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
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PLATONIS EUTHYPHRO

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ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ

PLATONIS EUTHYPHRO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ
οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρεταῖς
χρώμενοι·

Plato: *Euthyphro* 13 E.

45566

θεοῦ γάρ ἐσμεν συνεργοί· θεοῦ γεώργιον, θεοῦ
οἰκοδομή ἐστε.

Paul: 1 *Cor.* 3. 9.

PREFACE.

THE present edition of the Euthyphro is intended to be uniform with my editions of the Apology and the Crito. I have tried to shew in the Introduction that a thorough examination of the Euthyphro forms an excellent training for the study of Plato's more profound and complex dialogues; and with this end in view, I have spared no effort to make my exposition of Plato's style and doctrine as complete as possible.

The text is based on Schanz's collation of B and T, the few cases where I have departed from these manuscripts being noted in the commentary. In writing the notes, I have derived considerable help from the annotated editions of Fritzsche and Wohlrab, but above all from that of Schanz, whose work in this department proves him as great in exegesis as he is patient and trustworthy in collating manuscripts. For the Introduction, Fritzsche's Prolegomena and Bonitz's Platonische Studien have been of the greatest service. I hope however to have contributed a good deal that is new

in the interpretation both of the text and subject matter of the dialogue.

I am indebted to my friends Mr Neil of Pembroke, Mr Platt of Trinity, and Mr Headlam of Trinity Hall, for kindly reading through the sheets and contributing many valuable suggestions.

EMMANUEL COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE,
January 21, 1895.



INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. *On the leading motive of the Euthyphro.*

IN the well-known passage of the Phaedrus¹, where Plato weighs the rival claims of spoken and written discourse, it is said that the philosopher will write books for amusement (παιδιᾶς χάριν), as well as to provide a treasury of memories and suggestions for himself when he shall have reached "oblivion's old age", and for all who follow the same trail. Generally however, even a single dialogue of Plato shews a great complexity of motive. Playful personalities, veiled eulogies on his master Socrates, logical inquiries, ethical and metaphysical doctrine, are fused into one whole by his unsurpassed dramatic skill. Regarding as he did written discourse as the image of words spoken (τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὃ γεγραμμένος εἶδωλον ἂν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως²), Plato endeavoured to communicate to the image something of the variety and vivacity of actual conversation: δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶν συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε

Intermixture of motives in Plato's dialogues.

¹ 276 D.

² Phaedr. 276 A.

ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντ' ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα¹.

The dialogue called 'Euthyphro' was intended less for amusement, than as a finger-post to point the way παντὶ τῷ ταῦτὸν ἔχοντι μετιόντι. Though by no means deficient in character-drawing and general dramatic vivacity, it is in this respect inferior to dialogues like the Phaedrus or Euthydemus. The accessories of scene and setting are very simple: as in the Crito, only two actors appear upon the stage. But the very simplicity of its structure renders the work all the more suitable as an introduction to the more serious study of Plato. For while the artistic unity and brilliant colouring of the most finished dialogues frequently make it difficult to discover the germ of positive teaching which lies latent in them, in the Euthyphro, on the other hand, it is comparatively easy to see what Plato meant to say: in spite of more than one false start, and much wandering through devious byways, we come at last within clear view of the summit, though it still remains unscaled. The lesson learned in unravelling the Euthyphro may be afterwards made use of to disentangle the more complex dialogues. And besides this training in method, the careful student of the Euthyphro will be introduced to many logical problems that continually reappear in the more elaborate dialogues of Plato: while even more clearly than in any other of the Socratic dialogues, he will see the doctrine of λόγοι transforming itself into the theory of Ideas. If we add to this, that the diction of the Euthyphro possesses all the marks of Plato's style in dialogue,

¹ Phaedr. 264 c.

The comparative simplicity of the Euthyphro renders it valuable as an introduction to Platonic study,

concl.

especially as it foreshadows the theory of Ideas, and is thoroughly Platonic in style.

except that it is simpler, we shall admit that a thorough examination of the dialogue will form a fitting preparation for a more comprehensive study of Plato's style and doctrine¹.

It will facilitate the proper apprehension of the meaning of the Euthyphro to describe as clearly as possible the progress of the dialogue.

Socrates, going to the King's Porch in connection with the indictment preferred against him by Meletus, is met by Euthyphro. In reply to Euthyphro's wondering question as to why he had so far left his usual haunts, Socrates rapidly describes the accusation and alludes to his accuser in no flattering terms. His resentment is shared by Euthyphro, who sees in the prosecution something of the same spirit of secularism that leads the Athenian assembly to deride his own deliverances on things divine. 'Just so', says Socrates: 'you they deride, but me they prosecute: I suppose because I teach my wisdom, whereas you keep yours to yourself'. Euthyphro hopes that all will end well with Socrates' trial as he thinks it will with his own (Chapters I—III).

*Argument
of the
dialogue.*

*The intro-
duction.*

It is now the turn of Socrates to ask and of Euthyphro to answer. In reply to Socrates' questions, Euthyphro says that he is about to prosecute his own father for manslaughter. Socrates is horrified, or

¹ I am glad to see that Dr Franz Laucizsky (in the *Zeitschrift für österreichische Gymnasien* Vol. XL 3. p. 274) also regards the Euthyphro as 'eine fruchtbare und lohnende Schullektüre', chiefly on account of the clear and emphatic way in which the Socratic doctrine of concepts is presented and illustrated. Wohlrab's Euthyphro for schools has now reached a third edition (1887).

pretends to be: and his horror is not lessened when Euthyphro narrates the circumstances on which the charge rests. A day-labourer, in a paroxysm of drunken rage, had killed a slave belonging to Euthyphro's father. He was put in chains and thrown into a pit, till directions as to his treatment should come from Athens. In the meantime he died. Euthyphro is so confident in the correctness of his views of holiness and unholiness that heedless of the remonstrances of his family he resolves to prosecute his father (Chapter IV). As one who is himself accused of impiety, Socrates professes himself eager to be taught by Euthyphro the true nature of holiness and its opposite, so as either to prove to Meletus that he is not guilty of impiety, or to induce him to attack Euthyphro the teacher first (Chapter V).

What, asks Socrates, is holiness and unholiness? Euthyphro answers (1): Holiness is to do what I am doing now: unholiness is not so to do. See how Zeus treated his guilty father Cronus! But Socrates expresses his disbelief in such legends as dishonourable to the gods, hinting that perhaps that is why he is put upon his trial (Chapter VI).

Postponing the inquiry into the truth of such tales, Socrates directs his attack upon the definition given by Euthyphro and has no difficulty in shewing that it errs by putting one special instance in place of the general quality. Perceiving the mistake, Euthyphro offers an amended definition (2): what is dear to the gods is holy, what is not dear, unholy (Chapter VII).

In assailing this definition, Socrates points out that there are gods and gods: and as in the allusion

First
definition.

by instance

Second
definition.

to Zeus and Cronus it has already been admitted that they have differences, different gods will differ from each other just on those points on which men differ among themselves, viz. on such questions as what is honourable and what is just: and since they will love what they think honourable, it follows that they will love different things, so that one and the same thing will be both holy and unholy (Chapter VIII). For example, the conduct of Euthyphro in prosecuting his father may commend itself to one god, and not to another: in which case it will be unholy no less than holy. To Euthyphro's objection that all the gods will agree in thinking that the doer of unrighteous manslaughter should be punished, Socrates replies that the point at issue in such a case, with gods as well as with men, will be 'Is the manslaughter righteous or not?' So that they will still differ none the less (Chapter IX). How can Euthyphro shew that all the gods hold the manslaughter committed by his father to be unrighteous? Euthyphro pretends that he could give the proof if time allowed: the judges shall have it, if they will but hear him (Chapter X). After Euthyphro has thus for the first time shirked the issue, he is allowed by Socrates to restate his second definition in the corrected form which the inquiry has shewn to be necessary. "Holiness", he now says, *Third definition.* "is (3) what all the gods love, unholiness what all the gods hate". With this ends Chapter XI.

The third definition is refuted in the course of the two following chapters. Socrates proves that it is only an accident of piety to be beloved of the gods: whereas a definition should state, not the accident, but the essence of a notion. A brief interlude follows,

in which Euthyphro complains of the unsettling character of Socrates' dialectic.

A suggestion by Socrates.

7.14

Presently, with a view to attaining a more satisfactory definition, Socrates himself puts forward a suggestion: Is all that is right holy, or is all that is holy right, but only part of that which is right holy? Euthyphro is unable to catch the meaning of the question, until by an exercise in the conversion of propositions it is made clear to him (Chapters XII—XIII).

Fourth definition.

The question still remains what part of that which is right is to be identified with holiness? Euthyphro's solution is (4): "Piety and Holiness are that part of rectitude which is concerned with the care of the gods" (Chapter XIV).

In criticising this definition, the first object of Socrates is to determine what meaning is to be assigned to the word 'care'. That it is not the care which results in benefit to the gods, making them better, he agrees: it is rather such care as is shewn by slaves to their masters—*ὑπηρετική τις θεραπεία* (Chapter XIII). But even now the definition is not clear. Servants, working under their masters, produce some definite result: what result does the pious man produce, working under the gods? What do the gods produce, when they make use of us as their servants? To this question Euthyphro returns only the vague reply "many beautiful things", thus for the second time shirking the issue: when further pressed, he evades the point and declares (5) that "if one knows how to say and do what is acceptable to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, that is holiness, and such a course of conduct is the salvation both of private

Fifth definition.

homes and public communities: whereas the opposite of what is acceptable to the gods is impious, and overthrows and ruins everything" (Chapter XVI).

Socrates first points out that Euthyphro has evaded the issue: afterwards, taking his definition as equivalent to the notion that "holiness is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray", he interprets this as "the knowledge of how to ask from the gods and give to the gods aright" (Chapter XVII). In other words, Holiness is the art of merchandise exercised between gods and men. What benefit, then, do the gods derive from the gifts we give them? In Euthyphro's opinion, none: our gifts to the gods are acceptable to them, nothing more. And Euthyphro admits that if acceptable, they must be dear, thus reverting to the second definition, which has already been refuted (Chapter XVIII).

In the two remaining chapters, Socrates twits Euthyphro with even greater unsteadiness in argument than himself, and parts from him with an expression of deep regret that one so wise should be so niggardly of his wisdom.

From this analysis of the dialogue, it is clear that the Euthyphro falls into three parts, the two first of which are followed by a kind of transitional episode, and the last by a sort of valediction.

The structure of the dialogue is therefore as *Résumé* follows:

- I. Introduction, with transitional chapter: I—V.
- II. Suggestions coming from Euthyphro, followed by an interlude on the bewildering nature of the Socratic method: VI—middle of XIII.

III. A suggestion by Socrates, and its dialectical development, with two concluding chapters: XIII—XX.

Without going so far as to assert that there can be no positive teaching in the second division of the dialogue, we can hardly be wrong in looking for the most valuable result in the last section, seeing that it is introduced by Socrates. In the Theaetetus (184 B foll.), one of the most important doctrines of the whole dialogue, the power of the soul to cognize things by herself, independently of the senses, is introduced by Socrates and not by Theaetetus. Nevertheless, on a first inspection of this part of the dialogue, it may seem that there is no definite result attained even here: and, as we shall see later, Schleiermacher, in company with other critics, has taken this view.

The key to the Euthyphro, as to Plato's dialogues generally, is to be found by studying the unrefuted statements.

But on a closer examination, we shall find at least one question of the first importance to which Euthyphro returns no precise answer, and if we can find in our dialogue some unrefuted hints of the true answer, we shall be justified in regarding these as the key to the conception of piety contained in the Euthyphro. The principle of interpretation, that *whatever remains unrefuted in a Platonic dialogue contains the key to its positive teaching*, a principle consistently applied by Bonitz in his *Platonische Studien*, would seem to have the countenance of Plato himself in the Gorgias where he sums up the teaching of the dialogue in these words (527 B): οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκείσε φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχόμενων μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον

ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Applying this canon to the Euthyphro, we have first to note what questions are left partly or entirely unanswered in our dialogue. There is only one, but that of first-rate importance, the question in 13 E: εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Διὸς, τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐκείνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπὲρταῖς χρώμενοι; The question is presently repeated in 14 A: τί δὲ δὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται; τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς ἐργασίας; Once more Euthyphro evades the point: and, as if to make it clear beyond dispute that in the answer to this question lies the true conception of Holiness, Socrates in 14 B—C reproaches Euthyphro in these words: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἰ διδάξαι· δῆλος εἰ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦσθα, ἀπετράπου· ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἦδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. It may be added that as early as 1820 Socher (über Platons Schriften p. 62) saw that in this unanswered question lies the key to our dialogue: among more recent writers, Bonitz¹, Lechthaler², Fritzsche³, and with some modifications, Wohlrab⁴, hold the same view.

It is much more difficult to discover how Plato would himself have answered the question here ad-

¹ Platonische Studien⁸ pp. 227—242.

² Die *οσιότης* (Frömmigkeit) bei Platon mit Rücksicht auf Schaarschmidt's Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron (pp. 46—47). Meran 1879.

³ Prolegomena ad Euthyphronem p. 147.

⁴ Platons Euthyphron für den Schulgebrauch erklärt p. 9. In the third and last edition (1887) Wohlrab accepts Bonitz's view unreservedly.

*The
unrefuted
statements
in the Eu-
thyphro.*

dressed to Euthyphro. If we confine ourselves in the first instance to indications contained in the Euthyphro, we shall attain only to the conception of piety as a mode of working under the gods which is productive of some altogether beautiful result ($\pi\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu \epsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ 13 E). In the same view Socrates in 14 E remarks that we have no good thing, which does not come from the gods ($\omicron\upsilon\delta\epsilon\nu \gamma\alpha\rho \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu, \delta \tau\iota \acute{\alpha}\nu \mu\grave{\eta} \epsilon\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota \delta\acute{\omega}\sigma\iota\nu$). Viewing these passages in connection with Socrates' emphatic rejection of legends imputing wicked conduct to the gods (6 A foll.), we may take it as established that whatever the joint $\epsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ of gods and men may be, it will be something altogether good. Farther than this, there seems to be ~~no hint in the~~ Euthyphro of the true answer to Socrates' question. Wohlrab¹ can hardly be right in supposing that 14 B contains the secret: for, although Socrates does not refute the statement that holiness 'conserves private houses and public communities', yet he does refute the notion (upon which this remark of Euthyphro's depends) that piety is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray.

The most that can be elicited from the Euthyphro in the way of positive teaching as to piety is that piety consists in working under God for the production of some good result not specified. I say 'under God', because there seems to be an underlying note of monotheism in Socrates' refusal to allow that gods can quarrel among themselves. Throughout the argument in 7 A—8 A, Socrates is most careful to shew that the hypothesis of differences in opinion between gods and gods, on which he refutes the definition of Euthyphro,

¹ l.c. p. 9 (edition of 1880).

is Euthyphro's own hypothesis: he is refuting Euthyphro upon his own ground.

It was no small achievement to have brought the investigation even so far as to have asked the one vital question: ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορήσαι βουλομένοις προὔργον τὸ διαπορήσαι καλῶς, as Aristotle says¹. But unless we regard every dialogue of Plato as in itself a whole, to be studied quite apart from the others, it becomes our duty to inquire whether Plato has furnished any answer to the problem in any other dialogues. The conception of man as the ὄργανον of the gods is far from rare in Plato²: but it is less easy to discover what precise result the gods and pious men produce in common. Bonitz has correctly solved the question as follows. Reminding us that Plato in all his dialogues invariably ascribes perfect goodness to God³, and comparing passages of such a tenor with the slight indications of the nature of the ἔργον given in the Euthyphro itself, he infers that the true Platonic definition of Piety, as sketched in the Euthyphro, and filled in elsewhere, is "perfect morality, only in such a form, that man is conscious of being thereby the auxiliary organ of the divine working". In other words, Piety is conceived of as a virtue that transcends and at the same time includes all the other leading virtues. It is the knowledge of the good or God translated into the field of action: and is not to be separated from the ethical end, as expressed in ὁμοίως θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (Theaetetus 176 B), ἐπεσθαι θεῷ and the like.

¹ Met. B. i 995^a 27.

² See note on 13 D.

³ Rep. II 379 B. Timaeus 29 E et al.

This conception of piety suggests two reflections.

Two reflections on the view of Piety presented in the Euthyphro. It implies (1) the unity of virtue in knowledge:

In the first place it is equivalent to an assertion of the unity of the virtues. Piety includes all other virtues because it is the knowledge of the good: just as in the Laches, courage, being the knowledge of good and evil, is represented as identical with the whole of virtue¹. And besides many particular hints throughout the Euthyphro of the unity of virtue in knowledge, it is implied in the dramatic setting of the dialogue that, being knowledge, piety may be taught by Euthyphro to Socrates.

(2) the community of God and man.

In the second place, the notion of man's working in common with God has its root in the truly Greek idea that God and man are of one family. As is pointed out in the notes, this idea runs throughout a considerable part of the argument of our dialogue. In arguing that if gods differ among themselves, they will differ exactly on those points which arouse dissension among men (7 D), and again, when Socrates clears up Euthyphro's confusion about the precise point on which the gods join issue in discussing a case of manslaughter, the latent major premise might be expressed in the words which Lucian² puts into the mouth of Heraclitus³: *τί δαὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι; θεοὶ θνητοί. τί δαὶ οἱ θεοί; ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι*. Only in respect of immortality and superior power are the gods different from mankind: they will work together as members of one household, whether we regard them as standing to one another in the relation of master

¹ Laches 199 E: cf. Charmides 174 D, Alcibiades II 146 E foll.

² Vitarum Auctio § 14.

³ Cf. Her. Frag. 67 (ed. Bywater).

and slave¹, or children of a common stock, as Hesiod² does or Pindar³, when he sings ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι.

§ 2. *The definitions of Piety contained in the Euthyphro.*

Besides the leading conception of holiness as a co-working with God, it is worth while to direct some attention to the minor definitions. For the interlocutors in Plato are for the most part types both of his contemporaries and of men in general: what they say is intended to represent a certain attitude of mind. *Special treatment of the refuted definitions.*

The first definition advanced by Euthyphro need *The first*, not in itself detain us, since it is in reality no definition, any more than Theaetetus' account of knowledge as mathematics, shoemaking etc. (Theaet. 146 C—D), or the other abortive attempts at defining which meet us in the Hippias Major, Laches and elsewhere⁴. But it is important from the manner in which Euthyphro supports his view. He appeals to Zeus, who himself put his own father in chains for wrongfully devouring his offspring: and in this appeal he finds a sanction for his own conduct. Now it would seem that these and similar legends were in Plato's time

¹ Euthyphro 13 D.

² Works and Days 108. Compare also Frag. 187 (ed. Götting): ξυναι γὰρ τότε δαίτες ἔσαν, ξυνοὶ δὲ θόωκοι ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι καταθνητοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις. Aeschylus too in Sept. 238 makes the chorus address the gods as fellow-citizens.

³ Nem. VI 1.

⁴ See note on Ch. VI *ad init.*

in the discussion of which Plato contrives to defend Socrates from the charge of treason and corrupting the youth.

and earlier cited to give countenance to deeds which the morality of the day condemned. This might be done either sophistically, as by the Unjust Cause in the Clouds (904 foll.), or conscientiously and with religious faith, as when the Eumenides¹ defend themselves for leaving Agamemnon's doom unheeded by reminding Orestes that Zeus put his own aged father in chains. As for Euthyphro, there is nothing insincere or sophistical about his manner of using the legend. To him all these legends are true: he is in fact the quintessence of consistent orthodoxy. He differs from the Athenians on the one hand by not only believing the national theology but letting it influence his life and conduct: on the other hand, Socrates and he are still further apart, inasmuch as Socrates goes so far as to disbelieve the theology of his country. And here one of the subsidiary motives of our dialogue is seen to be at work—the apologetic motive, as we may call it. Socrates had been accused of heterodoxy—that is, of treason, according to the ancient view—and of corrupting the youth. In particular he was blamed for setting sons against their fathers. Plato replies by giving us a picture of active and consistent orthodoxy in the person of Euthyphro. It is as if he had said: “After all, you Athenians are not consistent: the creed which you theoretically believe you do not carry out in practice. If you would see what your creed leads to, look at Euthyphro: in living out his religion, which is yours, he becomes unfilial in his own person, to the extent of prosecuting his own father for manslaughter: it is your own religion that is the traitor, for its consistent

¹ Eum. 640—641.

believers are worse than useless to the state (3 C—D). The fact is, you do not really believe your national creed, otherwise you would approve of Euthyphro: why then do you prosecute Socrates for seeking to replace your indifference by some new faith?" It was of course no new thing to protest against a theology which ascribed to the gods deeds of which men might be ashamed. Since Xenophanes wrote his well-known censure on Homer and Hesiod (*πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὀμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδος τε ὅσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν*¹), it had been a commonplace with Pindar, Aeschylus, and other writers of a lofty moral tone², to urge that goodness must needs be one of the divine attributes, but in the character of Euthyphro Plato goes even further, and makes it clear that an active faith in the old theology was incompatible with what the ordinary public opinion of Athens pronounced to be right conduct: Athens had in fact outgrown her faith. And as Plato like his master hated nothing more than idle acquiescence in an inert λόγος, he desired to make the Athenians feel that the old religion was virtually dead, so as to pave the way for a higher creed.

Euthyphro's second definition may best be considered along with the third, which is but an amended form of the same underlying conception. *The second and third definitions.* The view that Holiness is what is dear to the gods, would have been accepted by most of the Greeks. 'Beloved of the gods' was an epithet of the truly pious and virtuous man. Δίκαιος ἀνὴρ, asks Socrates in the Philebus

¹ Ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. ix 193.

² See Nägelsbach's Nachhomerische Theologie p. 45 ff.

(39 E) καὶ εὐσεβῆς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἅρ' οὐ θεοφιλὴς ἐστι; and in the first Alcibiades (134 D) we read δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σύ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε. It was probably the popular conception of piety. In his preliminary criticism of the definition, Socrates is really arguing against polytheism. On the assumption of a plurality of gods, it is useless to say that what is dear to the gods is holy, since one god will love what another hates: but if the divine nature is one, then it will be constant in its likes and dislikes, and, so far, the definition may still hold good. Here therefore we have a distinct allusion to the underlying monotheism of the Socratic creed: but the doctrine is not explicitly stated and hardly goes beyond the common usage of τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον and the like, so often used in referring to the divine power as shewing itself in the government of the world.

In discussing these Socrates reveals the monotheism of his creed,

and distinguishes accident from essence.

Other contributions to logic in the Euthyphro.

After conceding the difficulty as to a plurality of gods, Socrates attacks the definition in earnest, and proves it inadequate even on a monotheistic creed, inasmuch as it puts a πάθος in place of the οὐσία. This is probably the earliest place in Greek literature where the distinction of πάθος and οὐσία is clearly recognised (11 A). Nor is this the only contribution to logic in our dialogue. The exercise in the conversion of propositions shewing that although all αἰδώς is at the same time δέος, yet the converse is not true (12 A ff.), doubtless had some value in an age when logic was still young. Moreover, the manner in which the notion of δίκαιον is subdivided into ὅσιον and another unknown quantity, with a view to reaching a definition (12 A), is suggestive of the διαίρεσις

which is so constantly employed in Plato's later dialogues: while in the form of definition required by Socrates in 12 D δὲ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον, we have a clear recognition of the principle of defining *per genus et differentiam*. We may therefore infer that one of the subsidiary purposes of our dialogue is to be a lesson in logic.

It has already been shewn that in the development of Socrates' suggestion about the relation between δίκαιον and ὅσιον lies the most valuable part of the positive teaching of the Euthyphro. We may therefore pass on to Euthyphro's fifth effort: Holiness is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray. In effect, as Socrates proves, there is nothing but the second definition elaborated in detail: it is therefore instructive to observe how Euthyphro, dizzy from the effect of Socrates' logic, takes refuge in crooning over to himself the sacerdotal view of religion with which his profession had made him familiar. As a professional μάντις Euthyphro cannot shake himself clear of the mantic stand-point. His theology is correctly described as a sort of ἐμπορικὴ: it conceives of gods and men as bound by a compact to give and take reciprocally¹. There is no hint of the importance of true devotion in the soul of the worshipper, such as Socrates always inculcated. δῶρα θεοῖς πείθει, δῶρ' αἰδοίους βασιλῆας² was the corner-stone of Euthyphro's creed. And it is just this view of religion which marks him out as essentially the representative

The fifth definition represents the sacerdotal view of religion.

¹ Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. IV 1123^a τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθρώμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον.

² Hes. Frag. 180 ed. Götting.

of active Greek orthodoxy: there could be no greater mistake than to take Euthyphro as a type of the disbelieving Athenians of his day. That sacrifice was a gift, almost a bribe to the gods (originally the gods' food¹), was so thoroughly recognised in the Greek religion as to have passed into a proverb². The sentiment was only a natural outcome of the view that gods and men are one in kind—an idea which we have already seen to be a distinctive feature of the Hellenic faith.

Summary. The results of the preceding investigation may be thus summed up. The main purpose of the Euthyphro is to lead the way to a higher conception of piety than was possible under the most orthodox belief in the old Greek religion. As secondary motives, there is first and foremost a desire to defend Socrates by shewing that orthodoxy if active and not quiescent was more dangerous to the family and the state than the heterodoxy of Socrates: there are also indications of a wish to improve the occasion by imparting some lessons in logic. The rejected definitions are valuable as shewing different points of view characteristic of the Greek religion, above all, the belief in a common origin and common interests for gods and men.

§ 3. *On Euthyphro.*

Euthyphro is known to us only from Plato.

Nothing is known for certain about Euthyphro as a historical person except what we learn from Plato. The statements of later authors rest entirely upon his authority.

¹ Article Sacrifice in Encycl. Brit.

² Eur. Med. 964 *πειθεῖν δῶρα καὶ θεοῖς λόγος.*

It is argued, indeed, by Bergk (*De Reliquiis Comœdiæ Atticæ Antiquæ* p. 357 foll.) that Eupolis' comedy called Προσπάλτιοι was directed against Euthyphro, who was a native of the deme of Prospalta, in the tribe of Acamantis¹. We know from Suidas (s.v. δρυαχαρνέυ) that the Prospaltians were derided for their extreme litigiousness: and Euthyphro, who accused his own father, might well be taken as a type of his demesmen. The fact that Eupolis' drama was written long before 399, the assumed date of Euthyphro's accusation, need not prove a difficulty, for "satis superque notum est, quam parum Plato curam temporum rationis habuerit: ut nihil distet, quominus illam litigationem aliquanto ante accidisse statuamus"². Some degree of probability is lent to the theory of Bergk by the line³

τί κατακροᾷσθέ μου τὰ μουσοδονήματα;

which seems to allude to some such tricks of language as are attributed to Euthyphro in Plato's *Cratylus*: but at most the theory is only a brilliant conjecture, and we are bound to confine ourselves to the Platonic picture of Euthyphro.

Except in the dialogue called after him, Euthyphro appears only in the *Cratylus*. The description of him there accords generally with what we gather from our dialogue: he is a μάντις not to say a μανικὸς ἀνὴρ. There his frenzy takes the form of etymologizing, and Socrates humorously makes him responsible for his own philological vagaries. καὶ αἰτιῶμαί γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενης (says Socrates), μάλιστα αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν

He appears as an erratic philologist in the Cratylus.

¹ See Fritzsche's *Prolegomena* p. 153 foll.

² Bergk l.c. p. 358.

³ Kock *Frag.* 245.

σοφίαν) ἀπὸ Εὐθύφρονος τοῦ Πρόσπαλτίου προσπεπτω-
 κέναι μοι· ἔωθεν γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆ καὶ παρέιχον τὰ
 ὦτα. κινδυνεύει οὖν ἐνθουσιῶν οὐ μόνον τὰ ὦτά μου
 ἐμπλήσσαι τῆς δαιμονίας σοφίας ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
 ἐπειληφθαι (396 D)¹. In the present dialogue there
 are perhaps one or two examples of Euthyphro's
 philological skill²: but it is chiefly as a μάντις that he
 is represented. Euthyphro is the incarnation of Plato's
 view of Athenian orthodoxy carried consistently into
 practice. Implicitly believing in the creed of Athens
 as a rule of conduct, he accepts all the obnoxious
 stories about the gods and despises the Athenians for
 not shewing their faith in their works: a superior
 person in his own estimation, he is at once fanatical
 and complacent, even jaunty in his bearing, as one
 who has solved the problem of the Universe. When
 he is confronted with the necessity of defending his
 position, he submits with the amiable condescending
 smile of a man who is impervious to reason, because
 he claims to stand on the higher platform of inspiration
 and faith: and when he is refuted, instead of distrust-
 ing himself, he takes refuge in the old position from
 which he has long ago been dislodged. He combines
 the worst features of a sciolist and a prig. But for his
 own sincere faith in himself, he might be regarded as
 a type of the μάντις ἀλαζών³. Doubtless the picture is

*Here he is
 the type of
 Athenian
 orthodoxy
 in
 consistent
 action:*

*a sciolist
 and a prig.*

¹ Cf. *ibid.* 399 A τῇ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος ἐπινοίᾳ, 407 D ὅφρα ἴδῃαι οἱ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος ἱπποῖ, 409 D ἡ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος μούσα (Fritzsch Proleg. p. 154). The expression οἱ ἀμφὶ Εὐθύφρονα in 399 E does not of course imply that Euthyphro had a following of Neo-grammarians.

² See notes on 2 B and 3 B, lines 11 and 18.

³ See Aristotle's account of ἀλαζονεία in *Eth. Nic.* IV 13. p. 1127^a 13 ff., esp. 1127^b 19—20 οἱ δὲ κέρδους (sc. χάριν ἀλαζον-

overdrawn, but not without reason : for Plato's object was to contrast the logical outcome of the Athenian creed with that of his master's, in order to shew that the Athenians no longer believed the national religion, and were ripe for something higher¹.

§ 4. *Genuineness of the Dialogue.*

Since the time of Ast (1816), doubts have frequently been expressed as to the authenticity of the Euthyphro, and not a few critics have categorically denied it. But the overwhelming balance of opinion is in favour of regarding the dialogue as a genuine work of Plato.

The arguments advanced by the party of attack are of very different weight.

Starting with the notion that every genuine dialogue contains some positive teaching either worked out or at least suggested, Ast rejected the Euthyphro on the ground that the essence of piety is not thoroughly investigated "oder auf Platonische Weise auch nur angedeutet²". Schleiermacher had already refused to allow the presence of any dogmatic teaching in the Euthyphro, while still retaining it among the works of Plato. Four years later it was pointed out by Socher³ that the required hint of positive doctrine

Arguments against the genuineness of the dialogue.
(1) *That it is devoid of positive doctrine :*

εὐόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιούνται) ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ ἃ διαλαθεῖν ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν λατρὸν. Numenius actually refers to Euthyphro as ἄνδρα ἀλαξόνα καὶ κοάλεμον (apud Eusebium Praep. Evangelica XIII. 5).

¹ See above p. xix.

² Platon's Leben und Schriften p. 470.

³ Ueber Platon's Schriften p. 62.

was to be found in the question addressed to Euthyphro in 13 E. After him, Susemihl (1855), Munk (1857), and later, Bonitz and Lechthaler¹, have all recognized that the Euthyphro is far from being devoid of positive teaching.

The views of these scholars have been subjected to a spirited criticism by Josef Wagner, in a Brünn Program of 1882—3 pp. 6—17, but he has not succeeded in weakening the position of Bonitz, if only we are willing to admit that Plato's meaning is not always discoverable without some effort on the part of the reader. In view of our previous discussion on the leading motive of the Euthyphro, without raising the question whether Plato could have written a purely peirastic dialogue, we may take it as certain that the arguments against the present dialogue which are drawn from its alleged absence of dogmatic teaching miss their mark². It cannot indeed be maintained that the Euthyphro by itself contains a clear and definite solution of the problem proposed: but³ this is in full harmony with Plato's representation of the Socratic method. Socrates does not take pains to enlighten those with whom he converses unless their humiliation is sincere: and it is manifest from the whole tone and bearing of Euthyphro that even while professing his inability to follow Socrates⁴ he still believes himself to be in the right.

¹ Die δαιμόνιος bei Platon: Meran 1879. On the other hand, Schaarschmidt (Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften p. 390 ff.) declares himself upon the side of Ast.

² In the Zeitschrift für öst. Gymn. Vol. xī 3. p. 275 Dr Lauczizsky also expresses his surprise that Wagner should still cling to his belief in the spuriousness of the dialogue.

³ See note on 11 E.

⁴ In 11 B.

A further argument has been found by Schaarschmidt¹ in the apparently untrue representation of Socrates given in the Euthyphro. To leave Euthyphro in a course of wicked conduct, and pass on to discussions on *δσιον* and *ἀνόσιον* which have only a remote bearing on the situation, is inconsistent (thinks Schaarschmidt) with Socrates' well-known practice of assisting his friends to improve their conduct by theoretical discussions. To this it seems a sufficient answer to point out that we are dealing here with Plato's Socrates, and not Xenophon's: nor are the discussions on *δσιον* at all irrelevant, but thoroughly in harmony even with Xenophon's representation of the Socratic method as an attempt to establish a *λόγος* for the regulation of conduct.

More serious would seem to be the arguments drawn from the alleged formal and structural defects of the dialogue. Wagner² descants upon the 'poverty manifest in the external scenery and characterisation of the actors': the whole dialogue is carried on between two actors and we hear nothing of auditors, in spite of the busy quarter where the scene is laid: Socrates is not true to life and Euthyphro's portrait is absurdly overdrawn! The climax is reached when in criticising the words of Socrates in 3 D (*ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅτι περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ᾗδέως, εἴ τίς μου ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν*), Wagner remarks "Auf welcher Seite die Ungeschicklichkeit liegt, brauchen wir nicht weiter zu erörtern, fragen nur, woher Sokrates dazu das Geld hätte hernehmen sollen,

¹ Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften p. 393.

² *l.c.* p. 26.

da er in der Apologie nur über eine Mine verfügt?" We may allow that the dialogue is inferior in dramatic power to the best of Plato's works without denying it to Plato: and as for Euthyphro's portrait, if it is meant to represent the logical outcome of an active faith in the old mythology, it is doubtless intentionally overdrawn.

(4) *That the theory of Ideas is erroneously employed.*

A great deal has been made of the supposed allusion to the theory of Ideas in 5 C—D and 6 D—E. It is chiefly on this ground that Ueberweg¹ rejects the dialogue, and Schaarschmidt² has used the same argument with great emphasis. The words (in 5 D) *ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα* (sic), applied to *ἀνόσιον*, have incurred the especial censure of Schaarschmidt and Wagner³. And it must be allowed that an Idea of pure and absolute negation is a singular doctrine to meet with in Plato. But, beyond all doubt, the correct reading in this particular passage is the *κατὰ τὴν ὀσιότητα* of the Bodleian manuscript⁴: and, on the general question, Bonitz⁵ seems to me to have conclusively shewn that there is no knowledge whatever of the ideal theory implied in either of the places cited. The *λόγοι* are not hypostasized, since in *τὸ ὄσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ*, *αὐτὸ* belongs to *αὐτῷ* and not to *τὸ ὄσιον*, while the expression *ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν* is parallel to the words in the *Meno* (72 C) *οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἰσιν, ἓν γέ τι εἶδος ταυτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσι, δι' ὃ εἰσιν ἀρεταί*. Similar passages, in which the expressions which were afterwards used in connection with the theory of ideas occur in speak-

¹ Untersuchungen p. 251.

² l.c. p. 22.

³ Plat. Stud.³ p. 240 ff.

⁴ l.c. p. 394.

⁵ See note *in loc.*

ing of the Socratic λόγοι, are far from rare in the Socratic dialogues: it will suffice to refer to the first Alcibiades 129 B and 130 D (ὁ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἐρρήθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτόεν εἶη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό· νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰτοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα ὃ τι ἐστίν), and to the Hippias Major 289 D εἰ δέ σε ἡρόμην, φήσει, ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ἐστι καλόν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν, εἴ μοι ἄπερ νῦν ἀπεκρίνω ἄρα, σὺ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἀπεκέκρισο. ἔτι δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴν προσγένηται ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος, τοῦτ' εἶναι παρθένος ἢ ἵππος ἢ λύρα; In neither of these two dialogues is the Ideal theory presupposed: but as it was chiefly out of the Socratic λόγοι that Plato's theory of Ideas was evolved, it is only natural that the phraseology of the later theory should sometimes be used in connection ~~with the earlier~~ and ~~the much discussed~~ passage in the Euthyphro is extremely valuable as a link in the chain of development, since besides the words ἰδέα and εἶδος applied to the Socratic λόγος we find the concept regarded as a παράδειγμα, exactly like the Idea in Platonic teaching generally.

It is further pointed out¹ that an imitator of Plato (5) *That the dialogue is on the text in the Republic (II 378 B) οὐδὲ λεκτέον a patch-work from other dialogues.* νέψ ἀκούοντι, ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρῶν ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοί τε καὶ μέγιστοι. Plato then proceeds, in language closely parallel to that of the Euthyphro², to enter a protest against the stories of wars between gods, whether sung of in poetry, or depicted on canvas, and concludes

¹ Ast, p. 472.

² Compare Euthyphr. 6 B with Rep. II 378 C.

with an eloquent assertion of the supreme goodness of God. Schaarschmidt¹ conjectures that the author of the Euthyphro had also in view the passage in the Laws (ix 865 c), where Plato would inflict only a moderate penalty in cases of manslaughter resembling that committed by Euthyphro's father. Numerous parallels with the Meno and the Theaetetus are also quoted: in particular, the comparison of unstable ideas with figures by Daedalus (11 c—E and 15 B) is supposed to be borrowed from the Meno (97 D—E), or elaborated out of the expression in the Theaetetus (203 D) καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς αἰχρήσεται. Socrates' demand that Euthyphro should give in his answer not a plurality of things holy but the one form of holiness reminds us of similar passages in the Meno (71 E ff. 74 A) and Theaetetus (146 A ff.). And among other reminiscences of the dialogues noted by Schaarschmidt is the echo of the Phaedrus (229 c) in Socrates' question (6 B) ἀλλὰ μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς φίλιου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡγεί ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

These arguments singly and together, are not enough to prove the Euthyphro spurious.

Striking as these parallels are, and especially that from the Republic, they are by no means enough to justify us in denying the Euthyphro to Plato. Were the ideas in question more fully and elaborately worked out in our dialogue than elsewhere, and with greater dramatic power, the same critics would be ready to doubt whether those other dialogues were genuine. If the dialogue could be shewn to be spurious on other grounds, such evidence as this would be valuable as shewing from what quarries the imitator had hewed his stone: but, as it is, the same ideas continually reappear in the admittedly

¹ l.c. p. 395.

genuine works of Plato, and if we are prepared to allow that the Euthyphro is a comparatively early dialogue, it may well be that ideas and images employed in this early work were afterwards expanded and developed by Plato in his more mature productions.

This leads us to say a word as to the date of the Euthyphro. Of external evidence there is none: we have only the style and treatment to guide us¹. From the tables given by Constantin Ritter in his Untersuchungen über Plato (pp. 56—59), it is seen to belong to the earlier dialogues, if any faith is to be placed in statistics of the use of particles and the like: and the absence of any allusion to the theory of ideas², together with the somewhat overdrawn picture of Athenian orthodoxy in the person of Euthyphro, lead one to place it among Plato's early works. It is of course impossible fully to discuss this point without at the same time discussing the chronological sequence of Plato's dialogues generally: at present it will suffice to say that I believe it (in common with all Plato's dialogues) to have been written after the death of Socrates, and to be considerably later than the Crito. It probably belongs to about the same period as the Laches and the Charmides, but I think it precedes both of these dialogues by a short interval³.

*Date of
the
dialogue.*

*It was
probably
written
just before*

¹ No argument can of course be based on the connection between the Introduction of the Euthyphro and the end of the Theaetetus: this is only one of Plato's many dramatic fictions.

² See above p. xxviii.

³ Siebeck (Zur Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge p. 128)

*the Laches
and the
Char-
mides.*

*Criticism
of another
view.*

It has however been argued from the manner in which piety is here treated that the dialogue is later than the Laches and Protagoras, possibly even than the Meno and Gorgias¹. Socrates' own definition of *εὐσέβεια*, as given in the Memorabilia (IV 6. 4), identifies it with 'knowledge of what is lawful in respect of the gods': *δικαιοσύνη* being the 'knowledge of what is lawful in respect of men'. In other words *εὐσέβεια* and *δικαιοσύνη* are put on the same platform by Socrates, each being regarded as a distinct and special virtue. Now in the Protagoras, Meno, and Gorgias, *δσιότης* is in the same way held to be one of the virtues, parallel with *δικαιοσύνη*²: whereas in the Euthyphro (12 A), *δικαιοσύνη* is set above *δσιότης*, the general notion *δίκαιον* being subdivided into *δσιον* and some other section not specified. And as in the later dialogues³ of Plato *δσιότης* is not mentioned as a substantive virtue at all, it is supposed by Fritzsche that Plato in the Euthyphro is passing from the Socratic conception of piety (as contained in the Protagoras, Meno and Gorgias) to a fourfold classification of the virtues, in which *δσιότης* as a special virtue shall be excluded. But the difference in the treatment of piety is susceptible of another explanation. The word

seems to me right in assigning the Laches and Euthyphro to the same period: but whether he is right in holding that the first four books of the Republic preceded these dialogues, *ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψω*.

¹ Fritzsche Prolegomena ad Euthyphronem p. 157.

² Prot. 329 c et al. Meno 78 D. Gorg. 507 B.

³ Such as the Republic (IV 428 A *τέτταρα ὄντα τυγχάνει*) and Laws XII 963 C. The four are *σοφία*, *ἀνδρεία*, *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη*.

δίκαιον had two well-marked senses throughout Greek literature: the first wider, equivalent to our 'right', as when Theognis said ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετῇ 'νι' and in this sense τὸ ὅσιον might at all times be regarded as a subdivision of δίκαιον. Plato is not in the Euthyphro propounding a table of the virtues: he is therefore justified in using δίκαιον in its non-technical sense. And the apparent divergence between the Protagoras for example and the Republic in the doctrine of piety has been explained by Bonitz in a way which fits in with the teaching of the Euthyphro as already expounded¹. "Where Plato", says Bonitz², "is demonstrably following the ordinary views (e.g. in the Protagoras), he enumerates Piety among the different expressions of man's moral nature, viz. the individual virtues: on the other hand, he makes no mention of it where he himself marshals the idea of virtue in its different expressions according to his own conviction (e.g. in the Republic), and thus he shews that to him Piety is not a single virtue, to be coordinated with Temperance or Justice. On the contrary, the entire essence of moral conduct is characterized by Plato on the one hand as the knowledge of the good determining of necessity the will, and on the other hand as a process of assimilation to the divine essence and an attaching of oneself thereto combined with service". For it is exactly this view of piety which is at all events suggested in the Euthyphro, and which marks it as belonging to the earlier

¹ Bergk's Theognis (Poetae Lyrici Graeci) line 147.

² Bonitz Plat. Studien p. 234.

³ Plat. Studien p. 234.

dialogues like the Charmides and Laches, in which the individual virtues, such as temperance and courage, are each of them finally resolved into the knowledge of the Good.



ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ.

Ἡ περὶ δόσιος [πειραστικός.]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

St. I.

2 I. Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ
τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατρίβας Socrates informs
ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βα- Euthyphro of his
σιλέως στοάν; οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοὶ ἔγε δίκη τις οὔσα impending trial;
τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὥσπερ ἐμοί. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐτοὶ δὴ Ἀθηναῖοί γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, δίκην
αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφὴν.

B ΕΥΘ. Τί φῆς; γραφὴν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπ-
ται· οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἔτερον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

10

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλὰ σέ ἄλλος;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΥΘ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γινγνώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρων,
τὸν ἄνδρα· νέος γάρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώστ' 15
ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι

δὲ τῶν δῆμων Πιτθεύς, εἴ τινα νῶ ἔχεις Πιτθέα
Μέλητον, οἷον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον,
ἐπίγρυπον δέ.

20 ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα
γραφὴν σε γέγραπται ; C

ΣΩ. Ἦντινα ; οὐκ ἀγεννῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ
νέον ὄντα τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνώκεναι οὐ φαῦλόν
ἐστίν· ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὥς φησιν, οἶδε τίνα τρόπον οἱ
25 νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς.
καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι· καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν
κατιδὼν ὥς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλικιώτας αὐτοῦ,
ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὡς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν
πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεται μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος
30 ἄρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον D
ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὅτι ἄριστοι, ὥσπερ
γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον
ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ
δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶτον μὲν | ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει 3
35 τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὥς φησιν·
ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
ἐπιμεληθεὶς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος
τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι ἐκ
τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένῳ.

II. ΕΤΘ. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ'
ὀρρωδῶ, μὴ τοῦναντίον γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς
in which Eu-
thyphro sees but
a symptom of
the contempt in
which seers are
held.
5 φησὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι
κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν
σέ. καὶ μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ
φησι διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νέους ;

ΣΩ. Ἀτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὥς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι. B
φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὥς καινοῦς

ποιούντα θεούς, τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα,
 ✓ ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν. 10

ΕΤΘ. Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ
 δαιμόνιον φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὥς οὖν
 καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεία γέγραπται ταύτην
 τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὥς διαβαλὼν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ
 δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς 15
 ε τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν
 τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ
 μέλλοντα, καταγελωσιν ὥς μαινομένον. καίτοι οὐδὲν
 ὃ τι οὐκ ἀληθές εἶρηκα ὦν προεῖπον, ἀλλ' ὅμως
 φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν 20
 αὐτῶν χρή φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμόσε ἰέναι.

III. ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν
 καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα.
 Ἀθηναίοις γάρ τοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ
 σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἶωνται
 εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ
 σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἶωνται
 D ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμούνται, εἴτ' οὖν
 φθόνῳ, ὥς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

ΕΤΘ. Τούτου οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμέ
 ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάννυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι. 10

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν
 παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ
 σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβούμαι μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας
 δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὃ τί περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ
 λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεῖς 15
 ἂν ἡδέως, εἰ τίς μου ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ
 νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν, ὥσπερ σὺ
 E φῆς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς παίζοντας καὶ

S. 'You do not
 proselytise: I do.
 Therefore they
 prosecute me and
 laugh at you.'
 E. 'I trust all
 will end well with
 your case, as with
 mine.'

γελώντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν, εἰ δὲ σπου-
20 δάσονται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ὕπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλήν
ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν.

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες,
πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην,
οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν.

IV. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ σοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τίς ἡ

I prosecute my father for man-
slaughter. S. 'Is
it holy so to do?'
E. 'Assuredly.'

ΕΤΘ. Διώκω.

ΣΩ. Τίνα;

5 ΕΤΘ. | Ὄν διώκων αὐτὸν δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

4

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;

ΕΤΘ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅς γε τυγχίνει
ὦν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὗτος;

10 ΕΤΘ. Ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ σός, ὦ βέλτιστε;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ τί τὸ ἐγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΤΘ. Φόνου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

15 ΣΩ. Ἡράκλεις ἡ που, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀγνοεῖται
ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὅπῃ ποτὲ [ὀρθῶς] ἔχεις·† οὐ γὰρ
οἶμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαι, ἀλλὰ
πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

B

ΕΤΘ. Πόρρω μέντοι νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

20 ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὺς ὑπὸ
τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; ἡ δῆλα δὴ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που ὑπὲρ γε
ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξήεσθα φόνου αὐτοῦ.

ΕΤΘ. Γελοῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἶει τι διαφέ-
ρειν, εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκεῖος ὁ τεθνεὺς, ἀλλ' οὐ

† MSS. ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἐχει.

τοῦτο μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἔκτεινεν ὁ 25
 κτείνας εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ, εἶαν, εἰ δὲ
 μή, ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάνπερ ὁ κτείνας συνέστιός σοι καὶ
 C ὁμοτράπεζος ᾗ. ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μίasma γίγνεται, ἐὰν
 ξυνῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνειδῶς καὶ μὴ ἀφοσιοῖς σεαυτόν
 τε καὶ ἐκείνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξιόν./ ἐπεὶ ὁ γε ἀποθανὼν 30 —
 πελάτης τις ἦν ἐμός, καὶ ὡς ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ
 Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευν ἐκεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὖν
 καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀπο-
 σφάττει αὐτόν· ὁ οὖν πατήρ συνδήσας τοὺς πόδας
 καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, 35
 πέμπει δεῦρο ἄνδρα πευσόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ὃ τι
 D χρεῖη ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου
 ὠλιγώρει τε καὶ ἡμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὄν
 πρᾶγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν.
 ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ρίγους καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀπο- 40
 θνήσκει, πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον παρὰ τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ
 ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὃ τε πατήρ
 καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ
 πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὔτε ἀποκτείναντι, ὡς
 φασιν ἐκεῖνοι, οὔτ' εἰ ὃ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, 45
 ἀνδροφόνου γε ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φρον-
 E τίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου· ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ υἱὸν
 πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξιέναι· κακῶς εἰδότες, ὃ Σώκρατες,
 τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὀσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.
 ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ὃ Εὐθύφρων, οὐτῶς 50
 ἀκριβῶς οἶε ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅπῃ ἔχει,
 καὶ τῶν ὀσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὥστε τούτων οὕτω
 πραχθέντων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικάζόμενος
 τῷ πατρὶ, ὅπως μὴ αὐτὸς ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνῃς
 πράττων ;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τῳ ἂν διαφέρῃ | Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν 5 ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.

V. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρον, κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῇ σὺ γενέσθαι καὶ ^{S. 'Then teach me holiness, that I may baffle Meletus. What is piety} πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτόν, λέγοντα, ὅτι 1
 5 ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιοῦμένην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴ με ἐκείνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἑξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητῆς δὴ γέγονα 2
 ✓ σίς—καὶ εἰ μὲν, ὦ Μέλητε, φαίην ἂν, Εὐθύφρονα B
 10 ὁμολογεῖς σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν καὶ ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζου· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὥς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκείνον δὲ νουθετοῦντί 3
 15 τε καὶ κολάζοντι—καὶ ἂν μὴ μοι πείθεται μηδὲ ἀφίη τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντ' ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ προῦκαλούμην αὐτόν.

ΕΤΘ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα με ἐπιχειρήσειε γράφεσθαι, εὖροιμ' ἂν, ὥς οἶμαι, ὅπῃ C
 20 σαθρὸς ἐστίν, καὶ πολὺν ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, ταῦτα γινώσκων μαθητῆς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδὼς ὅτι καὶ 4
 25 ἄλλος πού τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σέ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὀρᾶν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως καὶ ῥαδίως κατεῖδεν, ὥστε ἀσεβείας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι, ὃ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι δισχυρίζου· ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐ-

σεβὲς φῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ
 D περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ; ἢ οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει 30
 V τὸ ὅσιον αὐτῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὐ τοῦ μὲν
 ὀσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ὁμοῖον καὶ ἔχον
μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ὀσιότητα πάν, ὃ τί περ ἂν
 μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

35

VI. ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ
 ἀνόσιον ;

ΕΤΘ. Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ^{and holiness? E. (Def. 1) 'To do as I do now. Zeus dealt thus with his father.' S. 'These legends I disbelieve.} ὅσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ
 ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ
 ἱερῶν κλοπᾶς ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιού-
 των ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξιέναι, εἴαν τε πατήρ
 ὦν τυγχάνῃ εἴαν τε μήτηρ εἴαν τε ἄλλος ὅστι-
 E σουν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον· ἐπεὶ, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, θέασαι, ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ 10
 νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον, ὅτι
 ✓ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν
 τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ' ἂν ὅστισούν τυγχάνῃ ὦν· αὐτοὶ
 ✓ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν
 θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαιοτάτον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι 15
 6 τὸν αὐτοῦ | πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς υἱεῖς κατέπινεν
 οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ, κακείνόν γε αὐ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα
 ἐκτεμεῖν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν,
 ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὕτως
 αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περὶ τε τῶν θεῶν 20
 καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

✓ ΣΩ. Ἀρά γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τοῦτ' ἐστίν, οὐνεκα
 τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ
 τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι ; διὸ δὲ,

25 ὥς ἔοικεν, φήσει τίς με ἑξαμαρτάνειν· νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ
 σοὶ ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ τῷ εὐ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων,
 ἀνάγκη δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ B
 καὶ φήσομεν, οἳ γέ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν
 μηδὲν εἰδέναι; ἀλλὰ μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς φίλλου, σὺ ὥς
 30 ἀληθῶς ἡγεῖ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγεῖ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν
 τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ
 35 μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεται τε ὑπὸ
 τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφένων τά τε C
 ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς
 μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιού-
 των ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα
 40 ἀληθῆ ἔφωμεν εἶναι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον;

ΕΤΘ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὕπερ
 ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάνπερ βούλῃ,
 περὶ τῶν θείων διηγῆσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι
 ἐκπλαγῆσει.

VII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 μέν μοι εἰσαϋθίς ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγῆσει·

Your definition
 is but one special
 case: be general.
 E. (Def. 2) 'Ho-
 liness is what the
 gods love.'

5 νυνὶ δέ, ὕπερ ἄρτι σε ἡρόμην, πειρῶ
 σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. οὐ γὰρ με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, D
 τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτήσαντα
 τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ τί ποτ' εἴη, ἀλλὰ μοι εἶπες, ὅτι τοῦτο
 τυγχάνει ὅσιον ὄν, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξιών
 τῷ πατρί.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10 ΣΩ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ἄλλα
 πολλὰ φῆς εἶναι ὅσια.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅσια.

ΣΩ. Μέννησαι οὖν, ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευό-
μην, ἔν τι ἢ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ'
ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὁσιά ἐστιν ; 15
Ε ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ ιδέᾳ τὰ τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι
καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια· ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις ;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγώ γε.

✓ ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ιδέαν,
τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώ- 20
μενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, δὲ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾦ, ὃν ἂν
ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, δὲ δ' ἂν μὴ
τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλ' εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ
οὕτω σοι φράσω. 25

✓ ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν βούλομαι γε.

ΕΤΘ. Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσ-
φιλὲς ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον.

7 ΣΩ. | Παγκάλως, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐξή-
τουν ἀποκρίνασθαί σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι 30
ἀληθῶς, τοῦτο οὐπω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδι-
δάξεις ὡς ἔστιν ἀληθὴ ἃ λέγεις.

ΕΤΘ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί λέγο-
μεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλὲς τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλεῖς
ἄνθρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισῶν καὶ ὁ
θεομισῆς ἀνόσιος· οὐ ταῦτόν δ' ἔστιν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον, τὸ ὅσιον τῷ
ἀνοσίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως <εἴρηται> ;

S. 'But since
you say that the
gods differ among
themselves, they
will love different
things: the same
thing will there-
fore be both holy
and unholy. 5

ΕΤΘ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρηῆσθαι.

B ΕΤΘ. Δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες [εἴρηται γάρ].

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοί, ὧς
Εὐθύφρων, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἐστὶν
ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται ;

✓ ΕΤΘ. Εἴρηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὧς ἄριστε, ἡ περὶ
15 τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ ; ὧδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἂρ' ἂν εἰ δια-
φεροίμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ὁπότερα πλείω,
ἡ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ
ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περὶ
γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἂν ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν ; C

20 ΕΤΘ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάτ-
τονος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἐλθόντες ταχὺ
παυσαίμεθ' ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς ;

ΕΤΘ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

25 ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγῶμαι,
περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθεῖμεν ἂν ;

ΕΤΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα

✓ κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀλλήλοις
30 εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα ; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοι ἐστίν,
ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ τὰδ' ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον D
καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
✓ κακόν· ἤρα οὐ ταῦτά ἐστιν, περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ
οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἰκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ
35 ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες ;

✓ ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλ' ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ διαφορὰ, ὧς Σώκρατες,
καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; οἱ θεοί, ὧς Εὐθύφρων, οὐκ εἴπερ τι
40 διαφέρονται, διὰ ταῦτα διαφέρουσιν ἂν ;

ΕΤΘ. Πολλή ἀνάγκη.

Ε ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὧς γενναῖε Εὐθύφρων, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγούνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροὶ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν που ἐστασιάζον ἀλλήλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων 45
- διεφέροντο· ἦ γάρ;

ΕΤΘ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ καλὰ ἡγούνται ἕκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν; 50

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' αὖτε γε, ὡς σὺ φῆς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγούνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα· περὶ ἧ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες
8 στασιάζουσιν | τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως; 55

ΕΤΘ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, μισεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῇ τε καὶ θεοφιλεῖται ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐοικεν. 60

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὧς Εὐθύφρων, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΤΘ. Κινδυνεύει.

IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ ἡρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὧς θανάσι. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἡρώτων, ὃ
τυγχάνει ταῦτόν ὃν ὀσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον, ὃ δ' ἂν θεοφιλες ᾗ, καὶ θεομισές
B ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ὥστε, ὧς Εὐθύφρων, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν
θανμαστόν, εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Διὶ προσφιλες ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ
E. 'All the gods will hate unrighteous manslaughter.' S. 'Doubtless: but they will differ as to its unrighteousness.'

1 μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἥρᾳ ἐχθρόν· καὶ εἴ τις
10 ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ,
καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ ταῦτά.

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ γε τούτου
τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὥς οὐ
δεῖ δίκην διδόναι ἐκείνον, ὃς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀπο-
15 κτείνῃ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἤδη τινὸς
ἤκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὥς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείν- C
ναντα ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὀτιοῦν οὐ δεῖ δίκην
διδόναι;

20 ΕΤΘ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβη-
τοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικάστηρίοις. ἀδι-
κοῦντες γὰρ πάμπολλα πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι
φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀδικεῖν,
25 καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὅμως οὐ δεῖν φασὶ σφᾶς διδόναι
δίκην;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσιν.
τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδ' ἀμφισβητεῖν,
30 ὥς οὐχί, εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, δοτέον δίκην· ἀλλ' οἶμαι Δ
οὐ φασιν ἀδικεῖν. ἢ γάρ;

ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκείνῳ γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὥς οὐ
τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ' ἐκείνο ἴσως
35 ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν
καὶ πότε.

ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόν-
θασιν, εἴπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ

ἀδίκων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασιν ἄλλ' ἄλλους 40
ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασιν; ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε δήπου, ὃ
θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ
Ε λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΤΘ. Ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρα-
τες, τὸ κεφάλαιον. 45

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἕκαστόν γε οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τῶν
πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ
ἀνθρώποι καὶ θεοί, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοί· πράξ-
εὼς τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασιν
αὐτὴν πεπραῆθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως· ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτω; 50

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

9 Χ. ΣΩ. Ἴθι νυν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, δίδαξον | καὶ
ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκ-
μήριόν ἐστιν, ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ^{E. 'Not in the present case, as I can prove, and will, to the judges.'}
ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκως τεθνάναι, ὃς ἂν θητεύων
ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθείς ὑπὸ τοῦ 5
δεσπότης τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φθάσῃ τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ
δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ξυνδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν
περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ
τοιούτου δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξιέναι καὶ ἐπισκῆπτεσθαι
φόνου τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί· ἴθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί 10
B μοι σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὡς | παντὸς μᾶλλον | πάντες
θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πράξιν· κἄν
μοι ἱκανῶς ἐνδείξῃ, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ οὐδέ-
ποτε παύσομαι.

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ 15
Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχοιμι ἂν ἐπιδείξαι
σοι.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν
δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξει δῆλον

20 ὅτι, ὡς ἄδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάνπερ ἀκούωσί γέ μου λέγοντος.

XI. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀκούσονται, ἐάνπερ εὖ δοκῇς C
λέγειν. τότε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἅμα λέ-
γοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ· εἰ ὁ
τι μάλιστά με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν, ὡς
οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον
ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ
μεμάθηκα παρ' Εὐθύφρονος, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὅσιον
τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισὲς μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον,
ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ἂν· [ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι
10 ὠρισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μὴ· τὸ γὰρ θεομισὲς ὄν καὶ
θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη] ὥστε τούτου ἀφήμι σε, ὦ Εὐθύ-
φρον· εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ ἡγείσθων θεοὶ ἄδικον D
καὶ πάντες μισοῦντων. ἀλλ' ἄρα τοῦτο νῦν ἐπανορ-
θώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ὁ μὲν ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ
15 μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιόν ἐστιν, ὁ δ' ἂν φιλῶσιν, ὅσιον· ὁ δ'
ἂν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφό-
τερα; ἀρ' οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὀρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ
ὀσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου;

ΕΤΘ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

20 ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ
σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥᾶστά με
διδάξεις ὁ ὑπέσχου.

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλ' ἐγωγε φαίην ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι E
τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ
25 ἐναντίον, ὃ ἂν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὐ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύ-
φρον, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐώμεν καὶ οὕτως ἡμῶν τε

αὐτῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μόνον φῆ-
 τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω, ξυγχωροῦντες ἔχειν ; ἢ σκεπτέον
 τί λέγει ὁ λέγων ; 30

ΕΤΘ. Σκεπτέον· οἶμαι μέντοι ἔγωγε τοῦτο νυνὶ
 καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

XII. ΣΩ. Τάχ', ὦγαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐν-
 10 νόησον γὰρ | τὸ τοιόνδε· ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι S. 'But holi-
 ὅσιόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ness is loved by
 ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιόν ἐστιν ; the gods, because
 it is holy :

ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. 5

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι.
 λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον, καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ
 ἄγον, καὶ ὀρώμενον καὶ ὀρῶν· καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
 μαθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἕτερα ; |

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μαθάνειν. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστίν, καὶ τούτου
 ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν ;

ΕΤΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

B ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον, διότι
 φέρεται, φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι ; 15

ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ, διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ
 ὀρώμενον, διότι ὀράται ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὀρώμενόν γέ ἐστιν, διὰ 20
 τοῦτο ὀράται, ἀλλὰ τὸναντίον διότι ὀράται, διὰ
 τοῦτο ὀρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο
 ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ
 διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερό-
 μενον. ἄρα κατάδηλον, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ὃ βούλομαι 25
 C λέγειν ; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι, εἴ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι

πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 γίγνεται, γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐδ' ὅτι πάσχον ἐστί,
 πάσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστίν· ἢ οὐ
 30 ξυγχωρεῖς οὕτως;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενόν τι
 ἐστίν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ
 πρότερα· οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὧν
 φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον;

ΕΤΘ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, ὃ Εὐθύ- D
 40 φρον; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων, ὡς ὁ σὸς
 λόγος;

ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

45 ΣΩ. Διότι ἄρα ὁσιόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' οὐχ
 ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁσιόν ἐστιν;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν,
 φιλούμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλὲς <τὸ θεοφιλές>.

50 ΕΤΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ὃ Εὐθύ-
 φρον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὁσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλ'
 ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου.

ΕΤΘ. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

55 ΣΩ. Ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὁσιον διὰ τοῦτο
 φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διότι φιλεῖται,
 ὁσιον εἶναι· ἢ γάρ;

E

ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

XIII. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

that is, the love of the gods is but an accident of holiness. E. 'You are a second Dædalus.' S. 'Nay, 'tis *you* who are. Is not Holiness a part of Right?' E. 'Yes.'

ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν, ὃ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ

II I μὲν διὰ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι | ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ ὅσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, καὶ τὸ 10 ὅσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὅσιον ἦν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐναντίας ἔχεται, ὡς παντάπασιν ἑτέρω ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ τί 15 ποτ' ἐστίν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὃ τι πέ- B πονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὃ τι δὲ ὄν, οὐπω εἶπες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, μή με ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ὄν τὸ 20 ὅσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἴτε ὅτιδ' ἄσχει· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διοισόμεθα· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ προθύμως, τί ἐστὶν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι εἴπω ὃ νοῶ. περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν αἰὲν ὃ ἂν 25 προθύμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἰδρυσώμεθα αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἔοικεν C εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἴσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες, 30

ὥς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν τις αὐτὰ θῇ· νῦν δὲ σαι γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶν· ἄλλου δὴ τινος δεῖ σκώμματος. οὐ γὰρ
35 ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν, ὥς καὶ αὐτῷ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκώμματος, ὃ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γὰρ περιέμειναι τούτοις τούτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ
40 Δαίδαλος· ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ἔμενεν ἂν ταῦτα D οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσοῦτον, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς
45 ἑμαυτοῦ, ὥς ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός. ἐβουλόμην γὰρ ἂν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως ἰδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαιδάλου E σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων
50 μὲν ἄδην· ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτὸς σοὶ ξυμπροθυμήσομαι [δείξαι] ὅπως ἂν με διδάξης περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ μὴ πρραποκάμης. ἰδὲ γὰρ εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὄσιον.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοιγε.

55 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὄσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ὄσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ | δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ὄσιον, ἀλλὰ 12 τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὄσιον, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἄλλο;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐχ ἔπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ μου εἰ οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἢ
60 ὅσῳ σοφώτερος· ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾶς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ξύντεινε σαυτόν· καὶ

γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοῆσαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ
τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας

Ζῆνα δὲ τὸν θ' ἔρξαντα, καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντ'
ἐφύτευσεν,

B Οὐκ ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ
αἰδώς. 65

ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἴπω σοι ὅπη;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἵνα δέος, ἔνθα καὶ
αἰδώς· πολλοὶ γὰρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ
πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδιέναι 70
μέν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἃ δεδίασιν. οὐ καὶ
σοὶ δοκεῖ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ
ἔστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενός τι πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχυρόμενος 75
C οὐ πεφόβηται τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας;

ΕΤΘ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος,
ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὲν αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος, οὐ
μέντοι ἵνα γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδώς. ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ 80
οἶμαι δέος αἰδούς· μόριον γὰρ αἰδὼς δέους, ὥσπερ
ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵναπερ ἀριθμός, ἔνθα καὶ
περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττόν, ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμός. ἔπει
γὰρ που νῦν γε;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε. 85

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἡρώτων,
ἀρα ἵνα δίκαιον, ἔνθα καὶ ὅσιον, ἢ ἵνα μὲν ὅσιον, ἔνθα
D καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ πανταχοῦ ὅσιον· μόριον
γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι
δοκεῖ; 90

ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω. φαίνει γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

XIV. ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με ἡρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δὴ, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι ὅς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ᾖ ἀλλ' ἰσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοιγε.

10 ΣΩ. Πειρώ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι, τὸ Ε ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτω λέγωμεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μῆ.

15 ΕΤΘ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

XV. ΣΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, φαίνει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ σμικροῦ | τινος ἔτι 13

S. 'But what kind of care?' E. 'Such service as a slave renders to his master.'

5 λέγεις γε, οἰαίπερ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπείαι εἰσιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεοῦς. λέγόμεν γάρ που—οἷον φαμέν, ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἵππικός· ἢ γάρ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ που ἵππικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία.

ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν,
ἀλλ' ὁ κυνηγετικός.

ΕΤΘ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ που κυνηγετική κυνῶν θεραπεία. 15

B ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ βοηλατική βοῶν.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ δὴ ὁσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὧ
Εὐθύφρον; οὕτω λέγεις; 20

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταῦτὸν διαπράτ-
τεται; οἷον τοιόνδε· ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι καὶ ὠφελία
τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ
τῆς ἵππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ὠφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίους 25
γίγνονται· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγετικῆς
καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα
C ὡσαύτως· ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἶει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν 30
θεραπείαν εἶναι;

ΕΤΘ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ;

ΕΤΘ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἡ ῥασιότης θεραπεία οὐσα θεῶν 35
ὠφελία τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ;
καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ξυγχωρήσεις ἄν, ὥς ἐπειδάν τι ὅσιον
ποιῆς, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζει;

ΕΤΘ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οἶμαί σε τοῦτο 40
λέγειν· πολλοῦ καὶ δέω· ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ

ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, D
οὐχ ἡγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ
45 τοιαύτην λέγω.

ΣΩ. Εἰεν· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἴη ἂν ἡ
ὁσιότης;

ΕΤΘ. Ἦιπερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δούλοι τοὺς δεσ-
πότας θεραπεύουσιν.

50 ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὑπηρετική τις ἂν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη
θεοῖς.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

XVI. ΣΩ. Ἐχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἡ ιατροῖς
ὑπηρετική εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν
τυγχάνει οὐσα ὑπηρετική; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας
οἶει;

S. 'What good-
ly result does this
service produce?'
E. (Def. 5) 'Holi-
ness is to say and
do what is accep-
table to the gods
in prayer and sa-
crifice.'

5 ΕΤΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετική E
εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετική

ἐστίν;

ΕΤΘ. Δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.

10 ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;

ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετική εἰς
τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετική ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ
ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστα γε φῆς
15 εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ πρὸς Διός, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνο τὸ
πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρε-
ταις χρώμενοι;

20 ΕΤΘ. Πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

14 ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ | οἱ στρατηγοί, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ' ὅμως
τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥαδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ
πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὐ;

ΕΤΘ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ δέ γ' οἶμαι καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ 25
γεωργοί· ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν τῆς
ἀπεργασίας ἢ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἃ οἱ θεοὶ
ἀπεργάζονται; τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστὶ τῆς ἐργασίας; 30

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ Σώ-
B κρατες, ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα
ταῦτα ὥς ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω,
ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς
θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε 35
καὶ θύων, ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σφῆζει τὰ
τοιαῦτα τοὺς τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ
τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δ' ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων
ἀσεβῆ, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἅπαντα καὶ
ἀπόλλυσιν.

XVII. ΣΩ. Ἡ πολὺ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ
Εὐθύφρων, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ
C κεφάλαιον ὧν ἡρώτων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ ^{S. 'You have evaded my question,}
πρόθυμός με εἰ διδάξαι, δῆλος εἰ. καὶ
γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἤσθα, ἀπετράπου· ὃ εἰ 5
ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα
ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρῶντα τῷ
ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκείνος ὑπάγῃ· τί δὴ
αὐ λέγεις τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα; οὐχὶ
ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὐχέσθαι; 10

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαι ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς,
τὸ δ' εὐχέσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς;

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

15 ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς D
οσιότης ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ξυνήκας ὁ
εἶπον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιθυμητῆς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς
20 σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ, ὥστε οὐ(χαμαὶ
πεσεῖται ὃ τι ἂν εἴπῃς. ἀλλὰ μοι λέξον, τίς αὕτη ἡ
ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοὺς καὶ
διδόναι ἐκείνοις;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγώ γε.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν
εἴη, ὦν δεόμεθα παρ' ἐκείνων, ταῦτα
αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;

and fallen back
on your old defi-
nition of holiness
as the god-loved.

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλὰ τί;

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ αὐτὸ δίδοναι ὀρθῶς, ὦν ἐκείνοι τυγ- E
χάνουσιν δεόμενοι παρ' ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις αὐ
ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γάρ που τεχνικόν γ' ἂν εἴη
δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὦν οὐδὲν δεῖται.

ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10 ΣΩ. Ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρον,
τέχνη ἡ οσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ' ἀλλήλων.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμπορικὴ, εἰ οὕτως ἡδιόν σοι ὀνομάζειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἡδιον ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνει
ἀληθὲς ὄν. φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἡ ὠφελία τοῖς θεοῖς
15 τυγχάνει οὐσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὦν παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβά-
νουσιν; ἃ μὲν γὰρ διδόασιν, παντὶ δῆλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ
ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ὃ τι | ἂν μὴ ἐκείνοι δώσιν· ἃ δὲ 15
παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελοῦνται; ἡ τοσοῦτον

αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα τὰγαθὰ παρ' αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκείνοι δὲ 20 παρ' ἡμῶν οὐδέν;

ΕΥΘ. Ἄλλ' οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων ἢ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί δήποτ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς; 25

ΕΥΘ. Τί δ' οἶει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα καὶ ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

B ΣΩ. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸ ὅσιον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΥΘ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον. 30

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἄρ' ἐστὶν αὐ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὅσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

ΕΥΘ. Μάλιστα γε.

XIX. ΣΩ. Θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐὰν σοὶ οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ Daedalus is nothing to you. βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδα-

λον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολὺ γε τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλω περιμόντας 5 ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν

C πάλιν εἰς ταῦτόν ἥκει; μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταῦτόν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγώ γε. 10

ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον φῆς ὅσιον εἶναι; τοῦτο δ' ἄλλο τι ἢ θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται; ἢ οὐ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ 15 τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα.

ΕΤΘ. Ἔοικεν.

XX. ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτέον,
τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον· ὡς ἐγώ, πρὶν ἂν μάθω,
ἐκὼν εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μή D
But tell me
truly, what is
Holiness? E.
'Another time,
Socrates.'

5 ἔχων τὸν νοῦν ὃ τι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπέ
τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἶσθα γάρ, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώ-
πων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέρως εἰ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν
ἂν εἴπῃς. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἤδησθα σαφῶς τό τε ὅσιον καὶ
τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ποτε ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ

10 ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἀνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθειν
φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδειςας παρακινδυ-
νεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους ἡσχύνῃς. νῦν δὲ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἶει εἰδέναι
τό τε ὅσιον καὶ μὴ· εἰπέ οὖν, ὃ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρων, E
15 καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὃ τι αὐτὸ ἡγεῖ.

ΕΤΘ. Εἰσαυθίς τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ
σπεύδω ποι, καὶ μοι ὦρα ἀπιέναι.

ΣΩ. Οἶα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με κατα-
βαλὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἣν εἶχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ
20 μαθὼν τά τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον
γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκεῖνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς
ἤδη παρ' Εὐθύφρονος | τὰ θεῖα γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι 16
ὑπ' ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά,
καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην.

NOTES.

Εὐθύφρων ἡ περὶ δόλου, πειραστικός. So the title appears in the Bodleian MS, except that *πειραστικός* seems to have been added by a later hand. Plato probably called the dialogue simply *Εὐθύφρων*, in accordance with his frequent habit of naming his dialogues after an interlocutor: e.g. *Crito*, *Theaetetus*, *Protagoras*, *Phaedrus*. The words *ἡ περὶ δόλου* were added by the critic Thrasyllus, who flourished about the Christian Era. Thrasyllus classified the Platonic dialogues into dialogues of search (*ζητητικοί*) and of exposition (*ὕφηγητικοί*): he subdivided the former into *γυμναστικοί* (including *μαieuτικοί* and *πειραστικοί*) and *ἀγωνιστικοί* (including *ἐνδεικτικοί* and *ἀνατρεπτικοί*), while the latter or expository class fell into *θεωρητικοί* (either *φυσικοί* or *λογικοί*) and *πρακτικοί* (*ἠθικοί* or *πολιτικοί*). See Grote's *Plato* Vol. I p. 161. The other examples of peirastic or 'testing' dialogues were the *Charmides*, *Io*, and *Meno*: with the last of these the *Euthyphro* has much in common: see Introduction p. xxx.

The scene of the dialogue is in or near the porch of the King Archon. For dramatic purposes, Plato seems to represent the conversation as taking place soon after the interview with *Theaetetus* in the dialogue of that name: see *Theaet.* 210 D: *νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελλήτου γραφήν, ἣν με γέγραπται.* On *Euthyphro* as a man see *Introd.* p. xxii.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates, happening to fall in with Euthyphro, relates to him the circumstances of his prosecution by Meletus.

- 2 A 1. **τί νεώτερον**. Socrates had never figured in a law-court till now, either as prosecutor or as defendant: see Apol. 17 D *νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐτη γεγονὼς ἐβδομήκοντα*. The neuter comparative of *neos* (less frequently *καινός*) is preferred to the positive, to express an *objectionable* novelty: Prot. 310 B *μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις*; Hence *νεώτερόν τι*, *νεωτερίζειν*, and *νεωτερισμός* are used of revolutionary movements. **ὅτι** is the conjunction *quod* Eng. *that*: here however it retains more than it usually does of its original pronominal use as acc. n. of *ὅστις*. See the editor's Apol. App. II p. 123. Cron invariably writes *ὅτι* for both rel. (not *ὃ τι*) and conjunction.

2. **τὰς ἐν Δυκείῳ—διατριβάς**. The Lyceum was one of the three famous gymnasia outside the walls of Athens: the others were the *Ἀκαδημεία* (6 stades from the Dipylon or north-west gate: Cic. de Fin. v 1. 1) and the *Κυνόσαργες* (a little way N. E. from the Lyceum, on the road to *Alōpekē*). It was situated (see Milchhöfer in Baummeister's *Denkmäler* I p. 182) on the right bank of the Ilisus, near Diochares' gate, east of the city. Connected with the gymnasium, which is said by Theopompus to have been founded by Pisistratus, was a shrine of *Ἀπόλλων Λύκειος* of very early date (Plut. Theseus 27. 9). In later times it was famous as the seat of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school. Socrates was generally to be found in places of common resort, like gymnasia and the market place: it is to the Lyceum that he betakes himself after Agathon's banquet (Symp. 223 D): and the Lyceum is also the scene of the dialogues *Lysis* and *Euthydemus*. *διατρίβειν* and *διατριβαί* (originally simply of spending the time) suggest philosophical conversation, as the most rational way of occupying one's leisure: e.g. in Apol. 29 C *ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν*: *ibid.* 37 C *τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβάς καὶ τοὺς λόγους*. So *σχολή* has already in Greek come to be used for a disputation and even for a 'philosophical school'.

3. **τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν**. The porch of the King Archon (*στοὰ βασιλείας* Ar. Eccles. 685) was the first porch in the *ἀγορά* on your right as you approached the market place from the Ceramicus.

Paus. I 3. 1 πρώτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν δεξιᾷ καλουμένη στοὰ βασιλείος (sc. as you leave the Ceramicus). It was the duty of the King Archon to maintain many of the religious duties that had originally belonged to the Athenian King (compare the function of the *Rex Sacrorum* in the early Roman Republic): among other religious offices, he had charge of the mysteries, the *Ἀθήναια* and the torch-race: and in accordance with the usual principle of Athenian law, he had the presidency (*ἡγεμονία δικαστηρίου*) of the Heliastic Court when charges connected with his sphere of duties, impiety, for example, were being heard (Gilbert Handbuch der Gr. Staatsalterthümer I p. 241).

4. καὶ σοί γε. γε does not go with καὶ in the idiomatic sense of καὶ—γε = 'yes, and', but with οὐ γάρ: cf. infra 2 B οὐ γάρ ἐκείνῳ γε: 4 B οὐ γάρ ἄν που γε: 8 A οὐ γάρ τοῦτό γε. Schanz remarks that Plato nearly always uses γε with οὐ γάρ.

δίκη. δίκη is the general term for a case heard before an Athenian law-court. There were two sorts of δίκαι viz. the δίκη *ἰδία* (ἀγὼν ἰδῖος) or δίκη proper, and the δίκη δημοσία (ἀγὼν δημόσιος) or γραφή. The first was a civil suit: the latter either a criminal or a public process, in which the state (as represented by any Athenian citizen in the full exercise of his rights) was prosecutor. An accusation of φόρος was a γραφή: but Euthyphro here uses the more general term, in order not to prejudice the nature of the case in which Socrates might be concerned. In Socrates' careful distinction between γραφή and δίκη in his reply Schanz sees a delicate sarcasm on Euthyphro's vaunted accuracy in the use of names: see Crat. 396 D.

5. ὥσπερ ἐμοί. The ἄρχων βασιλεὺς as public guardian of religion presided in trials for φόρος: for it was a religious duty to wipe off the stain of bloodguiltiness: see 4 C ἔσον γὰρ τὸ μίαισμα γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν ξυνηὲς τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνειδῶς καὶ μὴ ἀφορισοῖς σεαυτὸν τε καὶ ἐκείνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξιῶν.

6. οὐτοι δὴ—γε. 'No, Euthyphro, the Athenians do not' etc. γε, following the emphatic Ἀθηναῖοι, should be taken with οὐτοι δὴ. So in Crat. 438 D οὐτοι δὴ δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ὦ Εὐθύφρων. B for the most part and T everywhere read ὦ Εὐθύφρων throughout the dialogue¹. Fritzsche compares similar

¹ The Bodleian ms of Plato is denoted by B: T stands for the ms in the library of St Mark's at Venice. These two are the best representatives of the two families of Platonic mss.

mistakes in the Laurentian MS of Sophocles e.g. Ajax 903 ὦ ταλαίφρων: O. T. 1299 ὦ τλήμων.

- 2 B 8. ὡς ἔοικε seems to shew that no interrogation is intended: I have therefore removed the mark of interrogation placed by most of the editors after γέγραπται. σέ is clearly emphatic (as in line 11): for which reason I print γραφήν σέ τις, not γραφήν σέ τις. Euthyphro, knowing Socrates' invariable ἀπραγμοσύνη, at once leaps to the conclusion that he is the accused, and not the accuser.

γέγραπται. γράφεσθαι = to cause to be written down: γράφειν = to write, as in Theaetetus 142 D ἐγραψάμην τότε εὐθὺς—ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ—ἔγραφον. Hence γράφεσθαι = 'to indict': the name of the accused party being written down by the ἀρχων or his clerk: whereas γράφειν = 'to propose a motion' i.e. to write it out oneself. Notice the two accusatives γραφήν γράφεσθαι σε: the first is the accusative of the internal, the second of the external object: Thompson Greek Syntax p. 66. γέγραπται alone would have sufficed for the sense: but a certain rhetorical effect of surprise and indignation is attained by repeating Socrates' γραφήν, at the same time that the antithesis with δίκην is thereby emphasized.

9. καταγνώσομαι. καταγιγνώσκειν is to see a weak point in one: Apol. 25 A πολλήν γέ μου κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν: Phaed. 116 C οὐ καταγνώσομαι γε σοῦ ὅπερ τῶν ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω. οὐ γὰρ που is found in one inferior MS, whence Stephanus read οὐ γὰρ σοῦ; but the omission of the genitive is accounted for by the presence of σοῦ in the next clause ὡς σὺ ἕτερον. Compare Thuc. VI 34. 8: ἐπέρχονται γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀμυνουμένοις, δικαίως κατεγνωκότες ὅτι αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐφθείρομεν. T here has ὡς σὺ γε ἕτερον.

11. ἀλλὰ σέ ἄλλος. 'Interrogatio supervacanea est valde mirantis', says Wohlrab. ἄλλος is used after ἕτερον for the sake of variety. So in Aristotle Ethic. Nic. IX 4. 1166^b γ' ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται. Here perhaps the jingle is intended to suggest Euthyphro's peculiar tricks of language: see Crat. 396 D and Introd. p. xxiii.

14. οἷδ' αὐτὸς πᾶν τι γινώσκω = "ne ipse quidem satis novi". On οὐ πᾶν see Riddell's Digest of Platonic Idioms § 139. It means 'not quite' i.e. generally 'not exactly', though sometimes 'not at all' by the usual Greek *meiosis* or *ἐμφασις*. It is however held by some scholars that οὐ πᾶν occasionally = πᾶν οὐ even without assuming *meiosis*: see Classical Review for 1887 p.

71. The addition of the adverbial *τι* makes the expression vaguer and less emphatic. So Phaed. 57 A οὐδεις πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήνας; Rep. IV 419 A ἐάν τις σε φῇ μὴ πάνυ τι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἀνδρας.

16. **Μέλητον.** Apol. 23 E ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μελήτος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων. Meletus was the protagonist in the prosecution of Socrates: his συνήγοροι were Anytus and Lyco. Hence when it is desired to allude to the prosecution briefly, Meletus alone is mentioned: so in Apol. 19 B foll. and Theaet. 210 D τὴν Μελητήτου γραφήν, ἣν με γέγραπται. On Meletus generally see the editor's Introduction to the Apology p. xxvi. Notice the indifference which Socrates contrives to express by means of νέος τις and ὡς ἐγώ μαι.

17. **τῶν δῆμων Πιτθεύς.** The deme Πιτθος was in the tribe Cecropis. τῶν δῆμων is a partitive genitive; for Πιτθεύς = ἐκ Πιτθου. The old reading was τὸν δῆμον (acc. of reference): Cobet Novae Lectiones p. 671 rightly remarks "corrigere τῶν δῆμων", and so B and T. See Holden on Plutarch Themist. I § 1 πατρὸς γὰρ ἦν Νεοκλέους—Φρεαρρίου τῶν δῆμων. Schanz remarks that this gen. is not found on Inscriptions, and that in manuscripts it generally precedes the name of the deme.

νῶ ἔχειν = meminisse: ἐν νῶ ἔχειν = in animo habere i.q. to intend. Contrast Apol. 20 B τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; with Rep. VI 490 A ἡγεῖτο δ' αὐτῶ, εἰ νῶ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια κτλ. There is here inferior MS authority for ἐν νῶ.

18. **οἷον τετανότριχα** by the usual attraction for τοιοῦτον οἷος ἐστι τετανότριξ. Cf. Soph. 237 C χαλεπὸν ἥρου καὶ σχεδὸν ἐλπεῖν οἷψ γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον = τοιοῦτῳ οἷος γε ἐγὼ εἰμι. Kühner's Griechische Grammatik II p. 916. τετανότριξ implies long rigid hair (curls). Astrologers used to maintain that a man born under the sign Virgo would be τετανότριξ χαροπὸς λευκόχρως ἀπαισ αἰδήμων (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. v 95). For long hair as affected by anyone who δοκεῖ εἶναι τι see Aristoph. Nub. 545 κἀγὼ μὲν τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ὦν ποιητὴς οὐ κομῶ. In Rep. IV 425 B Plato cites short hair (κουραὶ) as a mark of the well-conducted youth. Just so the Ephors annually commanded the Spartans κελρεσθαι τὸν μύστακα καὶ πελθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις (Plut. Cleom. 9, on the authority of Aristotle), although it was only the moustache that the Spartans fell foul of: long hair in general was considered Dorian and aristocratic. οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον alludes to Meletus' youth: so infra

in 2 C he is the tell-tale little boy complaining to his mother. It is clear also from Apol. 25 D and 26 E that Meletus was young. ἐπίγρυπος) (ἐπίσιμος = 'somewhat hook-nosed': the word occurs again Phaedr. 253 D in a description of the noble steed, just as the horses in the Panathenaic frieze are ἐπίγρυποι. In Rep. v 474 D βασιλικός is said to be a polite euphemism for γρυπός, like ἐπίχαρις for σιμος. Here the δέ seems to imply that Meletus made up for deficiency in beard by amplitude of nose. On the whole, Meletus gives us the impression of a Roman-nosed and angular young man: Socrates was flat-nosed and rotund.

20. οὐκ ἐννοῶ: ἐννοῶ = νῶ ἔχω 'I remember': Polit. 296 A οὐκ ἐννοῶ νῦν γ' οὕτως. ἀλλὰ δὴ marks the return after the digression. The particle is also idiomatically used = 'at enim' to introduce the objection of an adversary: see Stallbaum on Rep. II 365 D.

2 C 22. ἦντινα; A previous speaker's question is invariably repeated by the indirect interrogative. Schanz (following one inferior MS) emends Laches 195 A where a question is repeated with πρὸς τί; to πρὸς ὅ τι;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ: without ὥς, as in Crito 50 B ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε and Phaed. 108 D ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός. In such cases inferior MSS frequently insert ὥς.

23. οὐ φαῦλον 'no slight thing': φαῦλον is a more general term than ἀγεννής, which denotes lack of courage) (γεννάδας. Supra ἐγνώκεναι (novisse) is 'to know': as γινώσκειν (noscere) 'to perceive' or 'learn'.

24. τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται. For the terms of the indictment of Socrates see Apol. 24 B Σωκράτη φησὶν (sc. ὁ Μέλητος) ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα ἑτέρα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά.

26. κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι: κινδυνεύει = δοκεῖ as often in Plato: the word must originally have been used only where the predicate involved something evil = κινδυνός ἐστι with inf. as in Lysias κατὰ Ἀγοράτου § 27 σοὶ δὲ—κίνδυνος ἦν βασανισθῆναι. σοφός ('clever') is sarcastic, as often e.g. in Crito 51 A ἡ οὕτως εἰ σοφός; The word (like φροντιστής) was almost a nickname of Socrates (see Apol. 18 B): here it suggests the sophists, as in Meno 75 C τῶν σοφῶν—καὶ ἐριστικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν. Meletus is ὁ κατὰ νέους σοφός: see infra on line 32.

καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν—διαφθείροντος. ἀμαθής is regularly

used as the opposite of *σοφός*. Notice the implication that vice is due to ignorance (*ἀμαθία*). This doctrine is frequently regarded as peculiar to Socrates: but it is embedded in the Greek language. Take for example the words *ἀμαθής ἀπαίδευτος ἀγνώμων*. Primarily these words denoted a want of intellectual cultivation: but in practice they are often used of deficient moral culture: *ἀμαθής* (see Verrall on *Medea* 224) = 'boorish' 'unfeeling': *ἀπαίδευτος* is 'rude' and *ἀγνώμων* 'unkind'. An untutored intellect (from the Greek point of view) implies moral delinquency: since in the flourishing period of Greek life intellect and will are not discriminated. The same point of view comes out in Plato's theory of education (*Rep.* VI—VII): true education awakens *ἐπιστήμη*, and does not implant *ὀρθή δόξα*: and *ἐπιστήμη* means the regeneration (*περιαγωγή*) of the entire man, moral as well as intellectual. As to the syntax, note *ἐμὴν* (= *ἐμοῦ*) with *διαφθείροντος*.

28. *ὥς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν*. Had Plato chosen to make the simile an identification, he would have omitted the second *πρὸς* as Cobet requires. See on *Crito* 46 c: "If it is wished to bring the objects compared into the closest possible union, *ὥσπερ* (*ὥς, καθάπερ*) with the preposition is placed first, and the preposition itself written only once: *Rep.* VIII 545 E *ὥς πρὸς παίδας ἡμᾶς παίζουσας καὶ ἐρσεχλοῦσας*". Where *ὥσπερ* with the preposition precedes, Cobet (*Variae Lectiones* p. 165 foll.) would in every case delete the second preposition: but he defies the MSS. Otherwise both prepositions are inserted: and in case the object compared comes first neither preposition may be omitted e.g. *πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὥς πρὸς μητέρα*. Schanz emends two curious cases in which the first preposition is omitted with preceding *ὥσπερ*, viz. *Phaed.* 67 D *ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ δεσμῶν* (leg. *ἐκ δεσμῶν* with T) and *Tim.* 79 A *βεῖν ὥσπερ αὐλῶνος* (leg. *διὰ αὐλῶνος*) *διὰ τοῦ σώματος*. Archer-Hind retains *ὥσπερ αὐλῶνος*. The motherhood of the state is the leading motive of the *Crito* (see the editor's introduction to that dialogue): Socrates spurned the temptation to break her laws as parricide. On this view rested during the most flourishing period the entire fabric of Greek civic life. It is worthy of remark that the Cretans called their country *μητρὶς* (*Rep.* IX 575 D).

29. *τῶν πολιτικῶν* is neuter, and goes with *ἀρχεσθαι*.

30. *ὀρθῶς γὰρ ἐστί*. *ἐστί* of course is not equivalent to *ἔχει*, 2 D for *ὀρθῶς* (which would in English be printed with marks of quotation) = *τὸ ὀρθῶς ἀρχεσθαι*. Schanz compares (*inter alia*) *Symp.*



183 D καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλόν, αἰσχροῦς δὲ αἰσχρόν. αἰσχροῦς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πονηρῷ τε καὶ πονηρῶς χαρίζεσθαι, καλῶς δὲ χρηστῷ τε καὶ χρηστῶς.

31. ἐπιμεληθῆναι: true to his name Μέλητος: so infra 3 A ἐπιμεληθεῖς. Cf. Apol. 25 C (where see note), Μέλητε—ἀμέλειαν—μεμέληκεν and 26 B Μελήτω τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. In Aristoph. Ran. 990—991 there is perhaps a similar pun on Meletus' name, κεχνηότες μαμμάκνυθαι, μελιττίδαι (v.l. μελητίδαι) καθήντο: cf. ibid. 1302. For similar plays upon words in Plato and the principle which they involve see on Crito 46 C and especially 47 B (τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι). It should be remarked that ἐπιμελεῖσθαι was almost a technical term of the Socratic ethics (Crito 51 A): Socrates himself habitually professed ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς.

32. γεωργὸν ἀγαθόν. Herewith begins the agricultural metaphor, continued in ἐκκαθαίρει and in τὰς βλάστας: compare Rep. IX 589 B τοῦ πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελήσεται ὥσπερ γεωργός, τὰ μὲν ἡμέρα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεύων, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι. The γεωργός is the σοφὸς κατὰ φύτᾶ (Theaet. 167 B): so Meletus poses as ὁ κατὰ νέους σοφός. As to the subject matter, note in the first place the implication that the politician should make the citizens morally better: in the best period of Greece politics had an ethical purpose; see Aristotle Eth. Nic. I 10. 1099^b 30 ff. αὕτη δὲ (sc. ἡ πολιτικὴ) πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. In fact ethics and politics were not separated in Plato's time, since τὸ νόμιμον=τὸ δίκαιον—the law of the state is the law of morality for the man. (Introduction to Crito, p. xiii.) Only from this point of view can we see the true unity of the Republic, which, though it is called πολιτεία, is almost as much ethical as political. It was only when man was forcibly torn from the state by the loss of civic freedom that Aristotle wrote an ethical treatise as distinct from politics. In the second place, observe the paramount importance here assigned to the care of the young: sound education seemed to Plato the only possible salvation for a state: εὖ τραφέντων καὶ τρεφομένων τῶν νέων πάντα ἡμῖν κατ' ὁρθὴν πλεῖ (Legg. VII 813 D).

33. καὶ δὴ καὶ introduces the application as in Crito 47 C οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα—οὕτως—καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων κτλ. ἴσως infra='doubtless' (sarcastic).

3 A 34. ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει. Socrates as a noxious weed, or per-

haps as some pestilent monster preying on the young plants: cf. Arist. Hist. An. ix 625^b 33 τὰ δὲ γινόμενα θηρία ἐν τοῖς σμήρεσι καὶ λυμαινόμενα τὰ κηρία αἱ μὲν χρησταὶ μέλιτται ἐκκαθαίρουσιν. Hirschig's ἐκκαθαρεῖ is unnecessary, and in fact less forcible and accurate.

35. τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας. There is much irony in this clause, expressed by placing it after the verb ἐκκαθαίρει, and adding the words ὥς φησιν. Fritzsche well compares Apol. 34 A: εὐρήσετε—πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. For the general idea Schanz compares Legg. vi 765 E παντὸς γὰρ δὴ φυτοῦ ἡ πρώτη βλάστη καλῶς ὀρμηθεῖσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυριωτάτη τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τὸ πρόσφορον and ibid. vii 813 D quoted above on 2 D. The words τῶν νέων are bracketed by Schanz, following Gomperz, chiefly on the ground that τὰς βλάστας=τοὺς νέους (with the additional agricultural idea) can alone form a correct antithesis to τῶν πρεσβυτέρων: but I think the words are right, for it is quite in Plato's style in passing from the simile to the application to choose words applicable to both (τὰς βλάστας to agriculture, and τῶν νέων to the young: cf. note on Crito 47 B): moreover τὰς βλάστας τῶν νέων is more than τοὺς νέους or τὰς βλάστας alone since it means the development or 'sprouting' of the young. The idea contained in the four words is afterwards expanded in the Phaedrus: where philosophic Ἔρως is viewed as that which fosters the sprouting of the wings of the soul (τὴν βλάστην τοῦ πτεροῦ): Phaedr. 246 C foll. For a similar juxtaposition of the comparison and the thing compared, see Alc. i 134 D—Ε εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ὄρωντες,—εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες. [Liebhold in the Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie 1888 no. 40 p. 1226 also retains τῶν νέων, regarding it as an echo of the words τοὺς νέους in the indictment: but he can hardly be right in changing τὰς βλάστας to τοὺς βελτίστους.]

36. ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο. Not exactly a case of the σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου. ἔπειτα corresponds to πρῶτον μὲν (ἔπειτα and εἶτα are more common than ἔπειτα δέ and εἶτα δέ) as 'in the second place' to 'in the first place': while μετὰ τοῦτο=μετὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρειν. Compare Aristoph. Ran. 1026 εἶτα διδάξας Πέρσας μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐξεδίδαξα κτλ.

39. ἀρξαμένῳ sc. Μελήτῳ: τῷ ἀρξαμένῳ would make the statement general.

CHAPTER II.

The Introduction is here continued. Euthyphro is indignant that Socrates should be accused of heterodoxy and insult cast upon the profession of the *μάντις* to which both belonged.

2. *ὀρρωδῶ* is a very strong word, suggesting the physical results of excessive fear.

ἀτεχνῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ. *ἀτεχνῶς* = 'literally', 'absolutely' is used to intensify a statement, especially a simile or (as here) a proverb: it is opposed to *σχεδόν τι*, *ἐμβραχυ* (with relatives only) or *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, which modifies a universal affirmative or negative. Distinguish *ἀτέχνως* = 'inartistically': the English word 'simply' has both senses. Cf. *Apol.* 17 D and note.

3. *ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἀρχεσθαι*. All offerings began and ended with a libation to Hestia. In the economy of Greece, both political and religious, Hestia was the central divinity; she is the heart of the House and of the State. As a Goddess, she does not appear till Hesiod and the Homeric hymns, where she figures as the first-born daughter of Cronus and Rhea (*Hes. Theog.* 454): she is simply the personification of the Hearth. Every *πόλις*, being regarded as a family in accordance with the usual Greek view, had a *κοινὴ ἑστία*, on which holy fire was always kept burning: it was situated in the *πρυτανεῖον* (*Pind. Nem.* XI 1 καὶ ῥέας, ἃ τε πρυτανεῖα λέλογχας Ἑστία), which for that reason was the central point without which no *πόλις* could exist. Therefore the proverb *ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἀρχεσθαι* means to begin with the central or *κύριον* or fundamental point: *Ar. Vesp.* 845—846 *ἵνα ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἀρχόμενος ἐπιτρέψω τινά*. Euthyphro implies that Socrates is the corner-stone of Athens. Plato claims exactly the same honour for his master: as the *true ἑστία* of Athens he too should be supported in the Prytaneum (*Apol. Ch.* XXVI): cf. *Gorg.* 521 D *οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν*. But Euthyphro resents the accusation of Socrates because he feels himself attacked through him: Socrates is to him a *μάντις*, and *μαντική* he regards as the safety of the State. See *Intro.* p. xxi.

4. *κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν*. *κακουργεῖν* is opposed to *πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίος*—γενήσεται. Notice the implication that

evil treatment makes a man worse: *κακουργεῖν* = *κακὸν ποιεῖν* (as in Rep. I 335 B foll.): this is an essentially Greek view, well illustrated by the transition of meaning in *πονηρὸς* and *μοχθηρὸς* from 'afflicted' to 'depraved': see the editor's note on Crito 47 E where allusion is made to Simonides Frag. 5. 10—13, *ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι, δὲν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.* The converse view, that prosperity means goodness, is implied in the usual equivocation on *εὖ πράττειν* = to 'do well' and 'fare well': see Aristotle Eth. Nic. I 1098^b 20. The principle on which this view rests is found in Hom. Od. XVIII 136—137 *τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἔστιν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων ὅλον ἐπ' ἡμῶν ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.*

5. *καὶ μοι λέγε.* *καὶ* before Imperatives = 'pray': Apol. 24 C *καὶ μοι δεῦρο εἰπέ* = *agedum dic mihi.*

τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ. *καὶ* suggests that Socrates cannot possibly have done anything to corrupt the youth. See on *τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν* in 6 B.

7. *ἄτοπα, ὥς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι.* The charge is *ἄτοπον*, because 3 B gods should make men, not men gods. *γε* is placed after the emphatic *οὕτω*, and belongs strictly speaking to *ὥς*. So Lysis 216 A *εὖ γε, ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος, ὥς γε οὕτως ἀκοῦσαι.* *οὕτω* is idiomatically used for 'at first sight', 'on the first hearing', and the like. So Crat. 397 A *εἰ ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιμαρτυρήσει αὐτὰ τὰ ὀνόματα μὴ πάνυ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὕτως ἕκαστα κείσθαι.* For *ὥς* with inf. in this sense (as in *ὥς ἔπος εἰπείν*) see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 207.

8. *ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν.* It is worth while to notice the gradual development of the metaphor from the mint. *καινός* rather than *νέος* is used of new coinage: cf. Ar. Ran. 720 *ἐς τε τὰρχαῖον νόμισμα καὶ τὸ καινὸν χρυσίον.* Presently in *ἀρχαῖους οὐ νομίζοντα* the metaphor comes into sight: for *νομίζειν* and its derivatives mean not only to 'believe in' or 'worship', but also 'to use as current coin'. See Ar. Nub. 247—249 (a passage precisely similar to this) *ποῖους θεοὺς ὁμεί σύ; πρῶτον γὰρ θεοὶ ἡμῖν νόμισμα οὐκ ἔστι. τῷ γὰρ δμννῷ; ἢ σιδαρέουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Βυζαντίῳ;* In the reply of Euthyphro the metaphor is explicit: *ὥς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα κτλ.*

10. *τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν.* The precision of *τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα* (summing up *ὥς καινός*—*νομίζοντα*) followed emphatically by *ὥς φησω* (echoing the *φησί* with which the sentence begins) insinuates that Meletus was not actuated solely by a zeal for the

national faith. In the indictment against Socrates (for which see above on 2 C) it is clear that the religious accusation was introduced only to give a foothold to the graver charge of corrupting the youth: i.e. the religious charge was ancillary to the social and political. At the same time it should be remembered that owing to the constitution of the ancient state heterodoxy was equivalent to treason. In Apol. 23 E—24 A a personal motive for the prosecution is assigned: *Μέλῃτός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλῃτος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων.*

11. *μανθάνω· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον—γίγνεσθαι.* It is barely possible that *μανθάνω* is intended to suggest *μάντις*: Euthyphro (as appears in Cratylus 396 D) was addicted to the etymological pun. *ὅτι δὴ* is 'because forsooth', cf. 9 B *μανθάνω· ὅτι* ('because') *σοὶ δοκῶ κτλ.* Socrates regarded his *δαιμόνιον* as a species of *μαντική*—a divine sign (*σημεῖον*) or voice (*φωνή*), vouchsafed to him as a proof of the divine care: see the editor's Apology pp. xxvii and 88. He certainly did not look upon it as a new divinity: but it is clear from Apol. 31 D (*θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον—ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶ-δῶν Μέλῃτος ἐγράψατο*) that it was so misrepresented by Meletus, wilfully, if we may trust the sarcasm of *ὅτι δὴ* and *infra ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντος*. *σαυτῷ* is written in preference to *σοί*, because = *σοὶ αὐτῷ* i.e. 'to you alone': *αὐτός* often = *solus*. Socrates held that he was almost if not quite the sole possessor of a 'divine voice' (Rep. VI 496 C *ἢ γὰρ πού τινα ἄλλω ἢ μηδενὶ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν γέγονε*).

12. *ἐκάστοτε* is 'on each occasion': the voice did not speak always, but only as occasion arose—forbidding, not encouraging: Cic. Div. I § 122 *divinum quiddam—cui semper paruerit, nunquam impellenti, saepe (not semper) revocanti*. Notice that *γίγνεσθαι* is "the technical expression for the appearance of Socrates' *δαιμόνιον*" (Schanz): see on Crito 46 B.

13. *καινοτομοῦντος*. New coinage is apt to be inferior to old (Ar. Ran. 717 ff.) and *καινοτομεῖν* in Plato (who employs the word only as a metaphor) always denotes a change for the worse, like *κινεῖν* of revolutionary change.

14. *ὡς διαβαλὼν δὴ*: *δὴ* is 'therefore'. *διαβάλλειν* was a regular term in Athenian law for the opposite of a fair and honourable accusation (*κατηγορεῖν*): cf. Thuc. III 42 *εὖ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἂν ἡγεῖται περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ δύνασθαι, εὖ δὲ διαβαλὼν ἐκπλήξαι ἂν κτλ.*

15. εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα—πολλούς: since the πολλοί, for whom Plato had no great respect (οἱ γὰρ πολλοί, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται Prot. 317 A), judge by the canons of ὀρθὴ δόξα and not ἐπιστήμη, in which they do not partake. Witness (among the ancients) Anaxagoras, Socrates and Aristotle: each of whom was condemned for impiety.

16. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι: καὶ (also) goes with ἐμοῦ: τοι is 'let me 3 C tell you'. Observe how Euthyphro recognises in Socrates a kindred spirit: "we are both μάντις (see infra ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις)—*me* they laugh at, *you* they accuse—in both cases envy is their motive". The Athenians were right in laughing at Euthyphro, but Socrates was a far more serious antagonist—more serious indeed than he himself knew. His teaching contained the germs of ethical and political doctrine destined to contribute to the downfall of Greek civic life, while it at the same time paved the way for something higher. See Apol. p. xxviii.

18. καταγελῶσιν ὡς μαινομένου. As if the μάντις were μανικός: for the word μαινομένου naturally suggests μάντις: see Phaedr. 244 C: τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ δνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺν ἡγοῦντο οὐδὲ θνείδος μανίαν. οὐ γὰρ ὃν τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ἣ τὸ μέλλον κρίνεται, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἐμπλέκοντες μανικὴν ἐκάλεσαν.—οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀπειροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλλοντες μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν. In the same passage Plato recognises four varieties of serviceable madness whereof two are μαντικὴ ἐνθεος and μαντικὴ ἡ τῶν ἐμφρόνων (working through signs and omens). Euthyphro's variety was ἡ τῶν ἐμφρόνων.

καίτοι = 'quaque' 'and yet' followed by ἀλλ' ὅμως as in Phaed. 68 E (quoted by Schanz) καίτοι φασ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως κτλ.

20. τοῖς τοιούτοις, i.e. τοῖς μάντεσι. The words at the same time express the grounds of the envy.

ἀλλ'—λέναι. Notice the threefold occurrence of ἀλλά in three lines: in the first and last case it forms the natural adversative to the negatives: in the second it has the effect of a spirited exhortation.

21. ὁμόσε λέναι. A Homeric phrase (Il. XIII 337 ὁμός' ἦλθε μάχη) meaning 'to come to close quarters', 'grapple with'. ὁμός in Homer = ὁ αὐτός: so that ὁμόσε = ἐς ταυτόν, shewing the same suffix as in ἐκέισε, ἄλλοσε, ποτέρωσε, ἐτέρωσε etc., a suffix confined for the most part to pronominal stems, except in the Homeric κύκ-

λόσε (II. IV 212) and ὑπόσε (II. X 461): Kühner's Griechische Grammatik I p. 731, Anm. 5. Plato employs the phrase as a metaphor not unfrequently, e.g. Euthyd. 294 D ὁμόσε ἥτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, cf. Phaedo 95 B Ὀμηρικῶς ('as Homer's heroes do') ἐγγὺς ἰόντες.

CHAPTER III.

In this chapter Socrates is careful to point out the difference between himself and Euthyphro. Euthyphro the Athenians laugh at: Socrates they prosecute, because the latter proselytises, while the former is content with merely displaying his cleverness.

1. ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλά. More emphasis is thrown on ἀλλά by placing the vocative first. Schanz compares the position of the vocative before an imperative followed by δέ e.g. Phileb. 48 D ὦ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δέ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῇ τέμνειν.

τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι. The antithetical clause is to be understood as 'but to be accused is'. In 3 D—E infra the antithesis is fully expressed: εἰ μὲν οὖν, δ' οὖν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου καταγελαῖν κτλ., εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται κτλ. For μὲν with no corresponding δέ clause cf. Apol. 21 D ἐλογιζόμεν ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι: ibid. 17 B and note.

When the ignorant laugh at the wise, the wise may retaliate with laughter less ridiculous than theirs, says Plato (Rep. VII 517 B): for the ignorant come short in matters of far graver moment than the philosopher (Theaet. 175 C foll.).

2. οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα is idiomatic for 'nothing', 'a matter of no importance': so in 3 E (οὐδὲν ἔσται πρᾶγμα 'will come to nothing'), and not rarely in Plato.

4. δεινόν: 'clever' with the secondary notion of an 'uncanny, unsettling tendency'.

5. μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας. See infra on 3 D ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ κτλ.

3 D 7. τοιοῦτους sc. σοφοὺς τὴν αὐτοῦ σοφίαν. τοιοῦτος is frequently used to avoid the repetition of an adjective: see on Apol. 26 A τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίῳ. So ἕτερος τοιοῦτος often = 'just such another' Euthyd. 298 D—E, Gorg. 493 B.

θυμούνται sc. τούτῳ.

εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ—εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι. οὖν has the effect of

'perhaps': cf. Soph. O. T. 1049 εἴτ' οὖν ἐπ' ἀγρῶν εἴτε κἀνθάδ' εἰσιδῶν. Akin is the use of οὖν after relatives as in ὅποσοςοῦν, οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

No doubt some Athenians may have been envious of the proselytising δεινός: but others were indignant on political grounds (δι' ἄλλο τι), because such teaching seemed to weaken the authority of law, by promoting inquiry into its basis. See the speech of Cleon in Thuc. III 37. 4 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι—καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις. Socrates himself did not call in question the authority of the laws; for he defined τὸ δίκαιον as τὸ νόμιμον (see Introduction to Crito p. xiii): but some of his associates, as for example Alcibiades, were ready to submit the laws and constitution of their country to the test of reason. See Apol. Ch. XXI.

9. τοῦτου οὖν περὶ. τοῦτου is τοῦ διδασκαλικὸν τῆς σοφίας εἶναι. Euthyphro is not the man to cast his pearls before swine. Note the emphatic ἐμέ.

10. οὐ πᾶν = 'not exactly': see on 2 B above.

11. σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν: 'shew yourself rarely' not 'make yourself scarce'. For this use of σπάνιος cf. Legg. VIII 841 A σπανίῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ δι' αἰσχύνην χρώμενοι κτλ.

13. ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας: whereas the attitude of Euthyphro is that of a μισάνθρωπος.

14. ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν. Apol. 33 A ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος (different from διδασκαλικός supra) μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτε ἔγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμῇ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαντὸν ἐρωτᾶν κτλ. Socrates believed himself commissioned by God to preach to all who would listen. Apol. Chapters VI and XVII.

15. οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ: for Aristophanes misrepresents Socrates in Nub. 98 οὗτοι διδάσκουσ', ἀργύριον ἦν τις διδῶ κτλ.

προστίθεις (sc. μισθόν) is not here used absolutely, as Wohlrab and Schanz suppose. Josef Wagner (Die Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron, Brünn 1882—3, p. 26) shews but little sense of humour when in arguing against the authenticity of the dialogue he asks, apropos of this passage—"where could Socrates have got the money to pay his audience, when in the Apology he can command only a single mina?"

16. *εἴ τίς μου θέλοι ἀκούειν*. So B: T has *θέλει*. Either is right: but the reading of B gives the natural protasis to the apodosis in *προστιθείς ἂν ἡδέως* (i.q. *προστίθειν ἂν ἡδέως*—the participle being preferred in order to form a balance with *οὐ μόνον ἀνευ μισθοῦ*).

17. *νῦν δὴ* = *ἀρτίως* is written by Schanz and Cobet *νυνδῆ*: see on Apol. 37 C. The reference is to C above *τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα*. Note that if Plato had omitted *νῦν δὴ* he would probably have written *λέγω*: cf. Apol. 21 A *ὅπερ λέγω* (alluding to 20 E).

3 E 18. *οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδές*. *ἀηδές* is used as in Apol. 41 B *ἀντιπαράβαλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων—οὐκ ἂν ἀηδές εἴη*.

19. *εἰ δὲ σπουδάζονται*. So T, rightly: B has *σπουδάζοντας*, by an obvious assimilation to *παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας*. Note the contrast between the optative *εἰ μέλλοιεν* and the future indicative *εἰ δὲ σπουδάζονται*: the latter alternative is regarded as the more likely. *εἰ* with the future is common in threats and grave forebodings. For the middle form *σπουδάζονται* see Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 138: "All verbs expressing the exercise of the senses or denoting any functional state or process have the inflexions of the middle voice either throughout or in the future tense". *σπουδάζω* does not exactly fall under this rule, but it is a word in which the physical concomitants of enthusiasm (haste and the like) were "primarily uppermost" (ibid. p. 409).

20. *τοῦτ' ἦδη*. Note the emphatic position of *τοῦτο*. This use of *ἦδη* (*οὐπω* or *οὐκέτι* as the case may be is elaborately illustrated by Cope on Arist. Rhet. A 1 1354^b 7 (p. 13 of Cope's edition): it is like *denique*, or *iam* in Lucretius. The rule may be stated thus. In two or more cases where a certain predicate applies to all or any of the others after the first, *ἦδη* may be used in applying the predicate: *οὐπω* is then rightly used in negating the predicate in the first case: similarly, *οὐκέτι* is used in stating that a predicate which has been applied to one or more previous cases does not apply to one or more that follow.

ὅπη ἀποβήσεται. Naber would read *ὅποι*, thus changing the meaning, which is 'how it will turn out', not 'in what it will end'. Schanz compares Apol. 19 A *τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον* and Lysis 206 A *δεδιώς τὸ μέλλον ὅπη ἀποβήσεται*.

ἀδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντισιν. So in Apol. 42 A *ἀδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἡ τῷ θεῷ*. In the emphatic *ὑμῖν* Socrates refuses to recognize

Euthyphro as a brother *μάντις*: contrast Euthyphro's remark in 3 C: *φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις*. Spoken by Socrates, the words *πλὴν ὑμῖν κτλ.* might have been sincere: in Plato's mouth they would probably have been ironical. Plato had no high idea of *μαντική*: see *Politicus* 209 C where priests and soothsayers are placed on the same platform with slaves, artisans and merchants. 'Divination is the gift of God to human folly' says Plato in *Timaeus* 71 E: where see Archer-Hind's note.

22. *οὐδὲν ἔσται πρᾶγμα*: see on *οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα* in C above.

23. *σύ τε—οἶμαι δέ. δέ* (especially if followed by *καί*) is not rarely used after *τε*, both in Plato and in other authors: e.g. *Rep.* III 394 C *ἐν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δέ καὶ ἄλλοθι*: see Madvig's *Greek Syntax* p. 172 Rem. 5.

κατὰ νοῦν = 'ex animi sententia': as in *Soph.* 217 D *εἰ τίς σοι κατὰ νοῦν*.

24. *οἶμαι δέ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν*. The idiom *οἶμαι δέ καὶ* is frequent in Plato, followed either by the accusative (with infinitive) or by the nominative, since *οἶμαι* is often merely parenthetical: Schanz quotes (*inter alia*) *Lach.* 180 A *οἶμαι δέ καὶ Ἀάχνητα τόνδε* and *Crat.* 402 B *οἶμαι δέ καὶ Ἡσίοδος. ἐμέ* is here preferred to the more regular *ἐγώ* to prevent the doubt as to whether *ἐγώ* is the subject to *οἶμαι* or to the infinitive (understood): the other possible construction (the omission of *ἐμέ*) is not chosen because an antithesis is wanted to *σύ*. Similarly in *Soph.* 234 E *οἶμαι δέ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐτι πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι*: and so regularly in Plato when *οἶμαι δέ καὶ* is followed by the 1st pers. pron. with the infinitive, not *οἶμαι δέ καὶ ἐγώ*. There is only one previous allusion to Euthyphro's *δική*: viz. in 2 A *οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοί γε δίκη τις οἶσα τυγχάνει—ᾧσπερ ἐμοί*.

CHAPTER IV.

In chapters IV and V we are gradually introduced to the subject of the dialogue—what is piety?

Chapter IV explains the suit instituted by Euthyphro—an accusation of manslaughter against his father. Euthyphro allows that to bring such an accusation implies a knowledge of *τὰ θεῖα* and of *τὰ δαῖδά τε καὶ ἀνόσια*.

1. *ἔστιν δὲ δὴ σοί κτλ.* The effect of the order is to throw

emphasis on ἡ δίκη. So infra in 4 A ἔστιν δὲ τί τὸ ἐγκλημα κτλ. 'But your lawsuit, Euthyphro, what is it?' σοί is probably emphatic: for which reason I have accented it.

2. φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις; αὐτὴν is in both cases the internal accusative: see Thompson's Greek Syntax p. 66. φεύγειν 'to be a defendant' is used as the passive of διώκειν 'to prosecute'. So πάσχω ἐκπίπτω ἀποθνήσκω πρόσκειμαι μανθάνω etc. are used as passives of ποιῶ ἐκβάλλω ἀποκτείνω προσθέτω διδάσκω etc.

4. τίνα; masculine (as Euthyphro's answer shews), and the external accusative: so we find τύπτειν τινὰ πλῆγας and the like: Thompson Gk. Syntax p. 66.

4 A 5. αὐ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι. αὐ refers to 3 C καταγελῶσιν ὡς μαινομένον. Phocion thought he was wrong when Athens applauded him: Euthyphro thinks himself right when Athens thinks him mad. αὐ goes with μαίνεσθαι. Graser changes ὃν to ἦν, not seeing that τίνα is masculine.

6. πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις; = 'are you on a wild goose chase?' Socrates playfully understands διώκειν in its literal sense. The proverb τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν might well be applied to a madman (αὐ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι); it is found also in Arist. Met. Γ 1009^b 37—39. πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον ἀθυμῆσαι τοὺς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγχειροῦντας; τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν αὐ εἰη τὴν ἀλήθειαν. In Aesch. Ag. 394 διώκει καὶς ποτανὸν ὄρνιν and probably in Gorg. 471 C χῆρα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν there is an allusion to the same proverb: cf. Euthyd. 291 B ὥσπερ τὰ παῖδια τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα: Ar. Av. 169 ἀνθρωπος ὄρνις ἀστάθμητος, πετόμενος and Theocritus VI 17 καὶ φεύγει φιλέοντα καὶ οὐ φιλέοντα διώκει.

7. δεῖ is personal as in Apol. 30 D πολλοῦ δέω—ἀπολογεῖσθαι.

8. εὐ μάλα πρεσβύτης. To the same effect Tyrtaeus Frag. 10. 19 τοὺς δὲ παλαιότερους, ὧν οὐκέτι γούνατ' ἐλαφρά κτλ. εὐ μάλα, originally an epic phrase (Hom. Od. XXII 190 εὐ μάλ' ἀποστρέψαντε κτλ.), is frequent in Athenian conversational style. μάλα qualifies εὐ, not *vice versa*. μάλ' εὐ is rarer, e.g. Theaet. 156 A μάλ' εὐ ἄμουσοι.

10. ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ—βελτίστε. Notice the emphasis: 'My own father'. 'Your own father?' βέλτιστε is said with much sarcasm.

13. ἔστιν δὲ τί—δίκη; the order as in 3 E above. ἐγκλημα is τὸ ἐγεκκλημένον, the charge as distinct from the trial: Schanz quotes Isocr. περὶ τοῦ ξεύγουσ § 2, τὰς μὲν γὰρ δίκας ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐγκλημάτων λαγχάνουσι. The object of a δίκη is placed in the

genitive, which is here originally adjectival: 'trials of manslaughter' (φόνου) = 'manslaughter trials'.

15. Ἡράκλεις. A strong expression of wonder, much stronger than merely to repeat the word φόνου; (cf. supra ὁ σός, ὦ βέλτιστε;). The expression is common in Attic conversation, with or without ὦ, e.g. Symp. 213 B ὦ Ἡράκλεις, τουτὶ τί ἦν: cf. Ar. Av. 277 ὦναξ Ἡράκλεις: Lys. 208 E Ἡράκλεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴν μή τι ἠδίκηκας τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὴν μητέρα; Originally no doubt the appeal was to Heracles as ἀλεξίκακος or σωτήρ: so Ἀπολλὼν is used in exclamations = Ἀπολλὼν ἀποτρόπαιε.

ἦ που—ὅπη ποτὲ [ὀρθῶς] ἔχεις. The difficulties of this passage are very great. There is no variant in the MSS.

Madvig (*Adversaria Critica* I 366) and Schanz assume a lacuna in the first clause, in order to provide a subject to ἔχει: for the subject cannot be vaguely 'things in general', nor can ὀρθῶς ἔχει be the same as τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχει. To insert εὐσεβεῖν (as Madvig suggests) would be prematurely to anticipate the mention of the subject treated in the dialogue, viz. εὐσεβεῖν or δσιώτης, which (after the manner of Plato, who wished to preserve the semblance of a conversation: see on Crito 47 A) is reserved for a later stage (4 E). At the same time, if ἔχει is retained, it seems certain from ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξει that an infinitive is the subject to ἔχει: and the only relevant subject is 'to prosecute one's father for manslaughter'. Either therefore τὸ ἐγκαλεῖν (sc. πατρὶ φόνου) must be supplied from ἐγκλημα above, or we must assume the loss of some phrase to the same effect, probably τὸ ἐπεξιέναι πατρὶ φόνου in view of the frequent recurrence of these words throughout the chapter (οὐ γὰρ ἂν που—ἐπεξήγισθα φόνου αὐτῷ, and again ἐπεξιέναι in B: in D τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι: and especially ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ υἱὸν πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξιέναι in E). Now it will be admitted that while on the one hand it is harsh to supply τὸ ἐγκαλεῖν πατρὶ φόνου from ἐγκλημα, the insertion on the other hand of the phrase τὸ ἐπεξιέναι πατρὶ φόνου, whether after ἔχει or πολλῶν—and the latter position would be preferable—makes the sentence at once too cumbrous and too precise.

But even if we allow that ἔχει has some such subject, expressed or understood, a further difficulty presents itself in the precise meaning of the words ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξει. The clause introduced by οὐ γὰρ must either give the reason or the proof of the ignorance of the many. Obviously, no proof is here given, and if a reason is to

be assigned, we should expect, instead of *ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι* something like *ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ ἐγνωκέναι*. I formerly thought of *ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ τάξαι* in the sense of 'to rank it rightly', 'rate it rightly' (cf. Euthyd. 279 C *τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν*); but I now think the error lies in *ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὁρθῶς ἔχει*.

First, as to *ὁρθῶς*. *ὁρθῶς* can hardly be right on any view, for even if we retain *ἔχει*, the only relevant meaning is 'the many do not know the *truth* about τὸ ἐπεξίεναι πατρὶ φόνου, for they cannot *ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι*', not 'the many do not know how such a prosecution is to be justified': the following *οὐ γὰρ* clause can in no way be viewed as a reason for the statement in the preceding clause, if *ὁρθῶς* is retained there. I therefore agree with Madvig in supposing that the word has been wrongly inserted from *ὁρθῶς* in *ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι*.

Second, as to *ἔχει*. Even with the omission of *ὁρθῶς*, it is by no means easy to supply the correct subject to *ἔχει*. If *ἔχεις* is read, we obtain (I think) a satisfactory meaning and escape all possible risk of obscurity. 'Good Heavens!' cries Socrates, 'surely the many *are* ignorant of your condition: for it is not every one who could do rightly what you do, but only one far advanced in wisdom'. The force of *αὐτό* in *αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι* is 'the thing in question' viz. τὸ ἐγκαλεῖν: and as regards the sentiment, we have already had several indications of the indifference or contempt with which the people regarded Euthyphro, e.g. 3 C *ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελῶσιν ὡς μαινομένου*, 3 D—E and 4 A. In accordance with his usual theory, Socrates ascribes the injustice of the Athenians in their treatment of Euthyphro to ignorance.

17. *ἐπιτυχόντος* is followed by *εἶναι* in T. Schanz remarks that where the verb substantive appears in only one of the two leading MSS (B and T), we are justified in assuming interpolation. The aorist (not the present) participle of *ἐπιτυχάνω* (*προστυγχάνω*, *τυγχάνω*) is regularly used as 'der erste beste' = *εἰς τῶν πολλῶν*.

αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι: *αὐτό* is τοῦθ' ὃ σὺ πράττεις i.e. *ἐπεξίεναι πατρὶ φόνου*.

4 B. 18. *πόρρω—σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος*. So in Crat. 410 E *πόρρω ᾗδῃ, οἶμαι, φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν*. The metaphor is doubtless from the race-course.

20. *ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων*. For the order see on 3 E above. In early times it was only the relations of a murdered man who

were permitted to exercise the right of blood-revenge: and when the State undertook the punishment of manslaughter, the right to act as prosecutor was confined to certain relatives of the victim, or (if he were a *μέτοικος* or *δούλος*) to his *προστάτης* or *δεσπότης*. See Gilbert's *Handbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer* 1 p. 365. Two passages appear to contradict this principle of Attic law—viz. Demosthenes (?) in *Neaeram* § 9 and the present passage. But in the Demosthenic speech there is nothing to shew that the woman killed was not the prosecutor's slave. Various theories have been suggested to account for Euthyphro's position. Stallbaum conjectures that in the eye of the law Euthyphro may have been his master. In Lipsius' edition of Meier and Schömann's *Der Attische Process* p. 199 note 10 it is argued that the whole reasoning in the *Euthyphro* is intended to conform to moral law but not necessarily to the Athenian. I think the correct solution is to be found in Euthyphro's fanaticism: he was just the man to lodge a charge which the law would not receive, by way of protest. We have seen similar protests in our own days: and it should be remembered that Plato nowhere says that the archon received the charge. [So also Liebhöf (in *Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie* 1888 No. 40. p. 1227) says everything points to Euthyphro's bringing the charge even "ohne das formelle Recht dazu auf seiner Seite zu haben".]

ὁ τεθνώσ. The present *θνήσκω* is hardly used in the best Attic prose: *ἀποθνήσκω* takes its place. On the other hand *τέθνηκα*, not *ἀποτέθνηκα*, is used. See Rutherford's *Babrius* p. 36. For *ἀποθνήσκω* as passive to *ἀποκτείνω* see above on 3 E, line 2.

21. ἢ δῆλα δῆ; so Schanz, rightly understanding the words as a question. ἢ; = Latin *An?* introduces a second question intended to anticipate Euthyphro's answer to the first: see on *Apol.* 26 B ἢ δῆλον δὲ ὅτι κτλ.; Wohlrab (adopting Schanz's earlier reading) prints a colon after δῆ.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν που ὑπὲρ γε ἀλλοτρίου κτλ. So T and Schanz: in B γε follows που. ἀλλότριος: alienus:: οἰκείος: proprius. Socrates implies that Euthyphro's conduct was not permissible on legal as well as on moral grounds; see on *ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων* in line 20 above.

22. ἐπεξήρῃσθα. According to Schanz (Prot. pp. XIII ff.) Plato uses as imperfect of εἶμι only the forms ἦα, ἦεισθα, ἦειν). ἦτην (*Euthyd.* 294 D: the only case of the dual in Attic writers): ἦμεν,—ἦσαν (MSS ἦσαν). Compare Cobet *Var. Lect.* 308.

23. γελοῖον is different from καταγέλαστον as γελᾶν from καταγελᾶν: see on Crito 53 A and cf. Symp. 189 B φοβοῦμαι—οὐτι μὴ γελοῖα εἶπω—ἀλλὰ μὴ καταγέλαστα. The omission of the copula is commonest in Plato with ἐστίν: εἰ and ἐσμέν are sometimes omitted: ἦν rarely: εἶναι very often: parts of the conjunctive and optative are very seldom left out. See Schanz Novae Commentationes Platonicae 31—35 and Cope on Aristotle's Rhetoric Vol. 2, p. 328.

25. ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας. A frequent idiom in Plato: cf. Apol. 20 D ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων. Notice that κτείνω is rare in Attic prose: it is found chiefly in the older writers, or with an archaic and solemn effect, as here. ἀποκτείνω is generally used instead.

26. εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ. ἐν δίκῃ is an idiomatic adverbial phrase = ἐνδίκως. The cases of justifiable homicide are enumerated in Gilbert's Handbuch der Gr. Staatsalterthümer I p. 363. They were these: unintentional slaughter of an opponent in the games or of a comrade in war; the killing of an adulterer discovered with one's wife, mother, sister, daughter or legal concubine; and manslaughter in self-defence. Meier and Schömann Der Attische Process II p. 377 add cases of tyrannicide, and where one killed a man who had plotted to overthrow the democracy with or without success, or who had occupied a leading position under oligarchical or tyrannical government.

27. ἐπέξείναι—δμοτράπεζος ἦ. This is the only point in which Euthyphro's view transcends the standpoint of ordinary Athenian morality. He sees that family ties have nothing to do with the question of right and wrong: and so far Plato agreed with him. But his motive in prosecuting his father is mostly (though not entirely, see on 5 B) self-regarding, viz. a desire to escape the μῖασμα coming from daily life with one whom he knew to be guilty: whereas Plato, who regards punishment mainly in its corrective aspect, suggests that one should prosecute one's friends rather for their own sake, to set them free from the greatest of all diseases, sin. See Gorg. 480 D αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατηγοροῦν καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ ὅπως ἂν κατατῆλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γυγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας. ἐάνπερ is not = 'although', a meaning which it never bears, but 'that is to say, if'. Euthyphro implies that one is not bound to prosecute unless the guilty man lives under one's own roof: only then is one exposed to μῖασμα. It is in harmony with

his self-regarding morality to reason in this way. Schanz needlessly (I think) changes the text to ἐάνπερ χῶ = 'although indeed'.

28. ἴσον—μίσμα γίνεται: i.e. whether the person killed is 4 C ἀλλότριος or οικίος. For the communication of the taint of guilt Stallbaum compares Hor. Carm. III 2. 26 foll. 'Vetabo, qui Cereris sacrum Volgarit arcanæ, sub isdem Sit trahibus fragilemve mecum Solvat phaselon. Sæpe Diespiter Neglectus incesto addidit integrum'; and Schanz Antiphon Tetr. I i. 10 ἀσύμφορόν θ' ὑμῖν ἐστὶν τὸνδε μισρὸν καὶ ἀναγνον ὄντα εἰς τε τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μάλινειν τὴν ἀγρίαν αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἀνὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους. So in Soph. Oed. Tyr. 241—2 ὠθεῖν δ' ἀπ' ὅκων πάντας, ὡς μιάσματος τοῦδ' ἡμῖν ὄντος. Plato himself, speaking of the slayer in much the same vein as Euthyphro here, ordains (Legg. IX 868 E) κατελθὼν δὲ ὃ τι τοιοῦτον δράσας τοῖς αὐτοῦ παισὶν ἱερῶν μὴ κοινωνεῖτω μηδὲ ὁμοτράπεζος γίγνέσθω ποτέ.

29. τῷ τοιούτῳ goes with ξυνῆς rather than with ξυνειδώς.

ἀφοσιότις. The first clear hint is here given of the subject of the dialogue viz. τὸ ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον.

30. ἐπεὶ δὲ γε ἀποθανών. ἐπεὶ is virtually = 'although', 'and yet': see on Apol. 19 E where is quoted Prot. 335 C ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τ' εἶναι. Here too its force is obscured by an ellipse: "(But neither was the victim quite ἀλλότριος) for the murdered man was a day-labourer of my own". A πελάτης was a freeman, who hired himself out as a day-labourer (θῆς cf. 15 A): Timæus explains the word as ὁ ἀντὶ τροφῶν ὑπηρετῶν καὶ προσπελάζων. The word was used in Graeco-Roman times to translate the Roman *cliens*: but there is no reason for supposing that the employer was in any way the legal representative of the πελάτης.

31. ἐγεωργοῦμεν. Euthyphro's father was perhaps a κληροῦχος in Naxos. If so, as the Athenians had to give up their κληρουχίαι after the battle of Aegospotami in 404, at least 5 years must be supposed to elapse between the death of the πελάτης and Euthyphro's indictment of his father. There was probably no νόμος τῆς προθεσμίας relating to cases of φόνος (see Meier and Schömann Der Attische Process II pp. 838—840): but was Euthyphro's conscience sleeping all this time? Or did he and his father occupy separate houses? Most probably Plato does not mean the dates to be pressed too closely. It is however possible that Euthyphro and his father

were farming in Naxos even after 404, not as κληροῦχοι, but in some other capacity.

32. παροινήσας οὖν. οὖν continues the story as in ὁ οὖν πατήρ below. παροινεῖν means to forget oneself in one's cups. With the order in τῶν οἰκετῶν τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων Schanz compares Apol. 33 D τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων. ἀποσφάττει presently is a strong word and denotes a brutal murder.

34. συνδήσας—καταβαλὼν. For the collocation of participles cf. 9 A δς ἂν θητεύων ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθείς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου—φθάσῃ τελευτήσας.

36. ἐξηγητοῦ. The ἐξηγηταί formed a College of three members, according to Suidas (cf. also 9 A), apparently under one head, here called ἐξηγητής (κατ' ἐξοχήν): besides other religious duties, they were especially concerned with purification from blood-guiltiness (ὡς μέλει καθαίρειν τοὺς ἀγχι τινὶ ἐνισχηθέντας Suidas l.c.). Schöll in Hermes VI 36 foll. makes it probable that the members of the board were partly chosen by Apollo as πάτριος ἐξηγητής: apparently the Athenians selected 9 out of whom 3 were chosen by the Delphic representative of Apollo, one from each triad.

δ τι χρεῖα ποιεῖν. So apparently B, followed by Schanz: Wohlrab (with T) reads χρή. The latter is probably due to an assimilation in tense to the historical present πέμπει: after which the optative in a subordinate clause is quite regular: cf. Gorg. 512 A λογιζέται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ—τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον δνήσειεν (so MSS: Schanz δνήσει), where δνήσειεν=ῶνσα of direct speech.

4 D 38. ὀλιγώρει τε καὶ ἡμέλει. ἀμελεῖν is stronger than ὀλιγωρεῖν (ὀλίγη, ὥρα).

οὐδὲν ὃν πράγμα. See for οὐδὲν πράγμα above on 3 C. For the collocation of genitive and accusative absolute Schanz compares Rep. X 604 B ὡς οὔτε δήλου δντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαῖνον τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀξιον ὃν μεγάλης σπουδῆς. I think εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνει is simply 'though he should die' and not *si val periret*, as Wohlrab and Schanz take the phrase.

39. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν: much as in Euthyd. 283 A ὅπερ οὖν καὶ συνέβη ἡμῖν.

40. τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνήσκει: δεσμά=chains: δεσμοί=cases of imprisonment (δεσμός i.q. τὸ δεδέσθαι). See Apology 32 C and Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 353: "The masculine and neuter inflexions are not interchangeable, and though δεσμοί is occasionally

used for *δεσμά*, no Attic writer ever employed *δεσμά* for *δεσμοί*". Contrast *infra* 9 A *τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ δεσμά* with Rep. II 378 D *Ἦρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὲρ ὧς οὐκ ἐστὶν κτλ.* On the form *ἀποθνήσκω* (not *ἀποθνήσκω*) see Meisterhans *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*² p. 50.

42. *ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καί.* *καί* goes with the pronoun as in the familiar *ὁ καί.* *ταῦτα* is strictly speaking the internal accusative after *ἀγανακτεῖ*: its use here is akin to the use of *ταῦτα δὴ, ταῦτ' ἄρα* = *διὰ ταῦτα κτλ.*, for which see on Apol. 23 B.

43. *ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου*: *τοῦ* is justified not so much because the person has been already mentioned, as because it adds to the force of the indignation: 'in defence of that manslayer' (slowly and with emphasis).

44. *ὥς φασιν ἐκεῖνοι.* They doubtless maintained that death was due to natural causes.

45. *εἰ δὲ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν*: 'were it never so true that he had killed him': cf. 9 C *εἰ δὲ τι μάλιστα* (*si vel maxime*) *με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν—τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα κτλ.* In historians and orators *εἰ τὰ μάλιστα* is sometimes used in the same sense: Demosthenes *περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου* § 95 *συκοφαντίας οὖσας ἐπιδείξω μὴ μόνον τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι—ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ, εἰ τὰ μάλιστα* ᾗσαν ἀληθεῖς κτλ.

46. *ἀνδροφόνου γε ὄντος.* The *γε* shews that this clause is equivalent to a clause expressing condition.

οὐ δεῖν. The negative is repeated, partly because *οὐτ' εἰ δὲ τι μάλιστα* is somewhat remote, but still more for emphasis. I think *οὐ δεῖν* is the infinitive: the indirect is justified by the preceding *ὥς φασιν ἐκεῖνοι*, exactly as in Herodotus I 65 *ὥς δ' αὐτοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι, Λυκούργον—ἐκ Κρήτης ἀγαγεῖσθαι ταῦτα*, where see Stein, who shews that this anacolouthontic idiom is common in Herodotus, and found also in Aesch. Pers. 188 *τούτω στάσω τιν' ὥς ἐγὼ ὀδῶν ὄραν, τεύχειν ἐπ' ἀλλήλαιοι.* See also Sophocles Trach. 1240 *ἀνὴρ ὅδ' ὥς ἔοικεν οὐ νέμειν ἐμοὶ φθίνοντι μοῖραν*, with Blaydes' note. In Plato the idiom is comparatively rare: e.g. Phileb. 20 D *τόδε γε μὴν, ὥς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαῖστατον εἶναι λέγειν*: Soph. 263 D and Euthyd. 280 D *δεῖν* (so BT: Schanz *δεῖ*, rightly I think, because the *ὥς* clause follows) *ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν.* Crat. 399 D *ὥσπερ τοῖνυν μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτοις ἐξῆς εἶναι τι χρῆμα* is not a case in point, for *ὥσπερ* qualifies the whole expression: still less is Crat. 384 C *ὥσπερ ὑποπτεύω αὐτὸν σκώπτειν.* The idiom has a colloquial effect.

Stephanus read *δέον*, not *δεῖν*. The syntax would then resemble *ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὄν πρᾶγμα* in line 38. *δεῖν* is retained by Schanz and explained as a participle: *δεῖν* : *δέον* :: *πλεῖν* : *πλέον*. The existence of such a participle is attested by some ancient grammarians, and by Hesychius (*δεῖν*· *χρή*, *ἀναγκαῖον*, *πρέπον*, *ἢ προσήκον*): and Hertlein (*Neue Jahrbücher für Phil. und Pädagogik* 1867, p. 474) finds another example of it in Plato's *Charmides* 164 E *ὡς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προσρήματος—οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἀλλήλους*, while other alleged examples of its occurrence have been found in *Xen. Hell.* VII 4. 39 *κατηγόρου αὐτοῦ ὡς δεῖν ἀποθανεῖν*, *Lysias* XIV § 7 *ἀστρατείας μὲν γὰρ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλῶναι—δειλίας δὲ ὅ τι δεῖν αὐτὸν* (so Stephanus: MSS *δεῖ* *ἐκαστον*) *μετὰ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν κινδυνεύειν ἱππεύειν εἴλετο*, and *Ar. Frag.* 220 (ed. Kock) *εἰς τὰς τριήρεις δεῖν* (MSS *δεῖ* *μ'*) *ἀναλοῦν ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τεῖχη κτλ.* The whole subject is discussed at length in *Jahrb. für Philol.* for 1872, p. 741 by Usener, who derives *δεῖν* from *δεῖον* (participle of *δεῖω*, an assumed by-form of *δέω*), like *πλεῖν* for *πλεῖον* and *οἶμαι* for *οῖομαι*: also in *σμικροῦ*, *ὀλίγου*, *ἐνὸς δεῖν* and the like, he takes *δεῖν* as a participle, and ingeniously multiplies examples by emending in *Thuc.* VI 12 *ἐνθάδ' εἶναι τοῖς ἐνθα δεῖν*. But none of the examples hitherto cited seem to be enough to establish the use in Attic Greek: I therefore agree with Kock (l. c.) in looking on the usage as Byzantine.

- 4 E 47. *ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι κτλ.* The second hint of the subject of the dialogue, here in its negative aspect: the first or positive indication comes in C 4a—*μὴ ἀφοσίοις* (i. q. *δσιον ποιῆς ἀπὸ τούτων*). Presently the subject is hinted at in both aspects: *τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὀσίου τε περὶ καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου*: but it is not till 5 D that the subject is first explicitly announced: *λέγε δὴ, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ δσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον*; Schanz regards the words *ἀνόσιον γὰρ—ἐπεξίεναι* as a marginal note: but without them the subject would not be introduced so gradually as is Plato's wont.

49. *τοῦ ὀσίου τε περὶ καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.* *περὶ* when it goes with two substantives is regularly placed between them. Only *περὶ* and *ἐνεκα* among Greek prepositions are permitted to follow their case in Attic prose. Schanz says of *τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει* 'verba interpolata esse videntur': in his annotated edition he conjectures that they represent a marginal gloss *τὸ δσιον ὡς ἔχει*, *θεῖον* and *δσιον* being frequently confounded. I think the words are genuine, (1) because *οἷε ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων* follows immediately,

(2) because what Euthyphro means is that ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι—ἐπεξίεναι is not a belief entertained by the gods (whence the emphatic place of τὸ θεῖον), but mere ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξία (Gorg. 492 C). τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει simply means 'the position of the gods', and is parallel to τῶν θεῶν ὅπη ἔχει in Socrates' reply.

50. ὦ Εὐθύφρων—ἀκριβῶς οἶσι ἐπίστασθαι. Here and in ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην of line 58 there is perhaps an allusion to the etymological meaning of εὐθύφρων 'right minded'.

53. ὡς σὺ λέγεις. The insertion of σὺ shews that Socrates accepts Euthyphro's narrative only provisionally.

54. ὅπως μὴ αὐτὸ σὺ. ὅπως μὴ after verbs of fearing makes the object of apprehension appear more vividly as something to be shunned. For parallel cases see Goodwin M. T. p. 82. αὐτὸ = vicissim: lest you, who censure others for not knowing τὸ δσιον, be yourself guilty of τὸ ἀνόσιον. Presently πρᾶγμα is meant, to recal τούτων οὕτω πραχθέντων: and τυγχάνης πράττων virtually = be really doing: see Verrall on Medea 608. Plato himself would not have considered Euthyphro's father as deserving of prosecution for murder: see Legg. IX 865 C ἐὰν μὲν δοῦλον κτείνῃ νομίζων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ διειργάσθαι, τὸν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος δεσπότην ἀβλαβῇ παρεχέτω καὶ ἀζήμιον, ἢ δίκην εἰς τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος ὑπεχέτω διπλῆν.

56. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἴη. B and T have μοι for μου: the emendation is due to Heusde, and most critics accept it. Stallbaum rightly remarks: "Ferri non potest μοι. Nam ὄφελός μοι ἐστίν est 'mihi prodest': sed ὄφελός μου ἐστίν homo frugī sumi". Cf. Crito 46 A εἰ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος εἴη.

57. οὐδέ τι ἂν διαφέρει Εὐθύφρων. τι is of course dative of amount of difference. διαφέρειν is 'to excel' rather than 'to differ': Crito 49 B ἐλάδομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες. The effect of διαφέρει Εὐθύφρων = διαφέρωμι ἐγώ is to make Euthyphro's conceit more conspicuous, by putting the praise as it were into the mouth of a second party. Wohlrab compares Soph. Ajax 98 where Ajax says ὦσ' οὐ ποτ' Ἀλανθ' ὀδ' ἀτιμάσουσ' ἔτι. Cf. Iliad I 240 ἢ ποτ' Ἀχιλλῆος ποθὴ ἔξεται υἱας Ἀχαιῶν: Plautus Rudens 1245 'minime istuc faciet noster Daemones' (the Daemones I know). Much the same effect is produced by the pompous use of the article in Theaet. 166 A γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν.

τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων: contemptuously: nearly = 'the rout of 5 A

human beings': *I* am more than a mere *ἄνθρωπος*, *I* am a *θεῖος ἀνὴρ*.

§8. εἰ μὴ...εἰδένην. For the change from the third to the first person, cf. (with Schanz) Phaed. 91 C *συμκρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν*. The idiom is regular in Greek: see Jebb on Ajax 864. The second hand in T reads *εἰδένην*.

CHAPTER V

forms a transition to the subject of the dialogue. See Introduction, p. viii. Socrates proposes to become Euthyphro's pupil, so as to learn the nature of piety and impiety, and shift the accusation from Socrates the pupil to Euthyphro the teacher.

1. ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρων: 'admirable Euthyphro' (sarcastically). See on Crito 44 B ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες. To be called *θαυμάσιος* is a left-handed compliment: for *θαυμάζειν* means 'to be surprised at' as well as 'to esteem', like the old English 'admire'. This form of address is common in Plato: e.g. 8 A, 8 D, Symp. 222 E, Crat. 439 C.

3. πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς: Before either the *ἀνάκρισις* or trial proper began, either party could challenge the other (*προκαλεῖσθαι, πρόκλησις*) in the presence of witnesses to take some particular step. In case the challenge was declined, evidence was given at the trial (*ἐν τῷ δικάσῳ*; see infra on B) that such a challenge had been given and refused, with a view to prejudice the refuser's case. See for example the form of *μαρτυρία* in Demosthenes *κατὰ Στεφάνου* A § 8 *Στέφανος—Ἐνδῖος—Σκύθης—μαρτυροῦσι παρῆναι πρὸς τῷ διαιτητῇ Τισίῳ Ἀχαρνεῖ, ὅτε προῦκαλεῖτο Φορμίων Ἀπολλόδωρον—ἀνολίγειν τὰς διαθήκας τὰς Πασίωνος κτλ.* In the present case the effect of Meletus' refusal to accept the challenge of Socrates would be to make it appear that Meletus' motive was not public spirit, but private animosity: cf. Apol. 23 E *Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο—ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος*. See Meier und Schömann Att. Process II pp. 872 ff.

4. λέγοντα after *μοι* as in Crito 51 D *ὃ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι*. In both cases the accusative is due to the preceding infinitive.

ὅτι ἔγωγε...σός. Note the curious mixture of the direct and

indirect speech. From *ἐγωγε* down to *εἰδέναι*, or rather strictly speaking down to *καὶ νῦν*, we have Socrates' *ipsissima verba*, addressed (in the hypothetical case) to Meletus: after *καὶ νῦν* we should expect *ἐπειδὴ με σὺ* (i.e. *Μέλητος*)—*φῆς*—*Εὐθύφρωνος* (in place of *σός*): instead of this, Socrates wishing to address Euthyphro directly says *μαθητῆς δὴ γέγονα σός*: so that to prevent ambiguity *ἐκεῖνος*—*φῆσί* must take the place of *σὺ*—*φῆς* just before.

7. *αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα*. For *αὐτοσχεδιάζειν* (to improvise, speak, think, act on one's own initiative and hence hastily and unadvisedly) see on *Apol.* 20 C (*ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν*). The phrase is pathetically repeated in the end of the dialogue (16 A) when Euthyphro has proved a broken reed. For *καινοτομοῦντα* see on 3 B: there we find *καινοτομοῦντίς σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα*, because the metaphor is more prominent ('a coiner of novelties in regard to divine matters'): here *καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων* ('coining novelties about' etc.). Cobet in *Mnemosyne* III (N. S.), p. 281 would bracket *καὶ καινοτομοῦντα*, holding the words to be an interpolation from 16 A. He further adds: "Graecum est *καινοτομεῖν*, ut *σπουδάζειν*, *περὶ τι* non *περὶ τινος* ut *καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά* et pag. 3 B ὡς *οὖν καινοτομοῦντος σοῦ περὶ τὰ θεῖα*". But *αὐτοσχεδιάζειν περὶ σοῦ* in the *Apology* is enough to defend the construction, and the occurrence of *καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά* in 16 A is really an argument for the genuineness of the words here, since 16 A is intended as a reminiscence of this passage. The indictment against Socrates is given in the note on 2 C.

8. *μαθητῆς δὴ γέγονα σός*. *δὴ* adds a touch of sarcasm ('why of course'). The peculiar cadence is intended to throw ludicrous emphasis on *σός*, as in Horace's '*ridiculus mus*' and Martial's '*Unus de cunctis animalibus hircus habet cor*' (XI 84. 17). Notice the implication that to learn *τὰ εὖσεβῆ* is to be *εὖσεβής*.

9. *καὶ...φαίην ἄν*. Herewith Socrates as is his wont breaks 5 B into direct speech. *καὶ* of course goes with *φαίην ἄν*.

εἰ μὲν...τὰ τοιαῦτα. Meletus would not be likely to: see on 3 C *ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων καταγελῶσιν ὡς μαινομένου*. The position of *Εὐθύφρονα* after the pause is meant to suggest ironically that Euthyphro was an authority on the question.

10. *καὶ ὁρθῶς νομίζην...δικάζου*. The first *καὶ* goes with the third in the sense of 'both—and': *ἡγοῦ* being parallel to *μὴ δικάζου*. The second *καὶ* is 'also', i.e. 'as well as Euthyphro' and

goes with *ἐμέ*. Schanz and Wohlrab omit the second *καί* with B: but as it is found in T and as a correction in B, and would more naturally fall out than be inserted, I think it right. The old punctuation was *τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν, καὶ ἐμέ*: Schanz set this right. If any change were necessary, I should prefer to read *ὀρθῶς νομίζειν καὶ ἐμέ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζου*, assuming that *καί* before *ἐμέ* was wrongly placed before *ὀρθῶς* in B: b then inserted it before *ἐμέ* without striking it out before *ὀρθῶς*.

ὀρθῶς νομίζειν: 'to be orthodox'. *νομίζειν* is especially used of belief in the gods: see on 3 B above.

11. *ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ*. *τῷ διδασκάλῳ* is meant to explain *ἐκείνῳ*: a pause should be made in reading after *ἐκείνῳ*. This I think more likely than to take *ἐκείνῳ* as = *illi* = 'that famous'.

12. *λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί*. *λαγχάνειν δίκην τινί* is to bring an accusation against one. The original meaning was 'to obtain (by lot) one's rights': hence to obtain leave to discuss one's rights. The reason why *λαγχάνειν* (to get *by lot*) was chosen in preference to *λαμβάνειν* in this phrase seems to have been that in cases of simultaneous charges the order of precedence was determined by lot. Meier und Schömann II 790—794.

ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι. It might fairly be argued that it is worse to corrupt the young than to corrupt the old, and that so far Socrates was worse than Euthyphro: but Socrates means that to prosecute Euthyphro would be to get at the *fons et origo mali*, the corrupter of the corrupters. Euthyphro as Socrates' teacher would be just as responsible for Socrates' ill-doing as Socrates was for that of Alcibiades: and it was largely owing to Alcibiades' misconduct that Socrates was accused: see *Apol.* § 33 and notes. Note the double meaning in *διαφθείροντι*: taken with *ἐμέ μὲν*, it = *κακὸν ποιεῖν*, with *ἐκείνον*, *κακῶς ποιεῖν* (or worse); and *κακῶς ποιεῖν* in Greek is *κακὸν ποιεῖν*. Cf. *Rep.* I 335 B foll. and note on *κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν* in 3 A above.

14. *διδάσκοντι — νοθετοῦντι — κολάζοντι*. The accusative (found in B and T) is impossible. It is no doubt due to assimilation, as Schanz remarks. *νοθετεῖν* and *κολάζειν* are combined as in *Gorg.* 479 A *ὥστε μήτε νοθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι*. Euthyphro might have replied that he prosecuted his father for his father's own sake: punishment being a corrective agency, as is implied in 4 C *ἐὰν—μὴ ἀφοσιοῖς σεαυτὸν τε καὶ ἐκείνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξιῶν*, where see note.

15. *καὶ ἂν μὴ μοι πείθεται—γράφεται σέ*. Herewith Socrates turns to Euthyphro again. The clause *ἢ ἂντ' ἐμοῦ γράφεται σέ* is still under the influence of the negative of *μηδέ*. *γράφεσθαι* (cause to be written down sc. in the archon's book) is 'to indict': see above on 2 B. Notice the emphasis on *σέ* (not *σε*).

16. *λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ*: see on A above (*πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς*). The statement had to be supported by witnesses (*μαρτυρεῖν τὴν πρόκλησιν*). Meier und Schömann II 872 note 293.

18. *εἰ ἄρα με*. The emphasis is on *εἰ*: whence *με* (the reading of B) not *ἐμέ* (T). Translate 'if he tried etc.'. Euthyphro implies that the supposition is unlikely: presently, in *ἐγένετο ἂν*, it is assumed to be impossible. Euthyphro's animation and self-confidence increase as he hears himself talk.

19. *ἄπη σαθρός ἐστιν. σαθρός* (lit. 'furnished with holes' hence 5 C 'unsound') is frequently used as a metaphor in Plato and in Greek generally. It is no doubt a derivative from *σῆθω* (*σάω*) 'I sift' like *σαπρός* from *σήπω*. Conformably to this derivation it is combined with *τετρημένος* in Gorg. 493 E (*ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά*) shortly after the allusion to the sieve of the Danaids in B.

20. *καὶ πολὺ ἂν—ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ*. The second apodosis is framed as if the verb of the conditional clause had been in the past indicative. The effect is to throw the growing self-confidence of Euthyphro into stronger relief: if he had tried (but he dared not), I should have turned the tables on him. Schanz quotes from Xenophon an example of the converse change (from past Ind. to Optative): Cyneg. 12. 22 *εἰ οὖν εἶδεῖεν τοῦτο, ὅτι θεᾶται αὐτοῦς, ἔντο ἂν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνοὺς καὶ τὰς παιδεύσεις, αἷς ἀλίσκεται μόλις καὶ κατεργάζοιντο ἂν αὐτήν*.

23. *καὶ ἐγὼ τοι. καί* goes with *ἐγὼ*, not with *τοι*. Socrates pretends to share Euthyphro's confidence.

25. *ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος*: 'this person Meletus'. Socrates speaks of him sarcastically as a nobody: see on 2 B *οὐδ' αὐτὸς πᾶν τι γιγνώσκω—τὸν ἄνδρα κτλ*. Infra, in *οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν, οὐδέ* belongs to *ὁρᾶν*: cf. the usage of *οὐ φημι* (Goodwin Gk. Gr. p. 263. 3, note).

26. *ὁρᾶν—κατείδεν*. Schanz draws attention to the pun on Meletus' name: here is a *Μέλητος ἀμελής*! After *ὀξεύς* T has *ἀτεχνῶς*, which, if right, can only intensify *ὀξεύς*, as if 'literally with so keen an eye'. But *ὀξεύς* in connection with sight is no longer sufficiently metaphorical to be coupled with *ἀτεχνῶς*. *κατείδεν* is 'caught sight of' 'descried': blind to Euthyphro, Meletus could see

only Socrates. It is implied that personal animosity inspired the prosecution: see note on 3 B line 8 *ad fin.*

28. νῦν δὴ. See on 3 D. The reference is to 4 E—5 A.

ποῖόν τι—ἄλλων; The subject of the dialogue is rather *δοῖόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον* than *εὐσεβές τε καὶ ἀσεβές*: it is presently stated more precisely in 5 D. *εὐσεβές* and *ἀσεβές* are used here on account of the preceding *ἀσεβέας*: so *infra* in 12 E. Of the two words *δοῖον* and *εὐσεβές*, *δοῖον* is the wider, *εὐσεβές* denoting more especially the fulfilment of religious obligations: but throughout the dialogue *εὐσεβεῖν* and *ἀσεβεῖν* are used as the verbs corresponding to *δοῖον* and *ἀνόσιον*. On the difference between *ποῖός τις* and *ποῖος* Cobet remarks: "differunt enim certo usu *ποῖος* et *ποῖός τις*, ut *ποῖος* cum irrisione dicatur—*ποῖος μάγειρος*;—*ποῖός τις* ubi serio quaeritur de alicuius personae aut rei ingenio, indole, natura aut genere" (Nov. Lect. p. 276).

5 D 30. ἢ οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν—ἀνόσιον εἶναι. See for *ταῦτόν* note on 10 E below. Here and in 6 D—E Plato uses language which he afterwards used in connection with the theory of Ideas: but in neither passage is it necessary to suppose that the Ideas are already part of the Platonic doctrine. See *Introd.* p. xxviii.

What Plato means is this: *δοῖον* is always and everywhere the same, possessed of some one form (*ιδέα*) or character: similarly with *ἀνόσιον*: and these two, *δοῖον* and *ἀνόσιον*, are always and everywhere the opposites of one another. So far there is nothing that goes beyond the Socratic doctrine of *λόγοι*.

31. αὐτὸ αὐτῷ: with *ταῦτόν*. The juxtaposition of *αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ* is regular: Rep. III 411 C *ἀνδρειότερος γίγνεται αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ*. Beware of taking *αὐτό* with *δοῖον* in the sense of 'The Idea of Piety'.

32. παντός ἐναντίον. So the mss. Schanz reads *πάν τούναντιον*: but *πάν τούναντιον* in Plato is generally used adverbially. The *μέν* is concessive; the unholy, while (though) it is the opposite of all the holy (*τοῦ δόλου παντός* is virtually = *τοῦ ἐν πάσῃ πράξει δόλου*), nevertheless resembles it in this point, viz. that it is like itself, etc. The resemblance of the unholy to the holy in this one point is presently brought out still more clearly by the words *κατὰ τὴν δσιότητα*, i.e. like holiness, as holiness is like itself. *κατὰ* in this sense is common in Plato, e.g. Apol. 17 B *ὁμολογοῖν ἂν οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ*. Missing the precise force of the *μέν* and *δέ* clause, the editors (Schanz, Fritzsche and Wohlrab) read *ἀνοσιότητα* with

T for the *δοσιότητα* of B, taking *κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα* as = 'in virtue of its impiety'. So also Bonitz *Platonische Studien*³ p. 241. Prof. Josef Wagner (*Zur Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron*, p. 22) derives an argument against the genuineness of the dialogue from the mistaken reading *κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα*. An additional argument for the reading *κατὰ τὴν δοσιότητα* is contained in the words of 6 D—E: *ἐφῆσθα γάρ πον μὴ ἰδέα τὰ τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ δόσια δόσια*: that *δόσια* are *δόσια* μὴ ἰδέα has not been stated precisely if *κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα* is read here. Finally, the Scholiast read *κατὰ τὴν δοσιότητα*, and explained it as I have done: his note is *κατὰ τὴν δοσιότητα· ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁμοίως, παραπλησίως τῇ δοσιότητι*. See also on *μὴν τινὰ ἰδέαν* and on the whole passage, Introduction, p. xxviii.

34. *μᾶλλον*: on this idiomatic use of *μέλλω* see Madvig, *Gk. Syntax*, p. 94, Rem. 1.

CHAPTER VI.

The subject of the dialogue is now propounded: what is *τὸ δόσιον* and *τὸ ἀνόσιον*? Euthyphro's first answer puts a special case in place of a general definition: *τὸ δόσιον* is to act as I act now, *τὸ ἀνόσιον* is not so to act: witness the treatment of Cronus by Zeus. Before pointing out to Euthyphro his mistake, Socrates professes his disbelief in such legends about the gods, and suggests that this is perhaps why he is put upon his trial.

The habit of putting the particular for the general (*πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός* *Meno* 77 A) in a definition is frequently illustrated in the Socratic dialogues. A good example is *Theaet.* 146 C—D. What is *ἐπιστήμη*? asks Socrates. *Theaetetus* replies: mathematics, shoemaking, etc.—these, all and each, are *ἐπιστήμη*. Other examples are *Xen. Mem.* IV 2. 13 foll.: *ibid.* 31 ff.: *Hipp. Major* 287 E ff.: *Lach.* 190 E ff.: *Meno* 71 E ff. See Grote's *Plato* Vol. 1 p. 317 ff. The mistake consists in a simple conversion of the universal affirmative: to do this is pious (thinks Euthyphro), therefore *all* piety is to do this.

4. *τῷ ἀδικοῦντι*—*ἐξαμαρτάνοντι*. The second participle (which is to be taken with all the three alternatives) is logically subordinate to the first. The construction of *ἀδικῶ* with a participle is common enough: and there is no reason for rejecting *ἀδικοῦντι* as Schanz suggests, or reading *καὶ ἡ* for *ἡ* after *ἀδικοῦντι* with Fischer. Euthyphro states his principle thus: *δόσιον* is to prosecute *ὁ ἀδικῶν*

(which contains the notion of law-breaking, as well as of injustice: see on Crito p. xiii), whether his sin (*ἐξαμαρτάνοντι*) is in connection with manslaughter or sacrilege etc. *ἐξαμαρτάνοντι* is necessary, because manslaughter was not always *ἀδικον* or illegal: see on 4 B, line 26 above. *ἱεροσυλία* on the other hand was always punished with death: see Isocrates *κατὰ Λοχίτου* § 6. *ἥ τι ἄλλο* goes closely with *περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπὰς* and *περὶ* is to be taken with *τι* as well as with *κλοπὰς*.

- 5 E 10. *τοῦ νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει*. So the MSS. Schanz reads *νομίμων* for *νόμου* after Baumann: Hirschig reads *δούλου*. The idiom is like *οὕτως εἰς*: and *ὁ νόμος οὕτως ἔχει* is just as good Greek as *τὸ νόμιμον οὕτως ἔχει*. Probably Plato uses the noun *νόμος* rather than the adjective *νόμιμον* (conformably with *δούλον* above) because it is more personal and direct. *νόμου* is written rather than *δούλου* for two reasons. In the first place, Plato wishes to indicate that *νόμος* and nothing else determines Euthyphro's view of *τὸ δούλον*: in the second place *δούλου* would be inapt here, because the example quoted is an act of Zeus, who could hardly (I think) have been called *δούλος* by Euthyphro without presumption: for which reason he is presently called not *δούλος*, but *τῶν θεῶν ἀριστος καὶ δικαιοτάτος*. *νόμος* is here simply the law of Athens. Euthyphro's position is: the conduct of Zeus is sanctioned by Athenian law, Zeus is worshipped by the State, and I am simply following out his example.

11. *ὅτι ταῦτα—γιγνόμενα*. Schanz brackets this clause. I believe the words are genuine: they explain *ὁ καὶ ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον*. Euthyphro is a little indignant that his conduct should be called in question: he has already told others that this affair will be managed rightly (*ὀρθῶς* i.e. *δικαίως* or legally) in his way (*οὕτω* i.e. by prosecuting his father). *ὀρθῶς* goes with *γιγνόμενα*, and *οὕτω*, logically considered, is equivalent to a participial clause 'if done thus'.

12. *μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν* explains *οὕτως ἔχει* above.

13. *αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι*: *γὰρ* like *enim* is often introductory: here it explains *τεκμήριον*. See on Apol. 20 E *Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴσσε που*. The force of *αὐτοὶ* is 'of themselves', *ultro*, though laymen (*μάντεϊς*: cf. infra 6 B *τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἳ γε αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι*). As Euthyphro's argument is: the Athenian law approves my conduct, we might expect *Ἀθηναῖοι* for *ἄνθρωποι*: but here again Euthyphro's point of view comes out: he is no cosmopolitan: for him the Athenians are *οἱ ἄνθρωποι* and Athens the world.

14. *τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες* i.e. do really think, by the usual Attic *litotes*: see on 4 E line 54 above.

16. *υιᾶς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ*. For the form *υιᾶς* see on 6 A Crito 45 C. The forms of the second declension are preferred in the singular: in the dual and plural *υιῇ υιᾶς* etc. are preferred. Schanz everywhere prints this word without the *ι*: and so it generally appears in Inscriptions of Plato's time: see Meisterhans *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*² p. 113. Notice *καταπίνω* used in connection with solids; the effect is to make Cronus's feat disgusting as well as unjust. For *κατέπινεν* a late hand in T reads *κατέπειν*. The imperfect denotes as usual the repeated act. Hesiod is the literary source of this article in the Greek creed: Theog. 459 *καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατέπεινε Κρόνος μέγας κτλ.* For *ἐν δίκῃ* see above on 4 B line 26.

17. *κάκεινόν γε αὖ—ἐκτεμεῖν*. Cronus mutilated his father Uranus: Hesiod Theog. 176—182.

18. *δὲ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα*. Uranus did not swallow his children, but hid them away in the bosom of the Earth: Hes. Theog. 156 ff. On the idiom *ἔτερα τοιαῦτα*, see Apol. 26 A and note. With Euthyphro's reasoning here compare the Furies in Aesch. Eum. 640—641 *πατὴρ προσιμᾷ Ζεὺς μῆρον, τῷ σὺ λόγῳ· αὐτὸς δ' ἔδῃσε πατέρα πρεσβύτην Κρόνον*, and Aristoph. Nub. 904 ff., 1079 ff.

20. *τὰ ἐναντία—περὶ ἐμοῦ*. *ἐναντία λέγουσι* without the article would mean to 'state contradictory views *both* about the gods and about me'; since *ἐναντία λέγειν* is idiomatic for 'to contradict': the meaning here is contradict themselves by giving *one* view about the gods and another about me. Note the implication that the rule of conduct for gods and men is the same—a distinctive feature in the Greek creed, where God is man *in magno*, and man God *in parvo*. As the champion of Greek orthodoxy Euthyphro thinks it actually impious that there should be one rule for Zeus and another for him. See Intro. p. xvi, and *ibid.* p. xviii for the apologetic motive which appears in this part of the dialogue. Socrates was accused of setting sons against their fathers: Plato shews that the orthodox creed, believed and acted on, errs in this way more than he.

22. *ἀρὰ γε*: "assensum poscit" says Stallbaum, wrongly. The particle *ἀρα* merely marks the interrogation: see on Crito 44 E. Socrates plays his usual rôle of the ignorant man seeking for information.

24. *δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι*. *πως* is *nescio quomodo*, as

Fritzsche remarks. In Rep. II 377 D ff. Plato rejects all these crude stories as false and pernicious. God is altogether good and never lies: *ibid.* 379 B and 380 D. In particular he emphatically rejects the stories about the unnatural conduct of Cronus and Zeus: *ibid.* 377 E ὁρθῶς ἔχει τὰ γε τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι.—πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος—ὡς Οὐρανὸς τε ἐργάσατο ἄφῃσι δρᾶται αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὃ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτὸν. τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέος, οὐδ' ἂν εἴ ἦν ἀληθὴ, φμην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀφρονάς τε καὶ νέους κτλ. In the doctrine that God is good, latent in this passage, Bonitz finds the key to the positive teaching of the Euthyphro—the answer to the question left unsolved in 14 A: see Introduction, p. xiv.

δὴ δὴ. So Schanz with T: B has δι' α. The antecedent is the entire clause τὰ τοιαῦτα—ἀποδέχομαι. Special stress is to be laid on φήσει: it is implied (as above in 3 B) that the accusation of impiety is a mere blind. There is no need for Madvig's conjecture ἰδια δὴ.

26. τῷ εὖ εἰδῶτι. There is irony in the participial clause: cf. note on 3 A above.

6 B 27. ἡμῖν: not for ἐμοί, but equivalent to 'us laymen' (μάντις). So presently αἱ γε αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι. The sense is much the same in 12 E: πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι—ἴνα καὶ Μελέτω λέγωμεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τὰ τε εὖσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μὴ.

τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν. Cf. 3 A τί καὶ ποιοῦντα. "Qui τί χρὴ λέγειν interrogat, is quid dici, non an aliquid dici debeat quaerit; sed qui τί χρὴ καὶ λέγειν, is non solum quid, sed etiam an aliquid dicendum sit dubitat" Hermann, quoted by Fritzsche.

28. αὐτοὶ—μηδὲν εἰδέναι. αὐτοὶ of course goes with εἰδέναι: see on αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι in 5 E above. A negative infinitive dependent on verbs *sentienti et declarandi* in Greek generally takes οὐ: μὴ is sometimes used by Plato, with the effect of intensifying the negation, just as τὸ μηδὲν is stronger than οὐδέν: cp. *infra* 12 B πολλοὶ γὰρ μοι δοκοῦσι—δεδιέναι μὲν, αἰδέεσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα αἰδεῖσιν. Schanz quotes another example with ὁμολογεῖν: Phaed. 94 C οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁμολογήσαμεν—μήποτε' ἂν αὐτὴν—ἐναντία ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτελειοίτο κτλ.

29. ἀλλὰ μοι εἰπέ—γεγονέναι; The situation here reminds one of the words of Phaedrus (Phaedr. 229 C) ἀλλ' εἰπέ πρὸς Δίος, ὦ Σώκρατες, σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἀληθὲς εἶναι; Ueberweg

(Untersuchungen über die Echtheit etc. p. 251) needlessly sees in this correspondence an indication that the Euthyphro is spurious. Zeus as the god of friends had a temple in Megalopolis, seen by Pausanias and described in Book VIII 31. 4. Socrates, as might be expected from the high value he set on friendship, frequently invokes this god: see Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum* s.v. φίλιος.

ὥς ἀληθῶς: see on Crito 46 D. ὥς ἀληθῶς, τῷ ὄντι and τῇ ἀληθείᾳ are used by Plato chiefly in his earlier dialogues: in his later works he prefers ἀληθῶς, ὄντως and ἀληθείᾳ: Schanz in *Hermes* (1886) XXI 3. pp. 439—459.

32. οἱ πολλοί. λοιποί is a variant in T for πολλοί: but the ignorant multitude are here contrasted with the εἰς τεχνικὸς ἀνὴρ or μάντις, who is familiar with articles of faith not generally known.

33. καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα. So B: the editors read ἄρα for ἄρα. καί is 'also' and ἄρα asks the question. Hitherto only two examples of Euthyphro's orthodoxy have been given: Socrates now proceeds to ask whether he believes the other stories of poets and painters about war between the gods etc. Compare Rep. II 378 C ff.

τῷ ὄντι. See on ὥς ἀληθῶς in line 29 above.

34. καὶ ἑχθρας γε. So B: T omits γε, perhaps taking καί before πόλεμον as 'both', in which case it could not be followed by καί—γέ.

36. τὰ τε ἄλλα ἱερά. ἄλλα means 'besides': for ἱερά is 6 C 'temples'.

37. καταπεποίκιλται: sc. τοιαῦτα (acc.): for καταποικίλλειν like verbs of clothing takes two accusatives. We are not to understand οἶα or οἷος, as Schanz says: the Greek rule is rel. + conj. + anaphoric (demonstrative) pronoun, not rel. + conj. + rel. See on Apol. 40 A. The relative clause is now changed into a main sentence.

καὶ δὴ καί: introduces a climax as in Apol. 26 D, καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νεοὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν κτλ.

τοῖς μεγάλαις Παναθηναίοις. There were two Panathenaic festivals, one annual and less gorgeous (τὰ Παναθήναια τὰ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν, or simply τὰ Παναθήναια in Inscriptions, also called by writers Παναθήναια τὰ μικρά or μικρὰ Παναθήναια), the other held once every four years, in the 3rd year of every Olympiad (Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα in Inscriptions, called also by writers τὰ Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα or τὰ μεγάλα Παναθήναια). At the latter, if not also in the former (the evidence is contradictory), a robe,

woven by Athenian maidens and depicting the triumph of Athene and the Olympians over the giants, together with other celestial fights, was carried in procession to the Acropolis and presented to the statue of the goddess in the Erechtheum. Plato alludes to the same ceremonial in Rep. II 378 C πολλοῦ δὲ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον κτλ. The subject is represented on the Parthenon frieze: see Baumeister's Denkmäler des Klassischen Alterthums II p. 1185. From the beginning of the 4th century B.C., if not earlier, the robe was stretched like a sail upon the rigging of a ship, which ran on rollers in the procession. Preller's Griechische Mythologie⁴ I p. 243.

39. ἀνάγεται: ἀνά because of the rising ground of the Acropolis, not because the robe was an offering (ἀνάθημα). It is not unlikely that ἀνα- in ἀνάθημα and the like originally referred to the 'high places'. ἄγω is preferred to φέρω because of the accompanying procession.

41. μὴ μόνον γε. So B: T has μόνα. Strictly speaking, the sense is adjectival, but in Greek μόνον, πρῶτον etc. are occasionally used for the corresponding adjectives. Schanz quotes Meno 71 C ταῦτα—ἀπαγγέλλωμεν; μὴ μόνον γε κτλ. Kühner Griechische Grammatik II p. 236 Anmerk. 3.

42. ἄρτι: in B above.

CHAPTER VII.

In this chapter Socrates recalls Euthyphro to the point; 'Your definition is no definition: give me the εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ δῖα ὁσιά ἐστιν'. Euthyphro replies: τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλές=δῖον: τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς μὴ προσφιλές=ἀνόσιον.

Socrates is sincerely anxious to convince Euthyphro of his impiety, but it was useless to try to do so directly: a preliminary training in logical method was necessary. See Lechthaler Die δῶδης bei Platon (Meran 1879) p. 21.

1. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα—διηγῆσαι. Herewith Socrates dismisses the point. In Plato's expressed disbelief in these mythological tales we see the germ of his hostility to poetry, afterwards developed in the second, third, and tenth books of the Republic.

6 D 5. τὸ πρότερον viz. in 5 D.

9. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον. The imperfect of verbs of saying is

sometimes used where we should expect the aorist: cf. *ελεγον* in 15 A. Goodwin (M. T. p. 8) notices this usage in Herodotus and Thucydides: but it is not less common in Plato, or indeed in Greek generally.

10. ἀλλὰ γάρ = 'but in point of fact': see note on Apol. 19 C.

12. καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅσια. Schanz with T omits ὅσια, reading *ἔστι*. It makes Euthyphro's answer more emphatic if ὅσια is retained.

15. ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος—μὴ ἰδέα. *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are here practically synonymous: the only difference is that *εἶδος* views the thing in question more as to its content, *ἰδέα* more as to its form. Hence *εἶδος* is more naturally used as the object of *διδάξαι* than *ἰδέα*.

19. αὐτὴν διδάξον τὴν ἰδέαν. αὐτὴν (as its position shews) is 6 E 'by itself', unencumbered by the accidents of a special instance. So αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν = 'we are alone'.

20. ἀποβλέπων—παραδείγματι. These words are almost technical terms in Plato's theory of ideas, *παράδειγμα* in particular being common especially in the latest phase of that theory. Here there is no allusion to the theory as yet unborn: there is only a faithful description of Socrates' rule of conduct. Cf. *infra* 9 D line 21: also Crito 46 B and especially Phaedo 100 A *ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον* (the *λόγος* sought after in the Euthyphro is τὸ ὅσιον) *ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμένιστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα—ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ*. See Introduction p. xxviii.

24. καὶ οὕτω σοὶ φράσω. Euthyphro's readiness to suit his manner of answering to the wants of his audience is a point which he has in common with the sophists of Plato's dialogues. Cf. Gorgias in Gorg. 449 C: *καὶ γὰρ αὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἔστιν ὧν φημί, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν*.

27. ἔστι τοίνυν—ἀνόσιον. Euthyphro's second attempt at a definition is more successful. He avoids the former mistake of putting the particular for the general: but flaws hardly less serious remain. The worst (not pointed out till Ch. XII foll.) is still due to simple conversion of the universal affirmative: because all holiness is dear to the gods, it does not follow that all that is dear to the gods is holiness. Euthyphro in fact puts a *πάθος* of holiness in place of its *οὐσία*. On this definition in general see *Introd.* p. xix.

7 A 29. *παγκάλως* expresses Socrates' satisfaction that Euthyphro has escaped his former error. Just so in the Theaetetus (148 B), when Theaetetus and his friend shew that they have surmounted the first difficulty of defining, Socrates bursts out: *ἀριστὰ γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖδες*.

31. *ἀληθῶς* is preferred to the more natural *ἀληθῆ* (*ἀληθείς* has some inferior MS authority) from assimilation to *παγκάλως*, *ὥς*, and *οὕτω*. *ὥς ἀληθῶς* (the reading of T) is impossible: the meaning would then be 'if however you have really answered'.

ἐπεκδιδάξεις. Stallbaum quotes Prot. 328 E *σμικρόν τι μοι ἐμποδῶν, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥαδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξε*.

32. *ἔστιν*: emphatic, hence the accent.

CHAPTER VIII.

Socrates proceeds to examine Euthyphro's definition. He first endeavours to remove an ambiguity in the expression *τοῖς θεοῖς*: and in so doing contrives to shew that Euthyphro's definition is untenable from Euthyphro's own standpoint, while from a higher and indeed essentially monotheistic conception of God it is less objectionable, though still inadequate.

In this Chapter Socrates reminds Euthyphro that there are gods and gods: what one god loves another may hate, in which case the same thing will be both holy and unholy, which is impossible, because holiness and unholiness are opposites. See Introduction p. xix ff.

1. *τί λέγομεν*. *λέγομεν* is 'mean', as often: see on Apol. 21 B.

2. *τὸ μὲν θεοφιλὲς τε—ἄνθρωπος*. *τε* is displaced from its natural position after *τό*, partly because of *μὲν*, and partly because *ὅσιον* is thus more easily supplied. It is worth while noticing why *ἄνθρωπος* is introduced. What Socrates desiderated was the *εἶδος* *ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσια ἐστίν*: now *ὅσια* are of two sorts—men and deeds: applied to men, *ὅσιος* has a subjective sense; applied to deeds, an objective: the subdivision is therefore necessary to illustrate *πάντα τὰ ὅσια*.

3. *θεομισῶς* is equivalent to *μὴ προσφιλὲς θεοῖς*. The neutral condition of indifference is not admitted: if the gods are not with us, they are against us. Just so *ἀνωφελής* is rather 'hurtful' than

'useless': and in like manner ἄβουλος, ἄκοπος, ἄμεμπτος, ἄφθονος and other words have a positive meaning in Greek. See Alcibiades II 138 D foll. and especially Protag. 331 A foll. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁσιότης ὅλον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη ὅλον ὅσιον, ἀλλ' ὅλον μὴ ὅσιον· ἡ δὲ ὁσιότης ὅλον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον; Still more clear is Rep. IV 437 C τί δαί; τὸ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μὴδ' ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) καὶ ἐκ πάντων πάντων ἐκείνοις θήσομεν; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; This style of reasoning is indeed disallowed by Diotima in Symp. 201 E—202 A: οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; ἔφη· ἡ οἶε, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καλὸν ᾖ, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι αἰσχρόν; μάλιστα γέ. ἡ καὶ <δ> ἂν μὴ σοφόν, ἀμαθές; ἡ οὐκ ἥσθησαι ὅτι ἐστὶ τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; but only with a view to make room for the Platonic doctrine of ὁρθή δόξα. It was very prevalent among the Greeks, and may perhaps be illustrated by the Solonian law requiring every one to take a definite side in political questions. There are fewer merely negative notions in Greek than in English: 'All men are not wise' meant to a Greek 'all men are fools'. The whole subject is discussed by Theodor Kock in Hermes XVIII p. 546 ff. (Ein Kapitel aus der formalen Logik, angewendet auf Aristoteles und Platon).

4. οὐ ταῦτόν δ' ἐστίν. This explanatory clause (introduced as usual by δέ) is inserted to prepare for the *reductio ad absurdum* of 8 A καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὃ Εὐθύφρων, τοῦτω τῷ λόγῳ. "δέ stands in the third place, to avoid the union of οὐ and δέ". Schanz. For τὸ ἐναντιώτατον ('altogether its opposite') cf. Lysis 215 E τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἐναντιωτάτῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φίλον. ἐναντιώτατον without the article would have a different meaning: the article implies that unholiness has but *one* opposite, holiness. For ταῦτόν see note on 10 E.

6. οὐχ οὕτως <εἴρηται>; The reading is here very difficult. I adopt Hermann's emendation—a solution which had occurred to me independently. The MSS read: οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτω μὲν οὖν. καὶ εἰ γε φαίνεται εἰρησθαι. δοκῶ, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἴρηται γάρ. Fritzsche and Wohlrab retain the MS reading, except that they reject εἴρηται γάρ after Σώκρατες, and insert it after οὕτω μὲν οὖν: Schanz now rejects εἴρηται γάρ *in toto*: formerly he bracketed the whole passage from καὶ εἰ γε down to the first εἴρηται γάρ. Ast, Heusde, Hoenebeek, Maresch and Badham have each of them different suggestions. Hermann's correction seems to me at once the easiest and the best in point of sense. After οὐχ οὕτως we naturally expect εἴρηται, for the

statement *has* been made already in 5 D τὸ ἀνύσιον αὐ τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, where παντὸς ἐναντίον is practically equivalent to ἐναντιώτατον. I conjecture that the corruption arose thus. After δοκῶ, ὡ Σώκρατες, the words εἴρηται γάρ were added on the margin by a copyist, perhaps with a reference to 5 D above, to indicate that the statement had been made already. Being afterwards introduced into the text, they were the occasion of the omission of εἴρηται after οὕτως, the more readily, inasmuch as εἰρήσθαι, εἴρηται, and presently εἴρηται γάρ occur in the immediate vicinity.

8. καὶ εἰ γε φαίνεται εἰρήσθαι is added by Socrates because the assertion was previously made by Socrates, not by Euthyphro (5 D): Socrates wishes to have the sentiment approved by Euthyphro, in order that he may contribute to his own discomfiture.

- 7 B 9. δοκῶ, for which Schleiermacher suggested δοκεῖ, is not rarely used in the sense of δοκέει μοι, e.g. Rep. V 473 D οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα—ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένοι. A distinct usage is δοκῶ for δοκεῖ μοι 'it seems good to me' e.g. Agam. 16 δταν δ' αἰδεῖν ἢ μινύρεσθαι δοκῶ. See Mr Arthur Sidgwick in Classical Review (April, 1889) III 4, p. 148.

13. εἴρηται γάρ: viz. in 6 A—C.

14. ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς: ὀργαί (irae) are the particular ebullitions of the permanent state ἐχθρα. The singular ἐχθραν is kept probably out of a desire to conform to ἐχθρα just before. For a similar reason ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς is placed first in the sentence.

15. ὥδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. Once more the reasoning is from man to God: see above on 6 A line 20, and Introd. p. xvi.

16. περὶ ἀριθμοῦ. Three things are mentioned on which a dispute is capable of easy and sure settlement, viz. number, size, and weight. They all belong to the material universe, being things ὧν ἂν δυνάμεθα ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι. Schanz aptly quotes Xen. Mem. I 1. 9 δαιμονῶν δὲ (sc. ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης) καὶ τοὺς μαντευομένους ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν· οἶον κτλ., ἢ ἃ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας ἢ μετρήσαντας ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι, τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθανομένους ἀθέμιστα ποιεῖν ἡγγεῖτο. See also Rep. x 602 D ἂρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἰστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῶν τὸ φαινόμενον μείζον ἢ ἑλαττον ἢ πλεον ἢ βαρύτερον κτλ.; and Alcib. I 111 B foll. τί οὖν; δοκούσι σοι διαφέρεισθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ποῶν ἔστι λίθος ἢ ξύλον; To find a μέτρον for immaterial

things like justice, piety, etc. was the whole work of Socrates, and absorbed a large share of Plato's philosophical activity.

ὅποτέρα πλείω: at first sight we might expect *ὅπότερος πλείων*, but *things* are *πλείω*, hardly a number. The plural is used, because 'more' implies more than one.

17. **ποιοῖ.** This older form of the optative of contracted verbs is so frequent in Plato as to be almost regular. In Aristophanes, the longer forms (*-οίην -οίης -οίη*) are regularly used in the singular: see Rutherford's *New Phrynichus* p. 442 foll.

18. **περί γε τῶν τοιούτων** goes with *ταχύ ἄν ἀπαλλαγείμεν*. The *γε* contains a sinister hint that after all some subjects would remain on which they would differ still, piety for example. What is here called *λογισμός* is called *ἀριθμητική* in Alc. I 126 C διὰ τίν' οὖν τέχνην ὁμονοοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις περὶ ἀριθμούς; διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν.

21. **μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος** forms one idea: hence there is but one article. So τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφότερου below. The two opposites fall under one category—size in the first case, weight in the second. Aristotle was fond of saying τῶν ἐναντιῶν ἡ αὕτη ἐπιστήμη.

22. **ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν.** So Schanz with T: B has *μέτριον*. Formerly Schanz read *μέτρον*. *μετρεῖν* is better, in view of καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστάναι which follows. Compare Alc. I 126 C—D διὰ τίνα δὲ τέχνην ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁμονοεῖ περὶ σπιθαμῆς καὶ πήχεως, ὁ πότερον μείζον; οὐ διὰ τὴν μετρητικήν;

26. **διακριθεῖμεν ἄν.** T has *διακριθείμεν ἄν*: but the longer form seems not to be used by Plato in the plural: compare *ἀπαλλαγείμεν* in line 19 above. See Rutherford as cited on line 17 above. Schanz suspects that *ταχύ* has fallen out before *διακριθεῖμεν*. Its occurrence before the verbs *ἀπαλλαγείμεν* and *παυσάμεθα* in the two previous examples seems at first sight to confirm his suspicion: on the other hand, the threefold repetition of the adverb is somewhat offensive. Naber supplies *ῥαδίως*: but Plato may well have left out the adverb here: in the nature of things the operation of weighing could not have lasted long.

28. **ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσω** i.q. *ἐπὶ τίνος κρίσω*. So in Latin *hæc disputatio* is used in the sense of *huius rei disputatio*. The meaning cannot be 'to what criterion', since the criterion is *ex hypothesi* unknown, never having been reached: the question moreover is not what *test*, but what thing. Schanz reads *ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσω*: but if

τινα were the indefinite pronoun, it would naturally have followed, not preceded *κρίσιν*. The indefinite *τινα* is too weak a word to bear the stress of the sentence-accent, which will infallibly fall on it, if it precedes *κρίσιν*.

29. *ἐχθροί γε*. So B: T has *ἐχθροί τε*.

30. *εἴμεν* is easily restored from *ἦμεν* of B and *εἴημεν* of T (with *η* erased).

- 7 D 31. *τὸ τε δίκαιον—κακόν*. The difficulty of finding a standard by which to determine what is just etc. was continually present to the mind of Plato: but he sometimes draws a clear distinction between the case of *ἀγαθόν* and *κακόν* on the one hand, and *δίκαιον* etc. on the other. Thus in Theaet. 172 A it is said that the "incomplete Protagoreans" (perhaps to be identified with Socrates: see Dr Jackson in the Journal of Philology vol. XIII pp. 249—250) will probably allow that the doctrine *πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου* holds good, not only of present sensations, but also of the notions *καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροῖα*, *δίκαια καὶ ἀδίκαια*, *ὅσια καὶ μὴ*, but *not* of *συμφέροντα* and the opposite, i.e. *ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ* (for Plato, like the Greeks generally, always equates *ἀγαθόν* and *συμφέρον*, *κακόν* and *βλαβερόν*). Cf. Prot. 322 D—323 C. A close parallel to the present passage is Alcibiades I 112 A ff., where Socrates says it is precisely *περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων* that the Athenians do differ: and just as here *καὶ ἀγαθόν καὶ κακόν* is put on the same plane with *δίκαιον* and the others, so there Socrates proceeds to identify *δίκαιον* with *συμφέρον* through the middle terms *καλὰ* and *ἀγαθὰ*. Grote refers to Eur. Phoen. 499—502

εἰ πᾶσι ταῦτόν καλὸν ἔφν σοφόν θ' ἄμα
οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφιλεκτός ἀνθρώποις ἔρις·
νῦν δ' οὐθ' ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἴσον βροτοῖς,
πλὴν ὀνόμασιν, τὸ δ' ἔργον οὐκ ἔστιν τόδε.

Compare also Aristotle Eth. Nic. I 1. 1094^b 14 ff. *τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια—τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι φύσει δὲ μὴ. τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλαβὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν*. Notice by the way that the introduction of *τὸ δίκαιον* and similar ethical notions at this point prepares the way for the second division of the dialogue, in which *τὸ ὅσιον* is viewed as a part of *τὸ δίκαιον*. As regards the Greek, it should be noted that the omission of the article before *καλόν* and

the following adjectives is intended to reduce the notions to an ethical unity. Cf. Gorg. 459 D τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν.

34. αὐτῶν. Not ὧν: see on καταπεπόκιλται in 6 C above.

35. ὅταν γινώμεθα. This limitation (as Schanz remarks) is inserted because it is not every διαφορά which leads to ἐχθρα καὶ ὀργαί; a διαφορά about the weight of an object, for example, causes no ill-feeling, as we have been told. The editors compare Phaed. 68 D οὐκοῦν φέβω μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν.

37. ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὕτη. αὕτη is in the predicate. Note the accent on ἔστιν: it is frequently accented at the beginning of a sentence.

39. οἱ θεοὶ κτλ. Observe how here again the reasoning is from men to gods: see on 6 A line 20 supra and Introd. p. xvi. The clause εἴπερ τι διαφέρονται indicates Socrates' disbelief in the quarrels of gods. The caveat is more express in 7 E κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὡς σὺ φῆς, 8 A ὡς ἔοικεν, and 8 D ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.

40. διὰ ταῦτα. So B: T has δι' αὐτὰ ταῦτα as in 8 D οὐκοῦν αὐτὰ γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, but here there seems no reason for so much emphasis.

43. ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια. Schanz follows Hirschig in adding 7 E καὶ ἄδिका after δίκαια. He compares Alcib. I 111 E where B has τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων while T omits καὶ ἀδίκων: also Theaet. 172 B ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, where καὶ ἀδίκοις (not in BT) has inferior MS authority. Plato's almost invariable rule in such enumerations is to use both the positive and negative notions in each case if he uses them in any: but here I think the omission of καὶ ἄδिका may be defended. If of two gods A thinks a just, and B thinks b just, it follows that A thinks b not-just, i.e. (according to the usual Greek view: see on θεομῆτες in 7 A above) unjust. So that καὶ ἄδिका is unnecessary to the sense, and Socrates is justified in saying presently ταῦτὰ δέ γε, ὡς σὺ φῆς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδिका. καὶ αἰσχρά and καὶ κακά have been added in the other two cases perhaps because they are further removed from ἄλλοι ἄλλα.

44. οὐ γὰρ ἄν πον. Schanz remarks that this is one of the few cases where Plato uses this collocation without a following γε.

48. ἕκαστοι: plural, because we are considering the case not of god against god, but gods against gods (ἄλλοι ἄλλα in line 43 above): ἐστasiaζον above implies factions.

49. ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν. Observe how in the ancient view of life the emotions (here love) are made to depend on the intellect (καλὰ ἡγούνται): see on καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν in 2 C.

S A 57. ταῦτ' ἄρα. Here and in the next line ταῦτ' is easily restored from ταυτ' or ταῦτ' of the MSS.

61. καὶ ὅσια ἄρα—ἀν εἴη: which will contradict 7 A οὐ ταῦτόν δ' ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον, τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ. Protagoras however would have accepted the conclusion and said: A thing *is* pious for the gods who think it so, impious for those who think it impious. Notice the emphatic place of τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ—on *your* theory, but on no other.

63. κινδυνεύει. Euthyphro's assent becomes less hearty as he sees his approaching discomfiture. From πάνυ γε in 7 E to κινδυνεύει his answers betray increasing caution. Cf. Prot. 360 C πάνυ γε—ὠμολόγει—συνέφη—ἐπένευσεν—ἔφη—πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν—αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον.

CHAPTER IX.

The ambiguity in Euthyphro's definition being now clear, Socrates prepares the way for the amended form of the definition (viz. that piety is what *all* the gods love).

This he does in the present chapter by eliciting from Euthyphro the assertion that all the gods agree in desiring to punish wrongful manslaughter. 'Exactly', says Socrates 'but will they agree what manslaughter is wrong, and what right?'

1. ὦ θαυμάσιε. See on ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρων in 5 A.

2. δ τυγχάνει—ἀνόσιον. So BT. Schanz reads φ for δ and the change is approved by Apelt. In favour of Schanz's text might perhaps be quoted 9 C ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὠρισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μὴ: only there τούτῳ depends on ὠρισμένα. I think the MS reading is right. The meaning is: what I asked was not a thing which, while one and the same (without undergoing any change), happens to be both holy and unholy: whereas what you gave in your answer was θεοφιλές=ὅσιον, which is at the same time θεομισές=ἀνόσιον. τυγχάνει δν go together and ὁσίων τε καὶ ἀνόσιον are the predicate. ταῦτόν is pronounced with emphasis and a slight pause made after the word: otherwise δν would be taken with ταῦτόν. A similar passage is Rep. IV 435 A δ γε ταῦτόν ἄν τις

προσείποι μείζον τε καὶ ἑλαττον κτλ.; where Dobree would add *δν* after ἑλαττον. Here I do not think any change necessary: but it would be easy to insert *δν* after *ἀνόσιον*, and so relieve ταύτων of its weight of meaning, at the same time giving a balance to the sentence which would compensate for the (only seeming I think) lack of euphony, and correspond closely to the twofold copula in *θεοφιλὲς ᾗ*, and *θεομισέεσσι*. In Rep. IV 425 C *ἡ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ ὅμοιον δν ὅμοιον παρακαλεῖ* some MSS omit *δν*.

5. ὥστε, ᾧ Εὐθύφρων κτλ. applies the result arrived at to 8 B Euthyphro's special case. The shock of the insinuation is calculated to make him protest that *all* the gods approve *his* act and so lead up to the amended definition.

6. *κολάζων* is a more delicate word than *τιμωρῶν*: chastisement has the good of the chastised in view.

7. τῷ μὲν Διί. A touch of humour: Zeus had not been over-kind to his own father. See 6 A.

9. Ἡφαίστω. See Pausanias I 20. 2: λέγεται δὲ τάδε ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων, ὡς Ἦρα βίβηαι γενόμενον Ἡφαιστον, ὃ δὲ οἱ μνησικακῶν πέμψαι δῶρον χρυσοῦν θρόνον ἀφανεῖς δεσμούς ἔχοντα· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπεὶ τε ἐκαθέζετο δεδεσθαι κτλ. Dionysus finally made Hephaestus drunk and brought him back to Olympus to release his mother. The return to Olympus was frequently depicted on Greek vases: see Baumeister's Denkmäler I p. 643. Plato alludes to the incident again in Rep. II 378 D Ἦρας δὲ δεσμούς ὑπὸ νείεος κτλ.

11. καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ ταῦτά i.e. τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν φίλον ποιεῖς τῷ δὲ ἐχθρόν.

12. περὶ γε τούτου: γε exactly as in περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων γ B.

13. διαφέρεισθαι ὡς οὐ. Verbs meaning 'to contradict' are regularly followed by a clause with ὡς (ὅτι) giving what is maintained, not what is contradicted: hence the οὐ. So presently ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς—οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι: cf. 9 D and see on Apol. 31 B line 46.

14. δίκην διδόναι—ἀδίκως. Notice the verbal play. He who does not render justice in deeds must render justice in punishment: the tale of justice must be made up. So 8 E τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην. The form of expression implies the remedial view of punishment.

16. ἀνθρώπων. Once more Socrates solves the difficulty by reasoning from men to gods: see above on 6 A line 20.

18. ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα is equivalent to ἄλλο ἀδικοῦντα. As 8

an injury is supposed to be still in force till compensation is made, the present is used in spite of ἀποκτείναντα preceding: see on Crito 50 C.

20. οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται. μὲν οὖν is corrective (immo): see on Apol. 26 B. Cobet has pointed out that οὐ παύεται and οὐδὲν παύεται differ exactly as *finem non facit* and *finem nullum facit* (Nov. Lect. p. 500).

22. πάντα ποιούσι καὶ λέγουσι: a common phrase in Plato, occasionally with the singular πᾶν: e.g. Apol. 39 A πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. φεύγοντες is here conative like διδόναι = 'offer': Schanz compares Gorg. 479 B οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες.

24. ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν. Euthyphro has made two assertions: (1) many say τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιούντα οὐ δεῖν δίκην δίδοναι, (2) πάντα ποιούσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην. Socrates refutes (2) first, and the refutation of (1) follows from that of (2).

25. οὐ δεῖν φασί: οὐ φασὶ δεῖν would be more usual (as in οὐ φασιν ἀδικεῖν presently), but less emphatic. Perhaps the unusual order is responsible for the corruption οὐδὲν (for οὐ δεῖν) in B.

27. οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε: has the idea of εὐφήμει! No! they stop short of that. To admit (ὁμολογεῖν) that one's client has broken the law (ἀδικεῖν) would be tantamount to giving up the case: at the same time Socrates does not say that advocates do not sometimes defend clients whom they believe to be guilty.

8 D 33. οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε—ἀληθῆ λέγεις. These words are bracketed by Schanz (after Schenk!). They occur in the MSS, except that ὡς—ἀμφισβητοῦσιν is omitted in B (obviously by mistake), and replaced by a later hand. They are necessary to the sense, for so far only the second of Euthyphro's assertions has been expressly contradicted: it is equally necessary to reject the first expressly. In C above Euthyphro has said that men continually ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ὡς τὸν ἀδικούντα οὐ δεῖ δίκην δίδοναι: Socrates now says no! οὐκ ἄρα ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικούντα δεῖ δίδοναι δίκην. Plato is especially careful to make the refutation complete, and in terms likely to recall the statement of the doctrine refuted: cf. 8 A καὶ δαίμων—λόγῳ with 7 A οὐ ταῦτόν δ' ἐστίν—ἀνοσίῳ.

35. τὸ τίς ἐστίν κτλ. τό goes with the entire clause as in Aristotle's well-known τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Goodwin's Greek Grammar p. 201, note 7.

38. οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα. Socrates now makes the applica-

tion to the case of gods: that of men was but an illustration. The general reasoning reminds us of Pliny's *Panegyricus* § 72 *et sane priorum principum exitus docuit ne a diis quidem amari nisi quos homines ament.*

40. *οἱ μὲν φασιν ἄλλ' ἄλλους ἀδικεῖν* is a main sentence and does not depend on *εἴπερ*. *ἄλλ' ἄλλους* is my emendation for *ἀλλήλους*. I believe that *ἀλλήλους* is corrupt. Fritzsche remarks "Mira brevitās. Nam animo haec obversantur: *ἀδικοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασιν (ἀδικεῖσθαι), οἱ δὲ οὐ φασιν (ἀδικεῖν)*". But the Greek will not bear this stress of meaning. The first thing to notice is that *ἀλλήλους* if right must be the subject to *ἀδικεῖν*: the sense will not allow the subject to be supplied from *οἱ μὲν*, and besides it is irrelevant to name the *object* of the wrong-doing: the sole point is that the wrong-doing should itself be named (*ἀδικεῖν* has no external object wherever it occurs, from *τί δέ*; in B above to the end of the chapter). This being so—is it possible to say in Greek: the one party say that *one another* are doing wrong? It is just as impossible in Greek as in English, unless this 'one party' means to accuse itself, as Schanz's translation of *ἀλλήλους* (*die einen die andern*) makes it do. In Isocrates *Panegy.* 168 occur these words: *ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλήλων κακοῖς ἢ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς*. Cobet (*Var. Lect.* p. 519) substitutes *ἄλλων* for *ἀλλήλων*, wrongly (as I think) in this passage, adding "communis librorum error et frequens". In Xen. *Oecon.* Ch. xx § 5 he replaces *διαφέροντες ἀλλήλων* by *διαφέροντες ἄλλων*, this time rightly, although Holden hesitates to accept the emendation. "Quam saepe *ἄλλων* et *ἀλλήλων* confundantur notum est omnibus" (*Nov. Lect.* p. 596). In view of the last of these passages one might feel inclined to substitute *ἄλλους* for *ἀλλήλους* here: I believe however that Plato wrote *ἄλλ' ἄλλους*. One set of gods say: A (another god) is wrong in this, B wrong in that: but A and B deny that they are wrong. The phrase is doubtless a reminiscence of γ ε καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα—ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται.

41. ὦ θαυμάσιαι: see on 5 A. Here the appellation is strictly in point.

42. οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν—δίκην. γε before *ἀδικοῦντι* makes the words equivalent to 'because he is a wrong doer'.

44. τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις almost = τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθεύεις. 8 E Presently T has τό γε κεφάλαιον, which may be right. Schanz quotes *Phileb.* 48 C *ἔστι δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον*. *Euthyphro's*

guarded reply is not meant (I think) to indicate that there were some who openly professed the doctrine that 'he shall take who has the power, and he shall keep who can', though there were such men at Athens (see Callicles's speech in the *Gorgias* 482 c foll., and *Rep.* I 338 E foll.): it is merely a way of surrendering *salva verecundia*. Notice μέν without a following δέ: Euthyphro implies that Socrates is not *always* right in what he says. Cf. *Apol.* 21 D τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι.

46. ἀλλ' ἑκαστόν γε. So T: B has ἐκάστων by an accidental assimilation to τῶν πραχθέντων.

48. ἄπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοί: the usual caveat: see on 7 D line 39 above.

πράξεώς τινος περί. "Asyndeton explicativum" says Schanz. See on *Apol.* 22 A ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθὼν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες κτλ., and for περί postponed, *ibid.* on 19 c and *supra* 4 E. The emphatic place of πράξεως ('it is about an *action* that they differ') is meant to suggest the antithesis—'not about the right of punishing a wrong action'.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates now asks Euthyphro what ground he has for holding that all the gods will think his father guilty of wrongful manslaughter, and approve the conduct of the son. Euthyphro shirks the question: he reserves his reasons for the judges.

9 A 1. ἔθι νυν: so Schanz now reads. The reading is easily elicited from ἔθι νῦν of B and ἔθι τολυνν of T. νυν when illative is enclitic. Other examples quoted by Schanz from Plato are *Gorg.* 451 A: *Alcib.* I 114 D ἔθι νυν: *Politic.* 294 D φέρε νυν.

2. σοφώτερος: σοφός (like φροντιστής) was almost a nickname of Socrates: see note on *Apol.* 18 B and *supra* on 2 c.

τεκμήριον. As Wohlrab remarks, we have here an indication of the inquiry raised in the next three chapters. Had Euthyphro been able to give a satisfactory τεκμήριον why all the gods approved his conduct, he would have been able to separate the οὐσία of ὅσιον from its πάθος (viz. τὸ θεοφιλές).

πάντες θεοί: without the article: contrast πάντες οἱ θεοί in 9 E, where see note.

4. τεθνάναι as passive to the perf. of ἀποκτείνω: see on φεύγει αὐτὴν ἢ διώκει in 3 E above.

θητῶν ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος. Compare the account in 4 C. *θητῶν* is logically subordinate to *γενόμενος*: 'being guilty of manslaughter while a day labourer'.

6. φθασία τελευτήσας: the words almost suggest that he died of set purpose (like a Chinaman) to spite Euthyphro's father.

7. δεσμά: see on τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνήσκει in 4 D. The nom. (acc.) plur. *δεσμά* is said not to occur elsewhere in Plato.

ἐξηγητῶν: see on 4 C. Here the entire college is alluded to: in 4 C only ὁ ἐξηγητής, probably the president.

9. ὀρθῶς ἔχει. Hirschig reads *ἔχειν*: but the *ὥς* of *ὥς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγούνται* is still carried on. Notice the contempt expressed by τοῦ τοιούτου δὴ just above.

10. ἴθι recalls *ἴθι νυν* with which Socrates' appeal began.

11. παντὸς μᾶλλον: 'more than anything' is constantly used 9 B by Plato in the sense of 'assuredly'. See on Crito 49 B. The phrase is probably selected here because πάντες is to follow: 'beyond all doubt all the gods etc.'.

15. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον κτλ. Euthyphro evades the difficulty after the usual fashion of self-confidence nonplussed. 'I could an I would: but it's no mere bagatelle, and it would take time'. So in 14 B when he retreats for the second time: καὶ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον—ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὥς ἔχει μαθεῖν. Plato professes contempt for the man who has σχολή for "splitting differences between two degrees of the infinitesimally small, such as a tobacco pipe or the Roman Empire, a million of money or a fiddlestick's end", and none to probe a question to the bottom. See Theaet. 172 D foll. on the σχολή of the true φιλόσοφος.

16. ἐπεὶ: sc. were there time. Here ἐπεὶ is virtually equivalent to 'although': see on 4 C above.

ἐπιδείξαι: suggests a long, somewhat windy sermon, rather than a cogent proof (ἀποδείξαι). The word is regularly used of a sophistic display (ἐπιδείξις). Prot. 347 B ἐστι μέντοι, ἔφη (sc. Ἰππίας), καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῶν ἐπιδείξω, ἂν βούλησθε.

18. μανθάνω· ὅτι κτλ. See on 3 B. The sentence gives a sarcastic reason for Euthyphro's οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον. Socrates pretends to be ready to give Euthyphro as much time as the judges would allow him.

19. ἐνδείξαι. Notice that it is Socrates who uses ἐνδείκνυμαι,

Euthyphro who says ἐπιδείκνυμι: see last note but one. ἄδικα presently is 'illegal' as well as 'wrong'.

20. οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες: 'the gods one and all': the emphasis adds to the irony. On the article see πάντες οἱ θεοὶ in 9 E and note.

22. ἴάνπερ ἀκούσῃ γε: Euthyphro fears interruptions: indeed, like Phocion, he almost regarded them as a proof of his merit: see 3 C καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, — καταγελωσιν ὡς μαινομένον.

CHAPTER XI.

In this chapter Euthyphro at last emends his definition thus: Holiness is what all the gods love, unholiness what all the gods hate.

9 C 1. ἴάνπερ εὖ δοκῆς λέγειν. The Athenians liked above all things a clever orator: see Apol. 17 A μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν θαύμασιν τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν.

2. ἐνενόησα. So B: T has ἔχομαι: "perhaps", says Schanz "by interpolation, owing to the genitive". The genitive is of course a gen. absolute.

3. καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν σκοπῶ. A familiar incident with Socrates: sometimes his earnest thought rooted him to the spot (Symp. 174 D), on one occasion, it is said, for twenty-four hours (Symp. 220 B). The syntax is as in Apol. 21 D πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐλογιζόμεν: the ego is as it were divided into two beings, one of whom talks to the other. So Plato used to say that thought was the soul talking to itself: Theaet. 189 E τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς; τί καλῶν; λόγον δὲ αὐτῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ: Soph. 263 E: cf. Phileb. 38 D. The same self-dissecting process underlies the meaning of the Latin words *consciūs* and *conscientia* (see Nettleship's Passages for Translation into Latin Prose p. 14).

εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα: see on 4 D above.

5. οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες: see on 9 B and 9 E.

6. τί μᾶλλον κτλ. Socrates proceeds to shew Euthyphro that τὸ θεομισές and τὸ θεοφιλές are only *accidents* of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τε καὶ δσιον: we want their essence.

8. τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον viz. your father's act of manslaughter.

9. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦτω—ἐφάνη. This passage is most difficult. There is no important variant in the MSS.

We shall best understand the meaning by recapitulating the situation. Socrates says in effect: "Even supposing I allow that *all* the gods hate your father's act, are we any nearer to the knowledge of τὸ δσιὼν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον? That his act will be θεομισές I am willing to allow: but" (this is the implied antithesis to θεομισές μὲν) "is it necessarily ἀνόσιον? Is θεομισές of the *essence* of ἀνόσιον, or is it not merely a πάθος thereof? This will best be settled, if we formally amend your definition to 'what *all* the gods love is δσιον, and what they all hate ἀνόσιον' and examine it in this amended form". That is to say, Socrates is about to point out a new and more serious error in Euthyphro's definition, even when it is construed in its most favourable light: viz. that it puts the πάθος for the οὐσία. This chapter therefore is the transition to the following two chapters.

But what of the words ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦτω ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὠρισμένα τὸ δσιον καὶ μὴ τὸ γὰρ θεομισές δν καὶ θεοφιλές ἐφάνη? I believe them to have been interpolated by some scribe who failed to grasp the situation. For, on the supposition that they are genuine, τοῦτω must have for its antecedent either (a) θεομισές or (b) τὸ ἔργον. If (a), then Plato is guilty of thoroughly confused thinking. The only argument on which ἀνόσιον has *hitherto* been denied to be identical with θεομισές, is that all the gods do *not* hate the same thing, or, as the explanatory clause puts it presently, τὸ θεομισές δν καὶ θεοφιλές ἐφάνη. But this is just the argument which Socrates has declared that he is ready to give up: he will allow, for argument's sake, that *all* the gods *do* hate the act of Euthyphro's father. Moreover, it is intolerable to have three cases of the pronoun τοῦτο within four lines, whereof the first and third refer to the same thing, and the second to something quite different. In the third place, ὥστε before τούτου is hardly intelligible except on the supposition that ἀλλὰ γὰρ—ἐφάνη is either spurious or else a complete parenthesis. If therefore θεομισές is the antecedent to τούτω, the entire clause must be rejected. If however the antecedent is (b) τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, as Schanz believes, then another view is possible. The meaning will then be: suppose I allow that all the gods hate this *one particular act* of your father's, yet does this bring us nearer to a *general* definition of piety and impiety? That is to say, Socrates feels that Euthyphro has not yet shaken himself clear of the

personal elements in the case: he is still anchored in the harbour of 'Piety is doing what I am doing now'. The reference in ἀπρὶ will in that case be to the refutation of Euthyphro's *first* attempt in 6 D. This is Schanz's view and seems at first sight to be supported by the emphasis on τοῦτο and τούτου in the words τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, and ὥστε τούτου ἀφίημί σε: on the other hand, so far as I can see, there is on Schanz's view no antithesis latent or expressed to the μέν after θεομισές, and the position of the words in ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἶναι seems to shew that more emphasis was intended to fall on οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες than on τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον: moreover, if the antithesis is between the particular and the universal, we should expect the statement of the universal presently in D to be more emphatic e.g. πάνθ' ὅς' ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιά ἐστι κτλ. Even on Schanz's explanation it is necessary to reject the words τὸ γὰρ θεομισές δὲν καὶ θεοφιλές ἐφάνη (so Schanz, following Kleist), because they refer to the refutation of the *second* definition, whereas (on Schanz's view) the reference throughout is to the first. Schanz's explanation suits the passage taken by itself quite well: but it seems to me a flaw in Plato's art, if after the first definition has been quite refuted on the ground of putting the particular for the universal, and an error pointed out in the second definition, he should harp back again upon the first definition, without at the same time preparing the way (as I conceive him to have done) for discovering another grievous error in the second.

11. ὥστε τούτου ἀφίημί σε. τούτου sc. τοῦ ἔργου: viz. your father's act. ἀφίημι is a legal term for acquitting: Rep. v 451 B ἀφίεμέν σε ὥσπερ φόνου.

9 D 12. εἰ βούλει. Asyndeton as in 8 E πράξεώς τινος πέρι v. note in loc. Here T has καὶ εἰ.

ἡγέσθων: the MSS have ἡγέσθωσαν, corrected by the second hand in B. "The Imperative suffix -ωσαν does not appear till 300 B.C. Till then we meet only with forms in -ων (-ντων -σθων). The proportion in the frequency of the two formations is:

Before 300 B.C. -ων : -ωσαν = 111 : 0

After 300 B.C. -ων : -ωσαν = 3 : 22".

Meisterhans Grammatik der Att. Inschriften² p. 132. Cobet (Nov. Lect. p. 327) had already remarked: "Nunquam dixerunt Athenienses κρινέσθωσαν—sed κρινέσθων omnes".

13. ἀλλ' ἄρα τοῦτο κτλ. Socrates suggests that the definition should be amended so as to identify holiness with what *all* the gods love. To some extent this is an approximation to Monotheism: for if πάντες οἱ θεοὶ always agree, then they are essentially one (τὸ θεῖον); although in the words δ' ὃν οἱ μὲν φιλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν κτλ., a diversity of view is still permitted to them. For ἐπανορθώμεθα followed by a clause giving what is asserted, not what is corrected, see on διαφέρεισθαι ὡς οὐ in 8 B above. ἐπανορθώμεθα (conj. delib.) is a probable restoration for ἐπανορθούμεθα of B and T: but ἐπανορθούμεθα is not necessarily wrong, since Greek sometimes uses the present where we should use the future, especially in questions e.g. Rep. II 373 D ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; see also Kühner's Gr. Gramm. II p. 120 and compare note on ἀποδεχόμεθα infra in 9 E. Presently λόγῳ is simply 'definition'.

15. δ' ὃν—ἀμφοτέρα. This clause is really tantamount to a surrender of the definition, if ἀμφοτέρα is taken seriously: a thing cannot be both holy and unholy. But οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφοτέρα is only a way of saying that where the gods differ in their likes and dislikes, there is no question of holiness involved. For the expression cf. Rep. II 365 E οἷς ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον. The plural is regular: in ἀμφοτέρα it is logically right, while in οὐδέτερα it is probably due to a desire for uniformity, made easier by the Greek tendency to use neuter plurals as a single notion (φανερὰ ἐστι etc.), as in the case of τὰ ἕτερα (θᾶτερα) Phaed. 68 C φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἥτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ καὶ ἀμφοτέρα.

19. τί γὰρ κωλύει. Euthyphro talks with the airy tone of a man whose mind is already made up. The editors quote an exact parallel from Charm. 163 A τί γὰρ κωλύει; ἔφη. οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ ἐκείνον κωλύει κτλ.

20. τὸ σὸν σκόπει εἰ: is exactly equivalent (as Schanz remarks) to σκόπει εἰ σὺ γε.

21. εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος. See on 6 E, line 20 above. οὕτω sums up the participial clause τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος. The usage is frequent in Plato e.g. Gorg. 457 C οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται—μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνορίας: Prot. 310 D et al.

23. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε φαίην. Euthyphro now states the amended 9 E definition viz.: "Holiness=what all the gods love: what all the gods hate=unholiness".

24. πάντες οἱ θεοί. From 9 A to 9 E we find πάντες θεοὶ four times (A, B, D, E): πάντες οἱ θεοὶ twice (D, E), οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες twice

(B, C). A study of these passages shews that πάντες θεοί and πάντες οἱ θεοί differ just as 'all gods', and 'all the gods': the latter is the more regular and formal expression, for which reason it is used in the suggested definition (D) and in the first part of Euthyphro's formal statement thereof. οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες is the most emphatic.

27. οὕτως—ἀποδεχόμεθα: so B. T has ἀποδεχόμεθα: see on ἐπανορθώμεθα in D above. Here the conj. is of course necessary on account of the preceding ἐπισκοπῶμεν. ἀποδεχόμεθα in this sense regularly takes a genitive: strictly speaking τοῦτο is carried on as the direct object, and the gen. depends on ἀπο-. οὕτως is 'simply' 'without more ado' as in ῥαδίως οὕτω Rep. II 378 A and Symp. 176 E οὕτω πίνοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν.

28. εἰν μόνον φῆ τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω. What precisely is the meaning of τι and the reference in οὕτω? If the text is right, the situation is this. A man uses Euthyphro's definition as his λόγος, and asserts that a particular act (τι) squares with this definition (ἔχειν οὕτω) i.e. is θεοφιλές or θεομισές (as Euthyphro asserted of his father's act): are we to accept this on his word, or inquire what sense there is in what he says? If the latter, we should still ask why this particular act is θεοφιλές (θεομισές), and we should probably (as the next chapter shews) be told, because it is δσιον—so that we should be revolving in a circle. The result would be to shew us that we have not yet reached the οὐσία of δσιον (ἀνδσιον), but only a πάθος thereof. To omit τι would make the text easier, but I do not think this expedient necessary.

29. ἢ σκαπτέον τί λέγει δ λέγων; The question with which Socrates began (οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο;) is renewed: the order is α β α. By this means we are led to expect an affirmative answer. Compare a more elaborate example in Crito 49 A—B, where see note (line 14).

CHAPTER XII.

Here and in XIII, Socrates tests the amended definition. In the present chapter, arguing from analogy, he shews that δσιον is not θεοφιλές, because while a φιλούμενον (whereof θεοφιλές is one special kind) is a φιλούμενον (θεοφιλές) ὅτι φιλεῖται, δσιον is not δσιον ὅτι φιλεῖται, rather ὅτι δσιόν ἐστι φιλεῖται.

1. τάχα—εἰσόμμεθα. Schanz reminds us that τάχα in prose

only means 'soon' when combined with a future tense. It is especially common with *ἔσομαι*.

3. *φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν* = *θεοφιλέστω*.

10 A

5. *οὐκ οἶδ' ὃ τι λέγεις*: the distinction between *πάθος* and *οὐσία* is not yet familiar to Euthyphro: compare infra in 12 A *οὐχ ἔπομαι*, *ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις*.

7. *Λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον κτλ.* Socrates in the Platonic dialogues frequently begins to build up an argument in this way. Cf. *Phaed.* 103 C *θερμὸν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν*; *Meno* 75 D *τελευτήν τι καλεῖς*; where Fritzsche reminds us that the Xenophontic Socrates shews the same tendency e.g. *Mem.* II 2. 1 *εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, οἷσθ' ἂν τινας ἀνθρώπους ἀχαρίστους καλουμένους*; *ibid.* IV 2. 22. The distinction between active and passive is also found in *Gorg.* 476 B: compare also *Theaet.* 156 A ff. It is worth while noticing that the examples chosen by Socrates (*φερόμενον*, *ἀγόμενον*, *δρώμενον* and their actives) are from the material world, in which the distinction of active and passive is less hard to grasp. The selection of *φερόμενον* as an example naturally suggests *ἀγόμενον* as another: they are often combined in the phrase *φέρειν καὶ ἀγειν*.

11. *καὶ τούτου ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν* is not essential to the argument, except in so far as it defines *φιλούμενον* by contrast.

14. *διότι φέρεται*. The word *διότι* is preferred to the more usual *ὅτι* because it balances *δι'* *ἄλλο τι* better. 10 B

17. *καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δῆ*. *δῆ* is 'then' and *καὶ* 'also'. The collocation is common in Plato. *δῆ* rarely follows *καὶ* directly as in *Rep.* VI 490 C *καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χόρον κτλ.*

20. *οὐκ ἄρα διότι κτλ.* The illative *ἄρα* is justified because the results are being summed up. Notice the order of enumeration. It is exactly the reverse of that in which the illustrations were cited, and produces a chiasmic effect. Formerly *φερόμενον*, *ἀγόμενον*, *δρώμενον*: now *δρώμενον*, *ἀγόμενον*, *φερόμενον*.

21. *τοῦναντίον*. Adverbial accusative in apposition to the sentence: see on *τοῦναντίον τούτου πᾶν* in *Apol.* 25 B.

25. *κατάδηλον* is said of something which comes gradually into view. Cf. *Polit.* 291 A *ὄχλον—δε ἄρτι κατὰ δῆλος νῦν ἡμῶν γέγονεν*. *κατά* has the same force in *καταφαίνομαι* and *καταφανής*.

βούλομαι. *ἐθέλω* would be impossible here: *βούλομαι* is even frequently used by itself in the sense of 'I mean'.

26. *εἴ τι—πάσχει*. The second *τι* is not the nom., but the acc.: thus the full expression would be *ἡ εἴ τι πάσχει τι*. The words

are an attempt to express the grammatical notion of passive. Among passive verbs, some are *γινόμενα* (e.g. *δρᾶσθαι*), others *πάσχοντα* (as *ἀγασθαι*, *φέρεσθαι*): though in the last analysis they may all be viewed as *πάσχοντα*, and hence their name.

32. τὸ φιλούμενον is rather *πάσχον* than *γινόμενον*.

33. ἡ πάσχον τι ὑπὸ τοῦ: the τι after *γινόμενον* is to be repeated with *πάσχον*.

35. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα. τοῦτο is τὸ φιλούμενον, and τὸ φιλούμενον is understood as the subject to *ἐστιν* in the next line.

36. ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται. Short for ὑπὸ τούτων ὧν: in such cases the preposition is idiomatically left out before the relative e.g. Rep. III 402 A ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἐστι. See Kühner's Gr. Gramm. II p. 478. As regards the hiatus, Fritzsche on Meno 77 A quotes Cic. Orat. 44. 151, who remarks that Plato was not careful to avoid hiatus not only "in his sermonibus, qui *διαλογοί* dicuntur—sed in populari oratione, qua mos est Athenis laudari in contione eos, qui sint in proeliis interfecti" (alluding to the Menexenus).

10 D 40. ἄλλο τι. ἄλλο τι ἤ; = numquid aliud quam? = nonne? ἤ is often omitted. See on Apol. 24 C. B and T both have ἀλλ' ὅτι.

45. ἐστιν—φιλεῖται. The subject is still τὸ ὅσιον.

49. καὶ θεοφιλές <τὸ θεοφιλές>. With Bast, who is followed by Fritzsche and Schanz, I have added the words within brackets. If the MSS are followed, the only possible subject to *φιλούμενόν* (sc. ὑπὸ θεῶν) ἐστι is τὸ ὅσιον. However, not only is the argument faulty on such a theory, but the words of Socrates in E, where he restates the admissions made, are conclusive in favour of regarding not ὅσιον, but τὸ θεοφιλές as subject to *ἐστι*. And as it is impossible to supply the words from the context, they must be inserted. Then in E, τὸ μὲν ὅσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὁσιὸν ἐστιν κτλ. corresponds to διότι ἄρα ὁσιὸν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται κτλ., and τὸ δέ γε θεοφιλές ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλές εἶναι corresponds to ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, φιλούμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλές <τὸ θεοφιλές>. Compare also II A καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλές εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλές θεοφιλές ἦν κτλ.

53. ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου. For the collocation Fritzsche compares Meno 87 D ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι.

CHAPTER XIII.

The mistake committed by Euthyphro is here presented as the substitution of a *πάθος* of τὸ ὅσιον for its οὐσία. After a complaint from Euthyphro on the bewildering nature of Socrates' dialectic, Socrates remarks with a view to a new definition, that 'all holiness is moral': but 'not all morality is holy'. Euthyphro is puzzled: and Socrates explains by means of an illustration the difference between these two propositions.

The first two sentences of this chapter belong more properly to Chapter XII. For the division of his dialogues into chapters Plato is not responsible: and Schanz discards the division entirely in his later editions.

6. ἀλλ' εἴ γε ταῦτόν κτλ. The reasoning is somewhat difficult, 10 E though perfectly correct. It is desired to prove that ὅσιον and θεοφιλές are not convertible terms. If they were, then (a) supposing ὅσιον were loved because it is ὅσιον, θεοφιλές would be loved because it is θεοφιλές—but this is not so, since the truth is θεοφιλές is οἷον φιλεῖσθαι because it is loved (τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι): (b) supposing θεοφιλές were ὅσιον because it is loved, ὅσιον would be ὅσιον because it is loved,—whereas the truth is, ὅσιον is loved because it is οἷον φιλεῖσθαι (τὸ δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται). So that on neither supposition can θεοφιλές and ὅσιον be identified. It is noteworthy that the clauses εἰ μὲν ἐφιλεῖτο, and εἰ δὲ—θεοφιλές ἦν have the verb in the Imperfect Indicative, although the supposition is in both cases a true one: this is due, partly to the influence of εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν to which these two clauses are subordinate, but still more to the form of the anticipated conclusions καὶ ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν τὸ θεοφιλές and καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ἂν—ὅσιον ἦν.

Notice that Plato uses the forms ταῦτόν τοσοῦτον τοιοῦτον τηλικούτον in preference to ταυτό etc.: see on Crito 48 B and Apol. 24 C. The protases εἰ μὲν κτλ. and εἰ δὲ κτλ. are logically subordinate to εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν, of which they form two special cases: see on a parallel case Apol. 33 D.

11. νῦν δέ (but as it is=nunc) is regularly used in introducing 11 A the true state of the case after an untrue supposition with εἰ and a past tense of the Indicative: e.g. Prot. 335 C ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν—νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις κτλ.

12. ἐναντίως ἔχeton. ἐναντίως is the strongest possible word for opposition, whence παντάπασιν ἐτέρω ὅντε ἀλλήλων. Socrates somewhat overstates his case: the ἐναντιότης expressed in the following sentence is more apparent than real—it is difference rather than opposition.

13. τὸ μὲν γάρ—οἶον φιλεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν is τὸ θεοφιλές: τὸ δέ is τὸ ὁσιον. οἶον φιλεῖσθαι (i.q. τοιούτον οἶον φιλεῖσθαι) is substituted here for θεοφιλές in order to make the antithesis between θεοφιλές and ὁσιον more striking by using the same predicate with ἐστίν in both clauses: at the same time, the use of οἶον φιλεῖσθαι (sc. ὑπὸ θεῶν) in the next line seems to indicate that θεοφιλές is not the οὐσία of ὁσιον, but only a πάθος thereof: it is only 'such a thing as to be loved'—not 'the god-loved'. The way is thus prepared for the following sentence.

16. τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν—πάθος τι. The distinction of οὐσία and πάθος is here for the first time clearly marked in Greek philosophy. The clause ὅ τι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὁσιον is exegetical, being merely another way of expressing πάθος, which is comparatively new in this sense: had πάθος been the antecedent to the relative, ὅ and not ὅ τι, would probably have been written.

II B 19. ὅ τι δι' ὃν sc. φιλεῖται οἱ πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ πάθος. ὃν is meant to explain the novel use of οὐσία above.

21. εἴτε ὅτιδ' ἅσχαί "ut illud, ita omnia accidentia (πάθη) in definiendo nullius momenti sunt". Wohlrab.

24. ἀλλ', ὃ Σώκρατες κτλ. The interlude is intended to mark a break in the course of the reasoning, and to prepare us for the fresh start, in which Socrates endeavours to rescue Euthyphro from the ἀπορία into which he is now plunged.

ὥπως σοι εἶπω δ νοῶ. Euthyphro's ἀπορία has not led him to distrust himself: he still feels that he *has* views, and blames Socrates' dialectic for their discomfiture. Contrast Theaet. 148 E ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πείσαι ἐμavτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω, οὐτ' ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει· οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλλειν.

25. περιέρχεται—ἰδρυσόμεθα αὐτό. For προθύμεθα B has προθυμώμεθα, perhaps by reason of ἀλλ' εἰπὲ προθύμως above: see also on ξυμπροθυμησόμεαι in E below. The doctrine is personified, as often in Plato. It is so to speak an adherent of the Heraclitean πάντα ρεῖ: see Theaet. 179 E ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται (sc. οἱ Ἡρακλείτειοι), τὸ δ' ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ

λόγω—ἦτοτον αὐτοῖς ἐνι ἡ τὸ μῆδέν. Here περιέρχεται, as Fritzsche remarks, simply=ambulat, i.q. περιπατεῖ. See on I I C line 38, and 15 B ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς λόγους) ποιεῖν: cf. also Apol. 30 A οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἡ πείθων κτλ.

28. τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου. As the son of a sculptor, Socrates traced his descent to Daedalus, the eponymous hero of artists. So in Alc. I 121 A καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὃ γενναῖε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, εἰς Δαίδαλον. Cf. also Symp. 186 E where Eryximachus the doctor speaks of ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἀσκληπίος. In Meno 97 D ff. Plato compares ἀληθεῖς δόξαι to the works of Daedalus, because just as the latter, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει, so true opinions δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοὶ ἀξιοὶ εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δῆσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. The peculiarity of Daedalus' statues was that they were supposed to move. Eur. Frag. 373 (ed. Dindorf) τὰ Δαιδάλεια πάντα κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖ βλέπειν τ' ἀγάλμαθ'. ὦδ' ἀνὴρ κείνος σοφός. The Scholiast explains the fable by saying that Daedalus was the first to separate the feet and legs of statues: and Overbeck Gesch. der Plastik I 36 (quoted by Schanz) accepts this explanation.

For the separation of Δαιδάλου from προγόνου Schanz compares Euthyd. 271 B καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου οὐ πολὺ τι τὴν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν Κριτοβούλου.

29. τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. Notice that Socrates shifts the I I C responsibility on to Euthyphro. Practically, Socrates calls Euthyphro a Daedalus: his ἐργα are the peripatetic definitions which he has advanced.

30. ἐτιθέμην. τίθεμαι in Plato is more confident and dogmatic than τίθημι: see Dr Postgate in the Journal of Philology (1886), vol. xv pp. 111—119. I think there is here no allusion such as is implied in Fritzsche's note "de statuis simul cogitat". τιθεῖναι ἀγαλμα may be Greek, but τίθεσθαι ἀγαλμα is not.

31. ὥς ἄρα. ἄρα as usual expresses some surprise, genuine or affected: it is especially frequent in this sense "ubi aliquis non suis verbis loquitur" (Fritzsche on Meno 80 E). Cf. Apol. 34 C and note.

κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου συγγένειαν. Professions were frequently hereditary among the Greeks.

τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα="dialectical works of art". For ἐν cf. Rep. VI 487 C ὑπὸ πεττείας αὐ ταύτης τῶς ἐτέρας, οὐκ ἐν

ψήφοις, ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις: and for ἀποδιδράσκει Meno 97 D, quoted on τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου in B above. ἔργα frequently means 'works of art' e.g. Meno 91 D Φειδῖαν τε δε—καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο. The entire imagery of this passage is only an elaboration of the metaphor in Theaet. 203 D καὶ οὕτως ἡμῶν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχέσεται.

33. νῦν δὲ σοὶ γάρ κτλ. For νῦν δέ see on 11 A above: and for γάρ after νῦν cf. on Apol. 38 B νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν. It is usual to punctuate νῦν δέ—σοὶ γάρ, and take νῦν δέ with ἄλλου δὴ: but δὴ ('therefore') is against that punctuation, and neither in νῦν δέ—γάρ nor in ἀλλὰ γάρ (= γ' ἄρα) do the Greeks appear to have been conscious of any ellipse. See on Apol. 19 C, and cf. infra 14 C.

ὑποθέσεις. The word is probably selected in preference to λόγοι because it denotes something of a more material nature and so suits τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα better. Cf. Rep. VI 511 B τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις (i.e. we are to press both parts of the word—ὑπὸ and θέσεις), ὅταν ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς.

34. ἄλλου—σκόμματος: i.e. as *I* am not responsible, you cannot say that *my* ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα shew the traces of my ancestry. Euthyphro replies: a kindred jibe (σχεδὸν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ) is still permissible, for τὰ λεγόμενα are made to move by *you*. σχεδὸν τι is very common in Plato's earlier dialogues, in which σχεδὸν is rarely found: on the other hand in the later writings (Sophistes, Politicus, Timaeus, Philebus, Critias, Laws), σχεδὸν has nearly everywhere replaced σχεδὸν τι: see Ritter's Untersuchungen über Plato p. 58. Note also the accent on σοί: because)(ἐμοί.

37. δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα. Contrast τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα in line 29 above. The omission here of ὑπὸ σοῦ is intended to make Socrates partly responsible for what has been said.

τὸ γὰρ περιέναι τούτοις κτλ. περιέναι not περιέρχεσθαι, though περιέρχεται in 11 B above: see Cobet *Variae Lectiones* pp. 34, 307. Except in the case of ὑπέρχεσθαι in the derived sense of 'fawning on' (Crito 53 E), the parts of ἐρχομαι and its compounds other than the present Indicative are supplied from εἰμι (ἦα, ἔω, ἵοιμι, ἴθι, ἵεναι, ἰών, fut. εἰμι). Notice the close parallel with 11 B: τὸ γὰρ περιέναι=περιέρχεται γάρ: μὴ μένει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ=οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἰδρυσώμεθα αὐτό. τούτοις is wrongly rejected by

Stallbaum: it goes with *ἐπιθείς*, by the usual Platonic hyperbaton, on which see Riddell's *Apology of Plato* p. 236 ff., and Prof. Cook Wilson 'On the Interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus*' p. 97 ff. Schanz remarks that its position is determined by the paronomasia with *τοῦτο*, and quotes the parallel in *Phaedr.* 239 A *τοσοῦτων κακῶν καὶ ἐπιπλείωνων κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκη γιγνομένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐόντων τῶν μὲν ἡδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν*. For the same reason I prefer (with Schanz) the *τούτοις* of B to *αὐτοῖς* in T.

39. *σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ Δαίδαλος*. With *δοκεῖς* understand *ἐπιθεῖναι*: ὁ Δαίδαλος is then in emphatic opposition to *σὺ*: cf. 15 B *ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν*. I think this better than to take ὁ Δαίδαλος as the predicate: the omission of *εἶναι* in such a case would be unusual. There is some derision expressed by placing ὁ Δαίδαλος at the end: see on 3 A above.

40. *ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα κτλ.* Euthyphro clearly regards the II D discussion as purely academic.

42. *ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός*: with a certain mock dignity: nearly = 'the great departed': cf. *Rep.* II 368 A *ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός*. See on *Apol.* 33 E.

43. *ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν κτλ.* For *ὅσῳ* strict logic would require *ὅτι*, since there is no comparative in the relative clause. The idiom is an example of attraction of the relative akin in its nature to Attic attraction. Schanz quotes *Xen. Cyr.* VI 2. 19 *ὅς τοσοῦτῳ Σύρων κακίων ἐγένετο, ὅσῳ Σύροι μὲν μάχῃ νικηθέντες ἐφυγον κτλ.*

44. *πρὸς τοῖς ἑμῶν*. The Platonic Socrates is quite sincere in this: he did not pretend to have solved the universe—he only desired to discover some λόγος less unstable than the principles on which most men regulate their lives. Cf. *Phaedo* II 4 D *τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διυσχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διετέλθῃ, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα—τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν* and *Rep.* VII 517 B *οὐχ ἀμαρτήσῃ τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμείας ἀκούειν· θεὸς δὲ πού οἶδεν, εἰ ἀληθὴς οὕσα τυγχάνει*.

45. *καὶ δῆτα*. This collocation is not very common in Plato: it occurs also in *Protag.* 310 C *καὶ δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν—ὅπό τιος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμεν*. Like *καὶ δὴ καὶ* (see on 2 D above) it directs especial attention to the following clause. *τῆς τέχνης* presently is a partitive genitive depending on *τοῦτο*.

46. *ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός*. For *σοφός* as a nickname of Socrates see above on 2 C. Here the word has the idea of the English

'artist', just as *σοφία*, *σοφίζομαι* etc. are sometimes used in connection with poetry, sculpture and painting. The situation is like that in Theaet. 150 C *ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὑπερ ἥδη πολλοὶ μοι ὠνεΐδισαν*, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσιν κτλ.

II E 48. *ἀκινήτως*. *ἀκινήτους* has inferior authority. Schanz quotes Thuc. VIII 40. 2 *ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βεβαίως ἔδοξε μετὰ τείχευς ἰδρῦσθαι*.

49. *τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα*. *Ταντάλου τάλαντα* was a proverb. Schanz remarks that Plato cites, besides Tantalus, Darius Polycrates Cinyras and Midas as representatives of great wealth. There is intentional paronomasia in *Δαιδάλου—Ταντάλου*.

50. *τρυφᾶν*: said of one who is too high and mighty to condescend to details: so in II D above Euthyphro had said *ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ἔμενεν ἂν ταῦτα οὕτως*. The meaning is clearly fixed by II A infra: *ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾶς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας*. Originally the word seems to have denoted the lethargy consequent on too much good living: see Alc. I 114 A *ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρυφᾶς καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν ἡδέως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσαιτο λόγου*: Rep. II 372 E: and Rep. III 399 E *λελήθαμεν γε διακαθαίροντες ἢ ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν*.

αὐτός σοι ξυμπροθυμῆσομαι δεῖξαι. So the MSS read. I have followed Schanz in bracketing *δεῖξαι*. If *δεῖξαι* is retained, *διδάξης* must be changed into *διδάξαις* with Bekker, Fritzsche and Wohlrab: *ὅπως ἂν κτλ.* will then be a clause of manner, dependent on *δεῖξαι*. But on this view the sense is very cumbrous, viz. 'I will myself help you to shew how you might teach me etc.'. The word *δεῖξαι* might well have been introduced by some scribe who was not familiar with the absolute use of *ξυμπροθυμοῦμαι* and the final use of *ὅπως ἂν*. The reference is directly to Socrates' invitation in II B *ἀλλ' εἰπὲ προθύμως*. Of other alternatives *δείξας* is the most obvious, but this too necessitates *διδάξαις* for *διδάξης*: Madvig's *ῥῆσαι* (Adv. Crit. I p. 367) can hardly be right, since Socrates has now expressly discarded the metaphor (*καὶ τούτων μὲν ἄδην*). As regards the sentiment, it is to be noted that Euthyphro is now reduced to *ἀπορία*: it remains for Socrates to point a way out. (Compare the conversation with Euthydemus in Xen. Mem. IV ch. 2.) Socrates accordingly now takes the initiative: we shall therefore be right in looking for the positive teaching of the Euthyphro mainly in the second half. But just as Euthyphro's

ἀπορία is only half-confessed, so (in accordance with Socrates' usual procedure) the solution to the problem of the dialogue will be but a partial one. See *Intro.* p. xxvi.

53. *δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ δσιον*. *δίκαιον* here has the meaning of 'moral', 'right': see Bonitz *Platonische Studien* pp. 230, 233 and the editor's note on *Crito* 45 C (*ἐτι δὲ οὐδὲ δίκαιον*). Whereas in this passage Plato regards *δσιον* as a part of *δίκαιον*, in the *Protagoras*, *Meno* and *Gorgias* he places *δσιότης* as a substantive virtue on the same platform with *σοφία*, *σωφροσύνη*, *ἀνδρεία* and *δικαιοσύνη*. For a discussion of the bearing of this on the date of the *Euthyphro* see *Introduction* pp. xxxii ff.

57. *τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο*. *τι* goes with *τὸ δέ*: "the other, whatever it is, different". So in *Rep.* I 339 C *οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὁρθῶς τιθέασι, τοὺς δὲ τινας οὐκ ὁρθῶς*. Observe the latent logical process of *διαίρεσις*: in order to hunt out what *τὸ δσιον* is, *δίκαιον* is subdivided into two ideas, one *δσιον*, and the other something unknown. The Sophistes and Politicus shew this mode of logical analysis in its fullest development. See *Intro.* p. xx.

58. *οὐχ ἔπομαι*. *Euthyphro* has already shewn himself incapable of distinguishing between 'All *A* is *B*' and 'All *B* is *A*'. See on ch. VI *ad init.* Compare also 10 A *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες*.

59. *καὶ μὴν—σοφώτερος*. Socrates plays on the literal meaning of *ἔπομαι*: young men should run fast: *νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ μεγάλοι πόννοι* (*Rep.* VII 536 D). But though youth is the season to learn (*τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει* *Theaet.* 146 B), yet youth is far from being *σοφός* (*Rep.* V 475 C): so that *ὅσῳ σοφώτερος* is very sarcastic. *οὐκ ἐλάττω* (for which T has *ἐλαττων*) is equivalent to *τοσοῦτω*, as Schanz remarks.

60. *ὃ λέγω* viz. in 11 E. *λέγω* rather than *ἔλεγον* (*εἶπον*) is generally used in referring to a previous passage of the same dialogue: see on *ὅπερ λέγω* in *Apol.* 21 A.

ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. Socrates aspired to the belief that wisdom is the only true wealth: see the prayer to Pan in *Phaedr.* 279 C *πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν*. The same view afterwards became a commonplace among the Stoics.

61. *ὃ μακάριε*: see on *ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες* in *Crito* 44 B.

62. *οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν*. *οὐδέ* (for which Naber would read *οὐδέν*) presents no difficulty: the idiom is exactly like the English 'for

neither is it difficult' etc. Schanz quotes Legg. II 673 C ποιητέον· οὐδὲ γὰρ πάνυ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν.

Λέγω γάρ. An exercise follows in the conversion of propositions exactly as in Alcib. II 139 E. Here the example is not selected at random, though strictly speaking it is no more than an example: as Fritzsche remarks (p. 147 of his edition) "aptissime in quaestione de pietate instituta etiam de verecundia disputatur", for δέος and αἰδώς are parts of δσιότης. The principle of selecting an example which shall itself involve a useful lesson is akin to this, and is recognised in modern works on Education e.g. Bain's Education as a Science p. 292. αἰδώς as good shame is reverence, a proper sentiment to feel towards gods (Legg. XI 920 E θεοὺς προγόνους αὐτῶν αἰδουμένους), and something akin to δσιότης: it is used also like αἰσχύνεσθαι in connection with evil objects, as in the oracle quoted in Rep. VIII 566 C οὐδ' αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι. Both meanings are recognised in the sequel. Here the word is best translated by 'shame' throughout.

63. ὁ ποιητής—ποιήσας. According to the Scholiast, the verses are from the Cyprian poems, which dealt with the events prior to the Iliad, of unknown authorship but probably hailing from Cyprus, whence the name. Herodotus refuses to ascribe the poems to Homer—οὐκ Ὀμήρου τὰ Κύπρια ἐπεὶ ἐστὶ ἄλλ' ἄλλου τινός, says he (II 117): and in Athenaeus XV 682 E (where several verses are quoted) Hegesias and Stasinus are mentioned as authors to whom the poems had been assigned. Perhaps Plato indicates his sense of the doubtful authorship in the words ὁ ποιητής, like Plutarch (περὶ ἀοργησίας ch. 11. 459 D): οὐ γάρ, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς εἶπεν, ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς.

64. Ζήνα δὲ—αἰδώς. These two lines involve considerable difficulties, both of language and of meaning.

The accepted reading is θ' ἐρξαντα (so the second hand in B): but B has θέρξαντα, and T στέρξαντα: while Stobaeus Florileg. 31. 18 reads βέξαντα. If we suppose that βέξαντα or θ' ἐρξαντα is right (ἐρξας was used for ἐρξας=δράσας, if we may believe the Scholiast on Ar. Ach. 329), two difficulties arise. First, ἐρξαντα is harsh if used intransitively and should in that case be ἐρδοντα (compare the word ἐρξίης in Hdt. VI 98, as a translation of the Persian Darius), nor is it less harsh to supply τάδε πάντα as object, not to speak of the tautology involved in ἐρξαντα and ἐφύτευσεν: such tautology is however not uncommon in verses of an Orphic character. Second, do

τόν θ' ἐρξαντα and καὶ ὅς—ἐφύτευσεν both refer to Zeus? At first sight this appears to contradict the well-known idiom by which an anaphoric pronoun replaces the relative after καὶ if a relative with the same antecedent precedes (see on Apol. 40 A and supra 6 C): but on the other hand τὸν θ' ἐρξαντα is not quite the same as ὅς τ' ἔρξε: and on the ground of meaning it seems obvious that both clauses are descriptive of Zeus. Perhaps ὅς still retains something of its original anaphoric use.

Zeus is here conceived of as the creator, as so often in the Orphic hymns e.g. Hymn. xv 3—5 (ed. Abel) ὦ βασιλεῦ, διὰ σὴν κεφαλὴν ἐφάνη τάδε βεῖα, γαῖα θεὰ μήτηρ ὀρέων θ' ὑψηλές δ' ἄλχοι καὶ πόντος καὶ πάνθ', ὅπως οὐρανόσ ἐντός ἐέργει. There is probably a veiled allusion to some such derivation of Ζῆνα as is alluded to in Crat. 396 A—B οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ζῆνα, οἱ δὲ Δία καλοῦσι. συντιθέμενα δ' εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃ δὴ προσήκειν φάμεν ὀνόματι ὧν τε εἶναι ἀπεργάζεσθαι (cf. τὸν θ' ἐρξαντα). οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αἷτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων. συμβαίνει οὖν ὁρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὗτος ὁ θεὸς εἶναι, δι' ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει: see also Stobaeus Eclog. Phys. 2. 24—26, 86 et al.: and cf. Aesch. Suppl. 584—585 φυσίζοον γένος, τὸ δὴ Ζηνός ἐστιν ἀληθῶς. The feeling that the Highest should be unnamed meets us not rarely in Greek literature e.g. Eur. Troad. 885—6 ὅστις ποτ' εἰ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι, Ζεὺς (where see Paley). So in Plato Crat. 400 E and Phileb. 12 C: τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος—ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνη φίλον, ταύτῃ προσαγορεύω. The last passage is thus appropriated by Origen adv. Cels. iv 80—81 (ed. Migne) ἀλλὰ καθαρὰν εὐσέβειαν εἰς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀσκούντες οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος χραίνομεν τὰ θεῖα, ἀποδεχόμενοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος τὸν ἐν Φιλήβῳ λόγον—τὸ γὰρ ἐμὸν δέος κτλ. It is in the same spirit that Plato makes Socrates shrink from describing the Idea of Good otherwise than by a simile in Rep. vi 506 D—E ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριοι, αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὰγαθὸν ἐδάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι—ὅς δὲ ἐκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ λέγειν ἐθέλω: with which compare the impressive words of the Timaeus (28 C) τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.

Throughout this note I have assumed the correctness of θ' ἐρξαντα, the reading of b: but I incline to think that θ' ἔρξαντα is a

corruption of *θρέψαντα*—Zeus being conceived of as the sustainer and creator of all that is. The *ὑστερον πρότερον* would then be like Homer's well-known *ὁμοῦ τράφεν ἡδὲ γέγοντο* e.g. in *Od. IV 723*, where see Ameis.

- 12 B 65. *ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς*. Fritzsche points out that the same sentiment occurs in Epicharmus (Schol. on Soph. *Ajax* 1074) *καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος· ἐνθα δέος, ἐνταῦθα καὶ αἰδώς*. So also in Plut. Cleom. 9. 2 *καλῶς ὁ εἰπών· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς*, and *περὶ ἀοργησίας* Ch. 11. (quoted above on line 63). Plato's point is that *δέος* (metus) is a wider term than *αἰδώς* (pudor), which is only *one* kind of *δέος*.

68. *οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι. εἶναι* = 'to be true', and *ἵνα δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς* is virtually a quotation. So presently in *ἀλλ' ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι*. This is much better, because more emphatic, than to regard *εἶναι* as merely the copula.

71. *αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μὴδέν*. For *μὴδέν*, *οὐδέν* would be more regular after *δοκοῦσι*: *μὴδέν* is however a more emphatic negative: see on 6 B above.

74. *ἀλλ' ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι*. The Christian parallel (with a characteristic difference) is 'Perfect love casteth out fear'. On *εἶναι* see last note but one.

75. *αἰδούμενος—δέδουκεν*. Plato's choice of words is very characteristic here. Wishing to prove that *αἰδώς* implies *δέος*, he passes from the one notion to the other through a series of middle terms, of which the later in each case involves more notion of *δέος* than the earlier. Thus in *αἰδώς* fear is less prominent than in *αλοχύνεσθαι*, in *αλοχύνεσθαι* than in *φοβεῖσθαι*: and *φοβεῖσθαι* (timere), in which the physical agitation due to *present* danger (*ἡ παρῶν κινδύνος*, says Ammonius) is the leading idea, forms the natural transition to *δεδιέναι* (metus, *ὑπόνοια κακοῦ*): see Prodicus' perfectly just distinction between *δέος* and *φόβος* in Prot. 358 D and for other examples of this quasi-sorites in Plato see on Crito 47 B *τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαλοῦντι. πεφόβηται* as present of the state should be noticed.

- 12 C 77. *δέδουκε μὲν οὖν*. *μὲν οὖν* is corrective, as usual: see on Apol. 26 B. Plato of course writes *δέδουκε* rather than *πεφόβηται* or both because the point is to shew that *αἰδώς* involves *δέος*, not *φόβος*.

79. *οὐ μέντοι—γε*: stronger than *δέ* after *μὲν*. *γε* is regularly separated from *μέντοι* by a word.

80. *ἐπὶ πλεόν*: in logical terminology, *δέος* has more *extension*

and less *intension* than *αἰδώς*. Schanz puts the reasoning well thus: the higher idea (*a*) is the one which is poorer in essential marks, the lower is the one which is richer in these ($a+x$): consequently, the higher idea (*a*) is present where the lower ($a+x$) is, but not *vice versa*. For the phraseology cf. Euthyd. 290 B οὐδεμία—τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλεον ἐστὶν ἢ ὅσον θηρεύσαι κτλ. Notice the purely logical sense of *μόριον* and *μέρος* throughout this passage. It is important to bear this sense of *μέρος* in mind when Plato speaks of 'parts' of soul.

86. καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων. ἐκεῖ refers to 11 E—12 A. τὸ τοιοῦτον of course depends on λέγων (meaning).

CHAPTER XIV.

Euthyphro now understands the logical difficulty just cleared up: and Socrates, with a view to reaching a definition of *δσιον*, asks 'what sort of a part of *δίκαιον* it is'. The reply is—that part which is concerned with care for the gods.

3. τὸ ποῖον μέρος. "Articulus ubi pronomnibus interrogativis 12 D additur, semper refertur ad aliquid, quod praecessit". Hermann, quoted by Fritzsche. In Ar. Ran. 1227—1229 there is a case of the violation of this rule: ὦ δαιμόνι' ἀνδρῶν, ἀποπρίω τὴν λήκυθον, ἵνα μὴ διακναίσῃ τοὺς προλόγους ἡμῶν; ETP. τὸ τί; ἐγὼ πρίωμαι τῷδε; This particular passage is probably corrupt: but Hermann's rule is by no means without exceptions e.g. Rep. v 469 B and x 595 A.

5. ἡρώτας τι—εἶπον ἄν. τι as internal accusative. With ἐρωτᾶν this acc. is for the most part confined to neuter pronouns: yet Crat. 407 C τὸν Ἀρη ἐρώτα (ask about Ares). εἶπον is probably preferred to the more regular ελεγον as more decisive and instantaneous. Schanz quotes Symp. 199 D ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα ἡρώτων, —εἶπες ἄν κτλ. So also in Soph. Ant. 755 εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ' εἶπον ἄν σ' οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν.

6. οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός i.e. ὁ ἀρτιος.

7. σκαληνός—ισοσκελής. Greek arithmetic was largely geometrical: see the well known passage in the Theaetetus 147 D—148 B. An even number is of course called isosceles as being divisible by 2. So the Scholiast explains the passage.

11. ὁσιὼν ἐστίν. Hirschig would read (against the MSS) τὸ 12 E

δσιον, as in D above: but cf. *infra* in Euthyphro's reply *εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ δσιον*. It is indifferent whether *δσιον* or *τὸ δσιον* is written, since *δσιον* is to be no mere predicate of, but absolutely identical with, the part of *δικαίον* sought for.

13. *μαμαθηκότας*. It is implied as usual that to learn piety is to be pious.

15. *τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ.* This is the fourth definition given by Euthyphro. In harmony with the fact that it is led up to by Socrates, rather than by Euthyphro, we find it in other dialogues of Plato, e.g. *Gorg.* 507 A—B *καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς δσια. τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ δσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ δσιον εἶναι; ἔστι ταῦτα.* Cf. Zeno in *Diog. Laert.* VII 119 *εἶναι τε τῇ εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμῃ θεῶν θεραπείας*: the same definition is also given by *Sext. Emp. Adv. Math.* IX 123. See also *Introduct.* p. xiii.

CHAPTER XV.

This and the following chapters are concerned with the definition now reached. First, Socrates raises the question as to what *θεραπεία* means. In the present chapter he proves that it cannot be a care having for its object the benefit of the gods: and Euthyphro explains it as service like that of slaves to their masters.

1. *καὶ καλῶς γε*. There is no sarcasm here: for this definition (in Plato's view) conceals at least if it does not reveal the truth: see 13 E.

13 A 2. *σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἰμι*. Schanz aptly quotes *Prot.* 329 B *νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἰ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε*.

6. *λέγομεν γάρ που*. Plato begins as if he would state the difference between *θεραπεία* of gods and that of other objects in general terms: instead of which he breaks off and takes special examples. *οἶον* is similarly used in *οἶον τοῖονδε* below (13 B).

7. *ἵππους—ἵππικός*. The order is for emphasis. The analogies are quite in Socrates' style: see *Xen. Mem.* I 2. 37 where Critias says: *ἀλλὰ τῶνδ' ἐγὼ σε ἀπέχεσθαι δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκῶν κτλ. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων τούτοις, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων;*

13. *κυνηγετικός* = *κυνῶν θεραπευτικός*, for *ἀγω* often means to educate or train.

22. *ταῦτόν διαπράττεται*: for *ταῦτόν* see above on 10 E.

13 B

24. *οἱ ἱπποὶ—βελτίους γίνονται*. See Gorg. 516 A: *δῶν γούν ἂν ἐπιμελητῆς καὶ ἱππῶν καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιούντας δι' ἀγριότητα*. It is for this reason that Plato censures Athenian statesmen, Miltiades, Cimon, Themistocles and Pericles: see Gorg. 515 C ff., Meno 93 B ff., Prot. 319 E ff.

30. *ὡσαύτως* is now written by Schanz *ὡς αὐτως*, on the ground 13 C that Plato's *ὡς δ' αὐτως* shews that the two parts of the word were still felt to be distinct.

ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ κτλ. Is this the only alternative? Could they not remain *in statu quo*? See above on *θεομῶσι* in 7 A.

37. *ξυγχωρήσαις*. This older form of opt. Aor. is frequent in Plato.

38. *βελτίω—ἀπεργάζει*. *βελτίω* is primarily not of character, but of condition (prosperity and the like): but in the Greek view character is improved by improved circumstances: see above on 3 A *κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν*. The absurdity here consists in supposing that the gods are not already in the best condition possible.

43. *οὐχ ἡγούμενος* explains *τούτου δὲ ἕνεκα*.

13 D

46. *εἰεν* was pronounced *εἰέν*, with intervocalic aspiration. The particle (which is perhaps connected with *εἰα*) serves to dismiss one point and introduce another. See on Crito 47 B.

48. *ἦπερ—οἱ δούλοι*. For *ἦπερ* of B, T has *ἦνπερ*, and so Schanz reads. Fischer quotes Xen. Hell. II 3. 14 *ἐθεράπευον πάσῃ θεραπείᾳ*. The idea that man is a *δούλος* of the gods was tolerably common among the Greeks. Plato Legg. v 726 A *μετὰ θεοὺς ὄντας δεσπότας*: and especially Phaedo 62 B foll., where man is said to be *ἐν τῶν κτημάτων* (here = 'slaves') *τοῖς θεοῖς*: cf. *ibid.* D *ἀνὸς μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου* κτλ., Rep. x 590 C—D, and Legg. x 902 B: also Phaedr. 265 C *τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην* Ἔρωτα. So in Soph. Frag. 480 *Ἥλιε δέσποτα*: Eur. Hipp. 88 *ἀναξ, θεοὺς γὰρ δεσπότας καλεῖν χρεῶν*: Xen. Anab. III 2. 13 *οὐδένα γὰρ ἄνθρωπον δεσπότην, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς προσκυνεῖτε*. Socrates ever looked upon himself as Apollo's slave; see Apol. 30 A *ἐγὼ ὁλομαι οὐδὲν πῶ ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν*. Compare Introd. p. xiv ff.

50. ὑπηρετικῇ—θεοῖς. So Charm. 158 C ἐξάρνῃ εἶναι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα: see on τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστῆς in Apol. 18 B.

CHAPTER XVI.

Socrates now asks—what does this service seek to produce? Euthyphro is unable to reply, and the problem remains unsolved. Presently he declares (Def. 5) that holiness consists in saying and doing what is pleasing to the gods in prayer and sacrifice.

The key to the positive teaching of the Euthyphro lies in the unsolved question propounded in this chapter: see Introd. pp. xii ff.

1. ἡ ἱατροῖς ὑπηρετικῇ sc. *θεραπεία*. The word *θεραπεία* is however not expressed, because its usual meaning is care which has for its aim the good of the object: and this meaning has just been excluded. The use of drugs and the like is meant.

13 E 6. ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικῇ: viz. the *ὄργανα* of their craft.

12. ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικῇ κτλ. The possibility of piety being an *ἐνέργεια* without producing any *ἔργον* is not entertained.

14. τὰ γε θεία κάλλιστα γε. So B: T omits the second γε. Schanz quotes Rep. III 389 D εἰν γε, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα τέληται. For κάλλιστα ἀνθρώπων cf. Legg. I 636 E τὰ δ' ἐν Σπάρτῃ κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων δοκεῖ μοι κείσθαι: Theaet. 148 B ἀριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων.

17. εἰκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον. Socrates asks the τί: Euthyphro in his reply gives the ποῖον. Compare Meno 86 D—E and Gorg. 448 E. In πάγκαλον Socrates gives a slight hint as to the nature of the reply which he desired: see Bonitz Platonische Studien p. 238 note 7. The answer to the question is thus supplied by Bonitz (p. 234) from hints in the Euthyphro and other dialogues: "Piety is nothing but perfect morality, only in such a form that man is conscious of being thus the organ by which God works his will": see Introd. p. xv.

18. ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις: we are as it were the body of rowers, God the pilot: cf. Symp. 186 E ἡ τε οὖν ἱατρικῇ—διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου κυβερνᾶται κτλ. Heraclitus Frag. XIX (ed. Bywater) ἐν τῷ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην ἢ κυβερνᾶται πάντα διὰ πάντων. With the general sentiment compare Isocrates 5. 150 οἶμαι δέ σ' οὐκ ἀγνοεῖν ὃν τρόπον οἱ θεοὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διοικοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ αὐτόχειρες οὔτε τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε τῶν κακῶν γίγνονται τῶν συμβαινόντων

αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐκάστοις τοιαύτην ἐννοίαν ἐμποιοῦσιν, ὥστε δι' ἀλλήλων ἡμῶν ἐκάτερα παραγίγνεσθαι τούτων.

22. τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν. Schanz now inserts τῆς ἀπεργασίας 14 A before αὐτῶν: formerly he rejected τῆς ἀπεργασίας in the second passage below. The effect of αὐτῶν is to identify the generals with their profession: cf. τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι (Apol. 17 B). Contrast αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπεργασίας below: where αὐτῶν of course depends on ἀπεργασίας in spite of the hyperbaton, and has for its antecedent, not πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, but γεωργοί.

29. τί δὲ δὴ κτλ. The usual punctuation places the mark of interrogation after τί δὲ δὴ: but this seems to involve a confusion of thinking, unless τῆς ἐργασίας is regarded as merely exegetical, which is very awkward. (Engelhardt's note can hardly be right: "duo genitivi τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν et τῆς ἐργασίας eodem modo a κεφάλαιον pendent. Eadem grata (?) negligentia Wolfius: multorum et pulchrorum, quae dii efficiunt, quatenus summa est effectiois huius?") Taking ἐργασίας with πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, we get a wrong meaning. The meaning required is not 'what is the κεφάλαιον of the ἐργασία of the πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ?', but either, 'what is the κεφάλαιον of the πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ?' or 'what is the κεφάλαιον of the ἐργασία?' With the punctuation which I have adopted, the idiom is like Rep. v 470 A τί δὲ γῆς τε τμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ οἰκίων ἐμπρήσεως; ποῶν τί σοι δράσουσιν οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους; where see Stallbaum's note.

30. τῆς ἐργασίας is said rather than ἀπεργασίας, on account of the preceding ἀπεργάζονται: ἀπεργασία would moreover require an object, whereas ἐργασία is regularly used as equivalent to 'business' or 'trade': see also on ἐμπορικῇ in 14 E. Similar cases where a preposition is dropped are Phaed. 104 D ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φάμεν, ἢ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ, ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτε ἂν ἔλθοι—εἰργάζετο δὲ γε ἢ περιττῇ; Euthyd. 281 C οὐκ ἐλάττω πράττων ἐλάττω ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι, ἐλάττω δὲ ἀμαρτάνων ἦττον ἂν κακῶς πράττοι (Schanz). So Eur. Bacchae 1065 κατῆγεν, ἦγεν, ἦγεν ἐς μέλαν πέδον.

31. καὶ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον. The reference is to 9 B. After καὶ ὀλίγον we should expect καὶ νῦν ταῦτά λέγω or the like: in place of which Euthyphro substitutes a sentence intended to contain his last deliverance on the subject of piety. ἀπλῶς presently is 'simply', 'without qualification'.

34. εἰδὼν μὲν—τὰ ὅσια. This is strictly speaking no entirely new 14 B

definition (though laid down by Euthyphro as such), but an amplification of the definition given in 12 E (ὅσιον is τὸ περὶ τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν): see also note on τίς αὐτῇ ἡ ὑπηρεσία in 14 D. The special sense of *θεραπεία* is now said to be saying and doing what is acceptable to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, i.e. the formal aspect of religion is now insisted on, while at the same time, as Socrates proceeds to shew, there is a reminiscence of the definition already refuted viz. that Piety is τὸ θεοφιλές (6 E). Euthyphro (as a μάντις) takes the purely sacerdotal view of religion: cf. Cic. N. D. I 116 'sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum'. The conception of εὐσέβεια as a proper recognition of ἡ περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία (Symp. 188 C)—originally a strictly legal, almost mercantile relation—is well brought out in Politic. 290 C: καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἱερέων αὐτῶν γένος—παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δωρεὰς θεοῖς διὰ θυσιῶν ἐπιστήμῳ ἐστὶ κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις δωρεῖσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν εὐχαῖς κτήσιν ἀγαθῶν αἰτήσασθαι. See Introd. p. xxi. It should be noted that κεχαρισμένον is regularly used of what finds favour with the gods e.g. Arist. Pax 386 κεχαρισμένον χοιρίδιον: Hdt. I 87 εἰ τι οἱ κεχαρισμένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐδωρήθη: Xen. Hipparch. I 1 θύοντα χρητὰ αἰτεῖσθαι θεοὺς ταῦτα διδόναι, καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν, ἀπ' ὧν θεοῖς μὲν κεχαρισμένώτατα ἀρξείας ἄν κτλ.: Anacreon 2. 7 σὺ δ' εὐμενῆς ἔλθ' ἡμῖν κεχαρισμένης δ' εὐχολῆς ἐπακούειν.

36. καὶ σφίξει κτλ. Wohlrab formerly found in this sentence the most important positive result of the dialogue (see the Einleitung to his edition of 1880, pp. 8 ff.): this can hardly be correct however, for Socrates clearly implies in the immediate sequel (καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦσθα, ἀπετράπου) that Euthyphro has shirked answering the vital question, viz. that in 13 E. See Introd. p. xiii. Observe that Euthyphro looks on religion as essential to the existence of a state: see on 5 E above.

CHAPTER XVII.

The statement of Euthyphro is now examined, with a view to elicit its meaning: and it is reduced to the form 'Piety is the ἐπιστήμη αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς'.

1. ἡ πᾶλύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων. Prepositions are frequently inserted between an adjective and the adverb going with it: e.g.

Euthyd. 305 C πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς and Symp. 192 C οὕτως ἐπὶ μεγάλης σπουδῆς: see on Apol. 36 A.

3. *ἡρώτων*: the reference is doubtless to 14 A τί δὲ δὴ κτλ., but 14 C it should be noticed that Euthyphro's answer is not so much a reply to that question as a fresh deliverance on the subject of piety.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμος: so in 12 A ἀλλ', ὁ λέγω, τρυφᾷς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας.

4. *δῆλος εἰ*: a colloquial idiom, used in this paratactic way: Ar. Av. 1407 καταγελάς μου, δῆλος εἰ.

5. *ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦσθα*: viz. in 13 E. For *ἐπ' αὐτῷ* in this sense ('at the point') Schanz compares Phileb. 18 D ἡ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γε ἦδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φῆς, πάλαι.

δ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω. The precise force of ἀποκρίνεσθαι here is 'state in your answer': cf. the use of *ἐρωτᾶν* commented on above in 12 D.

6. *ἱκανῶς*: so B: T has *ἴσως*. We have here as clear a statement as is possible of the importance which Plato meant to attach to the question in 13 E. See Introd. p. xiii.

7. *ἐμεμαθήκη*: so the second hand in B: *ἐμεμαθήκειν* has inferior MS authority. Pluperfects in *-ειν* are not found in the best Attic: see on Apol. 22 C (ξυνῆδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ).

νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γάρ: see on 11 C νῦν δὲ σαί γάρ κτλ.

τὸν ἐρώonta τῷ ἐρωμένῳ. So B: T has τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ. Fritzsche and Wohlrab rightly retain the more difficult reading, which Schanz changes to τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωτῶμένῳ. There is a similar confusion of ἐρώμενος and ἐρωτῶμενος in the Erastae 132 D, and of ἐρώντος and ἐρωτῶντος in Rep. IV 437 C. Socrates frequently uses the language of the tender passion in talking with a younger disputant: compare (with Wohlrab) 14 D infra ἐπιθυμητῆς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ: and see Alcibiades in Symp. 216 D.

8. ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπῃ ἀν' ἐκείνος ὑπάγῃ. So in Rep. III 394 D ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ, ταύτη ἰτέον. The preposition in ὑπάγω denotes the gradual leading on from step to step: a good instance is quoted by L. and S. from Arist. H. An. IX 8. 613^b 30 ἐὰν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου ὀφθῇ (sc. ἡ πέρδιξ)—ἀπὸ τῶν ψῶν ὑπάγει, πρὸ ποδῶν φαινομένη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἕως ἀν' ἀπαγάγῃ.

10. ἐπιστήμην τινὰ κτλ. Note that in this short form of Euthyphro's definition there is nothing to represent the clause καὶ σῴζει τὰ τοιαῦτα κτλ. (14 B). A clause so unimportant cannot therefore be regarded as the corner-stone of the dialogue: see

Introd. p. xiv: and for the place of this definition in Greek religious thought *ibid.* p. xxi.

12. τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαι. Cf. Eur. Med. 964 πείθειν δῶρα καὶ θεοὺς λόγος. Hom. Iliad IX 492 ff. στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί—καὶ μὲν τοὺς θύεσσι καὶ εὐχολῆς ἀγανῆσιν λαιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρῶπῳ ἄνθρωποι λισσόμενοι κτλ. See Introd. p. xxi.

13. εὐχεσθαι αἰτεῖν. Fritzsche quotes Legg. VII 801 A εὐχαὶ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτήσεις εἰσὶ.

14 D 15. αἰτήσεως sc. παρὰ θεῶν. Compare Xen. Hell. I 3. 9 ὅρκους ἔδοσαν (sc. Φαρναβάξῳ) καὶ ἔλαβον παρὰ Φαρναβάξου (Stallbaum). For δόσεως θεοῖς see note on Apol. 30 D δόσιν ὕμῳ.

19. ἐπιθυμητής has much the same sense as ἐραστής, see on τὸν ἐρώντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ in 14 C and cf. Legg. I 643 E ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον.

20. οὐ χαμὰι πεσέται. A proverbial expression ἐπὶ τῶν διακενῆς οὐδὲν λεγόντων, ἀλλ' ἐπιτυγχανόντων, says the Scholiast. Fritzsche well compares Ar. Vesp. 1012 τὰ μέλλοντ' εὖ λέγεσθαι μὴ πέση φαύλως χαμᾶς' εὐλαβεῖσθε, and Pindar's χαμαιπετέες δ' ἄρ' ἔπος οὐκ ἀπέριψεν (Pyth. VI 37).

21. τίς αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία. The word ὑπηρεσία clearly shews that Socrates looks on the answer of Euthyphro in 14 B as no new definition, but an attempt to explain more precisely the meaning of ὑπηρετικὴ θεραπεία in 13 D.

22. αὐτοὺς—ἐκείνους. Both pronouns refer to the gods: Fritzsche compares Prot. 310 D ἂν αὐτῷ διδῶς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθῃς ἐκείνον.

CHAPTER XVIII.

The present chapter reduces Euthyphro's theory to the statement already canvassed and rejected, viz. that *δσιον* is τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

1. τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν: as ὁ ἐπιστήμων τοῦ αἰτεῖν will: piety is herewith virtually declared to be a kind of ἐπιστήμη. With the introduction of ὀρθῶς here compare Alcib. I 128 B τί δέ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ; ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελείσθαι καλεῖς τι ὁτιοῦν πρόγματος;

4. 'ἀλλὰ τί; i.e. why, what should it be? what else?' i.q. τί μὴν; which Plato uses regularly in his later dialogues: see Ritter's Untersuchungen über Plato (1888) p. 57.

5. *τυγχάνουσιν δεόμενοι*. There is the same ambiguity in 14 E *δεόμενοι* as in the English 'wanting'.

7. *τεχνικόν γ' ἂν εἴη*. Piety being *ex hypothesi* an *ἐπιστήμη*, the conduct of the pious man will be *τεχνικόν*. Stallbaum is hardly right: "*Pietas* 13 D *vocata est ὑπηρετικὴ θεοῖς* (int. *τέχνη*)": see my note on the passage. Cobet would omit *διδόντα*, but *δωροφορεῖν* is used absolutely as if 'throw one's gifts away': cf. *Phaedr.* 166 C of *ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῦσιν ἐθέλωσιν*—where the *βασιλῆς* are the Sophists.

10. *ἐμπορικῇ*. Wohlrab aptly quotes *Symp.* 188 B *καὶ θυσίαι πᾶσαι καὶ οἱς μαντικὴ ἐπιστατεῖ—ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία*. The way has already been prepared for this view of religion in the use of *ἐργασία* (which suggests 'trade', 'merchandise') in 14 A above. See also *Introd.* p. xxi.

12. *εἰ οὕτως ἤδιον*. *Euthyphro* insinuates that Socrates is using an invidious word.

16. *ἃ μὲν—δῆλον*. *ἃ* here virtually=*ἄττα* the indirect interrogative: it is so used sometimes in dependent interrogative sentences. So *ὅσος* is used for *ὁπόσος*, and *ὅλος* for *ὁποῖος*: see *Gorg.* 451 B, where Thompson quotes *Soph. O. R.* 1271 *ὁθούνεκ' οὐκ ὀφεινόντιν οὐθ' οἱ' ἐπασχεν οὐθ' ὁποῖ' ἐδρα κακά*. Kühner *Ausf. Gramm.* II p. 742 takes a somewhat different view, regarding *ὅς* in such cases as equivalent to *ὅλος* and denying that *ὅς* is ever used for *ὅστις*.

οὐδὲν γὰρ—δῶσιν. For Socrates' views on Providence see *Mem.* IV 3. 3 ff. *εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἥδη ποτὲ σοι ἐπῆλθεν ἐνθυμηθῆναι, ὡς ἐπιμελῶς οἱ θεοί, ὧν οἱ ἄνθρωποι δέονται, κατεσκευάασι; cf. Rep.* II 379 C *οὐδ' ἄρα—ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἷτιος—ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἷτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναἷτιος· πολλὸν γὰρ ἐλάττω ἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν*: see *Introd.* p. xv. The Scholiast on this passage (as Cobet points out in *Mnemosyne N. S.* II 88) was acquainted with St James's Epistle. His comment is *συνψδὸν τῷ· πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἐξ ἧς*. The passage is in St James i 17: *πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δῶρημα τέλειον ἀνωθεν ἐστίν, καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φῶτων*.

24. *ἀλλὰ τί—θεοῖς*; i.e. if not, what can these gifts be etc.? *ἀλλά* has the same force as in *ἀλλὰ τί* in D above. *τί* shews that Socrates wishes a general description by way of answer: *Euthyphro* replies with an enumeration of details, much as in his first attempt at a definition (5 D above). For the syntax Engelhardt compares *Phaed.* 58 C *τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα*;

27. ἄρτι λεγόν: viz. in 14 B. The words *τιμή, γέρας, χάρις* (and its derivatives *χαριστήρια, χαριτήσια* etc.) are of frequent occurrence in connection with Greek religion. *χάρις* prepares the way for *κεχαρισμένον* as *gratiae* might for *gratum*.

15 B 29. οὐχὶ ὠφελιμον οὐδὲ φίλον. τὸ ὠφελιμον is naturally also φίλον. The justification for adding τὸ φίλον is of course the desire to make Euthyphro confess that his present definition is identical with the earlier one in 6 E.

31. τοῦτο ἄρ' ἐστὶν αὖ. τοῦτο refers forward to τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον: αὖ back to 6 E.

CHAPTER XIX.

Socrates now retaliates on Euthyphro. "You who call me a Daedalus, yourself out-Daedalus Daedalus: for τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον is simply *θεοφιλές*".

1. ἐὰν σοί. I have accented σοί, because it is emphatically opposed to *καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει*.

3. αἰτιάσει: as in 11 C. τὸν Δαίδαλον alludes in particular to 11 C above, ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ Δαίδαλος: it is therefore virtually a quotation. The passage would be much less forcible if the words were expunged, as Schanz suggests. Liebhold's proposal, *τρόπον Δαιδάλου*, is ingenious, but quite unnecessary.

5. καὶ κύκλῳ περιόντας. So T: the second hand in B has *περιόντας*: B has *περιόντα*. καὶ is explanatory; there is no need to bracket the word, as Schanz suggests. For *περιόντας* Schanz reads *περιόντας*: but in 11 C above *περιέναι* (with the MSS). The forms *περιών* etc. are found occasionally in the MSS of Plato: but I cannot believe that Plato would have written both *περιέναι* and *περιόντας* within the compass of a single short dialogue. See on the subject of *περιών* in Greek manuscripts Naber in *Mnemosyne* N. S. v 417. κύκλῳ is by no means otiose here: since *περιέναι* may mean simply 'to move about' (as above in 11 C): Euthyphro is a greater artist than Daedalus, because he communicates to his λόγῳ a special sort of motion viz. circular: Daedalus' statues merely walked about. With the whole passage cf. Euthyd. 291 C—D ὥσπερ εἰς λαβύρινθον ἐμπεσόντες, οἴμενοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περικάμψαντες πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ζητήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες καὶ τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι, ὅσῳ περ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐζητοῦμεν.

7. ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν: the reading of T: B has ἐμπροσθεν. Schanz 15 C remarks that there is a tendency in Platonic MSS to write ἐμπροσθεν for πρόσθεν. The reference is to 10 E ff.

8. ταῦτόν: see above on 10 E.

12. ἄλλο τι ἤ: see on Apol. 24 C. If we regard the phrase as already a stereotyped particle of interrogation, the ἤ οὐ; following will present no difficulty: but in any case ἤ οὐ is otiose: and the fuller form ἄλλο τι ἤ is rarely used without some hint of its origin = ecquid aliud quam? Hermann reads οὐκ ἄλλο against the MSS and places a colon after γίγνεται. On the whole I prefer Schanz's view, with which Wohlrab agrees. ἄλλο τι ἤ is taken by them as equivalent to German *nicht wahr*, used parenthetically in the sense of 'I suppose', without a distinctly interrogative sense. I know no other case of such a use. γίγνεται is 'comes to be' 'is found to be': cf. (with Schanz) Euthyd. 298 E οὐκοῦν πατήρ ὢν σὸς ἐστίν, ὥστε σὸς πατήρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός;

15. ἄρτι: viz. in 10 E where the identity of δσιον and θεοφιλές was finally disallowed. For τιθέμεθα see above on 11 C.

CHAPTER XX.

In this concluding chapter Socrates complains of Euthyphro's wilful reticence.

3. ἐκὼν εἶναι: is used by Plato only in negative sentences: see 15 D on Apol. 37 A.

4. προσέχων—νῦν. ὃ τι μάλιστα is to be taken with προσέχων, νῦν with εἰπέ.

7. ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς: Hom. Od. iv 382 ff. Virg. Georg. iv 437 ff. Proteus is with Plato a figure for shiftiness and fertility of resource e.g. Io 541 E ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς παντοδαπὸς γίγναι στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω: Euthyd. 288 B ἀλλὰ τὸν Πρωτέα μιμῆσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς. ἡμεῖς οὖν τὸν Μενέλαον μιμῶμεθα καὶ μὴ ἀφιώμεθα τοῖν ἀνδροῖν κτλ.

8. ἥδυσθα: the only correct form in Plato: see on Apol. 22 C. Here B has ἡδυσθα, T εἰδυσθα.

10. ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἀνδρα πρεσβύτην. ἀνὴρ is frequently added thus to words which denote one's nationality, standing, condition and the like, as in ἀνὴρ μάντις, ἀνὴρ νομεύς (Sophocles), ἀνδρες δικασταί etc.

δικάθειν. Cobet Var. Lect. p. 390 (cf. Mnemosyne N. S.

III 281) would write *διωκαθεῖν*; "aoristos in -*αθεῖν* productos ubique in -*άθειν* depravarunt, ut multi hodieque opinentur, Graeca esse *διωκάθειν*, *ἀμυνάθειν*, *εικάθειν*, *ὑπείκάθειν*, *παρεικάθειν*, *εἰργάθειν*, *ἀλκάθειν*, quum *διωκαθεῖν* cett. aoristos esse Elmsleius ad Medeam vs. 186 acute perspexerit". It is not however certain that the formation is aoristic: nor that, even if aoristic, it would be accented on the last: see on *ὀφλων* in Apol. 39 B and Curtius' Greek Verb (E. T.) p. 502. B has *διωκάθειν*: T *διωκαθεῖν* (sic).

11. *τοὺς θεοὺς—παρακινδυνεύειν*. The construction of *ἐδεῖσας* is peculiar, if (with Schanz and Wohlrab) we regard *τοὺς θεοὺς* and *παρακινδυνεύειν* as both depending on it directly: nor can *τοὺς θεοὺς* depend on *παρακινδυνεύειν*, which can only take an internal accusative of that which is risked. If *παρακινδυνεύειν* is not a marginal note intended to explain the precise force of the following *μή* clause, it should probably be explained as an epexegetic infinitive. On the other supposition the balance is complete: *τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἐδεῖσας—τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (ἂν) ἥσυχύνθης*.

12. *μή οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσεις*. An almost solitary case of *μή* (*ὅπως μή*) with future optative after a verb of fearing: see Goodwin (MT p. 40), who quotes from Xen. Hell. VI 4. 27 *φοβούμενος μή τινας—πορεύουσιντο ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνου δύναμιν*. It corresponds to *μή* with future Indicative in direct speech after verbs of fearing, an idiom itself also rare: see Paley on Aesch. Pers. 117—121 *μή πόλις πύθεται—καὶ τὸ Κισσίων πόλισμ' ἀντίδουπον ἔσσεται*. The expression *μή οὐκ ὀρθῶς* κτλ. recalls 4 A above *οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαι*: but the meaning here is 'lest you should be wrong in so doing'.

13. *σαφῶς οἷε εἰδέναι*: so ἀκριβῶς οἷε ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων *ὅτην ἔχει* in 4 E. The emphasis is on *οἷε*.

15 E 18. *ἀπ' ἐλπίδος—καταβαλὼν*. Compare Phaedo 98 B *ἀπὸ δὲ θαυμαστῆς, ᾧ ἐταίρε, ἐλπίδος ψυχόμεν φερόμενος*.

19. *ἦν εἶχον*. The concluding sentence recalls 5 A—B. Thus in *σοφὸς ἤδη παρ' Εὐθύφρονος τὰ θεῖα γέγονα* we have an echo of *ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐπιουμένη εἰδέναι—καὶ εἰ μὲν, ᾧ Μέλητε, φαῖνεν ἂν, Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα*: and in *οὐκέτι—αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά* there is a reminiscence of *ἐπειδὴ με ἐκεῖνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων*.

20. *τά τε ὅσια καὶ μή*. It is unnecessary to read (with Liebhold Woch. für kl. Phil. 1888 no. 40 p. 1229) *καὶ τὰ μή*.

24. καὶ δὴ καὶ—βιωσομένην. For καὶ δὴ καὶ see above on 2 E. 16 A. For ὅτι ἀμεινον Schanz reads ἀμεινον against the MSS, taking ὅτι (like ὡς παρὰ σοῦ above) with ἐλπίδος: I prefer the MS reading, as forming a more euphonious and impressive conclusion. In the concluding words of the *Phaedo* the traditional reading is to be preferred for a similar reason. Here ὅτι depends on ἐνδείζόμενος and is parallel to the other two ὅτι clauses: Socrates might hope to be acquitted by convincing Meletus of his resolution to reform. For the change of mood from Indicative to Optative we may compare (with Schanz) *Thuc.* II 80 1 λέγοντες ὅτι—ῥαδίως ἂν—κρατήσουσι καὶ ὁ περίπλους οὐκέτι ἔσοιτο Ἀθηναίοις ὁμοίως περὶ Πελοπόννησον.

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