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PLATONIS EUTHYPHRO
Pitt Press Series.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ

PLATONIS EUTHYPHRO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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EDITED FOR THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE

1890

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Cambridge:
PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AND SONS,
at the university press.
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τί ποτ’ ἐστίν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάργαλον ἔργον, ὥστε ὁ θεός ἀπερράζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις ἐχθρώμενοι.

Plato: Euthyphro 13E.

455b6

θεοῦ γὰρ ἐσμεν συνεργοίς. θεοῦ γεωργίων, θεοῦ οἰκοδομή ἔστε.

Paul: 1 Cor. 3. 9.
PREFACE.

The present edition of the Euthyphro is intended to be uniform with my editions of the Apology and the Crito. I have tried to shew in the Introduction that a thorough examination of the Euthyphro forms an excellent training for the study of Plato's more profound and complex dialogues; and with this end in view, I have spared no effort to make my exposition of Plato's style and doctrine as complete as possible.

The text is based on Schanz's collation of B and T, the few cases where I have departed from these manuscripts being noted in the commentary. In writing the notes, I have derived considerable help from the annotated editions of Fritzsch and Wohlrab, but above all from that of Schanz, whose work in this department proves him as great in exegesis as he is patient and trustworthy in collating manuscripts. For the Introduction, Fritzsch's Prolegomena and Bonitz's Platonische Studien have been of the greatest service. I hope however to have contributed a good deal that is new
in the interpretation both of the text and subject matter of the dialogue.

I am indebted to my friends Mr Neil of Pembrooke, Mr Platt of Trinity, and Mr Headlam of Trinity Hall, for kindly reading through the sheets and contributing many valuable suggestions.

EMMANUEL COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE,

January 21, 1890.
INTRODUCTION.

§ i. On the leading motive of the Euthyphro.

In the well-known passage of the Phaedrus\(^1\), where Plato weighs the rival claims of spoken and written discourse, it is said that the philosopher will write books for amusement (παιδιάς χάριν), as well as to provide a treasury of memories and suggestions for himself when he shall have reached "oblivion's old age", and for all who follow the same trail. Generally however, even a single dialogue of Plato shews a great complexity of motive. Playful personal-\[\text{Intermix-}
\text{ture of}
\text{motives in}
\text{Plato's dialogues.}
\]\[\text{Get remedy for the image of}
\text{words spoken (τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ξώντα καὶ}
\text{ἔμψυχον, οὐ δὲ γεγραμμένος εἴδωλον ἃν τι λέγοιτο δικαιός\(^2\)),}
\text{Plato endeavoured to communicate to the image}
\text{something of the variety and vivacity of actual convers-}
\text{sation: δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ἡν συντοιχία σωμά}
\text{τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὡστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε}
\]

1 276 D. 2 Phaedr. 276 A.
INTRODUCTION.

The dialogue called 'Euthyphro' was intended less for amusement, than as a finger-post to point the way παντὶ τῷ ταύτῳ ἵχνος μεταύων. Though by no means deficient in character-drawing and general dramatic vivacity, it is in this respect inferior to dialogues like the Phaedrus or Euthydemus. The accessories of scene and setting are very simple: as in the Crito, only two actors appear upon the stage. But the very simplicity of its structure renders the work all the more suitable as an introduction to the more serious study of Plato. For while the artistic unity and brilliant colouring of the most finished dialogues frequently make it difficult to discover the germ of positive teaching which lies latent in them, in the Euthyphro, on the other hand, it is comparatively easy to see what Plato meant to say: in spite of more than one false start, and much wandering through devious byways, we come at last within clear view of the summit, though it still remains unscaled. The lesson learned in unravelling the Euthyphro may be afterwards made use of to disentangle the more complex dialogues. And besides this training in method, the careful student of the Euthyphro will be introduced to many logical problems that continually reappear in the more elaborate dialogues of Plato: while even more clearly than in any other of the Socratic dialogues, he will see the doctrine of λόγοι transforming itself into the theory of Ideas. If we add to this, that the diction of the Euthyphro possesses all the marks of Plato's style in dialogue,

1 Phaedr. 264 c.
except that it is simpler, we shall admit that a thorough examination of the dialogue will form a fitting preparation for a more comprehensive study of Plato's style and doctrine.

It will facilitate the proper apprehension of the meaning of the Euthyphro to describe as clearly as possible the progress of the dialogue.

Socrates, going to the King's Porch in connection with the indictment preferred against him by Meletus, is met by Euthyphro. In reply to Euthyphro’s wondering question as to why he had so far left his usual haunts, Socrates rapidly describes the accusation and alludes to his accuser in no flattering terms. His resentment is shared by Euthyphro, who sees in the prosecution something of the same spirit of secularism that leads the Athenian assembly to deride his own deliverances on things divine. 'Just so', says Socrates: 'you they deride, but me they prosecute: I suppose because I teach my wisdom, whereas you keep yours to yourself'. Euthyphro hopes that all will end well with Socrates’ trial as he thinks it will with his own (Chapters I—III).

It is now the turn of Socrates to ask and of Euthyphro to answer. In reply to Socrates’ questions, Euthyphro says that he is about to prosecute his own father for manslaughter. Socrates is horrified, or

---

1 I am glad to see that Dr Franz Lauczizsky (in the Zeitschrift für österreichische Gymnasien Vol. XL 3. p. 274) also regards the Euthyphro as 'eine fruchtbare und lohnende Schullektüre', chiefly on account of the clear and emphatic way in which the Socratic doctrine of concepts is presented and illustrated. Wohlrab's Euthyphro for schools has now reached a third edition (1887).
pretends to be: and his horror is not lessened when Euthyphro narrates the circumstances on which the charge rests. A day-labourer, in a paroxysm of drunken rage, had killed a slave belonging to Euthyphro's father. He was put in chains and thrown into a pit, till directions as to his treatment should come from Athens. In the meantime he died. Euthyphro is so confident in the correctness of his views of holiness and unholiness that heedless of the remonstrances of his family he resolves to prosecute his father (Chapter IV). As one who is himself accused of impiety, Socrates professes himself eager to be taught by Euthyphro the true nature of holiness and its opposite, so as either to prove to Meletus that he is not guilty of impiety, or to induce him to attack Euthyphro the teacher first (Chapter V).

What, asks Socrates, is holiness and unholiness? Euthyphro answers (1): Holiness is to do what I am doing now: unholiness is not so to do. See how Zeus treated his guilty father Cronus! But Socrates expresses his disbelief in such legends as dishonourable to the gods, hinting that perhaps that is why he is put upon his trial (Chapter VI).

Postponing the inquiry into the truth of such tales, Socrates directs his attack upon the definition given by Euthyphro and has no difficulty in shewing that it errs by putting one special instance in place of the general quality. Perceiving the mistake, Euthyphro offers an amended definition (2): what is dear to the gods is holy, what is not dear, unholy (Chapter VII).

In assailing this definition, Socrates points out that there are gods and gods: and as in the allusion
to Zeus and Cronus it has already been admitted that they have differences, different gods will differ from each other just on those points on which men differ among themselves, viz. on such questions as what is honourable and what is just: and since they will love what they think honourable, it follows that they will love different things, so that one and the same thing will be both holy and unholy (Chapter VIII). For example, the conduct of Euthyphro in prosecuting his father may commend itself to one god, and not to another: in which case it will be unholy no less than holy. To Euthyphro's objection that all the gods will agree in thinking that the doer of unrighteous manslaughter should be punished, Socrates replies that the point at issue in such a case, with gods as well as with men, will be 'Is the manslaughter righteous or not?' So that they will still differ none the less (Chapter IX). How can Euthyphro shew that all the gods hold the manslaughter committed by his father to be unrighteous? Euthyphro pretends that he could give the proof if time allowed: the judges shall have it, if they will but hear him (Chapter X). After Euthyphro has thus for the first time shirked the issue, he is allowed by Socrates to restate his second definition in the corrected form which the inquiry has shewn to be necessary. "Holiness", he now says, "is (3) what all the gods love, unholiness what all the gods hate". With this ends Chapter XI.

The third definition is refuted in the course of the two following chapters. Socrates proves that it is only an accident of piety to be beloved of the gods: whereas a definition should state, not the accident, but the essence of a notion. A brief interlude follows,
INTRODUCTION.

in which Euthyphro complains of the unsettling character of Socrates’ dialectic.

Presently, with a view to attaining a more satisfactory definition, Socrates himself puts forward a suggestion: Is all that is right holy, or is all that is holy right, but only part of that which is right holy? Euthyphro is unable to catch the meaning of the question, until by an exercise in the conversion of propositions it is made clear to him (Chapters XII—XIII).

The question still remains what part of that which is right is to be identified with holiness? Euthyphro’s solution is (4): “Piety and Holiness are that part of rectitude which is concerned with the care of the gods” (Chapter XIV).

In criticising this definition, the first object of Socrates is to determine what meaning is to be assigned to the word ‘care’. That it is not the care which results in benefit to the gods, making them better, he agrees: it is rather such care as is shewn by slaves to their masters—ὑπηρετική τις θεραπέα (Chapter XIII). But even now the definition is not clear. Servants, working under their masters, produce some definite result: what result does the pious man produce, working under the gods? What do the gods produce, when they make use of us as their servants? To this question Euthyphro returns only the vague reply “many beautiful things”, thus for the second time shirking the issue: when further pressed, he evades the point and declares (5) that “if one knows how to say and do what is acceptable to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, that is holiness, and such a course of conduct is the salvation both of private
Homes and public communities: whereas the opposite of what is acceptable to the gods is impious, and overthrows and ruins everything" (Chapter XVI).

Socrates first points out that Euthyphro has evaded the issue: afterwards, taking his definition as equivalent to the notion that "holiness is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray", he interprets this as "the knowledge of how to ask from the gods and give to the gods aright" (Chapter XVII). In other words, Holiness is the art of merchandise exercised between gods and men. What benefit, then, do the gods derive from the gifts we give them? In Euthyphro's opinion, none: our gifts to the gods are acceptable to them, nothing more. And Euthyphro admits that if acceptable, they must be dear, thus reverting to the second definition, which has already been refuted (Chapter XVIII).

In the two remaining chapters, Socrates twits Euthyphro with even greater unsteadiness in argument than himself, and parts from him with an expression of deep regret that one so wise should be so niggardly of his wisdom.

From this analysis of the dialogue, it is clear that the Euthyphro falls into three parts, the two first of which are followed by a kind of transitional episode, and the last by a sort of valediction.

The structure of the dialogue is therefore as follows:

I. Introduction, with transitional chapter: I—V.

II. Suggestions coming from Euthyphro, followed by an interlude on the bewildering nature of the Socratic method: VI—middle of XIII.
III. A suggestion by Socrates, and its dialectical development, with two concluding chapters: XIII—XX.

Without going so far as to assert that there can be no positive teaching in the second division of the dialogue, we can hardly be wrong in looking for the most valuable result in the last section, seeing that it is introduced by Socrates. In the Theaetetus (184 B foll.), one of the most important doctrines of the whole dialogue, the power of the soul to cognize things by herself, independently of the senses, is introduced by Socrates and not by Theaetetus. Nevertheless, on a first inspection of this part of the dialogue, it may seem that there is no definite result attained even here: and, as we shall see later, Schleiermacher, in company with other critics, has taken this view. But on a closer examination, we shall find at least one question of the first importance to which Euthyphro returns no precise answer, and if we can find in our dialogue some unrefuted hints of the true answer, we shall be justified in regarding these as the key to the conception of piety contained in the Euthyphro. The principle of interpretation, that whatever remains unrefuted in a Platonic dialogue contains the key to its positive teaching, a principle consistently applied by Bonitz in his Platonische Studien, would seem to have the countenance of Plato himself in the Gorgias where he sums up the teaching of the dialogue in these words (527 B): οὔ τινα βλέπως οὐκ ἔχεις ἀποδείξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλων τίνα βλέπως ή τούτων ὅπερ καὶ ἐκείνως φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἄλλῳ ἐν τοσοῦτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἢρμην ο λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ πάντως μᾶλλον

The key to the Euthyphro, as to Plato's dialogues generally, is to be found by studying the unrefuted statements.
INTRODUCTION.

The question in 13 B: εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Δώς, τί ποτὲ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ ὁ θεὸς ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις χρώμενοι; The question is presently repeated in 14 A: τί δὲ δὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ὃ ὁ θεὸς ἀπεργάζονται; τί τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐστὶ τῆς ἐργασίας; Once more Euthyphro evades the point: and, as if to make it clear beyond dispute that in the answer to this question lies the true conception of Holiness, Socrates in 14 B—C reproaches Euthyphro in these words: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃν πρόθυμος με εἶ διδάξαι. δῆλος εἰ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ ἱσθα, ἀπετράπον· ὃ εἰ ἀπέκρινω, ἰκανὸς ἂν ἦν παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὀσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. It may be added that as early as 1820 Socher (über Platons Schriften p. 62) saw that in this unanswered question lies the key to our dialogue: among more recent writers, Bonitz¹, Lechthaler², Fritzscbe³, and with some modifications, Wohlrab⁴, hold the same view.

It is much more difficult to discover how Plato would himself have answered the question here ad-

¹ Platonicba Studien³ p. 227—242.
² Die ὁσιότης (Frömmigkeit) bei Platon mit Rücksicht auf Schaarschmidt’s Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron (pp. 46—47). Meran 1879.
³ Prolegomena ad Euthyphoronem p. 147.

A. EU.
dressed to Euthyphro. If we confine ourselves in the first instance to indications contained in the Euthyphro, we shall attain only to the conception of piety as a mode of working under the gods which is productive of some altogether beautiful result (παγκαλὸν ἔργον 13 ε). In the same view Socrates in 14 ε remarks that we have no good thing, which does not come from the gods (οὐδέν γὰρ ἢμῖν ἐστιν ἁγαθόν, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἔκεινοι δῶσιν). Viewing these passages in connection with Socrates’ emphatic rejection of legends imputing wicked conduct to the gods (6 α foll.), we may take it as established that whatever the joint ἔργον of gods and men may be, it will be something altogether good. Farther than this, there seems to be no hint in the Euthyphro of the true answer to Socrates’ question. Wohlra" can hardly be right in supposing that 14 β contains the secret: for, although Socrates does not refute the statement that holiness ‘conserves private houses and public communities’, yet he does refute the notion (upon which this remark of Euthyphro’s depends) that piety is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray.

The most that can be elicited from the Euthyphro in the way of positive teaching as to piety is that piety consists in working under God for the production of some good result not specified. I say ‘under God’, because there seems to be an underlying note of monotheism in Socrates’ refusal to allow that gods can quarrel among themselves. Throughout the argument in 7 α—8 α, Socrates is most careful to shew that the hypothesis of differences in opinion between gods and gods, on which he refutes the definition of Euthyphro,

1 l.c. p. 9 (edition of 1880).
is Euthyphro's own hypothesis: he is refuting Euthyphro upon his own ground.

It was no small achievement to have brought the investigation even so far as to have asked the one vital question: ἦστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορήσαι βουλομένους προφήγου τὸ διαπορήσαι καλῶς, as Aristotle says¹. But unless we regard every dialogue of Plato as in itself a whole, to be studied quite apart from the others, it becomes our duty to inquire whether Plato has furnished any answer to the problem in any other dialogues. The conception of man as the ὅργανον of the gods is far from rare in Plato²: but it is less easy to discover what precise result the gods and pious men produce in common. Bonitz has correctly solved the question as follows. Reminding us that Plato in all his dialogues invariably ascribes perfect goodness to God³, and comparing passages of such a tenor with the slight indications of the nature of the ἕργον given in the Euthyphro itself, he infers that the true Platonic definition of Piety, as sketched in the Euthyphro, and filled in elsewhere, is "perfect morality, only in such a form, that man is conscious of being thereby the auxiliary organ of the divine working". In other words, Piety is conceived of as a virtue that transcends and at the same time includes all the other leading virtues. It is the knowledge of the good or God translated into the field of action: and is not to be separated from the ethical end, as expressed in ὀμοίωσις θεφ κατὰ τὸ δύνατόν (Theaetetus 176 B), ἐπεσθαίθε θεφ and the like.

¹ Met. B. I 995a 27.
² See note on 13 D.
³ Rep. II 379 B. Timaeus 29 E et al.
This conception of piety suggests two reflections.

In the first place it is equivalent to an assertion of the unity of the virtues. Piety includes all other virtues because it is the knowledge of the good: just as in the Laches, courage, being the knowledge of good and evil, is represented as identical with the whole of virtue. And besides many particular hints throughout the Euthyphro of the unity of virtue in knowledge, it is implied in the dramatic setting of the dialogue that, being knowledge, piety may be taught by Euthyphro to Socrates.

In the second place, the notion of man's working in common with God has its root in the truly Greek idea that God and man are of one family. As is pointed out in the notes, this idea runs throughout a considerable part of the argument of our dialogue. In arguing that if gods differ among themselves, they will differ exactly on those points which arouse disension among men (7 D), and again, when Socrates clears up Euthyphro's confusion about the precise point on which the gods join issue in discussing a case of manslaughter, the latent major premise might be expressed in the words which Lucian puts into the mouth of Heraclitus: τί διὰ οἱ ἀνθρώποι; θεοὶ θεντοι; τί διὰ οἱ θεοὶ; ἀνθρώποι ἀθανατοι. Only in respect of immortality and superior power are the gods different from mankind: they will work together as members of one household, whether we regard them as standing to one another in the relation of master

1 Laches 199 E: cf. Charmides 174 D, Alcibiades II 146 E foll.
2 Vitārum Auctio § 14.
and slave\(^1\), or children of a common stock, as Hesiod\(^2\) does or Pindar\(^3\), when he sings \(\varepsilon\nu\ \alpha\nu\rho\dot{\alpha}\nu\varepsilon\), \(\varepsilon\nu\ \theta\varepsilon\omega\nu\ \gamma\varepsilon\nu\nu\varepsilon\cdot\ \varepsilon\kappa\ \mu\imath\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\varepsilon\ \pi\nu\varepsilon\omega\mu\varepsilon\nu\ \mu\alpha\tau\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\mu\phi\omicron\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\iota\omicron\)  

\section*{§ 2. The definitions of Piety contained in the Euthyphro.}

Besides the leading conception of holiness as a co-working with God, it is worth while to direct some attention to the minor definitions. For the interlocutors in Plato are for the most part types both of his contemporaries and of men in general: what they say is intended to represent a certain attitude of mind.

The first definition advanced by Euthyphro need not in itself detain us, since it is in reality no definition, any more than Theaetetus' account of knowledge as mathematics, shoemaking etc. (Theaet. 146 c—d), or the other abortive attempts at defining which meet us in the Hippias Major, Laches and elsewhere\(^4\). But it is important from the manner in which Euthyphro supports his view. He appeals to Zeus, who himself put his own father in chains for wrongfully devouring his offspring: and in this appeal he finds a sanction for his own conduct. Now it would seem that these and similar legends were in Plato's time

\(^1\) Euthyphro 13 D.  
\(^2\) Works and Days 108. Compare also Frag. 187 (ed. Gottling): \(\xi\nu\nu\alpha\nu\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \tau\omicron\epsilon\nu\ \tau\alpha\iota\epsilon\varsigma\nu\ \varepsilon\sigma\uomicron\nu\), \(\xi\nu\nu\alpha\nu\ \delta\varepsilon\ \theta\omicron\wokou\ \alpha\theta\alpha\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\omicron\iota\iota\varsigma\ \theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\theta\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\iota\ \alpha\nu\rho\dot{\alpha}\rho\omega\pi\omicron\iota\). Aeschylus too in Sept. 238 makes the chorus address the gods as fellow-citizens.  
\(^3\) Nem. vi i.  
\(^4\) See note on Ch. vi ad init.
and earlier cited to give countenance to deeds which the morality of the day condemned. This might be done either sophisticatedly, as by the Unjust Cause in the Clouds (904 foll.), or conscientiously and with religious faith, as when the Eumenides\(^1\) defend themselves for leaving Agamemnon's doom unheeded by reminding Orestes that Zeus put his own aged father in chains. As for Euthyphro, there is nothing insincere or sophistical about his manner of using the legend. To him all these legends are true: he is in fact the quintessence of consistent orthodoxy. He differs from the Athenians on the one hand by not only believing the national theology but letting it influence his life and conduct: on the other hand, Socrates and he are still further apart, inasmuch as Socrates goes so far as to disbelieve the theology of his country. And here one of the subsidiary motives of our dialogue is seen to be at work—the apologetic motive, as we may call it. Socrates had been accused of heterodoxy—that is, of treason, according to the ancient view—and of corrupting the youth. In particular he was blamed for setting sons against their fathers. Plato replies by giving us a picture of active and consistent orthodoxy in the person of Euthyphro. It is as if he had said: "After all, you Athenians are not consistent: the creed which you theoretically believe you do not carry out in practice. If you would see what your creed leads to, look at Euthyphro: in living out his religion, which is yours, he becomes unfaithful in his own person, to the extent of prosecuting his own father for manslaughter: it is your own religion that is the traitor, for its consistent

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\(^1\) Eum. 640—641.
believers are worse than useless to the state (3 c—d). The fact is, you do not really believe your national creed, otherwise you would approve of Euthyphro: why then do you prosecute Socrates for seeking to replace your indifference by some new faith?” It was of course no new thing to protest against a theology which ascribed to the gods deeds of which men might be ashamed. Since Xenophanes wrote his well-known censure on Homer and Hesiod (πάντα θεῶς ἀνέθηκαν Ὄμηρος θ' Ἡσίοδος τε ὁσα παρ’ ἀνθρώπων ὄνειδα καὶ ψόγος ἔστιν, κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν1), it had been a commonplace with Pindar, Aeschylus, and other writers of a lofty moral tone2, to urge that goodness must needs be one of the divine attributes, but in the character of Euthyphro Plato goes even further, and makes it clear that an active faith in the old theology was incompatible with what the ordinary public opinion of Athens pronounced to be right conduct: Athens had in fact outgrown her faith. And as Plato like his master hated nothing more than idle acquiescence in an inert λόγος, he desired to make the Athenians feel that the old religion was virtually dead, so as to pave the way for a higher creed.

Euthyphro’s second definition may best be considered along with the third, which is but an amended form of the same underlying conception. The view that Holiness is what is dear to the gods, would have been accepted by most of the Greeks. ‘Beloved of the gods’ was an epithet of the truly pious and virtuous man. Ἀδικαῖος ἄνδρα, asks Socrates in the Philebus

2 See NägeIeIbach’s Nachhomeriche Theologie p. 45 ff.
(39 ε) καὶ εὐσεβῆς καὶ ἁγαθὸς πάντως ἀρ' οὐ θεοφιλῆς ἐστι; and in the first Alcibiades (134 δ) we read δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σοῦ τε καὶ ή πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε. It was probably the popular conception of piety. In his preliminary criticism of the definition, Socrates is really arguing against polytheism. On the assumption of a plurality of gods, it is useless to say that what is dear to the gods is holy, since one god will love what another hates: but if the divine nature is one, then it will be constant in its likes and dislikes, and, so far, the definition may still hold good. Here therefore we have a distinct allusion to the underlying monotheism of the Socratic creed: but the doctrine is not explicitly stated and hardly goes beyond the common usage of τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον and the like, so often used in referring to the divine power as shewing itself in the government of the world.

After conceding the difficulty as to a plurality of gods, Socrates attacks the definition in earnest, and proves it inadequate even on a monotheistic creed, inasmuch as it puts a πάθος in place of the οὐσία. This is probably the earliest place in Greek literature where the distinction of πάθος and οὐσία is clearly recognised (11 Α). Nor is this the only contribution to logic in our dialogue. The exercise in the conversion of propositions shewing that although all αἰϑός is at the same time δεός, yet the converse is not true (12 Α ff.), doubtless had some value in an age when logic was still young. Moreover, the manner in which the notion of δίκαιον is subdivided into δόσιον and another unknown quantity, with a view to reaching a definition (12 Α), is suggestive of the διαφραςίς.
which is so constantly employed in Plato's later dialogues: while in the form of definition required by Socrates in 12 D δεὶ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἀν έἰη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ όσιον, we have a clear recognition of the principle of defining per genus et differentiam. We may therefore infer that one of the subsidiary purposes of our dialogue is to be a lesson in logic.

It has already been shewn that in the development of Socrates' suggestion about the relation between δικαίου and όσιον lies the most valuable part of the positive teaching of the Euthyphro. We may therefore pass on to Euthyphro's fifth effort: Holiness is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray. In effect, as Socrates proves, there is nothing but the second definition elaborated in detail: it is therefore instructive to observe how Euthyphro, dizzy from the effect of Socrates' logic, takes refuge in crooning over to himself the sacerdotal view of religion with which his profession had made him familiar. As a professional μάρτυς Euthyphro cannot shake himself clear of the mantic stand-point. His theology is correctly described as a sort of ἐμπορικὴ: it conceives of gods and men as bound by a compact to give and take reciprocally1. There is no hint of the importance of true devotion in the soul of the worshipper, such as Socrates always inculcated. δῶρα θεὸς πείθει, δῶρα αἰδολῶν βασιλῆς2 was the corner-stone of Euthyphro's creed. And it is just this view of religion which marks him out as essentially the representative

of active Greek orthodoxy: there could be no greater mistake than to take Euthyphro as a type of the disbeliefing Athenians of his day. That sacrifice was a gift, almost a bribe to the gods (originally the gods' food\(^1\)), was so thoroughly recognised in the Greek religion as to have passed into a proverb\(^2\). The sentiment was only a natural outcome of the view that gods and men are one in kind—an idea which we have already seen to be a distinctive feature of the Hellenic faith.

Summary. The results of the preceding investigation may be thus summed up. The main purpose of the Euthyphro is to lead the way to a higher conception of piety than was possible under the most orthodox belief in the old Greek religion. As secondary motives, there is first and foremost a desire to defend Socrates by shewing that orthodoxy if active and not quiescent was more dangerous to the family and the state than the heterodoxy of Socrates; there are also indications of a wish to improve the occasion by imparting some lessons in logic. The rejected definitions are valuable as shewing different points of view characteristic of the Greek religion, above all, the belief in a common origin and common interests for gods and men.

\[\text{§ 3. \textit{On Euthyphro.}}\]

Nothing is known for certain about Euthyphro as a historical person except what we learn from Plato. The statements of later authors rest entirely upon his authority.

1 Article Sacrifice in Encycl. Brit.

2 Eur. Med. 964 πείθειν δῶρα καὶ θεοὶ λόγος.
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It is argued, indeed, by Bergk (De Reliquiis Comœdiae Atticae Antiquae p. 357 foll.) that Eupolis' comedy called Προστάλτωι was directed against Euthyphro, who was a native of the deme of Prospalta, in the tribe of Acamantis. We know from Suidas (s.v. δραχαρνεύ) that the Prospaltians were derided for their extreme litigiousness: and Euthyphro, who accused his own father, might well be taken as a type of his demesmen. The fact that Eupolis' drama was written long before 399, the assumed date of Euthyphro's accusation, need not prove a difficulty, for "satis superque notum est, quam parum Plato curam temporum rationis habuerit: ut nihil distet, quominus illam litigationem aliquanto ante accidisse statuamus". Some degree of probability is lent to the theory of Bergk by the line:

τί κατακροάσθε μου τὰ μονοσοδονήματα;

which seems to allude to some such tricks of language as are attributed to Euthyphro in Plato's Cratylus: but at most the theory is only a brilliant conjecture, and we are bound to confine ourselves to the Platonic picture of Euthyphro.

Except in the dialogue called after him, Euthyphro appears only in the Cratylus. The description of him there accords generally with what we gather from our dialogue: he is a μάντις not to say a μανικὸς ἀνήρ. There his frenzy takes the form of etymologizing, and Socrates humorously makes him responsible for his own philological vagaries. καὶ αἰτιῶμαι γε, ὃ Ἐρμόγενες (says Socrates), μάλιστα αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν

1 See Fritzche's Prolegomena p. 153 foll.
2 Bergk l.c. p. 358.
3 Kock Frag. 245.
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Within the context of Athenian orthodoxy, Euthyphro is portrayed as a type of the μάντης, exemplifying consistent action. Implicitly believing in the creed of Athens, he upholds the faith of the Athenians, even when it is not upheld in their works. A superior person in his estimation, he is both fanatical and complacent, even jaunty in his bearing, as one who has solved the problem of the Universe. When he is confronted with the necessity of defending his position, he submits to the amiable condescending smile of a man who is impervious to reason, because he claims to stand on the higher platform of inspiration and faith: and when he is refuted, instead of distorting himself, he takes refuge in the old position from which he has long ago been dislodged. He combines the worst features of a sciolist and a prig. But for his own sincere faith in himself, he might be regarded as a type of the μάντης ἀλαζών.

1 Cf. ibid. 399 Α τῇ τοῦ Εὐθύφρωνος ἐπινοίᾳ, 407 θερα ἵππαι οἱ Εὐθύφρωνος ἐπειδή τοῦ Εὐθύφρωνος μούσα (Fritzsche Proleg. p. 154). The expression αἱ ἀμφι Εὐθύφρωνα in 399 ε does not of course imply that Euthyphro had a following of Neo-grammarians.

2 See notes on 2 B and 3 B, lines 11 and 18.

3 See Aristotle's account of ἀλαζώνα in Eth. Nic. IV 13. p. 1127ᵃ 13 ἅ, esp. 1127ᵇ 19—20 ol δὲ κέρδους (sc. χάριν ἀλαζών-
overdrawn, but not without reason: for Plato's object was to contrast the logical outcome of the Athenian creed with that of his master's, in order to shew that the Athenians no longer believed the national religion, and were ripe for something higher.


Since the time of Ast (1816), doubts have frequently been expressed as to the authenticity of the Euthyphro, and not a few critics have categorically denied it. But the overwhelming balance of opinion is in favour of regarding the dialogue as a genuine work of Plato.

The arguments advanced by the party of attack are of very different weight.

Starting with the notion that every genuine dialogue contains some positive teaching either worked out or at least suggested, Ast rejected the Euthyphro on the ground that the essence of piety is not thoroughly investigated "oder auf Platonische Weise auch nur angedeutet". Schleiermacher had already refused to allow the presence of any dogmatic teaching in the Euthyphro, while still retaining it among the works of Plato. Four years later it was pointed out by Socher that the required hint of positive doctrine

1 See above p. xix.
2 Platon’s Leben und Schriften p. 470.
3 Ueber Platon’s Schriften p. 62.
was to be found in the question addressed to Euthyphro in 13 E. After him, Susemihl (1855), Munk (1857), and later, Bonitz and Lechthaler, have all recognized that the Euthyphro is far from being devoid of positive teaching.

The views of these scholars have been subjected to a spirited criticism by Josef Wagner, in a Brünn Program of 1882—3 pp. 6—17, but he has not succeeded in weakening the position of Bonitz, if only we are willing to admit that Plato’s meaning is not always discoverable without some effort on the part of the reader. In view of our previous discussion on the leading motive of the Euthyphro, without raising the question whether Plato could have written a purely peirastic dialogue, we may take it as certain that the arguments against the present dialogue which are drawn from its alleged absence of dogmatic teaching miss their mark. It cannot indeed be maintained that the Euthyphro by itself contains a clear and definite solution of the problem proposed: but this is in full harmony with Plato’s representation of the Socratic method. Socrates does not take pains to enlighten those with whom he converses unless their humiliation is sincere: and it is manifest from the whole tone and bearing of Euthyphro that even while professing his inability to follow Socrates he still believes himself to be in the right.

1 Die διψώθης bei Platon: Meran 1879. On the other hand, Schaarschmidt (Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften p. 390 ff.) declares himself upon the side of Ast.

2 In the Zeitschrift für öst. Gymn. Vol. xiv 3. p. 275 Dr Lauczizsky also expresses his surprise that Wagner should still cling to his belief in the spuriousness of the dialogue.

3 See note on 11 E. 4 In 11 B.
A further argument has been found by Schaar-
schmidt¹ in the apparently untrue representation of
Socrates given in the Euthyphro. To leave Euthy-
phro in a course of wicked conduct, and pass on to
discussions on δσιον and ἀνόσιον which have only a
remote bearing on the situation, is inconsistent (thinks
Schaarschmidt) with Socrates’ well-known practice of
assisting his friends to improve their conduct by
theoretical discussions. To this it seems a sufficient
answer to point out that we are dealing here with
Plato’s Socrates, and not Xenophon’s: nor are the
discussions on δσιον at all irrelevant, but thoroughly
in harmony even with Xenophon’s representation of
the Socratic method as an attempt to establish a λόγος
for the regulation of conduct.

More serious would seem to be the arguments (3) Alleged
structural defects.
drawn from the alleged formal and structural defects
of the dialogue. Wagner² descants upon the ‘poverty
manifest in the external scenery and characterisation
of the actors’: the whole dialogue is carried on between
two actors and we hear nothing of auditors, in spite
of the busy quarter where the scene is laid: Socrates
is not true to life and Euthyphro’s portrait is absurdly
overdrawn! The climax is reached when in criticising
the words of Socrates in 3 D (ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ ὑπὸ
φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅτι περ ἕχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ
ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἀνευ μυσθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς
ἀν ἴδεως, εἰ τίς μου έθελοι ἀκούειν), Wagner remarks
“Auf welcher Seite die Ungeschicklichkeit liegt,
brauchen wir nicht weiter zu erörtern, fragen nur,
woher Sokrates dazu das Geld hätte hernehmen sollen,

¹ Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften p. 393.
da er in der Apologie nur über eine Mine verfügt?" We may allow that the dialogue is inferior in dramatic power to the best of Plato's works without denying it to Plato: and as for Euthyphro's portrait, if it is meant to represent the logical outcome of an active faith in the old mythology, it is doubtless intentionally overdrawn.

A great deal has been made of the supposed allusion to the theory of Ideas in 5 C—D and 6 D—E. It is chiefly on this ground that Ueberweg\(^1\) rejects the dialogue, and Schaarschmidt\(^2\) has used the same argument with great emphasis. The words (in 5 D) \(\varepsilon \chi o \nu \mu \iota \alpha \nu \tau \iota \alpha \ i \delta \iota \alpha \nu \ \kappa a \tau \alpha \ \tau \eta \nu \ \alpha \nu \sigma i \iota \alpha \tau \eta \tau \alpha \) (sic), applied to \(\alpha \nu \sigma i \iota \nu \)\(^{\text{a}}\), have incurred the especial censure of Schaarschmidt and Wagner\(^3\). And it must be allowed that an Idea of pure and absolute negation is a singular doctrine to meet with in Plato. But, beyond all doubt, the correct reading in this particular passage is the \(\kappa a \tau \alpha \ \tau \eta \nu \ \delta \sigma i \iota \tau \eta \tau \alpha \) of the Bodleian manuscript\(^4\): and, on the general question, Bonitz\(^5\) seems to me to have conclusively shewn that there is no knowledge whatever of the ideal theory implied in either of the places cited. The \(\lambda \nu \nu \nu\) are not hypostasized, since in \(\tau \alpha \ \delta \sigma i \nu \ \alpha \nu \tau \)\(^{\text{a}}\), \(\alpha \nu \tau \)\(^{\text{a}}\) belongs to \(\alpha \nu \tau \)\(^{\text{a}}\) and not to \(\tau \alpha \ \delta \sigma i \nu \)\(^{\text{a}}\), while the expression \(\varepsilon \chi o \nu \mu \iota \alpha \nu \tau \iota \alpha \ i \delta \iota \alpha \nu \) is parallel to the words in the Meno (72 C) \(\omicron \tau \omega \ \delta \iota \ \kappa a \ i \nu \ \pi e \nu \ \tau \omega \ \alpha \nu \tau \iota \nu \ \kappa a \ \iota \ \pi o \lambda \lambda \iota \ \kappa a \ \pi a n \tau \iota \delta \alpha \tau i \alpha i \ \varepsilon \iota \iota \nu \), \(\epsilon \nu \ \gamma \epsilon \ \tau \iota \ \varepsilon \iota \iota \delta \iota \ \tau a i \tau o \ \iota \alpha \tau \sigma i \ \varepsilon \chi o \nu \nu \iota \), \(\delta \iota \ \delta \ \varepsilon \iota \iota \nu \ \alpha \nu \tau \iota \nu \). Similar passages, in which the expressions which were afterwards used in connection with the theory of ideas occur in speak-

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\(^1\) Untersuchungen p. 251.
\(^2\) l.c. p. 394.
\(^3\) l.c. p. 22.
\(^4\) See note in loc.
ing of the Socratic λόγοι, are far from rare in the Socratic dialogues: it will suffice to refer to the first Alcibiades 129 B and 130 D (ὅ ἄρτι οὖν πως ἔρρηθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτέον ἐκαίναυ τὸ αὐτό· νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἐκαστον ἔσκεμμεθα δ' τι ἐστίν), and to the Hippias Major 289 D εἴ δὲ σε ἡρόμην, φήσει, ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τι ἐστι καλὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν, εἴ μοι ἀπερ νῦν ἀπεκρίνω ἄρα, σὺ ἄν ὀρθῶς ἀπεκέκρισο. ἦτι δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, ὡς καὶ τάλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἴδος, τούτῳ εἶναι παρθένος ἢ ἵππος ἢ λύρα; In neither of these two dialogues is the Ideal theory presupposed: but as it was chiefly out of the Socratic λόγοι that Plato’s theory of Ideas was evolved, it is only natural that the phraseology of the later theory should sometimes be used in connection with the earlier and the much-discussed passage in the Euthyphro is extremely valuable as a link in the chain of development, since besides the words ἰδέα and εἴδος applied to the Socratic λόγοι we find the concept regarded as a παράδειγμα, exactly like the Idea in Platonic teaching generally.

It is further pointed out that an imitator of Plato (5) That the dialogue is might well have composed the dialogue as a sermon on the text in the Republic (11 378 B) οὐδὲ λεκτέον a patchwork from other νέω ἀκούοντι, ὡς ἄδικων τὰ ἐσχάτα οὐδὲν ἀν θαυμαστῶν ποιοί, οὐδ' αὖ ἄδικοντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ dialogues. τρόπως, ἀλλὰ δρόη ἄν ὀπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοι τε καὶ μέγιστοι. Plato then proceeds, in language closely parallel to that of the Euthyphro², to enter a protest against the stories of wars between gods, whether sung of in poetry, or depicted on canvas, and concludes

1 Ast, p. 472.
2 Compare Euthyphr. 6 B with Rep. 11 378 C.

A. EU.
INTRODUCTION.

with an eloquent assertion of the supreme goodness of God. Schaarschmidt¹ conjectures that the author of the Euthyphro had also in view the passage in the Laws (ix 865 c), where Plato would inflict only a moderate penalty in cases of manslaughter resembling that committed by Euthyphro's father. Numerous parallels with the Meno and the Theaetetus are also quoted: in particular, the comparison of unstable ideas with figures by Daedalus (11 c—E and 15 B) is supposed to be borrowed from the Meno (97 D—E), or elaborated out of the expression in the Theaetetus (203 D) καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰκήσεται. Socrates' demand that Euthyphro should give in his answer not a plurality of things holy but the one form of holiness reminds us of similar passages in the Meno (71 E ff. 74 A) and Theaetetus (146 A ff.). And among other reminiscences of the dialogues noted by Schaarschmidt is the echo of the Phaedrus (229 C) in Socrates' question (6 B) ἀλλὰ μου εἰτὲ πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἴση ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

Striking as these parallels are, and especially that from the Republic, they are by no means enough to justify us in denying the Euthyphro to Plato. Were the ideas in question more fully and elaborately worked out in our dialogue than elsewhere, and with greater dramatic power, the same critics would be ready to doubt whether those other dialogues were genuine. If the dialogue could be shewn to be spurious on other grounds, such evidence as this would be valuable as shewing from what quarries the imitator had hewed his stone: but, as it is, the same ideas continually reappear in the admittedly

¹ l.c. p. 395.
genuine works of Plato, and if we are prepared to allow that the Euthyphro is a comparatively early dialogue, it may well be that ideas and images employed in this early work were afterwards expanded and developed by Plato in his more mature productions.

This leads us to say a word as to the date of the Euthyphro. Of external evidence there is none: we have only the style and treatment to guide us. From the tables given by Constantin Ritter in his Untersuchungen über Plato (pp. 56—59), it is seen to belong to the earlier dialogues, if any faith is to be placed in statistics of the use of particles and the like: and the absence of any allusion to the theory of ideas, together with the somewhat overdrawn picture of Athenian orthodoxy in the person of Euthyphro, lead one to place it among Plato's early works. It is of course impossible fully to discuss this point without at the same time discussing the chronological sequence of Plato's dialogues generally: at present it will suffice to say that I believe it (in common with all Plato's dialogues) to have been written after the death of Socrates, and to be considerably later than the Crito. It probably belongs to about the same period as the Laches and the Charmides, but I think it precedes both of these dialogues by a short interval.

1 No argument can of course be based on the connection between the Introduction of the Euthyphro and the end of the Theaetetus: this is only one of Plato's many dramatic fictions.

2 See above p. xxviii.

3 Siebeck (Zur Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge p. 128)
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It has however been argued from the manner in which piety is here treated that the dialogue is later than the Laches and Protagoras, possibly even than the Meno and Gorgias. Socrates' own definition of ἐνοχθεία, as given in the Memorabilia (iv 6. 4), identifies it with 'knowledge of what is lawful in respect of the gods': δικαιοσύνη being the 'knowledge of what is lawful in respect of men'. In other words ἐνοχθεία and δικαιοσύνη are put on the same platform by Socrates, each being regarded as a distinct and special virtue. Now in the Protagoras, Meno, and Gorgias, ὀσιότης is in the same way held to be one of the virtues, parallel with δικαιοσύνη: whereas in the Euthyphro (12 A), δικαιοσύνη is set above ὀσιότης, the general notion δικαίον being subdivided into ὀσιόν and some other section not specified. And as in the later dialogues of Plato ὀσιότης is not mentioned as a substantive virtue at all, it is supposed by Fritzsch that Plato in the Euthyphro is passing from the Socratic conception of piety (as contained in the Protagoras, Meno and Gorgias) to a fourfold classification of the virtues, in which ὀσιότης as a special virtue shall be excluded. But the difference in the treatment of piety is susceptible of another explanation. The word seems to me right in assigning the Laches and Euthyphro to the same period: but whether he is right in holding that the first four books of the Republic preceded these dialogues, ἄλλης ἄν καθεσθεως.

1 Fritzsch Prolegomena ad Euthyphronem p. 157.
2 Prot. 329 c et al. Meno 78 D. Gorg. 507 B.
3 Such as the Republic (iv 428 A τέταρτα δυτα τυχανει) and Laws xii 963 c. The four are σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη.
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δίκαιον had two well-marked senses throughout Greek literature: the first wider, equivalent to our 'right', as when Theognis said ἐν δὲ δίκαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετή 'νι' and in this sense τὸ δοσιον might at all times be regarded as a subdivision of δίκαιον. Plato is not in the Euthyphro propounding a table of the virtues: he is therefore justified in using δίκαιον in its non-technical sense. And the apparent divergence between the Protagoras for example and the Republic in the doctrine of piety has been explained by Bonitz in a way which fits in with the teaching of the Euthyphro as already expounded. "Where Plato", says Bonitz, "is demonstrably following the ordinary views (e.g. in the Protagoras), he enumerates Piety among the different expressions of man's moral nature, viz. the individual virtues: on the other hand, he makes no mention of it where he himself marshals the idea of virtue in its different expressions according to his own conviction (e.g. in the Republic), and thus he shews that to him Piety is not a single virtue, to be coordinated with Temperance or Justice. On the contrary, the entire essence of moral conduct is characterized by Plato on the one hand as the knowledge of the good determining of necessity the will, and on the other hand as a process of assimilation to the divine essence and an attaching of oneself thereto combined with service". For it is exactly this view of piety which is at all events suggested in the Euthyphro, and which marks it as belonging to the earlier

1 Bergk's Theognis (Poetae Lyrici Graeci) line 147.
3 Plat. Studien p. 234.
dialogues like the Charmides and Laches, in which the individual virtues, such as temperance and courage, are each of them finally resolved into the knowledge of the Good.
ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ.

Α περὶ ὅσιον [πειρακτικός.]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΤΘΟΤΦΡΩΝ, ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

St. I.

2  Ι. Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σωκράτε, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τάς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπτῶν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βα-

ιλέως στοάν; οὐ γὰρ ποι ἄλλη ἡ δίκη τῆς οὖσα τυχικάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

Σ.Ω. Οὕτω δή Ἀθηναίοι γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, δίκην αὖτὶν καλοῦσιν, ἄλλα γραφήν.

Β  ΕΤΘ. Τί φήσ; γραφήν σὲ τις, ὡς ἔσικε, γέγραπ-

ται; οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο γε καταγγέλσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἔτερον.

Σ.Ω. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΤΘ. Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;

Σ.Ω. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΤΘ. Τίς οὕτως;

Σ.Ω. Οὐδ' αὖτὸς πάνυ τι γυνώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρον,

τὸν ἄνδρα· νέος γὰρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνωστὸς

ὁνομάζωσι μέντοι αὐτὸν, ὡς ἐγώμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι
δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιθεώς, εἰ τινὰ νῦ ἔχεις Πιθέα Μέλητον, οἶνον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπνον δὲ.

20 ἜΤΩ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὡς Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γραφῆν σε γέγραπται;

ΣΩ. "Ἁντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννή, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ νέον ὅντα τωσοῦτον πράγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαίλον ἐστιν· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ, ὡς φησιν, οἶδε τίνα τρόπον οἱ 25 νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς· καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφὸς τις εἶναι· καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδών ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλικιώτας αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται κατηγορῶσον μου ὡς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεται μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος

30 ἀρχεσθαι ὅρθως· ὅρθως γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν νέων πρῶτον εὐπιμεληθήναι, ὡς κεκυρωθοῦν ἀγαθῶν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον εὐπιμεληθήναι, μετὰ δὲ τούτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἵσως πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει 35 τοὺς τῶν νεῶν τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησιν· ἐπειτὰ μετὰ τούτο δῆλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εὐπιμεληθεὶς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίος τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρχῃς ἀρξαμένῳ.

II. ἘΤΘ. Βουλοῦμην ἂν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὀρρωδῶ, μὴ τοῦναντίον γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφ' Ἐστίας ἀρχεσθαι κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σὲ. καὶ μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σὲ φησὶ διαφθείρον τοὺς νέους;

ΣΩ. "Ἀτοπα, ὡς θαυμάσω, ὡς ὦτω γ' ἀκούσαι. Ἐφησι γὰρ με ποιητήν εἶναι θεών, καὶ ὡς καίνονς
ποιοῦντα θεοὺς, τῶν δ’ ἁρχαίων ὦ νομίζοντα,

ἐγράφατο τούτων ἀυτῶν ἔνεκα, ὡς φησιν.

ΕΤΘ. Μανθάνω, οἴ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ

dαιμόνιον φής σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γέγνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν

κανονομοούντος σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτῃ

τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβασάτω δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ

dικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὦτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς 15

Ετόσιν πολλοὺς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γὰρ τοῦ, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν

τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ

μέλλοντα, καταγελάσομαι ὡς μαινομένον. καίτοι οὐδὲν

ὁ τι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα δὲν προείπον, ἀλλ’ ὃμως

θεονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν 20

αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ’ ὁμόσε ἴέναι.

III. ΣΩ. Ὡ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν

καταγελασθήναι ἵσως οὐδὲν πράγμα.

Ἀθηναίοις γὰρ τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ

σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται
eἰναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ

σοφίας· ὃν δ’ ἄν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται

μοεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἴτ’ οὖν

φθόνφ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δ’ ἄλλο τι.

ΕΤΘ. Τοῦτον οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ

ἐχουσίν, οὐ πάνω ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Ἰσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν

παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν ὡς ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ

σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας

dοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὃ τι πέρ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ

λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστίθεις 15

ἀν ἡδέως, εἰ τίς μοι ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ

νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιεν μου καταγελάν, ὡσπερ σὺ

Εφής σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἰη ἀνήδες παίζοντας καὶ
γελώντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγείν, εἰ δὲ σπούδασται, τούτ’ ἦδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἁδηλοῦ πλὴν ὑμῶν τοῖς μάντεσιν.

ΕΤΘ. Ἀλλ’ ἵσως οὐδέν ἔσται, ὁ Σώκρατες, πράγμα, ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νουν ἀγωνιζεί τὴν δίκην, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ εἰμὶ τὴν ἐμὴν.

IV. ΣΩ. Ἐστίν δὲ δὴ σοὶ, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, τὸς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἡ διώκεις;

ΕΤΘ. Διώκω.

ΣΩ. Τίνα;

ΕΤΘ. Ὅν διώκων αὐτὸν μαίνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πετόμενον τινα διώκεις;

ΕΤΘ. Πολλοῦ γε δεὶ πέτεσθαι, ὡς γε τυρχὼν ἵνα μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩ. Τὰς υἱός;

ΕΤΘ. Ὅ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩ. Ὅ σὸς, ὁ βέλτιστε;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐστίν δὲ τί τὸ ἐγκλῆμα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΤΘ. Φῶνον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἡράκλεις ἢ ποιν, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὅτε ὅρθως ἔχεις; ὡς γὰρ οἴμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὅρθως αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω ποὺ ἡ σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

ΕΤΘ. Πόρρω μεντοι ἡ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐστίν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκελῶν τις ὁ τεθνεός ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; ἡ δήλα δή; ὡς γὰρ ἂν ποὺ ὑπέρ γε ἀλλότριου ἀπεξεσθά φῶνον αὐτῷ.

ΕΤΘ. Γελοίον, ὁ Σώκρατες, ότι οἴει τι διαφέρειν, εἰτε ἀλλότριος εἰτε οἰκεῖος ὁ τεθνεός, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ὅρθως ἔχει.
τούτο μόνον δείν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκη ἔκτεινεν ὁ 25
κτείνας εἴτε μῆ, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκη, ἔαν, εἰ δὲ
μῆ, ἐπεξείναι, ἐάνπερ ὁ κτείνας συνεστίος σοι καὶ
ὀμοτράπτετος ἦ. Ἰσον γὰρ τὸ μίασμα γίγνεται, ἐὰν
ξυνῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνείδώς καὶ μῆ ἀφοσίοσ σεαυτὸν
tε καὶ ἐκεῖνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξίων/. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀποθανὼν 30—
pελάτης τις ἢν ἐμός, καὶ ὡς ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ
Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευεν εκεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὖν
καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀπο-
σφάττει αὐτὸν. ὁ οὖν πατὴρ συνήσας τοὺς πόδας
καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, 35
πέμπει δεύρῳ ἄνδρα πευσόμενον τοῦ ἕξηγητοῦ ὁ τι
χρείη ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου
ἁλυγώρει τε καὶ ἥμελει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὔδὲν ὁν
πράγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνον. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν.
ὑπὸ γὰρ λημοῦ καὶ ῥύγους καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀπὸ—40
θυήσει, πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον παρὰ τοῦ ἕξηγητοῦ
ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἄγανακτεὶ ὁ τε πατὴρ
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἔγει ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ
πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὔτε ἀποκτείναντε, ὡς
φασὶν ἐκεῖνοι, οὔτ' εἰ ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, 45
ἀνδροφόνου γε ὁντος τοῦ ἀποθανούντος, οὐ δεῖν φρον-
τίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου. ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ νῦν
πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξείναι: κακῶς εἰδότες, ὃ Σώκρατες,
tὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὕσιον τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνόσιον.
ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ δὴ πρὸς Δίος, ὁ Ἐυθύφρος, οὕτω—50
ἀκριβῶς οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅτι ἔχει,
καὶ τῶν ὅσιων τε καὶ ἀνόσιων, ὅστις τούτων οὕτω
πρακτέντων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικαζόμενος
tῷ πατρὶ, ὡς ὁποιεῖς μὴ αὐ τοῦ ἀνόσιου πράγμα τυγχάνης
πράττων;
ΕΘ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μοῦ ὀφελὸς εἴη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὐδὲ τῷ ἂν διαφέροι | Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν 5 ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἶδεν.

V. ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν μοι, ὁ θαυμάσσω Εὐθύφρων, κράτιστον ἕστι μαθητῇ σῷ γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ 10 ἑντὶ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεία περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιοῦμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴ με ἑκείνοις αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητῆς δὲ γέγονα σῶς—καὶ εἰ μὲν, ὁ Μέλητε, φαίην ἂν, Εὐθύφρων Β 15 ὁμολογεῖσι σοφῶν εἶναι τὰ τοιαύτα, καὶ ὅρθώς νομίζειν καὶ ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζων. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἑκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὁς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἑκείνῳ δὲ νοεῖτοντι 20 τε καὶ κολάζοντι—καὶ ἂν μή μοι πείθηται μηδὲ ἀφίη 12 τῆς δίκης ἢ ἂντ' ἐμοῦ γράφηται σὲ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ προϋκαλοῦμην αὐτῶν.

ΕΘ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὁ Σῶκρατες, εἰ άρα με ἐπιχειρήσειε γράφεσθαι, εὐροῦμ' ἂν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅτη σ 25 σαβρὸς ἐστίν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἢμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἑκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι, ὁ φίλε ἐταύρε, ταῦτα γνώσις μαθητῆς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σῶς, εἰδώς ὅτι καὶ 25 ἄλλος ποὺ τίς καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὐτὸς σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως οξέως καὶ ῥάδιως κατείδειν, ὡστε ἀσεβεὶς ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Δίος λέγει μοι, ὁ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι δισχυρίζουσιν πολὺν τι τὸ εὑρίσκειν.
σεβθὲς φῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἁσέβες καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ
D περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταυτὸν ἐστὶν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει 30
ντό οὐσιον αὐτῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὐ τοῦ μὲν
ὁσίον παντὸς ἔναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ὁμοίον καὶ ἔχον
μᾶλιν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ὁσιότητα πᾶν, ὃ τί περ ἢν
μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

ΕΤΘ. Πάντως δήστου, ὁ Σώκρατες.

VI. ΣΩ. Δέγε δή, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ ὁσιον καὶ τὸ
ἀνόσιον;

ΕΤΘ. Δέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν
ὁσιον ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ
ἀδικοῦντι ὃ περὶ φόνους ὃ περὶ
ἰερῶν κλοπὰς ὃ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιοῦ-
των ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξεῖναι, ἐάν τε πατὴ-
ρῶν τυγχάνῃ εάν τε μήτηρ εάν τε ἄλλος ὅστι-
ς εὖν, τὸ δὲ μή ἐπεξεῖναι ἀνόσιον ἐπει, ὁ
Σώκρατες, θέασαι, ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ το
νόμου ὧτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἂν ἔιπον, ὁτι
ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἰγ ὄυτος γυγνόμενα, μή ἐπιτρέπειν
tῷ ἁσβοῦντι μηδὲ ἂν ὅστισον τυγχάνῃ ὅντα
γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι τυγχάνουσιν νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν
θεῶν ἀριστον καὶ δικαιότατον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι 15
ὃ τοῦ αὐτοῦ | πατέρα δῆσαι, ὁτι τοὺς νεῖκοι κατέπινεν

ὡς ἐν δίκη, κακεῖνον ἂν αὐ τοῦ πατέρα
ἐκτεμεῖν δι' ἐτερα τοιαύτα: ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν,
ὅτι τὸ πατρὶ ἐπεξέξχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ ὅτως
αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν 20
καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα γε, ὁ Εὐθύφρος, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν, οὕνεκα
τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαύτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ
tῶν θεῶν λέγη, δυσχερῶς ποιος ἀποδέχομαι; διὸ δὴ,

and holiness? E. (Def. 1) 'To do as I do now. Zeus dealt thus with his father.' S. 'These legends I disbelieve.
25 ὃς ἔοικεν, φῆσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ
σοι ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ τῷ εὐ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων,
ἀνάγκη δή, ὃς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἢμῖν ξυγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ 
καὶ φήσωμεν, οὐ γάρ αὐτὸν ὁμολογούμεν περὶ αὐτῶν 
μηδὲν εἰδέναι; ἀλλὰ μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς φίλου, σὺ ὃς 
30 ἀληθῶς ἤγει ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὡς Ἔκρατες, ὃ 
Σώκρατες, ὃς πολλοὶ οὐκ ἵσασιν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἅρα ἤγει σὺ εἶναι τῷ δυτὶ ἐν 
τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ 
35 μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεται τε υπὸ 
τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ υπὸ τῶν ἁγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε 
ἄλλα ἵερα ἢμῖν καταπεποίκιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς 
μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιοῦ-

tων ποικιλμάτων ἀναγείται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα 
40 ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὡς Εὐθύφρον;

ΕΤΘ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὡς Σώκρατες· ἀλλ’ ὅπερ 
ἀρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐἀντερ βοῦλη, 
περὶ τῶν θείων διηγήσομαι, δ ἂν ἄκοινων εὐ οἶδ’ ὃτι 
ἐκπλαγῆσαι.

VII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομι. ἄλλα ταῦτα 
μὲν μοι εἰσάγως ἐτὶ σχολῆς διηγήσει· 
nυνὶ δὲ, ὅπερ ἀρτι σε ἦρμην, πειρῶ 
σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. οὐ γὰρ με, ὡ ἔταιρε, 
5 τὸ πρότερον ἰκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἑρωτήσαντα 
τὸ ὁσίον, ὃ τι ποτ’ εἴη, ἄλλα μοι εἴπες, ὃτι τοῦτο 
tυγχάνει ὁσίον ὃν, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνον ἑπεξιῶν 
τῷ πατρί.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐλεγον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἰσώς ἂλλα γὰρ, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ἄλλα 
πολλὰ φῆς εἶναι ὁσία.
ΕΤΘ. Καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ὅσια.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὅτε οὐ τοῦτο σοι διεκελευόμην, ἐν τῇ ἡ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὅσιων, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος, ὃ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιὰ ἐστιν; 15 Ἐξέφησα γάρ ποι μὴ ἴδεις τὰ τε ἀνόσια ἁνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια· ἢ οὐ μημονεύεις;

ΕΤΘ. 'Εγώγε.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτην τούνυν με αὐτὴν διδάξαν τὴν ἴδεαν, τὰς ποτὲ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκεῖνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώ- 20 μενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἀν τοιοῦτον ἤ, ὃν ἀν ἦ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ ἢ ἀν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

ΕΤΘ. 'Αλλ' εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σοι φράσω.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν βούλομαι γε.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐστὶ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσ- φιλές ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλές ἁνόσιον.

ΣΩ. | Παγκάλως, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐξή- τουν ἀποκρίνασθαι σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι 30 ἄληθῶς, τοῦτο οὕτω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὦτι ἐπεκδι- δάξαι ὡς ἐστιν ἁληθῆ ἄ λέγεις.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐπισκεψόμεθα τὶ λέγο- μεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλὴς ἀνθρώπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομίστης καὶ ὁ θεομίστης ἁνόσιος· οὐ ταύτων δὲ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον, τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἁνόσιῳ· οὐχ οὕτως (ἐἰρηταί);

ΕΤΘ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρηταί.

ΕΤΘ. Δοκῶ, ὁ Σώκρατες [ἐιρηταί γάρ].

S. 'But since you say that the gods differ among themselves, they will love different things: the same thing will therefore be both holy and unholy.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ  
VIII 7 B

10. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοὶ, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τούτῳ εἰρηταί;

ΕΘ. Εἰρηταί γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργὰς, ὃ ἀριστε, ἢ περὶ 15 τῶν διαφορὰς ποιεῖ; ὁδὲ δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἀρᾷ ἂν εἰ διαφεροίμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ὅποτερα πλεῖον, ἢ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰς ἔχθρον ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιών καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἔλθοντες περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχῦ ἀν ἀπαλλαγέμεν;

20 ΕΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἔλθοντες ταχὺ παυσάμεθα ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς;

ΕΘ. Ἠστι ταύτα.

25 ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστάναι ἔλθοντες, ὡς ἑγώμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κούφοτέρου διακριθείμεν ἂν;

ΕΘ. Πῶς γάρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Περὶ τῶν δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἔχθροι ἂν ἀλλήλοις 30 εἴμεν καὶ ὀργίζομεθα; ἢ σοὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν σοι ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ τάδ' ἐστι τὸ τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀτιχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν; Άφα οὖ ταύτα ἐστιν, περὶ δὲν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἰκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἔχθροι 35 ἀλλήλοις γυγώμεθα, ὅταν γυγώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι πάντες; 

ΕΘ. Ἠστιν ἀὑτὴ ἡ διαφορά, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; οἱ θεοὶ, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, οὐκ ἐπερ τι 40 διαφέρονται, διὰ ταύτα διαφέρονταν ἂν;
ΕΤΘ. Πολλή ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὥς γενναῖε Ἐυθύφρον,
ἀλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τῶν σὸν λόγον,
καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ· οὐ γὰρ
ἀν ποὺ ἑστασίαζον ἄλληλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων 45
ὧς ἤγαρ;
ΕΤΘ. Ἄρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέρ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἑκαστοὶ καὶ
ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία
τοῦτων μισοῦσιν;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτὰ δὲ γε, ὡς σὺ φήσι, οἱ μὲν δίκαια
ἡγοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι· περὶ δὲ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες
8 στασιάζουσι· τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἄλληλοις· ἃρ' οὖτις.

ΕΤΘ. Ὀντω.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα, ως ἔοικεν, μισεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν
θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομυσίῃ τε καὶ θεοφιλῇ ταῦτ'
ἀν εἰη.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ σιὼ ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἀν εἰη, ὡς
Ἐυθύφρον, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΤΘ. Κινδυνεύει.

IX. ΣΩ. Οὖκ ἄρα δὴ ἡρῴην ἀπεκρίνω, ὅ θαυμα-

μάσιε. οὐ γὰρ τούτῳ γε ἡρῴων, δὴ
tυγχάνει ταῦτάν ὃν δοιγό τε καὶ ἀνό-
σιον, δὲ ἂν θεοφιλῆς γ', καὶ θεομυσίς
Β ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ὡς, ὡς Ἐυθύφρον, δὲ
σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν
θαυμαστόν, εἰ τούτῳ δρῶν τῷ μὲν Δίῳ προσφιλῆς
ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Ὑμαραφῷ ἔχθρον, καὶ τῷ

Α. ΕΥ.
μὲν Ἴηθαστὶ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἡρα ἔχθρον' καὶ εἰ τις
ἀλλος τῶν θεῶν ἔτερος ἔτερφ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ,
καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ ταύτα.

ἘΘ. Ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, περὶ γε τούτου
τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἔτερον ἔτερφ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ
dei ἄλλην δίκην διδόναι ἐκείνον, ὅσ ἂν ἄδικως τινὰ ἀπο-
κτῆνη.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ; ἀνθρώπων, ὃ Ἐυθύφρων, ἤδη τινὸς
ἡκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τὸν ἄδικως ἀποκτείνει
νανταν ἂλλο ἄδικως ποιοῦντα ὠτιοῦν οὐ δει δίκην
διδόναι;

20 ΕΘ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταύτα ἀμφισβη-
τοῦντε καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἄδι-
κοῦντες γαρ πάμπολα πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι
φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩ. Ὡς καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὃ Ἐυθύφρων, ἄδικεῖν,
25 καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὄμως οὐ δεῖν φασὶν σφάς διδόναι
δίκην;

ΕΘ. Οὕθαμῶς τούτῳ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πάν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσιν.
τούτῳ γαρ οἶμαι οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδὲ ἀμφισβητεῖν,
30 οὐκ οὐχὶ, εἰπέρ ἄδικοῦσι γε, δοτέον δίκην. ἀλλ' οἶμαι D
οὐ φασὶν ἄδικεῖν. ἡ γὰρ;

ΕΘ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκείνῳ γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ
tὸν ἄδικοντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ ἰσως
35 ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, τὸ τις ἄκοι ὁ ἄδικων καὶ τί δρῶν
καὶ πότε.

ΕΘ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὰ γε ταύτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόν-
θασιν, εἰπέρ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ
ἀδίκων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασίν ἄλλ' ἄλλοισιν 40
ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασίν; ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνο γε δήτου, ὡς
θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾶ
Ε ἔλεγεν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΤΘ. Ναί, τούτο μὲν ἀληθῆς λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρα-
τες, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἔκαστόν γε οἴμαι, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, τῶν
πραξάντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ
ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοί, ἐπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοὶ πράξ-
eos tinos peri diamferomeno i moi dikaioi fasin
avthn peptrakhvai, ois de adikovs 'ap' oux outw;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνω γε.

9   X. ΣΩ. 'Ιθι νυν, ὡς πιλε Εὐθύφρον, δίδαξον | καὶ
ἐμέ, ένα σοφότερος γένομαι, τί σοι τεκ-
μήριον ἐστίν, ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἤγονται
ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκως τεθνάναι, ὡς ἂν θητεύων
ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθεὶς ύπὸ τοῦ
desptóton toû ἀποθανόντος, φθάσῃ τελευτήσας διὰ τα
δेसμα, πρὶν τὸν ξυνδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν
περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθήσασθαι, τί χρή ποιεῖν, καὶ ύπὲρ τοῦ
toe νοῦν δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξείλαν καὶ ἐπισκήπτεσθαι
φονοῦ τὸν νῦν τῷ πατρὶ. Ίθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τὶ 10
Β μοι σαφὲς ἐνδεξασθαί, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον| πάντες
θεοὶ ἤγονται ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πράξιν καὶ
μοι ικανὸς ἐνδεξῆ, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφία οὐδέ-
poté paúsoi...

ΕΤΘ. Ἄλλ' ἵσως οὖκ ὁλγὸν ἔργον ἐστίν, ὡς 15
Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχομι ἀν ἐπιδείσαι
σοι.

ΣΩ. Μακάνων. ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστών
δυσμαθέστερος εἰναι: ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνος γε ἐνδείξει δήλον
20 ὅτι, ὡς ἀδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνω γε σαφῶς, ὁ Ἡσίκρατες, ἕκασπερ ἀκούοντας γέ μου λέγοντος.

XI. ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἀκούονται, ἕκασπερ εὖ δοκῆς C λέγειν. τόδε δέ σου ἐνενόησά ἁμα λέ-
γοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτόν σκοπῶ· εἰ ὁ
τι μάλιστά με Εὐθύφρων διδάξεις, ὡς
οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον
ἡγοῦνται ἀδικοὺν εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ
μεμάθηκα παρ' Εὐθύφρωνος, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὅσιόν
τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισίες μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἐργον,
ὡς ἐσκέι, εἴ τι ἄν· [ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὖ τοὐτῷ ἐφάνη ἄρτι
ωρίσμενα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μὴ· τὸ γὰρ θεομισίες ὃν καὶ
θεοφιλεῖς ἐφάνη·] ὥστε τοῦτον ἀφίμι σε, ὁ Εὐθύ-
φρον' εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ ἠγελόθην θεοὶ ἀδικοὺν D
καὶ πάντες μισούντων. Ἀλλ' ἄρα τοῦτο νῦν ἐπανορ-
θώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ὁ μὲν ἄν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ
15 μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον ἐστίν, ὃ δ' ἄν φιλῶσιν, ὅσιον: ὃ δ'
ἄν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἡ ἀμφό-
tερα; ἀρ' οὔτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὁρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ
ὁσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνόσιου;

ΕΤΘ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὁ Ἡσίκρατες;

20 ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐμὲ γε, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ
σῶν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὔτω ῥάστα με
didάξεις ὁ ὑπέσχον.

· ΕΤΘ. 'Αλλ' ἔγγυς φαίνει ἄν τοῦτο εἶναι E
tὸ ὅσιον, ὃ ἄν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ
25 ἐναντίον, ὃ ἄν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο, ὁ Εὐθύ-
φρον, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἡ ἐσμέν καὶ οὖτως ἡμῶν τε
αὐτῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν μόνον φη
tις τι ἔχεω οὕτω, ξυγχωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκέπτεον
τι λέγει ὁ λέγων;

ΕΤΘ. Σκέπτεον· οἶμαι μέντοι ἐγώγε τοῦτο νων
καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

XII. ΣΩ. Τάχι, ὥγαθε, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐν-
ιο νόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιώνδε ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι
ὅσιον ἔστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ
ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιον ἔστιν;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ οἷδ᾽ ὁ τι λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι.
λέγομεν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρων, καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ
ἀγων, καὶ ῥώμεσθαι καὶ ῥῷμον· καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐτερα ἄλληλων ἔστι καὶ ἢ ἐτερα;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγώγε μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενον τι ἔστιν, καὶ τούτου
ἐτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;

ΕΤΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον, διότι
φέρεται, φερόμενον ἔστιν, ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ, διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ
ὅρωμεν, διότι ὀρᾶται;

ΕΤΘ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὀρώμενον γέ ἔστιν, διὰ τὸ
τοῦτο ὀρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον διότι ὀρᾶται, διὰ
τοῦτο ὀρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενον ἔστιν, διὰ τοῦτο
ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ
diότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερό-
μενον. ἄρα κατάδηλον, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, ὃ βούλομαι 25
C λέγειν; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι, εἴ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι
πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενον ἐστί, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι
gίγνεται, γιγνόμενον ἐστὶν. οὐδὲ ὅτι πάσχουν ἐστὶ,
pάσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάσχει, πάσχουν ἐστὶν. ἢ οὐ
30 ἔναγχωρεῖς οὖνς;
ΕΤΘ. Ἐγγωγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενον τι
ἐστὶν ἢ πάσχουν τι ὑπὸ του;
ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.
35 ΣΩ. Καὶ τούτῳ ἄρα οὖνς ἔχει, ὡσπερ τὰ
πρὸτερα. οὖχ ὅτι φιλούμενον ἐστὶν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ δὲν
φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον;
ΕΤΘ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τι δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, ὁ Εὐθύ-
40 φρον; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων, ὡς ὁ σὸς
λόγος;
ΕΤΘ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ἀρα διὰ τούτῳ, ὅτι ὁσίον ἐστὶν, ἢ δὲ ἄλλο τι;
ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτῳ.
45 ΣΩ. Διότι ἄρα ὁσίον ἐστὶν, φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' οὖν
ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τούτῳ ὁσίον ἐστὶν;
ΕΤΘ. Ἑσικεῖν.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν,
φιλούμενον ἐστὶ καὶ θεοφιλὲς <τὸ θεοφιλὲς>.
50 ΕΤΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὁσίον ἐστὶν, ὁ Εὐθύ-
φρον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὁσίον θεοφιλὲς, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτερον τούτῳ τούτου.
ΕΤΘ. Πῶς δὴ, ὁ Σῶκρατες;
ΣΩ. ὃτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὁσίον διὰ τοῦτο
55 φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὁσίον ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οὖ διότι φιλεῖται,
ὁσίον εἶναι: ἢ γάρ;
XIII  Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε θεοφιλὲς οὕτω φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τοῦτῷ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὖχ οὗτοι θεοφιλὲς, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ γε ταύτων ἢν, ὃ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι | ἐφιλεῖται τὸ ὅσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἃν τὸ θεοφιλὲς, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ἀν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὅσιον ἦν γνῷ δὲ ὅρας ὧτι ἐναντίως ἔχετον, ὡς πανταπασισ ἔτερῳ ὑπετε ἀλλήλων.

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ, ὃτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἶον φιλεῖσθαι. τὸ δ’ ἢτι ἐστὶν οἶον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κυνδυνεύεις, ὃ Εὐθύφρων, ἑρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ τι 15 ποτ’ ἐστὶν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῖν οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δὲ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὃ τι πε- 

ΕΤΘ. Ἀλλ’, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι εἰπτὸ ὅ νοῦ. περιέρχεται γὰρ πῶς ἦμιν αἰὲ ὁ ἂν 25 προθύμως, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπως ἂν ἰδρυσώ- 

ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προσάν, ὃ Εὐθύφρων, ἔσοικεν 

ἐλωὶ Δαίδαλον τὰ ὑπὸ σου λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἔγω ἔλεγεν καὶ ἐπιθέμην, ἵσως ἂν με ἔπεσκαπτῆς, 30
ός ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου. ξυγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅποιν ἄν τις αὐτὰ ἑτέρι πόλεις δὲ σαί γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰς ἧν ἀλλοι δὴ τινος δεῖ σκόμματος. οὐ γὰρ 35 ἐθέλουσι σοι μένειν, ὦς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν τι τοῦ αὑτοῦ σκόμματος, ὁ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γὰρ περιέναι τούτων τούτῳ καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὖν εἶμι ὁ ἐντιθέσθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ 40 Δαίδαλος· ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἐνεκα ἐμενεν ἄν ταῦτα σοῦ ὁμώς.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὁ ἑταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσοῦτο, ὡς οἱ μὲν τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνα ἔπολει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τὸν 45 ἐμαυτοῦ, ὦς ἐοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δὴ ταῦτό μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, δὴ τὸν εἰμὶ σοφὸς. ἐβουλώμην γὰρ ἄν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ άκινητός ἰδρύσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τῇ Δαίδαλον ἑ 50 σοφία τὰ Ταυτάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων μὲν ἄδην· ἐπείδη δὲ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτὸς σοι ἐμπροθυμίσθωσοι [δεῖξαι] ὅπως ἄν με διδάξῃς περὶ τοῦ ὄσιον καὶ μὴ προπαθὰμας. ἐδὲ γὰρ εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὄσιον.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοῦγε.

55 ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὄσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ὄσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ὅδικαίν οὐ πᾶν ὄσιον, ἀλλὰ 12 τὸ μὲν αὑτοῦ ὄσιον, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἄλλο;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐχ ἐπομαῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν νεωτέρος γε μοι εἰ οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἦ 60 ὁσφοφότερος· ἀλλ', ὁ λέγω, τρυφῆς ὑπὸ πλοῦτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὁ μακάριε, ξύντευνε σαυτὸν· καὶ
γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπῶς κατανόησαι ὁ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ
tὸ ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ ποιητῆς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιητῆς
Ζῆνα δὲ τὸν θ' ἑρξαντα, καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντ' ἐφύτευσέν,

Β Οὐκ ἔθελεσ εἰπεῖν. ἦνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ

ἀιδώς.

ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἶπώ σοι ὅπη;

ΕΥΘ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἦνα δέος, ἐνθά καὶ

ἀιδώς· πολλοὶ γὰρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ

πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαύτα δεδιότες δεδίναι 7ο

μέν, αἰδείσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἀ δεδίασιν. οὔ καὶ

σοι δοκεῖ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἦνα γε αἰδώς, ἐνθά καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἔτει

ἔστων ὡστε αἰδεύμενος τι πράγμα καὶ αἰσχυνόμενος 75

ὅπως πεφόβηταί τε καὶ δέδοικεν άμα δέξαν πονηρίας;

ΕΥΘ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἃρ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἦνα γὰρ δέος,

ἐνθά καὶ αἰδώς· ἀλλ' ἦνα μὲν αἰδώς, ἐνθά καὶ δέος, οὔ

μέντοι ἦνα γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδώς. ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ 80

ὁμαί δέος αἰδώς· μόριον γὰρ αἰδώς δέος, ὡσπερ

ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὡστε οὔχ ἰναπερ ἀριθμός· ἐνθά καὶ

περιττόν, ἦνα δὲ περιττόν, ἐνθά καὶ ἀριθμός. ἔπει

γὰρ ποιν νῦν γε;

ΕΥΘ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῖνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἠρώτων,

ἀρα ἦνα δίκαιον, ἐνθά καὶ δόσιον, ἢ ἦνα μὲν δόσιον, ἐνθά

καὶ δίκαιον, ἦνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὔ πανταχοῦ δόσιον· μόριον

γὰρ τοῦ δίκαιου τὸ δόσιον. οὔτω φάμεν ἢ ἀλλως σοι

δοκεῖ;
ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ, ἄλλ' οὖτω. φαίνει γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

XIV. ΣΩ. Ὡρὰ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γάρ μέρος τὸ ὄσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρέθη τὸ ποιον μέρος ἂν εἰς τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὄσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ με ἰρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δή, οἷον ποιον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸν τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ἂν τυγχάνει οὕτως ὁ ἀριθμός, εἴπον ἂν ὅτι δὲ ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ἢ ἄλλ’ ἰσοσκελῆς· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοῦγε.

10 ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὖτω διδάξαι, τὸ Εποιον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὄσιον ἔστω, ἢν καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέτθ’ ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβεῖς γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἰκανῶς ἡδὴ παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τά μῆ.

15 ΕΤΘ. Τούτῳ τοῖνυν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Σωκρατεῖς, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβῆς τε καὶ ὄσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

XV. ΣΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, φαίνει λέγειν· ἄλλα σμικρῷ | τινός ἐτι 13 εὐδῆς εἰμι. τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαν οὕτω εὐνυπῇ ἤτινα ὀνομάζεις. οὐ γὰρ ποι

5 λέγεις ὅς, ολαίπτερ καὶ αἴ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπεῖαι εἰςω, τοιαύτῃ καὶ περὶ θεοῦς. λέγομεν γὰρ ποι—οἰνον φαμέν, ἱπποι οὐ πῶς ἐπισταται θεραπεύειν, ἄλλ’ ὁ ἱππικός· ἢ γὰρ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. 'Η γὰρ ποι ἱππική ἱππων θεραπεία.
ΕΘ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ούδε γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπισταταί θεραπεύειν, ἀλλ' ὁ κυνηγητικός.
ΕΘ. Οὔτως.
ΣΩ. Η γάρ που κυνηγητικὴ κυνοῦν θεραπεῖα. 15
ΕΘ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.
ΕΘ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ δὴ ὀσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὁ
Εὐθύφρον; οὔτω λέγεις; 20
ΕΘ. Ἐγώγη.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταύτῳ διαπράττεται; ὦ '"πον τοιόνυς' ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ωφελίᾳ
tοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὀρᾶς δὴ ὅτι οἱ ἢπποι ὑπὸ
tῆς ἵππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ωφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίως 25
gίγνονται· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσι σοι;
ΕΘ. Ἐμογησὶ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γε ποὺ ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγητικῆς
cωσαύτως· ἡ ἐπὶ βλάβη οἰεῖ τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν 30
θεραπεῖαν εἶναι;
ΕΘ. Μὰ Δι' οὔκ ἔγνωγη.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἐπ' ωφελίᾳ;
ΕΘ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;
ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἡ Ἰππότης θεραπεία οὕσα θεῶν 35
ωφελίᾳ τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίως τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ;
καὶ σὺ τούτῳ ἄγχωρήσας ἀν, ὡς ἑπειδὰν τι θοιον
ποιῆς, βελτίω τινά τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζεις;
ΕΘ. Μὰ Δι' οὔκ ἔγνωγη.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγω, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, οἵμαι σε τούτῳ 40
λέγειν· πολλοῦ καὶ δὲω· ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἐνεκα καὶ
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

άνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγως τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, δ’
oùx ἤγονεμονὶ σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ὄρθως γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ
45 τοιαύτην λέγω.

ΣΩ. Εἶπεν· ἀλλὰ τὶς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἶ ἡ
ὁσιότης;

ΕΤΘ. Ἡπερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσ-
πότας θεραπεύουσιν.

50 ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὑπηρετικὴ τις ἂν, ὡς ἔσκεν, εἰὴ
θεοὶς.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

XVI. ΣΩ. Ἔχως ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἡ ἱατροὶς
ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν
τυγχάνει ὑπηρετικὴ; οὐκ εἰς ὑγείας
οἷς;

ΕΤΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἡ ναυτηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ ἔ
eἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ
ἐστὶν;

ΕΤΘ. Δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοῖον.

10 ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμος γέ ποιος εἰς οἰκίας;

ΕΤΘ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοὶς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς
τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἰῆ; δῆλον γὰρ
ὅτι σὺ οἰσθα, ἐπειδὴτερ τά γε θεία κάλλιστά γε φῆς
15 εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἄληθή γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Δίος, τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο τὸ
πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργαζόμενοι ἡμῖν ὑπηρε-
ταίς χρόμουν;

20 ΕΤΘ. Πολλά καὶ καλά, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΧVII 14 C  ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ.  23

14  ΣΩ.  Καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοὶ, ὁ φίλε, ἄλλι ὄμως
tὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥᾴδιος ἄν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ
πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὐ;
ΕΤΘ.  Πῶς δὲ οὐ;
ΣΩ.  Πολλὰ δὲ γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ 25
γεωργοὶ· ἄλλι ὄμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἔστιν τῆς
ἀπεργασίας ἤ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφῆ.
ΕΤΘ.  Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ.  Τὶ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἢ οἱ θεοὶ
ἀπεργάζονται; τὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον ἔστι τῆς ἐργασίας; 30
ΕΤΘ.  Καὶ ὅλιγον τοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὁ Σώ-
Βραχυτέρων, ὅτι πλεονος ἔργου ἔστιν ἀκριβῶς πάντα
tαῦτα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω,
ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπιστηται τοῖς
θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε 35
καὶ θύων, ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ σοὶ, καὶ σφέζει τὰ
tοιαύτα τούς τε ἰδίους οἶκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ
tῶν πόλεων· τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων
ἀσέβη, ἢ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἀπαντα καὶ
ἀπόλλυσιν.

ΧVII. ΣΩ.  'Η πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὃ
Εὐθυφρόν, εἰ ἔβουλου, εἴπες ἂν τὸ
κεφάλαιον ὃς ἥρωτων. ἂλλα γὰρ οὐ
πρόθυμος με εἰ διδάξαι, δῆλος εἰ.
καὶ
gὰρ χῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἰσθα, ἀπετράπου· ὁ εἰ 5
ἀπεκρίνων, ἴκανος ἄν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσίότητα
ἐμεμαθήκη. χῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν ἐρωτα τῷ
ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅτι ἂν ἐκείνος ὑπάγῃ· τὶ δὴ
αὐ λέγεις τὸ οὐσιον εἰναι καὶ τὴν ὁσίότητα; οὐχὶ
ἐπιστήμην τῶν τῶν θύειν τε καὶ εὐχέσθαι;
ΕΤΘ.  'Εγὼγε.

S. 'You have evaded my question,
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαι ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δὲ εὐχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς;
ΕΤΘ. Καὶ μᾶλα, ὃ Σώκρατες.

15 ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμη ἁρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς καὶ ὁσιότης ἀν εἰη ἐκ τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου.
ΕΤΘ. Πάνω καλῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ξυνήκας ὃ εἶπον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιθυμητής γὰρ εἰμι, ὃ φίλε, τῆς σῆς ἡμείας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νῦν αὐτή, ἢςτε οὐχ ἔχειμαι
πεσεῖται ἄτι ἂν εἴπης. ἀλλά μοι λέξον, τῆς αὐτής ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ
didόναι ἐκεῖνος;
ΕΤΘ. Ἐγώγη.

ΧVIII. ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ ῥθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν
eἰη, ὃν δεόμεθα παρ’ ἐκεῖνων, ταῦτα
αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;
ΕΤΘ. Ἀλλὰ τί;

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ τὸ διδόναι ῥθῶς, ὃν ἐκεῖνον τυχ-Ε
χάνουσιν δεόμενοι παρ’ ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκεῖνοι αὖ
ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γὰρ ποὺ τεχνικὸν γ’ ἂν εἴη
dωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὃν οὐδὲν δεῖται.
ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

10 ΣΩ. Ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη, ὃ Ἐυθύφρων,
τεχνὴ ἡ ὁσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ’ ἄλληλων.
ΕΤΘ. Ἐμπορική, εἰ οὕτως ἤδιὸν σοι ὄνομάζειν.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἤδιον ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυχάναι
ἀληθὲς ὁν. φράσον δὲ μοι, τῆς ἡ ὀφελία τοῖς θεοῖς
15 τυχάναι οὕσα ἀπὸ τῶν δόρων ὃν παρ’ ἡμῶν λαμβά-
nουσιν; ἢ μὲν γὰρ διδόσειν, παντὶ δῆλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ
ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ὃ τι | ἂν μὴ ἐκεῖνοι δοσίων· ἢ δὲ 15
παρ’ ἡμῶν λαμβάνοντι, τὶ ὀφελοῦνται; ἡ τοσοῦτον
αὕτων πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα τάγαθα παρ’ αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκείνου δὲ 20 παρ’ ἰμάων οὐδέν;

ΕΤΘ. ἈΛΛʼ οἱεί, ὁ Σωκράτης, τοὺς θεοὺς ωφε- λεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων ἄ παρ’ ἰμάων λαμβάνουσιν;

ΣΩ. ἈΛΛὰ τί δήποτε ἀν εἰὴ ταῦτα, ὁ Εὐθύφρων,

τὸ παρ’ ἰμάων δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς; 25

ΕΤΘ. Τί δ’ οἱεί ἄλλο ἡ τιμὴ τε καὶ γέρα καὶ ὁπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

ΣΩ. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστὶν, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, τὸ ὅσιον, ἈΛΛʼ οὐχὶ ωφελίμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΤΘ. Οἴμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον. 30

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ ἄρ’ ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὅσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

ΕΤΘ. Μάλιστα γε.

XIX. ΣΩ. Θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐὰν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἄλλα βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδα-

λον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὁν πολὺ γε τεχνικότερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιώντας 5 ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει ὅτι οἱ λόγοι ἦμῶν περιελθῶν

C πάλιν εἰς ταῦτον ἤκει; μέμνησαι γὰρ ποι ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τὸ τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφίλες οὐ ταῦτον ἦμιν ἐφάνη, ἅλλʼ ἐτερα ἀλλήλων η ὡς μέμνησαι;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγώγε. 10

ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἔννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον φῆς ὅσιον εἶναι; τούτῳ δ’ ἄλλῳ τι ἡ θεοφιλεῖς γίγ-

νεται; ἢ οὐ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἢ ἐι 15 τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὁρθῶς τιθέμεθα.
ΗΠΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. ΧΙΧ 15 C

ΕΤΘ. 'Ενοκεν.

XX. ᾿ΣΩ. 'Εξ ἀρχής ἀρα ἦμιν πάλιν σκέπτεον,
τι ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον· ὡς ἑγὼ, πρὶν ἀν μᾶθω,
ἐκὼν εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ
με ἀτιμάσῃς, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσ-
έχων τὸν νοῦν ὑπὸ τὸ μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ
tὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἶσθα γάρ, εἶπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώ-
πων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἰ, ὡσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν
ἀν εἶπης. εἰ γάρ μη ἡθησα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐπεχειρήσας ὑπὲρ
ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄλλρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθειν
φόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυ-
νεύειν, μή οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὕτο ποιήσαις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους ήσχύνθης. νῦν δὲ εὐ οἴδα ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἰδέναι
tὸ τέρον καὶ μή· εἰπὲ οὖν, ὥς ἐβέλτιστο Εὐθύφρων, ἔ
καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὅ τι αὐτὸ ἦγει.

ΕΤΘ. Εἰσαθθεὶς τοῖνυν, ὃ Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ
σπεύδω ποι, καὶ μοι ὁρὰ ἀπίεναι.

ΣΩ. Οἶα ποιεῖς, ὃ ἐταῖρε· ἀπὶ ἐπίδος με κατα-
βαλὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ήν εἴχον, ὥς παρὰ σοῦ
μαθῶν τὰ τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον
γραφής ἀταλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἑκεῖνο ὅτι σοφὸς
ἥδη παρ’ Εὐθύφρωνος | τὰ θεία γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι 16
ὑπ’ ἄγνοιας αὐτοσχεδίαξω οὐδὲ κανονομῷ περί αὐτά,
καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὃτι ἀμείνον βιωσοῦμην.
NOTES.

Εὐθύφρων ἦ περὶ ὅσιου, πειραστικός. So the title appears in the Bodleian ms, except that πειραστικός seems to have been added by a later hand. Plato probably called the dialogue simply Εὐθύφρων, in accordance with his frequent habit of naming his dialogues after an interlocutor: e.g. Crito, Theaetetus, Protagoras, Phaedrus. The words ἦ περὶ ὅσιου were added by the critic Thrasylius, who flourished about the Christian Era. Thrasylius classified the Platonic dialogues into dialogues of search (ἐπητικός) and of exposition (ὑφηγητικός): he subdivided the former into γυμναστικός (including μαντικός and πειραστικός) and ἀγωνιστικός (including ἐνδείκτικος and ἀναπρεπτικός), while the latter or expository class fell into θεωρητικός (either φυσικός or λογικός) and πρακτικός (ἡθικός or πολιτικός). See Grote's Plato Vol. 1 p. 161. The other examples of peirastic or 'testing' dialogues were the Charmides, Io, and Meno: with the last of these the Euthyphro has much in common: see Introduction p. xxx.

The scene of the dialogue is in or near the porch of the King Archon. For dramatic purposes, Plato seems to represent the conversation as taking place soon after the interview with Theaetetus in the dialogue of that name: see Theaet. 210 D: νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφῆν, ἦν μὲ γέγραπται. On Euthyphro as a man see Introd. p. xxii.

A. EU.
CHAPTER I.

Socrates, happening to fall in with Euthyphro, relates to him the circumstances of his prosecution by Meletus.

1. τι νεώτερον. Socrates had never figured in a law-court till now, either as prosecutor or as defendant: see Apol. 17 D νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβήσακα, ἔτη γεγονός ἐβδομήκοντα. The neuter comparative of νέος (less frequently καυνός) is preferred to the positive, to express an objectionable novelty: Prot. 310 B μὴ τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις; Hence νεώτερον τι, νεώτεριζειν, and νεώτερισμός are used of revolutionary movements. δὴ is the conjunction quod Eng. that: here however it retains more than it usually does of its original pronominal use as acc. n. of δοτις. See the editor's Apol. App. ii p. 123. Cron invariably writes δὴ for both rel. (not δὲ) and conjunction.

2. τὰς ἐν Δυναλεῖ—διατριβᾶς. The Lyceum was one of the three famous gymnasia outside the walls of Athens: the others were the Ἀκαδημεία (6 stades from the Dipylon or north-west gate: Cic. de Fin. v i. 1) and the Κυνόσαργες (a little way N. E. from the Lyceum, on the road to Ἀλόπεκε). It was situated (see Milchhöfer in Baumeister's Denkmäler i p. 182) on the right bank of the Ilissus, near Diochares' gate, east of the city. Connected with the gymnasion, which is said by Theopompus to have been founded by Pisistratus, was a shrine of Ἀπόλλων Δύκειος of very early date (Plut. Theseus 27. 9). In later times it was famous as the seat of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school. Socrates was generally to be found in places of common resort, like gymnasia and the market place: it is to the Lyceum that he betakes himself after Agathon's banquet (Symp. 223 D): and the Lyceum is also the scene of the dialogues Lysis and Euthydemus. διατριβῶν and διατριβαί (originally simply of spending the time) suggest philosophical conversation, as the most rational way of occupying one's leisure: e.g. in Apol. 29 C ἐφ' ὧν μηκεί̂τι ἐν ταύτῃ̂ τῇ̂ ζητήσει διατριβεῖ̂ν μηδὲ̃ φιλοσοφεί̂ν: ibid. 37 C τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τῶν λόγον. So σχολή has already in Greek come to be used for a disputation and even for a 'philosophical school'.

3. τὴν τοῦ βασίλεως στοάν. The porch of the King Archon (στοά βασίλεως Ar. Eccles. 685) was the first porch in the ἄγορα on your right as you approached the market place from the Ceramicus.
Paus. 1. 3. 1 πρώτη δὲ ἐστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ καλουμένη στοά βασιλείου (sc. as you leave the Ceramicus). It was the duty of the King Archon to maintain many of the religious duties that had originally belonged to the Athenian King (compare the function of the Rex Sacrorum in the early Roman Republic): among other religious offices, he had charge of the mysteries, the Άνων and the torch-race: and in accordance with the usual principle of Athenian law, he had the presidency (ἡγεμονία δικαστηρίου) of the Heliastic Court when charges connected with his sphere of duties, impiety, for example, were being heard (Gilbert Handbuch der Gr. Staatsalterthümer 1 p. 241).

4. καὶ σοι γε. γε does not go with καὶ in the idiomatic sense of καὶ—γε=‘yes, and’, but with ὁ γὰρ: cf. infra 2 β οῦ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ γε: 4 β οῦ γὰρ ἤπειρος γε: 8 οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο γε. Schanz remarks that Plato nearly always uses γε with οὗ γὰρ.

δίκη. δίκη is the general term for a case heard before an Athenian law-court. There were two sorts of δίκαι viz. the δίκη ἱδία (ἄγων ἱδίος) or δίκη proper, and the δίκη ἡμοσία (ἄγων ἡμόσιος) or γραφή. The first was a civil suit: the latter either a criminal or a public process, in which the state (as represented by any Athenian citizen in the full exercise of his rights) was prosecutor. An accusation of φόνος was a γραφή: but Euthyphro here uses the more general term, in order not to prejudge the nature of the case in which Socrates might be concerned. In Socrates’ careful distinction between γραφή and δίκη in his reply Schanz sees a delicate sarcasm on Euthyphro’s vaunted accuracy in the use of names: see Crat. 396 D.

5. ὁπερ ἐμοί. The ἄρχων βασιλεὺς as public guardian of religion presided in trials for φόνος: for it was a religious duty to wipe off the stain of bloodguiltiness: see 4 c ἂν γὰρ τοῦ μεροῦς ἔγνεται, ἐὰν ξυρῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ ἔσωβει καὶ μὴ ἄφοσίοις σεαντῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνῳ τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξειρω.

6. οὕτω δή—γε. ‘No, Euthyphro, the Athenians do not’ etc. γε, following the emphatic Ἀνων, should be taken with οὕτω δή. So in Crat. 438 D οὕτω δὴ δικαίων γε, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ὁ Εὐθύφρων. B for the most part and T everywhere read ὁ Εὐθύφρων throughout the dialogue. Fritzsche compares similar

1 The Bodleian ms of Plato is denoted by B : T stands for the ms in the library of St Mark’s at Venice. These two are the best representatives of the two families of Platonic ms.
mistakes in the Laurentian ms of Sophocles e.g. Ajax 903 ὅ ταλαλ-φρων: O. T. 1299 ὅ γλύμων.

2 B 8. ὡς έλοκε seems to shew that no interrogation is intended:
I have therefore removed the mark of interrogation placed by most
of the editors after γέγραπται. σέ is clearly emphatic (as in line
11): for which reason I print γραφήν σέ τίς, not γραφήν σέ τίς.
Euthyphro, knowing Socrates’ invariable ἀπαγομοσύνη, at once
leaps to the conclusion that he is the accused, and not the accuser.

γέγραπται. γράφεσθαι = to cause to be written down: γράφεω
= to write, as in Theaetetus. 142 D ἐγραφάμην τότε εὐθὺς—
ὑπομήματα, ὦστερον δὲ—ἐγραφόν. Hence γράφεσθαι = ‘to indict’:
the name of the accused party being written down by the ἀρχων or
his clerk: whereas γράφεω = ‘to propose a motion’ i.e. to write it
out oneself. Notice the two accusatives γραφήν γράφεσθαί σέ: the
first is the accusative of the internal, the second of the external
object: Thompson Greek Syntax p. 66. γέγραμμεν alone would
have sufficed for the sense: but a certain rhetorical effect of surprise
and indignation is attained by repeating Socrates’ γραφήν, at the
same time that the antithesis with δίκην is thereby emphasized.

9. καταγγέλσωμαι. καταγγέλσωκεν is to see a weak point in
one: Apol. 25 A πολλὴν γέ μον κατέγρωκας διόστυλον: Phaed. 116
C οὖ καταγγέλσωμαι γε σοῦ διπερ τῶν ἄλλων καταγγέλσωκω. οὐ γάρ
πον is found in one inferior ms, whence Stephanus read οὖ γάρ
σοῦ; but the omission of the genitive is accounted for by the
presence of σοῦ in the next clause οὐ σοῦ ἔτερον. Compare Thuc. vi
34. 8: ἐπέρχονται γάρ ἡμῖν ὡς οὐκ ἄμυνουμενοι, δικαίως κατέγρω-
κότες δτὶ αὐτοῦς οὐ μετὰ Δακεδαμονίων ἐφθείρομεν. Τ here has
ὡς σοῦ γε ἔτερον.

11. ἄλλα στὶ ἄλλος. ‘Interrogatio supervacanea est valde miran-
tis’, says Wohlrab. ἄλλος is used after ἔτερον for the sake of variety.
So in Aristotle Ethic. Nic. IX 4. 1166b ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν
ἄλλα δὲ βοῶνται. Here perhaps the jingle is intended to suggest
Euthyphro’s peculiar tricks of language: see Crat. 396 D and
Introd. p. xxiii.

14. οὐδ’ αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνόσκω = “ne ipse quidem satis
novi”. On οὐ πάνυ see Riddell’s Digest of Platonic Idioms § 139.
It means ‘not quite’ i.e. generally ‘not exactly’, though some-
times ‘not at all’ by the usual Greek meiosis or ἐμφασις. It is
however held by some scholars that οὐ πάνυ occasionally = πάνυ οὐ
even without assuming meiosis: see Classical Review for 1887 p.
71. The addition of the adverbial τι makes the expression vaguer and
less emphatic. So Phaed. 57 A οὐδεὶς πάντα τι ἑπιχωρᾶσαι τὰ νῦν
Ἄθηνας: Rep. iv 419 A ἐὰν τίς σε φή μή πάντα τι εὐθαμονας ποιεῖν
tοῦτοι τοὺς ἄνδρας.

16. Μελητόν. Apol. 23 ε ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μελητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτὸς καὶ Λύκων. Meletus was the protagonist in the prosecu-
tion of Socrates: his συνήγοροι were Anytus and Lyco. Hence
when it is desired to allude to the prosecution briefly, Meletus
alone is mentioned: so in Apol. 19 B foll. and Theaet. 210 D τὴν
Μελητόν γραφῆν, ἣν με γέγραπται. On Meletus generally see
the editor’s Introduction to the Apology p. xxvi. Notice the
indifference which Socrates contrives to express by means of νέος
τίς and ὡς ἐγὼ μαί.

17. τῶν δῆμων Πυθεώς. The deme Πυθος was in the tribe
Cecropis. τῶν δῆμων is a partitive genitive; for Πυθεώς = ἐκ Πυθοῦ.
The old reading was τῶν δήμων (acc. of reference): Cobet Novae
Lectiones p. 671 rightly remarks “corrige τῶν δῆμων”, and so B
and T. See Holden on Plutarch Themist. I § 1 πατρὸς γὰρ ἦν
Νεοκλέους—Φρεαρρίου τῶν δήμων. Schanz remarks that this
gen. is not found on Inscriptions, and that in manuscripts it
generally precedes the name of the deme.

νῇ ἔχειν = meminisse: ἐν νῇ ἔχειν = in animo habere i.q. to
intend. Contrast Apol. 20 B τίνα αὐτοῦ ἐν νῇ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην
λαβεῖν; with Rep. vi 490 A ἥγειτο δ’ αὐτῷ, εἰ νῇ ἔχεις, πρῶτον
μὲν ἀλήθεια κτλ. There is here inferior ms authority for εἰ νῇ.

18. οἶον τετανότρικα by the usual attraction for τοιοῦτον οἶος
ἐστι τετανόθρις. Cf. Soph. 237 C χαλεπὸν ἦρον καὶ σχέδων εἶπεῖν
οἷς γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον = τοιοῦτοι οἶος γε ἐγὼ εἶμι.
Kühner’s Griechische Grammatik II p. 916. τετανόθρις implies long rigid
hair (curls). Astrologers used to maintain that a man born under
the sign Virgo would be τετανόθρις χαρодὸς λευκόχρως ἀταῖς
αἴδημων (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. v 95). For long hair as affected
by anyone who ἄκει εἶναι τί see Aristoph. Nub. 545 καγὼ μὲν
τοιοῦτος ἄνηρ ὧν ποιητής οὐ κομ. In Rep. iv 425 B Plato cites
short hair (koupal) as a mark of the well-conducted youth. Just so
the Ephors annually commanded the Spartans κελεσθαι τὸν
μύστακα καὶ πελέσθαι τοῖς νόμωι (Plut. Cleom. 9, on the authority
of Aristotle), although it was only the moustache that the Spartans
fell foul of: long hair in general was considered Dorian and
‘aristocratic. οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον alludes to Meletus’ youth: so infra
in 2 C he is the tell-tale little boy complaining to his mother. It is clear also from Apol. 25 D and 26 E that Meletus was young. ἐπίγρυντος ἐπίγρυντος (ἐπίγρυντος = 'somewhat hook-nosed'); the word occurs again Phaedr. 253 D in a description of the noble steed, just as the horses in the Panathenaic frieze are ἐπίγρυντοι. In Rep. v 474 D βασιλικός is said to be a polite euphemism for γρυνός, like ἐπίχαρς for σιμός. Here the δὲ seems to imply that Meletus made up for deficiency in beard by amplitude of nose. On the whole, Meletus gives us the impression of a Roman-nosed and angular young man: Socrates was flat-nosed and rotund.

20. οὐκ ἐμνω: ἐμνω = νη ἐμχω 'I remember': Polit. 296 A οὐκ ἐμνω νῦν γ' ὑ变态. ἀλλὰ δὲ marks the return after the digression. The particle is also idiomatically used = 'at enim' to introduce the objection of an adversary: see Stallbaum on Rep. II 365 D.

2 C 22. ἣντια: A previous speaker's question is invariably repeated by the indirect interrogative. Schanz (following one inferior ms) emends Laches 195 A where a question is repeated with πρὸς τι; to πρὸς δὲ τι:

ἐμογε δοκεῖ: without ἐσ, as in Crito 50 B ἐ δοκεὶ σοι σοι ὑπὲρ τε and Phaed. 108 D ὁ βιος μοι δοκεὶ ὃ ἐμβς. In such cases inferior mss frequently insert ὁσ.

23. οὗ φαίλον 'no slight thing': φαίλον is a more general term than ἀγενῆς, which denotes lack of courage (γεννάδας. Supra ἐγνωκέαι (novissee) is 'to know': as γιγνώσκεω (noscere) 'to perceive' or 'learn'.

24. τίνα τρόπον οἷς νέος διαφθείροται. For the terms of the indictment of Socrates see Apol. 24 B Ἐ νεκράτη φησιν (sc. ὃ Μελητός) ἀδικέω τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὕτως νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα ἐτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καὶ καὶ.

26. κινδυνεῖ οὐφός τις εἶναι: κινδυνεῖ = δοκεῖ as often in Plato. The word must originally have been used only where the predicate involved something evil = κινδυνὸς ἦσιν with inf. as in Lysias κατὰ 'Ἀγοράτου § 27 σοι δὲ—κινδυνὸς ἦν βασανισθήναι. οὐφός ('clever') is sarcastic, as often e.g. in Crito 51 A ἐθνὸς εἰ οὐφός; The word (like φροντιστῆς) was almost a nickname of Socrates (see Apol. 18 B): here it suggests the sophists, as in Meno 75 C τῶν οὐφών—καὶ ἑρωτηκὼν καὶ ἀγωνιστικών. Meletus is ὃ κατὰ νέους οὐφός; see infra on line 32.

καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν—διαφθείροντος. ἀμαθίς is regularly
used as the opposite of σωφός. Notice the implication that vice is due to ignorance (ἀμαθία). This doctrine is frequently regarded as peculiar to Socrates: but it is embedded in the Greek language. Take for example the words ἀμαθής ἄσταῖδεντος ἀγνώμων. Primarily these words denoted a want of intellectual cultivation: but in practice they are often used of deficient moral culture: ἀμαθής (see Verrall on Medea 224) = 'boorish' 'unfeeling': ἄσταῖδεντος is 'rude' and ἀγνώμων 'unkind'. An untaught intellect (from the Greek point of view) implies moral delinquency: since in the flourishing period of Greek life intellect and will are not discriminated. The same point of view comes out in Plato's theory of education (Rep. vi—vii): true education awakens ἐπιστήμη, and does not implant ὁρή δόξα: and ἐπιστήμη means the regeneration (περαγωγή) of the entire man, moral as well as intellectual. As to the syntax, note ἐμὴν (= ἐμοῦ) with διαφθείρωντος.

28. ὡς πρὸς μὴτέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. Had Plato chosen to make the simile an identification, he would have omitted the second πρὸς as Cobet requires. See on Crito 46 c: "If it is wished to bring the objects compared into the closest possible union, ὡσπερ (ὡς, καθάπερ) with the preposition is placed first, and the preposition itself written only once: Rep. viii 545 E ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παῖζουσας καὶ ἐρευκλαύσας". Where ὡσπερ with the preposition precedes, Cobet (Variae Lectiones p. 165 foll.) would in every case delete the second preposition: but he defies the mss. Otherwise both prepositions are inserted: and in case the object compared comes first neither preposition may be omitted e.g. πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὡς πρὸς μητέρα. Schanz emends two curious cases in which the first preposition is omitted with preceding ὡσπερ, viz. Phaed. 67 D ἐκλυομένην ὡσπερ δεσμῶν (leg. ἐκ δεσμῶν with T) and Tim. 79 A ἰδὲ ὡσπερ αὐλῶνος (leg. διὰ αὐλῶνος) διὰ τοῦ σώματος. Archer-Hind retains ὡσπερ αὐλῶνος. The motherhood of the state is the leading motive of the Crito (see the editor's introduction to that dialogue): Socrates spurned the temptation to break her laws as parricide. On this view rested during the most flourishing period the entire fabric of Greek civic life. It is worthy of remark that the Cretans called their country μητρὶς (Rep. ix 575 D).

29. τῶν πολιτικῶν is neuter, and goes with ἄρχεσθαι.

30. ὀρθὸς γὰρ ἐστι. ἐστὶ of course is not equivalent to ἔχει, 2 D for ὀρθῶς (which would in English be printed with marks of quotation) = τὸ ὀρθῶς ἄρχεσθαι. Schanz compares (inter alia) Symp.
NOTES ON I 2 D

183 D καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλῶν, αἰσχρῶς δὲ αἰσχρῶν. αἰσχρῶς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πονηρῷ τε καὶ πονηρῶς χαρίζοναι, καλῶς δὲ χρηστῷ τε καὶ χρηστῶς.

31. ἐπιμεληθῆναι: true to his name Μέλητος: so infra 3 A ἐπιμεληθῆησις. Cf. Apol. 25 C (where see note), Μέλητος—ἄμελειαι—μεμελήκεν and 26 B Μέλητῳ τοῖς οὖσῃ μέγα οὖσῃ μικρὸν πώ-ποτε ἐμέλησεν. In Aristoph. Ran. 990—991 there is perhaps a similar pun on Meletus’ name, κεχρυστός μαμμάκυθοι, μελιτίδαι (v.l. μέλητίδαι) καθήκτῳ: cf. ibid. 1302. For similar plays upon words in Plato and the principle which they involve see on Crito 46 C and especially 47 B (τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαντυτῃ). It should be remarked that ἐπιμελεῖόθαι was almost a technical term of the Socratic ethics (Crito 51 A): Socrates himself habitually professed ἐπιμελεῖόθαι ἀρετῆς.

32. γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν. Herewith begins the agricultural metaphor, continued in ἐκκαθαρις and in τάς βλάστας: compare Rep. IX 589 B τοῦ πολυκεφάλου ἀρέσματος ἐπιμελήθησεν ἄσπερ γεωργός, τά μὲν ἡμέρα τρέφων καὶ τιθαιδεύων, τά δὲ ἅγια ἀποκαλοῦντος φύεται. The γεωργός is the σοφὸς κατὰ φυτά (Theaet. 167 B): so Meletus poses as ὁ κατὰ νέους σοφός. As to the subject matter, note in the first place the implication that the politician should make the citizens morally better: in the best period of Greece politics had an ethical purpose; see Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1 10. 1099 b 30 ff. αὕτη δὲ (sc. ἡ πολιτικὴ) πλείστην ἐπιμελείαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιοῦ τινας καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ πολιτας ποιήσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. In fact ethics and politics were not separated in Plato’s time, since τὸ νόμον = τὸ δίκαιον—the law of the state is the law of morality for the man. (Introduction to Crito, p. xiii.) Only from this point of view can we see the true unity of the Republic, which, though it is called πολιτεία, is almost as much ethical as political. It was only when man was forcibly torn from the state by the loss of civic freedom that Aristotle wrote an ethical treatise as distinct from politics. In the second place, observe the paramount importance here assigned to the care of the young: sound education seemed to Plato the only possible salvation for a state: εἰ τραφείτων καὶ τρεφομένων τῶν νέων πάντα ἡμῖν καὶ ὁρθὸν πλεί (Legg. VII 813 D).

33. καλ δὴ καὶ introduces the application as in Crito 47 C οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλλα—οὕτως—καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων κτλ. οἷος infra = ‘doubtless’ (sarcastic).

3 A 34. ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαρίσω. Socrates as a noxious weed, or per-
haps as some pestilent monster preying on the young plants: cf. Arist. Hist. An. IX 625b 33 τὰ δὲ γυνόμενα θηρία ἐν τοῖς σμήσει καὶ λυμαυμόμενα τὰ κηρία αἱ μὲν χρυσαλὶ μελιττόν ἐκ κακαθαλροῦν. Hirschig's ἐκκαθαρεῖ is unnecessary, and in fact less forcible and accurate.

35. τῶν τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθειρόντας. There is much irony in this clause, expressed by placing it after the verb ἐκκαθαρεῖ, and adding the words ὡς φησίν. Fritzche well compares Apol. 34 A: εὐρήσετε—πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθειρντὶ, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἀνύτος. For the general idea Schanz compares Legg. vi 765 E παντὸς γὰρ δὴ φυτοῦ ἡ πρῶτη βλάστη καλῶς ὀρμηθείσα πρὸς ἄρετὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυριωτάτη τέλος ἐπιθείναι τὸ πρόσφορον and ibid. vii 813 D quoted above on 2 D. The words τῶν νέων are bracketed by Schanz, following Gomperz, chiefly on the ground that τὰς βλάστας = τοῖς νέοις (with the additional agricultural idea) can alone form a correct antithesis to τῶν πρεσβυτέρων: but I think the words are right, for it is quite in Plato's style in passing from the simile to the application to choose words applicable to both (τᾶς βλάστας to agriculture, and τῶν νέων to the young: cf. note on Crito 47 B): moreover τὰς βλάστας τῶν νέων is more than τοὺς νέους or τὰς βλάστας alone since it means the development or 'sprouting' of the young. The idea contained in the four words is afterwards expanded in the Phaedrus: where philosophic Ἑρως is viewed as that which fosters the sprouting of the wings of the soul (τὴν βλάστην τοῦ πτεροῦ): Phaedr. 246 c foll. For a similar juxtaposition of the comparison and the thing compared, see Alc. I 134 D—καὶ ἐὰν ὅτι θείον καὶ λαμπρὸν ὀρῶντες,—ἐλαῖον καὶ σκοτεινῶν βλέποντες. [Liebhold in the Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie 1888 no. 40 p. 1226 also retains τῶν νέων, regarding it as an echo of the words τοὺς νέους in the indictment: but he can hardly be right in changing τὰς βλάστας to τοῖς βελτιστοῖς.]

36. ἐπείτα μετὰ τοῦτο. Not exactly a case of the σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου. ἐπείτα corresponds to πρῶτῳ μὲν (ἐπείτα and εἶτα are more common than ἐπείτα δὲ and εἶτα δὲ) as 'in the second place' to 'in the first place': while μετὰ τοῦτο = μετὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαλρεῖν. Compare Aristoph. Ran. 1026 εἶτα διδάξας Πέρσας μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐξεδίδαξα κτλ.

39. ἀρξαμένῳ sc. Μέλητῳ: τῷ ἀρξαμένῳ would make the statement general.
CHAPTER II.

The Introduction is here continued. Euthyphro is indignant that Socrates should be accused of heterodoxy and insult cast upon the profession of the μάντις to which both belonged.

2. ἄφοβος is a very strong word, suggesting the physical results of excessive fear.

ἀφικνώς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀφικνώς = 'literally', 'absolutely' is used to intensify a statement, especially a simile or (as here) a proverb: it is opposed to σχεδὸν τι, ἕμβραχω (with relatives only) or ὡς ἔπος εἴπερο, which modifies a universal affirmative or negative. Distinguish ἀφικνώς = 'inartistically': the English word 'simply' has both senses. Cf. Apol. 17 D and note.

3. ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι. All offerings began and ended with a libation to Hestia. In the economy of Greece, both political and religious, Hestia was the central divinity; she is the heart of the House and of the State. As a Goddess, she does not appear till Hesiod and the Homeric hymns, where she figures as the first-born daughter of Cronus and Rhea (Hes. Theog. 454): she is simply the personification of the Hearth. Every πόλις, being regarded as a family in accordance with the usual Greek view, had a κοινὴ ἑστία, on which holy fire was always kept burning: it was situated in the πρυτανείων (Pind. Nem. xi 1 παὶ 'Ρέας, α τε πρυτανεία λέογχας Ἑστία), which for that reason was the central point without which no πόλις could exist. Therefore the proverb ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι means to begin with the central or κύριον or fundamental point: Ar. Vesp. 845—846 ἢν ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι μενος ἐπιτρήσθω τιν. Euthyphro implies that Socrates is the corner-stone of Athens. Plato claims exactly the same honour for his master: as the true ἑστία of Athens he too should be supported in the Prytaneeum (Apol. Ch. xxvi): cf. Gorg. 521 D ὥμως μετ' ὀλγὸν Ἀθήναι ἢν μὴ ἔκπυν μόνος ἐπικεῖερος τῇ ὥς ἄλθως πολιτικὴ τέχνη καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. But Euthyphro resents the accusation of Socrates because he feels himself attacked through him: Socrates is to him a μάντις, and μαντικὴ he regards as the safety of the State. See Introd. p. xxi.

4. κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν. κακουργεῖν is opposed to πλεον τα καὶ μεγατον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία — γενὴσται. Notice the implication that
evil treatment makes a man worse: *kakouγγειν* = *kakōν χωνειν* (as in Rep. I 335 B foll.): this is an essentially Greek view, well illustrated by the transition of meaning in *πονηρός* and *μοχθηρός* from ‘afflicted’ to ‘depraved’: see the editor’s note on Crito 47 ε where allusion is made to Simonides Frag. 5. 10—13, ἀνδρὰ δ’ ὕκ ἔστι μή οὗ κακὸν ἐμενει, δὴ ἀνάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη. The converse view, that prosperity means goodness, is implied in the usual equivocation on ἐν πράττειν = to ‘do well’ and ‘fare well’: see Aristotle Eth. Nic. I 1098b 20. The principle on which this view rests is found in Hom. Od. XVIII 136—137 τοῖς γὰρ νῦσ εστὶν ἐπικοθοινων ἀνθρώπων οὖν ἐστὶν ἡμαρ ἄγγει πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

5. καὶ μοι λέγει. καὶ before Imperatives = ‘pray’: Apol. 24 C καὶ μοι δεῖρο εἴτε = agedum dic mihi.

τι καὶ ποιοῦντα σε. καὶ suggests that Socrates cannot possibly have done anything to corrupt the youth. See on τι γὰρ καὶ φύσεων in 6 B.

7. ἀποστα, οὕς οὖν γ’ ἄκούσαι. The charge is ἀποστα, because 3 B gods should make men, not men gods. γε is placed after the emphatic οὖν, and belongs strictly speaking to οὐ. So Lysis 216 A εῦ γε, ἐφιρ δ’ Μενέξενος, οὐ γε οὖν σοι ἄκούσα. οὖν is idiomatically used for ‘at first sight’, ‘on the first hearing’, and the like. So Crat. 397 λ η ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιμαρτυρήσει αὐτὰ τὰ ὀνόματα μὴ πάνω ἀκὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὗτος ἐκαστὰ κείσαται. For οὐ with inf. in this sense (as in οὐ εἴποσ εἴπειν) see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 207.

8. ποιητῆν εἶναι θεῶν. It is worth while to notice the gradual development of the metaphor from the mint. καυνός rather than νέος is used of new coinage: cf. Ar. Ran. 720 ἔτε τὰρχαῖον νόμισμα καὶ τὸ καυνὸν χρυσοῦν. Presently in ἄρχαλος οὐ νομίζοντα the metaphor comes into sight: for νομίζων and its derivatives mean not only to ‘believe in’ or ‘worship’, but also ‘to use as current coin’. See Ar. Nub. 247—249 (a passage precisely similar to this) τοιοὺς θεῶς δοκεί σοῖ; πρῶτον γὰρ θεῶ τὸ καυνὸν νόμισμα οὐκ ἔστι τῷ γὰρ ὄμνυτ’; ἢ σιδαρέονιν, ὁκεῖν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ. In the reply of Euthyphro the metaphor is explicit: οὐ δὲν καυνοτομοκύντος σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα κτλ.

10. τοῦτων αὐτῶν ἐνεκα, ὡς φησίν. The precision of τοῦτων αὐτῶν ἐνεκα (summing up ὡς καυνός—νομίζοντα) followed emphatically by ὡς φησίν (echoing the φησί with which the sentence begins) insinuates that Meletus was not actuated solely by a zeal for the
national faith. In the indictment against Socrates (for which see above on 2 c) it is clear that the religious accusation was introduced only to give a foothold to the graver charge of corrupting the youth: i.e. the religious charge was ancillary to the social and political. At the same time it should be remembered that owing to the constitution of the ancient state heterodoxy was equivalent to treason. In Apol. 23 \(\varepsilon\)--24 \(\lambda\) a personal motive for the prosecution is assigned: Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Δαμόνιος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Δαμόνιος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημοσιαγῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων.

II. μανθάνων ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαμόνιον—γίγνεσθαι. It is barely possible that μανθάνω is intended to suggest μάντις: Euthyphro (as appears in Cratylus 396 \(\delta\)) was addicted to the etymological pun. δὴ δὴ is ‘because forsooth’, cf. 9 \(\beta\) μανθάνων ὅτι (‘because’) σὺν δοκῷ κτλ. Socrates regarded his δαμόνιον as a species of μαντική—a divine sign (σημείον) or voice (φωνή), vouchsafed to him as a proof of the divine care: see the editor’s Apology pp. xxvii and 88. He certainly did not look upon it as a new divinity: but it is clear from Apol. 31 \(\delta\) (θεῶν ῥι καὶ δαμόνιον—ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραψῇ ἐπικωμῷ 

12. ἐκάστοτε is ‘on each occasion’: the voice did not speak always, but only as occasion arose—forbidding, not encouraging: Cic. Div. 1 § 122 divinum quiddam—cui semper paruerit, nunquam impellenti, sacre (not semper) revocanti. Notice that γίγνεσθαι is “the technical expression for the appearance of Socrates’ δαμόνιον” (Schanz): see on Crito 46 \(\beta\).

13. κανονομοῦντος. New coinage is apt to be inferior to old (Ar. Ran. 717 ff.) and κανονομεῖν in Plato (who employs the word only as a metaphor) always denotes a change for the worse, like κινεῖν of revolutionary change.

14. ὅς διαβαλὼν δὴ: δὴ is ‘therefore’. διαβάλλειν was a regular term in Athenian law for the opposite of a fair and honourable accusation (κατηγορεῖν): cf. Thuc. III 42 ἐδὲ μὲν εἶπειν ὅπι ἄν ἥγεται περὶ τοῦ μή καλοῦ δύνασθαι, ἐδὲ διαβαλὼν ἐκπλήξει ἄν κτλ.
15. *eido's *st *eudidábolα—polloú's*: since the *polloí* for whom Plato had no great respect (ο'I γε *polloí*, ω'S *epos* *eitev*, oû'dēn *aoléthwntai* Prot. 317 A), judge by the canons of *dóth* *dóga* and not *épisthímη*, in which they do not partake. Witness (among the ancients) Anaxagoras, Socrates and Aristotle: each of whom was condemned for impiety.

16. *kal *ému' *gá' stoi*: *kal* (also) goes with *ému'*: *stoi* is ‘let me tell you’. Observe how Euthyphro recognises in Socrates a kindred spirit: “we are both *mántes* (see infra *h'mi'ν πάσι* *stois* *tow'tous*)—ne they laugh at, you they accuse—in both cases envy is their motive”. The Athenians were right in laughing at Euthyphro, but Socrates was a far more serious antagonist—more serious indeed than he himself knew. His teaching contained the germs of ethical and political doctrine destined to contribute to the downfall of Greek civic life, while it at the same time paved the way for something higher. See *Apol*. p. xxviii.

18. *katageláwsi' *ó's *ma'noménou*. As if the *mántes* were *mánikó's*: for the word *ma'noménou* naturally suggests *mántes*: see *Phaedr*. 244 c: *tō'n* *palaio'w* oi *ta* *ónomata* *tide'ménoi* oûk *a'lexhron* *ygo'wnto* ou'de *bneidos* *mavan*. ou *gá' r'v* *tη* *kalllstη' tê'xyn*, *dz' to* *me'llon* *kri'ntai*, *aut' ai* *tō'to* *stov'ma* *ému'plékontes* *ma'nikh' ékálasan. — *oi* *dē* *v'v* *áp'eprokia'w* *to* *taw* *épe'mbálalontes* *mántikh' ékálasan.

In the same passage Plato recognises four varieties of serviceable madness whereof two are *mántik' ére'tos* and *mántik' ἣ τῶν *émufrón'wv* (working through signs and omens). Euthyphro’s variety was ἥ *tô'n* *émufrón'wv*.

*kal'ō* = ‘quandam’ ‘and yet’ followed by *ddλ' *δmos as in *Phaedr*. 68 ε (quoted by Schanz) *kal'ō* *famén' γe *á'dvnavon* *énav*, *ddλ' *δmos *k'tλ.

20. *to's* *tow'tous*, i.e. *to's* *mántes*. The words at the same time express the grounds of the envy.

*ddλ'—léna*. Notice the threefold occurrence of *ddλa* in three lines: in the first and last case it forms the natural adversative to the negatives: in the second it has the effect of a spirited exhortation.

21. *ddmos* *léna*. A Homeric phrase (Il. xiii 337 *ddmos* *xλ' e* *máxh) meaning ‘to come to close quarters’, ‘grapple with’. *ddmos* in Homer=ο αυ'tos: so that *ddmos=és* *ta'w's*, shewing the same suffix as in *ékei'se*, *ddlase*, *poté'rws'es*, *eté'rws'es* etc., a suffix confined for the most part to pronominal stems, except in the Homeric *xuk-
NOTES ON II 3 C

λῶσε (Il. IV 212) and ὑψῶσε (Il. X 461): Kühner's Griechische Grammatik I p. 731, Anm. 5. Plato employs the phrase as a metaphor not unfrequently, e.g. Euthyd. 294 D ὑμᾶς ἔτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, cf. Phaedo 95 B Ὠμηρικῶς (‘as Homer's heroes do') ἐγγὺς ἰδνεῖς.

CHAPTER III.

In this chapter Socrates is careful to point out the difference between himself and Euthyphro. Euthyphro the Athenians laugh at: Socrates they prosecute, because the latter proselytises, while the former is content with merely displaying his cleverness.

1. ὡς φίλε Εὐθύφρῳν, ἄλλα. More emphasis is thrown on ἄλλα by placing the vocative first. Schanz compares the position of the vocative before an imperative followed by δὲ e.g. Phileb. 48 D ὡς Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τρίχῳ τέμνειν.

τὸ μὲν καταγελασθήναι. The antithetical clause is to be understood as ‘but to be accused is’. In 3 D—E infra the antithesis is fully expressed: εἰ μὲν οὖν, δὲ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μελλοῦν μον καταγελάν κτλ., εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται κτλ. For μὲν with no corresponding δὲ clause cf. Apol. 21 D ἐλογιζόμεν διὶ τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφῶτερος εἰμι: ibid. 17 B and note.

When the ignorant laugh at the wise, the wise may retaliate with laughter less ridiculous than theirs, says Plato (Rep. VII 517 B): for the ignorant come short in matters of far graver moment than the philosopher (Theaet. 175 C foll.).

2. οὐδὲν πράγμα is idiomatic for ‘nothing’, ‘a matter of no importance’: so in 3 E (οὐδὲν ἔσται πράγμα ‘will come to nothing’), and not rarely in Plato.

4. δεινόν: ‘clever’ with the secondary notion of an ‘uncanny, unsettling tendency’.

5. μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας. See infra on 3 D ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ κτλ.

3 D 7. τοιοῦτος sc. σοφός τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίαν. τοιοῦτος is frequently used to avoid the repetition of an adjective: see on Apol. 26 A τῶν τοιοῦτων καὶ ἀκούσωμεν. So ἐτερος τοιοῦτος often = ‘just such another’ Euthyd. 298 D—E, Gorg. 493 B.

θυμοῦνται sc. τοῦτῳ.

ἐκτ' οὖν φθόνῳ—ἔτε δὲ ἄλλο τι. οὖν has the effect of
'perhaps': cf. Soph. O. T. 1049 elτ' ὦν ἐπ' ἀγρών ἐλτε κανθᾶδ' εἰςιδῶν. Akin is the use of ὦν after relatives as in ὑποσοσοῦν, ὁδ' ἐπωσιοῦν.

No doubt some Athenians may have been envious of the proselytising δεινός: but others were indignant on political grounds (δι' ἄλλο τι), because such teaching seemed to weaken the authority of law, by promoting inquiry into its basis. See the speech of Cleon in Thuc. III 37. 4 οὐ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φανεροθαί—καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλά σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις. Socrates himself did not call in question the authority of the laws; for he defined τὸ δικαίως as τὸ νόμμων (see Introduction to Crito p. xiii): but some of his associates, as for example Alcibiades, were ready to submit the laws and constitution of their country to the test of reason. See Apol. Ch. xxi.

9. τούτον οὖν πέρι. τοῦτοι is τοῦ διδασκαλίκον τῆς σοφίας ἐναι. Euthyphro is not the man to cast his pearls before swine. Note the emphatic ἐμέ.

10. οὐ πάνυ = 'not exactly': see on 2 B above.

11. σπάνιον σεαντὸν παρέχειν: 'shew yourself rarely,' not 'make yourself scarce.' For this use of σπάνιον cf. Legg. VIII 841 A σπάνιος γὰρ ἀδ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ δι' αἰσχύνῃ χρώμενοι κτλ.

13. ὡς φιλανθρωπίας: whereas the attitude of Euthyphro is that of a μοσάνθρωπος.

14. ἐκκεκυμένος παρτὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν. Apol. 33 A ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος (different from διδασκάλος supra) μὲν οὐδενὸς πῶτον ἐγενόμην· οἴ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντο καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοὶ πράττοντο ἐκινθημένοι ἀκόνειν, ἢτο νοετέροις ἢτο προσβύτεροι, οὐδὲν πῶτοτε ἐφθανότα, οὐδὲν λαμβάνων διὰλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτῷ ἐρωτάν κτλ.

Socrates believed himself commissioned by God to preach to all who would listen. Apol. Chapters vi and xvii.

15. οὐ μόνον ἀνευ μυσθόου: for Aristophanes misrepresents Socrates in Nub. 98 οὐτοι διδάσκοντο, ἀργύριον ἦν τις διδᾷ κτλ. προστηθέος (sc. μυσθόν) is not here used absolutely, as Wohlrab and Schanz suppose. Josef Wagner (Die Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron, Brün 1882—3, p. 26) shews but little sense of humour when in arguing against the authenticity of the dialogue he asks, apropos of this passage—"where could Socrates have got the money to pay his audience, when in the Apology he can command only a single mina?"
16. ἐὰν τὸς μοῦ ἔθλον ἅκουειν. So B: T has ἔθλεια. Either is right: but the reading of B gives the natural protasis to the apodosis in προστιθεῖς ἄν ἢδεις (i.q. προστιθεῖς ἄν ἢδεως—the participle being preferred in order to form a balance with οὗ μόνον ἄνευ μυστήριον).

17. νῦν δὴ = ἄρτιν is written by Schanz and Cobet νυνί: see on Apol. 37c. The reference is to c above τὸ μὲν καταγελασθήναι τῶν οὐδέν πράγμα. Note that if Plato had omitted νῦν δὴ he would probably have written λέγω: cf. Apol. 21 οὗτος λέγω (alluding to 20 Ε).

3 E 18. οὐδέν ἄν εἶ ἂδής. ἂδής is used as in Apol. 41 B ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτῷ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνων—οὐκ οὖν κἂν ἂδεὶς ἔτη.

19. τὸ δὲ σπουδάσονται. So T, rightly: B has σπουδάζοντας, by an obvious assimilation to παλύνως καὶ γελῶντας. Note the contrast between the optative ἔλαβάλλω and the future indicative τὸ δὲ σπουδάσονται: the latter alternative is regarded as the more likely. τὸ with the future is common in threats and grave forebodings. For the middle form σπουδάσονται see Rutherford’s New Phrynichus p. 138: “All verbs expressing the exercise of the senses or denoting any functional state or process have the inflexions of the middle voice either throughout or in the future tense.” σπουδάζω does not exactly fall under this rule, but it is a word in which the physical concomitants of enthusiasm (haste and the like) were “primarily uppermost” (ibid. p. 409).

20. τοῦτ’ ἢδη. Note the emphatic position of τοῦτο. This use of ἢδη ) ( ὀσπόω or οὐκέτι as the case may be is elaborately illustrated by Cope on Arist. Rhet. Α 1 1354b 7 (p. 13 of Cope’s edition): it is like dēnōm, or iam in Lucretius. The rule may be stated thus. In two or more cases where a certain predicate applies to all or any of the others after the first, ἢδη may be used in applying the predicate: ὀσπόω is then rightly used in negating the predicate in the first case: similarly, οὐκέτι is used in stating that a predicate which has been applied to one or more previous cases does not apply to one or more that follow.

δην ἄποβησεται. Naber would read ὀσπόω, thus changing the meaning, which is ‘how it will turn out’, not ‘in what it will end’. Schanz compares Apol. 19 A τοῦτο μὲν ἤτω δὴν τῷ θεῷ φίλον and Lysis 206 A δεδώσω τὸ μέλλον δὴν ἄποβησεται.

δήλον πλην ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν. So in Apol. 42 A ἀδηλον παντὶ πλην ἦ τῷ θεῷ. In the emphatic ὑμῖν Socrates refuses to recognize
Euthyphro as a brother μάντις: contrast Euthyphro’s remark in 3 c: φθονούσων ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις. Spoken by Socrates, the words πλὴν ὑμῶν κτλ. might have been sincere: in Plato’s mouth they would probably have been ironical. Plato had no high idea of μαντική: see Politicus 209 c where priests and soothsayers are placed on the same platform with slaves, artisans and merchants. ‘Divination is the gift of God to human folly’ says Plato in Timaeus 71 e: where see Archer-Hind’s note.

22. οἴδην λογοῖ τραγύμα: see on οἴδην τραγύμα in c above.

23. σὺ τε—οἶμαι δὲ. δὲ (especially if followed by καὶ) is not rarely used after τε, both in Plato and in other authors: e.g. Rep. III 394 c ἐν τε τῷ τῶν ἐπών ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀλλοθι: see Madvig’s Greek Syntax p. 172 Rem. 5.

κατὰ νοῦν = ‘ex animi sententia’: as in Soph. 217 D ἐ εἰς σοι κατὰ νοῦν.

24. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμῆν. The idiom οἶμαι δὲ καὶ is frequent in Plato, followed either by the accusative (with infinitive) or by the nominative, since οἶμαι is often merely parenthetical: Schanz quotes (inter alia) Lach. 180 ἀ οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἀρχηγα τόδε and Crat. 402 B οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος. ἐμὲ is here preferred to the more regular ἐγὼ to prevent the doubt as to whether ἐγὼ is the subject to οἶμαι or to the infinitive (understood): the other possible construction (the omission of ἐμὲ) is not chosen because an antithesis is wanted to σὺ. Similarly in Soph. 234 E οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐτι πόρφυραν ἀφετηρίους εἶναι: and so regularly in Plato when οἶμαι δὲ καὶ is followed by the 1st pers. pron. with the infinitive, not οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ. There is only one previous allusion to Euthyphro’s δίκη: viz. in 2 A οὐ γὰρ τοῦ καὶ σοὶ γε δίκη τις οὖσα τυχάνει—ὡςπερ ἐμοὶ.

CHAPTER IV.

In chapters IV and V we are gradually introduced to the subject of the dialogue—what is piety?

Chapter IV explains the suit instituted by Euthyphro—an accusation of manslaughter against his father. Euthyphro allows that to bring such an accusation implies a knowledge of τὰ θεῖα and of τὰ δοσί τε καὶ ἀνθρώποι.

1. έστιν δὲ δὴ σοι κτλ. The effect of the order is to throw

A. EU.
emphatic: for which reason I have accented it.

2. *feíγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις; αὐτὴν* is in both cases the internal accusative: see Thompson's Greek Syntax p. 66. *feíγειν* 'to be a defendant' is used as the passive of *διώκειν* 'to prosecute'. So πάσων ἐκπίπτω ἀποθήκων πρόσκειμαι μανθάνω etc. are used as passives of ποιῶ ἐκβάλλω ἀποκτείνω προστέθεικα διδάσκο εκτ.

4. *τίνα;* masculine (as Euthyphro's answer shews), and the external accusative: so we find τόπτειν τίνα πληγάς and the like: Thompson Gk. Syntax p. 66.

5. *αὐ δοκῶ μαλνεσθαί. αὐ* refers to 3 C καταγελῶσιν ὡς μανυμένου. Phocion thought he was wrong when Athens applauded him: Euthyphro thinks himself right when Athens thinks him mad. *αὐ* goes with *μαλνεσθαί*. Graser changes *δν* to *ἡν*, not seeing that *τίνα* is masculine.

6. *πετομένον τινα διώκεις;*—'are you on a wild goose chase?' Socrates playfully understands *διώκειν* in its literal sense. The proverb *τά πετόμενα διώκειν* might well be applied to a madman (αὐ δοκῶ μαλνεσθαί); it is found also in Arist. Met. I 109 b 37—39. πάς οὐκ ἄξιον ἀδυνάται τοὺς φιλοσοφοὺς ἐγχειροῦντας; τό γὰρ τά πετόμενα διώκει τά ἵπτειν ἀν εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. In Aesch. Ag. 394 διώκει παῖς ποταμόν ὃρνιν and probably in Gorg. 471 C χήνα ἐφι διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν there is an allusion to the same proverb: cf. Euthyd. 291 B ὅπερ τά παιδία τά τοὺς κορόδους διώκοντα: Ar. Av. 169 ἀνθρώπος ὅμιλος ἀστάθμητος, πετομένον and Theocritus vii 17 καὶ φείδυει φιλέοντα καὶ οὐ φιλέοντα διώκει.

7. *δεῖ* is personal as in Apol. 30 D πολλοῖς δεῖ—ἀπολογεῖσθαι.

8. *εὖ μάλα προβύτης. To the same effect Tyrtaeus Frag. 10. 19 τοὺς δὲ παλαιότερους, ὃν οὐκέτι γούνατ’ ἐλαφρά κτλ. εὖ μάλα, originally an epic phrase (Hom. Od. xxii 190 εὖ μάλ’ ἀποστρέφαντε κτλ.), is frequent in Athenian conversational style. μάλα qualifies εὖ, not vice versa. μάλ’ εὖ is rarer, e.g. Theaet. 156 A μάλ’ εὖ ἀμονοῦ.

10. ὁ ἔμος πατὴρ—βέλτιστε. Notice the emphasis: 'My own father'. 'Your own father?' βέλτιστε is said with much sarcasm.

11. *εὗτον δὲ τί—δίκη;* the order as in 3 E above. *ἐγκλημα* is to ἐγκληματικόν, the charge as distinct from the trial: Schanz quotes Isocr. peri τοῦ ἕμους § 2, τὰς μὲν γὰρ δίκας ὑπὲρ τῶν ἦλθον ἐγκλημάτων λαγχάνουσι. The object of a δίκη is placed in the
genitive, which is here originally adjectival: 'trials of manslaughter' (φόνου) = 'manslaughter trials'.

15. Ἡράκλεις. A strong expression of wonder, much stronger than merely to repeat the word Φόνου; (cf. supra ὁ σῶς, ὃ βέλτιστε;). The expression is common in Attic conversation, with or without ὃ, e.g. Symp. 213 ὃ Ἡράκλεις, τοιῷ τῷ ἵππῳ: cf. Αἰ. Αν. 277 ὑμῖν Ἡράκλεις: Lys. 208 Ε Ἡράκλεις, ἵππος ἦ γ ν, μάω μή τι ἡδίκησα τὸν πατέρα ἥ τήν μητέρα; Originally no doubt the appeal was to Heracles as ἀλεξίκακος or σωτήρ; so Ἀπόλλων is used in exclamations = Ἀπόλλων ἀποτρόπαιε.

ἡ ποῦ—ἵππη ποτὲ [ὁρθός] ἔχει. The difficulties of this passage are very great. There is no variant in the MSS.

Madvig (Adversaria Critica 366) and Schanz assume a lacuna in the first clause, in order to provide a subject to ἔχει: for the subject cannot be vaguely 'things in general', nor can ὁρθός ἔχει be the same as τὸ ὁρθὸν ἔχει. To insert εὐσεβεῖν (as Madvig suggests) would be prematurely to anticipate the mention of the subject treated in the dialogue, viz. εὐσεβεῖν or ὁσιτῆς, which (after the manner of Plato, who wished to preserve the semblance of a conversation: see on Crito 47 Α) is reserved for a later stage (4 Ε). At the same time, if ἔχει is retained, it seems certain from ὁρθός αὐτῷ πράξαι that an infinitive is the subject to ἔχει: and the only relevant subject is 'to prosecute one's father for manslaughter'. Either therefore τὸ ἐγκαινία (sc. πατρὶ φόνου) must be supplied from ἐγκλήμα above, or we must assume the loss of some phrase to the same effect, probably τὸ ἐπεζήτει πατρὶ φόνου in view of the frequent recurrence of these words throughout the chapter (ὅυ γὰρ ἃν ποὺ—ἐπεζήσεωθα φόνου αὐτῷ, and again ἐπεζήτει in Β: in τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεζήσωμαι: and especially ἂν ἄνωτον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἅθιν πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεζήτει in Ε). Now it will be admitted that while on one hand it is harsh to supply τὸ ἐγκαινία πατρὶ φόνου from ἐγκλήμα, the insertion on the other hand of the phrase τὸ ἐπεζήτει πατρὶ φόνου, whether after ἔχει or πολλὰυ—makes the sentence at once too cumbersome and too precise.

But even if we allow that ἔχει has some such subject, expressed or understood, a further difficulty presents itself in the precise meaning of the words ὁρθός αὐτῷ πράξαι. The clause introduced by οὐ γὰρ must either give the reason or the proof of the ignorance of the many. Obviously, no proof is here given, and if a reason is to
be assigned, we should expect, instead of ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι something like ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ἐγκυκλεῖαι. I formerly thought of ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ τάξαι in the sense of 'to rank it rightly', 'rate it rightly' (cf. Euthyd. 279 C οὗ δὲ σοφίαν ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν); but I now think the error lies in δὲ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει.

First, as to ὀρθῶς. ὀρθῶς can hardly be right on any view, for even if we retain ἔχει, the only relevant meaning is 'the many do not know the truth about τὸ ἐπεξείναι πατρὶ φόνου, for they cannot ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι', not 'the many do not know how such a prosecution is to be justified': the following οὐ γὰρ clause can in no way be viewed as a reason for the statement in the preceding clause, if ὀρθῶς is retained there. I therefore agree with Madvig in supposing that the word has been wrongly inserted from ὀρθῶς in ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι.

Second, as to ἔχει. Even with the omission of ὀρθῶς, it is by no means easy to supply the correct subject to ἔχει. If ἔχεις is read, we obtain (I think) a satisfactory meaning and escape all possible risk of obscurity. 'Good Heavens!' cries Socrates, 'surely the many are ignorant of your condition: for it is not every one who could do rightly what you do, but only one far advanced in wisdom'. The force of αὐτὸ in αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι is 'the thing in question' viz. τὸ ἐγκυκλεῖν: and as regards the sentiment, we have already had several indications of the indifference or contempt with which the people regarded Euthyphro, e.g. 3 C ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, προλέγων αὐτῶς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελάσιν ὡς μαίνομενοι, 3 D—E and 4 A. In accordance with his usual theory, Socrates ascribes the injustice of the Athenians in their treatment of Euthyphro to ignorance.

17. ἐπιτυγχάνως is followed by εἶναι in T. Schanz remarks that where the verb substantive appears in only one of the two leading mss (B and T), we are justified in assuming interpolation. The aorist (not the present) participle of ἐπιτυγχάνω (προστυγχάνω, τυγχάνω) is regularly used as = 'der erste beste' = εἰς τῶν πολλῶν.

αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι: αὐτὸ is τοῦθ’ ὁ σοὶ πράττεις i.e. ἐπεξείναι πατρὶ φόνου.

4 B. 18. πόρρω—σοφίας ἐλαύνων. So in Crat. 410 E πόρρω ἢδη, σοφιαῖς, φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν. The metaphor is doubtless from the race-course.

20. ἐστὶν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων. For the order see on 3 E above. In early times it was only the relations of a murdered man who
were permitted to exercise the right of blood-revenge: and when
the State undertook the punishment of manslaughter, the right to
act as prosecutor was confined to certain relatives of the victim, or
(if he were a μέτοχος or δούλος) to his προστάτης or δεσπότης. See
Gilbert’s Handbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer i p. 365.
Two passages appear to contradict this principle of Attic law—viz.
Demosthenes (?) in Ne aeram § 9 and the present passage. But in
the Demosthenic speech there is nothing to shew that the woman
killed was not the prosecutor’s slave. Various theories have been
suggested to account for Euthyphro’s position. Stallbaum con-
jectures that in the eye of the law Euthyphro may have been his
master. In Lipsius’ edition of Meier and Schömann’s Der Attische
Process p. 199 note 10 it is argued that the whole reasoning in the
Euthyphro is intended to conform to moral law but not necessarily
to the Athenian. I think the correct solution is to be found in
Euthyphro’s fanaticism: he was just the man to lodge a charge
which the law would not receive, by way of protest. We have
seen similar protests in our own days: and it should be remembered
that Plato nowhere says that the archon received the charge. [So
also Liebhold (in Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie 1888 No.
40. p. 1227) says everything points to Euthyphro’s bringing the charge
even “ohne das formelle Recht dazu auf seiner Seite zu haben”.
]

ο τεθνώς. The present θνήσκω is hardly used in the best Attic
prose: ἀπόθνησκω takes its place. On the other hand τεθνήκα, not
ἀποτεθνήκα, is used. See Rutherford’s Babrius p. 36. For ἀποθνήσκω
as passive to ἀποκτενω see above on 3 Χ, line 2.

21. η δήλα δή; so Schanz, rightly understanding the words as
a question. η = Latin An? introduces a second question intended to
anticipate Euthyphro’s answer to the first: see on Apol. 26 B η
δήλων δή δι των κτλ.; Wohlrab (adopting Schanz’s earlier reading)
prints a colon after η.

οὐ γὰρ ἰν παν ὡπέρ γε ἀλλοτρίου κτλ. So T and Schanz:
in B γε follows παν. ἀλλοτρίος: alienus:: οἰκεῖος: proprius.
Socrates implies that Euthyphro’s conduct was not permissible on legal
as well as on moral grounds; see on ἔστω δε δη των οἰκείων in line
20 above.

22. ἔπεξήμεσθα. According to Schanz (Prot. pp. xiii ff.)
Plato uses as imperfect of είμι only the forms ηα, ηεισθα, ηει(ν).
ηθην (Euthyd. 294 D: the only case of the dual in Attic writers):
ημεν,—ησαν (MSS ηεσαν). Compare Cobet Var. Lect. 308.
23. γελοιον is different from καταγέλαστον as γελάω from καταγέλαν: see on Crito 53 a and cf. Symp. 189 β φωσωμαι—οτι μη γελοια ἐπω—αλλα μη καταγέλαστα. The omission of the copula is commonest in Plato with ἐστιν: εὶ and ἐσμέν are sometimes omitted: ἢν rarely: ἐναι very often: parts of the conjunctive and optative are very seldom left out. See Schanz Nova Commentationes Platonicae 31—35 and Cope on Aristotle's Rhetoric Vol. 2, p. 328.

25. έκτενεν ὁ κτεῖνας. A frequent idiom in Plato: cf. Apol. 20 ὑπαντεὶ μου δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων. Notice that κτεῖνω is rare in Attic prose: it is found chiefly in the older writers, or with an archaic and solemn effect, as here. ἀποκτεῖνω is generally used instead.

26. εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκη. ἐν δίκη is an idiomatic adverbial phrase=ἐνδίκως. The cases of justifiable homicide are enumerated in Gilbert's Handbuch der Gr. Staatsalterthümer I p. 363. They were these: unintentional slaughter of an opponent in the games or of a comrade in war; the killing of an adulterer discovered with one's wife, mother, sister, daughter or legal concubine; and manslaughter in self-defence. Meier and Schömann Der Attische Process II p. 377 add cases of tyrannicide, and where one killed a man who had plotted to overthrow the democracy with or without success, or who had occupied a leading position under oligarchical or tyrannical government.

27. ἐπεζέναι—ὁμοτράπεζος ἢ. This is the only point in which Euthyphro's view transcends the standpoint of ordinary Athenian morality. He sees that family ties have nothing to do with the question of right and wrong: and so far Plato agreed with him. But his motive in prosecuting his father is mostly (though not entirely, see on 5 B) self-regarding, viz. a desire to escape the μισομα coming from daily life with one whom he knew to be guilty: whereas Plato, who regards punishment mainly in its corrective aspect, suggests that one should prosecute one's friends rather for their own sake, to set them free from the greatest of all diseases, sin. See Gorg. 480 δ ἀντὸν πρῶτον ὑπά κατήγορον καὶ αὐτόν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκεῖων καὶ ἐπὶ τούτω χρώμενον τῇ ἡπτορικῇ διός ἀν καταδήλω τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγαντιών ἀπαλλάττων τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἄδικας. ἔναντι is not = 'although', a meaning which it never bears, but 'that is to say, if'. Euthyphro implies that one is not bound to prosecute unless the guilty man lives under one's own roof: only then is one exposed to μισομα. It is in harmony with
his self-regarding morality to reason in this way. Schanz needlessly (I think) changes the text to ἐδινηρ ἄνω = 'although indeed'.

28. ἵσον—μιᾶσμα γιγνεται: i.e. whether the person killed is 4 C ἀλλότριος or οἰκεῖος. For the communication of the taint of guilt Stallbaum compares Hor. Carm. III 2. 26 foll. 'Vetabo, qui Cereris sacrum Volgarit arcanae, sub isdem Sit trabies fragilmeve mucem Solvat phaselon. Saepe Diespiter Neglectus incessto addidit integrum'; and Schanz Antiphon Tetr. I i. 10 ἀνάμφωρον θ' ὑμῖν ἐστὶν τόδε μιᾶροι καὶ ἀναγρον ὑπα εἰς τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσόντα μαίνειν τὴν ἀγέλειν αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ τε τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἱόντα συγκαταπιεμάλαι τοὺς ἀναίτους. So in Soph. Oed. Tyr. 241—2 ὠθεῖν δ' ἀπ' ἀκών πάντας, ὡς μιᾶσματος τοῦθ' ἡμῖν δυνατος. Plato himself, speaking of the slayer in much the same vein as Euthyphro here, ordains (Legg. IX 868 Ε) κατελθὼν δὲ δ τι τουοτον ὑδρασας τοῖς αὐτοῦ πασίν λειών μη κοουνεῖτο μηδὲ ὑμοτράπεζος γιγνεθο ψεδῶ ποτὲ.

29. τῷ τουοτῷ goes with ἐφεσι rather than with ἐσειδῶς.

ἄφοροις. The first clear hint is here given of the subject of the dialogue viz. τὸ δοσιν καὶ τὸ ἀνδριν.

30. ἐτελ δὲ γε ἀποθανών. ἐτελ is virtually = 'although', 'and yet': see on Apol. 19 Ε where is quoted Prot. 335 C ἔγω δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐτελ ἐβουλήμην ἄν όλος τ' ἐλνα. Here too its force is obscured by an ellipse: "(But neither was the victim quite ἀλλότριος) for the murdered man was a day-labourer of my own". Α πελάτης was a freeman, who hired himself out as a day-labourer (θης cf. 15 Α): Timaeus explains the word as ὁ ἀντι τροφῶν ὑπηρετῶν καὶ προσελάξων. The word was used in Graeco-Roman times to translate the Roman cîiens: but there is no reason for supposing that the employer was in any way the legal representative of the πελάτης.

31. ἐγοργοῦμεν. Euthyphro's father was perhaps a κληροῦχος in Naxos. If so, as the Athenians had to give up their κληρονομαί after the battle of Aegospotami in 404, at least 5 years must be supposed to elapse between the death of the πελάτης and Euthyphro's indictment of his father. There was probably no νόμος tῆς προδεσμιας relating to cases of φόνος (see Meier and Schömann Der Attische Process II pp. 838—840): but was Euthyphro's conscience sleeping all this time? Or did he and his father occupy separate houses? Most probably Plato does not mean the dates to be pressed too closely. It is however possible that Euthyphro and his father
were farming in Naxos even after 404, not as κληροῦχοι, but in some other capacity.

32. παροιμήσας οὖν. οὖν continues the story as in ὁ οὖν παθόρ below. παροιμέω means to forget oneself in one's cups. With the order in τῶν ὀικείων τινὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων Schanz compares Apol. 33 ὑπὸ τῶν ὀικείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων. ἀποσφάτει presently is a strong word and denotes a brutal murder.

34. συνθήσας—καταβαλὼν. For the collocation of participles cf. 9 άπεὶ δὴ ἡτελῶν ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου—φθάσῃ τελευτήσαι.

36. ἔξηγητοι. The ἔξηγηται formed a College of three members, according to Suidas (cf. also 9 άπεί), apparently under one head, here called ἔξηγητης (κατ' ἐξοχήν): besides other religious duties, they were especially concerned with purification from blood-guiltiness (οἵς μέλει καθαρίζει τοὺς ἄγει τινὶ οὐσικηθέντας Suidas l.c.). Schöll in Hermes vi 36 foll. makes it probable that the members of the board were partly chosen by Apollo as πάτρως ἔξηγητης: apparently the Athenians selected 9 out of whom 3 were chosen by the Delphic representative of Apollo, one from each triad.

δ τι χρείητοιεν. So apparently Β, followed by Schanz: Wohlrab (with T) reads χρη. The latter is probably due to an assimilation in tense to the historical present τέμπει: after which the optative in a subordinate clause is quite regular: cf. Gorg. 512 άπολιγεται οὖν δι' οὐκ—τοῦτῳ δὲ βιωτέων ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ἀνάσειεν (so MSS: Schanz ἀνάσει), where ἀνάσει = ὁμος of direct speech.

4 D

38. ὀλιγόρευτε τε καὶ ἡμελεία. ἀμελεῖων is stronger than ὀλιγωρεῶν (ἄλγη, ὀρε). οὐδὲν ὁν πράγμα. See for οὐδὲν πράγμα above on 3 c. For the collocation of genitive and accusative absolute Schanz compares Rep. x 604 B ὅστιν δήλον δυτικὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὕτως εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαίνων τὸ χαλέπιον φέροντε, οὕτως τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων αξίων δὴ μεγάλης σκονδῆς. I think εἰ καὶ ἀποσάνων is simply 'though he should die' and not si vel periret, as Wohlrab and Schanz take the phrase.

39. δεπορ οὖν καὶ θάνατον: much as in Euthyd. 283 A δεπορ οὖν καὶ συνέβη ἢμῖν.

40. τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθηκεύει: δεσμᾶ = chains: δεσμοῖ = cases of imprisonment (δεσμὸς i.q. τὸ δεδέσθαι). See Apology 32 c and Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 353: "The masculine and neuter inflexions are not interchangeable, and though δεσμὸς is occasionally

42. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν-καλ. καλ goes with the pronoun as in the familiar δ καλ. ταῦτα is strictly speaking the internal accusative after ἀγαπεῖ: its use here is akin to the use of ταῦτα δὴ, ταῦτα ἀρα = διὰ ταῦτα κτλ., for which see on Apol. 23 B.

43. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον: τοῦ is justified not so much because the person has been already mentioned, as because it adds to the force of the indignation: ‘in defence of that manslayer’ (slowly and with emphasis).

44. ὡς φασίν ἐκεῖνοι. They doubtless maintained that death was due to natural causes.

45. εἰ δὲ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν: ‘were it never so true that he had killed him’: cf. 9 C εἰ δὲ τι μᾶλιστα (si vel maxime) με Εὐθύφρων δίδαξεν—τι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα κτλ. In historians and orators εἰ τὰ μᾶλιστα is sometimes used in the same sense: Δημοσθένης περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου ο 95 συνοφαντίας οὐδ' ἐπιθέτω μὴ μόνον τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι—ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ, εἰ τὰ μᾶλιστ' ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς κτλ.

46. ἄνθρωπον γε ὅντος. The γε shows that this clause is equivalent to a clause expressing condition.

οὐ δεῖν. The negative is repeated, partly because ὅτι εἰ δὲ τι μᾶλιστα is somewhat remote, but still more for emphasis. I think οὐ δεῖν is the infinitive: the indirect is justified by the preceding ὡς φασίν ἐκεῖνοι, exactly as in Herodotus 1 65 ὡς δ' αὐτῷ Δακε-δαμόνοι λέγουσι, Δυσδρογοῖ—ἐκ Κρήτης ἀγαγέσθαι ταῦτα, where see Stein, who shews that this anacoluthontic idiom is common in Herodotus, and found also in Aesch. Pers. 188 τούτων στάσεων τιν' ὡς ἐγὼ ὅδ' ὄρειν ὑπὲρ ταῦτα, τεῦχειν ἢ' ἀλλήλαις.

See also Sophocles Trach. 1240 ἀνὴρ δὴ ὥς ξοκεῖν σο ἑμὲνειν ἑμὸι φθόνοντι μοῖραν, with Blaydes’ note. In Plato the idiom is comparatively rare: e.g. Phileb. 20 D τὸδε γε μὴν, ὥς οἴμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαίωτας εἶναι λέγειν: Soph. 263 D and Euthyd. 280 D δεῖν (so BT: Schanz δεῖ, rightly I think, because the ὡς clause follows) ἀρα, ὥς ξοκεῖν. Crat. 399 D ὁσπερ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ τούτως εἶναι τι χρῆμα is not a case in point, for ὁσπερ qualifies the whole expression: still less is Crat. 384 C ὁσπερ ὑποτεθεὶς αὐτὸν σκῶτειν. The idiom has a colloquial effect.
Stephanus read δέων, not δεῖν. The syntax would then resemble ὃς ἀνδροφόνον καὶ οὐδεὶς ὃν πράγμα in line 38. δεῖν is retained by Schanz and explained as a participle: δεῖν: δέων :: πλεῖν : πλέων. The existence of such a participle is attested by some ancient grammarians, and by Hesychius (δεῖν: χρή, ἀναγκαίον, πρέπον, ἢ προσήκον) and Hertlein (Neue Jahrbücher für Phil. und Paedagogik 1867, p. 474) finds another example of it in Plato’s Charmides 164 ε ὃ τοῦτον μὲν οὐκ ὑρθοῦ δυτος τοῦ προσήματος—οὐδέ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἄλληλους, while other alleged examples of its occurrence have been found in Xen. Hell. vii 4. 39 κατηγόρων αὐτοῦ ὃς δεῖν ἄποδανεὶν, Lysias xiv 5. 7 ἀστρατέλας μὲν γὰρ δικαίους ἀν αὐτῶν ἀλῶναι—δεῖλας δὲ τι δεῖν αὐτῶν (so Stephanus: mss δεῖ εἴκαστον) μετὰ τῶν ὑπληθῶν κινδυνεύειν ἵππευει ἐλείτε, and Ar. Frag. 220 (ed. Kock) εἰς τὰς τρήρεις δεῖν (mss δεῖ δ’ ἀναλόγω ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τέχνη κτλ. The whole subject is discussed at length in Jahrb. für Philol. for 1872, p. 741 by Usener, who derives δεῖν from δεῖν (participle of δεῖ, an assumed by-form of δέω), like πλεῖν for πλεῖν and οίμαι for οἴμαι: also in σμικροῦ, ὀλγοῦ, ἐνῶ δεῖν and the like, he takes δεῖν as a participle, and ingeniously multiplies examples by emending in Thuc. vi 12 ἐνθὰδ’ εἶναι to ἐνθα δεῖν. But none of the examples hitherto cited seem to be enough to establish the use in Attic Greek: I therefore agree with Kock (l. c.) in looking on the usage as Byzantine.

47. ἀνάσιον γὰρ εἶναι κτλ. The second hint of the subject of the dialogue, here in its negative aspect: the first or positive indication comes in c ἐὰν—μὴ ἄφοισοίσ (i.e. δεῖν δοκεῖ διὸ τούτων). Presently the subject is hinted at in both aspects: τὸ θείον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὅσιον τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνάσιον: but it is not till 5 D that the subject is first explicitly announced: λέγε ὅτι, τι φήσε εἶναι τὸ δοσίον καὶ τὸ ἀνάσιον; Schanz regards the words ἀνάσιον γὰρ—ἐπεξεξήναι as a marginal note: but without them the subject would not be introduced so gradually as is Plato’s wont.

49. τοῦ ὅσιον τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνάσιον. περὶ when it goes with two substantives is regularly placed between them. Only περὶ and ἐνεκα among Greek prepositions are permitted to follow their case in Attic prose. Schanz says of τὸ θείον ὡς ἔχει ‘verba interpolata esse videntur’: in his annotated edition he conjectures that they represent a marginal gloss τὸ δοσίον ὡς ἔχει, θείον and δοσίον being frequently confounded. I think the words are genuine, (1) because οἶει ἐπιστάσθαι περὶ τῶν θείων follows immediately,
(2) because what Euthyphro means is that ἀνθρώπων γὰρ εἶναι—ἐπεξείναι is not a belief entertained by the gods (whence the emphatic place of τὸ θεῖον), but mere ἀνθρώπων φύσαρα καὶ οὐδὲν ἄξιον (Gorg. 492 c). τὸ θεῖον ἡς ἔχει simply means ‘the position of the gods’, and is parallel to τῶν θείων διη ἔχει in Socrates’ reply.

50. ὃ Εὐθύφρον—ἀκριβῶς οἱλα ἐπιστασθαι. Here and in ἀκριβῶς εἰδείν of line 58 there is perhaps an allusion to the etymological meaning of εὐθύφρον ‘right-minded’.

53. ὡς σὺ λέγης. The insertion of σὺ shews that Socrates accepts Euthyphro’s narrative only provisionally.

54. ὅπως μὴ αὕτη. ὅπως μὴ after verbs of fearing makes the object of apprehension appear more vividly as something to be shunned. For parallel cases see Goodwin M. T. p. 82. ad = vicissim: lest you, who censure others for not knowing τὸ διὸν, be yourself guilty of τὸ ἀνόητον. Presently πράγμα is meant. to recall τοῦτων οὕτω πραξέων: and τυγχάνῃς πρᾶττων virtually = be really doing: see Verrall on Medea 608. Plato himself would not have considered Euthyphro’s father as deserving of prosecution for murder: see Legg. ix 865 c ἐὰν μὲν δοῦλον κτείνῃ νομίζων τὸν ἐαυτοῦ διεγράσθαι, τὸν τοῦ τελευτᾶσαντος δεσπότην ἄβλαβῃ παρεχέτω καὶ ἄξιοι, ή δίκην εἰς τὴν ἄξιαν τοῦ τελευτᾶσαντος ὑπεχέτω διακήρυ.


57. οὔδε τι ἀν διαφέροι Εὐθύφρων. τῷ is of course dative of amount of difference. διαφέρων is ‘to excel’ rather than ‘to differ’: Crito 49 ἢ ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς παλίδων οὐδέν διαφέροντες. The effect of διαφέροι Εὐθύφρων = διαφέροιμι ἐγώ is to make Euthyphro’s conceit more conspicuous, by putting the praise as it were into the mouth of a second party. Wohlrab compares Soph. Ajax 98 where Ajax says ὅτι οὐ ποτ' Αἴανθ' οἴδ' ἀτιμάσων' ἐτ. Cf. Iliad 1 240 ἢ ποτ' Ἀχιλῆς ποθ' ἦταί νίας Ἀχιλῶν: Plautus Rudens 1245 ‘minime istuc faciet noster Daemones’ (the Daemones I know). Much the same effect is produced by the pompous use of the article in Theaet. 166 A γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξαν.

τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων: contemptuously: nearly = ‘the rout of
human beings': I am more than a mere ἄνθρωπος, I am a θείος ἄνηρ.

58. εὖ μὴ...εἰδεῖν. For the change from the third to the first person, cf. (with Schanz) Phaed. 91 c σμικρὸν φροντὶσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολύ μάλλον, εὰν μὲν τι υἱὸν δοκῶ ἀληθῆς λέγειν. The idiom is regular in Greek: see Jebb on Ajax 864. The second hand in T reads ἐλείνη.

CHAPTER V

forms a transition to the subject of the dialogue. See Introduction, p. viii. Socrates proposes to become Euthyphro's pupil, so as to learn the nature of piety and impiety, and shift the accusation from Socrates the pupil to Euthyphro the teacher.

1. ὁ θαυμάσιος Εὐθύφρος: 'admirable Euthyphro' (sarcastically). See on Crito 44 B ὁ δαμόνιε Σώκρατες. To be called θαυμάσιος is a left-handed compliment: for θαυμάσιος means 'to be surprised at' as well as 'to esteem', like the old English 'admire'. This form of address is common in Plato: e.g. 8 A, 8 D, Symp. 222 E, Crat. 439 C.

3. πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς: Before either the ἀνάκρισις or trial proper began, either party could challenge the other (προκαλεῖον, πρόκλησις) in the presence of witnesses to take some particular step. In case the challenge was declined, evidence was given at the trial (ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ: see infra on B) that such a challenge had been given and refused, with a view to prejudice the refuser's case. See for example the form of μαρτυρία in Demosthenes κατὰ Στεφάνου Λ § 8 Στέφανος —Εὐδίος—Σκόπης—μαρτυρούσι παρεῖναι πρὸς τῇ διαιτησίᾳ Τισίλι' Ἀχαρνεῖ, διέ προκαλεῖτο Φορμίων Ἀπολλώδωρον—ἀνοίγει τὰς διαθήκας τὰς Πασίονος κτλ. In the present case the effect of Meletus' refusal to accept the challenge of Socrates would be to make it appear that Meletus' motive was not public spirit, but private animosity: cf. Apol. 23 E Μελητός μοι ἐπέθετο—ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθομένων. See Meier und Schömann Att. Process II pp. 872 ff.

4. λέγοντα after μοι as in Crito 51 D ὃν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπειναῖ. In both cases the accusative is due to the preceding infinitive.

ὅτι ἐγὼ...σος. Note the curious mixture of the direct and
indirect speech. From ἐγώγε down to εἰδέναι, or rather strictly speaking down to καὶ νῦν, we have Socrates' ipsissima verba, addressed (in the hypothetical case) to Meletus: after καὶ νῦν we should expect ἐπειδὴ μὲ σὺ (i.e. Μέλητος)—φής—Εὐθύφρονος (in place of σὺς): instead of this, Socrates wishing to address Euthyphro directly says μαθητής δὴ γένοιτο σὺς: so that to prevent ambiguity ἕκειτο—φησὶ must take the place of σὺ—φής just before.

7. αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ κανονομοῦντα. For αὐτοσχεδιάζειν (to improvise, speak, think, act on one's own initiative and hence hastily and unadvisedly) see on Apol. 20 c (τίνα μὴ ἴμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν). The phrase is pathetically repeated in the end of the dialogue (16 A) when Euthyphro has proved a broken reed. For κανονομοῦντα see on 3 B: there we find κανονομοῦντις σοῦ περὶ τὰ θεία, because the metaphor is more prominent ('a coiner of novelties in regard to divine matters'): here κανονομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θελών ('coining novelties about' etc.). Cobet in Mnemosyne III (N. S.), p. 281 would bracket καὶ κανονομοῦντα, holding the words to be an interpolation from 16 A. He further adds: "Graecum est κανονομεῖν, ut σπουδάζειν, περὶ τι ποτὲ τῶν σου κανονομῶ περὶ αὐτά καὶ πρὸς κανονομοῦντος σου περὶ τὰ θεία." But αὐτοσχεδιάζειν περὶ σοῦ in the Apology is enough to defend the construction, and the occurrence of κανονομῶ περὶ αὐτά in 16 A is really an argument for the genuineness of the words here, since 16 A is intended as a reminiscence of this passage. The indictment against Socrates is given in the note on 2 c.

8. μαθητής δὴ γένοιτο σὺς. δὴ adds a touch of sarcasm ('why of course'). The peculiar cadence is intended to throw ludicrous emphasis on σὺς, as in Horace's 'ridiculus mus' and Martial's 'Unus de cunctis animalibus hircus habet cor' (XI 84. 17). Notice the implication that to learn τὰ εὐσεβή is to be εὐσεβής.

9. καὶ...φαλὴν ἄν. Herewith Socrates as is his wont breaks 5 B into direct speech. καὶ of course goes with φαλὴν ἄν.

αὶ μὴ...τὰ τοιαῦτα. Meletus would not be likely to: see on 3 c ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῷ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θελῶν καταγελῶσιν ὦ μανιτόμοι. The position of Εὐθύφρωνα after the pause is meant to suggest ironically that Euthyphro was an authority on the question.

10. καὶ ὅρθας νομὶσειν...δικάζων. The first καὶ goes with the third in the sense of 'both—and': ἡγοῦ being parallel to μὴ δικάζων. The second καὶ is 'also', i.e. 'as well as Euthyphro' and
goes with ἐμὲ. Schanz and Wohlrab omit the second καὶ with B: but as it is found in T and as a correction in B, and would more naturally fall out than be inserted, I think it right. The old punctuation was τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ὁρθῶς νομίζειν, καὶ ἐμὲ: Schanz set this right. If any change were necessary, I should prefer to read ὁρθῶς νομίζειν καὶ ἐμὲ ἦγον καὶ μὴ δικάζου, assuming that καὶ before ἐμὲ was wrongly placed before ὁρθῶς in B: b then inserted it before ἐμὲ without striking it out before ὁρθῶς.

ὁρθῶς νομίζειν: 'to be orthodox'. νομίζειν is especially used of belief in the gods: see on 3 B above.

11. ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ. τῷ διδασκάλῳ is meant to explain ἐκείνῳ: a pause should be made in reading after ἐκείνῳ. This I think more likely than to take ἐκείνῳ as = ıllı = 'that famous'.

12. λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμὸλ. λαγχάνειν δίκην τινί is to bring an accusation against one. The original meaning was 'to obtain (by lot) one's rights': hence to obtain leave to discuss one's rights. The reason why λαγχάνειν (to get by lot) was chosen in preference to λαμβάνειν in this phrase seems to have been that in cases of simultaneous charges the order of precedence was determined by lot. Meier und Schömann ii 790—794.

ὥς τοὺς προσβιτέρους διαφθείροντι. It might fairly be argued that it is worse to corrupt the young than to corrupt the old, and that so far Socrates was worse than Euthyphro: but Socrates means that to prosecute Euthyphro would be to get at the fons et origo mali, the corrupter of the corrupters. Euthyphro as Socrates' teacher would be just as responsible for Socrates' ill-doing as Socrates was for that of Alcibiades: and it was largely owing to Alcibiades' misconduct that Socrates was accused: see Apol. § 33 and notes. Note the double meaning in διαφθείροντι: taken with ἐμὲ μὲν, it = κακὸν ποιεῖν, with ἐκείνον, κακῶς ποιεῖν (or worse); and κακῶς ποιεῖν in Greek is κακὸν ποιεῖν. Cf. Rep. i 335 B foll. and note on κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν in 3 A above.

14. διδασκοντι — νοῡθετοῦντι — κολάζοντι. The accusative (found in B and T) is impossible. It is no doubt due to assimilation, as Schanz remarks. νουθετῶν and κολάζων are combined as in Gorg. 479 A ὅστε μὴ νουθετεῖσθαί μὴ κολάζεσθαι. Euthyphro might have replied that he prosecuted his father for his father's own sake: punishment being a corrective agency, as is implied in 4 C ἔλαν—μὴ ἄφοσιοις σεαυτόν τε καὶ ἐκείνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξεῖν, where see note.
15. καὶ ἂν μὴ μοι πειθηται—γράφηται σέ. Herewith Socrates turns to Euthyphro again. The clause ἦ ἄντ' ἐμοὶ γράφηται σέ is still under the influence of the negative of μηδὲ. γράφεσθαι (cause to be written down sc. in the archon's book) is 'to indict': see above on 2 B. Notice the emphasis on σέ (not σε).

16. λέγειν εἰ τῷ δικαστήριῳ: see on Λ above (πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς). The statement had to be supported by witnesses (μαρτυρεῖν τὴν πρόκλησιν). Meier und Schömann 11872 note 293.

18. εἰ ἤρα με. The emphasis is on εἰ: whence με (the reading of B) not ἤρε (T). Translate 'if he tried etc.' Euthyphro implies that the supposition is unlikely: presently, in ἔγενετο ἄν, it is assumed to be impossible. Euthyphro's animation and self-confidence increase as he hears himself talk.

19. δὴ πιεσιστὸς ἐστιν. σαθρός (lit. 'furnished with holes' hence 5 C 'unsound') is frequently used as a metaphor in Plato and in Greek generally. It is no doubt a derivative from σήθω (σάω) 'I sift' like σαπρός from σήσω. Conformably to this derivation it is combined with τετρημένος in Gorg. 493 Β (ἀγγεία τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά) shortly after the allusion to the sieve of the Danaids in Β.

20. καὶ πολὺ ἄν—ἡ περὶ ἐμοῦ. The second apodosis is framed as if the verb of the conditional clause had been in the past indicative. The effect is to throw the growing self-confidence of Euthyphro into stronger relief: if he had tried (but he dared not), I should have turned the tables on him. Schanz quotes from Xenophon an example of the converse change (from past Ind. to Optative): Cyneget. 12. 22 εἰ οὖν εἰδείεν τούτο, ὅτι θεύσαι αὐτοὺς, ἠντὸ ἄν εἰ τοὺς πόνους καὶ τὰς παιδεύσεις, αὐτοί ἀληκται μόλις καὶ κατεργάζοντο ἄν αὐτήν.

23. καὶ ἐγὼ τοι. καὶ goes with ἐγὼ, not with τοι. Socrates pretends to share Euthyphro's confidence.


26. ὅραν—κατείδην. Schanz draws attention to the pun on Meletus' name: here is a Μέλητος ἀμέλης! After ὅρανς T has ἀτεκνώσ, which, if right, can only intensify ὅραν, as if 'literally with so keen an eye'. But ὅραν in connection with sight is no longer sufficiently metaphorical to be coupled with ἀτεκνώσ. κατείδην is 'caught sight of' 'descried': blind to Euthyphro, Meletus could see
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only Socrates. It is implied that personal animosity inspired the prosecution: see note on 3 B line 8 ad fin.

28. νῦν θη. See on 3 D. The reference is to 4 E—5 A.

ποιῶν τι—ἄλλων; The subject of the dialogue is rather δοιῶν τε καὶ ἄνδοιον than εὐσέβες τε καὶ ἄσεβες: it is presently stated, more precisely in 5 D. εὐσέβες and ἄσεβες are used here on account of the preceding ἄσεβεσας: so infra in 12 E. Of the two words δοιῶν and εὐσέβες, δοιῶν is the wider, εὐσέβες denoting more especially the fulfilment of religious obligations: but throughout the dialogue εὐσέβειν and ἄσεβεῖν are used as the verbs corresponding to δοιῶν and ἄνδοιον. On the difference between ποῖος τις and ποῖος Cobet remarks: "differunt enim certo usu ποῖος et ποῖος τις, ut ποῖος cum irrisione dicatur—ποῖος μάγειρος;—ποῖος τις ubi serio quaeritur de alicuius personae aut rei ingenio, indole, natura aut genere" (Nov. Lect. p. 276).

5 D 30. ἡ οὖ ταύτων ἄστιν—ἄνδοιον εἶναι. See for ταύτων note on 10 E below. Here and in 6 D—E Plato uses language which he afterwards used in connection with the theory of Ideas: but in neither passage is it necessary to suppose that the Ideas are already part of the Platonic doctrine. See Introduct. p. xxviii.

What Plato means is this: δοιῶν is always and everywhere the same, possessed of some one form (ἰδέα) or character: similarly with ἄνδοιον: and these two, δοιῶν and ἄνδοιον, are always and everywhere the opposites of one another. So far there is nothing that goes beyond the Socratic doctrine of λόγοι.


32. παντὸς ἐναντίον. So the MSS. Schanz reads τῶν τούτων: but τῶν τούτων in Plato is generally used adverbially. The μὲν is concessive; the unholy, while (though) it is the opposite of all the holy (τοῦ δοιῶν παντὸς is virtually = τοῦ ἐν πάσῃ πράξει δοιῶν), nevertheless resembles it in this point, viz. that it is like itself, etc. The resemblance of the unholy to the holy in this one point is presently brought out still more clearly by the words κατὰ τὴν ἄσεστη, i.e. like holiness, as holiness is like itself. κατὰ in this sense is common in Plato, e.g. Apol. 17 B ὤμολογηθης ἐν ὑδ κατὰ τούτων εἶναι ὑπηρ. Missing the precise force of the μὲν and δὲ clause, the editors (Schanz, Fritzsche and Wohlrab) read ἄσεστη with
T for the ὀσίτηρα of B, taking κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσίτητα as = 'in virtue of its impiety'. So also Bonitz Platonische Studien 3 p. 241. Prof. Josef Wagner (Zur Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron, p. 22) derives an argument against the genuineness of the dialogue from the mistaken reading κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσίτητα. An additional argument for the reading κατὰ τὴν ὀσίτητα is contained in the words of ὅ—ἔφησα γὰρ που μὴ ἴδεα τὰ τέκνα ἀνδρίας εἶναι καὶ τὰ δοσια δοια: that δοια are δοια μὴ ἴδεα has not been stated precisely if κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσίτητα is read here. Finally, the Scholiast read κατὰ τὴν ὀσίτητα, and explained it as I have done: his note is κατὰ τὴν ὀσίτητα· ἀνὴ τοῦ ὄμοιος, παραπλησίοις τῇ ὀσίτητῃ. See also on μελλω τῳ ἴδεαν and on the whole passage, Introduction, p. xxviii.

34. μέλλῃ: on this idiomatic use of μέλλω see Madvig, Gk. Syntax, p. 94, Rem. 1.

CHAPTER VI.

The subject of the dialogue is now propounded: what is τὸ δοσιν and τὸ ἀνδρίου? Euthyphro's first answer puts a special case in place of a general definition: τὸ δοσιν is to act as I act now, τὸ ἀνδρίου is not so to act: witness the treatment of Cronus by Zeus. Before pointing out to Euthyphro his mistake, Socrates professes his disbelief in such legends about the gods, and suggests that this is perhaps why he is put upon his trial.

The habit of putting the particular for the general (πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς Meno 77 Α) in a definition is frequently illustrated in the Socratic dialogues. A good example is Theaet. 146 c—d. What is ἐπιστήμη asks Socrates. Theaetetus replies: mathematics, shoemaking, etc.—these, all and each, are ἐπιστήμη. Other examples are Xen. Mem. iv 2. 13 foll.: ibid. 31 ff.: Hipp. Major 287 e ff.: Lach. 190 e ff.: Meno 71 e ff. See Grote's Plato Vol. 1 p. 317 ff. The mistake consists in a simple conversion of the universal affirmative: to do this is pious (thinks Euthyphro), therefore all piety is to do this.

4. τῆς δικοῦται—ἐξαμαρτάνωτε. The second participle (which is to be taken with all the three alternatives) is logically subordinate to the first. The construction of δικώ with a participle is common enough: and there is no reason for rejecting δικούται as Schanz suggests, or reading καὶ ἦ for ἦ after δικοῦται with Fischer. Euthyphro states his principle thus: δοιν is to prosecute ὅ δικώ

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(which contains the notion of law-breaking, as well as of injustice: see on Crito p. xiii), whether his sin (ἐξαμαρτάνοντι) is in connection with manslaughter or sacrilege etc. ἐξαμαρτάνοντι is necessary, because manslaughter was not always ἄδικον or illegal: see on 4 B, line 26 above. ἱεροσύλλα on the other hand was always punished with death: see Isocrates κατὰ Δοξίτου § 6. ἦ τι ἄλλο goes closely with περὶ ἱερῶν ἰκανός and περὶ is to be taken with τι as well as with ἰκανός.

5 E 10. τοῦ νόμον δτι ὀντως ἔχει. So the mss. Schanz reads νομίμου for νόμον after Baumann: Hirschig reads ὅσιον. The idiom is like ὁτά σε τίς εἰ: and ὁ νόμος ὀντως ἔχει is just as good Greek as τὸ νόμμου ὀντώς ἔχει. Probably Plato uses the noun νόμος rather than the adjective νομίμου (conformably with ὅσιον above) because it is more personal and direct. νόμον is written rather than ὅσιον for two reasons. In the first place, Plato wishes to indicate that νόμος and nothing else determines Euthyphro’s view of τὸ ὅσιον: in the second place ὅσιον would be inapt here, because the example quoted is an act of Zeus, who could hardly (I think) have been called ὅσιος by Euthyphro without presumption: for which reason he is presently called not ὅσιος, but τῶν θεῶν δριστῶς καὶ δικαιῶτας. νόμος is here simply the law of Athens. Euthyphro’s position is: the conduct of Zeus is sanctioned by Athenian law, Zeus is worshipped by the State, and I am simply following out his example.

11. δτι ταύτα—γιγνόμενα. Schanz brackets this clause. I believe the words are genuine: they explain δ καὶ ἄλλοις ἓθη εἰκὼν. Euthyphro is a little indignant that his conduct should be called in question: he has already told others that this affair will be managed rightly (ὅρθως i.e. δικαίως or legally) in his way (ὁστω i.e. by prosecuting his father). ὅρθως goes with γιγνόμενa, and ὅστω, logically considered, is equivalent to a participial clause ‘if done thus’.

12. μὴ ἐπιπρέπειν explains ὀντως ἔχει above.

13. αὐτοὶ γάρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι: γάρ like enim is often introductory: here it explains τεκμήριον. See on Apol. 20 E Χαιρεφώντα γάρ ὅτε ποὺ. The force of αὐτοὶ is ‘of themselves’, ultiro, though laymen (μάντεις: cf. infra 6 B τι γάρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἱ γε αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μὴδὲν εἰδεναι: As Euthyphro’s argument is: the Athenian law approves my conduct, we might expect Ἄθηναιοι for ἄνθρωποι: but here again Euthyphro’s point of view comes out: he is no cosmopolitan: for him the Athenians are οἱ ἄνθρωποι and Athens the world.
14. τυχάνοντι νομίζοντες i.e. do really think, by the usual Attic *lìotes*: see on 4 Ε line 54 above.

16. *νεῖς* κατέπινεν οὖκ ἐν δίκη. For the form *νεῖς* see on 6 Α Crito 45 c. The forms of the second declension are preferred in the singular: in the dual and plural *υἱν* *νεῖς* etc. are preferred. Schanz everywhere prints this word without the i: and so it generally appears in Inscriptions of Plato’s time: see Meisterhans Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften 2 p. 113. Notice *καταινον* used in connection with solids; the effect is to make Cronus’s seat disgusting as well as unjust. For *κατέπινεν* a late hand in T reads *κατέπινε*. The imperfect denotes as usual the repeated act. Hesiod is the literary source of this article in the Greek creed: Theog. 459 καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατέπινε Κρόνος μέγας κτλ. For ἐν δίκη see above on 4 Β line 26.


20. τὰ ἐναντία—περὶ ἔμοι. ἐναντία λέγοντι without the article would mean to ‘state contradictory views both about the gods and about me’; since ἐναντία λέγειν is idiomatic for ‘to contradict’: the meaning here is contradict themselves by giving one view about the gods and another about me. Note the implication that the rule of conduct for gods and men is the same—a distinctive feature in the Greek creed, where God is man in magno, and man God in parvo.

As the champion of Greek orthodoxy Euthyphro thinks it actually impious that there should be one rule for Zeus and another for him. See Introd. p. xvi, and ibid. p. xviii for the apologetic motive which appears in this part of the dialogue. Socrates was accused of setting sons against their fathers: Plato shews that the orthodox creed, believed and acted on, errs in this way more than he.

22. ἀφι γε: “assensum poscit” says Stallbaum, wrongly. The particle ἀφι merely marks the interrogation: see on Crito 44 Ε. Socrates plays his usual rôle of the ignorant man seeking for information.

24. δυσχερός πως ἀποθέωμαι. πως is nescio quomodo, as
Fritzsche remarks. In Rep. ii 377 d ff. Plato rejects all these crude stories as false and pernicious. God is altogether good and never lies: ibid. 379 b and 380 d. In particular he emphatically rejects the stories about the unnatural conduct of Cronus and Zeus: ibid. 377 e ὥρθος ἔχει τά γε τοιαύτα μέμφεσθαι.—πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μεγίστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγάλων ψεύδως—ός Οὐρανός τε εὐρήσατο Ἀφείᾳ ἀντίκει Ἡσιόδος, δε τε αὐτῷ Ἐντομίσθαι αὐτῶν. τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἱέρος, οὐδέν εἶ ἢ ἐν ἄλληθ, φιλην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀφεροῦσα τε καὶ νέους κτλ. In the doctrine that God is good, latent in this passage, Bonitz finds the key to the positive teaching of the Euthyphro—the answer to the question left unsolved in 14 A: see Introduction, p. xiv.

διὸ δὴ. So Schanz with Τ: B has δι’ ἂ. The antecedent is the entire clause τὰ τοιαύτα—ἀποδέχομαι. Special stress is to be laid on φήσει: it is implied (as above in 3 b) that the accusation of impiety is a mere blind. There is no need for Madvig’s conjecture ἵδια δὴ.

26. τῷ εὐ εἰσὶντε. There is irony in the participial clause: cf. note on 3 a above.

6 B 27. ἡμῖν: not for ἐμοί, but equivalent to ‘us laymen’)(μνεις. So presently οἷ γε αὐτόι ἀμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι. The sense is much the same in 12 E: πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὖν διδάξαι—ἱσα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθ’ ἡμῖν ἄδικεὶν μηδὲ ἁσβεσθαι γράφεσθαι, ὦ γε ἴκαρός ἥδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τὰ τε εὐθείας καὶ δοσι καὶ τὰ μὴ.

τὶ γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν. Cf. 3 A τι καὶ ποιοῦντα. “Quin tī χρῆ λέγειν interrogat, is quid dici, non an aliquid dici debeat quae sit; sed qui tī χρῆ καὶ λέγειν, is non solum quid, sed etiam an aliquid dicendum sit dubitat” Hermann, quoted by Fritzsche.

28. αὐτόι—μηθὲν εἰδέναι. αὐτόι of course goes with εἰδέναι: see on αὐτόι γὰρ οἷ διδορωτοι in 5 e above. A negative infinitive dependent on verbs sentiendi et declarandi in Greek generally takes od: μη is sometimes used by Plato, with the effect of intensifying the negation, just as τὸ μηθὲν is stronger than οὐθὲν: cp. infra 12 b πολλὸ γὰρ μοι δοκοῦσι—δεδεῖναι μὲν, αλεθεῖσαι δὲ μηθὲν ταῦτα ἀ δεδλασιν. Schanz quotes another example with ὁμολογεῖν: Phaed. 94 c οὕκοιν αὐτῷ ὁμολογήσαμεν—μὴ γέογι ἀν αὐτῆν—ἐναντία θείσω ὅσι ἐπικεῖνοι κτλ.

29. δὴ δὲ μοι εἴπε—γεγονέα; The situation here reminds one of the words of Phaedrus (Phaedr. 229 c) δὴ εἴπε πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σωκράτε, σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πεῖθει δηθές εἴπει; Ueberweg
PLATO'S EUTHYPHRO.

(Untersuchungen über die Echtheit etc. p. 251) needlessly sees in this correspondence an indication that the Euthyphro is spurious. Zeus as the god of friends had a temple in Megalopolis, seen by Pausanias and described in Book viii 31. 4. Socrates, as might be expected from the high value he set on friendship, frequently invokes this god: see Ast's Lexicon Platonicum s.v. φίλος.

ος ἀληθῶς: see on Crito 46 D. ὁς ἀληθῶς, τῷ δυντι and τῷ ἀληθείᾳ are used by Plato chiefly in his earlier dialogues: in his later works he prefers ἀληθῶς, δυνατι and ἀληθείᾳ: Schanz in Hermes (1886) xxi 3, pp. 439—459.

32. οἱ πολλοί. λοιποί is a variant in T for πολλοί: but the ignorant multitude are here contrasted with the εἰς τεχνικός ἄντι or μάντις, who is familiar with articles of faith not generally known.

33. καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα. So B: the editors read ἄρα for ἄρα. καὶ is 'also' and ἄρα asks the question. Hitherto only two examples of Euthyphro's orthodoxy have been given: Socrates now proceeds to ask whether he believes the other stories of poets and painters about war between the gods etc. Compare Rep. ii 378 c ff.

τῷ δυντι. See on ὁς ἀληθῶς in line 29 above.

34. καὶ ἔχθρας γε. So B: T omits γε, perhaps taking καὶ before πόλεμον as 'both', in which case it could not be followed by καὶ—γε.

36. τὰ τε ἄλλα ἱερά. ἄλλα means 'besides': for ἱερά is 6 c 'temples'.

37. καταπεπολικταί: sc. τοιαῦτα (acc.) for καταποικιλλεῖν like verbs of clothing takes two accusatives. We are not to understand οἷα or οἷος, as Schanz says: the Greek rule is rel. + conj. + anaphoric (demonstrative) pronoun, not rel. + conj. + rel. See on Apol. 40 λ. The relative clause is now changed into a main sentence.

καὶ δὴ καὶ: introduces a climax as in Apol. 26 D, καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νεοὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοὶ μανθάνουσιν κτλ.

τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις. There were two Panathenaic festivals, one annual and less gorgeous (τὰ Παναθήναια τὰ κατ' ἐναυτὴν, or simply τὰ Παναθήναια in Inscriptions, also called by writers Παναθήναια τὰ μικρὰ or μικρὰ Παναθήναια), the other held once every four years, in the 3rd year of every Olympiad (Παναθηναία τὰ μεγάλα in Inscriptions, called also by writers τὰ Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα or τὰ μεγάλα Παναθηναία). At the latter, if not also in the former (the evidence is contradictory), a robe,
woven by Athenian maidens and depicting the triumph of Athene and the Olympians over the giants, together with other celestial fights, was carried in procession to the Acropolis and presented to the statue of the goddess in the Erechtheum. Plato alludes to the same ceremonial in Rep. II 378 C πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογιτέων αὐτῶν καὶ ποικιλτέων κτλ. The subject is represented on the Parthenon frieze: see Baumeister’s Denkmäler des Klassischen Alterthums II p. 1185. From the beginning of the 4th century B.C., if not earlier, the robe was stretched like a sail upon the rigging of a ship, which ran on rollers in the procession. Preller’s Griechische Mythologie 4 I p. 243.

39. ἰνάγεται: ἧδε because of the rising ground of the Acropolis, not because the robe was an offering (ἰνάθημα). It is not unlikely that ἰνα- in ἰνάθημα and the like originally referred to the ‘high places’. ἰγνω is preferred to φέρω because of the accompanying procession.

41. μὴ μόνον γε. So B: T has μόνα. Strictly speaking, the sense is adjectival, but in Greek μόνον, πρῶτον etc. are occasionally used for the corresponding adjectives. Schanz quotes Meno 71 C ταῦτα—ἀπαγγέλωμεν; μὴ μόνον γε κτλ. Kühner Griechische Grammatik II p. 236 Anmerk. 3.

42. ἄρτι: in B above.

CHAPTER VII.

In this chapter Socrates recalls Euthyphro to the point; ‘Your definition is no definition: give me the εἰδός ὃν πάντα τὰ δια διὶ διὰ ἑστιν’. Euthyphro replies: τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλές—ὁσιον: τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς μὴ προσφιλές—ἄνόσιον.

Socrates is sincerely anxious to convince Euthyphro of his impiety, but it was useless to try to do so directly: a preliminary training in logical method was necessary. See Lechthaler Die ὁσίατις bei Platon (Meran 1879) p. 21.

1. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα—διηγήσει. Herewith Socrates dismisses the point. In Plato’s expressed disbelief in these mythological tales we see the germ of his hostility to poetry, afterwards developed in the second, third, and tenth books of the Republic.

6 D 5. τὸ πρότερον viz. in 5 D.

9. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον. The imperfect of verbs of saying is
sometimes used where we should expect the aorist: cf. ἔληγον in 15 A. Goodwin (M. T. p. 8) notices this usage in Herodotus and Thucydides: but it is not less common in Plato, or indeed in Greek generally.

10. ἀλλὰ γὰρ = 'but in point of fact': see note on Apol. 19 C.

12. καὶ γὰρ ἑσυχ ἔσια. Schanz with T omits ἔσια, reading ἑστὶ. It makes Euthyphro's answer more emphatic if ἔσια is retained.

15. ἐκεῖνο αὐτῷ τὸ εἴδος—μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ. εἴδος and ἰδέα are here practically synonymous: the only difference is that εἴδος views the thing in question more as to its content, ἰδέα more as to its form. Hence εἴδος is more naturally used as the object of δίδωμι than ἰδέα.

19. αὐτὴν ἰδαξίων τὴν ἰδέαν. αὐτὴν (as its position shews) is 6 E 'by itself', unencumbered by the accidents of a special instance. So αὐτός γὰρ ἑσμεν = 'we are alone'.

20. ἀποδείκτων—παραδείγματι. These words are almost technical terms in Plato's theory of ideas, παραδείγμα in particular being common especially in the latest phase of that theory. Here there is no allusion to the theory as yet unborn: there is only a faithful description of Socrates' rule of conduct. Cf. infra 9 D line 21: also Crito 46 B and especially Phaedo 100 οὐ ποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον (the λόγος sought after in the Euthyphro is τὸ ὁσιόν) ἂν ἃν κρίνω ἐρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἂ μὲν ἃν μοι δοκῆ τοῦτον συμφώνειν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ δύνα—ἀ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὖκ ἀληθῆ. See Introduction p. xxviii.

24. καὶ σύνω σοι φράσω. Euthyphro's readiness to suit his manner of answering to the wants of his audience is a point which he has in common with the sophists of Plato's dialogues. Cf. Gorgias in Gorg. 449 C: καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἑστὶν ὡς φημὶ, μηδένα ἄν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἔμοι ταῦτα εἶπεν.

27. ἱστι τοῦν—ἀνάστιον. Euthyphro's second attempt at a definition is more successful. He avoids the former mistake of putting the particular for the general: but flaws hardly less serious remain. The worst (not pointed out till Ch. XII fol.) is still due to simple conversion of the universal affirmative: because all holiness is dear to the gods, it does not follow that all that is dear to the gods is holiness. Euthyphro in fact puts a τάθεος of holiness in place of its ὁσία. On this definition in general see Introd. p. xix.
7 A 29. ἄρωσις expresses Socrates' satisfaction that Euthyphro has escaped his former error. Just so in the Theaetetus (148 Β), when Theaetetus and his friend shew that they have surmounted the first difficulty of defining, Socrates bursts out: ἄρωσις γIKE ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖς.

31. ἄληθές is preferred to the more natural ἄληθή (ἄληθές has some inferior MS authority) from assimilation to ἄγκαλως, ως, and οὕτως. ως ἄληθές (the reading of T) is impossible: the meaning would then be 'if however you have really answered'.

Σταλλμαϊν quotes Prot. 328 Β σμικρόν τι μου ἐμπόδων, ὦ δήλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥάδως ἐπεκδιᾶξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξε.

32. ηστιν: emphatic, hence the accent.

CHAPTER VIII.

Socrates proceeds to examine Euthyphro's definition. He first endeavours to remove an ambiguity in the expression τοῖς θεοῖς: and in so doing contrives to shew that Euthyphro's definition is untenable from Euthyphro's own standpoint, while from a higher and indeed essentially monotheistic conception of God it is less objectionable, though still inadequate.

In this Chapter Socrates reminds Euthyphro that there are gods and gods: what one god loves another may hate, in which case the same thing will be both holy and unholy, which is impossible, because holiness and unholliness are opposites. See Introduction p. xix ff.

1. τι λέγομεν. λέγομεν is 'mean', as often: see on Apol. 21 Β.

2. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλὲς τε—ἄνθρωπος. τε is displaced from its natural position after τὸ, partly because of μὲθ, and partly because ὅσιον is thus more easily supplied. It is worth while noticing why ἄνθρωπος is introduced. What Socrates desiderated was the εἰδος τοῦ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν: now ὅσια are of two sorts—men and deeds: applied to men, ὅσιος has a subjective sense; applied to deeds, an objective: the subdivision is therefore necessary to illustrate πάντα τὰ ὅσια.

3. θεομοιότερος is equivalent to μὴ προσφιλὲς θεοῖς. The neutral condition of indifference is not admitted: if the gods are not with us, they are against us. Just so ἀνωφελῆς is rather 'hurtful' than
'useless': and in like manner ἄβουλος, ἄκοσος, ἄμεμπτος, ἄφθονος and other words have a positive meaning in Greek. See Alcibiades II 138 d foll. and especially Protag. 331 A foll. οὖκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὀφθέντι οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πράγμα, οὔτε δικαιοσύνη οἷον δίκαιον, ἀλλ' οἷον μὴ δίκαιον: ἢ δὲ ὀφθέντι οἷον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἄνδικον; Still more clear is Rep. iv 437 c τί διό; τὸ ἀβουλευτὶ καὶ μὴ ἑθελεῖν μὴν ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀκοδεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) καὶ εἰς ἀπαντα τάναντα ἑκείνου ἑθομεῖν; πῶς γὰρ οὗ; This style of reasoning is indeed disallowed by Diotima in Symp. 201 Ε—202 Α: οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; ἐφή: ἢ οἰεί, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καθ' ὑ, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι αἰσχρόν; μάλιστα γε. ἢ καὶ <σ> ἂν μὴ σοφῖν, ἀμαθεῖς; ἢ οὐκ ἠθοπαι ὅτι ἐστὶ τι μεταξύ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθείας; but only with a view to make room for the Platonic doctrine of ὁθή δόξα. It was very prevalent among the Greeks, and may perhaps be illustrated by the Solonian law requiring every one to take a definite side in political questions. There are fewer merely negative notions in Greek than in English: 'All men are not wise' meant to a Greek 'all men are fools'. The whole subject is discussed by Theodor Kock in Hermes Xviii p. 546 ff. (Ein Kapitel aus der formalen Logik, angewendet auf Aristoteles und Platon).

4. οὐ ταύτων δ' ἐστὶν. This explanatory clause (introduced as usual by δὲ) is inserted to prepare for the reductio ad absurdum of 8 Α καὶ δοσιν ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὖτε ἂν ἐκ, ὧν θυρήσας, ταύτῳ τῷ λόγῳ. "δὲ stands in the third place, to avoid the union of οὐ and δὲ". Schanz. For τὸ ἐναντιώτατον ('altogether its opposite') cf. Lysis 215 Ε τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἐναντιώτατῳ εἶναι μᾶλιστα φιλον. ἐναντιώτατον without the article would have a different meaning: the article implies that unholliness has but one opposite, holiness. For ταύτων see note on 10 Ε.

6. οὐχ οὕτως <εἰρηταί>; The reading is here very difficult. I adopt Hermann's emendation—a solution which had occurred to me independently. The MSS read: οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτω μὲν οὖν. καὶ εὖ γε φαευται εἰρηταί. δοκῶ, δὲ Σωκρατες, εἰρηταί γάρ. Fritzschw and Wohlkrab retain the MS reading, except that they reject εἰρηταί γάρ after Σωκρατες, and insert it after οὕτω μὲν οὖν: Schanz now rejects εἰρηταί γάρ in toto: formerly he bracketed the whole passage from καὶ εὖ γε down to the first εἰρηταί γάρ. Ast, Heusde, Hoene- beek, Maresch and Badham have each of them different suggestions. Hermann's correction seems to me at once the easiest and the best in point of sense. After οὐχ οὕτως we naturally expect εἰρηταί, for the
statement has been made already in 5 D το δυσσιον αθ το άυ μεν δολου παντος εναντιον, where παντος εναντιον is practically equivalent to εναντιωτατον. I conjecture that the corruption arose thus. After δοκω, δε Σωκράτες, the words ερηται γαρ were added on the margin by a copyist, perhaps with a reference to 5 D above, to indicate that the statement had been made already. Being afterwards introduced into the text, they were the occasion of the omission of ερηται after οθω, the more readily, inasmuch as ερηται, ερηται, and presently ερηται γαρ occur in the immediate vicinity.

8. καὶ εδ γε φανεται ερησται is added by Socrates because the assertion was previously made by Socrates, not by Euthyphro (5 D): Socrates wishes to have the sentiment approved by Euthyphro, in order that he may contribute to his own discomfiture.

7 B 9. δοκω, for which Schleiermacher suggested δοκει, is not rarely used in the sense of δοκει μου, e.g. Rep. v 473 D ουκ εστι κακων παυλα—τας πολεσι, δοκω δ' οδε τω άνθρωπινω γενει. A distinct usage is δοκω for δοκει μου ‘it seems good to me’ e.g. Agam. 16 οταν δ' αειδειω η μυθρεται δοκω. See Mr Arthur Sidgwick in Classical Review (April, 1889) III 4, p. 148.

13. ερηται γαρ: viz. in 6 A—C.

14. έχθαν δε καλ οργας: οργαλ (irae) are the particular ebullitions of the permanent state έχθρα. The singular έχθαν is kept probably out of a desire to conform to έχθρα just before: For a similar reason έχθαν δε καλ οργας is placed first in the sentence.

15. οιδε δε οκοπωμεν. Once more the reasoning is from man to God: see above on 6 A line 20, and Introd. p. xvi.

16. περι αριθμων. Three things are mentioned on which a dispute is capable of easy and sure settlement, viz. number, size, and weight. They all belong to the material universe, being things ον δυνατωμεθα απολες των χερων λαβεται. Schanz aptly quotes Xen. Mem. ι 1. 9 δαιμονων δε (sc. εφ ο Σωκράτης) και των μαντευομενους δε των άνθρωπων έδωκαν οι θεοι μαθον γιακρινων οιν κτλ., η έξεστιν αριθμησαντας ή μετρησαντας η στηρισαντας ειδεναι, το ε τα τοιαύτα παρα των θεων πυθανομενους άθεμιστα ποιεσιν ηγειτο. See also Rep. Χ 602 ά ουν ου το μετρειν και αριθμειν και ισταναι βοθειαι χαρεσται το αυτα εφ' άσιν, οστε μη αρχει αν ἡμιν το φαινομενον μειζον η ελατον η πλεον ή βαρβετον κτλ.; and Alcib. ι 111 B foll. τι ου; δοκοσι σου διαφερεσθαι οι πολλοι ποιων εστι λιθος η έχον; To find a μετρον for immaterial
things like justice, piety, etc. was the whole work of Socrates, and absorbed a large share of Plato's philosophical activity.

οπότερα πλειώ: at first sight we might expect οπότερος πλειών, but things are πλειώ, hardly a number. 'The plural is used, because 'more' implies more than one.

17. τοιοι. This older form of the optative of contracted verbs is so frequent in Plato as to be almost regular. In Aristophanes, the longer forms (-ολην -ολής -ολη) are regularly used in the singular: see Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 442 foll.

18. περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων goes with ταχὺ δὲ ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν. The γε contains a sinister hint that after all some subjects would remain on which they would differ still, piety for example. What is here called λογισμὸς is called ἀριθμητική in Alc. 1 126 c διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν.

21. μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος forms one idea: hence there is but 7 c one article. So τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κοινοτέρου below. The two opposites fall under one category—size in the first case, weight in the second. Aristotle was fond of saying τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή ἐπιστήμη.

22. ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν. So Schanz with T: B has μέτρον. Formerly Schanz read μέτρων. μετρεῖν is better, in view of καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἱστάναι which follows. Compare Alc. 1 126 c—d διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν ἀκατόμων αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁμοιός περὶ σπαθιμῆς καὶ πῆχεως, ἀπότερον μεῖζον; οὐ διὰ τὴν μετρητικὴν;

26. διακριθέομεν ἀν. T has διακριθήμεν ἀν: but the longer form seems not to be used by Plato in the plural: compare ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν in line 19 above. See Rutherford as cited on line 17 above. Schanz suspects that ταχὺ has fallen out before διακριθέομεν. Its occurrence before the verbs ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν and πανηγυρέω in the two previous examples seems at first sight to confirm his suspicion: on the other hand, the threefold repetition of the adverb is somewhat offensive. Naber supplies μάλιστα: but Plato may well have left out the adverb here: in the nature of things the operation of weighing could not have lasted long.

28. ἐπὶ τίνα κρῖσιν ἢ q. ἐπὶ τίνος κρίσιν. So in Latin hac disputatio is used in the sense of huius rei disputatio. The meaning cannot be 'to what criterion', since the criterion is ex hypothesi unknown, never having been reached: the question moreover is not what test, but what thing. Schanz reads ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν: but if
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τινα were the indefinite pronoun, it would naturally have followed, not preceded ρωσιν. The indefinite τινα is too weak a word to bear the stress of the sentence-accent, which will insensibly fall on it, if it precedes ρωσιν.

29. ἐξερολ γε. So B: T has ἐξερολ τε.

30. εἴμεν is easily restored from ἥμεν of B and εἰμεν of T (with η erased).

7 D 31. τὸ τε δικαίον—κακὸν. The difficulty of finding a standard by which to determine what is just etc. was continually present to the mind of Plato: but he sometimes draws a clear distinction between the case of ἀγαθῶν and κακῶν on the one hand, and δικαίων etc. on the other. Thus in Theaet. 172 A it is said that the "incomplete Protagoreans" (perhaps to be identified with Socrates: see Dr Jackson in the Journal of Philology vol. xiii pp. 249—250) will probably allow that the doctrine πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρώπως holds good, not only of present sensations, but also of the notions καλά καὶ αλοχρά, δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα, δεια καὶ μή, but not of συμφέρόντα and the opposite, i.e. ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ (for Plato, like the Greeks generally, always equates ἀγαθῶν and συμφέρον, κακῶν and βλαβερῶν).

Cf. Prot. 322 D—323 C. A close parallel to the present passage is Alcibiades i 112 A ff., where Socrates says it is precisely περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ δίκων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων that the Athenians do differ: and just as here καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν is put on the same plane with δικαίων and the others, so there Socrates proceeds to identify δικαίον with συμφέρον through the middle terms καλὰ and ἀγαθὰ. Grote refers to Eur. Phoen. 499—502

εἰ πάσι ταῦταν καλὸν ἐφι σοφὸν θ’ ἁμα
οὐκ ἦν δὲ ἀμφίπλεκτος ἀνθρώπως ἤρις·
νῦν δ’ οὖν δ’ ἰδιοὶ οὐδὲν οὐν’ ἰσον βροτοῖς,
πλὴν ἀνάμασιν, τὸ δ’ ἔργον οὐκ ἠστὶ τόδε.

Compare also Aristotle Eth. Nic. i 1. 1094β 14 ff. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια—τοσαῦτάν ἦσαν διαφοράν καὶ πλάνην ὡστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι φύσει δὲ μή. τοσαῦταν δὲ τινα πλάνην ἦσαν καὶ τάγαθα διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς συμβαίνειν βλαβᾶς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν· ἦδη γὰρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλούσιον, ἄτεροι δὲ δ’ ἀνδρελαν. Notice by the way that the introduction of τὸ δίκαιον and similar ethical notions at this point prepares the way for the second division of the dialogue, in which τὸ δόσιν is viewed as a part of τὸ δίκαιον. As regards the Greek, it should be noted that the omission of the article before καλὸν and
the following adjectives is intended to reduce the notions to an ethical unity. Cf. Gorg. 459 D to dikaiw kal to adikon kal to alogron kal to kalon kal ayaethon kal kakon.

34. auton. Not &omicron;: see on kataspetolitei in 6 C above.

35. etan gynnameba. This limitation (as Schanz remarks) is inserted because it is not every diaphorad which leads to &omicron;exb&omicron;rakal &omicron;rgyal; a diaphorad about the weight of an object, for example, causes no ill-feeling, as we have been told. The editors compare Phaed. 68 D oikoyn fobw melizonw kakon upomewnion auton oi andreoi ton theana, etan upomwnion.

37. &omicron;e&omicron;ta aut. aut in is in the predicate. Note the accent on &omicron;e&omicron;ta: it is frequently accented at the beginning of a sentence.

39. oi theoio in. Observe how here again the reasoning is from men to gods: see on 6 A line 20 supra and Introd. p. xvi. The clause etep ti diapherontai indicates Socrates' disbelief in the quarrels of gods. The caveat is more express in 7 E kata ton swon logon, &omicron;sw en fhs, 8 A &omicron;sw esyon, and 8 D &omicron;sw o sw sw logon.

40. did taivta. So B: T has di' auta taivta as in 8 D oikoyn auta ge taivta kal oi theoi ptepwbasv, but here there seems no reason for so much emphasis.

43. allaoi alla dikai. Schanz follows Hirschig in adding 7 E kal adika after dikai. He compares Alcib. I 111 E where B has twon dikalwv kai adikwv while T omits kai adikwv: also Theaet. 172 B en tois dikaloi kai adikoi kai oiais kai anoiosoi, where kal adikoi (not in BT) has inferior MS authority. Plato's almost invariable rule in such enumerations is to use both the positive and negative notions in each case if he uses them in any: but here I think the omission of kal adika may be defended. If of two gods A thinks a just, and B thinks b just, it follows that A thinks b not-just, i.e. (according to the usual Greek view: see on theomwtes in 7 A above) unjust. So that kal adika is unnecessary to the sense, and Socrates is justified in saying presently taivta de ge, &omicron;sw en fhs, oi mev dikai aigotebai, oi de adika. kal alogra and kal kakas have been added in the other two cases perhaps because they are further removed from allaoi alla.

44. ou yap av ton. Schanz remarks that this is one of the few cases where Plato uses this collocation without a following ge.

48. ekatov: plural, because we are considering the case not of god against god, but gods against gods (allaoi alla in line 43 above): estasiasov above implies factions.
49. ταῦτα καὶ πιλούσιν. Observe how in the ancient view of life the emotions (here love) are made to depend on the intellect (καλὰ ὡγονταί): see on καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν in 2 C.

57. ταῦτ’ ἡρα. Here and in the next line ταῦτ’ is easily restored from ταῦτ’ or ταῦτ’ of the MSS.

61. καὶ δοσιὰ ἡρα—ἐν ἑλ: which will contradict 7 A ὅσ ταῦτ’ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔναντίωτατον, τὸ δοσιον τῷ ἀνοσίᾳ. Protagoras however would have accepted the conclusion and said: A thing is pious for the gods who think it so, impious for those who think it impious. Notice the emphatic place of τοῦτῳ τῷ λόγῳ—on your theory, but on no other.

63. κυβευεῖ. Euthyphro’s assent becomes less hearty as he sees his approaching discomfort. From πάνυ γε in 7 E to κυβευεῖ his answers betray increasing caution. Cf. Prot. 360 C πάνυ γε—ὡμολογεῖ—συνκυρ—ἐπενευσεν—ἐφη—πάνυ μόνις ἐνταῦθα ἐπενευσεν—αὐτός, ἐφη, πέρανον.

CHAPTER IX.

The ambiguity in Euthyphro’s definition being now clear, Socrates prepares the way for the amended form of the definition (viz. that piety is what all the gods love).

This he does in the present chapter by eliciting from Euthyphro the assertion that all the gods agree in desiring to punish wrongful manslaughter. ‘Exactly’, says Socrates ‘but will they agree what manslaughter is wrong, and what right?’

1. ὃ θαυμάσοι. See on ὃ θαυμάσοι Εὐθύφρον in 5 A.

2. ὃ τυγχάνει—ἄνθρωπον. So BT. Schanz reads ὃ for ὃ and the change is approved by Apelt. In favour of Schanz’s text might perhaps be quoted 9 C ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ ταῦτῳ ἔφαντι ἄρτι ὡμοσμένα τὸ δοσιον καὶ μὴ: only there ταῦτῳ depends on ὡμοσμενα. I think the ms reading is right. The meaning is: what I asked was not a thing which, while one and the same (without undergoing any change), happens to be both holy and unholy: whereas what you gave in your answer was θεοφίλες = δοσιον, which is at the same time θεομοιός = ἄνθρωπον. τυγχάνει δὲ go together and δοσιον τε καὶ ἄνθρωπον are the predicate. ταῦτῳ is pronounced with emphasis and a slight pause made after the word: otherwise δὲ would be taken with ταῦτῳ. A similar passage is Rep. IV 435 A ὃ γε ταῦτόν ἂν τις
prosepei meizion te kai elattov ktl.; where Dobree would add διν after elattov. Here I do not think any change necessary: but it would be easy to insert διν after δυσισιων, and so relieve ταύτων of its weight of meaning, at the same time giving a balance to the sentence which would compensate for the (only seeming I think) lack of euphony, and correspond closely to the twofold copula in θεοφιλης ἦ, and θεομοσίς ἐστιν. In Rep. iv 425 C ἦ οὐκ ἂν τὸ δυμοιον διν δυμοιον παρακαλεῖ some mss omit διν.

5. ἄστι, ὁ Εὐθύφρον ktl. applies the result arrived at to 8 B Euthyphro's special case. The shock of the insinuation is calculated to make him protest that all the gods approve his act and so lead up to the amended definition.

6. κολάζων is a more delicate word than τιμωρῶν: chastisement has the good of the chastised in view.

7. τῷ μὲν Δι. A touch of humour: Zeus had not been over-kind to his own father. See 6 A.

9. Ἡφαιστ. See Pausanias i 20. 2: λέγεται δὲ τάδε ὑπὸ Ἐλλήνων, ὥσ Ἡρα ἤλευ χελμίνων Ἡφαιστον, ὅ δὲ οἱ μνησικακῶν πέμπει δὼρον χρυσοῦν θρόνον ἀφανεὶς δεσμοὺς ἔχοντα· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἔκειν τε ἐκαθέξετο δεδέσθαι ktl. Dionysus finally made Hephaestus drunk and brought him back to Olympus to release his mother. The return to Olympus was frequently depicted on Greek vases: see Baumeister's Denkmäler i p. 643. Plato alludes to the incident again in Rep. ii 378 D Ἡρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ νιεός ktl.

11. καὶ ἐκάλοις κατὰ ταυτά i.e. τούτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν φίλον ποιεῖς τῷ δὲ ἔχθρον.

12. περὶ γε τούτων: γε exactly as in περὶ γε τῶν τοιοῦτων 7 B.

13. διαφέρονται ὡς σὺ. Verbs meaning 'to contradict' are regularly followed by a clause with ὡς (ὅτι) giving what is maintained, not what is contradicted: hence the σὺ. So presently ἀμφιβοῦτος ὡς—οὐ δεί δίκην διδόναι: cf. 9 D and see on Apol. 31 B line 46.

14. δίκην διδόναι—δίκως. Notice the verbal play. He who does not render justice in deeds must render justice in punishment: the tale of justice must be made up. So 8 E τῷ γε δίκωντι δοτέον δίκην. The form of expression implies the remedial view of punishment.

16. ἀνθρώπων. Once more Socrates solves the difficulty by reasoning from men to gods: see above on 6 A line 20.

18. ἄλλο δίκως ποιοῦντα is equivalent to ἄλλο δίκωντα. As 8
an injury is supposed to be still in force till compensation is made, the present is used in spite of ἀποκτείναται preceding: see on Crito 50 c.

20. οὐδὲν μὲν οὐν παύονται. μὲν οὖν is corrective (immo): see on Apol. 26 B. Cobet has pointed out that οὐ παύεται and οὐδὲν παύεται differ exactly as finem non facit and finem nullem facit (Nov. Lect. p. 500).

22. πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι: a common phrase in Plato, occasionally with the singular πᾶς: e.g. Apol. 39 A πᾶς ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. φεύγοντες is here conative like διδόναι=‘offer’: Schanz compares Gorg. 479 B ό τίν δίκην φεύγοντες.

24. ἢ καὶ ὀμολογοῦσιν. Euthyphro has made two assertions: (1) many say τὸν ἀδικοῦ ἀποκτείναται ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκος ποιοῦτα οὐ δεῖν δίκην διδόναι, (2) πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην. Socrates refutes (1) first, and the refutation of (1) follows from that of (2).

25. οὐ δεῖν φασὶν: οὐ φασίν δεῖν would be more usual (as in oὐ φασίν ἀδικεῖν presently), but less emphatic. Perhaps the unusual order is responsible for the corruption οὐδὲν (for οὐ δεῖν) in B.

27. οὐ διδόναι τοῦτο γε: has the idea of εὐφήμει! No! they stop short of that. To admit (ὁμολογεῖν) that one’s client has broken the law (ἀδικεῖν) would be tantamount to giving up the case: at the same time Socrates does not say that advocates do not sometimes defend clients whom they believe to be guilty.

33. οὐκ ἢ ἡκείνο γε—ἀλήθη λέγειν. These words are bracketed by Schanz (after Schenkl). They occur in the mss, except that ὃς—ἀμφισβητοῦσιν is omitted in B (obviously by mistake), and replaced by a later hand. They are necessary to the sense, for so far only the second of Euthyphro’s assertions has been expressly contradicted: it is equally necessary to reject the first expressly. In C above Euthyphro has said that men continually ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ὡς τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι: Socrates now says no! οὐκ ἢ ἡκεῖν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην. Plato is especially careful to make the refutation complete, and in terms likely to recall the statement of the doctrine refuted: cf. 8 A καὶ δέω—λέγω with 7 A οὐ ταυτὸν δ’ ἐστίν—ἀμφισβή.

35. τὸ τῆς ἐστίν κτλ. τὸ goes with the entire clause as in Aristotle’s well-known τὸ τί ἐστιν. Goodwin’s Greek Grammar p. 201, note 7.

38. οὐκοῦν αὕτα γε ταύτα. Socrates now makes the applica-
tion to the case of gods: that of men was but an illustration. The
general reasoning reminds us of Pliny’s Panegyricus § 72 et sane
priorum principum exitus docuit ne a diis quidem amari nisi quos
hominem ament.

40. οἵ μὲν φασὶν ἄλλ’ ἄλλοισ ἄλλεοι is a main sentence and
does not depend on etexep. ἄλλ’ ἄλλοισ is my emendation for
ἄλληλοι. I believe that ἄλληλοι is corrupt. Fritzsche remarks
“Mira brevitatis. Nam animo haec obversatūr: ἄδικον ἂ ἄλληλοι,
kal οἵ μὲν φασὶν (ἀδικεῖσθαι), οἵ δὲ οὗ φασὶν (ἀδικεῖν)”. But the Greek
will not bear this stress of meaning. The first thing to notice is
that ἄλληλοι if right must be the subject to ἄδικειν: the sense will
not allow the subject to be supplied from οἵ μὲν, and besides it is
irrelevant to name the object of the wrong-doing: the sole point is
that the wrong-doing should itself be named (ἀδικεῖν has no external
object wherever it occurs, from τι δὲ; in B above to the end of the
chapter). This being so—is it possible to say in Greek: the one party
say that one another are doing wrong? It is just as impossible in
Greek as in English, unless this ‘one party’ means to accuse itself,
as Schanz’s translation of ἄλληλοι (die einen die andern) makes it
do. In Isocrates Panegyr. 168 occur these words: ὡτε καὶ
μᾶλλον χαρισμένον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλληλοις κακοῖς ἢ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἒλθοις ἀγαθοῖς.
Cobet (Var. Lect. p. 519) substitutes ἄλλων for ἄλληλοι, wrongly
(as I think) in this passage, adding “communis librorum error et
frequens”. In Xen. Oecon. Ch. xx § 5 he replaces διαφέροντες
ἄλληλοι by διαφερόντες ἄλλων, this time rightly, although Holden
hesitates to accept the emendation. “Quam saepe ἄλλων et ἄλλη-
lων confundantur notum est omnibus” (Nov. Lect. p. 596).
In view of the last of these passages one might feel inclined to sub-
stitute ἄλλων for ἄλληλοι here: I believe however that Plato
wrote ἄλλ’ ἄλλοι. One set of gods say: A (another god) is wrong
in this, B wrong in that: but A and B deny that they are wrong.
The phrase is doubtless a reminiscence of 7 Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα—
ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται.

41. ὁ θανάτος: see on 5 A. Here the appellation is strictly
in point.

42. ὀδηγεῖν οἱ τῷ θεῶν—δίκην. γε before ἄδικοντι makes the
words equivalent to ‘because he is a wrong doer’.

44. τοῦτο μὲν ἄληθες λέγειν almost = τοῦτο μὲν ἄλθευειν. 8 E
Presently T has τῷ γε κεφάλαιον, which may be right. Schanz quotes
Phileb. 48 c ἐστὶ δὴ πονηρὰ μὲν τῆς τὸ κεφάλαιον. Euthyphro’s

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guarded reply is not meant (I think) to indicate that there were some who openly professed the doctrine that 'he shall take who has the power, and he shall keep who can', though there were such men at Athens (see Callicles's speech in the Gorgias 482 C foll., and Rep. 1 338 E foll.): it is merely a way of surrendering salva vere-cundia. Notice μὲν without a following δὲ: Euthyphro implies that Socrates is not always right in what he says. Cf. Apol. 21 D τούτων μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφότερός εἰμι.

46. ἀλλ' ἔκαστὸν γε. So T: B has ἔκαστων by an accidental assimilation to τῶν πραξάντων.

48. οἴσειρ ἀμφιβολοῦσιν θεοῖ: the usual caveat: see on 7 D line 39 above.

πράξεως τινος περὶ. "Asyndeton explicativum" says Schanz. See on Apol. 22 A ἤ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔκαστον τι τοιοῦτον· ὁ μὲν μᾶλιστα εὐδοκίμωντες κτλ., and for peri postponed, ibid. on 19 C and supra 4 E. The emphatic place of πράξεως ('it is about an action that they differ') is meant to suggest the antithesis—'not about the right of punishing a wrong action'.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates now asks Euthyphro what ground he has for holding that all the gods will think his father guilty of wrongful manslaughter, and approve the conduct of the son. Euthyphro shirks the question: he reserves his reasons for the judges.

9 A 1. τῷ νῦν: so Schanz now reads. The reading is easily elicited from τῷ νῦν of B and τῷ τῶν νῦν of T. νῦν when illative is enclitic. Other examples quoted by Schanz from Plato are Gorg. 451 A: Alcib. 111 D τῷ νῦν: Politic. 294 D φέρε νῦν.

2. σοφότερος: σοφός (like φροντισθη) was almost a nickname of Socrates: see note on Apol. 18 B and supra on 2 C.

τεκμήριον. As Wohlrab remarks, we have here an indication of the inquiry raised in the next three chapters. Had Euthyphro been able to give a satisfactory τεκμήριον why all the gods approved his conduct, he would have been able to separate the οὐσία of διόν from its πάθος (viz. τὸ θεοφιλές).

πάντες θεοὶ: without the article: contrast πάντες οἱ θεοὶ in 9 E, where see note.

4. τεθνάναι as passive to the perf. of ἀποκτείνω: see on φεύγεις αὐθήρ ἦ διόκειτο in 3 B above.
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οικείων δύσροφον γενόμενος. Compare the account in 4 c. οἰκείων is logically subordinate to γενόμενος: ‘being guilty of manslaughter while a day labourer’.

6. φθάσῃ τελευτής: the words almost suggest that he died of set purpose (like a Chinaman) to spite Euthyphro’s father.

7. δεσμά: see on τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποδήμερει in 4 D. The nom. (acc.) plur. δεσμά is said not to occur elsewhere in Plato.

ἐξηγητῶν: see on 4 C. Here the entire college is alluded to: in 4 C only ἀ-ἐξηγητής, probably the president.

9. ὥρθως ἔχει. Hirschig reads ἔχειν: but the ως of ως πάντες θεοὶ ἡγούνται is still carried on. Notice the contempt expressed by τοῦ τοιοῦτον ὅτι just above.

10. ἦδη recalls θεῦ νῦν with which Socrates’ appeal began.

11. παντὸς μᾶλλον: ‘more than anything’ is constantly used 9 B by Plato in the sense of ‘assuredly’. See on Crito 49 B. The phrase is probably selected here because πάντες is to follow: ‘beyond all doubt all the gods etc.’

15. άλλ’ τῶν οὐκ ὅλγον κτλ. Euthyphro evades the difficulty after the usual fashion of self-confidence nonplussed. ‘I could an I would: but it’s no mere bagatelle, and it would take time’. So in 14 B when he retreats for the second time: καὶ ὅλγον ὑπ’ ἄλλην θείαν κλέον ἐπικρίθη ηγούμεν ἐκεῖν δὲ ἡγούμεν τάντα ταύτα ὡς ἐκεῖ μαθεῖν. Plato professes contempt for the man who has σχολὴ for “splitting differences between two degrees of the infinitesimally small, such as a tobacco pipe or the Roman Empire, a million of money or a fiddlestick’s end”, and none to probe a question to the bottom. See Theaet. 172 D foll. on the σχολὴ of the true φιλόσοφος.

16. ἐπεί: sc. were there time. Here ἐπεί is virtually equivalent to ‘although’: see on 4 C above.

ἐπιδείξας: suggests a long, somewhat windy sermon, rather than a cogent proof (ἀποδήξας). The word is regularly used of a sophistic display (ἐπιδείξις). Prot. 347 B ἐστι μεντοῦ, ἔφη (sc. Ἰππίας), καὶ ἔμοι λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐδ ἔχων, ὅν ὅμων ἐπιδείξω, ἄν βούλησθε.

18. μανθάνω· δι’ κτλ. See on 3 B. The sentence gives a sarcastic reason for Euthyphro’s οὐκ ὅλγον ἔργον. Socrates pretends to be ready to give Euthyphro as much time as the judges would allow him.

19. ἐπιθεμεν. Notice that it is Socrates who uses ἐπιθεικαζομαι,
NOTES ON X 9 B

Euthyphro who says ἐπιδελκυμί: see last note but one. ἄδικα presently is 'illegal' as well as 'wrong'.

20. οἱ θεοὶ ἄπαντες: 'the gods one and all': the emphasis adds to the irony. On the article see πᾶντες οἱ θεοὶ in 9 Ε and note.

22. ἑντερ ικονωσί γε: Euthyphro fears interruptions: indeed, like Phocion, he almost regarded them as a proof of his merit: see 3 C καὶ ἔμοι γὰρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῷ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων,—καταγελῶσιν ως μαυρομένου.

CHAPTER XI.

In this chapter Euthyphro at last emends his definition thus: Holiness is what all the gods love, unholiness what all the gods hate.

9 C
1. ἐάντερ εἴ δοκῆς λέγειν. The Athenians liked above all things a clever orator: see Apol. 17 A μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαμμασα τῶν πολλών ὧν ἐγεύσατο, τούτο εἶ σὰ ἔλεγον ὡς χρή ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ’ έμοί ἐξαιτηθῆτε, ὥς δεῖνοι δυντος λέγειν.

2. ἐννόησα. So B: T has ἔχομαι: "perhaps", says Schanz "by interpolation, owing to the genitive". The genitive is of course a gen. absolute.

3. καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτόν σκοπεῖ. A familiar incident with Socrates: sometimes his earnest thought rooted him to the spot (Symp. 174 D), on one occasion, it is said, for twenty-four hours (Symp. 220 B). The syntax is as in Apol. 21 D πρὸς ἐμαυτόν ἐλογιζόμεν: the ego is as it were divided into two beings, one of whom talks to the other. So Plato used to say that thought was the soul talking to itself: Theaet. 189 E τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἃρ’ ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς; τί καλῶ; λέγων δὲ αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξάγεται περὶ ὧν ἐν σκοπῇ: Soph. 263 E: cf. Phileb. 38 D. The same self-dissecting process underlies the meaning of the Latin words conscientia (see Nettleship's Passages for Translation into Latin Prose p. 14).

el ὑ τι μάλιστα: see on 4 D above.

5. οἱ θεοὶ ἄπαντες: see on 9 B and 9 E.

6. τὸ μᾶλλον κτλ. Socrates proceeds to shew Euthyphro that τὸ θεομοσία is and τὸ θεοφιλεῖσ are only accidents of τὸ ἀνθρώπος τε καὶ δεσιων: we want their essence.

8. τούτο τὸ ἔργον viz. your father's act of manslaughter.
9. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦτῳ—ἐφάνη. This passage is most difficult. There is no important variant in the mss.

We shall best understand the meaning by recapitulating the situation. Socrates says in effect: "Even supposing I allow that all the gods hate your father's act, are we any nearer to the knowledge of ὅ τοσον τε καὶ ἄνδιον? That his act will be θεομοιέτες I am willing to allow: but" (this is the implied antithesis to θεομοιέτες μὲν) "is it necessarily ἄνδιον? Is θεομοιέτες of the essence of ἄνδιον, or is it not merely a πάθος thereof? This will best be settled, if we formally amend your definition to 'what all the gods love is ὅσιον, and what they all hate ἄνδιον' and examine it in this amended form". That is to say, Socrates is about to point out a new and more serious error in Euthyphro's definition, even when it is construed in its most favourable light: viz. that it puts the πάθος for the οὐσία. This chapter therefore is the transition to the following two chapters.

But what of the words ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦτῳ ἐφάνη ἐρει ὑπομένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μὴ τὸ γὰρ θεομοιέτες ὅν καὶ θεοφίλες ἐφάνη? I believe them to have been interpolated by some scribe who failed to grasp the situation. For, on the supposition that they are genuine, τοῦτῳ must have for its antecedent either (a) θεομοιέτες or (b) τὸ ἔργον. If (a), then Plato is guilty of thoroughly confused thinking. The only argument on which ἄνδιον has hitherto been denied to be identical with θεομοιέτες, is that all the gods do not hate the same thing, or, as the explanatory clause puts it presently, τὸ θεομοιέτες ὅν καὶ θεοφίλες ἐφάνη. But this is just the argument which Socrates has declared that he is ready to give up: he will allow, for argument's sake, that all the gods do hate the act of Euthyphro's father. Moreover, it is intolerable to have three cases of the pronoun τοῦτο within four lines, whereof the first and third refer to the same thing, and the second to something quite different. In the third place, ὡστε before τοῦτον is hardly intelligible except on the supposition that ἀλλὰ γὰρ—ἐφάνη is either spurious or else a complete parenthesis. If therefore θεομοιέτες is the antecedent to τοῦτῳ, the entire clause must be rejected. If however the antecedent is (b) τὸν τὸ ἔργον, as Schanz believes, then another view is possible. The meaning will then be: suppose I allow that all the gods hate this one particular act of your father's, yet does this bring us nearer to a general definition of piety and impiety? That is to say, Socrates feels that Euthyphro has not yet shaken himself clear of the
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personal elements in the case: he is still anchored in the harbour of 'Piety is doing what I am doing now'. The reference in ἀριτ will in that case be to the refutation of Euthyphro's first attempt in 6 D. This is Schanz's view and seems at first sight to be supported by the emphasis on τοῦτο and τοῦτον in the words τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, and ὡστε τοῦτον ἀφίημι σε: on the other hand, so far as I can see, there is on Schanz's view no antithesis latent or expressed to the μὲν after θεοματίου, and the position of the words in ὦς οἱ θεὸi ἄπαντες τὸν τοῦτον θάνατον ἔγονται ἄδικον εἰςι seems to shew that more emphasis was intended to fall on οἱ θεοὶ ἄπαντες than on τὸν τοῦτον θάνατον: moreover, if the antithesis is between the particular and the universal, we should expect the statement of the universal presently in D to be more emphatic e.g. πάντες ὀσὶν καὶ θεοφιλὴς ἐφάνη (so Schanz, following Kleist), because they refer to the refutation of the second definition, whereas (on Schanz's view) the reference throughout is to the first. Schanz's explanation suits the passage taken by itself quite well: but it seems to me a flaw in Plato's art, if after the first definition has been quite refuted on the ground of putting the particular for the universal, and an error pointed out in the second definition, he should harp back again upon the first definition, without at the same time preparing the way (as I conceive him to have done) for discovering another grievous error in the second.

II. ἄστε τοῦτον ἄφημι σε. τοῦτον sc. τὸ ἔργον: viz. your father's act. ἄφημι is a legal term for acquitting: Rep. v 451 Ε ἄφεμέν σε ὅπερ φίλου.

9 D 12. οἱ θεοὶ. Asyndeton as in 8 Ε πράξεως τινος πέρι v. note in loc. Here Τ has καὶ οἱ.

ἡγεσθον: the mss have ἡγεσθοσαν, corrected by the second hand in B. "The Imperative suffix -ωςαν does not appear till 300 B.C. Till then we meet only with forms in -ων (-ντον -σθον). The proportion in the frequency of the two formations is:

Before 300 B.C. -ων : -ωςαν = 111 : 0
After 300 B.C. -ων : -ωςαν = 3 : 22".

13. ἀλλ' ἄρα τούτο κτλ. Socrates suggests that the definition should be amended so as to identify holiness with what all the gods love. To some extent this is an approximation to Monotheism: for if πάντες οἱ θεοὶ always agree, then they are essentially one (τὸ θεῖον); although in the words δὲ ἄν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μικρῶσι κτλ., a diversity of view is still permitted to them. For ἐπανορθώμεθα followed by a clause giving what is asserted, not what is corrected, see on διαφέρεσθαι ως οὗ in 8 Β above. ἐπανορθώμεθα (conj. delib.) is a probable restoration for ἐπανορθωμέθα of B and T, but ἐπανορθωμέθα is not necessarily wrong, since Greek sometimes uses the present where we should use the future, especially in questions e.g. Rep. ii 373 D ἦς τῶς λέγομεν; see also Kühner's Gr. Gramm. i p. 120 and compare note on ἀποδειχώμεθα infra in 9 Ε. Presently λόγῳ is simply 'definition'.

15. δὲ δὲν—ἀμφότερα. This clause is really tantamount to a surrender of the definition, if ἀμφότερα is taken seriously: a thing cannot be both holy and unholy. But οὐδὲτερα ἢ ἀμφότερα is only a way of saying that where the gods differ in their likes and dislikes, there is no question of holiness involved. For the expression cf. Rep. ii 365 Ε οἷς ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέων. The plural is regular: in ἀμφότερα it is logically right, while in οὐδέτερα it is probably due to a desire for uniformity, made easier by the Greek tendency to use neuter plurals as a single notion (φανερὰ ἐστὶ etc.), as in the case of τὰ ἔτερα (θάτερα) Phaed. 68 C φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτα τὰ ἔτερα τούτων ἢ καὶ ἀμφότερα.

19. τι γὰρ κωλύει. Euthyphro talks with the airy tone of a man whose mind is already made up. The editors quote an exact parallel from Charm. 163 A τι γὰρ κωλύει; ἐφὶ. οὐδὲν ἐμὲ γε, ἵν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ ἐκείνου κωλύει κτλ.

20. τοὐδ' σοὶ σκόπει εἰ: is exactly equivalent (as Schanz remarks) to σκόπει εἰ σοὶ γε.

21. εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενον. See on 6 Ε, line 20 above. οὕτω sums up the participial clause τοῦτο ὑποθέμενον. The usage is frequent in Plato e.g. Gorg. 457 οὗ ῥάδιος δίωναται—μαθότες καὶ διδάσκατες ἐαυτούς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας: Prot. 310 D et al.

23. ἀλλ' ἤγονοι φαίην. Euthyphro now states the amended 9 Ε definition viz.: "Holiness = what all the gods love: what all the gods hate = unholliness."

24. πάντες οἱ θεοὶ. From 9 Α to 9 Ε we find πάντες θεοὶ four times (Α, Β, Δ, Ε): πάντες οἱ θεοὶ twice (Δ, Ε), οἱ θεοὶ πάντας twice
(B, c). A study of these passages shews that πάντες θεός and πάντες οἱ θεοὶ differ just as 'all gods', and 'all the gods': the latter is the more regular and formal expression, for which reason it is used in the suggested definition (d) and in the first part of Euthyphro's formal statement thereof. οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντεῖ is the most emphatic.

27. οὕτω—ἀποδεχόμεθα: so B. T has ἀποδεχόμεθα: see on ἐπανορθώμεθα in D above. Here the conj. is of course necessary on account of the preceding ἐπισκοπᾶμεν. ἀποδεχόμεθα in this sense regularly takes a genitive: strictly speaking τοῦτο is carried on as the direct object, and the gen. depends on ἀπο-. οὕτω is 'simply' 'without more ado' as in ἰδίως οὕτω Rep. II 378 A and Symp. 176 E οὕτω πινοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν.

28. ἕκαν μόνον φῶς τὸ τι ἔχειν οὕτω. What precisely is the meaning of τι and the reference in οὕτω? If the text is right, the situation is this. A man uses Euthyphro's definition as his λόγος, and asserts that a particular act (τι) squares with this definition (ἔχειν οὕτω) i.e. is θεοφίλες or θεομιστός (as Euthyphro asserted of his father's act): are we to accept this on his word, or inquire what sense there is in what he says? If the latter, we should still ask why this particular act is θεοφίλες (θεομιστός), and we should probably (as the next chapter shews) be told, because it is ὅσιον—so that we should be revolving in a circle. The result would be to shew us that we have not yet reached the ὀνόμα τοῦ ὅσιον (ἀνάσιον), but only a πάθος thereof. To omit τι would make the text easier, but I do not think this expedient necessary.

29. ἡ σκέψεως τοῦ λέγει τὸ λόγον; The question with which Socrates begins (ὁδὸν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο;) is renewed: the order is a b a. By this means we are led to expect an affirmative answer. Compare a more elaborate example in Crito 49 A—B, where see note (line 14).

CHAPTER XII.

Here and in xiii, Socrates tests the amended definition. In the present chapter, arguing from analogy, he shews that ὅσιον is not θεοφίλες, because while a φιλομένον (whereof θεοφίλες is one special kind) is a φιλομένον (θεοφίλες) δὲ τὶ φιλεῖται, ὅσιον is not ὅσιον δὲ τὶ φιλεῖται, rather δὲ τὶ ὅσιον ἐστὶ φιλεῖται.

1. τάχα—εἰσόμεθα. Schanz reminds us that τάχα in prose
XII 10 C  PLATO’S EUTHYPHRO.  83

only means ‘soon’ when combined with a future tense. It is especially common with ἐσομαι.

3. φιλεῖταί ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν = θεοφίλες ἐστιν.

5. οὐκ οἴδ᾽ ὅ τι λύγει: the distinction between πάθος and ὀνολα is not yet familiar to Euthyphro: compare infra in 12 A ὅχ ἑπομαι, ὅ Ζώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

7. λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρων κτλ. Socrates in the Platonic dialogues frequently begins to build up an argument in this way. Cf. Phaed. 103 C θερμὸν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρῶν; Meno 75 D τελευτήν καλεῖς τι; where Fritzsche reminds us that the Xenophontic Socrates shews the same tendency e.g. Mem. II 2. 1 εἰπέ μοι, ἡφι, ὅ πας, εἰπότα τίνας ἄνθρωπος ἁρπάστως καλομένοις; ibid. IV 2. 22. The distinction between active and passive is also found in Gorg. 476 B: compare also Theaet. 156 A ff. It is worth while noticing that the examples chosen by Socrates (φερόμενον, ἄγομενον, ὄρωμενον and their actives) are from the material world, in which the distinction of active and passive is less hard to grasp. The selection of φερόμενον as an example naturally suggests ἀγομένον as another: they are often combined in the phrase φέρειν καὶ ἄγειν.

11. καὶ τοῦτον ἐτερον τὸ φιλοῦν is not essential to the argument, except in so far as it defines φιλομένοις by contrast.

14. διότι φέρεται. The word διότι is preferred to the more usual οτι because it balances δι᾽ ἄλλο τι better.

17. καὶ τὸ ἄγομενον δῆ. δῆ is ‘then’ and καὶ ‘also’. The collocation is common in Plato. δῆ rarely follows καὶ directly as in Rep. VI 490 C καὶ δῆ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσοφίας φώσεως χορὸν κτλ.

20. οὐκ ἄρα διότι κτλ. The illative ἄρα is justified because the results are being summed up. Notice the order of enumeration. It is exactly the reverse of that in which the illustrations were cited, and produces a chiastic effect. Formerly φερόμενον, ἄγομενον, ὄρωμενον: now ὄρωμενον, ἄγομενον, φερόμενον.

21. τοῦναντίον. Adverbial accusative in apposition to the sentence: see on τοῦναντίον τοῦτον πᾶν in Apol. 25 B.

25. κατάθηλον is said of something which comes gradually into view. Cf. Polit. 291 A ὄχλον—ὅ ὄρτι κατάδηλος νῦν ἡμῶν γέγονεν. κατά has the same force in καταφαινομαι and καταφανῆς.

βοσλομαι. ἐθνῶν would be impossible here: βοσλομαι is even frequently used by itself in the sense of ‘I mean’.

26. ἔ τι—πάσχει. The second τι is not the nom., but the 10 C acc.: thus the full expression would be ἦ ἔ τι πάσχει τι. The words
are an attempt to express the grammatical notion of passive. Among passive verbs, some are ἔγνωμεν (e.g. ὑποθαλ), others πάσχοντα (as ἀγεσθαί, φέρεσθαι): though in the last analysis they may all be viewed as πάσχοντα, and hence their name.

33. τὸ φιλούμενον is rather πάσχον than ἔγνωμεν.

33. ἂν πάσχον τι υπὸ τοῦ: the τι after ἔγνωμεν is to be repeated with πάσχον.

35. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα. τοῦτο is τὸ φιλούμενον, and τὸ φιλούμενον is understood as the subject to ἔστιν in the next line.

36. ὕπο ὅν φιλεῖται. Short for ὑπὸ τοῦτων ὅν: in such cases the preposition is idiomatically left out before the relative e.g. Rep. ιην 402 A ἐν ἀπασίω ὅς ἔστι. See Kühner's Gr. Gramm. II p. 478. As regards the hiatus, Friztsche on Meno 77 A quotes Cic. Orat. 44. 151, who remarks that Plato was not careful to avoid hiatus not only "in his sermonibus, qui διάλογοι dicuntur—sed in populari oratione, qua mos est Athenis laudari in contione eos, qui sint in proeliis interfecti" (alluding to the Menexenus).

10 D 40. ἀλλὰ τι. ἄλλο τι ἡ; = numquid aliud quam? = nonne? ἡ is often omitted. See on Apol. 24 C. B and T both have ἀλλ' ὅτι.

45. ἔστιν—φιλεῖται. The subject is still τὸ δοσιν.

49. καὶ θεοφιλές <τὸ θεοφιλές>. With Bast, who is followed by Friztsche and Schanz, I have added the words within brackets. If the mss are followed, the only possible subject to φιλούμενον (sc. ὑπὸ θεῶν) ἔστι is τὸ δοσιν. However, not only is the argument faulty on such a theory, but the words of Socrates in E, where he restates the admissions made, are conclusive in favour of regarding not δοσιν, but τὸ θεοφιλές as subject to ἔστι. And as it is impossible to supply the words from the context, they must be inserted. Then in E, τὸ μὲν δοσιν διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται, ὅτι δοσιν ἔστιν κτλ. corresponds to διότι ἄρα δοσιν ἔστιν, φιλεῖται κτλ., and τὸ δὲ γε θεοφιλές διὰ φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τοῦτω τῷ φιλεῖται θεοφιλές εἶναι corresponds to ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, φιλούμενον ἔστι καὶ θεοφιλές <τὸ θεοφιλές>. Compare also ιην 1 A καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλές εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἃν τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλές θεοφιλές ἢν κτλ.

53. ξυροφι τοῦτο τοῦτον. For the collocation Friztsche compares Meno 87 D ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέων εἶναι.
CHAPTER XIII.

The mistake committed by Euthyphro is here presented as the substitution of a τάθος of τὸ ὅσιον for its ἀνωτά. After a complaint from Euthyphro on the bewildering nature of Socrates' dialectic, Socrates remarks with a view to a new definition, that 'all holiness is moral': but 'not all morality is holy'. Euthyphro is puzzled: and Socrates explains by means of an illustration the difference between these two propositions.

The first two sentences of this chapter belong more properly to Chapter XII. For the division of his dialogues into chapters Plato is not responsible: and Schanz discards the division entirely in his later editions.

6. ἄλλα ἐν γα ταυτόν κτλ. The reasoning is somewhat difficult, ιό Ε though perfectly correct. It is desired to prove that ὅσιον and θεοφιλέσσε are not convertible terms. If they were, then (a) supposing ὅσιον were loved because it is ὅσιον, θεοφιλέσσε would be loved because it is θεοφιλέσσε— but this is not so, since the truth is θεοφιλέσσε is ὅσιον φίλείσθαι because it is loved (τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φίλείται, ἐστὶν ὅσιον φίλείσθαι); (b) supposing θεοφιλέσσε were θεοφιλέσσε because it is loved, ὅσιον would be ὅσιον because it is loved,—whereas the truth is, ὅσιον is loved because it is ὅσιον φίλείσθαι (τὸ δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσιον φίλείσθαι, διὰ τούτο φίλείται). So that on neither supposition can θεοφιλέσσε and ὅσιον be identified. It is noteworthy that the clauses ἐν μὲν ἐφίλειτο, and ἐν δὲ—θεοφιλέσσε ἦν have the verb in the Imperfect Indicative, although the supposition is in both cases a true one: this is due, partly to the influence of ἐν γα ταυτόν ἦν to which these two clauses are subordinate, but still more to the form of the anticipated conclusions καὶ ἐφίλειτο ἄν τὸ θεοφιλέσσε and καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ἄν—ὅσιον ἦν.

Notice that Plato uses the forms ταυτόν τοσοῦτον τοσοῦτον τηλικοῦτον in preference to ταυτό etc.: see on Crito 48B and Apol. 24 C. The protases ἐν μὲν κτλ. and ἐν δὲ κτλ. are logically subordinate to ἐν γα ταυτόν ἦν, of which they form two special cases: see on a parallel case Apol. 33 D.

II. νῦν δὲ (but as it is = nunc) is regularly used in introducing ΙΙΙ Α the true state of the case after an untrue supposition with ἐν and a past tense of the Indicative: e.g. Prot. 335 C ἄλλα ἐρ ἐρὴν ἡμᾶν αὐχώρωειν—νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔθελει κτλ.
12. ἐναντίον ἔχετον. Ἐναντίον is the strongest possible word for opposition, whence παντάπασιν ἔτέρω δύνεται ὅλλαξ. Socrates somewhat overstates his case: the ἐναντίον expressed in the following sentence is more apparent than real—it is difference rather than opposition.

13. τὸ μὲν γὰρ—οἷον φιλείσθαι. τὸ μὲν is τὸ θεοφιλέτ. τὸ δὲ is τὸ δόσιον. οἷον φιλείσθαι (i.e. τοιοῦτον οἷον φιλείσθαι) is substituted here for θεοφιλέτ in order to make the antithesis between θεοφιλέτ and δόσιον more striking by using the same predicate with ἐστὶν in both clauses: at the same time, the use of οἷον φιλείσθαι (sc. ὅπως θεόν) in the next line seems to indicate that θεοφιλέτ is not the υστερα of δόσιον, but only a πάθος thereof: it is only 'such a thing as to be loved'—not 'the god-loved.' The way is thus prepared for the following sentence.

16. τὴ ὁ μὲν υστερα—πάθος τι. The distinction of υστερα and πάθος is here for the first time clearly marked in Greek philosophy. The clause δ τι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ δόσιον is epexegetic, being merely another way of expressing πάθος, which is comparatively new in this sense: had πάθος been the antecedent to the relative, δ and not δ τι, would probably have been written.

II B 19. δ τι δὲ δυν ὅπως θεοφιλέται όρ πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ πάθος. δυν is meant to explain the novel use of υστερα above.

21. εἰσε ὅπως πάθεια "ut illud, ita omnia accidentia (πάθη) in definiendo nullius momenti sunt." Wohlrab.

24. ἄλλα, ὅ Σωκράτες κτλ. The interlude is intended to mark a break in the course of the reasoning, and to prepare us for the fresh start, in which Socrates endeavours to rescue Euthyphro from the ἀπολα into which he is now plunged.

διὸν σοι ὅκω δ νοω. Euthyphro’s ἀπολα has not led him to distrust himself: he still feels that he has views, and blames Socrates' dialectic for their discomfiture. Contrast Theaet. 148 ε ἄλλα γάρ οὕτως αὐτός δύναμαι πείσαι ἐμαυτῷ ὡς ικανῶς τι λέγω, οὕτως ἀκούσας λέγοντας οὕτως οὐ διακελεύει· οὐ μὲν δὴ ἀν ὡδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλλειν.

25. περιεχεται—ὑδρυστερα αὐτό. For προβόμομεν B has προ- θυμομεν, perhaps by reason of ἄλλα εἰσε προβόμομεν above: see also on ἐναντιοσμομαι in E below. The doctrine is personified, as often in Plato. It is so to speak an adherent of the Heraclitean πάντα βεί: see Theaet. 179 E ἀτεχνῶς γάρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται (sc. οἱ Ἡρακλείτειοι), τὸ δ' ἔπιμενειν ἐπὶ
λόγῳ—ἤττον αὐτός ἐνι ἢ τὸ μηδὲν. Here περιερχεται, as Fritzsche remarks, simply = ambulat, i.q. περπατεί. See on 11 C line 38, and 15 σὲ ἀλλάζεις βασίζονται αὐτοὶς (sc. τοὺς λόγους) ποιεῖν: cf. also Apol. 30 ο ὄδηγε γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγώ περιέρχομαι ἢ πειθῶν κτλ.

28. τοῦ ἡμέτερου προγόνου. As the son of a sculptor, Socrates traced his descent to Daedalus, the eponymous hero of artists. So in Alc. I 121 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, δὲ γενναὶ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰς Δαίδαλον. Cf. also Symp. 186 ε where Eryximachus the doctor speaks of δ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἀσκληπιός. In Meno 97 d ff. Plato compares ἀληθεῖς δόξαι to the works of Daedalus, because just as the latter, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ἤ, ἀποθεδάκτυκε καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει, so true opinions δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ δξαὶ εἰσιν, ἐως ἃν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἵτας λογισμῷ. The peculiarity of Daedalus’ statues was that they were supposed to move. Eur. Frag. 373 (ed. Dindorf) τὰ Δαιδάλεια πάντα κινεῖσαι δοκεῖ βλέπειν τ’ ἀγάλλαθ᾽. ὅδ’ ἀνὴρ κεῖνον σοφὸς. The Scholiast explains the fable by saying that Daedalus was the first to separate the feet and legs of statues: and Overbeck Gesch. der Plastik I 36 (quoted by Schanz) accepts this explanation.

For the separation of Δαιδάλου from προγόνου Schanz compares Euthyd. 271 τ καὶ τοῦ ἡμέτερου οὐ πολὺ τι τῆν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν Κριτοβοῦλοι.

29. τὰ υπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. Notice that Socrates shifts the 11 C responsibility on to Euthyphro. Practically, Socrates calls Euthyphro a Daedalus: his ἐργα are the peripatetic definitions which he has advanced.

30. ἐπιθέμην. τίθεμαι in Plato is more confident and dogmatic than τίθημι: see Dr Postgate in the Journal of Philology (1886), vol. xv pp. 111—119. I think there is here no allusion such as is implied in Fritzsche’s note “de statuis simul cogitat”. τιθέναι ἀγαλμα may be Greek, but τίθεσθαι ἀγαλμα is not.

31. ὡς ἄρα. ἄρα as usual expresses some surprise, genuine or affected: it is especially frequent in this sense “ubi aliquis non suis verbis loquitur” (Fritzsche on Meno 80 ε). Cf. Apol. 34 C and note.

κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνην ψυγγένειαν. Professions were frequently hereditary among the Greeks.

τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐργα = “dialectical works of art”. For ἐν cf. Rep. VI 487 C ὑπὸ πεπτείας αὖ ταῦτα τῶν ἐτέρας, οὐκ ἐν
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ψῆφοις, ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις: and for ἀποδιδράσκει Meno 97 D, quoted on τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου in B above. ἔργα frequently means 'works of art' e.g. Meno 91 D Φειδίαν τε ὑπε—καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο. The entire imagery of this passage is only an elaboration of the metaphor in Theaet. 203 D καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδράκως ἴδχεται.

33. νῦν δὲ σαλ γὰρ κτλ. For νῦν δὲ see on 11 A above: and for γὰρ after νῦν cf. on Apol. 38 B νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἑστιν. It is usual to punctuate νῦν δὲ—σαλ γὰρ, and take νῦν δὲ with ἄλλοι δὴ: but δὴ ('therefore') is against that punctuation, and neither in νῦν δὲ—γὰρ nor in ἄλλα γὰρ (= γ' ἀρα) do the Greeks appear to have been conscious of any ellipse. See on Apol. 19 C, and cf. infra 14 C.

ὑποθέσεις. The word is probably selected in preference to λόγοι because it denotes something of a more material nature and so suits τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα better. Cf. Rep. VI 511 B τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἄρχας, ἄλλα τῷ δὲτὶ ὑποθέσεις (i.e. we are to press both parts of the word—ὑπό and θέσεις), οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁμάδας.

34. ἄλλοι—σκώμματος: i.e. as I am not responsible, you cannot say that μὴ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα shew the traces of my ancestry. Euthyphro replies: a kindred jibe (σχέδων τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ) is still permissible, for τὰ λεγόμενα are made to move by you.

σχέδων τι is very common in Plato's earlier dialogues, in which σχέδων is rarely found: on the other hand in the later writings (Sophistes, Politicus, Timaeus, Philebus, Critias, Laws), σχέδων has nearly everywhere replaced σχέδων τι: see Ritter's Untersuchungen über Plato p. 58. Note also the accent on σολ: because ἐμοὶ.

37. δεισδαι τὰ λεγόμενα. Contrast τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγομεν in line 29 above. The omission here of ὑπὸ σοῦ is intended to make Socrates partly responsible for what has been said.

τὸ γὰρ περιέματι τοῦτοις κτλ. περιέματι not περιέρχεσθαι, though περιέρχεσθαι in 11 B above: see Cobet Variae Lectiones pp. 34, 307. Except in the case of ὑπερεχεσθαι in the derived sense of 'fawning on' (Crito 53 E), the parts of ἔρχομαι and its compounds other than the present Indicative are supplied from εἰμι (ἡ, το, τοιμι, θι, λέναι, λὼν, fut. εἰμι). Notice the close parallel with 11 B: τὸ γὰρ περιέματι περιέρχεσθαι γὰρ: μὴ μένεων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ = νῦκ ἔθελεν μένειν δι' οὗ ἱδρυσόμεθα αὐτῷ. τοῦτοις is wrongly rejected by
Stallbaum: it goes with ἐντίθελσι, by the usual Platonic hyperbaton, on which see Riddell’s Apology of Plato p. 236 ff., and Prof. Cook Wilson ‘On the Interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus’ p. 97 ff. Schanz remarks that its position is determined by the paronomasia with τοῦτο, and quotes the parallel in Phaedr. 239 A τοσοῦτων κακῶν καὶ ἐτι πλειόνων κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκη γνωριμενῶν τὲ καὶ φῶςε ἐνότων τῶν μὲν ἤθεσα, τὰ δὲ παρασκευαζέων. For the same reason I prefer (with Schanz) the τοῦτος of B to αὕτως in T.

39. σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ Δαίδαλος. With δοκεῖς understand ἐντιθέναι: ὁ Δαίδαλος is then in emphatic opposition to σὺ: cf. 15 B ἐμὲ αἰτίας τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντα αὕτως ποιεῖν. I think this better than to take ὁ Δαίδαλος as the predicate: the omission of εἶναι in such a case would be unusual. There is some derision expressed by placing ὁ Δαίδαλος at the end: see on 3 A above.

40. ἐπεὶ ἐμοὶ γε ἑνήκα κτλ. Euthyphro clearly regards the ΙΙΙ D discussion as purely academic.

42. ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός: with a certain mock dignity: nearly = 'the great departed': cf. Rep. ΙΙ 368 Α ὁ παιδὸς ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός. See on Apol. 33 E.

43. διὸ δὲ μὲν κτλ. For διὸ strict logic would require ὅτι, since there is no comparative in the relative clause. The idiom is an example of attraction of the relative akin in its nature to Ἀττικ attraction. Schanz quotes Xen. Cyr. VI 2. 19 ὅτι τοσοῦτον Σώρον κακὸν εγένετο, διὸ Σώροι μὲν μάχη νυκτένετε ἐφυγον κτλ.

44. πρὸς τοῖς ἐφαντοῦ. The Platonic Socrates is quite sincere in this: he did not pretend to have solved the universe—he only desired to discover some λόγοι less unstable than the principles on which most men regulate their lives. Cf. Phaedo 114 D τοῦ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διοχυρυσσάται οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἔγω διελθήθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἐχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ή ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἢ τοιαύτ' ἄττα—τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κυριεύειν οικεμένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν and Rep. VII 517 Β οὐχ ἀμαρτήσει τῆς γ' ἑμῆς ἐπιθύμους, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα ἐπιθύμεις ἀκούειν· θεὸς δὲ τοῦ οἴδηκεν, εἰ ἄληθθε γείσα τυγχάνει.

45. καὶ δήτα. This collocation is not very common in Plato: it occurs also in Protag. 310 C καὶ δήτα μέλλων σοι φράσειν—οὕτω των ἄλλων ἐπελαθόμεν. Like καὶ δὴ καὶ (see on 2 D above) it directs especial attention to the following clause. τῆς τέχνης presently is a partitive genitive depending on τοῦτο.

46. ἅκων εἵμι σοφός. For σοφός as a nickname of Socrates see above on 2 C. Here the word has the idea of the English
NOTES ON XIII II D

'artist', just as σοφία, σοφιζόμαι etc. are sometimes used in connection with poetry, sculpture and painting. The situation is like that in Theaet. 150 C ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἢ ἡ τολλοι μοι οὐνείδισαν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτώ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὔδεν ἀποκρινομαί περὶ οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφῶν, ἀληθὲς οὐνειδίζομαι κτλ.

48. ἄκινθτως. ἄκινθτως has inferior authority. Schanz quotes Thuc. viii 40. 2 ἥ στρατιὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βεβαιῶς ἐδοξε μετὰ τείχους ἑδύσθαι.

49. τὸ Ταντάλου χρήματα... Ταντάλου τάλαντα was a proverb. Schanz remarks that Plato cites, besides Tantalus, Darius Polycrates Cinyras and Midas as representatives of great wealth. There is intentional paronomasia in Δαιδάλου—Ταντάλου.

50. τρυφάν: said of one who is too high and mighty to condescend to details: so in 11 11 D above Euthyphro had said ἐκεῖ ἐμοῦ γε ἐνεκα ἐμεν ἐν ταύτα οὕτως. The meaning is clearly fixed by 11 12 A infra: ἀλλ', δ' ἐλέγω, τρυφάς ὑπὸ πλοῦτον τῆς σοφίας. Originally the word seems to have denoted the lethargy consequent on too much good living: see Alc. 11 11 14 a ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρυφάς καὶ οὐκετ' ἄν ἠδέως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γε ὑσαιο λόγου: Rep. 11 187 b: and Rep. 11 399 c λεληθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες ἢν ἂρτι τρυφάν ἐφαμεν πόλιν.

αὐτὸς σοι ἐξεπροθυμησμόμαι δεῖξαι. So the MSS read. I have followed Schanz in bracketing δεῖξαι. If δεῖξαι is retained, διδάξας must be changed into διδάσκαι with Bekker, Fritzsche and Wohlrab: ὅσως ἀν κτλ. will then be a clause of manner, dependent on δεῖξαι. But on this view the sense is very cumbrous, viz. 'I will myself help you to shew how you might teach me etc.' The word δεῖξαι might well have been introduced by some scribe who was not familiar with the absolute use of ἐξεπροθυμησμόμαι and the final use of ὅσως ἀν. The reference is directly to Socrates' invitation in 11 18 ἀλλ' εἰπὲ προθύμως. Of other alternatives δεῖξαι is the most obvious, but this too necessitates διδάξας for διδάσκας: Madvig's δῆσαι (Adv. Cr. 11 1 p. 367) can hardly be right, since Socrates has now expressly discarded the metaphor (καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἄδην). As regards the sentiment, it is to be noted that Euthyphro is now reduced to ἀπορία: it remains for Socrates to point a way out. (Compare the conversation with Euthydemos in Xen. Mem. iv ch. 2.) Socrates accordingly now takes the initiative: we shall therefore be right in looking for the positive teaching of the Euthyphro mainly in the second half. But just as Euthyphro's
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_Δικαιο_ is only half-confessed, so (in accordance with Socrates' usual procedure) the solution to the problem of the dialogue will be but a partial one. See Introd. p. xxvi.

53. _Δικαιον ελναι παν το δοιον._ _Δικαιον_ here has the meaning of 'moral', 'right': see Bonitz Platonische Studien pp. 230, 233 and the editor's note on Crito 45 c (ἐτι δε ουδε δικαιον). Whereas in this passage Plato regards _δοιον_ as a part of _Δικαιον_, in the Protagoras, Meno and Gorgias he places _δοιον_ as a substantive virtue on the same platform with _σοφια_, _σοφροσυνη_, _ανδρεα_ and _Δικαιο_._

For a discussion of the bearing of this on the date of the Euthyphro see Introduction pp. xxxii ff.

57. _το δε τι καλ αλα_. _Τι_ goes with _το δε:_ 'the other, whatever it is, different'. So in Rep. 1 339 c _ουκοιν επιειροντες νυμους τιθειαι τους μεν _ὁρθως_ τιθεαισ, _τους_ _δε_ _τινας_ _ουκ_ _ὁρθως_. Observe the latent logical process of _διαφωτις_ in order to hunt out what _το δοιον_ is, _Δικαιον_ is subdivided into two ideas, one _δοιον_, and the other something unknown. The Sophists and Politicus shew this mode of logical analysis in its fullest development. See Introd. p. xx.

58. _ον _επομαι_. Euthyphro has already shewn himself incapable of distinguishing between 'All _A_ is _B_ ' and 'All _B_ is _A_ '. See on ch. vi _ad init._ Compare also _το _ουκ_ _ολο_ δ τι _λεγεις_ ο _Σωκρατε_.

59. _καλ μην_—_σοφοτερος_. Socrates plays on the literal meaning of _επομαι_: young men should run fast: _νεων _δε_ _παντες_ _οι_ _πολλοι_ _καλ οι_ _μεγαλοι_ _πονι_ (Rep. vii 536 D). But though youth is the season to learn (_τω γαρ δυτι_ _νεοτης_ _εις_ _παν_ _επιδοσιν_ _εχει_ Theact. 146 B), yet youth is far from being _σοφος_ (Rep. v 475 C): so that _δοιον_ _σοφοτερος_ is very sarcastic. _ον __ελαττον_ (for which _T_ has __ελαττον_ ) is equivalent to _τοσοντυ_, as Schanz remarks.

60. _δ _λαγω_ viz. in 11 E. _Λαγω_ rather than _Δεγον_ (_εποιον_) is generally used in referring to a previous passage of the same dialogue: see on _οτερ_ _λαγω_ in _Apol._ 21 A.

_Υπο_ _πλουτου_ _της_ _σοφιας_. Socrates aspired to the belief that wisdom is the only true wealth: see the prayer to _Φαν_ in _Phaedr._ 279 C _πλουσιον _δε_ _νομιζομε_ _των_ _σοφον_. The same view afterwards became a commonplace among the Stoics.

61. _σακαρια_: see on _σαμων Σωκρατε_ in Crito 44 B.

62. _οδε_ _χαλετον_. _Οδο_ (for which Naber would read _οδεν_) presents no difficulty: the idiom is exactly like the English 'for

_A. EU._
neither is it difficult' etc. Schanz quotes Legg. II 673 c ποιητέου  οὖδὲ γὰρ τὰν χαλεπὸν ἐστιν εἰπέων.

Λέγω γὰρ. An exercise follows in the conversion of propositions exactly as in Alcib. II 139 E. Here the example is not selected at random, though strictly speaking it is no more than an example: as Fritzsche remarks (p. 147 of his edition) "aptissime in quaestione de pietate instituta etiam de verecundia disputatur", for δέος and αἰδῶς are parts of δωτρῆς. The principle of selecting an example which shall itself involve a useful lesson is akin to this, and is recognised in modern works on Education e.g. Bain's Education as a Science p. 292. αἰδῶς as good shame is reverence, a proper sentiment to feel towards gods (Legg. XI 920 E θεοὺς προγόνους αὐτῶν αἰδομένους), and something akin to δωτρῆς: it is used also like αἰσχονεσθαι in connection with evil objects, as in the oracle quoted in Rep. VIII 566 C οὖθεν αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι. Both meanings are recognised in the sequel. Here the word is best translated by 'shame' throughout.

63. ὁ ποιητῆς—ποιησαι. According to the Scholiast, the verses are from the Cyprian poems, which dealt with the events prior to the Iliad, of unknown authorship but probably hailing from Cyprus, whence the name. Herodotus refuses to ascribe the poems to Homer—οὖθεν Ἄμφρον τὰ Κύπρια ἔπει ἐστὶν ἄλλα ἄλλου τινὸς, says he (II 117): and in Athenaeus XV 682 E (where several verses are quoted) Hesegias and Stasinus are mentioned as authors to whom the poems had been assigned. Perhaps Plato indicates his sense of the doubtful authorship in the words ὁ ποιητῆς, like Plutarch (περὶ ἀργυρίας ch. II. 459 D): οὐ γὰρ, ὃς ὁ ποιητῆς εἶπεν, ἣν γὰρ δέος ἔθα καὶ αἰδώς.

64. Ζήνα δὲ—αἰδῶς. These two lines involve considerable difficulties, both of language and of meaning.

The accepted reading is θ' ἐξαντα (so the second hand in B): but B has θέξαντα, and T ἀεξαντα: while Stobaeus Florileg. 31. 18 reads ἔξαντα. If we suppose that ἔξαντα or θ' ἐξαντα is right (ἐξας was used for ἐρξας=δρῶς, if we may believe the Scholiast on Ar. Ach. 329), two difficulties arise. First, ἐξαντα is harsh if used intransitively and should in that case be ἔρξωντα (compare the word ἐρξῆς in Hdt. vi 98, as a translation of the Persian Darius), nor is it less harsh to supply τὰ δὲ πάντα as object, not to speak of the tautology involved in ἐξαντα and ἐφύτευσεν: such tautology is however not uncommon in verses of an Orphic character. Second, do
τὸν θ’ ἔρξαντα καὶ δὲ—ἐφότευσεν both refer to Zeus? At first sight this appears to contradict the well-known idiom by which an anaphoric pronoun replaces the relative after καὶ if a relative with the same antecedent precedes (see on Apol. 40 A and supra 6 c): but on the other hand τὸν θ’ ἔρξαντα is not quite the same as δὲ τ’ ἔρξε: and on the ground of meaning it seems obvious that both clauses are descriptive of Zeus. Perhaps δὲ still retains something of its original anaphoric use.

Zeus is here conceived of as the creator, as so often in the Orphic hymns e.g. Hymn. XV 3—5 (ed. Abel) ὥς βασιλείς, διὰ σὴν κεφαλὴν ἐφάνη τάδε ἰδία, γαῖα θεὰ μητὴρ ὅρεων θ’ ὑψηλές ὅθεν καὶ πῶντος καὶ πάνθ’ ὁ δὲ ὀμάδως ἑκατον ἐεργεί. There is probably a veiled allusion to some such derivation of Ζήνων as is alluded to in Crat. 396 α—β οὶ μὲν γὰρ Ζήνων, οἱ δὲ Δία καλοῦσιν. συντιθέμενα δ’ εἰς ἐν δὴλοι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, δ’ δὴ προσήκειν φαμέν ὄνοματι οὐκ ἐς ἀνεργάνθεος θαὶ (cf. τὸν θ’ ἔρξαντα). οὐ γὰρ ἔστων ἥμιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσιν, δοσίς ἐστιν αἰτίος μάλλον τοῦ ἥμιν ἢ τὸ ἔρχων τε καὶ βασιλεύς τῶν πάντων. συμβαίνει οὐν ὅρθως ὁμομάζεσθαι οὕτως οἱ θεδὶς ἐναι, καὶ δὲν ἥμιν ἄλλοις πάσιν οὐκ ἔστων ὑπάρχει: see also Stobaeus Eclog. Phys. 2. 24—26, 86 et al. : and cf. Aesch. Suppl. 584—585 φυσίζον γένος, τὸ δὲ Ζήνων ἐστιν ἀληθῆς. The feeling that the Highest should be unnamed meets us not rarely in Greek literature e.g. Eur. Troad. 885—6 δοσίς τοῦ εἰ σὺν, δυστάπακτος εἶδεν, Ζεὺς (where see Paley). So in Plato Crat. 400 E and Philob. 12 c: τὸ θ’ ἐμὸν δέος—δεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὄνοματα οὐκ ἔστιν καὶ ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μέγιστου φόβου, καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀδροδίτην, διὰ ἐκείνην φιλον, τοῦτο πραγματευόμεθα. The last passage is thus appropriated by Origen adv. Cels. IV 80—81 (ed. Migne) ἀλλὰ καθαρὰν εὐσέβειαν εἰς τὸν ἐπεμμερήμανον ἄσκοπως οὐδὲ μέχρι ὄνοματος χραίνομεν τὰ θεῖα, ἀποδεχόμεθα τοῦ Πλάτωνος τὸν ἐν Φιλήμβρῳ λόγον—τὸ γὰρ ἐμὸν δέος κτλ. It is in the same spirit that Plato makes Socrates shrink from describing the Idea of Good otherwise than by a simile in Rep. VI 506 D—Ε ἀλλ’, ὥς μακάριον, αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ’ ἐστι τάγαθων ἐκαθομὴν τὸ νῦν εἶναι—δεὶ δὲ ἐκγενός τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ λέγειν ἔθελω: with which compare the impressive words of the Timaeus (28 c) τὸν μὲν οὐν πατὴρ καὶ πατέρα τούδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρέων τὸ ἔργον καὶ εὐρώτα εἰς πάντας ἀδύναταν λέγειν.

Throughout this note I have assumed the correctness of θ’ ἔρξαντα, the reading of b: but I incline to think that θ’ ἔρξαντα is a
corruption of ὀρφαντα—Zeus being conceived of as the sustainer and creator of all that is. The ὅστερον πρῶτερον would then be like Homer’s well-known ὅμω τράφεν ἥδε γένοστο e.g. in Od. IV 723, where see Ameis.

12 B 65. ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς. Fritzche points out that the same sentiment occurs in Epicharmus (Schol. on Soph. Ajax 1074) καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἔνθα δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς. So also in Plut. Cleom. 9. ζ καλὸς ὁ εἰκὼν ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς, and περὶ ἀργησίας Ch. 11. (quoted above on line 63). Plato’s point is that δέος (metus) is a wider term than αἰδώς (pudor), which is only one kind of δέος.

68. οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι. εἶναι = ‘to be true’, and ἵνα δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς is virtually a quotation. So presently in ἀλλ’ ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι. This is much better, because more emphatic, than to regard εἶναι as merely the copula.

71. αἰδώσθαι δὲ μηδὲν. For μηδὲν, οὐδὲν would be more regular after δοκοῦσιν: μηδὲν is however a more emphatic negative: see on 6 B above.

74. ἀλλ’ ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι. The Christian parallel (with a characteristic difference) is ‘Perfect love casteth out fear’. On εἶναι see last note but one.

75. αἰδοῦμαι—δέομαι. Plato’s choice of words is very characteristic here. Wishing to prove that αἰδώς implies δέος, he passes from the one notion to the other through a series of middle terms, of which the later in each case involves more notion of δέος than the earlier. Thus in αἰδώς fear is less prominent than in αἰσχύνοθαι, in αἰσχύνοθαι than in φοβεῖσθαι: and φοβεῖσθαι (timere), in which the physical agitation due to present danger (ἡ παρανόια πτώσις, says Ammonius) is the leading idea, forms the natural transition to δεδέαι (metus, ὑπόνοια κακοῦ): see Prodicus’ perfectly just distinction between δεός and φόβος in Prot. 358 D and for other examples of this quasi-sorites in Plato see on Crito 47 B τῷ ἐπιστάτῳ καὶ ἄταντῷ. τεφόβησαι as present of the state should be noticed.

12 C 77. δέομαι μὲν οὖν. μὲν οὖν is corrective, as usual: see on Apol. 26 B. Plato of course writes δέομαι rather than τεφόβησαι or both because the point is to shew that αἰδώς involves δέος, not φόβος.

79. οὐ μέντοι—γε: stronger than δὲ after μὲν. γε is regularly separated from μέντοι by a word.

80. ἢ τι πλέον: in logical terminology, δέος has more extension
and less intension than αἶδος. Schanz puts the reasoning well thus: the higher idea (α) is the one which is poorer in essential marks, the lower is the one which is richer in these (α+α): consequently, the higher idea (α) is present where the lower (α+α) is, but not vice versa. For the phraseology cf. Euthyd. 290 οὐδεμία—τῆς θερευν-κῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλέον ἔστω ἡ βοσν θηρεύσωι κτλ. Notice the purely logical sense of μέρον and μέρος throughout this passage. It is important to bear this sense of μέρος in mind when Plato speaks of 'parts' of soul.

86. καὶ ἕκει λέγων. ἕκει refers to 11 Β—12 Α. τὸ τοιοῦτον of course depends on λέγων (meaning).

CHAPTER XIV.

Euthyphro now understands the logical difficulty just cleared up: and Socrates, with a view to reaching a definition of δικαίον, asks 'what sort of a part of δίκαιον it is'. The reply is—that part which is concerned with care for the gods.

3. τὸ τοιοῦτον μέρος. "Articulus ubi pronominibus interrogativis 12 D additetur, semper referitur ad aliquod, quod praecessit". Hermann, quoted by Fritzche. In Ar. Ran. 1227—1229 there is a case of the violation of this rule: ὃ δειμὼν· ἅδριών, ἀποξριω θὴν λήκυθον, ὅα μὴ διαξαλον τοὺς προλύγους ἡμῶν; ΕΤΡ. τὸ τί; ἐγὼ προλομα τἀδε; This particular passage is probably corrupt: but Hermann's rule is by no means without exceptions e.g. Rep. ν 469 Β and Χ 595 Α.

5. ἡρῴας τι—ἐίπον ἄν. τι as internal accusative. With ἐρωτᾶν this acc. is for the most part confined to neuter pronouns: yet Crat. 407 C τὸν "Ἀρη ἡρώτα (ask about Ares). ἐίπον is probably preferred to the more regular ἔλεγον as more decisive and instantaneous. Schanz quotes Symp. 199 D ἀλλ' ἄσπερ ἐν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτο πατέρα ἡρῴων,—ἐίπες ἄν κτλ. So also in Soph. Ant. 755 εἶ μὴ πατὴρ ἥς θ' ἐίπον ἄν σ' οὔκ εἴ δορον εἰς φρονεῖν.

6. στόχος ὁ ἄρθρος i.e. ὁ ἄρθρος.

7. σκαλανγδος—σπασκάλης. Greek arithmetic was largely geometrical: see the well known passage in the Theaetetus 147 D—148 Β. An even number is of course called isosceles as being divisible by 2. So the Scholiast explains the passage.

11. διὸν ἔστω. Hirschig would read (against the MSS) τὸ 12 Ε
NOTES ON XIV 12 E

διον, as in D above: but cf. infra in Euthyphro's reply εϊναι εὐσεβείς τε καὶ διον. It is indifferent whether διον or τὸ διον is written, since διον is to be no mere predicate of, but absolutely identical with, the part of δικαιον sought for.

13. μεμαθηκότας. It is implied as usual that to learn piety is to be pious.

15. τοῦτο τοινυν κτλ. This is the fourth definition given by Euthyphro. In harmony with the fact that it is led up to by Socrates, rather than by Euthyphro, we find it in other dialogues of Plato, e.g. Gorg. 507 A—B καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαιαν πρὸς τοῖς πράττοις, περὶ δὲ θεοῦ διον. τὸν δὲ τὰ δικαία καὶ δικαιον πάντα ἄναγκε δίκαιον καὶ διον εἶναι; ἐστὶν τάῦτα. Cf. Zeno in Diog. Laert. vii 119 εϊναι τῇ εὐσεβείᾳ εὐστήμων θεῶν θερασίλεα: the same definition is also given by Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. ix 123. See also Introd. p. xiii.

CHAPTER XV.

This and the following chapters are concerned with the definition now reached. First, Socrates raises the question as to what θερασίλεα means. In the present chapter he proves that it cannot be a care having for its object the benefit of the gods: and Euthyphro explains it as service like that of slaves to their masters.

1. καὶ καλῶς γε. There is no sarcasm here: for this definition (in Plato's view) conceals at least if it does not reveal the truth: see 13 E.

13 A 2. σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεχέσ εἰμι. Schanz aptly quotes Prot. 329 νῦν οὖν, δ' Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεχέσ εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἰ μοι ἀποκρίναι τόδε.

6. λέγομεν γὰρ τού. Plato begins as if he would state the difference between θερασίλεα of gods and that of other objects in general terms: instead of which he breaks off and takes special examples. οἷον is similarly used in οἷον τοῦδε below (13 b).

7. ὑπὸνοι—ὑπ'υκός. The order is for emphasis. The analogies are quite in Socrates' style: see Xen. Mem. i 2. 37 where Critias says: ἀλλὰ τῶν θεῶν τοῦ κυρίου ναοὺς ὑπακούειν, δ' Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων κτλ. οὗτοι, ὕφη δ' Ἡλλατικής, καὶ τῶν ἐπιμέλεων τούτοις, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ δολού καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων;
13. κυνηγετικός = κυνόν θεραπευτικός, for ágw often means to educate or train.

22. ταῦτα διαπράττεται: for ταῦτα see above on 10 E.


30. ὁπαῖτος is now written by Schanz ως ἄθως, on the ground that Plato's ως δ' ἄθως shews that the two parts of the word were still felt to be distinct.

ἡ ἕνα βλάψῃ κτλ. Is this the only alternative? Could they not remain in statu quo? See above on θεομάθης in 7 A.

37. ἕγκαρωρήσας. This older form of opt. Aor. is frequent in Plato.

38. βελτίω—ἀπεργάζει. βελτίω is primarily not of character, but of condition (prosperity and the like): but in the Greek view character is improved by improved circumstances: see above on 3 A κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν. The absurdity here consists in supposing that the gods are not already in the best condition possible.

43. σῶμα ἕγομνον explains τοῦτον δῇ ἑνεκα.

46. ἐλέν was pronounced ἑλέν, with intervocalic aspiration. The particle (which is perhaps connected with ἐλα) serves to dismiss one point and introduce another. See on Crito 47 B.

NOTES ON XV 13 D

50. ὑπηρετικὴ—θεῖα. So Charm. 158 c ἐξάρνω εἶναι τὰ ἐρωτῶμενα: see on τὰ μετέωρα φροντισθῆς in Apol. 18 B.

CHAPTER XVI.

Socrates now asks—what does this service seek to produce? Euthyphro is unable to reply, and the problem remains unsolved. Presently he declares (Def. 5) that holiness consists in saying and doing what is pleasing to the gods in prayer and sacrifice.

The key to the positive teaching of the Euthyphro lies in the unsolved question propounded in this chapter: see Introd. pp. xii ff.

1. ἡ ἱατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ sc. θεραπεῖα. The word θεραπεῖα is however not expressed, because its usual meaning is care which has for its aim the good of the object: and this meaning has just been excluded. The use of drugs and the like is meant.

I 3 E 6. ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ: viz. the θραύα of their craft.

12. ἡ δὲ θεῖος ὑπηρετικὴ κτλ. The possibility of piety being an ἑνεργεία without producing any έργον is not entertained.


17. ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον έργον. Socrates asks the τί: Euthyphro in his reply gives the τοῖς. Compare Meno 86 D—Ε and Gorg. 448 Ε. In πάγκαλον Socrates gives a slight hint as to the nature of the reply which he desired: see Bonitz Platonische Studien p. 238 note 7. The answer to the question is thus supplied by Bonitz (p. 234) from hints in the Euthyphro and other dialogues: "Piety is nothing but perfect morality, only in such a form that man is conscious of being thus the organ by which God works his will": see Introd. p. xv.

18. ἡμῖν ὑπηρέται: we are as it were the body of rowers, God the pilot: cf. Symp. 186 Ε ἢ τε οὖν ἱατρικὴ—διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦτου κυβερνᾶται κτλ. Heraclitus Frag. xix (ed. Bywater) ἢ τὸ σοφὸν, ἐπιστασθῆσα γνώμην ἢ κυβερνᾶται πάντα διὰ πάντων. With the general sentiment compare Isocrates 5. 150 οἷμαι δὲ σ' οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι τρόπον οἱ θεοὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διοικοῦσιν. ὥστε γὰρ αὐτὰ ἀκούσασθαι τῶν ἀκούσασθαι τῶν συμβαινόντων.
autōs, allē̂̄̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̂̄
definition (though laid down by Euthyphro as such), but an amplification of the definition given in 12 E (δοσιν is τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπεῖαν); see also note on τὶς αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία in 14 D. The special sense of θεραπεῖα is now said to be saying and doing what is acceptable to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, i.e. the formal aspect of religion is now insisted on, while at the same time, as Socrates proceeds to shew, there is a reminiscence of the definition already refuted viz. that Piety is τὸ θεοφιλές (6 E). Euthyphro (as a μάρτις) takes the purely sacerdotal view of religion: cf. Cic. N. D. i 116 'sanctitas autem est scientia coelorum deorum'. The conception of εὐσέβεια as a proper recognition of ἡ περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία (Symp. 188 c)—originally a strictly legal, almost mercantile relation—is well brought out in Politic. 290 c: καὶ μὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν λεγέων αὐτὸν—παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δωρεὰς θεοὶ διὰ θυσίων ἐπίστημόν ἐστι κατὰ νοὸν ἐκεῖνον δωρεῖσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνον ἡμῶν εὐχαῖς κτήσιν ἁγαθῶν αἰτήσασθαι. See Introd. p. xxi. It should be noted that κεχαρισμένον is regularly used of what finds favour with the gods e.g. Arist. Pax 386 κεχαρισμένον χοριδιών: Hdt. i 87 εἰ τι οἱ κεχαρισμένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐδωρήθη: Xen. Hippiarch. i 1 θύοντα χρή αἰτεῖσθαι θεοὺς ταῦτα διδόσατε, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ λέγεω καὶ πράττειν, ἀφ' ὧν θεοὶ μὲν κεχαρισμενώτατα ἄρξειας ἀν κτλ.: Anacreon 2. 7 σὺ δ' εὐμενῆς Θεῷ ἡμῖν κεχαρισμένης δ' εὐχωλῆς ἐπικούσων.

36. καὶ σφέξα κτλ. Wohlrab formerly found in this sentence the most important positive result of the dialogue (see the Einleitung to his edition of 1880, pp. 8 ff.): this can hardly be correct however, for Socrates clearly implies in the immediate sequel (καὶ γάρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἣσθα, ἀπετράπου) that Euthyphro has shirked answering the vital question, viz. that in 13 E. See Introd. p. xiii. Observe that Euthyphro looks on religion as essential to the existence of a state: see on 5 E above.

CHAPTER XVII.

The statement of Euthyphro is now examined, with a view to elicit its meaning: and it is reduced to the form 'Piety is the ἐπιστήμη αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεῶν'.

1. ἡ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων. Prepositions are frequently inserted between an adjective and the adverb going with it: e.g.
Euthyd. 305 c πάντα παρά πολλοίς and Symp. 192 c οὕτως ἐπὶ μεγάλης στουθῆς: see on Apol. 36 a.

3. ήρέων: the reference is doubtless to 14 A τὶ δὲ δὴ κτλ., but 14 C it should be noticed that Euthyphro’s answer is not so much a reply to that question as a fresh deliverance on the subject of piety.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμος: so in 12 A ἀλλ’, δὲ λέγω, τρυφᾶς ὑπὸ πλοῦτον τῆς σοφίας.

4. δῆλος εί: a colloquial idiom, used in this paratactic way: Ar. Av. 1407 καταγέλας μου, δῆλος εί.

5. ἐπιστὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἤσθα: viz. in 13 E. For ἐπ’ αὐτῷ in this sense (‘at the point’) Schanz compares Phileb. 18 D ἦ μὴν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γε ἦν γεγονότες ἵππειτε, ὡς φής, πάλαι.

δὲ ἀπεκρίνων. The precise force of ἀπεκρίνων here is ‘state in your answer’: cf. the use of ἐρωτῶν commented on above in 12 D.

6. ἰκανός: so B: T has ἦνως. We have here as clear a statement as is possible of the importance which Plato meant to attach to the question in 13 E. See Introd. p. xiii.

7. ἐμεμαθήκη: so the second hand in B: ἐμεμαθήκεων has inferior ms. authority. Pluperfects in -εων are not found in the best Attic: see on Apol. 22 C (ἐμφάνη οὔδεν ἐπισταμένων).

ῥῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ: see on 11 C ῥῦν δὲ σαλ γὰρ κτλ.

τὸν ἐρωτῆτα τῷ ἐρωτήμασι. So B: T has τὸν ἐρωτήτα τῷ ἐρωτήμασι. Fritzsch and Wohlrab rightly retain the more difficult reading, which Schanz changes to τὸν ἐρωτήτα τῷ ἐρωτήμασι. There is a similar confusion of ἐρωτῆτων and ἐρωτώμενος in the Erastae 132 D, and of ἐρωτῶς and ἐρωτῶσι in Rep. IV 437 C. Socrates frequently uses the language of the tender passion in talking with a younger disputant: compare (with Wohlrab) 14 D infra ἐπιθυμητὴς γὰρ εἶμι, ὥς φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῆ: and see Alcibiades in Symp. 216 D.

8. ἀκολούθησιν, διὰ τὴν ἐκένος ὑπάγῃ. So in Rep. III 394 D διὰ τὴν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φήμη, ταύτη λέον. The preposition in ὑπάγω denotes the gradual leading on from step to step: a good instance is quoted by L. and S. from Arist. H. An. IX 8. 613 b 30 ὅποι ἄθροισεν ὄρθη (sc. ἥ περδίς)—ἀπὸ τῶν φῶν ὑπάγει, πρὸ πολὺν φαινομένη τοῦ ἄθροισεν, ἐως ἄν ἀπαγάγῃ.

10. ἐπιστήμην τινα κτλ. Note that in this short form of Euthyphro’s definition there is nothing to represent the clause καὶ σφέτε τὰ τοιαῦτα κτλ. (14 B). A clause so unimportant cannot therefore be regarded as the corner-stone of the dialogue: see
NOTES ON XVII 14 C

Introd. p. xiv: and for the place of this definition in Greek religious thought ibid. p. xxi.


13. εὐχαρίστειν αἰτεῖν. Fritzsche quotes Legg. vii 801 Λ ἐν χαὶ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτεῖσθαι εἰδι.


19. ἐπιθυμητής has much the same sense as ἔρασθης, see on τὸν ἐρωτήτον τῷ ἐρωμένῳ in 14 C and cf. Legg. I 643 Ε ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ τοιτίνι γενέσθαι τέλεον.

20. οὗ χαμαλ πεσεῖται. A proverbial expression ἐπὶ τῶν διακεχαρεν ὁδὸν λεγόντων, ἄλλον ἐπιτυχαινόντων, says the Scholiast. Fritzsche well compares Ar. Vesp. 1012 τὰ μέλλοντα εὖ λέγεσθαι μὴ πλὴν φαύλως χαμάλεις εὐλαβείσθε, and Pindar's χαμαλπτεῖς μὲ ἄρ' ἐξ οὖν αὐτέρσεν (Pyth. vi 37).

21. τῆς αἴτησις ἡ ὑπηρεσία. The word ὑπηρεσία clearly shews that Socrates looks on the answer of Euthyphro in 14 B as no new definition, but an attempt to explain more precisely the meaning of ὑπηρετικὴ θεραπεία in 13 D.

22. αὐτοῦ—ἐκεῖνος. Both pronouns refer to the gods: Fritzsche compares Prot. 310 D ὧν αὐτῷ δίδωσι δριγύρου καὶ πείθης ἐκεῖνον.

CHAPTER XVIII.

The present chapter reduces Euthyphro's theory to the statement already canvassed and rejected, viz. that δειν is τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φιλον.

1. τὸ ὁρθῶς αἰτεῖν: as ὁ ἐπιστήμων τοῦ αἰτεῖν will: piety is herewith virtually declared to be a kind of ἐπιστήμη. With the introduction of ὁρθῶς here compare Alcib. I 128 B τί δὲ, ὥ 'Αλκιβίαδη; ὁρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλεῖς τι ὑπονόου πράγματος;

4. 'ἀλλὰ τί; i.e. why, what should it be? what else?' i.q. τί μὴν; which Plato uses regularly in his later dialogues: see Ritter's Untersuchungen über Plato (1888) p. 57.
5. τυγχάνονος δέσμευσι. There is the same ambiguity in 14 E δέσμευσι as in the English 'wanting'.

7. τεχνικών γὰρ εἰ. Piety being ex hypothesi an ἐπιστήμη, the conduct of the pious man will be τεχνικών. Stallbaum is hardly right: "Pietas 13 δ vocata est ὑποτετρική θεως (int. τέχνη)"; see my note on the passage. Cobet would omit διδόντα, but δωροφορεῖν is used absolutely as if 'throw one's gifts away'; cf. Phaedr. 266 c of δὲ δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεύοις θέλουσι—where the βασιλῆς are the Sophists.

10. ἐμπορική. Wohlrab aptly quotes Symp. 188 b καὶ θυσίαν πᾶσιν καὶ οἷς μαντικὴ ἐπιστατεῖ—τάυτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία. The way has already been prepared for this view of religion in the use of ἔργασια (which suggests 'trade', 'merchandise') in 14 A above. See also Introd. p. xxi.

12. ἐι οὗτος ἤθιν. Euthyphro insinuates that Socrates is using an invidious word.

16. δὲ μὲν—δῆλον. ἡ here virtually = ἄττα the indirect interrogative: it is so used sometimes in dependent interrogative sentences. So δοσι is used for ὄτις, and οἷς for ὅτιοι: see Gorg. 451 b, where Thompson quotes Soph. O. R. 1271 δοῦνεκ' οὐκ ὑπωντὸ πισ οἰ' ἐπασχειν ὄθ' ὅτι' ἐδρα κακά. Kühner Ausf. Gramm. II p. 742 takes a somewhat different view, regarding ὅς in such cases as equivalent to οἷς and denying that ὃς is ever used for ὅτιος.

οὐδὲν γὰρ—δόσιν. For Socrates' views on Providence see Mem. IV 3. 1 ff. εἰπὲ μοι, ἔφη, ὅ Εὐθύδημε, ἢδη ποτὲ σοι ἐπῆλθεν ἐνθυ-μηθήρας, ὡς ἐκπελάντι οἷς θεοὶ, διὸ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δεοντέ, κατεσκεύασι; cf. Rep. II 379 c οὖν ἄρα—ὁ θεός, ἐπειδῆ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἡ εἰ ἄτιος—ἄλλ' ὄλγων μὲν τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ἄτιος, κολλῶν δὲ ἀνατίος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἢμῖν: see Introd. p. xv. The Scholiast on this passage (as Cobet points out in Mnemosyne N. S. II 88) was acquainted with St James's Epistle. His comment is συμφέν τῷ τῷ. πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθῆ καὶ ἔξης. The passage is in St James i 17: πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθῆ καὶ τῶν δόρυμα τέλειον ἀνωθέν ἔστιν, καταβαίνων ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φῶτων.

24. ἀλλὰ τί—θεοί; i.e. if not, what can these gifts be etc.? ἀλλὰ has the same force as in ἀλλὰ τί in D above. τί shews that Socrates wishes a general description by way of answer: Euthyphro replies with an enumeration of details, much as in his first attempt at a definition (5 D above). For the syntax Engelhardt compares Phaed. 58 c τί ἢν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραξθέντα;
NOTES ON XVIII 14 E

27. ἄρει θεόν: viz. in 14 Β. The words τιμή, γέρας, χάρις (and its derivatives χαροτήρια, χαριτήσια etc.) are of frequent occurrence in connection with Greek religion. χάρις prepares the way for κεκαρωμένον as gratiae might for gratum.

15 Β 29. οὖχι ωφελιμὸν οὖθε φιλὸν. τὸ ωφελιμὸν is naturally also φιλὸν. The justification for adding τὸ φιλὸν is of course the desire to make Euthyphro confess that his present definition is identical with the earlier one in 6 Ε.

31. τούτο ἄρ' ἀκτιν αὖ. τούτα refers forward to τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φιλὸν: αὖ back to 6 Ε.

CHAPTER XIX.

Socrates now retaliates on Euthyphro. "You who call me a Daedalus, yourself out-Daedalus Daedalus: for τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φιλὸν is simply θεοφιλὲς".

1. ἐδώ σοι. I have accented σοι, because it is emphatically opposed to καλ ἐμὲ αληθέσι.

3. αληθέσι: as in 11 Κ. τόν Δαίδαλον alludes in particular to 11 Κ above, ἀλλά σὺ μον δοκεῖσ, ὁ Δαίδαλος: it is therefore virtually a quotation. The passage would be much less forcible if the words were expunged, as Schanz suggests. Liebhold’s proposal, τρόπων Δαίδαλον, is ingenious, but quite unnecessary.

5. καὶ κόκλω περιώντας. So T: the second hand in B has περιώντας: B has περιόντα. καὶ is explanatory; there is no need to bracket the word, as Schanz suggests. For περιώντας Schanz reads περίοντις: but in 11 Κ above περιέναι (with the mss). The forms περιών etc. are found occasionally in the mss of Plato: but I cannot believe that Plato would have written both περιέναι and περιώντας within the compass of a single short dialogue. See on the subject of περιών in Greek manuscripts Naber in Mnemosyne N. S. v 417. κόκλω is by no means otiose here: since περιέναι may mean simply ‘to move about’ (as above in 11 Κ): Euthyphro is a greater artist than Daedalus, because he communicates to his λόγοι a special sort of motion viz. circular: Daedalus’ statues merely walked about. With the whole passage cf. Euthyd. 291 Κ—ὅστερ ἐνταξένων ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐντῆς ἐντεῖος ἐντεῖος καὶ τοῦ ζου λέγειν, δουμεν ὑπὲρ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐξηλάμβαν.
7. ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν: the reading of T: B has εὐπροσθεν. Schanz 15 C remarks that there is a tendency in Platonic mss to write εὐπροσθεν for πρόσθεν. The reference is to 10 e ff.
8. ταυτόν: see above on 10 e.

12. ἄλλο τι ἢ: see on Apol. 24 C. If we regard the phrase as already a stereotyped particle of interrogation, the ἢ ὡς; following will present no difficulty: but in any case ὡς ὡς is otiose: and the fuller form ἄλλο τι ἢ is rarely used without some hint of its origin as equid aliud quam? Hermann reads ὡς ἄλλο against the mss and places a colon after γιγνεται. On the whole I prefer Schanz's view, with which Wohlrab agrees. ἄλλο τι ἢ is taken by them as equivalent to German nicht wahr, used parenthetically in the sense of 'I suppose', without a distinctly interrogative sense. I know no other case of such a use. γιγνεται is 'comes to be' 'is found to be': cf. (with Schanz) Euthyd. 298 e οὖκ οὐκ Πατήρ ὡς σῶς ἑστιν, ὥστε σῶς Πατήρ γιγνεται οὔ κόνων καὶ οὔ κυνάρων ἄδελφος;

15. ἄρτι: viz. in 10 e where the identity of δοιον and θεοφιλες was finally disallowed. For τιθέμεθα see above on 11 e.

CHAPTER XX.

In this concluding chapter Socrates complains of Euthyphro's wilful reticence.
3. έκάνω εἶναι: is used by Plato only in negative sentences: see 15 D on Apol. 37 A.
4. προσέχων—νῦν. οὐ τι μάλιστα is to be taken with προσέχων, νῦν with εἰςτε.

8. Ἰδησθα: the only correct form in Plato: see on Apol. 23 C. Here B has Ἰδεσθα, T Ἐδησθα.

10. ἄνθρωπος θητός ἄνθρα προσβόητιν. ἄνθρωπος is frequently added thus to words which denote one's nationality, standing, condition and the like, as in ἄνθρωπος μάντις, ἄνθρωπος νομέος (Sophocles), ἄνδρες δικασταὶ etc.

III 281) would write διωκαθεῖ; “aoristos in -αθεῖ productos ubique in -άθει deparvarunt, ut multi hodique opinentur, Graeca esse διω-
κάθει, ἀμυνάθει, ἐκάθει, ουκεκάθει, παρεικάθει, ἑργάθει, ἀλκάθει,
quum διωκάθει cett. aoristos esse Elmslieus ad Medeam vs. 186
acute perspexerit”. It is not however certain that the formation is
aoristic: nor that, even if aoristic, it would be accented on the last:
see on δόλω in Apol. 39 B and Curtius’ Greek Verb (E. T.) p. 502.
B has διωκάθει: Τ διωκάθει (sic).

II. τῶν θεῶν—παρακινδυνεύων. The construction of ἔδεισας
is peculiar, if (with Schanz and Wohlrab) we regard τῶν θεῶν and
παρακινδυνεύων as both depending on it directly: nor can τῶν θεῶν
depend on παρακινδυνεύων, which can only take an internal accusative
of that which is risked. If παρακινδυνεύων is not a marginal note
intended to explain the precise force of the following μὴ clause, it
should probably be explained as an epexegetic infinitive. On the
other supposition the balance is complete: τῶν θεῶν ἐν ἔδεισας—
tῶν ἀνθρώπων (ἄν) ἡγόμνης.

12. μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις. An almost solitary case of
μὴ (δὲν μὴ) with future optative after a verb of fearing: see Good-
win (MT p. 40), who quotes from Xen. Hell. VI 4. 27 φοβοῦμενος
μὴ τιμεῖ—πορεύομαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνου δύναμιν. It corresponds to μὴ
with future Indicative in direct speech after verbs of fearing, an
idiom itself also rare: see Paley on Aesch. Pers. 117—121 μὴ πόλις
πόθηται—καὶ τὸ Κισσίων τόλμω μὴ ἀντίδοτον ἐσεται. The expres-
sion μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς κτλ. recalls 4 A above οὐ γάρ ομαί τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος
ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαμεν: but the meaning here is ‘lest you should be
wrong in so doing’.

13. σοφῶς οἷς εἶδαί: so ἀκριβῶς οἷς ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν
θεῶν ὅτι ἔχει in 4 E. The emphasis is on οἷς.

I5 E

18. ἀπ' ἄληθος—καταβαλόν. Compare Phaedo 98 B ἀπὸ δὴ
θαυμαστῆς, ὁ ἐταίρε, ἐλπίδος ψυχῆς φερόμενος.

19. ἢν ἐξόν. The concluding sentence recalls 5 A—B. Thus
in σοφῶς ἢδ' παρ' Ἑυθύφρων τὰ θεῖα γέγονα we have an echo of
ἐγὼ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπρόσθεν χρόνω τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλῶν ἐπιστήμην
eἶδεναι—καὶ εἰ μὲν, ὃ Μέλητε, φαίην ἄν, Ἑυθύφρων ὁμολογεῖσ σοφῶν
εῖναι τὰ τοιαῦτα: and in οὐκείθεν—ἀυτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ κανονομό περὶ
ἀυτὰ there is a reminiscence of ἐπειδὴ μὲ ἐκεῖνος, ἀυτοσχεδιάζοντα
φῃς καὶ κανονομοδύνα περὶ τῶν θεῶν.

20. τὰ τε ὅστα καὶ μὴ. It is unnecessary to read (with
Liebhold Woch. für kl. Phil. 1888 no. 40 p. 1229) καὶ τὰ μὴ.
24. καὶ δὴ καὶ—βιωσομεν. For καὶ δὴ καὶ see above on 2 E. 16 A
For δὲ ἀμενον Schanz reads ἀμενον against the mss, taking δὲ
(like ὡς παρὰ σοῦ above) with ἐλπίδος: I prefer the MS reading, as
forming a more euphonious and impressive conclusion. In the
concluding words of the Phaedo the traditional reading is to be
preferred for a similar reason. Here δὲ depends on ἐνδειγμενος and
is parallel to the other two δὲ clauses: Socrates might hope to be
acquitted by convincing Meletus of his resolution to reform. For the
change of mood from Indicative to Optative we may compare (with
Schanz) Thuc. II 80 1 λέγοντες δὲ—ῥάδιον ἀν—κρατήσουσι καὶ ὁ
περίπλους οὐκέτι θυστο Ἀθηναίος ὑμῶν περὶ Πελοπόννησον.
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