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PLATO'S REPUBLIC

JOWETT AND CAMPBELL
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THE GREEK TEXT

EDITED, WITH NOTES AND ESSAYS

BY THE LATE

B. JOWETT, M.A.
MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE
REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
DOCTOR IN THEOLOGY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN

AND

LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A., LL.D.
HONORARY FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE
EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
ST. ANDREWS

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NOTES ON THE REPUBLIC
OF PLATO

BOOK I.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ] The second title, περὶ δικαίου, found in Par. A and other MSS., is probably a later addition. The plural form, πολιτείῶν γ', δ', ε', &c., also occurs.

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Peiraeus, and the whole discourse is supposed to be repeated by Socrates the day after it actually took place. To the Republic as to the Charmides, Lysis, Parmenides, and in a less degree to the Protagoras, Euthydemus, Symposium and Phaedo, Plato has given the form of a narrated dialogue. By this device he is enabled to combine description with dramatic effect.

The unfinished trilogy of the Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates professes to be a continuation of the Republic (cp. Tim. ad init.), but may have been added long afterwards (cp. the parallel relation of the Sophist and Statesman to the Theaetetus, which last would seem, from a comparison of the style, to have been written at an earlier time). The Republic contains no hint of the more comprehensive scheme. In the Timaeus Socrates is represented as having on the previous day set forth the principles of his ideal commonwealth to a select company, consisting of Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates, and a fourth person, whose name is not mentioned.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ] Socrates is the principal speaker, the chief interlocutors being Glaucon and Adeimantus, the sons of Ariston and Perictionē, and brothers of Plato, who, like a painter, introduces the names and portraits of his family in several of his
dialogues (himself and Adeimantus in the Apology; Charmides and Critias in the Charmides; Critias in the Timaeus and Critias; Adeimantus, Glacon, and Antiphon in the Parmenides). There are present also Thrasymachus, the sophist, who is 'charmed' into silence at the end of the First Book (cp. ii. 358 b), Cephalus and his eldest son Polemarchus, who soon vanish from the scene, Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, also sons of Cephalus, Niceratus the son of Nicias (cp. the Laches), Charmantides and Cleitophon. The last five, if we except a few words from Cleitophon (i. 340 A, B), are mute auditors. The circumstances of the opening scene are quickly lost sight of. Polemarchus once again appears, v. 449 B. Thrasymachus interposes once in v. 450, and is made the subject of a good-humoured remark in vi. 498 c.

Critics have discussed at length not only the date at which the Republic was written, which can only be approximately guessed at, but the date which the author intended to be represented in it. The year assumed by Boeckh for the imaginary scene is 411 or 410 B.C. Most of the characters in the Republic and also in the Timaeus and Critias agree with this date. Socrates himself was then about fifty-seven or fifty-eight years old, Lysias had just returned from Thurii to Athens in 411; the calamities of the year of the thirty had not yet fallen upon his house; Prodicus and possibly also Protagoras, both of whom are referred to as living persons in x. 600 c, may have been still alive (the date of Protagoras' death is quite uncertain: Prodicus is spoken of as a living person in the Apology). Hermocrates, if, as is probable, the Syracusan general of that name is intended in the Timaeus, may well have been at Athens at the time, after his banishment, and on his way to Pharnabazus. The minor discrepancy respecting the death of Cephalus, which is said by the pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. Or. iii. 3) to have occurred before the settlement of Lysias at Thurii (B.C. 443), is not worth noticing. Even if we accept this last statement on such authority,—and it is more or less contradicted by Lysias,—there is no reason to suppose that Plato would have cared about accuracy in such a minute detail. He is careless of such dramatic proprieties. His dialogues, like the plays of Shakespeare, are works of fiction, which have only a certain degree of historical truth. Many anachronisms occur in them, e.g. Ismenias the Theban, who did not become famous until some time after

1 De tempore quo Plato Rempublicam peroratam finxerit, dissertationes III: *Kleine Schriften*, iv. 437 sqq.
Socrates' death, is mentioned by him in the Republic (i. 336 A) among great potentates; in the Menexenus, Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles, continues her survey of Greek history down to the peace of Antalcidas, b.c. 387; in the Symposium (193 a), Aristophanes, at the banquet of Agathon, which is supposed to have taken place in 416 b.c., uses an illustration taken from the dismemberment of Arcadia, or rather of Mantinea, by the Lacedaemonians (b.c. 385). It is doubtful whether Parmenides and Socrates can ever have met, as they are said to have done in the Theaetetus (183 e), Sophist (217 c), and Parmenides (127 b); and certainly the meeting is not to be taken as historical on the authority of Plato. These examples are enough to show that Plato is not to be appealed to as an authority for the dates of his dramatis personae, any more than Shakespeare or Sir Walter Scott. It is not known at what date the worship of Bendis was introduced in Attica, though it appears to be referred to in an inscription found at Salamis (Foucart, Associations religieuses, p. 209), but for the reason just stated this point is likewise unimportant.

To defend uncertain, or try to reconcile inconsistent, statements in a work of imagination is out of place and alien to the true spirit of criticism.

Socrates and Glaucce are about to return from the Peiraeus after a festival, when they are detained by Polemarchus. He takes them home with him, and Socrates enters into conversation with Cephalus, the aged father of the household.

C. Age is in itself a time of peace. The sorrows of old men are to be attributed to their own faults and tempers.

S. The world will say that you are happy in old age because you are rich.

C. Neither a bad rich man can be happy in age, nor a good poor man.

S. What is the chief advantage of riches?

C. Not to have deceived any one in word or deed, and to have paid one's debts to gods and men.

S. But is justice simply to speak the truth and pay your debts, or are there exceptions to this rule?

C. Yes, there are.

'And yet,' interrupts Polemarchus, 'the definition which has been given has the authority of Simonides.'

Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices.
The old anecdote that the words with which the Republic opens were found after Plato’s death with various transpositions in his tablets—which is narrated by Diogenes Laertius (fl. 200? A. D.) on the authority of Euphorion (fl. circa 241 B. C.) and Panaetius (185?–110? B. C.)—Diog. Laert. iii. 25. 37 Ἐλθορίων δὲ καὶ Παναίτιος ἐφήκασι πολλάκις ἐστραμμένη εὑρήσασι τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς πολιτείας—and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (fl. circa 30 B. C.) de comp. verb. v. p. 209 (Reiske) τὴν δέλτον ἢν τελευτήσατο αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ Μάτωνος) λέγοντων εὑρεθήναι, ποικίλως μετακειμένη τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Πολιτείας ἵναν πείδα, κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιά μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀριστωνος.—may be true, but is more likely to have been invented.

Τήθει] Bendis, as is proved by the words of Thrasymachus, i. 354 ἱεῖται δή σοι, ἐλευθέρως ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδείοις. The prominent part which the Thracians take in the procession seems to show that she is a Thracian goddess: Proclus (Theol. 353) and others identify her with Artemis. Cp. Schol. in Rep. ἐκεῖ καὶ Βένδις παρ’ αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς Θρακίσι) ἢ Ἀρτέμις καλεῖται. It is not a little curious that the Platonic Socrates should care to be present at the inauguration of one of those ‘strange divinities’ who seem to have clustered about the Peiraeus in the fourth century, B. C. and even earlier (Foucart, op. cit. p. 57). See especially Laws x. 910 c.

καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπικωνίων] καὶ anticipates the mention of the Thracians, who are equal if not superior to the natives of Peiraeus. The second καὶ and α δε corresponding to μεν, which might have been expected, pass into οὐ μέντοι ἦττον... ην = οὐ χαί οὐ δε... καὶ ην.

θεωρήσαντες] ‘Having seen the spectator,’ corresponding to ὅμα τὴν ἱστημι θεωρήσας ἔθανασσας.

κατάδων οὖν πάρρωθεν ἡμᾶς ὅποιας ἁμημένους Πολεμάρχους ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν παῦδα παρμείναι καὶ κελεῦσαι.] ‘There-upon Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, catching sight of us from afar, after we had set out on our way home, bade (ἐκέλευσε) his servant run and bid us (κελεύσαι) wait for him.’

οὗτος, ὣπη, ὅπωσθεν προσέρχεται]. ‘There he is coming up behind.’ οὗτος is ‘deictic.’

ἀλλὰ περιμένει... ἀλλὰ περιμενόμεν] ‘But, pray you, wait.’ ‘But we intend to wait’: cp. infra 328 ἀλλὰ μέντε. This expositulatory use of ἀλλά implies resistance and opposition, which is to be overcome in the mind of another. The second ἀλλά deprecates the assumption implied in the first, that they do not intend to wait.
Notes: Book I.

As if from the procession, i.e. it was natural to suppose they had been there. From the direction in which they were coming, Socrates infers that they had been at the spectacle, but does not know it.

A similar playful threat occurs in the Philebus, 16 A βρ', ἡ δικαστής, ὥσ' ὅρει ἡμᾶς τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι νεὼν πάντες ἐσμὲν; καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήμου ἐυποιεῖσθαι; in the Phaedrus, 236 c ἐσμὲν δὲ μόνο μὲν ἐν ἐρμήι, λαυρῶτερος δὲ ἐγώ καὶ καλέσωρος: in the Charmides, 176 c ὡς βιασμοῦν, ἡφι, ἐπιαδήπερ δεὶ να ἐπιτάτηται. Cp. also Symposium 213 c, where Socrates claims the protection of Agathon against the apprehended violence of Alcibiades. Plato frequently repeats not only the same thought, but even small dramatic traits and terms of expression.

The genitive absolute is placed in a dependent relation to the main verb διανοεῖσθαι by the addition of ὡς: cp. vii. 523 c ὡς ἐγγίζειν... ὅρμενον λεγοτές μου διανοού: Xen. Cyr. viii. 4. 27. Goodwin, M. and T. 864, 918. The expression of the antecedent in οὕτω adds a peremptory emphasis like ‘even’ in Shakespeare. See Schmidt's Shakespeare Lexicon, s.v. ‘even,’ § 8. ‘You may even be assured we won’t listen.’

For the torch-race see the article ἀλματαδήμος in Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities. There is a difficulty in reconciling the form of the race described in Pausanias (Attica c. xxx. 2 ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ δὲ ἐστὶ Πρωμηθέας βιωμός καὶ θέουσιν ἄπι αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντες καιρότατα λαμπάδας τὸ δὲ ἀγώναμα ὁμοί τῷ δρόμῳ
Republic

I. 328 A

γιλάξει τὴν δῆδα ἐν τακμήν ἵστον ἀποσβεσθείσης δὲ, οὐδὲν ἦτο τῆς ἐπίσης τῷ πρῶτῳ, δευτέρῳ δὲ ἄν' αὐτοῦ μέντοισιν εἶ δὲ μὴδε τούτῳ καίστῳ, ὁ τρίτος ἵστον ὁ κρατῶν εἶ δὲ καὶ πάσιν ἀποσβεσθείσην, οὐδεὶς ἴστεν, διὸ καταλείπεται ἡ νίκη), which is between single competitors who run the whole course and where there is no passing on of the torch, with the favourite use of the image in such passages as Laws vi. 776 ἐν ἀνάστι καὶ ἐκφέροντας παιδᾶς, καθάπερ λαμπάδα τῶν βίων παραδίδοντας ἄλοις ἐξ ἄλλων: Lucretius ii. 79 'Et quasi cursores vitæ lampada tradunt': Persius vi. 61 'Cur me in decursu lampada poscis?' Compare also Aesch. Agam. 312, 313 λαμπαδηφόρων νόμοι, ἄλοι παρ' ἄλου διαδοχαῖς πληροῦμενοι, and the application of the image in Herod. viii. 98 to the Persian ἀγγαρον or royal post-runners. All these latter passages seem to imply a line of runners, each of whom carries the torch a certain distance and then hands it on to a successor. The form of the race which Plato has in mind in this passage was probably of this kind, the contest being between several competing lines running side by side.

διδασκούνων ἄλληλοις ἁμιλλάμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις: The relation between ἁμιλλάμενοι and διδασκούνων is not to be pressed: all that is necessarily implied is that the competitors were on horseback, and that they passed the torch from one to the other: not that the transmission took place while the riders were at full speed.

ἐξαναστησόμεθα γάρ ἢρ does not merely refer to ἔξων στάσασθαι, but introduces reasons for the mention of the παρευκήια, ['I mention the night-festival,] for we will rise after supper,' &c. The supper, torch-race and night-festival are entirely forgotten in the sequel.

B eis τοῦ Πολεμάρχου] Cephalus, the rich Syracusan, had settled in Attica at the invitation of Pericles (Lys., c. Eratosth. § 4, p. 120) about 440 B.C. He was joined there by his three sons, Polemarchus, Lysias and Euthydemus, who are mentioned here, and are spoken of by their aged father as young men (328 B). Polemarchus, however, is represented as head of the household, although Cephalus, whom Plato has probably kept alive for the purpose of the dialogue, still acts as the family priest. And Lysias, who was born in 458 B.C., would at the imaginary date of the dialogue (if that is B.C. 411) be forty-seven years old. In the Phaedrus (257 B) Socrates suggests that Lysias should cease to busy himself with the composition of paradoxical orations, and, like his brother Polemarchus, turn to philosophy. Polemarchus was put to death by the order of the Thirty Tyrants in 404 B.C. Of Euthydemus,
who must not be confounded with the Sophist of that name, nothing more is known.

καὶ δὴ καὶ[ ] calls particular attention to the stranger Thrasy-
machus, a sophist or rhetorician who came to Athens about the year 430 B.C.: facetiously described by Plato in the Phaedrus (267 c) as a sort of rhetorical Titan (τῷ τοῦ Ἡθηνοῦ θείου). 'He was a great master of the pathetic—would put people into a rage and out again.' 'No one better at inventing or answering calumnies.' In the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii. 23) the same character appears: 'Herodicus was wont to say of Thrasy machus that he was ever Thrasy machus (bold in battle), as Conon said of Thrasybulus that he was truly Thrasybulus (bold in council). He is spoken of with more respect by other writers (Cic. de Orat. iii. 32).'

Cleitophon may be inferred to be a disciple of Thrasy machus from the part which he takes in the skirmish with Polemarchus (infra, 340 A). In the Cleitophon Cleitophon charges Socrates with exhorting people to virtue, but with not telling them what it is; and for this reason he resorts to Thrasy machus and other sophists. The dialogue recalls in many passages the First Book of the Republic: it is probably spurious and may have been suggested by the passage just cited.

διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐκφάκα αὐτῶν] 'For indeed it was a long time since I had seen him.' Kai adds emphasis to the sentence and refers to μᾶλα προσβάντης μοι ἰδοὺν κ.κ.κ. (not 'It was long since I had actually seen him'). The connexion of the sentences is: 'He appeared to me very aged. And no wonder, for . . .'

οὐ δὲ θαμίζεις] Compare II. xviii. 385:

τίττε, Θείες τακυπέλε, ἱκάνες ἡμέτερον δῶ
αιδώι τε φίλη τε; πάρος γε μέν ὁ τι θαμίζεις.

1 Phaedrus 267 c, δ' τῶν γε μὴν οἰνοτροχόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ περιάλληλων λόγων ἐκφατηριῶν τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τό τοῦ Χαλκηδόνου θείου' ὧργισά τ' αὖ πολλά πολλά δὲν δειχι βήγιον, καὶ πάλιν ἅρμαζοντος ἠφίσον κηλεύει ὅτε ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβάλλεις οὕτως κρατιστός. ib. 269 D δ' δον δ' αὐτοῦ (sc. Ῥητορικῆς) τέχνη, ὃς ἂς Λυσία τε καὶ θρασύμαχος πορεύεται, δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι η λέξιδος.

2 Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, 29 καὶ ἓνων θρασύμαχον θρασύμαχον ἐκάλει, καὶ Ἰττέκος θρασύμαχον "αἱ θρασύμαχοι ἃ ἢν!"

3 'Quid de Prodicco Chio, quid de Thrasy macho Chalcedonio, de Protagora Abderita loquar? quorum unusquisque plurimum temporibus illis, etiam de natura rerum, et disseruit et scripsit.'
The latter words have suggested the emendation όδι in this passage. But this is unnecessary, and less expressive. The δὲ in οὐ δὲ may be explained as adversative to the idea contained in ἡπιάτερο: i.e. 'You are welcome, Socrates, but you do not come often enough."

χρὴν μᾶλλον] The imperfect here, as in ἡ, ἠδει, γὰμεν immediately following, is quite general, but there is a shade of difference between it and χρῆ infra. χρῆν, 'you ought to do what you have not been doing': χρῆ simply, 'you ought to do what you can do.'

οὖδέν δὲν σε ἠδεὶ] Goodwin, M. and T. 423, points out that in such cases 'the leading verb takes ἄν when the chief force falls on the necessity, propriety, or possibility of the act rather than on the act itself.'—'There would be no need (as there now is) of your coming hither.'

D ἣμας] The familiar use of the plural for the singular.

νῦν δὲ σε χρῆ πυκνότερον δεύρο ἱδὼν] 'But as things are (i.e. seeing that I am an old man) you should come here oftener.' In the Laches (181 c) the old man Lysimachus addresses Socrates in a similar strain: χρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον γε φαινόντων αὐτῶν παρ' ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκεῖοις ἤγεισθαι, διότι τὸ δίκαιον. νῦν οὖν ἄρα τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐπειδή ἀνεγνωρίσαμεν ἄλλης, μὴ ἄλλοις ποτει, ἄλλα σύνοδθι τε καὶ γνώριζε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τούθεν τοὺς νεανίας, δοὺς δὲ διασώζῃ καὶ ἐμέ τὴν ἡμετέραν φιλίαν, κ.τ.λ., in which as in the speech of Cephalus there is an imitation of the garrulity of old age.

tοῦδ' ἐς τοὺς νεανίας] Cephalus thus speaks of his sons, although they are men of middle age. Some early interpreters and Boeckh make τοῦδ' ἐς τοὺς νεανίας refer only to Glaucon and Adeimantus, the Athenian youths, and Serranus renders 'et hos adolescentes tecum adducas velim.' This notion, which was probably strengthened by the v. r. νεάνισκοις, is really inadmissible.

καὶ μὴν . . . χείρω γε] 'Believe me, Cephalus, that I have a real pleasure in talking to very old men:' γε is omitted in Α and other MSS.

καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἀν πυθομήν] καὶ δὴ καὶ, as often, introduces a special instance: 'I take a pleasure in conversing with all old men . . . and of you in particular I should like to ask.'

tοῦτο . . . ἐξαγγέλλω] The vague phrase δ' τί σου φαίνειν τοῦτο is made clearer by the explanatory clause πυθομέν . . . ἐξαγ-


Notes: Book I.

γέλλεις. τοῦτο refers to ὀδὼν ... ποία τις ἐστίν, κ.τ.λ., ‘the nature of the path of life in old age;’ but the meaning is defined by the addition of ἐπεδή ... ποιηται, which gives the reason for asking Cephalus to give his own experience in the matter. τοῦ βίου is a partitive genitive depending on χαλεπῶν, ‘a harsh part of life.’ χαλεπῶν sc. ἐστι: this is preferable to making it an accusative governed by ἠζηγγέλλεις, which might seem natural but for φαίνεται preceding. As in Iliad xxiv. 486:

μὴν οὖν παράσ χεῖν, θεοίς ἐπεικελ’ Ἀχιλλῆι,
τηλίκου δεσπερ ἐγὼν ὀλοφ ἐπὶ γῆρας οδέφι.

and Odyssey xv. 246:

οδό οτε γῆρας οδόν,

life is compared to a house, of which Cephalus is standing on the threshold—i.e. old age—preparatory to leaving it: (or old age or even death may be a house which he is entering). The meaning of the metaphor has been generalized by familiar use. It occurs also in Herodotus iii. 14, 12 ἐς πτωχήν ἀπίστατι ἐπὶ γηρας οδέφι.

διασφαλίστε τὴν παλαιὰν παρομίαν] ‘Keeping up the old adage,’—ἡλικ ἠλικα τέρπει.

ξυνόντες] is the resumption of συναρχόμεθα. The present in both cases has a generalized meaning, not ‘are coming’ but ‘come together.’ Cp. vi. 493 ζ ὤν τι τούτων δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὅ τιν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ξυνόντων ὁργῆν καὶ ἡδονῆς κατακεφαλὴν σοφίαν ἡγούμενον; ξυνόντες, the correction of Ast and Buttmann, is unnecessary.

ἀναμμηνησίμενοι] ‘calling to mind,’ ‘reminding one another.’ The word more commonly governs the genitive: περὶ here gives indefiniteness.

καὶ ἅλλῳ ἀπῷ τῶν τοιούτων ἤχεται] ‘and other things connected therewith.’ For this idiomatic use of ἤχεται cp. Theaet. 145 ζ δες παιδείας ἤχεται.

τότε μὲν εἰς ξύντες] The participle is in the imperfect tense.

ἐπὶ τοὔτω δὴ τὸ γῆρας ἀμοίβαισι δέων κακῶν σφίασιν αἰτίων] ‘and from this they take occasion’ (τούτω referring to προσθηλακίσεις τοῦ γηρῶς) ‘to bewail old age as bringing upon them innumerable evils.’ ἡμικ is used in a depreciatory sense, as viii. 549 ὁ οὖν φιλόσωφος αὖ γνώρει περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡμεῖν.
is resumptive of τούτο: 'if old age were the
case, as an old man I am sure that I should have felt the same.'
Cp. 337 δ ἄλλα ἐνεκα ἄργυριον λέγε ('if money is the question').

καὶ ἄλλους, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλῆι] The first καὶ prepares the
way for the particular example of Sophocles.

ἐπὶ οὖς τε εἰ... συγγίγνεσθαι] Hirschig, approved by Cobet,
would delete these words. But they are required by the cry of
shame, ἐφήμες, which follows.

ἀποφυγῶν] This passage is imitated by Cicero, De Senectute
c. 14 'Quum ex eo quidam iam affecto aetate quaeret, utereturne
rebuss Venereis, 'Dii meliora, (inquit,) liberter vero (μέστως) istinc
tanquam a domino agresti ac furioso profugi.' ' Cp. the description
of Sophocles in Aristophanes, Ran. 82 ὃ ὃ ἕκκολος μὲν ἐνδῆδ',
ἔκκολος ὃ ἕκει, which expresses the same character.

παντάπασι γὰρ... επειδὰν αἱ εἰσθήματα κατατέκνουσαι
καὶ χαλάσωσι... ἀνήλλαχθαι] It is best to omit γὰρ after επειδὰν with
Par. A: the clause επειδὰν αἱ εἰσθήματα... χαλάσωσι being taken as
an explanation of ἐν τῷ γῆρῳ. This involves an asyndeton of παντάπασι,
which introduces an emphatic resumption of the first clause of the
sentence παντάπασι... ἑλιθερία. The asyndeton at διεποτῶν κ.τ.λ.
is the common asyndeton which is allowed in an explanatory
statement. We note the absolute use of κατατείκνουσαι and χαλάσωσι:
the word κατατείκνουσαι has the same general sense with συντείνω,
συντόνως, and other compounds of τέκνα.

ἐστι] 'it is the case.' Arist. Ath. Pol. ch. 55 (Kenyon : Col.
28) ἔστι δὲ φησίςεσθαι, 'and the case is one of voting.'

τῷ τοιοῦτῳ] SC. τῷ μὴ κοσμίᾳ καὶ εὐκόλῳ, κ.τ.λ.

εὐμβαίνει] These words are also imitated by Cicero, De
Senect. cc. 2, 3, and the story of Themistocles and the Seriphan
is repeated. Cicero, like Virgil (who πάντως ἄνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο
ἐλεπτοῦντων), freely appropriates the turns of expression, as well as
the subject matter, of his Greek master. But while the Latin
poem is moulded by Virgil into a true work of Roman genius, the
Latin dialogue is an inartistic imitation of the Greek model, being
neither Greek in character nor Roman: a monologue rather than a
dialogue, in which the grace of conversation, as well as much of the
subtlety of philosophical thought, is lost.

ἐκίνων] 'tried to draw him out.' Cp. Lysis 223 λ ἐν τῷ
Notes: Book I.

εἶχον ἄλλον ὡδὴ τινὰ τῶν προσβυτήρων κυνίων: Χεν. Mem. iv. 2. 2 Republic

ὁ δικαιράτης βουλήματος κυνίων τῶν Εἰθίδημον.

tο̂ το̂ Θεμιστοκλέους] For a different version of the story, in which Timodemus of Belbina in the Saronic gulf (now the Island of St. George) called also the Aphidnean, takes the place of the Seriphian, see Herod. viii. 125.

ε̣δ' άμα] 'is in point.' The abruptness of the expression is softened by the repetition of it with ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος (330 λ), in the corresponding clause, where also the words τοῖς πλούσιοις are parallel with το̂ Σερφίφω in the preceding part of the sentence.

ἐν κύκτωρα] Socrates returns to the fact on which the conversation turns, supra 329 εδ' ἀδ' τῷ πολλῷ οὖσιν κατηγορεῖ.

το̂ι̣' ἐπεκτεινόμενην] 'Acquired, do you say?' This use of ποίος is not necessarily derisive or ironical, as in Gorg. 490 c ποίος ἐπιστήτω; but only implies a humorous feeling of contrast between the suggestion and the fact. Cephalus may be supposed to speak with a gentle smile, remembering that his additions had been but small to the diminished fortune which he had received. Cp. infra ἔγον ὑπ' ἀγαπῶ, κ.τ.λ.

τουτούς[] 'to my sons here'—an emendation of Bekker for τοῦτοισιν, the reading of the MSS. The 'Ionic' dative plural form in σι(ν) is rare in the Republic and occurs mostly in passages which have a poetical tinge, i. 345 ε, iii. 388 δ, 389 β, viii. 560 ε, 564 c.

διπλῆ ὡς ὁ άλλος διστάζοντας αὐτά] The dative or adverbial termination in διπλῆ probably here expresses the manner and not the measure of excess: 'in a two-fold way' as compared with, rather than 'double as much as.' It is taken up in ταύτη and in κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, ἕπερ ὁ άλλος. The MS. emendation καὶ ἐν κατὰ τὴν χρείαν is clearly erroneous and makes havoc of the sense. With διπλῆ ἂ cp. vii. 539 δ ἐν διπλάσια ἡ τότε.

χαλεποὶ . . . ξυγγεγεύθαι] For the construction cp. Phaedr. 275 β χαλεποὶ ξυγγείναι.

καταγελάμενοι] The participle is imperfect = ὁι καταγελάμενοι.

καὶ αὕτης . . . ἡμιεγερεῖν] The sentence becomes anacoluthic at καθορὲ, which would naturally have been καθορῶν: cp. vi. 495 δ ὁ δή ἐφείσατο πολλὶ, κ.τ.λ. where a main verb similarly takes the place of a participle. The resumptive δ' ὡς, 'however this may be,' makes the irregularity less striking. Cp. Tim. 28 δ ὁ δή πάς ὡς καθόμενος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο δ' τοῖς δύος ὄντα ὄντα περὶ αὐτοῦ πρώτων.
Republic

I.

331 A  ἰδιᾷ . . . γνωριμίας] 'but if a man is conscious of no injustice, hope is ever present to cheer him (ἡδεία), and to be his kindly nurse in age.' The order of the words is not ἠπίς ἡδεία καὶ ἡγοθῆ, but ἡδεία πάρεστι καὶ πάρεστιν ἡγοθῆ γνωριμίας.

B  ἀλλὰ γε ἐν ἀνθ' ἄνδρος ὀνὰ διάχωστον . . . εἶναι]. ἐν ἀνθ' ἄνδρος, an adverbial idiom, like ἐν πρὸς ἐν Laws i. 647 β. The emphasis is on ὀνὰ διάχωστον. 'But, comparing one thing with another, I should not reckon wealth as least useful for this object.' In ὀνὰ διάχωστον . . . χρησμότατον there seems to be a confusion of two constructions: ὀνὰ ἵκατα χρήσιμοι and χρησμότατον. Stobaeus gives ἀλλ' ἐν γε.

C  τοῖοτο δ' αὐτὸ . . . λάθε] 'but as to this very thing, justice I mean, shall we say thus simply (as you imply), that it is truthfulness, and the restoration of what a man receives from another?' τοῖοτο δ' αὐτὸ refers to εἰς τούτο, which itself goes back to τὸ γὰρ μμισθίαν διήνυσα . . . ἑπτάειν δεδομένα. The train of thought is as follows: 'You imply that a man may depart from life with a clear conscience if he has only told the truth and paid his debts, and that justice consists in this. But is it simply this—no more and no less? Are there not circumstances—e.g. if the man to whom we are speaking or to whom we are in debt is mad, in which to tell a lie or refuse to return a loan would be right; to speak the truth and return the loan wrong?'

For the indirect and natural way in which the subject of the dialogue is introduced, compare the Charmides; and for the familiar Socratic manner of commencing the argument with an external and superficial definition which is afterwards set aside or deepened by criticism and the consideration of instances, see the opening passages of the Charmides, Laches, Meno, Theaetetus.

Casuistry has a place in ancient as well as in modern thought, in Greek philosophy as well as in the theology of the Schoolmen and the Jesuits. It is not essentially the product of civilization or the consequence of deep pondering over moral problems. Amongst barbarous nations we already noticed a tendency to casuistical distinctions: the letter, not the spirit of a contract, is observed by them; if the word of promise can be kept to the ear, the real or natural meaning of it is of no account (Thucyd. iii. 34). Early morality is legal and external, easily giving opportunity for such evasions; it is a morality of compulsion, not of willing obedience: the attitude of the savage towards a duty or obligation is to avoid fulfilling it so far as he can. In civilized
societies too a strong tendency to casuistry sets in when there is an
abrupt transition from the old to the new, when the younger genera-
tion becomes dissatisfied with it and dares to criticize traditional
morality and belief. It is this tendency which asserts itself in the
transitional stage of Greek philosophy. Serious doubts arise when
it is discovered that the old rule, which formerly claimed un-
questioning obedience on all occasions, is found in the eye of
reason and an enlightened conscience to admit of an exception.
The course of such a revolution is well represented in the
criticism and development of Cephalus' definition: but Plato
artistically avoids the indignities which often arose out of such
conflicts of the old and new by first requiring the retirement of
Cephalus.

That simple rules, 'Thou shalt not lie,' 'Thou shalt not steal,'
are modified by circumstances, was apparent enough to the
contemporaries of Socrates. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics,
is fond of turning aside into these by-paths of morals, which
seem however to have rather an intellectual than a practical
interest for him. Casuistical inquiry was carried still further
in later writers, for example, in Panaeus, from whom Cicero
partly borrowed his treatise 'De Officiis'; and the tendency
was strengthened in later times by the parallel growth of law cases.
Ancient casuistry is fresher than modern, and nearer to the first
thoughts of mankind about right and wrong, growing up not
so much out of the conflict of established principles, as in the
effort to establish, widen, or purify them,—becoming in the hands
of Socrates and Plato a sort of dialectic which undermines the
maxims and aphorisms of the older times and prepares the way
for higher and more universal conceptions of morality.

άθλησ (οὔτως] (1) 'thus absolutely': 'οὔτως, i.e. 'as your words
imply'; άθλησ, 'absolutely,' i.e. making no allowance for circum-
stances. Cp. Laws i. 633 δ τὴν ἀθραίαν δέ, φάρε, τι θώμεν; πότερον
αθλήσ οὔτως (as implied in what precedes) εἶναι πρὸς φόβους καὶ
λύπας διαμάχην μόνον, ἢ καὶ πρὸς πόθους τε καὶ ἴδονας καὶ τιμὴς δεινᾶς
θυσίας κολακίας; infra iii. 386 β λαδορέως αθλήσ οὔτως τὰ ἐν Ὀμιου,
referring to the opinion of the terrors of the other world which
has been just alluded to. Or, (a) 'just absolutely,' οὔτως being
used idiomatically as in ῥεῖνος οὔτω (ii. 377 β, 378 Α) without any
special reference.

δ ἀποδιδοῖσε] 'The restorer in the case mentioned'; hence the
article, which is omitted with ἐθίλων in what follows (οὐδ' αὖ...
Plato: Republic.

331 C λέγειν), 'any more than if he were willing to tell the whole truth to a person in this condition.' The subject of ὁποδεῖες and ἔδεικνυ is one and the same person: 'neither the restorer... nor the same person if he wished.'

331 D δροε ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης] 'The definition or determining principle of justice:' δροε is here used as in Aristotle but in a less technical sense. Like other Aristotelian terms in Plato it retains several other meanings. The logical sense of 'term' or 'proposition' which appears occasionally in Aristotle is as yet unknown.

331 A πάνυ μὲν οὖν [ 'Nay, but it is.' Μὲν οὖν is a corrective of the preceding sentence.

καὶ μᾶριοι... καὶ] like καὶ δὴ καὶ implies a sort of meditative transition, μᾶριο calling attention to a new feature in the case. 'Well, said Cephalus (since you take up the argument), I hand it over to you.' The intervention of Polemarchus appears to Cephalus a fit opportunity for retiring: so he takes advantage of it to bequeath the argument to him. The second καὶ indicates that as Polemarchus has put in a word, the natural consequence of the interruption is that Cephalus should resign the argument.

331 D-Polemarchus, who 'inherits' the argument, is now called upon to defend the thesis of Simonides.

S. What does the divine poet mean by 'debt' in his definition of justice? Not simply that which has been lent; e.g. to the madman?

P. Certainly not; for if the madman were our friend, we should be doing him harm; whereas Simonides thinks that harm should be done to enemies, as is fitting (προοίμενοι), not to friends.

S. So Simonides meant by 'debt' 'what is fitting' (τὸ προοίμιος). And Justice is the art of benefiting friends and harming enemies. But when does it benefit us, as piloting benefits us when we are at sea?

P. When we make war.
S. Then Justice is of no use in time of peace?
P. In partnerships.
S. Partnerships in what?
P. In money transactions.
S. Not in buying and selling: in buying or selling a horse a horse-dealer will be a better partner than a just man.
P. No, but in keeping money safe.
Notes: Book I.

S. That is, while it is not put to any use? Justice, then, is only useful when the money is useless. But he who is strong in guarding is strong in attacking, as we see in medicine and in war, and so the just man, who is a good guardian of money, must also be an accomplished thief,—but always for the benefit of friends and harm of enemies.

Polemarchus, in desperation, repeats his definition—Justice benefits friends and harms enemies. Socrates proceeds to ask: Who are our friends? those who seem good to us, or those who are good?

P. Those whom we think good.

S. Then, if they seem and are not, the just will do good to bad men, and harm the good, who to him seem bad.

Polemarchus cries out against this conclusion and in order to avoid it, proposes to emend the definition. 'A friend must not only seem, but also be a good man.'

S. Then justice now means doing good to our friends who are good and harm to our enemies who are bad. But stay! Will the just do harm to any man? When harm is done to any creature, that creature loses something of his proper virtue. If harm therefore is done to any man, he loses something of justice. Our theory would make the just man the author of injustice, which is contrary to reason. That cannot have been the meaning of the wise Simonides, but must have been suggested by Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or some other rich and seeming-powerful man. (Cp. Gorg. 466.)

The first book of the Republic is a preface to the rest; Socrates pulls out the stuff which is hereafter to be spun and woven. The analogy of the arts is introduced, but fails to give any clear conception of the virtues.

δ Πολιμαρχος τῶν γε σών κληρονόμος;] 'Is not Polemarchus your heir?' That is, 'since the argument is yours' (γε adding emphasis to σών), 'does not Polemarchus inherit it?'

The character of Cephalus is distinguished by gentleness and goodness. There may also be traced in him the mannerism and garrulity of age: the love of anecdote and quotation, the matured experience of 'the evening of life.' Cicero (Ep. ad Att. iv. 16), who acknowledges himself to be what he truly is, an imitator of Plato in very minute particulars, remarks as follows on the retirement of Cephalus: 'Quum in iis libris quos laudavi
desideras personam Scaevolae, non eum temere demovi, sed feci
idem quod in ἡλιόσει Deus ille noster Plato. Quum in Piraeum
Socrates venisset ad Cephalum locupletem et festivum senem,
quoad primus ille sermo habetur, adest in disputando senex;
deinde quum ipse quoque commodissime locutus esset, ad rem
divinam dicit se velle discernere, neque postea revertitur. Credo
Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in
tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset. So in the Laches (189 b, c)
the old man Lysimachus apologizes for the shortness of his memory:
he 'cannot recollect the questions he would ask, or the answers to
them.' Accordingly he subsides into a listener, who, though
unable to take a part in the argument, is ready to act on the
conclusions obtained. It may be noted also that the simpler con-
ception of life and duty, the poetical and proverbial expression of it
is better suited to the aged than to those who were deeply versed
in the Sophistical and dialectical method of a later generation.

Sophistic cynicism, superficiality, and vehemence of assertion
prove to be no match for the dialectic of Socrates. Many questions
are raised, 'of which we have a taste only and not a full meal,'—
among them the question whether the just or unjust man is the
happier, which in the sequel (iv. 445 λ) 'becomes ridiculous.' The
second book proceeds to ask in a more earnest strain, 'What is
justice stripped of its externals?' Socrates then considers justice in
the State, to help him to find justice in the individual. The justice
thus found exists somewhere in the relations of society (ii. 372 λ).

λέγε δὴ, . . . ἐγώ δὲ ἄγνω] Observe the pretended awe for the
authority of Simonides; the 'accustomed irony of Socrates' in
professing his own ignorance, and assuming the knowledge of his
companion. Simonides' definition, however, is not set aside,
though certain explanations of it are, cp. esp. 335 ε.

ἀλλὰ μὲντοι, . . . τοῦτο μὲντοι] 'Allá opposes the words which
follow to, μὲντοι regards them as a limitation of, Socrates' rejection
of Cephalus' definition. The second μὲντοι limits the limitation intro-
duced by the first. 'But (as opposed to what I have said) I said, it is
true that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides—for he was a wise and
inspired man: still what he means by this . . . I fail to see.' It is
true that the criticism of Cephalus' definition must be modified, if that
definition has the authority of Simonides: but before we can appeal
to his authority we must first understand his meaning. For τοῦτο δὲ τι
λέγει, 'what he means by this,' cp. Symp. 178 δ λέγω δὲ δὴ τι τοῦτο ;
Notes: Book I.

σοφός] With a light touch of irony, as in Theaet. 151 β πολλοὺς μὲν δῆ εἰσίνα. Προδίκη, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλους σοφοῖς τε και θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι.

μη σωφρόνοις] i.e., 'when not in his right mind.' The adverb refers to the condition of the agent, not to the mode of action. It is probably used to avoid the awkward conjunction of two participles: μὴ σωφρόνοις ἀπατοῦντι.

ἀπατοῦν] i.e. 'at a time when you might suppose him to demand it.' Cp. Goodwin, M. and T. 555. He explains the optative as due to the fact that ἀποδεξάω = δεῖοι ἂν ἀποδεξάω (resuming the previously expressed condition εἰ μανίς ἀπατοῦ). Cp. also ib. 521, for the forms of indefinite sentences.

η τὸ τοιοῦτον] 'Than this sort of thing'—i.e. than the making restoration to a man who is out of his mind.

ἄλλο μέντοι . . . κακὸν δὲ μηδὲν] 'Something different, certainly, said he; for he thinks that the debt which friends owe to friends is a benefit, and no injury whatever.' Μέντοι as elsewhere in answers is used in confirmation of a previous suggestion: cp. v. 469 ὡς Ἐατίον ἄρα τὰς νεκρούλειας . . . ; Ἐατίον μέντοι, ἢδη, νῦν Δία. Phaedo 73 δ ἄλλα ποιοῦν μωρία τουαῦτα ἂν ἐλεί. Μωρία μέντοι νῦν Δία.

μανθάνων, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ] A similar argument occurs in the Memorabilia of Xenophon (iv. 2. 16, 17) where Socrates says that deception may be just towards enemies, and in some cases even towards friends; e.g., a general may fairly deceive dispirited troops by falsely telling them of the approach of allies; or, again, you may steal a sword from a melancholy friend who is about to destroy himself.

ἐλπὶπερ] Emphatic; 'that is to say, if.' The defining per limits the assumption to the case in point. Cp. Theaet. 166 c ἐλπὶπερ ἄνωθεν ὁ κόσμος γίγνεται.

ἠρίστη ἄρα . . . ὑφελίσματοι] Compare similar expressions in Charm. 162 ἢ ἠρίστη ἄρα, ὡς ἠκουεν, ὅπερ ἄρτε ἐγώ ἔλεγον, ὧ λέγον τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων σωφροσύνην οἴναι: and Theaet. 152 c τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἢ ἠρίστη τῷ πολλῷ συρφεῖται.

ἀνάμασεν, 'he called,' is slightly opposed to διευκοίτο, 'he meant.'

ἀλλὰ τί οἶει; . . . Σκωρίνθη] This is the reading which gives the best sense and which is found in nearly every MS. Like τί δή, τί μὴ in some of their uses, τί οἶει; = τί οἶει ἄλλο; 'But what else do you suppose him to have done?' Cp. Gorg. 480 b τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν; sc. ἄλλο. There is a touch of humour in making Polemar- chus agree so heartily in the views suggested by Socrates, as if they had always been familiar to him. The same confidence is shown vol. iii.
in his previous answers, into which he is led by the arguments of Socrates. The Zurich edition of 1881, adopting Madvig’s punctuation, reads έφη with a capital letter, making ἄλλα τί ὄνει; a part of the previous sentence. But the use of έφη in the sense of ξυνέφη is doubtful; and the use of ἄλλα in continuing the previous sentence is very abrupt.

Another expedient is to cancel έφη and the stops, and place a dash after καλείται: ἄλλα τί ὄνει, ὅ πρὸς Δίος, ἦν ὅ ἔγω (ὦν ὅ ἔγω being repeated, cp. infra 348 D έφη . . . ὅ ὅ Λ). This receives some support from τί δὲ ὄνει below, but no change is really necessary.

ὅ πρὸς Δίος] Socrates now fairly warms to the argument; he exults in the train of thought which occurs to him; he begins enthusiastically with a frequently recurring formula (v. 459 A, Lysis 214 E, &c.—‘By Heaven, I said’—to construct the Sorites which follows.—‘To invite Socrates to an argument is like inviting horsemen to a plain’ (Theat. 183 D).

καὶ οὖν δὴ τίσι τί, κ.τ.λ.] ‘And what then will that be which the art called Justice gives, and to whom?’

εἰ μὲν . . . εἰρημένοις] δὲ, sc. (1) ἡμᾶς, ‘If we are to be consistent with what we said before’: or (2) τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ‘If this case is to go along with the rest.’

καὶ δὲ δίκαιος ;] sc. δικαστὸς ἐστὶν ποιεῖν, gathered from δικαστῶσας . . . εἰ ποιεῖν above. An elliptical form of expression, in which we must supply some word to be gathered from the context: cp. infra 341 C τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; κ.τ.λ., and Gorgias 502 A τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; κ.τ.λ.

ἐν τῷ προστολεμέον] ‘In going to war with others.’ Thucyd. viii. 96. 5 ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ λακεδαιμόνιος ἄθροισι πάντων δὴ ἔμμορφος προστολεμέον ἐγένετο. The repetition of ἐν τῷ with ἔμμορχεῖν, though not necessary to the sense, is retained as having the greater MS. authority.

χρήσιμον ἄρα] ἄρα, ‘Then I am to understand.’ Socrates carries on the argument a little further by extracting the answer from the respondent in a more general or abstract form. An explanation or new mode of statement, especially in dialogue, often takes the form of an inference.

τί δὲ δὴ ;] marks the resumption of the main subject.

εὐμβολία . . . κοινωνίατα] ‘By contracts do you mean partnerships?’ The more general word is substituted for the sake of extending the analogy.
Notes: Book I.

πεττών] πεττοί are 'draughts,' which were played in various ways. According to one mode of playing the game, you blocked up your antagonist so that he was unable to move. This process of 'shutting up' is used as an illustration of Socrates' method of arguing in vi. 487 B, c δόσερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύων δεινών οἱ μὴ τελευτώντες ὑποκλείονται, κ.τ.λ.

ἀλλ' εἰς πλύουσι] The new illustration is suggested by the word βίοις.

δόσερ ὁ κιθαριστικός τοῦ δικαίου] Plato in his lively manner passes unexpectedly from one illustration to another.

εἰς κρουμάτων] sc. κοινωνίας: 'as a partner in playing the harp.'

διὰν . . . σῶν εἶναι] 'When you want to deposit it and have it kept safely': σῶν εἶναι sc. τὸ ἀργύριον: the subject is changed, as below—διὰν μηδὲν δὴ αὐτῷ χρησάμεν ἀλλὰ κίεσθαι (sc. αὐτό).

καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ is a transition from the word κοινωνία: 'whether the guardians of it are partners or not.'

Socrates' 'incessant talk of cobblers, physicians, curriers, and cooks' (Gorg. 491 λ) has left an impress on many passages in Plato. Both his political and his moral ideal are influenced by the analogy of the arts. But he repeatedly shows his sense of the inadequacy of the comparison of the 'art of living' to any particular art. And in the Statesman, 297 ε, where the examples of the pilot, the physician, and the weaver are once more elaborately employed, he dwells expressly on the imperfect and provisional nature of the argument from example: ibid. 277 c.

οὐκ ἐν ὅν] Par. A reads οὐκ ὅν omitting ὅν, but οὐκ ἐν ὅν was clearly written in the margin, until a wormhole interfered with the ρ of ὅν. The 'ʔ' in the critical note may therefore be cancelled.

ἐῖτε πυκτικῇ is added to vary the notion of μάχη from ἕπικτικῇ above, which has suggested the new topic; and also to introduce φυλάξασθαι, 'to parry a blow.'

καὶ λαθεῖν . . . ἐμποιήσας;] The Zurich edition (1887) reads ἐμποιήσας, the conjecture of Schneider; but the emphasis falls on the wrong word, for the principal point is not that he who can guard against disease can be secret in producing it, but that he can produce it at all: that he does it secretly is merely a way in which Plato prepares for ἀλέφαι and φῶρ δεινός in the following lines. It is better to retain the reading of the MSS., placing the comma after φυλάξασθαι, although the construction λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσας

Republic

I.

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Plato: Republic.

Republican

I.

κλέψαι "To steal an enemy’s plans and proceedings." Κλέψαι = 'by stealth' (1) 'to get possession of,' or (2) 'to obtain advantage over.'

ως γοῦν...σημαινει "That is certainly what the argument implies.' The qualification with γοῦν indicates Polemarchus’ reluctance to admit the conclusion, although he cannot rebut the argument.

ἀναπέφανται] expressing an unexpected result, as infra, 350 c: Sophist. 233 c δοξαστικὴν ἄρα...ὁ σοφιστὴς...ἐχων ἀναπέφανται.

κατὰ σὲ...Συμωνίδην] Compare Theaet. 160 n, where there is a similar ironical use of the poets: κατὰ μὲν ὸμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τουονον φύλον...κατὰ δὲ Θεαῖην. For the humour
of attributing to the respondent what Socrates has drawn out of him, compare also Gorg. 470 Β, 503 c; Theaet. 163 Α; Euthyd. 290 ε.

ἐν' ἀφελίᾳ . . . ἐξηρῶν] 'For the good, however, of friends, and the harm of enemies.' There is a humorous pretence of fairness in adding this limitation, which is also the link of connexion with what follows.

οδέττι . . . ἄλεγον] Cp. the passage in Meno 80 Α, B, in which the influence of Socrates on his adversary is compared to that of the torpedo (παρηγ τῷ θαλάσσῃ): ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἐγώ γε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σώμα παρῆκαί: and Euthyphro 15 β, where Socrates himself is compared to Daedalus, as he makes the arguments of his adversary 'walk away': Alcibiades I. 127 δ, which has perhaps been imitated from this passage: ἀλλὰ μᾶ τοὺς θεούς, οὐκ' ἕκαστρα, οὐδ' αὐτός οὖν δ' τί λέγω, κ.τ.λ.

ἀφελεῖν . . . ἢ δικαιοσύνη] Sc. δοκεῖ supplied from the previous words. Cp. vii. 517 β τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινομένα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῇ γνωστῇ τελευταίᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱδέα καὶ μάγεις ὁράσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἐξηρῶν ὁσαύτως] Sc. τοὺς δοκούντας εἰσαὶ ποιητοῖς, ἢ τοὺς δοκεῖς, καὶ μὴ δοκόως.

τούτως . . . φιλοι] 'These then have the good for their enemies and the bad for their friends.' τούτως, [sc. τοῖς περὶ τούτα ἀμαρτάνουσιν.

ἀλλ' δμὼς δίκαιος] δμως—i. e. notwithstanding their mistake, the principle which has been laid down is to be applied, and the result in this case is that the evil are to be benefited and the good harmed.

μηδαμῶς] Polemarchus, moved not by shame, like Gorgias or Polus (Gorg. 482 c, &c.), or Thrasymachus (infra 352 δ), but by honest indignation, entreat Socrates to alter the course of the argument. 'Do not let us have that conclusion, Socrates.' Cp. infra 335 λ κελεύεις, κ.τ.λ. For the ellipse of οὕτω δήμων, or some similar expression, cp. Gorg. 497 β μηδαμῶς, καὶ καλλίεσσε: Euthyd. 294 c.

δοι διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] 'That is to say, those of mankind who are in error.' These words are added to explain πολλοῖς, and refer to δρ' οὗξ ἀμαρτάνουσιν (supra, c). For the compound verb (δια = diverging from the aim) cp. Theaet. 178 λ ἢ οὖν καὶ τυχανάς δεῖ, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἑκάστη;

ποιμοί γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εἰσιν] 'For they have bad ones.'

τὸν δοκούντα τέ . . . καὶ τὸν δίνα] The article, though repeated
for the sake of emphasis both with δύναται and δοκοῦντα, refers to the same person. It may be expressed: 'He is our friend, who not only seems, but who also is a good man.'

κελεύεις ... ἔλεγομεν] 'You would have us add to our idea of justice more than we included in our first statement.' The particle ἢ depends on the notion of a difference or comparison which is contained in προσβείναι. Cp. Phaedr. 228 D οἶς ἠφεὶ διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρῶτος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μή: Gorg. 481 c ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν Ἰδιῶν τι ἐπισκεφτεῖ τάθει ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι. In what follows the words νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ λέγειν are in apposition with προσβείναι and explanatory,—hence the adyron. λέγειν is governed by κελεύεις. By the terms of the argument the words ἀγαθῶν δυνα, κακῶν δυνα are added, not in limitation, but in definition of φίλων and ἔχθρων: 'our friend who is good,' 'our enemy, who is bad.'

διότι ἢρα ... βλάπτειν] Cp. Crito 49 b, c οἴδαμος ἢρα δεῖ ἄκουεῖν. Οὐ δήτα. οὐδὲ ἀκούομεν ἢρα ἀκούομεν, ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ οὖνται, ἐπειδὴ γε οἴδαμος δεῖ ἄκουεῖν. οὐ φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ... ἢ οὐ;

That it is not right to harm even the evil is proved as follows:—When animals are harmed, they are made worse in that quality which is characteristic of them. That quality in man is justice: therefore, when man is harmed, he is rendered more unjust: whence follows the absurdity that justice is the cause of injustice. The argument is verbal, but hints at the truth more fully stated in ii. 379 c ff. (οδὸ δρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ... οἱ δὲ ἀνίκανον κολαζομένοι).

μη διώκω φώμεν] 'Shall we be told that we must not say in like manner...?' Cp. 337 b μη ἀποκρίνομαι δέν προεῖτει μηδέν;

ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ] δὴ emphasizes the real subject of inquiry; of which the previous cases are only illustrations. 'And by justice then can the just make men unjust?' So in οὔ δή τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (infra, D).

tоῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὕτη] 'And this moreover means for him.' Cp. Euthyd. 287 D δέ τι μοι νοεῖ τῷ ῥήμα;

σοφῶν ... μακριῶν] Both σοφῶν and μακριῶν are here ironical. μακριῶς originally means 'blessed,' and is sometimes applied to the dead: also, as here, to persons who have any cleverness or excellence—'blest with understanding.' Cp. Meno 71 b καυτοῖς σοι δοκεῖν μακριῶς τις εἶναι, ἄρετὴν γοῦν ἐντε διδακτῶν ἐνε ὅπερ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι.
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ἐγὼν οὖν . . . μάχης [‘for my part, anyway (οὖν) I am ready to share in the battle’]—said in answer to the previous words of Socrates—‘you and I will make war together.’ The reading ἐγὼν οὖν is better than the emphatic ἐγώ γοῦν. After Socrates has declared that both are ready to take up arms, there would be no meaning in Polemarchus’ asseveration—‘I at all events am ready to do so,’ as though there were a doubt of Socrates.

tὸ ῥῆμα . . . βλάπτειν] τὸ φάναι is in apposition with τὸ ῥῆμα: ‘the saying which affirms that it is just to do good to friends and harm to enemies.’

’ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου] Cp. Meno 90 Α, where Ismenias is said to have made himself a fortune in some sudden or irregular manner.—He was put to death by the Lacedaemonians in B. C. 382 after the seizure of the Cadmeia, on the ground that he had taken bribes from Persia.

μέγα όλομένου δύνασθαι] ‘who imagined that he had great power,’ but had it not really, because Plato is not prepared to admit, as he here intimates by the word όλομένου, that any man is really great or powerful who ‘cannot do what he will.’ (Gorg. 466 ff.)

οδηγ ὁ τοῦτο] Through the windings of dialectic we arrive at last in view of the Christian precept,—‘Recompense to no man evil for evil.’ After every caution and reservation something more is needed than the text of the old poet, which is only on a level with the old Hebrew saying, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy.’

Yet the definition of Simonides is really a very good one, nor can any objection be raised to the explanation of ὀφειλόμενον as προσήκον. Socrates is unfair to it, in his attempt to elevate into a universal principle, that which is only a maxim or rule of conduct.

Thrasymachus breaks in with an impatient cry—‘Instead of asking questions and criticising answers, why not at once give your definition of the just? But don’t treat us to such stale rubbish as ‘the fitting’ or ‘the expedient.’

Socrates deprecates the anger of the great Sophist and assures him that his own and his host’s error is involuntary. They are only too ready to learn, if he will teach them.

Thrasymachus laughs sardonically at ‘the accustomed irony’ of Socrates,—who now alleges the further difficulty that the most obvious answers have been forbidden him. He ends by prevailing
on Thrasymachus (who is really eager to speak) to give his own
definition, that justice is the interest of the Stronger. In States, for
example, the government, whether despotic, democratic or oligarchical,
makes all its laws with a view to its own maintenance and security.
And it is just for the subject to obey the laws. ‘But do governments
never make mistakes in the laws which they pass?’

T. ‘Yes, sometimes.’
S. ‘Then it is sometimes just for the subject to do what is
inexpedient for the ruler.’

Polemarchus sees the point at once. But Cleitophon takes up the
cudgels to defend his master’s thesis. By ‘what is expedient for
the Stronger,’ he says that Thrasymachus meant what the Stronger
thought expedient for himself.

διαλεγομένων . . . μεταξύ [‘In the midst of our discussion:’
μεταξύ is to be taken with the participle: cp. Apol. 40 B, where
Socrates says of the διαμόνων ομών—πολλάχων δὴ με ἐπίσης λέγοντα
μεταξύ.

ὅρμα . . . δεικτικό] ‘had been attempting,’ ‘had been repeatedly
prevented,’—the iterative force of the imperfect.

ἀντιλαμβάνονται] meaning originally ‘to seize,’ ‘grasp’; has two
secondary senses in Plato: (1) ‘to lay hold of with the view of
objecting’—so Soph. 239 ν ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ἡμῶν: infra, vi. 497 ν
φάβο διὰ ὦμις ἀντιλαμβανόμενον διδηλοῦσαι μακρῶν . . . καὶ χαλεπῆν
αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν; (2) ‘to get possession of’: so Parm. 130 ε, 
where Parmenides says of Socrates—οὕτω σου ἀντιλήπταις φιλο-
σοφία, ὅς ἦ τι ἀντιλήφθησαί. ‘To get hold of,’ i.e. ‘to interpose in,’
is the meaning here. Cp. Gorg. 506 λ χρή ἀντιλαμβάνονται καὶ
δέχεσθαι.

The sketch of Thrasymachus may be compared with that of
Polus in the Gorgias, or of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus in the
dialogue which bears the name of the latter: or with the vanity of
Hippias and Prodicus in the Protagoras. The greater masters of
the Sophistic art, such as Gorgias and Protagoras, have a higher
character attributed to them; they preserve a stately equanimity,
and are treated with a certain degree of respect by Socrates.

ὡς δὲ διεπαναλαμβάνει . . . ἔπον] ‘when we had ceased, and I had
thus spoken.’ The two clauses refer to the same moment. The
last words of Socrates coincided with the break in the discussion.
The emendation of Cobet—ὡς δὴ ἐπαναλαμβάνει, —which appears to
arise from a supposed difficulty in explaining διεπαναλαμβάνει, is
Notes: Book I.
needless. Cp. Symp. 191 c ἐν ... διαπαύσατε καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἓργῳ Republic I. τρίστοι. The compound signifies 'intermission.'

συστρέφεσα] i.e. 'gathering himself up,' i.e. for a spring. Cp. the Homeric ἔδη τε καὶ κανὴν (II. xx. 168), of the angry lion. ἡκεν is rather to be taken as the aorist of ἀμθι than as the imperfect of ἥκα. Cp. Herod. ix. 49, § 2 ἐπήκε τῆν ἄποκριν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ελλήνας. έταυτάν is easily supplied from what precedes: 'He gathered himself together and sprang upon us as if to tear us in pieces.' Cobet's conjecture (Varr. Lectt. ed. sec. p. 526), διασπασόμενος for διασπασόμενος, is quite unnecessary. Cp. II. xvi. 355 αἷα διαράγοιν (sc. τὸ λύκον τὰς ἀρνας).

διεπτωθήμεν] 'We were panic-stricken,' a metaphor taken from the scaring of birds. Cp. Od. xviii. 340 διεπτώθης γεννάκας, i.e. 'he scattered them in terror,' whereupon βὰν δὲ έμεκα διὰ δώμα.

eἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγόμενος] 'He called out to the whole company.' Cp. Laws ii. 664 c τὰ τούτα εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγόμενο: Herod. vi. 130 ἐπεξέ εἰς μέσον τάδε.

ἐποκαταλημάτω] The verb is used by Plutarch (τ) of a wrestler allowing himself to be beaten, (2) of one who in a banquet takes the lower place. The latter seems to give the more natural metaphor here. See Liddell and Scott, s.v. The word here, taken in the sense of 'giving way to,' or 'giving place to,' may have a suggestion of either or both associations.

οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, ἐὰν] 'I will not tolerate this sort of nonsense.' As elsewhere (infra, vii. 525 δ ὁδαμὴ ἀποδέχομαι, εἰς τις, κ.τ.λ.), the object of the verb is resolved into a hypothetical or relative clause.

καὶ ἐγὼ ... γενέθεσι] Cp. Theocritus xiv. 22 οὐ φθεγῇς; λύκων εἴδε; ἐπεξέ τις: Virg. Ecl. ix. 53 'Vox quoque Moerim l'am fugit ipsa; lupi Moerim videre priores.' It is suggested, rather than expressed, that Thrasymachus is a wolf.

eἰ γάρ] eἰ γάρ τι, the reading of Ven. II, is perhaps better suited to the irony of the passage; cp. Gorg. 488 Α ἐγὼ γάρ eἰ τι μὴ ὅρθως πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τῶν ἓματος, εἰ ἵσον τοῦτο τι δι' οὐχ ἐκῶν ἐξαμαρτάνω, άλλ' ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἕργῳ.

μὴ γάρ δὴ ... δυνάμεθα] 'If we were looking for a piece of gold, we should not, if we could help, allow ourselves to give place to one another and spoil our chance of finding it. Do not then imagine that in looking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, we are weakly yielding to one another, and
not doing our utmost to bring the hidden thing to light; believe me, friend, that we are doing our best; but the fact is that we cannot.'

After οὖ δινάμεθα some such word as 'find' or 'bring it to light' has to be supplied from φανῆιαι αὐτό.

For this mode of expression, in which an antithetical compound sentence is treated as a simple one, and is contained within a single negative or interrogative, cp. ii. 374 b : Phaedo 68 A, B.

οἶον γε σὺ] 'Believe it, friend, we are.' The reading of Χ, and of the old editions — οὖν γε ἐστίν, is feasible and without authority. The text may be said to have the support of the great majority of MSS., being the least possible correction of them. οὖν must be connected with στοιχαίσθην ὅ τι μάλιστα (not with οὐ στοιχαίσθη). Cp. the use of οἰσθαί γε χρή in a very similar sentence (Phaedo 68 b), where it is in the same way disconnected from the negative — οὐκ ἄσμην εἶναι αὐτόν; οἰσθαί γε χρή (sc. ἄσμην εἶναι αὐτόν): also Crito 53 ν οὐκ οἷον ἄσχημον φανείσθη τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα; οἰσθαί γε χρή. Another reading, but of small authority, is μὴ οἶον σὺ.

τῶν δεινῶν] cp. infra Χ ὅπ' ἄνθρωπος οὖ φαίλοιο: δεινὸς has several transitions of meaning from the literal one of 'terrible' to 'strange,' 'admirable,' 'wonderful,' 'wise'; and so of pretended wisdom—'awful.' A favourite meaning of δεινὸς, always with a slight reproach, is that of 'one who is too much for another.'

χαλεπαύωσθαί] 'Than to be the victims of your anger.' To form passives of verbs governing the dative, like φθονοῦ, πιστεύω, &c., was a growing tendency in the Greek of this period. See Essay on Platonic Syntax in vol. ii. p. 180, β.

σαρδανόν] probably from σαρκέω, 'to grind.' The word occurs already in Homer (Od. xx. 302).

eἰρωνεία] cp. Symp. 216 Ε ἢ γίνεται δὲ πάντα παῦτα τὰ κτήματα ὀδεῖν ἦς, καὶ ἡμᾶς ὀδεῖν εἶναι, λόγων μὲν οὐ, εἰρωνευμένος τε καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελέω: and Theaet. 150 c ἀγοῦς εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ἐπερ ἢδη πολλοὶ μοι ἄνειδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτεῖ, αὐτός δὲ ὀδεῖν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ ὀδεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σχίνοι σοφῶν, ἀλλὰς ὀνειδισζομαι. For the meaning of the word cp. Ar. Eth. N. ii. 7, 12 ἢ ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ Πλαττον (προσποιήσεις) εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρων: and Theophr. Charact. ἢ μὲν οὖν εἰρωνεία διδώσεις ἢ εἶπε... προσποιήσεις ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον πράξεων καὶ λόγων. The word gains a new association from the application of it to Socrates, who not only pretended ignorance with the view of gaining an advantage in argument, but sincerely believed it to be the natural condition of man.
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Δήλον ... πωθανομένη]' To a questioner who puts the question in this form, I believe you clearly saw that no one would answer.' The words Δήλον οίμαι σοι ἂν resume τὸ ὅν προσῆλθα, the previous sentence being repeated in ὁπως. For the enclitic after οίμαι in parenthesis cp. Theaet. 147 A ἦ oίμαι τίς τι συνήης τινος διόμα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστιν;

μηδ' ... ὅν]' ‘Not even if the answer to the question (sc. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον) happens to be one of these?’ Others would render, ‘Not if one of these chanced to be the truth?’ Such an emphatic or predicated use of ὅν with τυχάνει is doubtful, whereas the omission of a nominative, which is easily gathered from the rest of the sentence, is in the manner of Plato.

ὡς δὴ δύνατον τοῦτο ἐκεϊνον]' ‘Just as if the two cases were alike.’ For this use of ὡς δὴ cp. Aesch. Agam. 1633 ὡς δὴ σὺ μοι τύραννος Ἀργείων Ἰιττί: Soph. O. C. 809 ἦ σὺ ὅδε ὑπὶ βραχία, ταῦτα δὲ ἐν καιρῷ λέγεις.

οὐδὲν γε ... ἐγώ]' ‘There is nothing to prevent it.’ This is said in the same spirit as οὐκ ἄν βαθμάσαι, a few lines below (cp. Charm. 164 A καὶ οὐδὲν γε σε ἰσομεν κωλώνι ἀληθῆ λέγειν).

ἡμεῖς] is ironical. Socrates provocingly says: ‘A man can’t help thinking as he does, though you and I join in forbidding him.’

ἄλλο τι οὖν, ... ποιήσεις;] ἄλλο τι is used by Plato chiefly in two ways: (1) ἄλλο τι ἢ—‘Is it not the case that . . .?’—where the ellipsis of ἢοῖσιν or γύρνται is lost sight of in the familiarity of the phrase; cp. Phaedo 70 c ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶναι ὅπως ἂν ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεί; Theaet. 154 E ἄλλο τι τῇ ἥρεμα, ὅπως πάντων πολλῶν σχολῶν στόρες, πάλιν ἐπανασκυψίμεθα . . . ; ‘Shall we not,’ &c.: (2) ἢ is dropped and ἄλλο τι like οὖν, δοκεῖς, βούλεις, and the like words, is taken adverbially: cp. Gorg. 495 c ἄλλο τι οὖν . . . δότα ταύτα δέλεις; ‘You spoke of them as two, did you not?’ and infra i. 342 D ἄλλο τι οὖν . . . οἴδε ἢτροπος οἴδεις . . . τῷ ἢτρῷ ἐγκριόν σκοπεῖ . . . ; ‘Then said I, neither does any physician consider what is for the interest of the physician: is not that true?’ See Riddell’s Digest, § 22. In the present passage Thrasy machus says: ‘And that is what you are going to do, is it not?’ i.e. ‘I am to presume then that this is your intention,—as if the absurdity were too glaring to be further expressed. Instead of saying sharply ‘Do you mean to tell me . . . ?’ he says with assumed calmness ‘I am to understand then that you intend . . . ?’
This is a jest at the expense of the sophists, which Socrates is always either repeating or insinuating, as infra, 345 Α. He has not had the good fortune ‘to hear the fifty drachma course of Prodicus’ (Cratyl. 384 Β). He is informed by Callias, ‘who has spent more than all the rest of the world upon the Sophists,’ that a complete course of education may be had of Evenus at a cost of five minae (Apol. 20 Α): Hermogenes, the younger brother of Callias, who is poor, must get these expensive lessons at second hand (Cratyl. 391 Ε). And the trains of disciples who follow them in dutiful order (Protag. 315 Β), and are ready almost to carry them about on their heads (infra x. 600 Β), are constantly ridiculed. The gains of Protagoras (Meno 91 Β), which are greater than those of Pheidias or ten other sculptors, are ironically assumed as a proof of the truth of his doctrines. Compare also the mention of Socrates’ own circumstances in Apol. 23 Β ἐν πενήντα μυρία εἰμὶ.

τῆς]. See above note on δῆλον οἶμαι σοι supra Β.

ἐπετα. . . εἰσὶ] εἰσί, though apparently redundant, is found in all the MSS. ἀπειρημένων αὐτῷ εἰσί is written as if not a participle μὴ εἰδὼς but εἰ μὴ εἰδείη had preceded.

οὗ φαίλου] ‘who is not to be disregarded.’ Ironicē: see above ὅπω ὑμῶν τῶν διει τών (337 Α) and note.

προσεποιεῖτο . . . ἀποκρινόμενον] ‘He pretended to contend for my being respondent.’ φιλονείκους, ‘loving contention’: hence φιλονείκειαν, ‘to show a contentious spirit,’ ‘to be contentious.’ But like other words in Greek, it passes readily from the state to the act, and the feeling of the etymology is lost through frequent use. Cp. Protag. 360 εφιλονείκειαι μοι δοκεῖ τὸ ἐίμι εἶναι τῶν ἀποκρινόμενων: Phil. 14 Β oὗ δῆπον πρὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονείκιομεν. The Venetian MS. T. has φιλονείκειοι. C. F. Hermann and Cobet would restore φιλονείκοι, φιλονείκια in Plato throughout, relying on Plato’s own remarks connecting the word with ἔτη (ix. 581 Α, 586 c), in which he is followed by Aristotle (Rhet. ii. 12, 6). But Plato’s fanciful etymology is no sufficient ground for judging of the orthography of a word.

ἄκουε ὅη]. The sham compliment which precedes is too much for Thrasymachus, who immediately begins like a crier (οὗες / οὗες /) to proclaim his idea of justice. For the definition cp. Laws iv. 714 Β οὕτω γὰρ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον οὕτε πρὸς ἄρετήν δηλοὶ βλέπειν
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29
dein fas i tois nomous, alla 'hnes an kathetikia 'y politeia, tauto dein to xumphiron, opws arxai to 'el kai mi katalehestetai, kal to fuses dron tou dikaiou legevtnai kallass th otopes. Poi; 'Oti to to kreeton ev xumphiron esti.

do . . . xumphiron] The participle with the article is used as a noun; hence to kreetonos, not to kreeton. The new philosophy is first of all damaged by a broad joke from Socrates. If Polydamos the Pan- cratiaist, who is our superior, finds the expediency of eating beef, does not expediency, and therefore justice, require that we, who are his inferiors, should eat beef too? Thrasymachus replies angrily and pompously, endeavouring to re-invest the subject with the dignity that has been lost. A similar jest occurs in the Charmides (161, 162), where justice, having been defined, as in iv. 443, to be to to evoun prattan, the question is raised whether this means 'making one's own coat.' Cp. also Gorg. 490 c, where a similar question is provocingly asked—whether, as the wisest is to have most, the wise physician is to have most food.

alla 'oux edeltheis] The future here appears to be used as a stronger present: a sense of predetermination being expressed in it: 'But you won't.' Cp. Charm. 166 à ëxeis o év mou . . . diexai; alla 'oux ëxeis: Prot. 354 d alla 'oux ëxete.

cal touto . . . ti poti lègeis;] 'And with what meaning do you say this?' cal indicates surprise, as in cal vàs;

ei Poulebýmas ëmwn kreeton] Polydamos is mentioned by many ancient writers as a Pancratiaist of great strength and stature, who was at one time in the pay of Darius Ochus, and, amongst other wonderful feats, slew lions, and fought unarmed with armed men.

βélyrós . . . lágon] 'That is abominable of you, Socrates: you understand me in the sense in which you can do my argument most mischief.' kákovrgín implies malice.

títheTai . . . ë arxh] 'The government in each case makes the laws.' The articles tois and ë are correlative—títheTai ë arxh tois nomous. This removes Schneider's objection to ë. The interchange of the generic present and gnomic aorist (títheTai . . . bêmev . . . ápêphnai . . . kolázousai) is noticeable. Par. A reads ékásth—a manifest error. The thesis of Thrasymachus has a verbal and superficial truth. There are governments everywhere who have power in their hands and make laws for their own interest, and
obedience to government is right. The abstract notion of law is the same amid every variety of law and custom, and authority in the ruler is the correlative of justice in the subject. The statement is a paradox which partly gains force from the appearance of honesty in confessing what other men are trying to conceal. Cp. Callicles in the Gorgias 483 ff.

An opinion equivalent to this is cited by Aristotle, Pol. i. 3. 4 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τῆς εἰναι ἡ δεσποτεία . . . τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν. Nor are modern parallels wanting. When Hobbes says that power is the source of right, this is really the enunciation of a principle which is carried out only in his own ‘kingdom of darkness.’ He seems to have confused the duty of obedience to authority in the abstract with the duty of obedience to a particular authority. That authority always exists and always claims obedience may be readily allowed: the dispute is whether the authority does or does not reside in a certain person. ‘Mankind are rightly jealous of their principles being reduced to the level of their practice.’ It must be allowed that the theory of the Sophist is realized in fact whenever power is preferred to justice, or conventionality perverts truth. But the elevation of this distortion of life and nature into a philosophical theory is deservedly hated.

αὐτῷ[.] Sc. ἐν τῇ σῆ ἀποκρισίᾳ. η ἡ is emphatic and ironical:

ὅτι true.’

ουῳ . . . μεγάλη] Socrates, ignoring the irony of σμικρά, says gravely: ‘It is not yet clear, even whether it is a great one,’ i. e. ‘it may be a great one for anything we yet know.’

ταῦτ' ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.] ‘That is what I am going to do’—implying that the grumbling exhortation of Thrasymachus was rather unnecessary. The special use of μέντοι in interrogations with oū may be compared with the use of δὴν in claiming the recollection or agreement of the person addressed. But μέντοι further implies a transition of thought, or the renewal of an old thought, cp. infra vii. 521 ὧν ἀθανάτα μέντοι πόλεος ἢμαν τούτων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους δυνασ.; and 346 οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμέν ἑκάστης τῶν τεχνῶν τούτω ἔτρεκλ ἐίναι, κ.τ.λ.

Justice is the expediency of the superior, but the superior may err, and then inexpediency becomes justice. This ‘reductio ad absurdum,’ which Polemarchus receives with triumph, is rejected by Cleitophon, who argues that the word ‘expedient’ is to be taken as ‘expedient in the thought or mind of the ruler.’ The idea which
the ruler has of his interest, however inexpedient in fact, always
remains the idea which the ruler has of his interest. Polemarchus
truly retorts that this is an after-thought: Socrates, however, does
not object to the change, but Thrasymachus prefers a different
mode of shifting his ground. He argues not that the expedient is
what seems to the ruler to be expedient, but that the ruler when he
errs is not to be called a ruler.

τὸ δὲ τινας] For the qualifying use of the indefinite after the
article, cp. Phileb. 13 c τὸς δὲ τινας ἔτερας αὐτῶν κακίας: Herod. 1. 114
τὸν δὲ κοῦ τινα αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμῶν βασιλέως εἶναι.

τῇ λέγεις σὺς; ἡφι] The reading of Stephanus τῇ λέγεις; omitting
σὺς is adopted by Schneider and inferred by him from Bekker’s
silence to rest on the authority of Par. A, where, however, σὺ is read,
but is marked as doubtful (σὺς). For the text, which gives more
point to σὺ in the reply, cp. Aristoph. Nub. 1174 τῷ τοῦτο τοῦτο ἐπαθής, τὸ τῇ λέγεις σὺς; The question of Thrasymachus is
rudely expressive of indignation and surprise. Socrates returns
with a stroke of the hammer: ‘I am saying what you say yourself.’
There is the same form of the ‘retort courteous,’ infra in ὀφιναι and
ὁνο—‘I think so,’ said he. ‘Then,’ said I, ‘you must further
think,’ &c. Compare a similar repetition in iv. 430 c ἀποδίχομαι
τοῦτο τοῦτο ἀναθείαν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχοι, ἢ ὁ ἐγώ, πολιτείαν γε, καὶ
ὁδοὶ ἄποδεξαι.

ὅταν οὐ μὲν ἀρχουτες, κἄλα.] The sentence has a second apodosis:
ἀρα τότε κἄλα. resuming οὐ... ὀμολογήσας. Cp. Theaet. 171 B
ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀρα... τότε... ἄρα γε ἀπεικόνισε.

ἀρα τότε... ἄρα] The whole argument may be briefly
summed up as follows: ‘Justice is the interest of the superior.’
‘But what if the superior is mistaken about his interest?’ ‘But,’
says Cleitophon, ‘he cannot mistake about what he thinks to be
his interest; and that was what Thrasymachus meant.’ ‘But that,’
retorts Polemarchus, ‘was not the assertion actually made by
Thrasymachus.’ ‘Never mind,’ says Socrates; ‘we will take
this instead of the other.’ Cleitophon tries to evade the ‘reductio
ad absurdum’ of Thrasymachus’ argument by substituting after the
manner of the Sophists appearance for reality. Justice thus
becomes not the stronger’s interest, but what appears to the
stronger to be his interest. This, however, is not what Thrasy-
machus actually said (338 c, e).

οὐκ ἀναγκαίον... λέγεις:] ‘Must it not then follow that, in that
case, it is just to do the very opposite of what you say?'
According to Madvig’s punctuation, which is here followed, ἀνόητο
(emphatic) is joined to τοὐναντίον. (Madvig also, unnecessarily,
reads συμβαίνει.) The older punctuation was συμβαίνειν ἀνόητο οὖνσι,
δίκαιον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.,—ἀνόητο unemphatic and referring to the case put
in the first part of the sentence; the antecedent, as in Polit. 263 β
μήποτε παρ’ ἐμοὶ δόξης αὐτὸ ἐναργῶς διαφημιζόν ἀπειροῦσι,
having inexact reference to what precedes. [L. C.]

*οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον...λέγεις;] ‘Is it not necessary for the matter to
turn out thus, that it is just to do the opposite of what you say?’
ἀνόητο, ‘the matter,’ has a vague antecedent in what precedes: cp.
Polit. 263 β μήποτε παρ’ ἐμοὶ δόξης αὐτὸ ἐναργῶς διαφημιζόν ἀπειροῦσι.
οὖνσι is explained in the clause which follows. It is better to
explain the passage thus—placing the comma after οὖνσι, than
with Madvig (who unnecessarily reads συμβαίνει) to delete the
comma connecting ἀνόητο with τοὐναντίον and making οὖνσι mean
‘in that case.’ ‘Must it not then follow that, in that case, it is just
to do the very opposite of what you say?’ [B. J.]

τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευθέρα, κ.τ.λ.] The first γὰρ introduces a justifi-
cation, ‘You are right,’ says Cleitophon, and in that ‘Thrasymachus
was consistent, since he defined justice to be obedience to the com-
mand of the ruler.’ The second γὰρ with καί admits Cleitophon’s
assertion so far, but proceeds seriously to justify the argument by
adding what had been suppressed. ‘Yes, I was right: for he also
defined justice to be the interest of the stronger. And these two
general principles are rendered inconsistent by his admission that
the ruler sometimes makes a mistake about his own interest.’

ἀλλ’, ἐφ᾽...έπίθετο] ‘But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the
expediency of the superior, what the superior in his view thought
expedient for him; this, he said, was to be done by the subject,
and this he maintained to be justice.’ The asyndeton is relieved
by an emphasis on τὸῦτο. For the optative see Goodwin M. and T.
694, 700.

τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥπτοιν. Τλεγεῖν has to be repeated with
these words. Cleitophon’s dialectic recalls the passage with
Polemarchus, supra, 334 c ff. Thrasymachus passes by the inter-
position of Cleitophon and defends himself from another point of
view. He maintains not that what the superior thinks for his
interest is just, but that the superior, qua superior, can never err.
Socrates is ready to argue the question on the new ground proposed by Cleitophon. But Thrasyvachus takes a different line. ‘The ruler makes no mistake qua ruler; when he gives commands which are inexpedient for him, he loses his title to be called the ruler or stronger.’

S. Very well;—We will speak of the ruler in the strictest sense of the term. Turning to the analogy of the arts we note that the physician qua physician is a healer only; and he takes fees not as physician, but as money-maker. The pilot, qua pilot, considers not his own safety but that of the passengers in his ship. The art which rules each function is self-sufficing and perfect and in need of nothing, while that whereto it ministers has need of many things. In other words, a true form of government does not regard its own interest, but the interest of that which is governed by it. And in all cases, the ruler, who is truly such, rules not for himself but for his subjects.

Thrasyvachus raises a new objection: ‘The superior is not the superior when he errs.’ We say indeed that ‘the ruler has erred,’ as in the case of other arts we say that ‘the physician, the calculator, has erred.’ But this is an incorrectness of language; for in erring ‘the physician is no longer physician,’ ‘the ruler is no longer ruler.’ Yet the possibility of error in the ruler had been admitted by Thrasyvachus in 339 c without this restriction. The question which is here introduced—viz. how far words are to be restricted to their good senses—is one which has occasioned considerable perplexity in the infancy of philosophy. Are ἕθσεως, προαίρεσις, τέχνη, φύσις, σοφία, and the other names of habits which occur in the Ethics of Aristotle, to be taken only in their better signification?—e. g. ἕθσεως, as implying a good end, προαίρεσις, as the deliberate choice always of good, σοφία and φύσις as concerned with truth only? How far, again, is the meaning of such terms to be extended by analogy? The answer seems to be that the use of language is determined by custom and association, and aims only at such a degree of precision as is necessary for the attainment of perspicuity. Words are not necessarily ambiguous because they are taken in good, bad, or neutral senses, if the sense in which they are taken is clearly indicated by the context.

The Sophist in Plato is apt to develop his argument into a speech—he ‘goes running on in a long harangue, like brazen pots
which, when they are struck, continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them’ (Protag. 329 A). So Protagoras, in the dialogue which bears his name, objects to the short ‘cut and thrust’ method of Socrates, and prefers a stately display: and in the Gorgias, Socrates himself, when he can get no more answers out of his adversaries, is obliged to make ‘one man do the work of two,’ and embody a series of questions and answers in a single long speech.

συκοφάντης . . . διαμαρτάναι] ‘You are a sharper, Socrates, in argument.’

For the argumentative use of ἀδικά cp. Protag. 359 ε ἀδικά εἰς τὸν πάλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἴσα, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσίν. The most general meaning of the word is ‘immediately’—‘to begin with’; when used as it is here, it may be conveniently translated ‘for example.’

λογιστικόν] λογιστικός is used in Plato in both senses, (1) of calculating and (2) of reasoning. The latter sense, however, is chiefly confined to the neuter. For the first sense cp. vii. 526 β οἱ δὲ φύσει λογιστικοῖ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα . . . ὡς εἰς φύσιν: for the second, iv. 439 δ τὸ μὲν . . . λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες. Cp. the converse transition of meaning in the use of the word μαθήματα.

λέγομεν τῷ ρήματι] ‘The expression which we use is.’ Plato is fond of contrasting the expression with the thought: cp. Theaet. 166 δ τῶν δὲ λόγων αὐτὴ τῇ τῷ ρήματι μου δίωκε: Gorg. 450 δ οὐκ διʼ τῷ ρήματι οὕτω ἔστε: ρήμα, in the sense of ‘expression,’ is opposed to σωμα, ‘a single word.’ Cp. Craty. 399 λ, β, where Δίω φίλος, which is a ρήμα, when contracted into Δίφιλος becomes an ὄνομα.

τὸ δ’, αἰμα] ‘Whereas in fact, as I conceive.’ Cp. Laws i. 630 δ τὸ δ’ πᾶς χρὴν ἡμᾶς λέγειν; ‘ but how in fact ought we to say?’ τὸ δ’ is often thus used in Plato, and may be explained either as an accusative, ‘as to this,’ or as a nominative, ‘the fact is.’

τοιοῦτον . . . ἀποκρίνεσθαι] ‘Understand, then, that my answer to you just now was of this nature.’

εἶν] Like ‘So’ in German, and ‘Well!’ or ‘Good!’ in English, implies assent with every degree of expression, grave or ironical—in this passage making rather light of the attack of Thrasymachus: ‘Very well, Thrasy machus; you think me unfair?’ Elsewhere εἶν simply expresses agreement with a former proposition for the sake of getting on to a new one: cp. infra 349 δ, Protag. 312 ε εἶν’ ὥ δ’ δὴ σοφιστης περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;
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οδὲν γ’ ἐν ἐπικεφάλαιοι] Sc. βάσανοι τῷ λόγῳ. The boisterousness of Thrasymachus is contrasted with the provoking quietness of Socrates. Cp. infra 345 B ἡ εἷς τὴν ψυχήν φίλου τὸν λόγον; where the rejoinder is μὰ Δία, ... μὴ σὺ γάρ.

toivōton] ‘Any similar misunderstanding.’

dν νῦν] δ’ ἐν — (δ’ written over an erasure) is the reading of Par. A. Cp. δ’ ἀριτ. ἐλεγες infra c.: either δ’ or δ’ is quite admissible, but the masculine is more lively.

οδὲν δὲν καὶ ταῦτα] (1) ‘Though here again you are nobody,’ i.e. ‘with as little effect as ever.’ Thrasymachus has been prophesying that Socrates will try to cheat, but without success: Socrates replies that he is not such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus. The latter rejoins that he has made the attempt, though in this case, as on former occasions, unsuccessfully: or (2) [B. J.] ‘Although you made a fool of yourself at this too,’ i.e. at cheating Thrasymachus, as you would also have done at shaving a lion if you had attempted it. For οδὲν δὲν cp. viii. 556 b ἀνδρές ἡμέρας εἰσίν οδέν (according to one reading), and for the idiomatic καὶ ταῦτα, Charm. 154 B πάντα καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐστι καὶ ταῦτα.

Thrasymachus now argues that justice is the interest of the ruler regarded in his capacity of ruler, and therefore as unerring. Socrates accepts the position, and retorts that the ruler in his capacity of ruler has no concern with his own interests. To prove this, an appeal is made to the favourite analogy of the arts. The physician in his capacity of physician is not a taker of money, but a healer of the sick: the pilot is not to be thought of as a sailor, but as having a function of his own. And every man who has an art and function has in one sense an interest; but that interest is only the perfection of his art, and the art when perfect has no further need or interest.

οδὲν ... ὑπολογιστέοιν] ‘This must not be taken into the account.’ i.e. as interfering with our conception of him. Cp. Laws iii. 702 c μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον τῶ εἰκόνων αὐτῶν.

ἄρ’ οὖν ... τελέοιν εἰσιν] There is a slight play upon the word ἤμφερον, which is here used not of the artist but of the art. ‘But has any of the arts an interest other than its own perfection?’ In other words they are complete in themselves and self-contained. There is no reason to stumble at the words, or with MSS. g β and some modern editors to alter the text by the insertion after ἄλλο of.
Thrasymachus does not understand the meaning of this self-sufficiency of art. Socrates therefore adds an illustration. 'The body is not self-sufficing, because it requires the assistance of medicine: but the art of medicine (or any other art) is self-sufficing, because needing nothing external.'

νῶν] adds a slight emphasis which is sufficiently expressed in English by 'has been': but the word seems otiose, and may perhaps be a corruption of ἡμῶν.

ἐπὶ τοῦτον] 'For this purpose,' referring to the whole clause, viz. ἐπὶ τοῦτο διὸς τούτῳ (sc. τῷ σώματι) ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ εὐμφέρων τα. Cp. supra δ ἐπὶ τοῦτο πέφυκεν, κ.τ.λ.

Does art at all require any excellence?' Socrates maintains a purely ideal conception of art or knowledge, because Thrasymachus had insisted on a purely ideal conception of the ruler. Thrasymachus might indeed have replied that this ideal of art is a mere fiction, or that the arts and sciences are dependent on one another. But such an answer, though familiar to modern thought, would have been strange to early Greek philosophy, perhaps even to Socrates, who has a clearer idea of art in the abstract than of the circumstances by which the arts are conditioned, or of their relation to one another.

σκεφτομένης τε καὶ ἐκπορίζοντος] Here as elsewhere the present and future are combined. Cp. x. 604 A μαχεύσοιτε καὶ ἀντίστεισιν.

ὁι ἐκάστη τέχνη] Whether the reading of Par. A, ὁι ὅι, is the result of dittography, or the omission of ὅι in the other MSS. is due to the resemblance of ΔΕΙ-ΑΕΙ, is uncertain.

καὶ τοῦτω ὅστιν ἀπέραντον] The argument from infinity is a reducio ad absurdum characteristic of Greek speculation. How could art and knowledge, like the good, be other than finite? Unless they were a law to themselves, what limit was there to them? So Plato argues in the dialogue which bears the name of Parmenides (132 E ff, 133 A), that behind an idea and the particulars corresponding to it there may arise another idea and again another idea of that idea and its particulars, and so on to infinity. Aristotle, in his criticism of Plato's Ideas (Met. i. 9. 3), repeats the same objection in a particular form, which he calls the argument of the
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τρίτος ὀθροποιος: i.e. behind the idea of humanity and individual men there arises another idea inclusive of both, and so on to infinity.

τὸ συμφέρον σκοπεῖν] is a further explanation of ἐν τῇ ἀνθή ποιήσαι, 'for its own defect, to consider what is expedient.'

ἀδεὶ δὲ διὰ λαβὴς ... ὑπὸ ὁδὸ, κ.τ.λ.] 'And it is itself whole and unimpaired while it remains true—that is, so long as each art in its entirety is exactly what it is.' The latter words are an expansion or explanation of ὑπὸ ὁδὸ.

οὕτως, ἅπα, φαίνεται] Cp. infra c φαίνεται, ἅπα, οὕτως. φαίνεται is expressive of a careless indifference, 'so it seems'—which develops into reluctance (infra συνεχόμεν . . . μᾶλα μᾶλις), as Thrasymachus becomes more alive to the impending consequences.

ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . τέκνα] 'But the arts have rule in their several spheres.' The missing link is now supplied, and Thrasymachus begins to aware that he is caught in the toils of his adversary. For if the arts have no interest of their own, and yet are rulers or superiors, then in this case the ruler or superior does not seek his own interest. This idea that the only ruler is the scientific ruler, that government is an art, frequently recurs in Plato, and is the foundation of the famous notion of the 'philosopher-King.' Cp. viii. 552 B; Theaet. 170 A, B; Polit. 303 B.

τὸ ἀρχομένῳ] like ἐκεῖνῳ ὅ τε ἐκτὸ ἐστιν above, is neuter, including both things and persons: there is therefore no occasion to change the reading from ἐκεῖνο to ἐκεῖνον against the authority of the best MSS. Cp. infra 345 D ἀφ' ἐν τέκτακται . . . ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευόμενον: 346 D ἐκεῖνο ἀφ' ἐν τέκτακται.

ὁ καὶ ἀδύνατος δημοσυγγραφῆ] 'And that (i.e. the person or thing) for which he himself executes the work.' For the dative after δημοσυγγραφῆ cp. Laws viii. 846 E.

The impatience of Thrasymachus bursts forth again: 'As if the shepherd cared for the sheep and not for his own wages or profit! Justice is in reality another's good, that is to say the advantage of the ruler. The just man everywhere reaps harm and loss. But the unjust man who has power,—he is the happy man; above all when his power is supreme. For injustice, if practised on a sufficient scale, is stronger than justice, and much more worthy of a free and aspiring nature.

ἐπικείμην οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] Thrasymachus, foreseeing the inevitable
conclusion, makes a bold diversion. He is indignant at the paradox of Socrates, that the ruler seeks only the interest of his subjects, and places the opposite point of view in the strongest light. ‘Even a child might know that the idealism of Socrates is the very reverse of the truth.’ This he expresses in a coarse Aristophanic manner. Cp. the part taken by Callicles in the Gorgias; see especially 449 b, 511 a, 521 c, where several retorts courteous are given. For τί and δέτι cp. Hipp. Maj. 290 c καὶ ἔγω τί μάλιστα; φήσο. δέτι, ἐρεῖ, τὰς Ἀθηναὶς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρυσοὺς ἐποίησεν. τοι adds a slight emphasis: ‘because, to say the truth.’ Cp. supra 330 b ὅσ τοι ἕνεκα ἡμῶν.

ἀδητή] ‘as far as she is concerned.’ Cp. Lys. 208 ὅ ἐκείνη στε ἐὰν πουτίν δ' τί ἀν βοηθήσῃ, ἐδ' αὐτή μακάριος ἦ: Soph. 229 εἴ σαν αὐτόει ἐξαιρέουσαν.

οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα] ‘You do not know either sheep or shepherd,’ i.e. you do not know which is which. For this disjunctive form of expression cp. x. 605 b οὔτε τὰ μείζον οὔτε τὰ τάμπον διαγιγοῦσαν.

δέτι δὲ τί μάλιστα.] ‘Because of what?’ i.e. what is that which makes you say it? a verbal notion—γίνεται has to be supplied. The second δέτι is a repetition of the first. Cp. Charm. 161 c δέτι δὲ τί γε; ἐδήμ. ὅτι κ.τ.λ. δέτι . . . τί is a combination of a causal with an interrogative construction; or δέτι which would properly introduce a causal sentence is converted into an interrogative by τί. There is no doubt about the meaning: the difficulty is to explain the syntactical relation. In an idiom the syntax may be lost or cannot certainly be traced. Compare ἄν τί (sc. γίνεται): Apol. 26 c ἦνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις;

δέτι οὔπει, κ.τ.λ.] The state of Thrasymachus’ temper is worthy of attention. His imagined superiority is not greater than the real interval between himself and Socrates. He may be compared to an angry child struggling in the hands of a giant, who for a moment lets him go. Immediately his spirits begin to rally, and his impudence revives, only to entitle him to a more thorough castigation. The instinct of self-defence leads him to avoid the short interrogatory method of Socrates; he makes an oration, and after having had the pleasure of hearing himself speak, is about to retreat with dignity. But Socrates, with the help of the rest of the company, practises a method of detaining him which is quite as effectual as physical force. He is at first reluctant to be cross-
examined, but afterwards in the skilful hands of the master, he shows real good-humour, and takes some interest in the subject of inquiry.

Διανοείσθαι πρὸς[ ] Cp. Laws. i. 626 δ αὐτῷ δ᾽ πρὸς αὐτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμή πρὸς πολέμον διαφορεῖστον; 628 δ ὡσάντως . . . πρὸς πόλεως εἰδαμονίαν . . . Διανοεύμενος. Faesi, Badham, and Cobet would read Διακείσθαι, a change not required by the sense and which has no authority.

οὗτω πόρρω εἰ[ ] ‘You are so far out of the way.’ Cp. Lys. 212 λ οὗτο πόρρω εἰμὶ τοῦ κτῆματος: Theaet. 151 η πόρρω δυτες τοῦ εἰδέαν.


οἱ δ᾽ ἀρχόμενοι] Either ‘and the subjects—,’ or ‘and they, as subjects—.’ For the latter cp. ii. 380 ο θ ὡσάντω κολαζόμενοι: Protag. 315 β οἴς δὲι . . . κηλὰν τῇ φῶνῃ . . . οὶ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἐποῦται ἐπικηλήμενοι.

ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἱσων[ ] ‘the just man contributes a larger sum out of an equal fortune, the unjust a smaller.’

ἀνέχθεσθαι[ ] appears to be used (as the accent implies) for the present passive. Cp. ἄφελείσθαι supra.

λέγω . . . πλεονεκτεῖν] δνπερ, not δνπρ, which is found in some inferior MSS., is the true reading; the antecedent is inferred from 343 η τοῦ εν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας . . . ἄρχονταν.

ἡ τὸ δίκαιον[ ] sc. εἰμι.

τὴν τελευτητὴν ἄδικαν] cp. Euripides’ description of tyranny (Phoen. 549) as ἄδικαν εἰδαμονα, and the preceding speech of Eteocles concluding with the lines:

ἐπερ γὰρ ἄδικεν χρῆ, τυραννίδος πέιρα
κάλλιστον ἄδικεν, τάλλα δ᾽ εὐσεβεῖν χρεῖν.

δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς[ ] Villainy on a large scale is no longer villainy, just as successful treason is no longer treason. The picture of the tyrant, which is faintly given here, is further developed in the next book, and finally worked up in Books viii and ix.

οἱ . . . τῶν τουούτων κακουργημάτων] ‘For robbers of temples, man-stealers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves are the names which
are given to those who do wrong in the particular branches of this class of crimes." The genitive depends on κατὰ μῆπη (which is a resumption of ἐφ᾽ ἔκαστο μῆπη). The class implied is the class which comprises the various forms of robbery, τοιούτων referring back to τὰλλοτρία... δημόσια. For this use of τοιούτων cp. iv. 430 ἐν δῇ τοιούτην δύναμι καὶ σωτηρίαν: Crat. 405 ἐπολέου τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν.


Socrates entreats Thrasymachus to stay and answer the momentous question. "What way of life is best?" He will thereby confer an immense benefit on the whole company. Only let him be consistent and not shift his ground. If the physician is to be regarded as a healer of the sick, not as a receiver of fees, the shepherd is not to be described as a glutton, or a money-maker, but simply as a feeder of sheep. In so far as he is a shepherd, he tends his flock not for his own advantage, but for their good. All art is exercised for the good of its object—else why does the artist ask for pay? Every art has its proper function, beyond which it has no interest or requirement. And the earning of payment is the function of a separate art (μαθησιών) which is only accidentally associated with the other arts, such as medicine, shepherding, or the government of men. Hence the true rulers will not take office without reward, unless they are threatened with the penalty of being ruled by their inferiors. The last is the only motive by which a good man can be induced to govern.

[344 D] ἀπεικόνισε ἡμῶν καταντήσας... τῶν λόγων] Compare the imitation of the expression by Lucian (Encom. Dem. § 16)—ἢ ποῦ γε, ἢπει, διανομένων μοι τῶν δὲν ἀπεικόνισε καταντήσας τῶν λοιπῶν λόγων; ἀφρόν—'in a mass'—expresses the flood of words which the Sophist pours out upon them.

[344 E] ἡ σμικρῶν... [ἡ] For the form of the sentence compare Laches 185 ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ ὠσκεῖ τινι κυδωνίαν καὶ σύ καὶ Λυσίσκας, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτίματος, ὅ τῶν ἐμφύσεων μέγεθος δὴ τυγχάνει; For the sentiment cp. Gorg. 500 c, where Socrates in like manner pleads with Callicles that he should be serious in speaking of a subject so important as the end of human life.

[344 E] διαγόμενος] sc. τῶν βίων. The middle voice marks the personal
interest which each man has in his own way of life. ‘How his life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage.’

ἔγν γὰρ . . . ἐξει [There is no use in my remaining:] ‘for I am of a different opinion about the matter’ (i.e. about the nature and profitableness of justice). This is the most satisfactory way of taking the passage.

Some editors place a mark of interrogation after ἐξει. Thrasy- machus would then be understood to say, in answer to the question ἢ σμικρὸν . . . ὡς; ‘Do I think anything else?’ i.e. about the importance of the question. But this is wanting in point. Schneider gives to the sentence a slightly different turn by placing a full stop after ἐξει, and supposes the words to be ironical: ‘Just as if I think otherwise!’ But the irony is not sufficiently marked.

ἴσως, ἢν δ' ἔγν, . . . κῆδεσθαι] ἴσως sc. οὐσθαὶ τοὺτο ἄλλος ἐξει. ‘So you seem; or rather you seem not to care a bit about us.’ Socrates affects to understand Thrasymachus to mean that he thinks differently about the importance of the question.

ὁτοὶ κακῶς σοι κείσται] ‘It will not be a bad investment.’ For the use of κείσται in the sense of ‘being invested or laid up’ so as to yield a return of profit or interest, cp. Soph. O. C. 1518 ἀ σο | γῆσω δεινα τῇ δι κείσται πάλιν, and above 333 c ἄλλα κείσται which is the explanation of παρακαταθῶσαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, i.e. ‘to be left on deposit.’

The Sophist is presented in a ludicrous point of view. He has been clamouring for a fee (337 ν), and now the fee is offered to him as a bribe to prevent his running away.

ἔγν γὰρ . . . πείθομαι] ‘For my part (τό γ' ἐμών) I tell you that I am not convinced.’

ἐστι μὲν ἄλλος] ‘Let a man be unjust,—not ‘Let her (sc. injustice) be as unjust as she will,’ which is poor and tautological.

διὸ . . . κερδαλέωτερον] ‘Still this does not convince me, for one, that injustice is more profitable than justice.’ διὸ πείθει: sc. this supposed impunity of injustice. The nominative to πείθει is gathered from the previous sentence. ‘Grant that the unjust man may be unpunished, still this does not convince me,’ &c. The slight difficulty of this accounts for the reading of Ficinus (mihi suades).
Plato: Republic.

Republic

I.

345

B

ἡ ἐλε ἐν τῇ ἰν ζυχήν . . . μὴ σοῦ γε] (Cp. vii. 518 c.) 'Must I take and put the argument bodily into your soul?' 'By Heaven,' I said, 'don't.' The impatience of Thrasydamus is met by Socrates with a cry of horror. 'God forbid!—not that, whatever you do.' The coarseness of the Sophistic method of imparting knowledge is compared to forcing food down another person's throat.

C

διὰ γὰρ . . . φυλάσσω] Socrates, as his manner is, resuming,—returning on the old track (ἀναλαβόμεν, ἵνα μεταλάβω), says to Thrasydamus: You see that 'having at first defined the physician as the true physician (341 c, 342 λ) you did not think fit afterwards (343 b) to retain the same accuracy in speaking of the shepherd.' For φυλάσσω, 'to keep in mind,' cp. Theaet. 182 c τούτῳ μόνῳ φυλάσσωμεν.

ποιμαίνων] Par. A has ποιμαινέω here in the text, which agrees with μέλλοντα ἐγκαίνησαί τε γε τὴν ἐνωχίαν ἐνῆρα, and with παχύνων supra 343 b. But the same MS. has ποιμαίνω in the margin by the first or second hand,—which is clearly right and necessary to the sense.

D


ἐπι . . . ποιμανικῇ εἶναι] 'Since it has sufficiently provided what concerns itself with a view to its being perfect, so long as it lacks nothing of being the art of shepherd.' The subject of ἐκ-πεποίησαι (Perf. Mid.) is ἡ ποιμανική, as is shown by the nominative βελτίστη.

E

ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἄρχῃ] 'In a public as in a private exercise of power': that is to say:—'And this applies not only to the shepherd and the physician, but also to the statesman.'

σῦ δὲ τῶν ἄρχωντας . . . ἄλλος ἀλλήλως ἄρχωντας recall Thrasydamus' own assumption (343 b) that the term is used in the strictest sense. The fact that the artist will not work without pay, shows that as far as his art is concerned he studies not his own interest but the interest of his subject-matter. This is also the case with the true ruler: he too, for the same reason, will not rule without being rewarded.

οδηγὶα] sc. οἴομαι.

τὸς ἀλλής ἄρχεις] There is a slight inaccuracy in the expression,
which arises out of the somewhat forced analogy supposed to exist
between the art of government and the other 'arts' or 'offices.'
Cp. 342 c ἀρχοντι γε αἱ τίχαι, and infra 346 ε.

[αὐτῶν] The rare Ionic form is here adopted for emphasis
and euphony. The other passages where it occurs in the Republic
are iii. 388 b, 389 b; viii. 560 ε, 564 c.

[ἐκεῖ τοσόον εἰπέ] In assigning to each art a separate power or
function, Socrates is preparing to distinguish the other arts from
the art of pay.

[ἀλλὰ] deprecates the imputation of perversity conveyed in
Socrates' last words:—'But I admit that to be the difference.'

[οὐκόν καὶ μισθωτική μισθῶν] 'The art of pay,' as the giving and
receiving of money is quaintly termed, is distinct from the other
arts: the art of the physician is no more μισθωτικὴ because the
physician takes fees, than the art of the pilot is the art of medicine,
because a sea-voyage may accidentally improve the health of the
sailor. 'The art of pay' has a curious sound to modern ears,
because there is no such use of language among ourselves. But
Plato might have defended the expression by saying that although
applicable to all the arts, the art of pay had, like them, an end and
a function, viz., that of providing maintenance for the practitioners
of all of them.

[συπερ ὑπῆθου] 'as you proposed.' Cp. supra 341 b.

[ἐστι, ἕφη] Thrasymachus becomes more reserved in his
replies, as he begins to see the inevitable consequence. 'Let us
suppose so.' Cp. Gorg. 504, 505.

[ἡμινα . . . ἐφελείνται] 'Whatever benefit all craftsmen have in
common manifestly arises from their additional use (προσχράμευοι)
in common of some one and the same thing'—τι τῷ τῷ αὐτῷ—
since the arts are peculiar and the benefit common. προσχράμευοι,
i.e. using in addition to their peculiar arts. ἀπ' ἐκείνου, 'from that'
and not from their own art.

[οὐ φαίνεται] 'Apparently not.' οὐ φαίνεται, like φαίνεται (cp.
note on 342 c) has various shades of meaning which can only be
determined by the context. As with οὐ φημι, οὐκ εἴω, the negative is
attracted to the main verb: οὐ φαίνεται = φαίνεται οὐκ (ἐφελείνται).

[ἀπ' οὖν . . . οἵματι ἔγωγε] 'Does the art then confer no benefit,'
when the artist works for nothing? 'I should think it does.'
The point of Socrates is to show that the good which the art does is separable from the good of the artist. Now the artist is not benefited unless he is paid, but his art confers a benefit all the same.

καὶ ἐπιτάττει] The arts have already been spoken of in several places as exercising command: supra 342 c, E; 345 E.

διὰ δὴ ταῦτα... ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ] ‘For which reason,’ i.e. because the ruler considers the interest not of himself but of his subjects. ταῦτα refers to the preceding sentence. The clause which follows, διὰ τοῦ μίλλων, κ.τ.λ., is a resumption and further explanation of it, and is itself again resumed in δι᾽ ἐν δὲ ἕνεκα.

κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων] Thrasymachus is again and again reminded, and in every form of speech (cp. οἱ ἀληθεῖς ἀρχοεῖν: 346 Β ἐισπέρ βοῦν ἄριστον διόρισεν, and ἐὰν δὲν ἄριστος σκοπεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.), that at his own suggestion (346 E) they are speaking of the ruler qua ruler.

μισθών δεῖν ὑπάρχειν] δεῖν, sc. ἀλήθεια, the construction being continued from the previous sentence; and this is assisted by the interposition of ὡς οὐκε. Cp. Philol. 20 ὡς τὸς ὑπὸ μήν, ὡς οἴμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀργουκορετῶν ἔτη λέγειν: Soph. 263 ἦς ταχύπασσω, ὡς οὐκεν, ἢ ταυτὶ σύνθεσις... γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.

δὲν κινδυνεύει... αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαται] ‘And this would seem to be the reason why the willingness to hold office, without waiting to be compelled, has been thought discreditable.’ ‘Nos autem versamur non in republica Platonis, sed in saepe Romuli.’ Compare the fable of Jotham (Judges ix. 8–15).

ἐὰν μὴ αὖτος ἐθαλῆ] referring to the indefinite τιά which is the subject of ἀρχεσθαι. For αὐτὸς referring to an indefinite word cp. Gorgias 520 c.

ἐπι τι κινδυνεύει... τῷ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ] Compare the derisive words of St. Paul (1 Cor. vi. 4): ‘If then ye have judgements of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the church’: and of Christ (Matth. xx. 26, 27), in which there is a similar irony arising out of their intense contrast to the spirit of this world: ‘Whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant.’

πᾶς... ὁ γνωστός] ‘every man of understanding.’

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαχθείς σκεφώμεθα] Socrates, as elsewhere, availing himself of the facilities of conversation, breaks off
Notes: Book I.

(Protag. 347 b, 357 b, 361 e, &c.), and defers a topic which is liable to become tedious. Instead of arguing out the question whether justice is the interest of the ruler, he takes up the subsequent statement of Thrasymachus, viz., that the unjust life is better than the just.

ποτέρως] This reading, which has the support of the best MSS., is preferred to Ast’s conjecture πότερον.

πότερον] πότερον ὡς, the reading of Α Π, admits of explanation, the ὡς being used pleonastically, as in ὡς ἄληθῶς, ὡς ἁλίκες (Phaedr. 276 c, Soph. 221 c). But it may also be due to a variation of reading between πότερον and ποτέρως.

ἓκουσας, ἢ ἡ ἐνε] Plato thus prepares the way for the part to be taken by Glaucon in Book ii.

ἐξουμν] sc. ἐν πείθουμ, to be supplied from πείθουμ.

ἀν μὲν τοῖν ... ἐκήμεθα] With ἀντικαταστάτησε, ‘replying to each other in set speeches,’ compare Protag. 329 A δολικῶν κατα-

tαινως τοῦ λόγου. For ἀριθμεῖν ἑτέρωκ compare Cratyl. 437 D τί ὁ ἱν
tοῦτο, ὁ Κρατύλε, ἄσπερ ψύρους διαμεθρυσμόμεθα τὰ ἐνόμισα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐσται ἡ ὀρθότητος; where Socrates, in a similar manner, repudiates the arithmetical method of determining the principles of language; also Gorgias 471 e, where Socrates refuses to permit the element of numbers to influence his judgement, and Theaet. 171 A, where the method of ‘counting noses’ is ironically retorted on Protagoras.

δοσα ... λέγομεν] δοσα (sc. ἐγαθίδ) ἐκατέρω ἐν ἑκατέρῳ (ἐν τῷ δίκαιων
eiω καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄδικων ἐνω) λέγομεν.

ἄνωμολογογόμενοι πρὸς ἄλληλον] ‘by the method of mutual admissions.’

ποτέρως, κ.τ.λ.] gentler and less direct than ποτέρως. ‘Would you tell me which of the two ways you prefer?’ Cr. Euthyd. 271 b ὁ πότερον καὶ ἄρωτος, κ. κρίτων;

οὗτος, ἐφι] ‘As you propose,’ referring to the words ἐν δὲ ἄσπερ ... ἱπτομεν ἐσόμεθα.

‘Perfect injustice,’ says Thrasymachus, ‘is more profitable than perfect justice.’ ‘Then will Thrasymachus maintain that the unjust are wise and good?’ ‘Undoubtedly, if only they have supreme power. In that case injustice is not only wise and good, but noble and strong.’ And now Thrasymachus has told Socrates his whole mind, and they can argue on a satisfactory basis.
Socrates begins by putting Thrasydamus to the question:

Well,—but will the just man try to gain advantage over the just? or aim at more than what is just? ‘If he did, he would not be the diverting creature that he is.’ ‘Or would he claim to take advantage of the unjust?’ ‘He might claim to do so, but he would not be able.’ But the unjust claims to take advantage both of his like and of his opposite, the just. Analogy shows this to be inconsistent with goodness and wisdom. No true musician aims at overstraining the lyre,—no artist seeks ‘to do better than well.’ And so the just man is like the good and wise artist, the unjust man like the bad artist. Now things which are alike have similar qualities, and therefore the just man is wise and good. To all this Thrasydamus is reluctantly forced to assent.

Thrasymachus is at first unwilling to hazard the assertion that injustice is virtue and justice vice. He says that justice is simplicity, injustice discretion. The statement is at length extracted from him that injustice is to be classed with wisdom and virtue, justice with their opposites. This proposition, which has been craftily drawn out of him, is the step in the argument which leads to his destruction. η marks the astonishment of Socrates: ‘And you mean to say?’ Cp. infra iii. 396 β η μισθόντας;—ἀνίκε γενναίαν θήθειν: ‘sublime simplicity.’ For the ironical use of γενναίος cp. infra ii. 372 β μάζε γενναίασ, v. 454 η γενναία ... η δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογητῆς τέχνης: vili. 544 c η γενναία δή τυπώσει: Soph. 231 β η γένε γενναίαι σοφιστίκη: and for θήθειν iii. 400 Ε οὐχ η δικον οὐδεν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλούμεν ὀς θήθειν.
Notes: Book I.

κακοήθεια] a paronomasia: κακοήθεια is not the opposite of εὐήθεια in the sense in which Thrasymachus uses it. But Socrates snatches at the etymological meaning of εὐήθεια to make a point against Thrasymachus.

σὺ δὲ ... λέγειν] to transfer these words to Socrates, as is done on the authority of Par. A in the Zurich edition of 1887, interferes with the flow of the passage. The occurrence of ἦν θεός after ἔφη, though uncommon, is sufficiently accounted for by supposing a pause after ποιεῖν τι. Cp. Xen. Oecon. c. xvii. 8 πάντα μιᾷ ὁμολόγῳ, ἔφη: ἦν δὲ γέ ἦ, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ. and infra 351 A νῦν δὲ γʹ, ἔφη. The distinction of persons in Par. A, however, is clear.

λυσιτελεῖ ... ἠλεγον] 'Even this sort of thing is advantageous, if undetected, but not worth mention: the real profit (ἀλλὰ sc. ἐστὶν ἄξιον λόγου) is in what I was just now speaking of,' that is, in τελεῖ διαία. νῦν δὴ refers chiefly to 344 B, c.

ἔθαμμασα] Aorist of the immediate past.

τούτο ... στερεώστερον] (i) 'This new position is firmer,—' now you are on more substantial ground': or perhaps (2) 'this is harder to make an impression upon,' i.e. to deal with satisfactorily in argument. Par. A here reads ἓανow for ἓδιον, as ἓδιον for ἓαν in ii. 370 A.

ἀληθιστατα ... μαντεύει] 'That guess of yours is wonderfully near the truth.'

ἄλλα τόδε μοι πειρᾶ, κ.τ.λ.] A singular argument follows the admission that the unjust desires universal excess. The admission, which is rather unmeaning, seems to have arisen out of the desire of Thrasymachus to attribute to him every possible preeminence. In the argument the grasping nature of the unjust is contrasted with the moderation of the just, whose desires reach no higher than justice, and this, as Thrasymachus says, is the reason why he is such an amusing creature. The aim of the one is affirmed to be excess in all cases, the aim of the other, excess over deficiency, and attainment of the right measure. Immediately Socrates appeals to the analogy of the arts. No true artist desires excess in all cases, and the true artist is wise and good; therefore the just, not the unjust, is wise and good. But the conclusion thus arrived at contradicts the hasty assertion of Thrasymachus, that injustice is to be classed with wisdom and goodness, justice with their opposites. Compare the French proverb, 'Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien,'
Plato: Republic.

and the words of Pembroke to King John (Shak., King John, iv. 2. 28)—

'When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

Also Lear i. 4. 369 'Striving to better, oft we mar what's well': and Sonnet 103. 9, 10:—

'Were it not sinful then, striving to mend,
To mar the subject that before was well?'

Cp. also Gorgias 508 α γὰρ ἔστιν ἄσκειν γενετρίας ἀμελείς: and the Kantian conception of freedom as obedience to law. The two kinds of measure in the Politicus (283), viz. (i) the comparative measure of more and less; and (2) the reference to a standard, belong to the same line of thought. Summed up in a word or two, the argument is that justice, if it be like the arts, aims not at excess, but at law and measure.

οὐδὲτις δικαίας] 'Far otherwise, else he would not have been the amusing and simple-minded individual that he is.' ἀστείος, 'townbred,' as opposed to 'living far off in the fields.' Hence it acquires the meaning of 'witty,' 'clever,' which easily passes into that of 'amusing;' 'charming,' 'the cause of wit in others.' Cp. Lysis 204 ἀστείος γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, δρι ἄρθρια. 'It's charming to see you blush.'

οὐδὲ τής δικαίας] sc. πράξεως, which is found in one MS.

έι...μή] Although εἰ is interrogative, μή and not οὐ is used, because Socrates asks whether this, in the opinion of Thrasymachus, is probable. The use of δὲ in the preceding sentences has given a hypothetical turn to the expression. Cp. Goodwin, M. and T. 667, 5.

tοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου] Sc. ἄξιον πλέον ἔχειν. 'But he does claim to have more than the unjust.' The context shows that this only applies where the unjust errs on the side of deficiency. For the use of δὲ, when a negative has preceded in the first clause, compare i. 354 άδίκον γε εἶναι οὐ λυστελεί, εὐδαιμόνα δὲ: iv. 422 δὲ οὐ πλέον δὲ: and for the use of πλεονεκτεῖν in this passage cp. Laws iii. 691 ά

πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν τεβέλων νόμων.

τι δὲ δὴ...πράξεως] 'What of the unjust? Does not he claim as his due more than the just man, more than the just action?'

όδη δὴ...τοῦ ἄρμοστοι] 'Let us put-the matter thus: the just does not desire more that his like, but more than his unlike;
but the unjust desires more than both his like and unlike.' With this statement Thrasymachus is remarkably well satisfied. Cp. Philebus 27 ε, where Philebus is similarly entrapped: ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη... τῶν τῶ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἣττων δεχομένων ἑστῶν; Φί. Ναι, τῶν τῶ μᾶλλον, & ἰδῶρατες' ού γὰρ ἐγ' ἡδονὴ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἀτείρων ἐτύγχανον πενεκός καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

Thrasymachus accepts with ludicrous eagerness and want of foresight the restatement of his own opinion.

ὁ δὲ μὴ μὴ τουκένα] Par. A (reading ὁ δὲ, μὴ τουκένα) omits the first μὴ, which, though not necessary, makes the meaning more distinct.

tουτός ἂρα... τουκέν] sc. τουτός, οὐί εἰσιν ἱερὸν ὄλοπερ τουκέν.
nὰ μὲν νὰ μὲν τὰ μᾶλλα; ] sc. ἄλλο.

οὐς ὄρευ] sc. λέγεις;

ἀρμοτόμενοι λύραν] 'In tuning his lyre.'

ἐν τῇ ἐδοκῇ ή τὸσεί] i.e. 'in the diet which he prescribes.'

ἀλλ' ἱσομ. . . . ὀὐτός ἰχεῖν] Thrasymachus makes a grudging admission: 'I suppose that this must be as you say.'

ἡμεν, ἰχή] Thrasymachus still holds this fast.

ἀναπεφαναι] 'has turned out to be.' The word expresses the new light in which the subject is suddenly revealed to Thrasymachus and the company. Cp. i. 334 σκέπτεται ἂρα τίς ὁ δίκας . . . ἀναπεφαναι. The skilful management of refractory opponents in the hand of Socrates is one of the comic elements of the Platonic dialogue. Other striking examples are the treatment of Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias, of Anytus in the Meno, of Euthydemus and Euthypor in the dialogues which are named after them. Perhaps the highest exhibition of this dramatic power is to be found in the Protagoras, in which Socrates adapts himself to numerous adversaries with the happiest versatility.

ὁ δὲ ἔπειτα] The reading δὲ, which is found in Ven. II, but not in Par. A, is more emphatic and expressive than δή, which however has the authority of Α Μ Τ. δή marks the transition from a dramatic to a descriptive passage and may be translated: 'Now Thrasymachus assented to all this,' δέ, according to the English idiom, is better omitted, and the words may be translated simply: 'Thrasymachus assented,' &c. The latter reading has been retained by Hermann and Baiter.
Plato: Republic.

Republic I. 350 D 

_τότε καὶ_ is probably a mock heroic form of expression (like the imitation of Homer in Protag. 315 D καὶ μὲν ἄν τὸν ἀνθρώπον γε εἰσείναι) : cp. esp. Il. v. 394 _τότε καὶ_ μω ἀνέκειτον λάβειν ἄγος. _καὶ_ adds emphasis to _τότε εἶδον_ : 'Ay, and then I saw.' The unusual order has led to the erroneous punctuation of Par. A, which places the point after _τότε._

_Θρασύμαχος ἔρωβιώτα_] Compare Protag. 312 A, where the youthful Hippocrates is seen by the light of the opening dawn to have a blush upon his face, as he professes his intention of becoming a disciple of the Sophist.

350 D–352 B 

_The comparative strength of justice and injustice is tested by an independent argument._ Suppose a city to have triumphed in complete injustice, and to have subjugated many other cities. Can this triumph be secured without the help of justice? Can a city or an army or a band of robbers do any unjust thing in common, if they do not keep faith with one another? And what is true of large bodies of men is true also of two or three. If they are absolutely unjust, they will quarrel and fight and hate each other and be paralysed in action. And it is true also of the individual. If he is completely penetrated by injustice, he will be divided against himself and cannot stand. And he is the enemy of just men, and also of the Gods whose justice even Thrasymachus will not venture to deny. Complete injustice, therefore, is complete powerlessness.

350 D _ἐφαμεν_] Cp. supra 344 c. Socrates, with an apparent graciousness, but really with the object of drawing Thrasymachus into a fresh contradiction, reasserts a proposition formerly maintained by Thrasymachus (supra 344 c). Thrasymachus, who has learnt from experience to be cautious of Socrates, is in reply surly and reserved. For the plural, including the speaker as well as the respondent, cp. Theaet. 210 B ἦ οὐν ἦν καρούμεν . . . ὃ φίλε;

_οὐδὲ ἢ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει . . . δημηγορεῖν ἐν μὲ φαίτις_] 'I am not contented with your last conclusion any more than with the former ones, and I could answer you: but if I did, I well know that you would say I was haranguing.'

E _μυθάμως . . . παῦ ὑ γε τὴν συντοῦ βοήθων_] Cp. Gorgias 500 B καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὃ καλλίστηκε, μὴ με αὐτὸσ ὃν ἄγων πρὸς ἐμὶ παιζεῖν, μητὶ ὅ τι ἢ τύχει παῦ τὰ δοκοῦσα ἀποκρίνου.

_τοῦτο . . . ὅπερ ἔρτι_] Cp. supra D _ἐφαμεν_ . . . _μέμνησαι_.
Notes: Book I.

Ina kal ἔξης ... ἄδικων] Cp. Politicus 281 D οὐκέτιν ὁ λόγος, in ἐφεξῆς ἤμων ὁ λόγος ίπ.

ὔν δέ γ', ἔφην] Par. A reads ἔφη. But ἔφην is obviously the right reading; ν has been dropped from the compendium ἔφη consolation.

ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τι οὖτως ἀπλῶς ... σκέψονται] ‘I do not wish to consider the argument in this simple and abstract manner’ (i.e. that injustice is folly and therefore weakness), but to show, by the example of states and individuals, how it actually works.

πολὺν φανᾶ ἄν ... δουλωμοίνην] ‘You would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave, or may have utterly enslaved other states, while already holding many in subjection under her.’ Three stages are supposed:—(1) states attacked with a view to subjection; (2) states utterly subdued in recent struggles (καταδεδουλώσθαι); (3) states held in subjection (πολλά ... ἐχεῖν δουλωμοίνην). As elsewhere, the complexity of the thing imagined makes the language harsh.

εἰ μὲν ... ἄδικως] ‘If the case is as you were saying, and justice is wisdom, then, with justice; but if as I was saying, with injustice.’ The MS. authority is strongly in favour of ἤχει, the other reading, ἰστι, being an obvious correction which is meant to remedy the anacolouthon. The repetition of εἰ before ἡ δικαιοσύνη (a conjecture of Baiter’s) is unnecessary, and also objectionable on the ground of the hiatus. The irregular construction may be defended by other passages of Plato, in which one of two clauses is an explanation of the other. Cp. Theaet. 203 ζ ἔχει ὁ δικαιοσύνη, ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ιδία ... ι ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοτότων στοιχείων γιγνομίνη ἡ συναρμοσθείση, where the reading has been questioned equally without reason.

μετὰ δικαιοσύνης] sc. τὴν δύναμίν ταύτην ἀνάγαγε ἤχειν.

πῶν ἄγαμαι] Cp. a similar mode of practising on Meletus in the Apology 27 c ὡς ὀπάσας, ὡς μόνις ἀπεπρόν ὡς τούτῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος. See also Gorgias 449 c, d.

οὐκ ἐπινεύεις ... ἀνανεύεις] Cp. supra 350 E.

σοι γὰρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι] Thrasymachus wishes to intimate that the defeat which he sustains is to be attributed to his own good nature. The imperative moods which follow, ἔστω, ἔχειν, ἔστωσον, imply that he is ready to admit anything which Socrates likes: ‘let
us say so; 'agreed,' 'if you will,' 'we won't quarrel about that.'
And he is encouraged in his self-conceit by Socrates' words—Εὖ γε
σὺ ποιῶν, ἢ ἅριστε, &c., of which he fails to see the irony. Callicles
in the Gorgias (516 b) in the same temper says—Πάντα γε, ἢν σοι
χαρίσμαι. This is an ingenious device by which Plato is enabled
to carry on the argument to the end, without requiring his adversary
to undergo a process of sudden conversion.


D

ἡ γὰρ ;] This formula used interrogatively expects an affirmative
answer. 'Surely that is so?'

ἐν ἀλευθέρωσι τε καὶ δουλοις] 'alike in freemen and in slaves.'

E

ἐὰν δὲ δὴ] For the conflict with self cp. Laws i. 626 D αὐτῷ
dὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν πότερον ἡς πολεμὸν πρὸς πολέμον διανοητέον, ἢ πῶς ἢν
λέγομεν; also viii. 560; Soph. 223 b.

καὶ θεωρεῖε] marks the intense interest of Socrates as the
conclusion he has been preparing rises in full proportions before his
mind (ἀναπέφαντα supra 350 c).

μῶν μὴ] like other interrogative particles, used with some
uncertainty of meaning, which has to be defined by the context;
for instance, in this passage, it seems to require a negative answer,
but in Phaedo 84 c it merely suggests a doubt (τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν
μὴ δοκή ἡιδὲς λελέχθαι; πολλὰ γὰρ δὴ ἢν ἢξε ἣποψίας). It is
a pleonastic expression which intensifies the interrogation. Either
μῶν or μὴ might be omitted without any perceptible difference,
except a slight weakening of the sense. μῶν, having lost its
etymological sense of μὴ οὖν, allows the μὴ to be repeated.

ἀδητό] sc. πόλις, γίνοις or στρατόπεδον.

καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ] 'with all that opposes, and
therefore (inclusively) with the just.'

καὶ θεωσ ἀρα] θεωσ ἐχθρός was a common form of abuse (and
therefore a term to be deprecated beyond others). See Soph.
Phil. 1031 πῶς, & θεωσ ἐχθροτε, κ.τ.λ.: Demosth. de Cor. p. 241 Bekk.,
§ 46 ἐν κόλακι καὶ θεωσ ἐχθροι καὶ τόλλι ἐπορεύει πάντη ἀκούοντων.

Compare with this whole passage the description of the tyrannical
man in Book ix. (577 ff).

εὐχῶν τοῦ λόγου ... ἀπέχθωμαι] Socrates takes up the word
εὐχῶν with ἐστιασις, which is again echoed by Thrasymachus at the
end of the book, 354 A τοῦτα δὴ σοι ... εἰσπηγόν ἐν τοῖς ἑνδικίοις.

Thrasymachus is seeking to cover his defeat by casting upon his
adversaries the reproach of intolerance. 'I shall make enemies here if I oppose you.' Compare the discomfiture of Gorgias and Polus through their fear of incurring odium: Gorgias 487 A, B ἄρα δὲ ἐξω τόδε, Πόργιας τε καὶ Πάλλους, ὅσοι μὲν καὶ φίλου ἀντὶν ἐκριν᾽ ἐκεῖ, ἐνδεικτικὸν δὲ παραφράσεα καὶ αὐξανητηριώμεν μᾶλλον τοῦ διανόω σ. 

Once more, are just men happier than the unjust, as well as wiser, better and stronger? 

Every creature has a work or function. And everything does its own work best, when it has its proper excellence. For example, the eye sees best when it is possessed of perfect vision, which is the opposite of blindness. Now life is the function of the soul, and justice (as we have seen) is the virtue or excellence of the soul. Therefore the soul lives best when it has justice. And to live well is to be happy. 

Justice, then, is more profitable than injustice, if to be happy is profitable. 

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ... τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο] After a somewhat long digression (ὅτι γὰρ ἄν ... πρᾶτειν ἄδικοι) the sentence is resumed in the words—ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὔτως ἔστι, μάθαμεν. The first part, as far as λέγομεν, is governed by ὅτι, and τούτῳ οὐ παντάκαιρον ἀδικεῖ λέγομεν proceeds as if οὐ ξαφνίηθησαί ὅταν φαμέν τις. ἄλλον ὅχε ... ἐτίθεσο which is opposed to οὔτως ἔστι, repeats and emphasizes the antithesis. There is also a slight inexactness either of expression or of citation here, which is worth noticing as a point of style. The phrases ὡς σοὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο and ὥσπερ τὸ ὀστερόν προθύμως σκέψασθαι do not strictly agree. τὸ πρῶτον refers vaguely to the past discussion and suggests Socrates' subsequent criticism of the theory: 'which you maintained at first, but which I have since shown to be false.' The theory in question is that injustice is stronger than justice; and this, like the assertion next discussed—that injustice is happier than justice, is one aspect of Thrasy-machus' second contention—that injustice is generally superior to justice. τὸ ὀστερόν therefore contains a more exact reference than τὸ πρῶτον, alluding, not indefinitely to the past discussion, but to a definite point in it—the 'second contention,' as opposed to the first, that justice is the interest of the stronger (see above, 347 ν, ζ). There is a slight inaccuracy in substituting a particular form of superiority—superior happiness—for superiority in general; and the introduction of τὸ ὀστερόν obscures the fact that the second
contention of Thrasymachus involves superior strength quite as much as superior happiness.

The various reading ὅθι (M), though inferior in manuscript authority, is not to be disregarded.

The omission of ἰν in the following sentence, μαχαίρα . . . ἀποτέλεσμα, where however it is inserted in some MSS. of inferior note, may be defended on similar grounds.

Schneider defended the manuscript reading ἰν φαμὼν by comparing Laws iv. 712 ἐγὼ δὲ οὖν τὸν ἱκάλημα τοῦ πολεμητῆς ἤστο, ὅπερ εἶπον, ὅπερ εἶπεν τὸ τότε τῶν πολεμικῶν, and infra x. 610 λ ὡδότατα ἰν, ἔφη, λέγει so MSS. But the latter passage is easily corrected,—see note in loco,—and in the former ἵνα εἶπεν = ἰν εἶπομαι. There is no sufficient ground for refusing to admit so slight an alteration as the addition of an iota here any more than in vi. 494 ἐν ᾑπαίσον . . . ἐν ἀπαίσω, where Schneider vainly defends the manuscript reading ἰν πᾶνω.

μαχαίρα [ἰν] ἀμφελοῦ ἰν is omitted in Par. A, but may have dropped out between ἰν and ὁμ.

τι δὲ; ἵνων ἢν τι ἐργον;} ‘Did we speak of any function of ears?’ The imperfect refers to what has preceded, 352 τι δὲ; ἀκούσας ἀκρό ἡ ὡσιν; υποδαμῶς, as in Cratylus 410 το κο σμίν ἢν ἢν το μετὰ τοῦτο, referring to 408 οῦ, and Soph. 263 δει τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢν λόγον ὧν ἔγον ὑπάρχει εἶναι λόγον. ἡν = ‘was admitted by us.’

ὀδοιών καὶ ἄρτη';] Cp. Gorg. 468 β, 499 ζ, where the notion of an end appears in a still more rudimentary form. The conception of an ἐργον and an ἄρτη πρὸς το ἐργον is derived from the analogy of art, the province of which has not yet been thoroughly distinguished from the sphere of nature and of morals. The conception exercised a great influence on Logic and Ethics in the ancient world, leading to the ἄθαναθ of Aristotle, the opposition of means and ends, and the division of moral and intellectual virtue. Modern philosophy has moulded Ethics into another form. The favourite notion of a τάγματον or ‘summum bonum,’ of which the conception of an ἐργον is the germ, has been replaced by modes of speech such as duty, law, the will of a superior being, or resolved into the more concrete abstractions of utility and pleasure.

ἐξε ἢ;] ‘Well then,’ is used with various degrees of force for ‘hold,’ ‘stay,’ passing also into a mere invitation to attend or con-
sider. Cp. Laws i. 639 d ἐξε δή τῶν πολλῶν κοινωνίων ξυμπότας καὶ ξυμπότα θείων δὲ μιὰν τῶν εὐνοου下的 εἷς;

ἀρ ἀν ... καλῶς ἀπεργάσαστο] Heindorf conj. ἀπεργάσαστο, perhaps with reason. The use of the plural verb with the neuter plural nominative has been explained as a remnant of Epic usage, as a personification, or as due to the substitution in thought of a masculine plural substantive for a neuter plural having the same meaning, or to some other natural association. Cp. Thucyd. iv. 88 τὰ τολὴ (the magistrates) ... αὐτῶν ἐξέσπερυ

The construction in any of these cases follows the sense rather than the grammatical form. A doubt however is thrown on the passage by various readings, ἀπεργάσονται, ἀπεργάζονται, ἀπεργάσασθαι, and by the use of ἄρα with the singular ἀπεργάσαται in the next sentence. The reading of the MSS. has however been retained in the text; because Greek usage is not absolutely uniform in requiring the neuter plural to be joined to a verb singular.

ﺤ� ἐ... ἐρωτὼ] ‘Say rather, whatever their virtue is, for I have not come to that question yet.’ He means that he would rather affirm a general proposition (ἐὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἐρωτῇ ... ἐδ ἐργάσεσαι τὰ ἐργαζόμενα), and not anticipate the particular. Every step is to follow regularly in the dialectical process.

τίδεμεν ... λόγον;] ‘Do we include all other things under the same statement?’

tο ... ἀρχεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Phaedo 94 b. The pronoun αὐτά resumes τό ἐπιμελείσθαι ... πάντα.

ἐκεῖνη] The gender follows ψυχῇ and not ἄτυ ἐλλη. C 354

ἐδιαίρεσα δὲ] Cp. supra 349 c, d τοῦ δὲ ἐδιαίρεσαν, and note.

Thrasymachus is silenced, but Socrates is not satisfied. For he feels that he has passed on too quickly to consider certain attributes of justice, before he has defined what justice is.

ἄλλ' ὅστερ οἱ λίχνοι, κ.τ.λ.] This is imitated by Polybius, B. P. iii. 57, 7 εἰ δὲ τιμῶς ἐπιστροφοῦντι κατὰ τόπον καὶ κατὰ μέρος τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀκούοι, ἕως ἐγγοοῦσι παραπληθῶν τι πάχνουτε τοῖς λίχνοις τῶν διερημένων. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι, πάντων ἀπογυμνοί τῶν παρακείμενων, ὅτε κατὰ τὸ παρόν οὐδὲνις ἀληθῶς ἀπολαύουσι τῶν βραχίων, ὅπ' ἐὰ τὸ μέλλον ὀφείλειν εὖ αὐτῶν τῷ ἀνάδουσι καὶ τροφῇ κομίζομαι. The passage is a good example of the manner in which later writers amplified the ideas of Plato. See also Julian, Orat. ii. p. 69 c and Themist., Orat. xviii. p. 220 b.
Plato: Republic.

A similar image occurs in the Sophist 251 B ὅθεν γε, ὧμα, τόι τε νέοι καὶ τῶν γερόντων τόις ὕσμαθισι θοίνην παρακενάκαμεν: and in the Lysis 211 C, D τί ὑμεῖς, ἐφι στὶς ἤκτωμεν, ἀκτῶ μᾶλλ᾽ ἔστιν διον, ἢ μὴ δὲ οὖ ἐπειδήδεπτον τῶν λόγων; Compare also the opening words of the Timaeus.

πρὶν δὲ τὸ πρῶτον, κ.τ.λ.] Plato is loose in recapitulating here. The question—'What is justice?' was immediately followed by the question which Thrasymachus raised, whether justice or injustice was the more expedient, and the question whether justice is wisdom or folly was subordinate to this. But in glancing backwards from the conclusion that the just man has the better life, Socrates recalls the argument about the wise and good (349), as if it had arisen independently. The order (1, 2, 3) is not that in which the questions were raised by Thrasymachus, but that in which they were discussed. Such slight inconsistencies are very natural to the freedom of discourse. See above, 352 B.

Socrates ends the discussion with the truly Socratic thought, that the result of a long inquiry is ignorance. The First Book of the Republic, and the first half of the Second Book, though here and there (335 α–ε, 352 λ) containing true and deep thoughts, are in general destructive only. The controversy with the Sophists which has been carried on in the Protagoras, Meno, Gorgias, and other dialogues, is now concluded, or takes another direction (cf. Sophist and Politicus). In the Republic, as elsewhere in Plato, they are the representatives of the popular morality in a better or worse form; their theory accords with the practice of the world, which is the great Sophist (vi. 492 λ): this is contrasted by Socrates with the deeper truths and higher aspirations of philosophy. The thought that he who is ignorant of the nature of anything cannot know its qualities or attributes is very characteristic of Plato, and is the germ of a distinction which has exercised a lasting influence on philosophy. Compare Laches 190 λ, β εἰ γὰρ μὴν αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδείημεν ὅ τι ποι’ ἔστιν δόσιν ἢ ὅ τι ἔστιν ἄκοι, σχολή δὲ σύμβουλι τε ἐξίον λόγον γενομένη καὶ λατρείς ἢ περὶ δορθαλμῶν ἢ περὶ ἔτων, ὅπως ἄρα ἡ ἐν κτήσει τις: Protag. 361 C: Meno 71 B συμπένθηκα τοὺς πολίτας τούτον τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτῶν καταμέμψεις ὥσον εἷδος περὶ ἄρετῆς τὸ παράπαν ὅ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστι, πῶς δὲ όποῖον γε τι εἰδείην;
BOOK II.

Glaucopis is determined to continue the argument. The theory which Thrasymachus has ineffectually maintained is one which passes current in various forms, and although it has no practical influence on ingenuous youths, yet their minds are confused by incessantly hearing it preached on every side.

τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς δοκεῖ, προοιμίαν] As a parallel of style we may compare Laws iv. 722 νόμον δὲ ἀριτί μοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ἄρχοντα, τὰ δὲ ἐμπροσθεν ἦν πάντα ἠμῶν προοίμια νόμων. τὸ in τὸ δὲ resumes ταῦτα εἶπον: 'What I had said, I thought was the end, but it turned out to be (ἄρα) only the beginning.'

ο γὰρ Γλαύκων . . . πρὸς ἄπαντα] Another example of this 'intrepidity of talk' in Glaucopis occurs in Xen. Mem. iii. 6, where he is described as dragged from the Bema, and with difficulty persuaded by Socrates that at twenty years of age he does not possess the qualifications of a statesman. In viii. 548 b he is compared to the representative of timocracy for his ἡμικοίμας. Glaucopis is also the 'juvenis qui gaudet canibus avibusque' (v. 459 λ), who breeds animals and birds; and the man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love (v. 474 δ). He is an interlocutor in the introduction to the Parmenides and Symposium. For ἄνθρωπος cp. Polit. 263 δ, where the young Socrates is called ὁ πάντων ἄνθρωπον after a similar exhibition of boldness: also Theaet. 204 Ε ἄρρενθος γε, ὃ Θεάτης, μάχη.

dei τὸ before ἄνθρωπος is closely connected with καὶ δὴ καὶ, which, as frequently, introduces an instance illustrating the general statement. The Greek expresses by a co-ordinate clause what in English would be introduced by a relative: 'For Glaucopis, who is always,' &c.

τὴν ἀπόρρησιν] 'Renunciation of the argument' (cp. supra i. 350 δ, κ. 358 δ). Cp. the use of ἀπειρεῖν, Phaedo 85 c: ἀπεγείρειν, infra 368 c, viii. 568 c: Theaet. 200 b: ἀπηρεῖν, ibid. See also Phileb. 11 c Φιλήσοι τὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ κάλος ἀπειρηκαίν.

παρὰ τρόπῳ] 'in every way,' cp. infra 368 c δ τὸ ὁλὸς Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔδειξεν παρὰ τρόπῳ βοηθησαί—i.e. 'to do all that he could to assist.' The expression is passing into an adverb, and may be compared with πάνω, παράπασι, παράκαθι, πάσῃ μικαίῃ, πάσῃ τίχῃ.
With the threefold division of goods which is given in the text may be compared the Aristotelian distinction (Eth. Nic. i. 6, 9) of goods which are pursued for their own sake, and goods which are means to other goods; also the statement (Eth. Nic. i. 7, 5) that the highest good (εὐδαιμονία) is the end of other goods, and not pursued for the sake of anything else: which implies a slightly different point of view from that of Plato in this passage. Yet afterwards (vi. 508) a higher good which gives reality even to virtue and knowledge and reaches beyond them, is also admitted. In the Philebus (65, 66) Good is measured by three tests—beauty, symmetry and truth,—and arranged in five degrees or stages: (1) measure; (2) symmetry; (3) reason and wisdom; (4) science, art, and true opinion; (5) unmixed pleasures.

Socrates in his refutation of Thrasy-machus has been led to dwell on the superior profitableness of Justice. He seems to acknowledge himself that this is an unsatisfactory way of treating the subject. For (i. 354 c) he cannot know whether the just man is happy until he knows what justice is, any more than in the Meno (100 b) he can tell how virtue is acquired until he knows the nature of virtue. The question which Socrates had left unexamined is raised again by Glaucon, who, proceeding from another point of view, asks ‘What is Justice stripped of its externals?’

The reading of the text is that of the best MSS. καὶ μηδὲν has been altered by Stephanus and some of the later editors into καὶ μηδὲν, and γιγνεται into γιγνηται, on slight external authority, from an objection to the use of μηδὲν in an independent clause. But the indefinite force of the relative (δοσις) is continued, and therefore the use of μηδὲν is justified: διὰ ταύτας is added because the subject is changed and the Greek idiom does not allow of the repetition of the relative (δε' δοσις). διὰ ταύτας γιγνεται = αἱ ποιοῖς. Cp. i. 337 ο ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἶν, which is used as though εἰ μὴ εἰδεῖν or ὡς μὴ εἰδεῖν had preceded.—Glaucou's eager logic separates in idea what cannot be separated in fact. He forgets that harmless pleasures may be loved both for their own sake and for their effects.

ἡ χάρα γίγνομαι] (1) γίγνομαι, sc. αὐτᾶς, or (2) 'to go on rejoicing,' L. and S. s. v. γίγνομαι b iv. 2.
Notes: Book II.

... τὸ κἀμοντα ἱατρεύσαθαι] Corresponding to the mixed or contrasted pleasures of the Philebus (44 ff.).

ἵατρευχις τε καὶ ἀνὸς χρηματισμός] (1) 'The practice of healing and other modes of money-making,'—the practice of medicine being included under money-making. The thought of ἱατρεύς has suggested ἱατρεύς, and hence this is given as the most obvious example of χρηματισμός. This is better than (2) understanding the words to mean—healing and also money-making,' according to the well-known idiom. Cf. infra 371 A τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν and τῶν ἄλλων δικαίων. Gorgias 473 C πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζήνων.

ἑαὐτῶν] the reflexive pronoun here does not refer to the subject of the verb.

ἑστι γὰρ οὖν ... τί δή;] 'There is, I said, certainly this third class also. But what then?'

ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ] This 'fairest' intermediate class may be compared with the 'mixed' or concrete essence of the Philebus. See especially Phileb. 26 C οἶον μὲν ὕμεια καλλος καὶ λεχών, καὶ ἐν ψυχώ, ἀδ' πάμπολα ἔτερα καὶ πάγκαλα: ibid. 27 D μικρὰ μὲν ἐθείμαι πον τῶν μυκτῶν βίων ἡδων τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιτόπου εἰδουσ] sc. εἰδω.

ἄκικα δ' ἐπιμείναται] The omission of these words in Par. A may be due to the likeness of terminations (ψίγεια, ἐπιμείνα). See Essay on Text, p. 103. The statement of the other side of an alternative where one only is in point is frequent in Plato.

ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις ... δυσμαθής] 'But I, you see, am a slow sort of person.'

ἐν σοι ταῦτα δοκὴ] A shortened or elliptical form of expression—'and then we shall see whether or no you and I agree.' ἢν gives a softened and colloquial turn to the hypothesis. Cp. Theaet. 156 c δῆρες, ἢν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ, ib. 192 E: Xen. Cyr. ii. 4, 16 ἀκούει τοῖς ... ἢν τι σοι δόξω λέγειν.

In order to elicit from Socrates a convincing argument in favour of absolute justice, Glaucon restates the Sophistic theory in a more abstract and more developed form.

διδ ... ἐπαινῶν] 'And so I will do my utmost to declare the praises of the unrighteous life.' For κατατέλην cp. 367 B ὡς δίναμι μᾶλλον κατατέλην λέγω. So διατέλεσιν, συντέλεσι, ἐπιτελείν, ἐπιτελείω.
Republic
II.
358 D

occur in a metaphorical sense, implying a high degree of effort or tension: v. 474 ἀ θει διατηταμένουs: vii. 536 μάλλον ἐπειδήμενος εἰσιν: Soph. 239 ὥς τι μᾶλλον δύνασαι συνειδήσει πνεύμη.

αἱ σοι βουλομένη ν καὶ λέγω] The suppressed word is probably ἕστιν, or possibly λέγω, echoed from the relative clause.

E

οἷν τε] sc. ἕστιν. This reading, though not of much authority, seems probable, the reading of Ven. Π, τι οἷν τε being perhaps an emendation of τι δὲ τε, the reading of Par. Α ΜΕ, &c., which is also possible, notwithstanding the harshness of the construction ('being what, and whence, it arises'), and has far higher manuscript authority. τι οἷνται γ' is derived from τι οἷν τε. [τι δὲντε may be a corruption of τι ἔστι, L. C.] The nature of Justice is distinguished from its origin, although in the following argument the two are discussed together. Cp. infra 359 B αὐτὴ τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ δὲν πέφυκε τουαὐτα.

358 E-
359 B

In the nature of things to do wrong is a great good, but to suffer wrong is a still greater evil. Whence those who have not power to escape the evil and secure the good make an agreement with their fellows, by which they try to get rid of both. This is the origin of law and right, and the neutrality so brought about is Justice.

358 E

πεφυκέναι . . . (359 B) ὡς καὶ λόγος] Cp. the words of Thrasy-machus in i. 344 C οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν . . . τὸν ἄθελὸν. The same theory is otherwise stated in the Gorgias, where the favourite opposition of νόμος and φύσις also occurs: see especially Gorg. 483 B ἀλλ', οἷον, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ αὐθεντικοὶ διερωτοί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί, κ.τ.λ. (Callicles is the speaker), 'The makers of laws are the many and the weak; so that legislation and praise and blame have all a view to them and to their interest. They terrify the mightier sort of men who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say that to take advantage of others is base and unjust and that injustice is the attempt to take advantage. Their reason is, as I believe, that being inferior they are well pleased to share alike.'

359 A

Σοκι] Ast conj. δοκεῖν, in keeping with the oratio obliqua which precedes and follows. But the number of consecutive infinitives, which is supposed to have led the copyist to try his hand at emendation, may rather be said to account for the return to the indicative here, although the infinitive construction is resumed immediately afterwards.
Notes: Book II.

(1) ‘Agreements with one another’—αὐτῶν for ἀλλήλων as elsewhere: Laws x. 889 Ε ἐκ τοῦ ἐν τούτωι συν-αιμαλότησιν νομοθετοῦμεν. Or (2), reading αὐτῶν: ‘And this they say is the beginning of the imposition of laws and covenants among them.’ αὐτῶν is best; the objective genitive is equivalent to πρὸς αὐτοῖς, sc. ἀλλήλους. So in Thucyd. i. 140 τὸ Μεγαρίας ψήφισμα = τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρίας ψήφισμα: infra iii. 391 c ἵππηραν Ὀδώρ, i.e. πρὸς θεοὺς.


ἀρρωστὴρ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν] ‘through want of confidence in their power to do wrong.’

If men had power to be unjust with impunity they would agree to no such compact. This is illustrated by the legend of Gyges’ ring, which changed him from an innocent shepherd into a guilty usurper, simply by enabling him to become invisible. Let the just man and the unjust each have such a power, and they will both act alike.

εἰ τούθεν... ξοσίαν... ἐπακολοῦθησαι] The clause δοῦτε ἠξοσίαν... ἐπακολούθησαι is an explanation of τούθεν.

δ' πάντα... πέφυκεν] δ', sc. πέλεομετεια, as elsewhere in Plato, the neuter referring to the feminine. Theaet. 146 Ε γινώσκει ἐπιστήμην αὐτῷ δ' τί ποτ' ἑστιν: infra x. 612 B, where αὐτῷ δικαίωσιν (or αὐτῷ δικαίωσιν) is the reading of most MSS.: Laws ii. 653 B τί ποτε λέγοντες ἢμῖν ἐναὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν παυτελεῖν. τούτου γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.

ῥύμη βία] Cp. the words of Hippias in Protag. 337 D δ' δι' ῶμοιο, τόρανοι δι' τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζοντες. For the adverbal βία with the other dative cp. viii. 552 E οὖς ἐπι-μελεῖ βία κατέχουσιν αὐτῷ δραχά. The active verbal use of τρήν, as in the words which follow, is rare.

τούθεν... φασι... γενέσθαι] τούθεν is grammatically connected with οἷον: the construction is hardly interrupted by the addition of εἰ αὐτοίς γένοτο, which adds liveliness to the expression. ‘The liberty of which I speak would be realized by their obtaining such a power as this,’ &c. The repetition of δόμωμι after ἠξοσίαν is occasioned by the additional words. This is the earliest mention, according to Mr. A. Lang, of the invisible-making ring.

τῷ [Γύγου]... προγόνῳ] It is Gyges himself, not the ancestor of Gyges, of whom Herodotus tells nearly the same story (without
the marvel), and Gyges himself, who is intended by Plato, as appears from x. 612 B ἐδω τ᾽ ἐξεῖ τὸν Γύγου δακτύλων, ἐδω τε μή. Hence there is reason to suspect a miswriting of the text. Stallbaum reads, on slender manuscript authority, τῷ Γύγῃ, and, without authority, encloses τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ in brackets. But as Gyges was not the ancestor of Lydus, who is the eponym of the race, it is difficult to see how these words can have found their way into the text even as a gloss. A more satisfactory alteration would be the substitution of Κροίσου for Γύγου—τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι, of which Γύγῃ may have been the explanation in the margin; or the original reading may have been Γύγῃ τῷ Κροίσου, κ.τ.λ.


δύμβου δέ, κ.τ.λ.] Translated by Cicero, de Off. iii. 9 cum terra discensusset magnis quibusdam imbris, in illum humidum descendit aeneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadvertit, cuius in lateribus fores esset, &c.

άλλα τε δη [ά] μυθολογοῦσιν τά μυθολογοῦσιν is the reading of the greater number of MSS., but not of Par. Α. If α is omitted, μυθολογοῦσι is a repetition of φασί, 'they tell,' resumed by 'they say in the tale.'

τούτων δὲ ἄλλο μὲν [ἐξείν] οδηγέν] The insertion of ἐξεῖν has not the authority of Par. Α, but appears to be required in order to avoid a harsh ellipsis. Ε omitting ἐξεῖν reads δακτύλων φίλιν.

υ᾽ ἐξαγγέλλον εὐ'] The present is the true reading (not ἐξαγγελλον with some MSS., a second aorist which is rarely, if ever, found; or the future ἐξαγγέλλειν, which is ungrammatical). The tense expresses the general habit of making the report and is suggested by εἰσθώτως. It is further confirmed by κατὰ μῆνα.

τὴν σφενδόνην] the collet of the ring, in which the stone was placed as in a sling. καὶ διαλέγονται changes the subject: 'he became invisible to the company, and they began to speak of him as though he were not there.'

καὶ αὕτη ἀδελφος εὐμβαινειν] 'and he found this to be the case,' referring partly to εἶ ταύτην ἐξοι τὴν δύναμιν: also to the words which follow, στρέψοι μὲν εἶσω, κ.τ.λ., which are a further explanation of ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν.
Notes: Book II.

δέ δέξιεν] The optatives may be accounted for by assimilation (Goodwin, M. and T. 558, cp. 531). But Glacon speaks throughout as putting the case for another who is the objector. See the Essay on Syntax, vol. ii. p. 175.

οὗτος δὲ δρῶν . . . ἀμφότεροι] For a similar piece of sophistry at an earlier stage compare Hdt. iii. 72. 6, 7 τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ γλισώμεθα, οἷο τε φευγόμενον καὶ οἷο τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διαχρῆμενον. οἷο μὲν γε φεύγοντα τὸν, εἰπάν τι μὲλλοντι τούτοις φεύγεις πιστάντες κεφαλάζονται οἷο δ' ἀληθέστατα, οἷο εἰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐπιστασώμεθα κέρδος, καὶ τι μᾶλλον σφιξὶ ἐπιτράπηται. A more refined form of the same doubt occurs in Aristotle, Eth. Nic. v. 9, 9 ἑτέρου γὰρ ὁγαθοῦ, εἰ ἐπικεφαλεῖ, οἷον δέξις ἢ τοῦ ἀπλᾶς καλοῦ.

ὦς οὖν ἀγαθόν ἵδια δόξος] gives the reason of ἀναγκαζόμενος: 'under compulsion, because justice is not a good to him individually'; τοῦτο refers to ἐπὶ ταύτῃ ἤιον and is further explained in the clause ταῦτα δὲν γ' ἢ . . . ἀδικεῖν.

ὅ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων] Either (1) 'he who makes this argument his theme'; or (2) in the Homeric sense of περὶ, like ψυχομένου περὶ πάρης, 'who argues in defence of this thesis.' Cp. infra 362 D ἡμῶν εἰρήση τοῦ τοῦ λόγου.

ταὐτότης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος] 'Having got such an opportunity into his hands,' a more graphic expression for ἐξουσίαν λαβόν. Cp. προφάσιον ἐπιλαβόντα in Hdt. iii. 36. 5; vi. 13. 3; 49. 3.

Which is the happier, the just life or the unjust?
Before we can answer this question, we must view them as they are in their perfection, the one entirely just, the other entirely unjust. The unjust man, seeming just, shall receive the rewards of justice in addition to the gains of injustice: the just man, seeming unjust, shall sacrifice his own advantage and also suffer the penalties of injustice.

τὴν δὲ κρισῖν αὐθην] 'But the decision itself,' or 'the actual decision.' The judgement, as of supreme importance, is distinguished from the preliminary description.

περὶ] Either πέρα or περὶ: on such a point the authority of MSS. is of no value. It is best to read πέρα and make the genitive antecedent to δἐν depend on κρίσιν. 'The decision, in the case of the persons in question, as regards their life.' The accusative κρίσις is first placed out of construction, and then resumed as a cognate accusative with κρίσις.

τίς οὖν δἐν ἡ διάστασις;] For the sudden question compare infra 376 E τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία;
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E

Ideas of justice and injustice cannot really be isolated from their consequences. (Compare the attempt which is made in Phileb. 20 ε to divide pleasure and knowledge: μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἴδιον ἐνστῶ φράσις, μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονοντες ἴδιον.) Truths which have any meaning or interest for man cannot be wholly withdrawn from the conditions of human life. Aristotle remarks on the absurdity of such paradoxes, Eth. Nic. vii. 13, 3 οἶ δὲ τὰν τροχίζων καὶ τὸν δυνατίας μεγάλας περιμενοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἴναι, ἐὰν ἐὰν ἀγαθόν, ἢ ἐκῶτες ἢ ἀκούτες οὖν ἕνεκεν λέγουν. And Socrates brings his hearers back to a more natural point of view when he requires that the meaning of justice should be sought for not in the individual, but in some relation of men to one another (infra 372 Α). The construction of the sentence is noticeable. First οἶον, κ.τ.λ. is added in explanation of διστερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοι, then the whole clause, διστερ... ποιεῖται, is resumed in διστερ.

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A

τὴν τελεωτὴν ἀδικείαν] Glauc on again recalls the phraseology of Thrasy machus, i. 344 λ.

B
τῷ λόγῳ] ‘In our description.’ So infra δ ἐπεξειλθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. Cp. infra 363 c εἰς ‘Αδικοὺ γὰρ ἄγοντες τῷ λόγῳ, said of Musaeus and his son taking their heroes down to the world below in their descriptions: 369 λ εἰ γεγομένῃ πόλιν θεασάμεθα λόγῳ: εἰ τῷ λόγῳ εἰς ἄρχῃς πωμὲς πόλιν—‘let us create the state’; vii. 534 δ οἷς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις... εἰ ποτὲ ἢρηψ τρέφων. So Tim. 27 λ ἀνθρώπους τῷ λόγῳ γεγομένας might be translated ‘the men whom we have created.’ The word ιστώμεν suggests the image, διστερ ἀνδραίατα, &c., in what follows, infra δ.

οὐ δοκεῖν] Aesch., S. c. Th. 592 (said of Amphiaraus)

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν διστος, ἄλλι εἶναι θλιπτ.,

βαθιάν δοκεῖ διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενοι,

εἰς ἃ τὰ κενὰ διάκειται βουλεύματα.

C

ἀδηλον οὖν... τοιοῦτος εἰν] ἀδηλον, sc. ἄν εἰν: ‘In that case it would be uncertain whether he were such (i. e. just) for justice’ sake, or for the sake of the gifts and rewards.’ εἰν is the true reading, not ἄν εἰν, which has slight manuscript authority (Vind. E, Flor. x). The optative accords with the conditional nature of the case in an imagined future. See note on ὁ δὲ δόξειν 360 in supra.

Notes: Book II.

The reading of the best MSS. ἵπτο is a late form, which has probably crept in by mistake. Better ἰπτό (cp. vii. 534 c διαπορεύεται). The η of ἰπτό in Par. A appears to have been made from i. ἰπτό is probably a conjectural emendation for ἱπτό.

βοβαία] is an exclamation of wonder, parallel in form to πότι, ποταί. 'Wonderful, said I, dear Glaucon. In what a spirited manner you polish up your two heroes for the decision, as if each were a statue.' Cp. the reversal of the two portraits in the true state, in which the King and the Tyrant (ix. 577) and the just and the unjust (x. 613) receive their final reward.

ἐκκαυθήσεται] (A II), and not ἐκκαυθῆσεται (g) or ἐκκοψῆσεται (M), is the reading of the best MSS., and is confirmed by a further reference to this passage in x. 613 εν γαι δε αἷμα θυσάμα σεβί εἰμαι ἀληθῆ λέγων,—ἐίτα ορεβλάστων καὶ ἐκκαυθήσεται. The Gorgias contains a germ of the second book of the Republic; we find there (473 c) the parallel words, εἰν αἷμαν ἀθροίσας ληφθῇ τυραννίδει ἐπι-βουλεύων, καὶ ληψάς ορεβλάστων καὶ ἐκτίμηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμον ἀκάται, which also confirms the reading in this passage. The corruption in μ is due to the later pronunciation of au.

Using a bold inversion, Glaucon says that the life of the unjust is more real than that of the just. For the reality of justice, when without the appearance of justice, is annihilated by suffering. But the hypocrisy of the unjust man is a part of his business, which is unmistakably real. The discourse of Adeimantus which follows is a further development of this paradox: cp. 362 εν οἷς σαφέστερον ἡ μοι δοκεῖ βούλευται Γλαύκων. Adeimantus however represents the worldly or prudential, rather than the sophistical point of view.

ἀρα] ‘As may be inferred from this.’

Ἀλήθειας ἰχόμενον] ‘which has to do with truth,’ a favourite Platonic usage of ἰχόμας, e.g. Theaet. 145 Α δεικνύεις ἰχτεα: ἀλήθεια was a favourite word, not only with Plato and Socrates, but with the Sophists, meaning with them, not reality, but appearance, which they asserted to be reality. Cp. Theaet. 167 A, c and the title of the book of Protagoras (ἡ Ἀλήθεια—Theaet. 161 c); also Sophist 246 B τὸν λεγομένην ἵπτόν αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν.

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Republic II.

362 A 66 Plato: Republic.

Glaucion resumes the quotation, which he applies to the unjust man. In what follows the 'counsels' and their results are confused.

362 B πρῶτον μὲν . . . δικαίως εἶναι] The words δοκοῦντι δικαίως εἶναι are governed by βλαστάνει, with the subject of which ἄρχειν agrees. The accusative takes the place of the dative in κερδαίοντα, and with the words εἰς ἀγώνα τοῖς ἱστα εἰς τοὺς the construction reverts to φήσομαι ( supra λ). For the former change cp. iv. 422 B ὁδῷ ἐὰν ἐξείη . . . ὑποθείοντι τὸν πρότερον ἐν προσφερόμενον ἀναστρέφοντα κροῖν . . . ;

εὐμβάλλειν] 'to have dealings with:' cp. iv. 425 C εὐμβολαίων τε πέρι . . . ἀ πρὸς ἀλλήλους εὐμβάλλοντες. With the juxtaposition of εὐμβάλλειν and κοινωνεῖν cp. i. 333 λ εὐμβολαία δὲ λέγει κοινωνήματα, ἣ τῇ ἀλλο ;

παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα] 'in all this:' cp. iv. 424 B ὅπως ἄν . . . παρὰ πάντα αὐτῷ φιλάττωσι.

τοὺς τε φίλους εἰς ποιεῖν . . . βλάπτειν] A link of reminiscence connecting this with the previous discussion: supra i. 334 B.

C θεραπεύειν . . . τοὺς θεοὺς] This also contains an allusion to what precedes, supra i. 331 B, where Cephalus gave his simple definition.

θεοφιλέστερον . . . μᾶλλον προσήκειν] For the redundant comparative compare Laws vi. 781 λ λαθραίους μᾶλλον and the redundant superlative in i. 331 B ὁ εἰκ οἴκεταν . . . χρησμικότατον.

D οὕκοιν . . . ἐπάμων] 'Well then, let brother help brother, as the proverb says.' The proverb is a natural one and appears to be remembered in the lines of Homer:—

Iliad xxi. 308 :

φίλε κατίγγητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροι περὶ σχῆμαν.

Od. xvi. 97 :

αἱ τι κατεγρήτου ἐνεμέμφεια, ὅσι περὶ ἄνὴρ 

μαραθαμένοι πέποικε, καὶ εἰ μέγα νύκτος δείξαται.

τὸ λεγόμενον, as elsewhere, is an accusative in apposition to the sentence. For the optative παρεῖν, expressive of a wish or gentle command, see Monro's Homeric Grammar, § 299 b.

E 67] sc. λόγοι, which, as elsewhere, are personified.
Notes: Book II.

Glaucön had endeavoured to isolate justice and injustice from their consequences: 'let the just suffer and the unjust be rewarded.' 'But what are justice and injustice in their nature?' Adeimantus would wish also to make them independent of the opinion of men, who maintain, not that the just will suffer, but (1) that he will be rewarded (τοὺς ἐναρχίους λόγους) in this world and also in another (these are the sort of motives that they inculcate): (2) that injustice is only condemned by opinion and custom, and may be readily expiated. Here then is another reason for having a clear account of the nature of justice and injustice.

Adeimantus, whose character is contrasted with that of Glaucön throughout, as the more solid and practical is opposed to the eager and impulsive nature,—(two contraries, which, as Plato remarks in vi. 503 C, are seldom to be found in the same person)—now urges on Socrates a different set of considerations. Glaucön has shown how the opponents of justice declare that seeming is better than reality, and that the praise of justice arises from the fear of injustice. According to Adeimantus, the world is always repeating that virtue is honourable, but toilsome and difficult, vice easy and profitable, although disreputable. The young are told to pursue justice, not for its own sake, but for the sake of reputation and reward, and to avoid injustice only from the fear of punishment. Poets and prose-writers alike tell of temporal prosperity attending on justice here, and sensual delights awaiting the just hereafter, and in speaking of the penalties of injustice they bury souls in mud or make them carry water in a sieve; their imagination reaches no further (cp. Theaet. 177 A).

λέγουσιν] resumes λέγουσ supra.

αὐτὸ δικαίωσιν] For this apposition of neuter and feminine, which has led some of the copyists to write αὐτοδικαίωσιν in one word on the supposed analogy of αὐτοκαταθήθων, cp. infra v. 472 c ἐξητείμεν αὐτὸ τῇ δικαιώσιν αὐτῷ ἐστι, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον: also x. 612 B.

γίγνεται] not γίγνομαι, is the true reading. The singular has a collective force which is assisted by the neuter δικαίως. Cp. infra v. 463 ζετεῖ... δικαίως τῇ καὶ δήμος: Euthyd. 302 c ζετεῖ... καὶ βωμοὶ καὶ γέρα, κ.τ.λ.

τῷ δικαίῳ] is read in x q v and is probably right, though perhaps only a manuscript conjecture:—τῷ δικαίῳ, which is the reading of F 2.
most MSS., including A Π M, may have arisen out of a logical confusion. Madvig would delete the words, which are omitted in one MS. (Par. k). It is hardly conceivable that Plato should have written δικαιόν = δοκοῦντι δικαιόν.

ἐπὶ πλέον . . . καὶ φασὶ θεοῦς διδόναι] ‘Now these make still more of reputation; for throwing in the good opinion of Heaven, they have numberless benefits to relate, which the Gods, as they say, confer on the pious.’ That is to say, they add the favour of Heaven to the good opinion of men.

δισπερ . . . (c) παρέχῃ ἡθοὺς] The first quotation is from Hesiod, Opera et Dies, 230:—

tοῖς φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βλέπει, αἱμίμεν δὲ ὑδῶς

ἀγροθύμοι τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσης δὲ, κ.τ.λ.

as in the text. There is no reason to suppose any variation in this passage in the text of Hesiod. Plato has adapted the words to suit the construction of his own sentence. The second passage is quoted from the Odyssey, xix. 109—113, where δοτε τῷ is the beginning of the verse, τῷ depending on ἐλέος in the previous line, and ἄ is correlative to another ἄ, which would have followed if the sentence had been completed.

C  Μουσαίος δὲ . . . τοῖς δικαίοις] ‘And the blessings which Musaeus and his son (Εμολούς? cp. Suidas s. v.) represent the Gods as giving to the just are still more glorious.’ In the lively language of Plato the poet is the maker of what he relates; he takes his heroes down into the world below, and lays them on couches, and puts them into a state of intoxication, while others extend the heavenly rewards yet further to their descendants (ο μακροτέρον ἀποτείνονται μεθαύερ πᾶρα θείων). μακροτέρον is to be taken with ἀποτείνουσι. The jingle in συμπάκων τῶν δαίων is perhaps intentional: cp. Symp. 185 C Παισανίου δὲ πανσαμικόν, διδακοῦσι γὰρ μὲ ἵσα λέγειν οὕτωι οἱ σοφοί.

D  εἰς πηλὸν των . . . ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν] Phaedo 69 c κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελεσά ἡμῶν οὕτω καταστάτσαντες οὐ φαίλοι τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῇ δοτὶ πάλαι αὐτόπτεσιν, ὧτι δὲ ἄν ὁμόπτως καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς "Λιδοῦ ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κατεύθυνε, κ.τ.λ.: Gorg. 493 B ὡς τῶν ἐν "Λιδοῦ . . . οὕτω οἰκείως ταῦτα ἄν εἶναι οἱ ἀμύτους, καὶ φοροῖς εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὑπὸ ἔτερῳ τοιοῦτω τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ.

E  ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἐξουσίων] sc. λέγειν. Plato has in his mind the only real punishment of injustice, which such reasoners cannot see. Cp.
Theaet. 176 ἐγνοουσα γάρ ζημίαν ἄδικας, οὐ δὲ ἥκεν τα ἐγνοεῖν. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δοκοῦσιν, πληγαί τε καὶ βάρσαι, ὅν ἰσοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἄδικου-
τες, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἄδικον ἐκφυεῖν, viz. that by their wicked acts they
become like the pattern of evil.

ἐκατέρω] i. e. τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἄδικων.

Again, they tell us that the way of virtue, though honourable, is
grievous and toilsome, whereas vice is easy and pleasant, although
disreputable. And while dwelling on the rewards of virtue, they
speak also in the same breath of the prosperity of the wicked, and of
the misfortunes of the just, attributing both to the action of the Gods.
There are prophets, too, and mendicant priests, who profess to have
the means of reconciling the Gods to sinners, and these declarations
of theirs are confirmed by poets, who represent the Gods as not
inexorable.

What conclusion will a youth of lively parts gather from all
this? Will he not avoid the hard road which leads to possible
disaster and follow the smooth pathway of appearances, holding up
to the world a show of virtue, while in secret he pursues his own
interest? If a doubt is suggested whether he can elude exposure, he
is ready with an answer. Is there not rhetoric, the science of
persuasion, and the power of combination into clubs for mutual
security? May we not hope even to circumvent the Gods? And
perhaps there are no Gods. But if there are, those who have told
us of them tell us also that they may be propitiated by sacrifice.
Then let us share our gains with them. You speak of the punish-
ments of the world below. But are there not mighty deities who
will give us absolution?

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις... καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν] 'Further, Socrates, con-
sider yet another way of speaking about justice and injustice to
which utterance is given, not only by the poets, but also in prose
writing.' Cp. infra 366 Ε αὐτὸ δ' ἐκατέρω... οὖν καὶ τούτοις ὑπὲρ ἑν
ποιῆσαι ὑπὲρ ἑν ἔνδοξον λόγους ἑπεξήλθεν ἑκατον τῷ λόγῳ. ἢδ' is opposed to
ὑπὸ ποιητῶν in the same way that ἰδιωτής is opposed to a skilled


καὶ ποιητῶν πλουσίων... ἑκατέρω] 'wicked men who are rich
or have any power besides riches.' ἀλλα, sc. ἐν πλουτῶ, understood
from πλουσίως.
Plato: Republic.

II.
364

εἰκερῶς] 'lightly,' is a word of blame here and in vii. 535 εἰκερῶς διστερ θρην ὑσιν ἐν ἀμβλία μαλώνται.

τοῦτων δὲ . . . ἐναντίαν μοίραν] Compare infra 379 π, where the Homeric sentiment of the two vessels of Zeus, the one full of good, the other of evil destinies, is condemned; also the words of Psalm xxxvii. 36 'I have seen the wicked in great power, and spreading himself like a green bay tree,' which are in like manner followed by a justification of the ways of God to man.

θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται] θαυμασιώτατοι is the predicate of λέγονται, in which the notion of λέγω is repeated. 'The tales which are told about the Gods and Virtue are the most wonderful of all.' The following words show the connexion implied in τε καλ. 'How the Gods are disposed towards virtue.'

ἀγοραται] 'begging priests.' Cp. infra 381 d Ἡμαν ἰλλουμενήν ὡς λέμειν ἀνείρουν.

βλάψει] 'A man shall hurt,' sc. πείθοντι ὡς ὁ ἱδίλων βλάψει. The passage may be taken in two different ways according as the prophet or the person who consults him is supposed to be the subject of διστερα supra. In the latter case there is no difficulty in supplying the subject of βλάψει. The regularity of construction is interrupted by the sudden introduction of the direct form of speech, which adds vividness to the passage. And the main thread of the sentence is taken up again in ἐπαγγειά . . . ὁπετεῖν. If the prophets are the subject throughout, the reading βλάψει is more convenient though still not necessary. But the man who has recourse to the prophet or priest is clearly the nominative to ἔθλη, and is referred to in τοὺ supra. Cp. 365 λ ἐθάνατοι. Βλάψει is found in almost all the MSS, and is a reading which the scribes were unlikely to invent. Βλάψει is an emendation of Muretus.

οὶ μὲν . . . διδότων] 'Those of them (i.e. of the persons mentioned in 364 A) who offer facilities for vice' (calling Hesiod to witness that, &c.). The conjecture of Muretus, approved by Cobet, οὶ μὲν . . . διδοῦντες, 'Some of them singing about the facility of vice' was needlessly adopted in Baiter's edition of 1881. For διδότων = διδοῦσαι λέγοντες cp. supra 363 c, d διδοῦσι, 'represent as being given,' κατακλινάντες, κατορῶσαν.

λείπ μὲν δέδοι] The reading in the text of Hesiod (Opera et Dies, 286) is δλίγη, not λείπ, which is found here and in Laws iv. 718 ε,
Notes: Book II.

where the quotation occurs again, and three other lines are added, the two last of which are quoted also in Prot. 340 D:

\[\text{ἀθάνατοι, μακρός δὲ καὶ ὅρθιος οἷος ἐστὶν αὐτή, καὶ τρικές τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ ὅε ἐς ἄφον ἔσαι, μήδεὶς δὲ ἑσπείται τέλει, καλεῖ περ ἔοισα.}\]

The substitution of λείη for δλίγη in Plato and also in Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1, 20) and Plutarch (Mor. 77 n) is supposed to have been intended to avoid tautology of the two ideas, δλίγη ὄδος and μάλα ἑγγόθε ναις, but such a tautology is frequent in Epic poetry: δλίγη, of which μάλα ὅ ἑγγόθε ναις is an explanation, is probably the true reading, and is opposed to μακρός following.

\[\text{στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοὶ]}\] The MSS. point to an early variety of reading between λιστοὶ, and στρεπτοὶ which is the reading of the original passage, II. ix. 497. The word λιστοὶ does not occur elsewhere, though ἄλλιστος is found in Empedocles (frag. 50), and τριλλιστος in Homer (Iliad viii. 488).

\[\text{βίβλων δὲ δραμον παράγονται Μουσαίοι καὶ Ὄρφεοι]}\] For the 'host' of books cp. Eurip. Hippol. 953:

\[\text{Ὀρφεα τ' ἀνατ'} ἤκουν βάσχευς, πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνοί,}\]

also Alcestis, 967:

\[\text{Ὀρφεας ἐν σανίσι, τὰς Ὄρφεα κατέγραψεν γῆρος;}\]

and for the general thought in what follows, Soph. Fragm. 719 Dindorf (753 Nauck):

\[\text{ὡς τρισάλβουι κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἵ ταῦτα διερχόμενος τέλη μᾶλλον ἐς Ἁἰδοῦ τοίαθε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεί ζην ἐστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις πάντ' ἐκεί κακί.}\]

Homer, Hymn to Demeter, 480–482:

\[\text{ἄλβως, δὲ τὰ ὄπωι ἐπιχειρών ἀθράπτων ἕδ' ἀτελῆς ἱρῶν, ὡς τ' ἱμορος, οὐποθ' ὁμοίνοις ἀλαν ἤκου, φθίμενός περ, ὅποι ξίφει εὐφέρετ'}.\]

Suidas has given a list of twenty-one Orphic works, which he attributes to various authors; one class of them being called τελεται and ascribed to Onomacritus. This and other passages (Phaedo
Republic 69 c; Orat. 402 b; Phileb. 66 c) show that a body of writings, older probably than any Orphica which have come down to us, existed under the name of Orpheus in the age of Plato.

καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδωνῶν] ‘and sportive delights.’ The pleonasm gives a scornful emphasis.

τελετάς] Compare Laws x. 908, 909, where the enemies of religion are divided into two classes: (1) open unbelievers, who may be honest and good men; and (2) insidious priests and magicians, who practise upon the souls of the living and dead: 908 δ γίγνονται δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν (sc. μάντων) ἵσταν δει καὶ τύραννας καὶ δημη-
gόρους καὶ στρατηγοὺς, καὶ τελεταῖς δὲ ἵππας ἐπιβεβουλευκότας σοφιστῶν τε ἐπικαλομένων μηχανῆ: 909 β δογικὸς ὁ ἄε. . . καταφρονοῦστες δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαγωγῶν μὲν πολλοὺς τῶν ἔωτρων, τοῦ δὲ τεθρίοντας φάσκον-
tes ψυχαγωγῶν καὶ θεοῦ ύποχυνομένους πέθειν, κ.τ.λ. Both the open unbeliever and the religious impostor are to be punished, the former with a view to reformation, the latter more severely: both capably, if they persist after a five years’ imprisonment.

ταύτα . . . λέγομενα] The accusativus pendens receives a construc-
tion from ἄκουοόμες, as the sentence proceeds.

ἂς . . . ταμῆς] ταμῆ is here used in the active verbal sense—‘re-
gard’—cp. supra 359 c ἐπὶ τὰ τῷ ἱην τιμῆς.


ἁσσερ ἐπιπτάμενοι συλλογίσσεσθαι] The words suggest the image of a wandering bee, gathering honey from each flower in passing. Cp. Ion 534 B ἐκ Μοῦσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπῶν τὰ μέλη ἡμῶν φεροῦσιν, ἃσσερ αἱ μελιταί.

λέγοι γὰρ ἄν . . . λέγεται] φασίν, like λέγεται, at the end of the sentence, is a resumption of τὰ μὲν . . . λέγομενα, which is out of construction or rather in suspense. For the anacoluthon cp. Polit. 295 δ ἦ πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον . . . ἄρμαται . . . γέλως ἄν ὁ μέγας γεύσται τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετημένων;

πότερον δίκαιος τείχως ὑπόν, κ.τ.λ.] The same passage is cited by Cicero ad Attic. xiii. 38, 41; Maxim. Tyr. xviii. init.; Atticus Platonic. apud Euseb. Praep. Ev. xv. 798 D; and Dionys. Halic. de Comp. verb. c. 21. From these sources Bergk gives the fragment thus:—Πότερον . . . δίκαιος τείχως ὑπόν | ἡ σχολαῖς ἀπόδεικται ἀναβαίνει | ἐπι-
κόσμιον γένος ἀνδρῶν, | δίκα μι κόσμο ἀπρίκειον ἐπινέιν. Bergk observes
that thunëzios bios and kúrin eiddaimoniâs in what follows have also a poetical ring.

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῆ] 'If at the same time I have the opposite reputation.' This, and not ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῆ, is the reading of a majority of MSS., and is more idiomatic.

ἀδικῶ δὲ] sc. ἵνα.

τὸ δοκεῖν . . . καὶ τὰν ἀληθεῖαν βιάται] The words of Simonides, quoted by the Scholiast on Eur. Or. 782.

καὶ κύριον εἴδαιμον] sc. ἵνα.

πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα] 'As a vestibule and exterior.' πρόθυρα, k.t.l., are accusatives in apposition to σκιαγραφίαν . . . περιγραπτεῖν, and the whole sentence is explanatory of ἀπὶ τοῦτο δὲ τρεπτῶν διὰς and therefore in asyndeton.—σκιαγραφία in its simple meaning is painting in light and shade. In Plato the word is metaphorically used to imply illusion or unreality of any kind: cp. ix. 583 b odde παλαιθῆς ὑπὸν ἢ τῶν διαλευκών ἐκδοσὶ . . . ἀλλ' σκιαγραφημένη: Phaedo 69 b μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ταυτήν ἀρετή, k.t.l. ἀλωτέκα, 'the fox,' is a more lively reading and better suited to the epithets κερδαλέων and ποικιλῆν, 'cunning and versatile,' which are quoted from Archilochus, than ἀλωτείη, the fox's skin, which is quoted in the Lexicon of Timaeus. The fox—as the emblem of cunning—is to be trailed behind. Cp. Themist. Orat. xxii. 279 a ἀκριμία σμικρὰ καὶ ἀνελιθθείς τὰς ἀλωτείκας ὄπισθεν ἐκείνῃ: and Solon, Fr. 10. 7 ἀλωτείκος ἱκνεῖται βαϊνει.

οὐ βρᾶυν ἄει λαυθάνειν καὶν δετα] For the failure of the wicked in later life cp. x. 613 b οἱ μὲν δεινοὶ τε καὶ δίκαιοι δράσειν ὑπὲρ οἱ δραμέουσα, οὗτοι αὐτῶν ἴδο ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἁναμ μή.

ταύτη τετέθεν, ὅς . . . φέρει] ταύτη, 'in this path' (i.e. the path of dissimulation and appearance) 'we must proceed, following in the track of the argument.'

ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαυθάνειν] 'For' (as to what you say of the difficulty of escaping detection) 'with a view of escaping it,' &c.—referring to the previous words οὐ βρᾶυν ἄει λαυθάνειν καὶν δετα.

ἐκ δὲ] 'So drawing from these resources.' The antecedent to ἐκ is the whole sentence from ἐκποιμοδίας to διδότες. The clubs supply force; the rhetors give the means of persuasion.

οὐδ' ἡμῖν μελητῶν τοῦ λαυθάνειν] καὶ ἡμῖν μελητῶν is the reading of...
But a wrong sense is thus given to the clause καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέων τοῦ λαθάνων: 'We must take care to conceal our crimes.' Various ways of removing the difficulty have been suggested. (1) Stallbaum, in his later edition (1858), reads τι καὶ ἡμῖν . . .: and this is supported by slight manuscript authority (Flor. x); but the new interrogative beginning is too abrupt after ὅπικοιν. (2) For μελητέων the Zurich editions substitute ἀμιλητέων, the conj. of Baiter. But the meaning is not 'We ought not to attend to concealment,' but 'we need not attend to concealment.' The difficulty in the passage is clearly the omission of the negative, which is a very common kind of corruption. It may be supplied either by reading with γ οὐδ' instead of καὶ (as in the text), or with a still smaller alteration, adopted by Schneider, of inserting οὗ before μελητέων—καὶ ἡμῖν οὖ μελητέων: or by throwing back the accent on ὅπικοιν (ἰς), a suggestion of Hermann's, who thus obtains the required negative. But in that case the force of ὅπικοιν cannot be supposed to extend equally to both members of the sentence, which are distributed by μέν and δὲ; in the second clause εἰ δὲ, κ.τ.λ., it must be assumed that the negative is forgotten and the construction changed.

The reading ἀγανήσι here, as well as in 364 δ, where some MSS. also read εὐχώλης, may possibly be a correction of ἀγανάσις taken from the ordinary text of Homer.

ἐὰν τῶν ἀδικηματων] 'From the results of wrong-doing.' For the sense compare Shakespeare, Hamlet iii. 3. 59 'And oft 'tis seen the wicked prize itself Buys out the law: but 'tis not so above.'

The various reading μῷν, which is found in ΠΜ and several other MSS. but not in Par. Α, after the first ἄγημοι, helps somewhat clumsily to point the sense: 'If we are just, all that we gain is,' &c. μέν, the conjecture of Muretus, gives a possible account of both the manuscript readings.

The line of Homer already quoted — 364 εἰ λισσόμενοι, δικε κὲν τις ὑπερβηθαι καὶ ἀμάρτη — is ingeniously turned so as to suggest the notion of sinning and praying at once.
Notes: Book II.

η παίδες παιδών] Cp. supra 363 d.

αδ μέγα δώσαται] These words happen to be omitted in Par. A, showing that the best MSS. not unfrequently err. It is quite unnecessary with Hermann to spoil the effect of a very spirited passage by the introduction of a very tame emendation — ἄλλ' ἔφελθον τοις ἀγνοομένοις αἱ τελεται καὶ οἱ λύσιν θεοῖ — in order to vindicate the accidental omission of αδ μέγα δώσαται in Par. A.

αὶ μέγιστα πόλεις] Meaning Athens, where the Eleusinian mysteries had become part of the state religion.

καὶ οἱ θεῶν παίδες ποιηταὶ] Either (1) 'and the poets, who are the children of the Gods': sc. ὄρες, absorbed in γενόμενοι, 'and have become their interpreters': or (2) 'the children of the Gods who have become poets and the interpreters of the Gods.' The authority of states is contrasted with the genius of individuals. Cp. infra τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ άρων.

τίς μηχανή] This phrase from the more precise — 'What contrivance is there?' has passed into the more general sense— 'What possibility is there?' Cp. Phaedo 72 d τίς μηχανή μὴ σωκέπαστη λόγοι; 'How can it be but that all things would be consumed?'

ὅς δὴ τοι... (9) αὐτὸ δράν] For a like humanity of feeling cp. v. 476 ε ἐκπρατήσας δῆττι οὐχ ὑμαῖν: vi. 492 A foll., 499 E; Phaedr. 268 E; Laws x. 888, 903. The conviction that vice is at any rate in some degree involuntary leads men to regard it in a more tolerant spirit.

κληρον οὐ τις θεία φύσει] Cp. again vi. 492 E οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ γένεται οὐκ ἐγὼν παρά μη γένεται ἄλλοις ἡδος πρὸς ἄρτην παρὰ τῆν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένοις,—ἀνθρώπειος, οὐταίρας θείοις μέσων κατά τὴν παροιμίαν εξαρμόμεν λόγοι. See also the question raised in the Meno and in Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 9, whether virtue is not a divine gift.

ψεύδει] supply ἕκαστος from οὖθειά, as in Symp. 192 ε ἐκτὰ ακούσας... οὖθ' ἐν εἷς ἐξεµπεθεί... ἄλλ' ἐτεχνύει οἴου' ἐν ἀπεκείναι.

ὅς μὲν, δὴλον] 'And that this is so, is plain.' Cp. Dem. c. Tim. 730, 25 ὅς δὲ, ἐγὼ φράσσω.

tῶν τοιούτων] sc. τῶν ψευδών τῆν ἁδικίαν.
Plato: Republic.

For these unworthy thoughts the friends of justice must be held responsible, if they continue to dwell mainly on the consequences of virtue and do not rather employ their eloquence to show that justice is in its own nature the highest good and injustice the greatest evil. Let Socrates apply himself to the task of showing this.

Δριμησε... ειπειν] 'And all this arises from one thing, which was the beginning of our whole argument with you. My brother here and I were impelled to say to you,' &c. ειπειν is an explanation of λόγος and receives a subject from τολα και ἕμοι—δοτε τον άς και εμε ειπειν. For the expression cp. Hdt. vi. 86, 16 του δε εινεκα δ λόγος ὅσε, δ 'Αθηναίοι, ἀρμήδη λέγεσθαι ἐς ὑμεις, εἰρήσεται.

δθαυμάσει] 'What surprises me in all of you who praise justice is that... ' The mode of address, δθαυμάσει, identifies Socrates with the ordinary panegyристes of justice, with whom Adeimantus is expostulating. Cp. Phaedr. 260 ν τι ποτ', δθαυμάσει, ληρείγε;

Εν τον δε άξοντις... λελαμμένοι] Plato is referring to well-known tales and maxims, which the poets and logographers had put into the mouths of ancient heroes, such as the choice of Heracles, or the advice of Erechtheus to his son in Euripides (Fragm. 364, ll. 11-17):

άδεως δε μη κτω χρήματι, ἦν βούλη πολιν
χρόνον μελαθρος εμμένων τά γαρ κακώς
οικοι ἐσπενδόντα' ουκ ἔχει σωτηρίαν.

ἐκεῖ δε πειρώ τουτο γάρ το τι ενεκείσ
και τούς γάμους δίδωσι τούς πρώτους εκείν.
ἐν τοι πίνεσθαι δε εστίν ἢ τι ἄλοξα,
καὶ ἣ σοφός τις, ἢ τι' ἀτμία βιον.

δόξας, κ.τ.λ.] sc. ἐπαινῶν και ψέγων.

ἢ ὑδειος λόγοι] 'in ordinary speech,' i.e. in prose. The poet is a professional person. Cp. ἴδια supra 363 ε, Phaedrus 258 δ.

ἀδός αδτοῦ... φολάς] After ἐκατοσ some MSS. (Π γ) introduce ἁριστος, which Bekker approved. The weight of authority seems to be against it.


φορτικῶς] 'grossly,' 'unworthily.' The word has an associa-
tion of vulgarity or bad taste: infra vii. 528 Ξ ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπανωθῆναι:
Theaet. 183 Ε μή φορτικῶς σκοτώμεν.—'lest we consider the subject
in an unworthy manner.'

σοὶ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τάραντία] is emphatic: 'it is because
I wish to hear from you the opposite side, that I speak with so
much earnestness, for I may as well be open with you.'

δὲ δύναμαι μᾶλιστα] Cp. supra 358 d, where Glaucn says—
διὸ κατατίθην αἰτῶ, κ.τ.λ.

εἰ γὰρ . . . φέγγων ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκεῖν] 'For unless you subtract from
both of them their true reputation, and unless you add on the false
one (μή is to be repeated with προοθήκης), we shall say that you
do not praise justice, but the appearance of justice, nor blame the
being unjust, but the seeming to be.'

While the essences of justice and injustice remain the same,
their consequences are supposed to be interchanged. The second
ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκεῖν is omitted in the text of A, but has been added in
the margin by the second hand.

tὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἄγαθον, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 343 c.

tὸ δὲ δίκιον αὖτὰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] The unjust is expedient to
a man's self, as above i. 344 κ τὸ δὲ δίκιον ἀντὶ λυπηλοῦν τε
καὶ ξυμφέρον.

ἐπειδὴ οὐν ὄμολογησας . . . μᾶλλον αὖτὰ αὐτῶν] See above 357
b foll. Plato is fond of 'looping up' the argument by allusions
to what has preceded. At the beginning of the Book, justice was
placed in the second or 'fairest' class of goods, that is to say, goods
desirable in themselves and for their consequences. Adeimantus
in the words—πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὖτὰ αὐτῶν—has slightly altered this
statement of Socrates, making justice belong to that class of goods
which are desired much more for their own sakes than for their
results.

We may observe τε followed by δὲ as ὡς by οἰδὲ when a
clause is emphasized, as below vi. 499 β ὡς πολὺ ὡς τε πολι-
tεία οἰδὲ γ' ἀνήρ.

156 β καὶ ἡδοναὶ γὰρ δῇ καὶ λίπω: Meno 87 ε ἵσχυς καὶ κάλλος καὶ
πλοῦτος δῇ, infra vi. 503 ε.

γόνιμα] 'genuine,' 'real.' Cp. γόνιμον πωμῆν in Aristophanes
(Ran. 96).
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For these unworthy thoughts the friends of justice must be held responsible, if they continue to dwell mainly on the consequences of virtue and do not rather employ their eloquence to show that justice is in its own nature the highest good and injustice the greatest evil. Let Socrates apply himself to the task of showing this.

Δρμησε... ἐις ἐν [366 D] 'And all this arises from one thing, which was the beginning of our whole argument with you. My brother here and I were impelled to say to you,' &c. εἰς ἐν is an explanation of λόγος and receives a subject from τῷ δὲ καὶ ἐμοὶ—ὅστε τόδε καὶ ἐμὲ εἰς ἐν. For the expression cp. Hdt. vi. 86, 16 τοῦ δὲ εἶνεκα δὲ λόγος ὅτε, ὅλαι μαίνεται, ἀφάνθη δένεσθαι ἐς ὑμεῖς, εἰρήσεται.

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οὖν μὴ κτῶ χρήματι, ἢν βούλῃ πολὺν
κρώνον μελάθροις ἐμένειν τὰ γὰρ κακῶς
οἴκους ἐστελθοῦσιν ὅπου ἦσαν φαντάσαι.

ἐχει δὲ πειρῷ τούτο γὰρ τῷ τῷ εὐγενείᾳ
καὶ τοὺς γάμους δίδωσιν τοὺς πρῶτους ἔχειν.

ἐν τῷ πένθους δὴ ἐστὶν ἢ τῷ δοξαία,
καὶ ἦν σοφὸς τίς, ἢ τῷ ἀνεμία βιοῦ.

ὃς, κ.τ.λ.] sc. ἐπαινῶν καὶ ψέων.

ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις] 'in ordinary speech,' i.e. in prose. The poet is a professional person. Cp. iδία supra 363 ε, Phaedrus 258 δ.

αὐτῶς αὐτοῦ... φιλαξ] After έκαστος some MSS. (Ιγ) introduce οἶνος, which Bekker approved. The weight of authority seems to be against it.


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tion of vulgarity or bad taste: infra vii. 528 καὶ φορτικῶς ἐπανοντης: Republic II. 367 A
Theaet. 183 ε μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπάμεν—'lest we consider the subject in an unworthy manner.'

σοὶ ἐπιθυμήν ἀκούσα τὰναρτία] is emphatic: 'it is because I wish to hear from you the opposite side, that I speak with so much earnestness, for I may as well be open with you.'

ὅς δύναμαι μᾶλλον] Cp. supra 358 δ, where Glaucan says—διὸ κατατείνα ἐρῶ, κ.τ.λ.

εἰ γὰρ . . . ψέγειν ἄλλα τὸ δοκεῖν] 'For unless you subtract from both of them their true reputation, and unless you add on the false one (μὴ is to be repeated with προοθῆκες), we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of justice, nor blame the being unjust, but the seeming to be.'

While the essences of justice and injustice remain the same, their consequences are supposed to be interchanged. The second ἄλλα τὸ δοκεῖν is omitted in the text of Α, but has been added in the margin by the second hand.

τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄλλοτριον ἀγαθὸν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 343 c.

τὸ δὲ δίκαιον αὐτὸ μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] The unjust is expedient to a man's self, as above i. 344 c τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἵνατρε χρησιμολογέων τε καὶ κύριον δοκεῖν.

ἐπειδὴ οὐ ψεύδομαι . . . μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν] See above 357 b foll. Plato is fond of 'looping up' the argument by allusions to what has preceded. At the beginning of the Book, justice was placed in the second or ' fairest ' class of goods, that is to say, goods desirable in themselves and for their consequences. Adeimantus in the words—πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἀυτῶν—has slightly altered this statement of Socrates, making justice belong to that class of goods which are desired much more for their own sakes than for their results.

We may observe τε followed by δὲ as ὀρτε by ὀφεῖ when a clause is emphasized, as below vi. 499 ὧτε πόλει ὀφεῖ πολιτεία ὀφεῖ γ' ἀπὶ.

καὶ ὑπολογῶν δὴ] δὴ calls special attention to ὑπολογῖον. Cp. Theaet. 156 b καὶ ἢδονα γε δὴ καὶ λυπαί : Meno 87 ε λοχὸς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ, infra vi. 503 ε.

γόνυμα] 'genuine,' 'real.' Cp. γόνυμον πουπήν in Aristophanes (Ran. 96).
Plato: Republic.

Republic

II. 367 D

tou` o`nu a`vto... b`lape`ne] δ αυτή, κ.τ.λ. is an explanation of tou` a`vto, which also refers to the previous context. ‘She by herself’—setting aside the consequences which flow from her. και δικαια βλαπτει is an instance of an unnecessary (and here ungrammatical) addition of a correlative clause.

ἀνασκοίμην ἄν] The MSS. vary between ἀποσκοίμην, ἀποδεκαίμην, and ἀνασκοίμην, the reading of ξ, which has also the authority of the Scholiast and is represented in the version of Ficinus. The construction of the genitive with ἀνέχομαι occurs again in viii. 564 δ καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, Protag. 323 Α ελεύθερος ἄπαντος ἄνδρος ἀνέχομαι.

εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις] κελεύεις is the reading of Par. Α (with the iota over an erasure) and should perhaps be preferred to κελεύεις.

E 367 E-

E 369 A

Socrates is greatly struck by the divine instinct which has kept in the paths of virtue two young men who are able to plead so eloquently for the opposite of virtue.—He is discouraged at not having satisfied them, but in the sacred cause of Justice he may not falter. He suggests an expedient by which the discussion may be facilitated. Justice is an attribute of States as well as of individuals, and in the state it must surely be present on a larger scale. Justice in the state may be compared to a writing in large letters, and in the individual to a writing in small letters. Having failed in our attempt to decipher the small characters, let us now begin with the larger, and afterwards return to the smaller letters.

καὶ ἔγω... εἰπον] For the form of the sentence cp. Protag. 335 Ξ δὲ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τήν φιλοσοφίαν ἔγομαι, ἀριτρ καὶ νῦν ἐπανω καὶ φιλ. 368 A

εκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός] Not Thrasymachus, as Stallbaum ridiculously supposes (quoting in proof of his opinion Phileb. 36 δ, where Protarchus, who supports the doctrines of Philebus, is jestingly addressed as ἀναι κείνου τῶν ἄνδρων), but Ariston, whose name immediately follows, and is connected with the phrase by the repetition of the word παῖς. What the passage of the Philebus really proves is that this was a familiar mode of address amongst
intimate friends. As in other passages (Theaet. 207 D αὐτόν: Sophist 263 εἰ αὐτό), the demonstrative waits for the correlative word, which is supplied by the verse. The 'pronominal phrase' ἐκείνῳ τοῦ ἀνδρός, 'of that man,' prepares for the quotation from the Elegiac Poem and avoids the repetition of the name of Ariston.

περὶ τὴν Μεγαρῶν μάχην] The battle of Megara here referred to may be one of those mentioned by Diodorus (xiii. 65, 72) as having taken place in 409 or 405. As the Athenians were constantly at war with the Megarians, it may also be some minor engagement which is unrecorded. It certainly could not have been the battle in 424, because Plato, who was the eldest of the family, was only born in 430 or 428. We may be certain of so much:—(1) that Glauccon and Adeimantus were Plato's brothers; (2) that they did distinguish themselves at a battle of Megara; (3) that this battle was not the famous one in 424. Cp. Böckh 439, 440.

εἰ δοκεῖ δὲ[ ‘seems to be very appropriate.’ Cp. i. 329 ε.

δοκεῖτε δὴ μοι . . . ἡπιστουν ἐν ὄμιν] ‘I do believe that you are really not convinced; and I gather this from your general character, for if I judged by your words only, I should not trust you.’

ἐν τοῦ ἄλλου] ἄλλοι here, as frequently in Plato, and occasionally in other writers, is used adverbially; not ‘I judge from the rest of your character,’ but ‘I judge from something else [than your speech] which is your character.’ Cp. supra 357 c. The antithesis is further pointed by ἀντόσι in ἀντόσι τοῦ λόγου.

δ τι χρῆσμα] used absolutely, as in Protag. 321 C ἡπιστεῖ δ τι χρήστατο: Gorg. 465 εἰ ἐὰν . . . καὶ ἀντικρισάμενοι μὴ ἔχο δ τι χρῆσμα. μὴ βοηθεῖν] sc. τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.

ἔπειδῆ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] For οὖν βεβαιοι cp. Theaet. 154 D οὖσοι εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἡμεῖς, κ.τ.λ., and, for the favourite illustration from letters, Polit. 277 ε foll., where the argument is from the simpler to the more complex, as here from the greater to the smaller. οἰκεῖον ἐν εἰ may be compared with the elliptical formula ἀστερ ἐν εἰ. The sentence is complicated. It would naturally have run thus: ‘We should make such an enquiry as near-sighted people would make, if they were bidden to read small letters at a distance, and some one discovered that the same letters existed elsewhere larger and on a larger ground. It would be thought a gain to read the larger letters first, and then proceed to
the lesser.’ These two sentences are compressed into one, the
apodosis of the first (ἐποιήσαστο τις), or some such words, being
omitted, and ἔρραλον τῷ ἑῷν, strictly an exegesis of it, taking its
place. For a similar accusative out of construction, cp. especially iv.
434 δ (where this passage is referred to) νῦν δ’ ἐκείλομεν τὴν σκέψιν
ἡν φόβημεν, κ.τ.λ. Compare the use of διότερ εἰ with a sentence
following: e.g. Thearet. 197 c ἀλλ’ διότερ εἰ τις . . . τρέφοι, and else-
where.

οὕτω] sc. πρώτων ἀγαπώντας.

eἰ τὰ αὐτὰ διὸν τυγχάνει] ‘To discover if they are really the
same.’ See the transition from the state to the individual, which
is made with a reference to this passage in iv. 434 δ.

τί τοιοῦτον . . . καθορᾶ] ‘What do you see like this in the
inquiry respecting justice?’ i.e. how is the inquiry facilitated by the
simile of the large and small letters?

E [ἔσω τοῖν . . . ἐνεί] There is a touch of Socratic irony here.

369 A τὴν τοῦ μείζονος . . . ἀνισοκοποῦντες] ‘Looking for the likeness
of the greater in the form of the less.’

γενομένου αὐτοῦ] ‘When we have done as we propose.’ Sc. τοῦ
γίγνεσθαι τὴν πόλιν λόγον.

B δοκεῖ ὅν χρήσαι, κ.τ.λ. The apparent backwardness of Socrates
has the effect of stimulating his hearers. The crowning instance
of this is in v. 472 Α.

369 B–
371 E The state is the offspring of mutual need. No individual can
supply a tithe of his own wants. Each therefore invites the co-opera-
tion of others, and the resulting association constitutes the state.

Primary wants are those of food, shelter, raiment and shoes, and
these are supplied by the husbandman, the builder, the weaver and
the cobbler.

Their labours must be divided, and each must produce enough of
his commodity, and that of the right quality, to supply the rest.

This division of labour is approved upon the following grounds:—
1. Natural aptitudes differ. 2. A man who has one calling only
is more likely to excel in it. 3. Work must be done at the right
time, and therefore there should be no risk of the workmen being
otherwise engaged. A market must also be provided; and a medium
of exchange.

And the principle must be carried further. The manufacture of
tools and implements must be committed to the carpenter and smith,
and there must be a class of herdsmen and shepherds to rear the
animals required for husbandry and for use in building, and for the
supply of wool and leather to the weaver and the shoe-maker.

Our city is growing in size and can hardly be self-supporting.
This deficiency leads to importation, and this to the creation of
a mercantile class, and then, as imports necessitate exports, there is
an increase of the number of persons in the city who are engaged in
production. There must also be ships and sailors, and as exchange
within the city grows more complex, barter becomes purchase,
a currency is established, and a class of retail merchants is
created. Lastly, the bulk of the commodities now carried to and
from necessitates a class of hired porters, who complete our simple
state.

γίνεται τοίχω... πόλει] The real origin of society is beyond
the horizon of human history. We reconstruct the fabric on some
modern basis of contract, divine right, division of labour, mutual
necessity, or obligation, which is ascribed by us to the earliest ages.
But the society which we put together is only that which we have
previously taken to pieces. We mistake the scientific exposition of
a subject for its historical growth and development. The principles
which we suppose to have been known and recognized by all mankind from the beginning, are really working in them, but
unconsciously. They grew like children according to certain laws,
but they did not understand these laws.

ἡ τίν' οἱ... πόλιν ὅκεῖ[εν] ‘Or to what other origin would
you attribute the foundation of the state?’ (Literally, ‘What other
beginning, think you, founds the state?’) Necessity is the πρῶτος
οἰκουσία. For the liveliness of the expression, cp. infra c ποιήσαν
δι' αὐτὴν... ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία.

οὕτως ὁδ' ἀρα... ἀδέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα] The plural is the main
subject: this is subdivided by παραλαμβάνων, which is attracted by
ἄλλος into the singular: cp. ἡμῶν ἐκατοστος in the last sentence.

ἄλλος ἄλλω... ἐν' ἄλλῳ χρείᾳ] ‘One taking to himself one
person for one purpose, another taking another for a different
purpose, and yet another for another purpose still.’ The complex
expression reflects the mutual interlacing of various needs.

μεταθέτωσι δὴ... ἀμείνον εἴναι] ‘And so one gives to another

vol. iii.
or receives from another, because he believes it to be better for him' (to do so).

Well then, said I, let us in idea create a city from the beginning; although our need will be the real creator.'
meagrely,' i.e. with a view to mere necessities; but not without an allusion to geometrical necessity. Also in ix. 574 B ἔνεκα ... ὡκ ἀναγκαῖος ἐταῖρος ... τὴν ... ἀναγκαίαν μητέρα. The geometrical meaning is also played upon in v. 458 D ὄν γεωμετρικάς γε, ... ἀλλ' ἔρωτικάς ἀνάγκας.

ἀμελήσατα] sc. τῶν ᾿Ηλιων.

τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν] Compare Charm. 161 ε, where this simple notion of doing one's own business, which has been suggested as a definition of σωφροσύνη, is humorously set aside: δοκεῖ δὲ σοι τάλις εὖ οἰκείου ὑπὸ τοῦτον τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτῷ ἱμάτιον ἐκατον ἑράκτησα εἰς κλίπτειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυπτομαίνει, καὶ λύκην καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τάλλα πάντα κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγον, τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἀπεσθανεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτῷ ἐκατον ἐργάζεσθαι τε καὶ πράττειν; Οὐκ ἦμοις δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ἀδείς.

ἀλλ' ἵνα ... Ῥόνων ἢ 'κείνων] 'But surely, Socrates, the former way (ὀδὼν, sc. by co-operation) is easier than the second way' (ἐκείνως, by isolation). Ῥόδων, which is the reading of Par. A and of the great majority of MSS., is supported by Meno 94 ε Ῥόδων ἀγακάς ποιών ἀνθρώπων ἢ εἰ. The manuscript emendation, Ῥόου, may be right (see v. rr. on i. 348 ε), but is not absolutely necessary. The confusion, if so be, arises from dillographia and the similarity of A to Δ (Ῥόου, Ῥωμών, Ῥαδίων). ὄντω refers to the more familiar of the two alternatives, which is nearer in the speaker's mind.

ἐντούτῳ γὰρ ... ἐπιτόφως σοὐ] 'It comes into my mind now you speak.' Socrates has been leading Adeimantas to this result, which he now characteristically pretends to gather from him. The genitive absolute indicates the occasion rather than the cause: cp. infra 383 A οὕτως, ἡδή, ἦμοις καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοι λέγοντος.

φόβαι] This word has the chief emphasis, and is resumed in φόβοι. The first point is that all have not the same natural aptitudes.

πράξει] The reading πράξει (Μτ) is not impossible.

ὦν μίαν εἷς] sc. ἐργάζεται.

ὥς γάρ, ὅμως ... ἐν παρέργου μέρει] 'For the business, I conceive, will not wait for the leisure of the doer of the business, but the doer must keep at the work, making it his first object.' For the metaphorical application of ἔθλειν to things without life, cp. infra iv. 436 B τοῦτο τακτίζω ποιών ἡ πάσχει ... ὅν καθελθεῖ. So Hdt. i. 74 συμβάσας ἰσχυράτε ὥς ἔθλεουσι συμβένουσι.

II. 370 ἐκ δὲ τοῦτον ἀπὸ τοῖς πράττῃ] The order is inverted, πληρέω referring to καθώς, καλλίων ὁ δὲ μᾶς εἰς ὑποθεῖντον, ὧν φύεται, in what precedes.

D τάκτωνες δὲ] δὲ, not δὲ, is the true reading. 'And so,' &c.

ἀλλ' ὁδ' ἐν πῶ] ὁπως, like οὐκέτι (373 A, 468 B), is used to imply stages in the argument. Cp. supra i. 353 c οὐ γὰρ πῶ τοῦτο ἡμῶν—'I have not yet come to that question.'

E ἵνα οἱ τὰ γεωργοὶ ... χρήσαντα ὑποζυγίας] 'That the husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders, as well as husbandmen, the use of cattle for draught.' ἔχοντα is used in a double sense and construction—ἔχοντα (possess') ἔχοντα and ἔχοντα ('be able') χρήσαι: ἔχοντα follows the mood of προσβῆσαι: 'if we were to give them shepherds and other herdsmen that the husbandmen might have oxen for the plough.' Every possible use of the animals is enumerated except that of eating them. This is reserved for the luxurious state. Cp. infra 373 c δεῖγμα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουκήματων παμπύλλων, ἐὰν αὐτὰ ἔμαθεν. [ὑποζυγίας, which should have been accusative after ἔχοντα, is attracted into construction with χρησαι.—L. C.]

ἀδερθὴν τὴν πόλιν] 'To place the city itself' (not to speak further of the things contained in the city) 'where no imports are required, is well-nigh impossible.' ἀδερθὴ opposes the state to the previously mentioned individuals who are included in it. Cp. especially Thuc. ii. 60, § 4 ἀπὸτε ἀνὴρ πόλεως μὲν τὰς ἱδίας ἐμφορᾶς οὐ τὰ φέρειν, ἐλείστατο τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδίκους, πῶς ὁ λαὸς πάντας ἄμωμεν αὐτῇ;

κενὸς τὸν ἵππον] ἵππος is found in all the manuscripts with the exception of q β'. But the meaning of the words κενὸς τὸν ἵππον is poor and feeble, and the asyndeton at κενὸς ἐπεισεῖν indefensible. The reading κενὸς τὸν ἵππο, though probably a manuscript conjecture, is most likely to be the true one. 'But if the minister come empty-handed, and bring nothing which the other people want, whoever they may be from whom they obtain the supply of their needs, he will depart empty-handed.' The position of κενὸς before τὸν ἵππο is emphatic, and prepares for the repetition of the word.

371 A δὲ] 'And, therefore, what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but also enough and of the right kind to accommodate (subaud. ἱκάνη ἐστὶν) those of whom (i.e. of whose commodities) they stand in need.' The slight difficulty of explaining the last words of this sentence has probably led to the insertion of
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either (1) δυν may be taken as masculine: in this case the construction is peculiar and different from δυν ἐκεῖνον διακοιν. in the preceding sentence: ‘Those of whom they stand in need’ : i.e. of whose commodities they stand in need; or (2), placing a comma after ἐκεῖνος, the clause δυν διακοιν. may be taken as epexegetic—ολα και στα εκεῖνος, sc. ἰδιαί, ‘but in quality and measure suited to them (viz. those of whom they buy, παρ’ δυν δυν κομίηνται)—whatever the things are which they require.’ The former interpretation (1) is the more probable.

tων δικαίων διακοιν. ‘And we shall also want the ministerial class of whom we spoke before, who will have to import and export the various products.’ δικαίων is adverbial. The article recalls the previous mention of them in 370 ε. It is implied, but not expressed, that this class also must be increased.

ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει] ‘In the city itself.’ The pronoun here distinguishes the internal from the external commerce of the city.

ἐν δη ἢνα] sc. του μεταδηνα, κ.τ.λ., supra 369 c.

ἀγορᾶ... ἐκ τοῦτου] ‘The next step will be to have a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.’

τῆν διακοιν. ... ταῦτην] ‘this service’—of selling, as infra ε τῆν τιμήν ταυτήν. The antecedent has to be collected from the previous words ἐν ἀγορῇ καθησκει.

αὐτῇ... τῇ πόλει] ‘This want, then (i.e. of ministers of exchange), calls retail-traders into existence in the state.’

tοῦδε δὲ πλάνηται ἐπί τῆς πόλεως] He recalls the ἵμποροι mentioned in 371 λ in order to distinguish them from the κάπηλοι.

τῆν τιμήν ταυτῆς μισθῶν καλούσε] ‘Who, selling the use of their strength, because they call the pay thereby obtained hire are called hirelings.’ ταὐτήν refers to πωλούσε: cp. Theaet. 168 β ἄνθι φιλοσόφων μισθῶσα τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα (=φιλοσόφιαν) and supra c τῆν διακοιν... ταῦτην.

Plato is not a bad political economist; he saw the advantage of a division of labour (cp. Laws viii. 846 β, ε) in saving the time and improving the skill of the labourers, and the accordance of such a division with the natural differences of mankind. The distinctions of manufacturers and dealers, and of soldiers and citizens, are based by him on the same principle, of which he also makes a fanciful
application in his objections to the drama (iii. 395 A, B 'One man cannot in his life play many parts'). He further saw the necessity of foreign trade or 'territorial division of labour,' in speaking of which Plato almost uses the formula of modern economical writers.

τὴν ῥωμα . . . μισθωτοῖ] 'Then hirelings also go to make up a state.'

Where in the state are Justice and Injustice and at what point in the growth of the state do they come in? Adeimantus thinks that Justice somehow springs out of the mutual intercourse of the different classes with each other. Socrates then proceeds to describe the way of living in the primitive state.

But the rudeness of this Arcadian simplicity is distasteful to Glaucion, who, as a man of pleasure, demands that their citizens should have the comforts of civilized life.

And Socrates does not object. For the contrast between Justice and Injustice is likely to be more apparent when luxury has set in.

The first consequence is a further enlargement of the city by the addition of classes devoted to the supply of artificial wants; animals will be reared for food; more servants too, amongst others the class of swine-herds, as well as cooks and confectioners, will be required. The sphere of medicine also will be greatly extended.

χρειά] Here used in the sense of 'intercourse' or 'dealings with one another.' Cp. Aristot. Rhet. i. 15, 22.

θρίψωμα . . . πόλεμον] The main verb θρίψωμα is forgotten in the accumulation of participles: and when the sentence is resumed with greater emphasis in the words μάζας, κ.τ.λ., a word more suitable to the context (αὐτόχθόνοις) takes its place. Hence an asyndeton.

τῶν κριθῶν . . . τῶν πυρῶν] The article refers to σίτω supra.

τὰ μὲν] sc. τὰ δέλτρα.


μάζας γενναίας] 'Noble bannocks,' see note on i. 348 c.

ἐνι υπερθέντοις ἐπορευμένω ἐμακρί τε καὶ μυρρίναις] 'On pallets spread of yew and myrtle boughs.'

τοῦ οἴνου] the article referring to σίτω τε ποιούσες καὶ οἶνον.
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οδὴς ὀπίσω τῆς ὥρας ποιοῦμαι τοῖς παιδαῖς] cp. iv. 421 E-423 C, Republic II.

ἐκλαβοῦμεν ... πόλεμον] cp. infra 373 D, where war is seen to be occasioned by the excess of population over territory.

ὅνευ δῆφος ... ἑστιομένοι] ἑστιομένοι conveys a sarcastic allusion to ἐσωκρήσαται. 'You call it feasting when they have nothing but dry bread!'

καὶ βολβοῦς καὶ λάχανα ... ἐφησώμεθα] 'And they will boil truffles and cabbages—such vegetables for boiling as, you know, are to be had in the country.' Xen. Cyr. i. 2, § 8 asserts that cress (κάρδαμον) was the only δῆφος allowed to the Persian youth when under training.

Socrates assumes a charming unconsciousness of Glaucon's meaning when he asks for δῆφος, and, like Grumio, 'feeds him with the name of meat.'

μετρίως ὑπονύμησε] 'Drinking moderately the while.' ὑπο-
implies that the wine was an accompaniment of the 'dessert.' Cp. Anacreon f. 63 (quoted by L. and S. s. n.) καλοῖς ὑπονύμησεν ἐν ἰμαῖς.

εἰ δὲ δῶν πῦλυν, κ.τ.λ.] This picture of paradisiacal simplicity and vegetable diet has no attractions for Glaucon, who abruptly exclaims: 'And if, Socrates, you were establishing a commonwealth of pigs, how else would you be feeding the beasts?' (χορτάνων is used properly of animals). 'But what ought I to do, Glaucon? said I. Let them have the usages of civilized life: people who are to be comfortable should lie on sofas and dine off tables, and have dainties and dessert after the modern fashion.' In this easy, humorous style Plato makes the transition from the first simple notion of a state to the more complex. With ἀλλὰ τῶν χρήματα, ἀνερ φιλοτέχνα, some general words like πόλεως and ἰδίων have to be supplied from ἵζεται.

ἐπὶ τε κλίνων κατακεκλείσας] in apposition with ἀνερ φιλοτέχνα. κλίνη, 'a couch,' is opposed to στρώμα, 'a pallet,' supra b.

δῆφος] sc. ἰκνίων, absorbed in ἵζεται.

ὑποπούντες γάρ ... ἐφησώμεθα] Socrates ironically dissembles his real meaning, which is that without taking into account the evils attributable to luxury, and amongst other evils war, any real inquiry into the origin and growth of justice and injustice would be
impossible. Plato does not seek for justice in the simple state, because his idea of it and his anxiety to elaborate a parallel between the virtues of the individual and the state requires a more complex and highly organized form of society. There must be three classes in the state (as there are three parts of the soul)—each having its appropriate virtue of temperance, wisdom, courage,—before there can be justice, which is the harmonious blending of three virtues or cooperation of the three classes in the state. These three virtues and classes have no sufficient *raison d'être* in the city of pigs.

*ὁ μὲν οὖν . . . ὅγις τίς*] The word ὅγις, which is softened by δοπέρ, prepares the way for the stronger metaphor of φλεγμαίνουσαν τόλμην, which follows. Cf. *Laws* iii. 691 ε ὁ φύσις τίς . . . κατιδότευ οὐκόν τὴν ἀρχήν φλεγμαίνουσαν ἐτι.

*εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε . . . θεωρήσωμεν*] The subjunctive in phrases of this kind was originally interrogative, but the exact relation of the words was forgotten in the course of time. Goodwin, *M. and T.* §§ 287, 288.

*ταύτα γὰρ δὴ τίσιν*] Socrates thus playfully alludes to the displeasure which Glaucon expresses at the simple state.

*κλίναι, κ.τ.λ.*] κλίναι are to supersede the yew and myrtle boughs, τράπεζαι to take the place of the clean leaves.

*ἐταίραι*] are introduced παρὰ προσδοκιάν among cakes and ointments, as below ἔτι δὲ καὶ συμβοτῶν προσδησόμεθα, in contrast with the more refined ministers of luxury. A link of association is supplied by the mention of the rich perfumes and other sensual delights. A similar juxtaposition occurs in the *Theaetetus*, 175 ε μηδὲ γὰρ ἡδύναι ἡ δύσαι λόγους. So infra iii. 404 δ μέγις δρα καὶ Κορινθίων κόρην φίλην εἰνα, where the Κορινθία κόρη is mentioned along with the luxuries of the table.

*καὶ δέα δή*] the particle δή calls attention to the special demand of Glaucon for ὅψιν in 372 c, which Socrates now satisfies.

*ἐκαστα τοῖς παροδοπάδα*] The asyndeton adds to the effect, as in iv. 434 Α πάντα τάλα μεταλλαττόμενα.

*καὶ δή καὶ . . . θετῶν*] The antecedent to δ is repeated with a limitation in τὰ δεξαμενὰ. 'In providing what we first spoke of (shelter and covering) we must no longer ordain mere necessaries, as houses, garments, shoes, but set-a-going the arts of decoration.'

*καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν*] These words are omitted in Par. A and
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several other MSS., but their presence in II shows the reading to be an early one, and as decoration is required for houses in the luxurious state, so embroidery is required for clothing.

μελιον τι άλ] The correlative sentence is deferred; it is probably to be found in καὶ ἡ χώρα ποι, κ.τ.λ. (infra d).

δρυκοῦ . . . καὶ πλήθους] ‘It is to be increased in bulk and number.’ The words have a depreciatory tone, and are suggestive of a huge unwieldy multitude.

οἱον . . . μυμηταί] (1) It is not certain whether in this passage θηρευταί simply means ‘hunters,’ who may be supposed to supply the wants of the luxurious citizens, or whether it includes the association of ‘hunters of men,’ ‘birds of prey,’ who live by their wits at the expense of others (observe the addition of πάρτες suggesting a multifarious class). The love of fanciful language in Plato, and also the tendency to fanciful comparisons and generalizations, which is apt to prevail in the infancy of dialectic (see especially the Sophist and Politicus, in both of which θηρευτική and μυμητική occur together, as θηρευταί and μυμηταί in this passage,—Soph. 265 A, Polit. 299 D), makes it likely that this mischievous second intention of the word has not been forgotten by Plato. So the Sophist is termed νεών καὶ πλουσίων ἐμμαθός θηρευτής (Soph. 231 D), and the art of the Sophist (Euthyd. 290 B), θηρευτική . . . τεχνή ἄθρόπων: in Laws vii. 823 B, the term θύρα is extended to men as well as to beasts and birds, so as to include thieves, pirates, &c.,—as also in the Sophist and Politicus, where the θύρα τῶν ἢμέρων has many subdivisions, including piracy, kidnapping, law, rhetoric, and sophistry (Soph. 222 B foll.)—and στρατηγική is included under θηρευτική (Polit. 299 D στρατηγική καὶ ξυμπάτης ἡττωσοῦ θηρευτικής καὶ γραφματῆς ἡ ξυμπάτης μέρος ὅτιοι μμητικῆς). Cp. also Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 29. (2) On the other hand, although the metaphorical use of θηρευτὴς is common, it may seem that the word could hardly be applied in this way without some preparation or explanation.

οἱ περὶ τὰ σχῆματα τε καὶ χρώματα] Simply ‘forms and colours,’ a general expression, including probably sculptors, painters, architects, as well as inferior decorative artists—not dancers, who are referred to under the next head (χορευταί).

τοιηταί] The poets are allowed to enter with other μμηταί, but most of them in Book iii are afterwards driven out. And by this
Republic II.

reform of μονοκή Socrates professes to have done something to purge the fevered commonwealth: cp. infra iii. 399 ξ καὶ ἡ τῶν κόσσ. εἶναι, λείψαμα νέον παραδειγματές πᾶλιν ἤν ἄρτι τρυφῶν ἰδαμεν πόλιν. The purgation is made more complete in Book 1. βαφυδοί, ὑποκριταὶ, χορευταὶ, ἄργολόβοι are the ministers of the poets.

πατήσοντες] Fathers will no longer look after their sons themselves. Mothers will not suckle their own children. All sorts of persons will be required to minister to the extravagances of fashion and the luxuries of the table.

ἐν δὲ καὶ συμβιβασμοῦ This is humorously added. Swine are fed only for eating; they were not wanted in a state that dispensed with animal food.

tοῦτο . . . τοῦτο] The vagueness of the reference renders the transition easy to 'the other animals,' as if swine, and not their keepers, had been mentioned at first. In what follows the emphasis is on παμπολλῶν. The other animals (that were included in the former state) will be needed in far greater numbers than before, i.e. not only enough for ploughing, draught, &c. (supra 370 ξ), but also for the table.

iatrῶν ἐν χρείαις] The plural in χρείαις is occasioned by i atrῶν.

A further consequence of luxury is that we shall be no longer content with the boundaries of our original territory, nor our neighbours with theirs: each will covet a portion of the other's land. And so we shall go to war:—which to states is the source of so many evils. For self-protection we must now have a soldier-class, which, like the other classes, will devote itself exclusively to its own pursuits.

In appointing the guardians, we must first of all select suitable natures. But what natures are suitable? The example of the watch-dog may instruct us here. For he, too, is a guardian. And we observe that courage and gentleness are united in him. Is such a combination possible in man? The difficulty seems at first sight insuperable; yet our illustration of the watch-dog shows a way out of it; for dogs are fierce to strangers, but gentle to those whom they know. May we not then infer that the love of knowledge in a spirited nature is the combination for which we are seeking.

ἀφόειν ἀντίστασι] It is this prevalence of the lower nature (σιδηρών, χρηματιστικῶν) which occasions the degeneracy of the state in Book
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viii. (pp. 547, 550 ff.). Cp. also the downfall of Atlantis in the Critias (130 d ff.).

\[\textit{πολεμήσωμεν...δὲν γίγνεται\} Without enlarging on the precise effects of war, Socrates is content to argue that war arises from the same cause (i.e. luxury), as most of the other evils of mankind.\]

\[\textit{ἐξ δὲ}\] Either (1) referring to \textit{πολέμου} (plural to singular, whence two MSS. read \textit{ἐξ ὧν}), or (2) \textit{ἐξ ἰδίων γνωσμένων δέν}. For \textit{δὲν γίγνεται}, which is equivalent to \textit{ἰκάστος}, cp. Euthyphr. 7 \textit{ὁ ἱχθὺς} ἀλλήλων γνωσμένων, ἄνεν γνωσμένα. \[\textit{ὅπως στρατοπέδων]} follows the construction of \textit{σμικρῷ} which is a dative of measure or excess.

\[\textit{ἐπεὶ δὲν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν} \] perhaps with an ironical reference to \textit{τίθασι κομμωτρίαν κουραῖς, &c.} \[\textit{αὐτοῖς οὕς ικανοῖς} \] ‘Are they not enough to take care of themselves without adding to them?’ The answer is: ‘Not enough; for if we are to carry out our principle of a division of labour, the soldier’s must be a separate calling.’

Plato separates the profession of the soldier on much the same grounds as standing armies would be defended in our own day. Yet, as he himself allows afterwards, the soldier may also be a philosopher, nor is the utmost military training inconsistent with other employments in modern times. Large standing armies may be required by the exceptional circumstances of politics, and are not necessarily attended by political dangers. Yet the division between the calling of the citizen and the soldier is probably injurious to both, as tending to separate elements of character which should rather be united—in Plato’s language, as dividing courage from gentleness, and also as superseding a patriotic by a merely professional feeling.

\[\textit{ἀλλ’ ἔρα} \] applies, not only to the first, but also to the second member of the sentence (\textit{ῥὰ δὲ δὴ...ἐν ἀνεργαιοβίντα}), which latter is the emphatic part of it: ‘But are we to infer then that while we make one rule for the cobbler and for the husbandman with a view to their attaining a special excellence, the attainment of special excellence in the military art is not of the greatest importance?’

\[\textit{ἔφ’ ἐὰν...ἐργαζόμενος}) \] (1) ‘With a view to which keeping himself free from all other pursuits’—or better (2) ‘attending
Plato: Republic.

Republic

II.

374 B
to which, 'in which,' i.e. 'leaving other things and doing this.'

δφ' φ' belongs either (1) to σχολήν ἀγων, or (2) to the whole sentence,
bearing resumed emphatically in διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος.—ζεμέλλε, i.e.
'if he was to do his work well,' as supra 372 δ τοὺς μελλόντας μὴ
tαλαιπωρεῖοςθαί.

C

ἡ οὖσα βρέθον . . . (ν) ἰκανὴν παρασκευομένη] For the complex
form of sentence, where two clauses, which cannot be true together,
are included in one interrogation or negation, cp. especially supra
i. 336 ε μη γάρ δὴ σοι, εἰ μὲν χρυσίων ἐγχυμένων . . . δικαιοῦντας δὲ
ζητοῦντας, κ.τ.λ., and note. The implied disjunctive argument, If
war is to be left to citizen soldiers it is either less important or
easier than other pursuits, is characteristic of Plato, as also is the
introduction of fresh examples, πεπτείᾳ καὶ κυβείᾳ, when those
already adduced were sufficient.

αὐτὸ τοῦτο] sc. πεπτείαν ἢ κυβείαν, understood from πεπτεικός ἢ
κυβεικός.

D

λαβὼν . . . ληφθὼν] The momentary tense is significant: 'the
instant he takes it' or 'it is taken in hand.'

διήλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων] The addition of ὀργάνων points the
analogy. The weapons of the warrior are his tools.

πολλοῦ γὰρ ἐν, κ.τ.λ.] sc. εἰ οὖσα ταῦτα ἤν.

τῶν ἄλλων] To be joined with σχολῆς: 'Leisure from other
pursuits,' sc. ἐπιτηθεμάτων. Cpt. supra 370 c σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων,
374 B.

E

ἀρ' οὖν . . . ἐπιτηθεμένον] 'Will he not also require a natural aptitude
for the particular occupation?' ἐπιτηθεμένος (cp. ἐπιτηθής, ἐπιτηθεμένος)
has a wide range of meaning,—what a man practiseis, makes an
object or profession: hence also the customs and institutions of
a state.

ἡμέτερον μέντοι] μέντοι gives a deliberative assent to the new
and somewhat disturbing suggestion.

δοὺν γ' ἢ δύναμις παρείκη] 'as far as our power allows.'
Theaet. 150 D οὕτως ἢ δ ὅθεσ παρείκη: more often impersonal—
Sympos. 187 E καθ' δοὺν παρείκει, φυλακτίον.

375 A

οἰεὶ . . . διαμέλεχθαι] Compare with what follows the conclusion
of the Politicus 306–311, where courage and gentleness are to be
Notes: Book II.

interwoven in a state. Also infra iv. 441 Β: vi. 503 B, C: Laws vi. 773.

εἰς φυλακὴν] is to be taken closely with διαφέρειν. αἰσθητὸν
is masculine: 'When he has the game in view.' αἴσθησις has
a special use in hunting, cp. Xen. Cyn. 3. 5.

δὲ ἰμαχὸν τι καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός] Cp. the saying of Heracleitus
(fr. cn Bywater) θυμῷ μᾶχεσαι χαλεπῶς δὲ τι γὰρ ὁ κρήξῃ
γίνεσθαι, ψυχὴ ἄνικηται.

tαῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτως ζήσκε] 'Now this seems an impossible
requirement'—viz. that a nature should be found, having both
these opposite qualities. For a similar affection of despair on
the part of Socrates cp. Theaet. 203 ὁ προγνώσκων τὰ στοιχεῖα
ἀκούσα αὖ πρὸς μήκος ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλογήν, καὶ αὐτῶς ἠμῶν ὁ καλὸς
λόγος ἀποδεδρακός οἰκήσεται.

δικαιο... ἀπελειφθήσεν] 'My friend, said I, we deserve to be
in a puzzle, for we have lost sight of our own illustration.' Theaet.
189 c δικαίον δὲ καλῶτα ψυχῆς διαφαίνεται. So δίκαιον vi. 504 ὁ Ἰάρ
μημονεῖν... τὰ λοιπὰ δὲ εἰς δικαίον μὴ ἀκούνων.

οδὸς τοποθετήσαμε... ταύτα] The greatest characters are those in
which opposite qualities, instead of extinguishing one another, exist
side by side, and are developed by the occasions which require them.
Besides the strength or goodness, the range or play of a
character has also to be considered. ὅρα, 'then,' as this example
shows.

οἰσθα γάρ του... τοὐναντίον] τῶν γενεαῖν κυνῶν has a double
construction: (1) after οἰσθα, as a poetical genitive, which may be
defended by such passages as Laws i. 646 ὁ τῆς περὶ τῶν οἴκων ὅρα
διαρρήσθης ὡς αὐτῶς διαστηθῇν. (2) The use of the genitive is further
supported by the resumption of κυνῶν in αὐτῶν, which is governed
by ἤθος. Cp. infra iv. 439 ὁ τοῦ τοξότου οὗ καλῶς ἧκε λέγει, ὅτι αὐτοῦ,
k.t.l.

οἰσθα μὲντοι] 'Certainly.' μέντοι marks Glaucon's assent to the
new point to which attention is called.

καὶ τούτο, ἣν δὲ ἐγὼ... προτεκτοῦσα] Compare the fragment of
Heracleitus (cν Bywater) κύους καὶ βασίζομαι δὲ ἐν μῇ γνώσκων.
This double character of friendliness to acquaintances and savage-
ness to strangers—τὸ φιλτρικὸς μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρίσμων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς
ἀγνωστας ἀγρίους—is attributed by Aristotle to θυμός, which he makes
the principle of friendship, instancing in support of his statement the fact that we are more liable to be excited against friends when we are slighted by them than against enemies (Pol. vii. 7, § 5). ἰδι εὐθὺς is well supported by manuscript authority, although Par. Α has δὲ, and the particle is omitted by Stobaeus. ἰδι is more forcible than δὲ. ‘He has manifestly received no injury from one whom he has never seen.’

οὐ πάνω ... προσεέξειν τὸν νοῦν] ‘I never before gave any attention to the point.’ οὐ πάνω, ‘not at all’ or ‘certainly not,’ the absoluteness of the negative being used to intensify the statement, as also in οὐ πάνως, with which the expression may be compared.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ... φιλόσοφον] ‘But surely this instinct of canine nature is charming, and quite like a philosopher.’ κομψὸς is one of the facetious words in Plato. Compare the following: viii. 558 Α ἡ προσφερέντον τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ‘charming,’ as in this passage: iii. 405 D τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας, ‘clever sons of Aesculapius’; ν. 460 Α κλήροι κομψοί, ‘clever,’ ‘cunningly devised lots’; vi. 489 εύ τούτο κομψοσάμενος ἐσφράσται, ‘the ingenious inventor of this told a fib.’ Phaedr. 230 c πάνω δὲ κομψότατον τὸ τῆς πόλεως, ‘most charming of all is the grass.’ In all these passages there is an idea (1) of fineness or subtlety: (2) of amusement.

πῇ δη; ... καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον] Socrates works the illustration with ironical gravity. ‘Your dog,’ as he would say, ‘is a philosopher; for he loves those whom he knows, and what is the love of knowledge but philosophy?’

For the use of πῇ and δη—‘Interesting in what way? In this way’—cp. vi. 510 B σκόπει δη ἀδ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοστοῦ τομὴν γάρ τιμητώς. πῇ; Ἡ τὸ μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦτο τέτις τιμήσεως ἂν εἰλάσῃ χρωμαίνει ψυχή την ἀναγκάζεται εἰ ὑποθέσεως: Theaet. 172 D, where δη in like manner introduces a sentence: πῇ δη; γὰρ τοὺς μὲν ... δεί πάρεστι σχόλη, κ.τ.λ.

οὐκοῦν ... δεῖν εἶναι] ‘And may we not say confidently of man also that he who is to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?’ The following sentence shows that φύσει is construed with φιλόσοφον and not with πρᾶξις.

οὐσιος μὲν ... οὐσι] The abrupt change of number is again noticeable. Cp. supra 373 ε.
Notes: Book II.

The antecedent is to be gathered from παιδεύσονται.

σκοπωμένοι = εἰν' σκοπώμεν.

οι καὶ τοίς... διεξάγομεν For the use of ἵκανας see Gorg. 512 c ἴκανα γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος: and for συχνός, implying tediousness, cp. Thuc. 185 ε μαλα συχνὸν λόγον: Soph. 217 δ ἵπτεναι ἵκανον· λόγον συχνὸν κατ' ἐμαυτόν: Phil. 23 β βαβαί... συχνὸν μὲν λόγον τοῦ λοιποῦ. 'For we do not want to be tedious, and we do not want to leave unsaid what is required for completeness;' i.e. 'For we want enough, and not too much.' Cp. x. 601 c μὴ τοῖς ἡμίσεσι αὐτῷ καταλίπωμεν ῥήτιν, δὴ ἴκανος θεωμεν. ἴκανον λόγον, like πλέρωμα supra 371 ε, is a collective word used partitively. This clause is omitted in the text of Par. A, but has been added in the margin by an early hand.

καὶ δ' τοῖς Παθευκονόμοις ἀδελφοίς Glaucon, who was provoked by 'the city of pigs,' has been the interlocutor in the lively discussion of the luxurious commonwealth and of the nature of the guardians. Adeimantus now interposes on the question of method and continues the serious discussion about education, till on the question of music Glaucon is again too much interested to keep silence.

How are these select natures to be reared?

In youth they are to be educated, according to the dictates of long experience, in gymnastic and the liberal arts (μουσῶν).

The liberal arts come first, beginning in the nursery with fables, in which truth is to be conveyed through fiction.

Considering the extreme importance of early impressions it is right to legislate even for these first beginnings of education.

The rules to be laid down may be exemplified by considering those great fables which the poets have embodied.

Their account of Gods and heroes is apt to insinuate wrong notions, which are injurious to the young and tender mind. Our poets must not tell of wrong done by Gods, nor of wars in heaven. Such tales are false and of bad example. Nor can they be defended as allegorical, for the child cannot distinguish allegory from fact.

God must be represented as He really is: (1) good, and (2) true.

τὸς οὖν η ἡ παιδεία;] Education in modern as well as in ancient times hangs to the past: the study of the poets who were committed to memory by the Athenian youth in the age of Plato (Protag. 325 ε foll.: 'And when the boy has learned his letters, and
Republic

II.

376 E

is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises and encomia of famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them,—Laws vii. 810 foll.) may be compared with the study of the classics in our own day.


ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστική] This, the commonplace point of view (που), is stated here, but corrected afterwards (τι. 411 E).

μουσικής ἢ εἰπών . . . ἢ οὐ;] ‘In speaking thus, do you include literature under music, or not?’ The genitive depends on λόγος.
For εἰπών without an object (σα. οὖν or μουσικής) cp. supra 370 A εἰπώνος σου.

The manuscript authority is divided between εἰπών and εἰπον: the latter reading would mean, ‘And do you include literature,’ I said, ‘under music?’ εἰπών is to be preferred as having better authority.

παιδευτῶν ἢ . . . ψυχική] Truth of feeling rather than of fact or reasoning is the form of truth which the mind is most willing to receive during the first years of life. The child has to go through a stage which is not unlike that of the infancy of mankind, and is only partially corrected by the experience of older persons. That the pupil may have as little as possible to unlearn (παρὰ ψυχικῆς τῶν παιδών καὶ λαμπάνων . . . ἐν τῷ ἴκτωρ, ἢ ἐπίθετα τελευτημένο, ἢ χρόνου οὐρώμεθα διὰ αὐτῶν; infra 377 B: cp. also iii. 411 E, Laws ii. 653 B), whether in religion or in anything else, considering especially the shortness of life, is what Plato would have termed a ‘point of first-rate importance’ in education. Compare again Laws vii. 792 A ἢ ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ χρόνος oὐτος τριῶν ἢ τέλτων ἢ τῶν μόνων oὐσικῆς τοῦ βίου διαγωγίοις χείρον ἢ μὴ χείρον. Nor has the power of the love of truth, regarded only as an instrument of enlarging and deepening the faculties, ever been sufficiently considered either in ancient or in modern education. For the falsehood of the poets cp. the familiar quotation from Hesiod—Theog. 27 ἢ μὲν ψυχία πολλά λέγειν ὑπομονήν ὅμοια. Also Pindar, Olymp. i. 28 foll.:
Notes: Book II.

ἡ θαύματα πολλά, καὶ ποὺ τι καὶ βροτῶν φάτων ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀλαθή λόγον
dειδαιμόνιον ψεύδεσθι τουκίους έξευράντη μῦθοι.

and Arist. Met. i. 2, 13 κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν πολλα ζεύγεσθαι δοιδω.

τούτο δὲ του . . . ἄληθῆ] ‘These, I conceive, speaking generally, are fictions, but they contain some elements of truth.’ Mythology, taken as a whole, is false, but may contain elements of historical or moral truth.

τούτο δὴ ἔλεγον . . . γυμναστικῆς] ‘That was my meaning in saying that (1) they (the young), or (2) that we (the teachers) must take in hand music before gymnastics.’

ἀπτέων] (1) sc. τοῖς νέοις (infra νέω καὶ ἄπαλφ). Cp. infra iii. 389 β τὸ γε τοὐτὸν ἱερὸς δατέων, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἀπτέων. Or (2) sc. τοῖς παιδεύουσιν ἡμῖν.

πλάττεται] sc. ὁ τραφέομενος. The word occurs presently in a different connexion (μύθους πλασθέντας): but cp. infra c πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν.

ἐνδύομαι τύποι] ‘A deep impression is made.’ For ἐνδύομαι in the sense of ‘penetrate,’ ‘sink in,’ cp. Laws i. 642 β εὐνοοὶ ἐκ νεῶν εἴδος ἐνδύομαι ἕκαστον: also Theaet. 169 β οὕτω τις ἤρως δεινὸς ἐνδύ- δυκε τῇ περὶ ταύτα γυμνασίας: infra iii. 401 β μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἔστω τῆς ψυχῆς δὲ τὸ μυθός καὶ ἀρµωνία. For the sense compare Timaeus 26 β ὡς δή τοι, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὰ παιδεῖ μαθήματα βαθματών ἔχει τι µηµεῖον: Theaet. 194 c τὰ σηµεῖα . . . λεγών τὸν βάθος ἕχοντα πολυχρόνια . . . γίγνεται.

Compare the saying—ἀρχὴ ἡµῶν παντὸς—or, as Plato, altering the well-known line of Hesiod, says in the Laws vi. 753 ε ἀρχὴ . . . πλέον ἢ τὸ ἡµῶν παντὸς: an adaptation which is repeated by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. i. 7, § 23. See also infra iii. 401 ε τὰ µὲν καλὰ ἑκατον, . . . τὰ δ' αὐτόµαχα ψιγοῦ τ' ἀν ὅρθος καὶ µικρότερον νεός δε, πρὶν λόγον διαστῶς εἶναι λαβῆται, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀπάτοιον' ἀν αὐτῶν γνωρίζων δὲ ἀκεβότητα µάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφέως; and Laws ii. 653 B.

ῥαῖνως οὕτω] (1) ‘Thus lightly,’ i.e. as we should be doing if we went no further; like ἀπλῶς οὕτως i. 331 c and elsewhere, and νῦν οὕτω: or, rather (2) ‘lightly, as is now commonly done’ (with the customary indifferance). Cp. infra iii. 403 ε ἡ τῶν τῶν ἀσκη- τῶν ἐξει; viii. 544 c ἡ Κρηστικὴ . . . οὕτη, sc. πολειτεία. The same difficulty arises infra 378 A.
καὶ πλάτειν . . . ταῖς χεραῖς] A good commentary on these words is afforded by Plutarch, De Educatione Puerorum, ed. Reiske, 3. 26 ἄσπερ γὰρ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος εἴδος ἀπὸ γενέσεως πλάτειν τῶν τέκνων ἀναγκαίων ἔστιν, έτι ταῦτα ὁρθὰ καὶ ἄστραβη φύσει, τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων εἰς ἀρχῆς τὰ τῶν τέκνων ἡδῆ ρυθμίζειν προσέχει. A similar use of πλάτειν with reference to the adult body occurs in Plut., De Sanitate, ed. Reiske, 4. 93, where the editor vainly conjectures παλαιοσύμπιτα.

τῶν αὐτῶν τυπῶν εἶναι] sc. τῶν μεῖζων καὶ διατόμων μόδων, which is easily supplied either from the previous or the following clause.

καὶ ταῦτα δύσασθαι] ‘And should have the same effect,’ i.e. embody the same principles.

καὶ λέγουσιν] This is said either (1) of Homer and Hesiod, whose poems still live and are recited, or (2) of contemporary poets, who are included in εἰ ἄλλοι νοουται. Probably the latter.

διὰ πέρ, ἣν δ᾿ ἐγὼ . . . μεμφεσθαί] i.e. τὸ γενέσεως περὶ θεῶν. Plato means (1) that any falsehood about the Gods is blameworthy, but (2), above all, when it has an immoral tendency.

ἄλλως τε καὶ . . . ψεύδηται] ‘Especially when the fiction is bad as well as false.’ The meaning of μὴ καλῶς may be illustrated by the repetition of the expression (οὗ καλῶς) in describing what Socrates terms the ‘immoral fable of Uranus and Cronus.’

δε τε αὖ Κρόνος ὅ] ὅς here is not a mere resumption of the previous ὅς, but is emphatic and means ‘in what way.’

ἄπορον] The meaning is that the difficulty of procuring the victim was to make the representation nearly impossible.

καὶ γὰρ . . . χαλεπος] ‘Why yes, he said, these stories are certainly indefensible.’

ὁδὲ γὰρ ἄληθῆ] i.e. ‘for they are false, as well as bad.’

εἰ γε δει ήμῖν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘if we are to have them think.’ ήμῖν, here
Notes: Book II.

as elsewhere, is the dative of the person interested. See on i. 343 A δε γε αὑτῆς, κ.τ.λ.

πολλοὶ δὲ ... καὶ ποικιλτέον] ‘Far be it from us to tell them of the wars of the giants and (1) make them the subject of decorative work,’ or (2) ‘embroider them on garments.’ To the same stories Euthyphro appeals in justification of his own conduct in bringing an action against his father. See Euth. 6 b, c καὶ πολλοὶ δὲ γάρ εἶναι τὰ δυτὶ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔσφρας γε δεικνύει καὶ μάχαι καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεται τε ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁγαθῶν γραφέων τὰ τε ἄλλα λεπτὰ ἡμῶν καταστοιχίαται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγίλοις Παναθηναίοις δὲ πεῖπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν: and the previous passage, 5 ε, in which Euthyphro defends his impiety by the example of Zeus binding his father.

The sentence is an emphatic repetition of what has preceded: the emphasis justifies the asyndeton. πολλοὶ δὲ has passed into an adverb = ἑαυτὰ.

τοιαῦτα λεκτά ... λογοτειχί] ‘Such, rather, must be the stories told to them in earliest childhood by old men and old women alike, and as they grow up, we must compel the poets also to compose for them in a similar spirit’ (cp. infra 380 a, c). This punctuation, with a comma after γραμάτι, was first adopted in Baiter’s edition of 1881. Previous editors, including K. F. Hermann, made the pause at προσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις. The passage, when so punctuated, was variously understood: (1) ‘by old men and old women, and all elderly persons’ (Davis and Vaughan): (2) ‘this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children, and the same when they grow up’ (Jowett’s Plato, first edition). These ways are unsatisfactory, although the change from πρὸς τὰ παιδία to the dative, in (2) may be defended by examples (Soph. 248 a). The omission of λεκτία in Par. A may be accidental, or the insertion of the word in other MSS., although necessary, may be only conjectural.

vidēs] is proved by the antithesis of παρῆς to be the true reading; the old correction Διός (2 m), which is mentioned by Suidas and Photius, appears to have arisen from a reference to another story, which is told in Iliad xv. 18 ff. The legend of the golden throne containing hidden chains, which was presented by Hephaestus to his mother out of revenge for her rejection of him at his birth, is given by Pausanias i. 20. 3. It is to this legend that Plato refers.
Republic

I. 378 D

ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένοις] 'Composed with a hidden meaning.'
Cp. ἐν φαρμάκῳ ἀδείᾳ (iii. 389 Β) and similar expressions. ὑπόνοια was looked upon as an old-fashioned word in Plutarch's day. Cp.
Plut. de aud. Poet. ii. 19 ἐ ταῖς πάλαι μὴν ὑπονοίαις ἀληθορίαις δὲ
νῦν λεγομέναις.

Ε 379 A

πρὸς ἀρετήν] 'In regard to fitness for producing virtue.' Cp.
Phaedo 69 Α ἡ ὀρθή πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ, and see Riddell's Digest,
p. 128.

ἐχεὶ γὰρ . . . φαίμεν] 'Yes, said he, there is reason in that; but
suppose a person were to ask us with regard to this what these
noblest kinds of fiction (sc. τὰ κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν)
are and what the tales in which they are found, what answer should
we give?' The first ταῦτα refers vaguely to what precedes, the
second more precisely to κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

Compare Laws vii. 811, where the question is asked, what literary
pattern the guardian of the law shall use in the education of youth,
and is answered (not without a certain degree of egotism) that

379 B

αὐτὸ δὴ ταῦτα] in apposition with the sentence. 'But as to this
very point—the forms of theology, what shall they be?'

οὐς . . . τραγῳδία] 'God should ever be rendered to us as he
in truth is, whether the form of verse which the poet chooses for
the description of him be Epic, Lyric, or Tragic.'

ἐὰν τε ἐν μέλεσι] though omitted in Par. Α, is found in Eusebius
(p. 376) and is probably genuine. The insertion seems to be
required by the sense, and agrees with the divisions of poetry, infra
iii. 392–394.

379 B–380 C

1. God is good. He can never be the author of evil. He is not
the cause of all things, but only of the good.

How many poems will be cancelled by this simple rule!

If human calamities are referred to God, it must be added that
they were inflicted for the good of those on whom they fell.

42 D διαθεσμοτητῆς . . . ταῦτα, ἵνα τῇ ἐπαρκεῖ καὶ καλῆς ἔκαστῷ ἀναιτῳ.
Some of the inferences in the preceding Sorites are verbal
only. The unnecessary multiplication of the steps is a charac-
teristic feature of the Platonic dialectic.
Notes: Book II.

δλίγων μήν ... τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν] Such pessimism seems more in harmony with the spirit of the Timaeus or the Laws than of the Republic. Cp. however infra v. 473 d. It is a strain of reflection always apt to recur in Greek literature: Iliad xvii. 446: Hdt. vii. 46, 3.

ταύτην τὴν ἄμαρτιαν] sc. the error of making God the author of evil, as is further explained in what follows.

κηρῶν] 'lots,' not κηρύς, 'fates.' Cp. Iliad xxii. 210:—

ἐν δ' ἐτίθει δύο κήρε ταυρλεγώς θανήτων.

The lines are not found in our text of Homer exactly as they are quoted; the passage referred to is Iliad xxiv. 527-532:—

δοιοι γὰρ τε πίθοι κατακώτατα ἐν Δῶς οὕθι,
δφωροι, οὐδὲ δίδωσι, κακῶν, ἑτερος δὲ ἐκὼν
ψ μὲν κ' ἀμιξίας δώῃ Ζεὺς τρεπικέφαλος,
ἀλλοτε μὲν τε καθ' ὧ γε κύρεται, ἀλλοτε δ' ἐσθήθη
φ' χαὶ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δώῃ, λαοτρῖκων ἤθικε,
καὶ ἐ κακὴ βοσβρωσίς ἐπὶ χθόνα διὰν ἔλαινε.

The quotations from Homer in Plato often show slight variations—which are sometimes intentional departures (see infra iii. 388 a) from the old manuscript text which has come down to us. The changes, however, are far from being sufficient to justify Wolf’s assumption of the unsettled state of the Homeric text before the times of the Alexandrian Grammarians.

δὲς ταμίας] δὲ follows λέγωντος, in the same construction as δὲς δοιοι πίθοι supra. The words which follow are not found in Homer; they probably arise out of a confusion of the preceding quotation with Iliad iv. 84:—

Ζεὺς, δὲν ἀνθρώπων ταμίας πολέμου τίτυκται.

ἐπ] cognate accusative.

Θεῶν ἐπὶ . . . καὶ Δίδς] (1) The strife and combat in the θεομαχία in Iliad xx takes place after an assembly of the Gods, convened by Zeus, whose command is carried to them by Themis,—in Plato’s view a most inappropriate person for such a message. κρίνων is here ‘dispute,’ ‘altercation,’ from κρίνειν. (2) Others suppose an allusion to the judgement of Paris, and the contention which led to it: θεῶν is then from θεία. This explanation, however, rests on a con-
jectural emendation of Proclus’ abstract of the Cypria (viz. Θέους for Θείδος—Heyne). See W. R. Hardie in the Classical Review, vol. iv. p. 182. And the strife of the goddesses is only the first of a chain of incidents leading to the events which the Cypria spoke of as planned between Zeus and Themis (or Thetis).

ἀλλ’ ἐδώ τις, κ.τ.λ.] τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη is used in two senses: (1) ‘the sufferings of Niobe,’ which is the object of ποιήσ. ‘if any one shall make a poem on this theme:’ (2) as the description of the play, which is the antecedent to οὕς. Plato is quoting from the Niobe of Aeschylus.

ἀδιν] probably refers to the poets, the singular being exchanged for the plural, as ποιήσ in the next sentence is followed by λέγουσι. θεός in this passage is used in a generic sense, and δάκτυλος is relative to the θέας which has preceded. But the abstract term is already tending to pass into a proper name—a philological transition which in some degree assisted and also veiled the change in the Greek mind from many gods to one. Cp. infra 381 c θεῳ ... ἰκανος αὐτῷ, and note: x. 597 b, c. For the sentiment cp. Butler’s Analogy, part I. c. ii On the government of God by rewards and punishments. ‘Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are unacquainted with (i.e. which prevent God from making men’s happiness independent of their actions). Or less happiness, it may be, would upon the whole be produced by such a method of conduct, than is by the present.’ Again c. vii ‘Though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial (οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι κολαθημένοι) ... yet notwithstanding it might have been much better for the world if this very evil had never been done.’ The difficulty which Plato and Butler thus attempt to solve is, perhaps, reduced to the smallest proportions by regarding the whole of human existence as a course of education in which evil is ever lessening in the advance towards a higher good.

The amount of evil, rather than the permission of evil, seems to be the real difficulty. For what is called the permission of evil is only another way of describing the mixed nature of man. And no one can seriously complain that he does not belong to another order of beings, or that, having the power of doing right, he was not made incapable of doing wrong. And even in reference to the amount of evil there is no limit to the power which a man has of improving his own state and that of his fellow-creatures.

See on Book i. 352. In a solitary passage of the Laws (x. 897).
which is imitated in the Epinomis (988 κ) Plato seems to explain the origin of evil as in the Zoroastrian system, by supposing a power of evil as well as of good. No trace of this double principle of good and evil is to be found in Plato except in these two passages.

ός δὴ λοιος οἱ κακοὶ] Cp. infra ix. 591 Α πῆς δ’ ἀδικοῦτα λασάνωιν καὶ μὴ δεδότα δέκαν λευκτελίαν; ἢ οὖν π’ ἢ μὲν λαβάνων ἢτι πυγμήρετος γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ., and Gorg. 472 foll.


ἐν τῷ ἁπτοῦ πόλει] is added with solemnity; it does not imply that he might do so in another country.

μυθολογοῦται] agrees with the subject of λέγειν, although νεώτερον is probably suggested by μήτε τινα ἀκομήν which is inserted διὰ μίσου. Cp. for the general meaning supra 378 c.


οὗτος μὲν τοῖς . . . μὴ πάντων] ‘This then will be one of our laws and patterns relating to Theology, which will have to be observed in speaking and writing,—that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.’ That morality in the highest and purest sense must be at the foundation of religion and especially of our conception of the nature of God, is a truth the repetition of which is rendered necessary by the corruption of the human intellect in Christian as well as in heathen times.

2. God is true. He changes not, nor does he deceive.

(a). He is not changed by another, for that other would be stronger than he; nor by himself, for that which is perfect can only change for the worse.

(b). He never deceives mankind. He is capable, neither of true falsehood, nor of falsehood in word;—neither of false-thinking (which all beings hate), nor of false-speaking, which men sometimes find necessary, when they want to elude an enemy, to humour an insane friend, or when they do not know the truth about ancient times, to make mythology as much like truth as they can. But God knows all things and is all powerful, and no madman is the friend of God. In this particular, as in the former, Homer and Aeschylus have committed grievous errors.

τί δὲ δή, κ.τ.λ.] The connexion of these paragraphs is as follows:
(1) God is good; (2) God is true, and this (a) in himself (i.e. unchangeable either from without or from within), and (b) in relation to us—i.e. he cannot lie or appear other than he is.

αὐτῶν γεγομένων] sc. ἄλλοι τὴν ἴδιαν, i.e. ‘actually in his own person becoming different,’ as opposed to ‘merely appearing to become so.’ The predicate is to be gathered from what precedes (ἀφιερώθη οὐκ... ἴδεις), and any ambiguity which might have been felt is cleared up by the addition of the words καὶ ἀλλᾶ ἄλλα τὸ αὐτῷ ἐίδος, κ.τ.λ. God is described, first as really taking some other form; in the second part of the sentence (τὸ τε δὲ... δοκεῖν) the metamorphosis is only an illusion.

ἡ ἀπλῶν τε εἶναι... τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἴδεας ἐβαίνειν;] ‘Or is he of a simple nature, and least of all going out of his own proper form?’ What is this form? The true answer to this question can only be gathered from the context, viz. that God is good, and God is true. The highest idea of beauty is described in the Symposium (211) as ‘that final cause of all our toils, which in the first place is everlasting, not growing or decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time and in one relation, or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some or foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty only, simple, absolute, separate, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things.’ Cp. also infra vi. 508 ε, in which is described what Plato there terms the idea of good: this is that nature ‘which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty, and which is not only the author of knowledge, but of being and essence,—which is to the intellectual world what the sun is to the visible.’ See also Tim. 29 ε.

οὕτω μὲν ἄλλου] μὲν takes up one of the two cases which are supposed in the previous sentence. The second case is omitted, or rather deferred to infra 381 β ἄλλο δέποι αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.

σῶμα... καὶ πάν φυτῶν] φυτῶν, in the most general sense, would
be inclusive of the human body. Cp. vi. 491 δ παντὸς . . . φυτοῦ, εἰς ἐγγείων, εἰς τῶν ἔφων.

οὗ τῆς] This is the reading of Par. A and several other MSS. Bekker read with Stephanus and some of the old editions αὐτῆς οὗ τῆς. Aldus and Eusebius give αὑτήν. One MS. (β') has αὖ τῆς. If αὐτῆς is read it must mean 'the soul herself' as opposed to the body mentioned in the previous sentence.

καὶ μὴν τοῦ . . . ἀλλοιοῦται] For the meaning of σκεῦος compare Soph. 219 ἡ τὸ τὰ αὐτὸν τὸ ζιωθητον καὶ πλαστὸν, ὅ δὲ σκεῦος ἀνομάκαμεν. The words καὶ ἀμφισβητα are omitted in Par. A.

ὁ θεὸς γε] ὁ θεὸς τε, Par. A, may perhaps be right.

ἐκὼν αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] These words contain a fresh application of the Socratic principle of the involuntariness of Evil.

ἐκατος αὐτῶν] sc. τῶν θεῶν, referring to θεό. See note on 380 Α.

μένα . . . μορφή] Cp. the impressive language of the Timaeus, 42 Ε καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστή τοῦτο διατάξας ἵμαν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ κατὰ τρόπον ἔδει.

θεοὶ ξείνουσιν, κ.τ.λ.] Odyssey xvii. 485, 486. Plato has somewhat unfairly omitted the following line, which expresses a higher feeling, and is therefore unsuited to his purpose:—

ἀνθρώπων ὥμοι τε καὶ εὐσκόμεν ἐφορᾶν.

In Soph. 216 c he alludes to the whole passage, and applies it to the philosophers, whom Socrates compares to unknown mysterious visitants, καθορᾶντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κατὰ βλέν.

Θείας] Thetis, according to Sophocles (Troilus fr. 556 Nauck; cp. Schol. in Fing. in Nem. iii. 60) and other writers, took various forms in order to escape from her nuptials with Peleus.

μὴν ἐν τραγῳδίαις . . . βιοδώρους] 'Nor let any one, either in tragedy or in other poetry, introduce Herè disguised, in the form of a priestess, collecting alms for the life-giving sons of the Argive river Inachus.' For the significance of ἀνεργοῦσαν see the noun ἀγάρτης with the feminine ἀγάρτημι and the compound μπραγάρτητι, 'a begging priest of Cybele.'

'Ινάκου, κ.τ.λ.] It is uncertain from what poet this quotation is taken. The children of Inachus are the other rivers of Argolis on whose waters the fruitfulness of the plain depended.
Plato: Republic.

Such charges may be illustrated by the tales which are alluded to in the Laws, ii. 672, of Dionysus losing his reason through the devices of his step-mother Herè, and revenging himself by infusing madness into the rest of the world. Plato with a feeling like that of Herodotus is afraid to repeat the story (ἦγὼ δὲ τὰ μὲν τοιαύτα τοῖς ἀσφαλεῖς ἣγομένοις εἶναι λέγειν περὶ θεῶν ἀφίημι λέγειν): he appears, however, in the spirit of Pindar, to explain the madness innocently, as meaning the excess of youthful life.

ιδαλλόμενοι] The poetic word recalls the spirit of the mythology.

ἀλλ' ἄρα] ‘But are we to suppose then . . .?’ ἄρα (as above 381 b) expresses doubt or wonder about the alternative which remains. The emphasis is on the latter part of the sentence ἦμων δὲ ποιοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.

ἴθαλω ἂν] ‘Can we imagine that God would lie or be willing to lie?’ ἰθαλω here, as in 375 λ, is nearly equivalent to μήλω. ‘Is God likely to do so?’ ‘Is it in His nature?’

ἡ ἔργη φάντασμα προτείνων] ‘Or in act, by putting forth a false appearance.’

tὸ γε ὡς ἄληθος ψεύδος] Plato is fond of this and similar oxymora. Cp. Theaet. 189 c οὐκ ἂν, οἰραί, σοι δοκῶ τοῦ ἄληθος ψεύδους δυσαλβέσθαι: Soph. 263 B: Phil. 23 B δρ' διτ' τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἤδινθι;

tὸ κυριωτάτῳ . . . ἑωτῶν] For this as an expression for the soul, cp. Phaedo 94 B–E.

ἐκαί] sc. ἐν τῷ κυριωτάτῳ.

άυτό] sc. τὸ ψεύδος.

ἠγὼ δὲ λέγω] Here, as often in antithesis, the pronoun, although not emphatic, partakes of the emphasis which belongs to the whole clause. ‘What I really mean is this.’

ψεύδοσιν τε καὶ ἐψεύδοσιν] ‘To be and remain deceived.’ ἐψεύδοσι is added to explain or correct ἐψεύδοσιν, ‘the lie in the soul’ being a thing infixed or permanent, and the whole phrase answers to ἐξειν τε καὶ κακτήσασθαι in the following clause. Cp. supra i. 351 B δουλοῦσαι . . . καὶ καταδεδουλώσασθαι.
Notes: Book II.

ἐν τῇ τοιούτη' 'in such a case'; when the lie is in the soul and about real being. Cp. Laws v. 731 c τῶν γὰρ μεγάστων κακῶν ὁδείς ὁδομοὶ ὁδοὶ ἐκὼν κεκθὴ τῶν ποτὲ πολὺ δὲ ἤκιστα ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἀντίστοις τιμωτάτοις. Cp. for ἄνταθά (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) vi. 505 D ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄκαν ὅτι τοιούτα, τὴν δὲ δακχα ἄνταθα ὅντα πᾶς ἀντιμακι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . ἀκρατον ψευδος] The lie in the soul is unconscious falsehood respecting the highest matters. To regard God as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding men with appearances, or to deny the existence of God would be a lie of this hateful sort, which may be compared with Aristotle's ἀγνωστα καθάλων (Eth. Nic. iii. 1, § 15), and is a contradiction of the essential nature of the soul, which, according to Plato, lives on truth, Soph. 228 c ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχὴν γε ξομεν δικουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνωσταν. Plato considers this unconscious falsehood to be much more spiritual than the mere conscious or verbal falsehood.

ἐφευμένου] is masculine, referring to a person (as supra ἐφαρμόζων) 'on the part of him who is in error'; and the genitive depends on the whole phrase, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀγνωστα, resumed with ἐν.

tῶν καλουμένων φίλων] is a suspended genitive which finally gains construction from ἀποτροπής ἔνεκα. The emendation ὅ ὁνο for ὅταν is unnecessary; ὅταν is correlative to τῶν. This is perhaps said with a glance at the discussion in Book i, as to who are our friends (i. 334: cp. supra 362 b, c).

διὰ τοῦ μὴ εἰδέναι διη τάλαθας ἔχει, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Timaeus 40 D ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παιῶν ἀποτελεῖν, καίπερ ἄνω το ἐκάλεν καὶ ἄνεγκαλω ἀποτελεῖσθαι τέτοια. Σε. περὶ δαμόνων γένεσιν. This notion of the functions of mythology may be illustrated from the Politicus, Timaeus, Critias, and Laws (Book iii), in which Plato gives the imaginary history of a 'world before the flood.'

κατὰ τι ζῆ... ἄν ψευδοτο;) 'Then on which of these grounds is lying useful to God? Will he lie in imitating the truth, because he is ignorant of the events of other days?'

τοι θῆ... οὐκ ἰν] 'Then in God there is nothing of a lying poet.' For the personification of a quality compare Phaedo 77 θ ἀλλάζων ἐν τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, δοτις τὰ τοιαύτα φοβεῖται: also Phil. 39 A, B, where the faculty of memory is personified as a scribe, ὅ... παρ ἡμῖν γραμματέως, and imagination as a painter, and some
ludicrous lines of Diphilus, quoted by Harpocration, s. v. δεισοποιῶς:

ἀγαθὸς βαφεῖς ἢντιν ἐν τῷ παιδίᾳ
tαυτὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν δεισοποιὰ παντελῶς
tὰ σπάργαν ἀποδίδειχιν.

Ε ἀλλὰ . . . φεύγοντο;] 'But shall we suppose him to speak falsely, for fear of his enemies?'—"Λα" is to be supplied from ἄφομοιων ἄν 
ψεύδοτο above. Cp. supra i. 352 ε ἀκούσας, and note.

ὁ θεὸς ἀποκινᾶ καὶ ἀληθὲς] The neuter is continued from the preceding sentence.

οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας] These words are omitted in Par. Α, probably from the repetition of οὔτε.

συγχωρεῖς . . . ἑαυτοῦ] 'You agree then that here is a second principle, according to which the Gods are not enchanter who transform themselves?' τοῦτον refers to what has preceded, and is further explained by ὡς μήτε, κ.τ.λ.

παράγειν] The construction is changed from ὡς . . . δόται, probably in consequence of the clause τῷ μεταβάλλειν, κ.τ.λ., coming between.

οὔδὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου] sc. τοῦτο ἐπαινεσύμεθα. ἄσ is changed from ἐμάς to suit the former part of the sentence, and the less usual form is chosen to preserve the rhythm of the verse.

ξέρπαρτά τ’ εἰπών, κ.τ.λ.] (1) 'And in saying all, he raised a note of triumph over the blessedness of my lot.' τύχας is governed by παιδίᾳ ἐπευθήμησεν in one phrase. Or (2) joining εἰπών . . . τύχας,

'Having spoken of my lot as in all things blest of heaven.'

δην τίς τοιώθα λέγει] This sentence begins with a resumption from δην τοῖς φῶς, κ.τ.λ. supra: hence the asyndeton.

χαλεπαναθείμεν] 'We will frown,' says Socrates, speaking with the imaginary authority of the ruler and lawgiver.

οὔδε τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσωμεν . . . εἰ μελλόνων, κ.τ.λ.] There is a confusion or combination of two constructions. 'We will not, because' and 'we must not, if.' For this condensation see Riddell's Digest, § 256: and cp. Thucyd. i. 40, 2 δοτις μή τοῖς δεξαμενοῖς, εἰ 
σωφρονουσί, πόλεμον ἀντὶ εἰρήνης ποιήσει.
Notes: Book III.

BOOK III.

Besides their false representations of the Divine nature, the poets and mythologers are guilty of other falsehoods, which must likewise be forbidden in the interests of morality. The tales about the world below are such as cannot fail to inspire cowardice in all that hear them. But our guardians must be brave and have no fear of death. And our poets must tell the truth concerning Death, and rob him of imaginary terrors.

They will therefore be forbidden to represent their heroes as lamenting for the death of friends, since to die is not an evil, and the hero is sufficient for himself, and the loss of money and friends does not affect him greatly. Achilles must not mourn inordinately for Patroclus, nor Priam for Hector;—still less the chief of the Gods for his son Sarpedon.

Not only excessive grief, but excessive laughter must be discouraged. For every extreme brings on a reaction to the opposite extreme. The 'inextinguishable laughter' of the Gods must be erased from Homer.

Then our guardians must be taught veracity in their youth. For even 'the lie in word' has been reserved as a medicine for exceptional cases. And such a remedy must be solely entrusted to the physician, that is, to the ruler. No other in the state may ever dissemble what he knows.

In some things we may praise Homer—as where Diomed enforces obedience, or the good discipline of the Achaeans is described. But not the passage in which Achilles reviles his chief, nor where Odysseus rejoices over the banquet. For temperance, orderliness, and chastity are to be enforced, and such fortitude and self-control as Odysseus shows when he 'strikes upon his breast and chides his heart'

Liberality is another virtue to be fostered by us. Our poets must not sing that gifts prevail with kings, or tell how Achilles took a ransom for the body of Hector.

Nor must we listen to those passages in which the same hero is represented on the other hand as proud and impious. To hear of one so born and so brought up as being possessed with the opposite vices of meanness and insolence cannot but be ruinous to the morals of the young. The preceding rules, then, must restrict the choice of subjects in mythologising about Gods and Heroes and the world unseen.
toíaúr' óttα] viz. that God is good and true.

καὶ γονέας . . . ποιησμένους] This is added in allusion to the stories of Zeus and Cronos, and of quarrelling among the Gods. The words form a transition to the human virtues and duties which follow. The effect of such stories on the conduct of children towards their parents is again referred to in Laws x. 886 c ff.

toîs ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν] ‘who essay to speak.’ ἐπιχειρεῖν is often used in Plato as an amplification of the word which is attached to it. Cp. Phaedr. 265 εἰ τὸ πάλιν καὶ εἴδη δίωναθαι τέμνειν, καὶ ἅρη, ἡ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγγέληται μήπος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόφφ χρώμενον—' and not go about to break any part,' &c. Here the periphrasis is more significant. περὶ τοῦτων τῶν μῦθων is (1) governed by ἐπιστατεῖν: (2) repeated with λέγειν: cp. ii. 360 δ ἐπεὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων.

δείσθαι] sc. αὐτῶν. The construction is again changed at λέγοντος, which refers back to λοιδορεῖν: ‘since, in reviling the world below, they do not say what is either true or expedient.’ In some MSS. (Ven. Ξ p. m., Vind. E, &c.) ἄν is inserted after λέγοντες which implies a suppressed condition: not ‘since what they say is not true,’ but (sc. ἐλ λοιδοροῖς), ‘since if they did so they would not speak truly.’ Compare ii. 380 c ὥστε οὕτω δοσι ἄν λέγεμαι, ἐλ λέγοιτο.

ἀπὸ τοῦτο τοῦ ἔπους] ‘beginning with this verse’ of the speech of Achilles to Odysseus: Od. xi. 489. For ἔπος in the sense of an Epic line cp. infra 393 Λ ὀδός οὖν ὅτι μὴ χρῆ μεν τοῦτων τῶν ἐπῶν, κ.τ.λ.

[ἡ μή βιοτος πολλος εἴη] These words are omitted in Par. A and may possibly have been inserted by some scribe from recollection of Homer.

οἶκια δὲ . . . θεοὶ περ] II. xx. 64, 65. The lines occur in the description of Poseidon striking the earth with his trident:—

dείσας δὲ ἐκ θρόνου ἄλογο (sc. Hades) καὶ λαχε, μή οἱ υπέρθεν γαίαν ἀναρρήξεις Ποσειδών ἐνοιχόθων,
oῖκια δὲ, κ.τ.λ.

ἐν πόσῳ . . . οἶκ ἐνί πάμπαν] II. xxiii. 103. 104: the words of Achilles on awaking from the dream in which the ghost of Patroclus appears to him.

καὶ τό, κ.τ.λ.] And the verse about Tiresias:—‘To him alone [after death did the goddess Persephone grant] to have under-
standing, but other souls flit as shadows' (Odysse 1. 495). The feminine νοσ is due to the attraction of σκια;—the verse is quoted also in the Meno (100 a) δει οίς πάντας τῶν ἐν Ἀδων, αὐτί σκια ἀσουνοι. Plato seems to presuppose the construction and context to be in the memory of his hearers. Though he sometimes quotes inaccurately, both he and they must have been intimately familiar with the Iliad and Odyssey.

ψυχή δ' ἐκ μεθέων] Il. xvi. 856. On the form ἀνθρωπήτα see Monro and Leaf in loco.

ψυχή δὲ κατὰ χθονος] Il. xxiii. 100.

ἀς δ' δετ... ἐμ' ἔγεναν] Odysse. xxiv. 6—9, 'As bats in hollow of a mysterious cave, whenever any of them falls off out of the string from the rock, fly squeaking and cling to one another, so did they move together with gibbering cry.'

τρίσω is here used of a shrill treble sound—the squeak of a bat. The thin treble cry of the bat (inaudible to some persons) has been the recognized similitude in many lands for the voice of a ghost.

διαγράφωμεν] διαγράφωμεν is here to 'cancel' or 'strike out,' as elsewhere (vi. 500 ξ) to 'describe' or 'draw a plan of.'

ἀκουστῶν] sc. δ' , in construction with ἄς supra.

τὰ περὶ τῶν ... ἀνεβα] The order is τὰ δεκα τῆ καὶ ἀνεβα ὁμάτα πῶτα τὰ περὶ τῶν: 'We must cast aside all the terrible and dreadful names which are used in describing this subject, Cocytus, Styx,' &c.

ἀναφηλητα] though plural, takes the accusative after it, like ἀκουστῶν supra.

καὶ ἄλλα ... δομαζομένα] i.e. τέλλα ὃματα τούτων τού τύπου δότα, δ.Chrome.

φρίττειν δ' τοια, κ.τ.λ. 'At the mention of which names a shudder passes through the soul of him that hears them.' The words ἄς οὗν τὲ are probably genuine, though resting on slender manuscript authority, which is chiefly that of q. The reading which is found in almost all the MSS. is ἄς οὗρας, i.e. 'as the poet thinks' or 'imagines, he produces a fine effect; whereas we fear that this effect of terror will spoil the courage of our soldiers.' This is forced; and the emendation of δε τῆ, which is supposed to be an allusion to annual recitations of the rhapsodists, is worse.
Republic
III.
387 C

Another conjectural reading is ὃς ἔτει, 'believing them to be true.' The reading ὦτα may have easily sprung out of 

οἶῶν τε through οἶῶν τε: compare the converse confusion, i. 336 ἐ ὦν γε σὺ, 

δ ἕλε, where for ὦν γε σὺ Ven. Ξ reads ὦν γε ἔστιν. The meaning of ὃς ὦν τε may be supported by the frequent recurrence of ὃς ὦν τε μᾶλιστα, μέγιστα, elsewhere in Plato. Protag. 349 ἐ 

ἀλλον ποιο καλὸν ὃς ὦν τε μᾶλιστα.

καὶ ἵως... ἄλλο τι] (1) 'And this sort of thing (sc. δὲ ἄλλα, 

καὶ) may be well enough for some other object,' i.e. to excite interest, or to teach not courage but something else. Cp. supra b 

οὐχ ὃς ὦν ποιμείκα, κ.τ.λ.: infra 390 A ei ἐς τινα ἄλλην ἠδονὴν παρέχεται, 

θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν. (2) Or does Plato mean—'this effect of fear may be well enough for another purpose,' viz., to discourage vice (cp. the judgement of the dead in x. sub fin.)? Cp. infra 394 D where, under a similar vague expression, a very important matter seems to be concealed, viz. the expulsion of Homer.

θερμότερον] 'Too heated,' i.e. 'nervous,' or 'excitable,' not cool enough. θερμότερον suggests μαλακότερον, 'softer,' the ordinary effect of heat being to soften. Plato is fond of the conjunction of θερμός, and similar words with μαλακός. The effect of heat on wax is probably present to his mind. Cp. infra 411 b; Cratyl. 432 b; 

Laws ii. 671 b τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πιστῶν διαπίπτον τινί γεγομένας 

μαλακότερα γίγνεσθαι: or 666 b μαλακότερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς 

ψυχῆς ἔθος, καθάπερ ηὔς πῶς σιδήρων ἐνεβίστα, γεγομένων.

Ast conjectured ἄθρωμότερον, and this reading was subsequently found by Bekker in MS. v (Angelicus).

καὶ τῶν ἄθρωμῶν... ἄνθρων;] 'And shall we also get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?' The genitive ἄλλοι τῶν ἄθρων is the subject, not the object, of οἴκτους; otherwise the argument from 'Ἀλλα μὴ... καταλέξῃ infra would be irrelevant. Cp. infra Ε τῶν ἀθρόμων τῶν ἀθρώμων ἄνθρων: also 390 D: Soph. 

O. C. 1636 ὃ δ', ὃς ἄθρογενος, οἴκτον μέτα, κ.τ.λ.

διαφέροντω... προσεθεῖται] 'He is distinguished above his fellows by standing least of all in need of another.'

ἡμιστα δρ'... καταλαβῆ] 'And therefore will be least likely to 

lament, but will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.' The infinitive is dependent on λέγομεν (supra D), to which the construction returns.

Ἄλλοι' ἐπὶ πλευρᾶς... ἄλλος ἀτρυγγέτων] Iliad xxiv. 10-12,
Notes: Book III.

slightly altered. Plato has dropped the metre (in the words τὸν... ἀναστήσα) to save the construction. It is probable that he has further altered διεισεξα (II. xiv. 12) into πλούζωντα, which does not occur in Homer, for the same reason, and also to increase the mock-heroic effect: the word ἀναγκαῖον does not occur in Homer, but is added to round off the line. πλούζων is found in Hesiod (Op. et Dies 632), and seems to be introduced here in a humorous sense (‘sailing along’), in order to throw ridicule on the description. 

Cp. vii. 529 c ἄν δὲ ἐὰς ἕντις καὶ ἐν γῇ. Heyne’s conjecture, προϊσσα, a word not found, but formed on the analogy of ὀψίσσα, ‘taking a morning walk,’ is ingenious, cp. the words οὐδὲ μὲν Ἡδὲς | φανονίμη λήθαικεν, which follow in the text of Homer; but no change is necessary.

ἐκεῖνος] sc. Ὕμηρος.

κυλωδομένον] The unmetrical κυλωδομένον is read in ΜΗ, where the copyists have probably substituted the later prose form κυλωδίτης for κυλωδήν, which is the only form in Homer. The same may or may not be true of ἀμφοτέρας (ἀμφοτέρας Par. A).

ヂμοὺ ἔγα, κ.τ.λ.] The words of Thetis in Iliad xviii. 54.

ἀμφοτέρας] = ‘in a manner unlike him,’ recalls ii. 379 οἶος τουχάνει ὁ θεὸς ἄν, ἀεὶ δὴν ἄρδοντέων.

δὴ πότιον... δεσμη] II. xxii. 168, 169; xvi. 433, 434.

ἠραξίως] sc. τῶν θεῶν.

εἰ καὶ ἐπίοις αὐτῷ] ‘Should it even come into his mind.’ Compare Phaedr. 264 β τὸ ἐπὶν, ‘what came into his head’: infra viii. 563 c οἴκοιν καὶ  Λεοχίλων, ἐφη, ἐρωσμέν δ’ τι νῦν ἡλθ’ ἐπὶ στόμα; Eurip. Med. 1051, 1052 ἀλλ’ τῆς ἑμῆς κάκης, | τὸ καὶ προίσσας μαθακοῦσι λόγους φρενί. The very inclination to such words and actions is to be rebuked and suppressed. So in the Theaet. 173 D σπουδαὶ δι’, κ.τ.λ. ... οὐδὲ δὲν ἁπλῶς προισσαται αὐτῶι.

ἄλλος καλλιόν [ Another and a fairer one: sc. λόγῳ. For the term καλός applied to an argument cp. i. 334 D, where Polemarckus says—ὁτις ἐκεῖνον καλλίων φαινεται: Theaet. 203 D, 209 Ε.

δια τοῦτο ἐρρη καὶ γλωττὶ] ‘when a man gives way to violent laughter.’ Cp. Tim. 59 D (Bekker’s reading) ταύτη δὴ (sc. τῆς ἡδονῆ) καὶ τα νῦν ἐφίνες (ἐφίνες, Par. A), and Protagoras 338 L οὐριὰ ἐφίνε, ‘running before the wind.’

The same thought occurs in viii. 563 E τὸ δὴν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην vol. III.
Republic III. 388 E

πολὺ δὲ ἦττον, ἐὰν θεοὺς] The particle δὲ after τε (in otre) is emphatic: 'but surely much less so if they are Gods.'

οὐκ ἀποδεκτὸν ... οὐ γὰρ οἴνον δὴ ἀποδεκτὸν] 'On your views we must not admit them.' 'On my views, if you like to call them mine: that we must not admit them is certain.' For a similar piece of raillery compare v. 475 λ ἔλθων, ὡς, ἤπειρον λέγω ... συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου χάριν.

B 389 A

Ἀλλὰ μὴν, κ.τ.λ.] How far does Plato sanction falsehood? Only in the governors, who are allowed to use the 'lie remedial' in the management of their subjects; the subject is not allowed to have the privilege of lying in return. The higher sense of the inexpediency and immorality of all falsehood seems to be wanting here, as above in ii. 382 c. Yet falsehood is denied to the Gods, and only admitted as a necessary imperfection among men. Possibly some thread of irony is here interwoven (see especially ἐπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις). Plato seeing that falsehood plays a great part in the government of the world, is willing to sanction it for certain purposes: so for example in the marriage lots (v. 459 D), and in the noble lie—Φαινομένων τι—about the origin of classes in society (infra 414 c).

ei γὰρ ὅρθως ἐλέγομεν ἀρτί] sc. at the end of Book ii. 382.


ἰδιώταις δὲ ὅχον ἀπέσχω] sc. τού τοιοῦτου.

tοῖς ἄρχοντι δὴ ... ἦτοι πολιτῶν ένεκα] The disjunctive form of sentence is occasioned by the negative implied in ἐπερ τισιν ἄλλοις. 'None but the ruler is to do so, either for warlike or peaceful purposes.' For the meaning of πολεμίων ένεκα, cp. ii. 382 c τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεύδος ... χρήσιμων ... πρὸς τε τοὺς πολεμίους, κ.τ.λ.

C 390 B

πρὸς γε δὴ τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἄρχοντας] 'To our rulers, being what they are.' Plato does not acknowledge the same obligation towards unskilled rulers such as the demagogue or tyrant. Here, as supra i. 346 Ε Plato without distinctly anticipating the great
Notes: Book III.

revolution of making philosopher-kings already hints at a better sort of government than any at present existing among mankind. In Par. A τοιούτους is written only in the margin, but by the first hand. It is omitted in Stobaeus and in v. It may therefore possibly be a repetition of τοιούτου.

`Looking] agrees with ἵδιστη supra, the construction being slightly changed from λέγω.

ἀν ἀρ’ ἀλλον . . . ἐν τῇ πόλει] ‘If then a ruler catches any one besides himself lying in the state.’ ἀρχων is understood from τοῖς ἀρχοις.—ἀρχος supra.


d’ αν γε . . . ἀργα τείχωσι] ‘Yes, said he, that is, if our theory is carried out.’ ‘If over and above the word there should ever be the fact’ (τροπον τίλαν). For the use of ἔπι cf. Odys. xvii. 308 εἰ δὴ καὶ ταύτα ἤσκε βίειν ἐπὶ ἐδει τίδε.

Outline Plato has opposite ways of enlivening his language. The first creation of the state is confessedly theoretical (ii. 369 λ, c), but it soon appears that ‘we are the legislators or oekists’ (ii. 379 λ, v. 458 c), ‘and do what we describe; or rather not we, but necessity is the founder of the state’ (ii. 369 c). Then again we are reminded that this is a mere argument or similitude, and the fact quite another thing, which is to be added over and above (ἐπι λόγῳ), as in this passage. Elsewhere the two modes of speech alternate with one another.

ὡς πλήθει] ‘for a body of men,’ such as the army of guardians whom we are training. The qualifying phrase is probably added to prepare for the definition of σωφροσύνη in the individual in Book iv. For a similar qualifying addition, cp. iv. 430 c πολιτείᾳ γε. (The phrase is so understood by Van Heusde, Spec. Crit. in Plat. p. 52 and by Matthiae, Greek Grammar, § 388.)

τέττα . . . μόθυ] II. iv. 412.

tά τοιτῶν ἐχόμενα] either (1) ‘other lines which are of the same order with these,’ as expressing a similar feeling, or (2) ‘which go along with these.’ Plato, who is quoting from memory, supposes that all which he quotes occurs in the same passage.

Ἰον . . . Αχαΐοι,—συγγενεῖς σημαντοράς] The first line is found in Iliad iii. 8: the second in Iliad iv. 431. It is improbable that we have a trace here of a Pre-Alexandrian Homer, nor is there
any reason for supposing that the second verse is interpolated in the text. Some Homeric illustration of obedience to chiefs is needed, and Plato has taken the liberty of bringing together two half-lines out of different passages, perhaps by a slip of memory, perhaps not intending that they should be connected. Cp. supra 388 b.

οἴνοβαρεῖς . . . ἔλαφοι] II. i. 225.

καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔξης] ἐξῆς is variously construed with a genitive or dative (infra vii. 528 A τὸ ἔξης . . . τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ).

νεανίεόματα] ‘impertinences.’ So the verb, Phaedr. 235 A ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανίεσθαι ἐνδικτάμενος: Gorg. 482 c: and the adjective νεανίκος, Gorg. 508 B τὸ νεανίκον δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σου λόγου. νεανίεόματα is the form in Par. A. In other MSS. there are traces of νεανικεύματα. Xenophon, Cyr. i. 2. 15, appears to have used νεανικεύσαναι:—Pollux, 2. 20; see Stephanus’ Thesaurus, ed. Dindorf.

εἰ δὲ τινά ἄλλην ἤδονήν] ‘If however, apart from this, it gives any pleasure,’—ἄλλην being ‘adverbia l.’

παραπλεῖαι δὲι τράπεζας, κ.τ.λ.] altered from Odysse. ix. 8 παρὰ δὲ πλῆθος τράπεζα. Plato has somewhat unfairly left out the minstrel, who, in the same passage, is placed foremost among the delights of the banquet.

λιμφί δ’ ὀξιτωτον . . . ἐπισπειρον] Odysse. xii. 342.

ἡ Δία . . . ἐπιλαμβανόμενον] ‘Or to hear that Zeus, while the other Gods and mankind were sleeping, lightly forgot all that he had planned while he alone was awake.’ The construction is ἄκοινοι Διᾶ δι’ ἐπιλαμβανόμενον = ὡς Ζεὺς ἐπιλαμβανότα (cp. ii. 383 λ ἄ . . . γόητας δόνας). The nominatives, μόνος ἐγγυσάριος, agree with the subject of ἔβουλεύομαι, the relative being transposed as supra ii. 363 λ τοὺς σάινας δ’ φασὶ τούς θείους διδώσαι. καθευδάντων . . . ἐμβουλεύσατο is a paraphrase of Iliad ii. 1, 2 ff.

Ἀλλοι μὲν ἐν θεῶ τε καὶ ἄνδρες ἱπποκυντοί
εἶδον πανόχιοι. Δία δ’ οὐκ ἔχει κήδυμος ὕπνος’ κ.τ.λ.

And the chief allusion is to Iliad xiv. 294–351. The words φίλους λήσοντε τοκέας, which occur in the poet’s narrative (l.c. l. 296), are inaccurately ascribed by Plato to Zeus in person.

τὸ δωράτων] The diminutive is comically substituted for the δῶραμος of Iliad xiv. 338, and is perhaps meant to burlesque the αἴθρα Δίως δωμάτων which Aristophanes (Ranae 100) ascribes to Euripides.
Notes: Book III.

δι’ ἔτερα τοιαύτα] ‘for something else of the same kind,’ ‘for the same sort of thing.’ These words are euphemistic and contemptuous. Plato does not care to give the second tale in full: Odyssey. viii. 266 foll. The sentence passes out of the interrogative form. odh, sc. ἐπιτίθεσιν ἂν ἄκοινω.

ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦ τινε... ἀκουστέον] ‘But any extreme deeds of endurance which are either performed by famous men or told concerning them, your youth should see (represented at the theatre) and hear.’ λέγονται, sc. περὶ ἀλληγόμεν ἀνδρῶν: ὦτό, κ.τ.λ., is in construction only with πράττεται. For πρὸς ἀπαυγά cp. Thuc. iii. 82, 4 τὸ πρὸς ἀπαν ἐνειποῦ.

τῶς ἄνδρας] is used pronominally,—‘the men before us,’ ‘our pupils.’ Compare infra 391 c τῶς ἡμείρους. This familiar way of speaking adds a touch of reality to the conversation. Cp. Theaet. 144 δ, where Socrates says in reply to Theodorus’ description of his pupil—γενικῶν λέγει τὸν ἄνδρα.

δώρα... βασιλής] This verse is said by Suidas (i. p. 623) to be taken from Hesiod.

Θοίνικα, κ.τ.λ.] Il. ix. 432, 515 sqq.

τῆς μήνας] The Epic word recalls the theme of the Iliad.

παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος δώρα λαβεῖν] Il. xix. 278. Plato does injustice to the character of Achilles, who is indifferent to the gifts. It is a misconception of the Homeric idea to charge him with ἀνάλημφτη or φιλοχρηματία, as infra 391 c. See especially Il. xix. 147, 148 δώρα μὲν, αὐ e ἐθελήσατα, παρασχέσθην, ὡς ἐξεκέκα, | eιτ' ἐξέκα, πάρα σοι.

δ’ ὁμηρόν] Compare x. 595 ὅς θαυμάζει γε τίς μή καὶ αἰῶν ἐκ παῦσα ἔχονται περὶ Ἰῳμήρου ἀποκαλεῖν λέγειν.

ἐβλαψάς μ’ ἐκάραγε... παρείη] Il. xxii. 15, 20.

καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ποταμὸν... ἀπειθῶς εἶχε] Il. xxi. 130 ff.

καὶ ὡς... ὡς πειστένοι] Il. xxiii. 151. ‘Or that he said “Let me offer to Patroclus,” who was a lifeless corpse, “to take with him the locks,” which had been consecrated to the other river Spercheius, or that he did so, we should not believe.’ ὡς is to be repeated with ἥρ. The accusative, τὰς... τρίχασ, is in a loose construction, which becomes more precise when the phrase is resumed in κόμην. The genitive τοῦ... ἔπερχειοῦ is to be taken closely with ἔρας in the usual construction.
The pluses $\zeta$ of some distinct arts. The body of Hector was dragged day after day, and twelve human victims, not one only, had been offered on the funeral pyre.

For the genitive of the object after $\delta\pi\epsilon\rho\sigma\varphi\alpha\nu\iota\nu$ $\gamma\pi\nu$ after $\delta\rho\pi\rho\upsilon\alpha\varsigma$, and note.

Then let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated the tale of Theseus, son of Poseidon, and Pirithous, son of Zeus, going forth to perpetrate such horrid acts of rape.

Pirithous aided Theseus in carrying off Helen, and Theseus joined Pirithous in his attempt to steal Persephone away from Pluto (Isocrates, 'Εληφτης ἐγκώμιον, 20–22). The plural $\delta\rho\pi\rho\upsilon\alpha\varsigma$ includes both actions. $\delta\epsilon\nu\alpha\varsigma$ marks not the danger of the descent to Hades, but the heinousness of the offence. $\delta\rho\mu\upsilon\varsigma$ is read in Par. A after all, and not $\delta\rho\mu\rho\upsilon\sigma\varsigma$, as stated by all the Editors from Bekker downwards. This determines the balance in favour of the plural verb. $\delta\rho\tau\omicron\varsigma$ is to be joined with $\delta\epsilon\nu\alpha\varsigma$. Cp. Symp. 192 c $\delta\rho\tau\omicron\varsigma$ ἐπὶ μεγάλης σπουδῆς.

$\delta\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ is clearly preferable to $\delta\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ (sic) is the reading of Par. A.

'That the Gods are progenitors of evil.' The doers of evil cannot be sons of God. Else evil would proceed from God.

$\delta\rho\alpha$, 'then'—if these stories are true.

These lines are taken, like the quotation in ii. 380 a, from the Niobe of Aeschylus. The lines are also quoted by Strabo (xii. 870), as they occur here, with the exception that $\delta\kappa\iota\varsigma$ is read for $\delta\iota\alpha\rho\upsilon$ $\pi\alpha\gamma\omicron$. The reason of the resolution (καὶ οὗ ποῦ), which occurs in all the MSS. but not in Strabo, may be either that Socrates is putting together lines from different places, as at pp. 386, 387, or that the copyists supposed him to have done so.

Aeschylus seems to imagine a sort of heavenly Ida, like Olympus in Homer, where the demigods sacrifice to their father in the sky.
Notes: Book III.

It is the mountain whose top reaches to Heaven in the imagination of the poet. Cp. the similar consecration of Mount Oeta in Soph. Trach. 1191.

What principles are to regulate the representation of human things? The point is reserved until after the decision of the main question, concerning the nature of Justice, and whether it is profitable or not to him who has it,—and this whether it be known or unknown to Gods and men.

[ἡμῖν] before ἤν δ' ἡγώ is omitted in Par. A, probably owing to ἤν following.

[OF ιτιον εἰδος λόγων πέρι] 'What department still remains that has to do with the subjects of discourse.' The reading λόγων πέρι is confirmed by τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι infra c, and by the expression εἰδος πόμων πέρι, infra iv. 427 A. The periphrasis is nearly equivalent to a simple genitive. The reading of ζ, which was also the reading of the text before Bekker, is περιφερεμένος, a word the existence of which could not be allowed on the authority of this passage only, even if the other reading had not the authority of Π. The scribe who wrote περιφερεμένος οὐ as in Α must have understood the relative clause to mean 'what is to be told to whom.' For the meaning of λόγω cp. supra ii. 376 ε μονευκής δ' ειπόν τιθε λόγους, δ' οὖ; where the subject was first started.

ὁς ἄρα] 'to infer from what we admitted,' 'according to our view;' viz. in Book ii.

Plato remembers that the poets (as Adeimantus pointed out, ii. 364 Α) err equally in their ideas about men, as about the Gods. But how can we determine the truth about human virtue till we define justice? This is an ironical or fanciful excuse for varying the order of the subject. Cp. iv. 430 δ.

ἄλλοτρον μὲν ἀγαθόν, κ.τ.λ.] i. 343 c, ii. 367 c.

ἀ πάλαι * ἔργοιμεν] 'which we have been seeking all this while.' The manuscript reading is ἔργοιμεν, 'which we were seeking for long ago': sc. in the inquiry about justice, before we began to construct the state. But the conjectural reading ἔργοιμεν, which is confirmed by the version of Ficinus, is more probable. Cp. iv. 420 c κατὰδίνεις δὲ ρίζας ἐν ἄ πάλαι ἔργοιμεν. For the use of such a pronominal phrase in recapitulating, to avoid tautology, cp. Phileb. 50 c τά νῦν πολλάκες λεγόμενα.
Plato: Republic.

So much is said with regard to the substance of the new literature. Next, as to the form. Shall it be (1) narrative, or (2) dramatic, or (3) a mixture of both?

The speeches in Homer are dramatic, but they are linked together with bits of narration. Tragic poetry is dramatic throughout. Homer, again, would be entirely narrative, if the speeches were reported indirectly. And this is the mode actually adopted in the Dithyramb.

The purely dramatic form is to be excluded from our state. For we have long since decided that simplicity is to be our rule; and the imitation of various characters is fatal to simplicity. Our youth may be allowed to impersonate the virtuous and good, but nothing that is vicious or mean, nor a female in any condition, nor a slave; still less, as happens in comedy, a drunkard or a coward. They must indeed know such characters from without, but never for a moment must they be identified with them. Nor may they mimic menial arts, of which they are to know nothing, nor unmeaning noises, such as the neighing of horses or the sound of thunder.

In narrating the fortunes of some hero, if they are carried away into impersonating him when he is about some noble deed, well and good. Or if they scornfully throw in a dramatic touch in characterizing some bad man, there is no great harm, provided that such points in their discourse are few and momentary. But the main tenour of the recital will be pure narration, and the manner of the recitation in the pitch and cadence of the voice will be simple and uniform.

διήγησις οὖσα] The participle is attracted to the noun instead of agreeing with πάντα supra.

ἄρ' ὀδι... περαιόνοις] There are three kinds of poetry:—(1) the simple narrative, of which the dithyramb is given as an example (394 c): (2) the opposite kind, which has only action and no narrative, as is the case in tragedy and comedy: (3) the union of the two, as in Epic poetry, which, if you leave the speeches only, becomes a drama, or if you omit the speeches or report them in oratio obliqua, takes the form of simple narration.

Compare Aristotle's Poetics, c. iii. § 2 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μεμείσθαι ὡς την ἄργαμα ἡ ἑτερών τι γεγονόμενον, ὡς τοῦ Ὀμήρου νοις, ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὅσ πρῶτων καὶ ἐν-εργοῦντας τούς μεμοινίαν.—Λέξις, as a separate element, is overlooked in Gorg. 502 c φέρε δῆ, εἰ ταῖς περιελοίῳ τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης το
Plato’s test of the moral character of poetry, while including dithyrambs, would exclude the tragedies of Sophocles and Aeschylus. On the relation of Plato to the poets, see further notes in Book X.

περαινοῦντι] ‘proceed.’ For this absolute use cp. Laws iv. 715 ἐ ὁ μὲν δὴ θεὸς . . . εἰδείρ περαινεί (‘fulfils his course’).

ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι] ‘breaking off a part,’ i.e. making use of an example. Cp. Gorg. 495 ἐ πρὶ ὅσιν βουλεῖ τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει, and Theaet. 182 λ ὃς μαθάνει ἀθρόῳ λεγόμενον κατὰ μέρη ὁ孰 ἀκούει.

οὐκ ἐτύχηκαν] The imperfect as in οὐκ ἐπειδή.

καὶ ἔλεοςτο . . . λαύν] II. i. 15, 16.

tῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ Ὑπὲρ ‘Ὀδυσσείᾳ παθημάτων] ‘the things which happened at Ithaca and in the Odyssey generally,’ i.e. not only in Ithaca, but at Sparta, Phaeacia, and elsewhere. Observe that ἐν is not again repeated, but is implied in a somewhat different meaning with Ὀδυσσείᾳ.

οὔκοιν διήγησιν . . . τῶν βήσεων] Epic poetry is narrative throughout; but the simple narrative, i.e. the descriptive part is to be distinguished from narrative through imitation, i.e. the speeches: ἀλή διήγησις ἀνευ μωμῆσεων ὀρατθεὶν δια μωμῆσεως.

ἐν δὲ τις ὑμῶν] sc. ἑαυτῶν, to be supplied from ὑμοίου ἑαυτῶν at the beginning of the sentence.

καὶ ὅμως ἐδείξα, ὅπι οὐκ ἄν μανθάνεις] ‘But that you may not say ‘Once more I do not understand you.’’ The order of the words appears to be euphonic. Cp. Theaet. 161 λ ὃς οὐκ ἄν ἔχει ὁστὶν ταύτα.

ἀὑτοῖς] emphatic—‘themselves,’ opposed to τὴν θυγατέρα αἰ.

λέγω] depends on the general notion of urging implied in εὐχέτο.

μη . . . οὐκ ἐπαρκέσσι] This is the oratio obliqua of μη . . . οὐκ ἐπαρκέσσι, Plato’s prose version of μη . . . οὐ χραίσσει in Homer. The future indicative after a verb of fearing is rare, but occurs in Aesch., Soph., and Xen. See Goodwin, M. and T., § 367. Cp. ν. 451 λ μη σφαιλεί . . . κείσομαι, and for the optative Euthyphro,
The future indicative after μή in a final clause, although rare, is not unknown (Ar. Eccl. 495 εἰκη...μη βραδύνειν...μη καὶ τις δύσεια), so that, as Goodwin remarks, M. and T., § 132, there is no objection to μη...ἐπαρκέσει being so taken here. In places of this kind the notions of purpose ('lest') and fearing ('for fear that') are nearly coincident.

ἀπείναι δ’ ἐκλευε...οἰκαδε ἀθοι] ‘He told him to be off, and not to provoke him, if he wished to get home safely.’ Plato omits the accusative case after ἐρεβίζειν (ἀλλ’ ὅθε, μη μη ἑρεβίζει), which has been unnecessarily restored by Valckenier (μη δ’) without manuscript authority.

ἀποχωρήσως δε ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου] This is prose for ἀπώγεοι κιόν II. i. 35.

tας τε ἐπωμιάς...ναϊν οἰκοδομήσεως] II. i. 37-9:—

κλώθε μεν, ἀργυρότερε, δε Χρύσην ἄρμαβεικακ
Κυλλαν τε ξαθίνην, Τενδαῖον τε ὑφι ἀνάσσει,
Σμυρνί, εἰ ποτε του χαρέντι ἐπὶ ηυν ἐρεψα,

which last seems to have been understood by Plato, not of crowning shrines of the God with garlands, but of roofing them (ἐν ναιν οἰκοδομήσεως), as Eustathius explains the word ἐρέφα by ἀρώφασα, which is probably the true meaning. ‘ἐρέψα seems to indicate the most primitive form of temple—a mere roof to protect the image of a God standing in a grove.’ Leaf’s note on II. i. 39. Cp. Paus. x. 5, § 9.

tα δ’ ἄδεκρα] δ’ is an archaism or Homericism, into the use of which Plato is probably led by his subject. Cp. supra ii. 383 β τας ἐδεισεἰδιας, and note. There is a similar use of a poetical form in the Phaedrus, where Socrates ‘plays’ at dithyrambs: 237 λ ἐμμοι λαβέσθε τοῦ μύθου.

ταύτης αδ’ ἐννυστα] sc. διήγησις, i.e. ἦ διὰ μυθήσεως.

και τοῦτο...τοιοῦτον] ‘That again I understand; and I perceive that your remark applies to tragedy.’

δρθότατα...οὐχ οἶός τ’ ἦ] ‘You perfectly catch my meaning, and now I think I make you see what before I could not.’

ἐμπροσθέν...ο’ τότε] supra 392 δ και τοῦτο (the first statement about διήγησις)...ἐτι διόμαι σαφέστερον μαθεῖν.


Notes: Book III.

διπερ σ’ λέγεις] supra μανθάνο ... τοιούτον. The respondent gets full credit for his contribution. The reference to this definition is repeated infra 395 A.

e’ μοι μανθάνεις] ‘If I make you understand.’ The dative μοι, which is the reading of the MSS., has been altered into μον by Heindorf. This is unnecessary, although e’ μοι μανθάνεις occurs in Phileb. 51 c. Compare Laws i. 644 c καὶ μοι δέ εἰκόνος ἀποδέξασθε.

tο πρό τοιούτον] 392 c.

tούτο τοινών ... ἔλεγον] ‘That was just what I meant.’ τούτο αὐτό refers to what follows, ἐτί χρείη ... μμείθαι, as well as to the words ὡς ὦ λεκτέον in what precedes.

οὐδε μμείθαι] sc. ἐάνομεν.

ἰὼν ὦ καὶ πλείω] ‘And there may be more than this in question,’—an anticipation of the condemnation of epic poetry in Book x.

tολλὼν ἐφαντόμενος] ‘attempting many things, he will altogether fail to be eminent in any (τού).’ ὡσε depends on some positive idea, which is gathered from ἀποτυχάοι: ‘he will not succeed (σφ νυχών ὦ) in any so as to be eminent.’ Cp. Protag. 314 b, where ἐτί πέοι δόσε = οἴσω ἡλικίαν ἔχομεν, δόσε.

οἶον κωμῳδίαι, κ.τ.λ.] Yet Socrates at the end of the Symposium (223 d) maintains that comedy and tragedy belong to the same artist: τὸ μέντο κωμῳδίαν, ἐφ’ ἀποτυχάοι τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτόν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαι καὶ τραγῳδίαι ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνην τραγῳδιστῶν διὰ κωμῳδιστῶν εἶναι.

For a judgement on tragedy compare Gorg. 502 b τι δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὐτὴ καὶ βασιλικὴ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφ’ ‘ φ’ ἐστοφάσας; where he proceeds to say: ‘Is the vocation of tragedy to please the spectators only? Or does she refuse to speak of pleasant vices and proclaim only what is wholesome but unpleasant? We must say Yes to the former; and if so, all the pretensions of tragedy will not hinder our classing her creations under the head of flattery.’ The same test is applied to other kinds of poetry.

Plato’s enmity to the drama seems to rest on grounds which are partly fanciful and partly real. The mimetic sympathetic power of the actor is unfavourable to strength and unity of purpose: the genius of imitation is certainly akin to weakness. But a man will not be induced to become a murderer by acting the
part of a murderer; nor is the inference sound that the same individual cannot act many parts because he cannot succeed in many serious pursuits. The evil of the drama does not consist in the imitation of evil any more than of good, but in the effect of continued emotion and excitement on the character of the actor and spectators.

\[394\] B, C.

\[\text{Apisoi ge}\] sc. δύναται είναι.

οὖδ' τοι ὑποκριτα... οἱ αὐτοὶ] 'And you know that the same actors do not perform in tragedy and comedy.' Cp. τραγωδοῖς μιᾶς, and similar expressions.

πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μημήματα] i.e. the rhapsode and the tragic or comic actor are 'imitators,' as well as the poets whose works they produce; or, in modern language, there is a sense in which the actor, too, 'creates' his part. Plato, however, fails to realize that true art is not mere imitation, but the embodiment of an ideal; although he comes near the expression of this truth in 401 B (infra).

\[395\] B

\[\text{Δυσε δύνατος είναι... ἀφοινώματα}\] (1) If η is unemphatic, 'And becomes unable to imitate many things well or to do the things themselves well, if they are many'; (2) or taking η emphatically—'Or else' (if able to imitate) 'is not able to do the things themselves.' For the latter (which resumes σχολῇ ἃρα ἐπιστηδεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.) cp. vi. 503 A η τῶν δυνατοῦντα ἀποκτείνουν: vii. 525 B τῆς οὖσις αὐτῶν εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξωκακοῦσθαι, ἣ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι.

C


\[\text{ινα μὴ... ἀπολαύσωσιν}\] 'Lest by imitation they should become imbued with the reality of that which they imitate.' Cp. infra 401 Β, C ινα μὴ εἶν κακίας εἰκός τρεφόμενοι... εἶν τὶ εὐφυστάτας λαυθάνουσα καλῶν μέγα ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν ψυχῇ.

D

\[\text{δὲν ἐκ νέων πάρρῳ διατελέσωσιν}\] 'If, beginning in youth, they continue far into life.'

eἰς ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθιστανταί] 'Acquire the fixedness of habit and nature.'
Notes: Book III.

ἄνδρι λοιπονμένην] ‘Reviling’ (1) ‘a man,’ opposed to πρὸς θεοῖς following, or (2) ‘her husband.’

πολλοῦ καὶ δεήσομεν] καὶ adds to the emphasis: ‘We shall be far indeed from that.’

μεθύσωντας ἢ καὶ νηφόντας] These words qualify the preceding participles. ‘Abusing and reviling one another whether drunk or sober.’

ἀμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλους] ‘Sin against others and against themselves,’ i.e. degrading themselves as well as injuring others.

γνωστόν μὲν γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. infra 409 D ἡ ὅρατη δὲ φύσεως παιδευμένης χρόνῳ ἄμα αὐτής τε καὶ ποιησίας ἐπιστήμην λήγεται.

κελεύοντας τοῦτοις] s. cois ἑλάφουσιν: ‘giving the time to the rowers,’ i.e. doing the work of the κελευσθής on board ship.

οὐδὲ προσέχειν τὸν τοῦτον τούτων ὀδηγεῖ] supra ii. 374 D, E.

ἡ μυκήσωται] ἢ, which is emphasized by its position in the sentence, asks the question with a tone of indignation. Cp. v. 469 C τὶ δὲ; συνείδειν . . . τοὺς κελεύωντας πλὴν ὁπλῶν, ἐπειδὴ περιόρισα, ἢ καλὰς ἔχει;

ἀπείρηται αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] supra A.

εἰ . . . μαθάνω καὶ σοῦ λέγεις] Socrates again ascribes his own reflections to the respondent.

οὐ δὲ ἔχων] ‘In which he will persist.’ Cp. Soph. 264 E εἶχομενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κουμάνιας: Thuc. i. 140 τῆς μὲν γνώμης . . . τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχουμι.

ὁ μὲν μοι . . . μέτρωσαν ἄνηρ] ὁ is the definite article before μέτρωσαν ἄνηρ. The words which intervene give an additional emphasis to μέτρωσαν.

σπουδή] ‘in earnest,’ is opposed to παιδία χάριν.

οὐκ ἐδειλήσω] like ἐδειλήσω supra, dependent on δοκεῖ.

αὐτῶν ἐκμάτειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάμαι, κ.τ.λ.] ‘To mould and adapt himself to the baser shapes,’ like the clay of the statuary which would be said ἐνιστάσθαι τῷ τύπῳ, ‘to settle into the shape of the mould.’ But in Tim. 50 D ἐν φιλοτυχοῦσιν ἐνιστάται, the same word is used conversely of the form being impressed on the matter.
kai ἐσται ... τῆς μυθήσεως] ‘And his style will partake of both kinds, of imitation and also of narrative’ (τῆς ἀλήθεις διηγήσεως: see on ii. 357 c: it may be remembered however that διηγήσεις alone, when not distinguished by the epithet ἀπλῆ, may include the imitative, as well as other kinds, as in the beginning of this passage, supra 392 d): ‘only there will be a few grains of the former in a long recital.’ Bekker alters the text into συμκρόν δὲ τὲ μέρος μυθή- σεως ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς διηγήσεως, for which there is some faint manuscript authority; but the alteration is unnecessary; the text is neater and gives an equally good sense.

σω ἀν φαυλότερος ἡ διηγήσεως] It seems necessary to adopt Madvig's emendation here. Of the two manuscript readings, that of q, although probably conjectural, is the more plausible: ‘The more vulgar he is, the more constantly will he employ imitation.’ The reading of Par. A. &c., πάντα τὲ μάκλεν διηγήσεως, could only mean: ‘the more ready will he be to tell about anything and everything’—laying a strong emphasis on πάντα, and implying that there are some things which a good man will not even narrate. If Plato had meant this, he would have said it more clearly. And the form of the sentence (τε ... καὶ ὁδῆν ... ὁστε, κ.τ.λ.) is much better adapted to bring out the additional point—that not only does the bad man always prefer imitation, but there is nothing which he is ashamed to imitate. The expression πάντα διηγήσεως is also too obviously out of keeping with the concluding words, συμκρόν τί διηγήσεως ἐχώσα. [The avoidance of a mere awkwardness does not justify an emendation which has no real manuscript authority. B. J.]

τροχιλίων] ‘pulleys.’ Perhaps, as Ast suggested, τροχιλίων should be read, τροχιλία, not τροχιλίων, being the usual form.

σχήμασιν] ‘gestures’: cp. Soph. 267 Α ἦταν ... τὸ σῶν σχῆμα τις τῷ λαύτῳ χρώμονος σάματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωθὴν φωνὴν φαινοθαι πού, μίμησις τούτο τῆς φαντασμῆς μίλιστα κύκληται πού. The word is differently used supra ii. 373 b.

διέγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν ... καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμονίᾳ] (1) πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν, sc. λέξιν (‘ferme ad eandem orationis formam,’ Fic.). ‘The result is that he speaks nearly in the same style and with a uniform cadence.’ [(2) διέγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν, sc. χορδήν. πρὸς λέξιν τω λέγειν is hardly a natural expression, and the question here is not that of the style itself, but of the cadence and tone adapted to it. The cadence is uniform and approaches monotone. Cp. πρόσχορδος
Notes: Book III.

(Laws vii. 812 b) and the ellipsis of χορή with ἡμᾶς, ὑπάρχον μὴν (infra iv. 443 b): also Lucian, De Salt., c. 80 ἰδοὺ κυνούμενοι καὶ μιθῆν, ὅπως ἐρᾶτη, πρὸς τὴν χορήν. The narrative style, as it has less alteration of meaning or feeling (συμπερι γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαὶ), has fewer and slighter variations of tone than the dramatic.—As there is no authority, however, for this elliptical phrase, this interpretation, though suited to the context, is only conjectural. L. C."

For the use of ὁρθῶς compare 403 B οὐδὲ κανωπήτων αὐτῆς ἡρατῇ τε καὶ παιδικάς ὁρθῶς ὑπάρθηκε τε καὶ ἐρωμένους. The words τῇ ὁρθῶς λέγοντες ("when one recites properly") are balanced by εἰ μέλλει αὖ οἰκεῖος λέγεσθαι (infra c), i.e. "when the enunciation is appropriate to the style." It is clear that ἀρμονία here is not used in the strictly musical sense, but is applied to the changes of pitch and tone which occur in speaking and reciting. Cp. Ar. Rhet. iii. 1, where Aristotle says that the three elements of utterance are μέγεθος, ἀρμονία and ῥυθμός, and identifies ἀρμονία with τὸν τόνος.

τί δὲ τὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχον εἴδος; . . . τῶν μεταβολῶν εἴχειν;] "But what about the character of the other style? Will it not require the opposite? Will it not require all harmonies and all rhythm, if it is to be appropriately expressed, because it has every variety of change?" The μεταβολαί here referred to are changes in the style.

ἄριστος, κ.τ.λ.] The words λόγος, λέγει, ἀρμονία, ῥυθμός, βιοσίς, may be distinguished as follows:—

λόγος, the subject, which is true or false, moral or immoral.

λέγει, the style, which is dramatic or narrative, or a composition of the two.

ἀρμονία is a musical term: it was applied (a) to the Enharmonic genus (this is the only sense it has in Aristoxenus), (b) to the modes, which according to some differed in the arrangement of the intervals, according to others in pitch. The word really means "scale," as defined in Laws ii. 664 B εἴτομεν . . . ὡς . . . τῇ διὰ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει, ρυθμός δομοὶ εἶν, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε δίκαιον ἄμα καὶ βαρίου συγκράτησαι, ἀρμονία δομοὶ προσαγορείνοντο: (γ) Plato also applies the term in a still wider sense, as in the preceding sentence, to cadence or variation of tone in speaking and recitation—infra 398 b τοῦ μὴ φθορίου λόγου.

ῥυθμός is a term which applies equally to the music and to the
words: the division of time in metre (e.g. Paconic, Dactylic, Trochaic, proceeding respectively in a ratio of $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{1}{2}$) and the corresponding accentuation of the music.

$\beta\alpha\varphi\iota\varsigma$ is the movement considered as a system of times or quantities, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{1}{2}$. In 400 $\lambda$ τρι' ἑταί ἴστιν ἴδη $\varepsilon\xi\delta\nu\alpha\iota\beta\alpha\varsigma\iota\varsigma$ πλέκονται Plato implies that the term $\beta\alpha\varphi\iota\varsigma$ applies to the whole of each of the three systems of which the Paeon, Dactyl, or Trochee is the characteristic element.

$\varepsilon\delta\alpha\mu\phi\omicron\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\nu\omega\nu\nu\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ τινι $\gamma\nu\gamma\kappa\epsilon\kappa\alpha\rho\nu\alpha\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ τινι $\delta\iota\omicron\nu\varepsilon\delta\nu\alpha\omicron\iota\nu\nu\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\delta\omicron\mu\phi\omicron\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\nu\omega\nu\nu\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$. $\gamma\nu\gamma\kappa\epsilon\kappa\alpha\rho\nu\alpha\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ would have been more natural. But the preference for the active is characteristic of Greek.

παισί τε καὶ παιδαγωγόις, κ.τ.λ. καὶ παιδαγωγός is humorously added. He knows that his regulations will be unpopular, not with the children only, but with their attendants, who are ‘children of a larger growth.’ Cp. Gorg. 502 δ (speaking of tragedy)—νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν βροτολήν τινα πρὸς δήμον τουκτίων, οὖν παῖδαν τε ἄμοι καὶ γυναικέων καὶ ἄνδρων, καὶ δούλων καὶ δευτέρων. The expression recurs in Laws iii. 700 c with reference to the earlier custom of the theatre: παισί δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τῷ πλέοντε διαλοῦντος κανονισμοῦς ἡ νοβλετήσεως ἐγγένετο.


The genial versatile poet shall be sent into honourable exile: his severe didactic brother shall be alone retained.

αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα, κ.τ.λ.] (1) ‘himself, and wanting to show his poems.’ Cp. iv. 427 δ αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὸν ἄδελφόν παρακάλει, and Phaedr. 253 β μμομεμείναι αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παϊδικὰ πείδουτες: or perhaps (2), ‘himself and his poems which he wishes to display’; τὰ ποιήματα being taken first as nominative to αύτόκειτο and then also as accusative after ἐπιδείξασθαι.

προσκυνοῦμεν ἂν, κ.τ.λ.] The words that follow are an ironical glorification of the dramatic poet: He is a holy and marvellous being—a delightful creature (cp. Ion 534 ό κουφον γάρ χρῆμα ποιητῆς ἐστι καὶ πτηνόν καὶ ἵππον). But as the like of him is not allowed among us, let us fall down before him and crown him with wool, and anoint his head with myrrh,—and show him the way out.

A similar, though more serious strain is addressed to the tragic poets in the Laws, vii. 817 a.d., where they are told that they will
not be allowed to perform their plays until they have been submitted to the censorship of the magistrates, and this severity is humorously attributed by Plato to professional jealousy. The law-giver who is a tragic poet in that 'his whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life' cannot be expected to allow his rival and antagonist 'to erect his stage in the agora and introduce the fair voices of actors, speaking above his own,—very often in contradiction.' Cp. also Phileb. 50 b τῆς τοὐ βίου ζωοπάση τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία.

ἐρῶ στέφανος] (1) 'Crowning him with wool': or (2) 'providing him with a woollen fillet' (στείμα), which he is to carry on a wand in token of the sacredness of his person.

καὶ ἄφασ] ii. 379 a ff.

εἰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐλήνῃ] 'If we really had the power.' For a similar reference to the possibility of the Republic being realized in fact cp. supra 389 δ ἐὰν γε ... ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἐγὼ τελήται, and note.

So much for the subjects and the style of spoken discourse. And with regard to song the principles will be the same.

The difference lies in the addition of tune and metre. As we have forbidden our poets to use lamentation, we shall forbid our musical composers to employ pathetic melodies, or any kind of music which tends to relax the moral fibre. No 'soft Lydian airs' for us, nor the 'linked sweetness' of Ionian strains! But only the manly Dorian and the martial Phrygian mood. Or, to speak more exactly, we must have one sort of music which expresses warlike resolution and patient fortitude, and one which breathes the serene temper of philosophic aspiration and wise counsel and calm rejoicing in the triumph of good.

For this we shall need no elaborate instrument, least of all the infinitely variable tones of the flute—nothing but the lyre and simple reed. We renounce Marsyas and hold to Apollo.

The passage which follows has been fully discussed by Westphal, Griechische Harmonik, ed. 1886, c. 5, §§ 25-31, pp. 187-240.

περὶ τῆς τροποῦ καὶ μελῶν] 'About the character of songs and the tunes.'

ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων] is a play upon the word πᾶς (ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πᾶς σθῆ διὸ εὔροι). Socrates argues that the application to song of the principles which have been already laid down will be evident to all. Glaucos answers with a smile: 'I do not seem to be included in the comprehensive word "all," and am therefore at a loss to con-
Republic

jecture at present (though I have a suspicion) what sort of things we ought to say." Cp. Soph. 233 E λέγω τοινυν σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν πάντων: infra vii. 529 A παντὶ ἥλιον . . . ἔσω, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, παντὶ δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοὶ.

D

λόγου . . . μυθοῦ] See note on supra 397 c.


καὶ μὴν, κ.τ.λ.] This general truth has been admitted above, 397 B ἐὰν τε ἀποδίδω ἐπεστῶσαν ἀρμονίαν καὶ μυθοῦ τῇ λέξει, although this is there said of speaking and recitation only.

E

μεξολογίστι] 'That famous mode which Sappho invented, and which Aristoxenus declares to be perfectly adapted to tragedy' (Westphal, Griechische Harmonik, ed. 1886, p. 198). The authority for this is Plutarch, De Mus., c. 16 καὶ ἡ μεξολογίας δὲ παθητικῆς τε ἐστὶ, τραγοφοίας ἀρμονίας. 'Αριστοκέφων δὲ φησὶ Σαπφῆς πρῶτην εὕρασαί τὴν μεξολογίστι, παρ' ἑν' τοὺς τραγοφοιούς μαθίνει λαβώντας γοῦν αὐτοῦς συνάξαί τῇ διωρίᾳ, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ δεξιώματικόν ἀποδίδωσιν, ἡ δὲ τὸ παθητικόν, μεμικτεῖ δὲ δαν τούτων τραγοφοί. But Plutarch, in the same passage, attributes to Aristoxenus other statements at variance with this.

ἀς δὲ ἐπεικεῖς ἐλαία] Cp. supra 387 E καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας σπουδαίας. The suggestion that some women are to aim high is one of the preparations for the surprise in Book v.

ἀδίνεις χαλαραί καλούμεναι] 'The sort of melodies called lax.' The indefinite relative suits with Plato's affected ignorance (cp. infra 400 c), and the antecedent is in apposition to 'ιαστὶ and λαβώστι taken together. The 'relaxed harmonies' include Ionian as well as a species of Lydian (ὀσπολονιστὶ), but there appears to be no distinction among Ionian melodies; although Westphal (§28, p. 200), assumes it. χαλαραί is probably a technical term of music, implying a lower pitch, and opposed to σύντομος, but is used by Plato with an ethical association, for which cp. ix. 590 B τρυφῆ δὲ καὶ μαλακία οὔκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο (τοῦ θυμοῦ) χαλάσει τε καὶ ἄνεσει ψέγγει. Aristotle, Pol. viii. 5, § 22 says: 'Some of the modes make men sad and grave, like the so-called Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the relaxed harmonies, others again produce a moderate and settled temper, which appears to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian;--the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm.' Aristotle's word for 'relaxed' is ἄνεμεναι, and in this he is followed by Aristoxenus and later writers. It is generally assumed that χαλαραί in Plato means
the same thing. Aristotle in Pol. viii. 7, § 14, censures Plato for rejecting the ‘relaxed’ harmonies: he would keep them because less difficult for aged persons to sing.

Φρυγικό[ ]. Why should Plato choose the Phrygian mode to suit the ‘modest stillness and sobriety’ becoming men in peace? Aristotle’s criticism of this passage in Pol. viii. 7, §§ 9–11, seems only natural: ‘The Socrates of the Republic is wrong in retaining only the Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and the more so because he rejects the flute; for the Phrygian is to the modes what the flute is to musical instruments—both of them are exciting and emotional. Poetry proves this, for Bacchic frenzy, and all similar emotions are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to the Phrygian than to any other harmony. The dithyramb, for example, is acknowledged to be Phrygian.’ Either Phrygian melodies had other than orgiastic uses, or Plato is proceeding on some abstract ground, as that the Phrygian was in the mean between excess and defect in pitch.

Εν πάσι τούτοις] is a resumption of έν πολεμική πράξει and what follows: ‘In all these cases repelling the attacks of fortune with a firm front.’

Δαστόν ἐπέχοντα] ‘giving his attention to.’ Cp. Laws xi. 926 b ἐπὶ μείζονι γάρ εἰτε τὴν διά τοῦ επεξοντο. After βεομάνων the construction is changed and the accusatives ἐπέχοντα . . . πράξατα, κ.τ.λ., are governed directly by μείζωντο. The correction ἐπέχοντα, ‘resigning’ or ‘submitting himself,’ which is found in a single manuscript (3), is unnecessary.

ταῦτα δοῦ Ἀρμονίας, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Laws vii. 814 Ε, where it is said of dancing τοῦ δη συνυλαῖον [ἐναι κινήσεων] τὴν μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ ἐν βιαιοί ἔμπλεκοντα πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλών, ψυχή τ' ἀνδρείη, τὴν δ' ἐν εἰσφραγίαις τέ οὖσα ψυχή γάρ φραγοῦσα ἐν ἓδοινα τε ἐμιμέτρους εἴρημεν ἀν τις λεγόνι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιάντη δρχησιν λέγοι.

Βουστυχούσων . . . ἀνδρείων] The genitives depend on φθόγγους. The second Ἀρμονίας, here bracketed, should probably be omitted.

οὸκ ἄρα . . . φαίνεται] ‘Then we shall certainly not want in our songs and tunes a multitude of strings or notes, or an instrument which has all the harmonies.’ ‘Clearly not.’

The Panharmonic instruments were those which were adapted for the performance of all the modes and musical genera; in other words, which admitted the greatest possible variety in the intervals and arrangement of the scale.
Plato: Republic.

399 C

τριγώνων ἀρα καὶ πηκτιδῶν, κ.τ.λ.] 'Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and composite scales, nor of any of the many-stringed curiously harmonized instruments.'

'Manifestly not.' Cp. Arist. Pol. viii. 6, §§ 12, 13, who says that these and other elaborate instruments were gradually disused, as men learned to distinguish what conduced to virtue. The πηκτίς, like the μέγαδις, was of Lydian origin (Herod. i. 17), and was played with the fingers without a plectrum. See Susemihl's note on Arist., l.c.

D τι δι; . . . μήμα;] 'Next, will you admit makers and players of flutes into the state? Has not this' (τοῦτο, sc. αὐλός understood from αὐλητής and αὐλοσφόις) 'more strings than all of them? And are not panharmonic instruments themselves an imitation of the flute?'

Plato says playfully that the flute, which has no strings, is 'the most many-stringed of instruments': that is to say, the flute has those qualities in the greatest degree which he has just been denouncing in stringed instruments. According to Proclus, in Alcib. p. 197, each aperture of the flute gave three or more sounds: this variety was obtained by the use of shifts and slides. It was natural that the panharmonic principle should be first applied to an instrument of which the notes could be easily modified. (Paus. ix. 12, § 5.)

In the Laws iii. 700 δ, Plato describes the degenerate musicians θερανύντες δὲ ρήσους τε ὑμνοῖς καὶ ποιῶνς διθυράμβους, καὶ αὐλητικὰς δὴ τὰς κιθαροφιλίας μυμούμενοι. Cp. Pind. Ol. vii. 21 παμφώνωσι σ' ἐν ἑτέσεις αὐλῶν: Isthm. iv. 35 ἐν αὐλῶν τε παμφώνοις ὀμοιώσαι.

κιθάρα] The Dorian mood includes the 'ὑποδωρωτί (otherwise called the Aeolian), of which Arist. Probl. xix. 48, § 1, says that it is κιθαροφιλικωτάτη τῶν ἀρμονίων.

E νὴ τῶν κῦνα] may be regarded as a jest παρὰ προσοδοκίαν (cp. Phaedr. 236 ε ὄμως . . . τῶν πλάτανων ταυτηρί). It occurs in a lengthened form, which perhaps explains the allusion, in the Gorgias 482 ε μὰ τῶν κῦνα, τῶν Ἀγυπτίων θεῶν—' By the Dog, the God of Egypt.' It is observable that another oath of the same kind, μὰ τῶν χήμα (which is likewise attributed to the followers of Socrates see Schol. on Ar. Birds 521), refers to an Egyptian deity.

399 E—400 E

By thus simplifying music we have purged our luxurious state. And we must also simplify rhythm and metre. Not to enter into technicalities of dactylic, spondaic, iambic, trochaic metre, and the
Notes: Book III.

merits of the corresponding rhythms, we observe once for all that the rhythm must be noble and appropriate to the style, as the style is to the subject, and all must harmonize with the mental character which we desire to create.

See Westphal’s *Metrik* (1885), pp. 237–239.

τὰ λοιπὰ καθαίρομεν] ‘Let us finish the purgation.’ In other words—‘Let us do with the metres what we have done with the modes.’

μὴ ποικλοὺς . . . βάσεις] ‘not to aim at having complex rhythms or varied systems of metre.’

ἀλλὰ μὰ δὲν, ἕφη, κ.τ.λ.] ‘But in good faith I cannot tell. That there are three kinds of feet out of which metrical systems of feet are formed, as in sounds there are four notes whence spring all the modes,—so much I have observed and can say: but of what sort of life they are severally the expressions, I am unable to affirm.’

(1) The elements of metrical systems are simple, like the elements of musical systems:—since all systems of metre are based on three proportions of time, ⅓, ⅔, 4, and all the musical genera and modes, are produced by different intervals, or a different order of intervals, in the four sounds of the tetrachord. This is the simplest explanation of the words, ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέταρα, sc. εἶδη. Cp. Theaet. 206 α ἐν δὲ κιβαροτοῦ τελείως μεμοιχηκέναι μᾶλλο τι ἢ τῷ τῶν φθόγγων ἐκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, τοῖς χορδῶν εἶδή, ἡ δὲ στοιχεία πάς ἀν ὀρόλογῳ σου συγκριθη; (2) Westphal, who interprets the words ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέταρα as = εἶδη ἀρμονιών τέταρα (εἶδη corresponding to the γένει of later writers), is compelled to assume that Plato here includes the Locrian mode, to which he has nowhere alluded: *Griechische Harmonik* (1886), § 31, p. 234. (3) Mr. Monro believes that τὰ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέταρα are the Pythagorean ratios ⅔, ⅕, Ⅳ.

καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος] It is Damon in the Laches who is supposed to have imparted to Nicias his ideas about education (Laches 180 c, d: 200 a). Compare p. 200, where Laches ironically says to him: πάνω δὴ μεγάλην ἀλείδα εἶχον ὅτι παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφία αὐτῆς (sc. ἀνθρώπων) ἀνεφήσεις. Damon is said by Plutarch, de Mus. 16, to have invented ‘the relaxed Lydian mode’ (see above). καὶ, as in καὶ εἰσαγέναι. We are not limited to our own wisdom in this, but may confer with Damon too.
The masculine accusatives in this sentence belong not to the rhythms as such, but only to the feet, which have been spoken of above as the ἔοι ἢ ε ὑ ὑ βάςις πλάκωταν. [B. J. questioned this, pointing to the words τοὺς ὑβιμάθους ἀδύνατοι below as well as to ὑβιμάθους in the sentence itself. But can the words διάκτυλν, ἦμβιν, τροχαίον be used for the corresponding rhythms (δακτυλικοῦ, &c.)? L. C.] The cretic (ἐνόπλιος) is composite (ἐνθεῖτος), being made up of a trochee and a long syllable — —, in fact a ditrochaeus catalecticus. ἡφίος, which is elsewhere an epithet of the dactylic hexameter rhythm, seems here (sc. ποὺ) to stand for the spondee, and the following words are an obscure way of saying that the spondee is equivalent to the dactyl, which is only a resolved spondee: 'a dactylic and also an heroic foot, which he somehow arranged so that arsis and thesis were equal, and long syllables and short were inter-changeable.' By expressing himself in this awkward way, Socrates parades his affected ignorance of the subject. His use of the terms ἄνω, κάτω, however, is quite accurate. See Westphal's Metrik (1885), pp. 103, 104, and Aristoxenus, § 16, p. 20. (The inversion of the terms ἄρσεις and βίεις need not detain us here.)

ἐνόπλιον τέ τινα, κ.τ.λ.] That ἐνόπλιον is the Cretic we learn amid some variety of statement from the Scholiast on Arist. Nubes 651: οἴ δὲ ἐνόπλιον, τὸν ἄμφιμακρον, δὲ καὶ Κρητικός καλεῖται. The view in question is confirmed by this passage in which the mention of the Cretic or Paean in illustrating the three kinds of metres (τρία ἄστρα εἶδη) could hardly have been omitted. Plato takes no account of epitrite and Ionic metres. He probably discarded them as too composite and irregular. For Damon cp. Isocrates περὶ ἄνταδαισεως 251 where he is described as one of the wisest of the citizens and the teacher of Pericles.

καὶ τούτων . . . συναμφότερων τι] ‘And in respect of some of these he appeared to praise and blame the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythms themselves;—or perhaps the combined effect of both.' The meaning of τὸς διαγγαλὸς τοῦ ποδός is the comparative speed or slowness of singing or reciting (tempo). The foot has clearly different effects in different times.

This agrees with the definition of Aristides, quoted by Westphal, Metrik (1885), p. 336: 'Ἀγγεία δὲ ἐστιν ὑβιμάθης χρόνον τάχος ἢ βραδύτης, οἷον ὅταν τῶν λόγων σφυροκοίμων οὐκ ἄλθεις ποιοῦνται πρὸς τός ἀρσεις...
Notes: Book III.

And it is confirmed by Aristozenus, quoted by Porphyry. ad Ptolem. p. 255 (Westphal, op. cit. p. 78) εἰπερ ἐἰς τὰ ἓκαστον τῶν μυθῶν αὐγαί ἀπείροι, ἀπείροι ἔποιησαν καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι (sc. χρόνοι) ... οὐ διὰ λογία τῶν μυθῶν, ὅμως εἰς τὸ τροχαῖον, ἐπὶ τῆς δὲ τύχης ἀγωγῆς τεθεὶς ἀπείροι ἐκείνων πρῶτων ἐκα τῶν λήφθηται εἰς αὐτῶν: i.e. the time depends on the metrical unit ω, and conversely the length of the metrical unit differs according to the time.

Alla ταῦτα μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] Is Plato serious or affected in his ignorance of music and metres? He probably knew all that was known of music and mathematics in his own day. The feigning of ignorance seems therefore to be an artistic excuse for touching lightly on a subject, of which the lengthened discussion would have been out of place.

ἡ σοῦ εἰς: ] sc. συμκρού λόγον εἶναι.

ταῦτα γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον = δέ ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν.

eἰλογία ἢρα ... διάνισι] Subject, style, metre, music, make up a fourfold harmony which in modern times has become dislocated and discordant, the style not being perfectly expressive of the subject, nor even lyric poetry always intended for song, and the time of the music being generally divorced from the metre of the words. Whether such an ideal as Plato imagines can be attained may be doubtful, as music can rarely express ideas, and the principles of articulate and inarticulate sound are necessarily different.

This musical harmony Plato partly confuses with a well-balanced life, and partly regards as the great instrument of attaining moral harmony. He is right in supposing that simplicity is a first principle both of art and life. Compare the defence of the ordinary education in μοισχή which he puts in the mouth of Protagoras—Protag. 326 B καὶ τούς ρυθμοὺς τε καὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκαζόμενοι οἰκειούσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παιδὼν, ἦν ἡμερότεροι τε δι' αὐτό, καὶ εὐθυμότεροι καὶ εὐφροσυτέροι γεγονόμενοι χρήσιμοι δι' οὕτω τοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ πράπτειν πᾶς γὰρ οὗ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυμμίας τε καὶ εὐφροσύνας δεῖται.

tο αὐτῶν πράπτειν] 'To do their duty as guardians.'

αὐτῶν] sc. of the principles of rhythm and order implied in ταῦτα supra. For the expression cp. Phil. 56 λ ὑστῇ μὴν ποὺν μοισχή πρῶτον, κ.τ.λ.
The rules which have been laid down for poetry and literature must now be extended to the other arts—building, painting, &c. For in these likewise there is the expression of mind and character. And when the true harmony and rhythm, inspired by nobleness of heart, is observed by all of them, our youth will be able to feast eye and ear on fair sights and sounds; they will dwell in a land of health where refreshing breezes blow and will gather good from all things.

But of all the arts music, taken in the larger sense, is the most potent for good or for evil. And he who has been rightly trained in this will take less harm from outward things and will grow into natural conformity with reason, so that rational ideas when they are presented to him in due time will be recognized by him and find their way into his soul—just as one who has learnt the alphabet will attain to the power of reading the most complex writing, and will recognize the faintest trace of the familiar characters, even when reflected in water.

The fairest of all sights is the incarnation of these principles—as when a fair soul finds habitation in a body as fair, or even not so fair. The liberal education of our youth will culminate in having such a friend, not as the object of passionate longings, but of affectionate and well-tempered intercourse.

In what relation does good taste stand to morals, or beauty to truth, or character to virtue, or strength to right, or in general, what is external to what is within us? About these and similar questions there is in Plato a degree of ambiguity arising partly out of the Greek nature and education, partly out of the imperfect modes of conception which prevailed in the beginning of philosophy. To us the difference between art and morality is almost as permanent and settled as the distinction of intellect and will, and hardly less important. The dexterity or skill of hand of the mechanic is at once seen to be perfectly distinct from his moral character: though of course the hand is only the executor of the mind. In the fine arts, as we call them, here again making a distinction unknown to the ancients in the time of Plato, there is more danger of confusion, because a moral, or rather, perhaps, a sentimental, element enters into them. That is to say, the poet, painter, &c., must, at the time of executing his work, feel the thought to which he gives expression. But this temporary sentiment is really distinguished from the permanent basis of his
character. Ancient philosophy was little concerned with criticisms on art, and failed to make this analysis. Aristotle does indeed discuss the question whether the good citizen may be also a good man: but he never asks the parallel question, whether the good poet or good artist must be also a good man. In Plato, art has a large share in early education, but seems in later life to be superseded by speculative intelligence, which becomes the centre of truth and goodness. The discussion of such questions realizes to us the difficulty of reproducing a mental world which is different from our own. Compare the speech of Pericles in Thucydides (ii. 39–41).

οὖν...προσβάλλη] 'From whatever source some influence of fair works stirs the sense of sight or hearing.' πρὸς δὴμο not exactly = πρὸς δῆμο but includes the notion of πρὸς τὸ ὀράμα. Cp. Theaet. 152 E—157 A.

ἀερα] 'like a breeze which wafts health from wholesome places.' ἀερα, not λύρα, as in the critical note, is the reading of Par. A.

φροντις] For the neuter plural, referring to two words (δυνάμις and ἀρμονία) which are not in the same gender, cp. Herod. iii. 57 ἴν τὸν ἴδιον καὶ τὸ πρωτανήματον Παρίφ λίθῳ Ἰσημνία.

καὶ δὴ αὖ...οἷς πραγμα[ι] Education may be truly regarded as a process in which instincts, feelings, impressions, words, rules, are gradually ennobled and lighted up by reasoning and reflection. The results of reasoning and reflection may again become instincts and feelings; no conscious effort of thought is required to recall the first principles of morality. But this practical intuition of morals which is gained by use must not be confounded with that narrower and feeble perception of right and wrong which is given in childhood; or with the simple abstractions of right and wrong which are gained by later reflection.

Plato is conscious of the importance of educating the sense of beauty in childhood. The standard of taste, as of manners and morals, may be independently raised by the atmosphere of early life.

ἐκεῖ] sc. ἐν μοναχ[ῆ]: cp. infra 404 ξοίκων ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀκολοχίαν ἣ ποικιλία ἐνέτυκεν.

καὶ ῥήματι ὑπ’ ἱεραίρων...καταθέκομεν] Baiter, in the Zurich edition of 1881, adopted this very plausible conjecture of Maur.
Plato: Republic.

ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, διότι χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπέσθαι οἶς δὲι. [B. J. would
have retained the manuscript reading χαίρειν καὶ καταδεχόμενος =
‘ rejoicing in them and receiving them into his soul.’]

δόσπερ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.] The image of letters, helped by the ambiguous
use of the word στοιχεῖα, had a considerable influence on Plato’s
mind. At the end of the Theaetetus (201) an attempt is made to
explain knowledge as a combination of elements, στοιχεία, which,
like the letters of a word, have a meaning only in combination;
and the same image occurs in the Sophist, 252 ε. Cp. Polit. 278 δ
ταῦτα τούτο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή φῶσει περὶ τά τῶν πάντων στοιχεία πνευματικά,
κ.τ.λ.: Phil. 17 α: Tim. 48 β.

δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα . . . μὴ λαθάνοι] ‘Whenever the letters, though
few, were detected by us.’

οἰς] sc. ἐν οἰς.

ὁς οὐ δέοι] oratio obliqua, depending on the thought implied in
ὁμιμάζομεν = ‘under the idea that we need not notice them.’ So
below, πρὶν . . . ἔχομεν is indirect in past time for πρὶν ἄν . . .
ἔχομεν.

ἄληθῆ], The sentence from δόσπερ ἄρα is an anacliticon; the
thought is interrupted by the eager assent of Glauc on to the
illustrative statement (ἄληθῆ), and after being expanded with οὖν οὐ,
k.τ.λ., is resumed and completed in the words, ἄρ’ οὖν, δ λέγω, πρὸς
θεόν, οὖν οὖν οὐδὲ μονακοῦ, κ.τ.λ. For a similar interruption of a
comparison softened in the same way by a reference to what precedes,
cp. Theaet. 197 c, δ ἀλλ’ δόσπερ ἐλειτίς, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων] Plato remembers that the highest forms
of virtue to be found in human life are but shadows of the ideas,
reflected on a fleeting stream.

ἀόρα] the letters themselves—opposed to their shadows.

καὶ ὑλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας] Cp. vi. 486 λ. The list
of four ‘cardinal’ virtues is not here regarded as exhaustive. And
in the present enumeration Justice is held in reserve.

παντοχώ οἰκετέρεμα γνωρίζομεν] Cp. Theaet. 197 δ ἐνια δὲ
μόνας διὰ πασῶν, δὴν ἐν τόχωσι, πετομένας: Polit. 278 δ μετατελέσειν
δ’ ἐίς τὰ τῶν πραγμάτων μακράς καὶ μὴ ῥαδίους συλλαβᾶς . . . ἕγοι; . . .

ἄτιμάξωμεν] Compare Parmen. 130 ε ὅπω ἁμαρτεὶς φιλο-
σοφία ὡς ἤτο ἀνελήλυθαι καὶ ἐς ἐμὴν δώοιατ, δὴ ἐν διὰν αὐτῶν ἄτιμάξεις.
The man who has the spirit of harmony will be enamoured, then, of those who have most of this character; but of one who is inharmonical he will not be enamoured.'

Compare Symp. 209 B τά τέ ὄν σῶμα τά καλά μάλλον ἡ τά αἰσχρά ἀστάρτα ἢ τέ και, καὶ ἓν ἑντύχη ψυχή καλή καὶ γενναία καὶ εὐφυείς, πάντων δὴ ἀπαύγαζε τό ἐνυμμαφότερον: ibid. 210 B, c μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τό ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλως τιμώτερον ἐγκαθησάθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἄρτε καὶ ἓν ἐπικείμενον ἐν τῷ ψυχῆς τις καὶ ἓν συμπροφόρον ἀνθρώπος ἢ χή, ἱσαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἑρᾶν καὶ κηδεμόνα, κ.τ.λ.

A similar allusion to Glaucön's character occurs in v. 474 D ἀλλὰ, 'ἐπον, ἐπρεπεν, ἐπρεπεν, ἐγκακία, ἔλεγεν ἐπεὶ ἀνδρὶ δ' ἐραστήκατο οὐ πρέπει ἀμμησονυμία, κ.τ.λ. The σωματικός of Theaetetus is a case in point (Theaet. 185 ε).

Cp. the description of the marvellous effects of pleasure in Phileb. 47 Α.

But for the rest he should so associate with him for whom he may care as not to be forced to pass beyond this limit; and if he does, he is to be censured for coarseness and bad taste:’ i.e. if he goes beyond what is implied in the words φιλεῖν, ἐξουσίαν, ἔπεσθαι ἐπειράνειον.—the optative (for ἐν συνδάσει), because the legislation applies to an imagined future, or as Riddell would say, Digest § 74 β, is intended to belong to all time. δέξει is not to be taken emphatically; not ‘even appear to’ but simply ‘be thought to.’ A fact is spoken of, not as unreal or uncertain, but with reference to the impression which it creates. Cp. Thuc. iii. 10, § 1 εἰ μὴ μετ' ἄρτης δοκοῦσις ἐστὶν ἀλλάζων γίγνετο: Soph. O. T. 402 εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄγκεις γέων [ῖναι.

is dependent on νομοθήτουσι, the construction changing from the infinitive to the participle. Cp. supra 389 c λέγων. Aristotle in the Politics (ii. 4, § 3) refers to this passage: ἀτοπον δὲ κακοῖς... διαφέρειν καὶ τό τινι συνουσίαν ἑφελεῖν δ' ἀλλην μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὡς λιαν δ' ἐκχώρια τῇ ἠδονῇ γινομένην δὶς δ' δ μὲν πατηρ ἢ νύς, ο郤 δ' ἀθέλφοι ἀλλήλων, μηδεν' οἴεσθαι διαφέρεν. There seems to be some misunderstanding here. Plato has said that love is not to go beyond the innocent sort of familiarity which
subsists between members of a family. This is only an illustration of what is to be permitted. But Aristotle seems either to assume that Plato allows of improper intimacy between near relations, or to think that he ought to have distinguished different cases on some other ground than the mere violence of the pleasure. As he is evidently referring to this place, he has probably been misled by a confused recollection of the words, ἀνεσθήσας ἀνεστήν υἱός, or is drawing a strained inference by connecting this passage with the regulations in Bk. v.

Meanwhile their physical education will not have been neglected. We may observe that a good mind makes a good body, not a good body a good mind; and so if the mind be well trained, it will be enough for us to lay down general rules about gymnastics, leaving the more particular care of the body to the mind herself. The first rule will be that of temperance, and it must follow that our system of training must be different from that of the Hellenic athlete, which is both dangerous to health and inconsistent with mental activity. Our youth must be always on the alert, and their training must be suited to their warlike duties.

In gymnastics as in music simplicity will be the guiding principle. And in this we shall follow Homer, whose warriors ate no fish nor stewed meats, but simple roast, and that without sauce. Far be from our youth the luxury of Sicily and the lasciviousness of Corinth, or even the niceties of Athenian confectionery.

Living in this simple fashion they will have no need of the law-courts and the doctor's shop.

The excellence of the mind is not dependent on the body, but the excellence of the body on the mind. Plato does not mean to say that greatness of soul will give the strength of Milo, or that an effort of the will is able to raise men above their bodily condition. But the mind has the initiative; it trains the body when duly trained itself; beginning in youth and considered with reference to the whole of life, the power of reason is really very great, if not supreme, over health and strength. 'Every man is either a fool or a physician' in some degree: he is his own best watchman, and has the power of observing and controlling his bodily habit.

Plato also regards the subject from another point of view: the mind is prior to the body as ideas are prior to sensible objects. There is something doubtful and ambiguous in such a notion, but
there is also the crude form of a truth which in modern times has been greatly neglected. Compare the fragment of Democritus, Frag. Mor. 128 (Mullach): ἀνθρώπων ἀρμόδιον ψυχής μᾶλλον ἡ σώματος ποιεῖσθαι λόγον: ψυχή μὲν γὰρ τελευτάτη σκέψις μορφηρίαν ὄρθοι, σκέψις δὲ ἱσχὺς ἀνευ λογισμοῦ ψυχῆς οὐδὲν τι ἀμείον τίθησι. Also Charmides 156 ε πάντα γὰρ ἐή ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρμήθησαν καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὸ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπερείν ὄσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐκ τὰ ὀμοία ἐκεῖνον καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μᾶλλον δερματίνοιν. See also Laws x. 891 ff. for the priority of mind. That the object of Gymnastic is mental and not bodily training (ἐι μή ἐι πάρεργον) is a truth which is more fully brought out infra, 410 B, ff., 411 E.

μέθης... ἀφεκτὸν αὐτοῖς] supra 390 A, B: 395 E.

τὶ δὲ δὴ... ἀγώνος] ‘But next what shall we say of their food? For the men are in training for the greatest of contests.’ Compare Laws viii. 829 ε, where the legislator is supposed to ask himself: φέρε, τίνας ποτὲ τρέφω τὴν πόλιν δὴν παρασκευάζας; ἄρ’ οὖν ἀθλητάς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγώνων, οὐς ἀνήγγειλαντι μυρίου ὑπάρχουσι; ἄρ’ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Training is of use as the preliminary of any extraordinary bodily exertion, yet dangerous to health generally because inducing an artificial state, and increasing the muscular, while often impairing the constitutional powers.

ἡ τῶν... ἀμυνότων ἡτὶς] ‘The condition of our ordinary athletes.’ Cp. Symp. 211 C ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶν τῶν καλῶν.

οὖς... ὄντες κἀκεῖνας... ὀχυρίαν] Cp. ii. 375 A ἰδίων τί ποιεῖν οὗ οἷς ἀκέραιον ἐκλέγει πρὸς ἀκεραιούς καὶ ἑλαφρῶν πρὸς τὸ αἱσθηματίκον διακόσμησις, καὶ ἵκουρων αὐτοῖς δὴ τὴν ἐναρκὴ διαμάχησιν.

καὶ τῶν... ἀλλων στιτών] ‘And of food also.’ ἀλλων adverbial.


ἀπλὴ ποιεῖ καὶ ἐπεικὴς γυμναστικῆ, καὶ μάλιστα ἡ τῶν περὶ τῶν πόλεμων] The subject of the first part of this sentence is ἡ ἐπεικής γυμναστικῆ and the predicate of the second part μάλιστα ἀπλὴ καὶ ἐπεικῆς. The verb in both cases—ἐν ἐν—is supplied from the preceding words. The force of τίς (ὁδελφὴς τίς) must be continued with ἀπλὴ καὶ ἐπεικῆς. The whole would be: ἡ ἐπεικής γυμναστικὴ ἀπλὴ ποιεῖ καὶ ἐπεικὴς τίς γυμναστικῆ ἐν ἐν, καὶ ἡ τῶν περὶ τῶν πόλεμων μάλιστα ἀπλὴ καὶ ἐπεικής ἐν ἐν.

καὶ παρ’ Ὀμήρου... μάθοι ἐν τίς] ‘Even from Homer,’ whom in other cases we blame, ‘one may learn such simple matters as
Plato: Republic.

Republic

III.

404 B

ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ] ‘at the Hellespont.’ The name is here given not to the straits merely, but to the country near them.

C καὶ ὑπός γε . . . ἀπέχονται] ὑπός applies mainly to ἀπέχονται. ‘They know it, and rightly abstain.’

D ψάγεις ἀρα . . . ἐπιστείας] ‘You would not have men keep a mistress, who mean to preserve their constitution?’ ‘Certainly not.’ ‘And you disapprove also of the delights, as they are termed, of Athenian confectionery?’ For a similar association cp. ii. 373 λ ἑταῖρα καὶ πίματα. See also in the Laws, viii. 840 λ, the account of Iccus of Tarentum and other athletes who διὰ τῶν ὀλυμπιάδων τε ἄγωνα καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους . . . οὕτω τινὸς πῶς ποτε γυναικὸς ἡγητο, κ.τ.λ.

ἄλην γὰρ . . . ἀπεκάθομεν] ‘We should not be far from the truth in comparing generally this way of feeding and living to the composition of melody and song in the panharmonic style and in all the rhythms.’

ταναρμόνιον here means ‘panharmonic style,’ the style in which all the modes were combined and there were frequent transitions from one to another: above, 399 c, it was used of the instrument adapted to this style.

E ἐκεῖ] ἐν τῇ μελοποιίᾳ καὶ ψῆφῳ.

405 A δικαστική] Cobet would read δικαστική as in 409 ε: unnecessarily and against the MSS.

διανε μη . . . σπουδᾶσιν] ‘when even free-men concern themselves about such matters in great numbers and with much eagerness.’ For καὶ ἐλευθεροῖ cp. infra μὴ μόνον τοὺς φαίλουσε, κ.τ.λ.

B [καὶ] ἀπορία οἰκεῖων] καὶ is found in all the MSS., and, though somewhat difficult, is defensible. There is a double evidence of the want of education: (1) that like a slave you receive a justice that is imposed on you from without, and (2) because you have none of your own. The last clause not only adds emphasis but gives a new point.

ἡ δοκεῖ σοι . . . (c) ἐκεῖνον ἢτί ἀλάχιον] The difficulty of this sentence arises chiefly from its length, and from the ambiguous use of τοῦτον, τούτο in the first clause. The mind has to be carried on
Notes: Book III.

from πάντων μὴν οὖν, ἕφη, αἰσχιστον, τὸ ὀν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', ἕφη, ἐκεῖνον ἢ τῷ ἀϊχιστῷ. 'Is it not a most disgraceful thing to send out for justice because you have no supply at home' (ἀπορία οἰκείων)?—such is the general meaning of the previous sentence. To which the answer is that 'nothing can be more disgraceful.' The argument proceeds: 'Do you think this importation of justice (τούτο) is more disgraceful than the further stage (τοῦτον) of the same evil, in which a man takes a pride in litigation?' &c. 'No,' is the reply, 'that is more disgraceful still.' For the play on words in αἰσχιστον and ἢ τῷ αἰχιστῷ cp. infra iv. 423 c καὶ φανδόλων γ', ἕφη... φανδόλητον τοῖς.

ὅς δειδός ἢν... λογιζομένος] 'under the idea that he is a master of crime, who is able to wriggle into and out of every corner and hole, bending like a withy (λογιζομένος) and getting away.' The reading λογιζομένος, which is that of the majority of MSS. (but not of Par. Α or the Scholiast), is feeble: it affords an instance of the substitution common in MSS., of a well-known word for a less known one. Another various reading—αὐτὸ (or αὐτὸ) λογιζομένος (Vind. F. Flor. X. Aug. v) is an indirect testimony to the reading of the text, as it has probably arisen from a confusion of the two, ἀλλὰ λογιζομένος becoming λογιζομένος. For the imagery cp. Arist. Nub. 449, 450:—

μάσθη, εἴρων, γλωσσα, ἀλαζῶν,
κέντρων, μαρούσι, στρόφας, ἀργάλεος, κ.τ.λ.

μυσταζοντος διακιστη] 'of a noddling justice.' The epithet is intended to cast a slur upon the law-courts.

τὸ δὲ ἱστρικής] The words φύσας τὲ καὶ κατάρρους correspond to δειμάτων τὲ καὶ πνευμάτων in the words immediately preceding. For φύσα cp. especially Xen. Cyr. i. 2, 16 ὄσχρον... ἢ τὰ καὶ καὶ καὶ ἅπερται... τὸ φύσας μετοποὶ φαινομένου.

ἀλλὰ] is adversative to the negative idea contained in δὲ μὴ.

διαταν οἶδαι διήλθομεν] viz. in 403 D ff., although the errors in diet have been rather hinted at than described. But see especially 404 D.

How simple were the prescriptions of the sons of Asclepius, for the wounded heroes who had lived as Homer describes! Very different is the practice nowadays, since Herodicus, himself a valetudinarian, has taught men to prolong their sickly lives by regimen.

The common workman has no time to be ill. Neither has the
rich man, if, as Phocylides says, he ought to practise virtue. For to
this or any other serious pursuit valetudinarism is a great
obstacle.

And Pindar and the tragic poets offended against principle when
they said that Asclepius, who was a son of Zeus, was bribed to
bring a man back to life, who in the course of Nature ought to have
died.

It is Machaon (the Asclepiad), not Eurypylus, who
receives the potion at the hands of Hecamede (Il. xi. 624). The
name Eurypylus is repeated below, 408 a. It is observable that
the same circumstance is rightly narrated of Machaon in the Ion
(538 c). The mistake is natural (as the wound of Eurypylus
occurs only a few lines earlier Il. xi. 575 ff.), and ought not to be
adduced as a proof that the text of Homer was different in Plato’s
time.

‘which, as you know, are considered to be rather
inflammatory.’

‘That watches over the course of
a disease,’—as a tutor (παιδαγωγός) over a growing boy. Cp.
infra παρακολουθῶν . . . τῶν νοσήματων. The word παιδαγωγός recurs in
the same sense in Tim. 89 d, but the passage in which it is found
has a very different spirit, for Plato has changed his mind:—διὸ
παιδαγωγόν δει διαίται πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα, καθ’ ὅσον ἄν ἡ τῷ σχολῇ, ἄλλ’
οὐ φαρμακεύσαντα κακῶν δόξας ἔρεβοικον.

Little is known of Herodicus
(ὁ Σπλυσβρανεύς, τὸ δὲ ἀφχαίνον Μεγαρέως Protag. 316 e). From
Plato’s account we infer that he substituted regimen for medicine;
in so doing he was probably in advance of his age. Two other
notices of him in Plato agree with this passage: (1) Protag. 316 e,
where he is called, with some degree of depreciation, ‘a first-rate
Sophist’—but this we may observe to be only said of him in the
same sense in which Plato speaks of the poets as Sophists: (2)
there is a pleasant mention of him at the commencement of the
Phaedrus, where he is supposed to recommend walks in the open
air, as far as the walls of Megara and back again (Phaedr. 227 d).
According to Aristotle, Rhet. i. 5, § 10, Herodicus himself ex-
pressed an opinion not far removed from Plato’s here: πολλοὶ . . .
ὑμαίνοντες ὡσπερ Ὑπάκουος λέγεται, οὐδὲς ὡς ἑβδομοῦσιν τῆς ῥήσεως
dia τὸ πάντων ἀπείχοσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων.
Notes: Book III.

νοωδής γενόμενος] 'having fallen into bad health.' Cp. Plato's own opinion that the physician should not be in robust health—408 d, e.

δυσθανατών . . . ἀφικετο] 'So struggling against death by his cleverness he reached old age.' His sickly life, prolonged by care, was in fact a lingering and painful death. Cp. Tim. 75 B τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἡμιτέραν γέιας δημιουργοῖς, ἀλαλογομένοις πότερον πολυχρονίτερον χέρων ἢ ἄρακχρονίτερον βίλιον ἄπεγαζαντο γίνοις, ἔνωδες τοῦ πλείονος βίου φαυλοτέρου δὲ τὸν ἐλάττωνα ἀμείνοια δοτα παντὶ πάντως απετεί.

καλόν] For the ironical use of καλὸν cp. Theaet. 183 λα καλὸν ἢ μὲν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανάρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, κ.τ.λ.

οὐκ ἄγνοια, κ.τ.λ.] It is assumed that Asclepius, as Apollo's son, must have had a Divine knowledge of the art of healing, and Plato implies that the innovation in question is not merely erroneous, but impious.

πᾶσι τοῖς εὐθυμομεμφαίοις] is a dative of the persons interested: 'for the behoof of any well-governed community.'

δ ἡμεῖς . . . οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα] 'This we observe in the case of the artisan, and ludicrously enough fail to make the application to people of the richer sort.' The adverb γελοίως has a predicative force (=γελοὺς δρώντες). Cp. supra i. 332 λ ὡστε τις µή σωφρόνως ἀπαντῇ; Thuc. i. 21, § 1 ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ µυθώδες ἐκκενεπήσα. Σοκοῦτων is used with a slight contempt.

μακράν] Some MSS. read µακράν, among them Par. A. But µακράν has sufficient manuscript authority and agrees better with the context, even if µακρὰ διάστα were a natural expression for 'low diet.'

ἐπεν . . . ἀπηλλάγη] are gnomic aorists, used in general statements to give greater liveliness, as in the Homeric similes. ἐμβάς has an association of boldness, 'embarking on his accustomed mode of life.'

ἡν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον . . . ἐλυτελεῖ] The past tenses refer to the previous supposition, 406 c, d.

ἀδίωτον] recalls οὐκ ἐλυτελεῖς ζῆν.

οὐκον δὴ λέγεται γε] sc. ὧ πλούσιος ἐξισιν τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκειμένων.

μηδὲν, εἶπον . . . (β) οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει] 'Let us not quarrel with him on this head' (viz. at what time a man is to commence a life of vol. III.
virtue), 'our object is rather to inform ourselves whether the rich are bound to practise virtue; he who fails to do so having no true life; or whether valetudinarianism is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and other arts, but is no impediment to that which Phocylides enjoins.' The disjunctive sentence, which is complicated by the expansion of the second clause with μὲν and δὲ, might be paraphrased as follows, 'if the rich man is allowed to be a valetudinarian, either he is not supposed to have any duties, or his duties must be of a kind with which the care of health does not interfere, as we found that it interfered with the work of the artisan.'

Plato is urging that the rich man, so far from having time to be an invalid, has the business of virtue always on hand, and that valetudinarianism is just as great a hindrance to the pursuit of this as it is to the occupation of the artisan. For the complex sentence cp. supra ii. 374 c and note: infra c, d.

B
Two MSS., οὐ δὲ, read τῷ . . . παρακλήσιμα for τῷ . . . παρακλήσιμα, but the accusative, which is found in all the other MSS., is preferable. Cp. Phaedo 66 c ἐπισκόπες . . . τῆς τοῦ δαυτοῦ ὥρας: Xen. Mem. i. 2, 4 ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἐξιδιν ὑγείαν τῆς ικανοῖς εἶχεν καὶ τῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἑπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐπισκόπες ἔπη: Aeschines 85, 35 ἐπισκόπες τοῦ τῆς πόλεως καρπός. 'But to the duty which Phocylides enjoins it (valetudinarianism) is no hindrance.' The datives, τεκτονικὴ μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τήχαις, depend in the first place on ἐπισκόπης, but also on τῇ προσεχής τοῦ νοῦ, which is added in further explanation.

ἐδραίως εν πόλει ἁρχής] opposed to στρατεύας.

τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον] τὸ μέγιστον is a 'Noun-Phrase in apposition' (Riddell, Digest, § 13) to the notion of ἐπισκόπης, or δύσκολος (ἐστίν) which is continued in thought. ἄν δὲ ἐγὼ is omitted here, as above in ὁ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος, κ.τ.λ.

C

μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτῶν] i.e. ὅταν μελέτη τίς τοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν.

κεφαλῆς . . . διαστάσεις] 'tensions' or 'fulnesses of the head,' i.e. headaches. This reading has the authority of Galen and Stephanus. Par. A and most other MSS. read διαστάσεις, 'distractions'—as we say, 'a splitting headache'—a violent use of the word.

ὅτη ταύτη] ταύτη sc. ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, including not only dialectic, but the preparatory studies of Bk. vii. For the two adverbs cp. Theaet. 194 Λ. ταύτη ταύτη ψεύδεται ἡ διάσωμα: and for the general meaning Phaedo 66 b μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα
Notes: Book III.

... étis de, év tēs nósoi prospéswai, ἵμπωδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὀστοῦθραν... ὅστε... ὀδὲ ἐφοβήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγχύεται οὐδέποτε οὖδέν. When Plato wrote the Timaeus he looked more seriously on the disorders occasioned by over-much study (87 κ. η.) ταῖτον δ' ἰσαντεῖον... αἰτίασθω ποιεῖ.

tοὺς μὲν φύει... τὰ δ' εἶσον, κ.τ.λ.] For the double form of the sentence (the two members of which may be joined by 'whereas') cp. supra B τεκτονικὴ μὲν, κ.τ.λ.: iv. 445 Λ ἄλλ', ἵφι... βιωτῶν ἅρα ἵστω. The accusative in both parts of the sentence (τοὺς μὲν... ξυντας... ισχυντας) is a loose construction for which the dative τοῖς is afterwards substituted.

tὰ δ' εἶσον... λυσίτηλη] (1) τὰ δ' εἶσον σώματα is accusative of reference. Both οὖσιν ἐπιχειρεῖν and μη ὁλέσθαι depend on φομεῖ in spite of the difference of negative, μη in indirect discourse being often used where we should expect οὐ. See Goodwin, M. and T., § 685. ἀπαντιόμεν, sc. αὐτῶν: ἐπιχείροτα, sc. εἰς αὐτά. ‘But as for bodies diseased to the core, shall we not say (φομεῖ) that he (sc. Asclepius) would not have attempted by regimen, that is by gradual processes of evacuation and effusion, to make a man's life long and evil, and to make men beget children probably as good for nothing as themselves,—he did not think that he ought to prescribe for any one who did not live in the accustomed round of life, under the idea that such an one was useless alike to himself and to the state.’ [B. J.]

(2) τὰ... σώματα are in a pendent construction similar to τοὺς μὲν, κ.τ.λ. above. Of the infinitives, προστάταιειν and ἐπιχειρεῖν are in the construction with καταβείξαι: ποιεῖν is governed by ἐπιχειρεῖν, and φυτεύειν apparently by ποιεῖν: μη ὁλέσθαι, however, would seem to depend on καταβείξαι ἐστρεφόντα supra, i. e. 'he taught his disciples so.' This seems required to justify the change from οὖ to μη, which helps to point the correspondence between τοῦ μη δυνάμενον... ζήν and what follows. [L. C.]

μη ὁλέσθαι δεῖν θεραπεύειν] Cp. Laches 195 c ὥς οὖν πολλοὶ οἷς ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἄμελεν εἶναι μὴ ἀπατήημα ἡ ἄμαζηνα; for the same thought.

πολιτικῶν, ἐφι, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιόν] ‘You make out Asclepius to have been a statesman.’ Some of the commentators defend Plato against the charge of cruelty. But it is not necessary to view this half-ironical passage in so serious a light. His main conclusion, that the art of medicine should be made simple, is justified by the uncertainty of the subject and confirmed by modern science.
The reading of the inferior MSS. καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ δεικνύον ἃν δὲ τοιοῦτος ἦν ἤ οὐχ, κ.τ.λ. was due to a mistake as to the meaning of δὴ. Sauppe would read δῆλον . . . καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἦν, comparing Crito 44 D δῆλα τὰ παρώνα . . . δὲ, κ.τ.λ. But the text is right. 'That is manifest,' I said; 'and because of his statecraft, do you not see that his sons at Troy not only showed themselves brave in war, but practised medicine in the way I have described.'

Plato is quoting from memory, as is shown by the substitution of τι for ἄρα. ἐκμυζήσατι is dual. Asclepius had two sons, Podaleirius and Machaon. The words in II. iv. 218 αἰτὶ ἐκμυζήσα τιν' ἄρα ἤπια φάρμακα εἶδος | πάσας refer to Machaon only. Purves' rendering, 'He squeezed out the blood and sprinkled,' &c., is supported by the gloss in Suidas: ἐκμυζήσας, ἐσπεῖός, ἐθλάγης. The notion seems to be that of pressing together the lips of the wound.

Plato probably has in mind the verses of Tyrt. Eleg. iii. (12 in Bergk) 5, 6:—

οὐδὲ εἰ Τιθυνῶν φυην χαριέστερος εἴη
πλοῦντοι δὲ Μίδω καὶ Κυνώρα μάλιον.

The latter line is quoted with slight variation in the Laws ii. 660 ξὲν δὲ ἄρα πλοῦτι μὲν Κυνώρα τε καὶ Μίδα μάλλιον.

πάνυ κομψοὶ . . . παῖδας] 'From what you say, the sons of Asclepius must have been very clever' (perhaps referring to 405 D τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας).

καὶ Πῦθαρος] Pindar, Pyth. iii. 55:—

ἐπραπεν καὶ κείνοιν ἀγώνοι μισθό χρυσὸ ἐν χρέων φωνές
ἀνδρὶ ἐκ βασιλῶν κομίσας
ὑδὴ ἄλωσκότα, κ.τ.λ.


κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα] sc. the principle laid down in 391 D—that no one can be at once a son of God and a bad man,—which is also alluded to in the words ἀπέθανοντος γε ἦμιν supra.

καὶ μάλα . . . τοιοῦτος] 'Assuredly I mean good physicians, but do you know whom I consider to be such?' Socrates evades the point of Glaucón's question, viz. how the physician can see enough of disease in the 'healthy' commonwealth. Cp. supra 399 ξ, 405 ξ ff.
Notes: Book III.

ἐν εἰκῆς] sc. εἰδεῖν ἔν. 'I should, if you would tell me.'

ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι ... ἡροῦ] (‘It is difficult,) but I will try, I said. Let me note, however, that in the same words you join two things which are dissimilar.'

ἰατροὶ, κ.τ.λ.] The most skilful doctors are those who combine experience of disease in their own persons as well as in those of others with the theoretical knowledge of their art. Plato is right in maintaining that the profession of a physician is one for which rude health is not in every respect a qualification. A delicate organization helps to give an intelligence of the bodily state of others.

ἀὕτη] sc. τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν.

γενομένην τε καὶ ὠδευ] 'which has been and is.' The periphrasis gives dignity to the expression. The phrase repeats κύρων καὶ εἰν ... εἶναι ποτὲ καὶ γενέσθαι supra. It is implied that past evil leaves its trace in the soul.

δικαστῆς δὲ γε, κ.τ.λ.] The case of the judge is different: his knowledge of evil ought not to be derived from the conversation of early companions, or the experience of his own 'wild oats.' 'The princely heart of innocence' is the foundation of a sound judgement in questions of right and wrong. The knowledge of evil and of the world had better wait until a man is older, and be obtained, not by introspection, but by study and observation of others.

On the other hand, that there may be in the best of men a narrowness of virtue and ignorance of human nature, which degenerates rapidly into a moral fault is not to be denied. And the tendency to believe that all the world are rogues is almost as characteristic of good men as of bad. There may also be in good men as well as bad, even without experience, a natural insight into the wickedness of mankind: this is a reflection which Plato stops short of making.

παραδείγματα ὄμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς ποιητοῖς] 'Samples of experience shared in common with the wicked,' i.e. παραδείγματα παθῶν ὄμοιων τοῖς τῶν ποιητῶν.

καὶ ἄγαθὸς γε ... σὺ ἠρώτας] 'Yes, and good too, which is what you were asking'—in the words above, 408 c ἃρ' ὅτι ἄγαθος δεῖ ἐν τῇ πάλαι κεκτήσασθα ἱατροῖς; κ.τ.λ. Socrates insists that the good judge must be a good man.
Plato: Republic.

Republ. III. 409 D

σοφὸς ολόμενος εἶναι [Cp. supra 395 ν ολομένην εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι.

σοφῶτερος . . . αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳι] ‘He is more apt to be held wise than foolish, both in the opinion of others and in his own.’

ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως, κ.τ.λ.] ‘But virtue, in a nature which is educated by time, will attain to a knowledge of herself and of vice likewise.’

χρόνῳ reads better if taken with παιδευμένης than with λήψεται.

In the latter case there is a want of point, as the fact has been already stated that the knowledge of evil is obtained by time, above 409 Β ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διασθάνουσα αὐτὸν πέφυκεν κακόν. The principle that knowledge is of opposites is assumed.

E 410 άλλ’ οὖχ ο διακός] sc. the rogue described above in the words—ο δὲ δεινός ἑκεῖνος καὶ κακύποπτος, κ.τ.λ.

αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενόσιν] ‘ultra occident.’ αὐτοὶ refers to δικασταὶ and ἱπποὶ understood in δικαστικῆς and ἱππακτικῇ, which are the antecedents to αὐτότεροι: although strictly speaking only ἱπποὶ goes with ἑκατὸν and only δικασταί with ἀποκτενόσιν.

B 410 ἀρ’ οὖν . . . αὐγάκη;] ‘And may not our student of music by following the same track—(i.e. aiming at simplicity) in his pursuit of gymnastic, gain an immunity from doctors, except in extreme cases?’

Simple training in music corrects the evil tendencies of law; simple gymnastic minimizes medicine. For the meaning of αἱρεῖν, ‘to win’ or ‘gain,’ cp. supra ii. 358 E τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἑκβλεψυν τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν.

αὐτὰ μὴν . . . μεταχειρίζεται] The ‘muscular’ philosophy of Plato aims at steadying the nerves,—πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς . . . ἑκεῖνο,—at courage and endurance rather than at strength.

οἱ καθιστάντες . . . παιδευέων] i.e. those who institute an education in music and gymnastic.

For the optative which follows see Riddell’s Digest, § 75. Either, (1) as is there suggested, ‘the dependent verb is intended to belong to all time’—καθιστάνων being a generic present, ‘who at any time appoint’ (cp. viii. 566 B ἐξουσιάζοντων), or (2) the present tense may include a reference to the past as in Aristoph. Ran. 23:

αὐτὸς βαδίζω καὶ πονῶ, τούτων δ’ ἀχαί,

ινα μὴ ταλαπωρόντο μηδ’ ἄχθος φέροι—

i.e. ‘I have been walking and toiling all this while.’ Goodwin,
Notes: Book III.

M. and T., § 323. The institutions of the legislator are present in their operation, but the grounds for them were considered in past time. So oi καθοτάτες . . . παιδείαιν. ‘Those who are the authors of the system of education which now prevails.’

αὐτήν τὴν διάνοιαν] ‘Even in their minds’—though you might not expect the mind to be affected by their bodily training.

ἐγώγε, ἐφη] sc. ἐννοοῦ, from οἷς ἐννοεῖς above.

tὸ ἡμερον . . . φύσει] Cp. ii. 375 E.

ἀστοι] sc. τῆς φιλοσφοφίας φύσεως: the neuter for the feminine, as elsewhere. That ἀνεβάντως here means ‘relaxed’ rather than ‘indulged’ or ‘set free’ is proved not only by ἐπιτάθει supra, but by the use of δαισμα in iv. 442 A τὸ δὲ δαισμα παραμυθημένη.

ἀμφιέρα . . . τοῦτο τὸ φύσει] τὴν τε θυμωδῆ καὶ τὴν φιλόσφοφην: cp. ii. 375 E.

διήλθα καὶ διηροίκεσ] The verbal parallelism is maintained without considering that the two vices are not necessarily combined. Cowardice arises from excess of music and deficiency of gymnastic—rudeness from deficiency of music and excess of gymnastic.

οἴκων ἐταν . . . ἐτοίμους] ‘Accordingly, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour over his soul through his ears, as through a funnel, those sweet and soft and melancholy strains of which we were just now speaking, and when his whole life is passed in warbling and under the glamour of song, at first whatsoever passion there is in him he tempers like iron, and makes useful instead of brittle and useless.’

For the use of παρέχειν with the infinitive cp. Charm. 176 B ἣν ἐπίθεν παρέχεις ἵπποράται, and for the fanciful meaning of καταυλεῖν viii. 561 C μεθίω καὶ καταυλούμενος: Laws vii. 790 E ἀνεκνωσ οἷον καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων: Eurip. H. F. 871 τάχα σ’ εἴγο μάλλον χορεύσω καὶ καταυλήσω φόβαρ.

ἡς τῶν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν] referring to supra 398 D, E.

τὸ μὲν πρῶτον . . . (β) μαλβακὸν αἰχμητὴν] ‘At first he tempers what spirit he had in him, as steel is tempered, and makes it serviceable instead of stiff and useless. But when he perseveres to fascination-point, thenceforward he begins to waste his spirit away, till he have melted the spirit out of him, and as it were cut out the sinews from his soul, and made thereof a feeble warrior.’ ἡμάλαξε, κηλῆ, τήκεί, λεἰβει,—sc. τὸ θυμωδῖς: ποιήσῃ, sc. τὴν ψυχήν from τῆς ψυχῆς.
preceding. Also in what follows, ψυχήν is to be supplied with ἀθυμοῦν and θυμοειδῆς. For ἐπέχων μὴ ἄνει, of one who keeps on doing anything unremittingly, cp. Theaet. 165 ν ἄγνωρ ἐν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἄνεις. For the Homericism μαλλακὸν αἰχμητήν see II. xvii. 588, where Menelaus is so called.

καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε, κ.τ.λ.] ‘And if he act upon a nature originally wanting in spirit, he quickly accomplishes this: but if upon a spirited nature, he makes the spirit in him weak, and therefore excitable, quickly flaming up on slight occasions and quickly extinguished.’ The above interpretation (subaud. ψυχήν) affords a more natural construction than to supply θυμῶν, with which ἀθυμοῦν and θυμοειδῆς could hardly agree. For ἐὰν λάβῃ = ‘if he have taken in hand,’ i.e. to be submitted to the process in question, cp. Theaet. 159 c ὅταν ... λάβῃ ἵκναις σεικρίτης.

ἀπὶ θυμοειδοῦς] The use of the singular here seems to imply that the adjective in this and similar expressions is neuter. Cp. Theaet. 185 ε καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, το Θεότητα πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εἴ το οἰκεῖον μὲ : Symp. 195 c νόος ... ἔτη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νῷ ὑπαλός.

καὶ εὐωχήται εὐ μᾶλα] (1) ‘and fare sumptuously’—with reference to the heavy feeding of Polydamas and his like (supra i. 338 c): or [rather, L. C.] (2) ‘If he take his fill of it,’ sc. τῆς γυμναστικῆς. Cp. i. 352 ν εὐωχητέρον τοῦ λόγου: Gorg. 518 ε εὐωχεῖτο τον ἐπεθύμου.

οὖν λόγου μετίσχον οὖν τῆς ἄλλης μουσικῆς] ‘having no share in reason or in musical culture,’ i.e. in those harmonies and rhythms, which are in accordance with reason. Cp. supra ii. 376 ε, iii. 402 λ.

αὐτοῦ] sc. τοῦ ἀθερώσκου, i.e. the indefinite subject of ποιή, εὐωχήται, πράτη, κοινωνί, &c.

βίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἄρρούτης ... [η] ‘And his only way of managing is by violence and fierceness, as if he were a wild beast, and he lives amid ignorance and perversity, with no sense of proportion or grace.’

πρὸς πάντα follows διαπράττεται, the genuineness of which there is no reason to doubt. For a similar use of διαπράττεσθαι as a neuter verb cp. Protag. 319 c περὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ οὐν αὐτὰ ἐν τίγχη εἴναι, οὕτω διαπράττοντα.

ἐπὶ δὴ δὲ ὅτε τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.] With Plato the effect of gymnastic on the body is of secondary importance compared with its effect
on the mind (cp. 1 Tim. iv. 8 ἡ γὰρ σωματικὴ γνωσις πρὸς διίγον ἵστιν ἐφιλμοῦ). Republic
III.

εἴ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον] The reading of the text, which is that of Ven. Π, is partly confirmed by the first hand of Par. Α, which reads εていきたい εἰς εἰργον (sic). The omission of the second εἰ, or the substitution of εἴη in some MSS., are probably emendations, arising from the comparative singularity of the expression εἴ μή εἰ. But cp. ix. 581 δ εἰ μή εἰ τι αὐτῶν ἄρχων ποιεῖ: Gorg. 480 c εἰ μή εἴ εἰ τις ἐπολάβη εἴπ τοιναπτιν.

τελέως μονοκωτατοῦ] Compare a fine passage in the Laches 188 ν καὶ κομιδῆ μοι δοκεῖ μονοκωτοῦ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἀρμονιαν καλλιτην ἠμοσμένος, οὐ λύραν οὐδέ παιδίας δραγα, ἀλλὰ τῷ δινὶ ζῆν ἠμοσμένος, and the definition of σωφροσύνη as a kind of harmony in iv. 430 ε. Cp. also note on 400 δ.

οἰκον . . . σῶ[ξεθαὶ:] ‘And in our city, if the form of government is to last, shall we not have need of some one to preside over it, who is of the character now described?’ τοῦ τοιοῦτοι refers to the class which is definite, τινὸς to the individual who is undefined. It is obvious that this minister of education will be one of the chief magistrates, but this point is for the present left undefined.

Our guardians have now been chosen, and the main lines of their training have been laid down. But which of them are to be placed in command? At present we must be contented with providing that the officers or rulers shall be of ripe age and appointed on the principle of merit. And by merit is to be understood a steady loyalty, which neither forgetfulness nor sophistry nor pain nor fear nor even pleasure is able to shake or undermine.

χορείας γὰρ . . . χαλεπᾶ εὐρείν] As elsewhere, Plato avoids details: cp. his treatment of music (especially 399 λ, 400 β), and his unwillingness to legislate about the smaller proprieties of life (iv. 425).

tούτων] sc. τοῖς τύποις.


φρονίμους τε . . . δυνατοῖς] ‘both wise and efficient for this object.’ εἰς τοῦτο, sc. εἰς φιλακήν πόλεως.

When he first selects his rulers Plato is contented that they should
be wise, capable and patriotic: they are not supposed to be philosophers. In Books v-vii he places his requirements far higher. He refers to this passage in vi. 502 D, E παραλειπόμενοι... την των δραχμών κατάστασιν, κ.τ.λ., vii. 536 C.

καὶ [ὁταν μάλιστα] The MSS. read ὅταν μάλιστα, but ὅτι μάλιστα (‘as far as is conceivable’) is read in the quotation of Stobaeus. Hermann cancels both words, and Baiter (1881) plausibly suggests that they are due to the eye of the scribe having wandered back to τοῦτός γε μάλιστα. It is not probable that ὅταν is ever followed by the optative mood: either read ὅτι μάλιστα with Stobaeus, or follow Hermann and Baiter in the omission of the words. ἐκεῖνος, not οὖς, is written because the relative is not repeated in Greek: cp. ii. 357 b αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅταν αἰθαλαζεῖ καὶ μηδεῖ... διὰ ταύτα γίγνεται.

μὴ δὲ] i.e. μὴ εἶ δὲ πράττοντος ἐκεῖνος. The other reading, εἰ δὲ μὴ, is probably conjectural.

φαλακροῦ... τοῦ δόγματος] Plato is playing, as elsewhere, on the word φάλακς. They are guardians of the city, and guardians of the patriotic principle which is implanted in them by the laws.

φαίνεται μοι δόξα, κ.τ.λ.] Plato takes occasion, in the description of the true guardian, to remind us that ignorance is involuntary, because no one can be supposed voluntarily to part with a good; and knowledge is a good. Compare Arist. Eth. Nic. vii. 2: supra ii. 382 a.

τραγικῶς... κυβυπρίων λέγειν] ‘I seem, I said, to be speaking like a tragic poet,’ i.e. obscurely: viii. 545 E φώμεν αὐτῶς τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς παιδιὰς ἡμᾶς παιδιοῦσα καὶ ἔφηκόμενος. In the latter passage, however, there is an association of mock solemnity which is hardly present here. For κλέπτων used in tragedy with a similar reference to memory cp. Soph. Ant. 681 εἰ μὴ τῷ χρόνῳ κεκλημένα.

νῦν γὰρ ποιούσανείς] [‘I say no more] for now, I suppose, you understand.’

ὑπὸ φόβου τι δεισάντες] τι is a cognate accusative—not ‘fearing something,’ but ‘having some fear.’

τοῦ παρ’ αὐτῶς δόγματος] παρ’ αὐτῶς is a little more emphatic than αὐτῶν—‘which has been imparted to them.’ Cp. Soph. O. T. 612 τὸν παρ’ αὐτῷ βιοτον.

δὲ δὲν... [αὐτῶς ποιεῖν] αὐτῶς is in the dative, because the interest of the state is also their own. ‘That which they conceive
it best for their state that they should perform.’ But the two words are better omitted.

τηρητέων] sc. ἡμῖν.

καὶ ἀγώνας αὐτοῖς θετέων] θετέω is used with immediate reference to ἀγών.

οἶκοιν, ἢν δ’ ἄγω, . . . χρησμότατος εἴη] This passage is referred to in vi. 503 ε, in the second education, where Socrates proceeds to speak of intellectual tests.

τρίτου εἴθους . . . ἄμελλαν] ‘A trial of a third sort, with regard to enchantments.’ The genitive γοητείας adheres closely to ἄμελλαν cp. ἄγω εἴσυχος (Eur. Med. 402) and the like expressions.

Three dangers were mentioned above (A) in the words ἀλαπιόνες ἡ γοητεύθεις ἡ βασιλείς, and three tests are proposed of the capacity of the youths to meet them. Tasks are to be set them with a view to ascertain if they are proof against the two great thieves, Forgetfulness and Persuasion. They are to be subjected to hard toils and wearisome labours in order to show whether they can hold out against the violence of pain. A third and more subtle trial will test their powers to withstand the assaults of pleasure and fear. In the preceding sentence ἐκκατάφερτο has no reference to ἐπατῆ, but recalls ἀλαπιόνες and μεταρρυθμίσας supra. The accidental use of the same word in different connexions is slightly confusing.

καὶ εἰς ἱδονὰς αὖ μεταβλητέων] ‘And again pass them into pleasures,’ just as metal is passed through different processes of heating and cooling.

τάφων . . . λαγχάνοντα] ‘having allotted to them the highest honours of sepulture and of the other memorials,’ which the dead have, such as celebration on festival days, inscriptions on columns, sacrifices, and the ἄμαρτωλος μῆμα spoken of by Pericles in Thucyd. ii. 43. λαγχάνοντα is made to agree with ἄρχοντα, the intervening clause τιμᾶς δοτέων . . . τελευτήσαντι being neglected.

ἀς ἐν τύπῳ . . . εἰρήσθαι] These words are inserted to prepare the way for Books v–vii.

ἀρ’ οὖν ἀξιοθάς . . . κακουργεῖν] φιλάκης is used in two different senses with πολέμιον and φιλίον: ‘to keep guard against the foe without and to watch over friends within.’ ἔπος is dependent on ἐν φιλάκωσιν implied in φιλάκης. The form φιλίος occurs here as elsewhere in Plato (Symp. 221 β) in connexion with πολέμιος,
as φίλος goes with ἔχθρος, perhaps from some affinity of rhythm.
οἱ μὲν, ἢ ἐκ τῶν φίλων: οἱ δὲ, ἢ ἐκ τῶν πολέμων.

Now is the time for the founders of the state to invent a myth respecting its origin. 'Like the warriors of Cadmus, our citizens'—so the tale will run—have sprung in full armour from the bosom of the land, who is their mother, so that they are brethren all. The rulers have Gold in their composition: the auxiliaries Silver, the artificers and husbandmen Brass and Iron. But, as they all spring from a common stock, these class-differences will not be absolutely hereditary. It will therefore be a task of the chief rulers to test the metal of the children of the citizens, and assign them to their proper classes, so that brass and iron may never take the place of gold and silver in the government of the state.

τίς ἄν...μηχανὴ...τῶν ψευδῶν...γενναίον τι ἐν ψευδομένων πείσαι, κ.τ.λ.] The genitive τῶν ψευδῶν is to be taken partitively with γενναίον τι ἐν: 'Would that by telling one of those necessary falsehoods which we were mentioning,—just one noble lie—we might find a way of persuading,' &c.

ἐν δὴ τῶν ἐλέγομεν] supra 389 B.

μηθῶν καὶν] An implied imperative. 'I don’t want anything new. It is an old story.'

Φοινικής τι, κ.τ.λ.] The mythical origin of the Cadmeans is again alluded to in Laws ii. 663 E τὸ μὲν τοῦ Σιδονίου μυθολόγημα ράβδων ἐγένετο πείθειν, υἱὸς ἀπὸβαν ἐν, και ἀλλα μυρία. People have been readily persuaded of the tale of Cadmus. Why should not the legislator be able to persuade them of a similar tale?

γεγονός...γενεμένον ἃν] It is not clear whether γεγονός and γενεμένον ἃν refer to the acceptance of the story or to the occurrence of the facts mentioned in it. The ambiguity is perhaps intentional. Plato is half inclined for the moment 'to credit his own lie.' But cp. iv. 425 B ὅπε γὰρ πον γίνεται, κ.τ.λ.

πείσαι δὲ συνήψις πειθοῦς] sc. ἃν. 'But needing much persuasion to persuade men of it.'

ὡς ζωλαξ, ἡπ, ἤκνουτι λέγειν] There is a similar hesitation on the part of Socrates in the Fifth Book, 450 D, 471 ff., where he is about to introduce his two great theses of communism and the philosopher-king. The fear is, of course, only pretended.
Notes: Book III.

ὅς ἄρ' ἃ ἡμείς, κ.τ.λ.] ἀρα, 'according to our tale.'

ἰδόκουν ταῦτα πάντα πᾶσχειν, κ.τ.λ.] ἱδόκουν is emphatic, opposed to ἦσαν—'they only thought.' ταῦτα πάντα is the object of πᾶσχειν and the subject of γέγονα—'they imagined that they suffered all these things and that they happened to them.'

καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ helps to mark the correspondence of the clauses. They were being fashioned in the Earth, and when they were ready, even then the Earth sent them forth. ἀνέναι is rightly used of the offspring of the ground: cp. Soph. O. T. 270, 1405. For the creation of man in the bosom of the earth, compare Protag. 320 D τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοί γῆς ἱδον, κ.τ.λ. Plato has a special fondness for the fable of an earth-born race. Compare Symp. 190 b; Soph. 247 c, 248 b; Polit. 269 b; Tim. 23 ε; Critias 109 c.


γῆ τε μητρί, φιλτάτη τροφή·

ἡ γὰρ πιὸς ἐργοὺς εὐμενε πίεψ,

ἀπαιτα παιδοκώσα παιδίας οἰκίαν,

ἐθρέψατ' οἰκετήρας ἀσπιδεθέρεως

πιστοὺς, ἰδιῶς γένουσι πρὸς χρόνος τότε.

See also the description of Melanippus in the same play, 412–416:

σπαρσθῶν δ᾿ ἀπ᾿ ἀνδρῶν, διὸ "Ἀρχίς ἐφείσατο,

ῥίζωμι ἀνείμαι, κάρτα δ᾿ ἐστὶ ἐγχώριος,

Μαλανίτιος· ἔργον δ᾿ ἐν κύβοις "Ἀρχη κρηνή·

Δίκη δ᾿ ὁμαίων κάρτα κιν προσετέλεται

εὐρέων τεκόουσι μητρὶ πολέμων δόρων.

οὖς ἐτὸς . . . λέγειν] 'You had good reason to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.'

ικανοὶ ἄρχειν . . . ἐπίκουροι] The distinction between the ἄρχωτες or φιλακες proper and the ἐπίκουροι has an important place in the analysis of the virtues (Book iv) and the development of philosophy in the state (Books vi and vii).

δὲ οὖν ἔγγυαῖς ὅτες πάντες] These words refer to the second member of the sentence, ἦστι δ᾿ δε, κ.τ.λ., which has the chief emphasis. 'As you are all originally of one family,' specific differences will not always be maintained.

διὰ αὐτῶν . . . παραμέμκονται] (i) 'What they (the rulers) find to
be mingled in the souls of the young,' αὐτοῖς, sc. τοῖς ἄρχοντι: cp. i. 343 A & τοῖς αὐτῇ, κ.τ.λ., or (2) [B. J.] 'which of these metals is mingled in their souls.'

σφέτερος] 'belonging to their own (the rulers') class,' according to the familiar use of σφείς.

ὑπόχαλλος] 'having a proportion of brass.'

κατελεσθοσι] κατα- in composition here implies blame (as in καταχαρίζομαι), 'improperly pity them.'

ἐκ τούτων] sc. τῶν δημιουργῶν ἢ γεωργῶν. It is observable that in our own day the industrial class still tends to divide into these two sections—artisans and husbandmen.

τιμήσαντες] 'Having estimated their values.'

The readings in this passage vary considerably. The principal variations are as follows: σιδηροῦσ φυλάξ Σecunda manu and Μ; σιδηροῦσ φυλάξ Σ prima manu and Π; σιδηροῦσ with the omission of φυλάξ Σ. Either ὁ σιδηροῦσ ὁ χαλκός, omitting φυλάξ, or ὁ σιδηροῦσ φυλάξ ὁ χαλκός give a good sense, the latter reading resting on the best authority.

Plato means to intimate that almost any fable may be rendered credible by time. The new account of the origin of man is not more improbable than the old one was at first, or the old one more true than the new.

σχέδων γὰρ τι μανθάνω δ λέγεις] 'I think that I understand what you mean:' viz. the difficulty of persuading the present generation. The first rulers must be taken into our confidence.

Enough of the fiction, and now let the rulers lead them to their camping-ground. They will select a position commanding both friend and foe; and there they will build habitations for themselves, of a humble sort, such as are suitable for soldiers and will afford them no temptation to break the rules of their education. They will live together and call nothing absolutely their own; they will be fed on rations at the public expense, and share a common table. As for gold and silver, they will not tarnish the pure metal of Divine
origin which is within them, by having anything to do with the corrupted coinage which passes current amongst men. Glaucón quite approves of this.

καὶ τοῦτο ... ἄγγελ] 'And this will turn out as rumour directs it,' i.e. according to the success with which the fiction is rumoured abroad.

ὀπλίσατες] Here, as elsewhere, the distinction between the guardians and the lower classes appears to be lost sight of.

θῶσαντες οἷς χρῆ] The particulars of religious service are left undetermined: see iv. 427 B.

ναὶ, ἔνθα ἐγώ ... ἀρηματιστικάς] 'Yes, said I, lodgings for soldiers, not for traders.' Compare supra 397 E καὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ οὐ χρηματιστικῆ πρὸς τὴν πολεμικῆ.

πομπῆ] The shepherds here are the lawgivers and the rulers who are to succeed them. The dative with αἰσχροτον takes the place of the accusative before the infinitive ἑρείν. Cp. Soph. O. C. 1201, 1202 λιπαρῶν γὰρ ὁ ἱλαί | διεκαί πρὸς χρημάτωσιν.

ἐπιχειρήσας ... κακουργεῖν] (1) is a confusion between ἐπιχειρήσας κακουργεῖν τὰ πρᾶξα and ἐπιχειρήσας τοῖς προβάτοις. Cp. supra ii. 370 E χρῆσοι ὑποζυγίωσι and note; or (2) more simply 'so that they attack the sheep to do them harm': κακουργεῖν, epekegetic infinitive.

ἀφομωθώσευ] As elsewhere, the asyndeton is allowed where the second clause is explanatory of the first. For a similar apposition compare Eurip. Heracl. 176:—

μηδ', ὅπερ φιλεῖτε δρᾶν,

πάθησι σὺ τοῦτο, τοὺς ἀμεῖνοις παρὸν

φιλοῦν ἐλέσθαι, τοὺς κακίωνας λάβῃς.

οὐκοῦν ... εἰσω:] 'Will they not, if they are really well educated, be provided with the best of safeguards?'

τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας] With this phrase cp. τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀριστη, τῶν πλείστων τοῦ βίου, τὴν πλείστην τῆς στρατιάς (Thuc. vii. 3). The adjective takes by attraction the gender of the noun following. The accusative is used adverbially after παρεσκευασμένοι: cp. Riddell's Digest, § 7.

tοῦτο μὲν ... ἢτις ποτέ ἐστιν] We cannot be confident that they have the right education, but we may be confident that they
ought to have. This touch of unlooked for modesty prepares for
the higher education of Book vii.

καὶ ὑράτος γε] sc. ἐλέγομεν.

πρὸς τοῖνυ, κ.τ.λ.] The perfect harmony of a society is an idea
only, which can never be realized in practice. Yet class-differences,
though unavoidable, are still an evil. The antagonism of different
sections deducts from the total strength of the whole of a com-

munity. The differences of interest create jealousy and party-
spirit; the exclusive opinions of a class, whether of the highest or
lowest rank, are always more or less untrue, and require to be
adjusted by those of other classes. The happiest condition of
society seems to be that in which different ranks insensibly fade
into one another, or in which the transition is easy from one to the
other, and personal merit, as in the Republic of Plato, readily
acquires the privileges and estimation of rank. And although the
individual is always in danger of sinking into his own class or
imitating the one above him, yet he may lay aside the impress
of any class in the sense of a higher freedom. Compare Aristotle,
Pol. ii. 5, § 26, who in his matter-of-fact way objects that the con-
finement of office to a single class will be a cause of faction in
a warlike state, and adds—δι’ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ποιεῖν τοῖς αὐτῶν
ἀρχοντας, φανερῶν οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις ὅτε δὲ ἄλλοις μὴ μεῖται ταῖς
ψυχαῖς ὥ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυσοῖ, ἄλλ’ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτῶι. But he does
not seem to remember that Plato has already met this objection, in
part at least, by allowing merit to rise in the social scalé.

D ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου] 'Men in training for war:' cp. 493 E
ἀθληταὶ . . . οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἄγωνος.

E χρυσοῖο δὲ καὶ ἀργύριοιν, κ.τ.λ.] 'But as for gold and silver
coin, we must tell them that they have that (viz. gold and silver)
of a divine quality in their souls.' That the words are used in the
first instance of money appears from νόμισμα a few lines
below.

τὴν ἐκεῖνου κτῆσιν] sc. τοῦ θείου χρυσοῦ.

417 ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρθῶν ἑνώτι] The slight exaggeration and comic
formality of the language keeps up the humour of the passage.

ἐξ ἀργύρου ἢ χρυσοῦ] The inverted repetition has the effect
of a sort of legal phraseology.

B θέοντες . . . ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθρου] A metaphor from navigation.
Notes: Book IV.

Glauc\'on, who began by protesting against the omission of the luxuries of life in the ἀναγκαστήρ ἕπος, has by the art of Socrates been insensibly brought round to deny his own position. Cp. supra ii. 372 c, d.

BOOK IV.

Adeimantus here points out the apparent incongruity of making the highest class in the state the poorest. They have the city in their power, and yet they are to get no enjoyment out of it. Socrates will not ask at present whether plain living is or is not consistent with true happiness; he would rather insist that the law-giver is bound to consider the welfare of the whole community, and not of a part only, however important. Now the welfare of the community depends on the single-minded devotion of the guardians to their proper work, and the possession of private property would be subversive of this.

Indeed one of the chief duties of the guardian will be to prevent excessive inequalities of fortune from arising at all in the city. For the city in which there is wealth and poverty is no longer one. Two nations are already struggling within her. And so long as our state avoids this evil condition and remains really one, she will have nothing to fear from her neighbours, although in bulk and outward semblance they may be many times more powerful than she is.

καὶ δ Ἀδείμαντος, κ.τ.λ.] Happiness is the result, not the aim, of our Utopia. We do not separate the advantage of our ruling citizens from the well-being of all. Their life is not exactly a life of enjoyment, yet in the end a happiness incomparably beyond the lot of other men will fall to their share: cp. x. 612, 613.

τί οὖν . . . ἀπολογήσει] Cp. Phaedo 63 B Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε, οἷοι γὰρ ἦσαν λέγειν ὅτι χρὴ μὲ πρὸς ταύτα ἀπολογήσεσθαι ῥυτερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. For δι' ἑαυτοῦ, ‘by their own act,’ compare i. 354 α οὐ μείναι καλῶς γε εἰστίαιμαι, δι' ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ: and for the meaning, Gorgias 492 B ὥσ τις ἀπολογεῖν τῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίων δυνοῦτο, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς διεστήμην ἐπαγάγωμο τῶν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμων τῇ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ψύχῃ. There is a reference to this passage in ν. 465 ζ Μέμνησαι οὖν δι' ἑν' ἔγω, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι οὐκ οὐδ' ὅτι τὸν λόγον ἢμιν ἐπέπλησθεν, ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαιμονεῖς ποιήσεν, οἷς ἐξ ἑαυτὰ πάντα ἑκεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἑκεῖν;
Plato: Republic.

419 μη...μηδέν] μη is used not unfrequently in oratio obliqua, especially when as here the main sentence is conditional, ἔδω τις σε φη, κ.τ.λ.

νῦν δη] supra iii. 416 d.

ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνὸς...φοινοὺτες] ‘they simply appear, he would say, like mercenaries to be stationed in the city doing nothing but mounting guard.’ The infinitive is used after φαίνονται to avoid a confusion of participles.—Badham would cancel μυθωτοί, but Socrates in saying ὀδ汉语 μυθου, κ.τ.λ., tacitly corrects the respondent.

φαίν ἂν] resumes ἔδω τις σε φη in an independent construction.

Socrates at first, instead of answering, reinforces the objection. Cp. vi. 487 ε ἀκοίους ἂν, ὅπι ἑμοι δεινομενα τἀληθῆ λέγων. ἐπιστίτου...λαμβάνοντες is a correction of ὅτις ἐπίκουροι μυθωτοί. ‘Yes, said I, and this for their food only, and not even receiving pay in addition.’

οἱ ἄλλοι] sc. ἐπίκουροι.

οἱ εὐθαὐμοὶς δοκοῦτες εἶναι] δοκοῦτες with a slight contempt, as in iii. 406 c τῶν πλούσιων τε καὶ εὐθαυμοὶς δοκοῦτων εἶναι: cp. x. 612 a τῶν εὐθαυμῶν λεγομένων ἑιστάσων.

When Adeimantus is exhausted Socrates carries on the charges against himself, and as a final stroke he adds—‘they will have no money to spend on courtesans, or other objects, which, as the world goes, make happiness.’

τι...ἐπιλογογοιμέθα] ‘What, then, shall be our defence, you ask?’ Socrates, in repeating the question from supra 419, would have Adeimantus make common cause with him.

τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοῖον, κ.τ.λ.] refers to the division of labour, as appears from the words ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. infra ε.

ἔρουμεν...ἐλη ἡ πόλις] Aristotle (Pol. ii. 5, § 27) has the following remarks on this passage: ‘Plato deprives the guardians of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in none of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people.’ It seems incredible that any one who has read
the beginning of Book iv should have so utterly misunderstood it. Plato, it is true, deprives the guardians of happiness, but only in the vulgar sense of the word: he believes that they will attain true happiness to the full in the performance of their proper function. So too of the other classes in the state.

ἐροῦμεν] The future implies: 'The spirit of our previous remarks will lead us to say.' Cp. iii. 392 Λ ὅμως ἡμᾶς ἔρειν, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἀδ... ἀδικίαν] This was not clearly said at first, although the presence of evil was acknowledged as a condition of the search (ii. 368 ζ, 372 ξ), but is added in anticipation of the bad states (infra 445 c, viii, ix). Compare infra C αὐτικα δὲ τὴν ἔνωσιν.

ἀπολαβώντες] Compare iii. 392 Ξ ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράσωμαι σοι εν τούτῳ δηλᾶσαι: Gorg. 495 Ξ οἶνον περί δοτο βούλει τοῦ σῶματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπησι.

τιθέντες] is altered in some manuscripts (Π Ξ ζ) into δίνεις, apparently for the sake of symmetry with ἀπολαβώντες: but the present agrees better with the present πλάττομεν.

ἀσπερ οὖν... (π) τὸ δῶν καλὸν ποιοῦμεν] Why should the eyes of a statue be coloured black? The colouring of Greek statues was conventional, the design being, not to imitate life, but to bring out form. Perhaps the blackness of the eye was also conventional, or refers only to the pupil. Compare the Hippias Major 290 Β ἤτι, ἐρεῖ, τὸς Ἀθηνᾶς τοὺς ὁφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρωσοῦς ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄλλο πρᾶσσω, οὐδὲ τοὺς πόδας οὐδὲ τὰς χεῖρας, ἐπερ χρωσοῦν γε δὴ ὕν καλὀστον ἐμελεῖ φαίνεσθαι, θελεφάντων.

All true art proceeds in the artist's mind from the whole to the parts—from composition and proportion to ornament and detail. The power of the whole, however simple, is the highest excellence of art, as the weakness of the whole, however finished in detail, is the greatest fault. The Greeks, though not much given to art criticism, were quite sensible of this first principle of art. Compare Soph. 235, 236, where symmetry of form and harmony of colour are declared to be the first principles of 'image-making,' with the single exception that in large works a slight deviation is necessary from the true and symmetrical line in the upper part of a statue to make up for distance.

ἐπιστάμεθα] 'We know how to,' i.e. we could do so, if we chose.
This word may mean (1) 'from left to right,' cp. Homer, Odysse. xxi. 141, 142:

\[\text{ὅρμωθ ἵζεις ἐπιδέξια πάντες ἑταῖοι,}\
\[\text{ἀρξάμενοι τοῦ χώρου, ὅθεν τε περ ὑκοχύειν,}\

or (2) 'dexterously,' 'cleverly.' If the former sense is preferred, it must be taken with διαπίνοντας: if the latter, with κατακλίναντες: 'having cleverly stretched them by the fireside challenging each other to drink.' [Against the former view it may be urged that it introduces a particular which is too minute and adds nothing telling to the description. B. J.] The manuscripts do not agree here, some reading ἐπιδέξια (Par. A), others ἐπὶ δεξιά (M): if the sense 'dexterously' is preferred ἐπιδέξια alone can be read: if the sense 'from right to left,' either reading is possible.

κεραμεῦσαι] sc. ἐπιστάμεθα κελεύειν.

\[\text{οὔτε ἄλλος ὀδεῖς . . . ἑξ ἡν πόλις γίγνεται} (1) 'Neither will any one else have any of the characteristics which go to make up a city'—or (2) 'Neither will any of the persons who make up the city have any distinct character.' The antecedent to ἑξ ἡν may be either a plural σχῆμα implied in σχῆμα, or a masculine ἐκεῖνων dependent on ἄλλος ὀδεῖς.

νευροφράσσαι] Plato, as his manner is, in recapitulation adds a new touch to the picture. The word is chosen as humbler even than σκυτοτόμος.

For other references to the lowest class of citizens in Book iv see infra D, E, 423 D, 425 C, D, 428 B, C, E, 431 C—432 A, 434 A, B; cp. also V. 456 D ἢ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους, τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευέτας.

\[\text{φυλακῆς δὲ . . . τῶν καιρῶν ἔχουσιν} The subject of ἔχουσιν is φυλακῆς, without the addition μη . . . δοκούστες. For ἄρθην cp. Laws iii. 677 c θάμεν δὴ τάς . . . πόλεις . . . ἄρθην ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφημίσας; And for οἰκεῖν, used in a neutral sense, cp. viii. 543 A τῇ μελλόνῃ ἠκρωσι οἰκεῖν πόλει: also Thuc. ii. 37 διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰς ὀλίγος ἄλλῳ ἐς πλείανοι οἰκεῖν.]

\[\text{εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . (π) ἄλλο ἂν τι ἡ πόλις λέγοι] 'Now if our way be to make guardians in the truest sense (ὅς ἀληθῶς opposed to δοκούτες), who are the reverse of harmers of the state (cp. πᾶσαι ἄρθην πόλιν ἀπολλίσας), but he who asserts the other view imagines (πολει understood from ποιούμεν, or λέγει from λέγων) a sort of ploughman, —a happy merry-maker, as we may fancy, at a high festival, not in a state,—he means something which is not a state.'
The sentence is a good deal involved, and is one of the few passages in the Republic which, like many in the Laws, seem to require the 'curaec secundae' of the author. The perplexity in some degree arises from the antithesis to the previous sentence, which occasions the awkward apposition of ἥμισυ... τόλεως: also from the omission of the verb in the second clause (which is λέγει rather than ποιη), and the tautology of τόλων and ἐν τὸλει. The difficulty is increased by the complex 'paratactic' structure. More simply expressed, the sense is as follows: 'If the idea of a state requires the citizens to be guardians, he who converts them into rustic holiday-makers will mean something that is not a state.' τόλων (without the article) is used in the same general sense as τόλεος in ii. 369 b. ἀκείνο refers to the objection of p. 419 as expanded in 420. Instead of finishing the sentence Socrates breaks off abruptly with a tone of impatience.

τότῳ μὲν[ sc. δ', τι πλέοντα εὐδαιμονία.

ἀναγκαστέον ποιεῖν] sc. ἥμισυ, 'you and I must compel.' Socrates persists in treating Adeimantus' imaginary objector as a real person who is certainly not Adeimantus. Cp. 420 A τι οὖν δὴ ἀπολογησόμεθα, φίς;

καὶ οὖν... εὐδαιμονίας] ἀπέλον anticipates the infinitive μεταλλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας, which, however, is drawn into construction with ἀποδίδωσι.

ἀδελφόν] For this metaphorical use of ἀδελφός cp. Soph. 224 B ἀδελφός τινί τίς πράξεως ἄκομα: Crito 54 c, where the laws of the world above speak of the laws of the world below as οἱ ἥμισυ αὐτοῖς ἀδελφοί. Compare the use in Soph. Ant. 192 καὶ νῦν ἀδελφά τῶν τε κηρίζει ἔχω: μετρίως is modestly substituted by Socrates for καλῶς in Adeimantus' reply.

τῶς ἄλλους αὐτὶ δημιουργοῦσι] The φύλακες have been called δημιουργοί in a secondary sense, supra c; Socrates now speaks of the artificers properly so called. That this, and not the adversative use of ἄλλος is intended here, is shown by the use of αὐτὶ to point the antithesis.

ὅτε καὶ κακῶς γίγνεσθαι] (1) 'To the extent of rendering them worthless.' Cp. for the meaning infra κακῶς χυτρεῖσ ἴγνεται, κ.τ.λ.: and for the expression Thuc. ii. 51, § 6 ὅτε καὶ κτείνου, occurring in a negative sentence to which the interrogative (with κεί) here corresponds; or (2) 'So that they become bad workmen.' καὶ is
used idiomatically to give emphasis and is equivalent to an attenuated 'even.' [B. J.]

παρέχεσθαι] 'To supply from his own resources.' It is not necessary to depart from this, the common use of παρέχομαι, though some here prefer the directly reflexive meaning, 'to provide for himself.'

διδάξεις] (1) It is usually said that in Attic διδάσκω means 'to teach,' διδάσκομαι 'to get some one taught by another.' (2) Hence Dr. W. H. Thompson (Journal of Philology, vol. xii. p. 184) and Cobet, Var. Lect. 310, would read διδάξει here. (3) But it is doubtful whether this distinction can be strictly maintained. See Riddell's Digest, § 87. (4) The middle seems to be used for the sake of variety without any difference of meaning from the active: 'others whom he may teach, he will teach to be inferior workmen.' [B. J.] (5) The rare use of the middle is justified by the personal relation subsisting between the χειρεύως and his sons or apprentices. The same observation applies to διδάχαινυ in Ar. Nub. 783 σὺ δὲν διδάχαίνυ σ' ἔτι, 'I won't have you any longer for my pupil.' [L. C.]

πλούτος the, κ.τ.λ.] That riches are the bane of a state was a favourite notion with the ancient world; nearly the opposite view is current among thinkers on these subjects in modern times. How is this difference to be accounted for? (1) The first impressions of men about riches and poverty are derived from poetry rather than philosophy, and this has led to a sort of inconsistency in our ideas of them (παλαιὰ μὲν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητική). (2) There is a real difference in the influence of wealth among the ancients and moderns. In the modern world, the possession of wealth is the cause and effect of industry and progress; accumulation implies distribution; and many moral qualities, justice, order, independence, energy, are the accompaniments of wealth. In the ancient world wealth was generally acquired by the labour of slaves, or by corruption and violence: in the early times of the Greek republics accumulation was really a disturbing agent in the relation of classes, and in the later days both of Greece and Rome implied an admixture with foreigners which sensibly impaired the force and intensity of the national character. (Compare the extreme opposition of rich and poor which Plato describes as prevailing in the last stage of oligarchy, Book viii. 551–556.) (3) It may be conceded that modern writers have erred in making wealth and security the
sole business of government, and that political economy, after every allowance for difference of circumstances, has something to learn from ancient philosophy on this subject. (4) Declamations against luxury in modern times have sometimes arisen insensibly from the application of the language of ancient writers, as in other instances, to an altered state of society. The same remark may be applied to the language of the New Testament about poverty, which presents an ideal only, not immediately applicable to other times and circumstances.

πλούτος] The noun agrees with the subject of λήσει.

ἄς ὁλόν τε . . . παρεσκευασμένοι] 'trained to perfection in the art of boxing.' ἐπὶ τοῦτο, i.e. ἐπὶ τὸ πυκτεῖνο. For this use of παρεσκευασμένοι cp. especially Gorg. 448 ο καλῶς . . . παρεσκευασθαι εἰς λόγους.

οὐδ' εἰ . . . πνίγει] (1) 'Not, said I, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up, and supposing he were to do this repeatedly (πολλάκις) in the heat of a suffocating sun?' πολλάκις, 'several times,' adds a point to the description. Or (2) according to the other meaning of the word, 'perhaps,' 'it may be,' adding an accidental particular ('possibly in stifling heat') which would be much in favour of a trained boxer.—The change of case ὑποφεύγοντι . . . ἀναστρέφοντα is due to the affinity which the infinitive has for an active subject.

ἀμέλει . . . θωμαστόν] 'Certainly, said he, there would be nothing wonderful in that.' ἀμέλει implies a full admission.

εἰδαίμων εἰ . . . ἐτι οὖν] 'I envy you your simplicity in fancying.' The word εἰδαίμων has a similar ironical sense in other places: v. 450 c οὐ ῥήδον, ὡς εἰδαίμων . . . διελθεῖν—as here implying a simplicity in the previous question. So ὁ μακάρε Phaedr. 241 e, al.

ἄλλα τι μὴν; ἢ πη] 'But what would you have? said he.' τι μὴν, sc. ἄλλο. Cp. i. 348 c and note.

μείζων, κ.τ.λ.] 'You must give a grander name to other cities.'

tο τῶν παλαίστων] may either mean, (1) 'as people jestingly say' (cp. ix. 573 D το τῶν παλαίστων, ἢ πη, τοιοῦ σοῦ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἔρεις: and Laws vi. 780 c) in allusion to some saying οὐ πόλεις ἄλλα πόλεις (or πολείς, the Epic plural of πόλις—'not a city but a many'), the exact application of which has not been preserved to us: or (2) 'as in the game' where there is more than one city, in reference to the
expression παίζειν πόλεις which, according to Suidas and the Scholiast, had passed into a proverb. Cp. Dict. of Ant. vol. ii. p. 12. In this case there is an allusion to the game called πόλεις, for a description of which, see Pollux, iv. 98. It was a species of draughts, in which the pieces (κύκλοι) were ranged on opposite sides of the board (πόλεις), the game consisted in their taking one another.

δύο μέν...πλούσιων] καὶ ὅπως ἦν, 'if it be anything at all': the καὶ is to be taken with ὅπως, according to a common use. For the meaning of ὅπως compare Polit. 308 c εἰ τις που τῶν συνθετικῶν ἐπιστημῶν πράγμα ὅπως τῶν αὐτῆς ἔργων, καὶ εἰ τὸ φαινότατον... εὐνότητος: Apology 35 B τοὺς δοκοῦτας καὶ ὅπως ἐκεῖ.


καὶ ὅς ἂν...τῶν προπολεμοῦντων] 'And as long as your city is governed wisely in the order just now prescribed, it will be the greatest of states, I do not mean in distinction or estimation, but in fact, though it number only a thousand fighting men.' εὔδοκιμοί has been altered into δοκεῖ in one manuscript (Par. K), which is followed by some editors.

δοκοῦσα δὲ...τῆς τηλικαύτης] 'But many that appear even many times greater than one of such a size.'

The same rule must be applied to population and territory. In neither way must our city attain a size which is inconsistent with unity.

Another 'trifling' rule they have to keep is that already laid down about maintaining the purity of the several classes: that so each individual may do one work and be truly one.

But indeed all else is really trifling in comparison with the great principles of Education as we have laid them down. If this all-important point be observed, all else is sure to go on rightly. Above all, the regulations respecting musical harmonies must be most jealously watched and preserved. No other innovation creeps in so insidiously, or is so destructive in its consequences, as the alteration of taste in music.

The minor details of conduct, including rules of behaviour, are matters which men educated as our citizens have been may be left to discover for themselves. But how if the greater principles are
not observed? They will tinker away at these minor matters of legislation, like men who will not give up a life of debauchery, but wish to avert its consequences: instead of getting rid of the cause of disease, they will strive by petty legislation to minimize its evils. What is this but trying to cut off the head of Hydra?

οὐμαί μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] The limit of the state was a natural idea to the Greeks, who had no experience of any organization which could give unity to a great empire. Aristotle (Pol. vii. cc. 4, 5) agrees with Plato respecting the necessity of having a limit to the state, which is to be large enough to contain the elements of political well-being, and small enough to have a form of constitution (πολιτεία) and enforcement of the laws, within sight of the government (εὐσύνομος), and within the hearing of the herald. Much of his reasoning on the subject, however, turns on the abstract principle of measure in men, animals, and works and instruments in general. He approaches most nearly to Plato in the passage where he says that the greatness of the city depends, not on the numbers of the citizens, but on fulfilling the end for which political society exists (c. 4, § 5).

μὴν μεγάλη δοκοῦσα] 'Nor one that gives the idea of being large' (since none is really so). The qualifying word δοκοῦσα is added with reference to the preceding argument. Cp. supra β δοκοῦσα (sc. είναι μεγάλας) δε πολλάς.

καὶ φαύλον γ', ἐφὶ . . . προστέξομεν] 'And surely,' said he, 'this is a light matter to impose upon them.' 'And this,' said I, 'a lighter still.' Adeimantus says ironically 'This, i.e. the preservation of the unity of the state, is a trivial matter,' meaning that it is grave and difficult. Socrates with a deeper irony says, 'And this (i.e. the assignment of the citizens to their several classes) is more trivial still.' Then, throwing off irony, he adds in sober earnest, 'All is light in comparison of the one great thing, i.e. education.' Cp. the ironical uses of γενναῖος, χρίεις, καλός, εἰδαίμον, &c.

τούτο 6'] βούλετο . . . δεί κομίζειν] 'And this meant that in the case of the other citizens also (as well as of the guardians) we must put each individual man to that one particular work for which nature designed him.'

He means that the transposition of ranks in individual cases is in accordance with our old principle of the division of labour, and
that this is to be carried out in detail, not only as between the
guardians and the rest of the citizens, but as applied to the indus-
trial classes amongst themselves.

ἀλλὰ εἰς γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. v. 462, where he insists that
there must be unity in the state.

οὕτως... ἵκαρον] The words μᾶλλον δὲ ἀριτ μεγαλοῦ ἵκαρον are
added with characteristic moderation, because adequacy is better
even than greatness. In using the familiar (τὸ λέγομεν) expression
ἐν μέγα φυλάττει (cp. Polit. 297 ά μέχρι τε ἐν μέγα φυλάττωσι),
Socrates reflects that the whole spirit of his previous remarks is
against aiming at bigness in anything. Compare the curious
passage in i. 349. The construction is slightly altered: μέγα is at
first merely attributive to ἐς, but ἵκαρον is added as if μέγα were
a supplementary predicate. ‘So long as they observe one great
thing, or rather, if they observe it, not to a great but to
a sufficient extent.’


γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας] These genitives depend upon some
word of more general meaning supplied from κτήσεως. ‘The matter
of marriage,’ &c.


Εθ. Nic. viii. 9, § 1.

ὄρθοτατα... γίγνοντ' ἄν] Adeimantus is led on by the familiar
γράμμα, κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, to assent easily to a proposition which he
does not fully understand. Polemarchus calls his attention to this
at the beginning of Book v, and brings into prominence the
question which is here briefly indicated.

καὶ μὴν... ἀληθομενή] ‘The truth is, said I, that a state, if
once started well, goes on with accumulating force like a wheel.’

The efforts of ancient philosophers were directed to the attain-
ment of permanence; they sought to preserve the type, which the
legislator had fixed, by education. Their want of historical
experience prevented them from perceiving that the institutions of
one age are not adapted to another, or that in politics, as in the
action of organic bodies, true permanence is also a progress.
Nor had they the modern feeling that education has higher objects
than merely political ones, and is degraded by serving the purpose
of a governing body.
Notes: Book IV.

The word ἀδίσταστη is not to be pressed into the comparison. A hoop or wheel, when once started well, goes on smoothly. This is true also of the growth of the state.

τοιαύτης παιδείας] τοιαύτης, sc. χρηστής.

ἀντλαμβανόμεναι] Lit. 'getting a firm hold of,' i.e. being thoroughly imbued with it.

παρὰ πάντα] 'On all occasions.' Cp. Parmen. 144 E δ' οὖν 
δει παρὰ πάντα: Protag. 325 D παρ' ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἐργὸν καὶ λόγον.

τὸ μὴ νεωτέρεις, κ.τ.λ.] τοῦ μὴ νεωτέρεις, in agreement with τοῦτον ἄθετέον, would have been the natural construction, but the proximity of αὐτό, which refers to τοῦτον, in the exaphegetic clause, determines the structure of the sentence against what would be its more grammatical and logical form. Strictly only the words τὸ μὴ νεωτέρεις ... φιλάττειν are exaphegetic of αὐτό: hence φοβοῦμεν agreeing with the subject of φιλάττων would have been more correct than the accusative. But the nominative φοβοῦμεν is attracted into agreement with the subject of the dependent clause τὸ μὴ νεωτέρεις ... φιλάττειν. sc. σφός. The notion of duty (δει implied in ἄθετέον) is also influential in favour of the accusative being used in place of the nominative in agreement with the subject of the main verb as required by the common rule.

For the use of πολλάκις (= 'perhaps') cp. ix. 584 B ἐνα μὴ πολλάκις ὀπιθῆς ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ οὕτω τοῖτο πεφυκέναι. The quotation is from Homer, Od. i. 351, where, however, not ἐπιθρονίου, but ἐπικλέουσα is read.

δει δ' οὖν ἐπαινεῖν ... οὕτω ὑπολαμβάνειν] 'But this ought not to be praised or conceived to be the poet's meaning,' i.e. that he approves a new kind of song.

εἰδος γὰρ ... κινδυνεύοντα] 'For we must beware of a change to a new kind of music, as endangering the whole.' For the use of μεταβάλλειν to take in exchange, cp. Theaet. 181 C ὡσπον τι χῶρας μεταβάλλῃ: or perhaps the adjective καίνην is used proleptically. μεταβάλλειν would then mean 'to change,' 'to alter,' not 'to take in exchange.' For ἐν in this connexion cp. Laches 187 B μὴ οὖκ ἐν τῷ Καρπ λαμάν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύεται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς υἱοῖς, κ.τ.λ.

οδήμου ... παρὰ] Compare Laws vii. 800 B παρὰ τὰ δημόσια μήλα τε καὶ λειβα καὶ τὸν τῶν νεὼν ξύμπασαν χορείαν μηδεὶς μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ἀντικών ἄλλον τῶν νόμων φθεγγίσω, μηδ' ἐν ἀρχῆσει κυισίσθω. The
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same fanciful importance is attributed to music in the saying, 'Let me make the ballads of a people, I care not who makes their laws.' For Damon, cp. iii. 400 B and note. Modern Damons have been equally ready to prognosticate the ruin that would follow from trifling changes in education.

D ἡ γοῦν παρανομία...παραδούμενη] 'Certainly, said he, this musical lawlessness easily creeps in unobserved.' αὕτη, sc. ἡ ἐν μονικῇ, referring to κυνοῦνται μονικῇ τρόποι supra. παρά here and supra 421 ε (παραδῶντα) means 'sideways,' i.e. 'unawares.' Compare παρεμπιπτέν (Charm. 173 D).

οὔδὲ γὰρ ἔργαλεται, κ.τ.λ.] 'And it really does no harm, except that,' &c. The use of the negative is idiomatic, as in οὔδεν γ...εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε Protag. 310 B.—'The only harm it does is this: it gradually ruins everything—that is all.'

E ὦ...παιδῶν τοιούτων] τοιούτων, sc. παρανόμων. Cp. supra α τοιαύτης παιδείας and note.

425 A καλῶς ἀρκέμενοι παῖδες παιξεῖν] The influence of the amusements of children upon their character is dwelt upon at length in the Laws vii. 797, 798.

πάλιν...οὖθε] sc. ἡ μονική. 'Music does for them the opposite of what she did in the former case. She follows them into every part of life and makes them grow.' ἢ ἑκεῖνος, sc. ἡ τοῖς τῇ παρανόμῳ μονικῇ χρησιμένοις ἔποιει.

ἔκειτο] Like 'jacere' in Latin.

B κατακλίσεις] Either (1) 'when to sit down, and when to give place'; or [rather L. C.] (2), as κατακλίσεως the verb has an active meaning, the substantive may be taken actively, of 'making another sit down,' or 'assisting elders to a seat.' This appears to be the right way of explaining the word in Arist. Eth. Nic. ix. 2, § 9 παρὶ δὲ τῇ προσβυτίρῳ τιμήν καθ' ἥλικιαν [sc. ἁποδοτέοι], ἐπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει, when it is similarly combined with ἐπαναστάσει. For the sense compare Hdt. ii. 80 συμφέρονται δὲ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο Λιγυπτίων ἐλλήνων μούσαις λακεδαιμονίσεις, οἱ νεώτεροι αὐτῶν τοῖς προσβυτίροις συντυχάνωντες εἴκουσι τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ ἐκτρέπονται καὶ ἑποίοις εἰς ἔδρας ὑπαναστάσει.

οὔτε γὰρ ποι γένεται οὔτε ἐν μείνειν] 'For express and written enactments on such points are ineffectual and could never endure.'
Notes: Book IV.

Cp. Polit. 294 b al γὰρ ἀμφοτέραις τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε μηδέν, ὡς ἐποίειν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οὐδέν ἔσων ἄλοιπον ἐν οὐδέποτε πρὶς ἑώρασαν καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχνην οὐδ’ ἤμυνον. And for an attempt to meet the difficulty by 'exhortation' see Laws vii. 793, Soph. 230 a. For γίγνεται = 'take effect,' cp. supra iii. 414 c.

It is difficult in legislation to attain a mean between too great generality and too much detail. Particulars are endless and cannot all be included; yet the attempt to limit legislation to general principles gives rise to an undergrowth of precedents and legal maxims, which has no plan and is apt to become a wilderness. The good of one man is limited by the good of all; and the greatest freedom of the greatest number is attained by rules which fall very far short of universality. It might seem as if the legislator, having power, could easily mould the laws of a nation according to his will. But human nature is a stubborn thing—not a sheet of blank paper on which we can inscribe anything at will. Neither in England, nor in India, nor in any other country, can legislation be much in advance of public opinion. The laws of nations always stand in a near relation to their customs and history. Considering the influence of habit and idea and the growth of interests, the danger even in democracies is not of good institutions being too susceptible of change, but of bad ones becoming ineradicable. In social and commercial matters the difficulty of modern times is not how to preserve laws, but how to alter them, because great interests have grown up under their protection.

καὶ τελευτῶν . . . ἢ καὶ τοῦλατρόν] 'And in the end it (i.e. the start which education gives him) terminates in some one complete and grand result either good or the reverse.' αὐτό, sc. τὸ ὅποι ἀν τις ἀρµήνῃ ἐκ τῆς παιδείας. νεανίκον, 'youthful: in the prime or pride of youth,' and so 'vehement.' The word is used in this sense by Hippocrates and the medical writers.

οὐκ ἄν ἔτι] 'I would not go on and try to legislate in these matters.'

[τάδε] τὰ ἀγοραία] τάδε is omitted in Par. A. Though not necessary to the sense, it is idiomatic: 'Those familiar regulations.' Cp. supra iii. 403 ζ τῶν τῶν ἄσκησεων.

δικών λήξεως] 'obtaining by lot the turn for bringing on a suit:' the last step in the ἀνάκρισις, i.e. the examination before the Archon of the parties to a suit prior to its being sent into the public courts.
The reading λίτεως (με φιλοκρᾳκὸς) is clearly right, though Par. A and Ven. Π Π agree in λίτεως. Throughout this and the following passage Plato has Athenian legislation in his mind. In the Laws the legislator makes minute provisions on many of the points here left to his successors to determine.

τελών... ἦ πράξεις ἦθεσις] 'Rules for collection or assessment.'

οπο ἀκολογίας] These words are added to explain οὐκ θελοντας.

και δει ἔλπιζοντες] The participle is resumed from λατρευόμενοι.

τι δέ; ἢν δ' ἔγω, κ.τ.λ.] 'Well, said I, is not this charming in them?' &c. The irony in the word χαρίζει is seriously taken up in the next sentence: 'Not at all charming, he said: for there is no charm in going into a rage with a man who gives you good advice.' For the uses of the word χαρίζει first ironically and then seriously cp. the similar use of φαινον supra 423 c, d. For the change from plural to singular (αὐτῶν... μεθ'ων) cp. infra c ἀποθανομένοις δε ἄν and note.

The epigrammatic sentence of Tacitus, 'corruptissima civitatem plurimae leges,' may be quoted as a Roman parallel of this passage of the Republic. The thought of both goes rather beyond the truth. For the complexity of law does not mainly arise from depravity of morals, or the ingenuity of legislators, or the love of novelty, but (1) from the complexity of the relations and dealings of mankind: (2) from the remnants of old laws and usages surviving side by side with new ones. Law, which must appeal to a written word, superseding the discretion of individuals, can never be perfectly simple. A popular system of law is impossible in a civilized country. Yet, on the other hand, the habit of mind which has been acquired in making necessary distinctions may go on to make unnecessary ones. The subtlety of law should fall short of the subtlety of the ordinary circumstances of mankind, instead of exceeding them. Compare the Politicus, 294 foll., in which the fixed character of law amid the variety of circumstances, and the necessity for this owing to the imperfection of human nature, are unfavourably contrasted with the living supervision of the perfect ruler.

ἀποθανομένους] agrees in number with πολίταις: in what follows, δε ἡ, κ.τ.λ., is substituted for όι ἐν τούτῳ δρώσι. A few manuscripts (αι Κ το) have ἀποθανομένως, corrected in Π to ἀποθανομένον, which is the reading of η Β.
Notes: Book IV.

§ 8, ἀν... τιμήσεις ὑπὸ σφῶν;] Compare vi. 493 λ, where the Sophist is compared to one who studies how to manage a great brute.

οὐφός τὰ μεγάλα] 'Wise in great matters.'

ὕπ' αὐτῶν] sc. τῶν πολιτῶν supplied from πόλεις supra.

.πός λέγεις; κ.τ.λ.] Socrates aggravates the satire by an ironical answer: 'What do you mean? Have you no mercy on the men? Do you think that one who does not know how to measure, when a number of others who are equally ignorant say that he is four cubits high, can help believing about himself what they say?' With a sort of half seriousness this impossibility is admitted in the words which follow.

οὐκ ἀλήθείας, ἐφη, τοῦτό γε] The manuscripts vary between οὐκ ἄν and οὐκ αὖ. For the first we might compare supra 422 β οὐκ ἄν ἔσοι, ἐφη, ἀλήθείας, where, however, there is ἄν also in the preceding sentence. In this passage οὐκ ἄν might possibly mean οὐκ ἄν ἔσοι τε ἐφ' ἐν τοῦτο ἔγεισθαι. But οὐκ αὖ which has the support of ΑΠΜ is more in point (sc. οἰων). 'Though I do not admire the men who are so deceived, yet on the other hand I do not think that they could help believing in such a case.' The form of expression is not uncommon: cp. Ion 541 ά οὐκ αὖ μαί δοκεῖ τοῦτο: Soph. El. 1034 οὔδ' αὖ τοσοῦτον ἐχθέος ἐξαίρετο σ' ἐγώ.

μὴ τοῦτων χαλέπαις] 'Don't be angry, then.' Look at them not under a serious but under a comic aspect. Cp. Phaedr. 269 β οὐ χρῆ χαλεπάναις, ἀλλὰ συγγεγυμνάσκειν, εἰ τινες μὴ ἐκτεινόμενοι διαλέγομαι ἀδύνατον ἐγείροντο ὀρίσοντα, τι ποτ' ἐστι ῥητορική. χαριστάτων recalls χαριέν supra λ.

νομοθετοῦσι τε... ἐπαινοθετοῦσι... οἰκεῖοι] (1) The first two participles may be dependent on the third: 'believing that by such legislation and reforms as we have just mentioned they will put an end to frauds in contracts.' Or (2) taken more simply the words may mean 'legislating and reforming as we have just described in the belief that they will put an end,' &c. Cp. supra 425 ε.

τὸ τοιοῦτον εἴδος νόμων πέρι] νόμων πέρι is an explanation of τοιοῦτον, which refers to legislation in matters of detail. Cp. vii. 539 c τὸ δὲν φιλοσοφίας πέρι.

τὰ δὲ δὲ] ὅτι is repeated pleonastically.
It only now remains to legislate concerning Religion. Here again we shall insist on a single principle, that religious worship shall be national. All questions concerning it shall be referred to Apollo the God at Delphi, who is the hereditary authority on this subject for all Hellenes.

Plato here, as in the Laws (vi. 759 c), is unwilling to depart from the traditional ceremonial of Greece. For a discussion of religion in the higher sense cp. the tenth book of the Laws.

τελευτησάντων αὐτθηκαὶ...πλευσ αὐτοῦς ἔχειν] 'Likewise the graves of the dead, and the ministrations which are necessary to propitiate the inhabitants of the under-world.'

The manuscripts, with the exception of Ven. Ξ, omit τε after τελευτησάντων. The insertion is unnecessary, asyndeton being not uncommon in enumerations. Cp. iii. 399 c βισιων, ἐκούσων, κ.τ.λ.

τὸ πατρίῳ] sc. ἵνη τὴν: 'our ancestral interpreter.' There is slight manuscript authority (Par. Κ, Ven. Π, m q) for the reading πατρῴα, which would mean 'the father of our race,' Apollo being reputed the father of Ion (cp. Euthyd. 302 π) and worshipped under this title at Athens. The reading of the text, however, is favoured by the sense as well as by the manuscripts. For Plato is not speaking in the person of an Ionian, but of a Greek who will have no other teacher of religion than the god of his ancestors. And the Apollo of whom he is thinking is not Ἀπόλλων πατρῶν, but 'the God who sits in the centre of the earth, and is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.'

Plato's profession of reverence for the gods of Hellas is repeatedly expressed in a manner which makes it impossible to doubt his seriousness. The only passage which appears ironical is Tim. 401 D-41 Α. He probably felt (1) that religion was indispensable, and (2) that a new religion could not be established in a day. (Cp. Laws x. 909 Ε ἵππα καὶ θεοὶς αὐτῷ ράδιον ἱδρύσατι, μεγάλης δὲ διανοίᾳ τυόν ὅρθος δράν τὸ τοιοῦτον.)

The foundation of our state would seem to be complete, but we still need a strong light to discern in it the nature and essential value of Justice.

Assuming, however, that the new city has the four cardinal virtues, if we can find three of them—wisdom, courage, and temperance—the remaining virtue will be the one which we seek.
Notes: Book IV.

αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει] Cp. iii. 398 λ αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα Βουλόμενος ἐπιδεικνύσθαι, and note: Phaedr. 253 b αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ παιδικα πειθούσας: Xen. Anab. iii. i, § 44: Thuc. viii. 55 ὁ Πεδάρτης αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπικουρικῶν ἵχων. This passage is peculiar in that the verb is in the imperative mood and not a participle.

καὶ πότερον ... καὶ ἀνθρώπους] Compare the closing words of Adeimantus' speech, ii. 367 ε ἐὰν τε λανθασθῇ, κ.τ.λ., and note.

ὅς οὐχ δοιών σοι ὦν] Another allusion to the words of Socrates in the passage just cited, ii. 368 b δίδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' δοιον ή παραγινόμενον δικαίωσιν καταγγορομένη ἀπαγορέων.

μὴ οὖ] οὖ is added in good manuscripts, and is in accordance with the usual idiom after such negative expressions as ἀδίκου, ἄλογον, οὐκ δοιον. Compare, both for the meaning and the form of the sentence, Laws x. 891 a διὰ ταῦτα λόγου οὐδαμὴ ἤξει οὖδε δοιον ἐμοιγε ἐναι φαίνεται τὸ μὴ οὖ δοιθεῖν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις πάντα ἄδρα κατὰ δύναμιν. In what follows the popular classification of the virtues which, although first explicitly recognized by Plato, was latent in the common consciousness of Hellas, is assumed as the basis of inquiry.

οδοκῶν ... ἐκρημένων] The use of this half-logical half-mathematical 'method of residues' marks the infancy of philosophy. Cp. Lys. 216 ε. If we were sure that the subject of our inquiry was one of four terms, and could eliminate the other three, then, as Plato says, the remaining term would be the one for which we are seeking. Another condition must be remembered, viz. that the four terms have each a precise meaning. Otherwise the form will be illusory, and the disjunctive syllogism in which the error is expressed will only help the illusion. But no logical term has the precision of a mathematical quantity. For example, in the discussion which follows, the third term σωφροσύνη is not easily separated from the fourth, which seems also to comprehend the two previous ones. The formula of residues is true when applied to abstract quantity or to the laws of nature. But the further application of this or of any other abstract form to morals or metaphysics is interfered with by the imperfection, or rather by the nature of language, and the indefiniteness of the subject.

ἄστερ τοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] For the form of sentence (ἄστερ with deferred apodosis) cp. iii. 402 λ, B, and note. Plato intended to make άλλων


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την υπο τεττάρων dependent as a partitive genitive on ἐν τί: but the insertion of the resumptive ἄντων throws the words out of construction and they become a 'genitivus pendens.' Cp. infra 439 ὁσπερ γε, ὅμως, τοῦ τοχότου οὐ καλώς ἔχει λέγειν, ὥστε αὐτοῦ ἄμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῖται τε καὶ προσέλθονται . . .

ἐν ὀτρού] 'In any subject-matter,' as we are now looking for justice in the state. ὅπως, 'as soon as we had.'

οὔκ ἄλλο ἔτε κ ἔτε] 'It could now be no other.' ἔτε = 'was all along,' i.e. 'proves to be.' Cp. vi. 497 c δηλώσῃ οὗ τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἔτε. ἔτε = 'after the other three were found.'

Wisdom is obviously present, but is possessed by one class only, and that the smallest, which gives this character to the whole. For statecraft is supreme wisdom, and this is vested in the rulers alone.

Courage or fortitude also has her seat in one class principally, that is to say, in those guardians who are not rulers but defenders and preservers of the peace of the state. On their holding fast the patriotic principle with which they have been imbued, and thus having the courage of citizens, depends the security of the whole commonwealth.

Temperance is the mutual concord of the different classes rather than the proper excellence of one. In individuals this is spoken of as self-control, which means the obedience of the lower nature to the higher. And in our community it is the willing obedience of the industrial classes, which are lower and have a lower order of desires, to the two higher classes, which gives to the whole state the character of temperate.

ἐν ἄντων] not ἐν ἄντη, is the true reading; the neuter, as in other places, referring to the masculine and feminine in abstract things, and here following the gender of ὀτρού.

Political science is similarly distinguished from the arts in the Euthydemos (291), and, with curious elaboration, in the Politicus, 258–268 and elsewhere.

ὡς ἐν ἄνοι ἐξόντωσα] sc. τὰ ἐξόνα σκεύη, 'how wooden implements may best be made.' It has been doubted whether βουλευομένη, which is the reading of all the manuscripts, should not be altered into βουλευομένη. But βουλευομένη, sc. ἐν πόλει τάτη τῷ ἐπιστήμη, resumes διὰ . . . ἐπιστήμην. Cp. infra ὑ . . . βουλεύομαι and note.
For the omission of ὅλον compare Phaedo 64 D, where, however, as in this passage, the preposition is easily supplied: φαίνεται σω θιλοιφον άνδρος εἶναι ἐστονδαίησαι περὶ τὰς ἱδονάς καλουμένας τὰς τοιούτας; ... τι δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; see Riddell's Digest, § 190.

ἡ...βουλεύεται] ἦ is Hermann's correction of ἦ, which was formerly read. It is confirmed by Ματν, and is supported by δινής, immediately below, which, though it proves not to be the reading of Par. A, is on the whole most probable. The accent on ἦ in Par. A is written over an erasure. It is the city, not the science, that is εὐβουλος, and is therefore rightly said βουλεύεται: cp. supra βουλευομίην, and note.

ἡμιοί] The MSS., with one exception (Flor. n) omit ἀν. The optative without ἀν in a relative clause expresses remote or ideal possibility, in a case that is perfectly general: 'what might be or may be conceived to be the best policy, internal or external.' Compare Phaedrus 239 B ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ὡραστήν, οἷς ἄν τῷ μὴ ἱδιοτός, ἑαυτῇ δὴ θλαδερότατος εἶ[πα ἄν εὐς σολύς Θ].

οὖς τὸν δὲ...άναμφοτερον] iii. 414 B. The reading τελεως was erroneously attributed in Bekker's collation to Par. A, which reads τελεως with all the other MSS. except Ven. Ξ. τελεως has therefore been restored in the text.


όκοιδον...γίγνεται γένος] Cp. Polit. 292 E—293 A, where Plato remarks that in a city of a thousand men there would not be two or even fifty good draught-players. How much smaller then would be the number of kings (i.e. scientific rulers)! The fewness of the wise is an often-recurring thought in Plato: cp. Theaet. 186 c, Polit. 297 C ἀλλὰ περὶ σμικρῶν τι καὶ διάγον καὶ τὸ ἐν ἑστὶ ὑπηχείν τὴν μίαν ἐκείνην πολιτείαν τὴν ὀρθήν.

οὖ γὰρ...ἡ τοιαυτήν αὖν εἶναι ἡ τοιαύ] 'For I do not imagine, said I, that the courage or the cowardice of the other citizens will have the power of giving such a city this or that character.' Infra 437 E τοῦ δὲ τοιοῦ ἡ τοιοῦ τὰ προσωπογράφημα.

καὶ ἀνδρεία ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ ('too') marks the correspondence between the courage and wisdom, both of which are virtues of a portion of the city and not of the whole.
I do not quite understand.' The other meaning, 'not at all,' is unsuitable here. It would be absurd for Glaucön to say that he does not at all understand the meaning of Socrates about courage.

Socrates still answers enigmatically, as in Gorg. 463 d, where he defines rhetoric to Polus as politeutés moriôn eîdoulon.

'And in speaking of courage as a never-failing preservation, I meant that a man preserves this principle when he is tried,' &c. diaseleixethai is in the middle voice and has a general subject (tivá, tòn ánthrōpòn). autēn, sc. tivn dàsæn. Hermann would cancel the words autēn svthμiβa. Another reading is tiv en te lóuπas, k.t.l., 'by reason of,' &c. For the right opinion concerning things terrible and not compare iii. 386 a, 387 b oβe ðeî elævhrón eînai, dévleían thevástoû mállon pevosthμénaν. See also Laches 190 ff., where the treatment of the subject is tentative, not dogmatic.

Out of so many.' The number of existing colours out of which the choice is made helps to show the amount of care that is required. The colour álvχραν is described by Plato, Tim. 68 c, as órhpòν dé ðh méλían leuvké te krahēn.

'And whatever is dyed in this manner, that which is dyed becomes of a fast colour.'

déuσoπoiw] 'fast-dyed.' Cp. some ludicrous lines of Diphilus quoted by Harpocratōra, 
tautē γåρ ἕμων δευσοποιά παντελῶς
tá spáργαν' ἀποδιδεῖν,
where as here déuσoπoiw is used not of the colour, but of the coloured material.

δόθε] i.e. the perfect brightness of the colour, which is like the bloom of a flower.

'and what is so dyed]' taúta, sc. tá leuvká. The choice of the wool answers to the selection of the guardians, the preparation of the wool to their education and training, and the dyeing of the wool to the imposition of the laws.

toiouτων toivn, k.t.l.] The words ðevleγγμεθα ... éπαιδευόμεν recall ðeλογιζω ... προπαρασκευάζουσαν supra.
Notes: Book IV.

μηδὲν οὖν ἄλλο μηχανάσθαι, κ. τ. λ.] is a restatement of τοιοῦτον... ἡμᾶς. Hence the asyndeton.

ἐκπλύναι] the optative is the right reading, to be construed with ἕνα μῆ. The form is less common than ἐκπλύνει, but occurs elsewhere in Attic Greek. Par. A reads ἐκπλύνας, the infinitive, an obvious mistake, for δήμητα, as ἡδονή shows, is in the nominative case.

χαλεστραῖοι] 'pearl-ash' is said by the Scholiast to be derived from Chalastra, a town or lake in Macedonia (Hdt. vii. 123).


ἄλλ' οὕδεν... λέγω] sc. ἄλλο. 'But I do not say anything else,' 'I agree.' As here, so in Laches (196 ν, ε) Socrates refuses to admit that the brutes possess courage.

καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου... ἀποδέξει] 'Why, yes, said I, accept it, but as the courage of a citizen, and you will be right.'

Plato is speaking of courage only as the virtue of citizens, not as based upon philosophical principle. Compare x. 619 c, where the unfortunate choice is made by one ἐν τεταρμένη πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβαιωκότα, ἔθει ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεξελθόντος: also Phaedo 68 d, where the courage of the philosopher is contrasted with the courage of ordinary men, which is only a fear of greater evils. There is nowhere in the Republic a discussion such as appears to be intimated in the words αὕθει δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ (sc. τῆς ἀνδρείας)... ἐπὶ καλλιον διόμεν, but cp. vi. 486 Α, B οὐκοῦν καὶ δόλατον οὐ δεινον τι ἡγέσαται ὁ τοιοῦτος; Compare Aristotle (Eth. Nic. iii. 7, 8), where he distinguishes true courage, which is for the sake of τὸ καλὸν, from the spurious forms of courage, and speaks of political courage as making the nearest approach to the true.

πῶς οὖν ἄν... περὶ σωφροσύνης] 'How then can we discover justice, that we may trouble ourselves no more about temperance?' i.e. that we may be relieved from further discussion, πῶς ἂν expresses a wish, which Socrates affects to believe to be that of his hearers. εἰπερ expresses 'I do not want justice to appear first, at least, if that is to prevent us from proceeding to examine temperance.' For this mode of creating variety by playing with the order of the subject, compare the correction of the order of the sciences, vii. 528 Α, B, and the similar artifice in Sympos. 185 c, d.
In the Charmides 160 ff., where σωφροσύνη is treated tentatively, as courage in the Laches, it is described (1) as ἄσχημα—but energy is excellence: (2) as αἰθός—but Homer says αἰθός νῦν ἀγαθόν: (3) as τὸ τὰ ἔσωτο πράττειν—but if every one makes his own coat, this is inconsistent with a division of labour: (4) as γεγονόσεως ἔσωτο—but that would make σωφροσύνη an ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης, and this is contrary to the analogy of other sciences and arts.

In accepting the recognized four virtues (supra 427 Ε) Plato has prepared for the threefold division of the soul into rational, irascible, concupiscient. To the rational and irascible elements correspond the first two virtues σοφία and ἄθροισις. σωφροσύνη is not the virtue of a single part of the soul, but consists in the subject of the lower elements to the higher. The remaining virtue δικαιοσύνη, which is the condition of all the rest, is the fulfilment by each part of its own proper function.

In Gorg. 507 a, b, Protag. 331 a, the virtue of ὀσιότης is also mentioned.

οὔτε οὐδα] sc. πῶς ἄν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὑρομεν.

E

ἀλλὰ μέντοι ... εἰ μὴ ἄθροισις] ‘But that, said I, I do desire, or I am in the wrong.’ There seems to be a slight ellipse: the full sense would be, ‘I do desire, as I must, unless, &c.’ The phrase occurs elsewhere, e.g. x. 608 β σὺ δὲ τοῦτ ζήτεις λέγειν; ἐπὶ μὴ ἄθροισις γ', ἐφεξής: and Charm. 156 λ καὶ τοὐσμα μου σὺ ἀκριβοίς; ἐπὶ μὴ ἄθροισις γ', ἐφε.

ὡς γε ἐνεύθεν ἔδειν] ‘Looking from where I stand,’ i.e. to judge from our present point of view. This graphic touch recalls the image of the search, supra 427 Ε, and prepares for the still more lively one of the hunt for justice, infra 432 β: cp. also 445 c δεύτερο ... ἣν καὶ ἔδει πρόθεμα κ.τ.λ.

ὡς φασὶ, κρείττω δὴ ... λέγεται] The reading is doubtful. That in the text is confirmed by the margin of Par. A, and by Ma. also, according to Schneider, by two chief MSS. of Stobaeus. Schneider adopted this reading, but placed a full-stop at φασὶ, supposing in the latter part of the sentence the passive λέγεται to have taken the place of λέγουσιν, and comparing, amongst other passages, Apol. 21 c διασκορπών οὐ τοῦτον ... καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέ μοι ὅτι ἢ ἀνηρ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ... ἢνω δ' οὐ. The reading of A Π Φ, &c., κρείττω δὴ αὐτοί φαίνονται οὐκ οἶδ' ἄκπρω τρόπων καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαύτα ἡσύχω ἵνα αὐτῆς λέγεται, can only be construed by
supplying λέγεται from λέγεται, cp. supra 421 B ὑ̃ ἔ̃εκιν λέγων, κ. τ. λ. One MS., g, reads φαίνεται ... καλούστει, which Bekker adopted.

οSystemService| A προσαγορεύεται] In the Laws, i. 627 c, the same figure is applied to a family or state: cp. also 626 ε ἐπείδη γὰρ εἰς ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν ὑμῖν κραίττων αὐτοῦ, ὅ ἔτι ἦττων ἐστί: and Gorg. 491 D ἔνα ἐκαστὸν λέγω αὐτῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα.

καὶ δέ ταν μὲν ... τὸ κραίττων αὐτοῦ] φῶσεi is to be joined with βέλτιον, 'that which is by nature better.' τὸ κραίττων αὐτοῦ ὅ λόγος supra, is the subject of λέγειν, which depends on φαίνεται and not on βουλέσθαι.

ἐπαινεῖ γοῦν] 'it is certainly a term of praise.' Cp. Crat. 419 άπερ δὴ ἐπαινεῖ, and the use of νοεῖ with a neuter subject: i. 335 ἐν τούτῳ δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ: also supra 423 D τούτῳ δὲ ἤβουλετο δῆλον. The more general subject (sc. ὁ λόγος) is continued with ψέγειν, καλεῖν infra.

καὶ γὰρ ἐωκεν] (That is evidently the meaning) 'for it seems a natural way of speaking.'

οὖ] 'Seeing that a thing, the better part of which rules over the worse.' οὖ is governed by τὸ ἄμεινον τοῦ χείρους.

*πασὶ] This correction of the manuscript reading πᾶσι is necessary here, and in vi. 494 B.

τῶν κλειδάρων λεγομένων] 'Those who are called freemen.' In this expression, as in τῶν εὐθειώδων δικαίους (iii. 406 c) and the like, Plato implies that the philosopher alone is really free and happy.

τὰς δὲ γε ἀπλάς] The accusative is unusual after ἐπιτεθεὶς, and therefore these words are best regarded as an anacoluthon, apparently occasioned by the parallel of the previous sentence, τὰς γε πολλὰς ... εὐροι. It may be rendered in English, 'But as to the simple and moderate pleasures, you will find them,' &c. αἱ δὴ, κ. τ. λ., 'which of course follow reason,' i. e. as being ἀπλαὶ and μέγρια.

διὰν ὁτιοῦ ἔχονσι] sc. ὅταν ἡ αὐτή δέξα γ τοῖς τὲ ἀρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένοις περὶ τοῦ ὀδύσεις δὲ ἄρχειν.

διὰ ὁδὸς ἀσπερ ... (Α) ἄποιον τῶν τοιοῦτων] 'Because courage and wisdom reside each in a portion of the state, which the one makes wise and the other valiant, but that is not the way with temperance (ὁδὸς ὁτιοὺ ποιεῖ αὐτὴ is a resumption of ὁδὸς ἀσπερ ...
Republic

431 E παρέχετο) which literally extends through all the notes of the scale, and produces a supreme harmony of the weakest, the strongest and the intermediate class, whether in wisdom or in force, or, if you will, in number, wealth and the like. ὑπὸ ἀλης (λύρας) and διὰ πασῶν (χορδῶν) are musical terms, carrying out the notion of ἀρμονία supra. The application of the figure is pointed with ἀναχώρει, 'literally through the whole,' i.e. the whole state as the whole lyre. A somewhat similar notion of the harmony of the various elements in a state occurs in Thuc. vi. 18 (the speech of Alcibiades) ὅμοι ὑπὸ τὸ τε φαῖλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνω ἀκμαίες ἄν ἐνεκραδεῖν μᾶλλον ἄν ἴσχυεν.

432 A ταὐτῶν] A cognate accusative emphasizing εὐυδοντας: 'agreeing in unison.'

εἰ μὲν βουλεῖ, κ.τ.λ.] This may be expressed in the following tabular scheme:—

| ἡσυχοῦσατοι | rulers, | στρατιῶ, | populace. |
| μύσοι | soldiers, | populace, | soldiers. |
| ὁσσυντατοι | populace, | rulers, | rulers. |

432 B–434 D We are on the track of Justice but have not yet found her. Ah! we have been looking too far off. Here she lies, quite near to us,— the ground of the other virtues, the very life of the machine! Why is there harmony amongst the classes in the state? Why are the soldiers brave, the rulers wise? Simply because each is doing his own proper work, not interfering with his neighbour.

That each should have his own and keep within his sphere is the popular notion of Justice. And by adhering to our first principle of the division of labour, we have secured that each of the three orders or classes shall perform its function well, and that our whole state shall be just, and escape from injustice which arises out of the interference of the three classes with one another.

432 B οδύκων, ἐ Γλαύκων... ἀδηλος γένηται] 'So now then, Glaucon, like huntsmen we should encircle the cover, taking heed that
justice do not slip away and vanish out of sight.' For the metaphor compare Laches 194 B Ὀἰκοίν, ὁ φίλε, τὸν ἄγαθον κυνηγήτην μεταθεῖν χρῆ καὶ μὴ ἀνέιπαι; Παρατάσας μὲν ὁδόν. Βούλει ὁδὸν καὶ Νικεῖαν τὸῦδε παρακαλῶμεν ἐπὶ τὸ κυνηγῆσαι...; Justice is more general and abstract and has more of the nature of universal law, whereas temperance, courage and wisdom are particular applications of this law: it is the general idea underlying the other three; the virtue of the whole as contrasted with the virtues of the parts: it may also be viewed as the result of all the rest. The simplicity of this is the real difficulty in understanding the nature of Justice: we are looking into the distance for that which is tumbling out at our feet. Justice is neither more nor less than 'our old friend' the division of labour applied not merely to the artisan class but to all the classes in the state (cp. the anticipation of this, ii. 372 λ ἐν αὐτῶν τοῖς ἰχθίοις τῷ τῷ πρῶς ἀλλήλων). Further, justice is the foundation or condition of the three other virtues, the quality which makes them possible (δὶς πᾶσιν ἔκτοις τὴν δύναμιν παράγειν ἄκετε ἐγγενέσθαι 433 β). It is obvious (1) that the relation between the three first and fourth is at variance with the method of elimination or residues by which Plato has proceeded: the fourth is not separable from the other three, they are particularized forms of it: (2) that the four virtues, especially justice, do not hold the same place in the state as in the individual, because it is only in certain respects and to a very limited degree that the state and individual admit of comparison.

The four 'cardinal virtues' of Plato appear meagre when compared with the greater fulness and minuteness of the psychology of Aristotle. Aristotle seems to include other types of virtue, e.g. that of magnificence, which belong to particular characters and circumstances and are not parts of the common ideal of human nature. Yet this virtue as well as the kindred ἅμβρωτης, although not entering into Plato's system, are mentioned by him along with ἀσφηροσίνη and ἁμβροία, iii. 402 c.

The definition of justice in this passage is one of the definitions of temperance in the Charmides (162 λ). So far is Plato from using language with the technical strictness of Aristotle. In general an ethical conception appears to lie at the foundation of temperance, a political one at the foundation of justice.

The ironical self-depreciation of Socrates and the humility of Glaucon are worthy of observation.

εἰν τὸς...[For the form of expression cp. infra 434 α and Theaet. 156 c ἀλλ' ἄδρει, εἴρεν τὸς ἀποτελεσθή.
Plato: Republic.

Republic IV. 432 C

ἐάν μοι ἑπομένη χρῆ... χῆσαι] The omission of ὃς is singular.
pάνυ μοι μετριῶς χρῆσαι, 'You will make a very fair use of me.' Compare a similar turn in the Sophist, 239 b, c ὅ τι μᾶλλα δύνασαι συνεχέως πειράθη... Πολλὴ μέν τ' ἄν με καὶ ἐποσοῦ ἔχω προθυμία τῆς ἑπιχειρήσεως, ἐλ... ἑπιχειρήσει, Cratyl. 398 ε ἐπὶ δὲν, ὃ ἐγνήθη, ἔχω; οὐδ' εἰ τι εἷς τ' ἀν εἶχη εὐρείαν, οὐ συνεχεῖ διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σι μᾶλλον εὐρίσειν ἢ ἕμαυτάν. Also infra v. 474 a, b.

ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινὸς] Compare the hunt for the Sophist in the 'dark cave' of negation, Soph. 254 a διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανόησαι χαλεπός.

D καὶ ἔγω κατάδων... εἰπών] 'Here I got view, and cried Hurrah! hurrah!'

ἤμεν καταγελαστότατοι... ἀπεσκοποῦμεν] The words from ἀπεσκοποῦμεν are added in explanation. Hence the asyndeton.

E ἅκουε, εἰ τ' ἄρι λέγω] 'Listen and see whether there is anything in what I say.' Cp. infra 433 ε είτων δέχει.

433 A τοῦτο ἐστιν... ἢ δικαιοσύνη] 'This, or rather some form of this, is justice.' For the use of ἦν compare iii. 400 c τὰς ἄγωγας τοῦ ποδὸς αὐτῶν οὐχ ἢντιν ψέγειν... ἢ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς αὐτούς, ἦν τοὺς ἑορμβολεῖν τι. This (i.e. each doing his own proper work) as he says below, when done in a certain way or manner, may be suspected to be (καὶνεῖν εἶναι) justice.

τοῦτον τι εἶδος] It is the division of labour applied, not to the several industries, but to the three classes in the state and the three parts in the soul in the individual. The same thing is meant by τρόπον τιμά supra 432 ζ and infra b. See 434 a.

B τὸ ὑπόλοιπον... ἢ ἀκέμμεθα] 'That which is the remainder of those we have considered;' i.e. which remains now that we have considered the other three. So τὸ ὑπολείψθαι ἐκεῖνον infra. Cp. note on 432 b.

παρέχειν] depends immediately on δοκεῖ.

C ἀλλὰ μέντοι... (ν) καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει] The resumption ἢ τούτο, κ.τ.λ., helps to emphasize the alternative which is immediately in question. τούτο is explained by διὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.

D ἐνάμιλλον... δύναμις] 'Then competing with wisdom, temperance, and courage in the promotion of political virtue we find
this power, that each individual in the state is doing his own work.'

The genitive is descriptive or explanatory, 'the power that consists in this, that each individual in the state does his own work.'

ὑ ἄλλοι τῶν αὐτών στέρωται] The rule observed by courts of law in the administration of justice, that each shall have his own, is adduced in confirmation of the definition. Cp. infra 442 E.

ἐδὲ δὴ...βλάψαι πέλευ;] 'Look now: perhaps you will agree with me. Suppose a carpenter to undertake the work of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter—either exchanging implements or duties, or the same person to be attempting to do both—any change you please but one, do you imagine that such changes will be any great harm to the state?'

πάντα τὰλλα μεταλλάττομενα] are followed in γ by τά γν τοιαύτα, which gives a true explanation, but is unnecessary as a correction of the passage. The words are in apposition with τέκτων...ἡ σκυτότωμος, πάντα summing up, and τάλλα, as elsewhere in Plato, referring to what follows:—'anything but what I am about to speak of.' Compare Laws vii. 798 D τά μὲν οὖν τάλλα ἐλάττω μετα

βαλλόμενα κακὰ διεξεργάζοντ’ ἀν, δότα περὶ σχήματα πάσχει τό τοιοῦτον’ δότα δὲ περὶ τά τῶν ἡδῶν ἐπάσχει τε καὶ ψόγον πέρι πυκνὰ μεταπίπτει, πάντων, ὀμνα, μέγατά τε καὶ πλείον εἰςλεβίαι δεδομένα ἄν εἴη. For the form of expression in summing up compare Polit. 299 E περὶ ἀπαντα ταύτα οὕτω πρατόμενα τί ποι’ ἄν φανεῖν, κ.τ.λ. ἡ...μεταλαμβάνοντες καὶ...πράττειν are opposed, ἡ τιμᾶς introducing a subordinate distinction between implements and industries.

eἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ ἔθους] 'Mode of life or action,' i.e. 'function' rather than 'class.'

οὔτωι] The pronoun emphatically sums up the three classes in opposition to the minor sub-divisions of the industrial class enumerated in supra λ.

ἡ τριῶν ὁφρα...τριῶν γενῶν, sc. guardians, soldiers, traders.

τῆς ἔτου τό πόλεως] is added with the same solemn feeling as ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πόλει, supra ii. 380 B.

μηδὲν...παγίως αὐτὸ λέγωμεν] 'We will not as yet say this quite positively.' For παγίως compare v. 479 C οὕτ’ εἰναι οὕτε μὴ εἰναι μηδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατῶν παγίως νοῆσαι: and Theaet. 157 λ ἐπὶ καὶ τὸ ποιῶν εἰναι τι καὶ τὸ πάς ὁμοί αὐτὶ ἐπὶ ἐνός νοῆσαι, ὃς φασίν, οὐκ εἰναι παγίως.
Republic
IV.
434 D

ἀλλ’ ἔδω... ἡγχωρησόμεθα ἦδη] ‘But if we apply this notion to the sphere of the individual, and it be admitted there also to be justice, we will concede the point without more ado.’ Cp. infra 442 D. And for the liveliness of the expression compare Phaedr. 249 B δει γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἐξωναίναι καὶ εἰδός λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἢν ἀισθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ἔννοιαρομένου.

ἐκεῖ] sc. ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ.

τί γὰρ καὶ ἑρώτημεν;] sc. ἄλλο. ‘For what else can we say?’

ἡν ψεύθημεν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘In regard to which we thought that we should more easily detect its nature in the case of the individual if,’ &c. The accusative is in apposition to the sentence, and the difficulty of this construction is lessened by the attraction, which makes it unnecessary to ask for an account of the construction of ἡν. For similar accusatives cp. Hom. Il. xx. 83 πού τοι ὁπολώ, ἰς Τρώων βασιλέων ἑπίσχεο... Ἀχλάτη συντήριον πολεμίζεω; Phaedr. 249 D τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, ἡν... aitíon ἐχεῖ ὡς μανικός διακεῖμεν. For the allusion see ii. 368 D ff.

ἐκεῖνο] sc. δικαιοσύνην.

τούτῳ εἶναι πόλις] sc. τὸ μείζον... τῶν ἑκάστων δικαιοσύνην.

Ε] ῖν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ] This was not distinctly said, but has become apparent since the development of the ideal state.

ἐκεῖ] sc. ἐν τῇ πόλις.

ἐπαναφέρωμεν] Compare the description of the argument from example in Polit. 278 λ–c 'Ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ ὄθε βάστων καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπάγει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα γεννωσκόμενα; Πῶς; Ἀνάγων πρῶτον ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐν οἷς ταῦτα ταῦτα ὄρθως ἐδοξάζων, ἀναγόμενος δὲ τὴν πάντα τὰ μήπω γεννωσκόμενα, καὶ παραβάλλομεν εἴδους τὴν αὐτὴν ὑμοῦτα καὶ φύσιν ἐν ἄμφοτέρων οἷς ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς, μέχρις ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρωπομοίῳ τὰ δοξάζομεν ἄληθως παρατίθεμεν δειχθῆ, δειχθέντα δὲ, παραδείγμαθα ὃν τοῖς γεννώμενοι παραθέτεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων πάντων ἑκάστων ἐν πάσι χάριτα ταῖς συλλαβαῖς, τὸ μὲν ἐτέρων ὃς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐτέρων ὃς, τὸ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ ταῦτα ἔπειτα ταῦτά ἐστιν προσαγορεύεται. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Οὔκ ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν ἐπεικῶς συνελθήσαμεν, ὅτι παραδείγματος γ' ἐστι τῶν γένεσι, ὡς ὁτινός δὲ ταῦτα, ἐν ἐτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ δοξάζομεν ὄρθως καὶ συναχθεῖν, περὶ ἑκάστων ὃς συνα- ἵμφω τινι ἄληθεν δόξαν ἀποτελή; Φαινεῖται.

καὶ μὲν ὡμολογήται] sc. τούτῳ καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι.

ἐὰν δὲ τὶ ἄλλο... ἑμφαίνηται] sc. ὃν τὸ δίκαιον. So also supra ἀφάνη; sc. δι.
Notes: Book IV.

πεπαλώσαμεθ' ὧν, κ.τ.λ.] 'We will fix in our souls,' i.e. we will not only form a clear conception of justice, but will adopt it as our rule of life. There is here an anticipation of the tone assumed at the end of Book IX.

καθ' ἄδαν] In this expression, as in πρὸς τρόπον, &c., the notion of rightness is included in the noun. 'Your proposal is a right one.'

Let us turn now from the large letters to the small,—from the state to the individual,—and see whether this account of justice and of the other virtues is equally applicable in both cases.

The same words of praise and blame are applied to communities and to individuals. Whence we conclude that the same moral attributes belong equally to both.

But if this be so, and our account of the virtues is right, the soul must have three parts corresponding to the three classes in the state. (We must be content for the present with crude methods of psychological inquiry, only bearing in mind that there is a longer and more certain way.)

The imperfect apprehension of logical distinction in the Socratic age of Greek philosophy is seen in the following discussion, which may be summarized as follows: 'Quantitative difference leaves a quality unchanged. The difference between the state and the individual is only a difference of quantity: therefore the quality of justice in the state and the individual is the same.' It is hardly necessary to point out in our own day that the spheres of law or politics and of morality are only partially co-extensive; or in the language of ancient philosophy, that justice in the state is not the same with justice in the individual. The criticism with which Aristotle commences the Politics, on the erroneous conception of the state as a large family, appears trite to us; in his own age such a criticism afforded a valuable landmark against error. It seems to be directed against Plato.

ἀρ' ὁὗν... ἅμωνον;] 'Is a nature which is called by the same name, whether it exists in a larger or smaller form, unlike or like in that respect in which it is called by the same name?' In other words, does quantity make any difference to quality? The translation in the English version is not strictly accurate: not two things, but two different forms of the same thing are spoken of.

πάθη τε καὶ ἔχεις] 'affections and qualities.'
Plato: Republic.

Republic IV. καὶ τὸν ἄνα ἁπά... (c) τῇ πόλει] ἐκεῖνος, sc. τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐδειει. ἄξιούθεναι is passive.

435 ἐἰς φαύλον γε... χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ] The irony of Socrates in the use of the term φαύλον is taken up seriously in what follows. Cp. supra 423 c φαύλον... φαυλότερον: 426 λ ὅτε αὐτῶν ὦ ἱππεῖν...; which is seriously answered by the words ὦ πάνω χαρίειν. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ is a maxim which later on is put into Socrates' mouth, infra vi. 497 D. For ἐμπεπτύκαμεν, 'we have tumbled into,' cp. the image in v. 453 D ἐν τῷ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μεκρὰν ἐμπέση ἀν τε εἰς τὸ μέγατον πέλαγος μέσων, κ.τ.λ.

D ἐὰν τοιοῦτον μεθόδουν, κ.τ.λ.] Plato seems to intimate some 'dialectic of the future,' of which he has himself laid the foundation in the Sixth and Seventh Books, where he distinguishes the kinds of knowledge and the faculties corresponding to them: in the present discussion, which does not aim at philosophical accuracy, he will argue from the common use of language. The nature of such a dialectic can only be conjectured: probably Plato would have desired to proceed by some method of ideas in the investigation of the soul: e.g. 'what idea is that which contains or knows other ideas?' He might have gone on to speculate on the identity of the 'Ego' and the universal. Cp. Theaet. 184 D θεων γάρ του... εἰ πολλαὶ των ἔν ἡμῖν, ὅπερ ἐν δορισοῖς ὑπότο, αἰσθήσεως ἐγκαθίσταται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τοῖς ἱδεῖν, εἰς ψυχήν εἰς δὲ τῷ δι᾿ καλῶν, πάντα ταῦτα ἐνυπερέ. In Book x. 611 b he hints that the soul is really one and not many.

In similar enigmatic language he appears in the Charmides (169 a) to describe dialectic: μεγάλον δὴ τυχος, δὲ φίλε, ἀνδρέας δεῖ, δοξεῖ τῶν κατὰ πάντων ἱκανῶς διαφέρεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν υπάρχει, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τοῦ ἱδεῖν, εἰς ψυχήν εἰς δὲ τῷ δι᾿ καλῶν, πάντα ταῦτα ἐνυπερέ. So Phaedrus, 246 a περὶ δὴ τῆς ἱδεῖς αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) διδὸς λεκτεῖν τῶν μὲν εἰς, πάντη πάντως θεῖα εἰς καὶ μακρᾶς ὑπογιάσεως, ὃ δὲ εἰς, ἀνθρώπῳ συνε καὶ συλλόγοις. An application of the words ἀλλὰ... ἀγοῦσα, in a sense of which Socrates would doubtless have recognized the truth, may also be made to modern inductive philosophy.

οἷας τῶν... χρώμεθα] So far as the expression is concerned, Plato might be referring generally to the methods in use in his own day: cp. vii. 516 λ τῶν τῶν λεγομένων ἀλήθῶν: but that he is referring rather to the methods which he has employed in the previous discussion, is shown by the words τῶν ἐς προερμήμενων τε καὶ προεσκερμέμενων ἁξίως, and also by the reference to this place in vi. 504 b...
Notes: Book IV.

It is clear that if a state has moral attributes, these can only come from the individuals of whom the state is composed. But what is not so clear is whether the three activities which we have identified with our three classes, are functions of three faculties or of one indivisible nature. In other words, is the distinction which we draw between thought, passion and desire, a real distinction?

The soul is one. Is it also many? Let us make sure. We see a top revolve and yet stand still. But that implies that it has an axis and a circumference. For nothing can have opposite activities (or passivities) at the same time with the same part of itself and in the same respect.

Now assent and dissent, desire and repugnance, are opposites.

And thirst is desire of drink,—of that simply, without qualification,—unless the thirst is qualified. One may be thirsty, however, and yet not drink, because reason is opposed to the desire. This proves that reason excludes desire. It remains to distinguish anger from desire and reason. Some may be inclined to identify the two impulsive principles. But the case of Leontius is a refutation of them. For when he was led by a low craving to look at the dead bodies of criminals in the place of execution, a higher impulse struggled with his desire and he was angry with himself. Indeed anger commonly takes part with reason (just as our soldiers support the rulers), wherever injustice is perceived. Yet anger is clearly to be distinguished from reason. For children are irrationally angry—so are lions and wolves,—and when Odysseus rebuked his spirit, it was the reason in him which checked his passion.

ἀρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ.] The courageous temper (τὸ ὑμετέρος) in the state is said to be derived from the individuals who compose the state. Cp. infra viii. 544 D, κ οἴοθ' οὖν . . . πέντε άν έλεν. But
Republic

435 E

Socrates again leaves out of sight the fact that the collective courage of a state or an army is in some degree different from the courage of individuals. And yet the conception of the state as an ideal unity different from the individuals who compose it belongs rather to ancient than to modern thought. See Thuc. ii. 60 πολιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὑδροημένη ὁφελεῖν τοῦς ἰδίωτας ἢ καθ ἐκατον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγούσαν, ἀδράν δὲ σφαλλομένην.

γελοιον γὰρ ... ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν] 'For example, in the case of a people who have the character of being passionate, to imagine that this quality does not originate in the individuals, who compose the state, would be ridiculous.' For the use of αἰτία compare Laws i. 624 θεὸς ... ἐλπις τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως; and elsewhere αἰτίαν ἔχειν. οἱ δὲ: the relative refers to a masculine understood from πόλειν, rather than immediately to ἰδιωτῶν.

τῶν ἄνω τόπων] This can hardly mean 'the Highland country,' as L. and S. interpret: rather the parts of Europe which are remote from Hellas and the Aegean Sea.

436 A

Φοίνικας ... Ἀγυπτῶν] In Laws v. 747 c he passes a similar censure on the Phoenicians and Egyptians, whose institutions are charged with causing πανουργία instead of σοφία, though he is uncertain whether this is to be attributed to the hand of the legislator, to adverse fortune, or to climate. For Thrace and Scythia cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 7, § 2 τά μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἐθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκράτησιν θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστι πλήρης. διανοίας δὲ ἐνδεικτερα καὶ τέχνης, κ.τ.λ., which he goes on to contrast with the intellectual and indolent character of the Asiatics, and the union of intellect and passion in the Greek.

The fallacy about the sameness of the state and the individual easily escapes notice. A question of psychology receives more attention, and is imagined to involve a real difficulty:—Does the soul act as a whole or in three parts? Before this question can be resolved, the meaning of sameness and difference has to be ascertained. (1) Opposition in the same relation is to be distinguished from opposition in different relations; in the first case the two members of the opposition are necessarily exclusive or contradictory—they cannot co-exist; but not so in the second. (2) If one of the terms which are correlative (e.g. drink or thirst) is simple, the other should be simple: if one is compound the other must be compound.
Notes: Book IV.

τὸδε δὲ . . . ἀλλο ἀλλῳ] 'But this is a real difficulty. Is there one principle here by which we perform our several actions, or three whereby our actions are severally performed?'

τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ] finds an imperfect antecedent in what precedes: 'this faculty' of which we spoke as θυμοίδει, φιλομαθείς, φιλοχρήματον. τούτων ἔκαστα, the correction of q, would refer to the several actions of the mind.

δὴ λοι . . . οὐκ ἐθελῆσαι ἐμα] 'It is clear that the same thing will not do or suffer opposites at the same time, in the same part and in the same relation.'

Can two contradictories be true? Not in the statement of particular facts, when the terms are accurately used and the same relation is preserved. A wheel or top which moves upon a fixed axis or centre may be said to move and not to move, i.e. it may move at its circumference, while its axis (conceived as a vertical straight line) remains still. But the wheel or top cannot move and not move around its axis at the same time: it is ridiculous to maintain that 'the earth goes round the sun in the same sense and at the same time that the sun goes round the earth.' Where in any subject of theological or metaphysical speculation, such as necessity and free-will, or the divisibility of matter, contradictories are said to be equally true, the reason is that neither expression is more than half the truth, and both together are only approximations to the truth. Plato is perhaps arguing with the Heracliteans in this passage. If so, he has got beyond their point of view and reached the region of common sense. Cp. Symp. 187 A, B: Soph. 242 Ε διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἐν ἔμφερεται, φασὶν αἱ συναντῶτεραι τῶν μονῶν, κ.τ.λ.

οὗ ταῦταν ᾧ] The imperfect of εἰμί is nowhere used simply for the present, but either (1) with some reference to the past as in ix. 580 δ τὸ μὲν, φαμὲν, ᾧ, referring to the discussion at iv. 439 δ: or (2), as in this passage, supra 428 A, and x. 609 B, implying an assertion of existence confirmed by inquiry and therefore prior to it,—'was all along.' Compare the expression τὸ τι ᾧ εἶμαι, in which the past tense refers to the essence as prior to our conception of it.

οὐκοῦν . . . περιφέρονταί] 'And suppose such an objector were still further to display his wit by subtly arguing that tops at any vol. iii.
rate, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the same spot, stand and are moved in their entirety at the same time.'

These are apparent exceptions to Plato's law of contradiction which have to be cleared away before we are in a condition to determine whether the parts of the soul are really opposed. There would be no distinction of ὑμός and ἐπιθυμία unless the actions which flow from the one principle excluded those which flow from the other.

ὅσον κατὰ ταῦτα...φερομένων] τὰ τοιαῦτα is to be taken as cognate accusative with the participles. 'Since things which act in this way are not at such moments in motion and at rest with the same parts of themselves.'

πάθοι...ποιήσεις] The words εἰς ἢ καὶ to which Stallbaum objects as unmeaning, and which he supposes to have crept in from the termination of ποιήσεις, have the authority of the best MSS. They are more likely to have been omitted than inserted. Nor is there any objection to them on the ground of want of sense. Because the categories of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν are correlatives there is no reason why εἰς should not be interposed between them, the three together answering to active, intransitive, passive.

ἐνα μὴ ἀναγκαζόμεθα...μηκόνων] 'that we may not be compelled to be tedious by going right through all such objections, and satisfying ourselves that they are untrue.'

ὁποθέτειν...ἐσεθαί] He means to say that he will not guard every possible case: if any assumption on which the argument turns is found to be erroneous, the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn. Cp. supra 434 D μὴδέν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ποιό πάνω παγίος αὐτὸ λέγωμεν.

προσάγεσθαι] 'to draw to oneself,' i.e. to accept.

ἀπωθεῖσθαι] 'to reject.'

τῶν ἐναντίων...ἀν ἄλληλοις] The insertion of ἄν seems necessary, and it may easily have dropped out between -ων and ἄλ-

ἐτει ποιημάτων...παθημάτων] 'Activities or passivities as the case may be.'

οὕτω γὰρ ταύτη διάλεξε] i.e. this relation of opposition is equally possible between activities and passivities.
\textit{Notes: Book IV.}

\textit{εἰπερεῖτο τοῦτο . . . τῆς γενέσεως} (1) 'Nods assent to this within herself,' or (2) 'beckons this with a nod towards herself—as if some one were putting a question to her, longing for the attainment of it.' For \textit{πρὸς αὐτήν} in the former case, cp. Phil. 38 \textit{καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν διανοούμενος}. But the contrast favours (2).

eἰς τὸ ἄπειρον . . . θήσομεν] Compare Soph. 235 \textit{εἰς γάπτα . . . θετεῖν} (sc. \textit{αὐτὸν}) \textit{τιμᾷ}.

\textit{ἄρ' οὖν, καθ' ὅσον, κ.τ.λ.} He means to say that if one of two relative terms is qualified the other must also be qualified: e. g. simple thirst is relative to simple drink, but great thirst implies much drink, hot thirst cold drink, and so on.

\textit{ἡ οὖ] The false reading \textit{ποὺ} seems originally to have had a place in Par. \textit{λ} (ἡ \textit{οὖ: ποὺ mg}). Hermann's inversion of \textit{ψυχρὸς} and \textit{θερμὸς} for the sake of symmetry makes nonsense of the passage; see infra \textit{438} \textit{καὶ οὗ τί λέγω, ὦς, οίων \acute{α} ἓ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔστιν}.

tοῦ δὲ τοίου . . . τὰ προσεγγυμένα] 'But the accessories of the desire are relative to this or that quality in the object of desire.'

\textit{μὴν τις, κ.τ.λ.} The objection ends with the words \textit{χρηστοῦ αὐτοῦ}. It is restated in a different and more general form by Socrates in the following sentence (\textit{πάντες γαρ . . . αἱ ἄλλα ὀφθαλμα}). Plato leaves the objection for a time (until \textit{439 λ}), and proceeds to show more clearly how the qualification of one term of a relation inevitably involves the qualification of the other. Then returning to the case of thirst in \textit{439 λ} he states that thirst simple is neither of much nor of little, neither of good nor of bad drink, but simply of drink. He does not fully criticize the objection. Had he done so, he would probably have gone on to contest the fact that 'all desire is of good.' Obviously the desire of the drunkard is not of drink that is good for him—or to explain that the statement could only be accepted as true if 'desire' is used in an ideal sense and therefore implying the qualification of it by the word 'good.'

\textit{ἔσως γὰρ \ἄρ., κ.τ.λ.} \textit{γὰρ} means, 'You are right to call attention to this, for,' &c.

tοιαύτα οἷα εἶναι τοῦ] For the technical use of the genitive to express relation, cp. Theaet. 160 \textit{Αἰμάγη δὲ γε ἐμὲ τοῖς γίγ-}

\textit{νοθαῖ} \textit{κ.τ.λ.}

\textit{οἶκ ἔμαθες, κ.τ.λ.} The example of comparatives is next taken, to which the same principle applies. 'Greater' is relative to
'smaller,' 'heavier' to 'lighter,' 'more' to 'fewer.' But if one of the terms in these several pairs is qualified, the other must also be qualified. Thus 'much greater' is relative to 'much smaller,' 'much heavier' to 'much lighter,' 'many more' to 'many fewer.'

A similar transition is made in the Charmides, from the relation between sense and knowledge, and the objects of sense and knowledge, to comparative terms: 168 B καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεῖζὸν φαίμεν τοιαύτην τινά ἐχειν δύναμιν, ὡστε τινὲς εἶναι μεῖζον; c οὐκοῖν καὶ εἰ τι διπλασίων ἐστι τῶν τε ἄλλων διπλασίων καὶ ἐαυτοῦ, ἡμίσεως δὴπον δυστο ἐαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διπλασίων ἐν εἴη: ibid. πλέον δὲ αὐτοῦ δν οὐ καὶ ἐλαττον ἐσται, καὶ βαρύτερον δν, κονφότερον, καὶ πρεσβύτερον δν νεώτερον, καὶ τάλλα πάντα ἁγαίτοις;

C τά διπλασία πρὸς τά ἡμίσεως] The same rule applies to these terms as to 'greater' and 'smaller,' 'more' and 'fewer,' a 'larger double' is relative to a 'larger half.' The double of 6 (=12) is a larger double than the double of 4 (=8): and the larger half (6) is relative to the larger double (12): the smaller half (4) to the smaller double (8).

τὸ δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; κ.τ.λ.] So with regard to sciences: the object of science is knowledge, but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge. With τὸ δὲ, σοὶ δοκεῖ may be supplied.

ὁ αὖτος τρόπος] sc. τούτων ἐστὶ.

D οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη] Cp. Theaet. 146 D ὅταν λέγῃς σκοταίην, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας; κ.τ.λ.

αὖτα] 'themselves,' i.e. without their accidents. The simple correlatives are simply of each other, the qualified correlatives are of the qualified.

αὖτων μονῶν] sc. δὲν ἐστίν.

E καὶ οὖ τι λέγω, κ.τ.λ.] The qualities of the two terms of a relation, though correlative, are not necessarily identical, e.g. as we have seen above, hot thirst is of cold drink; or to take the case of knowledge and its objects: there is a sub-division of things which are objects of knowledge into healthy things; and there is a subdivision of knowledge corresponding to these healthy things: but because the objects are healthy it does not follow that the knowledge which is concerned with them, although distinguished from other kinds of knowledge, is healthy too. As these objects are
distinguished from other objects by the possession of a particular quality (i.e. health), so the knowledge which is relative to them is distinguished from other kinds of knowledge by possessing a peculiar quality (i.e. having to do with health).

τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψος ... (439 Α) πώματός γε] 'Will you not say that thirst, said I, is in this class, the class of relations, as far as its essence is concerned. Thirst is, I imagine,— Yes, said he, thirst is of drink.' Two questions are asked; before the second is completed Glaucos breaks in with a reply to the first (ἐγώνε) : and in πώματός γε he completes and answers the second. The order of words in the first question is οὐ δή τὸ δίψος εἶναι τούτων τῶν τινῶν (sc. δυνών) and in adding τοῦτο ἐπερ ἔστιν, sc. εἶναι, τούτων is neglected. For a brachylogy similar to that in τῶν τινῶν cp. Phil. 166 τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων.

The bearing of this passage on the argument appears to be as follows. The object of Socrates is to establish a difference between θυμός, ἐπιθυμία and λόγος, and to show that these are primary elements of the soul. In order to meet the possible objection—that these are not distinct elements, as is shown by such phrases as a 'reasonable' or a 'passionate desire,' or a 'reasonable anger,' he insists that 'desire' or 'anger' are in themselves simple, and that they become qualified by the addition of something apart from them and different from them.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ ... πράττειν] 'For surely as we maintain, the same thing cannot do opposite things with the same part of itself in reference to the same thing at the same time.' ἂν is to be supplied from the previous sentence: cp. for parallels i. 352 Ε, ii. 382 Ε, and notes.

τοῦ τοξότου] cp. supra 428 Α and note.

πότερον, κ.τ.λ.] A man may be thirsty and not choose to drink: but this is because there is present in him another principle (usually reason) besides thirst, which masters his thirst.

τὰ τοιαῦτα] i.e. the indulgence of appetite generally.

δὴν * ἀγαθίγνηται] Plato never loses an opportunity of saying that 'all men have not' right reason. Cp. Theaet. 186 c τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὀφειλέων μόνος καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ τολμῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς δὲ καὶ παραγίγνηται.

διὰ ... νοομάτων] 'through the incidence of morbid conditions.'
From the rule that the same principle when rightly defined cannot have two contradictory effects is inferred that the desire to drink and the power to abstain from drinking proceed from different elements in the soul.

The perfect signifies a perpetual or constantly recurring state, 'is in a continual flutter.' Cp. vii. 521 E τετείτακε.

in the answer refers back to οὐ δὴ ἄλογος.

The opposition of desire and reason is admitted. Are desire and anger equally opposed? At first sight the impression is that they are nearly related.

'To one or other of these.' The indefinite πότερος (L. and S. s.v.) occurs several times in Plato. It is hardly found in other Greek writers of the classical period.

An anecdote is introduced to prove that a similar opposition may exist between anger and desire as between reason and desire. The interpretation of ποτε ἄκοινας τι πιστεύω τοῦτο is difficult; the best explanation of the words as they stand is as follows: 'I once heard a story in which I put faith,' and which implies that anger is not akin to desire. [Possibly, however, a negative οὐ has been dropped before πιστεύω. 'I once heard a tale which makes me doubt that suggestion of yours.' L. C.]

I.e. the outer wall on the north running from Athens to the Peiraeus. The middle wall (τὸ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος), which was parallel to the north wall, is mentioned in the Gorgias (455 ε): it also extended from Athens to Peiraeus, and was so called because it lay between the north wall and another wall which ran to Phalerum. Thus a fortified open space communicating between Athens and the Peiraeus, and not merely a wall, was still preserved as a means of communication between Athens and the Peiraeus, even if the north wall were captured.

The story is that Leontius, son of Aglaiion, going up from the Peiraeus underneath the north wall on the out-
side observing dead bodies lying by the executioner’ [or ‘at the executioner’s’; L. C.], &c. There is no reason to read δημιουργος for δημιουργος. The spot is sufficiently described as outside the north wall on the road from Peiraeus to Athens, being also the spot where the executioner would naturally be found.

ιδού δημιουργος... δια κακωδαιμονες] ‘There’s for you, wretches!’

οὕτως μέντοι... διὰ λόγος] ‘This tale, however.’ μέντοι contrasts the inference suggested by Leontius’ words with Glaucnon’s first impression.

οδικοῦν καὶ ἄλλωθι... (B) τοῦ τοιοῦτου] The subject is at first the man himself, but changes to τὸν θυμὸν as the sentence proceeds. Cp. supra 411 B.

αὕτον κοινωνήσαντα] sc. τὸν θυμὸν.

αιροῦντας λόγον μὴ δείν ἀντιπράττειν] ‘When reason decides that she is not to be opposed.’ The omission of ἵνα (sc. τῷ λόγῳ) after ἀντιπράττειν is sufficiently supported by instances (L. and S., v. v. ἀντιπράττειν 2). The reading of the principal MSS. has therefore been retained, and may be construed as above. There is no distinct subject of ἀντιπράττειν, with which either θυμὸν or ἐπιθυμίαν or τὸν ἀνθρώπον, or all together may be supplied. The other reading, δὲν τι πράττειν, accepted by Bekker, is obviously an emendation, which gives a poor sense. Stallbaum places a comma after δεῖν, and construes as follows:—‘But that the spirit, making common cause with the desires when reason insists that its making common cause is wrong (μὴ δεῖν, sc. κοινωνήσαντα), should oppose reason,’ &c.,—a method of taking the words which is harsher than the other.

The sentence is an anacoluthon, the structure of κοινωνήσαντα being broken by τοῦ τοιοῦτου αἰσθήσαντα, which is substituted for ἰδεῖν.

ὅταν ἀδικείοντι τε ἥγηται... (B) πραγμῇ] The subject of ἰδεῖν, κ.τ.λ., is δὲθυμὸς from the previous sentence, as appears from ἄκουσιν κἀκεῖνον ὑπὸ νομίσας. But the θυμὸς is closely identified with the person in whom it forms the active principle. Hence παρ’ αὐτῷ, ‘with the man’s self.’

διὰ τοῦ πεινής, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. infra 443 C διὰ τούτων κΑὶ ἡδονῶν: vi. 494 D διὰ τοσοῦτον κακῶν. The reading is conjectural. The manuscript reading διὰ τοῦ can only be defended in one of two ways. Either (1) connecting διὰ τοῦ τί πάσχειν directly with ὧν λέγει τῶν γενεαίν = ‘he does not on that account desist from noble efforts;’
the words καὶ νικᾷ καὶ being introduced διὰ μέσου: or (2) [B. J.] 'and because it (sc. passion) endures hunger and cold and other such sufferings patiently,' &c. (πεινήν οργήνων being equivalent to οργήνων πεινών). The words καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει, κ.τ.λ., present considerable difficulty, and involve a contradiction if νικᾷ and οὐ λήγει are supposed to refer to the same struggle, because they put together conjunctively (καὶ . . . καὶ) what should be joined disjunctively (ὅ . . . οὐ). The difficulty is somewhat obviated if νικᾷ and οὐ λήγει, κ.τ.λ., are taken to refer to different struggles,—the former to the struggle between θυμός and ἐπιθυμία within the injured man himself, as exemplified in his endurance of hunger and cold in the attempt to satisfy his anger, the latter to the struggle in which the injured man strives to avenge himself on his injurer.

καίτοι γ'] 'And indeed'—a common use in Homer, rare in Attic.

ἄλλ' *ἡ . . . ἐπιθυμεῖ;'] 'But do you bear this also in mind, I wonder?' *ἡ, the conjecture of Ast, is more expressive than ἢ, the manuscript reading. ἢ in Hellenistic Greek (Matt. xii. 10), as in Homer (Od. i, 158) is used with directly interrogative force. But this only helps to account for the corruption.

'ὄμεθα] refers to the suggestion hesitatingly put forward by Glaucón, supra 439 Ε ἰσως, ἢθη, (τὸ τοῦ θυμαῦ ἂν ἔτη ὁμοφυάς . . . τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ. Socrates, as in other passages, courteously assumes a share of the responsibility of a suggestion which has proved erroneous.

τίθεσθαι τὰ διπλά πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ] 'Arrays itself on the side of the rational part.'

These words seem to imply an admission that the statement in 440 B goes beyond the actual fact, and represents what Plato regards as the normal condition. It is only in the uncorrupted soul that passion always obeys reason. It may, in perverted natures, become subject to the many-headed monster, i.e. the desires, cp. ix. 590 B, where the deprivation of θυμός is described, especially in the words κολασεῖα δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ τότῳ, τὸ θυμοειδὲς, ὅτε τῷ ὀρθῷ διέλθει θηρίῳ τοῦ καὶ ἕνα κρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἑκείνου ἀπληστίας προπηλακίζομεν ἐθῆν ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον γίγνεσθαι;

ἀνάγκη, ἢθη, τρίτον] sc. τούτῳ εἶναι.
That passion or spirit is the ally of reason against appetite has been already shown. But is there any difference between passion and reason? Yes, for passion exists in children who have not attained to reason, and in irrational animals. A further proof of their opposition is given by Homer, who makes the reasoning principle rebuke senseless wrath.


ἀν τοι ἄκατ] ‘Somewhere above (you know where).’ The reference is to iii. 390 b.

Since, then, it is proved that the state and the individual are alike resolvable into three elements, it may be assumed that wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice are severally referable to corresponding parts and relations in either. Justice in the individual as in the state exists when reason, passion, and desire perform severally their proper functions. And this end is secured by the united influence of music and gymnastic applied to the two higher elements, which together will rule and keep guard over the third. Courage in the individual as in the state is the virtue of the spirited element, and consists in tenacity of patriotic resolve; temperance is the harmony between higher and lower; wisdom is the supremacy of the rational element. The ‘small letters’ are now as legible as the large. And our theory will stand the test of common instances. For the actions of the just man, as we have defined him, are in accordance with popular notions of justice. Our presentiment that justice would be found in the interaction of the various classes of the community has been more than confirmed. But the principle of the division of labour which we then asserted was but a shadow of the deeper truth, that there are these three elements in the soul of man, whose right and consentaneous working constitutes him just. Such is justice, then, in states and individuals.

διαινεύκαμαι] Compare Parmen. 137 A πῶς χρῆ τηλικῶν δικαίως διανεύσαι τοιοῦτον τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος λόγων.

ἐπικοίνως] like μετρίως, is an expression of moderation, which is not, however, to be taken very strictly—‘we are fairly agreed.’ Socrates determines that we reason with one part of the soul, and desire with another, and are angry with another. This is an important beginning in the science of psychology. For though
a thinker of the Megarian school may argue that the soul is without parts (and Plato himself hints as much—Book x, p. 611), the thing intended is nevertheless true, that there are different and opposite effects which may be ascribed in a figure to parts of the soul. The division does not interfere with the higher unity in which they meet. A limb is dead when cut off from the source of life; a faculty is unmeaning which is independent of the mind and of other faculties. But the body or mind which had no limbs or faculties would be incapable of being made the subject of inquiry or of description.

Psychology seems to rest (1) on language, which expresses in a crude and general manner, subject to the conditions of language, the collective reflections of the human mind about itself; the common use of terms which has come down from former ages is partially modified (a) by the efforts of great thinkers, who stamp words anew, and (b) by the experience of mankind, which insensibly changes their meaning: names which have originally referred to material objects insensibly pass into the sphere of mind: (2) on consciousness, which suggests rather than proves, and the facts or results of which are generally lost in the attempt to define them: (3) on external observation (a) of the physical antecedents of mental states or habits, which, however, fall very far short of the whole secret of the mind: (b) of outward acts either seen by the eye or verified by the independent testimony of several observers,—and admitting sometimes of being tabulated in the form of statistics: these form the principal scientific ground of psychological inquiry: (4) on history, which traces the continuity of the human mind in all ages and countries, though with many breaks and chasms: which shows the impossibility of explaining mental phenomena within the limits of the individual: which helps to separate the abstract from the concrete, the ideas of the understanding or reason from the colours of mythology or imagination: which subjects the mental world to our use by showing us our place in the whole. There is no science in which we are more likely to be imposed upon by words: in none is greater care required that the parts should not be separated from the whole; in none is more left to the subtlety of individual apprehension. The greatest use of such a science is not to supply positive information about the mind or the faculties of the mind, but to quicken the habit of observation of ourselves and others.
Notes: Book IV.

τὰ αὖτὰ μὲν . . . τὰ αὖτα δ᾽] For this idiomatic pleonasm cp. Soph. Trach. 263, 264, Philoct. 1370, 1371 διηλῆν μὲν . . . διηλῆν δὲ, κ.τ.λ. Republic IV. 441 D

ἀμφότερα] The individual and the state.

τῷ τὸ ἐναυτῷ . . . γεννών] The order is τῷ ἐκαστὸν τριῶν διστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γεννῶν πρᾶτετο τὸ ἐναυτῷ.

τὸ μὲν] sc. τὸ λογιστικὸν. τὸ δὲ, sc. τὸ θυμοιδής.

ήμεροῦσα ἀρμονία τε καὶ ρυθμὸς] Cp. iii. 401 D, 412 A.

καὶ τούτῳ . . . προστάτησετον] The MSS. give προστῆσετον, which would mean,—'And so music and gymnastic' (the subject is supplied from μουσικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ κράτος above), 'will place these two' (reason and anger), 'which have been thus nurtured and have learned their parts and been educated, in authority over the concupiscient element.' There is a harshness in this change from the singular to the dual with a dual object, and in the further change of subject in τηρήσετον to which the subject appears to be τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοιδῆς. To avoid this Bekker has, without manuscript authority, altered προστῆσετον into προστατησετον,—'these two' (reason and anger) 'will preside,' &c. But the correction is not absolutely necessary, and therefore, like all emendations which are not absolutely necessary, should not be admitted into the text. [B. J.]

δ τηρήσετον . . . (b) ἀνατρέψῃ] 'Over this part of the soul they (reason and passion) will keep guard, lest waxing great with fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, and no longer confined to her own sphere, the concupiscent soul should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural born subjects, and overturn the common life of all.' For the use of οἷς αὖ, referring to τὰ αὐτῶν μαθόντα (supra), cp. iii. 393 D, and note: vi. 499 D τοῖς δὲ σελαίοις, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, δηλοί αὖ δοκεῖ, ἡρεῖς; Bekker reads γεννών for γένει with θ᾽, these MSS. also give προσῆκεν for προσήκον with Stobaeus—probably the right reading.


πάντων] sc. τῶν μετόν, which, in Plato's figurative language, are spoken of as a community: cp. infra ἐκάστῳ τε καὶ διὰ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν διστὶ.

σοφῶν δὲ γε ἐκεῖνης τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ δ' ἡρχέτ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτα παρηγγελλεῖν] The reference in the first words, ἐκεῖνης τῷ σμικρῷ . . .
Plato: Republic.

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IV.
442 C

ἡρῴς ἐν αὐτῷ, is to supra 428 E τῷ σμυκρωτάτῳ ἀρα ἔθνει καὶ μέρει ἐντῆς καὶ τῆ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιστήμης, τῷ προειστώτῃ καὶ ἄρχοντι, δὴ σοφὴ ἄν εἰς κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθείσαι πόλεις.

ταῦτα παρῆγγελλεν] referring to τῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἱλίου παρῆγγελθὲν supra, and both containing a reference to supra 429 c, where the instruction is given not by reason to the individual, but by the law-giver to the state. The imperfect refers to the time of education.

ξένον αὖ κάκειν, κ.τ.λ.] 'that again too having in itself a knowledge, the knowledge of what is advantageous to each and to the whole community which is composed of them, being three in number.' Reason has in itself a knowledge (i.e. of the expedient for each and all), as it was implied in the previous sentence that θυμὸς had received a knowledge (i.e. of what is or is not fearful).

D
to τε ἄρχων καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ] the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of passion and desire.

οτασιδὼσαν αὐτῷ] sc. τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τῷ ἄρχοντι.

ὦ πολλὰς κακίων] Cp. ii. 368 a for a similar 'pronominal' phrase.

τι οὖν; ... ἔφαν;] 'Is justice in any way more dim to our eyes, so as to appear other than she appeared in the state?' Justice, as now seen in the individual, has the same form under which she appeared in the state, and the outlines are as sharp in every way. In ii. 368 c the form of justice in the individual was said to require a keen vision. And a visual image, if seen more dimly in one position than in another, might be said ἀπομαθίωσθαι. As elsewhere, the attribute of perception is transferred to the thing perceived.

E
διὸ γὰρ . . . προσφέρετες] 'Because if there be any doubt lingering in our minds we may thoroughly convince ourselves in this way;—by applying to it (i.e. to justice as we define it) the test of common-place notions.' αὐτῷ refers to δικαιώσην, as elsewhere, a neuter taking up a feminine. προσφέρων is used as in Phileb. 23 a τὴν ἀριστεράτην αὐτῷ προσφέροντα βάσανον. Plato uses common opinion, not without disdain, as a confirmation of his philosophical definition. The common notions about justice, which when adduced by Polus and Cephalus are rejected as superficial and external, are now used 'as witnesses' to the soundness of the deeper conception. Cp. supra 433 e, where the definition of
justice in the state is illustrated by the legal notion of justice, viz. that every man should have his own.

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τελεον ἄρα... τὸ ἐνύπνιον... δ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεύσαι] 'Our dream, then, is fulfilled, I mean the suspicion which we expressed.' The antecedent to δ is in apposition to τὸ ἐνύπνιον, and δ is a cognate accusative, governed by ὑποπτεύσαι. In what follows, the reference is to supra 432 D κυνουρεύομεν τι ἔχειν ἰχνος, and 433 A δ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐδίδεθα... διὸ τὴν πόλιν κατακίξομεν. That again refers back to ii. 370 f f. And an anticipation of the dream occurs at ib. 371 E, 372 A ποῦ οὖν ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ εἰπῇ ή τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ή δικαιία;... ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεία τινί. There is also some reference to supra 432 D. It follows that ἀρχόμενοι in the present passage is in the imperfect tense, and ἐμβεβηκόμεν pluperfect:—'how that in the very commencement of our foundation of the state we had lighted (it would seem) upon a certain beginning and impress of justice.'

ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως σικεῖεν] lit. 'making a beginning of the city to found it.' So v. 450 B μέτρον... τοιωτῶν λόγων ἄκουειν.

κυνουρεύομεν] In recalling the language of supra 432 D κυνουρεύομεν τι ἔχειν ἰχνος, Plato retains the direct form, although κυνουρεύομεν would have been more regular.

τὸ δὲ γε ἂν ἄρα... δι’ δ καὶ ἀφελεί, ἀπεδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης] 'And this (the division of labour) was really a sort of shadow of justice. Hence the advantage of it,' i.e. because it partakes of the nature of justice. τὸ refers to ἀρχὴ τε καὶ τύπον τινα τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ and is further explained by τὸ τῶν μὲν, κ.τ.λ.

τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθὲς] 'Whereas in reality.' The words oppose what, after inquiry, has been found out to be the case, to what at one time they suspected to be the case. The construction of this sentence is as follows: τοιοῦτο is first explained in the clause ἀλλ’ οὖ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πράξεων... περὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, and what follows (μὴ ἐάσαντα... περὶ τὰ ἱδία ἔμπνευμα) is again an explanation of the second part of this explanatory clause (περὶ τὴν ἑντὸς ὡς ἀληθὸς περὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ). οὖτω δὴ πράπτειν resumes the participial clauses from μὴ ἐάσαντα... σώφρονα καὶ ἥρμοσμένον. Plato passes from explanation to a more general characterization of justice in the words ἐν πᾶσι τούτως ἀρετοῖς, κ.τ.λ.

tοιοῦτο μὲν τι] 'Something of this kind': i.e. a sort of doing one's own business.
Plato: Republic.

*Republic* IV. 443 C 1) ἠκαστὸν ἐν αὐτῷ] The omission of the article τῶν is supplemented by the addition of τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη below.

τῷ ὧν τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐδέχετον] ‘Having in very truth arranged his proper home business well.’ For what is more οἰκεῖον than a man’s soul, and what arrangements more perfect than what is here described?

καὶ ἕνωμαρμόσαντα... ὄρους τρεῖς... καὶ μόρης] ‘and having harmonized the three elements, just as if they were three notes of a scale of a higher, middle and lower string.’ The scale contemplated seems to be the octave: νεότης, ὑπάτης, μέσης, sc. ρομβος. The Greek ‘highest’ note (ὑψάρη) corresponds to our ‘lowest,’ the ‘lowest’ (μάρη) to our ‘highest.’

The words εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξά (suggested by the intermediate notes of the lyre) are observable, as seeming to imply that Plato did not wish his threefold division of the soul to be taken as strictly exhaustive.

σοφίαν ἐκ... δόξαν] The distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα is here assumed.

444 A 1) ἐν αὐτοῖς] sc. ἐν ἄνδρι καὶ πόλει.

444 B- 445 E Injustice is the strife of the three elements with one another, the insurrection of a part against the whole, the rebellion of the lower nature against that which has natural authority.

Having determined so much we have no difficulty in distinguishing what actions are just and what are unjust. And we perceive that virtue is health and vice disease in the soul.

Let us ask once more, Is it expedient to be just or unjust, apart from opinion, human or divine? It is no longer possible to ask the question seriously. For if incurable bodily disease makes life not worth living, how utterly unprofitable must it be, if the soul which is the principle of life is diseased? However, we must complete our survey, and describe the forms of unrighteousness. They are innumerable, but four may be selected as sufficiently distinct for our examination. These four severally correspond to four forms of
political constitution. The just life, which is the fifth, answers to Kingship or Aristocracy.

οδικοῖν σταῦν τινὰ, κ.τ.λ.] Evil, unrighteousness, injustice are regarded by Plato here and in other passages (e.g. Soph. 228 a) as a sort of distraction or dissolution. They can only exist to a certain degree, because they would be destructive to that in which they are contained. As he says in i. 352 d, there is no such thing as perfect injustice, for that would be suicidal: enough justice must remain to keep injustice together.

No single aspect includes all the forms of evil, which varies infinitely with the characters and circumstances of mankind. (i) Evil may be represented as weakness: the higher nature, though not absolutely extinct, habitually and without resistance giving way to the lower: ἅπασα, ἔμπλα. Or (ii) as mere negation or privation of good: the diverse, transient, irrational principle, which has been imagined to stand in the same relation to God that physical impurity does to ourselves. (iii) Evil may be conceived as strength; the merely animal passing into a diabolical nature, the reason giving a malignant intensity to the passions, doing and suffering without end in this world and another,—τῶν δ’ ἐχομα καὶ μᾶλα ὥσικόν παρέχωσαν (X. 610 e: cp. vi. 491 e). (iv) Evil may be summed up under the two commonest forms of evil: (a) untruth—ψεῦδος: (β) sensuality—ἀκολουθία. (v) Evil, according to some theological writers, is the preference of self to God or other men. Lastly (vi) evil is strife, or ἐπανάστασις μέρους τινὸς τῷ διλ τῆς ψυχῆς, as in this passage; or, as in the Epistles of St. Paul, the consciousness of sin. To Plato evil appears more under the aspect of deformity and untruth than to modern writers, and less under that of sensuality; also more as political and social, and less as spiritual and moral. Yet in the picture of the tyrant and the tyrannical man in the Republic (Book ix), and in the discussion of the Gorgias respecting the chastisement of evil, the effect of evil in the individual is also strongly felt and expressed.

οδικοὶ... τῷ τοῦ ἄρχιστον γένους ὅρτοι] ‘Must not it (i.e. injustice) on the other hand be a kind of quarrel between these three, a meddlesomeness and interference and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole in order that it may rule over her when it has no right, but is of such a nature as to be properly the slave to that which is of the royal race.’

The majority of MSS., including Par. A, read τοιούτου... δου-
Plato: Republic.

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444 B

λέιειν, τού δ' αὐθ διουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους διήν (ἀντος Μ. ἄντε q). Vind. E has τὸ δ' αὐθ μὴ διουλεύειν, ἀρχικοῦ γένους διήν. This last is approved by Madvig, but is much too feeble. The variation of the MSS. is difficult to account for, and throws some doubt upon the text.

ἀλλὰ opposes τοιοῦτο... διήν to οὖ προσήκον (sc. αὐτῷ ἀρχεῖν). In τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους διήν he describes a part of the soul in language appropriate for describing a member of a class in the state 'to that which is of the ruling class' instead of 'to the ruling part.' This use of language is rendered easier by the expression τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη supra. And again the highest class is figuratively compared to a dynasty or royal family. Cp. Polit. 310 B μᾶλλον δὲ γε δίκαιον τῶν περὶ τὰ γένη ποιομένων ἐπιμελείαν, τούτων περὶ λέγειν, εἰ τι μὴ κατὰ τρόπον πράττον.

445 A
tὸ δὲ νόσου παρὰ φύσιν, κ.π.λ.[] sc. τὸ δὲ νόσου ποιέω ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι παρὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι ἀρχεῖν τε καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι ἀλλο ὑπ' ἄλλοι.

Justice is the health of the soul, is beauty, is harmony, is fitness, is division of labour, is nature, is happiness: of all which injustice is the contrary. Already at this stage of the argument our old question about their comparative expediency 'has become ridiculous,' and can no longer be seriously entertained.

ἔκτε λανθάνη] sc. τίς.

μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενοι] Cp. supra ii. 380 B οἱ δὲ ἀκίναιτο κολαζόμενοι.

τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου... ἀρετῆν κτῆσεται] ‘And when the very principle of our life is thrown into confusion and is going to pieces, shall we be told that it is worth a man’s while to live, whatever course he choose to follow, unless he finds some means of escaping from vice and injustice, and of acquiring justice and virtue?’ δὲ marks the transition from the trivial to the more important case. The general drift of the sentence is, that nothing can make life bearable to the unjust, except the prospect of escape from injustice. For a similar mode of expressing an ‘a fortiori’ argument cp. i. 336 θ. μὴ γάρ δῆ ὡς ... φανήσαι αὐτῷ and note. οὖ, not μὴ, is used because the clause depends on δοκεῖ and not on the conditional particle εἰ, which introduces the whole sentence. The negative belonging to the direct form is retained in the indirect. The fresh protasis, ἀσπερ, κ.π.λ., is added in the development of the thought independently of the preceding participial clause, so that the sen-
tence has a twofold protasis, or in other words, ἐντερ, κ.τ.λ., modifies the apodosis.

*ἀποκρυφέον] This is Bekker’s conjecture for ἀποκρυφέον, the MS. reading. The change is very slight, and is justified by the general exactness of the replies in the Platonic dialogue. It is obvious that Glaucon is intended to emphasize (with characteristic ardour) what Socrates has just said. He is much less likely to have used a different expression than the copyists are to have written the commoner for the rarer word. And the form ἀποκρυφέον, though not occurring elsewhere, is perfectly legitimate.

ἄριστος ἐν καὶ ἕιδι καθά] Plato will not assert that his division is exhaustive. Cp. viii. 544 D ἢ τινα ἀληθὲς ἕχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἢ τίς καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τυι κεῖται; Similarly in Theaet. 156 B it is said that modes of sensation are infinite, though only a few of them have distinct names.

ἄπεφε ἀπὸ σκοπίας] The course of the argument which had once kept Socrates and his companions watching a thickets, has now taken them up to a mountain top, from which they have a wide and clear survey of human things,—of the one form of virtue and the countless forms of vice. The graphic use of δεώρο has prepared for this.


οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πλείους οὔτε εἰς ἐγγενόμενος] ‘For the accident of there being one, or more than one of them will not lead them to disturb any fundamental law of the state so long as they observe the nurture and education which we have described.’

τῶν ἕξιμων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως] For the partitive genitive—‘any of them,’ cp. Gorgias 514 A δημοσία πράξειν τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων.

BOOK V.

At this point Socrates is interrupted by a whispered conversation between Adeimantus and Polemarchus, who has not failed to notice the application of the proverb ‘Friends have all things in common,’ to the question of marriage (iv. 423 e). He and Adeimantus are agreed that Socrates must be challenged to explain himself on a matter of such paramount importance as the relation of the sexes.

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Socrates admits that the subject is one on which it would be calamitous to miss the truth, but for that very reason he is reluctant to speak. In the end, however, he yields to their request.

The subject of the four perverted forms of the state is resumed again in Book viii.

That is, Polemar-"chus sat a little further away from Socrates than Adeimantus did. He is supposed to draw the latter away from Socrates and to whisper in his ear. This explains how a conversation could be carried on of which Socrates heard only the last words.

λαβόμενος . . . παρά τὸν δίμον] 'having taken hold of him (ἀντοῦ) by his garment, high up, close to the shoulder.'

τὸ μάλιστα, ἐφην . . . ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἐφη] τὸ μάλιστα is taken in two senses: in the first case as meaning 'what in particular?' and in the second case 'why in particular?' This play of words cannot be maintained in English.

ἐτι ἐγὼ εἰπόν] is the reading of all the MSS. but Ven. Ζ, in which ἐτι εἰ. εἰ. is found. (A trace of the same reading appears in M, which reads ἐτι, according to Signor Rostagno. Schneider asserts that ἐτι is the reading of ὑμεῖς, notwithstanding the silence of Bekker.) The alteration to ἐτι . . . τι (because of what?) is no improvement in the meaning: and where this combination occurs, as in i. 343 λ ὅτι δὴ τὸ μάλιστα; ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ. ὅτι οἵεις, κ.τ.λ.: Charm. 161 c ὅτι δὴ τὶ γε; ἐφη. ὅτι οὐ δῆσω, ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ, δὴ τὰ ρήματα ἐφθασατο, ταῦτα καὶ ἐνδει: ὅτι is resumed in the reply and the words are not separated, as they are here, by ἐγὼ εἰπόν. For the use of ἐτι with an aorist, cp. vi. 508 c Πορ; ἐφ' ἐτι διὰλεγμένοις: Prot. 310 c ἐτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα.


καὶ λόγειν οἰηθήναι . . . κοινὰ τὰ φίλαν ὅταν] 'And you seem to have thought (δοκεῖς . . . οἰηθήναι) that you would escape detection in throwing out the slight remark that forsooth in the
matter of women and children everybody must know that friends will have all things in common.' The passage referred to is iv. 423 E ταύτα ῥαδίως διώκονται, καὶ ἄλλα γε ὅσα νῦν ἡμεῖς παραλείπομεν, τόν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτήσεως καὶ γέμων καὶ παιδειότοις, ὅτι δει ταύτα κατὰ τήν παρομοίως πάντα ὡς τὰ μέλισσα κοινὰ τὰ φιλῶν ποιοῖσθαι.


dρήσει] sc. εἰπὼν to be supplied from εἰπὼν supra.

τὸ δρῆσε τοῦτο... λόγου δεῖται, τὸς δ' τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας] 'but your word "rightly," like the rest, requires explanation, as to the manner of the community.' τάλλα, the other particulars of legislation which have not been lightly passed over but fully explained.

γενομένων] sc. τοὺς πάιδας understood from παιδειότοιςονται.

δὴν ταύτην ἢ λέγεις κοινωνίαν] 'and [speak about] the whole subject of the community of women and children which you mean.' Some verb governing the accusative must be supplied with δὴν in place of μηδένεσσθαι, or the construction goes back to μή ὁδὸν παρῆσ.

μέγα γὰρ τι ὀλόμεθα φέρειν καὶ διὸν, κ.τ.λ.] 'For we think that whether it takes place rightly or not rightly will make a great, nay all the difference to the state.' Cp. Phaedo 79 E διὰ καὶ παρατί, Laws xii. 944 C διαφέρει δὲ διὸν ποιν καὶ τὸ πάν.

φέρειν... γεγομένων] sc. τῷ τῆς περὶ ταύτα κοινωνίας.

ἐπειθῇ... πολιτείᾳ] 'But now as you are taking in hand another form of government.' For ἐπιλαμβάνονθαι in this sense cp. Soph. 217 B λόγων ἐπιλάβου παραπλησίων, κ.τ.λ.

ἀμλεί] 'Never mind!'—'without more ado,' setting aside a remark or question either as unimportant or not requiring further discussion. Cp. iv. 422 C and note 'Ἀμλεί, ἐφη, οὕτων ἂν γίνοντο θαυμαστῶν: and vii. 539 E 'Ἀμλεί, εἰπον, πέντε δὲ.

ἐπιλαβόμενοι μου] 'In laying hands upon me.' The word is repeated in a different sense, for which cp. especially Prot. 329 A μακρὸν ἥκει καὶ ἀποτείνεις, εἰ δὲ ἐπιλάβηται τίς, 'unless someone lays hold of it.'

δωπερ ἡ ἀρχής] 'As if we were just beginning,' cp. i. 348 B.

ὡς τότε ἐρρήθη] iv. 423 E.

ἄ... παρακαλοῦντες] Either (1) 'and in now calling in this fresh argument,' or (2) 'and in now urging me to this.' In the latter case the antecedent is to be gathered from the general sense
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of the preceding words (sc. ταῦτα πάλιν διαλέθειν) and ἄ is cognate accusative.

450 δοσὺν ἐσμὸν λόγου] For the image cp. Cratylus 401 ε ἐκπευθέρα τι σμῆνος σοφίας.

τί δέ; ἢ θ' θα... ἀκουσμένους] χρυσοχοῖν, literally, 'to smelt ore for gold.' The word had also acquired the sense of 'to go on a fool's errand,' 'to be imposed upon,' the origin of which Suidas and Harpocration explain in the following manner: A report was once spread about at Athens that there was on Hymettus a great quantity of gold dust guarded by warrior ants. The Athenians went armed out to seize the treasure but were worsted and returned home without accomplishing their purpose. Cp. the parallel expression in English—' to seek for the philosopher's stone.'

μέτρων δέ γ'] In book vi. (498 b) such discussions are not merely confined to this life, but are supposed to be continued in another, when the soul is reborn to the world: πείρας γὰρ οὖ όδυν ἀνήσομεν, ἔως ἢν ἡ πείσωμαι καὶ τούτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ προβρούσιοι πονηρῶσαι εἰς ἑκείνῳ τῶν βίων, δόντα όδυν γενόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχουσι λόγους: Theaet. 173 c: Polit. 283. δικείσθαι is an epegegetic infinitive.

αλλὰ... ία] 'but never mind us,' i.e. never mind inflicting on us a discourse of immoderate length, referring to μετρῶν γε.

C

ἲ δὴ ἐπιποτοτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι] 'Which is generally thought to be the most troublesome part of education.' ἐπιποτοτάτη, sc. τῆς τροφῆς. Plato dwells on the importance of the very earliest training in Laws vii. 792 a. See especially the words ἐστι δὲ ὁ χρῶσ αὐτος τριῶν οὐκ ἐλάπτων ἐτῶν (i. e. the three first years of life), μύριον οὐ συμκρᾶν τοῦ βίου διαγείρει, διὰ χεῖρον.

πειρῶ* ήγ] The choice lies between this correction of πειρῶ ἂν, the reading of Par. A, and πειρῶ οὖ, the reading of ΠΙΜ. Cp. iv. 431 b: Symp. 221 e.

οὐ δὲ διδού... ἀπειστήσηται] καὶ ταῦτα refers to ὡς ἄριστ' ἄν εἰθ ταῦτα. For εὐδαιμον in the sense of 'blissfully ignorant,' cp. iv. 422 ε εὐδαιμον ἄγο, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οἰ διε, κ.τ.λ. and note.

Great preparations are made for the introduction of the new social system. First, Socrates is disposed to pass over the entire subject. After he has been detected in this little trick he will only proceed at the earnest request of the company, who are willing to take upon themselves the entire responsibility. He anticipates all
the ridicule which the common sense of mankind has agreed to
heap on the attempt to overthrow the first and simplest of human
institutions. At each fall of the wave the sound of laughter is
resounding in our ears, until the greatest wave swallows up all, and
the Republic, which was originally a Dorian state, reappears as
a kingdom of philosophy.

μὴ εὖχη δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος] Cp. infra 456 c οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατα γε
οὐδὲ εὖχαίς διότι ἐνομοθετούμεν.

dμοι] not ἰμαυτῷ, because the object is to be distinguished from
the subject of belief. The repetition of the same word adds point.

καλὸς εἶχεν] The omission of ἄν gives emphasis to the apodosis,

περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων] ‘About matters dear to us, and
of the highest importance’ (such as family life).

ἀσφαλές καὶ θαρραλέον] ‘A thing safe and giving confidence,’
i.e. a thing which may be done with safety and confidence. The
epithet θαρραλέος, commonly used of a person who possesses confi-
dence, is here applied to a thing which inspires confidence in the

οὐ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν is an explanatory infinitive after φοβερὸν τε καὶ
σφαλέρον—‘not at all as to incurring ridicule.’ The phrase γέλωτα
ὀφλεῖν recurs in vi. 506 D ἀλλ' ὃπερ μὴ οὖχ οἶδ' τ' ἔσομαι, προθυμοῦμενος
dὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω.

κείσομαι] ‘I shall be overthrown.’ Cp. Euthyd. 303 A ἄστερ
πληγεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἐκείμην ἄφωνος: Ar. Nub. 126 ἀλλ' οἴδ' ἐγὼ
μίντοι πεσών γε κείσομαι. The future indicative follows μὴ by
a slight anaclusth arising from the common tendency to revert
to the more direct form of expression.

προσκυνοῦν δὲ ... ὀδ μᾶλλον λέγειν] ‘And I bow to Adrasteia
touching what I am about to say.’ The involuntary homicide
prays Adrasteia to bear witness that he could not help his act,
and Socrates is in a like evil case. Cp. Aesch. Prom. 936 οἱ
προσκυνοῦντες τὴν Ἀδραστείαν σοφοὶ. The slightly archaic form
ἀπατῶν (cp. λυμεῖν) adds to the mock solemnity here and infra B.

ἀληθῶ γάρ ... νομίμων πέρι] ‘For I do indeed believe that to
be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver
about the beautiful, the good, and the just, in the matter of laws.’

Republic
V.
450
C

D

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Schneider joins the words καλῶν τε καὶ ἄγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων with νομίμων, but is inclined to cancel δικαίων. Several MSS., with Ven. ξ, read δικαίων καὶ νομίμων περὶ.

δόστε εὗ με παραμυθεῖ] (1) ‘So that you console me well.’ This at first sight appears to be a contradiction of the words καλῶν εἰς τὴν παραμυθία, at 450 ε. The apparent difficulty has led the scribe of q to insert οὖν after δόστε. Socrates had rejected the consolation when first offered, and now, without much point, he is supposed to repeat his refusal. The reading of the text, in which the other MSS. agree, gives also a better sense. Socrates ironically accepts the consolation which he had previously rejected. The ironical emphasis is more pointed than the simple negative would have been. Cp. the ironical use of καλῶν in iii. 406 β καλῶν ἢρι τὸ γίγαντ, κ.τ.λ. ‘You are indeed happy in your attempt to console me!’ This is better than (2) making the words equivalent to εὗ ποιεῖς ὅτι με παραμυθεῖ (‘You do well in endeavouring to console me’) which loses the reference to the point of Glaucon’s remark, οὗτο ἀπιστοὶ οὐκ δύναντες ἔκοισιμον.

αλλ’, ὁ Σώκρατες, έφη ... εἰπερ ἐκεί, καὶ νάδε] The first αλλα is adverbial to the remark of Socrates about the risk which he is running, the second αλλα is a repetition of the first with the addition of a request. Both are resumed in the third αλλα, which implies that Socrates adopts Glaucon’s point of view in opposition to his own.

ἀφίμεν ... καθάρων εἶναι] ‘We acquit you both as guiltless of our blood, so to say, and as not our deceiver.’

αλλα μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Well, it is true that in that case, said I, the man who is acquitted is clear as the law says, and if in that case (i. e. in the case of the homicide) it is likely that he will be so in this’ (i. e. the case of involuntary deception).


Our guardians have been compared to watch-dogs. Now in training these, we make no difference between male and female, except that we do not expect the female to be quite equal to the male in strength.

In applying this general principle we must be prepared for ridicule, especially when we insist that the women, like the men,
must strip for gymnastic exercises. But we may remember that when this custom was first introduced among the men, the wits of that day had their opportunity, and no doubt made use of it. Yet experience and common sense have proved too much for them.

ιούνιν] sc. ημίν. For the idiomatic dative cp. infra 452 c πορευτέων... δευθείσαι, κ.τ.λ.

ἀκολουθήμεν... ἀποδιδόμεν] ‘Let us follow out that hint in the matter of the birth and training which we assign to our women, making it similar (to that of the watch-dogs) and then consider whether we deem it suitable or not.’ The subject of πρέπει is τό τήν γένεαν καὶ τροφὴν παραπλησίαν ἀποδίδομα gathered from the previous words.

eι ημίν πρέπει] ‘If we find it suitable.’ Cp. especially infra 462 Α δρα... εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱχνος ημίν ἀρμότει.

ἀπερ ἄν... φιλάττωσι] ἀπερ is cognate accusative: ‘In those duties of guardianship which are performed by the males.’

κοινή, ἐφι, πάντα] sc. οἴμεθα δέιν αὕτας πράττειν.

ὡς ἀθενεστέρας] The subject, τὰς θρειάς τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν, is sufficiently indicated by the previous sentence.

παρά τὸ έδος] sc. πραττόμενα, which is absorbed in λεγόμενα.

eι πράξεται η λέγεται] Cp. iii. 389 D ‘Εάν γε, δ' ἦς, ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα τεληται, where see note.

οὐ μόνον τὰς νέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ η ἡ τὰς πρεσβυτέρας] Said with a slight hyperbaton (which adds emphasis) for τὰς η δὲ πρεσβυτέρας.

ρυσοι] sc. δινεῖς.

ὀδοκοῦ, ἢ δ' ἔγω, κ.τ.λ.] The uncompromising tone of this passage may be contrasted with the greater respect for public opinion which is shown in Laws viii. 834 D θρειάς δὲ περὶ τῶν νόμων μὲν καὶ ἐπιτάξεως οὐκ ἄξια βιάζοντα τῆς κοινωνίας εἶν δὲ εἰ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν παθημάτων εἰς έδος λόντων ἡ φύσει ἐνδίκηται, κ.τ.λ.

περὶ τὴν τῶν διπλῶν σχέσιν] ‘as to their bearing of heavy arms.’

πορευτέων, κ.τ.λ.] Plato’s theory of female education, though at variance with modern ideas, has points which are worthy of attention.

(1) He considers the subject independently of existing practice, and with reference to the difference of sex only. He implies (2) that
bodily health and strength, and the training which gives them, are equally necessary for both sexes. (3) Also that men and women have the same interests and duties, and are capable of the same occupations in a greater degree than the customs of society allow. (4) That false delicacy is not a good foundation either for manners or morals. The error of Plato seems to arise from not considering the other differences to which the difference of sex gives rise in mind and feeling. He has forgotten that ‘women’s best education is the training of their children.’ He has lost sight also of the fact that education is relative to character, and the character of women is necessarily formed by the universal opinion of mankind. The merit of seeking to give them position in an age in which they were comparatively degraded must certainly be conceded to him. Modern philosophy would ascribe to them equal powers of different qualities:

‘For woman is not undeveloped man,
But diverse.’

Plato has made a considerable step in advance of the ancient world by assigning to them unequal powers of the same quality: as the poet elsewhere sings:

‘Woman is the lesser man.’

to traxo to w mou] For an analogous phrase cp. viii. 568 c pro to aanteis twn politeivon.

depheiso te tostw] sc. hymin.

od polis xronos de o, k.t.l.] Cp. Hdt. i. 10: Thuc. i. 6, § 5.

panta taota and panta ta toiauta refer partly to the ludicrous image called up supra otan mousi, k.t.l.

kai to en tois ofthalamious . . . evdeiexato, k.t.l.] ‘Then the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the arguments which showed what was best, and this (i.e. the disappearance of ridicule) showed that he is a fool who thinks anything else ridiculous,’ &c. The first kai is intensive, marking the correspondence between men’s experience and the change in their opinions. This was an instance of the folly of ridicule not grounded in reason.

mataios de yeloiouch, k.t.l.] Ridicule is not ‘the test of truth’ or goodness, but the test of strength, the detector of some flaw or inconsistency or pretension or deviation from custom in
character or action. 'Man is a laughing animal,' and reason uses this power no less than that of speech as the expression of herself, finding in the pleasure of laughter a ready opening at which wisdom or wit may enter in. But the alliance, though capable of a serious purpose, is partly fanciful and humorous, and cannot always be constrained, as Plato seems to imply, for the sake of some political or moral end. Ridicule has more influence on manners than on morals;—is more concerned with the outward surface of life and society than with the inner nature of man, having a free touch and passing lightly from one topic to another. Ridicule is the enemy of superstition and sentimental feeling; and the employment of such an instrument on serious subjects is not always to be deprecated as hurtful; there is nothing of which hypocrisy is so much afraid, nothing which better sifts the weaknesses of human nature. Successful ridicule (1) depends on a certain force of character or ready tact in the person who makes another ridiculous: (2) it requires either an object of attack which is sensitive to ridicule, or (3) public opinion which supports the assailant. A rude justice is the result, in which perhaps a certain degree of injustice may be concealed by the excellence of the jest. On the other hand, the greatest minds, one of whose proper works is to help and free others from scorn, are perhaps incapable of using the weapon of ridicule as they are also incapable of being made ridiculous. Compare Arist. Eth. Nic. iv. 8, 9.

καὶ καλὸν αὐτὸ σπουδάζειν] is the reading of the majority of the MSS., which yields a tolerable sense—'and who again aims seriously at any standard of nobility which he sets up for himself, except the good.' Schneider reads ἧ σπουδάζει, omitting καὶ καλὸν. Others make πρὸς ... σκοπῶν depend on στησάμενοι, 'having set himself to some other aim.' (Jebb on Soph. Ant. 299.)

But the first aorist middle of ἵστημι, unlike ἴστασθαι, requires an object. This may be supplied in one of two ways, (1) supposing the expression to be metaphorical, sc. τὸ τόκον: cp. the absolute use of ἐπιστῆσαι, sc. τὸ ἄρμα; or (2) as above, σπουδάζει πρὸς ... σκοπῶν, στησάμενοι (αὐτῶν), 'with any other aim which he proposes to himself.' The word ἵστημι is used of setting up a mark, although ἄφενος would be more usual. Cp. Hom. Od. xix. 573, 574:

τοὺς πελέκειας, τοὺς κεῖνοι ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐςιν
ἵστασθ' ἵφειν, δρόμους δὲ, δώδεκα πάντας.

The conjectural omission of πρὸς (W. H. Thompson on Gorg. 474 d)
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is plausible, but not necessary. For the epexegetic participle cp. iii. 397 C ἔναρξασσαντες.

452 E-457 B

The only question of any real moment is whether the female sex in man is capable of sharing in the duties which we assign to them. For our first principle is that our citizens, all and each, shall do the work which is suited to their several natures. A controversialist will say that men and women differ, and therefore that the pursuits assigned to them must differ. But in the spirit of controversy such a one omits to ask whether the difference of nature has anything to do with the particular work in question. One cobbler may have a shock of hair and yet another who is bald is not disqualified from cobbaging. Now the difference of sex is limited to the function of procreation, and this lies quite apart from government and war. In point of fact women can do all that men do, though as a rule they cannot do it so well, and men can do all that women do (even to weaving and the baking of cakes), and as a rule, when they do it, they do it better. And there are the same differences amongst women as amongst men. One has a taste for medicine, another for music. And we may presume that some of them, though not all, have capabilities for war and government. These ought to be selected as companions and helpmates for the highest class of men, and to share in the same occupations. In giving them also the same education in music and gymnastic we have been legislating according to nature.

This is contrary to present custom: but is it possible? Is it the best course? We have shown that it is possible. And if the men whom we have chosen and educated are better than the other men, will not the chosen women, similarly educated, be better than other women? And is it not best to provide for the existence of the best possible men and women in a community? Our women, then, shall not shrink from physical exercises nor from war, although we shall assign to them the lighter duties in both pursuits, because of the comparative weakness of their natures. Our standard of excellence and grace, in this and all respects, shall not be Custom, but the highest Utility.

452 E φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἡ θήλεια] 'Female human nature.' The words ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη, to which Cobet objected, keep up the analogy between man and the other animals which runs through the passage. Cp. supra 451 D, E.

453 A καὶ τούτῳ δὴ . . . ποτέρων δοτίν;] 'And to which of the two
classes (the class of things they can or cannot share with the men) is this duty of warfare to be assigned?'

τις κατοικίσεως] sc. τής πόλεως, for which πόλιν is substituted by attraction. Cp. iv. 443 c and note. The reference is to ii. 369 a ff.

ὁ θαυμάσιον] 'O rare, O admirable sir,' as elsewhere, marks the wondering eagerness of Socrates at the new turn in the argument.

σοῦ δεόσομαι τε καὶ δέομαι] 'I shall have to ask you, as I now do.' For the future cp. Theaet. 164 ε κενδυνέσωμεν . . . αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

καὶ τὸν . . . ἐρρημένωσαι] Socrates has explained the views of an imaginary critic of the argument (supra λ ἵνα μὴ ἔρρημα, κ.τ.λ.). He is now asked to explain 'our own' meaning, which is not yet clear. For the word compare Soph. 246 Κήλευν δὴ τοὺς βελτίως γεγονότας ἀποκρίσασθαι σοι, καὶ τὸ λειχεῖν παρ' αὐτῶν ἀφερμένες.

ὁ μὰ τὸν Δία . . . ἵκων] 'I don't wonder at your hesitation, for by Zeus it is no easy task,' &c. The strong negation is put forward as a reason for the fear which Socrates expresses in the previous sentence:—'No indeed, that does not look easy' (which is a reason for hesitation). 'Why, no; but the truth is that whether a man tumbles into a swimming-bath or into a mighty ocean, he swims all the same.' The real order is, ὅ γὰρ εἰκόλη ἵκων, ὁ μὰ τὸν Δία. But the eagerness of the speaker brings the oath to the front. Cp. Parm. 131 ε ὅ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, ὁ μοι δοκεῖ εἴκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐθαρίσθαι. οὐ εἰκόλη = χαλεπῆ. Cp. i. 348 ε.

ἀν τὸ τις . . . νεὶ αὐθεν ἔττον] is perhaps the first suggestion of the image of the wave which is distinctly mentioned infra 457 b ff. The word διανεύκαμεν iv. 441 c. has prepared the way for it. A similar figure occurs in the Laches, 194 c ἵθι δῆ, ὁ Νείκια, ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειραμάτωμεν ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσι βοήθησον. Cp. Eurip. Hipp. 469, 470 έ δὴ τὴν τύχην | πεσοῦσ' δορνή σοι πῶς δὲν ἐκνεύεσαι δοκεῖς;

ἐπιστόρυ] lit. 'hard to come by': cp. ii. 378 ἅλλα τί μέγα καὶ ἐπιστόρυ δύμα, 'some unprocurable victim.' σωτηρίαν is the subject of some more general word than ὀπολαβεῖν, e.g. φανῆι.
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453 E

The imperfect tense seems preferable, as the reference to the former argument is so pointed here, although ὠμολογοῦμεν, the reading of Par. A, is also possible. The present might convey a general statement. Cp. supra B ὠμολογοῦμεν...

τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις] ‘The aforesaid different natures.’ τὰς δὲ ἄλλας is to be explained with reference to ἄλλην φύσιν in the preceding line. The verbal ambiguity is obviated by the clearness of the context. So in Soph. O. T. 845 τοῖς πολλοῖς is not ‘the many’ or ‘the greater number,’ but ‘the plurality of persons which the previous description implied.’

ἡ γενοία ... (454 A) πρὸς ἄλληλους χρώμενοι] That is to say, People make oppositions of words, because they do not understand the differences of things. Our argument hinged upon the opposition of ‘some’ and ‘other’; but we never considered in what sense each of these terms applied to the difference of sex. There are various species of difference — ἐίδη τῆς ἄλλωσιν (454 c) each appertaining to some particular quality or capacity (πρὸς τὰ τείνοντα), e.g. height, strength, &c.; and because people differ as participating in some particular species of difference, we must not conclude that they differ in toto, depriving ‘different’ as applied to them of all real significance.

Compare Soph. 218 c δὲ δὲ δὲ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πράγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον συνομολογήσασθαι χωρὶς λόγου: Theaet. 164 c ἀντιλογικὸς ἐοίκαςμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀρματῶν ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιοῦτοι τοις περιγινόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἅγαπαν, καὶ οὐ φάσομεν ἄγανοιται ἄλλα φιλόσοφοι εἴναι λαβάνουσεν ταῦτα εκεῖνος τοῖς δεινῶς ἄνθρακες που-όντες: Polit. 285 A, B: Soph. 259 D ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα ἀποφαίνειν ἀμὴ γε τῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ταῦται καὶ τῷ μέγα σμερὰ καὶ τῷ ὅμοιον ἄνθρακαν, καὶ χαίρειν οὐτω τώπιστα ἄει προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὕτω τὶς ἔλεγχοι οὖτοι ἀληθινῶς ἀρχετοί τῶν ὁμοίως ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος ἁγεμένῳ διν.

454 A


κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὅμως διώκειν] Either (1) as in the translation ‘pursuing a merely verbal opposition,’ or (2) (as suggested by Mr. J. Solomon) ‘assailing,’ or ‘holding in chase, what is a mere verbal contradiction.’ For the latter cp. Theaet. 166 D τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐ μὴ τῷ ῥήματι μου δίωκε.

B τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν φύσιν] μὴ is the reading of Ven. X and the old
editions, and is probably right. 'We might valiantly and contentiously insist upon the verbal truth that the nature which is not the same (i.e. the female nature) ought not to have the same pursuits (i.e. as the male nature), but we never considered at all what was the nature of the sameness and difference which we were then distinguishing and whereon it was related.' The reading of the other MSS, A Π M &c. τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν, κ.τ.λ., can only mean, 'the nature which was in fact the same we argued in our contentious manner to be incapable of the same pursuits.' But the words τὸ ... τυγχάνειν are simply a restatement of the objection in 453 B, c that men and women having different natures should have different pursuits, while the assertion that men and women share the same human nature would be out of place. And the opposition of μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν, is more like Plato than the conjectural reading τὴν ἄλλην (Baiter).

ἐπεσκεφάλεθα δὲ ... (c) μὴ τοὺς ἐπέρων] We spoke of the same and other, but we did not define the meaning or object of the difference. Bald and hairy men are different; but no conclusion can be drawn from this that because the bald man is a cobbler the hairy man is not to be a cobbler. Plato is well aware of the value of a ludicrous illustration. Cp. infra 474 E: vi. 495 E: Theaet. 149 A.

μὴ δὲν κομῆται] sc. σκυτοσκομέν.

τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπέραν] ὁ αὐτὸς and ὁ ἐπέρας are here generalized. Cp. Theaet. 190 c.

ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρικὸν τὴν ψυχήν δυνα] This reading has weak manuscript authority (q B'), but is probably right, the older MSS. having been misled by the apparent dittographia. Par. A has ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρικὴ τὴν ψυχήν δυνα: others (Vat. Θ) give ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρικὴ τὴν ψυχήν ἐχοντα by a further corruption. K. F. Hermann approved of ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρικὴ τὴν ψυχήν δυνα, 'a man and woman gifted with medical talent' (cp. infra 455 E), but Plato could not be guilty of the clumsiness of assuming at the very beginning incidentally the general proposition which he has to prove, viz. the aptitude of women for all pursuits. Others have proposed ιατρὸν μὲν καὶ ιατρὸν τὴν ψυχήν δυνα, which is adopted by Bekker, and may be supported by comparing Xen. Mem. iii. 1, 4 ὁ μαθὼν ἰασθαι κἀν μὴ ιατρῷ ἐμός ιατρὸς ἦσσιν: Polit. 259 A εἰ τῷ τις τῶν δημοσιευκότων ιατρῶν ἰσαίος ξυμβουλεύειν ἰδιωτέων αὐτῶς, κ.τ.λ. But
the slight alteration ιατρόν is unnecessary, and it is better not to depart further from the MSS. than is absolutely required. Schneider obtained nearly the same meaning by reading as in the text and joining τὴν ψυχήν with the second ιατρόν exclusively. But the repetition simply emphasizes identity in order to prepare for the contrast between identity and difference. ‘If two men have each the soul of a physician, we meant to say for example that they have the same nature’ (however different they may be in other respects); ‘if one have the soul of a physician, and the other have the soul of a carpenter, we meant to say that they have different natures’ (however else they may resemble one another). The singular δύνα is accounted for by attraction to the nearest word.

πρὸς τέχνην τινά] ‘in regard of fitness for some art.’ Riddell, Digest, § 128.

ὅσ πρὸς δ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, κ.τ.λ. ἧθη εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διὸ ποῦ σκόμμια δὲιν εἰς πρὸς δ λέγομεν.

δισερ αὐτό διέλγων πρότερον διέλγεσ] supra 453 c ‘Ὡς μὲν ἔξαιφης, ἔφη, οὔ παν ρήμαν.

καὶ τῷ μὲν . . . (c τῷ δὲ ἐνναύον;) Strength of body is needed for strength of mind. Cp. vi. 498 B τῶν τῶν σωμάτων, εὖ δεῖ μαλαστάναι τα καὶ ἄρδροιται, εὖ μάλα ἐμπελειδεῖα, ὑπηρεῖν φιλοσοφία κτώμενον: Protag. 326 B ἐ̂τι τοῖνυ πρὸς τοῖς τοῖς εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμποντος, ἢν τα σώματα θετεῖν ἔχονται ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οἰσθ.

οἴς . . . ὀρίζου] For the dative cp. ii. 376 B συνέσει τα καὶ όγοι ὀριζόμενον τῷ τῷ οἴκειν καὶ τῷ ἀλλότριον. The imperfect tense alludes to what was implied in the objection, ‘you meant to define,’ supra 453 B.


κρατεῖται] κρατεῖσθαι is passive, and as in a few other instances (with the meaning of ἠτάσθαι) takes the genitive (τολλῶν ἄνδρῶν) without the preposition (e.g. κρατεῖσθαι ἡδόνων Aeschin. de Fals. Leg. § 152).

Compare Cratyl. 392 c πότερον οὖν αἱ γυναικεῖς ἐν τοῖς πόλεσι φρων-μότεραι σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, ὡς τὸ ἔλον αίτειν γένος ;
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ἀλλ’ ἄφοιος . . . ἄφοιον τοῖν [ζώοιν] ‘But natural aptitudes are equally diffused in both.’ [assembly] the qualities suited for the different occupations of life. For the generic use of ζώον cp. Thes. 157 C ὁ δὲ ἄφροισματι ἀνθρωπὸν τε τίθεναι καὶ λίθον καὶ ἔκαστον ζώον τε καὶ ἐδος.

ἐν πᾶσιν δὲ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. supra 451 ζ πλην ὅς ἀθεωστίραις χρώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἵσχυροτεροῖς.

ἀλλ’ ἐστι γὰρ] It has been agreed that women must have some occupation. ‘But then (ἀλλὰ γὰρ) as we shall say, women’s capabilities differ, just as men’s do, and their occupations therefore must be similarly distributed.’

καὶ γυνῇ] sc. ἡ μὲν λατρεύῃ, ἡ δὲ οὐβ.

γυμναστικὴ δ’ ἀρα οὐ . . . (456 Α) ἐγών] ‘But is not one woman a lover of gymnastics and of war, another unwarlike and no lover of gymnastics?’ ‘I should think so.’

The reading γυμναστικὴ δ’ ἀρα οὐ, οὐδὲ is adopted by Schneider and Hermann and the Zurich editors, and is supported by the preponderance of MS. authority. The form of question is not the ordinary use of οὐ expecting an affirmative answer, but rather an ironical negation with an interrogative tone. Cp. infra 468 Β (where however the humour is more apparent): ἀλλὰ τὸδ’, οἴμαι, ἥν δ’ ἐγώ, οὐκέτι σοι δοκεῖ. Τὸ ποίον; Τὸ φιλήσαι τε καὶ φιλήσαι ὕπο ἐκάστου. The other readings, καὶ γυμναστική, ἡ δ’ ἀρα οὐν and that of σα, which Bekker adopted, καὶ γυμναστική ἀρα καὶ πολεμική, look like clumsy attempts at emendation.

ἀθυμος] ‘Passionless.’ For this use of the word cp. iii. 411 Β, 456 Α, Laws x. 888 Α.

ἡ οὖ τοιαῦταν] sc. φιλόσοφον καὶ θυμωνιδή. The instances from μονοική onwards have led the way to this.

ἐπείπερ εἰςιν ἰκανοὶ καὶ ἐγγενεῖσι] ‘Seeing that they are qualified and of a kindred nature,’ i.e. one which is at once φιλόσοφος and θυμωνιδής. In the Politicus and Laws, on the other hand, the aim of the legislator is rather to unite in marriage opposite natures that they may supplement each other.—Polit. 309, 310: Laws vi. 773 ff.

ἡκομεν ἀρα . . . ἀποδιδόναι] ‘And so we are come round to what we were before saying, and allow that there is nothing
unnatural in assigning the pursuit of music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians." Cp. Laws ii. 659 c Δοκεῖ μοι τρίτον ἡ τέταρτην οἱ λόγοι εἰς ταύταν περιφερόμενος ἡκειόν: Gorg. 521 ε ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ μοι ἡκεῖ λόγος, διστρε πρὸς Πάλαιν ἔλεγον: ibid. 517 c οὖδὲν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ δὲι περιφερόμενοι.

C ἐδχαίς δἐμοια] Cp. supra 450 ν ἡ ἐθνικὴ δοκῆ ἕιναι οἱ λόγοι.

ἡ ἐπίσκεψις] supra 452 ν.

δὲν δὲ δὴ βελτιστα, κ.τ.λ.] The possibility of our proposals has received an elaborate proof. Men and women have been shown to have a common nature and therefore it is natural to assign to them a common education and common pursuits. Whether our proposals are desirable remains to be considered.

Aristotle (Pol. i. 13, § 9), perhaps referring to Meno 71 ε, will not hear of the ascription of the same qualities to men and women: ὁδὲ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὖθ' ἅμα καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ φέτος Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἄρχικαι ἄνδρα, δὴ ὑπηρετική.

οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν ... (p) παραλαβοῦσα;) 'Then surely with a view to a woman's becoming fitted to be a guardian, there will not be one education which will make men and another which will make women guardians, especially when it has received the same nature to work upon.' The whole sentence is negativated, and the para-tactic expansion breaks from the construction with πρὸς. τοῖησει, sc. φυλακοῦντε.

D ἐν οἴδι τῇ πόλει ... τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευθέντας;) This is the most distinct allusion which is made in any part of the Republic to the education in the lowest class in the state. Cp. however viii. 547 c, where the condition of the ordinary citizens is alluded to in general terms, and iv. 421 ε, where apprenticeship is incidentally referred to. The lower classes have no real place in the Republic; they fade away into the distance.

τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ... ἀριστοι) i.e. (1) 'better than the other citizens,' as they are better than the cobblers, or (2) 'than the citizens besides themselves.' [B. J.]

καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτέν] Their devotion to public duty forbids their absorption in the nursery. This remark contains a hint of the next-coming 'wave.'

B ἀπελῆ τοῦ γελοιοῦ σοφίας δρέπων καρπῶν] σοφίας is the genitive
after καρπῶν, which is governed by δρέπων, ‘the man who laughs at naked women, plucks from his laughter an unripe fruit of wisdom,’ i.e. foolishness, ‘not knowing at what he is laughing.’ According to Stobaeus (ed. Gaisford, Tit. 304), the quotation is from Pindar, who applies the words ἄνελθη σοφίας καρπῶν δρέπων to the physiologists, the addition τοῦ γελοίου is Plato’s own. See also Phaedr. 260 c, D ποῦν τινα οἰς... τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπῶν ἄν ἐπιτρέπει τεράξειν; Jests about the gymnastics of the Spartan women such as Plato describes are found in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes (80–83).

κάλλιστα γάρ ὅτι τόσο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται] i.e. ‘this which is commonly said will ever be the noblest saying: “That the useful is noble and the hurtful is base.”’ See especially Theaet. 172 a, b, 177 d, e. The sentiment recurs infra 458 εἰσὶν ὅτι ἂν ἵπποι ὁδὸι ἐφελιμωτατοί. The future-perfect expresses permanence and absoluteness in future time.

We have escaped one wave of the sea of ridicule which was ready to swallow us up alive. But the next is still more formidable. For on the community of education and employment there follows the community of marriage. And here also the scepticism to be encountered is two-fold:—(i) Is the change possible, and (2) is it for the best? Socrates is confident upon the latter point, and proposes to take it first, leaving what is more doubtful and difficult to be disposed of afterwards. Let us build our ‘Castle in the air,’ and then consider whether we may hope one day to find a seat fit for it on the solid ground.

The women shall be first selected, then educated, and, lastly, have their duties assigned to them. Then—having their work, their quarters, and their meals in common—the two sexes cannot but be drawn together, by a more than mathematical necessity. Now order is inseparable from our first principle: licentiousness, in a city of the blessed, is a thing not to be permitted: and so the question rises, What order is to be observed about marriage-rites? Once more we may appeal to the analogy of the lower animals. In breeding hawk or hound, Glauccon is careful in the matter of selection, pairing the best-bred individuals with the best, while both are in their prime. And the same conditions ought to be applied to the breeding of other animals and of men amongst them, if the quality of the race is to be preserved. Here, then, is a point in which the wisdom of our rulers will be put to the test. For they must have recourse to the ‘medicine’ of deception, so that, without apparent constraint,
the highest privileges in the way of marriage may be reserved for the
noblest. There must be festivals and hymeneal songs proclaiming
how 'the brave deserve the fair.' And exceptional advantages in
affairs of this kind must be provided for those who distinguish
themselves in war. There will be lotteries cunningly devised, which,
unknown to the people, will effect our purpose. And there will
be magistrates, male and female, appointed to take care of the
children who are born of these marriages. The perfect offspring of
noble parents they will carry to the common nurseries and place
them under appropriate care. But the children of inferior parents,
and accidental misbirths, will be carried off by them none shall know
whither,—never to reappear. The mothers shall be allowed to
suckle their own and one another's children (not knowing the differ-
ence), as much as is desirable for their health. But there will be
wet nurses who will relieve them of any duties that might break
their rest.

It remains to define the age for marriage. In women this lasts
from twenty to forty, and in men from about twenty-five to fifty-five.
Beyond these limits either way none shall be permitted to bring forth
children for the state. Nor shall any one within the prescribed age
cohabit without permission of the magistrates. But a general
dispensation shall be given to those who are past the age, provided
that they abstain from incestuous intercourse and provided also that
if a child is born, it shall be understood that no one shall be respon-
sible for rearing it.

Now under these new laws what connexions are incestuous? Chil-
deen are not to know their real parents. But all who are born
from seven to nine months after each marriage festival will be
brothers and sisters to each other, and sons and daughters to all who
were married at that festival. These will be the prohibited degrees.

ἀλλὰ τὴν... ὀμολογεῖσθαι] 'But that the argument somehow
comes to an agreement with itself.' For the reciprocal middle
voice, cp. Phaedr. 265 ν τὸ αὑτὸ αὑτῷ ὀμολογοῦμεν: Tim. 29 c:
Laws v. 746 c.

The image of the wave, the way for which has been already
prepared (453 ν), is one of those continuous images in Plato which
also form links in the arrangement of the subject.

μεῖξον πρὸς ἀποιτίαν] 'more formidable, as more provocative of
incredulity.'
The aorist is sometimes used without ἄν in confident prediction. Cp. Protag. 316 c τοῦτο δὲ οὐτε ἀν 
μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ τοις συγγίνοιτο: Goodwin, M. and T., § 127. But 
the similarity of ἄν, ἄμ, may easily have led to the loss of the 
particle here.

λέγεις] 'Your words imply.' Cp. iv. 425 ἐ ἔγειρε, ἀφεν ἐγώ, 
βιάζωσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους, κ.τ.λ.

λόγων σύστασιν] 'A combination' (or 'coalition') 'of arguments': 
i.e. λόγου λόγος συστάσιμος. Socrates had hoped to escape from 
one of his enemies, he now finds that he has to meet both of 
them. Cp. Eurip. Androm. 1088 εἰς δὲ συστάσις [κύκλους τ' ἐξάρχη 
λαος οἰκήτωρ δεόν: Dem. κατὰ Στεφάνου Λ., 1122, l. 5 τάς αὐτῶν συστά-
σεις κυριωτέρας τῶν νόμων ἄξιοιν εἶναι.

ἐκ γε τοῦ ἑτέρου] The language is still coloured by the image 
of the 'sea of arguments.'

λοιπὸν δὲ δὴ ... περὶ τοῦ διωντοῦ καὶ μή] sc. διαλύγησθαι, or 
λόγου διδόναι, which is supplied in the next sentence (cp. infra).

ἐκασών με ἐπορτάσαι] 'suffer me to keep holiday.'

καὶ γάρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ in καὶ γάρ anticipates καὶ in 
ἐδήσεων καὶ αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ., to which it is correlative.

γενομένου] sc. ἐκείνου βούλονται. Cp. ii. 369 οὐκοῦν γενομένου 
αὐτοῦ ἢ λείς εὐπτέστερον ἢ ἐπικύροις;

καὶ δεῦτερον] καὶ implies 'there will be an opportunity of doing 
so hereafter as well as now.' Cp. iii. 400 B καὶ μετὰ δύσμονος and 
note: Soph. 254 B περὶ μὲν τούτῳ καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεφθόμηκα σαφέστερον. 
[καὶ simply='and.' B. J.]

γεγονόμενα] 'When they do take place.' Cp. supra γεγομένου.

τὰ δὲ καὶ μμομένους] sc. τοὺς κόμους, i.e. 'following their spirit.'

Cp. Polite. 300 ff., where the actual rulers are advised to 'imitate,' 
i.e. act in the spirit of, the ideal ruler.

οὐ μὲν τοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] αὐτοῖς depends on παραδόσεις, sc. τοὺς 
ἀρχοντας καὶ τοῖς ἐπικύροις.

ὅμως δὲ ἀναμεμημένων ... ἔσται] The subject of ἀναμεμημένων 
is also the subject of ἔσται. ἔσται is passive in sense.

οὐ γεωμετρικαίς γε ... ἀνάγκαις] The dative ἀνάγκαις is to be
construed with ἀναγκαία, 'necessary in virtue of': cp. Soph. 252 ὑπὸ ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀναγκαῖς ἀδύνατον. For the play on ἄναγκη, cp. vii. 527 A, ix. 531 E.

ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, δὲ Γλαύκων, κ.τ.λ.] Is Plato serious in his scheme of communism? Modern readers would like to explain this part of the ideal commonwealth in a figure only (ἐν ὑπονοίᾳ); they might imagine themselves not far off a kingdom of heaven, 'in which they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.' But the particularity of the details forbids this: we seem rather to be entering on a 'new moral world.' It may be urged on behalf of Plato: (1) that he himself acknowledges the community of women and children to be 'the second of the three great waves' or paradoxes: (2) that in the Laws the theory is not put into practice, though regarded as affording the true and absolutely perfect rule of the state, Laws v. 739 ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις, εἴτε ποιῶν θεοὶ πολεμοῦσι θεῶν αὐχεῖαν ἀλκοός πλείους ἐνός, οὕτω διαβάλλεται εἰπραμόμενοι κατακοινώσαι: (3) that the Greek sentiment about the relations of the sexes is unlike that of modern times: (4) that the family is not destroyed but merged in the state; public interests are supposed to take the place of private ones: (5) the equalization of the sexes was a great thought in that age and country, not entirely realized by any modern nation: (6) the communism of Plato has other aims than the indulgence of the passions; licentiousness is to be deemed 'an unholy thing': (7) although the physical considerations to which Plato draws our attention can hardly be dwelt upon, neither can they be safely overlooked: (8) lastly, there is a speculative interest in considering social institutions with a reference to first principles which lie beyond the range of custom and experience.

ἀρ' οὖκ εἰσὶν τινες καὶ γίγνονται ἀριστοί:] 'Are there not some who are and who prove themselves to be the best?' The same creatures form the subject of both verbs.

ἐκ τῶν ἀριστῶν] sc. γεννᾶν.

γεννᾶται] sc. (1) τὸ γεννώμενον, or (2) τὸ γίνος infra.

τί δὲ ἵππων οὗτοι] ἵπποι may be taken as a genitive of reference (with peri omitted), as in Hom. Od. xi. 174 εἰσίν δὲ μοι πατρὸς τε καὶ ἴππος, ὅν κατέλειψον: Soph. O. C. 354, 355 ματέρ' ἤγουσα πάντα, . . . ἄρουθ' ἐκρήγοθ' σώματος: this is eased by assimilation to the genitives in
the previous sentence (δρήθων...κυνών). Cp. Phaedo 78 d Ti de taw polewv kalov...; apa kata ta va ta ixei...; 

ως ἀρα... δει ἀκρων εἰναι τῶν ἀρχόντων] is a fusion of two constructions of δει: ως σφόδρα δει ἀκρων ἀρχόντων and ως σφόδρα δει ἀκρων εἰναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας.

ἐπί ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] For deception as a political medicine, cp. ii. 382 c. The order is ἡγούμεθα ἔξαρκεν ἰατρόν εἰναι καὶ φαιλοτέρον.

μὴ δεομένους μὲν... ἔθελοντων ὑπακούειν] ἔθελοντων (1) sc. τῶν σωμάτων (the genitive absolute is changed in one MS., r, to the dative ἔθελουσιν), 'when the constitution is amenable to diet:' cp. ii. 370 B and note; or (2) the subject of ἔθελοντως is personal: 'when the patients are willing to submit to regimen' [B. J.].

ἀνδρευτέρου] 'more courageous': the task of prescribing medicine is more difficult than of prescribing a diet, and therefore requires more courage in the physician.

tὸ ὀρθὸν τοῦτο] sc. τὸ ὀρθὸν εἰσὶ τῇ ψευδεὶ χρήσθαι, ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἴσαι. Socrates echoes the expression of Glaucion. Cp. supra 449 C τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο... λόγου δείται.

εἰ μὴ λεῖ... ἀκρότατον εἰναι] 'If the flock is to be of the highest quality': as above σφόδρα ἄκρων.

ποιμνὸν... ἄγη] The words are meant to recall the analogy of the lower animals (cp. Polit. 261).

tοὺς ἡμετέρους ποιηταῖς] For the sort of poetry and poets to be received in our state cp. iii. 398 a, b.

tοὺς γυναικεῖους γάμους] 'The unions which result' from brides and bridegrooms being brought together. The expression prepares for the restriction following.

tο δὲ πλῆθος, κ.τ.λ.] 'But the number of the marriages we shall place under the control of the magistrates.' For πλῆθος of a limited number or quantity, cp. Gorg. 451 c τὸς ἵχει πλῆθος (τὸ τὲ ἀρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν): Phaedr. 279 c τὸ... χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἶν μοι δοσὼν, κ.τ.λ.

On the question of population, cp. viii. 546 a, b, d. We may observe that these two passages have an apparent likeness but are not really similar in their drift. In the first, Plato supposes
a limitation to be placed upon population by the rulers to avoid excess and defect of numbers: in the second, he fears the deterioration and confusion of classes which may arise by ignorance in the rulers of the so-called number of the state or cycle of human births.

Aristotle and Plato are agreed, the latter both in the Laws and the Republic, in limiting the state by unity, μέχρις ὧν ἵνα εἶναι μία. No definite number is given in the Republic: in the Laws it is said that the number is to be regulated by the size of neighbouring states. The number finally fixed upon is 5040, which Plato praises in respect of convenience, because it was capable of such numerous subdivisions. At this number, in a passage which it is hardly possible to explain, Aristotle carps. It would require, he says, a territory as great as Babylonia to support such a vast population in idleness, to say nothing of their attendants.

πρὸς πολέμους . . . ἀποσκοπούντες] Cp. ii. 372 c εἰκαβοιμένοι πειναὶ ἡ πόλεμος (but in the present passage the notion is rather that of making allowance for losses sustained through war or pestilence): and for μῆτα . . . γίγνεται cp. iv. 423 c ὡπὸς μῆτε σμερά ή πόλει ὑσται μῆτε μεγάλη δοκοῦσα.

κλήροι δὴ τινές . . . τῶς ἀρχοντας] ‘Then, I suppose, we must contrive some ingenious kind of lot, that the less worthy person, on each occasion of uniting them, may lay the blame on chance, and not on the ruler.’

For σύνεργεις, cp. Tim. 18 φ εἰς τῶν γάμων σύνεργεις, where Plato, referring to this passage, repeats the expression, and infra 461 β μή συνεργίσεις ἀρχοντας. Cp. also the Homeric use of συνέργος in Od. ix. 425—427 ἀρσενες δίες ἔσεν . . . | τοὺς ἀκέων συνέργον εὐπρεψεσι λύγοισιν. Plato thinks that the principles which are observed in breeding animals should also be observed in breeding human beings. Hence he applies the terminology of the former to the latter. Σύνεργεις, properly used of the penning of animals, is here applied to the union of men and women. Cp. the use of the words ἐγάλη and πολιμνον supra 459 ε, and of σηκος infra c.

τῶν φαύλων ἐκείνων] The reference is to supra 459 δ τῶν δὲ φαυλοτάτων ταῖς φαυλοτάταις τοινστιν.

Ina καὶ . . . σπειροῦμαι] ‘That there may be moreover a colourable excuse for such fathers having as many children as possible.'
Notes: Book V.

καὶ ἀμα] 'and at the same time,' i.e. while we honour bravery we also reap an advantage.

eἰτε ἄμφότερα] For this adverbial accusative cp. Laches 187 λ ἡ δόμος ἡ χάρισμ ἡ ἄμφότερα.

κοινῷ . . . καὶ ἄρχαι, κ.τ.λ.] 'Offices also' (as well as education and the general duties of guardians, supra 456 ff.) 'are I suppose to be common to both women and men.' The inference on p. 456 supra only extended to the duties of guardians generally. The further consequence that the rulers will be taken from both sexes is here assumed by the way. Plato seems, however, to betray a certain consciousness that the office immediately in question might be specially suitable for women. Cp. Laws vi. 784, vii. 794, where it is actually entrusted to women.

eἰς τῶν σηκῶν] Cp. Homer, Od. ix. 219, 220, where the lambs and kids await their mothers in the pens: στείνωτο δὲ σηκαὶ | Ἄργων ἢ ἐρίφων.

τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρῶν . . . κατακρύφουσιν ὡς πρέπει] Cp. infra 461 c ὡς σῦκ ὁσὺς τραφῆς τῷ τουπτῷ. Is Plato a maintainer of infanticide? It must be admitted that the words in which he touches on this subject are not perfectly clear. First let us consider the passage supra 459 ὃ δὲ . . . τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνισθαι ὡς πλεονάκη, τοὺς δὲ φαινότατους ταῖς φαινόταται τούπτατον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἐγκα τρέφοι, τῶν δὲ μῆ, εἰ μάλλα τὸ ποιμνὸν δὲ τὰ ἀφόστατα εἶναι, 'The best of either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with the inferior, as seldom as possible; and they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in first-rate condition.' Here Plato is speaking of keeping up the breed of the guardians in perfection: but it does not necessarily follow that the weaklings or imperfect individuals must be put out of the way to accomplish this: he could have obtained his object by degradation of them to an inferior class. Nevertheless the words τῶν δὲ μῆ (sc. τρέφων) have an ominous sound, unaccompanied as they are by any explanation of what is to become of them. Still more ominous are the words in the present passage τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρῶν, καὶ δὰν τὶ τῶν ἐτέρων αὐτῶν γίγνοται, ἐν ἀρνορητέ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύφουσιν ὡς πρέπει, 'But the offspring of inferior parents, or of the better, when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious un-
known place, as they should be.' These words are meant to suggest something different from rearing the children in a pen or asylum, which Plato does not like or think it good taste more distinctly to describe. It is further stated in 461c that the children born of irregular unions between parents who have passed the prescribed limit of age, if abortion has not been already practised, shall not be reared, μάλιστα μὲν μὴ εἰς φῶς ἑκφέρειν κόμα μηδὲ γ' ἐν, ἢν γένηται, ἢν δὲ τι βιάσηται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ τροφῆς τῷ τοιῷτῳ. It may be remarked that whatever doubt may be entertained respecting the meaning of the word τρέψεω in the first of these passages, there can be no doubt as to the sense which is to be assigned to τροφῆ in the last.

All three passages occur within two pages of each other: there is therefore a strong presumption that they must be explained in the same way. It may also be fairly argued that they must be taken in the worst sense that they will bear, because Plato would naturally wish to cast a veil over an unpleasant subject. Nor can the milder view be defended by Timaeus 19 A τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἀλήθη λάθρα διαδοτῶν πόλιν: for it is not necessary that Plato should be perfectly consistent: he may have altered his mind or may have forgotten.

The Greek feeling is sufficiently expressed in a well-known passage of Aristotle (Pol. vii. 16, § 15): 'As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live, but where there are too many (for in our state population has a limit), when couples have children in excess, and the state of feeling is averse to the exposure of offspring, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation.' The occurrence of such a passage in Aristotle is a strong reason for believing that similar passages have a similar meaning in Plato. It shows that they are not in any degree at variance with Greek feeling.

On the whole we must conclude that the only reason for denying Plato to be a maintainer of infanticide is the wish to acquit him of allowing a practice so repugnant to modern Christian notions.

There are similar questions in antiquity; e.g. whether human sacrifices were practised by the Greeks and Romans, about which there is the same doubt, due to the same reticence or ambiguity, and which should probably be answered in the same way.
Notes: Book V.

τὰ εἴκοσι έτη] 'a period of twenty years.' The article, which is added according to Greek idiom with the word of number, defines the time in reference to the rest of life.

τὰ ποια αὐτῶν;] sc. τῶν ἐτῶν. 'Which years of life do you mean?' i.e. within what limits do you define the twenty or thirty years?

γυναικὶ μὲν . . . περιπεπεπτηκομιταῖον] 'For a woman, said I, the proper time (μέτριος χρόνος) is to begin at twenty years of age and to continue to bear children to the state until forty; for a man the proper time is to begin when he has passed "the swiftest prime of running,"' i.e. when his powers of running are at their highest, 'and to beget children to the state until fifty-five.' The words τὴν δευτέρην δρόμου ακμήν have also been referred to the course of life. But it is difficult to make δρόμος refer to the race of life where there is nothing in the context to suggest this metaphorical application of the phrase. In Laws (vi. 785) a man must marry, if at all, between thirty and thirty-five, a woman between sixteen and twenty.

τῶν εἴς τὸ κοῦν γεννήσεως] This qualification is added to leave room for the licence given infra c.

ἀν λαθὴ] sc. φῶς. Cp. infra c ἀν δὲ τῇ βιάσει. It is assumed that, if such a birth came to the knowledge of the rulers, the child would be at once destroyed.


ἀνέγγυον] 'unwarranted.'

καὶ ταῦτα γ' ἡδη . . . προθυμεῖσθαι] ταῦτα γε, sc. αφήσομεν. 'Before granting this permission, however, we must instruct them to use all diligence,' &c.

ἔδω γένησα] sc. κόμα, not παιδίων.

βιάσηται] sc. εἰς τὸ φῶς.

οὕτω τιθέναι] sc. τὸ γεννύμενον, 'to dispose of it on the clear understanding that such an offspring is not to be reared.'

πῶς διαγνώσονται . . . οδηγοῦ] sc. διαγνώσονται. 'How will they distinguish their fathers and daughters and the other relatives of each other whom you mentioned?' (1) 'Not at all,' i.e. they
Plato: Republic.

Republic
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will not know their own fathers and daughters, &c. in the literal sense. Or (2), as sometimes elsewhere, the negation with ἄλλα is only a stronger way of saying 'simply as follows.' Cp. iv. 424 d and note: also infra 472 b ἄλλα τι τοῦτο γ' ; ἔφη. Ὀδηγεῖν ἄλλα εἶν, κ.τ.λ. [L. C.]

Plato's 'table of prohibited degrees' appears to be the following. Brothers and sisters (except in the reserved case of a 'dispensation' from the Oracle), parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren. These terms are all relative to the common marriage of the hymeneal festival. Brothers and sisters are those born from seven to ten months afterwards; they cannot marry those who took part in the festival, who are all their parents, any more than one another; nor any one who took part in the festivals from seven to ten months before the birth of their parents.

There is no difficulty in this passage if we bear in mind that Plato uses the words parents and children, brothers and sisters in a new sense which he consistently observes. Some of the results of his arrangements he hardly saw or does not care to notice. The infrequency of the opportunity of nuptial intercourse is singular: but this is not unreasonable if it is considered that the nuptial scheme has absolutely no other object but the procreation of children: also the circumstance is to be remarked that those who were united in any hymeneal festival would rarely be born in the same year owing to the difference in the marriageable age prescribed for men and women.

μετ' ἀκινήν θεκάτω μηνὶ καὶ σβιδίων δὴ] 'After an interval of ten or indeed of seven months': an inexact way of saying, 'From seven to ten months after.' δὴ draws attention to the more exceptional case.

καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὰ τοῦτων ἐκγενε] 'Their offspring defined in the same way.' Cp. Theaet. 156 c τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δή.

Ε ἐὰν δ κλήρος ταύτης ἔως ἐπίτη] It is not forgotten that the lottery has been cunningly devised by the rulers: supra 460 A.

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The great merit of the new arrangement is that it secures the unity of feeling in the state: so that if one member suffer, the whole body shall suffer with it, and the gladness of one shall be the gladness of all.

In other states one family sorrows, another rejoices at the same
event; the rulers, though fellow-citizens, are masters, the people slaves, and even the ruling class are bound together by no tie but that of office. Whereas in our community the people regard the rulers as their protectors and are regarded by them in turn as bread-winners, and the rulers will be all one family, not only in name, but in reality.

This new institution is in keeping with the community of property which was previously ordained. And both together, by securing unanimity, will render quarrels and crimes of violence impossible in our state. Nor shall we have poor men flattering the rich, nor fathers of families harassed by petty cares, but the life of our guardians will be more enviable than that of Olympian victors. So little need we fear the objection that in forbidding them to have property we have made them less happy than the other citizens. Should any of them be moved by a low ambition and seek to appropriate the state to himself, he will learn to his cost how truly Hesiod said, 'Half is better than the whole.'

ἔς ὅ... παρὰ τοῦ λόγου] βεβαιώσωσθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου is literally 'to obtain confirmation from the argument,' which, as elsewhere, is personified. Cp. Gorg. 489 Λ μὴ φθάνεις μοι ἀποκρινόμενοι τοῦτο, Καλλίπετε, ὦ, ήδ' τὸ οὐκ ὁμολογήσας, βεβαιώσωμαι ἡ τε παρὰ σοῦ, ἄρτι ίκνον ἄρδες διαγνώσαι ὁμολογηκότος.

In what follows Plato appears to confuse the absolute unity of the state with the harmony or balance of the various elements which are contained in the state. He has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences—τὸ ἀντίθετον συμφέρων. May we not imagine some Athenian statesman or man of the world saying: 'O Socrates, did you ever see one individual who was by nature the same as another? and is not a state made up of differences of character as well as of different employments? And if you could destroy these differences by education, would you not reduce men to a powerless unity in which their best qualities are lost?' Such has certainly been the fate of religious orders, who, in a spirit not unlike that of Plato's Republic, have attempted to extinguish individual character or genius in a common interest. Cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 2, § 3 οὐ μόνον ὅ ἐκ πλείστων ἅπαθτων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἑπεὶ διαφερόντων. Cp. also ibid. c. 2, § 2; c. 5, §§ 13-17. This truth begins to find acknowledgement in Plato's regulations concerning marriage in the Politicus and Laws (Polit. 309, 310: Laws vi. 773).
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Plato: Republic.

τῆς διμολογίας [‘Of the mutual understanding or agreement,’ implied in the words ὁς ὅ γε ἐπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ... δι... βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.

ἄρα... ἡμῖν ἄμοντει] ‘If we find that it fits the impress of the good.’ For ἡμῖν cp. supra 451 δ ἐν ἡμῖν πρέπει καὶ note. δ' τοῦ δὲ διηλθομένη: sc. the community of women and children.

ή δ' γε τῶν τοιούτων ἰδίωσις... τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει;] The clause ὅταν αὐτὲς... ἐν τῇ πόλει; is the explanation of ἰδίωσις, as in the next sentence the clause ὅταν... αὐτὲς ἐμόν; is the explanation of ἐκ τοῦ.

καὶ ἡμῖν δέ... ἐχεῖ] αὐτὴ ἄρσης διοικεῖται is to be supplied from the previous sentence. The illustration then proceeds until Glaucos gives his assent and returns to the original question of Socrates (τοῦτο δ' ἐρωτάς). For the expression ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα... τεταμένη cp. ix. 584 c ὅ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν τείνοσαί... ἤδονα: Theaet. 186 c ὅ δ' ἐν τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν τείνει: Phil. 34 c, d: Tim. 64. The redundancy of ἄρα after πάσα is occasioned by the antithesis of μέρος.

ὁ αὖθεσ' γὰρ... πόλις οἰκεῖ] For οἰκεῖν as a neuter cp. iv. 421 A καὶ αὖ τοῦ εἰς οἰκεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνον τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντον: viii. 543 A τῇ μελλοῦσῃ ἄκρος οἰκείν πόλει.


ἐστὶ μὲν ποι... ἄρχοντες τε καὶ δήμως] For the use of the singular verb with a plural substantive, cp. ii. 363 A ἐκα... γίνεται... ἄρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι, κ.τ.λ. and note.

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A πρὸς τῷ πολιτάσ] sc. προσαγωγέων.

B τῶν ἄρχων] ‘with regard to the rulers.’ The genitive is at first vague, as supra 459 B τοῖς ἐπὶ ποιεῖν οἷον...; and is then brought into government with εἰ τει.
Notes: Book V. 237

τὸν μὲν οἶκεῖον . . . (c) ὁ δὲ ἱματοῦ;) ἂς The friend he thinks and speaks of as belonging to him; the stranger as not belonging to him.

πότερον αὖτοι . . . κατὰ τὰ δόματα πράττειν;) 'Will you merely assign to them by law the name of friends?' It is hardly necessary to observe that νομοθετεῖν has two constructions in the successive clauses: (1) with τὰ δόματα: (2) with πράττειν.

περί τὲ τοῦ πατέρας] The correlative phrase (καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐγγενεῖς) is deferred through the expansion of the sentence, and the lost thread is resumed in the words καὶ περὶ πατέρας . . . καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐγγενῶν, in construction with ἵππησονως.

αὐτάι σοι ἡ ἄλλη ψῆμα . . . (ε) πιθέγγυον] This resumption only regards the latter part of the preceding sentence (ἡ μὴ τοις θεῖοι . . . ἡ αὐτά), in which not the law itself, but the sanction of the law is spoken of.

δύνησον] is used intransitively like οἶκεῖον in the expression ἡ ἀματα πολιτευμία πολις οἰκεῖ (supra 462 D).

ἐφαμεν] supra 462 b, c.

κοινὴ] sc. γυναικέσια.

οὖκων μάλα μα . . . ἡγούν] As Aristotle truly remarks (Pol. ii. 1), 'mine and thine,' as well as 'father and mother,' have received a new meaning; Plato seems to forget that the legislator cannot create by new use of names the feeling of family relationship where no such relationship exists. The sweetness of the 'wine,' which is the affection of a family, has been dissolved in water (Ar. Pol. ii. 4, 7, 8).

πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ καταστάσει] 'besides the general arrangement of the state,' i.e. the other arrangements not including the community of wives and children. Cp. supra 463 a, b.

σώματι . . . δὲ ἵππη] The slight harshness of adding πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ to σώματι (cp. infra 466 D para φύσιν τὴν τοῦ βίλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν) is softened by the further addition of δὲ ἵππη λύτης, κ.τ.λ.

τοῖς πρόσθεν γε] The reference is to iii. 415 ff.

κοινῆ πάντας ἀναλίσκειν] This was implied in the institution of συνσίτια, which were a κοινῆ ἀναλίσκεις τῆς διδομένης τροφῆς (iii. 416 ff).
καὶ γυναῖκα τε καὶ παιδας ἐτέροις] sc. ὀνομάζοντας ἐμοῖν. ‘Calling a different wife and different children his own.’

ἰδιων ὄντων] sc. τῶν τε παιδών καὶ τῆς γυναικός.

δοσα γε . . . στασιᾷουσιν:] ‘They are blest with peace from all those factious dispositions which,’ &c. δοσα is cognate accusative. See Riddell’s Digest, § 2.

καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίων γε, κ.τ.λ.] The mention of offences against the person is suggested by the exception of πλὴν τὸ σῶμα in the preceding sentences. (Cp. the classification of criminal offences in the Laws, Book ix, especially pp. 879, 880.)

δικαίως ἄν εἶλεν] ‘Can have any right to exist,’ i.e. may be expected. This use is idiomatic:—cp. εἰ μὴ ἄδικο (iv. 430 B, &c.).

ἡλιξὶ μὲν γὰρ . . . δικαιῶν ποὺ φήσομεν] ‘First, I believe we shall declare it to be chivalrous and right for equals to defend themselves against equals.’ The order is φῆσομεν ποὺ καλὸν καὶ δικαίων ἡλιξὶ ἀμώνεθα ἡλικα. The dative depends on καλὸν καὶ δικαίων. Cp. Laws ix. 879 B ἡλιξὶ δὲ ἡλικα . . . ἀμυνόσθω κατὰ φύσιν ἄνω βέλους πυλαις ταῖς χερσίν. The correlative to μὲν (‘in the first place’) is supplied by μὴν infra.

ἀνάγκην . . . πιθόντες] ‘In this way we shall oblige them to keep themselves in condition’: literally, ‘setting compulsion on the care of their persons.’ The reading ἀνάγκην . . . ἐπιμελείας has the greater manuscript authority. Several variations occur: ἀνάγκη (x), ἐπιμελείας (9 supported by Stobaeus), ἐπιμελείαν (ΠΣ): the two last appear to be corrections.


πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴν νεωτέρων πάντων ἀρχεῖν] Cp. iii. 412 c.

καὶ μὴν . . . ὡς τὸ εἰκός] διὶ γε, κ.τ.λ., sc. δῆλον. Cp. iii. 407 B. ὡς τὸ εἰκός = ‘as is likely,’ is added to supplement the defective construction. For the sense cp. iv. 425 B.

δοὺς δὲ . . . βοηθαῖν] Although τὸ, the MS. reading, may be construed—‘the fear, namely, that succour will be brought,’
Madvig’s simple change of τὸ to τῶν seems justifiable. Cp. iv. 440 c.

ζυμβαίνει γὰρ οὕτως] ‘That is clearly the result’ (viz. of our institutions—ἐκ τῶν νόμων infra).

tοῦτων μὴν . . . διχοστατηθῆν] Plato, as Aristotle remarks (Pol. ii. 5, 18 ff.), seems hardly to think of the lower orders of the state. The question which is raised in the Politics has no answer: ‘Did he mean the communism of the higher orders to extend to the lower?’ There is certainly no proof that he did.


κολακείας τε πλουσίων πέντες] (1) ‘Flatteries of the rich, in the case of the poor’: κολακείας, like ἀπορίας and ἀλγηθόνος, is the accusative after λέγειν, while πέντες is in apposition (part with whole) with the nominative of ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἄν εἶνεν; the full expression is κολακείας τε πλουσίων ἄν πέντες ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἄν εἶνεν. Or (2) κολακείας gen. sing. in the same case with ἄν.


ἀπαλλάξωσι] Cobet’s conjecture, ἀπαλλάξωσι (future perfect), though in strict accordance with ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἄν εἶνεν supra, is quite needless, and the form does not occur elsewhere.

γέρα δέχονται . . . μετέχουσιν] Plato seems at first to have intended to end the sentence at τελευτήσασθε, but by an after-thought expands the word into an independent clause. Cp. Phaedr. 258 c ἦσσον ἡγείτω αὐτὸς τε αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς, καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα γεγομένῳ ταῦτα ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν νομίζομεν.


ποιοῦμεν . . . σκέφτομεθα . . . ποιοῦμεν] The optative has sufficient manuscript authority, and is therefore preferred, although the readings of Α, ποιοῦμεν (bis), σκέφτομεθα, are not impossible.

εἰ που παραπίπτοι] ‘If so be that the topic should fall in our way.’ Cp. viii. 561 B.

μὴ πὴ κατὰ . . . τῶν τῶν γεωργῶν] ‘Can it from any point of view be regarded as on a level with that of the husbandman,’ &c. Cp. Gorg. 512 B μὴ σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τῶν δικαιῶν εἶναι;
Plato: Republic.

 Republic  

V.  

466  

C  

μενεὶ...βίω] either (1) ‘he will continue in, or remain true to, this life.’ Cp. vi. 496 B πάνω...κατὰ φόσιν μεῖναι ἐν αὐτῇ: or (2) taking μενεὶ in a more general and absolute sense, ‘he will remain where he is (i.e. he will be content) when such a life is offered to him.’ (ἐντ = on condition of.)

συγχωρεῖσ] here is followed by two constructions: first by the accusative of the noun (κοινωνίαν), then by the infinitive (θεῖν, παραξεῖν). ‘You agree to the community...viz. that the women should (θεῖν)...and that if they do so they will do (παραξεῖν) what is best...’

D  

γ τεφύκατον...κοινωνίν] These words are added in limitation and further explanation of παρὰ φόσιν.

466 D–

471 C  

Here Glaucon would have reminded Socrates of the question which had been left to the last,—whether such a revolution of established custom is possible. Socrates anticipates him by subtly interposing a point of detail, which still detains them for some time. What are to be the laws and usages of war? The women will go campaigning with the men, and they will take their children with them (except those of tender age), mounted on swift and well-trained horses, under proper guidance and protection, to see the battle and to perform such services as they are fitted for. Thus, while their safety is provided for, they will learn their future occupation, and their presence will heighten the valour of their parents.

As to military discipline, the appropriate punishment for cowardice in action will be the degradation of the offender to the rank of an artisan, and if he is taken prisoner, we may make a present of him to the enemy. As rewards for eminent service in the field, there will be crowns, ovations and favours from the young and beautiful (as before said), not to mention feasts for which we have the example in Homer. Those who die bravely for their country shall be declared to be of the golden (or royal) race, and shall have divine honours paid to them, as the God at Delphi shall direct. And a similar tribute shall be assigned to those who die at home after doing eminent service.

But how will our soldiers treat their enemies? They will distinguish between Hellenes and barbarians. No Hellenic city shall be enslaved; no Hellene held in bondage. And it shall be forbidden
Notes: Book V.

to despoil the dead, both on grounds of humanity and discipline. Hellenic armour (unless by Divine command) shall not be hung as a trophy in the temples of Greek Gods. Nor shall Hellenic territory be ravaged, or Hellenic villages burnt. For the quarrel of Helle with Helle is not war, but sedition, an untoward variance between kinsmen; and it should be kept within strict bounds, not suffered to degenerate into unnatural violence. Nor should men act as if such contention were irreconcilable. In warring with barbarians, which alone is truly war, the usages heretofore practised by the Hellenes in fighting amongst themselves are quite barbarous enough.

οὔκοιν, ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ, ... (ἐ) πολεμόσονιν] 'The only question that remains, is as to the possibility of the scheme.' 'That is what I was going to suggest.' 'We need not speak about war, for it is obvious what will be the manner of their wars.'

ἔφθης ... ἐπολύφεσθαι] 'You have forestalled an interruption which I was meditating.' ἐπολυβάνεσθαι has the meaning of interrupting, taking up a conversation, cp. Prot. 318 λ ἐπολαβῶν ... ἐπεν.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, κ.τ.λ.] γὰρ introduces the reason why the possibility of the scheme is the only remaining topic (λοιπὸν supra). The real motive of the digression is an artistic one. The great peripeteia, the on-rushing of the 'third wave,' is made more impressive by being delayed.

ὅτι κοινὴ ... (467 λ) καὶ μετέρασ] The words διακοινῶν, κ.τ.λ., follow the general notion of what is fitting. They may be construed with ἔρως, but the change is occasioned by διέσει intervenning. For ἄδροι cp. Hdt. iv. 180 ἐπεὶ δὲ γνωκέ τὸ παιδίον ἄδροι γένηται.


ἀναλαβείν] here as often in later writers is intransitive in meaning = 'to recover.'

καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κείμενοι] (1) οὐκ ἄξιον is co-ordinate with σμικρόν. 'Do you think the difference unimportant and not worth some risk?' Or (2) the words οὐκ ἄξιον κείμενοι are parenthetical and are to be joined with θεωρεῖν, neglecting ἡ μῆ. [B. J.]

VOL. III.
Boys who are to be men of war.'

'This then we must begin with.'

'to begin with,' being used with the accusative as well as the genitive, is legitimately formed into a passive verbal with τούτο in the accusative. προσημηχανόσθαι depends on the general notion of duty implied in ὑπαρχεῖν.


εὐλαβήσονται] sc. ἕγειν.

ἀλλὰ γάρ] introduces an objection. 'But this is not enough. For many accidents defy calculation.' This is said in the same spirit as supra β σφαλείσθω, οἷά δὲ ἐν πολέμῳ φιλεῖ. He is careful to enumerate all the risks with the view of providing against them.

καὶ διδαξαμένους ἵππευειν] 'And when we have had them taught to ride.' διδαξαμένους is a correction of γ. Cp. Meno 93 ν θεμιστοκλῆς κλεοφαρτον τὸν νῦν ἰπτεία μὲν διδαξαπτο ἰγαθῶν. The construction of the accusative with the gerundive (διδαξαμένους . . . ἐκτέον = ἡμᾶς διδαξαμένους αὑτόν (sc. τοὺς παιδας) δεὶ ἔγειν) is quite legitimate; although διδαξαμένους would be more unequivocal here. The reading of ΑΠ Μ, διδαξαμένους, could only mean 'that they may teach themselves to ride.' But it would surely be more reasonable for them to learn to ride before they were taken on such expeditions. And the rare reflexive use in Aristoph. Clouds 127: Soph. Ant. 356 will not justify such an interpretation either of the future or of the aorist here. Another reading, διδαχθέντας, is probably conjectural. The passage is referred to in vii. 537 A.

τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον] sc. ἐσόμενον.

πῶς ἐκτεόν σοι τοὺς στρατιότατας] πῶς ἐκτεόν; = πῶς ἔγειν δεῖ; σοι is an ethic dative: 'How should you have your soldiers disposed to one another and to their enemies?'

τοῦ ἄν] sc. εἰ τὰ σοι καταφαμήσατα. [H. Richards cj. ποιὰ δῆ;]

τοῖς δέλωσι] sc. ἔγειν.

dεξιώθηκαι] δεξιώθηκαί often means 'to extend the right hand towards a person in token of admiration.' See especially Soph. El. 975, 976: Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 3 οὐδείς ἐκεῖνον τῶν στρατιώτων ὅτε οὐκ ἐδεξιώσατο, καὶ ὃ μὲν ἐστεθάνωσεν, κ.τ.λ.
Notes: Book V.

καὶ μὴ ἔχεινα [καὶ, which is omitted in some MSS., including A, may indicate the addition of a further clause to the law. ‘Be it furthermore enacted,’ &c. Cp. iii. 417 A and note.

ἀρέσεις τῶν τοιούτων] Either (1) ‘there will be more frequent selections of such men’ (τοιούτων referring to ἀγαθὸς ὠν) ‘than of others by the rulers to take part in the marriage festivals,’ cp. supra 460 A, B; or (2) ‘success in winning such prizes.’

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ καθ’ Ὀμηρον . . . (ὅ) τὴν ἵσχυν ἀδέξεις] Il. vii. 321, 322

νῶτουσ ὁ Ἀιαττα διημείκεσθαι γέραιρεν

ἲπρας Ἀπρείδης, εἰρνυκρεῖον Ἀγαμέμνων.

As in iii. 408 B and elsewhere, Socrates takes a humorous delight in supporting his opinions by the authority of Homer.

ἀς ταύτην οἰκεῖαν ὀδον τιμήν] ‘implying that this was a proper way of honouring.’

ταῦτα γε] ‘in this,’ although we refuse to follow him in other things (ii. 383 A, &c.).

τῶν δὴ] supra B, C.

καὶ κρέασιν . . . δεσπάσασι] Il. viii. 162: xii 311. This may seem a curious form of training and hardly consistent with iii. 390 A, B, &c.; but compare Laws i. 649. Plato cannot be held up as an advocate of total abstinence, but rather of moderation in the use of wine.

tοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους] iii. 415 A–C.

ἀλλ’ ὁν τεινομεθά Ἡσιόδῳ] The lines which follow are altered from Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 121 ff.:

τοί μὲν δαιμόνες εἰσὶ Δᾶς μεγάλον διὰ βούλες,

ἰσθλοῖς, ἐπίχωνοις, φίλακας θητῶν ἀθρόρων.

They occur also in Crat. 398 A, where it is inferred that Hesiod meant by δαιμόνες the wise and good. Ib. c ὅ τ' ἀγαθός ἄ δαιμόνων εἶναι, καὶ [ὡν] καὶ τελευτήσατα καὶ ὁρᾶς δαιμόνα καλεῖσθαι.

tοῦ τοιούτου] τοῦ χρυσοῦ. Cp. iv. 424 A.

τῶς χρῆ . . . τιβέναι] ‘how to order the sepulture of heroic and divine persons’: τιβέναι used absolutely for ἐς ταφᾶς τιβέναι (cp. τὸς θῆκας infra B).

τί δ' ἐπ' αὐτῶς πολεμίους, κ.τ.λ.] Plato would make a distinction in the context.

Republic

V. 468 C

469 A

B
between Greek meeting Greek and the wars of Greeks with barbarians, not unlike that which has been observed in modern times between the wars of civilized nations with one another and with Orientals or savages.

What are to be the usages of war is a question which has not received a complete solution. This is due to the comparative infrequency of wars and the variety of their circumstances. The precedents are few and there are no courts to sanction or register them. Still some shadow or reflection of law seems to watch over a state of man which in one sense is the negation of law. As in other cases in which the law of nations fails, the law of nature tends to appear. 1. In ancient times there was a faith that 'God would defend the right'; and in our own day justice has not so entirely vanished from the world, but that some plea or appearance of right also gives might. 2. As there must be a degree of justice in the commencement, there must also be some regard to the common rights of humanity in the conduct of a war: (a) so much truth and sincerity in the dealings of the two adversaries as may enable them to fight collectively; an army would cease to be an army which had no word of honour with their opponents; (b) so much humanity as is consistent with the object of war; everyone would agree that a destruction of life or property, say of an unfortified town or of helpless persons, which had no military result, was barbarous and inhuman; (c) but the question when the destruction of life and property is justified by the military result is always a matter of opinion; (d) the first thoughts of mankind regard war as a great evil, which is to be humanized as far as possible; their second thoughts lead them to doubt the 'greatest humanity principle,' as likely to multiply and protract the evil: on the other hand, cruelty or severity, which may perhaps tend to shorten wars, tends also to deprive them of their chivalry, and to demoralize those who are engaged in them; (e) neutral nations insist that the two belligerents shall not be allowed so to injure one another, as permanently to injure the world: also that they shall settle their quarrel within as narrow limits and with as little injury to others as possible. 3. An element of feeling and courtesy happily enters into the usages of war; the friendly relation of individuals is not wholly absorbed in the collective antagonism; the condition of prisoners is ameliorated, and the communications between the two parties are couched in friendly language, and are not interpreted by legal technicalities.
4. No Christian or civilized nation would willingly overstep the limits of custom. The soldier may be trained to give the most fatal wound; the engineer may invent deadly machines: but the suggestion of any new kind of death by poisoning and suffocation is revolting to the military as well as to the common feeling. With a like inconsistency, the Greek, who slew his prisoners, nevertheless restored the bodies of the slain. 5. Speculative politicians have sometimes imagined that war, which has been in some degree regulated, might be further conventionalized into a duel between armies and fleets. But the elements of war are never so completely under our control, or the situation so equal, as to admit of such a convention. International law, whether about neutral ships or goods, rights of blockade, privateering, can only be altered by common consent; and the alterations commonly affect the relative positions of different nations in the event of war. 6. That one usage of war should be maintained towards Greeks, one towards barbarians—one towards Europeans, another towards Indians or New Zealanders, may be palliated by necessity or previous wrong, but cannot be defended in theory. ‘A great nation’s little wars’ are commonly the least creditable part of her history.

ἀδικέω ... τοῦτο ἀδικεῖν] ἄλλη σ. πολει (ἄλφα). For the form of sentence cp. Theaet. 154 οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἵκερωσε, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ. For the influence of this feeling on actual Greek usages of war cp. Xen. Hellen. i. 6, § 14 κελεύοντων τῶν συμμάχων ἀποδέσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμαίους οἰκέτη (ὁ Καλλικράτιδας) ἑαυτὸν γε ἀρχοντὸς οἰδίπον ἐλλήνων εἰς τὸ ἰκεῖνον δυνάτον ἀνδραποδισθήσαται.

καὶ τοῦτο ἀδικεῖν] σ. τοῦς Ἑλλήνας. Our state is a Greek state (cp. 470 κ.) and will therefore habitually spare their own kinsmen.

τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων δουλεῖαν] ‘Their enslavement by the barbarians.’

ἄλω καὶ παντὶ] ‘altogether,’ ganz und gar. The expression is varied in different places, τῷ ἀλῷ καὶ παντὶ (Rep. vii. 527 c): τῷ παντὶ καὶ ἀλῷ (Laws v. 734 c).

μὴ δὲ ... ἐνμαχεῖσθαι;] ‘Is it just that they should not even possess a Greek as a slave and that they should advise the other Hellenes not to do so either?’ The sentence is divided by μῆτε ... ὑπε, the latter particle introducing a variation of μῆτε τοὺς ἄλοις. The infinitives depend on the general notion of ἀδικέω δικαίω, understood from the previous question.
Xenophon tells us (Hell. ii. 4, § 19) that Thrasybulus and his friends, after their victory over the thirty tyrants, ἡ δὲ νὰος ἐλαβον, τοὺς δὲ χιτώνας οὐδενὸς τῶν πολιτῶν ἐσκύλευσαν.

ἡ οὖ πρόφασιν . . . τοίς δειλοῖς ἔχει] For the use of ἔχω cp. Thuc. ii. 41 ὅπερ τῷ πολεμῷ ἐπελθόντες ἴγκακτησαν ἔχει.

tοῦ βαλόντως] 'of him who hit them,' is the reading of Par. A. Other MSS. have βάλοντος, 'of the thrower' in general, or 'of him who is throwing at them.' This passage is quoted by Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 4, § 3, as a specimen of an εἰκὼν: καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολεμείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς τεθεοῦσας σκυλεύσατε ἐκκασι τοῖς κυνιδίοις, αἱ τοὺς λίθους δάκει τῶν βαλλόντων οὐ άπτόμενα.

ἐστον . . . τῶν διαφόρουσαν διακωλύσεις] 'We must let alone spoliation of the dead, or prevention of the removal of corpses.' See Thuc. iv. 97-101 (the affair of Delium).

ἐστον μέντοι] μέντοι here implies strong assent to a proposition which alters what had previously been thought.

ἐάν μὴ τι δή, κ.τ.λ.] Plato thus avoids clashing directly with religious tradition. He will not lay down the law too rigidly, but allows an appeal against himself to the oracle of Delphi (iv. 427 B, c). See Paus. x. 10, § 3.

γῆς τε τιμήσεως] For the omission of περὶ cp. supra 459 B τι δὲ ἐπισαν οἷοι . . . ; vii. 515 B τι δὲ τῶν παρασφερομένων; οὐ τιτούν τοῦτο; and Gorg. 500 D. The correction τιμήσεως, formerly adopted by the Zurich editors ('assessment of the territory?'), is not in keeping with the corresponding clause, and is unsupported by manuscript authority. What is expressed in γῆν τέμενιν, which is forbidden, is clearly more than the removal of the year's produce, which he allows (infra d), and would include the cutting down of fruit-trees, the destruction of farm buildings and the like.

τί σοι διάσωσιν] For σοι cp. supra 468 A πῶς ἐκτίν σοι τοὺς στρατιώτας;

δότα ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ.] The article τά, which is added after ταῦτα in some MSS. (ΜΧ), throws a stronger emphasis on the verb, but makes no real difference in the sense: 'It appears to me that wars and sedition, as they are two in name, are two in reality.'

διντα ἐπὶ δυσῶν . . . τῇ τοῦ ἄλλοτρίου πολέμου] 'being applied to
differences arising in two things. And the two things I speak of are what is domestic or kindred and what is alien or foreign. Accordingly sedition is the name for the enmity of what is domestic: war, for the enmity of what is alien.' The quarrel or enmity of what is domestic and kindred = the quarrel of one state with itself: the quarrel or enmity of what is alien and foreign = the quarrel of two states with one another. For καλεῖν δομα ἐπὶ τιν c. Parmen. 147 b, Soph. 218 c: and for the use of the passive, Eurip. Hec. 1271 τῷ βφ δ' δομα σφ κεκλησται. The particle οὖν (ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν), which is omitted in a few MSS., is probably genuine. It is hardly worth while, therefore, to discuss whether the asyndeton which is occasioned by the omission of οὖν is justified by examples. The genitives are possessive or descriptive: 'where the relation is that of kindred,' 'where it is that of aliens.' For the definition of στάσις cp. Soph. 228 η τῆς τοῦ φύσει ξύγχρονας ἐκ τιμως διαφοράς διαφοράν.

καὶ οὖν γε . . . ἣτο τρόπου λέγεις] 'That is a very just mode of speaking.' ἄτι in the sense of 'away from' is accented by the grammarians as a paroxytone, a distinction however which is often neglected in the MSS.

δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ δὲ . . . λέγω] καὶ belongs in sense to τὸ δὲ.

"ἐλλήνας μὲν ἄρα . . . τὴν ἐξήραν τοιτποη κλήτων] A slight variation in the order of the text occurs here: instead of πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε . . . εἶναι, some MSS. (including Λ mg.) read μαχομένους πολεμεῖν τε in order to give τε its proper position after the main verb. But τε may follow πολεμεῖν μαχομένους as a single word.

ξυγχρο βείτοι νομίζειν] 'I agree to hold this language.'

ἐν τῇ νῦν διοικουμένῃ στάσις] 'In what people now agree in calling sedition,' i.e. in sedition as ordinarily understood, as opposed to the new meaning which Socrates has given to it, viz. the war of Greeks with Greeks. For the use of νῦν in such a connexion cp. ii. 372 ε ἐπειδή καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχοντε: vii. 529 λ ὡς μὲν νῦν αὐτήν μεταξειρίζονται οἱ ἐς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες.

ὡς ἀληθείας τε, κ.π.λ.] ὡς is substituted for ὡς at the beginning of the sentence. It is to be taken with ἀληθείας in the sense of 'how.' 'How wicked does the strife appear! and neither of the two parties seem lovers of their country.' Cp. vi. 496 c.

τὴν τροφὴν τε καὶ μητέρα κείρειν] See note on iii. 414 ε.
μέτριον εἶναι] The force of δοκεῖ is continued from above.

470 δὲ διαλλαγοσιμὸν] For the construction of διαλλαγοσιμόν see cp. i. 327 c ὡς μὲν ἀκουσμέναν ... διαλλαγοσιμόν: vii. 523 c ὡς ἐγγὺς τοῖς δραμάδος λήσωμεν μου διαλλαγοσιμον.

αὕτη ἡ διάνοια ἐκείνη] αὕτη refers to the words immediately preceding, τοὺς καρποὺς ἀδαιρεῖσθαι ... πολεμησόμενων: ἐκείνης τοῦ ἐν ἐκείνης κ.τ.λ.

ὅσο πόλιν ὀλιγός] σο is emphatic. The new city shares the nationality of Glaucon, who is playfully called the founder of it.

ἀλλ' ὁδὸν ... ἀπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐρῶν] For ὁδό in interrogations cp. supra 455 ε ὁδόν πολεμῆς;

471 σωφρονοισίων] For the significance of this term cp. Xen. Hell. iii. 2, § 23 ἔδει τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκλησίᾳ σωφρονοῖσαί αὐτούς (sc. τοὺς ἤλεείσ), and the context there.

ὅπο τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἄλγουσιν] The innocent, who are in the majority (cp. ὡς φιλῶν τῶν πολλῶν), compel the minority (cp. ἄλγουσιν ἂν ἐχθροῖς, κ.τ.λ.), for whose guilt they are made to smart, to submit.

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὡς ... πρὸς ἄλληλους] 'And they should deal with barbarians as the Greeks now deal with one another.' The irony is transparent.

In the previous clause the ingenuity of the transcriber of g has unnecessarily altered ἐναντίους into ἔλληνας. That Greeks only are intended is clear from the context.

473 C-473 C θώμεν, ἓφη ... καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν] The infinitive ἔχειν is governed by θώμεν, which is used in two constructions: 'We will lay down this law, and we will assume that this and the former enactments are excellent.' For the infinitive after τίθημι cp. i. 331 Λ ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει πλείστον ἄξιαν εἶναι.

Glaucou grows impatient of the digression and Socrates can no longer elude the advance of the 'third and greatest wave.' The new institution involves innumerable benefits, but is it possible? Can this ideal ever become real?

Socrates first pleads that such a demand goes beyond the aim proposed (ii. 368), which is to find the nature of justice in the abstract. If we have made that discovery, our success will not be
discredited, though we should be unable to show an actual embodiment of Justice answering to the ideal conception of it. It is enough to have obtained a pattern by which to judge of approximate resemblances, without seeking for absolute agreement. And if asked in what way the nearest approximation can be made, we must premise that in the nature of things all practical realisation must fall short of the ideal as conceived in thought and expressed in language.

What then is the simplest and least difficult change within the range of human possibility, by which the present hindrances to the attainment of perfection may be removed? One change there is that would effect this object, and it is not impossible, though neither slight nor easy.

ὅτι γε, εἰ γένοιτο . . . ἢ γένοιτο, κ.τ.λ.] The point to be chiefly dwelt on is put forward, leaving the construction in suspense, and the words καὶ ἀπὸ παραλείπεις ἡγα λέγω supply the apodosis: 'For as to the advantages of this form of government, if possible, to the state in which it might be possible, I add particulars not mentioned by you.' For a similar turn of expression cp. iv. 420 σα, δή ὃ ἡγα, καὶ ταῦτα γε ἐπιστώτως . . . κατηγορημα, and for παραστάμενος cp. Soph. Trach. 358 δόν νῦν παράστασις οὗτος ἢ μαλακόν λέγει.

ὅτι καὶ τὸς πολεμίους, κ.τ.λ.] As in vii. 528 ε, 537 δ, the lively imagination of Glaucon seizes on the incidental results and circumstances of the institution which is in question. γιγνόκοπτες is to be taken closely with what follows, 'acknowledging each other as brothers,' &c. Compare supra 461 c.

στραγγελευμάτω] instead of the unmeaning στρατευομένως, is the ingenious emendation of Orelli; and is also found as a correction in the Viennese MS. F: 'You have no mercy on my hesitation.' The metaphor in the word στραγγελεύομαι is taken from the falling of drops of water extracted by pressure: cp. στρεύομαι, and for the use of the word Aristoph. Nubes 131 τι ταῦτα ἵχνων στραγγελεύομαι; Acharn. 126 κάπερ ἡγα δή ἐνδοθόσα στραγγελεύομαι; This reading is confirmed by the resumption of the same idea in ἡξυντι τι καὶ ἐθεδοίη infra. στρατευομένω may have been suggested to a scribe by the association of καταδρομῆστε ἐποίησο: or possibly by the notion which Stallbaum seems to entertain that warfare is the subject in hand.
The same metaphor occurs in the Euthydemus infra 473 c'en' autò dè... eimi ò tò megistòs prosoikázomen kúmati.

δ ἐπειδὲν... ἐπιχείρειν διασκοπεῖν] ἀκόουσι still preserves the metaphor of the wave, referring to its roar. The expression διεικότως ἄρα expands the idea of συγγνώμην, 'you will make allowance for me and feel that my hesitation was natural.'

λόγον λέγειν τε] This is the reading of MΣ. The reading of Par. A, Ven. II, λέγειν λόγον τε, might be preferred as the durior lectio, but on no other ground. It is probably an accidental miswriting. The reading of the text is also supported by g corr., the first hand having written λέγειν λέγειν according to Schneider, who examined the MΣ. after Bekker.

ἐπὶ τοῦτον] sc. τοσοῦτοι ἐπὶ τοῦτον.

οὐδέν, κτλ.] As a preparation for the third and last wave, which is still impending, Socrates returns to the main object of the work, which, as he again reminds us, is the search after justice and injustice, first in the state, and secondly in the individual. The ideal of justice is not the less ideal because incapable of realization, any more than the perfection of human beauty in a picture is less perfect because there is no ideal man like the man in the picture. Therefore Socrates regards the task required of him, to prove the possibility of his state in fact, as a work of supererogation, the failure of which in in no way interferes with the truth of his speculations, and in which only a contingent and imperfect success is to be expected. The spirit of this passage may be compared with vi. 501 ff., where the relation of the ideal to the actual is again in question. In both these passages Plato talks of painters as copyists of the Idea. In Book x he speaks of them along with poets as mere copyists of the copy. The former view comes nearer to the modern notion of art as the idealization of nature than the ordinary Greek conception of μιμητική.

ἀλλὰ τί τούτο γ' ;] sc. εἰπεῖς, 'why that?'

οδήγειν. ἀλλ' ἔδει] 'Only that if.' Cp. supra 461 D οὐδομᾶς and note.

ἄρα καὶ ἄρα τὸν δίκαιον... διαφέρειν] Plato here implies that it is the nature of the actual to fall short of the ideal, and of the concrete to fall short of the abstract.
Notes: Book V.

οὕτως] 'The latter,' answering the last question.

εἰ γένοιτο] These words may be explained to mean 'whether he could be produced'; but they are then inconsistent with οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα infra d. Madvig would obviate the difficulty by omitting καί. But the tautology of εἰ γένοιτο . . . γενόμενος is then very weak, and it is better to cancel εἰ γένοιτο as a gloss on γενόμενος. Another expedient is to read ἢ (ἂν?) γένοιτο with Bekker. τελέως is omitted in Ven. II. [There is no inconsistency between εἰ γένοιτο . . . γενόμενος and ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα infra d: to inquire whether perfect justice or a perfectly just man are possible is a different thing from trying to demonstrate their possibility. B. J.]

τὴν ἔκεινος μοίραν ὀμοιότατην ἐξειν] τὴν ἔκεινος, the reading of Par. A and most MSS., 'The lot that is most like justice,' is not ungrammatical, but extremely improbable, as answering to ἔκεινος . . . ὀμοιότατος preceding. It is much more likely that ἔκεινος is due to iatricism or to an echo of the phrase μηδὲν δεῖν αὐτῆς ἔκεινος διαφέρειν in what precedes.

ἐν' ἀποδείξεωμεν] is the explanation of τούτου ἔνεκα: cp. infra τούτου ἔνεκα, ἕν μὴ ἔχωμεν.

τὰ αὖτα διομολόγησαι] Socrates in 472 D had extracted from Glaucon the admission that an artist who cannot demonstrate the possibility of the existence of a man so beautiful as he has painted is not to be considered inferior for that reason. Here, before he attempts to show the possibility of his communistic scheme, he asks Glaucon to make the same admission, in a different, it is true, and more universal form: 'That action can never come up to description.'

ἡ φύσιν ἔχει, κ.τ.λ.] 'All experience is against this, but that is no reason for doubting the truth of it,' says Euler (quoted by Coleridge) of the properties of the arch. He means that the mathematical ideal of the arch is imperfectly realized in matter. The relation of mathematics to physics is a good because a definite type of the relation of the abstract to the concrete. The ideal of the state is much farther removed from actual fact; or in Plato's words, 'action falls short of conception or expression, though some may deem otherwise.' What is true or perfect is one thing: what is possible, another. And great evils may arise from an attempt to enforce political ideals on a state of the world unsuited to them,—
the ‘respublica Platonis’ or ‘the primitive church,’ ‘in faece Romuli’ or ‘the dregs of the Gothic empire.’

For the expression φῶς ἔχει cp. vi. 489 B ὑδ. ἔχει φῶς κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι.

καὶ εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ;] i.e. though it may seem an inversion of the recognized opposition between λόγος and ἔργον. ἀλλὰ σὺ is an appeal from common opinion to the judgement of Glaucon.

καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δεῖν] δεῖν is pleonastic, expanding ἀνάγκας.

φάναι] is the common use of the infinitive for the second person of the imperative (like φάσεσθαι in poetry). Cp. vi. 508 B τοὺς τοῖς ... φάναι με λέγειν, and 509 B καὶ τοῖς γεγομένως τοῖς μὴ μόνον τὸ γεγομένου εὐνοεῖν φάναι, κ.τ.λ.

A σῷ ἑπιτάττεις] sc. ἐξερχεῖν ὡς δυνατὰ διὰ γένους, ‘which you bid us find to be capable of coming into existence.’

ὡς ξοίκε, πειρώμεθα] πειρώμεθα is probably subjunctive: cp. Theaet. 173 C λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ξοίκε.

The change required is nothing short of this. Either kings and rulers must be philosophers or philosophers kings. Until that is effected, there can be no happiness for individual or state.

This is a hard saying, and to escape from the consequences of having uttered it we must distinguish whom we mean by ‘philosophers.’

ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ ... κατακλύσειν] For ἐπ' αὐτῷ ... εἶμι cp. infra 476 B ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν ... λέγειν. The pronoun is used as in Soph. O. T. 1169 πῶς ἀντὶ γ' εἴμι τῷ δεῖνα λέγειν. The metaphor of the laughing wave is perhaps the most audacious in Plato; the wave which has been following us throughout the book, since our first plunge, supra 453 B, is at last turned into a roaring sea of ridicule.

εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν] ‘But the word shall be spoken, come what may.’

ἐὰν μὴ ... (ε) διεληλύθαι] (Cp. Laws iv. 710, 711, where a wise and virtuous despotism is affirmed to be the best basis of legislation: εἰ τύραννος γένοιτο ... νίος, σωφρων, εὖμαθής, μνήμων, ἀνδρείος, μεγαλοπρεπής).

In this celebrated sentence Plato expresses the real unity of
practical and speculative life. Everywhere they seem to diverge—
in politics, in religion, in the characters of men; but the principle
which unites them lies deeper than the divergences. One is
subject to the idols of the tribe, the other, of the den; the one is
of this world, the other not of this world: the one is strong within
a limited range, the other has a feeble intelligence of all things.
The philosopher, in the description of the Theaetetus (173 ff.),
may hardly recognize the existence of his fellow-creatures: the
lawyer or politician in the companion picture (ib. 175) often
knows only a narrow and debased section of human nature, and
is as much out of his element in extraordinary circumstances as
the philosopher is in common life. And there are false ways in
which the two elements may be reconciled—in the doctrinaire
(Euthyd. 395), in the pseudo-philanthropist, in the political idealist,
or in any premature and superficial attempts to rest society on
a liberal and philosophical basis. There is a real reconciliation of
them when the king is also a seer, or the statesman in the highest
sense is a philosopher, equal to the immediate present, rising also
into the more distant future. The words of the text may also be
regarded as a sort of Greek prophecy of a millennium: ‘I heard
a voice crying, The kingdoms of the world are become the
kingdoms of wisdom and truth.’

The passage is the keystone of the Republic. In other writings
of Plato the speculative is divorced from the practical: in the
Republic there is an attempt to unite them. The philosopher is
no longer an isolated being who lives in contemplation; he
descends from his ‘mountain heights’ to dwell among his own
people, and in ‘his father’s house,’ ‘if there is such a home upon
the earth’ (ix. 592 b).

οἱ βασιλῆς . . . λεγόμενοι] It is implied that the actual rulers of
the world are not true kings.

καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦταν συμπερι] ‘And unless these two, political
power and philosophy, meet together in the same.’ Two things are
here spoken of which coalesce in one. In the form of the sentence
their coalition is anticipated. Cp. iv. 435 Α and note.

εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν] ‘so far as is possible,’ in the nature of things.
Such touches of moderation (in accordance with supra 472 ff.)
occur in the most ideal passages of Plato. Cp. especially Symp.
212 Α καὶ εἰπερ τῷ Ἀλεπρὸς, ἀνθρώπῳ κακίνῳ: Phaedr. 253 Α
καθ’ ὅσον δυνατὸν δεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν.
It may be asked whether there has ever been a period in which this dream of the Republic has received a fulfilment: in the course of ages, as Plato pathetically asks, may there not have been a king who was also a philosopher? Some would add a further condition, not only that the king should be a philosopher, but that he should rule over a people fitted to receive his institutions. The names of the philosophical Roman emperors naturally occur to us; as has been truly said, one of the greatest blessings to the world would have been the adoption of Christianity by Marcus Antoninus instead of by Constantine. Still nearer approaches to a philosopher-king may be found in the legislators and princes of the East: Zoroaster, Sakya Muni, in the Mahometan emperor Akbar Khan, in our own Alfred the Great or the Mexican Montezuma.

Nor have there been wanting in our own day one or two who have shown a remarkable union of philosophical genius with military and political insight. Compare the ideal of the Puritans and the French Protestants.

χαλεπόν γὰρ ἰδεῖν] 'It is given to few to perceive.' Cp. Phaedo 62 B ὅ... λόγος... μέγας τε τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὗ βρέθηκε διδάσκειν. χαλεπόν is used of an excellence rarely attained: cp. Theaet. 144 A ὁς ἄρη χαλεπόν.

καὶ 55, Ἡ Σωκράτης, κ.τ.λ.] We are reminded of the manner in which the upholders of paradoxical or revolutionary ideas are threatened with popular hostility in Aristophanes, e.g. Birds 310 ff., Wasps 400 ff., and Acharnians 280 ff.

The famous words are introduced with great circumstance and preparation. The expectation has been raised by the image of the wave; at last the time has arrived for the revelation of the overwhelming truth. The real solemnity of the revelation is instantly broken by the ludicrous outburst which follows. Socrates admits all the consequences which are urged, and gravely charges them upon his companion. The companion promises to help with good wishes and encouragement, which are all that he has to offer; and Socrates, having such a champion to support him, takes heart, and, still relieving the discourse by ludicrous imagery, proceeds to the description of philosophy.

διαδηλών] 'distinguished,' i.e. from those whom we do not mean.
The philosopher loves wisdom in its entirety. His desires are fixed on universal truth: not as seen in the concrete, but as known in the abstract. For between knowledge and ignorance there is an intermediate faculty of sense or opinion (δόξα), and between being and nonentity there is an intermediate region of ‘contingent-matter.’ Now, as being corresponds to knowledge, and not-being to ignorance, so the contingent, which now is and now is not, must be the object of the blinking, twilight faculty of opinion. That is the sphere of sense and ordinary thinking, and has no share in philosophy.


Compare the image in the Symposium of those who are ‘bitten’ with philosophy 218 λ τὴν καρδίαν... πληγεῖς τε καὶ διηθείς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων: Eurip. Hippol. 1301-1303 τῇ γὰρ ἐχθρίας θεῶν ἡμῖν θάνατον παρείνειν ἢ διηθείων κατέχων παῦσι, ἡμῶν ὁδὸν. So with comic exaggeration, διαρκάττει πάθος in Aristoph. Ran. 66. καίζω is the common word.

ἡ οὔχ οὔτω ποιεῖτε;] ‘Is not this your way?’ Cp. ii. 365 λ τί οὕμεθα... ψυχᾶς ποιεῖν; and note.

ὁ μὲν, διὶ σιμός, κ.τ.λ.] A parallel to the thought is furnished by Hor. Sat. book I. iii. 38 ‘Illuc praevertamur amatorem quod amicæ | Turpia decipiunt caecum vitia... Strabonem | Appellat Paetum pater:’ Lucret. iv. 1160-1164 ‘Nigra melichrus est, immunda et fetida acosmos, | Caesia Palladium, nervosa et linea dorcas | Parvula pumilio, chariton mia, tota merum sal, | Magna atque immanis cataplexis plenaque honoris.’ In Charmides 154 ν ἀρχαὶ γὰρ λευκή στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς, Socrates ironically represents himself as thus universally susceptible. Cp.errick, ‘What I fancy, I approve, | No dislike there is in love.’ For the colour of μελίχλωρος cp. Theocritus x. 26

βομβίκη (silkworm) χαρίσσα, Σύραν καλώντι τυ πάντες, ισχνίνα, διάκαλαστόν γέω δὲ μόνον μελίχλωρον:

and for the expression πάσος φωνῆς ἀφίετε, Laws x. 890 ἀλλὰ πάσαν, τὸ λεγόμενον, φωνῆν λέγειν... ἐπικουρον γίγνεσθαι.

The meaning is that the lover, by the excuses he makes for the defects of his favourites, proves that his love is not partial, but universal: in this he is the figure of the lover of knowledge. The idea of a ‘whole’ in this passage is less abstract than elsewhere in Plato, e.g. Theaet. 173 τ, where philosophy is again the love of
the whole, πάσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνομένη τῶν δυτῶν ἐκάστου διου. This is intentional, however, and prepares for the correction of Glaucou's view, infra 475 D, E.

εἰ βουλεῖ . . . τοῦ λόγου χάριν] 'If you wish to say, taking me as your example, that lovers act thus, I agree, for the argument's sake.' For this use of ἐπί cp. x. 597 B ἐπὶ 'αὐτῶν τούτων ζητήσωμεν τῶν παιδὸς, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ μήν φιλοτήμων γε] 'And further you see that lovers of honour,' &c., cp. τοῦς φιλοτήμους supra. The article appears to be omitted for the sake of variety; the difference of meaning is hardly distinguishable in English.

τριτταυχοῦσι] 'If they cannot be στρατηγοί, they are glad to be in command of the third of a tribe.' See Photius, p. 288: Pollux viii. 109.

C τῶν . . . εὐχερῶς ἠθλοντα, κ.τ.λ.] The real lover of knowledge has a taste for every kind of knowledge.

E ἄλλ' ὁμοίως μὲν φιλοσόφους] Aristotle says more seriously that the love of knowledge is apparent even in the delights of sensible perception: Metaph. i. 1 Πάντων ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέας δρέπωνται φύσει. Σημείων δ' ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἑγγύσεις καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἑγαστάνται δι' αὐτάς, καὶ καλώτατα τῶν ἄλλων ή διὰ τῶν ἀμμάτων . . . Αὐτῶν δ' ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν τι ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοὶ διαφοράς. For the use of μῆν cp. Theaet. 201 B οὐδαμῶς ἐγγυές οἷμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μὲν.

οὔδαμος . . . τοῦ τοιούθεν] (1) Socrates appeals to Glaucou's confession of discipleship, supra 474 A, B. Cp. vi. 504 E, 505 A: Phaedo 100 b, c. This agrees better with the context and with the tone of the passage than to suppose (2) that Socrates is continuing the raillery with which he attacked Glaucou, supra 474 D, E, 'A man of pleasure like you will readily perceive that beauty and ugliness are not the same.'

τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων . . . καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία] Plato here supposes, first of all, an admixture of the ideas with human actions, and with sensible objects; secondly, with one another. For the intercommunion of ideas, cp. Soph. 250 ff. It may also be illustrated from infra 478 E, where τὸ δοξαστῶν is shown to be τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχων, τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι: there is therefore no
reason for suspecting or emending the word ἀλήθειαν. Cp. also Polit. 278 δ μετατιθέμενα δ' εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μη διδούς συλλαβᾶς, κ.τ.λ.


ἀγούμενος τὸ τι αὐτὸ καλῶ] For ἄγεισθαι (= νομίζει) with a simple accusative and without εἰσα cp. Laws x. 899 δ' ἢν μὲν ἢγεῖ θιόν, κ.τ.λ.: Soph. 222 B ἢτε . . . ἄνθρωποι . . . μηδεμᾶν ἢγεῖ θήραν.

καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖνα μετέχοντα] The language of μέθεις is here used, although the ideal of justice has just before (472 c) been spoken of as παράδειγμα. The two notions, which are figures, are not here, as in Arist. Met. i. 6, §§ 3 and 4, opposed.

ἐπικρατούμενοι δ' εἰς ὁμαίνει] 'Drawing a veil over the fact that he is not in his right mind.' Cp. Phaedr. 268 ε οὐκ ἠγιός εἶσον ἑν, ὃ μοιχηρέ, μελαγχολικό, ἀλλ' δ' ἰη μοιχικὸν ἐν πρασίερον, ὅτι, ὃ ἀριστε, κ.τ.λ. for a similar humanity of feeling.

ἀλλ' ἢμιν εἰπὲ τόδε] The sentence returns to the direct form, addressing the imaginary respondent.

ικανὸς οὖν . . . πάντῃ ἔγνωστον] Being, according to Plato in this passage, is the absolute object of knowledge; not-being, of ignorance; and the intermediate which partakes of both, matter of opinion. This last, as here expressed, is probably the earliest conception of contingent matter. That Plato should not have perceived that degrees of certainty are in the subject only, and have no corresponding object, considering the great difficulty which the ancient world experienced in disengaging subject and object, is not perhaps surprising: the wonder is rather that such a figment as a 'contingent or probable matter' should have survived in the traditions of modern logic. The other two conceptions of being and not-being also present a different aspect to the ancient philosopher and to the student of modern metaphysics. Being, according to Plato, is true existence, the essence of things human and divine, the correlative of absolute knowledge, almost the Supreme Being. To the modern metaphysician, on the other hand, being, as Hegel says, is a word only, the poorest and most void of all abstractions, which only by negation or combination with not-being attains to positive or definite meaning. The necessity of passing from being to the determinations of being or to
actual phenomena was never seen distinctly in the Platonic philosophy (although approximately realized in the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus). Not-being has in Plato, at least in the present passage, a positive or substantial existence, and is not perceived to be abstract or negative only.

ικανος...καν ει πλεοναξη σκοτοιμεν] The supposition refers to the negative notion implied in ικανος. 'We could not be more assured of this, even if we were to look at it in several more points of view.' For the implied admission that an important truth may be proved in more ways than one cp. x. 611 b: Theaet. 206 c ἀλλα δη τούτου μέν ἐτι καν ἄλλας φανεῖσ ἀποδείξεις.

το κεικρνως δητος] 'the pure light of being'; cp. Phaedo 67 b γνωσιμεθα δη ημων αυτων παν το κεικρνως.

ουκοιν *ἐπει ἐπι μεν, κ.τ.λ.] Most of the MSS. omit δε after μεταβω. Two of them (q β) complete the sentence by adding ει after ουκοιν. Hermann and Baiter further amend ει by ἐπει, for the omission of which the alliteration may afford a reason. This is adopted in the text. The true reading is uncertain. A further step is being taken in the argument: 'Since knowledge corresponded (ἡν) to being, and ignorance to not-being, for this intermediate must we not look for a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if such there be?'

κατά την δυναμιν έκατερα την αυτης] For αυτην in the reading of Par. A, &c. (κατα την αυτην δυναμων), Hermann and the Zurich editors conjecture αλλην (cp. infra 478 b αλλη δε έκατερα, ὡς φαμεν). But a safer correction is (with Schneider and the Viennese MS. Φ) to omit αυτην, which may be due to a repetition of the preceding letters ἡ την. The addition of ἡ κατά την αυτην δυναμιν in Vind. E, &c. indicates an early variation of reading. The words from κατα to αυτης are omitted in Ven. Σ. Π Μ really agree with Par. A.

ουκοιν ἐπιστημη μεν...διελθαι] The words γνωιμαι ὡς ἐτι το δν are a resumption or exephesis of the words which precede. Socrates returns to the same question below (478 Α), where he repeats it in nearly the same words—ἐπιστημη μεν γε που ἐτι το δν, κ.τ.λ. But first he will explain and illustrate by examples the meaning of the term 'faculties' or 'powers,' which he is employing. Compare the preliminary psychological discussion in iv. 435 ff.

δυσκλεως δ' εις ἐκεινο...ἀπεργαζομενην ἀλην] He means that faculties have no sensible qualities, but are known by their effects
only. This is a first principle of psychology. Cp. Ion 537 d ἐρατὴς τεταγμένη ἐς ἐπιστήμην, ἢ δ᾿ ἐτέρων, οὕτω καλὸ τὴν μὲν ἀλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην τέχνην. And for the words ἀλλην χράειν ὑπὸ ὀφθείς σχῆμα, κ.τ.λ. cp. Soph. 247 c, d and Theaet. 155 E (of the crude materialists) πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀρχατον ὡς ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίαις μέρις, whereas the disciples of Protagoras are said to uphold the existence of things (or processes) not visible.

ἐπιστήμην πότερον . . . φῦς εἶναι αὐτῆς] The pronoun is unemphatic, being simply a resumption of the noun, which is placed at the beginning for the sake of emphasis.

eἰς τοῦτο . . . ἐρρωμενοστατη] For the two-fold answer to one question in the same sentence cp. iv. 439 A ἢγειν, ἢ δ᾿ ἄν πώ-ματος χρ.


ἐπιστήμην] θεραμων Μ corr. Ὑ Vind. D; and so Cobet. The use in the text is certainly singular. But φῦς is elsewhere used (with ἐπι) of referring a predicate to a subject (Soph. 237 c, Tim. 37 E), or a thought to its object (infra 478 B).

πῶς γὰρ ἂν . . . τιθεῖν] Δόξα is the faculty of opinion and is also nearly allied to sensible perception or sense. But what has opinion to do with perception? To us opinion is fallible and probable; sense is generally infallible. Opinion to us is for the most part concerned with the same matter as knowledge; sense with external objects only. The truth seems to be that here and in other passages of Plato δόξα is a union or rather confusion of two operations of the mind which are really distinct. The origin of this confusion is to be sought for in the history of early Greek philosophy which opposed sense and opinion alike to the certainty of pure intellect. Both are opposed to the universal and neither of them affords a standard of measurement. Αἰσθησις and δόξα are however distinguished in Theaet. 187 A, where it is suggested that knowledge may be the same with true opinion.
Plato: Republic.

260

Republic V. 478 B

οὖν τὸ μῆ ἐν δοξάζει] sc. ὁ δοξάζων: cp. i. 345 A ἢστεν μὴν ἀθέτοις, κ.τ.λ. So infra c οὔν ἄρα . . . δοξάζει. For the form of argument cp. Theaet. 188 D ἔτοιοῖπος δὲ ἄτοιοί ό λέγετε, καὶ τὶς ἀνθρώπων τὸ μῆ ἐν δοξάσῃ; . . . ὁ ἄρα ἐν γὰρ τι ὀρῶν ἃν τι ὁρᾷ: Soph. 237 D τὸ τί τοῦτο μῆμα ἐν· ἄντι λέγομεν ἐκάστῳτε . . . ἀνάγεται τὸν τι λέγοντα ἐν γὲ τι λέγειν.

μὴ ἐν γε] (1) sc. τὸ μῆ ἐν, which is resumed as the subject of προσαγοραζόμενοι from supra τὸ μῆ ἐν δοξάζει. To this μὴ ἐν γε is attached as a ground or reason. ‘Not-being, since non-existent, would not rightly be called one-thing, but, strictly, no-thing’ (μὴ ἐν γε i. q. εἰ μὴ εἴη γε, Stallbaum).

[(2) It is better to take μὴ ἐν more simply for ‘what is not’ or (‘not-being’) the sense in which μὴ ἐν τι occurs just below. B. J.]

C 479 C

ὁ ἐκτὸς τούτων . . . ἄσαφε[ι] ‘Does opinion then lie in a region beyond these, surpassing either knowledge in clearness, or ignorance in dimness?’—But if not ‘without,’ the argument proceeds to show that opinion is within these limits.


D 479 A

οἶν ἄρα δὲν τε καὶ μὴ δὲν] supra 477 A, B.

οἶν ἄρα δὲν τε καὶ μὴ δὲν] There is probably a confusion of the two contructions οἶν ἔναι and φανεῖ δὲν.

E 478 E

ἀποκρινόντωσθο δὲ χρηστὸς . . . (479 A) φιλοδεμάνων] ἵκεϊνος ὁ φιλοδεμάνως is a resumption of ὁ χρηστὸς, referring to supra 475 D—476 B, c. For the vague reference cp. supra 460 A τὸν φαίλον ἵκεϊνον. Socrates proceeds to show that sensible objects are and are not what they are:—They have no fixed character of their own; they are different in different relations.

479 A

ἡγεῖται . . . νομίζει] supra 476 C, D.

καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω] Some of these ‘other things’ are enumerated infra B.

B 479 B

τι δὲ; τὰ πολλά διπλάσια . . . φαίνεται;] That is to say, although, in the abstract, a double and half differ, in the concrete they may coincide; e.g. two chairs are the half of four and the double of one.
Notes: Book V. 261

The same view of the relativeness of sense occurs often elsewhere: e.g. Theaet. 152 D ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύεται, καὶ σαμικρὸν φαν-εῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κούφον, ἡμπικτιὰ τε ἀπὸς: Phil. 14 D καὶ βαρύν καὶ κούφον τὸν αὐτὸν: Phaedo 74 B ff., 102.

τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἀστιάδεσιν, ἥπη, . . . αἰνίγματι] (1) ‘They are like the double-entendres at feasts, and like the children’s riddle about the eunuch throwing at the bat.’ ἐπαμφοτερίζομαι is thus explained by Timaeus in his lexicon to Plato: cp. the active use of ἐγκαθίστασις in Euthyd. 300 B. [(2) But the verb occurs immediately below, ἐπαμφοτερίζειν sc. ὥστε, in the ordinary intransitive sense, and it is unlike Plato to repeat the same example in illustration—(Riddles at feasts and the children’s riddle). The phrase τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἀστιάδεσιν ἐπαμφοτερίζομαι may contain an allusion to some incident of Greek festivity familiar to Plato’s readers, but to us unknown. L. C.]

καὶ τῶν παιδῶν αἰνίγματι] The riddle referred to is given by the Scholiast:—

Ἄνδρας τις ἔστω ὡς ἄνήρ τε κοῦκ ἄνήρ
ἀρνιθα κοῦκ ἄρνιθ ἠδῶ τε κοῦκ ἠδῶ
ἐπὶ ἔλοι τε κοῦ ἔλοι καθημένης
λίθῳ τε κοῦ λίθῳ βάλοι τε κοῦ βάλοι:

i.e. a eunuch aimed at a bat which he saw imperfectly sitting upon a reed with a pumice-stone and missed him.

ὁ] ‘wherewith,’ viz. with a pumice-stone. This proves to be the reading of Par. Α, and is therefore to be adopted without question in preference to ὡς.

ἐφ’ οὐ] sc. καθημένην.


μεταξὺ του κυλινδραία] ‘range somewhere between.’ The word κυλινδρόσθαι has often a depreciatory association, as of ‘knocking about, a prey to chance or circumstance,’ &c. Cp. Phaedr. 275 ε, Phaedo 81 c, 82 ε.

προωμολογήσαμεν δὲ γε . . . πλανητῶν ἄλλομεν] ‘But we agreed beforehand, that anything of this kind which might come to light was to be described as the object of opinion, not of
knowledge, being the class which oscillates between and is apprehended by the intermediate faculty.

480 ἢ οὖ μημονεύομεν] supra 476 B, C: 479 A.

ίκαστον τῷ δὗ] 'Each kind in its essential nature,'—i.e. πάντο τὸ καλὸν, δίκαιον, ἡγαθὸν, . . . καὶ τῶλλα σῶτω.

BOOK VI.

If the philosopher can lay hold of universal and unchanging truth, and those who cannot rise above opinion are not philosophers, to which of the two shall we commit the government of the state?

In a word, ought the true guardian to be clear-sighted or blind?

There can be but one answer to this question, unless the philosopher is deficient in some other way. But the philosophic nature contains all the elements of virtue. He who is to be trained in philosophy must be quick-witted and have a good memory; he must be a lover of all truth, a hater of falsehood, courageous, temperate, just, gentle, large-minded, gracious in his thoughts and ways. Not even Momus can have any fault to find with such a character.

484 διὰ μακροῦ . . . λόγου] λόγος, as elsewhere, is personified: cp. infra 503 A παρεξήγως καὶ παρακαλουτόμου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένοι κυνὴν τὸ νῦν παρών. διεξελθόντος may be explained (1) as intransitive (cp. Soph. 337 B τῶν δὲ λόγων, ἵππηστα διέξεκα: Sophocl. Oed. Col. 574 ὑπὸ λόγος διέρχεσαι: Dem. 541, 22 πάντα δ' ἂν διεξελθόθεν τὰκ τῶν νόμων)—the participle being added afterwards to complete the expression—'In the course of a long discussion which has come to its conclusion.' Or (2) αὐτοῖς, sc. τοὺς φιλοσόφους, may be supplied as the object of διεξελθόντος—'after a long argument which has discussed their nature.' Cp. Laws v. 743 ε ἤν διεξερχόμεθα πολιτείαν.

μακροῦ] a slight exaggeration, as the argument about the true nature of philosophers does not extend to more than six pages, 474-480. But if such a matter-of-fact objection needs an answer, it may be replied that six pages seem a considerable space to devote to the definition of a single term: and the steps through which Glaucon has been led to the conclusion were elaborate and
minute. The reading of ξ, διὰ μ. τ. δ. τοῦ λόγου, is due to a false interpretation, i.e. τοῦ λόγου διεξελθότας διὰ μακροῦ τινός. διεξελθότας (x ν) is another manuscript conjecture. According to this reading the philosophers are supposed to run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed.

οὗ βαθιοῦ] sc. ἀπαθανήτως αὐτῶς.

οὗ φαίνεται] is, 'it appears to be not easy': not 'it does not appear easy.'

ἐμοί γάρ] 'To me at least it appears that it might have been set forth in a still better manner, if we had had only to speak of this one point.' The subject of φαίνει is τὸ πρᾶγμα rather than τοὺς φιλοσόφους, as appears from τοῦτο μόνον following.

μελλοντι] agreeing with τωι understood, not with ἐμοί γάρ supra:

'if one were not required '; not 'if I were not required.'

οὐ δὲ μή] sc. οἱ δὲ μὴ τοῦ δὲι κατὰ ταῦτα ἀσαύτως ἔχωτο δυνάμενοι εὑρίσκεσθαι.

πλανώμενοι] 'Wandering up and down'—referring to the uncertainties of opinion: cp. v. 479 A ff., especially D τὸ μεταξοῦ πλανῆτων: also infra 485 B. For the word cp. especially Lysis 213 ε οὐκ ἀν ποτὲ οὔτε ἐπλανώμεθα.

μετρίως] 'fairly,' 'duly,' 'fittingly.' Cp. x. 597 ε τοῦτο . . . ἐμοίγε δοκεί μετριώτατ' ἀν προσαγορεύεσθαι, μμητής.

καθιστάναι] sc. λέγοντες δὲν.

τὰδε δὲ . . . τρείν ὅπω:] 'But can there be any question whether a blind or sharp-seeing watchman should guard a thing?'

—in Plato's language, he who is ignorant of the universal is blind, 'not seeing the sun': he has no mental image or 'pattern in the mount' (cp. ix. 592), no idea of true being or principle of order, to which he may refer objects of sense or the particulars of human action: he is still in the den, having his back turned toward the light (cp. vii ad init.).

ἀπεκρ γραφής] Cp. infra 500 ε οἱ τῷ βιεῖ τοῖς παραδέγμασι ξρώμενοι ζωγράφου, 501 Α, Β, where Plato repeats and expands the image suggested here.

κακῶς] sc. εἰς τὸ ἀληθινότατον. But the opposition of ἐκεῖνος—ἐνθάδε implies that the truth is not here but yonder,—ἐν οὐρανῷ ποι ἀνακείμενον (ix. 592 B: cp. also x. 610 B).
264 Plato: Republic.

64d έν δὲ τίθεοθα] ‘If there should be need of such enactments.’
The regulation of minutiae was to be left to each generation of
rulers, the great principles having been once for all laid down:
ср. iii. 412 b, iv. 425, 426, 427 a: and Laws vi. 769, 770, 772,
779 d, vii. 816, viii. 846 e, xii. 956 e.

τούτους] sc. ‘the blind leaders of the blind,’ who have just been
described.

ἐκαστον τὸ δὲ] i. e. who know the essential reality of each thing:
who are capable, in modern language, of abstraction and generali-
zation:—The power of abstraction seemed to Plato in his own
age to constitute the great difference between one man’s mental
condition and another’s (Phaedr. 265 e, Rep. vii. 534).

ἐι γε τάλα μὴ ἀλλείπωντο] ‘If they did not fall behind in
other ways.’

τούτῳ γάρ αὐτῷ . . . ἀν προκόμειν] ‘For this very thing in which
they will have the superiority is about the most important point of
all.’ σχέδαν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ: the emphasis is on τῷ μεγίστῳ, ‘the
greatest point of all’ is the knowledge of ideas and universals.
τι which follows σχέδου does not weaken its force but calls attention
to it: as ‘pretty’ is employed in some uses of the phrase ‘pretty
nearly’ in English.

κάκεινα καὶ ταῦτα] ‘The other qualities (= τάλα supra ε—i. e.
experience and general excellence) and these (the special attributes
of the philosopher). Both are comprised in ταῦτα infra (ταῦτα
ἐξειν of αὐτοῖ).

The question how this combination of the practical and specu-
lative may be attained, is answered by an inquiry into the nature
of the philosopher. For the necessity of the philosopher’s knowing
also the particular, ‘if he is to find his way home,’ ср. Phileb.
62 b.

δ τοῖνυ, κ. τ. λ.} v. 474 b. If with the best MSS. we read δεῖ, we
must supply τοῦτο ποιεῖν δεῖ from πρώτον δεῖ καταμαθεῖν to complete
the sentence. Or if this explanation is deemed unsatisfactory we
must adopt the reading δεί of the inferior MSS.

δ ἀν αὕτως δῆλοι . . . καὶ φθορᾶς] The genitive ὀδοίας is
partitive and follows δῆλοι: ср. iv. 445 ε ὁ ἔλεγεν μενος κυρίοιεν
ἀν τῶν ἄξιων λόγων νόμων τῆς πόλεως. έκείνης refers to the discussion
in v. 475 ε foll.
The words are found in Themistius, Orat. xxi. 250, with some verbal differences: τούτο μὲν δὴ ὁμολογεῖσθω τῆς φιλοσοφίας φύσεως πέρα, ὅτι μαθήματος δύο οὖσαν πάντοτε ἄλλα ὅ ἐν ἐκείνην δηλοῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς αἰτίας καὶ μὴ πληρομένην ὑπὸ φθοράς καὶ γνώσεως. The agreement is not sufficiently exact to justify the substitution of οὐσίαν for οὐσίας in the text; Themistius appears to have simplified the construction.

πάσης αὐτῆς] sc. τῆς οὐσίας, governed by ἔρωτιν.

οὔτε τιμωτέρον οὔτε ἀτιμωτέρον μέρος] Cp. Soph. 227 a, Parmen. 130 ε, for this favourite thought.

ἄστερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ... διήλθομεν] v. 474 c ff.

ἐκόντας εἰναι] 'so far as their being willing is concerned.' έκών εἴναι is a parenthetic phrase—generally used in negative sentences—in which the word έκών gains force from the addition of εἴναι.


ἀλλὰ μὴν ... ἀπωχετευμένον] For ἀπωχετευμένον in strict accuracy ἀπωχετευμέναι might be expected. But the attraction which confuses the simile and the thing compared is common in Greek (e.g. Soph. Trach. 33), and occurs elsewhere in Plato: cp. iii. 401 c, ὡς ὅπουν ἅν αὐτοῖς ... πρὸς ἀκοὴν τι προσβάλη, ἄστερ ἀθρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων υγείων, καὶ ... ἄγουσα. ἀκείνη refers to τε ἐν τε.

τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος] τὰς is an accusative of reference—'in respect of': or περὶ may be supplied from the previous clause. The former is the more natural way of taking the words. The image of the stream is continued in ἐρρυσάσαι and ἐκλειποῦν.

It is common to draw a line between talent and character: the powers of a man are distinguished from his interests and affections. Such lines of demarcation are convenient, but they are also partly misleading. For the love of knowledge is knowledge: moral qualities interpenetrate with mental: how much a man feels is quite as important as how much he thinks, or rather he must feel what he thinks. There is no surer criterion of progress in education than an interest in study: nor anything more fatal to intellectual excellence than envy and meanness.

δὲ για τοιούτως] 'such an one, at any rate'—i.e. one who takes no delight in the pleasures of the body—'must be temperate.'
Plato: Republic.

Republic VI. 485 E


486 A

toû ðloû kai paiôs] Compare Theaet. 173 E, where the soul of the philosopher is described as πάσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρυθυμομεθί τῶν ἁπτών ἑκάστου ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθίσαται.

γῇ οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοία ... οἷον τε οἰεὶ τοῦτῳ, κ.τ.λ.] The common transition from the mind or soul to the person. Cp. x. 620 D.

Ast and Stallbaum, following a quotation of the passage in Marcus Aurelius (vii. § 35), read φ. . . . διανοίας for γ. . . . διανοία, but this is unnecessary.

B

μηδ’ ἀλαξών] This refers to the love of truth, supra 485 c.

εὐθ’ δὴ τὸ δυσφόρμητος . . . γένοιτο] For δυσφόρμητος with δυσκοινώνητος following, compare the juxtaposition of ἔμβαλλων and κοινοῦ in ii. 362 B.

καὶ τοῦτο δὴ . . . καὶ ἄγρια] Cp. Theaet. 144 D. The qualities here enumerated are nearly the same that are found to be actually embodied in the ‘wise’ Theaetetus. The words ε. . . . ἄγρια are the explanation of τοῦτο, the whole question being suggested by the words of the previous sentence, δυσφόρος ἢ ἄδικος.

C

eὐσμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθής] sc. ε. ἀρι. The construction is to be supplied from the previous sentence.


D


Δικέων] Cp. viii. 568 C εἰς τυραννιδας . . . ἔκοιτα τὰς πολιτείας. The word conveys an idea of distortion and perversion.


Ἡν ἐπὶ . . . (Ε) εἰδάγωνον παρέξει] ‘which its own nature will make easy to lead towards the idea of each form of being.’
Notes: Book VI.

... τῆς δοκούμενος σοι, κ.τ.λ.] γίνεται 'at any point.' The dative τῆς depends chiefly on ἀναγκαία.

φίλος τε καὶ ἔγγενής] The latter word implies a reference to

485 ἢ ἄνω ὀικεῖότερον σοφία τη ἀληθείας ἄν εὑροί;

ἀλλ', ἢ β' ἐγώ. . . . τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέπουσι] Compare the virtues of the philosopher-tyrant in Laws iv. 709, where despotism is thought to afford the most favourable opportunity for organizing a state: ἐπὶ τύραννος γένοιτο, φήσι, νόος, σῶμα, εὐμαθής, μήμων, ἀδρικος, μεγαλοπρεπής.

tελεωθεις . . . παιδεία τε καὶ ἥλικις] is introductory to the discussion about the education and age of the rulers, from 502 onwards.

The conclusion appears inevitable that the philosophic nature, 487 B-E when matured by time and training, ought to be entrusted with the supreme power. But Adeimantus meets all these theoretical assumptions by an appeal to facts. Experience shows that those who continue in the pursuit of philosophy after their first youth turn out to be either strange creatures, not to say rascals, or at all events, even when they are thoroughly respectable, their philosophy makes them useless. Socrates admits the force of the objection, yet maintains his paradox. To explain his position he has recourse to an allegory.


παραγόμενοι . . . μέγα τὸ σφάλμα . . . ἀναφαίνεσθαι] i.e. μεγάλως σφάλματα καὶ τοῖς πρῶτοι ἀφοιλουμένως ἐσπαραγωγαὶ: cp. vii. 534 C ἀπότιμο τῷ λόγῳ. The subject is changed from the persons to that which they experience: 'the overthrow which is revealed is great and contradictory of their first impressions.' At σφίξις, κ.τ.λ., the original construction is resumed.

Compare the description of the Elenchus in the Sophist, 230 β διερωτώσων δὲν ὅτι αὐτῇ τις τι πέρι λέγων λέγων μηδὲν; εἰ δὲ πλανο- 

μένων τὰς δίδαξι βραδίως ἐξετάζων, καὶ συνέγνωσε δὴ τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς τοῖς τούτων μὲν τῆς ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύοντον αὐτὰς αὐτὰς ἄμα περὶ 

τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταύτα ἐννοιας. And for the effect of 

Socrates on his hearers see the image of the torpedo in Meno 80.

ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεῶν δεινῶν] The game of draughts here spoken
of is plainly one in which the victory was won by hemming in the adversary. The metaphor of πτερωτάς occurs again in Laws v. 739 a, where legislation is compared to a game of draughts.

τοι πεπαιδεύθαι ἔνεκα] Cp. infra 497 e (where ἀπεσθαυ occurs in the same idiomatic sense).

πάνι ἀλλοκότος . . . παμπονήρους] ‘very strange beings, not to say utter rogues.’

tοῖς δ’ ἐπιεικεστάτους . . . ἀρχῶτους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους

See the description of the philosopher in the Theaetetus, who has not a word to say for himself in the courts or the assembly (173 c, d): or the view of Callicles in the Gorgias, 485 λ ἡ φιλοσοφίας μέν, δεδομένων παιδείας τώρα, καθώς μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἄσχημον μεμαρκάρισε δεντροφιασίν. The man of the world admires philosophy in youth: such interests, at that time of life, are indications of a free and generous spirit: but if a person has not ‘passed his metaphysics’ when he is old, why, he should go to school again and be beaten. The feeling which Plato here expresses is a feeling of modern quite as much as of ancient times. The study of metaphysics is regarded as at once dangerous and puerile. They have been thought to belong only to a particular stage of life: ‘poetry for boys,’ ‘metaphysics for young men,’ ‘facts for those who are of full age.’ The true conception of metaphysics is the combination of the parts of knowledge by an effort of the mind into an ideal whole. They are always extending their domain, as the prospect is opening of new fields of science and of the past history of man. The narrower view is lost in a wider one: the previous elements of knowledge, whether in the world or in the individual, are taken up into the mind, and adjusted in new proportions. Also the knowledge of facts would be narrow and partial unless the imagination enabled us to allow for the unknown part of man and nature, raising us above our own particular study or aspect of things to the other elements of truth and knowledge. On the other hand it may be argued that metaphysics may easily outrun facts, and interfere with our capacity of observing and acquiring them.

ἀκοόουσ ἄν . . . λέγειν] The popular opinion of philosophy has been seriously urged against Socrates. Instead of the expected refutation, ‘Quite true’ is the only reply.

ἐρωτᾷς . . . δι’ εἰκόνων λέγειν] ‘You ask a question, I said,
requiring to be answered through a similitude.' 'And you, methinks, are not accustomed to speak through similitudes.'

The last words are of course ironical: Socrates carries on the irony in what follows (ἐντ' ἐτι μᾶλλον ὅψις, κ.τ.λ.).

ἐτι μᾶλλον] 'that (having this contempt for my similitudes) you may see still better what a poor hand I am at them.' For γλίσχρως cp. Crat. 414 c, where Hermogenes, speaking of one of the etymologies offered by Socrates, says: καὶ μᾶλα γε γλίσχρως, ὁ Σύκρατες. He who would judge of Socrates' powers in inventing similitudes may, after reading this passage, compare ix. 588 c, d.

There is a ship of which the captain is a simple-minded giant, short-sighted, dull of hearing, and but slightly skilled in navigation. The crew are always contending among themselves for the possession of the helm, but have never learnt, and even deny the possibility of learning, the art of steering. He only is the skilled navigator who is a partisan of theirs. If they cannot succeed by persuasion, they resort to force, throwing their rivals overboard and drugging the captain. Thus beginning they proceed to make free with the stores, and their voyage is such as might be expected of men like them. What chance of a hearing has the skilled pilot among such as they are? They only call him prater, star-gazer, and good-for-nothing. This image sufficiently indicates the position of those philosophers whom Adeimantus has acknowledged to be honest men. They are useless, because their states, as at present governed, make no use of them.

At a later date Plato returns to the comparison of the ruler to the steersman as a familiar image: Polit. 297 E ἔξι δὴ τάς εἰκόνας ἐπισώμεν πάλιν, αἷς ἀναγκαῖοι ἀπευθάνειν ἑαυτοῖς βασιλικοῖς ἄρχοντες. Ποιας; Τῶν γενεάων κυβερνήτην καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντίτιθην ἵπτον. κατάδικοι γὰρ δὴ τί σχῆμα ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς πλασάμενοι. αὐτό] sc. το πάθος τῶν ἐπισωμάτων.

οἶον ... γράφωσι] oïon may be taken either as an adverb, 'just as'; or as an adjective governed by γράφωσι—'to form by combining from many sources an idea of it like what' &c. The former is right.

νόησων ... (ν) ἑτέρα τοιαύτα] τοιουτων, i.e. the kind of thing which I have now before my mind.

ναικηληρον] The asyndeton, as usual, in an explanatory clause.
βροχό τι] is cogn. accus. 'having but a narrow range of vision,'—and ἔστερα τοιαῦτα is in the same construction,—'and whose intelligence in nautical matters is much on the same level.'

περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως] 'quarrelling about the steering, each thinking that he ought to steer.'

μήτε μαθόντα, κ.τ.λ.] This recalls Socrates' well-known accusation against the statesmen of Greece, that there are among them no teachers of political virtue. Cp. Protag. 319 D τούτοις οὐδείς τούτο ἐπιπλήττει ἄσπερ τοῖς πρόσωποι, ὅτι οὐδαμῶς μαθόν, οὐδὲ ἄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενός αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπικεφαλή: δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι οὐχ ἤγουνται διδακτοί εἰδοι. Cp. also Xen. Mem. iii. 6.

πρός δὲ τούτοις . . . κατατέμειν] Yet Plato himself seems to maintain this paradox in the Protagoras and Meno. In those dialogues the postulate that there must be a science of politics was ironically held in reserve, while the hollowness of the actual politicians was disclosed. But Plato is now ready to assert, not only that there is such a science, but that he has the key of it.

περικεχώθαι . . . τῆς νεώς ἄρχειν . . . πλεῖν] These infinitives, which follow νόησον at the beginning of the sentence, avoid the confusion which would otherwise be occasioned by the multiplication of participles. In πρός δὲ τούτοις, κ.τ.λ., a return is made to the participial construction.

ζυμποδίσσαντας is metaphorical: 'having enchained the noble captain,' i.e. rendered him incapable, 'by some narcotic drug, or by drink or some other means.' Cp. Gorg. 482 E ἐκ τοίης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ἐπ’ οὐ συμποδίσσεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίθησα: Theaet. 165 E ἔλεγεν ἄν . . . οὐκ ἀνέεις πρὶν . . . ζυμποδίσσης ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ.

πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦς τοιοῦτους] 'make just such a voyage as might be expected of men like them.' Cp. Polit. 302 Λ πολλάι μὴν ἐνίοτε καὶ καθάπερ πλοία καταδυόμεναι διόλυνται καὶ διαλύσασι καὶ ἐξι διωλόνται διὰ τῆς τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ ναυτῶν μοχθηρίαν τῶν περὶ τὰ μέγατα μεγίστην ἄγνων εἰληφότων, κ.τ.λ.: Laws x. 906 D.

ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει . . . (ε) καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν] (1) 'But to get the helm into one's hand, with or without consent, is an art and study which they imagine to be irreconcilable with the acquisition of the science of navigation.' The mutinous sailors think that the struggle to get the helm into one's power, which, in their opinion, is the all-important thing, leaves no time for the study of navigation, and so
they neglect it. Transferring the image into the language of politics we have—ὅπως δὲ ἄρξῃ (τις) κ.τ.λ., μήτε τέχνην τούτου... δυνάτων εἶναι λαβῶν ἄμα καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. They are absorbed in the struggle for power, and have no time to think how power should be used. Therefore they reject philosophy and the philosopher. ὅπως... κυβερνήσει... ἐὰν τῷ μή is a resumption of ὅπως ἄρξονται ἡ πείδουσι ἡ βιαζόμενον τῶν ναύσκολον, and τὴν κυβερνητικὴν refers to the science of the true pilot, τοῦ... ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου supra. τούτου takes up ὅπως, κ.τ.λ. Socrates reiterates his main point, that power, not knowledge, is the object of the actual politicians. (2) According to Ast and others the true pilot is the subject of κυβερνήσει, and this part of the sentence gives the impression which the behaviour of the true pilot makes on the world in general. The phrase ἐὰν τῷ τινης βούλευται ἐὰν τῷ μή is supposed to contrast the scientific pilot, who keeps the ship in her course, without consulting the passengers, with the conduct of the sailors in the allegory, whose one thought is to cajole or intoxicate the captain (i.e. to flatter and humour the people) so that they may get the helm into their power. The sense then would be: ‘imagining that to know how to steer, whether he has the leave of those on board or no,—as, in their opinion, the true pilot does,—‘is an art and study quite incompatible with the business of a steersman’—as they conceive of it. They consider that the arbitrary rule as it appears to them of the true pilot is inconsistent with steering, as they understand it (i.e. as the art of cajoling the captain). They think it is no part of piloting to know how to manage the helm (no part of politics to know how to govern). This explanation appears plausible on comparing infra 489 Β ὃς γὰρ ἐξει φύσιν κυβερνήτην παντῶν δεῖσθαι... υφ' αὐτοῦ; and Polit. 293 A ἐὰν τῇ ἐκτάσει ἐὰν τῇ ἕκτον ἄρχοισιν...νομίσματο...κατὰ τέχνην...ἄρχονται. But the exactness of the parallel in the immediate context between ὅπως ἄρξονται and ὅπως κυβερνήσει, and between πείδουσι ἡ βιαζόμεναι and ἐὰν τῷ τινης βούλευται ἐὰν τῷ μή, is decisive in favour of the first (1) interpretation. And the true king in the Republic is imagined as the ruler of a willing people: infra 502 Β πόλιν ἐχὼν πειθομένην, 499 Β καὶ τῇ πόλει κατηκόρ γενίσθαι.

οἰδέμενοι The MSS. vary between ἐπαίνοτες, οἰδέμενοι, and ἐπαίνοτας, οἰδόμενοι. That the copyists should have changed the accusative into the nominative is unlikely; the analogy of ψέγουσι was almost certain to lead some of them to change the nominative into the accusative. The transition to the nominative may be occasioned by
the neighbourhood of ἀρχοντῶν, and in so long a sentence the original construction is apt to be lost sight of.

The ‘parable’ hardly needs an interpretation. The ship is the state: the star-gazing pilot is the philosopher: the noble captain, ‘not very quick in his perceptions,’ the people honest and stupid: the mutineers, the sophists and adventurers by whom the noble captain is ‘drugged and disabled,’—who make their last appearance in the Politicus (291).

Aristotle refers to this passage in Rhet. iii. 43 as an example of an εἰκὼν—ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον ὅτι ἁμοίος ναυαληφθεὶς, λαχυρὸς μὲν, ἰπποκάφος δὲ. The passage should be compared with Politicus 298, 299, where it is supposed that if certain rules were prescribed by the state about navigation and the true κυβερνήτης, who steered from knowledge of the stars and winds, were to transgress them, he would be liable to be called μετεωρολόγος, ἀδολεσχὴς τις σοφιστὴς.

ἐκεῖνον] supra 487 D.

ὅτι . . . οὖ τιμῶνται] Socrates softens the language of Adeimantus.

καὶ ὅτι . . . λέγεις, κ.τ.λ.] ὅτι depends on δίδασκε and is parallel with ὅτι in the previous sentence. The MSS. are divided between λέγεις and λέγει (for Par. D, which reads λέγει, has no independent value): the greater weight of authority is in favour of λέγεις. ‘And that you are not wrong in saying that the best of the votaries of philosophy are of no use to the world:—for their uselessness, however, bid him blame those who make no use of them and not the good philosophers themselves.’

In using the second person (λέγεις), Socrates attributes to Adeimantus what he had only represented to be the opinion of others, though with an evident inclination to assent (cp. infra ν ὁ δὲ σὺ φῆς . . . ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν). The other reading, λέγειν, could only be explained, if at all, as a harsh confusion of two constructions—δίδασκε λέγειν and δίδασκε ὅτι λέγεις.

οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φόσιν] φόσιν ἔχει, ‘it is natural,’ like λόγον ἔχει, ‘it is reasonable.’ The phrase occurs in Herodotus, ii. 45.

ἀλλ’ ὅ τοῦτο κοιμηθεῖσθαι . . . πέφυκεν, κ.τ.λ.] The saying is attributed by Aristotle to Simonides: Rhet. ii. 16 τοῦ οὖσος γὰρ ἔφη ὁ ῥήν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίωνθ' ἠρείες διατηρεῖν. Cp. for the general
sentiment, Theaet. 170 A, B and in ye tois megístous kínvóvous, étan én strateíeis ἡ τούτι ἡ ἐν βαθάτη χειμάζωντα, διότι πρὸς θεοὺς ἢ ἡ τούτι én ékástous ἁρχοντας, σωτήρας σφών προσδικάτως, οὐκ ἄλλο τι διαβέβαινη ἡ τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τὰ χρόνων ἡττάρων διακόλουθος τε καὶ ἁρχοντας ἵπτατων τε, κτλ.

Deioudai] (1) is governed by some word (such as πρέπειν) suggested by ἀναγκαίον εἶναι preceding. Or (2) ἀναγκαίον εἶναι is neglected, and the infinitive continued directly with πέφυκεν.

Μετεωρολόγοις] Meteorologizers’ combines the μετεωροσκόπων τε καὶ ἀκολούθων of supra 488 E.

ἐκ τοῖν ... ἐπιτηθευών] ‘As a result of this and (1) in these circumstances’—or (2) ‘among men like these’—‘the noblest pursuit can hardly be held in esteem by those who have opposite pursuits.’

ἐν τοῖς may be either masculine or neuter (infra 494 C ἐν τοῖς τοῖς τοῦκοιν: Symp. 220 B: Phaedo 101 C), but for the masculine cp. supra ἐπί τούτων. The words οἱ δὲ ἐπισκέψατων ἁρχητοὺς are added to recall both sides of the statement, although only one is in point.

τὰ τοιαῦτα] sc. τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

τῶν ἐγκαλουτα ... ἀληθῆ σε λέγεν] Supra 487 D, E. As before in supra B Socrates chooses to identify Adeimantus with the objectors whose opinions he quotes.

οὕκου τῆς μὲν ... ἁρχητίας, κτλ.] The reason why one class of philosophers are useless is that the world will not use them: the reason why another class are corrupted is that the finest natures are most susceptible of adverse influences.

τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην] ‘The cause which inevitably produces the wickedness of the greater number.’

The philosophic nature combines qualities that are rarely found in the same person. It is also exceptionally liable to corruption. Rare plants are more than others sensitive to surrounding influences. And the very graces which have been enumerated, above all when combined with gifts of fortune, become, through their perversion, sources of evil. The world is the great sophist that spoils the highly endowed youth, and moulds him with popular applause and clamour to mundane purposes. How can such an one, except through some divine providence, give ear to the teachings of philosophy? The professional, fee-earning sophist is like the attendant of a great beast,
whom he knows when to approach, and who indicates by grunts his likes and dislikes. He never distinguishes between what is inevitable and what is best. Hence, of those who are at their birth endowed with a philosophic nature, all save the few 'useless' ones (whom pride or sickness or some internal oracle have retained) desert philosophy for 'politis' and leave a vacant room, which is filled by those whom Adeimantus designates as nondescripts and rascals. The maiden of high estate, left poor and desolate, is married to a tinker just let out of prison. Meanwhile the child of light, who is faithful to his trust, sees the hopelessness of effort, and stands in shelter until the storm has passed, contented if he may preserve his own integrity.

δικούωμεν δή... κάγαθν εὐδόμενον] δῆν is put for ὀδ by attraction with ἐκεῖθεν, which is to be construed with ἀναμμηθέντες.

ἀυτῷ] is not the usual dative after ἤγεισθα, but an ethical dative: sc. ἤγεισθο τοῦ χρῷ ἀυτῷ—'he was the leader of his band,' infra c.

εἰ νῦν ἔχεις] 'if you remember.' Cp. Euthyphro 2 B εἰ τιμὶ νῦν ἔχεις Πυθία Μαλητὼν.

ἢ δαλαίων δυντι, κ.τ.λ.] For the use of ἢ in the sense of 'or else' cp. v. 463 D ἢ μήτε πρὸς θείων μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀυτῷ ἄμεινοι ἱσταθαί.

οὐκοῦν... περὶ αὐτοῦ;) 'Is not this one point, to say no more (οὗτῳ), very inconsistent with our present ideas about him?' οὕτῳ is idiomatic, as in νῦν ὁὗτος, ἀπλῶς ὁὗτος.

παρὰ δὸξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκομένοις] i.e. πρὸς τὰ νῦν δοκομένα, the whole expression being an amplified equivalent of παρὰ τὰ νῦν δοκομένα = παρὰ ταῖς τῶν νῦν δόξας. τοῖς νῦν δοκομένοις = 'received opinions,' is a noticeable phrase.

ἀπολογησόμεθα... ἀμαλλάσθαι] 'We shall defend ourselves' (when accused of being paradoxical) 'by saying' (as we have said) 'that it was his nature to press onward towards true being.' The optative after the future indicative in an indirect sentence may be explained as implying a reference to some former expression of the thought quoted. See Goodwin, M. and T., §§ 159, 676.


ἀλλ’ οὖν... ἔδινος, πρὶν δ’ οὖ] In such glowing language does Plato describe what are termed by us mere abstractions, to which metaphysical enthusiasm has, nevertheless, given a permanent
place in the mind, and which in a secondary logical stage have been the regulators and instruments of human knowledge. In one point of view the language may be compared with that of Eastern Pantheism (μοιχός τις ἄνθις ἲντις), in another (ἐπὶ τούς ... πολλοὶς ἐκάστοις), with that of the Organon of Aristotle.

ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡ προσήκεια ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιοῦτον] i.e. τούτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς φ. τούτῳ, the suppressed antecedent, is a dative of the instrument, τούτῳ, the relative, a dative of reference with προσήκεια: 'with that part of the soul to which it belongs.'


λόγοι τῶν ἄνθρωπων] Cp. Theaet. 148 β ἔδειξεν γὰρ, οἰ φίλε Θεαίτης: Symp. 206 b τῷ κεπάντει ... πολλῆ ἢ πτοίχος γέγονεν περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ἀδικίας ὑπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα.

τούτῳ τι μετέστη ... μισεῖν;] 'Will he have any part in loving falsehood, or, on the contrary, will he not hate it?'

ἀλλ' ὅγιες τε καὶ δίκαιον ἢθος] sc. φαίμεν ἐν αὐτῇ (sc. ἀληθείᾳ) ἄκαλουθησα.

καὶ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ... ἀναγκάζοντα τάσσειν:] 'Why should I again set in array from the very beginning the rest of the band of qualities which make up the philosophic nature, at each step compelling your assent?' ἀναγκαζοντα is taken up in ἠγάλθη: 'Why force you again to admit what you have already admitted?'

ἀναγκαζοντα is the reading of the best MSS.: ἀναλαμβάνοντα (= 'recapitulating'), the reading of Stephanus and of Ven. ξ, is probably a correction: cp. infra δ τῶν ἀληθῶν φιλοσοφῶν φύσιν ... εἰς ἄναγκης ἀριστίμβηα.

For the favourite image of the chorus (continued from χοροῦ κακῶν supra), cp. especially Euthydemus 279 c τῷ δὲ σοφίαν ποὺ χορῷ τάξιον; ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἣ πᾶς λέγεις; Rep. viii. 560 b ὑδριν καὶ ἀναγιν ... λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοὺ χοροῦ κατίγουσιν ἐπιστακωμένους: ix. 580 b ἔγωγε ὁπερ χοροῖς κρίνω, κ.π.λ.: also Theaet. 173 b–d τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἑμετέρου χοροῦ . . . περὶ τῶν κορυφαιῶν.

καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλαμβομένου] 'And when you interposed and said.' Cp. Symp. 214 e εἰνὶ τι μὴ ἄνθρωπος λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαμβοῦ.

τῆς διαβολῆς] διαβολή is a malicious 'misrepresentation.' Cp. supra 489 d: infra 500 δ διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλῆ.
A small number, whom, as you say, they call,' &c. The antecedent of ὅς is implied in the collective neuter σμικρὸν τὶ = ὄλγοι τινες.

καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτηδευμα καθισταμένα αὐτῆς] 'and settling down to her pursuit.'

ἀνάξιον ... έαυτῶν] 'of which they are themselves unworthy.' For this use of ἀνάξιος = 'too good for,' cp. Soph. Phil. 1009 ἀνάξιον μὲν σοῦ, κατάξιον δ' ἐμοῦ: i.e. 'of which you are unworthy and I am worthy.'

καὶ μεῖζον] For μεῖζον = 'too great' or 'high,' cp. Soph. 231 ά μη μεῖζον αὐτῶι προσώπωμεν γέρασ.

καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶντας] sc. τείνουσαν: 'and extending to all who bear the name.' This phrase is added by an afterthought and is not strictly in construction.

δ μὲν πάντων ... ἀποστὴς φιλοσοφίας] 'In the first place what is strangest of all to hear, viz. that each of the qualities which we praised as belonging to the philosophic nature destroys the soul which possesses them and draws it away from philosophy.' These words are the answer to τίνες δή;—giving one of the ways in which these rare natures are corrupted. δν = ἵκειν ἰ.

τὰ λεγόμενα ἄγαθα] This is Plato's way of quoting a common opinion which is not acknowledged by philosophy. Cp. iv. 431 c τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις.

καὶ τοῖνυ ... περὶ αὐτῶν] αὐτῶ = 'the subject in hand': αὐτῶν = 'the philosophic natures;' last mentioned supra b in τοῖνυ δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων, κ.τ.λ.

κελεύεις] sc. λαβίςθαι αὐτοῦ.

παντός, ἃν δὲ ἐγὼ, ... ἵσμεν] 'Of every seed or growing thing, whether vegetable or animal, we know.' φυτῶν is here taken in its widest sense.

It is not, however, the stronger or better nature of which the remark in the text is psychologically true. The poetical and sensitive temperament is the one which suffers most from alien conditions. Weakness, especially when accompanied by intellectual gifts, may indeed, by the help of accidents, be matured into strength. And strength, which was wanting in the original
character, has been sometimes developed in a life-long struggle against the passions or against circumstances. But, in general, the finer qualities of mind, which are capable also of coming to the greatest good, are most injured by corrupting influences: the gentler nature, which meets with no response at school or in the world, is coated over with an impenetrable rind: the soil is receptive, and the imagination is frequently haunted by impressions of evil, when they have ceased to affect the will. Genius, in the spring of youth, is hardly ever aware of the deteriorating effects of the surrounding atmosphere or soil. Stronger, rougher characters are not in the same way the creatures of circumstances. But weakness has no limit of evil, when the barriers of education and of public opinion have been once passed. This is commonly the stuff out of which great criminals are made.

κάκων ἀπαλλάττειν] Stallbaun reads κακίον, with a slight variation of writing and of meaning, but see L. and S. s. v. ἀπαλλάσσειν, a. ii.

νεανκῆς] 'vigorous,' 'high-spirited.' Cp. infra 503 c νεανκιν to kai μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας.

ἀσθενή δὲ φῶςιν, κ.τ.λ.] This clause depends on the general force of the words ἢ οἴει ... ἄλλ' οὔκ, which emphasize the second alternative mentioned:—'Surely you must think that great crimes spring from a high-spirited (not from an inferior) nature, but that a weak nature,' &c. For ἢ οἴει ... ἄλλ' οὔκ cp. i. 344 ἢ ἡ σμικρὸν οἶει ἐπεχειρεῖν πρόγνα διορίζεσθαι, ἄλλ' οὗ βίου διαγωγή; αἰτίαν here is the adjective.

οὔκ, ἄλλα ... οὕτως] oūk, sc. ek faivhēs: oūtou, sc. ek neankê̂s.

ἡ τοῖνυν ἐθεμεν] sc. einai.

ἡ καὶ σοὶ ἡγεῖται ... (b) ἄνδρας καὶ γυναίκας;] 'Or do you, like the many, really think that there are, in any degree worth speaking of, young men corrupted by Sophists, or Sophists in a private capacity who corrupt them?' &c. Plato exhibits the Sophist in different lights,—here in a more favourable one. The point of this passage is to show that whether the Sophists are good or bad, their influence is unimportant compared with that of the great Sophist, public opinion, which they merely echo.

ἰδιωτικοὶ] 'in a private capacity;' is opposed to the sophistry
of the assembly or of public opinion. Cp. infra εἰς διωτικὴν: Εἰ διωτικοῦ λόγου.

492

**μεγίστους ... σοφιστὰς** [Cp. Polit. 303 c, where Plato says of false statesmen — μεγίστους δὲ ὅταν μμητᾶς καὶ γύρως μεγίστους γέγονα τῶν σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς.

**ζυγικαθεζόμενοι ἀθρόι ὁι πολλοί** 'sitting down together assembled in great force.' Hermann's correction ὁι πολλοί adopted in the text is not quite certain. ἀθρόι πολλοί seems to have been a not uncommon phrase: cp. Gorgias 490 b ἐὰν ἐν ταῖς ὅμοι, ὅσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόι ἀνθρωποι: Xen. Anab. vii, 3, § 9 οἷς κύριος πολλὸς ἀθρόις. The subject of ψέγωσι is to be supplied from αὐθώς τοῦτα λέγοντα supra.

C

**ὑπερβαλλόντως ἵκατερα** sc. ποισώτες —' doing either in excess' (referring to ἐπαινώσιν and ψέγωσι).

ἡ ἡ ποιαν αὐτῷ ... ἀνθείων] ποιαν ἂν MSS. (1) ἂν with future indicative and future infinitive is a well-authenticated construction, that is, in many cases it has the support of the best MSS.: the omission of it is unjustifiable when it has sufficient manuscript authority in its favour. Here it is read in all the MSS. The particle, without weakening it, gives an ironical force to the future: 'will be likely to.' Cp. x. 615 d οἷς ἤσει, φύσει, οἶδ' ἂν ἤσει δεύρο. Cp. Goodwin, M. and T., §§ 197, 208. [B. J.]

(2) The repetition of the same syllable in ποιαν ἂν makes it easier to question the authority of the MSS. The 'colloquial style' of which Goodwin speaks in referring to x. 615 d, is not present here. [L. C.]

αὖτος] ὁ τοιοῦτος ψόγος ἡ ἐπανος, under the image of a torrent suggested by κατὰ φόνων and by κατακλυσθεῖσαν supra.

φήσειν ... τοιοῦτον] φήσειν is dependent on οἷς ἤσει to be gathered from ποιαν αὐτῷ παιδείας ἀνθείων (sc. ἤσει, supplied from τίνα ἤσει καπδιαν ἰσχεῖν;) ἂν οὐ ... οἰχῆσθαι which is equivalent to οἷς ἤσει καὶ ἡπτανοῦν παιδείας ἰδιωτικῆς ... οἰχῆσθαι. Cp. note on 491 Ε ἀπελευθ. ἐκ φύσεως, k.τ.λ.

D

**τόν** μὴ πειθόμενον] τὸν is the reading of Ven. Π Σ and a majority of the MSS. and seems more expressive here than τό (collective neuter), the reading of Α Μ, for which cp. infra Ε ὑ δἰ πνευμ, k.τ.λ. τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον is Bekker’s reading.
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οὐ γὰρ ἐξαιρέμεν λόγου] For ἐξαιρέμεν λόγου cp. Symp. 176 c 

That which is impossible with men is possible with God’ is one way in which Plato expresses the Socratic feeling that the idea of philosophy is a divine reality, which is nowhere fully manifested. Cp. the θεῖος λόγος of the Phaedo (85 δ), and the ‘epiphany’ of the philosopher in the Sophist (216 c) : ii. 368 a: ix. 592 a ἓν μὴ θεία τις ξυμβη τίχη. See also the words which have prepared for this, supra 492 a ἓν μὴ τίς αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τίχη.

ἀλλοιον ἥδος . . . πεπαιδευμένον] (1) ‘A different type of character, which has been trained to virtue in opposition to the education which they (sc. οἱ πολλοί) supply.’ It is better to adopt this interpretation, giving to παρά its common signification, and taking πρὸς ἀρετήν with πεπαιδευμένον (cp. Protag. 342 ἰ πανερμελείαν πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἀρμόσῃ πεπαιδευμένοι : Gorg. 471 δ), than (2), with Stallbaum, to take παρά in the unparalleled sense of ‘in accordance with,’ translating the whole passage: ‘a type of character differently disposed towards virtue, if it has been trained in accordance with the education which they supply.’ The participle, πεπαιδευμένον, according to the first interpretation, is equivalent to a relative clause, δέ πεπαιδευται: according to the second, to a conditional, ἢ πεπαιδευμένοι ἢ.

ἐκαστος . . . μὴ ἀλλα παιδευται] sc. δοξάτω σοι. For what follows cp. Phaedrus 260 c, d, especially the words δόξας δι πλήθους μεμελετηκόν, κ.τ.λ.

οὖς δὴ . . . ἡγούνται] ‘whom they regard as their professional rivals.’

οὖτοι] the people, who are themselves the Sophist: cp. τούτων, supra 492 ε. The dislike of the Sophists on the part of men like Anytus (Meno, sub fin.) is humorously attributed to professional jealousy.

μεγάλου καὶ ἴσχυρον τρεφομένου] ‘a great and mighty beast which is fed by him,’—‘of which he is the keeper.’

ἐφ’ οἷς ἐκάστος] The reading of nearly all the MSS. is ἐκάστος, which cannot be explained satisfactorily. Corrections are ἐκάστοτε (Vind. E), ἐκάστος, δὲ ἐφ’ ἐκάστος (q), and ἐκάστας (cj. van Prinsterer). ἐκάστας is preferred because it gives a slight increase of distinctness
to the meaning: 'upon what occasions he utters his different cries.' Cp. Laws vii. 792 οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἂν προσφερομένων στίγμα, καλῶς ὁμοίως προσφερέω, οὔ δὲ ἂν κλαίῃ καὶ βοᾷ, οὐ καλῶς.

καὶ χρόνου τριβὴ] τριβή is opposed to ἐπιστήμη, Phaedr. 260 ε &c.: Gorg. 463 b: Soph. 254 α.

καὶ ἐπιθυμίων] Opinion and desire are hardly distinguishable in the great beast.

όνομάξω δὲ πάντα ταύτα, κ.τ.λ.] 'should employ all these terms (καλόν, αἰσχρόν, &c.) according to the opinions of the great beast.'

τάναγκαια δίκαια καλῶ] His only principle of justice would be the physical necessities and exigencies of the great beast’s nature.

οὐκ ἄτοπος ἂν . . . παιδευτής] ἂν is to be joined with εἰπαί.

ξυνότων] marks the fact that the Sophist represents the collective opinion of mankind in their assemblies: παντοδαπῶν, that this opinion is a mixture of very incongruous elements, cp. Protag. 319 δ ὄμοιως μὲν τέκτων, ὄμοιως δὲ χαλκίως, κ.τ.λ.

ἐν γραφῆς, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Polit. 297 ε ff., where the absurdities of actual politics are ridiculed by imagining the result of similar proceedings in other sciences.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ . . . ἐπαινῶσιν] The construction is incomplete: δῆλον or some such word has to be supplied with ὅτι. Cp. v. 471 c, d ἐπι τε ὅτι γε, κ.τ.λ., and note: Soph. 248 ν ὅτι ὅσο τὸ γιγνόσκειν ἐσπερ ἦσται ποιεῖ, τι τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὗ ἐμβαίνει πάσχειν.

ἐπιδεικνύμενοι] supra iii. 398 a.

πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων] is to be joined with κυρίοις αὐτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς: 'The man who makes the many his arbiters of taste, except in so far as is necessary, will experience the fatal necessity of doing whatever they approve.' The true artist will not fall under the dominion of the many: but he must respect the opinion of the world up to a certain point, if 'he is to get leave to live in it.'

The aim of the Sophist, in Plato’s view, is not to undermine public opinion or morals, but to reproduce them. His wisdom is to think like other men: cp. Shaks. 2 Henry IV. ii. 2, 62 'Never a man’s thought in the world keeps the roadway better than thine.' He is
the representative man, who utters the average mind,—in religion, in politics, in arts, in society. He gathers up in his words the power of the many, which he directs against the wisdom of the few. He systematizes received opinions, which are thus rendered capable of being taught (compare the Protagoras). And sometimes philosophy may enable him to invest a popular belief with the dignity of a great truth, or to embody in a general formula the maxims of a party or sect.

η Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἄναγκη] The proverb is said by the Scholiast to refer to the following story:—Διομήδης καὶ Ὄδυσσεύς τὸ Παλλάδιον κλέφαντες ἐξ Ἡλίου νυκτὸς ἐπανήγαγον ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς σελήνης ὑποφαινούσης, ἐποιημοῦνες δὲ Ὄδυσσεύς αὐτοῦ μόνον δάβαί γενέσθαι τὴν πράξειν, ἐπιχείρησαν τὸν Διομήδη αμίτα τοῦ Παλλάδιον προηγούμενον ἀνικέοι. οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὸ τῆς σελήνης φῶς τὴν καθ’ αὐτοῦ θεασάμενος τὸ ἐπιφερομένον ξίφους σκιάν, συλλαμβάνει τὸν Ὅδυσσεά, καὶ τὰς χείρας τοὺς συνδεῖ, προάγεις τε κελεύει, καὶ τύπτων αὐτοῦ πλοτεί τῷ ξίφει τὸ μετάφρησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἡλίου παραγίνεται. The Scholiast on Aristoph. Eccles. 1029 has a different explanation:—ὅτι Διομήδης ὁ Θρᾷς, πόρνος ἤλεγχε τὰ χων θυγατέρας, τοὺς παρίστατοι ξίνους ἐβαζότο αὐταῖς συνιόμενα. Whatever the story may be to which the phrase refers, it is quite clear that the general meaning of it is ‘inevitable necessity.’

ταῦτα τοῖνυ... (494 λ) ὅπε’ αὐτῶν] The opposition of the few and the many is almost as great in the reading age of the nineteenth century as in the hearing age of Socrates and Plato. In politics, in society, in the realms of thought and imagination, there are two classes not marked in the vocabulary of party and found in all parties—the inferior minds and the superior: those who are under the influence of the hour, and those who have characters and principles. The difference is exaggerated when a single mind is at variance with the rest of the world. The great man who may be born on the deeper tide of ages has, nevertheless, to struggle with the eddies and currents which react upon the surface. Yet the opposition is not so entire and absolute as Plato seems to assume. For different classes of minds, like different ranks in society, fade into one another: and also the simple elements of moral and religious truth afford a wide ground of common interest. No link from the highest to the lowest can be spared in the order of things. And through the progress of commerce and the arts, in the movements of history, by the gradual spread of education, the discoveries of great thinkers at length find a place in the world,
and the speculative ideas of one generation become the received opinions of the next.

493 E ταύτα τούτων...διαμαρτήματι] 'Bearing all these things in mind, remember further that point which we mentioned before'—i.e. in 491 a, where it is said that the truly philosophic nature is rarely found among men.


αὐτέςται] sc. λεγόμενα.

φιλόσοφον μέν ἡρα...πλήθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι] Cp. especially Polit. 292 έ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ πλήθος γε ἐν πολει ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην δυνατόν εἶναι κτήσασθαι; Καί πόσ;

καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν] supra 493 λ.

ἐκ δὴ τούτων] 'As a consequence of this,'—i.e. the fact of their being blamed by the people and by their flatterers. Cp. supra 489 c.

495 a, 487 c.

οὐκοῦν εἴθις ἐν *παισίν...ἐν ἀπασίν] The MSS. have εἴθις ἐν παῖσιν. But the conjecture ἐν παισίν is clearly right. For (1) it makes explicit the contrast to πρεσβύτερος infra: (2) the same correction (παισί for παίσι) is required in iv. 431 c, where there can be no reasonable doubt: (3) it agrees better with εἴθις: cp. iii. 401 d εἴθις ἐκ παιδών.

497 c ὑποκείσοντες ἡρα] 'Then they will lie at his feet.' ὑποκείσοντες is here used like ὑποκέπτειν (infra ix. 576 λ) or ὑποστρέφειν (iv. 426 c). Cp. Gorg. 510 c ταύτα ψέγων καὶ ἐπαισίων ἐτήλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκείσονται τῷ ἄρχοντι.

τί οὖν οἶει...ποιήσειν] 'How then do you suppose that he will behave?' For ποιήσειν cp. supra ii. 365 λ and note: Thuc. v. 71 τὰ στρατώπεδα ποιεῖ μὲν καὶ ἄραπτα τοῦτο.

ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις] 'under such circumstances': cp. supra 489 c ἐκ τε...τοιούτων καὶ ἐν τοιούτωι according to one interpretation.

498 C ἦγομενον] The lives of Pausanias, Themistocles, Alcibiades (the latter especially in the words καὶ ἐτί εἴδης καὶ μέγας), perhaps of Lysander, may have been in the writer's mind. Cp. I Alcibiades 105, where Socrates charges the young Alcibiades with an ambition extending beyond Athens to Greece, beyond Greece to Asia and the world.
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τὸ δὲ όν κτητὸν] sc. ὡς, as elsewhere the neuter referring to a masculine word.

διὰ τοσοῦτῳ κακῶν] ‘through’ (i.e. notwithstanding) ‘such manifold hindrance.’ For a somewhat similar use cp. Soph. Trach. 1131 τίρας τοῦ διὰ κακῶν ἑῖσηπώρας. Cp. also Keble, Christian Year, Whit-Sunday:

‘To other strains our Souls are set;
A giddy whirl of sin
Fills ear and brain and will not let
Heaven’s harmonies come in.’

διὰ τὸ ... ξυγγενὲς τῶν λόγων] (1) ‘Because such reasoning is congenial to him’; or (2) ‘Because of that in him which is kindred to dialectic.’ Cp. iii. 402 άδιάντος δι’ τοῦ λόγου ἀστάξον’ ἀν αὐτῷ γνωρίζον δι’ αἰκειότητα μᾶλστα ὁ οὕτω τραφεῖς.

else] ‘One person’: more than ‘one’ cannot be expected.

τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλούναι] ‘who think that they are losing.’

οὕτω μὲν ἔργον ... else ἄγωνας καθιστάντας] With the participles we must supply οἰόμεθα καὶ ὅτιον δράσειν αὐτούς from τί οἴομεθα δράσειν ...; immediately preceding. ‘Do we not suppose that they will do anything, performing any action and speaking any word ...?’ The words καὶ (‘both’) ιδία ... καθιστάντας are added in explanation of πράπτονται ... περὶ τὸν πείθοντα.

ἐλέγομεν] 491 B ff.

πλάκτοι] The plural has the effect of scorn.

οὕ γάρ] ‘Yes, I see that all this is true: for it was not a bad, but a true observation.’ κακῶς has to be understood from the beginning of the preceding sentence—οὕ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν.

ἐλέγης καὶ ἐλλος γινομένης] ‘which even otherwise’ (i.e. setting aside the cause of destruction just mentioned) ‘is a rare growth.’

ὦς ἡμεῖς φαμέν] v. 476 b: supra 491 a, b.

καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἄνδρῶν ... οὕτε ιδιώτην οὕτε πόλιν δρά] Plato thinks that it is only great natures which do great evil. Yet it is almost a condition of men’s greatness that they should also in spite of themselves do some good.

The largeness and force and originality of a man’s character are
the qualities which give him power over his fellows. The narrow
nature, which is incapable of attracting others and has no
intelligence either of things or persons, is necessarily unable to act
upon them.

καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα] καὶ = 'also,' anticipating καὶ οἱ τἀγαθά. The
latter clause introduces the reverse statement, though not
immediately in point.

καὶ οἱ τἀγαθά, οἱ ἄν ταύτῃ τόχωσι βρέστες] 'and' [from these
men, i.e. the philosophers, come those who do] 'the' [greatest]
'goods, being such of them as are drawn in this direction.' The
element of chance is never wholly eliminated in Plato.

οἷς μᾶλιστα προσήκει] sc. ἡ φιλοσοφία—'to whom she is nearest
of kin.' There is a reference to the Athenian law which compelled
the nearest kinsman to marry an orphan maiden. Cp. Laws
xi. 924.

The bad philosophers are not the philosophic
natures spoilt, but the unphilosophic pretenders to philosophy. ἐδ
answers both to μὲν (οὗτοι μὲν) and τέ (οὗτοι τέ).

The sentence is really unfinished,
the finite verb τυγχάνουσι, substituted for the participle by
attraction from λελαβήται, giving it a fallacious appearance of
completeness. The sense is completed figuratively in the words
τοῦ δεσπότου τὴν θυγατέρα μᾶλλοτος γαμεῖν, κ.τ.λ., of the next
sentence, and literally in 496 A ἦσαν αὐτὴ πλησίασοντες ὁμιλῶν κ.τ.λ.

The personification which follows is suggested in the words
ἀπετέραριφθης κυριεύνων (c), and continued by the help of οἱ εὐρωτες
αὐτῇ (ibid.), until the idea is complete and philosophy is transformed
into a gentle maiden who is compelled by poverty to marry a tinker
and has offspring νόθα καὶ φαίλα. In the words τί δαί; ... ἀληθινῆς
ἐχόμενον; the simile is blended with that which it is intended to
illustrate.

Σοκείς ... διαφέρειν αὐτούς ἴδεῖν] ἴδεῖν is epexegetic := 'to look at.'

φαλακροῦ] is only added to make a more contemptible image,
while εμπροσθιοῦ is in keeping with the diminutives ἀδρωπσίσκοι, τεχνίον,
and νεωτί ... λελυμένον continues the figure οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργων
... ἀποδιδήσασκοντες. τοῦ δεσπότου is in construction with θυγατέρα.

'fit to be called sophisms.'

Cp. Lysis 207 A οὗ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἀξίος ἄκούσαι, and see L. and S.,
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s. v. ἀκοῦω, iii. 2. The use of this idiom here implies the familiar personification of λόγοι, in the shape of the διανοημάτα τέ καὶ δόξας, which are the offspring of the unworthy marriage. προσήκορτα = εἰς προσήκει,—a 'personal' construction.

καὶ οὕδεν . . . ἔχομεν οὖν:] 'And nothing genuine or worthy of true wisdom or having to do with it.' There is no sufficient reason for cancelling ἵσιον, which may be either taken absolutely, or as governing the genitive as well as ἔχομεν, which in this case is pleonastic, like φανεὶς, ἐχοὶ, μολὼν, &c. But the reading of Ven. Π, ἢιων ὥς, suggests the possibility of ἵσιον.

πάνσημορον δή τι] For the collective neuter cp. supra 490 εἰκονίδιον δὲ τι ἐκφεύγει: 492 εἰ τι περ ἀν σωφῆ. καταληθήσεται, 'detained by exile,' sc. from deserting philosophy. Βραχύ ή τι . . . ἐν ἀυτῇ ἀν ἢθοι εἴφησε gives the reason of δικαίως ἀπιράζων: its force may be rendered thus:—'rightly scorning it by reason of its own natural excellence.'

κατασχεῖν . . . (c) κατακαίει] sc. πρὸς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ.

τὸ δαιμόνιον σημείον] On this subject see Apology 31 δ: Theaet. 151 α: Theages 128 ε: Xen. Mem. i. 4. What we gather respecting this 'familiar' of Socrates is (1) that he had experienced these intimations from childhood (Apol. 31): (2) they prohibited but never instigated a course of action; they would stop him when going out of his house or forbid him to proceed in the middle of a speech (ibid. δ), or prevent his taking back truant pupils (Theaet. 151), or hinder his departure till he had expiated some trifling impiety (Phaedr. 242 β): (3) the δαιμόνιον is always described by him in the neuter gender,—once in a doubtful dialogue as having a voice (Theages 128 ε); also as a special monitor which is peculiar to himself, as in the text and Xen. Mem. i. 4. Xenophon is very anxious that we should believe his master's account of this strange experience; the simplicity of Socrates' own statement is a strong reason for doing so. It is not to be confounded with the general consciousness of a divine mission received by Socrates from the Oracle, or with special intimations such as that given by the dream in the Phaedo (60 ε). There is nothing wonderful or mysterious beyond the fact itself: no intimations are given by the δαιμόνιον of future events or divine truths. Nor can we easily set bounds to the latent forms of instinct which reason may assume,
or deny the possibility of mental phenomena, which are without parallel in ordinary experience.

A slight extension of a common idiom, for which cp. Apology 17 B ἢ τι ἢ οὐδένι.

tοῦτων δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν οἱ γενόμενοι] Cp. Thuc. iii. 56, § 7 ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι.

If a perfectly wise and just man were to appear, how would the world receive him? Would he make his voice heard in opposition to the opinions and practices of the day? Would any party range themselves on his side? Or would he be an outcast and an exile, 'wandering about in sheepskins and goatskins'? Would he have been burnt at the Reformation, or would he be tolerated in our own day?

ἐπὶ τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν] The manuscript authority is nearly divided between τῷ δικαίῳ (Par. A: Vind. F) and τῶν δικαίων (Π Μ). The former was adopted by Schneider and is idiomatic: but τῶν δικαίων (the objective genitive) is not ungrammatical. Both readings have the same meaning: 'to the assistance of what is just.'

ἀλλ' ὅσπερ ἐξ θηρία . . . πλεόν τε καὶ εὐρενής ἀπαλλάξεται] Cp. Gorg. 521, 522, where Socrates gives the reason why he takes no part in politics, viz. because he would have been long ago put to death.

ἐξ πᾶσιν ἀγρίως ἀντέχειν] ἀγρίως is emphatic and a part of the predicate := ἀγρίως οὔς οὐδ' ἢ ἀγριώτατος, 'singly to oppose the fury of them all.' The collocation of ἐξ πᾶσιν aids the antithesis.

λογισμῷ λαβῶν] The change from the plural to the singular (ἰδὼντες τὴν μακάν . . . τάτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβῶν) is due to the singular in the image (ἄσπερ εῖς θηρία ἀνθρώπος ἐμπεσών).

τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν, κ.τ.λ.] 'He will take his departure from it with a fair hope, in peace and good-will.' αὐτοῖ, sc. τοῦ βίου.

οδέθε γε . . . τὰ κοινὰ σώσει] Shall a man acquiesce in the state of life, politics, education, which he finds around him, retiring 'behind a wall' in stormy times, or shall he 'take arms against a sea of troubles' and strive to set men right? That is a question which admits of a general answer so far as this: That he who from cowardice or self-interest or over-refinement or indolence or irresolution fails in resisting the prejudice or injustice or falsehood of his
age, is wanting in the fulfilment of the highest duty of a citizen and a man. Yet, in the ordinary state of society, the antagonism between the individual and the world, whether of politics or of public opinion, is not so great as is implied in the Platonic contrast. The spirit which replies to divine goodness with the words, ‘We have a law and by our law he ought to die,’ is, in Plato’s language (supra 496 c), hardly worth mentioning, having only occurred once perhaps in the history of mankind. Most societies have better, as well as worse impulses; if they are not so good as the best individuals, of whom they are partly composed, neither are they so bad as the worst. Of their nobler impulses the philosopher may avail himself: he is the Master of those that think; his gentle qualities may readily be appreciated by all. Nor does he really stand alone: many intermediate minds are the conductors between himself and the multitude, with whom he may sometimes also make a direct alliance, like the King and the Commons in the Roman State, against the prejudices or interests of the few. His duty is to struggle rather than to win, in the faith, which is the meeting-point of philosophy and religion, that truth will finally prevail. His place is not in the congenial state which Plato offers him—this would only limit him; but in the world at large, in which he makes himself felt as a power.

Philosophy must continue thus degraded and defamed, until the true philosopher obtain a state and constitution suited to him. Thus, having a true environment, Philosophy will prove in action that she is alone divine. Such a perfect constitution has now been described in outline. But the education of the philosophic rulers has yet to be determined. And first, the method of their training in philosophy must be the opposite of that now in vogue. Instead of getting a smattering of dialectic in the brief interim between school and business, after which, as things now are, the student hardly meddles with philosophy again, they shall be content in youth with elementary mental discipline and attend seriously to the strengthening of the physical frame; until the age arrives when the mind approaches her maturity. Then they shall increase the gymnastics of the mind. And when declining strength exempts them from public services, they shall be permitted to devote themselves entirely to the pursuit which they love, and so prepare themselves for blessedness to come.

τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῆς τίνα . . . λέγεις] For the form of expression cp. v. 475 ἐ τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινοὺς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις ;
Plato: Republic.

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Republic VI.

497 B

επαναλάμβαναι] τὰς νῦν πολιτεῖας is easily supplied, but is unnecessary.

κινήματα] κινήματος is preferable to κινήματος, which is inaccurate.

καὶ καὶ στρέφεσθαι ... κρατοῦμεν λέον] And so it (i.e. the philosophic nature) is warped and changed, just as a foreign seed, sown in an alien soil, fades away (ἐξίτηλον) and tends to be subdued and pass (κρατοῦμεν λέον) into the native stock. For λέον cf. Laws viii. 834 D παιδιμίτων ἐστι θὸς ἄνθρωπον.

The words which follow, οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ... ἑκκίπτεται, are added as if ὅστερ ἥν κύκλον στέρμα, κ.τ.λ., had been quite independent of καὶ καὶ στρέφεσθαι ... ἀνθρώπου. The construction would have been more correct if the sentence had terminated at λέον, or if καὶ had been inserted before ὅστερ ἥν κύκλον στέρμα. As the sentence stands there is an asyndeton either before ὅστερ or οὖν.

C


ἡ] 'was always,' even when rejected of men.

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.] 'In other respects this one (sc. ἡ ἡμείς διαλείψαμεν) is the best constitution': but there was one defect in it. We did indeed say at the time that the spirit of the legislator was to be preserved, but we did not show sufficiently how this was to be effected. τοῦτο δὲ αὐτῷ, 'this very point' (which is excluded and excepted by τὰ ἄλλα) was mentioned, but not adequately discussed.

ἐρρήθη μὲν ... (ο) ἄλλα οὐχ ἱκανῶς ... ἐπηλώθη] The construction is broken by the answer, ἐρρήθη γὰρ, ἣν: and ἄλλα οὐχ ἱκανῶς ... ἐπηλώθη takes the place of οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ ἐπηλώθη.

Socrates had said (ἐρρήθη: cp. iii. 412-414) that it was necessary to have an authority in the state that should preserve the spirit of the legislator. The question as to how this was to be effected had only been partly answered in Book iii (οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἐπηλώθη), owing to the objection of Adeimantus (φ布βαν δὲ ἡμεῖς, κ.τ.λ.) at the beginning of Book iv (419 ff.), and the more serious interruption at the beginning of ν (450 ff.), which led to the discussion of communism. Socrates now proceeds to complete (τὸ λοιπὸν) his answer by stating how the study of philosophy is to be pursued.

D

λόγον] 'idea,' 'conception,' 'reasoned notion.'

ὁν ὡμείς ἀντιλαμβανόμενον] ὡς, sc. ἡκίνων ἀ (cognate accus.).

αὐτοῖς] 'of it,' i.e. of the question which we were discussing in Book iii.
Notes: Book VI.

οὐ 'πάντως ῥήστον] πάντως MSS.—' not by any means the easiest.' Bekker's correction, οὐ 'πάντως ῥήστον, is unnecessary [B. J.]. But the change is slight and the phrase more idiomatic [L. C.].

καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον . . . χαλεπτὰ] τὸ διπτὶ is an addition of Socrates', 'we may indeed say in the words of the proverb.'

ἀλλ' ἔως . . . φανεροὶ γενομένου] 'Still, he said, let us clear up this point, and so complete the demonstration.'

νῦν μὲν . . . (498A) περὶ τοὺς λόγους] 'At present those who do engage in philosophy are mere striplings, just past their boyhood: they approach—that is, those of them who are most thought of as philosophers—the most difficult part of the subject; and I mean by the most difficult part, dialectic; in the interval before keeping house and going into business, and then betake themselves off.' That is to say, the study of philosophy, as at present pursued, begins too early, at the wrong end, and ends too soon. The opposite advice is given by Callicles in the Gorgias (485).

(1) Only the extreme limit (οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ) of the interval (τὸ μεταξὸ) is mentioned; the other is to be gathered from ἐκ παιδῶν: 'between boyhood and business.' Or (2) we may take τὸ μεταξὸ . . . χρηματισμοῦ, with Stallbaum, as meaning 'in the spare moments of housekeeping and business.'

οἱ φιλοσοφῶτατοι ποιοῦμενοι] On comparing vii. 538 c τῶν ἄλλων ποιούμενων οἰκείων, it appears that ποιοῦμενοι is a qualifying word like δοκοῦσθε, &c., and is to be understood passively: 'who are thought to be most accomplished in philosophy.'


τὰς ἁπάτες;] sc. πράττειν.

παν τοινυντίων] sc. δεὶ πράττειν.

ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφία κτωμάνους] In the Protagoras Plato represents this principle as recognized in the ordinary education of the Greek: Protag. 326 B ἐνά τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοιᾷ χρηστῇ ὁσῷ.

προϊόμενοις δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν γάρ] 'as the period of life advances in which.' Two notions are combined: 'As the time of life goes forwards,' and 'as the particular age arrives.'

vol. iii.
Adimantus thinks that the seal of Socrates will be met with equal seal on the part of his opponents, beginning with Thrasymachus. 'Do not try to cause ill-feeling between Thrasymachus and me, who are now friends, although we were never enemies. For I shall never relax my efforts to do good to him and to all men, and my work may bear fruit in another life, if not in this.' He adds that it is no blame to ordinary men that they do not believe, since they have had sophistry palmed upon them for truth, and an artificial combination of words for the spontaneous unity of nature. Nor have they ever seen a perfect man ruling in a perfect state. Socrates therefore once more reiterates his main position, that there is no hope for mankind unless either the few who are now 'useless' should have supreme power, or the actual potentates should be inspired with a genuine love of true philosophy. Then, and not till then, the ideal state will come into being. And when the vulgar see the philosopher as he really is, they will be of another mind. The majority of men cannot be angry with one who loves them, or be jealous of one who is free from all jealousy and personality. For his mind dwells, not among the contentions of earth, but in the divine order. He will take the state in hand and make a 'tabula rasa,' wherein he will plan out the ideal of human society, looking at the abstract principles of virtue, and at the actual traces of it existing among men, framing out of both together the image of a divine humanity. He—or they, if there be more than one—is alone qualified for this work. Nor is it inconceivable that in the whole course of time one such may arise, and may legislate for a willing people, or that he may make his laws according to the spirit of our doctrines. In that case our ideal ('though hard and rare') will be actually realized.
μὴ διαβαλλε, κ.τ.λ.] See note on i. 336 b. The words οὐδὲ πρὸ
tοῦ, κ.τ.λ., are in keeping with the good humour which, after the
storm, Socrates has contrived to restore at the end of Book i, and
which remains unbroken at the beginning of Book v. For the
use of διαβάλλειν cp. Symp. 222 d ἄτομς ἡμεῖς καὶ σὲ μυθικο διαβάλλεις.

ὅταν . . . ἐντύχως λόγοι] For this notion of discourses taking
place in another life cp. Apol. 41, Phaedo 68 a, b, in which Socrates
anticipates his meeting with great souls in Hades. In the present
passage, however, the reference is to a future life on earth after the
interval of a thousand years. It is curious after this allusion to
find Glaucón in x. 608 d expressing surprise when Socrates
announces the immortality of the Soul.

eἰς οὖν μὲν οὖν . . . τὸν ἄναντα] Cp. x. 608 c τὶ δὲ ἄν, ἵν ποῖ
ἔως, ἐν γε διάλογον χρόνον μέγα γένοιτο; πᾶς γὰρ οὖσα γε δὲ εἰς παύεται μέχρι
πρεμεῖτον χρόνον πρὸς πάντα διάλογος ποῦ τις ἄν εἰη. Οὖς οὖν μὲν οὖν, ἡμῖν
Τὶ οὖν; οὐι αὐθανάφι πράγματι ὑπὲρ τουσοῦτον δεῖν χρόνου ἐσποδακάνιν,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ πατοῦς;

ἐξεπίτευξες ἄλληλοις ὁμοιωμένα] 'artificially made to agree with
one another.'

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομίστου, δισπερ νῦν] This allusion to the 'spontaneous
harmony' of the dialogue is partly a mode of praising his own
work (cp. Shakespeare, Jul. Caes. iii. i, i11 'How many ages
hence | Shall this our lofty scene be acted over | In states unborn
and accents yet unknown!' and Laws vii. 811, where Plato
eulogizes his own compositions with the freedom and garrulity of
old age), and partly expresses his real conviction that the harmony
of his dialogues (as of a living creature—Phaedr. 264 c) was not
merely a work of art, but had a real correspondence with the truth
of the ideas. Cp. Theaet. 200 ε, Phil. 20 c.

λόγων . . . δευθέρων] 'discourses noble and free.'

οἶνον ἴητεῖν] 'whose nature is to seek.' οἶνον = τοιοῦτον ὄστε.
The arguments are again personified.

πρὸς δόξαν] 'to producing an impression.'

πάρρηθεν ἀσταφομένων] 'giving a distant welcome.' Cp.
Psalm cxxxviii. 6 'The proud he knoweth afar off.' The phrase
occurs in Eurip. 102 πρόσωθεν αὐτὴν ἄγρος ἀν ἀσπάζομαι.

τότε] v. 473 d.
Plato: Republic.

καὶ δεδιότες δμως] 'although with trembling.' καὶ as in καίπερ.

οἰδέ γ' ἀνὴρ δμως] 'No, nor can an individual become equally perfect,' sc. as he would in a kingdom of philosophers. See above 497 ἄνοιγμα, τὰ μέγατα, κ.τ.λ.

περιβάλλη] which is found in the best MSS., is probably correct: 'until necessity (1) encompasses them' (L. and S. s.v. περιβάλλω, ii) to take charge of the city and the city to obey them, or (2) 'constrains them' (lit. 'invests them with it'), the infinitives taking the place of an accusative. The inferior reading, παραβίλλω, must be taken intransitively, like παραβάλλω in viii. 556 c ἀναπαραβίλλων ἀλλήλων οἱ τε ἀρχηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄρχουν.

καὶ τῇ πόλει *κατηκόρα γενέσθαι] The MSS. have κατηκόρου (κατηκόρο II), which is harsh in grammar and irrelevant in meaning. κατηκόρο, a correction of Schleiermacher's, involves the least possible change (from α to φ), and makes the sentence smooth: 'Until either philosophers are invested with power, or kings, who have power, become philosophers.' Cp. v. 473 δ ἐν μη... ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς for the same two alternatives. κατηκόρος has been explained as attracted to the subject of βοινωσταί from κατηκόροι which Stallbaum conjectured: but apart from the grammar, the notion of the city entreating the philosophers to govern her, goes beyond anything which has been suggested by Plato.

τούτων δὲ πότερα... ξειν λόγον] 'To suppose that either or both of these alternatives is impossible, I maintain to be quite unreasonable.' πότερα is the indefinite, 'either of the two,' as in Theaet. 145 α τι δ', εἰ ποτέρα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαύει πρὸς ἄρσῃ, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere. This is one of Plato's subtleties of language which appear to be lost in later writers. The pronoun οἴδανα is more emphatic than the simple negative οὐδὲν ξειν λόγον,

εἰ τοῦν... (κ) ἐγκρατῆς γεννηται] Ξτομος, sc. ἔσχιν. αὕτη ἡ Μούσα, sc. ἡ φιλοσοφία, αὕτη referring to ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν at the beginning of the sentence.

ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ] The fancy of ancient writers led them to speculate on the boundless past more than on the future. Herodotus has no difficulty in imagining that the Delta might have been accumulated in 10,000 years. Socrates in the Theaetetus (174 ἐ) imagines infinite time, in which every man's
pedigree has contained princes, as well as peasants, many times over. In the Laws infinite time, in which a series of destructions is supposed to have occurred, is said to be the origin of states (iii. 677). Similar speculations occur in the Politicus and Timaeus. In this respect, as in several others, Greek thought seems to occupy an intermediate space between the dreamy infinity of the Oriental and the narrower notions of the West.

η ταύτα διὰ μετώπως... σπορινώσασαι] (1) The difficulty of this passage is removed by reading η for η, placing a full stop after σπορινώσασαι, and joining καὶ... όστε: 'You will surely say that, if they look at the philosophers in this light too' (and not in the former only), 'they will change their mind and answer in another strain.' Cp. Thuc. v. 45 τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐφόδους μη καὶ ἤν εἰ τῶν δήμων ταῦτα λήψωσιν, ἑπαγαγοντα τὸ πλῆθος, where καὶ marks the antithesis of εἰ τῶν δήμων ἐν τῇ βουλῇ. This avoids the harshness of taking ἀλλοιαν δόξαν in two opposite senses (i.e. (a) 'different from their earlier opinion': and (b) 'the same with their earlier opinion but different from yours') within a few lines. (2) But the reading χ ὁ γάρ εἰν suggests a clearer sense which can be obtained by Stallbaum's simple expedient of changing τοι to τε: 'or supposing them to look at the question in this light, will you not say that they will adopt a different opinion and make another reply?' The repetition of ἀλλοιαν has then a natural emphasis. For the omission of a negative see note on iv. 439 ε. Cp. for the spirit of the passage Phae. 258 ν ὁς ἐν ἀγροίκως γε, ὄμει, λοιποίσθειαν, κ.τ.λ.

ἀφθονον τε καὶ πρᾶξιν δύνα] with this use of ἀφθονος cp. ἄθυμος in iii. 411 B, Laws x. 888 A. It is remarkable that Plato should be found asserting the goodness of ordinary human nature when treated with gentleness and consideration.

ἀμέλεια] See note on iv. 422 c.

ἐκείνους] Supra 495 c, d.

λοιπορομέτως... αὐτοῖς] αὐτοῖς is better than αὐτοῖς, being more in keeping with the spirit of the passage: cp. supra 499 ε μὴ φιλοσοφεῖν ἄλλα παραγωγον, and infra С μαχέων αὐτοῖς. It was by no means an uncommon practice of the old philosophers to abuse the people. For an illustration of ἑπισκοπεῖσθαι compare the amusing description of Alcibiades in Symp. 213 ff. A still
more fanciful use of the metaphor occurs in Theaet. 184 α ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπισκεψακινότων λόγων.

It may be often doubted whether the persecution of religious and philosophical teachers is to be laid to the door of their virtues or of their faults: in the nineteenth century and under ordinary circumstances, rather to the latter. No man is now persecuted for his goodness: there is far more danger that the rewards which he receives may injure the bloom of his disinterestedness. He is more likely to be persecuted for the love of truth, when the truth happens to be opposed to the prevailing sentiments of his age and country. Yet here, again, much will depend upon himself. The philosopher who has no kindness for the many and is too fastidious to sympathize with them, easily becomes the object of enmity to those who are unacquainted with him. This does not show that mankind deliberately prefer falsehood to truth, any more than evil to good.

ἥκιστα . . . πολούντας] Names and authorities in the place of reasons and proofs, personalities instead of facts, in ancient as well as modern times, mark a superficial and unphilosophic character. So the μεγαλοψυχος in Aristotle is οὐκ ἄνθρωπολόγος (N. E. iv. 3, § 31). Yet those who are guilty of these faults are almost always unconscious of them.

πολό γ'] sc. ἥκιστα.

ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα, κ.τ.λ.] In a similar spirit it is said in the Timaeus (47 a–c) that men should in their lives imitate the unchanging motions of the heavens. Compare also the philosopher in the Theaetetus 174 ff., and, for the loftiness of κάτω βλέπων, Sophist 216 καθορωτέην ύψοθεν τῶν τῶν κάτω βίων.

tαῦτα μιμεῖοθαί τε . . . ἀφομοιοιποθαί] sc. δι', elicited from οδηθ . . . σχολή, the positive from the negative.

ἀφομοιοιποθαί] sc. τοῦτοις.

διαβολή δ' ἐν πᾶσιν πολλῇ] ἐν πᾶσι may mean either (1) 'among all men': or (2) 'in all things,' i.e. attending every form of human life. 'The philosopher attains to divinity as far as man can: but there is always detraction going on.' The divine life is not complete until its excellence is acknowledged by mankind.

δημοτικής ἀρετῆς] Cp. iv. 430 c πολιτικήν γε and note: Phaedo 82 β οἱ τῶν δημοτικῆς τε καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιτεθευκότες.
Notes: Book VI.

οδ' χαλεπαυσίως... (501 A) δ' οδ' πάντων ρήματον] ‘They will not be angry if they understand. But tell me, what is their manner of drawing it?’ ‘I mean, I replied, they will take for their tablet a state and human nature, and will begin by making a clean surface, which is not at all an easy thing to do.’

The modern philosopher will rather say: διαρκεί τοι πάντων δυνάμεων. Neither individuals nor states can wholly break with their antecedents. The power of habit or tradition, in institutions as well as characters brings back the former things.

αλλ' οὖν... ἥ αὐτοῖ ποιήσαι] ‘However, you know that this is the point which will at once distinguish them from the others: they will have nothing to do with individual or state, and will draft no laws, until they have either (§) received or (§) themselves made a clear surface.’ In other words they will begin with the abstraction of a state. A method of effecting such a ‘clean sweep’ is suggested at the end of Book vii, where all persons of ten years old and upwards are to be sent out of the city.

οδον... τῆς πολιτείας] ‘Do you not suppose that the next step will be to make an outline of the form of the constitution?’ For the meaning of ὑπογράφων cp. the opposition of ὑπογραφή and τελεστὴ ἀπεργασία infra 504 D. In Protag. 326 D the word is used of the writing-master setting a copy.

ἀπεργαζόμενον] ‘In filling up the outline.’

to φυσει δίκαιου... το ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] i.e. to natural justice and to that justice which exists among men. Cp. Phaedo 103 b oβέτo ἐν ἡμῖν oβέτo ἐν τῇ φύσει: ibid. 102 D. The absolute ideal or the ideal in nature, is opposed to the actual in man. The pronoun is resumed in ἄν' ἐκεῖνον.

ἐμποτείκειν... τεθεοσκέλον] ‘they would put into the picture what is manlike, mingling and mixing it from the modes of human action, forming their conception of it from that ideal, which Homer, when existing among men, called divine and godlike.’ There is possibly an allusion to the secondary meaning of ἀνθρείκελον = a pigment of the colour of human flesh.

ἄν' ἐκεῖνον τεκμαρύμενον, κ.τ.λ.] Does an artist paint from an ideal in the mind’s eye, or from observation of nature and life? Is moral and political philosophy to be gathered deductively from ideas, or inductively from experience? The same answer may be
Plato: Republic.

given to both questions: (1) that different minds work in different ways: one with eye and thought simultaneously, the other with a conception that always seems to outrun the power of execution. One fills up a previously existing outline, the other creates piece-meal: the ideal is first in one mind, the real in another. And one man is a philosopher from running about in life, another from reading and study. (2) The opposition of fact and idea, though often made and occasionally justified by the differences of human character or genius, is not, speaking generally, a true one; ideas and ideals are only more universal and distant facts, in which the particularity and confusedness of sense is lost.

C oδὲ διατεταμένους ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ἐφησα δεναι] Viz. v. 474 Ἀ θεῖν διατεταμένους, κ.τ.λ.

D ἦν ἡμεῖς διηλθόμεν] Referring once more to supra 485 ff.

τί δὲ; τὴν τοιαύτην . . . διωφίσαμεν] The change from μῆ to οὐ shows that ἀμφισβητήσεως has been forgotten, some general notion such as λέγειν having taken its place; and in what follows φήσεων can only be explained by a recurrence to οἴκει or some similar word implied in the preceding question, the infinitive being suggested by ἔσεσθαι preceding.

E ἦν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ] Cp. once more iii. 389 δ ἐὰν γε . . . ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἦταν τελικται.

ἐπίτον] sc. δυραινοῦσιν.

βοιλεῖ . . . (502 Α) δομολογησισωσιν] 'Do you wish that we should say, not that they are less angry, but that they have become altogether gentle.' So the unregenerate materialists in the Sophist are imagined to be better than they are, for the sake of the argument (Sop. 246 δ, 247 ε). Cp. also i. 354 Α ἂν ποδό σοῦ γε, . . . ἀ θρασύμαχει, ἐπειδὴ μοι πρᾶσσεν ἐγών καὶ χαλεπάεινων ἐπιτυχώ.

ἐπίτον φῶμεν] sc. δυραινιν.

502 A αὐλυχυνθέτες] 'from shame' at our magnanimity in saying they are quite gentle.

τις] τις; which proves to be the reading of Par. A, agrees equally well with the answer oδῷ ἀν εἶς, but cp. ἐξει τις . . . , ἔσθῳ δοτις . . . , infra.

δὲ μὲν γὰρ . . . ἐνυχωροῦμεν] Supra 491 ff., 499 δ.

B γενόμενος] = εἴ γένοιτο, 'were he to arise.'
Plato is arguing about the probability of his perfect state coming into being, and he assumes this to be possible if only one philosophic nature in the course of ages remains uncorrupted, and finds a city willing to obey him—that is the first step. The ruler lays down his laws and the people execute them—that is the second step. But why should not that which approves itself to us approve itself to him? Or, in other words, ‘Why should not the laws which he lays down be the same with ours?’

We may now return to the education of the ruling class, which, as was said above, must be arranged with due regard to the age best fitted for each branch of study. And first, the tests which we now demand for them will be more severe than those previously required. Their patriotism must indeed be proof against all assaults, but they must also be unwearyed in learning. Now this implies the combination, rarely found, of quickness with steadiness, of eagerness with persistence. If this higher nature is to be tested, the course of studies must not only include such provisional views of justice, temperance and other virtues, as have been given above: but the pupil must be taken round by what was then briefly indicated as the ‘longer way.’ In other words, he must not stop short of the highest of all studies, that of the idea of good,—a thing of which all men have a presentiment, but which none have grasped, yet without which all pursuits are vain. This the true guardian must not fail to know if our state is to be perfectly ordered. Yet for the present this supreme idea, transcending not pleasure only, but wisdom, knowledge, truth, and even Being, cannot be defined, but only shadowed forth. As the sun is the source not only of light and vision, but also of the generation and growth of visible things, so the Idea of Good is the supreme cause, not of truth and knowledge only, but of Being. The analogy may be carried further. As in the visible world there are shadows and (so-called) substances, so in the intelligible there is a lower sphere in which ideas are symbolised by sensible things, and a higher one, where the ideas are contemplated absolutely in subordination to the idea of good. Thus:

The visible world presided over by the sun has

a. Shadows perceived by (α) Conjecture:
b. Realities perceived by (β) Faith.

The intellectual world presided over by the Idea of Good has

c. Mathematical truth perceived by (γ). Scientific thought:
d. Ideal truth perceived by (δ) Reason.
Plato: Republic.

οδύειν . . . το οσφύν μοι έγένετο] 'I gained nothing by the trick.'
Cp. Symp. 214 Α πρὸς μέν Σωκράτη, δὲ ἄνδρες, το σοφισμά μοι οδύειν.
The allusion is to v. 449 c and the passage there referred to—iv. 423 ε.

tὴν . . . δισεχερεῖαν] 'the troublesomeness,' i.e. both the inherent difficulty of this, and the dislike which the statement of it was sure to occasion.

ἡ παντελῶς ἄληθής] The absolutely right arrangement being that the rulers must be philosophers. He proceeds to take up the subject at the point where in Book iii he had digressed. The φιλάκες had been supposed to go through a novitiate, with a view of testing their temperance and courage: 413 ε καὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ παιισί καὶ πανίσκους καὶ ἐν ἄνδρασι βασανιζόμενον καὶ ἀκρατοῦς ἐξεβάλοντα καταστατέων ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως . . . τῶν δὲ μὴ τοιούτων ἀποκριτέων.

δέλεγομεν] iii. 412 c ff.

tὸ δόγμα τούτο] as appears from iii. 412 ε, is that which is implied in φιλοποιοῖσας, viz. the determination ὅ μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡγησώμασι εὐμφέρειν, πάση προσωπική ποιεῖν, ὅ δ' ἐν μή, μηδὲν τρόπον πράξαι ἂν ἐδίελεν.

ἡ τῶν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέων] 'else, he who failed was to be rejected.'

παρακαλιστομένου] proves to be the reading of Λ, as well as of Π Μ. The reading παρακαλίστεσθαι appears in no manuscript.

ἡν γάρ διήλθομεν φῶσιν δεὲν ὡπάρχειν αὐτῶς] 'for the nature which we described as needing to be present in them.' διερχόμεθα here takes the construction of λέγειν: ὡς δέον would be more regular than the infinitive δεῖν.

διεσπασμένη] διεσπασμία was wrongly read by Cobet (Var. Lectt., ed. sec., p. 531, quoted by Baiter) in Par. Α. It is really found only in a' Α, and was adopted by Stephanus from the Latin version of Ficinus. διεσπασμένη is now restored.

cέλαιεις καὶ μεμονε . . . εθέλειν ἢ] There are two ways of construing this passage:—(1) 'You know that people who have a quick apprehension and memory, shrewdness and acuteness, and such like qualities, are not wont to be at the same time of a generous and noble spirit, so as to be such as to wish (ὅστε τοιοῦτα εἶναι δέοι) to live an orderly life, quietly and steadily.' (2) 'People who have
a quick apprehension and memory, and shrewdness and acuteness, and other such qualities, as you know (and we must add the impetuous and noble), are not wont to be at the same time such as to wish to live orderly.'

The former interpretation (1) gives the more obvious and natural construction. But it is objected, not without a show of reason, that the combination of high-spirit with quickness of intellect does not necessarily produce quietness of conduct (μετὰ ἡσυχίας ... ἦν). To which it may be replied that νεανικὸς, as well as μεγαλοπρεπὴς, is here used in a good sense, implying, not youthful impetuosity, but a robust and high-toned character. For this use of νεανικὸς cp. supra 491 ε ἢ οἷς τὰ μεγάλα ἀδιάμετα ... ἐκ φαιδή, ἀλλ' οἷς ἐκ νεανίκης φύσεως τροφῆ διαλογίσθει γέγονεν ... ; For the connexion of μεγαλοπρεπής with σωφροσύνη and κοσμίτης cp. supra 500 c, d.

τὰ βιβλία ... ἦσθη] The ἐμβηδεστεροῖ of Theaet. 144 b.

αὐτὸς] sc. τῷ παιδευμένῳ.

αὐτὸς] sc. ἧν διήλθομεν φύσιν (supra b).

οἷς τότε ἠλέγομεν] iii. 413 c ff.

διαφημάζονοι ἦνεβιβάζομεν] is the reading of the majority of MSS. It may be defended by supplying φύσις (or ψυχή cp. vii. 535 b) from the general sense of the preceding passage.

οἷς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις] 'In other kinds of effort,' i.e. other than intellectual. Orelli's conjecture, ἄλλοις, is plausible but unnecessary. It is also noticeable that the word ἄλλοις is absent from most of Plato's dialogues, occurring only in the Timaeus and Laws.

διαστημάζονοι ἦνεβιβάζομεν] It is better (1) to take ἦνεβιβάζομεν transitively—'we gathered concerning justice, temperance, courage and wisdom, what their several natures were,' than (2) intrinsically, as Timaeus does, 'we came to an agreement.' The meaning here approaches that of proof or inference which is common in Aristotle. L. and S. s. v. συμβασζω, iii.

μή γὰρ ... ἀκοῦειν] 'Why, if I did not remember, I should deserve not to hear the rest.' μή μημονεών = εἰ μη μημονεώμι.

ἡ καὶ τὸ προσφηθὲν αὐτῶν] sc. μημονεώσις. αὐτῶν, sc. our discussion of the three parts of the soul.

ἲλέγομεν ποὺ ... προσφαῖ] Cp. iv. 435 ὁ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὀδὸς ἦ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα. That is to say, the account of the ideas of
justice, temperance, courage, wisdom, which was given in Book iv, was inexact and popular. Their true nature would only be revealed by dialectical deduction in their relation with the good. For ἐποιήναι with the genitive cp. Polit. 271 ε δει της τοιαύτης ἐστι κατα- ἐποιήναι ἐπόμενα.

δὲ μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν] The use of the indicative here amongst so many optatives belongs to the idiomatic use of ἦν in speaking of an ultimate fact.

άτελες γὰρ οὐδὲν οὖδενὸς μέτρον] ‘Nothing imperfect is the measure of anything.’ The very notion of measure involves completeness or definite quantity. For another play on the word μέτρον cp. v. 450 θ μέτρον . . . τοιοῦτων λόγων ἀκούει δῆλος δ ἁπλός νοῦν ἐχουσίν. A somewhat different test is proposed in Polit. 286 δ, ε οὗτε γὰρ πρὸς της ἡδονῆς μέγιστος ἀρμόστουν, κ.τ.λ., where it is said that discourses are not to be measured by the pleasure they give, nor by the ease or quickness with which they dispose of a subject, but as they tend to sharpen the dialectical powers.

δοκεῖ δ’ εὐνοεῖ τισιν] Cp. ii. 372 ε, where τισιν conveys a similar innuendo.

καὶ μείζον, κ.τ.λ.] Not only is there a knowledge higher than virtue, but the virtues themselves should be exhibited in their most perfect form.

καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφή, ἀξιόν τὸ διανόημα] ‘Your sentiment, said he, is a right noble one’: i. e. that the highest perfection is required on the highest subjects. καὶ μᾶλα is to be connected with ἀξιόν: cp. i. 334 ε καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφή, ὡσπο ἐξεσκάλεξε. Cp. the αὐτὸ τάρκησις of the Politicus (284 δ), which will require a standard of measure.

Yet in modern, as well as in ancient times, the highest subjects have been treated in the loosest manner. The reason is that they are partly matters of faith and feeling, as well as of reason: all have something to say upon them, and all are eager to hear about them. Not only philosophy, but theology, has often fallen into ignoble hands—οὐ προσήκου ἐπεισεκωμακότας.

οὐ πάνυ] ‘Certainly not.’

πάνως] as elsewhere, has the force of a connecting particle; cp. Theaet. 143 καὶ πάνως ἤγεν καὶ ἀναστάσασθαι διόμαι: Polit. 268 ε πάνως οὐ πολλὰ ἐσφέυγες παιδίας ἐτη. The sentence is not therefore to be regarded as an asyndeton.
Notes: Book VI.

η αδιανοεί... αντιλαμβανόμενοι] 'Or you again intend to interrupt and give trouble,' as Adeimantus had previously done by recurring to the subject of women and children (v. 450 θοαν νόμοι λόγων ἐπεγιρέτε, κ.τ.λ.).

ei δὲ μή ἵστον... ἄνευ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ] The double ei in the former part of the sentence helps to distinguish the indicative clause from the optative,—the former mood being correctly used to repeat a previous statement, the latter indicating the further supposition. For the same reason Bekker rightly changed κεκτήμεθα to κεκτήμεθα.

ἡ οὖσι... ἁγαθὴ] Compare the passage (iv. 438 λ) in which drink or any desirable object is said to include the good. But are all the meanings of 'good' the same?—would have been the question of Aristode (Ν. Ε. i. 6). Words seem to play the same part with the ἱδέα τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ as with the Eleatic δὖ or with the abstract θές. Language readily provides an expression for the unity which the human mind is vainly seeking.

tοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις] Cp. Aristotle's οἱ χαριντες (Ν. Ε. i. 4, § 2, &c.): also Theaet. 156 λ.

καὶ δὲ γε, ἢ φίλε, κ.τ.λ.] (α) Those who maintain that intelligence is the good, on being asked what they mean by intelligence, reply—'Intelligence of the good'—thus re-introducing the word and still begging the question 'What is the nature of the good?' (β) Those who maintain that pleasure is the good have to admit that there are bad as well as good pleasures, and therefore that bad and good are identical. In the first sentence Plato appears to be speaking of the Cynics, or perhaps of the Megarians: in the second of the Cyrenaics and of people in general. Cp. Phileb. 67 θ πολλαί κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζήν ἡμῖν εἰς κρατιστας εἶται. For the contradiction ἁγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ ταῦτα (infra ν), cp. Phil. 13 β, c: and, for ὅς... ἡμιντων, Theaet. 147 λ, θ οἷον οὖν ἑπινέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετερᾶς ἀποκρίσεως, κ.τ.λ.

τὰ δέ; τοῖς οὖ φανεροῖς, κ.τ.λ.] However men may differ in their idea of the good, they all alike insist on having what they think the reality and will not put up with a sham.

The argument is in some degree like that of Anselm and Descartes, that the highest perfection involves existence. The reality of pleasure might be maintained on similar grounds. For nobody desires 'sham pleasure.' Plato in this passage (but cp.
Parm. 132 b, where he has begun to suspect that abstractions may be a creation of the mind) does not appear to be aware of the answer to this sort of argument—that good, like being, may be an abstraction only, though one of the three greatest or highest of our abstractions: 'verum, unum, bonum.' Compare Theaet. 172 a, where the real nature of the good or expedient is contrasted with the conventionality of law and justice.

The tautology in δοκοῦντα... δοκείν affords no valid objection to the reading.

δ ἐν διώκει μὲν ἀπασα ψυχῇ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp Aristot. N. E. i. 1, § 1 did kalōs ἀπεφύνατο τάγαθον, αὐτ' ἐφεται.

ei ti δεθεῖτο ἢν] sc. αὐτῶν.

δοκοῦσθαι] Cp. Theaet. 209 ε τὸ γάρ, ἀνεμεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεῖν... πάντα γενναίας έσεκεν δοκοῦσθαι.

πρότερον] (1) sc. του φυλακος. The guardians are φυλακες τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, sc. τῶν νομίμων. Cp. supra 504 c φυλακει πάλιας τε καὶ νόμων. Or (2) ‘before he sees how they (justice and beauty) are good (διὰ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν).’ [B. J.]

διάγκη... παρὰ ταῦτα] A slight discontent is betrayed in these words. Adeimantus, here, as elsewhere, is not easily satisfied: he wants to know Socrates' own opinion. Socrates before giving his answer, exclaims against the persistent vein of expostulation adopted by Adeimantus already in several passages: ii. 367 b, v. 449 c, vi. 487 b. The impatience of Glaucon (infra v: cp. ii. 357 a) comes to the aid of his elder brother.

οὕτως... ἄνθρωπος] oūτoς ἄνθρωπος expresses a sort of humorous indignation. The MSS. vary between καλὸς and καλῶς. If καλῶς is read, it must be taken ironically with oūτoς ἄνθρωπος: 'A fine gentleman like you.' For καλῶς (which is idiomatic) cp. Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1008 ὁ παῖ, καλῶς ei δήλος ποῦ εἶδος τί δρήσα: Oed. Col. 269 τοῦτ' ἐγὼ καλῶς ἐξουσία. The point is determined in favour of καλῶς by observing that the vernacular phrase οὕτως ἄνθρωπος (for which cp. especially Gorg. 467 b, 489 b, 505 c) does not elsewhere occur with the addition of an epithet. The text agrees with the first hand of Par. A.

A similar trait of character is attributed to Cebes in the Phaedo 63 a δεῖ τοι, ἐφι, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινάς ἀνερέπνη, καὶ καὶ πάνω εὐθυμος ἐβείλει πειθεσθαι δ τι αὖ τίς ἔπη: and 77 a καίτοι καρπερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστι (sc. ὁ Κέβης) πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις.
Notes: Book VI.

For the blindness of right opinion without knowledge cp. Theaet. 201 c.

As in the search after justice (iv. 432 b, c), the increasing dramatic life indicates the interest and importance of the discovery.

Glaucion seizes on the admission of Socrates (504 D), that an approximate method might be sometimes employed. Socrates replies that in the present case even the approximation may be unattainable.

‘To reach what is now in my mind is too much for our present attempt.’ We have set out in search of Justice (v. 472 b), and in the attempt to discover it we are called upon to define the Good. But that is only to be attained by metaphysical disquisitions for which the readers of the Republic are not yet expected to be sufficiently prepared. Cp. Theaet. 177 c, where Theodorus prefers moral discourses to dialectic. The present remark throws some light on the scope and aim of the Republic.

The untranslateable pun (τόκος, ‘offspring,’ and τόκος, ‘interest’), for which the way has been prepared in the word ἀποστία, is carried further in what follows: ‘Take care that I do not unintentionally deceive you and render a false account of the offspring or interest.’

For the same figure cp. Polit. 267 ἀμερερεὶς καὶ καθαιρέηται χρεῶν ἀπεδεικτήσα τῶν λόγων, προσθέτει τὴν ἐκτροπὴν ὁμοιότατα τῶν τόκων καὶ ἀναπληρώσας αὐτῶν: and for a different simile viii. 555 ἐτού παῖδε ἐγκυόν ρόκους πολλὰ πολλαπλασίους κυμαίμενα.

For the use of the aorist participle with γε = ‘not until,’ cp. Phaedr. 228 τὴν μεν τοῖς διάμοιραις... διεμι, ἀνακείμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτου. Διέξασι γε πρῶτον, ὁ μελότητι, τῷ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὁμοστερῷ ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῷ ἰματίῳ. The reference in ἐν τοῖς γεμαρχηθέν is to v. 476 ἐκ: cp. supra 493 ε.

This passage has been thought...
inconsistent with v. 478, 9, where it was shown that the ‘many
beautiful,’ &c. cannot be said either to be or not to be. But εἶναι
is not here used in the sense of ‘to have real existence,’ but
simply = ‘to be’.

ἐκαστὰ οὖτως] οὖτως, sc. πολλά, ‘many individuals of each class.’

καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλῶν ... προσαγορεύομεν] ‘And we say that there is
a beauty in itself and a good in itself: and in the same way with
reference to all the classes which we previously regarded as
consisting of many individuals, reversing the process and placing
the individuals under one idea corresponding to each of these
classes, as forming a unity, we call each class by what it really is.’
Cp. Phil. 16 c, d δεῖν ... δὲ μίαν ἴδεαν περὶ παντὸς ἐκάστου ὑθέων
ζητεῖν· εὑρήσας γὰρ ἴδιόνυσαν.

ἄρ’ οὖν ... ἐκθηματισθῆναι] Cp. Heracleitus, fragm. 21 ὀφθαλμοὶ
ὁτων μάρτυρες ἀκριβέστεροι.

ἔστιν δὲ τι ... (υ) ἀκουσθῆται] The ancient physical philosopher
did not observe that air was as necessary for the transmission of
sound as light for the medium of vision.

ἡ σοὶ τινα ἵεσι eπιτεί;] sc. αἰσθήσιν ἤτιν τουίτου τινὸς προσεδι.

παρουσίας δὴ χρῶς ἐν αὑτοῖς] sc. ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς from τοῦ ὁρατοῦ
supra. The analysis of vision here is less minute than in the Theaetetus and Timaeus. Colour is imagined as being present in the
objects, although neither colour nor vision can be realized without
light. Cp. infra 508 c δεν ἐν τας χρῶς ... ἐπέχῃ ... νυκτερινὰ φέγγη.

τίνος δὴ λέγεις] (1) sc. γένους παραγενομένου τὴν τα ὅψιν ὁρᾶν τὰ
τε χρώματα ὁρᾶν τίνα. The genitive is used as if ἔδω μὴ παραγένηται
had been ὁ μη παραγενομένου. (2) For the genitive cp. v. 459 b τι
dὲ ἔπαιν ὅπει; [B. J.].

οὔ σμικρὰ ἄρα ἴδεα ... (508 λ) τὸ φῶς] ‘Then the sense of sight
and the quality of visibility are joined together by a bond nobler by
the measure of no small nature than the bond which unites other
correlatives, if light be no ignoble thing.’ ‘Nay, said he, it is
far from being ignoble.’ οὔ σμικρὰ ἴδεα is the dative of measure
or comparison, and is said in the same way as μείζων τῆς πόλεως
δὲ οὔτι σμικρὰ, ἀλὰ διὰ οὐκοῦκτοδ ἐγένσαν ἀνθρωπότητι. For the
use of ἴδεα in this sense, cp. Phileb. 64 ε ὅποιον ἐί μὴ μὴ δυνάμεθα
Light is necessary to the correlation between the eye and visible things, and the preciousness of light is the measure of the superiority of that correlation to those existing between the other organs of sense and their several objects.

For the use of αἰτίων in the sense of 'allege to be the cause' cp. x. 599 E σὲ δὲ τὶς αἰτίαται πόλις κυριδέτηρ ἄγαθον γεγονέναι καὶ σφάς ὀδηγήκεναι:

'Is not the power which it (the eye) has, dispensed from the Sun and possessed by it as something derived from without?'

This may be appropriately termed Plato's 'solar myth.' Even at the present day, when the power which the Sun's force exerts over all nature is so much more truly recognized than formerly, the influence which the idea of the Sun continues to exercise over the mind and imagination is hardly less remarkable. The ordinary religious feeling about the Sun was shared by Socrates: Apol. 26 c, Symp. 220 d.

For φάναι cp. v. 473 Α φάναι ἡμᾶς ἐξευρηκέας ὁ ποιμήν τοῦτο γένοις ἄν ἐπιστήσεις. Ὁ τί περ, κ.τ.λ., is added in explanation of ἀναλόγων ἑαυτῷ.

ὁ παῖς τὰ αὐθεντικά... (c) τὰ ὀργάματα] 'whom the good begot to be its own counterpart, to be in the visible world in relation to sight and the things of sight what itself is in the intelligible world in relation to mind and the things of mind.' τοῦτοι, emphatically resuming the preceding τοῦτοι, is in the same construction with ὅν, while τοῦτο is the emphatic antecedent to ὅ τί περ. For the construction of λέγειν, with all that follows it cp. 511 A, B.

ἀν... ἐπέκμι] 'upon the colours of which the light of day falls.'

ἀλλὰ ἄν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη] sc. ἄλλι' ἐπὶ ἐκείνα ἄν τός χρόνος νυκτερινὰ φέγγη ἐπίκμι.

καταλαμμένη] The ἄν, which is not absolutely required in this and similar expressions, may be supplied from what has preceded, ἄν ἄν... ἐπέκμι, and would be felt as superfluous after ἄτον.

ἐνώσα φαίνεται] sc. ἡ καθαρὰ ὑψις.

οὔτω τοῖνυν... νοῶν ἐχεῖν φαίνεται] 'In like manner (οὔτω) conceive too of the soul in this way (ἄνε): when she is fixed steadily on that on which truth and being shine, she knows and understands this and appears to have intelligence.'
The expression recalls v. 479 c.

'this, then, which imparts truth to the things that are known and gives to the knower the power of knowing, is what I would have you call the idea of good: and this you will deem to be the cause of knowledge and of truth so far as the latter is known: but fair as are both these, knowledge and truth, you will be right in thinking that it is something fairer than these.' μὲν strictly belongs to αἰτίαν and is opposed to the following δὲ: the idea of good 'is indeed (μὲν) the cause of knowledge and truth, but (δὲ) it is other and fairer than they.' The reading διανοοῦ instead of the formerly received διὰ νοῦ (Ven. Ζ, &c.) has superior manuscript authority, including Par. Α, and gives a clear sense. The other is feeble and the expedient of cancelling the clause ὡς γνωσκομένης ... ἡγήσει indefensible.

The good is the sun, truth is light, the ideas are the objects of sight, and knowledge is vision. The strain of 'heavenly beauty' in which the mind is to be absorbed is in a region far away from modern thoughts. The intense reality of all beauty and all truth when seen according to the divine idea is perhaps as near an approach as we can make to the meaning of Plato. The want of personality in the ἀγαθὸν prevents our minds from resting in that which to Plato is the most real of thoughts, comprehending in one the idea of order and design, of a cause in nature and of intelligence in man, not without an association of goodness in the sense of benevolence and good-will. Cp. Tim. 29 ξ.

Preparations for the ἀγαθὸν may be traced in the Symposium, 211 D, E τι δήτα, ἐκή, οἴμομαι, εἰ τῷ γένοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρῶς, ἀμικτὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεωσαν σωφρόνως καὶ χρωμάτως καὶ ἔλλα πολλά φλυαρίας δινήτης, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τῷ θεῖῳ καλὸν δύνατο μοιοειδὲς κατιδεῖν; where the idea of ἀγαθὸν is not yet evolved out of the καλὸν: in the Phaedrus 250 D ὑπὲρ ἴδιον ἰδειγμάτων διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήματος, ἡ φρονήσις οὐχ ὄραται—δεινοὶ γὰρ ἐν παρείξει ἔρωτας, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐαυτῆς ἐναργής εἰδωλον παρείξει τε ἐν τις ἔν—καὶ τὰλλα δὸνα ἐραστάτ' ἔν τι κάλλος μόνον τοῖσ' ἐσχε μοῖραν, δοτ' ἐκφαντάστησιν εἰμαι καὶ ἑρασμιώτατον. And in the Philebus, which is probably later than the Republic, we find an attempt to give a further definition to the idea. The eternal nature or highest good is found to consist in measure, above the σύμμετρον and τέλος, which are second, and νοῦς and φρόνησις, which are third in the scale (Φιλ. 66 Α, Β).
Notes: Book VI.

ηλιοειδή] Neuter plural rather than feminine singular.

τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ [ξεν] = τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἐκεί, 'the state or nature of the good.'

ἀμήχανον κάλλος] sc. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

φάναι] cp. supra 508 b.

οὐκ οὕσις δύνατος . . . ὑπερήχοντος] Referring to the history of philosophy we may translate this:—'The idea of good reaches a step beyond the Eleatic being.'

"Ἀπολλων . . . δαμοσίας ὑπερβολὴς] 'Good heavens, what a marvellous superiority!' The way for this exclamation has been already prepared in the words ἀμήχανον κάλλος, supra. Glaucón speaks with a feeling of admiration and yet of incredulity. Cp. Euthyd. 303 ἀ ὁ Ἡράκλεις, ἐφη, καλοῦ λόγον! and for the rejoinder of Socrates cp. Phaedr. 238 ὃ οὐκετί πάρρω διηράμβων φθέγγομαι . . . τούτων μέντοι σὺ αἴτιος.

eἰ μὴ τι] sc. ἅλλο: 'at all events complete the simile of the sun.' Cp. 501 ε Ἦνα, εἰ μὴ τι ἅλλο, αἰσχυνθίτες ὑμολογήσωσιν: Meno 86 ε εἰ μὴ τι οὖν, ἅλλα συμπέραν γε μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον.

Ἠνα μὴ οὐρανόν . . . περὶ τὸ δυσμα] In allusion to the fanciful derivation of οὐρανός from ὦραν. Cp. Crat. 396 β οὐρανία, ὦρασα τὰ ἄνω. The v. g. οὐρανοῦ, though of inferior manuscript authority, may possibly be right.

ἀδηπερ τούτων γραμμήν . . . τὸ μὲν ἔτερον τὴμα εἰκόνες] Cp. Sophist 265 ε ff., where ποιητὴς is first divided κατὰ πλάτος into διείς and ἀδερφοπίνη, and then sub-divided κατὰ μῆκος into shadows and realities. Ἀνως οἰκόμενο is the reading of Proclus, p. 431. 10; of the Pseudo-Plutarch, 1001; and of the great majority of MSS., including Par. A. The emendations Ἰος, Ἰος, Ἐος, have been proposed: the variations εἰς Ἰος (v), perhaps equally an emendation, and Ἰος, Ἐος (Vind. ε, &c.), are also found in MSS. The reading Ἰος Ἰος is poor Greek, as well as poor sense; and the other correction, εἰς Ἰος, although not open to the first charge, equally enfeebles the meaning of Ἰος τὸν ἀόρατον λόγον. —'Divide the line equally and then sub-divide in the same proportion.' The text, as found in the best authorities, is probably genuine: the difficulty is to discover a reason for the inequality in the divisions. The whole line may be regarded as representing a progress upwards from the
infinite multiplicity of sense and the reflections of sense at the lower end, to the unity of good at the higher; the reflections of sense are more numerous than the objects of sense, as the mathematical figures and other phenomena of nature are more numerous than the ideas; and also downwards from the infinite value of the idea of good to the insignificance of sensible objects and their shadows (cp. infra 511). Still, although this explanation is in harmony with Plato’s ideas and with the general context, as a matter of style further explanation is needed. Cp. however Theaet. 197 D, where in the same manner he describes the different kinds of knowledge under the image of birds, some in larger and smaller groups, others singly flying through all, without adding any explanation of the reason of this.

τό μὲν ἕτερον τμῆμα] i.e. the lower segment.

διὰ πυκνὰ τε καὶ λεία καὶ φανὰ ξυνετήκε] For ξυνετήκε of a compact solid, cp. Tim. 61 a, 83 a. And for an account of the phenomena of reflection, ibid. 46 a, b.

η καὶ θεοὺς ἄν . . . ὡς ωμόθη} αὐτό, sc. τὸ ὅρμημα, which has now been divided.

ἳ τὸ μὲν ἑτεροῦ . . . τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη] ‘As thus:—There are two subdivisions of the intellectual sphere: a lower one, wherein the mind uses the objects given by the former segments as symbols; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle, works downward to a result. In the higher subdivision, the soul passes out of hypotheses and ascends to a first principle, which is above hypotheses, making no use of symbols, as in the former case, but proceeding by ideas alone.’

toίς τότε τμηθείσων] = tois εἰµπροσθεν εἰρημένων τμημασιν, referring to supra 509 D, E, 510 A. The reading of A and of the MSS. of Proclus, μυθείσων, though it may be due to the ingenuity of some early corrector, has the advantage of giving clearness to the logical connexion:—i.e. the visible realities, of which the εἰκώνες in the lower segment of the visible were imitations. These now become εἰκώνες in their turn. Cp. infra E ὡν καὶ σκιαί, κ.τ.λ.: vii. 515 D ικώνα ὡν τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἕωρα. The testimony of Ven. II is not available here, two leaves of the MS. having been lost; but its congeners D K agree with other MSS. in giving τμηθείσων.

τὸ δ’ αὐτ ἕτερον τό, κ.τ.λ.] The genuineness of τὸ after ἕτερον is open
to question. For no mention has occurred of the upper division leading to an ἄρχη ἀνυπόθετος. It may be answered that this is sufficiently implied in the preceding words, which describe the soul in the other division as ἄρχην ὑποθέτησιν ὅπερ ἀρχῆν ἀρχηγὸν. But the construction is also much simpler and more intelligible without the article, the only word to be supplied being ζητεῖ, which governs both τὸ ἐπερευνούν and ἐκεῖνο. The conjecture δ for τὸ is ingenious but unnecessary.

Of the three manuscript readings, ἀναπτύσσετο καθὼς εἰκών (Ἀ Μ), τῶν περὶ ἐκείνο εἰκὼν (ΔΚ ΒΙΝΔ. Ψ corr.), ἀναπτύσσετο καθὼς εἰκών (ΒΙΝΔ. ψ ῶ. ῶ.), the first, which is that of Par. A is probably the true one: i.e. ἀναπτύσσετο καθὼς εἰκών. The conjecture δ for τὸ is ingenious but unnecessary.

καὶ ἄλλα...καὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον] This is added, like καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα supra, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως infra, to show that διάσωμα is not confined to Arithmetic and Geometry, but prevails also in the other sciences.

τουσιδότην ὑποθέτης αὐτά] That is to say, they presuppose mathematical quantities and figures without any inquiry into the grounds of their suppositions, and end in the construction of their problem ὑμνισκομένως,—i.e. consistently, without any contradiction within the sphere of mathematics.

οὗκοιν καὶ ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.] sc. οὗκοιν καὶ τόθε οἷοθα ὅτι.

καὶ τάλλα οὕτως] sc. πραγματεύοντα.

ἡ πλάττουσι] e.g. the sphere, pyramid, cube, and other solid figures.

ὁ καὶ σκιαί, κ.τ.λ.] These words allude to the fourth or lowest section. Plato means to say that the mathematicians use as images of abstract ideas those things of which shadows and reflections are the natural images, that is, the forms of superficial and solid geometry, such as the square, circle, sphere, pyramid, cube, &c., and the other objects of vision.

Cp. vii. 534 ἂ, where further inquiry into the relation of the subdivisions is declined. The lowest of the four segments consists of shadows and reflections of objects: and each of the three.
lower is the reflection of the segment above it. The two main
divisions rest on the fundamental antithesis of Greek philosophy,
\textit{aiōnē} and \textit{νοημα}: the first and third subdivisions appear to be
suggested by the Heraclitean and Pythagorean doctrines.

\textit{τοῦτο τοῖς νοητοῖς, κ.τ.λ.} The mind, beginning with number
and figure, in the longest trains of reasoning always remains within
the sphere of mathematics—a truth which was not perceived by the
Pythagoreans when they identified numbers with moral ideas, and
is forgotten by Plato in the next book where he supposes the
higher astronomy to consist only of mathematical problems.

\textit{εἰκόνι δὲ χρωμένη... τετηρημένως} 'using, however, as images
those very things of which there are reflections in the sphere below
them, and which, in relation to those reflections, are habitually
esteemed and honoured as real and clear.'

There are two respects in which \textit{διάνωσ} or scientific reasoning is
inferior to true dialectic (\textit{νοῦς}):

(1) In deducing its results from certain abstract assumptions.
Thus arithmetic assumes the notions of 'odd' and 'even,' geometry
those of the circle, square, \&c., and of acute, right and obtuse
angles; solid geometry, the notions of the sphere, pyramid, cube,
octahedron, \&c.: astronomy, certain relations of matter in motion:
harmony, certain proportionate vibrations, and the like. None of
these sciences ask the reason of their primary definitions, or can
prove them to be otherwise than arbitrary.

(2) The other point in which these sciences are inferior is that
their processes are not pure from matter. For although both their
assumptions and their deductions have for their object certain pure
abstractions, they are unable to study these apart from visible
things. Even the arithmetician has a difficulty in separating his
abstract unit from the units which he is engaged in counting, or
from the geometrical figures through which he studies the relations
of numbers. In the \textit{έπιπεδων σχήμα}, which stands visibly for 9, each
side is of a certain length. The geometry cannot reason without
diagrams, much less can the astronomer without the outward
configuration of the heavens (\textit{τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ πουλιμα} vii. 529 c)
or some copy of this, or the harmonist without audible sounds.

The first of these defects is meant by \textit{ἐποθέσει} \textit{ὁ} \textit{ἀναγκαζόμενη}
ψυχήν χρήσατα: the second by \textit{εἰκόνι δὲ χρωμένη}, κ.τ.λ. 
Cp. vii.
529 \textit{δ} τῇ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν πουλίδα παραδείγματι χρυστέων τῆς πρὸς
ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἔννοια (\textit{sc. τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἐν σχήμασι φορῶν}).
Notes: Book VI.

But in speaking of sensible objects as the symbols or images through which science works, Plato remembers that what are images or shadows in relation to scientific conception, are the realities of common language and experience, and he recalls the distinction which he made at first between the shadow and the substance (supra 509 κ), which were to one another as opinion or fancy to knowledge (τὸ μὲν ἄτερον τρεῖμα εἰκόνες ... τὸ ... ἄτερον ... ὡς τοῦτο ἠομαίνει ... διήρησθαι ἀληθεία τε καὶ μῆ, ὡς τὸ δοξαστῶν πρὸς τὸ γνωστῶν, αὐτῷ τὸ ὀμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑμοιώθη). The εἰκόνες of the present passage are taken from the same class, which in the former place (and in common life) hold the higher and more honourable position of Realities—τὸ δὲ ἡ εἰκὼν ὑμοιώθη, and are so esteemed in relation to the εἰκόνες of that place (509 κ), viz. the shadows and reflections which occupy the fourth or lowest grade. To avoid the confusion that might arise from this, he here resumes what he had hinted just before, supra 510 ε ὡς καὶ σκιᾶ καὶ ἐν ὑδάτω εἰκόνες εἰσὶ, and uses emphatic pronouns to make the distinction felt, αὐτοῖς, ἑκείνοις, πρὸς ἑκείνα. The things which science uses as her symbols are sensible objects, τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἄλλως ἤθελεθη, —αὐτοῖς, the things themselves, as distinguished from their shadows, &c.—of which the class below them are again the symbols or likenesses: and in relation to those likenesses (their shadows and reflections) those sensible objects (both are ἑκείνα because remote from the true objects of knowledge) have had awarded to them an honourable estimation for clearness and reality.

The words ἑκείνοις πρὸς ἑκείνα (sc. τοῖς ὄρωμασι πρὸς τὰς σκιὰς) are added in apposition to τοῖς ... ἄλλως ἤθελεθη, so as to show that the 'distinctness' (ἐνάργεια) here spoken of is entirely relative, within the lower world of sense: and αὐτοῖς is not used with the specially Platonic meaning, but simply to distinguish objects from their shadows. Cp. Soph. 266 c, and for ἄλλως ἤθελεθη, Phaedr. 250 B ἔξω ἐνὶ τὰς εἰκόνας λόγος θεώντα τὸ τοῦ ἄλλως ἤθελεθη γένος. The use of ἑκείνα here distinguishes the visible, which has been dismissed, from the intellectual, which is the immediate subject of thought.

For τετρυμπήνους several MSS., including the first hand of Par. Α, read τετρυμπήνους, which may be variously regarded either as supported or suggested by τοῖς τότε ἅμηθεν above. The word τετρυμπήνους is not, however, in harmony with ἕδοξασμένους. The correction of Par. Α is by the first or second hand, and both Ven. II and M are defective here.
In the highest of the four divisions we are concerned with ideas only. The spheres of Mathematics and Metaphysics, as they may be termed in modern phraseology, are alike limited, the one to hypotheses, the other to ideas.

Mathematical studies are regarded by Plato as affording the most distinct example of scientific method. Indeed, from the position which they occupy in the next book, it might appear that they are understood by him to constitute the whole of the division intermediate between πίστει and νόησις, the field that is occupied by διάνοια. But from an incidental remark, vii. 517 D τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκέψις ἢ διάλυσιμον δὲ αἰ σκει, it is evident that he does not clearly distinguish between those hypotheses which are abstractions of sense and those which are abstractions of mind, between the hypothetical conception of a circle or a square, and that of Justice, so far as method is concerned. See also Meno 86 E ff. ὅπερ αἱ γεωμετρίαι, κ.τ.λ., where ethical reasoning is illustrated from mathematical. All science is imperfect so long as assumptions are taken for first principles, and symbols for realities. When the hypothesis is referred to a first principle, and the symbol explained by the thing signified, the science is complete (νοητῶν δὲ τῶν μετὰ ἀρχῆς έισφέρει). Of the attempt to rise upwards from ὑποθέσεις towards first principles, we have many examples in Plato: for instance in the Phaedo, where from the consideration of equality we rise to the conception of a perfect ideal, and in the Symposium, where Diotima leads Socrates upwards from the definition τόκος ἐν καλή το the contemplation of absolute Beauty. We may doubt if Plato himself would have asserted that in any part of his works he had realized the other aspect of his ideal method, that of descending by due steps from the Idea of Good to particular things. There is a sense in which his method is far more inductive than deductive. But, in the early part of the Timaeus, where from the notion of the Uncreated, the Eternal and the Good, he passes gradually to the necessary constitution of the Universe, there is an approximation to the intellectual movement which is here indicated.

It would be vain to formulate the precise relation in which Plato's view of Mathematics in the Republic stands to the statement of Aristotle, Metaph. i. 6, § 4 ὅτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἴσθημα καὶ τὰ εἶδη τὰ μαθηματικά τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φρονί μεταξύ, διαφέρουσα τῶν μὲν αἴσθησιν τῷ άίθιον καὶ κατείσθητα εἶναι, τῶν δὲ εἴδων τῷ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἀττα δόμω εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἴδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἐκατον μόνον.
Notes: Book VI.

The assumptions here meant are clearly not those of Mathematics only, but of every subject which can be brought under definition.

For a similar ladder by which we may ascend through the lower stages of beauty, ὧσπερ ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁμάδας, to the contemplation of a divine perfection see Symp. 211 b, c.

dοῦν ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁμάδας] Meaning geometry and the sister arts, cp. supra b. That the term is not quite accurately used Plato himself seems to intimate in καλούμενων, and also in vii. 533 c, d especially the words ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν πολλάκις προστίθησον διὰ τὸ ἐπιστήμης, δεόντως δὲ ὁμάδας ἀνακριβῶς ἄλλου, ἐναργειώτερον μὲν ἡ δίκης, ἄρνητορέτον δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμης.

BOOK VII.

Now if the idea of good in relation to the other ideas be represented by the sun, who gives light and warmth and growth to the natural world, the condition of men without philosophy may be compared to that of persons in a subterranean cave, bound fast in a position where they can only see the shadows of manufactured images cast by the light of an artificial fire. Education in the higher sense might then be represented as the process of unbinding such prisoners and turning them round and making them look upwards and then dragging them from their cavernous habitation into the light of day.

μετὰ ταύτα, κ.τ.λ.] The metaphor by which the sun represents the idea of Good as supreme over the intellectual world is now developed into an allegory, in which the shadows cast from images by the light of an artificial fire are contrasted with the true objects seen by the light of the sun.

tοιούτω πάθει] ‘To a condition which I may thus describe.’ For the use of πάθος cp. vi. 488 άντω γάρ χαλεπῶν τοί πάθος τῶν ἐπιμενετῶν.

ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς . . . παρ’ ἀπευ τὸ στήλαιου] ‘The entrance extending all along the den,’ i.e. the cave is shallow in proportion to the width of its mouth. This helps verisimilitude, because a multitude of human beings can be thus imagined as similarly placed with respect to the ascent towards the opening. The light of heaven does not penetrate into the cavern, which is ‘open to the light’ only in the sense that it is possible to clamber out of it into the light.

κύκλῳ δὲ . . . δινάτων περιήγειν] The construction with ἴδε is continued. The illusion of the shadows could not have been preserved if the prisoners had been able to turn their heads and see the fire and the images from which the shadows fell.
Notes: Book VII.

ϕῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς παρόν ἀνωθεν ... ἐπάνω δὴν] The way along which the figures are moving is raised and the light at a distance is raised still higher: otherwise the shadows of the figures and vessels could not have been visible to the prisoners in the den.

ἄπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς ... δεικνύσιν] 'As exhibitors of puppets have a screen before the persons who exhibit them, over which they show the puppets.' The image of puppets is a favourite one with Plato. In the Laws i. 645 b, vii. 804 b, he compares human life to a puppet-show. The difficulty in τῶν ἀνθρώπων, which seems at first sight needless, is best met by supposing the θαυματοποιοῖς to be not the actual exhibitor or puller of the strings but the master of the show. This agrees better with what follows— ὄρα τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ., than to suppose τῶν ἀνθρώπων to refer to the spectators.

σκεῦη, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. vi. 510 a. These represent the natural and artificial objects (τὰ τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὄλον γένος of vi. 510 a) which have their patterns in the upper world and in relation to them are mere toy-work (cp. x. 596, where Plato speaks of the ideal bed, the real bed, which is the copy of it, and the picture of the bed: also Tim. 28, 29, where the visible patterns are made in the likeness of the invisible and fashioned by the younger gods; ibid. 42 d, e): yet even of these only the shadows are perceptible by sense. The intention of this expression is best seen by comparing the following passages:—

515 c τὰ τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς
ib. d καθαρὰν ἑκαίνω ὅν τὸ τὰς σκιὰς ἰόρι
ib. πρὸς μᾶλλον ὅστα τετραμήλιον
ib. ἔκαστον τῶν παριστῶν ... τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα

517 b τὸ ... τοῦ πυρὸς ... φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει (ἀφημοιούν)
ib. d ἤ ἀγαλμάτων ὅν αὐτοὶ σκιά

520 c γρώσεισθε ἐκαίνα τὸ εἰδώλα ὅτα ἠστὶ καὶ ὅν
532 b μεταστροφῇ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἰδώλα καὶ τὸ φῶς
ib. c τὰ ἐν ὄρασι φαντάσματα θεία καὶ σκιάς τῶν δεσμῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιάς ἢ ἐτέρον τοιοῦτον φωτός ... ἀποσκευώμενα

534 c τῇ τῇ εἰδώλου τυός ἐφαπτοτεί, δέξῃ, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ἐφάπτεσθαι.
Plato: Republic.

Without wishing to press the allegory, it is natural to assume that a point of which so much is made has a distinct intention. Now in page 532 a it is stated that the man who in the allegory begins to see the real objects in the daylight represents the soul beginning dialectic, and that the scientific education preceding this was represented by the turning round to the ἐθωλα, the ascent, and the first glimpse of the reflections of the real objects in the light of day.

The stages in this preliminary process represent not different spheres but different degrees of scientific enlightenment. The meaning of ἐθωλα receives further illustration from the following passages:—

530 Α νομεῖν μὲν, ὡς οὖν τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιάτα ἔργα συνήσασθαι, οὗτοι ξυνεστῶσι τῷ τοῦ ὀφρανδο δημιουργῷ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἕμεραν εὐμμετρίαν, . . . οὐκ ἐστοῖς . . . ἡγησίται τὸν νομίζοντα γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιάτα δὲ ὑστάτος . . . σώμα τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα, καὶ ξηθεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὸν ἐλέειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν;

533 Ὅ συνερθοῦσι καὶ συμπεριγγωγοίς χρωμένη αἰς διάθσιμον τέχναις—ἀς ἐπιστήμης μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ θεὸς, δεότα δὲ ὁμοίως ἄλλοι, ἐναργείστεροι μὲν ἡ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέροι δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμης. διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτήν ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν ποι ἠριστάμεθα. See also ibid. b, c.

The ἐθωλα are (1) out of sight of the ἱδεα of good, (2) made and shown by somebody, (3) lighted by the fire which represents the sun. They are the figures of real outward objects: but as all outward objects can be comprehended under number and figure, Plato seems also to include in them the figures and numbers of arithmetic and geometry. He passes from the world as we see it to the world as conceived of by the mathematician, in which he expects to find the way up to the ἱδεα of good.

The notion of the σκευαστα ἐθωλα has been prepared for by the mention of the solid figures of geometers ἀ πλάτωνοι (vi. 510 e) and the use of the word σκευαστα for inanimate objects (ib. 510 λ).

515 Λ

ἀθινα τε . . . εἰργασμένα] The σκευαστα πρε wrought in various materials, as the visible world is compounded of the four elements.

οὖν εἰκός] To be joined with what follows: ‘naturally, some of the carriers are speaking, others not.’ The first impression of these words is that they have no point, but we see below (515 b εἰ καὶ ἠχό, ε.τ.λ.) the reason why they are introduced. Plato has hitherto spoken of the sensible as the visible world. But he here also
includes the world of hearing. This prepares for the science of harmonics infra 530 ff.

τι δὲ τῶν παραφρωμένων] sc. οἷον ἐν ἑωράκειναι αἰτεύοις;

οὗ ταῦτα ἡγεῖ . . . ἀπερ ὅρφεν;] ‘Do you not suppose that they would believe that they were naming those things that they saw actually before them?’ i.e. that the terms they used in their conversations applied to the shadows and not to the realities of which they are ignorant? ταῦτα the reading of Β Κ, the simple antecedent, is better than ταῦτα, the reading of Α. Π and Μ are wanting in this place. Παρώθησα the reading of Flor. Χ is rather confusing as it might signify either the shadows or the realities. The pleonastic expression ‘those present things which they actually saw’ is emphatic and in the manner of Plato.

παράπασι . . . σκιάς] σκιαστάρα are not ordinary artificial objects (as in vi. 510 Α καὶ τὸ σκιαστάρι ϝλω γένος) but diminutive images of ordinary artificial objects, being the σκία which are carried along the wall. For the purpose of the present allegory the σκία and φωτεινά also are σκιαστάρα, ‘manufactured articles.’

τὸ ἀληθές] ἀληθέω, ‘reality,’ was the favourite term of Protagoras, who denied all truth beyond momentary impressions, Theaet. 162 Α; Soph. 246 Β; Crat. 391 Β.

The stages of the educational process may be roughly sketched in terms of the preceding allegory. The man is first loosed from his bonds and turned towards the light. Then by questions his attention is fixed upon the realities of which he has hitherto seen the shadows, and heard the echoes only—then upon the central power which gives light to these. After this he is dragged up the rough and steep ascent into the daylight; where again he first sees the shadows, then real objects, then the heavenly luminaries, first the moon and stars by night, and last of all the sun by day. And when he has seen the sun, he will recognize the truth about him, that he is in a manner the cause of all things. He who has so far attained will not wish himself back in the den nor covet the honours there adjudged to those who make the best guesses about the shadows. And if he were restored to his old place while his eyes were still unaccustomed to the darkness, his fellow-prisoners would laugh him to scorn, and say that Philosophy was the ruin of a man.

σκότεις δὲ, κ.τ.λ.] join λύσιν τῶν δεσμῶν, ταῦτα τῆς ἀφροσύνης. The latter phrase refers to the state of ignorance described as the
consequence of their position. ΄Αφροσίνη here is unconscionableness rather than folly.

el φύσει τοιδήθε εξουμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς] Supposing that the following were the manner of it (their release and cure as it happened to them): 'in the course of nature.' For the conception of philosophy as the freeing of the soul from sense cp. Phaedo 83.

tί ἄν οἷς . . . βλέποι] This is the apodosis of the new sentence which begins with ὅποτε and is grammatically in apposition to that which precedes, although gradually developed into an independent statement. Cp. supra ii. 359 B el τοιοῦτο ποιήσαμεν, κ.τ.λ.

ϕλουρίας] Cp. Phaedo 66 C εἰπόλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλουρίας ἐμπιστος ἡμᾶς πολλῆς. βλέποι is the reading of all the better MSS. which grammarians are disposed to correct into βλέπει in accordance with the more common usage. The optative may be due to the attraction of the preceding optative λέγοι.

καὶ δὴ . . . δεικνύμενα;] Plato here seems to be thinking of the practice of Socrates, who by interrogation about the facts of experience in the light of common sense reduced men to perplexity.


ὀνυχῶθαί . . . ἄγανακτεῖν . . . (516 A) δύνασθαι] These infinitives depend like the preceding (ἀπορεῖν, &c.) on ὅλυς οἷς (supra D).

τῶν νῦν λέγομένων] 'Of the objects which are now (by men in general) called real.' Plato reminds us that he is speaking in a figure. Cp. infra 519 A, vi. 490 A.

tά τε . . . εἶδωλα] He will see an image of the truth in words (Phaedo 100 A) before he rises to the contemplation of the highest ideas. The gradations that follow are not to be pressed beyond the general meaning; but there are degrees of glory in the heaven of ideas. Cp. note on vi. 511 A. One is tempted however to suppose that 'the moon and stars' may symbolize the ideas of Being, Truth, Sameness, Difference, &c., which although divine are of a lower order than the Good and are studied apart from it.

tῶν ἀνθρώπων] The knowledge of man is the starting-point, as in all Socratic philosophy.

tελευταῖον δὴ . . . οἷς ἐστίν] The fulness of expression, the
antithesis and the thrice repeated pronoun give effect to the climax.

δις αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. vi. 509 B. αὐτός, the reading of Π, is equally good Greek, but αὐτός has a solemn emphasis.

σφέσι] 'He and his fellow-prisoners.'

τρόπων τινά] Inasmuch as the σκευαστά were images of real objects, and the 'fire' was borrowed from the sun.

τῷ δὲ ἐξετασθαὶ . . . (ὁ) ἅλεω] We may apply Plato's words to the vain shadow of a philosophy, whether ancient or modern, in which facts are divorced from principles, and about which there arises a mighty controversy having no basis or foundation of truth.

τὸ τοῦ Ὄμήρου] quoted in iii. 386 c.

σφάδερα] emphasizes the quotation,—'would indeed wish.'

*ἀν] before ἀνάπλεως is not found in any MS. In this and many similar places it may be doubted whether ἀν was omitted by the author to avoid cacophony, or by the scribe as an apparent ditto-graphia.

ἐκ τοῦ ἅλιου; ] 'out of the sun,' i.e. the sunshine. ἅλιος = 'sunlight' occurs also in Phaedo 116 ε ἐπὶ ἅλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς δραστ.: infra 532 B: cp. also Soph. Phil. 17 ἅλιον διηλή πάρεστιν ἐνθάλεσιν.

τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιάς, κ.τ.λ.] Plato is never weary of contrasting in all the fanciful forms that his imagination suggests, the real and seeming; the life of the philosopher, martyr, king, 'who is not of this world,' and the life of the politician, lawyer, sophist (vi. 492 λ), who is the impersonation of the world. The contact of philosophy with common opinions and life affords one of those curious points of view in which appearance is opposed to true knowledge: either the philosopher is conceived to be made ridiculous by tumbling into wells, mocked at by Thracian women, mazed and puzzled in the justice-room, blinking at 'a world unrealized,' laughed at by mankind, but also laughing at them, or the ambitious Sophist is imagined, more truly ridiculous in his impotent attempts after first principles, dressing himself up in names and words, to be compared only to a bald little blacksmith's apprentice, who washes the dirt from his face, and marries his master's daughter, which is the Lady Philosophy. Cp. Theaet. 174 ff., Polit. 299.
Plato: Republic.

Republic VII.

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516 E

γνωματεύοντα] A ἐπαξ λεγόμενον in classical Greek, and therefore of uncertain meaning: either 'reasoning from signs' (γνώμα, 'a sign') or 'measuring the shadows' (γνώμα, 'a measuring rod'). It is used in the latter sense by Themistius, but the more general sense of 'forming a judgement of' is more in accordance with the context here. It is perhaps used with some degree of contempt, as contrasted with contemplation of the idea. γνωμονοῦσα is quoted by Timaeus in his lexicon to Plato: cp. the γνώμων of the sun-dial.

517 A

τῆς συμβείας] is added to correct the vagueness of οὕτως: sc. τοῦ καραστήρια τὰ δύματα.

ἀποκτενώναί ἂν; ] as though ὁκ ὠφι had preceded, which words really occur a long way off in supra 516 c.

517 B - 518 B

In the foregoing allegory the cave is the phenomenal world, the fire is the power of the sun: the way upwards and the vision of the things above is the elevation of the soul into the intellectual region, whereof the idea of good is the crown or summit. This, once beheld, is known to be the cause of all that is admirable, both in the higher and in the lower sphere. And he who has risen to this contemplation will not be eager to take part in human affairs. And if compelled to do so he will stumble and be confused at first, like one who comes suddenly out of the daylight into a darkened room.

517 B

tῆς γ' ὑμής ἐπίδοσ] ἐπίδω, like ἐπίζω, is used in the sense of 'surmise' or 'idea,' cp. v. 451 A ἐπίζω γὰρ οὖν ('for I suspect') διατον ἀμάρτημα ἀκούοντας τινός φονέα γενόθαι, Laws vii. 817 B ὥς ἡ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐπίδω ('as I suspect').

ἐπειδῆ . . . ἀκούων] See vi. 506 D μὴ πρὸς Δίως . . . ἀποστῆς.

ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ, κ.τ.λ.] is an explanation of οὕτως: ἰδεά is in apposition with the nominative to φανέραι, which has to be supplied with ὑπ' αὐτοῖς and εἶναι: συλλογιστα δια singular feminine:—'My opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all and is with difficulty seen.'

518 C

οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες] 'Those who have attained to this.' Cp. Symp. 211 D ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου . . . εἰ πίρ τοῦ ἄλλου, βιωτόν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωμένοι αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν.

D εἶπερ αὐτὸ . . . τούτ' ἰχθεί] αὐτ is to be taken closely with τοῦτο, the most emphatic word:—'in this particular as well as the rest.' The
point in the allegory to which this corresponds is to be found in 516 d: 'he would rather be a hireling than live and think like his old companions in the den.'


ἀγάλματα] ἀγάλματα and σκαλι refer back to the Allegory, and if the meaning of them is asked may be represented as embodiments more or less imperfect of the idea of Justice. The ἀγάλματα may be conceived to be the enactments of Athenian Law; and σκαλι the sophistries of pleaders relating to them and the like. Similarly in iv. 443 c the principle of the division of labour is called εἰδολον τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης.

φανότερον . . . λαμπροτέρου] These words are neuter, not masculine with βίου supplied. For the omission of the article cp. Phaedo 89 b ἐπὶ πολὺ ἵππος τερόν ἢ ἐγώ.

ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαραμμανής ἐμπέπλησται] 'is dazzled (μαραμμανῆς ἐμπέπλησται) by a more brilliant atmosphere.' Cp. supra 516 a αὐθαί ἢ ἐξοντα τὰ δομάτα μαστά, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ οὕτω δέ, κ.τ.λ. Cp. supra 516 c ἀνάμμησις μεν . . . τοῦ τότε ἐψευσμοτός ὅποι ἢ ὅποι αὐτῶν μὲν εἰδαμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τῶν δὲ εἰς εἰς

The returning captive is happy in having once seen the brighter day: the newly liberated one, on the other hand, is an object of pity to the inhabitants of the upper world, or if of laughter, there is more reason in this 'laughter of angels' than in the sounds which greet the other from the den. Cp. Soph. 254 a ὁ μὲν ὑποδιδώσας εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὅτις σκοτεινότητα, τραβή χρηματάμενος αὐτής, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινόν τοῦ τόπου κατανόησαι χαλεπός . . . ὁ δὲ γε ψυχοσφός, τῇ τοῦ ὅτις ἄλ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενον ἰδιός, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὐτῆς χώρας εὐδαμός εὐπτήρος ὅφθητιν.

It follows that education consists not in putting knowledge into the mind, but in fixing the organ of knowledge on its proper object by turning the whole soul from darkness to light. The mind of a clever rogue sees keenly, but is forced into the service of evil. The same power, when redeemed from degradation, and directed aright, would see the truth as clearly as now it perceives the mean purposes to which it ministers. It follows, too, that government should be...
entrusted neither to men who are without training in philosophy nor to those who have passed all their life in it. The one sort do not see the end of life, the others are unwilling to engage in politics.

518 καὶ λέγει τό δὲ ἡμεῖς ἵνα ἤπειρον ταύτην τὴν ζωὴν... δύναμιν] The accusative is governed by περιακτικον infra. The eye of the mind cannot turn to the light without the whole mind: it is as if the bodily eye could not turn and look round unless the body turned with it.

ταύτον... αὐτῷ... διαμηχανήσασθαι] ταύτον αὐτῷ is explained in τής περιαγωγῆς. The indirect interrogation τίνα τρόπον depends on some such notion as ἦτοι σκέψεται implied in τέχνην. The words οὗ τού ἐμποίησαι... διαμηχανήσασθαι like τής περιαγωγῆς are dependent on τέχνην.

μεταστραφήσεται] sc. τὸ ὄργανον ὁ καταμαθάνῃ ἑαυτός.

αὐτῷ] sc. τῷ ὀργάνῳ.

αὐτό] sc. τὸ ὀράμα.

ταύτα διαμηχανήσασθαι] sc. ὅπως ὄρθως ἐσται τετραμένων καὶ βλέψει οἱ δεῖ.

αἱ μὲν τοῖνυν ἄλλαι, κ.τ.λ.] The theory of habit is transferred from the body to the mind: they are the lower not the higher gifts
of the intellect (‘memory, allied to sense,’ attention, the link between the moral and intellectual qualities) rather than genius or originality, which are subject to the influence of habit. Yet these latter, though not acquired by habit, require to be trained and directed before any good use can be made of them.

καλούμενα] They are ‘virtues of soul’ only in a lower sense. See note on supra 516 a.

παντὸς μᾶλλον] cp. infra 520 e.

θεοπέρου τιμῆς . . . οδον] sc. ὅργανον ὁρετή: ‘is the virtue of a more divine principle.’

δριμὸ[ ‘Shrewdly.’ The same word is applied to the narrow legal soul in the Theaetetus 175 δ τὸν σιμερὸν ἐκείνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὸν καὶ δικαστή: ib. 173 λ ἐντοιον καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται.

δοτε . . . ἐργαλήματον] The infinitive ἐργαλησθαί, which would naturally follow δοτε, is ‘attracted’ into the participial construction (ὁς . . . ἐχον . . . ἰναγκασμένον).

τοῦτο μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.] τοῦτo is to be taken with τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, which is a periphrasis for ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις, the nature so constituted. The hypothetical clause ei ἐκ παιδὸς . . . μολυσθαίς, having been expanded with αἱ δὴ . . . ὁψαίν, is resumed and continued in the words δὲν ei . . . τάληθη, and the apodosis begins with καὶ ἐκείνα.

τοιαύτης] sc. οὕτω δριμεῖας ὁρῶν.

τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἡγγαγεῖς] The reading of the older editions τὰ . . . ἡγγησθή, is not indefensible; the gender of the relative (αἱ) being in that case assimilated to that with which the antecedent is compared.

†περὶ κάτω] Madvig, followed by Cobet and Baiter, conjectures περικάτω. This could only mean ‘upside down.’ It is better to read simply κάτω with Hermann (cp. infra 529 b, ix. 586 a) or περὶ τὰ κάτω with some of the inferior MSS.

μήτε . . . μήτε] The use of μή is occasioned by ἀνάγκη preceding.

V 2
Our duty then as founders of the state is first to educate the chosen natures in 'the highest of studies,' and then to compel them to take part in the active conduct of affairs.

'But will it not be a wrong to them,' says Glaucon, 'to drag them down from the realms of light into the darkness of the den?'

The answer is that in legislating (cp.iv. 419) we must consult the welfare not of a part but of the whole state. It is also to be observed that our philosophers do not spring up of themselves as in other cities, but are the product of our institutions. They owe a debt therefore to the state and its founders, which they are bound to pay. When their education has been completed, they must descend by turns into the cave and accustom their eyes to the darkness. For when once habituated, they will see and judge of the shadows infinitely better than those who have always been captives. An incidental advantage of the plan will be that our citizens, coming from a brighter life, and being rich inwardly (cp. iii sub fin.) will take office as a duty, and not for the sake of gain.

519 C τῶν οἰκιστῶν] is explanatory of ἡμέτερον.
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν] vi. 504 E ff.
[Θείν, κ.τ.λ.] In apposition to ἀφικέσθαι . . . μέγιστον and in construction with ἀναγκάσαι.

D τὸ αὐτὸ . . . καταμένειν] A parallel to this description may be traced in the unwillingness of Christian saints and hermits to leave their cells and take part in the business of life, seeming sometimes, as Plato says, to be ἐν μακάρων νήσοις already.

ἐξεῖτε σπουδαιότεραι] sc. εἰσίν.

Επείγ', ἐφι, ἀδικόσμεν αὐτοῦς] An expression of surprise. 'And are we then to do them an injustice?'

ἀμεινον] sc. ζην.

Επελάθου . . . πάλιν] iv. 419 ff.

τοῦτο μηχανεῖται ἐγγενεσθαι] sc. ὁ νόμος τὴν εὐπραξίαν.

520 A αὐτός ἐμποίησ . . . τῆς πόλεως] αὐτός ὅσ is emphatic: 'the law itself creating such men in the state, not in order to leave them to their own devices, but that it might itself have the full use of them for the binding together of the state,' or taking ἐκδεσμος in the more common sense of the word, 'so as to be the bond of the state.'
Notes: Book VII.

ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδικήσομεν] 'that we shall not be wronging them after all.' δὲ in οὖδὲ = 'in spite of what you say,' referring to ἀδικήσομεν supra 519 ν.

δίκην δ' ἔχει ... τροφεία] 'now it seems fair that the wild plant which owes culture to nobody should not be eager to pay the price of its culture to anybody.' The phrase δίκην ἔχει may be compared with φῶς ἔχει, λόγον ἔχει.

οἷμας δ' ἡμεῖς] The sentence returns to the direct form.

ἐκείνων] sc. τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς πόλεσι φιλοσόφων γιγνομένων.

ἐκάστῳ] sc. οἷμον.

ζυνθειδέων] Not 'to be accustomed together with the prisoners in the den,' but simply 'to be accustomed,' as is seen by the use of the word in the following sentence.

ζυνθειδέωμεν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The strength and weakness of the politician in his limitation: he can see and act powerfully on the immediate present or future, but on that only. In times of revolution he is apt to be at fault: he is neither capable of spanning the movement, nor of confining himself to the necessities of the hour. It is only the greatest genius that can use the legal, political, or ecclesiastical maxims of an age and country, and yet be above them, knowing their true value;—who is at once φρόνιμος and σοφός: able to follow theoria and polity.

τὰ ἐἴδωλα] This word is not always strictly used for the images from which the shadows are thrown, as in 532 B ἐπὶ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐἴδωλα, but also more generally as in 516 A of reflections in water, and, as in this place, to include σκιαί. We have risen to a point of view from which the σκευαστὰ and the σκιαὶ are included under one notion as ἐἴδωλα: cp. vi. 511 λ.

From this part of the Republic Lord Bacon borrowed his figure of 'idola spectus' and of the 'idols' generally.

σκιαμαχόντων ... στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν] These words refer to the disputes and ambitions of the prisoners in the den, and στασιαζόντων also reminds us of the quarrelling of the sailors about the helm (vi. 488 c).

οὗτοι] sc. τοῦ ἄρχειν.

τὸ δὲ ποιοῦ ἀληθές, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 342 d, 345 e. There is a slight change of construction from ἐν πόλει τῷ ἄρχει, κ.τ.λ.
By what methods then shall such rulers be created and brought up out of darkness into the light of reason? 'Gymnastic' is clearly incapable of doing this; and so is even 'music' as hitherto defined, seeing that the harmony and rhythm which it imparts are not evolved from within, but impressed by habit from without. And the 'arts' we have already rejected (vi. 495 D) as mechanical. The germ of something higher first appears in the perception of number. Arithmetic may help to educate the reason. For, every perception has this effect which brings with it the perception of an opposite. And not until sensation reports contrary attributes of the same object does the mind become aware of unity and diversity. This, however rudimentary, is an act of pure intelligence; and when aroused in us by the study of number, it becomes an instrument of essential value for the awakening of thought. Arithmetic therefore is the first step in the higher education. The incidental advantages of the study, especially for soldiers, are easily seen.
Notes: Book VII.

from a day which is as night to the true ascent, which leads towards being.' The text, as thus interpreted, is not free from objection: the meaning of οὖσαν drags, and ἐπάνωθυν gives a feeble antithesis to ἡμέρας. It may however be argued that the addition of οὖσαν is in harmony with the emphatic and pleonastic expressions in which Plato describes being (cp. infra 529 η); and that ἐπάνωθυν arises out of the connexion of the passage. The sense is clear, though the style is perhaps a little at fault. The first thing to be done is to turn the soul round to philosophy, which is not the light itself, but the real and true way up to the light. The περίηγη (supra 518 ι) or μεταστροφή precedes the ἐπάνωθυν (infra 532 η). This is quite in the Socratic and Platonic spirit. For οὖσαν some late copies have ἴόντης (q), which appears to be a feeble correction. Σ omits οὖσαν. Iamblichus has preserved a reading, οὖσα ἐπάνωθυν, which may possibly be right ('being the way upward to the "true day" of being'), and which may be supposed to have been lost owing to the copyists not understanding that ἡμέραν was to be supplied with ἀληθινὴν. But according to this reading the distinction between the 'turning round' and the 'ascent' is not strictly maintained. With reference to Cobet's conjecture, εἰς ἀληθινὴν τὸν ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνωθυν, it may be questioned whether Plato would have used the expression 'the existence of being,' although the phrase οὖσαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος occurs in Soph. 262 c in a different connexion.

For διστράκου cp. Phaedr. 241 η δ' ἰραστή, διστράκου μεταπεισόντος, ἰταί δέ γε μεταβιβάζων. διστράκου περιστροφή is an allusion to the game διστρακίδα, in which a potsherd white on one side and black on the other was twirled upon a line, and accordingly as the black or white turned up, one party fled and the other pursued. Such at least is the explanation of the game which may be gathered from these two passages, of which only that in the Phaedrus is referred to by Pollux, ix. i. i.

tοδε δ' ἐννοο... νέους δινασ.serv: 'Now this occurs to me as I speak: were we not saying that they must in the days of their youth be trained warriors?' Cp. iii. 403 ε ἄληται μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος: viii. 543 π ἔσπερ δέ ἄλητας τε πολέμου καὶ φίλακας.

δει δηρα... ἐκείνη] 'The study which we are searching for must have this in addition to the other;,' i.e. military use as well as a philosophical value. τοῦτο refers to what precedes, and is explained in what follows.
The etymological use, for ἔχειν πρὸς, 'to have in addition,' is remarkable. Cp. Soph. O. T. 175 ἄλλον δ' ἃν ἄλλῳ προσίδος, κ.τ.λ. The singularity has probably led to the various readings προσέχω (τ), πῶς ἔχειν (γ), παρέχειν (α).

δὴν τὸ πρῶτον δηλώθηκεν] ii. 376 έ. ff. There is a sense in which philosophy is also μουσική, cp. vi. 499 δ' αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα, Phaedo 61 α ὡς φιλοσοφίας . . . οὕτως μεγάλη μουσικής.

ἀλλ' ἦν ἐκείνη γ', ἐφη, κ.τ.λ.] For the repetition of ὑφη infra (τούτων ἀδελφά, ἐφη), cp. viii. 557 c, where ἦν δ' ἐγώ is similarly repeated.

ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς] This is said in the spirit of the preceding remark (518 δ) that all the virtues except wisdom are not far removed from bodily habit.

ἀγαθόν] is to be taken with τοιούτων and not with μάθημα:—

μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιούτων, κ.τ.λ., refers to supra 521 δ μάθημα ψυχῆς ἄλλων . . . εἰ δ' ἄλλω, and οὖν οὐ νῦν [ητείς probably to μάθημα: cp. supra 521 δ ζητούμεν μάθημα. The ν. τ. ἂν Π mg. deserves to be considered.

αὶ τε γὰρ τέχναι] The corresponding καὶ is superseded by the speech of Glaucus, καὶ μὴν, κ.τ.λ.

ἐδοξάσαν] viz. supra vi. 495 δ ὡσπο δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημοφρομέας ὡσπερ τὰ σώματα λειλάθησαν, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἔνθεκε σκληροπόντες τε καὶ ἀποσπασμάτων διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσαν.

τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τενῶν, κ.τ.λ.] 'Let us take something of universal application.' Cp. Laws v. 747 λ, β πρὸς τε γὰρ οἰκονομῶν καὶ πρὸς πολιτείαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἐν οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναμιν ἔχει παιδείου μάθημα μεγάλην, ὡς ἡ περὶ τούτου ἁρματος διαστροφή τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι τὸν νυντάξεσαν καὶ ἀμαθῆ φύσει, ἐγείρει καὶ εὐμαθῆ καὶ μημονα καὶ ἀγχόνου ἀπεργάζεται, παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἐπιδιδόντα θεία τέχνην: and for the use of arithmetic and geometry, and their relation to the other sciences, cp. Philebus 56, 57.

κοινῶν] = ἐπὶ πάντα τεχνών: cp. Theaet. 185 έ αὕτη δ' αὕτης ἡ ψυχή τὰ κοινα μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπῶν, where among τὰ κοινὰ is mentioned number (ἐν τέ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν).

διάνοια] διάνοια is perhaps here used according to the definition in vi. 511 c, d for mathematical reasoning.
Notes: Book VII.

τὸ φαύλον τοῦτο] For this ironical use of φαύλος cp. iv. 423 c, 435 c.

παγγέλοιον γοῦν ... ἀποφαίνει] The three extant tragedians all wrote plays on the subject of Palamedes. Agamemnon is addressed in an extant fragment of the Palamedes of Euripides (584 Nauck). Aeschylus also attributes the invention of number to Prometheus (P. V. 459).

ἀναριθμητῶν οὖν τε] SC. τῶν τε νεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων.

καὶ λογίζεσθαι τε] καὶ, which is supported by Par. A, and is certainly more likely to have been altered than retained, though maintained by some editors to be a corruption of ἢ (which gives a poor sense), is the right reading. 'Shall we hesitate to set down as a study necessary to a warrior also an ability to reckon and count?' For ἄλλο τι οὖν cp. note on i. 337 c.

καὶ ἀνθρώπος ἔσχον] cp. Tim. 39 β ἢν ... μετάσχοι ... ἀριθμοῖ τὰ ἣα, ἄνω ἃν προσήκοι, μᾶθοντα παρὰ τῆς ταυτοῦ καὶ ἀμίον περιφοράς. Also Phaedr. 249 b for difference between the souls of men and animals.

ἐν ξητούμεν] supra 521 d.

χρησθαι δ' oüdeis autóù orthós] oüdeis, sc. καθονεὶ. Plato means that persons study arithmetic for convenience only, and not as a training of the mind. In modern education, mathematics, besides their more particular application as the expression of physics, would generally be regarded as having four uses: (1) they fix the attention; (2) they give accuracy; (3) they impart a perception of symmetry and order, and a power of construction; (4) they are also said to strengthen the rational powers generally. The last use must be admitted with reservation, considering that reasoning in general, whether in science or life, is for the most part concrete and not abstract. The highest of human faculties, the judgement, is little cultivated by mathematical studies. Plato seems to have valued mathematics as a general training of the mind (infra 526 c): not without an anticipation of the enormous power gained by it in the interpretation of nature.

τὸ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλώσαι] For a similar hesitating manner of speaking cp. Theaet. 164 d πειράσομαι δηλώσαι περί αὐτῶν δ' γε δὴ νοώ, ot légomev] sc. πρὸς οὐδαί.
καὶ τοῦτο] sc. τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν.

The participial construction follows δείκνυμι as a verb implying perception.

παρακαλοῦντα . . . εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν] i.e. calling in reason to examine the intimations of sense.

ἐκείνῃ] sc. τὴν νόησιν, emphatically opposed to τῆς αἰσθήσεως following.

οὐδὲν ὑγίες ποιοῦσης] 'is behaving in an untrustworthy manner.'

τὰ πόρρωθεν . . . τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα] Cp. x. 602 δ ὃ δὴ ἦμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοστείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει. Socrates proceeds to explain that he is referring not to the effect of distance or of artificial illusion, but to the confusion caused by contradictory impressions of natural objects close at hand.

οὐ πάνω . . . ἔτυχες οὐ λέγω] (1) 'you have not quite hit my meaning,' said ironically rather than (2) 'you have altogether missed it.' οὐ πάνυ varies in meaning according to the context. It is sometimes 'not altogether' and sometimes 'not at all.'

τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, κ.τ.λ.] Some sensations excite thought, others do not. Take the case of a finger: a finger as a finger does not give rise to contradictory impressions. But as possessed of qualities it does, e.g. a finger as far as visibility is concerned is at once both great and small; as far as the touch is concerned, at once hard and soft, thick and thin. This contradiction in the 'mere sensation' excites thought to separate the two elements given in sensation and to go on to consider what the elements are in themselves—i.e. what is the great and what is the small, &c.

ἐναντίαν αἰσθήσιν] e.g. 'hard as well as soft,' 'rough as well as smooth.' αἰσθήσις here and supra ά (τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεις) is not the faculty (either generally, or as one of the five), but the act of sensation. In supra ά (τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγίες ποιοῦσης), infra 524 ά (ἥ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη αἰσθήσις . . . τὸ τοῦτο σημαίνει αὕτη ἢ αἰσθήσις), the word has its more ordinary meaning.

ἐν πάσι γὰρ . . . ἐπερεῦθαι] 'the ordinary mind is not driven to ask any question.' ἐν πάσι . . . τούτοις, sc. τοῖς ὦτοι φαινομένοις (ἐάν τε
Notes: Book VII.

ἐν μέσῳ, κ.τ.λ.). He goes on to show that another faculty is called
in when contradictions arise which sense cannot explain.

tὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] The interrogation ἄρα gives a strong
emphasis which is continued through the following clause.

ὅσα ποιεῖ] ‘behaves in the following way.’

ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη αἰσθησις] sc. ἡ ἀφή.

ἀδ] ‘In contradistinction to the former case in which the soul
was not perplexed’: 523 c ff.

ἡ τοῦ κοσμοῦ καὶ ... βαρέως] What is here mentioned without
a name in Plato seems to be the same which modern philosophers
call the sense of resistance. For these antinomies of sense
cp. v. 479 B, Theaet. 152 d, Phil. 14.

πρῶτον μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] The apodosis comes in with οὖκ ὁ ... ἀδ (c)
which takes the place of δι, because of the development of the first
clause which has intervened.

οὖκ ὁ δὲ δύο φαίνεται, κ.τ.λ.] The sense, while thought is
latent, perceives a sort of chaos only, of great and small, after-
wards the mind is awakened and distinguishes the great from the
small.

dia δὲ τὴν τοῦτον σαφήνειαν ... ἡ 'κείνη] ‘But with a view to
clearing up this chaos of sense’ (τοῦτον, sc. τοῦ συγκεκριμένου) ‘the
thinking mind is compelled to reverse the process, and look at
small and great as distinct and not confused.’ For διὰ ... 
σαφήνειαν cp. Polit. 262 c σαφήνειαν ἐνεκα. τοῦτον τον is an adverbial
accusative, i.e. τοῦτον τον, sc. ποιουσα. ἡ 'κείνη = ἡ ἰοῦσ.

The difficulty of this passage is to understand how the operation
of sense is separated from that of the mind. The theory of vision
may offer an illustration of Plato’s meaning. Our first impression,
as common language seems to imply, is that surrounding objects
are seen by us in their true forms and at their proper distances by
the sole use of the eye. Experiment shows that much which is
apparently part of the act of sight is really an unconscious
influence of the mind which habit has confused with the pure
sensation, arising from the observation of shadow, colour, or the
use of the two eyes in connexion with each other. The mere
eye without the mind may be said in Plato’s language to perceive
οὐ διωρισμένα ἀλλὰ συγκεκριμένα.
The error of Plato is that he describes the act of vision as having two successive stages, one in which the sense, another in which the mind is active: we ourselves should regard these two processes as one and simultaneous in the concrete, although in thought we can analyze an act of vision into them. The world opening on the half-awakened eyes of a new-born child is perhaps the nearest image of Plato's conception of the material of sense.

When the same objects suggest the idea of opposites, e.g. of great and small, the mind is 'irritated' into the consideration of the nature of great and small, of which the impressions have hitherto been confused.

This, although only an early correction in Par. A seems on the whole more probable than ποτέρων. Cp. infra 525 A, B: Theaet. 186 A.

The 'one and many' here spoken of seems still to be the Zenonian puzzle which is said in the Philebus (14 D) to have been superseded by the deeper oppositions amongst the ideas themselves.

There is a various reading περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ, sc. περὶ τὸ ἔν. τὸ αὐτὸ is retained, not as inherently more probable, but as the reading of the best MSS.

If this happens in the case of unity it must happen to all number, since number proceeds from unity. Cp. Parm. 144 A.

'All number' collectively. Cp. Theaet. 147 ε ὁ ἀριθμὸς πάντα δίχα διελάβομαι: Phaedo 104 A ὁ ἡμεῖς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀπα. For τοῦτο some MSS. have τοῦτο, others omit the word.

This may be illustrated from modern philosophy, which equally recognizes contradiction as a motive of thought. The being which is also not-being, that is to say, the privation or abstraction of individual or particular being: the one which is many: the same which is diverse: the motion which is and is not in the same place: the moment which is and is not in the same time: the continuous which is also discrete: the finite which is infinity: the beginning which begins not,—the negation which is only relation, together with the higher contradictions which arise in the sphere of theology or moral philosophy—
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would have been regarded by Plato no less than by Kant and Hegel as highly suggestive difficulties to the student of dialectic. In the later stage of his philosophy, beginning with the Parmenides, he is increasingly disposed to dwell on such modes of thought.

philosophos δε, κ.τ.λ.] 'while the philosopher must study arithmetic because without emerging from the sea of generation and laying hold of true being he can never become an arithmetician.' The 'philosopher' = the philosophic student, he that would be a philosopher. Else there is some want of point in the termination of the sentence, because the study of arithmetic is a preliminary to philosophy and not the result of it. Davis and Vaughan render λογιστική, 'skilful reasoner,' but this is pointless, and hardly possible when the word is used in two other passages within ten lines in the sense of calculation (515 λ, c). For ἡ μηθέπτοτε... γενάθαι cp. iii. 401 B ἡ μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ποιεῖν.

γενάθαι δὲ γενάθαι] Cp. Phaedr. 247 n where the soul has risen to the inner heaven 'in the revolution she beholds Justice and Temperance and Knowledge absolute not in the form of generation' (οἷς ἡ γένεσις πρόκειται).

προσθήκην δὲ τὸ μάθημα, κ.τ.λ.] μάθημα (or αὐτὸ) is to be repeated in the accusative after νομοθετήσαι and πείθειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν λέναι. Cp. supra 519 D ἴδεῖν τε τὸ ἄγαθόν, κ.τ.λ.

ἐνεκα πολέμου τε... καὶ οὕσιν] By the insertion of τε after βαστώνης from Par. A, the awkward agglomeration of three genitive cases is avoided. The warlike use of arithmetic is admitted here; but when Glaucou follows up this line of argument afterwards, he is reproved by Socrates. This change of front is one of the expedients which Plato employs to keep attention alive.

ἐνοῦ ῥήθετος] Socrates professes to have discovered what has long been familiar to him: this also is one of the artifices by which he quickens the interest of his hearers. Cp. a similar form of expression in ii. 370 C ἐνοῦ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἶπότοις σοῦ.

ἄλλα μὴ τοῦ κατηλεύειν] Cp. supra c ὡς ἐμπόρους ἡ κατηλεύοι: i. 345 C, ὃς δισετερ χρηματιστὴν ἄλλα ὀδ ποιεῖν.

οἰσθα γὰρ ποῦ... πολλαπλασιών] 'If you go about to divide the unit they multiply it.' In teaching arithmetic, the unit was represented by a line — —. If the pupil by a natural mistake assumed the magnitude of this line to be significant, and proposed to divide it, the teacher would show him that for arithmetical purposes
it was a matter of indifference whether the line was divided into four parts or multiplied by four, since a magnitude, however great or small, might equally be taken to represent the abstract unit. 'One,' so conceived, is without parts: if it is imagined as divided, every part is equal to the whole. The same distinction between the popular and scientific study of arithmetic is clearly stated in Phil. 56 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ποὺ... τις ἰδέως.

Apposition of a part to the whole.—Plato is endeavouring to show the purely abstract and intellectual nature of the science of number. The proof of this is, that while bodies or objects of sense have parts, the unit is said by arithmetical theorists to be incapable of division: which shows that, if questioned, they would at once acknowledge that number of a purely intellectual or abstract sort is the subject of their operations.

οὐ... by attraction for ἄ.

ἦρες οὖν... (ἢ) τὴν ἀλήθειαν;] 'then do you see, my friend, I said, that this science may be fairly thought necessary to us, since we find that it necessitates the soul to use the pure intelligence for the attainment of pure truth?' A slight play of words seems to be intended, as infra 527 and elsewhere, on ὄνακτάω and προσανακάλω. ἡμῖν, 'for our purpose' (i.e. for us as lawgivers).

οὶ τὰ βραδεῖς... ἐπιδιδόσαω] Compare again Laws v. 747.

καὶ μὴν... ὃς τοῦτο] 'And, indeed, you will not easily find anything that is more laborious to the student; nor will you find many that are equally so.' οὖδε πολλὰ, sc. δὲ πάνω οὖν μέγαν παρίσταται. Hence in continuing the sentence, ὥ which should have followed μὲνω is changed to ὃς.

Geometry, no less than arithmetic, is indispensable to the profession of arms, and if followed far enough, it may also serve as a stage in higher education. For, however this has been obscured by the employment of terms implying a practical application, its real purpose is to obtain abstract, universal, and it may even be said, eternal results. Moreover, experience shows that as arithmetic quickens so geometry clears the mind.

[... such as the hollow square (πλαίσιον). For the form of the sentence cp. Lach. 182 εἰ προσθήγομεν δ' αὐτῷ οὐ συμπάν...
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προσθήκην, διε πάντα άνδρα εν πολέμῳ καὶ θαρραλεώτερον καὶ άνδρεωτερόν ἄν ποιήσεις αὐτόν αὐτός ὁ μάλα άλλη ἡ ἐπιστήμη. And for the phrase γεωμετρικός καὶ μή ἄν cp. infra 527 c ἡμεῖς τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή.  

τὸ εὐδαιμονετάτον τοῦ ὄντος] The blessedness of the soul that apprehends the good is attributed to the good itself. Phaedr. 250 c εὐδαιμονία φάσματα . . . ἐποπτεύσεις.  

πάν τοῦ τσαντίον] is adverbial.  

λέγουσι μὲν ποῦ . . . ἄναγκαίως] ‘They talk in a very ridiculous and meagre fashion.’ ἄναγκαίως = with merely practical needs in view. For this meaning cp. ii. 369 d ἀναγκαιότητα πόλις: Tim. 69 d: Thuc. v. 8 ὅπλων ἄναγκαιαν. There is however a facetious allusion to geometrical necessity, for which cp. v. 458 π τὸ γεωμετρικὰς γε . . . ἄλλα ἐρωτικὰς ἄναγκας: ‘they have only practical necessities in view, not the necessities of geometry.’  

tετραγωνικῶς] = to construct a square equal to a given area. The use of the same word in Theaet. 148 a is slightly different, viz. ‘to form when squared,’ said of the line which represents a square root.  

παρατείνειν] (1) ‘to produce a straight line’ [or, (2) as in Meno 87 a, to extend a plane figure, L. C.]  

προστιθέναι] ‘to apply,’ viz. a plane figure to a line.  

ὡς τοῦ δὲ ἄνδρος γνώσεως, κ.τ.λ.] The words διομολογητῶν and ἔνεκα are repeated from the previous sentences: τὸ is to be joined with γιγνομένου, ‘becoming this or that.’  

尿Δλκὸν ἄρα . . . ἔχομεν] ὡς γενναίες, like ὡς θαυμάσοιε, ὡς ἠδικεῖ expresses the feeling of the speaker about the noble thought which has just arisen in his mind.  

πρὸς τὸ ἄνω . . . ἔχομεν] ‘with a view to (πρὸς) our directing upwards what now wrongly we direct downwards.’  

ἂ] sc. τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁµματα. Perhaps ἂ should be read.  

ἐν τῇ καλλιτόξει σοι] ‘in your model state’: used as a term of endearment; cp. ii. 370 π τῶν πολιχριστὶν. αὐτότι, i.e. ‘geometry,’ for the incidental advantages of the science are not small.

Astronomy is approved by Glaucon as conveying information that is of use for generalship. Socrates rallies him on his zeal for useful knowledge, which, as he insinuates, is due to the fear of popular
opinion. He reminds him that the main purpose of education is to brighten the eye of reason. Now there is a much-neglected science which should on this account have been taken first. Geometry was understood to mean plane geometry. But the geometry of solids should come before astronomy which is the science of the motion of solids. Although yet in its infancy, the intermediate science may yet some day be developed. For, difficult as it is, if only encouraged, it would work its way through the fascination which it infallibly exercises on superior minds.

Socrates seems to think that too much is being made of the military uses of the sciences. He himself first drew attention to the point in the case of arithmetic (521 d): but when Glaucen, following, as he imagines, the lead of Socrates, praises geometry for the same reason, he observes that even a little of it suffices for the commander, and lays stress upon its higher use in purifying the eye of the soul. Here where Glaucen again makes the same point, he laughs at his utilitarianism and fear of popular opinion. When astronomy again comes up for consideration (528 e), Glaucen, mindful of the remonstrance of Socrates, praises it for making the soul look upward: but Socrates objects to having his metaphor understood so literally: and insists that the truth to which the soul should look up is not visible to the eye but to the mind only.

whereas it is a high truth although believed by few, that,' &c. τὸ is the subject of ἔστιν and is explained by the clause introduced by διά.

a faculty in the soul of every man.'

is polished’ (like a soiled mirror) ‘and lighted up’ (like a fading torch) cp. infra 533 δ ἐν βορβόρῳ . . . τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς διμαι κατοργαγμένον.

i.e. ‘will you argue with the philosophers or with the utilitarians, or will you carry on the argument independently and chiefly for your own satisfaction?’ A similar turn of thought occurs in Protag. 331 c οὐδὲν γάρ δύναι τὸ εἴ τι βουλεῖ τούτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἄλλ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σε. The argument is sometimes conceived of in Plato as a disputation between two persons, or again, as the mind talking to itself, or once more, as
independent of the mind and having a distinct power and reality of its own.

Cobet's conjecture (ἡ οὖν πρὶς ἔρειν) is neat and plausible, and preferable to Madvig's (ἡ εἰ πρὶς αὐτοὕρως), but is not really required. The double negative is merely emphatic.

ἀναγε... αὖτο καθ' αὖτο λαβειν] 'then take a step backward,' I said: 'for the truth is that we mistook the science which should follow next after geometry.' 'How was that?' said he—(sc. πῶς λαβότες νῦν ἄρθος ἔλαβομεν;)—'The error was in placing solids in motion before solids at rest.' According to Plato's own statement (528 a) the mention of solid geometry in its natural place was purposely omitted because of its backwardness: the omission may also be a trick of style intended to give variety and dramatic effect. If astronomy had not been mentioned twice, Socrates would not have had the two opportunities for laughing at Glaucon, first for his utilitarianism, secondly for his sentimentalism. Cp. iv. 430 b where it is proposed to pass on to Justice without considering Temperance: and Symp. 185 b where the order of the speakers Aristophanes and Eryximachus is transposed.

νῶν δή] These words in the sense of 'just now,' 'a little while ago,' are not divided by γάρ, but express a single notion: cp. καί δή.

ἡδή] is to be joined with ἐν περιφορᾷ δή.

tοῦτο] sc. τρίτη αὔξη.

μεγαλοφορούμενοι] 'in their great conceit of themselves:' a word not found elsewhere except in the active voice, but not for that reason to be changed into μεγαλαυχούμενοι (Cobet). It is not surprising that Plato should have introduced the middle voice of a verb signifying a mental state. Compare the word φιλο-φρονεῖσθαι, which occurs six times in the Laws and nowhere else in the genuine writings of Plato.

ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν... (n) φανήναι] The plan of the sentence seems to have changed in the process of construction. ὡτό δὲ τῶν ζητοῦντων may depend on some general idea of disadvantage, e.g. καλομετα understood from the previous clause. (Vögelin cuts the knot of the difficulty by cancelling δὲ: this suggests another interpretation, taking ὡτό τῶν ζητοῦντων with ἀνεβάςται, 'still by the efforts of their orators they grow perforce,' but this is also very improbable.) Plato means to say that these mathematicians were ignorant of...
the educational value of their own study. His own love of the regular solids may be remarked in the Timaeus (54, 55).

528 D αὐτὰ φανῄναι = εἰ φανῄν.

σπεέδων, κ.τ.λ.] Plato elsewhere alludes to the backwardness of such studies in Greece as compared with Egypt: a fact which the Athenian interlocutor in the Laws (vii. 819 d) says had struck him late in life (καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοίεις ὡψὶ ποτὲ τὸ πεπὶ ταύτα ἡμῶν πάθος ἦδαιμον): when he found that among the Egyptians mathematical problems were an amusement of childhood, the ignorance of the Greeks seemed to him absolutely 'swinish' (οἷκ ἀθρώπινον ἄλλα ἔννοι τινῶν... θρησκεύων).

γελοῖος] 'In a way that is ridiculous,' and so 'miserable,' or 'contemptible'—a favourite application of the word in Plato: cp. especially iv. 429 ε ἐκπλυτε καὶ γελοῖα.

528 E—530 C Having corrected this omission, we proceed in order to Astronomy. Glaucon praises the contemplation of the starry heavens, not now as a useful, but as an elevating pursuit. Socrates replies, that the eye may look upwards, but that the mind looks down, if it is contented with mere observation and does not rise to universal truths. The sky is only a great moving diagram, and Astronomy, like Geometry, must leave poring over phenomena, and proceed to determine the general principles of solids in motion, if this science also is to help us onward and upward, as we advance from what is visible towards the intellectual and invisible. The astronomer must let the heavens alone and make use of problems (i.e. study abstract theorems).

528 E δὲν αὐτὴν πόλις μετῆ] The expression is elliptical: sc. ἰσομεν γὰρ ὑπάρχουσαν, εάν, κ.τ.λ. Cp. supra 522 χ εἴπερ... μὴ ἡμίτοιτο.

δ γε νῦν δὴ μοι... ἐπέπληξα] 'acting on the principle of your rebuke': supra 527 D. There is great humour in the way in which Glaucon is driven from the utilitarian to the sentimental view of knowledge, only to receive a more severe rebuff from Socrates.

The antecedent to δ is an accusative εἰκιν in apposition to the following clause.

529 A οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες] has been translated (1) 'who embark' or 'set sail on the sea of philosophy': a metaphorical use of ἀνάγεω which, although it receives some colour from Phaedr.
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272 D obb ἄναγας ἰὼν μακρὰν περιβαλλομένου, seems to require more help from the surrounding imagery; or (2) ‘who raise astronomy to the rank of a science.’ For this use of ἄναγας cp. Tim. 19 a τοὺς ἄξιους πάλιν ἄναγας δεῖν, ‘the worthy are to be raised from a lower to a higher class.’ It is also possible (3) that ἄναγας simply means ‘to refer,’ ‘those who refer it’ (sc. astronomy) ‘to philosophy.’ φιλοσοφία is here used in the popular sense of any higher kind of knowledge, as in Tim. 88 C μοισχὴ καὶ πάση φιλοσοφία προσχρόμενον.

οὐκ ἄγερως, κ.τ.λ.] This and what follows is of course ironical, as Glaucon very clearly sees (δίσην, ἡφη, ἵω infra c). Those who have conceived thus ‘nobly’ of the things above, are said in the Timaeus (91 ν) to be destined hereafter to enter on another life in the form of birds.

νομίσαι ... ποιοῦν] For the participle instead of the infinitive after νομίζω, which here avoids a treble infinitive (νομίσαι ποιοῦν βλέπειν) cp. Xen. Anab. vi. 6, § 24 νομίζει ... ἀνδρα ἀγαθῶν ἀποκατείνων.

οὔτε μαθεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] As often in an illustration, the construction is resumed with an asyndeton.

τῶν ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάσσῃ] For this piece of extravagance cp. iii. 388 A πλώντων and note. A similar, but more pointed, metaphorical use of ἐν ὕππαιρια νεῖν occurs in Phaedr. 264 A ἦν ὕππαιρια ἄνθρακει διανείπει τὸν λόγον. νεῖν is absent from some MSS. but is required by ἐν θαλάσσῃ.

τῶν τοιούτων] sc. τῶν ἄρματον.

τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν] sc. φορῶν, as the following clauses show. That swiftness and slowness are themselves causes which move and contain all moving objects, is a mode of speaking due to a philosophy which attributes an excessive importance to abstract ideas. As afterwards in the Timaeus, though in a somewhat different manner, the world is doubled—the true swiftness and slowness convey the real heavenly bodies which are invisible, as the apparent velocities of the bodies that appear are the visible copies of them.

τᾶσι ... σχῆμαν] Plato seems to mean that every mathematical figure is, or ought to be, exemplified in the revolution of the heavens.

ὅκων, εἴπον, κ.τ.λ.] The works of creation are imperfect, like all other works of art. Let us imagine that some Daedalus had
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529 D

drawn mathematical figures: no one would measure these figures with the view of learning the true nature of proportion. Nor will any one gather the true nature of astronomy from measuring the proportions of days and weeks and months and years.

δοσπερ αν . . . (ε) διαγραφμασιν] sc. χρήσατο αυτοῖς.

530 A

νομεῖν μὲν] is a resumption of ταῦτα πείσεσθαι, ‘that is to say, he will think.’

συνήσασθαι] is of course active in meaning.

αυτῶν] sc. τῶν οἰραίων.

τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς . . . πρὸς ἀλληλα] The sentence is slightly altered in the process of construction, and the general meaning of these words is resumed in ταῦτα infra. For παραλλάττειν cp. Tim. 22 c τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ τῶν περὶ γῆν καὶ καὶ οἰραίων ἀντὶν παραλλαγέ (deviation).

B

ζητεῖν] depends on νομίζοντα with the common ellipse of δεῖν.

προβλήμασιν ἄρα . . . μέτμεν] ‘Astronomy, then, like geometry, we shall pursue by the help of problems.’ It is obvious that pure mathematics do not give the slightest knowledge of physics. No abstract study of θάδους φορά would explain the motions of the heavenly bodies. But when a ground of fact has been obtained, mathematical science is the great lever of our knowledge of the universe.

Though Plato was mistaken in identifying the science which treats of solids in motion with astronomy, he was probably before his age in the idea that a theory of matter in motion might form a separate branch of mathematics.

The same desire to make physics a pure science resting on the ἄγαθον appears in Phaedo 97 n, ε, where Socrates describes himself as turning away dissatisfied from Anaxagoras, because he was unable to demonstrate the rational necessity of physics. A similar tendency is observable in the Timaeus, where Timaeus, although professing that the knowledge of physics which is attainable by man is only probable, nevertheless seeks to construct the elements out of triangles. In Laws vii. 821, 822, there is a complaint of the empirical state of astronomy, which led men to ‘blasphemous’ notions of wandering stars and contrarious orbits. Plato seems to imply, perhaps drawn to this by a sound instinct,
that if there were a true science of astronomy, we should find
nothing irregular in the motions of the stars.

πολλαπλάσιον . . . ἡ ὁς τὸν ἀστρονομεῖται] For ἡ after an
implied comparison cp. i. 335 λ προσθείναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἡ ὃς τῷ πρῶτῳ
ἐλέγομεν.

The theory of music (a Pythagorean subject which is not at once
obvious to Glaucon) must also be raised not only above the wrang-
ing disputes of practical musicians, but also above the limitations of
Pythagorean theory, which is still based upon the 'harmonies which
are heard.' Our pupils must rise to the universal contemplation of
harmonic ratios in themselves.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ τι, κ.τ.λ.] γὰρ connects with τὰλλα,—'but (seeing that
there are other studies) have you any of the suitable studies to
suggest?' For τῶν προσθείνων cp. supra 521 b.

τὰ μὲν οὖν πάντα, κ.τ.λ.] Such professions of ignorance or
imperfect knowledge are characteristic of Plato: cp. supra iii.
400 c, τ έὶς Δάμων ἀναβεβλήθησθο. Plato is suggesting that many
phenomena besides those of astronomy and harmony may be
scientifically brought under φορά. All change might be described
as a kind of motion. Cp. Theaet. 152 b, 156 c, d, where vision
is described as the result of certain motions, and Laws x. 893, 894,
where ten kinds of motion are enumerated; among them σίγκρησις
and διάκρησις, ὁξύν and φωνή.

ὁς πρὸς ἀστρονομεῖν . . . παγηναί] Cp. Tim. 47 b, c δεῦ τι ἡμῖν
ἀνεμίζων δωρήσασθαι τε δόσιν, ἵνα τὰς ἐν ὀφθαλμὶ καταδόντες τοῦ νοῦ περίδους
χρησιμοθῇ ἐπὶ τάς περιφέρεις τας τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν διακόσιαν, ἐνυγγείις
ἐκείναις αὐτας, ὑπαρκτός τετραγμένας, ἐκμαθήσετε δὲ καὶ λογισμὸν κατὰ
φώναν ὀρθύτητος μετασχόντες, μιμούμενοι τὰς τῶν δεῦ πάντως ἀπλανεὶς
αὐτας, τὰς εἰ ἡμῖν πεπληρωμένας καταστημοθέα. —The whole passage
should be read.

ὁς οὖ τε Πυθαγόρειοι φασί, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. iv. 424 c ὅς φησὶ τε Δάμων
καὶ ἐγὼ πειθόμαι: Symp. 186 c, see also Tim. 80 b for an analysis
of 'harmony.'

ἐκείνων] viz. the Pythagoreans, who had given special attention
to harmonics.

καὶ εἰ τι ἀλλο πρὸς τοῦτοις] This seems to imply that other
applications of βαθύς φορά are possible besides astronomy and
There were two parties in the musical world of Athens: one the scientific, which rested on the old Pythagorean doctrines and generally denied the appeal to sense into which however they were sometimes betrayed (they were headed in later times by Aristoxenus the pupil of Aristotle): the other, the empirical, who are referred to in the words \( \text{ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος} \) (531 b) that he appeals to the scientific and not to the empirical party. But he adds that even the former are not wholly right.

The subject is to be gathered from the context, viz. \( \text{οἱ περὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας} \). Socrates means the Pythagoreans, but Glaucon understands him to speak of the empirics or ordinary musicians. This is corrected in what follows (infra b, c).

Plato gives a comic description of the empiric musicians experimenting either with voice, flute, or lyre. A tone and a quarter-tone are sounded successively, while the men lean forward to listen, whereupon some of them declare that they perceive no difference, while others say they recognize a distinct interval, and that this ought to be made the unit of harmony and employed as the basis of the scale: \( \text{ἐν μέσῳ τινά ἡχὴν} \) is a slightly inaccurate but idiomatic expression for \( \text{μέσων τι τῶν ἡχῶν} \), 'a difference of tone.'

The introduction (in flute-playing) of a quarter-note (\( \text{πυκνών} \)) between the middle notes of the enharmonic scale, is recognized as a comparative novelty even by Plutarch (De Musica, c. xi), and was treated as an obscure point by Aristoxenus, who says of it, \( \text{τελευταῖον} \) \( \text{αὐτῷ καὶ μόλις μετὰ πόλλα} \) \( \text{πόνον} \) \( \text{συνεβίβασα} \) \( \text{ἡ ἀσθήσις} \). See Westphal's Harmonik, 2nd ed., p. 128. Aristoxenus (Elem. Harm. i. 24) defines \( \text{πύκνομα} \) as \( \text{τὸ ἐκ δύο διαστημάτων συνοπτικός} \), \( \text{ἀ} \) \( \text{συνεβίβαστα} \) \( \text{πλατον} \) \( \text{διάστημα} \) \( \text{περίει} \) \( \text{τοῦ} \) \( \text{λεπτομένω} \) \( \text{διαστήματος} \) \( \text{ἐν} \) \( \text{τῷ} \) \( \text{διὰ τεσσάρων}. \) For example \( a \delta \delta (c) d \) when the two intervals \( a \delta \), \( \delta \delta \), are together less than the interval \( b \delta \) (\( c \) being omitted). Φθειγμένων (viz. τῶν χορδῶν). Ven. E Vat. m read Φθειγμένων: 'others contending that the note is now identical.'

\( \text{οἶνον ἐκ γειτῶνος φωνῆς θηρευόμενος} \) 'as if catching a sound from a neighbour's house.' The exact metaphor is obscure.
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σώ μόν] The order of words as rendered in the translation is (1) περί κατηγορίας ἔχοντες, κ.τ.λ. The words πράγματα . . . στρεβλούσαται suggest other imagery derived from the law-courts.

'They have a controversy with the strings and torture them: they accuse them of refusing to speak or of speaking too much.' Socrates is contented with hinting at this grotesque conception. According to another way of taking the words (2) κατηγορίας, κ.τ.λ., may be rendered 'concerning accusation of the strings and their denial of it and exaggeration,' the latter words describing the behaviour of the strings under trial. The musicien enragé is imagined as scolding the strings: the strings as denying his accusations and braving him.

For the weakness of empiricism in music cp. Phil. 56 A τὸ μᾶτρον ἐκεῖς ἠρθησα τῷ στοχάζεσθαι ἄφημε, ἄφημονα.

ταύτικ γὰρ ποιοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.] Plato as we may retort has fallen into the same error about harmony as about astronomy. For harmony no less than astronomy rests ultimately on a fact, which is that certain successions or combinations of sound are agreeable to the human ear. The simplicity of this fact, which is found to agree with certain ratios of number, has naturally led in either case to the substitution of numerical laws for the phenomena of which they are the expression.

οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀναφέρ] 'They do not rise to problems,' i.e. to abstract questions which are independent of facts.

χρήσιμοι . . . ἀκρηστοι] καλοῦ is here added because music seems especially to suggest the identity of the beautiful and the good. ἄλλως, i.e. μὴ πρὸς τὴν καλοῦ τε καὶ ἄγαθον ζητήσω. The subject of ἀκρηστον is τὸ περὶ ἀρμονίας.

Furthermore, the sciences thus purged from empiricism must be carried upwards to the stage where they are seen in mutual correlation. Then they may really become the prelude (they can never be more) of Dialectic, the study of pure abstractions by pure thought. By this alone the mind gets beyond 'hypotheses' and dispenses with them, although employing the arts or so-called sciences concerned with them, in the preliminary stage, which for want of a better word has been termed in the previous survey (vi. sub fin.) διάνωσα. Nor is the dialectician perfect until he has realised a complete conception not only of Being but of the Good.
The affinity of astronomy and music is not at first sight obvious. To the Pythagoreans and Plato (see Tim. 47) the music of the spheres afforded a link of connexion between them, which to us appears fanciful.

But Plato sees also a real connexion, inasmuch as he supposes them both to be based upon number and proportion, which he regards as the common element of all the preparatory sciences. When reduced to this mathematical form they are the prelude to the science of the Good.

For the application of this remark cp. infra 537 c.

The genitive is continued in τίνος by a sort of attraction.

The figure of the προοιμίων and νόμος with a play on the word νόμος, is one of the leading features in the structure of the Laws. (Laws iii. 700 b, iv. 722 d.)

‘But do you imagine that persons who are as yet unable to give and accept a reason will ever know anything of the things which we say they ought to know?’ Badham’s conjecture οἱ ἡ... τίνος is partly anticipated (οἱ Λα) by a corrector of Par. A, where οἱ μη is written, but with two dots over οἱ. But the text is sound. ἡη is to be connected with μὴ δυνατὸ τίνες ὄντες. With εἰσεθαλί, δοκοῦσι has to be supplied from ὁ γὰρ ποὺ δοκοῦσι γέ σου supra.

‘Nor again is that my view,’ i.e. while I deny that mathematicians are dialecticians, I will not affirm that any but dialecticians can have the knowledge required.

The reading of the MSS. is followed in the text. Various alterations have been suggested: (1) the insertion of ἃν (or ἰάν) before ἄνευ; (2) ἐπιχειρῶν for ἐπιχειρῆ; (3) ὅρμαν for ὅρμα; (4) καὶ μὴ for καὶ μη, with a comma after ὅρμα (then supposed to be in the indicative mood). It is better to follow the MSS. without attempting to get over the asyndeton which is not without parallel in Plato—the clause ἄνευ... ἀποστῇ being explanatory of οὖσα... ἐπιχειρῆ.
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§ 321 ἐκαστός] Until he reach the Good, he will still find himself among specific ENTION. Cp. vi. 484 d and note.

ἐκεῖνος τότε] sc. δὲ τῆς ὀψεως δυνάμει χρώματος supra Α: τότε like ἐλέγομεν refers to supra 516 A ff.

ἡ δὲ γε . . . (c) ἀπουσκιαζομένας] 'But the release of the prisoners from their chains and the turning of them from the shadows towards the images and the light, and the ascent from the underground den into the day (supra 516 ε), and their vainly endeavouring when there to look on the animals and plants, and the light of the sun, whereas they can only look on the divinely made reflections and the shadows of real things (not shadows of images cast by the light of a fire, which is itself a shadow compared with the sun).'

In what follows the construction is changed and the nominatives are resumed in ταῦτῃ . . . τὴν δύναμιν. For the confusing double use of the demonstrative οὗτος cp. iii. 405 b, c.

The conjecture of Nagelbach ἐτι ἀδυναμία βλέπειν (a reading found also in Iamblichus) is plausible and in keeping with the previous nominatives feminine. But on the other hand it may be said that ἀδυναμία βλέπειν (for τοῦ βλέπειν) is a questionable construction without a verb preceding; and that the infinitive βλέπειν follows the preceding verbal nouns as if ἡ ἐπάνωδος had been το ἐπωνυμοῖο ἄυτοις, while the preposition ἐπί may be used as in Sophocles (El. 108, Ant. 759, O. C. 1554), in which passages the sense of condition appears to have passed into the manner. So here, 'to look powerless,' i.e. to be without power to see. In πρὸς δὲ, κ.τ.λ., the negative notion in ἐπ' ἄδυναμίᾳ disappears.

θεῖα] This word has been needlessly suspected. In Soph. 266 b, c, D Plato speaks of a divine as well as a human μητήρ. The epithet here contrasts the reflections in water, &c., due to the light of the sun, with the shadows of the ἀκατάστατα cast by the fire-light. The phantasmagoria in the den and the σκια of real objects are distinct, as in the passage which this resumes, 516 A ff.

For the position of θεῖα as a 'dragging predicate' cp. ix. 573 λ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνωνοιαῖς ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων.

τῶν ὀρτων] is emphatic = the visible realities which in the allegory correspond to the ideas.

δι' ἐτέρου τοιοῦτου] τοιοῦτος refers to εἰδώλων.

ἀσπέρ τότε] sc. ἡν ἐπαναγωγή: supra 516 b ff.
It is difficult to accept, being difficult to understand: it is difficult not to accept it, because when understood, it appears self-evident.

The pronoun is emphatic. Cp. v. 473 c είπ' αὑτῷ δὴ . . . εἰμί ὁ τέφρον μεγίστης προσεκάζομεν κύματι.

For the moderation of statement cp. Phaedo 114 c, D τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διασχισάσθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγώ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοὺς ἔχων ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ, κ.τ.λ.

This reading is supported by the version of Ficinus and partially by the reading of Φ (ὡς δὲ μὲν): 'What we must insist on is that our pupils ought to behold the vision which we thus indicate.' The reading of Par. A, &c., ὡς μὲν δὲ, κ.τ.λ., 'That in appearance (ἰδεῖν) it is something like this,'—is better authenticated but seems less in point.

Systematically, 'methodically': cp. Phaedr. 263 b ὅποι διηρήθωσι.

The division of the arts into κολακεί (πρὸς δόξαν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθυμιών), ποιητική (πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις) and ἐπιμελητική (πρὸς θεραπείαν) may remind us of similar divisions in the Gorgias (463 ff., 501, 502), Sophist (222 e, 265 ff.), and Politicus (261–275 e): γένεσις, ἢ δεικνύον, κ.τ.λ. τετράβαται τρέπον μὲν εἰς.

The accusative, by attraction to δς, is also in construction with δρόμεν. The plural, also partly due to attraction, has a depreciatory effect.

Mathematics are not a science in Plato's sense of the term, because they do not inquire into the nature of their own conceptions. They start with certain assumptions: they have a scientific basis only when connected with the idea of good, which is at once the beginning and end of them, the final cause to which they all tend and the foundation on which they rest. Such a connexion is of course an illusion, the nature of which was not understood in the
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The acknowledgement that the ‘reality’ of mathematics is not metaphysics but physics would have been an entire inversion of the Platonic order of ideas.

The nature of our ideas of number and figure may be summed up under a few heads: (1) Mathematical, like other abstractions, have been gradually separated from the concrete; the process by which the abstract idea of one is obtained is not different from that which gives the abstract idea of man. (2) But in such abstractions the individual being perfectly vacant of any separate content is identical with the universal: hence they admit of endless construction, and every construction has absolute necessity and certainty. (3) They are affected like our other ideas by use and association: the incessant recurrence of them, the power of constructing them; also the verification of their truth in the concrete, as well as by algebra and trigonometry and the various processes of arithmetic,—greatly strengthen our conceptions of them. (4) The mode in which they have been gradually attained and developed by a series of inquirers from Pythagoras to Newton and Laplace, must be clearly separated (as in the case of all our ideas) from the accidental way in which they are acquired by the individual, (a) unconsciously through the medium of language, (b) as the result of education and study. In any other sense, the origin of our ideas of number and figure, as of all our other ideas, is only their history.

οδικούν... (π) αὐτὶς διήλθομεν τέχναις] ‘then dialectic and dialectic alone pursues this method: doing away with hypotheses and going to the very first principle so as to have certainty; and gently drawing and leading upward the eye of the soul, which is actually buried in some barbarian bog’ (βαρβαρικός is chosen partly for the sound), ‘using as handmaids in the work of conversion the arts which we have discussed.’

ἀυροῦσα] has been compared to the Hegelian aufheben (‘the hypotheses which in the sphere of mathematics were absolute become relative to each other and to the Good’). But the analogy is hardly so close. ἐπὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν is governed chiefly by πορεύεται, and ἀυροῦσα means ‘taking out of the way.’ The hypotheses are done away with; that is, when seen in their relation to the good they cease to be hypotheses, cp. vi. 511 B τὰ ὑποθέσεις παύομενοι οὐκ ἄρχας, ἀλλὰ τῷ δτὶ ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάςεις τε καὶ ὄρμας, κτλ. : and Symp. 211 c ὄσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενοι. A simpler
conception of διαλεκτική as the ‘science of sciences’ occurs in Phil. 58 A ὧν γὰρ περὶ τὸ δικαίον καὶ τὸ δικαίον ταῦτα ἀλεθεύειν.


Ε ἀλλὰ ὣν μονὸν . . . δὲ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ] These words are omitted in Ven. Π, and their genuineness has been doubted, partly on the ground, which is not very strong, that in Plato’s language assent in the negative form (οὐ γὰρ οὐν) is not usually accompanied by any further elucidation. There is considerable variety in the readings: the weight of manuscript authority being in favour of that which is retained in the text. The various reading λέγει for ἔθον q need not be rejected on the ground of tautology. Cp. viii. 543 c τῶν λόγων ἑπότου λέγον. Another reading is ἀ λέγεις, ‘what you mean to express’—this appears as a correction of Par. Α. The words in the text are very possibly genuine and may be rendered—‘we only require’ (the verb is gathered from οὐ περὶ ὁμοίως ἀνθρωπότητις) ‘an expression which may indicate with a clearness proportioned to the mental condition, that of which it speaks as existing in the mind.’ For example, διάνοια may not be a very clear or definite expression, but the state of mind which it expresses is also far from clear. Of many suggested emendations that of Professor Bywater deserves most consideration, ἀλλ’ ὣν μονὸν δηλοὶ τῷ ἔθον, πῶς ἔχει σαφηνείας ἐὰν λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ. For the whole expression Cp. ix. 581 a ὥστε τι ἡμιν αὐτῶς δηλοῦν, ὡς τούτῳ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μέρος λέγομεν. It deserves notice that the whole sentence ἀλλ’ ὣν . . . ψυχῇ being omitted in Π is accordingly absent from the editions of Aldus and Stephanus.

534 A τὴν δ’ ἐφ’ οἷς ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ.] ‘The exact proportion to each other of the things to which these terms apply, and the division of the spheres of opinion and reason severally.’ The line (vi. 509 D, Π) was proportionately divided. Plato seems to hint that the proportionate division of the line and of each of the subdivisions was not a mere arbitrary fancy.

πολλαπλασίων . . . ἡ] Cp. supra 530 c πολλαπλάσιον . . . ἡ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται.

δεσω] (1) sc. δεσω λόγων οί παρελθόντος λόγοι ἡμᾶς ενέπλησαν [B. J.], or (2) for τῶν δεσω by a somewhat unusual attraction as if η had not preceded.
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η καὶ διαλεκτικὸν... ὀδυσίας;] ‘Do you call by the name “dialectician” one who has a conception of the essence of each thing?’—The words τὸς γὰρ δὲν... φαίνει; in the answer, refer only to the latter part of the question.

διὰ πάνων ἐλέγχων διεξιῶν] ‘running the gauntlet of all questionings.’ Under the figure of a battle Plato describes a logical pursuit.

ἀπτωτὶ τῷ λόγῳ] ‘without the argument coming to a fall.’

εἰ ποτε ἄργω τρέφοις] Cp. iii. 389 D ἐὰν γε... ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἐργα τελήσαι: and for μετὰ γε σοῦ, ib. Α εἰ σὺ... βούλεις ἔμοι τιθέναι.

ἀλόγοις ἄντας ἄστερ γραμμάς] (1) ‘incapable of reason, like irrational lines’ (i.e. surds in mathematics) [so Schneider]. It must be admitted that such a punning allusion belongs rather to Plato’s later manner. (Cp. Polit. 257 Α, 266 Β.) But it gives the most plausible meaning to this place, and may be illustrated from Theaet. 146 Α (addressed to Theodorus the mathematician) προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιήσαι διαλέγομαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόροις ἀλλόλους γίγνομαι. Cp. also the number of the tyrant in ix. 589 ff. which is little more than an elaborate jest. For the idiom in which the qualifying epithet is omitted with the thing compared cp. Soph. O. T. 922 and 923 ἐκπεπληγμένων... ὡς κυθρηθηνι νεώς. Another interpretation (2) is suggested by Theaet. 202 Β, where the elements of thought are said ἀλογα καὶ ἀγωνα ἢναι, αἰσθητὰ δὲ—being compared to letters, which have no significance until combined in syllables. ‘Insignificant and meaningless, like mere lines.’ (3) The only other possible explanation is that of Ast, ‘incapable of speech like mere lines or written characters.’ Cp. Phaedrus 274, where he dwells on the superiority of speech over writing.

Who are to be counted worthy of this training, and how shall it be ordered? Those who are to be our rulers must be chosen young, not as in our first selection (iii. 412). And besides the steadiness and firmness which were then required, their intellectual quickness and perseverance, and their love of truth, will have to be thoroughly tested and approved. Philosophy will not then be disgraced, as she is now. In early life intellectual training should be given through amusements, but at twenty when compulsory gymnastic comes to an end, our selected pupils must begin a ten years’ course of mental discipline, in which the scattered elements of knowledge previously
acquired must be combined in a whole according to their natural relationship to one another and to true being. Comprehensiveness is the great test of dialectical talent. At thirty a further selection should be made, and those finally sifted out by the help of dialectic for the select class may be promoted to still higher honours.

535 A τούς τε γὰρ βεβαιωτάτους, κ.τ.λ.] vi. 503.
B βλοσυρωθς τὰ ἡθη] ‘Of a sturdy moral nature.’

ἄλλα καὶ . . . αὐτοῖς] ‘but also they must have the natural gifts which are suitable to this education’ — i.e. the higher education of which he is now treating.

ποιὰ . . . διαστέλλεις;] ‘Which do you determine these to be?’ For the middle voice cp. Aristot. Pol. ii. 8, § 17 ἐπειδὴ πεποίημεθα μνείαν, ἢτα μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστελλασθαι βέλτιον.

δριμύτητα . . . μαθήτεοι] μαθήτεοι, which takes the place of a subject of ὑπάρχειν answering to δριμύτητα, is attracted into construction with δει.

οἰκειότερος . . . δ θόνος] ‘The toil more properly belongs to the mind, being confined to it and not shared by the body.’ For ἀποδεικλιῶν cp. vi. 504 A.

C καὶ μνήμονα . . . [ηπτικών] ‘Therefore the man whom we seek must also be endowed with memory; he must be a solid man who is a lover of all kinds of labour.’

ἀρξατον] from α and ραῖω, a word said to have existed as a various reading for ἀρχητον in II. xiv. 56 ἀρχητον υπὸν τε καὶ αὐτῶν εἴπορ ἵσεσθαι. The only other place where it is now found is Cratyl. 407 D, where it is said to mean σκληρὸν τε καὶ ἀμέτάστροφον: compare the French word indébranlable.

τὸν τρόπο] sc. ἄλλω.

τά τε τοῦ σώματος, κ.τ.λ.] As in iii. 403 D, bodily exercise is subordinated to the training of the mind.

D χῦλος δὲ . . . φιλοποιεῖαν] ‘And he too is lame, whose love of labour, instead of this, has taken the opposite turn.’ See Tim. 87 c, d for a similar train of reflection.
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οδοκῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, κ.τ.λ.] For the voluntary and involuntary lie cp. ii. 382.

Minds that hate falsehood in practice are often very impatient of scientific or historical truth. They may be unconscious of their defect: this unconsciousness, however, is no measure of the responsibility which attaches to them. Prejudice and stupidity cannot be altogether exempted from the guilt of the consequences which flow from them. The educated are apt to imagine that they are no more bound to inquire than the uneducated; and they sometimes think that their duty is rather to conceal than to express the result of their inquiries, when at variance with common belief. The truth is that the less the uneducated inquire, the more the educated are bound to inquire; and the stronger the impulse to concealment, the greater the duty to speak plainly. The sense of such a duty is not easily aroused when at variance with interest or custom, at the point where science and religion, virtue and truth, temporarily seem to diverge, or where the inquirer has to stand against the general opinion of mankind. Intellectual cowardice or common-placeness, or want of faith, are fatal to all true philosophy. He who has such a 'maimed soul' may perhaps escape without injury to himself: but, if a man of ability, he cannot fail to leave an evil mark on others, in our day especially, when more than in ancient times the world needs to be reminded that the love of truth is the first of intellectual virtues.

ἀμαθαινοῦσα] The termination is expressive—'to indulge in ignorance': cp. ἀκολασταῖνω.

πρὸς δὲ τι ἄν τὸ χωσι τοῦτων] τοῦτων refers to τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη, which has been already resumed in τὰ τοιαῦτα, and the subject of τὸ χωσι is the same with that of λαθάνουσι. 'They fail to see that they are making use of people who are lame and bastard with respect to the qualities for which they happen to make use of them.'

tοσαῦτην'] supra 535 c.

αλλοίως . . . κατανθήσουσιν] πράξομεν is intransitive, καὶ . . . καὶ = 'not only,' 'but.' κατανθεῖν and κατοχεῖν are favourite metaphors in Plato. Cp. Laws vii. 800 D πάσαν βλασφημίαν τῶν ἱερῶν καταχέουσι, and Rep. i. 344 D ἐστιν βαλανίς ἡμῶν κατανθήσας κατὰ τῶν ὀτίων αδρόν καὶ πολὺν τῶν λόγων.
Plato: Republic.

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γελοὶον δ' ἐγώγε . . . παθεῖν] 'My present error is, if not disgraceful, yet ridiculous enough.' It is observable that although Plato maintains the verisimilitude of the fiction that he is an actual legislator by all sorts of minute touches, he sometimes for the sake of variety, as in the present passage, allows the illusion to be broken through: cp. iii. 389 δ ἐὰν γε, ἃ δ' ὤς, ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελησαί: supra 534 δ ὅσ' τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις . . . εἰ ποτε ἔργο τρέψωσ: vi. 510 Ε.

C τοὺς αἰτίους] For the strong feeling which these words convey cp. Phaedo 116 c ὅσ' ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γεγονότες γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἄλλα ἐκεῖνοι.

οὐ μᾶ τὸν . . . βῆτοι] Briefly the meaning is, G. 'You do not in my judgement, who am the listener;' S. 'But I do in my own, who am the speaker.'

Σᾶλον γὰρ οὐ πειστένοι] Alluding to the famous line of Solon (Fragment 20, Bergk) γηράσκω δ' αἰεί πολλὰ διδασκόμενοι, quoted also in Lach. 189 λ. In the first selection of rulers or officers, older men were chosen, because no man is to enter on an office, till he has reached a certain age. But in providing for the future the rulers designate must be chosen young, because they have so much to learn.

D οὐχ ὡς ἑπάναγκες, κ.τ.λ.] 'Not making the plan of our instruction such that leaning should be compulsory.'

E χείρον οδδέν] But see above vi. 495 δ.

ψυχὴ δὲ . . . μάθημα] 'Knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.'—Why do we remember some things and not others?—memory is (1) most retentive and impressive in childhood; (2) most suggestive and associative in later life; (3) generally strongest of words and events which are seen by the light of emotion or interest, or under new circumstances. The healthy memory is that of observation, which freely receives from the external world. The memory of study, when not merely verbal or mechanical, is proportioned to the degree of attention or interest which the mind is capable of giving. Memory seems also to flourish at the expense of the other faculties, and may receive by an exclusive training a monstrous and disproportionate growth. On the other hand, memory is greatly impaired and disturbed by excess of imagination, which tends to confuse the
recollection of the past; or of reflection which draws away the mind from the external world and is only willing to receive facts connected with theories or principles. Probably even intensity of feeling, while preserving some facts with a preternatural clearness and light tends to impair the ordinary operation of memory about facts in general: the concentration of the intellectual faculties is generally inconsistent with their diffusion. Many persons have observed that a growth of mind has compensated the loss of memory: in such cases the change may be regarded as a sort of adjustment of the intellectual faculties. The true art of remembering is also an art of forgetting: better to forget most things than to remember all. Lastly, memory appears to be allied to sense and to depend on health: the reason of the common decay of the faculty in old age is partly physical, partly due also to the fading interest in the surrounding world.

Ioν καί[ καί = besides making the knowledge permanent.  

ἐφαμεν] v. 467 E.

ἐν πᾶσι, . . . ἐγκριτέον] 'And whoever appears to be always most ready at all these things—labours, lessons, dangers, will have to be enrolled in a select number.'

οὐδός γάρ . . . πράξαι] 'This time of life,' viz. that devoted to compulsory gymnastic: cp. infra 539 E, where twice the time is estimated at five years as the mean between 4 and 6. The time meant is between 17 and 20.

ἀδυνάτος τι ἄλλο πράξαι] 'is one in which it is impossible to do anything else.' The inability which is really inherent in the persons is transferred to the age.

τίς ἐκαστος, κ.τ.λ.] τίς = ποίος τις: cp. viii. 558 C ἄθροι δή, ἢν δὴ ἐγώ, τίς δ' ὁ ποιούσα ἱδία: Thuc. iii. 12, § 1 τίς οὖν αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἐγίνετο ἡ ἐλευθερία πιστῆ: Soph. O. T. 151 τίς ποτε τίς πολυχρόνου, κ.τ.λ.: O. C. 775 τίς αὕτη τίρρης, ἄκουσας φιλίν;

μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον τῶν χρόνων, κ.τ.λ.] Education in the higher sense of the term is concerned not only with practical subjects of knowledge, but with the method or connexion of knowledge in general.

That science which adjusts other sciences in relation to each other, which begins where they end, and examines the conceptions
which they receive and use; which separates the progress or
movement or history of human thought from the course of events;
which regards the body in relation to the mind, and both in
relation to God and the world, perceiving amid abstractions and
imperfect points of view, the higher or united nature of all, is
called by Plato dialectic, and may be accepted by ourselves as
the description of metaphysic. But to Plato such a science is
almost imaginary, extending only to the connexion of the math-
ematical sciences: among ourselves it is very imperfect; in idea
a 'novum et antiquum organum' of all knowledge; in fact,
scarcely advancing beyond discussions respecting the origin of
human ideas, and the correlation of the sciences.

τά τε χρήσιν μαθήματα ... γενόμενα] The imperfect construction
of the article and noun with the adverb, for which cp. viii. 564 Α
ή ... ἕλθαν εὐδερία: Laws i. 630 D εἰς τούτο πάρορον νομοθέτου: Aesch.
Ag. 165 τὰ μάταν ... ἅθαν, is supplemented by the participle.

τούτοις] sc. τοῖς ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσιετῶν προκαθεστῶν.

εἰς σύνοψιν ... φύσεως] The genitives ἄλληλων, καὶ τῆς ... φύσεως, both depend on οἰκειότητος ... τῶν μαθημάτων.

ἐν οἷς ἄν ἐγγένηται] Cp. Theaet. 186 c τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογία-
ματα πρὸς τε ὀφθαλμιν καὶ ὑφελείαν μόνος καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων
καὶ παιδείας παραγίνεται οἷς ἄν καὶ παραγίνηται.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός] Cp. especially Phaedr. 265 D,
Soph. 253 D, Tim. 83 c τοὺς ἄν διανοαῖς εἰς πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀνάμων
βλέπειν, ὥραν δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν γένοις ἔννοιαν ἐξεισάγεται πάσης.

Great caution has to be exercised in admitting young men to the
study of dialectic. As things now are, dialectic is another word for
eristic, which may be described as a sort of revolutionary scepticism.
As a supposititious child, who after a time discovers that his
supposed parents are not his real parents, ceases to honour them:
so the young man ceases to honour the principles of justice and
virtue in which he has been brought up, when he hears them refuted
by the eristics. By postponing the study of dialectic to the age of
thirty we have provided one security. But there is still need of
cautions.

οὐκ ἐπιτρέπεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] Compare the evil name of philosophy in
vi. 495.
Notes: Book VII.

ἐμπίπλανται] The first hand of Par. A agrees with Ven. II in reading ἐμπίπλανται, a corrector has changed this to ἐμπιπλάνται, and ἐμπίπλανται is the reading of M. If ἐμπίπλανται were read, the subject would be τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, and αὐτοῖς in what follows would get its antecedent from the general context. But the expression τὸ διαλέγεσθαι παρανομία ἐμπίπλανται has a sound unlike Plato, who would speak of κακοῖς περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, but hardly of τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ἀσ ἐμπιπλάμενον κακίας.

ἐμπιπλάνται gets a subject, οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ, from the preceding words, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, and this subject is the antecedent to αὐτοῖς.

τὰ μεγάλα] ‘in important matters.’

ἄπαρακαλύπτως] Cp. the democratic youth in viii. 560 c πάλιν τε εἰς ἅπεινος τοὺς λατοφυγίους ἀλθῶν φανερῶς κατοικεῖ.

τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκεῖων] ‘the rest of his reputed kindred.’ This meaning of ποιεῖσθαι (passive) is supported by vi. 498 αὶ οἱ φιλοσοφῶτατε ποιούμενοι—(where see note), ix. 573 ἃ δόξας . . . ποιουμένας χρηστάς, 574 δ. δόξας . . . τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας. It is therefore unnecessary to take the word in the middle sense of ‘adopting,’ i.e. ‘laying claim to him.’

ζητεῖ τοῦ . . . αὐτά] The contrast of knowledge and opinion, or of speculative truth and popular belief, is the source of a real difficulty in education. The maxims in which the young are brought up, and which have a kind of parental influence on them (διὰ περὶ οὗ γονεῖς) are sometimes narrow or partially untrue or perhaps represent the traditions of a former generation. False or imperfect conceptions of the truth necessarily precede higher and more perfect ones. There is a time at which the young man grows out of them, and falls under the influence of other ideas or meets the tide of the world. With active minds the element of authority is always receding within narrower limits. But when ‘the human spirits on a day’ begin to ask what are the real foundations, τι τὸ καλὸν, δίκαιον, &c., there comes the danger that the youth in his iconoclasm, or destruction of shams, may lose his sense of reverence for the first principles of truth and right.

Emerson says, ‘when the Gods come, the half-gods go’: but the half-gods sometimes go first, and leave an empty room. The candles are out, and the sun has not yet risen.

A a 2
Plato: Republic.

Republic VII. ήκουεν] 'he used to hear,' viz. in the days before doubt came to him. For the imperfect cp. supra 515 D ἐώρα βις.

538 μή εὐρίσκῃ] τε ... μή are substituted for a second μήτε for the sake of emphasis or variety.

539 τὸν κολακεύοντα] 'the life that is flattering him:' i.e. the life of pleasure which has been described, supra 538 D.

δόξει γεγονέναι] 'He will have become.' The expression is idiomatic, and the force of δοκεῖν is not to be pressed. Cp. iii. 403 ο and note.

τὸ πάθος] 'their condition,' that which happens to them. Cp. τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων vi. 488 Λ.

δ ἄρτι ἔλεγον] supra 537 ε οὐ ἐγγυγίγνωσκεις, κ.τ.λ.

ἂντόνοι] sc. αὐτοῖς, i.e. εἰλαβομένως σοι δεῖ αὐτοῖς ἀντεθαι τῶν λόγων. 'You must exercise every sort of care about the manner in which they are to apply themselves to dialectic.'

μία ... συχνά] 'Is not this one great precaution—that they should not taste dialectic when young?'

αὔτῶν] sc. τῶν λόγων.

χαίρωντες ... τοὺς πλησίον δεῖ] For the manner in which a young gentleman who has these propensities may inflict himself not only on his neighbours, but on the domestic circle, see the ludicrous description in the Philebus, 15 D, and cp. Apol. 23 c αὐτόματα χαίροντες ἀκούοντες ἔφετασμένως τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μισοῦνται, εἰτα ἐπικεφαλώσεις ἀλοντες ἐξετάζειν.

Εἰκείν τε καὶ σπαράττειν] an amusing parallel to the language occurs in Boswell’s life of Johnson: 'I found him extremely proud of his conversational prowess. "Sir, we had good talk last night." "Yes, Sir, you tossed and gored several people."'

C τὸ δὲν μισοῦνται] 'the cause of philosophy altogether.'

ὁ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερος] It may be truly said that moderation is the lesson which is latest learnt in speculative philosophy. The intensity and isolation of mind which is necessary for the invention of a metaphysical system, depending on the force with which a single idea is seized rather than on the power of filling up details or of using the system in relation to what is beyond and outside of
it; and also the susceptibility in the disciple which is required for the reception of such a system,—are unfavourable to counsels of moderation. Such moderation, which may be only the 'via media' of expediency borrowing the language of philosophy, may also rest on a just appreciation of the many aspects and hindrances of human knowledge. The thought here is very similar to that put into the mouth of Protagoras in Theaet. 167 ε ὥσ τι το πάντα μὴ χωρίς μὲν ὡς ἄγωνισμος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιήσαι, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παῖδι τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγομεν σπουδάζῃ.


τοῦτον ἐπ' εἰλαβοκ] (1) i.e. ἐπὶ τῷ εἰλαβοκοῦ τοῦτο. This seems better than (2) taking τοῦτον with προειρημένα (as in vi. 504 οἰ τῷ προρρηθῶν αὐτῶν) because there is nothing sufficiently definite between pp. 535 and 539 for τοῦτον to refer to.

καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν, κ.τ.λ.] As often in comparisons, the illustration takes the place of the thing illustrated, hence the construction changes from ἐφασθαί to ἐφεσθαι. Cp. x. 610 d.

The first course of dialectic, beginning at thirty, is to last five years. And at thirty-five, the trained dialectician is to come down to practical life and for fifteen years to exercise command in war, and other subordinate offices of state. At fifty, if deemed worthy of promotion, he is to renew the study of dialectic, and at last proceed to the contemplation of the Form of Good. Having seen the Good, he is to take his turn at intervals in the labour of government, legislation and education, still spending the greater part of his time in contemplation, until he pass to the islands of the blest.

ἀρκεῖ δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] ἀντιστρόφως ... γυμνασίως is explanatory of μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, and ἔτη διπλάσια ὑπό τότε refers to 537 b.

Ἐν μηδὲν εἰμιπεριξί βοτεροῦσι] Cp. vi. 484 d.

eἰ ἐμμενοῦσι ... (540 ᾗ ἃ καὶ παρακινήσουσιν] Great intellect often exists without will, and is drawn hither and thither by the influence of circumstances; and sometimes may be apparently even increased by yielding to their influence. The power of mind which is shown at a particular moment is not always consistent with the self-command or patience which is necessary for continuous action. The bravery of the orator's words (e.g. Demosthenes') is no test of his ability as a commander, nor the speculative politics of the
philosopher (e.g. Bentham's) any evidence of capacity as a states-
man. There is a narrower as well as a wider circle, of action as 
well as thought, which may be compared to the den, and which
must not be confounded with the world of ideas, nor yet wholly cut
off from them: into this the philosopher has to descend and
apprentice himself to practical affairs. He who is the 'spectator
of all time and of all existence' has to reconcile immutable
principles with the jealousies, fears, passions, prejudices of the
hour: in his own character he must unite the utmost readiness and
power of adaptation with the greatest inflexibility.

—he, and καὶ παρακινήσουσιν] 'or whether they will give way at all,'
parkinōn is here used intransitively: cp. the similar use of ἵππωκατιν
and other compounds of κινω.

ἀνακλίναται . . . παρέχον] 'directing the light of the soul
upward to look at that which gives light to all.' The eye in
the act of vision is here, as in Tim. 45, conceived of as emitting light.

[small addition here]

εὐναυαρή] 'give her consent;' cp. v. 461 ε Ὑ εἰ λύρος τούτῃ
εὑρίσκετη καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναρή, The MSS. vary between εὐναυαρή
and εὐναυαρή. Par. A gives εὐναυαρή—av perhaps by a later hand.
But the use of εὐναυαρή in the sense of 'consenting' is improbable.

δεσπορ ἀνδριαντοποιάες] Cp. ii. 361 δ ὡς ἐπωμένως ἐκτελοῦν, δεσπορ
ἀνδράντα, εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαρίσεις τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

Such women as are found capable, are to take office with the men.
But these things will not come to pass until the philosopher-king, or
kings, arrive upon the scene, and have removed all the inhabitants
who are more than ten years old. He or they will then set to work
to educate the remainder in the manner which we have described.
Here ends the account of the perfect state. And the perfect individual
is like unto it.

ὁς διηλθομεν] v. 451 c ff.

εὐχας εἰρηκέναι] v. 450 δ ὅπος τις αὐτῶν ἄπτεσθαι, μὴ εὐχα δοκῇ
eu iai δύνας: ib. 456 c, vi. 499 c.

ἀναγκαίταιον] i.e. they will hold justice to be the highest
necessity. In other words they will not allow any so-called
political necessity (‘the tyrant’s plea’) to stand in the way of what
they know to be right. Cp. vi. 493 c.
Notes: Book VIII.

when they shall have set to rights their own city.’ The construction is continued from ὅταν, κ.τ.λ., supra.

The philosopher-statesmen will save a generation by sending the grown-up inhabitants into the country and taking possession of their children to educate them in the new plan. With ἕκταμης ... ἀκέφαλα ὅταν must be again supplied. The poet Gray was led by a curious misapprehension to suspect δέκας. ‘This is undoubtedly a false reading,’ he says, ‘for ἐνκυκλωσάρων or ἐνδομεσάσαρων, so that till some MSS. inform us better, we must remain in the dark as to the age when Plato would permit his statesmen to retire wholly from the world.’ This is extravagant enough, but Plato has hardly considered how the provision, which he here abruptly introduces, is to be reconciled with what precedes. For how are the children to be taught music and gymnastic when all their elders have been sent away? From what other state, πόρρω σε ἐτούτοις ὅτι ηὔμερας ἐπούχεσο (vi. 499 c), are the new teachers to be brought?

The dependent construction is continued from ἐγκυκλωσάρως ... ἄνδρων supra 540 η. The similarity of sound in ἐνδομεσάρως ἀνδρών is probably intentional as in Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου (Symp. 185 c).

BOOK VIII.

Having determined the great questions of state communism and of the philosopher-king, we return to the point from which we digressed (vi. 499 η) and proceed to describe the four principal false forms of political society. These are (1) the Cretan or Laconian (τυραχία), (2) oligarchy (a condition fraught with evils), (3) democracy, the reaction from this, and (4) the consummation of political evil, which is tyranny. Parallel to these are the corresponding perversions of individual character. The tyrant represents the ideal of evil, as the just man (vii. 541 η) embodies the ideal of good.

in the state which is to be perfectly administered’—opposed to the imperfect states which follow: οἶκεῖν, as elsewhere, is used intransitively: cp. iv. 431 η καὶ ὡς τοῦ καὶ οἶκείν καὶ ἐνδομεσάρως μας τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντι.
kai πᾶσιν . . . ἐιρήνη] The community referred to in these latter words includes the education and employment of women on the same lines with the men. The lowest class is here left out of sight.

ολας προείπομεν] iii. 415 ε στρατιωτικάς γε, ἀλλ’ οὐ χρηματιστικάς, κ.τ.λ.

ἀλλὰ μνημονεύων] 'certainly I have not forgotten' (referring to εἰ μνημονεύεις), 'that at all events we thought none of them ought to possess anything which other people possess.'

δὲν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι] iv. 419 οἶνον ἄλλοι, κ.τ.λ.

ἀθηναῖς τε πολέμου καὶ φιλακας] iii. 404 λ κομψοτέρας . . . ἀκρόπολις δεὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀθηναῖς. In several other passages he harps upon the same figure of speech, iv. 422 c, vii. 521 d.

tῆν εἰς ταῦτα τροφήν] sc. εἰς τὸ στρατιώτατον καὶ φιλακας εἶναι.

ἀναμνησθῶμεν . . . [ωμεν] 'let us recall the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the same pathway.' The accusative is cognate, sc. ὀδόν.

οδ ἀλεποῦ, κ.τ.λ.] The words from καὶ ταῦτα refer to v. 449 λ Ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοῖς τὴν τουιτῆν πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ὑφήν κολώ, καὶ ἄνδρα τῶν τουιτῶν. Socrates, having completed the first sketch of the state and of education at the end of Book iv, in order to supply an omission of which he is supposed to be guilty in the first part of Book v, begins the higher conception of both (καλλίω ἐτε, κ.τ.λ.), which is given by the addition of the philosopher-king at the end of Book v. The true idea of the philosopher-statesman is then separated from the false, and a second or higher education provided for him in books vi, vii.

Socrates now passes from the ideal commonwealth to various defective polities, which have a clear affinity to the ordinary Greek states: he afterwards returns to another ideal, not of this world, including a vision of a future life, which is faintly sketched in Book x.

The following lines of Wordsworth's Prelude describe a similar descent from the ideal to the actual:—

Ere long, the lonely mountains left, I moved,  
Begirt from day to day with temporal shapes  
Of vice and folly thrust upon my view,  
Objects of sport, and ridicule and scorn,
Manners and characters discriminate,
And little bustling passions that eclipse,
As well they might, the impersonated thought,
The idea or abstraction of the kind.

ἀλλ’ ὁδι θη] ἀλλὰ supplies the opposition to μὲν (ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν
tοιαύτην): ὁδι θη marks the emphatic resumption of the train of
thought preceding the digression καὶ ταύτα, κ.τ.λ. : ‘but, however
this may be, you said.’

ὅν καὶ πέρι, κ.τ.λ.] iv. 445 c.

αὐτοῦς] sc. τούς ταῖς πέντε πολιτείαις ὁμοίους ἰδρας.

καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρμόνοι, κ.τ.λ.] For the absolute use of ὑπελαβεῖ cp.
Meno 74 c ei . . . μετὰ ταύτα ὑπελαβέν ὁ ἐρωτῶν. A summary of the
previous discussion is ingeniously grafted upon the dialogue.
Compare for a similar recapitulation the opening of the Timaeus.

ὅσπερ παλαιότης, τὴν αὕτην λαβὴν πάρεχε] ‘like a wrestler, let
me have the same grip of you,’ i.e. let me resume my position.
For this favourite metaphor cp. Phil. 13 ε τάχ’ ἀνόητες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας
(sc. λαθαί) ἵνα ἄν πως ἀλλύλοις συγχωρήσιμον: Phaedr. 236 b,
Laws iii. 682 ε.

οὗ χαλεπῶς . . . ἀκοκυκή αὕτη] ‘there will be no difficulty in
answering your question: the forms of government of which
I speak are those which also have distinct names, that which meets
with general approbation, the well-known Cretan and Spartan
constitution’: cp. infra δ ὅτις καὶ ἐν εἰδι διαφανεῖ τινι κεῖται; For
the connexion of the Cretan and Lacedaemonian forms of govern-
ment see especially Arist. Pol. ii. 10.

ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν] ‘by most people.’

ἡ . . . ἀκοκυκή αὕτη] i.e. the Spartan constitution with which
we are so familiar. Cp. iii. 403 ε ἡ τῶν ἀπειρῶν ἑσ.

καὶ δευτέρα, κ.τ.λ.] ἡ ὀλιγαρχία would naturally have followed
ἐπανουμένη, but the participle καλομύνη is added, and the expression
is then accommodated to the participial phrase.

In the words συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία there is a trace of
the same personal bitterness which makes the picture of oligarchy,
infra 552, so full of scathing satire.

ταύτη διάφορος] ‘at variance with this last’—being familiarly
known as the watchword of the opposite faction—not merely 'different from this,' which would be ταύτης διάφορος.

καὶ ἡ γενναία ἤ τυραννίς, κ.τ.λ.] γενναία is ironical as in v. 453 ε

The reading διαφέρουσα for διαφέρουσα is found in Par. A and all the best MSS. (διαφέρουσα Ven. Χ, Flor. Χ, Ang. ν, Vind. E). Such a degree of unanimity in a singular reading might possibly justify a forced interpretation: 'and escaping' (or 'surviving') 'all these comes tyranny, the fourth and last disorder of a state.' This interpretation, however, clearly passes the limits of usage in language and is almost unmeaning, even though we take into account Plato's tendency to resolve words compounded with prepositions, and give them new senses (e.g. προοίμιον vii. 521 D). It may be further remarked that διαφερέων always governs the accusative.

The reading διαφερέουσα may have arisen from the desire in a copyist to avoid the tautology of διάφορος which immediately precedes and may have been thought to derive some confirmation from ix. 587 c φεύγων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον. It affords one of the few instances in the text of Plato, in which the requirements of the sense must prevail against the greater authority of the MSS.

ητές καὶ . . . κείται] Cp. supra A ὅς καὶ πέρι, κ.τ.λ., and note.

δυναστείας . . . εἰσίν] 'for the family governments and sovereignties which are bought and sold and other constitutions like these are a sort of intermediates.' This sentence makes it clear that although Plato is idealizing he has an eye to historical facts. Aristotle does not mention the ὑνηταί βασιλείαι.

ἡ οἰκεί, κ.τ.λ.] An allusion to Od. xix. 163 οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἐστὶ παλαιφάτου οὐδὲ ἀπὸ πέτρης.

The same allusion occurs in Apol. 34 D ἵμω, ὁ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν ποὺ τιμεῖ καὶ οἶκείσυ καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὑτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὄμήρου, οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδὲ ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα. For the relation of the state to the individual cp. especially iv. 435 Ε ὃ τὰ αὑτὰ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἑνώσων ἡμῶν ἐίδη τε καὶ ἢθη ἄνερ ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὗ γὰρ που ἀλλοθεν ἐκέισθε ἀφίκεσται.

αἱ τῶν ἡδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ] 'the formations of the individual character.'

κατὰ τὴν . . . πολιτείαν] 'whose characters answer or correspond to' (lit. 'are ranked with') 'the Spartan constitution.'
Notes: Book VIII.

καὶ τὸν τυραννικὸν] The article is omitted with διλογορικὸν and δημοκρατικὸν so as to reserve the emphasis for "the tyrannical man."

ἐν . . . ἡ σκέψις ἦ] These words contain a reference to Books i and ii.

προφανομένῳ] 'which is coming into view.' Cp. Charm. 173 λ ἡμῶν τὸ γε προφανέμονον ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖ καὶ μὴ εἰς γη παριέι.

ὅσπερ ἡρξάμεθα, κτλ.] ii. 368 ε πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δησωμεν, κτλ. The allusion here, as in other places, to what has preceded, is part of what may be called the composition of the work. The drawing together of the various threads is the beginning of the end.

καὶ ὢν οὖν . . . κλητὸν] (1) 'first we have to consider the "ambitious" constitution: I say "ambitious," because there is no other name of it in common use. Or shall we call it timocracy or timarchy?' or (2) 'first we have to consider the "ambitious" constitution: I say "ambitious," because there is no other name in use. We must call it either timocracy or timarchy.' According to the last way of taking the words, which appears to be the best, the clause ἡ τιμοκρατία, κτλ., is an asyndeton. Dr. W. H. Thompson ingeniously suggested ληγόμενον, ἄλλ' ἡ, κτλ.

The word timocracy, which in Plato and Xenophon means a government of which honour is the ruling principle, is used by Aristotle in the sense of ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολεία (Eth. N. viii. 10, Pol. iv. 14; cp. Isocr. Antid. 259 ξ) : a government based on a property qualification, which existed in Athens even before the time of the Solonian constitution, as in Corinth after the fall of the Cypselidae. In Plato the constitution ἀπὸ τιμημάτων is the characteristic of oligarchy: infra 550 c.

The succession of states has but a slender resemblance to the actual fact: and the succession of individuals is still more shadowy; for in the first place, admitting the Spartan and Cretan type as a fair representative of timocracy, which is the first declension from the perfect form, there is no example of this or any similar state passing into an oligarchy of wealth, while the common form of oligarchy, resting on distinctions of birth, is unnoticed in the Republic. Again, the transition from democracy to tyranny is not the order of history, except perhaps in the single instance of Dionysius the elder and the Sicilian despots (the thirty tyrants are imposed by a foreign power, and are not the natural outgrowth of
the Athenian democracy, which had an end of another kind): tyranny, instead of being the end of democracy, is rather to be regarded as a stage in early Greek history which preceded democracy, and in which the vigour and ability of individuals asserted themselves with the help of the Demos against the rule of a class (the saying ἐν προσωπικῇς μῆκος φύσει is thus far justified); or in later times as a phase of violence which is to be attributed not to an excess of democracy (this was the last bulwark against such a state), but to the general disorder and unsettlement of Greece. In the case of Euphron of Sicyon, democracy preceded tyranny, but was itself brought on by the influence of Euphron (cp. Arist. Pol. v. 12, § 7, who makes similar criticisms).

None of the descriptions of Plato are to be verified by history: the pictures of the oligarch, democrat, tyrant, are all caricatures. The latter is such a portrait as the Greeks in later times loved to draw of Phalaris or Dionysius the elder, being a great exaggeration of the truth, in which quite as much as in the lives of medieval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one were attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was nothing that the Greek was not willing to believe of them (Clearchus apud Athenaeum ix. 396). The tyrant was the negation of government and law, whose assassination was glorious, for he ruled only for the good of himself and not of his subjects. The ideal image of Plato was therefore not far removed from the vulgar thought of the ordinary Greek.

In the succession of individuals Plato is also following an order of ideas, and not an order of facts. Here and there a trait may be found of Alcibiades or Themistocles or perhaps of Critias. But the transition of one type of character to another is wholly imaginary. The error of identifying the individual and the state is seen most strikingly in the further assumption that the succession of states implies a corresponding succession of individuals.

πρὸς ὅτι ταύτην] 'In comparison with this.'

All change in states begins with a factious spirit arising within the governing class. But how should faction enter in amongst our philosophic rulers? It can only spring from some degeneracy, which must inevitably come sooner or later from some flaw in their arithmetic—since being human, they are not inaffilible—leading them to diverge, however slightly, from the true number which presides over
human generation. Some inauspicious births, consequent on such an error will gradually deteriorate the breed, until men come to power, who know not the muse, and neglect the liberal element in education. And those so educated, when they succeed in turn, will fail to eliminate aright the iron and brass from the pure silver and gold, whence disproportion following will lead to contention; the brass and iron pulling one way, towards acquisition, the gold and silver towards wisdom and virtue; until a compromise is reached, whereby private property is established, the industrial class depressed, and the guardians become an army of occupation.

ἀπλοῦν] ‘True without distinction’ of all governments.

ἐταν . . . ἐγγένηται] ‘When division arises within the governing power itself.’ Cp. Laws iii. 683 ξ βασιλεία δὲ κατάλυται . . . ἢ καὶ τις ἀρχή πόσοτε κατέλυθη μάν ὑπὸ τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν;

κἂν πᾶν ἔλεγον ἃ] Cp. iv. 423 ά άκος δι ἡ πόλει σοι οἰκῆ σοφρόνως ὅς ἀριτε εὐάχθη, μεγίστη ἔσται . . . καὶ ἐὰν μόνων ἡ χιλίων τῶν προπολεμονίων.

ἡ βουλεῖ . . . (ἐ) λέγειν;] ‘Shall we after the manner of Homer pray to the Muses to tell us how faction first was fired? Shall we imagine them in tragic vein talking in mock earnest and lofty style, playing and jesting with us as with children.’

ἐπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσει ἔμπεσε] An allusion to Iliad xvi. 112 ἐστετε δι μοὶ, Μοῖσσαι . . . δεπες δι πρῶτον πῶς ἐμπεσε νοσιν Ἀχαιων.

γενομένου παντὶ φθορὰ ἐστιν] Plato says here that all created things are liable to dissolution. In the Timaeus the same thought is expressed, but with a difference. They exist only under the form of time: and when time comes to an end, they will no longer exist.

ἐταν . . . συνάπτωσι] ‘When their revolutions severally join their circumferences:’ i.e. come round to the point where they began.

γένους δὲ ὀμετέρου] i.e. the human race, opposed by the Muses to their own or the divine.

λογισμῷ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως] Cp. Phaed. 65 ξ μῆτε τωδ’ ἀλλην αἰσθησιν ἐφήλκειν μηθὲν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. To Plato philosophy is abstract: when alloyed with sense, as in all human endeavours, it is doomed
to error and failure. Cp. Polit. 269 c, d and Tim. 28 A το δ' αδ
δαση μετ' οιδηθσεως, κ.τ.λ.

The change now to be contemplated is the greatest possible—from the perfect to the imperfect; and the causes of the transition are occult. It is precisely at such a critical moment that the reader of Plato may expect the occurrence of a myth—in which, while the style is adorned, verisimilitude is made to compensate for the absence of exact knowledge (ii. 382 b). And as the irruption of evil is supposed to spring from an error in the calculation of times and seasons, the myth is a mathematical one.

The danger of over-population is not here in question, as in iv. 423 b, v. 460 A; deterioration comes in with an alteration in the quality of the breed.

The list of interpreters who have tried to solve this famous riddle, which even in Cicero's time had become proverbial, is a very long one. Even of those who have contributed important hints, from Faber and Barocci in the fifteenth century to Gow and Adam in the nineteenth, it must suffice to name here, besides those just mentioned, K. F. Hermann, Schneider, Weber and Monro.

The last named critic, after a very full and clear discussion of the chief interpretations (Journal of Philology) appears to think, not that the key has been lost, but that there never was any one key, the passage being really nothing else than a series of tentative guesses disguised in intentionally vague language. Professor Jowett, on the other hand, believed that Plato meant something which contemporary Greeks would understand, but he thought that the exact meaning was irrecoverable, and probably also unimportant. He was by no means confident of the soundness of the explanation which he finally adopted, and it need not be repeated here. See Translation of Dialogues, ed. III. vol. iii. pp. cxxx–cxxxv.

Mathematical definition in Plato's time was tentative and uncertain, and the significance of terms consequently unfixed. He himself uses διόνυσις in different senses, and it is by no means clear that his use of παραθέσθαι is consistent with the terminology of the geometrical writers. (See note on vii. 527 Α.) All that will be attempted here will be first to give approximately the most probable force of each expression, and then with great diffidence, chiefly by way of illustration, to put forth one amongst many partial solutions.

One or two general remarks may be prefixed. (1) That the answer to the riddle is probably much simpler than the tragic
language of the Muses has led some commentators to expect. This may be inferred from the words ἐν ὁ πρῶτος, as well as from the language of the opening sentence, in which it is indicated that the elaborate terminology is not to be taken too seriously. This has to be considered in the interpretation of such words as δυναστευόμεναι, αἰδηθεῖς, φαίνονται, &c. (2) That as Plato intends to puzzle his reader, it is quite possible that even if the mathematical methods of his time were clearly known to us, their employment in the solution of this riddle might be misapplied. (3) That the whole tenour of the passage would lead one to expect the introduction of some arbitrary assumption at some point or other. The difficulty turns on minimizing this, and finding where it comes in. Whether, for example, in the phrase τῆς αἰδηθείας or in ἐκατον τοσούτακες?

λογισμῷ μετ᾽ αἰδηθείας] ‘Through reasoning accompanied with sensation.’ Notwithstanding their high training, they cannot absolutely attain to pure reason. The tincture of sense makes it impossible wholly to eliminate error.

θεῖα . . . γεννητο] For example the World of the Timaeus.

περίοδος] This is explained by the words ἔταν . . . συνάπτωσι: ‘the time in which it comes round.’

ἀριθμὸς . . . τέλειος] The ‘perfect number’ which comprises the period in which a divine birth (i.e. the right moment for it) comes round, may or may not correspond to the definition ‘a number equal to the sum of its divisions.’ But Plato is probably thinking of some higher and more complex expression than any of the simpler terms of which this is true (6, 28, 496). This is implied in the expression βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἑναντίοις δὲ ἑναντίας: cp. Tim. 39 e.

ἐν ὁ πρῶτος] ‘In which first,’ i.e. in the series of numbers;—the simplest that is resolvable into elements of which the following statement is true.

αἰδηθεῖς . . . ἀπέφηναν] Almost every word in this sentence has been disputed. It seems pretty clear that a series of four terms is meant,—having of course three intervals between them. That which has met with most favour is the continuous proportion 27: 36: 48: 64, or the converse of this. The difficulty is to make this harmonize with the remaining expressions.

αἰδηθεῖς] Is it necessary that this should mean anything more than ‘increments’? Some would restrict the word to powers (αὐξ
Granting this last, may it not extend to multiples of unity?

The latter word does not occur elsewhere, and the explanations of it given by Greek arithmeticians are inconsistent. If ἡ δυνάμενη (εξήκουσα) is the side of a square, may not τὸ δυναστευόμενον (passive, sc. ἐπίπεδον) be the square itself? Thus if 3 is ἡ δυνάμενη, 9 would be τὸ δυναστευόμενον. The series will then consist of root-numbers and their squares.

δύοιοιύτων τε καὶ ἄνομοιότων] ‘Consisting of numbers that make similar and dissimilar figures:’ i.e. numbers odd and even. For the genitive with δύοις cp. iv. 443 D δύον τρεῖς ἀρμοσίας . . . νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης—also the expression in what follows, infra c ἐκατῶν μὲν ἄρθρων, κ.τ.λ. This designation of the odd and even numbers turns upon a theorem to which Aristotle alludes in Phys. iii. 4 and which is in fact the geometrical expression for the formula \((a+b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2\).

Thus \(CG = a + b\), and \(CF = CG^2 = (a + b)^2\). \(CE\) is the square on \(a\). Then \(DE, EG\), are each severally equal to \(ab\), and \(EF = b\). Hence the square \(CF = (a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2\). Take now the case in which \(b = 1\). Then \(CF = (a + 1)^2 = a^2 + 2a + 1\). Now \(2a + 1\) = the gnomon \(DFG\), and is clearly an odd number, which varies from 3 upwards according to the value of \(a\), so that any such number equals \(2a + 1\).

Hence every odd number has the peculiar property that when added to the square of half-itself-minus-one (i.e. to \(a^2\)), it produces a square number:—

\[
\begin{align*}
1 + 3 &= 4 \\
4 + 5 &= 9 \\
9 + 7 &= 16 \\
16 + 9 + 25 &= 51, \text{ and so forth.}
\end{align*}
\]

The odd numbers are in this way δύοιοιύτες, ‘producing similar figures,’ viz. squares; the even numbers (each = 2 \(a\)) are ἄνομοιότες, because when added to the same squares they produce oblongs, not squares, every such oblong being dissimilar from every other:

\[
\begin{align*}
a^2 + 2a &= CE + DE + EG = CH. \\
1 + 2 &= 3 \\
4 + 4 &= 8 \\
9 + 6 &= 15 \\
16 + 8 &= 24 \&c.
\end{align*}
\]
Otherwise the words have been explained more generally, δυσοιωντες = 'expressing similar figures,' e.g. 9 and 81; ἀνομοιωντες, 'expressing dissimilar figures': e.g. 3 and 9 or 27 and 81.

καὶ αἱδόντων καὶ φθινότων] Either αἴδευν here must be intransitive or φθίνω transitive, and there is no authority for either in classical Greek. As αἴδω is frequently intransitive in common Greek, such a meaning may possibly be admitted here. The terms are borrowed from the Pythagoreans, who may not have observed Attic purity. And in speaking of the numbers, to which so much of active force is attributed, the difference may have been hardly felt. Schneider tried to identify this distinction with that between ἱπτρετεῖς ἄρθροι (‘numbers exceeded by their factors’) and ἐνθεῖς (‘exceeding them’): but there is no reason why it should not be understood more simply of a series of numbers alternately increasing and diminishing.

πάντα . . . ἀπέφηναν] I.e. the process is completed without having recourse to any irrational quantity, such as ‘the diameter of the square of five.’ This is implied in βητά: προοήγορα conveys something more, viz. a common measure: in this case unity. I.e. no use is made of fractions.

At this point we pause to consider ‘the number of the human period’ which has been now described. The solution which has found most favour is 216, a number which has more integral factors than any previous number. It is the cube of 6 and may be divided into 27, 64, 125, the cubes of 3, 4, 5, which are the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. Anatolius, Theolog. Arithm. p. 40, ed. Ast (quoted by Schneider), asserts that the successive births of Pythagoras were said by Androcydes, Eubulides, Aristozenus and others to have taken place at intervals of 216 years. But the very complexity of the number, which is its chief recommendation, also makes it difficult to say which of the many ways of forming it was selected by Plato’s fancy. He is not satisfied with describing it simply as 6³. In the Timaeus (35 b ff.) the soul of the world is formed by the interweaving of two numerical series starting severally from 2 and 3. Can it be that the four terms here intended are simply the combination of 2, 2ⁿ with 3, 3ⁿ? Taking these in the order 2, 4, 3, 9, they are both odd and even, they increase and diminish, for 2<4>3<9; and when multiplied together they make 216.
The wonderful properties of the mysterious number are not yet exhausted. By skilful manipulation there can be developed out of it a complex geometrical expression which, taken in connexion with the number itself, contains the secret of prosperous generation. The terms of this expression are clearly indicated in the sequel, but the method of obtaining it is, as in the former case, extremely obscure.

Δὲν ἐπίτριτος πυθμην, κ.τ.λ.] 'The base whereof, in the proportion of four to three.' πυθμην is the word used for the lowest term of any series: thus 3 is the base of the series 3 : 9 : 27 : 81. The phrase ἐπίτριτος πυθμην, taken alone, could only mean the proportion of 4 to 3, as the lowest term of the series of ratios 4 : 3, 8 : 6, 12 : 9, 16 : 12, &c. See Nicomachus Gerasenus, Introd. Arithm. i. 19, who gives these examples of the ἐπίτριτον εἴδος τοῦ ἐπιμορίου (Schneider). But then what becomes of Δὲν? The expression as a whole seems to suggest some process of which the πυθμην of the series in question is the foundation. Supposing the first term of the series to be 2, as proposed in the preceding note, and still following the analogy of the passage in the Timaeus, may not the words be understood to mean, 'the base of the series,—viz. 2,—being (1) quadrupled, and (2) tripled'—so obtaining the two numbers 8 and 6, for the operation which follows?

πεμπάδι συζυγείς] 'In conjunction with the pentad,' i.e. the number 5 is also to be employed in the operation. The meaning of συζυγείς μι is quite general; for example, in the passage of Nicomachus just referred to, οὔ ἀπὸ τετράδος συζυγείᾳ τετραπλάσιοι, συζυγείαις τοῖς ἀπὸ τριάδος τριπλασίοις, ὁμοτριγών ὁμοτριγών, it means simply that the numbers are to be arranged in pairs. So far then the manner in which 5 enters into the combination is left vague. It is rendered more precise, however, by the addition of τρίς αὐθενείς, which is paraphrased by Aristotle, Pol. v. 12, § 8, in the words διὰ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀμφότερο τοῦ τούτου γένηται στεφείς. But when we ask what is meant by ὁ ἄρθρος τοῦ διαγράμματος τούτου, the only answer is ὁ τῶν (πρώτων εἰρημένων) ἐπίτριτος πυθμην πεμπάδι συζυγείς. i.e. if we are right so far, some combination of the numbers 8 and 6 with the number 5.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that having multiplied 8 and 6 severally by 5, producing 40 and 30, we multiply each of these
products, first by \(10 \ (= 2 \times 5)\) and then by \(25 \ (= 5^2)\). The result is
\[
40 \times 10 \times 25 = 10,000, \\
30 \times 10 \times 25 = 7500.
\]

Each of these, as the product of three factors, is a 'solid' number. And if they are to be added together (but this is uncertain) \(17500\) is also \(\sigmaτεινός\) \((25 \times 25 \times 28)\).

By this, or some other process, the number produces 'two harmonics,' δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται.

By ἀρμονία here is meant a solid number, resolvable into factors which have a certain recognized relation to each other, e.g. \(10,000 = 10 \times 25 \times 40\), reducible to the simple arithmetical progression, 2, 5, 8; and \(7500 = 15 \times 20 \times 25\), reducible to 3, 4, 5, the sides of the Pythagorean triangle.

[σην ἵσακις, ἐκατὸν τοσαυτάκις] 'A square consisting of 100 multiplied into itself,' i.e. \(10,000 = 100^2\). This explanation agrees best with the idiomatic use of τοσαυτός.

[ἰσομῆκη μὲν τῇ] 'Equal to the former in one dimension,' i.e. having a side = 100.

προμῆκη δὲ] But oblong. Viz. \(100 \times 75 = 7500\).

[Otherwise, supposing the plural ὁν supra to refer to the number 216 as including its factors—and so accounting for the plural—and taking πυθμὴν = 6, as the first term of the series 6, 36, 216, the ἐπίτροπος or \(\frac{1}{3}\) of this is 8. Multiply this as before by 5, 10, and 25 the result is 10,000 which divides into the two harmonies 2500 and 7500. The former may be described as ἐκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, '100 taken so many times.'

ἐκατὸν μὲν . . . τριάδος] 'Consisting of a hundred numbers formed (i.e. squared) upon rational diameters of the number 5, each wanting one (or if irrational then wanting two), and a hundred cubes of the number three.' In other words \(\{(7^2 = 49) - 1\} = 48 \times 100 = 4800\); or \(\{(7.0204)^3 - 50\} - 2\} = 48 \times 100 = 4800,\]

[The words ἐκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν . . . τριάδος have generally been taken to be a more explicit account of the second harmony, as in the rendering just given. I.e. it is an oblong measuring 100 one way, and composed of two quantities, which are thus described. The sentence, so explained, has a natural rhythm. Mr. Gow on the other hand supposes this to be a repetition of the two previous]
clauses in the reverse order: 2700 being the regular solid figure of which one side is 100: and the oblong being 100 times the square of the diameter of 5 minus 2. Mr. Adam follows up this suggestion by multiplying these two quantities together

\[(4800 \times 2700 = 12,960,000 = 60^4).\]

The diامετρος βητή peμπάδος is the diameter of the square of 5 \((= \sqrt{50})\) neglecting the fraction: i.e. since \(\sqrt{50} = 7.0204\), and this is the diαμετρος ἀρητος, the diαμετρος βητή is 7.

ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοιούτων κύριος, ἀμειβόμεν τε καὶ χειρώνων γενέσεων] What is to be done with the two harmonies when obtained? Plato leaves this quite uncertain: and it does not appear as if he intended anything further. The ξύμπας ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός is the number 216 with all that is involved in it, viz. the production of the two 'harmonies' in the way above described. The knowledge of all this on the part of the rulers is essential to the preservation of the breed in its perfection.

This diagram has been drawn upon the margin of Par. A by an early hand. It seems to represent the Pythagorean triangle τρίς αὐξηθέεις, i.e. simply raised to terms of 3 and 9. The ἐπίτριτος πυθήν peμπάδι συγκενεις is understood to mean simply a combination of 3, 4, 5. But how the scholiast found in this a solution of the whole problem is not apparent. For the numbers 3, 4, 5; 9, 12, 15; 27, 36, 45, are as enigmatical as ever.

As to the symbolic significance of the number or numbers the Muses make no sign, and it is vain to cross-examine them. The following observations contain the more important amongst many suggestions which have been made.

(1) The word περίδος is vague, and may cover anything from the minimum time of gestation (216 days—Adam) to such a cycle as that described in the Politicus, or the 'great year' of Tim. 39 ε. (2) The number 5 was sometimes regarded as the type of justice, sometimes of marriage \((= 3 + 2\), the first male combined with the first female number): (3) duality enters into human generation as into all material things. (4) The proportion of 40 to 30 may be regarded as suitable for the marriageable ages of men and women (Gow). (5) The successive births of Pythagoras
are said to have taken place at intervals of 216 years (Schneider).

(6) A grand cycle for the state might be rounded off with a
century of human lives ranging between 100 and 75 years each
\[ \frac{17500}{2} = 8750 \].

(7) The two harmonies have been supposed
by some to signify mental and bodily excellence, by others virtue
in the State and the individual, by others again perfection in man
and woman.

\[ \text{δων καταστήσονται} \] ‘The men of the former age will appoint
the best of them to be their successors.’ So the middle voice may
be rendered. The reading καταστήσονται, which has slight manuscript
authority, may, however, be the true one, as in the next sentence
καταστήσονται is used passively. Cp. note on iv. 442 A.

\[ \text{δεις δὲ ... ἀμελεῖν} \] ‘Nevertheless [although the best avail-
able] when they in turn come into their fathers’ power, they will
in the first place begin to neglect us.’

\[ \text{φυλάκες δεῖ} \] ‘although guardians.’ This is an aggravation,
for music was to be the first care of the guardians: cp. iv. 424 C
τὸ δὴ φυλακτήριον ... ἐναυθά ποιοι ὀικοδομητέον τοῖς φόλαχεν, ἐν μουσική.

\[ \text{παρ’ ἐλαττὸν ... μουσικῆς} \] said in explanation of ἡμῶν ἀμελεῖν.

\[ \text{δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς} \] the ‘shadow’ of a difficulty is found
in these words. For the Spartan or Cretan constitution, which is
the first stage in Plato’s declining scale, was not negligent of
gymnastic: cp. infra 547 ν γυμναστικῆς ... ἐπιμελεῖται. Hence
the suspicion which gave rise to Madvig’s emendation δεύτερα τε
γυμναστικῆς. Cp. infra 548 c πρεσβυτέρω γυμναστικῆς μουσικῆς
tετεμέκεναι, and for δεύτερα Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, § 35 ἐτύμωτο δεύτερον
μετὰ τῶν Πελοπίδων. But the sense of the reading in the text
although arrived at in a different way, is nearly the same. Socrates
means to say that in the first place they neglect music: and in the
second place, and therefore in a less degree, gymnastic. It is
further observable that the first declension in the state is not
from music to gymnastic, but from the philosophical to the military
government, which no doubt retained gymnastic, but did not care
for it in the spirit prescribed in Book iii. For the seeming want
of point cp. v. 451 A δωτε ἑν μὲ παραμεθεί, and infra 547 E ἀπλοιντέρων.
Plato from a love of parallelism or for the sake of completeness,
often presents the other side of an antithesis, though not in point.
Cp. infra 559 c ἁπρὸ ὁν ... ὀλυμφρικῶν, and ii. 358 A ἄρκια δ’ ἐπαυεῖται.
The timocratic state will resemble our ideal aristocracy in debarring the ruling and fighting class from other occupations in devotion to military discipline and gymnastic, and in the practice of common meals. Its characteristics will be a certain jealousy of philosophers, a love of strategy, and a continual tendency to engage in war. On the other hand it will approach the oligarchic spirit in a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, and the illegal habit of keeping large private establishments.

Honour is the ruling passion, leading to ambitious quarrels which are aggravated by the prevalence of extravagance among men whose
vitue has been compulsory and is not inspired by rational conviction. Republic VIII.
Such is the general outline.

τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας τὸς ἐπεὶ τῶν πόλεμον ἄγωνως.

τῷ δὲ γε φοβεινθαὶ, κ.τ.λ.] The construction at the beginning of the sentence is continued from τῷ μὲν τιμῶν, κ.τ.λ., but resumed with a change to the accusative in τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.

Various attempts have been made to correct ἀπλούστερος which is the reading of the MSS. on the ground of inconsistency with ἀπλός preceding. But (1) inconsistent tautology is not a strong ground of objection to an expression in Plato: (2) the apparent tautology is also an antithesis though feebly expressed: ‘the state has no philosophers who are sincere and thorough-going, and therefore falls back on the simpler nature of the soldier.’ (3) The want of a word is often found in writing to lead to the inappropriate repetition of a preceding word. For ἀπλότης meaning straightforwardness cp. Xen. Hellen. vi. 1, § 6 κάκειος μὲν τινὶ ἐπιφανέστατ τὴν ἀπλότητα τῆς πόλεως ἀπήλθε, said of Polydamas of Thessaly after his conference with the authorities at Sparta.

ἐπιθυμηται δὲ γε, κ.τ.λ.] The words τὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλγορχίαν (547 δ) are here taken up.

μέμικται γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The description of Plato may be illustrated by the real declension of the Spartan state. There were divisions in Sparta between the partisans of the Ephors and Kings (φιλονεκρικαῖ). According to Aristotle, no other state was equally corrupt (ἐπιθυμηται χρημάτων): her greatest citizens, Pausanias, Asyochus, Lysander, were the reverse of simple and straightforward (οὐχ ἀπλοὶ καὶ ἀτενεῖς). The ‘wild’ love of money which existed in the Spartan character is the more remarkable, because unaccompanied by the enterprise which is necessary for the acquisition of wealth. The cruelty to slaves is also touched upon in the corresponding figure of the πιθανορραγικός νεανίς (infra 549 λ).

οὐκοῦν . . . ἀπεργάσασθαι.] It is observable that Plato implies that his succession of commonwealths is only a rough outline of a few of them, intended to show ‘in large letters’ the true portraits of the just and the unjust. Cp. supra 544 c, d and the similar suggestion of intermediates in the division of the soul in iv. 443 ε καὶ ἐὰν ἄλλα ὁπο τεγαζεντι γυναί δύοι. The attempt here declined by
Plato was made so far as the constitutions of states were concerned by Aristotle or by his school in the Πολιτεία.

The Timocratic individual,' says Adeimantus, 'must be about as quarrelsome as Glaucot. But he will be more obstinate and less inclined to liberal pursuits: although he likes listening to a song or speech. He is obedient to the rulers, but rough to slaves, while civil to his equals, and above all things, he is ambitious of honour in war, while athletics and hunting are his recreations. In youth he despises money, but in age he covets it, having no resources in himself.

He should be made of harder stuff, I said, and somewhat less cultivated, yet a lover of the muses and a good listener, though nothing of a speaker.' In other words the timocrat is an unimpressionable man, with no original power, and yet poetry and oratory have a charm for him. The Spartan will never extract a verse out of 'his own pure brain,' is not in the habit of making long speeches, but will listen to the oratory of Alcibiades when he visits Sparta, or to the recitations of Homer and Tyrtæus. For the hit at Glaucot, compare the description of him in Xen. Mem. iii. 6, § 1 Γλαύκων δὲ τὸν Ἀρίστωνος ὄτρ' ἐπεχείρει δημηγορεῖν, ἐπιθυμῶν προστατεῦσαι τῆς πόλεως, οὐδέπω ἔκοιμον ἐν γεγονός, ὥστε τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγων τε καὶ φίλων οὔθεν ἰδώνατο παύσαι, ἐλκυμνῶν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος καὶ καταγελαστοῦ ὄντα, κ.τ.λ.

The features of the Spartan character are sufficiently apparent in this description. Compare the account at the commencement of the greater Hippias, 285 ε, which Hippias gives of the willingness of the Spartans to hear him tell of the genealogies of gods and heroes, and their unwillingness to receive instruction in the sciences. Again, for what follows, compare the statement of the Laws, Book i, that the Spartan and Cretan institutions were exclusively designed for war; also Protag. 343, where Plato adds another trait to the Lacedemonian character, their making brevity the soul of their primitive philosophy.

This is still part of the character of the Spartan. See the beautiful passage of the Laws (vi. 777 λ) in which the Athenian describes the behaviour of a just and noble person towards his slaves: he is not to be too familiar with them, he is to be more just to them than to his equals, herein showing that he loves justice for its own sake.
Notes: Book VIII.

ἀν appears in only two MSS. of slight authority. But most MSS. have τωμ which is probably a corruption of τιτων.

ἐστι . . . πολιτείας [this type of character belongs to that form of government (timocracy)]. The genitive is the predicate.

οὐκοῦν . . . καταφρονοῦ ἄν] ‘and will not such an one while young be a despiser of riches?’

His origin may be thus conceived: a good man who avoids politics in an ill-conditioned state has a son who in boyhood hears his mother complain of ‘the slights which she has to endure through the submissiveness of her husband,’ and is told by the servants of the house that when grown up he must be a man indeed and reclaim what his father has let go. By and by he comes to know a little of the world as it is. Distracted by these diverse influences, while he admires his father’s virtues, he is tempted to covetousness and ambition. And in the end the love of honour becomes his ruling passion.

πὴ δὴ . . . (π) γυναῖκιν] The sentence ὅταν, κ.τ.λ., is not in any exact construction: the most grammatical way of taking the words is after πὴ δὴ . . . γίγνεται; sc. γίγνεται ὅταν (cp. πῶς followed by ὅταν infra 553 λ). But the imperfect construction is supplemented by the deferred apodosis at 550 ἔτει δὴ ὁ νικ. The legend of the wife of Caius Licinius Stolo in Livy, vi. 34, is a similar tale of feminine jealousy. Plato is perhaps thinking of Laconizing youth at Athens.

ἐπείτα ὀρώσῃς . . . (κ) ὑμνεῖν] αἰσθάνεται reverts to the construction with ὅταν, although having the same subject with the participle ὀρώσης, which itself somewhat loosely follows ἀκούῃ. Mr. H. Richards proposes to cancel αἰσθάνεται.

ἰδίᾳ τε ὑπὸ δικαστηρίων καὶ δημοσίᾳ] ‘privately in law courts, and publicly’ (sc. in the assembly).

ἐνυπὸ μὲν τὸν νῦν προσέχοντα] Cp. vi. 496 π ἀγαπᾷ, εἰ πὴ αὐτὸν καθαρὸς . . . βιώσεται.

καὶ οἱ οἰκέται, κ.τ.λ.] The picture would not be complete without the old servant who is zealous for the honour of the family.

καὶ ἔξων, κ.τ.λ.] ‘And when he goes abroad he hears and sees more of the same sort.’ The reading of Par. Α is ἀκούῃ, but this is hardly defensible, even on the ground of a supposed construction.
with δειν repeated from supra c. The words are too far off, with ὀσθα ὀν, κ.τ.λ., intervening.

μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν] (sc. πράττοντας) has the force of τὰ μὴ αὐτῶν. The order of words gives emphasis to the negative.

παρὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων] These words are to be taken with ἔγγυθεν, 'having a nearer view of his father's ways than of the ways of others,'—which may account for his father still retaining an influence over him.

ἐλκόμενος . . . (b) ἠλεχὲ] The first ἐλκόμενος is resumed after the parentheses τοῦ μὲν . . . κεχρησθαί.

διὰ τὸ μὴ . . . φύσιν] 'being the inheritor of no mean nature.' The father (supra 549 c) was a good man whose virtue was rendered ineffectual by outward circumstances. For the idiomatic genitive cp. Soph. Tract. 1062 θῆλυς ὀδα κοίλ ἀνδρὸς φύσιν.

Oligarchy is a form of constitution based on the valuation of rateable property. It is a government in which the wealthy rule and in which the poor have no share. The change to this from timarchy is occasioned by that secret hoard of which we spoke (supra 548 b), alluring them to spend on things forbidden. They vie with one another in accumulation, and in expenditure, until wealth becomes of more account than merit. The poor man is always rejected and the rich preferred, and at last a law is carried, either by intimidation or by force of arms, making money the qualification of citizenship.

λέγωμεν . . . τεταγμένων] The line is probably quoted from memory, and made up out of two lines in the Seven against Thebes, 451 λέγ. ἄλλον ἄλλον ἐν πύλαις εἰληκότα and 570 ἄριστων δὲ πρὸς πύλαις τεταγμένος. The similarity of πύλη and πύλαι was nearer in sound than in spelling.

κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν] supra 545 b.

τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων . . . πολιτείαν] 'A government resting on the valuation of property I term oligarchy.'

It is to be observed that Plato here absolutely opposes timocracy to oligarchy. But as a fact in the history of Greece, so far as we can judge from somewhat meagre indications, there were many kinds of both, the element of wealth combining in various degrees
with that of birth: the right of the strongest, that is, of the heavy armed soldier or horseman, or of the well equipped pirate, or the leader of pirates, largely entering into all of them.

εκεῖνοι] supra 548 A.

τοὺς ῥώμους . . . ἀπειθοῦντες] ‘they wrest the laws to this end, disobeying the law,’ i.e. they misinterpret the letter and violate the spirit of the constitution.

ἡ οὖχ οὔτω . . . ἐπονεῖ] ‘Is not this the sort of difference between riches and virtue? When they are placed in either scale of the balance, the one rises, as the other falls.’ The text follows Madvig’s correction; the manuscript reading κειμένου ἐκατέρου may however be explained by placing a comma after ἐκατέρου, ‘the one ever rising as the other falls, as if each were placed in a scale of a balance.’

ἡ καὶ πρὸ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.] As in the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens: Thuc. viii. 66 ἀντιλεγέ τε οἶδεις ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων, δεδομέναι καὶ ὀνομαζόμενο τὸ ἔνθεστησ.

Suppose a property qualification to be required of a pilot, what would become of navigation? To guide the helm of the state is more difficult and also more important than to steer the ship; the failure in the practice of it will therefore be more disastrous. The oligarchical city, moreover, is not one, but two at least, vis. the rich and the poor. (Cp. iv. 422 E.) The government cannot go to war, for fear that the multitude may desert in battle and leave the few, who are also covetous, to support both the danger and the expense. Again, under this constitution the same person may have diverse callings; he may be warrior and trader in one. And, what is worst of all, he may reduce himself to beggary. He never was a real ruler, and now he is only a spendthrift and a drone in the hive. And of these wingless drones, unlike the winged ones, there are some with stings. In other words, wherever there are paupers there are also rogues.

ἐφαμεν] supra 544 C.

πρώτον μὲν . . . οἷς ἐστιν] The first error relates to the very principle of the constitution (supra A δρόνον πολείτιας ἀληθικής ταξιάμενον πλῆθος χρημάτων): πρώτον, sc. ἀμάρτημα ἐστιν: for the turn of sentence cp. i. 331 c τούτο δ’ αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, τότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτό φήσομεν εἶναι; and for the use of δρόσ, Laws i. 626 c
The meaning of ὤρος in Plato is more general and less abstract than the logical term "definition," which is its signification in later Greek. A similar change takes place in the meaning of several words (ἴδιος, ἴδεα, συλλογισμός, ἐπόθεσις, ἔνθη), which in Plato retain more or less their popular senses,—but in Aristotle have already passed into the technical language of the schools.

Ἀδερεῖ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.] The interruption of Adeimantus prevents Socrates from completing the sentence, and the apodosis, ἐποιῶν τί ἐν δικείσ συμβαίνειν or some such words, is wanting. The reply of Adeimantus, ποιηράν . . . ναυτάλεσθαι, is dependent on the omitted apodosis. The comparison of the ruler to the steersman was always with Socrates a favourite topic: i. 341 c, vi. 488 b; Polit. 297 ε; Xen. Mem. i. 1, § 9. [Ast and H. Richards cj. εἰκὸς for ἧ δ' ὅς.]

οὐκόμων . . . ἀρχηγὸς;] 'And is not this true about any government of anything?' Ast's emendation ἤστινος for ἤ τινος of the MSS., which is here adopted, gives the best meaning with the least alteration. The construction is elliptical, and put by attraction for ἀρχηγῷ, ἤ τις ἐν ἧ. For the use of ὅς τις, cp. Hipp. Maj. 282 δ ἢ ἄλλος δημιουργὸς ἀφ' ἤστινος τέχνης.

τί δὲ; . . . ἀλλήλοις] Cp. iv. 422 ε, where Socrates strongly insists that other states are not one but many. There is a lively image of the change here described, which probably represents the condition of many Greek cities in the seventh and eighth centuries before Christ, in the poems of Theognis, who laments that the old oligarchical privileges have been superseded by an invasion of rich bad men. (Theogn. 1109 ff. ed. Bergk.)

ἀλλὰ μὴν, κ.τ.λ.] Bekker was right in saying that οὐδὲ is omitted in Par. Α. The MS., reads ἀλλὰ μὴν τόδε but τὸ is written over an erasure and the word as at first written may have been οὐδὲ (sic). A later hand has replaced οὐδὲ in the right hand margin after ἀλλὰ μὴν, which comes at the end of the line. If οὐδὲ were omitted, the sentence would receive an ironical turn (cp. iv. 426 λ), but this is scarcely suitable to the directness of the reply οὐ καλὸν.

Ἰοσ] 'in all likelihood.' [H. Richards cj. ἰσχυρῶς.

διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαίοντας, κ.τ.λ.] As at Lesbos in the Peloponnesian war:—Thuc. iii. 27; Arist. Pol. vi. 7.

Εἰναι χριστοὺς φανῖναί] For this play of words cp. infra 555 Α.
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πάλαι] ii. 374 b.

gεωργοῦντας] like the αὐτουργοῦ of the Peloponnese; Thuc. i. 141, §§ 3–5.


ἡ δοκεῖ ὅρθος ἐχειν:] The position of the interrogative particle implies strong emphasis.

eἰς ὧν δὲ ἐξέγομεν:] vix. the functions mentioned in the words μήτε χρηματιστήν . . . μήτε ὑπόληπτην (supra λ).

αὐτής] sc. τῆς πάλαις.

οὗτος] 'The latter; he seemed to be a ruler but was only a spendthrift.'

αὐτῶν] resumed in καὶ τῶν τοιούτων to accentuate the parallelism.

ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέντων] ἐκ points to the class from which they come without saying whether all become paupers or only some.

πτωχοὶ . . . τελευτῶσιν] sc. εἰς τὸ πτωχοί εἰσαι, like τεταμενᾶς . . . εἰς πτωχίας τελευτῶσις in x. 618 λ. The words have also been translated, though with less point and less meaning in the preposition: 'who die in old age paupers' (Schneider).

πάντες, κ.τ.λ.] sc. γύρωσαί implied in τελευτῶσιν.

δήλον ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.] In modern language, Where there is pauperism, there is crime:—this is at least true of every oppressive and unequal state of civilized society.

βαλλαντιστόμαι] The form is doubtful (see L. and S. s. v. βαλλάντιστος), but is retained as given by the first hand of Par. Α.

μὴ ὃν, κ.τ.λ.] 'May we suppose.' μὴ ὃν in this passage is equivalent to μὴν:—although the affirmative answer has already been implied in the previous argument, Socrates ironically proposes the question as one absolutely undetermined: so supra 552 λ ἄρα δὴ . . . εἰ τόδε . . . παραδέχεται: Theaet. 145 λ ἂ καὶ ἄστρονομοι . . . ;

ἐπιμελεῖα βία] The insertion of καὶ between these words is unnecessary: βία has passed into an adverb and lost the idea of a dative case. Cp. ii. 359 χάρις δὲ βία παράγεται, κ.τ.λ., infra 554 καταχρείας βία ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλλῆς ἐπιμελείας.

ἰῶσι δὲ καὶ πλείω] These words betray the same feeling which appeared in the first mention of oligarchy supra 544 c συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία.

ἀπειργᾶσθω] 'Let this form of government too be deemed
by us to be complete.' For the not uncommon use of the imperative cp. ix. 588 D ἡπελάσθω.

Let us now imagine the transition from the timocratic to the oligarchic man. The former has a son, who walks in his footsteps, until the father meets with some reverse in his ambitious career, and is either put to death or banished and his goods confiscated. The son, impoverished and disenchanted, flings away ambition, and by sparing habits and hard work scapes a fortune together. Desire of wealth he elevates to the rank of king and lord, to whom the reasoning and aspiring elements are to be subservient. This revolution is as complete as it is swift.

δια τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου] supra 548 D ff.

This clause is partly the answer to ποῦ, sc. μεταβάλλει, partly the protasis of a sentence of which ἐπί κεφαλὴν ὁδεῖ, κ.τ.λ., is the deferred apodosis. Cp. supra 549 C πη δὴ . . . γίνεται; δια τοῦ, κ.τ.λ.

ἐμπεσόντα . . . ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν] 'then brought into court, being damaged by informers.' It has been proposed to omit βλαπτόμενον, the insertion of which is attributed to some transcriber's ignorance that ὑπὸ after ἐμπεσόν was good Greek. But the word is very expressive of the harm which informers might do to a man's career (Lys. pro Polyestr. § 12 ὃ ὁδὸς δὰ τοῦτο ἐστί βλαπτόσθαι): and the imperfect tense, which is one ground of the objection, is quite appropriate as describing a continuous state and not like ἐμπεσόντα, &c., a momentary act, i.e. ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἐβλάπτετο τε καὶ ἐμπεσόν εἰς δικαστήριον ἀπέδανεν.

καὶ παθὼν] The son of course suffers in the exile of his father, or in the confiscation of his property.

δείσας] is to be taken closely with what follows: 'He is alarmed and straightforward thrusts ambition and passion head foremost from his bosom's throne.'

tὸ θυμόειδὲς ἐκείνο] supra 550 B.

tιάρας τε καὶ . . . ἀκινάκας] περιτείνοτα or the like word which is required for τιάρας, κ.τ.λ., is altered to παρατωνώντα to suit ἀκινάκας. For the plural, which may be described as 'magnific,' cp. vi. 495 λ


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The change from ὀδὲν ἄλλο to μὴ δὲν ἄλλο is to be explained by the general notion of ἄναγκαζε in the second clause being understood from ὀδὲν... ἔσω in the first.

Ἡ γοῦν... διμοσὶν ἐν εἴη] 'The change which produces him is from an individual who is similar to the state which produced oligarchy' (viz. timocracy). 'Let us consider then whether he be like oligarchy.' The assumed parallelism of states and individuals is presumptive evidence of the likeness which is now to be verified. ἐν εἴη, sc. εἷς οὖν μετοβάλοι.

In this conversion from ambition to avarice the individual follows the analogy of the state; he is a lover and getter of money, indulging only his necessary desires and keeping under restraint the extravagant ones: he is penurious, industrious, sordid, negligent of culture (he has deserted the muses for the blind god of wealth). Yet some of his passions are still strong within him because of his neglect of education: and being hungry and unsatisfied they are like the paupers and vagrants in the city. In his ordinary dealings he represses them, because he is afraid of losing his character and his property: but when he has a safer opportunity of taking advantage, as when he is guardian of an orphan, he does not scruple to indulge them. The oligarchical man is thus divided against himself; and in the contest of ambition he proves a contemptible adversary, being niggardly of his means and distrusting his own nature, except that meagre portion of it which is absorbed in money-getting.

μὴ παρεχόμενος] 'not affording or allowing himself:' a special use of the middle voice. The negative is μὴ, not οὐ, because παρεχόμενος is part of a 'causal expression' (τῷ... ἐναι, κ.τ.λ.).

ἀὐχιμηρός γέ τις... ὧν, κ.τ.λ.] This sentence is in effect a participial clause attached to the preceding participles—'and this because he is a shabby fellow,' &c. The idiom is the same as in εἴ γε σὺ ποιῶν and the like expressions. Cp. Aristoph. Nub. 893 λόγος—ἡττάν γ' ὧν.

οὐς δῆ, κ.τ.λ.] sc. θησαυροποιεῖς: for the plural referring to the singular cp. Thuc. vi. 12, 13 νεωτέρῳ... οὕς ἔγω, κ.τ.λ.

τυφλὸν ἤγερον] sc. Plutus. Cp. the Plutus of Aristophanes, the
plot of which turns upon the restoration of the god of wealth to sight.

καὶ ἐπὶμα μᾶλιστα] ἐπὶμα is an ingenious and almost certain emendation of Schneider's, which is confirmed by the expressions τιμῶντες ἄγριοι . . . χρυσὸν 548 A, τιμᾶν μηδέν ἄλογον 553 D, and χρήματα . . . μᾶλιστα ἐπὶμα . . . παρά τῷ τοιοῦτοι just above. The principal MSS. vary between καὶ ἐπὶ μᾶλιστα εὖ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τόδε δὲ σκόπει, which has the greater weight of authority, and καὶ ἐπὶ μᾶλιστα εὖ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τόδε δὲ σκόπει, either of which leaves the previous thought without assent or approval, and also has an unmeaning emphasis:—μᾶλιστα is at the end of a line in Par. A.

tόδε δὲ σκόπει] The quality in the individual which corresponds to oligarchy in the state is the love of money. The money-maker has a show of respectability, and his other passions are generally kept under by the main one of avarice. The truth is that he is one half beggar and the other half rogue; this however can only be discovered by watching him in secret places. If you would know his real character, see how he manages a trust, and whether he deals with other people's money as he does with his own.

κατεχομένας . . . ἐπιμελείας ;] 'kept down perforce by his general habit of carefulness.' ἄλλας is 'adverbial' contrasting ἐπιμελείας with ἐπιθυμίας, κ.τ.λ.

ἐπεικεὶ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ κατέχει] (1) 'By some virtuous element in himself he forcibly restrains': βίᾳ as supra c, 552 e (where see note on ἐπιμελεία βίᾳ), is to be taken separately as an adverb. For ἐπεικεὶ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ cp. infra 555 λ ἄλογος τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ. [(2) 'By some virtuous restraint which he puts upon himself.' B. J.]

ἄλλας] sc. the non-avaricious passions—here opposed to 'respectable' prudential motives. For ἄλλας opposing things different in kind cp. iii. 396 ε μιμητικόν τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διηγήσεως.

eὐρήσεις] Par. A gives εὐρήσεις (sic)—ἐν by the diorthotes. Schneider observes that, as the text now stands, the dative is too far from the preposition. Perhaps εὐρήσεις should be read.

τοῦ κηφήνου ἑγγενείς] i. e. κηφήνωδες :—'drone-like,' 'of the nature of the drone.'

οὐδὲ εἷς ἄλλα διπλούς τῖς] As the city was divided between
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rich and poor, so the man is divided between meanness and respectability.

δυνομητικής . . . τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ] ‘the true virtue which arises when the soul is at unity and in harmony.’ The expression is somewhat singular, but there is no sufficient reason for omitting the article.

ἡ τινος νίκης, κ.τ.λ.] For the genitives after ἀνταγωνιστῆς cp. ii. 374 b, Laws viii. 834 b.

χρησάτα τε, κ.τ.λ.] τε connects the two parts of the sentence, of which the second, ending with πλωτεῖ, is loaded with participles: of these δεδωκε expresses the cause, and πολεμῶν the consequence, of οὖν ἔθελων, κ.τ.λ.

ἀλγαρχικός] ‘like the men in the oligarchy’: supra 551 Ε.

Democracy comes next, and is brought about by a natural reaction against the ruling spirit of oligarchy, which is covetousness. The extravagance of young men is not properly controlled, because it is profitable to those in power, who lend them money at high interest and when it is spent seize their estates. Thus the class of stinging drones is multiplied, while the ruling class grow fat and soft, neglecting all martial exercises. The hour for revolution ripens; and the oligarchical government is easily overthrown. Some of its members are proscribed, some banished; the rest are admitted to an equal share of the power, which is now in the hands of the people.

τοῖν τινα ἔχει] sc. τρόπον, in a slightly different sense of the word, which occurs again immediately below. τρόπον in τρόπον τινα τοιῶθε is again used in the first sense.

οδοκοῦν . . . γίγνεσθαι;] The words δι’ απληστίαν are a partial explanation of τρόπον τινα τοιῶθε. The pleonastic δεῖν resumes the notion of προκειμένου.

ιθρείν . . . μὴ ἔθειναι] ἔθειναι is pleonastic.

νόμῳ] Cp. supra 552 A.

καθημέναι δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘there they sit doing nothing in the city.’

καθημέναι implies that they are biding their time.

οδὸς δοκοῦσιν . . . ὀρῶν] ‘Making as if they saw them not.’

See L. and S. s. v. δοκεῖ, i. 4.

vol. iii. c c
For the imagery cp. vi. 507 Α.

The singular is collective.

Two ways are suggested of correcting the evil: (1) a man may be prevented from doing what he likes with his own: (2) the protection of the law may be withdrawn from the creditor. The latter principle is laid down in Laws v. 742 c μὴ δανείζων ἐπὶ τόκω, ὥσει δὲ ἀποδιδόναι τὸ παράπαν τῷ δανεισμῷ μητὲ τόκον μητὲ κεφάλαιον: viii. 849 ε, xi. 915 δ. It is also said to have been a law of Charondas (Stobaeus, Serm. 44, 21).

How far the law should interfere to protect the creditor, and whether no protection is not the best protection, is a question which may be regarded as still undecided. Although commerce can never be wholly without the pale of law, yet as time goes on, the interference or protection of the law seems to be confined within narrower limits, which may probably with advantage be still further restricted. So much in trade has been settled by the consent and common sense of traders. The law again is so powerless to enter into the minutiae of private transactions, where many interests combine against inquiry, as to suggest the thought that except in cases of direct fraud or theft, trade, like morality, is beyond the legal arm. Many contracts of the highest importance are matters of honour only. If legal protection were withdrawn from the creditor, the result would obviously be that no one but a man of established character could borrow money, for the borrower would be under no compulsion to pay except that of his own interest. It is equally obvious, that this would limit the operations of trade—whether advantageously or not, is a doubtful question.

ἐκεῖνη refers to the regulation which existed in the well constituted state, but was relaxed in the oligarchy (supra 552 Α, 555 Α), viz. that young men shall not be allowed to waste their fortunes.


τις] ‘any one,’ i.e. ‘the legislator,’ ‘the state,’ ‘we.’

τὰ τοιοῦτα refers to the whole description from ἀρι, οἶμαι (555 Α) onwards, ὅστω to the creation of the dangerous class among the poor (supra 555 β ff.).

σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] i.e. on the other hand they leave their sons to grow up in idleness and luxury, while they themselves are absorbed in making money. The sentence is
expanded and becomes two sentences, the condition of the youth being first described; then in αὐτοῖς δὲ, κ.τ.λ., that of the older generation: cp. the structure of supra 552 c τοῖς δὲ πεξοῦς τούτους, κ.τ.λ.

οὗτω δὴ παρασκευασμένοι, κ.τ.λ.] In this sentence the verb καταφρονῶνται is dependent on ἤταν. (1) An appearance of confusion is caused by the nominative θεώμενοι which seems to be connected with παραβάλλωσιν, but in reality is equivalent to ἤταν θεώσατα, preceding καταφρονῶντα. Either παραβάλλωσις ... ἦ ... θεώμενοι ... καταφρονῶνται or παραβάλλωσιν ... ἦ ... θεώσατα και καταφρονῶνται would be the regular construction. Or (2) the words θεώμενοι ... καταφρονῶνται οἱ πάντες may be regarded as an instance of the common apposition of whole and part.

ἤταν παραβάλλωσιν] ‘when they come along-side,’ probably a nautical metaphor: cp. Lysis 203 ε ναραβάλλωσις; For the sense cp. Phaedr. 239 c, d.

ἄλλοτρίας] ‘which he has no right to’: ‘which does not properly belong to him.’ He has grown great at other men’s expense. Cp. Gorg. 518 d, Laws vii. 797 ε.

eἰσὶν *παρ’ οἴδεσιν;] This is Baiter’s correction of εἰσὶν γάρ οἴδεσιν which is the reading of the best MSS. εἰσίν οἴδεσιν, the reading of the old editions, though giving a more forcible meaning (cp. infra 562 d), is of inferior authority.

ὦ οἴδα μὲν οὖν] μὲν οὖν corrects οἴς. ‘Do you ask if I think they will do so? Nay, I know it for a fact that they do so.’

ἐκείνων] sc. τῷ νοσοῦσι σώματι. κατὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων = νοσοῦσιν.

For the comparison of sedition to disease cp. Soph. 228 ά νόσων ἰσός καὶ στάσιν οὖν ταῦτα νοσομένα, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ὡς τὸ πόλυ ... γίγνονται] This feature of democracy is recalled in the companion picture of the individual infra 561 b, ἀσπερ λαχοῦση. γίγνονται is the reading of the best MSS.: the subjunctive is inexact, because any words dependent on ἤταν should describe a characteristic of the origin of democracy, not merely a characteristic of democracy. γίγνονται may be an error of the copyists caused by the preceding subjunctives.

ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας] The article goes with both words taken together as a single expression.

dià φοβοῦν] dià φοβοῦ (Par. A p. m. Ven. Π) is a natural error occasioned by the apparent parallelism of δεί διπλῶν.
Freedom is now the word and every man arranges his life just as he pleases. The city is like an embroidered robe, in which all modes of life, all forms of government, are represented. There is no one constitution, but samples of all. To take office, to obey authority, to make war or peace when others do so, are matters left to individual caprice. Men publicly condemned to death or banishment go out and in with acclamation of their friends. No training or qualification is required for office as in our state, save only the profession of popular sympathies. It is a city of delightful ease, 'exempt from awe, worship, degree' where all however unlike are 'equal' and 'unclassed, sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed.'—Delightful for the moment!

557 B δηλον γαρ, κ.τ.λ.] This is a reason for deferring the consideration of the democratic man, who appears infra 558 c.

ἀν...κατασκευαζοντο] 'may be expected to arrange' (not 'is able to' as in the translation).

C ὁσπερ ἰμάτιον, κ.τ.λ.] As elsewhere in comparisons there is an asyndeton because the words are explanatory of the preceding clause.

καὶ ίονι μοι, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ] The words τι μὴν; ἔφη (following φαίνοιτο), which Bekker retained from earlier editions, are almost, if not entirely, without manuscript authority. The sentence which takes their place in the Munich MS. 9—φαίνοιτο γαρ ἢ δὲ δέ, τοιαύτη τις—betrays the same uneasiness at the repetition of ἢν δὲ ἐγώ. But this, like the frequent insertion of ἔφη λέγων in reported narrative, is a natural way of calling attention to a fresh point. Cp. vii. 522 A, where fifteenth century scribes have tried to get rid of the second ἔφη by the clumsy expedient of reading ἀδελφα ἔθη ἀττα ἔχουσα.

D διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν] supra B ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅ τι τις βουλεύει.
κατοικίζων] sc. τὴν πόλιν.

E μηδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμοῦσιν] Aristophanes indulges in a similar flight of fancy in the Acharnians 180 ff. where he makes Dicaeopolis conclude a private treaty with the Lacedemonians.

μηδὲ αὐθ...μηδὲν ῥητον, κ.τ.λ.] There is a slight confusion arising out of the double negative, the words μηδὲν ῥητον, κ.τ.λ., presupposing ἔχειν, which is implied in μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην supra. This slight difficulty may have led to the reading ἄφης, for which
the first hand in Par. A and Ven. P wrote ἡράκης. For ἐπὶ cp. iii. 388 δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ οὐτῷ τοιοῦτον ἥλεγεν ἢ ποιεῖτο: Phaedr. 264 β ὃ τὸ ἐπὶδόν εἰρήσθαι.

ἐνως . . . ἐν γε τοῦτῳ] 'Perhaps so, for the moment': i.e. not permanently.

τί δέ; ἡ πραοτής . . . οὖδε θραυσθή] (1) 'And is there not something exquisite in her clemency towards some who have been condemned?' This involves a possibly allowable extension of the 'objective' use of the genitive: ἐνως = πρὸς ἐνως cp. ii. 359 καὶ εὐθάκης αὐτῶν. Laws iv. 717 α ἄρκοντα δὲ σωματικὸν οὖν ἡμῖν ἀντίς ὁ δὲ στοχαζόμεθα: βελη δὲ αὐτοῦ (the darts which reach the mark) καὶ ὧν ἡ τοὺς βέλεσιν εἴρησι, τα ποι ἃν λεγόμενα ὑδάτα τίτυους φέροις ἀν; This was Bekker's view.

(2) The genitive διακαθότων may be taken as of the subject, 'the meekness of some of the condemned': said ironically for their indifference or contempt of the laws:—Both explanations give a sufficiently good sense, but the latter is to be preferred. περισσοτέρες ἅπερ ἤρως infra is in favour of this interpretation, and it is harsh to make ἡ πραοτής without any qualification or hint from the context to mean 'the gentleness of democracy' or 'her gentleness.' Some propose to insert ἐπὶ, περὶ or κατὰ (Stephanus) before ἐνώς.

ἡ οὖντος ἔλθει, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence is somewhat irregular, the genitive μενόντων . . . ἐν μέσῳ being substituted for the accusative after ἔλθει, through attraction to ἄνθρωπων. The construction is softened through an association from the ordinary construction of the genitive with αἰσθάνομαι.

The subject of περισσοτέρες is to be gathered from μενόντων, κ.τ.λ., 'The man marches about.' Late MSS. insert ὁ καταφρονθέτος. There is perhaps an implied allusion to the νόστος. 'He is welcomed wherever he goes like one of the heroes returning from the siege of Troy.' [Madv. cj. καταφρονθέτος: Schn. cj. αὐτοῦ μενόντων.]

ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence breaks off and is completed by the answer of Adeimantus πάνω γ', ἐφι, γεναία, in which γεναία may agree with πόλει (as in the translation) or rather with συγγνώμη, the force of the interrogative having been continued from a preceding sentence—'and what say you of her forgiving spirit, &c.? 'Yes, said he, that is glorious.' The relation of ὃς μεγαλοπρέπως . . . πλήθει το καταφρονήσις . . . τα τοιαῦτα πάντα may be expressed as follows:

'her contempt for the things we spoke of . . . how grandly trampling them under foot she cares not at all,' &c.
Before examining the democratical man it is advisable to define the necessary desires, which were above (554 A) distinguished from the unnecessary ones. Necessary desires are those which (1) are conducive to life, (2) impossible to extinguish. The desire of food, for example, is necessary, while that of savoury meats is unnecessary. And the drone of whom we spoke is the slave of unnecessary desires, but the oligarch only of the necessary.

τίς ὃ τοιοῦτος ἰδία; τίς, like 'what' in English, has occasionally the meaning 'what sort of' = ποιὸς τις. Cp. vii. 537 B.

τοῦ φειδωλοῦ, κ.τ.λ.] 'Our penurious oligarchical man might have (I suppose) a son,' &c.

βιὰ δὴ . . . κέκληται] This is said in continuation of the preceding sentence, the participle ἄρχων agreeing with the subject of γένοιτο οὖν. Socrates is proceeding to develop the genesis of the democratic man. A finite verb (e.g. ἔγευσαν κυρήφων μέλες, cp. infra 559 B) would have followed, had not the apodosis been broken off or deferred in favour of the digression about the necessary desires. This is better (as is shown by δὴ) than to suppose the participle to be merely linked on to the preceding sentence as in 554 A αἰχμηρὸς γί τις . . . οὖν.

adders οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates here makes a psychological digression, for the first time introducing the distinction which afterwards became the favourite one with Aristotle and the Epicureans, of pleasures which are and are not natural and necessary. The digression may be compared with the one in iv. 436-438 in which Socrates treats of relation and opposition. He returns to the distinction of natural and necessary pleasures in the next book (ix. 572 c ff.).

καὶ πρὸς] πρὸς is taken adverbially, as often with γε, e.g. i. 328 A καὶ πρὸς γε παννυχίᾳ ποιήσουσιν, and sometimes without: as in Euthyd. 298 D καὶ πρὸς ἄρα σοι πατήρ ἐστί καὶ κύων: Laws iv. 709 C.

αὐτῶν] Cp. vii. 529 A τὴν περὶ τὰ διὸν μάθησιν λαμβάνων παρὰ σαφῆ, ἦ ἐστι: where ἦ = οὖ, as in this passage αὐτ = οὖν.
Notes: Book VIII.

ἄρ' οὖν οὖδέν... (β) ἄν εἴη;) 'will not the desire of eating within the limits of health and strength, and of simple food and condiments be necessary?' αὐτὸῦ σῖτου τε καὶ δύσου is joined with ἥ, and completes the notion of τοῦ φαγεῖν, κ.τ.λ. αὐτοῦ is added to prepare for the antithesis ἥ πέρα τοῦτων, κ.τ.λ., infra B. Cp. iv. 439 Λ δίψος... αὐτῷ... αὐτοῦ πάμαρος. The modern distinction between food and the pleasure of eating as the object of hunger, does not occur to Plato.

ἕ τε μὴ... δυνατῇ] 'and because a man cannot suppress it while he lives.' This reading of the Munich MS. q (not noticed by Bekker) is preferred to those of the chief MSS. on two grounds: (1) καθ' ἄμφοτερα must refer to the twofold condition repeatedly mentioned in 558 b, e, 559 a, and again implied in δυνατῇ δὲ κολαζουμένη, κ.τ.λ., infra. This meaning cannot be got out of the reading ἥ τε παῦσαι ζώντα δυνατῇ: (2) παῦσαι ζώντα, 'to make one cease from living,' would be a very strange expression for ἁρπαγμώναι. Just as βλαβερά, in what follows, is opposed to ωφέλιμος here, so δυνατή... ἀπαλλάττεσθαι contains the opposite of the remaining clause ἥ τε μὴ... δυνατῇ.

For the idiomatic expression cp. vii. 537 Β ἀλευρός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι, where, if the subject of πρᾶξαι had been expressed, it would have been in the accusative (τοῦ νείον). So ζώντα agrees with the subject of παῦσαι here. Negation is expressed through μὴ rather than οὐ—which Coraes suggested—because the sentence states a condition. The complete expression would be ἀναγκαῖа (ἀν εἶπ) ἥ μὴ (ἐστι) δυνατή (τιμ) παῦσαι ζώντα. Professor W. W. Goodwin, who approves of this interpretation, quotes Xen. Anab. iv. 1, § 24 δυνατή... ἀποτέλεσθαι ὑδόν. For the transition from the dative to the accusative with an infinitive cp. 422 Β οἰδ' εἰ ξένη... ἄποφευγοντι... ἀναπτρέψοντα κρούειν. For the corruption of MSS. through dropping the negative, see Essay on Text, pp. 106–109. [L. C.]

τι δὲ... ἀπαλλάττεσθαι] 'and the desire which goes beyond this, craving more elaborate dishes, of which, if controlled and trained in youth, most people may get rid': καὶ ἄλλοιων, κ.τ.λ., answers to καὶ αὐτοῦ σῖτου in what precedes. ἀπαλλάττεσθαι is passive: cp. supra Α ἀς... ἀπαλλάξειν ἄν.

χρηματιστικάς διά τό, κ.τ.λ.] Plato seizes the word which comes nearest to his meaning, and justifies it by a false etymology not better than many in the Cratylus.
‘and the rest’: sc. the other desires besides the desire of food.

Now suppose the oligarchical individual to have a son, who after a miserly education, falls amongst the drones and tastes their honey. His useless desires are re-inforced, until in turn his prudential inclinations are strengthened with admonition. There is civil war within him, till the democratic faction is turned out, and he returns to regular ways. But his father has no gift in education, and the ill weeds grow apace; and there is again a faction within that holds secret correspondence with strange pleasures, with whose aid at last they rush up and seize the Acropolis of the Soul. It has been swept clean of its true defenders (reason and virtue) and lies open to the assaults of vicious sophistry. The youth returns to the companionship of the drones, and when good counsel (accredited or not) seeks audience, the gates are barred. Perverted reason discards the old-fashioned virtues, and all vices of insolence and excess are openly installed under fair titles as manliness and liberality and freedom. This downward course may be arrested as youth wears off, and then the man gives way to every impulse in its turn, now drinking, now abstaining; now toiling at athletics, then again doing nothing at all; first all for war, then all for business; living not one life but taking a turn at many—an existence truly delightful as many persons think.

The analogy of the state and the individual, which in the previous stages was helped by real points of resemblance as well as by language, begins to fail more and more. For though the transition from the miserly father to the spendthrift son is natural enough and true to human life, the parallel transition from oligarchy to democracy is not substantiated by history and is fanciful and untrue. παλιν marks the resumption from 558 ν after the digression.

δε νυν δη διέγομεν] supra 558 c. αίθωσι θηρί, sc. the drones.

αίθωσι] = ‘fiery,’ a poetical word, in keeping with the rhetorical and grandiloquent character of this part of the Republic.

There is no difference of reading in this passage, but the words are difficult: either (1) διηγαρχίς
Notes: Book VIII.

(supply πολιτείας or καταστάσεως) is the genitive after μεταβολής, but the ellipse is harsh; or (2) διλυγαρχίας may be a corruption of διλυγαρχία, which has led to the further corruption of δημοκρατίαν into δημοκρατικήν. For the double genitive cp. vii. 525 c βρατώμης τε μεταστροφής, κ.τ.λ. The addition of εἷς after μεταβολής would certainly make the sentence clearer.

εὐμμαχίας] used here, as in Thuc. vi. 73 ὧνες εὐμμαχία ... παραγίνηται and elsewhere, in the concrete sense of 'an allied force.' So also εὐμμαχία below.

ἔξωθεν] viz. from the εὐφήμες with whom he associates. We may note that the quarrel is not between reason and desire, but between a thrifty parsimonious spirit and unsatisfied craving and discontent.

τὸ ἐτέρῳ τῶν παρ᾿ ἐκείνῳ] the self-indulgent desires, as opposed to the necessary ones.

τὸ ἐν ἐαυτῷ] The reflexive pronoun can hardly be right with ἐκείνῳ preceding. Perhaps the two words have changed places in the MSS. from τῶν παρ᾿ ἐαυτῷ ... τῷ ἐν ἐκείνῳ.

ἡ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός] 'it may be from his father': πὸθεν expresses the uncertainty from what quarter the alliance will come.

αὔτος δὲ ... ἔγένσω] For a time the democracy is partially suppressed by assistance from without, and the house is again swept and garnished. But new passions gather and grow to a head, and possess themselves of the undefended citadel: 'seven other devils' in the shape of opinions and sophisms 'enter in and dwell there': and they hold the gates of the palace against all comers, and suffer no other power to make an alliance, nor even individuals to parley. The inter-penetration of metaphor and fact, and the subtle manner in which the particulars of the life of the state are woven into the life of the individual, add greatly to the beauty and expressiveness of the passage.

τῶν ἐκπεσούσων ... ἐγγεγένετο] 'Other desires, akin to those which were banished, growing up within him.'

δι᾿ ἀνεπτυστημονίαν τροφῆς πατρός] (i) 'because he, their father, does not know how to educate them.' The man is regarded as the parent of his desires (cp. infra 561 B ἡ ἵππος τρέφων). But the imagery is forced, and not consistent. For his duty towards these
desires was not to educate but to exterminate them. Rather (2) 'because his father had no skill in education.' The reference is to the 'oligarchical' father, who was said above (554 B, 559 D) to have given no attention to education, and to have brought up his son ἀπαθέωτως. [L. C.]

λάβρα ξυγγιγνόμεναι] sc. ταῖς ἐξωθεν ἐπιθυμίαις, implied in ταῖς ἀδτάς ὁμιλίαις which again refers to 559 E.

φρουροὶ τε καὶ φίλακες] φρουροὶ is added to sustain the image of a garrison. Cp. infra 561 B τῷ φρούριον.

καὶ πολὺ γ', ἐφῇ] sc. ἀριστοί.

τὸν ἀδτῶν τόπον] sc. τὴν ἀκρόπολιν.

eἰς ἑκείνους τοὺς Ἀκτοφάγους] who make him forget his home, like the mariners of Odysseus, Od. ix. 81 ff. The reference is to the κηφῆνες mentioned supra 559 D.

φανερῶς] 'openly,' no longer λάβρα supra b. Cp. vii. 538 c ἀπαρακαλότως. Before, he had hesitated and listened to both sides; now he has made up his mind, and will listen only to this one.

οὕτε πρέσβεις . . . εἰσδέχονται] 'Nor do they receive the words of old men in a private capacity, which come as ambassadors.' The λόγοι, not the persons, form the embassy. The image is complicated and in some danger of being confused by the subordinate contrast between the authority of the family and the influence of friends. The former is described as the action of a league coming publicly in aid; the latter as a commission or embassy. The word πρέσβεις, which is suggested by the association of πρεσβυτέρων, is not necessarily inconsistent with ἰδιωτῶν. See Dem. 1121. 1, quoted by L. and S. s. v. πρεσβυτέρης, ii. The image, as not infrequently happens in Greek, is crossed with the thing signified. The advice of private friends is imagined as that of individual commissioners accompanying an army, much as in Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, § 36, the public embassy from the Peiraeus is accompanied by individuals, ἰδιωται, who are sent in a private capacity from a party in the city.

The emendation of Badham adopted by Cobet, δι’ ἀτων, is unnecessary and feeble, and the personification of the ἀλαξιόνες λόγοι who have ἀτα, extravagant.

ἵδιωτῶν] may be explained as having the force of ἰδια, opposed to ἀδτῆν τὴν ξυμμαχίαν—'sage words, the ambassadors of elders,
who advise him on their own account,"—not as accredited on
behalf of his friends (παρ’ οίκειων τις βοήθεια supra).

καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ, κ.τ.λ.] For the inversion of ethical terms, cp.
Thuc. iii. 83.

πείθοντες (sc. ὥς ἄγρωκια καὶ ἀνελευθερία ἑστὶν) is added to complete
the expression.

καθήρατες] is of course ironical (cp. infra 567 c), and, like
tελοµένου, alludes to the mysteries.

κατεχοµένου] has a twofold association: (1) "who is occupied
like a conquered city," or (2) "possessed" by them, cp. Ion 533 ε
ἐνθεοι ὅτες καὶ κατεχόµενοι.

λαµπρᾶς] "with great éclat": cp. Soph. El. 685 εἰσῆλθε λαµπρός,
pάσι τοῖς ἐκεῖ σέβας.

ἀρ’ ὀξὺ . . . ἄνειν] The accusative ἀλευθέρωσιν, κ.τ.λ., expresses
the effect of the change: cp. iv. 424 c εἴδος γὰρ κυνὸν μονοχώς μετα
βελλείν. ἐκ τοῦ . . . τρεφοµένου may be either neuter = "from a life
that is nourished," or masculine "from one who is nurtured," cp.
supra 558 D υἱὸς ὅπο τῷ πατρὶ τεθραµµένος ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἱθείν.

ἐὰν εὐτυχῆς ἦ] Madvig conjectured εὲν εὐτυχῆσῃ, partly with
a view of harmonizing the tenses, and partly under the influence
of a parallel passage ix. 578 c where Bekker reads δὲ δὲν . . . τυραννικὸς
ἀν . . . δυστυχῆσῃ, κ.τ.λ. But (1) there is no objection to the dis
similarity of tenses, which constantly recurs: (2) the present tense
gives a better meaning, 'if he be fortunate,' referring to his whole
state and character: (3) there is no reason if Plato wrote δυστυχῆσῃ
in one place, that he should have written εὐτυχῆσῃ in another: (4)
moreover δυστυχῆσῃ is itself an unnecessary emendation of δυστυχῆς
ἦ, which in turn is a confirmation of εὐτυχῆς ἦ.

ἀλλὰ τι καὶ πρεσβύτερος, κ.τ.λ.] The words τι καί are opposed to
μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ and modify what follows μέρη τε . . . ἐνῷ:" but
as he grows older in some degree modifies his passions," a meaning
which is to be gathered from the remainder of the sentence.

tοῦ πολλοῦ θορύβου παρελθότοις] 'when the turmoil of passion
has mostly passed by.'

tοῖς ἐπεισελθόντων] supra 559 E.

eἰς ἵσων δὴ τι καταστήσας, κ.τ.λ.] The passions of the democratic
man rule by chance, as in a democracy the magistrates are elected
by lot. The freeman gives each of them their turn, and will not be the slave of any: but unfortunately he is equally impartial between good and evil. As he grows older, he learns to balance them with one another. He is the Alcibiades or Mirabeau of history: the rake who turns politician in common life—προσβόλετος γενόμενος, κ.τ.λ.

παραπιπτοῦση... λαχώσῃ] ‘the chance passion, which as it were obtains the lot.’

ζως ἐν πληρωθῇ] sc. ἡ παραπετοῦσα ἠδονή. πληροῦν ἠδονή is said with a slight degree of inaccuracy for πληροῦν ἐπιθυμίαν.

σφόδρα γάρ] This and other strong affirmations indicate that what Socrates asserts is corroborated by Adeimantus’ own experience, cp. supra 556 E ἐδόθα, κ.τ.λ.

ὁς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] ‘as if he were spending his time in philosophy’: ὃς here = quasi.

παντόπασιν... ἄνδρος] ‘You have certainly described the life of a man who is a lover of equality.’ The compound, meaning ‘equality before the law,’ is made to suggest indifferences as to this, that, or the other rule of life.

καὶ παντοδαπῶν τε καὶ... μεστῶν] sc. βίον.

τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον] not the life but the man. The article in the predicate (τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον) implies ‘the man whom we are seeking.’ ‘And that the man of whom we are speaking is the fair and spangled one whom we are seeking, just as that city was.’

As wealth, the good of oligarchy, caused the reaction to democracy, so liberty leads from democracy to tyranny. The first stage however in this progress is from democracy to anarchy. Unscrupulous leaders, the evil cup-bearers, mix the draughts of liberty too strong, until the city is drunken. Then fathers fear their sons, and sons assume authority over their fathers. The citizen, the metic and the foreigner are all as one. The young vie with the old; and the old condescend to the young, lest they should be thought severe and morose. The difference between men and women disappears, and at last even the slaves assume the airs of free-men. Nay the very cattle in the public roads will jostle wayfarers, as having equal rights. The public mind becomes so restive as to be intolerant of the very shadow of authority.
Notes: Book VIII.

τίς τρόπος . . . γίγνεται;] i.e. τίς τρόπος ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ;
‘What is the nature of the process in the case of tyranny.’

σχέδον δὲ λοιπὸν] This is assumed as a corollary from the succession of states. That it comes from oligarchy is clear. The question is how does it come?

[‘What is the character of tyranny? For it is clear that it arises out of democracy.’ ‘It is clear.’ ‘And does not tyranny arise from democracy in much the same sort of way as democracy from oligarchy?’ Plato begins by speaking of the character of tyranny, just hinting that its origin is too well known to need discussion. But then, with a certain amount of inconsistency, he proceeds to treat the question at some length. B. J.]

τρόπος γενά τῶν αὐτῶν] ‘In somewhat the same way.’ γενά is added because the process is only to a certain extent the same.

δὶ προδώστα, κ.τ.λ.] The construction of the sentence is interrupted by ἃ γὰρ; and resumed in ἃ πλοῦτον τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπελπισμάτως. πλοῦτον being substituted for τοῦτον after the digression.

[ὑπερπλοῦτοσ] occurs elsewhere only as an adjective (supra 552 b, Aesch. Prom. 466). As a substantive it may be defended by the analogy of such words as ὑπέρθεος, ὑπερσφυστής, ὑπερθεματοκλῆς, ὑπερδουλος. [B. J.]

[But ὑπερ is probably a corruption of που, which occurs elsewhere in similar references: vi. 490 c, vii. 533 d, ix. 572 c, 582 d, 588 b. Other conjectural emendations are ὑπερ πλοῦτον (Madvig), ὑπερπλοῦτος. L. C.]

ἐν δημοκρατομένη πόλει] sc. ὅν.

ἐχει τε καλλιστον] sc. ὡς δημοκρατομένη πόλες,—(1) ‘is the fairest of its fair attributes.’ Cp. Theaet. 171 A τούτῳ ἐχει κομψότατον. Or (2) ‘it has this in the highest perfection,’ i.e. better than any other state.


διπερ ἦν νῦν ἢ ἐρῶν] These words resume the thread that has been broken off by digressions. Socrates has reminded Adeimantus that wealth was the principle and excessive wealth the ruin of oligarchy, and that liberty was the principle of democracy. He
now returns to his main purpose, which was to prove that excessive liberty is the ruin of democracy and prepares for tyranny.

562 τὴν ἀναρχίαν] No longer liberty, but anarchy.

563 καὶ σμικρὰ τοιαδή [σμικρὰ is used ironically as in i. 339 B σμικρὰ γε ἰσως, ἐφι, προσιτη. Cp. iv. 423 C καὶ φαύλων γ’, ἐφη, κ.τ.λ., and note.

B τὸ δὲ γε ... ἔσχατον, κ.τ.λ.] is an exclamation, softened by the epexegetis in δεον γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ. See above, 558 B ἢ δὲ συγγρώμη, κ.τ.λ., and note.

C οὐκοῦν κατ’ Αἰσχύλον, κ.τ.λ.] From an unknown play of Aeschylus. Fr. 344 Nauck.

Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity are found to exist among men and women, slaves and freemen. The animals catch the infection.

This and some of the previous passages are translated by Cic. de Rep. i. chap. 43. He has not however been altogether able to ‘carry the jest,’ which is propounded by him seriously and without the delicate preparation of Plato. ‘Ex quo fit ut etiam servi se liberius gerant: uxoribus eodem iure sint quo viri. Quia tanta libertate canes etiam et equi, aselli, denique liberi sint, sic incurrunt, ut eis de via decedendum sit.’ The most extravagant and comical ideas (δ τι νῶν ἡλθ’ ἐπὶ στόμα;) often occur in the works of Plato. But the manner of saying them, which enhances the humour, does away with the feeling of bad taste and impropriety.

ἀπεξερωχα γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘The proverb is amply verified, “like lady, like lap-dog.”’ The proverb of course refers to assimilation of character;—Master Shallow’s men ‘by observing of him, do bear themselves like foolish justices; he, by conversing with them, is turned into a justice-like serving-man: their spirits are so married in conjunction with the participation of society, that they flock together in consent, like so many wild-geese’ (Shakespeare, 2 Henry IV, v. 1). But Plato applies it in a new sense with reference to assumed equality. The spaniel disputes the sofa with her mistress.

γίγνονται, κ.τ.λ.] ‘and there are horses and asses accustomed,’ &c. [B. J.]

[After γίγνονται some general notion such as ἀλείδουροι has to be supplied. Or (2) deleting the commas and construing γίγνονται with what precedes, we may suppose some word of similar ending, e.g. οἰκονομονται, to have dropped out before τε δῆ, κ.τ.λ. L. C.]
Notes: Book VIII.

The excess of liberty leads to the extreme of servitude, and the state passes from democracy through anarchy to tyranny. The immediate authors of the change are the class of idle spendthrifts whom we compared to drones. Of these there are two species, the stinging and the stingless: the former lead the way, the latter follow; while between them they have almost a monopoly of power. For the money-making class do but afford them pasture, and the poor who have to work for their subsistence will not attend to politics unless they are paid. And the drones, taking money from the rich, will give the others just so much as may conduce to their own purposes. The rich, driven to self-defence, incur the suspicion of oligarchy, and power is thus given to the Protector of the people. For the populace have always some one favourite. Let the Protector once taste blood, and his destiny is fixed. By the law of self-preservation he must become a wolf, i.e. a tyrant. When the combination of his enemies becomes formidable, he asks for a bodyguard which is readily granted him. When this takes place, then let the rich man fly. For the Protector will cast many down, and stand erect in the chariot of the state, a full-blown Tyrant.

τάδεν . . . τούτο] 1. e. excess. Socrates raises expectation by drawing out the analogy in the disorders of the oligarchical and

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πάντων τούτων . . . ποιεῖ] ‘You perceive how the accumulation of all these things renders sensitive the mind of the citizens.’ The subject of ποιεῖ is to be supplied from the genitive absolute. τὸ . . . κεφάλαιον is in apposition with the sentence. ‘As the upshot of all this when it has accumulated, how sensitive the soul of the citizens becomes’: cp. Theae. 182 B ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγραμμένον τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθήτα ἀποκύκλωμα τὰ μὲν ποιά ἢτα γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθητῆμα.

προσφέρηται] Dr. W. H. Thompson conjectured προσφέρη.

καὶ μᾶλ’, ἐφι, οἴδα] ‘I know it only too well, he said.’ The alacrity of the response to the description of democracy here and supra 558 C implies personal experience.

νεανίκη] ‘sprightly.’ This epithet is specially applied to the exaggerated form of democracy in which liberty becomes license—supra 562 C ff.

The excess of liberty leads to the extreme of servitude, and the state passes from democracy through anarchy to tyranny. The immediate authors of the change are the class of idle spendthrifts whom we compared to drones. Of these there are two species, the stinging and the stingless: the former lead the way, the latter follow; while between them they have almost a monopoly of power. For the money-making class do but afford them pasture, and the poor who have to work for their subsistence will not attend to politics unless they are paid. And the drones, taking money from the rich, will give the others just so much as may conduce to their own purposes. The rich, driven to self-defence, incur the suspicion of oligarchy, and power is thus given to the Protector of the people. For the populace have always some one favourite. Let the Protector once taste blood, and his destiny is fixed. By the law of self-preservation he must become a wolf, i.e. a tyrant. When the combination of his enemies becomes formidable, he asks for a bodyguard which is readily granted him. When this takes place, then let the rich man fly. For the Protector will cast many down, and stand erect in the chariot of the state, a full-blown Tyrant.

τάδεν . . . τούτο] 1. e. excess. Socrates raises expectation by drawing out the analogy in the disorders of the oligarchical and
now returns to his main purpose, which was to prove that excessive liberty is the ruin of democracy and prepares for tyranny.

562 E τὴν ἀναρχίαν] No longer liberty, but anarchy.

563 A καὶ σιμικρά τοιάδε] σιμικρά is used ironically as in i. 339 B σιμικρά γε ἵσως, ἐφ' ἡπ', προσθήκη. Cr. iv. 423 C καὶ φαύλων γ', ἐφ', κ.τ.λ., and note.

B τὸ δὲ γε... ἐσχατον, κ.τ.λ.] is an exclamation, softened by the epexegesis in δεν γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ. See above, 558 B ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη, κ.τ.λ., and note.

C ὁδοκοῦν κατ' Ἀισχύλον, κ.τ.λ.] From an unknown play of Aeschylus. Fr. 341 Nauck.

Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity are found to exist among men and women, slaves and freemen. The animals catch the infection. This and some of the previous passages are translated by Cic. de Rep. i. chap. 43. He has not however been altogether able to 'carry the jest,' which is propounded by him seriously and without the delicate preparation of Plato. 'Ex quo fit ut etiam servi se liberius gerant: uxores eodem iure sint quo viri. Quia tanta libertate canes etiam et equi, aselli, denique liberi sint, sic incurrant, ut eis de via decedendum sit.' The most extravagant and comical ideas (δ' τι νῦν ἡλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα;) often occur in the works of Plato. But the manner of saying them, which enhances the humour, does away with the feeling of bad taste and impropriety.

ἀπεχνώς γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] 'The proverb is amply verified, "like lady, like lap-dog."' The proverb of course refers to assimilation of character,—Master Shallow's men 'by observing of him, do bear themselves like foolish justices; he, by conversing with them, is turned into a justice-like serving-man: their spirits are so married in conjunction with the participation of society, that they flock together in consent, like so many wild-geese' (Shakespeare, 2 Henry IV, v. 1). But Plato applies it in a new sense with reference to assumed equality. The spaniel disputes the sofa with her mistress.

γίγνονται, κ.τ.λ.] 'and there are horses and asses accustomed,' &c. [B. J.]

[After γίγνονται some general notion such as ἀλεύθερος has to be supplied. Or (2) deleting the commas and construing γίγνονται with what precedes, we may suppose some word of similar ending, e.g. σεμινονται, to have dropped out before τε δή, κ.τ.λ. L. C.]
Notes: Book VIII.


πάνω τούτων . . . ποιεῖ] ‘You perceive how the accumulation of all these things renders sensitive the mind of the citizens.’ The subject of ποιεῖ is to be supplied from the genitive absolute. τὸ . . . κεφάλαιον is in apposition with the sentence. ‘As the upshot of all this when it has accumulated, how sensitive the soul of the citizens becomes’: cp. Theaet. 182 β ἀλλ’ ἐς ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγμόμενον τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποστίχουτα τὰ μὲν πιὰ ἀπὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθησάμενα.

προσφέρηται] Dr. W. H. Thompson conjectured προσφερη.

καὶ μᾶλ’, ἐφι, οἴδα] ‘I know it only too well, he said.’ The alacrity of the response to the description of democracy here and supra 558 c implies personal experience.

νεανική] ‘sprightly.’ This epithet is specially applied to the exaggerated form of democracy in which liberty becomes license—supra 562 c ff.

The excess of liberty leads to the extreme of servitude, and the state passes from democracy through anarchy to tyranny. The immediate authors of the change are the class of idle spendthrifts whom we compared to drones. Of these there are two species, the stinging and the stingless: the former lead the way, the latter follow; while between them they have almost a monopoly of power. For the money-making class do but afford them pasturage, and the poor who have to work for their subsistence will not attend to politics unless they are paid. And the drones, taking money from the rich, will give the others just so much as may conduce to their own purposes. The rich, driven to self-defence, incur the suspicion of oligarchy, and power is thus given to the Protector of the people. For the populace have always some one favourite. Let the Protector once taste blood, and his destiny is fixed. By the law of self-preservation he must become a wolf, i.e. a tyrant. When the combination of his enemies becomes formidable, he asks for a bodyguard which is readily granted him. When this takes place, then let the rich man fly. For the Protector will cast many down, and stand erect in the chariot of the state, a full-blown Tyrant.

ταῦτα . . . τούτο] I. e. excess. Socrates raises expectation by drawing out the analogy in the disorders of the oligarchical and
democratical state. To this the interlocutor, Adeimantus, gives several passive and uncertain answers. He does not see whither the generalities of Socrates are tending. Socrates refers to his half-expressed dissatisfaction in the words ἀλλ' οὖ τοιτ', οὐμαί... ἤρωτατς infra 564 B. 'But this was not the point of your question': viz. supra 562 E πῶς... τοιτοιτιν λέγομεν;

καὶ τῷ ὄντι... (564 A) ἥκιστα] τῷ ὄντι marks the fresh exemplification of a familiar truth: cp. vi. 497 D τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά. So ὃς ἀληθῶς, ἀλεξω. [564 A]

καὶ δὴ] is omitted in Par. A and some other MSS. Though not necessary, the words are Platonic and idiomatic.

eἰς ἔγαν δουλείαν] Like σφόδρα πίλα Laws iii. 698 c.

ἐξ οὐμαί, κ.τ.λ.] οὐμαί is inserted like a particle after the preposition.

δουλόται αὐτήν] sc. τὴν δημοκρατίαν, or rather τὴν δημοκρατομένην πόλιν.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις] i.e. that was what I meant.

ἐκεῖνο... ἀκέντροις] The pronoun refers to supra 552 C where the 'drones' are first mentioned.

ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγίγνομεν] sc. εἷς ἐν ἐγγίγνομοι, 'wherever found.' After ταράττον, τῇ πολιτείᾳ must be supplied from ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, 'make confusion in every state where they arise.'

φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή] According to Aristotle, Prob. i. 29, χολή is hot and φλέγμα cold. The hot humour answers to the stinging, the cold to the stingless drones.

μελιτουργόν] 'maker of honey,' is the reading of the first hand of Par. A. The other reading μελιτουργῶν, 'bee-master,' is the more common, if not the only form elsewhere, which may be regarded as a reason either for adopting or rejecting it. It is also more directly in point.

ἐκτετμήσεσθαι] The rare fut. perf. is very expressive,—'that they were extirpated once for all.'

ὥστε τοῖνυ... καὶ ἔχει] The object of λέβωμεν, sc. τῶ πρῶγμα, is easily supplied. There is a tendency in Plato to omit the case after verbs which describe dialectical or mental processes, e.g. ἄναλαβεῖν, διορίζονται, ἀναγκάζειν.
Notes: Book VIII.

to τοιούτου γένος] sc. το τῶν κηφήνων.

ζιε έξουσίαν] Cp. supra 557 B, d.

ἐκτὸς δήλων] Public offices with few exceptions are filled by this class of persons. What exceptions Plato had in his mind we can only guess. He may be referring to institutions like the Areopagus, or to individual statesmen like Pericles: cp. infra ε χωρίς των δήλων.

προσίζον βομβέι] 'settles and keeps up a constant hum.'

βλίττει] There is no reason why this verb should not be used intransitively, but it is rather confusing to have it so with βλισσεων following in the active meaning, and Ruhnken (Tim. p. 63) was perhaps right in reading βλίττεται.

καλουνται] implies that the rich are now a separate class.

αὐτουργοι] 'who work with their hands:' not, as the word elsewhere means, 'tilling their own land.' They are here opposed to the employers of labour.

καὶ ἀπράγμονες] 'and keep out of politics.'

ἐστι γὰρ . . . μεταλαμβάνῃ] θαμά belongs to the whole sentence, not to ποιεῖν alone:—'are not often disposed to do so.'

One of the great problems of democracies has ever been how to make the mass of the people use their infinitesimal share of the government. The power which they have is so small that it is very partially exercised except in times of revolution and excitement. The Athenians solved the difficulty by giving the ecclesiasts as well as the dicasts 'a little honey.' Cp. Aristoph. Wasps 655–679, and Dem. Olynth. iii. 37, §§ 35, 36.

The history of Athens in the century after the Persian War, and especially of the oligarchical party,—hardly loyal in the time of Pericles and Ephialtes, and in the later years of the Peloponnesian War usurping the government, which they afterwards accepted from a foreign power in the name of the Thirty Tyrants, and the political reaction to which the remembrance of this tyranny as well as of the older one of Pisistratus gave rise, is the best commentary on this passage.

to πλείοντον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν] Cp. especially Thuc. iii. 38 and 42.

μεταλαμβάνει . . . οὕτως] 'Why, yes, to that extent the people

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Republic VIII.

do share:’ i.e. they have what their leaders are willing to leave them.

565 C εἰσαγγελλαὶ] ‘impeachments,’ viz. against the oligarchs for arbitrary conduct, leading to reprisals on their part.

D ὅφ̄ ἄρα ... λύκῳ γενόσθαι] ὁ γενόσμενος, κ.τ.λ., which is an anacolouthon, is resumed in τοῦτο.

ἐνός] sc. σπλάγχνου ἀνθρώπινον.

The legend is told in Pausanias viii. 2 Λυκίων δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τοῦ Λυκίαν Δώς Βρέφος ήνεγκεν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἔθυσε τὸ βρέφος, καὶ ἔσπεισεν ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τὸ αἷμα, καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτίκα ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ γενόσθαι λύκων φησὶν ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπων.

E ἐμφυλίου αἰματος] His fellow-citizen is regarded as his kinsman. For an account of the wide prevalence of similar beliefs and various conjectures respecting their origin, see McLennan’s article ‘Lycanthropy,’ in Encycl. Brit., ed. ix.

γλῶττη ... ἀνωτίῳ] The tongue and lips which make the slanderous accusation are vividly imagined as actually tasting blood.

566 A ὀποσημαίνῃ] For ὀποσημαίνω = ‘to indicate or intimate a line of action,’ cp. Thuc. i. 82, § 3 ὀρῶνες ἤμων ὤθη τὴν τε παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῆς ὄμω ὀποσημαίνοντας. εἴμαται adds solemnity. It is a law of Destiny.

οὗτος ... γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ.] οὗτος is predicate. ‘The leader of the faction against the rich becomes that person’—the man who is destined to turn wolf.

B διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει] ‘by setting the citizens against him.’ For the construction cp. Phaedo 67 Σ διαβάλλεται μὲν παραξῆ τῷ σώματι.

τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἰτημα, κ.τ.λ.] αἰτεῖν infra is the explanation of αἰτημα.

οὗτος] sc. τῷ δῶμῳ supplied from τῶν δήμων supra, marks ironically the personal interest which the people take in their Protector. The simplicity or stupidity of the people, who are compared in vi. 488 λ, β to the deaf and short-sighted ship-master, is a favourite theme of Plato in the Republic.

C τῶν Κροίων γενόμενον χρησμὸν] Herod. i. 55.
Notes: Book VIII.

What sort of happiness has the tyrant and the city which is under a tyranny? In his early days, the tyrant is all smiles and promises and humbleness, making gifts of lands to all and sundry, but especially to those who serve him. But there comes a time when he must stir up wars, that the people may require his leadership and that he may drain the resources of the powerful and also expose his private enemies to danger. War brings unpopularity, and some of those who helped him to his throne find fault with him. He must put these out of the way, and gradually he is compelled to 'purge the commonwealth' of all high-minded, brave, and able men, leaving only the dregs of the populace. At the same time, to secure his power, he must increase his body-guard with mercenaries and emancipated slaves. These are 'the wise companions whose intercourse,' as the tragic poet says, 'makes the tyrant wise.'—And it is because they say such things that we refuse to admit the tragedians into our state and bid them go elsewhere. They will breathe most freely, where the form of government is worst!—But we wander from the subject. Thus installed, the tyrant will, as long as he can, support his armies by robbery of temples and confiscation: and when that source fails, he will tax the people. If they resist, he will disarm and strike them, though he will be striking his own father.

βροτός] is a poetical word and is chosen to express abhorrence:—‘such a creature.’ The strain of irony mingles with contempt in such expressions as καλλιστος ἄνήρ, καλλιστή πολιτεία, τὴν εἰδαμονίαν τοῦ ἄνδρος, κ.τ.λ., cp. supra 562 Α, 563 Ε.

tois μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις, κ.τ.λ.] cp. Hotspur on Bolingbroke (‘this king of smiles’) in Shakespeare, 1 Henry IV, i. 3, 246.

διάν δὲ γε . . . καταλαλαγη] ‘but when in his relations to enemies without he is reconciled to some and destroys others,’ &c. The irregularity of the language is softened by the possible construction of πρὸς ἑχθροὺς with καταλαλαγη, and the resumption of ἑχθροὺς in ἑκέινων. For ἰσχύς ἑκέινων cp. Herod. i. 45, § 4 ἐπεὶ τῇ ἰσχύς τῶν ἑκάστων ἐγένετο περὶ τὸ σῆμα.
Plato: Republic.


ταῦτα δὴ ... (B) πολιταίρας;] ἔτομον, sc. ἵστιν. ἔτομος is one of a class of words, ἀξίως, δῆλος, &c., with which this ellipse is common. In the following sentence παρρησίασθαι is governed by ἔτομον ἵστιν, or by a more general notion to be gathered from ἀνάγκη and ἔτομον.

B οὖκοι καὶ τίνας τῶν ἔγγονταρτησάντων] Cp. again Shakespeare, 1 Henry IV, Act iii. sc. 1, Act v. sc. 1 (Worcester’s speeches).

ὑπεξαίρετα] ‘to remove.’ Par. A reads ὑπεξαίρετα by a frequent confusion. For ὑπεξαίρετα in this sense = ‘to put out of the way,’ cp. especially Thuc. viii. 70, § 2 (of the Four Hundred) ἅγδρας τε τίνας ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολλοί, οἱ ἕδοκοιν ἐπιτήδειοι εἰναι ὑπεξαίρεται.

C ὡς ἔοικε γὰρ] sc. ἐίναι. ἀνάγκη is the subject of ἔοικε.

ἐπερ ὀφει] ‘if he is to be master.’

D μετὰ φαθλῶν τῶν πολλῶν] not ‘with the many bad’ (as in the translation) but ‘with companions most of whom are bad.’ Cp. ix. 579 B ἐπὶ πάντων πολεμίων.

τῶν μισθῶν] ‘the necessary pay.’ It is assumed that he can get no service voluntarily.

E τί δὲ;] The early editions read τὸν δὲ, which is not indefensible though weakly supported by the MSS. ‘And when he has guardsmen on the spot, will he not prefer to employ them?’ Par. A and nearly all the other MSS. give τίς δὲ (‘but who would not wish to get them on the spot?’) This meaning is forced and inconsistent with the ἀρα which is weak even if changed to ἄρα. The most probable variant is that of the Munich MS. q which was preferred by Stallbaum, and is adopted in the text:—‘Well, but will he not choose to take retainers (δορυφόρους ποιήσασθαι) from the spot?’ According to any way of taking the passage some general notion such as λαθῶν or ποιήσασθαι must be supplied with ἑθελόσεις from μεταπημέται in the previous sentence.

568 A οἱ νεῖοι πολίται] viz. the foreign mercenaries. ἐξεισεῖν, sc. αὐτῷ.

ποικὶς διανοίας ἐχόμενον] ‘characteristic of a shrewd wit.’ Cp. vi. 496 A φρονήσεως ... ἑκδινῆς ἐχόμενον.

B ὡς ἄρα ... συνουσία] The line σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία is variously ascribed by the scholiasts to an unknown play of
Notes: Book VIII.

Euripides, and also to the Ajax Locus of Sophocles. See Nauck, Republic VIII. 568 B

τούτοις] (1) may refer to οὗτοι οἱ ἔναρχοι supra: ‘these’ (i.e. the associates Plato has mentioned) ‘are manifestly the wise men meant by Euripides:’ or (2) with a comma before ἔναρχοι, ‘these are the wise,’ viz. the people with whom the tyrant consorts.

καὶ ὃς ἱσοθεόν γ', ἵππη ... ποιηταί] The line to which allusion is made is Eurip. Troad. 1169 γάμων τε καὶ τῆς ἱσοθεοῦ τυραννίδος. See also Phoenissae 503–506.

τοιγάρτοι ... (c) κορψοι] The poets, who are ironically supposed to be of a gentle nature, as the law has been already passed, ‘do forgive us’ for expelling them. Hence the present (Συγγιγνό- σκοντον) as well as the future παραβεβεβεβεβα.

Euripides is said to have visited the court of Archilas king of Macedonia; Pindar and Simonides, perhaps Aeschylus also, were familiar at that of Hiero. Was Plato himself the friend and intimate of Dionysius? The manner in which the relation is here spoken of is at variance with such a supposition, for which the spurious epistles are not a sufficient warrant; and which may, perhaps, like the meeting of Solon and Croesus in Herodotus, be a moral sentiment rather than an historical fact. Whether Plato ‘was or was not a good citizen,’ no one was ever more intensely penetrated with the Greek feeling against tyrants.

καλὸς φωνᾶς ... μεθωσόμενοι] ‘viz. of those who are called the poets’ ὑπηρέτα, supra ii. 373 B βαρψον, ὑποκριταὶ, χορευταὶ.

ἐκβημεν] ‘In this we have been making a digression.’ The reference to Tragedy beginning at supra λ οὐκ ἐτὸς was a digression.

τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων] This cannot be right. Par. A reads λ ἀποδομένων, the λ above the line being possibly by the first hand. The reading ἀποδομένων is also found in the Munich MS. g. Baiter reads καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων, which has the merit of giving regularity to the syntax. But the deferred apodosis (for which cp. especially ix. 575 λ τῶν ἱγονότα τε and note) offers no real difficulty, and the suspended construction, to be resumed again after τί 8' δειαν, κ.τ.λ., is more suitable here than a passing reference to the proscription, which was a fait accompli at 567 c (cp. also supra λ τῶν προτέρους ἐκείνου ἀπολέσω). Stephanus proposed τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων. But
even the present tense ἀποθιδοῦσθαι hardly occurs with passive

The reading ἀποδομένω is very possibly a corruption of πωλομένω. ‘First he will make use of what sacred treasures there are in the city,—so far as the proceeds of what is thus exposed for sale suffice, reducing the contribution which he exacts from the people.’ [L. C.]

ἐὰν δὲ ἐὰν τε, the reading of Par. A, &c., is difficult to explain, and is not satisfactorily accounted for by Schneider, who supposes it to answer to a suppressed ἐὰν τε μὴ. It is better either to omit τε or to read ἐὰν δὲ, as in the text, with two MSS.—M (the Cesena MS.) and ν (Angelicus). The latter alternative seems further to involve the omission of δὲ in πῶς [δὲ] λέγεις;—πῶς λέγεις; ἐπιτιν· ἐὰν δὲ. The apodosis is supplied by the answer γνώσεται γε, κ.τ.λ. (infra).

κατέστησε] ‘established,’ sc. ὡς προστάτην τοῦ δήμου.

ἀπὸ] ἰπὸ is the reading of the MSS., but is clearly wrong.

καὶ νῦν . . . ἐξελαύνων:] It may be doubted whether (1) καὶ νῦν κελεῦει is dependent on δὲ, and the indirect form of καὶ νῦν κελεῦω; or (2) the preceding construction has been forgotten and καὶ νῦν κελεῦει is an independent clause. The former is more lively and every way more probable.

γνώσεται γε . . . ἐξελαύνει] for ἡδὲ cp. supra 565 c ἄβειν μέγαν.

καὶ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κ.τ.λ.] ‘And as the saying is, the people who would avoid enslavement to free-men, which is smoke, have fallen under the tyranny of slaves, which is fire.’ For the proverbial phrase cp. Shakespeare, As You Like It, i. 2, 270 ‘Thus must I from the smoke into the smother; From tyrant Duke unto a tyrant brother.’

δοῦλων δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος] i.e. they are enslaved by slaves (cp. supra 567 κ), which is the most galling form of slavery.
BOOK IX.

The tyrannical individual alone remains. To know how he arises out of the democratical man, and whether he lives happily or not, we must examine into the nature of the desires. There are some of them which are active only in sleep, but in our dreams are capable of any amount of lawlessness. Now the democratical man, as we found, deliberately gave play to every impulse in its turn, and we imagine him in later life to have a son, whom he has brought up on the same principle of indiscriminate indulgence. But the son is led away by the temptations to which his father had yielded only in part, and after various oscillations between counter-influences, at length a master-passion is planted in his breast.

λοιπὸς γὰρ οὖν ὁ ὁδὺ adds emphasis which can hardly be expressed in English: 'why, yes, he said, he is indeed the only one remaining.'

tο τῶν ἐπιθυμίων, κ.τ.λ.] The thread is taken up from viii. 558 ff., where the distinction between the necessary and unnecessary pleasures is first clearly drawn. The unchaining of the lower nature, which had been arrested at a certain point (viii. 561 A) is now to be followed to its consummation, and the working of the desires must therefore be more minutely described.

οὐκοῦν ... ξίν ἐν καλῷ;] ‘Is not the inquiry still open to us?’—ἐν καλῷ as in Soph. Elect. 384 νῦν γὰρ ἐν καλῷ φρονεῖν.

αἱ κυριευόμενοι ... παρά] ‘which appear to be innate in every man.’

ἐνίοιν μὲν ἀνθρώπων] ‘in some persons.’ The genitive follows ἔδωκαι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦμια resumed from the beginning of the sentence, and is to be repeated with ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. The latter word is passive as in viii. 559 A, B.

tῶν γε] ‘but in the case of others,’ answering to ἐνίοιν μὲν.

λέγεις γε καὶ ... ταῦτα;] ‘and further let me ask, which do you mean by these?’ καὶ is expressive of the surprise and interest which arises about the new point. Cp. Soph. O. T. 1129 ποῖον ἄλθα καὶ λέγεις; Herod. ix. 25, § 2.
Republic IX.

571 C

ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] is the resumption of the previous sentence ἰδαν... ἥθη, which in turn is the explanation of the clause τὰς... ἐγειρομένας.

μητρὶ τε γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Soph. O. T. 981:

πολλοὶ γὰρ ἥθη καί ἄνειρασι βροτῶν
μητρὶ ἡνευκαίσθησαν.

ἐπιχειρεῖν] From the irrational element of human nature we here pass insensibly to the person in whom it is active.

D

ὡς οἶτει] ‘in imagination.’

βρώματος τε ἄπηχοσται μηθενός] ‘to indulge in any sort of food.’ Plato is preparing for the mention of the tyrant, infra 574 ε, who in x. 619 c is supposed to eat his own children. In the latter part of the sentence the negative form of expression οὐδὲν ὁκνεῖ is lost sight of, and the general sense of τολμᾷ supra is continued.

ὄγιεινός... ᾗτὸς ᾗτοῦ] ᾗτοῦ is a genitive of relation, like καλῶς ἔχειν ᾗτοῦ. The passage which follows is translated by Cicero, de Divin. i. 29.

 eius σύννοιαν ᾗτὸς ᾗτοῦ] ‘having come to reflect upon himself.’ σύννοια has the meaning of ‘reflection,’ ‘deep thought’ (cp. Aesch. Prom. 437 συννοιή δε διάπτομαι κείρας).

E


572 A

ἀλλ’ ἐξ, κ.τ.λ.] sc. τὸ βελτιστον. Par. A p. m. has ὅρεγεσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι. Par. A corr. has ὅρεγεσθαι τοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι: the remaining MSS. have ὅρεγεσθαι τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι. If the reading ὅρεγεσθαι τοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι is sound, the meaning is ‘it leaves the soul free from pains and lusts to pure contemplation, and to aspire further (καί) to perceive something which it knows not.’ But the words καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι should perhaps be struck out and the accent restored to τοῦ. The rational principle is imagined as feeling after that in sleep which it may hope to comprehend in waking. Cp. x. 611 ε οἷς ἐφείτει αὑλίοις.

καθεύθη] is a resumption of eius τὸν ὑπὸν ᾑν, which is again
repeated in ἀναπαύσια: ‘and does not go to sleep in a state of angry excitement because of a quarrel against some one.’

τῆς τ’ ἀληθείας . . . ἀπτεται] These words are not to be taken generally, but with reference to the time of sleep. When he goes to rest with his passions calmed and his reason awakened he attains more truth than when he goes to rest in any other frame of mind.

tαῦτα μὲν . . . ἔστίν] ‘In saying these things we have digressed further than we intended: but the point on which we wish to remark is this.’


The truth seems to be, as Aristotle implies, that dreams have little or nothing of a moral nature; they are not the passions let loose from the control of reason, but physical imaginations of good and evil in which the will is almost, if not entirely, absent. Dreams are ‘decaying sense’; they are the recollections of our waking life fancifully combined by associations which have no law; and sometimes the animal desires, but hardly ever the malignant ones, find an expression in them.

καὶ πάνυ . . . εἶναι] ‘Even in some of us who unquestionably seem to be virtuous men.’ καὶ πάνυ is to be joined with δοκοῦσιν. μετρίοις, ‘not in excess,’ and therefore, according to Greek notions, ‘good and virtuous.’

ὁ] ‘He arose, did he not (παύεται), through being trained from his youth upward under a miserly parent?’ (supra viii. 559 d).

παραδίσ τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἔνεκα] ‘Disregarding the unnecessary, which have for their object only amusement or ornament.’

εἰς . . . τὸ ἐκεῖνον ἐἴδος] ‘To their fashions.’ ἐἴδος is the plan or mode of life adopted by the men. Cp. Thuc. viii, 56 τρέπεται ὅπλον ἐἴδος. Ficinus gives moræ (ἡδονῆς): cp. vi. 497 B.
Republic: Republic.

572 D

οὐ δὲ ἀνδροθερόν οὐτὲ παράνομον] i.e. in the mean between δικαστήριον and ἀναρχία,—οἷς μᾶλλον εἰς ἄστασιν ἢ μὴ ἄστασιν ἡδονάς ἀναλίσκειν (viii. 561 A), βίου ἰσορροπικῶς τιμᾶ τινὰς ἀνθρώπος (ib. E).

θέσ τοῖν ... τίθει] The present tense is appropriately substituted for the aorist, because in what follows attention is drawn not merely to the fact of his education which is presupposed, but to his way of life which is represented as continuing.

E

ὁνομαζομένην δ'] ‘which however is termed.’ Cp. Herod. vii. 155. § 2 ὑπὸ ... τῶν σφετέρων δούλων, καλομένων δὲ Κυλλυρίων.

ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ] Supra D κατέστη εἰς μέσον.

τούς δ’ αὖ] sc. τοὺς διαφθείροντας, supra c.

τὰ ίσοιμα διανεμομένων] ‘which divide his means among them.’ Cp. viii. 552 B τῶν ἐποίμων ἀναλοιχής.

573 A

τῶν τοιούτων] ‘of men like him,’ in whom the lower nature is predominant.

573 A-C

The master passion, a great and winged drone, leads the swarm of other passions buzzing in his train. They feed and pamper him until his sting is grown, when he is surrounded with a body-guard of furious lusts, which kill or banish what remains in the man of prudential and conventional virtue. Has not Passion long been called the tyrant of the soul? Is not the drunken man a lord? And do not madmen fancy that they can rule over the Gods?

573 A

περὶ αὐτῶν ... (η) ἐν αὐτῷ ... παρ’ αὐτοῦ] περὶ αὐτῶν, i.e. the monster winged drone. ἐν αὐτῷ, i.e. the man,—not ἐν αὐτῷ, ‘in the drone,’ for good opinions and desires could hardly be supposed to exist in him, and οὗτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς must be the subject of λάβῃ: παρ’ αὐτοῦ, i.e. the monster winged drone. The subject of καθήσῃ is the drone and the object is the man.

οἴνων] The rare plural may imply variety of wines (Xen. An. iv. 4, 9), but is rather simply ‘magnific.’ ἀνεμίδενῶν is a ‘dragging predicate’ implying a relative clause (cp. vii. 532 c) ‘the pleasures found in such society, which are dissolve.’

ὡς μανίας] A crowd of mad thoughts and fancies supply the place of the tyrant’s body-guard—viii. 566 B. The manner in
which the metaphor is harmonized and sustained by the 'buzzing of the appetites,' and the 'sting of desire,' which is implanted in the monster drone, is very characteristic of Plato, in whom such continuous metaphors are used not merely as images but as links of connexion. In the same manner, by the use of the word προστάτης 572 Ε, continued in the προστάτης τής ψυχής, the master passion is gradually developed into the demagogue or leader of the people.

πολυμένας χρηστάς] 'regarded as good.' πολυμένας is one of those disparaging additions which Plato often employs, and here refers to the respectable ideas and motives which hold the desires in check when philosophy is absent. See above in the description of the oligarchical man (viii. 554 Ε) ευσκημονίστερος ἄν πολλῶν . . . εἶ, and in the progress of his son (viii. 560 Α) αἰδοὺς τυως ἐγκεφαλίτης ἐν τῇ τοῦ πώς ψυχή. This use of the passive ποιώσας, although not supported by parallels from other writers, appears to be sufficiently established by the passages quoted on vi. 498 Α. Another meaning suggested here is 'good opinions in process of formation.' But this use is no better authenticated, and it is out of keeping with the rest of the description to suppose any genuine tendencies to virtue springing up afresh at this stage of the downward career.

καὶ μανίας] καὶ, although found in Par. Α and several other MSS, is probably spurious.

καὶ μην . . . ἀρχεῖν] Cp. Soph. Aj. 116, where Ajax gives his orders to Athena. ἱποκυνία suggests mental disturbance or excitement, παρακυνία rather alienation or derangement. There is no reason why ἱποκυνία should not also be used intransitively.

Plato, in introducing a new sense of τυραννικός, illustrates his meaning by metaphorical uses of the word in common parlance,— τὰ φορτικὰ . . . προσφίρωσις (iv. 442 Ε).

ἀκριβῶς] τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ: 'in the true sense of the word.'

*ἀνὴρ] This word is probably the subject and should be ἀνὴρ, although the MSS., as usual in such cases, read ἀνὴρ. The presence of the article is proved by the lengthening of the alpha in similar places of tragic dialogue.

The life of riot which ensues awakens amorous wants, which are supplied through rapine, until he robs and beats his parents, whom
he makes subservient to the meanest object of his desires. Then he breaks into houses, and robs temples, while the newly enfranchised lusts, that were formerly chained down except in sleep, overpower his respectable 'democratic' prepossessions. The master-passion is now tyrant to the height, and leads the soul that is under his dominion into every excess of crime, being ministered to partly from without and partly from within.

τὸ τῶν . . . ἐρείς] 'As people say in jest, that is not my business to tell you, but yours to tell me.' καὶ is idiomatic, giving a sly emphasis:—'That is just what you have to tell me.'

παρ' αὐτοῖς] 'Amongst them,' viz. the man and his companions: cp. supra ἄ τῶν τωστῶν; also infra 575 c. Such monstrosities 'never come single.'

ὅσεῖ δὲ ἔρως] ὅσεῖ is governed by ἔρως. 'Whatever things are objects of the tyrant Passion that lives within.'

παραβλαστάνουσιν] 'spring up beside' the master-passion. The image is that of young saplings shooting up at the side of a tree.

τῆς ὀδοίας παραβλέψεις] 'encroachments on his capital':—he parts with some of his estate.

ὅταν δὲ . . . βιαστήσει] The passage is imitated by Longinus, de Sublim. xlv. 7, where a poetical image is converted into a rhetorical figure.

τοῦτο δὲ] Still referring to the tyrannical man and his comrades who resemble him:—supra παρ' αὐτοῖς and note. The alternative of sing. and plur. prepares for infra 575 ἄ καλ ἄιν . . . ἄλγεια . . . ἄσι, κ.τ.λ.

οὔ πάνυ . . . τοιοῦτο] 'I do not feel at all comfortable about the parents of such a gentleman as this.'

πρὸς Διός] here as elsewhere, like ὀ δ θαυμάσσει supra, indicates the rising excitement of the speaker. There is a play on the word ἀναγκαῖος in the two senses of necessitas and necessitudo,—'who is bound to him by the closest ties.' Cp. vii. 527 ἄ ἀναγκαῖος and note.
Notes: Book IX. 413

πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι, κ.τ.λ.] In these words Plato is preparing for the actual tyrant: cp. infra 575 B ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέψῃ, κ.τ.λ.

ἐπιλίπη] The reading is doubtful between ἐπιλίπη, 'fail,' and ἐπιλίη, 'begin to fail.'

νεκκόρησε] 'He will clean out,' i.e. plunder, 'a temple':—a playful litotes like 'convey' in Shakespeare. This point in the individual answers to viii. 568 D, E in the account of tyranny:—ἐὰν τε ἕρα χρήματα β, κ.τ.λ.

τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας] The reading δικαίας was restored in place of δίκας by Bekker from Par. A; in which, however, it is a correction, though apparently by the first hand. The phrase is a repetition of supra 573 B ἐὰν τίνας ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἡ ἐπιθυμία λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστάς, where see the note. The reading of the other MSS., τὰς δίκας ποιουμένας, meaning, according to Stallbaum 'which gave judgement about things good and evil,' is equally doubtful in point of Greek and of sense. The 'opinions' are those imparted to him by his democratic father, who still respects, or fears, the law.

αἱ νεωτι... λελυμέναι] Cp. supra 571 B κολαζόμεναι, κ.τ.λ., infra 575 A τὸν δὲ ἔνδοθαν... ἀληθεραβίοντα. This point recalls viii. 567 E.

tυραννευθέν δὲ ὑπὸ ἔρωτος] 'But now that he is under the dominion of the great Passion.'—The subject is changed from αἱ νεωτι ἐν δολείαις λελυμέναι under the influence of the preceding clause ὅτε ἤν αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.

βρῶματος] supra 571 D and note.

tὸν ἔχοντα τε αὐτόν] The particle τε after ἔχοντα is probably genuine; but the construction is broken off and resumed in δὲ μὲν, κ.τ.λ. which follows, the immediate consequences being thus distinguished from the ultimate result. Plato readily passes from the individual to the state, and plays with language in the transition from one to the other.

αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτόν] The reflexive pronouns refer to ἔρωτ. τὸν... θάρυσσαν] The rabble-rout in attendance on the master-passion. The racket and turmoil (viii. 561 B) are poetically substituted for the crowd which makes them.

$options = array

και ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν τρόποιν καὶ ἑαυτῷ] 'By those same dispositions
and by himself' (sc. τοῦ ἴσωτος). The pronoun τῶν αὐτῶν refers to the preceding words—τῶν μὲν ἴσωθεν, κ.τ.λ. The master-passion, with the help of the alien lusts which are his bodyguard (μαριάς...ἐπαρχοῦ supra 573 B) sets free the servile lusts which have hitherto been held in subjection. The whole description is parallel to viii. 567 d, e.

Such is the tyrannical person in himself. What is he in relation to his city? When there are a few such men, and they are kept under, they go and serve some tyrant or become mercenaries, if there is war; otherwise they stay at home and do petty mischiefs, such as burglary and kidnapping, or find congenial occupation about the courts of law. But when they have multiplied, and become aware of their numerical strength, they pick out the man from among them who has the most tyrannical disposition and make him a tyrant. He is the most lustful, the most violent of them all; who, before 'his infant fortune comes to age,' is full of smiles and 'courtesies,' but when his end is gained, looks strangely on those that helped him to power. He never has a friend, nor gets a taste of freedom, but is ever faithless, ever unjust. We are now speaking of him as in a dream. But when the dream becomes reality, then is attained the very acme of human evil.

ἄλλων τινὰ...τάραννον] ἄλος refers to τυραννοῦς ἀνὴρ: they who have the making of tyrants in them, or who are all but tyrants, i.e. οἱ τυραννοί ἄνδρες, go and find another tyrant, in whose service they enlist.

ἐὰν...γένωται] 'If such characters are bred when there is no war.' The antithesis is suggested by the casual phrase ἐὰν που τὸλεμὸς ἦ.

σμικρὰ...βάλλαι] 'A small catalogue of evils,—(even) if there are only a few such men!' 'Why yes,' said I, 'for small is small in comparison with great; and all these things in the misery and mischief which they inflict upon a state don't come within a league of the tyrant, as the saying is.' Socrates' σμικρά,—'small in comparison with tyranny,' is ironically echoed by Adeimantus. The meaning, however, is taken up seriously in the next sentence. A similar play on the same word between the ironical and serious occurs elsewhere in Plato: cp. vi. 498 D Eἰς μικρὸν γ', ἵφη, χρόνον ἔρικας. Eἰς οἶδεν μὲν οὖν, ἵφη, ὡς γε πρὸς τὸν ἅπαντα. For the catalogue of 'small evils' cp. i. 344 B ff.
Most of the tyrannical nature. Cp. ii. 382 D ἔστησα ἐν θεῷ ὡς ἑν,—viii. 554 D τὰς τοῦ κηφήνως ἑγγενεῖς ἐπιθυμίας. The expression here keeps up the personification of Ἕρως, τύραννον ἐνδον οἴκων, supra 573 D.

Most fit to be a tyrant. Cp. Basilius.

For the suppressed apodosis cp. Protag. 325 D καὶ ἢν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθοι: εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

like the English 'mother-country' for the German 'fatherland.'

has a sarcastic force. 'That is his way of supporting her!'

toioide] refers to what follows: 'they are always associating with their flatterers, cringing to those who have power to aid them, and neglecting their old friends.'—The plural again takes the place of the singular (τοῦ τοιούτου ἄνδρος).

In the first place, in their intercourse with others, they associate with their own flatterers or ready tools; or, if they want anything from anybody, they are equally ready to fall down before them:—there is no attitude of friendship into which they will not throw themselves:—and when they have gained their end, they know them no more.' This also is a point in which tyrannical men resemble the tyrant (viii. 566 ε).

καὶ σφόδρα γε] sc. τοιούτωι γίγνονται.

Let us, then, sum up in a word the character of the worst. He is the man who in reality is such as we imagined him in our dream.'

The thought of ἔπαρ and ἔναρ may have been suggested by supra 571 c, d, but does not directly refer to the bad dreams there spoken of: the word διήλθομεν is inconsistent with this explanation:—not 'who is in reality the monster let loose in a dream,' but 'who is in fact the man whom we have described in words.' Plato's love of climax leads to this further step. And here, as in several other places, Socrates enlivens the thought by a transition from the imaginary to the real. Cp. iii. 389 D ἢν γε... ἵππει γε λόγῳ ἔργῳ τελήται. At this point the mock-heroic style passes into seriousness. Socrates, as Chaerephon says of him in the Gorgias, is profoundly in earnest:—'Εμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὃ καλλιέλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπονδάζειν.
And is the acmè of evil the acmè of wretchedness? Let us compare them, Glaucon,—the five cities and the five men. The men will be as the cities.—For example, as the city under a tyranny is the most wretched of all, so is the life that is under the tyranny of desire. Such at least is the judgement of those who are able to look within. City and man are both seen to be enslaved under the rule of the worst. Both are poor and hungry. Both are full of lamentation and mourning and woe. But there is one being who is yet more wretched than the tyrannical man, and that is the tyrannical man who becomes a tyrant.

τοιοῦτοι] ἀθλιοι,—sc. φανίσθηται.

τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς... δοκεῖι] ‘But the many have likewise opinions many.’ These words follow closely on τῇ ἀθλητῇ. Truth is one; error is manifold. He is miserable, though opinions differ. Plato thus signifies his contempt for common opinion. For the turn of expression cp. vi. 500 D διαθελῇ δ' ἐν πάσι πολλῇ.

ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ.] ‘that must certainly be as you say.’ γοῦν implies ‘whatever the many may think.’

ἀλλο τι... οὗτοι;] ‘And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical city?’ ὁμοίωσις is an explanation or illustration of κατά: cp. viii. 555 Α ἀνισοτούμεν μὴ κατὰ τὴν διευρυμένην πόλιν ὁμοίωσις... τοῦθεν;—‘Must they not correspond in similitude?’ The word in both places has been needlessly called in question. The dative is like ποιηθεί τε καὶ ἀδιάλυτη supra 575 C. ἀδιάλυτη would fit the context here. But Plato characteristically prepares for what follows by using a general expression and so affecting to keep the question open. Cp. infra 577 C τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἀναμμηνευσκόμενος.

This reading, which is manifestly right, has been corrupted in all the MSS. to τὶ οὖν ἄρα (or ἄρα) ἢ, and has only been preserved as a various reading by the diorthotes on the margin of Par. A.

ἐδαμομοίας] For the use of the genitive cp. v. 470 Α τί δὲ; γῆς τε τμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ ὅλῳ ἐμπρήσεως. The same notion is resumed with greater distinctness infra 577 B πῶς ἔχει ἐδαμομοίας;

ἀλλ' ὡς χρή] sc. θεασάμενοι ὡς χρή, which is resumed in καταδόντες... καὶ ἐδότες, ‘having fairly looked at the whole city from within, we will then give our opinion.’
‘And shall I be right in making the same challenge about the men, and in claiming to have as judge one whose mind can enter into the character of a man and look through him; not like a child who sees from the outside and is dazzled at the parade which the tyrannical nature assumes to those without;—but who has a clear insight?’

πρόστασις, like προστασία, πρόσχημα, here signifies ‘outward show,’ the externals of majesty. This meaning of the word, though not common, is defined by the clause which follows:—ἡν πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω σχηματιζομένους.

ei ὁδὸν ὀφειλεῖ. (B) ταύτα προκαλοῖο] The words ei ὁδόν, κ.τ.λ., are a resumption of the previous sentence: the apodosis to them is the answer;—‘If I were to suppose, as I am saying’—‘... That, he replied, would like the former be a very right challenge.’

καὶ ταύτα] refers to 576 ἐ ὀρθός... προκαλεῖ.

tῶν δυνατῶν ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Of the number of those who would be able to judge’: ἄν is to be taken with δυνατῶν = δυνάμεων.

What follows is the answer to the question which was raised in the first Book,—‘Whether the life of the just or unjust man is the happier?’ The inquiry, which had already become ‘ridiculous’ in Book iv (445 λ), is once more resumed, and the answer to what was at first an unanswerable paradox appears in the most complete and triumphant form.

καθ’ ἐκαστὸν] sc. πάθημα, anticipating τὰ παθήματα.

ἐν μέρει ἄθρων] sc. ἐκατερὸν,—τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα.

ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν] ‘To speak of the city as a city’ [i.e. not merely as a number of individuals]. Cp. infra καὶ ὡς περὶ δῆλης εἰπεῖν ψυχῆς.

ἀνὴρ] See above, note on 573 c.

σμικρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μοιχθρότατον] The ruling passion is here spoken of as a small part of the soul. The object of this, which is hardly consistent with the foregoing description, is to render the parallel between state and individual as complete as possible.

πολὺ γε] sc. ἡκιστα.

καὶ ἡ τυραννουμένη ἄρα... μεστὴ ἔσται] ‘Then the soul which is under tyranny (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole)
will do least of all what she wishes;—ever violently carried away by frenzy, she will be full of confusion and remorse.' Cp. Gorg. 467 ff

The harmony of affections and faculties is a far higher conception of the powers of human nature than the isolated strength of any one of them under the name of will or passion; which has the appearance and perhaps the consciousness of strength, and is really weakness.

The confusion of τε and γε in MSS. is so frequent, that there need be no hesitation in reading τὴν τε here, although it has less of manuscript support than τὴν γε.

δισυμμόσ δὲ] δὲ here rests on the authority of Ven. ξ.—Par. A having τε with the remaining MSS. Schneider, to account for the variation, suggested δὲ γε. [τε should be adopted: there is no objection to an asyndeton. B. J.]

Here the variant τὴν γε might seem preferable. But cp. viii. 568 β and note.

οὐπω ... μᾶλλον] 'I do not think that our description has yet arrived at the extreme form of misery.' οὔτος = 'the man before us.' τοιούτος = δῆλος, sc. ἄν.

Plato is preparing a rhetorical surprise:—There is yet a worse than the worst.

δυστυχῆς ἦ] is better than δυστυχήσῃ, an emendation unnecessarily proposed by Bekker and Cobet. There is no valid objection to the variation of tense. The present here is more pathetic,—'But is an unfortunate man': cp. infra 580 A δυστυχί ἔσαι

Consider first the position of the tyrant. He may be compared to the master of a household of slaves, who should be set down with them in a desert place out of reach of aid from his fellows. Nay more, we must suppose him to be surrounded by neighbours who are determined to abolish slavery. He cannot go abroad, or see what is worth seeing anywhere, but, starved in spirit, must abide like a woman in some inner chamber, cowering and unsatisfied.

Now suppose the man in this position to have the tyrannical nature, such as we have described it. Must he not descend to be the slave of the meanest, the flatterer of the vilest,—becoming daily more avarice-bitten, more inquisitive, more envious, faithless and unjust? Godless and friendless, he is the entertainer and cherisher of all manner of evil,—unhappy and causing unhappiness.
\(\text{Notes: Book IX.} \quad \text{Republic IX.} \quad 578 \quad \text{C}\\
\text{τεκμαίρομαι ... σκοπεῖν} \) 'I should infer from what has preceded that what you say is true.' 'Yes,' said I; 'however, these are not matters about which to have an opinion, but of which one should endeavour to gain a clear conception (1) by the help of such a process of reasoning as we now employ': or possibly (2) 'Where the argument is of such a nature.' For the latter (2) cp. infra 579 C τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς and note. The turn of conversation here resembles vi. 504 D ὅχι ὑπογραφὴν δεὶ ὅπερ νῦν θέασασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεστάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παρέμειναι.

\(\text{ὁςον πλούσιοι} \) sc. ὡτε, which seems to be omitted in accordance with the idiomatic ellipse after ὡςον.

\(\text{διαφέρει ... πλῆθος} \) 'But the number of the persons over whom he (the tyrant) rules is a point of difference.' Cp. Xen. Mem. iii. 4, § 12 ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἱλιὰν ἐπιμέλεια πλῆθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν.

\(\text{οἷον ὁδῷ δεῖς, κ.τ.λ.} \) Socrates, wanting to draw attention to a familiar fact, treats it as a new and original observation.—'Did you ever remark' &c.? Cp. ii. 376 A ὃ ὁπως τοῦτο ἑθαύμασας;

\(\text{τί γὰρ ... ὡδέν, εἶπον} \) 'Why should they fear them?' 'Oh, for no reason.' The negative in this and similar places merely waives the point immediately in hand without calling attention to something else, which remains to be said, cp. esp. iv. 424 D ὡδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται and note. The familiar phrase in Protag. 310 B—μὴ τι πειρεῖν ἀγγίξασθαι; ὡδέν γ', ἡ δ' δε, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε,—is an example of the same conversational idiom. [L. C.]

\(\text{ἐν ποιῷ ... καὶ ὑπόσῳ} \) The indirect form following on the direct is partly occasioned here by the neighbourhood of ὡδέ. Some MSS. have ποὺς,—but cp. Gorg. 500 A ἐκλέξασθαι ποία ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἥδεων ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπόσα κακά.

\(\text{ἐν παντὶ} \) sc. φόβῳ. 'In absolute terror.' Cp. Soph. 250 D πάντα συνεχόμεθα ἀπορίᾳ.

The single master who has many slaves is safe only because all the masters unite for mutual protection. But suppose the family and their slaves to be carried off into the wilderness: the case of the individual owner is desperate. Or, again, surround the unfortunate man with neighbours who make the possession of slaves a crime,—and there is a worse than what seemed to be the worst position. Both these misfortunes have befallen the tyrant:—he is in a solitude, and has nevertheless all mankind for his enemies.

\(\text{R. C 2} \)
When he has no need to do so': i.e. being actuated by no ordinary motive, but by fear. Cp. Plut. Tib. Gracc. c. 21 (quoted by Schneider) δείσασα περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός ἡ βουλή ψφιζεται μηδὲν δεομένη πέμπειν αὐτῶν ἵνα ἄσιν.

'By people who are all his enemies.' Cp. vi. 496 d εἰς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντίχειαν : viii. 567 d μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖων.

Resuming from 578 c Plato now returns to the tyrant and the tyrannical man.

It is a characteristically Greek trait that the tyrannical nature has not only the lower desires in excess, but also unbounded curiosity, like Glaucus's φιλοθεάμονες in v. 475 d.

A dative of circumstance, referring to the immediately preceding description of the tyrant's condition. Ast's conjecture εἰς τούς τ. κ. is not necessary. The tyrant's miseries are increased a hundred-fold when he is of the tyrannical nature. The extreme of wretchedness attending the combination of character and position is greater than the evil involved in either taken separately. Or (2) the dative may be explained as denoting the measure of excess—The description of the tyrannical tyrant began at 578 c: what followed was an illustration of his excess of misery over the tyrannical individual as such. The illustration is now applied. 'Do not such evils as these measure the excess of misery accruing to him whom you just now judged to be most wretched of all, when he is raised from a private station to despotical power?' πλείω καρποῦται, sc. κακί.

The opposition of the following clause logically requires μὴ ἄνω, which recent editors have accordingly accepted from Stobaeus and Vat. Θ. But the order of words is idiomatic.

The conjunctive δοκῇ—see v. rr.—has the authority of all the MSS. but one. There are too many instances of ἐν, ἐνεῖ, &c., with the subjunctive to allow of confidence in rejecting it: e.g. Laws xii. 958 d εἰσεὶ τις ἄρρην εἰσεὶ τις δήλους δ. [But? ἢρ.] And κἂν ἐν appears sometimes to be treated as = καὶ.
Notes: Book IX.


κόλαξ τῶν πνευματικῶν] cp. supra A κόλαξ . . . θεραπόντων.


The case is now ripe for judgement, and Glaucion formally assigns to the five individuals their places in the order of virtue and happiness and the contraries of these. The most royal nature is the best and happiest; the most 'tyrannical' is the worst and wretchedest, while (1) the oligarchical and (2) the democratical man come between.

Ἡ δὲ . . . τυραννικὸν] 'Come now, said I, as the universal arbiter sets forth his sentence,' 'so do you also decide who in your opinion is the first, and who the second, and the remainder, being five in all, in order.'

The expression διὰ πάντων κριτής is obscure, and cannot be certainly explained. It has been compared to τὸν διὰ πάντων χορὸν οὗ δύναι, found in inscriptions:—BOEcKH's C. I. G. vol. i. 425, 1586, 1719, 1720. The words may mean (1) the judge who decides the prizes of all the different kinds of contests; (2) or all the prizes, e.g. first, second, third, in the same contest; (3) the judge who gave the final decision in some musical pentathlon, such as appears to be referred to in the inscriptions. cp. Herod. ii. 91, § 5 δύναι γυμνών τιθέοι διὰ πάσης ἀγωνίας ἔχοντα, and Laws ii. 658 A τι ἂν, εἰ ποτέ τις οὐτος ἀπλῶς ἀγώνα βείη ἀντινοού, μηδὲν αὕρωται μήτε γυμνῶν μήτε μουσικῶν μήθ' ἱστικῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας συναγαγον τοὺς ἐν τῇ πάλιν προείποι θείη νυκτῆρα τὸν θουλόμενον ἥκειν ἀγωνισμένον ἥδειον πέρι μόνον: ib. xii. 949 A καὶ κριτῆς αὗ χορὸν καὶ πάσης μουσικῆς. The separate contests may have had separate experts to judge of them—πέντε ὄντας seems to convey an allusion to the pentathlon; and the words ὅπερ χοροῦ κρίνω in Glaucion's reply are in favour of this line of interpretation, for which see also Xen. Mem. iii. 4, § 3 ὅσας κεχορήγηκε, πάσα τοῖς χοροῖς νείκηκε. The image, however, is not consistent; for διὰ πάντων must have originally referred to all the kinds of performance, but is here applied to all the competitors.

πέντε ὄντας] of course refers to all the individuals and not to τοὺς ἄλλους with which it is verbally combined.
Plato: Republic.

422 Republic IX. καθάπερ . . . εἰσῆλθον . . . κρίνω] ‘I assign them their places in the order in which they came in.’

580 C δι τι Αρίστωνος υἱός, κ.τ.λ.] ‘That the son of Ariston’ (i.e. Best) ‘judged the best man to be the happiest’: an obvious play on words. Cp. x. 614 β Ἀλκίνου . . . ἀλκίμου.

δὰν τε λανθάνωσι, κ.τ.λ.] ii. 366 e. This is one of the threads by which Plato connects the end of the Republic with the beginning.

580 D–583 A The judgement of Glaucnon,—or of the enlightened observer (supra 577 Α) is confirmed by that of the philosopher, who has the best right to judge. For there are three pleasures, corresponding to the three parts of the soul,—the pleasure of learning, the pleasure of honour or victory, and the pleasure of gain. The philosopher knows them all, but the lover of honour or of gain is acquainted only with one. He has this threefold experience; and in him Reason which is the faculty of judging is far superior: therefore he will be the most competent to decide. And his decision is that the pleasure of knowing and learning is by far the most worth having, while he assigns the second place to the pleasures of ambition.

580 D δὰν τι δόξη] ‘If it at all approve itself,’—τι adverbial.

δέξεται . . . ἀπόδεξιν] τὸ λογιστικόν, which is found before δέξεται in Par. Α and most MSS., seems to have arisen from a gloss on τριχή, enumerating the three parts of the soul. This is confirmed by the reading of Par. Κ λογιστικών, ἐπιθυμικών, θυμικών δέξεται. K although a derivative of Π has some readings coming from an independent source. τὸ in Par. Α is marked with two dots as questionable. For the impersonal use of δέξεται, sc. τὸ πράγμα, cp. the use of δείξει, Phil. 45 δάχω . . . νὰ δῶτω δείξει, and the like expressions.

τὸ μὲν, φαμὲν, ἡν] The past tense refers to the previous discussion in iv. 439 ff.

583 E τοῦτο ἐπωνομάσαμεν] The dative is instrumental. ‘We employed this to name it with.’ This better corresponds with ἐν . . . δόκιμον supra than the various reading τοῦτο, which has very slight authority (Ang. v, Vat. m, Par. Κ corr.).

581 A μάλιστ’ ἀν . . . τῷ λόγῳ] ‘We should be most able to rest on a single comprehensive notion in speaking (τῷ λόγῳ).’
The passionate element resolves itself into the love of power and honour.

"διτημελής δι᾽ ἀχοί;" δια sometimes anticipates an affirmative answer.

τούτων] sc. τών τριάν εἴδων. I.e. it cares less for gain than θυμός does, and less for power than ἐπιθυμία. The word, though pleonastic, is in accordance with the fulness and precision of Plato's style. W. H. Thompson's πάντων, on the other hand, is over-emphatic. The philosopher (infra 582 A) cares less for gain than for glory. [If rejected, the word must be attributed to an accidental doubling of τούτων. L. C.]

κατὰ τρόπον ἢ καλοίμεν] 'We should give the proper name.' Cp. ἀπὸ τρόπου, πρὸς τρόπου.

ἀνθρώπων ... τὰ πρῶτα] sc. γίνῃ. 'Three kinds in chief (or primarily). For the limitation cp. iv. 443 E καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄτα μεταξὺ τυχαίας δυνα and note.

ὑποκείμενον εἰς ἐκάστῳ τούτων] 'Corresponding severally to each of these'—i.e. in the order of classification. Cp. Protag. 349 β ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄνοματος τούτων ὑπόκειται τίς ὅσιος οὐσία καὶ πράγμα. ὑποκείμενον, not = subject-matter, but simply denoting correspondence as in Protag. l. c.

τρεῖς τοιούτων] I.e. one of each kind.


δ’ τε χρηματιστικός] 'First the money-maker.' The second τε changes to δὲ as the sentence becomes adversative.

τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ, ποιώμεθα, κ.τ.λ.] 'But may we suppose that the philosopher regards the other pleasures in regard to the pleasure of knowing the truth and in that pursuit abiding always, not so very far from the Heaven of pleasure, and that he calls the other pleasures necessary under the idea that if there were no necessity for them he would rather not have them.'

In this way of taking the passage the words τίς ἠδονής ὁδ πάνω πᾶρρω have a slight irony, intended to express that the philosopher has in knowledge the true pleasure. For ποιώμεθα Gräser and Hermann read τί αἰώμεθα, which diminishes the harshness of the
expression νομίζειν τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδεναι τάληθες δὲν ἔχει. With καλεῖν, δρ' ὀφεὶ γι' ἀλήθεια has to be supplied from τί οἰώμεθα, in which there is also considerable harshness. In the translation τί οἰώμεθα has been read not without hesitation, as it is difficult to account for the same error, however slight (π for τι) creeping into all the MSS. [B. J.]

τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί οἰώμεθα . . . (ἐ) εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν;]

'And what, are we to suppose, is the philosopher's estimate of other pleasures in comparison with that of knowing the truth as it is and being evermore engaged in such an intellectual pursuit? Must we not think that he accounts them far removed from true pleasure, and that he calls them necessary and nothing more, inasmuch as, apart from knowledge of the truth, he has no wants but what are absolutely necessary? ' τί οἰώμεθα is Gräser's correction of ποιώμεθα, the manuscript reading, which may be strained to yield a possible meaning (—' may we suppose? ') but is ill-suited to the immediate context, and to the reply—εἴ . . . δὲι εἰδεναι, which exactly fits οἰώμεθα, cp. i. 341 A, B; viii. 556 D, E.

In what follows, Madvig's conjecture τὴν . . . ἡδονήν; for which see v. rr., is occasioned by the apparent baldness of τῆς ἡδονῆς in the present connexion. But his reading, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδεναι τάληθες δὲν ἔχει . . . ἡδονήν, is ill-balanced, and the last phrase too abrupt. The word ἡδονήν, which is marked with dots in Par. A, is very possibly corrupt, however, and may have grown out of ἀληθεύης through an interlinear gloss, τῆς ἀληθεύης. It might, indeed, be said that in the philosopher's view other pleasures, as compared with that of knowledge, were far from being pleasure at all. But the sudden introduction of this thought in a passage of such gravity is on the whole improbable. [L. C.]

οὐ πάνω πόρρω] sc. δει οἴσθαι νομίζειν αὐτῶν. The force of οὐ is continued with καὶ καλεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

τολῶ, ἐφ' διαφέρει] The philosopher is at a higher stage of experience than either of the two others: he has passed them, but they can never compete with him. In the world of the money-getter, where wealth is held in respect, something is known even of the pleasure of honour: but neither he nor the ambitious man can conceive of the pleasure which the philosopher finds in knowledge. Cp. ' He that is spiritual judgeth all things; Yet he himself is judged of none.'
Notes: Book IX.

τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης] sc. τοῦ τὰ δικτα, ὃπη πέφυκε, μακθάνειν.  

τὶ δὲ τοῦ φιλοτιμοῦ] sc. διαφέρει ὁ φιλόσοφος ὡς οὐ;

alles τιμή μὲν] The best MSS., including Par. A, have alles τι μέν.

όστε ἀπὸ γε, κ.τ.λ.] The order is πάντες ἐμπειροὶ (εἰσί) τῆς γε ἀπὸ 
tου τιμάσθαι ἡδονῆς, αὖν ἐστί.

καὶ μὴν . . . φιλοσόφου] 'And he is the only one of them whose 
experience is accompanied by wisdom.—Certainly.—Further, the 
very instrument by which judgement is to be given is not the 
instrument of the covetous or ambitious man, but only of the 
philosopher.'

διὰ λόγων ποι ἔφαμεν, κ.τ.λ.] supra λ ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ 
λόγῳ.

tyoutou] τοῦ φιλοσόφου.  

ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐμπειρίᾳ, κ.τ.λ.] sc. κρίνεται τὰ κρινόμενα.  

καὶ ἐν φ. . . ἡδονῶς] 'And he amongst us, in whom this is the 
ruling principle, has the pleasantest life.'

For a similar judgement of lives cp. Phil. 65 ff.

ὁ κριτής] The argument which began at 582 λ is now complete, 
and the philosopher,—not Glaucos or one of ourselves,—is 
admitted to be the judge.

αὐτοῦ] sc. τοῦ κριτοῦ.

To add a third and crowning demonstration:—The pleasure of 
the philosopher is alone real.

The satisfaction of desire and that of anger only appear pleasant 
through contrast with antecedent pain. Moreover the things of the 
body are less real than things of the mind; and therefore bodily 
pleasures, like the indulgence of appetite and anger, are more unreal 
than the pleasures of intellect. Most men are ignorant of this, and 
looking ever downwards prefer the shadow of delight. Whereas if 
the lower nature be subdued to the higher, even the lower pleasures 
partake somewhat of reality, because the whole life is standing in 
the light of truth.

ταῦτα . . . ἀκηκοέναι] The two victories already achieved are 
(1) the superior happiness of the just in Glaucos's judgement, after
comparing the individuals with the states: (2) the judgement of the philosopher, accredited by his superior knowledge of true pleasure. The third and last is the proved unreality of other pleasures in comparison with those of philosophy. For the favourite allusion to Zeus Soter cp. Charm. 167 A, B πάλιν τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἑγώ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ Σωτῆρι, δεικνύει αὐχένες ἅπασκοπῶμεθα: Phil. 66 D ἦν δὲ τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, κ.τ.λ. The association of the phrase with the Olympian contests occurs only here.

ἐσκιαγραφηματι] σκιαγραφία is a painting in light and shade, which owes its effect to contrast and is therefore a very appropriate figure of pleasure,—here affirmed to be purely relative. In Phaedo 69 B it is applied to courage and temperance, which are likewise said to be unreal when separated from knowledge. Cp. x. 602 D ὃ δὴ ἦν τῷ παθητῷ τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολέει:—also vii. 523 B, Theaet. 208 E.

ὦς ἑγὼ δοκῶ] Compare the part of the Philebus in which the relativity of pleasure is discussed, especially 44 c, where the opinion of those who deny the existence of pleasure is quoted.

Plato uses a similar anonymous formula in Lys. 215 c, probably referring to the Heracliteans; also in Phaedo 62 B, speaking of the Pythagoreans; in Theaet. 201 D, of the Megarians (?); and of certain anonymous physicists (friends of Democritus?) in Phil. 20. He is probably here alluding to these persons, whoever they may have been,—who maintained a doctrine not unlike that in the text, viz. that pleasure is only an escape from pain. It is not likely, as Stallbaum supposes, that Plato would have used this ironic formula of a doctrine for which he had made himself responsible. And the greater precision and fulness with which the subject of pleasure is treated in the Philebus is one of the reasons for supposing the date of that dialogue to be later than that of the Republic. Both speak of a neutral condition between pleasure and pain; in both the metaphor of health and sickness occurs; both describe pleasure as an enchantment,—γοητεία. But in the Republic the object of Plato is only to convict ordinary pleasure of unreality; in the Philebus there is an elaborate attempt to analyse pleasures, and to distinguish true from false kinds:—the higher pleasures are not only the intellectual, but extend also to those which are derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell (here only incidentally mentioned), and are unalloyed with pain. Here, again, it is simply assumed that all pleasures are κατηχεῖς (583 ε) and πληρώμεις.
Notes: Book IX.

(585 a, b);—in the Philebus, as in Aristotle’s Ethics, the circumstance of some pleasures being γενετικός and πληθωρικός is adduced as a ground for depreciating them. For the Platonic view of pleasure see introduction to Philebus, Eng. Trans. vol. iv. pp. 530 ff.

ἀδικήματα'] ‘I will make the matter clear in the following way, carrying on the inquiry while you answer me.’ ἄδειε points generally to what follows—the manner of which is further particularized by σοῦ ... ἄμα. For ζητῶν ἄμα cp. v. 450 e.

From the relativeness of pleasure and pain Plato deduces their illusory and unsatisfying nature. There are two extremes, pleasure and pain, and an intermediate state which may be described as the absence of either. But it may also be conceived as pain or pleasure. Health and rest are all the pleasures that a man desires in sickness; and the cessation of enjoyment may be assumed in like manner to be often a pain.

This is an argument characteristic of ancient philosophy, which in modern times has no value. Pleasure is relative and contrasted, admitting of degrees, and associated with certain bodily sensations; also of a fleeting and transient nature when compared with the eternal idea, or the absoluteness of knowledge. But pleasure only partakes in this of the condition of our bodily state; that which is relative or admits of degrees is not the less really existing. Even the power of receiving intellectual pleasure is almost as transient as the enjoyments of sense; the permanence of objects of knowledge must not be confounded with the continuance of our capacity to be pleased by them. This is casually admitted in Symp. 207 ε. But it is more clearly seen by us than by Plato and Aristotle, who were confused in their perception of the imperfectly abstract ideas of the ‘limit’ and the ‘relative’; and to whom that which was incapable of being defined seemed also to be incapable of any true existence.

... ἄμα] ‘as they find.’

tοῦ τοιοῦτου] sc. τοῦ λυπηροῦ—the absence of pain. Cp. viii. 566 ε ὅταν ... ἡσυχία ἐκκύσθη ... γέιηται.

η ἡσυχία] sc. φαίνεται, resuming τοῦτο.

οδυνὸν ύπόλευς] cp. vii. 523 B ως τῆς αἰσθήσεως αἰδεῖν ύπόλευς, Soph. 232 A ὅταν ἐπαιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνεται ... τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ... οὐκ ἐστὶν ὕπολευς. And for γοητεία, Phil. 44 C αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπάγωγον γοητεύμα αὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι.
Between this and ἢν δ’ ἐγώ the reading is uncertain. See v. 11.

'Perchance': cp. iv. 424 c, &c.

Although pleasures and pains have both been mentioned. Cp. infra 586 c ἐκατὼν and note.

C 

'And are commonly called pleasures.' For this frequent formula, in contrasting common opinion with philosophic truth, cp. iv. 431 c τῶν ἐλευθερῶν λεγομένων.

'Is this not also true of the anticipations of pleasure and pain which precede them?' πρὸ μελλόντων instead of πρὶ μελλόντων, and προηοθήσεις instead of προαιρήσεις, are required by the sense, and are the readings of Par. A and other MSS. The form of the word προηοθήσεις is singular, but is confirmed by the use of ἡσθαμα in the sense of pleasure in the fragments of Eupolis' Δῆμοι.

The Timaeus, p. 62 c ff., shows a clear advance beyond the crudity of this distinction which is parallel to the point of view in Phaedo 109. [L. C.]

As the man who has no true pleasure has, nevertheless, a true experience of pain.

'they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure, just as if they were looking at grey when contrasted with black in inexperience of white, and viewing pain in like manner contrasted with the absence of pain in their inexperience of pleasure, they are deceived.' So we may translate, omitting δὴ after δισπερ with all the best MSS. The antithesis to μὲν is to be gathered from the clause καί ... ἀπατώται (= ἀπατώται δὲ). This is a possible but not a probable way of taking the passage. A much better sense is obtained by the insertion of δὲ after δισπερ, which is actually found in one MS. (Munich q), 'they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of
satiety and pleasure, but as a matter of fact they are deceived through viewing pain in contrast with the absence of pain in inexperience of pleasure, just as they would be deceived (sc. ἀπαθὴν ἄν) if they viewed (ἀποσκοποῦντες = ei ἀποσκοποῖν) grey contrasted with black in inexperience of white.

πρὸς τὸ ἄλυτον οὐτω λύτη] W. H. Thompson's conjectural emendation, πρὸς λυπὴν οὐτω τὸ ἄλυτον, is certainly more logical, but the 'chiasmus' in the text is not impossible.

αλλὰ πολὺ μάλλον, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Theaet. 142 B καὶ οὐσίν γ' ἄτοπον, αλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν.

οὐκοὶν . . . ἵσχων] 'If this be so, he who takes food and he who gets hold of understanding' (ἵσχω a stronger form of ἵχω) 'will both be filled.'

ποτερα . . . (c) ἀρετή;) 'Which classes of things are they which in your judgement have a greater share in true being?—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and in general all virtue?' Observe the transition from plural to singular in passing from sense to knowledge.

καὶ ἀληθείας] The word is obelized because the abstract noun is oddly correlated to the adjectives preceding, where καὶ ἀληθεῖς might equally have been said.

τὸ τοῦ μηδέποτε ὅμοιον] The article here was added by Ast, as below ('τοῦ ἄλ ομοίου) by Madvig. Though not absolutely required in either place, it might easily have been dropped by a copyist.

ei δὲ ἀληθείας ἥττον, οὔ καὶ οὕσιῶ;] Plato wishes to show that the unchangeable partakes of essence, knowledge and truth in equal degrees: or rather that essence, knowledge and truth go together. First he asks whether it has either of these qualities in a greater degree than the others, and elicits the answer that it has not. Then with the same object in view, he proceeds to inquire whether, 'if the unchangeable had less of truth, would it not also have less of essence?' For the sake of his argument it would have been sufficient to obtain the admission that truth and essence go together: that the pleasures of the body, being less true, are also less real.

For somewhat similar inversions cp. infra 587 ε, supra 582 β, c.
Plato: Republic.

It is therefore unnecessary with Madvig to suppose a lacuna before ει.

σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ... οὖτως;] sc. ἤττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχειν.
tὸ τῶν ἤττον ὄρτων] sc. πληροφορεῖνον.

tῶν φύσει προσηκότων] 'with things naturally befitting;' i.e. things perishable for the body, things eternal for the mind.

ἀπιστοτέρος] corresponds to ἤττον ... βεβαιῶς in the previous clause.

μέχρι πάλιν ... μεταξύ] 'back again as far as the middle point'—but no farther upwards.

ταύτῃ] 'hereabout,' i.e. in the region below the middle. So τοῦτο in the next clause.

tὸ ἀληθῶς ἀνω] Cp. Phaedo 109, Phaedrus 247 c for the similar idea of an upper heaven into which the mind is elevated.

κεκυφότες, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. vii. 519 λ τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὀσπερ μολυβδίδαις, κ.τ.λ. Note χορτάζομενοι, a word usually applied to animals (ἐχόρταζες ii. 372 ά) and see Milton, Comus, sub init.

'Who knows not Circe,
The daughter of the Sun, whose charmed cup
Whoever tasted lost his upright shape
And downward fell into a grovelling swine?'

ἐνεκα ... πλεονεξίασ] For the origin of war in luxury cp. ii. 373 ξ and Phaedo 66 c καὶ γὰρ πολίμοιροι καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔπιθυμα.


ὄπλαισ] probably with a glance at ὀπλαις.


παντελῶς ... χρησμοθείς βίων] 'Verily, Socrates, said Glaucion, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.'

ξυμνείαι] sc. τοῦ τοιοῦτου.

ὁπό τῆς ... ἀποχραιμομέναις] 'Whose colour is gained by
juxtaposition. ’ ἀποχραίην (Laws vi. 769 a) seems to mean ‘to give the last touches,’ ‘put in the high lights’ in painting.

ἐαυτῶν] refers to ἡδονᾶς only, although ἐκατέρως resumes both ἡδονᾶς and λύπας.

tοιούτων τι αὐτὸ εἶναι] The life of the pleasure-seekers is like that of men fighting for a shadow. Cp. vii. 520 c, where there is a reference to the shadows on the wall of the den. For the form of the legend of Helen here referred to see especially the Helena of Euripides.

τί δὲ; . . . οὐχ ἕτερα τοιοῦτα;) The satisfaction of anger also is a relief from pain.

αὐτὸ τοῦτο] sc. τὸ τοῦ θυμοειδές πρᾶγμα understood from τὸ θυμοειδές. For the use of διαπράττομαι cp. Phaedr. 256 c τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακριατήρια οἴρους εἰλατύνει τε καὶ διαπράβασται καὶ διαπράβασται τὸ λοιπὸν ἰδ环节, κ.τ.λ., and for the dative, iii. 411 D βία . . . πρὸς πάντα διαπράττεται: Gorg. 451 D τῶν λόγω τὰ πάντα διαπράττομένων.

Observe the use of θυμῷ in the ordinary sense in the same passage with the more technical θυμοειδές.


ἐπερ τὸ βελτιστόν . . . οἰκεῖοτάτον;) Cp. Lys. 222 c πόρευν οὖν καὶ ταγιαθὸν οἰκεῖον θήρημεν πρωτί, τὸ δὲ κακόν ἀλλότριον;

τὸ εαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίω εἶναι] An allusion to the definition of Justice in Book iv.

καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατόν τὰς ἀληθετάτας] ‘the truest of which they are capable,’—since the pleasures of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are less true than that of reason, cp. supra D ὡς δὲ αὐτὰς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν.

ὁ δὲ ὀλίγωτον] ‘but the other’ (viz. the philosopher-king) ‘is least removed from it.’

The conclusion just arrived at may now receive a mathematical expression. The shadow, which is a surface, may be represented arithmetically as 3 × 3 = 9, the distance between king and oligarch being simply multiplied into that between oligarch and tyrant. But to fathom the depth of the declension, not 9 but the cube of 9 must serve to express the enormous interval. The square of 9 is 81, the cube is 729, a number not unsuitable to human life, for it is a number connected with days and nights and months and years. And if in pleasure the tyrant differs from the king so widely, how great must be the king’s superiority in other ways!
Socrates, having discussed the different kinds of pleasure and the different forms of government and character in relation to pleasure and pain, proceeds to sum up these differences in an arithmetical formula, or rather in two numbers, 9 and 729. These numbers are obtained in the following manner. The oligarch is in the third remove from true pleasure; the king has the pleasure of wisdom, the timocrat that of honour, the oligarch that of wealth, which is an unreal shadow. But the tyrant is in the third remove from the oligarch, and his pleasure is the shadow of the shadow of a shadow—and this a shadow thrice removed from reality. According to the simplest computation, his life is thrice three times less sweet or his pleasure less true than that of the king. His shadow of enjoyment is therefore represented by the superficial number 9. (For the superficial nature of the ἐιδωλος cp. x. 598 A, B.) But in order to gauge the depth of the tyrant’s misery, or conversely to estimate the solidity of the king’s happiness, it is necessary to cube the simple number 9. The number so obtained is 729.

δ τύραννος] not δ τυρανικός, because we are thinking of the extreme case of the tyrannical individual made tyrant—supra 573 C, 580 C. By the force of antithesis we pass in what follows from the βασιλικός to the βασιλεύς, i.e. the philosophical individual who has authority in an ideal community (vi. 497 B, C).

ϕυγών νόμον τε καὶ λόγον] cp. supra A ἀ θλείσανυ . . . λόγον ὑπεστήκε.

δορυφόροις] ‘armed’ viz. with stings: supra 573 E, 575 A. They are the body-guard of the tyrant passion.

οδδε] is to be joined with εἰπεῖν—‘not even to express it.’

ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τρίτος . . . τρίτῳ εἰδώλῳ] Plato adopts the inclusive mode of reckoning (Oligarch 1, Democrat 2, Tyrant 3), and similarly from the oligarch to the king (Oligarch 1, Timarch 2, King 3). Then to obtain a value for the shadow of pleasure enjoyed by the tyrant, he multiplies together the numbers so obtained. But when he turns to consider the solidity of the king’s pleasure he is not contented with the square number, but taking this as ‘linear,’ i.e. as a simple number, he squares and cubes it (9, 81, 729).

ἐὰν εἰς ταῦτα . . . τιθομεν] In accordance with iv. 445 D, E.
Notes: Book IX.

επιστέθον... διν εἰρ [The shadow of tyrannical pleasure, then, determined by the number of length will be a plain figure:] i.e. the number 9, which is the 'linear' expression of the interval, is also the expression of a surface, the square of 3.

tο εἴδωλον... ἡδονής τυραννικής [The shadow, of which the tyrant's pleasure consists.]

κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν] sc. λογιζομένου.

κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην] (1) 'But if we square and cube.' There is some doubt as to the exact process intended and even as to the precise meaning of δύναμις. The δύναμις of a number is properly its square,—τὸ επίστεθον ὁ δύναμις (Theaet. 148 8). Hence either 9 : 81 : 729, as above; or 3 × 9 × 27 = 729. But in the passage of the Theaetetus just cited, δύναμις is 'the square-root,' and even 'an irrational square-root'—showing that in Plato the technical usage is not fixed. Here it may possibly mean (2) 'any higher power,' e.g. the cube: 'if we raise the number,' i.e. 9, 'say to the third power.'

δυν, κ.τ.λ.] sc. ὁ τύπανος τοῦ βασιλικοῦ.

μεταστρέφασ] sc. τὸν λόγον. 'If you turn the argument the other way about': i.e. if you show not how far the tyrant is removed from the king in the untruth of his pleasure, but how far the king is removed from the tyrant in the truth of his pleasure.

tελειωθεῖσθαι τῇ πολλαπλασιώσει] I.e. when 9 is raised to the third power; [or when 3, 9, 27 are multiplied together]. It should be remembered that Plato is only playing with numbers and must not be taken too seriously. The number 729 besides being convenient for the measurement of days and nights, also included many numerical compounds, and was the expression of many geometrical figures which gave a seeming authority to it. If it is worth while to raise the question, we can hardly say that Plato is in earnest: but we may perhaps say that he was fascinated by finding a numerical expression of what he conceived to be the truth. He did not trouble himself about minor details, any more than in the number which he assigns in the Laws for the population of his city.

ἀμήχανον... τοῖν ἄθροιν] (1) 'You have brought to bear upon the two men ' (viz. the king and the tyrant, although the tyrant is chiefly thought of) 'an overwhelming calculation of the difference vol. iii.
between them;' or (2) 'you have brought down upon us a wonderful calculation of the difference between the two men.' The image is that of a river coming down in flood and covering everything with debris. Cp. καταχώρωμα in Gorg. 512 B, Theaet. 171 B. In the former case (1) the genitive τῶν ἄνδρων is governed by κατά in composition. [If the other reading, κατασφοράκας (see v. rr.), were adopted, the genitives would follow διαφορότητος as in (2). But Plato is not likely to have used such a word as κατασφορά without more point than can be found in it here. L. C.]

τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ δίκου In apposition to τῶν ἄνδρων. The king is the ideal of justice, the tyrant of injustice.

ἄληθή] 'The calculation is a true one and we may remark further,' &c. The mathematical accuracy of the calculation is made an argument for the truth of its application.

ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες] The year is supposed to consist of about 364\(\frac{1}{2}\) days and 364\(\frac{1}{2}\) nights. For the approximate number cp. Laws vi. 771 c ὃς πάσας τὰς διανομὰς ἔχει μέχρι τῶν δώδεκα ὡπὸ μᾶς ἀρξίμων πληθυνόντων 'αυτή δ' ἐχει σφερόων ἑαυτα. ἐπὶ ἄλλα γὰρ ὑπή γένεται δυοῖν ἑστίων ἀπονεμήδεσαν—said of the number 5040.

καὶ μῆνες] 12 months in a year: 30 + \(\frac{1}{3}\) days in a month:

\[12 \times (30 + \frac{1}{3}) = 364\]

\[2 \times 364\frac{1}{2} = 729.\]

To such a pass has the theory of the profitableness of injustice come! Let us try to bring this home to our adversary's imagination. 'Three natures,' we will say, 'are enclosed within the single form of man:—one human, one leonine, and one a many-headed beast. And we are told that it is for the man's interest to starve the human nature, and enslave it to the bestial! But the praise of justice means that the man should set the human or divine element in charge over the other two, to prune the desires, and train the leonine element to help him in controlling them. That is the purpose for which laws are made and children held under authority, that licence may be kept in check, and the harmony of the soul preserved. And on this purpose every wise man will concentrate his efforts.'

ἡ ἡδί́που, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates, not without an air of triumph, returns to the source of the discussion, which is finally disposed of,—the old argument of Thrasymachus, who, however, is no
longer attacked by name, as peace was concluded between them at the end of Book i, and Socrates would not allow this to be disturbed in vi. 498 c μὴ διάβαλλε, κ.τ.λ. He is mentioned once more infra 590 ν. The question had become ridiculous at the end of Book iv, but having proceeded so far, it was thought best to complete the discussion by describing the forms of evil (iv. 445 c).

αὐτῷ] sc. τῷ ἐκείνῳ λέγοντι—supplied from below and from λεγόμενον supra—rather than τῷ ... ἄδικῳ supra.

οἷς ἔλεγεν] ‘What a preposterous statement he was guilty of.’


Milton's description of Sin (P. L. ii. 650, 651) has some degree of similarity:

‘The one seemed woman to the waist, and fair:
But ended foul in many a scaly fold,’ &c.

See also the image of the charioteer and the two steeds in Phaedr. 246.

ἡμέρων δὲ] If δὲ is retained, against Madvig's τε, the fact that the many heads are some wild and some tame, is a fresh point in the description. δὲ is not correlative to μὲν.

δεινὸ... (D) πεπλάθω] ‘The work implies marvellous power in the modeller: still, inasmuch as language is more easily moulded than wax or similar substances, let us suppose the model to have been made.’

τούτῳ... τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ] ‘This human creature whom we have made,’ referring to ἄνθρωπον immediately above, as distinguished from the man within.

διὸ οὖν... (589 A) ἄλληλα] It is hardly necessary to observe that (a) the multitudinous monster represents the desires: (b) the lion, anger; (c) the man within, reason. For the first cp. supra 580 ν, η τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυείδιαν ἐνὶ οὐκ ἵσχομεν ὄνοματι προσειπεύν ἰδιῷ αὐτοῖ.

τὰ περὶ τὸν λεόντα] This phrase prepares for the serpentine element, which is afterwards (590 B) brought in to represent the meaner forms of anger.

διὸν... ἔγκρατέστατος] ‘The genitive τοῦ ἄνθρωπου (1) may be
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IX.

governed by ἔγκρατεστάτος, or (2) may be taken partitively with ὁ ἄντικός ἀνθρώπως.

589 B  ἐξίμμαχον .... λέοντος φύσιν] Cr. iv. 440 B ὅπερ δυὸν στασιαζότων ἐξίμμαχον τῷ λύγῳ γιγνόμενον τῶν θυμῶν τοῦ τοιούτου.

C  πρὸς τε γὰρ .... ψέγει] 'For whether you consider pleasure, or reputation, or advantage, the eulogist of the righteous man speaks the truth; and he who attacks him has no sanity or knowledge in all his attacks;' ὑγεία is governed by ψέγον λέγει, which is to be gathered from the main drift of the sentence.

πείθωμεν, κ.τ.λ.] Cr. Laws x. 888 A λέγωμεν πρῶς σβέσαστε τῶν θυμῶν ὅσ εἴνα διαλεγόμενοι τῶν τοιούτων. 'Ο παί, νέος εἰ, κ.τ.λ.

οὐ γὰρ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει] Plato falls back on the Socratic notion of the involuntariness of error.

δὶ μακάρει .... (3) φόβεως] 'May we not say that things customarily esteemed fair and foul have come into existence for some such reason as this, that the fair are those which subdue to the man or rather those which subdue to the divine the wild beast element of the nature: that foul are those which enslave the gentle element to the savage.' The words τὰ μὲν καλὰ, κ.τ.λ., are an explanation of διὰ τὰ τοιαύτα, the participle taking the place of the prepositional phrase—τοιούτα = διὰ τὸ τοιεῖν: 'for this reason, the good being those,' &c. With τὰ μὲν καλὰ .... αἰσχρὰ δὲ we must supply φαίμεν ἄν εἶναι from ἄν φαίμεν γεγονέναι.—νόμμα nearly = νομιζόμενα.

D  λαμβάνων .... μοχθηροτάτῳ] This sentence is in apposition to τοιοῦτος.

E  εἰς ἄγριων .... ἄνθρωπον] sc. οἰκίαν.

550 A  ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] sc. ἐν τῷ ἀκολουθοῖ τούτω.

τὸ δεινὸν, τὸ μέγαν, κ.τ.λ.] τὸ δεινὸν is used substantively, and τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο, κ.τ.λ., added expositively: 'the dangerous thing, viz. that great beast.' The reading of the old editions, without the comma after δεινόν, is not so good.

B  τὸ .... ὑθέον] The serpent element has not hitherto been mentioned [but cp. supra 588 E τὰ περὶ τῶν λέοντα, where something besides the lion is suggested. L. C.]. It is here added to account for the meager forms of anger. The image grows under the artist's hand. So in the next sentence the lion when rabid with lust becomes a 'mad-headed ape.'
Notes: Book IX.

χαλάσει τε καὶ ἁλέσει] ἁλέσει is here 'relaxation,' not 'letting loose' as in ἁλέσει supra λ. Since faculties are of opposites, δυμὸς is the seat of cowardice as well as of courage.

ὁχλάδεί] At once 'multitudinous' and 'troublesome.'

ἐκεῖνου] τοῦ ὁχλάδους θηρίου.

θέρακείων] follows ὅστε: δύνηται is governed by ἄταν, the construction of the earlier part of the sentence being resumed. Cp. vi. 493 A, B, 495 D, E, and, for the imagery, vi. 493.

ὁ τοιοῦτος] sc. ὁ βαμνος καὶ χειροτέχνης.

ἀπερ ἀρασύμαχος ἰπτὸν] i. 343 B, C.

καὶ ὁρθῶς γ', ἐφι] sc. φαμίν supra c.

βουλέται] βουλεύται is the reading of most MSS.; but βουλεύται is the more idiomatic and probably the true one. See v. τττ.

καὶ ἡ τῶν . . . (591 λ) ἀφίεμεν] Cp. supra iii. 402 A. This mention of the inward πολιτεία prepares for the highly wrought passage at the end of the book, infra 592 B. Cp. also v. 449 A περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευῆς.

τῇ . . . τοιοῦτο] sc. βελτίστηφ.

πῇ δ' ἀδικοῦντα λαμβάνειν . . . λυσιτελεῖν;] sc. φήσομεν.

ἡ οὐχὶ δ' μὲν . . . γίγνεται] Cp. Gorg. 509, where the noble paradox is maintained that the wicked are gainers by being punished.

τιμωτέραν ἐξιν λαμβάνει] 'attains a nobler state.'

eἰς τοῦτο ἐξυπερια] viz. to assert the pre-eminence of the soul over the body.

ἀλλ' ἄδι] 'But his aim will ever be that he may be found to preserve the harmony of the body for the sake of the symphony of the soul.' ἀλλ' ἄδι, sc. ζησεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων. For the change from the future to the subjunctive after ὅπως cp. Timaeus 18 ε ὅπως . . . ἐξιλληφθῆναι, καὶ μὴ τις . . . γίγνεται. [The addition of φαίνεται can only be accounted for by an attraction into the ὅπως clause occasioned by the occurrence of οὐχ ὅπως. The preference of the subjunctive to the future appears to be similarly caused by the neighbourhood of μελήματ]. But the sentence would certainly be more regular if φαίνεται were omitted. L. C.]
Republic

591 D

οὖκοιν ... ἔσμφωναν ...] sc. τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἑνεκα ἔσμφωνας ἀρμοστο-
μενος ζῆσαι.

τοῦ πλῆθους] sc. τῶν χρημάτων. οὖκ with αὐθέντει.

E

μὴ τί ... τῶν ἐκεῖ] 'That none of his elements therein (ἐν τῇ
πολιτείᾳ) give way.' For παρακινεῖν, 'to give,' cp. vii. 540 λ.

καὶ τιμᾶς γε] The accusative looks forward to φευγέται, but as
the sentence is developed, the genitive τῶν μὲν is required by
μεθέξει καὶ γεωύσται.

592 A


'M. If you shall cleave to my consent, when 'tis,
It shall make honour for you.

B. So I lose none,
In seeking to augment it, but still keep
My bosom franchised and allegiance clear,
I shall be counselled.'

592 A, B

The wise man, then, will not devote himself to politics, unless by
some divine providence he has been born under the ideal constitution.
But whether this be so or not, according to that ideal, and to no
other, he will frame his life.

592 A

νὴ τῶν κόνα] Socrates excited by the misunderstanding of
Glauccon, gives vent to his feelings in his favourite oath. 'By the
dog of Egypt, he certainly will in his own city, not however perhaps
in his native land.'

ἐὰν μὴ θαύμα τις ἔσμφημη τοῦχη] Cp. vi. 492 ξ ὅ τι περ ἄν σωθῇ τε καὶ
γένεσα οἶνον δεὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ καταστάσει πολιτείᾳ, βετοῦ μοῖραν αὐτῷ σῶσαι
λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἔριστ : ib. 499 c ff.

B

ἐαυτῶν κατοικίζειν] sc. ἵκει.

τά γὰρ ταύτης ... οὐδεμιᾶς] 'He will live after the manner of
that city, having naught to do with any other': i. e. he will live
in the spirit of philosophy and take no part in politics, unless in
a perfect state.

Plato is not thinking of the constitution of the state on earth
 corresponding to the movements of the heavenly bodies (as in vi.
Notes: Book X.

500 c, Tim. 47 c). The heaven which he describes is an ideal one, answering to the individual rather than to the state. His ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ is within; and in this passage is exhibited to us as a life rather than as a system of government. For παράδειγμα cp. especially Theaet. 176 e.

BOOK X.

The tenth book of the Republic has two parts, the first containing a final settlement of the question of poetry, the second treating of the Immortality of the soul, which is proved and also revealed, the myth being the crown and completion of the previous argument respecting Immortality, as the allegory of the cave in Book vii is a figure of the stages of the mind in the processes of knowledge as described in Book vi. A preparation was made for the renewal of the first of the two subjects (which could be only partially treated in iii. 391-398) by the casual allusion in viii. 568 a-d; and the way to the second of them has been indicated in scattered hints such as are furnished by the concluding words of the last book, and vi. 498 d εἰς ἐκίνησιν τὸν βλεν, ὅταν άδεης γενήσῃ τοῖς τοις τουαίτος ἐντάξεις λόγους: cp. also the words of Cephalus, i. 330 e. Plato does not base this life upon another: the empire of virtue is sufficient. But he believes another life to be the natural continuation of this, as is sufficiently apparent from the language of the Phaedo, Crito, Apology, Phaedrus, Gorgias, Politicus. And as in the Gorgias the subject of Justice seems naturally to lead up to a final judgement, so the end of Book x is also the fitting conclusion of the whole dialogue.

The exclusion of poetry from our ideal state has been confirmed by our subsequent analysis, which shows how dangerous imitative art must be to those who have not fathomed its true nature. My love of Homer makes me unwilling to say this, yet it must be said.

For what is imitation?

There are many beds, but one ideal bed which the craftsman seeks to imitate. The painter represents a bed or anything in Heaven or Earth with equal ease, because he makes not the ideal nor even the actual bed, but only a superficial likeness of the latter. Thus he is in the third remove from truth. As are in like manner the whole tribe of imitators and the poet among them.
In the third book Tragedy and Comedy were excluded from the state, but there was an intimation that possibly something more than this was intended: 394 D ἴσος, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ ἴσος δὲ καὶ πλείω ἐτὶ τοῖς: in other words, the fate of Homer was not finally determined. A hint was also given (392 c) that the nature of Justice must first be investigated, before the poets generally could be brought up for judgement. The attack on poetry is now repeated and receives a new direction. The poet is shown to be at a greater distance from truth than was originally supposed; he affects the feelings only, and not the reason. These new points of view are suggested by the divisions of the soul (iv. 435 ff.) and the doctrine of ideas: not so much however, by the higher view of the ἰδέα of Good, which appears in Book vi, as the lower view, which makes the ideas class-words, as at the end of Book v (cp. Meno, Phaedo, Cratylus): also by the distinction of higher and lower pleasures and desires in Book ix. περὶ αὐτῆς, sc. περὶ τῆς ἐν λόγοις κειμένης πόλεως (ix. 592 A).

ψιλομεν] The imperfect tense refers to the Aorist in the preceding sentence ἐν ἡν νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει (at the end of Book ix).

λῶθη, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Meno 91 c οὗτοι γε φανερὰ ἐστὶ λώθη τε καὶ διαφθερά τῶν συγγενεμένων.


ἀποκωλοέ] ‘a feeling about Homer which has possessed me from a child makes me reluctant to speak.’

ζωκε μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ. ] So below, 598 d, Homer is called τραγῳδιάς ἔγειρων, 607 λάβον τῶν τραγῳδιστῶν, and Theae. 152 καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιητής ἑκατέρας κομμιδιάς μὲν, Ἐπιχαρίας, τραγῳδίας δὲ, Ὀμρος. Cp. also Aristotle’s Poetics, chap. 4 ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστοτῆς ἀνάλογον ἔχει, διότερ Ἡλιᾶς καὶ ἡ Ὀδυσσεία πρὸς τὰς τραγῳδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κομμιδίας.

tῶν καλῶν, κ.τ.λ. ] ‘who have such charms.’ The epithet is ironical. Cp. iii. 398 Λ προσκυνούμεν δ’ αὐτὸν ὃς λεπόν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἕδων.
Notes: Book X.

δ λέγω] ‘as I say,’ referring to ἴητεν, ὥν τι ἐγώ, supra. Republic X. 595 C

διώς] Imitation in general, as distinguished from poetry, which is a species of imitation. τι ποιο... (596 A) πρότεροι εἶδον, κ.τ.λ.] ‘A likely thing then that I shall understand! There is no reason why you should not, for those who have the dullest sight often see a thing quicker than those who have a keener one.’ Cp. iv. 432 c ἦν μοι ἐπομένῳ χρή... πάνω μοι μετρίως χρῆσαι.

Socrates, instead of modestly declining the implied compliment of Glaucon, contrary to expectation adopts it with a kind of irony: at the same time leaving on the mind the impression, which cannot be effaced, of his own superiority. So in vii. 532 ε οἰκέτης... ἡ φίλη Πλάγκων, οὔτε τ' ἐσεῖσ ἀκολουθεῖν, Socrates, speaking as a master to the pupil, plainly acknowledges that Glaucon will not be able to follow him beyond a certain point.

οὐδὲ δὲν προθυμηθήναι οἷς τε εἶθν] ‘I could not muster courage.’ 596 A

βουλεῖ οὖν... ἐπιφέρομεν] ‘Shall we begin our inquiry at this point—with our accustomed method? For, as you know, our custom has been to assume some one single idea in the case of the many individuals to which we apply the same name.’ So in vi. 504 ε he speaks of the ἴδια of good as a common subject of speculation with him, πάντως αὕτη οὖν ἀληθείας ἀφήσομαι: v. 475 ε ff.: Phaedo 100 b. See also Phileb. 16 b.

εἰδος and ἴδια are used in many places indifferently. Both have the meaning of form or ideal. But εἰδος more than ἴδια inclines to the notion of a logical universal, ἐν ἑνὶ πολλῶν.

τῶν πολλῶν] Here equivalent to τῶν πολλῶν ὄσων ἐκάστων: cp. vi. 490 A, B τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἐκάστοις.

ἀλλ' ἔρα... (c) τὰχα μᾶλλον φήσεις] ‘But consider what name you give to the artificer whom I am about to mention. Who is that? One who is the maker of all things which are made by any and every craftsman. That must be a strange and marvellous man. Wait a little; there will be more reason for your saying so.’ For τὰχα μᾶλλον φήσεις cp. Cratyl. 410 ε δ. πόρρω φην. οἴμαι, φαίνομαι σοφίας ἔλαβες. E. πάνω μὲν οὖν. Σ. τὰχα μᾶλλον φήσεις.

πάνω θαυμαστοῦ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Soph. 233, 234, where the ‘wizard’ C
of a sophist is described as the maker of all things in play and not in earnest, imposing on the young by imitations which deceive them, like paintings seen at a distance. The 'wizard' here is the μυστής (597 B), of which genus the painter and the poet are specific forms.

The word is here used in the vernacular sense for 'the master of an art or mystery.'

In this passage Plato seems to return from the higher and more speculative theory of ideas which has been exhibited in the sixth and seventh books, to the cruder conception of the earlier dialogues. His aim, however, must be remembered: which is to represent the poet as being in the third remote from the truth. This could only be accomplished by separating the idea from the object, and the object from the shadow or reflection: cp. vi. 509 D. The same imagery is applied to the tyrant in ix. 587 c ff.

But is the poet or painter a mere imitator as Plato seems to imply? That is a question which he has himself answered in another passage, v. 472 D εἰ δὲν οὐδὲν ἤτοι τι ἁγάθον ζωγράφῳ εἴναι δὲ δὲν γράφει παράδειγμα σωμα πίθα ἐν εἴπος οὐδέν θεομον καὶ πάσα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἰκανός ἀποδέει τῇ ἔρημε διεδείξει ὡς καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τῶν ὁμών ἀνδρόν; No theory can be more erroneous than that which degrades art into mere imitation,—which seeks for beauty in the parts and not in the whole, in colour and ornament rather than in proportion and design, in outward objects and not in the inspiring or informing mind. The requirement of composition in a work of art is alone an evidence that mere imitation is not art.

τοιητής] 'maker': the word is used in the most general sense, [though with a glance at the poet, L. C.].

οὐ χαλεπός ... δημιουργοῦμενος] 'not a difficult way, I said, but one which is soon compassed and by various methods.' For δημιουργοῦμενος applied to the manner of the action and not to the thing, cp. Soph. 221 A τὸ τῆς ... πληγῆς ... ἀναστρέμενον.

ταχύ μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] There is an asyndeton here, as is not uncommon in explanatory clauses.

εἰς δὲν ἔρχεται τῷ λόγῳ] 'You bring welcome aid to the argument,' i. e. you go to the point required: viz. to the distinction between φαινόμενα and δεχομαι.

μέντοι] recalls a previous statement which tends to modify what
Notes: Book X.

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X.

597 A

has just been said: the picture is unreal, but is not the bed itself unreal too?

Plato here uses the language of ‘crude realism.’ But the beginnings of logical technicality are discernible in the expressions ἐστιν, ὅπερ ἐστιν.

.telēwp{s ἐν...ἀληθὴν λέγειν] The idiomatic use of the verb κινδυνεύει makes a change in the usual construction, which would be εἶ τις φαίη...οὐκ ἐν λέγοι. κινδυνεύει = ‘he would seem,’ i.e. may be presumed to be according to this theory. Cp. Theaet. 152 c οἷς ἀνασκόποι τοιαῦτα ἐκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

ἀπὸ ἀν δάξειε, κ.τ.λ.] sc. τοις διαλεκτικῶς ἔμπειρος.

καὶ τοῦτο] sc. τὸ τοῦ κλινουργοῦ ἔργον. καὶ, the work of the maker of the actual bed,—as well as the painter’s imitation of it.

πρὸς ἀληθεύον] ‘with respect to reality.’ Cp. infra 600 b γελούστερος ὦ τι πρὸς παιδείαν.

βούλει ὁδ...τίς ποτ’ ἐστίν;] ‘Suppose that we inquire into the nature of this imitator, basing our remarks upon this example.’

For the use of ἐπί with reference to an example, cp. v. 475 A εἰ βούλει, ἐφι, ἐπὶ ἐμοὶ λέγων περὶ τῶν ἑρωτικῶν.

tὸν μιμητὴν τοῦτον] ‘the imitator who is the subject of our inquiry.’ Cp. supra 595 ξ μιμησιν ἀλος...δὲ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν; infra ξ τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ὁμολογήσαμεν. It is now sufficiently evident that the wonderful artificer described on p. 596 is the μιμητὴς. The accusative τοῦτον is confirmed by Par. A and the majority of MSS. Nor is the inexactness of the antecedent a sufficient reason for reading τοῦτον, which has the greater fault of being weak. The use of αὕτα immediately below is similar to the use of τοῦτον in this passage.

μία μὲν... (c) ὅ ἐστι κλίνη] Plato in the Sophist separates ποιητικὴ into two parts, one divine, the other human (Soph. 265 c). In what follows ib. 266, 267, he further divides human art into creative and imitative.

ἐν τῇ φύσει] ‘in nature,’ i.e. in the true order of nature. Cp. Phaedo 103 b αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. In this passage Plato distinguishes the picture of the bed, the bed made by the carpenter, and the real bed which is ideal, essential, in the nature of things, in the
mind of God. It may be asked whether the third bed is the idea of a bed. We may reply that it is not distinguished from it, neither does Plato identify them. He uses many forms to express what in the popular language of philosophy is termed by us his doctrine of ideas. [The further relation of the ideal bed to the supra-
mundane ἑναί is beyond the scope of this passage. L. C.]

δὴ ... ὅτι αἱ δόσι] Compare a somewhat similar argument in the Sophist 243 d, e, in which the dualistic principles of some of the previous philosophers are reduced to 'being,' because existence is predicated of cold and hot. See also Parmenides 133 Α, Tim. 31 Α.

βούλειν ὅτι ... πεποίηκεν] 'Shall we then speak of him as the natural maker of this (i.e. the idea of the bed) or by some name of a similar kind? Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation he has made this and all other things.'

φώσει] is the echo of φυτουργῶν = 'by a natural process.'

ἀλλὰ τί ... εἶναι;] 'but what of the bed will you call him?'

κλήσις is governed by τί:—'if not the maker or artificer, what is his relation to the bed?' Cp. Symp. 204 d τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως;

τῶν τοῦ τρίτου ... γενέματος] sc. δημιουργῶν. Cp. Dante, Inferno xi. 105 Si che vostri arte a Dio quasi è nipote: 'So that your art is as it were the grandchild of God.'

τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστιν καὶ ὁ τραγῳδιοποιός] 'The tragic poet then since he is an imitator will be like these (καί), i.e. the painter and carpenter, 'in the third remove from the king and the truth.'

God (supra n) is here represented as a king. The word is borrowed from the language of the ninth book in which the imperfect shadow of the king is δημοκρατικός, ὀλγαρχικός, as here of God the shadows are ἐγγράφος, κληνοποιός, &c.

αὕτω τὸ ἐν τῇ φώσει ἐκαστον] i.e. the several patterns of things as they exist in nature. Cp. again Phaedo 103 b.

πεποίηται] Perfect middle = 'is wont to create her productions,'—the perfect being used like τετεύτακτος of an habitual state. Cp. viii. 556 c τῶν ἄλλων ἡμελημάτων, καὶ οὐδέν πλείω ἑπιμελέων πεποιημένοις άριτής, κ.τ.λ. πρὸς τὸ δὲ follows πεποίηται, 'with a view to being.'
μμήσασθαι] sc. τὸ δὲ.

φαντάσματος . . . μήσως;] a resumption of the previous question πότερα . . . ὡς φαίνεται;

πόρρω . . . εἴδωλον] πόρρω is a favourite Platonic expression: cp. ix. 581 ε, Theaet. 151 c πόρρω δυτες τοῦ εἰδέναι: Soph. 234 c ἐν πόρρῳ τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφετέτον. εἴδωλον refers to supra φαντάσματος μήσως. ποῦ is the indefinite adverb of place, 'somewhere far off,' not = 'as I conceive'; cp. vi. 499 c, D πόρρω ποὺ ἑκτὸς δινὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἑπόψιν.

tοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς] 'or any other artist.' For the asyndeton cp. iv. 434 λ πάντα τῶλα μεταλλητόμενα.

τῷ δοκεῖν] sc. τὸ ἰερογραφεῖον.

ἀπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ] 'We must understand by such a statement,' cp. ix. 578 c τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν and note. The description of φανταστική in Soph. 238 D ff. recalls the present passage.

ἀνθρωπός] Possibly ἀνθρωπός: see note on ἄνρι ix. 573 c.

Homer, who is deemed to be an authority on the arts and virtues, is in the third remove from truth. Else he would have left laws and institutions and distinguished pupils behind him, and in his life-time would not have had to beg his bread.

ocrōω, κ.τ.λ.] In the Ion of Plato, the same argument is drawn out at length in answer to the Rhapsodist's assertion of Homer's omniscience (Ion 538 ff.—Homer is not a physician or a charioteer, or a general or a pilot, and yet he writes of all these subjects).

Why should Plato who is himself 'the last of the poets,' and the most poetical of prose writers, be also the enemy of poetry? For reasons partly fanciful and partly real:

1. He is conscious of a deeply-seated opposition between poetry and philosophy, between the imagination and understanding, between the feelings and reason, between opinion and fiction and truth, between mythology and morality. Poetry is concerned with sense and not with abstractions or ideas, which are to Plato the food of a higher imagination. 2. The poet is from his point of view a mere imitator, who can do everything because he does nothing well; and he encourages the weaker or sentimental side of
the human character. 3. He has not forgotten the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry, which is of longer standing and perhaps even deeper than that between the philosopher and the Sophist, just as the difference between Socrates and Aristophanes might be said to strike deeper than that between Socrates and Protagoras or Gorgias. 4. The ironical distinctions which the poet is to receive indicate the sense of his genius and of the beauty of his works; this, however, is not to supersede the sense of truth. 5. Plato's mission is to realize the abstract, and poetry is a picture, not an abstraction. Modern philosophy, in seeking to realize the abstract in the concrete, adopts a different attitude towards poetry and art. 6. He is probably influenced by the decline of poetry in his own age; what he calls in Laws iii. 701 A a 'theatocracy' was taking possession of the field.

Yet after every allowance has been made, there remains some reason for surprise, (1) that he should not have acknowledged the moral greatness of Sophocles and Aeschylus, or (2) have noticed that he himself like the tragedians is an imitator, for that both have based the form of their writings on conversation.

599 τριτά ἀπέχοντα] τριτά is adverbial, sc. διαστήματα, nearly equivalent to τρίς, 'three times.'

ἡ τι καὶ λέγουσι] 'or whether there is after all some meaning in what they say.' καὶ has a deliberative force.

οἷς οὖν . . . (B) ἔχοντα . . .] For the use of ἀφείναι to express self-abandonment to a pursuit, cp. ii. 373 D ἔκακον καὶ ἐκείνον ἀφόσιν ἀδότους ἐπὶ χρημάτων εἰσέχων ἐκεῖνον (ἐπὶ τῇ, κ.τ.λ., is here to be construed with σπουδάζειν).

προστήσασθαι . . . βίον] 'To set in the forefront of his life.' Cp. viii. 565 c ἡ να τιμᾶν ἔκεις καὶ . . . προστήσασθαι οὕτω.

B καλὰ . . . μημεῖα] οὕτω is to be joined with μημεῖα.

ἡ ἀφελία] 'The benefit or usefulness' rather than 'the profit.'

τῶν μὲν τούτων . . . (D) πυθαγομένως] i.e. we will not ask whether Homer as a physician has effected any cures; a fairer question will be (δικαίων του) whether he is a general or a legislator, or an educator of mankind:—ἐρωτώτες is connected with τίνος ὑγείες, κ.τ.λ., not with εἶ πατρικός, κ.τ.λ., which merely expresses the supposition on which the question rests. Cp. the construction of infra d ὀ φίλε Ὠμηρε, κ.τ.λ.
O φιλε... δεύτερος] ἀρετῆς πέρι resumes what is implied in πολέμων... ἀθρώτου. ἐπίθελου ἐπιμορφώσ is an explanation of τρῖτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας.

ἐν δὴ... ἡμιομέθεα] ὅν is the predicate: 'which we defined the imitator to be.' Cp. vi. 499 ε ὁδὸς λέγεις τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ix. 576 b and note. The reference here is to supra 597 ε, 598 b, c.

σὲ δὲ τίς, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Lach. 186 b ἦ εἰ τίς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ διδάσκαλον μὲν οὐ φησί γεγονεί, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔργα αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἧξει εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐπειδήξατο τίνες Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξίνων, ἢ δοῦλοι ἢ ἐλεύθεροι, δὲ ἐκείνον ἐμπολογομένως ἐγραφαὶ γεγόνασαν;

The words which follow after Σόλωνα, viz. σὲ... εἰπεῖν, are read in the MSS. and earlier editions without interpunctuation. This great improvement in the text was introduced by Bekker.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δὴ... λέγονται] eis before τὰ ἔργα was omitted by the first hand in Par. A. Whether the preposition is retained or rejected, the words τὰ ἔργα or εἰς τὰ ἔργα are to be connected with σοφοῦ.

ἐπὶ συνούσια[ ] 'For companionship,' i.e. as a companion. ἐπὶ τούτῳ (θ) refers to ἐπὶ γεγονός, 'on this ground.'

καὶ σὲ ὑστεροι... ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις;] The form of sentence is an expansion of the common idiom αὐτὸς τε καί, for which see iv. 427 c.

In the confusion of early and later Pythagoreanism, the testimony of Plato to a Pythagorean way of life is not without importance.

οὔθ' ἄδ., ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.] The meaning is that Homer could not have educated Creophylus, or judging by the examples of Pythagoras, Protagoras and others, that 'child of flesh' would never have left him to starve. There is no need of emendation, nor any difficulty in the text.

Κρεώφυλος] is mentioned in Strabo xiv. cc. 638, 639 as a Samian who entertained Homer and received from him the poem called ὁχαλίας ἐλωσις, which, according to an epigram of Callimachus, was really the writing of Creophylus himself. He is mentioned by Pausanias iv. 2, 2 as the author of the Heraclea in which he spoke of Oechalia, probably the same work. Socrates similarly argues in Gorg. 516 against the statesmanship of Pericles and others from the ingratitude of the people towards them.
Of this the words ὃτε ζήσῃ, 'when he was alive,' are a further colloquial amplification. Plato seems to have supposed that the name ἀσφαλος was derived from ἀσφάς and φυλή: 'of the stock of flesh.'

ἀλλ' οὖν . . . ὅδ' ἄρ' ἄν . . . ἄλλα πρωταγόρας μεν . . . (d) Ὠμηρον δ' ἄρα . . . καὶ οὐχί, κ.τ.λ.] The first part of this sentence has a regular protasis (εἰ τῷ δότι . . . δυνάμενοι) and apodosis (οὐκ ἄρ' ἄν ποιλοὺς . . . οὐ' αὐτῶν): the second part has two subdivisions (1) πρωταγόρας μεν ἄρα . . . οἱ ἐταίροι: (2) Ὠμηρον δ' ἄρα . . . μεταλάβοιεν. The connexion of the first and second part may be traced as follows: If Homer had been able to make men better, he would have been honoured: but as a matter of fact, while Protagoras was honoured (and therefore may be supposed to have done men good) Homer was not honoured (and therefore cannot be supposed to have done men good). For the interposition of οὖν near the beginning of the sentence cp. especially Meno 93 c ἄλλ', οὖν, οὐκ ἄν ἐδοξάσθη;

ἀρα . . . ἄρα . . . ἄρα] 'As we are expected to suppose.'


ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σφοίρᾳ] has an ironical reference to εὰν μὴ . . . επιστατήσωσιν: i. e. a wisdom which has so high a claim.

ὄννάναι] The reading of a majority of MSS. is ὄννανι (Α' II &c.) or ὄνναν (Α2). As such forms are anomalous, several emendations have been suggested,—ὅννα which rests on slight manuscript authority (Flor. x &c.), and ὅννα which is also found in a single MS. ὄννανοι, however, which is not found in any MS. is more likely to have been the original of ὄννας, and the tense agrees better with the other verbs in the sentence.

καὶ οὐχί, κ.τ.λ.] The force of the negative οὐχί, demanding an affirmative answer, is continued to the end of the sentence.

E  αὐτοὶ ἄν ἐπαιδαγώγουσιν] 'They would have chosen to attend or follow him.' From the more precise sense of watching or following about like a tutor, the word seems to acquire here and in I Alc. 135 D οὔ γὰρ ἐστιν ὡς οὖ παιδαγωγήσω σε, the more general meaning of following another, never leaving him out of sight. For the whole passage cp. Theag. 128 ε.

μιμητὰς εἰδώλων] (1) 'forgers of semblances,' 'imitative makers
of shadows'—from μμαίσθησις εἴδωλον, 'to make a shadowy imitation' (εἴδωλον cognate accusative, cp. infra 602 b τοῦτο μμαίσθηται) [L. C.]; (2) 'they copy images of virtue' [B. J. Trans.].

χρώματ' ἀττα ἐκάστων τῶν τεχινῶν] 'colours belonging to' ('taken from') 'the several arts.'

τοῖς δόμασι καὶ βῆμασι] The dative is either (1) governed by ἐπὶ in ἐπιχρώματιςειν, 'he dips his language in the colours of the arts': or (2) instrumental, 'he gives his work a superficial colouring of the arts by the language he employs.' The latter is the more natural mode of expression.

ἐπει γυμνωθείτα γε, κ.τ.λ.] Poetry, it is argued, becomes bare and meagre if stripped of poetical diction and colouring. More than half the grace and bloom of a poem necessarily flies off in translation; the same ideas, when expressed in prose, are no longer the same. But the poet might reply that philosophy also would become unmeaning if deprived of a suitable vehicle of expression, nor can language ever wholly lose a musical and poetical element.

αὕτα ἐφ' αὐτῶν λέγομενα] I. e. when the matter or λόγος is stripped of the form of poetry (λέξις, ἄρμονία, ῥυθμός) and merely spoken. Cp. iii. 392 D ff.

τεθάσαι γὰρ τού] 'For you have seen I suppose, what they look like?' We may paraphrase 'you have seen the Logographer turning poetry into prose.'

Not the imitator, nor even the maker of things is the true authority, but he who uses them and directs them to their end. The imitator consults neither use nor reality (of which he is ignorant) but appearance only.

μὴ τοῖνυν . . . ἔδωμεν] 'Do not let us leave the subject half explained, but let us have a thorough understanding of it.' Cp. ii. 376 D ἦνα μή ἐδομεν ικανὸν λόγον, Phaedo 77 C φαίνεται γὰρ ὡσπερ ἡμῶν ἀποδειχθαί οὖ διε. ἡμίσεως, the genitive used adverbially (corrected to ἡμίσεος in Par. A), is the reading of most MSS.: ἐφ' ἡμίσεως (γ) seems to be a conjectural reading: ἡμίσεως, the conjecture of Stephanus, is an adverb formed on the analogy of ταχέως, ποχεῖος, &c.

ἀπ' οὖν ἐπιστεί, κ.τ.λ.] A favourite idea in Plato:—Cratyl. 390 D

vol. iii. 601 B—602 B

601 C

601 A
Plato: Republic.

Republic 450

Tis de tv tou nomobetou igenous epistatheis i' av kallista kai etragasmivos krimies kai evnade kai ev tois baphaires; ar' oux osper chrhsetai;

D 601

oia . . . f chrhetai] 'What specimens of that which he (the user) employs, the maker makes that are good or bad in actual use.' The correlation of singular and plural here arises from the collocation of particular and universal. The instrument (sing.) is good in some cases bad in others (plur.) [L. C.]

605

egaggalei (dis)] Some would read egaggelai. But see note on infra 604 a avteineiwn.

a av deiptetov] sc. avloj. 'Which he finds serviceable:'—not merely 'which he makes use of.' Cp. Protag. 326 B iwa tv sormata belei t'h vtorites deiptetoj tv diawol xhresti oba. The occurrence of deiptetov and deiptetoj in successive lines, but in a different connexion, is worthy of remark.

E

piotin drhy] piotis is here used in the sense of an opinion received from others:—not with the technical meaning which was given to it in vi. 511. The genitive, governed by poihtis, is resumed with kallous te kai poihras.

602

biod tv . . . epitattsebhai] 'because of having orders given him.' For the passive cp. i. 337 A kalpeainosbhai.

charieis av eli . . . poi] 'The imitator will be in a charming state of intelligence about his own inventions.' The asyndeton is used as elsewhere to express the persistent feeling with which Socrates (epxov kai oux avneis) sends the argument home: cp. v. 462 e drav av eli . . . epainenai. For the ironical use of charieis and the reply cp. iv. 426 A tode avtoj av charin and the answer (B) av pain charin.

B

alx ouv de dmws ye, ktl] The particles emphasize the absurdity of such a proceeding, considering the nature of imitation: nevertheless he will do it.'

touto makhsetai] touto is a cognate accusative: not 'that he will imitate' but 'such will be the mode of his imitation.'

kai ev epesi] Homer is still included among tragic poets: supra 595 c, infra 607 a, Theaet. 153 a.

451
Thus shallow and unreal itself, imitation works upon what is shallow and unreal in human nature, appealing as it does to the crude experience of sensation and not to the arts of measuring and weighing by which the illusions of sense are corrected. So painting deceives the eye, and poetry introduces similar confusion by her representation of complex and inconsistent emotions, appealing to the passions and not to reason.

πρὸς Διός] The exclamation (cp. i. 332 c, ix. 574 b) is uttered in glad anticipation of a new argument, in which Plato having shown the unreality of dramatic performances, proceeds to consider them as injurious to the moral character: first, as illusive; secondly, as tending to imitate the feelings when excited and variable rather than when equable; thirdly, and more than all, as promoting the indulgence and expression of feelings which would otherwise be restrained. Before taking the new step he resumes what has preceded with μὲν (περὶ τρίτων μὲν τι, κ.τ.λ.). In the next sentence ἔστιν is to be supplied with ἔχον.

tοῦ ποίου τινός πέρι λέγεις;] 'what is the subject of your remark?' The interrogative pronoun is not a repetition of ποιόν τι supra, but refers generally to the whole point in question, asking for an example or illustration of it.

πάσα τις ταραχή] 'a kind of utter confusion' = πάνως τις ταραχή: πάσα is used intensively and not extensively: cp. Soph. 250 D πάση συνεχόμεθα ἀπορία,—and for the use of τις, Gorg. 522 D αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἐαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὕπειρον κρατίστη εἶναι.

γοντείας οὖν ἀπολέεις] (1) 'fails in no resource of magic art;' (2) 'has all the effect of magic' [B. J.]. Cp. vii. 533 A.

ἀπ' οὖν οὖ τὸ μετρεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] The apparent variations of the senses are corrected by measure and number. This is the answer to the doctrine of the fallibility of our knowledge of sensible objects, whether suggested by Plato or by Berkeley. The variations are ascertainable or assignable to disturbing causes and afford no reason for doubting the general truthfulness of sense. For Plato's conception of the art of measuring, cp. Protag. 356 D, Philebus 55 E.

τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις, κ.τ.λ.] The dative would naturally have been followed by some such word as συμβαίνει, 'it turns out,' &c. For this the expression τάσαντια φαίνεται is substituted. Or in other
words, the dative is in a loose construction with the whole sentence, like a genitive absolute, and is not to be taken with φαινεται. It would not be in accordance with Plato’s use of language, or with the context in what follows, to speak of the contradictions of sense as having anything to do with the rational element in the soul. For a similar change of construction, cp. viii. 566 ξπρος τοὺς ἐξο εἰδροῦς, κ.τ.λ., Theaet. 182 θαλ’ εὐ ἀμφοτέρων ... τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα.

οὐδενεν ἐφαμεν . . . εἶναι;] He refers to iv. 436 λ—c. The dative here as there is instrumental:—‘with the samefaculty to form opposite opinions at the same time.’

Δαλλα μὴν, κ.τ.λ.] Measure and number are among the leading ideas of the Platonic philosophy. There is a measure in words as in all other things (Polit. 285 α) and the μέτρον and μέτρον in the Philebus are in the highest region of good.

Λεγον] supra 597 εε., 602 δ.

ἡ γραφικὴ . . . (β) ἀληθεῖ[ The chief stress is on πόρρω, which has the first place in each clause and is repeated for the sake of emphasis.

ἐπ’ οὐδενί, κ.τ.λ.] The purpose for which their friendship is cemented is utterly unsound and untrue.

φαίλῃ . . . μιμητικῇ] Cp. vi. 496 α ποι’ ἄττα οὖν εἰκὸν γεννῶν τοὺς τουτίστως ; οὖ νῦθα καὶ φαίλα ;

μὴ τι ἄλλο γ’ παρὰ ταῦτα;] μὴ τι ἄλλο ᾧ, the conjecture of Ast, is certainly probable. The past tense would refer to iii. 399 λ, β, where the true scope of μιμητικὴ was described. But the interrogative use of the subjunctive with μὴ expecting a negative answer, is a sufficiently well-ascertained Platonic construction—see Goodwin, M. and T., § 268. Cp. especially Parm. 163 δ τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μὴ τι ἄλλο γ’, κ.τ.λ., where, however, Bekker reads ὧν with Heindorf.

κατὰ τὴν δὲ φιν ἐστασιάζει] sc. ὁ ἀνθρωπος: supra 602 c ff.

ἀναμμησκομαι δὲ . . . ἡμῖν] Socrates apparently refers to two discussions, one in iii. 387, where the brave man is described as bearing sorrow with fortitude,—the other in iv. 439, where opposite tendencies are spoken of as working together in the soul.
Notes: Book X.

ἀνὴρ...ἀπολέσας] The words ὑδὲν ἀπολέσας...ποιεῖται are an explanation of τοιοῦτος τύχης μετασχῶν.

tούτε] iii. 387 D, E.

οὕτω...ἀληθές] ‘Rather the latter, said he, if we are to speak truly.’ τὸ γε ἀληθές is an adverbial phrase = re vera. The reasonableness of this is noticeable. Plato sees that even the good man, who has his feelings most under control, cannot altogether overcome them.

tὸ δὲ...εἶπε] ‘But now tell me this about him.’ There is no need of altering τὸ δὲ to τὸ δέ with Schneider and the inferior MSS. The neuter of the article is often used thus demonstratively in beginning a new sentence.

Socrates recalls the heads of the former discussion, to which he adds a new one, viz. the tendency of dramatic performances to relax the self-control which is natural in the presence of others.

μαχείσθαι τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν] Cp. i. 342 η σκηνομένη τε καὶ ἐκπορίζουσι, supra 601 ὑ μεγάλει...καὶ ἐπιτάξει—ἀντιτείνειν, which is supported by the great majority of MSS., is probably genuine, notwithstanding the change of tense.

ὁ ὤν δὲν ἰδεῖν διέφερα] ‘Which he would not choose to see another doing.’ Cp. Soph. El. 1278 ἢ κάρτα καὶ ἄλλαι αὐτοὶ ἰδεῖν. (Unless η has dropped out—ὁ ὄν δὲν ἰδεῖ τινι ἐδειν ὢρθωτα.)

ἐναντίοις...εἰναι] ‘But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions in reference to the same object, we say that he has necessarily two distinct principles.’

ϕαμέν may be understood parenthetically, and ἀναγκαῖον as ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν. But ἀναγκαῖον is equally well explained by supplying εἰναι :—sc. ϕαμέν εἰναι ἀναγκαῖον δῶ εἰναι ἐν αὐτῷ. Compare again the discussion in Book iv (436 ff.) in which the principle of contradiction is first stated.

The change of construction from δὴ λοι ὄντος to προβαίνειν is caused by the transition to the impersonal verb. Cp. Euthyphr. 4 ὁ ὁ ἀνδροφόνον καὶ οἵδὲν ὑν πρόγμα. The accusative, when once adopted, is continued.

οὔτε τι...ποιοῦσι] The spirit of these words resembles that of many passages in the Laws; e.g. vii. 803 B, C ἢ ὁτε δὴ τοίνυν τῶ
Plato: Republic.

Republic τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπουδῆς οὐκ ἔξια, ἀναγκαίων γε μὴν σπουδαίων τούτο δὲ οὐκ εὐτυχίας.

C 604 ἐν αὐτοῖς] ‘In the circumstances’:—i. e. ἐν ταῖς ἐμφοραῖς (supra).

τίνι, ἢ τῇ ὅς, λέγεις;) Ὁ Ὀ. vii. 531 D, E.

ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπαθεῖντας, ὁμιλ. For the image cp. Dem. Philipp. i. § 40 ἄσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι πνεύματι, οὐτω πολεμεῖν Φιλίππη καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ὁ πληγεὶς οὐκ ἔχεται, ἀλλὰ ἐνεργεῖ πατάξει, ἐκεῖν' ἐκείν' οἶκες προβάλλονται δ' ἐξ ἔληπτων ἑαυτῶν οἷον οἴδεν οὐκ ἐθέλει.

γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τῷ ἱδαθαί] The dative appears elsewhere in similar expressions (ix. 585 A, Polit. 264 A, Laws vii. 799 c) and therefore τῷ (τά) is to be preferred to τῷ, the reading of the older MSS., which, however, is not impossible after γίγνεσθαι (‘to arrive at’).

D 605 φαμέν] ‘As we are saying’—supra B.

E θειλαίς φιλον] Cp. iv. 439 D πληρώσεων τινών καὶ ἱδονῶν ἑταίρων (neuter): supra 603 B.


μεμούμενον] μεμούμενον (sc. τινὸς αὐτῷ), the reading of Π and a few other MSS., has been preferred by some editors on the supposition that μεμούμαι is not used passively. As other tenses of the verb are taken in a passive sense (Laws ii. 668 B τὸ μεμιθηνίν: Cratyl. 425 D γράµµασι καὶ συναλλαξίς τὰ πράγματα μεμιθησάμενα: supra 599 A μεμιθησάμενον) there is no sufficient reason for refusing such a sense to the present. But, as Schneider observes, μεμούμενον here may quite well be an accusative masculine,—‘nor is it easy to understand one who tries to imitate this.’ Finicus (‘si imitemur’) perhaps read μεμούμενον.

πανηγύρει καὶ . . . ἐυλλεγομένους] πανηγύρει is dative of the occasion, while ἀνθρώποι is depends on εὐτυχεῖς καταμαθαίν. ‘At a public gathering, and for men assembling,’ &c.

oī . . . πέπην] oī negatives the whole sentence; hence καί, not oδὲ. It follows that τέ, not γε, is right, and τέ was probably at first written in Par. A, in which γε is a correction. (The mark — written over γ by the diorthotes, has been mistaken for τ.) For
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πέπηγε cp. vii. 530 δ ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ἁμαρταν πέπηγεν, δὲ πρὸς Republic X. 605

φαίλα . . . πρὸς ἀλήθειαν] Cp. supra 597 ἀμμαθῶν τι . . . πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.

ἐτέρων τοιούτων] sc. φαίλον, to which τοῦτο before ἡγείρει also refers.

δότερ εἰς πόλει] ‘As in the case of a city;’ sc. the rational part is destroyed. The subject of comparison is resumed in τοιούτων καὶ τόν, κ.τ.λ., infra.

παραδείγμα] sc. αὐτοῖς.

tοιούτων] Accusative in apposition to καθῆ . . . ἐμποιεῖν, bringing out the antecedent to δότερ.

πολιτείαν] The thought is similar to that in ix. 592 ὑ: sc. infra 608 ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας δεδομένη.

οὔτε τὰ μείζονα οὔτε τὰ ἄμετα] Cp. i. 343 οὐδὲ πρὸσάρα ὑπὲρ οὖσαν καὶ note.

ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ . . . ἀφεστώτα] There is great uncertainty about the text and construction of this passage. The reading εἰδωλο-

ποιοῦτα, which refers to the poet, rests on insufficient manuscript authority (q corr.). Nor is the change from the dative to the accusative necessary, as the ‘foolish part of the soul’ may very well be called ‘a maker of images.’ There is, however, good authority for ἀφεστώτα; and it may be argued that if either the dative or the accusative is read in one clause, it should be read in both. But ἀφεστώτα,—‘things remote from the truth,’ may quite well be in agreement with εἰδωλα. On the other hand, ἀφεστῶν, the reading of Ἀ. D corr., is also possible.—It may be argued further, on the one hand that εἰδωλοποιοῦτα agreeing with the subject of ἐμποιεῖν preserves better the balance of the sentence, on the other hand that it is too far removed from its context.

The crowning offence of poetry is her corrupting not only bad or indifferent persons, but even the good. Our feelings are stirred when Homer or one of the tragedians represents some pitiful hero weeping or smiting his breast. But in our own sorrows we are expected to play the manly part. And we cannot be right in praising others for a weakness which would disgrace ourselves. The same rule applies to the excess of laughter excited by comedy,
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and still more to the awakening of lower feelings. Hymns in praise of God and god-like men are the only poems which we admit in our state.

605 ἐρνοτάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους] 'Chanting and beating their breasts.'

The change from singular to plural marks the transition from the single speeches (ῥήσεις) of the characters in Epic poetry and tragedy to the combined song or plaint (κομμάς) of the chorus and the persons on the stage. The conjectural reading ἥ κλαίοντας for ἥ καὶ ἐρνοτάς is unnecessary.

606 μὴ ἄξιοι εἰσά] μὴ, not ὦ, is used in putting the case.

οὐ μὰ . . . σκοποῖς] ναὶ here expresses dissent from the negative preceding. 'That does not appear reasonable.' 'Yes, but it will, if you look at it in this way.' ἐπιγον is used in slightly different senses in the two clauses. 'It looks very inconsistent,' said Glaucon, 'thus to praise the tragic poet.—Rather, it is easily explained, if you look at it in this way.'

A πεπεινηκὼς τοῦ δακρύσαι] 'compelled to fast from tears:' i.e. which has been denied the satisfaction of weeping.

ἀνεισεῖ . . . τοῦτο] 'relaxes its watch over this tearful part of our nature.' Cp. viii. 547 c φιλικῆς αὐτῶν and note.

B ἔαν] Plato passes from the rational part of the soul to the man himself. ἔαν like ὦ is construed with the accusative neuter participle of an impersonal verb.

λογίζεθαι . . . εἰς τὰ οἴκεια] Cp. iii. 395 c ἐνα μὴ ἵκ τῆς μνήμης τού εἰσαι ἀπολαύσωσιν.

C ἄρ' οὖχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, κ.τ.λ.] περὶ τοῦ γελοίου depends on ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, and is to be continued with ταῦτα ποιεῖσ, κ.τ.λ., which is added in apposition to ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.

δὴ, *ἀν αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.] The text has been variously emended. Schneider's reading (ἀν for ὄν) has been adopted as involving the least change. Hermann's correction of δὲ to ἥ is to some extent confirmed by the absence of μὲν after αὐτός. Supposing this accepted, the simplest change is to add ἅ before αὐτός and ἃν after αἰσχύνουσι: — δὴ, ἀν ὁ αὐτός αἰσχύνου ἃν, κ.τ.λ., 'that, if jests, which you would be ashamed to make, sound delightful to your ear.' It is possible, however, that we have here a carelessly written
sentence, in which the differing moods δ' αὐτῷ κάθωσαι and δ' αὖν 
χαρῆς (= δ' αὖν ταύτα χαρῆς) are connected with δε.

αὖ] 'again,' as in the former case, supra λ.

ἐκεῖ] 'On those occasions,' i.e. in hearing poetry, cp. v. 451 b.

ἐν τούς οἰκείοις] In your private life and conversation (supra b).

καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων] ὁ αὖτος λόγος is to be supplied before δε.

Plato is an enemy to sentimentalism; all those influences which
are represented to us by novels, plays, poems, are to be sternly
repressed. He will not have the feelings excited by unreal
sorrows, lest they should be unequal to the support of real ones.
That the indulgence of the feelings even in virtuous or religious
emotions may be carried to excess, is certainly true. Also, as
Butler has remarked, passive impression is (or rather may be) in
an inverse ratio to active habit. Still, one who cannot feel is
almost as far removed from a rational being as one who cannot
think: the sources of imagination and sympathy are dried up in
him; and to quicken the feelings and imagination where they are
deficient is quite as important a part of education as to moderate
them where they are in excess.

Plato does not recognize that the indulgence of the feelings may
also be a cultivation of them (μιμησίας . . . περαινοῦσα δε' ἐλιών καὶ
φόβου τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαροι). What would he have
thought of a system which resolves the moral sentiments into
sympathy? Much of the obscurity of this subject arises out of
the strongly marked line of distinction which is drawn between
reason and feeling, and from the neglect to observe that reason
is often manifested in the form of feeling.

ὁξίος ἀναλαβώντα μαθάνειν] 'It is well worth while to take him
up and learn him.' The reading ὁξίος has the authority of Par. A
as well as of Π M, and is also more idiomatic than ἀξίων, which
has been adopted by editors on the supposed authority of Par. A.

δον] owing to the omission of its antecedent τοσοῦτον, is in
the accusative case; hence ἦμων by attraction to it becomes ἦμος.

ἐγκόμα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς] 'praises of the brave,' like Symp. 194 ν
ἐγκαμίων τῷ ᾼρωτε. The construction here follows that of the
preceding words.

τοῦ κοινῷ . . . λόγοι] Either (1) 'the reason which by common
consent has always been held to be the highest,' or (2) 'that reason which from time to time appears best to the majority.' Cp. supra 604 b, c.

Such then is our defence for what may seem hard measure towards the poets who have charmed us. The truth is that there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. But if the Muse, making her defence in turn, can prove that we are wrong, we are only too ready to listen to her. Yet until she or her friends can show that she is not only pleasant but useful to the state, we shall hear her under protest, using the foregoing argument as a counter-charm. For great is the issue at stake. And of the highest rewards of virtue we have not yet spoken.

The reasons for ἀπολελογηθείτω, 'let this be our defence,' and ἀπολελογισθείτω, 'let this be our final reckoning' or 'summing up,' are very nearly balanced. In favour of the latter may be urged (1) the agreement of the two best MSS. Par. Λ and Ven. Π, (2) the old argument of the 'more difficult reading;' (3) the apparent anticipation of the defence of poetry in the word ἀπολελογηθείτω, which may also have suggested the alteration to the mind of the copyist, (4) the tone of the preceding pages, which has not been that of apology but of accusation or judgement (supra 595 Α, Β, 604 Δ, Ε). On the other hand, ἀπολελογηθείτω (1) has the consent of the remaining MSS., (2) is a more natural and appropriate expression; (3) towards Homer at least the attitude has been one of apology; (4) in the immediate context, the exep exegesis ἐπὶ εἴκόνων ἀρα, κ.τ.λ., is more suitable to this idea, for which cp. also iv. 420 Β, vi. 490 Α; Phaedo 63, 69; (5) 'this is our defence; let poetry make hers if she can,'—is not by any means an illogical sequence.

ὁ γάρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἠρεῖ] The expression ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ is not infrequent in the sense, 'reason constrains us.' In the present passage ὁ λόγος may mean either (1) 'the argument,' as in Laws ii. 663 Β ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτῷ ἠρεῖ ὁ λόγος ἑξείν, or (2) 'reason' generally. The addition of ἡμᾶς which gives a touch of liveliness, is rather in favour of the former.

προσείκωμεν] 'let us say in addition,' cp. Soph. 250 Β. The scribe of Ρ, not understanding this, wrote αὐτὴν instead of αὑτῆ.
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καὶ γὰρ ἡ λακέρωια, κ.τ.λ.] for the saying of 'the yelping hound barking at her lord' and 'one mighty in the vain talk of fools,' &c. The first of these two quotations is said by Plato (Laws xii. 967 c, d) to be applied by certain poets to the disciples of Anaxagoras, who though nameless, are sufficiently indicated by their doctrine ὡς νοῦς εἶναι δὲ ἀδιακόσμητος πάνθεον ὡς κἀρ' οἰδανοῖς,—which doctrine of theirs however they ruined, and themselves with it, by also making earth and stones the universal causes.

ὁ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ὀχλος κρατῶν] The best mode of construing this clause is to take Δία with κρατῶν, 'the crowd of philosophers overmastering Zeus.' Cp. Shakespeare, Hamlet, v. 1, 86–88 'A politician, . . . one that would circumvent God.' The order of the words may be possibly explained by the circumstance of their being a quotation from some lyric poet. In Plato himself, however, there occur examples of somewhat violent or affected transpositions, as in Laws vii. 824 λ θρευσίς . . . ἡ τῶν διανομήματα πόσων ἔλεος. The Vulgate text before Bekker (still followed by some editors) had διασώφων in one word on the authority of some inferior manuscripts (which read διασοφῶν) according to the supposed analogy of διάσεμνος,—itself a word of doubtful authority.

ὁ σημεῖα] sc. ὅστις, which gives the required verb.

ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν ποιητική] is opposed to the 'austere' poetry which is to be admitted: iii. 398 λ ἄντι δ' ἀν καὶ ἀνθρωπότερον καὶ ἀδειστήρῳ ποιητῇ χρῶμεθα.

ἀπολογησομενή] The reading ἀπολογησομενή, which seems to have been that of Α', is probably right. ὁδῷ, 'on this condition,' is explained by ἀπολογησομενή . . . μέτρῳ.

τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν] said ironically, like ἡ καλλιστη . . . πολιτεία in viii. 562 λ.

† αἰσθάμεθα] is a word of doubtful genuineness. And even if it be changed to αἰσθανόμεθα, the expression is feeble. 'Hiaσθάμεθα and ἱσθάμεθα are not much better. Εἰσόμεθα, the reading of q, is probably conjectural. Madvig very ingeniously conjectured φοσμεθα, continuing the idea of ἐπιδραμες. But (1) the participial clause εἰσλαβοῦμενοι . . . ἐρωτα is hardly enough of a digression to justify the resumptive δ' ὅτι: (2) the expression φοσμεθα ὡς, κ.τ.λ., is not quite natural or idiomatic: (3) there is nothing in the words ὡς ὅ
One life is far too little to reward virtue, or to deserve the serious care of an immortal soul. — That the human soul is immortal is a strange thought to Glacon. But Socrates undertakes to prove it.

Poetry is emphasized as being the immediate subject of the previous discussion.

That the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which is asserted in the Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and referred to in the Apology, Timaeus, Politicus, Laws,—and also in Rep. vi. 498 d, should be here spoken of as a new revelation of which Glacon hears for the first time, is remarkable.

That which perishes can be destroyed only by its own proper evil. Now the soul has an evil proper to it, namely vice. But vice does not destroy the soul. It would lose all it terrors if it did. For it would release the wicked man from evil. Instead of which it keeps him alive and wide awake. It follows that as the soul is capable of being destroyed by its own evil, the soul therefore must be imperishable and immortal.
destroying power over the soul, no merely external evil can have any.

κακῶν τι] The best MSS. read κακῶν τε, which is possibly right.

τούτο μάταιο . . . ἀπολλύον] 'An evil however whose destructive agency cannot cause its dissolution.'


ἀλλ' ὅσε ποιεῖ] 'But put the matter in this way.'

ὅσπερ . . . (ὁ) ἀφικνεῖται] The apodosis is deferred to make room for the question ὅστις οὖς; It is resumed in a new form in ὅτι δή, κ.τ.λ., infra.

καὶ ἂ ρών δή, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ must here mean 'and'—not 'also,' as in καὶ ψυχή infra d, because the comparison is not between the body and corn, iron (supra λ), &c., but between all these and the soul.

ἐκεῖνο γε] 'The other (and more remote) alternative,' referring to supra λ.

ὑπὸ τῆς . . . ποιμνίας . . . ἐκείνων] 'by the evil which is proper to them alone,' i.e. in so far as it is an evil of food considered in itself. For example, mildew, the disease of corn, can destroy the ear of corn, but the mildewed ear of corn will not destroy the human body of itself, but only by introducing into it some disease of the body.

*ἀρθότατα] ἀρθότατα ἄν is the reading of all the MSS. with two unimportant exceptions (ἀρθότατα ἄν Vind. F, ἀρθότατα ἄρ Vind. E), but is probably corrupt. Either ἀρθότατα as in the text, or ἀρθότατα γ', should be read.

ἡ τοίνυν . . . (ό) ἀνασωμέτερα γύνηται] Compare the first chapter of Butler's Analogy, Part i:—especially the curious observation, 'we have no way of determining by experience what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself; and yet till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be absolutely indiscrepible.' Here however Butler seems to imply that the soul may be a primary atom, and so indivisible. Plato argues that no disease
of the body nor division of the particles however minute can affect the soul.

For εἰ τις δ' τι σμικρότατα we should perhaps read εἰ τις εἰς δ' τι σμικρότατα: but cp. vi. 509 δ' γραμμήν δίχα τετμημένη ... ἄνσα τριήματα.

όμοιε τῷ λόγῳ τολμεῖ ιέναι] 'boldly closes' (1) 'with our argument,' or (2) 'with us in argument.' The latter may be supported by the absolute use of ὀμός ... χωρῆσθαι in Theaet. 165 ε, and for τῷ λόγῳ thus used cp. ii. 361 β τῶν δίκαιων παρ' αὐτῶν ἑστώμεν τῷ λόγῳ. But the first explanation is perhaps simpler and more natural.

μάλιστα ... ἔττοι] sc. λαμβάνοντα αὐτό.

ἀλλὰ μή, ὥσπερ νῦν ... οἱ ἄδικοι] Cp. vii. 539 δ καὶ μῆ δις νῦν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν προσέχον ἔρχεται ἐν' αὐτὸ— and the note there.

πρὸς ... τῷ [προσκ] Cp. Theaet. 185 ε καλὸς γὰρ εἰ, δ' Θεώτητε ... πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἑπολήγας με.

ὀὖν πόρρω ... εἰναι] 'So far is she removed from being deadly.' I.e. Injustice is far enough from being one of the things which cause death. Cp. Phaedo 107 c εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν ὁ βάνας τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγῇ, ἔρροικν ἤν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος διὰ ἀπηλλάθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. Yet at the end of Book i (351 ff.) Socrates uses an argument apparently inconsistent with this, which he applies both to the state and to the individual, viz. that evil is a principle of dissolution or annihilation, which subsists only through the latent presence of good.

For the figurative language cp. Polit. 284 E πάνθος ὃποφα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀποκαθῆ τῶν ἐκχάτων.

Now the number of souls, since they are immortal, must always be the same, neither less nor more; they cannot become less, because none of them can die: and they cannot increase, because they could only be increased if what is mortal became immortal, of which the result would be that all things would become immortal. Nor can their nature really be so complex as appears to us. The fact of immortality is proved. But the nature of the soul is beyond the limits of our knowledge. For she is plunged in the sea of mortality and encrusted with earth. Only the divine spark of philosophy within her gives an inkling of her pristine and true being.
Plato teaches that souls are eternal, and have a certain fixed number which is incapable of increase or diminution. Any process of change by which the mortal passes into the immortal must end after infinite ages in the immortality of all the mortal. That this is Plato’s meaning, which is, however, obscurely expressed, appears from Phaeo 72 B, C ει γαρ μη εις αναποδοθαι τα έτερα τοις έτεροις γνωριμεναι, οσπερει κυκλο περιοντα, διλλ’ ευθεια τε εις η γενεσι εκ του έτερου μόνου εις το καταστημι, και μη απακαμπτοι παλιν επι το έτερον μηδε καμπην πωοτο, ολοθ’ οτι πυντα τελευτωντα το αυτο σχημα δη σχοιν οπου an opposite turn is given to the same argument and it is urged that life must follow death as death follows life. One of the reasons given by Anselm in Cur Deus Homo, for the redemption of mankind, is ‘the appointed number of the souls of the blessed.’

τη δηθεσεται φωσιν] ‘in her truest nature,’ as distinguished from that phenomenal nature of the soul which is known to us in experience, and has parts and opposing desires as in Book iv.

οδ δριων, κ.τ.λ.] (1) ‘that can hardly be eternal, as we have now discovered the soul to be, which is compounded of many elements, and is not perfectly compounded.’ The words σωθετον τε, κ.τ.λ., may be illustrated by ix. 588 ff. where the soul is said in a figure to be composed of a many-headed beast, a lion, and a man. Otherwise (2) the words ὡς νυν...ψυχη may be taken closely with the clause immediately preceding and referred to the psychology of Books iv and ix. The position of the words in question is in favour of the latter explanation—‘that can hardly be eternal which is imperfectly compounded of various elements, as in our present conversation the soul has appeared to be.’

[L. C.] Cp. infra c νυν δι ειπομεν, κ.τ.λ., 612 α νυν δι... διεληπιδιμεν.

και οι άλλοι] such as the reasonings in the Phaeo and Phaedrus.

ἀναγκάσειν αν] ‘would prove beyond doubt.’

εὑρήσει... διοφεται] The subject of these verbs is to be gathered from the preceding sentence: viz. ο διτω διαθεωμενος.

δικαιοσύνας τε και δικιας] The plural signifies the concrete realization of the abstract notion:—Justice and Injustice in their various forms.

τεθεόμεθα μέντοι... την όρχαίν διότιν] The construction is
altered to suit the expansion of the simile: and there is a resumption of τεθέντες... αὐτό in infra ν οὖν καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, κ.τ.λ.

With the following image cp. Phaedrus 250 c ἀδαμαντιώτα τούτου δὲ νόμω σώμα περιφέροντες ὅνωμάζομεν, ὀστεάν τρόπων δεδεμομένου.

υπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὁρμῆς] sc. τῆς τοῦ τῶς θείω εὔπεπτου.

γενρᾶ καὶ πετρώθη] These words in the relative clause resume "ἐπίρρεα τε καὶ ὀστεά supra.

υπὸ... δότεςων] 'as the effects of what are called blissful banquets.' Cp. supra γὰν ἐστις."
accusations or clear away objections is a meaning constantly assigned to ἀπολύεσθαι. On the other hand there is no certain instance of the use of the middle voice of this verb in the sense of 'paying a debt.' A various reading ἀπεδομάσθαι is found in the Cesena MS. (M), in Ven. z, and in Stobaeus: this may be connected with the passage (ii. 361 c γεμυμνώσκοι δῆ πάντων πλὴν δικαιώσῃς, κ.τ.λ.) in which Glauccon and Adeimantus desire Socrates to 'strip' justice. The allusion, however, is too remote; the form is unusual in Attic prose, and the reading is not assisted by the immediate context.

ἐπηνέκαμεν] Par. A reads ἐπηνέγκαμεν (sic) with a dot over the γ, suggesting ἐπηνέκαμεν, and Par. K reads ἐπηνέσαμεν. This recalls the words of Adeimantus (which may however have suggested this reading to the scribe) ii. 363 a οὐκ αὐτῷ δικαιώσῃς ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλα τάς ἀν’ αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ib. 367 d μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πιέρες ἄλως ἐπανεῖν. But for ἐπεφέρειν, 'to bring to bear,' 'apply' (reading ἐπηνέκαμεν), cp. Soph. 251 a λέγομεν δικαίωσθαι δῇ ποιήσαντες τά τε χρώματα ἐπεφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ . . . κακίας καὶ ἄρετα.—The word ἐπηνέκαμεν with the same variant ἐπηνέσαμεν occurs in Polit. 307 a.

ὁμεῖς γὰρ ἄγεισθε] ii. 361 a ff., 367 ε.

ἡτίσθε, the reading of Par. A, which is supported by M (ἡτίσθε) is perhaps to be preferred to ἄγεισθε: it agrees better with Ἰδωκα and δοτέον, and with ἀπατῶ in the following sentence. Cp. infra n, ε. There is a slight pleonasm or anacoluthon in δοτέον following ἠτίσθε, which however is not unplatonic.

ταῦτα λαμάνθην] ‘That one should escape notice in this.’ ταῦτα, cognate accusative.

δοκεῖοναί] For the passive cp. vi. 490 a τοῖς . . . δοκουμένοις.

ἐι μὴ τι αναγκαῖον, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Butler, Analogy, Part. i. chap. 2 ‘Why the author of nature does not make his creatures happy without the instrumentality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another matter. Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things which we are unacquainted with.’

ἐκ προτέρων ἀμαρτίας] The effect of one life on another is again referred to infra 620 a κατὰ συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἱρεῖσθαι.

οδ γὰρ δή, κ.τ.λ.] cp. vi. 500 c, D θελεί δὴ καὶ κοσμίῃ δ' γε φιλόσοφος vol. III. h h
Socrates is about to show that righteousness has the rewards both of this life and of another. He may be said to have partly begged the question of this life by imagining the existence of true happiness in a perfect state. Yet, as he has himself implied at the end of Book ix, the good man has also the power of constructing a 'Kingdom of God' within him, even when the world is against him. Nor is he so antagonistic to his fellow-creatures in fact as he is supposed to be in idea. The world comes round to him at last: appearances as well as realities must be at length restored to him: virtue in the long run is also happiness and good repute.

'Is not the actual truth as follows? Are not those clever unjust men in the position of runners who run well from the lower end of the course to the upper, but not from the upper to the lower? They lead off at a great pace, but in the end come to look foolish, slinking away with their ears down on their shoulders, and without a crown.' The words ἀνω τῶν κάτω . . . ἄνω have been taken to mean 'from the lower and upper parts of their body,' i.e. their hips and shoulders; and Socrates is supposed to be describing those who have good legs and no chest. See Riddell's *Digest of Idioms*, § 111: also Madvig quoted by Baiter in his preface. But it seems more natural to apply the ambiguous words ἄνω and κάτω to the upper and lower end of the race-course than to the parts of the human body. The 'upper end' of the course is that farthest from the starting-place, and only a course up and down the stadium is contemplated. The second statement (τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, κ.τ.λ.) as in many similar passages is an expansion of the first. The race alluded to is of course the δίανθος: cp. Aesch. Agam. 343, 344 δέι γὰρ πρὸς οὖκος νοστίμου σωτηρίας | κάμψαι διανθόν βάτερον κάλον πάλιν. The new interpretation in which Riddell and Madvig concur rather takes from the point of the comparison, but the use of ἀπό which it implies is idiomatic: cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. v. 9 ὀμοίως γὰρ ἀπὸ τε τῶν σκληρῶν καὶ ἀπὸ χειρῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τραχήλου γυμνάζονται.

Another of the numerous links by which Plato connects the beginning with the end of his work.
Notes: Book X.

γέροντες ... προπηλακίζονται (1) 'As they grow old they are miserably insulted' (ἀθλοι predicative), rather than (2) 'becoming wretched old men they are insulted.'

The words εἶτα στραβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται, though found in all MSS., are omitted by some editors and bracketed by others. There is no necessity for this. The addition of the word εἶτα, which improves the effect of them, sufficiently shows that they are not a gloss arising out of a reference to the words of Glaucion, ii. 361 E. They suggest the antecedent to δ, and may be sufficiently defended as a humorous epitome of the original to which Socrates briefly refers.

δ λέγω] supra c.

καὶ μᾶλλ' ἐφη, κ.τ.λ.] καὶ μᾶλ (καὶ intensive) is to be taken closely with καλὰ τε καὶ βέβαια. 'They are indeed most fair and well assured.'

Yet greater far are the rewards of the just and the punishments of the unjust in another life. This is shown by the report which Er the Pamphylian brought from the other world. He was left for dead amongst the slain, and twelve days afterwards came to life upon the funeral pyre. His tale was as follows:—'When his soul left the body, he proceeded with a great company to a place where there were two chasms in the earth, near together; and directly above them two chasms in the sky. Judges sat there in the midst, and after judgement, some souls ascended through the chasm on the right, while others descended into the chasm on the left. He himself on approaching the judgement seat, was told that he was to observe what took place, and carry the report of it back to living men. Then he beheld how from the chasm on the right hand were coming up souls parched and dusty, while from the chasm upon the left came down another troop clean and bright. All gladly rested in the meadow after their long journey of a thousand years.'

Plato ends the Republic with a myth: partly (1) because he is on the limits of human knowledge: imagination necessarily enters into any representation of another life: (2) also because he has the old garment of mythology still clinging to him: (3) that he may popularize moral truths by investing them with the charm of a religious tale: (4) since he is embodying in literature the Pythagorean and Orphic feelings of the age. Like religious...
paintings, the myths of Plato have also some traditional elements which lend them verisimilitude and help to bring them into harmony with contemporary ideas. Plato is accepting the old forms and trying to breathe a moral and intellectual life into them. His myth consequently, instead of being a mere fiction or fairy tale, is supported by the strength of traditional belief. The attempts of Numenius, Proclus and others to connect this myth with those in Gorg., Phaed., Phaedr., Tim. so as to get a complete and consistent view of Plato's supra-mundane theories, only show the futility of such a method.

τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἁκοῦσαι] 'The debt of description which the argument owes to them.' Supra 612 c ὁ ἰδανίστασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. The repetition of ἁκοῦσαι has been suspected by Stephanus and Stallbaum, but the word is not without meaning if it be taken in the sense of 'to have related concerning them.' Cp. supra vi. 496 ά, Lys. 207 ά οὔ τὸ καλὸς ἢνα μόνον ἄξιος ἁκοῦσαι. The debt which has been incurred in words has to be paid in words.

λέγοις ἄν, κ.τ.λ. ] 'As one who delights in listening to few things more.'

ἀλλ' ἄλκιμον μὲν ἄνδρος] Socrates makes a pun on the name of Alcinous; as we might say, parodying the words: 'I will introduce you to a hero: not the well-known one of the Pilgrim's Progress:---yet this too is a Great-heart.' Cp. Symp. 185 c Παυσανίον δὲ πανσαμένου. There is perhaps an allusion to the descent among the shades (Odyssey xi) which forms a part of the tale of Ulysses to Alcinous. The epithet is appropriate to one who fell in battle.

tοῦ Ἀρμενίου] not 'the A.menian' but 'the son of Armenius' as in the quotation of Clement infra: his country is mentioned afterwards. Pamphylia is again referred to, infra 615 c.

Ερ, the son of Armenius, is declared by Clement of Alexandria (Stromat. v. 710, § 24) to be Zoroaster: ὁ δ' αὐτὸς (sc. Πλάτων) ἐν τῷ δικαίῳ τῆς Πολιτείας Ἰρός τοῦ Ἀρμενίου τὸ γένος Πάμφυλον μέμνηται, ὡς ἐστὶ Ζωροαστρῆς αὐτός γοῦν ὁ Ζωροαστρῆς γράφει: Τάδε ἐνεγράψε Ζωροαστρῆς Ἀρμενίου τὸ γένος Πάμφυλος ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας ὅσα ἐν Ἀλτὶ γενόμενος ἵδαι παρὰ θεῶν.

dεκαταϊὼν . . . δωδεκαταῖος] This gives two days for the home-bringing and funeral preparations. The twelve days are not forgotten in the narrative. The sojourn of seven days is succeeded
by a journey of four days, and this by another journey of one day (616 B).

ἐπειδὴ οὖ] The first hand in Par. A wrote ἐπειδῇ οὖ with Ven. x: an early corrector changed this to ἐπειδὴ οὖν. The genitive goes with the noun: not 'when the soul left him,' but 'when his spirit went forth.' In what follows, the soul or spirit is spoken of as the man.

eἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον] 'to a wonderful place.'


τῶν διακρινόμενων] is neuter: cp. infra σημεία πάνω ἐν ἐπραβαν.

διακρινόμενο] Oblique for διακρινομένα: 'The judges or their apparitors said, "You must be the messenger, and we exhort you to look and listen.'"

‘The souls that came from heaven, pure and bright, and those that rose out of the ground, dusty and soiled, met and rested in the meadow, friends greeting friends and telling of what they had seen in their respective journeys. The one told of delights beyond compare; the other with lamentation and weeping recounted all that they had suffered and seen others suffer. Each sin was punished ten times over, once in every hundred years; and the rewarding of good deeds was in the same proportion. Newly born infants, too, were there, but of them there is not much to be said. The punishments of impiety and parricide were greater than of other sins. I heard a Pamphylian ask, "Where is Ardiaeus the Great?" "Not here," was the reply,—"nor will he ever come. The mouth of the chasm refused him with a terrific roar, and he was thrown down and flayed and dragged away over spikes of flint to be cast into the abyss." The same happened to other tyrants.'

δια τι καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν] 'Of all the dreadful things they had experienced.'

χιλιετη] The form χιλιετη is supported by the Cesena MS., and by Par. DK which may be taken as representing Ven. Π, of which the concluding pages are wanting.
Republic

X.

615 B

τούτο δ' εἶναι... ἀνθρωπίνου] 'that is to say, once in every hundred years, this being reckoned as the measure of the life of man.' Plato often deals in round numbers. See ix. 588 A προσηκόντα... βίοις ἀριθμοῖς. τούτο refers to δήκνυ δεδυκάνα... δεκάες.

καὶ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence breaks off with an illustration and is continued as if δὲ had preceded: καὶ, which is found in all the MSS. is genuine, and the phrase may be explained as a colloquialism:—'And, for example, if there were any,' &c.

πολλαῖς] This is the reading of Ven. Ξ, and may be a conjectural emendation of πολλοὶ, the reading of most MSS., which cannot be right. A corrector of Par. 5 has changed πολλοὶ to πολλοῖς,—certainly an idiomatic reading. Schneider is hardly justified in saying of it 'propter pluralenum θανάτων ferri nequit.' Cp. Laws ix. 870 D. The words ἥ πολεις... ἐμπεθεληκότες explain θανάτων... αἰτποι.

κομίσαντο... κομίζοντο] The aorist refers to the fact, the present to the general rule.

τῶν δὲ εὐθὸς γενομένων... πέρι] 'And of those (who died) as soon as they were born, or after living only a little while.' Since the dead alone are in question, the ellipse of ἀποθανόντων or ἀπογενομένων (conjectured by Cobet) can be endured, especially since it avoids the collision of two participles.—Plato also has a 'limbus infantum,' at which he hints.

C

eἰς δὲ θεοὶ... διηγείτο] 'and of piety and impiety to Gods and parents and of the murder of kindred (reading αὐτόκειρος φίλου), the retributions which he narrated were yet greater.' The reading of all the MSS. is αὐτόκειρος, as in the text, of which, however, no grammatical account can be given. The conjecture of Ast, αὐτόκειρος φίλου, is extremely probable. Αὐτόκειρ is used, as often in tragedy, to imply violence to kindred: cp. Laws ix. 872 C ἔγγενῶν αὐτόκειρος φίλου. The sentence thus includes all acts of impiety, as involving a higher degree of crime.

'Ἀρδαιὸς ὁ μέγας] The tyrant of Books viii, ix, is still alive, and is having the reward of his crimes. The spirits amongst whom Er finds himself are his own countrymen. The questioner is obviously a Pamphylian, who, having passed his thousand years in Heaven, is still interested in the concerns of his native country. He asks of his friend who has come from Hell (cp. supra 614 ξ ὡςυ γνώριμαι) not without a certain degree of dread, how it has fared with the
contemporary tyrant, of whose greatness he still retains the impression.

χίλιοις τῶν ἔτος] Cp. supra A εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλίητη. Plato would not have us forget that a thousand years have passed since these spirits were in the body.

ἀποκτείνας] = δὲ ἀπίστευεν, 'who in the course of his tyranny had slain.'

οὖν δὲ ήξει] οὖν combined with the future indicative throws a shade of irony into the meaning: 'nor is he likely to be coming here.' See Goodwin, M. and T. § 197.

ἐθεασάμεθα, κ.τ.λ.] These are not the words of Er, but of the spirit whom he overhears. The narrative which follows is a confirmation of the words 'he is not likely to come.' Er begins again to speak in his own person at infra 616 b καὶ τὰς μὲν δή.

τοῦτο] refers both to what precedes and follows: 'for this' viz. the fate of Ardiaeus 'was one of the terrible sights which we' i.e. the spirits in the world below 'witnessed.' The partitive genitive here forms part of the predication.

καὶ τῶλλα πάντα πεπονθήτες] 'and had suffered all that we told you.' These words, like τῶν δεινῶν θεμάτων supra, refer to the conversation which the pilgrims from the lower world had held with the pilgrims from the upper respecting their experiences in the thousand years,—supra 614 e. τῶλλα, 'the rest,' i.e. all except the spectacle now to be described.

ἡσαν δὲ καὶ . . . ἡμαρτηκότων] It was not the position of the tyrant that had merited judgement, but the character of his life. Cp. Gorg. 524 E ὁ Ῥαδαμάνθος . . . διὰ τίνα ἑκάστον τὴν ψυχήν, οἷς εἰδὼς ἄτον ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ παλλάμεις τοῦ μεγίστου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος, κ.τ.λ.

ἀ μὴ ἰκανῶς, κ.τ.λ.] Ardiaeus was incurable, but the attempt might be made prematurely by whose term of punishment was only to be temporarily prolonged.

ἐνταῦθα δή, κ.τ.λ.] The ministers of vengeance are represented as they might be in Dante or by one of the early Italian painters. They are waiting (παρεστώτες) for the well-known signal.

τῶν δὲ Ἀρδιαίου . . . (616 λ) ἄγουτο] The transposition of ὧν εἰς to εἰς ὧν in Par. A led Hermann to conjecture that τῶν Τάρταρον as well
Plato: Republic.

Republic

615 E

as ταῦτα ἐπομένον was an accretion. The latter words are probably a gloss: they are not found in ΑΜ. It is not possible, nor is it very important to determine accurately the reading of this passage: the general meaning is clear enough.

616 A

σφίαν] 'to him and to his fellows' viz. the souls just ascended from beneath.

τῶν . . . ἀναβαίνοι] There is some confusion in the MSS. here. Par. K appears to read as in the text. Par. A omits τῶν ἄφθων: other MSS. retaining τῶν ἄφθων read εἰ μηκήσατο τὸ στόμιον instead of μη γένοιτο . . . ἀναβαίνοι. There can be little doubt that in these MSS. a gloss has taken the place of the true reading. But τῶν ἄφθων is probably genuine, although in the reading of Par. A it has been rejected as superfluous.

συγγεγαρτός] sc. τοῦ στόμιου supra 615 E. The aorist points to the moment of passing the aperture. Observe too, the difference between ἀναβαίνοι, 'tried to ascend,' and ἀναβήναι, 'ascended.'

617 D

'Now after seven days of rest in the meadow we set out upon our journey. And during the fourth day's journeying we saw far off a light, straight like a pillar, in colour like unto a rainbow. Another day of travel brought us to the light, and in the midst of it we saw the spindle of necessity depending from the fastenings of the sky. This spindle is the cause of all the celestial revolutions, and the ball or whorl of it is eight-fold, as there are eight concentric circles or orbits (fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, Sun and Moon), endowed with appropriate motions, and each having its peculiar Siren tone. The three Fates sit round and set their hands to the revolutions of the spindle as it turns on the knees of their mother Necessity, where she sits enthroned. And they sing, to the music of the spheres, Lachesis of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future.'

616 B

ἐκάστοις] 'each company,' i.e. all those who had arrived on the same day.

δεῖν] is general, referring to all the souls: ἀφικνέσθαι refers to Er and his company in particular.
Notes: Book X.

ἐκεῖν... φῶς εἰδότα] ἀνωθεν is to be taken with τεταμένον. Republic

616

B

‘Whence they descried a line of light reaching from above.’ It is worth observing as illustrating the difference between Greek and English on the subject of Tautology, that in this most finished passage Plato three times over uses the same word (τεταμένον) within ten lines. The phrase διὰ παντὸς τεταμένον is applied in the Timaeus, p. 40, to the axis of the universe (πόλος).

μᾶλλον τῇ ἱρωδί προσφέρῃ] That is, not in shape, but in colour. It has been remarked by Boeckh, following Numenius and others, that the idea of the luminous column was suggested by the Milky Way. But this is hardly consistent with the distinct statement that the light was straight and vertical, or with the rainbow colours.

τὰ ἀκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν] ‘the extremities of the chains of Heaven’ or ‘of the Light.’ αὐτοῦ is ambiguous, and may refer either to ὁδρανοῦ or φῶς,—more naturally to the former.

The Earth is imagined as an inner sphere, concentric with the outer sphere of the heaven, and connected with it by the column of light, in the midst of which are fastened the ends of the chains of Heaven. In the centre of the column and attached to the ends of these chains is the spindle which the Fates are turning upon the knees of Necessity. This together with the whirl which ‘governs’ it gives law to the movements of the heavenly bodies.

The Light is compared to the ἐπόξωμα of a trireme, which is variously explained as the undergirding rope (Acts xxvii. 17), or as a rope passing from stem to stern. See especially E. Warre in Journal of Hellenic Studies, v. 216 (‘On the raft of Ulysses’): ‘The hawser, called ἐπόξωμα, stretched from stem to stern, over crutches, kept up bow and stern and prevented “hogging.”’ This is seen very clearly in the representation of an Egyptian ship given in Duemichen’s Fleet of an Egyptian Queen. Possibly the difficulty about the ἐπόξωμα, Plat. Rep. Bk. x, finds its solution in this straight truss amidsthips. But the ἐποξώματα in the case of triremes seem generally to have been applied outside, stretching from stem to stern on both sides of the vessel. These hawser, put on dry, would shrink when wet, and so tighten up the timbers of the lightly built vessel.’ The thought of Plato seems to be that the whole circle of the Universe was held fast by the column, which, like the rope that fastened a trireme from stem to stern, passed through the midst of it. The words, όλον κίονα, show that the position of
the column was vertical from Er's point of view. The lower hemisphere is not considered, because everything is viewed from the upper surface of the Earth. The form of expression, εἶναι γάρ, κ.τ.λ., shows that the figure of the ἵπποςμα illustrates rather the function than the appearance of the pillar of light.

τὴν περιφορὰν] 'the revolving sphere,'—not merely 'the revolution.'

'Ἀνάγκης ἀτρακτῷ] The spindle of necessity is the pole or axis of the heaven and earth, which passes through the midst of the column of light.

τὴν ... ἤλακατη] Not here the distaff, but 'the shaft' of the spindle.

ἐκ τῆς τούτου καὶ ἄλλων γενόν] Cp. the difference, in Tim. 41 d, between the Divine and Mundane elements of the Creation.

τὸ μὲν ... ἐνθάδε] 'In shape it (ἡ τοῦ σφαιρικοῦ φύσις) resembled that (ἡ sc. φύσις) of a common whorl.'

νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ, κ.τ.λ.] The whorl is fastened round the spindle like the body of a teetotum on its shaft, and is formed of eight whorls fitting one into the other like a number of boxes, and showing on the upper side a continuous surface. It is doubtful whether this whorl is in the form of a cylinder or of part of a sphere. The circumstance that the upper surface only is said to be smooth is in favour of the latter supposition, which also agrees better with the image of the boxes fitting into one another. But on the other hand the shaft is driven home (διαμπτερές ἐλπίσαται) through the eighth or innermost, and each whorl appears to be driven through and through the one immediately outside it,—although διαμπτερές ... ἀρμότων may be understood to mean merely that they fitted each other in every part.

τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτον τε, κ.τ.λ.] The passage which follows is to be explained (1) from the phenomena of the Heavens, as they
Notes: Book X.

present themselves to the eye, or as they were accounted for by the crude astronomy of Plato's age: (2) from certain Pythagorean ratios or harmonies of number. The description of the heavenly bodies is still partly a work of fancy. This part of the Republic agrees with the Timaeus in general outline. (a) The order of the planets is the same in both: (b) there is an axis of the universe in both, which passes through the centre of the earth: (c) in both there is one motion of the whole, and a different motion of the seven inner circles. (d) In neither is there any distinct mention of a motion of the earth. The whole and the outermost circle are moving in one direction, the seven inner circles while partaking of this motion, ἐν τῷ διάλεκτῳ περιφερομένῳ, move also gently, ἰδιότα, in an opposite direction. This conception of a double movement seems intended to explain the difficulties of astronomy arising out of the apparent diurnal motion of the Heavens round the Earth and the distinct and apparently inconsistent movements of the Sun, Moon and Planets: cp. Tim. 38 ζ ff. The outer whorl, which is spotted, represents the fixed stars (which, as in the Timaeus, have only the 'motion of the same'); the seventh which is described as the brightest is the sun; the eighth shining with borrowed light, and having more of retrograde motion, is the moon; the second and fifth, which are of a yellower colour than the sun and moon, are Saturn and Mercury; the third and whitest of all is Jupiter; the next whitest or sixth is Venus; the fourth, which is reddish, is Mars. The whorl of the fixed stars is the widest; the others are enumerated according to their width; the breadth of the rims may be intended to signify the supposed distances of the orbits from each other; it may also rest merely on some notion of harmonical arrangement.

[It is difficult to reason about a description of the universe which is mythical and fanciful, and only has a faint basis in the astronomical notions of the ancients themselves. The following note on this subject has been contributed by Mr. W. A. Craigie, and deserves insertion here.

The order of Plato's enumeration of the planets in
Rep. x. 616 ζ, ff.

Although the relative distance, brightness, &c. of the σφάλδωλα, in this theory of the universe, correspond in the first instance to the real or supposed distance &c. of the planets denoted by these, there is a curious fact connected with Plato's order of arranging them
that can hardly be accidental, and may account for his views regarding some of their properties. This is that each enumeration seems to be based on combinations which rest on the number 9. Thus to take first the 'breadth of the lips' of the σφόνδυλοι, which gives Plato's view of the distance of each planet from the other, we have the following series, the 1st σφόνδυλος being the outermost and the 8th the innermost of the set.

A. No. of σφόνδυλοι 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
Order of 'width' 1 8 7 3 6 2 5 4

By thus joining those σφόνδυλοι whose united numbers produce a sum of 9, we have a symmetrical figure with its centre between the 4th and 5th.

This appears even more clearly in the next enumeration, that of the respective colours, for here it comes out in the otherwise arbitrary way in which Plato springs from one to another instead of taking them in the order of some scheme of colour. Thus the 4th, which is reddish, is inserted between the 3rd and 6th, which are both white. Writing down the numbers then in Plato's order, we get

B. 1 7 8 2 = 5 3 4 6

which gives another set divided in the centre of the 8 rings, where it is indeed coupled by the remark that the 2nd and 5th nearly resemble each other.

The respective speed of the rings gives them in their natural order from 8 to 1 which of course produces a similar result

C. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | centre | 8 7 &c.

It may also be significant here that the three which move at the same rate (5, 6, 7) produce the sum of 18, or half that of the whole series.

Note.—Series A gives a still more elaborate figure if we invert the lines: thus

Order of width 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No. of σφόνδυλοι 1 6 4 8 7 5 3 2]
Notes: Book X.

τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ διλε ἡμέα περιφερεσθαι] I. e. while they partake of the diurnal revolution, the sun, moon and planets alter their position in the sky from day to day,—the moon most rapidly, then the sun with Venus and Mercury, and so on. The peculiar apparent motions of Mercury and Venus are noticed in the Timaeus (p. 38 b); but this point is too minute for Plato's purpose here.

τρίτον δὲ τῶν τρίτων which is in all the MSS. except g, may possibly be defended: 'the third in order of reverse motion was the fourth';—but the ambiguity of this expression and the probability that τῶν may have arisen out of πέμπτον, justify the rejection of the article.

οἴοι] To Er and the other souls, who are thus kept in mind.

ἐπανακυκλομένοι] 'in the reverse or retrograde revolution,' which it shares with the other six inner circles. This word is to be closely joined with φορᾷ ἵνα.

αὐτῶν] sc. τῶν ἀρχαίων.

ἐνα τῶν] is the reading of the best MSS. and of Proclus: 'one sound and one note.' Another reading, of inferior authority, is αὐτὰ τῶν.

Μοῖρας, κ.τ.λ.] The touches of the Fates regulating the motions of the inner and outer Heaven are obscurely symbolical. 'Lachesis, wise in past events, allots to each his life (she touches both motions); Clotho spins this in the present (touching the larger motion), Atropos (touching the inner circles) makes the destiny irreversible. Why does Clotho touch the outer circle? Is it because the present, as the moment of choice, alone from time to time lays hold upon eternity? Lachesis touches both alternately:—the past is unalterable but influences what is to come. Atropos, the future, not to be averted, is alone contingent, ἐνεχάμενον ἀλλως ἰχεῖν.' So we may attempt to interpret Plato's symbolism.

ὡσαυτῶς] 'In like manner,' i. e. at intervals, referring to διαλείπουσαν χρόνον.

'As soon as we came thither we were taken before Lachesis, from whose lap an Interpreter took lots, and samples of lives. After some warning words he threw the lots to each of us, but I was forbidden to take up mine. Then he laid out the samples and bade
the souls in order of their lots make choice of the lives which they
desired to lead on earth.'—Socrates observes by the way that of the
whole of human existence this is the most critical moment. And in
order to make the choice aright, not merely the life of good habits,
but philosophy is required.

πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν] The allotment of lives is assigned to Lachesis,
ἀπὸ τοῦ λαγχαίνων.

ἄλλης περίοδου θητοῦ γένος] 'Another period of belonging to
the race of mortals.' θανατηφόρω agrees with περίοδον,—'leading
to death.'

πρῶτος δ' ὁ λαχὼν . . . βίων] 'Let him who draws the foremost
lot, first choose a life.' The order of words seems intended to
produce the effect of tragedy.

ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδήμοστον] 'Virtue is free to all' or 'is not the
exclusive property of any.' In such allegorical fashion does Plato
assert the freedom of the human will in a previous existence, as
determining the condition of this. Cp. Tim. 42 διαθεμοβοτήσας
dὲ πάντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, ἵνα τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ κακίας ἐκάστων ἀπάτης.
Also Laws x. 904, in which God is described as, after consideration
of their nature, placing living beings, in whom the connexion of
soul and body, though not eternal, is morally speaking indissoluble,
in a state of probation, and making their future character and
dwelling-place depend upon virtue and vice, of which one or other
is to be chosen in an instant.

The allegory is not to be too closely pressed: for while it is
said below that the life chosen determines the character of the soul
during that life, this is followed by the exhortation that a man
should study philosophy, so that everywhere, as far as possible,
both here and hereafter, he may choose the best life with reference
to his individual character. Compare the parallel passage of the
Phaedrus, pp. 248, 249, where in the first instance the law of
transmigration is called θεσμὸς 'Ἀδραστείας, and then in what follows
the individual choice is mentioned incidentally:—Phaedr. 249 B τῷ
dὲ χιλιοστῷ (ἐτεί) ἀμφότεροι ἀμφικούμενοι ἐπὶ κληρωσὶν τε καὶ αἱρεσίν τοῦ
dυντίου βίου, αἱροῦνται δὲ ἄν ἐδίκη ἐκάστη.

ῥίψαι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους] 'Threw the lots so as to reach
them all.' πάντας, sc. σφάς.

ἐ δὲ οὐκ εἶν] 'But him' (viz. Er) 'the minister did not
permit to do so.' οὐκ ἔδω, sc. τῶν προφήτην.
Notes: Book X.

ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘There was no definite character in the samples of their lives: because the character was given to the individual by the life which the soul had chosen.’ τάξιν = πῶς ἵκοι τάξιως. Cf. supra 617 ε ύμείς δαίμονα αλήθειᾳ: infra 621 D.

τὰ δὲ καὶ μεσοῦν τοῦτων] I.e. ‘some were in a mean state between health and sickness, riches and poverty.’ So infra 619 λ τῶν μέσων . . . τῶν τοιούτων βίων.

τῆς αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ.] depends immediately on ἐξευρέων. The idea of seeking out the truth is developed into that of finding the true teacher, which has been suggested by the word μαθητής.

τὰ τῶν ὑπὸ ἰδέας] All the various circumstances of life included in the previous description (supra λ) of the βίων παραδείγματα.

μετὰ ποικὶς τῶν ψυχῆς ἔξως] The whole of a man’s present life is to be a preparation for his choice in the life to come. To this choice he is to bring with him a knowledge of the influence which circumstances exercise on character,—whether the circumstances in which nature places him, or in which he places himself. He must also know the nature of the soul, and how she may be made better or worse.

ἔδει] A return from the participle to the finite verb. Ven. Ξ reads ἔν, Vat. ε ἔδειν.

ἀδιαμαρτήσω] is a stronger word for βεβαιῶ.

πλούτων] The plural is used with a certain grandiloquence to express the various degrees and kinds of wealth, cp. vi. 495 λ. For ἀνεκπληκτος cp. ix. 577 λ καὶ μὴ καθάπερ πάντα ἔξωθεν ὅρων ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυχαιῶν προστάσεως.

καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτα] This truth is anticipated in the remark (vi. 498 D) half understood by Glaucou πειρᾶς γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνήσομεν, κ.τ.λ.

Er proceeds with his narrative.—‘In bidding us choose, the Interpreter told us to use judgement; and if we did so, even the last comer need not despair. No sooner had he spoken than one of the souls came forward and chose the greatest tyranny; he was one of those who came from heaven, and had dwelt in a well-ordered city: but like others who were similarly overtaken, he had no philosophy. He lamented his choice when it was too late, but disregarding the word of the Interpreter, blamed everybody but
Republic
X.
619 B–620 D

 himself. This was a typical instance of sudden reversal of destiny, due to chance and inexperience. The spectacle of the election was at once pathetic, ludicrous, and wonderful. Most of the souls chose the opposite of their former lives. The soul of Orpheus took the nature of a swan, disdaining to be born of a woman, because women had been his murderers. Those of Ajax and Agamemnon, in resentment of their wrongs, preferred the lives of a lion and an eagle severally to the life of man. Atalanta chose the life of an athlete, Epeius that of a woman cunning in the arts. Thersites who came late, put on the likeness of an ape; and the soul of Odysseus which came last of all, weary of travel and ambition, rejecting every other, chose the quiet life of a private man.

καὶ δὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ. ] 'and according to the report of the messenger from the other world,'—viz, Er, supra 614 D,—' these were the very words of the prophet: 'Even the last comer, if he chooses with understanding and lives earnestly, is destined to have an eligible life and one which is anything but bad. Let not him who chooses first be careless, nor let the last despair.'

We note the rhetorical art with which Plato first enunciates his 'whole duty of man,' and then confirms his precepts by recurring to the myth of Er.

eἰπόντος δὲ] sc. τοῦ προφήτου ταῦτα.

ἐφὶ] sc. ὁ Ἡρ.

C

εἰμαρμένην ... βρότες, κ.τ.λ. ] An apposition which may be compared with supra 616 D κύκλους ... τὰ χείλη φαινομένα.

tοὺς προρρηθείσιν] 'to the former speech'; supra 617 ε ἀλτία ἐλομένου.

ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ... (ν) ἀρετῆς μετεληφότα] Plato means to intimate that the life of mere habit is no safeguard of truth or virtue, under altered circumstances. Cp. Phaedo 81, 82, where those who have lived virtuously in a well-ordered community, though their condition is said to be comparatively blessed, are only permitted to attain some tolerable social state, whether of men or other political animals, such as ants or bees: their life is contrasted with that of the votaries of philosophy, who are meet to be the companions of Gods. See also vi. 506 c where he compares those who have right opinion without knowledge to blind men who manage to keep the straight path; also Meno 97.
Notes: Book X.

ἀς δὲ καὶ εἶπεῖν] ‘and as indeed one might say,’ a qualification of the seeming paradox that quite as many of the souls who made a bad choice came from Heaven as from underground. For καὶ, which marks the bearing of the new remark on what precedes, cp. Gorg. 520 B μόνος δ’ ἔγγει καὶ ζυμὸν τοῖς δημιουργοῖς τε καὶ σοφιστᾶι οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν, κ.τ.λ.


διὰ δὴ ... τύχην] ‘and because of this’ (i.e. because of the experience of some and the inexperience of others) ‘and also because of the chances of the lot, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil, or an evil for a good.’ Innocence and happiness in his previous life are not sufficient to sustain a man in the choice for the future: a severer probation or discipline is required, which is that of philosophy. And, suppose a man to have had the discipline, even the journey from one life to the other is a heavenly pilgrimage: and the return hither, if he have only moderate fortune in his opportunity of choice, is not unblessed. But most men are under the dominion of habit, and few know how to profit by experience.

μίσει τοῦ γνωρεύον γένους, κ.τ.λ.] The dative is to be taken closely with οὐκ ἐθλοουσαν:—‘because of hatred of the sex who destroyed him, not choosing to be born of a woman.’

ὡσαῦτως. εἰκοστὴν δὲ] This reading is confirmed by the quotation of Plutarch. The reader naturally asks what some of the copyists (who read εἰκός τήν, or who changed the reading into ἡσαῦτως, ὡς τὸ εἰκός τήν) perhaps asked themselves: ‘Why should the soul of Ajax have been the twentieth?’ Plutarch, who also raises this question (Symp. Quaest. lix. 5), says that Ajax is the twentieth soul who appears in Homer (Od. xi) to Ulysses,—that is to say after excepting Elpenor, who is not worth counting. The real answer is that no answer is needed. Ajax is twentieth and Agamemnon twenty-first for the same reason that Atalanta is in the middle and Ulysses at the end of the series: that is to say, in order to heighten the effect of the narrative by the appearance of exactness, and to illustrate the working of the element of chance. The copyists may have been merely misled by the letters ὡς at the end of ὡσαῦτως suggesting the familiar phrase ὡς εἰκός.

τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ] sc. λαχανῶν εἶναι ψυχῆν.
Republic X. 620 C

καὶ ἀδελφὴν ἐλέσθαι] ‘and took up the lot with joy.’ ἐλέσθαι is co-ordinate with ἔσείν ... ἔσείν.

τὰ μὲν ἄδικα, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Phaedo 82 A τὸυ δὲ γε ἄδικας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτειμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ λέγακας καὶ λιτῶν γένη, κ.τ.λ. For δίκαια as an attribute of θηρία cp. vi. 496 D.

620 D–621 D

‘When all had chosen, they went each in order to Lachesis, and received from her the Genius who was to be the guardian of their lives. This Genius led them for confirmation beneath the hands of Clotho and of Atropos successively. Then all passed under the throne of Necessity; and when we had passed through the midst of it we came into the arid plain of Oblivion, and encamped beside the waters of Forgetfulness, whereof each soul was compelled to drink a certain measure, but some drank to excess. I, however, was not permitted to drink of it. But when, at midnight, it had thundered, and the Earth had quaked, and the souls had shot upwards like stars to their places of birth, I, without knowing how I returned to the body, opened my eyes at dawn, and found myself lying on the pyre.’

‘And so,’ adds Socrates, ‘this Vision of Judgement vanished not, but was preserved for our instruction. By taking to heart its lessons, we may secure true happiness here and hereafter.’

620 D

ἐν ἐλεστῷ δαίμονα] Supra 617 E. Δαίμον here = ‘the genius,’ or ‘guardian angel,’ or ‘the double’ of a man, as in Phaedo 107 c ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, διὸ περὶ ζωῆς εἰλήφθη: elsewhere one of the race of demi-gods or sons of God who are supposed to have governed and to govern mankind: cp. Polit. 271 D καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἱώματα γένη καὶ ἄγγελος ὧν νομεῖς θεῖον διεληφθέεαι δαίμονες: Laws iv. 713 D ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα καὶ φιλαρχώτας διὸ τὸ γένος ἐμετε ἐμφότη τὸ τῶν δαίμων. In the Timaeus, 90 A, the δαίμων of each one is spoken of as the rational principle, κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος, which God had given them.

κυροῦντα] ‘Ratifying’ (participle of κυρόω), agreeing with δαίμων.
λαχών] is masculine instead of feminine: the person for the soul. The same gender is continued in ἐφανήμενον and διεξελθόντα, which are more naturally referred to the person than to the Genius, who, however, is the subject of κυρωντα, ἔγεν, ποιοῦντα.

ἀμεταστρέπτει] follows up ἀμετάστροφα, and helps to mark the solemn moment when, their destiny having been made irreversible, they pass singly beneath the throne of Necessity. The words ἐπειδή . . . διήλθον imply that they pass one by one. Each, when he has passed through, has to wait for the rest.

dιεξελθόντα] The subject has changed insensibly from δαίμονα with which the previous participles agree, to the spirit, or the man himself. Cp. οἱ ἄλλοι.

διὰ καύματος . . . δεινοῦ] They are passing through the midst of the pillar of light.

καὶ γὰρ . . . φύει] The plain of Oblivion is appropriately described as a barren wilderness, having nothing to remind us of this world.

σφάς] Er, in continuing his narrative, now includes himself in the company of souls. From 617 Ε, ἐ δὲ οὐκ εἶν, he has been only a spectator.

οὐ τὸ ὁλορ . . . στέγειν] Another suggestive image of forgetfulness. These words metaphorically describe the failure of memory to retain the things which have happened to men in a former state of existence. No vessel, such as the human soul, can hold the stream of recollection after it has drunk of the water.

tοὺς δὲ φρονήσει . . . μέτρου] The eagerness of the soul to forget past cares is the source of temptation here. The soul that drinks too deeply of forgetfulness is 'defiled,' infra c: cp. vii. 535 Ε ἢ δὲν . . . ἀμαθία μολύνηται. The wise seek to retain, if possible, some recollection of a former state of existence. For the forgetfulness of a former state cp. Phaedrus 250 a. This is the only allusion which occurs in the Republic to the doctrine of ἀκάμησις, which, moreover, is rarely spoken of elsewhere—and chiefly in the earlier writings of Plato (Meno 81 ff., Phaedo 73-76, Phaedrus 250, 275).

πάντα . . . ἐπιλαυθάνεσθαι] The aorist denotes each several act of drinking: the continuous, or general tense, answering to ἐι, describes the uniform result.
Plato: Republic. Notes: Book X.

αὐτὸς . . . ἰδεῖν . . . αὐτῶν] The grammar reflects the strangeness of the situation, in which the disembodied spirit returns, and the man suddenly finds himself lying on the funeral pyre.

ἠδη κείμενον] The MSS. are a good deal divided between the omission and insertion of ἥδη. It may be explained as referring back to the beginning of the narrative (supra 614 b) where the dead are described as being taken up for burial on the tenth day, two days before Er's coming to life upon the pyre.

καὶ οὕτως, κ.τ.λ.] 'And so' (by Er's coming back to Earth) 'the tale, Glauccon, was saved and has not perished, and may be our salvation, if we are obedient to it.' οὕτως is the reading of Par. Α, the Cesena MS. (M), Ven. Χ and several other MSS., οὗτος of Par. δ Χ (the representatives of Ven. Π), the Munich MS. θ, &c. Both readings seem to require the article before μύδος, which appears only in Par. Κ. The reason of its omission may be the familiarity of the proverbial phrase μύδος ἀπόλεσθι. (Theaet. 164 δ, Phil. 14 Α, Laws i. 645 β.)

πάντα . . . ἀνέξοσθαι] Supra 610 β.

πάντα δὲ ἀγαθά] After ἀγαθά some more general word like δίκεσθαι has to be understood from ἀνέξοσθαι.


καὶ τὰ καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 351 Ε–352 β.

D ὄσπερ . . . περιαγείρόμενοι] 'Like the victors at the games, who go round to collect gifts.'

The words καὶ ἑνέβδομεν . . . πορεῖς, which are pleonastic, resume what has been said of the rewards of virtue both in this life and in the life to come (614 E ff.); and the continuous tense in κομίζωμεθα corresponds to the long period over which the recompense is spread.

ἡν διεληλύθαμεν] 'Which we have gone through,' i.e. described; but with a playful suggestion of our having made the pilgrimage ourselves.
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