες· σὲ. Stops all faint	-τη·	-δῃ· -κρατῇ· ὅτι ὡς ὁ, ἄλλῳ.
καθάυτην· εἶναι· ἂν, faint. [here.	καθάυτην . . later.	καθάυτην αὐτοῦ ἐκ· εἶναι·
μὲν.	μὴ δὲ αὐτῷ εἶναι ν later.	μὲν. μηδεμίαν· καθ [οὐκοῦν·
εἶη φά· -γεις εἰπεῖν	φά· -τη· οὖν [καθ' later.	ἐτι εἶη φάναι· -κρατῇ· λέγεις εἰπεῖν·
εἰσιν, -σιν· αὐταῖ, faint.	ἰδέων· later. αὐταῖ, later.	τῶν c. ἰδ· εἰσιν. αἱ εἰσιν αὐτὰς
ἡμῖν, faint.	πρὸς αὐτὰς c.	ἔχουσιν· -ματα. D
δῇ· -ται· -τες, , faint.	ὁμοίᾳ· τατα line ends at *	δῇ· τις τίθεται· -χοντες.
-μεθα· (α cursive maj.) ταῦτα·	δηδῇ	ταῦτα· ἐκείνους. [οὐκ
ἐστίν· εἶδῃ· -τῶν, faint.	ταῦτα. ταν on *	πρὸς αὐτά· ἀλλοῦ· εἶδῃ· αὐτῶν. ἄλλ
-κείνων· λέγεις, φάναι, faint.	αὐτά ἐστίν· εἶδῃ καὶ εἰ patched	-κείνων· οὕτως· λέγεις φάναι
οἶον φά· -νεῖδῃ· τοῦ, -λός, . faint	φά· Will not note again.	-νείδῃ c. εἰ τοῦ· δοῦλος
ἐστίν· δῆπου ὁ ἐστὶ -της	δῇ ν later· τοῦ ἐκείνου διτ·	ἐστίν· δῆπου ὁ, ἐστὶ -πότης. E
[της· next line. [paler.	αὐτοῦ first added; same	ἐστίν· δούλου. ὁ ἐστὶ ἄλλαν· (next
ἐστίν· δούλου ἐστὶ δοῦλος· ὁ δεσπό·	αὐτοῦ δούλου ὁ ἐστὶ δ added	-ὡς c. ὦν· ταῦτά ἐστίν· αὐτῇ· -εἶα. ἡ
ὦν· ἐστίν· -τεία.	gap. αὐτῇ δὲ changed to	looks like ι, latter part very faint.
ἐστὶ καὶ δουλεία, ὡσαύτως, faint	[αὐτῇ	ὁ ἐστίν· -τως.
ἡμῖν, faint.	ἐστίνδ	ἄλλοῦ· πρὸς κεῖνα
-χει· ἐκείνα, ἡμᾶς· λέγω· αὐτῶν·	ἀλλ' ἐλέγω . . added· αὐτῶν·	-χει· ἡμᾶς· ἀλλ' ὁ λέγω· αὐτῶν. (
αὐτὰ ἐστὶ· προσαυτά· ἡ	αὐτὰ ἐκείνα τέ· πρὸς αὐτά· ἡ	shd. mark 80 b 1, not as in text.)
λέγω· γ' εἰπ· -άτη· οὖν 'faint.	αὐτὰ ἐκείνα τέ· πρὸς αὐτά· ἡ	αὐτὰ ἐκείνα τέ ἐστὶ· ὡσαύτως· αὐτά· ἡ 134
-μη φάναι· μὲν, ὁ ἐστὶ· -μη· ὁ ἐστίν	-θάν ends line· -γω; οὖν	λέγω· γ' εἰπ· -κράτη· οὐκοῦν c.
ἀλήθεια· (= -θειας?) , faint.	δεσπίν twice· -θεια.	-μη φάναι· ὁ ἐστίν -μη· τῆς ὁ ἐστίν
ἡ ἐστίν· commas here faint.	-μη· αὐτῶν first added.	[·θεια.
-των ὁ ἐστίν· -μη· ἡ οὐ· faint.	ἡ οὐ·	-μη· αὐτῶν -μῶν· ἡ ἐστίν
-μη· εἶη; , faint.	εἶη·	-των ὁ ἐστίν· -μη· ἡ οὐ·
μη· -σπου.	εἶη·	-στήμη· εἶη·
-λαμῆν· εἶδῃ· -γεις· -μεν, faint.	εἶη·	-στήμη· -νοι εἶναι c. : B
οὐ, ' and next faintish.	ἄλλᾳ	εἶδῃ ὡς· -γεις· ἔχομεν·
	οἰδόντι εἶναι; 3 upper marks	ἡμῖν οἰδόνται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οὖν c. :
	later· οὐγαροῦν· δειγέ	

α.	ΤΥΒ.	τ.
εἶδη	---	τῶν c. ὄντων c. εἶναι
-ψας· μὴ δέτι ¹ -στοι.	μηδέτι	-βλέψας· μὴδ' ὅτι ὁρ- ¹ -στον.
ἔξει· ¹ ἔων ·· ¹ faint.	ἔων 18.	ιδέαν τῶν c. ὄντων c.
εἶναι·	---	εἶναι·
-ρεῖ·	---	-ρεῖ· ¹ δοκεῖς·
-γεις φά· ² περί·	---	λέγεις ¹ τί ¹ περί·
-ψει, ἃ τούτων· ¹ -ρᾶν, , , faintish.	τρέψη	τούτων· ¹ γε τῷ c.
γὰρ εἰπεῖν ¹ -ναι ¹ -τες·	---	παρόντι· πρῶτ' γὰρ εἰπεῖν ¹ -σθῆναι ὦ σω, In in. marg. γρ. πρῶτῃ, sugg. by πρωιην below?
-λὸν τέ τι, ¹ -καιον, ¹ -θὺν, , , , faint.	---	-χειρεῖς. καλοντέτι ¹ -θὺν·
-ριζ stained. [outer corner. [even in vbs. or advbs.)	---	---
τῶν τ stained, stain creeps in from πρῶην (no ι. Cease to note	---	---
-θάδε, , faint. ¹ τῷδε· ¹ μεν ¹ θεία ¹ -θι θεία ¹ orig. ¹ ισ·	---	-θάδε c. ¹ τῷδε· ¹ θεία εὖ ὥσθι ἡ ὀρμή. ἀριστοτέλει... ὀρμή). = 1 line in Ms. with ση. in middle space.
-γοις. ¹ σαιτὸν, ¹ -λον, , , , faint.	---	γύμνασον μάλλον,
εἶναι, , faintish.	---	τῶν c. πολλῶν c.
αἶδ· ι subs. dark ¹ μὴ. σε	ἀδολ· (ι held as subs.) ¹ σῆ	έως ¹ εἰ δὲ c. μή, σε [εἴπειν.
-πος φάναι ¹ -σίας: οὕτως εἶπεν	---	τρόπος φάναι ὅ· -νίδη ¹ -νασίας: οὗτος
---	---	-ωνος· ¹ πρὸς
-σθην -τος, ¹ εἴασεν ¹ -νοις, , , faintish.	ἔασε τοῖς	-σθην. ¹ -μένοις.
-πεῖν· ¹ -να, ¹ -βοι, , , faintish.	---	-σκοπεῖν· ¹ λάβοι.
μοι ¹ γε . faintish. [faint.	---	εἶδη ¹ μοι ἔφη ταύτη γε.
ναι· ¹ -μοια, ¹ -μοια· ¹ , and ' on οὖν	ὅτι οὖν	ἀνόμοια·
γ' ἔφη· ¹ -εἶν·	πρὸς τοῦτο π.	γ' ἔφη. ¹ ποιεῖν·
---	εἴστιν	-μενον.
-σεως· ¹ ἔστι, , faint. ¹ -θαι·	μή ἐστι	-θέσεως c. ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -θεσθαι.
-γεις φᾶ· οἶον ἔφη, , faint.	---	λέγεις φάναι: οἶον ἔφη.
-λά ἐστι.	---	-θέσεως c. ¹ ἰπέθετο· εἰ πολλὰ ἔστι.
-νειν· ¹ το ἐν· ●	αὐτὰ· patched ¹ τὸ	-βαίνει ¹ πολλοῖς· ¹ αὐτὰ ¹ ἐν·
πρός γε αὐ· ¹ αὐ· ¹ -λὰ· πάλιν	αὐτὸ· added. μὴ ἐστι πολλά·	-ν· πρόστε ¹ αὐ εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά.
-πεῖν, ¹ -λοῖς·	αὐτὰ· patched.	πολλοῖς·
-λα· ¹ αὐτοῖς αὐ· ¹ -της· ¹ ἔστιν. . .	προς ἄλληλα gap	ἀλληλα· ¹ αὐθις ¹ -ότης· ¹ ἡ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. κ
-σεται·	gap [had been πρὸς	ἔφ ¹ -σεται.
-θεῖσιν. ¹ -λα·	gap πρὶ π patched, on *;	-τεθείσι ¹ ἄλλοις· ¹ αὐτὰ. ¹ -ληλα·
-μοίου, , faintish. ¹ -σεως. ¹ περι-σεως·	πρὶ twice	-σεως·
-ρᾶς· ¹ -ναι, , faintish.	γενέσεως ω rough	-νεσεως c. ¹ -ρᾶς·
καὶ ¹ λόγῳ, had been . ¹ -θῆ·	αἰ ¹ καὶ οἰκ	καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ¹ ὅτου οὖν αἰεὶ ¹ καὶ ὡς
-κόντος· ¹ -τος·	ὅτι οὖν	οἶτος· καὶ ὅτι
-νοντα, , very faint. ¹ αἰτὸ. ¹ -έλη·	αὐτὸ.	αἰτὸ. ¹ ἄλλων. ¹ προέλη·
τᾶλλα· faintish.	ἐμπαντα· -τως καὶ τᾶλ·	πλείω. ¹ ὡσαύτως· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐ πρὸς
τε. ὅτι οὖν ¹ αἰεὶ·	αὐτὰ ¹ ὅτι οὖν ¹ αἰεὶ so.	αἰεὶ προαιρῇ.
-θεσθε· ἄντε ὡς μὴ δν, , faint. ¹ -μενος·	ὑποτίθεσθε.	-θεστο· ¹ δν. ¹ -σάμενος.
-ψεσθ ¹ · -χανον ἔφη λέγεις ὦ	διόψεσθ ¹ αἰ added.	-ψεσθαι ¹ ἀμήχανόν γ' ἔφη λέγεις ὦ

A.

TUB.

t.

το ἐν. ¹ ἔχῃ : i subs. faintish
 -λου. . faintish.
 πῶς : ¹ τοῦτο
 -ταχῇ i fainter. ¹ ἀπ' ἔχῃ; altered from
 ἂν ἔχῃ, fainter. ¹ καὶ μὴν εὐθύγε.
 μέσον, ¹ εἴη; ¹ οὖν. , , and 'on οὖν
 [fainter. οὖν (will not note again).

ἐν. ¹ εἴη. ¹ -ματος.
 εὐθὺ.
 ἐστιν.
 ὄν. ¹ -λφ.
 δῆ : ¹ ὄν. ¹ περιέχοντο, faint. ¹ -νου.
 εἴη. fainter.
 -ροῦς, faint. ¹ -χοντος.
 μὴν, fainter. ¹ ἐν * after ¹ ὄν. κὰν
 ἑαυτῷ εἴη περιέχον, ¹ ἢ αὐτὸ, fainter. ¹ ἢ
 τῷ γάρ τι εἴη μὴ περιέχον, τὸ i subs.
 [and, fainter to ν and αἰ put later.

εἴη ¹ -έχον.
 ἀμφω, ταυτὸν, faint.
 ἐν. οὐκ ἂν ¹ ἐν. οὐγαροῦν : ¹ ἐν, ', faint.
 αὐτῷ. ¹ δῆ.
 κινούμενόν * γε, had been ὄντε, τ
 -ροῖτο. [changed to Γ, faint.
 ἑαυτοῦ.
 κατ' ¹ ἄρα τῷ i squeezed in. ¹, of ;
 μὴν ¹ ἐν. [faint.
 κύκλω. ¹ -λάττοι, ., faint. ¹ οὖν.
 -μενον. ¹ -γκη.
 το ¹ φ, faint. ¹ μεσον.
 -σῆκει. ¹ -χανη. τοῦτο,
 -θῆναι : ¹ ἀμείβων
 -νεται. ¹ εἰπέρ. ¹ οὖν faint.
 αὐτὸ ο on * ¹ ἐφάνη : ¹ ἄρ' οὖν.
 -τερον : ¹ ἐν τῷ τι γίνεταί i subs.
 squeezed and faint ¹ τέ πω ω on a
 stain.

ετι, ἐνγιγ. ¹ μήτετι ¹ -πασιν
 ἐν γίγνεται ; faint. ¹ τί ¹ τοῦτο.

πάσχοι, ¹ το ¹ -νφ. το
 μέρη.
 -ναί τινος
 εἰσὶ, ¹ ὄν. ¹ -τώτερον, , , faint.

ἔχῃ :
 εὐθύγε
 πον
 ἴσον ἂν ἔχῃ :
 οὖν (will not note again).

ἐν.
 ὁρθῶς.
 gap.
 ἔχοντο
 ἐν. ¹ κὰν
 ἢ
 αἰ
 ἢ μὴ περιέχοντε, η changed
 to ν and αἰ put later.

ταυτὸν
 ἂν ¹ οὐ γὰρ οὖν : ¹ ἔστι
 ὄν ; ¹ ἔστιν. ¹ εἰσὶ etc.
 ἔσται. ¹ -μενόν τι, ἢ
 ἂν.

φάσθαι : φ neat dark on *
 ἦτοι

ἀλλὰ ¹ ἄδε

ἐπ' ἔφ' ἄνη : φ neat dark
 ὅπη : ο on * ¹ μήτε

ἐν γίγ. later ? ¹ τί
 αὐτ
 τὸ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἥδη ¹ τὸ
 εἴη ¹ πον ἔστι τρ.
 ἄμα.
 -χάνα a large, ε on *.

ἐν. ¹ ἔχει :
 ἄρα. ¹ -γύλου. [οὐ* ἂν ὅρος στρογ Ε
 πῶς : ¹ γέπου ἔστι τοῦτο. γύλου.
 ἴσον ἀπέχῃ : ¹ γε. ὅρος εὐθείος.

(Note in outer
 μέσο. marg. 1st hand.)
 ἐσχάτοι ἐπὶ προσθεν ἦ : οὕτω : οὐκ οὖν

C. τοῖν had been τοῖς
 ἐν. καὶ πόλλ' ἂν εἴη. εἴτ' ¹ -ματος.
 εὐθὺ.

ἐστιν. 138

ὄν. ¹ εἴη. ¹ εἴη :
 δῆ : ¹ ὄν. κύκλω ¹ φ (ὄν had been ἂν)
 ἂν εἴη ¹ ἂν

-χοντος.
 ὄν. κὰν
 ἑαυτὸ ¹ -χον. ¹ αὐτὸ ¹ εἴη. ἐν B
 τῷ γάρ τι εἶναι C. ¹ -χοντι. ¹ οὖν C.

-έχον. ¹ -μενον :
 γε.
 ἐν. οὐκ ἂν ¹ ἐν. ¹ οὐ ¹ ἔστιν πουτὸ ἐν.
 ἑαυτῷ C. ¹ ἀλλφ ἐνόν : ¹ ἔχῃ.
 οἶοντε ἔστιν ἔσταναι ¹ ὅτι C. κινούμε-
 -ροῖτο. ¹ ἂν. ¹ γλ (= γὰρ). [νόντε C
 ἑαυτοῦ. C. ¹ ἔτι που εἶναι : ¹ ἄρα C.

καταλλοῖσιν ¹ ἀλλᾶρα
 ἴσως : ¹ μὴν ¹ ἐν.
 κύκλω. ¹ οὐκοῦν C.
 -μενον. ¹ -κέναι C. ἀνάγκη.
 -μενα. ¹ ἑαυτοῦ. D
 -σῆκει. ¹ ποτὲ ἐπὶ
 -χθῆναι : ¹ ἀμείβων.

γίγνεται. ¹ οὐκοῦν
 αὐτῷ. C. ¹ ἐφάνη : ¹ ἄρ' ¹ -νεσθαι.
 -τώτερον : ¹ ἐν τῷ τί γίγνεται. ¹ μηδέπω p. 13.

ἐγγιγνόμεν. ¹ μήτετι ¹ -πασιν.
 περ ἥδη ἐγγίγνεται : ¹ τί ¹ -σεται. τοῦτο E

πάσχοι. ¹ εἴη ¹ αὐτοῦ ἥδη ¹ -νφ.
 δὲ. ¹ ἐξω ¹ μέρη. ¹ οἶοντέ ¹ ἔσται.
 ἄμα. ¹ εἶναι τινος
 εἰσὶν ¹ ὄν.

	Α.	TUB.	t.
	που' ¹ μέρη, ¹ ; , faint.	—	που' ¹ μέρη. μήτε ὅλον
139	ποῖ ἰδὼν ἰον same hand, neat on * ¹	ποιῶν.	ἰδὼν ¹ τῷ -μενον. ¹ -λάττει.
	τῷ -μενον, ¹ -ττει. ¹ τῷ both ¹ subs.		
	added, yellow, squeezed. , , faint.		
	-όμενον.	—	-μενον. ¹ ἔοικεν: ¹ ἄρα c.
	το' ἄλλα ¹ γεφαιμέν	ἀλλὰ	ἐν. ¹ γε φαιμέν
	; , faint ¹ ἔστιν:	—	αὐτὸ. ¹ ἄρα c. ποτὲ. ¹ ἔστιν:
	εἶη. ¹ ἔστιν:	τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι: πάντῃ	εἶη ¹ ἔστι: [οὖν: c.
	αὐτῷ. ¹ αὐτῷ ἐν εἶναι: ¹ subs. inserted,	αὐτῷ ¹ αὐτὸ ἐν εἶναι:	ἐν αὐτῷ ¹ ἀλλῳ. ¹ αὐτῷ c. ¹ ἐν εἶναι:
B	μὴ δέποτε [pale and squeezed. ¹ οὐ	ἔστι ¹ gap.	ἔστιν τὸ ἐν. ¹ αὐτῷ c.
	αὐτῷ ¹ subs. added. ¹ ἄγει.	-κεν.	ἐντῷ c. αὐτῷ c. ὃν οὐτε ¹ ἄγει. οὐτε
	[in pale ink. ¹ οὐκ οὖν	[first τ.	[ἔστηκεν: ὃν crowded in.
	-ρα ¹ οὐτ' ἔστηκεν. first τ has 0 on it	οὐτ' ἔστηκεν. later θ' pale on	-ρα ὡς ἔοικεν. οὐτε ἔστη-
	δεμῆνταιτόνγε, faint. ¹ ἑτέρω. ¹ αὐτῷ	μῆ ¹ = ν.	γε. οὐτε ¹ ἔσται. ¹ ἑτερον.
	[(¹ added ?) ἔσται. ¹ ἑτερον.	[ends line.	
	αὐτοῦ. ¹ τίνι δὴ: ¹ ἔν.	αὐτοῦ orig. = ¹ τί' νι δὴ: τί	αὐτοῦ ¹ πῇ δὴ: ¹ ὃν. had been αὐτοῦ
	εἶη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ καὶ ¹ fainter. ¹ ταυτόνγε	gap. ¹ καίμην	εἶη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ ὃν.
	ἑτέρω ὃν. ¹ subs. squeezed.		
C	εἶη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ ὅπερ ἔστιν	οὐκὰν	εἶη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ εἶη ὅπερ ἔστιν
	ἐν. ¹ οὐγὰρ οὖν: ταυτὸν ¹ ἑτέρω, ἡ ἔτε-	οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ταύ. ¹ ἡ	ἐν. ἀλλ' ἑτερον ¹ οὐ γὰρ
	[ρον. ¹ on ἡ is dark at the turn.		
	οὐ γὰρ: ¹ ἔσται.	οὐγὰρ:	-αυτοῦ. ¹ ἔσται. ἔως ¹ ἐν;
	-σῆκει, ¹ εἶναι. ¹ ἑτέρω. ἀλλῳ δὲ. last ¹	—	-σῆκει. ¹ εἶναι. ¹ ἑτέρω ἑτέρων. ἀλλῳ
	[subs. fainter and squeezed.		
	εἶναι. ¹ ἔσται ἑτερον. ἡ (had been) οἶει:	ἔσται ¹ ἡ	εἶναι.
	ἀλλαμῆν, ¹ οὐτῷ. ¹ αὐτῷ. οὐδεῶν, and	εἰ-δὲ μὴ αὐ. a orig. = οὐ	μὴ τοῖτῳ. c. ¹ μὴ αὐτῳ.
	last part of + faint, ¹ subs. fainter		
	and squeezed. [οὐδε		
D	-δαμῆ ¹ fainter and squeezed. ¹ ἑτερον. ¹	δν ¹ οὐδὲ	ἑτερον.
	ταυτὸν ¹ οὐχ' ἡ, περ, faint. ¹ φύσις.	δοῦ: ¹ ἡ περ	ταυτὸν
	ταυτοῦ; ¹ οὐκ ἐπεὶ δὲν ταυτὸν γένηται	-δὲν	αὐτῇ ¹ καὶ τοῦ ταυτοῦ: ¹ ὅτι c.
	[, and last ¹ faint.		
	τῷ ¹ ἄλλα ¹ ταυτὸν γενόμενον.	τὸ τί ἐγγίγνεται: ἀλλὰ clear,	τῷ ¹ ταυτὸν -μενον.
	-σθαι ¹ ται-	τῷ in one, patched later.	
	-φέρει. ὁπότ' ἐν ταυτὸν ἐγγίγνεται. αἰεὶ	δόχῳ	-νεσθαι.
	[has been αἰεὶ, changed on a *	ὁπότ' ἐν ταυτὸν ends linc.	-φέρει. ¹ -γενετο.
E	ἐν ταυτὸν: ¹ το' ταυτὸν ἔσται. faint.	τὸ	ἐν. ¹ ταυτὸν ἔσται.
	—	δόχῳ twice second ¹ added.	ἔσται* c. ¹ ὃν. ¹ γε.
p. 14.	ἐν, faint. ¹ εἶναι. ¹ ταυτὸν:	—	ἐν. ¹ ἑτερον c. εἶναι c.
	ταυτὸν ¹ οὐτῶν αὐτῷ. last ¹ blurred.	οὐτῶν αὐτῷ	ταυτὸ τὸ ἐν, ¹ αὐτῷ.
	ἔσται. ¹ -μοιον. οὐτῶν	-οντιν ¹ οὐτ' ἄν ¹ added?	οὐ ¹ -μοιον. οὐτ'
	αὐτῷ. ¹ ταυτὸν ¹ -θδς, ὁμοιον; latter	αὐτῷ	ἑαυτῷ ¹ ταυτὸν ¹ -θδς.
	[part of + and , , faint.	—	
140	ἐνδς, ¹ φύσιν, ¹ ταυτὸν. -λαμῆν, , , ,	—	φύσιν.
	[faint,		

24.

TUB.

t.

-θε, το εν. -θοι, η εν. , , faint.

το η εν. last on *.

-πονθε. εν. η εν. The last εν and its
[stop resemble ενί

εστιν ταυτον εις, faint.

εστιν πεπληθους

-νατο: αρα ταυτον.

εν. darker, orig. ? -λφ.

εν. αρα c.

-ναι. -λφ. ουδε -ρονγεπέ

ειναι. εαυτω: c. ουκ εοικεν: c. γε.

το εν. darker. ουτω, εις.

ουτω(s) c.

-θδς, η, faint. -λου. εις.

γάρ το αλλον.

-τφ. η αλλφ. ταυτδ

αλλφ. ταυτδ

εν ως -θδς. εστιν.

εν. ως εοικεν. -θδς. εστιν.

ουτεαυτω close and pale ουγαρ
[ουν: -μοιον twice.

αυτω c. ετέρω: c. ου ανόμοιον.

-τέρω. εαυτω

ετέρω c. εαυτω

ον, ισον is fainter. -ται. -τφ. πη: ισον twice ανισ- after this
a leaf cut out, but no gap.ον. ισ- ανισον εσται. εαυτω c.
αλλφ: c. πη: ισ- πη: begins a
line—Δη in margin.

οντων -τρων ισον δέπου, η, fainter. ισον η: η

ον. των c. αυτων c. ισ ο η:

ον. η, fainter.

ον. η. των c. -τόνων,

εξει. -τω; -τρον, fainter.

εξει-μετρον. των c. μεν εν μεν curs.

εσται. -ουν, fainter.

-τερων. των c. δε ουκουν

αυτου, εις, fainter.

αυτου. των c.

αυτων: ισον (fainter) μεν. αρα, -τφ. τινων ουν line orig. ? ισον
ουκουν. A stain covers φαι and ουκουν accident. under
[lower half of αρα above. [the γι

αυτων: c. αδυνατ: ισ- αρα.

αυτων c. ουκουν

-τόνων. -τρων.

τοσοιτον.

ον. -τόνων. μετρων.

εσται. -σαυτα, faintish.

ουκετι

ειη. εσται.

ειη. ισον

ισον

μέτρα: ειη. ισ- τφ c. μετρω writing
in μέτρα and μετρω partly cursive.

δε. ισον αυτω fainter.

ισον αυτω patched?

-έχον. -λων. -γων, faint.

το παρ- orig. ?

-έχον. ποτε -κεν ισον. fainter.

ποτε ισον

μείζον. -τον [την, faint.

δαί: small and on * -τερον, -τερον, τί δα πρ- την

εν, τφ, squeezed and pale τί δη γάρ

[δηγαρ που, , , faint.

έχον, -τφ, -λφ, -τος. χρόνου. , , , αὐτῷ ισότ.

[faint. roughish.

-ξει. ενι. faintish.

ουν: μην, fainter. A stain on ότη, ισότ. ουν:

πώς and η at end of lines 1, 2, 3.

ισότητος. έχει. μεν

do.

εσται, faint. εις.

ειναι. ογ last (=οδδ) on *. gap

έχειν, τφ -τερον, faint.

-τερον την το εν αυτω traces of.

το αὐτῷ had been

αρ.

τοπαράπαν orig. ?

ανισότητος c. -χει.

ουν c. εσταί τινος εις.

τφ -δαμώς: c. αρ'αν -τερόν γε

εν. αυτω c.

αλλφ: c. αρ' δύναται

p. 15.

54	ΠΑ.	TUB.	t.
	το ἐν, fainter. ἔϊη. ἡ' χρόνῳ· -σθαι: ὁδν,	τὸ ἡ αὐτοῦ ' orig. ?	ἐν. ἔϊη; ἡ', later. -κη. χρόνῳ. οὐκοῦν -τερον. -τερον: -μενον. -τερ' -νεται. ἔχειν. πρεσβ- ὡδε -φορον lower half ἔτερ' -σθαι. [of β patched. ὄντος. εἶναι. -νότος. -νέναι. -λοντος. -μένου. -νέναι c. -λειν. πωτὸ διάφορον. -σθαι. c. γάρ: ἀλλὰ -τερον. ἐστὶ. -μενον. ἑαυτοῦ χρόνον γίγνεσθαι μητ' ἐλάττω c. ὥσον ἑαυτῷ. εἶναι. clear that c. ~ does not always include i [subs.
B	-Τερον. -μένον. ἔϊναι. [on * ὦδε i darker. ἔχειν. Πῶς λέγεις: Π same ink but -ρου, fainter. -σθαι. ὄντος. εἶναι. -νότος. -νέναι. -λοντος. -μένου. -νέναι. -λειν. -φορον. -σθαι. C γὰρ ἄν: -τερον. νεωτέ' faint. ἐστίν. -μενον. ἀνάγκη, ἀλλὰ χρόνον, ἥσων fainter. εἶναι.	πῶς λέγεις: ὡδε. -νέναι gap [for sense? resumes οὔτε μάλ- altered οὔτε λα, οὔτε on ε is put a pale i ἐστὶ (i). ἀλλὰ ἴσον -σθαι. ἐστὶ (i). [had been ? αὐτὴν τὴ αὐτὴ * αὐτῷ c. ἡλ- ἄμα αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν αὐτὰ μέτεστιν: orig. αὐτὸ οὐκοῦν 'paler' -γος ἔφει: no [σημ. in marg. -τος; τί δὲ τὸ ἔσται τό broad -λοντος; τὸ ἔσται τὸ [on * -τος; τὸ οὔτε ποτὲ οὐτὴν ποτὲ οὐτ' ἔπειτα τί; [again) ἔσται τὸ on * -χει; (will not note this stop ἐν; on * ἔστιν [ε ἐν. ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκεν τὸ οὔτε ἔστιν δεῖ κινεῖ later. ὡδὲ μὴ ἔστι τίς ἡδύνατο οὐκ οὐκ so orig., [but altered. ἔσται ποῖα πο- τὲ	ἐν. ἔϊη; ἡ', later. -κη. χρόνῳ. οὐκοῦν -τερον. -τερον: -μενον. -τερ' -νεται. ἔχειν. πρεσβ- ὡδε -φορον lower half ἔτερ' -σθαι. [of β patched. ὄντος. εἶναι. -νότος. -νέναι. -λοντος. -μένου. -νέναι c. -λειν. πωτὸ διάφορον. -σθαι. c. γάρ: ἀλλὰ -τερον. ἐστὶ. -μενον. ἑαυτοῦ χρόνον γίγνεσθαι μητ' ἐλάττω c. ὥσον ἑαυτῷ. εἶναι. clear that c. ~ does not always include i [subs.
D	ἐστὶν ὡς, fainter. του. τῶν, fainter. ἡλικ. -χειν. ἄμα, fainter. -λάμην, ink? ἐν, -μάτων. οὐδεν -ἐστίν. on a scr. [ἦν, -γονε. οὐκοῦν δὴ. ὡς λόγος. ὁδν. on * -νετο. -νειν, [ἔσται, -σεται, E δαὶ αἰ on *, same hand and ink. ἔσται. -ται. το twice δὴ ἐστί, all commas -ται. το [fainter. χρόνον. οὐτέποτε γέγονεν. accents on [οὔτε fainter. -νετο. ποτε. -νεν. -νεται. οὐτέεστιν. -νήσεται. -θήσεται p. 16. -σχοι, ἄλλως. τί; , faint, σίας at the beginning and μ on l. 2 on a stain. ἔστι faint and rough. ἐστὶν, ἡδὴ, , faint. ὁν. το ἔστιν. οὐτέεστιν, εἰ, , faint. 142 δ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν. fainter. ὄντι, ἂν τί αὐτῷ, πῶς: , fainter. αὐτῷ. -γος. -τήμη. -σις. ἄρα. -γεται. -ζεται. -σκειται. ἔχειν. οὐκοῦν	οὐδὲν αὐτὰ μέτεστιν: orig. αὐτὸ οὐκοῦν 'paler' -γος ἔφει: no [σημ. in marg. -τος; τί δὲ τὸ ἔσται τό broad -λοντος; τὸ ἔσται τὸ [on * -τος; τὸ οὔτε ποτὲ οὐτὴν ποτὲ οὐτ' ἔπειτα τί; [again) ἔσται τὸ on * -χει; (will not note this stop ἐν; on * ἔστιν [ε ἐν. ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκεν τὸ οὐτε ἔστιν δεῖ κινεῖ later. ὡδὲ μὴ ἔστι τίς ἡδύνατο οὐκ οὐκ so orig., [but altered. ἔσται ποῖα πο- τὲ	ἐστὶν ὡς εἰκεν. -του. ἔχειν. αὐτοῦ [here ? ἐν, τῶν c. παθημάτων * an n erased -εστίν. δὴ ὡς γε' ὁδν. γέγονε. -γνετο. δαὶ -ται. ἔπειτα -ται. οὐτέποτε γέγονεν. -γνετο. οὐτ' ἦν ποτε. -γονεν. -γνεται. ἔστιν. -σεται. -θήσεται. ἄλλως c. [wax (?) which has come off. ἐν. -έχει: -ει on a small spot of ἐστίν. εἴη ὁν. ἄλλως εἰκεν τὸ ἐν. ἔστιν. ἔστιν. ἔστι. τῷ c. μὴ ὄντι. αὐτῷ: c. πῶς: ὄνομα αὐτῷ. λόγος. -μη. -θησις. οὐδὲ c. ἄρα. λεγεται. -ζεται. -κεται. ὄντων c. οὐκοῦν αρχῆς. opposite οὐδν in inner space. -θωμεν. φανῆ. οὐκοῦν ἔστιν. αὐτοῦ. ὄντα. ταῦτα.
B	φανείη; , and the other fainter. οὐκοῦν ἔστιν. όντα. ; , very faint.		

A.

TUB.

t.

μέν,
οὖν, very faint. ἑνός. ἂν ταυτὸν
ἐνί· οὐγὰρ ἐκείνη· -σία· οὐδ' ἂν ἐν,
λέγειν· εἶναι. καὶ ἐνεν· [faint.

ἄρα οἴοντι
οὐχ' οἴοντι: 2nd 'added. ὅν
οὐδ' ἂν 2nd 'added.
καὶ ἐν, ἔν· ends page, ν added
later: orig. ἔν·?

ἔστιν· ἄρα
οὐκοῦν ἂν.
ἐνί· ἂν ἦν· οὐσία· οὐδ' ἂν ἐν.
-χεν· ἀλλομ· -λέγειν· εἶναι· καὶ ἐν C
[ἐν·

δὲ. -θεσις εἰ ἐν εντι· -νειν· ἐν
ἔστιν· ἀλλότι· ἐστὶ
ἄρα οὖν, ἄλλο. το ἐν, , faintish.
ἐπειδ' ἄντι συλ· εἴπη ι subs. seems
squeezed in afterwards. ἔν ἔστιν:

ἔστιν· εἰ ἐν εντι last' had been?·
οὐκοῦν· ἔστι
ἐν: ἀνάγκη: last: crowded
ἔστι; [in later. τὸ

-θεσις εἰ ἐν τί· -νειν. ἀλλεὶ ἐν
ἔστιν· μὲν οὖν: both c. οὐκοῦν
ἄρα ἄλλο. ἐν.
-μενον. τις ἐν ἔστιν:

-μην· ἔστιν· -σεται·
-νειν·

λέγομεν· ἔστι·

λέγομεν· ἔστι· -σεται· οὖν οὐκ
-θεσιν· -νειν·

πῶς: ἔστι· -γεται· καὶ το· from be-
gin. to πῶς: scratch above line.

ᾤδε: εἰ τὸ ἔστι: later? τὸ

πῶς: ᾤδε· ἔστι· ἐνός (ἐ curs.)· -γεται· D
[] contents omitted.

No injury. Dots over text = dele:

[] added by me.

ὄντος· -γεται, faint. το· ἐνός·
το ἐν· -νον· -μεθα· ὄντος.
-κη, faintish. ὅλον· αὐτὸ·
μόρια, οὖν, , and the other faint.
τούτων· -ροῦμεν· ἦ· ὅλου· μόριον,
[seems a faint * at 'on ὅλου

no repetition here.

τὸ
ἄρα
εἶναι; , added.
ἦ· -ρίον (2nd)

ἐνός· ἔστι δὲ τὸ
ἐν· -νον οὐ· -μεθα τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος.
ἄρα αὐτὸ·
μόρια· τό, οὖν. ἐκάτερο τῶν c.
τούτων· c. -ροῦμεν· μόριον·

ἔστι· ἐν· + latter part fainter—hesita-
[tion between text and ἐνῇ.

προσφ' ἑνόν: ἔστιν· ἐνῇ altered
[later " ?

ἄρα c. ἔστιν ὃ ἐὰν ἐν ἦ

οὖν· τούτων,
ὄν·
-ον: ἦ το· οὐκ' ἂν εἴη πάλιν

ἄρα
τὸ οὐκ' ἂν

ἔχει: τί οὖν τῶν c. μορίων c.
ὄντος· τό, ὄν· ἄρα· -πεσθον· μόρι- E
ον· μορίου; οὐκ' ἂν εἴη: τῶν c. μόριον
had been μορίου? A \ through εἴη
likely by accident.

ὄν, fainter. The οἶν at end and the
[ἐν of next line on a stain.

τοχ· τὸ

αἰεὶ ὅτι περ [and on *
-ται· -τῷ τῷ-ρίῳ αἰεὶ (2nd) αἰ smaller
μῆδέποτε

αἰεὶ
αἰεὶ τσ· twice.

τῇδε ι seems squeezed in. πῇ:
ἐν, διό ἔστιν; το; , , fainter.
δαΐ· αι on * same hand. ' and com-
mas fainter. ἐν· δὴ φαμέν· αὐτο,

εἶναι: stop later.

καθ' αὐτὸ· -έχειν·
-σεται· ἦ το· τοῦτο: ἐν
εἰδόμεν δὴ, ἀλλότι· εἶναι, , , fainter.
αὐτὸ, ἐν, , and the others fainter.
οὐσία, ἐν· ἐν, τῆς, , fainter.
-ρον· ἄλλο·

καθ' αὐτὸ ' added? ἄρα γε
ἦ [later.
εἰδόμεν δὴ. ἄλλοι· εἰ shakes,
slightly above in outer marg.
οὐτὲ τὸ ἐν, το ε· ends l. [is ∴
ἄλλο· 8 later.

-τερον. τό, τέεν ἔσ· ὄν· -χιστον. never p. 17.
ι: will not be noted further.
αἰεὶ ὅτι περ [* had been ι?
-νηται, τούτῳ c. τῷ c. μορίῳ*· τό, ἐν.
-σχει· -μενον. μῆδε- 143
μὲν οὖν: (both c.) οὐκοῦν ἀπ-
ἔοικέ γε: πῇ:
ἐν. διό ἔστιν; ὄν, ἐφάνη:
τὶ δὴ ἐν. ὃ δὴ

-βωμεν c. τούτοι· -χεν. ἀρά γε
-σεται· τοῦτο: ἐν
δὴ εἶναι· [οὐκοῦν B
αὐτὸ· οὐσίας τὸ ἐν. ἀλλὰ -σχεν·
οὐσία· ἐν, τῷ ἐν· [καὶ
-ρον· εἶναι· ἄλλοι· τῷ c. ἐτέρῳ c.

α. TUB.
 ἄλλω. ¹ ταυτόν ἐστιν. ¹ ἐνι. t.
 οὖν. ¹ αὐτῶν, , faint. ἄλλω. ¹ μὲν οὖν: (both c.) ¹ ταυτόν
 C -σίαν, ¹ το ἕτερον. ¹ -σίαν, ¹ το ἐν. ¹ το τὰ 3 times
 το ἕτερον. [ἐν, , , faint. τὰ οὐσία. ¹ οὖν
 νέω. ¹ -τερα: πῶς: ᾧδε. ἕτερον. ¹ ἐν.
 ἐστίν: ¹ ἄρ' commas fainter. ἕτερον: ἄρα
 τί δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἐν. * ὦ. ¹ σθς ¹ -τέρω; πῶς: ὦδε.
 οὖν, ¹ ἐν. commas fainter. ἀρ'
 D δᾶν [mas fainter. -ρηται; τίδ' ¹ ἐν ἄρα
 -ησθον. ¹ οἰόντε, ¹ αὐτῷ εἶναι, com- -τέρω; ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ ἕτερον. ¹ ἐν.
 οἰόντε ᾧ δᾶν ¹ ἦτον. ¹ ἐστὶ τις μηχανή, ἐφ' ἕκαστ' ¹ λέγω; ¹ ὦ δ' ἂν
 [οὐχ, -τερον -σθον. ἄρα ¹ εἶναι. [μὴ οὐχ
 εἶναι: ¹ ἄρα ¹ περ οὖν δύο μή: ¹ ὦ δ' ἂν ¹ ἦτον. ¹ ἐστίν τις μηχανή,
 εἶναι. [ἐστι τις ¹ οὐχ' ἐκ-
ἀρα c. ¹ σὺν δύο
εἶναι. ¹ ἕκαστον: written under low-
[est line of 82 a 2.
 ἐστι, ¹ ἦτινι latter half of +, the ', ἐστίν. ¹ ὅποιοι οὖν ἦτινι οὖν -γίμ. **
 and the commas fainter. ¹ συ*ζν. [___ faint. had been ', as for separate words.
 γί*ζ, first * = i let., i subs. orig.? ριττά.
 δέ, ¹ -ριττά; ¹ δύο, all commas faint. δαί ¹ -τοιν. ¹ δις. ¹ τρίς.
 [; seems changed from :
 E δαί αι on * same hand ¹ -τοιν, ¹ δις; ¹ τί δέ ¹ δις. ¹ τρίς
 [των τρίς; commas fainter.
 ἐν. ¹ τῷ i paler and squeezed in. ¹ δις ἐν.
[ἐν:
 The words from τε which follows to ἀνάγκη αὖ stand in the mid space with L at the end
 corresponding to a similar mark rather above and before δις ὄντων, which can hardly be the
 right reference as the τε runs straight out into the margin after τῷ. Written, I should say, by
 the scholiast. See Schanz.
 δις. ¹ καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς. τριῶν καὶ τρίς
 αὖ, ¹ δαί. ¹ αι first hand on *, ' fainter. ¹ τί δέ δὲ
 [όντων, commas fainter. -κητρία addition later.
 ὄντων. ¹ ὄντων. ¹ -γκη τε, , fainter. -κητρία addition later.
 p 18. ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ¹ εἴη. A stain over ἐν. καὶ τρία δις: ¹ ἄρα ἀρτιάκ-
 144 -τάκις twice. [, . fainter. -ρίττα (1st) -τάκις. (gap.)
 οὖν ¹ ἔχει. ¹ -πεσθαι, , fainter. δν
 ὄν ¹ ἀνάγκη ¹ ἐν. —
 -ναι: ¹ μὴν, ¹ ὄντος. ¹ εἴη. —
 ἦ ¹ -θει, ἦ
 -σία -ται: ¹ οὖν, ¹ -έχει, commas —
 fainter, latter had been a period.
 B -θμοῦ —
 ἄρα, ¹ ὄντα, ¹ -μηται. commas fainter. οὐδενὸς
 -των. ¹ -τάτου. ¹ ἦ ἦ ¹ ἀλογον
 [mas fainter.
 -σθαι. ¹ δὴ, ¹ ὄντων, τοῦ -τατέ: com- -τατέιν:
-μoυ. ¹ αὐτῆς:
-μηται. ¹ οὐδενὸς
-τῶν.
-ρέσθαι. ¹ γε. ¹ τον, ἀποσταται: , ink?

X.

TUB.

t.

-όντε, ¹ -γιστα, commas fainter.ὄντα· ¹ -λιστα·ἐστὶ ¹ fainter. [fainter. ¹ οὐσίας,οὖν· ἐστὶ τι αὐτῶν, ¹ and commasγε οἷμαι ἐστίν. [γέτι· ¹ δὲαἰεὶ first ι on * and darker. ¹ ἦ ἐν

ἐν.

-μενον, , faintish. ¹ μέρους·ἄρα οὖν, ἐν ὄν, ¹ ἄμα, ¹ ἐστὶ; ¹ and

-θρῶ· καὶ ὄρῶ. [all stops faintish.

γάρ πῶς

-σαι. ¹ -σδν, , fainter.

-σαῦτα, , fainter.

[altered.

-μητας· ¹ ἴσα ὡς εἴκε accent on ἴσα-πεται. ¹ ὄντος· ¹ -σθον.

παραπάντα : dot accidental?

-σίας.

ἐστίν· ¹ ἐν, ¹ ἐστίν.

-μένον.

ὅτιγε ¹ μόρια. πε-

ἐν.

[faintish.

-α : ¹ μὴν, ¹ -έχον, ¹ εἴη; commasὄν. ¹ ἐστὶ που καὶ (dots ink?) πολλὰ· ¹ ἐντὶςὄλον· ¹ -ρια· -ρα at end, and α,

l. 2 on stain.

-σμένον· ¹ ἄρ' οὖν· οὐκ-σμένον· ¹ δαί· αι· orig. on * ¹ ἔχοι· καὶ c.μέσον· ¹ ἦ ¹ εἶναι· ¹ τοῦτων κὰν τοῦ

ἐτι commas faint. [faint.

δὴ ¹ -τῆν, ¹ -σον, ¹ ἄλλα commasμέσον· ἴσον ¹ faint. ¹ εἴη : οὐ

τινος ὡς εἴκει· ἐν·

-θέος· ἦ ¹ -λου· [πῶς : commas faint.ἔχον· ¹ ἐν twice, had been ἐν· ¹ -σαι, ¹-στον, ἐν· ¹ ἐστίν, commas faint.μέρη, ¹ καὶ μὴν commas faint.αὐτοῦ· ¹ ἐστι· ¹ οὐτετὸ π· ¹ -τον. ἦ

οὐ γάρ :

ὄντα· ¹ ἐν, , faint.

-λον·

ἐν, , faint.

-τοι, , faint. ¹ αὐ· ¹ ἐστίν· ¹ -σιν.ἐν τινι· ¹ -σιν· ¹ δι.-κὰν· ¹ εἶναι

H

καὶ μερισται

ἐστι· ¹ αὐτῆς·

ἐστι τι (a leaf out here; no

[gap.]

αἰεὶ ¹ ἐνγχι

πρόσεται

ἐστι τοῦτο

γάρ πῶς· ¹ α μα δπ· μα wide

-ρεσι [on a *

ἀλλ' ἴσα " retouched.

οὕτε τὸ (v erased) ¹ -ισοῦσ-

παρὰ

οὖν·

ἐντὶς

ἀρδὲν ~ ~ altered.

τί δὲ

ἡοῖοντι τι· ¹ κὰν

ἐτι

εἴκει· ἄλλα

ἴσον· ¹ οὐ (2nd)

ἐν·

ἦτοι

ἄρ' ¹ ἐν αὐτ· ¹ ἐν ἄλλω :ἐν· ¹ ἐστι

μὴν

μέρη τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ¹ τὸ πλεον· ¹ ἦοὐ· ¹ ἐστι· ¹ δδν :

ἐν τινι

κὰν· ¹ ἐνγχιὄντα· ¹ πάντων c. -λιστα·

οὕτω(ς) : c. [on last ἐστὶ = acc.? c

οὖν· ¹ ἐστίντι αὐτῶν c. ὁ ἐστὶ· ¹ οὐσίας.-ρος : ¹ ἀλλεπέπερ γε οἷμαιαἰεὶ ὥσπερ· ¹ ἦ· ¹ μὴδὲν δὲ

μέρει. πρόσεται τὸ ἐν

μέρους.

ἄρα· ¹ ὄν· ¹ ἐστίν.ἀλλάθρῶ καὶ ὄρῶ· ¹ ἄραὄλον· ¹ που (so my notes).μέρισι παρέσται. c. ¹ -σδν.

-σαῦτα.

-γομεν λέγοντες.

-μηται ἀλλ' ἴσα ὡς εἴκειν τῷ ἐνι·

-πεται· ¹ ὄντος· ἀλλεξισοῦσθον.

οὐσίας.

τὸ ἐν· ¹ ἐστίν.

-μένον.

μὲν οὖν : both c. ¹ μόρια. πεπερασμς

ἐν· [(= μένον ?) 145

-έχον.

ὄν· ¹ τε· ¹ πολλὰ· ¹ -λον· ¹ -ρια·

p. 19.

-μενον· ¹ ἀπειρ· ¹ ἀρ' οὖν c. οὐκ-σμέν· ¹ ἔχον : ¹ τί δ' εἰ ὄλον. οὐ καὶ

τοῦτων· κὰν τοῦ [ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ

ὅτι ι on an o. ¹ -στατῇ· ¹ ἐτιὁῦ ὡς εἴκειν· μέσον· ¹ ἐν : ἔχει :μέσον· ¹ τῶν c. ἐσχάτων c. ἀπέχει·τινος ὡς εἴκειν· ὄν· ¹ ἐν·-θέος· ¹ -γύλου.ἄρ' ¹ ἔχον· ¹ ἀλλψ : πῶς :ἐκαστον, ἐν τῷ c. ὄλψ c. ἐστίν· ¹ ὄλον :

μέρη.

αὐτοῦ· ¹ ἐστίν· ¹ οὐτέτι πλεον· ¹ -ττοι·οὐκοῦν· ¹ ἐν ἐστι : c.

ὄντα·

-λον· ¹ πάντα.ἐν· καὶ οὗτος ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἐν· ¹ ἐαυτῷ c.αὐ· ¹ μέρεσιν ἐστίν· ¹ πᾶσιν.ἐν τινι· ¹ πᾶσιν· ¹ ἐν τινι· ¹ ὄν.-κὰν· ¹ εἶναι· ¹ μὲν c.

D

E

B

C

D

	Σ.	TUB.	τ.
	ἐστὶ· μὴ ἐνὶ· ἐντισι twice· εἴη·	ἐστι· πᾶσι ἐν — —	-των c. ἐστὶ· ἐνὶ· ἐντισι τῶν c. μερῶν· c.· ἐντισι· εἴη. τῷ c.· εἴη. ὁ ἐστὶν· ἀδύνατ' γάρ· πλείοσιν. μὴδ'· μὴδ'· ὅλον. εἶναι· c.· εἶναι· c.· οὐκοῦν ὄν· ὄν· αὐτῷ ἐστὶν. ἐν· ὅλον· ἐστὶν· μέρει· -χάνει· ἐαυτῷ ἐν. ἐαυτῷ c. [που. ἐν· ἄρα· -τάναί; πῇ· ἔσθηκεν μὲν ἐστὶν· ὄν· -βαίνον. εἴη ἐν ἐαυτῷ· c.· αὐτῷ c.· ὄν. εἶναι· τί δὲ ὄν. οὐτὸ -τίον· ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῷ. c. μὴδὲ -τάναί· -σθαι· ἐν.
	μὴδὲ twice, but· on μὴ faintish· ὅλον· E commas faint. ὄν· αὐτῷ ἐστὶν. ἦ· το ἐν, ὅλον. ἐν· ἐστὶν· faint. ἦ· -νει· ἐαυτῷ αὐτό· ἐαυτῷ ἐν· ἄρ'· -κη,· -σθαι,· πῇ· 140 ἐστὶν· ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ ὄν, εἴη· αἰεὶ ὄν, * slight. , fainter. που;· δαί· αἰ on * [εἶναι· ὄν, οὐτὸ -τίον· μὴδέπ- twice.· ταυτῷ p. 20. μὴδὲ ἐστάναι· -σθαι;· το ἐν ἐν at [beginning and d of 2 on stain. ἐτέρω αἰεὶ· ε of αἰ on * B καὶ μὴν ταυτόν γε· faint.· -τοῦ· -τως· ταυτόν γε· εἶναι. πῶς· πρὸς ἅπαν,· ταυτόν ἐστὶν. [ὡς ἦ· ταυτὸν ἦ, μὴδέτερον· -του,· ἔχει, μέρος· ἄρ' οὐδ, το· ἐστίν; , , fainter. μέρος· εἴη , fainter. ἄρα· C εἴη;· -ρον, , fainter. [fainter. -λον,· -ρος· ἐστὶν· -κη,· ταυτὸν , , δαί· -τοῦ· αὐτῷ ὄντος. αἰ· and ῶ -τῷ· εἶναι· [on * ἐν,· ἐν· ἄμα. ἄρα ὡς ἔοικεν [ἐστὶν· -τος, D οὐν· εἰ τοῦ τὲ· and commas fainter.· ἐστὶν· ἐνδς,· το several accs. and breaths, as well as commas, fainter. δῆ· fainter.· ταυ- ἄρα ταυτὸν· ποτὲ ταυτῷ· -ται· οὐδέ ἐστι E ἐστὶν· εἴη, ἐντῷ , fainter. ταυτῷ· -ρον· ἐστὶν. ἐν· ἐν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ ἐτέρω· subs. faint.· μὴ ἐν· faint.· ἀν [τάμη α at end = maj. curs. 147 ἐστι, fainter.· -ρψ· -γοί,· -λων· ἄλλα	πλείοσιν — — ἦμεν· τὸ ἦν altered to· ἐστι· ἦ αὐτὸ· ἐαν· ἄρ'· ^ altered. ἐν ἐν τῷ αἰεὶ ὄν ἐστὸς δῆπου, ἀν· αἰεὶ· τῷ μὴδέπ- twice. μὴδὲ ἐσ-· patched? twice.· τὸ [been· -τὸ τὲ· αἰεὶ twice· ἐστ· had — — -πονθε· ἀπ· ὄδς μὴδ' ἔτερον τὸ αὐτοῦ· patched· ἐστίν· οὐδ' ἄρα αὐτοῦ· patched ἄρα — αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἐαυτό [αὐτοῦ ὄντος τῷ ἐτέρω· pale,· blotted.· ∴ in outer marg. αὐτὸ τὲ ἐν· ὄν· patched ἐαυτοῦ c. ends line. τουτὶ· οὐχ' ἐτ· 2nd· added. ὄν ὅσα μέρη ἐστίν, ἀπανθ'· τὸ τῶν ἐν τῶν ἄλλων; ἔτερον· ἄρα· ἦ [dark added.· ὄδς ποτὲ — ἐστι· ὄντιν· — — οὐτ' ἄρα 2nd· pale.· ἦν εἴη· γὰν· ἐν· (2nd)· μὴ [οὐ γὰρ -ρ' ἄν αὐτοῖς ἐκφύγοι· -φεύγ· ἄλλα	-των c. ἐστὶ· ἐνὶ· ἐντισι τῶν c. μερῶν· c.· ἐντισι· εἴη. τῷ c.· εἴη. ὁ ἐστὶν· ἀδύνατ' γάρ· πλείοσιν. μὴδ'· μὴδ'· ὅλον. εἶναι· c.· εἶναι· c.· οὐκοῦν ὄν· ὄν· αὐτῷ ἐστὶν. ἐν· ὅλον· ἐστὶν· μέρει· -χάνει· ἐαυτῷ ἐν. ἐαυτῷ c. [που. ἐν· ἄρα· -τάναί; πῇ· ἔσθηκεν μὲν ἐστὶν· ὄν· -βαίνον. εἴη ἐν ἐαυτῷ· c.· αὐτῷ c.· ὄν. εἶναι· τί δὲ ὄν. οὐτὸ -τίον· ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῷ. c. μὴδὲ -τάναί· -σθαι· ἐν. ὄν· -στάναί· c. ἐαυτῷ c.· -τοῦ. ὡσαύτως· εἶναι. πῶς· ὡς ἔχει· ἐστίν· ἔτερ·. ἦ· ἔτερον· ἔχει. ἦ ἄρ'· ἐστίν; [αὐτοῦ? αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ· εἴη. αὐτὰ had been ἄρα οὐκ ἄρα -λον· ἐστὶν· εἶναι c. ἐαυτῷ· τί δὲ· αὐτῷ c. ἐαυτῷ· εἶναι. ἐν· ἐαυτῷ c. ἄρα ὡς ἔοικεν· -τοῦ, ἐν· ὄν εἰ τοῦτὶ [c. μὴ ἐν· οὐκοῦν· ἐστίν. ἀπανθ'· ἐνδς· ἐν. τῶν τῶν c.· δῆ· ταυ- ἐτέρ· ἄρα· -λοις· [c. ἐτέρω. ἦ ἔτερον ἐν ταυτῷ c. ποτὲ εἶναι· ταυτῷ c. μὴδέποτ' ἐσται. οὐδὲν ἐστι· ἐστι· -ρον· εἴη. ἐν τῷ [ὄντων c. χρόνον· -τερον· οὐχούτῳ; οὕτω· τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν· τῶν c. ἐν· ἐν εἴη· οὐ τῷ c. ἐτέρω c.· ἐν. τῶν c. μὴ ἐν· ἐν, αλλήλων. [ἐτέρω. ἐαυτοῖς ἔτερα ἐστίν· patched.· τῷ c. ἀν ἡδὲ ἐκφύγοι· εἶναι c. ἀλλήλων· ἐκφ· last κ patched—had begun φ?

<p> $\eta\gamma$. $\eta\gamma$ ἀλλά πη on ἐν before $\eta\gamma$ fainter $\eta\gamma$ οὐδ' ἀν' τὰ μὴ οὐδε γὰρ' $\eta\gamma$ [twice. $\eta\gamma$ -πασιν' οὐ γὰρ' δαί' (2) ἐνδ' ἄρα $\eta\gamma$ ἐστίν. ἢ κὰν' ἐν: [, fainter. ἢ κὰν $\eta\gamma$ -τη, ἐστὶ ἐν' μὴ ἐν' εἴη. ὅλον, μὴ (2nd) $\eta\gamma$ μορίου twice. -ψ and -α ending ll. $\eta\gamma$ 1 and 2 on a stain. $\eta\gamma$ -ρια' ὅλα. $\eta\gamma$ -λων, ταῦτα $\eta\gamma$ τὸ ἔχον, το' αὐτοῖς; ἄρα, fainter. $\eta\gamma$ -τοῦ καὶ ταυτὸν $\eta\gamma$ -νεύει, ἄρ' οὖν, fainter. $\eta\gamma$ -μοιον. [fainter. $\eta\gamma$ -νη καὶ τὰλλά accents on τὰλλά </p>	<p> TUB. $\eta\gamma$ gap. $\eta\gamma$ οὐ γὰρ οὖν: τί δὲ $\eta\gamma$ οὐ γὰρ οὖν: τί δὲ $\eta\gamma$ ἐστίν. ἢ κὰν' ἐνδ' ἄρα $\eta\gamma$ -τι' ἐστὶ ἐν' τῶν c. μὴ ἐν' εἴη' B $\eta\gamma$ μορίου' ἐν' μόρια' ὅλα. last a p. 21. $\eta\gamma$ repeated. [marg. ∴ $\eta\gamma$ between line 1 and 2 in outer $\eta\gamma$ ταῦτα c. ends line. $\eta\gamma$ πρ ends line. ἔχον τὸ α $\eta\gamma$ ἴουκ' ἐστὶ [τοῖς: $\eta\gamma$ ἴσως: γοῦν $\eta\gamma$ — </p>	<p> $\eta\gamma$. ἀλλά πη last ^t faint. $\eta\gamma$ οὐ γὰρ οὖν: τί δὲ ἄρα $\eta\gamma$ ἐστίν. ἢ κὰν' ἐνδ' ἄρα $\eta\gamma$ -τι' ἐστὶ ἐν' τῶν c. μὴ ἐν' εἴη' B $\eta\gamma$ μορίου' ἐν' μόρια' ὅλα. last a p. 21. $\eta\gamma$ very like ou. $\eta\gamma$ τῷ c. ὅλα. $\eta\gamma$ τὰ αὐτὰ $\eta\gamma$ τὰ μὴ ἔχον. -τοῖς: ἄρα ὡς $\eta\gamma$ ἴοικεν' τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ἐστίν. $\eta\gamma$ ἄρ' [-τοῦ: τὲ c $\eta\gamma$ ἄλλοις: τῶν c. $\eta\gamma$ ἄλλων c. ἐφάνη. καὶ τὰλλά πον. ἕτερ' $\eta\gamma$ εἴη: οἰκοῦν 7=δὲ, after τὰλλά? $\eta\gamma$ ἴσως is above—thus γ ἴσως: $\eta\gamma$ τῶν c. ἄλλων. c. τὰλλά -νου. $\eta\gamma$ ἦττον: τί γὰρ: εἰ -τον' ὁμοίως: $\eta\gamma$ [οὐκ οὖν c. $\eta\gamma$ ἕτερον' τῶν c. -λων. ὡσαύτως. $\eta\gamma$ ταυτὸν' τό, -λοις. D $\eta\gamma$ ὥδε' τῶν c. -ματων c. καλεῖς: γ ἔγωγε: $\eta\gamma$ γ again, smaller. Marks the stop $\eta\gamma$ to which a — refers in marg. ? $\eta\gamma$ οὖν' -κίς. ἢ ἄπαξ: $\eta\gamma$ οὖν' εἴπης. $\eta\gamma$ τούνομα' ἐαν-λάκίς' ἐκείνο' ἢ ἄπαξ, $\eta\gamma$ ταυτὸν' -ξη. σεταιυτὸν' αἰεί: $\eta\gamma$; , differs. ὅτ' ἀν $\eta\gamma$ -γῆ' -παξ, -κίς. -λφ, -λότι $\eta\gamma$ -ζεις. -γωμεν, $\eta\gamma$ τὰλ- patched' ἐνδ' το' -λων $\eta\gamma$ -τες. -λῆ, -γομεν $\eta\gamma$ τούνομα; ἢ ἐν, , differ. $\eta\gamma$ τὰλ- ἐνδ' κατὰ ταυτὸν ἕτερον -θέναι, $\eta\gamma$ [οὐκ ἄλλο. , , differ. </p>
<p> $\eta\gamma$ -λων' τὰλλά fainter. $\eta\gamma$ μᾶλλον, ἦττον, , fainter. $\eta\gamma$ ἦ εἶναι' τὰλλά -νου, -τως, fine. $\eta\gamma$ ταυτὸν' εἶναι' -λοις. τὰλλά $\eta\gamma$ -μάτων, </p>	<p> $\eta\gamma$ ἦττον ὁμ- $\eta\gamma$ ἦ -θε $\eta\gamma$ -θῶτα εἰ ἐν' τὰλλά $\eta\gamma$ ὥδε </p>	<p> $\eta\gamma$ οὐκ οὖν c. $\eta\gamma$ ἕτερον' τῶν c. -λων. ὡσαύτως. $\eta\gamma$ ταυτὸν' τό, -λοις. D $\eta\gamma$ ὥδε' τῶν c. -ματων c. καλεῖς: γ ἔγωγε: $\eta\gamma$ γ again, smaller. Marks the stop $\eta\gamma$ to which a — refers in marg. ? $\eta\gamma$ οὖν' -κίς. ἢ ἄπαξ: $\eta\gamma$ οὖν' εἴπης. $\eta\gamma$ -νομα' -κίς. οὐκ ἐκείνο' ἢ $\eta\gamma$ -ξη. τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεί: $\eta\gamma$ οὐκοῦν' ἕτερον' τινι: $\eta\gamma$ -γῆ' -κίς. E $\eta\gamma$ -ζεις, ἢ κείνο $\eta\gamma$ ἕτερον' τὰλλά ἐνδ' τῶν c. ἄλλων c. $\eta\gamma$ -τες. ἄλλῃ. αἰεί -μεν $\eta\gamma$ -νομα: ἢ ἕτερον τῶν c. ἄλλῃ $\eta\gamma$ τὰλλά ἐνδ' κατὰ ταυτὸν ἕτερον πε- 148 $\eta\gamma$ πονθέναι ἄλλο. In outer marg. $\eta\gamma$ faint and careless πεπονθεν εἶναι $\eta\gamma$ ταυτὸν -θῶς, $\eta\gamma$ -ὄ. οὐχί: ἄλλων c. εἶναι. c. κατὰ τὸ $\eta\gamma$ γὰρ. τῶν c. $\eta\gamma$ ἀλλῇ' ὁμοῖο. τῶν c. ἀνομοίων c. $\eta\gamma$ -τίον: (not τῷ -οίφ) οὐκοῦν' -ρον. $\eta\gamma$ τῷ αὐτῷ: -νη. τὸ ἐν τοῖς. τ' ταυτ $\eta\gamma$ [by same hand in margin. $\eta\gamma$ ἐστίν. τὸ αὐ- B </p>
<p> $\eta\gamma$ οὖν' ἢ ἄπαξ: $\eta\gamma$ οὖν' εἴπης. $\eta\gamma$ τούνομα' ἐαν-λάκίς' ἐκείνο' ἢ ἄπαξ, $\eta\gamma$ ταυτὸν' -ξη. σεταιυτὸν' αἰεί: $\eta\gamma$; , differs. ὅτ' ἀν $\eta\gamma$ -γῆ' -παξ, -κίς. -λφ, -λότι $\eta\gamma$ -ζεις. -γωμεν, $\eta\gamma$ τὰλ- patched' ἐνδ' το' -λων $\eta\gamma$ -τες. -λῆ, -γομεν $\eta\gamma$ τούνομα; ἢ ἐν, , differ. $\eta\gamma$ τὰλ- ἐνδ' κατὰ ταυτὸν ἕτερον -θέναι, $\eta\gamma$ [οὐκ ἄλλο. , , differ. </p>	<p> $\eta\gamma$ ἦ $\eta\gamma$ οὐπερ $\eta\gamma$ ἐστὶ τούνομα' 2nd 'patched. $\eta\gamma$ αἰεί: $\eta\gamma$ τινι' ὅταν $\eta\gamma$ φθόγγῃ $\eta\gamma$ ὅταν $\eta\gamma$ τὰλλά τὸ 1st. $\eta\gamma$ ἐπεκείνη $\eta\gamma$ τούνομα: $\eta\gamma$ τὰλλά (in marg. later hand $\eta\gamma$ gives πέπονθεν εἶναι) </p>	<p> $\eta\gamma$ οὖν' -κίς. ἢ ἄπαξ: $\eta\gamma$ οὖν' εἴπης. $\eta\gamma$ -νομα' -κίς. οὐκ ἐκείνο' ἢ $\eta\gamma$ -ξη. τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεί: $\eta\gamma$ οὐκοῦν' ἕτερον' τινι: $\eta\gamma$ -γῆ' -κίς. E $\eta\gamma$ -ζεις, ἢ κείνο $\eta\gamma$ ἕτερον' τὰλλά ἐνδ' τῶν c. ἄλλων c. $\eta\gamma$ -τες. ἄλλῃ. αἰεί -μεν $\eta\gamma$ -νομα: ἢ ἕτερον τῶν c. ἄλλῃ $\eta\gamma$ τὰλλά ἐνδ' κατὰ ταυτὸν ἕτερον πε- 148 $\eta\gamma$ πονθέναι ἄλλο. In outer marg. $\eta\gamma$ faint and careless πεπονθεν εἶναι $\eta\gamma$ ταυτὸν -θῶς, $\eta\gamma$ -ὄ. οὐχί: ἄλλων c. εἶναι. c. κατὰ τὸ $\eta\gamma$ γὰρ. τῶν c. $\eta\gamma$ ἀλλῇ' ὁμοῖο. τῶν c. ἀνομοίων c. $\eta\gamma$ -τίον: (not τῷ -οίφ) οὐκοῦν' -ρον. $\eta\gamma$ τῷ αὐτῷ: -νη. τὸ ἐν τοῖς. τ' ταυτ $\eta\gamma$ [by same hand in margin. $\eta\gamma$ ἐστίν. τὸ αὐ- B </p>
<p> $\eta\gamma$ ταυτὸν $\eta\gamma$ -ον οὐχί: ἢ 'patched? $\eta\gamma$ ἀλλά τῷ ὁμοίῳ οὖν 'dark. $\eta\gamma$ ἀλλαμῆν, -φάνη' ἐν. $\eta\gamma$ ταυτόν: τουν- ταυ- </p>	<p> $\eta\gamma$ οὐχί; 'later' ἢ δὴ $\eta\gamma$ ἀπάντων. τὸ ἐν. $\eta\gamma$ ἀλλά μ' ends line. $\eta\gamma$ ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν $\eta\gamma$ ταυτόν: τόν. ἐστὶ </p>	<p> $\eta\gamma$ οὐχί: ἄλλων c. εἶναι. c. κατὰ τὸ $\eta\gamma$ γὰρ. τῶν c. $\eta\gamma$ ἀλλῇ' ὁμοῖο. τῶν c. ἀνομοίων c. $\eta\gamma$ -τίον: (not τῷ -οίφ) οὐκοῦν' -ρον. $\eta\gamma$ τῷ αὐτῷ: -νη. τὸ ἐν τοῖς. τ' ταυτ $\eta\gamma$ [by same hand in margin. $\eta\gamma$ ἐστίν. τὸ αὐ- B </p>

X.

TUB.

t.

ἡ· ἕτερον
ἡ ἀραταυτὸν· τὸν-
ἀνομοίως
εἰ ἀραταυτὸν.

πάνυγ· ἡγ· dark.
ἡ· added· τὸν· 'added.
ὁμοιοῦσι

-λοις· ἕτερο· τῶν c· -τερον.
-άνη· τὰυτὸν· ἔσται.
ὁμοίου
τὸ ταῦτόν, τῷ c· ἐτέρω· c.

p 22. C -λοις· ἡ·μενέτερον· ὁμοιον· ἡ·δὲ
ταυτὸν· ἀν· at beginning on stain.

ον
ἀνομοιοῦται on later· με̄ ends
[line.

-τερον· ὁμοιο· ταυτόν.

δὴ ὥς·οικεν [θέναι· -κε
τίνα· ἡ ("darker) ταυτὸν πέπονθε, ἡ
-θὺς· -μοιον· μὴ· δὲ· ink? ἡ· ἡδὲλλο

δὴ ὥς·οικεν·
τίνα· ἡ ταίτ· -θεν· μὴαλλ· -ναι· δὲ c.
-θὺς· -οιον· δὲ· εἶναι· c· ἄλλο
[πεποι·

-θεν· -λοῖον· ὄν· ταυτόντε· ink?
ἐν· "dark· ἔστι·

—
ε̄ ends line· κατ'ἀμ· 2nd·
[added and so line 9.

-θεν· -οιον· αλλ· ὄν· -οιο̄
ἀλλοις· ἔστι

D καὶ· οὐκοῦν
-τῷ· i darker and crowded in both
[cases. -τως· -τοῦ· ταυτὸν
-φάνη· -τερα· -τερον·

—
ταυτὸν ἐαυτῷ 2nd half of α
dark on *

-τερον· οὐκοῦν
ὡσαύτως· ταυτὸν

-νη· καὶ κατὰ ἐκύτερον· Mark = a,
or only a stop cancelled? μοιον
φανήσεται· centred below last line
83 a 2.

τί δαὶ δὴ αἰ darker on *· μὴ
πέρι· ἔχει· ἐαυτῷ, dark and fine.
ἐν; , dark and fine.

τί δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ· μὴ

δὴ· τῶν c· ἄλλων· c.

E ἡ· -λοις· ἀν· ἡ·
-λων· -γοιτο· -σθαι· ἀν.
το· αὐτοῦτε· 'or'· patched· ἀπτο·
δαί(*)τῇδε· ἀρ· τινος·

ἡ· later?· ἀν· ἡδὲ· later?
αὐτοῦ
τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ τὸ δπ·
τί δὲ τῇδε· ἀρα οὐ a· almost
hid in in. marg., no note.

-λοις· τῶν c· ἐαυτῷ· c.
τῶν c· -λων· -σθαι· ἀν.
ἐν· τῶν c.

-νψ· ἀπτεσθαι,
ἔδρα· ἡ· "· differ· το ἐν ἀρα

-δραν· κὰν μετ' ἐκείνην ἡ
ἔδρα, ἡ ἀν κέηται ἀπτεται· τὸ
αὐτοῦ had been·

-νψ· ἔδραν κατέχον
ἔδρα· -τεται· ἀρα

-σθαι· ἐχομ·

-σθαι· ξῆς· μετὰ αὐτὸ· -ραν·

κείσθαι

-νψ· ἡ· i dark and crowded in·
[γὰρ· seems orig.

κ· ἐκείν (end) ἐν ἡ αὐτό· ἔστι·
[γὰρ·

-νψ· ἐν ἡ· δεῖ γὰρ οὐδ· οὐκοῦν· ἐν.

149 -σει ἐν ἀν ταῦτα· δᾶν· ἐν.
οὐγὰρ· ἐν, εἶναι· , fine and dark.

-σειν ἀν· δᾶν
οὐγὰρ οὐν
αὐτοῦ· οὐδ· faint if any.
δν· ξῆς· dark, patched?

ἐν.
οὐ· ἐν, εἶναι.
ἀλλοῦδ· τῶν c· ἄλλ·

ὅτι φαμέν, -σθαι· ὄν.
εἶναι· -σθαι·

ἴδαν

ὅτι φαμέν· ἀψασθαι· ὄν. [εἶναι· c.
εἶναι· ἀπτεσθαι· αἰτῶν c· μέσψ·

εἶναι· (1st)· εἶν
B ὄροι, ἐξ ἧς· ἔσται·
ἀεὶ· -μενον·

δρουν· ἐξῆς

ὄροι· -νῆται· ἐξῆς· ἔσται.

-νεται·
μιά· εἶναι· Γὰρ· δύο,

αἰεὶ
προς γίγνεται· cancelled.

δύο· αἰεὶ· -μένου.
-γνεται· τῶν c· ἀριθμῶν· c.
εἶναι· -τῆς τῶν αἰψ·

λ.	TUB.	t.
-λων, ' -θμὸν, ' ἀψεις·	ισω	εων, ' ἀψεις.
-νεται.	---	πῦς.
-θμὸν, ἀ, εἰ	ἔστι ' αἰεῖ	ἔντετῶ C. ' -νεται.
ἐστίν, last δὲ seems patched: parch- ment worn and stained.	ἔστι·	ὅσα a very like οὐ ' -μὸν αἰεῖ.
ἔστιν. ' οὐκὰν ' οὐν φαμέν ' ἐνός, , faint.	---	ἔστιν.
ἔστιν. ' ἀλλά ἐστίν: ' ἐν ' rough: ἐν ἔστιν, ' γὰρ: ἐν [patched?	ἔστιν ' ἐν ἔντος	ἔστιν. ' εἴη: ' οὐκοῦν φαμέν ' ἐνός.
ἐνόντος had been ἐν ὅ-?	οὐτ ἄρα	ἔστιν, ' αὐτοῦ. ' ἀλλά ἐστίν: ' ἐν
-λα. ' δύο.	οὐδέν:	ἔστιν ' ἀλλοις. ἐνός μὴ ὄντ
ἄρα, , faint. ' ἐστίν ἐν. ' δυὰς.	ἔστι	τᾶλλα.
ἔστιν. ' οὐκῆστιν:	οὐ γὰρ	-νομα, ' ἐν. ' οὐκὰν
-τεται. ' ἐνός. ' οἷγὰρ	---	ἔστιν ' τῶν C.
ταῦτα, ' ἐν. ' -λων.	---	-τεται, ' τᾶλλα ' ἐνός. ' οὐ
οὐχάπτεται: εἴκεν: * ἴσον :: eras. ἄρ' οὐν καὶ ἴσον ἔστι. αὐτῶ	---	ταῦτα, ' τῶν C. ' -τοῦ.
of 4 (?) letters like εστ + ?) ' αὐτῶτε	---	ἄρ' οὐν καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ ' -σον.
ε squeezed in.	---	---
πῶς: ' τᾶλλα ' -τον ἢ αὐτὴ ἀλλα,	τᾶλλα ' ἢ αὐτὰ ἀλλά.	[λα
ἢ -τω: ἄρα ' τᾶλλα	ἄρ' οὐκ ' τᾶλλα ἀλλά	ἄλλοις; πῶς: ' τὰ ἀλλα. ' -τοιν. ' τᾶλ- E
-λα. ' ἐνός, οὐτέτι μείζω. οὐτέτι ἄλλο, ' οὐτε τί ἄλλο ἄλ.	---	-ττω. ἄρα οὐκὰν ' τὸ ἐν,
---	---	ἐνός. οὐτέτι ' οὐτέτι ἐλάττω ' -λων.
---	---	-τερα.
ἴσα ' -θος,	ἴσῳ. ' ἴσα	ἔχοιεν. ' μὲν μέγεθ'
-τητα. ' ἢ ' το ἐν, ' τᾶλλ', ὁ , , faintish.	ἢ ' τὸ ' τᾶλλ'	δὲ -τητα. ' ἐν, ' τᾶλλα.
-εἴη. ' εἴη.	---	-σεῖη. ' εἴη.
-κρότης. ' ἐστὸν τετине	τέτινε	-κρότης. ἔλαττο: ' οὐκοῦν ' τοῦτω εἰδῆ.
---	---	[τό, had been τοῦτω τῶ εἰδῆ?
---	δντεγε	ὄντεγε.
εἴτην,	---	εἴτην.
ἄν. ' αὐτοῦ ἐν εἴη:	ἦτοι ' ἦ	-γνεται. ' ἄν.
-γνοιτο, ' ἢ ' διό	gap.	-γνοιτο
ἢ ἄρ' οὐν, , had been .	δῆ:	εἴη. ' ἄρ' οὐκ
μένουσα ' ἐν, ' αὐτῶ εἴη. i subs.	ἔξισον μένουσα ' ἴση	ἴσου ' ἐν, ' εἴη.
τῶ, , fainter. [squeezed in.	ἴσην τῶ εἶναι.	τῶ εἶναι
τινός. ' -τητος, , fainter.	ἴσῳ. [and pretty large.	τινός. ' -τητος.
ἐνὶ the , of ; differs.	ἐν μὲν * ὅλω the * is rough	-τῆς: ' τῶ C. ἐνὶ οὐκὰν
-της. ἀλλ' εἰ περ' οὐτέγε ' δὲ μῆταῦ	ναί: οὐτεγε . . . αὐτῶ μέρα:	-της. ἀλλ' εἰπερ ἐν μέρει: ' οὔτε ' τῶ C.
---	[phrase twice written.	[μέρει. ' μὴ ταῦ.
ποιήσῃ i subs. squeezed. ' το ὅλον. ' -σα ' τὸ ' ἴση	---	τα ποιήσῃ ' ὅλον. ' ἡμεῖζων ' -ροις.
ἀκεί ' ἐν ἔσται ' -της. [ἔσται, ' -ροις.	αἰεῖ ' οὐδενί	αἰεῖ ' οὐδενί ' τῶν C. ὄντων C. ' -της.
-ρει. ' οὐδέτι ' -κρὸν.	---	μῆτε ἐν ὅλ. ' -κρὸν.
---	ἐν ἔσται	-τῆς τῆς συμ-
-τῶ. ' ἀντί ' ἄλλο. ' -θους	ἀντι	ἄλλο. ' αὐτοῦ C. -θους.
-εἴη. ' αὐτῶ i squeezed. ' ὄντος ' ἀνάγκη	---	μέγεθος ἐνείη. ' ὄντος.

	Ἀ.	ΤΥΒ.	ἰ.
P. 24.	κη-έχειν. δὲ. -νατον· remains of κη of ἀνάγκη on a stain and tear. ἀλλα· -γεθος.· -ζον. -τητος· οὐδὲ· -τον. οὐγάρ·:· ἐνὸς.· -τω· D -θος· ἐχοντα· αὐτῶ· τούτω· το· ἐχέ- -σθαι· -λω· αὐτῷ ἐν τούτοι· ἀν· εἴη οὐν· ἀρ' οὐν. -ζον· -λων· νων, , fainter. -έχειν· -σθαι· -χον· -μενον· -κη· εἶναι· ὄν. E ἴσον εἶχοι, , fine. -χοιτο· -του· ἴσον ἀρα· ἴσον καί· αὐτό τε· ὄν, fine. μὲν· εἴη· δὲ. 151 -κη. ἀλλα· δεῖ,· ἀεί:· ἐν τῷ, ὄν,· ὄν. οὐ· ἐνὸς· τῷ, εἶναι· εἶναι B -λα· ἐνι· το· εἶναι· ἐνεστιν· ἐνὸς. αὐτό το· -λων ἐνι· -λων· -γον, εἴη· -λα· -τω;· ON *· το· ἴσόντε, -ζον· ἐστιν· -του· καί -ζον· -τον· ἴσον· -τρων, , fine. C -νων· -τόνων· αὐτῷ· -τρων. ὄν,· -όνων, , fine. -νων· αὐτοῦ -λων· ἴσον· ταῦτα· πῶς· P. 25. ἐστι· που· -τρων· με on stain. ἴσον· ταῦτα· ἴσον· -τρων, , faint. D πλειόνων, , faint· αὐτῷ· -τρων. αὐτῷ ἴσον· αὐτῷ δὲ πλέον· δὲ· αὐτοῦ·	ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ [τω οὐγάρ· οὐδὲ λα· ἐχοντα· αὐτῷ τούτω c. (end)· οὐδὲ λα· οὐν· ἀρ' patched. μήτ' ἑλάτ· 1st 'added? ἕξισον twice ἴσον· καὶ μὴν οὐτ' ἄν 2nd 'added? οὐτ' ἄν "added?· ἕξισον· ἴσον [and next line. πρὶτ' added? αὐτῷ· from orig. τοῦ, later. αἰεί:· ἐν 'patched from" τῷ ? so:· later· ὄν· οὐ· ἐστι· ἐνός· τῷ εἶναι; τῷ μῆδ· ἐνίστι· τῷ δὲ ἑλάτ· ἑλάττω· ἔοικε:· τῷ ἴσ· αὐτοῦ had been· ἴσον· ἴσως ἂν αὐτῷ δοῦ: ἴσον αὐτοῦ had been· ἴσοναυ· ποῦ· ἴσ· ἴσον· ἴσων ἴσ· ἴσ·	μέγας· -τητος· -της· -ττον. -θους:· οὐ· τᾶλλα· οὐδὲ -τω. -τα· τούτω· ἔχετον [τῷ -μν· -σθαι· c. ἀλλὰ [εἴη. -λω· τούτοι· τῶν c. ἄλλων c.· οἱδ· οὐκοῦν· ἀρ' τῶν c. ἄλλων, c. -σθαι:· οὐκοῦν -μν· -κη· ἴσου εἶναι· ὄν. ἑαυτῷ οὕτω c. εἶχοι· -τῷ· ἔχον. [τῷ: -χοιτο· -του· ἀλλ'· ὄν· ἴσον αἰεί εἴη ἑαυτῷ c.· -λοις. -ται:· c.· αὐτόγε· ὄν· ἐξωθ· μὲν· εἴη· -χόμενον c.· -τον· εἴη· ἑαυτῷ· οὐκοῦν τόδε· -κη· -τος· τῶν c. ἄλλων:· c. δεῖ· αἰεί:· οὐκοῦν· ἐν ἐν τῷ had been [ἐν τῷ, signs of change but no· τῷ· ἐλάττον ὄν· ἐπειδὴ τῷ τῶν c. ἄλλων c.· ἐνός. ἐν τῷ (as above) εἶναι· εἶναι· ἐνι· -λοις· εἶναι: -στιν· τᾶλλα· ἐνός αὐτῷ· ἐν· -λων· -μν· τᾶλλα· ἐνι· αὐτῷ· εἴη· -ττω· ἔοικε:· c. ἐστιν· τῶν c. ἄλλων:· c. ἴσον. αὐτῷ c.· -λοις· -τρων. πῶς δ' has been πῶσο and 'put above [o, ends line.· ἴσων ἄρα εἴη· τῶν c. ἄλλων· c.· ἴσον· πῶς: ἐστιν· -τρων καὶ -τον· ὡσαύτως· ἴσον. οὐκοῦν· -ζ· ἴσον· ἐλαττόν αὐτῷ· from ατ to αυ a stain scraped, v very faint.· -τρων· πῶς δ' (as above c). αὐτῷ· πλῆθ' αὐτῷ εἴη δὲ· πλέον· ἐλαττόνων c. δὲ c.· αὐτοῦ:

Α.	TUB.	t.
-τάλλα' ἐν.	τάλλα traces of 't. 15a	οὐκοῦν' τὰλλα ὡσαύτως
-νεται.	—	αὐτῶν c. -ται' αὐτῶν c.
-τερον. -τον' ἴσον -θει	ἴσον twice (cease to note,	-τερ' ἴ-γέθει.
αὐ ὡς εἰσὶκε τὸ ἐν. ἴσον	— [save change).	οὕτω δὴ αὐ ὡς εἰσὶκεν τὸ ἐν. καὶ ἴσο E
αὐτοῦ	αὐτὸ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἴσ.	τ' -μόν. καὶ, τῶν c.
ἄρ' dark, patched? ἐν, ἔστι	ἄρ' ἔστιγε	ἄρ' ἐν.
ἄλλων, [-γνεται,	-ρόν γε αὐτὸ τὸ	αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν c. ἄλλων; c.
-τερον twice. -τοῦ, -λων,	-ἴχον;	τῶν c. ἄλλων. c.
πῶς: ἐν ἔστιν; εἶναι,	ἐν ἔστι:	πῶς: -χει. ἐνέστι: 'patched.' εἶναι.
ἄλλό τι ἔστιν ἢ first part of added. [-σίας, -όντος,	ἄλλότι ἔστιν, ἢ	ἄλλό τι ἔστιν -τος.
-θότος. αὐτο ἔσται, -λοντος.	ἦν τοῦ παρ-	-θότος. -ντος 152
— ἔστι	—	-νία; μετέχειν -νου.
ἀεὶ in the two; the, differs from:	αἰεὶ	εἶναι; c. οὐκοῦν αἰεὶ
-τοῦ.	—	πρόέρχεται
οὖν, -μεθα.	ἄρ' νωτέρου	ἄρ' -μεθα -μένον.
—	—	-ρον πρεσβύτερ' οὐκοῦν
ἐν. -μένου,	—	-τερ' ἐν. -τοῦ. B
γίγνεται: meant? [lighter.	—	— [ἄρ'
-ρον ἂν τοῦ, οὕτω; -τερον. ἄρ' , ,	ἂν τοῦ added. ἄρ' οὐχ' ἔστιν	αὐτοῦ (2nd u patched) οὕτω: -τερον.
ἔσται. [dark. οὐ	— [last added.	χρόνο -μενον' ἔσται;
ἔπειτα, ὑπερβήσεται junction at . ὑπερβή- οὐ	—	ἔπειτα.
ἄρ' οὖν. οὐκ ἐπισχέει	οὐκ ἐπ. -δαν	ἄρ' C
-τύχη -γνεται. τότε -τερον. γὰρ.	ἄλλ' ἔστι	-χρη' ἔστιν γὰρ,
κάνποτε νῦν. -ἴδον, ἔχει.	ἂν	νῦν. ἔχει.
-τεσθαι. νῦν. καὶ	—	-σθαι νῦν. ἀφιεμέ-
-νον. -μενον,	—	-νον. -τα. -τέρω
-νον. -τα.	τοῦτε.	-νον. τοῦτε δέ c. γε
τὸ, νῦν. ἦ. ἀεὶ	-μενον: gap.	νῦν -μεν. κατατοῦτο ἦ. αἰεὶ
-γενεσθαι. τοῦτο ὅτι γ on a stain.	-νεται καὶ τὸ * ἦν	-σθαι. τοῦτο. D p. 26.
ἄρα τὸ, νῦν.	ἄρα ἔστιν τὸ νῦν ἐπίσχε	ἄρα ὅτ' ἂν τῷ νῦν ἐπισχεν [έ-
-γενεσθαι. ; finer. οὐκοῦν οὐπερίε-	οὖν ἐπιπλεῖ. (εγγ in Ms. ?)	-σθαι. ἔστιν -τερον: οὐκοῦν οὐπερ
ἔστιν. αὐτοῦ; finer.	γίγνεται ε upon αἰ ἔστι δὲ	-τερον. ἔστιν.
; , finer.	-τερον; καὶ c. ἔστιν:	-τερον. ἔστιν:
ἔστι τὸ ἐν.	ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν	ἔστι τὸ ἐν. -τερ' -μενον.
νῦν, ἀεὶ. -τὸς.	αἰεὶ and twice next line.	νῦν αἰεὶ τῷ c. ἐνὶ.
ἀεὶ twice ἔστι darker.	ὅτ' ἂν ἔστι τὸ	-να. αἰεὶ νῦν. αἰεὶ ἔστι E
-γνεται. -τοῦ,	ἐν εἰσὶκε:	-ται. -τερον. εἰσὶκεν: c.
ἔστιν, -γνεται. ἢ first half of	ἢ τὸν ἴσον τὸν ἴσον.	ἔστιν -ται. -σον: τὸν
added? ἴσον: τὸν. Traces of	—	—
on ἴσον twice.	—	—
ἴσον χρόνον, ὅν.	ἔχον. [τε added later.	τόγε -νόμενον c. ἢ ὅν. ἔχει:
τοδὲτην ἔχον. -τερον.	δοδ: τὸ τὴν οὐπρεσ: οὐπρεσ.	πῶσδ' as in 151 c and d but not
ἴσον	[changed from -τὸ	[ending line. ἔχον.
—	ἄρα αὐτο* (ends line) ἑαυτοῦ	νεώτερόν ἐστιν: ἄρα -νον. ἑαυτοῦ c.

¶.	TUB.	t.
-μενον· ε curs. ὄν. ὡτερον.	—	ὄν. ὡτερον
153 ἔστιν· τί δαίτων αἰτ on * darker.	τί δα	ἔστιν· τί δὲ τῶν c. ἄλλων· c.
τόδεγε· -γειν· ἑνός, ἔστιν,	τόδεγε	λέγειν· τὰλλα· ἑνός ἔστιν.
ἕτερον· ἔστιν ἑνός; , differs. ἔστιν· μὲν	ἑνός· μὲν	ἀλλὰ· -ρον· ἑνός· ὄν. ἕτερα
[γὰρ ὄν· ε curs. γ maj.]	—	—
ὄντα· γὰρ ἄν·	—	ὄντα· ἔστι·
ὄν. ἔχοι. ἦ ὡ first half darker.	ἦ	ὄν. ὡ· -χοι·
οὖν ἄρ· -μεν ε curs. [γιστον βοθ·	—	οὖν
-τερον. ἦ ὡ first half darker. ὀλί·	ἦ ὀλιγοστών	-τερον.
B δέσστιν τὸ ἐν· ἐν, fainter.	δέσσι· ἦ	-τον· ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἦ· πάντων c.
τὰλλα ὡ second half darker. ὡ· -θμὸν.	τὰλλα	-γοιεν. τῶν c. τὰλλα· -μόν.
ἀλλα· ἄλλο ἔστιν· γε οἶμαι γεγονός.	—	ἀλλα· ἄλλο· ἔχει· γε οἶμαι -νός.
-νε· -λα· -νότα.	—	-νε· ἄλλα· ὕστερα -νότα
-τερα,	—	εἴη τὰ ἄλλα
ἑνός· ἐνπρε-	—	ἑνός· ἐν· τῶν c.
τί δαίτ' ὅδε; αἰτ on * : traces of ἐτό·	τί δα ἄρ· αὐτοῦ ἦ	τί δὲ τόδε· ἄρ· -νός
[ἄρ· -γονός. ἦ both patched.]	—	—
C μὴν· ἔχον· -μέρη.	ἀλλὰ μὴν c. ends line.	δὲ μέρη·
-χὴν· -τὴν· οὖν, -τον,	—	τελευτή καὶ μεσον· οὐκοῦν c. πάντων c.
-ται· ἑνός, tail added? -την	τὴν	-νετα· ἑνός· τῶν c.
-χὴν· τὰλ· καὶ fainter.	τὰλλα patched· μὴν· καὶ	ἀρχὴν· τὰλλα πάντα. μέχρι τοῦ τ· :
-μεν ε curs. τὰλ·	—	τὰλλα· ἑνός· δὲ c.
-νέναι.	ἔν	φύσσομεν c.
δέ· γε νε at end on a stain.	-φυκε ε large on *	δέ γε οἶμαι· ἄμα· -κεν
D ὥστ' το· -σθαι.	—	-σθαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ· γίνεσθαι. γινγ
—	—	so my notes, first ν patched: γίνε-
-νός, -λων,	—	σθαι had been first meant.
ἔστι· -λα.	ἔστιν·	-γονός· τῶν c.
δαί δὴ· αἰ darker on *	τί δὲ δὴ	τῶν c. ἄλλων· ἔστιν τὰ last a letter?
δοῦν οὖν· μέρη·	ἔάν	τί δὲ δὴ
ῖ, differs.	ὄν·	ἑνός· οὖν c. μέρη.
E ἄν· -τέρψ	-τάν	εἶναι c. ὄν· οὐκοῦν· ἐν.
-μένων ὅτι περ [ἐγγένη·	—	τῶν c. ἄν· -τέρψ· [s ends line.
ὅτ' οὖν. ε darker and squeezed. -λον	—	τῶν c. ἄλλων c. -μένων. ὅτι· προσγί-
-ται· -σου, -του, -του.	ὑ	οὖν· -λθόν. ὅλον ἐν
—	ὑπεμέσου υ orig.?	-ται· οὔτε ἐσχάτου. οὔτε πρώτου.
ἐν· ὥστ' εἰ	γενήσεται·	ἄλλοις.
ἐν· -τερον· -τερον, εἴη.	ἔσ· ἐν. gap.	ἐν· ὥστ' εἰ μὴ παραφύσιν [line).
154 -μα·	πρότερον.	ἐν· τῶν c. ἄλλων c. εἴη. ἀλλ' αἰ (next
εἴη τὰλλα· δε	gap· εἴη· τὰλλα and next	μα· τῶν c. ἄλλων c.
-ρον καὶ τὰλ·	—	εἴη· -σθεν.
-νός·	—	-τερον· τὰλλα· ὡγαῦτως·
-λων	—	-νός·
τὰλ· dark. ἑνός· ὡτερον·	τὰλλα	τῶν ἄλλων· c. c.
—	—	τὰλλα· ἑνός·

	ἄ.	TUB.	t.
	αὐτοῦ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ἔστιν ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -ται, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. D το ἐν, -σθαι, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. νῦν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. [καὶ καὶ on brown blots. -το, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -νον, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -ξ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. δὴ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. E -ξεται, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ὄντα. -μεν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -κη, αὐτὸ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -νον, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -στιν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. οὐδ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -σται, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -χει, καὶ 156 -τοῦ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -νος, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ἔσται, τότε, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -νειν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -σίας, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. [το ἐν δὴ ὡς εἰσὶν. -νοντε, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. B -λὰ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ἐν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. καὶ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. καὶ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ἀν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ἀν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. C ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -λη, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. πρότερον, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -μενον, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -δεῖς, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -σθαι, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -λει, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. D εὐδὸς, ὡς, ἄλλον, c.	αὐτοῦ had been ' ἔστι τὸ ὡς, ἄλλον, c. αὐτοῦ τὸ ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ἀρ' ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. μή, ends line. ἦν, ἔστι -γας, ἔστιν καὶ περιττὰ ἄλλα -χ, χ ends line. ἔστι παν- -τως. ἀρ' ἐν τῷ ποτὶ -σται αὐτοῦ ποτὶ ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -σται rough (ff. 174, 175 have been stuck together, latter is injured). μόνος τε, καὶ οἰοντάσται ἀφίαν ἀρ' ὅταν ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται: gap καὶ ἀρ' τε . . . -σθαι; written twice, dotted, later καὶ μὴν ὅταν ἴσ, ἴσ. οὕτως ὅταν (so twice) ἴσταται. μεταβάλλη, μὴ δὲ ἔσθαι ἔσταναι. ἔσταναι: οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ εἰς: πότ' ἔσθαι οὐ γὰρ	τῶν c. ἄλλων, c. ἔσθαι ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -νεται, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ἐν. σθαι, ἀρ' ἐπειτα. νῦν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. εἰς, [αν? αὐτοῦ, -νον, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -τομεν; ὁρθῶς c. αὐτῷ. -ξεται c. τὰ ἄλλα ἔχει ἐν εἰ ἔστιν c. οἶον -μεν. ἀρ' αὐτὸ πολλὰ twice. [οἰοντά- χρόνον, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ποτὶ ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -χει, οἰόντε -χειν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -χει. -χει, ἐν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. αὐτοῦ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. εἶναι, αὐτοῦ, [μὴ ποτὲ ἔσται c. τότε αὐτὸ, τότε ἔχειν, c. το -νειν, ἀράγε οὐ -σθαι c. -λείς: -σίας, ἀρ' -σθαι; , has been added. [δὴ ὡς εἰσὶν -σίαν, γίγνεται καὶ ἀπόλλυται; c. ὅν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ἐν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. πολλὰ, ἀρ' ἀναγκη -νηται. μείζον, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. οὕτως: ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -σθαι, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -τέρ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. -μενον, -τέρ, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. οὐδεῖς ἔστιν. -ναι: οὐ γὰρ -λει, ὡς, ἄλλον, c. ἔσθαι ἀν, ὡς, ἄλλον, c.

V.

TUB.

t.

ταῦτα [small.
-μενα, ' στωτα, ' πάθη. 3 , , , all
τάλ. ' of ' darker. ' ἐνός.
οὖν εἰ [' of ' darker.
-νερά. ' ποῖμεν. ' -λιν, ' ἔστιν. ἄρα.
ἐνός. ἧ ' seems patched.
-χῆς. ' ἔστιν. τί,
το. ' -λων.
τάλ. ' dark. ' ἔτερον.
ἐνός. ' -λων.

-μοῖο-τατα: ' αὐτοῖς ' very
ἀνόμοια ἂν [dark.
ἔστωτα. ' dark patched.
τάλλα ' added. ' ἐνός.
—
ἄρα
οὐχ' ὁύτως 2nd ' added ' ἧ
ἔστι.
γάρ: ἄρ' ' τὸ
τάλλα
ἔτι

τάλλα, ταῦτά τε
-λοις.
-λων. c. ' -τωτα. ' -θη.
τάλλα ' ἐνός: : wide. B
οὐκοῦν εἰ
-ρά. ' ποῖμεν. ' -λιν ἂν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα
τάλλα ' -νός.
-χῆς. ' -τιν. ' τάλλα ' -νός.
-ναι: c. ' ἄρ' ' τῶν c. ἁλλων. c. and
τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός; τί [so below.
-νός. ' γὰρ c. εἴρηται. ὅτ' ἂν my notes c
[have near this -ἔαν (? ἔαν).

ἐν, ' τάλ. ' of ' dark. ' τουτων,
αὐτῷ ε crowded. ' τάλ-as above ' οὐ
ταυτῷ ἔστιν, ' τάλ. ' ἄρα; ' of '
[darker. ' ; seems uniform.
φαμέν,
ἂν, ' -λοις. ' -τοῦ.
-λων. ' ἔχῃ:
-τάλ. ' ἐνός. ' -τοῦ.
τάλλά ἔστιν.
τάλλα.
ὅλου. ' δέ, ' ἐν.

τάλλα: ' ἔστιν
τάλλα: οὐ γάρ:
ἄρα; ναί:

οὐτ' ἄρα
—
ἔχῃ. ' οὐδένι
τὰ ἅλλα τοῦ ἐνός.
-θαμῇ ' τάλλα ἔστιν. οὐδέ [ἐκ-
οὖν. οὐδ' ἄρα ' τάλλα. ἂν γὰρ ἦν
— (no σημ. in marg.)

τό, ' τάλλα: ' γάρ: c. ' ἄρα ἔστιν
τό, ' εἴη τῷ c. αὐτῷ, c. καὶ τάλλα:
ἔστι τὸ ' τάλλα: ' -κεν: ' ἄρα: c.

-μέν, ' ἄρα c.
-λοις. ' -τον. ' -ρις. [οὐδένι ἄρα c.
τῶν c. ἁλλων c. ' ἔχῃ: πῶς γὰρ οὐ:
τάλλα ' -νός. ' -τοῦ. ' κατὰ c. D

ἔστιν. ' ἔχει
οὐ ' οὐδ' ἄρα ' ἔστι. ' τάλλα.
αὐτῶν c. ' -λου. ' ἐν.

-λά. ' ὅλου. ' τάλ. ' ἐνός.
δύο. ' τρία. ' αὐτά ἔστι τὰ ἅλλα.
ἐν ἔστιν. ' αὐτοῖς. ' ταχῆ ε squeezed.
[Final οὐ on a stain.

ἔστι. ' τάλλα
οὐδ' ἄρα 2nd ' ad. ' τάλλα.
ἐν ἔστιν ἑαυτοῖς.

-λά. ' -λον. ' ἔστι τάλλα. ' ἐν.
τρία, ' -τιν τὰ ἅλλα.
ἐν ἔστιν. ' -τοῖς.

E p. 33.

ἄρα. ' -μοια. ' ἅλλα.
-της. ' εἰ
εἴη. ' -τα. ' δύο
-τοῖς, , fine.

ἐν τὰ ἅλλα. οὐτε ἐν ἔστιν on *
— [or pchmt. rough?
ἔχῃ
ἂν upper half of α on * ' ἐν
[ἐν ends line.

δὲ c. ' -μοια, οὐ. ' -στιν τῷ c. ' τάλλα. ' [ἐνέστιν
-της. ' εἰ
εἴη. ἧ. ' -τα. ' δύο
ἐν. ' ;

δυοῖν dots very fine. ' -χειν, ' μὴδ'
ὁμοία. ' ἔστιν. ' τάλλα.
-μοια. ' -χοι.
ὄντα
οὐδέτερα, ' -μενα,
-μενα, ' -λύμενα. ' -ζω. ' -τω.
-θέναι, [τριῶν. ' -του.
ἅλλα. dots meant? ἐνός. ' δυοῖν.
-ον. μεθέξει.
ἔστιν. ' τέ.
ἐν. ' ἔστι. ' τάλλα
εἰεν. ' ἐν. ' ἄρ. acc. patched?

μηδεν ends line.
οὐτ' ἄρα. ' οὐτ' ἄν. ' τάλλα.
—
-νηλῆθῃ:
οὐδέτερα.
ἴσα.
—
-μενα. ' ἐνός. ' x = ' cancelled
—
ἔστι.
ἑαυτοῖς v erased. ' τὰ ἅλλα
οὐν εἰ δε μὴ ἔστι. ' ἄρ.

-τον, ' -χειν. ἂ μηδενός -χοι:
οὐτ' ἄν. ' -τερα, ' τάλλα.
γὰρ ἂν ὄν. -μοια. ' ἐν. ' -χοι.
-τα. ' -τίον. ' δὲ. ἀδύνατον [τα.
δ' ἄρα. ' -τὰ. ' οὐδέτερα. ' -μενα. ' οὐδὲ c. ' 16.
-μενα. ' -μενα. ' οὐ μείζω. οὐδέλάττω, ' [ἴσα.
-θεν τῶν c. ' τοιοῦτων c. B
-λα.
-ξεῖ. ' μετεχειν.
ἔστιν.
ἐν. καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν ἔστι. c. ' τάλλα
μὲν c. οὖν. c. ' εἰεν. ' ἐν. ' ἄρ.

9.	TUB.	t.
ταῦτα : ' -θεσις·	—	μετατοῦτο; ' οὖν c. ' εἴη' -θεσις.
ἔστιν ἀρατί' μη ἔστιν :	ἀρα τι	-τιν. ἀρατί
C μόνον· ἡ ' of ' darker. ' τουναν·	ἡ πᾶν τοῦν· ἔστιν· μη twice.	-νον·' ἔστιν·' ἔστιν·
[-πεῖν·' μη twice ' ἔστι,		
μη ἔστιν : ' τουν·' -γοι, ' μη ἔστιν·	μη ἔστι : ' τοῦν·' τίςδκ' μη	ἔστιν : ' -γοι·' -τιν.
ἔστιν·' -ούτων, ἀρα dots small : ' of	ἡτι· on *. ' ἀρα	-τιν· ἡ ἀλλότι τῶν c. -των. ἀρα ἐφ
-λοῖ, twice. ' , , differs. [' darker.	λέγοντο τὸ	λέγει' οὐκοῦν c.
λέγοι· ὄν·' ἀν·' ἐν, ' ἔστι.	ἔταν·' μή ἔστι·' ἔσ·	λέγει τῶν c. ἀλλων c. ' ὄν·' ἐν·' ἔστι·
λέγει·	λέγει : ἔσ· : on *.	ἀρα·' -γει. [γιγ· . . . εἶναι·
D -λων·' ἀν·' ἐν·' -σθεῖς·' εἶναι· Mar-	ἔταν·' no words in marg. or	ἐν·' αὐτῷ c. -θεῖς·' εἶναι· c. οὐδὲν ἡττοί
ginal addition has no γαρ, has	[in text, = εἶναι καὶ ἔστι	
-ται· c., and εἶναι·		
ἡ	ἡ σθ·' ὤδε	τῶν c. ἀλλων· c. ' ὤδε·' αρ-
-χῆς·' μὴ ἔστιν·' εἶναι·	ἔστι·	χῆς·' ἔστί·' εἶναι· c. ὑπάρ·' patched.
δεῖ·' -μην·' ἡ μὴδε ὅτι ' of ' dark, and	ἡ μὴ δε	δεῖ ὡςέοικεν·' -μην·' μὴδὲ ὅτι λεγεται
— [angle sharp.	ἔταν τις·' ἔστιν ἀληθῆ :	-σθαι·' ἔστι(ν)· c. ' οὐκοῦν c. ' τᾶλλα
εἶναι·' μὴδὲ ἐκείνο,	—	ἔτερ·' -ναι·' μὴδὲ ἔτερ· τῶν c. ἀλλῶν c.
		in lower margin
		of 85 b 2 stands
		ῥ
		ῥ
ἔστιν·' επιστήμη·	ἔστιν	αὐτῷ c. ' -μην·
E λέγει,	ἔταν	ἀλλων c. ' -τητα c. λεγει·' λε-
-γῆ ἀλλατῆν	ἀλλὰ·' -νον φαίνεται : καὶ	-γην·' ἐκείνου : ου patched on a stain,
		and trace of accent? ' -νον·
τινὸς·' -του·' -τψ·' -των· καὶ	—	τινὸς·' -τψ·' τούτων· c. ' πάντων τῶν
		[-των· all c.
ἐν·' -γετο·' ἀν·' darker than ' ἔτερα·	δᾶν·' ἐκείνω	ὄν· οὐ·' -γετο· οὐδ' ἀν·' -ρα·' ἐκείνω
[my notes.)		orig. ἐκείνο? ψ small, crowded.
ἡν·' -νον· οὐδ' ἀντι·' -γετο·' μετῆν· (so	οὐδ' ἀν	ἡν·' -νον·' -γετο·' -ἡν.
-όντε.	—	τῶν -λων -των : -θῶς : all c. ' τε
161 -λῶν·' -λύνει·' -κη [fainter.	ἔστι·	ἔστιν·' -λναι·' -κη.
ἔστιν·' το ἐν, , and the other are	τὸ	-νο·' ἔστιν·' ἐν·' μῆτ' ἔσται·
τοῦ·' -γος·' δὲτὸ accs. differ from	—	-γος.
[others.		
-νο·' εἶναι·' -νον, tail of , scraped. ' -κεῖται·' μὴ εἶναι καὶ		
[-λῶν· γε· καὶ		
-λα· τὰ·' ὄντα·	—	-λο·' -ναι·' -λων -λῶν· c.
δ' ἀλλοῖα·	—	-τψ c. ' ἀρα αὐτῷ ἔστι(ν)· c.
		τᾶλλα·' -λα·' -τα.
		-ροῖα·' -λοια, οὐκ
B ἔστι·' δῆλον· ὅτι ' is sharp and dark.	ἀνόμοια ἔστιν δηλονότι	οὖν : c. οὐκοῦν c. ' τψ c. ' ἔστιν.
-μοια, (1st)	—	-μοια· ἀν·' τψ c.
ἔστιν; ἔοικεν· ἡ	ἔοικεν :	-της·' τψ c. ἔστιν : ' εἰ δὲ δι
ἔστιν αὐτῷ·	ἀρ· οὐκ	τῶν c. -λων c. ' ἔστί· τψ c. ἀρ·
πῶς : ' ἐν·	ἔστι	τψ c. ' εἶναι : πῶς : ' ἐν· οὐκάν
εἴη·' ἐνδς·	-δᾶν	εἴη·' -νός· οὐδ' ἀν
ἐνδς·' ἐνός; ' γε; , , different.	ἐνδς· (1st)	-σις·' -νός·
C ἑαυτῷ; δεῖ : ' καὶ μὴν accs. different.	καίμην	ἑαυτῷ εἶναι :

X.

TUB.

t.

οὐδαὶ ἴσον· -λοις· ἴσον· ἥδη,

ἰόν ἐστι ἴσον. τε
ἰσ· δάμ·

οὐδαὶ ἴσον γ' ἐστὶν· -λοις· ἴσον· ἥδη·

-τα· ἴσον·

ἰσ·

-τα· ἐστι(ν) c. ἐν· ἴσον·

ἄρα, τὰλ· ἴσα in ἥ the darker.

ἄρα τὰλλα· ἰ·

ἄρα τὰλλ' [the, is later.

ἴσα· ἄνισα· ἄνισα, οὐ·

ἰσαοκάνισα; δ' ἄνισα ἰσ·

ἴσα· -σα, οὐτῷ c. ἄνισα c. -σα; In;

ἐν. προς

-ισ· [-ισα: ἐν, τὰλλα αὐτῷ c. ἐστὶν c.

μέντοι· ἐστὶ

-ισ· γέστι . . . καὶ injured

γέ ἐστι

μεγ . . . do· -ικρο· [but = X

ἐστὶ· -κρότ·

ἀεὶ· -λοις; , lighter.

αἰεὶ

-κρότ· αἰεὶ ἀφαστ·

τί· ἀεὶ· τί

τί· αἰεὶ· οὐντι

-τοῖν· αἰεὶ· ἄλλο

-τητα· οὐκ· -θος.

ἰσ· ἐστι

-τοῖν· -τητα· οὐκ· ἀλλὰ ('or'?

-της ἐστὶν· οὐσα; , small fine.

ἐστὶ ἰσ· οὐσα·

-της· ἐστὶ· -τῷ c. [patched]· ἐστὶ

δντι ὥσκειεν· μετή, , small fine.

-κα καὶ ἰσ·

ἐνι· -τι ὥσκειεν· μετελή·

-θους·

-κε:

καὶ μὴν οὐσίαςγε.

πῇ;· δεῖ, οὕτως· -μεν·

—

πῇ· -τως· -μεν·

ἐχῃ· -μεῖς, εἰ at end on a stain.

ἐχα·

ἐχῃ· οὐκάν· -μεῖς.

-θῇ· -μεν· ἥ' of ἥ dark· -τω:

-λονότι· ἥ . . . -τω: written

-θῇ· -μεν·

δέφαμέν· -γειν· φάναι

— [twice. δέ φαμέν· -γειν.

[γὰρ c.

ἄρα ὥσκειεν τὸ ἐν. οὐκόν·

—

ἐστὶν ἄρα ὥσκειεν τὸ ἐν. οὐκ ὄν· εἰ 162

δν, προστὸ εἶναι.

τῇ τοῦ no note in marg.

δν. ἀλλά τι ἀνήσει· εἶναι. c.

(S· ἀφήσει ἥ ἀναπέ· σει opp. foot-line,
inner marg., small majs.)In lower marg. $\frac{\wedge}{\text{ia}}$
S

δν· εἶναι ὁμοίως, , fine. μῇ δν· -ναι

οὐν δαε [μῇ δν ἐχα μῇ εἶναι οὐν· c. δασμ· -ναι.

-ναι τὸ μῇ δν· T covers a μ δν· -ναι ὁμοίως· c. δν· εἶναι. c.

αὐ εἶναι· ἥ· ἄν, εἶη. Nothing in
[marg. corresp. to mark above ἥ.

εἶνα (will note only use of ἥ)· ἥ· τό, εἶη.

[ἥ no mark.

δν· δν, δν

—

οὐκάν· εἶη· -τα, τὸ μὲν οὐσίας· δν· δέ.

μῇ δν, twice.

μῇ δν, 1st. gap.

δν· δν· μὲν.

δν· μῇ δν· εἰ

—

δν· δέ· δν·

ἐνι· ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι·

—

-θεστατα· οὐκ οὐν c. εἶναι. c.

μῇ ἐνι, εἰ μῇ ἐστὶν; last, differs.

τὸ μῇ· μῇ ἐστι·

-στι· ἐνι· ἐστὶ· εἶναι c.

μῇ ἄρα· οὐν,

gap· πᾶς δ' . . . -τι injured, ἐστὶν:

-ναι· εἰς· εἶναι: c. τῷ c. ἐνι· ἐστὶ;

πῷ οὕτως

— [seems = X

πῷ· -τω·

-οὐτον,

—

-τον· -ναι·

τε, δέ, κίνησις. ἥ' of ἥ darker.

τῇ ἥ

-σις.

τὸ ἐν· patched.

ἐνότι

οὐκ οὐν c. -νῇ:

-μενον ἄρα

ἐοικε: ἄρα

ἄρα c. twice· ἐχον.

δν ἐμπεφάνται· εἶναι, ἐπι

ἐπι

ἐμπεφάνται· μ orig., sugg. ἐμπ?

p. 35.

α.	TUB.	τ.
ἀλλα ¹ -μουτέ ἐστι ¹ -των	μήδα.	μηδαμουτέ rather dub. if τέ or Γέ— prob. former. ¹ τῶν c. ὄντων c.
-τιν ¹ ἔστιν ¹ μηθίσται το ποθένποι : δαν μηθίσταιτο		-τιν ¹ -τιν. οὐδ ἂν μεθίσταιτο ποθεν [ποι ¹ πῶς γάρ c.
D τῶιγε had been τό	τόγε μετα ¹ -τῶν :	νειν. ¹ οὐδὲ c. ¹ αὐτῷ c.
-φοίτο ¹ ταυτοῦ γὰρ ¹ ὄν ¹ ἐστι ¹ ταυτόν ¹	—	-το ¹ γὰρ ¹ ἀπτεται ¹ c. ¹ ταυτόν ¹
μη ὄν εν τῷ ¹ repeated in marg.	μή ὄν εν τῷ τῶν no ¹ over εν	τῷ τῶν c. ὄντων c. -τ ¹ εἶναι : c. ¹ ἀρα c.
ἐν ¹ ὄν, "and, differ. ¹ -νψ, ¹ οὐ	μή ἔστιν : οὐ ¹ ὄν	ὄν. ¹ οὐδ : c.
ἐν, ἐαυτοῦ ¹ ὄν ¹ ὄν ¹	—	-τοῦ ¹ μὴ ὄν ¹
ἐνὸς, ¹ -τοῦ ¹	—	ἐνὸς. ¹ -τοῦ ¹
-οὔται, ¹ ταυτῷ	τίνος :	-ται ¹
E -φεται ¹ -νει ¹ -νητον ¹	ἀρ ¹	-ται ¹ -νει. ἀρ ¹ -τον.
-γειν ¹ -ζον. εσάναι : ¹ το ¹ ἀρα	εσάναι :	ἄγειν ¹ -ζον. ¹ ἀρα
ὄν ¹ μὴν εἰπέρ γε [line retouched.	εστηκέτι ¹ -αι : ¹ εἰπέρ γε	-κεν ¹ ἔστη ¹ -νεῖται : c. ¹ μὴν
163 -ται ¹ -θῆ. Several letters in this	-ται ¹ ἀν. μεγ ¹	-ται ¹ αὐτῷ c. ¹ -θῆ.
p. 36. ἔχει, ὡς ἔχει.	—	-το ¹ ὡσαῦ- ἔχει ὡς εἰχεν. ἀλλ ¹ οὕτω :
-νον. οὐδαμῇ ἀλ- in the ; ; differ.	-μὴ δὲ κιν-	ἐν ¹ -μενον. ¹ ἂν
οὐγάρ :	οὐ ¹	ἢ μὲν ¹ ἐν. -ται ¹ η
οὐγάρ : ¹ ἀρα ὁ of ἄ darker. ¹ τε	οὐ ¹ ἀρα and line 5	-νεῖται : c. ¹ ὄν.
-νον ¹ ἀρα as above. ¹ -ρον, , differs.	—	-οὔται : c. ¹ -νον, ἀρα c.
B —	—	-ρον. -σθαι c. ¹ -εως.
—	—	-νον ¹ -σθαι : c.
ὄν ¹ μὲν. ¹ -λνται ¹	-μενον γίνεταί	ὄν ¹ μὲν. ¹ -ται ¹
δὲ ¹ -νεται ¹ μὴ ὄν.	οὔτε a word on *, had been	δὲ, οὔτε ¹ οὔτ ¹ οὕτω c. ο on * ¹ ὄν.
-λνται ¹ -νεται ¹ οὐγάρ	οὐ γὰρ ὄν :	-ται ¹ οὔτ ¹ ἀπόλλνται : c. οὐ γάρ :
ἴωμεν ¹ patched. ¹ -μενοι, ¹ -εῖται,	ὀφέ-μενοι	ἴωμεν c. παλιν. -νοι.
C νῦν ¹ -τιν ¹ φαμεν ¹ αὐτοῦ	ἔστι φαμέν.	νῦν ¹ ἑτέρα : ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ ἐστίν. φαμέν
ἀν-μεν ¹ ἀρα ὁ of ἄ darker. ¹ -νει ¹	ἐτάν ¹ ἀρα	-μεν ¹ ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι -νει.
ἦ ὁ of ἄ darker. ¹ -αν, τούτῳ, ¹ εἶναι : ἦ	ἐτάν	τούτῳ c. ὁ ἂν ¹ -ναι :
-ἀν ¹ τι. πῶς twice. ¹ -ναι φαμέν αὐτὸ. ἐτάν	—	οὔν ¹ τι. πῶς οὐκ ¹ αὐτὸ πῶς
-ναι ¹ ἦ ὁ of ἄ dark. ¹ -μενον, ¹ νει, ἦ	—	-ναι ¹ ἀπλῶς, -νει ¹
-τιν ¹ οὐδὲπῇ ὁ of ἄ dark. ¹ -σίας, ¹ ὄν :	οὐδέπῃ ¹ ὄν : 'on *	ἔστιν. ¹ ὄν :
ἀρα δύναίτο ¹ ὄν.	—	ἀρα εἶναι ¹ ὄν ¹ -σίας -χεῖ :
D -σθαι, ¹ -σθαι, ¹ ἦ ἦ ὁ of last ἄ dark.	ἦ ἦ τὸ	ἦ.
-νειν, ¹ -σίαν : ¹ ῥ, [, differs.	—	-νειν ¹
-στιν ¹ οὔτ ¹ ἀναλαμβάνοι, ¹ αὐτό ; last	οὐτ ¹ ἀναλαμβάνοι οὐτ ¹ ἀ-	-τιν. οὔτ ¹ ἂν λαμ- οὔτε
ἔστιν, ¹ τέον. ¹ τέον ¹	-δαμῇ ἄ dark ¹ ἐκτέον ¹ changed	ἀρα c. ἐπειδὴ ¹ ἔστιν. ¹ τέον. ¹ τέον ¹
—	[to ¹	—
ἐν ¹ -νεται ¹	—	ἐν ¹ -ται ¹
E οὐδαμῇ two dots very fine.	οὐδάρ ¹ ἀλ-	ἀρ ¹ -ται ¹
-κη, μὴ δὲ	—	—
-σομεν,	εσάναι ¹ ὄν ¹ [τίνι ¹ αἰεῖ	-μεν.
τινι ¹ αἰεῖ εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ :	εστὼς changed from -τὸς ¹	-τὸς, ¹ αὐτῷ c. ¹ αἰεῖ εἶναι : c. ¹ αὐτῷ c.
αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν, μὴ τέποτε εσάναι. ¹ -μεν ¹	αὐτὸ μὴ ¹ μητί ¹ εστά ¹ -γωμεν ¹	ὄν. ¹ πότε -ναι.
μὴν. ¹ ἔστι ¹	οὐδέποτε ¹ τί	ἔστι ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων ¹ c. ἡδη ¹ τοῖτο

X.

TUBA

-θος·

-κρότης· ἔστιν· γε

-ότης· αὐτὸ· ἄλλα [dark· τῷ εἰ αὐτῷ οὐ no ; slight stain.

δαὶ τὰλλα· αἰ darker on α, ὁ of τῷ τῷ· ἔσθ'·

ἴμοια· -μοια· ταῦτα.

οὐ γάρ· τί δαί· το all after δ on α·

[·νου· το· νφ· τί· τοῦτο·

-του· -λου· -λφ· ποτέ· -τα· ἢ τοῦτο· ἢ last, 'patched.

[νῦν· -μη·

-ξα· -σις· -μα· το Scratch oblique

ly down from r. to l. on ἄλλο.

μη δν· ὄν· πῶς· οὐκοῦν

δῆ· γε· -μεν· τὰλλα· τί ὁ of dark.

μήν· ποῦ

ἄλλά ἔστιν.

-γος· ἦ ὁ of dark· τῷ ἄλλο,

-ρον· που φαμέν, ἕτερον

το· δῆ· εἶναι. [εἴη· ἐνδς· -σται·

ἔστι· ἄλλα second λ blotted,

ἄλλα ὄντος· ἔστιν.

-ται, εἰ μὴδ· ἄρα,

-λων· ἄλλα ἔστιν· γὰρ· ἐνδς·

-στος· -κεν· -τῶν· -θει, κύντῳ

τίς· -νεται,

-λά·

-μέγεθες· dark.

-κων· τὰλ· ὁ of dark· ἄλλά ἔστιν·

-μυδῶν· dark, ε subs. added later.

νος· ὦν δὲ οὐ· -ται· δὲ, δόξειεν.

-ριττὰ ὄντα· -ται·

οὐ γάρ· " and next', with some οὐ γάρ οὖν· καὶ μὴν

letters, retouched· γεφαμέν δόξειεν

-ναι·

ἴσος· -λοῖς·

εἶναι·

-μενος.

οὖν,

ἔχων· αὐτὸν· -χῆν.

-ρας· ἀ· εἰ λά·

-νοία· ὄν· ἀ· εἰ

χῆ· -ευτῆν· -ευτῆ

-τερα τὰ τοῦ μέσου σμικρότερα, διὰ το

δὴ οἶμαι· -νον· ἀνάγκη· πᾶντο ὄν,

κ

αὐτῷ οὐ no ; slight stain.

τῷ τῷ· ἔσθ'·

ταῦτα

οὐ γάρ· τί δὲ· τί gap.

τοῦτο· ἢ last, 'patched.

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t.

-τος· δῆλ·

οὐ γάρ· -της τε τε clear.

-της· τὰλλα· αὐτῷ· c.

δὲ· αὐτῷ· c· -τῷ c.

-μοια οὔτε ταῦτα· ἔστιν

-τῷ c· τί δὲ· -νου· -νφ· τί· -το·

-του· -λου· -λφ· -τὲ· -τα· -νῦν· -μη· B

-ξα· ξ over a smaller ζ· -σις· ἢ λόγ·

[-μα· τῶν c. ὄντων c.

ἔσται· ὄν· πῶς· οὐκοῦν

-μεν· -τι· τὰ ἄλλα χρῆ

μέν· μὴ δὲ

ἔστιν c. οὐκάν· τῶν c.

-γος· -λα· -τιν· -τῷ c. [-ρου.

-ρον· ἔγωγε· δέγε ποῦ· φαμέν· c· c

ἄλλο δῆ· ἄρα c· ἄλλα εἶναι c.

ἔστιν· -ται· εἴη.

ἄλλα· -λων ἄρα c. ἔστιν.

-ται· ἢ· -τα.

-λων c· ἔστι c· οἰκάν· εἴη· -νός·

-τος ὡς οἰκεν· -τῶν c· ἔστι c· -θει·

δοκοῦν c. εἶναι c· τίς· -ται. [κάν D

-τος· -λά·

-θες· αὐτοῦ· -τατα· c.

-κων c· -λων c· τὰ ἄλλα· ἐν·

οὐκοῦν· -ται [ἔστι(ν) c.

-νος· οὐ· ἔσται· οὕτω· καὶ αὐτῶν c. κ

-λῶν c· -τῶν· c· -τια [δόξει·

δὲ· τὰ· -τα· -ται

οὐ· μὴν· γε φαμέν δόξειεν αὐτοῖς

(πο ἐν) εἶναι· c· -τὸν c. τῶν c.

-λῶν c· -των·

-κροῖς· εἶναι· c.

-νος.

-ξεῖεν· δ'· ἄν· οὐκοῦν c.

αὐτὸν.

ὅτι c. αἰεὶ τῶν c. ὅτ' ἄντις λά·

-νοίε· τῶν c. ὄν· -χῆς· ἄλλη αἰεὶ B

-χῆ· τὴν c. τελευτῆν· -τῆ· τῷ c. μέσφ.

-τερα τοῦ μέσου· -τερα δὲ c.

-τῶν c· -σθαι.

δὲ οἶμαι· ὄν,

-νοίε· ἐνδς· αἰεὶ λαμβάνοιτο ἄν·

164

p. 37.

165

p. 38.

ὁρῶντι·³ -βλὺ. ἔν· φαίνε- = ἐμφ-?
 C σθαι· ἀνάγκη·¹ δὲ¹ ὀξύνονται.
 -ναι,
 ἔχοντα·¹ τᾶλ·¹ dark.
 -λα δὲ φαί·¹ ἔστιν,¹ ἐνός;¹ οὖν.
 ἀνόμοια,¹ -μένα·
 μέν·¹ -μενα, ταυτὸν ε curs. , fine.
 D γε,¹ ἕτερα·
 -σματι.
 —
 -σθαι, a fine . in marg.
 ἑαυτῶν
 -σεις,¹ ἐστῶτας πάντη·
 -νους·¹ -μένους·¹ -τερα
 E τα,¹ ἡμῖν,¹ -λά ἔστιν;
 ἀπαξ,¹ -χὴν.
 μῆ¹ darker¹ ἔστιν τᾶλ·¹ ἐνός,
 τᾶλ·¹ dark.
 γε¹ οὖσιν· ἐν εἴῃ¹ ἐν·¹ μῆδέν
 ἔστιν ἐν· ἀπαντα·¹ -ἀν
 -λοις·¹ -λά·¹ οὐτ' ἐν¹ τᾶλλα : ου
 166 ἐν,¹ τᾶλλα darker.
 των,¹ οὐδέ τι
 τῷ,¹ ἔστι
 —
 ἔστιν·¹ -σμα·
 οὐ γὰρ¹ ἀρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν·
 B εἶναι·¹ ἐνός.
 μὴ ἔστιν. τᾶλλα οὐτέ ἔστιν.
 ἐν,¹ ὁμοια·
 γε. οὐδέτερα·¹ -μενα·
 -ρίς·¹ -λα·¹ -μεν· [·?] ἄλλα,¹ ἔστιν·
 αὐτὰ τούτων, οὐτετί ἔστιν , had been
 C -μεν· ε curs.¹ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἔστιν.
 -ποιμεν;¹ τοῦ, τότε·¹ ὅτι [καὶ c.
 εἴτε ἔστιν,¹ ἔστιν·¹ τᾶλλα,¹ αὐτὰ,
 —
 -ληλα,¹ ἔστίτε¹ ἔστιν·
 -τατα last a curs.

TUB.
 οὖν :¹ ἐμφαι·
 -σθαι : ἀνάγκη :¹ ὀξύνονται
 —
 τᾶλ·
 μη ἔστιν a faint ' on η ?¹ οὖν
 —
 -θόντι δεγ¹ ad.?
 φαντάσματι· some marks
 above 1st a· αὐτοῖς - al-
 tered and doubtful.
 αὐτοῖς τὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀ-
 νάγκη φαί·¹ οὖν
 ἄπτο· had been '
 ἔστωτ had been '
 μῆδέν·
 some stains on 188 scraped,
 — [but text clear.
 μῆ ἔστι τᾶλ·
 οὐκοῦν¹ τᾶλλα :
 —
 οὐδ' ἄν 2nd ' ad.?
 οὐτ' ἔστι τᾶλλα :
 τᾶλλα
 οὐδέν¹ οὐδέ τι
 οὐδέ γὰρ
 —
 οὐ γὰρ οὖν : ἐν ἀρα¹ ἔστι
 πολλά : 1st
 ἔστι τᾶλλα·¹ ἔστιν·
 -δῶρα
 οὐδέτερα·
 ὅσα
 ἀλλὰ¹ μὴ ἔστι :
 μὴ ἔστιν
 —
 ἔοικεν¹ εἴτε ἔστιν·¹ μὴ ἔστιν·
 αὐτὸν τὲ τᾶλλα ' faint¹ αὐτὰ
 · ad.
 ἔστιν τὲ¹ ἔστι·
 ἀληθέστατα :—No title.

t.
 οὖν : c. οὐκοῦν c.¹ -ρωθεν ὁρῶντι καὶ
 [ἀμβλὺ ἐμφαίνε- (next line).
 -σθαι : ἀνάγκη :¹ ὀξὺ νοοῦντι.
 —
 -ναι,¹ ἐν [ἀπειρά is loosely written ὀ
 -τα·¹ -λά· ἕκαστα : c. τὰ ἄλ· first a of
 —
 δεῖ -θαι·¹ ἔστιν·¹ ἐν·¹ οὐκοῦν
 ἀνόμοια·¹ εἶναι :
 μέν·¹ -μενα,
 δέγε·¹ -ρα·
 -ματι·¹ ἑαυτοῖς :
 —
 ὁμοίους c.¹ -κους·¹ ἑαυτοῖς
 οὐκοῦν c.
 -λων· c.¹ -νους·¹ -τῶν· c.
 -σεις·¹ -τας πανταχῇ·
 -νους·¹ -μένους· c.¹ μῆδ' ἕτερα.
 -τα·¹ -θεῖν, εὐπετέες ἡμῖν ἤδη·¹ -λά
 -θόντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν. [ἐστι(ν) : c.
 -τιν. ἄλλα¹ ἐν·¹ εἶναι : c.
 οὐκοῦν¹ ἔσται c. τᾶλλα :
 οὐσι· εἴῃ¹ ἐν·
 ἔστιν ἐν·¹ οὐδ' ἄν
 -λοις·¹ τᾶλλα :
 -λά·¹ τᾶλλα
 -των c. οὐδέν¹ -μῶς. οὐδέμειαν¹ ἔχει·
 τῶν c.¹ ὄντων c.¹ τῶν c.¹ -τῷ· -τιν
 —
 -τίν· -μα·
 ὄν·¹ τῶν c. -λων : c.¹ -τιν
 -ναι·¹ ἐνός.
 -τιν. τᾶλ· οὐτέ ἔστιν
 οὐτε πολλά·¹ οὐδὲ¹ ὁμοια
 γε. οὐδέτερα. οὐδὲ -μενα.
 χωρὶς·¹ -μεν.
 αὐτὰ -των· c. οὐτετί ἔστιν¹ τᾶλλα
 οὐκοῦν¹ -μεν·¹ ἔστιν. οὐδέν ἔστιν.
 τε·¹ ὅτι
 -κεν ἐν εἴτ' ἔστιν¹ ἔστιν·¹ τᾶλ·¹ αὐτὰ
 —
 ἔστιν τε¹ -τιν.
 —ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ. Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ
 Slight flourish.

II. EXPLANATORY.

BESIDES the various medieval or modern commentaries and translations available for the elucidation of the Parmenides, the writings of succeeding Greek thinkers, more particularly Aristotle, furnish many apt notes and illustrations. But there are likewise works of a very early date devoted specially to the explanation of the dialogue. Of these two have been cited in this edition. One is the commentary by Proclus, which is printed, somewhat inaccurately, along with Stallbaum's text, and is here referred to according to the paging of Cousin. The other, entitled *Δαμασκίου διαδόχου ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην*, has been more recently edited, with the greatest care, by C. E. Ruelle (Paris, 1889). This latter is less a commentary than a discursive consideration of speculative questions more or less connected with Plato's work, which it has not been possible for us to study with sufficient thoroughness. It is a strange compound of physics, metaphysics, and mythological theosophy; extremely subtle and provokingly confused. The nature of the ἀπορίαι will be gathered from the following examples:—What is an ἀρχή, and what is its relation to that of which it is ἀρχή? Is it knowable; is it one; is it αὐτάρκης? Is it ἀρχή κινήσεως, and how are we to advance downwards from it to concrete things? What constitutes existence; has it phases; and are these represented by ὑπαρξίς, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή? Do we ever really attain to the ἀπόρητος ἀρχή and ἀπλῶς ἔν, or do we stop short at a lower, more concrete, phase of each? How know τὸ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ? At what point in development does νοῦς, and with it γνώσις, appear—ὄν, ζώή, νοῦς?—or is γνώσις even further removed from the πρώτη ἀρχή? Does knowledge not involve division, as opposed to simple oneness? What is μέθεξις, and what is comprehended in τὸ μικτόν? How things go in triads—εἶναι, ζῆν, γινώσκειν—μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή—ἀκίνητον, αὐτοκίνητον, ἑτεροκίνητον—στοιχεῖα, μέρη, εἶδη? How the last triad stand related? What is the relation of ὅλον—μέρη, ἔν—πολλά, πολλά—στοιχεῖα and the like? How the order of development is ἑνός, οὐσία, ζώή, νοῦς, ψυχή, σωματοειδές ἅπαν, to which series, excluding the first, correspond τὸ ἀδιάκριτον, διακρινόμενον, διακεκριμένον, αὐτοκίνητον? Whether ψυχή is one, or as numerous as bodies? How ἔν produces not ἔν but πολλά; and how there are both ἀμέθεκτοι ἐνάδες, and ἐνάδες which are μετεχόμεναι by all the grades of existence just specified? How (apparently) a process ideal moves *pari passu* with a process phenomenal? How νοῦ ἰδιον ἢ ἐπιστροφή? Whether the ἀρχή must not be in fact complex if it causes the complex? What is the character of χρόνος and αἰών (discrete *v.* continuous?), of τὸ νῦν and τὸ αἰεί, and how ὁ χρόνος μερίζει τὴν γένεσιν? And so on. Through all which runs on the one hand a disjointed reference to special passages of the dialogue, and on the other a strange artless appeal to mythology and the old poet-seers—would like to combine faith and reason.

The Title has been already discussed. The spelling *παρμενιδης* is used throughout the dialogue except in one case (131 B) where the *ι* is on a scratch. Cp. 127 C, *κεραμεικῷ* where the *ε* is patched, apparently by the first hand: also 137 B,

πραγματιώδη for the usual *-τειώδη*: and e.g. *δέη* St. 126: p. 1. side by side with *πινθάνει* on this page. Cp. Plato himself, *Crat.* 418 B. The forms *ε* *ι* trace their origin to different sources in different words, and may have been differently treated by later writers

in consequence. But there is no doubt that these and other vowel sounds showed a strong tendency to approximate under certain circumstances, as time went on; and Blass (*Aussprache des Griechischen*, 1888), p. 58, says: Diese Schreiber des 2 Jahrhunderts [B.C.] wussten durchaus nicht mehr, wo sie *ι* und wo sie *ε* setzen sollten, sondern schrieben, *Εἰς, τειμάς* [for *Ἰρις, τιμὰς*], und wiederum *παραμινάτω* und *ιερῖς*, etc. Again, Meisterhans (*Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*, 1888), p. 30, says: Dieses *ε* nimmt dann in der römischen Zeit, wie verschiedene Versehen in der Orthographie zeigen (*Αἰγίς, Ἐρεχθίς, Οἰνίς, χολλίδης, λειτουργία*), die Aussprache *ι* an. Gleichwohl ist die gewöhnliche Schreibweise, wenigstens bei den Eigennamen auch in der Kaiserzeit, die mit *ε* (*χολλεΐδης*). That the quantity need not trouble us is clear from Meisterhans, 54: Dass in der Kaiserzeit die Quantität der vokale sich mehr und mehr vermischt, geht hervor aus Messungen wie, *Κῶς μὲν μοι πατρίς ἐστίν, ἐγὼ δ' ὄνομα Νεικομήδης*. For us the point of interest is—does this spelling indicate that at any stage of its transmission our Platonic text had been written to dictation?

ἐκ κλαζομένων. κλαζόμεναί. πόλις Ἰωνίας says a Schol., *ι*, and Rhunken's collec. Anaxagoras was born here. Stallbaum says fuerunt igitur haud dubie Anaxagorei, and seems to find in that a point specially appropriate. Possibly. Yet perhaps the town is mentioned merely to give an air of reality to the work. Cp. *Ion* 530 A, Τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν. πόθεν τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἐπιδεδήμηκας; ἢ οἴκοθεν ἐξ Ἐφέσου;

ἀδειμάντη etc. The question of the identity of the interlocutors cannot be clearly determined. Plato's brothers and the Cephalus of the Republic naturally suggest themselves; and perhaps we may claim it so far as an evidence of the authenticity of the work, that the difficulties connected with such an identification must have been present to a forger's mind and yet cause no concern. To go no further—the Cephalus of the Republic is described by Socrates as resident in Piraeus, as an intimate acquaintance of his, and as considerably his senior; while our Cephalus is now on his second visit (τὸ πρότερον) from Clazomenae, and his own language would convey the idea that

he is younger than Socrates. It is objected, too, by Stallbaum, Hermann, and others that Antipho, Plato's youngest brother, could hardly be old enough to have learned the conversation from Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno; and Hermann assumes a set of three brothers of Plato's mother, called by these names, as the true interlocutors both here and in the Republic. Antipho, the brother of Plato, could hardly have been born much before 420 B.C., neither could he have learnt this dialogue much sooner than 404 B.C.: so that Pythodorus must have been an old man when the two met. On the other hand we cannot well place the arrival of Cephalus in Athens earlier than 399 B.C., since, had Socrates been alive, the inquiries might have been addressed to him, in which view an older Antipho seems to be rendered unlikely. See Zeller's *Plato*, and his references: also Stallbaum's *Parmenides*. For Pythodorus, Proclus iv. 13, refers to Alcib. i. 119 A, εἰπὲ ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ [Σωκρ.] ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν διὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάρχου, ὧν ἕκαστος Ζήνωνι ἑκατὸν μῶας τελέσας σοφός τε καὶ ἑλλόγιμος γέγονεν.

μου λαβόμενος τ. χ. Does *μου* depend upon the participle 'taking me by the hand,' or the noun 'taking my hand'? For the former we have *Laws* i. 637 C, ταχὺ γὰρ σου λάβοιτ' ἂν τις τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμυνόμενος, although the sense of the verb is different. Parallel passages are *Charm.* 153 B, Χαιρεφῶν δέ, ... ἔθει πρὸς με, καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ δ' ὅς; *Rep.* i. 327 B, καὶ μου ὅπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, where ὅπισθεν seems to be the adverb, as ἀνωθεν in v. 449 B, λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου ἀνωθεν αὐτοῦ, although here the pronoun depends upon the noun. But *Cratyl.* 429 E, gives οἶον εἴ τις ἀπαντήσας σοι ἐπὶ ξενίας λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἴποι, which makes for the view that *λαβ. τῆς χειρὸς* is a phrase. We have no means of translating neatly the force of the aorist in these cases; 'after taking' 'having taken' are too formal. We do not usually associate this form of greeting with Greek life; ἀσπάζεσθαι, as in 127 A, is more common and more suggestive of southern feeling.

αἱ του ... δυνατοί. It seems to be accepted that *του* and *ὦν* are neuter. Yet *τι τῶν τῶνδε* is a peculiar

expression, which Ast, Müller, and the Engelmann and Didot translators all give loosely, avoiding the plural in spite of τῶν and ὧν, while it appears that Ficinus gave no equivalent for τῶν τῇδε. At are clear and united as regards the text—though Π suggests πον—so that any change would be very rash. It may be just possible that τῶν τῇδε means ‘belonging to those here.’ But is there any objection to our taking τον as masculine, and translating ‘if you are seeking for any one of those belonging to this place with whom we have any interest’? It will be observed that δεησόμενος ὑμῶν follows.

φράζε. The use of the present imperative as contrasted with the aorist is said to suggest ‘the notion of permanence, as in general precepts, advice, rules, etc.’ (Jelf), but it can hardly do so here. If we are to see any special purpose we must suppose that the explanation by Cephalus will be an act occupying some time: cp. Theaet. 143 C, Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβέ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε, where λέγε may be taken as present; Phaed. 61 B, Ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κ., Εὐνὴν φράζε. But Polit., 263 C, gives φράσον δὴ μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, where time enters more clearly than here.

ἀλλὰ ... ὑμῶν: We may render thus ‘Why in point of fact I am *here* (γε) for this very purpose.’ Τοῦτο may be used here, rather than τόδε, as referring backwards to τον δέη etc. no less than forwards to δεησόμενος; cp. ἄρα τοῦτο, 127 E. Stallb. cites Euthyd. 274 A, Ἐπ’ αὐτό γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐπιδείξοντε ..., and cp. Gorg. 447 B, Ἐπ’ αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν. εἶπον ἐγὼ is inserted parenthetically as compared with καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον below, which forms an integral part of the narrative. This parenthetic use occurs again in B and C and in the form ὅπερ γ’ εἶπον, 128 E. Arthur Frederking (Jahrbücher für Philologie—Fleckeisen, cxv., 1882, p. 534 sqq.) treats of this use, whether in the mid. or at the end of a sent., as an evidence of date. While not over confident he urges that this usage is unknown in Protag., Charm., Phaedo, and occurs only once each in Lysis and Euthydemus, while greater liberty is taken in other works such as Sympos. and Repub. In the Phaedo, he points out, the case is striking, as it is a narrative at second hand. Here are the statistics for

the Parmenides as far as 137 C, where the construction stops:

εἶπον mid. 4 end 0

εἶπεν „ 2 „ 1

εἰπεῖν „ 8 „ 4 ὅπερ γ’ εἶπον is in-

cluded; ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν not. The number is considerable: yet we must weigh the exigencies of the narrative at fourth hand. Plato also requires in the same space a liberal parenthetic use of ἔφη and φάναι. ἔφη mid. 16 end 1

φάναι „ 29 „ 12 All five words occur non-parenthetically likewise. Sometimes εἰπεῖν comes between two cases of φάναι (130 B, 131 C). Little can be inferred except that Plato’s ear required variety; and possibly a later work might have fewer instances simply because no need arose for the usage. For δεησόμενος ὑμῶν cp. 136 D, αὐτοῦ δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου. We may complete the construction by τι with or without an infin., unless Plato intends to suggest δέξιν, which is not essential where it stands. Cp. for somewhat analogous passages, Hipp. Min. 373 A and Crat. 391 C.

λέγοις ἄν. Both Heindorf and Stallb. cite instances of this polite imperative. Thus λέγοις ἄν alone occur Phaedr. 227 C, Polit. 267 D, 268 E, 291 B. λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὡς οὐ πολλά ἀλλ’ ἡδίων ἀκούοντι, Rep. x. 614 A. So ἀκούοις ἄν, Rep. x. 608 D, Polit. 269 C. Also λέγοις ἄν τὴν διαίρεσιν ὅπη, Polit. 283 D. They seem unfinished conditional sentences.

καὶ ἐγὼ ... διακοῦσαι: Construc. easy and conversational: παῖς δέ που... αὐτῷ δέ γε; being a parenthesis needed only from a picturesque point of view. The speaker, seeking to strengthen his claim to attention, lets the sentence get so broken up that the important ἀκηκόασι becomes formally a mere adjunct. Strictly we should have καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, οἶδε ἀκηκόασιν ὅτι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν Ἀντιφῶν τοὺς λόγους, οὓς ... διελέχθησαν, ἀπομνημόνευει τούτων δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι. Cp. Apol. 21 A, where the parts bracketed, although conversationally very natural, really confuse the construction, Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἵστε που[. οἶδος ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πληθύνει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ ξινέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ’ ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ] οἶος ἦν [Χαιρεφῶν,] ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ’ ὅτι ὀρμήσειε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεῖσθαι· [καί,

ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὧ ἄνδρες ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ,] εἰ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος.

B τί ἦν ὄνομα; It would seem that ὄνομα is used predicatively here, 'what was name to your brother, what had he as name?' Cp. Crat., opening Κρατύλος φησὶν ὅδε ... οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἂν τινες ξυνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι ... ἐρωτῶ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ, αὐτῷ πρότερον Κρατύλος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἢ οὐ. Unless we are to take it as = τί ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν; Had Plato said τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ὑμῶν τί ἦν τοῦνομα; the sense would have been much the same, but τοῦνομα the subject.

παῖς δέ που ἦν Is ἦν 1st or 3rd person? Probably, though not certainly, the latter: ἦ being the more likely form in Plato for the 1st. Cp. Prot. 310 E, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός εἰμι, ἄμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἐώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἐτι γὰρ παῖς ἦ, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. The constant use of που with no reference to place bears some analogy to that of 'there': 'A time there was, ere England's griefs began,' etc. We might trace the original sense perhaps by saying 'he was somewhere in his boyhood.'

τὸ πρότερον Cp. ἐξ ἐκείνου and 127 A, τῆς προτέρως ἐπιδημίας. C. had been only once at Athens, years ago. Stallb. raises the question whether τὸ πρῶτον may not be the reading. Apart from the fact that it appears only in ΞΣ, Mss. of no authority, this reading would injure the sense; for what matters the length of time since the first visit, if C. had had later opportunities?

ἐπιδήμ. could stand alone; the add. of δεῦρο may be compared with τῶν τῇδε above for insistence on the place; while ἐκ κλ. may just possibly be an early gloss upon the other two words.

πολὺς ... ἐκείνου Here, as with ὄνομα, the article is omitted, the sense being πολὺς δὲ ἤδη χρόνος παρελήλυθε. Are we to understand τοῦ χρόνου after ἐκείνου; or to assume a neuter construction, either absolute 'from then,' or having reference to τὸ πρ. ἐπεδ. as a sort of neuter equivalent for τῆς προτέρως ἐπιδημίας?

δοκῶ, used thus parenthetically is rare, the phrase being usually ὡς (ἐμοὶ) δοκῶ (or δοκεῖ); Ast gives a case from Laws III. 687 E, τότε, δοκεῖς, παῖς πατρὶ συνεύχεται. This is no evidence that the Parm. is late; Stallb. cites a like use in Theages 121 D,

δοκῶ γὰρ μοι, τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τινὲς ... διαταράττονσιν αὐτόν.

πάνυ γε: αὐτῷ δέ γε; ἀντιφῶν· ἀλλὰ So Ἄ: giving πάνυ γε: to Adimantus; αὐτῷ δέ γε, which we make interrogative, to Ceph.; and the rest to Adim. This gives excellent sense; but t disagrees, inserting (as the printed texts do) ἔφη after πάνυ γε, and giving the whole to Adim. It may be said that the upper point of the second: in Ἄ is weaker than the lower. γε ... γε = 'quite so,' 'And his?'

Οὕτω. The ο placed in the margin indicates a new paragr., as δ below marks one at τοῦτων.

πολιταὶ μοι ... ἀκηκόασί τε. So Ἄ reads: t gives πολιταὶ τέ μοι, and this or τε μοι, γ' ἐμοὶ (= mei) τι μοί (strangely) appears in most texts. It may be right, yet the τε may have crept in to balance the following one. If the text is as here given the latter τε is an illustration—the only other in Parm. occurring 131 A—of a use which Frederking (as p. 77) cites as a mark of lateness. He counts 200 cases of it in Timaeus—e.g. at the opening, ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν σὺν τῶνδ' ἐργον etc.—and argues, but with hesitation, that its rarity in Parm. suggests an early date for the work. Cp. on 127 A.

πολλὰ ἐντετεύχηκε 'has had many a meeting.' Ast c cites Phaedo 61 C, πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετεύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί: and Crat. 396 D, ἔωθεν γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆν καὶ παρείχον τὰ ὅσα. Naturally we find also πολλὰκις, e.g. Sophist. 251 C, and Menex. 249 D.

διελέχθησαν. The tenses of this verb used by Plato in this sense seem to be διαλέγομαι, διαλέξομαι, διελεγόμην, διελέχθην, διελεγμαι: the form διελεξάμην never occurs. In Alcib. I. 129 C we have the definition τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταῦτ' οὗ καλεῖς: but this is modified in Gorg. 448 D-E, and again Rep. v. 454 A, from which we see that it is not rhetoric, nor yet wrangling. Later we find, 135 C, τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν, and in Theaet. 161 E, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. In short, it is methodical conversational argument on philosophic questions. For the language here compare Theaet. 142 C, δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι (ὁ Σωκρ.) ... συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνν' ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι 'Αθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγους, οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ, διηγῆσθαι.

πολλάκις ... ἀπομνη. Comp. the course taken by Euclides in reconstructing the discussion between Socr. and Theaet., Theaet. 143 A. He took notes of what Socrates told him, expanded these carefully from memory, consulted Socrates whenever he had an opportunity and corrected his narrative. ἀπομνη. = 'has them by heart' 'is able to repeat'—Euclides was not able διηγῆσασθαι οὕτω γὰρ ἀπὸ στόματος—as Critias says, Tim. 26 B, ὡς δὴ τοι, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὰ παίδων μαθήματα θαυμάστων ἔχει τι μνημεῖον ... καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτου προθύμως με διδάσκοντος, ἅτ' ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἐπανερωτῶντος, ὥστε οἷον ἐγκαύματα ἀνεκπλύτου γραφῆς ἐμμονά μοι γέγονε. Cp. Phaedr. 228 B, D. The word also means 'to repeat from memory' as Critias had already said (id. 20 C), ὡς ἀπεμνημόνευεν αὐτὸς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ γέρον· cp. Phaedr. 227 E, οἷε με ἂν Λυσίας ... συνέθηκε ... ταῦτα ἰδιώτην ὄντα ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἀξίως ἐκείνου;

τούτων ... διακ. τούτων must mean τῶν λόγων: the accusative would have been equally natural, as in Tim. 26 B and Rep. I. 336 B, βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον. Perhaps the construction is varied designedly, ἀκούσας being so far associated with the accus. so recently. τοίνυν, as in Gorg. 454 B, ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω = 'well' 'well then': it refers back to λέγοις ἄν, this forms τὴν δέξιν. t reads ἀκοῦσαι, but Proclus διακοῦσαι.

μαράκι ... διατρ. μαιρ. etc. explains οὐ χαλεπὸν: and ἐπεὶ etc. explains μαιρ. διμελέτησεν seems to occur only in Critias and Laws, which may perhaps speak for a late date. πρὸς ἱππικῇ—Proclus iv. p. 13. 'Ἀθηναῖος δὲ οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν, τῶν ἐπ' εὐγενείᾳ φρονούντων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἱππικὴν σπουδάζων, ὡς τοῖς γενναίοις ἦν Ἀθηναίων πάτριον. To explain the absence of τῇ Stallb. says 'non opus articulo ante artium nomina, ubi significatur quempiam eas attingere tantum, non omnem earum vim et ambitum complecti.' Is this likely? Like other such adjectives ἱππικῇ would require the article so long as τέχνη, παιδιὰ, or some such word was supposed to follow, but when used as a naturalized noun it might take it or want it like other nouns; μουσικῇ, γυμναστικῇ, ἱατρικῇ are frequently so used, and Plutarch, Mus. c. 2, speaks of ἀνδρας μουσικῆς ἐπιστήμονας, which does not mean attingere tantum. For the language here cp. Lach. 180 D, ἅτε κατ' οἰκίαν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβοντες ὑπὸ τῆς

ἡλικίας. Rep. vii. 540 B, τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας.

αὶ δὲ, Stallb. seems quite right in rejecting Heind.'s proposal to read εἰ δοκεῖ, both because this has no authority, and because δὲ is read by Procl. iv. 73 and 78, and finally because δὲ lenem quandam habet recusationis significationem, quandoquidem Adim. ad eum, qui omne tempus equitandi studio transigat, non statim vult una cum hospitibus accedere.

ἐπὶνδε ... μελίτη. Surely Plato's ear must have been at fault in the collocation of the first four words. Μελίτη δῆμος Κεκροπίδος says Schol. t given by Rhunken. Suidas s.v. quotes Harpocr. δῆμός ἐστι τῆς Κεκροπίδος, ὀνομασθεὶς ἀπὸ Μελίτης τῆς κατὰ μὲν Ἡσίοδον θυγατρὸς Μύρμηκος, κατὰ δὲ Μουσαίου Δίου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος. It seems to have lain to the N. of the Areopagus, and to the E. of Ceramicus. From the Agora they would walk north, E. of Areopagus, W. of the Propylaea.

ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἔβ. Proclus in his overstrained manner says, iv. 78, τὸ σύντομον τοῦ λόγου καὶ σαφὲς καὶ καθαρὸν ἔξεστι καὶ διὰ τούτων ὁρᾶν οὐ γὰρ ἐκαλλώπισε τὸν λόγον εἰπὼν, 'ταῦτα εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες,' ὡς εἴωθεν, ἡδύνων τὴν συγγραφὴν, ἢ τι ἄλλο προσθείς, ἀλλ' ἀμέσως 'ταῦτα εἰπόντες'. αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ τε εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες. 'Having said this we began walking'; unless (spite of aor.) it means 'we were walking as we said these words.'

χαλινὸν τινα ἐκ. 'some bit or other,' 'a bit or some such matter.' Ceph. is not a horsey man. ἐκδιδ. is tech., as Heind. and Ast note, 'locare faciendum,' the correl. being, though not in Plato, ἐκλαβεῖν.

ἐκείνου might refer either to the χαλκεὺς, or to the important χαλινός, or in a general way to 'that weighty matter.'

τε. A case of τε used as introductory with no καὶ (Introd. xxi.) which Frederking has overlooked.

παρεῖμεν. So Ὑ: t gives παρείημεν, which seems to mean that παρείημεν was first written, then η was dotted for ejection, and the circumflex put as for εἶμεν: optative in either case. The apodosis begins at ἀνεγνώρ.

δοσμ. ... διηγ. The full constr. would be δεομένων αὐτοῦ ἡμῶν διελθεῖν αὐτὸν τοὺς λόγους. ὤκνει = 'began to make excuse,' 'showed a disposition to decline.' With πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι we must

supply τὸ διελθεῖν as subject. Stallb. notes the tenses from ἔβαδ. to διηγ. The impfs. are descriptive, and suggest continuance, as of acts going on under the eye: the aorists merely record necessary facts without dwelling upon them as filling time: ἐκδίδ. = 'in the act of ...': ἀπηλλάγη for plupf.: we also say 'was done' as well as 'had done.' The language of this introduction may be compared with that of Protag. 310 E, 311 A, some of which has been already quoted. We may add ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν ... ἀλλ' ἔωμεν... καταληψόμεθα αὐτὸν... ἔνδον. Cp. also Rep. I. 328 B, ἦμεν οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Λυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐ... εὐθὺς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἡσπάζετο τε.

ἦν δὲ etc. From here to the beginning of Part II. 137 C, the construc. is involved, and not always consistent; the reason being, as Proclus says, IV. 13, that ἔστιν αὕτη δηλαδὴ τρίτης τῆς συνοουσίας ἐκθεσις ταύτη τοίνυν παρὼν τις Κέφαλος ... ἀφηγηματικῶς καὶ οὐδὲ πρὸς ὠρισμένα πρόσωπα λοιπὸν τοὺς λόγους διατιθείς, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐκθεσιν παραδίδωσι τὴν συνοουσίαν.... (1) Πρώτῃ τοίνυν ἔστιν συνοουσία ἢ αὐτὰ περιέχοντα τὰ κύρια πρόσωπα καὶ τὴν πρώτην σκηνὴν τῶν λόγων· (2) δευτέρα δὲ ἢ παρὰ Πυθοδώρου διαμνημονεύοντος τῆς πρώτης συνοουσίας καὶ οἶον ἱστοροῦντος τὰ κατ' ἐκείνην πάντα· (3) τρίτῃ δὲ ἢ παρὰ Ἀντιφῶντος, οὗς ὁ Πυθόδωρος διηγῆσατο λόγους ἀπαγγέλλοντος τῷ τε Κεφάλῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, φιλοσόφοις· (4) τετάρτῃ δὲ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ Κεφάλου τῶν ὑπ' Ἀντιφῶντος αὐτῷ λόγων παραδεδομένων ἀφήγησις, εἰς ἀόριστον τελευτήσασα θέατρον. We have a change from ὅτι ἀφίκοντο τοὺς μὲν οὖν ... εἶναι instead of καὶ ὅτι ... εἶναι. Plato gives us dialogues at first hand, such as Crito, Cratylus, Philebus, Phaedrus; at second, as Phaedo, Theaetetus, Republic; at third, as Symposium; and here at fourth hand. The reason seems rather literary than philosophical. Here the repeated transmissions suggest that remoteness which Plato desires to set up for the original conversation. The Theaet., 143 C, alludes to the difficulty of sustaining a second-hand narrative—copied by Cicero—which seems to imply that Plato had already tried that method, although it may be simply another literary artifice to secure variety. Some light would be thrown on the matter, no

doubt, if we possessed any of the dialogues composed by Plato's contemporaries.

παναθήναια. Ἡ τῶν Παναθηναίων ἑορτὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν ἐτίθη μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ Ἐριχθονίου τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τῆς Ἀθήνης, ὕστερον δὲ ὑπὸ Θησέως συναγαγόντος τοὺς δῆμους εἰς αὐτοῦ. ἀγεται δὲ ὁ ἀγὼν διὰ πέντε ἑτῶν· καὶ ἀγωνίζεται παῖς Ἰσθμία οὐ πρεσβύτερος, καὶ ἀγένειος [καὶ] ἀνὴρ· τῷ δὲ νικῶντι διδόσασιν ἔλαιον ἐν' ἀμφορεῦσιν, καὶ στεφανοῦσιν αὐτὸν ἐλαίᾳ πλεκτῇ. Schol. t, with contracts., top, 79 a 2, and Rhunk. What connection has the last sentence? διττὰ παν. ἦγγο Ἀθήνησι, τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν, τὰ δὲ διὰ πενταετηρίδος, ἃ καὶ μεγάλα ἐκάλουν. ἦγαγε δὲ τὴν ἑορτὴν πρῶτος Ἐριχθόνιος ὁ Ἡφαίστου. τὰ δὲ παναθ. πρότερον Ἀθήναια ἐκαλοῦντο (Harp.) Suid. s.v.

ζήνων τε ... γεγον. See the histories of philos. etc. We may quote Diog. Laert. IX., Parm. 21-23, Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης διήκουσε Ξενοφάνους.... Εἰς τοῦτον καὶ Πλάτων τὸν διάλογον γέγραφε, Παρμενίδην ἐπιγράψας ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν. ἤκμαζε δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ ἐξηκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα (B.C. 504-1). 25-29, Ζήνων Ἐλεάτης. τοῦτον Ἀπολλόδορός φησιν εἶναι ἐν Χρονικοῖς φύσει μὲν Τελευταγόρου, θέσει δὲ Παρμενίδου· περὶ τοῦτον καὶ Μελίσσου Τίμων φησὶ ταῦτα· Ἀμφοτερογλώσσου τε μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδὸν Ζήνωνος πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος ἢ δὲ Μελίσσου....

Ὁ δὲ Ζήνων διακήκοε Παρμενίδου καὶ γέγονεν αὐτοῦ παιδικά. καὶ εὐμήκης ἦν, καθά φησι Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Παρμενίδῃ, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ καὶ Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην αὐτὸν καλεῖ. (261 D.) φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ εὐρετὴν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι διαλεκτικῆς, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλέα ρητορικῆς (seems a lost dial. cp. D. L. VIII. 57 under Empedocles, and Bekk. Arist. v. 1484). γέγονε δὲ ἀνὴρ γενναϊότατος καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ ἐν πολιτείᾳ... οὗτος τὴν πρότερον μὲν Ὑέλην, ὕστερον δὲ Ἐλέαν... πόλιν εὐτελεῖ καὶ μόνον ἀνδρὺς ἀγαθοὺς τρέφειν ἐπισταμένην ἡγάπησε μᾶλλον τῆς Ἀθηναίων μεγαλαυχίας, οὐκ ἐπιδημήσας τὸ παρῖπαν (which need not be taken too literally) πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀλλ' αὐτόθι καταβιούς... ἤκμαζε δ' οὗτος κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ ἐβδομηκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα (B.C. 464-1).

οὐ μάλα δὲ is not a usual combination. We find οὐ μάλα frequently, both in regard to age (Euthyphro 4 A, with πρεσβύτης: Tim. 22 B, with παλαιόν) and otherwise. Again, Sophist. 217 C, we have μάλα δὲ used of Parmenides—ἐκείνον μάλα δὲ τότε ὄντος

πρεσβύτου. In Charm. 154 B Socr. says νῦν δ' οἶμαί που εὖ μάλα ἂν ἤδη μειράκιον εἴη: and Ast in his Lex. and text reads εὖ μάλα ἤδη here with *t*, which may be correct. But δὴ need not go too closely with εὖ μάλα, it may = 'you are to observe.'

περὶ ἑτη The only analogy which Ast quotes is Rep. x. 602 C, Πρὸς Διός, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτον μὲν τί ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; Stallb. renders 'circiter (περὶ) quinque et sexaginta annos et quod excurrit (μάλιστα) natus' citing authorities. But L. and S. quote Thucyd. i. 118, ταῦτα δὲ ... ἐγένετο ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα, μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου, where the time is 480-431 B.C. or 49 years at most. So vii. 68, the constitution of the 400 at Athens is said to have occurred ἔτει ἑκατοστῇ μάλιστα ἐπειδὴ οἱ τύραννοι κατελύθησαν, that is 510-411 B.C., or 99 years. Although (Introd. xxxv.) the text here is certain, one cannot but think that there is something wrong. εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι σφόδρα πολίον, together with the phrases from Sophist. above and Theaet. 183 E, πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη, suggest an age decidedly beyond sixty-five. ἐξήκοντα may be a very early corruption of ἐνενήκοντα. Or may it have crept in from some early reference to the ἐνάτην καὶ ἐξηκοστήν 'Ολυμπιάδα of Diog. Laert.?

αὐτὸν ... γεγονέναι is subject to λέγεσθαι. καὶ ἐπὶ θηλειῶν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀρρένων ἐρωμένων ἡ λέξις εὐρηται, κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν σπουδαζομένων πάνυ ἢ καὶ ἐν Φαίδρῳ λέγεται. ἰσπούδακας, ὁ Φαῖδρε, ὅτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμεν, ἐρεσχηλῶν σε. ἡ δὲ λέξις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσελγῶς ἐρωμένων. Sch. *t*, with contrs. foot of 79 a, Rh. It is clear that Diog. Laert. took the statement literally. So does Athenaeus, Deipn. xi. 505 end, τὸ δὲ πάντων σχετικώτερον, καὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν, οὐδεμιᾶς κατεπειγούσης χρείας, ὅτι παιδικὰ γεγόνει τοῦ Παρμενίδου Ζήνων ὁ πολίτης αὐτοῦ.

καταλείπειν ... νέον. ἔφη breaks the constr. Its next use in D, ἔφη ὁ πυθόδωρος is still more irregular, following λέγειν τὸν π. above. Note the absence of the article with the nouns τεῖχους and κεραμεικῷ contrasted with the use of it with the names of the various persons. ἐν κεραμεικῷ corresponds with ἐν μελίτῃ above, and ἐκτὸς τεῖχους may be compared with our 'out of town,' 'out of doors.' We have

τόπος ἀθήνησιν ἔνθα καὶ οἱ πόρνοι προεστῆκεσαν. εἰσὶ δὲ δύο κεραμικοὶ· ὁ μὲν ἔξω τεῖχους, ὁ δὲ ἐντός: Sch. *t*, foot of 79 a, Rh. The use of *of* with infin., like that of ἡνίκα below, is not unusual in orat. obl., cp. 130 A, and Timae. 21 E, οἱ δὲ Σόλων ἔφη πορευθεῖς σφόδρα τε γενέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐντιμος, καὶ ..., and has parallels even in Latin. Thus Tac. Ann. vi. 2 has the relative 'sed quos omitti posse, quos deligi? ... quam deinde speciem fore?'

ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς, Here τινὰς must be taken closely with ἄλλους, much like χαλινόν τινα, otherwise it seems to clash with πολλούς: we may render 'a number of less important persons.' Still the phrase is odd, and inconsist. with 136 D-137 A which closes with ἐπειδὴ ... αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν. One could fancy the text standing ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ and some early reader writing in the marg. οὐ πολλούς with a ref. to the above passage, then οὐ πολλούς getting incorporated, and finally losing the οὐ after αὐτοῦ. Socrates says, 129 D, that they were seven.

τότε γὰρ Here we have the first introduction of διαλεκτικὴ into Athens, about 450 B.C. according to Plato. For Socrates' age, see Introd. xxxiv.

ἀναγν. ... τοῦ ζήν. τὸ τοῦ ζήνωνος ἃ ἐπιχ. εἰ πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, τὰ αὐτὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιον· οὐκ ἄρα πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα. Sch. *t*, with contractions, top, 79 a 2. αὐτὸν, 'himself.' Is τῶν λόγων practically the same as τῶν γραμμάτων before and after it? The point would be clearer if the altern. reading in A -κόμενον (agreeing with βραχὺ) were adopted (Stallb. translates 'sermonum, vel potius disputationum quum recitarentur,' which itself is ambig.); but τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι in D seems to decide for the identity. Verti potest 'litterae,' says Ast, 'very little was still left of the arguments as they were being read.'

ἡνίκα ... ἔφη The constr. becomes irreg. again, shaking off the gov. of λέγειν, 127 A. It should have been ἡνίκα αὐτόν τε ἐπεισελεθεῖν τὸν πυθόδωρον ... οὐ μὴν αὐτόν γε. As it stands it gives a good illustr. of the nom. before the infin., when the subject of the principal verb is referred to, in contrast with the accus. (τὸν παρμενίδην) of any other person. μετ' αὐτοῦ throws Pythod. once more into the background; the ἔφη ὁ π. almost, as Heind. says, demands μεθ' αὐτοῦ. τὸν γενόμεν. seems to be used as

a hist. ref. to something in the past, but has little weight in fixing the date, since (Intro. xx.) the dial. must be supposed to be written after the death of Soc. If special force lies in the prefix of *ἐπακούσαι* it may be contrasted with *διακούσαι*, 126 C. οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε (sc. οὕτως τὸ πρῶτον ἐπακούσαι). The constr. of the thing heard with *ἀκούειν* varies throughout between acc. and gen.

ἢ τὸν οὖν σκε. ... ὁ βούλ. It does not appear that any fragments of Zeno's writings are left. We know them only by reference and description, ancient historians and commentators giving in many cases descriptive summaries which may or may not include the actual expressions of their author. According to Grote (Plato, Parm.) Zeno is here confuting the assumption that 'the self-existent and absolute *ens* is plural.' This seems a rather unfortunate account of the matter. Opponents of Parmenides did not, as a rule, set up a 'self-existent and absolute' plurality, but rather that every-day plurality of sense which his absolute unity of being was vainly put forward to account for: 129 A, καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν. In dealing with the question Zeno composed several *λόγοι*, and each of these, it would seem, had more than one *ὑπόθεσις*. This may perhaps refer to such an argument as that in which he shows that the many must be both (1) infinitely small, and (2) infinitely great; where 'the first hypothesis' would be the working out of No. 1. According to this view each *λόγος* would be likely to have two *ὑποθέσεις*, each setting out one side of the contradiction. But in the case before us, *ὁμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια*, not *ὁμοια εἶναι* alone, seems to be the *πρώτη ὑπόθεσις*. This would necessitate a different view of *λόγος*, according to which the *πρῶτος λόγος* would be perhaps the whole argument against multiplicity, of which the contention from likeness and unlikeness would form the first *ὑπόθεσις*; while the next *λόγος* might be the whole argument against motion, of which the 'Achilles' would rank as one *ὑπόθεσις*. ἀναγνωσθείσης sc. αὐτῆς. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; must be read along with οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; οὕτω: below. It seems compounded from πῶς λέγεις;—ἢ τοῦτο; and πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;—ἢ οὕτως; or = ὡς τί διανοούμενος τοῦτο λέγεις;

ἃ πολλά ἐστὶ τὰ ὁ. Zeno assumes this as the popular view (τὰ λεγόμενα, ε below) in opposition to the view of Parmenides (Intro. xxxvii.). Immediately below the constr. is οὐτε γὰρ οἰόντε (ἐστὶ) τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια ... εἶναι.

οὐκοῦν is usually two words in X and most codices vetustissimi. With our punctuation the word may be made to explain its origin εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον ... οὐκ ἀδύνατον δὴ ...; But we might also take οὐκοῦν as the beginning of an inference resumed at ἄρα, the words εἰ ἀδύνατον ... τὰ ἀδύνατα coming in as what is inferred, οὐκ οὖν—εἰ ἀδύνατον ... πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα—ἄρα τοῦτο ... λόγοι; the purport of this inferential query being yet further explained by οὐκ ἄλλο ... ἐστὶ; In the sentence εἰ γὰρ ... εἴη πάσχοι ἂν, the condition is as clearly held to be denied as if the form had been εἰ γὰρ ... ἦν ἐπασχεν ἂν.

παρὰ ... λεγόμεν. Heind. treats this on the analogy of παρ' ἐλπίδα, παρὰ δόξαν, παρὰ φύσιν, 'beyond, contrary to, in opposition to, all received views'; but it seems better to say with Stallb. 'to fight the matter out along the whole line of popular opinions,' or 'from front to rear of their array' as in 144 E, where of οὖν and ἐν it is said ἐξωοῖσθον δύο ὄντε αἰεὶ παρὰ πάντα: so too Rep. vii. 514 A, ἐν καταγείφ οἰκῆσαι ... τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούση μακρὰν παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον. A pron. is omitted in ἡγεῖ τσαῦτα [σε] τεκμ. παρέχ.

ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ πολλά; It may be doubted whether this means ὡς 'πολλά' οὐκ ἐστὶ, or whether the sense intended is, as above, ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστὶ [τὰ ὄντα]. For the κ of οὐκ see Intro. cxi.

καταμανθ. may be compared with κατελάβομεν, 127 A, and καταβαίνεται, 132 D; where, if the prep. has a definite purpose, it seems to recall our 'come down upon,' 'drop upon,' whether what is so 'dropped upon' be a person or the sense of a statement.

οὐκ—negatur τὸ 'οὐκ ὁρθῶς καταμανθάνειν' says Heind., and compares Gorg. 453 D, πότερον ὁ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὐ; Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σ., ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει. Stallb. adds other cases. We may simplify the sense to ourselves by putting κακῶς or εἰηθῶς for οὐκ ὁρθῶς.

ὅλον τὸ γράμμα. Partly under each verb: the phrase is not simply συνήκας ὁ βούλεται ὅλον τὸ γράμμα, but includes συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα—ὁ βούλεται. We have the former constr. alone in

Crat. 414 D, *συνεῖναι δ' τί ποτε βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα*, where note the modified relative. *γράμμα* is questionable in the singular for a writing. We have first *τῶν τοῦ Ζ. γραμμάτων*, the plural being used so in e.g. Xen. Memor. iv. 2: to it corresponds *τῶν λόγων*, where the arguments are regarded without reference to their written form. Then comes *τοῦ πρώτου λόγου, ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων*—to which corresponds *τὸ γράμμα*. Finally *ὅσους περ λόγους γέγραφας*, when viewed as a whole, are called up by *τῷ συγγράμματι* with which we are familiar in Thucyd. G. Kaibel (Hermes xxv. 103, 1890) holds that Zeno introduces the word as a local idiom, which Socrates quietly corrects once by *τῷ συγγράμματι*. But it is not Zeno who first uses the word (127 c), so that, if the argument is to hold, we must assume that *γράμμα* was the accepted title of Zeno's work, and used as such. Kaibel adds that a mutilated gloss. of Phrynicius gives ... *καὶ* (leg. αἰ) *ἐπιστολαὶ δὲ γράμματα καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα, ὡς Δημοσθένης*.

τῇ ἄλλῃ φ. The whole might be arranged thus *οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ φιλίᾳ σου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι βούλεται ψικεῖσθαι [σοι]*. Heind. would read *σοι for σου*: Stallb. rightly objects: 'non modo in universum amicitia erga te cupit se insinuare (better insinuassee, gratum tibi fecisse)' is Ast's rendering: 'desires to have secured to him a place in your affection, not merely by his general friendship towards you.' In both *Ἀ* and *t* the first syllable of *ψικ.* seems to have been originally *οἰκ.*

ταῦτόν ... σέ, τρόπον τινὰ is of course parenthetic. *Ἀ* reads *ὃν περ*, and in *t* there is a scratch between *ο* and *π* in *ὅπερ*: no doubt an early scribe was led astray by *τρόπον τινά*. For the expression cp. Theaet. 152 A, *λόγον οὐ φαῦλον ... ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἶρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα*.

μεταβάλλον 'Twisting it about under our very eyes' so to speak: but *t* has *μεταβαλὼν*. We have a different constr. of this word, Phaedr. 241 A, *μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἀρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ ... νοῦν ... ἀντ' ἔρωτος*: cp. *mutare sententiam* with *mutat quadrata rotundis*.

ἐν φῆς *ἔφης* Procl. and *Ἀ*; was he or his orig. thinking of the poems as already finished, without noticing *παρέχει*? *t* has *ἐν φῆς*. Ast prints *ἐν φῆς*.

τούτων Germans translate 'dafür': strictly it should be *τούτου*, 'of this assertion.'

ἔτι ... ἔτι δὲ without *μέν* is common enough; but *double δὲ* is unusual. *οὐ π. φ. εἶναι*, it would seem that the *οὐ* is to be tacked to *πολλὰ* like the *μή* which follows.

τεκμ. *ἔτι αὐτὸς* *t* reads *δὲ καί*, the *καί* being a contrac. whose form (Intro. cxi.)—if we suppose the archetype of *Ἀ* written in minuscule—would help to explain how *Ἀ* may have omitted *καί*, i.e., by mistaking it for a superfluous *δ'* = *τεκμήρια δὲ δ' αὐτός*. The whole would be simplified could we read *τεκμήρια καὶ αὐτὸς ... παρεχόμενος*.

παμμεγέθη—this form occurs once oftener, according to Ast, than the form *παμμέγας*, two of the three cases being in this dialogue (164 D). We also find *παμπληθὴς* though much more rarely than *πάμπολος*; and *παμμήκης* without any *πάμμακρος*. The following sentence is loosely constructed. It is not absolutely certain whether *μή* is to go with *πολλὰ* or with *φάναι* understood, nor whether *ἐκότερον* is masc. and subject, or neut. and object to *λέγειν*. Again, while *σχεδὸν τι* may in a vague way qualify *λέγοντας ταῦτα* it would be better if written *λέγοντας σχεδὸν τι ταῦτά*. And while the whole down to *ταῦτά* is begun as subject to *φαίνεται* with perhaps an *εἶναι* added, he suddenly introduces a sort of résumé of the subject in the words *ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα* (= *τὰ ὑμῖν εἰρημένα*), which again prompts him to replace *εἶναι* by *εἰρήσθαι*. Stallb. compares Rep. i. 331 B and Theaet. 144 A, the latter being very good, *τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθὲ ὄντα, ὡς ἄλλῃ χαλεπὸν, πρῶτον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρείον παρ' ὄντιν οὖν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν φόβον γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνομένους*. For the language cp. Crat. 429 D, *Κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἡλικίαν, ὧ ἑταῖρε*; and Arist. Met. II. 4, 1000 a, 15, *Καίτοι περὶ ... τούτων ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἰρήκασιν*.

ναί, φάναι ... ἔπ. What is it that *ναί* confirms? Stallb. says 'recte quidem nos fere idem dicere arbitraris etc.' and refers to E. But the *σὺ δ' οἶ* would be clearer if we take *ναί* as affirming *ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς* (nous autres) etc., 'Quite true: our position does seem to transcend the comprehension of you outsiders. You at least, for one, have not in all points perceived the true purport of the writing.' As to the dogs Suidas quotes Soph. (Aj. 8), *κενὸς ε*

Λακαίνης ὡς τις εὐρινος βάσις. Aristotle says Περὶ τὰ Ζῷα, p. 607 a 3, καὶ ἐξ ἀλώπεκος καὶ κυνὸς οἱ Λακωνικοί. I. 608 a 27, καὶ αἱ Λάκαιναι κύνες αἱ θήλειαι εὐφύστεραι τῶν ἀρρένων εἰσίν. Περὶ Ζῴων γενέσεως, E 781 b 9, διὸ ὄσων οἱ μυκτῆρες μακροί, οἷον τῶν Λακωνικῶν κυνιδίων, ὁσφραντικά. The σκύλαξ suits the age of Socrates. So Rep. II. 375 A, οἷε οὖν τι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς; where see the comp. in detail: and VII. 539 B, οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γέυνονται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ... χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἔλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον αἰεῖ. For the action of the dogs, cp. Politic. 263 A, ταῦτα δὲ εἰσαῦθις κατὰ σχολὴν καθάπερ ἰχνεύοντες μέτιμεν. The actual words occur Xen. Cyneg. IV. 9, ἀγειν δὲ ἄμεινον τὰς κύνας εἰς τὰ ὄρη πολλάκις ... τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄρη οἷόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἰχνεύειν καὶ μεταθεῖν καθαρῶς. In these the order of the two verbs is better than in Parmen. Stallb. quotes several examples in Plato of καίτοι followed by ἄλλά: Symp. 177 E, Euthyphro 3 C, Phaed. 68 E, 69 A. Here, however, the καίτοι rather answers σύ δ' οὖν etc., or comes in as a parenthesis, ἄλλά referring back independently.

πρῶτον μὲν has no second objection answering to it, and E seems to admit that it is the only one; but so one begins a defence. τοῦτο, used like τόδε, of what follows.

ὅτι ... διαπραττ. may be freely rendered 'that the writing takes no airs whatever to itself as though it were written with the aims which you mention in its head, while at the same time (ἐπι-) keeping people in the dark, as if that were some great achievement.' The context (A-B, ταῦτόν γὰρ ... εἰρήσθαι) suggests that ὡς τι μέγα δ. mean chiefly, if not entirely, the success of the concealment; and these words can hardly be the object of ἐπικρυπ., the thing which is to be concealed, though some translators seem so to take them. Cp. Gorg. 511 C-D, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν ... αὕτη ... οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη. Here the γράμμα and the art of seamanship are personified, as below λόγος.

τῶν συμβεβ. τι is one of the accidental circumstances attaching to it, opposed to τό γε ἀληθές, the true aim: we come very close here to the technical Aristotelian sense of τὸ συμβεβ.

αὐτὸν is τὸν λόγον not τὸν Παρμενίδην. Cp.

Symp. 193 B, καὶ μή μοι ὑπολάβῃ Ἐριζίμαχος κωμῳδῶν τὸν λόγον, ὡς Πausanias καὶ Ἀγάθωνας λέγω, and D, μὴ κωμῳδήσῃς αὐτόν: Theaet. 164 C-E, περιγεγόμενοι τοῦ λόγου—καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἄμα ... εἶπερ γε ὁ πατήρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη ... νῦν δὲ ὄρφανόν αὐτόν ... προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ ἐπίτροποι ... βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν ... ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἔνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν; also Phaed. 88 E, and for personification of ὁ λόγος, id., 87 A and 89.

κωμῳδεῖν. In Symp. 193 B the constr. is much as in here, where ὡς means 'to the effect that.' Ast would seem to supply λέγοντες ὡς; but it is simplest to suppose οὕτω κωμῳδεῖν ὡς, as below τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν ὡς.

πολλά καὶ γ. Heind. says, 'i.e., πολλὰ γελοῖα, ut semper fere Graeci dicunt πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, π. καὶ πονηρὰ, π. καὶ χαλεπὰ, π. καὶ ὀλβια.' Are π. καὶ γ. nom. to συμβαίνειν as a personal verb, or acc.; and, if the latter, how are they related to πάσχειν? συμβ. seems to be so far imperson., and the constr. συμβαίνειν τῷ λόγῳ πάσχειν πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ, the arrangement being a Platonic hyperbaton.

αὐτῷ. So Ἄ and τ: neither it nor αὐτῷ seems satisfactory. We must read τῷ ἐνὶ into τῷ λόγῳ, and render ἐναντία αὐτῷ = ἐναντία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει, antagonistic, as πολλὰ, to its inherent nature.

τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα seems to be accepted as one phrase; yet τὸ γρ. might stand alone, and τοῦτο might be object of ἀντιλέγει, 'retorts this difficulty.' It would, however, strengthen the case of those critics who wish to read ταῦτά, immediately following, against the Mss.

τοῖς τὰ πολλὰ λέγ. 'the asserters of The Many.' Above, ἐν and πολλὰ are predicates of τὸ πᾶν; here the πολλὰ are used in substantive independence; and perhaps the last εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ with the following εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶν, ἢ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι are to be regarded in the same light, τὸ πᾶν having dropped away. For the language, cp. Arist. Met. I. 3. 984 b 1, τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ... τοῖς δὲ δὴ πλείω ποιοῦσι.

ἐπὶθεῖς. An anchor to the agitated thinker, according to Phaedo 101 D, σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκιάν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο

ἀν. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἑφῆς ἂν: and if asked for a reason ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις. One expects an obj. to ἐπεξίῳι, as Rep. iv. 437 A, πᾶσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐπεξιόντες. So one expects βουλευσασθαι (μοι) ἐξεγένετο below, as Euthyd. 275 E, ὥστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαι μοι ἐξεγένετο εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ.

ταύτη Stallb. and Ast render hactenus, but we get hactenus in κατὰ τοσοῦτον, 129 A, which differs from ταύτη. Is not ὁδῷ rather in Plato's mind with λανθάνει? Stallb. and others supply τὸ πρᾶγμα as nom. to λανθάνει, and σε τοῦτο λανθάνει ὅτι—above accords; yet Heind. better suggests τὸ γράμμα.

πρῶτον. Relative to νέον: Zeno wrote 'from an eagerness for controversy pardonable in a youth, not from a desire for notoriety undignified in a mature man.' ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, probably 'as I said above'—128 A, καλῶς ... ὃ βούλεται: yet it might be 'the actual purport of my argument' as opposed to its motive. Can Plato be writing historically when he puts this apology into Zeno's mouth? He certainly conveys that Zeno's contribution to philosophy has been overrated.

ἡγοῦμαι ... ἔχειν. Is the construction ἡγοῦμαι (τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχειν) ὡς λέγεις (αὐτὸ) ἔχειν: or ἡγοῦμαι 'I adjust my belief,' ὡς λέγεις (τὸ πρᾶγμα) ἔχειν 'in accordance with your account of the matter'? The question οὐ νομίζεις, etc. is not answered by Zeno, and Plato can hardly be serious in ascribing such doctrines to him. If we are to hold that Parmenides, and even Socrates as a lad, had got so far in speculation, what is left as Plato's own contribution to the subject? Cp. Introd. xxx-xxxi., xxxiv., and ff. The full sense of εἶδος must grow upon us; but its strongest feature is that it is τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ or, 130 B, χωρίς. Death is described in similar language, Phaedo 64 C, ἀρα μὴ ... εἶναι τοῦτο τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι;

ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμ. Stallb. 'H.e. ὃ ὄντως ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον, unde retracto accentu ἔστιν scripsimus.' in which editors follow him. We have ὃ ἔστιν ἐν below B, and the classical passage is Phaedo 75 D, περὶ πάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο ὃ ἔστι καὶ ἐν ταῖς

ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι—where he shows his whimsical insistence on the importance of question and answer. And throughout Socrates' speech, cp. Diog. Laert. Plato III. (9)-(13): also Phaedo 78 D, 92 D.

πολλὰ The world of sense with its multiplicity.

ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ τ. 'In the way and to the degree in which.'

ἐναντίων Note the change from δυοῖν. δυοῖν brings out the idea that there are two opposites to partake of; now his mind dwells on them as opposites and more than one. Immediately ἀμφοῖν recalls the dual idea, which is again merged in the plural.

αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. He does not, probably, mean that any single object is like and unlike itself—though that might be taken as a sort of transcendental completion of the case—because the sharing in 'likeness' makes it like another thing which also shares likeness; and if that thing agrees with it further in sharing 'unlikeness,' the two will be at once like and unlike. If αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς is to be pressed, then it would seem to mean 'among themselves as a world of sensible objects' as against αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια, etc. which follow.

τί θαυμάστον; Thus far he readily accepts a world of sense so sharing in εἶδη. In αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια he is speaking of εἶδη; does he assume numerous εἶδη of ὁμοιότης? Probably not. But μετάληψις among the εἶδη, which he would like to see thought out, must lead to complications. There will be as many ὅμοια among the εἶδη as there are derived ὅμοια with us. And due to the same cause?

εἰ ... ἀποφαίνομεν ... τέρας ἂν ᾗν rejects the supposition as hopeless; εἰ ἀποφαίνει ... οὐδὲν ... ἀτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι, speaks as of a thing actually going on; εἰ ἀποδείξει ... θαυμάσομαι takes a hopeful view; εἰ ἀποφαίνοι ... ἄξιον [ἂν εἴη] θαυμάζειν is quite impartial; εἰ ἀποδείξει ... τί θαυμάστον; is back in the region of fact, cp. εἴπερ καὶ νῦν πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν, 155 D.

μετέχοντα In treating of participation he uses two verbs μεταλαμβάνειν and μετέχειν, each of which gives a noun μετάληψις, μέθεξις. No theory on the kind of relationship is implied in either word; at present he does not seem to think any necessary. Phaedo, 100 C-E, directly states that any theory is renounced and gives παρουσία, κοινωνία as alterna-

tives. ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁψοῦν ἄλλω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά' ... καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα. In other respects the views of Socrates on μέγεθς seem much clearer in the Phaedo. Here he draws no distinctions as to compatible and incompatible combinations, but speaks of μέγεθς as though anything might share in anything; in Phaedo 102 D ff. he shows not only that there are (104 B) ἐναντία which are ἀλλήλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει αἰεὶ τὰναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὕση ἐναντία ᾗ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἥτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήγομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πείσασθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; So too 103 A and Sophist. 253 B-254.

δ ἴστιν ἐν Note the emphasis in this and in τὰ πολλὰ δῆ. These latter are of course quite other in sense from α δῆ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν above, which mean 'the many of sense,' whose real existence Zeno rejects. Socrates assumes that these draw with them as real counterpart an abstract ideal many which he here calls τὰ πολλὰ δῆ and πλῆθος.
c ἥδη θαυμάσ. 'When you are as far as this, I shall be at the wondering point,' 'by this time I shall have begun to wonder.' Of the future of θαυμάζω Ast cites no other case in Plato but Euthyphro 15 B, θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων.

γένη τε καὶ εἶδη In the fully elaborated Aristotelian terminology these differ as the more general and the more specific, as genera and species. Even A., however, does not always adhere to this use, nor does Plato speak in such a sense here. The two words are merely a comprehensive phrase for the world of ideas. If there be a distinction, perhaps γένη brings out the generality of the ideas, and εἶδη their outward aspect so to speak.

πάθη πάσχοντα, Cp. Apol. 22 C, τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιεῖται πεπονθότες: and for Socrates' language about his own plurality, Phaedo 102 B; also Soph. 251 A, Λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δῆ που πόλλ' ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τὰ τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς ... καὶ τὰλλα δῆ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἐν ἑκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν, and Phileb. 14 C, ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον εἶνα γεγονότα φύσει,

πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὴν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

ἔφα is in X wrongly ἐρῇ. The form may have arisen partly from a mistake in dictation, and partly from an association with ὅτ' ἂν. It enters as a conversational relief, but breaks the construction. The passage should grammatically run εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ... πολλὰ —λέγων, ὅταν μὲν ... ὡς ... ὡσαύτως, ὅταν δὲ ἐν, ὡς ... ἄνθρωπος—τί θαυμαστόν; καὶ γὰρ πλήθους οἶμαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς μετέχω, ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφοτέρω.

ἑπτὰ We can name only five—Parmenides, Zeno, Pythodorus, Socrates, Aristoteles.

ἐὰν οὖν ... ἀποφαί. = ἐὰν οὖν τις ἐπιχειρῇ ἀποφαίνειν ταῦτ' ὄντα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ καὶ τοιοῦτον ἐν, 'that many and one of this type, in this sense of the terms, are the same.' We have here another series of conditional sentences whose shades of thought the reader can work out. Of the form ἐὰν ... ἀποφαίνειν ἀγαίμην ἂν Jelf (854, 2b) gives a case, Phaedo 93 B, ἂν (ἐὰν) μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, ... μᾶλλον τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων· εἰ δ' ἥττον τε καὶ ἐπ' ἑλάττω, ἥττον τε καὶ ἐλάττων; where note also the change to εἰ.

λίθους καὶ Cp. Phaedo 74 A-B, φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πάντα ἕτερόν τι αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. The verb ἀποδεικνύμαι means 'gives us examples of'; in the next clause it is understood in the sense of 'prove that the one is many,' etc.

ὦν νῦν δῆ So X and t—δ rc. II.—Stallb. says Vett. editt. ὦν νῦν δῆ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον quod Heindorfius interpretans per τὰ εἶδη τούτων α νῦν δῆ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, i.e. τοῦ ὁμοίου, τοῦ ἀνομοίου, κ.τ.λ., duriores amplexus est explicandi rationem quam quae cuiquam placere possit. Recte aliquot codices δ, quod etiam Bekkerus restituit. Heind. adds—Ita recte habet hoc ὦν, quod jam nolim mutari in ὡς, quum manifesto opponatur praeced. λίθους καὶ ξύλους καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, and he refers to 130 C-D, where εἶδη for θρίζ etc., are rejected. The reading δ may be suitable, but we have shown that 'rc. II.' is no authority; it is likely a conj. of a reader of II. H. seems right in saying that ὦν does not refer to λίθους, etc., and the tense of ἔλεγον confirms him, 'which I was speaking about just now,' i.e. before I referred to stones and wood. Cp. Gorg. 485 D,

ὁ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κἀν πᾶν εὐφυὲς ᾗ, which refers to 484 C-D, εἰν γὰρ καὶ πᾶν εὐφυὲς ᾗ, etc., and 135 A, where ὁ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν refers to 133 B below.

διαιρῆται. Ἄ has διαιρείται, which cannot go with εἶν. Was this a dictation error—see on 126 A? It seems not to have been detected till the writer came to ἀποφαίνει, the *η* of which is inclosed in three dots. He would see that -*η* disagreed with -εἶται, then seeing that -εἶται was wrong he corrected it -ῆται. In διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη we have the most characteristic step in Plato's theory. What the unphilosophic mind daily has to do with is the πολλὰ of sense. Philosophic thought may be said to have begun for Plato with the general definitions which Socrates extracted from these πολλά. What Arist. says on this point has been seen (Introd. xxix.; cp. xxxii., xliii., 1.); Xen. (Mem. iv. 6, 13) says something similar, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπάνηγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον. The special Platonic contribution was the χωρισμός.

ε ἀγαίμην Why the speedy change to ἀγασθείην? ταῦτα δὲ sc. ᾧ συ λέγεις ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι.

πεπραγμ. The perf. inf. of this verb is again used Apol. 22 B, ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα ᾧ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς—both are passive, although the verb is what would be called in Lat. a trans. deponent: cp. 130 E.

φδε Such is the spelling of Ἄ (not so in t), and if the word be formed from ὄδε on the analogy of τῇδε, ταύτῃ, οἷ, ᾗ, it seems reasonable. Stallb. punctuates so as to make ὡς λέγω parenthetic, 'as I say.' But it might equally be ὄδε ὡς λέγω = 'in the way I mention.' The expression is careless for πολὺ μὲντ' ἂν τόδε μᾶλλον ὡς (or ὁ) λέγω ἀγασθείην, cp. 135 D. Perhaps he would have preferred τοῦτο μᾶλλον and felt that he had used ταῦτα already.

ε **τις ἔχει** τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν t inserts ταύτην, and so most editors. **πλεκομένην** would suggest that the εἶδη are in space, but cp. νοητὸς τόπος, Rep. vi. 508 C, vii. 517 B, and λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις below.

οὕτως καὶ ... λαμβ. break the constr., but add a further detail to our knowledge of the ideas. For the language cp. Rep. vi. 496 D, ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβὼν ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων, also Phaedo 79 A, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχόντων οὐκ

ἔστιν οὕτω ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰεὶ δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; This λογισμὸς (which—see Ast—is constantly coupled with ἀριθμός, γεωμετρία, ἀστρονομία; and with νοῦς, νόησις) is as it were the mental telescope by means of which διαιρούμεθα χωρὶς each successive εἶδος in the νοητὸς τόπος or intellectual firmament.

ἐπιδείξαι. From B to E we had two words used to signify 'prove, show, demonstrate'—ἀποφαίνειν (he begins with the middle) 8 times, and ἀποδεικνύναι 3 times. Here the prefix is changed, as though Socr. were now looking at the proof for the ideal world as something added on—as an œuvre de surcroît for his special satisfaction—to the proof for the physical world. Note that while Zeno advances his proofs in regard to the latter as a reductio ad absurdum, Socrates takes them up seriously and wants similar entanglements carried into the sphere in which the one of Parmenides is supposed to be supreme (Introd. xl.). For it seems clear that he does desire it; the θαυμαστόν, θαυμάζειν, τέρας change to ἀγαίμην θαυμαστώς, and merely indicate his consciousness that the topic involves great difficulties. One cannot help contrasting this whole passage with Phaedo 102-4, Sophist. 248-52, Phileb. 14-16. In the two latter dialogues the service to philosophy here spoken of in such terms as ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πᾶν ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῖσθαι, is ridiculed as an occupation for children—Soph. 251 B, ὄθεν γε, οἶμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ που χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐώντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον, etc.; Phileb. 14 D, εἰρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμάσιων περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ, ... παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥάδια καὶ σφύδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια, etc. (Introd. lx.). And in all three the carrying of the matter into the world of ideas is treated very differently (Introd. xxxi., and on 129 B above). Thus Socrates old repudiates Socrates young. In Sophist. he makes distinctions, 251 D, 252-53 A—finding that to deny all forms of mingling, and to affirm all, lead equally to absurdities, and that the true course is to admit certain combinations and to reject others.

ἐφ' ἑκάστου Cp. 160 c and Theaet. 204 c, οὐκ οὖν ἐφ' ἑκάστης λέξεως τὰ πάντα ἔξ' εἰρήκαμεν; But these are not quite parallel, and our phrase refers to a cause, while there is a feeling of locality in them. The dat. is more general, as Rep. v. 457 B, ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυναικὶς γυναιξί ... οὐδὲν οἶδεν ... ἐφ' ᾧ γελᾷ οὐδ' ὁ τι πράττει. ἄχθεσθαι, at the invasion of the sphere of the one by a crowd of εἶδη. Stallb. and Heind. would prefer the future, 'on the brink of being annoyed'; but is that better?

τοῦτο δὲ = αὐτοῖς δέ, a known usage: here αὐτὸς precedes and αὐτῷ follows. How steadily Plato uses the article with the proper names.

μαδιᾶν etc. Cp. Phaedo 62 E, ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σ. ἡσθῆναι τε μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, αἰεὶ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κ. λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ. 86 D, διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σ., ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας. Ὁ ἀγαμέμνων cp. Phaed. 88 E, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πρότερον μᾶλλον ἡγάσθη ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος ... ὡς ἡδέως ... τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο.

ἔπερ οὖν sc. αὐτοῖς ἀγασθαι τὸν Σ. as Heind. points out, 'which in point of fact (οὖν) Parm. declared they did.' Here again we have relat. with inf., 127 c.

p. 5. εἰπεῖν φάναι This Frederking regards as the normal usage of these verbs in such cases; εἰπεῖν part of the narrative, φάναι parenthetical.

B ἀξίως ἀγασθαι θαυμάζεσθαι c., Schol. t outer marg. 79 b 1, and Rh. Yet the verb seems active 'worthy to wonder at'; cp. Lys. 207 A, οὐ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἀξίως ἀκούσας, etc. Donaldson in a like case cites Waverley, 'a Prince to live and die under.' Still we have Alcib. 1. 105 B, ὅτι ἀξίως εἰ τιμᾶσθαι, etc. We may take the inf. as in the gen., both from the ordinary govt. of ἀξίως, and from e.g. Phileb. 14 A, ἄρα ἀξίως ἂν εἶην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν;

τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους, cp. 135 D. Probably 'your zeal for discussion' (τοὺς λόγους = τὸ διαλέγεσθαι): but it might also mean 'your eager attack upon Zeno's λόγοι.'

αὐτὸς οὐ 'Is this distinction your own?' says Grote; but does it not mean 'You ask if Zeno has done this: have you yourself done it?' What follows upon the ideas comes clearly under the criticism of Aristotle, Met. A. 9, 990 b 15 (Introd. xlii.) who defines τὰ πρὸς τι thus: Cat. 7, 6 a 36, Πρὸς τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν

ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον τὸ μείζον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρου λέγεται. τινὲς γὰρ λέγεται μείζον· καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ... Again, ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι, οἷον ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον ... Again, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρὸς τι· ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόμοιον μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον λέγεται. Once more, πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δούλος δεσπότην δούλος ... καὶ τὸ μείζον ἐλάττωτος, etc. In a word τὰ πρὸς τι are what we call 'qualities' as opposed to those complexes which are called 'things' or 'objects.' And it may be observed that Socrates feels most confidence in the εἶδη which are πρὸς τι, and least in those which are objects or οὐσίαι.

ἄττα Sophist., 255 E, speaks of 5 as a minimum. In X the breathing is patched (Notes 1.). t reads ἄττα. Authorities say ἄττα = τινά, ἄττα = ἄτινα. But the latter form alone is found in Attic inscriptions. (Gramm. der Att. Inschr., p. 123, Meisterhans.) 'Recte Stephanus καὶ τί σοι δ. scribendum vidit pro vulgato καὶ τί σοι δ.' Stallb. I.e. the τι = aliquid, not quid? The constr. is καὶ σοι δοκεῖ αὐτῇ ὁμοιότης εἶναι τι χωρὶς τῆς ὁμοιότητος ἣν ἡμῖς ἔχομεν, καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ ἐν καὶ ... ἡκούετε, χωρὶς ὧν ...;

αὐτῇ ὁμοιότης This seems to have been the orig. from which the variants come. Stallb. thinks the want of the article led to all the changes. Notes 1.

ὅσα νῦν δὴ ζήνωνος Zeno has urged only that the sensible many must be 'like and unlike, which is impossible.' Even if we suppose Parm. to allude to all the λόγοι or γράμματα he can only mean—'Do you assume εἶδη for those qualities which Zeno was proving to be inseparable from a sensible many, with a view to disproving the existence of this latter?' From Phaedr. 261 D, τὸν οὖν Ἑλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἔσμεν τέχνη, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ (1) ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, (2) καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, (3) μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα; we see that the only remaining εἶδη to be covered by πάντα ὅσα would be στάσις καὶ κίνησις—if the list in Phaedr. is exhaustive. For the general vagueness and absence of order and gradation in the ideal sphere as here embodied cp. Introd. xxx., xlii. Damasc., § 95, p. 237, speaks of a διττὸς μερισμὸς—ὁ μὲν κατὰ βάθος τῆς καθ' ὑφασιν ἀπορροεύσης ὅλης σειρᾶς, ὁ δὲ κατὰ πλάτος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ περιεχομένων εἰδῶν, but we have here rather a refer-

ence to the concretion of a single idea, so to speak, from pure *αὐτοάνθρωπος* to our *άνθρωπος* in a *σειρά*, than to a succession of ideas.

τοιᾶντα, *t* has *τοιᾶδε*, more usual in ref. to what follows; but cp. Jelf 655, 6.

δικαίον Adjs. as nouns without art. beside *τὸν σωκ.*, *τὸν παρμ.* It is hard to give a rationale. See *Phaedo* 76 D-77 A.

πάντων αὐ This list is separate from Zeno's *πάντα ὄσα*. Is it a series of *εἶδη* bearing on conduct?

C *καὶ τῶν οἰοί ... πάντων* 'i.e. καὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων τοιούτων οἰοί ἡμεῖς (ego, tu, ceterique qui adsunt) ἐσμέν, s. πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων ἀνθρώπων.' Heind. 'Sed grammaticae rationi convenientius ita potius interpretaberis: καὶ χωρὶς τῶν πάντων, οἰοί ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν, h.e. ... speciem se junctam a nobis et ab omnibus iis, quae talia sunt, quales nos sumus. Ex quo clarum est, cur deinde adiciatur αὐτό τι ... ὕδατος; Etenim Parm. vult non tantum homines, sed omnia, quae sub sensus subjecta sunt intelligi.' Stallb. This is better, except as to *χωρὶς τῶν πάντων*. The sense seems to be *χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰοί-ἡμεῖς-ἐσμέν* (i.e. τῶν ὄρατῶν) πάντων, and Stallb. so translates. Failing this it would be better to read καὶ τῶνδ' οἰοί. The constr. would be improved by omitting *ἀνθρώπου εἶδος*, or transposing *τί δ' ἀνθρώπου εἶδος*—αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος, *χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰοί ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν πάντων*. See *Phileb.* 15 A, ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἀνθρώπου ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βούν' ἕνα, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕν, περὶ τοῦτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ πολλῇ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται. We have got ideas of physical qualities and of moral qualities; we now take the important step of assuming ideas for sensible things or complexes of qualities. Such Arist. calls (*Met.* II. 2, 997 b 10) the same with the sensible objects but eternal. *παραπλήσιον ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεοῖς μὲν εἶναι φάσκουσιν, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς δέ οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἐποιοῦν ἢ ἀνθρώπους αἰδίους, οὐθ' οὗτοι τὰ εἶδη ἄλλ' ἢ αἰσθητὰ αἰδία*. He adds (*xi.* 3, 1070 a 18) that such ideas according to Plato ἐστὶν ὅσα φύσει, εἴπερ ἐστὶν εἶδη ἄλλα τούτων, οἷον πῦρ, σάργξ, κεφαλὴ. Cp. *Damasc.* § 102, p. 263, τὰ πολλὰ εἶδη φαινόμενα τῶν πολλῶν ἀληθινῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ τεκμήρια, etc. That ideas for 'things' are an advance upon ideas for single qualities is the view implied in *Arist. Phys.* II. 2, 193 b 36, τὰ γὰρ

φυσικὰ χωρίζουσιν, ἥττον ὄντα χωριστὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.

ἢ πυρὸς etc. Ficinus 'et ignis etiam et aquae,' qua si legisset ἢ καὶ πυρὸς ἢ ὕδατος, non male. Heind. Such is the sense clearly.

αὐτῶν for *τούτων*, so in E.

A ... *δέξειεν* ἂν εἶναι, sc. εἴ τις φαίη καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς: more simply (ὁ καὶ γελοιὸν δέξειεν ἂν εἶναι).

οἷον θρίξ. What is the rationale of the nom.? Is it = ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε οἷον (ἐστὶ) θρίξ, helped by the intervening *δέ*? Is *τύπος* only here in Plato?

αὐ τῶν τῆδε ὦν Both A (Notes 1.) have *αὐτῶν ἢ ὦν*, which can hardly be right. Editors with Π drop *ἢ*; even so *αὐτῶν* is rather unsuitable. 'Sed αὐτῶν hoc vide an rectius mutetur in αὐ τῶν. Ut Theaet. 204 D, ταῦτον ἄρα ἕν γε τοῖς ὄσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί,' etc., Heind. But Stallb. defends αὐτῶν positum pro τούτων quanquam paullo alia vi et significatione. We have had this above, and it occurs in E below. But this rather makes against a third case so near. Yet αὐ τῶν ὦν seems harsh, and ἢ is unexplained. Our *τῆδε* justifies both the ἢ and the αὐ τῶν, and makes excellent sense; see *Phaedr.* 249 D, Ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἡκὼν λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, ἣν ὅταν τὸ τῆδε τις ὄρων κάλλος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμνησκόμενος, πτερῶται τε καὶ etc.; and 250 B, οὐκ ἔνεστι φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῆδε ὁμοιώμασιν. Proclus, too, repeatedly uses τὰ τῆδε as an expression for τὰ ὁρατά, e.g. V. 5. ON 130 B, πῶς μετέχεται (τὰ εἶδη) ὑπὸ τῶν τῆδε, καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς μεθέξεως; So, too, *Damasc.*, § 91, p. 226, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὁ τῆδε ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ ἐκεῖ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, and elsewhere. A palaeographer will know that a contracted τῆδε in majuscules might be very like Η. The class of things here discussed is merely another type of ἀπερ ὁρῶμεν; if an εἶδος πυρὸς be granted so may an εἶδος πηλοῦ. The only difference is the greater unworthiness (*Introd.* xli. ff.).

οὐδαμῶς appears to deny the question ἢ ... ἀπορείς; D

ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι 'sc. οἶμαι, φημί,' Heind. This of course occurs even to a Zeno; indeed were it otherwise there would be no problem.

οιηθῆναι εἶναι Although a passive sense would be quite good, the active is ineant. See *Ast.* One might supply (ἀπορώ) μὴ λῖαν, or δέδοικα, which is to hand. Grote refers here to the note

of Alexander on Arist. Met. i. 991 a 23, Bekker iv. 575 a 30, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶων τινῶν γενέσεις τεταγμέναι μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς ἰδέαν, οἷον σκωλήκων ἐμπίδων τερηδόνων. Proclus expands on the question of what ideas are to be admitted; but his views, incorporating all that appears in Timaeus, and indeed in generations of commentary, are far in advance of Plato's present stage. He explains the hesitation of Socrates about an idea of man by urging that man as known to us is at the lower end of a series of which the idea is the upper (cp. on B), οὐ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτως μετασχὺν ἀνθρώπου ὁρῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐσχάτως, and thus εἰκότως παμπόλλην ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν διαφορότητα καθορῶμεν (v. 41). Again he rejects hair as being a mere part of that which comes from a rational pattern; and πηλὺς as a σύμμιξις δύο στοιχείων ἀόριστος, οὐ κατὰ λόγον γενομένη; and finally ῥύπος because all κάθαρσις is removal of ῥύπος, and while there is an idea of the former there is none of the latter as being a κακία to be cleared away: of κακίαι there are no ideas (v. 61) he affirms.

ἦδη μέντοι ... ἔθραξε Heind. would read μέν τι, after Phaedr. 242 C, ἐμέ γὰρ ἔθραξε μέν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον. With which cp. Phaedo 86 E, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὐθράττον, and 103 C. But he has to admit that Theaet. 187 c differs, Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ ... γεγονέναι, etc., where there is no specific nom. to the verb. Stallb. objects that the change does not improve the sense, and also that the subj. is contained in the words μή ... ταυτόν, which on Heind.'s assumption would be in appos. with τι. In place of our Schol. t gives ἐτάραξεν, ἠνώχλησεν, ἐνύξεν: so Rhunk. Suidas gives the same meanings, and adds δυσωπείσθαι καὶ ὑφορᾶσθαι. The glossary of Timaeus also gives τάραττει κινεῖ.

μή τι ἢ π. π. ταυτόν 'lest something the same might be the case in regard to all,' 'ob es nicht bei allen dasselbe wäre' (Engelm. Transl.); but what sense does it convey? Heind. says 'ne idem sit in omnibus, i.e. ne eadem sit omnium omnino rerum ratio, ut suum quaeque εἶδος habeat': meaning that after all θριξ πηλὺς etc., may have each their idea (he almost needlessly guards us from reading μή τι (εἶδος) ἢ π. π. ταυτόν). In this case the ἀβυσθ. φλυαφ. would arise from the hopeless complication of the theory when thus extended. Our marginal

summary gives another view, which also seems tenable: the difficulty involved in the conception of ideas for θριξ πηλὺς etc., is so great that he is sometimes driven to think that as there are no ideas for them so there is none for anything—the μή τι ταυτόν referring to εἶδος οἰηθῆναι ... ἀποπον. In this case the ἀβ. φλυ. would arise from the sea of sensible perceptions unregulated by any idea. Cp. Timae. 51 C, ἀρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πάντα, περὶ ὧν αἰεὶ λέγομεν οὕτως, ... ἢ ταῦτα ἄπερ καὶ βλέπομεν ὅσα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα μόνα ἔστι ... ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ... ἄλλα μάλιστα ἐκάστοτε εἶναι τί φαμεν εἶδος ἐκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος; The language seems a compromise between μή τι π. π. ταυτόν and μή τι ἢ π. π. τοιοῦτον.

ταύτη ἰστώ. The reading of Ἰ is as given with the aspirate and long initial ι, and (although t gives ταύτη στῶ) an effort should be made to maintain a form so clearly given. Proclus quotes τ. ἐγὼ ἰστώ. It may be noted that ταύτη is scarcely used = ἐκὼ or τῇδε with a verb of rest like στῶ. Even in Philoct. 1331, ἔως ἂν αὐτὸς ἥλιος | ταύτη μὲν αἶρη, τῇδε δ' αὖ δύνῃ πάλιν the verb is one of motion; and so generally when used of place it means 'in this direction,' 'by this road,' with a verb of motion. Could an object be understood with ἰστώ, such as τὰ πράγματα, τὸν λόγον? The sense would be either 'when I place matters in this fashion' or 'when I weigh the subject in this manner.' In Euthyphr. 7 c we come within sight of the latter use, καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθεῖμεν ἂν; and Prot. 356 B, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἄνθρωπος where the context gives the meaning. For the former sense cp. Theaet. 171 D, ἢ καὶ ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἰστασθαι τὸν λόγον ...;

φεύγων οἰχομαι. The participle with this verb is common, especially ἀπιὼν and φερόμενος. For the sense see Phaedo 98 B, ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὃ ἑταῖρε, ψόχον φερόμενος. Phileb. 13 D, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχίσσεται.

ἀβυσθον φλυ. There is no doubt of the reading (Notes 1.), though ἀβυσθον is found, probably by confusion of the old minuscule u = β with a cursive μ. The sense is clear, although the adjective seems unique. 'Denique Synesius qui ad hunc locum

respexit ... et Origenes ... legerunt ipsi quoque ἄβυσθον non ἄμυσθον. Nam Celsus quidem dixit εἰς πέλαγος φλυαρίας ἐμπεσών· sed verba Synesii haec sunt, καὶ κίνδυνος εἰς ἄβυσσόν τινα φλυαρίας ἐμπεσόντας διαφθαρῆναι· ὃ καὶ Σωκράτης ἐφοβήθη παθεῖν, καὶ τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἀπεκρύψατο φίλους ἀνδρας, Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα. Atque his ex locis Vyttenbachius, in Notis ad Plutarch, de S. N. V., p. 72, putabat satis apparere, apud Platonem reponi debere εἰς τινα ἄβυσσον φλυαρίας. At neuter, neque Orig. neque Synes. retinuisse videtur ipsa verba Platonis, immo utrumque imitari tantum voluisse arbitror omnino formam loquendi, ita ut non dubitarint adjectivi loco substantiva ponere.' Fisch. L. and S. suggest that we should read εἰς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας, which has some support from the text of A and the reading φλυαρίας suggested by the words of Synes. But the text of Proclus v. 64 reads λοιπὸν καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἄβυσθος φλυαρία, εἰς ἣν etc.

ἐκαστὸν δ' οὖν ... εἰς ἃ = εἰς ἐκεῖνα δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος ἃ ... ὅς ἐκείσε ... ὅς ἐστι τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα εἶδη ἔχειν What is the exact sense of δ' οὖν? Perhaps 'however that may be (about my fear of destruction, etc.) at all events I get back to the safer ground just referred to.' The ἃ are probably the two groups referred to in B above—Zeno's group and the next. ἐλέγομεν, cp. note, 129 D.

E **περὶ ἐκάστης** There is good Platonic authority for taking this either with *πραγ.* or with *διατρ.*

νῆες γὰρ So Theaet. 162 D, Νέος γὰρ εἰ, ὃ φίλε παῖ· ταῖς οὖν δημηγορίαις ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθεις. What does γὰρ meet?—the δέισας etc., the ἔθραξε etc., or the μὴ λῖαν ἢ ἄτοπον? Perhaps the general sense of contempt for the suggestion of ideas which are common and unclean; this would appear from ἀτιμάσεις which follows.

οὕτω σου ἀντίειλ. So Phaedo 88 D, θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὕτως ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰ ... On the whole passage see Procl. v. 65-7, Ταῦτα ὁ Π. ἐπιπλήττων ἀποροῦντι τῷ Σ. δόξειεν ἂν τισιν αὐτὸς ιδέας ἀποτίθεσθαι πάντων, καὶ ὅσα σμικρὰ καὶ ὅσα ἐνυλότατα καὶ ὅσα παρὰ φύσιν ... ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ μὴ πρὸς τοῦτο πεποιῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιπλήξιν, ἀλλὰ ... τὸ ἀναίτιον οὐδαμῶς προσιέμενος (meaning all has a cause, but that cause is not necessarily an idea? Questionable.), πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου

τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι φησὶ καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος ... οὐδὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὕτως ἀτιμον καὶ φαῦλον, ὃ μὴ μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κακείθεν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν ... ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαι τὰ σμικρὰ καὶ εὐτελῆ τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἐξάπτειν ἐξαισχύονται ... οἱ δὲ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι πάντα ὅσαπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σμικρὰ προνοίας ἐξάψαντες οὐδὲν ἀτιμον οὐδὲ ἀπόβλητον ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ Διὸς ὀρώσιν ... ὅτι δὲ ὁ Σ. ἀναιρῶν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ἐνυλοτάτων τὴν εἰδητικήν αἰτίαν ἀγέρει καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἔλαβεν ὁ Π. ... ἡ θρῖξ μὴ ἐχέτω μὲν παράδειγμα νοερὸν, ἐχέτω δὲ φυσικὸν λόγον αἰτιῶν. ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὴ ταύτην εἶναι τρίχα μόνον ἣν ὀρώμεν, ἀλλὰ κακείνην τὴν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως; δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ τρίχας ποιῶσα ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ οὐ μάλιστα οὐδὲ ταύτας ὑποστήσασα καὶ ἡ ἐκλείψει ἡ τούτων παρὰ φύσιν, διατιθεῖσα τὰ δεόμενα τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν βοήθειας. ... καὶ εἰ ἀπορήσειας δὲ τῶν προσεχῶν αἰτίων, ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀνάδραμε τὴν μίαν τοῦ ὄντος αἰτίαν ἀφ' ἧς πάντα τὰ ὄντα προελήλυθε, καὶ ἐκείνην φάθι καὶ τούτοις παρέχειν τὴν γένεσιν, ὥς μὴδὲ τούτων ἀναίτιον εἶναι τὴν ὑπόστασιν. καὶ ἵσως ἐπρεπε τῷ Π. τῷ τὸ ἐν ὄν τὸ πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν ὀρώντι τὸ "κατ' αἰτίαν" προτιθέναι τοῦ "κατ' εἶδος" καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιπλήττει τῷ Σ., μετὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀναιροῦντι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, δέον μὴ κατ' εἶδος μὲν αὐτὸν νοερὸν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὴν γένεσιν, κατ' αἰτίαν δὲ πρεσβυτέραν τῶν εἰδῶν (better, not worse, than ideas?) ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἡμεῖς τὰ τεχνιτὰ ποιῶμεν, ποιῶμεν ταῦτα καὶ ὁ νοῦς ...

αὐτῶν See Notes I and above c. The observation οὐδὲν ἃ ἀτιμάσεις, etc., must be for the Platonic Socrates, not the Socrates of history, who had little regard for the conventional dignity of philosophy, and who did not touch these inquiries—οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφην ... αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων αἰεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές ... Xen. Mem. I. i. 11-16. We are to hold not that Plato draws no distinctions between diverse objects, but that he sets any such distinctions aside in the interests of philosophy. Thus in Polit. 266 D, Νῦν, ἐκείνῳ ἐστὶ καταφανὲς μᾶλλον ... ὅτι τῇ τοιγάρ μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὐτε σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμέλυσεν ἢ μή, τὸν τε σμικρότερον οὐδὲν ἡτίμακε πρὸ τοῦ μείζονος, etc.; cp. Soph. 227 A. On the other hand when looking at them from the standpoint of

character he speaks—Theaet. 174 C-D—of 'practical' matters with scorn,—οὐ προσποιήτως ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν, etc.

¹³⁷ **ὅν ... ἴσχαν** On εἶναι εἶδη ἅττα, see for variants Notes 1. For constr. cp. 127 C. Stallb. well cites Phaet. 102 B, ὡμολογείτο εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τὰλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, and Symp. 210 E-211 B, κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν ... αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς αἰεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα. For the language see Soph. 257 C, ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερματισθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη ... μία μὲν ἐστὶ πον καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ ἐαυτῆς ἰδίαν. Herodt. VII. 121, Θέρμη δὲ ... ἀπ' ἧς καὶ ὁ κόλπος οὗτος τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει. Dam., § 86, 205, says ἀλλ' ὅμως τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὀνόματά τε καὶ νοήματα—noteworthy. μεταλαμβ. the present is descriptive—you see the process going on, and with the process comes the name: μεταλαμβάνοντα is a narrative reference to the description given, the participation has now taken place, whence the likeness. It is clear that the εἶδη are much fewer than τὰ ἄλλα. "Because there is only one idea for each class of things (Rep. VI. 493 E, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ, ἢ αὐτό τι ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα, ἐστ' ὅπως πλήθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι;) ideas are also termed ἐνάδες or μονάδες (ὅταν δὲ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἕνα ... περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ πολλῇ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται ... πρῶτον μὲν εἰ τινὰς δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπελαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὔσας, etc.), Phileb. 15 A." Zeller.

μεγέθους This, with σμικρότης, ἰσότης, and others is fairly hit by Arist. Phys. IV. 1, 209 A 17, ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα σώματα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν οὐδὲν γίνεται μέγεθος—if the idea in such cases is an entity.

χωρὶς τούτων 'h. e. praeter haec,' Stallb. Symp. 211 B gives a vague suggestion of the μετάληψις—τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιοῦτον, οἷον γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἐπολλυμένων μηδὲν ἐκείνο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. It may be true even of a conception that you must possess either the whole or a part of it if you possess it at all; yet

one feels instinctively that Plato is here somewhat governed by physical analogies, and tends to think of the idea as extended. On ὅλον τοῦ εἶ. we may use a phrase of Dam. § 87, 207—individuals differ, he suggests, only by place; the idea is the same, ὡς εἰ τις ἀφέλοι τὴν ὕλην ἐν ἃν τὸ ὅλον εἶδος ἐφάνθη. At § 90, 225, he distinguishes ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρωθεν τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ζῶον, ταύτῃ μεθεξίς· ἡ δὲ συμπληροῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπου, ταύτῃ ὑπαρξίς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Also § 126, ii. 2, without actually dealing with participation of ideas, he discusses the meaning of the word and the possible varieties of the fact—ἐνωσις, σύγκρισις, πάραθεσις, and finds difficulties on all sides; but adds 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεινὸς ὁ λόγος, εἰ διεσπασμένα πάντα ποιήσει ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ... καὶ αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν διαφθερεῖ ὁ λόγος. Οὐ γὰρ ἐξέσται αὐτῷ λέγειν κεχωρισθαι ἀλλήλων τὰ πράγματα· μεθέξει γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλα χωρισμοῦ. In fact we are back at the negation of predication (Introd. lx.), for, he says elsewhere, § 70, 152, τὸ ἡνωμένον εἰ γινώσκοντο, οὐκ ἔσται μόνον ἡνωμένον ἀλλὰ καὶ γνωστόν,—which makes it two at least.

πότερον ... ἐν εἶναι: πότερον preceded by ὅλον ἢ μέρους and followed by ὅλον leads one to expect ἡ μέρος αὐτοῦ; in place of ἡ πῶς; But the context might suggest that πότερον is superfluous; and that he means to begin δοκεῖ οὐν σοι, and is for the present taking up only the former alternative of ὅλον, and dwelling not on that alternative but on the question of the idea remaining one in the process (ἐν ὄν=ita ut unum sit. Heind.) This view is enforced by ἐν εἶναι, which, again, Schleiermacher changes to ἐνείναι against Ἄτ. Stallb. agrees; Heind. dissents, giving as the meaning τί γὰρ κωλύει ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν πολλῶν ἐνὸν ἐν εἶναι; of which Stallb. says (why?) contorta est Heindorfii interpretatio.

ἐν πολλοῖς χ. t has καὶ c. before χωρίς, which adds force.

ἐν ἔσται So Ἄ; t also, but on eras. "Ἐνεσται might be better; but Plato may be purposely harping on the ἐν εἶναι—if there is nothing to prevent it being one, at least it 'will be one' in such a way as to be separate from itself.

αἶ γε, φάναι etc. As to the text, setting aside stops, Ἄτ agree on the following—οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα εἴη μία καὶ ἢ αὐτὴ οὔσα πολλαχού ἅμα ἐστὶ, while t begins with

οὐκὰν εἶναι φάναι followed by a stop. Some change seems needed, and εἶ γε seems preferable to εἶναι. The phrase οἶον εἶ lacks Platonic authority, and has been changed by some to οἶον ἦ. Again the εἶη following has been omitted so as to give οἶον ἦ ἡμέρα, μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὕσα: this ἦ seems superfluous, while the omis. of εἶη is questionable. Yet some omission is called for; and we may note the repeated use of εἶ, ἦ, and the collocation εἶη in quick succession. Any text involves a somewhat broken construction which is picked up at εἶ οὕτω. In Proclus' comments the phrase εἶ γε οἶον ἡμέρα εἶη without article occurs v. 12. The text given demands little change, and yields a satisfactory sense, the break in constr. being as follows—οὐκ ἂν εἶ γε, φάναι, οἶον εἶη ἡμέρα (ἡ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὕσα πολλαχού ἅμα ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν)—εἶ οὕτω, 'not if it were some such thing as day, which, etc. ... if in such a fashion as this, I say, each of the ideas preserved its identity in all things.' Procl. says δι' ὑπερβατοῦ τὸ ὅλον συναπτέον· φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σ. μὴ ἂν συμβῆναι τοῦτο ὃν ἄτοπον, ὃ φησιν ὁ Π., "εἶ γε οἶον ἡμέρα εἶη, οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταυτὸν εἶη" (where the interpretation differs a little from ours). δεύτερον δὲ τὸ "εἶ οὕτω" διὰ τὴν ἐπαναλήψιν οἰητέον ἔχειν τὸ "εἶ τοῦτο" προκείμενον, ἐν γὰρ ταῖς διὰ πλείονος ἀποδόσεσιν αἱ ἐπαναλήψεις χρήσιμοι· τρίτον δὲ τὸ "μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὕσα πολλαχού ἅμα ἐστὶ" μεταξὺ ῥηθὲν κατὰ ἀποστασιν ἀκουστέον. In illustrating he reminds us, though without referring to the Rep., of the analogies ἡλιος—ἀγαθόν, φῶς (ἡμέρα)—τὰ εἶδη, σκοτός—ὕλη (τάδε τὰ ἄλλα). And he adds (v. 101) καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγου τὸ παράδειγμα εἰληφε, δηλον· (on what authority?) ἐκεῖνος γὰρ δηλώσαι βουλόμενος, ὅπως τὰ πολλὰ μετέχει τινὸς ἐνὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἔρημα ἐνὸς κἂν διωστήκει πορρωτάτω ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, εἶπεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ μίαν οὕσαν τὴν λευκότητα παρεῖναι καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἀντίποσιν οὕτως ὡς τὴν εὐφρόνην καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ... ἀλλ', οἶμαι, Ζ. ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνύλδου εἶδους τὸ παράδειγμα θείας, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐν καὶ οὐχ ἐν μεριστῶς μετεχόμενον ... τῷ ... παραδείγματι τοῦ τοιοῦτου εἶδους ὀρθῶς ἐχρήτο καὶ ἀνελέγκτως· ὁ δὲ Σ. ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ ἀμερίστου ὄντος καὶ ἐνὸς ἅμα πυρόντος τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. Arist., Phys. III. 6, 206 a 30, says of the ἀπειρον—οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς τούδε τι, οἶον ἄνθρωπον ἢ οἰκίαν,

ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀγών, οἷς τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς οὐσία τις γέγονεν, ἀλλ' αἰ ἐν γενέσει ἢ φθορᾷ, εἶ καὶ πεπερασμένον, ἀλλ' αἰ γε ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον.

ἡδέως ἀντὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἵν. σημαίνει δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὸ εὐήθως καὶ τὸ γελοῖως. Schol. Rhunk. 'Male Schol. ... Ironice hic quoque adhibetur hoc verbum' Heind. = lepidē, 'that is a pleasant conceit of yours, to prove your case by, as it were, putting men under a sail and saying,' etc.

οἶον εἶ etc. The οἶον εἶ here are separate, not as they would have been above οἶον εἶ (or as Plato puts it, οἶον περὶ στοιχεῖα, Theaet. 201 E). The phrase ἰστίφ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἄνθρ. seems an odd reversal, and recalls αὐτοὺς ὕβρει περιέθηκε, Diog. Laert. VI. 3 3, and still better Choeeph. 576, νεκρὸν θήσω ποδώκει περιβαλὼν χαλκεύματι.

τὸ τοιοῦτ. One almost wishes τι τοι., but cp. E.

ἡγεῖ λέγειν as 127 E without the pron. as subj. to the inf.; see Rep. I. 338 A, σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναι καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, and a little lower ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀποκρίσιν παγκάλην. Although Parmenides makes merry over such an idea, does not his own ἐν συνεχεῖς bear some colourable resemblance to it?

ἡ οὖν ἢ h.l. idem est quod πρότερον. Heind.; but it means rather more, 'would the whole really be present then, or only a part?' Immediately below it recurs, but this time suggesting the improbability of the other alternative. οὐκ ἔτι. So A for οὐκέτι.

ἐν ἑκάστῳ Note the change of reference in the next ἐκάστου—οὐκ ἔτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ (τῶν πολλῶν) ὅλον (τι εἶδος εἶη), ἀλλὰ μέρος ἐκάστου (τοῦ εἶδους ἐν ἑκάστῳ) ἂν εἶη. οὕτω γε 'according to this reasoning?'

ἡ οὖν—A εἶ οὖν, t ἡ οὖν: another error by dict.?

φάναι Is this word parenthetic? If so, one of two things follows; (1) either the phrase τὸ ἐν ... μερίζεσθαι as a whole is an object to ἐθέλῃσεις, while that verb generally governs, at least in Attic, a mere infinitive (ἐθέλω πείθεσθαι, ποιεῖν, etc.); (2) or μερίζεσθαι must be used in an active sense: which is rare, although if taken with ἡμῖν it might yield a good sense—'Do you wish then to be in very truth a party to our splitting up the one idea among us?' But we have parallels to the use of φάναι governing an inf. and itself governed by a verb like ἐθέλειν—Rep. VI. 510 A, ἡ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διηρῆσθαι ἀληθεία τε καὶ μῆ;

Theaet. 171 E, ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον... ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὐτό. Polit. 276 B, ἐπιμέλεια δὲ ... οὐδεμία ἂν ἐθελήσειεν ἑτέρα μᾶλλον... φάναι καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς εἶναι τέχνη. The only objection to this construction is the other use of φάναι so repeatedly; and there is a further argument in its favour that it gives a definite sense to ἡμῖν (to divide among us all the one εἶδος ἀνθρώπου) which in the other case would seem a mere adjunct to τὸ ἐν εἶδος = 'our one εἶδος.' Yet for such a use see E below, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι etc.

καὶ ... αἰπὸν: We may make καὶ ... ἔσται; a fresh interrog. sent.; but it is as likely to be part of the previous one with the constr. varied—see Riddell's Platonic idioms, § 277 b (Apology, Clar. Press)—while οὐδαμῶς gives a denial to both φάναι etc. and ἔσται. We bring out the force of γὰρ thus—καὶ καλῶς γε, ὅρα γάρ.

D καὶ ἕκ. ... ἔσται 'and each of the many objects which rank as "big" will be such in virtue of a portion of bigness which is smaller than "bigness" proper.' φαίνεται—t better, φανείται: but the point is small. δαί; See Intro. lxxi. and Notes 1.

τοῦ ἴσου μέρους etc. So Ἄτ, though t has os above -ous. The reading is rather difficult, and it is just possible that an orig. os has been changed through the ambiguities arising from ἕκαστον and σμικρόν. If retained the phrase must mean 'the "equal" section of our ideal kingdom.' The order of words is ἕκαστον (τῶν πολλῶν) ἀπολαβὸν σμικρόν τι τοῦ ἴσου μέρους, τὸ ἔχον (τοῦτο τὸ σμικρόν) ἔξει (τι) φ, ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου, ἴσον τῷ ἔσται; As Heind. notes τὸ ἔχον might be omitted.

τούτου ... ὄντος. i.e. τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ μέρους αὐτοῦ) τὸ σμικρόν μείζον ἔσται ἅτε (τούτου) μέρους ἐαυτοῦ [sc. τοῦ σμικροῦ] ὄντος.

καὶ ὅττω 'smallness' will become bigger thus—a change which should be impossible to it—in one of two ways: (1) either by being, as we have seen, greater than its part, (2) or by having something taken from it, for like a negative quantity it grows by deductions—as he goes on, the addition of a bit of smallness (i.e. of a negative quantity) lessens the size of that which receives it. This is partly jocular. Plato knows that if 'smallness' proper be indeed greater than its part, then the part cannot reduce the size of that to which it accrues; while if the

latter is the case it follows that 'smallness' itself would reduce the object still more, and is therefore smaller than its part. τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν is the μέρος just referred to. Cp. Ar., Phys. I. 4, 187 b 35, εἰ ἅπαν μὲν σῶμα ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἐλάττον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ σαρκὸς ὥρισται τὸ ποσὸν καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἐλαχίστης σαρκὸς οὐθέν ἐκκριθήσεται σῶμα· ἔσται γὰρ ἐλάττον τῆς ἐλαχίστης. Proc. v. 115, ἄτοπον ἄρα διαιρετὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ σμικρόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μέρος, διότι μὲν ἐλασσον ἔστι τοῦ ὅλου, μείζον ἐκείνο πάντως ἀποφαίνει, διότι δὲ τῷ λοιπῷ προστίθεται, μείζον αὐτὸ τὴν προσθήκην λαβὼν ἀπεργάζεται... ὁ καὶ ἔδοξε τισὶν οὕτω δισδιάθετον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ὥς καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῖς [αὐτὰ, Bekk.] καταλέξει τινὰς καὶ περιγράψαι τῶν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ῥημάτων.

τίνα ὅν ... θεωρ. Proc. (116) dwells on the conditions of the problem here with great point, but without answering this question. ἀδιάστατα (without dimensions) ἄρα πάντα τὰ εἶδη ἔστι· κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τόπου παντὸς ὑπερίδρυται· πᾶσι γὰρ πανταχοῦ τοῖς μετέχουσιν ἀκωλύτως πάρεστι. τὰ δὲ ἐν τόπῳ κρατούμενα τῆς ἀκωλύτου ταύτης παροισίας ἁμοῖρα πέφυκε... ὡσαύτως γε καὶ χρόνου παντὸς ὑπερήπλωται· πάρεστι γὰρ ἀχρόνως ἅπασι καὶ ἀθρόως· ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ γενέσεις προπαρασκευαίαι τινὲς εἰσι τῆς ἐκείνων μεθέξεως... μὴ τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῶν μετεχόντων εἰ τὰ μετεχόμενα μεταφερέτω τις ἢ τὸν χρόνον ἢ τὴν τοπικὴν περίληψιν ἢ τὸν σωματικὸν μερισμόν, μηδ' ὅλως συνθέσεις ἢ διαιρέσεις σωματοειδεῖς ἐν ἐκείνοις ἐπινοείτω. πόρρω γὰρ ταῦτα διέστηκε τῶν εἰδῶν τῆς ἀπλότητος τῆς αἴλου, τῆς καθαρότητος τῆς ἐν αἰῶνι συνεχομένης ἀμεροῦς ὑποστάσεως. We have learnt above so far that the ideas are certain moulding formative entities existing apart, and grasped by reason. Their function is to introduce method, form, meaning into the many of sense (but how πολλὰ without ἐν etc.?), and we see that this is done by their entering into these, or giving the latter a share in them, and that either κατὰ ὅλον or κατὰ μέρος, if at all. The whole argument suggests physical conditions and analogies, none the less so because of the special ideas selected for treatment; and Proc. enters a caveat that such physical conditions as space, time, dimensions are out of place. He adds an elucidation of the difficulty, which amounts to this, that the many may be ranged in

grades, the more exalted of which come close in character to the ideas, and may partake of them with practical completeness; the others tail off towards matter, and partake of less and less, or of mere εἰδωλα, of the ideas. Parmenides, he says, ἀνακινεῖ τὸν Σ. καὶ προκαλεῖται τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ νοῦν εἰς τὴν τῆς κυριωτάτης μεθέξεως εὐρεσιν.... By those who understand the whole and part μὴ σωματικῶς, ἀλλὰ προσφόρως ταῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ νοεραῖς οὐσίαις, ὁφθῆσεται τὰ τῆδε καὶ ὄλων μετέχοντα τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ μερῶν... καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα τῶν μετεχόντων πλείους ὑποδέχεται τοῦ παραδείγματος (we have not got this length yet in the text) δυνάμεις, τὰ δὲ κοιλότερα ἐλάσσους. He even supposes men in other parts of the universe μᾶλλον ἐγγυς ὄντας τῆς ἀνθρώπου ιδέας, and so partaking of it κατὰ πλείους δυνάμεις, and adds οὕτως ἡ μία ιδιότης ἄνωθεν καθήκει μεχρὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων... σειραὶ γάρ τινες ἀπὸ τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καθήκουσι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶνδε πάλιν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, καθ' ἕκαστον στοιχείον ἐξαλλασσόμεναι καὶ μέχρι γῆς ὑφίζανουσαι. τούτων δὲ τῶν σειρῶν τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα μειζόνως μετέχει τῶν παραδειγμάτων, τὰ δὲ χαμαιζηλότερα ἐλασσόνως, τῆς ιδιότητος ἐπὶ πάντα τῆς μίας ἐκτεινομένης, ἡ καὶ ποιεῖ μίαν τὴν ὅλην σειράν. And so Dam. § 206 II. 89, ἡ σειρὰ προποδισμός ἐστιν οὐσίας ἀπὸ ἐνὸς εἰς πλῆθος ἐκμηρνομένης. Pl. has nothing of this.

ἢ ἕκαστον The latter is part of subj., the former of pred. ἐκ. εἶναι ἔν.

132 184a 'h. l. non est idem quod εἶδος sed potius conspectus sive species quaedam menti objecta.' Heind. But we get here the origin of the technical term, as we do that of the idea it represents. ἐπὶ πάντα with ἰδεῖν does not seem to be a common phrase with Pl.; L. and S. quote Iliad xxiii. 143, ἰδὼν ἐπὶ οἶνοπα πόντον.

τί δ'... φαίνεσθαι; He seems at first to have meant αὐτὸ... μεγάλα to be subj. to some such verb as παρέξει, to which ἔν τι would be the obj.: as he wrote he made the latter the subj. and replaced παρέξει by φανέται as though he had begun τί δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ... μεγάλων. But again, φαίνεσθαι with its relative would more naturally be φ'... φανήσεται or φανέται. Either there is suggested dependence on the sense of the clause ἔν... φανέται, or a lapse into orat. obl. Either way the fact that φανέται precedes and ἀναφανήσεται

follows may help to explain the change. While we reason back to the ideas they, of course, prove to be the causes or rational elements of the things through which we reach them. In this case of μέγεθος the remark of Arist., Met. xi. 10, 1075 b 29, applies—ἔτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; τῇ ψυχῇ is here identical with τῇ διανοίᾳ.

αὐ πον is the smallest change which yields a meaning from the text of Ἄ αὐτοῦ: t has αὐ μέγα.

ἀναφανή. Will start up beyond the end of the row.

ἕτερον, Has no meaning here distinct from ἄλλο. B This idea is not 'different' in kind from the others, and it can be called a 'second' only if we arbitrarily call ἄλλο the first of the series.

ἄπαντα should in strictness be sing. to agree with ἐν ἕκαστον, but is attracted into the plur. by its mean. and by τῶν εἰδῶν. Having dealt a blow at the idea of μέθεξις or μετέλψις Parmenides now takes up the nature of the ideas themselves as apprehended by reason. Cp. Phaedo 74 B-C, ἀρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταῦτα ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται τῷ δ' οὐ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν... ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννεονόκας τε καὶ εἰληφας; ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Symp. 211 B, τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά ἵεναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ αἰεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἐνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυεῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωματῶν ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδεύματων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, ἕως ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκείνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτήσῃ ὃ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλον ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γινῶ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἐστὶ καλόν. Phaedr. 249 B, δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὼν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄν ὄντως. In all these generalization is regarded as a certain and fruitful method, not a hopeless one: also the objection that we merely read into sensible objects what we wish to find there is parried in a fashion by the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις and the walking of the soul with God. It will be felt that they are in advance of our passage. In particular the rising gradations

of the *Sympos.* from *καλὰ σώματα* through *ἐπιτηδεύματα* and *μαθήματα*, while resembling roughly the *ἄνθρωπος*, *πῦρ*—*καλόν*, *ἀγαθόν*—*ἐν*, *πολλά* of our 130 B, in crescendo abstractness, show a much firmer grasp of the subject. In the *Parmenides* the process is treated almost hopelessly—as a chasing of the rainbow. Nor must we mistake the contention. Our ideas of generalization are not what Plato has in his mind here (*Introd.* xlv.) though they do seem to be something like what he assumes in the dialogues just quoted. His meaning would be better suggested thus—

ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι then come successive generalizations.

<i>τὰ τῆδε</i>	+	1	+	2	+	3	+	4	+	etc.	+	n
<i>τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα</i>				<i>τὸ μέγα</i>		<i>ἄλλο μ.</i>		<i>ἄλλο</i>		<i>ἄλλο</i>		<i>ἄλλο</i>

Here the new *μέγα* does not arise in each case from a fresh generalization based on a new set of *τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα*. The latter are supposed to be exhausted in the first view—*ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι*—and the only new element at each step is the *τὸ μέγα* just previously reached. In this way not only does the process never end, but it is unfruitful in another sense. Each fresh judgment is what Kant calls analytic, not synthetic. All the evidence was led when the first was formed; in going on to a second and a third you add to that evidence merely a synopsis of itself. We may compare here—although it is used rather of the countless types of *εἶδη* than of the countless replicas of one—the language of *Arist.* already quoted, *Met.* i. 9, 990 b 1, *ζητούντες τῶνδὶ τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἕτερα τοῦτοις ἢ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀριθμῆται βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἰοῖτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοῖ.*

ἀλλὰ ... μὴ 'What if ... Should we perhaps say ...?' So in *Dam.* often *μήποτε*, as § 42, 84, *μήποτε οὖν ἀσφαλέστερον λέγειν ...* 'Ἰδωμεν, ἄθρει, or so is omitted.

ἢ τοῦτων ... προσήκη See Notes 1.: the order of the text is the more euphonious, and, so to say, distinguished. Is -*κει* of both Mss. due to dictation?

p. 7. *ἐν γὰρ τ' ἐν τε.* But Heind. says 'prius propositionis membrum οὕτω γὰρ ... εἴη explicatur per posterius hoc καὶ οὐκ ... ἐλέγετο, sc. τὸ ἀπειρα εἶναι τὸ πλήθος, ut parum hic apta videatur vocula τε.' He adds (not knowing X) scripserim *ἐν τε ἔκ.* With

regard to the whole passage—which has so struck some reader (*Arethas*?) that he has marked it with a σημείωσαι 'N.B.'—note that the process of reaching *εἶδη* by the method *ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι*, and the treating of them as *νόηματα* is much in accord with the *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* and the *ὀρίεσθαι καθόλου*, ascribed by *Arist.* to *Socrates* (*Introd.* xxix., xliii.). Plato does not accept the theory; but it is the first point at which the conception of an extended idea is definitely excluded. Grote refers to *Simplicius* on *Arist. Categ.* 8 b, 25, *τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνῆρουν τὰς ποιότητας τελέως, τὸ ποιοῦν συγχωροῦντες εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἀντισθένης, ὃς ποτε Πλάτωνι διαμφισβητῶν 'ὦ Πλάτων' ἔφη 'ἔπουν μὲν ὁρῶ, ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ' etc.* Here *ἱππότης* would be a *νόημα*, or with *Porphyrius Simplicius* etc., a *ψιλὴ ἐπίνοια* or *ἐννοια*. Referring to *ἐν ψυχαῖς* Grote says 'Here we have what *Porphyry* calls the deepest question of philosophy explicitly raised; and so far as we know for the first time.' *Porph.*'s words (*Isag.* to *Categ.* begin.) are *αὐτίκα περὶ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν τὸ μὲν εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται, εἴτε καὶ ὑφέστηκεν σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα, καὶ πότερον χωριστὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ὑφέστωτα, παραιτήσομαι λέγειν, βαθυνάτης οὕσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας καὶ ἄλλης μείζονος δεομένης ἐξετάσεως.* Grote refers to *Simpl.* on *Categ.* 8, 8 b οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑρετρίας ἀνῆρουν τὰς ποιότητος ὡς οὐδαμῶς ἐχοίσας τι κοινὸν οὐσιώδες, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ συνθέτοις ὑπαρχούσαις, and after referring also to *Dicaearchus* and *Theop.* he adds *οὔτε γὰρ σώματα οὔτε ἀσωμάτοις ἔθεντο εἶναι τὰς ποιότητας, ψιλὰς δὲ μόναις ἐννοίαις αὐτὰς ὑπελάμβανον διακένως λεγομένας κατ' οἰδεμῆος ὑποστάσεως, οἷον ἀνθρωπότητα ἢ ἱππότητα.*

οὐδενός; etc. See *Theaet.* 163 E, *τί δέ; μνήμη οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι; Ναί. Πότερον οὐδενός ἢ τινός; Τινὸς δὴ που.* That the *νόημα* must be *τινός* is clear: it is not clear that it must be *ὄντος*: so *Arist. Met.* i. 9, 990 b 25, *καὶ γὰρ τὸ νόημα ἐν οὐ μόνον περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐπιστήμη οὐ μόνον τῆς οὐσίας εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρων.* And what *Proc.* urges against the advance by generalization from *κοινότητες* (v. 131) is true here *λήσσομεν ἀπὸ πάντων εἰς ἐκείνας ὁμοίως ἀνατρέχοντες, οὐ μόνον ὦν εἰσὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὦν οὐκ εἰσὶν, οἷον τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, τῶν παρὰ τέχνην, τῶν παρὰ λόγον, τῶν ἀνοσιῶν,*

αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνυποστάτων, τραγελάφων λέγω καὶ ἱποκενταύρων· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτων κοινότητες· καὶ οὕτω τῶν οὐκ ὄντων θήσομεν ἰδέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῶν ἀπείρων, οἷον τῶν ἀλόγων γραμμῶν, τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς λόγων ... ὧν εἰσὶ κοινότητες. That Plato had no doubts as to the separate existence of these objects of νοήματα is clear. Cp. Rep. v. 476 C, ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε νομίζων μήτε, ἂν τις ἡγήται ἐπὶ τὴν γνώσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἐπεσθαι, ὅναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; etc.

C δ ... ἰδεῖν; The words should be taken thus [ἐνός τινος ὄντος] ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ—μίαν τινὰ ὄσαν ἰδεῖν—ἐκείνο τὸ νόημα νοεῖ; For the text see Notes 1. It seems here nearer the orig.—νοεῖ may have become νοεῖν by a confus. with either the μ of μίαν or the πάντα νοεῖν below (which in τ is nearly underneath, and may have been so in the archet.); and this corrup. would tend to produce εἶπον to govern the infin. Again ὄσαν is probably rightly explained by Heind.—‘legitimo modo positum est pro ὄν (agreeing with ὁ) propter praecedens μίαν’: failing that it must have the same sense as ὄντος above, and be taken closely with ἰδεῖν,—ὄσαν-ἰδεῖν = existent ἰδέα. Of transls. we may give Ast ‘Nonne unius cujusdam rei quam in omnibus exstantem cogitatio illa cogitat, ut quae una quaedam sit species?’ Heind. ‘Quod tanquam omnibus rebus inditum cogitatio illa cogitat?’ ‘of some one existent thing, which resting upon all objects—being in fact some single visible characteristic of them—that thought dwells upon.’ For the language see Theaet. 203 C, φέρε δὴ, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγωμεν τὰ ἀμφοτέρα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ἢ ἡ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;

ἰδεῖν ... εἶδος ἵσταται Stallb. ‘Itaque ex ταῖς ἰδέαις liquet τὰ εἶδη existere.’ It seems to be the fact that when these two words are not used as synonyms the former has more of the sensible in it. Heind. adds ‘ita rursus εἶδη existunt, a νοήμασι diversa.’

νοεῖν. ἐν εἶναι, ‘this object perceived by thought to be one.’

ἀνάγκη ἢ so read for ἀνάγκη ἦ, to save altering with editors to ἀνάγκη εἰ ... δοκεῖν. The sense seems good, and the language may be compared with Phaedr. 264 B, σὺ δ’ ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικὴν, ἢ ταῦτα ἐκείνος οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρ’ ἀλλήλα ἔθηκεν; Phaedo 76 E, ἀρ’ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἵση ἀνάγκη

ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι; ... ὑπερφύως ... δοκεῖ μοι ἢ αὐτῇ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

ἐκ νοημάτων ... εἶναι; See Tim. 30 B, οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶν ἐμψυχον ἐννοῦν τε ... διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν. Dam., § 26, 46, says of the one, ἐτι εἰ, ὅτι πάντα, διὰ τοῦτο γνωστόν, ἔσται καὶ γνωστικόν· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τῶν πάντων, and certainly if one is All it must ‘know even as also it is known.’ Our passage recalls the historic Parm. (Intro. xxxvi.) who holds that thought is identical with being, or certainly that being includes thought as part of itself. Of a much later date we have Plotin. Enn. v. 4, 2, νοῦς δὴ καὶ ὃν ταυτόν· οὐ γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ νοῦς ὥσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν προόντων, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πράγματα etc. But in our passage Plato assumes that a thought has itself the power of thinking (Intro. xlv.). For the language cp. Tim. 30 B, λογισάμενος οὖν (ὁ θεὸς) εὗρισκεν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλου κάλλιον ἔσεσθαι ποτε ἔργον, νοῦν δ’ αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῷ; also in another connection, Arist. Phys. III. 3, 202 a 30, ὥστ’ ἢ πᾶν τὸ κινεῖν κινήσεται, ἢ ἔχον κίνησιν οὐ κινήσεται.

καταφαίν. Cp. with note on καταμανθ. 128 A; and contr. with ἀναφάνη. 132 A and E. The observer detects as it were by looking from above, while the new object will emerge from below. See Phileb. 16 C, θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί; and 16 D, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ, and Crat. 401 B followed by 402 A. Proc., v. 160, notes the sudden boldness of Soc., καὶ διὰ τοῦ καταφαίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ φαίνεσθαι μόνον εἰπεῖν ἐνδειξάμενος, ὅτι διαφερόντως περὶ ταύτης τεθάρρηκε τῆς ὑποθέσεως. But is this accurate? Rep. x. 596 A has—after a reference to those who ἀμβλύτερον ὁρῶντες πρότεροι εἶδον—ἀλλὰ σοῦ παρόντος οὐδ’ ἂν προθυμηθῆναι οἷός τε εἶην εἰπεῖν εἴ τι μοι καταφαίνεται· ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ὄρα.

παραδείγματα ... φύσει, Two difficulties arise here, that of holding on to the intelligible character of the ideas when called models, and that of distinguishing between Plato’s concep. of φύσις here and our own. We would naturally think of physical patterns to be found in the sensible world, in spite of the warning of Proc., εἴωθε γοῦν ὁ Πλάτων καὶ

ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ φέρειν τοῦτο τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα. Stallb. well cites Rep. x. 597 B, οὐκοῦν τριτταὶ τινες κλίνειαι ἀδται γίνονται· μία μὲν ἢ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὕσα, ἣν φαίμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγώ· μὲν, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι, and so on till 598 A, and Phaedo 103 B. Arist. Met. i. 3, 984 b 15, again, comes nearer our conception when he says of Anaxag. Νοῦν δὲ τις εἰπὼν ἐκείναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει, etc. We may also cite Theaet. 176 E, παραδειγμάτων, ὃ φέρεται, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστῶτων, τοῦ μὲν θεοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου τοῦ δὲ ἀθίου (N.B.) ἀθλιωτάτου. Suid. says of παράδειγμα—εἰκὼν, ἢ χαρακτήρ ἐννοίαν ἔχων αἰσθητοῦ πράγματος. ... παράδειγμα μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅταν ἀντιπαραβῇ τις ὁμοίον ὁμοίῳ, ὅσον λογικῷ λογικόν. He quotes Alex. Aphrod. on Top. 254, παράδειγμα δὲ γίνεται τὸ ὁμοίον καὶ γνωριμώτερον τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ ἥττον γνωρίμου. To apply in our case, the word γνωρίμων must not be rendered 'familiar' but as = γνωστόν. For the reading ἐν τῇ φύσει as opp. to τῇ φύσει we have early testimony in favour of the Mss., as is noted by Fischer: the passage ἀλλ' ὃ Παρμ. ... εἰκασθῆναι being quoted by Stobaeus, Eclogg. Phys. p. 31, who is put roughly at the beginning of the 6th century A.D. On ἐστάναι Proc. says, v. 161, εἰ οὖν τὰ εἶδη καὶ ὁ Σ. ἐστάναι λέγει, τὰ δὲ ἐστῶτα (as he mentions above) κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἐν Σοφιστῇ γέγραπται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναι τὰ θεϊότατα τῶν πάντων ἐν Πολιτικῷ διώρισται, δηλὸν ὅτι τὰ εἶδη θεϊότατα ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκέτι νοήματα αὐτὰ ψυχῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξηρημένα πάντων τῶν τοιούτων.

τὰ δὲ ... ὁμοίῳ. This closely corresponds with Rep. x. 595 etc., where there is but one ἰδέα of each class μία μὲν κλίνης μία δὲ τραπέζης, and ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας, ὁ δὲ τὰς τραπέζας· but he adds, 597 A, οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὁ δὲ φάμεν εἶναι ὁ ἐστὶ κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά, which being so οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὄν ποιοῖ ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτον ὅσον τὸ ὄν, ὄν δὲ οὐ. Against this hypothesis Arist. urges Met. i. 9, 991 a 20 (Introduct. xlvi.), τί γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ιδέας ἀποβλέπον; ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ὁμοίον, ὁτιοῦν καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε καὶ ὄντος Σ. καὶ μὴ ὄντος γένετ' ἂν οἴοσπερ Σ. That is, apparently, A. admits that sensible objects—κλίνειαι τινές—might be modelled after ὁ ἐστὶ κλίνη, but sees nothing to necessitate this as the only expl. But does A. make as much as he

assumes by his argument? He does remove the necessity for ideas, which is much; but his own contention is not a *disproof* that two separate and apparently unconnected like objects were by some divine δημιουργὸς moulded consciously upon a divine pattern known to him. Alexand., in commenting on A. (574-5, Berlin), admits the connection which exists in nature—διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ,—but says to deduce παραδείγματα therefrom τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἔχει τὸ δὲ ψευδὲς τι γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ πάντα τὰ φύσει κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ καὶ ἀριθμούς τινες ὁρισμένους καὶ οὔτε ἀπὸ τύχης οὔτε αὐτομάτου, οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς παράδειγμα. οὐ γὰρ ἐννοοῦσα [so far as we know] ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ ἢ ποιεῖ (ἄλογος γὰρ αὕτη δύναμις ἐστίν), ἀλλ' ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ἐν τεταγμένη κινήσει ... ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος αἰ κινήσεις προέλθωσιν, οὐ χάριν ἐγίνοντο. ἣν τάξιν ἢ τέχνην ἐστὶ μιμουμένη· κατὰ τὸν λόγον γὰρ ταῦτα συντίθῃσι καὶ ποιεῖ ἢ ποιεῖ. διὸ ἢ μὲν τέχνην δύναμις ἐστὶ λογική, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἄλογος. He rejects the idea of calling the action of nature θεῖαν τινὰ τέχνην.

καὶ ἢ ... αὐτοῖς: Are τὰ μὲν εἶδη and τὰ δὲ ἄλλα above also noms. before their infins. like μέθεξις? or is this the begin. of a new direct constr. which relapses into the form of the previous sent.? The sense is clear, 'and this participation of the ideas accrues to the other existences in no other form than that of resembl. to them,' 'this particip. by the others in the ideas proves to be a simple resembl.' 'Et communitas ipsa qua ceterae res cum formis teneantur alia nulla esse nisi similitudo cum ipsis,' Ast. The form which would be grammatical with least change would be καὶ ἢ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν εἰδῶν γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ὅτι ἡκασθῇ αὐτοῖς. Note the difference between εἰκέναι, a mere fact, and εἰκασθῆναι, a fact with its producing cause. What is modelled on the παραδ. is called here a ὁμοίωμα and it is said εἰκασθῆναι; but the word εἰκὼν found in e.g. Tim. 29 B, ὁδὲ οὖν περὶ τε εἰκόνας καὶ περὶ τοῦ παραδ. αὐτῆς διοριστέον, does not occur. Yet this latter is the term which was accepted finally as the technical one: thus Dam. § 83, p. 190, οἷον εἰκὼν καθ' ἣν τὸ παραδ. εἴσεται, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὸ παραδ. τὴν εἰκόνα· καίτοι πολλὰ τῆς εἰκόνας ἢ πρὸς τὸ παραδ. τὸ οἰκεῖον διάκρισις: and § 93, p. 231, παραδ. γὰρ καὶ ὁ Σ. τῆς οἰκείας εἰκόνας. Is this not another evidence

that we are here at the beginning of Pl.'s theory on the subject? *ἔφη* Parmen., not Pythod., this time.

οὐδὲν τι... εἶναι Proc. maintains the possibility of such a one-sided connection even in the case of participation proper—*οὐκ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἐκείνοις ἀλλὰ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῖς* v. 129: and Dam. § 37, p. 77, draws distinctions *καὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἡλίου μύσαντες ἀφιστάμεθα μὴ ἀφισταμένου... καὶ τῆς ὕλης αὐτὴ διακρίνεται τὸ εἶδος οὐκ ἐχούσης τὴν διάκρισιν, εἶδος γάρ τι καὶ ἡ διάκρ. ... καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν τῷ παραδ. ὁμοία οὐκ ὄντι ὁμοίῳ τῇ αὐτοῦ εἰκόνι*: again *εἰ δὲ ὅτι ἡ εἰκὼν ὁμοιοῦται τῷ π., καὶ ταύτῃ ὁμοία κατὰ ἑλλειψιν, καὶ τὸ π. ὁμοιοῖ τὴν εἰκόνα πρὸς ἑαυτό, καὶ ταύτῃ ὁμοιον* [καθ' ὑπεροχὴν];

αὐτῇ [τῷ εἶδει] ἀφωμοιάθη [τὸ εἰκασθέν]; *ἡ ὅστις τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὁμοιον* [sc. τὸ εἰκασθέν] *μὴ ὁμοίῳ* [sc. τῷ εἶδει] *ὁμοιον εἶναι*; *μηχανή* with the simple inf. seems to be just as common in Pl. as it is with *ὥστε* or *ὅπως*. Note the want of the art. in *μη-ὁμοίῳ*. Is it because these words are part of the predicate?

τὸ δὲ... μετέχον; The connection is *ἀρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη τὸ ὁμοιον μετέχειν ἐνὸς εἶδους τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῷ ὁμοίῳ*, where however the last words are still condensed for *μετέχειν ἐνὸς εἶδους τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνῳ* *οὐδὲ τὸ ὁμοιον μετέχει*. The first *τὸ δμ.* is *τὸ εἰκασθέν*, the second which we have extracted from *τῷ δμ.* is the original *εἶδος* on which *τὸ εἰκ.* was modelled, while the two cases are combined in the *τὰ ὁμοια* ^E which immediately follows. Jackson (Jour. Philol. xxii. 291) would bracket *εἶδους* 'as a premature anticipation of Parmenides' next question.' Certainly the word might be dropped, if we are always to assume that an author said what centuries of criticism discover that he should have said.

οὐ μὴ, An odd neg.; it denies the previous one *οὐκ ἄρα οἶόντε*. We must take the *εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐχ οἶόντε* = *εἰ δὲ οἶόντε* and transl. with Stallb. 'sin aliter,' or with Ast 'alioquin.'

παρὰ τὸ... ἀναφ. etc. The same reasoning and in the same language as above *α.* The idea seems to be similar to what we observe when a company of soldiers forms 'from column into line'; as each new file comes up and takes his place and dressing, the officer at the pivot can say of him *ἀναφαίνεται παρὰ τὸν πρότερον*, and if he is not sufficiently visible the officer will bid him 'dress up.' The

difference is that in this case the movement starts from zero and has a definite end, while with Plato it starts from *τὰ πολλὰ ὁρατὰ* and is endless. There is, as we have hinted, another difference—the successive files are each a 'living man of mortal mould' contributing new strength to the formation, though no one claims to be better than the last: Pl.'s endless *εἶδη* are mere 'men of buckram,' each one being but a reflection of those before, with no substance of his own. In this view they resemble still better perhaps the reflections of a figure in two opposing mirrors; the figure is *τὰ πολλά*, the reflections are the successive *εἶδη*—they are endless, yet none of them contributes an atom of new information to justify its existence. This *ἀπορία* seems to be very much upon the analogy of Zeno's *ἀπορία* on motion: Zeno would prevent a man going from A to B not by adding to the distance but by dividing the given space into an endless succession of smaller and smaller parts. Or, as we have said, it resembles an analytic judgment which brings more clearly before us all the possibilities latent in the distance from A to B, or from *πολλὰ* to *εἶδος*, but does not synthetically increase our acquaintance with the unexplored region beyond. As to the mutual likeness, it is plain that an *εἰκὼν* (such as the copy of a picture) has been made like the original, without the other having been made like it—the likeness here is all on one side. But Pl.'s view is that the original must, not so transparently yet really, be itself a copy of some idea which was its model; and that both are like that, and so on.

καὶ ἂν It is striking to find *ἂν* and *ἐὰν* interchanged within twenty words. Probably the *καὶ* has something to do with the difference; yet Ast gives Polit. 292 E, *ἐπιστήμην, ἂν τ' ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐὰν μὴ*, which reverses the case. Are we certain that such uses are not sometimes due to the scribes?

καὶνὸν τῷ So *ῥ*, which seems clearly the better: ¹³³ see Notes 1. The question throughout is whether the *εἶδος* is like the *εἰκασθέν*, and here *ἐκείνο* is the new *εἶδος* which is assumed to be *ὁμοιον τῷ*; that being so, both are like some other thing which becomes *εἶδος ἕτερον αὐτ.*

καὶ οὐδέποτε... αἰεὶ etc. The language is a little odd, *καὶ καινὸν εἶδος οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον*,—it might have been *οὐδέ παύσεται ποτε καινὸν*

εἶδος αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον, omitting καί,—‘and never at all will a fresh εἶδος desist from always turning up.’

μετέχοντι. As the sole μέθεξις here is that of ὁμοιον γίγνεσθαι, it would be more correct though grammatically confusing to say τῷ ἑαυτῷ εἰκασθέντι. Here comes a pause in Par.’s ἀπορίαί to Soc.’s assumption of the ideas. Soc. gives up the argument, and does so because he cannot conceive how the ideas can influence the many, while yet remaining ultimate absolute entities νοητά, χωριστά, ἰστώτα ἐν τῇ φύσει. The μέθεξις cannot be physical else the ideas get broken up; nor can it be by resemblance else we have a progressus in infinitum—ἄνθρωπος + εἶδος ἀνθρώπου yielding a καινὸν εἶδος or τρίτος ἄνθρωπος and so on indefinitely. Introd. xii.

ὄρεσθαι οὖν, etc. It is not clear whether ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ form an attribute to εἶδη or, with ὡς understood, a part of the predicate with διορίζεται. Engelm. ‘wenn Jemand die Begriffe als an und für sich seiend gesondert hinstellt.’ t reads ἐάν τις ὡς εἶδη and so most texts; but it does not seem a gain, and may have arisen from a confusion of the eye with ὡς ἔπος below.

B οὐδέπω ἄπει. etc. Of course the verb is 2nd sing. mid. Stallb. says ‘h.e. αὐτῆς τῆς ἀπορίας, ὅση ἔστιν,’ while Heind. quotes as analogous Apol. 20 E, τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οὐα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεόν. Cp. as odd Crat. 413 C, ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγώ ... πολλὸν ἐν πλείονι ἀπορία εἰμὶ ἢ πρὶν ἐπιχειρήσαι ..., and Ar. Met. VI. 14, 1039 b, ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα τε συμβαίνει καὶ τούτων ἀποπώτερα. ἦ is given from a strong desire to follow ἄ wherever it yields a meaning. But the constr. is unusual, and t reads εἰ ἐν which also corresponds with ἐάν τις above.

ἐν εἶδος ἕκαστον ... θήσεις: The most natural understanding of this would be that of Heind. who arranges thus εἰ ἕκαστον εἶδος τῶν ὄντων ἐν τι αἰεὶ, ‘if you are always going to set up each several εἶδος of those which exist, as an exclusive isolated entity.’ This is quite clear, but it is a mere repetition of εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ διορίζεται, strengthened by ἐν ἕκαστον αἰεὶ. Can the words mean then that that former phrase admitted intercommunion of εἶδη which by this amended form is disallowed? If so, they are at variance with the whole purport of the following argument, which admits co-relations in the ideal sphere, and is directed to destroy only the

relation which Soc. assumed that sphere to have with the world of sense. If again we are to assume that the insistence upon the ἀπορία which arises out of the ἐν ἕκαστον αἰεὶ τι ἀφορίζμενος is meant to suggest that some εἶδη may be in connection with our world while others admittedly are not—then, while this would be in harmony with the constant contention of Proc. that there are ascending or descending grades in the ideality of the εἶδη, and that the solution of the problem is that there are σειραὶ—Jacob’s ladders, as it were—between the ideal and sensible spheres, it would place us under the necessity of assuming that Plato really was inclined to believe that οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, that you do ascend from sense to εἶδος by a graduated series of existences; a supposition which is not only at variance with the whole tone of his reasoning above, but is in absolute antagonism to what he advances for the next page. It would however have some affinity with his later views, Phileb. 16 D, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνός· τότε δ’ ἤδη τὸ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἔρν. As to language, τῶν ὄντων seems to mean the ideal not the sensible sphere, while ἀφορίζμενος would be simpler if changed to ἀφωρισμένον. πολλὰ etc. is as if he had said ὅσα ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπορα or ἀπορήματα.

εἰ τις φαίη ... εἶναι: The persons here are not easily kept distinct. It is clear that τις φαίη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι, ψεύδεται, and ὁ ἀναγκάζων are the same; and equally so that ἔχει τις ἐνδείξ. is another. Which is ἐμπειρος ὢν ... μὴ ἀφυῆς? Heind. says ‘is qui contendit ne cognosci quidem haec posse’: Stallb. says ‘potius is qui istius rei sententiam in dubium vocat et impugnatur.’ So again on ἐνδεικνύμενον Heind. says ‘sc. ὅτι ψεύδεται ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, manifesto enim hoc ἐνδεικνύμενον spectat ad praecedens ἐνδείξασθαι’: while Stallb. contends ‘τοῦ ἐνδεικ. quod prave Heind. refert ad adversarium, intelligendum est de illo ipso qui cognitionem ea ratione sublatam esse contendere fingitur.’ Stallb. sees the necessity for acuteness on the part of him chiefly who undertakes to prove the error of saying that the εἶδη cannot be known, and neglects in urging this necessity the clear connection of ἐνδεικνύμενον with ἐνδείξασθαι, which Heind. points out.

There can be little doubt that Heind. is right. Both men require to be acute, and if the man who denies the possibility of knowing the *εἶδη* is to be convinced of his error it will only be by arguments which come *πρόρωθεν* and which it will tax his intellect to follow. Arist. himself could not see the force of the argument in favour of knowing *εἶδη* which were *χωριστά*: and Pl. clearly points out, 135 A-B, that the cleverness of τοῦ δυνησομένου *μαθεῖν* on this point is second only to that of τοῦ ἄλλον δυνησομένου *διδάξαι*. The parallelism of the passages is complete *ἀμφισβητεῖν*—*ἀμφισβητῶν*, *εὐφροῦς*—*μὴ ἀφύης*, *ἐνδεικνυμένου*—*δυνησομένου διδάξαι*, *μαθεῖν*—*ἐπεσθαι*, *δυσανάπειστον*—*ἀπίθανος*. As regards language *πραγματενομένου* is gen. absol. and *ἐπεσθαι* is used without a case. *ἀπίθανος*, though generally meaning 'unpersuasive' rather than 'unpersuaded,' clearly corresponds to *δυσανάπειστον*, 135 A, and Ast renders it 'is cui non persuaseris,' while Müller gives 'unwiderlegbar': the Rhunk. Scholiast too has *ἀντὶ τοῦ δύσκολος καὶ μὴ ῥαδίως πειθόμενος*, and Stallb. agrees. For expressions cp. Phaedr. 229 D, *ἐγὼ δέ... ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός*. Phaedo 70 B, *ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ὥσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δέεται καὶ πίστεως*.

C. ἀναγκάζων Cp. Soph. 241 D, *βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὄν ὥς ἐστι* etc.; 246 B, *νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι*.

p. 8. οἶμαι ἂν 'I should suppose': ἂν recurs in place after ὁμολογ.

ἐκάστων The usual reading is αὐτοῦ ἐκάστων, and so t. It seems to make the passage tautological, and may have crept in from a zeal for exaggerated abstractness 'a separate existence, apart, of each separate *εἶδος*.' The text makes οὐσίαν = *ιδέαν*, and ἐκάστων = 'each several class of beings in the sensible world.' Cp. 135 B, also Phaedo 78 D, *αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι*, and 92 D, *ὥσπερ αὐτῆς (τῆς ψυχῆς) ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος*.

τίθεται is habitually used in this sense, as some English writers use 'posit'; but *εἶναι* rarely appears with it. The phrase is not similar to e.g. Phaedo 93 C, *τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι*, where the last three words are the judgment *ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἁρμονία* put as object of *θεμένων*: nor to Crat. 385 A,

ὁ ἂν θῇ καλεῖν τις ἕκαστον, which but varies the *ὁ τι ἂν τίς τῷ θῇται ὄνομα* of 384 D. Our passage means 'assumes or posits as existing,' and comes nearer to Rep. v. 458 A, *θέντες ὡς ὑπάρχον εἶναι ὁ βούλονται*, where *ὑπ. εἶναι* again seem connected with such other phrases as *ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῶ εἶναι*.

ἐν ἡμῖν: So again *ε* for the more usual *παρ' ἡμῖν*.

πῶς γὰρ PL's interlocutors cease raising difficulties when he wishes them to cease; see 137 B.

πρὸς ἁλλήλας etc. Introd. xlv. and on 130 B above. *αἰ* is fem. in both Mss., where we would rather expect *ᾶ* or *ὁ* ἐστὶν: but the sense is clear, as in Phaedr. 243 E, *ὥσπερ ἂν ἦς ὡς εἴ*. Stallb. seems to think that the alternative to *αἰ* must be not *ᾶ* or *ὁ* but *οἷα*, and that clearly this would be wrong. The full phrase would be *εἰσὶν αἰ ιδέαι εἰσὶν*, as in Rep. v. 533 D, *χρωμένη αἰς διήλθομεν τέχναις*, and 130 B, *ἦς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν*.

αὐταὶ 'scripserim αὐται pro αὐταὶ' Heind. There is no need; still there is a scratch over *αὐ* in *Ἀ*. *πρὸς αὐτὰς* combines the sense of *καθ' αὐτὰς* and *πρὸς ἁλλήλας*. We may cp. Dam. § 93, p. 231, *ἀρα οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ εἰκόνες, καὶ ταῦτα εἶδη ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκατέρωθι ἐστὶ; πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ εἰκὼν ὁμοιωμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ὁμ. ἀποτέλεσμα ὁμοιότητος ὁμοιοῦται δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὡσαύτως π. γὰρ καὶ ὁ Σ. τῆς οἰκείας εἰκ.*

τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν... ἕκαστα 'Quorum dum nos partem D habemus, singulis appellamur nominibus—v.c. magni parvi similes etc. Trahendum hoc εἶναι ad ἐπὶ νομαζόμεθα' Heind. 'Sive simulacra sive quo quis alio modo ea statuatur quorum dum participes sumus, singulis appellamur nominibus' Stallb. Our idiom would omit the first *εἴτε*. See for the idea and lang. Phaedo 100 C-D, more than once referred to: Stallb. also cites Crito 50 A, *εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὕπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο*, and others. One would suppose that the *ὁμοιώματα* were the individual things of sense which, as we have learnt to think, partake of and are called after *εἶδη*. But they are *ὁμοιώματα ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες*, which throws us back on the explanations of Proc. already quoted, 131 E etc., to the effect that there are grades of abstractness in the *εἶδη*, some *εἶδη* being *φυσικὰ* or *αἰσθητά*, which must be understood here. Plato must be held as saying—all our discussions on *εἶδη* thus far turn out

to be discussions upon spurious semi-sensuous models; for the more clearly we grasp the separateness which we ascribe to the εἶδη, the more clearly we see that they have nothing to do with our world.

ἐκείνους, 'Ceterum ἐκείνους dixit quia jam τὰ εἶδη in mente habebat' Stallb. These are the real εἶδη.

πρὸς αὐτὰ include the sense πρὸς ἀλλήλας, for we are dealing with ὁμοιώματα which πρὸς ἀλλήλα εἶστιν ἃ εἶστιν.

ἐστίν 'Temere aliquis inserendum conjectabat ἃ εἶστιν (after ἐστίν), quum ἐστίν hoc loco idem sit quod τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει' Heind.

καὶ ἐαυτῶν ... οὕτως; The transl. deal loosely with this; closest comes Engel. 'und von sich selbst, nicht von jenen, erhält gleichfalls den Namen, was benannt wird.' All seem to suggest that the genitives are equivalent to ἐπ', ἐξ, ἀφ', ἐαυτῶν ... ἐκείνων = 'and all things again in our world which are so named (large, small, like etc.) are named after themselves (i.e. each other), and not after those abstract εἶδη.' Is there any justification for this construction? It seems better to extend the passage thus—καὶ ἐαυτῶν αὐ [i.e. ἀλλήλων] ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὁμοιώματά ἐστιν ὅσα παρ' ἡμῖν ὀνομάζεται οὕτως [i.e. τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀνόμασι sc. μεγάλα, ἴσα, μικρά, δεσπότης etc.]: unless we prefer καὶ ἐαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων μετέχοντα ἐπονομάζεται ὅσα αὐ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως: It will be observed that Engel. severs οὕτως from ὀνομάζεται, and puts it as gleichfalls in another connection.

παρμενίδην ν wanting in A: in Σωκράτη ν is often added by scribes.

δεσπότης ἢ δούλος The example chosen by Arist. Categ. 7, 6 b 28 on πρὸς τι. ὁ δούλος δεσπότην δούλος λέγεται καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης: he adds διπλάσιον—ἡμίσεος, μείζον—ἐλάττωτος: but τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη Sometimes οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν ... οἷον τὸ πτερόν ἐάν ἀποδοθῇ ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερόν ὄρνιθος: ... but ἐάν ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οἷον τὸ πτερόν πτερωτοῦ πτερόν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτόν. We even coin to get the antith.: if we say τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πλοιοῦ ... οὐκ οἰκεία ἢ ἀπόδοσις: but with τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πηδαλιωτοῦ we are right τὸ γὰρ πηδαλιωτὸν πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν. We must be careful

then not to make the ἀπόδοσις πρὸς τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων as δούλος—ἀνθρώπου. See on 130 B.

αὐτοῦ δεσπότην ... ὁ ἐστίν We may note here these usages of αὐτὸς and ὅς. The originals we find in 134 B, αὐτὸ καλὸν ὁ ἐστίν [καλὸν], where concord is accurately observed, and we have throughout concords of αὐτὸς and ὅς taken separately. The rel. seems to have been fixed in the neuter first, for Pl. often uses ὁ ἐστίν absolutely, e.g. Phaedo 75 D, περὶ πάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τοῦτο ὁ ἐστίν: and we have here ὁ ἐστίν δεσπότης—δούλος. This phrase must be distinguished, as Stallb. says, from e.g. πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσὶν above and αὐτῇ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστίν ὁ ἐστίν below, which mean 'are what they are,' 'is what it is.' Again we have had, 130 B etc., such expressions as δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ and αὐτὸ τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου which, with the constant neuter forms such as αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν and τὸ ἐν, serve as bridges to phrases like Prot. 360 E, σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος ... τί ποτ' ἐστίν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή, where Herm. puts a comma after αὐτὰ, and Crat. 411 D, εἰ δὲ βούλει αὐτὸ ἡ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἐστίν ἔστις. In Arist. the phrases have advanced beyond themselves: for αὐτὸ ὁ ἀνθρώπος we get αὐτο-ἀνθρώπος and beyond ὁ ἐστίν—τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

δεόλου ὁ ἐστίν δεόλος No ὁ in A, but ἡ gives ὁ ἐστίν, and clearly this is wanted. On these two phrases Heind. says 'Epexegetesin referunt praecedentium αὐτοῦ δεσπότην et αὐτοῦ δούλου, in quibus commode abessent haec δεσπότην et δούλου.' ἀνθρώπος ὢν = εἰς ὢν τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, τῶν τῇδε.

τὴν θέναμιν ἔχα (sc. ἡν ἔχει), like ἐστίν ὁ ἐστίν above.

πρὸς αὐτὰ again involves καθ' αὐτὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλα: 134 καθ' αὐτὰ = in our (or the other) world πρὸς ἀλλήλα = towards each other, δεσπότης πρὸς δούλον and the converse. τῆς ὁ ἐστίν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἀν' ἐκείνης εἴῃ ἐπιστήμη [= εἴῃ ἢ ὁ ἐστίν]. In order the words would be εἴῃ ἀν' ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς ἐκείνης ἀληθείας ὁ ἐστίν (ἀλήθεια). Cp. Arist. Met. XI. 7, 1072 b, νόησις ἢ καθ' αὐτὴν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ ἐστίν: Stallb. is prob. right in saying that ἡ so closely after ὁ in regard to ἐπιστήμη is to point the distinction between ἐπιστήμη ἡ and τῶν ὄντων ὁ. He adds 'τὰ ὄντα sunt τὰ ὄντως ὄντα ut sexcenties.'

ἐκάστη ἢ ... συμβαίνει εἶναι; Steph. notes that ἐκάστη ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνει εἶναι ἐπιστήμη might equally

be συμβαίνοι *ἂν* ἐκάστην τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐπιστήμην. A desire for antithesis has entrapped Pl. into using ὄντων of sensible things. He had ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων ὁ ἔστιν above, and so he uses τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου here, where his usual guarded phrase τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, or τῶν *ἐν* ἡμῖν, would have done. ἀλλὰ μὲν ... εἶναι; = ἀλλὰ μὲν, ὡς ὅμ, οὔτε ἔχομεν γε αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, οὔτε οἶόν τε (ἔστιν αὐτὰ) παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι;

γένη εἶδη, ιδέαι and γένη are, or may be used as, equiv. when that is desirable. Here γένη is used probably because τοῦ εἶδους has preceded—the power of knowing being for the moment an εἶδος the objects of knowledge are for the time γένη. In a sentence we return to τῶν εἶδων οὐδέν: and after passing ιδέας αὐτὰς come to αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστ.

δ γε etc. Grote cites here Arist. Met. VIII. 8, p. 1050 b 34, εἰ ἄρα τινές εἰσι φύσεις τοιαῦται, ἡ οὐσία οἷα λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ιδέας, πολλὸν μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμον *ἂν* τι εἴη ἢ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ κινούμενον ἢ κίνησις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνέργειαι μᾶλλον, ἐκείναι δὲ δυνάμεις τούτων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρότερον ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς, φανερόν.

δ δὴ ... ὑπολαμβάν. Heind. says 'i.e. δ δὴ ὡς ὄντα ιδέας αὐτὰς ὑπολ.' perhaps rightly: but perhaps we should take ιδέας-αὐτὰς-οὐσας closely 'abstract existent ιδέας.' There may be point in ὑπολαμβάν. after the argument that the εἶδη cannot be known. We only assume their existence after all.

δυνότερον—τὸ δεινότερον οὐχ ὡς ισχυρότερον ἄπορον, ὡς εἰώθασι δεινοὺς λέγειν τοὺς κρατοῦντας τῇ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, ἀλλ' ὡς μείζονος δέματος καὶ εὐλαβείας τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν ἄξιον. Schol. Rh. from Proc. v. 220, who adds τὴν γὰρ ἔνωση τῶν ὄντων διασπᾶ καὶ διοικίζει χωρὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου τὸ θεῖον etc.

τὸ ποῖον: The punctuation is left as in *Ἠ*. This is clearly a question; and so in other cases.

ἀκριβέστερον as we talk of 'the exact sciences.' The sense is very clear in Phileb. 23 A, οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν [ἡδονήν] ἔρῃ ἤδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτὴ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν; So Nubes 130, πῶς οὖν ... λόγων ἀκριβῶν σκινδαλάμους μαθήσομαι; cp. 153, ὃ Ζεὺ βασιλεὺ τῆς λεπτότητος τῶν φρενῶν. Ar. Met. XII. 3, 1078 a, ὅσῳ δὲ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπλουστεύων, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰκριβές. From our context αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη = ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστ., ναί = φαίην ἂν:

ἔπερ τι ἄλλο ... ἐπιστήμην; Sense as clear and p. 9. constr. as faulty as Milton's 'loveliest pair That ever since in love's embraces met, Adam the goodliest man of men since born His sons, the fairest of her daughters Eve' (P. L. IV. 321). Pl. seems to mean 'If any other thing [than science?] possesses science, you would say that no one was more entitled to possess it than God': what he does mean would be clearer thus—οὐκοῦν θεόν, εἴπερ γέ τι φαίης ἂν ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην; The very tenses are jumbled.

παρὰ τῷ θεῷ In the νοητὸς τόπος as contrasted D with the ὁρατὸς or ὁρώμενος τόπος, Rep. VI-VII. 499-532 etc., Introd. xlix. Whatever may be meant by this, it is clear that God is closely associated with it. Thus Rep. X. 597 B, οὐκοῦν τριτταί τινες κλίνει αὐταί γίνονται· μία μὲν ἢ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐσα ἢν φαίμεν ἂν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι. Proc. v. 238, ὁ μὲν ὅλος συλλογισμὸς τοιοῦτός ἐστι τῶν προκειμένων· οἱ θεοὶ τὴν αὐτοεπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αὐτοδεσποτείαν ἔχουσι· τὰ τὴν αὐτοεπ. καὶ τὴν αὐτοδ. ἔχοντα οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ τὴν δεσποτείαν· οἱ ἄρα θεοὶ οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστ. καὶ τὴν δεσποτ., οὐ γιγνώσκουσιν ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ δεσπόζουσιν ἡμῶν. (οἷ or οὐκ ἄρα γ.) This holds only if we transl. the major (here second) premiss 'whatever has absolute science and power has a science and power which have no connection with us.' Dam. § 70, p. 154, doubts if even God can know the real One: τόγῃ πρὸ τοῦ ἡνωμένου ἐν ἐτι μειζόνως ἄγνωστον. It comes before νοῦς.

οὐτ' ἂν ... ἂν δεσπόσειεν οὐτ' ἂν The hypothetical form even redundant, and that after εἰ ... ἐστίν. The cond. is assumed as true—God has perfect knowledge: the consequence is felt to be questionable—he surely cannot be ignorant of our world. While Plato raises the question apropos of knowledge he soon makes it co-extensive with the whole scope of the two worlds. Indeed his language is elastic throughout—even θεὸς becoming θεοί.

ἄλλ' ὁμοίως ἡμῶς τε etc. Observe the precision of E the inference. If the one assumption holds the other holds. Is that a fact? 'Our science' may be powerless to know the divine, though in conjuring up and discussing all this it seems to do pretty well; but does it follow that the perfect divine science

must fail in knowing us? The greater includes the less, though not the less the greater.

θεοὶ ὄντες: Might be either because, or although, they are gods: we may say 'gods though they be.' ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ 'θεοὶ ὄντες' προστεθὲν πολλήν τινα τὴν ἐνδείξιν τῆς ἀπορίας: πᾶν γὰρ τὸ θεῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ βούλεται πάντα πληροῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ... ἐπήνεγκε μετὰ πολλῆς βαρύτητος 'θεοὶ ὄντες.' PROC. V. 237-9. ἀποστ. τοῦ εἰδέναι: not 'to say that God is without knowledge' but 'to rob God of some knowledge—make his knowledge less than universal—minish aught of it.' καίτοι (PROC. V. 240) πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἔδει στέρησιν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ' ὑπεροχὴν γνώσεως· εἴρηται γὰρ ἡ γνώσις ἐκείνῃ πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβεστέρα πασῶν· ἐπειτα εἰ καὶ στέρησιν ἔδει λέγειν, τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων πραγματείας (-τειῶν?) γνώσεως ἔδει τίθεσθαι τὴν στέρησιν ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς γνώσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο συνήγαγεν ὁ λόγος. This recalls the Phileb. as to the relative dignity of νοῦς and ἡδονή. Here the knowledge of αἱ ἡμετέραι πραγματεαίαι is put in the position of ἡδονή, and seems in the judgment of Proc. to merit the same rejection. 'The inference here drawn by Parmen. supplies the first mention of a doctrine revived by (if not transmitted to) Averroes and various scholastic doctors of the middle ages, so as to be formally condemned by theological councils. M. Renan tells us "En 1269 ... Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia" etc. (Ren. Avert. p. 213). The acuteness with which these objections are enforced is remarkable. I know nothing superior to it in all the Platonic writings.' Grote Pl. II. 275. Of course ἡ must be supplied mentally with μὴ λίσαν θαυμαστός. Heind. wishes to write it, and well cites 132 B and 136 D with others.

¹³⁵ **εἰ εἰσὶν ... τῶν ὄντων** etc. Once again we have the distinction noted in 133 A-B—if the εἶδη exist, and if each of them is to be held as separate from the others. Here τῶν ὄντων probably, though not certainly, = τὰ καθέκαστα. The order of the next words is ὁριεῖται τις ἕκαστον εἶδος (ὡς) αὐτό τε.

ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς etc. L. and S. give examples of this constr., and Stallb. cites Rep. V. 476 D, καὶ ἀμφισβητῇ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθὴ λέγομεν, and VI. 502 A-B, οὐ τε ... εἴ τε the copulative force is shown here by separating τε 'both that they do not exist and if they did exist ever so much.' Cp. L. and S. οὔτε 4. Stallb. raises difficulties, and proposes εἰ δέ. 'Sub-

jungere in altero orationis membro volebat haec οὔτε τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει γνωστά. Sed mutata verborum structura' etc.

λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε Several cases here of τε-καὶ run together. Stallb. rightly says we are not to expect τὸν λέγοντα because we have τὸν ἀκούοντα above. Τὸν ἀκούοντα is the subject of both ἀπορεῖν and δοκεῖν, while ταῦτα λέγοντα = ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃ. καὶ ἀνδρὸς etc. 'Ficinus: et viri admodum ingeniosi esse, percipere posse etc. Bene si legeremus καὶ ἀνδρ. πάνν ... εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι. Nunc nihil adest unde genitivi hi pendeant, neque structurae ratio constat, nisi post εὐφνοῦς excidisse putemus δεῖν. ut Charm. 169 A' Heind. A better case is Stallb's., Menex. 235 D, ἀγαθοῦ ἂν ῥήτορος δέοι τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὐδοκίμησοντος. The δεῖν may have been left out by his change of struct. He meant to put εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι after εὐφνοῦς, but having got so far wrote τοῦ δυνῆσθαι. after passing the proper point for δεῖν.

ἔτι θαυμαστ. Another irreg. He mentally recalls θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσ. when the constr. is no longer parallel. He should have said ἔτι δὲ εὐφνεστέρον. εὐρήσοντος, PROC. V. 240, says ὅτι γόνιμος καὶ εἰρητικός ἐστι περὶ τὴν διδασκαλίαν: we must add some such phrase as τὴν προσήκουσαν διδασκαλίαν. So Sophist. 253 C, πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δέ, καὶ σχεδόν γε ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης;

διυκρινῆσθαι. The Mss. agree: yet one would expect the genitive. τ shows traces of having at first reversed this and written δυνησόμενον, which is obviously wrong. As it stands, this part. must agree with ἄλλον whilst one would expect it to agree with τοῦ εἰρήσοντος. It gives, however, a good sense: the hearer (ἄλλον) has so profited and has so clear a conception of the case that he believes, after 'having sufficiently analysed or investigated.'

μὴ εἶσα εἶδη ... εἶναι, Notes 1. Ἄτ agree in reading εἶσα, which is due probably to dictation and is impossible, as εἰ precedes and ὁριεῖται follows. The phrase is counterp. of ἄγνωστα ἀναγκ. ... εἶναι 133 C.

ἀποβλέψας, Looking away from favourable points and confining his view to objections; cp. 130 E. μηδέ τι cp. the repeated use of τε in αὐτό τε ἕκαστον εἶδος A, and γένος τι ἕκαστον B above; yet Ἄτ might suggest μηδ' ἔτι, Notes 1.

τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον seems to decide that τῶν ὄντων

all through are the sensible world 'of each natural group of sensible, or at least of sublunary, existences.'

τὴν τοῦ διαλ. δύν. διαφθ. This means strictly metaphys. discuss. See above on 126 c; for the phrase Stallb. cites Phileb. 57 E, ἡμῶς ... ἀναίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγ. δύναμ. which is described as being περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως. also Rep. vi. 511 B, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἀπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλ. δυνάμει, which becomes in C ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ. The reason of its complete destruc. is clearly given in Arist. Met. i. 6, 987 a 32 (Intro. i. etc.) οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν (ὁ Πλατ.) ... ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὄρον (ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἐζητεῖ) τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός, ἀεὶ γε μεταβαλλόντων. In Theaet. 161 E, ξύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγ. πραγματεία becomes μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία—εἰ ἀληθὴς ἡ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου. Ar. Met. x. 6, 1063 b 10, μηθὲν γὰρ τιθέντες ἀναιροῦσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ὅλως λόγον. For the object of philosophical discussion you need an οὐσίαν or ἰδέαν τὴν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ οἶσαν. Proc. v. 253-58 discusses the question as regards ὑπόδειξις, ὁρισμός, διαίρεσις, and ἀνάλυσις, and finds that all require τὸ ἀκίνητον τὸ μόνιμον τὸ τέλειον τὸ μοναδικὸν τὸ αὐλόν etc. for their action, δοξαστικῆς γὰρ ἔστι διαιρετικῆς τὰ ὑστερογενῆ (= τὰ αἰσθητὰ) διαιρεῖν, διανοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἐπιστημονικῆς τὰς οὐσιώδεις τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ λόγων διαφορὰς θεωρεῖν etc.

καὶ μᾶλλον ᾗσθησθαι: Stallb. quotes Ficinus 'tu praecipue sensisse mihi videris' but suggests that μᾶλλον may also mean justo magis, nimis. In the former case we must understand μᾶλλον ἑτέρου—does he allude to the search for general definitions on the part of the historic Socrates as the reason?—in the latter case he may be supposed to have shown signs of being very much impressed by the force of Parmenides' argument.

τί οὖν ... πέρι; for dialectic and philosophy are one, Sophist. 253 E, ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῃ δώσεις ... πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφούντι. For the language see Rep. vii. 539 C, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται. Cp. Met. i. min. 2, καὶ τὸ γινώσκειν οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ γὰρ οὕτως ἄπειρα πῶς ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν; XII. 10, 1086 b, there is a difficulty both with and without the ideas εἰ μὲν γὰρ τις μὴ θήσει τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι κεχωρισμένας, ... ἀναι-

ρήσει τὴν οὐσίαν ... ἂν δέ τις θῇ τὰς οὐς. χωριστάς, πῶς θήσει τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν;

ἀγνοομένων τούτων; Does τούτων mean τῶν εἰδῶν (ἀγνώστων ὄντων)? or does the phrase mean 'these matters being undetermined'? Probably the latter; denial of the existence of the εἶδη has interposed since they were pronounced unknown, and a new paragraph begins here.

The following are the cardinal points in the discussion, thus far. 1. The terms εἶδη γένη ἰδέαι represent certain intellectual entities influencing essentially the world which we apprehend by the senses. 2. This latter is not subjective in the sense of being a mere series of impressions: it is objective, but as γιγνόμενον it cannot be known. 3. The εἶδη are totally separate from it and, if known, are known not by αἴσθησις but by λογισμὸς διάνοια νοῦς ἐπιστήμη. 4. After some efforts the best conception of the influence exerted by these εἶδη upon our world is found to be that they act as models after the pattern of which its several constituents are framed. 5. We advance to a knowledge of the εἶδη from our side by a process of inference and comparison; and it seems to be suggested that there may be stages in this advance—an early one being the sensible picture or what Proclus calls the αἰσθητὸν or φυσικὸν εἶδος, whilst a more adequate one is the νόημα or ψυχικὸν εἶδος. 6. But in the end we are baffled:—for (a) the process runs on ad infinitum—and naturally so, the εἶδη being given as χωρίς: (b) the εἶδη if reached would thereupon cease to be what they are—χωριστά, which it is their duty to remain, and would become tainted with a sensible flavour. However far we prosecute our 'victorious analysis,' or rather synthesis, the result when attained will remain at best an object of 'our science.' The world of εἶδη is the unconditioned, to know it would be to condition it. 7. This χωρισμὸς follows its own course of victorious analysis—will not 'burn so high and no higher.' After separating the εἶδη from our sphere it enters the νοητὸς τόπος itself and runs riot there, parting the ideal sphere into as many isolated units as will match the divisions of the sensible world. This involves an ideal knowledge which we don't possess, and whose possessor does not know us. 8. Thus to solve the riddles of world α, of which we know

little, we call up world β , of which we cannot know anything, and are left plantés là. While if we refuse to call up the latter, rational reflection is denied us.

We may note several facts in passing:—1. Although we have spoken of two worlds here, Plato does not so speak: he says merely τὰ πολλά, τὰ εἴδη. We must go to the Timaeus for the two worlds—for the κόσμος or ζῶν ὁρατὸν whose model is a ζῶν νοητόν (30-31 etc.). This may be an advance. At least it organizes the two spheres. Is Plato leading to this theory by his present ἀπορία? 2. We have not a whisper of ἀνάμνησις as a bridge between the spheres. For that and the immortality of the soul we must go to the Phaedo and Philebus. Is not it an advance also? 3. There is no suggestion that the world of sense has any worth—philosophic worth, at least—in itself. Yet it is a vast series of individual objects with an ἐπιστήμη of its own! When contrasting νοῦς and ἡδονή in the Philebus he presses the point that all trace of the former which may lurk in the latter must be eliminated, and has no difficulty then in degrading the latter completely. But here we have the world of sense consisting of such objects as ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλα as these are understood by us, and yet we need another world in order to make such a one an object of thought. Or does he mean that what knowledge we have here is due to that other world, whether we can explain it or no? 4. Science or knowledge can have only τὸ ὄντως ὄν for its object, and has no proper sphere in a world such as ours—τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν: not only must it have something unchangeable for its object, but it is something essentially ἀκριβές or exact in itself. Does not this look too exclusively at science as a result, forgetting science as a process? Knowledge starts from ignorance and does not reach perfection per saltum. However immutably existent its object may be, how does that object look in the process of becoming known? It can appear only as a γιγνόμενον—that is, under the character assigned to an object of sense in a sensible world. Then how can we be sure that it is not such? Alternatively, if science is always a fact or result and not a process, does not that make it a mere analytical thing, and deprive it of the power of advancing synthetically into the unknown? See Introd. xlii-li.

πρῶτ. It is not always clear in the Mss. whether an ι is subscript or not—all being postscript. Here it is clearly a separate syllable: while in πρῶτῃ immediately below it must be meant as subscript for the accent is upon the ω. This in each case accords with Curtius, s.v. But what of ἰδολεσχίαι, D, where the ι is inserted on a scratch? See L. and S. On πρῶτῃ Heind. says vox haec rariore significatu h. l. sonat 'nimis mature,' and aptly quotes Sophocl. Trach. 631, δέδοικα γὰρ | μὴ πρῶ λέγοις ἂν τὸν πόθον τὸν ἐξ ἐμοῦ, πρὶν εἶδέναι τάκειθον εἰ ποθοῦμεθα, which also supports his preference for πρῶτ. καλόν τε τί so from the Mss. reading καλόν τέ τι with most editors. But cp. Heind. 'Vulgo καλόν τε τί καὶ. Sed καλόν τι h. l. est i. q. εἶδος seu γένος τι τοῦ καλοῦ. De pulchri justique et boni definitione in his non est sermo.' That is, although ὀρίεσθαι is the verb used, Pl. does not here speak of defining τί τὸ καλόν; the phrase corresponds to ὀριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος in 135 A. And yet there is room for doubt, as Parm. refers to what Soc. had been attempting in another discussion and the attempt to define is the great characteristic of the historic Soc. Proc. too assumes a ref. to definition, v. 261, καὶ πῶς, φαίη ἂν τις, ὅλως δυνατόν ὀρίεσθαι τὰ εἶδη; τὰ γὰρ ἀπλᾶ καὶ ἀμέριστα περικιλίαν λόγων οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται καὶ σύνθεσιν etc.

Ἐκκυσον δὲ etc. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τῆς λέξεως τὸ μὲν D p. κ. 'εὐ ἴσθι' προσκείμενον βεβαιοῦν αὐτῷ τὸν ἐπαινον, ὃν ἐπῆνεσε, τὸ δὲ 'ἐκκυσον' δεῖξιν ἔχειν τῆς συμπαθείας αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς πτοίας τῆς περὶ τὸ ὄν' ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τινῶν δυσασποσπάστων καὶ δυσμεταθέτων, οὕτως εἶπε τὸ 'ἐκκυσον,' ἔλξιν προσειπὼν τὴν ... περὶ τὰ διαλεκτικὰ θεωρήματα μελέτην καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα μετὰστασιν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὄντως ὄντων θεωρίας. Proc. v. 267. But does the word mean 'to drag himself away from his present studies to preliminary exercises'? It means rather, as we say in Scotch, 'tax yourself' 'pull yourself about' as a gymnast in training must do. K. J. Liebhold (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 123, 1881, p. 561) objects to ἐκκυσον as always involving resistance, which no doubt it does to some extent; and proposes ἐκλυσον, citing Lach. 194 C, ἡμᾶς τε τῆς ἀπορίας ἐκλυσαι etc., and Tim. 22 D, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σώζει λυόμενος. This is ingenious, but it disturbs the metaphor.

τῆς δεκοῦσθαι ἀχρήστ. etc. We can hardly suppose

that ἀδολεσχίας is the subst. meant here, as that would not seem, but actually be, useless; probably some such word as μελέτης, πραγματείας, γυμνασίας was designed. ἀδολεσχίας, 'useless prosing,' Grote.

οὕτως, so t, no doubt rightly; ἄ gives οὕτως.

πλὴν τοῦτο γε etc. 'You have been injudicious save in this one point with which I was struck': as if τοῦτο μέντοι γε. For the sentiment see Phaedo 89 A, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, and above 129 E. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον, 'and that in regard to Z. himself, of whom I am speaking.'

Ξ τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκ. 'dass man ... dem Irrthum nachspüre' (Müller), 'den Irrthum zu erforschen' (Engelm.), and Stallb. says πλάνη, i. q. ἀπορία ἐν τοῦτοις παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένη. This makes the words run οὐκ εἷας (ἡμᾶς) ἐπισκοπεῖν τὴν πλάνην ἐν τοῖς ὁ. Proc. again, v. 274, says δεῖ τοίνυν τῆς πλάνης τῶν διαλεκτικῶν πρὸς τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν τῶν εἰδῶν ... τὴν ὅλην τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, ἣν θριγκὺν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐκάλεσεν, ἐν λογικαῖς ἡμᾶς ἀνελίξισι καὶ διεξόδοις γυμνάζουσιν ... πλάνη γὰρ τὸ μὴ μόνον τάληθ' σκοπεῖν, ὅπως ἀποδεκτέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν μεθόδων ἐκπεριτρέχειν ἐλέγχοντα ... καὶ εἰκεν ἡ πλάνη τέτταρα δηλοῦν ἢ ... ἢ πλῆθος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα χωροῦν, ἢ ... τούτων δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων ἡ διαλεκτικὴ λέγεται γυμνασία πλάνη κατὰ τὸ τρίτον, ὁδεύουσα διὰ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ὑποθέσεων. So in 136 E we have ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης, 'libera disputatio' Ast calls it, while ἐπισκοπεῖν has the same sense as in 159 B. The words would thus run ὅτι οὐκ εἷας τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα. 'You would not suffer the argument to investigate merely in the' etc. In 2 ... λόγῳ ... εἶδη ... εἶναι: Heind. says that λόγῳ = λογισμῷ, and argues for ἡδη (the read. of E) in place of εἶδη, but ἄ and t agree on the text.

ταύτη γε οὐδὲν etc. ταύτη γε = αὐτὴς περὶ ταῦτα ἐπισκοπῇ. Cp. 129 C-D etc., where he showed ἐμὲ λίθους ξύλα to be one in their collective capacity, many as having numerous qualities. Now, he rejects ideas for stones etc., and to that extent the world of ideas is less open to this treatment than the world of sense. But he holds that there is an αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου, and this is one and many in its degree. It has not as many qualities as ἐγώ,

but it has very many, all that he directly assigns to ἐμὲ and more, and as having these it is many, while it is one in its character as εἶδος ἀνθρώπου. Plato as creator of ideas dwelt strongly on their character as simplifiers of phenomena, that was their raison d'être; but they grow under his hand until their simplicity is not their most marked feature.

οἶον, The general sense is clear, but some words must be mentally supplied. The following may represent fairly Plato's thought—οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν ζήνων ὑπέθετο [μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι (unless εἰ βούλει be taken parenthetically), χρὴ σκοπεῖν ὑποτιθέμενον] εἰ πολλὰ etc. The inf. has been held over to πάλιν σκοπεῖν. The antitheses seem almost needlessly elaborate; τί συμβήσεται καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς αὐτά, καὶ τούτοις ἀμφοῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα would suffice.

αἰεὶς etc. See Notes I. ὑποθῇ, 2nd sing. of ὑποθῶμαι, cp. βούλει above and μέλλεις below c. On τί ἐφ' ἐκατέρας Stallb. cites 160 c and Sophist. 251 E, τί οὖν οὐ ... ἐφ' ἐκάστου τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω; τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις = to the things postulated and to their antithesis in the given case.

καὶ περὶ στάσεως 'Posteriorius περὶ elegantius abeset,' Heind., and editors omit it,—yet its retention is quite reasonable. Hitherto we have had some details, here begins a summary statement. That statement is introduced by καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος—the first step in the descent; the second comes in the repeated περὶ; then follows the bald enumeration.

δετ ... ὁσαύτως It is not easy to think out the details of this dictum. Take the case actually selected in this dialogue. If you 'posit' the 'one,' then its antithesis—the others which you don't posit—is certainly 'many'; and what he seems to say is that you must institute an inquiry in which you compare this one with 'each one of the others, and with several, and with the whole mass of them,' and the converse. But the dialogue, although it is pretty detailed, does not fulfil the pledge. Yet the statement is sound. We do not truly know any thing, however small, until we have viewed it in relation to all other things whatsoever. And the extent to which we fall short of that standard of knowledge is what divides us from omniscience, and

makes 'our little systems' 'but broken lights.'
Cp. *Intro.* lii.-lx.

c *ἐπειθεο* is probably correct: t gives it, while *Ἀ* is corrupt. Heind. wishes the aorist, but he might as well change *προαιρῇ* to *προέλῃ*. The aorist simply notes an item; the present or imperfect gives to that pictorial reality. 'Whether you assumed as existing what you actually were assuming in the given case or whether as not existing.' *κυρίως διόψεσθαι* is no doubt correct: t gives it, *Ἀ* is corrupt, 'to see through and through the truth with the eye of a master,' so to speak, who has finished his apprenticeship. See Notes 1.

ἀμήχανον ... πραγματίαν, etc. 'A work of awful magnitude,' Grote; 'an undertaking with which my resources cannot cope.' We might perhaps have printed *-τείαν*, as *Ἀ* is corrected and t so writes; yet *Ἀ* gives *-τιώδη* 137 B. *σφόδρα μανθ.* 'I do not completely understand.' So Phaedr. 263 D, *εἰπέ καὶ τόδε ... εἰ ὠρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου. Νῆ Δί' ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα*: Phileb. 58 D, *καὶ νῦν δὴ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἱκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι. τί οὐ διήλθες*, so Sophist. 251 E, quoted above on *τί ἐφ' ἐκατέρας*. The aorist seems to be part of the phrase. Thus Gorg. 468 C, *ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὐ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις*; has an entirely different sense 'why do you make no reply?' While Protag. 310 A, *τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν*; Symp. 173 B (similar); Phileb. 54 B, *τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ ὦ Σ.*; and Phaedo 86 D, *εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο*; are all a form of imperative—'why have you not done it? pray do it at once.'

p. 11. D *προστάτεις ὡς τηλικῶδε*: Several parallels occur in Sophist., e.g. 226 C, *Ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάτεις*. 234 E, *ὡς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῶδε ὄντι κρίναι*—spoken by Theaet. a youth. Polit. 263 A, *οὐ φαῦλον προτάτεις, Σώκρατες*. Of the demonsts. *τηλικῶδε*—*τηλικούτῃ* (below), it often happens that the former stands like *ὅδε* for the 1st pers., the latter like *οὗτος* for the 2nd—'a man of my, of your, years.' Yet see Apol. 25 D, *Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὢν, ὥστε* etc.

δεῖμα So t, clearly better than *Ἀ*. Notes 1.

μὴ γὰρ σὺ φαῦλον ἦ We have a double parallel, Rep. 11. 368 B-C, *δέδοικα γάρ, μὴ οὐδ' ὅτιον ἦ παραγε-*

νόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν etc., where we have the rationale of *μὴ ἦ*: and *εἶπον οὖν ... ὅτι τὸ ζήτημα ὃ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον, ἀλλ' ὀξὺ βλέποντος*. Stallb. gives others, e.g. 374 E, *οὐκ ἄρα φ. πρᾶγμα ἡράμεθα*. Cp. Polit. 263 A above.

εἰ ... πλείους ἦμεν οὐκ ἂν ἦν A model *condit. sent.* where the conclus. is *ἀλλ' οὐ πλείους ἐσμέν*. It seems to clash with 127 C, if we are to press that as alluding to the auditors of this discussion and not the visitors of Parmen. *ἀπρεπῇ ... τοιαῦτα ... λέγειν*, 'such things are unbecoming to utter.' *ἀπρεπῆς* would have been simpler.

ἐντυχόντα ... νοῦν ἔχον. 'Die Wahrheit zu treffen und Einsicht zu erlangen.' Engelm. 'ut quis verum adipiscatur et intelligentiae compos fiat.' Ast, who reads with t *σχεῖν*: and others take *νοῦν ἔχειν* or *σχεῖν* in a similar sense. Proc. too, v. 311, uses such phrases as *ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς πλάνης ταύτης ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ ὁ νοῦς ... τοῦ χωριστοῦ νοῦ μετοισίαν*. ... *μόνη δὲ ἡ κατὰ νοῦν ζωὴ τὸ ἀπλανὲς ἔχει*. The last words however, with *καὶ θόρυβον αὐτῇ* (sc. *τῇ ψυχῇ*) *παρέχειν ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι* point to the reasonableness of taking *νοῦν ἔχειν* as 'to keep one's head' on discovering the truth, as opposed to *ἰλιγγίαν*. Thus Phaedo 79 C, the soul when contaminated by *αἰσθησις* etc., *αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα*, all which is altered *ὅταν ... αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ*; so Prot. 339 E, *καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὥσπερ ἐῦ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα*—he needed ἡ διὰ πάντων δέξιος. This view is at least worth considering. On this passage Proc., v. 311, says, beyond Pl., *οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄλλως ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα μὴ διὰ τῶν μέσων πορευθέντας ὁδῶν τῆς ζωῆς, ὡς γὰρ ἡ κάθοδος ἡμῖν διὰ πολλῶν γέγονε τῶν μεταξύ ... οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀνοδος διὰ πολλῶν ἐσται μεσοτήτων*.

διὰ χρόνου: This cannot be historical. For the phrase, we also sometimes say 'through time,' not in the sense of 'after a long interval' but in that of 'as time goes on.'

ἐνδεῖξ. δ λέγει, Indirect for *τί οὐκ ἐνδείξω ὁ λέγεις*; Cp. Rep. 1. 338 A, *μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει· ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθορήσης καὶ Γλαῦκος τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους*; and so elsewhere. Why is the first inf. aorist and the second present? τὸ του 'Ιβ. *πεπονθέαι*. The perf. inf. slightly differs: *π*

from πάσχειν, 'to have met with an experience like that of.' τὸ τοῦ μελοποιοῦ Ἰβύκου ῥητόν: 'Ἐρως αὐτὲ με κυανέουιν ὑπὸ βλεφάροις τακερὰ. ὁμ'μασι δερκόμενος κηλήμασι παντοδαποῖς, εἰς ἀπειραδίκτυα κύπριδος βάλλει· ἢ μὲν τρομέω ἴν' [νιν] ἐπερχόμενον' ὥστε φερέζυγος ἵππος ἀεθλοφόρος ποτὶ γήραι ἄσκων, [ἀεκ-]' σὺν συνοχέσι [ῥεσφι?] θοοῖς εἰς ἀμύλλαν ἔβα. Sch. t 81 a 1. Proc. omits νιν and reads ὥς τις, ἄσκων, θεοῖς. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici, reads 'Eros, τακερ', ἐς twice, γήραι, and divides into lines ending δερκόμενος, βάλλει, γήραι, ἔβα. Ibycus belonged to Rhegium but lived at Samos, γέγονε δὲ ἑρωτομανέστατος περὶ μεράκια.—Suidas. Quis est enim iste amor amicitiae? cur neque deformem adolescentem quisquam amat, neque formosum senem?... maxime vero omnium flagrasse amore Rheginum Ibycum, apparet ex scriptis etc. Cic. Tusc. iv. 33. μεμνημένος Does this refer to times when Z. formerly heard the discussion?

διανεῦσαι... λόγων. Sch. t in mg. 81 a 1—πῆραιω-θῆναι, and Rh. Ἄ has -νύσαι: even this is used of the sea by Hesiod, as L. and S. show; but the text makes the metaphor clearer. Ficinus 'quo pacto tam grandis natu tam profundum disserendi pelagus transnatare queam' has suggested to many that he had πύλαγος λόγων. He may be merely pointing the metaphor. If he had this, where did he get it? Stallb. well quotes Phaedr. 264 A, ὅς... ἐξ ἱπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον. Rep. iv. 441 C, ταῦτα μὲν ἄρα... μόγεις διανενεύκαμεν, with others. Thus πύλαγος is not needed; nay, διανεῦσαι may itself be an early error suggested by such passages as an improvement. But if διανύσαι be correct it is the sole case of this word in Pl.

ὁμῶς δέ... ὅ etc. This seems the best solution—ὁμῶς δέ = 'but however,' with an aposiopesis, and ὅ as relative. 'However (let us proceed), for I needs must comply, and moreover, as Zeno says, we are by ourselves.' The only difficulty in the way is that Ζήνων will have no article, which is unusual hitherto. On δέ γάρ Heind. says 'ut bene monuit Heusd. (Spec. Crit. p. 10) post ὁμῶς δέ elliptice omisum est διανενωτόν vel simile quid, ab eoque vim suam accipit hoc γάρ,' and he very aptly quotes Charm. 175 B, νῦν δέ—πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὐρεῖν etc. We may add for an aposiop., resumed by breaking the constr. later, Theaet. 143 D,

νῦν δέ,—ἦττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τοῦσδε φιλῶ, and for lang. Alicib. i. 118 B, ὀνομάζειν μὲν ὀκνῶ, ὁμῶς δέ, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν, ῥητέον. Stallb. cites Pind. Pyth. i. 164, and better Aristoph. Lysistr. 144, ὁμῶς γε μάν' δεῖ τὰς γὰρ εἰράνας μάλ' αἶδ.

ἀρξόμεθα... ἡγησόμεθα; So Ἄt. A 2nd hand in t¹¹ alters to ἀρξόμεθα, erasing the first half of ω. The cause of the change is clear; but the words do quite well: 'whence then are we to begin, and (if we do begin) what shall be our first assumption?' In this connec. we have a good illustr. of the danger of assuming that commentators had certain readings because of expressions which they use. Proc. says (quoting), v. 320, δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ 'πόθεν ἀρξομαι' καὶ τὸ 'τί πρῶτον ὑποθῆναι' etc., while, 326, he says what we quote below. Probably neither represents his text.

πραγ. παιδ. παίζαν, 'Operosum ludere lusum' Stallb., 'to amuse ourselves with a laborious pastime' Grote. 'Nihil viderunt, qui ex hoc loco voluerunt demonstrare, universam, quae deinceps agitur, disputationem nihil esse nisi dialecticum aliquod artificium, quo artes Eristicorum, imitatione scilicet delusae exagitarentur.' Stallb., and rightly; but the phrase detracts from the seriousness of the issue. We never quite allow metaphysics to overwhelm us, feeling that the laws of nature will continue to act until our system is ready. And yet, as Pl. says, Polit. 307 D, παιδιὰ τοίνυν αὕτη γέ τις ἢ διαφορά τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· περὶ δὲ τὰ μέγιστα νόσος ξυμβαίνει πᾶσιν ἐχθίστη γίνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν. In Laws vii. 803 C he speaks of man as θεοῦ τι παῖγνιον... τούτῳ δὴ δεῖν τῷ τρόπῳ ξυνεπόμενον καὶ παίζοντα ὅ τι καλλίστας παιδιὰς πάντ' ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα οὕτω διαβιῶναι, τούναντίον ἢ νῦν διανοηθέντας. Perhaps the point is that referred to in Theaet. 168 E, where Soc. says to Theod. that they may have to dispute together, ἵνα μὴ τοι τοῦτό γε ἔχῃ (ὁ Πρωταγόρας) ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μεράκια διασκεψάμεθ' αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον. Parmenides' auditors are mostly young.

ἀπ' ἐμ. ἀρξομαι etc. Proc. v. 326, δοκεῖ δ' ἐμοί γε τοῖς προειρημένοις συμφώνως ἀποδοῦναι τὰ προκείμενα, τῷ μὲν 'πόθεν ἀρξομαι' τὸ 'ἀπ' ἐμαντοῦ,' τῷ δὲ καὶ 'τί πρῶτον ὑποθήσομαι' τὸ καὶ 'τῆς ἐμαντοῦ ὑποθέσεως' καὶ οὐ ταῦτον ἐνδείκνυσθαι δι' ἀμφοῖν· οὐ μὲν γὰρ τὸν τρόπον ἀφορίζεται τῆς ἐνεργείας... ὅπου δὲ

τὰ ὑποκείμενον αὐτῇ πρᾶγμα περιποιήσεται τὴν διέξοδον τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου. Whatever we may think of this, his next remark is suggestive, if overstrained—θεοειδὴς καὶ ὁ τρόπος ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν θεῶν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχεται ἐνεργεῖν. Parm. imitating the divine says this καὶ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον ἀλλὰ κἀκείνο, τὸ πραγ. παιδ. παιζ., θεῖον γὰρ δὴ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο, τὰς ἐμφάσεις καὶ πολυμερίστους ἐνεργείας παιδιὰς καλεῖν· παίγνιον γὰρ θεῶν καὶ ἄνθρωπον [text gives -πων, but see above, Laws VII. 803 C, which is clearly referred to] καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅποσα κατὰ τὰς ἐξω προϋούσας αὐτῶν ἐνεργείας ὑφέστηκε· παιδιὰ μὲν διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς ὁξὺς λόγος πρὸς τὴν ἡρεμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡνωμένην τοῦ ὄντος νόησιν etc. There may be in fact a playful allusion to Homer's Ἀτρεΐδῃ ... σέο δ' ἄρξομαι, Il. ix. 97, and Pindar's ὕμνησαν Διὸς ἀρχόμεναι, Nem. v. 45. The constr. βούλεσθε ... ἄρξομαι has ample parallels, e.g. 142 B; also Phaedr. 228 E, ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει καθεζόμενοι ἀναγνῶμαν; repeated 263 E; and others.

πρὶ τοῦ ... συμβαίνειν: Proc., v. 322, says one may ask πῶς ὁ Παρ. ὁ περὶ τὸ ἐν οὐ διατρίβων ἑαυτοῦ κέκληκεν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἐν; and says some suggest that like Gorgias Protagoras etc., Parm. becomes in Pl. φιλοσοφώτερος καὶ ἐποπτικώτερος ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ὁρώμενος. Pl. sees that τὸ ἐν ἐπέκεινα καὶ ὄντος καὶ οὐσίας πάσης ἐστὶ etc. Stallb., again, says that while Parm. does not seem to have called his ὄν ἐν—tamen quoniam τὸ ὄν volebat omnem omnino complecti οὐσίαν, praeter quam nihil esset, a Platone narratur docuisse omnia unum esse; and cites Theaet. 180 E ὅσα Μέλισσοι τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διίσχυρίζονται ὡς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ὥστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται, and Sophist. 242 D, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἐτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Proc. raises a difficulty too soon: Plato clearly holds this to have been historically the case, and ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἐν ξυνεχῆς are Parmenides' own words. But we should probably be nearer the truth if we understood εἴτε ἐν ἐστὶ (τὸ πᾶν) εἴτε μὴ ἐν, as in 128 B, which would modify the argument a good deal.

μοι ἀποκρίνεται; etc. For the position of the pron. Stallb. cites e.g. Clitoph. 409 D, τελεντῶν ὑπεκρίνατό τις, ὦ Σ., μοι τῶν σῶν ἐταίρων: to which

add 407 A, ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Σ., σοὶ συγγιγνόμενος (but here σοι is emphatic), and above 135 D, εἰ δὲ μὴ, σε διαφύζεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. ἡ ὁ νεώτατος; ... ἀπόκρισις:—see Sophist. 217 C-E, the passage which alludes to the meeting that is assumed in our dialogue, Introd. xix. It is too long to quote, but should be read: there is a strong resemblance. That Plato was serious in his insistence upon the importance of dialogue must be presumed, both from these passages and from such phrases as ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος: yet the value of it could hardly be put lower than here; and Aristoteles certainly acts up to the description. Hitherto we have had dialogue: henceforward we have the ἡκιστα πολυπραγματεῖν and the ἀνάπαυλα. And if dialogue is important, why should it be laboriously told at fourth hand?

ἔτοιμος ... φάναι, τοῦτο etc. The text, including c stops, is that of Herm.: and but for the stops (t has none, X none but τοῦτο,) it is that of the Mss. with perfect clearness. As it stands it seems to mean ἔτοιμός σοι εἰμι—τοῦτο, φάναι τὸν 'Α. 'I am at your service in that capacity'; or ἔτοιμός σοι ἐστὶ τοῦτο, 'this is at your command,' where we may assume τοῦτο to refer to the whole descrip. given by Parm. of what he wants, and the adj. to be attracted into concord with the nouns ἀντίπ. ἀπόκρ.—he starts in agreement with them and then finds the neuter better. Both, however, are forced interpretations. Another course is to read φάναι τοῦτο τὸν 'Α.= 'I am at your service': Aristotle said this. But Stallb. is right in calling this a strange use of the parenthetic φάναι—to give it an object in a sort of apposition to the object-clause, as he seems to mean when he says λέγειν would be required. The next step is to read τοῦτον (sc. τὸν νεώτατον) with one or two Mss., 'said the one in question, Ar.' This gives a good meaning, although Heind. fails to see the force of τοῦτον. Two Mss., A H, read τούτω—the former with ° above the line—which must mean φάναι τούτῳ (sc. τῷ Παρμ.), not a good solution. Another possible change would be ἔτοιμόν σοι ... τοῦτο, and the change would be easy enough if the ν were the small one like υ, and were coupled to σ in σοι—νσ might then be mistaken for σσ. Here ends the bridge between part I. of the dialogue and part II. (135 C-137 C). For the nature of the relation between these parts see

Introd. xxxi.-ii., lii.-v. Does Plato now go on to talk metaphysics in a mystery, does he refute Parmenides' doctrine out of its author's own mouth, or does he merely give a lesson in dialectic? Such are some of the suggestions. Except that the second might better run, does he develop what is latent in the doctrine of Parmenides?—there is no inconsistency in supposing that he does all these at once, and advances his own conception of the ideal problem at the same time. Among the thoughts which succeed each other in his mind as he writes, one is that there is complexity within the ideal world analogous to that in our sensible one: a second is that the ideas having so far been held to be isolated, as a *sina qua non* of their purity, hopeless contradictions thus arise which cut at the very roots of philosophy: a third is that some such trenchant dialectic as that exemplified by Zeno's writings is essential if these difficulties are to be overcome; and that a laborious discipline in it is the sole training adequate for him who would deal with the ideal theory, or (which to Plato is the same thing) with metaphysical problems at all. It is clear from the detail given that Plato has this last subject deeply at heart. As upshot, Parm. is, as it were, put to revise his own doctrine in the light of more recent developments. And the result seems to be that even the simple idea of 'one' has indefinite possibilities latent in it, and that, so far from its being possible to regard any idea as isolated, an almost Heraclitean complexity in the ideal sphere arising through dialectical necessities is now the real problem to be faced. Dialectic, says Aristotle (Met. i. 6; xii. 4), did not exist before this; and the more Plato looks into it as a factor in speculation the more impressed he is with its transforming powers—in physical matters it has infinitely divided the space between Achilles and the tortoise, so that we can hardly think of the one overtaking the other: in the intellectual sphere it converts even the simple unity of being as put forth by Parmenides into endless multiplicity. It is curious to observe, however, that the 'idea of science' quietly drops out of sight. Nothing has expelled it, for the separateness between the ideas and our world continues, though that between idea and idea does not; but somehow it has served its

turn, and we get on with our human science not so badly. It is said by some that what follows of the work is an imitation of Zeno's dialogue as well as of his dialectic. This may be so, though it would not be easy to prove it; but if so it is no isolated case of such imitation in Plato. The greater part of the Republic, for instance, is analogous.

α. β. γ. δ. ε. ζ. η. θ. ι. κ. λ. μ. ν. ξ. ο. π. ρ. σ. τ. υ. φ. χ. ψ. ω. The first step is to make us realize that one is one, by freeing it as far as may be from everything extraneous. That is what this division of the argument does—it asks τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς αὐτό; Grote says of Unum and Ens 'both words are essentially indeterminate ... are declared by Aristotle to be not univocal or generic words'; and of the same words and Idem Diversum Contrarium etc. (his equivalents for Pl.'s terms) 'Plato neither notices nor discriminates their multifarious and fluctuating significations ..., the purpose of the Platonic Parmenides is to propound difficulties; while that of Aristotle is, not merely to propound, but also to assist in clearing them up.' (Pl. Parm.) Of Gr.'s many references to Arist. and his Schol., it may be enough to cite Met. iv. 6 sqq., 1015 b 16, ἐν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτό, in the former case Coriscus, musician, Cor. the musician, Cor. the just musician, etc. are all 'one'—as it happens. True, these words are indeterminate, but only in the sense in which all words are so, unless we define them and stick to that. In speaking of Cor. many might refer only to his appearance; many (never having seen him) only to his fame; others, who knew him, to both etc. That Pl. does not notice or discriminate the senses of 'one' etc. is true only in a sense. He is not explicit, as we have learned to count explicitness; but he sees, and means us to see, much both of the different senses of the words and of the results of the inquiry. His intention clearly is to treat of one καθ' αὐτό and as an οὐσία, but he tries (Introd. lvii.-lxiv.) to simplify it so much that he overpasses the possibilities of the case—consciously. As Dam., § 48, 98, says κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθ. τὰ πάντα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀνελών, καὶ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς ἅπαντας, αὐτὸ μόνον ἀφήσει τὸ ἐν γυμνωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. It is a ἀπλῶς ἐν, and (§ 108, 280) δεῖ δὲ πρὸ τῆς τινὸς εἶναι τὴν ἀπλῶς ἐνάδα· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀμέθεκτόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεθεκτὸν οὐδέποτε ἀπλῶς. § 117, 304, ἔστω

γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀνάριθμον, καὶ εἰ χρὴ φάναι σαφέστερον, ἀτρίαστον καὶ ἀμονάδιστον. In such an undertaking *τολμῶμεν* (§ 119, 307) *τά τε ἀνάριθμα ἀριθμεῖν καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν τάξιν ὄντα* (Dam. speaks also of ἀπλῶς πολλὰ) *τάττειν, καὶ τὸν ὑπέρκοσμον τῷ ὄντι βυθὸν ὁμῶς διακοσμεῖν*: for (309) *ἀφανίζει τὴν τριάδα τὸ ἐν, καταπίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ* [N.B.] *ἅπας διορισμός*. It is a *ὑπαρξίς* or *ἀρχή*—*δεῖ δέ* (§ 121, 312), *εἰ μέλλοι σύνθεσις τις εἶναι, προὔπο- καίσθαι καὶ προὔπαρχειν ἀτεχνῶς τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀπλοῦν, ὡς ἀνευ γε τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο προέλθαι εἰς ὑπόστασιν ὑπαρξίς ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάσης τὸ ἐν καὶ ἡ πρώτη ὑπόθεσις*. ἄλλο *τι*—as if *ἡ* were dropped; so Theaet. 203 C, ἄλλο *τι* ὁ γινώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γινώσκει;

οὐδ' ἂν ... ἀπῆ ὅλον ἂν εἴη. We look for *ἀπείη* or for *ὅλον ἔσται*: neither this nor above *εἰ ἐν ἔστιν* etc. being normal; below D, *οὔτε ἔξει εἰ ἔσται* is.

p. 12. D *αὐτὸ μὴδὲν ἔχει μέρος*, *Ἄ* has *ἔχη* which cannot be right without *ἐάν*, t gives *ἔχει*. Thomson recalls that Pl. quotes Parmen. in Soph. 244 E, *πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, ἡμεσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ* etc., and must therefore know that what he gives is not the view of Parm.; and he refers to Simplicius' comm. on Arist. Phys. "pag. 12" (cannot verify), in which it is said that Pl. must be practically refuting Parm. in this part of the work: and quotes Dion. Halic. 'ita de Platone scribens αὐτός τε ὁ Πλάτων Παρμενίδην, καὶ Πρωταγόραν, καὶ Ζήνωνα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φυσιολόγων οὐκ ὀλίγους, ἡμαρτηκότας ἀποδεικνύει βούλεται, quae confirmat Eusebius Praeparat. Evangel. l. xiv. c. 4.'

E *οὔτε γὰρ ... μετέχει*: Herm. adds *ἂν*—'vel contra Oxon. cum VS retineri structurae concinnitas jubebat, eidemque mox, 138 A, debebatur *ἐνείη* ... circumscripto *ἂν*, cujus ut omnino vel optimi codices leges ignorarunt, ita nunc ne conjunctis quidem editorum omnium auctoritatibus concedi poterat.' *ἂν* is a delicate subject. If it be imperative here, we might urge that it may be understood from *οὔτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν* above; or alternatively that *μετέχει* might be *μετέχει* like *ἔχει* above. It is sometimes hard to decide when a statement is meant to have a conditional element; while again as *ἂν* is often redundantly repeated it may sometimes be repressed. *στρογγύλου* etc.: it can have no boundaries whether curved or straight: here the curved boundary is

circular or spherical, *περιφερές*. Cic., N. D. II. 18, eulogizing these as more perfect than all other forms, says his *duabus formis contingit solis, ut omnes earum partes sint inter se simillimae*.

οὐδὲ γε ... ἡ; i.e. if you put your eye at either end and look towards the other the middle will lie right in the way. Or as Heind. puts it—'cujus media pars extremae utrique ita objacet, ut tegat quasi utramque et obumbret.' Euclid says *γραμμῆς δὲ πέρατα, σημεία. εὐθεία γραμμὴ ἔστιν, ἣτις ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς σημείοις κείται*. In *Ἄ* *εἴη* stands for the *ἡ* of t; wrongly: perhaps from confusion with the *εἴη* below.

οὐδὲ μὲν ἔχει: The *δὲ* has a force of its own here, ¹³⁸ not easy to render: it might be put *ἐπείπερ καὶ μέρη οὐκ ἔχει*. 'It must be without both straight and round, since it is also without parts,' would be our way of putting it. He dwells on the convertibility of these qualities. For the language cp. Arist. Phys. III. ii. 201 b 26, *οὔτε γὰρ τόδε οὔτε τοιόνδε οὐδεμία αὐτῶν [τῶν ἀρχῶν] ἔστιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν*.

ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἐν εἴη, etc. So *Ἄ* without doubt: and it is perfectly admiss. We oftener find a subjunct. when *ἂν* goes with the relat.: Heind. would prefer that, or to drop *ἂν*. But Jelf cites Thucyd. III. 59, *ᾧ τινί ποτ' ἂν καὶ ἀναξίῳ ξυμπέσοι*, and Xen. Mem. II. i. 22, *ἐσθῆτα δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ὥρα διαλάμποι* and others. He does indeed lay down that in such cases the *ἂν* goes in sense with the vb. not with the rel.: but it is difficult to draw such a line precisely. See also Riddell, Digest of Idioms, § 68. t reads *ἐν ᾧ ἂν εἴη*: possibly *ἂν* may have arisen from *ἐν*. *ἐν εἴη* is quite clear, and is one among many cases in which it is open to doubt whether *ἐν* or (as Heind. and Herm.) *ἐν*—should be used. Each case has been viewed apart and *ἐν* kept wherever it gives sense: cp. on 131 A, B. Pl. when discussing *ἐν* might sometimes strain his language to emphasize the word. *αὐτοῦ ἀπτοῖτο πολλοῖς ... ἀπτεσθαι. περιέ- χοιτο* has τὸ *ἐν* for subj.: has *ἀπτοῖτο* the same subj.—*αὐτοῦ* being = *ἐκείνου*—or does the subj. here change to *ἐκείνο*—*αὐτοῦ* being = *τοῦ ἐνός*? The former is the more grammatical; but, as Heind. notes, *ἀπτεσθαι* has the surrounding *ἐκείνο* as subj. and *τοῦ ἐνός* as quasi-obj. Either way there is a hitch, although the sense is clear. It is hard to see

a distinc. between *πολλαχού* and *-χῆ*. *πολλοῖς* = *multis partibus, multifariam*. Heind. As to the argument he seeks to move step by step, deducing each conclusion from the one preceding; otherwise he might have proved that the one cannot 'be anywhere' from the original assumption that it is not many, or from the second that it has no parts—he shows that these are in his mind by repeating *ένός τε*, and *ἀμεροῦς*.

ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅν κἀν ἑαυτῷ etc. *κἀν ἑαυτῷ* ᾧ, and it admits of transl. as the instr.: *καὶ εἴη ἂν περιέχον ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό*, the last words being obj. of *περιέχον*. But *τ* gives the text, and it is on the whole better, *ἑαυτῷ* being nom.; unless we exactly reverse and read *καὶ ἂν οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό εἴη περιέχον ἑαυτό*. Some—e.g. Stallb. and Bekk.—seem to take *ἑαυτῷ* so, and read *περιέχον, ὅν οὐκ ἄλλο*, without apparent Ms. auth. for *ὅν*. The redundant looking *εἴπερ ... εἴη* are after all significant. The words *αὐτό γε ἐν ἑ* *ὅν* merely put the altern. suggested above, while the repet. brings out its inherent impossibility in view of what is seen to flow from it. 'Put the case that it is within itself: then it itself will be in the position of surrounding what—if it really is within itself—can be nothing but itself after all.' So D, *εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται ... εἴπερ δὴ ἐγγίγνεται. εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι* is *τ* and seems correct. 'I say surrounding itself—for it is impossible that anything can be within a thing which does not surround it.' The *εἴη* of ᾧ may be due to a confus. with the same word above and below. This is the more likely as a confus. has arisen about *περιέχοντι*, written *περιέχον τι*, cp. lines above and below.

αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον etc. So ᾧ. Heind. thinks *αὐτὸ* tautological: yet that which surrounds needs a little emphasis, for it is impalpable. It is the mere rim of what is surrounded—not even so much, it is an imaginary line, the whole *ἐν* (whatever it may be) being that which is surrounded. Heind. leans to Schleiermacher's *αὐτοῦ* 'that of the one (*αὐτοῦ*) which surrounds is one thing, that which is surrounded is another'; which, if a change be needed, is a good one. Stallb. retains *αὐτό*, making it the obj. of *τὸ περιέχον*, 'that which surrounds it is one thing'—a very good idea, but involving, he thinks, the mental add. *ἕτερον δὲ τὸ (ὑπ' αὐτοῦ) περιεχόμενον*; while at the same time the colloc. *αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον*,

if that is its meaning, tends to mislead. But he gives instances. For the arg. cp. Arist. Phys. iv. ii. 209 b 32, *δοκεῖ δὲ αὖτὸ ὅν που αὐτό τε εἶναι τι καὶ ἕτερόν τι ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ*.

ὅς γὰρ ὅλον γε ἀμφω etc. Ficinus says 'nunquam enim idem ipsum totum utraque haec simul pateatur et ageret.' This Heind., rightly, approves; but adds that it seems to assume as text *ἀμφω τούτω ταῦτ' ὅν* (*τούτω* sc. *τὸ περιέχειν* et *τὸ περιέχασθαι*); and Stallb. agrees. Is that necessary? It seems merely a hyperb. of *ἀμφω*—*οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ταῦτ' ὅν* *πέισται ἅμα καὶ ποιήσει ἀμφω*. Stallb. would take *ὅλον ἀμφω ταῦτ' ὅν* as 'the single identical whole consisting of these two aspects,' and leave the verbs with no obj. One feels throughout the diff. of keeping the language faultless when describing what is so very liable to confusion. Cp. Arist. Phys. iii. i. 201 a 20, *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐνια ταῦτα καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν, οὐχ ἅμα δὲ ... πολλὰ ἤδη ποιήσει καὶ πέισται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων*. *ἅπαν γὰρ ἐσται ἅμα ποιητικὸν καὶ παθητικόν*.

ἐστίν που που here is strictly local, referring to *οὐδαμοῦ* A above; not as below *ἀδύνατόν που*.

ὅρα ... ἔχον ... οἰόντε ἑ ἢ κ. *οἰόντε* must be personal to give a subj. to the verbs; *ὅρα δὴ εἰ (τὸ ἐν) οὕτως ἔχον οἰόν τε ἐστίν*, 'has it in its power to' etc., see 141 A. *τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ*: 'sic et infra (140 E); nam alias fere in hac formula omittitur illud δὴ.' Heind. *κινούμενόν γε* from ᾧ it would seem that their orig. had *τε*. Fischer says of *γε* 'posterior emendatio haud dubie vera est. At etiam in Stobaei Eclogis Physicis, p. 30, ubi verba *ὅτι κ. ... ναί* laudantur, legitur *τε*.' Heind. would reject *τε*.

αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσασθαι. See Introd. vi. Thoms. C says that Galen calls these kinds of motion *τὴν τοπικὴν κίνησιν* and *τὴν φυσικὴν*. Here are some phrases from Arist. Phys. iii., *ἀνευ τόπου καὶ κενού καὶ χρόνου κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι. —οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ κ. παρὰ τὰ πράγματα. —ὥστε καὶ τὸ κινεῖν φυσικῶς κινήτόν*. *πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον κινεῖ κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό. —ᾧ γὰρ ἢ κ. ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἢ ἀκίνησία ἡρεμία. —ἢ κ. ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινήτου, ἢ κινήτόν. —οὐδ' ἢ ποιήσας τῇ παθήσει τὸ αὐτὸ κυρίως, ἀλλ' ᾧ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, ἢ κ.* Dam. § 101, 262, says *τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀρξεί μεταβολῆς τῆς τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτεροκινήτου. ἀνάγκη ἄρα πρὸ τοῦ ἐτ. τὸ αὐτ. ὑποτίθεσθαι. καὶ μὴν τὸ κινεῖν, ἢ κινεῖ, πάντως ἀκ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ*

τοῦτο κινεῖτο, ἐπ' ἀπειρον ἤζομεν—yet here too arise difficulties.

ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ ... ἐαυτοῦ ... εἶναι means, as Heind. and Stallb. suggest, ἄλλο α. ἀλλοῖον ἐαυτοῦ, ἀλλοῖον ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν, γιγνόμενον. This constr. recurs 162 D, 163 C, where also he urges the unity of ἀλλοιώσις and κίνησις. To say that the one, whilst passing through the process of change, cannot remain one, is to use the word 'one' in two senses—that of one numerically, and of one or the same in appearance. S. called himself 'one as distinguished from those present'; he does not cease to be so by growing older or stouter or balder. He remains one numerically, but to the extent to which the change goes he ceases to be the same S. We can assent to Plato's concl. rather than to his argument, and our assent is based on the understanding, obviously ruling his mind at this moment, that the one is to be one not in number alone.

ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας: This illustrates, and may have helped to suggest, the argument 139 C, that only the different can differ from the different. He could say μεταλλάττειν χώραν ἐκ χώρας, but if he uses one ἑτέρα he needs two. Phileb. 13 C, σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ τινὰς—ἑτέρας αὐτῶν—κακάς; is not an exception. τὰς μὲν τινὰς balances τὰς δὲ τινὰς, while ἑτέρας αὐτῶν comes in parenthetically—'some good, some (distinct from them) bad.' See ἄλλοι' ἄλλοι below. In Latin too we have alia-alia: but in English we can say 'change to one place from another,' and the German is 'einen Ort mit einem anderen vertauschen.'

ἐπὶ μέσου βαθγκίναι. 'It must be that in being carried round in a circle the one has gone off upon motion which leans upon a centre.' In the equivalent which follows, ἐπὶ τοῦ μεσ. ἐν., the centre has become definite. καὶ ... ἐαυτοῦ 'and possess as other parts of itself those portions which are being carried round the centre.'

D χώραν ἀμείβον etc. -βον is the reading of t, and can hardly be wrong: ἄ has the masc. ἄλλοι' ἄλλοι γίγνεται are one phrase.

εἴπω γε δὴ: sc. κινεῖται. 150 B, ἀλλ' εἴπω, ἐν μέρει.

ἄρ' οὐ γίγνεσθαι sc. ἐν τινι. If it cannot be in anything, still less can it 'come to be' so.

p. 13. μήτε πω ... δὴ ἐγγ. It is not yet (πω) in, while

still (ἔτι) entering; nor is it any longer (μήτ' ἐτι) wholly without, if it is actually (δὴ) passing in. ἄ = ἐνγιγνόμενον, ἐν γίγνεται: t rightly gives ἐγ- in both cases. Both give μήτετι, which Heind. rightly divides as in the text, saying egregie hoc ἐτι respondebit praegresso πω. Cp. Arist. Met. x. 6, 1063 a 17, ἐτι δ' εἰ κίνησις ἐστι καὶ κινούμενόν τι, κινεῖται δὲ πᾶν ἐκ τινος καὶ εἰς τι, δεῖ ἄρα τὸ κινούμενον εἶναι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐξ οὗ κινήσεται καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰς τοδὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ.

τι ἄλλο πείσεται though idiomatic—cp. 134 C—E ἄλλο seems specially de trop here, where μόνον follows. The fut. is a little odd, 'if anything at all is to have such an experience.'

ἄμα. Heind. would expect a reply after this.

τὸ δὲ ... ὅλον ... ἐντὸς ... ἐξω. Suppose the case of a thing 'coming to be inside'—passing into—any other thing. Arrest it at any moment and part of it will 'be' inside, part outside. But here the thing has no parts, and cannot take that position. The only course open to it, if it is to pass inside something else, is that in the process it must 'be' wholly in and also wholly out. This he here says is impossible. 'There is no possibility at all that a thing which lacks parts can as a whole be at the same moment neither in nor out of another thing.' οὐ δὲ ... εἰσὶ ... ἐγγιγνόμενον—and if that be so 'is it not much more impossible that what has no parts, and is no whole should come to be anywhere, since it comes to be neither part by part nor whole by whole?' The argument is a controversialist's luxury, it slays the slain. The lang. is a little peculiar. Both Mss. have μήτε before an aspirate, so κατὰ ὅλον below. Both have εἰσὶ where ἐστὶ is normal. Heind. puts the latter: Stallb. supports the former, as put quo clarius vis multitudinis emergat. The construction would be simpler thus, ὁ δὲ μήτε μέρη ἔχει μήτε etc.

οὐτ' ... ἀλλοιούμενον: In 138 C we have change and circular + linear-motion: here he puts linear-motion and circular-motion + change. Heind. says κινεῖται is to be understood, or even inserted, after ἀλλοιούμενον from χώραν ἀλλάττει.

γέ φαμεν Ficinus transl. 'asseveravimus' whence Heind. thinks he read γ' ἔφαμεν, the ref. being to 138 B, οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν πον τὸ ἐν etc. But this would need ἔφαμεν γὰρ below; both Mss. = γε φαμέν.

ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν: 'ἐν ᾧ scil. τῷ αὐτῷ, ἐστίν' Heind., or 'ἐν ᾧ tanquam τῷ αὐτῷ inest' Stallb. H. cps. Gorg. 483 A, ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις: so 159 C below, ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἐν ᾧ εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τᾶλλα. This seems very probable: yet the sense might possibly be rather different—viz. that we should print 'τῷ αὐτῷ' as repeating literally the τῷ αὐτῷ just before, instead of changing it to τὸ αὐτὸ as gram. requires. Οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, ὅτι ἡδὴ ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη ἐν ᾧ 'τῷ αὐτῷ' [= τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ] ἐστίν.

οἷόν τι ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι: So editors print: but both Mss. read ἐν εἶναι, and it is far from certain that this is not correct. Pl. thinks it 'impossible for it (the one) to be 'one' in itself or in another.' What is nothing save 'one' cannot be localized, 138 A etc. B οὐτε ἡσυχίαν Proc. elaborates the arg. here in syllogs. VI. 163, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἐστίν ἐν τινὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν τινὶ οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστὶ (he has said above πᾶν γὰρ ἐστὼς ἐν τινὶ ἐστὼς τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζωτικῶς ἐστὼς ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ σωματικῶς ἐν ἄλλῳ)—these are the premisses to Pl.'s concl. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Proc. goes on ἐπεὶ δὲ δεύτερος λόγος τοιοῦτος τὸ ἐν οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστὶ τὸ μὴδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν οὐκ ἐστὶκε τὸ ἄρα ἐν οὐκ ἐστὶκεν. ὁ δὲ (Pl.) προσέθηκεν 'οὐδ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγει'—δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐστάναι μὲν καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἰδρυμένον, ἡσυχίαν δὲ ἄγει τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ μένειν δυνάμενον. ἀμφοτέρω δὲ ἀπέφησε τοῦ ἐνός. Although Pl. has treated of motion with sufficient care for his purpose, and sees clearly its two great divisions; it seems very unlikely that he would have made no allus. to the more elaborate classification which Arist. gives—e.g. Phys. III.—had that been known to him. In this the Parm. agrees with the Theaet.

πῇ θή; So t; X has τίνι δὴ which in uncials, if written closely, is very like πῇ. Introd. lxxxi.

ἕτερον ... ἐνός ἕτερον etc. The concep. of the ἐν is here much more abstract than it was above. Refs. to physical conditions, such as size and position, are now pointless: the 'one' has been driven from the physical sphere and is now a pure logical entity. The args. used will apply if we regard their terms as terms merely, or the one as a thing having no positive content. 'This part of the argument is the extreme of dialectic subtlety' says Grote. Of the four parts of the argument Proc., VI. 172, points out that he

begins ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων [read πορωτέρων] τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἡμῖν εὐληπτοτέρων—καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ταῦτόν τοις ἄλλοις (Pl. says ἐτέρῳ) οὐκ ἐστὶ, δῆλον καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐστὶ—the latter of the two, being clearest of all, comes first: καὶ γὰρ ἐστίν ... τὸ ταῦτόν ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ἐνός, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον πορωτέρω τὸ δὲ ἐγγύτερον χαλεπώτερον ἀφαιρεῖν.

ταῦτόν γε ... ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη, Sound, as words are generally used: but we shall soon see it contradicted; and shall then learn why in elucidating his present position his args. do not run in the order given above (Proc.). The reasoning holds, moreover, only from the standpoint of the 'one'; changing that standpoint we can see that ἐκεῖνο would in turn cease to be itself and would be ἐν. Cp. Dam. § 42, 85, οὔτε ἡνῶται αὐτῷ· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνο ἡνῶμενον.

ἄλλ' ἕτερον ἐνός: This too is right in ordinary usage: but the words have scarcely been uttered when he shows that he should not have used them—οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἐτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι. θαρρεῖ δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο, says Proc. 174-176, τῷ μὴδὲν εἰσδέχεσθαι τὸ ἐν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ... οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ιδιότητος ἀναμιμνῆσαι δυνατόν ... ἦν γὰρ ἂν τι πρὸ τοῦ ἐνός· ἢ γὰρ ἀνοδος ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος ... τὸ δὲ πρῶτος ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐφετὸν πᾶσι τοῖς ὄντιν ἀμέθεκτον προὑπάρχει τῶν ὄντων, ἵνα μὲν ἐν ἀπλήθυντον ... οὕτω δ' ἂν ἀποδείξαις καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα αὐτὴν ἐστὶν σπῆ ταυτότητα μὴ οὖσαν, εἴπερ εἴη πως τῇ ἑτερότητι ταῦτόν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων παρ' αὐτῆς ... τὰ μὲν [N.B.] πρὸ αὐτῶν ἔχοντα γένος ἢ εἶδος οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος ... ταῦτά ὄντα κατὰ τὸ γένος ἢ εἶδος οὐκέτι ἀλλήλοισι ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ ταυτά· μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἀνάγκη πρὸ τοῦ ἐνός γένος ἢ εἶδος ... τὸ γὰρ μετέχον τοῦ γένους ἔχει τι παρὰ τὸ γένος ... καὶ καθόλου πᾶν τὸ μετέχον τινὸς ἔχει τι παρὰ τὸ μετεχόμενον· εἰ γὰρ μὴδὲν, αὐτὸ ἂν ἐκεῖνο εἴη παντελῶς καὶ οὐ μετέχον ἐκείνου μόνον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἐν μήτε ἐν γένει ἐστὶ μήτε ἐν εἶδει, ταῦτόν δὲ ἢ ἐτέρῳ τινὶ, αὐτὸ ἂν ἐκεῖνο εἴη ᾧ ἐστὶ ταῦτόν οὐκ ἄλλο ὄν.

οὐ γὰρ ... ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ, etc. How far may this arg. be due to the Greek idiom alluded to in discussing χώραν ἐτέραν ἐξ ἐτέρας, 138 C? Our idiom says 'the one is larger than the other,' but the classic idiom is ἕτερον ἐτέρου μείζον ἐστὶ alterum altero majus est. And this is the truer statement, a clearer perception of which may have fixed the

idiom. When we compare one with another the act places the former in a position of otherness to the latter, even if the result be that the two are pronounced similar. We may use a physical illustration which, though not quite fair, may help to explain the idea. Two similar pith balls are magnetized in the same way: place them together and polarization occurs, when each becomes 'other than the other,' while yet 'the same as the other.' t has *μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου*, which Stallb. and Heind. defend. The former says 'Nimirum quod unum est, hoc, ob id ipsum quod est unum, ab altero differre nequit. Quocirca post ἑτέρῳ deinde rursus infertur ἑτέρου quo magis urgeatur notio diversitatis quae in Unum infinitum cadere negatur.' The latter translates 'Neque enim ei quod unum est convenit diversum ab aliquo esse, sed huic soli id convenit quod ab altero diversum est,' adding 'quippe h. l. unum illud per se sine ulla alia qualitate intelligendum,' and giving a very acute reason for the ἑτέρου—'ἑτέρου illud post ἑτέρῳ si deleas vereor ne quis haec falso ita interpretetur: neque enim uni convenit diversum ab aliquo esse, sed tantum diversum aliud autem nihil.' That is, the one has no title to be 'other than something,' but only to be 'other' and nothing more. But the context renders such an error unlikely; and would not the Gk. have been ἀλλὰ *μόνον ἑτέρῳ ἄλλου* δὲ οὐδενός to bring out the meaning? Proc., 177, points out that this third arg. takes more discussion than the first two as being μάλλον τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐγγύς ... διὰ τὴν ἐξηρημένην τοῦ ἐνὸς ὑπεροχήν. Of ταῦτ' and ἑτερον he says λέγεται γὰρ ταῦτ' (1) καὶ ἡ ταυτότης (2) καὶ τὸ μετέχον τῆς ταυτότητος, καὶ ἑτερον ὁμοίως. Thus far the 'one' is not 'other than' anything διότι οὐ (179) μετέχει ἑτερότητος. *μόνῳ γὰρ ἑτέρῳ εἶναι προσήκει τῷ ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ*, which phrase may perhaps support ἑτέρου. Dam., § 72, 159, says τὸ διακεκριμένον διακεκριμένου διακέκριται, εἰ καὶ ἄλλος ἑκατέρου ὁ τῆς διακρίσεως τρόπος. καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἑτερον, ἑτέρου καὶ τούτου ὄντος· ἀλλ' ἡ ἑτερότης οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ πλὴν τῷ γένει τῆς ιδιότητος. We may cp. Theaet. 158 E, ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτ' οὖν, ὅταν ᾗ κομῶν ἑτερον. With such cases of πρὸς τι we must guard, as Arist. says, Categ. 7, 6b 35 etc., against giving τὸ ἀντιστρέφον otherwise than οἰκείως. ἑτερον ἑτέρου is given οἰκείως, but not (Polit.

283 D) *δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μᾶλλον μηδενὸς ἑτέρου δεῖν μᾶλλον λέγειν ἢ τοῦ ἐλάττωτος*; Pl. has to put τὸ μέτριον between, and even that hardly meets the case. He is right if he means that the sole antith. to μᾶλλον τινός is not ἐλαττόν τινος, but wrong if he thinks that anything can be inserted between the terms when saying τὸ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλάττωτος. Can he be thinking of μέγα and σμικρόν?

τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἐν εἶναι ... αὐτό τῷ ἐν εἶναι 'by the fact of being one': after οὐδὲ αὐτό· underst. ἑτερον ἐσται οὐδ' αὖτως. We have seen that Proc., VI. 177, speaks of 'one' as not 'other' in two ways. He holds, 179, that here we have the proof that it is not itself 'otherness,' εἰ γὰρ μὴ καθὼ ἐν ἑτερόν ἐστι, οὐκ ἐσται τῷ ἐν ἑτερον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τῷ ἐν ἑτερον, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἑτερότης ἐσται. πάνυ δαιμονίως· ἡ γὰρ ἑτερότης ἐαυτῇ καὶ δι' ἐαυτὴν ἑτερον, τὸ δὲ ἐν οὐχ ἐαυτῷ ἑτερον ... καὶ τοῦτο ἐστίν ὅπερ αὐτὸς εἶπε συντόμως· 'εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ ἐαυτό, τουτέστιν εἰ μὴ ἐαυτῷ ἐν ὄντι ἑτερόν ἐστι, διότι ἐν καὶ ἑτερότητος διάστηκεν, οὐδὲ αὐτό ἐστίν ἑτερότης'· ἦν γὰρ ἐν ταῦτ' φάναι τῷ ἐν ἑτερον εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἑτερότητι ἑτερον εἶπερ τὸ ἐν ἑτερότης, ὅπερ ἀνείλεν ὁ λόγος.

αὐτὸ δὲ ... ἐσται ἑτερον: etc. He has said that only the other can be other than anything; he has next shown that the one is in no way other; he now infers that thus it cannot be other than anything. ταῦτ' ἐαυτῷ this comes, says Proc., more closely home to the one than even the last arg.—διὰ τὴν ἄρρητον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἐνὸς) καὶ ἀφραστον ὑπερένωσιν.

οὐχ ἦπερ ... τοῦτο γε ἀδύνατον. Proc., VI. 182-186, says that here (1) the one is proved not to be 'the same':—to be 'one' and to be 'same' would need to be rigidly convertible, but that which becomes the same as the many becomes so by becoming many, not by becoming one; so that 'same' and 'one' are not rigidly convertible: (2) τοῖτ' δὲ δειχθέντι συνῆψε (Pl.) καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ ταῦτ' οὕτω τὸ ἐν, ὡς ταυτότητος μεταλαβὼν ... ἄλλης οὐσης, ... ἐσται γὰρ τῷ μεταλαβεῖν ταυτότητος ἐν τε καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ μὴ ἐστι, καὶ οὐκέτι φυλάξει τὴν ιδιότητα τοῦ ἐνός, πλήθος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνός γενόμενον. Pl. may give the purport of these separate arguments in his text, but Proc. rightly adds that he does it briefly. Assuming that Pl. has proved one not to be convertible with same on the ground that, if it were, then ὅποτε τι ταῦτ' ἐγγίγνετο αἰεὶ ἂν ἐν ἐγγίγνετο, Proc. asks what right he has to go further and say καὶ ὅποτε ἐν, ταῦτόν? The addition is justifi-

fied if the two are convertible; but Proc. rather suggests an alternative which interposes, *ἐν γὰρ τι γιγνόμενον ἕτερον γίγνεται τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τοι γὰρ ... ἔδει τὸ ἐν γιγνόμενον εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ταυτόν*. He adds, by way of marking the priority and purity, so to speak, of the one as here viewed, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ- ἐν διὰ τὴν ἀντίθεσιν [ἕτερον v. ἕτερον is present to the mind] ἕτερον γίγνεται (τὸ ἐν)· καθὼ δὲ ἐν τὸ ἐν ἔστιν ἐν, οὐκ ὃν τῶν πρὸς τι· καθ' αὐτὸ γάρ, ... τὰ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ προϋπάρχει πανταχοῦ τῶν πρὸς τι ... τὸ δὲ ταυτόν τῶν πρὸς τι λεγομένων ἔστιν*. This is how we must, if possible, conceive of the one in our present course of argument—οὐ γὰρ ἀποστατεῖ τοῦ πλήθους ἢ ταυτότης [we can say something is ταυτόν τοῖς πολλοῖς], τὸ δὲ ἐν [he also says ἐνόησεν δὲ] ἔξω τῶν πεπληθυσμένων ἔστιν· ἐκάστη γὰρ τάξις συνεισφέρει τι ἐαυτῇ πάντως ὁ μὴ ἦν πρὸ αὐτῆς. And so we are to think of the following hierarchy of existences, each step downwards (or, if we treat the first as lowest, upwards) bringing in its own special characteristic ὁ μὴ ἦν πρὸ αὐτῆς:

τὸ ἐν—	ἔχει ἀπλότητα κρείττωτα ταυτότητος		
τὸ ὄν—	ἔχει τὴν ταυτότητα καὶ ἑτερότητα ἢ οὐκ εἶχε τὸ ἐν		
ὁ νοῦς—	,, τοῦ νοῦ ὄρεξις	,,	,, ὄν
ἡ ψυχὴ—	,, μεταβατικὴν νόησιν	,,	ὁ νοῦς
ὁ οὐρανός—	,, κύκλῳ κίνησιν τὴν τοπικὴν	,,	ἡ ψυχὴ
ἡ γένεσις—	,, κατ' οὐσίαν μεταβολὴν	,,	ὁ οὐρανός.

In this difficult section Pl. does convince us that same and one are not rigidly convertible, that οὐκ ἐπειδὴν ταυτόν γένηται τῷ τι ἐν γίγνεται. We may by popular usage say 'what becomes the same as anything becomes one *with it*' but not 'becomes one'; and that being realized, when we say one is the same as itself, we add a fresh quality to one. So of εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐαυτῷ ταυτόν ἔσται οὐχ ἐν ἐαυτῷ ἔσται· popular language says that a thing is the same as itself. But Proc. truly holds that 'same' is a πρὸς τι, and that our duty here is to think of 'one' as καθ' αὐτὸ if we can, as an entity rigidly unmodified by extraneous comparisons. If we do, then when we call it ταυτόν ἐαυτῷ—innocent as the act may seem—we have caused it to be no longer ἐν ἐαυτῷ—καὶ οὕτω ἐν ὃν οὐχ ἐν ἔσται. Proc. accounted for the order of the args. by their relative difficulty, the hardest coming last. But there seems to be another reason at work. The second contention, above B,

is 'ταυτόν γε ἑτέρῳ ὃν ἐκείνο ἂν εἴη. This we now see is a popular use of language, which dialectic rejects; otherwise ταυτόν γε ἐαυτῷ ὃν ἐκείνο ἂν εἴη would hold, and the one, when the same with itself, would be itself, and so necessarily one with itself. He could not, then, have put his second arg. after his fourth, which cuts away its basis. On the other hand if we accept the latter we may be supposed not to need the former. As to language Heind. justly says on γένηται 'Rectius fuerit γίγνηται, ac deinde γιγνόμενον pro γενόμενον': unless we are to fall back upon the distinc. between mere narrative or argumentative forms (aorist) and pictorial forms (present), 'when it passes into sameness with anything, it is in that very process becoming one before our eyes.' Heind. adds that διέφερε would be preferable to διαφέρει, while a διαφέρει οὐδὲν would be an improvement before πάνν γε. Proc., vi. 185, asks, why say τοῖς πολλοῖς ταυτόν instead of ἴσον, and answers by saying that we don't here deal with a τι ποσὸν existing ἐν τοῖς ἐνύλοις πράγμασιν, but with an οὐσιῶδες πλῆθος or ποσόν, and that ἡ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν κοινωνία ταυτότης ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τι ποσὸν ἰσότης. He probably gets this partly from the language in 140 B.

οὕτω δὲ ... ἐτέρῳ εἴη: 'Malim οὕτω δὲ ἢ ἑτερόν' E p. 14. Heind. A smaller change would do, οὕτω δ' ἢ. From the dats. gov'd. by ταυτόν we supply gens. for ἕτερον. The statement is a condensation of the one with which the arg. began 139 B.

οὕτω ... ἐτέρῳ are an enlargement of τινι above. We might have had εἴτε εἴτε, and also οὐδενὶ for τινι.

ὅτι τὸ ταυτόν σου etc. 'Because to be affected anyhow in the same way is resemblance,' 'because what is similarly affected in any way is like'; or as Jowett translates 'Because likeness is sameness of affections.' Plato exposes his arg. to needless danger by resting its further progress upon this assertion. The reasoning used about 'same and different' would amply cover 'like and unlike': but he seems to wish each step to lean, as far as may be, on its predecessor. If we are to define likeness this def. will do very well. Arist., Met. iv. 9, 1018 a 15-19, says ὁμοία λέγεται τὰ τε πάντῃ ταῦτὰ πεπονθότα, καὶ τὰ πλείω ταῦτὸ πεπονθότα ἢ ἕτερα, καὶ ὧν ἡ ποιότης μία· καὶ καθ' ὅσα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται τῶν ἐναντίων, τούτων τὸ πλείω ἔχον ἢ κυριώτερα

δμοιον τούτῳ. ἀντικειμένως δὲ τοῖς ὁμοίοις τὰ ἀνόμοια. He says briefly, id. 15, 1021 a 10-12, κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν λέγεται πάντα. ταῦτὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄν μία ἡ οὐσία, ὁμοία δ' ὄν ἡ ποιότης μία, ἴσα δὲ ὄν τὸ ποσὸν ἐν. In ix. 3, 1054 b 5-11, he speaks of things as like which κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ταῦτὰ ἢ ... ὅτι ἐν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν, where εἶδος seems to mean appearance. We must note throughout the adherence to the perfect tense—never πάσχειν πάσχει—the thing has been so affected, and thus is like. Cp. τὸ ταῦτὸν which occurs, with our 'the t'other' and the Scottish 'the t'ae ane and the t'ither.' τοῦ δέ γε ἐνός etc. 'jungas hunc in modum τὸ δέ γε ταῦτὸν ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν χωρὶς (ὄν) τοῦ ἐνός.' Stallb., who cites for abs. of ὄν 165 D, οὐκυδὼν ... χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, and 166 οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρὶς.

140 αἱ τι πέπονθε etc. = εἰ τὸ ἐν πέπονθέ τι χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, πεπόνθοι ἂν εἶναι πλείω ἢ ἐν. The strict balance of moods is broken. πλείω ἢ ἐν 'This is the main point of Demons. I. and is stated pp. 139 D, 140 A compared with 137 C.' Grote.

οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν etc. = οὐδαμῶς δυνατόν ἐστιν ἄρα τὸ ἐν εἶναι ταῦτὸν-πεπονθὸς οὔτε ... οὔτε, οὐ φαίνεται is a little ambiguous: 'non videtur' Ast, 'clearly not' Jowett. οὐδὲ μὴν if not ταῦτὸν 'still less' ἕτερον. One is tempted to relapse and hold that the one must be either ταῦτὸν π. or ἕτερον π. and that it cannot be at once οὐδαμῶς ταῦτὸν π. and οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον π. But the objection lies in the πεπονθός: to be one, as we are striving to regard that, it must be οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς πεπονθός, χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι: if indeed τὸ ἐν εἶναι is τι πεπονθέναι, and not αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι.

8 οὔτε ἄρα ... ἂν αἴτῃ τὸ ἐν: The dats. are luckily suited to both adjs. this time; not as 139 E. Ἄ reads ἑαυτῷ here. We are not far past the argt. ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί, 139 C, and already we lapse and mingle ἄλλος with ἕτερος, and even speak of ἕτερον πεπονθός ... ἄλλου.

τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων With likeness and unlikeness physical features recur; and with equality and inequality they come to the front. We may recall what Proc. said (above) about τι ποσόν, and Arist.'s defin. (also above) ἴσα δὲ ὄν τὸ ποσὸν ἐν. He says, Categ. 6, 6 a 26, ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τι καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι: when not used strictly so it is still used κατ' ἀναλογίαν of τὸ ποσόν. Pl. regards all ποσά as estimated by units, and does not here

ask whether the measure is of length, capacity, or weight. οἷς ... σύμμετρον, those with which it is commensurable, or has a common unit. Cp. Arist. Met. 1. 2, 983 a 15, we begin, he says, by wondering e.g. περὶ ... τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσυμμετρίαν θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν εἰ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται, and end by reversing our wonder.

τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων τῶν δὲ etc. In the previous sentence the τῶν μὲν, τῶν δὲ belonged to the foll. adj.: here they are separate, referring to the things (οἷς) with which the one is incommens., while the adjs. qualify μέτρων. It might have read σμικροτέρων μὲν καὶ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται ἡ ταῦτα ἐστί. He assumes, as dealing now with equality, that a standard is chosen in each case which will measure the objs. the same number of times; but this—as these objs. have not a common measure—will vary in absolute size. That which measures the 'one' a given number of times will in the cases of larger things be smaller, in the contrary case be larger, than that which measures those things an equal number of times. We may note the use of μὲν—δὲ throughout.

ἴσον μὲν	τῶν μὲν
μειζόν δὲ	οἷς μὲν ἂν
οἷς δ' ἂν	τῶν δὲ

τοῦ αὐτοῦ ... τῶν αὐτῶν This argt. depends on that regarding 'same and different,' while the orig. admiss. that the one had no parts would cover the whole. τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ is the conditional part; the rest the consequent. οὔτ' ἂν ... οὔτε one would look for the repet. of ἂν or for e.g. οὔθ' ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἶη, οὔτε ἄλλῳ. οὐκ οὐκ φαίνεται γὰρ 'well (οὐκ) it does not seem (γὰρ) so.' τοσοῦτων καὶ μερῶν is true D throughout. καὶ οὕτως the hiatus clear in both Mss.

τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ... 'quoniam ita ei accedat aliud quiddam, videlicet mensurae ratio, quum tamen ipsa (unitas) ab omni ratione libera sit atque immunis,' Stallb. Proc. says here (vi. 210-12), ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἴποι ἂν τις ἀπορῶν, ἀλλὰ ἴσον μήτε ἐλαττόνων ἔσται μέτρων μήτε πλειόνων ἀλλ' ἐνός, ἵνα μὴ πλήθος ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ καταλείπωμεν, αὐτῷ οὖν ἔστω ἑαυτοῦ μέτρον· διὰ δὲ τούτων λύων τὴν ἀπορίαν ταύτην ἐπήνεγκεν, ὅτι ἄρα εἰ τις τοιοῦτον ὑπόβοιτο τὸ ἐν, ἔσται ἴσον τινὶ πάντως—τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μέτρῳ· καὶ εἰ μὴ αὐτῶν (το ὄν ?) τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἐν, διότι τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι, δῆλον ὡς ἴσον ὄν τὸ ἐν ἔσται καὶ οὐχ ἐν διὰ

τὸ ἴσον οὐχ ἔν ὄν. ... ἀνέκφατον ἔσται μετροῦν ἑαυτὸ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ μετρούμενον, καὶ ἔσται οὐχ ἔν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀλλὰ δυοειδές. ... εἰ οὖν μηδὲ ὅλον ἔστι τὸ αὐτό, ἵνα μὴ πεπονθὸς ἢ τὸ ἔν, ὡς ἐν Σοφιστῇ δέδειχε, πολλῷ μᾶλλον μέρος οὐκ ἔστιν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀτελὲς ἢ πρὸς τῷ καὶ πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἔν. ἐκ δὲ τούτου φανερόν (N.B.) ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῶν εἰδῶν τι ἔν· πᾶν γὰρ εἶδος μέρος ἔστι τοῦ νοητοῦ παντός, ἀλλ' ἐξήρηται καὶ τοῦ ὅλου νοητοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδῶν μερῶν ὄντων. ... καὶ πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη μέτρον, ἐπέκεινα παντὸς πέρας ὄν καὶ ὄρου καὶ ἐνότητος; πᾶν δὲ μέτρον πέρας ἔστι τοῦ μετρούμενου καὶ ὄρου.

ἴσον αὐτῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι: So Ἀ, retained as intelligible. But t gives ἴσον τῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι: which (if read as ἴσον τῷ) is preferable. And the reading ἴσον αὐτῷ may perhaps be an error from ἴσον ἂν above. τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι—γρ. αὐτῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι. Sch. Rh.

οὔτε αὖ μείζον etc. Proc., vi. 213, says διεῖλε δὲ τὸ ἄνισον ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι, μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον εἰπὼν, ἅπερ ὠνόμαζεν ἐν τῇ προτάσει κοινῶς διὰ τοῦ ἀνίσου παραλαμβάνων. His first statement was (B) οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον, but he followed it by μείζον·δέ πούτῃ ἔλαττον ὄν.

E δοκεῖ τῷ The τῷ, as Stallb. says, depends on τὴν αὐτήν: the passage in full might run τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ δυνατόν εἶναι (or δοκεῖ δυνατόν εἶναι τὸ ἐν) πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερόν του εἶναι, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν τῷ ἔχειν; as in 141 A; Stallb. cps. 151 B-end.

χρόνος καὶ ὁμοιότητος etc. It is not clear if χρόνος belongs to ὁμοιότης or only to ἰσότης. Proc. however rightly says that likeness in time is as much to be weighed as equality (vi. 226) πρεσβύτης γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἱππῷ πρεσβύτῃ δῆλον ὁμοιότης ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰσότης: ἢ γὰρ οἶμαι χρόνου ἰσότης οὐ ποιεῖ ταυτότητα τῆς ἡλικίας... διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰσῆλικον ὀνομάζεται, τὸ δὲ δμήλικον. The ὄν does not include χρόνον.

p. 15. 141 πῶς οὖν ... τοιοῦτον ὄν: Proc., after saying that what has no equality or inequality in time may still have these of a non-temporal kind, adds (vi. 228) προσέθηκε τὸ 'τοιοῦτον ὄν' τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιότητος καὶ ἀνομοιότητος ἐπέκεινα πᾶς ἂν μετέχοι τῶν ὁμοιότητος καὶ ἀνομοιότητος μετεχόντων (such as time); καὶ τὸ ἰσότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος ἐξηρημένον πῶς ἂν συντάττοιο τοῖς μερικῶς τούτων μετεληφόσι; τὸ γὰρ κατὰ χρόνον ἄνισον καὶ ἴσον οὐ πάσης μετέσχε τῆς τοῦ ἀνίσου τε καὶ ἴσου δυνάμεως.

ἔρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ... αἷ; οὐδὲ might be dropped.

νυν. πρεσβύτερον; Here two ideas πρὸς τι may be said οἰκείως ἀντιστρέφειν as he notes, c below. τὸ πρεσβύτερον ... γιγνόμενον, the article goes not, as above, with πρεσβ., which is part of the pred., but with γιν. A similar case in c.

καὶ νεώτερον ... γίγνεται: Apelt (Parm. des Plato, Weimar 1879) regards this argt. as unjust and due to the idiom, which occurs above, αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι, and which of course involves the element of time. A thing becomes older than itself *was*, not than itself *is*. But we are probably to think of the one as caught in the instant of changing its age (on the analogy of 138 D, where it is arrested at the moment of passing from one thing into another): at that instant it may be regarded as becoming both older and younger than itself. εἴπερ μέλλει etc. 'if it is to have anything than which it grows older.' Not only is this clause curtailed by the want of a proper object to ἔχειν; but it is odd in the use of the pres. indic. γίγ. This tense would be natural if the clause stood εἴπερ ἔχει; but with μέλλει one expects γενήσεται or ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται.

διαφέρειν Ἀ clear and admissible, although t has διάφορον as below. οὐδὲν δὲ γίγνεσθαι 'premit notionem τοῦ γίγνεσθαι.' Stallb. And so we see immediately. If οὐδὲν is nom. ἕτερον is tautol. Perhaps it is = κατ' οὐδέν, οὐδαμῶς.

ἀλλὰ ... ἦδη εἶναι, short for e.g. ἀλλὰ δὲ μὲν αὐτὸ ἦδη εἶναι διάφορον τοῦ ἦδη ὄντος διαφόρον: and so below, μέλλειν needing also the word ἔσσεσθαι as in c. After pointing out (vi. 235) that Pl. lays down here κοινόν τινα κανόνα περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀπαξ ἀπάντων, Proc. urges that this affects παραδείγματα, which must 'become' as their image becomes etc. If this is so, and if παραδ. are not to be affected by τὸ γίγνεσθαι, then οὐκ ἀποδεξόμεθα τοὺς πραγμάτων ἐπικλήρων (mortal) παραδείγματα ποιούντας' ἔσται γὰρ τὸ παραδ. τῆς εἰκόνος οὐκ οὔσης,—unless the latter does not itself partake of becoming, but is of the same nature as its model.

οὖν: so t, Ἀ has ἂν: the two words, however written, might easily be interchanged. διαφορότης νεωτέρου—on διαφ. Fischer and Heind. cite Moeris Atticista Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ· παρ' ἄλλῃ οὐχ ἔδρον. Fischer adds 'scilicet apud nullum veterem scriptorem Atticum Platonique aequalem. Phileb. 3 et 4 est διαφορότητα.' At Theaet. 209a he quotes Thomas Magister

διαφορά, πάντες λέγουσι· διαφορότης δέ, Πλάτων μόνον ἐν Θεαιτήτῃ. These statements might appear to discredit the authenticity of the Parm.; but probably the case in Theaet. was better known than the others. Besides ours, Ast gives the foll.—Theaet. 209 A, D, E, 210 A; Phileb. 12 E, 14 A (the passages referred to by F.); Rep. ix. 587 E: a list which sets aside any argt. as to authenticity. The word does not seem to occur in Arist., who uses διαφορά. Would any Aristotelian, familiar with the latter word, go back, even when writing in imitation of Plato, to this rare word, when διαφορά is likewise habitually used by Plato? If not, then the Parm. is not likely to have been written by a later imitator.

νέωτερον ἔμα. The adv. is important. He has been narrowing the question to the very instant of the change. But to such an argt. we may apply the lang. of Arist., Poet. 7, 1450 b 39, when discussing a brief plot—*συγχέεται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη*. Has Pl. in mind the reasoning of Zeno upon space? Proc. says, vi. 231, δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀπορώτατος εἶναι καί, ἔν' εἴπω, σοφιστικός πως οὗτος ὁ λόγος. He points out (233) that there are two views of participation in time, τὸ μὲν οἷον εὐθείαν ὁδεῦον καὶ ἀρχόμενον τε ἀπὸ τινος καὶ εἰς ἄλλο καταλήγον (in which case the object sharing in time would not become both older and younger)—τὸ δὲ κατὰ κύκλον περιπορεύμενον καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τὴν κίνησιν ἔχον, ὃ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρασ ἐστὶ ταῦτόν καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἀκατάληκτος, ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ πέρατος ὄντος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀρχῆς καὶ [ἡ?] πέρατος. τὸ δὲ κυκλικῶς ἐνεργεῖν μετέχει τοῦ χρόνου περιοδικῶς, καὶ (ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πέρασ τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστι καὶ ἀρχή,) καθόσον μὲν ἀφίσταται τῆς ἀρχῆς πρῶτον γίγνεται, καθόσον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ (which is the ἀρχή) ἀφικνέεται νέωτερον γίγνεται· γιγνόμενον γὰρ ἐγγιον τοῦ πέρατος ἐγγύτερον γίγνεται τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς. This is ingenious: but had Pl. meant it he surely would have been more explicit. Besides, when life is advancing, περιπλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν, do we grow younger as the end of the year brings round our birthday? Does the explanation explain? Proc. goes on to urge that whatever becomes ten years old becomes older than itself—as nine-years-old; ἐν ᾧ δὲ γίγνεται τοῦτο, νέωτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἐνναετές—by

instantaneous transition to ten years, which makes its still-at-that-instant-subsisting-age-of-nine younger than its at-that-instant-emerging-age-of-ten. This is just what has been urged above; but it has no necessary connection with circular motion.

ἀνάγκη ... ταῦτα: For this abbreviated express. Heind. quotes parallels, Gorg. 475 B, οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; and Rep. vii. 519 B, Laws x. 899 A.

ἐν χρόνῳ ... τοῦ τοιοῦτου, What does τοιοῦτου refer to? 'Quae in tempore sunt atque hoc tali participant,' Ficinus: 'quaecunque in tempore sint huiusque partem habeant,' Ast: 'Was in der Zeit besteht und deren theilhaftig ist,' Müller: 'things which are in time and partake of time,' Jowett. These agree more or less in referring τοιοῦτου to χρόνῳ directly. 'Was in der Zeit ist und an so etwas Theil hat,' Engelm.: this is less definite and may refer the word to the process of becoming older and younger just described. We might then supply mentally παθήματος, which occurs in the plural just below. But perhaps the former view 'and partakes of such a thing as we have shown time to be' is the more correct, considering what follows.

οὐδὲ ἄρα ... χρόνῳ: On this Proc., vi. 215 seqq., has much to say, e.g. καὶ μοι προσέχειν ἀξιώ τὸν νοῦν ἐκείνους, οἱ ψυχὴν ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον εἰρήκασιν τὸ πρῶτον, ὅπως αὐτῶν περιαιρεῖ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὃ Παρ. δεικνύς ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἀδεκτον χρόνου, τὸ δὲ ἀδεκτον χρόνου ψυχὴν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· πᾶσα γὰρ μετέχει χρόνου, καὶ χρῆται περιόδοις ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρούμεναις. ... τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀπιστον εἶναι πολλοῖς καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυσιολόγοις, οἱ πάντα περιέχεσθαι φοντο ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ εἴ τι αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸν ἀπειρον εἶναι χρόνον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀκαταμέτρητον ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν πάντων εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τόπῳ πάντα φοντο εἶναι, σώματα οἰόμενοι πάντα ὑπάρχειν ἀσώματον δὲ μηδέν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ πάντα εἶναι, κινούμενα ὄντα ἀκίνητον δὲ μηδέν. ... ὥστε διὰ τούτων εἶναι δεδειγμένον πάντων, ὅτι οὔτε σῶμα τὸ ἐν οὔτε ψυχὴ οὔτε νοῦς, τὸ μὲν διότι μὴ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ διότι μὴ μετέχει χρόνου, τὸ δὲ διότι μὴ κινεῖται καὶ ἔστηκε. He goes on to raise the question what manner of time Pl. here refers to, and decides apparently that it is χρόνος ὁ πρῶτιστος, οὐχ ὁ προελθὼν εἰς τὸ ἐμφανές, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀπόλυτος καὶ ἀσχετος καθ' ὃν αἱ περίοδοι πᾶσαι μετροῦνται τῶν ψυχῶν. But into this we cannot follow him, both because Pl. says nothing about

time which does not apply to the time which we know, and because, in the meantime at least, he declares the one to have no connection with it. For this concl. Proc., vi. 223, gives a reason δὲ γὰρ δειχθῆναι τὸ ἐν ἐπέκεινα καὶ τῆς θείας πάσης ψυχῆς πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν, ὡς δέδεικται πρὸ τῶν ὄντων ὄντων καὶ αἰτίων πάντων. But we must not forget that this severance from time speedily costs the one its existence. He further points out that a thing may, so to speak, be 'in time yet not of it,' may exist contemporaneously with time yet not be temporal (241): τὸ εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ is not the same as τὸ εἶναι τότε ὅτε χρόνος ἐστίν, any more than τὸ εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ τουτέστι τὸ εἶναι ὅτε τόπος ἐστίν, ἢ οὕτως πᾶν τὸ ὁσώματον ἐν τόπῳ φήσομεν εἶναι, διότι τόπου ὄντος ἐστίν. Nay τὸ 'ὅτε' χώραν ἐπὶ τούτου [τοῦ ἐνὸς] παντελῶς οὐκ ἔχει πρὸ αἰῶνος ὑφεστῶτος ὅς ἐστι παρὰ τὸν χρόνον. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τις τὸ ὅτε ἐπὶ τοῦ μήτε ἐν αἰῶνι μήτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντος, ἀναινομένου δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἄμφω κοινωνίαν; ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ ἐν, ὅτι μὴ ἐν κινήσει, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐν αἰῶνι, ὅτι μὴ ἐν στάσει· μένει γὰρ ὁ αἰὼν, ὡς ὁ Τίμαιος φησιν. Any further discussion of these problems may be deferred.

Ἔς ... αἰρεῖ: So Ἄτ, and there are several instances of the phrase. Crit. 48 c, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ. Phileb. 35 d, διψῆν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ... οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ. Rep. x. 604 c, ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν: see also 607 b etc. This need be said only because ἐρεῖ was an early reading, and seems to be transl. by Ficinus 'non sane, ut ratio dictat.' Cp. Phaedr. 274 a, ὡς ὁ λόγος φησίν. It will be seen that a reader of Ἀ, (Arethas?) struck with the text, makes a note of it in the marg.

καὶ τὸ γέγονε etc. Cp. Rep. vi. 499 c-d, εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροισ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρελθούτῳ χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ... ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχασθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἢ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστι καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὕτη ἡ μούσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. Proc., vi. 242, cites Rep. vi. 617 b, where Σ. τὰς Μοίρας διαιρεῖσθαι τὸν χρόνον φησί, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄδειν τὰ παρελθόντα, τὴν δὲ τὰ παρόντα, τὴν δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα: and says πρόεισι πρῶτον μὲν τριαδικῶς εἰς τὸ παρὸν καὶ παρελθόν καὶ μέλλον, ἔπειτα ἐννεαχῶς ἕκαστον τῶν τριῶν τούτων εἰς τρία πάλιν ὑποδιαιρῶν. But in the case of τὸ παρὸν Pl. has only two subdivisions ἔστι and γίγνεται.

q

He rectifies this by including in his summary νῦν γέγονε: but he thus repeats γέγονε twice and has to add ποτὲ to the first one. Proc. classifies thus:—

τὸ παρελθόν = ἄκρον, ἢ μέσον, γεγενῆσθαι τελευταῖον, ἐγίγνετο
τὸ παρὸν = κυριώτατον, ἔστι, γέγονε, γίγνεται
τὸ μέλλον = ὑψηλότερον, ἔσται, γενήσεται, γενηθήσεται

but (243) has doubts as to the main divisions, μέχρι τίνος γὰρ ἦν τὸ παρὸν ἢ τὸ παρελθόν, καὶ πόθεν ἄρξεται λοιπὸν τὸ μέλλον; ἀλλ' ἴσως ἄμεινον λέγειν ὅτι πᾶσαι μὲν κατὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἐνεργοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἔχοντος τοῦ ὅλου χρόνου τριπλᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεις—τὴν μὲν τελεσιουργὸν πάσης κινήσεως, τὴν δὲ συνεκτικὴν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν βασιλευμένων καὶ φρουρητικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐκφαντορικὴν τῶν θείων. Proc. speaks throughout as of ὁ χρόνος τῶν ψυχῶν, not of οὗτος ὁ ἐμφανὴς χρόνος, though this is constituted on the same analogy, or rather κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα ὁμοιότητα which comes between. This is probably suggested by Tim. 37 d, εἰκὼ δ' ἐπινοεῖ κινητὸν τινα αἰῶνος ποιήσας, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἄμα οὐρανὸν ποιῶν μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰούσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον δὲ δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν—and so on; but περὶ μὲν τούτων τάχ' ἂν οὐκ εἴη καιρὸς πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι. One would like an excuse for changing τὸ γέγονε into τὸ ἐγεγόνει and ποτὲ γέγονεν into ποτ' ἐγεγόνει. This would furnish τὸ παρελθόν with past tenses and remove the double use of γέγονε. But the text is certain, and Proc. goes on to comment upon it:—τὴν δὲ πρώτην τριάδα τέως ἐπισκεπτέον. αὕτη δὴπου κοινὸν ἔχει πᾶσα τὸ ποτέ... τῶν τριῶν τούτων τὸ μὲν σημαίνει τὴν ἀκρότητα τῆς τριάδος—τὸ ἦν—κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἀφορίζον· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀθρόαν τελείωσιν—τὸ γέγονε· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῷ τελειοῦσθαι παράτασιν—τὸ ἐγίγνετο· μιμήματα ταῦτα τῶν νοητῶν—τὸ μὲν ἦν τοῦ ὄντος, τὸ δὲ γέγονε τοῦ αἰῶνος, τὸ δὲ ἐγίγνετο τοῦ πρώτως αἰωνίου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ ὁμοῦ πᾶν καὶ ὅλον ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, τὸ δὲ πληθύνεσθαι καὶ ἐκτείνεσθαι ὅπως οὖν ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου. τούτοις δὲ τοῖς τριῶν καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς ἔστιν ἀνάλογον τρία. Of the second γέγονεν he says ἕτερον γὰρ παρ' ἐκείνο τὸ γέγονε, τὸ μὲν ὡς παρελθόν, τὸ δὲ ὡς παρὸν... ἐπειδὴ οὖν διττὸν ἐστίμαινε τὸ γέγονεν, ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος δύο μόνον εἶπε—τὴν πρώτην τὸ ἔστι καὶ [τὸ] γίγνεται, ἵνα μὴ παράξῃ τὸν λόγον· ὕστερον δὲ προσθήσει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ γέγονε. γενηθήσεται, 'inter γενήσεται et γενηθήσεται quid intersit non video. Vere, opinor, Schleierm. correxit γεγε-

νήσεται, quod in textum recepissem, si aliud usquam in promptu esset formae hujus exemplum.' Heind. Proc. views it as parallel with *ἐγίγνετο* and *γίγνεται*, regarding it as giving the continuance of a process—*τὴν ἐν τῷ τελειοῦσθαι παράτασιν*. He adds *σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν γενήσεται τὴν ἄχρονον ἀθρόαν εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὑπαρξιν, ὅλον ἀστραπή γενήσεται* τὸ δὲ *γενηθήσεται τὴν παρατάσεως πρόοδον, γενηθήσεται ἄνθρωπος* ἐπὶ δὲ ἀστραπῆς εἰπεῖν τὸ *γενηθήσεται ψεύδος ἐστίν*. This must apply here; but that the form in *-θήσομαι* is not always strictly so used appears from Theaet. 158 D, *τί οὖν; κλήθει χρόνον ... τὸ ἀληθὲς ὀρισθήσεται*; But perhaps the form *ὀρίσεται* is confined to the mid., as in 190 E, *εἴ τις ὀρίσεται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδὴ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν*. Stallb., overlooking what Proc. says and the demands of the case, renders *γενήσεται* 'es wird im Werden sein' and *γενηθήσεται* 'es wird werden.' He cites cases of verbs possessing both forms—such as *ἀδικεῖν, τρέφειν, παιδεύειν*—in which (Gorg. 509 D, Crito 54 A etc.) the shorter form is used, and that (we must assume) in the sense of continuance. But there is no importance attaching to time in those instances: they are cases of statement merely.

τοῦ μέλλοντος; So *Ἄτ*, and the sense is clear. Still Heind. says with reason 'Articulum τοῦ ante μέλλοντος male intrusit librarius. Τοῦ ἔπειτα μέλλοντος respondebit praegresso τοῦ ποτε γεγονότος et subsequenti τοῦ νῦν παρόντος. Thucyd. 1. 123, *τὰ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένα ... περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μελλόντων*' ... Stallb. agrees, but adds 'nisi forte praestat ratio G. Hermann ad Eurip. Iphig. Taur. 1234, corrigentis τοῦ ἔπειτά που μέλλοντος, ut ποὺ ad solum ἔπειτα referatur.'

ἔστιν οὖν ... τούτων τι; 'But are there any forms of being other than these?' Jowett: 'Num potest quidquam essentialiter aliter quam secundum istorum aliquod participare?' Fic.: and others clearly take *τούτων* of the phases of time just noted. This seems the natural sense; in which case Pl. imagines here no existence save one in time, and time such as we know it. Proc. has no basis for his repeated reference to a time other than *ὁ προελθὼν εἰς τὸ ἐμφανές*. Yet he regards *τούτων* as referring to the entire series of aspects in which the one has been thus far considered (vi. 249 etc.), *πάν φησὶ τὸ*

μετέχον οὐσίας κατὰ τι τούτων ἐστὶ μετέχον, ... ὅλον ἢ ὅλον ἐστὶν ἢ μέρη ἔχον ἢ ἀρχὴν ἢ μέσον ἔχον etc.

οὐδαμῶς ἄρα etc. It seems clear that this argt. is meant to banish the one from existence, to annihilate it: but Proc. (vi. 250) regards it as raising the one 'above' existence. οὕτω δὲ που καὶ ὁ ἐν Πολιτεῖα Σ. τὸ πρῶτον ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ἔλεγεν εἶναι ... ἐνταῦθα φησιν ὅτι οὐχ ὅλον τε εἶναι μὲν τι μὴ μετέχειν δὲ οὐσίας καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ διαλόγῳ καὶ ἐν Τιμαίῳ παραπλησίως. ... καὶ ταύτῃ διέστηκεν ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνα Παρμ. τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐν ὄν βλέπει, καὶ τοῦτό φησιν εἶναι πάντων αἷτιον, ὁ δὲ ... εἰς τὸ μόνως ἐν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἀναδραμών. The passage in the Rep. is vi. 509 B, καὶ τοῖς γινώσκομένοις τοῖνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γινώσκεισθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρᾶσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος, the spirit of which is totally distinct from that of ours, where the assumption is that the one has been logically abolished. Proc. adds ἀποφύσας δ' οὖν τὸ μετέχειν οὐσίας τὸ ἐν ... προσέθηκεν 'οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν', οὐκέτι τοῦτο δι' ἀποδείξεως λαμβάνων' οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀποδείξαι δυνατόν τοῦτο αὐτόθεν διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ ἐν συγγένειαν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποφάσεσι τὰ συγγενέστερα δυσἀποδεικτότερα ... ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ὄν δείξει τῆς δευτέρας ἀρχόμενος ὑποθέσεως. But the argt. in the text seems quite a case of ἀπόδειξις—Nothing that is apart from time has any being: the one is apart from time, therefore the one has not any being = Ferio of the first figure!

εἴη γὰρ ... μετέχον. The text and meaning both quite clear, 'denn dann wäre es doch seiend und des Seins theilhaftig,' Engelm. Heind. would prefer *εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ἐν ὄν, καὶ οὐσίας μετέχοι*,—neat but needless.

τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ. Our idiom is the indef. art. in such cases; and so 'wenn man einem solchen Schlusse vertrauen darf,' Engelm. It would agree with our ideas to explain the usage thus, *εἰ δὲ πιστεύειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιῷδε ὄντι*. The demonstr. is probably used δεικτικῶς, the λόγος being personified as one of the company: otherwise τοιοῦτος would be more in place.

ὁ δὲ ... ἢ αὐτοῦ; literally = but what does not exist—could there be to this non-existent thing

anything either 'for it' or 'of it'? We might simplify thus—*μὴ ὄντος δέ τινος, εἴη ἂν τι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ*; e.g. οὐδ' ἄρα ὀνομά ἐστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος [αὐτοῦ]. So Alcib. I. 128 A-B, *δακτύλιον ἐστιν ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίης ἢ δακτύλου*; What has no οὐσία can have no ποιότης or πρὸς τι.

οἷσ' τι 'neque ab aliquo ex iis quae sunt sentitur,' Fic., who must take the words thus, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων (subject of sent.) αἰσθάνεται αὐτοῦ; and similarly Jowett, 'nor does anything that is perceive one': and Müller and Ast. But Engelm. 'noch (wird) etwas von dem Seienden an ihm wahrgenommen' clearly assumes αἰσθάνεται to be passive; and very naturally in view of the connection. Stallb. without remark renders 'nec quidquam eorum, quae reuera sunt, in eo percipitur et animadvertitur.' Pl.'s point seems to be that nothing which is can perceive what is not.

ἢ δυνατόν ... δοκεῖ: Here we have a conclusion; and it is unsatisfactory. Proc. (VI. 241) thus traces back the argt., ἀπέφησε πάντα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐν τάξει: (10) τὸ χρόνου μετέχειν ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε πρεσβύτερον εἶναι μήτε νεώτερον, (9) τοῦτο ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε ὁμοιότητος μήτε ἰσότητος μήτε ἀνομοιότητος μήτε ἀνισότητος μετέχειν, (8) τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε ταῦτόν εἶναι μήτε ἕτερον, (7) ταῦτα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐν, (6) τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μηδαμῶς, (5) τὸ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἐστάναι ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ, (4) τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε περιέχειν ἑαυτὸ μήτε περιέχεσθαι, (3) τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρη μὴ ἔχειν, (2) τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ὅλον, (1) τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι πλῆθος. At 251 he asks, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔστιν ἤρξατο τῶν ἀποφάσεων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, and answers ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐναντίως εἶχεν ἢ τῆς οὐσίας ἀποφασίς· ἢ μὲν γὰρ λέγει τὸ ἵν' ὡς ἔστιν, ἢ δὲ ἀπόφασις ὡς οὐκ ἔστι. πάντων οὖν γελοιότατον ἦν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγειν εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, αὐτὸς γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἔδοξεν ἀναιρεῖν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο τῷ ἔστι καταχρησάμενος, καὶ ὡς μηδὲν διαφέρειν λέγων εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, εἶπεν ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ μάλιστα ἀντικεῖσθαι πως δοκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐν· καὶ ἄλλως τῷ Παρμ. δοκοῦν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ὄν καὶ οὐ πολλά. ἀρξάμενος οὖν ἀπὸ τούτων ὡς γνωριμωτάτων, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ἀποφύσας, κατείδεν ὡς ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔννοια καὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ἀναίνεται συνάρτησιν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔστιν. He gives, then, two reasons for the order; that to begin by

saying 'the one is not many' is to approach the subject from a distance and lay siege to it in due form, and that this falls in with the dictum of Parm.—as stated by Z.—that 'the whole is not many.' It certainly adds greatly to our conviction that the truth should seem to be reached gradually by cumulative evidence. Grote says 'As far as I can understand the bearing of this self-contradictory demonstration, it appears a *reductio ad absurdum* of the proposition—*Unum is not Multa*. Now *Unum* which is not *Multa* designates the *Αὐτὸ-Ἐν* or *Unum Ideale*; which Pl. himself affirmed and which Arist. impugned. If this be what is meant, the dialogue Parm. would present here, as in other places, a statement of difficulties understood by Pl. as attaching to his own doctrines etc.' Plat. Vol. II. Without at present discussing Pl.'s views upon the αὐτοῦ ἐν we can only repeat that the argt. here says nothing upon the question of a 'one' which should be 'super-sensible' and ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας: it simply shows how by pressing the 'oneness' of the 'one' we press it out of existence. One might quote many phrases from Dam.:—§ 5, 7, τὸ γὰρ δὴ ἐν ... εἰ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν ἔστιν· εἰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ λόγος ἀρμόσει, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις ... ὄνομα ... δόξα ... ἐπιστ. ... οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰτῶν ἀπλαῖ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦς, ὥστε πάντῃ ἀγνωστον καὶ ἄρρητον τὸ ἐν. § 7, 15, καὶ τί πέρας ... πλὴν σιγῆς ἀμηχάνου καὶ ὁμολογίας τοῦ μηδὲν γινώσκων ... § 25 bis, 43, διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἀπογυμνῶν ἡμῶν ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν ἣν τελευτῶν οὐδὲ εἶναι φησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐν τοῦ εἶναι ἀμέτοχον· ἀπ' αὐτῆς γὰρ τὸ εἶναι. § 27, 48, εἰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνο πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ πᾶν ... τὸ δὲ 'πάντα εἶναι' οὐκ ἐστὶ 'τόδε τι εἶναι,' τὸ δὲ 'γνωστὸν εἶναι' 'τόδε τί ἐστιν εἶναι'—δηλον τὸ συμβαῖνον ὅτι τὸ πάντα ὄν οὐκ ἐστὶ γνωστὸν. § 29, 55, ὡς γνωστῷ πόρρωθεν ἐιτυγχάνομεν καὶ ... ἱπερβάντες ἡμῶν τὸ γνωστικὸν τοῦ ἐνὸς εἰς τὸ ἐν εἶναι περιστάμεθα, τοιτέστιν εἰς τὸ ἀγνωστον εἶναι ἀντὶ γνωστικοῦ. He like Proc. treats the one here as transcendental.

βούλα οὖν ... φανῇ; So t, which seems essential: B Ἄ φανείη. Cp. Phaedr. 263 E, βούλει πάλιν ἀναγνώμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ; Tim. 17 B, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διὰ βραχίων πάλιν ἐπ' ἀνέλθε αὐτὰ ἵνα βεβαιωθῇ μᾶλλον παρ' ἡμῖν. Arist. Met. I. end, ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν τάχα γὰρ ἂν etc. We must suppose something like ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶμεν ἂν etc. (Riddell's Digest, § 64, γ):

'Considerantes si quid forte redeuntibus (Stallb. 'a principio repetentibus') nobis aliter se habere videatur.' Fic. t marks this by ∴ opp. οὐν.

οὐκοῦν ... ταῦτα. 1. 'Nonne, si ipsum unum est, confessi sumus, quae circa illud eveniunt, cujusmodi esse oporteat?' Fic., which Heind. says would imply ἔφαμεν with a ref. to 137 B, ἡ βούλοσθε etc., but that a similar case recurs 163 C. We need not press Fic. too closely, who almost omits διομολ. ταῦτα. 2. Müller, 'Behaupten wir nicht (οὐκοῦν φαμέν) es liege uns ob vollständig darüber uns zu verständigen (διομολογ. ταῦτα) was etwa (ποῖά ποτε) wenn das Eine ist (ἐν εἰ ἔστιν), in Bezug auf Dasselbe daraus folgt (τυγχάνει ὄντα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ;)' This is very literal, and gives the same interpretation as (3) Jowett, who is very brief, 'We say that we have to work out all the consequences that follow, if one exists.' 4. Engelin., 'Also "Eins, wenn es ist" sagen wir, und müssen das was dasselbe trifft, von welcher Art es auch immer sein mag, bestimmen.' This makes ἐν εἰ ἔστιν the object of φαμέν, 'this is our hypothesis "if the one is," and we are bound to follow out the consequences of it whatever they may be.' This yields excellent sense (though ταῦτα is treated as needless); but it inserts καὶ after φαμέν. 5. Ast, 'Nonne, unum si esset, diximus quae consequerentur ratione ipsius, qualia ea cumque essent, oportere inter nos convenire haec?' This seems partly like (4). 6. Stallb. rearranges, and says 'quod dictum est per attractionem pro: οὐκοῦν [ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν] διομολογητέον, ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτό; Etenim ταῦτα ... ex abundanti adjectum est. Ex his vero intelligitur etiam alteram Heindorfii conjecturam, qua ὁποῖα pro ποῖα legendum statuit, minime necessarium esse. Ceterum cp. Rep. VII. 527 B, οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον; τὸ ποῖον; ὥς etc.' There is room for still another rendering, which would be brought out by arranging the words thus, οὐκοῦν φαμέν ἐν εἰ ἔστιν διομολογητέα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα [εἶναι]—ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα; and by the following paraphrase—'let us review our hypothesis again in the light of our conclusions—and do we not maintain in it that if the one exists we must perforce agree that the conclusions flowing from it are those which we have just stated, whether

we like their character or not?' The weak point here lies in ποῖά ποτε τυγ. ὄντα for καίπερ ὄντα τοιαῦτα: it would be met if we read for περὶ αὐτοῦ ποῖά—περὶ αὐτό, ὁποῖά.

ἐν εἰ ἔστιν ... οὐσίᾳ δὲ etc. 'In primo supposito unum supra ens efferebat et a rerum universitate exinebat Parm.; in hoc secundo vero unum vult cum essentia conjungi.' Thoms. He professes to have just discovered a grave blunder, and to be astonished at the consequences which flow from it. He said the one existed; and this time he won't forget it. Introd. lviii.

οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν οὐσα τῷ ἐνί; The point is vital to what follows. Yet had he made it ταῦτ' ἐνί he might have contended—as above—that this did not make it ἐν τῷ ἐνί. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ... μετέιχεν' so t but not X: ἂν seems essential. The protasis might be either (1) εἰ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἐνί ἢ οὐσία τῷ ἐνί, or (2) εἰ γὰρ ἢ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐκ ἦν—if it were one with the one, or if it did not belong to it, in either case—οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ... οὐδ' ἂν μετέιχεν' ἀλλ' ὁμοιον ἂν ἦν. That the sentence is normal we see by νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις: where further note the αὕτη referring to what follows; but that repeats what precedes.

οὐκ οὐν ὥς ... τοῦ ἐν; is irregular. Fic. 'nonne ita dicitur tanquam aliud significet ipsum est, aliud ipsum unum?' But this would need οὐκ οὐν οὕτως ὑποτιθέμεθα ὥς ἄλλο τι σημαίνοντος τοῦ ἔστι or οὐκ οὐν (εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις) ἄλλο τι σημαίνει τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; or yet again οὐκ οὐν ἄλλο τι ὃν σημαίνουσα [ἢ ὑπόθεσις] τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; as we have it a little below. That ὃν is all but as primitive as ἐν is granted by all the ancients, οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν' πάντα γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένον τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται. Ar. Phys. I. 2, 185 a 31. Yet we ask πότερον ποτε τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐν οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶ, ... ἢ δὲ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστι τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐν ὥς ὑποκειμένης ἄλλης φύσεως. Met. II. 4, 1001 a 5. In making distinctions we are beginning 'process,' for (Dam. § 32, 62) ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐστὶν ἢ πρόληψις τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, and we get a compound which (§ 66, 144) Pl. calls οὔτε ἐν οὔτε ὃν, ἀλλ' ἐν ὃν τὸ ὄλον δι' ἀπορίαν τοῦ προσρήματος οἰκείου. We see (§ 67, 145) ὄλον προποδισμὸς εἰς τὸ ὃν τοῦ ἐνός: while next comes (§ 108, 280) μετὰ τὸ ἐν ὃν εὐθὺς τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀντιπαρεταγμένα κατὰ δύο στίχους. The one is not a mere single quality of a thing— (§ 117,

300) τὸ γὰρ ἐν οὐκ ἰδιότης μία, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον οἶον πάντα. Our sent. implies that the preceding one ran νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ὑποτίθεται τὸ ὑποτιθέμενον. Probably the change arose partly through οὐχ οὕτω; coming between οὐχ αὕτη and οὐκ οὖν ὥς, and partly to avoid the colloc. τοῦ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; ἔστι and ἐν are, as it were, in inverted commas.

ἄρα ... τις ... ἔστιν: Ἄ τι, ἢ τις. One can easily see how ε may have dropped out before συλ-. The order which would best give a value to each would be ἐπειδ' ἂν οὖν συλλήβδην εἴπῃ τις ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν, ἄρα ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴῃ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἐν;—as Stallb. suggests. ἂν εἴῃ is softer for ἔσται. The text should read τις not -δην.

τοιοῦτον ... ἔχον: i.e. τὴν ὑπόθεσιν σημαίνειν τὸ ἐν τοιοῦτον ὃν οἶον [= ὥστε] μέρη ἔχειν. Might we not also have μέρη ἔχον?

D αὐτὸ ἔστι ... ὄντος ἐνός. After writing τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, John on glancing up let his eye rest on the first ὄντος, and wrote λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι etc. If he corrected the mistake by inserting points above the words to be omitted (there are no brackets) he must have gone on at least to ἔστι before noting his error, otherwise he need have cancelled only the 2nd λέγεται. The Ms. from which he copied could hardly have had lines of the same length as ours, for in that case the second ὄντος would not be likely to cause confusion. But if we assume what is *primâ facie* probable, that the archetype had two cols., then the words might have stood in some such form as

εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος λέγεται

καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι

or ᾗδε· εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος

λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος

so that a mistake might easily happen. Stallb. rightly renders thus, 'si οὐσία tribuitur uni illi quatenus est, et vicissim unum τῷ ὄντι quatenus in se suscepit unum.'

ἔστι δὲ οὐ ... ἐνός ὄντος. Fic. 'est autem idem essentia et unum, eodem existente uno quod supposuimus' which differs from the text (1) by omitting οὐ, and (2) by treating τοῦ αὐτοῦ ... ὄντος as genitive absolute. The οὐ is needed, although τ omits it; and the τοῦ αὐτοῦ depend upon ἔστι: so in B above, οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνός εἴῃ ἂν, οὐ ταυτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἐνί; Stallb. 'sed ad ipsum illud pertinet [ἡ

τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἐν] quod sumsimus, videlicet ad τὸ ἐν ὄν.

τὸ μὲν ὅλον ... αὐτό, Thoms. reads αὐτοῦ and conj. αὐτό, which agrees with Ἄ, which he had not seen. The sense is as if the words stood αὐτὸ—τὸ μὲν ὅλον—εἶναι ἐν ὄν 'dass das Ganze das seiende Eine sei.' Müller. But the emphatic word should be ὅλον, which the text, naturally interpreted, hardly gives. Jowett boldly puts it as we would wish it, 'must not the being or existence of unity be a whole?' For this we must view τὸ μὲν as adverbial, not followed by τὸ δέ: the words would then stand (τὸ μὲν—) αὐτὸ εἶναι ὅλον-ἐν-ὄν with the emphasis on ὅλον = 'is it not imperative *first* that the thing itself should be a *whole*-existent-one, and [second] that the "one" and "being" become parts of this?'

ἢ ... τό γε ... προσρητόν: γε italicises the noun, 'or is this *part* ['part,' observe] to be called part of the whole?' *προσρ.* is tautol., cp. Theaet. 204 E, Μέρος δ' ἐστ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ὅλου; Τοῦ παντός γε... Δοκεῖ μοι οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.

μέριον ἔχει; 'Sed ne illud quidem μόριον... sanum est, quod mutandum in μόρια, nisi quis Platonem scripsisse conjiciat μορίῳ δύο.' Heind. But the singular is probably due to the vis inertiae, so to speak, of the three immediately preceding cases of the same word. It has a part, whatever more.

τὸν μορ. ... μόριον, The noun is not hitherto in the dual, while the verb is. μόριον, so Ἄ and τ, but the latter is altered μορίου. Bekker reads ἡ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μόριον [Stallb. μορίου], which gives a good sense: but then he says, 'ὄντος om. mei omnes,' and Heind. 'non sane τὸ ἐν est pars τοῦ ὄντος sed τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος, neque τὸ ὄν pars τοῦ ἐνός est, sed ejusdem τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός.' Perhaps the ὄντος before εἶναι may have been an early marginal substitute for εἶναι. It is more symmetrical to say τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος μ. than τοῦ εἶναι μ., when τοῦ ἐνός follows. There would be less diff. if the following words were ἡ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνός μόριον, but here both Mss. read μορίου. The sense is ἄρα ἡ τὸ ἐν ἀπολείπεται τοῦ εἶναι, ἡ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνός; and Schleierm. would omit μόριον (as Bekk., or μορίου as Stallb.) in each case. Stallb. rejects B's μόριον, but adds 'nunc suffragari dubito sententiae Schleierm., Heind., et Bekkeri, qui istud μόριον et post εἶναι et post ἐνός tanquam insititium delendum censuerunt. Nam quod Fic. illud inter-

pretatione sua omisit, vereor ne id non tam deliberato consilio quam propter inertiam quandam ita ab eo factum sit. Quod autem codices omnes eam vocem constanter utroque loco tuentur [they are equally decided in omitting *ὄντος*], id ejusmodi est ut summam suadeat prudentiam et cautionem. Sed dicam quod sentio; legendum est *μορίου*, genitivo casu, quod jam in ed. Basil. 2. evulgatum nuper codicum quorundam egregiorum auctoritate confirmatum est.' He interprets 'perinde ac si scriptum esset *τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ὡς μορίου* et *τοῦ ἐνὸς ὡς μορίου*.' This seems to mean that the sense is *ἄρα ἡ τὸ ἐν ἀπολείπεται εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ὡς μορίου* etc., and to be designed as a reply to Heind.'s remark above. *εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ὡς μορίου* is intelligible, but it does not meet Heind.'s objection: and is there authority for using both *ἀπολείπ.* and *εἶναι* with *τινος*? The chief diff. in the text is *μόριον*—*μορίου*. Were both *μόριον* the form would have justification: were both *μορίου* all would be clear. Herm. defends the text —'Mihi librorum lectio idoneum sensum praebebat: ex duabus unius-entis partibus neque unum, quia pars est [= *μόριον*, i. q. ? *μόριον δν*], essendi notione caret [= *ἀπολ. τοῦ εἶναι*], neque ens, quia unum est, parte sui uno.' That is the meaning; but to reach that should we not need *ἄρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἡ τὸ ἐν τοῦ εἶναι* [*μορίου*] *μόριον* [*δν*], ἡ τὸ δν τοῦ ἐνὸς *μορίου* [*μόριον δν*]; why then the capricious omission? And the natural meaning of *ἀπολ. ἡ τὸ ἐν τοῦ εἶναι* *μόριον* would be 'does either the one recede from being a part' or 'is either the one deprived of being a part,' which does not balance *τὸ δν τοῦ ἐνὸς μορίου*. On the whole, unless some serious error lurks in the text, the simplest correc. would be to read either *μορίου* or *μόριον* in both cases; and the former is simpler and has t in its favour. Perhaps 144 C, E

p. 17. decide that *ἀπολείπεσθον* is passive? *τὸ ἐλάχιστον* is adverbial, 'ex duabus saltem particulis.' Fic.

τούτω τὸ μορίῳ Notes 1. Does *μόριον* form part of the subj. with *ὃ τί περ* (quaecunque particula occurrit—Fic.) or is it pred. with *γίνεται*?

143 *δὲ αἰεὶ γιν.* sc. αὐτό, i. e. τὸ *μόριον*. On the elis. cp. 143 D *δύο ἦτον*, *δύο ἄρτια* 149 A *δύο εἶναι*, *δύο ἄρα* B *δύο ἐπλεο* etc. Leichtere Elisionen werden mit der grössten Inkonsequenz bald vorgenommen, bald nicht. Meisterhans 54, § 23, 1.

ἄραρον δν τὸ πλεόν 'This is exactly what S. ...

(p. 129 B-D) had pronounced to be utterly inadmissible. [Had he? He desired to see Z. carry the discussion into that field.] The essential characteristic of the Platonic Idea is here denied. ... Pl. here reasons upon two contradictory assumptions: first that *Unum Ens* is a total composed of two parts separately assignable ...; next, that *Unum* is not assignable separately from *Ens* ... Proceeding upon the first, he declares *Unum Ens* to be divisible: proceeding upon the second, he declares that this division must be carried on ad infinitum, because you can never reach either the separate *Ens* or the separate *Unum*. But Pl. must make his election: either he takes the first, in which case the total *Unum Ens* is divisible, and its two factors, *Unum* and *Ens*, can be assigned separately; or he takes the second, in which case *Unum* and *Ens* cannot be assigned separately ... so that *Unum Ens* instead of being infinitely divisible, is not divisible at all.' Grote, Pl. II. Thoms. cps. this passage with the poem of Parm. (l. 81 Mullach) *τῷ συνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστίν, ἐν γὰρ ἰόντι πελάζει*: which seems to show that (Is it also Grote's view?) a physical turn is given to the division of *ἐν* and *δν*. Simpl., on Arist. Phys. I. 2, 185 b 5, illustrates the division of a *συνεχὲς ἐν* by that of a line: and if that is the division which is meant in our text, then you cannot take up the first half of the line and maintain that it contains the *δν* of the second. Now Pl.'s repeated use of the word *μόριον* does suggest physical analogies; but his detailed argt. for the relation of the *μόρια* to a *δλον* which is a *ἐν-δν* show that he means a logical not a physical division. 'One' and 'being' are the two distinguishable 'moments' of a single complex but indissoluble conception. Yet this does not remove Grote's difficulty about the second half of Pl.'s argt. Pl. seems to hold that when he has established the separateness of being and one in his existent-one he introduces thereby into the latter a capacity for indefinite sub-div. which was not there before. Grote seems right in rejecting the argt. as thus put: and perhaps the argt. which immediately succeeds (143) shows that Pl. was not quite satisfied, and sought to secure divisib. otherwise. But again—granted that *ἐν δν* are distinct and essential elements in the concep. *ἐν δν*, are they co-ordinate as Being

and Nothing are in the Hegelian concep. of Becoming? Pl. must regard them so, since every sub-div. of one still retains being as factor. Proc.-Dam. vi. 258 becomes transcend. αὐτὰ τὰ μόρια τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔχουσι, καὶ αὐθις ἐκότερον τῶν μορίων ... καὶ αὐθις ἐκεῖνα, καὶ αἰ ἐπ' ἀπειρον· πλὴν ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἐνός, ὅτι καὶ οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ ὑπερούσιόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ὅλον ὄν ἀμερές ἐστι ... ἐν γὰρ τῷ λεγομένῳ μορίῳ τὸ ὅλον ἅπαν πληροσπάτως, καὶ ἀνελλιπῶς.

διὸ ἔστιν; 'and therefore is' Jowett. This seems correct; yet translators forsake the sense from a feeling that it should be the converse. Our assumpt. was εἰ ἐν ἔστι, not εἰ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει: on the contr. we reached the latter from having assumed the former—142 B ἐν εἰ ἔστιν ἄρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; Fic. gives 'Diximus unum essentia participare in quantum est?' Müller, 'Behaupten wir nicht, das Eine sei des Seins theilhaftig, weil es ist?' and so Engelm. But can διὸ = because?

ἂν ... μόνον καθ' αὐτὸ The context suggests that μόνον goes with αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, not with τῇ δ.—τούτου: yet οὐσίας μετέχειν has scarcely left his pen. τὸ αὐτὸ τούτου; the sense would not suffer if the article were absent. The separation of τὸ ἐν from τὸ ὄν here is put with emphasis: yet we must take with us the caution of Stallb. 'Fallitur igitur, Heind. mirifice, hoc jam Parmenidem docere velle existimans, etiam τὸ ἐν, quatenus absque τῷ εἶναι per se intelligatur, multa esse numeroque infinita. Licet enim τοῦ ἐνός natura per se spectetur tamen ea ab τῷ ὄντι minime prorsus sejuncta est aut divulsa, quod vel propter sumtionem ἐν εἰ ἔστι nullo modo poni licuit.' The position is complicated. The one has been assumed as existent; that at once confers upon it a more definite nature than was the case previously, and the definiteness clings to it even when we consider it apart from the element of existence which we have added to it. And definiteness is all that we require to work upon in order to transform one altogether. Stallb. urges that if there be any want of clearness it arises 'aporum vocabulorum penuria'; which is likely, and makes for the authenticity of the work.

B εἰδόμεν Notes I. Ἄ εἰ, δῶμεν and eds. generally ἰδόμεν. Confus. may have arisen from dict.; but

the form in the text is quite legit.—Veitch cps. Frogs 322, ἡσυχίαν τοῖνυν ἄγειν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἂν εἰδῶμεν σαφῶς. ἄλλο τι ἕτερον etc.: Ridd. Idioms § 22. Reference to ellipsis is out of date, yet the full thought here would need e.g. ἄλλο τι [συμβαίνει ἢ ὅτι] ἕτερον etc. Heind. rightly rejects the punct. of Ἄ, Ἰδόμεν δὲ ἄλλο τι ἕτερον. εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία—the old read. was οὐσίας: Heind. sugg. οὐσία without knowing Ἄt. Stallb. 'Nonne prorsus necesse est aliud quid esse ejus οὐσίαν aliud ipsum per se (αὐτό), siquidem τὸ ἐν non est οὐσία, sed tanquam unum, quod suam sibi propriam naturam habet, οὐσίαν participat?'

οὔτε τῷ ἐν ... καὶ ἄλλῳ etc. ἐν and οὐσία are in the nom., connected by subst. verb with τὸ ἐν and ἡ οὐσία. 'τῷ ἐν sc. εἶναι, quod etsi statim infertur post illa οὔτε τῷ οὐσία, tamen illud et hic accurata sermonis ratio requirebat. Commodius certe post οὐσία quam h. l. abesset.' Heind. For the promiscuous use of ἕτερον and ἄλλο Stallb. cites ample auth., e.g. Il. ix. 472, οὔτε ποτ' ἔσβη πῦρ, ἕτερον μὲν ... ἄλλο δ' ἐνὶ προδόμῳ, and Soph. 245 E, συνάπτεται γὰρ ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου. Phileb. 57 B, ἀρά ἐστὶ τις ἐτέρας ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. In the argt. Pl. reverts to the line taken in Dem. i. and introduces plurality into the one more legitimately than in 142 E. Stallb. speaks of the 'notio differentiae, quae tamen neque in uno neque in essentiae natura continetur, sed accedit extrinsecus. Est enim quasi negans quaedam utriusque illius copula:' cp. Soph. 257 B-C, ὅπῃ ταν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον ... namely ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τι μὴνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ ... τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ αὐτ' ἂν κένηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα. But why exclude the ὄν involved in εἰ ἐν ἔστι and then create another ὄν after that? Would he not have got his ἕτερον with the original ὄν as well? Proc. or Dam. vi. 259 says διὰ μικροῦ δὲ ἐφοδεύει τὰς ἀποδείξεις καὶ προηγουμένως κατασκευάζει· εἰ ἐν ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς ἔσται· τούτῳ δὲ ἔπεται τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι, and goes on τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ ἕτερον οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐτέρῳ, δηλονότι τῇ ἐτερότητι, καθὼς ἐν Φαίδωνι ἔλεγεν, (100 E etc.) ... τούτων οὖν ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων, τῆς τε οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἐνός, παρεισάγεται τὸ ἕτερον, καὶ τρία γίνονται. οὐ ταῦτόν ... τὸ ἕτερον: here the dat. is used in connec. with the idea of

compar. ; not, as above, to express the instrum. or material. *ἐὰν προελ.* etc. our idiom would choose e.g. *ἐὰν προελ. αὐτῶν δύο τινὲ ἢ βούλει, εἴτε ... εἴτε.*

C *δ ... -τέρω* Notes 1. : so *t* (*ω* patched), and it seems to be required : *Ἄ τινέφ ... -τερα.* We have seen (142 E) a similar confus. of dat. sing. and accus. dual. The *α* is often almost indisting. from *ω*. For the express. cp. Crat. 392 A, *γινῶναι ὅπη ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκείνον τὸν ποταμὸν Ξάνθον καλεῖν*, and *ὅσῃ ὀρθότερόν ἐστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκὶς κυμίνιδος*; Laws v. 744 D, [*νοσήματος*] *ὁ διάστασιν ἢ στάσιν ὀρθότερον ἂν εἴη κεκλησθαι.* So Arist. De Coelo i. 1, *τὰ γὰρ δύο ἄμφω μὲν λέγουμεν καὶ τοὺς δύο ἀμφοτέρους, πάντας δ' οὐ λέγουμεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν προσηγορίαν φάμεν πρῶτον*—he has said above, quoting the Pythagoreans, that *τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὄρισται.* *ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν*; cp. nom. below *ὅτ' ἂν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἔν*, and again : the constr. seems free and capricious, e.g. Theaet. 147 A, *ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός*, Prot. 317 C etc.

οὐκ οὖν καὶ ... καὶ the second *καὶ* ('likewise') resumes the first. Stallb. quotes De Corona p. 317, *ὥστε καὶ ὧν αὐτὸς ὡς ἀτυχημάτων ἐμέμνητο, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖ, et sic centenis locis. ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἔκ. est 'quodcunque simul commemoratur,' ut non opus sit numero duali ἐκάστοιν quem desiderabat Heind. De formula ἐπὶ τίνος λέγειν v. ad Remp. v. 475 A, *εἰ βούλει ... ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν.* Stallb.*

δ seems necess. : *Ἄ φ, t δ.* *μηχανὴ οὐχ ... ἐν εἶναι*; so *Ἄ*, but it can hold only if the constr. is *οὐχ-ἐν* or *οὐκ-εἶναι*, which from the position is very unlikely. *t μὴ οὐχ*, and *μὴ* may easily have fallen out after *μηχανή*.

σύνδύο *Ἄ οὖν, t σύν* as first syll. This would perhaps be one of the cases relied on by Kröschel (Introd. lxxvii.) as proof that the source of *Ἄ* was ill written. *σύν* as in *t* might be suggested by the later Hellenistic use of this word separately—see L. and S. *ἐκάστα* = each group, *ἐκάστον* = each factor, 'now in as much as our selections each prove binary, surely of these factors each must be one.'

ἐν ἑκάστ. etc. *ἐκ.* subj. *ἐν* pred. as 131 E. *συμπεθέντος ... τὰ πάντα*; = 'if to whichever couple we please be added whichever factor we please, does not the total become three?' or alternatively 'do not three arise in all?' Stallb. cites Prot. 317 C,

καὶ γὰρ τὰ ξύμπαντα [ἔτη] πολλά μοι ἔστιν. Proc. or Dam., vi. 260, seems to take the second altern., as he says *ἡτινιοῦν δὴ συζυγία προστεθέντος τοῦ ἐνὸς τρία φαίνονται.*

τῷ τε δύο ... τῷ τρία He chooses now to speak of *ε* two and three as singular and in inverted commas; he might almost as well have put *δύο ὄντος, τρία ὄντος* above and below.

ἀνάγκη τε τρία etc. So *Ἄ*: the *τε* might quite well be misplaced, as we often misplace a word like 'both'—'both as regards time and space.' Pl. might wish to associate *τρία δις* as closely as *δύο τρίς*. *t* reads *τρία τε δις*. *δις τρία* is the text of *Ἄt*, p. 15. but *Ἄ* has *δυο τρις* very small and neat in marg. The correc. may have been very old without being seen, as the Ms. is both stained and creased there. Schleierm. anticipated the change; and all admit its necessity. Stallb. says 'veram lectionem habuisse videtur Dam., aut quisquis Procli commentarium inde ab secundae sumtionis exploratione continuavit, T. vi. 260, *ἐναλλάξ συνδυάζει τὸ δις τοῖς τρισὶ καὶ τὸ τρίς τοῖς δισίν.*' The words are merely for symmetry, as *τρία δις* = *δύο τρίς*.

Ἄρτιά τε ... ἀνάγκη εἶναι; After noting that we have 4 (*δύο δις*), 9 (*τρία τρίς*), and 6 (*τρία δις* = *δίό τρίς*), Proc.-Dam. goes on, vi. 260, *καὶ δὴ γίνονται ὁ μὲν τέσσαρα [sc. ἀριθμὸς?] ἀρτιάκις ἄρτιος, ὁ δὲ ἐννέα περιττάκις περιττός, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἀρτιοπέριστος. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις, ὁ λεγόμενος περισσάρτιος, ζητητέον δὲ πόθεν καὶ οὗτος συνάγεται' ἢ, ἐπεὶ ὁ δις συνήχθη ἐκ τῶν δύο καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐκ τοῦ τρίς δύο, πάντως ἐκ τοῦ δύο αὐθις καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ὁ δώδεκα, ὅς ἐστι περισάρτιος. Is not six *περισσάρτιος* when = *τρία δις*?*

εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἔν, ἀνάγκη etc. Yes: a definite, thinkable, usable 'one' is such only as having number, or many ones, for background.

ὄντος ... τῶν ὄντων. The subst. verb is important throughout: he sets up multitude on the basis that *ἐν* is *ὄν*. *καὶ* here seems = *μᾶλλον δέ. ἢ οὐκ ... γίγνεται*; a hyperb. for *ἢ οὐκ ἀριθ. γίγνεται*—*πλήθει ἀπειρος καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας*; = 'or is it not so, that number boundless in amount and sharing in existence arises?' Thoms. says 'Numerus Platonis et Pythagoreis denotabat essentiam, ὁ ἀριθμὸς inquit Damascius ἀποφαίνει οὐσίαν.' That may be so (though the language of Dam. does not necessarily express it, but may merely mean *quot numeri tot*

essentiae), but Pl. makes no such assumpt. here. He is at pains to prove the connec. of existence with one; thereafter he infers the connec. of existence with number or many.

οὐκ οὖν εἰ πᾶς ... τὸ μόριον etc. 'quod si totus ipse numerus est essentiae particeps unaquaeque etiam particula numeri essentia participabit.' Fic. The argt. seems curious. He began by establishing the connec. of ὄν with εἶν, next he built up the existence of number by 2, 3, 4, 9, 6, odd, even, etc., reaching πᾶς ἀριθ., number as a whole, last of all. He now argues εἶν has ὄν, therefore πᾶς ἀριθμὸς has it, therefore τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον (2, 3, 4, 9, 6 etc. etc.) has it. This assumes that Fic. is right; and Jowett agrees with him. But if πᾶς = every, then in τὸ μόριον ἐκ. we must deal with fractions; a view which finds some support in σμικρότατον, μέγιστον.

ἐπὶ πάντα ... ἔχα οὕτω. 'Exscripsit haec ... (whole of 144 B) Stobaeus in Eclogg. Phys. p. 30.' Stallb. 'Sed legitur ibi οὐσία τῶν ὄντων τοῦ ἀποστατοῖη—κατὰ κεκερματίστα—καὶ μεριστὰ πάντων, μάλιστα δ' ἔτι—ἔχει οὕτως. Et ἀποστατοῖη quidem placet: caetera sunt manifesta librariorum vitia.' Fischer. ἀποστατοῖ. Notes 1. The optat. is necess.; but clearly a very old error has to be dealt with. If in some very early copy ἀποστατοῖ stood as closely under ἀποστατέ, two lines above, as in A, the mistake might be due to misreading. It might also have come through dict.—'ei für oi kommt auch im Jungattischen sporadisch vor: οἴκει = οἴκοι bei Menandros, δυεῖν häufig, τοῖς λοιπεῖς auf einer Inschrift des Jahres 100 v. Chr.' Blass, p. 56-7. For the sense Thoms. says 'Dionysius, vulgo Areopagita dictus, de Div. Nom. c. 5, Τὸ εἶναι οὐδέποτε ἀπολείπεται τῶν ὄντων, ὅτε γὰρ ἀπολείψει τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν.' κατακε. ἄρα ὡς οἶόν τε σμικρ., in full = κ. ἄρα ἡ οὐσία εἰς μόρια ὡς οἶοντε σμικρ. etc. Stallb. cites Rep. III. 395 B, καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὧς Ἀδ., φαίνεται μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακερματίζθαι ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις. 'Accusativi autem pendent a verbo κατακε. quae constans prope structurae est ratio in verbis *divisionem* significantibus: velut [D] λέγοντες ὡς πλείστα μέρη ἡ οὐσία νενομ. εἴη.' Heind. See Jelf § 583, 48 on δαίω. L. and S. cite Symp. 191 D, ἕκαστος οὖν ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου σύμβολον, ἅτε τετμημένος ὥσπερ αἱ ψήτται ἐξ ἐνὸς δύο. πανταχῶς 'quomodocunque' Fic.,

'utique' Heind. A part must either be small or large, so that this merely emphasizes the completeness of the division. μέρη ἀπέραντα with the whole cp. Sophist. 256-7 on τὸ μὴ ὄν etc.; thus 256 E, ἀπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν. 257 A, καὶ τὸ ὄν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσα πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκείνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτ. 257 C, ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακερματίζθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη—μία μὲν ἐστὶ που καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ ἐαυτῆς ἰδίαν· διὸ πολλὰ τέχνηαι τ' εἰσὶ λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι. etc. μέντοι: ... μέντοι 'plurimae certe ... non tamen pars etc.' Fic. τοι τοῦτο 'πῶς ἂν τοιοῦτο dedi pro πῶς ἂν τοι τοῦτο, quia τοι in interrog. ferri non poterat; quanquam fateor etiam τὸ τοιοῦτο vel πῶς τι ἂν τοῦτο rescribi licuisse.' Herm. He surely means πῶς ἂν τι? μὴδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον: = ἀδύνατον δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι μὴδέν.

πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἕκαστῳ etc. So A: but ἀπ. ἐκ. is a strange phrase; though it may be compd. with such early expressions as everilk or everich, and even everichone, as in Kings Quair, stanza 64, And efter this, the birdis everichone. Heind. says 'Fic.: non solum ergo universae essentiae, sed illius etiam singulis partibus unum adest. Quasi legerit πρὸς τῷ παντὶ ἄρα (i.e. πρὸς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπάσῃ) καὶ ἕκαστῳ τῷ τ. οὐσ. μέρει ... neque satis integrum ἅπαντι hoc cum ἕκαστῳ junctum videtur.' i.e. πρὸς τῷ π. = 'in addition to the whole.' But cannot this be got from the text? Cp. Rep. VII. 514 A, εἰσοδὸν ἐχούσῃ μακρὰν παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπῆλαιον; and Laws I. 637 D, ἔτι γὰρ οὖν εἵπωμεν πλείω περὶ ἀπάσης μέθης, which is explained below—λέγω δ' οὐκ οἶνον... μέθης δὲ αὐτῆς πέρι. Stallb. 'itaque suspicari licet aut ἕκαστῳ ex glossemate natum esse—quod vocabulo ἅπαντι nunc *unumquodque* significanti additum esset; aut corrigi oportere ἐκάστοτε, quo facto haec eodem modo dicta erunt atque antecedentia illa ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αἰεὶ εἶναι γέ τι εἶναι.' This would do; but the change cannot be at once accounted for. In οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον... οὐδενός: the verb is middle, 'partem nullam deserens.' Fic.

ἄρα οὖν ... ὅλον ἐστὶ; Transls. divide differently. D The pith of the question lies in the last two words. Phps. the best grouping is ἄρα οὖν ἐν—ὄν πολλαχοῦ ἄμα—ὅλον ἐστὶ; but ἄμα might be taken with ὅλον

ἑστί; 'Can one be in many places at the same time and still be a whole?' Jowett. 'Kann nun das vielerwärts befindliche Eine zugleich ein Ganzes sein?' Müller. Some divide thus ἄρα οὖν ἐν ὄν (= ἐπεὶ περ ἐν ἔστι)—πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἔστι; = 'Ist es nun, indem es Eines ist, an vielen Orten zugleich ganz?' Engelm. ἄθρει: ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ Stallb. cps. 148 D, σκόπει. σκοπῶ. and Soph. 268 A, Ὅρα σύ. Σκοπῶ καὶ μοι διττῶ etc. So βούλει οὖν ... πάνν μὲν οὖν βούλομαι 142 B above, also Crito 49 B, φαμέν ἢ οὐ; φαμέν. Phileb. 25 B, εὖχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει. σκοπῶ καὶ μοι δοκεῖ etc. Rep. VII. 523 A, δέικνυ, ἔφη. δέικνυμι δὴ, εἶπον and many others.

ἅμα ἅπασι 'Malim ἅμα πᾶσι. Certe alias vix usquam reperias ἅμα ἅπαντες.' Heind. ὅσαπερ μέρη: one would expect ὅσαπερ τὰ μέρη [ἔστι]. λέγοντες ὡς etc., see c above. On the construc., on which something has been said above, Fischer says, 'aliud est ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται ἐπὶ πάντα aliud ἡ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἴη πλείστα μέρη. Nam hoc quidem in genere, quum totum in partes dividi dicitur, verbis divisionem declarantibus additur fere simpliciter, activis quartus casus, primus passivis, ita ut πλείστα μέρη nominativi sint, non accusativi. Quod quum non animadvertissent grammatici et veteres et recentiores, tentare hujusmodi locos scriptorum veterum temere ausi sunt. vid. ad Politic. § 24 [283 D διέλωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὴν (τὴν μετρητικὴν) δύο μέρη—where he quotes Herod. VII. 121, τρεῖς μοίρας ὁ Ξέρξης δασάμενος πάντα τὸν περὶ στρατὸν] Sic apud Xenoph. Cyrop. VII. 5. 7 (? 13), recte legitur in libris editis antiquis omnibus τὸ στράτευμα κατένειμε δώδεκα μέρη' sed Hutchinsonus edere ausus est εἰς δ. μ. temere.' He is right about the prep., but surely not about the nom. case? νενέμηκε τὴν οὐσίαν πλείστας μοίρας being the act., the pass. would be νενεμημένη εἴη or νενέμηται ἡ οὐσία πλείστας μοίρας, the sense being εἰς πλείστας μοίρας with either voice. In the examples chiefly cited of the pass. the case cannot be determined.

Ξισοῦσθον ... παρὰ πάντα: It is, as it were, 'canto fermo' and 'counterpoint,' 'note against note' all through the compos.—quot et quanta ὄντα, tot et tantae ἐνάδες. We may understand ἀλλήλουν with ἔξις., a verb which Pl. seems to use only twice elsewhere (Rep. VIII. 563 A, Laws XI. 927 E) and never in the act. Eds. give δν' ὄντε, not so ὕτ.

ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας strong, when he excluded the οὐσία contained in ἐν εἰ ἔστι. Even after that is in thought removed the influence of its original presence can revolutionize the nature of the one.

οὐ μόνον ... ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος 'Then not only is the unity-of-being many, but absolute unity, divided by existence, must also be many.' Jowett. This refers to 143 A, where after showing that τὸ ἐν ὄν is πολλά, he proceeds to discuss τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ μόνον καθ' αὐτό. This latter one it is which has now been made an innumerable multitude, and that too ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος (= ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας). Thoms. would read as in 143 A, τὸ ἐν ὄν—the text is very well as it is, and the language of Proc.-Dam. VI. 262, would seem to show that he had it, ἐν τῷ κερματοῦσθαι ἄρα τὴν οὐσίαν κερματίζεται καὶ τὸ ἐν. εἰπόντος δὲ ἐκείνου ('Aριστοτ.) τὸ 'φαίνεται,' συμπεραίνει λέγων οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἐν πολλά ἔστιν etc. Stallb. would read τὸ ὄν alone, which seems to be a missing of the sense. ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος might have been ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄν or τοῦ εἶναι. πολλά ἀνάγκη εἶναι: for ἀνάγκη εἶναι πολλά, the adj. in this and the previous case is not gov'd. by διανενεμ. or κεκερμ. after the anal. in B-D. With the assertion that τὸ ἐν alone becomes ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος cp. Rep. VII. 524 E-525 A, where the study of ἀριθμός τε καὶ τὸ ἐν is called one of those which are ἐγερτικά τῆς νοήσεως because αἰετὶ αὐτῷ ἅμα ὁράται ἐναντίωμα, and we are compelled to ask τί ποτ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἢ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις ... ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτόν ὡς ἐν τε ὠρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. πεπερασ. ... κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν. 'terminatum, secundum totum, unum erit' Fic., or (Heind.) 'finitum fuerit ratione τοῦ ὅλου, i.e. quatenus totum est.' Pl.'s statements here and above on whole and parts may be cp'd. with those of Arist. (1) The most comprehensive def. of a whole by A. is Phys. III. 6, 207 a 9, οὕτω γὰρ ὀρίζομεθα τὸ ὅλον, οὐ μὴθὲν ἄπειστιν, and just below he says τὸ ὅλον οὐ μὴδὲν ἔστιν ἔξω. With this cp. above 137 C, οὐ ἂν μέρος μὴδὲν ἀπὸ ὅλου ἂν εἴη. (2) In Polit. III. 1, 1274 b 40, A. speaks of a city as being καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅλων μὲν συνεστῶτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων; with which cp. our ὅλον τὰ μόρια μόρια etc. (3) Yet again, Poet. 7, 1450 b 26, ὅλον δ' ἔστι τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν, with which cp. 145 B, τί δαί; ὅλον οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχαι

καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; (4) But Arist. Met. IV. 26, 1024 a 1, draws a distinction *ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ ἔσχατον*, ὧσων μὲν μὴ ποιεῖ ἢ θέσις διαφοράν (such as units), πᾶν λέγεται, ὧσων δὲ ποιεῖ (e.g. members of a body), ὅλον· ὅσα δὲ ἀμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ὅλα καὶ πάντα—*ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ὧσων ἢ μὲν φύσις ἢ αὐτὴ μένει τῇ μεταθέσει ἢ δὲ μορφῇ οὐ, οἷον κηρὸς καὶ ἱμάτιον ... ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ ὅσα ὕγρα καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ' ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἀν μὴ μεταφορᾷ ... πᾶς οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς, πᾶσαι αὐταὶ αἱ μονάδες*. A clear and good distinction. Now our whole passage and all that has gone before shows that Pl. knows no such. He is speaking of parts *ὧν οὐ ποιεῖ ἢ θέσις διαφοράν*, yet he calls their sum ὅλον. But we are not left to inference. In Theaet. 204 A-205 B, after directly raising the question *τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταῦτόν καλεῖς ἢ ἕτερον ἐκάτερον*; (which is a marked advance upon anything we find here—*Introd. xxxi.*), he declares *δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον*: and after asking *ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν*; (which would correspond to *ποιεῖ διαφοράν*) he concludes for *οὐδ' ἂν μέρη ᾖ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται*. No doubt he deals with numbers to some extent, but he also discusses the *στοιχεῖα* of the *συλλαβή*; and one finds no distinc. between πᾶν and ὅλον, and this largely because he never raises A.'s point of divers kinds of *μέρη*.

p. 12. 145 τὸ ἐν ἄρα ὧν ... ἄπειρον πλήθει: 'Quum h. l. jam non τὸ ἐν ὧν, sed ipsum τὸ ἐν a Parm. intelligi superiora illa declarant (i.e. 143 A, 144 E), istud ὧν expungere non dubitavi' Heind. It is true he excludes the ὧν of his ἐν εἰ ἔστι in the passages cited, but his having first of all emphasized the ἔστι has in his view given a new character to the ἐν which, even when he proceeds to dwell on ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, does not forsake it again. It still is the ἐν of his ἐν εἰ ἔστι, and he reminds us of that in here summing up—ὧν is to be retained therefore.

142 B-145 A. (1) Thus far his first result is that ἐν ὧν is ἐν καὶ πολλά: and so he has made it to appear, not unjustly. Yet if he still speaks of it as the ἐν of which we speak in arithmetic, his division of it into many is open to objection on Arist.'s ground (*Introd. lxiii.*) that, in number, 'one' is an indivisible minimum, a unit of measurement. Phys.

III. 6-7, 206 b 31, 207 b 7, ἢ γὰρ μονὰς ἐλάχιστον—ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ἓνα πλείω καὶ πῶς' ἄττα ὥστ' ἀνάγκη στήναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον; Met. IX. 1, 1052 b 16-34, διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ἐστὶν εἶναι ... πανταχοῦ γὰρ τὸ μέτρον ἐν τι ζητοῦσι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον. XII. 9, 1085 b 33, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀδιαίρετων σύγκειται, τὰ δὲ μεγέθη οὐ. If Pl. divides a numerical unit he makes fractions of it. If it is the most elementary *thing*, or idea, with which thought can deal, then he may plead, as he does here, that this very condition makes it a thing admitting of further and ever further division, whose parts (and not the assumed whole) must be the 'one'—and so on *εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον*. To be justly divisible it must be an existent *ἐν συνεχές*. (2) And this is equally true if his second contention is to hold—that it is ὅλον καὶ μόρια, for, if the ἐν is to be an arithmetical unit, its μόρια must be fractions alone, in no sense units in and by themselves, but parts, whose sole *raison d'être* is to be joined in one. (3) As to his third concl. *πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει* we may quote Arist. (as above 207 a 14), *τέλειον δ' οὐδὲν μὴ ἔχον τέλος*: τὸ δὲ τέλος πέρας. διὸ βέλτιον οἰητέον Παρμενίδην Μελίσσου εἰρηκέναι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ (M.) τὸ ἄπειρον ὅλον φησὶν, ὁ δὲ τὸ ὅλον πεπεράνθαι μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές. This refers to Parm. 102-4 Mullach, *Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πείρας πύματον τετελεσμένον ἐστίν,* πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ¹ μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντη etc. Parm. however, here speaks of τὸ ὧν, while in the dialogue he strives as far as may be to speak of τὸ ἐν, ignoring τὸ ὧν. Without discussing the question raised by Arist. whether οἷόν τε εἶναι ἄπειρον ἐντελεχέα σῶμα αἰσθητόν, we may note that Pl. holds the one here as ἄπειρον τῇ διαιρέσει, to quote A.'s lang.—cp. *De Coelo ad init.* *συνεχές μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς αἰεὶ διαιρετά*.—i.e. as admitting of indefinite sub-div. And if it is ἄπειρον in this sense it cannot, says Arist., be a mere numerical unit. On the other hand Arist. points out that the latter unit is, like a moment of time, ἄπειρον κατὰ πρόσθεσιν—you can add on successive units ad infinitum—while this cannot be said of an αἰσθητὸν σῶμα. It is to be noted in conclusion that we have here a single antithesis under three forms—ἐν v. πολλά, ὅλον v. μόρια, πεπερασμένον v. ἄπειρον πλήθει. For the rest we have no duty laid on us to

discuss Pl.'s doctrine on the development of number—whether it grows by 'two twice etc. and every combination of even and odd,' or, as in what Arist. (Met. XII. 6, 1080 a 30) calls mathem. number, by units, ὁ μὲν μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμεῖται μετὰ τὸ ἐν δύο, πρὸς τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἐνὶ ἄλλο ἐν, καὶ τὰ τρία πρὸς τοῖς δυὶ τούτοις ἄλλο ἐν, καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς δὲ ὡσαύτως. He wants to develop multitude; the special device he tries is indifferent to us. If he gets the length of thinking 'this is one, that two' he has multitude already: as Dam. says § 96, 240, πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τῆς μονάδος ἐστὶ προποδισμός. As there is no question above of ideal time, there is none here of ideal number, or of number in connection with the ideal theory.

ὅλον ... ἀρχήν etc. This feature of a whole has already been noted. It involves a σῶμα αἰσθητὸν (or mental picture of one), or ἐν συνεχίς. It seems natural to say that a whole has beginning, middle, and end, yet it is rather pedantic. The sort of whole to which it applies strictly is that to which Arist. especially applies it (Poetics), viz. an action. To an action, occurring as it does in time, beginning and end are not convertible terms, but represent an inherent distinction. To an object, on the other hand, extended in space, beginning and end—so long as organic structure lies out of the question—are very much what you please to make them. Such objects would be more simply described as having a μέσον or ἐντός, and a περιφέρεια, περιέχον, πέρασ or σχῆμα (τὸ γὰρ σχῆμα πέρασ, Proc.-Dam. VI. 263). Why then is this triple distinction dwelt upon (cp. 137 D)? Possibly Pl. may be thinking of the ὅλον as in motion, or in process of growth or change—as 138 C-E—in which case the side which entered another position first, or with which change began, would be the beginning and the other side the end. This idea appears clearly in 153 B-D. At the same time the Greeks often exhibit a tendency to dwell upon the number three, and Thoms. may be right in referring here to Oriental and other mystical speculations. He cites 'Iambl. sect. II. c. 7, ἐν δὲ τούτοις τοῖς τρισὶν ὅροις τριπλῆς τάξεως, ἀρχῆς καὶ μεσότητος καὶ τέλους, ὅλα τὰ γένη κατενείματο. Ideo veteribus deus dicebatur ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχειν apud Plat. lib. IV. de Leg. quae autem desumpta sunt ex Orpheo.'

The ref. is IV. 715 E, ὁ μὲν δὲ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων. The words as given by T. are thus seen to be misleading, and more clearly so when we turn to 'Orpheus' Mullach Frag. II. line 33 etc. ἔστι δὲ πάντως ἑαυτὸς ἐπουράνιος, καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ πάντα τελευτᾷ, ἀρχὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μέσσοτον ἡδὲ τελευτὴν ὥς λόγος ἀρχαίων, ὥς ὕλογενὴς διέταξεν—that is, God accomplishes all things upon earth, having their beginning, middle, and end in his own hand. If this be really old it may be the source of the phrase in both Pl. and Arist.

κἂν τὸν ἐν ὅτιον 'ita scripsi cum Schleierm. pro κἂν τοῦ ἐν (so Ἀt) ne opus sit corrigere ἐνός, quod vertit Fic.: "et si quid ipsorum ab eo, quod unum, distat" etc. Heind. Perhaps this is best, the sense being καὶ ἐὰν ἐν ὅτιον αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ τινός, as in 144 B, τῶν ὄντ. τὸν ἀποστ. Still we have concords neglected above—e.g. 143 B, τῷ ἐν, and E, τῷ τε δύο ... καὶ τῷ τρία—and the Mss. reading as turned by Fic. is quite good, being = καὶ ἐὰν ὅτιον αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ τοῦ ἐν. For ἐθελήσει ἐτι Bek. represents Ἀ and other Mss. as reading ἐθελήσειέ τι. But Ἀt both give ἐθελήσει ἐτι, which may justify either reading. Heind. cps. 149 begin. For ἔχοι ἂν ... ἔχοι: he B also cps. 148 E, ἀπτοίτο ἂν τὸ ἐν ... ἀπτοίτο: Stallb. adds, 147 A, ἂν ἡδὲ ἐκφεύγοι ... ἐκφεύγοι and ἡ κἂν οὕτω μετείχε ... μετείχεν: But where more than the verb is repeated we have the ἂν given, e.g. below, μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἐν ... μετέχοι γὰρ ἂν. ἡ τοι εὐθέως, ... ἡ τινος etc. τοι with the first ἡ emphasizes the fact that it must have some shape, the special one being indiff. Had τοι gone with either of the other cases of ἡ the emph. would have fallen on that particular shape: cp. 131 A. For εὐθέως see 137 E. ἐν ἄλλω; Stallb. notes the want of the art. here and 145 E, and, contrasting this with τοῖς ἄλλοις etc., 146 B and D, says the art. is omitted 'quia non significatur id, quod omnino ac simpliciter ab ipso uno discrepat, while τὰ ἄλλα significant ea quae formis unitatis intelligibilis, h.e. ideis, plane opposita sunt.' That is, he takes ἐν to represent the unity or unifying principle involved in the ideas, and τὰ ἄλλα as the many of sense, and declares that ἄλλο in this passage means something different from the many of sense. It may be so: the variation as to the art. is a fact, and occurs often—e.g. 138, 140, 141—

but it is doubtful if such a distinc. is meant by it. Cp. with this variation that between ἄλλο and ἕτερον—e.g. 140 B—and again that between τὰ ἄλλα itself as used largely through the work, and τὰ πολλὰ so distinctly specified in 136 A, which distincs. convey no change of meaning. It is just possible that ἐν ἄλλῃ here may = ἐν ἄλλῃ τόπῳ. But what does Stallb. gain by his view? No doubt τὰ πολλὰ and τὰ ἄλλα are terms often used of the multiplicity of sense—e.g. in the opening of the dial.—but Soc. there wishes to see that distinc. shown to exist within the ideal world, and we were told that the ideal world could not be known by our faculties, so that in any case our course has not been rigidly consistent. Nor is anything said throughout which should distinguish τὰ ἄ. from τὸ ἐν as sense is divided from the ideas. We are simply bringing our mental faculties to bear upon the relations of ‘one’ with ‘many’ or ‘others,’—these ‘one,’ ‘many,’ and ‘others’ being all such as are λογισμῷ λαμβανόμενα, and being understood to exhaust existence between them in the same way in which A and not-A do so. If ἐν ἄ. refers to something different from τὰ ἄ. it must refer to another εἶδος such as Stallb. holds τὸ ἐν to be; but in that case there should be a great gulf fixed between its character and theirs. Where is that gulf? The only difference is the omis. of the art. It would seem that Pl. having started with the antithesis ἐν—τὰ ἄλλα (τὰ πολλὰ), does not always thrust that distinc. forward in his argt., but occasionally forgets the art. without giving up any feature of the antithesis in doing so. Arist. Phys. iv. 3, init. reckons the various ways in which one thing may be in another—τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ—τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν—εἶδος ἐν γένει—γένος ἐν εἵδει—εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ—ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ—ἐν τῷ τέλει—ἐν τόπῳ. Pl. has nothing so clear as this.

C τῶν μερῶν ... περιέχεται; We have seen that the ἐν as ὅλον was ἀπειρον in the sense of being endlessly divisible. The fact that all its parts are rigidly circumscribed by its πέρας as a whole precludes the idea of its being ἀπειρον in the sense of being of unlimited extent: οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲν μὴδὲν ἔξω, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ αἰετὶ ἔξω ἐστί, τοῦτο ἀπειρόν ἐστιν. Arist. Phys. III. 6. καὶ μὴν... τὸ ἐν ὅτιν; The art. here with both subj. and pred. indicates (Clyde Greek Synt., Art. § 9)

‘the convertibility of the terms of the proposition’—τὰ πάντα μέρη ἐστί τὸ ἐν = τὸ ἐν ἐστί τὰ πάντα μέρη. So just below ἐστί δὲ τὰ τε πάντα τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον. In both cases it is doubtful if τὸ ἐν is subj. or pred. Whichever it be it is not to be coupled with αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον in the last case. οὔτε τι πλέον ἢ οὔτε τοῦ, τ οὔτε τι. The text as printed seems necess. The frequent use of the art. hereabouts may have misled Ἀ or his orig.

ἐν ὅλῳ Why no art.? One could better understand his beginning with ‘a whole’ and afterwards speaking of ‘the whole’—he has already spoken so, 145 A—but here he has used the art. four times in the same connec. before thus omitting it.

αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη: Not within itself as the centre is within the circle, but only as ‘the rectangles contained by the whole and each of the parts are together *within* the square on the whole line.’ The argt. would be more just thus ἀρ’ οὖν (see B above) οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἄλλῃ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῃ;

οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρ. ... ἐν γὰρ ἀπασιν εἶναι. Pl. has just urged that πάντα τὰ μέρη = τὸ ὅλον = τὸ ἐν, and has thence inferred that πάντα τὰ μέρη are ἐν ὅλῳ. He now denies the converse. This would be correct were the whole something other than the sum of the parts. But that distinc., as we have seen on 144 E, Pl. does not recognise, and here it is expressly excluded. Καίτοι γὰρ—Proc.-Dam. vi. 264,—εὐρηται καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος τρόπος τοῦ ‘ἐν τινι,’ ὅτι περιεκτικόν ἐστί τὸ ὅλον τῶν μερῶν· τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου οὐ. The text of this comment in Stallb. seems unsound and the argt. is obscure; but we get a sugg. from it. We must remember that τὸ ὅλον = τὸ ἐν, and that each part is also ἐν: and D. says τὸ γοῦν ἐν ἐνὶ μὴ τηρηθὲν ἐν πῶς ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐν τηρηθήσεται; Can he mean ‘as a whole which is “one” is not found in *one* part, how can you expect to find it, being “one,” in a *number* of parts (which are not one)?’ That is, after first viewing the several parts of one as mere parts whose sum makes the one or whole, Pl. it seems now turns round and regards each part as ‘one,’ and therefore more likely to contain a whole which is one than a plurality of them is—each was a mere portion of a ἐν συνεχές, now each is ἀριθμῷ ἐν. This, while sophistical, would be intelligible. And two lines of argt. do seem to be used. A word

on the text. If there were any authority in \mathfrak{A} for doing so, one could almost read with Schleierm. οὔτε ἐν τισί. Pl. would thus state a general concl. that 'the whole is not in the parts either in all or in some' and then proceed to prove the first half of his concl. in εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν... οὐδαμῶς: and the second in οὐδὲ μὴν... ἀδύνατον γάρ: But besides the want of authority, the succeeding words, after γάρ, make for the text, ἐν πλείοσιν... ἐν ἐνὶ... ἐν ἀπασιν. As to the whole not being in all the parts, he proves this by saying—'if it were in all it must needs be in one,' and leaves us to add the other limb of the argt., 'but it is not in one therefore it is not in all.' One can understand how it is not in one, as he next declares that it is not in some, because the greater would thus be in the less. But if the only reason for its not being in one or in some of the parts be that it is bigger, then, as it is expressly said not to be bigger than all the parts, why may it not be in them? Because, according to Pl., if in all it must also be in each. But if that is so the character of the 'whole' is quite altered. After treating it like the day and the sail—131 B—part of which rested on each portion of space covered by them, and the whole upon all the portions collectively, he now implies that it is not extensive but intensive, that the whole has an essence which is imparted perfectly to each of its portions.

^D αὐτὸ τοῦτο... οὐδαμῶς: This he regards as clear proof of his contention. 'Si autem haec una pars aliqua est de his omnibus' Refertur hoc τοῦτο τὸ ἐν ad praecedens illud ἐν τινὶ ἐνὶ, ad ἀπάντων autem supplendum est τι, more pervulgato. Heind. 'Vulgatum ἐν ἔσται jam Thoms. vidit in ἐνέσται mutari oportere. Pro ἐνὶ autem Heind. restituit ἐν,' Stallb. \mathfrak{A} both read ἐν ἔσται, while \mathfrak{A} gives ἐνὶ and τ ἐνὶ. The change to ἐνὶ is a great improvement. With regard to ἐν ἔσται see on 131 A etc. Here it is poss. that ἐν may have been confused with the ἐν above; but it is also poss. that this very juxtaposition and the fact that ἐν and ἐν recur, may have put the scribe (either John or a predecessor) on his guard. And one may even sugg. that the constr. is τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐν 'the entire number of ones,' as τῷ ἐν 143 B. He could hardly say τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐσίν: and in 146 E etc. he speaks of τὰ μὴ ἐν. Arist. again has got the length of τὰ ἐνα—Phys. III. 7, 207 b 7, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἐστίν

ἐνα πλείω καὶ πόσ' ἄττα. Met. XII. 8, 1083 a 25, ἀτοπον γὰρ τὸ ἐν μὲν εἶναι τι πρῶτον τῶν ἐνῶν ὥστερ ἐκεῖνοί φασι.... Such a remark gives a force to τῶν ἀπάντων, and marks his line of argt.:—If this one is but a sample of the entire number, and the whole is not in it, how after that will it be in all the ones together? He seems to be back for the moment at the old argt. on the particip. of εἶδη. Has he made out his contention? It would have been more to the point to have urged that a whole when reached is a new creature, and that to speak of it as in all its parts is to disintegrate and destroy it.

αὐτὸ γὰρ... ὃ ἐστίν ἀδύνατον: The 'which is imposs.' would have justified ἦν for εἶη. The lang. recalls Euclid, e.g. I. 39, τὸ ΔΒΓ ἄρα τρίγωνον τῷ ΕΒΓ ἴσον ἐστίν, τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάσσονι, ὅπερ ἐστίν ἀδύνατον.

μὴ ὄν δ' etc. One would almost expect another step in the argt. Thus μὴ ὄν δ'... τὸ ὄλον [οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν: οὐ γάρ: μὴ ὄν δ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ] οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ etc.

μηδαμοῦ μὲν etc. Thus the ἐν ὄν as ὄλον exists E under conditions of space and (as we shall see 151 E) time, and is not an εἶδος. See also 151 A. ἐν ἄλλῳ is repeated twice and is preceded and followed by ἐν ἑτέρῳ with no diff. of meaning.

τὰ πάντα... (sc. τὸ ἐν) τυγχάνει. One would look for ὄν: but 'cave corrigas ὄν. Sic solent Graeci et verba et participia praegresso proxime nomini accommodare. Menon. p. 91 C, οἱ τοῖ γε φανερά ἐστι λῶβη τε καὶ διαφθορά τῶν συγγιγνομένων.' Heind. He also cps. 153 A below, which is cited Jelf § 389, 2, ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὄν which is said of τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

αὐτό τε... ἐν ἑτέρῳ: As Stallb. says, the order would be better ἐν ἑαυτῷ τε αὐτὸ εἶναι καί. But he adds that αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ form a phrase such 'ut unam notionem efficiant nec commode possint divelli,' and cites 151 B, E, 155 C, and 159 A.

ἔστηκε μὲν πού. It is stationary in the sense that οὐ μεταλλάττει χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας, but (so far as this argt. goes) it is quite free, as τὰ πάντα μέρη, περιφέρεισθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ ὄλῳ)—to use his own lang. 138 C. It might even be maintained, in view of its double char. as τὰ πάντα μέρη and τὸ ὄλον, that κατ' ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται.

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ... αἰεὶ εἶναι; We have admitted that it may be stationary if αἰεὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, but in truth it need not. Admitting that such a thing as motion

exists—which Pl. here assumes in spite of Z.'s dialectic—then Achilles is in motion when chasing the tortoise, but all the while he is *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ* if that means *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*. He is far from being *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*, however, if that means *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ*—a meaning which Pl. must give it in his second use of it in order to infer of the 'one' that *ἐστὺς δὴ πον ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι*. Pl., as the Theaet. shows, knows what the Eleatics think, and is for the moment in accord with them. Thus the verses of Parm. after saying *αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν ἔστιν* etc. go on thus, 85 etc., *τωῦτόν τ' ἐν τωῦτῳ τε μένον καθ' ἑωυτό τε κέεται*. 'οὕτως ἔμπεδον αἰθερὶ μένει', *κρατερὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη* πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει τε καὶ ἀμφὶς ἔργει. Parm. does not prove this dialectically: he lays it down as his view. Pl. seeks to prove that the *ἐν ὄν* is bereft of motion, and he has not done it. The neuter *ἐστὺς* for *ἐστὺς* seems, from Veitch, to be confined to Pl. It occurs in this dial., in Theaet. 183 E, *οὐ ἐν ἐστὺς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν*, said of the Eleatics, and Sophist 249 D, where Herm. reads *τὸ πᾶν ἐστηκός*. Note further *εἶναι ἐστὺς* in the sense *ἐστάναι* first above; its sense is *ἀκίνητον εἶναι*.

P. 20. τὸ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ... ἐστὺς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; Another sophism. If the one is *ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ* it cannot indeed be *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ*; but it can be *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐτέρῳ*, and if it is 'always there' it is as much motionless as it would be if 'always in itself.'

B τοῖς ἄλλοις ... εἶναι, The dat. need not be under the govt. of *ταῦτόν*, for then *τῶν ἄλλων* must be underst. after *ἕτερον*, but is rather a dat. of gen. ref. 'and as regards the others.' Stallb. says of τοῖς ἄλλοις here 'non esse ideas ab aliis ideis diversas aut iis contrarias, sed potius res sub sensus subjectas.' Yet if the argt. hitherto in regard to *ἕτερον* and *ἄλλο* does not refer to sens. objects but to the ideal world, how do we get from it any infer. as to sameness or difference of the one in regard to the sensible world? The whole argt. moves on just as it did previously—the only change being the art. Proc.-Dam. VI. 266 says, *ποιεῖται δὲ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τι*. ἐπεὶ τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστίν· ταῦτόν γάρ τινι (ταῦτῳ?) ταῦτόν, καὶ ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ ἕτερον.

πᾶν πον πρὸς ... ἢ ἕτερον. Thoms. well cps. Arist. Met. IX. 3, 1054 b 15, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ἀντικειμένως

[λέγεται] καὶ τὸ ταῦτό, διὸ πᾶν πρὸς ἅπαν ἢ ταῦτό ἢ ἄλλο and below *πᾶν γὰρ ἢ ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτό ὅ τι ἂν ἢ ὄν*.

ἢ ταῦτόν ... ὅλον ἂν εἴη. This seems to mean that in speaking of any two things we may say that they are related either (1) as A - A, or (2) as A - not-A, or (3) as A - $\frac{A}{n}$, $\frac{A}{n}$ - A, (not-A - $\frac{\text{not-A}}{n}$, $\frac{\text{not-A}}{n}$ - not-A).

'Nam quod partem vel totum cuiuspiam rei conficit, id nec ταῦτόν est, nec omnino ἕτερον.' Stallb. This depends on our adopting his further note 'verba πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει referas ad praegressa ἂν μὴ ταῦτόν ἢ μὴδ' ἕτερον,' in a very definite sense. A moment's thought will show that these might conceivably and grammatically mean that the second thing stood to the first in either of the following relations A - $\frac{A}{n}$, A - $\frac{\text{not-A}}{n}$, since it is only A - A and A - not-A that represent accurately the cases of *ταῦτόν* and *ἕτερον*, Pl. having chosen to raise the ques. of part v. whole. At the same time what Pl. means is that anything, whether *ὅλον* or *μέρος*, having the marks of not-A will be *ἕτερον* to A; and that it is only where there would be *ταυτότης* but for difference of size that the question of *ὅλον* and *μέρος* enters at all. This appears from the following words. But how again does this square with his argt. 145 D, *ἐν τινι γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πον δύναίτο ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι*? If a 'whole,' regarded even in its extended sense merely, must be in each of its parts under penalty of not being in all of them taken together, much more must this hold true if the 'whole' be regarded as the 'same' intensively, i.e. in character, as its part irrespective of area. In that view of it size has nothing to do with the question. Arist. Met. IX. 3, 1054 b 15 (see above) continues as follows: *τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτό διὰ τοῦτο πᾶν πρὸς πᾶν λέγεται, ὅσα λέγεται ἐν καὶ ὄν. ... διαφορὰ δὲ καὶ ἐτερότης ἄλλο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτ. καὶ ὁδ' ἔτ. οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τινι ἔτ., πᾶν γὰρ ἢ ἔτ. ἢ ταῦτό ὅ τι ἂν ἢ ὄν· τὸ δὲ διάφορον τινὸς τινὶ διαφ., ὥστ' ἀνάγκη ταῦτό τι εἶναι ὃ διαφέρουσιν.* As regards text *ἔτ.* reads οὕτως ἔχει ὡς πρὸς; but *t* has *ἢ ὡς* which is clearly required, and the *ἢ* might easily have dropped if dictated — *ἔχ-ει* ἢ representing three very similar vowel sounds.

ὁδ' ἔρα ὡς ... μέρος ὄν: This is perfectly clear; and (although Cornarius suggested *πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος μὴ*

ὄν, which yields a good meaning of its own 'since it is not a part towards itself') the reading is not doubtful. But the intricacy of the statement may cause confus., and the constr. may be disputed. Pl. has all he needs when he has reached εἴη, the words reading as if they stood οὐδ' ἄρα αὐτὸ εἴη ἂν ὅλον αὐτοῦ ὡς πρὸς μέρος, the last three words being equal to ὡς μέρους, as in 147 B, ὅλον ὡς μορίων. It is just poss. that the αὐτὸ may not be the subj. of εἴη, but may be in the acc. as part of ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτό. But this is unlikely, both because αὐτὸ would have been the better reading, and because the αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ of the prev. sent. makes for the parallel use of αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ in this one. Pl., as we say, might have stopped here; but, wishing to be very emphatic, and to bring more clearly forward the contrad. involved in the case, he adds πρὸς αὐτὸ μέρος ὄν. The constr. here might be = οὕτως ὃν μέρος πρὸς αὐτό, or as Heind. puts it redundantly, οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸ μέρος ἂν εἴη, 'since it would thus be a part towards itself—which we have just declared in the previous sentence that it could not be.' It might also be taken in close exegetical connec. with the prev. ὡς πρὸς μέρος thus—αὐτοῦ ὅλον ὡς πρὸς μέρος, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ-μέρος-ὄν. 'It could not be whole of itself as towards a part, rather towards itself turned for the moment into a part.' So Stallb. following Schmidt, in which view μέρος ὄν is in the acc. agreeing with αὐτό. Either way there is some awkwardness.

αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ... ὄντος αὐτῷ, ὄντος agrees with αὐτοῦ, not with αὐτό, which is really redundant, and is present only in obedience to the Greek idiom. The sense is 'If a thing be elsewhere than itself when that self is in the same place with itself, is not that thing of necessity other than itself?'

C οὕτω μὴν ... τὸ ἐν = ἐφάνη μὴν τὸ ἐν οὕτως ἔχον. οὕτω refers both back and forward, what follows being but a restatement of what has just been said. He points back to 145 E, ἣ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἅλλῃ ἐστίν. Here μὴν = attamen: Ast. gives several cases, e.g. Soph. 217 D, συμβούλῃ μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τινὰ αἰρήσει with which cp. 216 B, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἀνὴρ οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μὴν. In all the sense would be brought out by using δὲ μὴν.

ἔτερον ἄρα ... ταύτῃ ἂν 'Non sine causa ταύτῃ dicit. Significat enim huius tantum rei habita ratione unum

a semet ipso diversum esse.' Stallb. We may cite Arist. Soph. Elench. 5, 167 a 11, οἷον εἰ, λαβὼν τὸν Αἰθίοπα εἶναι μέλανα, τοὺς ὀδόντας ἔροιτ' εἰ λευκός· εἰ οὖν ταύτῃ λευκός, ὅτι μέλας καὶ οὐ μέλας, οἷοιτο διειλέχθαι συλλογιστικῶς τελειώσας τὴν ἐρωτησιν. Proc.-Dam. vi. 267 puts the present argt. thus, αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπεφάνθη. τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄν, ἐτέρωθι γεγονὸς ἕτερον ἔσται αὐτοῦ· ἐτέρωθι γὰρ γέγονεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος—οὕτω γὰρ ἀπεφάνθη· ἕτερον ἄρα αὐτοῦ. But he prefixes this ἐστὶ δὲ σοφιστικὴ ἢ ἐπιχείρησις. ἔλεγον γὰρ οἱ σοφισταὶ Κορίσκος ἕτερος αὐτοῦ· ὁ γὰρ νῦν μὲν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ, νῦν δὲ ἐν Στοᾷ, ἕτερος· ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐξελέγχει Ἀριστ. Arist. Soph. Elench. 5, 166 b 28, gives among the παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς παραλογισμοὶ—οἷον εἰ ὁ Κορίσκος ἕτερον ἀνθρώπου αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἕτερος· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος. ἢ εἰ Σωκράτους ἕτερος, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, ἕτερον ἀνθρώπου φασὶν ὡμολογῆναι διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκέναι, οὐ ἔφησεν ἕτερον εἶναι, τοῦτον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον. How to meet these he shows chap. 24. Proc.-Dam. means that Pl. here proves a thing to be different from itself παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς—by a mere difference of place—while according to Arist. this is no ground of difference. Ἔτερα δὲ λέγεται ὦν ἢ τὰ εἶδη πλείω, ἢ ἡ ὕλη, ἢ ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας· καὶ ὅλως ἀντικειμένως τῷ ταύτῃ λέγεται τὸ ἕτερον. Met. iv. 9, 1018 a 10. εἰ τοῦ τι ἄτ' εἰ τουτί.

ὅσα μὴ ἐν ... τῶν ἄλλων: Thoms. speaks here of τὰ ἄλλα and τὰ πολλὰ being used for the objects of sense, which is quite true (as Stallb. says and said above); and quotes appositely Proc. (in Parm. Ms. Lib. v. fol. 32) Ἔθος γὰρ ἦν περὶ (l. παρὰ) τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἐν μὲν προσαγορεύειν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀσώματον καὶ χωριστὴν οὐσίαν· ἄλλα δὲ τὴν σωματικὴν καὶ ἐν σώμασιν ὑφεστηκυῖαν [N.B. he does not say τὰ ἄλλα]. But what evidence is there throughout of a distinc. between ἐν and πολλὰ or τὰ ἄλλα of this fundamental kind? The one and the many are contrasted, but as correlatives and, to use a modern phrase, on the same platform: if the one is an εἶδος the many are other εἶδη, if they are sensible objects the one is such. He does better when he says 'differunt hic τὰ ἄλλα ab uno uti ἢ διάκρισις differt ab unitate. Ita Dam. de hac quam Parm. statuit differentia aperte scribit. ἦδε ἡ ἑτερότης οὐκ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὴν ταυτότητα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἐν, ὡς διάκρισις πρὸς ἑνωσιν' ὥστε γὰρ τὸ ἐν πάντα ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐν, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶν ἑνωσις, οὕτω

καὶ ἡ ἑτερότης αὐτῇ τὸ πάντων πλῆθος ἔστιν τὸ διαρισ-
μένον.'

146 D-E. We may note the complications of the passage:—(1) The 'different' is 'different from the different': (2) the 'not-ones' are 'different from the one' and the converse: (3) the 'one' is 'different from the others': (4) the 'same' is 'opposed to the different' and vice versa: therefore (5) the 'same' is never 'in the different' and vice versa: therefore (6) the 'different' is never 'in any existent thing': therefore (7) the 'different' is never 'in the not-ones or the one': therefore (8) the 'one and the not-ones' do not 'differ by the different': and as (9) the 'one and the not-ones' cannot differ 'by themselves without the different' it follows that (10) the 'one and the not-ones escape from differing' (and are therefore 'the same'). Why this series of rather sophistical statements? His aim being to infer that the one does not 'differ' from the not-ones, he might have founded at once on the concession that Only the different differs, and differs from the different. As neither not-ones nor one is the different these do not differ. Possibly because this might seem abrupt he chooses a widely different course which is itself startling. After the admiss. that It is the different that differs, he flies off at a tangent, affirming that The not-ones differ from the one—and the converse; and that the one differs from the others. Next he finds that the 'same' will be of use, and declares that the same and the different are *ἐναντία* which obviously means that they differ, since he has assumed above that, setting aside the possibility of whole versus part, everything is either same or different relatively to everything else. The truth seems to be that one, other, many, different, whole, part, not-one etc. are all different: but that when we speak of them as differing each becomes for the moment the different, relatively to that from which it differs, and so only the different differ mutually. Returning now to No. 5 above we see Pl. quibbling with 'the same' as he has done before. If the same and the different are two entities, no doubt it may follow that the one of them will never be in the other; but it does not follow that either of them is never in the same or a different position. It would be quite fair to retort upon him thus, If the different is never in the same,

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then the different is always in the different: the different therefore is always in that same thing the different: accordingly the different is always in the same: or The same differs from the different: but only the different can differ: the same therefore is the different. It is not clear whether Pl. is throughout consciously sophistical or partly confused. His views on this relation of contraries seem clearer in the *Phaedo*, although expressed in terms of his ideal theory. There he says, 102 etc., that if Simmias is taller than Socrates he is so not qua Simmias but τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων, and if from being taller he becomes less, it arises from *σμικρότης* expelling μέγεθος—οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι δὲ ὅπερ ἦν [ἐθέλει] ἅμα τούναντίον γίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Applying this here we may say, if the one is different from the not-one it is so, not qua one but τῷ ἐτέρῳ ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων and so on. The same percep. of possible and impossible combinations with a like crudeness of lang. appears in the *Soph.* 252 C-260.

α γὰρ ὄντων [χρόνον] etc. *Proc.-Dam.* vi. 268^B says οὐδέποτε ἐν ταύτῳ χρόνον τινά. Pl. mixes up pres. and abs. in space and time with logical agreement and difference. We have here an accurate condit. sent. εἰ γὰρ εἴη ... ἐκείνον ἂν ... εἴη τὸ ἕτερον. A less accurate one precedes εἰ ἄρα ... ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι, and a still less careful one follows ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ... ἔστιν, οὐδέποτε ... ἂν εἴη. Throughout there are several only the apod. of which appears.

οὐδέποτε ἐν τινι etc. He quibbles again. The different is not in the 'same' so it can be in nothing; for if it were in anything for so much as an instant it would thus be in the same. 'The same' at first is a thing so called; it changes to ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος or τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα. *Proc.-Dam.* explains—πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἑκαστόν ἐστιν ἐν ταύτῳ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τινι.

τῷ ἐτέρῳ ... αὐτοῖς 'by reason of the different ... of themselves.' We must, as Heind. says, suppose ἕτερον after τὸ ἐν from τὰ μὴ ἐν ... ἕτερα.

οὐ πάντῃ ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ A question to which¹⁴⁷ the answer is—Yes ἐκφεύγοι [ἂν]. 'Recte, quamquam parum Latine, Cornarius: "penitusne jam effugerint, ut ne inter se alia sint." Frequens hic usus est voculae μὴ post verba fugiendi abstinendi et similia illatae. *Soph.* 235 B, ὥστε οὐκέτ' ἐκφεύγεται

τόδε γε ... τὸ μὴ οὐ ... εἶναι etc.' Heind. He adds examples, and Stallb. cites Crito 43 C, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν. A better case is Phaedo 117 C, οἱ πολλοὶ ... οἳ τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν. Proc.-Dam. vi. 268 says κἀντεῦθεν ἐκφεύγοι ἂν ταῦτα, τό τε ἐν δηλονότι καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐν, τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἕτερα·—δηλονότι 'τὸ εἶναι ἕτερα·' πλεονάζει γὰρ ἀπτικῶς τὸ 'μὴ' εἰς 'τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἕτερα.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν ... ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα: Again we have variety in the condit. sent. By strict rule we should have οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἐν—(εἰ γὰρ μετέχεν) οὐκ ἂν μὴ ἐν ἦν ἀλλά ... : ἀληθῆ: οὐδ' ἀριθμὸς ἔσται ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἐν—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἐν ἦν παντάπασιν εἰ ἀριθμὸν γε εἶχεν. The first sent. is the basis of his premiss That the not-ones have no connection with the one, and the result is naturally a foregone conclusion (ἂν ἦν). Having fortified his premiss he draws as inference That the not-ones will not be number; but puts that in a politely problematic form (οὐδ' ἂν ... εἴη). But he at once clinches it by a reason which he holds as unanswerable (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ... ἦν). The οὕτω refers back to the οὐ γὰρ ἂν just above. They can no more be not-one if they possess number than they can if they share in one. We may put his syllog. in Aristotelian form, τοῦ ἐνός γε οὐ μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἐν· ἀλλ' ὁ ἀριθμὸς μετέχει τοῦ ἐνός· οὐδ' ἀριθμὸς ἂρ' ἂν εἴη τὰ μὴ ἐν. τὰ μὴ ἐν not τὰ οὐχ ἐν is the form throughout: he speaks hypothetically.

ἡ κἀν οὕτω μετέχει = ἡ καὶ οὕτω (= εἰ μόρια ἦν τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνός) μετέχεν ἂν. The answering μετέχεν like the ἐκφεύγοι omits ἂν. Above on 145 B.

p. 21. B **μορίων ... μόρια.** Ἄ μορίων ... μορίων, ἡ μορίων ... μόρια. The text seems clearly needed. Whether in majusc. or in early minusc. μορίων and μόρια have a strong likeness. It is less easy to explain the corrup. of μορίων. Perhaps an early scribe had omitted the ω, and after writing MOPIN had placed a diminutive ω above. A little ω in majusc. might easily be taken for ου (or α), and a later scribe—e.g. Joannes—might so read it and think that it was to be put in place of the N, thus giving μορίου. The repeated use of the same word in different constr. might naturally cause difficulty. The note of Proc.-Dam. vi. 269 reads ἐπεὶ γοῦν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν οὔτε μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ὅλον ὡς μορίου.

πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν So ἡ, and the sense requires it. Ἄ

has τὸ for τὰ, and Proc.-Dam. also reads ὥστε τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα ... τοῦ λόγου. Common sense, as well as Pl.'s reasoning, tells us that the one is the same with itself and different from the others. But the others here must stand for the different, and as the argt. advances, another synonym is the not-ones. That the one is different from itself has been made out above only sophistically, apart from the objection that, on Pl.'s own showing, only the different and not the one can differ. His final thesis that the one is the same with the others requires much argt. He starts by laying down four possibilities (practically three) as open to two things when under comparison—they may be the same, or they may stand related as whole to part, or they may be different. He then aims at reaching the truth by elimination. First the different must have no connec. with the one and the others (or, as the latter are now called, the not-ones), and thus the one and the not-ones 'escape altogether (he feels how narrowly) from differing.' Next he takes up the question of whole and part. He gets rid of the possibility that the not-ones or others can be simply a number of ones instead of a single one—it is noteworthy that they are never called τὰ πολλὰ or πλῆθος here. They must have no connec. with one—a curious preliminary to their being the same with it. But the absence of connec. is needed to prevent their standing related as whole and part; there is no one in the not-ones, no not-ones in the one, so they cannot be whole and part. It remains then that they must be the same. No wonder Aristoteles says 'from the course of the argument there is a risk of their appearing so'—which is but another way of saying that Pl. knows how narrowly he has escaped failure. We may meet his reasoning in several ways. 1. The one and not-ones *are* different. It is a παραλογισμὸς παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς to say that the different has no connection with them, and that they cannot differ. The term 'different' is applied to two objects as a result of their comparison. They are found not to have the same qualities, and to express that fact they are called different—a term which is applied to them κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς and adds nothing to their characteristics save the accidental circumstance that they have been compared. 2. Pl. would

have made out a better quartette of tests for distinguishing two objects if he had said they may be (a) the same, (b) different, (c) part v. whole, or (d) parts of a whole. In fact one and not-ones are both parts—not extended but logical parts—of one complex concep. Give what name you please to this concep. it is certain that they are the two necessary factors in it, that you cannot think the one of them without the other to help you. 3. And we may, if we choose, call them in *this* sense the same, because they play the same part or have the same function in the thought in which they occur. But our calling them the same because of the function they fulfil does not prevent them from differing when compared each with the other.

ἴσως: ἐπαδὴ γ' οὖν 'Very likely,' says Aristoteles, like one who does not really see his way but gives up courting controversy. 'Well, at all events,' replies Parm., 'they both differ equally.'

τί γάρ ἐν: The meaning of this answer will be seen if we put the passage differently. οὐκ οὖν οὕτως ἕτερον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων εἴη... καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον ἕτερον οὔτε ἴστων; Τί γάρ μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἢ ἴστων ἂν εἴη;

ἢ ... τῷ ἐν: = ἢ [τὸ ἐν] πέπονθεν εἶναι ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ τό τε ἐν πεπονθὸς ἂν εἴη ταῦτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ τᾶλλα τῷ ἐνί. 'In the way in which the one has the experience of being different from the others and the others likewise than it, in that way the one would have an experience identical with (that of) the others and the others with (that of) the one.' Fic.: 'Porro si uni contingit' etc.; so he read εἰ for ἢ, which would need other changes. The two are sometimes interchanged; but the Mss. agree here.

D ἑκαστον ... καλεῖσθαι; We find in this connec. καλεῖν τινὰ ὄνομα (or τι). = to call one a name, something: καλεῖν ὀνομά τινι which is much the same, but resembles our 'to call names to one': καλεῖν ὄνομα ἐπὶ τινι which Jowett renders here 'You give a name to a thing?' Heind. also gives 'Unumquodque nomen nonne rei cuiquam tribuis?' And L. and S. seem to agree. Would it not be better thus, with Ast and Engelm. 'Of the names in use you employ each on some ground?' Thus in Soph. 218 c, of the name Sophist he says νῦν γὰρ δὴ σὺ κάγω ταύτου πέρι (sc. τοῦ σοφιστοῦ) τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχομεν (= καλοῦμεν) κοινῇ· τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐφ' ᾧ καλοῦμεν ἐκά-

τερος τάχ' ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν. Neither this nor the other cases cited (e.g. Cratyl. 433 B, Rep. v. 470 B etc.) nor the case in E seems to clash with such a meaning, though the other sense is quite possible. Cp. Proc.-Dam. vi. 270, πᾶν ὄνομα ἐπὶ σημασίᾳ τινὸς λέγεται. Arist. Met. x. 5, 1062 a 13, δὲ τοῖνυν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑκαστον εἶναι γινώσκον καὶ δηλοῦν τι, καὶ μὴ πολλά, μόνον δ' ἐν· ἐν δὲ πλείῳ σημαίῃ, φανερόν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ᾧ φέρει τοῦνομα τούτων.

πλεον. ἢ ἄπαξ; Fic. 'vel saepius vel semel,' and so Thoms., Ast, Engelm., and Jowett. But would not this need ἢ πλεονάκεις ἢ ἄπαξ;? As it stands the choice seems exclusive, in which case ἔγωγε has no meaning, and the answer would be πλεονάκεις. Müller gives 'mehr als einmal' = 'oftener than once,' with which cp. Rep. iii. 409 D, πλεονάκεις δὲ πονηροῖς ἢ χρηστοῖς ἐντυχάνων (ὁ δικάστης) σοφώτερος ἢ ἀμαθέστερος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις. This seems preferable, the important thing being that a name may be given oftener than once. Perhaps the transl. incline to the other because ἄπαξ and πολλάκεις are contrasted in what follows. But that is met in the latter rendering—if you use a word oftener than once you must use it once also, which gives the material for contrast.

οὐπὲρ ἐστὶ τοῦνομα, Cp. οὐπὲρ ἦν ὄνομα and ἥσπερ ἦν τοῦνομα in E. Taking these in order Fic. gives 'cujus est nomen, cujus hoc nomen est, cujus proprium nomen est'; Ast repeats 'cujus est nomen,' and others treat the phrases as identical. Substantially they are; yet one feels a difference in mental attitude, although it is hard to define. Should not τοῦνομα be the subj. and ὄνομα part of the pred.? Cp. on 126 B; and contrast the following, τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ἐκείνος οὐπὲρ τὸ ὄνομα ἐστὶ and τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ἐκείνος οὐπὲρ ἐστὶν ὄνομα. The formula might be completed thus, τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ἐκείνος οὐπὲρ τὸ ὀνομά ἐστὶν ὄνομα, which gives material for both expressions. Heind. would read τοῦνομα in all three cases. ταῦτὸ ὄνομα the use of ταῦτὸ and ταῦτὸν seems capricious. Here if anywhere ταῦτὸν might be expected. ἐὰν φθέγγῃ cp. ὅταν φθέγγῃ below. So in Proc.-Dam.'s notes, vi. 270. The common distinc. between aor. and pres. is that the former makes a passing allus. in narrat., the latter rather a pictorial allus. in descrip. If there be any distinc. here it may be shown by the

τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων is the only other case of the act. in Ast.; but there are several cases of the pass. Stallb. however refers to Lobeck Phrynich. 563. By praeter analogiae leges does he mean that you don't have privative verbs formed from affirmative ones? If so, it may be that ἀνομοιώ is not from ὁμοιώ but from ἀνόμοιος as the other is from ὁμοιος. ταῦτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται (sc. τοῦτο τὸ ταῦτόν) τῷ ἐτέρῳ—t has τὸ ταῦτόν, as above τῷ ταῦτῳ, in marg.

p. 22. C ἔχει γὰρ ... λόγον: From the τόνδε it seems that τοιοῦτον λόγον form one express. and that τοιοῦτον is not a neut. nom. descriptive of the argt. just closed. But the expression is odd. 'Talem ut videtur rationem habet' Fic., whom Thoms. copies; and this is the best rendering. The force of the particles might be brought out thus: 'I agree; for, strange as it may seem, it is true that the statement has some such reason in its favour.' Instinct bids one expect τὸν or τινὰ with τοιοῦτον. In this passage, ἔχει...ἀνόμοιον εἶναι, Proc.-Dam. seems, vi. 271, inclined to take ἔχει...ἔχει as spoken by Parm., leaving only τινὰ; to Aristoteles; and if we may judge by his words he seems to have read ἔχει μὲν οὖν δὴ here. οὐκ ἐνέμεινε τὴν συγκατάθεσιν τοῦ προσδιαλεγόμενου, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐπικρίνει καὶ τὸ πᾶν λέγει, ὡς θαρρῶν καὶ ἄλλως ἀποδείξει. ἢ τὸ 'ἔχει μὲν οὖν δὴ' ἀπολογία ἐστὶ καὶ κατάνευσις τοῦ προσδιαλεγόμενου καὶ ἐκ τότε ἐπιφέρει ἀποδεξάμενος οἷον τὴν ἀπόκρισιν 'καὶ γὰρ καὶ τόνδε ἔχει'. εἴτε οὖν οὕτως εἴτε ἐκείνως, ἢ ἐννοία σῶζεται. The ἔχει has no very definite subj. here or above. We may supply 'your contention.' Then we must add some words, e.g. τινὰ; τὸ ἐν, ἢ ταῦτόν πέπονθε, μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δε πεπονθὺς μὴ ἀνόμοιον εἶναι, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δ' ὃν ὅμοιον εἶναι. ἢ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ ὃν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι: ταῦτόν τε ἄρα ὃν ... καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, the particip. constr. is exactly parallel to ὅτι or ἐπεὶ as below, with the indic. giving a reason. κατὰ ἐκάτερον so both Mss. as μετὰ ἑαυτὸ E. The editors give καθ'. Note this insistence on the clear recognition of each method and both, repeated also below. 'Secundum ambo haec et secundum horum utrumque' Fic. καὶ ἐκάτερον so X; t repeats the κατὰ, probably rightly.

147C-148D. Here we have a demonstr. that the one is like and unlike itself and the others. How does he reason? 1. He takes pains to establish

that the one is like the others (147C-148A). The argt. ends by proving that everything is like everything; and that because all things differ by difference—that is, by the same thing. Were he speaking as in the first part of the dial. and in the Phaedo he would say they differed by having the εἶδος of difference, which of course is always the same thing. But one is tempted to think that Pl. wants us to confound this with the idea of differing to an equal extent. One, two, and three are alike in differing each from the other, but one and two are not alike in the extent of their difference from three. Arist. as usual does a service when he notes that in practice the word 'different' has several senses. Now, while Pl. proves likeness through sameness of difference, and recalls his own remark that τὸ ταῦτόν πεπονθὺς ὅμοιον, save for his wish to make each new quality of the one spring from its predecessor, is there any need for the argt.? One would say that sameness includes likeness, and, as he proved sameness, he might infer likeness. We may also ask, supposing one and not-ones (or others) are like, *how* like are they? Pl. would lead us to fancy that they were so like as to exclude divergence—although, of course, unlikeness is proved very soon. And there is something to justify such a view in this case, for, when speaking of mere existent oneness and comparing it with mere existent otherness, and proving these like or unlike, we feel that the latter qualities may rank on the same level with the former, and that we say as much about a monad when we call it 'like' as we do when we call it 'one.' On the other hand he has been speaking about one and not-ones now for some time, and we have had a sense of growing complexity in these as the argt. has advanced. One has become One-being-whole-parts-different-same-in-itself-possessing-shape etc., and if to all these qualities we add but one more—likeness—we add little, something that might be called a mere separable accident, not an essential feature. Of course if likeness were the outcome of all combined—if one were like not-ones παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα, then likeness would be a very important feature in its character. 2. He next proves unlikeness between one and others very briefly—it was in virtue of difference that they appeared to be like, that being so they must in

virtue of sameness be unlike (148 A-B). This would be unanswerable if we were sure of our terms. Pl. has said that all words retain the same sense through all uses. Now when we speak of two things as different we think of the characteristics in which they don't agree—one is square-white-flat, the other round-black-solid, and that is the sense in which Pl. uses the word at present. On the other hand we have used the word 'different' in regard to both these things, and not a bit more or less in regard to the one than in regard to the other, and to that extent the two things resemble—by the *μήτε μάλλον μήτε ἥττον* of their difference. It was in this latter sense that Pl. used the word when he proved by it that one and others were like. In other words he proved them like by difference not qua difference but qua the sameness which it suggests. If then they were like in virtue of the sameness of their difference they need not necessarily be unlike through sameness. 1 + 2. Having now sought to show that one and others are both like and unlike, he shows his doubt as to the result by re-proving it on the converse ground (148 C). The two are 'like' ἢ ταύτων πέπονθε (leaving the ἕτερον out of sight), and 'unlike' ἢ ἄλλο πέπονθε (leaving ταύτων out of sight): a proof which is assented to with much greater readiness than the previous one—*ἀληθῆ λέγεις*.—*ἰδοὺ καὶ οὕτως ἀποδείκνυται τοῦ ἐνὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸ τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον*. Proc.-Dam. VI. 272. But he won't give up the former proof: on the contrary he maintains (*ταύτων τε ἄρα ... ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις*) that the case is made out by the two methods jointly (*κατ' ἀμφοτέρα*) and severally (*κατὰ ἑκάτερον*). 3 + 4. In proving that one is both like and unlike itself he says merely—See previous argts. jointly and severally (148 D). One is like itself both by equality of difference from itself—which must be held as proved 146 C—and by *ταύτων πεπονθῆναι ἑαυτῷ*; and unlike itself by sameness with itself (146 B-C), and by *ἄλλο πεπονθῆναι*. Proc.-Dam. VI. 272 says *κατὰ ἑκάτερον—κατὰ τε τὸ ταύτων, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς προτέρας ἀποδείξεως*. But when he adds *κατ' ἀμφοτέρα—ὁμοιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ὁμοιον ἄλλοις*. οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον—*κατὰ τε τὸ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τὸ (?) ἄλλοις*, he surely mistakes.

^D *περὶ τοῦ ἀπτεσθαι* etc. We must take *ἀπτεσθαι* ...

ἄλλων, as a phrase equivalent to a noun whose art. is *τοῦ* and which is gov'd. by *περί*, = *περὶ τοῦ 'τὸ ἐν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων' = περὶ τοῦδε*, sc. *εἰ τὸ ἐν ἀπτεται αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴτε μή, σκόπει*. αὐτὸ γὰρ ... *ἐφάνη δὲ ... τὸ ἐν*; See 145 B-E. Heind. objects to the repetition of *τὸ ἐν*. But it may be due to the fact that when the one was shown to be in itself as whole it was so as *πάντα τὰ μέρη*, while when it was shown to be in the others it was again *ὅλον ἐν δὲ*.

ἢ μὲν ... ἑαυτῷ δὲ: Thoms. refers to the opp. con- clus. reached in Dem. I. 138 A and cites Proc. in Theol. Plat. Lib. 2 Cap. 1, 'ubi tandem ita concludit ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ἢ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἐστίν, ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπτόμενον' *εἴη γὰρ οὕτω πεπονθὸς τὸ ἀπτεσθαι καὶ τὸ χωρὶς*. τὸ δέ γε ἐν πέπονθεν οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρ' αὐτό.' But this refers to the one in whose case existence was not pressed. We deal now with the one which 'is.' Again he points out that 'alia est ratio materialium alia immaterialium. Sic Porph. Sent. τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀσώματα, αὐτὸ δὲ κρείττον παντός ἐστι σώματος καὶ τόπου πανταχῇ ἐστίν, οὐ διαστατῶς ἄλλ' ἀμερῶς. Ita in Phaed. de Anima ὅταν μὴ προσομιλοῖσα τῷ σώματι ἢ ψυχῇ, ἀπτεται τοῦ ὄντος.' Which is of course true, and the *ἀπτεται* in the Phaedo is a metaph. And so of any *ᾧς* among the *εἶδη*? Whether the one is here to be material or not is hard to say; but if it is not material it is at least a mental picture of an extended thing to which the idea of touch has a natural application. Proc.-Dam. VI. 273 says *περὶ τοῦ ἀπτεσθαι ... οὐκ ἀνεσκέυασεν ἐν ταῖς ἀνασκευαῖς, οὐδ' ὅλως ἐμνήσθη* (but see 138 A). *διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν τίθησιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὴν ἀνασκευὴν*. πλὴν προτέραν τὴν κατασκευὴν (positive side, *θέσις*) *διὰ τὴν τῶν λοιπῶν κατασκευῶν συνέχειαν, καὶ ἔπειτα τὴν ἀνασκευὴν* (negative side, *ἀναίρεσις*) *ποικιλωτέραν*. As to lang. in *τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἀπτεσθαι* the position of *τῶν μὲν ἄλλων* would suggest that they depend directly, as they might, on *ἀπείργοιτο, ἀπτεσθαι* being = *ὥστε μὴ ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῶν*. But the constr. is probably *ἀπείργοιτο ἀπτεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων*: yet here we miss a neg. with the vbs. But both usages are found: cp. Laws XI. 929 C, *ἐάν τις ... νιδὼν βούληται θέσθαι, μηδεὶς νόμος ἀπειργέτω ποιέσθαι*, and VIII. 837 D, *δεῖ κωλύειν τὸν νόμον ἀπείργοντα μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν*. *ἀπτοίτο*: as 147 A, *ἀν* om.

ἄρ' οὐ πᾶν ... ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν: The lang. is peculiar. First the usage of the verb to touch is uncertain throughout, 148 E-149 A. In A we have τὸ μέλλον ἄψασθαι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψασθαι, τὸ μέλλον ἄψασθαι, οὐ μέλλει ἄψασθαι; and the future is usual, as 141 C; but with this we have οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι 148 E, and εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι 149 A, which also is a recognised construc. t corresponds in the three cases 148 E, but reads as follows in 149 A: τὸ μέλλον ἄψασθαι, οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι. Thus all possible construcs. appear, and in the order of their normal frequency—fut., pres., aor.: this last, however, is probably wrong considering its surroundings. Of course μέλλει here means purpose rather than futurity. Some would change οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι to fut.; but μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι still remains, while Proc.-Dam. in his note uses οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι thrice. Next we have the words ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἢ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ἢ ἔδρα, ἢ ἂν κήται ἄπτεται. (Cp. Dam. § 14, 28, ἕκαστα μένει τὰ εἶδη, κατέχοντα τὴν ὑποκειμένην τοῦ σώματος ἔδραν) Notes 1. The text shows that κατέχον had been omitted; nor does it seem to have been soon supplied—Introd. lxxxvi., xci. Otherwise the text is as in A, save that ἢ has a smooth breath. as well as the rough. t agrees, having κατέχον and ἢ in the text: and the remainder of the sent. also corresponds, with ἐν added before ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν: in A this last ἢ has the acc. above a scrape. As A has omitted κατέχον, t seems in this place the better authority, and probably ἐν should be read. But granting this, the words quoted above still contain some ambiguity. Their general purport is clear, and corresponds to what follows about the one. Fic., as Stallb. says, seems to render correctly, the crux of the passage being in ἢ ἂν etc. 'Nonne quodcunque tacturum aliquid est, prope illud quod tacturum est jacere oportet, atque eam sedem occupare quae sequitur illius sedem—in qua cum primum fuerit, tanget?' The descrip. of the position ends with ἔδρα, and the sent. might end there. But Pl. chooses to add 'if it assumes *that* position it touches.' This surplusage has parallels, e.g. 146 B, πρὸς ἐαυτὸ μέρος ὄν, and 146 C, εἴπερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἔσται; The only difficulty in the way of this interpr. is the use of ἐκείνην where one would rather look for μετ' ἐκεῖνο or μετ' ἐκείνου ἔδραν referring to τινος above. Nec tamen

opus est corrigere μετ' ἐκείνου says Stallb. The nom. ἔδρα is a little harsh, but may be part of the pred. to ἢ. Those who find the text incomplete do so because they assume these last words to be an integral part of the descrip. of the position necessary for the thing that intends to touch something. Corrections usually follow Heind., ἢ ἂν κήται οὐ ἀπ., and with this they either change ἔδρα to accus. or omit it. Heind. reads ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἢ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ἢ [ἔδραν], ἢ ἂν κήται [ἐκείνο] οὐ ἄψεται. This gives a good meaning, and the οὐ might have been om. through confus. with the one above. But Heind. sees what others seem not to notice, that ἄπτεται must in that case be made fut. The pres. is an addit. argt. for the text as it stands, and for the interpr. Fic. puts upon it, notwithstanding his tanget. Pl. says virtually 'if one thing is going to touch another it must take up a position by the side of that in which the other is—when there it *touches*.' Heind. makes it 'by the side of that position in which lies the thing which it is *going to touch*.' It is just possible that the text may once have stood ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κάσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι—ἢ ἂν κήται ἄπτεται and that an early reader, not being certain of its meaning, added a gloss borrowed from the lang. of the foll. sent., which gloss after being itself patched has been inserted in the text in the form ταύτην ... ἔδρα. And it is worth noting that in the passage which follows χώρα, not ἔδρα, is used twice. ἐκείνης ἢ Bek. and Stallb. read ἐ. ἐν ἢ though neither collated t in this dial.

χωρὶς ὄν ... εἶναι: Clear but irreg. The first half ¹⁴⁶ might be χωρὶς δεῖ εἶναι ἐφεξῆς δὲ ἐκείνῳ. The second introduces τρίτον as a new subj. To be regular we should have either τρίτον δὲ δεῖ etc. or else τὸ μέλλον ἄψασθαι ἐφεξῆς μὲν δεῖ εἶναι, τρίτον δὲ ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν ἔχειν.

ὀλιγοστών So A, Notes 1. Bek. after Gais. wrongly puts the accent on ι. τοῖν δυοῖν ὄροι ... ἐξῆς, A oddly writes ἐξ ἧς; but both Mss. give τοῖν δυοῖν ὄροι, of which Heind. says 'Istud ὄροι quis ferre potest, quum de rebus ipsis non de earum terminis hic agi appareat?' After the 2nd Bâle ed. he omits τοῖν and reads ἐὰν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοι, while Bek. and Stallb. bracket ὄροι. Herm. says 'ὄροι librorum consensu traditum nec cum Tur. in

ὁμόροιν mutare nec cum Stallb. cancellis notare libuit; ὅροι nunc opponuntur ἀψῆσι, ut Phileb. c 7, διαστήμασι, Rep. viii. 3 et Tim. c 8 διαστάσεσι, quarum ipsarum absentia ἀψῆς oriuntur; nec neutrum τρίτον offendit, quia tertium illud non tanquam ὅρος accedit, sed accedendo demum ὅρος fit. Immo ipsos ὅρους pro numeris accipi ostendunt sequentia καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἀψῆς τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μὴ ἐλάττους εἶναι, ubi recte jam Stallb. Heindorfii conj. τὸν ἀριθμὸν a BT receptam abiecit. We retain ὅροι, although Herm. is not quite clear. The τρίτον refers to τρίτον above and means τρίτον τι. Observe that ὅροι is introduced only after the suggest. of a τρίτον coming ἐν μέσῳ. May not this convert the previous δύο into the two ὅροι of a row of three? PL wishes us to see that he means those two, so he uses the dual and calls them ὅροι (below he calls them τὰ πρῶτα δύο), that we may not suppose one of them and the τρίτον to be meant—for if we did the conditions of ἀψῆς would not be violated, only another than the original δύο would be meant. That ὅροι existed at an early date is made prob. by Proc.-Dam. vi. 275, ἡ δὲ ἀψῆς τὸ ἐλάττον (?) ἐν δυὶ καὶ μεταξὺ τρίτον οὐκ ἔσται,—εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἔξωθεν, καὶ τότε δύο ἀψῆς εἰσὶ τριῶν ὄρων ὄντων [he uses it as = terms?], καὶ ἀεὶ οὕτως παρὰ μίαν αἱ ἀψῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὄρους, καθὼς Ἀριστ. ἔλεγε περὶ τε τῶν ὄρων καὶ τῶν προτάσεων τὰ γὰρ δύο πρῶτα τὸ ἐν [sense = τὰ γὰρ δύο πρῶτα παρὰ τὸ ἐν] πρὸς τὴν μίαν ἀψῆν ἐπλεονέκτησε καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτω γίγνεται. After quoting this Stallb. adds 'ex his verbis origo glossematis explicari poterit,' i.e. ὅροι crept into the text from this passage? In that case Dam. must have written prior to the date of the archetype of both our Mss. Do we know that? And if he is to account for glosses can we cite him as corroborating the text?

τὰς ἀψῆς ... ἐλάττους εἶναι. 'ipsos tactus a numerorum multitudine uno exsuperari.' Fic. That is, ἐλάττους gov. τοῦ πλήθους, and that τῶν ἀριθμῶν, which word means the δύο, τρία etc. that touch. 'Non opus est cum Heind. et Bek. praeter fidem omnium librorum corrigere τὸν ἀριθμὸν [i.e. κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν on the analogy of the phrase which follows].' Stallb.

ᾗ γὰρ etc. Notes 1. So A with ΔΠDR, t reads ἐπλεον. τῶν ἀψῶν. The latter is universally adopted

(though by editors who had not collated t) while no one discusses ἄλλων at all. ἀψῶν certainly makes the sense obvious, but does it not also suggest the probability that εἰς τὸ πλείω ... τὰς ἀψῆς is a gloss, explaining ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἀψῶν? Alternatively, in view of the fact that the conflict arises over τῶν ἀψῶν, may that not have been put in the margin, the text having been τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι etc., a reading which would account for A having ν at the end of the verb? But again, what of the repeated plural, when from the nature of the case only one touch can be meant; and what of the lang. of Proc.-Dam. above, τὰ γὰρ δύο πρῶτα τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὴν μίαν ἀψῆν ἐπλεονέκτησε καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτω γίγνεται? It would not meet this last objec. but it would simplify matters otherwise if some such view as the following were adopted. He is all the while discussing the relation of ἐν to τὰ ἄλλα and he wishes to bring out two facts of the case, if the one touches the others—(1) that there will always be one touch less than the whole number (of others, let us say), (2) that number does not exist in the others; on both of which grounds, but chiefly on the second, the idea must be abandoned. Suppose now that some early reader had put in the margin τῶν ἄλλων as a gloss on τῶν ἀριθμῶν to show that, so far as the present argt. goes, the latter must mean the former. Without following the argt. one would not see the point of this, and at the same time one might note that ἐπλεονέκτησεν had no case. Assume further that ἄλλων was in old minuscule, but written small and with a slight running of the ink at the λλ. Now when λ occurs double it closely resembles ψ, both being approximately a +. When then this τῶν ἄλλων comes to be read and copied both scribes think it belongs to ἐπλεονέκτησεν; one of them reads it correctly and puts it down, the other sees no sense in it and takes it for a blotted ἀψῶν, which he thinks more suited to the context. In any case this paragraph on touch has been somewhat tampered with. τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ refers back to φ. Fic. 'quanto, tanto'; but 'by this equal amount' seems an odd phrase. Might τούτῳ be gov. by τῷ ἴσῳ, and alone refer to φ, 'by an amount equal to this, by the equal of this amount'? The amount of course is one. ἔπειτα like λοιπὸν

carries out the idea of starting at one and adding
C on numbers in a row. $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ τε τῷ 80 Α; τ ἐντετῷ C.

ἀδ μὲ implies that the units follow in a line.

p. 23. οὐκ οὐδ' ... οὐ γάρ: Fic. alters the tense of φαμέν, makes it govern the sent., and assumes φαμέν in the answer. φαμέν is so far parenth. as to leave the constr. independent, and the sent. is neg. in sense but interrog. in original form. 'Is it not the case then, we say, that the others-than-the-one neither are one nor have part in it?' = But as a fact, we say, the others neither are nor have? In τὰ ἄλλα-τοῦ-ἑνὸς as one, the τοῦ ἑνὸς are intentionally added to fortify the concl.

ἑστίν ... ἐνόντος So Α, but with ' and ' patched.

Notes 1.: τ gives $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ ἑστίν and ὄντος. One can sympathize with the uncertainty. The feeling that the sense might be οὐδ' ἄρα εἰς ἑστίν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις may present itself. Fic. 'Ex iis conficitur ut non sit in aliis numerus unus quippe cum unum illis minime adsit'; and Thoms. adopts $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ 'non ergo unum numerus est in aliis'—both apparently meaning 'the number one.' On the purport of the statement Thoms. refers to Plotin. Enn. v. 5, 4, and quotes Hierocles in Aur. Carm. xx., ἡ μὲν γὰρ μόνος ὡς ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ τὰς πάντων δυνάμεις ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνέχει. He further quotes Sext. Emp. Contra Phys. Lib. x., following the Pythagorean μόνος and ἀόριστος δίας, and finally cps. 147 A. It must be remembered that if number even to the extent of 'one' crept into the others the argt. is upset, for that one with 'the one' = 'two,' and two give touch. But if Pl. had meant $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ he would have worded his statement more clearly.

D οὐτε ἄλλον ... οὐδέν: The constr. is οὐτε [ἑστίν τὰ ἄλλα] ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ = οὐτε ἔχει ὄνομα etc. Exspectabam οὐδενός. Heind.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα ... ἐν, καὶ etc. Heind. and Bek. following Schleierm. reject the second ἐν referring to C, εἰ δέ γε ἐν μόνον ἑστίν. Stallb. seems right in objecting: but he seems to treat the words as = τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἑστίν ἐν μόνον. Why not 'only the one, therefore (and not the others), is one; and thus two cannot exist'? In C on number Pl. declared that if we had only one and no two, touch vanished. He now applies this to the one and the others, and finds that, so far as they are concerned, (1) the necessary one exists only in the one, (2) the absence of one and

of number from the others shuts out the existence of two also. If, after directly referring to the others, he said, τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἑστίν, would he not deny existence as well as number to them?


148 D-149 D. The question of touch was mentioned 138 A, but only to prove that the one could not be either in itself or in another. Here we have the one in itself and in the others, therefore it touches in each case. Thus far touch is dealt with from the point of view of one thing inside and one thing outside another, and in 138 A the phrase used is πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ ἀπτεσθαι. 1. Now he urges that the one is in 'the others,' and therefore touches them, 148. He does not prove that it is, but assumes it from what has gone before. In Dem. 1. 138 A he speaks of the one being ἐν ἄλλῳ, and in II. 145 E he says ἐν ἄλλῳ and ἐν ἑτέρῳ: in 146 D-E we have ὅσα μὴ ἐν ἑστίν ἀπανθ' ἑτερα τοῦ ἑνός, ἑτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν ... ἐνείη ἂν τὸ ἑτερον, but that seems to be the utmost that can be urged as proof that it is in the others. We must assume that ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἐν ἄλλοις, mean the same thing: and the touch is that of neck and necklace. 2. Next the one is in itself, and touch of the same kind occurs. 145 C affirms that one as parts is within itself as whole: which is true in the sense that the bricks are in the wall. But the wall does not touch the bricks, nor they it. To get touch we must have at least a film in addition to the parts, as we have in the roe of a fish. But at once the objection urged in 138 B applies—οὐκ οὐδ' ἑτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἑτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον. 3. So far his case is not strong. He now chooses a way of his own to subvert it. Touch, it seems, is external only: and if one is to touch itself δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κείσθαι—ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν. The touch is now that of two beads: and one cannot touch itself. 4. But the stress comes when he seeks to show that the one cannot touch the others. Touch being external, it is immaterial to say that the one is in the others locally: his cue now is to prove that it is not in them logically. Three ideas run through his argt.—touch is external: it needs number as far at least as two: it goes in a straight line, so that there is one touch less than the things touching. He then shows that the others have no number in them, on the logical ground

that the idea 'others' excludes 'one'—see 147 A. If this holds, his case is made out. 'The one' gives 1, and if 'the others' yielded even another 1, then $1 + 1 = 2$ and touch may exist. Why then the idea of a straight line? There seem to be two reasons. 1. If touch went in a circle, as we have it in a rosary, there would be as many touches as there are things touching, and this would seem to him somehow to clash with the idea that two things are needed to make one touch, while he must have 'two' or his argt. from number fails. 2. If he can make out that—given a number of 'ones'—there will be a touch less than that number; then in the event of the others being such a collection of ones, touch will fall short of overtaking them. If these do not account for the introd. of this bizarre idea it is hard to explain its presence. We might ask, Would the one touch the others as a body or as individuals? But this is shut out by his line of argt. Thoms. says 'Unum quatenus est supra omnia tactus omnis est expers, quatenus autem cum aliis conjungitur tangere dicitur et tangi Procl. in Theol. Plat. Lib. 6, cap. 24, τὸ δὲ ἀπτόμενον τῶν ἄλλων ἔσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἀπτόμενον, καὶ συνέξενται πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὑπερίδρηται αὐτῶν (l. -δρυνται). Super and ὑπερ imply something above argt.; but Pl. professes to argue throughout.

ἴσων ἔστι. In A (Notes 1.) the gap between ἴσων and ἔστι represents an eras. of several letters. Some early blunder had been made. As to the statement Thoms. says 'in semet ipso esse, i.e. stare Pythagoraei aequalitati tribuebant, in alia autem transire seu moveri inaequalitati competere credebant. Sext. Empir. Lib. x. adv. Phys., Τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐναντίαςιν ἔλεξαν ἄρχαι—γένους τάξιν ἐπέχον—τὸ ἴσων καὶ τὸ ἄνισον· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ πάντων τῶν ἐναντιουμένων θεωρεῖται φύσις· οἷον μόνης μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι, κινήσεως δὲ ἐν ἀνισότητι, ἐπιδέχεται γὰρ τὸ π. μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥσσον.' τὸ ἐν ἡ τὰλλα ἡ ἔλαττον, it is odd to find ἡ τὰλλα thus followed by ἡ ἔλαττον, espec. when the genit. of comp. occurs immediately, τοῦ ἐνός. ἡ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα, Notes 1.

ἄρα οὐκ ... ταῖς οὐσίαις οὐκ here goes with what follows and is strengthened by οὔτε οὔτε: ἄρα begins to tell at εἰ μὲν, and the whole might stand ἄρα (οὐκ ἂν ... οὐσίαις· ἀλλ') εἰ μὲν πρὸς ... ἔλαττον; ἄρα indicates interrogation; but, to make the interrog.

form expecting an affirm. answer correct, we must understand οὐκ twice—ἄρα οὐκ (οὐκ ἂν ... ἀλλ') εἰ μὲν etc. Both Mss. read ἄρα, which would be better but for its position. Considering the repetition of ἂν and the awkward turn of the sentence, the reading οὐκ ἄρα τῷ μὲν would be welcome if there were any authority for it. And all objcs. would vanish if we simply omitted ἄρα here as an early confus. with ἀρ' οὖν above; or alternatively read εἰ ἄρα μείζον εἴη ... οὐκ ἂν ... As Stallb. says, καὶ τὰλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός = καὶ τῷ τὰλλα εἶναι ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός. The words τῷ μὲν ἐν ... τοῦ ἐνός, and αὐταῖς γε ταύταις οὐσίαις explain each other: the one and the others are not equal or unequal καθ' αὐτὰ or in virtue of their own nature, but by receiving into themselves equality etc. [ἄλλο] is bracketed as having no meaning. It may be due to confus. with the τὰλλα above. For ἐκότερα one would almost expect the sing.; but τὰλλα are themselves plural, which may decide the writer's bias. The word goes with ἔχουεν not with τοιαῦτα εἶναι. τὰ δὲ σμικρότητα, so both Mss., and the τὰ may be used carelessly in antith. to τὰ μὲν, though it refers to the one, and edd. read τὸ δέ. Phps. it is a feeling of this diffc. as well as a sense of the repeated use of μὲν δὲ in the sent. that leads t to write τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ as a guide to the connec. The relation of the particles throughout seems to be as follows:—



and the whole might stand εἰ τὸ ἐν μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον εἴη τῶν ἄλλων, ἡ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ—τῷ ἐν καὶ τὰλλα εἶναι—μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ἐκότερον ἔχουεν πρὸς τούτῳ ἰσότητα ἴσα ἂν εἴη, τῷ δὲ τὸ μὲν μέγεθος ἔχουεν τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα τὸ μὲν μείζον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον ἂν εἴη. μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἐν is his second altern., but it is one which would not apparently be thought of by a Pythagorean. Thoms. quotes Sext. Emp. as above, ἀλλὰ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀορίστου δῶαδος λόγον τέτακται: also Auctor Theol. Arithm.

ἐκάλουν δὲ τὸ ἴσον τάξιν συμφωνίας ἐν μέζονι καὶ ἐλάττονι οἱ περὶ Ἑμπεδ. καὶ Παρμ. καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν, φάμενοι τὴν μοναδικὴν φύσιν ἑστίας τρόπον (like the hearth) ἐν μέσῳ ἰδρύσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἰσόρροπον φυλάσσειν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔδραν. τῷ εἶδει so both Mss. and the word is quoted by Proc.-Dam., ὁποτέρῳ μὲν εἶδη (-ει?) ἐκ τούτων, ἢ τῷ ἐν ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγεθος προσείη (vi. 276). Yet we have the word in the next line. There it is used in its well-known ideal sense of αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος and αὐτὴ ἡ συμκρότης: here it is used of τὸ ἐν and τὰ ἄλλα in which these ideas are to be found. Thus (1) if the sense is the same in both cases then we have quite unexpectedly and in isolation a practical illustr. of μέθεξις of εἶδη by εἶδη such as S. spoke of at the beginning, which disposes at once of the view which pervades Stallb.'s commentary that τὸ ἐν is an εἶδος but τὰ ἄλλα not: these are on the same footing in that respect—both or neither: (2) if we have not this μέθεξις then τῷ εἶδει must be used in a different sense from εἶδη, and as a fact Ast classes the expression with such as ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει, τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκρενταύρων εἶδος; while Jowett calls it 'class.' But why choose this particular place to speak of τὸ ἐν as an 'appearance' or 'class' or 'shape'? It is certainly as little reasonable as the use of ὄρου (B) which troubles edd. Yet ἐν τοῖς ὅδοις ἐγγιγνοίσθην below makes for this view. εἶδη entering into τὰ τῷδε is sound Platonic doctrine; but if τὰ τῷδε are in this case to be themselves εἶδη the fact is broached with little ceremony, while it is as well worthy of elucidation as the question whether one is equal to the others.

ἔστων τί τινα etc. Both Mss. give τε, yet edd. naturally prefer γε. Heind. wishes τῷ before εἶδη and in τ a τω is erased and εἶδη written. The article however would throw the whole stress upon ἔστων = do not these two εἶδη exist?, while its absence makes the noun part of the predicate = οὐκοῦν τούτῳ ἔστων τίνα εἶδη. Below he says μὴ ὄντε γε = εἰ μὴ εἶτην, which in turn rather makes for ἔστων in the sense of existence. Nothing would be lost to the present argt. if οὐκοῦν ... πῶς γὰρ ἂν: were dropped. It is a mere aside, to justify once again the existence of εἶδη. If it does anything more it adds to the unlikelihood of the view that ἐν and τὰ ἄλλα are meant here to be εἶδη, by its

leaving them—the principals in the discussion—unmentioned.

οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ... μέζον: This alternative of sup-¹⁵⁰ posing that when one thing is in another the two may be equal, or one may be bigger and contain the other, is not dwelt upon when ἐν is called ὅλον and πάντα τὰ μέρη (145). These are indeed regarded as two views of the same ἐν, yet the whole contains all the parts and not the converse, so that it must be the bigger of the two. It is noteworthy that he here reverses the view of μέθεξις of the εἶδη given in 131. There the diffic. was how to divide the εἶδος among many partakers: here he asks whether the partaker receives the whole εἶδος in the whole or part of itself. Contrad. arises under both views.

πράττειν τὰ μεγέθη etc. = to assume the rôle of, perform the function of. Does he mean playfully to bid smallness mind its own affairs καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμαίνειν? Rep. iv. 433 A, ὅτι γε τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμαίνειν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί.

οὔτε γε etc. The οὔτε is unusual standing alone. B The sense of course is (ἀλλ' ... ναὶ scarcely breaking it) οὔτε ἐν ὅλῳ, οὔτε γε ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ μέρει. t reads οὔτε, which has good parallels in Pl., e.g. Phaed. 81 D, εἰκὸς μέντοι ... καὶ οὔτε γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ... ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων. So Bek. reads; while Heind. says 'Malim οὐ τοι γε = neque tamen.' Herm. says 'οὐδέ γε Herm. ex Oxon. vestigiis ubi est οὔτε γε: editi οὔτε γε, quod foret certe non ut Phaed. c. 30 [the passage quoted above]; cf. nos ad Lucian. Hist. Conscr. p. 183.' If he means that A shows signs of patching he seems wrong. Perhaps οὔτε may stand, as showing the orig. design of the sent., which was found to need ἀλλ' ... μέρει as it went on. L. and S. citē a case of οὔτε alone, Arist. Phys. III. 8, 1, οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἡ γένεσις μὴ ἐπιλείπῃ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνεργεῖν ἄπειρον εἶναι σῶμα αἰσθητόν. With ἀλλ', εἶπερ Stallb. cps. 138 D, εἶπερ γε δὴ: and Heind. quotes many cases of ellipse with εἶπερ; we may add Arist. Met. vi. 1, 3.

ἀλλ' ἢ for this phrase after a neg. (= otherwise), Heind. cps. 132 E, and we may add Arist. Met. vi. 5, 1030 b 34. Διὸ ἀποπον τὸ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς τοιούτοις τό τι ἦν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἰς ἄπειρον εἰσω. ταῦτα ποιήσει, Notes I. ποιήσῃ must be wrong.

τῶν ὄντων The proof really is a general one, although he deals only with τὸ ἐν.

- c μείζον γὰρ etc. He overstrains: he has admitted above A that when one thing is in another it may be ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτῷ τεταμένον. The argt. holds, however, as μείζον cannot be ἴσον any more than σμικρότης can. In ἄλλο, καὶ πλὴν Heind. wants καὶ first. καὶ gives emph. in either case, and where it stands it may point the anal. to πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος which precedes: καὶ ταῦτα just below is still stronger; ἐκείνο, i.e. τὸ ἐν. καὶ ταῦτα ... ἢ μέγα. The ταῦτα is idiomatic, we use the sing. Heind., Bek., and Stallb. all take αὐτοῦ to be the read. here, and Heind. shows acuteness in changing it to αὐτῷ [= ἐκείνῳ τῷ μείζονι]. But see Notes 1. The sense is 'nor will bigness be in it either. For thus there would be something else bigger—ay, independently of bigness itself—that namely within which bigness was; and this moreover when it is not furnished with smallness, the thing which it is essential that it should surpass if it really is big.' Of course a plea might be urged for αὐτοῦ, which Stallb. reads. He rightly notes that smallness is not here annihilated, but only excluded from meeting bigness within the one.

- p. 24. αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλοι etc. Stallb. justly cites 133 C. In οὔτε ἄρα ... οὔτε αὖ τὸ ἐν Pl. chooses to begin with τὰ ἄλλα on which he has led no explicit proof, and end with τὸ ἐν on which the whole proof has turned. We would expect οὔτε ἄρα τὸ ἐν ... οὔτε αὐτὸ τούτω ... οὔτε αὖ τὰ ἄλλα (which are included but by implication only—see οὐδ' ἐνὶ ... τῶν ὄντων B). This freedom of order is common in Pl., and still more that of passing from one illustr. to another analogous. So Arist., e.g. Met. vi. chap. 7, after μέρος τῆς οἰκίας· οἶον οἱ λίθοι, gives ἡ οἰκία πλινθίνη ἀλλ' οὐ πλίνθοι, and again ὁ ἀνδριὰς οὐ λίθος ἀλλὰ λίθινος [usually χαλκοῦς] followed by οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἀνδριὰς ξύλον ἀλλὰ παράγεται ξύλινος: so χαλκὴ σφαῖρα and χαλκοῦς κύκλος are interchanged. Note the negs. here. First οὔτε οὔτε οὔτε: then within
 o the sphere of the first and last of these μήτε μήτε: finally within the sphere of the last τούτοις οὐδ' τῶν ἄλλων and μείζον οὐδ' ἑλαττον. The inference may be that had he been using μὴ in the last cases he would have put μήτε τούτοις μήτε τῶν ἄλλων and μήτε μείζον μήτε ἑλαττον. But he cannot use οὔτε

τούτοις οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων etc., lest confus. should arise with the main οὔτε αὖ. αὐτὸ τούτω so t. Notes 1.

ἔχον So t. ἔχέτω. There is a small final ν like a υ which if written after an ο might be taken for the latter half of a careless ω, p. cxi.

οὔτε αὖ τὸ ἐν τούτοις So t. Ἄ οὔτε αὐτῷ ἐν τούτοις which cannot be right. Notes 1. He deals with three entities, ἐν, τὰ ἄλλα, and τούτω, i.e. smallness and bigness.

ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ etc. Thoms. quotes Porphyry. Sent. 36, τὸ ὄντως ἐν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν ἐστι—τὸ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρόν κυρίως ὀγκον ἰδια.

οὐκ οὖν καὶ τόδε etc. Notes 1. We must supply mentally something with τόδε. Stallb. justly cps. 141 c: there are many examples.

μηδὲν εἶναι ... τῶν ἄλλων: This is explicit. He uses, as we have seen, several antith. to the one, τὰ πολλά, τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ ἄλλα, ἄλλο and τὰ μὴ ἐν. The last is best here; for ἐν—μὴ-ἐν, = A—not-A, include all possibilities. Arist. indicates in various places that τὸ ἐν is used in different senses, generally giving four. Thus Met. iv. 6, 1016 b 10, καὶ γὰρ ἀριθμοῦμεν ὡς πλείω ἢ τὰ μὴ συνεχῆ, ἢ ὧν μὴ ἐν τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ὧν ὁ λόγος μὴ εἰς: and below εἰτε δὲ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμόν ἐστιν ἐν, τὰ δὲ κατ' εἶδος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, —ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ἡ ὕλη μία, εἶδει δ' ὧν ὁ λόγος εἰς, γένει δ' ὧν τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας, κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ὅσα ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. So again Met. ix. 1, 1052 a 34, λέγεται μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐν τοσαυταχῶς—τό τε συνεχὲς φύσει, καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ καθ' ἑκαστον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου.

καὶ εἶναι πον ... ἐν τῷ ἐν We have more than one condit. of exist. laid down in the dial. for τὸ ἐν. Here we have apparently the condit. of space (we have τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν 148 E), and although he speaks metaphor. of a νοητὸς τόπος he can hardly be held as speaking so here. If he speaks literally then τὸ ἐν cannot be an εἶδος. But Stallb. interprets καὶ εἶναι πον as 'aliquam habere cum alio necessitudinem et conjunctionem,' which is a logical 'being in somewhere,' not a spacial one.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκ οὐδὲν etc. The one has been proved somehow or other to be in another, or in the different. This is the first case in which it is proved—per imposs.—to be ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. The argt. is—all that exists must be somewhere: the one and the others are all that exists: therefore the

one and the others are in each other. Here too Stallb. holds his ground: 'Meminerimus enim necesse est haec omnia ita disputari ut rerum sub sensus cadentium rationes ad ipsas ideas transferantur.' Thoms. argues, 'Unum quidem est in aliis sed omnia implet et nusquam est. Plotin. Ennead. 3, Lib. 9, cap. 3, πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς πλήθος; ὅτι πανταχοῦ· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁπουοῦν. πάντα οὖν πληροί. πολλὰ οὖν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα εἶδη· αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰ μόνον πανταχοῦ, αὐτὸ ἂν ᾗν τὰ πάντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ γίνεται, τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτό, ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἐκείνο. Conf. Procl. in Theol. Plat. Lib. 1, cap. 2. Patebit ex his quomodo respondendum fuisset ad propositam quaestionem anne aequale sibi sit unum et aliis et inaequale, quae his praemissis nititur, quod unum in se sit et in aliis, quod majus sit et minus se ipso et aliis.'

149 E-151 B. The stages of the argt. upon equality and inequality are as follows:—*a.* (1) The one and the others, if equal or unequal between themselves, are so only through having in them the ideas equality, bigness, or smallness—for there are such ideas in existence. (2) But the existence of these ideas in the one and the others leads to a series of contrads., and the conclus. is that (149 E-150 D. 3) the one and the others cannot be equal or unequal one towards the other, because they have not equality, bigness, or smallness in them, and because those ideas have their respect. relats. only towards each other. Here we have an almost startling return to the argt. of the first sect. of the dial. In Dem. 1. the present conclus. was reached without this machinery. There (140 B-D) the argt. which immediately succeeds this did effective duty—equality meant the same number of measures, and so of parts, and the one had no parts. Here that argt. will not apply, because the one as existent has already been proved to have parts. Now it may be granted—although this is not how Pl. uses the argt.—that the concepts of one and others in themselves do not involve ref. to size; and that if size is to enter it does so κατὰ συμβεβηκός. To Pl., for the present, it seems that the only means by which size can come in is by the entrance of three ideas; and as these cannot enter, size remains out. But note that he does not argue out the case as regards *ισότης*—perhaps for the reason that there is no

absurdity in fancying equality as occupying the whole of the one, and so being equal to it. The absurdity here would arise only if μέγεθος also occupied the same ground and became equal to equality. If we read the whole argt. fairly over from εἰ μείζον 149 E to φαίνεται γὰρ 150 D, we can hardly help feeling, notwithstanding the express. ὁποτέρω μὲν τῷ εἶδει (149 E), that *ισότης μέγεθος σμικρότης* as *εἶδη* stand in one class, and that τὸ ἐν and τὰ ἄλλα are grouped together as co-ord. members of a totally diff. class (if Stallb. is right in thinking τὸ ἐν an *εἶδος*, then again τὰ ἄλλα must go with it, for they are treated alike); and for the second time it is proved that *εἶδη* have no useful function in metaphys. In arguing that the one and the others are not equal or unequal because they don't possess the ideas of equality etc., Pl. seems to make two mistakes. He fails to see that he should have a single idea of inequality, though this is a small matter: and he fails to ask—how then are the one and the others 'one' and 'others' without the interpos. of suitable *εἶδη*? He speaks of their being such τῷ ἐν εἶναι and τῷ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶναι—is this then what Arist. would call their ὕλη, the ὑποκείμενον which is postulated as a substance whereof size in its various forms is to be predicated by the aid of *εἶδη*? ἀπορήσει δ' ἂν τις, as he would say.

b. (1) The one and the others, not having in them bigness and smallness, cannot exceed or be exceeded. (2) Two things which mutually neither exceed nor are exceeded must be equal: so (150 D-E. 3) the one and the others are equal. Here we have the argt. by exclus., as we have had on several occasions: but it will scarcely serve in its present position. Why does he not say—Things which, viewed in regard to size, possess neither 'bigness' nor 'smallness' must possess 'equality'? And if they are equal merely by not possessing bigness or smallness, are they not equal τῷ ἐν εἶναι and τῷ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶναι, which was impossible? It is true that the one and the others when viewed as the two factors of a compound concep. may be called equal, in the sense of being co-ord. or equally essential. But Pl. is speaking of equality not logically but spacially.

c. (1) The one, being in itself, is also around itself: so (150 E. 2) the one is bigger and smaller than itself. Here we get clear away from the

εἶδη again. The process began with the absence of exceeding and being exceeded as steps to prove equality, and now it is complete. We may talk of the one and the others as being equal and unequal without reference to *εἶδη* at all. But his conclus. is reached by falling back on the view which he took in 138 A and 145 C, and which he adheres to in what remains of the argt. (d'), that if one thing be in another, or in itself viewed as another, bigger and smaller are the only terms which can be used in describing the situation. Now he has just contended (150 A) that 'smallness' might, if in the one, 'play the part of equality,' because of being *ἐξ ἑσού τῷ ἐνὶ δὲ ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη*. If then smallness might thus be equal to the one, it seems still more natural that the one might in the same way be equal to itself, and not bigger or smaller.

d. (1) The one and the others represent all that exists. (2) Whatever exists must be somewhere: so (151 A-B. 3) the one and the others must be in each other, and thus (4) must be greater and smaller than each other. This cancels the idea of *χώρα*, which was assumed in the argt. on touch (148 E), where the one and the others lay outside of each other and the latter occupied *τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν* to the former. Or alternatively the one and the others must include space between them. Yet he adheres to the view indicated at several points that existence is spacial—whatever is must be somewhere—and as this is contrary to the nature of the *εἶδη* which are in a *νοητὸς τόπος*, the one and the others cannot be *εἶδη*. If they are, we must suppose Pl., as Stallb. does, to be speaking figuratively throughout—yet what would be his motive? But again he does not prove his conclus. The one and the others comprise all that is; but they are not necessitated to be in each other unless they are first precluded from being each in itself, while the one has been expressly declared to be in itself. It must be admitted that the lang. throughout Dem. 11. is ambig. and confus. Before leaving the subj. we may raise another point on this reappear. of the *εἶδη* of smallness, bigness, and equality. Since mentioning these before he has talked freely of the infinite divisib. of the one. Now, as Arist. points out (Met. IX. 1 and elsewhere), if you speak of one as a starting point, a unit of measurement, *ἀδιαίρε-*

τον τὸ ἐν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἡ ἐν: it is your terminus a quo. But if you are searching for that which you may call one because it does not admit of being made smaller—for one as your terminus ad quem, as an atom—you will fail to find it; *φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι πᾶν συνεχὲς διαίρετον εἰς ἀεὶ διαίρετά* (Phys. VI. 1 etc.). Now this has a bearing on Pl.'s idea of *σμικρότης*. That is an idealized minimum of extens. At 132 the process by which *εἶδη* are reached is said to be comparison—smallness then should be gradually attained by compar. of smaller and smaller things. He admitted there that this was an endless process. Since then he has (144) exhibited the one as *ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος*. And smallness is by the nature of it to be smaller than the smallest part of one—how is it then to be got at? Again when got at it is *ποτ* to be smaller than anything save bigness, which in turn is bigger (?) than the biggest of sensible objects.

καὶ ἀριθμῷ Heind. would change this to *ἀριθμὸν*,^c to accord with *τὸ πλῆθος* and *τὸν ἀριθμὸν* in D: but *ἄτ* are clear, and to be consist. he needs *τόν*.

καὶ ἴσον ἴσων etc. As Stallb. notes we must underst.^{p. 25.} *ἐαυτῷ* with *ἴσον* from the preceding *ἐαυτοῦ*, and conversely extract *αὐτοῦ* for *πλειόνων* and *ἐλαττόνων* from *αὐτῷ*, the last construc. being (Heind.) ident. with *ἴσων ... αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις* above. Just before that in B we have the other altern., *ἴσον τε καὶ μείζον ... αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων*, and again in the summing up below E.

151 B-E. This argt. may be compd. with that at 140 C. He uses the concep. of *μέτρον* or *μέτρα* solely as a lever to prove something else, not as a separate attrib. of the one, and brings it in quite incidentally as a thing of course. But if he possesses a 'measure' without assistance from the *εἶδη*, can he not determine equality and inequality without reference to them? And does he not perceive that in a well-regulated world of *εἶδη* an *εἶδος* of 'measure' would be much more useful than one of 'bigness,' 'smallness,' and 'equality'? Again, is not a measure simply a unit, a one? Is it a suspicion of this that causes Pl. to insert (140 D) *εἰ δέ γε ἐνὸς μέτρον εἶη ἴσον ἂν γίγναιτο τῷ μέτρῳ*—for he is measuring a one? When he speaks of one as the source of number (148 E-149 D), he is treating his one as itself a *μέτρον*: and when again he speaks of his one as divisible into parts he is

treating it as a *μετρητόν*, as a *ἐν συνεχείς*. The quest. naturally arises why in both cases Pl. mentions measures after he has referred to equality and inequality. An extended thing will contain measures whether we know that it is equal to any other thing or not. Phps. he does so because equality and inequality more than any other terms apply to extension—as Arist. says, *Met.* iv. 13, 1020 a 23, *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα λεγόμενα, τοῦ ποσοῦ πάθη καθ' αὐτά*. When Pl. extends his inference about measures and numbers etc. to the others, he of course turns his back upon the contention in 149 B-C that the latter had no one and no number.

Ε *εἶναι μὲν πον* The *πον* here has not the local sense which it had A, *καὶ εἶναι πον δεῖ*. It means 'I presume,' as in *οὐ γάρ πον* 152 B below. *τὸ δὲ εἶναι ... τὸ ἦν ... τὸ ἔσται*. Analog. would require infins. throughout. There is of course no infin. for *ἦν*: but he comes nearer to uniformity in 141 C, *καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσσεσθαι*.

152 *κοινωνία*: The Mss. on which Aldus, Stephanus etc. relied have *κοινωνίας*: but Steph. said 'substituendus nomin.,' and so *ἄλ.* *μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου*, t and others read *μετέχειν*, which apparently has led to a reading *μετέχειν μὲν ἄρα ἔστι χρόνου*. Heind. does not doubt 'quin post *ἄρα* textu exciderit *ἀνάγκη* quod expressit in vers. Fic.: "ergo si ipso esse participat, necesse est temporis quoque esse participes." Nisi quis scribere maluerit: *μετέχον μὲν ἄρα ἔσται*.' A good case of conjecture going wrong.

πορεῖται τοῦ χρόνου; Thoms. 'Strato tempus compositum esse dicebat ἐκ μερῶν μὴ μενόντων apud Dam. fol. 280.' *μεμνήμεθα* refers to 141 A-B.

B *αὐτὸς οὖν*; Had the pron. been ill-formed in the archet.? *Ἄ ἄν του*, and t *αὐτοῦ* *.

ἔστι δὲ ... τὸ νῦν: The *ἔστι δὲ* *προσβ.* gains force from preceding *ἄρα*. Ast cps. 147 A above, *τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄρα μόριά ἐστιν*; and cites other cases of the usage. *ἡ γιγνόμενον*, the part. is predicative = *ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι*, *ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ*; being a stage more indep. of *ἡ* than it is of *τύχη* in *ὅ τι ἂν τύχη γιγνόμενον* D below. It is only to onlookers that this is an isolated act on the part of the one; as he says below D, *το γέ μὴν νῦν αἰεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἐνὶ* etc. Carlyle is fond of calling the present time the meeting point

of two eternities, but this too is a judgment from without. The one if conscious knows of the future only that it is the next moment, and of the past that it is the sum of the moments up to the passing one.

ἐπίσχει τότε etc. 'Hoc significat Parm., praesentis temporis articulum a futuro esse sejunctum ac separatum, ita ut τὸ ἐν, dum in eo versetur, nondum temporis particeps sit futuri.' Stallb. The present moment is a punctum saliens: we must think of it in both its capacities. Unless we can seize it as a separate entity, being in the sensible world does not exist: *οὐκ ἂν ποτε ληφθείη*. That is the aspect of the question on which Heraclitus and his followers dwelt, in so much that Cratylus τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθέν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ 'Hρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δις τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι' αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἄπαξ. Arist. *Met.* III. 5, 1010 a 12. Of course as a fact the present is a good deal more than τὸ νῦν: our memory unconsciously extends it. Proc.-Dam. vi. 282 says μεταφέρει δὲ λεληθότως τὸ γίγνεται εἰς τὸ ἔστιν, ὃ ἔστι μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν καὶ ἔσται' τὸ γὰρ γιγνόμενον κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον 'ἔστι' λέγεται ... εἰ γὰρ πρόεισι κατὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι πάντως οὐ κρατηθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. It does not occur to Pl., either here or above 141, to discuss what time is: he merely treats of one as influenced by an accepted conception called time. We gather incidentally that time is to him a something which may be partaken of, which passes, and which has a present moment of brief duration called now. The one, again, while passing through time, becomes: but when at now, is. We shall hear of this later, 156. The passage seems to have struck some reader—perhaps Arethas—as 'seasonable' and suggestive, for he has marked it with the usual contr. for *ῥαῖον*.

προῖδν ... ληφθείη (= *κρατηθείη* in Dam.) i.e. *εἰ γὰρ προῖοι οὐκ ἂν* etc.: he does not use the indicative, though he must assume the condit. as denied.

πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμεν. may be either in the acc. as subj. to *παρελθεῖν* while understood in the nom. as subj. to *ἐπίσχει* and *ἡ*, or the exact converse. In favour of the former view is the point that *παρελθεῖν* would have to wait for its subj. and be left unprovided: in favour of the latter it may be urged that in its present position, following *ἀνάγκη* and *μή*, the phrase should rather have been *μηδὲν τῶν γιγνομένων*. The grammar would have been safer had he written *πᾶν*

δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον εἰ γε ἀνάγκη etc. Our pointing makes the phrase nom. to ἐπίσχει.

p. 26. D ἐπὶ τῇ τῷ νῦν, etc. So τ, and it is clearly necess.: Ἄ τὸ, νῦν. If the passage were dictated τῷ might be confused with τό, and νῦν taken momentarily as going with ἔπεσθεν. This last is a sudden appearance of the aorist, and may be used both in its momentary and in its iterative capacity. It is an odd instance of the difficulty we have in expressing τὸ ληφθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν: the present tense is too continuous, and whilst we are using the instantaneous aorist the present has become the past. The present moment is a present moment; but if we are to realize it and think of it as such, we do that in the next moment, and retain this one in the memory to be dwelt on as an atom of the past. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲρ ἐγίγνετο so τ, and it can hardly but be right: Notes 1. τό γε μὴν νῦν αἰεὶ etc. Thoms. 'Hinc illud Platonium "aeternitas manet in uno." Quod enim nec futuro nec praeterito tempori est obnoxium, sed semper in praesenti est, id demum est aeternum. Plotin. Ennead. 3, Lib. 7, cap. 2, ὁ οὖν μήτε ἦν μήτε ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἔστι μόνον, τοῦτο ἔστως ἔχον τὸ εἶναι, τῷ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ ἔσται μὴδ' αὖ μεταβεβληκέναι, ἔστιν ὁ αἰών. Hinc τὸ νῦν τὸ ἔχνος αἰώνιον dicitur. Dam. fol. 282.'

E πλείω δὲ ... ἢ τὸν ἴσον; Fic. 'Quin etiam longiusne vel brevius tempus est aut fit quam ipsummet; an potius aequum?' From this appearance of vel brevius and from the general use of 'more, less, and equal' in the work, Cornar., followed by Steph., suggested ἢ ἐλάττω after χρόνον; and Heind. would agree but finds no authority. The words occur neither in Ἄτ nor in any of Bekker's Mss.; and Proc. - Dam. vi. 283 says ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ πλείω χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαινόμενον, ἴσον ἄρα. Stallb. thinks Pl. gets all he needs by the words as they stand, and cps. 157 B, ἐκ σμικροῦ ... εἴη ἂν for needless meddling by Cor.

οὔτε νῦν. ... οὔτε γίγνεται: So both Mss. But scholars find a diffic. in the last οὔτε and give altern. changes. (1) If οὔτε is to stand we must have οὔτε ἔστιν to balance it, and Heind. cps. 155 C, κατὰ δὴ etc., while Stallb. quotes Rep. II. 382 E, οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὐθ' ὑπάρ οὐτ' ὄναρ. (2) If no οὔτε precedes ἔστιν we must read οὐδὲ γίγνεται,

for while τε has a coupling power and is repeated, δὲ has a disjunctive power and may stand alone. Heind. cps. 155 B where the connec. is οὔτε τὸ ἐν ... οὔτε τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ... γίγνεται' ἂν πρὸς βύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον. And cp. further 150 D, where we have on the one hand οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὔτε, and μήτε ... μήτε twice repeated, and on the other a single οὐδὲ twice repeated, τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων, μείζον οὐδὲ ἐλαττον. Certainly as a rule οὔτε requires οὔτε, and it is οὐδὲ which can be used singly. But does this rule hold αἰεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (Arist.) or only ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ;—If the latter it may have exceptions κατὰ συμβεβηκός: and while we often have οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ for οὔτε ... οὔτε, we may perhaps have a single οὔτε in the sense of a single οὐδέ. We have it in poetry, see L. and S. οὔτε II. 5 b. If the text is to be changed it seems all one as to sense which change is adopted: 'neither is nor becomes' will suit as well as 'is neither younger etc. nor yet becomes so.' Edd. read οὐδέ.

τί θαῖ, τῶν ἄλλων: 'quo autem modo ad alia se habet?' Fic. A loose rendering: Ast's is better, 'Quid vero? num ceteris? (i.e. junius aut senius est vel fit).' Gen. gov'd. by compar. underst.

οὐκ ἔτερον ... ἂν ἔχοι: 'Nusquam Parm. τὸ ἄλλο aut τὸ ἔτερον in hac disput. sua memoravit, sed constanter numero plurali usus est. Cujus rei causa posita est in eo quod ideae natura sua unitatem habent, res adspectabiles autem per se omni carent unitate, quam per idearum demum vim accipiunt.' Stallb. as usual. It may be that Parm. does not say τὸ ἄλλο or τὸ ἔτερον, but we have seen that he says ἄλλο and ἔτερον while meaning apparently the same thing. As for ὃν agreeing with ἔτερον, not with τὰ ἄλλα, Heind. contrasts 145 E where τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα is said of τὸ ἐν. The concord recurs in πλῆθος δὲ ὃν. Note the change of form in the cond. sents. ἔτερον μὲν γὰρ ὃν [= εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔτερον ἦν τὰ ἄλλα] ἐν ἂν ἦν and ἔτερα δὲ ὄντα [= εἰ ἔτερα ἔστι] πλείω ἐνός ἐστι, καὶ [εἰ πλείω ἐνός ἐστι] πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι. In (1) the suppos. is held as denied and the concl. as one to be rejected: in (2) the suppos. is held as true and a very obvious concl. is directly drawn: in (3) from that concl. as a suppos. a new concl., to which exception has formerly been taken, is drawn but not dogmatically. This last again is followed by another in the same form.

πλήθος δὲ ... τοῦ ἐνός: This one is not, of course, the one of the dial. but the one of number. Yet he might equally have said ἡ τὸ ἐν, where the one of the dial. would have been meant. Proc.-Dam. (vi. 284) is less distinct, πλήθος δὲ ὃν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος τοῦ ἐνός μετέχον ἄν.

ὀλίγιστον Notes 1. Ἄ has a scratch over -ον which recalls the ὀλίγοστων of 149 A; but there seems to be no eras. in the second α. Proc.-Dam. has τὸ ὀλιγοστωνδέ. Thoms. says—'Dam. περὶ Ἀρχ., Ms. fol. 2, invehitur in Speusipp. quod unum omnium rerum duxerit esse minimum, cum Parm. nihil uno esse majus defenderit. Sic Parm. in versibus apud Simpl. et Platon. in Soph. Sed vocat h. l. Parm. unum minimum utpote primum, cujusque magnitudo non sit ex mole metienda. Ita Auct. Theol. Arithm. ἐκ μονάδος πᾶς ἀριθμός, ἡ δὲ μονὰς τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ ἐκάστων. Et ut evincat Parm. unum esse omnium primum, supponit hic alia numero constare, quod antea sustulerat,' i. e. 149 B-C. The passage quoted, Sophist. 244 E, does not say of τὸ ὃν nihil uno esse majus, but that as regards shape it is σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, and οὔτε τι μείζον οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ.

B πρῶτον δὲ γε ... γεγονὸς refers back to πρῶτον γέγονε as if nothing had intervened to interrupt. τὰ δ' ὕστερον so Ἄ with ΠΔ, but t (whence the other Mss.) has ὕστερα which also occurs in Proc.-Dam. with τοῦ προτέρου γεγονότος.

τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν Proc.-Dam. vi. 285 says of this proof προσχρᾶται δὲ τῷ λήμματι τῷδε ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν τὸ ἐν οὐ γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἵνα εἰς οἰκείον τέλος κατατήσῃ τὸ ἐν ... διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τέλος οἰκείον λαμβάνει τὸ πῦρ ἅμα κινούμενον τὴν αὐτοῦ (?) κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν· εἰδοποιηθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἴσταται καὶ κινεῖται πρὸς τὰ ἄνω, καθὼς Ἀριστοτέλης φιλοσοφεῖ. προσχρᾶται δὲ πρὸς τῷ λήμματι τούτῳ ... καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτι μέρη ἔχει, καθὼς καὶ πρότερον ἀπεδείκνυε—144 B etc. As to the natural order of the one Dam. § 86, 201 says πᾶν γὰρ ἐν πρὸ τοῦ οἰκείου πλήθους (whether μέρη, στοιχεῖα, or εἶδη) ἐστὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ... χαλᾶται τὸ ἐν εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν πολλῶν ... χῶραν καὶ τούτοις παρεχόμενον εἰς ὑπόστασιν etc.

C πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχῇ Heind. would like ἡ here, but the statement is in general terms, and it may simply resume the word ἀρχὴν immediately before. Do π. πρ. mean as we say 'first of all' or 'in the

case of all things first'? Probably the latter. So Proc.-Dam.—he also has ἡ—οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πρότερον ἢ ἀρχῇ.

καὶ τὰλλα πάντα Heind. would omit καί; but the Mss. give it, though Stallb. notes that Fic. does not.

καὶ μὴν ... ἐνός The order here is καὶ μὴν φήσομεν ταῦτα πάντα τὰλλα εἶναι μόριά γε τοῦ ... ἐνός. He repeats the τὰλλα πάντα of the previous sent. = these aforesaid, 'all the rest.' Stallb. seems almost annoyed at the presence of τὰλλα—'quid enim? estne ipsum quoque initium pars τοῦ ἐνός atque totius? Cur igitur Parm. de iis solis loquitur quae principium excipiunt?' He is right about the ἀρχῇ. The lang. is a little careless. But is not Stallb. thinking that he would rather not see 'importunum istud τὰλλα' standing for anything but sensible objects?

αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν Heind. would make τὸ ἐν a gloss p. 27. D wrongly included. It is the only use thus far of αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, and its natural sense is not τὸ αὐτὸ-ἐν but 'the one itself' as distinct from the parts whose genesis he describes. ἅμα τελευτῇ ἄν ... ἄν probably the repeated ἄν is to enforce the nat. order of growth for the one—it follows the two important words. His argt. has been—Every whole must come into being in its natural order; i.e. cannot have come till all of it has come; i.e. must come last in order. He applies this in condensed form ὥστε ... γίγνεσθαι: 'Thus, assuming that the one itself (the whole one) must come into being in its natural order alone (εἴπερ ... γίγνεσθαι), [it would arrive simultaneously with the end, and] if it has come into being simultaneously with the end, it would be its nature to come into being last of all.' The Greek would be εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἄν γεγονὸς εἴη, ὥστε, εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἅμα τελευτῇ γεγονέναι, πεφικὸς ἄν εἴη γίγνεσθαι ὕστατον τῶν ἄλλων. This should be ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων or ὕστατον πάντων: but Pl. wishes ὕστατον to make sure of its being last, and he wishes τῶν ἄλλων to say νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων.

νεώτ. ... πρεσβύτερα: Proc.-Dam. vi. 285-6 says ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐτίθη ὅτι οὐ παρὰ φύσιν [εἶναι], ἀλλ' ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ (ὡς κατὰ φύσιν κινούμενον) γέγονε, ὕστερον ἄν τῶν ἄλλων μορίων—ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἄλλα, πρὸς ᾧ συγκρίνεται τὸ ἐν—ἔσται. πρεσβύτερα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα· καὶ οὕτως εὐρέθη ἀνάπαλιν τὰ ἄλλα

τοῦ ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα. He sees the double dealing with τὰ ἄλλα.

ἀρχὴν ... μέρος γε ὄν; ἀρχὴν put first rhetorically. The order is οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον—ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὅ τι οὖν ... ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν;

F. οὐκ οὖν ... ἐν τῇ γένεσι: Note the growing confidence in the change from γίγνεται ἄν to ἀπολείπεται. Or are we to make a break in the sense, as though the words were καὶ οὕτως οὐδενὸς ἀπολ. ? The ind. in Proc.-Dam. vi. 286 takes preced. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἐν καὶ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ μέρει ἐν διατηρηθήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολειφθήσεται τινὸς τῶν μερῶν ἕως οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἐσχατον, τὰ πάντα διελθόν, γένηται. For the sense of ἀπολ. see L. and S. c. 11. The following words mean 'the others as they come into being, whichever it be that in each case succeeds which.' The sent. is redund. for emphasis: it might end with γένηται. So also ὅτι οὖν might be omitted, since, of course, if the one chosen be the sixth it must follow the fifth, if the ninth the eighth, and so on. ἐν γένηται t: A and its family ἐγγένηται, with which contrast 138 D, Notes 1. Here we have a glaring double use of ἐν, first as any part, then as ὅλον ἐν. The end of Proc.-Dam.'s note just cited shows that he sees this change. ἐπεὶ γοῦν διερχόμενον τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἅπερ ἐστὶ μέρη ἐκείνου καὶ ἐν ἐκάστῳ τούτων γιγνόμενον ἐξισάζει.

154. περὶ τοῦ γίγ. ... γίγνεσθαι: The words between the two infins. inclus. form a noun gov'd. in the gen. by περὶ: αὐτὸ and τὰ ἄλλα are subjs. to the infins.; τοῦ ἐνός might in the circs. have been αὐτοῦ. In ἄρα ... ἔχει the sent. divides at οὕτω, an ἔχει being underst. F. after εἶναι. εἰ καὶ ... ἑτέροι, is quite clear, only we must understand a second ἐστὶν after πρεσβ. which Π. supplies at the wrong place—εἰ καὶ ἐστὶν καὶ ἐστὶν ὅτι. t places the ὅτι before εἰ and so the edd., Notes 1. It is to be said for A that its reading is the less likely to have been invented, and that the ὅτι from its position in the line—marking a new paragr.—could hardly have been the subject of a blunder. ἕτερον ἑτέρον make the statement general, as ἅπαν ἅπασιν 148 A. γίγνεσθαι γε A has τε, t seems to have γε. Notes 1. Herm. defends τε, 'at respondent inter se πρεσβύτερον et νεώτερον, quanquam gradatio structuræ ad posterius οὐδ' αὖ addidit.' This would seem to mean that οὐδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον stands for τό τε νεώτερον. It is difficult to

accept this; and γε gives emphas. to γίγνεσθαι which suits the passage. It has an exact antith. in οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὄν below.

πρεσβ. ἐτι ... ἐτι δύνατο, πρεσβ. ἐτι means 'still older,' as ἐτι νεώτ. means still younger, and is explained by ἢ ... τῇ ἡλικίᾳ; the second ἐτι goes with οὐκ and means it would no longer be able—could not go the further length of becoming still older. The clause ἢ ... τῇ ἡλικίᾳ makes the constr. awkward, = ἢ τὸ πρῶτον, ἢ πρίν, ἢ κατ' ἀρχάς.

χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ The close connec. here almost gives a plural sense such as may agree with ἀνίστοις; yet we need two times, and two of everything in the circs., which makes it more likely that the dat. is used in the sense of ἐν or ἐπὶ χρόνῳ = in the case of time and of everything else. For διαφέρειν why not διενεγκεῖν, with διήνεγκε διενέγκη? οὐκ ἄρα ... τοῦ ἐνός ... νεώτερον, edd. after Schleierm. reject ἐνός here: but the Mss. are clear. On the other hand the preceding ὄν is upon a scratch in A, and suggests an orig. ἐν. The sense is οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὄν πρεσβύτερον τοῦ ὄντος νεωτέρου καὶ γίγνεται ἄν πρεσβύτερον ἐτι, οὐδὲ νεώτερον. For οὐδὲ here cp. on c. οὔτε γίγνεται 152 E; and here t gives οὔτε. τὴν ἡλικίαν does just the same duty as τῇ ἡλικίᾳ above.

πρεσβ. τότε, νεώτ. δ' αὖ: A πρεσβ. τότε, νεώτ. δ' οὐ: t γεγνε πρεσβ. τὸ δὲ νεώτερον γίγνεται δ' οὐ: And so the edd., supplying mentally τὸ μὲν before πρεσβ., as is not rarely done. This is quite satisf., and is very likely the true reading. The text is an attempt to adjust A so as to yield a satisf. meaning. After pointing out the scope of the argt., Proc.-Dam. vi. 287-8 says ἐστι δὲ ἡ ἐφοδος ἡδε—τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον τότε τοῦδε ὄν, καὶ ἐτι πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι (παρὸ ὡς πρότερον γέγονε πρεσβύτερον) χώραν ἔχει [it is possible for what is older to become relatively older still!], καὶ γίγνεται ἐτι πρεσβύτερον καὶ πρεσβύτερον τὸ δὲ νεώτερον οὐ χωρεῖ καὶ ἐτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ὥστε τὸ εἶναι μὲν καὶ γεγόνεναι τι νεώτερον ἄλλου τινὸς ἐστι λέγει [λέγειν?], αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὄν νεώτερον νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐαιτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου [οὐ] χωρεῖ [yet this is but the correlative of the previous statement!]. This can hardly mean that he had the reading of A in 154 C, νεώτερον δ' οὐ; for he soon adds εἶναι μὲν καὶ γεγόνεναι πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον δοτέον ὥς κατὰ τὴν προτέραν διαφορὰν καθ' ἣν εὐθὺς διήνεγκε, γίγνεται δ' οὐ [the reading of t]—

οὔτε νεώτερον (οὐ γὰρ ἐπισθοδρομεῖ), οὔτε πρεσβύτερον (ἅπασι γὰρ τὴν πρώτην πρόσθεσιν ἴσως τοῦ χρόνου ἔλαβε καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, ἔπειτα δὲ ἴσῳ διαφέρων ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν προτέραν πρόσθεσιν πρεσβύτερον οὐ γενήσεται καὶ ἔτι). The text of D., as given in Stallb., is not always quite clear. δν ... ὄντων here as above we must understand τὸ ἐν ὃν πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων νεωτέρων ἢ πρεσβυτέρων.

ὅρα δὲ ... γίγνεται: After the long proof upon one side, we might expect ὅρα δὲ with the opening of the opposite argt. Heind. wishes the adjs. in the sing., but Stallb. seems right in assuming that the suppressed subj. is αὐτά, i.e. τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰλλα.

p. 28. D πλέονι ... τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ The πλέονι refers to the elder, the ἐλάτ. to the younger; and we add equal times. He now asks if they differ by the same portion as before: and here we see that his use of the word ἡλικία, above B, was a little unhappy. If he wished to prove that the diff. between an older and a younger never changed, he should have said διήνεγκε τῷ χρόνῳ, ἴσῳ διαφέρει αὐτὸν χρόνον: and no doubt that is what he meant. Here it is at once conceded that the two do not continue to differ τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ [τῆς ἡλικίας] while it is certain that they do continue to differ τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ τοῦ χρόνου. A boy is one year old when his brother is two; he is younger in time by a year, and in age by $\frac{1}{2}$. He is 79 when his brother is 80; he is younger in time by a year, and in age by $\frac{1}{80}$.

οὐκ ἄρα ... τὸ ἔπειτα, = ὅ τί περ τὸ ἐν ἦν διαφέρων ἡλικία πρὸς τὰλλα τὸ πρῶτον, οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο ἔσται διαφέρον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα. ὅ τί περ ἂν τούτο might be replaced by ὅσον περ and τοσούτον. τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρων = ὅ γε ἐστὶν ἔλαττον διαφέρων, ὃ γ' ἐλαττον διαφέρει. πρὸς τι becomes at once, in applic. to the case, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, πρὸς α. In τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ... ὡσαύτως all the change of age is, of course, relative; and πρὸς ἀλλήλω must be understood although not used thus far.

155 ἰόντε γὰρ ... γίγνεσθον etc. Ἄ ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοι. γίγνεσθον. τὸ μὲν νεώτερον, πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου· τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον. νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου. Our text makes this clearer by reading αὐτῶ and connecting γίγνεσθον with what follows. But t repeats τὸ ἐναντίον. This admits of αὐτοῖν, in a sense equivalent to ἀλλήλοι; connects γίγνεσθον with the latter word; and makes

τὸ μὲν νεώτερον etc. an explanatory adjunct:—thus ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοι γίγνεσθον—τὸ μὲν νεώτερον etc. All edd. adopt this; and it would be easy to omit one of two successive phrases such as τὸ ἐναντίον in copying.

γενίσθαι ... εἰεν ἄν. etc. The dual is not kept up. He gives an odd reason for their not being able actually to transpose their positions, while always getting apparently more nearly within reach of doing so. They fail, not, it would seem, because there is a limit which, while admitting of infinite proportional reduction, cannot be surmounted, in the shape of the original difference of time at birth, but because we are speaking of them as becoming at present and not as become! No doubt if they became differently placed they would be so: 'he that will to Cupar maun to Cupar': but that is hardly an argt.

γίγνεται μὲν πρεσβ. The μὲν has no answering δέ, with which Heind. cps. Theact. 197 C, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ ... παραγεγονέναι, and there cites other cases—Theact. 201 B, οὐδαμῶς ... ἀλλὰ πείσαι μὲν: Phileb. 37 B, ἄρ' ὅτι δόξῃ μὲν ... etc. ὅτι πρεσβ. ... ὅτι ὑστερα, a neat paradox. You can only 'reduce' a lead' by having a lead to reduce. The constr. is interrupted to emphasize the parad. and to avoid hopeless involution of relations: the omission of γίγνεται would make it more of a piece.

τὰλλα οὕτω πρὸς For οὕτω t gives τούτῳ, which gives a good meaning if = κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τούτῳ λόγον καὶ τὰλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἴσχει.

οὐκ οὖν ἢ μὲν ... τῶν ἄλλων: This sent. is balanced as a whole, though with variation in detail, thus:—

οὐκ οὖν $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{ἢ μὲν} \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{οὔτε (neg.)} \\ \text{οὔτε} \end{array} \right. \\ \text{ἢ δὲ} \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{τε (pos.)} \\ \text{καὶ} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$

The irreg. arises from the diff. of form in the words following ἢ μὲν and ἢ δὲ respectively. Had the second corresponded it would have run thus—ἢ δὲ πᾶν παντὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται καὶ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἄλλῳ μορίῳ ἀλλήλων αὐτὸ διαφέρειν, πρεσβύτερα τε ... γίγνεται τὰ τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων. κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ etc., i.e. the numerical diff. between them is constant; but it is an ever lessening frac. of the ages under discussion. Proc.-Dam. is surely wrong (ut sup. 290) καθὼ μὲν γὰρ φησι

κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὡς ἴσα ἔχοντα μέρη ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἴσα ὄντα etc.
D καὶ τοῦ προσβ. ... γίνεσθαι. He has just inferred this in χρόνου μετέχει—it ranks with the succeeding infs. For the repet. εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; Stallb. cps. 138 A, ἐν αὐτῷ ὄν ... εἴπερ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶν.

p. 29. καὶ εἴη ἄν ... τὸ ἐν ἔστιν: Here are general statements followed by partic. illustrs.; but in the reversed order of χιασμός. ἐκείνῳ is exemplified in ὄνομα and λόγος, and ἐκείνου in ἐπιστήμη δόξα αἴσθησις. Proc.-Dam. says (291) εἶη μὲν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἔσται ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἐκείνου τι ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ προσόντα [so O. Apelt for ἐκείνου πεισόντος and other variants] ὡς ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντι. ἐκείνου δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη etc., περὶ ἐκείνου γὰρ ταῦτα ὡς ἐπιστητοῦ etc.—πλὴν οὐχ ἅμα τὰ τρία ταῦτα. Nothing he says would preclude the idea that ὄνομα and λόγος are ἐκείνῳ. It is true that the preds. ἦν ἔστι ἔσται are also ἐκείνῳ; but is that sense conveyed here? Dam. seems to hold that the constr. makes καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται explanatory of εἶη ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ. Perhaps his reason is the diffic. noted by Heind. that (if we construe = καὶ εἶη ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου) we really repeat εἶη ἄν in ἔστι. But Heind.'s explan. seems sound, 'verba εἶη ἄν in universum τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι, illa ἦν ἔστι ἔσται temporis rationem designant,' i.e. if the one (or the others) be in time there would be something for it and of it, and that something was and is and will be of it and for it according as the one itself was or is or will be; or as Fic. 'Esset quoque illi aliquid et illius,—eratque et est et erit.' Any diffic. in the way of this interp. arising out of the use of εἶη ἄν and ἔστι is much less than would arise if we take Dam.'s view. Pl. expressly says that ἐπιστήμη etc. are αὐτοῦ (= ἐκείνου), and that ὄνομα and λόγος are αὐτῷ (= ἐκείνῳ): the passage is thus balanced as we said by χιασμός. Now if ἦν ἔστι ἔσται are to be taken as Dam. takes them, not only is the balance disturbed, but there is nothing save infer. to decide whether they are examples of αὐτοῦ or αὐτῷ.

εἴπερ ... πράττομεν: i.e. εἴπερ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ δοξάζομεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα says Heind. rightly. This is rather a bizarre argumentum ad hominem: Parm.'s argts. against the existence of the one would fall equally well under the categ. πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν. But does not this frank admiss. that the one is

a subj. of δόξα and αἴσθησις no less than of ἐπιστήμη tend to support the view that the one is not an idea? ὅσαπερ τῶν τοιούτων go together 'et quotecunque ejusmodi in aliis reperiuntur' etc. Thoms. It does not seem as if τὰλλα were used in a technical sense here: rather it means that the one is named, discussed etc. just like any other thing.

142 B-155 E. Here closes what Grote calls Dem. II. He points out that while I., starting from a neg. propos., proceeds (like the second figure in the syllog.) to prove double negs.—Unum is *neither ... nor*—in II. the concls. are all *both ... and*. Of two contrads. first both are false, next both are true. 'This offends doubly against the logical canon, which declares that of two contradictory propositions one must be true, the other must be false. We must remember that in the Platonic age there existed no systematic logic ...'—Prantl (in his *Geschichte der Logik*, vol. i. 3, 3, pp. 70-73) maintains, if I rightly understand him, not only that Pl. did not adopt the *principium identitatis* ... but that one of Pl.'s express objects was to demonstrate the contrary of it, partly in the *Phileb.* but especially in the *Parm.* ... I understand these Antinomies as *ἀπορίαι* to be cleared up, but in no other character. Prantl speaks (p. 73) of "die antinomische Begründung der Ideenlehre im *Parm.*" etc. This is the same language as that used by Zeller ... *Introd.* lx-lxiii. The ancients are clear for the priority of one to being. After arguing the point with special reference to ἀπλότης, Dam. says, § 21, 37, πανταχῶς ἄρα τὸ ἐν πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος: this is the ἀπλῶς ἀμέθεκτον ἐνιαῖον ἐν. Proc. speaks in the same sense. Compared with this ἐν the ἐν-ὄν of Dem. II., or ἐν ἡνωμένον, is markedly less abstract in their eyes. While to later students the materials for this distinc. may appear in Pl.'s text, it is not drawn by him, and we may doubt if, as thus formulated, it was even present to his thought. In Hegel the distinc. is transposed. There Being comes first, and 'process' has advanced appreciably before One is reached: and if the latter be as abstract as ἐν the former must be more abstr. not only than ὄν but than ἐν itself—Dam. sometimes in a sort of despair admits that the ἀρχή is too elementary to be grasped or defined. We may note that H., constructing ab intra, says No thought no being: these ancients, surveying ab extra, hold

that process has 'crept gently crusting' past both $\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon$ and $\delta\upsilon\upsilon$ ere $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ emerges. Is their $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ his Self-consciousness? Lastly of this $\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon\delta\upsilon\upsilon$ —When Arist. (Met. IX. 2-end) says $\delta\tau\iota\ \delta\epsilon\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \sigma\eta\mu\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\ \pi\omega\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\upsilon\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon$, $\delta\eta\lambda\omicron\nu\ (1)\ \tau\omicron\ \tau\epsilon\ \pi\alpha\rho\alpha\kappa\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \iota\sigma\alpha\chi\omega\varsigma\ \tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \mu\eta\delta\epsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\tau\iota$, ... (2) $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \pi\rho\omicron\sigma\kappa\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\ \tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \alpha\upsilon\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$, $\omega\varsigma\pi\epsilon\rho\ \omicron\upsilon\delta\epsilon\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota\ \pi\alpha\rho\alpha\ \tau\omicron\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \eta\ \pi\omicron\iota\delta\upsilon\nu\ \eta\ \pi\omicron\sigma\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\acute{\kappa}\alpha\sigma\tau\omega\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ —he seems to be speaking of both as a logician and $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \sigma\upsilon\mu\beta\epsilon\beta\eta\gamma\omicron\kappa\omicron\varsigma$, not as a metaphys. and $\kappa\alpha\theta'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$. Now of Pl.'s argt. It was said in the Introd. that Dem. II. v. Dem. I. = synthet.-construct. v. analyt.-destruct. This is true; and Pl., either consciously or half so, shows it by his efforts to make each step lean on the previous one. But the great constructive step is the first, that of adding $\delta\upsilon\upsilon$ to $\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon$. All else might almost be called an analysis of what that synthesis implies. And while much is extracted from it, the $\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon\delta\upsilon\upsilon$ even at the close remains a very abstract concep., in no way more advanced than atoms and the void. When Dam. talks (§ 88-89, 214-17)—not as a commentator—of a $\sigma\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha$ through $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$, $\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$, $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta$, $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$ towards $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\nu$ he is far beyond this dial. As Pl. goes step by step, and secures progress by $\delta\iota\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, it may be assumed that his first distinc. is as primary as he can make it. We shall not seek to determine what is the most elementary difference from one—not one, many, others, or what not. Dam. (§ 104, 270) speaks in this connec. of $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\upsilon\upsilon\ \mu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\iota\delta\iota\eta\rho\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu\ \pi\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon$, $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \tau\eta\nu\ \pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\eta\nu\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\tau\alpha\ \phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\nu$. $\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\iota\kappa\epsilon\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \eta\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\eta$, $\chi\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\sigma\alpha\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\upsilon\upsilon\ \alpha\pi\delta\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, $\acute{\omicron}\phi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\upsilon\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\omega\varsigma\ \pi\rho\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ — $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\ \tau\alpha\varsigma\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\alpha\delta\alpha\varsigma$, $\mu\epsilon\theta'\ \acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \epsilon\phi\epsilon\acute{\xi}\eta\varsigma\ \tau\alpha\varsigma\ \mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\chi\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\varsigma\ \upsilon\pi\delta\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \zeta\acute{\omega}\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon$. $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'\ \delta\ \Pi\lambda.$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\iota\tau\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \delta\upsilon\omicron\ \sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\chi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\epsilon\theta\eta\kappa\epsilon\nu\ \tau\omega\nu\ \mu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\kappa\tau\omega\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\alpha\delta\omega\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omega\nu\ \mu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\omega\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$ etc. at greater length than we can quote. This is an early form of Grote's objec. to Pl.'s course at 143 A, and seems to mean that if Pl. took that course he should have gone from $\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon$ (without $\delta\upsilon\upsilon$) to $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\iota\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\alpha\delta\epsilon\varsigma$ then to $\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\chi\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$, in place of running $\delta\upsilon\omicron\ \sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\chi\omicron\iota$ downwards $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$. Pl.'s course indeed seems almost to refute the importance of the addition of $\delta\upsilon\upsilon$, and to make us ask, Does he really add a vital new predicate to $\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon$ which

advances it to greater concreteness, or does he merely mean in a loose way that he will not push the one so hard as in Dem. I.? Dam. can justly say (§ 91, 226) $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\upsilon\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\upsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \epsilon\acute{\xi}\epsilon\iota\ \pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega$, $\omicron\upsilon\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\pi'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\alpha\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\rho\omicron\eta\lambda\theta\epsilon$ —elsewhere he gives (§ 33, 63) the dialectical reason, which Pl. does not, $\omega\varsigma\ \kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \dots\ \omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \tau\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \dots\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\alpha\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\eta}\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\sigma}\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$. He makes a further direct comment (§ 98, 253), $\delta\ \Pi\lambda.$ $\tau\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu\ \pi\alpha\rho\alpha\delta\acute{\epsilon}\delta\omega\kappa\epsilon\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \Pi\alpha\rho\mu.$ — $\tau\eta\nu\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\eta\nu\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\delta\upsilon\upsilon$, $\tau\eta\nu\ \delta\epsilon\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\eta\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta$, $\tau\eta\nu\ \delta\epsilon\ \tau\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\eta\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\ \pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma$: with which cp. 142 B-143 A. Dam. (§ 122, 314) says again $\delta\ \Pi\lambda.$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ [\tau\omicron\ \eta\gamma\omega\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu]$ $\delta\iota\alpha\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon\ \delta\mu\omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\upsilon\rho\iota\sigma\kappa\epsilon\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\kappa}\alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\ \tau\omicron\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\phi\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\ \gamma\iota\gamma\acute{\nu}\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$, $\tau\omicron\ \delta\epsilon\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\kappa}\ \mu\epsilon\rho\omega\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\pi\omicron\acute{\omicron}\epsilon\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$. But when he goes on to say of $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ — $\acute{\alpha}\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota\ \pi.$ $\pi\rho\delta\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, $\acute{\omicron}\theta\epsilon\nu\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\ \pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ (cp. 143 A), $\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\omicron\nu\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\rho\delta\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \acute{\omicron}\rho\omicron\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\eta\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon$, $\omicron\upsilon\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \acute{\omicron}\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta.$ $\epsilon\acute{\nu}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\ \dots\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\ \pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta.$ $\dots\ \epsilon\pi\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \tau\omega\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\omega\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu\ \upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ —we must qualify his words. It is true that Pl., 143 A, speaks of $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\ \pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ before he elaborates number; but this does not isolate the one from the other. On the contrary the culmin. of the deduc. of number is stated thus (144 A) $\eta\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \pi\lambda\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\iota\ \dots\ \gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\acute{\nu}\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$;

$\epsilon\tau\iota\ \dots\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta$: As he does not qualify $\acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\nu\ \delta\iota\epsilon\lambda\eta\lambda$. we must hold that he refers to the whole course of the argt. up to the present stage. Of this he assumes that every aspect has been established and is to be accepted: he does not regard Dem. II. as abrogating I.

$\acute{\alpha}\rho'\ \omicron\upsilon\nu\ \dots\ \acute{\omicron}\rho\theta\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$: From the answering $\omicron\upsilon\chi\ \acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\nu\ \tau\epsilon$ it seems that $\acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\nu\ \tau'$ does not agree with $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}$, but means 'will it be possible' not 'will it be able.' He here suggests an explan. of the contrad. involved in his conclusions regarding the one. Grote has urged that they imply disregard or ignorance of the law of contrad. Now, men reasoned before they wrote logical treatises; and, although the dialectic of Zeno was a great advance, yet in practice they were always guided by innate feeling for logic, so that this law would be accepted in fact before it was formulated by Arist. And his formula is, Met. III. 3, 1005 b 19, $\tau\omicron\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\ \iota\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$

τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό. We thus see that καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό is all that Arist. adds to the argt. which Pl. here employs. Pl. knew in principle the law of contrad., and is here applying it, although when in 'his altitudes' he does not always regard it. Cp. *Intro.* lx. etc. There is a diff. between science in process of becoming, and science when checked by tests in its results. As Arist. says, *Met.* iii. 5, 1009 a 35, οὐνάμει μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία, ἐντελεχεία δ' οὐ. But there is a flaw in the reasoning of a different kind. He has said that the one is one and many, and neither one nor many. Now, although this may exclude the possibility of existence for the one, he does not actually say that the one is and is not, unless we interpret the words ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν ... ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν in that sense, in spite of their manifest reference to what has just preceded. Yet with this limitation of his language he, as *Proc.-Dam.* (293) points out, goes on to infer non-existence absolutely from non-existence as one, though the latter may merely mean existence as many: πλὴν ὅρα τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ 'μήτε ἐν' ὁῦλον ὅτι τοῦ 'οὐχ ἐν ἔστι,' τὸ 'οὐκ ἔστιν' ἀπλῶς λαμβάνει [-νειν *Ms.*], καὶ μὴ μετέχειν αὐτὸ οὐσίας κατὰ τοῦτο φησίν.

οὗτος χρόνος *Stallb.* explains the want of the art. by saying that οὗτος is loco subjecti while χρόνος is instar praedicati. This would justify the omiss.; but is οὗτος thus subject? The sense is 'is there not then also this point of time, viz.' etc.—which in better Eng. becomes, as in *Jowett*, 'is there not also a time?' Fic., 'numquid est id tempus?' *Jelf* says of the art., § 453, 1, 'In prose it is sometimes omitted when the substantive is ... a collective noun used as a proper name; as *Thuc.* ii. 74, ἐπὶ γῆν τήνδε.' This comes nearer what we need. For the lang. cp. *Arist. Phys.* vi., 10, 241 a 17, οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἔσται χρόνος ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται διὰ τὸ πᾶν ἐν χρόνῳ κινεῖσθαι.

ἐν δὲ καὶ ... πάνυγε: Just above ἐν is the subj. of both γίγνεται and ἀπόλλυται: here it is the subj. of γίγν., but is it of ἀπόλλ.? Fic., 'desinit esse multa' and 'desinit esse unum,' which might seem to favour the view that it is the subj. What then are we to make of the τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι of *Alc.*? Fic., one would think, must have read τὰ, the constr.

being ἀπόλλ. εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ, if even that be a possible one. But on the suppos. that ἐν is the subj. we would need to treat τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι as a phrase in the accus. of descrip., 'dies so far as being many is concerned.' The altern. is to make that subj. to ἀπόλλ.—as *Jowett* and *Müller* do—the only objec. to which is the sudden change in that respect. *Stallb.* seems to take this view, 'posteaquam Unum ipsum et oriri et interire docuit, etiam singula ejus attributa eandem subire vicissitudinem ostendere instituit.'

ἐν δὲ ... ἰσοῦσθαι; Two examples of χιασμός occur here in the arrangement of the infins. *Proc.-Dam.* 293-4, διακρίνεσθαι δ' αὖθις ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἐνὸς πολλὰ γίγνεσθαι κατασκευάζει and καὶ ἐκ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ὁμοιον, ὡς ἔλεγε κατὰ τὰς προτέρας ὑποθέσεις (πλὴν ἀορίστως, καὶ οὐ λέγει 'ἐαυτῷ' ἢ 'τοῖς ἄλλοις,' ὡς ἐκεῖ ἔλεγε· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ δοκιμάζει καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ, ὅπερ μετὰ ταῦτα ποιήσει), ὁμοιοῦσθαι· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἀνόμοιον, ἀνομοιοῦσθαι· ὅρα γάρ, πῶς προσβιβάζει συνάπτων τὸ γίγνεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις, καὶ ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι ὅπερ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἐθήρασεν. ἔλεγε γὰρ ἐν τῷ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν γίγνεται, ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι γοῦν ἢ μείζον ἢ ἑλαττον ἢ ἴσον κατὰ τὰς προτέρας ὑποθέσεις αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι. He urges two points here: (1) that Pl. gets in all his predications in the wake of τὸ γίγνεσθαι, (2) that these are here used abstractly—the one becomes like, equal etc., but not to anything.

δὲ ἂν δὲ κινεῖται ... εἶναι; etc. As *Proc.-Dam.* has said, and says in his next note, Pl. has carefully developed everything thus far through γίγνεσθαι· he adds καὶ ταῦτα πάντα διὰ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἐν χρόνῳ—note the last words. Pl. now assumes motion abruptly, without reference to becoming, or to any other source. It is not even certain at the moment what sort of motion he means. The lang. suggests φέρεσθαι (138 B), but the associations would favour ἀλλοίωσις. Not till we reach εἰ is the ref. to motion in space established. μὴδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ is very emphatic. The expression τὸ νῦν, used in 152, is not adequate, and must be replaced by a better. πῶς δὲ: does not seem to mean 'how should it?' implying acquiescence—as πῶς γάρ: seems to do—but rather 'how can that be?' implying doubt, which the foll. sent. clears up. In ἐστὸς τε ... ταῦτα πάσχειν: the

last two words are (Stallb.) superfl. The constr. is, as it were, broken at *ἐστάναι*, which might be followed by a dash. Stallb. seems right in objecting to Heind.'s sugg. *ἀνευ μὴν*, and in saying that the *μὲν* is taken up by *χρόνος δὲ* which follows. Proc.-Dam. 295 says *οὐδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐστὼς κινεῖται καὶ κινούμενον ἵσταται καὶ οὐδέποτε μένει*, and again *ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐν τινι χρόνῳ οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐστάναι ἐστὶν οὔτε ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι*.

πότε οὖν μ. This opening use of *πότε* is not frequent, and rather arrests attention.

^D *οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὶς οὖν* etc. *Ἄ ἐστὶς οὖν*, which makes *ἐστὶς* an adj. such as *ἀκίνητον*. No one seems bold enough to take this view, yet we have a fair analogy in 157 B, *οὔτε αὐξανόμενον ... φθίνον ... ἰσοῦμενον εἴη ἂν*: and in e.g. *ταῦτ' ὅν πεπονθότα ἂν εἴη* 158 E; indeed in 159 A *καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἑστῶτα* are directly under the infl. of the preced. *ἂν εἴη*. It seems to give *ἂν* for *οὖν*, and the accepted course is to adopt this and read *μεταβάλλοι*. We hesitate to make a double change in *Ἄ* and so read *οὖν*, not with any great conviction, the position being strained and the word occurring four times rapidly. Possibly the orig. might be *οὔτε γὰρ οὖν ἐστὶς*?

ἀρ' οὖν ἐστι ... τὸ ἐξαίφνης. *ἔστι* seems to express existence here. *τοῦτο* may naturally be used for *τόδε* as some descrip. precedes, back to which *τοῦτο* partly refers. It is hard to disting. *τὸ ἐξαίφνης* from *τὸ νῦν*, save so far as the latter refers to the *τὸ ἐξαίφνης* of the present, while the former is a *νῦν* not necessarily contemporaneous with our sensations. Yet a distinc. is necessary, both because *τὸ ἐξ.* is assumed not to be in time, and because you construct time out of successive *τὰ νῦν*, which you cannot do if these have individually no time. 'Differt hoc *ἐξαίφνης* a *νῦν*, cujus ante aliquoties mentionem fecerat Parmen. *τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐ. ἀμερές ἐστι τῇ ιδιότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρονον, ἐκείνο δὲ χρόνου μέτρον ἦν καὶ διάστημα*, scribit Damasc., Ms. fol. 295.' Thoms. Proc.-Dam. 295 describes the instantaneous as *πάντως ἐν ἀκαρεῖ*, and *τὸ ἐν ἀνεπαίσθητῳ χρόνῳ*—but this last, which comes from Arist., gives up the point. Even when speaking of that which must have no time, Pl. is forced to say *ἐν ᾧ τὸτ' ἂν εἴη ὅτε*.

ὅς ἐξ ἐκείνου ... εἰς ἑκάτ. This is not easy to transl. The meaning would be got better from *ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ*

μετ. τὸ ἐν εἰς ἐκάτερον, or still better from *τοιόνδε τι εἰκοι σημαίνειν ἐξ οὗ μετ.*, or again *ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ ἐνός*: 'certum quiddam significat ex quo in utrumque transitur.' Fic. The meaning is that the one (or anything), whatever state it may be in, passes through *τὸ ἐξαίφνης* into the corresponding counter-state—'No pause the dire extremes between, He made me blest—and broke my heart.'

οὐ γὰρ ... κινδύνου: This brings out the full agony of the crisis. The one is stock-still until instantaneously motion is in full swing. Proc.-Dam. points the paradox by showing that, in order to effect this sudden transfor., motion and rest must themselves not be in time (295), *ἐν μηδενὶ γὰρ χρόνῳ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα ἐκ τούτου εἰς τὸ ἵστασθαι μεταβάλλοι, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἵστασθαι ἵνα ἐκ τούτου εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλοι*, and again on the other types of trans. (296), *οὐ γὰρ ἐν τινι χρόνῳ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ εἶναι οὔτε μὴν ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε κατὰ τὸ ἐξαίφνης καὶ τοῦτων γιγνομένων οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται*. Pl. begins by assuming that *τὸ γίγνεσθαι* in all its forms is in time; he is now eager to effect the change from motion to rest with absolutely perfect abruptness, and says that the point at which the one is in *neither* state cannot be in time. Thus rest endures in full force until the one is already in the instantaneous, while motion has acquired perfect action before it comes out: in other words, motion and rest, which we might infer were in time, are now shown to be in the instantaneous and therefore out of time, i.e. non-existent. And with the disappearance of time disappear all the characteristics just assigned to the one *διὰ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἐν χρόνῳ*.

οὐδ' ... οὐδὲ ... οὐδ' The sense of *οὔτε ... οὔτε* is not quite given here in the last two cases; the first of course coalesces with *ἐνί*. The sense of the whole would, if accurately stated, stand thus: *εἰ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐξαίφνης ἂν μεταβάλλοι καὶ οὕτως ἐν οὐδ' ἐνὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη· εἰ δ' ἐν οὐδ' ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἴη οὐδὲ κινεῖτ' ἂν τότε οὐδ' ἂν σταίη*, 'and if it were in no portion of time, neither would it move then, nor yet stand.' We have learned, 152 A, that a thing *μετέχει μὲν χρόνου εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι*.

πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μ. ἔχῃ, He introduced motion and rest abruptly without any statement that they resembled the characteristics already assigned to the

one; here he assumes that they do, and are but one type of μεταβολή. He seems to think that he can reach τὸ ἐξαίφνης more readily through them.

¹⁵⁷ οὔτε ἔστι ... οὔτε, οὔτε ... οὔτε etc. These seem to constitute two pairs, and may without violence be rendered strictly; 'and neither is then nor is not, neither becomes nor perishes.' The same arrang. is continued. Contrast ἐφ' ἐν with ἐπὶ ἀνομ., ἐπὶ δμ., ¹⁵⁸ ἐπὶ ἴσον, and the repeated cases of οὔτε unelided. εἰς τὰ ἐναντία. He does not say ἐπὶ τά, the phrase being used apparently much like τούναντίον, 'towards big and towards equal, and the converse—and vice versa.' οὐκ ἔοικε. Steph. reads ἔοικε saying 'alia est lectio οὐκ ἔοικε' quam et Fic. agnoscit': and Bek. says 'οὐκ om. AEF.' Does this give us the Ms. authority on which Steph.'s edition rests?

155 E-157 B. We have seen Dem. II. conflicting with I., and within itself containing contradictory proofs that the one 'both is and is not' something or other. Pl. in Dem. III., while not giving up any previous conclus., calls in a reconciling element. If the one 'is' it 'partakes of time and πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου (152 A), and we have only to understand that 'is and is not' apply to different portions of time in order to comply with the law of contrad. and to save every characteristic of the one. But Pl. seems to be possessed by the concep. of 'is and is not,' and he has already dealt with that very small portion of time called τὸ νῦν. Apparently under these two influences he proceeds to prove even here that the one 'both is and is not,' the medium of proof being a refinement upon τὸ νῦν. The more one thinks of τὸ νῦν the less one is able to distinguish it from τὸ ἐξαίφνης. Pl. describes τὸ νῦν as the point at which the one οὐ γίγνεται ἀλλ' ἔστι—which seems clearly to assume that at τὸ νῦν we have a μεταβολή: and τὸ ἐξαίφνης is simply τὸ νῦν reduced to so fine a point that time vanishes. But can τὸ νῦν itself be other than a timeless instant? If it can, then it has duration, and before we reach its end its beginning is past, has ceased to be τὸ νῦν and become τὸ παρεληλυθός. 'Some of the Stoics,' says Grote, 'considered τὸ νῦν as μηδὲν—and nothing in time to be real except τὸ παρωχῆκος and τὸ μέλλον (Plut. De Commun. Notitiis contra Stoicos, p. 1081 D).' He adds 'The doctrine (of τὸ ἐξαίφ.) served the purpose of the

Platonic Parmenides, as ingenious, original, and provocative to intellectual effort, but it did not acquire any permanent footing in Grecian dialectics.' Something must be said here, but within modest limits, on Time and Change.

TIME.—1. Both Pl. and Arist. accept the popular idea of time. Pl. hardly discusses it now: A. after disc. decides thus, τούτων δ' ὄντων ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν χρόνον συνεχῇ εἶναι· λέγω δὲ συνεχῆς τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά (Phys. vi. 2). Both are influenced by the analogy of space; but A. notes (what Pl. assumes) that while space has six (our three) dimensions (iv. 1), time has but two (our one) πρότερον and ὑστερον, and that neither of these exists while we speak (iv. 10 etc.). He also raises the question whether if motion and souls observant of it ceased time would remain (iv. 14)—a step towards the Kantian standpoint. Of time Pl. assumes that it 'passes,' the one μετέχει πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου, 152—quite a popular view. A.'s may come to the same, but it involves much deeper analysis: he says time is our measure of change—τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ χ., ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότ. καὶ ὕστ. (iv. 11). 2. Over against this both elsewhere speak of αἰών, our eternity. A. draws a fine distinc. in this connec.—οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν-χρόνῳ-εἶναι τὸ εἶναι-ὅτε-ὁ-χ.-ἔστιν ... ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα, ἢ ἀεὶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ ... σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὅτι οὐδὲ πάσχει οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ χ. (iv. 12). Thus the law of contrad. exists during the writing of this note and the discuss. of Supply in the House of Commons, but is unaffected thereby—it is ἀεὶ ὄν. Of αἰών Dam. says (§ 150, ii. 31) συνελίττειν ἐθέλει καὶ συναιρεῖν εἰς ἐν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὅλον τὰ μέρη, ὡς ὁ χρ. διαιρεῖν. 3. To both the effective existing portion of time is τὸ νῦν. Popularly Now may include a good deal, but Pl. and A. agree in treating it technically as a part of time, but an extremely small part. A. says—and Pl. would probably agree—that νῦν may be infinitely small, time being divisible εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά, and makes this play a part in his reply to Zeno (vi. 6 etc.). 4. Pl. makes a further step in τὸ ἐξαίφ. It is not easy to say whether he means by this merely a generalized and infinitely reduced νῦν, or whether he creates a timeless time, so to speak: probably the latter, as he calls it φύσις ἀτοπὸς τις ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδ' ἐνὶ οὐρα. A. uses the term, but in the other sense, τὸ δ'

ἐξαίφ. τὸ ἐν ἀναισθήτῃ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν (iv. 13).

CHANGE, again, is the insoluble crux, the vital question in the philosopher's brief. 'If, indeed, you are able to instruct *that* point, Mr. Fairbrother—' 'If I am indeed able to instruct that point, my Lord, I trust not only to serve my client, but ...' We cannot instruct that point. Pl. does not even treat it in a strictly metaphys. manner. Metaphys. explanations do not so much explain it as explain it away. Pl. is directed by Zeno towards physical becoming or change, whether in the form of κατὰ τόπον κίνησις or of ἀλλοίωσις: he does not admit Z.'s reduction of it to impossibility: he seeks to construct a physical theory which will explain the physical facts. He said (152 B etc.) that in past time the one has been becoming older and younger than itself, but that when it reaches 'now' it 'ceases to become and is' older and younger—for if it went on becoming it 'would not be caught by now.' And this now holds on to it as long as it 'is,' which seems to mean that to us at each successive now the one 'is,' while when we look back, from each to all that have passed, it seems to have been 'becoming' all the while. There is the crux: it is conceded that change is gradual and takes time (e.g. 138 C, and A. Phys. iv. passim), but when you put that time under the microscope you find that at each instant the changing thing 'ceases to become and is.' To put it in terms of A.'s dictum (1. above), if 'now' as a 'measure of change' reveals change going forward, it eo ipso breaks up into as many nows as the stages of change which it reveals, and at each of these the thing 'ceases to become and is.' From one 'now' to the next we find, it may be, different being; but being, not becoming, is what we find: we *can* not catch change in the fact. Pl. then in despair says Change is *extra*-temporal: time advances thus—νῦν, ἐξαίφ., νῦν, ἐξαίφ., νῦν, ἐξαίφ. εἰς ἀπειρον: at each νῦν the changing thing 'is' in some phase (not the same phase, yet not more than one phase), and at each ἐξαίφ. the change from phase to phase (or from place to place) is effected. It would need a minute knowledge of A.'s works to ascertain clearly his final view on change, but he seems to be driven to the same conclus. as Pl. He says μεταβολὴ δὲ πάσα φύσει ἐκστατικόν (iv. 13), and again ἐν ᾧ δὲ πρώτῳ

x

(hunting change into a corner) μεταβέβληκε τὸ μεταβέβληκός, ἀνάγκη ἄτομον εἶναι (§vi. 5). Here ἄτομον conveys the same idea as Pl.'s ἐν οὐδ' ἐνὶ χρόνῳ, and might even prompt a wrong-headed critic to read φύσις ἄτομός τις for ἄτοπος at 156 D. To Pl. then change is resolved into the series 'is, is-not, is, is-not ...,' and perhaps one influence that leads him to such a concep. may be that while Heraclitus (Intro. p. 1.) had taught him that 'becoming' is not a subject of science, 'is and is-not' may be subjects of science. Another influ. is of course to hand in the fact that, when Pl. lands the changing thing in that which is not time, he may—having made time a condition of being—declare that it 'is not' in an absolute sense. He is thus able to say in Dem. III. as in II. that each attribute of the one both is and is not.

τί δαί ... σκεπτόν; For τί δαί see pp. lxxxi., xci. But this case is peculiar. Elsewhere the τί δαί either stands alone, or is coupled with δῆ, or again with τῇδε or τόδε, to form a brief prelim. question introducing a longer one which is complete in itself. The only apparent excep. seems to be τί δαί, τῶν ἄλλων; (153 A). This however does not mean 'but what of the others?' τῶν ἄλλων is gov'd. by πρῶτον in the line above and corresponds with ἑαυτοῦ. In the present case τί is an integral part of the main quest., in close connec. with προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν. Had it been like the others the lang. might have been τί δαί: ἄρ' οὐ σκεπτόν τί τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν; This case seems to show that δὲ was the orig. word rather than δῆ, and so t.

οὔτε So Ἄτ; but nothing responds; whence Buttm. (Heind. agreeing) reads [οὔτε τὰλλα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν] οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ τὰλλα, which may perhaps have been in Pl.'s mind, but is surely redundant. Stallb. reads οὐδέ. May not the following οὐδὲ meet all requirements—the intervening ὀρθῶς: being a mere ἀνάπαυλα to Parm., and no interrup.? Engelm. suggests οὔτε referring back to 150 B. The note of Proc.-Dam. 297—which as usual reflects the text while commenting upon it, contains οὔτε ... οὔτε: but the lang. seems to need correc., which takes from its value as evid. For the sense Thoms. cites Plotin. Ennead. 5, lib. iii. cap. 15, Εἰρηται μὲν οὖν ὅτι εἰ τι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ἄλλο δὲ παρ' αὐτό· ἄλλο δὲ ὄν,

οὐχ ἔν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἐκείνο. With οὐ γὰρ ἄν ... ἦν suppl. τὰλλα, εἰ ἔν ἦν.

C οὐδὲ μὴν ... πῇ δὲ: Notes 1. t gives μετέχει πῇ. The text is as near ἄ as possible: it assumes that αὐ—not unsuitable to the context—had been in the orig., that it had been overlooked and inserted in the marg. or above, and that the writer, influenced by στέρεται, had supposed the intention to be that μετέχεται (αυ=αι) should be the reading.

τοῦ ἐνὸς seems to go closely with τὰ ἄλλα, and yet it may be a case of hyperbaton: the sense in any case would be given thus: *ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς μόνως ὡς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶη.*

δ ἄν ὅλον ἦ; So t; and the sense needs it.

ἄλλα μὴν etc. This intricate argt. is meant to show that ὅλον-μόρια are strictly correl. He seemed to find no diffic. before (145 A), and his argt. now is not easily followed. If a part is not part of a 'whole' (τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὁλότητος, Proc.-Dam. 297), it must be part of a 'many' or 'all': that is, if it is not part of a many in their collective sense it must be so in their distributive and individual sense—must be part of each, including itself. For if so much as one be excluded then it cannot be part of 'all,' and by hypothesis it is not part of the 'whole.' If the argt. is sophistical (Stallb.) it is so mainly because it undertakes to prove that which hardly admits of proof, or needs it. The sophistry arises in the statement that 'if it is not part of each it will not be of any.' Proc.-Dam. takes (298) a different view. He says the parts must be part of some 'one' thing—*τινὸς μόριον ἂν εἴη οὐ δὴ πολλῶν, τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ διακεκριμένα ἐστίν*—if therefore it is to be part of 'all' which are not a 'whole,' it must be so by being part of each 'one' of the all. This it cannot be—*ὅτι, φησὶν, ... ἔσται μόριον ἑαυτοῦ [τὸ] μόριον, ὃ ἀδύνατον.* It thus is not part of each one, ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντων τῶν πολλῶν οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ μόριον εἶναι

D τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἐκάστου (ἔσται) τῶν ἄλλων and so can be part only of the whole-less many en masse—*πλὴν γὰρ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ μόνου τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται ἅμα, καὶ οὕτως ἀναιρέται τὸ ἐκάστου εἶναι μόριον, μὴ ὃν δὲ ἐκάστου μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν* p. 31. *ἔσται.* In the closing sent. μηδενὸς δὲ etc. ὦν (t) seems essential. Heind. and Stallb. object to εἶναι after ἀδύνατον as useless, and as probably due to the previous εἶναι. It would be easy, with a slightly

different length of lines to imagine the second nearly below the first, and so to account for the presence of the latter; but the Mss. agree, and (as Stallb. adds) Proc.-Dam. agrees with them. The sent. may be rendered 'and to be something of all those things, of none of which it is anything—whether that something be a part or what else you please—is a thing which cannot happen.' (φησὶν) *ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι.* Proc.-Dam.

Ἰδέαι This does not seem to be used technically. Thoms. quotes here his Dam., 'ἔστι μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἐν ἐν τῇ γενέσει μεριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐν πεπληθυσμένον, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἦ ἐν καὶ ἦ ὅλον, τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ περιείληφεν. Inde Pythagoraeis Monas dicebatur ἀρρενοθήλυ test. Macrobr. ... Totam rem vero aperit Plut. in Quaest. Platon. οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ, inquit, Μόνας ἀριθμόν, ἂν μὴ τῆς ἀπείρου δυνάδος ἀψήται ποιήσασα δὴ οὕτως ἀριθμόν, εἰς στιγμάς, εἴτα γράμμης, ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς ἐπιφανείας καὶ βάθης καὶ σώματα πρόεισι, καὶ σωματῶν ποιότητας ἐν πάθει γιγνομένων.'

δν ἄρα So t, and rightly. On μόρια ἔχον Proc.-Dam. 298 says καὶ συνέγραψε ταῦτα εἰς τὸ ἔχειν μόρια ἵνα μή, ἐν ὄντα, οὐκ ἦ [Ms. ἦν] ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐδείκνυν τὰ μόρια ὅλον καὶ τελείου μόρια—καὶ οὐτε ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων οὐτε τῶν πολλῶν οὐτε τῶν πάντων τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ, i.e. he calls none of these others τέλειον? αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν μορίων. τό γε So t: ἄ τό τε, less good. τ γ easily confused, p. cxi.

οὐ γὰρ ... αὐτὸ ἐν=εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἦν οὐκ ἂν μετείχεν etc. The _ suggests that some writer or reader thought the form αὐτοῖν—like αὐτοέκαστον in Arist.—the proper one. Notes 1. The word, however, would convey the idea of an εἶδος τοῦ ἐνός, which is not meant here, but rather that the others 'in place of being partakers of the one would be the one itself.' Proc.-Dam. 299 says τὸ μετέχον τοῦ μετεχομένου ἄλλο τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ... μετέχει γοῦν ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων τοῦ ἐνός καθὼς ἐν μόριον, καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃν μετέχει τοῦ ἐνός. In νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ ... που the first ἐνὶ is a notable case of attrac. We expect ἐν with εἶναι; yet the dative is used through the action upon the writer's thought of the succeeding constr. ἀδύνατον μὲν που παντί, πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐνί, ἐνὶ εἶναι. The δὲ of νῦν δὲ answers to a suppressed μὲν in οὐ γὰρ, while the ἐνὶ μὲν is answered by μετέχειν δέ.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ... μόριον ὅλου: Heind. is prob. right in taking τὸ μὲν as separate from the following ἐν,

and τὸ δ' αὖ as corresponding—only it seems better to couple ἑκαστον with the latter. The sense will thus be 'for the former (the whole) will be one whole of which the parts are parts, while again each of the latter, i.e. whatever is part of a whole (ὁ ἂν ἢ μῶριον ὅλου) will be one part of the whole.' This is quite intellig.; but excep. is taken to the clause in brackets, although Ἄτ agree. As it stands, Heind. renders it 'quaecunque tandem est pars illa totius sive magna sive parva—sive ei commensurabile est τὸ ὅλον, sive non commensurabile,' and this gives excellent sense, although no ref. to size has been made hitherto. Bek. again, following ΞΣΥ and followed by Ast and Herm., reads οὐδ' ἂν ἢ μῶριον ὅλου 'will be one part of the whole--of that whole of which it is a part,' but there is no such gain as to justify the change. And so of the suggest. of Schleierm., ὁ ἂν ἢ μῶριον ὅλου (altered to μῶριων and called egregia by Stallb.), 'one part of the whole, of that one which happens to be whole of the part (or parts).' The clause, like some we have met, is redund., but neither of these changes helps much.

Ἡ οὐκ οὖν ... αὐτοῦ: Steph. (leaning, as Fischer says, on Fic.) wishes ἑνὸς twice, the former being gov'd. by ἕτερα, the latter by μεθίξει, but (Heind.) the art. also must in that case be repeated, while there is no diffic. in treating αὐτοῦ as gov'd. by both part. and verb.

αὐτά γε ... τοῦ ἑνός; This might end at ἐκεῖνα or even αὐτά, but his argt. seeks to emphasize the paradox that this is their nature, while yet it is they that partake of the one. The tense of the part. is import. and is dwelt on in what follows. The sent. contends that, as both the whole of the ἅλλα and each portion of them turns out to be more than one, we may well say they are πλήθῃ ἀπειρα. Proc.-Dam. (300) puts it differently—ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλο τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἑνὸς μῶριον (ὃ ἦν τὸ μῶριον), καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἑνὸς ὅλου (ὃ ἦν ὅλον) πλείω ἄρα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη πλήθῃ ἀπειρα εἶναι τὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου μεταλαμβάνοντα.

αἰδῶμεν. So both Mss. as in 143 B. Edd. give ἰδῶμεν and so Dam. ἄλλο τι might be replaced by τί δαί or the like: it introduces the quest. and assumes what the answer will be, but does not otherwise interfere. So Theaet. 159 D, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα [με λίσβῃ] ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀλη-

θείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; and others. Proc.-Dam. differs—ἄλλο τι καὶ οὐχ ἓν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑνὸς τότε μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνός, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει, ἄλλο τι ὄντα ἢ ἓν.

πλήθῃ ὄντα, each severally is a πλήθος.

αἰ ἰδῶμεν etc. An exaggerated superlat. of dimin. It might take various simpler forms: εἰ ἐθέλομεν ἀφελεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ (μῶριον) τῶν τοιούτων ὡς οἰοί τ' ἐσμὲν—οἱ ὡς οἶόν τε—οἱ ὅτι—ὀλίγιστον. Proc.-Dam. explains ἐπεὶ εἰς ἀπειρα διαιρετόν ἐστι διανοεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὰ ἅλλα τοῦ ἑνός ὡς ὅλον τι διανοεῖσθαι ἄξιον. On ὀλίγιστον, Notes I., ὀλιγοστὸν has prob. been the orig. as in 149 A, unless indeed that case may have influenced this one. 'Ἀφαιρεθὲν following thus upon ἀφελεῖν is a neat illustr. of the fact that no 2 aor. pass. of the verb was in use.

οὐκ οὖν ... πλήθῃ: The constr. changes between σκοποῦντι and ὀρῶμεν, while ἔσται will suit either. Thomson's Dam. reads σκοποῦντες, Proc.-Dam. has σκοποῦντί σοι. Here τοῦ εἶδους means the concep. of τὰ ἅλλα, and τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν is that aspect of it which is separate from the one—'quatenus πολλὰ sunt τοῦ ἑνός μὴ μετέχοντα.' Heind.

μῶριον μῶριον The former goes with ἓν ἑκαστον, but it is (by linguistic necessity) used prematurely. ἓν ἑκαστον μῶριον cannot properly apply to any element of τὰ ἅλλα before it comes into connection with the one, nor even τότε ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει, but only ἐπειδὴ μῶριον γένηται. He does not say whether this transform. occurs ἐν τῷ ἐξαίφνης.

καὶ τὸ ὅλον etc. This is the ὅλον τέλειον μῶρια ἔχον of 157 E: and of course it does not, any more than the μῶρια, exist until the latter are thought of as μῶρια. In the phrase τὰ ἅλλα τοῦ ἑνός the ἓν is of course the ἓν of the dial. Does ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνός refer to that also? Perhaps so, in view of the prev. express. and also of the ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων which could cover his recent argt.: yet it really is diffic. to say. He has not been speaking of τὸ ἓν for some time, and the ἓν ὅλον τέλειον, or even the ἓν ἑκαστον μῶριον of which he has been speaking—any ἓν, in fact—would do. We must remember too, though he chooses to forget, that even τὸ ἓν only gets its πέρασ when thought of in connec. with τὰ ἅλλα, and that the nature of either, if we strive to think of it out of such connec., is

ἀπειρία—so much so that the very names he gives would not be permissible. Κοινωνησάντων is seldom used in this absolute manner to mean 'in uno communicantibus' (Fic.). Proc.-Dam. puts τοῦ ἐνὸς under the govt. of κοινων. (301):—τοῖς ἄλλοις γοῦν τοῦ ἐνὸς συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐπερ ἐκοινωνήσαν, γίγνεσθαι τι ἕτερον, ὅπερ αὐτοῖς πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα. We might expect ὁ δὴ πέρας αὐτοῖς παρέσχε, but ἐαυτοῖς immediately precedes. In t we have
 p. 32. ἀπειρίαν, for which a verb must be sought from παρέσχε.

E ὁμοιά τε... ἐαυτοῖς; A formula with which cp. the familiar οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον (οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται) οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων.

α μὲν So A: t ᾗ, which certainly suits ταύτη. The same diverg. occurs in εἰ γε, εἰ δέ below. In this sent. Heind. would read πάντα twice, one with ἀπειρα the other with εἴη, to corresp. with the ἅπαντα—πάντ' following. In ἐναντία... πεπονθεν the force is as if it read ἀρ' οὐκ ἐναντία πάθῃ ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθῃ α πέπονθεν;

159 κατὰ μὲν... ἀνομοιότατα: i.e. so long as we consider them all either as ἀπειρα or as πεπερασμένα in both cases they are like; but when we regard them all in both lights at once—both κατὰ τὴν ἐαυτῶν φύσιν and as τοῦ ἐνὸς μετέχοντα—then they are as unlike as possible. Here (Heind.) ἀμφοτέρως = αὐτὰ τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις. Stallb. is brief, 'Itaque ex quaque ratione similia erunt sibi ipsis et inter se, ex utraque autem utrinque maxime contraria et dissimilia.'

καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ etc. Up to ἐστῶτα this preserves the connec. with the ἂν εἴη above, and ἐστῶτα should have had a colon.

157 B-159 A. In pursuance of the dictum 136 A-C, Parm. has now entered upon his consideration of τὰλλα αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὃ τι οὖν (i.e. πρὸς τὸ ἐν). But we find that the discuss. becomes more and more a recapit. of argts. dealt with at length in Dems. I, II.—οὐκ ἔτι χαλεπῶς εὐρήσομεν is its key note, and inevitably. He cannot define his ἄλλα save in relation to τὸ ἐν, but he has already set forth the nature of τὸ ἐν by continuous ref. to τὰ ἄλλα: a complete discuss. of the one, however it may be formally isolated, involves so much ref. to others and many as to make a separate treatment

of these perfunctory. His difficulties here, as formerly, are that he must make ordinary lang. express abstruse ideas, and that he must treat as successive, thoughts that are correlative and simultaneous. We see still more clearly now that 'the one' is but a counterpart of each of 'the others' or 'the many.' Stallb. persists in regarding the latter as the sensible world and the former as the ideal; there is no distinc. in the treatment of them to justify this.

εἰ... ἐπισκοποῦμεν Both Mss. εἰ... ἐπισκοποῦμεν, of B which the former seems diffic. to explain and the latter must be wrong, unless we assume that some words have dropped out, which would account for both. It will be seen that εἰ has an -εἰ nearly above and an εἰ nearly below it; if this was so in the archet. one of these might explain this one. To account for -ποῦμεν some would read ἐῶμεν. But we have λέγωμεν below; and the subjunc. is employed in 142 B and 155 E. It is curious that in the former case ἐπανελέσθωμεν is followed by φανείη in A. It is just conceivable that εἰ may point in some way to a lost βούλει—οὐκ οὖν βούλει or βούλει οὖν. But Heind. suggests τί οὖν εἰ, which of course carries the optat. in both verbs. In ἀρα... μόνον the order seems inverted: it would at least be equally clear thus, ἀρα οὕτω μόνον [i.e. ὡς ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν] ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα ἢ καὶ οὐχ οὕτως. Proc.-Dam. (303) says ἐπισκοπεῖ δ' αὖθις περὶ τούτων αὐτῶν—τοῦ τε κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι, τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πεπερασμένου... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων παθῶν—εἴπερ οὕτω μόνον ἔχει ταῦτα ὡς φανῆναι τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπόμενά τε καὶ οὐχ ἐπόμενα. Cp. 163 B, εἰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανέται ἄπερ καὶ νῦν, ἢ ἕτερα: εἶναι; is under χρῇ or χρῆ πεπονθ. in the prev. sent.

ἐν ᾧ... τῷ αὐτῷ Hyperbaton for effect: = ἐν ᾧ καθάπερ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ = 'in quo velut in eadem sede' Fic.

ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις This is hardly proved. He has urged that they are not, as separate things, in one third thing; and he has added that the one has not parts which could be in the others; but he has not said till now that the one as a whole may not be in the others, and he gives no reason that could justify it till he says οὐδαμῇ ἀρα... ἐν οὐδέν:

μη ἔχει: Both Mss. ἔχη—phps. shows that the archet. had been partly written to dict.

τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, Not in this case one phrase, τοῦ ἐνός is govd. by μετέχοι. In ref. to this and what

follows Thoms. quotes his Dam., fol. 23, οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο [τὸ ἐν] μόνον ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μετ' ἐκεῖνο, πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα. καὶ ὅτι μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο, φανερόν· ὥστε διακρίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθόσον ἐν ἑκάστον ἀλλὰ καθόσον οὐχ ἔν. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ οὐχ ἔν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόφασις, ἀλλὰ θέσις τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἐν.

ἐν γὰρ ... πολλὰ ἦν· Is it the form of this sent. which has led to the marg. note? If we are to regard the words as complete they are oddly assorted. A better arrang. would be ἐν γὰρ ἑκάστον αὐτῶν ἦν ἂν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου. Yet that hardly gives the sense required, which demands (as in Fic.) that ἐν should be the pred. We must then read thus: ἑκάστον γὰρ αὐτῶν ἦν ἂν ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου: or as Proc.-Dam. (304) ἑκάστον ἂν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου ἐν ἦν which omits αὐτῶν. Τοῦ ὅλου must be regarded as = τῶν ἄλλων or πάντων τῶν ἄλλων.

ὅν δὲ ... μετέχει: Here again the lang. is diffic. Fic. does not injure the sense and aids the grammar by neglecting αὐτοῦ, and mentally arranging the last words as ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδαμῇ μετέχει. Possibly we should treat τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς as one phrase, since it has often been used as such, and hold αὐτοῦ as sufficiently explained by the occurrence of ἐν and ἐνός.

οὐδ' ἄρα ... ἐν αὐτοῖς, Stallb., neatly, 'Ergo τὰ ἄλλα neque ipsa sunt duo vel tria neque hos numeros in se complectuntur.' The simplest order would be—οὐδ' ἄρα (1) οὔτε αὐτὰ τὰ ἄλλα δύο οὔτε τρία ἐστὶ (2) οὔτε ἐνεστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς (τὰ τοιαῦτα). Here οὐδ' ἄρα connects a new neg. sent. to previous ones, as above; and οὔτε is left out before δύο.

1-33. F. οὐδὲ ὅμοια ... ἀνομοιότης is another sent. on the same plan. But the correl. nature of ὅμοια-ἀνόμ. and the corresp. nouns makes it easier than in the case of δύο τρία to use καὶ for οὔτε.

εἰ γὰρ ... τοῦ ἐνός: t has ἦ ἔχει which makes the apod. begin here instead of at διό που. The text is better. The contention is—where you have not 'two' you cannot have two of anything, and we saw that there could be no two where there was no one. εἰδῇ may or may not be used technically. Below δυοῖν is, of course, gen. by μετέχειν: we expect a τούτοις gov'd. by ἀδύνατον as anteced. to αἱ.

οὐδ' ἄρα ... στερημένοις: We have here three successive cases of οὔτε followed by ten successive cases of οὐδέ. Do the former three suggest the connec. 'neither-nor,' while the others are a

string of strong independ. negations to be rendered by a series of 'no nor' or 'not yet'?

ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ὄντα μόνως, (Proc.-Dam. 304) ἡ ἀνόμοια μόνως, ἐνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἐτέρου εἰδους μετέχει, ἡ τῆς ὁμοιότητος ἢ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος· ἀμφοτέρω δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοις μετέχει: and again εἰ γὰρ ὁμοιότητος μετέχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἢ ἀνομοιότητος, ἔσται ἡ ὁμοιότης ἢ ἀνομοιότης τι καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός: and again (305) εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν πῶς κινηθήσεται; πῶς στήσεται; ... τοῦ δ' ἐνός ἀναίρεθέντος κατὰ τὰς ἀνωτέρας ὑποθέσεις καὶ ταῦτα ἀναίρεθήσεται.

οὕτως δὲ ... μὲν οὖν: This summing up seems rather a non-sequitur. It may state facts, but if so they are not the facts on which the argt. has dwelt. Dam., cited by Thoms., says this concl. is similar to that of Dem. i. But to make it the same the very important words πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἐν, which really refer to Dem. iv., must be omitted. The remainder forms a comprehensive negative pronouncement which corresponds with that of i. But granting it to be true it is not relevant. We are speaking now of the others, and the natural concl. would have been πάντα τέ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστι, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ὡσαύτως: It is very natural, then, that Heind. should expect καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως: the introd. of καὶ τὰ ἄλλα being but a modest acknowledgment of their prominence in this last Dem. He also points out that this summary comprehends the argts. in both iv. and v. Indeed Thomson's Dam. says that it amounts to a summary of the whole five. οὕτω δὲ ἐν ἐστὶ κοινὸν τοῦτο συμπέρασμα τῶν πέντε ὑποθέσεων. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν, (1) καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν, ὡς ἡ πρώτη καὶ πέμπτη—(2) καὶ πάντα ἐστίν, ὡς ἡ δευτέρα καὶ τετάρτη—(3) καὶ ἐστὶν ὁμον καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν, ὡς ἡ τρίτη καὶ μέση τῆς ὅλης πεμπτάδος. Proc.-Dam. (305-6) observes at this stage πεπλήρωκε τὰς προτέρας δώδεκα ὑποθέσεις τοῦ εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ, (1) τίνα ἔπεται καὶ (2) τίνα οὐχ ἔπεται, καὶ (3) τίνα ἔπεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἔπεται:—καὶ ταῦτα τετραχῶς· τίνα ἔπεται αὐτῷ (α) πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ (β) πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις (γ) πρὸς τε ἀλλήλα καὶ (δ) πρὸς τὸ ἐν καὶ τίνα οὐχ ἔπεται ὁμοίως τετραχῶς, καὶ τίνα ἔπεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἔπεται ὁμοίως τετραχῶς [i.e. 3 x τετραχῶς = 12]. λοιπὸν εἰσβάλλει καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἐν οὐχ ἐστίν, ἐξ ὧν τὰς ἐτέρας δώδεκα ὑποθέσεις συστήσει.

c. ἡ καὶ etc. Gram. requires either that εἰπεῖν should be om. or that it should be underst. after τοῦ.

ὅτι ἕτερον ... τὸ μὴ ὄν; may be rendered (1) 'that he speaks of non-existence as something distinct in its nature' or (Müller) 'dass er unter dem Nicht-seienden etwas Verschiedenes versteht.' But this would rather require τὸ μὴ εἶναι—(2) 'that (in each case) he says that this which is not is something distinct,' or (Ast) 'se diversum ac proprium quid dicere hoc quod non sit.' This is the better. In the case before us the thing which is spoken of as μὴ ὄν is τὸ ἐν, and to it we must attach an intellig. and separate meaning as compared with τὰ ἄλλα. Upon ἕτερόν τι Heind. cps. Theaet. 153 D, ὁ δὲ καλεῖς χρώμα λευκόν, (ὑπόλαβε) μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὁμμάτων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμμασι. Proc.-Dam. (306) says ἕτερον γοῦν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ μὴ ὄν καὶ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὅταν οὖν εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν ἴσμεν ὁ λέγει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν, ἴσμεν δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν καὶ [μὴ] ἐν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ὅτι ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν κατὰστασιν. With this argt. cp. Soph. 257 etc., where he not only brings out the definite exist. of what in each case is described as being μὴ ὄν—τὸ μὴ καλόν, μέγα, δίκαιον—but clearly shows that he is aware of his divergence in this from the views of the historic Parm. by quoting his well-known words: οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε τοῦτο δαμῆς—εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῇσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα.

1) εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι ... τῶν ἄλλων. There has been an omiss. here in A, cp. pp. lxxxiii., lxxxvi., lxxviii., xc., xci. It probably arose from a confus. in connec. with the double μὴ εἶναι. A reader of the Ms. at a later date supplied the blank but omitted γὰρ and the second γ in γινώσκεται. The γὰρ is also absent from t, and no doubt it would be from the second family which t represents that the passage would be supplied. The word seems necessary. Heind. refers to a reading γινώσκειται τι τὸ λεγόμενον, and says that it probably points to γινώσκειται ὡς τι. The text seems better.

πρῶτον μὲν ... μὴ ἔστιν: τοῦτο refers forward to εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, but the substance of this is already given in ἴσμεν ὁ λέγει and γνωστόν τι λέγει. We must get a governing word for γινώσκ. etc., from ὑπάρχειν δεῖ: Stallb. suggests ἀναγκαῖον which would cover the following infin. also.

καὶ μὴν etc. An extens. of 142 A, 155 D-E. E Proc.-Dam. (307) says τί δὲ διαφέρει τὸ ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ τούτου; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκείνου ἀναφορικόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ τούτου δεικτικόν; οὐδ' ἂν τι ἐλέγετο etc. = NOT R 34. would it be called or spoken of as 'something' if it had no share in 'something.'

εἶναι μὲν δὲ ... μὴ ἔστιν. Stallb. says 'quum formula εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ significet negativa habere praedicata, non est difficile ad intelligendum, εἶναι nunc esse aientibus gaudere attributis. Itaque sententia verborum haec est: ubi τὸ ἐν sumserimus non nisi negantibus notis esse determinatum, aientibus s. positivis utique carere. Quod autem addit Parm.—μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν ... ἀνάγκη—his verbis significat 161 ideam negando finitam cum ideis aientibus eatenus habere communionem quandam quod per has ipsas negando determinetur.' But is the one here defined by negative qualities? On the contrary, having made the single stipulation that we must 'know what we are talking about' when speaking of the non-existent one, Pl. proceeds to affirm for it all the qualities ascribed to the existent one. Does he then mean that when he says 'the one is,' a definite thing with the characteristics claimed for it exists ἐν τῇ φύσει; while when he says 'the one is not' (in his present acceptation of the term) he means that this same thing has no exist. in nature and exists only as a subject of our thought? I assume, he says, on the one hand a definite set of qualities which I call 'one' to enter into the sum of things as pictured by me, and on the other hand that same set of qualities to be withdrawn from the sum of things; and in each case I ask—What follows?

εἰ μὲντοι ... οὐδέν. After insisting that 'that one,' and no other thing, is non-existent, he goes on, 'For if the thing which is to be non-existent be neither one nor that, but rather the talk is about some other thing, then we have not a word to say.' And so Proc.-Dam. (308), εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἐστὶ λέγομεν, ἐκεῖνο λέγομεν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο· ἐπειδὴ, εἰ μήτε τὸ ἐν ἐλέγομεν μήτε ἐκεῖνο μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινος ἄλλου ὁ λόγος ἦν ὅτε ἐλέγομεν τὸ ἐν μὴ εἶναι—οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι ἔδει ... καὶ ἐνδὲς μὲν—τοῦ εἶναι—οὐ μεθέξει, πολλῶν δὲ μεθέξει καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τούτου καὶ τοῦ τούτῳ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Stallb. finds a diffic. here, and says that what we require from the passage is this, 'Si vero praeter unum

etiam τὰ ἄλλα negando determinarentur facile apparet (sublati affirmantibus notis omnibus) futurum esse ut ne verbum quidem crepari oporteret? Undoubtedly if both one and others were negated there would be little to speak about, but this seems hardly what the passage requires. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ... ἄλλοια; It seems odd that ἕτερα and ἑτεροῖα should have to be called in before we can admit that ἄλλα are ἄλλοια. He makes a much bolder step immediately. If (εἴπερ τῷ ἐνὶ etc.) he can infer that τὸ ἐν is ἀνόμοιον because τὰ ἄλλα are ἀνόμοια τῷ ἐνὶ, why not infer at once that it is ἄλλο τῶν ἄλλων because τὰ ἄλλα are ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός? This comes directly under 146 D that the different differs only from the different, and so below C τὰ δὲ ἄνισα etc.

B εἰς αὐτοῦ ὁμοιότητα Cp. 147-8 on this argt. The words below, οὐκ ἂν ... τοῦ ἐνός, admit of two senses differing slightly—(1) about such a thing the argt. could not be conducted as if it were the one (= ὥστερ εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐν). This seems to be Müller's view, 'so könnte wohl nicht von so etwas die Rede sein, wie von dem Einen': (2) the argt. could no longer be held as dealing with such a thing as the one. The latter suits οἶον τοῦ ἐνός better. Both Mss. and edd. seem agreed that in τοῦ τοιούτου we have the art.: yet it might be του. Does not this argt. cancel the preceding one? If the one must be like itself, it must equally be unlike the others, and so ἄλλα ἕτερα ἑτεροῖα ἄλλοια are unnecessary.

C With δὲ ἄρα ... εἰς αὐτῷ cp. ἄρα οὐκ ... αὐτῷ εἶναι; above. In the former the dat. εἰς αὐτῷ is wanting, in the latter the εἶναι—the full constr. being δὲ ἄρα [ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη] εἶναι τῷ ἐνὶ [αὐτῷ] ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτῷ.

εἰ γὰρ εἴη ... ἀδύνατα: The odd part of this argt. lies in the εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη—if the one were equal it would already have acquired being, which it has not. Stallb. points to this as coinciding with his view that the non-existent one has only neg. qualities—equality being positive. But surely likeness to itself is a positive quality, to say nothing of the others referred to 160 E. Besides Pl. has not yet decided whether the others exist or not, and yet has brought them into compar. with the non-existent one, a course which ought to involve diffics. Again he infers immediately that if one and others are not equal they must be unequal; but that altern.

holds only if they exist; at least if they exist to an equal extent, are on the same terms as to existence. And if they are equally related to existence are they not equal and like to that extent? The εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη seems one of those captious freaks of sophistry exemplified already in 155 D, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν.

ἄλλα μέντοι ... συμκρότης: 'It is, however, in connection with inequality that we have bigness and smallness.' 'Jam vero ad inaequalitatem referuntur magnitudo et parvitas' Ast.

ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ... ἐνὶ: This first καὶ refers to the whole express. μ. τε καὶ σ. and means 'moreover, in addition (to what has already been conceded).' ἀφέστατον is a syncopated perfect form with a present sense. One almost feels as if μεταξύ τι below were one word and αὐτοῖν a dative. But the following words contradict the idea.

τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ ... μετρίῃ Heind., and with him most edd. read τῷ δὲ 'In his, quibus conclusio praecedentium continetur, δὲ scripsi pro δέ. Fic.: *Uni igitur* etc.' A good change; but it deserts both Mss. μετρίῃ comes from τ: for the μετρί of Ἀ cp. πραγματίαν 136 C and πραγματιώδη 137 B.

ἔχεν αὐτὸ δὲ ... ἀνάγκη: Both Mss. read οὕτως ἔχῃ which cannot stand. Edd. change to ἔχοι: The text gives a form which usage justifies and which is closer to the Mss. The subject to λέγειν is omitted. The contention here recalls that of Descartes, that the concep. of God postulates his existence; but it is more extrav. both because of the less vital nature of the concep. and because of its neg. charac. The fallacy lies in the sense put upon ἀληθῆ. We were told that τὸ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι is a ὑπόθεσις, and we now learn that it is not, but a statement of a fact, because our veracity hangs upon that issue. If that is so then any hypoth. which we may set up about Hippocentaurs, Chimaeras, and the other πλῆθῃ τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων referred to in the Phaedr. (229), carries with it objective validity. The only truth with which we have to deal in arguing from an assumpt. is the truth involved in consistent adherence to the terms and conditions it imposes upon us—a truth which does not carry us into the region of objective reality. No doubt Pl. and still more Parm. set great store by the one, and would not place it in comparison

with a Pegasus or Gorgon: but the argt. 'If the one does not exist, what follows?—The objective existence of the non-existent one follows' seems a circle of rather contracted radius. The οὕτω μὲν οὖν and ἀνάγκη illustrate the unreal character of the discuss. If Parm. wishes to push on or to change the subject Aristoteles will say ἀνάγκη to the most paradoxical assertion; if Parm. would like to enlarge a little, he will say πῶς δὴ; in a much simpler case. And this in detail, though not always in the main outline, is largely the character of Platonic dial.

¹⁵² ἔστιν ἄρα ... μὲν οὖν: The first sent. here may have two senses (1) ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἐν ἔστι, but this jars with the context; (2) τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστιν οὐκ ὂν 'The one is non-existent, then, as would appear.' It is diff. to form a theory of what underlies the correc. of τῇ in the marg. In t the text is τι, so that the error does not go back to the archetype. Perhaps some scribe had been writing to dictation, and after confusing the sound τι with that of τῇ (an easy matter) had decided for the latter, from some odd passing notion that ἀνήσει was the dat. of a fem. noun. As to the corrector: there is no sign of correc. in Π or Δ, whence we infer that it was not in the marg. of A at the time when Δ or its orig. was copied. But there is another possibility. Proc.-Dam. (below) seems to have read τοῦ πῇ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, and 161 ε gives οὐσίας μετέχειν πῇ. Does πῇ explain τῇ, and is τι the missing accus. to ἀνήσει added, and was the orig. τι τοῦ πῇ εἶναι or πῇ τι τοῦ εἶναι? On ἀνήσει we have in the marg. of tII (Notes 1.) the schol. ἀφήσει ἢ ἀναπέσει. 'Scholiastes Augustanus interpretatur a. ἢ a.—ut Hesychius: 'Ανήσει· ἀναπέσει, ἀφήσει. Quae quidem interpretamenta docent, librarium Codicis Augustani perperam ἀνύσει scripsisse pro ἀνήσει.' Fisch. Why ἀνύσει? The only diff. lies in ἀναπέσει, and it is not easy to see how that suits ἀνύσει better than ἀνήσει. May not the sense be 'if it shall let loose a portion of being against non-being'—like a dog? (L. and S. ἀνίημι, III. 2). To this ἀφήσει would be a suitable equiv., while ἀναπέσει might mean 'hound on,' 'urge forward': unless by chance it is an error for πέμψει. Proc.-Dam. (310) has ἀπολύει τοῦτο τὸ πῇ εἶναι πρὸς which seems an equiv. for ἀνήσει. On the substance

of the argt. he says ἔστιν ἄρα ὡς ἔοικε τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὂν κατ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο—ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν. ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν ἔστιν οὐκ ὂν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀντίφασις τεθῇ (ὅπερ ἔστιν, οὐκ-ἔστι-μὴ-ὂν) καὶ οὕτω τοῦ πῇ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, μᾶλλον εὐθὺς ἔσται ὂν. ὡς ἂν εἰ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὂν, λέγομεν τὸ ἐν [Ms. ὂν] οὐκ ὂν ἔστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὸ πῇ εἶναι τούτῳ παρέχομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀπόφασις τεθείη (τὸ οὐκ-ἔστι-μὴ-ὂν), καὶ ἀπολύει τοῦτο τὸ πῇ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι εἰς δῆλωσιν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, μᾶλλον εὐθὺς ἔσται ὂν. ὅταν γὰρ τις λέγῃ τὸ ἐν οὐκ-ἔστι-μὴ-ὂν, ἀποφαίνεται [= ἀπόφῃσι here?] τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐκείνου, καὶ γίγνεται ἔστιν-ὂν. This means that Pl. gets round to the doctrine that 'the non-existent one exists in a sense' by two paths. (1) If we speak truth then the non-existent one *is* non-existent, and so we show that it οὐσίας μετέχει πῇ. (2) If we reaffirm the more strongly that 'the non-existent one does not exist,' we by our double neg. let existence at the one again.

δεῖ ἄρα ... μὴ ἔσται: The first statement is this δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ [i.e. τὸ ἐν] ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-ὂν (ὡς) δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι: and the second ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-ὂν (ὡς δεσμὸν) ἵνα τελέως αὐ εἶναι ᾗ. In the third οὕτως refers to these two assumed necessities, and is explained by the following μετέχοντα which (Heind.) would be clearer as εἰ μετέχει. For the modern reader (whatever might be the case for the ancient one) this complicated statement is rendered still more trying by the introd. of Chiasm—τὸ μὲν ὂν ... τελέως εἶναι referring to the second statement, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν ... τελέως μὴ ἔσται to the first: and additionally so by the closing redundancies εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι and εἰ καὶ ... μὴ ἔσται. We feel also the want of abstract terms, which leads to the use of parts. and infins. in a confusing manner. As regards grammar ἵνα τελέως αὐ εἶναι ᾗ would be clearer were εἶναι omitted, or if it had τὸ before it. The whole means much the same as ἵνα αὐ ἐξῇ αὐτῷ τελέως εἶναι. Again the phrase οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὂν etc. = 'of the actuality of being existent, and of the non-actuality of being non-existent.' The whole might run thus—εἰ ἄρα τὸ μὴ-ὂν-ἐν μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-ὂν ὡς δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-ὂν ἵνα τελέως ᾗ. τό τε γὰρ ὂν εἴη ἂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν

οὐκ ἂν εἶη οὕτως μάλιστα, εἰ μετέχοι τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι-ὄν μὴ-οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ-ὄν μὴ-οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν. 'Accordingly if it is to prove non-existent it must have the being-non-existent as a bond of its non-existence, just as the existent must, in order to perfect its existence, have as bond the non-existence of not-being; for in this way best would both the existent be, and the non-existent not be, namely, where being shares the actuality of existence and the non-actuality of non-existence, if it is to prove truly existent, and where not-being shares the non-actuality of the absence of non-existence and the actuality of non-existence, if not-being also in turn is to be completely such.' After paraphrasing, Proc.-Dam. (310, 311) says τὸ γὰρ εἶναι οὐσιοῖ τοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐμφασιν ἔχει τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. τέτταρα γάρ τινα λαμβάνει ὄν πλέον οὐχ εὐρηται—ὄν ἔστιν, ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ πάλιν μὴ ὄν ἔστι, μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι ... εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τελῶς οὐκ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ὁμως τὸ εἶναι οὐσίαν [Ms. -σίας] παριστᾷ, ὥστε τοῦ ὄν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὄν εἶναι οὐσίας μέθεξις ἔστιν· ἔτι [Ms. ἐπὶ] δὲ τοῦ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐσίας μέθεξις ἔστιν.

οὐκ ὄν ... πᾶς δ' οὐδ': Heind. supplies mentally τοῦ μὴ εἶναι [μὴ ὄν], καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι [μὴ ὄν]. The phrase ἐς τὸ μὴ εἶναι corresp. to εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι above. Heind. suggests εἶναι as underst. with φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί. This Stallb. rejects, giving 'also erscheint auch ein Sein für das Eins, wenn es nicht ist.' In either case the sense is clear. When Pl. wishes to say that the non-existent one has being he presses the ἔστι in εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστι, when he wishes to say that it has not he presses the μὴ. Proc.-Dam. goes on (311) οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ περὶ τῷ τε ὄντι μέτεστι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι [Mss. μετά τι τοῦ εἶναι] διὰ τὸ [τοῦ] μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι, καὶ τῷ ἐνί ἄρα—ἐπεὶ δὴ λέγομεν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι—τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ οὐσία φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ αὐθις μὴ οὐσία καθ' αὐτὸ μὴ ἔστι καὶ μόνον. This commentary as printed by Stallb. seems to have many errors; the last clause has probably something wrong.

οἶόν τι ὄν ... ἔχῃ: It is not clear whether οἶόν τι ὄν is impers., followed by an accus. and infin. clause, or personal with τὸ ἔχον as subj. to the understood ἐστί. πως is from t; ἄ πω wrongly.

Ast turns the first sent. thus: 'Num potest autem fieri ut id quod aliquo modo se habet (ἔχον πως) non se habeat ita, nisi transeat ex hoc habitu?' There seems to be no special tense-meaning in μὴ μεταβάλλον, which = εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλει, ἄνευ μεταβολῆς. In the second sent. we look for μεταβολὴν σημαίνει at the close; and for some such word as πάσχει rather than σημαίνει. The latter would imply the form 'every such case, in which we have the presence and the absence of a quality, etc.' Proc.-Dam. says (311) ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔχειν ἔξιν δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν στέρησιν, ἐξ ἔξεως δὲ εἰς στέρησιν μεταβολὴ τις ἔστιν, ἰδοὺ καὶ μεταβολὴν αὐτῷ προσμαρτυρεῖ. Here again Pl. accepts in subst. the law of contrad.

καὶ κινούμε ... εἶναι ἔχον: Notes I. It would seem as if the archet. had not been quite clear on ἐν πέφανται: and we have many cases of hesitation between ἐν and ἐν in the dial. If Ἀ is right this would appear to be the only case of the perf. of ἐμφαίνω in Pl., while πέφανται and other parts of the tense occur repeatedly. No doubt that very rarity might suggest a change here. Again we might expect to find τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν here, as it is the subj. of discuss. and occurs just above. Yet the very expect. of it might cause the scribe in t to write it wrongly (i.e. he expected the form and put it, but afterwards corrected himself); while on the other hand we find τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν without ἐν, and following τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν in 162 A above. ἐμ and ἐν differ much less in Ms. than in print. ἔχον corresponds with κινούμε, and yet one almost looks for ἔχει after ἐπεὶ περ. In ἀλλὰ μὴν ... ποί: both Mss. read τε for γε, and Ἀ has blundered in μὴ θίστατο. The clause εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν stands as it were in brackets.

οὐδὲ μὴν ... ἀδύνατον εἶναι: If all three forms for 'the same' here were in the same case they would read ταῦτόν τὸ αὐτόν τὸ ταυτόν. Perhaps the last may mean 'the same of which we are speaking.' Both Mss. read ἐν τῷ. What is the marginal mark like a small 5 here? μὴ ὄν ... μὴ ἔστιν: the former neg. keeps up the hypothetical nature of the case; the latter is as it were a quot. of the former, and is as if in inverted commas.

τό γε μὴν ... ἐστάναι: If the reason for absence of motion be non-existence that reason will equally exclude the idea of rest. Pl. draws no distinction of a def. kind between ἡσυχάζειν and ἐστάναι, but

his terms *κινεῖσθαι*, *ἑστάναι*, *ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν* imply a distinction. Prob. the last corresponds to Arist.'s *ἡρεμεῖν*, which is the true antith. to *κινεῖσθαι*. It is the state of being unmoved on the part of a thing which admits of being moved; both *κίνησις* and *ἡρεμία* imply duration—*χρόνον τινά*. It would seem that *τὸ ἵστασθαι* is included in motion, and means its momentary arrestment with the expectation of renewal; on the other hand—*οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν ὅτε πρῶτον ἡρέμησέν ἐστιν· ἐν ἡμερῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἡρέμησε διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ἐν ἀτόμῳ· ... οὔτε γὰρ κινεῖσθαι οὔτ' ἡρεμεῖν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ νῦν*. Phys. IV. 8, and elsewhere.

163 *ἔπη γὰρ ... ἂν ἀλλοιοῖτο*: One expects *καθόσον* in place of *ὅπη*, or *ταύτη* in place of *κατὰ τροσούτον*. The words used show that the orig. meaning of each form had been so far modified. The two presents p. 36 *ἔχει ὡς ἔχει* are retained as intelligible; but the *ὡς εἶχεν* of t is better. Both Mss. read *κινούμενον δέ*. Edd. prefer *δή*, and Fic. renders 'ergo unum dum movetur,' which is more approp. *Ἄ* has no *ἂν*: t gives it, and it seems necessary. On the argt. Proc.-Dam. (312) says *σοφιστικὸς φανερώς ὁ λόγος (οὐ γὰρ εἰ κινεῖται ἀλλοιοῦται φάμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἀλλοιοῦται κινεῖται)· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, οὐ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν*. The brackets are put to bring out what must be the sense: the last statement being (necessarily, if it is to hold) the ground of the charge. He no doubt refers to 138 B, *ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἂν*, where *κίνησις* is the genus of which *ἀλλοίωσις* is one species; and his charge is that this is here reversed in order to establish *ἀλλοίωσις* from a conceded *κίνησις*, while all that can be inferred is either change or motion in space. Despite Stallb. the charge is just, if Pl. adheres to his terminology: and he has just renewed that by saying, 162 D, *μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις*, and then treating of its kinds; cp. Arist. Phys. III. 1, 201 a 8, *ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἐστὶν εἶδη τοσαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος ... ὅλον ... ἀλλοίωσις, ... αὔξεισις καὶ φθίσις, ... γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά*. *Εἰ μὲν ... ἀλλοιοῦται*: *Ἄ* *εἰ ... εἰ*, and it does quite well: t *ἦ ... ἦ*, which also satisfies the passage. If this conversion is to hold *ἀλλοίωσις* and *κίνησις* must be convertible. In any other case the lang. must have been either *εἰ κινεῖται ἀλλοιοῦται, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται οὐ κινεῖται* or *εἰ ἀλ-*

λοιοῦται κινεῖται, εἰ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται—the latter being the form which would agree with Pl.'s former definitions.

τὸ ἀλλοιοῦν ... ἀπόλλυσθαι; Here again *ἀλλοίωσις* stands for *ἀπόλλυσθαι-γίγνεσθαι* if the conversion is to hold. But if so *ἀπόλ.* and *γίγν.* are used to mean (1) any change (even one of place), (2) the very special change implied in death-birth.

ἀλλοιοῦμενον μὲν ... οὐ γὰρ οὐν: Here while the B positive *τε καὶ* are repeated twice, the negs. vary from *οὐ ... οὔτε* to *οὔτε ... οὔτε*. Of the negs. the latter form is the normal one. On the former cp. on 150 B. Jelf rightly says, 775, Obs. 2, that *οὐ ... οὔτε* is often ident. with *οὐδὲ ... οὔτε*, the *δὲ* merely linking the sent. to a previous one. The want of symmetry here is often paralleled in English—'Does not become nor perish' might well be followed by 'neither becomes nor perishes.' t gives *οὔτε ... οὔτε* in both cases.

160 B-163 B. Dem. B 1. is to the hypoth. 'if the one is not' what A II. was to the hypoth. 'if the one is.' It is synthet. or construct, being based upon such a concep. of the hypoth. as admits of discussion. Grant that the subject admits of being clearly discussed, and it has in it a capacity for endless antithetic development, it 'both is and is not' many things. But like A II., B 1. is much harder to work out than is the corresponding analytic one. The author makes his points in various ways—(1) by stipulating for definiteness, (2) by pressing the 'is' in 'is not' as he did in 'if the one is,' (3) by attempting determination through negation, (4) by claiming that the object of thought if you are 'truthful' exists, and withal (5) by sophistry. These various methods run into each other. With regard to the fourth, while the proposition that thought and existence are one may be strongly and legitimately defended, it is not easy to feel that Pl.'s statement of it is legitimate. One is reminded of the statement 132 C, which he regards as sufficient to refute itself, about 'thoughts that are without the power of thinking.' What he seems rather to contend for is that if any persons choose to lay down a hypoth. and reason seriously about it, their reasonings, if just, will lead to conclusions possessing objective reality. In that sense thought and being are not identical. Even Arist.'s strong assertion, Phys. III.

4, 203 b 30, 'Ενδέχεται γὰρ ἢ εἶναι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἐν τοῖς αἰδέοις, is guarded by the closing words. Grote says 'The meaning of the predicate is altogether effaced (as it had been before in Number 1): we cannot tell what it is which is really denied about Unum ... the proposition *Unum non est* is so construed as to deny nothing except *Unum non est Unum*, yet conveying along with such denial a farther affirmation — *Unum non est Unum, sed tamen est aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis* (160 c). Here this *aliquid scibile* is assumed as a substratum underlying Unum, and remaining even when Unum is taken away: contrary to the opinion—that Unum was a separate nature and the fundamental Subject of all—which Arist. announces as having been held by Pl. (Met. B, 1001 a 6-20). There must be always some meaning (the Platonic Parm. argues) attached to the word Unum, even when you talk of *Unum non Ens*: and that meaning is equivalent to *Aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis*. From this he proceeds to evolve, step by step, though often in a manner obscure and inconclusive, his series of contradictory affirmations respecting Unum.' As regards terminol. the close association between the ideas *κίνησις* *ἀλλοιώσις* and *γένεσις* is derived from the old physical philosophers. Πάντα ῥεῖ etc. suggest the first, while Arist. Phys. I. 4, 187 a 29, οὕτω λέγουσιν, ἦν ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοιόνδε καθέστηκεν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, couples the others.

αὶ ταῦτα So both Mss. Edd. may be right in reading ταῦτά: but there is nothing to call for the change. For ἀλλὰ χρή: one would expect some such echo of the previous statement as ἴωμεν δῆ.

C ἀρα μή etc. The query = ἀρ' οὐ τόδε σημ.

πότερον ... τό γε μή ὅν; μή ἔστι λεγόμενον corresp. so far to μή ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν above, and phps. it is used for mere variety after the repeated φῶμεν μή εἶναι: μή ἔστι is in inverted commas. As to the sense; we are, it may be hoped, speaking as truthfully here as at 161 E, yet we can banish the one from existence with some success. The εἶναι below is found in t, and seems necessary.

D μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἡ etc. So both Mss.; yet Heind. can justify ἦν, 'Ita correxi vulgatum ἦ, quoniam μή h.l. interrogandi vim habet non dubitandi.' The ἦν would (Stallb.) refer to 156 A. Certainly μή interrogans in Ast goes always with the indic. As for the

colloc. of sounds cp. Phaed. 69 A, μή γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθή ἀλλαγῇ. The close of the sent. might equally have run τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μετάληψις τὸ δ' ἀπόλυσις οὐσίας.

μηδὲν τούτου The fem. might be looked for, and Heind. would read μηδέν του: but αὐτὸ confirms the neuter. Cp. 157 D, μηδενὸς δὲ ὅν etc.

οὐτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι So t: Ἄ οὐτ' ἀναλαμβάν. There is something to be said for the compound verb, but ἂν can hardly be spared. Proc.-Dam. (315), however, in paraphrasing gives οὐτε γοῦν ἀναλαμβάνει οὐτε ἀπολλύει. Was his text that of the A family? If he is on the right track we would have an un-Attic form in ἀπολλύει. Notes 1.

τῷ ἐνι ... αἰέας: It is hard to bring out the distinc. between οὐδαμῇ and οὐδαμῶς as used throughout this passage. 'Auf keine Art und Weise' Stallb. above: 'dass das Nichtseiende keineswegs irgendwärts ist und nirgendwie an dem Sein Theil hat' Müller: 'nullo prorsus modo usquam est' Fic.: 'in no sort or way or kind' Jowett, including πῃ. Is οὐδαμῶς = nohow, and οὐδαμῇ = nowise? As to the argt., Proc.-Dam. (314), after saying that the previous Dem. discusses τίνα ἔπεται τῷ ἐνι μὴ ὄντι, goes on ἐκ τούτου δὲ ἀποδείκνυσι τὰ μὴ ἐπόμενα (an odd but intelligible phrase) ... τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι, φησὶ, τότε λέγομεν ὅταν οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ προσμαρτυρῶμεν ὃ ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι. οὐκ εἶναι γοῦν φάμεν αὐτὸ πῶς, πῶς δ' εἶναι, ἢ ἀπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ...; καὶ ἀπολογεῖται ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος οὐ μόνον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ ἀπλούστατα. etc. Thoms. quotes his Dam., Ms. fol. 8, τὸ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὃν ἀπόπτωσις ἔστι τῆς οὐσίας. In οὐτε ἄρα ... πάσῃσιν he carries out his remarks in B.

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ... πῶς γὰρ οὐ: The assigning of the E second τῷ αὐτῷ to the reply is t, not A, and it seems essential, while Stallb. gives ample authority for the omission of the prep.—e.g. Crat. 408 D, ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν. Τῶν γε τοιούτων, ὦ Σ., εἰ βούλει. Μῆτε ... μῆτε ... μὴ γὰρ ὄν, a neat illustr. of the compound character of μῆτε as = 'both not, and not' rather than 'neither, nor.' The μὴ in the ans. takes up the double μὴ of the statement, and leaves the τε ... τε as mere copulatives.

ἦδη γὰρ ἂν ... ὄντος So A, and it seems quite satisf. It is as if he said ὄντος γὰρ ἂν τούτου μετέχον, the ὄντες being predicative. τοῦτο t can hardly be right.

Bek. adopts *ἀν του* from 'rc. Σ'; while Stallb. inserts *του* before *ὄντος*, which seems to take from the significance of the passage.

164 οὔτε ἄρα ... *ἀν αὐτῷ*: In the first sent. the triple οὔτε is reg.: in the second there would be two cases of a double οὔτε, but in the former of them the first οὔτε becomes οὐδὲ so that the δὲ may couple the second sent. to the first. *t* balances this οὐδὲ by a second before *ἐτεροι*: and gives *τε* for *γε* and *τᾶλλα* for *ἄλλα*.

τᾶλλα ... εἶναι; 'Is it possible that there should be a *τᾶλλα* for it at all, if it be necessary that there should be nothing for it?' 'is there any respect in which it can have *τᾶλλα* if it behoove to have nothing?'

p. 37. B *περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν* A variety from *τῷ μὴ ὄντι*. So 155 E and often. Thoms. cps. Soph. 238 c for a series of negations, *συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτόν τε καὶ ἄλογον*;

163 B-164 B. These two Dems., marked B I. and II., under the hypoth. of *ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι* correspond to Dems. A I. and II., under the hypoth. *ἐν εἰ ἔστι*, but in a reversed order. The present II. corresponds to the former I. Both are analytic or destructive, and attain their object, the present one by pressing the *μή*, the former by pressing the *ἐν*. And the result is much more easily and satisfactorily got at than in the corresponding synthetic or constructive cases. Indeed the course of reasoning merely tends to give clearness to the conception with which we begin. In this case *μὴ εἶναι* = *οὐσίας ἀπουσία*; and there is an end. Grote says 'These two last counter-demonstrations (6-7), forming the third Antinomy deserve attention in this respect—That the seventh [i.e. this one] is founded upon the genuine Parmenidean or Eleatic doctrine about Non-Ens, as not merely having no attributes, but as being unknowable, unperceivable, unnameable: while the sixth is founded upon a different apprehension of Non-Ens, which is explained and defended by Pl. in the Sophistes (pp. 258-9) as a substitute for, and refutation of, the Eleatic doctrine ... The negative results of the 7th follow properly enough from the assumed premisses: but the affirmative results of the 6th are not obtained without very unwarrantable jumps in the reasoning, besides its extreme subtlety.'

It was said, Introd. lxvi., that not-being is as diverse as being; and that Pl. assumes this in part here, and more clearly in the Soph. Arist. as usual has the advant. in scient. clearness when he says that not-being *ἰσαχῶς ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγεται* (Met. XIII. 2). If your Categs. are properly deduced the statement is complete. In this Dem. we deal with not-being in the Categ. of *οὐσία*, in the prev. one we did not—this corresp. with Grote above. The most import. declar. in Dems. B. I-II. is that (162) being and not-being imply each the other. If we speak of being in the popular phenom. sense this holds even under the Categ. of *οὐσία*, while of course it holds in the sense of the dictum *Omnis determinatio est negatio*. It does not hold (Grote above) in the Parm. sphere of being; hence the abortive char. of that system. Pl. in this dial. has a presentiment that it will have to hold in the ideal sphere—*ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἰδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην*—if his system is to succeed where the other failed.

ἀλλὰ μὴν που ... λέγοιτο: *t* μὲν which (Heind.) would suit *εἰ δὲ περὶ*. The *που* has probably not a local meaning, though occurring thus it suggests such at first. To be consist. Pl. should say *δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι πῃ*. He has proved, or assumed, that this alone is needed 161 E-162.

ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ Cp. on 147 D 'on the same ground.'

ἕτερον δὲ ... ναί: The *τὸ (t)* seems needed to mark the subject. For the terms see 143 B. The argt. is that 'others' as a *πρὸς τι* must have a correl.

μὴ ὄντος γε: In this Dem. then the sense of *μὴ εἶναι* applied to the one is the same as in the preceding—*οὐσίας ἀπουσία*.

ἀλλήλων ... ὁρθῶς: Proc.-Dam. (316) *τὸ ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς τι ἐστίν ... ἔστιν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τι (εἰ μέλλοι [sic] ἄλλα εἶναι) οὐ ἄλλα ἔσται ... ἐπεὶ νῦν τὸ ἐν φαίνεται ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστί*. It seems to be idiomatic to use the pres. *λείπεται* in this sense of *λοιπόν*, cp. Ast. So *τὰ σωζόμενα* for the literary remains of an author: cp. Arist. Phys. III. 6, *λείπεται οὖν δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ ἀπειρον. κατὰ ἐν ... ἀλλ' ἕκαστος* give a sharp contrast of hiatus and elision.

ὁ δόκος ... ἐξ αὐτοῦ: *δόξαντος εἶναι* is one of Pl.'s D redundancies for emph.; while *καὶ ἀντὶ συμκροτ. παμμέγ.* is surely a confus. of ideas. It grows

numerous, and exhibits a case of what Arist. calls *ἄπειρον κατὰ διαίρεσιν*, but surely it does not increase in bulk. No doubt Arist. says, *Phys.* III. 6, 206 b 27, Πλ. ... δύο τὰ ἄπειρα ἐποίησεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξὴν δοκεῖ ὑπερβάλλειν καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον ἵεναι, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαίρεσιν and very likely he may regard τὰ ἄλλα collectively as ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξὴν ὑπερβάλλοντα, but he can hardly mean that τὸ σμικρόν, because it is divisible indefinitely, becomes indefinitely large. His words are probably to be qualified by πρὸς τὰ κ. ἐξ αὐτοῦ—it becomes infinitely big by comparison. On the other hand we have the extraord. paradox, as Arist. *Phys.* III. 6, 206 b 5; points out, of a limited bulk divisible infinitely, and then (as regarded from the divided state backwards) augmentable infinitely—ἡ γὰρ διαιρούμενον ὁράται εἰς ἄπειρον, ταύτη προστιθέμενον [ἀντεστραμμένως he says above] φανέται πρὸς τὸ ὠρισμένον. Thoms. quotes 'Procl. Inst. Theol. cap. 1, Πᾶν πλῆθος μετέχει πη τοῦ ἑνός' εἰ γὰρ μηδαμῇ μετέχοι οὔτε τὸ ὅλον ἐν ἑστίαι, οὔτ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ἐξ ὧν τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' ἑστίαι καὶ τι ἐκ τούτων πλῆθος καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων τούτων ἕκαστον ἑστίαι πάλιν πλῆθος ἄπειρον. Democr. must have believed in the ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξήν, or as Arist. also puts it, οὐ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἰεὶ τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἕξω, since starting with ἄτομοι he held καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους δ' ἀπείρους εἶναι κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ πλῆθος. *Diog. Laert.* IX. 44.

τοιούτων δὴ...τᾶλλα, Fic. 'talibus, inquam, acervis diversa invicem alia praeter unum erunt,' where invicem rather avoids the difficulty. Heind. wishes we had ὄντων after ὄγκων. Stallb. objects and says the order is τᾶλλα δὴ εἴη ἂν ἄλλα ἀλλήλων τοιούτων ὄγκων, but does not transl. Jowett 'And in such aggregations the others will be the others of one another,' which gives the gist but does not explain the structure. Pl. has already said that the others are other than one another, and he does not wish to part with the phrase, but he seeks to add his elucidation of the true character of the ἄλληλα. What we seem to need is either a mentally repeated ἄλλα—τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα, ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἂν εἴη τᾶλλα—or a different case for the first words—τοιούτοι δὴ ὄγκοι ὄντα τᾶλλα, ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἂν εἴη.

E καὶ ἀριθμὸς...ὄντων: Ἄ δόξειεν may be a reminisc. of the εἴη ἂν which has occurred more than once,

or may be due to δόξει ἐν below: t δόξει. Heind. would supply οὐκ ὦν to ἀριθμὸς δόξει εἶναι. That is the sense, carried on from ὦν δὲ οὐ, and recurring in οὐκ ἀληθῶς. The argt. shuts out his use of πολλὰ above.

φαίνεται, From 'would' (εἴη ἂν) through 'will' (δόξει) we reach 'does.' 'Mallem φανεῖται,' Thoms.

καὶ μὴν...εἶναι. Ἄτ δόξειεν αὐτοῖς, while t reads εἶναι for ἐν εἶναι. The edd. prefer δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι, which may possibly be best, but ἐνεῖναι and ἐν εἶναι are debatable throughout the dial. Proc.-Dam. in his note follows Ἄ, δόξειεν...ἐν εἶναι.

καὶ ἴσος...ἰσότητος: Without knowing that t has 165 σμικροῖς here Schleierm. (whom edd. follow) suggested that for σμικρός, and it is very taking. But we must note that if we have not this direct statement that the ὄγκος from having been big becomes small, after passing through equality, we can only infer that it does from the following words which assume it. Proc.-Dam. (317) says καὶ ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται καὶ ἴσος τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικρός. The form δοξασθήσεται occurs Theaet. 209 c, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, and this passive voice is much more frequent in Pl. than one would infer from L. and S. When the ὄγκος passes from little to big it is being closely observed and becoming many; when it passes from big to little (Heind.) each of the many is being momentarily viewed as one. The constr. of φαινόμενος partly recalls the idiom προτεραιός for τῇ προτεραίᾳ. The words οὐκ ἂν μετῇ. φαίν. are fairly equiv. to οὐκ ἂν μεταβαίνειν ἐφαίνετο, but we might bring out the force of the part. by rendering 'for it could not cross over in its phantasmal course, in its progress of make-believe': unless indeed we are to suppose that by some strange whim the words ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος are meant for ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος εἰς τὸ ἔλαττον φαίνεσθαι. Edd. do not comment upon πρὶν δόξειν ἐλθεῖν, yet the express. is peculiar. How many cases are there of πρὶν with the fut. infin.; and why the fut.? If again we take πρὶν ἐλθεῖν, still how deal with δόξειν? t gives δόξειεν, which would do very well but that one would then expect μεταβαίνοι, the whole sent. being = οὐ γὰρ ἂν μεταβαίνοι... εἰ μὴ πρότερον... δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν. It is worth asking whether the orig. may not have been δόξαν, the part. balancing φαινόμενος so far, but agreeing with τὸ μεταξὺ = πρὶν ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξαν.

οὐκοῦν ... μέσον ἔχων: Heind. would understand *δοξασθήσεται εἶναι* with the first *ἔχων*, while Stallb. assumes it with the latter only. Heind. seems right; yet it is hard to make any distinc. where all is seeming. But if, with Stallb., we assume that each *ὄγκος* has a limit towards every other, a considerable step has been taken towards making each 'one.' Yet Proc.-Dam. (318) takes this view, *ἐντεῦθεν δαίκνυσιν ὅτι ἕκαστος ὄγκος πρὸς ἄλλον πέρας ἔχων* (*εἰς γὰρ ἕκαστος περιορίζεται πρὸς τὸν ἑτερον*) *αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἔξει ταῦτα*. If we take this view we must remove the comma from *αὐτὸν* and place it before *πέρας ἔχων* and also perhaps with Herm. put *γε* for *τε* against both Mss.

ἔτι ἀλλ' ... τοῦ ἐνός: What is *αὐτῶν*? It might, so far as form goes, like the following *τούτων* refer to *ἀρχὴν πέρας μέσον* preceding, but it is better to refer it to *ὄγκων* = 'as often as one takes hold mentally of any part of them (the groups), as being one of these parts (i.e. as being beginning, middle, or end), so often does another beginning appear before the beginning [if it is as a beginning that we have viewed our part] etc.' The reading of *ἄ* is *ἄλλα* *μεταίτερα τὰ τοῦ μέσου* from which edd. omit the unintelligible *τὰ* leaving what is the reading of *τ*. The text gives a reading which, with a very slight change indeed, both accounts for the *τὰ* and yields a much better parallel to the two previous expressions. For the lang. cp. Arist. Met. IX. 4, 1055 a 20, *οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐσχατώτερον εἴη ἂν τι*. The *δὲ* is added from *τ* as apparently necessary. For the closing words from *διὰ* Fic. gives 'quia nequit unum aliquid in his accipi etc.'; but would not this require *διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον λαμβάνεσθαι*? If it stands as in the text *λαμβ.* must be mid., as Ast assumes, and we must borrow mentally a subj. for *δύνασθαι* from *τις* at the beginn. of the sent. = *διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι αὐτόν*.

θρύπτ. ... τῇ διανοίᾳ. There seems to be in PL but another case of *θρύπτεσθαι* used for 'break to pieces,' viz. Crat. 426 D-E, where he is speaking of the *ρ*-sound as indicating movement or *φορά*, and cites *ρεῖν βοῇ—εἴτα ἐν τῇ τρύμφῃ, εἴτα ἐν τῇ τραχείᾳ, ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε ῥήμασιν οἷον κρούειν, θραύειν, ἐρείκειν, θρύπτειν, κερματίζειν, ῥυμβεῖν*: πάντα ταῦτα τὸ πολὺ ἀπεικάζει διὰ τοῦ ῥῶ· ἑώρα γάρ, οἶμαι, τὴν γλῶτταν ἐν τούτῳ ἦκιστα μένουσαν μάλιστα δὲ σειομένην.

Thus we might render it 'crumble away': which the group does, as Proc.-Dam. (319) says *διὰ τὸ μὴ θέλειν ἵστασθαι ἐν τῇ ἐνί*. He twice uses the phrase *λαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ*, cp. 130 A. Does he mean that the *ὄγκοι* are not physical? Whether so or not they are at least mental pictures of physical objects. 'Ἄνευ ἐνὸς λαμβάνοιτ' ἂν: so *ἄ*, while *τ* gives *ἀνευ ἐνὸς αἰεὶ λαμβάνοιτο ἂν*, and so Fic. 'semper enim acervus unius expers accipitur.'

ὁξὺ γνόντι, *ἄ* ὁξύνοντι, where the small mark *c* looks like a small aspirate. Although Proc.-Dam. has *ὁξύνοντι*, it can hardly be right. PL does not use the word at all elsewhere, and in the sense required here it does not seem to be used anywhere. *τ* gives *ὁξὺ νοοῦντι*. Perhaps the little sign is all that is left of a misunderstood *γ* or *Γ* which had been omitted and was placed above, or else it may be a sign of a lost marginal correction. The aorist seems better too in this connec. as we have the parallel *ὁρῶντι: φαίνεσθαι:: γνόντι: φαινῆναι*. For the lang. cp. Rep. X. 596 A, *ἐπεὶ πολλά τοι ὁξύτερον βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὁρῶντες πρότεροι εἶδον*, and Theaet. 165 D, *ἴσως δέ γ', ὃ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἔπαθες, εἰ τίς σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὁξὺ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πόρρωθεν δὲ μή*.

δα φαίνεσθαι. So *τ*. *ἄ* has *δή*: wrongly—explained by *δή* above, or by dictation.

οἷον ... ἀλλήλοις: The *πάντα* (*τὰ ἄλλα*) are identical with *τοὺς ὄγκους* or *πάν τὸ ὄν*. The sense is that as outlined roughly to one at a dist., they have a sketchy resemblance to units, and that as thus affected similarly they are also like; but that when one goes up to them they split into differentiated multitudes, and by an appearance of difference become unlike. *ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα* is subj. to *φαίνεσθαι* and *ταῦτὸν πέπονθιναι* is pred.; *καὶ ὁμοία εἶναι* is the conclus. drawn in conformity with 139 E. We must assume *δόξει* from above to gov. the infins., which changes as we go on to *ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι*. Heind. cps. Theaet. 208 E, Arist. Rhet. III. 12, to show that *σκιαγραφήματα* were meant to be seen at a distance. In *οὐκ οὖν ... πολλὰ ἔστιν* the parts. and adjs. seem throughout to be gov'd. by *ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι*. In *κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις* we have an allus. to the distinc. in 138 B-C, 139 A, *φορά, περιφορά, ἀλλοίωσις*, while *πάντη* (*τὸ πανταχῇ*) = *πάσας*

εστώσεις to correspond. 'Hδη = by this time, after the practice we have had.

164 B-165 D. The result of this argt. is that in the absence of 'one' we may affirm or deny anything about the others with equal truth. But in his anxiety to make sure that the latter cannot be one he permits himself to speak as if they were many, which he has no right to do. They are simply undefinable as lacking τὸ μέτρον. But he saves himself from self-contrad. by urging that all this is only apparent,* and does not stand investigation. If you are to have others without one the result is a wild phantasmagoria or chaos. 'This Dem. 8 with its strange and subtle chain of inferences, purporting to rest upon the admission of Caetera without Unum, brings out the antithesis of the Apparent and the Real, which had not been noticed in the preceding Dems. Dem. 8 is in its character Zenonian. It probably coincides with the proof which Zeno is reported ... to have given (p. 127 E, cp. 165 E) against the existence of any real Multa Zeno probably showed ... that Multa under this supposition are nothing real, but an assemblage of indefinite, ever-variable, contradictory appearances: an Ἀπειρον ...: relative and variable according to the point of view of the subject.' Grote.

ἐν εἰ μὴ ... καὶ ἐν. The opening means εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστι τὰλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔστι. The πολλοῖς οὖσιν is an echo of ἔσται τὰλλα and πολλὰ ἔστιν, we might view it as equivalent either to ἐν γὰρ αὐτοῖς πολλοῖς οὖσιν or ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς εἰ ἔστιν. Proc.-Dam. (320) says of this Dem. εἰπὼν τοίνυν (in the last) τίνα τὰ ἐπόμενα, τίθησι καὶ τίνα τὰ μὴ ἐπόμενα, and one sees what he means, though as above his lang. is odd.

166 ὅτι τὰλλα ... μὴ οὖσιν: The order here is ὅτι τὰλλα οὐδ' ἐνὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων etc. and παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων. The argt. rebuts the assumpt. both by whole and part; the ἄλλα have 'nothing whatever' to do with what is non-existent, nor has any part of either any connection with any part of the other. Stallb. would read οὐδὲ γὰρ for οὐδέν, but the Mss. agree. Heind. in order to justify μέρος, which he thinks superfluous, suggests that δόξα etc. which follow may be regarded as μέρος. And so Proc.-Dam. (321) εἰ γοῦν τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔστιν etc.

οὐδ' ἄρα ... ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων: As Proc.-Dam. says, νῦν ταῦτα δὴ, ἅπερ ἐφαίνοντο εἶναι (in Dem. B III.) οὔτε εἰσὶν οὔτε φαίνονται. Cp. Rep. v. 478 B, ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν; etc. From 155 D we may infer that φάντασμα is a result of αἰσθησις. It is a startling thing to be told that the δοξάζειν is supposed, if it exists, to be carried on ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων: no such sugg. has hitherto been made. On the contrary we have been permitted to assume that ἡμεῖς ... πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν, and edd. follow Schleierm. in reading ἐπὶ against the Mss. Yet it is not more startling than that νοήματα should have νόησις, in 132 C; and if we change ὑπὸ we cannot stop there, the same sense being contained in δόξα παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔστιν.

οὐδ' ἄρα. Note the series of similar negs. meaning B 'no, nor,' 'nor yet' etc. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, i.e. 165 D. p. 39. The sent. = ὅσα ἐν τ. π. εἵπομεν αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι. It gives τὰλλα, and it seems better. ἐν εἰ τε ἔστιν etc. This summarises the dial.: Proc.-Dam. (321) says καὶ εἰ ἐν ἔστι καθὼς ἐν ταῖς πρόσθεν ὑποθέσεσιν ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι καθὼς ἐν ταύταις δὴ ταῖς παρούσαις. As in Dems. B I. and II. he had treated of the result to the one if it is not, first after a fashion and second absolutely; so he deals in Dems. III. and IV. with the fate of the others under similar conditions. That is, I. corresponds with III. and II. with IV. With regard to the last sent., summarising the whole, it must be regarded as held subject to the conditions indicated in Dem. A III. 156 A-B, viz. that the law of contrad. operates at least roughly. As Grote points out that Dem.—which breaks up the harmony of the antinomies A I.-II., IV.-V., B I.-II., III.-IV.—must so far apply to each pair of contrary proofs as these occur. Of the conclus. he says 'The close of the Parmenides as it stands here, may be fairly compared to the enigma announced by Plato in his Republic v. 479 C, [ἔοικε καὶ τῶν παίδων αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου τῆς βολῆς πέρι τῆς νυκτερίδος, ᾧ καὶ ἐφ' οὗ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν] ... This is an enigma propounded for youthful auditors to guess: stimulating their curiosity and tasking their intelligence to find out. As far as I can see, the puzzling antinomies in the Parmenides have no other purpose ... There is however this difference ... The

constructor of the enigma had certainly a preconceived solution to which he adapted the conditions of his problem: whereas we have no sufficient ground for asserting that the author of the antinomies had any such solution present or operative in his mind. How much of truth Plato may himself have recognised, or may have wished others to

recognise in them, we have no means of determining. We find in them many equivocal propositions and unwarranted inferences—much blending of truth with error, intentionally or unintentionally. The veteran Parmenides imposes the severance of the two as a lesson upon his youthful hearers.' Surely this is too pessimistic.

ERRATA.—The following errors have been observed: no doubt there are others, although much care has been taken. It should be noted that, in giving the punctuation in Notes I., no attempt has been made to give the 'middle stop' where it seemed to occur. This is due partly to doubts as to the facts, partly to the trouble which would have been caused in printing. The upper or lower stop has been used according as the position in the Mss. seemed to incline.

Page xxvii.,	line 30,	for premises	read -isses
„ liv.,	„ 31,	„ principal	„ -ple
„ lxxv.,	„ 30,	„ VI.	„ VII.
„ ci.,	„ 38,	„ reproductions	„ -tion
„ 16,	„ 22,	„ <i>τις συλλήβδην</i>	„ <i>τις -δην</i>
„ 32,	„ 14,	„ <i>ἐστῶτα</i> ,	„ -τα
„ 115,	„ 1,	„ <i>πορωτέρων</i>	„ <i>πορωτέρων</i>
„ 139,	„ 29,	„ than	„ from
„ 8.—	The 80 b 1 and 1	belong to δ' λέγω	in line 17.

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