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PLATO'S REPUBLIC

THE GREEK TEXT

EDITED, WITH NOTES AND ESSAYS

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ESSAYS

BY

THE LATE PROFESSOR JOWETT.

(UNFINISHED)
ESSAY I

ON THE TEXT OF GREEK AUTHORS, AND ESPECIALLY OF PLATO

I. That Greek MSS. are miswritten and misspelt in various degrees;—that glosses and marginal interpretations have crept into the text;—that particular letters or combinations of letters, as for example Α, Δ, Λ,—Γ, Τ,—Ε, Θ, Ο, Κ,—are often interchanged;—that contractions are another source of confusion;—that forms of words or usages which were allowed by Thucydides or Plato have sometimes received a more Attic impress from the hand of grammarians, or have decayed insensibly into the forms and usages of the common or Macedonian language;—that the writing is more regular and uniform than can be supposed to have proceeded from authors who lived in the days when grammar was only beginning to be studied;—that the texts of the Classics have passed through changes sometimes in the uncial sometimes in the cursive [or minuscule] stage;—that the copyists of many MSS. like modern editors had a love of emendation, which led them to improve upon the meaning or grammar of their author;—that emendation is often needed, and that many emendations are probably, almost certainly, right;—these general facts would hardly be disputed by any one who has a critical acquaintance with Greek authors.

But such general considerations do not justify the indiscriminate use of conjectural emendation. We have to distinguish the kind of mistake before we can determine whether it can be corrected. That mistakes often happen
is a safe text; the inference which is sometimes drawn that they are liable to happen equally in all authors and in all MSS., and that all therefore afford equal material for the conjectural art, is a very erroneous one. The kind of mistake may also vary from the interchange of \( \Gamma \) and \( T \) which is corrected at sight up to a degree of confusion in which grammar and sense are lost in anarchy. And where such mistakes are most numerous and complicated they are generally beyond the reach of human sagacity to amend. Unless new and better MSS. are discovered, the corruption must remain a corruption to the end of time. Nor can the most ingenious conjecture ever attain the certainty of a reading well supported by MS. authority. The verifying faculty is only the knowledge and moderation of the critic, who may indeed have acquired the power of seeing in the dark, or at least of seeing better than others, but who may also have found in lifelong studies only the material of his own self-deception. An art or kind of knowledge which is attractive and at the same time wanting in certain tests of truth is always liable to fall into the hands of projectors and inventors. It may be cultivated by many generations of scholars without their once making the discovery that they have been wasting their lives in a frivolous and unmeaning pursuit. From being subordinate and necessary it may come to be thought the crowning accomplishment of the scholar. But after all, to compare small things with great, ingenious conjectures are only like the hypotheses of physical science in the days when there were no experiments, which, while retaining their attractiveness, diverge further and further from the truth.

A sanguine temperament and sometimes even a good memory flush the mind and interfere with the exercise of the judgement. A little knowledge will furnish objections to an old reading or arguments in support of a new one. The inventor has a natural fondness for his own inven-
tions and is ready to offer his reputation as a guarantee of their truth. He has got into a region in which the common sense of the many is unable to control him, and in which no one can demonstrate that he is only a visionary. And as learning or imitative talent or even genius for scholarship are often unaccompanied by philosophical power, which is the natural corrective of a lively fancy, the sanction of great names has not been wanting to great mistakes. There have been Atticists in modern as well as in ancient times, who have regarded grammar as a science of rules without exceptions, and who have assumed a greater clearness and accuracy than ever existed in the text of ancient authors. Metrical canons which are not universally true have been applied with the rigour and severity of a law of nature. It has been forgotten that there was a transitional age of language in which syntax and prosody had not yet become separate studies, and that in every age the subtlety of language far exceeds the minuteness of grammatical rules. Writers like Sophocles or Thucydides or Plato have been even divested of the peculiarities of their own style, in order to satisfy some more general notion of sense and Greek. Not the value of the correction but the name and reputation of the critic have been regarded. The authority of Bentley, Porson, and Hermann has obtruded on the text of the Classics many unfounded emendations which have been allowed to remain, as a homage to their reputation.

A just estimate of the value of emendations requires a consideration, (1) of the limits of the human faculties in this sort of divination. No definite measure can be given of them; they must depend on the nature of the materials; but often the real limits are in inverse proportion to the ingenuity and facility of scholars in making emendations: (2) there must be a consideration of the nature of MSS. In textual as in historical criticism the invention or imagination which has no foundation of facts can only build castles in the air. The emendations which lie on the surface have
been generally made by previous editors, while the deeper corruptions are hardly ever remediable. And in proportion to the character of the MS. the necessity or possibility of emendation will greatly vary. No generalities about the frequency of mistakes, or the possibility of glosses, or the probability in favour of the more difficult reading can be set against the readings of MSS., which may be erroneous but cannot be corrected out of nothing. (3) There must be a consideration of authors as well as of MSS. The range of language in some is too wide or irregular or uncertain to admit even of a fair probability in the emendation of them. The Doric or Aeolic dialect is not so well known to us as the Attic; and again, conjectures in prose and verse stand on a different footing. Nor will any one say that he is as certain of the use of language in Pindar and Theocritus as in Sophocles and Euripides, or of the metre in a line of a chorus as of an Iambic or Trochaic verse, or that a fragment is equally within the range of emendation with a passage that has a context. Yet the method of conjecture which was practised by the first editors seems to have continued as a habit of mind among scholars, who do not always remember that the field for new conjectures is ever narrowing, and that the ‘woods and pastures new’ of fragments, to which they return, are the least likely to afford passages which can be corrected with certainty. Nothing can be more improbable than some of the conjectures of Madvig on Thucydides, when he discards a word because it is not found in later Greek and introduces a new word found in later Greek, but not in Thucydides.

Some idea of the limits of human ingenuity in restoring a text or an inscription, may be formed in this way: let a person try the experiment of emending the text of an English passage previously unknown to him miswritten for the purpose. (You may vary the conditions of prose or metre, or give a fragment without the context, or select
and especially of Plato.

from an author whose style is only known in short writings; or take some writing such as an epitaph which has regular lines and set forms of speech; the words too may be wrongly divided or written without stops and without accents or breathings as in the Uncial Greek MSS.) One person is quicker at guessing the riddle than another, but in any case the critic will soon be at fault, for the simple reason that he has no materials for conjecture. No divination or second sight or knowledge of style can supply one-half of a page from the other half, nor restore with certainty a single word or even letter unless absolutely required by the context, that is to say if any other word or letter would equally fit or make sense. The general meaning may in any of these cases be clear or probable; e.g. in the case of a torn letter, or of the Inscription of which Niebuhr attempts a restoration about the burning of the tribunes; but the precise words are really irrecoverable wherever more than one word or letter or combination of words and letters may amend the miswriting or bridge or fill up the vacant space. The problem is not of the nature of the discovery of a cipher, the secret of which is really contained in certain letters or symbols which have been artificially transposed, or of the interpretation of a hieroglyphic, the signs of which are known, although the mode of reading them or the language in which they were written has been lost. The case of an Inscription again is widely different from a MS., because an Inscription is formal and regular and may be compared with other Inscriptions which are sometimes verbatim or literatim the same. Hence a single letter in a particular place may sometimes restore a whole line, but why? because the letter is found in that place in a line which is preserved elsewhere. Nor, again, is the restoration of the text of an author analogous to the restoration of a ruined building or statue, the form or structure of which is simple and uniform, and the lost features of which may be restored from a very few
indications assisted by the analogy of buildings or statues of the times. Such illustrations are misleading because they are not in pari materia, and when applied to the restoration of words they tend to obscure the real difficulty which is the variety and flexibility of language. To take an example: between two points in a line of Shakespeare there is a lacuna or erasure or corruption of five letters which admits of being filled up in twenty or thirty different ways; who can decide between them? A truly Shakespearean word may be found by one of our critics whom we may suppose to be playing at the game of emendation; in referring to the text the expression actually used may turn out to be less Shakespearean, or more common, or the reverse; possibly a word not elsewhere occurring in any extant play. Two very popular and familiar emendations of Shakespeare will illustrate the point which I am discussing:

(1) *Henry V*, act ii, scene 3—

'His nose was as sharp as a pen
On a *table of green fields* (FL; om. in Qq.);

'And a' *babbled of green fields* (Cj. Theobald);

or altering the other word,

'On a table of green *frieze*.' (Collier MS.)

A third expedient, adopted by Pope, is to omit the whole phrase 'And . . . fields,' with the Qq. Several other conjectures by scholars of repute, including Malone, have found acceptance in their time.

(2) *Macbeth*, act v, scene 3—

'My *way* of life
Is fall'n into the sere and yellow leaf.'

'My *May* of life.' (Cj. Johnson.)

The change is slight and gives an attractive reading while avoiding an apparent incongruity. But similar incongruities arising from the condensation or crowding together of imagery abound in the Shakespearean text and are not always so easily got rid of:—e.g. 'to take arms against a sea of troubles.'
and especially of Plato.

The critic can only succeed when a particular word is absolutely demanded by the context, or where the error is reducible to some rule. He will more easily restore the terminations of words than their roots; mere misspellings in which the sound remains are found to occasion no difficulty to the practised eye. And much further we cannot go. The instance just given shows how in a very characteristic and remarkable passage it is impossible absolutely to decide about a single letter. Conjectural emendation is a kind of prophecy, and though there is a vast difference between the powers of one man and another while they remain within the legitimate field of knowledge, there is not much difference when they take to foretelling future events.

The argument from English to Greek and Latin scholarship is not really unfair, provided the difference be remembered between a language which has and which has not inflexions; the unfairness, however, is really in favour of English conjectural emendation. The practice of emending classical authors has come down from the revival of literature, and is fostered, at any rate in Englishmen, by the habit of Greek and Latin composition in early life. But every Englishman who applies his mind to the subject is a better judge of English than of Greek verse, for he is better acquainted with his native language than with a dead one. Even Bentley knew more of English than of Greek, and there is no paradox in saying that he was better qualified to edit Milton than to edit Homer—that is to say, not comparatively with others, but absolutely in reference to his own knowledge. In an evil hour he applied to an English poet the method or manner which he had acquired in editing the classics; and the result tends to detect his method and to raise a suspicion of his authority as an editor of the Greek and Latin classics. He finds a great deal of error in Milton; this he supposes to be due to the circumstance that Milton in his blindness dictated to his
daughters; a sort of general consideration introduced into the subject similar to the hypothesis of transposed leaves in Lucretius or Catullus. Bentley's Milton cannot be separated from Bentley's Horace; the multitude of emendations in the one tends to shake our faith in the multitude of emendations in the other. The many will hardly trust, in what they are unable to understand, a judgement which is so wild and fanciful in what is within their own range. The lesson is instructive, as showing what is indeed sufficiently apparent otherwise, that great powers may often coexist with extravagance and want of common sense.

The English parallel may throw a further light on the problem which has been started. The text of Shakespeare presents many points of similarity with the text of an ancient author. The richness and obscurity of the language, the complexity of the meaning, the variety of readings, and the uncertainty which hangs over their origin, give rise to doubts like those which have tried the text of the classics. A harvest of emendations has sprung up; Shakespeare has been treated in the same bold style by Warburton as Milton by Bentley. But the ingenuity of critics has not supplied a generally received version; only in a very few instances have conjectures found their way into the text.

Two other general facts may be adduced which are of weight in estimating the value of emendation in classical authors. 1. First the absence of emendations in the New Testament; there are 'old correctors' of the Gospels and Epistles, but they are not scholars of the present or last century; at least the important variations which occur in them are of an earlier date and spring from other causes; and the few emendations which have been suggested by scholars have not found their way into the text. Lachmann, when he made the attempt in the preface to the second volume of his New Testament, met with very little
success. [Of Cobet perhaps the same might have been said.] Nor does Bentley himself indulge in his bold 'meo periculo' style of criticism within the sacred precinct; it is from manuscript not from conjecture that he proposes to restore the text of the New Testament. Yet there are certainly a few passages in the New Testament which have as much apparent difficulty as the corruptions of classical authors. (It is true that in some respects the text of the New Testament is unlike that of other Greek writers, especially in the number of MSS. and versions.) The quotations in other writers are also numerous, but these create the new difficulty of an *embarras de richesses*. The circumstance that critical emendation has not been held a safe or certain path in the most important of all Greek writings is a proof that there is danger and uncertainty in the application of such a method to the text of Greek authors generally.

2. The tendency of criticism has of late years been adverse and not favourable to the use of conjecture. Manuscripts have been collated afresh and more precisely valued, and the result has rarely confirmed the previous conjectures of critics. There is no consensus of great critics in important emendations; those of Meineke and Ahrens are decried by Cobet; Porson has not generally been followed by Hermann in his corrections of the text. The ideas which inspired the last-named critic (Hermann) in his edition of Aeschylus are already out of date and certainly tend to undermine the authority of the great editor in Sophocles and Aristophanes. Madvig, the most prolific inventor of new emendations, who has laid down many sound principles which he fails to observe in practice, remarks that Bentley constantly violated the rules of his art, and that Hermann never had any; he also justly censures Dindorf in Ed. V of the Poetae Scenici for pretending to emend passages without regard to the MSS. Most persons will find that the need of conjecture diminishes as
On the Text of Greek Authors,

their familiarity with an author increases; the peculiarities of his style become more apparent to them; they receive on the authority of MSS. expressions which their first thoughts would have set down as destitute of grammar and meaning; and the judgement and industry of Bekker have probably done more for the text of Greek writers than was effected by the vast powers of Bentley.

3. Lastly, some instruction may be gathered from observing the most palpable forms of delusion which prevail among conjectural critics. Their judgement is not equal to their invention; they are often deceived by parallel passages; any special knowledge which they possess of Greek dialects or metres or lexicographers tends unduly to form their opinion. They are apt to introduce a point which is not wanted, or to create a false emphasis, or to impair the due subordination of the word to the sentence or figure of speech. They are hasty in assuming that an author could not have used this or that expression or formation; and they think a regular and perfect phrase or figure or parallel better than an irregular one. They sometimes insist on uniformity of construction where uniformity is not required, or they miss the slight and subtle change from the 'oratio recta' to the 'oratio obliqua,' or conversely. A random statement of a lexicographer or grammarian or other ancient author is sometimes affirmed against the clearest evidence of the manuscript. Their perception of the context is often overpowered by their sense of some anomaly or obscurity. They do not always study an author from himself; the subtleties of which Plato and Sophocles are capable in the use of language or grammar are not made a separate matter of investigation. The transitional periods of grammar and language are confused by them with those in which the uses of language are fixed. They do not fairly renounce impossible problems, but seem rather to find a stimulus to their imagination in hopeless corruptions of the text. They sometimes restore
an author from himself and argue from the use of a word in one passage to the use of the same word or phrase in another. Their own self-confidence in the most slippery of all arts is a reason why they should suspect themselves, and may well raise a suspicion in the mind of others; 'meo periculo,' 'away with all this,' 'apage putidissimam interpolationem;' the disdain of objectors; the repeated promise to free a beautiful passage from deformities; the improvements and re-writings of the text; the 'nihil tam metuens quam ne de se diffidere videretur,' are not indeed inconsistent with a real knowledge and study of Greek, but they are doubtful proofs of the judgement or trustworthiness of the critic. The tendency appears to grow upon them with years; their last performances are often a caricature of their earlier ones. They speak of an intuition which is peculiar to themselves; which a person who is not similarly gifted might be more ready to acknowledge, if the intuition of one critic were not sometimes at variance with the intuition of another; the older editors, as for example Casaubon in Polybius, frequently introduce emendations without distinguishing them from the text of the MS., and many late emendations, as of Hermann in Sophocles, are fast becoming established in the printed books without brackets or other signs of uncertainty. Nor does there seem any reason why the self-confidence of a discoverer should be accepted as a warrant of the truth of a discovery in restoring the text of the classics any more than in science or life.

II. The general purport of what I have been saying is that the more we reflect upon the nature of conjectural emendation of the classics—the more we put it to the test, or try it by the analogy of English—the more we think of the follies into which great scholars have been betrayed by the love of it—the narrower are the limits which we are disposed to assign to it. The nature of the
On the Text of Greek Authors,

manuscripts has now to be considered. At first sight the accurate preservation or transmission of the words or ideas of ancient writers during a period of 2000 years might be deemed impossible. Yet experience supplies many facts which make this credible. The text of the Vedas is known to have remained unaltered since the fourth century before Christ. Unlike the Greek Scholiasts, the Vedic commentaries of more than 2000 years ago have exactly the same readings which are found in Vedic MSS. at the present day. This is the more remarkable when the observation is also made that, owing to the material on which they are written, they must have been frequently copied: no Sanscrit MSS. have the antiquity of Greek ones: and more remarkable still when it is considered that the commentary is purely fanciful and stands in no relation to the original text. And there are many Greek MSS., such as the Paris A of the Republic of Plato, which are remarkably good and gain in authority in proportion as they are better known. There is no probability therefore of accuracy or inaccuracy in a Greek MS. prior to an examination of the contents. No general assumption that copyists were ignorant or that 'mistakes often happen' should be allowed antecedently to influence the mind.

Thus the question which we started returns from very general considerations to very minute ones. The greater part of the science of textual criticism is contained in the valuation of MSS. That corruptions, confusion, glosses, interchanges of letters, emendations of grammarians and copyists are to be found in Greek MSS. will be readily allowed; the point at issue is whether a particular interchange of letters or the insertion of a gloss or any other special corruption is incidental to the writing of a certain scribe or of the copy which he used. An editor may feel disposed to substitute ΟΞΙΟC for ΘΕΙΟC; he has to ask himself the question whether this particular form of corruption occurs elsewhere in the MS.
Or he may feel a conviction that certain awkwardly introduced words are a gloss; again, he will have reason to doubt the correctness of his conviction should no similar example of a gloss occur elsewhere in the same MS. Once more, he may feel disposed to adopt the better or easier reading—say of a late manuscript: his hand will be held if he finds that the manuscript which is his authority offers in many other places better and easier readings where other good MSS. are perplexed or obscure. For then the intelligibility of the copy is possibly due to the corrector and not to the original text. The student or editor has to consider not all the possible errors which may be thought likely to occur in Greek MSS., but those which he discovers in the manuscript which he is perusing. There is no error of which some copyists are not capable in times and places when Greek was becoming barbarized; but the mass of Greek MSS. were written by moderately learned persons who were copying their own language. And the MSS. of the greater writers, with the exception of some passages of Aeschylus and Euripides, are as a fact extremely free from error, and would be thought still more so, if their correctness were measured by the style of the writer and not by an imaginary grammatical standard.

Some application of the doctrine of chances may serve as an illustration of the probabilities of error in MSS. (1) There is obviously a probability that the copyist will fail in difficult passages; the mind and eye require great discipline before they can write exactly words or forms of words which are unintelligible or unknown or imperfectly known to them. (2) But there is no greater probability that the copyist will err in the violation of a canon of grammar or of prosody, unless indeed in cases where the usage or grammar or metre has changed in later literature, than in any other way. (3) Thus, let us suppose the case of a manuscript which contains in all
a hundred errors or miswritings; and further that no less than twenty of these are found to consist in omissions of ἄν, or uses of ἄν with the present indicative, or of προσέχω as a verb of existence, or of ὅμικρον with the present or 1st Aor. Act., or of unions of dissimilar tenses, or of words of doubtful analogy, or of any other violations of supposed laws of grammar—the question arises whether the proportion of grammatical errors which has been described is not greater than can be accounted for on any rational principle. Why should as many as \(\frac{3}{10}\) of all the mistakes which occur be found to affect the rules of grammarians? Why, for example, should the copyists have been guilty of forty errors which are violations of the celebrated law of the Cretic in Tragic Iambic Verse? When it is remembered that the refusal to admit a spondee which is broken into two words in the fifth place is a sort of last refinement in the structure of the verse, the probability appears to be that such a law would be occasionally broken, rather than uniformly observed.

There is a further consideration which seems to strengthen this view of the subject. There are grammatical anomalies which are not found to exist equally in earlier and later Greek writers. The usages of Demosthenes are more regular than those of Thucydides or Plato. But this cannot be attributed to the greater care or skill of the transcribers; there is no reason why the words of Demosthenes should have been preserved to us with more accuracy than those of Plato. The only reason is that the MSS. exhibit a real difference of usage in earlier and later writers. Whether in historical or textual criticism, in the New Testament or in classical authors, those intimations which are opposed to the prevailing use or feeling of an age witness to their own truth. Many reasons may be given why the copyist should have altered the forms or usages of Thucydides into those of his own age; but there is no reason why he should have returned to older forms;
why for example he should have used εἴ with the subjunctive or omitted ἄν with the optative, except that such apparent anomalies existed in the original copies. That the traces of such anomalies in Plato or Thucydides or in the Greek tragedians are already becoming faint is a fact which agrees with the contemporary rise and progress of grammatical studies. The golden age of Attic tragedy was never completely purged of the remains of Epic irregularity; that the anomalous uses which are found in the MSS. retain this character is in some degree a proof of their genuineness.

Another consideration distinct from the mere correctness of a manuscript is antiquity. The superiority of the older MS. is traceable to the circumstance that the copy is not only nearer to the original but also to the Uncial MS. A manuscript like Paris A, which is supposed to have been written in the ninth century, or the Bodleian which bears the date A.D. 896, retains many Uncial forms, and has probably been transcribed from an Uncial MS. And the observation may be worth making that another interval of equal length would nearly reach back to the autograph of Plato. Many chances of error are thus excluded. The size of the character and the comparative absence of contractions prevents the letters from being minced into an illegible scrawl. On the other hand the indications which are afforded of the divisions of words by breathings and accents or of sentences by stops are generally wanting in the Uncial MSS. Nor in such matters can MSS. be held to be of any authority. It is unfortunate also that in minute questions of orthography an appeal has ever been made to them. For such questions (1) are of little importance; the correct writing of ἐπεπόνθη or of κατὰ adds nothing to our appreciation of Greek authors and scarcely anything to philology; (2) they can seldom be determined precisely; the MSS. are constantly at variance with one another and with the precepts of the grammarians;
(3) uniformity and etymology are better principles of spelling than are supplied either by the MSS. or by the Atticist grammarians; (4) there is no reason to suppose that the classical authors of an earlier period could have known or conformed to exact rules of orthography. Such inquiries have certainly been carried far enough and need no longer be suffered to detain us from more important subjects. They would be thought ridiculous if applied to the printed text of English authors of two or three centuries ago.

Besides the estimate of a particular manuscript as distinct from manuscripts in general, there remains a further estimate to be formed of the value of manuscript authority in a particular passage or word. There are peculiar causes which may lead to error in certain places; an entanglement in the meaning of a passage will often confuse the copyist’s head or hand; he will be apt either to miswrite or amend the words at which he stumbles; and as common words are often substituted for uncommon ones, common forms will also take the place of uncommon or curious ones. Similar letters at the end of one word and the beginning of another; repetitions of syllables; similar beginnings in two successive sentences, are also a frequent cause of error or omission; the omission of a word is far more usual than the insertion of one. The omission of a word may often lead to the insertion of the same word in another order or in a clause which has a common government. Again, words written at the side sometimes find their way into the text, or two passages which are really similar are absolutely identified. (Of this many examples occur in the Gospels.) Among various readings that one is preferable of which the origin may be explained on some one of these principles or which seems to be the centre or kernel of the rest. Above all the similarities of certain Greek letters both in the Uncial and the Cursive hand render particular words much more liable than others to be misspelt; which first misspelling by rendering the
passage unintelligible naturally introduces some further error. Two such lists, one of Uncial, the other of Cursive letters, should be present to the student's eye; the Uncial letters ΑΔΛ; ΓΤ; ΕΘΟΣ; ΗΝ; ΤΙ, Π, ΙΓΤ; Κ, ΙΣ; ΛΛ, ΑΛ, ΛΑ; ΝΙ, Μ; ΤΤ, ΙΤ, ΤΙ, ΙΓ; ΨΤ;—the Cursive letters which offer a second chance of error being λ, μ, ν; (β) υκ; ψ φ; α, ευ; τ ε.

The use of Cursive [minuscule] letters together with Uncial letters is a stage of writing which must also be considered. A further source of error is the habit of contracting certain words both in Uncial and Cursive writing ΘΣ, ΠΡ, ΠΡΟΣ, ΑΝΩ, ΚΣ, ΙΗΛ, ΟΤΝΩ (θεός, παρήρ, παρός, ἀνθρώπος, κύριος, Ἰσραήλ, οὕρανωφ), and the abbreviation of terminations.

The famous rule 'potior lectio difficilior;' seems to require some limitation. For there is plainly a degree of difficulty or obscurity which may render the acceptance of a reading improbable; nonsense which is just construable is not to be regarded as preferable to sense when offered by a MS. Some correction or alteration must be made in the rule. (1) First of all, not the more difficult reading is to be preferred, but the more remote one or the one least likely to have been invented. (2) But the question which is the more difficult reading can never be confined to this one point; repetitions of letters or syllables may tend to substitute the more remote or difficult reading for the simpler one. (3) The rule presupposes a certain degree of knowledge and intelligence in the copyist who makes the substitution, which does not always exist. (4) The meaning and agreement with the context or style of the author cannot be left out of sight in the comparative estimate of MSS.; nor lastly the character of the MS. which in some cases may be discovered to be valueless by the uniform adoption or insertion of easier readings. (5) A large allowance must be made for accident; the greater number of mistakes do not arise from the principle of the adoption of the easier reading but on no principle
at all. This famous rule seems to be chiefly suggestive and certainly cannot be allowed to supersede in particular passages the estimate of the value of MSS. taken as a whole. The canon of the more difficult reading really points to one element among many in the consideration of the text. It is not enough to say, 'this is the more difficult reading and therefore the true one.' But 'this is the more difficult reading, which at the same time makes good sense and is in harmony with the general style.'

Lastly—(a) the Scholia, (b) quotations in other Greek authors, especially lexicographers and grammarians, (γ) Latin versions, may be reckoned among the occasional subsidia.

(a) The Scholia may be regarded as a witness to the genuineness of the text of Greek authors; also as a living link with the past; moreover in a few passages they have preserved a reading which is lost in the MSS.; their language has also been tortured into the support of conjectural emendations, and the occurrence of a word in the explanation of the Scholiast has been an argument for the introduction of it into the text. It need scarcely be remarked that they are of every degree of antiquity and value and embrace observations of the most widely different kinds, learned and puerile, ethical and grammatical, according to the temper of the author. The value of each Scholiast, like that of each MS., must of course be judged alone, remembering, as is obvious in the Scholiasts on Homer, that he may often repeat or preserve the opinions of older or wiser writers than himself. Many of them, like the Scholiasts on Thucydides or on Aristotle, while deficient in grammatical knowledge and falling according to our standard into remarkable grammatical blunders, have a curious dialectical insight into the meaning of passages; they are not unfrequently chargeable with the objection 'Too much logic,' or illogical logic. That with all Greek literature lying open before them, themselves the students
of an art which, commencing with the Sophists and Alexanderian grammarians, lived and flourished for above 1500 years, they should have added so little to our knowledge either of the classics or of language generally, is a valuable warning of the tendency of such studies when pursued in a false and narrow spirit by those ὃσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ ἐιδήναι αὐτὰ ὅτα ἐστίν. A labour which is wholly disproportioned to the result is apt to infect the judgement and to pervert the wider comparison of the other branches of knowledge which is the safeguard against the errors of exclusive study. A man will hardly be persuaded to form a humble or uncertain estimate of the labour of many years of his life. Nor can any mere servile and unreflecting toil add much even to the stores of learning. No man who is a mere scholar can ever be a great scholar, because scholarship is not separable from other branches of knowledge, e.g. from history and philosophy. The school which is represented by Niebuhr and K. O. Müller in Germany were quite right in regarding antiquity as a whole; their error lay not there, but in the introduction of theories and conjectures in the place of facts and in not considering the nature of evidence.

(3) Quotations in old Greek writers can only be used with great hesitation as a means of correcting the text of an author. The pre-Alexandrian readings of Homer cannot with any certainty be restored from Plato or Aristotle. Quotations, in the strict sense of the term, are frequently altered to suit the context or structure of the sentence; moreover they often lose or change a word owing to a lapse of memory in the author who cites them. The citations of lexicographers, again, unless strongly supported by internal reasons, are rarely to be set against the evidence of the MSS. And although in the days of Suidas the familiar knowledge of Greek literature was beginning to be narrowed within the range of authors which have been preserved to us (any one who will be at the pains of counting
will find that the proportion of passages in Suidas which are from extant works or parts of works far exceeds the proportion which these works bear to the mass of Greek literature), yet the materials which were used by them were very large and the difficulty of accuracy proportionably increased. Nor can the testimony of grammarians about the uses of forms or words in particular authors be safely trusted when opposed to the evidence of the MSS., because (1) they have probably attempted to impress an Attic character on earlier writers; or (2) they may have drawn their precepts from copies in which the original forms had been altered.

III. One more general head remains to be considered; this is the different character of different authors or writings, under which the principal points for consideration seem to be the following:—First, the different ages of authors and our knowledge of contemporary literature. No one, for example, would attempt to restore the poems of Homer to the earliest or original form or indeed to any other but that of the Alexandrian period. Though there may be reason to think that the change which they have undergone is not great, there are no materials worth speaking of which would enable us to fix the text of the Iliad and Odyssey which was present to the eyes of Herodotus or of Plato. No critical ingenuity can penetrate the grammatical covering which the Alexandrian critics have interposed around them or distinguish the original from the restored forms of words. Again, of Attic literature alone there were at least three periods; first, the antegrammatical or transitional, which includes Aeschylus and Sophocles, and in Attic prose may be admitted to descend as low as Plato. Secondly, the age of orators, in which the language attained the perfection of grammatical and rhetorical accuracy. Thirdly, the age of the Atticizers, who have an affectation of purism, and mix up with the imitation of an earlier age the uses and
forms of their own. The text of each of these classes of authors has some peculiar features. The grammar in the first period is less reducible to rule and the use of words more audacious and inventive than in that of the second; there is more uncertainty in limiting the freedom of language; the forms and constructions of the old Epic poetry are not altogether banished from the tragedians; in Thucydides, again, is felt the oppression of an age which is beginning to philosophize and sometimes loses hold of grammar in the attempt to arrange multifarious relations of thought. The Tragic dialect is tinged by Homericism, and the influence of Attic verse has not yet completely harmonized the language of prose. These causes interfere with the attainment of that perfect type of Attic regularity which the grammarians of later ages found or made and sought to impose upon earlier ones. And the greater the liberty the greater also the difficulty not only of fixing the limit of usage but of restoring by conjecture what has become corrupted. The second may be regarded as the normal period of Greek grammar. (2) These differences of ages or periods of literature run into other differences of individual style or character. One measure of language must be applied to Aeschylus or Pindar; another to Sophocles; a third to Euripides—one to Thucydides, another to Xenophon; one to narrative writings, another to speeches or philosophical reflections. It is not by a general knowledge of Greek, for example, that an idea can be formed of how a particular author would have written in certain passages, as far as such an idea can be formed at all, but from the attentive study of the usages of individual authors. The abruptness of Aeschylus, the fanciful and tortuous associations and order of words in Pindar, the novelties, subtleties, experiments, refinements of Sophocles, the freedom in the use of cases and the substitution of a logical for a grammatical connexion which characterizes the language of the two first extant tragedians
as well as of Thucydides, could not have been anticipated from any general knowledge of the principles of Greek grammar. Each writer is characteristic in some degree in his grammar as well as in his style. The uses of grammar like the meaning of words are (1) chronological in some degree and require to be considered in chronological order; (2) they are individual and vary (though in a less degree) with the character and subject matter of an author. And these considerations tend to impose a check on those who are ready to maintain with authority what an author may or may not have written.

Peculiarities of dialect and metre remain to be briefly considered. As to the first (1) we obviously possess no means of determining the forms or uses of the Doric and Aeolic with the precision of the Attic; the remains of their literature are small and the notices of the grammarians comparatively unfrequent. (2) It is difficult to decide the limits of that common Doric dialect which the Tragic writers retained in their choruses, and which in a still more Doricized form is the language of Pindar. (3) The dialects themselves were never subjected to the influence of grammarians; nor equally with the Attic to the influence of writing. (4) The Tragic dialect, again, always retained some degree of metrical licence and also of Epic usage, which are seen in the double forms—μόνος, μοῦνος: κιώς, ἱκεῖως, &c., and in the occasional omission of the augment. (5) General distinctions between the earlier and later Attic forms cannot be always determined with certainty on the debatable ground of Plato and Aristophanes. But the general rule may be laid down that, e.g. ἀπαλλαχθεῖς and not ἀπαλλαγεῖς would be commonly found in writers before 400 B.C. (6) That any distinction has been preserved is a testimony to the incorruptness of the MSS., which indeed contrasts with the changes in English books: no reprint of an English book of three centuries since, if not a professed facsimile, would retain the antiquated spelling of the original.
and especially of Plato.

The other question of the extent of metrical licence has also an important bearing on the doctrine of emendation. Metre is a help to the emender's art, and whatever may be the uncertainty of emendations in metre it is less than of emendations in prose. For one datum which the metre gives is wanting in prose. Still the metre also introduces a new element of difficulty. For supposing the laws of the metre to be known the language must conform to those laws; and what are the laws of metre must be gathered partly from the writings of metricians and grammarians, partly from an induction of the facts. This subject may be divided for the sake of convenience into two heads: (1) the more exact metres of the dialogue, (2) the laxer metres of the choruses. It is remarkable that great precision has been attained in the conventional quantity of words and that in either kind of metre there is rarely a suspicion of difference or error.

1. The metres of the dialogue have general and inviolate rules about the admissibility of feet; they have also precepts which relate to the divisions and composition of feet. Whether these latter are of the same inviolable nature as the former is doubtful; they seem to be not so much metrical canons as unconscious refinements of the ear. The fact that some of them, as for example the rule that trisyllabic feet shall be included in single words, do not apply equally to all the tragedians, tends to show that they are not matters of rule but of ear. In the latter case they would be general rather than universal, and the lines which do not conform to them would not therefore be held to be corrupt. The probability of such rules being universal evidently depends partly on the nature of the rule, chiefly on the number of exceptions. The law of the Cretic, which has been already mentioned, may be cited as an example of a rule with several exceptions, while the rarity of the Anapaest in the third place of the Tragic Iambic would probably justify the inference that the
exception is only a corruption of the text. Again, is it not probable that some syllables may have had common or different quantities which have generally been held to be of a fixed or uniform one; if words such as φαρη, ἧμιν and ἥμιν are admitted to have had two quantities, may not νεορός also have been common or uncertain? Such an inference seems a fair one where the exceptional quantity is strongly supported by the MSS. even in a single passage. It agrees generally with the fact that in the termination -ων there are two quantities; we say χειμερίνος, but also ὑπθηρίνος and ὑπωρίνος.

2. The choruses of the Greek plays have a rhythmical rather than a metrical character; that is to say, the metre is hardly enough defined to be distinguishable from rhythm. Many of the metres used in them admit of such numerous exchanges of feet, and the transitions from one rhythm to another are so frequent, that there would generally be great uncertainty as to the corruption of a line in which the metre alone appeared to be at fault. There is more guidance however afforded by the correspondence of strophe and antistrophe. Still doubts will remain; (a) are the quantities of words absolutely certain? (b) has the beat of the verse no effect on them? (c) is no Homeric licence ever admitted? (d) are the corresponding feet exactly known? Such doubts are only suggested here; the tendency of them is to abate our confidence in the discovery of corruptions in the choruses of which the metre is taken as the proof.

In conclusion, let me observe that though I have endeavoured to show how small the power of divination is, and though I deeply lament that the lives of so many ingenious men should be thrown away in such a fruitless task, and though I think that the supposed corruptions of the text have been greatly exaggerated through this very 'cacoethes' or 'lues emendandi,' yet I am far from maintaining that the Greek classics are in general
free from corruption or that there can never be any place for conjectural criticism. But a passage must be proved corrupt first before it is made the subject of the emender's art: and the emendation must be the least possible (for no other has any chance of being true); it must follow the letters of the MSS., it must accord with the style and language of the author.

IV. The principles or suggestions offered for consideration in the preceding pages may now be illustrated from Plato. The text of the Republic will be conveniently treated under three heads, (1) the MSS. and recensions of the text, (2) the anomalies of language which affect the text, (3) the more remarkable conjectures, an examination of which will tend to illustrate the general principles which have been followed in this edition.

Of all the MSS. of Plato first and without a second is the Codex Parisiensis A. It contains the Cleitophon, Republic, Timaeus, Critias, Minos, Laws, Epinomis, Definitions, Epistles, the Dialogues 'De Justo' and 'De Virtute,' Demodocus, Sisyphus, Halcyon, Eryxias, Axioschus. It is written on parchment in double columns, the scholia being in small capitals, and has the annotation written at the end, ὁ βιβλος αυτη ὑπο Κωνσταντίνου μητροπολίτου λειπάδεως του και ἰσημανήν. 'This book was corrected by Constantine, metropolitan of Hierapolis, who was the purchaser of the book.' About the precise antiquity of the MS. there is some uncertainty; Bekker who is the highest authority on such subjects places the date as early as the ninth century on the ground that the writing is more ancient than that of the Bodleian or Clarkian MS. which has the date 896 written at the end. (In the latter which contains nearly every other dialogue the Republic and the Laws are wanting.) The Codex A is certainly one of the noblest of extant MSS. And considering the fate of other Greek authors we may congratulate ourselves

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on having the whole writings of Plato preserved in two MSS. of the ninth century.

The authority of Paris A may be justly said to balance that of all other MSS. put together. The successive editors of Plato—Stallbaum, Schneider, Baiter, Hermann, seem to estimate more and more highly the value of this MS. The last-named scholar has made a closer approximation to its text than was ever exhibited before. Nor is this high estimate exaggerated, as may indeed be shown by a simple test. Any one who will take the very slight trouble of comparing the recension of the First Book at the beginning of the Zurich edition with the text will find that after making allowance for differences of orthography the real substantial errors are exceedingly few, being in all not more than two or three. There is considerable variation in minute points, as for example (1) the first person of the pluperfect tense which has been Atticized in the first hand of the MS. (ἐνοράκη, ἐπεπόνθη A¹, ἐνοράκευ, ἐπεπόνθευ Aº); (2) also in the forms of some substantives, e.g. ὁφελία, εὐηθία: (3) in the use of the i subscript which is most frequently adscribed; (4) most of all in the omission or addition of the aspirate, causing a frequent confusion of ἀντός and ἀντός, &c.: and (5) not unfrequent confusion in accentuation. Whether ἐκαυ δέοι κ.τ.λ. 333 D, which is found in several other MSS., including Vat. Θ, or οὐκοῦν followed by an optative without ἄν (ib. E) be a mistake is uncertain. But after making these deductions there remain only about three passages which must be admitted to be substantial errors; these are 327 A ἔτοσων for ἔτσων, οἶνον τε σύ probably for οἶνον γε σύ 336 E; the interchange between Τ and Γ being of the commonest of MS. errors, and probably ἀποκρίνεσθαι for ἀποκρινείσθαι 337 C. (These last variations are cited on the authority of the Zurich edition; none of them are to be discovered in the collation of the Paris MS. made by Dübner for Didot, the various readings in which are almost confined to matters of orthography.)
and especially of Plato.

On the other hand there are several probable corrections of the received text, e.g. ἐλεύθερον for ἐν λεύθερον 327 C, probably the two examples of the omission of ἄν noted above (333 D, E), the explanatory ἀσώντευκτον in which γὰρ is wanting (ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμιαὶ for ἐπειδὰν γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμιαὶ 329 C), the substitution of πιαίνειν for ποιμαίνειν, all of which are supported by the canon of the more difficult reading.

Nearly the same result follows from the examination of the Second Book, in which several erasures and a somewhat greater number of errors are found, e.g. there are six omissions: (1) ἄδικα δ’ ἐπανέφαται 358 A, (2) the words ἀδικεῖται after μὲν τελε τελεθα 366 A, (3) εἶναι after δοκεῖται 356 E, (4) ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν 367 C which is inserted in the margin, (5) the words παρὰ τῶν βασιλέα 360 B which are also found in the margin, (6) καὶ τὴν ποικίλαν 373 A. The number of these omissions tends to weaken the authority of the MS. in other cases of omission; number (4) which is an antithetical clause and is added at the side also throws light on the character of the omission in number (1). The tendency to omission and especially to the omission of parallel clauses or words may be observed in several other passages of the MS., e.g. 400 D τὸ εὐδόκιμον [καὶ ἀνδόκιμον]. Again there are errors of orthography, ὑφειλαῖα for ὑφειλαῖα 368 C, λύσεοι for λύσει 366 B, ἀμφοτέρων for ἀμφοτέρων 379 D, ἰαμβία 380 A, interchanges of υ for ν and of breathings and accents; also one or two of a more serious character, e.g. τῷ διόκω for τῷ διόκω 363 A, τῷ Γέγη τοῦ Λυδείου 359 D where the error of the other MSS. is retained. On the other hand it is possible that in ἔλαυν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ 365 B, ἀποσχολήμεν 367 D, this MS. has preserved the true reading.

[Professor Jowett’s MS. here ends abruptly: for further observations on the text of the Republic see Essay II, pp. 67 ff. of this volume.]
ESSAY II

THE KINGDOM OF EVIL

Book I. 35a d.

οἱ γε παμπόνηροι . . . πράττευν ἀδύνατοι. Plato argues that there is no such thing as a kingdom of evil (compare Matthew xii. 25, 26—‘Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand; and if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself: how shall then his kingdom stand?’); also that there is no unmixed evil in the individual. Cp. Lys. 220e, 221 A πότερον, . . . ἐὰν τοῦ κακῶν ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἢτι ἐσται οὐδὲ διψῆν, οὐδὲ ἀλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τουμῶν; . . . ἡ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρωτήμα, δὲ τὸ ποτ’ ἐσται τότε ἡ μὴ ἐσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν; which raises the question of the connexion of evil with the desires; and Crat. 403 E, where (as in the Timaeus) evil is attributed to the accidents of the bodily state. Evil is elsewhere referred to necessities in the nature of things (Theaet. 176 A), or to pre-existing elements in the world (Polit. 273 C), or to the necessary imperfection of secondary causes (Tim. 48 A), or to the bodily constitution (Tim. 86). The contradictory nature of evil is again discussed in the Laws (i. 626 C, D), where the argument that war is the natural condition of states is carried back to individuals. The connexion of virtue and power is also observed by Aristotle, Pol. i. 6, § 3 τρόπων τινὰ ἄρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τοῦ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς, ὡστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἄρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν. On the other hand in Rep. x. 610 E
evil is described as having an agonized and intensified existence—τὸν δ’ ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ἐξωτικὸν παρέχοντα.

It has been asked in later ages whether evil is negative or positive, to be represented under the figure of decomposition or of death. It may be replied: (1) that there is no ideal of evil; Milton or Goethe give consistency to their creations by the addition of intellect and of will; (2) all evil has some admixture of good. But again, no limit can be assigned either to the persistency, or to the consequences of evil. The difficulty of this, as of many other questions, seems to arise out of the attempt to realize in the abstract a state or nature which is essentially concrete. Cp. note on IV. 444 B.
ESSAY III

THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Book II. 369 a ff.

The favourite analogy of the state and the individual is a figure of speech which lends a sort of elevation and interest to politics, and yet is only true partially and has frequently led to practical errors. Man is a microcosm, and 'the world is set in his heart,' and new aspects of either arise when they are reflected on each other. But the life and organization of the state are far inferior to the life and organization of the individual, nor do the virtues or parts of the one answer, as Plato supposes, to the virtues or parts of the other. The nation never attains the unity of a person and has therefore a lower degree of freedom and responsibility; a national will means the excess of the majority of wills, which often balance each other or are lost in circumstances, and thus pass into a sort of imperfect necessity. The famous expression of a 'national' or 'state' conscience is poetical and figurative only, for that consciousness which is essential to the idea of conscience in the individual becomes in a state only the aggregation of many individual consciousnesses which from sympathy or some action or tendency of circumstances are led to form the same reflection on themselves. And in judging collectively, the sense of right and wrong is apt to be blunted. When, again, a nation is said to 'rise as one man,' the very form of expression seems to imply that this unanimity is an exceptional condition, and that a nearer approach is
made to the unity of an individual at one time than at another. On the other hand the nation lasts while 'the individuals wither': it gathers up and retains many more elements than are found in any single person: it has no natural term, and may have an endless growth. The citizen of a state presupposes the state into which he is born, the laws and institutions of which are the outward barriers and limits within which his life is set, being a more durable structure than that which he himself is. Lastly, the sphere of the state is co-extensive with law and politics, the sphere of the individual with morals and religion. The exceptions to this opposition arise where individuals act for nations, or where in the leaders of states the personal character takes the place of the official and representative, or where, as in the case of a treaty or agreement, there is a definite act binding on nations just as much as on individuals. Nor must nations any more than individuals be deemed incapable of acting from any higher motive than interest; nor are they mere organizations of individuals, but they have also a national life.

Grave errors may arise in practice from the neglect of these simple considerations. When politics are confounded with ethics or the state identified with the individual, the conditions of human society are ignored; legislation has a false aim: human law is superseded by a fiction of divine law: there are aspirations after the ideal which degenerate into feebleness and tyranny. The Utopias of ancient times often fall into the theoretical errors of which the confusions of spiritual and temporal, or erroneous theories of punishment in modern times are practical illustrations.

That the state was not a larger family or magnified individual was clearly understood by Aristotle (Pol. i. 1). In the political ideal of Plato the state and the individual are in closer union (ἐγγείρεται ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος) than in fact and experience. In the same way, the lines which distinguish the Church and the members of the Church fade away in
such expressions as—"The kingdom of Heaven is within you."

The idea of the individual as distinct from the state or family is not one of the earliest but one of the latest of human conceptions, not having yet emerged in ancient times from the unity of the family which expanded into the state.
ESSAY IV

VERACITY

Book II. 389 a ff.

Plato allows that a doctrine of economy or accommodation may be necessary for men in certain cases, but not for the Gods; the accommodations attributed to the Gods are really erroneous conceptions of the divine nature. Falsehood is permitted by him: (1) in dealing with enemies or madmen (I. 331 C); (2) for educational purposes, provided the falsehood be a moral one (II. 377 A ff.); (3) as an engine of state, to be used by the rulers only (III. 389 B, 414 B).

Moral philosophy in modern times has a stricter rule. Every one would agree that some points of divinity or philosophy are liable to be imperfectly apprehended; also that modes of thought vary in different ages and countries, or in different individuals, according to their education and natural powers. In the communication of one age with another, some degree of error or inaccuracy thus arises naturally. Nor would any one deny that instruction is often best conveyed through fiction, or that the rule of truth and falsehood is in a measure determined by the relations of men to one another, or that received opinions, however erroneous, cannot always be rudely and immediately set aside. But we refuse to admit that any man under any circumstances may tell or preach a lie; or that the rulers of states and churches are privileged to introduce artificial economies. Extreme cases, which are sometimes put, of justifiable, or more strictly speaking, excusable falsehood, may be fairly said to prove the rule.
ESSAYS

BY

PROFESSOR CAMPBELL
ESSAY I

ON THE STRUCTURE OF PLATO'S REPUBLIC
AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER DIALOGUES.

I

On the Composition of the Republic.

The Republic parts naturally into five sections, which § I. are marked off with elaborate forms of transition by Plato himself.

1. Book i, in which the question concerning Justice is propounded, and the views of Socrates and of the Sophist are dramatically set in opposition.

2. Books ii, iii, iv, in which the question is put more seriously, and partly answered through the institution of the ideal State.

3. Books v, vi, vii, developing further the ideal of the State, and expounding (a) the community of goods and of marriage, (b) the supremacy of the philosopher, (c) the education of the philosopher-kings, reaching up to Dialectic and to the Idea of Good.

4. Books viii and ix, supplying the reverse picture of the declension of States and Individuals from ideal perfection, and concluding with the ideal of evil, as embodied in the tyrannical man. This is forcibly contrasted with the kingdom of Righteousness, which each man may seek to establish 'within his own clear breast.'
5. The tenth Book forms an appendix or conclusion to the whole work, in which (1) the exclusion of the poets from education is reaffirmed, and (2) (as in the Gorgias) the rewards of another life are added to the blessedness of the just and misery of the wicked in this life as already set forth.

§ 2. Parts 1 and 2 are intimately connected.

1. (B. i.) In conversation with Cephalus, who bases happiness on a moral and religious ground, so implying that the just are happy, Socrates raises the question 'What is Justice?' Polemarchus vainly tries to answer him. Thrasydamas interposes, and in arguing with him Socrates employs, (1) the analogy of the arts, especially of medicine and navigation; (2) the comparison of the Ruler to a Shepherd, suggested by an objection of Thrasydamas; (3) the notion of ἴμφερον, utility or expediency, which recurs afterwards in various forms and applications; while (4) the extreme opposition of the tyrant to the true ruler is ironically hinted by anticipation.

2. (Bb. ii, iii.) The remarks of Glaucceon and Adeimantus having shown that the question is not thus disposed of, Socrates undertakes to give his own account of the matter. Observing that the nature of Justice is first to be studied in the large letters, for this purpose he 'creates the State.' The principle of 'one member one function' is first laid down, then the state of primitive simplicity imagined,—then the introduction of luxury occasions the necessity for soldiers, who in accordance with the first principle must be trained and organized as a standing army. But the protectors of the State must not only be 'good haters' but true friends, and they must be chosen and educated accordingly.

The rules for their education, (1) in liberal culture, (2) in bodily exercises, are clearly set forth, with many pregnant observations scattered by the way; then the rulers are provisionally appointed, and the army is led out to its modest quarters, the whole people having been first imbued with the Phoenician 'lie.'

(B. iv.) The objection of Adeimantus, that the highest class
Composition of the Dialogue.

is not thus made the happiest, leads to reflexions on the desirableness of unity, the dangers of wealth and poverty, and other incidental topics, concluding with the establishment of religion on a national basis. Thus the still impeding task of defining Justice is further delayed. But the time for it arrives at last, and amidst various references to the opening of the inquiry, Socrates calls for a 'light.' He then suggests the method of residues, by which in the discussion of the four cardinal virtues Justice is held in reserve. When her turn arrives, the importance of the critical moment is marked by the new image of huntsmen clustering round an impenetrable thicket. And when Justice in the State has been discovered, much yet remains to do. The analogy of State and Individual (the 'large and small letters') must be verified by proving that the Soul has parts corresponding to the classes in the State. This psychological question cannot really be determined without a higher method, i.e. without going beyond psychology to find the metaphysical basis of its distinctions; but it is for the present settled provisionally in the affirmative, and the definition of Justice in the individual as the harmonious action of the three parts of the soul, is at length obtained.

The continuity of the work so far is obvious, and is § 3. assisted by many minute links, such as (1) the question of the profitableness of justice; (2) the allusion, in ii. 357, to the description of medicine as a mode of money-making in i. 342, 346; (3) the power of doing good to friends (i. 334) and of pleasing the gods (i. 331) is claimed for Injustice in ii. 362, 366; (4) Justice, according to Polemarchus (i. 333), is ἐν τῷ κοινωνεῖν,—this prepares for the suggestion (ii. 372 a) that it is ἐν χρείᾳ τῷ τῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλους; (5) the noble 'lie' in iii. 414 B recalls the ἐν τοῖς λóγοις ψεύδος of ii. 382, iii. 389.

The end of the dialogue (Bb. viii–x) is also subtly joined to the beginning. The tyrant, set up by Thrasymachus as having the noblest life (B. 1), is cast down to the depths of infamy in B. ix, and receives his final sentence in B. x, where the picture of the world below confirms the remark of
On the Structure of Plato's Republic.

Cephalus in i. 330 d. The question of the profitableness of injustice, whether it escape or not the observation of gods and men, which had already become ridiculous at iv. 445 A, is finally dismissed in B. ix. B. viii resumes the conclusion of B. iv. The avoidance of poverty and wealth, hinted in B. ii. 372, and repeated in iv. 421, is elaborately enforced in Bb. viii–ix; where also the division of the soul into νοῦς, θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, demonstrated in B. iv, is further developed and illustrated. This division is once more referred to in B. x, sub init., although not without a reservation in favour of the unity of the soul (x. 612).

§ 4. But many students of Plato\(^1\) have been struck by the fact that the central and cardinal portion of the Republic—the third act in which the drama culminates—takes the form of a digression,—an ἑρωϊκή, as Plato himself describes it\(^2\). And some have not been contented with the obvious solution that this break in the conversation belongs to Plato’s concealment of his art, like the palinode of the Phaedrus, the hiccup of Aristophanes in the Symposium, the casual inroad of Alcibiades in the same dialogue, the objections of Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo, and other similar expedients. They have proceeded to remark on the absence of allusions to v–vii in the concluding books, viii–x, as compared with the frequent and distinct allusions in viii–x to i–iv, and have further observed that the references to i–iv which occur in the central portion, v–vii, have more the appearance of deliberate quotation than of the subtle continuity which binds together i–iv, or viii–x, when taken separately. A. Krohn\(^3\) also dwells on the difference of tone and of philosophical content between v–vii on the one hand and i–iv and viii–x on the other.

According to Krohn, in those which he regards as the earlier books, i–iv, viii–x, the work of Socrates, as described in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, is continued on the same lines; the method is that of empirical psychology; the ruling

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\(^1\) See K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie, 1839, pp. 536 foll.

\(^2\) viii. 543 νόθεν δεύτερο ἑρωϊκήμενα;

\(^3\) Der Platonische Staat, &c.
conception is that of φύσις, i.e. of Becoming; the word εἴδος
is frequently employed, but (1) is applied only to the virtues
and the parts of the Soul, and (a) these εἴδη are not transcendent, but ‘innocently immanent’; and are merely modes of
γένεσις. These books exhibit Plato in the light of a genial
optimist, who thinks by a simple effort of construction to
purify nature.

But in v–vii Plato is carried off from the conception of
Nature, which still rules in the early part of B. v, into a
transcendental, metaphysical region. This purely intellectual
act begins with contemplating the ideas of Justice, Beauty,
Goodness, &c., not now dynamically but statically, and
distinguishing in each kind between the one and the many.
Thus a step is made beyond the old Socratic opposition of
knowledge and ignorance, and room is gained for δόξα,
Opinion, as an intermediate faculty. From this point onward
Plato advances on his intellectualizing course by leaps and
bounds, until the Good is seen radiating from beyond the
realm of Being. At each new stage the foregoing position
is ignored. In the series νόησις διάνοια πίστις εἰκάσια the
crudeness of επιστήμη δόξα ἀγνώσια is silently corrected.
And in B. vii, according to this writer, who takes but slight
reckoning of the great allegory, even the ideas are lost in
the transcendent notion of the Absolute, as the supreme end
of Dialectic.

In trying to account for the subsequent addition of Bb. v–vii,
Krohn avails himself of a suggestion made by F. A. Wolf and
repeated by Meineke, that Aristophanes in the Ecclesiazusae
(a. c. 391) aimed his ridicule at the communistic scheme of
Plato, of which some hint must therefore have been already
published. It is probable enough that, when the comedy was
brought out, some notion of ‘the monstrous regiment of
women’ was already in the air; but the only ground for
supposing a personal reference is by no means firm. The

1 'Harmlos immanent.'
2 The idea of a community of wives, such as Herodotus attributes to the
Agathyrsi, was already familiar to Euripides. See the fragment of his Pro-
tesilaus, (655 in Nauck) κοινὸν γάρ εἶναι χρῆν γυναικίων λόγοι.
name Aristyllos occurs in the play (l. 647, cp. Plutus, 314'), and is twisted by Meineke into a diminutive of Aristocles, which was Plato's birth-name according to Diogenes Laertius—though if it were so he had changed it before the death of Socrates, as we know from the Phaedo. On such premises Krohn builds the assumption that the 'Socratic' books (i–iv, viii–x) were written before b. c. 391, and that after this Plato re-edited the work with the addition of the ἐκτροπή (v–vii), at the opening of which he declares his defiance of τὰ τῶν χαριτων σκώματα. This whole process is supposed to have been completed before any other of the Platonic dialogues had been composed. All the greatest ones—'which alone we need care to vindicate,' are viewed as more advanced even than B. vi, and the rest are discarded as unimportant, having little, if any, philosophical significance. Dr. E. Pfleiderer, who more recently reaffirmed Krohn's theory in a modified form, conceives on the other hand that the shorter dialogues came out in the interval between the composition of i–iv, viii–ix, and of v–vii, in which interval also, at some uncertain time, B. x was composed.

§ 5. Krohn's cavils have been answered in detail by Zeller in the last edition of his History of Philosophy, and in a Latin Monograph by B. Grimmelt (De Reipublicae Platonis compositione et unitate: Berlin, 1887). But although his reasonings are inconclusive, his book is noticeable on several grounds.

1. It recalls attention to many coincidences between the earlier books of the Republic and the Memorabilia of Xenophon, and thus accentuates anew the supremacy of the ethical motive in Plato's life and work. With equal acuteness and candour this critic himself supplies the link which binds the metaphysics of Book vi to the 'innocent' psychology of Book iv. He looks on Plato as throughout continuing the endeavour of Socrates, who strove to

1 It also occurs in Attic inscriptions, C. I. r. 298, n. 169, 38. This makes for the reality of the name. The jest in Ar. Eccl. would have no point unless Aristyllos were personally repulsive, which his enemies cannot have said of Plato as a young man.
counteract the disintegrating tendencies of the age. The Platonic ideas were at first merely the result of moral forces recognized by an empiric optimism. By and by, however, they assumed (a) a logical and (b) a transcendent aspect. In the former stage (a) moral conceptions are co-ordinated with mathematical, but in the sequel (b) it is found that Plato’s main interest throughout has been to establish the indefeasible regulative value of moral truth, and that his guiding principle is one of ethical teleology, which his imperfect knowledge of Nature led him to blend with a vague cosmology.

2. Krohn’s thesis and the controversy to which it gave rise have brought into relief some inequalities in the structure of the Republic, which, whether accidental or intentional, are really there. But his argument proves too much for his case. For, if Plato had at any time regarded the education of Books II and III as adequate, or had ever been contented with the psychological method of Book IV, instead of setting out from the point reached by Socrates, he would have fallen behind it. No Socratic dialogue, even in Xenophon, is without an appeal to reason, which is conspicuously absent here. Socrates drew a sharp line of distinction between Knowledge and Ignorance, and aimed simply at basing life on an ideal of Knowledge. Plato in these books provides for that which the method of Socrates excludes;—a life grounded on true opinions, which are determined by a rational authority and moulded by education. If instead of taking the dialogue piece-meal after Krohn’s fashion, the description of the ‘first state’ is regarded as an integral portion of a larger whole, it reveals a conception not only in advance of the purely Socratic point of view, but also passing beyond the paradoxical attitude which Plato himself assumed when he raised the question whether virtue could be imparted otherwise than scientifically. Such a positive conception is only rendered possible by the conception of the state considered as a complex whole,—a constructive notion not anticipated in ‘Socratism.’ This will appear more clearly by and by in studying the relation of the Republic to the Protagoras and Meno. See below, p. 23.
3. The idea of Nature is more pervasive in the Platonic writings than Krohn is willing to admit (see Essay on Diction). The fact is that while pure 'dialectic' remains to the last an unrealized ideal, a fresh appeal to experience is continually made. At the height of the intellectual argument (vi. 506 D, E, vii. 533 E) Socrates will only go where he can take Glaucon with him. That there is some disparity between the ethical and the metaphysical books of the Republic is undeniable; the attributes of the philosophic nature are not the four cardinal virtues, nor in the series νοῦς διάνοια πίστις ἐλκασία is there any recognition of the other series νοῦς θυμός ἐπιθυμία. But this independent treatment of different aspects of the truth is quite in the manner of Plato, and it is best to take his own account of the matter, and to say that in the earlier books it was necessary to proceed provisionally, because the true philosophers had not yet been distinguished from the false, nor had the intellectual kingdom been revealed. In passing from the lower to the higher education, and from the mere guardian or soldier to the philosopher-king, he has entered on another region of thought, and is no more compelled to continue the same method than a poet feels bound to continue the same rhythm in passing from a dramatic to a lyrical strain. In Books viii–x we descend again into the ethico-political region, and the emotional elements (which had no place in the intellectual argument) naturally reappear.

4. Krohn should be accepted as an independent and competent witness to the comparative lateness of the dialectical dialogues. His remarks on the Sophist and Philebus in their relation to the Republic are especially acceptable. For the coincidences between the Philebus and Rep. Book vi, on which Zeller lays so much stress, do not really bear out his conclusion that the Philebus is the earlier writing. It may be argued with at least equal probability, that the longer and more elaborate statement of Plato's theory of pleasure was subsequent to the cursory indication of it. See below, p. 22.

5. Plato himself has noticed the discrepancy between Bb. iii and v, with regard to the appointment of the rulers and
had prepared for it by the qualifying expression (III. 414) ὡς ἐν τούτῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρηνοθαύ. In the original constitution of the State, before the higher education had been divulged, the elder guardians were made to rule the younger. But now that the rulers are to be trained for dialectic, it is necessary to make the selection while they are still young. It does not follow that they are to rule while very young, for the training is a long one, and they are not to be admitted, even to military commands, until thirty-five; still the first provisional order is superseded by the necessities arising out of the principle that kings shall be philosophers, which has been subsequently introduced.

Precisely the same difficulty is encountered by the founders of the colony from Cnossus in the Sixth Book of the Laws. The Athenian stranger explains to them that the first appointment of the νομοφῶλακες and other magistrates cannot possibly conform to the regulations as to selection and training which are to be afterwards in force (Laws vi. 751 c, ν). And one of the cautions imposed by this necessity is analogous to that enjoined in Republic, Book iii. The men selected to nominate the rulers are to be the eldest as well as the best, so far as possible (εἰς δύναμιν Laws vi. 754 c). This comparison of the two writings places the superficiality of Krohn's objection in a strong light 1.

The unity of the Republic is not that of a syllogistic § 6.

1 The following passage is characteristic both of Krohn's acuteness and of his illogical logic (Der Plat. Staat, p. 107, ed. 1876) —

'Hier wird der grosse Riss des Platonismus sichtbar. Der moralisirende Sokratiker hatte den ersten Entwurf geschrieben, der Metaphysiker fand eine wahrere Wesenheit. Beide treffen jetzt kämpfend auf einander, Beide verleugnen sich nicht. Der Reformer, der die Krankheit seines Volkes heilen will, muss glauben und vertraut der eigenen Kunst: aber mit der Substanz unter verfliessenden Formen besiegelt der Denker seinen Verzicht. Instinktmässig zieht der Eine die Idee auf die Erde, um sie zu gestalten, in bewusster Erkenntniss hebt sie der Andere in ein intelligibles Reich. Aber dieser Riss des Platonismus ist der Riss, der durch das Leben aller edelen Geister geht. Sie wirken hier mit ihrer besten Kraft und wissen, dass das Hier ein flüchtiges Etwas ist.'

This is really to say that Plato's philosophy has a body as well as a mind. But if such an antithesis is so deeply inherent in Platonism, why deny that a work in which it is found was written continuously!
treatise, but partly the unity of a philosophical movement or development and partly of a piece of literary art. Students of the Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus, Theaetetus, should be aware that it is Plato’s way in the earlier stages of any exposition to hold much strictly in reserve. His method is ‘regressive,’ as it has been termed, continually passing from a partial or superficial view of the subject in hand, to another which he regards as more complete or more profound; ascending, as he himself would say, from hypothesis to hypothesis in the approach towards absolute truth. Whether the lower hypothesis is refuted, as in the Theaetetus, or discarded by a seemingly capricious impulse, as in the Phaedrus, is merely a question of form. The words of Socrates (Theaet. 187 Α) are equally applicable in both cases—δια δή νῦν πάλιν ἡ ἀρχή, πάντα τὰ πρῶσθεν ἐξαλείψατε, εἰ τι μάλλον καθορᾶτα, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελημύθασ.

In the Republic, as in the Phaedo, the disciples suggest difficulties which provoke the master into disclosing what he has so far kept in the background. The gradual evolution of the thought by this means is not referable to the incoherence of an unformed thinker, but to the most deliberate literary and philosophical design. To imagine Plato as in any single dialogue himself groping tentatively along the path by which he conducts his reader, or like the guide across the ford (Theaet. 200 ε) taking his audience with him into depths which he has not explored, is an error no less grave than to suppose with Schleiermacher and others, that the whole body of the dialogues, the work of fifty years, was composed according to a preconcerted plan. It argues a strange insensibility both to the irony and the dialectical economy of Plato, that any one should take literally such expressions as ‘whither the argument like a breeze may carry us, on that course we must proceed.’ Such words express the spirit of the catechetical mode of exposition; but only a blind simplicity can believe the master serious when he professes not to know the way.

Another general feature of Plato’s discourse has not been sufficiently noticed, and it is this:—the most elaborate dis-
cussion of the higher aspects of metaphysical or psychological truth does not prevent the recurrence of crude statements essentially inconsistent with the results so gained. Observe, for example, how the mythical doctrine of pre-existence is resumed in the Politicus, notwithstanding the clear dialectic of the Theaetetus and Sophist which has avowedly come between.

The unity of the Republic as a literary masterpiece hardly § 7. needs defence. Each part has its own climax of interest, and, in spite of the intentional breaks and digressions, or rather with their aid, there is a continuous rise and fall,—as in a tragedy,—pervading the whole work.

The peripeteia of the drama is made by the revelation of the truth about the philosopher-king, which is disclosed, after being purposely held back by the digression on the laws of War, and by the ‘coy excuses’ of Socrates, precisely at the middle point of the dialogue. (The culmination of the earlier portion in the definition of Justice had been similarly heightened by ingenious delays.) The breaking of this ‘third wave of the πρωτεύμα’ of course overwhelms Glaucon with surprise. That is the rhetorical artifice. But the attentive reader of the preceding books should not be wholly unprepared for the discovery. What else is implied by the identification of ἀρχή with ἐπιστήμη in I. 342, III. 389? or by the true ruler who is unwilling to rule, I. 346, cp. VII. 520? or by the few wise men through whose wisdom the State is wise (IV. 428)? The supremacy of reason is a Socratic principle which could not be absent from any part or aspect of Plato’s Commonwealth. A similar outburst of astonishment marks the importance of the discovery that the education of the philosopher is to be carried up to the Idea of Good. That is the culminating point of this central portion, which develops the intellectual and philosophical ideal. But for this surprise also there had been some preparations in the earlier books. The ‘Fables’ for which rules are given in Bb. II, III, are characterized in 376 ε as containing elements of truth. And although this remark is merely dropped by the way, the rules themselves are determined by the motive that when the age of reason
comes, the truth may be accepted, because it harmonizes with the legends that were learned in childhood (402 Α). The child so trained will have been made familiar with the elementary forms of goodness (σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθερίας... καὶ δοσα τοῦτων ἀδελφά)
1, and may hope therefore to attain to true μονωμή. And while the τύποι θεολογίας are thus a reflexion of the Form of Good, the law of simplicity in education and even the division of labour are associated with the philosophical conception of Abstract Unity. Lastly, the psychology of Β. iv is avowedly provisional—those who would discuss the Soul and virtue adequately must go round by the ‘longer way.’ (This thread is explicitly resumed in Β. 503 Α.) And the definition of courage, in particular, is limited by the term πολιτική, thus reserving a place for the intellectual courage and fortitude of the philosopher, who regards human life as a little thing and is dauntless and indefatigable in the pursuit of truth.

§ 8. Those who would break up the Republic have not observed that Ββ. v–vii are linked to the preceding book by the image of a ‘sea of difficulty.’ The first hint of this is given at iv. 435 c, by the word ἐμπετώκαμεν, which is followed up by ταῦτα μόρις διαγενεύκαμεν ib. 441 c. This renders less abrupt the image in v. 453 d (ὅπερ τε τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἄν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, διόμεν γε νεὶ οὐδὲν ἤστων), which gives distinct note of preparation for the continued metaphor (457 Β ἐν ὀσπὲρ κύμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν—ὅστε μὴ παντάπασι κατακλυσθῆναι, 472 Α μόρις μοι τὸ δύο κύματε ἐκφυγόντε νῦν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπότατον τῆς τρικύμιας ἐπάγεις, 473 Α εἰρήσεται δ’ οὖν, εἶ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτι τε ἀτεχνῶς ὀσπὲρ κύμα ἐγκελών καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλυστεί). Socrates reverts to the figure implied in iv. 441 c, although the image of a ‘swarm of arguments’ (v. 450 Β) had come between.

§ 9. One point affecting the structure of the Republic, which requires careful elucidation, is connected with the famous allegory of the cave at the opening of Β. vii,—the passage

1 It has been observed that this enumeration comes nearer to the list of philosophic attributes in Β. vi than to the Cardinal Virtues.
which suggested the 'idola specus' to the mind of Bacon. At the end of B. vi, the Platonic Socrates had shadowed forth a hierarchy of pure ideas, constituting the supra-sensual kingdom of being and truth, presided over and vitalized by the supreme Form of Good. This is not only a turning point of the Republic, but may be regarded as marking a critical moment in the development of Platonism. The 'Reason of the Best' is said indeed in the Phaedo to be the Atlas of the World, and true causes to be more effectually approached through the examination of language and thought than through external nature; but in that dialogue there is no such clear vision of an ideal unity of knowledge as is here given. In the Phaedrus-myth the forms of Justice and Holiness appear to be raised on lofty pedestals above the rest. And it is shown that to be man at all one must understand general notions abstracted from sense. But there is no well-defined path of ascent from the first or primary generalization of experience to the height of moral vision. Now in the Republic, the conception of such an ascent is formulated in the concluding passage of B. vi, and carried further in B. vii. Plato here anticipates that gradation of mental stages, and that remotion of the Divine from Man, which, as will be presently shown, is increasingly characteristic of the later, or more constructive, phase of his philosophy.

But in passing onwards from the conclusion of B. vi to the allegory of B. vii, the ground is insensibly shifted, as the idealizing impulse gathers strength, so that not only the distinction between πίστις and ἐλκασία is dropped (since from the higher point of view the sensible world consists entirely of images), all ordinary experience being now merged in ἐλκασία,

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1 Professor E. Caird writes as follows on this passage:

'I. I do not think it need cause us any difficulty to find the whole visible world viewed as standing in the same relation to the whole intelligible world as the parts in each do to each other, after we have been told that the former is the "offspring and likeness" of the latter. In fact this gives us three pairs standing to each other as image to reality:

1 : 2 :: 2 : 4 :: 3 : 6

a : b :: c : d :: (a + b) : (c + d). That is

ἐλκασία : πίστις :: διάνοια :: νόησις :: τὸ δρόμενον : τὸ νοούμενον.
but the actual scientific processes which rank with ἀνάλογα in B. vi are now degraded to the level of ordinary experience. The geometers, the astronomers, the ‘empiric’ harmonists, are all found guilty of the same error, that of not rising beyond and above sensible things and narrow everyday utilities. They are still tied and bound, still watching the fleeting shadows on the wall of the den.

§ 10. The passage now to be considered extends from vi. 504 to vii. 519. The difficulty of interpretation is increased by the fact that Plato’s exposition here is avowedly imperfect, being (1) relative to the immediate purpose of the dialogue, and (2) figurative from beginning to end.

Much turns on the significance of vi. 511 A, especially the words ἐκόσι δὲ χρωμένου ἀντοίς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθέοι. (Cp. vii. 532 c.) That ἀντοίς here designates not the ideas but merely sensible objects as distinguished from their shadows, is proved by comparing supra. 510 ε ἀντὰ μὲν ταύτα,

1 a. I suppose the difficulty in the case of the artificial figures lies in this, that it is not real beings whose shadows are seen in the cave, but marionettes, and that therefore the process of rising to true knowledge involves two steps: first to turn from the shadows to the marionettes, and then to discover that they are merely artificial figures, and to turn from them to the realities they copy. What Plato would suggest by this is I think, that individual things are not seen as what they are, till we have turned away from their first appearance and tried to define them. Then we find, as Plato shows in the 5th book, that they cannot be defined. They are great or small, good or bad according to the reference in which they are viewed. We thus discover that they are συναρτα, combinations of elements which have no real unity, but are merely imitations of real things. We are therefore obliged to go up to the intelligible world in order to find real things, first in the sciences under their subordinate principles, and finally in dialectic which sees all things in the light of the highest principle of knowledge and reality (“sees all things in God”).

1 b. The sciences are conceived by Plato as starting with principles, which are hypothetical in the sense that they have not been carried back to the first principle. He further adds that, when this is the case, science has to help its deductions by employing sensible images: in other words he thinks that, when we do not carry back knowledge to its first principle, we are obliged, in Kantian language, to use the Anschauung to supply the defects of the Begriff, and to make demonstration possible. This is illustrated by the mathematical use of diagrams, in which we prove universal truths by means of the particular image we set before us.

1 I think the principles in question are not merely the principles of mathematics, though it is the type of mathematical science that is present to Plato, and on which he conceives the other sciences to be constructed.”
Books VI and VII.

It follows that the ὑπόθεσις is a scientific proposition, the subject of which is not the sign but the thing signified; while the ἐικών is a sensible object, employed as the symbol of the abstraction which is the subject of such a proposition. The visible square symbolizes the ideal square, whose properties are to be mathematically determined. Διάνοια, then, in B. vi, is the intellectual process, which, starting from hypotheses (of which mathematical assumptions are the clearest example) works out results through the mediation of sensible figures, plane (διαγράμματα) or solid (πλάσματα).

This general view is not forgotten in the discussion of the particular sciences. Astronomy, for example, ought to be a process of true διάνοια, but the actual astronomers, like the actual geometers, misunderstand the case so far that they think their science has for its object the visible revolutions of the stars, and not the laws of motion which these typify.

The higher aspect of διάνοια remains as a process intermediate between sense and knowledge, but in B. vii is represented by a new image, that of the upward path, rugged and steep, from the cave into the light of day. What meanwhile becomes of the σκέψιστά and of the light of the fire? This part of the figure, involving as it does a dualism from which Plato was working himself free, is almost lost sight of in what follows, being only cursorily alluded to as a part of the circumstances of the cave. It is a provisional 'hypothesis,' which Plato discards (ἀναρέω) in pressing onwards and upwards. But in its place this feature also of the allegory must have its own significance, and Socrates himself gives a partial interpretation of it by saying that the light of the fire represents the power of the Sun. There is some confusion, however, even here; for the objects seen by the denizens of the cave are not lights but shadows. What, then, are the things of which our unenlightened consciousness perceives only the shadows? What are the ἄγάλματα σκεναστά, the 'manufactured articles,'
which hands unseen exhibit between the prisoners and the artificial (i.e. created) Sun? What else but the realities of γένεσις, Nature as the embodiment of the ideas, the facts of human experience, as they really happen, and not as they seem?

1. Plato is engaged in bringing out a twofold distinction, (1) between Nature and the Ideas, (2) between Appearance and Reality in Nature. This, and not merely the requirement of a fourth term for his analogy, was his motive for separating πλοτις from ἐλκαστα.

2. The ἀγάλματα are not themselves immediately perceived by sense at all. It is only when the individual mind has been freed by Socratic questioning, and turned about, and asked What is it? (τί ἔστι;) —or, in more Platonic language, by a process of διαφοράς and συναγωγή,—only, in more modern terminology, when some effort is made to distinguish, abstract, and generalize,—that the soul begins to have an inkling of the nature of that world, which was dimly represented to her in crude experience,—of a real finger, of a real square, of the Sun himself as an embodied god, &c. And she learns that these things, however perfect in their kinds (vii. 529 ε), have been created after some higher pattern,—in other words, that their being is determined by universal and eternal Laws, and ultimately by the Law of the Best,—τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ Ἰδέα. While not absolute νοητά, they are νοητά μετὰ ἀρχής (vi. sub fin.). It is not improbable that in this part of the allegory there is still some reference to the διάνοια of B. vi as a process intermediate between sense and reason. But the ‘manufactured articles’ here exhibited by unseen powers correspond, not to the ἔλκονες of the geometers, for example, but to the realities typified by them. Those πλάσματα and διαγράμματα were only shadows and copies of these, which answer more nearly to the subjects of their ἱποθέσεις.

3. In the Timaeus, the true phenomena of nature are attributed to the created gods, who are said to make and set in order the living creatures in whom soul and body are temporarily combined (Tim. 43). Similarly, the παραφέρουντες, who are clearly δαίμονες, exhibit the σκευαστά here.
4. The ἀγάλματα or ἐδώλα of the allegory constitute a lower stage of the ideal which in Plato's language is alone the real, not the immediately visible, but the truth of phenomena, the ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἐκάστων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, the ἐμφαν εἶδος, the first intention of the ἐν λογισμῷ ἐσωτερικῷ.

Now these realities of γένεσις, τὰ φύσει ἐσωτερικά, of which the shadows or impressions are presented to the uneducated mind, are not really known until we get above and behind them. Then they are seen to be themselves the images or copies (ἐδώλα) of higher things, and the mind reaches beyond them and lays hold on the primal cause of being and of knowing, the ἴδεα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

May not this notion of a 'lower stage' help to remove the difficulty which is felt in seeking to reconcile the αὐτοκλίνη of B. x with the higher teaching of B. vi? For the purpose of degrading the poets it is not necessary to mount to the ἀνυπόθετον or to the Form of Good. It is enough to have risen from shadows to objects, and from objects to their first abstraction—to the truth of γένεσις. The painted bed is the shadow of the actual bed, which is made after the pattern of the ideal bed. This we are 'disposed' (as Platonists) to say that God has made and set in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει). But God made that, as he made the world, under the guidance of yet loftier ideals, the ideal of utility, of rest, of stability, of security, of permanence, of symmetry. However this may be, Plato's views of ontology, as seriously held by him at the time of writing the Republic, are to be gathered rather from Bb. vi, vii, than from B. x, where the reference to the doctrine of ideas is merely illustrative.

And it is worth observing that while mathematical truths are put in the forefront amongst the objects of 'hypothetical science,' because they are the most definite and distinct, moral notions are by implication co-ordinated with these. The fact is rendered manifest by the words in 517 ε, where the disputants in the den are said to argue περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἡ ἀγαλμάτων ἐν αἱ σκιᾶ, i.e. 'impressions about right, or rules of right,' the latter (τὸ νόμον) holding an intermediate place between abstract Justice (αὐτὸ
On the Structure of Plato's Republic.

τὸ δίκαιον) and the actual constitutions of states in the world (τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις νόμιμα). This intermediate position of τὸ νόμμων as ἀγαλμα τοῦ δίκαιου may be compared to the function ascribed to Law in the Politicus. Compare also vi. 501 ἐπὶ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

§ II. Bb. viii–x, as already indicated, have less in common with vi–vii than with the earlier portion. It does not follow that they are unconnected with what immediately precedes them: still less that they could be read continuously after B. iv without leaving a deplorable gap. The 'number of the state' in viii. 546 is from a 'laboratory' of which Bb. i–iv afford no trace. And in contrasting the pleasures of the tyrant with the happiness of the philosopher-king, the account of the higher education is manifestly presupposed. The hope of conforming the individual life to the 'pattern in the sky' precisely answers to that which is left to the actual philosopher of B. vi, who lets the storm rage past him, and strives to imitate the regular courses of the stars1. But the later books have also a special tone and quality of their own. If Bb. vi, vii carry us to a height of intellectual contemplation that is unsurpassed, Bb. viii, ix are even more impressive in the depth of ethical feeling which they convey. The growing intensity of earnestness, as state after state, man after man, discloses a lower circle or stage of evil, is incomparably grand, and it is expressed with extraordinary wealth and happiness of imagination. The effect is not less different from the serene and smiling optimism of Bb. iii, iv, than from the speculative abstraction of Bb. vi, vii. And when the return

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1 See Eur. Fr. Inc. 902 (N.):—

Διδύμος δότες τῆς Ιστορίας
δοξη μάθησιν,
μήτε πολέμων ἢ πηροσύνην
μήτ' εἰς αδίκους πράξεις ὅρμων,
ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορίων φύσις
κόσμου ἄγνωστο τή τε εὐνέστη
cαὶ ὅπως
καὶ τοῖς τῶν οὐκοῦν ἀλληλούρων
ἐργαν πελετήμα προσεῖε.
is made, towards the end of B. ix, from the life of the
tyrant to that of the king, the philosopher is invested with
new majesty. The continuity of this portion (the fourth act
of the drama) is assisted by the recurrence of a few great
topics, each of which is gradually amplified: (1) Wealth and
poverty; (2) the three principles of intellect, anger, desire,
corresponding to the ruling, defending, and industrial classes
in the State; (3) the necessary and unnecessary desires;
(4) the image of the drones, stinging and stingless (i.e. rogues
and paupers), leading up to the description of the tyrant’s
master passion as a great winged drone; (5) the insurrection
in the soul (an image which intensely vivifies the analogy
between the individual and the State); (6) the relation of the
tyrant to the Demos represented as that of son to father;
(7) the image of the man and beasts within the man—the lion
and the serpent and the many-headed brute. The manage-
ment of these notions and successive images so as to charac-
terize the evolution of ever fresh aspects of social and per-
sonal life, is most curious and instructive, even as a literary
study.¹

At the beginning of B. x, Socrates reviews his creation § 12.
and finds it good. The point immediately resumed is the ex-
clusion of the poets—which occasioned Plato more compunc-
tion than the community of wives; but, in returning to the
discussion, he, as usual, takes up new ground, and glances at
the conversation which has intervened. Although the allegory
of the cave is not distinctly referred to, yet in defining μίανως
it is now permissible to assume the existence of an ideal
world, and to speak of the artist as the maker of shadows
of images, thrice removed from reality and truth. And, as
Socrates says explicitly, the psychological distinctions of
Bb. iv, ix, enable us now to affirm that these unrealities
appeal to the lower part of the soul, i.e. to emotion and not

¹ When tested by statistical evidence, i.e. by the presence or frequency
of particular modes of expression, the eighth and ninth Books are found
to have as many features in common with Plato’s later writings as any
other part of the Republic. See Constantin Ritter’s Untersuchungen, &c.,
pp. 33–47.
to reason, so rendering more difficult that control of the feelings and that abnegation of pleasure, which has been shown to be of the essence of virtue.

Thus Plato leads us back to the main question:—the intrinsic value of justice, independently of reputation and reward. Socrates claims to have established this; and now begs leave to restore what for the sake of argument had been taken away, the outward happiness attending a good life. And to crown all, he makes known the immortality of the Soul, and the future blessedness of the just: to which is added, as the natural counterpart, the punishment of the wicked¹—the tyrannical tyrant in chief.

§ 13. Accepting the Republic from the hand of Plato as an artistic whole, we refuse to examine curiously into the exact time when the several parts were written. That the central portion may have been written last is a possibility which we neither affirm nor deny. Such speculations lie beyond the scope of criticism. That on the Republic, with all its comprehensiveness and variety, the author has impressed an unmistakable unity of design, is a proposition which no mature and sober student is likely to dispute.

II

The Republic considered in relation to other dialogues of Plato.

§ 14. From the fulness and range of its contents, and especially from the combination of moral and political with purely intellectual elements in its composition, the Republic has more affinities with other writings of Plato than are to be found elsewhere in any single dialogue.

Gorgias.

To the Gorgias it stands in a close and peculiar relation. For the longer writing is in fact an elaborate endeavour to substantiate that supremacy of right, which Socrates so

¹ This has been thought inconsistent with iii. 386ff. What Plato there deprecates is the fear of death. Here he is enforcing the fear of sin.

Cf. Laws v. 727 d tao yap en 'Aidou pragramata panta kai a'goumeneis tis psychis einai eneizei kai oke antiteinei, e.t.l. The words in iii. 387 c Isaos ebd eixe prds allo ti possibly refer to the other aspect of the truth.
eloquently vindicates in refuting Gorgias and Polus. The Gorgias asserts the claims of justice. The Republic reiterates the claim and adds a definition. The counsel of perfection, ‘Do right in scorn of consequences,’ leaves the disciple of Socrates unsatisfied, until he finds an answer to the question ‘What is right?’ And this can only be obtained through the study of Man in Society. In the Republic, accordingly, the social environment of the higher life is elaborately set forth; and this constitutes a real and at first sight a very wide distinction between the two dialogues. But the difference appears less when it is considered that Plato’s Commonwealth is an ideal projected into the future, and that the philosopher in the Republic, like Socrates in the Gorgias, takes no part in actual politics, but ‘stands under the shelter of a wall’ and lets the storm of unrighteousness vi. 496 D. rage past him.

In Bb. i–iv of the Republic, the most characteristic positions of the Gorgias are restated and developed further. Thrasymachus may be described as a magnified and more original Polus, and like Polus he is tongue-tied at last, through fear of opinion. Then, in place of the thorough-going cynicism of Callicles, who speaks openly what other men implicitly believe, the brothers Glaucion and Adeimantus give their clear philosophic exposition of the worldly principles from which their generous natures instinctively recoil. The theory, although put differently, is in both dialogues essentially the same,—that Might is Right, and that Justice (as Shakespeare’s royal villain says of Conscience)

‘is but a word that cowards use,
Devised at first to keep the strong in awe.’

The sophistical paradox is associated in both dialogues with admiration of the tyrant as the one strong man, who by trampling upon so-called rights secures his interest and asserts his power. Adeimantus, however, introduces a new element into the discussion, when he says that the praise of Justice, as commonly enforced, is no less immoral than the

\[1 \text{ i. 352 b ἵνα μὴ τούτῳ ἀπέχωμαι.}\]
praise of Injustice,—that prudential morality encourages immorality.

The parallel between the Gorgias and the Republic,—not to touch on many minute coincidences, which are mentioned in the notes to this edition,—extends also to the vision of judgement with which both dialogues alike conclude, and which in the Gorgias, although briefer, is even more vivid and terror-striking than the tale of Er. The description of the tyrant's soul, naked before her judge, contains some hints of the conception of the last state of the tyrannical man, which is elaborated towards the end of the ninth book of the Republic.

The Gorgias also agrees with the Republic in assuming an intellectual or scientific basis for morality (Gorg. 508 α σο δε πλονεξιαν ολε δειν δασκειν γεωμετριαν γαρ αμελεις), and in the rejection of Hedonism.

Which dialogue came first in order of composition? The question is perhaps an idle one, and in the absence of adequate external evidence the answer must necessarily be uncertain. But some grounds may be adduced for the opinion that the Republic was planned after the Gorgias was written. The shorter dialogue has, comparatively speaking, some of the crudeness and also of the freshness of a sketch contrasted with an elaborate picture. The impressive figure of 'Socrates against the world' is softened, in the more finished work, with a halo of ideal optimism. 'The world is not unreasonable, could it but hear reason,' is a note that would have sounded strange in the presence of Callicles. The companion portraits of the Just and Unjust Man are completed, in the Republic, by filling in their imaginary surroundings.

Taking either dialogue as a whole, it may be fairly argued that the assertion, 'A right will is all in all,' which is the upshot of the Gorgias, is naturally previous to the inquiry, 'What is essential rectitude? and how is righteous action possible?'

§ 15. It has been assumed by Schleiermacher and Zeller that the passages of B. vi, where the claims of Thought and
Gorgias: Philebus: Protagoras.

Pleasure are contrasted (505–509, see also ix. 581–587), presuppose the composition of the Philebus. The coincidence is obvious, but not less so is the comparative simplicity of the point of view advanced in the Republic. It is possible that the principles here briefly stated may have been previously elaborated. But it is by no means necessary to assume that it was so. And it is at least equally conceivable that Plato had arrived at this general conception of the relative worth of Pleasure, Thought, and the Good, before giving to it the full and complex expression which the Philebus contains. If the assertion of Justice is held to precede the definition of Justice, it may be similarly maintained that the solemn adumbration of the Idea of Good precedes the laboured attempt to seize this Supreme Form (and, as it were, ‘confine the Interminable’)) through metaphysical determinations. But the position of the Philebus in the series of the Platonic writings is part of the larger question of the place to be assigned to the other dialectical dialogues, to which it is manifestly akin. Some observations pertinent to this subject will be made in the sequel.

The Republic provides an approximate solution of the difficulty paradoxically raised in the Protagoras, and imperfectionly met in the Meno by the theory of ‘inspiration,’ viz. the question ‘How is virtue possible without perfect knowledge?’ In the Republic, Science is more strenuously than ever asserted to be the basis of well-ordered life, but in all except the Rulers it is unconsciously so. By selecting the right natures for the reception of Culture, by the reformation (1) of mental, and (2) of physical education, the predominance of Virtue is secured even in those not yet capable of Reason, so that they may ultimately embrace her the more readily, because they have nothing irrational to unlearn. Thus the conception of the State affords the means of reconciling an opposition, which, as we learn from the Protagoras, tended to hinder, by making it seem impossible, the application of Philosophy to the bettering of human life. Protagoras professed to benefit his pupils by promoting their attainment of

1 Milton.
that civic and social excellence which was shared in some degree by all the citizens of a civilized community, and which the primary education of Greek freemen was already calculated to foster, in evolving those seeds of Justice and of mutual respect which had been scattered broadcast at the remote origin of human society. Socrates denies that such a process deserves the name of teaching, or that the virtue thus communicated is really virtue. He makes the seemingly impossible requirement that a science of exact measurement should be applied to human life and action. Now the philosopher of the Republic is in possession of such a science, and he is entrusted with the control of primary education. Thus the unconscious, relative, approximate virtue of the subordinate class, who again compel the obedience of those beneath them, is essentially grounded in philosophy. And the whole State is wise, although the wise amongst its citizens are still the few. The work professed by the Sophist is now undertaken by the Philosopher, with far better assurance of a solid foundation.

§ 17. It is more difficult to find the angle (if the figure may be allowed) at which the Republic stands towards those dialogues which symbolize philosophic enthusiasm under the form of Love. There are mystic passages in the Republic also, but in the work as a whole, what may be termed the ecstatic phase of Platonism is greatly toned down and subdued. Whether Plato is here addressing a wider audience, or has now entered on a further stage in the evolution of his thought, is a question by no means easy to determine. The points where some approximation to the spirit of the Phaedrus and Symposium occurs are chiefly two.

Even the earlier culture is not completed without a description of the modest loves of beautiful souls.

III. 403, 404. And in describing the philosophic nature, the love of truth is characterized in words which might have been used by Diotima:—ὅτι πρὸς τὸ δυν πεφυκὼς εἰς ἀμιλλάσθαι ὅ γε δυτῶς φιλομαθῆς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξοζομένοις εἴναι πολλοῖς ἐκάστοις, ἀλλ’ ίοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνωτο οὔθ’ ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτὸν ὃ ἦστιν ἐκάστοπ τῆς φύσεως ἄψασθαι ὃ προσήκει.
ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιοῦτον προσῆκε δὲ ἦγγενεῖ δ' πλησίασας καὶ μμεῖς τῷ ὅτι δυτικος, γενήσας νύν καὶ ἀληθεῖαν, γραφεὶ τε καὶ ἀληθώς ζῆνη καὶ τρέφοντο καὶ οὖν λήγοι ἄδινος, πρὶν ἕν ὃν.

Essentially cognate to the same aspect of Platonism are the account of education as a development from within, the rising scale of Being, through sense, opinion, thought, and reason, to the idea of Good, recalling the stages leading to the ocean of Beauty in the Symposium; the upper air and sunshine of the ἄνυπόθετον in Bb. vi, vii, compared with the outer rim of Heaven in the Phaedrus-myth; the enthusiastic account of Dialectic, and the wanderings of the soul in B. x. The prayer to Pan and the Nymphs with which the Phaedrus ends, has, of course, many echoes in the Republic. Constantin Ritter, who has examined all the Dialogues by the 'statistical' method introduced by Dittenberger (in Hermes xvi, 1881), regards the Phaedrus and Theaetetus as belonging to the same period with the Republic. He is disposed to think that both were written while the Republic was in course of composition, and that the Theaetetus is the earlier of the two. This last opinion may be disputed on the following grounds:—

1. Not to dwell upon the signs of immaturity which some critics (Usener amongst others) have discovered in the Phaedrus, it appears inconceivable that Plato should have expressed the paradoxical preference of oral to written speech, at a time when he was himself actively engaged in preparing a written work so large and important as the Republic.

2. Those who attach any weight to L. Spengel’s arguments—and some weight they certainly deserve—are bound to give the Phaedrus the earliest date which a comprehensive view of all the facts will admit. Whether the dialogue is earlier or later than Isocrates’ περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν, there are strong grounds for supposing it to have been written not long after the opening of the Academy.

3. The Theaetetus presents a matured harmony of thought and expression. The gravity of Theodorus, which tempers
the irrepressible playfulness of Socrates, is evidently in keeping with Plato's own deeper mood.

4. The soaring idealism of the Phaedrus, which reappears in the Republic, is likewise modified in the Theaetetus by an approach towards a rational psychology. This point will be further developed by and by.

§ 18. The doctrine of immortality (incidentally recognized in the Meno) is expressly maintained in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic. And while the line of proof is different in all three, the demonstration chosen in the Republic is closely allied to one of those in the Phaedo—that by which it is shown in answer to Simmias that the soul is not a harmony. The words of Socrates, ὅτι μὲν ἄδινατον ψυχή, κἂν ἄλλα ἄηιεν ἀποδείκτης, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, may or may not contain an allusion to the Phaedo, or to the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Symposium in one. But it is at least tolerably clear that the Republic and Phaedo both belong to a stage of Platonism in which the doctrine of ideas had been distinctly formulated, while the logical and metaphysical bearings of the theory had not yet been thought out so clearly as in the period of which the Parmenides marks the opening stage. Coincidences between the Phaedo and Republic are the more significant, as the meditation of death is a different subject-matter from the supreme realization of life in the world.

§ 19. There is a very close approximation both of style and substance between the most serious part of the Theaetetus (173-177) and Rep. vi, vii, although in the dialogue concerning knowledge, as in the Gorgias and Phaedo, the philosopher is described as withdrawn from action and as knowing nothing of his neighbour. In this he corresponds not to the King-philosopher of the Republic, but to the actual philosopher who is 'useless to his State,' who in his contemplation of realities has no time to look down on human affairs (vi. 500), and who seeing mankind replete with lawlessness is content to live apart, if only he can keep his own life pure. The contrast between the philosopher and the lawyer resembles also the description of the awkward plight of him who descends again out of the daylight into the glimmering den (vii. 517).
more, the nature of retribution is similarly conceived by Socrates in Theaet. 177 and by Adeimantus, while the ideal pattern of the blessed life is similarly set forth in Theaet. 177, and in Rep. ix, sub fin. Such near agreement at once of matter and of tone as becomes perceptible on a repeated reading of these passages, albeit by no means a certain test, is more decisive than such chronological indications as the allusion to the battle of Megara (B.C. 394?), and the fact that Cleomenes, who was at that time king of Sparta, counted precisely twenty-five generations from Heracles (cp. Theaet. 175x). These points, however clearly demonstrated, belong to the time assigned to the imaginary conversation. They cannot determine the date of its composition (except as giving a terminus a quo). On the other hand the dialectics of the Theaetetus evince a maturity of psychological reflexion, and a moderation and firmness of metaphysical handling, which had scarcely been attained by Plato when he wrote the Republic. This may of course be a deceptive appearance, attributable to the fact that in the larger dialogue the mind is taken off from abstract speculation, and plunged in politics and popular moralities. But there are considerations which point the other way, and which incline the balance in favour of placing the Theaetetus after rather than before the Republic.

1. The manner of approaching the subject through the criticism of earlier philosophies would seem to mark a distinct stage in the development of Plato's mind (cp. Soph. 246 ff.).

2. The allusion to the Parmenides seems to mark the Theaetetus as one of the same group with the Parmenides and Sophist. And in the statement of metaphysical ἀποταλάτυ the Theaetetus and Parmenides are companion dialogues.

3. The clear conception of Being, not-being, Unity, number, sameness, difference, similarity, diversity, as logical categories or ideas of relation, which comes out at Theaet. 184, 185, could hardly have been possible, while Plato held the doctrine of ideas in the crude and undeveloped form which is still implied in the Republic, and which the Parmenides for the first time showed to be unsatisfying.

4. The greater subtlety and accuracy of the psychological
distinction between ἑπιστήμη, δόξα, ἀλήθεια, as compared with Rep. vi, sub fin., and still more with the end of B. v, is also apparent, though here, too, the difference of subject may have involved disparity of treatment.

§ 20. As was previously said (p. 22) with reference to the Philebus, the presumption thus raised can neither be substantiated nor set aside without taking into account the other dialectical dialogues, Parmenides, Sophist, and Politicus. And for reasons which will presently become apparent, the consideration of these dialogues in their relation to the Republic must be postponed to some brief remarks on the great work which in subject-matter as well as in extent comes nearest to the Republic, viz. the Laws. As this dialogue, by those who acknowledge its genuineness, is admitted to be the last of Plato’s writings, the contrast which it presents to the Republic is the more instructive, since difference may here be interpreted to imply some change. But the comparison must be made with caution. For two main points have to be borne in mind: (1) that Plato in the Laws is confessedly aiming only at the second best, and (2) that the work is doubly incomplete:—the composition of many portions is unfinished, and the question of Higher Education is expressly reserved, so that, to employ Plato’s own metaphor (Laws vi. 752 A), the dialogue is without a head. The attempt to supply this latter defect in the Epinomis (according to a credible tradition, by Philip of Opus, the editor of the Laws) only shows how incapable Plato’s immediate successors were of continuing what was most significant in his philosophy. The Platonism that survived the Master in the Old Academy was indeed

Ψυχή καὶ εἶδολον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἐν πάμπαν.

It may be argued, however, that both these peculiarities are indicative of changes in the philosopher’s own mental attitude.

The very notion of a second-best in politics, of an aim worth striving for which yet falls short of the highest, is alien to the spirit of the Republic. Before entertaining such a notion Plato must have come to think that the realization of the Divine ideal was even more distant than in the fifth and
ninth books of the Republic he had declared it to be: that it was in fact impossible 'for such a creature as man in such a state as the present.'

Even in the Republic he had acknowledged that the State of primitive innocence could not last, and his ideal constitution presupposes the inevitableness of war. But in the Laws that constitution also, so far as it involved the principle of communism, is relegated to the reign of Cronos, and is declared to have been suited not for human government, but only for a theocracy. The Athenian Stranger finds it necessary to strike into the middle path between two extreme views: (1) that legislation is futile, seeing that 'time and chance happen unto all,' and (2) that God governs all things without the aid of man. The third or intermediate view is that human skill, taking advantage of opportunity, may imitate from afar off the principles of Divine action. And the opportunity now prayed for is one less unlikely than the union of philosophy and sovereignty in the same person. It is the conjunction of a 'temperate' sovereign with the wise legislator (Laws iv). Now such a change from 'optimism' to 'meliorism' cannot have taken place without a mental struggle. It must have cost Plato something, one would imagine, to discover that in his greatest work he had only been uttering a vain, though pious, aspiration,—ἐλλαξε εἰρήνα δίκαια λέγων. And of such a struggle, with the bitterness naturally accompanying it, there is very distinct evidence in the Politicus; where there is also a foreshadowing of the very solution arrived at in the Laws.

Through a skilful process of generalization and division, § 21. Socrates Junior has been led by the Eleatic Stranger to define Statesmanship as 'the art of man-herding,'—according to the figure repeatedly used by Socrates in the Republic. But on reflexion the image is found unsuitable to the actual state of the world, in which the work of tending mankind is shared by many functionaries besides the statesman or ruler. Not the human governor, but the divine superintendent of the Golden Age, may be thought to have included all these functions in his own person. Our science of politics must
convert to the actual present world and distinguish more
definitely between the art of government and the other modes
of managing mankind.

This position is illustrated by the wonderful myth, in which
a more serious effort is made, than was attempted in the
Republic, to face the problem of the existence of evil. 'God
alternately guides the world and lets it go.' There can be no
doubt under which dispensation we are living. Amidst this
anarchy, of which Zeus is the reputed lord, the only hope of
improvement lies in cherishing some faint remembrance of
the Divine Order which was once a reality. Occasionally
this remembrance comes with exceptional clearness to the
mind of the philosopher, who is the only law-giver. Happy
is that portion of the human race, that, when he appears, is
willing to listen to him, and to obey his precepts. But his
time upon the earth is brief, and when he departs, like a
physician going into a far country, he leaves a prescription
behind him. In his absence, the only feasible rule is the
observance of Law, which is better than caprice, though far
inferior to the immediate rule of Mind.

§ 22. It is sufficiently manifest how all this leads up to the
point from which the Athenian Stranger makes his departure
in counselling Cleinias and Megillus; although in the Politicus
there is little as yet of the spirit of compromise, which
appears in the Laws,—for example, in the partial adoption of
election by lot, notwithstanding the often expressed scorn of
Socrates.

Also in many isolated points the Statesman anticipates the
Laws. (1) The distinction between oligarchy and democracy
is regarded in both as non-essential. Either may be better
or worse according as it is administered. And constitutional
democracy is far better than unconstitutional oligarchy. (2)
The weaving together of diverse elements in a State is a notion
to which prominence is given in both dialogues; especially (3)
in the provisions concerning marriage. And (4) as the name
of Statesman is denied to the actual politicians in the Politicus,
so the actual constitutions are contemptuously referred to in
the Laws as the 'non-constitutions' (διὰ τὰς οὐ πολιτείας
They are not polities but parties. (5) The conception of an infinite past, by which Plato accounts for the growth of civilization, appears most distinctly in the Timaeus, Critias, Politicus and Laws (B. iii).

Although the philosopher's practical scope has thus shifted, § 23, and numberless minute provisions are expressly made of a kind which the ῥόφιμοι of the Republic were meant to discover for themselves, the reader of the Laws is often reminded of the leading thoughts of the Republic. Each individual, as far as possible, is to be not many but one. The definition of Justice, obtained with so much difficulty, is silently discarded, but Plato still glances with disfavour on the heretical view that Justice is conventional, and he still dwells on the phenomenon that self-preservation is the basis of de facto governments upheld by statute. At the same time he points out that no government is overthrown but by itself. The law of Charondas, by which the money-lender was left to take the risk of loss, is spoken of with emphatic approval both in the Laws and the Republic. The avoidance of the extremes of wealth and poverty is equally a principle of both. General rules (τόποι, ἑκμαγεῖα) are laid down, as in the Republic, so also in the Laws, for the censor of the poets. Early education is again regarded as an anticipation of Reason. The importance of rhythm in education is more than ever insisted on. The music is still to be subordinated to the words1. And although the paradoxical view that gymnastic also has a mental purpose does not expressly reappear (it had already been ignored in Rep. vii. 521 ε), the merely utilitarian conception of physical training is not the less scornfully rejected. The neglect of education by Cyrus and Darius is held accountable for the vices of Cambyses and of Xerxes (cp. Prot., Gorg.). The supremacy of mind is vehemently asserted. The passions are in the individual what the populace are in a State. Yet here also the later phase of Plato's philosophy makes itself felt, and the conjunction of sense with intellect is introduced, not merely as the cause of error (Rep. viii), but 546 B.

1 Laws ii. 669.
62 b.c. as the condition of practical wisdom (compare the Philebus). On the other hand the unity of Virtue (Justice and Temperance especially running up into a single principle), which is only hinted as a possibility in the Republic, is prescribed as a main dogma of the Higher Education, which is to be presided over by the Nocturnal Council.

§ 24. This Higher Education is spoken of in two passages of the Laws as a subject reserved for future consideration.

α'. B. vii. 818 (in speaking of the higher arithmetic, geometry and astronomy) ταῦτα δὲ ἔχομαινα ὅχι ὡς ἄκριβελας ἔχομενα δεῖ διαπονεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλὰ τινὰς δλίγους' οὖς δὲ, προϊόντες ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει φράσομεν . . . χαλεπὸν δὲ αὐτὰ προ-

ταξίμευνοι τοῦτω τῷ τρόπῳ νομοθετεῖν ἀλλ' εἰς ἀλλὸν, εἰ δοκεῖ, χρόνου ἄκριβέστερον ἄν νομοθετησαίμεθα.

β'. B. xii. 969 εἰγὼ δ' ὑμῖν συγκοινωνεῦσον τῷ φράζειν τε καὶ

ἐξηγεῖσθαι τά γε δεδομένα ἐμοὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς

tῆς νῦν αὖ κεκινημένης τῶν λόγων' τὸ μέντοι κοινωνεῦμα οὐ

σμικρὸν οὖθ' ἐτέρως τις προσφέρει ἄν εὖ.

The former passage (α') may be compared with Rep. iv. 435 c, where Socrates remarks that for the true account of the virtues it would be necessary to take the ‘longer way’ (which is afterwards identified with dialectic); the latter (β') is very similar to Rep. vi. 536, 537, where Socrates introduces the ‘Idea of Good.’ But, whereas in the Republic, Socrates at least partially satisfies expectation, the statement promised by the Athenian Stranger is deferred until a more convenient season.

The student of the Laws is consequently left in a position resembling that in which readers of the Republic would have been, had Books v, vi, vii of that dialogue remained unwritten. He is aware, indeed, that the Nocturnal Council were to comprehend the single underlying principle which gives unity to the Virtues, that they would acknowledge Wisdom to be the guide (cp. Rep. iv. 428) and Temperance the inseparable condition of them all; that their minds would have been cleared and strengthened by a sound training in the necessary truths of mathematics and astronomy; that the absolute priority of Mind to Body would be a principle deeply
infixed in their souls. But beyond this we are unable to judge how far the education and nurture which the Stranger advocates, resembled or differed from that developed in Rep. vii, or indeed whether he proposes that the members of the Nocturnal Council of this secondary State should be 'philosophers,' in what Plato at the time of writing conceived to be the highest sense of the word. Like the definition of the Philosopher projected by the Eleatic Stranger, the Athenian Stranger's account of the Highest Education seems never to have been written down by Plato.

We can only dimly trace some fragments of his leading thoughts, in the directions for elementary study given in B. vii, the religious principles inculcated in B. x, and some detached sentences towards the end of B. xii.

(1) Mathematics as the Truth of Nature, vii. 818 τίνες oδυν, ὥς εἶνε... κατὰ φύσιν & λέγεις.

(2) Priority of Mind, x. 887 ff., xii. 966 ff.

(3) Necessary existence of a 'primum mobile,' x. 894, cp. Phaedr. 245.

(4) Eternal supremacy of the better mind over the worse, x. 897.

The author of the Epinomis has gathered up these scattered threads, but the pattern into which he has woven them is not Plato's, still less are there to be found there the traces of the untrammelled thought and free intelligence, of a mind not enslaved to its own formulae, which are absent from no genuine Platonic writing.

A theory of knowledge and of the object of knowledge is, therefore, not to be looked for in the Laws. Yet the study of dialectic has left its trace, in the pedantic elaboration of method, which marks the earlier and more finished part of the dialogue, and is analogous to the tedious classifications which the Eleatic Stranger in the Politicus remarks on and defends.

1 'Of a supreme or master science which was to be the coping stone of the rest, few traces appear in the Laws. He seems to have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time for such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up the outline which he had sketched.' Jowett's Plato, vol. v, Laws, Introduction, p. 130.
§ 25. The position of the Politicus, as intermediate between the Republic and the Laws, is sufficiently evident after what has been said. Now the Politicus cannot be far removed from the Sophistes, and the Philebus in style and structure bears evidence of belonging to the same period. The Timaeus is avowedly later than the Republic.

We are therefore not left without data for the difficult inquiry:—Did Plato’s theory of knowledge undergo any change after the composition of the Republic? In what direction were his thoughts moving with respect to this, which he himself regarded as the highest subject of study?

The inquiry is difficult. For each work of Plato’s is a separate whole, in which the parts have reference, not to any previous statement, but to the particular aspect of the Truth to which for the time being the philosopher addressed himself, and in which his mind was wholly absorbed. Even such distinct references as those in the Timaeus and Laws to the Republic, or those in the Theaetetus and Sophistes to the Parmenides, do not involve any attempt to adjust the later dialogue to the earlier one. Yet, on a general survey of the group of dialogues above-named, from which the Parmenides and Theaetetus (perhaps even the Euthydemus) cannot altogether be separated, there is observable a greater amount of consistency, as well as of positive content, than, for example, appears in grouping together Protag., Apol., Symp., Phaedr., Phaedo, Gorg. And this general observation may be of use, if, instead of attempting a detailed harmony, or ‘peering between the lines’ of detached passages for the evidences of a system which is nowhere formulated, we content ourselves with marking the broad outlines, and so endeavouring to follow the main movement of Plato’s thought.

The concluding passage of Rep. vi contains a statement of the unity of knowledge, which may be summed up as

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1 The reference to the Sophist in Polit. 284 a ὁς εἰς τῷ Σοφιστῷ (‘as in dealing with the Sophist’), is not in question here, as the Sophist and Statesman are to all intents and purposes one dialogue.

2 See above, p. 13.
Dialectical Dialogues.

follows:—‘The investigation of Truth under the conditions of human life on earth must start from assumptions based on sensible perception. But that is only the starting-point. The philosophic spirit cannot rest, until the mind’s conceptions have been purified by the activity of thought from every sensible mean, and so rising from height to height of abstraction, the thinker may lay hold on the Absolute (τὸ ἀνυπόθετον), whence again descending, he may pass from Form to Form, and end with pure ideas.’ Nowhere else had Plato hitherto so clearly asserted the connexion and gradation of the Forms of Being.

But if we ask, what is the nature of the connexion, or of the transition from the higher to the lower forms, the Republic yields no consistent answer.

1. In the fifth book the ἐπάθος is said to be related to its particulars, as the whole to the parts. Are the higher ἐπάθη of Book vi thus related to the lower? Do they form a series of which the extreme terms are Summum Genus and Infima Species?

2. The reader of B. x is at once presented with a different conception. The ideal Bed is not a whole of which the actual bed is part, but the Pattern after which it is made. Are the higher ideas related to the lower, as the Perfect to the Imperfect? The beginning of B. vii and the end of B. ix may lend some colour to this view; which, however, is inconsistent with the preceding.

3. Once more, in studying the educational discussions of B. vii, in which the general conception of Science is practically applied, we are led upwards from the mind’s first perceptions of difference and identity, through the abstract study of number, form and motion, first to the common principles determining all such studies, then to universal principles worked out by Dialectic, and last of all to the primal, ultimate, creative, regulative, alone substantial Form of Good. Are the Ideas, then, Forms of Thought, and are the higher related to the lower as the ideas of the Reason to the categories of the Understanding, and those of the Understanding to those of pure intuition,—to use a Kantian figure?
§ 26. The truth is that Plato had not yet cleared his mind from some confusion on this subject. It may be doubted whether he ever did so completely. Three points of view, which to modern thinkers are obviously distinct, the logical, the cosmological, the psychological, repeatedly cross and recross each other in his writings.

The moment came, however, when he keenly felt the need of solving this and other metaphysical difficulties. It is generally acknowledged that the Parmenides reflects precisely such an intellectual crisis. He could no longer satisfy himself with making a vague metaphysic the imaginary basis of an empirical morality.

Plato's thought in the Parmenides is directed towards (1) the theory of general forms and (2) the opposition of the one and many, not with barren contemplation, nor yet with scepticism, but with serious inquiry. At the same time Plato's Dialectic for the first time consciously stands face to face with Eleaticism. Most of the objections afterwards brought by Aristotle against the ἐνθέ are here raised in the form of ἄπολπαι, which are discussed, but not finally answered. And a tentative effort is made towards a New 'Kritik' of pure truth, through a disjunctive method, which the aged Parmenides recommends as a necessary propaedetic, but which nowhere recurs. The dialogue ends, after the Socratic manner of the Protagoras or the first book of the Republic, with contradiction and the confession of ignorance, but the reader has been carried into higher regions of speculation than in the purely 'Socratic' dialogues.

In the Theaetetus likewise the Socratic mask of irony is effectively resumed. There is much in it of the playfulness of the Phaedrus or Symposium, but without the wildness. That is sobered down through the presence of the grave Theodorus. We have again, as in the Parmenides, a chain of ἄπορηματα, most subtly reasoned out, but not finally got rid of. Once more comes back the old familiar Socratic ending—'What knowledge is, I do not know.' But just as the Parmenides breathes the profound conviction, 'No philosophy without ideas, whatever the ideas may prove to be,—nor
without the One, however our conception of Unity may
have to be modified,’ so the Socrates of the Theaetetus will
never discourse without assuming the reality of Knowledge,
nor will Theaetetus hesitate to affirm that unity and diversity,
sameness and difference, number and quantity, are not per-
ceived through any bodily organ; but the perception of them,
however manifestly evoked through sensible impressions, is
in each case a direct intuition of the mind. Plato in the
Theaetetus is again conscious of Eleatic influence, while he
reckons with Heraclitus, Protagoras, and the Cyrenaics,—
perhaps also with Antisthenes.

In these two dialogues, then, the philosopher is directly
grappling with the chief difficulties which surround his own
as well as other theories of Knowing and Being: the Par-
menides breaking ground which is afterwards to be renewed,
and dealing mainly with questions of Being; the Theaetetus
(in this approaching modern thought) treating the central
questions of philosophy chiefly from the subjective side.

Taken together, these writings represent a time of § 27.
strenuous mental effort, when Plato was resolutely bent on
going by the ‘longer way,’ and on fulfilling, even ‘through
hours of gloom,’ the ‘tasks in hours of insight willed.’ What-
ever tedium it may cost him, whatever intellectual fatigue, he
is determined to see more clearly and fix more definitely
those lines and veins of truth ‘according to Nature’ of
which he has spoken in the Phaedrus. No result of this
endeavour is formulated. That is not Plato’s way. But as
his Socrates says to Theaetetus, \( \beta \epsilon \lambda \tau \iota \omega \nu \omega \) \( \iota \sigma \eta \ \pi \lambda \eta \rho \eta \sigma \ \delta \iota \alpha \ \tau \nu \ \nu \nu \ \\xi \epsilon \tau \alpha \sigma \omega \), so the philosophy of this whole group of
dialogues (Parm., Theaet., Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim.) has
distinctive features which clearly separate them not only
from the Phaedo or Symposium, but even from the Phaedrus
and the Republic.

1. The first point to notice is the serious criticism of earlier
and contemporary philosophies. As Socrates questioned
with individuals, so Plato now cross-questions doctrines and
methods. He had elsewhere glanced allusively at the
Heracliteans, the Pythagoreans, the Cyrenaics the Mega-
rians and others,—he had perhaps satirized Antisthenes;—but it is now through the lengthened examination of whole schools of thought that he at once develops and tests his own conceptions. This is a new thing in philosophy, and argues a great advance in dialectical method.

2. Plato has had many a fling at the art of controversy (ἀντιλογική), with its love of cross distinctions (Rep. v. 454), its confusion of facts with principles (Phaedo 90 B), and all the array of sophisms which are grouped together for ridicule in the Euthydemus. But he has now discovered that in a deeper sense a cognate error lies at the root of all the intellectual confusion of the time—that an illogical logic based on abstract contradictions has been responsible not only for the vain jangling of Dionysodorus and his fellows, but for the waste of serious thought over such problems as whether false opinion is possible, whether an element can be defined, whether all discussion is not unreal, and other cognate difficulties, which were threatening the very life of philosophy. This element of contemporary speculation he traces to the Zenonian logic, in which the profound speculative thought of Parmenides had been beaten out and misapplied.

3. Hence comes his endeavour to turn the weapons of the Megarians against themselves, and to evolve, at least approximately, a theory of predication both in thought and language which, instead of hindering, may stimulate and aid the healthy growth of eager minds. His interest in dialectic is at this stage more than ever educational. And this is especially true of that aspect of it which carries on the work commenced in the Phaedrus,—the use of Classification.

§28. The 'dichotomies' of the Sophist and Politicus are not to be taken too seriously. They afford a method of approach to the main subject, by which the mind of the youthful hearer or reader is to be at the same time kept on the alert, and awakened to the difficulties with which the scientific treatment of any general question is surrounded. They remind us of the description in the Philebus of the charm which the logical 'one and many' had for young Athenians. They may even be regarded as bearing some analogy to the arithmetical
puzzles which the Egyptians had invented for the amusement of children. But there are turns and moments of the laborious game where some principle of method is illustrated. These are marked with special emphasis, and by attending to them we learn something of the direction of Plato's own thoughts.

In the Phaedrus the ideal of generalization and division had been left disappointingly vague. The spirit of dialectic seems there to be regarded as its own evidence in determining the outlines of Truth, as an organic whole. In generalizing, the dialectician recognizes the ἐἴδος of which his soul had once the vision; in dividing, he will 'follow Nature,' hitting the joints, and not hacking the limbs. It is further indicated that 'Nature' has a 'right-hand' and a 'left-hand' segment,—which may be interpreted indifferently as positive and negative, or as good and evil. But in the Sophistes, and even more in the Politicus and the Philebus, while the dialectical method is still upheld, and still subordinated to the free activity of the philosophic mind, the difficulties and hindrances attending on it are more seriously felt. The process is accompanied with much labour, and leads through 'slippery' places. The several definitions of the Sophist, all based on observation and attained through successive excursions, at first seem to have little in common. The synoptic and selective faculty must be called in, to gather from all these the characteristic difference of the creature. And it is at this point (Soph. 233) that the investigation passes from the formal to the real.

In resuming the work of 'carving' to define the statesman the young respondent is warned that he must not cut off too much at once (for fear of 'hacking the limbs'),—whereupon he asks the difficult and important question, 'How is one to know an accidental segment (μέρος) from a true form (ἐἴδως).? He is further made aware that the process of residues is insufficient for the purposes of science, (since, as was shown in the Sophist, negation also has a positive content), and that before I can know the nature of this, I must know something also of what is not this but akin to this. Thus dialectic becomes more concrete, no longer turning on the mere perception or intuition of elementary forms, but endeavouring to recognize
them as actualized in the complexity of the world. Hence the great value of the argument from example. Nor should the hearer of dialectic ever complain of mere length as tedious, for length and brevity are relative not to each other merely, but to the requirements of investigation and discovery. Thus, as by a side wind, is introduced the principle of τὸ μέτριον, which plays such an important part in the Philebus.

The same increasing consciousness of the intricate developments of real science as opposed to mere logic appears in the well-known passage of the Philebus, 16 foll., where it is shown that the lover of truth must not rest in the mere discovery of a one and many, but pursue his investigation until he ascertains 'how many.' This is not a mere return to Pythagoreanism, but a real advance towards a fuller conception of scientific truth.

§ 29. There is another aspect of this part of the subject, on which Plato dwells in different ways, but with similar emphasis, in the Parmenides, Sophistes and Politicus. The Sun of Science, as Bacon says, shines equally on the palace and the dunghill. Socrates, replying to Parmenides, is doubtful whether he ought or ought not to assume ideas of dirt and refuse. But he is assured by the philosopher that when the love of knowledge has taken hold of him, as one day it will take hold, he will neglect none of these things. And in like manner his namesake, the Younger Socrates, raises no objection when the Eleatic Stranger affirms that in the eye of Science the vermin-killer is as much a huntsman as the general, or when he reminds him afterwards that, in classification, no preference should be given to what is not ridiculous. And Socrates himself tells Protarchus (Phil. 58 c) that the art of which we are in search is not that which produces the grandest effect, but that which discovers some particle of truth, however seemingly unimportant.1

These hints of an ideal of science are in entire keeping with the curiously modern description of the intellectual life as 'an

1 Rep. iii. 402 b oβτ' ἐν σμακῷ ὡστ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἔγχυμαξομεν αὖτᾶ, may seem an anticipation of this, but should rather be compared with supra. ii. 369 d, infr. iv. 435 α.
interrogation of all natures with the view of learning from each what it has to contribute from its particular experience towards collective wisdom' (Politicus, 272 b, c).

If in these dialogues Plato's logical method assumes a more definitely scientific aspect, his metaphysical theory undergoes modifications of a corresponding kind.

Not only is each 'natural kind' 1 to be regarded as a whole 2, but (as in the scheme foreshadowed in Rep. vi) the several wholes must be known in the light of higher conceptions, and as forming one vast totality. The primary forms or notions of unity, likeness, unlikeness, numerical difference, motion, rest, must be recognized as no less real than the attributes of each several kind. 'Quality' itself is a new abstraction which has to be named. Now this implies, what is not explicitly formulated, the admission of 'ideas' not only of existence, but of relation. Plato nowhere seems distinctly conscious of the difference between a genus and a category 3. The terms ἑιδὸς and γένος are used by him indifferently for both. But in the dialectical dialogues he dwells more and more on those universal conceptions which are inseparable from knowledge and being. These are the 'birds that fly everywhere about the aviary,' sameness and difference, unity and plurality, number, quantity, motion and rest. And it is in the effort to realize ideas of relation and to understand the relativity of thought that he takes in hand the central problem of Being and Not-Being, affirmation and negation. The reasoning of the Sophistes, based as it is on a critical review of previous philosophies, marks one of the most decisive moments in the history of thought, exploding the prime fallacy, which had its stronghold then in the misapplication of the great conception of Parmenides, and has since haunted many a polemical dispute, the confusion of the Dictum Simpliciter with the Dictum Secundum quid. When it is once recognized that omnis negatio est determinatio, a fatal obstacle is removed out of the way of science.

1 Theaet. 157 ἐκαστὸν γεών τι καὶ ἑιδὸς.
2 Ibid. 174 Λ τῶν δυτῶν ἐκαστοῦ δήλου.
3 See above, p. 35.
This great advance in Plato's central point of view has sometimes been represented as if Plato had now for the first time introduced Motion amongst the ideas. But the identity of thought and life is of the very essence of Platonism throughout,—witness the proof of immortality in the Phaedrus, and the description of the Idea of Good as the supreme efficient cause in the Republic. It was precisely because Eleaticism made this impossible, by assuming the incommunicability of Being and Becoming, One and Many, that Plato found it necessary to lay hands on 'Father Parmenides,' and to prove the maxim, "Τελεωτάτη πάνων λόγων εστίν ἄφάνισι τὸ πάν ἀπὸ πάσης ἀποκαλύπτειν." That 'love of the Whole' of which he speaks again and again never ceased to be his ruling passion. The more he becomes aware of the variety and intricacy of things, the more he is bent on binding them with the unity of knowledge. But in the speculative region, as in he practical, he loses something of the daring confidence of his earlier essays, and while his vision of mental phenomena becomes clearer, in speaking of the Universe he betakes himself again to Mythology.

§ 31. The preceding observations may serve to commend the view which is here maintained, viz. that the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Philebus, in the order named (with the doubtful insertion of the Euthydemus before or after the Theaetetus, as a πάρεργον), form a distinct group or series, and that this series, taken as a whole, is subsequent to the great literary effort which terminated with the Republic.

The dialogues thus grouped together have certain characteristics in common.

1. The thought expressed in them is far more condensed, and, except in the Theaetetus, is much less richly clothed with imagination and humour, than that expressed in the dialogues which are here supposed to have preceded them.

2. On grounds of style as well as of substance it has been shown that the Politicus holds an intermediate place between the Republic and the Laws 1, and also that the manner of

1 See L. Campbell's edition of the Sophistes and Politicus, 1867. The position therein assigned to the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus, has
Later Characteristics.

the Sophistes and Philebus has marked affinities to that of the Politicus. It may be added that although the Theaetetus and Parmenides are not throughout written in this later vein, the dialectical passages in both of them indicate an approach to it.

3. In these dialogues there is an increasing clearness and minuteness of psychological analysis and definition. Compare for example the analysis of vision in the Theaetetus with Rep. vii. 525 c, or the description of αἰσθήσις, φαντασία, μνήμη, ἀνάμνησις, &c. in the Philebus with the tabular view of νοῦς, διάνοια, πίνας, ἐλκαστα, in Rep. vi sub fin.

4. Plato is no longer contented with positing the existence of universals, nor even of such a hierarchy of pure ideas as he imagines at the end of Rep. vi. He is now seriously bent on discovering the nature of Knowledge and its object, and of determining the connexion and correlation of ideas.

5. From the recognition that every εἶδος is a νόημα, through the account of Being, not-being, sameness, difference, &c. as pure categories of perception, and the admission of Otherness as a mode of Being, up to the description of Measure as the Supreme Law, we trace the tendency, which is certainly less perceptible elsewhere in Plato, to define conceptions, which, while still regarded as objective, are essentially forms or modes of mind. The Philebus is rich in such determinations, which sometimes cross each other inconveniently, and even the seven forms of civic life in the Politicus, 289 b (τὸ πρωτογενὲς εἶδος [= ἔλη], ὄργανον, ὄγγειον, ὄχυμα, πράξημα, παύμιον, θρήμα) may be quoted as illustrative of a similar effort after συναγωγή.

6. Without admitting that a metaphysical system or consistent body of doctrine (‘Plato’s later theory of ideas’) can be gathered from these dialogues, it is possible to trace in them the development of a metaphysical attitude which differs since been given to these same dialogues on independent grounds by W. Dittenberger (Hermes, xvi), M. Schanz (Hermes, xxi), and Constantin Ritter (Untersuchungen 1888). The convergence of different lines of investigation towards the same result has now reached a point which must surely be acknowledged to be convincing. See Excursus, infra pp. 46 ff.
both from that of the Protagoras and of the Republic. The supposed incommunicableness of knowledge and sense, being and becoming, universal and particular, one and many, which had threatened to paralyze philosophy, is felt to have been practically overcome, and the unity and correlation of knowledge and of nature is re-established.

7. That speculative interest in γένεσις,—in the origin and growth of phenomena,—in what modern thinkers call the laws of evolution,—which had been the prime motive of the Ionian physiology, but had on different grounds been discarded both by Parmenides and Socrates,—is now, therefore, once more re-awakened in Plato's mind, and is partially justified by a metaphysic, in which the absolute comprises and sustains the relative, and evil is but a necessary moment in the self-development of Good.

8. But this speculative advance involves what cannot but be felt as retrogression on the practical side. For by introducing the conception of infinite gradation, it defers, without destroying, the hope of perfectibility:

οὐ ταῦτα ταύτη μοίρα πως τελεσθορός
κράναι νέφωται

is the tone to which the ear of philosophy is now attuned. The distance between Man and God is found to be greater than in the first bright vision of the Ideal it had been conceived to be.

9. And the spirit of the philosopher becomes less sanguine, but more profoundly religious than before.

10. This phase of Platonism is marked by some obscure but not uncertain indications of a controversial attitude towards Democritus.

§ 32. The Timaeus is linked on to the subject of the Republic, but although both dialogues are referred to a time of public festival, they can hardly be viewed as strictly continuous. Socrates had on the previous day expounded to Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates his conception of an ideal state,—not, apparently, in the form of a reported conversation.

1 The latter observations (7, 8, 9, 10) are supported by the following passages of Soph., Polit., Phileb.: viz. Soph. 216, 246-248, 265 (cp. Theaet. 173, 185 d, e); Polit. 269-275 (the myth), 278, 301, 302; Phileb. 22, 28, 30, 54; 59 A, 62, 64.
The Higher Education seems to have been cursorily mentioned, and the institution of infanticide must have been suppressed. However this may be, the Timaeus reflects the later phase of Plato's philosophy which has been just described. There is no room here for an exposition of the most difficult, if not, as some still declare it to be, the most important of Plato's dialogues. It must suffice to observe that metaphysical conceptions which are formulated in the Sophistes and Philebus are here applied, e.g. the ἡ ταρέτων φύσις, and the μικρή ὀθόνη; that the new conception of matter or extension as γενέσως τιθηνη is of the same order with the πρωτογένες ἐδος of the Politicus, and that the mythological colouring more resembles the myth in that dialogue, than any other of the Platonic myths, although the relation of God to the world is more nobly conceived. Cosmological and Pythagorizing notions are not absent from other dialogues. The Phaedo and Republic are both influenced by them. But a comparison of passages makes it clear that the point of view implied in the Timaeus is different and more developed.

The Timaeus is only the opening page or prelude of the most magnificent prose-poem ever planned by a single mind; a complete Bible, had it been written, of philosophical imagination. The story of Creation was to have been followed up by the history of the Chosen People, of their wars with the Unbelievers, and of the final triumph of the Good. Here indeed would have been an account of Evolution. But it breaks off before the rebel armada had been set in array.

What stayed the hand of the veteran thinker and creator from this fair work? We can only conjecture. But the Laws afford a possible reply. His practical enthusiasm was inexhaustible. In ages far remote, it might be, the vision of that conflict of the Sons of Light with the material Power of Atlantis might operate for good. But ere then, the day of Hellas might be dim. The states for whose reform he had so cared might all have foundered. The years were closing

1 Compare for example the desperate notion of God relinquishing the helm, with the delegation of the lower works to the demiurgi: Tim. 42 ε ὁ μὲν πάντα ταῦτα διατάξας ἐμεν ἐν τῷ λαυτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔθει.
round him, the setting of his life¹ was near at hand. He had no longer strength for both efforts. The speculative and imaginative powers, perhaps, were ebbing from him. But practical earnestness remained. He would attempt what still was possible. And perchance those who had turned a deaf ear to his ideal strains might listen to suggestions of reform if pitched in a somewhat lower key.

Some such reflections are naturally suggested by Plato’s sudden descent from the Council Chamber of Zeus, where the Critias breaks off, to enter on the long and weary labour of the Laws.

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**EXCURSUS**

*On the position of the Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus in the order of the Platonic Dialogues; and on some characteristics of Plato’s latest writings².*

§ 1. It had long since occurred to students of Plato that, while it appeared antecedently probable that all the shorter dialogues were previous to the Republic, the Sophistes in particular implied a philosophical point of view in advance of the definition of knowledge and opinion at the end of Republic, Book v. It seemed possible, however, that such an opinion might be coloured with some metaphysical preconception, and in editing the Sophistes I resolved to verify this observation without having recourse to ‘metaphysical aid.’ The objections which Socher had raised against the genuineness of this and the companion dialogue had been answered by W. H. Thompson³, who had defended both writings as having the general characteristics of Plato’s style. I felt, however, that the discrepancies to which attention had been called by Socher and Schaarschmidt⁴ could not be thus easily disposed of, and must have some significance.

¹ *Laws* vi. 770 a ἡμεῖς ήταν ἐν σοφίαι τοῦ θεοῦ.
² From a paper read to the Oxford Philological Society in June 1890, by L. Campbell.
³ In the Cambridge Philosophical Transactions.
⁴ Rheinisches Museum.
Now, as difficulties of a similar kind had been urged with reference to the Laws, it seemed a question worth raising, whether any affinity could be established between these several works, as belonging to one and the same period of Plato’s literary activity. For if the Laws were assumed to be genuine on the authority of Aristotle, the genuineness of the other dialogues would be rendered more probable, if their peculiarities were found to approximate to those of a well-authenticated writing. And the difficulty about the Laws would at the same time be lessened. For the authorities which attest their genuineness (to lay no stress on the confessions of the Athenian Stranger) represent them as Plato’s latest—or even posthumous—work, and any differences either of manner or of matter between this dialogue and the Republic would be made more intelligible by the discovery of an interval and a period of transition. A step would also have been made towards the solution of the problem stated by Schleiermacher, but not satisfactorily solved by him—nor by Hermann—the order of the dialogues.

The Timaeus and Critias are avowedly subsequent to the Republic. And the right method for testing my hypothesis was, therefore, to ascertain what elements of style and diction, as well as of opinion, were ‘common and peculiar’ to the Sophist and Statesman with the Timaeus, Critias and Laws: i.e. what special features are shared by the members of this group, which are absent from the other dialogues, or less apparent in them. It was a method of concomitant variations. The result of a somewhat tedious inquiry was to confirm my anticipation, and to include the Philebus also amongst the works which are intermediate between the Republic and the Laws. The only support for this view which I could find in any previous writer, was the opinion expressed by Ueberweg in his *Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitsfolge Platonischen Schriften*¹ (pp. 207–209), but afterwards abandoned by him in deference to the objections of Schaarschmidt.

The argument set forth in my Introductions to the § 2. Sophistes and Politicus, possibly through some fault of

¹ Wien, 1861.
Excur sus.

exposition¹, seems to have escaped the attention of scholars. And yet, so far as it was sound, it tended to establish a fact of real significance, viz. that the Republic and Laws are separated by a period of great philosophical activity:—an activity which renders more conceivable the discrepancies which have troubled critics of the Laws, and accounts for the supposed anomalies in the intervening dialogues.

The same conclusion is now upheld in Germany on similar, but wholly independent grounds—viz. on a statistical estimate of variations in Plato’s use of particles and recurring formulae. In 1881 W. Dittenberger in Hermes (vol. xvi, pp. 321–345)² called attention to the fact that the formula τί μῆλυ—so familiar to the Platonic student,—is entirely absent from two-thirds of the genuine dialogues. From this point onwards the statistics of Platonic formulae have been pursued by successive inquirers. Dr. Martin Schanz, for example, in vol. xxi of Hermes (1886), pointed out a striking variation in the comparative frequency of τὴν ὁρς i and ὁρως, the latter being found only in a fraction of the dialogues, while in some of these it has completely ousted τὴν ὁρς³. The avoidance of hiatus (noticed by Blass in 1874, Att. Ber. ii, p. 426) is another phenomenon of which the varying frequency points to the same result.

The accumulated outcome of seven years of this kind of inquiry is recapitulated by Constantin Ritter in his little book of Untersuchungen (Stuttgansdt, 1888), in which he has recorded also valuable observations of his own.

Notwithstanding the tendency—which seems to be inseparable from such investigations—to aim at more precise results than the method justifies (of which Dittenberger’s inference from the use of τί μᾶλ; in Epicharmus⁴ is an amusing example), yet, when minor uncertainties are discarded, there remains a strong concurrence of evidence in favour of

¹ I take this late opportunity of correcting a serious misprint. For 'Critias,' in the tabular view on p. xxxii of the work in question, read 'Crito.'

² Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der Platonischen Dialoge.


⁴ That Plato brought back τί μῆλυ from his journey to Sicily.
Later manner.

placing the Soph., Polit., Phileb., Tim., Critias, and Laws—nearly in this order—as latest in a separate group.

When it is considered that the facts thus collected unite in corroborating the observations published in 1867, it will probably be admitted that the inference is irresistible, and that the question of the order has to this extent been solved.

It is therefore worth some pains to examine the significance § 3. of the phenomenon, the reality of which is now abundantly demonstrated.

We are really considering an important movement in the development of Greek prose writing:—the gradual prevalence over Plato’s style of the rhetorical artificiality, which in the earlier periods he had alternately ridiculed and coquetishly played with.

And we are met on the threshold by one of those observations by which the mere collection of instances has to be checked. Some of the features which we are now taught to identify with Plato’s later manner are already present in the Phaedrus,—the balanced cadences, the vocabulary enriched from the poets and the earlier literature, the comparative rareness of hiatus, the use of ὑπό τοῦ for τῷ ὑπό, of δῆλον ὡς for δῆλον ὑπό, even the Ionic dative plural, all are represented there. But the most casual reader cannot fail to see that in the Phaedrus these are but decorations of a sort of carnival dress that is worn for the occasion only. Plato is caught by a fascination at which he himself is laughing all the while. His Socrates is νυμφόλητος and a strange fluency possesses him. For Phaedrus’ sake he is compelled to phrase his thoughts poetically,—he speaks in dithyrambs. It would therefore be rash, as F. Blass long since observed, to argue from the avoidance of hiatus, for example, to the date of the Phaedrus. But this dialogue has, notwithstanding, a real bearing on the subject in hand. For in spite of all his

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1 Observe the suggestion of lyrical cadences—

- Λ ο- - Λ ο- -

ἐφανερώσαν ὁμαθεῖν ἀγωγῇ

- Λ ο- - Λ ο- -

ἐπονυμίαν ἵππο χέληθη.
persiflage it is evident that the tricks of style which Plato
there parodied were exercising a powerful charm upon his
mind. In the Politicus and Laws, where, under the grander
name of ὑποτελεία (Polit. 303), the once ridiculed ὑποτομή is
admitted to have a legitimate function, the ornate manner
is employed not in humorous irony, but with solemn gravity.
It is therefore reasonable to regard the rhetorical flowers
of the Phaedrus as the early anticipation of a habit which
long afterwards becomes fixed.

§ 4. The following are some of the peculiarities of language
in which the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus are found
to approximate to the Laws, and which therefore mark the
transition towards Plato’s later style. It may be well to take
first the particles and formulae, to which Dittenberger and
others have recently directed attention. For the purpose
of the argument we may for the present neglect those which
(like τι μὴν;) bear only on the relation of the Republic (with
Phaedr., Theaet.) to the earlier dialogues.

γε μὴν occurs only twice in Rep., and once in each of the
following:—Euthyd., Symp., Phaedr., Theaet.; but 6 times
in Soph. (52 pp.)¹, 8 times in Polit. (54 pp.), 7 times in Tim.
(76 pp.), and 25 times in Laws (368 pp.).

περ, added to adverbs and pronominal words:—

μέχριπερ only in Tim. (4), Critias (1), Laws (16).

ὅπηπερ " Soph., Tim., Laws.

ὅποσοσπερ " Polit., Laws.

ὅραχεπερ " Tim. 43 E.

τάχ’ ἵσως (combined) only in Soph. (2), Polit. (3), Phil. (3),
Tim. (1), Laws (11).

σχέδον without τι, frequent in Aristotle,—a use which first
appears in Euripides⁵,—is rare in Plato except in Soph. (26),
 Polit. (13), Phil. (14), Tim. (9), Criti. (4), Laws (122).

The use of ὑποτομή is one of many coincidences between
Plato’s later style and tragic Greek. According to Stephanus
(Thesaurus) the word appears first in Euripides. It is used

¹ The pages referred to are those of the edition of Stephanus, 1578.
² In Soph. Trach. 43 with τι πημα following the omission of τι is accidental.
Particles.

also by Aristophanes in burlesque of tragedy, and by Xenophon in the Banquet (which Dittenberger has shown to be not one of his earlier writings). In Plato—


In Rep. 42 times, In Soph. once,
and hardly ever in Polit., In Phaedr. 6 times.
Phileb., Tim., Critias, Laws.

In Rep. 9,
In Soph. 21,
In Polit. 11,
In Phileb. 15,
In Tim. 8,
In Laws 50

τὰ νῦν or τὸ νῦν for νῦν (clearly a tragic form) occurs singly in Charm., Prot., Phaedo, Theaet., Rep., not at all in Lach., Euthyd., Crat., Apol., Crit., Euthyphr., Gorg., Meno, Symp., Phaedr.,—but in Soph. 5 times, Polit. 5 times, Phileb. 9 times, Tim. 7 times, Critias 3 times, and Laws 79 times.

μῶν in questions (also tragic) occurs sporadically in Charm. (2), Euthyd. (3), Phaedo (1), Meno (3), Theaet. (4), Rep. (3): but frequently in Soph. (12), Polit. (8), Phileb. (10), Laws (29). (There are very few questions in Tim., Critias.)

χρεῶν (τοῖς) for χρή occurs only in Soph. (1), Polit. (1), Tim. (3), Critias (2), and Laws (57).

The suppression of δ ὄντι &c. in antitheses, and the use of abstract plurals (especially of the dative pl.), as in ἀνποδησείας συγγενεσθαι (Laws), are also tragic uses which become more frequent in the same group of dialogues.

Another marked difference appears in the preference of the more concentrated ἐλς (or κατὰ) δῶναμιν for ἐλς (or κατὰ) τὸ δυνατόν. This occurs in

Euthyd. 1
Phaedr. 1
Rep. 6
Soph. 3
Phil. 4
Tim. 10
Critias 1
Laws 63.
A usage, not tragic but Ionic, which is continued in Aristotle, is the employment of καθαπερ as the equivalent of ὧσπερ. See Bonitz’ Index Aristotelicus, s. v. καθαπερ. In the few instances in which καθαπερ appears in Lach., Euthyd., Crat., Gorg., Symp., Theaet., Phaedr., Rep. (6 times), it may generally be distinguished from ὧσπερ, which occurs in Rep. 212 times.

But in Soph., Polit., Phileb., Tim., Critias, Laws, it occurs more frequently, and with less discrimination.

ἡσπερ appears in Soph. 9 times, Polit. 16, Phil. 9, Tim. 10, Critias 2, Laws 24.

καθαπερ appears in Soph. 14 times, Polit. 34, Phil. 27, Tim. 11, Critias 5, Laws 148.

Another Aristotelian use (see Bonitz, s. v. δέ) is that of δέ for διάδ, e.g. in Soph. 248 b, Laws 11. 666 ε.

The Ionic dative plural form is a point of resemblance between the Politicus and the Laws,—although, according to the best MSS., it appears also in a few places of the Phaedrus and Republic

The three such datives in the Phaedrus have an obvious rhythmical intention,—240 B ἡδιστοισιν ἐναυ ὑπάρχει: 276 B ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὑκτό: 278 B ἀλλαίσιν ἀλλων ψυχαίς (where this form prevents the concurrence of 3 spondees).

In the Republic there are only five genuine instances, for κενεγορλαισιν in x, νῶτοισιν in ν occur in poetical quotations: and of these five σμικροίσι and θεοίσι in B. 111 occur in a passage that is much coloured with poetical citation; μεγάλοισι in B. 19, in a highly-wrought piece of declamation; ἀντοίσι (bis) is in both instances emphatic and not attributive.

But in the Laws—especially in the later books—the use of such forms has become a confirmed trick of style. It is extended to participles, and is by no means confined to words in common use. And of the four examples in the Politicus, while one (279 E τούτοισι) is doubtful (Bekker reads τούτωισι), two at least are of the freer kind: 262 A διπλασιώσι, 304 E ἐπομένοισιν. The less rhetorical vein of the Sophistes and

1 See Schneider’s Rep. vol. 1, p. 222.
Later Dialogues:—Diction.

Philebus may account for the absence of such forms in them.

The periphrastic tendency (noticed in the Introduction to Soph. and Polit., p. xxxiv), of which χρεών, πρέπον ἄν εἴη, λέγοις ἄν, δέον ἄν εἴη, διὰ τὸ μετέχων εἶναι (Tim. 47 B), ἡ τοῦ θατέρου φύσις, τὸ τῆς ἀποπλανήσεως, &c., are examples, belongs likewise to the same preference for earfilling and rhythmically balanced expression.

The peculiar diction of these later dialogues is next to § 5. be illustrated.

In tabulating the Platonic writings so as to bring out the fact that many words were 'common and peculiar' to a certain section of them, it was formerly observed that 'the position of the Phaedrus and Parmenides'—'and,' it should have been added, 'of the Philebus'—was due to exceptional circumstances. This meant that from the nature of the subject matter, and from the mode of treatment intentionally adopted, the vocabulary of the Phaedrus was exceptionally rich, while that of the Parmenides and of the Philebus, in consequence of the dry abstractedness of the discussions in them, was exceptionally poor. It follows that in order to show the bearing of the Phaedrus or of the Philebus upon the present discussion (the Parmenides is not immediately in point), a somewhat closer analysis of either dialogue becomes advisable.

(a) The Phaedrus has more than 170 words which occur in no other dialogue—about three for every page in the edition of Stephanus. The Theaetetus, which may be taken as representing Plato's normal style, has 93 words not occurring in other dialogues—or 1½ words for every page of Stephanus. The peculiar words of the Phaedrus are borrowed from all literature, especially poetic literature, whether Epic, Lyric, or Tragic. Such words as γάνυμα, γλαυκόμματος, γνάθος, ἡμιοχέα, λιγυρὸς, μελήμης, μετεωροπορέω, μήμαμα, δμόζυξ, τελειουργός, ὑποβρύχιος, ὑψαῦχην, and others which the beauty of Phaedrus draws from the full breast of

1 Cp. Laws ii. 661 b ἀδάματον εἶναι γένομενον δ τε τάχιστα.
Socrates, are foreign alike to the style of the Republic and the Laws. What then is the specific element of diction which the Phaedrus owns in common with Tim., Critias, Laws? It consists (1) of physiological words, (2) words borrowed from the dialect of tragedy, and (3) words having a religious or mystical significance.

(1) Not Isocrates only, but also 'Hippocrates the Asclepiad' is mentioned with commendation in the Phaedrus'. And whatever may be the significance attaching to that circumstance, the following words, connected with physical states or processes, occur in the Phaedrus and Timaeus, and in no other Platonic dialogue:—βρέχω, γαργαλίζω, διαθερμαίνω, διαφωσκόμεθα, ἐπιμήνυμι, ἐφείδω, ἱσχίον, κατακορή, κολλάω, πτερον, συμφράττω, φάτνη.

If now we include Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws, the following words peculiar to this small group are of the same complexion:—ἄκεφαλος (Phaedr., Laws), ἀπορρέω (Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws), ἀσήμαινως (Phaedr., Laws), διατρέχω (Phaedr., Laws), ἐκφυσίς (Phaedr., Laws), ἐμπλέκω (Phaedr., Laws), εὐροια (Phaedr., Laws; cp. εὐρος, Tim., Laws), προσώπης (Phaedr., Laws), σπάω (Phaedr., Laws), ὑπεράρω (Phaedr., Laws), ὑψος (Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws).

(2) The Phaedrus borrows at least as much from Epic and Lyric sources as from tragedy; but the poetical words which it adopts in common with Tim., Critias, Laws, are mostly of the tragic, or old Attic, type. For example, ἄνθος (Phaedr., Laws), αἰμύλος (Phaedr., Laws), ἀκαρτος (Phaedr., Tim.), ἄνως (Phaedr., Tim., Laws), ἄναπας (Phaedr., Laws), ἀντός (Phaedr., Laws), ἐκαστοξοῦ (Phaedr., Tim., Laws), ἐμμανῆς (Phaedr., Tim., Laws), ἐμπεδόω (Phaedr., Laws), εὐπειθῆς (Phaedr., Laws), θαλός (Phaedr., Laws), θηρεος (Phaedr., Tim.), νομὴ (Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws), παμμέγας (Phaedr., Tim.), παράνοια (Phaedr., Laws), πρόνοια (Phaedr., Tim.), συμμυθής (Phaedr., Laws), ταπεινός (Phaedr., Laws), τύμβος (Phaedr., Laws), φίδος (Phaedr., Laws).

(3) Words having religious or mystical associations are

1 Thucyd. iii. 82.
Later Dialogues:—Diction.

δαμονίως (Phaedr., Tim.), ἐνθονσιαστικός (Phaedr., Tim.), ἐποπτεύω (Phaedr., Laws), ὁργία (Phaedr., Laws), ὄρκομοσία (Phaedr., Critias), ὑσνείχομαι (Phaedr., Laws).

The Phaedrus, like the Republic, has many words unknown to the earlier literature. The following are peculiar to the Phaedrus:—ἀνήκους, ἀπερόκαλος, ἀποπολεμέω, ἀχρώματος, δημωφελής, δικαιωτήριον, δοξόσωφος, ἐνθονσιασία, εὐσπάττητος, ἱσομέτρητος, κακηγορία, λογοδαίδαλος, μετεωρολογία, πολυήκους, προσπαραγράφω, πτεροπτέρω, συγκορυβαντίω, τερατολόγος, ὑπερούρανος, ὑψηλόνους, ψιλός, ψυφόδεχος, ψυχαγωγία.

(b) It has been admitted that the proportionate number of ‘late words’ in the Philebus, i.e. of words common and peculiar to it with the Timaeus, Critias, and Laws, is below that of the Republic, and even of the Phaedo and Symposium. And this fact appears at first sight to contradict the evidence of the more recent statistical inquiry, as well as the other data adduced in 1867. But the anomaly is explained, as already said, by the restricted vocabulary of a dialogue which deals so exclusively as the Philebus does with metaphysical and psychological formulæ. In 55 pp. (St.) the Philebus has only 55 peculiar words, i.e. only one for a page, or one-third of the proportion of the Phaedrus. Now of these 55, notwithstanding the prosaic cast of the dialogue, the following are tragic:—ἀναίρωμαι, ἀναπολέω, ἄνως, μυητός, περιβότης, προχαλώ, χαρμονή, ψευδῶς, while these are Epic—ἀσπαστός, θέρωμαι, μυγάγκεια (but cp. Ar. Pl. 953). A good many are late derivatives—ἀπόρημα, δυσχέρασμα, προσδόκημα, στοχασμός, ἀναχώρησις, θεώρησις, στόχασις, φάρμαξ, διδυμότης, δυσαπαλλακτία (or -ελα), εὐδοκίμα, δοξοκαλία, αὐτάρκεια, παθα-μίασις, περατοειδής, νηφαντικός, ἔχουρημικός, ἀνοητάνω. The rest are chiefly new compounds (with ἀνα, ἐν, ἐπι, προσ, συν, ὑπεξ).

If we now examine the group consisting of Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Critias, Laws, we shall find that although the contribution of the Philebus to the special vocabulary of this group is not large, it is notwithstanding significant. It contains about
Excursus.

20 tragic words, including ἀμήχανος, ἀμικτος, ἐνδίκως, καλρός, λυφον, πάθη, περιφανής, τέκνον, τέρψις.

50 new compounds, including ἀποσάζω, διαμερίζω, ἔξιδομαι, συγκεφαλαίομαι.

10 late derivatives, including ἀναισθησία, δοξοσοφία, ἐπιχείρησις, πῆξις, σύστημα, σωμασκία.

And 13 physiological words, amongst others διάκρισις, σύγκρισις, σύγκρασις, σύμμειξις, ὑπομίγχυμι, ὑποδοχή.

The Phaedrus affects ornateness, novelty, and copiousness of diction, and in doing so anticipates some of the peculiarities which became fixed in the later vocabulary. The Philebus on the other hand is below the average of copiousness; and yet, when its characteristic features are examined not by number but by kind, it is found to partake, even in its diction, of the special characteristics which mark the Timaeus, Critias, and Laws.

§ 6. (c) Every reader of the Laws must have been struck by the frequency of Old Attic and Ionic words and forms. Stallbaum¹, in reply to Zeller, tried to account for this by the nature of the subject and the gravity of phrase belonging naturally to a book on legislation. But the same features are present more or less in all the six dialogues now under review. Dionysius must have had these in mind, when he coupled Plato with Thucydides as having written in the earlier Attic. The familiar observation that the later prose runs more and more into Iambic and Paeanic rhythms might also be largely illustrated from these writings.

Such obvious facts as the use of τέκνον for παιδίον, βλάβος² side by side with βλάβη, of κλαυθμονή for ἀλοφυρμός, of τέρψις and χαρμονή side by side with ἡδονή, the preference of full-sounding words like φράζεως, φλαύρος, the fondness shown for νάμα, ἐπιρροή, γεννήτωρ, ἀμαθάλων, and other similar words, are apparent even to the cursory reader. ἡσυχαῖος is preferred to ἤσυχος, ἐνεκά to ἐνεκά (if we may trust the MSS.), Ἀπόλλωνα to Ἀπόλλω. The mannerism of the style appears not only in the use of different forms, but in the frequency of

¹ Vol. x, pp. 57 foll. ² βλάβος = damage, βλάβη = hurt.
Later Dialogues:—Diction. 57

some which occur sparingly elsewhere. Thus manuscript evidence favours πτέσθαι (not πτέσθαι), φευξέσθαι (not φευξέσθαι) in the Laws more than in other parts of Plato. Some inflexions, although true to analogy, are altogether new—such as ἡπιστήθη (i aor. of ἑπιστήμη) Laws 686 d. A noticeable peculiarity is the substitution of the common γιμναστής for the specially Attic παιδοτριβής.

The following specimens are taken from a list of 150 tragic, Ionic and Old Attic words, which are found in the Laws and not elsewhere in Plato:—

ἀλτωρ, ἀκταίων, ἀρτίπους, βασιλίς, γαμετή, γέννα, δολιχός, ἔρεισμα, βράσος, κλαυθμονή, κλόδων, λύσμος, νέηλυς, οἰκισμός (Solon), ὀμλημα, ὄτα, παιδεία, παιδουργία, παπαί, πέλανος, πλησιόχωρος (Herodotus), βέζω, σφριγάω, τητόμαι, τόλμημα, φορβάς, χόρευμα, χρόνιος.

The following, on the other hand, are amongst the words which appear in the Laws for the first time. Some of these also have an Ionic flavour. Others are obviously recent derivatives and compounds:—

ἀναθάλωσις, ἀπηγόρημα, γλυκυθυμία, γοώδης, διαθή, διαφωνία, δυσκληρέω, ἐφυθμός, ἐξειλήνης, ἐπτυθείσης, ἐτεροφωνία, εὐθημονέωμα, θρασυθεία, καλλίφωνος, κηπεία, κλεμμάδιος 2, κόσμημα, λοιδόρησις, μακαριότης, μεγάλόνων, μετακόσμησις, μοναλία, ὄχεταγωγία, παιδοποίησις, πατρογομένωμα, σκάμμα, σωφρονιστικός, ταπείνωσις, τάφρευμα, φιλοστοργέω, φωνασκέω.

(d) There are marked differences of style between the Timaeus and the Laws. The high-wrought concentration, the sustained movement, the strong energy of the shorter dialogue might be effectively contrasted with the leisurely progress, the lengthy diatribes, even the tedious wordiness of a conversation, for which the longest day can hardly have sufficed. Yet the two writings have a large common element, and as compared with the Republic they both exhibit changes pointing the same way. At present we are concerned with the vocabulary. Of 81 words common and peculiar to the

1 Schanz' Plato, vol. xii, p. 18. 2 Qu. an ἀλεξοδίος.
Timaeus and Critias (considered as one dialogue) with the Laws (Tim. 68, Critias 13), about 40 are tragic, including—

\[ \text{δισόφωος, αυθολέω, άπειρης, δυσθύμια, άξιστος, έξορθώω, εδαγής, ευφυχος}^{1},
\text{ευφυτία, λογάρυθμος, κύτος, κάλου, μετάστασις, έξων, παίδευμα, πλημμελῶς, σαλεύω, φράττω.} \]

Of 348 words peculiar to the Timaeus and Critias a certain number may be attributed to the special subject of the Timaeus. But more than 100 (or about one-third) belong to the language of tragedy: for example, \[ \text{άλυγμός, άση, βασιλείας,}
\text{δύσφωρος, ευήμερος, θλίβω, καθαγίζω, κάρτα, κατηρεφής, κεραυνός,}
\text{κτύρος, κτυπός, μένος, νοτερός, πεδάω, περιθύμος, σκέπη,}
\text{στενωπός, συντόμως, σφίγγα, τιμαλφής, τραχήλος, ύπόστεγος,}
\text{φλόξ, χειρουργέω, χλόη, χάρος.} \]

Of late forms in the Timaeus some of the most remarkable are—

\[ \text{αναπλαστός, έγερος, έγκαυμα, έτυμωσις, θερμαντικός, ίμαυτώδης,}
\text{κηροειδής, δεξίχοος, οργανοποιεια, παραφορής, φαντασια} \] (side by side with \[ \text{φαντασία.} \]

(e) It remains (under the head of diction) to show that the vocabulary of the Sophist and the Statesman, apart from the special subject matter of either dialogue, has much in common with that which has been found to belong to the Philebus, Timaeus, Critias and Laws.

The vocabulary of the Sophist (52 pp. St.) coincides in 54 instances with that of the Laws.

The Politicus (54 pp. St.) exhibits 72 such coincidences.

Between the Timaeus (with Critias) and Soph. there are 36 coincidences of diction. Between Tim., Critias, and Politicus, 42.

This estimate includes only words which are found in no Platonic dialogue, except those immediately in question.

The number of tragic words found in Soph., Polit. (taken together), and in none of the ‘earlier dialogues,’ is 116, of which the following are the most remarkable:—\[ \text{άγγερος (Polit.,}
\text{Phileb., Tim., Laws), άντισταθμός (Soph.),} \] \[ \text{άπλετος (Soph.).} \]

\[^{1}\text{In the Laws εύφυτία has the special sense of ‘good mental condition,’ but ευφύχοι = άνθρωπος.}\]

In adverting briefly to the less tangible subject of § 7. structure and rhythm, I may refer to the Introductions to the Sophist and Statesman, ed. 1867. A word of reply is due, however, to a friendly objector, who urges that the tone and colouring of these dialogues are dramatically suited to the presence of Timaeus, of the Eleatic friend, and of the Athenian Stranger.

(1) Why should the chief speakers in these six dialogues talk so nearly in the same curious manner?

Compare together, for example, the following places, taken almost at random:—

Soph. 258 D τὴν γὰρ δακρόν ὑφόσω . . . τὸ μῆ ὅν.
Polit. 284 e, 288 e.
Phileb. 53 b, c σμικρὸν δρα καθαρῶν . . . καλλων γλύνοιτ' ὄν.
Ib. 67 ad fin. οὐς πιστεύοντες . . . ἐκάστοτε λόγων.
Tim. 53 b νῦν δ' αὖ τὴν διάταξιν . . . ξυπήψεσθε.
Laws 1. 644 D δαῦμα μὲν . . . ξυνεστηκόσ.
Ib. 1. 648 D, E.

And (2) Why, within the limits of the same dialogue, should Socrates, Critias, and Hermogenes adopt the language of Timaeus, or why should Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus and the younger Socrates adopt the fashion of their new acquaintance from Magna Graecia? Why should the young Protarchus ape the new-fangled affectations of his teacher? Or how is it that Kleinias and Megillus, although less instructed, have caught so readily the style of their Athenian companion for the day?
Excurus.

Compare once more—

Sophist. 217 c (Socrates).
   265 d (Theaetetus).
Polit. 257 b (Theodorus).
Phileb. 13 b, c (Protarchus).
Tim. 20 c (Hermocrates).
   23 c (Kritias).
   29 d (Socrates).
Laws iv. 713 b (Megillus).
   vi. 752 b (Kleinias).

Surely the resemblance of style between the Cretan and Spartan, and of both to their Athenian friend, is closer than that between the several Athenian speakers in the Symposium.

I have tried to show, not only that the six dialogues, Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Critias, Laws, are rightly grouped together as the latest, but I have also endeavoured to describe the nature of the change in Plato's manner of writing which this fact involves. The chief characteristics of his later style are the following:—

1. A measured and elaborately balanced gravity of utterance, in which the rhetorical artifices which he had once half affected and half despised are passing into a settled habit of ἰντοπεία and conscious impressiveness.

2. The increasing prevalence of certain particles and formulae, adopted partly for euphony, and partly to suit with an archaic and tragic colouring.

3. A range of diction passing far beyond the limits of 'Attic purity,' and reverting in a remarkable degree to the use of the Old Attic and Ionic words. Macaulay speaks of Milton's prose as 'stiff with cloth of gold.' Plato's later style is stiffened with a sort of τραγικὸς λῆμψος, or antique embroidery, while the tendency to employ new compounds and derivatives, already active in the Republic, is present here in a more advanced stage.
4. The artificial balancing and interlacing of phrases is carried much further than even in the Phaedrus, Republic and Theaetetus.

If we turn from the form to the substance of these six § 8. dialogues, we find in them an increasing sense of the remoteness of the ideal, without any diminution of its importance. A deepening religious consciousness is associated with a clearer perception of the distance between man and God, and of the feebleness and dependence of mankind. But the feeling is accompanied with a firm determination to face and cope with the burden and the mystery of the actual world—to provide support for human weakness, alleviations of inevitable misery. The presence of Necessity in the universe and in life is acknowledged, in order that it may be partially overcome.

The change here implied is not one of creed, but of mental attitude, induced, as we may gather from indications that are not obscure, by a large acquaintance with the contemporary world, and by the writer's own experience in wrestling with intellectual and practical difficulties. The effect is traceable (1) in metaphysics, (2) in logic, (3) in psychology, (4) in physics, (5) in politics, (6) in ethics and religion, and (7) in the conception of history.

(1) Metaphysics.

In their metaphysical aspect, these dialogues turn chiefly on a few highly abstract notions, the essential forms of Being, not-being, sameness, difference, motion, rest, limit, finite, infinite:—and these are no longer merely contemplated in their isolated reality, but in their connexion with phenomena and with one another. The method becomes less ontological and more logical. 'The idea of good' is approached not merely through Socratic definitions or figurative adumbration, but through the direct analysis and manipulation of primary conceptions—for example those of measure and
symmetry. The five γένη of the Sophist, the description of the ideas in the Politicus as τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα, the metaphysical categories, as one may venture to term them, of the Philebus, belong to a more exact mode of philosophizing than had been thought of when the Phaedo was written, and one which was only vaguely anticipated in the Republic as 'the longer way.' The θανέρων φύσις and μικρὴ ὁμοία of the Sophist and Philebus are resumed and applied in the Timaeus.—The Laws contain but few references to metaphysical problems. But this is in entire keeping with the remotion of the actual from the ideal; and the attentive student is aware of an ever-growing conviction of the significance of measure and of number, and a fixed belief in the supremacy of Mind. ‘Measure’ is indeed the first and last word of Plato’s metaphysic—the μετρητική of the Protagoras anticipates the μέτρον of the Philebus.

(2) Logic.

The dialectical achievement in the Sophistæs is the pivot of the logical movement. Plato had found that thought was being sacrificed to the instrument of thought, or rather that the instrument was itself endangered. Zeno had ‘jammed’ the weapon of Parmenides. The Sophist-dialogue brings for the first time into a clear light the nature of predication, of classification, and of proof, and places the science of Logic on a rational footing. The effects of the discussion, which is continued in the Politicus, are apparent in the method of that dialogue, and even in the elaborate distinctions of the Laws. As Mr. Paul Shorey observes in his able papers on the Timaeus, the practical aim of the whole business is ‘to obtain a working logic.’

(3) Psychology.

The dialectical advance accompanies, and indeed occasions, a corresponding progress in psychological analysis—which is especially apparent in the Philebus. It is needless to illustrate this familiar fact. See especially Tim. 42 A, 69 D;
Later Views.

Laws III. 644–646, iv. 770 d (comparing this last passage with Rep. vi sub init.).

(4) Physics.

In all these dialogues, and not in the Timaeus only, there is an unceasing interest in production (γένεσις), and a tendency to look upon things from the point of view of the Universe rather than of Man. See especially the myth in the Politicus, and the mention of prehistoric cataclysms in the Laws:—also Soph. 265 c and Phileb. 59 a, compared with Tim. 59 c, d. The physical conditions of mental states, especially of Sensation, Pleasure and Pain, and of moral evil are more insisted on. The importance of health, and of the care of the body generally, is more fully recognized. The allusions to medicine and gymnastic in the Republic are in strong contrast to those in the Timaeus and Laws. And a great advance in clearness of cosmological conception is implied in the discussion of δῶσω and κάηω in the Timaeus, as compared with the employment of the same notion in the Phaedo and Republic.

(5) Politics.

In Rep. B. v Plato already acknowledges that it is hard to realize the ideal. Notwithstanding, he is absolutely bent on realizing it. He will not swerve aside in deference to opinion or circumstances, but will wait until circumstances favour, and till opinion shall come round. He is sure that mankind are not unreasonable, could they but hear the truth. Before he wrote the Laws, a varied intercourse with man had dashed his confidence and lessened his hope, but had not impaired his zeal for the improvement of mankind. He is now ready to adapt himself to human weakness and, the higher road having proved impracticable, to seek a modus vivendi that may embody as much of righteousness and wisdom as the race will bear. The work is full of the gentleness and consideration of one who lives on

Till old experience do attain
To something like prophetic strain.
Now the crisis of this tradition from Optimism to Meliorism is reflected in a very interesting manner in the Statesman dialogue. Plato has been brought to feel that in his ideal Republic he had been grasping at the moon. He had legislated for the age of Cronos during the reverse cycle which is said to be under the government of Zeus. The dialogue is instinct with a suppressed bitterness, which time had mellowed when he wrote the Laws. But the author of the Politicus is not less keenly bent on finding a practicable way. The problem he sets before himself is how to bring scientific thought to bear upon the actual world. Despairing of spontaneous obedience to a perfect will, he has recourse to legislative enactment, as a second best course, by which men may be led or driven to imitate from afar off the free movement of Divine Reason. The art of legislation is compared to that of weaving (a metaphor which is repeated in the Laws). And the same stress is laid, as in many passages of the later dialogue, on the importance of combining, through breeding and education, the energetic with the gentler elements of human nature. The provision of a διαδοχος in Laws vi to supplement the work of the legislator, is in accordance with the hint given in the Politicus, and may be contrasted with the contempt that is showered on ἐπανάφθωσις in Rep. iv. 426.

The Timaeus, Critias and Hermocrates, had the trilogy been completed, would have been the outcome of another mood, but of one also differing from the spirit of the Republic. In the Republic Plato contents himself with laying down great principles. He is confident that, if these are preserved, the citizens may be trusted to discover the rest. The opening of the Timaeus makes a deeper plunge into actuality by raising the almost impossible demand:—How did the citizens of the ideal state comport themselves in that far-off time beyond our ken (Rep. vi. 499 d)? This question belongs to the firm resolution to be practical, to realize abstractions in the concrete, to make the step from υστερα to γένεσις, which finds a less confident application in the Politicus and Laws. The same motive appears in the admission of approximate
knowledge in the Philebus as requisite 'if a man is to be able to find his way home.'

(6) ETHICS AND RELIGION.

In these last dialogues, more than elsewhere in Plato, we are made conscious, as has been already said, of the distance between Man and God. The imitation of the Divine is still the highest duty, but it is an imitation from very far away. Although the doctrine of metempsychosis is retained, and the belief in immortality is more than once very finely expressed, yet the proud claim to ἀπαθανατικὸς the life which is a meditation of death, and even the formation of the inward man after the pattern in the Heavens, are no longer the leading notes of the new strain. The philosopher is less than ever simply bent on saving his own soul. The speakers rather strive after the partial overcoming of evil with good, the infusion of a spirit of generosity, which may leaven the inherent selfishness of men;—the institution of a rule of life which may prevent society from foundering amid the weltering sea of politics. Sympathy with Orphic observances, especially in the abstention from animal food (ἀλληλαπών ἐδωκέν) is common to the Politicus and Laws.

The human and divine νοῦς are kept apart in the Philebus more emphatically than in Rep. vi; and in the Timaeus the elements of soul which the Creator dispenses to the ἀμυντηροῖς for the creation of man are not of pristine purity ἀλλὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα. The faintness which now attends 'the larger hope' is strikingly apparent in the Politicus-myth.

(7) HISTORY.

Lastly, in these six dialogues (to which the Menexenus may perhaps be added) we find a more distinct anticipation than elsewhere in Plato of two essentially modern ideas, the conception, namely, of a History of Philosophy and of a Philosophy of History.

(a) In the Sophistes, philosophical method is for the first
time expressly based on criticism (although the step had been partly anticipated in the Parmenides and Theaetetus). The same plan is carried out in parts of the Philebus.

(b) The Hermocrates, on the other hand, was to have been an ideal history of human good and evil. And in speculating on the nature and origin of legislation, the Athenian Stranger Laws III finds it advisable to preface his remarks with a recapitulation of the earlier History of Hellas.
ESSAY II

ON THE TEXT OF THIS EDITION OF
PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

Bekker's text of the Republic (1817 to 1823) rests on § 12 MSS., which he quotes as A Θ Ζ Π Φ Δ K q r, all collated by himself; he also mentions the Venetian Codex t, of which Schanz in editing the smaller dialogues has since made valuable use.

Stallbaum added the Florentine MSS. ß c n x a' β' γ',—and Schneider, besides re-collating q exhaustively, collated Lobcov., Vind. D, Vind. E, Vind. F. To these twenty-four MSS. is now to be added a twenty-fifth, Codex 4. Plutei xxviii, in the Malatestian Library at Cesena, which in the present edition will be quoted as M (Malatestianus). Subsequent editors, especially K. F. Hermann, have relied more exclusively than Bekker did upon the chief MS., Paris A; and Baiter in his preface to the fifth Zurich edition particularizes no other MS. authority.

1 Collated only to p. 441 St.
2 'Primo libro caret,' Bekker.
3 Schneider, Praef. p. xxxi 'Ibidem [Morelius] quartum commemorat non magis a quoquum collatum, absque numero post impressum indicem bibliothecae Marcianae additum, forma maxima sec. xii scriptum, inter alia Platonica civitatem cum scholiis continentem, sed inde a libro tertio usque ad ultimum manu sec. xv exaratum.' It is now numbered App. 4. 1. Schanz has proved that the earlier portion is derived from Paris A.
4 Schneider's habit of marking all his MSS. anew is a drawback to the otherwise exceptional usefulness of his edition. Bekker's and Stallbaum's marks are here retained, those of Schneider being adopted only for his own MSS. He made little use of Vind. 54, in which the Republic is by a recent hand and copied from Lobcov.
§ 2. The present text was originally founded on Baiter's edition of 1881, but in the course of revision has assumed a form more nearly approaching to that of Hermann. The select list of various readings at the bottom of each page has been for the most part taken from three MSS., A Π M, with occasional reference to others of those mentioned above.

Paris. A, of the ninth century, has been re-examined several times since Bekker's edition, notably by K. F. Hermann, Dübner, and Cobet: also by Baiter, who, however, in his preface to his edition of 1881 still marked a few readings as uncertain. In order to clear up these remaining uncertainties I visited the Paris National Library in June, 1890, and found that several readings which are quite clear and unmistakable in Paris. A are still misquoted in the editions. I have therefore now made a fresh collation of this MS. with the present text, which had unfortunately been partly printed off before the opportunity for this collation occurred, and a list of the corrections which are thus rendered necessary will be found in the Appendix to this Essay (Appendix I).

Bekker's quotations of Venn. Π Ζ are also not free from inaccuracy, and Professor C. Castellani, Prefect of the Library of St. Mark at Venice, has done good service by providing a complete new collation of these MSS. with Bekker's text for the purposes of the present edition. A list of Bekker's errors and omissions will be found below, Appendix III.

M. Schanz considers Ven. Π and the MSS. derived from it (D K q β' Vind. D), as bearing traces in the Republic of a tradition independent of Par. A. And it may be observed in confirmation of this opinion, that the erroneous reading λύρα (for αὕρα) in III. 401 C, now shown to be peculiar to Π, must have arisen from the misreading of a copy in uncial characters and therefore anterior to A. A third set of MSS., having some probable readings not

1 I refer especially to Baiter's Zurich editions since 1881.
distinctly referable to A or Π, are regarded by many recent editors as merely interpolated. To this class of ‘bad’ MSS. Schanz¹ has consigned the Cesena MS., our M. A full description of this MS., written by Professor Enrico Rostagno, who has collated it for this edition, is given below (Appendix IV).

In Muccioli’s catalogue of the Malatestian Library it is described as of the twelfth century, and Signor Rostagno, whose judgement is of weight, speaks of it as for the most part written towards the end of that century. The absence of iota subscript from the portion written in the earlier hand, and the constant accentuation of the enclitic τέ, after unaccented syllables, afford some slight confirmation of this view. The portion of the MS. which is by a later hand, is referred to as M (italic) in the critical notes to this edition (pp. 308–319).

Other MSS. occasionally referred to in the critical notes are:

b Laurentianus, 85, 6, containing Books I and II:
but from II. 358 ἐ πολλάκις τίς νοῦν ἔχουν in a fifteenth century hand. The earlier part, ending with περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἀν μᾶλλον was formerly quoted as of the twelfth century, but according to E. Rostagno belongs to the thirteenth.

x Laurentianus, 85, 7, thirteenth century (?).

a Laurentianus, 80, 7, fifteenth century.

γ Laurentianus, 42, thirteenth century (?).

D Parisiensis, 1810, thirteenth century.

K Parisiensis, 1642, fifteenth century.

m Vaticanus, 61, ‘bombyc. aut chart.’ Bekker.

r Vaticanus, 1029 a b, ‘membr. f. max. foliis bipartitis,’ 2 vols.

Vind. E Vindobonensis, 1, ‘chart.’

¹ Studien, p. 67.
On the Text of this Edition

Vind. F Vindobonensis, 55, fourteenth century.
Vind. D Vindobonensis, 89, 'chart. f. max.'
q Monacensis, 237, fifteenth century.
Ξ Venetus, 184, fifteenth century.

§ 3. Some further observations on the more important MSS.
are here subjoined:

A Parisiensis A: Paris National Library MS. Gr. 1807:
ninth century. On the left-hand margin, at the end of
the volume, the following note has been written with con-
tractions in reddish ink, and in a cursive hand:—ἀρθώθη
ἡ βιβλοσ αὕτη ὅπω κωνσταντίνου μητροπολίτου λεπάλεως τοῦ
καὶ ἄνησαμένον. If this Hierapolis might be assumed
to be the Metropolis of Phrygia, the question raised by
Mr. T. W. Allen in the Journal of Philology, vol. xxi,
as to the provenance of the group of MSS. to which A be-
longs, would be partly answered. But the Bishop is not to
be held responsible for the more serious corrections, which
were probably made by the copyist of the Scholia before
the book was exposed for sale. Indeed, some of the most
trivial annotations, ignorant emendations, and impossible
various readings, bear a suspicious resemblance to the
metropolitan's writing. The question whether the first
diorthotes, who seems to have been a careful person, had
before him any other MS. than that from which the first
hand had copied, is important, but can hardly be resolved.
In point of authority there is in fact hardly any difference
between the first and second hand. It will be observed
that there are several cases in which words omitted in the
text are supplied in the margin, to all appearance by the
second hand. The first hand corrected many slips in the

1 For a complete catalogue of the MSS. of Plato, see Martin Wohlrab's
Die Platonhandschriften und ihre gegenseitigen Beziehungen, Leipzig, 1887.
Those left out of account in the present essay are Venetus 187 (closely
related to Ξ); Vindobonensis 54, collated in part by Schneider; Mon. C. =
Monacensis 490 (collated by Schneider in B. vii and part of B. x); Monac-
censis 514, Venetus 150, and the fragments b (Bekker) and Palatinus
(Schneider) in the Libraries of Darmstadt and Heidelberg. (On Lobcov.,
Φ, Θ, see below.)
course of writing, and has frequently covered the blank made by erasure with \( \div \div \div \) instead of writing again over the same space. Many slight omissions are supplied either by the first or second hand between the lines. Adscript iota is often added by the second hand, sometimes a little above the line (\( \delta'\delta\eta\)) which appears to have been a mode intermediate between adscription and subscription (\( a\iota \) and \( q \)). Many, if not most of the accents have been added after writing,—perhaps by the diorthotes. They are in a different ink, as Cobet observed.

Habits of the MS. to be noticed once for all are:

1. Spelling:—

\( \pi\omicron\omicron\omega \), not \( \pi\omicron\omega \), \( \upsilon\omicron\omicron\varsigma \) or \( \upsilon\omicron\varsigma \) more often than \( \upsilon\varsigma \), \( \pi\omicron\rho\omicron\pi\omicron\rho\omicron\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\omega \), \( \epsilon\gamma\gamma\nu\tau\omicron\epsilon\omicron\omega \), \&c., \( \tau\omicron\omega\iota\varsigma\omega \), \( \theta\nu\eta\iota\varsigma\kappa\omega \), \&c. Paragogic \( \nu \) retained before consonants: \( \omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\varsigma\omicron\varsigma \) and \( \omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\omega \) interchanged.

2. Accentuation:—

a. \( \tau\epsilon \), \( \pi\omicron\omicron \), \( \tau\epsilon \omicron \) (\( \text{sic} \)):—enclitics are constantly thus accented—especially after unaccented syllables.

b. \( \delta\alpha\lambda\omicron \tau\iota \), \( \eta\pi\epsilon\rho \epsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron \), \&c.

c. \( \gamma\omicron\omega\omicron\nu \) (not \( \gamma\omicron\omicron\omega\omicron\nu \)).

d. \( \delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \omicron\omicron \), \&c. (generally corrected to \( \delta\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \), \&c., by a recent hand).

e. \( \mu\eta \delta \epsilon \mu\omicron\alpha \), \&c.

f. \( \epsilon\pi\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \), \( \kappa\alpha\delta\alpha\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron \), \&c.

g. \( \alpha\omicron\phi\omicron\eta \), \( \pi\omicron\rho\omicron\eta \), \( \xi\omicron\nu\omicron\eta \) (retained in the text).

h. The accent on \( \mu\epsilon\nu \), \( \delta\epsilon \), \&c., in antitheses often doubled,—the second accent often added by another hand.

i. A singular practice of distinguishing \( \acute{a}v=\acute{e}\acute{a}v \), by omitting the accent and writing \( \acute{a}v \). In many cases the accent originally written has been erased.

k. \( \epsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron \) and \( \epsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \) constantly confused.

l. \( \tau\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha \), not \( \tau\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha \):—also \( \tau\eta\omicron\nu\omicron\epsilon \), \( \tau\omicron\omicron\omega\omicron\nu\omicron\epsilon \), \&c.

3. Breathings:—

a. Confusion of \( \alpha\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron \) and \( \alpha\omicron\omicron\omicron \), \( \alpha\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron \) and \( \alpha\omicron\omicron\omicron \), \&c.

b. \( \delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \omicron\omicron \).

c. \( \delta\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron \), \( \delta\omicron\mu\omicron\epsilon\omicron\omicron \), \( \delta\omicron\tau\alpha \), \( \omicron\kappa\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron \).
4. Abbreviations are very infrequent; the commonest is ω for ν. Possibly, however, some errors, such as ζητεί for ζεί in IV. 440 C may be due to early compendia.

5. The persons are distinguished with : between the words and a line — in the margin. The punctuation is careful on the whole.

Later hands have busied themselves in various ways:—

1. In changing ω to ο, ι to η and vice versa, not always rightly;—δ φελλα to δ φελελα.—δλειπη remains unchanged.

2. In constantly changing ει of the 2nd per. sing. middle and passive to ηι, η of the plup. 1st per. sing. to ευ, and placing the mark of elision ' over έγιμαι, οβχ', &c.

3. In changing the division of syllables between lines by erasing a letter at the end of one line and inserting it at the beginning of the next, or vice versa.

4. Marking interrogation by subjoining a comma to the colon between the speeches, thus ;.

5. Adding marginal glosses, various readings and initial letters of respondents' names, inserted where a doubt seemed possible.

π Venetus Π: St. Mark's Library, Venice; MS. Gr. 185: twelfth century. It contains the Republic, with the loss of about four leaves, from VI. 507 E to VII. 515 D, and from X. 612 E έριτε ταῦρα to the end.

The first hand has been but slightly corrected while the MS. was new, but a hand of the fifteenth century has altered many readings, generally in accordance with the tradition which is now represented by Ven. Ε. Ven. Π supplies some words that are omitted in Par. A, though it agrees with A in other places, where both have to be corrected from a different source.

The following brief description of the MS. is from the hand of Professor Castellani, Prefect of St. Mark's Library at Venice:

'Cod. 185, membr. Saec. XII¹, 348 x 260 millim., ff. 349,

¹ Morelli, Bibl. manuscripta, p. 109.
of Plato’s Republic


_Cesenas M_: 28. 4, in the Malatestian Library at Cesena: M twelfth to thirteenth century. This MS. is here selected as a sufficient representative of the third or inferior class of MSS. which retain some readings independently of A and Π. It is older than any of the Florentine MSS., and it has a close and indisputable affinity to Vaticanus m, the last of Bekker’s MSS. which M. Schanz eliminated in his process of reducing the apparatus to A and Π. The age of m is not given, but Bekker’s description of it as ‘bombyc. aut chartac.’ shows that it has no high claim to antiquity. This MS., while agreeing in very many points with M, is much more seriously interpolated, and may be assumed to represent a later stage of corruption. M therefore holds a high place in the sub-family m Ε v t, to which the Florentine MSS. a c γ’ may be confidently added. Of this class Schanz writes as follows:

‘So liegt die Schlussfolgerung nahe, dass die Mutterhandschrift von m Ε v t aus dem Parisinus A stammt. Nicht zu verwundern ist, dass bei der grossen zeitlichen Entfernung von A die Handschriften m Ε v t Interpolationen und Ergänzungen der Lücken, welche A bietet,

1 The older hand of Flor. b, was formerly attributed to the twelfth century. But E. Rostagno, who has examined both MSS. (M and b) places nearly a century between them.

2 See this fact brought out below, pp. 87 ff.
On the Text of this Edition

aus der zweiten Klasse erfahren haben. So kommt es, dass mehrmals A mit seinen Weglassungen allein dasteht.

§ 4. Whether or not the Cesena M.S. is the ‘Mutterhandschrift’ in question, it will be presently shown to belong to the same sub-family, and to be much purer than m, while it is older by two centuries than Ζ v t, and little younger, if at all, than Π, the head M.S. of the ‘second class,’ above referred to. Schanz’s reasoning in the passage quoted is thus invalidated in so far as changes are accounted for by long lapse of time, and while every assumption in a matter of this kind may be regarded as provisional, we are in the meantime justified in regarding M as a third witness agreeing in some things with A, in others supporting Π, and also giving independent testimony for some readings which have hitherto depended on the inferior evidence of Ven. Ζ, Mon. q, Vind. E, or Flor. a c x a' y'. This opinion rests upon the following grounds:

A M versus Π

I. It is admitted that M agrees with A in many points where Π diverges from both.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/M</th>
<th>Π</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. 328</td>
<td>ὀάλλη ἡμεῖς—ἰέναι</td>
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<td>325</td>
<td>νεανίας</td>
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<td>326</td>
<td>ἐλαφω</td>
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<td>330</td>
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<td>346</td>
<td>ὀάλλη, διπερ—παρα- σκευάζει</td>
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<td>II. 358</td>
<td>τι δυν τε</td>
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<td>365</td>
<td>ἀλθειαν</td>
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<td>366</td>
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<td>367</td>
<td>ἕνυκοικος</td>
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<td>372</td>
<td>οσκω</td>
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<td>373</td>
<td>om.</td>
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1 Hermes xii. p. 181 (Berlin, 1877).
of Plato's Republic.

II. 377E ὁκακὸς τῷ
379A ὃμ.
381A ὅμ.
382E ὅμ.
383 B ὅπαιῶν

III. 389D ἕκολάσεως Α: κολά-

οποῖος Μ
394D ἐγὼ—γάρ δή
401 C ὅδιρα
402 C οἷόμεθα
403 B ὅδιζει
404 D ἐν τῷ
405 C ὅλυγμίζομενος
407 B ὅμὲν
408 C ὅρθότατα
411 D ἔγεμομένου
414 E ὅδημοιοργομένη
416 C παρασκευάσασθαι

IV. 421 A ἕξωσιν
423 B ἀὐξομένη
425 C τὰ ἁγοραῖα
427 E μὴ ὅλω βοηθεῖν
429 A ἐφηρῆσθαι
437 C ἔρωτωτος (corr. from ἔρωτωτος Α).

V. 451 B φόνου καὶ καθαρόν
460D τίθασι
461 C τῶν τοιούτων
462 C κομιδὴ μὲν σῶν—
κατὰ ταύτα (Μ om.
πόλει)
463 B οἱ δ'
On the Text of this Edition

A M
v. 464 E ὁνάγκην
465 C ἡ παιδοτροφία Α
      παιδοτροφία Μ
466 B εφαμεν
468 C καὶ μηδενι
469 A ὁ νυπρώπων—θεοῦ
470 A φοβηθοσήμεθα
472 B τὸ δὲ χρῆ
      " C ὁ τελέως
      " D ἐπιδειξαι
478 B εφαμεν
      " C φαινότερον
      " D ἐντὸς
479 C ὦ (ἢ Μ)
479CD ὃ μὴ εἶναι—μᾶλλον
       om.

VI. 487 C ταῦτην
488 A χαλεπὸν πάθος
490 D τοὺς
      " D θῆς διαβολῆς
504 B ἀλλή
      " C ἀπολείπων
505 A ἢ
506 B τελέως
507 B ηττὶ ταῦτα
       om.

VII. 522 C τοῖον
529 C ἢ ζεὶ ὑπτίας μὲν
533 A μοι
      " B ἢ καὶ πρὸς θεραπελαν
536 A τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν
538 C ἢ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀποτομέους
540 B κατακομβέως
      " E δέκα ἐτῶν
      " C διελήλυθος
544 C καὶ ὁ πασῶν
       om.

Π
ἀνάγκη
παιδοτρόφῳ
ἐφαμεν
καὶ μηδενὶ
ὅτως
ἐπιδειξαι
ἐφαμεν
φαινότερον
ἐνὸς
ὅς
ταῦτη
χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος
τοὺς μὲν
θῆς ἢθη διαβολῆς
ἀλλή ἢ
ἀπολείπως
ἢ καὶ
παντελῶς
ὁττὶ ταῦτα
τὸ τοῖον
ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων
ἐμοὶ
ἡ καὶ πρὸς θεραπελαν
πάντῃ τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν
προσαπτομέους
κατακομβέως
δεκατων
ὅς
διελήλυθος
καὶ πασῶν
of Plato's Republic.

VIII. 547 E τοιούτους
tous toioutous
554 B οτὸς χρόνον
toys chrono
556 A ὅπετε γ’
ho pete y'
559 C ὁ τῶν
to
560 B ὑποτρεφόμεναι
ypotrefomenai
" E ἀπαιδευομέναι
apaidewomenai
561 A τὴν τῶν
thn ton
" A ομάλα
omala
562 B προθεντο
protheneto
" B ἀπόλλυν
apollun
" D αὐτῆς
authes
564 A καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις
kai ev politeiais
" E σμικρά
smikra
569 C πῦρ δυσλων
pur dulos
IX. 571 C καὶ τίνας
tinasa
572 A ἔδω
edoa
" A ἐλθὼν
elthon
" D ἐκαστὸν
ekaston
573 A δια
xia
" A αἱ ἄλλαι
ai alla
" D διακυβέρνων
diakuvbernwn
574 C οἱ πάνυ γε
oai panu ge
578 E ἡ πλειώ
he pleio
579 C καὶ ἀνὴρ
kai aner
581 A ὅει δλον
oai dolon
584 B τοῦτο
touto
X. 597 B ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει
eh en th fyshei
598 B πῶρῳ ἄρα τοῦ
porwoi ara tou
600 D ἐπιστατήσωσι τῆς
epistatoswisi ths
παιδείας
paideias
601 A ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις
eteiroi toioutois
" E υπηρέτησει
ypheretesei
602 A οἱ πάνυ γε—ἐπιστήμην
oai panu ge—epistimhn
" D καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
kai alla
603 E τοίχης
tichis
The fifty-five places which are marked with ω in the foregoing list afford ample evidence that the main text of M is independent of Π. But for the purpose of testing the relationship between M and A, these passages may be neglected, for they merely show that both MSS. agree so far in a sound tradition. What is correct in both comes from the archetype and does not prove any closer affinity.

In one place, IV. 437 D, M is free from the suspicion of error which attends the reading of A. In another, III. 389 D, the reading of M is intermediate, and accounts for the corruption of Π. It remains then to consider those places in which A and M agree in readings (1) erroneous or (2) doubtful.

1. In the twelve places, which are here marked with an obelus †, the two MSS. are clearly following the same mistaken original. But it is still an open question whether the later is derived from the earlier, or whether they are both derivatives from an older copy in which these errors were already to be found. Such changes as those in III. 411 D (from γενομένου to γενομένου), VI. 487 C (from ταύτην to ταύτην), X. 603 E (from ψυχής to τόχης), may have occurred at an early stage of the tradition.

In IV. 437 C A hesitates between two readings, the first hand having written ἐρωτῶντος, and the diorthotes having corrected this to ἐρωτῶν, which is the reading of M. This being so, it is not a little remarkable that in II. 383 B, M gives ἐνδείκται, the reading of A₁, but not of the diorthotes, who has changed it to ἐνδατείσθαι. The reading μὲν for νῦν (529 C) is so widely spread that it may be assumed
of Plato's Republic. 79
to be an early corruption, and ἐπὶ is by no means certain.

There remains τι ὦ τε (II. 358 E), a mistaken reading, but one into which an early copyist might easily have fallen, and ἐν τοῖς for ἐπῆδος (X. 601 A), which forms part of a phrase supplied in the margin by the diorthotes of A, and therefore not with certainty attributable to the MS. from which A was copied.

(2) So much for the erroneous agreement of M with A. There remain fifty-one places which may be considered doubtful. In most of these the reading of Π has been rejected by recent editors in deference to the authority of A. If they are right in this, the same argument recurs:—A and M agree in following the archetype, which proves nothing as to their special affinity. Where all three MSS. are in error, as in X. 604 D, Π shows a further stage of corruption, and the error is not one which commenced with A. For it is presupposed in Π, which ex hypothesi is independent of the A tradition. In IV. 437 D there is a reading which appears significant. A seems originally to have read ποῦ, the reading of Π. An early corrector changed this to ἡ ὦ, and wrote ποῦ in the margin. M has ἡ ὦ, and ἡ ὦ is the true reading. In IX. 576 D, on the other hand, the true reading ἄφιετα is absent from A Π M, but is given as a variant by A in the margin. If M were copied from A, the scribe would surely have availed himself of this. With regard to the omissions not marked with ὅ, viz. II. 373 A, 379 A, 381 A, 382 E, it may be reasonably argued that Π is right, although not demonstrably so, for the words supplied are not necessary to the sense. But the error, if so be, is one which may have occurred at any period. Even in the few cases, such as III. 408 C, V. 451 B, VI. 488 A, VIII. 564 A, where it may be thought that the advantage is on the side of Π, this would indicate affinity between A and M, but would not prove the derivation of the later from the earlier MS. When all is said, the amount of agreement here exhibited
proves a close relationship between A and M, but does not necessitate the inference of direct derivation.

§ 5. II. What then is to be inferred from the places in which M agrees with Π while differing from A?

In the following list A = A + A², that is the places are discounted in which the reading of M is anticipated by an early corrector of A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Π M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A versus Π M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. 330 C ἃπερ</td>
<td>ὀὕπερ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>332 C ἐφη ὧ πρως</td>
<td>ἐφη πρῶς</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>339 B καὶ δίκαιον φής</td>
<td>ὀδίκαιον φής</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342 A δεὶ αλεὶ</td>
<td>ὀδεὶ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>344 E οὔδὲ τι</td>
<td>οὔδὲ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>345 C πιαίνειν c. γρ. ποι-μαίνειν</td>
<td>ὀποιαίνειν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347 C δεὶ δὲ</td>
<td>ὀδεὶ δὴ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>349 B πλεῖον</td>
<td>πλέον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>352 D ὁστ' ἔμοι</td>
<td>ὀδὲ γέ μοι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. 358 A om.</td>
<td>ὀἀδικλά δ' ἐπανεῖται</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; E πλέονι</td>
<td>πλέον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>359 C ἐπαυτοφάρφ</td>
<td>ἐπ' αυτοφάρφ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; C νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ</td>
<td>νόμῳ δὲ καὶ βίᾳ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; D μυθολογοῦσι</td>
<td>ὀμυθολογοῦσι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; D ἄλλο μὲν</td>
<td>ὀἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360 E τί οὖν</td>
<td>τίς οὖν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>364 D λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοὶ τε ὀστρεπτοὶ δὲ τε</td>
<td>τε καὶ δικασοῦντα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; D om.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>366 A ἄζημοι</td>
<td>ἄζημοι μόνον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>374 B οἰκοδόμοι, ἵνα—οἰκοδόμοι ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμοι, γίγνοιτο</td>
<td>ἵνα—γίγνωιτο Π οἰκοδόμοι ἵνα — γίγνωιτο, ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμοι M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; C σκυτοτόμων</td>
<td>σκυτοτόμων</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>378 D τοιαύτα μᾶλλον</td>
<td>ὀτοιαύτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. 387 C ὀπὸ</td>
<td>ὀὕπερ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390 A νεανικεύματα</td>
<td>νεαν(σκ)εύματα</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of Plato's Republic.

III. 392 A  περιορίζομεν ὁις  ἐπὶ δριζομένους
395 C ἵνα ἐκ τῆς μμὴσεως  ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μμὴσεως
396 D ἐπιστοῖ  ἐπιστὸν
398 A τε ἐλς  τ' ἐν ἐλς
399 C ἀποβαλλοντα  ἀπ' ἀποβαλλοντα
401 C ἀνεμόμενοι  ἀνεμόμενοι
402 D διότι  ὁδ' ὅ τι
404 A τε καὶ ἀνάγκη  τε ἀνάγκη

IV. 421 D διαφέρει  διαφθείρει
431 A τὸν  τὸν
432 C φράσεις  φράσης
433 E τούτο  τούτου
434 C ὅδε λέγωμεν  ὅδε λέγομεν
435 B ἔστη  ἔστη
439 D ἔτερον  ἔταρον
440 E εἴδος  εἴδος
443 A μὴν καὶ  μὴν καὶ
d. om.

V. 450 A ταῦτα  ταῦτα
451 B λέγειν δὲ  λέγειν δὴ
453 E ὁμολογοῦμεν  ὁμολογοῦμεν Π
466 A φύλακας ποιοῦμεν  φύλακας ποιοῦμεν
469 E βάλλοντος  βάλλοντος

VI. 491 C πάντως  πάντως
496 C τῷ δικαίῳ  τῶν δικαίων
497 B ἐκπίπτει  ἐκπίπτει
498 B φιλοσοφίᾳ  φιλοσοφίᾳ
502 B ἐσθ' ὡτις  ἔσθ' ὡτις
504 D om.

VII. 516 E ὅτι οὗτος  ὅ τοιοῦτος
518 D ἄν. μηχανήσασθαι  ἀν. μηχανήσασθαι

VOL. II.
Schanz's theory would assume that in these places M has been emended from a MS. of the family of Π. Is this assumption probable? Let us first consider the places where omissions are supplied or words added:—

II. 358 A, 359 C, D (bis), 364 D, 366 A, 374 B, 378 D; III. 395 C, 398 A; IV. 443 D; VI. 504 D; VIII. 552 A.

Of these II. 358 A, 359 D bis, 378 D, 395 C; IV. 443 D; VI. 504 D; VIII. 552 A (eight in all) are probably genuine readings, and in that case need not be accounted for by derivation from Π, while they certainly point to a source independent of A. But if they are not genuine, the supposition that they are borrowed by M from Π is weakened by the fact that the not less plausible additions in II. 366 A, 373 A, 379 A, 381 A, 382 E, have not been similarly borrowed. (See above, pp. 74, 75.)

The interpolations in II. 366 A μόνον and 374 B ἄλλα σκυτοτόμων must indeed be due either to Π or to an ancestor of Π, it is impossible to say how far removed. But the
of Plato's Republic.

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different position of the words ἀλλὰ σκυταλώμον in the two MSS., makes against the supposition that they came directly from Π to M. And it is not impossible that they are genuine: see below, p. 112.

Two passages, v. 453 E and vi. 485 A ὤμολογήσθω, in which the reading of M is offered as an alternative in Π, ὤμολογείσθω M, ὤμολογήσθω ἀρ, rather point to the conclusion that M's text, here differing from A, is independent also of Π, since Π is here corrected from the archetype of M. The omission of λιστοὶ δὲ in Π. 364 D is clearly right, and is not likely to have been derived from Π, supposing M to have been copied from a derivative of A. The interpolation of μόνων (perhaps corrupted from an earlier μέν) in Π. 366 A, and the insertion of ἀλλὰ σκυταλώμον at different points in 374 B, are wholly insufficient grounds on which to establish any connexion between M and Π. They rather point to a source anterior to both, which may or may not be earlier than A. If the forty-seven readings marked with o in the foregoing list, or any of them, are genuine, the common source of Π and M represents a tradition independent of A. Besides retaining the words which A omits, in particular the forty letters in vi. 504 D, that source in all probability gave ποιμαίνειν (I. 345 C), πλέων (349 B), στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε (Π. 364 D), ἀδύμοι τίμον (366 A), ἀλλὰ σκυταλώμον in mg. (374 B), μὴν (IV. 443 A), ὤμολογούμεν (v. 453 E), ὤμολογείσθω (VI. 485 A), παντός (491 D), τῶν δικαίων (496 C), ὑπηρεσιάν ἡφιλοσοφίαν (498 B), ἔσθ' ὅτι (502 B), μετ' αὐτήν (VII. 528 D).

The amount of variation and corruption which is here implied, may easily have come into existence long before the ninth century. The certainty of corruption after all is limited to the three places here marked with ♠.

III. So far a presumption has been raised, (1) that M, ΑΠ versus Μ while closely related to A, is not necessarily derived from it; (2) that where A and M differ, the difference need not be accounted for by the correction of M through Π. This
view has still to be confirmed by considering the passages in which M differs from A and Π.

§ 7. M upholds the following sixteen correct readings which have hitherto rested on weak MS. authority, as they are ignored both by A and Π:

I. 330 B ποι' M K x ν Vind. F ποι A Π
347 A δύν M b c a α' τ' Φ A οὖ Π
" Ε πότερον ἀληθεστέρως M x ν Vind. F πότερον ὡς ἀληθεστέρως Α Π

III. 402 B καὶ εἰκόνας M Ε q x ν β' καὶ εἰ εἰκόνας Α Π
406 D μακρῶν M Ε x μικρῶν Α Π

IV. 425 D δικῶν λήξεως Μ Φ q K ν α' β' δικῶν λήξεις A Π
" D τὸ παράπαν M K a c τὸ πάμπαν Α Π
441 C ένῶς ἐκάστου M Ε q x ένι ἐκάστου Α Π

V. 462 B ξυνὴ M Ε x q K v ξυνεί Α Π
472 A λόγου λέγειν τε M Ε a c x λέγειν λόγον τε Α Π

VI. 492 E ἔξαρωμεν M Fic. ἔξαρωμεν Α Π

VIII. 564 E βλέσει M m a c x y' βλέσειν Α βλέσειν Π pr.
IX. 574 D ἐπιλέτη M Ε i t ἐπιλέτη Α ἐπιλέτης Π
X. 607 B ἀπολογογήσθω M Ε q c ἀπολογογίσθω Α Π
611 C θεατῶν M m a c α' y' (διαθεατῶν Ε) διαθεατῶν Α Π

N.B.—The reading φ καὶ ἐφ' οὖ, v. 479 C, in which M agrees with a c x α' y' m ν Vind. D, E, F, Athen., now proves to be the reading of Par. A.

And in X. 606 E ἄξιος, for which Π used to be the single early witness, is now supported by A Π M.

2. In the following places, M, while differing from A1 Π, is anticipated by a corrector of A, though not in every case by the diorthotes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Π</th>
<th>Μ A°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III. 411 C γεγένηται</td>
<td>γεγένηται</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415 C σίδηρος φύλαξ</td>
<td>σίδηρος φύλαξ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. 424 B ἐπιφρονέουσι</td>
<td>ἐπιφρονέουσι'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430 E φαῦνται</td>
<td>λέγοντες</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. 471 A οὖ πολέμιοι</td>
<td>ὡς οὖ πολέμιοι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>474 D ἐπαινεθήσεται</td>
<td>ἐπαινεθήσει</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of Plato's Republic.

VI. 486 C ἀνόητα  
      505 B εἶλεναι
VII. 525 D δύο ὡς
      537 E ἐμπύλαιαι
VIII. 548 B οὐ φανερῶς
       549 A τίσιν
       557 A φόβων
IX. 582 C σοφὸς
     584 B ἐφη β᾽
     613 E ὑπὰ

It will perhaps be said that in these passages the copyist of M or its original had before him the emended text of A; but if so, why in other instances should he have preferred the first hand to the corrector? See Book I. 351 C, II. 383 B, VII. 524 D (M), X. 612 B. The argument is not a strong one, but it at least suggests the alternative possibility, that, in the preceding instances, A may have been corrected from an ancestor of M. And it is observable in this connexion, that while alternative readings occur frequently on the margin of M, in the places here referred to the readings of A¹ do not appear at all.

3. The following readings, for which M is the oldest witness, are improbable or doubtful:

A Π  
I. 332 E ἐν τῷ  
     340 A αὐτὸς γὰρ Ὀρασύμαχος
II. 365 B παρασκευασμένῳ
      370 B πράξει
III. 403 B αὐτὴ ἡ ἱδονή
V. 475 B τιμᾶσθαι
VI. 495 A δῦν
     496 A τᾶν σμικρῶν Α, πᾶν
     σμικρῶν Π

M Α°

ἀνόητα
εἶλαι
ὡς (M)
ἐμπύλαιαι Α°
ἐμπύλαιαι M
φανερῶς
tίς
φόβου
ὁ σοφὸς
ἐφη
ὑπὰ

ομ.
αὐτὸς Ὀρασύμαχος
παρασκευασμένῳ
πράξει
αὐτὴν ἱδονή (η and ν confused)
tιμῶνται
δῦν
πᾶν σμικρῶν
§ 8. 4. The evidence so far has tended to show (1) that M in a few passages confirms the genuineness of a text which is otherwise supported only by late MSS. (2) That while thus to some extent independent both of A and Π, it agrees very closely with A and still more closely with the text from which A has been corrected. (3) That it notwithstanding diverges from that text in more than seventy places, where it stands in agreement with Π. (4) That it is not sufficiently removed from Π in point of time to make it probable that in these places it has been altered through contamination with derivatives of Π.

It remains to support the position that, of the inferior MSS., M may be safely taken as the most competent witness. Schanz, in the article already referred to, Hermes XII. p. 181, concludes a careful examination of the MSS. which he regards as derivatives of A by stating that Vat. m is the only one about which for some time he hesitated in forming this conclusion; or rather, he takes Ξ m v t as a sub-family of which m is the oldest representative. The relation of M to m (whose age is uncertain) is therefore now to be exemplified.

M and m M is (1) closely related to m, and (2) it is far more free from corruption. Both points may be illustrated from a passage taken almost at random, viz. III. 390 B — v. 465 A.

(1) Close agreement of M m:
of Plato's Republic.

III. 390 B ἡ βλα
392 A οἶς οἶονς
394 D ἱσως δὲ καὶ
398 C ποία ἄττα δοκεῖ
403 A δῆβρις
415 C σίδηρος (et A')

IV. 420 E ἐπικλῖναιτε
425 D περίς συμβολαίων
428 C ἡφ

V. 457 B ἐπὶ γυμναίς ταῖς γυναιξὶ
  (so quoted by Eusebius and Theodoret)¹
461 A θύσας
465 A πρὸς πρεσβύτερον

In particular these MSS. show coincidences of a minute kind in the elision of final vowels, and this although M frequently avoids elision (e.g. II. 361 C ἀλλὰ ἢτω, III. 408 C εἰ δὲ αἰσχροκερδῆς, X. 614 B κομψεῖς δὲ οἰκάδε). The following are a few a few out of many such coincidences:

II. 357 C τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ τὲ
374 E οἰμαί ἔγωγ', ἡ δ' ὅς
III. 390 C οὐ μά τὸν Δ', ἡ δ' ὅς
399 D τὶ δ' αὐλοτοίους

(2) The following list of corruptions of M and m within the same limits, viz. in v. 466–480, may serve to substantiate the second assertion, that M is considerably less corrupt than m:

M
466 A εὐδαίμον om. pr. (perhaps rightly?)
A καὶ ἀμείλων om. pr.

m
B ποι for πη (Ξ)
B μηδ' ἀρκεσθη

¹ The agreement of Mm in this place with the quotations of the Fathers, affords an additional argument for the independence of the M tradition.
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466

C τῷ ὄντι om.
D ἐι for ἕ
E τῶν om.

467

B δὴ ποῦ for εἴ ποῦ (Ξ)
C οὐκ for καὶ οὐκ Π

C διαφέρειν

468

A αὐτῶν for αὐτῶν (ὦ,Ξ)
A γεωργῶν for γεωργῶν

B χρήματ om. (perhaps rightly?)

C ταριστείου (τῷ ἀρ. Ξ)
D διηνεκέσι (Ξ)
A εἰδαμίων (ι)
C οὖν after ἄν om. (Ξ)
C ἦ οὐκ ἦ for ἦ οὐ (Ξ)
D δὲ δὴ for δὲ

469

C οὖν after ἄν erased

E μέλη for μέλη (Ξ)

σκυλεύσεις

E διακωλύσεις

470 A καὶ τμῆσεως for τμῆσεως

B μὲν om.
B οὖν om. (Ξ)
B οὐδὲ for οὐδὲν
D ὀμολογούμενη for ὀμολογούμενη

E καὶ (before σφόδρα) om.

471 A ὡς οὐ for οὐ

A ὡς οὐ for οὐ
B ἐθέλουσι for ἐθελήσουσι
C ταῦτα γε (Ξ)
C μηθήσεται
D μάχοι τὸ

D στρατεύοιτο pr. for συστρατεύοιτο

E ἦ (before πολιτεία) om.
M 472 A συγγιγνώςκει

A λέγεις for λέγης (sic
A¹)
B γίγνεται for γίγνεσθαι
C οἵ νῦν for ἡμῖν
D ἐκέλησ
D ικανός misplaced
Ε δυνατῶν τ‘ ἀν sed in rasura, for δυνατῶν τ‘ ἂν

473 A οὖσα om. pr.
B ἂν before ἄγαπήν om. (τ Ξ)
Ε λέγειν om. pr. (probably right?)
Ε εὐδοκίμησειν for εὐδαιμονήσειν (but mg. γρ. εὐδαιμονήσειν)
Ε σὺ om.

474

D ἐπαινεῖται for ἐπαινεθή-
σεται (given as an alternative by A²)

475 A φιλοτίμως
B τούτων om. pr.
D πολὺ pr. for πολλοί

A φιλοτίμως
D πολὺ for πολλοί
D δὲ δ‘ for δὲ γ‘
Ε τῶν for τούτων
Ε αὐτῷ for αὐτῷ
On the Text of this Edition

M
475 E ἄλλων pr. for ἄλλον
476 C δ for ϕ
D τι before αὐτὸ om. pr.

m
E ἄλλων for ἄλλον
C δ for ϕ
D καλ before οὕτε om.

D χαλεπὴν (Ξ)
477 A πλειοναχή
B ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ δυντι
C τι om. pr. after γένος

C δὴ for τι
C βλέπων for ἀποβλέπων
(Ξ)

D ἐκάλεσαν
D ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑταμένη (τ)
479 A οὐδαμοῦ for οὐδαμῆ
A καλ . . . ἀδικον om. pr.
Ε ἄλλα for ἄλλ' ὁδ
480 A τινὰs for καλᾶς
A τινὰs for καλᾶς
A τὸ ἐν for τὸ δὺν

It will be seen at once that the errors of m are not only more numerous, but more grave. And it is also noticeable that of the variants which belong to the M tradition one, λέγεις 472 A, agrees with the first hand of A, another, ἐπαυεῖται 474 D, was acknowledged by the diorthotes (or an early corrector) of A, while some of the variants in which M stands alone, e.g. the omissions in 466 A, 468 B, 473 E, and χαλεπὴν (476 D) in which Ξ agrees, are defensible readings. There remain thirty-six errors in M to fifty-seven in m.

m The character of Vat. m sufficiently appears from what has been already said. Vat. m is referred to in this edition only where in consequence of the lacuna in VI and VII the direct evidence of M is not available.

§ 9. θ Vat. Θ (Vaticanus 266), which was highly valued by Stallbaum, is shown by M. Schanz to be derived from Ven. θ as far as III. 389 D, and in the remainder of the
of Plato's Republic.

Republic from Π. It is said to be the second volume of Vat. Δ, which is in close agreement with the Bodleian MS. It has now and then a peculiar reading, but where it has any pretensions to independence it generally agrees with Vat. r, which on the whole seems to have a higher claim. The Raudnitz MS. (Schneider's Lobcovicianus), is of the same family, which with rare exceptions comes into use only where there is a lacuna in Π. It may be mentioned incidentally, though it is a matter of slight consequence, that the corrector of M and the writers of the supplementary leaves (M) are frequently in agreement with r. This MS. (with Lob. Θ Vind. E) supplies at least one indisputable reading I. 354 B ἐγὼ μοι (A Π ἐγὼ μοι).

Here and elsewhere it is uncertain whether an obviously correct reading, appearing only in a comparatively late MS., is derived from earlier tradition or from Byzantine conjecture. Critics have been fond of adopting this last supposition; the rashness of which, however, becomes evident, when it is considered that the reading ἐπανείηαι v. 474 D, formerly supposed peculiar to some of the later MSS., has now been found in a text of the twelfth century, and is given as an alternative by the diorthotes of Par. A. Be that as it may, no text of the Republic can be constituted aright without placing some reliance on late MSS. Par. K for example, like Par. D, is in the main a derivative κ from Π: but, besides agreeing in special points with q, it has here and there a singular reading, which it would be unwise to neglect, and one at least, which although clearly interpolated is demonstrably early, and cannot possibly be due to conjecture (Schneider vainly argues against this position). In ΙΧ. 580 D, the reading of K (fifteenth century) λογιστικῶν ἐπίθωμητικῶν θυμικῶν is manifestly anterior to the readings of Α τὸ λογιστικῶν, and Π λογιστικῶν, and helps to account for them. This being so, it deserves consideration whether the reading πολλοίς in Χ. 615 B, though only a correction of πολλοὶ in Par. D, may not be D.
the original of the impossible reading πολλοῖ in Par. A, for which Ζ gives πολλῶν, the received reading. It is on the whole most probable that the copyists or correctors of the fifteenth century MSS. from which the first printed editions were chiefly taken, paid more respect to earlier MSS. than to the conjectures of their contemporaries. Conjecture has of course played a certain part in the interpolation of texts, but MS. conjecture is generally traceable to some mis-writing having introduced obscurity which the scribe has instinctively sought to remove. This process began early and was never discontinued. It has aggravated corruption, but, except in the removal of the simplest clerical errors, can seldom be credited with the restoration of an original text.

§ 10. The MS. Venetus Ɛ, 184, of the M family (closely related to A), was written in the fifteenth century by a scholar, Johannes Rhosus, for the learned Cardinal Bessarion, who like the Bishop of Hierapolis, amused himself with corrections of the text. The following is Signor Castellani’s description of it.


Venetus Ɛ is of some historical interest, as it appears to
have been a chief source of the *editio princeps*, the Aldine Plato of 1513. In more than thirty-six places where Ζ differs from ΑΠΜ, the Aldine follows this MS.---even in some passages where the Basle editions and Stephanus give a different reading. These coincidences include two lacunae:

VII. 533 έλλα... ἐν ψυχῇ ous. Ζ Ald. Steph. (where the reading of Ζ is unnoticed by Bekker);

X. 604 D λατρεία τὴν ous. Ζ Ald. Steph.:

and such distinctive readings as

II. 359 E δακτύλιον φέρειν δὲν
    367 D ἀδικίαν ἐν θλάππει

VIII. 544 E βεύσαμα
    562 B ἀπόλλυσιν (again unnoticed by Bekker).

Places where Aldus agrees with Ζ against Steph. are:

II. 360 E διαισθάνεσθαι Ζ (διαισθάνεσθαι Ald.): διαισθάνεται
    Steph.

IV. 433 C ὑπολειφθένι ἀπόλλυσιν Ζ Ald. (and Α³): ὑπολειφθένι Steph.

IX. 587 E ἔδωσον Ζ (not quoted by Bekker) Ald.: ἔδωσον
    Steph.

X. 607 D ἀπολογησαμένη Ζ Ald. (and Α³): ἀπολογησαμένη
    Steph.

620 C περιούσαν Ζ Ald.: περιούσαν Steph.

These facts are enough to raise a strong presumption. But Aldus was not tied to one MS. For in II. 358 E he read τῇ δὲν τυγχάνει with Flor. b, in 377 E κακός οὐδές with the same MS., and in VIII. 560 A ἐπιστρεφόμεναι with ζ ΔΚ (a correction of ἐπιστρεφόμεναι the reading of Π).

In II. 363 B he may have corrected ἀδικίας, the reading of Ζ, to ἐδικίαις by referring to the Odyssey.

Ζ still remains the chief or sole authority for the reading of several places which have gone wrong in ΑΠΜ. It is enough to point to—

I. 331 D ἔφην ἔγω... ἔφη ἔγω ΑΠΜ

III. 407 C τινὰs... τινὸς ΑΠΜ

IV. 434 E ἔκεινo... ἔκει ΑΠΜ

440 E τὸ ὁμολογητικοῦ... τὸ ὁμολογητικὸν ΑΠΜ
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IV. 440 E καὶ τοῦτον . . . καὶ τοῦτο Α Π Μ
442 C ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου . . . ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων Α Π Μ
" Ε τοῦτο αὐτών . . . τοῦτον αὐτῶν Α Π Μ (τοῦτον αὐτῷ cjr.
Schneider)
444 B τῷ τοῦ . . . τοῦ δ' αὖ δουλεύειν Α Π Μ
V. 465 A ἄλλως . . . ἄλλος Α Π Μ
VII. 534 A δύσων . . . δύσων Α Π Μ
VIII. 544 C διαφέρουσα . . . διαφεύγουσα Α Π Μ
557 E ἀρχεῖν καὶ δικάζειν . . . ἀρχηγεῖς καὶ δικάζεις Α Π Μ
(dikázei Π pr.)
IX. 590 E Βουλεύσαι Ξο (χ v Iambl. Stob.) . . . Βουλεύσαι ΑΠ Μ
X. 604 C αὐτῷ (Ξ q) . . . ἐρεί Α Μ (ἐρρεί Π)
611 C διαθεατέων . . . διαθεατέων Α Π: θεατέων Μ
614 A ἐκάτερος Ξ corr. . . ἐκάτερον Α Μ (lacuna in Π)
615 B πολλῶν . . . πολλοί Α Μ (πολλοῖς D corr.)
See also VII. 532 D διάλεγομεν, now supported by M.

On the important fact of the occasional agreement of Ξ
with the papyrus fragment of the Phaedo, see below, p. 98.

x Flor. x is another MS. without which the apparatus
criticus would be imperfect. It is of the Μ family, but has
been corrected from other sources. See especially VIII.
549 A δούλους τις διν.

§ 11. 9 Flor. β' is also a 'learned' MS. (Laurent. 80. 19) with
which q (Munich 237, fifteenth century) constantly agrees.
The date of β' being uncertain, it is hard to say which
is derived from its fellow, but as q has been collated
not only by Bekker, but after him by Schneider in the
most complete manner, it has been thought safer to refer
to q. Bekker's high estimate of this MS. is on the whole
justified, although Hermann has rightly rejected many of
its readings in deference to the authority of Par. A. The
two MSS. q β' represent a recension based on the Π tradition,
partly preserved also in Paris. D K, in which the defects
of that tradition have been somewhat boldly supplemented
with interpolations which the examination of other MSS.
enables us to detect.
For example:

I. 333 E φυλάξασθαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν

II. 358 E τί οἴονται

360 B περιθείτο ὁμ.  
364 E μετὰ τινών ἐνοτῶν τε καὶ θυσίαν (ὅτι διὰ θυσίαν)  
365 C πρὸς ὁμοίως μὲν γὰρ  
366 D ὀρμήθη (et Par. K pr.)  
368 C φαύλου  
381 D βλοῦν δόροις (supplying an object for ἀγέλοσαν)  

IV. 437 D ἡ ποτοῦ (conflatum ex ἡ οὖ et ποῦ)

V. 450 D καλῶς εἴχε παραμυθεῖσθαι  

459 B δεῖ ἄκρων (for δεῖ ἄκρων εἰναι)  
475 B οὐ ἀν τιμα (for ἄν ἀν τιμα)  

D ἐπιθέονται (for περιθέοντι)  
476 B ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν

VI. 501 C δεῖ (for δητι)  
502 B καὶ πῶς and γενόμενοι ὁμ.  

VII. 529 C ὡς θαλάττη ἢ ἐν γῇ (for ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ)

VIII. 544 E ῥήψατα q corr. (ῥῆψατα q pr.)  
545 E μὴ τραγικῶς q, μὴ inter versus (with ὡς δὲ σπούδη following)  
548 A περὶ ταῦτα ὁμ. περὶ ταῦτα  
553 C μετὰ for κατὰ  

IX. 575 A τῶν αὐτῶν for τῶν αὐτῶν

X. 595 C τούτων ὁμ.  
619 C σκέψασται

This recension, however, remains responsible for some true readings which it would be unsafe to assume to be conjectural.

See for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Π</th>
<th>Μ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>365 D οὕτ' ἡμὶν μελητέουν</td>
<td>καὶ ἡμὶν μελητέουν</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>370 A ῥῆφων</td>
<td>ῥῆφων</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>397 A μᾶλλον μιμῆσθαι</td>
<td>μᾶλλον διηγῆσθαι</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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$q$  

III. 414 E δει  
IV. 429 C γεγονότας  
444 C τὰ δίκαια  
V. 454 D καὶ ιατρείκην  
VI. 500 A ἡ οὖν ἔδω  
VII. 529 B νοθησει  
537 D τούτους  
VIII. 553 C τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν  
559 B ἦ τε μὴ παῦσαι  
567 E τί δὲ  
IX. 585 A ἀσπέρ δὲ  
X. 604 B δύο τωκὲ  
„ B φαμὲν ἐν  
„ D πρὸς τῷ  
610 D τοῦτον  
„ D διὰ τούτο  
617 B τρίτον  

$A Π M$  

δῆ  
γεγονότας  
τὰ δίκαια  
καὶ ιατρείκην  
ἡ καὶ ἔδω  
νοθησεὶ (M)  
τούτους  
τὸν ἐπιθυμητικόν  
ἡ τε παῦσαι  
τίς δὲ  
ἀσπέρ  
δύο  
φαμὲν  
πρὸς τὸ  
τοῦτον  
διὰ τούτου  
τὸν τρίτον $A M$

The interpolations, or would-be emendations, of $q$ and $q$ corr., so far weaken the authority of this MS. as to render it an unsafe guide (for which reason several possible readings adopted by Bekker and Stallbaum have been rejected). And in accepting the readings above-mentioned, it may remain an open question whether they are conjectural or not. This question, which has been already touched upon, will be more fully considered below.

Glosses of MSS. The principal MSS. of the Republic may accordingly be classified as follows:

1. A b α γ'
2. (1) Π D $q^* β^* Κ^*$: (2) τ Φ Θ: (3) Vind. D E F
3. $M Ξ^* m a c x^* τ ν$

Ven. t and Flor. n are not referred to.

* Those marked with the asterisk are emended MSS., i.e. they admit readings derived from various sources and sometimes conjectural.
of Plato's Republic.

Textual Errors and Emendations.

The discovery of fragments of classical texts in Egypt § 12. on papyrus rolls, some of which are known to have been written before the Christian era, has brought out some unexpected results. 1. The texts so far deciphered, where they differ from our MSS. of the ninth and tenth centuries, differ almost always for the worse. 2. For the most part they confirm the received tradition. 3. Very rarely, and then only in minute particulars, have they confirmed the conjectural emendations of modern scholars. 4. On the other hand, they do occasionally support the authority of readings which have hitherto rested on the evidence of some late MS.

These remarks may be illustrated from the long fragment of the Phaedo discovered by Mr. Flinders Petrie and published by Professor Mahaffy. See an article by the present writer in the Classical Review for October and December, 1891, pp. 363–365, and 454–457.

1. The papyrus, besides several patent errors of slight importance, exhibits at least two striking variants, ἀνδραπο-δάθη for εἰνήθη in 68 E, and δεὶ δὲ αὐτῇ προσέχειν for δὲ αὐτῇ ὀρᾶσαι in 83 B. In the former case the scribe being familiar with the text has awkwardly anticipated a point which is presently to be made (viz. in 69 B); cp. Theaet. 158 c where for δὲ ἄρα the Bodleian MS. gives δὲ ἄρα κρῶν αὐτῷ, anticipating the mention of the time which occurs eight lines lower down. See also in the same dialogue 149 c where ἄντοπος is written in the Bodleian MS. for ἄντοκος with ἀντοπότατος half a page higher up. A somewhat similar instance occurs in Rep. V. 469 E in the v. r. διακωλύσεις for διακωλύσεις with σκυλεύω occurring, as a prominent notion, in the same passage. In the latter of the two cases in the Phaedo, 83 B, a prosaic and somewhat late mode of expression is substituted for the simple and vivid language of Plato.

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2. The only matter of any consequence in which the papyrus tends to invalidate the existing text is in 81 D, the passage about apparitions. Here our MSS. appear to have omitted a phrase which in the papyrus is unfortunately illegible. This lacuna has never been suspected by any scholar.

3. In the space which the papyrus covers there are nineteen places where modern scholars have proposed emendations, all of which have appeared to Schanz deserving of mention in his critical notes. Only one of these is confirmed by the papyrus. This is the rejection of the words ἐξεκάφαος in 83 E, which was proposed at one time by K. F. Hermann but afterwards withdrawn by him.

4. On comparing the readings of the papyrus with the existing apparatus criticus, they are found, in eight instances at least, to be in agreement with Ε and the corrector of Π, both of the fifteenth century, and with no other MS. of Plato. These readings, then, which have hitherto been referred to the fifteenth century A.D., are found to have existed already in the third century B.C.

The same lessons, of caution in conjecture, and of trust in the persistence of tradition, have been taught by other similar discoveries. Among the papyri published in Mr. Kenyon’s Classical Texts (1891) is one containing a great part of the third ‘Letter of Demosthenes,’ on which F. Blass has written an instructive monograph in Fleckeisen’s Jahrbuch für Klassischen Philologie for 1892, pp. 33–44. He observes:—

(1) That in eleven pages of Reiske’s edition, the papyrus gives sixty new readings which are clearly right.

(2) That twelve of these had been anticipated by conjecture, but except the proper name Εὐθύδικον for Εὖθύδικον (Blass’ own emendation) only in matters of light moment (such as ἀγαμόος for ἀγαμῶς, τιμ’ for τὴν, γενέσθαι for γενήσεσθαι).

(3) Out of nineteen places in which Blass had admitted
of Plato's Republic.

conjectures into the text, nine only agree with the papyrus.

(4) On the other hand the papyrus supports the principle of not relying exclusively on one MS. in constituting a text. The readings of the later MSS. are in some instances confirmed.

Blass remarks that in another part of Demosthenes the proportion of successful conjecture might prove larger; but he adds that the reverse might be the case, as in the passage of the Phaedo.—(The emendation of an 'Epistle' is easier, because the language is less highly wrought; the orations would be copied with greater care, and they exist in more MSS. of the highest class.)

The observation of such facts is the best corrective for § 13. the extravagances to which textual criticism has been always liable; proceeding, as it does, at one time by the wholesale excision of supposed 'accretions,' at another by the detection of 'lacunae,' now relying on close resemblances of written characters, now on the hypothesis of the frequent substitution of glosses for the words which they explain. Each of these methods has a show of scientific precision, but, when indiscriminately applied, involves rash and unwarranted generalization from scattered instances. Palaeography, in particular, has supplied the textual critic with an armoury of weapons, in which as Bacon would have said 'opinio copiae causa est inopiae'; the ductus literarum often drawing the mind away insensibly from the context, which is the principal thing. The other main requirement, familiarity with the individual author, is also apt to be forgotten, and an attempt is made to emend Plato on the same principles which have proved applicable to Demosthenes or Isocrates. No MS. is without errors: but the most recent discoveries have tended to show that the preservation of ancient texts of the greatest authors has on the whole been extraordinarily successful. It is hardly paradoxical to say that all interpolation comes by way of

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emendation, and that to 'emend' is mostly to interpolate. The various modes of so-called 'scientific' emendation are liable to one and the same fallacy, that of assuming, because a thing is known to have happened sometimes, that it must have happened indefinitely often. Whereas the available evidence tends to show, that the changes in MSS. between the tenth and fifteenth centuries were greater in the most important texts than in the ten centuries preceding.

§ 14. In the multiplication of MSS. at the revival of learning, all copies must have diverged from very few centres; since the remnants of the Classics which had found their way from Constantinople to Western Europe were enshrined in the comparatively small number of MSS. which had been rescued by the men who prized them. But in the earlier periods, those who (whether at Alexandria or at Constantinople) were preparing a copy that should be valued as authentic, had a choice of almost countless apographa of high repute at their disposal; and if the scribe followed too closely his immediate archetype, or himself fell prone into some error, the diorthotes who revised his work, in many cases the same person who wrote out the scholia, was able to correct the first hand and add alternative readings by the comparison of other texts, thus increasing the solid value of the recension. Under such conditions corruption would not proceed in an increasing ratio. At the same time this process has aggravated the difficulty of tracing the affiliation of MSS., readings belonging to different families having continually crossed each other, thus causing a mixture of traditions. The question remains, whether amongst the manifold corruptions of the fifteenth century, some grains of genuine tradition may not be preserved, having descended by some fortunate accident from the text or margin of some MS. which was then extant and has since been lost. There is a balance of probabilities here. On the one hand such MSS. must have been few and far between, but on the other hand the feebleness of conjecture
at best, and especially in the infancy of criticism, makes it antecedently improbable that Rhosus or Cardinal Bessarion, for example, should have hit, by mere intuition, on readings which had been lost for sixteen centuries. Between the time of the occupation of Constantinople by the Latins and its destruction by the Turks, notwithstanding the decline of learning, many copies even of classical works must have still existed which perished in the final conflagration. The example of Vat. r shows that Plato was sometimes written in two volumes. Is it likely that Arethas, the deacon of Patrae, would procure, or that Constantine, the Metropolitan of Hierapolis, would purchase, an incomplete book? If otherwise, there must have existed, perhaps for centuries, a second volume of A (the Bodleian MS.) and a first volume corresponding to A, and on the margin of these correctors of the tenth century probably wrote many various readings from other recensions. This belief is justified by the instances in which the Petrie papyrus supports Ε and the corrector of Π against the Bodleian. And the inference here indicated bears a striking analogy to Messrs. Hort and Westcott's conclusion respecting certain 'cursive' MSS. of the New Testament, which together with variations due 'to ordinary degeneracy of transmission,' contain others which 'supply important documentary evidence. They are virtually copies of minute fragments of lost MSS.' Introduction, pp. 144, 145; § 197.

Textual Errors.

§ 15.

1. Simple Clerical Errors.

(a) The mere mistaking between forms of letters is a less frequent cause of error than is often supposed, and almost always the mistaken letter has suggested some familiar word. For example:—

a for ω: ἀφελεῖας for ἀφελεῖας Π, III. 398 B.

o for ε: προσῆκεν for προσῆκεν (? A (προσῆκεν is the reading of Stobaeus), IV. 442 B.
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η for ν: Confusion of η and ν. ζων for ζψη A1, I. 344 E: kakovelas for kakopeias II, III. 401 A: αυτην for απη η M; III. 403 B.

ν for i: των δικαιων for τω δικαιω Π M, VI. 496 C.

ν and u: γευμενοι for γευμενοι M, VI. 496 C.

λ for α: λυρα for αβρα Π, III. 401 C: απολλυειν for απολαειν A², X. 606 B.

δ for λ: απεδυσμεθα for απελυσμεθα M, X. 612 A.

τ for γ: Confusion of τε and γε passim; πληστους for πληγευτος A, X. 604 C (this confirms the correction of V. 472 A): ητεισθε for ηγευσθε A, X. 612 C.

τ and ψ: τύχης and ψυχής, II. 366 C, X. 603 E.

Compendia—The signs for καλ and ὁς have perhaps been confused in V. 471 A, where the v. r. ὃς ού πολέμοι (A mg. M) perhaps stands for καλ ού πολέμοι.¹

(b) More frequently the sound has been mistaken, as between o, ω and ou; between η and ε; between ε and αι; between η and αι; between ι and η and i; between ν and αι; π for φ: πάνυ for φάναι M pr., X. 610 C; αβ for αυ: απολαβων for απολαβων IX. 572 D (A M); απολαβειν for απολαειν X. 606 B, an error shared by A Π M; cp. VIII. 544 C, where διαφεύγωνα for διαφέρονα (A Π M) is attributed by Schneider to a similar cause, the burring pronunciation of γ; and lastly, but only in late MSS., between ευς and εψ, e.g. βεύσατα for βέψατα (E) VIII. 544 E. (Similarly φ for αυ: εκκοφθήσεται for εκκαυθήσεται M, II. 361 E.)

(c) Letters added or omitted.


¹ It is less apparent what ζ the sign for ζηλων, first written, then marked with dots and then erased, in Π after τιμην in Π. 359 C can have meant. Perhaps it originated in dittography of ζη.
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VI. 487 B: ὑποστρέφομεναι for ὑποστρέφομεναι Π (corr. to ἐπιστ. in q D K), VIII. 560 A: προσευτές for προσευτές A, VIII. 565 E: so perhaps ἐπιμείγκαμεν A\(^1\), X. 612 B: ἵδια λαβόντες (ἵδια A\(^6\)) Α\(^6\) Ζ, X. 615 E.

Dittographia or repetition. Not only single letters but words and even whole phrases are accidentally repeated, and in a MS. like Π, which has been little emended, this fault is more perceptible. Thus in IX. 561 B the words μέρη ... ἐκπεσόντων were written over again in this MS., and there are many other examples of the same mistake.

β. More commonly letters and syllables are omitted, where the word thus formed is in some way possible: cp. Theaet. 185 D ὄργανιδίον for ὄργανον θίδιον Bodleian MS.: IV. 421 D διαφέρει for διαφείρει A: V. 461 B φόσομεν for ἀφίσομεν A: IX. 574 D δίκας for δίκαλας Πί Μ: X. 611 C διαβείτευν for διαθεβαίτευν A Π.

Many such errors have been corrected by the first or second hand in Par. A; for example, in VIII. 548 D, the first hand wrote οἴμεν, which is corrected by the second hand to οἶμαι μὲν. A similar mistake remained uncorrected in all MSS. and editions in VIII. 554 B καὶ ἐτί(μα) μάλιστα until Schneider's conjecture. See also corrections of the third epistle of Demosthenes mentioned above (p. 98) as confirmed by Mr. Kenyon's papyrus.

A single letter is often put for the double, and vice versa, especially in the case of λ, ρ, ν: thus μέλει and μέλλει are often confused; Π. 375 B ἐνενόηκα Π for ἐνενόηκα: III. 401 A ἄρνθημα is written for ἀρνθημα, and there is a doubt between βαλάντιον and βαλλάντιον A, VIII. 552 D: μελιτουργὸς and μελιτουργῆς A, VIII. 564 C.

One of two similar syllables is very apt to be lost; e.g. ὅν after the neuter adjective. See especially VIII. 564 C ἐκτέταμπθεν for ἐκτετέμπθεσθον A: X. 600 B δεινωὶ for δεινῶαί A.

Homoeoteleuton. In the MSS. of the Republic there are many instances of omission due to the recurrence of the same word or syllable, the eye of the scribe having reverted
to the wrong place. Venetus II, which had not the benefit of correction until three centuries after it was written, supplies seventeen examples of this fault, of which the following seven occur in Book I:—328 D δεύρω λέναι [ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς ... δεύρῳ λέναι]: 330 A ὁ ἐπικής [πάνω τι βρόδως ... ὁ μή ἐπικής]: 335 B εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων [εἰς τὴν τῶν ἱππων ... εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων]. A clear example in A is III. 400 A ἐσπομμ [ποία δὲ ποιοῦ βλού μι]. See also II. 379 B, 380 E. So in M, II. 377 C ὁν δ’ ἀν μή, ἀποκριτέων is omitted after ἐγκριτέον. And in Lobcsov. VIII. 550 A καὶ αὖ ... ὃρων ὅτι.

Another cause of such omission is the dropping of a line or more than one line. Thus, in I. 335 C ἀμώσουσι ... ἰππική (forty-two letters) om. II. 367 C φρονεῖν ... γώνια τῇ (forty-three letters) om. II. 394 B ἄλλων τροχαίων ... βραχύτατος (thirty-nine letters) om. II. 410 C δοσι ἀν ... σκληρστότερος, καὶ (seventy-five letters or two lines) om. II.

Two very striking examples occur in X. 607 A ὃ[μνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσως παραδεικτέον (forty-five letters) om. II, leaving the vox nihil ost, which is changed in q D K το ἐκτέον: and 616 C εἰ[ναι ... ὑποζώμα]τα om. (forty-eight letters) D K in absence of Π, which has a lacuna here: etra remained unsuspected, as a good Greek word.

For similar omissions in A1 see II. 376 D, IV. 443 D, VI. 493 D, VII. 528 B, X. 601 A, B, 609 B.

(d) Division of words.

a. As the words were not divided in the earliest MSS., some confusion has arisen in consequence, e.g. in IV. 442 B, where the best MSS. give φυλάττοι τὴν for φυλαττολην (corrupted to φυλάττοι τῷ in Ζ St.), III. 403 B, where A wrote νομοθέτης εἰς for νομοθετήσεις and X. 620 B ὡσάτως εἰκός. τὴν MSS. for ὡσάτως. εἰκοστήν.

β. Conversely, words are unduly run together; as in III. 415 C φυλάξῃ for φυλάξῃ Ἡ Ζ: VI. 496 B ἀνέλθοι for ἃν ἔλθοι A: IX. 577 B ἀνοφθείη for ἃν ὀφθείη A.

1 The termination of γίγνονται in viii. 563 C possibly hides such an omission, e.g. (σεμνόνονται).
of Plato’s Republic. 105

(e) Transposition of words or letters; often corrected by the scribe:

a. Of letters, as in VII. 538 D καταλάβη (for καταβάλη) A: IV. 437 D ἐν ἀλγψ (for ἐνὶ λόγῳ) MSS. IX. 571 D ἐν ἀλγψ (for ἐνὶ λόγῳ) seems to have been the reading of A1.

b. A new word is made by transposition of two letters in III. 400 A where for εἰπομι Π reads εἰπομι. Cp. VII. 530 C ἄρχης του (for ἄρχηςτου) A1. Words are transposed in III. 412 D εἰ μὴ δὲ M. For inversion without such marks see III. 404 D δοκεὶ ταῦτα (for ταῦτα δοκεῖ) M.

It may be remarked generally with reference to the preceding examples that the scribe often misunderstood the meaning, but he generally knew a Greek word when he saw it or fancied that he saw it.

2. Errors due to mental association.

(a) False construction. By a kind of spurious attraction § 16. the case of a noun or pronoun is altered to what the immediate context suggests. This is most frequent in late MSS., but occurs even in A, e.g. III. 391 D ἄλλον θεόν παῖδα for ἄλλον θ. π.: VII. 529 E διαφέροντος (sc. γραφέως) for διαφέροντος. (The similar mistakes in I. 338 E τίθεται... τοῦ νόμου ἐκάστη ἡ ἄρχη, for ἐκάστη ἡ ἄ. and VII. 521 E γυμναστική... μοντική for γυμναστική, &c., have not been transmitted, having probably been obliterated through the disuse of the i adscript in the twelfth century.) VIII. 550 E γυναίκες αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ νόμῳ) for γυναίκες αὐτῶν Α: VIII. 561 Β ἑαυτῷ ἑνδός for ἑαυτῶν ἑνδός Α. Prepositions are also confused, e.g. ὑπὸ for ἀπό, ὑπὸ for ὑπὲρ, περὶ for παρὰ.

(b) Confusion of tenses and moods. There is often a doubt between the perfect and aorist, I. 330 E ἡδύκηκεν Α, present and aor. subj. VII. 538 D ἔξελέγχῃ A, aor. and future middle V. 474 A ἔργασατον for ἔργασατον A pr. Π; X. 607 D ἀπολογισμῆν changed to ἀπολογισμοῦν (A);

As the feeling for the moods grew weaker, subjunctive and
optative were confused through itacism: I. 333 D δέοι (A) for δη. Also indicative with optative or subjunctive, e.g.
I. 376 A πεπόνθηει for πεπόνθη M; v. 450 D δοκοι Ε, δοκει Π, for δοκη. The omission of ἄν, when favoured by other causes of error, may often be thus accounted for, e.g.
I. 353 A ἀμπέλου, for ἄν ἀμπέλου, Α Π Μ.

(c) A word of frequent recurrence is apt to be substituted for the word in the text, I. 352 C δικαίους Α¹ for δή καὶ ὅσι: II. 365 A ἐπιστόμευοι for ἐπιπτόμευοι ιο Δ Κ; IX. 579 C ταυτί A¹ for ταυτί. In IV. 437 C where ἐρωτάωτος is wrongly changed to ἐρωτόθον, some Platonic ἐρωτός must have been haunting the mind of the corrector. By a converse error in II. 375 B ἄλλοτροις is written for ἄλλοις. So in Theaet. 148 C ἀκριβῶν for ἀκρῶν Bodl. pr., IV. 440 C ζητεῖ for ζεῖ, VIII. 568 E συμπολίται for συμπόται.

(d) Again, the context suggests the wrong word in place of the right one: e.g. v. 469 E where an early corrector of M proposes διασκευέσθεις for διακωλύσθεις. In VI. 510 D Μ reads εἰρημένοις for δρωμένοις which seemed to contradict εἰ- δετι; VI. 510 B confusion of μυθεῖσιν Α and τυφθεῖσιν Μ and VI. 511 A τετυμημένοις Α¹ for τετυμημένοις Α²; X. 606 C μιμήσις for η μιμήσις Π, where μιμήσις is in question. So in Polit. 279 A παράδειγματείαν for πραγματείαν, where παράδειγμα is the subject under discussion. Other associations, possibly from the reminiscence of a different part of Plato, give rise to various readings, for example v. 458 E γυμνοθκοῖι for μύγνοσθαι A Μ, cp. Laws VI. 772 A.

§ 17. (e) Logical confusions, especially between affirmative and negative, positive and privative, are peculiarly frequent in the text of Plato. There are more than fifty instances of this form of error in the Republic; mostly, however, amongst the later MSS.

a. The following examples of the omission of the negative are the most important, and in some of these the earliest MSS. are involved. II. 365 D οὐδ' ἡμῶν μελητέου q, καὶ ἡμῶν
of Plato's Republic.

μελητέων Α.; III. 395 C ἵνα μὴ Π Μ, ἵνα Α.; IV. 429 C ἢ οὔ τοῦτο ἀνδρελαν καλεῖς; οὔ omitted by Π and ten other MSS.; V. 454 B τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν Ξ, τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν Α Π Μ; 455 E γυμναστικῆ δ' ἄρα οὔ Α, καὶ γυμναστικῆ, ἢ δ' ἄρα οὔ Ξ; VI. 511 C ἱκανῶς μὲν οὖ Ξ, ἵκ. μ. οὖν Α.; VII. 537 E καλὸν Α, κακὸν Μ Μ; VIII. 548 B οὐ φανερῶς Α pr. Π, οὐ erased in Α and omitted in Μ; 559 B ἢ τε πάυσαι most MSS., for ἢ τε μὴ πάυσαι q; IX. 574 C οὐ πάνυ Π, πάνυ Α.

β. In the following cases a negative is wrongly added: I. 330 B οὗ τοι ἐνεκα Π Β (οὗτοι Π), οὗτοι Α Μ; 336 E οἷον, μὴ οἷον q Κ; IV. 437 D ἢ οὗ, ἢ οὗ Α.; V. 451 Α οὔστε εὖ με παραμυθεῖ Α Π Μ, οὔστε οὐκ εὖ q; VIII. 526 E δ δεῖ, οὐ δεὶ Α.1

It is doubtful whether the following belongs to α or β:—VI. 500 A ἢ καὶ ἐὰν οὐθω Α Π Μ, ἢ οὐκ ἐὰν οὐθω q. See note. γ. Positive and privative are confused in Π. 363 A τῷ δικαλω most MSS. for τῷ ἄδικῳ(q); 363 B ἄδικα for εὐδίκα Ξ; VIII. 560 E ἄπαιδευτικαν for εὐπαιδευτικαν Π.

The following list of similar errors in inferior MSS. might possibly be augmented.

(1) Negative omitted:

I. 352 C οἷον γὰρ ἄν ἀπελείχουτο Σ ἡ γὰρ ἄν Μ (ἡ τ)
II. 373 E οἵτινες σμικρῷ ὅστι σμικρῷ τ
III. 388 D καὶ μὴ καταγέλετεν καὶ δὴ καταγέλειν τ
tοῦ μὴ ἀδομένου q
398 D τοῦ μὴ ἀδομένου τ
IV. 421 E πῶς δ᾽ οὔ πῶς δὴ Φ
data δὴ q
data τοῦ Π τ
428 C οὐκ ἄρα καὶ ἄρα q
data τοῦ Π τ
429 C ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τοῦτο Π τ
V. 462 C τὸ τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ τὸ τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν Π
tοῦ τε ἐμὸν καὶ τοῦ Π ἐμὸν
479 E ἄρ᾽ οὖν γιγνώσκειν ἄρ′ οὖν q corr.
479 Ε αἱ ἄρ᾽ οὖν γιγνώσκειν ἄρα Ξ

Ε ἄλλα ἄρος ἀδικεῖν ἄλλα ἄδικα Μ
VI. 484 Β πλανῶμενοι οὗ πλανώμενοι οἱ πλανῶμενοι οἱ φιλόσοφοι Τ
489 A οἱ πλανῶμενοι οἱ πλανῶμενοι οἱ φιλόσοφοι τ
489 A οἱ πλανῶμενοι οἱ πλανῶμενοι οἱ φιλόσοφοι τ
φιλόσοφοι τιμῶναι Μ
VI. 500 C μὴ μιμεῦσθαι
504 E μὴ μεγάλατας
511 D ἀλλ' οὖν νοῦν

VII. 521 A πλοῦσιοι, οὗ χρυσίου
527 E οὐχ ὁρώσων
", E ἦν οὗ πρὸς οὔδετέρους
530 A τὸ δ' οὖν μέλλειν

IX. 585 D πῶς γὰρ οὖν,
608 A ὃς οὗ σπουδαστέον
", D τὸ οὖν χαλεπάν

(2) Negative added:
I. 330 C καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν
II. 377 A πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς

III. 388 C εἶ δ' οὖν θεοῦς
393 C φῆσομεν τί γὰρ ὑποστήσων
398 E οὗ γὰρ μοισικός
416 C εἰ μέλλοντο τὸ μέγιστον
", D εἰ τοιαῦτα των τρόπων

IV. 426 A καὶ μὴν οὔτοι γε
", E χαριστατοι οὔτουτοι
431 B καὶ ἀκόλοθον
435 B γενών ἄλλα ἄττα πάθη

V. 438 A ἄλλα χρηστοῦ σίτου
452 E καὶ καλοῦ αὐτοπουστάζει,
478 B ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ δύν

VI. 484 C ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσι τι
492 C οἷς ἄρ' οὖν τοιοῦτοι
503 C ἰδ' οὕτωσιν τοιοῦτοι

VIII. 562 D ἄρ' οὖν ἀνάγκη
564 E χρηματιζομένων ποιοῦντων

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On the Text of this Edition

μιμεῦσθαι M
μεγάλατας M
ἀλλ' οὖν Ξ
πλοῦσιοι χρυσίου Π Ῥ
ὁρώσων M
ἵππος οὔδετέρους M
τὸ δὲ μέλλειν Ῥ
πῶς γὰρ ; q Vind. E F
ἀς σπουδαστέον D K
τὸ χαλεπὸν q
of Plato's Republic. 109

IX. 581 D νομίζειν πρὸς νομίζειν οὐδὲν πρὸς Ξ Μ

corr.

" 585 Ε καὶ βεβαίως καὶ οὖ βεβαίως Ξ Μ corr.

In several of the above instances, other causes may be assigned; but it is manifest that in most of them 'logical confusion' has been at work. In some also we may perhaps trace the effect of bias; a sort of pedantic euphemism having stolen into the mind of the scribe.

3. Complex errors.

In several of the preceding examples, two or more of the causes specified are combined, for example in μορφὴς for μὴ μορφής there is itacism and false association assisting the wrong division of words; but still more confusion arises where an initial error of the simpler kind leads to the interpolation of a letter or syllable on the part of a corrector, who in the attempt to retrieve matters goes far to make them irretrievable. For example, in III. 403 B, where for νομοθετήσεις following ἔοικε the first hand of A wrote νομοθέτης εἰς, an early corrector supposing the ν to belong to ἔοικεν, and ο to be the article, supplied the apparently missing syllable νο (ἔοικεν ὁ νομοθέτης εἰς)¹. Similarly the reading of the Bodleian MS. in Theaet. 152 Ε ἔξαλοι σοφοῖ for ἔξις οἱ σοφοὶ may be thus accounted for: an early hand wrote ε for η; this was again changed through similarity of sound to αι, making ἔξαλοι, which a later scribe assumed to be mis-written for ἔξαλοι.

In X. 604 C ἐρεῖ (A) having been written for αἰρεῖ was again changed to ἐρρεῖ (Π), δὴ δὲ λόγος ἐρρεῖ = 'which way reason moves.' In X. 610 Ε several MSS. including Μ have expanded ζωικῷ to ζωτί κακῷ by some similar process. In V. 468 B τί δὲ; δεξιωθήναι, the second δὲ has been regarded as dittographia, and δεξιωθήναι has con-

¹ See also III. 401 C, where νομάμενοι was changed first to νομόμενοι then to αὐτομάμενοι ('drawing up'), and III. 391 Ε οἱ ζητῶ ζηγός, ἰδιων where ιδιων having been dropped ζητῶ ζηγός ἰδιων became the reading of A: VI. 499 A προσώπον for τρίπον Α Μ (this may be due to a compendium).
sequently been changed to ἔξιαθῆναι. In VI. 498 Β ὑπηρε-
σίαν φιλοσοφόλη Α, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφόλη Π, ὑπηρεσία φιλο-
σοφόλη Μ Ῥ. In VIII. 556 D παρακχέλεις having been
accurately written for παρακρχέλες in some MSS. of the
Π tradition (D K q) (supr. 1 (c)), the scribe of β' has changed
this to παρακχέλες. See also the curious variant I. 342 B M mg.
ἡ ὡς ἡ σφαίρα for ἐκωσπερ ἄν. In VIII. 568 D πωλομένων, having
been written πωλομένων, was altered first to πολομένων then
to ἀπολομένων, with supposed reference to the proscription
of the tyrant's enemies, and was further changed, with
a view to the nearer context, into ἀποδομένων, by a corrector
who was aware of the frequent interchange between λ and δ.

§ 19. 4. Accretions.

Few errors of this description can be detected with any
confidence in the older MSS. The supposed redundancies
which recent scholars have excised on the ground of their
omission in Par. A (Π. 358 Α, &c., see above), more probably
belong to the class of omissions through homoeteleuton.
Now that the words in Π. 366 Α αὐτὰ μέγα δύνασται prove to be extant in the first hand of Π, the argument in favour
of this view is considerably strengthened. In the Byzantine
period scholars contented themselves with adding here and
there a single word such as (I. 329 C) γὰρ and (Π. 359 C) καλ.
But towards the fifteenth century, as it became fashionable
to discourse on Plato, attempts were made here and there to
supply real or apparent defects in the tradition by explana-
tory phrases, which in several instances found their way
into the text of that period. In I. 341 D, q adds, after ἄλλα,
οὐ προσδεῖται, ἢ ἐξαρκεῖ ἐκάστη αὐτῇ ἐστὶ; in Π. 371 Α for οὐκ
καὶ ἦσα ἐκεῖνοι δὲν ἄν δέωσταί, γ reads οὐκ καὶ ἦσα ἐκεῖνος
δέωσαι, οὶ μεταδόσουσιν δὲν ἄν δέωσται. In III. 407 E for
οἱ παῖδες αυτοῖ, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν the correctors of Π Μ introduce
dεικνύοντες with or without ἄν before δητ, and in this they are
followed by most of the later MSS., one of which, however,
ν, has ποιοῦσιν (to be construed with δῆλον) instead. In
VII. 529 B (after συμμεμονίκως) q adds τούτων τι μανθάνῃ λαν
of Plato's Republic. II

VII. 532 C Σ adds ἑνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς φαντάσματα after φ. θεία. In x. 616 A the case appears more complicated. Here A reads δὲ ενεκά τε καὶ ἐκ δὲ τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσομένοι ἁγιωτο. A sense may be obtained by excising τὸν Τάρταρον as a gloss—'the causes wherefore and the place whereinto they were to be thrown.' But it has been more commonly assumed that ἐκ δὲ τί has arisen by simple transposition from δὲ ἐκ. Adopting this view, and feeling still unsatisfied, the correctors of Μ Σ and the scribe of x supplied the phrase ταῦτα ὑπομένου εἰ̂ν before καὶ. In the passage immediately succeeding this, there is a cognate difficulty. The words τὸν φόβον which seem genuine but are dropped in Α have been preserved by Μ and Σ, while the words μὴ γένοιτο ἐκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα appear to have been lost in the archetype of Μ, which gives for them the inferior substitute εἰ μυκήναιτο (legendum μυκήναιτο) τὸ στόμων. Here a marginal gloss or scholium seems to have taken the place of the original text.

See also II. 368 E where ν and Vind. F read πρῶτον ἐν τῷ μετάμεν ὑπομένετεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι. A similar process may be traced at a somewhat earlier stage in III. 388 E, where, the verb having been lost through the simple error of writing ἐφίνυ for ἐφί, a recent hand in Par. A adds κατέχοιτο after λοχυφῷ, while the r subfamily and q adopt the different expedient of reading γέλωτι ἀλῷ, following the suggestion of a scholar whose note has been preserved on the margin of Vind. D, ἵμοι δοκεῖ ἀλῳ προσθεῖναι.

The only manifest accretions in Par. A besides IX. 580 D τὸ λογιστικόν, spoken of elsewhere, are (1) VII. 525 E the addition of δῶ to δεινοῦσ:—it is an early interpolation, for it is shared by Π, and is difficult to account for;—possibly the scribe of some early MS. had begun to write δεινοῦσ over again, and on discovering his mistake had proceeded without erasing the superfluous letters: and (2) II. 364 D λυστόλ δὲ στρεπτόλ τε a gloss in the text. In IX. 581 E a gloss
has supplanted ἅλθως, which would seem to have been the original reading. In Π, at II. 377 ἐ, a singular reading κακῶς οὐσίαν (sic) for κακῶς has obtained a place. A cognate reading κακῶς οὐσίας was adopted by Aldus from some other MS., probably Flor. b. This interpolation may have arisen from an early dittographia of the letters ος. Some doubtful cases remain to be considered. In v. 459 ε the word ἔσονται Ε Fic. proves to be absent from all the chief MSS. including A. It is harmless but can well be spared. In the Cesena MS., M, some words are omitted, which could be dispensed with, but for the authority of A. In I. 335 δ βλάπτεως ἔργον, ἐργον om. M pr. (Some MSS. read ἐργον βλάπτεως, changing the order.) In I. 346 δ ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις om. M pr.: λήψις is marked as doubtful in A.

In v. 466 A τοῦτο εὐθαμον πλάταμεν, εὐθαμον om. M.
In v. 468 B δοκεῖ σοι χρημαί, χρημαί om. M.
In v. 475 B παντὸς τοῦ εἴθους τοῦτον, τοῦτον om. M pr.

Of the phrases omitted by A which recent editors have bracketed or cancelled, only three are really open to suspicion, II. 382 Ε ὅτε κατὰ φαντασία: 378 C καὶ ποικιλτέον and 379 A ἔλαν τε ἐν μέλεσι: and considering the grounds on which the other phrases are retained it would be illogical to reject them ¹.

The confusing interpolation in IV. 444 B τοῦ δ' αὖ δου- λεύειν (A Π M) has probably arisen from dittographia. Some other words which have been rejected as accretions may possibly be right after all. Thus in II. 374 Α ἰκανολ διαμάχεσθαι is the reading of Π, and ib. B the words ἀλλὰ σκυτοῦμον occur in the text both of Π and M, although

¹ The slightest external evidence would justify the rejection of vi. 504 ε ἐξω τὸ διάνοημα, suspected by Schleiermacher. But with the testimony of all the MSS. in its favour, it would be rash to cancel either this, or the troublesome εἰς βραχύ... γεγομένον in iii. 400 B. The word ἐξων in vi. 456 A is inconvenient, but the reading of Π (ἐξων ἐξ) suggests that, instead of cancelling it, we should read ἐξω. In II. 376 δ the words ἐνα μὴ ἔμεν... διεξιῶμεν (om. A pr.) could be dispensed with.
of Plato's Republic.

differently placed (in Π before, in Μ after the clause ἵνα 
... γέγονε). They probably existed as a various reading on the margin of some copy from which Μ is derived, and may therefore be due to earlier tradition. As an explanatory gloss they seem unnecessary, and they may have been originally dropped after ὀλκοδόμον through homoiooteleuton. If genuine they might be accounted for by the wish of Socrates emphatically to impress the principle of the division of labour on Glaucon's mind. In ΙΧ. 572 A καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι could well be spared, and confuses the sense. A troublesome obscurity, perhaps due to an accretion, occurs in ΙΒ. 533 Ε ἀλλ' ὅ ἐν μόνῳ δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφείν ὅ λέγει (λέγειν Μ, λέγεις Α2) ἐν ψυχῇ. It might be justifiable to follow Ζ Steph. in omitting these words altogether.1 Of single words which have been suspected, in V. 468 C καὶ μηδενὶ, καὶ proves to be absent in A, and now rests on the sole authority of Π. The progressive corruption of the later MSS. may be illustrated from the Darmstadt Fragment ἰ, in which several passages, instead of being copied, are briefly paraphrased, as if from memory. The interpolations in Theaet. 156 C, 190 C may be compared with some of the above.

Textual Emendations.

Mistakes occurred in the earliest MSS.; and the attempt § 90. to rectify them immediately followed, not always with success. In one of the oldest and best papyrus fragments, that of Iliad XXIII and XXIV, lately published by Mr. Kenyon, the habit of correction, by writing between the lines, and putting a dot over a superfluous letter, is already begun. If nothing but Π in its original condition had come down to us, or even if we depended solely on A as at first written, before it was revised, whether by the first or second hand, not to mention other early correctors, no human ingenuity

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1 Perhaps also in v. 477 B the words καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἔκαλε τὴν αὐθή, which are likewise omitted in Η, and are variously read in other MSS.

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could have brought the text of Plato to its present state. Even if the lacunae were suspected, they could not have been filled. Modern criticism could at best have provided some such stop-gaps as were adopted by scribes and diorithotae of the Renaissance, in the absence of the best tradition. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that in every case where the text of A has been preferred, a contrary decision might not be justified by the discovery of some earlier authority. In several instances, where the evidence of A had been misinterpreted through the silence of Bekker, it now proves that its witness goes the other way, and turns the scale in favour of a rejected reading; e.g. in III. 391 C ὁμηηυαυ not ὅμηηυεν: in VI. 496 C τῷ ὑκαἰφ not τῷ ὑκαϊον: X. 606 E ἀξιον not ἀξιων is the reading of A. The later MSS. exhibit an increase both of corruption and of attempted emendation; but we have seen reason to believe that in the few instances in which the readings of these MSS. are alone to be relied on, it is quite possible that by some happy accident they have preserved an earlier tradition.

The simplification of the *apparatus criticus* by the supposed affiliation of all the MSS. to one, is sometimes alleged to justify the license of conjecture. But the argument is fallacious. For the comparison of independent traditions is a firmer ground on which to base conjecture than a breakdown in the evidence of a single document. There are few places in the Republic, however, about which any serious doubt remains. Those most intimately acquainted with the text are the least inclined to emend it conjecturally. Schneider, the most accurate of critical editors, and the author of the certain emendation in VIII. 554 B ἐχώμα μάλιστα for ἐχο μάλιστα, was even extreme in his conservatism. He defended places which are indefensible, and where the remedy when once suggested cannot admit of doubt. For example, in Book I. 352 E he maintains φαίμεν with the MSS. against φαίμεν, the reading of
Stephanus, Ast, Bekker and Stallbaum. In IV. 445 B he defends ἀποκυρτέον, in VI. 494 B ἐν πᾶσιν against ἐν παισιν, and in VI. 497 D argues with great subtlety, but doubtful success, against Bekker's emendation, οὔ πάντως ῥάστον for οὔ πάντως ῥάστον. He only adopted στραγγευμένης (V. 472 A) on finding it anticipated by an early corrector of Vind F., and to the last refused to treat τὸ λογιστικὸν (IX. 580 D) as a gloss in the text, on the insufficient ground that Par. K is manifestly derived from Ven. II. He was also willing to retain δικῶν λήξεως in IV. 425 D, with the transposition of the words into a different order which he found in Vat. Θ.

Passages still open to suspicion, where no convincing remedy seems to be attainable are:—

II. 358 E οἶνον τε καὶ δ莫名其 γέγονε. The reading of Aldus and the editions before Bekker τί τε δν τυχάνει καὶ δ隩εν γέγονε has very weak manuscript authority; being confined so far as we know to Flor. b, which in this passage and what follows it, is in a very late hand. The expression is therefore probably a conjectural expansion of the same kind with the addition of δεικτῶλευ δν in III. 407 E. τί δν τε is the reading of ΑΜΕ; but gives a poor sense, requiring τί δν γέγονε to be joined. The reading of Π τί οἶνον τε καὶ δ隩εν γέγονε, taking οἶνον τε in two words, may be explained ‘what, and of what nature, and from whence, justice has arisen.’ The choice lies between this and the simpler reading of Flor. x οὶνον τε καὶ δ��εν γέγονε, ‘The nature and origin of justice.’ The slight obscurity of this may be defended by supposing Plato to remember that he is speaking of the γένεσις not of the ποιεια of justice. But after all it is quite possible that τί δντε is a mis-writing for τί ἄρτι. Bekker adopted τί οἷοται and wrote γεγονέναι.

II. 359 C τῷ [Γύογυν] τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνφ. There is clearly something wrong here; but the emendation is doubtful: see note in loco.

III. 387 C φρίττευν δὴ ποιεῖ δς οἰτει (δς οἶνον τε γ). Neither of these readings is satisfactory, and conjecture is at fault.
IV. 439 E ποτὲ δικοῦσας τι πιστεῦω τοῦτο. For various suggested interpretations of this passage, see note in loco. Perhaps it is one of those in which a negative has been omitted (see above p. 107). τ. δ. τι οὐ πιστεῦω τ., 'I once heard a story told which prevents me from accepting that.' But the emendation remains uncertain.

VII. 533 E ὅ ἄν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σαφῆνελα λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ. The whole is omitted in Ε and may possibly be an accretion. For an attempt to treat the text as it stands in the MSS., see note in loco.

VIII. 562 Β τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑπαρπλοῦτος. The compound substantive is anomalous, and the attempts at emendation are hitherto unsuccessful. For the grounds of the conjecture τοῦτο δ' ἦν *ποιο πλοῦτος, see the notes.

VIII. 567 Ε τι δέ; (Or τίς δὲ) αὐτόθεν (τοὺς δὲ Steph.).

VIII. 568 Β ἀποδομένων. Reasons are given above, p. 110, for the conjecture *παλουμένων.

IX. 581 Ε τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάντων πόρων. See above (pp. 111, 112) for the conjecture τῆς ἀληθείας: but certainty is unattainable in a passage which has to be emended in more places than one. The difficulty in IX. 585 C ἐλ δὲ ἀληθέλας κ.t.l. may be due to some want of logical precision in Plato, but Madvig's theory of a lacuna must also be considered.

IX. 590 D ὀλκεῖον ἔχοντος. Here again the grammatical inaccuracy may be due to Plato, but one cannot exclude the supposition that there is some corruption in the text arising from the words ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ preceding. Madvig's ὀλκεῖον ἔχοντος may be right.

X. 603 C μή τι ἄλλο ἦ. Ast very probably conjectured μή τι ἄλλο ἦ.

X. 615 C for ἀὐτόχειρας Ast conjectured αὐτόχειρος or ἀὐτόχειρας. Once more, in X. 616 A, the passage considered above, p. 111, it is difficult to arrive at a perfectly definite conclusion.
of Plato's Republic.

The following are the places, twenty-nine in all, in which § 22.
the present text relies on conjecture:—

Steph.  

I. 330 B τούτοις Bekker  
    τούτοισιν
336 E οὖν γε σὺ Bekker  
    οὖν τε σὺ
341 B ὅν νῦν Benedictus  
    ὁ νῦν (ο in erasure A)
352 E φαμὲν Stephanus  
    φαμὲν
II. 361 C ήτω Neukirch  
    ήτω (but η from i ? A)
III. 392 B ζητούμεν Hermann  
    ζητούμεν
401 E χαίρων καὶ δυσχεραίνων  
    δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ  
    καὶ χαίρων καὶ  
    καὶ ηπαυνοὶ καὶ χαίρων καὶ
    ηπαυνοὶ καὶ καὶ Vermehren  
    καὶ om. g)
410 C ἀμφότερα Schneider  
    ἀμφότερα
IV. 431 C εν παισὶ H. Wolf  
    εν πασὶ
437 B ὁ ἄλληλοι Baiter  
    ἄλληλοι
D εῖν λόγῳ Cornarius  
    εῖν λόγῳ, cp. IX. 571 D
440 C διὰ τοῦ (bīs) L. Campbell  
    διὰ τὸ
443 B ἀλλο . Ἐτι τι Hermann  
    ἀλλο ἤτι . Τί
445 B ἀποκυμητέων Bekker  
    ἀποκυμητέων
V. 465 B δέος δὲ τοῦ Madvig  
    δέος δὲ τὸ
VI. 492 C ποίαν Cobet  
    ποίαν ἰν
493 B ἐκάστος G. van Prinsterer  
    ἐκάστος (ἐκάστος, ἐκάστος)
494 B πασίν Geer  
    πασίν
497 D πάντων Bekker  
    πάντως
499 B κατηκόσι Schleiermacher  
    κατηκοσὶ
505 B κεκτημεθα Bekker  
    κεκτημεθα
VIII. 551 C ήτινος Ast  
    ή τινος
554 B ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα Schneider  
    ἐστήσατο. Καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα  
    μάλιστα. ἐν

MSS.
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Steph.  
IX. 581 D τί οἴωμεθά Graser  
585 C τοῦ (bis) Madvig  
590 A τὸ δειών, ἐκείνο Schneider  
X. 600 D ὄνυναι Ast  
606 C ὅτι, ἄν Schneider  
MSS.  
ποιώμεθα  
οτ.  
τὸ δειών ἐκείνο  
ὄνυναι or ὄνυνα  
ὅτι ἄν

The following rest only on slight manuscript authority:—
II. 363 A τῷ ἀδίκῳ q x and Muretus cj.: III. 388 E ἐφή Vind. D mg. (ἐφήν A) and Hermann cj.: V. 472 A στραγγευμένῳ Vind. F. corr. and C. Orelli cj. (στραγγευμένῳ cett.).

A few others depend on citations of ancient writers:—

§ 23. The most important conjectures on the text of the Republic in recent years have been those of Cobet, Madvig, W. H. Thompson, and Ingram Bywater (see Baiter’s Preface). Still more recently Mr. Herbert Richards has contributed many ingenious suggestions in the C. R. for 1893. It may be not unprofitable to examine at some length the most considerable of the fifty-seven emendations of the Republic proposed by Cobet in *Variae Lectiones*, ed. II, pp. 526–535. We shall best obey his favorite precept ναφε καὶ μέμνωσ’ ἀπιστεῖν by not yielding blindly to his authority.

To begin, then, with those passages in which he appeals to the authority of the chief MS.

X. 612 B ἐπηνέκαμεν for ἐπηνέγκαμεν. The former is really the reading intended in Paris. A, where the η has ι adscript and there is a dot over the γ (sic ἐπηνέγκαμεν), which is thus marked by the diorthotes as superfluous. In Politicus 307 A, where ἐπηνέκαμεν is the best reading, the Bodleian gives ἐπηνέγκαμεν, and in both passages there is a variant ἐπηνέβαμεν. And although ἐπηνέγκαμεν in the Republic
admits of a possible meaning, the pointed reference in ἐπινέκαμεν (or ἐπινέσαμε;?) to II. 367 D τούτο 'οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαινεῖν δικαιοσύνης . . . μισθοῦ δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρεσ ἄλλως ἐπανεῖν—is the more probable, as the context shows that Plato has that passage distinctly before him. Cobet failed to remark, however, that, if ἐπινέκαμεν is right the perfect is used together with the aorist ἀπελνοῦμεθα. So that ἐπινέσαμεν, the reading of Par. K, should perhaps in strictness be preferred; and it may be still argued in favour of ἐπινέκαμεν that notwithstanding the reference to II. 367 D this need not involve the repetition of the same words.

VI. 503 B διεσπασμένα for διεσπασμένη. Here the critic has been less fortunate: διεσπασμένη is the reading of Paris. A (not διεσπασμένα as he supposed). It is also (subaudiendo ἡ φύσις) the more idiomatic reading. The variant διεσπασμένα is due to the tendency, noted elsewhere by Cobet himself, to adapt terminations to the nearest word. See above, p. 105.

The remaining passages may be taken in their order of sequence.

I. 343 B *διακείσθαι for διανοείσθαι (so Faesi). If there were any evidence for διακείσθαι the word might be accepted. But the familiar truth that κείσθαι is an equivalent for the perfect passive of τίθημι is not a sufficient proof that διανοείσθαι πως πρός τινα is bad Greek.

II. 362 B ξυμβάλλειν for ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν. The exact equivalence of these two words is not proved by the fact that Socrates in I. 333 A leads Polemarchus by gentle transition from contracts to partnerships. The use of both words here recalls the preceding conversation more effectually.

II. 376 A οὔδε ἐν for οὔδεν δὲ. Cobet's suggestion is very ingenious, and may be right, but the reading of the inferior MSS. οὔδεν δὴ is at least equally plausible.

III. 411 A *καταλείψεω (so Van Heusde) for καταλείψειν καὶ καταχείν. καταλείπειν sc. αὐτός or τῆς ψυχῆς. Cobet's assumption that the construction must be καταλείπει τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς
is wholly gratuitous. The words καὶ καταχεῖν κ.τ.λ. are an expansion of the notion of κατακαλεῖν. The idea underlying many of these suggestions, that Attic Greek loves parsimony in expression, is peculiarly inapplicable to the language of Plato.

III. 412 έπιλανθανόμενοι to be omitted? There is some awkwardness in the introduction of the word in this place, considering what follows in 413 θλαπέντας... τοὺς έπιλανθανομένους, but Plato has elsewhere admitted similar tautology and verbal inconsistency.

V. 452 έλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν προστηράμενος for πρὸς έλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στηράμενος. An ingenious but doubtful way of correcting a doubtful text. Θ. ή φύσις ή θήλεια for φύσις ή ἀνθρωπίνη ή θήλεια. Cobet seems to have forgotten the reference to the lower animals in 451 D, E.

V. 477 έφησομεν for οἴσομεν. This seems to be a genuine conjecture, although anticipated by Θ.Φ.Γ (see Bekker and Schneider) and also by the corrector of M. Cobet's logic sometimes coincides with that of the later scribes. οἴσομεν is really unobjectionable. Ficinus has dicitum (φησομεν ?).

VI. 491 B [ει τελέως μέλλοι φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι], 'verba soloece concepta sententiam onerant et impediunt.' The imputed solecism is really a Platonic idiom. To get rid of all such impedimenta, many pages would have to be re-written.

VI. 496 C ή γὰρ ποὺ τίνι [διάφ.] ή oδευλ. 'Attic parsimony' is again assumed; but the passages quoted are not exactly in point, and it is Plato's manner in employing an idiom to adapt it to the immediate context.

VII. 521 C ὀνοίαν ἐπάνοδος for ὀνοιαν ἐπάνοδον. Cobet's emendation, els ἄληθινη τοῦ ὄντος ὀνοίαν ἐπάνοδος still leaves the expression cumbersome, and περιαγωγή... els... ἐπάνοδον is in close agreement with the description in 515 C-E.

VII. 527 E οἴδε πρὸς ἔτερους for οὗ πρὸς οἴδετέρους. Neat, but not certain.

VII. 528 C *μεγαλυχώμενοι for μεγαλοφρονοῦμενοι. Cobet
objects to μεγαλοφρονεῖν as a late Greek word and to the use of the middle, but many compounds and singular uses of the middle voice occur for the first time in Plato.

VII. 538 C προσποιομένων for ποιομένων. For similar uses of ποιείσθαι see note in loco.

VIII. 555 A and IX. 576 C [διοικητη]. The argument from parsimony is again misplaced, and the same gloss is not very likely to have crept into the text in both places. In the latter passage the word had been previously cancelled by Ast and Badham.

X. 615 C ἀπογενομένων for γενομένων. The suggestion is ingenious but unnecessary. Not birth, but death, is the pervading notion of the passage, and is therefore more easily understood. Not ‘those who died immediately’ (on birth) ‘but those’ (whose death occurred) ‘as soon as they were born.’

X. 618 A διὰ τέλους for διατελεῖ. The adverbial phrase διὰ τέλους would require a participle such as κατεξομένας, which the adjective dispenses with. Cobet proceeds on the assumption that the Athenians always expressed the same thing in the same way. The same fallacy underlies his emendation in VIII. 565 C of ἐνα γε τινα for ἐνα τινα.

Some of Madvig’s suggestions, in spite of their acuteness, § 24, are decidedly wanting in good taste. For example, his proposal to change φαυτάσμαρα θεία VII. 532 C to φαυτάσμαρα ἀδεία is almost ludicrous, and reminds one of modern Greek. Not much happier is his suggestion of χωλάι for πολλαί in V. 473 D supported by referring to VII. 535 D. The two passages stand in no relation to each other, and the abrupt introduction of the metaphorical word is foreign to the manner of Plato. Such harriolations as these tend to disable a critic’s judgement, and to cast suspicion on other proposals of his which are at first sight more plausible. The most ingenious of Madvig’s suggestions are in VIII. 546 D δεύτερα τε for δεύτερον δὲ τα, and X. 608 A ἔσομεθα for ἄλογομεθα, but in the latter case it appears more probable that
the corrupt αἰσθώμεθα has taken the place of some expression answering to the ὁσπερ clause, such as ἀφεξώμεθα. In x. 606 c there is much to be said for his conjecture ἀν κατείχες for αὖ κατείχες.

W. H. Thompson, in IX. 585 A, with great plausibility conjectured πρὸς λύπην οὕτω τὸ ἀλυπον for πρὸς τὸ ἀλυπον οὕτω λύπην, but see note in loco. Another very probable suggestion which he does not seem to have communicated to Baiter, is in VIII. 545 B ἀλλ' ἥ for ἀλλο. ἥ. For other conjectures of the same critic, see notes on VIII. 563 D, 567 D, and IX. 573 C.

Charles Badham is responsible for a conjecture which Cobet approved, and Baiter received into his text, VIII. 560 D δι' ἕτερων for ἐνδωτῶν. Reasons against adopting this and in support of ἐνδωτῶν are given in the commentary to this edition. He also proposed to cancel μυσθωτολ in IV. 419 A.

Prof. Bywater's chief suggestion is V. 476 A ἀλλ' ἀλλῶν for ἀλλήλων in a passage where needless difficulty has been felt. See note in loco. In VI. 504 A Orelli's ἄθλοις for ἄλλοις would be convincing, if ἄθλος had been a usual word in Plato, but he uses it only in the Timaeus and Laws.

In VII. 532 B, C Nägelsbach's ἕτε ἀδύναμια for ἕτε' ἀδύναμίq is exceedingly plausible and is supported by the quotation of Iamblichus. But it hardly bears examination; see note in loco. Even if the absence of ἦ may be excused, the construction with the infinitive, instead of ἦ ἀδύναμια τοῦ βλέπειν, is hardly Greek. In Theaet. 156 A, where ἀδύναμως ἔχειν is construed with the infinitive, probably the closest parallel, the case is altered by the presence of the participle. For ἀδύναμως ἔχειν = ἀδύνασθαι.

Of Mr. Richards' conjectures on I–V, the most persuasive are :

III. 407 E Δήλον, ἐφη, δι' τοιοῦτος ἦν' καὶ οἱ παιδεῖς αὐτοῦ οὖχ ὅρας δι' κ.τ.λ. It would be quite as easy, however, to
cancel οὐκ ... ἄν as an 'accretion'; and in either case the received reading gives a preferable rhythm.

IV. 430 E κρέβτω δὴ αὐτῷ ἀποφαίωντες κ.τ.λ.
433 D καὶ δοῦλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ (καὶ γεωργῷ) καὶ δημιουργῷ.
444 C ἀρτα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα (so Stob.). Probably right.
V. 457 C δὲ γε δὴ, Ίωα for λέγε δὴ, Ίω. This is better than Cobet's φέρε δή. But neither is required. See Goodwin, M. and T. 257.
462 C ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ for ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό. This is possibly right.
468 A λέγ', ἔφη, ποῖα δὴ for λέγ', ἔφη, ποί' ἄν. If the text is corrupt, this is the most likely way of emending it.

On Muretus' conjecture in II. 364 C, ἄδουτες for διδοὺτες, see note in loco.

The present editor has suggested the following conjectural changes, which he has not, however, ventured to introduce into the text:—

II. 358 E τι *έστι καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε
III. 387 C φρίττεων δὴ ποιεῖ ὅσ *έτεα
IV. 439 E ἀκούσας τι *οὗ πιστεύω
442 E τοῦτο *αὐτό for τοῦτο αὐτῶν (τοῦτον A Π M)
V. 471 A δύνατες, *καὶ οὗ πολέμοι (ὡς οὗ τ. A mg. M)
479 D *ἀμικαλήσαμεν (for ἀμικαλήσαμεν)
VI. 496 A φρονήσεως *άξιως ἀληθεύης ἐχόμενον (αξιον A : αξιον ὡς Π)
500 A ἡ οὕκ (sic q) ... ἀλλοιαν *τα φήσεις ... ;
VII. 518 D ἔγγοι τι *τείνει τῶν τοῦ σώματος
VIII. 562 B τοῦτο δ' ἄν *ποιούσας for τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὅπερπλοῦτος
563 C οἰκίστην αἱ δεσποται γλύφονται, (σεμικύνοντα) τε δὴ καὶ Ἰπποῖ καὶ ὅνοι
568 D τὰ τῶν *πολούμενων for τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων
IX. 581 E τῆς *ἀληθεύης οὐ πάνω πόρρω; for 'τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐ π. π.
IX. 585 C kal *ἀληθοῦς for kal ἀληθείας
X. 610 A ὁρθότατα γ' for ὁρθότατα

And the following readings, mostly of inferior authority, are recommended for further consideration:

I. 333 E δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι [kal] μὴ παθεῖν q
335 D βλάπτειν (omitting ἔργον) M
340 A αὐτὸς θρασύμαχος (omitting γὰρ) M
346 D ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις om. M

II. 358 E πλέον δὲ κακῷ Π M
367 A ἐκαστὸς ἀριστος φύλαξ Π
370 B ἐν ἄλλου ἔργου πράξει M
374 B μὴτε οἰκοδόμον, ἄλλα σκυτοτόμον Π

III. 409 D kal tois ἄλλοις M

IV. 435 D ἄλλη γὰρ a Galen.
436 A τοῖς ἐκαστα q corr.
442 B προσήκειν q Stobaeus
444 C αὐτὰ μὲν ὄνων Stob. et cj. H. Richards 1893

V. 459 E ἔσονται om. Α Π M
468 B χρήναι om. M

VI. 489 B τάληθεν λέγει D
497 B ἄλλομεν εἶδος Ξ
499 B παραβάλη Ξ
509 D οὐρανῶ Ξ
510 B μυθιζέων A Proclus

VII. 522 A πρὸς τοιοῦτον τι ἁγων (γρ.) Π mg.
525 A ταύτῳ πέπονθε τοῦτο Π
528 C καλυμμένα Ξ pr.
532 E τίνες αἱ ὁδοὶ τ

VIII. 554 D ἐνευρήσεις Α² Π M

IX. 587 E καταπεφώρακας τ Ξ corr. v
X. 601 B αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὐτῶν γενόμενα Α²
6 C ἐφ' ἡμίσεως q
603 B καὶ ἡ κατά τὴν ἄκοιν q
607 D ἀπολογησαμένη τ (et forsitan A pr)
612 C ἤπείσθε A
615 B πολλοῖς D corr.
It may not be out of place to quote an example of the § 26, manner in which a scholar of the sixteenth century approached the task of emendation:—

'Enimvero quum in plerisque locis fidem eorundem librorum a me frustra implorari viderem, alii autem non suppeterent, ad coniecturas, tanquam ad δεύτερον πλοῦν, me convertere necesse habui. Sed quum intelligerem quàm periculose sint coniecturae, et quàm fallaciter plerunque suis coniecturis adblandiantur, ex ingenio meo proiectas emendationes non in ipsum recepi contextum (ut antea etiam cum vulgo appellavi) sed partim margini adscripsi, partim Annotationibus reservavi, ubi earum rationem etiam reddere daretur...'

'Quinetiam contingebat interdum ut quantumvis pectus concuterem (non foecundum illud quidem, sed nec omnino, quorumdam iudicio, infoecundum) nihil quicquam ex eo egredereetur, antequam loci in quibus haeretam excusi essent: simulatque autem iam excusos relegerem, ex eo illorum emendationio velut sponte sua prodire videretur. Ex eorum numero duos mihi nunc suggerit memoria: quorum unus habet, ἰνα μη μεμφης, alter δ' ἔξεως: horum enim emendationem assequi coniectura non potueram antequam paginae in quibus erant, excusae essent: at quum operae meae penso suo manum extremam imponerent, ego superveniens, perinde ac si longè quàm antea perspicacior factus essem, pro [μή] μεμφής quidem [μή] με φθης ¹ [Polit. 266 E]: pro δ' ἔξεως autem, δεξεω scribendum esse, primo ferè aspectu animadverti.'

'Henricus Stephanus lectori': Preface to Plato ed. 1578.

Plato is one of a select number of Greek authors whose text is known to us as it existed in the ninth century A.D. The Byzantine MSS. of that period were not only carefully written, but carefully revised; with the aid, as there is good

¹ This conjecture is partly confirmed by Bodl. Vat. A reading μη' ἔφθης.
reason to think, of other MSS. besides the one immediately in hand. Some of the errors in these early copies have still to be corrected by the help of later ones, into which, as it now appears, some grains from a yet earlier tradition have in some way filtered down. There remains little scope for conjecture. Such achievements of intuition as Schneider's ἐτήμα μάλιστα and Orelli's στραγγευομένει remain isolated instances of success. Plato's language is so highly wrought, so various, and so full of unexpected turns, that the task of emending him is like that of emending poetry. In a so-called epistle of Demosthenes there is more room for 'certain conjecture' than in a whole tragedy of Aeschylus or Sophocles, where the most brilliant suggestions, such as Conington's λέοντος ἰνω or Jebb's λυτήρων λάφημα, are still open to doubt; or in one of those plays of Euripides, where the judgement is sufficiently perplexed by the discrepancies of thirteenth century MSS. without having recourse to vain hariolatio. The thesis might be maintained, however, that the more a text requires emendation (either from bad copying, or from the use of technical terms, as in the musical or mathematical writers, or from obscurity or singularity of style), the less possible it is to emend it. Take, for example, the portion of the Oresteia which is lost in the Medicean MS., or again the Supplices of Aeschylus, which is manifestly corrupt in the Medicean MS. without having any other independent MS. authority. Conjecture has been active, with but little of agreement in the result. In the case of Pindar, although we have no MS. earlier than the twelfth century, those we have seem to give evidence of a constant and authentic tradition. The difficulty is at its height in the later part of the Bacchae, 755 ff., where there is only one MS. and that of an inferior description: or again in the case of such an author as Marcus Aurelius, where the critic has to choose between late MSS. and a printed text founded on an earlier MS. now lost.

It would be unsafe to argue from the analogy of Latin
authors; the great variety of style and dialect in Greek of all periods involving ever fresh uncertainty. Lucretius or Catullus may be emended with more probability than Aeschylus or the fragments of Alcman. Different literatures admit of different treatment. Bentley in his proposal for a text of the New Testament says expressly that he is well aware that conjecture can have no place in the sacred text. This may have been intended to soothe orthodox apprehensions, but it at least involves an admission of the precariousness of conjecture.

The invention of so-called Canons of Criticism introduces § 27. an appearance of scientific precision, which is really fallacious. The rule of the more difficult reading, 'Potior lectio difficultior,' may often prove misleading. The balance is in favour of the less common word, if equally in point: e.g. ἐγετ for λέγει. But when an absurd reading has once found its way into an approved text, the conservatism of tradition will often maintain it for centuries against common sense. The true reading meanwhile may have passed down through weaker channels, and may be supported, though less authoritatively, by independent evidence. For example, in IV. 442 B ἄν ὁ τὸ προσήκον αὐτῷ γένει, προσήκον is the harder reading, and is supported by the better MSS.; but the change from e to o might be made early, and once made would remain in one line of tradition, and the easier reading προσήκει, having the support of Stobaeus, would

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1 Yet it is not to be overlooked that here also the unwisdom of employing one manuscript authority exclusively has been clearly shown. See Prof. Ellis' 'Praefatio' to his Notae Manilianae (Clarendon Press, 1891):—'Gemblacensis Codex . . . ueterrimus ille quidem, utpote saec. xi scriptus, et integerrimus est omnium; ita tamen, ut si absit Vossianus is secundus Iacobi, cui scriba suus annum 1470 in fine addidit, uera manus poetae relictam sit in incerto, idque plurifariam.' The same scholar adds his testimony to the general fact—'antiquos codices ita praestare recentibus ut his tamen supersederi nequeat.'

2 It is also a strong instance of the general fact that the more reverently an author is handled the fewer are the conjectures which find their way into his text.
On the Text of this Edition

seem to be traditional in q. It should be remarked, however, that the best MS. of Stobaeus is, according to Gaisford, of the fourteenth century.

Nor is the 'ductus literarum' in every instance a safe guide. Many other causes beside the forms of letters have been at work, as we have seen above, and the only effect of an apparently simple change may be to 'skin and film the ulcerous place.' Who could have supposed that between the syllables of ἐκτέω, the reading of D K in x. 607 A, there lurked a lacuna of forty-three letters? Or what palaeographer could have corrected χρησιόν λέγοντας in Solon fr. 36, l. 9, to χρελοὺς φυγόντας, which the Ath. Pol. now proves to be the true reading? What critic could have guessed it? Or, if he had, who could have assured us that he was right?—The errors of printed books present only a distant analogy to those of classical MSS., which in the great authors, have often been more carefully revised. Yet even here conjecture has proved of little avail. Of innumerable emendations of Shakespeare by far the greater number have been rejected by recent editors, and very few have the certainty of Johnson's 'no more, but e'en a woman, —(Foll. 'in')—Ant. and Clea. iv. 15, l. 73. Who shall emend with certainty 1 Henry IV, Act iv. 1, ll. 98, 99 'All plumed like estridges that with the wind | Baited like eagles having lately bathed,' or supply the 'missing word' in Sonnet 146 'Poor soul, the centre of my sinful earth, ... by these rebel powers that thee array'? or in Hamlet iv. 1, ll. 40, 41 'And what's untimely done . . . | Whose whisper o'er the world's diameter,' &c. Or, to take a more modern instance, what but documentary evidence can determine between 'an unbodied joy' and 'an embodied joy' in Shelley's Skylark?

Yet it must be admitted that Shelley's text affords some examples of conjectural emendation subsequently corroborated by documentary evidence. The subtle criticism of W. M. Rossetti suggested several corrections of the printed text which examination of the MSS. has since
of Plato’s Republic. 129

confirmed 1. Julian and Maddalo (vol. ii. p. 324, l. 18) ‘and even at this hour.’ ever cj. Rossetti and so Shelley’s MS. Letter to Maria Gisborne (vol. iii. p. 48, l. 1) ‘or those in philosophic councils met’: philanthropic cj. Rossetti 2 and so Shelley’s MS. Hellas (vol. ii. p. 145, l. 20) ‘The caves of the Icarian isles Hold each to the other in loud mockery’: Told cj. Rossetti and so the MS., and also a list of errata in Shelley’s handwriting.

I understand also that in Chaucer five conjectural readings of Tyrwhitt’s have been found in the Ellesmere MS. which is supposed to have been unknown to him. But his examination of MSS. may have been more minute than appears on the surface of his edition. Have all the twenty-four MSS. mentioned by him been identified and thoroughly collated?

The history of classical texts presents few such examples. In Soph. Philoctetes 29 Lambinus suggested κτύπος for τύπος, and this was afterwards found in the Laurentian MS., and as a marginal variant in Γ. In Phil. 689 Auratus suggested κλύων for κλύζων, and this has also received some MS. confirmation. The correction of errors in the third epistle of Demosthenes, confirmed by the British Museum Papyrus as noted above, is perhaps the most striking example hitherto of such success.

Of Platonic editors probably Heindorf and Schneider have come nearest—Schleiermacher and K. F. Hêrmann being not far behind. Two conjectures of Schleiermacher though turning on a very slight change of letters are of distinguished merit:—in Rep. VI. 499 Β κατηκῶθοι for κατῆκοιοι and Protag. 328 C άνήρ for νοήμα. C. Orelli’s στραγγευμένω for στραγγευμένο (V. 472 A) confirmed by Vind. F corr. is the best example in the Republic 3. It is also rather a striking

1 I quote the earlier readings from ed. 1847 (reprint of Mrs. Shelley’s edition).
2 ‘The epithet “philosophic” does not appear specially apposite; should it be “theosophic” or “philanthropic”?’ W. M. Rossetti, note to vol. ii. p. 245 of his edition, 1870.
3 For several instances in which conjecture has coincided with MS.
fact that τὴν τῷ δικαίω δοθείαν, which Schneider adopted from Vind. F pr. in place of τῷ δικαίων β. in vi. 496 D, now proves to be the reading of Par. A.

In some cases, where all the MSS. are at fault, the true reading has been found in a quotation by some ancient writer, as Galen, Athenaeus, Stobaeus, and the Fathers Eusebius and Theodoretus. A doubt may arise, where the consent of the oldest MSS. is opposed to the reading of some inferior MS. supported by such quotation. When the author who gives the quotation is preserved in MSS. say of the tenth century, the evidence is nearly balanced,—the only remaining uncertainty being that which attends upon all quotations. The commentary of Proclus also supplies some evidence; but the Scholia to Plato, for the most part, throw but little light upon his text. They are full of Neo-platonic fancies, and few of them can be referred to the Alexandrian time. This is the more unfortunate, because, as a general rule, the best emendations have been those to which scholars have been led by some discrepancy between the explanation of a scholiast and the traditional text. The best emendation of a Sophoclean passage is Boeckh's φονωσαίων for φονεωσιν in Ant. 117, founded on the scholion ταῖς τῶν φονῶν ἐρώσεις λόγχαις. Another, almost equally good, without such help, is ἄνη (Auratus and Pierson), in Phil. 639, confirmed by the gloss in L, παρη.

Were the corruptions and interpolations of the text of the Republic as numerous as recent scholars have imagined, the difference of meaning involved would be still infinitesimal. Some feature of an image might be obscured, or some idiomatic phrase enfeebled, but Plato's philosophy would remain uninjured. That is not a reason for careless treatment, but it is a consideration deserving to be set against the natural bias which minute and long-continued attention to the details of criticism is apt to produce.

evidence (in Euthyphr. Apol.) see Wohlrab Platonhandschriften, &c., p. 657.
of Plato's Republic.

The fashion of Greek orthography has changed somewhat since this text was printed. Exact scholars, whose eyes are accustomed to recent classical editions, will miss ὑπόκειται, σφίζω, ποίειν, μελέτας, νείς, and other forms, which inscriptions show to have been usual in Attica from about 400 B.C. The new-old spelling is hardly yet finally established, and a text which is arrière in this respect may perhaps have some compensating advantages for those who in their school days were familiar with the former practice; to whom ὅς μαίας μάλα γενναίος ὑπὲρ καὶ βλαστρᾶς (Theaet. 149 A) still presents an awkward ambiguity, and who are for the moment puzzled when, in perusing a Latin treatise on Greek races, they come across the familiar patronymic, 'Jones.' The retention of φιλόνεικος, φιλονεικεῖν, φιλονεικία (against φιλόνικος, &c.) deserves a more serious defence. (See an elaborate note on the point in Leopold Schmidt's Ethik der alten Griechen.) There is no doubt that Greeks in Plato's time and afterwards associated the word with νικη. But Greek etymological fancies are hardly solid ground to rest upon; and the derivation from νείκος appears more probable: cp. φιλαπεχθήμων. The accentuation of ἀφηγη (VII. 520 A) is indefensible. But I have followed the MSS. and editions. No scholar has yet suggested the adoption of the ı adscrip in our ordinary texts. But this, together with the abolition of capitals and the recasting of our type in imitation of the earliest uncials, may follow in time.

1 Vol. i. p. 386.
**APPENDIX I.**

**Collation of the Present Text with Paris A (1807).**

The purpose of these pages is to supplement and partly to correct the list of various readings subjoined to the Text of this edition. Where my collation agrees substantially with Baiter's report, I give my own observation without any distinctive mark. An asterisk is placed against items believed to be new. And where these tend either to confirm or to alter the text as it stands, the reading of A is printed in larger type. It will be observed that in six places the new collation turns the scale against readings formerly adopted: **III. 391 c βρυσμαν not βρυσμεν** : **IV. 428 D τελευτ not τελευτ** : **VI. 456 C τι βιασει not τιν βιασει** : **503 B διεπαισμενη not διεπαισμαη** : **X. 606 E εξιον not εξιον** : **607 D απολογησαμενη not απολογησημενη.**

L. C.

For the List of Errata in Text, see the last page of this volume. And for general peculiarities of Paris A, neglected here, see above, p. 70.

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<td>γρ. ἐν</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>328 D ὡς παρὰ φιλους τε</td>
<td>in mg.: om. pr.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>E αὐτὸ</td>
<td>αὐτὸ Α²</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>329 E σου</td>
<td>σου (corr. rec.)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>330 C αὐτῶν</td>
<td>αὐτῶν (et sic saepius)</td>
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<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>332 C τι οἴει; ἔφη</td>
<td>The persons were at first divided with : after ἔφη. This was afterwards erased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D τίσι</td>
<td>τισι (sic saepius)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I I</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>333 C τι</td>
<td>τι (et saepius)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>D δέο</td>
<td>δεο</td>
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<tr>
<td>* I 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>333 E φυλάξασθαι, καὶ</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>λαθεῖν</td>
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### Appendix I: Collation, &c.

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<td>29</td>
<td>Cr. n. 12</td>
<td>Cr. n. 12</td>
<td>οὐκ ἀν ὄν ἐν mg. m. vet. Rep. I. The ν of ἀν partly eaten away</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>337 A</td>
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<td>ἀνεκάγ</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>ἀποκρίνατο</td>
<td>ἀποκρίνατο: λαι is written over an erasure of two letters</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>338 E</td>
<td>ἐκάστη</td>
<td>ἐκάστη (sic adscript)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>339 E</td>
<td>οὐτωσι δίκαιον εἶναι οὐτωσι δίκαιον εἶναι;</td>
<td>τοιντων, τοιντων, h (sic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>341 A</td>
<td>ἀρχων ἔστι</td>
<td>ἀρχων ἔστι pr.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>εἶν</td>
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<tr>
<td>*</td>
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<td>Cr. n. 20</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>έστι τι</td>
<td>έστιν τι (et saepius)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>αὐτή</td>
<td>αὐτ ... pr., αὐτή corr.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>σκέψεται</td>
<td>σκέψεται (ται in erasure)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>αὐτή</td>
<td>αὐτή</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cr. n. 4</td>
<td>δει αἰει Α</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>344 E</td>
<td>ζφη</td>
<td>ζων pr.: corr. p. m.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Cr. n. 7</td>
<td>πομαιψίν Α² mg.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>346 D</td>
<td>λήψις</td>
<td>λήψις</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ἐκάστη</td>
<td>ἐκάστη (η in erasure)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>347 A</td>
<td>ξυνίς</td>
<td>ξυνίς</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>έγωγε, έφη</td>
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<td>πειθομεν</td>
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<td></td>
<td>αὐτ</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Cr. n. 20, 21</td>
<td>ut videtur Α; viz. — :</td>
<td>σῦ δὲ ... λέγειν:</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Cr. n. 19</td>
<td>Cr. n. 19</td>
<td>ὃ δὲ μὴ</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>350 E</td>
<td>ἐῖς</td>
<td>ἐῖς. followed by an erasure</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>The breathing of εἶπεν has absorbed the sign - for ν</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>5 &amp; 31</td>
<td>351 C</td>
<td>ἐὰν γε σὺ ποιῶν</td>
<td>ἐὰν γε σὺ ποιῶν: pr. (as if there were a change of persons)</td>
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<td>οὖδεν ἤγγου</td>
<td>γρ. σὺ Α² mg.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>352 C</td>
<td>τοιώνδε τινὰ</td>
<td>τοιώνδε τινὰ (et alibi)</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>δῆ καὶ οὗς</td>
<td>δικαίους pr.</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>δοστέμοι corr. to ὃς ἐμοὶ by Α²</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>354 A</td>
<td>Βενεδίδειος</td>
<td>πρᾶξις Α²</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>357 C</td>
<td>εἴπον</td>
<td>Βενεδίδειος</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>361 A</td>
<td>φαίμεν</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>δὰν' αὐτῆς</td>
<td>μεθοδόγυεσσων Α</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>360 B</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>καίτου</td>
<td>καὶ το pr. καὶ το Α²</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>ἀνοφτότατος</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>361 C</td>
<td>ἢνω</td>
<td>ἢνω: but η from ι p.m.</td>
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<td>363 A</td>
<td>ἀσ' αὐτῆς</td>
<td>ἵπται αὐτῆς pr.</td>
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<td>*59</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>364 D</td>
<td>ἀνάπηση</td>
<td>καὶ τραχείων added in mg. by Α²</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>365 A</td>
<td>ἐπιστόμενου</td>
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<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>366 D</td>
<td>ὁ δὲ</td>
<td>ὁ δὲ (sic) Α¹ or Α²?</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td></td>
<td>εἰπέν</td>
<td>εἰπέν corr. to εἰπέν by Α¹ or Α²</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>367 C</td>
<td>ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν</td>
<td>om.: supplied in mg. by Α²</td>
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<td>μὲν</td>
<td>om.: inserted above the line by Α²</td>
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<td>Line</td>
<td>Steph. p.</td>
<td>Text.</td>
<td>Par. A</td>
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<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>367 D</td>
<td>κέλευες</td>
<td>κέλευες: i in erasure (it never was κέλευες) Rep. II.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>χρήσομαι</td>
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### Appendix I: Collation of

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<td>τι δὲ δὲ δεξιωθήναι cum γρ. (mg.) τι δὲ δὲ δεξιωθήναι: Α²</td>
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<td>καὶ μηδεὶ</td>
<td>μηδεὶ (καὶ om.)</td>
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<td>471 C</td>
<td>αὐτὴ</td>
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<td>472 B</td>
<td>γ'</td>
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<td>E</td>
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<td>ἐξῆς: ἐξ ἀρχῆς Α² mg. Rep. VI.</td>
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<td>εἰργαῖον Α²</td>
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<td>496 A</td>
<td>ἤν δ' ἐγώ</td>
<td>ἤν ἦ δ' ἐγώ</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>ἐἰσ</td>
<td>om. pr.: add. Α² Rep. VIII.</td>
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<td>ἡθῶν τῶν</td>
<td>ἡθ λ. (not ἡθ λ. γε) τῶν</td>
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<td>ἐκατόν (bis)</td>
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<td>oἱ τοιοῦτοι pr.: oἱ τοιοῦτοι Α²</td>
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<td>551 D</td>
<td>γνωικές αὐτών</td>
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| 350   | 12 & 30| 551 D    | ἀλλα μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε | ἀλλα μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε pr.: καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ | τόδε corr. rec. (οὐδὲ being written in the right-hand margin)
# Appendix I: Collation of

|-------|-------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Rep. VIII. | 351 | 29 & 31 | 552 D | **βαλλασσατόμοι**
  | | | **βαλλασσατόμοι pr. : βαλλασσατόμοι** A³ |
| | 354 | 30 | | **καλ ἐπὶ μαλακτα | εὖ (two lines)** |
| | 355 | 31 | | **ἐν** |
| | 356 | 6 | 555 A | **ἐν** |
| | 358 | 26 | 556 E | **κατὰ (sic)** |
| | 359 | 1 | | **ἐπαγομένων . . .** |
| | *360 | 25 & 30 | 557 E | **ἐπαγομένων** |
| | 362 | 12 | 558 D | **ἐπαγομένος** |
| | | 30 | | **ἐπαγομένος (not ἐπαγομένος)** |
| | | | | **is the reading of** A
<p>| | | | | <strong>ἡ τοιοτών</strong> |
| | 363 | 8 | 559 B | <strong>ἡ τοιοτών</strong> |
| | 364 | 9 | E | <strong>ἐφη</strong> |
| | | 10 | | <strong>ἐφη : in mg. add. A³</strong> |
| | 366 | 6 | 561 A | <strong>πῶς</strong> |
| | | 17 | B | <strong>πῶς</strong> |
| | | | | <strong>πῶς : as a separate speech</strong> |
| | 367 | 5 | D | <strong>ἀποδομάτων</strong> |
| | | | | <strong>ἀποδομάτων (erasure of eight letters)</strong> |
| | 372 | 30 | | <strong>μελισσαυρίνον</strong> Δ corr. |
| | *375 | 4 | 565 E | <strong>προεστώς</strong> |
| | | | | <strong>προεστώς is the reading of</strong> A |
| | 377 | 6 | 567 A | <strong>πρὸς τῷ</strong> |
| | *378 | 8 | D | <strong>πρὸς τῷ</strong> |
| | | | | <strong>πρὸς τῷ pr.</strong> |
| | 380 | 12 | 568 D | <strong>ἀποδομάνων</strong> |
| | * | 17 | E | <strong>ἀποδομάνων</strong> |
| | 382 | 21 | | <strong>ἐγκαλῶ Α (not ἐν καλῶ)</strong> |
| | 383 | 22 | 572 A | <strong>τοῦ</strong> |
| | | | | <strong>τοῦ pr. : supplied by first hand at end of line</strong> |
| | | | | <strong>κα in erasure</strong> |
| | *386 | 18 | D | <strong>ἀσύ (sic)</strong> |
| | *389 | 25 | 575 C | <strong>ἐτπαρ</strong> |
| | 391 | 23 | 576 D | <strong>ἀρηγῇ</strong> |
| | | | | <strong>ἀρηγῇ in mg. A³</strong> |</p>
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<th>Text.</th>
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<td>δυναμών τε is the reading of Α</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>587 A</td>
<td>ἐξηγαγότο</td>
<td>ἐξηγαγότο pr.: ἐξηγαγότο Α³</td>
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<tr>
<td>412</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>νόθας</td>
<td>νόθας (but οι in erasure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414</td>
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<td>589 A</td>
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<td>ἐκείνω pr.: ἐκείνω Α³</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>ἐν αὐτῷ Α³</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ἐν αὐτῷ</td>
<td>ἐν αὐτῷ Α³</td>
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<td>E</td>
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<td>418</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>591 C</td>
<td>ἄλλα</td>
<td>ἄλλα</td>
</tr>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>ζω...pr.: ζῶη corr.</td>
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<td>419</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>αὐτῷ</td>
<td>αὐτῷ Α²</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>πλήθος</td>
<td>πλήθος pr.</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>add. 'but the accent is by a recent hand' (κλίνων infr. 597 b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>423</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>596 c</td>
<td>τάχα</td>
<td>τάχα (the accent and χ in erasure)</td>
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<tr>
<td>*428</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>599 A</td>
<td>μυθησομένου</td>
<td>μυθησομένου pr.: μυθησό-μένου A³</td>
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<tr>
<td>*429</td>
<td>16–18 &amp; 30</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>οδικον ... δημήρου</td>
<td>The mark for the change of persons (—:) is before οδικον, not before ἀλλα (Not 'praescriptum est σω.')</td>
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<tr>
<td>430</td>
<td>27 &amp; 31</td>
<td>600 D *δινάμας</td>
<td>δινάμας A³</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>601 A</td>
<td>αὐτῶν ... ἐτέρους</td>
<td>om. pr.: add. in mg. A³, with ἐν τοῖς for ἐτέρους</td>
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<tr>
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<td>B</td>
<td>ἐν μέτρῳ ... λέ-γεσθαι</td>
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<td>434</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>602 C</td>
<td>τῶν</td>
<td>τῶ A³</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>αὐτῆ</td>
<td>αὐτῆ</td>
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<td>438</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>604 C</td>
<td>δ τε δεῖ</td>
<td>δεῖ δεῖ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>18 &amp; 31</td>
<td></td>
<td>ιατροῖ</td>
<td>ιατροῖ. A² (letter erased)</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>αὐτὸ</td>
<td>om. pr.: add. in mg. A²</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 &amp; 31</td>
<td>605 A</td>
<td>τε</td>
<td>γ (γ in erasure)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>*440</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Cr. n. 27</td>
<td>ei ἐκεῖνη (ei not omitted)</td>
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<tr>
<td>441</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>606 B</td>
<td>ἀπολαύειν</td>
<td>ἀπολαύειν A³</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cr. n. 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>*442</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>δεῖος</td>
<td>δεῖος (not δεῖον) is the reading A³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>443</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>607 B</td>
<td>ποιητική</td>
<td>μὴ ποιητική A³</td>
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<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>ἀπολογησαμένη (sic le-gendum) corrected by erasure to ἀπολογησαμένη</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>445</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>608 D</td>
<td>οὐχ</td>
<td>οὐχ ἡγούτο γ' ἡφη A³</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>om. pr.: add. in mg. A³</td>
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<tr>
<td>446</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>609 B</td>
<td>ψυχή ἀρα ... ἀν</td>
<td>οἰν ἡφη A³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Line</td>
<td>Steph. p.</td>
<td>Text.</td>
<td>Par. A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 448  | 22   | 610 D     | φανείται | φανείται is given as an al-
|      |      |           |        | ternative by Α¹ or ² |
| 452  | 3    | 612 D     | Δ       | Inserted after κτωμένη by
|      |      |           |        | Α² |
|      | 7    | K         | αίτει    | αίτει (sic)
|      | 15   | ηε        |         | γ
| 454  | 1    | 613 E     | λέγων    | γρ. λέγωντα Α² mg.
| 25 & 32 |   | 614 B    | ἐπειδὴ οὗ | ἐπειδὴ οὗ Α : ἐπειδὴ οὗν Α³ |
| 455  | 10   | D         | θεάσθαι  | θε · ἀ · σθαι (ἀ in space of
|      |      |           |         | three letters)
|      | 18   | E         | ἀπωόσας  | ἀπωόσας Α² |
| 456  | 1    | 615 A     | δόνου    | · · obs (two letters erased)
|      | 14   | 616 A     | τοῦτων    | τοῦτων Α² (ο in erasure)—
|      |      |           |         | primitus scriptum τοῦ-
|      |      |           |         | τῶν ἕ
|      |      |           |         | προσφερη Α² |
| 460  | 7    | 617 E     | συνέταται | συνετέται pr.? |
|      | 11   |           | τ δὲ    | τδε Α³ |
|      | 27   | 618 B     | ἴγεῖαι   | ἴγειαι pr. |
| 462  | 6    | 619 B     | νῦ   | om. pr. : supra lineam
|      |      |           |        | add. Α³ |
|      | 5    | 621 B     | ἐωθεν    | γρ. ἐωθεν Α² mg.
|      | 6    |           | ἤθη    | om. pr., then add. at end
|      |      |           |        | of line |
|      | 17   | D         | χιλιέτει  | χιλιετε pr. : χιλιετί Α³ |

*
APPENDIX II.

ERRORS OF THE FIRST HAND IN PAR. A.

N.B.—To avoid undue length some slight clerical errors such as ὅ του for ὅ τοι (i. 330 b), ἂπερ for ἂπερ (ibid. c), ὅ τοι for ὅ τοι (ib. 337 c), ἡγεῖται for ἡγεῖται (v. 479 A), πάντως for πάντως (vi. 491 c)—although sometimes confusing enough—are omitted in the following list.

A², for the sake of simplicity, is here made to include, together with readings of the Diorithotes, some corrections by A¹, and some by other early hands, and only manifest errors are admitted.

It will be observed (i) that only thirty-three out of 170 errors of the first hand (about 1/3) are corrected by A²; (a) that the correction in forty-one places is due to Π as the earliest witness, in fourteen places to M pr. m., in twenty-five places to Ε, and in twenty-four places to q. Of the remainder x is responsible for three corrections, Vind. D for one, Vind. F for three, and r for one; three rest on the testimonies of ancient writers¹, and nineteen are conjectural.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Errors of Α p.m.</th>
<th>Corrected to</th>
<th>By</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. 331 Δ ἔφη ἐγώ</td>
<td>ἔφην ἐγώ</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>333 Δ δεῖ</td>
<td>δῆ</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; E οὐκοῦν</td>
<td>οὐκ ἀν οὐν</td>
<td>A² mg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336 E οἶον τε σὺ</td>
<td>οἶον γε σὺ</td>
<td>Bekker (οἶον γε Ε)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>339 Β καὶ αὐτὸς</td>
<td>καὶ αὐτὸ</td>
<td>A²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342 Α δεῖ αἶ</td>
<td>δῆ</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>345 C πιαίνει</td>
<td>πιαίνει</td>
<td>A² mg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>346 Α οἶο</td>
<td>οἶον</td>
<td>A²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; B ξυμφέρον</td>
<td>ξυμφέρει</td>
<td>q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347 Α δο</td>
<td>δο</td>
<td>Μ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; C δεῖ δῆ</td>
<td>δεῖ δῆ</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; E πότερον ὅς</td>
<td>πότερον</td>
<td>Μ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>348 Ε ράτων</td>
<td>ράτων</td>
<td>Χ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>351 Α ἔφη</td>
<td>ἔφην</td>
<td>q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; C σοῦ</td>
<td>σῶ</td>
<td>A²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; D διαφέρομεν</td>
<td>διαφέρομαι</td>
<td>Π</td>
</tr>
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</table>

To these perhaps two more should be added:—

iv. 442 B προοίμεν Stobaeus.
444 C αὖτα μὲν οὖν Stobaeus.
## Appendix II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Errors of A p.m.</th>
<th>Corrected to</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>352 Ε φαμέν</td>
<td>φάμεν</td>
<td>Steph.</td>
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<td>354 Β ἐγώμαι</td>
<td>ἐγώ μοι</td>
<td>π</td>
</tr>
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<td>360 Ε ἐαυτῷ</td>
<td>ἐαυτῷ</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361 Α ἀπ’ αὐτῆς</td>
<td>ἀπ’ αὐτῆς</td>
<td>Eusebius</td>
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<tr>
<td>363 Α τῷ δίκαιῳ</td>
<td>τῷ δίκαιῳ</td>
<td>ι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>364 Β λιτοὶ δὲ στρεπτοίτε</td>
<td>στρεπτοῖ δὲ τε</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>365 Ε καὶ ἡμῶν</td>
<td>ἡμῶν</td>
<td>ι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>366 Α αἱ τελεταί</td>
<td>αἱ τελεταί αἱ μέγα</td>
<td>Π</td>
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<tr>
<td>„ „ „ δὲ</td>
<td>„ „ „ δὲ</td>
<td>Α²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>367 Α ἀποσχοίμην</td>
<td>ἀποσχοίμην</td>
<td>Ε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>370 Α ῥάδιον</td>
<td>ῥάδιον</td>
<td>ι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>„ „ εἴη</td>
<td>„ „ εἴη</td>
<td>ι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>371 Β ἀλλορίωσ</td>
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<td>ι</td>
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<tr>
<td>376 Β γίγνεται</td>
<td>γίγνεται; ἵνα μη...</td>
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<tr>
<td>378 Β δοκῶ</td>
<td>δοκεῖ</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>„ „ μᾶλλον</td>
<td>Π Μ</td>
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<td>Α²</td>
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<td>„ „ εὐθείωθαί</td>
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<td>„ „ „ ὥς ὁληται</td>
<td>ι</td>
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<td>Ξ</td>
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<td>τὸ περὶ</td>
<td>Ξ q</td>
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<tr>
<td>ἱατρικῆν</td>
<td>ἱατρικῆν</td>
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<td>By</td>
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<tr>
<td>V. 455 B τὸ μὲν</td>
<td>τὸν μὲν</td>
<td>A²</td>
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<tr>
<td>455 E γυμνοῦσθαι</td>
<td>μίγνυσθαι</td>
<td>Π</td>
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<tr>
<td>460 D προδομομέθεα</td>
<td>προδομήθεα</td>
<td>x Stob.</td>
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<tr>
<td>461 A φύσας· ἢ ἰκάστους</td>
<td>φύσας· ἢ ἐφ' ἰκάστους</td>
<td>Ξ (yun. ἐφ' ἰ. A²)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Eusebius</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ἐκεῖνα</td>
<td>Ξ</td>
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<td>Vind. F (corr.)</td>
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<td>Prinsterer (ἀς ἐφ' ἐκάστως q)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>πασῶν</td>
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<td>495 A ἰδα</td>
<td>ὅρα</td>
<td>Π M</td>
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<td>Schleierm.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ὁ τοιοῦτος</td>
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<td>ὡς</td>
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<td>νέων</td>
<td>Π</td>
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<td>530 C ἐξ ἀρχῆς του</td>
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<td>κακῶν</td>
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<td>538 D καταλύθη</td>
<td>καταβάλη</td>
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<td>VIII. 544 C καὶ ἡ πασῶν</td>
<td>καὶ πασῶν</td>
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Errors of A p.m. | Corrected to | By
---|---|---
VIII. 544 C δ.αφείγουσα | διαφέρεωσα | Χ
546 D ἡμίν | ἡμῖν | Π Μ
549 A τισω | τις ἄν | Χ
551 C ἥ τισω | ἥσιν | Ast
 | δὲ ὁδὴ καλὰν | Α³
553 B ἡ τῆν ἄλλην | ἡ τῶν ἄλλων | Μ
 | τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν | τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν | q
554 B καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλοντα | καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλοντα | Schneider
556 E ἐσι γὰρ οὐδὲν | ἐσι παρ' οὐδὲν | Baiter
557 E ἐπιθυμή | ἐπιθυμή | Χ
 | ἐν γαῖς καὶ δικάζεις | ἐν γαῖς καὶ δικάζεις | L. Campbell
562 B ἦν ὑπερπλαῦτος | ἦν 'που πλοῦτος | q
567 E τις δὲ αὐτῶν | τι δὲ; αὐτῶν | Π
568 D τιμὴ | τιμὴ | L. Campbell
 | τὰ τῶν πολυμένων | τὰ τῶν πολυμένων | Π Μ
569 A ὑπὸ | ὑπὸ | q
IX. 571 B ἑγαλῶ | ἐν καλῷ | M
 | ὑπὸ ὀλίγῳ? | ἐν λόγῳ | Α³
572 D ἀπολαβῶ | ἀπολαβῶν | Π
573 B ἐπαισχυνόμενος | ἐπαισχυνόμενος | Π
576 D ἀρτῇ | ἀρτῇ | Α³ mg.
580 D δὲ δὲ | δὲ δὲ | M (corr.) Χ
 | τὸ λογιστικὸν δέ- | τι ὁδόμεθα | Graser
 | δέκται | τῆς ἁληθής | L. Campbell
581 D ποιώμεθα | τῆς ἁληθῆς | Θ (corr.) ι
 | τῆς ἱδρυμῆς | τιμῆ μὲν | Α³
582 C τὶ μὴν | ἐφὴν ἐγὼ | Α³
584 B ἔφην δ’ ἐγὼ | κατὰ | Α³
 | ἐφην ἐγὼ | ψυχής | Α³
585 D τῆς ψυχῆς | θεύται | x (Χ corr.)
590 E βουλεύεται | ἔτι | Μ
591 B ἔτι | ἤσσει | Ast
 | ὀνυκώναι | add. | Α³ (ἐν τοῖς for έτέρως) Π
Χ. 600 D ὁμίλουσιν | add. | Α³
### Appendix II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Errors of A p.m.</th>
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<tr>
<td>$x$. 603 B ἡ κατὰ</td>
<td>ἡ καὶ κατὰ</td>
<td>$A^2$</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; E ψυχῆς</td>
<td>τύχης</td>
<td>$π$</td>
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<td>ἀλρέι</td>
<td>$Σ$</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; C πλήγουντος</td>
<td>πληγέοντος</td>
<td>$π$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; D λατρείαν</td>
<td>λατρείαν</td>
<td>$q$</td>
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<td>607 B ἀπολλογίσθω</td>
<td>ἀπολλογήσθω</td>
<td>$M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>608 A αἰσθάμεθα</td>
<td>αἰσθάμεθα ἡ</td>
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<td>609 B ψυχῆ ὁρὰ ... ἀ νῦν ὁμ.</td>
<td>add.</td>
<td>$A^2$</td>
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<td>610 A ὀρθότατα ἃν</td>
<td>ὀρθότατα γ'</td>
<td>L. Campbell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611 C διαθέτειν</td>
<td>διαθέτειν</td>
<td>$Σ$ (beat. M)</td>
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<td>612 B ἐπημένακαν</td>
<td>ἐπημένακαν (sic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; ἐγώ</td>
<td>εἰς</td>
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<td>613 E ὁρὰ</td>
<td>ὁρὰ εἰ</td>
<td>$A^2$ mg.</td>
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<td>614 A ἐκάτερον</td>
<td>ἐκάτερος</td>
<td>$Σ$ (corr.)</td>
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<td>615 B πολλοὶ</td>
<td>πολλοῖ</td>
<td>$Σ$ (pollois D</td>
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<td>616 A εἰς δ τῶν</td>
<td>δἰ εἰς τῶν τάρταρων</td>
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<tr>
<td>617 B τῶν τρίτων</td>
<td>τρίτων</td>
<td>$q$</td>
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<tr>
<td>620 B ὄσαύτως ἐλεός. τῆς</td>
<td>ὄσαύτως· ἐλεοσῆν</td>
<td>Vind. F Plutarch</td>
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</table>
# APPENDIX III.

**Correction of Errors and Omissions in Bekker's Collation of Π and Ζ. By C. Castellani.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steph.</th>
<th>Bekker (1823)</th>
<th>Venetus Π</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. 330 B</td>
<td>9, 7</td>
<td><strong>ἄλλ' οὐ ἦς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἄρετὴν;</strong> (omitting <strong>ἐς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. ἀρ' ὄν ... ἐς τὴν τῶν ἵππων)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>335 B</td>
<td>19, 6–8</td>
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<tr>
<td>336 E</td>
<td>22, 6</td>
<td><strong>εἰ γὰρ τι</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>340 E</td>
<td>30, 14</td>
<td><strong>ἀκριβολογεῖ</strong></td>
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<td>, E</td>
<td>,</td>
<td><strong>καὶ ὁ δρχων ἢμαρτε οτ.</strong></td>
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<td>342 A</td>
<td>33, 1–3</td>
<td><strong>καὶ τῇ ... σκέψεται (not omitted)</strong></td>
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<td>, B</td>
<td>, 3</td>
<td><strong>ἥ ομει αὐτῆς οτ.</strong></td>
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<td>35, 6</td>
<td><strong>ἤ ὡς ἀληθῶς</strong></td>
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<td>, E</td>
<td>36, 10</td>
<td><strong>τοῖς τε ὀλείοις</strong></td>
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<td>350 D</td>
<td>49, 9</td>
<td><strong>ἤμῳ πλαηετ ἀρ. κείσθω</strong></td>
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<td>50, 9</td>
<td><strong>τῇ ἐνισκεφασθαί</strong></td>
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<td>51, 7</td>
<td><strong>καὶ μίση</strong></td>
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<td>53, 4</td>
<td><strong>ὅτι οτ.</strong></td>
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<td>353 B</td>
<td>54, 9–11</td>
<td><strong>ἐστὶν ἔργον; Ναι. (omitting ἐστιν. ἄρ'</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>όν ... ἢν τι ἔργον;)</strong></td>
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<td>59, 7</td>
<td><strong>εἰν τοι ἔκατα δοκῆ</strong></td>
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<td>70, 19</td>
<td><strong>στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε καὶ</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>366 A</td>
<td>73, 11</td>
<td><strong>αὐ μέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ</strong></td>
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<td>370 C</td>
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<td><strong>ἐν κατὰ (not ἐν ἢ κατὰ)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>371 E</td>
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<td>317, 20.</td>
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<td>p. l.</td>
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<td>VIII. 543 D</td>
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<tr>
<td>544 A</td>
<td>„, 16</td>
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<tr>
<td>547 B</td>
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<td>„, B</td>
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<td>„, D</td>
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<td>„, E</td>
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<tr>
<td>558 C</td>
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<tr>
<td>559 A</td>
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<tr>
<td>560 A</td>
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<tr>
<td>562 C</td>
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<tr>
<td>„, E</td>
<td>419, 5</td>
<td>καὶ before ἰδία omitted</td>
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</table>
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| 604 E | 484, 17 | αὐτὸ ὥτι |
| „, E | „, „ | μμομέμενον |
| 607 C | 489, 20 | κηλεῖ |
| 611 A | 496, 11 | διάπτωσον |

N.B.—Some of the above corrections have been anticipated by Stallbaum and others; see Schneider’s Preface, p. xxxi. The general result is to raise somewhat the character of Π and also to establish more clearly its affinity to the later MSS. D K q β′.

L. C.
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<th>Venetus Σ</th>
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<td>ἀλλ' ... ἐν ψυχῇ ὁμ.</td>
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<td>368, 16</td>
<td>καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις</td>
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<td>Steph.</td>
<td>Bekker (1823)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>561 D</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>585 C</td>
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<td>X. 597 E</td>
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<td>600 A</td>
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<td>602 A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>604 C</td>
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<td>612 D</td>
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<td>620 B</td>
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APPENDIX IV.
[By E. Rostagno.]

DE COD. 4 PLUTEI XXVIII, QUI CAESENAE IN
BIBL. MALATESTIANA ASSERVATUR.

Codex est bombycinus, exequite saeculo XII maiore ex parte, ut
videtur, exaratus, foliis 418, versibus plerumque quadragenis, aut
singulis et quadragenis. Ad formam voluminis quod attinet, hanc
ita sum mensus: 0, 228-40 x 0, 339-41. Complectitur autem 52
quaterniones, qui octonis foliis constant, praeter quaternionem 40
[μ], cui unum deficit: in textu tamen nulla lacuna hic deprehenditur.
Singulorum quaternionum seriem numeri, graecis literis exarati, atque
in infimo ultimae paginae margine rubro charactere depicti, repre-
sentant. Postremo quaternio 49 [μθ], quamquam unus paginae
lacuna laborat (vide sis Παλαιστίνη 5', p. 510 d) nihil minus octo
foliis et ipse constat.

Notandum interim est, in hisce 52 quaternionibus haud contineri
tria ff., quibus volumen incipit, quaeque seorsim ab illis in vol.
collocata sunt.

Insunt praeterea in ipso voluminis ingressu duo ff. membranacea,
interioris integumenti locum obtinentia (ut vulgo dicunt ‘fogli di
guardia’), binis columnis exarata, saeculoque circiter xrv conscripta.
De re theologica in illis agitur, ut textus quidem docere nos videtur.
Hinc, speciminis ergo, quae sequuntur ex scripsi:

‘Quia [?] in superioribus consideramus qualiter deus sit secundum
se ipsum, restat considerandum qualiter sit in cogitatione nostra, id
est, quomodo cogitetur a creaturis. Circa hoc quaeruntur xiii. Primo
utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit essentiam dei videre. Secundo
utrum dei essentia videatur ab intellectu per animi [?] speciem creatam.
Tertio utrum oculo corporeo dei essentia possit videri.’ Et q. s.

Provenisse hae duae paginae videntur ex eodem libro atque opere,
e quo nonnulla alia folia avulsa sunt, ut interioris integumenti locum,
Appendix IV.

ut ita dicam, obtinerent in codd. qui sunt 3 Plut. xxviii
1 Cod. 2 Plut. xxviii
2 Cod. 5 Plut. xxviii
3 Cod. 3 Plut. xxvii

In fine autem codicis una pagina bombycina locum interioris integumenti obtinet.

Primo aspectu codex bifarium dividi posse videtur: altera enim pars voluminis e charta dente, ut dicunt, polita constat, altera (4v–171v) e charta obsoleta, minus levigata, ut bibulam eam prope dicas. Ex quo fit, ut in hac priore parte folia 12r–43v et 113r–171v, cum atramentum sucum, ut ita dicam, charta elicuisset, nigrescentem speciem prae se ferant. Alterius autem partis paginae charactere ad rubrum vergente plerumque sunt exaratae.

Quod ad manus, ut dicunt, attinet, duas in primis scripturas codex, de quo agitur, exhibet: altera, satis quidem elegans atque nitida, qua maior operis pars exarata est, minu tus characteribus constat, nitidis atque subrubentibus; altera autem incompta, deflexis characteribus, saepius nigricantibus, impolitis crassioribusque constans, duorum scriptorum imperitiorem manum redoet. Ut de duobus hisce scriptoribus, seu mavis, duabus hisce manibus nonnulla subiciam, hoc arbitror animadversione dignum in primis esse, duas scilicet has scripturas per alternas vices saepius ita continuari, ut altera alteram vel in medias paginas plerumque sequatur: quod nimirim ut in promptu esset, paginas descriendas curavi, incompta—ut in superioribus dixi—scriptura crassiorque charactere exaratas, et duas manus illas redolentes. Hinc luculentem patebit dimidiam ferme paginam saepius altera manu conscriptam esse, quam paulo sequioris aevi esse merito dicas.

Altera manu igitur haec ff. exarata sunt:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Altera pars f.</th>
<th>Inferior</th>
<th>Folium</th>
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</thead>
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<td>99v.</td>
<td>122v.</td>
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<tr>
<td>112v.</td>
<td>116v.</td>
<td>123v.</td>
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<tr>
<td>118v.</td>
<td>119v.</td>
<td>124v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120v.</td>
<td>121v.</td>
<td>125v.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Cod. 3 Plut. xxviii duo ff. exhibet, ut in voluminis principio, ita in fine: alterum folium autem cum codicis ligneo integumento compactum est.
2 Cod. 2 Plut. xxviii duo ff. exhibet in principio, quorum alterum cum ligneo codicis integumento compactum est.
3 Cod. 5 Plut. xxviii duo ff. exhibet in fine.
4 Cod. 3 Plut. xxvii duo ff. exhibet in principio.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Folium</th>
<th>131v.</th>
<th>Maior pars folii</th>
<th>168v.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>132v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>169v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>135v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>170v.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>136v.</td>
<td>Inferior pars folii</td>
<td>171v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>137v.</td>
<td>Folium</td>
<td>171v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>139v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>172v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>140v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>174v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>141v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>175v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>142v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>177v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>144v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>179v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>145v.</td>
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<td>180v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>147v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>148v.</td>
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<td>184v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>153v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>191v.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>154v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>192v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maior pars folii</td>
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<td>200v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>202v.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>157v.</td>
<td>Altera pars folii</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>158v.</td>
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<td>160v.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>163v.</td>
<td>Altera pars folii</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>166v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>211v.</td>
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Alter autem manu haec ff. sunt conscripta:

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<tr>
<th>Folium</th>
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<th>Folium</th>
<th>246v.</th>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>216v.</td>
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<td>248v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>260v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>233v.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>245v.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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</table>
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Folium 295r. Folium 344v.
Folium 341v. 357r.
Folium 344v. 357v.
Folium 379r. inde e verbis k.t.l. (cf. Poliit. a', p. 335 e).

"τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεὶ αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὴν ἵχθῳς βλάψων ὀφείλεσθαι Folium 379r. inde e verbis k.t.l."

"ἵχθρα στάσις κέλθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ αὐλοτρόπου πόλεμος κ.τ.λ."
"πάντα τούτων τὰνατι ἱπάρχει."

(cf. Poliit. e', p. 470 b).

λέγω γὰρ διότερ νῦν κ.τ.λ." (cf. sis Poliit. 379v.

Poliit. a', p. 343 ε sqq.).

Folium 393 (sc. 393v, 393v) erectioribus litteris atque rotundis exaratum est. In hac autem parte τῆς Poliitías literam i subscriptam reperimus, quam nusquam in decem libris codex exhibet.

Folium 392 (sc. 392r, 392v) deflexo maioreque charactere est exaratum, codem nimirum atque folia 1, 2r, quae εἰσαγωγὴν τοῦ ἄλθουν complectuntur. F. 392 autem ceteris glutino connexum est.

Pag. 198r et alteram partem pag. 199r diversa manus conscripsisse videtur. Postremo ff. 12–35 nigrucrante scriptura quae ceteris insignia sunt gravique et crasso charactere: paulo sequiori aevö haec diversaque manu exarata videntur.

Ad scholia quod attinet, quibus marginalibus codex es adspersus, duabus diversis manibus conscripta ea esse constat; pars enim scriptura nitidissima, alia contra inelegante ac recentiore exarata sunt. Quod autem ad Poliitías decem libros spectat, tres manus deprehendi hic possunt: nonnullost enim multo recentior manus notavit, characteribus minutis nexibusque plerumque implicitis.

Horum schol. speciminis loco quae sequuntur ita ex scripsi, ut signum quod est * recentioribus apposuerim.

Poliit. a', 328 δ extr. ὡς εἰ ἵσθι τῇ ἐνοχῇ κ.τ.λ.] σημεῖωσαί λόγον ἡδοναί

329 A. παλαιάν παρανομεῖν] περὶ "ἀεὶ κολοκύ τοι κολοκύνν ἵππει"

330 D. σημ. τοῦ ἱουστινοῦ τοῦ λόγον

337 A. ἤπο υἱῶν τῶν δεινῶν] δεινῶν*

359 D. ἱστορία τοῦ γίγνου

372 B. κριθῶν ἀλήθη πένθαινες πυρῶν ἀλευρα μάξαι τε

372 C. καὶ τραγήματα σου τραγήματα

372 C. E. τρυφέαν πύλων

372 C. E. extr. ἄλλην καὶ ἀγείς πόλεως
Appendix IV.

Πολιτ. Β', 372 ε extr. φλεγμαίνουσα πόλεις

378 B. θεών οι πρώτοι τι καὶ μέγιστοι] σημ. τίναι πρώτους καὶ μεγίστους θεών λέγει*

379 B. πρώτος τύπος θεολογίας, ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι τῶν κακῶν ὁ θεός

380 D. δεύτερος τύπος θεολογίας, ὅτι ὁ θεός ἀμετάβλητος

382 A init. τρίτος τύπος θεολογίας, ὅτι ἀληθείς ὁ θεός

388 B. ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀγνοια] τὸ ἴσεος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πρώτων*

388 C. μέγιστος θεών ὁ Ζεύς

390 C. τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων κ.τ.λ.] λόγων, λέξεως*

394 D. ἐπιστῶθα σαφέως δηλοῖται τὸ "λόγων" τι τὸ "λέξεως" σημαίνει*

398 E. μεσολυδιστὶ καὶ θρηνώδεις* συντονολυδιστὶ*

399 A. δαφνιστὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπεις*

400 B. ὀίμαι δὲ με ἀκηκοίναι, κ.τ.λ.] μόθων ὀνόματα*

401 E. τι εὑρέθη

402 E. περὶ τῶν ἀγάθων

403 E. τῶν τῶν ἀσκητῶν] ἀσκητὰ*

404 A. κομψοτέρας δὴ τῶν κ.τ.λ.] τίς στρατιωτῶν ἀσκησις

405 B. ἀμεσοφαλῆς εἰς ὑγίειας*

406 A. ἔστια*

407 E. ἀπεικονίσεις*

409 D. φύσις τε καὶ κατάρροις] φύση | καταρρος*

410 B. ἐπιζυθεῖται*

416 B. ὅτι τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ κ.τ.λ.] ἡ νῦν λατρικῇ, παιδαγωγικῇ τῶν νοσημάτων

Et alia multa id genus.

416 D. κοινὸν Βίον καὶ εὐτελῆ τοῖς φύλοι βιοτίον

421 A. λίπως καὶ πενία διαφορίζει τοὺς δημιουργούς

436 B. Δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν ἀντικειμένων κ.τ.λ.] σημ. τὴν πρά-

470 B extr. σημ. τί διαφέρει πόλεμοι στάσεωι

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Polem. c', 477 b. ἐπι ἄλλη ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ κ.τ.λ. ἢ ὀφαλω δεῖ γράφεσθαι. τις . . . κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν ἢ κατ' ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐκατέρα τῆς αὐτῆς δύνας

,, s', 499 c extr. ἀπειρά (sic) ο ὁ παρειληνθεῖς χρόνος
,, g'. 518 d extr. αἰ μὲν τοῖνυ ἄλλας ἀρεταὶ κ.τ.λ. αἰ μὲν ἀρεταὶ κτηταί, ἢ ἀ τῷ χρόνος ἀνμυνο ἡ ψυχή

,, 534 e. θρυγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτική
,, y', 545 c extr. πῶς ἐστὶ ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας τιμωρία
,, θ', 580 b. βασιλικῶν, τιμωρικῶν, ὀλεγαρχικῶν, δημοκρατικῶν, καὶ τυραννικῶν

,, ι', 608 d. σημ. ὃτι ἀδάμετο η ψυχή
,, 611 a. σημ. ὃτι ἀδάμετο η ψυχή καὶ ὃ τι μεταβάλλεται
,,,, d extr. σημ. ὃτι συγγενής ἡ ψυχή τῷ θεῷ
,, 615 b. σημ. ὃτι δηκαπλασίους ἀπόδιδοται τιμωρία (sic)
,, 617 c. σημ. περὶ τῶν μορφῶν
,, 621 a. εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἁθηνᾶς πεδίον σημ. περὶ τοῦ ποσαμοῦ τοῦ τῆς Ἁθηνᾶς

De scholiis hactenus.

Iam vero paucis absolvam de iis quae codex complectitur: in quibus recensendis editione Lipsiensi usus sum Hermanni MDCCC.LXIV (voll. 6).

F. 1r. Rubris litteris et maioribus legiur: "εἰπαγωγῇ εἰς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος βίβλου ἀλβίνου πρόλογος."

Incipit "ὅτι τῷ μελλοντι ἐπιστήμη οὐ Πλάτωνος διαλόγους, προσόκει πρότερον ἐπιστήμη οὐ τοῦτο τί ποτὲ ἐστὶν ὁ διάλογος."

Desinit (f. 2r): "καὶ ὡς αὐτοῦς καὶ ἄντων τρόπον προσφέρεσθαι κακουργοῦνται περὶ τοῦ λόγους."

,, 2v. vacuum est scriptura. Tum occurrunt tabula, rubris litteris exarata, quae titulos ac seriem scriptorum repraesentat. Haec est inscriptio eius:

,, 3r. διαλόγων Πλάτωνος ἀκριβῆς τίναξ.

,, 4r. Sequitur deinde: "βίος Πλάτωνος συγγραφεῖς παρὰ λαερτίου Διογένους (haec autem rubris litteris leguntur)."

Incipit "Πλάτων αἰσθήσεως καὶ περικτότης καὶ ποιήματι ἀδημοί κ.τ.λ."

Desinit (f. 11r): "τὰ μὲν περὶ πλάτωνος τοσαῦτα ἢ ἢ ἢ τὸ δυνατόν ἢ ἢν εὐρεγαγεῖν φιλοπόνων διειλήσασα τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ τῶν-

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Appendix IV.

A pag. 12* incipit Platonis opera, et quidem hoc ordine:

F. 12* εισδοφρων ἢ περὶ ὀσίου.
16* σωκράτους ἀπολογία.
24* κρίτων ἢ περὶ πρακτοῦ.
28* φαιδών ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς.
49* κρατόλος ἢ περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθύττους.
63* θεαίτητος ἢ περὶ ἑπιστήμης.
82* σοφιὰς ἢ περὶ τοῦ δοτοῦ.
97* πολιτικὸς ἢ περὶ βασιλείας.
114* παρακίνητη ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν.
126* φιλήθος ἢ περὶ ἱδυνής.
143* συμπόσιον ἢ περὶ ἔρωτος.
158* φαιδρος ἢ περὶ καλοῦ.
174* ἀλκιβίαδης ἢ περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου.
183* ἀλκιβίαδης ἢ περὶ προσευχῆς.
187* ἵππαρχος ἢ φιλοκέρδης.
189* ἑραστών ἢ περὶ φιλοσοφίας.
191* θεών ἢ περὶ σοφίας.
194* χαρύδης ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης.
202* λάκης ἢ περὶ ἀνθρώπου.
209* λύσεως ἢ περὶ φιλίας.
215* εὐθύνης ἢ ἐρυθρός.
216* πρωταγόρας ἢ σοφιάται.
242* γοργός ἢ περὶ ῥητορικῆς.
266* μέλινων ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς.
274* ἵππαις μεῖζον ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.
282* ἵππαις κλίττων ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.
286* ἰον ἢ περὶ ἰλάδος.
289* μενεξενὸς ἢ ἐπιστάμοιοι.
294* περὶ δικαίου. πλατῶνος νοθευόμενον ἀ.
295* περὶ ἀρετῆς.
296* δημοδόκος ἢ περὶ τοῦ ξυμβουλεύεσθαι.
298* σίγυρος ἢ περὶ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι.
300* ἀλκυόν ἢ περὶ μεταμορφώσεως.
301* ἑρμήνῃ ἢ περὶ πλούτου ἐν ἄλλῃ ἐρασίστρατος.
306* ἀξίων ἢ περὶ δικαίου.
308* τεῖλος τῶν νοθευμένων.
310* κλειστοὺς ἢ προτερπτικὺς.

310* τίμιοις ὄ μερος (Incipit: "Τίμιοις ὄ λοκρός τάθ' ἐφα")

1 Tituli omnes rubris maioribusque literis constant.

M 2
F. 313. τίμασις ἡ πελοφύσεως.

„ 332. κρίσις ἡ ἀδιαλυτικός.

„ 336. μύσως.

„ 338. τυλιγόρον σαμίον ἔπη τὰ ἑνεστὶ τὰ χρυσά.— (cf. Cod. 9 Plut. 85, Bibl. Laurentianae, pag. 3).

Incipit haec carmina:

ἀδιάλυτος μὲν πρῶτα θεοὺς, νόμω ὡς διάκινεν
touς τε κατάνθοινοι σεβε δαιμόνως ἐννομα μὲζων κ.τ.λ.

Desinit ibid.: "Ἰσοταῖ ἀδιάλυτος θεὸς ἀμβροσος οὐκέτι θυρήσπτος;—"

Denum f. 339. "πλάτως πολιτικά;—"

Reliquum vol. hic dialogos complectitur, qui f. 418 desinit.

In infimo margine pag. 418 literis evanidis legitur: 'ὀπῆ Platonis. dialogi nro 50.'

In dialogis huiusce codicis nomina τῶν προσώπων desunt: locus vero est relictus ad literas saltem eorum initiales ponendas.

Codex demum, de quo hactenus actum est, elegantiori et perpoliti operis speciem quondam prae se tulisse videtur. Oblita enim auro folia circum iam fuere: ad hoc lignea integumenta, corio contacta candentis ferri stigmate perbelle impresso, clavis vel bullis aeneis etiamnunc sunt transfixa.
ESSAY III.

ON PLATO'S USE OF LANGUAGE.

PART I.

On Style and Syntax.

The purpose of the following pages is to bring into a general view some forms of expression and tendencies of grammatical construction, which, although not confined to Plato, more frequently occur in him than in other Greek writers. In treating of his writings, principally from a grammatical point of view, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to separate absolutely between questions of syntax and questions of style; since in the Platonic dialogue, syntactical peculiarities have often a rhetorical motive. Whilst the subject is treated generally, the Republic, as the work immediately in hand, will furnish most of the examples; but reference will occasionally be made to other parts of Plato, and, now and again, to various Greek writers. A distinction will be maintained between those dialogues which represent the earlier or middle style of Plato (e.g. the Symposium, Phaedrus, &c.) and those which reflect his later manner (e.g. the Politicus, Philebus, Laws, &c.)¹.

§ 1. Plato has not one style but several. No great prose writer has command of an instrument so varied, or an equal power of adapting modes of expression to moods of thought and imagination. Without breaking harmony, he passes often from extreme simplicity to the extreme of complexity, according to the subject handled and the spirit in which he is approaching it.

The ground may be cleared by distinguishing between,

(1) Simple statement or narration.—The narrative passages which introduce the dialogues or are interspersed in them are in many places perfectly limpid and clear. Hardly less so is the language in which Plato often clothes his fictitious tales (Egyptian or Phoenician), using a series of short sentences connected with the ingenuous naïveté of the λέισι εἰρομένη. The simplicity of the language often strikingly contrasts with the incredibility of the myth, as, for example, where Protagoras describes the creation of man, or where the Judgement of the Dead is reported by Socrates in the Gorgias, or in Republic X. Plato's simpler style, as Littré has remarked, bears some affinity to that of the genuine writings of Hippocrates.

(2) Ornate narration.—But there are other mythical discourses in which the language becomes more elevated and at the same time more complex, such as the account of the Soul's Migrations in the Phaedrus, the description of subterranean and supramundane regions in the Phaedo, or of the allegorical cavern in the seventh book of the Republic. Here the sentences are longer, and are complicated with explanations, illustrations, maxims, reflexions, and incidental statements, free play being given to fancy,

1 See Phaedr. 277 c παραμονίους λόγους.
Part I: Style.

while the effort to surround the marvellous with an air of naturalness and credibility is still maintained.

(3) Passages of moral elevation.—Distinct from both these narrative modes is the sustained eloquence of such passages as the discourse of Diotima (Symp. 211 D ff.), the reflections of Socrates addressed to Theodorus on the happiness of the philosophic life (Theaet. 172 D–177 C), or the description of the misery of the tyrant in Rep. IX (579 and 591–592); also, to notice some of Plato's later works, the creation of the world in the Timaeus (29–30); the summing up of religious duties in the Laws (v. 726 ff.); or again, in the same dialogue the remarks on the commerce of the sexes (VIII. 835 D ff.), and on the sin of Atheism (x. 887 C–888 D). In these, notwithstanding occasional exuberances, there is uninterrupted harmony and continuity. But there is an entire absence of formality, and only an approach to that rhetorical smoothness and concinnity which Plato well knew how to assume, as is shown by the speech of Agathon in the Symposium.

(4) Question and answer.—As in tragedy στιχωμοθεία is followed by δήσις, so in Plato the pervading dialectic is at one time broken up, at another continuous and concentrated. Socrates everywhere begins with questions, but often (as is explicitly stated in the Gorgias and the Protagoras) he finds it necessary to take the argument into his own hands. In the questioning stage the logical steps are sometimes so numerous and so minute as to seem little more than verbal; sometimes, as in the conversation with Polemarchus (Rep. I. 331 D–336 A), they have a sophistical effect, and, as Adeimantus complains (Rep. VI. 487 B, C), lead the respondent unawares to a paradoxical conclusion. In the Republic, while dramatic effect is nowhere relinquished, the use of question and answer, after the contention with Thrasymachus in Book I, is retained more in form than in substance. But in laying afresh the foundations of the doctrine of Ideas, Socrates
again becomes minutely dialectical (Rep. v. 476 ff., vii. 523 ff.—cp. x. 608 E).

(5) Continuous dialectic.—In departing from the strictly catechetical method, the style becomes in one way more condensed, and in another more expansive; more condensed, because Socrates does not wait so often for the respondent to come up with him, more expansive, because, as he flows along in talk, illustrations multiply. It is to be observed also that the more constructive method of the Republic is assisted by the choice of the respondents, Adeimantus and Glaucon, who, although they are more life-like than the Aristoteles of the Parmenides and have many picturesque differences of character which are dramatically maintained, are, on the whole, predisposed to follow the lead of Socrates (v. 474 A), and are carried for the most part unresistingly by the full stream of Platonic discourse. And, as they are made to stand for the objectors, the adversary is often found more amenable to reason than would be the case if he were present in person (vi. 502 E, cp. Soph. 217 D, 246 D, Parm. 136 B, Theaet. 146 B, 162 B).

§ 2. These remarks lead up to the general question: What relation is there between Plato's use of language and the form in which his works are cast?

Consisting of argument embodied in fiction, his writings fall under conditions both of exactness and inexactness which are peculiar to them 1. His style is consequently distinguished on the one hand (1) by conversational liveliness and freedom, and on the other (2) by dialectical precision.

1 The following passage from Antony Trollope's autobiography shows the consciousness of a modern writer as to the conditions of written dialogue:—'The novel-writer in constructing his dialogue must so steer between absolute accuracy of language—which would give to his conversation an air of pedantry—and the slovenly inaccuracy of ordinary talkers,—which, if closely followed, would offend by an appearance of grimace,—as to produce upon the ear of his readers a sense of reality. If he be quite real, he will seem to attempt to be funny. If he be quite correct, he will seem to be unreal.'
(1) Thought and expression in Plato are in continual movement. Inchoate conceptions grow while being put into words. Illustrations are amplified until they threaten to supplant the original statement, on which they also react. Qualifications are perpetually inserted: abstractions are unexpectedly personified. The more *vivid* of two possible constructions is constantly preferred. Attention is kept on the alert by small dramatic surprises, as when Adeimantus suddenly remembers the ideal state in connexion with the philosopher who is in need of a city, vi. 497 C, or when Glaucon, who thinks that in the tyrannical man he has discovered the most miserable of human beings, is told of one who is yet more miserable, ix. 578 B. Interrogations, adjurations, apostrophes, are abruptly interposed. Crises of the argument are marked by increased liveliness, as when Socrates turns to his respondent with ἀθαύσαι, or when he delights in exaggerating the audacious image of the laughing wave, v. 473 C. At one time, that which is imagined is treated as real, at another, Socrates returns to sad realities, with an outburst of emotion, vii. 536 C. From irony, he sometimes passes to direct seriousness, or with humorous gravity calls attention to some familiar fact, ix. 578 D. And beneath the ebb and flow of outward inconsistencies there is produced a deep impression of advance and growth. (See esp. iii. 412 C, vii. 535 ff.)

Closely connected with this ever-fresh vivacity, indeed another aspect of it, is the obvious freedom from restraint. Plato's sentences are less tied down than those of other writers, even in Greek, to a predetermined form. Constructions are often found to shift through the interposition of some afterthought. Corrections, explanations, restrictions, digressions, break the regularity of grammar and occasion either a new construction or a pleonastic resumption of the previous statement, very often both. One protasis has more than one apodosis and *vice versa*. The
meaning is followed at the expense of concord (as in the agreement of neuter with feminine, or singular with plural) or, conversely, the nearer construction is chosen at the expense of the meaning. The grammatical order of words is modified by emphasis and by the desire of euphony. Verbs and participles are absorbed by the neighbourhood of kindred words. Not only cases but tenses and moods are employed κατὰ πόνεσιν. The language is at one time more explicit, at another more elliptical than would be allowable in a treatise or set speech. Lastly, the tendency which is common in Greek, wherever there are long sentences, to make the construction of the later clauses independent of the main construction, is peculiarly common in the long sentences of Plato.

But through all this licence, which the grammarian is apt to censure for irregularity, the hand of the creative artist is clearly discernible. Plato is not, like Thucydides, continually struggling with a medium of expression which he has imperfectly mastered; but the medium itself is one which has not yet attained to perfect lucidity. He moulds contemporary language to his purpose with the greatest skill. But the formal correctness of Isocrates would ill have suited him. It would be unnatural in 'dear Glaucon' though it is natural enough in Polus to 'speak like a book.' When this is once acknowledged, the meaning is almost always clear, although the combination of subtlety with laxity does sometimes lead to ambiguity. The conversational tone, however, is sometimes fused with rhetoric, and invites comparison with the orators. For sustained force, directness, and rapidity, no style is equal to that of Demosthenes. But the oratorical style of Plato contrasts favourably with the monotonous equability of Isocrates, the plain seriousness of Andocides, and the simple passionateness of Lysias. In ornate passages, Plato often betrays familiarity with poetry; but in his middle period, to which the Republic belongs, epic and lyric elements are more distinctly present
than echoes of tragedy. His language coincides, in some points, with that of comedy, but this will become more apparent in considering his vocabulary. (See Part II: Platonic Diction.) Tragic phrases become more frequent in his later writings, especially the Laws.

(2) While the dialogue of Plato has a conversational, and § 3. sometimes a rhetorical cast. This gives rise to some refinements of construction, and also to an occasional complexity appearing chiefly in two specific ways, (a) coordination, (b) remote connexion.

(a) Coordination.—The disjunctive question, or negation, in which two statements are bound together under a single negative, or interrogative—signifying that they cannot or should not both be true at once—a form of sentence peculiarly Greek, attains a high degree of complexity in Plato. See below, VIII.

(b) Remote connexion.—In Plato, as sometimes in tragedy, the formula of assent or dissent, instead of referring merely to the concluding words of the question, often reverts to the very beginning of a long speech, implying in the respondent a remarkable power of continuous attention (below, X). Similarly, the whole work is bound together with links of allusion to what has preceded, and preparations for what is to come, demanding a sustained interest far surpassing that of ordinary conversation.

2. Syntax.

A Chapter in Grammar.

It follows from what has been said that the sentence in § 4. Plato, when looked at from a grammatical point of view, presents exceptional features both of irregularity and also of regularity, the ordinary structure being modified at once by conversational freedom, and by the effort to be precise and clear. This general statement will now be illustrated
by a series of quotations from the Republic and other
dialogues under the following heads:—

I. Tenses, Moods, and
    Voices of the Verb.
II. Cases and numbers of
    Nouns.
III. Article and Pronoun.
IV. Adverbs and Prepositions.
V. Particles and Conjunctions.
VI. Ellipse and Pleonasm.
VII. Apposition.
VIII. Coordination of Sentences.
IX. Deferred apodosis:
    (Digression and Re-
    sumption).
X. Remote Reference.
XI. Imperfect Constructions.
XII. Changes of Construction.
XIII. Rhetorical figures.
XIV. Order of words.
XV. Grammatical irregularities considered in
    relation to the text.

I. The Verb.

§ 5. 1. TENSES.

(a) The 'aorist of the immediate past,' referring to what
    has just been said or felt, though less common than in
    tragedy, is not infrequent in Plato.

I. 348 E ἀλλὰ τόδε θαύμασα, κ.τ.λ. 'But this surprises me'
    (in what has just been said).

(b) The 'gnomic aorist,' stating a general fact, often
    occurs, especially in describing mental phenomena.

VII. 523 D οὐδαμῶν γὰρ ἡ ὄψις αὐτῆς ἀμα ἐσημένη τὸν δάκτυλον
     τοῦ ναυτίου ἡ δάκτυλον εἶναι. 'Sight nowhere tells her that
     the finger is the opposite of a finger.'

Obs. 1.—In general statements Plato often passes from the present
     to the aorist and vice versa.

I. 338 D, ἐ τίθεται δὲ γε τοῦ νόμου ἑκάστη ἡ ἀρχή . . . θέμεναι δὲ
     ἀπέφηναν, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 551 Λ φιλοχρήματοι . . . ἔγνωτο, καὶ τῶν μὲν πλούσιον ἐπαινοῦσι
      . . . τότε δὲ νόμον τίθεται, κ.τ.λ.

Obs. 2.—The imperfect is used in correlation with this as with the
     ordinary (preterite) aorist.
Part I: Syntax—Verbs.

VII. 524 C μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμηρύν ἔφη . . . διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦτον σαφῆναι μέγα οὐ καὶ σμηρύν ἡ νόησις ἰναγκαζθῇ ἵδειν.

VIII. 547 B εἰλικτήν . . . ἡγέτην . . . ὄμολόγησαν.

IX. 572 D κατέστη εἰς μέσον ὄμφοι τῶν τρόπων, καὶ μετρίως δὲ, ὡς ἤκετο, ἐκάστων ἀπολαίων οὐκ ἀναλείβεται οἴκτε παράνομοι βιον ἦν.

Obs. 3.—The aorist infinitive without ἵν is used in assured anticipation.

V. 457 D οἴμαι . . . πλείστην ὄμφισθητον γενίσθαι. (So the MSS.) See Goodwin, M. and T., § 127.

Of course ἵν might easily drop out before ὄμφ.

(c) The imperfect tense of εἰμί has two special uses in Plato and in other philosophical writers:

a. In reference to what has been previously said or assumed—

III. 406 E ὅτι ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον. 'Because as we suggested (405 C) he has something to do.'

IX. 587 C ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ δημοτικὸς ἦν.

So (according to Ast's conjecture) in X. 603 C μὴ τι ἄλλο *ἤν (MSS. ἦν) παρὰ ταῦτα. Cp. ib. D ἐστασίαζε . . . εἰσχεν.

β. In stating the result of an enquiry, because what a thing is found to be at the end of search, that it was before the search began.

IV. 428 Α δὴλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο ἦν ἦν ἦν τὸ ὑπολειφθέν. 'It was all along nothing else.'

IV. 436 B, C ἵνα ποιεῖσθαι ὅπως ἡ ἀυτοίς ταῦτα ἵνα μερισθῇ, ἐισόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταῦτα ἦν άλλα πλείω. 'They were all the while more than one.'

VI. 497 C τότε δηλώσει ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν τῷ ὄντι θείῳ ἦν. 'This was from the beginning undoubtedly divine.'

(d) The perfect sometimes signifies a fixed habit (cp. Monro's Homeric Grammar, p. 28).

VII. 521 E γυμναστικὴ μὲν ποιεῖ γυγώμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον τετελώται—'is constantly employed.'

VII. 533 B αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσι τέχναι . . . πρὸς θεραπείαν . . . ἀπασα τεταράφασα— apply themselves continually.'

So in VI. 511 A εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω
On Plato's use of Language.

ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκεῖνοι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσις βεβοηθημένοι τε καὶ τετιμημένοι—'usually esteemed and held in honour.'


(a) Conjunctive.—The familiar combination of the 'de-liberative subjunctive' with βούλει, βούλεσθε, occurs in

II. 372 E el δ' ἀν βούλεσθε ... θεωρήσωμεν, οὕτω άποκώλυει. This was misunderstood by the diorthotes of Paris. A. See E. on Text, p. 135.

IX. 577 B βούλει . . . προσποιησόμεθα, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere.

Obs.—In such expressions as τι λέγομεν; πῶς λέγομεν; the MSS. often leave it doubtful whether τι λέγομεν; &c. should not be read.

(b) Optative.—Plato's optatives are sometimes a little difficult to explain, depending rather on the drift of the sentence than on grammatical rule. The following are the chief places in the Republic requiring special treatment.

I. 337 E πῶς . . . ἀν τις ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς . . . ἐπειτα, εἰ τι καὶ οίτει περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἰη . . . ;

The condition implied in the participial clause μὴ εἰδὼς becomes explicit as the sentence proceeds, and is expressed as if εἰ μὴ εἰδείη had followed πῶς ἀν τις ἀποκρίναιτο. Cp. Protag. 327 D εἰ δέοι αὕτων κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, ὅς μὴ παιδεία ἔστι μὴτε δικαστήρια, . . . ἀλλ' εἶναί κυριοὶ τινες.

Here the condition introduced in εἰ δέοι regains its force towards the end of the sentence, which is continued as if the whole from ὅς downwards were a single relative clause (e.g. ὅς μὴ ἔχοισιν οὐ ἔχοισιν, κ.τ.λ.). See Xen. Symp. VIII. 17.

I. 352 E τι δὲ: άκουσίας ἀλλὰ ἢ ὁσίν;

II. 360 B οὕτως ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειν, οὕτως ἄδαματνοις, ὡς ἂν μείνειν, κ.τ.λ.

The clause ὡς δόξειν, although not conditional, seems to fall under Goodwin's law of assimilation (M. and T., §§ 558, 531). But it is to be observed also that the whole of Glaucion's speech proceeds on the assumption that he is putting the case of another (359 B ὡς ὁ λόγος: 361 E μὴ ἐμὲ
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οὗ τε λέγειν, and the mood is affected by the sense of indirect discourse. Cp. IV. 420 C ἐναλληλομενοί εἶν.

II. 361 C δύνην οὖν εἶπε τοῦ δικαίου εἶπε τῶν ὁραέων ... ἕνεκα τοιούτως εἶπ. Glaucos's reasoning is hypothetical, though he tries to treat his supposition as a matter of fact. The language therefore wavers between the indicative and optative: i.e. εἶπε ... εἶπ is brought in, as if εἶπε ... ἔσονται ... ἤδην εἶπεν ἤδην ἤδην ἤδην ἤδην εἶπ.

II. 382 D, E ἀλλὰ δεδώσεις τοὺς ἐκθροὺς ψυχούσοι; In both these cases the construction is continued from a preceding sentence having the optative with ἄν. In the former some editors insert ἄν, and it may possibly have dropped out before ἄλλα.

III. 403 B νομοθετήσεις ... ὁπῶς ὁμιλεῖν προς ἐν τις σπουδαίως. 'In Attic Greek an optative in the relative clause sometimes depends on a verb of obligation ... with an infinitive. ... E.g.

'Ἀλλ' ἐν πόλει στήσεις, τοῦδε χρὴ κλάειν, Soph. Ant. 666.' Goodwin, M. and T., § 555.

III. 410 B, C οἱ καθιστάντες μουσικῆ θαλασσακρατεῖν παιδείαν ὁχι οὖν ἐνεκάτων ὁπωτεύονται καθιστάναι, ἵνα τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα θεραπεύοντο τῇ δὲ τῇν ψυχῆν.'

Madvig would read καθιστάσαν. But this accords ill with κυριεύοντον following. And for the tense cp. VIII. 566 B ἔξενοράκοντος. The indirect discourse here depends on a general statement, which, as Riddell would say, 'belongs to all time' (Digest, § 74), or as Goodwin puts it (M. and T., § 323) 'implies a reference to the past as well as the present.' He quotes Dem. XII. 11 τοῦτον ἔξει τῶν τρόπων ὁ νόμος, ἵνα μὴ δὲ πεισθήσην μηδ' ἐξαπατηθήσην γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ.

IV. 428 C, D ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ἀρτι ὡς ἡμών οἰκισθείση ... ἤ ... βουλεύεται ... ὄντων τρόπων ... πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἀριστα ὁμιλοῦ. Here 'a reference to the past' is implied in the words ἐν τῇ ἀρτι οἰκισθείσῃ. Or the reference to time is altogether vague. Hence in the indirect discourse ὁμιλοῦ, not ὁμιλῆ.
VI. 490 Α ἄρ’ οὖν ὃν ὑπὲρ μετρώς ἀπολογηθομένα δὴ πρὸς τὸ δὲν 
περισσός εἴη ἀμιλλάσθαι ὡς δὲντως φιλομαθῆς, κ.τ.λ.  ‘Shall we 
not make a reasonable defence in saying (what we have 
already indicated),’ &c. There is an implied reference to 
the definition of the philosopher in Bk. v sub fn.  This is 
Professor Goodwin’s ingenious explanation of the difficulty, 
which others have met by conjecturing ἀπελογηθομένα or 
ἀπελογισμένα,—neither of which is justified by the context: 
for v. 474 B ff. is neither, strictly speaking, an ‘apology’ 
nor a ‘reckoning.’ (M. and T., § 676.)

(c) The imperfect indicative in the apodosis of an unreal 
supposition is made more vivid by the absence of ἄν (M. 
and T., § 431).

V. 450 D, Ε πιστεύουσα μὲν γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἐμοὶ εἰδέναι & λέγω, 
καλώς εἶχεν ἡ παραμυθία. ‘Had I been confident in my 
knowledge of the things I say, your comfort were indeed 
welcome.’

(d) Imperative. The third person imperative has a 
special use in dialectic, viz. in stating or admitting a postu-
late or assumption.

VIII. 553 Α ἀπειρύγαθω δῆ, κ.τ.λ.  ‘I may assume that our 
description of oligarchy is complete.’

§ 7. (e) Infinitive. The construction of an infinitive can some-
times be gathered only imperfectly from the context:—

V. 467 C τούτο μὲν ἄρα ύπαρκτέον, θεωροῦν τολέμου τοὺς παῖδας 
ποιεῖν, προσμηχανάσθαι δ’ αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλειαν, καὶ καλῶς ἔξει γὰρ;

προσμηχανάσθαι is governed by the notion of obligation 
(ἀέ or χρῆ) implied in ύπαρκτέον, and the construction is 
assisted by the inf. ποιεῖν coming between. This point 
will be further illustrated in considering imperfect con-
structions (below, XI).

Epexegetric uses of the infinitive: a. following an ad-
jective:—

I. 330 C χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ἕγγενέσθαι εἰσὶν. ‘Troublesome 
to converse with.’
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VII. 537 B ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πράξαι. 'Incapable of (admitting) any other employment.'

Obs.—In the difficult place I. 333 εἰς καὶ λάθειν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποίησαι, unless something is wrong with the text, there is a double construction of this kind:—'most clever to implant,' 'most clever to escape notice (in implanting).'</Obs> Schneider's emendation ἐμποίησας saves the grammar at the expense of natural emphasis.

β. In apposition with a noun:
VII. 531 C ἄλλ' οὖκ εἰς προβηλήματα ἀνδρασιν, ἐπισκοπέαν, κ.τ.λ.
VIII. 566 B τῷ δ' τυραννικὸν αἰτήμα ... εξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

The infinitive, instead of the participle as elsewhere, sometimes follows φαίνεσθαι:
IV. 432 D φαίνεσθαι πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῶν ἕξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι. 'It has manifestly been rolling (ἐκυλίνδείτο) at our feet all the while.'

(f) The participle. In expanding his sentences Plato § 8. makes continual use of participial expressions.

I. For pleonastic (or expository) uses see especially III. 397 C ἥ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων ἐπηνυχάωσιν ... ἥ τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἥ ἐξ ἀμφότερων τινι ἔσωσαννύστες. 'They hit on one or other of these modes, or on a third, which they compound out of both.'

VI. 494 E τί οἴδεθα δράσειν ... οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔργον, πάντα δὲ ἔσωσιν λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας;
VII. 527 A ὡς γὰρ ... πράξεως ἐνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι λέγοντες τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα δέ οὕτως φθεγγόμενοι.

A more doubtful instance is VI. 496 A οὖν γρήσιον οὖν ἄγων ἐποιήσεως ἄξιον ἀληθεύσῃ ἔκόμησον, where the awkwardness may be obviated by reading ἄξιον ὡς Ven. II).

2. Alternation of participle with infinitive. In Plato's long sentences the participle sometimes alternates with the infinitive:
VI. 488 B ff. (in the allegory of the mutinous crew)

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στασίαζοντος ... φάσκοντος μηδὲ διδακτῶν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὡς διδακτῶν ἐτοίμους κατατέμενες, αὐτοῖς δὲ αὐτῷ ἂν τῷ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύθηκα, κ.τ.λ.

The infinitive περικεχύθηκα may have been occasioned, but is not grammatically accounted for, by κατατέμενες coming between. This point will be more fully illustrated below, under Changes of Construction.

Obs.—As the use of the participle with the article after the preposition instead of the infinitive is doubtfully admitted by some editors in several passages of Thucydides (i. 2, § 5; iv. 63, § 1; v. 7, § 2; vi. 84, § 10: viii. 105, § 2), it may be worth observing that in Rep. i. 346 β δὲ τὸ ἐξεμφαίνειν the best MSS. have δὲ τὸ ἐξεμφάνειν. Cp. Phileb. 58 c, Laws viii. 831 ε.

3. The participle passive, mostly neuter, denoting a mode of action or existence, occurs in VIII. 561 A ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀνακαλοῖς ἐπίθυμαις τρεφομένου: X. 596 D (τρόπος) ταχύ δημιουργοῦμενος, ‘a manner in which it is easy to produce the effect;’ cp. Theaet. 184 C τὸ δὲ εὐχερές ... καὶ μὴ ... ἐξεταζόμενον, ‘an easy-going method, without strict examination.’

4. The accusative and participle, with or without ὡς, have the effect of a reported statement. With ὡς: I. 345 Ἐ ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖς ἄφελλαν ἐσομένην, ‘implying that they would not profit thereby.’ II. 383 A ὡς μήτε αὐτοῖς γόρτας ὅταν κ.τ.λ., ‘conveying the impression that the Gods themselves are not impostors.’ III. 390 A, B τὶ δὲ; ποιεῖν ... δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι ... ἀκούειν νῦν ... ἦ Διὰ ... ὡς ... ἐπιλαμ-θανόμενον, ‘do you think it fitting that a young man should hear such a poetical description, or that he should hear Zeus described as forgetting,’ &c. VI. 511 D ὡς ... τὴν διάνοιαν ὁδοιαν. VIII. 560 D ὡς ἀγροκλαν ... ὁδοιαν. Cp. Phaedrus 245 A πεισθῆς ἡτὶ ... ἐσομένης. Without ὡς: VI. 511 A μεν τὸ εἴδος ἐλεγον, ὑποθέσει δὲ ἀναγκαζόμενην ψυχήν χρήσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήσεων αὐτοῦ, ‘I spoke of this kind as intellectual, but (said) that the mind was compelled to use hypothesis in investigating it.’

Obs. i.—In x. 604 β the transition from the genitive to the
accusative ὤς ὠβύε δήλου δύτω... ὠβύε... προβ.ίουν is occasioned by the impersonal verb.

Obs. 2.—The subject of an infinitive or participle following a verb is accusative even when the same with the main subject, if this happens to be considered in two aspects. X. 621 ἐὰν... ἀντὸν... καίμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ. 'He saw that he himself was lying.' The previous narrative referred to the disembodied soul.

Obs. 3.—The idiomatic use of the aorist participle with γι in a reply = 'Let me first,' &c. (Phaedr. 228 θίχας γι πρῶτον, ἄφαλο-

της, κ.τ.λ.) occurs in vi. 507 λ διομολογησάμενός γ', ἔφην, κ.τ.λ. 'Not until I have come to a clear understanding.' Cp. I. 338 c ἐὰν μάθω γι πρῶτον with similar ellipse.

For a slightly different idiom with the present participle, see viii. 554 κ αὐχμηρός γι τις... ὡν, 'Ay, because he is a shabby fellow,' and the note in loco.

Obs. 4.—The gerundive in -τέον is construed with the accusative: π. 400 ὁ ταύτα γι λόγο ἀκολουθητέον.

So also in v. 467 θ βιβλασάμενος... ἀκτίον, 'we must have them taught and bring them,' where see note, and cp. Tim. 88-β, κ τὸν δὴ μαθηματικὸν... καὶ τὴν τὸν σώματος ἀποδοτέον κίνησιν, 'the hard student must give his body corresponding exercise.'

Obs. 5.—The subordination of participle to participle is very frequent:

viii. 555 θ ἐνέκτεις ἄργυριον τετράσκοιτε. 'Stinging by inserting money.'

N.B.—A little-noticed idiom, occurring also in Herodotus and Thucydides, is the use of the aorist participle referring to a time subsequent to that of the principal verb. Parm. 127 δ τὸν... γενω-

μένον (= δ οὐσιον τοῦτον ἐγένετο). Goodwin, M. and T., § 152.

3. Voices.

(a) Active.

a. Impersonal. X. 604 β ὡς ὁ με δήλου δύτω... ὁ με εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαίνουν τῷ χαλεπῷς φέρουτε.

IX. 580 δ ἐξεταίρης, sc. τὸ πράγμα (Theact. 200 θ δεῖγεν αὐτό. Phaedo 73 B σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ).

b. With a neuter subject, which signifies some condition, aspect, or attitude of mind.

IV. 442 E ε ὁ ἡμῶν ἐτί ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμφισβητεῖ. 'If there be
any objection lurking in our mind.' More often in the participle (cp. Thucydides).

IV. 439 B τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἀγοντος ... ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν. 'The appetite of thirst, that drags him to the act of drinking.'

γ. Intransitive with cognate subject.

v. 463 D αὕτη ... ἡ ἀλλαὶ φήμαι ... ὑμήσουσιν ...; 'are not these and none but these the strains that will resound in song?'

(δ) Passive.—Verbs not strictly transitive acquire a passive voice.

a. With the cognate accusative of the active for implied subject.


β. With the remote object of the active for subject.

I. 336 E, 337 A ἡμᾶς ... ὑπὸ ὑμῶν ... χαλεπαίνεσθαι (= ὑμᾶς χαλεπαίνεις ἡμῖν).

X. 602 A συνεῖναι τῷ εἰλότῳ καὶ ἐπιτάπεσθαι (Sc. ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰλότου, i.e. τῶν εἰλότων, ἀτρότων εἰπτάτετε αὐτῷ).

This use, of which πιστεύεσθαι τι, 'to be entrusted with anything,' is the most familiar example, is extended in the later dialogues to ἐπιχειρεῖσθαι (Tim. 53 B οτε ... ἐπιχειρεῖτο κομιέσθαι τὸ πάν), διακονεῖσθαι (Laws VI. 763 A), δυστυχεῖσθαι, ἀσέβεισθαι (Laws IX. 877 E ὅταν ὅν τις ἅμα δυστυχηθῇ καὶ ἀσέβηθῇ τῶν οἰκών, 'when some habituation has received the taint of misfortune and of crime'), νομοθετεῖσθαι, 'to be legislated for' (Laws XI. 925 E, 926 A, where the passive ἐπιτάπεσθαι again occurs).


γ. Passive impersonal.

VII. 530 C ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται, 'as Astronomy is now pursued.'

§ 10. (ε) Middle.

a. The Middle Voice in Plato has still frequently a subtle force—accentuating some relation in which the action stands to the agent.
I. 344 Ε βλού διαγωγήν, ἢ δὲν διαγόμενος, 'conducting his own life.'

I. 349 Ε ἀρμοστόμενος λύραν, 'tuning a lyre for himself to play upon.'

III. 405 Β τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βλού ... καταρρήσηται, 'wastes the greater part of his life.'

Obs.—The distinction of τιθέω and τίθεναι, 'to institute and to adopt a law,' is well discussed by Mr. Postgate in Journ. of Phil. xv. 29 (1886). See a good example of this in Laws vii. 820 Ε τοὺς δίνας ἡμᾶς ἢ καὶ τοὺς θεμένους ἡμᾶς.

β. On the other hand, the voice is sometimes varied almost capriciously.

VI. 484 Δ μηδὲν ... ἐλλειποντάς ... μὴ ἐλλεἰποντο: cp. Laws IX. 853 Σ νομοθετοῦμενοι ... εὐνομοθέτουν: XI. 913 Β ἀνελών ... ἀνελόμενος.

γ. A vague reference to self is implied in what has been called the subjective middle voice, of which παρέχομαι, ἀποδείκνυμι, περιφέρομαι are instances. παρέχεσθαι, for example, is 'to furnish from one's own resources,' or 'to produce by one's own inherent power.'

IV. 421 Δ ὀργανά γε μὴ ἔχον παρέχεσθαι, IV. 443 Β ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ τόλεις: cp. Phaedr. 240 C ἢ ... χρόνου ἱσότης ... φιλίαν παρέχεται.

δ. The reciprocal use appears most prominently in ὁμολογεῖσθαι, 'to agree together.'

IV. 436 Σ ἔτι τοις ἀκριβέστεροιν ὁμολογήσωμεθα: VIII. 544 Α ὁμολογησόμενοι τῶν ἄριστων καὶ τῶν κάκιστων ἄνδρα.

This is sometimes emphasized with reference to λόγος by the addition of the reflexive pronoun.

V. 457 C τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι: cp. Phaedr. 265 D τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ὁμολογοῦμενον.

ε. A special use of the middle voice, combined with the construction noted above (the accusative as subject of the verbal in -τέω), gives the most probable solution of the difficulty in V. 467 Ε καὶ διδασκάμενοι ἱππεύεω, 'and when
they (the guardians) have had them (the young people) taught to ride.' See above, p. 179, Obs. 4.

Obs.—When the above cases are considered such an isolated use of the middle voice as μεγαλοφορούμενοι in vii. 528 c appears less remarkable. Another rare use of the middle, vii. 535 β ποία δή διωστέλλει; 'what distinction do you propose to yourself?' is supported by Aristotle, Pol. ii. 8, § 17 μικρά περὶ αὐτοῦ δια-στελλάσθαι βελτιών. For a similar use of the middle voice in connexion with the dialectical process cp. Phaedo 101 ε ἄμα δὲ αὐτὸν ἰδὺ φύσιν ... περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν διαλεγόμενον καὶ τῶν εἰς ἐκείνην ἀρμμένων.

II. The Noun Substantive.

§ II. 1. Cases.

(a) Nominative and Accusative.

a. The preference for the nominative, where the subject is identical with that of the principal verb, extends to instances where the clause is headed by δοστε, πρῶ, or even by a preposition. This is quite regular, but the point is sometimes overlooked.

I. 345 D ἐπεὶ τὰ γε αὐτῆς ὡς' εἶναι βελτίωτη, ἱκανῶς δὴ ποιο ἐκπεπόρισαι (βελτίωτη agrees with the subject of ἐκπεπόρισαι, which is perfect middle = 'she has provided for herself').

III. 402 A πρῶ λόγον δυνατός εἶναι λαβεῖν: VI. 501 A πρῶ ... αὐτῷ τούχει.

III. 416 C εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον ἔχεω πρὸς τὸ ἥμερον εἶναι.

V. 454 A διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ... διαφόρουμεν, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 526 B εἰς γε τὸ διεύωρεν αὐτοῦ αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι.

Laws X. 885 D βελτίων ἂ ... παρατρέπεσθαι κηλούμενοι.

(Cp. Xen. Hell. VII. 5, § 5 εἰ τινὲς δὴ πόλεις διὰ τὸ σμικρὰ τα εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσαις ταῦταις οἰκεῖν ἡγαγκάζοντο.)

Obs.—The accusative occurs in a similar connexion v. 457 B φῶμιν ... λέγοντε, δοστε ... τιθέντος.

β. In the absence of a definite construction, the accusative is the case usually preferred, and the case sometimes reverts to the accusative, although the construction has been previously in the dative (as in the familiar instance,
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Sophocles, Electra 479 ὑπεστὶ μοι θράσος | ἀδυπνόων κλάουσι | ἄρτως ὥς ἐδέξατων). See note on VIII. 559 B.

γ. It has sometimes been assumed (Digest, § 11) that all substantives apparently out of construction are accusatives in apposition. This point will be treated more fully below under Changes of Construction. Meanwhile, it is enough to adduce as an instance of the nominativus pendens VII. 532 B ἢ δέ γε . . . λύσις τε . . . καὶ μεταστροφή, κ.τ.λ., where, as the sentence proceeds, the nominative is changed to an accusative in C τὰ την . . . τὴν ὀνομά.

A good example of the accusative in apposition is II. 365 C πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχήμα, κ.τ.λ.

This idiom is peculiarly frequent in the Timaeus. A common form of it in most dialogues is ἀλλο τι ἡ . . . (Gorg. 470 B, &c.), a special case of the familiar idiom of which Theaet. 195 E ἄ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἡ διανοεῖται τις is an example. Cp. Rep. IV. 420 A οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ φρονοῦντες. For ἀλλο τι without ἡ following see below, under Apposition.

Under this heading, whether as nominative or accusative, may be brought the abrupt exclamations in VIII. 557 E τὸ δὲ μηθεῖσιν ἀνάγκην . . . εἶναι ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ.: VIII. 563 B τὸ δὲ γε . . . ἵστατον . . . τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλῆθους.

δ. An adverbial accusative is sometimes abruptly introduced.

IV. 436 D ὡς οὐ . . . τὰ τοιαῦτα τότε μενοῦτων.

V. 460 B εἰτε ἀνδρῶν εἰτε γυναικῶν εἰτε ἄμφοτέρα.

VI. 492 B ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐκάτερα.

So in such expressions as Symp. 204 C τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστίν δ' ἑρως;

e. The cognate accusative (or accusative of the internal object,—too common to be noticed here) has its correlative in the cognate subject of the passive voice. This use is especially frequent in the participial form (see above, p. 178, 3), and in the adverbial accusative of the verbal noun; VI. 510 B τοῖς τοῖς τμήσεως (if the reading is sound).

ζ. The accusative, equally with the dative, accompanies
the verbal in -τέον, IV. 421 B, 424 C: for dative see III. 413 C, v. 468 ά τός έκτεον σοι τόδε οριστιστάς, where the accusative would have given another (i.e. an active) meaning to ἐκτέον. Cp. Tim. 88 c τόν δὴ μαθηματικῶν ... τήν τοῦ σώματος ἀποδο- 

tέον κίνησιν. So in v. 467 E, see above, p. 179, Obs. 4.

§ 12. (b) Genitive.—The genitive, like the accusative, sometimes stands in a loose construction with what follows, the construction being afterwards, in some cases, made more definite.

V. 463 B ἔχεις οὖν εἴπειν τῶν ἀρχότων, κ.τ.λ. 

V. 470 A τί δὲ; γῆς τε τρίθεσις τῆς Ελληνικῆς καὶ ὀλίκων ἐμπρή- 

σεως πολύν τούτῳ οὐκ οὐδεμισθαί πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους 

Cp. Symp. 221 C τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιτηθευμάτων τάχι ἄν τις ... 

eἶσοι when περὶ follows, but in construction with another word.

See also—

Π. 375 Ε οἶσθαι γάρ ποιν τῶν γενναίων κυψάν, δι' τούτο δὲ φύσι 

αὐτῶν τὸ ἡδον (where αὐτῶν supplies the link).

IX. 571 B ἐνών μὲν ἀνθρώπων ὁ ... ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἂν ἔληγα 

λείπεσθαι ... τῶν δὲ ... καὶ πλείους. 'In the case of some men,' 
&c., where ἐνών might be construed with ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, but the context shows this not to be the construction.

Special uses of the genitive are—

a. 'Consisting in' (Digest, § 24).

IV. 433 D ἦ τοῦ ... τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν δύναμις.

β. Objective = πρὸς with acc.

Π. 359 Α ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν. 'Contracts with one another.'

ΠΙ. 391 Α ὑπερήφαναν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. ' Haughtiness 

towards gods and men.'

VIII. 566 Ε ἡσυχα ἐκεῖνω, 'he has tranquillity in regard to 

them.'

A doubtful instance is VIII. 558 Α ἦ πρατης ἐνών τῶν δικασ-

θέτων, κ.τ.λ. (see note in loc.). See also IX. 572 D ἦν ἄν 

'Ερως, κ.τ.λ. 'Whatever things are the objects of the 

passion,' &c. (Prof. Jowett construed •the genitive with 

tὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαντά, 'of whatsoever men love masters 

the whole soul.'
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γ. Partitive.
X. 615 D ἐθεσάμεθα ... καὶ τούτῳ τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων, 'this was amongst the terrible sights we beheld.'
VI. 496 C τούτων δὲ τῶν διλύων οἷς γενόμενοι. Cp. Laws VI.
754 D οἷ δὲ γενόμενοι τῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα.
δ. 'Requiring.'
III. 414 C πείσαι δὲ συχνὸς πειθός, 'but much persuasion is required to convince men of its truth.'
X. 615 A πολλοῦ χρόνου διηγήσασθαι.
135 B ἀνθρώποι πάνυ μὲν εὐφυῶς τοῦ δυνησμένου μαθείν: Laws
V. 730 A πολλής οὖν εὐλαβείας, κ.τ.λ.
ε. 'In respect of:"
II. 365 A ὡς ... ἔχονσι τιμῆς, 'how they are disposed to regard them.'
VII. 518 B εὐδαιμονίασθαι δὲ τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου: VII. 531 D τοῦ προσμίμου.
IX. 571 D οὁν ... ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχει αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ('in comparison with himself') καὶ σωφρόνως.
This does not occur with other adverbs than those in ὡς.
VII. 188, 3 τῶν οὕτω εἶχε δρμοῦ.
The genitive in ejaculations is closely allied to this:—
VI. 509 C "Ἀπολλών, ἕφι, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς.
So perhaps IX. 576 D εὐδαιμονίας ... καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὄσαντως ...
κρινει: cp. Laws i. 646 D τῆς ... διαμορφής ... διανοητέου.
Phaedo 99 B πολλῇ ἄν καὶ μακρὰ βαθύματα εἰς τοῦ λόγου.
Obs.—Double and even triple genitives are not uncommon, the second being sometimes exepgetic of the first, as in VII. 534 B τῶν λόγων εὐάστον ... τῆς οὕτος.
For other examples see—
VII. 525 C ῥατόνης τε μεταστροφῆς, κ.τ.λ.
" 537 C εἰς σύνοψιν ὀνειδικής ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως. (Cp. Soph. 254 C κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πάς ἔχει δυνάμεως.)
VIII. 544 D ἀνθρώπων οἶδ' ... τρόπων.
" 560 B δὲ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς πατρός.
§ 13. c. Dative.

a. The dative of the person interested has an extended use in Plato.

I. 334 E πονηροὶ γὰρ ἀστοῖς εἰσίν. 'For their friends are bad.'

I. 335 E τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ. 'And this expression means, as employed by him.'

I. 343 A δὲ γε αὐτῇ οὖδε πρᾶβατα οὖδὲ πομένα γιγνώσκεις. 'Since she leaves you in ignorance of the difference between shepherd and sheep.'

III. 394 C εἰ μοι μανθάνεις. 'If I take you with me' (where some would read εἰ μον μ.);

III. 415 B δ᾽ τι αὐτοῖς τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμμεναι. 'What alloy they find in the souls of their young charges.'

V. 451 D εἰ ἡμῶν πρέπει ἡ οὖ. 'Whether we find it suitable or not, for our purpose.'

V. 462 A ἄρα . . . εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱκνος ημῶν ἀρμόττει. 'Whether we find that our proposals fit into the lines of good.'

VIII. 549 C, D ἀθρομένης, ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνήρ ἔστιν. 'Aggrieved to find that her husband is not in the government.'

In X. 602 E, with a participle (τοῦτο δὲ . . . μετρήσατε, κ.τ.λ.), it has nearly the force of an absolute clause, i.e. 'when this faculty of measurement has done its work, it finds after all,' &c. See note in loco.

Obs. 1.—It may be worth observing that the dative so used (except when amplified as in the last instance) is seldom or never emphatic.

Obs. 2.—The dative of reference, in combination with a participle, often introduces a concomitant circumstance or condition, as in the familiar phrase εἰ δὲ ἔσονται &c.—

V. 451 C καὶ ἐκείνην τὴν ὀρμήν λουσίν.

VI. 484 A μέλλοντε.

IX. 589 C ἀκοποιμένη.

β. The dative of manner may be added to another dative without any feeling of confusion.
Part I: Syntax—Nouns.

II. 359 C νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἱσον τιμὴν. 'But is forcibly diverted by law and custom into a respect for equality.'

VIII. 552 E ὁμ. ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ. It is added pleonastically in VIII. 555 A, IX. 576 C ὄμοιότητι, and it is sometimes expanded by an additional word.

IX. 575 C πωνηρᾷ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως. It has the effect of an absolute clause in IX. 578 C τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λόγῳ, also perhaps in IX. 579 C τοῖς τοιοῦτοις κακοῖς. The reading has been questioned in both passages, see notes in locis, but cp. X. 598 D ὑπολαμβάνειν δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ, κ.τ.λ.

γ. In VI. 490 A παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις, the dative follows a prepositional phrase as if it were an adjective, e.g. ἐναντίον, and in 496 C τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν it is construed with a verbal noun. So in later dialogues, Tim. 23 C φθορὰν ἰδαν, Laws III. 698 B Ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἐλλήσιον.

δ. The dative of the measure of excess occurs in the remarkable expression in VI. 507 E οὕς συμκραί . . . ἱδέα, 'by the measure of no unimportant nature,' and has been applied to the interpretation of IX. 579 C cited above.

Obs.—The Ionic form of the dative plural in σι(ν) according to the best MSS. occurs only in Phaedr. Rep. Polit. Tim. Laws. In the Phaedrus and Republic, however, it is merely an occasional ornament, whereas in the Laws it is of constant recurrence. (F. Blass finds examples in the earlier orators.) Of the five examples occurring in the Republic (I. 345 E; III. 388 D, 389 B; VIII. 560 E, 564 C), two are of the definitive pronoun I. 345 E, VIII. 564 C αὐτοῖς (very emphatic in both cases); two of familiar adjectives III. 388 D συμκραί, VIII. 560 E μέγαλοις and one of θεός, III. 389 B, in a passage coloured by frequent quotations from Homer. All these are of the second declension (ἐπιγορίας in X. 607 B, like νότος in V. 468 D, is in a poetical quotation, and should not be counted). In the Laws according to C. Ritter, op. cit., there are eighty-five instances of the form, which here extends, although more sparingly, to feminines of the first declension. The four instances in the Politicus include the participle ἐπιγορίας (304 ἦ).  

1 C. Ritter (Untersuchungen, &c.) mentions six; but he seems to include the quotation in X. 607 B.
§ 14. 2. NUMBER OF NOUNS.

(a) The plural of an abstract word is often used to express its exemplification in the concrete. This happens especially when other words in the sentence are in the plural.

II. 364 C κακίας περί εὐπετείας διδόντες. 'Offering easy occasions for vice.'

II. 373 D λατρῶν εἰν χρήσαι. 'In frequent need of the physician.'

V. 449 A περὶ τε πόλεως διοικήσεις.

VIII. 547 D γεωργῶν ἀπέκεκλασα τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς. 'That its military class abstains from agricultural employments.'

X. 611 C δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας. 'Its various modes of justice and injustice.'

(b) In X. 618 A, B πενίας . . . πτωχείας . . . πλούτων καὶ πενίας the plurals serve to emphasize the variety and complexity of human conditions. Cp. Tim. 65 C τραχύτητι τε καὶ λειώτητι: Laws V. 733 B σφοδρότητιν ἴσοτητι τε, 734 A πυκνότητι.

(c) The plural is used with the meaning of the singular to express either admiration or scorn. Cp. Symp. 218 B, Theaet. 169 B.


III. 391 B ἐξεῖσ . . . σφαγᾶς . . . (D) ἀρπαγᾶς.

VI. 495 A πλοῦτοι τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή.

VIII. 553 C τίαρας τε καὶ στρεπτοῖς καὶ ἀκινάκας.

(d) The plural of abstract verbals and other adjectives is often preferred to the singular.

II. 375 D ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε.

III. 387 B ἀποβλητεῖα.

VI. 498 A μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται.

(e) The singular neuter is often used in a collective sense.

IV. 442 B τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν.

IX. 577 C σμικρὸν γέ τι τούτο.

For the combination of neuter with masculine or feminine see below, Imperfect Constructions.
III. Article and Pronoun.

1. The Article is sometimes—§ 15.
   (a) Correlative, i.e. it marks each of two correlative words.
   I. 338 D. E τιθεται... τῶν νόμων ἐκάστη ἡ ἀρχὴ (where it may also be regarded as distributive (b)).
   V. 455 D κρατεῖται ἐν ἄπασι... τὸ γένος τὸν γένος. 'The one sex is beaten by the other.'
   (b) Sometimes distributive—
   VII. 540 Β διὰ τὸ... τὸ μέρος ἡκι. 'When the turn of each arrives.'
   (c) The article of reference in ὁ δὲ ἄλλοι, ὁ πολλοὶ, is to be distinguished from the common use of these phrases.
   V. 453 Ε τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις. 'These natures which have been described as different.'
   X. 596 Α θώμεν... δὲ τι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν. 'Let us put the case of any one you will of things which exist in plurality.'
   (d) In the idiomatic use with a future participle the article often resumes an indefinite pronoun—
   I. 342 Α δεῖ τῶν τέχνης τῆς... σκέψομένης.
   I. 348 Β δικαστῶν τῶν τῶν διακρινοῦντων.
   (e) For the 'deictic' use with a personal or reflexive pronoun, see Theaet. 166 Α τῶν ἐμέ, Phaedr. 258 Α.

Obs. 1.—The article is sometimes repeated merely for emphasis—
   I. 334 Ε τῶν δοκεῖται τῷ... καὶ τῶν δότα χρηστῶν.

Obs. 2.—The article is omitted—
   (1) With common nouns used as proper names, as λιμὴν, ἄγρα, &c. (for the harbour, market-place, &c. of the town where the scene is laid).
   Theaet. 142 Α οὐ γὰρ ἢ κατὰ πόλιν (i.e. in Megara).
   Theaet. 142 Α εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνειν. 'As I went down to the harbour' (of Megara).
   Rep. II. 371 C καθῆμενος ἐν ἄγρᾳ.
   (2) With a noun used in a general sense, but without pointed reference to others from which it is distinguished—
   I. 332 Ε ἐπρός... κυβερνήτης.
II. 369 b γίνονται ... τόλμες.
VI. 499 c ἀρχαῖος εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ... τόλμες ... ἐπιμεληθείμαι.
VIII. 562 λ τουρανίς τε καὶ τύραννος.
Χ. 611 B ὅτι μὲν τοῖσιν ἀβάναστον ψυχή.
And sometimes arbitrarily to avoid cumbersome repetition (in many cases it may have accidentally been dropped, yet it is needless to restore it as H. Richards proposes in IV. 434 λ τὰς τιμὰς)—
IV. 438 c καὶ ἀδ βαρύτερα πρὸς κονφούτερα καὶ δάντω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα.
V. 475 λ καὶ μὴν φιλοτιμοῦμεν, κ.τ.λ.
VIII. 545 λ καὶ ἱλαρόκικον αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικὸν (supra Obs. 1).
Phaedr. 254 λ τῷ σύζυγῷ τε καὶ ἱμάχω.

Obs. 3.—The substantival use of the neut. adj. does not always necessitate the article.

V. 478 c μὴ δὲντο μὴν ἀγνοοῦμεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομοιν, δόντο δὲ γνῶσιν.
VII. 518 a, b εἰς φανότερον λεύσα ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρῆς ἐμπενθέπται (where, even if διὸν is to be supplied with φανότερον, λαμπροτέρου at least is neuter).
Symp. 218 λ ὑπὸ ἀληθινοτέρου.

Obs. 4.—The omission of the article with ἄνῃρ so constant in MSS. is proved by the examples in tragedy, where the a is long (e.g. Soph. Aj. 9, 324, 783, &c. all in senarii), to be often due to the scribes; but it is uncertain whether in such instances as IX. 573 c γίνονται ... οὕτω καὶ τοιοῦτος ἄνῃρ the Platonic idiom requires us to write ἄνῃρ or not. Cp. Phaedr. 266 c ἄνδρες, 267 c δεινὸς ἄνῃρ γέγονε (this Thompson leaves unaltered), 268 c μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος.

§ 16. 2. THE PRONOUNS.

The pronouns, especially the demonstratives (with their adverbs οὕτως, ὅδε, ὅσαντως, &c.) have a widespread use in the Platonic dialogues, in which resumption, reference, antithesis, are necessarily so frequent.

(a) Demonstratives.

a. The demonstratives and the oblique cases of ἄνῃρ, as in Thucydides, often refer to an antecedent which although implied in the preceding context has not been fully expressed. The same thing happens in the case of the adverb ἄντοθι.
Part I: Syntax—Pronouns.

I. 334 A κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὀμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό.
II. 339 A, B πρόσεατι δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος.
III. 371 C τὴν διακοιλιαν . . . ταύτην.
IV. 371 E τὴν τιμῆν ταύτην.
VII. 373 C τοῦτο γὰρ (‘the care of swine’) ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρῃ πόλει οὐκ ἐνή.

III. 399 D ἢ οὐ τοῦτο (ἀιλὸς from αἰλοποιοῦσα) πολυχρονότατον.
IV. 424 D ἢ ... παρανομία ... αὕτη (sc. ἢ ἐν μουσικῇ).
VI. 491 C λαβοῦ . . . δλον αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς.
VI. 507 D παροῦσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖ (sc. τοῖς ὅρωμένοις).
X. 597 B τὸν μμητῆν τοῦτον.

β. οὖσα is sometimes simply the thing or person in question.

180 A καὶ τοῦτον ζητῆσ λόγων λαβεῖν, τε εἰρηκε, εὔτερος πεπλήξει, κ.τ.λ.

Theaeet. 199 B μῆ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου όλον τε, ἀλλ’ ἐτέραν ἄν’ ἐκεῖνη. Hence in Rep. IV. 436 A if we read with most MSS. εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ ἐκαστα πράττομεν, τοῦτω means the thing in question—having no distinct antecedent.

θ. οῦν and οὖσα are less markedly distinguishable in § 17.

Plato than, for example, in Xenophon. The familiar rule that οὖν points to what is present in perception, οὖσα to what is present in thought, applies to the Platonic instances, but with modifications arising from the liveliness of the discourse and sudden changes of the aspect in which a thing is regarded.

Both pronouns are used to indicate what is familiar in daily experience, as distinguished from what is imaginary or remote.

III. 403 E τῶν δὲ τῶν ἀσκητῶν.
VIII. 544 C ἡ Κριτικὴ τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὕτη (πολιτεία).
Gorg. 470 D τὰ . . . ἔχθει καὶ πρώτη γεγονότα τοῦτα. So probably οὖσα in II. 377 B ἀρ’ οὖν ῥηθῶς οὖσα (‘as is usually done’) παρῆσομεν, although this may be merely idiomatic like νῦν οὖσα, &c. (VI. 490 A σφόδρα οὖσα).
δ. In the same spirit the antithesis of ὁδεῖς and ἐκεῖνος does not necessarily correspond to what is ‘latter’ and ‘former’ in the sentence. But whichever term is imagined as in some way nearer to the mind is marked with ὁδεῖς, and that which in the same aspect is more remote, with ἐκεῖνος. Thus, in the opening of the Euthydemos (p. 271), it is a mistake to suppose, because Critobulus is last mentioned, that he is meant by ὁδεῖς. Crito modestly speaks of his own son as ‘gawky’ (σκληφρός), and admiringly of the stranger who is more immediately in question.

II. 370 οὗτος ἔστω ἔρωτ ἡ ἐκεῖνος, ‘the familiar way is easier than the novel plan proposed,’ i. e. οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος do not refer to the order in which they have been mentioned but to the order in which they occur to the mind or which is more familiar in use and experience.

III. 416 ζεύς, ἐφη, αὕτη τούτῳ λέγεις διαφέρει τακεινος; ‘How does the plan you now prefer differ from that which you condemn?’

IV. 421 Εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἄλην βλέποντας θεάτην εἰ ἐκεῖνη ἐγγίγνεται.

In VI. 511 ἐκεῖνος πρὸς ἐκεῖνα both terms are remote, because they are the segments of τὸ ὅρατον, and τὸ νοστόν is immediately in question. See note in loco.

ε. The vividness of Plato’s style sometimes anticipates, as already present to the mind, something to which attention is for the first time directed. Hence ὁδεῖς (ἐντάθει, &c.) are sometimes used where δός (ἐνθάδε, &c.) might rather have been expected.

IV. 430 οὗτος γε ἐντάθειν δόειν, ‘from the point of view at which I am standing.’

VI. 510 τούτων προειρημένων, ‘when I have stated what I have now to state.’

VII. 514 οὐσία πάθει, ‘to a condition such as I am now imagining.’

So probably VI. 488 νήσου ... τοιούτω γενόμενον, ‘conceive
the occurrence of such a situation as I (have in mind and) am about to describe.

"οὗτος is used vaguely for ὁ τουτός.

III. 395 C τὰ τοῦτον προφήκουτα.

Obs. 1.—οὗτος occurs twice in the same sentence with different references in VII. 532 C πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία... ταύτην ἕχει τὴν ἀυθαίρετα, where αὕτη refers to the sciences, ταύτην to their educational effect.

Obs. 2.—εἴτε in the progress of a sentence often refers to what has previously been denoted by an oblique case of αὑτός or οὗτος. See especially III. 405 C, VI. 511 A, VII. 533 A.

η. τουτός (especially in ἐτέρα τοιαῦτα) and ὁ τουτός are § 18. often used to avoid the repetition of an adjective.

IV. 424 A φύσεις χρηστάλ τοιαύτης (sc. χρηστῆς) παιδείας ἀντιλαμβανόμενα.

Ιβ. Ἐ παρανόμου γιγνομένης αὐτῆς καὶ παίδων τοιούτων (sc. παρανόμων).

IV. 429 A δι' ὁ τοιαύτη (sc. ἄνδρεία) κλητέα ἡ πόλις.

VIII. 560 C κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιοῦτου (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γιγνομένου).

Similarly in VIII. 546 C ἐκατόν τοιαύτακτις probably means ἐκατόν ἐκατοντάκις.

Obs. 1.—τοιούτος is used euphemistically in V. 452 B πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα: and in III. 390 C δι' ἐτέρα τοιαῦτα the euphemism conveys also contempt.

Obs. 2.—ὡσ, τοιούτος, &c., as in other Greek, gain a peculiar force from the context or intonation.

IX. 588 B οία ἔλεγεν, 'what a preposterous statement' he was guilty of.'

Obs. 3.—The derisive use of ποῖος (Theaet. 180 B ποῖος μαθηταῖς, ὡς δαμάων;) is applied in Rep. I. 330 B ποῖ ἐπεκτείνομαι; to express the gentle amusement of Cephalus at the suggestion that he may have augmented his ancestral fortune.

θ. The deictic form τοιοῦτοι is rightly restored by Bekker in I. 330 B. Cr. τοιούτοι VI. 488 A.

(The deictic use of pronominal adverbs may be VOL. II.

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illustrated from IV. 430 E ἐνείθεν, 445 B δεύρο, V. 477 D, VII. 527 E αἰτόθεν. This adds vividness to the style.)

(b) Indefinite Pronoun.

§ 19. a. Τίς added to the predicate with the force of ποῦ or πῶς as in Soph. Ajax 1265 τοῦ δαινύτως ὡς ταχεῖά τις βροτοῖς ἥρας διαρρεῖ. II. 358 Α ἄλλα τίς, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής, 'but I am a slow sort of person it would seem.'

VIII. 548 Ε δούλους μὲν τίς ἄν γρίς ἔη. β. Combined with other pronouns:

I. 346 C τις τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρήμενοι.

III. 412 Α τού τοιούτου τινός.

VIII. 562 Α τρόπων τω τῶν αὐτῶν. γ. With indirect allusion to a person:

Phaedr. 242 B λόγῳ τυλι, 'a speech of mine.' Phaedo 63 Α λόγους τινάς ἀνερευνα, 'one's arguments,' i.e. mine.

II. 372 Ε ταῦτα γὰρ ὅτι τισω ὅν ἐξαρκέσθει ('Glaucon and fine gentlemen like him').

δ. Πότερος indefinite.

VI. 499 C τοῦτων δὲ πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀμφότερα, κ.τ.λ. This is rare in other writers but not infrequent in Plato. See IV. 439 E, Theaet. 145 Α, 178 C.

ἄτοτερον in IX. 589 Α seems only to be a more emphatic πότερον.

(c) Reflexive.

§ 20. a. Ἐαυτῷ has sometimes an indefinite antecedent.

IV. 434 C τῆς ἐαυτοῦ πόλεως, ib. 443 D.

The authority of the MSS. about breathings is very slight, and it is sometimes difficult to decide whether to read αὐτῷ or αὑτῷ, &c., e.g. I. 344 Α, II. 359 Α, 367 C.

β. The personal is sometimes used for the reflexive pronoun, giving special point to a relation or antithesis.

(d) The Relative Pronoun ὦς is sometimes used where an indefinite antecedent is implied.
I. 352 C ὦς φαμεν, κ.τ.λ., 'any persons of whom we say,' &c.
This differs from ὦς ἀν φῶμεν in assuming that we do thus speak.

(e) Indirect Interrogatives.
When an interrogative is repeated, if there is any ground for using the indirect form, this is usually done.
IX. 578 E ἐν ποιῷ ἀν τινι καλ ὑπóσω φόβῳ ὕει, κ.τ.λ. Even without repetition the indirect form is sometimes preferred—with the ellipse of επιε or the like.

(f) Personal Pronouns.
§ 31.
a. The explicit use of the nominative in such phrases as εἰδ γε σο ποιών (I. 351 C), ἔγω δὲ λέγω (III. 382 B), where the sentence and not the subject of it is really emphasized, deserves a passing notice; also the idiomatic use of Ἡμεῖς for ἔγω (sometimes a cause of ambiguity).

β. One usage (though again rather rhetorical than grammatical) seems to claim notice as characteristic of the Platonic dialogue,—what may be termed the condescending use of the first person plural for the second person singular or plural, the speaker identifying himself with the person or persons addressed. It belongs to the 'maieutic' manner of Socrates, who deals gently with his patient and asks at intervals 'How are we now?' A clear example occurs in Theaet. 210 B ἡ οὖν ἐτι κνοιμέν τι καὶ ὄδυνομεν, ὁ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἡ πάντα ἐκτετάκαμεν;
Somewhat similar to this are such places in the Republic as
II. 368 D ἐπειδὴ οὖν Ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοὶ, κ.τ.λ.
II. 373 E πολεμήσουμεν (i. e. πολεμήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ τρόφιμοι), and the more distinctly ironical use in
I. 337 C ἐὰν τε Ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἐὰν τε μή.
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In the mouth of the respondent this use becomes a mere façon de parler, II. 377 E πῶς ... λέγομεν;

(g) Pronominal phrases, i.e. phrases which take the place of nouns.

It is sufficient to glance at such expressions as ἀνὴρ, οὗτος ἀνὴρ, τοῦναυτίου, τὸ εἰρημένου, τὸ πολλάκις ἤδη λεγόμενον and other such phrases which avoid the repetition of a noun. See especially II. 368 Α ἐκείνου τοῦ ἄνδρός: VIII. 560 Α τῶν αὐτῶν τόπον τοῦ τοιότου (sc. τῆν τής ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν), and cp. Symp. 212 Α ἢ δεῖ ... ὃς ὄρατον τὸ καλὸν.

This habit increases in the later dialogues and is especially frequent in the Philebus, when it has an effect of mannerism. Something like it occurs already in Thuc. VIII. 92, §3 where the phrase ἐφ' οἷς περ καὶ αὐτὸς δεὶ κατηγόρησι is used to avoid repeating what Theramenes has been represented as saying twice before.

IV. Adverbs and Prepositions.

§ 22. 1. Adverbs.

(a) The predicative use of adverbs (cp. Thuc. I. 21, §1 ἀπίστως) though not frequent is noticeable.

I. 332 Α μὴ σωφρόνου (＝μὴ σωφρῶν ὄν) ἀπαιτοῖ expressing the condition of the agent rather than the mode of the action

III. 466 Α ὡς γελοῖος (＝γελοῖοι δυνεῖ). (b) The adverb also takes the place of an epithet.

VII. 537 Α τά τε χύουν μαθήματα (with γενόμενα following by an afterthought)—‘the subjects indiscriminately taught.’

VIII. 564 Α ἢ ... ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ... εἰσ ἄγαν δουλείαν.

§ 23. 2. Prepositions.

(a) διά.

A questionable use of ἐν with the accusative occurs in IV. 440 Α, D ἐνμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίω καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ μυγὸν ... ὑπομένων καὶ νυκῶ καὶ οὐ λήγει ... (so the MSS. and edd.), a place which Madvig has rewritten. See
notes and v. rr. On the whole it seems necessary to obviate the difficulty by reading διὰ *τοῦ in both places as is done in this edition. The use of διὰ will then be the same as in VI. 494 D ἃρτε ἐνεπέλθε οὖσα εἰναι εἰσακοῦσαι διὰ τοσοῦτων κακῶν;

The notion of persistence and of obstacles overcome is common to both passages.

N.B.—To take διὰ = ‘on account of’ and the whole phrase as equivalent to ἔνεκα τοῦ πεινῆν ... οὐ λήγει, κ.τ.λ. (καὶ νικῶν) being διὰ μέσου) is hardly a tenable view.

(b) ἐπί.

a. With gen. after λέγειν, =‘in the case of.’ This seems a slight extension of the use after ἀλοθάνασθαι, νοεῖν, &c.

V. 475 A ἐπί ἐμοῖ λέγειν.

VII. 524 E ὀσπερ ἐπί τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν.

β. With accusative =‘extending to.’

VI. 491 A ἐπὶ πάντας, cp. Prot. 322 C. Tim. 23 B ἐπί ἀνθρώπους.

(c) μετά. A frequent and characteristic use is that of § 24. conjoining correlated attributes.

IX. 591 B σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετά φρονήσεως κτωμένην, ἢ σῶμα ἴσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ ὑγείας λαμβάνων.

Theaet. 176 B, Phaedr. 249 A, 253 D.

Similarly with article prefixed.

VIII. 548 B Μοῦσης τῆς μετὰ λόγου, κ.τ.λ.

(d) παρά (with accusative).

a. ‘In the course of.’

Π. 362 B παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὀφελεῖσθαι: IV. 424 B; VII. 530 E. Cp. τὸ παράπαν, and see Hdt. Π. 60 ταῦτα παρὰ πάσαν πάλιν ... ποιεῖσθαι.

β. In VI. 492 E παρὰ τὴν τούτων παίδειαν πεπαιδευμένων, it is doubted whether παρὰ means ‘in consequence of’ (cp. Thuc. I. 141, § 7 παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, Xen. Hipparch, § 5), or ‘contrary to.’

(e) ἐπί.

a. Like ὑπέρ, ‘on behalf of.’
II. 360 D ὁ περὶ τοῦ τουιντού λόγου λέγων.

β. For περὶ pleonastic, see esp.:

IV. 427 A τὸ τουιντον εἰδὸς νόμων πέρι.

VII. 539 C τὸ δλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι.

(f) πρὸς.

α. πρὸς τινι εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι, 'to be engaged (or absorbed) in a thing.'

VIII. 567 A πρὸς τῷ καθ ἡμέραν ... εἶναι, 'to be engrossed with their daily avocations,' Phaedo 84 C, Phaedr. 249 C, D.

β. But in IX. 585 A πρὸς πληρώσει ... γίγνεσθαι, 'to be close upon repletion.' So in Phaedr. 254 B πρὸς αὐτῷ τ' ἐγένετο, κ.τ.λ.

γ. With accusative.

VIII. 545 B πρὸς ... ταύτην, 'in comparison with this' (emphatic).

§ 25. (g) ὑπέρ. The less common use with the genitive, nearly = περὶ, 'concerning,' is clearly present in II. 367 A ταύτα ... Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ἄλλος ποὺ τίς ὑπέρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἄν (Thrasymachus is not imagined as speaking in behalf of Justice). For other instances in Plato see Apol. 39 E ἥδεως ἄν διαλέχετην ὑπέρ τοῦ γεγονότος, κ.τ.λ., Laws VI. 776 E ὑπέρ τοῦ Διὸς ἄγορευων. And, for several in Aristotle, Bonitz' Index Aristotel. s. v. ὑπέρ, 1 b.

(h) μεταξ. α. μεταξ' τῶν λόγων, 'by the by,' Phaedr. 230 λ.

β. With a participle, μεταξ' ἀναγιγνώσκων Phaedr. 234 D.

γ. τὸ μεταξ', 'during the interval until.'

See Mr. Herbert Richards' note in the Classical Review for December, 1888, p. 324: 'Instead of a thing being between A and B, it is sometimes said to be between B, so that μεταξ' practically means "on this side of," "short of," "before reaching."

Clear instances are Soph. O. C. 290, 291 τὰ δὲ ὑμεταξ' τοῦν, 'in the interval before Theseus arrives,' Dem. de Cor. p. 233 sub fin. τῶν μεταξ' χρόνων τῶν ὁρκων, 'the interval before the ratification.'
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So, probably, Rep. vi. 498 A ἄρτι ἐκ παιδων τὸ μεταξύ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ, 'just after boyhood, in the interval before keeping house and engaging in business.'

V. Particles and Conjunctions (Digest, §§ 132–178).

The use of particles acquires its full development in Plato, who employs them with extreme subtlety, variety and precision, not only to mark with minute clearness the progress of the argument, the degrees of assent and dissent, and the modes of inference, but also to give the light and life of oral conversation to each successive clause.

Platonic particles have lately been made a subject of 'statistical' investigation, and W. Dittenberger and others have attempted with some success to test the relative age of different dialogues by the absence or comparative frequency of certain particles in them. The results have been summed up by Constantin Ritter, Untersuchungen über Plato, Stuttgart, 1888. The Republic is shown to come with Phaedrus and Theaetetus about midway between the Symposium on the one hand and the Politicus Philebus Laws on the other.

1. καί.

(a) καί adverbial.

a. The anticipatory use, though common in Greek, is still worth noticing, from the liveliness which it adds to many sentences:

I. 327 ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐν μοι καί ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἕδωκεν ἐναι, οὐ μέντοι ἤττον ἐφαινετο πρέπειν ἢν οἱ Θρῆκες ἐπεμπον.

II. 375 δὲοι μὲν ἄν τις καί ἐν ἀλλως ὀφος, οὐ μέντ' ἄν ἠκιστα ἐν φι ἡμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι.

β. οὐ καί.

IV. 445 C δεῦρο ... οὐ καί ἔφη. 'Come hither ... that you may really descry.'
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γ. In interrogative phrases:
IV. 434 D τι . . . καὶ ἐρωτήμεν; 'What, after all, are we to say?'
IV. 445 C ἵνα . . . ἧς δεῖ καὶ εἴδη ἔχει ἡ κακλα, 'that you may see how many, in point of fact, are the varieties of vice.'
Cp. Gorg. 455 A ἰδὼμεν τι ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς βητορικῆς.
δ. In affirmative sentences, giving additional emphasis:
I. 328 C διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐωράκη αὐτόν, 'for indeed it was long since I had seen him.'
ε. καὶ ταῦτα = 'in this too.'
I. 341 C οὐδὲν ὑμι καὶ ταῦτα = 'discomfited as usual;' or 'as you would be if you attempted to shave a lion.'
ζ. At once pointing and softening an asyndeton (cp. αὐ, πάντως).
I. 350 D τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, πρότερον δὲ οὕτω, Ὀρασύμαχον ἐρωθαῖντα. See note in loco.
η. With implied preference for an alternative:—'as well' = 'rather' (cp. Phil. 33 B ἐτι καὶ εἰσαύθης).
III. 400 B ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος Βοῦλευσόμεθα. 'For the matter of that, said I, I had rather we conferred with Damon.'
V. 458 B ἀναφαλέσθαι καὶ ὑστερον ἐπισκέψασθαι.
IX. 573 D τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἔμοι ἔρεις, 'that, it would be as well (i. e. better) for you to tell me.'
θ. With ὡστε, emphasizing the clause.
IV. 421 D ὡστε καὶ κακοῦς γίγνεσθαι, 'I mean so as to deteriorate.'
Cp. the idiomatic use with ὡς εἶπεῖν in X. 619 D ὡς δὲ καὶ εἶπεῖν, where καὶ really belongs to the whole sentence.
ι. Displacement (hyperbaton or trajection) of καὶ. A possible instance is VI. 500 A ἦ, καὶ ἕων οὕτω θεώρται, where (see note in loco) the difficulty may be solved by joining καὶ οὕτω,—'If they look at it in this light rather (supra § 5) than in the other.' But the reading is doubtful, and perhaps ἦ οὖν, ἕων should be read, with γ, merely changing τοι in what follows to τε.
(b) Kai conjunctive.

a. In narrative, indicating prompt sequence (as in the § 27. familiar phrase kai eγω ειπον).
I. 327 B κελευει υμας, εηθη, Πολεμαρχος περιμειναι. kai eγω μετεστραφην τε, κ.τ.λ. ‘Whereupon I turned about,’ &c.

b. In abrupt questions with a tone of surprise (as in kai πως;) to which kai gives emphasis.
I. 338 C το τοι κρειττονος φης ξυμφερον δικαιον ειναι. kai τουτο, δω Θρασύμαχε, τι ποτε λέγεις; ‘Pray, Thrasymachus, what can you mean by that?’

Obs.—Similarly kai toυ interposes a sudden question.
I. 350 E και τοι τι άλλο βούλει; ‘What else in the name of common sense would you have?’
II. 376 B και τους ουκ αυ φιλομαθεις ειη;
VII. 532 D και τους ποιον τω αυτων ουι εστραγηθην ειναι;

(c) kai virtually disjunctive (§ 7).

III. 411 A δειλη και άγροικος, ‘either cowardly or rude’ (the former being the effect of music without gymnastic, the latter of gymnastic without music).
VII. 518 B και ει γελαυν, κ.τ.λ.

In these cases kai is possibly preferred to η on account of euphony. The result is a slight inexactness of expression.

Obs.—The former of two correlatives kai . . . kai = ‘both . . . and’ is brought in after the beginning of the sentence in VII. 536 B ταυτων παντα και πράξει και φιλοσοφιας ετι πλειο γελωτα καταντησωμεν. This gives additional emphasis—‘not only . . . but also.’ Cp. IV. 440 D ὑπομενον και νυκτι και ου λήγει, κ.τ.λ. ‘It not only prevails but perseveres,’ &c.

2. ʿAlla.

§ 28.

(a) In animated conversation ʿalla often opposes what is now advanced to the position attributed in thought to the other speaker. Thus in the opening scene of the Republic (327 B)—ʿalla περιμενετε. ʿalla περιμενονμεν—the first ʿalla opposes the entreaty that they should remain to their apparent intention of departing; the second ʿalla opposes their willingness to remain to the supposed necessity of
further entreaty. So on the following page (328 B) the
first ἄλλα emphasizes entreaty as before, the second opposes
Socrates' present assent to his previous show of reluctance.
Cp. 338 C ἄλλα τι οὐκ ἐπανεῖς; ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις.

(δ) ἄλλ' ἦ. This familiar idiom occurs frequently after
negatives, e.g. IV. 427 C οὖδε χρησόμεθα ἐξηγητὶ ἄλλ' ἦ τῷ
πατρῷ, 'we will consult no other authority, but only that
which our fathers consulted.'

Also after an interrogative with negative meaning, IV.
429 B τίς ἂν . . . εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψας . . . εἰποί ἄλλ' ἦ εἰς
tοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. See L. and S., s. v. ἄλλ' ἦ.

(ε) Since δὲ often takes the place of ἄλλα in the Laws and
in Aristotle (see Bonitz, Ind. Ar. s.v. δὲ, p. 167 a 1. 19), it is
worth while to notice the use of δὲ after the negative in—
I. 349 B, C εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἄξιοι πλέον ἐξειν . . . τοῦ
δὲ ἅδικου.
I. 354 A ἄδικον γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, ευδαίμονα δὲ.
IV. 422 D οὖν ἦμιν θέμι, ἦμιν δὲ.

§ 29.

3. Μέντοι.

Μέντοι is a particle having a distinct and prominent
office in Platonic dialogue.

(a) In affirmation it marks that what is now said alters
the case.
I. 328 C χρὴν μέντοι. Cephalus pleads that Socrates
should make an exception to his general rule by visiting
the Piraean:—'But you really should.'
I. 331 E ἄλλα μέντοι . . . τοῦτο μέντοι. μέντοι here is not
merely adversative, but implies reflection.
IV. 440 οὗτος μέντοι, ἐφην, ο λόγος σημαίνει, κ.τ.λ.

(b) In questions it calls attention to some fact or previous
statement which has been overlooked and is inconsistent
with what has just been said.
I. 339 οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φῆς
εἶναι; 'But, by the by, is it not your view that it is right
to obey authority?'
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I. 346 Α οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦτον ἐτέραν εἶναι;

In such expressions μέντοι not only, like δῆτον, claims assent, but also implies that the new statement is one which affects the argument.

c In replies, it often expresses deliberate assent (after reflection) to an objection or suggestion which alters the point of view.

I. 332 Α ἄλλο μέντοι νῦ Νέλ', ἐφη. 'There you are right, he said; he meant something different from that.'

II. 374 Ε ἡμέτερον μέντοι.

4. Τοι.

Τοι, 'I may tell you.' For idiomatic uses see

I. 330 Β οὐ τοι ἐνεκα ἡρόμην. 'Well, that was just my motive for asking.'

I. 343 Α οτι τοι σε, ἐφη, κορυφῶντα περισφῆ. 'Why,' said he, 'because she lets you drivel.'

Gorg. 447 Β ἐπι αὐτό γέ τοι τούτο πάρεσμεν. 'Indeed, that is just why we are here.'

Prot. 316 Β Ὁ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σε τοι ἠθόμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Ἰπποκράτης οὔτοι.

The use of τοι is often a delicate way of bespeaking attention to what is said.

5. Μέν.

Μέν is used without δὲ following not only in the phrases εἰκὸς μέν, δοκῶ μέν, but in other connexions, as in ΙΙΙ. 403 Ε ἀθλητὴν μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἄγωνος. 'For, to begin with,' &c. V. 466 C ἐμοὶ μὲν ... ἐμμεθοῦσα χρόμενος, κ.τ.λ.

Obs.—In v. 475 Ε ἄλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφους the δὲ is supplied by the respondent; τοὺς δὲ ἀληθεύοντες, ἐφη, τινας λέγεις; Cr. ΙΙ. 380 Ε ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλων ... 381 Β ἄλλα ἐρα αὐτὸς αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.

6. Γε.

§ 31. Besides its ordinary use (very frequent in Plato) in giving a qualified or intensified assent, γε also (a) limits the application of a statement:
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I. 331 B ἀλλὰ γε ἐν ἀνθ’ ἐνός, κ.τ.λ.
VI. 506 E τού γε δοκοῦτοι ἐμοί τὰ νῦν, and
(δ) usually with participles it emphasizes what is put forward as the ground of a preceding statement.

Polit. 260 C ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ἐπιτακτικῆς ὡς δυτα αὐτὸν τέχνης θήσομεν, δεσπόζοντά γε; ‘Or shall we rather assign him to the preceptive art, since he commands?’

Rep. VIII. 547 A ἀνάγκη Μοῦσας γε οὕσας.
So also perhaps

V. 478 B μὴ δὲ γε (sc. τὸ μὴ δὲ). ‘Not-being, since non-existent, should be called no-thing.’

And, without a participle:

I. 331 D τῶν γε σῶν, i.e. ‘of the argument, since it is your property.’

VI. 485 E δὲ γε τοιοῦτος, ‘since that is the description of him.’

(ε) δὲ γε (‘yes, but’) often introduces a second statement, which in some way modifies the first.

I. 335 D δὲ γε δίκαιος ἄγαθος.
VIII. 547 E, 549 B, 553 C, 556 B, 561 E, &c.

7. Ἐκα.

(γε ἄρα remain uncompounded in Theaet. 171 C.)

(a) Explaining something implied or understood. Cp. Hdt. IX. 92, § 2 μετὰ σφέων γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.: VI. 111, § 2 ἀπὸ ταῦτης γὰρ υφι τῆς μάχης, κ.τ.λ.

Rep. II. 365 D ἔτι γὰρ τὸ λαοῦ ἔμειν (‘there is a difficulty, but it is not insuperable; for,’ &c.).

III. 413 B νῦν γὰρ ποὺ μαθῆται; ‘(I have said enough); for I suppose you understand me now.’

VI. 491 C ἔτι γάρ τὸν τύπου νῦν λέγω.

So commonly in replies=‘yes, for —’, ‘no, for —’, &c.

(b) Introducing an inference under the form of a reason, ‘the truth is,’ ‘the fact is.’ Lit. ‘That is because.’

I. 338 D βδελυγός γὰρ εἶ, ‘that shows your malignity.’

Cp. Gorg. 454 D δὴλαν γὰρ αὖ ὅτι οὗ ταύτων ἔστω, ‘that is another proof of their difference.’
Δή marks what is said as manifest, either in itself, or in connexion with a preceding statement: 'you know,' 'of course,' 'to be sure.' Sometimes ibernic, 'forsooth' (as in ὡς δή). In questions it demands proof or certainty, or asks for something more explicit.

(a) Idiomatic combinations of δή with adverbs and conjunctions:

a. With adverbs of time = 'just,' νῦν δή, 'just now' (passim), αὐτίκα δή μάλα, 'just immediately' (I. 338 B), τότε δή, 'even then' (Sypm. 184 E).

b. καὶ . . . δή and καὶ δή καὶ, singling out the most prominent item in an enumeration or series:

I. 352 A (ὁ ἄν ἐγγένηται, εἶτε πόλει τῳ εἶτε γένει εἶτε στρατοπέδῳ . . .) καὶ ἐν ἑν δή.

II. 367 C οἶνον ὀρῶν, ἄκονεῖν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δή, 'and in particular the being well and strong.'

VIII. 563 E, 564 A ἐν ὀραίοις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δή καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἤκιστα (καὶ δή om. Par. A). Cr. Men. 87 E, Theaet. 156 B.

g. δή οὖν: οὖν δή.

II. 382 D κατὰ τί δή οὖν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεύδος χρήσθωμον; 'On which, then, of these grounds, in particular, is falsehood useful to God?'

VI. 497 C δῆλος δή οὖν εἰ ὅτι μετὰ τούτοις ἔρχεται . . . 'Now, then, I see plainly that the next thing you will ask is . . .'

VII. 526 D ἄλλος οὖν δή, εἴπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα βραχὺ τι ἄν ἐξαρκοῖ . . ., 'Howbeit, it is manifest, said I . . .'

VIII. 545 D πῶς οὖν δή, εἴπον, . . . ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν κινηθήσεται; 'How, then, in point of fact, shall our city be disturbed?'

(b) δή, with imperatives, giving peremptory emphasis:

φέρε δή, θά δή (passim), σκόπει δή (I. 352 D), ἔχε δή (ib. 353 B).

Hence Baiter's emendation of v. 450 C πειρῶ *δή for πειρῶ δή (Par. A) is at least plausible, although the reading of ΠΝ πειρῶ οὖν is perhaps preferable, because less abrupt.
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(c) ὡς δή, ‘since forsooth!’

I. 337 C ὡς δή διαμοιον τοῦτο ἐκεῖνος, ‘as if there was any comparison between the two cases.’ Quite different from this is the effect of ὡς δή τοι.

II. 366 C ὡς δή τοι … πολλὴν ποὺ συγγρώμην ἔχει, κ.τ.λ., ‘since truly, as you are aware.’

§ 33.

9. Ἐν.

Ἐν bespeaks attention for a fresh topic, generally in combination with a conjunction, καὶ μὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴν … γε, οἶδὲ μὴν, &c.

Plato shows a growing fondness for this particle, and employs it in new ways, especially in questions, asking for something fresh or different from what has been said.

(a) μὴν alone:

VII. 520 E παντὸς μὴν μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ’ ἀναγκαῖον . . . εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, ‘let me observe, however.’

VII. 524 C μέγα μὴν καὶ ὅψις καὶ σμίξην ἔφορα, ‘you will observe that vision too had perception of great and small.’

VIII. 528 Α φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ’ ἄν ἄλλῳ, κ.τ.λ., ‘though, to be sure, you would not grudge any incidental benefit which another may reap.’ Cp. Phaedr. 244 B, Theaet. 193 D.

(b) ἀλλὰ μὴν … γε:

VI. 485 D ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε εἰς ἐν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ἰένουσιν, κ.τ.λ., ‘well but, observe —.’

(c) μὴν in combination with an interrogative:

a. In such expressions there is generally an ellipse of ἄλλο—i.e. an implied contrast or antithesis. In other words, μὴν gives to the interrogative an intonation=‘what else?’ or ‘what then?’

I. 362 D ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; εἰπον, ‘but what more, then, would you desire? said I.’

VII. 523 B οὐ πάνω, ἥν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐπεξε οὐ λέγω. τοῖα μὴν, ἐφη, λέγεις; ‘You have not hit my meaning.’ ‘But what, then, are the things you mean?’
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β. Hence τί μήν; acquires the force of strong assent: ‘what else?’ i.e. ‘that, certainly.’

VI. 508 D ὑπερ γε, οἴμαι, ὡς ἡλιος καταλαμήη, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, κ.τ.λ. τί μήν; ‘of course.’

Obs.—W. Dittenberger has shown (Hermes, xvi. pp. 321 ff.) that τί μήν; is absent from two-thirds of the Platonic dialogues, but increasingly frequent in Phaedr. (12 times), Rep. (35), Theaet. (13), Soph. (12), Polit. (20), Phileb. (26), Laws (48).

The combination γε μήν, which is very frequent in the later dialogues, above all in the Laws, occurs only twice in the Republic:

I. 332 E μὴ κάμνουσι γε μήν, κ.τ.λ., ‘well but, if men are not ill,’ &c.

V. 465 B τά γε μήν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν, κ.τ.λ.

10. Ἄδ and πάντως. § 34.

Ἄδ and πάντως, though not conjunctions, serve to connect sentences which are otherwise in asyndeton.

IV. 427 B τελευτησάντων ἂδ θήκαι, ‘moreover, how the dead are to be buried’ (v. g. τε ἂδ).

VI. 504 E πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὄλγακεν ἄκηκοα.

Theaet. 143 C, Symp. 174 B, Gorg. 497 B, Polit. 268 E. So ἐίρα—as in other Greek—expressing impatience:

I. 338 D ἐίρα οὐκ ὀίσθα, κ.τ.λ., Protag. 359 E:

and αὐτίκα in adducing an example, Protag. 359 E, &c.

This last idiom occurs also in a subordinate clause,

I. 340 D ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα λατρῶν καλεῖς, κ.τ.λ.

11. "Ἀρα.

"Ἀρα is not only a particle of inference (like ὡς) but also, and in Plato more frequently, a sign of reference. This has sometimes been overlooked by interpreters. Socrates and other speakers are often engaged in developing opinions which they do not endorse, or in relating what
is matter of hearsay. In such passages, ἄρα is constantly used to direct attention to the fact that the speaker is not uttering his own thought. The light particle enables Plato to dispense with such clumsy additions as (a) 'as my informant said,' (b) 'according to the theory I am expounding,' or (c) with reference to other speakers, 'according to the theory which they uphold,' or 'which you uphold,' or 'as we are expected to think.'

(a) II. 364 B ὃς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς . . . βίου κακῶν ἐνείμας, 'that, as they declare,' &c.
(b) II. 362 A τὸ δὲ τού Ἀλοχύλου πολὺ ἵν ἄρα ('is really, according to their view') ὄρθοτερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου.
X. 598 E ἀνάγκη . . . ἐλδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, 'he must, according to them, make his poetry with perfect knowledge.'
(c) I. 332 E χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη; 'Justice is useful in peace also, according to you?'
X. 600 C, D Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ('according to the view in question') . . . Ὀμηρὸν δ' ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.

12. ποι.

ποιόν= 'I presume,' appealing to the knowledge or recollection of the respondent; often used in recalling what has been previously said.

VI. 490 C μεμινήσατι γάρ ποιόν.
IX. 582 D διὰ λόγων ποιόν ἐφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι.
Hence perhaps also in VIII. 562 B we should read τοῦτο δ' ἵν *ποιόν πλοῦτος.


It is needless to do more than to cite a few scattered uses which appear to be specially Platonic. (Uses of μὴ oὐ, for example, in Plato fall under the headings now given in L. and S. s.v. μὴ)—

(a) Oὐ in negation.
a. There is a courteous, reassuring use of oὐδὲν, oὐδαμῶς,
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&c., which is not intended to be taken seriously, but only to prepare for a modified restatement. This may in some cases be formally accounted for by supplying ἄλλο, &c. (below, p. 216 β), but not, for example, in

IX. 578 D τί γὰρ ἂν φοβοῖτο;

Οὐδὲν, εἰπὼν ἄλλα τὸ αἰτιον ἐννοεῖς; 'Why indeed?' said I. 'But do you know the cause?'

V. 472 B ἄλλα τί τούτο γ'; ἔφη.

Οὐδέν ἄλλ' ἐὰν εὑρωμεν, κ.τ.λ., 'Oh, merely to find,' &c.

The courtesy is sometimes ironical: as in

IV. 424 D ὢνδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἔφη, ἄλλο γε ἦ κατὰ σμικρὸν, κ.τ.λ., 'Oh! said he, 'it is innocent enough, I dare say. All that it does is to undermine morality,' &c.

These examples may justify a similar rendering of

V. 461 C, D πατέρας δὲ καὶ βυγατέρας ... πῶς διαγνώσονται ἄλληλοι;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἄλλ' ἄφ' ἦς, κ.τ.λ., 'Oh! simply in this way, said I.'

Although it is of course possible to take the words to mean literally 'not at all,' i.e. they will never know their actual parents.

β. Οὐ πάνω in Plato has various shades of meaning, from

(1) 'not quite,' to (2) 'not at all.'

(1) V. 474 D οὐ γὰρ πάνω γε ἐννοῶ, 'I cannot quite recall it,' rather than, 'I have it not at all in mind.'

(2) VI. 504 Ε οἷοι τιν' ἄν σὲ ... ἀφεῖναι ... ;

Οὐ πάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 'Certainly not, said I.'

The stronger meaning may, however, be sometimes indirectly implied,—the speaker, as so often in Greek, saying less than he means.

IV. 429 Α οὐ πάνω χαλεπών, 'not so very difficult,' i.e. 'surely not difficult at all.'

(b) Interrogatives. 37.

a. The regular interrogative use of οὐ in confident questions (= 'don't you think' &c.) is to be distinguished

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from the negative assertion with interrogative meaning, assuming a negative reply (= 'you don't think so, surely?'):

II. 362 D οὐ τί πον οἶει, . . . οὐ Σώκρατες, ἵκαρις εἰρήσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου;

β. Slightly different from both is the use in

V. 455 E (again assuming an affirmative answer) γυμναστική δ' ἄρα οὔ, οὐδὲ πολεμική; 'And (will you tell me that) there is not an athletic nor yet a warlike woman?' Cp. Theaet. 145 A ἄρ' οὔδὲ γεωμετρικός; 'But will you tell me that he is not a geometrician?'

γ. ἤ and ἄρα, emphatically interrogative, commonly anticipate a negative reply.

(1) I. 348 C ἤ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακιὰν; 'Do you mean to tell me that Justice is Vice?' (The particle here might ironically anticipate an affirmative answer, but the following examples confirm the above rendering.)

III. 396 B τὰ τοιαῦτα ἤ μιμήσασθαι; 'Shall we allow them to imitate such things as these?'

V. 469 C ἤ καλῶς ἔχει; 'Is that an honourable thing?'

VIII. 552 A ἡ δοκεῖ ὑδρῶς ἔχειν;

(2) VII. 523 E τί δὲ δὴ; τὸ μέγεθος . . . ἄρα ἰκαρίως ὑπὲρ;

( resumed with ἄρ' οὖκ ἐνδεώς immediately afterwards).

δ. But ἄρα; with ironic emphasis is sometimes practically equivalent to ἄρ' οὖ;

VI. 484 C τὸδε δὲ, ἦν δ' ἕγω, ἄρα δῆλον . . . ; Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον;

Cp. Soph. 221 D ἄρ', ὡς πρὸς θεῶν, ἡγεσίκαμεν, κ.τ.λ., 'Can it be that we have failed to recognize their kinship?' i.e. 'Are they not, after all, akin?'

ε. And ἤ in ἤ γάρ; 'Surely that is so?' puts a strong affirmation with an interrogative tone (cp. supra a).

Gorg. 449 D ἤ ύφαστικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματιῶν ἐργασίαιν ἤ γάρ; 'Surely that is so?'

In X. 607 C, however, this use is 'mixed' with the ordinary interrogative use of οὖ.
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η γάρ . . . οὖν κηλεύει ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ σὺ; 'Do not you feel her charm? Surely you do?'

Obs.—This use of η may be pressed into service to account for ν. 500 λ η, καὶ λαῦν οὖσα θεϊνται. But η καὶ λαῦ may be corrupted from η οὖκ λαῦ, through dittographia of e and dropping of οὖ.

ς. For ἡρα μη, μων, μων μη (I. 351 E, VI. 505 C) in doubtful questions, see the Lexica.

 Cena) Exceptional uses of μη. These mostly occur where § 38, either some generalized notion, or some idea of prohibition, has been implied.

a. Where a relative has preceded:

II. 357 B οὐσαι ἄβλαβείς καὶ μηδέν . . . γίγνεται ἀλλο, κ.τ.λ. (See above, p. 174, 2 (b).)

VIII. 559 B η τε μὴ παύσαι ζωντα δινατη (so ԛ). See note.

X. 605 E οἶνον ἐαυτόν . . . μὴ ἄξιοι εἶναι. Μη is here used in putting the case generally.

In Hipp. Maj. 295 C οὶ ἄ ν δοκῶσι τοιοῦτοι εἶναι οἰοι μὴ δινατοι ὅραν, the hypothetical turn of expression follows οὶ ἄ ν δοκῶσιν.

β. In oratio obliqua (M. and T., § 685).

I. 346 E διὰ η ὑπάτα ἑγγυε . . . καὶ ἀρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα θέλειν ἑκόντα ἀρχεῖο—recalling the general statement in 345 E τὰς ἀλλας ἀρχαὶ . . . στὶ οὐδεὶς θέλειν ἀρχεῖον ἑκών.

X. 602 A πάτερον ἐν τούχρησθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐξεῖ ν ἄ ν ἄ ν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὁρθὰ εἴτε μη;

Theaet. 153 A μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἄ ν μείζων . . . γενέσθα . . . τοῦτο μὴ αὐξάνεσθαι νοτε μὴ τε φθίνειν. Socrates is recording the 'postulates' or a priori determinations of the mind. "Ἀν in the former sentence adds the notion of impossibility. So τίς ἄ ν in Apol. 27 D τίς ἄ ν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παιδας ἵγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοῖν δὲ μη;"

γ. A shadowy sense of prohibition seems present in VIII. 553 D where οὐδέν . . . έφ λογίζεσθαι is followed by τιμάν μηδέν, as if ἀναγκάζει or some such word had preceded. So possibly in III. 407 D οὖκ ἐπίχειρέων . . . μὴ οἰκεσθαι δείν θερα-
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πεὺν, the change to μή is occasioned by some reminiscence of καταθέεια... προστάτευ, preceding. See note in loco.

Obs.—For idiomatic accumulation of negatives, see especially x. 610 A-C ἡ τοῖνυ... ἀπόλλυσθα.

§ 39.

14. Formulae.

(a) Of question—ἡ ὁ; τίς μὴχανη μὴ ὁ; &c. For ἡ γάρ; see above p. 210, ε.

(b) Of reply—πάνυ γε, σφμδρα γε, καὶ μάλα. πάνυ μὲν ὁ, παντάπασε μὲν ὁ, κομιδὴ μὲν ὁ. φαίνεται, οὐ φαίνεται, δοκεῖ γε δή. πῶς γάρ; πῶς γάρ ὁ; τί μὴν (sc. ἄλλο); (See above, under μή, p. 206.)

The degree of assent or dissent implied in each case varies somewhat with the context.

(c) Of connexion, τί δὲ; τὸ δὲ γε, ἄλλο τι ἢ (cp. Herod. II. 14, &c.), ἄλλο τι; ἄλλο τι ὁ; a. The question whether τι δὲ and τि δὲ δή are to form a separate sentence, or to be joined to the words that follow them, is one that can only be determined by the immediate context. See especially I. 349 B, C, E; V. 468 A and notes in locis.

β. For ἄλλο τι in apposition to the sentence, see below, p. 221.

Obs. 1.—Single words habitually used in parenthesis are not treated as breaking the unity of a clause, but may be immediately followed by an enclitic. This applies, not only to ὁτι and the like (for which see especially VIII. 564 A), but to a vocative, e.g. I. 337 τι πῶς γάρ ἂν, ἐφθανεν ἐγώ, ὁ βέλτιστε, τίς ἰπσερίνατο;

Obs. 2.—For the common transference of ἢη, ἢτι, πω from temporal to logical succession, see especially II. 370 D, IV. 430 D—432 B.

Obs. 3.—ἀληθῶς, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὅτερος, τῷ δότι may be taken under the present head. M. Schanz has shown that in the later dialogues ὅτερος gradually takes the place of τῷ δότι. But when he argues that because ὅτερος occurs five times in Bb. v—vii while it is absent from
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Bb. i–iv, Bb. v–vii are ‘late,’ he loses sight of his own observation that τῷ ἀνα is naturally avoided in conjunction with other cases of ὦν.

VI. Ellipse and Pleonasm. § 40.

I. Ellipse.

To maintain the effect of conversation and to avoid monotony, Plato constantly represents his speakers as omitting what, although essential to the meaning, is assumed to be obvious to the hearers. Hence a frequent duty of the interpreter is to supply the word or words ‘understood’—especially (a) in references, (b) in replies, (c) in antitheses, (d) in transitions, and (e) where a word of simple meaning is absorbed in some neighbouring word. Under this head should also be noticed (f) familiar abbreviations.

(a) In references.

I. 341 B τῶν ὃς ἔπος εἰπέων (sc. στῶ προσαγορευόμενον).

The incomplete expression is explained by the reference to 340 D λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως.

(b) In replies.

I. 334 D μηδαμῶς (sc. στῶ τιθομεν).

I. 349 B οὖν δὲ τῆς δικαίας (sc. πράξεως).

IV. 428 E πολὺ, ἔφη, χαλκέας (sc. πλεόνος οἴμαι ἐνέσεθαι τῇ πόλει).

V. 451 D κοινῇ, ἔφη, πάντα (sc. οἴκωμεθα δεῖν αὐτὰς πράττειν τοῖς ἄρρεσιν).

V. 468 A λέγ', ἔφη, ποί' ἄν (sc. καταφαίνοιτο σοι).

V. 473 A δ' σὺ ἐπιτάττεις (sc. ἀποφαίνειν ὡς δυσατά ἐστι καὶ ἢ).

VI. 508 C διὰν δὲ γ', οἴμαι, ὃν ὁ ἡλιος καταλάμπη (sc. ἐπ' ἐκείνα τὶς τρέπτη τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς).

VIII. 552 C ἔδωκει (sc. τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι).

IX. 585 D σώμα δὲ αὐτὸ πυροχής οὐκ οἴει οὕτως; (sc. ἥττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ σοφίας μετέχειν).

Cp. Phaed. 73 A ἐν μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ (sc.
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tauta ἀποδείκνυται supplied from ποιεῖι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; preceding).

Obs. 1.—In continuing a conversation, the indirect form is sometimes used with the ellipse of εἰπέ. Rep. i. 348 B ὀπότερως . . . ἄρεσκε; Ethyd. 271 B. Cp. Polit. 261 E ὀπότερον ἀν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ξυμβαίνῃ (sc. ὀνομάσομεν).

Obs. 2.—A special idiom is the ellipse of the apodosis with a new protasis, participial or otherwise.
Phaedr. 228 d δεῖξε γε πρῶτον, ὁ φιλότης (see above, p. 179, Obs. 3). Rep. i. 338 C ἐὰν μᾶθω γε πρῶτον;
I. 340 A ἐὰν σὺ γ', ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσῃς.

Obs. 3.—Note the occasional omission of a comparative with ἦ following.
I. 335 A προσθείναι . . . ἦ . . . ἐλέγομεν.
Symp. 220 E ἦ μὲ λαβεῖν ἦ σαντόν.

(c) In antitheses.
II. 360 A ἔξω δὲ δῆλω (sc. ἔξω δὲ αὐτῷ στρέφοντι τὴν σφενδόνην δήλω γλύνεσθαι).

III. 412 D μὴ δέ, τούταντιν (sc. εἴ δὲ ολοίτο ἔκεινον μὴ εὖ πράττοντος, ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ κακός πράττειν).
IV. 444 D τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ. (sc. τὸ δὲ νόσον ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι παρὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι, κ.τ.λ.).
(d) In transitions:—i. e. in passing from one alternative to another, or to a new topic.
I. 351 B ἦ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης (sc. τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔχειν).
II. 366 B ὡς δὲ (sc. οὕτως ἔχει), δῆλον.
IV. 428 C τί δὲ; τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ (sc. διὰ τὴν . . . σκευῶν ἑπιστήμην).
VI. 493 D ὅτι μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ. (sc. δῆλον ἔστι, from δοκεῖ preceeding).

Obs.—In Plato, as in other Greek, the affirmative notion is often assumed in passing from a negative—e. g. ἐκαστος supplied from οὐδείς in
II. 366 D οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δικαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀναδρομίας . . . ψέγει τὸ ἀδίκειν.
VI. 500 B οὐδὲ γάρ . . . σχολὴ . . . βλέπειν . . . ἀλλὰ (καιρὸς) μμείσθαι.
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And sometimes the word to be supplied is more general than that which precedes—e. g.

v. 469 c μηδὲ Ἑλληνα ὅρα δούλον ἐκτῆσθαι (sc. δεῖ from δοκεῖ δικαίων, κ.τ.λ. preceding).

Somewhat similarly in VIII. 557 Ε μηδὲ αὖ ἔλαν τις ἄρχεων νόμος σε διακωλύῃ ἢ δικάζειν, μηδὲν ἤττων καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν, the general notion of 'no compulsion' (sc. ἐξείναι) is continued from μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην supra. 'There is nothing to compel you any the less for that to be a ruler and judge,' i. e. there is nothing any more on that account to prevent you from exercising both functions.

(e) Absorption by a neighbouring word. The want of the § 41. word omitted is not felt because of another word which suggests it to the mind. Cp. Herod. II. 87 τοὺς τὰ πολυ-
tελέστατα (sc. σκευαζόμενους) σκευάζουσι νεκροὺς.

II. 358 D εἰ σοι βουλομένω (sc. λέγω) η λέγω.

II. 364 Α πουροῦσι πλουσίους (sc. δυτικάς) καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἐξουσίας.

II. 366 Ε ἄλλως ἡ δόξα (sc. ἐπιστατέως, κ.τ.λ.).

II. 372 Ε καὶ ὤσα (sc. ἐχειν) ἀπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἐχουσί.

IV. 421 B ὅ ὅ ἐκεῖνο λέγων . . . (sc. λέγειν).

IV. 439 Α τῶν τινῶν (sc. δυτικών suggested by εἶναι following).

See note in loco.

V. 452 Α παρὰ τὸ ἔθος (sc. φαινόμενα) γελοῖα ἄν φαῖνοιτο.

VI. 488 Α νοῦκληρον (sc. μὲν) μεγέθει μὲν, κ.τ.λ.

VI. 510 Β ἀλλ' ἄδησις, ἢν ὅ ἐγώ (sc. μαθίσει, which follows soon).

VII. 517 D φαίνεται . . . γελοίου (sc. ὄν) . . αἱμβλυντῶν.

IX. 589 C ὅ δὲ ψέκτος οὐδὲν ὑπεί (sc. λέγει, from ἀληθεύει preceding or ψέχει following) οὐδ' εἶδος ψέχει ὅ τι ψέχει.

Χ. 615 B, C τῶν ὅ δὲ εἶδος γενομένων (sc. ἀποθανόντων: the whole passage relating to the dead). See Essay on Text, p. 121.

Obs.—Such omissions are not purely accidental, but are due to instinctive avoidance of cumbrous tautology.
(f) Familiar abbreviations.

a. Certain adjectives readily dispense with the verb substantive. The idiom is frequent with ἰᾶος and ἐτόμουs (Parm. 137 C ἐτοιμός σω, ὁ Παρμενίδη) but is extended by Plato to other words.

II. 358 A ἀλλΓ ἔγω τις, ὡς ἐσκε, δυσμαθῆς.
III. 407 B ἀβίωτων τῆ μὴ μελετάωτι.
X. 598 D εὔθυκες τις ἀνθρώπως.

Obs.—The substantive verb is similarly omitted with ἀνάγκη, τίς μηχανη, &c., also in el μὴ ηλ, κ.τ.λ.: III. 411 E, IX. 581 D. In II. 370 E ἢν ἀν αὐτὸς χρεία, the subjunctive ᾧ is dropped.

β. ἀλλος is constantly omitted with interrogatives and negatives.

I. 332 C ἀλλὰ τί οἶει (sc. ἀλλο);
I. 348 C ἀλλὰ τί μὴν (sc. ἀλλο);
V. 461 D οὐδαμῶς (sc. ἀλλος).
V. 472 B οὐδέν (sc. ἀλλο).

Also in the hypothetical formula el μὴ τι ἀλλά.

On ἀλλα τι, which is sometimes called an ellipse, see below, p. 221, Obs. 2. Another phrase which is appositional not elliptical is ἐν ἄνθρω πός (I. 331 B).

γ. The indefinite subject is dropped, as in the common idiom, κωλύει ἐν τῷ νύμφη, &c.

IV. 445 A εἶν τε λαβεῖν ἐὰν τε μὴ (sc. ὁ δίκαια τε πράττων καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτιθέοντο).
V. 478 B ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὴν δὲ δοξάζει (sc. δοξάζων).

δ. Transitive verbs used absolutely, i.e. without express object.

I. 335 D ψύχεω ... υγραίνω ... βλάπτεω.
II. 368 B ὁ τι χρήσωμαι (sc. ύμων ορ τῷ λόγῳ).
III. 392 D περαινουσιν.
III. 411 A οἵαν μὲν τις ... παρέχε.
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III. 411 E διαπράττεται.

IV. 420 C ἀπολαβόντες.

VII. 525 D οὐδεμιᾷ ἀποδεχόμενον.

IX. 585 E χαίρειν ἂν ποιεῖ (sc. τὸν ἀνθρώπον).

Obs.—Several of these words (χρῆσθαι, περάειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀποδέχεσθαι) belong to the technical language of the dialectical method. See also

v. 467 B οἷα . . . φιλεῖ (sc. γίγνεσθαι).

viii. 565 E οἷα δὲ φιλοῦσι (sc. ποιεῖν).

ε. In some technical phrases a feminine abstract substantive is suppressed, as e.g. τέχνη in ἡ λατρικὴ, &c. (sexcenties). Similarly

III. 397 B πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν (sc. χορδήν), 'in the same tone.'

See note in loco.

IV. 432 A δὲ δὴ λής (sc. τῆς λύρας).

Ibid. δὴ πασῶν (sc. τῶν χορδῶν).

ζ. One of two alternative or correlative expressions is sometimes dropped.

VI. 486 C (πότερον) εἰμαθής ἢ δυσμαθής.

Obs.—Thus δὲ μὲν is omitted where δὲ δὲ follows, e.g. Phaedr. 266 A σκαι, τὰ δὲ δεξιά. This idiom appears more frequently in the later dialogues (Tim. 63 e &c.).

N.B.—For the special idiom with μεταξὺ (vi. 498 A) see above, p. 198, γ.

η. Other conversational ellipses are
I. 343 C οὕτω πόρρω εἶ (sc. τῆς γνώσεως).

V. 467 C δοσα ἀνθρώπωι (γιγνώσκουσιν).

2. PLEONASM.

§ 42.

As the omission of words gives an impression of ease and familiarity, so their redundancy enhances the appearance of leisure and freedom (cp. Theaet. 172 C foll.). Plato’s periods 'are not made but grow' (cp. Phaedr. 264); he drifts down the wind of his discourse (Rep. II. 365 D). Hence when a new thought or mode of expression has occurred to the speaker, he does not wait to round off the
sentence before introducing it, but weaves it into that which is half finished, often to the sacrifice of formal coherency. Thus rhetoric interferes with grammar.

A good instance of Plato’s love of amplification occurs in II (380 A foll.), where Socrates insists that evil must not be attributed to God:

‘Αλλ’ ἐὰν τις ποιῇ ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ λαμβέια ἐνεστί, τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη, ἢ τὰ Πελοπίδων ἢ τὰ Τρωϊκά ἢ τί ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐκείνα αὐτὰ λέγει, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρέτευν αὐτοῖς σχέδιον ὅν καὶ ἢμεῖς λόγους σημάδια, καὶ λεκτέων, ὡς ὁ μὲν θεος δίκαια τε καὶ ἁγαθὰ εἰργάζετο, οὐ δὲ ἀνίκατο κολαζόμενοι· ὡς δὲ ἄθλη λέγει, ὃς δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν διδότης, ἢν δὲ δὴ ὁ δρῶν ταύτα θεος, οὐκ ἐκείνων λέγει τὸν ποιητήν. Αλλ’, εἰ μὲν δι’ ἐδείχθη σαν κολαζόμενοι λέγοντες, ὃς ἄθλη λέγεται κακό, διδότης δὲ διὰ τηλίκην ὀφελοῦσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐκείνων· κακῶν δὲ αἰτίων φάναι θεοῦ τινι γλύγεθαι ἀγαθῶν ὅντα, διαμαχήτων παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγει ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει εὐνοομῆσθαι, μήτε τινὰ ἀκοῦει, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτε ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἀνευ μέτρου μυθολογοῦσα, ὃς οὔτε δοσια ἢ δοσιαν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοτα, οὔτε ξύμφορα ἢμιν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς.

Here observe (1) the accumulation of examples characteristically summed up with ἢ τί ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, (2) the disjunctive mode of statement, put first affirmatively (either one or other), then negatively (not both); then affirmatively again, then once more negatively with increased explicitness and emphasis, and with the characteristic qualification εἰ μέλλει εὐνοομῆσθαι. Observe also (3) the addition of the participle μυθολογοῦσα, and of εἰ λέγοντο. Note further (4) the pleonastic φάναι anticipating λέγειν, and (5) the clinching of the argument in the last clause, ὃς οὔτε δοσια, κ.τ.λ. The examination of this one passage may prepare the student for much that he will find elsewhere. Cp. especially vi. 489; Π. 374 B–D ‘Αλλ’ ἄρα ... παρασχομένῳ; IV. 421 B–C. A simile or illustration is often expanded in this way, e.g. III. 402 A ὡσπερ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ. See also the pleonastic use of participles in Symp. 218 A, B.
Part I: Syntax—Pleonasm.

(a) The most ordinary pleonasmgs are those in which § 43 a notion already implied is made explicit in a subsequent phrase.

II. 358 E πλώον δὲ κακῷ ὀπερβάλλειν. κ.τ.λ.  
II. 371 D καπῆλων... γένεσιν ἐμποιεί.  
VI. 486 D ζητάμεν δεῖν.  
VI. 490 A παρὰ δόξαιν τοῖς νῦν δοκομένοις.  
VIII. 555 B τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ώς πλουσιώτατον δεῖν γίγνεσθαι.

(b) Specially Platonic is the expletive use of ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἡλεῖν, κινδυνεῖνε, ἔχομαι and other verbs as auxiliaries. See also VI. 500 D μελετήσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἢθη... τιθέναι: VII. 520 B ἐκτείνω... προθυμεῖσθαι. So Cephalus, in his garrulous talk about old age, speaks of the time when one comes near to thinking that he is about to die, ἐπειδὰν τίς ἐγγὺς ή τοῦ οἰσεθαὶ τελευτήσει (I. 330 D). For the pleonastic or expletive use of participles (ἐχων, &c.) see above, p. 177 (f).

(c) The amplifying, expansive tendency of Plato's language has a distinct bearing on the treatment of the text. The excision of supposed 'glosses' and 'accretions' by which editors have tried to prune away such redundancies, must be carried far beyond the limit of even plausible conjecture, if the tendency itself is to be disproved. (See Essay on Text, p. 110.)

V. 477 B, C φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὅντων, αἷς ἡ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πάν ὅ τι περ ἵνα δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὅψιν καὶ ἄκοψι τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἀρα μανθάνεις δ βουλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος.

Obs.—The addition of an equivalent phrase often adds a touch of admiration or scorn.

I. 331 Α ἡδεία ἀλείσ... καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος.  
II. 364 Ε διὰ θυσίων καὶ παιδιῶν ἡδονῶν.

(d) A special idiom, not exclusively Platonic (see L. and S., s. v. Π. 8), is the pleonastic (or adverbal) use of ἄλλος.
Cp. especially Hom. Odys. IX. 367 μητηρ ἥδε πατὴρ ἥδ'
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ἄλλοι πάντες ἔταρτοι: Herod. IV. 179, § 1 ἄλλην τε ἐκατόμβην καὶ

α. ἄλλος attributive.

II. 368 Β ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, 'from your
manner of life, not from your words.'

II. 371 Α γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν ... καὶ δὴ
cal τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων, 'and also of that ministering class.'

III. 404 Α, Β πολλὰς μεταβολὰς ... μεταβάλλοντας οὐδέτερο τε καὶ
tῶν ἄλλων σιτίων, 'enduring many changes of drinking-
water and also of food.'

β. In other cases ἄλλος is predicative or adverbial, but
still pleonastic:

Χ. 617 Β ἄλλας δὲ καθημένας πέριξ, κ.τ.λ., 'and sitting there,
moreover, round about.'

The Fates are thus contradistinguished from the Sirens,
(or perhaps 'there were others ... daughters of necessity,'
&c.). Cp. the idiomatic ἄλλος in Gorg. 470 Ο συγγενόμενος
ἄν γυνίς, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν ὑμ γεγνώσκεις.

(e) Αὐτὸς τε καὶ, with expansion of the correlative
phrase:

III. 398 Α αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι,
'bringing his poems for exhibition with him too.'

IV. 427 Ξ αὐτὸς τε καὶ τῶν ἄδελφων παρακάλει, 'and call your
brother also to assist.'

VII. 535 Ε ἢ δὲ ... χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτὴ τε καὶ ἑτέρων ψευδο-
μένων ὑπεραγανακτῇ.

(f) Double comparative and superlative:

I. 331 Β οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ... χρησιμώτατον.

II. 362 Κ θεοφιλόστερον ... εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν.

§ 44.

VII. Apposition.

One very frequent consequence of Plato's discursiveness
is what may be loosely termed the apposition of sentences,
—the second being often not the exact equivalent, but an
explanation or expansion of the first. Cp. Herod. I. 23, § 2
θόψα μέγιστον ... Ἀρίων ... ἐπὶ δελφίνος ἐξενείχθεντα:
VI. 117, § 2 θάνατα γενέσθαι τοιόνδε, Αθηναίων ἄνδρα Ἐπίζηλον 
... τῶν δομάτων στερηθήναι.

Three cases may be distinguished:—

1. Where a pronoun or a pronominal phrase or an adverb
resuming a preceding statement is followed by a restatement
of the same thing, more or less expanded or modified.

II. 337 C καὶ στὸν οὖσον ποιήσεις; ἢν ἐγὼ ἀπεῖπον, τούτων τι ἀποκρινεῖ;

II. 365 C ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τριπτέον διόες πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχήμα
κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφῶν ἁρετὴς περιγραφέων, κ.τ.λ.

III. 416 B μή τοιοῦτον... ποιήσωσι τι,δὲ τοῦν. πολίτας, ἐπειδὴ
αὐτῶν κρείττον εἰσίν, ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων εὐμενῶν δεσπόταις ἄγριοι
ἀφομοιωθῶν.

IV. 429 E, 430 A τοιοῦτον... ὑπόλαβε... ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς
... μηδὲν οὗν ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι ἣν, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 517 B τὰ δὲ οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὖσον φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ
γνώστῳ... μόνες ὁρῶσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 532 A οὖσι καὶ ἐτοι τοῖς τῷ διαλέγεσθαι εἰπερίπτῆ, ἄνευ
πασῶν τῶν ἁλοθήσεως διὰ τοῦ λόγου έντροφεί, δὴ οὗτον Ξάστων
ἐρμή (subjunctive) καὶ μῆ ἀποστῆ, κ.τ.λ. Here the protasis
is expanded.

Χ. 605 B ταῦτα καὶ τῶν μιμητικῶν ποιητῆν φήσομεν καθὼ
πολιτείαν... ἐμποιεῖν.

Obs. 1.—The frequent formula of transition with the interrogative
follows the analogy of this mode of construction—

I. 332 E τί δὲ οὐκ αἰεὶν; εἰ ἐν τίνι πράξει, κ.τ.λ. et passim.

This form is better suited to the majority of cases than the o’her
punctuation τί δὲ; οὐκ αἰεὶν εἰ τίνι πράξει, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 515 B τί δὲ τῶν παραφρομένων; οὐ ταὐτῶν τοίτο;
although the latter is also sometimes required by the context:

VII. 517 D τί δὲ; τοί δὲ εἰς τι βασιλείαν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs. 2.—So ἄλλα τι, when not followed by ἣ, forms virtually
a separate clause in apposition.

I. 337 C ἄλλα τι οὖν, ἐφη, καί οὐ οὖσον ποιήσεις; ‘You mean to say
that that is what you are going to do?’

So I. 331 B εἰν αὐτ’ ἐνός: VI. 498 B πῶν τοῦντιν.
Also τό δὲ (Soph. 248 D; Laws III. 676 c).

VII. 527 Λ τὸ δ’ ἐστὶν ποιν τῶν μάθημα, κ.τ.λ. (Digest, § 22).
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Obs. 3.—Similarly, the relative pronoun, although not forming a separate clause, often introduces a long sentence, towards which it stands in apposition. (Digesti, §§ 10 ff.)

II. 368 D ὁδεπρέπει ἐν εἴ, κ.τ.λ. ‘A method similar to that we should have adopted, if’ &c.

IV. 434 D ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν, ἥν φέρθημεν, κ.τ.λ.
Protag. 352 E, 353 A τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασίν ὕπο τῶν ἵδιον ἔχτισαν. So ὅν, vi. 488 A ὁλον οἱ γραφῆς, κ.τ.λ. ‘As painters do, when they delineate monsters.’

§ 45. 2. Apposition of Clauses,—where a statement is immediately followed by a parallel statement, in the same construction, with no conjunction between (Asyndeton).

I. 329 C, D παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιοῦτων ἐν τῷ γῆρᾳ πολλὴ εἰρῆνη γίγνεται καὶ ἔλευθερια, ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωνται κατατέλουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφικλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πάντων πολλῶν ἐστι καὶ μανομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι. (Some MSS. insert γὰρ after ἐπειδὰν.)

II. 359 B, C εἰ τοιόνυς ποιήσαμεν ἃ ἰδιανολὴ δόντες ἔχουσιν . . . ἐπακολουθήσαμεν.

V. 457 C λέγε δή, ἵδω.
VII. 530 A οὐκ οἷει . . . τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ;
VII. 540 E διασκευωρήσωμεν . . . ἐκπέμψωσιν.
VIII. 557 C κυριεύει . . . καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτείων εἶναι ὁπερ ἵματιον ποικίλον . . . καὶ αὕτη . . . καλλίστῃ ἄν φαύνοτο. IX. 589 D τοιόνυς τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων, κ.τ.λ. Cp. Phaedo 95 C ; Gorg. 493 E.

Obs. 1.—Between clauses thus related a question is sometimes interposed,

VII. 540 E ὅταν . . . διασκευωρήσωμεν . . . : Πῶς ; ἣ : . . . ἐκπέμψωσιν.

Obs. 2.—Slightly different from the foregoing is the emphatic repetition, with asyndeton, of what has been said—

(a) giving the effect of a second apodosis:

I. 339 E ὁλον τοῖνυ . . . ὡμολογήσθαι . . . ὅταν . . . , ἀρα τότε . . . οὐκ ἀναγκαίον συμβαίνειν, κ.τ.λ.
I. 340 B τοῦτο πωμήν ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.
II. 372 B βρέψονται . . . ἐσωχήσονται.
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So iii. 413 C; vi. 497 b.

N.B.—The case of viii. 545 β δομα γάρ οὐκ ἔχω... ἀλλ' ἡ τιμοκρατία, κ.τ.λ. is peculiar and should probably be met as W. H. Thompson suggested by reading ἀλλ' ἡ τιμοκρατία, κ.τ.λ.

(β) The protasis is likewise (1) repeated with variation, or (2) an additional protasis subjoined.

(1) vii. 529 B εἰς τέ τις ἀνω κεχρω... ἐπιχειρη μανθάνει, οὗτε μαθεῖν ἂν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν, κ.τ.λ.

(2) i. 331 C εἰς τις λάβῃ... ἐν μιᾶς ἀπατεί. Cp. Theae. 210 B, C εἰς τοῖς... ἐγκύων ἐπιχειρη γίγνεσθαι... εἰς τέ γίγνε... εἰς τέ κενός ἂς, where the two alternative hypotheses are subordinate to the principal one.

Obs. 3.—This, like other Platonic idioms, is used with greater abruptness in the Laws. See especially, Laws iv. 708 B ὅταν μὴ τῶν ἐσμάω γίγνεσθα τρόπον, ἐν γένος ὅπως μιᾶς ἱκάρας οἰκίζεται.

VIII. Co-ordination (Parataxis). § 46.

While in all syntax the subordination of clauses gradually supersedes their co-ordination, this tendency is checked in Greek by the fondness for analytical and antithetical expression, not only giving to co-ordination a temporary survival, but also favouring some independent developments of it, which interfere with the complete regularity of subordination. The crossing of the two methods may confuse the interpreter, but it enriches the style.

1. Interposition of one or more co-ordinate or parallel clauses with μὲν or τέ after the sentence is begun.

(a) μὲν.

II. 367 E καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, ἔλει μὲν ἡ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ του Ἄθεμάρτου ἡγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάντα γε ἡςθην.

III. 407 C, D φῶμεν καὶ Ἀσκληπίῳν τοὺς μὲν φύσει... τά δ' εἶσον... θεραπεύειν (see notes in loco).

III. 415 A ἀτε οὖν ἄγγελοι δότες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίως ἄν ὡμώ αὐτοῖς γεννήτε, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθεὶ ἄν
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ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἐξ ἀργυροῦ, ἔρμον ἐκγονον καὶ τῆλα πάντα οὕτως ἐξ ἄλληλων.

IV. 421 A, B ἔξ ἡμὲν ἕμείς μὲν ... ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖνο λέγων ... ἀλλο ἀν τι ἡ πόλει λέγοι.

VIII. 552 B ἡ ἑδοκεῖ μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶντων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτε ἀρχῳ οὐτε ὑπηρέτης ἤν αὑτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐτοιμῶν ἀναλωτῆς; Cp. Laws VI. 765 E ἄνθρωπος δὲ, ὅς φαμεν, ἡμερον, κ.τ.λ., where although μὲν is omitted, the mode of expression is virtually the same.

(δ') τε.

Π. 357 A ὅ γάρ Γλαῦκων ἔδε τε ἄνθρωποτας ἄν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἀπαντα, καὶ ἦν καὶ τότε ... οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο.

Τ. 404 C καὶ ὅρθως γε, ἔφη, ἵσαι τε καὶ ἀπέχονται.

See also Π. 359 D ἀλλα τε ἦν [δ'] μυθολογοῦσι θανασσατ, κ.τ.λ., when the same idiom may perhaps justify the omission of ο, as in Par. A.

2. Δέ in apodosis.

The use of δ' οὖν in resumption is a special case of this. The general idiom is too common to require further illustration. See, however, Symp. 183 C ἐπειδὰν δὲ ... μή ἑώρη ... els δὲ ταῦτα τις αὐθ βλέψας, κ.τ.λ., for a striking example of its effect.

Δέ is also added to a participle subjoined to a sentence,

VIII. 544 C δευτέρα καϊ δευτέρως ἐπαινομένη, καλουμένη δ' ὁλιγαρχία: IX. 572 E els πᾶσαν παρανομία, δομαζομένη δ' ... ἐλευθερίαν ἀπασαν.

3. Two complex sentences, opposed with μὲν and δέ, are bound together by a single interrogative or negative. This may fairly be regarded as a speciality of Platonic syntax, though not unknown to other Greek writers. In a simpler form it occurs, e.g. in Aesch. Prom. 507, 508—

μή νυν βροτοῦ μὲν ὧφιλει καυροῦ πέρα,

καυτοῦ δ' ἀκῆδει δυστυχοῦστος.

Eur. Bacch. 311, 312—

μηδ', ἢν δοκήσ μὲν, ἢ δὲ δόξα σου νοσεῖ,

φρονεῖν δόκει τι.
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Cp. Shakespeare, *M. of V.*, i. 3, 180:

‘I like not fair terms and a villain’s mind.’

*Macb.* ii. 2, 12:

‘The attempt and not the deed confounds us;’ and a complete example occurs in Lysias, contra Eratosth.

§ 36 οὐκ ὄντως δεινόν, εἰ τοὺς μὲν στρατηγοὺς, οἱ ἐνικῶν ναυμαχοῦντες . . . θανάτῳ ἐξημιώσατε . . . τούτων δὲ, οὐ . . . ἐποίησαν ἠττηθήναι ναυμαχοῦντας . . . οὐκ ἄρα χρή . . . ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἡμίαις κολάξεσθαι. (See also Xen. Mem. I. 4, § 17: III. 4, § 1.)

This form is employed where the combination of the two statements is deprecated or denied, i.e. to signify either that they ought not to be true together or cannot be so. The enormity or impossibility is marked more pointedly by the union of the two contradictories in a continuous sentence.

I. 336 Ε μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶνον, εἰ μὲν χρυσόν ἐξητούμεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἐκόντας εἶναι υποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ ζητήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὑρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιούμεν ἐκτὸς ζητοῦντας, πράγμα πολλῶν χρυσῶν τιμιώτερον, ἐπειδ' ὅτως ἁναγίης ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὃ τι μάλιστα φανήσαται αὐτῷ.

II. 374 B, C 'Αλλ' ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτότομον . . . ἦ οὕτω βάθιον, ὡστε καὶ γεωργῶν τίς ἁμα πολεμικός ἔσται . . . πτευτυκός δὲ ἡ κυβευτικός Ἰκανώς οὖθ' ἄν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτῷ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτευχέων:

III. 406 C οὐ ἡμεῖς γελοοὶ ἐπὶ μὲν . . . ἐπὶ δὲ . . . οὖκ, κ.τ.λ.

III. 407 A, B ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδάξωμεν, πότερον μελετητέον τοῦτο τῷ πλουσίῳ καὶ βίωτον τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι, ἡ νοσοτροφία τεκτουρίη μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νου, τὸ δὲ Φωκυνίδου παρακέλευμα οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει.

IV. 445 A γελοοῖο ἐμοίηκε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμα γλυκεσθαι ὡς, εἰ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τῆς φύσεως διαφθειρομένης δοκεὶ οὐ βιωτόν εἶναι . . . τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ψάμμων φύσεως παρατομομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτόν ἄρα ἔσται, κ.τ.λ.

V. 456 C οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν ἡμῶν ἄνδρας ποιήσει παιδεία, ἄλλη δὲ γυναῖκας.

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IX. 589 D, E el μὲν . . . el δὲ . . . όυκ ἄρα; and, without μὲν, V. 456 A.

Similarly, but with the second statement deferred, VIII. 556 B, C σφάς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν—ἀρ’ οὖ τροφῆς ταῖς μὲν τοὺς νέους, κ.τ.λ. (three lines), αὐτοὺς δὲ πλὴν χρησιμοσκὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἡμεληκότας, κ.τ.λ.

X. 600 C ἄλλ’ οἶει, ὁ Γλαύκων, κ.τ.λ.

N.B.—Such introductory words as δεινὸν el, γελοῖον el, have the force of a negative.

Obs. 1.—A clause is sometimes prefixed or appended to such composite sentences, just as if the meaning had been simply expressed, e. g.

v. 456 C πρὸς γε τὸ φυλακικὴν γυναικά γενέσθαι, όυκ ἄλλη μὲν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs. 2.—Sometimes instead of introducing the sentence with a negative, two alternative suppositions are co-ordinated and followed by an apodosis relating to both combined; so as to point the antithesis between what is preferred and its opposite.

IV. 421 A, B el μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν . . . ποιῶμεν . . . ὃ δ’ ἐκεῖνο λέγων . . .

—ἄλλο ἂν τι ἢ πάλιν λέγωι.

§ 47. 4. Disjunctives.

A clause, apparently pleonastic, is often introduced with ἢ to enforce a rule by adding to it the sanction of a penalty. This formula is especially frequent in the Republic.

III. 401 B προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τού ἁγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἡθοὺς ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήσας ἢ μὴ παρ’ ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, 'else they shall be prohibited.'

III. 401 B διακαλυπτεῖν τὸ κακόθες . . . μήτε . . . ἐμποιεῖν, ἢ ὃ μὴ οἶος τε ἄν οὐκ ἑκτέος παρ’ ἡμῖν δημιουργεῖν. See p. 219 (a).

V. 463 D περὶ . . . τοῦ ὑπῆκοον δὲν εἶναι τῶν γυνέων, ἢ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἑσεσθαι.

VI. 490 Ά ἢ (sc. ἀλλήλειαν) διώκειν . . . ἐδει ἢ ἀλαζοὺν ἄντι μυθικῆ μετείναι φιλοσοφίας.

VI. 503 A τὸ δόγμα τούτω μήτ’ ἐν πόνοις μήτ’ ἐν φόβοις . . . φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον.
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VII. 525 B τῆς οὐσίας ἀπέτευχεν εἶναί γενέσεως ἐξαραβώντι, ἡ μηδέποτε λογιστικῶ γενέσθαι.

(Cr. Isocr. Aeginet. § 27 οὔδε γὰρ ἀπελθεῖν οἶνον τ’ ἦν, ἥ δοκεῖν ἀμελεῖν.)

Obs.—Another mode of introducing such a sanction,—not falling under the same grammatical heading,—is the incidental assertion of a condition in a hypothetical or participial clause, in which the word μέλλω generally occurs—

Π. 365 c, d ἀλλὰ ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εἰσδαμονήσειν, ταύτη ιέτων, ὡς τὰ ἠχη τῶν λόγων φέρει.

Π. 372 d ἐπί τε κλινῶν κατακείσαται, ὅμως, τὸς μέλλοντος μὴ τολαπωρείσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

So in vi. 491 B εἰ τελέω μέλλοι σιλβόσοφος γενέσθαι, words unduly suspected by Cobet.

5. Minute or verbal antithesis. § 48.

The Greek love of antithesis gives rise to forms of expression which, if taken literally, are over-emphatic or even inaccurate.

(a) Thus ἀυτὸς is sometimes emphatically used where the antithesis is too minute to be pressed.

Π. 370 Ε ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιούτου τόπου, κ.τ.λ. ‘The city,’ as distinguished from the citizens.

Π. 371 B ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει.

Antithetical formulae are also used ironically to suggest the equivalence of an alternative of which one side is tacitly preferred.

Π. 373 E μὴ ' εἰ τι κακὸν μὴ ' εἰ ἀγαθόν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται (cp. Herod. VIII. 87, § 5 οὔτε εἴ . . . οὔτε εἴ).


Such antithetical redundancies as I. 346 A ἐκάστην . . . ἐκάστοτε, V. 462 D μέρους ποιήσαντος δῆ, VII. 516 B αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ, and such reduplications in climax as III. 406 A, B πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα, V. 449 D μέγα . . . κάι δλον are extremely frequent.
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The following are more noticeable:

IV. 441 C τὰ αὖτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει, τὰ αὖτὰ δ’ ἐν . . . τῇ ψυχῇ.
X. 605 B, C οὕτω τὰ μείζω οὕτω τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκονται.
X. 618 B βλεν καὶ χρηστον καὶ πονηρῶν διαγιγνώσκοντα.

(b) The love of antithesis often gives a negative turn to a sentence; VIII. 556 C, D ἦταν . . . μὴ δαμὴ . . . καταφρονῶνται . . . ἀλλὰ, κ.τ.λ.

6. Introduction of the reverse or contrary statement. In dwelling on one side of a distinction or antithesis the other side is introduced with apparent irrelevancy where it is not immediately in point. This is another way in which co-ordination breaks the smoothness of subordination.

A clear example is VII. 528 A ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ ἐνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν οὖθ’ ἀν ἄλλῳ, κ.τ.λ.

See also:

I. 349 B, C εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαῖον μὴ ἄξιοι πλέον έχειν μηδὲ βούλεται δ’ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ δίκιον;

II. 358 A πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον δὲν ψηγεταῖ, δικία δ’ ἔπαινεται (om. Par. A).

II. 371 D ἦ οὖ κατήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς . . . διακονοῦντας ἱδρυμένους ἐν ἄγορῇ, τοὺς δὲ πλάνης ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους;

II. 374 C μὴ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐκ ταῦτα ἔπιστηκεν, ἀλλὰ παρέγγυ χρώμενος;

V. 455 E, 456 A πολεμική, ἦ δ’ ἀπάλεμος.

VI. 490 E τὰς φθορὰς, ὡς διώλλυται ἐν πολλοῖς, σημικρὸν δὲ τι ἐκφεύγει.

VII. 520 D ὅπως ἐθελήσουσι ξυμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐκαστοὶ ἐν μέρει, τὸν δὲ πολὺν χρόνον μετ’ ἄλληλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ;

VIII. 546 D (if the text is sound) ἡμῶν (τῶν Μουσῶν) πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν . . . ἐλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἡγησάμενοι τὰ μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς (δεύτερα τε γυμν. Madv. c.j.).

VIII. 552 A τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ αὐτῷ ἀπόδοσθαι, καὶ ἄλλῳ κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου.

VIII. 559 C δόν νῦν δὴ κρήνην ἀνομάζομεν, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἱδρῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμημέν γέμοντα καὶ ἀρχίσεμενον
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ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαῖων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων φείδωλον τε καὶ ὀλγαρχικῶν;

Obs. 1.—The same love of completeness shows itself in the frequent addition of limiting or qualifying clauses, such as ὅταν γίγνηται, ἄν μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη, ὅσα ἀνθρωποί, ὅσον γε μ᾽ εἰδέναι, κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν or εἰς τὸ δυνατόν and the like, also in the addition of single words which remind the reader that there is another point of view, especially of δοκῶν, καλοῦμενος, λεγόμενος, or τῶν λεγόμενος, &c. to mark what belongs to ordinary unphilosophic opinion. For other examples of similar fulness of expression, see

iv. 430 c καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἤπ δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε.
vi. 492 Α δὶ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου.
vii. 523 Α τὸ γ᾽ ἐμοὶ δοκῶν.

Obs. 2.—Note also, as illustrating the same over-emphatic or exaggerating tendency, the multiplication of pronominal words in the same sentence;—ταυταύτους γε καὶ οὕτω (iii. 416 Α'), μηδαμὴ μηδαμός (Laws vi. 777 ε), εἴτε ἐσθή ἔχει καὶ ἐσθε,—also the addition of the negative side in such expressions as ἀλλὰ σμμέρων οἷοι διαφέρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κυβήνου, θεωρεῖν ἡ μή. A striking example of this sort of thing occurs in π. 369 c where in introducing the division of labour, Socrates is not contented with saying that different men have different wants and need various helpers, ἄλλον ἐπ᾽ ἄλλοι, ἀλλήλων γὰρ, but adds τῶν δ᾽ ἐν᾽ ἄλλου, 'and this man yet another, for another want,' to show not only that different men need different helpers, but that each requires more than one.

IX. Deferred Apodosis.

Digression and Resumption. § 49.

1. It is a natural consequence of the expansion of sentences, and especially of the tendency of parentheses and subordinate clauses to take an independent form, that the main statement at first intended is thrust aside, and, if not wholly lost, can no longer be expressed in strict continuation of the original construction. The sentence becomes like a tree whose leading stem has been distorted or broken. This is particularly apt to occur in the course of those elaborate similes of which Plato is fond. Cp. Lysias, contra Eratosth. § 6, Xen. Mem. iv. 2, § 25.

1 See Prof. Jowett's note on Rom. ii. 16.
§ 50. 2. As in all conversation the consciousness of imperfect expression is apt to occasion the attempt to recover preciseness by the introduction of superfluous words, so in the conversational style of Plato it often happens that what has been already stated or implied is resumed with some increase of explicitness, often with the addition of a formula of reference, such as δ' λέγω, διέπερ εἶπον, &c. Thus the effort to be exact leads to further irregularity of structure and sometimes even to a degree of confusion.
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(a) The simplest case is where the antecedent to a relative or correlative clause is made explicit with τοῦτο, ταῦτα or some other demonstrative word. This is common in Greek and is used more for emphasis than for clearness.

The same remark applies to αὐτὸς τε καὶ and to καὶ ταῦτα. See above, p. 220 (c).

In some instances, however, the demonstrative is thus inserted from the fear of losing the thread of the discourse, when the phrase that has been put emphatically foremost has been amplified:

IV. 440 B ταῦτα δὲ ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν κοινωνήσαντα . . . οἶμαι σε οὐκ ἄν φάναι . . . τοῦ τούτου αἰσθέοναι, where the construction also becomes more definite.

So I. 331 B τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἔξαπατήσαι . . . μέγα μέρος ἐκ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.

Or, where there is no amplification, but the order has been disturbed by emphasis, the chief word is resumed with an oblique case of αὐτὸς.

V. 477 D ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμιν τινα φῆς εἶναι αὐτήν, κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Gorg. 483 E where the construction is disturbed by the substitution of a general for a particular expression, ἢ ἄλλα μορφα ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιάδα λέγειν.

(b) In an explanatory clause, the chief word in the sentence to be explained is often resumed by a synonym:

II. 359 B ἀγαπάσθαι . . . τιμῶμεν.

II. 359 C εἰ ὃὶ ἄν ἡ ἐξουσία . . . οἰαν ποτὲ φασὶ δύναμιν, κ.τ.λ.

X. 611 C, D τεθεάμεθα . . . ὥσπερ οἱ . . . ὄρωντες οὐκ ἄν . . . ἴδοιεν . . . , οὕτω . . . θεώμεθα, κ.τ.λ.

(c) In resuming a deferred apodosis, a conjunction is often introduced; and, as μὲν οὖν usually introduces a digression, so δὲ οὖν is the regular formula for resumption.

I. 330 E καὶ αὐτὸς,—ὅτι δι όπο τῆς τοῦ γῆρως ἀσθενείᾳ ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἣδη ἐγγυτέρω ὄν τῶν ἐκεὶ μᾶλλον τι καθορῆ αὐτά—ὑποψίας δὲ οὖν καὶ δείκτος μεστὸς γίνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἢδη καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἰ τινὰ τι ἡδικηκεν.

This, reduced to normal syntax, might be thus ex-
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pressed:—ἡτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γῆρως ἀσθενείας, ἡ ὑπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾶν τὰ ἐκεῖ, ὑποψίας καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται. But the addition of ὁσπερ ἐγγυτέρω δὲν, by occasioning the change to the indicative, disturbs this orderly arrangement and requires the insertion of δ’ οὖν.

Cp VIII. 562 B δ’ προδέξατο . . . ἀγαθὸν . . . τοῦτο δ’ ἦν *που πλοῦτος . . . ἡ πλοῦτον τοῖς ἀπληστία, κ.τ.λ.

X. Remote Reference.

§ 51. The power of holding firmly by a complex thought appears (1) in the continuation of the main construction in spite of interruptions; and (2) in the pertinence of replies, showing that the respondent has fully grasped the main question, although the previous statement has been complicated by digressions.

(1) III. 413 E, 414 Α τῶν . . . ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα . . . καὶ τιμᾶς δοθέων καὶ ξώτι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, . . . μέγιστα γέρα λαγχάνοντα. Cp. Phaedo 81 Α οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα . . . ἀπέρχεται . . . οἱ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὕτη εὐθαῦσἀ εἰναι, πλάνης . . . ἀπηλλαγμένη. ὁσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμημένων . . . μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγονος.¹

VII. 540 D ἔχωγρείτε . . . εἰρηκέναι. Then follows a sentence of nineteen lines with a break and appositional asyndeton in the middle, then the construction with the infinitive is resumed with πλείστα ὄνησεν 541 Α.

(2) III. 405 B, C ἡ δοκεῖ σοι . . . τοῦτον ἀλχιοῦ εἰναι . . . (ten lines) . . . οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’, ἐφη, ἐκεῖνον ἐτι ἀλχιοῦ.

IV. 439 D οὖ δὴ ἀλόγως . . . (five lines) . . . οὐκ, ἀλλ’ εἰκότως.

VI. 491 E οὐκ, ἀλλὰ, η δ’ δς, οὕτως (see note in loco).

VIII. 558 B, C η δ’ ἐδε συγγυώμη . . . (nine lines) . . . πάνυ γ’, ἐφη, γενναία.

IX. 573 E ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη . . . (six lines) . . . σφόδρα γ’, ἐφη.

¹ διάγονος is supported by the Petrie papyrus against διαγοῦση, Heindorf’s conjecture.
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XI. Imperfect Constructions.

Attraction, Hypallage, Zeugma.

Very often, however, as in all Greek, the attraction of the § 52. nearest word, or an agreement that is apparent only, prevails over logic. The speaker is contented with a prima facie appearance of concord. The frequent redundancy of expression causes this anomaly to be more common than it would otherwise be.

1. Construction with the nearest word. (What is commonly known as Attraction is a special case of this.)

II. 370 ἐνα οὗ το γεωργὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν ἔχοιεν βοῶς, οὗ τε ὁκοδόμαι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρήσθαι ὑποξύγιοις (i.e. ἔχοιεν ὑποξύγια ὥστε χρήσθαι αὐτοῖς).

III. 392 ὁ πάντα, δόσα ... λέγεται, διήγησις ὁσα τυχάνει.

III. 409 ὁ ἀρετὴ ἄλθεις παιδευμένης χρόνῳ. Mr. H. Richards would read παιδευμένη. But if precise exactness is required, should it not be χρηστὴ φύσις παιδευμένη?

III. 416 ούκ ἔχοις τοιούτους ... τρέφειν κύνας (ποιμέσιν in construction with αὐχιστον takes the place of ποιμένας the subject of τρέφειν). Ib. ἐπίχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν. Madvig would omit κακουργεῖν. But the pleonastic infinitive is rendered easier by the frequent use of ἐπίχειρεῖν with infinitive in Plato so that ἐπίχειρεῖν κακουργεῖν τὰ πρόβατα is also suggested.

IV. 421 ἐναὶ διὰ τῶν ὑποκτόνων τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ φύσις ἀποδιδόται τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας (where the meaning is ἐναὶ τὰ ἔθνη μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας ὑποκτόνων ὑποκτότων ἡ φύσις ἀποδιδόται).

V. 454 ὁ διαφέρον sing. agreeing with γένος, instead of plur.

V. 459 B δεὶ ἄρχων εἶναι τῶν ἄρχοντων.

V. 472 ὁ παράδειγμα οἶον ἂν εἷς ὁ κάλλιστός ἀνθρώπος (οἶον is neuter because of παράδειγμα).

V. 473 ὁ τοῦτο εἷς ταύτων συμπέση, δύναμις τε πολιτικῆ καὶ φιλοσοφία. τοῦτο is singular by prolepsis. H. Richards
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would read ταῦτα. But cp. IV. 435 A ὃ γε ταῦτα ὅν τις προσέποι, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 520 D ἐν πόλει ἡ ἕκαστα πρόθυμοι ἀρχεῖν ... ταῦτῃ ἀριστῃ ... ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖοθαί (for πόλιν ἐν ἤ, κ.τ.λ.).

VII. 526 C ὃ γε μείζω πόλοι παρέχει ... ὡς ἀν ῥαδίως οὔδε πολλὰ ἐν εὐφροι ὡς τούτο (ὡς is said as if οὔτω μέγαν and not μείζω had preceded; and this is occasioned by οὔδε πολλά coming between. 'You will not easily find any that give more trouble; not many that give as much.'

VII. 534 A ἦν μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ η ὅσων οἱ παρελημυθότες—a place at which the critics have stumbled. It may no doubt be explained by supplying ἥ ὅσων λόγων οἱ παρελημυθότες λόγου ἐνεπλήσαν ήμᾶς. But it seems more probable that ὅσων (for ὅσοι) follows the case of πολλαπλασίων.

Obs. 1.—In comparisons the antecedent is often attracted into the relative clause.

vi. 485 D αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ... ἀσθενείστεραι, ὅσπερ μέμα ... ἀπωχευτε-μένων.

vii. 539 D μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχόν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκον ἀρχεῖ τίς αὐτό.

X. 610 D μὴ, ὅσπερ νῦν διὰ τούτο ἦπ' ἄλλων ... ἀποδήσακοσιν οἱ ἄδεικνοι.

A striking example in Phaedo 84 a is supported by the Petrie papyrus, Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἰστὸν μεταχειριζόμενης.

Obs. 2.—The mood of a verb is affected by an intervening conjunction, though not strictly in construction with it.

IX. 591 C, D ὡς ὁποιοι ... ἐν τρεις τετραμήνοις ἔστε, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ... τούτῳ προσβελθὸν, ὁπως ... καλὸς ἦσται, ἐὰν μὴ ... μέλη ... ἀλλ' άει ... φαίνηται. φαίνηται should have been φανείσαι depending on the first ὁπως. Cp. v. 466 E διακονίως, sc. δεῖσαι.

Obs. 3.—The verb of a relative clause is often attracted into the infinitive of oratio obliqua: vi. 492 c; x. 614 c; 619 c &c., cp. Herodotus.

Obs. 4.—The conclusion or answer, instead of following the main sentence, sometimes takes the nearer construction:

1. 336 ὃ μὴ γὰρ δὴ ὅσον ... (five lines intervene) ὑπείκειν ... καὶ οὐ σπουδάζει ... οἷον γε σῶ (sc. σπουδάζειν ἡμᾶι):—the original sentence μὴ γὰρ δὴ, κ.τ.λ., is lost sight of.
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IV. 421 Ε ἄτερα δὴ ... εὐρήκαμεν ... ποιά ταῦτα; Πλούτος τε, ἢ ν δέ γάρ, καὶ πενία.

The nominatives really answer to the accusative ἄτερα, but this is lost sight of, the case of ταῦτα being ambiguous.

VI. 492 C, D ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν νέων ... τίνα οἶει καρδιάν ἱσχειν; ἢ *ποιαν αὐτῶ παιδείαν ... ἀνθίζειν, ἢν οὐ ... αὐχέσσεθαι ... καὶ ἐπειτδείσειν, κ.τ.λ.

Πολλή ... ἀνάγκη.

The answer refers to the last clauses of the preceding sentence, and takes no notice of the question.

2. Parallelism. § 53.

(a) The action of a verb is extended to several nouns although it is strictly applicable to one only (‘zeugma’).

VIII. 553 C τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοῦς καὶ ἀκινάκας παραξωμόντα: the participle is strictly applicable only to ἀκινάκας.

(b) On the other hand, a preceding construction is continued, although some other construction is really required.

IV. 453 D ἦτοι δελφίνα ... ὑπολαβεῖν ἄν ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον σωτηρίαν (φανήματι ἄν).

IV. 431 C τάς δε γε ἀπλάς τε καὶ μετρίας ... ἐν ἁλγοὺς τε ἐπιτεύξει, κ.τ.λ. The accusative is carried on from ἀπλάς τε καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐπιθυμίας, supra.

IV. 467 C προσμιχαναθὶς governed by δεί in ὑπαρκτέον.

VI. 510 B τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ... ὕπχη ἡμεῖς ἀναγκάζεται εἰς ὑποθέσεως ... τὸ δ` αὖ ἐτερὸν τὸ ἐπ` ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ... ἱοῦσα (sc. ζητεί) where to two parallel clauses a single expression is applied, which is only suitable to the former of them. The higher dialectic is above Necessity.

VII. 528 C ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ... κολούνμενα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄτρούντων, λόγον οὒ ἐχόμενον καθ` ὁ τι χρήσιμα.

(c) In replies the construction is sometimes continued from the previous sentence, although involving some harshness in the immediate context.

VI. 507 E τίνος δὴ λέγεις; here the genitive may be explained as = peri tivos; see above, p. 184 (b), but it is more
probably occasioned by a reference to what precedes: τίνος, sc. μὴ παραγενομένου.

VII. 531 D τοῦ προομέλου ... ἡ τίνος λέγεις; A construction may be found for τίνος by supplying τὸ ἔργον, but the genitive is more probably occasioned by assimilation to the preceding construction.

VIII. 547 E τῷ δὲ γε φοβεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. The dative is parallel to πᾶς τοῖς ποιούσις (supra D) but is inconsistent with what follows (548 A) τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ποιούσιν οἶδα ἔξει;

VIII. 558 A. The words αὐτῶν μενούτων have a possible construction with εἰδε, supra, but really follow the case of ἀνθρώπων which is genitive absolute.

Obs. 1.—An imperfect construction is sometimes supplemented by epexegeesis.

v. 464 B ἰπεικαζόντες ... πολὺν σώματι πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ ... ὡς ἔχει.

Obs. 2.—The parallelism not only of cases and moods, but also of adverbs should be noted.

v. 475 Ε πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις;

Οὐδεμισῶς ... ῥήδιος ('not in a way easy to explain'). Cp. Symp. 202 C πῶς τοῦτο, ἔφη, λέγεις; καὶ ἢ, ῥήδιος, ἔφη.

§ 54.

3. Interchange of subject and attribute (Hypallage).

The common idiom by which the attribute of a subordinate word (such as an infinitive) is attached to the subject of the main verb,—e.g. δικαίος εἰμί ποιεῖν,—has an extended use in Plato.

VII. 537 B οὗτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ... ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι.

VIII. 559 B ἢ τε μὴ παῦσαι ζώντα δυνατή, 'in that one cannot suppress it while one lives.' See note in loco.

Hence VI. 489 A ταῖς πόλεσι ... τὴν διάθεσιν ἐνικὴ τοὺς πόλεως διαθέτει ἐνική, and in VIII. 562 A τὸς τρόπος τυραννίδος ... γίγνεται; appears to be equivalent to τίνα τρόπον γίγνεται τυραννίς;

See also VI. 496 A προσήκοντα ἀκούσαι σοφίσματα = οἷς προσήκει ἀκούσαι σ. ('to be so described'). Cp. Eur. Or. 771 οὗ προσήκομεν κολάζειν τοῖσδε = οὗ προσήκει τοῖσδε κολάζειν ἡμῶς.
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4. Mixed Constructions. § 55.

As a word is sometimes attracted out of its proper construction, so the speaker sometimes hesitates between two constructions and fuses both into one. Familiar instances are—

I. 347 A ἄν ὡς ἐνεκά, ὡς ἐοικε, μισθὸν ὅτι ὦπάρχειν.
VI. 485 A ὦ ... ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν ... ὅτι καταμαθεῖν.
VIII. 560 D ὃς ἀγροκλίᾳν ... οὖσαν πείθοντες ὑπεροπίζουσιν (πείθοτες ... ἐλέαι, ὑπεροπίζουσιν ὃς ... οὖσαι).


(a) Apparent solecisms.

I. 351 C εἰ μὲν, ἐφη, ὡς ὅτι ἔλεγες, ἔχει, ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία.

Cp. Theact. 204 A ἔχετω δή, ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα ... γενομένη ἡ συλλαβή.

II. 378 C πολλοῦ δὲι γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέων, κ.τ.λ. (πολλοῦ δὲι is treated as an adverbial phrase = οὕτως).

III. 414 C οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ (i.e. μόλις) γενόμενον ἄν. Cp. Tim. 26 B οὐκ ἄν οἶδα εἰ δυναίμην.

IV. 444 B τοιούτων ὅτι ... οἶνον πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν.

'Toioυτow ὅτως oινoν dουλευειν would be Greek. So would τοιούτων ὅτι ... ὅτα τ. a. δουλεύειν. But the text as it stands is not Greek at all.' H. Richards. It may stand as Platonic Greek.

V. 478 D εἰ τι φανείη oινoν ἀμα ἄν τε καὶ μή ἄν (confusion of oινoν εἶναι with φανείη ἄν).

X. 615 D οὐδ' ἄν ἦξει (expressing more of certainty than ἦκοι ἄν, more of modality than ἦξει: Cobet cj. οὐδ' *μή ἦξει).

Perhaps also in the doubtful passage, I. 333 E λαθείν ... δεινότατος ἐμποιήσαι, there is a confusion of δεινότατος λαθείν ἐμποιήσαι with δεινότατος λαθῶν ἐμποιήσαι, the position of δεινότατος suggesting the construction of ἐμποιήσαι. But see note in loco.

(b) Fusion of the objective and subjective aspects of the same notion.
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IV. 434 D ἔνα... εἰς ἕνα ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἵνα τὸ εἴδος τούτο ὀμολογήται, κ.τ.λ. (It is not the εἴδος which goes or turns to individual men.' H. Richards, who proposes λοιαν.)

IV. 442 D μὴ πη ἡμῖν ἀπανθλῶνται... δικαιοσύνη. 'Justice' here is the notion of justice as formerly conceived.

V. 450 Ἐθαρραλέου, 'fearless,' i.e. not dangerous, a thing to be attempted without fear. Cp. Soph. Phil. 106 οὐκ ἄν ἐκεῖνος γ' οὐδὲ προσμεῖχαι θρασύ;

(c) Abstract and concrete.

a. Attributes are personified.

II. 382 D ποιηθῆς... ψευδής ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἐνι. 'The lying poet has no place in our idea of God.'

VIII. 554 D τὰς τοῦ κηφήνων ζυγενεῖς... ἐπιθυμίαι.

IX. 575 C, D ὅς ἄν... πλείστος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύραννον ἔχῃ.

β. In X. 617 D ἄρχη ἁλλὰς περίοδου δυνητῶ γένοις, 'the beginning of another cycle of mortal race' is put abstractedly for 'the beginning of your time for again belonging to the race of mortals.'

γ. Name and thing.

V. 470 ὁ ὁσπέρ καὶ ὁμομάζεται δόσ ταῦτα ὁμόματα, πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο, δύτα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινῶν διαφοράιν.

(d) General with particular.

IV. 435 A δὲ γε ταῦτον ἂν τις προσέλθῃ, κ.τ.λ. 'That which receives the same appellation' is the just, whether just man or just state, but these, although univocal, are not one thing.

Cp. V. 473 D καὶ τούτο εἰς ταῦτα συμπέσῃ, κ.τ.λ. (p. 233).

(e) Part with whole (synecdoche).

II. 371 E πλῆρωμα... πόλεως ἐς... καὶ μισθωροὶ, 'Hirelings will help to make up our population.'

(f) Constructions κατὰ σύνεσιν may be included here.

V. 455 D κρατεῖται takes a genitive in the sense of ἤπαται.

XII. Changes of Construction.

§ 56. 1. From the relative to the definitive pronoun.

It is a well-known peculiarity of Greek syntax that in
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continuing a relative sentence, a definitive or demonstrative pronoun takes the place of the relative.

I. 353 D ἐκθ' διὶ ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοίμεν καὶ φαίμεν ἰδια ἐκεῖνης εἶναι.

VI. 511 C αἰς αἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκάζονται ἂν αὐτὰ σχετισθὲι οἱ σχεταῖσιν.

IX. 578 C ὅς ἂν ... ἦ καὶ αὐτῷ ... ἐκπορισθῇ, κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 452 D ὃ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ... καὶ σὲ δημιουργῶν εἶναι αὐτῷ.

Obs.—In Plato although the sentence passes out of the relative construction it is still partially affected by it.

II. 357 B αἰ ἡδοναὶ δοκεῖ ἀδέλαδες καὶ μηδεν ... διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλα. See above, p. 211, a.

So in passing from a participial clause which is equivalent to a relative.

I. 337 Ε πρώτους μὲν μὴ εἰδῶς ... ἐπετα ... ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἰη, where μὴ εἰδῶς = ὅς μὴ εἰδεῖν.

2. Another consequence of the comparative laxity of the § 57. Greek sentence is the frequent change from a dependent to an independent construction. (See esp. Hom. II. xv. 369, Lysias, c. Eratosth, § 38.)

II. 383 A ὅς μὴτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὡντας ... μὴτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν. Here παράγειν returns to construction with λέγειν, the subordinate clause, ὅς ... ὡντας, being ignored.

IV. 426 C τίν μὲν κατάστασιν ... μὴ κειν ... ὅς ὃν ... θεραπεύῃ ... οὖσος ἀρα ἄγαθος ... ἐσται (H. Richards would read οὖσος ἀρα ἄγαθος ἐσται).

V. 465 E γέρα δέχονται ... Ἴωντες τε καὶ τελευτάτας ταφῆς ἄξιος μετέχουσιν. Here μετέχουσιν is co-ordinated with δέχον- ται, passing out of the subordinate participial construction.

VIII. 549 C, D ὅταν ... τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούον ἀχθομένης ... ἐπεκτα δρώσης ... καὶ ... αἰσθάνεται. αἰσθάνεται which has the same subject with δρώσης, κ.τ.λ., passes out of the participial construction, and is construed immediately with ὅταν.

IX. 590 C ὅταν τίς ἀσθενεῖς ... ἔχει τὸ ... εἰδος, ὡστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἀρχεῖν ... ἄλλα θεραπεύειν ... καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα ...
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μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν; δύνηται passes out of the construction with ὅστε, and returns to the construction with διαν. The last two instances might also be referred to mistaken parallelism: see above, p. 235. The reading of II. 364 C (βλάψει) may be sustained as an example of this tendency, and, in the same passage, 365 A περιμένει is to be retained.

Obs.—Note also the converse return from the finite verb to the participle.

vii. 531 ἂν φασίν... ἀμφισβητοῦσε.
and from inf. to partic.

III. 403 B, C οὕτως διμελεῖν... εἴ δι μὴ... ὑφέξωτα.

§ 58. 3. Change of subject.

This frequently occurs when there is some alternation between the active and passive voice.

I. 333 C διαν μηδέν δέη αὐτῷ χρησθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι;
II. 359 E, 360 A ἀφαιρή αὐτῶν γενέονται... καὶ διαλέγονται ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου.

II. 377 B μᾶλλον γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος.
III. 409 E, 410 A. The subject changes from the arts to the professors of either art respectively.

III. 414 D ταῦτα... πάσχειν τε καὶ γλύγνονται περὶ αὐτῶν.

4. Limitation of subject.

V. 465 C ὅν ἀπηλλαγμένοι δὲν ἔτεν (sc. οἱ πολίται)... κολακεῖς τοῖς πλουσίοις πένητες, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 556 C, D διαν... ἄλληλοις θεώμενοι (sc. οἱ πολίται) μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονώνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων.

5. From the dative in regimen to the accusative in agreement with the subject of an infinitive. (This change occurs in other Greek writers from Homer downwards.

II. IV. 341, 342 σφῶιν μέν τ' ἐπέοικε μετὰ πρώτοις ἔδωκας | ἔστάμεν.)

IV. 422 B, C εἰ ἐξεῖν... ὑποφέροντι... ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν;


In many sentences, the notion which it is intended to
make prominent is put forward either in the nominative or accusative (see above, p. 183, γ), and is left with no definite construction, the turn of the sentence being subsequently modified. (Cp. Soph. El. 1364–1366 τὸς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ λόγους, ή τοι αὐτῷ κυκλοφορεῖ νύκτες ἡμέραι τ’ ἵσαι, αἱ ταῦτα σοι δεξιοῦσιν, Ἡλέκτρα, σαφῆ.)

II. 365 Α ταῦτα πάντα . . . λεγόμενα . . . τί ολομέθα ἄκονοῦσας νέων ψυχᾶς ποιεῖν. Here the shadow of a construction is supplied by ἄκονοῦσας.

II. 365 Β τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα . . . ὀφελοῦσας ὁμοιότερα καὶ τὸ ὕποκέφαλον, κ.τ.λ.

III. 391 Β τὰς τοῦ . . . Σπερχειοῦ ἱερᾶς τρῖχας Πατρόκλου ἡρωὶ, ἔφη, κόμην ὁπάσαμα φέρεσθαι.

V. 474 Ε μελιχλώρους δὲ καὶ τούσμα, κ.τ.λ.

VI. 487 Β παραγομενοί . . . μέγα τὸ σφάλμα . . . ἄναφανεσθαι.

VIII. 565 D, E ὡς ἀρα δὲ γεωσάμενυς . . . ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι.

VIII. 566 E πρὸς τοὺς ἐξεω έξηροίς τοῖς μὲν καταλαμψῆ, κ.τ.λ.

7. Addition of a summary expression, without a con-. § 59. junction, to clinch a series or enumeration which has been given whole or in part.

II. 373 Α κλακαὶ τε προσέσονται . . . ἐκαστὰ τούτων παντοῦτα.

IV. 434 Α πάντα τὰλλα μεταλαττόμενα.

VIII. 547 D πάσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις.

X. 598 B τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς.

Obs.—A conjunction is sometimes inserted.

VII. 523 D καὶ πάν ἐκ τοιοῦτων.

8. In resumption after a digression (see above, pp. 229 ff.) the construction is often changed. See especially, in the rambling speech of Pausanias in the Symposium, the passage 182 D–183 D ἔνθιμηθαντι γὰρ . . . ἔνθαδε νομίζεσθαι, where, amongst other irregularities, the dative ἔνθιμηθαντι is in no construction, because the ‘deferred apodosis’ is resumed (183 C) with a fresh turn of expression, ταύτη μὲν οὖν οἰνοθείη
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ἀν τίς, κ.τ.λ., in which the original construction is forgotten. (Badham proposed to read γε for γάρ.)

Rep. VII. 532 B, C ἢ δὲ γε... λόγοι τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφῆ... πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία... ταὐτὴν ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν.

The passage has been already quoted above, p. 183 γ, but it is a strong instance of the peculiarity here spoken of.

§ 60. 9. From interrogative with negative meaning to direct negative:—

III. 390 A–C τί δέ; ποιεῖν ἄνθρα... (fifteen lines); οὔτε Ἀρεώς τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης... δεσμὸν δὲ ἐτέρα τοιαῦτα.

10. Other anacolutha.

The laxity of the conversational style admits of changes which can hardly be brought under the preceding heads. Some words have only the 'shadow' of a construction, the sentence continuing as if that had been expressed which is only implied, or else returning to a connexion from which the intervening clauses have broken loose; or some new connexion or antithesis is suggested in the act of speaking.

II. 362 B τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν... ἔπειτα γαμεῖν... ἐκδιδόναι... μυμβάλλειν, κοινωνιῶν οἷς ἄν ἐθέλῃ... ἐς ἁγώνας τοῖς ἑαυτῷ... περιγύγνεσθαι... Here ἄρχειν and the following infinitives are in apposition with βουλεύματα, but in περιγύγνεσθαι the sentence has reverted to the construction with φύσομαι (supra A).

III. 387 D, E φαμέν δὲ δὴ, δι᾽... τὸ τεθυάναι οὐ δεινῶν ἡγήσεται... οἷς ἄρα... ἐπιφύτευται ἂν... ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν λέγομεν, ὥστε... ήκιστα ἑτέρου προσδείται... ήκιστα ἄρ' αὕτη δεινῶν στερηθήναι... ήκιστο' ἄρα καὶ ἐδύνεσθαι (sc. φύσομεν). (Cp. VI. 501 D ἣ ἐκείνους φύσεως μᾶλλον, where see note.) The last infinitive, while perhaps occasioned by στερηθήναι, which is in a different construction, must borrow its government from φαμέν and λέγομεν preceding. Others would supply προστίθηκε from δεινῶν.

III. 388 E, 389 A οὖτε ἄρα ἀνθρώπους... ἀν τίς ποιή, ἀποδεκτέον, πολὺ δὲ ἦττον, ἐὰν θεοῦ.
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III. 389 C κάμνοντι ... λέγειν ... μὴ τὰ δύτα λέγοντι (the participle co-ordinate with the infinitive).

III. 399 A, B κατάλεπε ... τὴν ἄρμονίαν, ἥ ἐν τε πολεμικῇ πράξει ὁυτος ἀνθρώπου ... μιμήσατο φθόγγου ... καὶ ἀποτυχόντος ... ἀρμονέου τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἀλλην αὐ ἐν ἐλπικῇ ... πράξει ὁυτος, ἥ ... πείδουτος ... ἥ ... ἀλλῳ ... μεταπείδουτι ἐαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα. To obtain a construction for ἐπέχοντα one must go back to μιμήσατο or to κατάλεπε.

III. 407 C, D φῶμεν καὶ Ἀσκληπίων τοὺς μὲν ... ὄγιεινὸς ἔχοντας ... τούτοις μὲν ... καθαδείξα παντρικὴν ... τὰ νοσήματα ἐκβάλλοντα ... προστάτευσεν διὰ αὐτοῦ ... τὰ δ᾽ εἶσω ... νεοστηκότα σῶματα ὁδὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν διαίτασι ... ἀπαντόλυστα ... μακρὸν καὶ κακῶν βλου ἄνθρωποι πολεμεῖν, καὶ ἐκγονα αὐτῶν ... ἔτερα τοιαῦτα φυτεύον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὴ δυνάμενον ... ζήν μὴ οἰεσθαι δεῖν θεραπεύειν.

Goodwin (M. and T., 685) quotes several instances of the exceptional use of μὴ in oratio obliqua after φαίνειν ἄν, πάντες ἐρωτεῖς, τίς ἄν ... ἡγούτο. (I omit those in which μὴ is combined with ἄν, and also Rep. I. 346 E ἔλεγον μηδένα ἔθελεν, for which see above, p. 211 β.)

These examples may justify the supposition that the change from ὁδὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν to μὴ οἰεσθαῖ is merely capricious. But I would suggest, 1st, that it is occasioned by the sound of μὴ δυνάμενον, and 2nd, more doubtfully, that while ἐπιχειρεῖν is parallel to ἐπιδείξει, οἰεσθαῖ is in regimen after it—he prescribed that the physician should not think, &c. A further doubt occurs whether the subject of φυτεύσετω is Ἀσκληπίων, τὸν ἰατρὸν, or τοὺς ἄνθρωπους from ἄνθρωπος, supra.

See note in loco.

IV. 424 B ὅτωs ἄν ... φυλάττωσι, τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν ... ἀλλ' ὅσι ὅλω τε μάλιστα φυλάττειν.

The infinitive φυλάττειν is co-ordinate with νεωτερίζειν, but the construction is forgotten. Plato would not consciously have said φυλάττωσι τὸ φυλάττειν. The infinitive is taken as a vague imperative, or as depending on ἄνθρωπουν.

VI. 488 C αὕτως δὲ ... περικεχώσθαι δεομένοις, κ.τ.λ.

In what follows the infinitive takes the place of the
participle, e.g. ἀρχέω, πλέω. Then there is a return to the participle in ἐπαυνοῦτας . . . ἡγοῦτας. Then, if the MSS. are right, the nominative takes the place of the accusative in ἐπαυνοῦτας . . . οἴκουμενοι possibly suggested by the nominatives, πελότσεις and βιομοιοῦσιν, which have intervened.

VI. 492 C ἤν ὦ κατακαλυπθείς . . . αἰχύνονται . . . καὶ φήσουν. The subject is changed, and the sense continued as if no negative particle had preceded.

VI. 510 Ἐ τοῦτος μὲν . . . χρώμεναι, ζητοῦντες τε αὐτὰ ἐκείνα ἒδειν. But perhaps δὲ should be read.

VII. 517 Α ἀρ' ὦ γέλωτ' ἄν παράσχοι . . . καὶ . . . ἀποκτινώναι ἄν. If the text is sound the construction reverts to ἐννόησον supra 516 Ε.

VII. 530 B καὶ ζητεῖν appears to depend immediately on ἄτοπον ἤγησται, losing count of the intermediate words.

VIII. 556 C, D ἄταν παραβάλλων . . . ἢ καὶ . . . ἀλλήλους θεόμενοι μηδαμὴ ταύτη καταφρονῶνται. Θεόμενοι really takes the place of a subj. θεόμεναι καὶ ἑπειτα, κ.τ.λ.

IX. 581 D ὃ τε χρηματιστικὸς . . . τῇ δὲ δικαίοτητος . . . τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον.

Obs.—A curious instance of wilful ambiguity occurs in I. 344 E ἐγὼ γὰρ οίμαι . . . τούτι ἀλλος ἤγεοι; "Εικοσα, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ.

Thrasymachus says, 'you see, my view is different from yours,' meaning that injustice is profitable.

Socrates replies, 'You do seem to take a different view;' meaning 'you seem to think the question unimportant.'

In several of the above instances, those who do not allow for the extent of irregularity in Platonic syntax have recourse to conjecture.

§ 61. 11. Specially noticeable are the frequent interchanges or combinations (a) of singular and plural, (b) of masculine or feminine and neuter (in speaking of abstractions), (c) of the artist with his art, (d) of a city with her citizens, (e) of the soul (or some part or function of the soul) with the person; and, what is equally noticeable, the opposition of the soul to the man.
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(a) Singular and plural—

I. 344 B, C ἐπειδὰν δὲ τις πρὸς τοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀνδραποδίσημον δουλώσῃται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰχμῶν ὁσμάτων εὐθαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληται . . . δοσὶ ἂν πῦθωνται αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.

III. 399 D αὐλοποιοῦσ还 αὐλητᾶς . . . ἦν οὗ τοῦτο πολυχορδότατον.

III. 411 B, C καὶ ἐὰν μὲν . . . λάβῃ . . . ἐμπλευ.

VI. 496 C, D τοῦτων . . . οἱ γενόμενοι, . . . λογισμῷ λαβῶν, κ.τ.λ.

VI. 498 B, C ὅταν . . . ἐκτὸς γίγνηται . . . αφέτως νέμεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 554 B, C ἐν αὐτῷ . . . αὐτῶν.

VIII. 558 άνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων . . . περισσοτέρως δισερχόμενος ἄρος.

IX. 571 C τὰς περὶ τὸν ὅπων . . . ἐκεῖνον.


So with transition from particular to general VIII. 554 θησαυροποίοις ἀνήρ ; οὐς δὴ καὶ ἐπανεῖ τὸ πλῆθος.

Obs. 1.—A collective plural has sometimes a singular verb (v. 462 E, 463 ά ἐστι μέν . . . ἄρχοντες τε καὶ δήμοι) and a collective singular, a plural relative (v. 490 ο σμικρῶν δὲ τε . . . οὐς, κ.τ.λ.). In III. 399 D, quoted above, τοῦτο is a collective singular.

Obs. 2.—When two things are joined or brought under a single notion, they are spoken of as one (iv. 435 ά ταυτῶν . . . μείζων ἐ καὶ θλαστῆς : v. 473 D καὶ τούτῳ . . . δύναμις τε . . . καὶ φιλοσοφία). Hence we have the part in apposition to the whole (vii. 526 A τὸ ἐν . . . ἰσον . . . ἐκατον πάν παντὶ), and singular and plural are correlated where the former is universal, the latter particular (x. 601 D θρώμενον ἐκάτω . . . οίδα ἄγαθα ἡ κακά . . . χρήσαι).

(b) Masculine or feminine alternating with neuter—

II. 359 C πλεονεξίαν, δ πάσα φύσις, κ.τ.λ.

II. 363 A αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην.
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III. 401 D ὅ τε ῥυμὸς καὶ ἀρμονία . . . φέρωντα.
III. 410 E ἀνεθέωτος αὐτῷ (sc. τῆς φύσεως).
IV. 428 A κατάδηλον . . . ἡ σοφία.
IV. 428 B τούτο γε αὐτό, ἡ εὐθυομία.
V. 449 D κοινωνιάν . . . ἀδερφὸς . . . γιγνόμενον.
X. 611 B τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχῆ, κ.τ.λ.

Obs.—Even where a concrete masculine noun is used abstractly, it has a neuter correlative.
II. 382 E ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν.
VI. 494 D νοῦς οὐκ ἕνεστίν αὐτῷ . . . τὸ δὲ οὐ κτητόν.

(c) The artist and his art.

III. 409 E, 410 A οὐκοῦν καὶ λατρικὴν . . . μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης δικαστικῆς κατὰ πόλιν νυμοθετήσεις, αὐ τῶν πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εὐφυείς . . . θεραπεύουσιν, τοὺς δὲ μή . . . αὐτὸι ἀποκτενοῦσιν;

Mr. H. Richards would read αὐτάλ. But observe that in that case ἵσουσιν and ἀποκτενοῦσιν would both refer as θεραπεύουσι does to λατρική and δικαστική combined.

The plural here is κατὰ σύνεσιν as the dual in VIII. 550 E πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν . . . τοῦναυτὸν βῆσοντε. So dialectic and the dialecticians in VII. 537 E τὸ ἴσον περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι κακῶς . . . παραγομένα . . . ἐμπίπλανται.

(d) The city and her citizens.

IV. 435 E ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν . . . ὅ δὴ καὶ ἐξοσκεῖ ταύτην τὴν αὐτίαν.
VIII. 551 D τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

On the other hand the city is opposed to the citizens (as in Thuc.): II. 370 E αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν, IV. 428 C, D οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλευταί, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ζωτῆς δῆλης.

(e) The man and his mind. (This may also be regarded as a point of style. Cp. esp. Phaedo, pp. 82, 83.)

III. 411 A, B οὕτως τὸ μὲν πρῶτον . . . ὀπέρ συμφωνον ἐμάλαξε (τὸ θυμοειδῆς) . . . ὅταν δὲ ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνή . . . τίκει . . . ἔως ἄν . . . ἐκτέμνῃ ὀπέρ νεῦρα εκ τῆς ψυχῆς, κ.τ.λ. (with ἄθυμον infra ψυχῆ is to be supplied).
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IV. 440 C, D ὡστιν τις οἴηται . . . πραύνθη.
VI. 486 A ἦν οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοια . . . οἶνον τε ὡς εἰς τοῦτο μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τοῦ ἀνθρώπουν βίου;
VI. 503 C, D τὰ βέβαια ἀδ ταῦτα ἡθη . . . χάσμης ἐμπίπτεται.
The plural requires a masculine subject.
VI. 503 D, E δέω αὐτῷ (masc.) μεταδιδόναι . . . σπάνιον αὐτῷ ὡς ἑσθῆθαι . . . βασανιστέων ἡ . . . εἶ . . . δυνατή (sc. ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς).
X. 620 E ἔγειν αὐτήν . . . κυρώντα ἦν λαχῶν εἶλετο μοῖραν.

XIII. Rhetorical Figures. § 62.

1. Personification enters largely into Greek idiom and is very characteristic of Plato. The argument (λόγος) is of course continually personified. A strong instance occurs in

VI. 503 A παρεξήγητος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένον κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.

Hence in VI. 484 A διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς διεξελθόντος λόγου, this reading (A Π Μ) is probably to be retained in preference to διεξελθόντες (X V).

Amongst many personifications perhaps the most striking is that in VIII. 568 D describing the difficulty experienced by tragic poetry in mounting ‘constitution hill,’ ὡσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος ἀδωνιστοῦ πορεύεσθαι. Books VIII and IX indeed abound with bold personifications: see esp. IX. 573 A δορυφορεῖταί τε ὑπὸ μανίας, IX. 587 C δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς.

The use of personifying words often adds a touch of liveliness to the style.

διολού (cp. Herod.): IV. 436 B ταῦταν ταύτα ποιεῖν ἡ πάσχειν . . . οὕτω δηλήσει ἄμα. Cp. II. 370 B.
V. 459 C μὴ δειμένως μὲν σώματι φαρμάκων, ἀλλὰ διαίρῃ διεξελθόντων ἑπακόως.

ροχεῖν (I. 335 E), λέγει, ἐπανεῖχε, ψέγει, καλεῖν of words and phrases (IV. 431 A τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ κρείττων αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ.).

To this head belongs the adjectival use of ἀδέλφος, ἐταῖρος
III. 404 B, IV. 439 D.
ποιῶ: a special use of ποιεῖ (intrans.=‘to behave’) may
be noticed here because occurring sometimes with an
impersonal subject.
II. 365 A τέ οἴλομεθα ἀκονούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν.
IV. 432 A οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖ (‘acts’) αὐτή.
So probably in VII. 523 Ε ὡδε ποιεῖ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν (τῶν
αἰσθήσεων).
For the same use with a personal subject see V. 474 D ἦ
οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλούσ; ‘Is not this your way?’
III. 416 B μὴ τοιοῦτον . . . ποιήσωμε, κ.τ.λ.
V. 469 B πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πῶς ποιήσουσιν;
§ 63. 2. Continued Metaphor. The two chief examples in
the Republic of this figure, which serves at once to enliven
and to connect discourse, are the image of the wave in
Book V, and the allegory of the cave in Book VII. The
former is a good instance of the way in which an image
grows in Plato.
It may possibly have been suggested by some pre-
paratory hints in Book IV. See esp. 441 C ταῦτα . . . μόνης
διανέφεσαμεν. This renders more natural the incidental
remark in V. 453 D ἄν τε τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ
ἀν τε εἰς τὸ μέγαστον πέλαγος μέσον, οἷον γε νεῖ οὕδὲν ἤττον;
(ibid.) σωκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν νευστέων καὶ πειρατέων σώξεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ
λόγου, ἢτοι δελφινία τινα ἐπιτίκοτας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαμβαῖν ἄν ἢ τινα
ἄλλην ἄπορον σωτηρίαν. So far, although the image of
a ‘sea of difficulty’ has appeared in connexion with the
fear of ridicule and the mockery of comic poets (452 B),
there is no hint of combining the notion of laughter with
that of the waves. Four pages afterwards (457 B, C) we
are found to have escaped from the first great ‘wave’
which had threatened to swamp us. And, after a still
longer interval,—the digression about usages of war having
intervened,—it appears at 472 A that the three stages of
difficulty are distinctly thought of as a τρικύμλα, of which the
third and greatest wave is now impending. Hence, as the result of all this, when the discussion culminates, and the moment has arrived for the audacious figure of the laughing wave, it is introduced without any effect of violence, (473 C) εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτι τε ἀτεχνώς ὅσπερ κύμα ἀκυκλώα ('bursting in laughter') καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσεως.

Similarly, the descriptions of the evil states in Books VIII, IX are linked together by the growing image of the drones in the hive (distinguished as stinging and stingless) which culminates in the description of the master passion in the tyrannical individual as a mighty winged drone—ὑπόστερον καὶ μέγαν κηφήνα τῶν (IX. 573 A).

Again, the incidental phrase βιοῦ κατασκευή (VIII. 557 B) helps to render more natural the impressive conception of the inward πολιτεία, 'the kingdom of Heaven within,' at the close of Book IX. 592 B ἐν ωδρανφ... παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὄρωτι ἑαυτόν κατοικίζειν. Also in IX. 588 E the words καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν λέοντα serve to make less abrupt the introduction of the serpent element—τὸ ὀφειδῆ (ib. 590 B).

Other instances of Plato's love of climax and gradation are the elaborate account of the misery of the tyrant in IX. 576-588, and the demonstration of the unreality of poetry in X. 598, 599. (Cp. the treatment of Pleasure in the Philebus.)

3. Cumulative illustration. The effect of liveliness and § 64. also of fertility of conception is often produced by the substitution of one illustration for another before there has been time for the first to be applied. Thus in the quick succession of examples with which Socrates poses Polemarchus, after showing that the just man is inferior to the draught-player as a partner in draughts, to the builder in the laying of bricks, &c., instead of simply asking, 'to whom then is he superior, and in what?' he brings in a fresh example at the moment of asking.
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I. 333 B ἄλλ’ εἷς τίνα δή κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείλων κοινωνῶς τοῦ κιβωτικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιβωτικὸς τοῦ δίκαιου εἰς κροφαμάτων; Cp. Theaet. 147 A where in showing the absurdity of the definition of πηλός—πηλός ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλός ὁ τῶν ἱπποπλαθῶν καὶ πηλός ὁ τῶν πλυσθευργῶν—an unexpected addition is made to it,—εἶτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέτει, εἴτε ἄλλων ἀντιμικῶν ἔμμισθολον.

So in IV. 421 A—where he has been arguing from the examples of the husbandman and potter that the life of the guardians must be arranged so as to secure their devotion to their proper work,—instead of proceeding to say that this is the more necessary in proportion to the high importance of their function, he suddenly introduces to our notice the class of ‘botchers,’ whose work is the least important of all:—νευρορράφου γὰρ φαῖλος γενόμενοι, κ.τ.λ.

Hence it is probable that in V. 479 B—τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐκτιμα- σεσιν, κ.τ.λ.—there are two illustrations and not one only. See note in loco.

§ 65. 4. Irony and Litotes. The tendency to under-statement, which in Thucydides and elsewhere renders οὐχ ἥσσον = μᾶλλον and the like, is strengthened by the peculiar irony of Plato. In a few places this irony has been a cause of obscurity, e.g.:

(a) I. 337 C ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὖν ποιήσεις; ‘I suppose, then, that is what you mean to do?’

IV. 423 C—E φαῖλον . . . φαῖλότερον . . . φαῖλα.

V. 451 A ὅστε εἷς με παραμυθεῖ. 

VII. 529 A οῖκοι ἄγεννως (cp. Phaedr. 264 B).

It gives rise to doubt about οὐ πάνω, μη πάνυ τι, &c. See above, p. 209 β.

Obs.—The alternation between irony and seriousness, which Plato sometimes introduces with marked effect, has also given rise to misapprehension.

I. 344 E ἔγω γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Ὀρασύμαχος, τοὺς ἄλλας ἐξειν. Ἐοίκας, ἥν δ’ ἐγώ. (See note in loco.)
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(b) The constant insertion of qualifying phrases, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism, belongs to the same tendency. To this may be referred the frequent use of τάχ’ ἄν, ὡς ἔποσ εἶπεῖ, εἰς τὸ δυνατόν, ἂν μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη, εἰς ὅσον εὑδέχεται, and VII. 527 A καὶ σμικρὰ.

(c) Ironical collocation of words (παρὰ προσδοκίαν) II. 373 A ἔταιραι καὶ πέμματα. (See note on II. 373 B ثيرενταί.)

5. Recurring phrases.

Besides the qualifying expressions mentioned in the last paragraph, Plato employs certain recurring phrases or façons de parler, partly (a) to maintain the resemblance to ordinary conversation, and partly (b) to keep before the mind the pervading antithesis between the actual and the ideal.

(a) Of the former sort are ἀρα ἄν εἶ, τίς μηχανή; τὸ λεγόμενον, πάση τέχνη, εἰ μὴ ἄδικῳ, εἰ μὴ τί (sc. ἄλλοι), εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, and the ‘pronominal’ phrases noticed above, p. 196 (g).

The frequent use of ὁ δαιμόνιε, ὁ θαυμάστε, ὁ πρὸς Δίος, &c. marks the rising interest of the discussion. See esp. IX. 574 B ἀντεχομένων δὴ καὶ μαχομένων, ὁ θαυμάστε, γέροντός τε καὶ γραός, κ.τ.λ. A similar effect is produced by the repetition of η δ’ ὅς in the course of a reported speech. Cp. ἔφη λέγων in Herodotus.

(b) To the latter motive,—the contrast of actual and ideal,—is to be ascribed the constant use of δοκῶ, λεγόμενος, καλούμενος, δοξάζομενος εἶναι, οἰόμενος (I. 336 A, III. 395 D &c.): also of ποιούμενος—‘esteemed’ in VI. 498 A, VII. 538 C, —where see notes. Special uses of οὕτως, ἐκεῖνος, ὅδε, ἐνθάδε, ἐκεῖ, νῦν (VI. 489 C τοὺς νῦν πολιτικοὺς ἀρχοντας) are grounded on the same antithesis.

6. Tautology and Repetition.

§ 66.

(a) Plato is not in the least afraid of repeating the same word and often does so accidentally in the same passage with a difference of meaning. This happens very frequently with δοκεῖν, δόξα, and other words which have both a vernacular and a philosophical sense. Especially noticeable are:
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III. 415 C τὴν ... προσήκουσαν τιμὴν ἀποδόντες ... τιμήσαντες: where H. Richards would read τιμήσαντες <κατ’ ἄξιαν>.

V. 449 D ἄλλης ἐπιλαμβάνει πολιτείας, 'You are taking up another form of State,' with V. 450 A ἐπιλαβόμενοι μον, 'taking me up,' i.e. 'checking my discourse' immediately following.

VIII. 546 D ἀρχοντες ... καταστήσωνται, 'rulers will be appointed' (passive).

Ibid. καταστήσωνται ... τοὺς ἀριστούς, 'they will appoint the best men to be their rulers' (middle voice).

Cp. Laws VIII. 840 E, 841 A τίνα δὴ συμβουλεύεις αὐτοῖς τίθεσθαι νόμον, ἐὰν δὲ τῶν τιθέμενος αὐτοὺς ἐκφύγῃ; where τίθεσθαι is middle, and τιθέμενος passive.

For Rep. VIII. 547 E ἀπλοὺς ... ἀπλονστέρους see note in loco.

Obs.—There are limits to this as to other anomalies and it is very improbable that in vi. 499 E ff. ἄλλοιαν ... δόξαν should mean, first, 'a different opinion from what they now have' and then 'a different opinion from that which we maintain,' or that in x. 601 D, E τῶν χρώμενων ... ἀγγείον γίνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ οία ἄγαθά ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ... φι χρήται οἶον αὐλήτης ... περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ... ἐπιτάξει οἴους δεὶ ποιεῖν, the words οἰα ἄγαθά ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ... φι χρήται should mean 'what the instrument does well or ill,' and not 'what specimens of the instrument the maker makes well or ill.'

(b) On the other hand the language is varied without apparent reason.

VII. 530 E ἔθηκον ... ἀφῄκειν and often elsewhere.

XIV. Order of Words.

(Cp. Digest, §§ 287–311.)

The freedom of conversation allows of great variety in the order of words, and Plato has used this liberty for purposes of effect, sometimes putting words to the front to give importance to them, sometimes reserving a surprise, and sometimes merely avoiding harsh collocations. Thus
unusual order is employed (1) for emphasis, (2) for euphony, or (3) for both together. (The general rule that the more emphatic notion stands first in Greek—not last, as often in English—of course holds in Plato as in other writers.)

1. (a) A phrase is rendered more emphatic by separating the words of which it is composed and placing unemphatic words between. (Phaedr 247 θέκραυ ... ἀψίδα.)

I. 339 ἡ θέκραυ τότε ... οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαλλεῖν αὐτῷ οὕτως δικαιοῦ εἶναι πολεῖν τοῦτον τῶν ἑυτῶν ἤ δ’ οὐ λέγεις (see note in loco).

VI. 492 Α ἔδω μὴ τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσασι θεῶν τύχῃ.

VI. 499 Β πόλεως τις ἀναγκῇ ῥυμηληθὴναι.

IX. 572 Β καί πάνω δοκοῦσιν ἤμών ἐνιούς μετρίους εἶναι.

IX. 582 Β ἀπὸ γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἶνον ἵστε, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔμπειροι (i. e. πάντες ἔμπειροι τῆς γε ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς, οἶνον ἵστε).

(b) In order to bring an emphatic notion into prominence, a relative, interrogative, or negative word is postponed.

II. 303 Α τοῖς διόσις δ’ φαιν θεοὺς διδόναι.

II. 377 Ε τε αὖ Κρόνος ὅς ἐτιμωρήσατο.

III. 390 Β μόνος ἐφηγορᾶς δ’ ἐπιστρέφατο.

III. 413 Ε τοῦτο ὁς ποιητέων.

IV. 437 D οὖν διάφα ἵστε διάφα ἀρά γε, κ.τ.λ., where the inversion has led to an error of punctuation (see v. rr.).

V. 453 D οὖ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ἐφη, οὗ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἐστιν ( = οὗ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἐστι, οὖ, μᾶ τὸν Δία).

2. Euphony.

(a) The interlacing of clauses has sometimes no obvious motive except a more euphonious rhythm.

III. 396 Α δ’ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνήρ.

Phaedo 99 Α τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὅς οἶδο τε βελτιστα αὐτὰ τεθήναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεϊσθαι.

(b) A special case is the displacement of adverbs through the adherence of the preposition to its noun. (See Vahlen on Ar. Poet. 1457 Α, 31 μὴ εκ σημαινόντων : ‘quae collocatio et apud Ar. ipsum multa habet exx., et apud alios.’)

Cp. Herod. II. 27 κάρτα ἀπὸ θερμῶν χωρέων : Dem. de Cor. § 288 ὃς παρ’ οἰκειότατα.
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III. 391 D ὄρμησαν οὖς ἐπὶ δευτέρας ἀρπαγάς.
VI. 492 A μὴ ἐν προσηκοισθῇ.
IX. 590 A πολὺ ἐπὶ δευτέρας ὀλέθρῳ.

§ 69. 3. Both emphasis and euphony seem to be consulted in the displacement or trajectory of αὖ, ἦδη, καί.

(a) The habitual postponement of αὖ to the negative at once emphasizes the negation, and, in the case of οὖκ αὖ, avoids an undesirable hiatus. The use of μὴ αὖ probably follows the other idiom by assimilation.

III. 393 D ισα δὲ μὴ εἰκῇς, οὖκ οὖκ αὖ μανθάνεις.
IV. 442 A θῃρήστενος μὴ . . . πολὺ καὶ λοχυρον γενόμενον οὖκ αὖ τὰ αὐτῶν πράττῃ.
VI. 499 D τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς . . . οὖκ οὖκ αὖ δοκεῖ, ἐρεῖς;
Cp. Theaet. 161 A οἶει . . . ἐρεῖν ὡς οὖκ οὖκ ἐχει οὐτω ταῦτα.
Crat. 391 C ἀλλ' εἴ μη αὖ σε ταῦτα ἀφέσκει, κ.τ.λ.
Aristoph. Pax 281 τι ἐστι; μᾶν οὖκ αὖ φέρεις;
Aὖ comes even between the preposition and the noun:
II. 371 D τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὖ ἀργυρίου.
IX. 577 B καί ἐν αὖ τοῖς δημοσίοις κυνδύνοις.

(b) An emphatic ἦδη is placed foremost although in meaning really attached to a word from which it is thus separated. In some cases this arrangement avoids cacophony.

V. 452 B ἀλλ' καί ἦδη τὰς πρεσβυτέρας.
VII. 531 E ἀλλὰ ἦδη, εἰπον, [οἱ] μὴ δυνατοὶ τινες (s. τινος) δύνεται, κ.τ.λ. (avoiding μὴ ἦδη).

(c) Similarly καί is sometimes separated (ὑπερβάτως) from its word.

V. 470 B, C δρα δὴ καὶ εἰ τόδε πρὸς τρόπον λέγω.
[VI. 500 A ἦ, καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεωταῖ, κ.τ.λ. (joining καὶ οὕτω, but see note in loco and supra, p. 200 i.)]

In IX. 573 D τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς, καὶ although joined to ἐμοὶ really emphasizes both pronouns.

It is sometimes postponed together with the interrogative, though belonging to the whole sentence.
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IX. 57 Ι Κ λέγεις δὲ καί τίνας . . . ταύτας (i.e. τίνας καί λέγεις);
Cp. Hdt. viii. 89, § 1 ἄλγου δὲ τίνες καὶ Ἑλλήνων, where καὶ belonging to the whole clause is attracted by the emphāsis to Ἑλλήνων. See also ib. III. 36, § 4 Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ τολμᾷς συμβουλεύειν.

(d) ἀλλὰ . . . ἤ are widely separated in V. 467 D ἀλλὰ γάρ, φήσομεν, καὶ παρὰ δόξαν πολλά πολλοῖς ἤ ἔγενετο.

(e) Observe the position of τε in λέγειν λόγου τε in V. 472 Α, according to Par. A, and of μὲν in VI. 508 E, but see notes in locis.

4. Words introduced διὰ μέσου by an afterthought may sometimes disturb the order of the sentence.

IV. 425 Ε ὁσπέρ τοὺς κάμποντάς τε καὶ οὐκ ἑθέλοντας ὑπὸ ἀκολοχίας ἔκβηναι πονηρὰς διαίτης, where the position of ὑπὸ ἀκολοχίας belongs to the whole phrase οὐκ ἑθέλοντας ἔκβηναι.

V. 467 Κ καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου (see note in loco).

5. Parenthetical words are introduced sometimes before an enclitic, sometimes between a preposition and its case.

I. 337 Ε τῶς γάρ ἄν . . . ὡ βέλτιστε, τίς κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 564 Α ἢς οἶμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας.

So in Phaedr. 227 Β οὐκ ἄν οἶει, κ.τ.λ. the parenthetical word divides ἄν from the verb.

N.B.—All these peculiarities of rhythmical arrangement become more marked in the later dialogues, especially the Timaeus and Laws.

XV. Grammatical irregularities considered in relation § 70.

to the text.

It will probably be objected that in these remarks too little account has been taken of the alterations introduced by recent editors into the Platonic text. The emendations of Cobet, Madvig, Badham, and W. H. Thompson are manifestly deserving of attention. But before adopting them wholesale, or even to the extent to which they were embodied in the fourth Zürich edition, several considerations should be
carefully weighed. (1) The balance of anterior probability is against the best founded conjecture when this is opposed to the consent of the MSS. (2) How few of the changes confidently proposed by Schleiermacher, van Heusde, Ast, Heindorf, and K. F. Hermann, are at this moment accepted as certain! (3) In the last resort the context must decide. But in judging of the context, it is not enough to be well skilled in grammar and logic, or in the law of parsimony that presides over a terse literary style. The special conditions of Attic dialogue should be taken into account, and, as these are chiefly to be learned from Plato, some such synoptical survey as has been here attempted is required to assist the student in comparing Plato with himself. If the result of such an endeavour, based on the traditional text, is to bring out a series of phenomena which to those who are intimately acquainted with Greek and with the nature of language commend themselves even in their irregularities as natural and consistent, it follows that the number of places in which conjecture is found necessary will be considerably reduced. If, on the contrary, the redundancies and anomalies to which reference has been made are to be regarded as unworthy of the great stylist and dialectician, and the acknowledgement of them inconsistent with true reverence for him, the process of conjectural emendation, precarious as it is at best, must be largely extended before all such unsightlinesses can be removed. And should this labour be completed, the doubt may ultimately recur whether Plato's image has not suffered like that of the great English poet, whose bust (according to Sir Henry Taylor) was 'sadly smoothed away into nothingness at the instance of some country neighbour of Wordsworth's, whose notions of refinement could not be satisfied without the obliteration of everything that was characteristic and true.'

There is an extreme to be avoided in both directions, and rational critics will probably be found to admit that
the distinction between what is sound and unsound often turns upon a question of degree. There are emendations which secure acceptance by their convincing quality—which 'jump to the eyes' of the reader as well as of the emender at the first flash. Such is Schneider's ἐτίμα μᾶλιστα for ἔτι μᾶλιστα in Rep. VIII. 554 B, such is Geer's πασιν for πᾶσιν in VI. 494 B, and Mr. Archer Hind's ἐν τῷ μέρει for ἐν τῶν ἐν μέρει Theaet. 190 C. There are others of which a high degree of probability may be safely predicated, such as van Prinsterer's ἐκάστος for ἐκαστὸς (v. r. ἐκάστοτε) in VI. 493 B. Such simple changes as πάνων for πάντων (VI. 497 D), κατηκός for κατήκου (VI. 499 B), τῷ δ' αὖ, τῷ for τῷ δ' αὖ (VIII. 547 B), when they have the effect of restoring a smooth and idiomatic context, may be accepted without cavil. The transposition of χαίρων καὶ in III. 401 E (based on a reference in Aristotle—but cp. Laws VI. 751 D) although supported by the similar syllables in δυσχεραίιν, and even Graser's τί οἰδάμηθα in IX. 581 D can only be regarded as highly probable (the same may be said of δοὺς for δοῦν in VII. 534 A, οἰκεῖον ἐνώτος for ὦκεῖον ἔκοντος in IX. 590 D, αὐτόχειροσ for αὐτόχειρας in X. 615 C), and there is good reason for rejecting the seemingly simple alteration of διδάφοις to δίδοντες (II. 365 D)\(^1\), and that of βλάψει to βλάψεων (a MS. emendation) in the preceding context, II. 364 C. Madvig's ingenious conjecture in X. 608 A, φόρμεθα for αἰσθόμεθα, may well appear convincing at first sight. It gets rid of a non-classical form; it merely presupposes the miswriting of CΘΟ for CO; and it seems naturally enough to echo ἐπάθοντες in the sentence immediately preceding. But on closer inspection, the use of δ' ὅν requires the resumption not of what immediately precedes (with only εὐλαβοῦμενοι ... τῶν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα coming between) but of the main apodosis answering to the words in the comparison, ὄσπερ ... βλα μὲν, ὄμως δὲ ἀπέχωνται.

\(^1\) Although supported by the v. r. δθούν (Ven. II) for δθόμην in III. 398 D. But there is no reason for assuming corruption. See note in loco.
Either ἀφεξόμεθα, therefore, or some equivalent word, and not φέωμεθα, is what the context requires.

§ 71. Accretions consequent on the admission of glosses into the text, are a form of corruption to which all classical writers\(^1\) are liable. The assumption of such alteration has been of late extensively applied to Plato. It is supported by such manifest instances as Theaet. 190\(c\), Rep. IX. 580\(d\), and it cannot be denied to have a legitimate place, although the condition of some dialogues, such as the Phaedo and Cratylus, is found in point of fact to give more scope for it than is the case with others. But the editors who, after the manner of Hirschig, have bracketed or excised every phrase that could not conveniently be tied upon the trellis-work of logic, should be asked to pause and consider whether these 'overgrowths' do not belong to the native exuberance of the Athenian language in its times of leisure (Theaet. 172\(c, d\)). Their ideal of trimness seems too like that of the old English (or Dutch) gardener—

'Go thou, and like an executioner,
Cut off the heads of too fast growing sprays,
That look too lofty in our commonwealth.
All must be even in our government.'\(^2\)

But, it will be said, some superfluous clauses in the Republic are omitted in Par. A, the earliest and most authoritative MS. This is perfectly true, but, before drawing conclusions from the fact, it is right to understand the nature and extent of it. First, then, account should be taken of the observation, which is easily verified, that in most of these instances there is present either 'homoeoteleuton' or some other condition slippery for scribes; e. g.—

II. 358 A ψέγεται [ἀδικλα ἡ ἐπαινεῖται].
360 A τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι [τῶν παρὰ τῶν βασιλεᾶ, add. in mg.].

\(^1\) See especially Hdt. iv. 127, § 5.
\(^2\) Shakespeare, Richard II, iii. 4, 33-36.
II. 364 A ἡ σωφροσύνη [τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη].
366 A αἱ τελεταί [αὖ μέγα δύναται].
367 C ψέψειν [ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν add. in mg.] with ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν in preceding line.
373 A [καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν], καὶ χρυσὸν, κ.τ.λ.
374 Ἕ [καὶ ἱδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ] κακὰ γλυκεται add. in mg.
376 C [φιλόσοφον] καὶ φιλομαθῆ. 
378 C τοιαῦτα [λεκτέα].
379 A ἐὰν τε τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἐπεσι ποιῇ [ἐὰν τε ἐν μέλεσιν] ἐὰν
τε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.

This argument is greatly strengthened by considering the omissions in Ven. II, also due to homoœoteleuton, or in some cases to the dropping of a line. See E. on Text, pp. 103, 104.

Secondly, it is by no means an indifferent circumstance § 72. that these omissions all come within a certain limited space in the Republic. We should have to search far in order to gather an equal number from elsewhere, and those which do occur in the later portions of the dialogue for the most part involve the loss of indispensable words, and are to be accounted for by the accidental dropping of a line.

Thirdly, that some of them at least were the errors of a scribe appears from the omitted words being supplied in the margin by the diorthotes, either from the archetype of A or from another MS. And it should be observed that the words bracketed are not in every case superfluous. It would be rash to cancel αὖ μέγα δύναται (II. 366 A), though they had been omitted in more MSS. than one, and the clause ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν (ib. 367 C) would have to be supplied if it had been omitted by all the scribes. But if these omissions are due to the copyists, the others can not be assumed not to be so. And the redundancy, even where indisputable, has been shown to be not inconsistent with the manner of Plato. The case of ى. 580ocrates where A reads τὸ λογιστικὸν δέξεται, and another MS. (Par. K) λογισ-
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τικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικὸν δέξεται, for the simple δέξεται, stands on a different footing (see note in loco), and it may be admitted that a somewhat similar corruption may have crept into VII. 533 Ε ὅ ἀν μόνον δῆλοι πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφνελά ἐγένετ ἐν πυψί, though the interpolation is here less manifest and correction consequently more difficult, if not impossible. The whole sentence is omitted in Ven. Ε. (E. on Text, pp. 112, 113.)

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PART II.

PLATONIC DICTION.

i. New Derivatives and Compounds.
ii. Selection and use of Words.
iii. Philosophical Terminology.

§ i. Plato's vocabulary is that of highly educated Athenians of the fourth century B.C., enriched with special elements derived (a) from the Socratic love of homely illustration, (b) from poetic and other literature, in the way of quotation, adaptation, imitation, and allusion, (c) from the innovations of the Sophists, both rhetorical and eristic, and (d) from habits of speech fostered within the Academy as a philosophical school.

i. New Derivatives and Compounds.

The restrictive or selective tendency of Attic Greek, reserving one word for one idea, and rejecting many synonyms, has been repeatedly illustrated.

'No Attic writer would have used it (Εὐφρόν) for νύξ: but not only does it occur in Herodotus more frequently than the soberer term, but even a scientific writer like Hippocrates employs it. Again, if we compare the usage of πάλος and κλῆρος, it will be seen that the more picturesque of the two words has in all Attic, but that of Tragedy,

1 See Rutherford, New Phrynichus, pp. 13 ff.
been ousted by the colourless term, though in Ionic prose the former remained the commoner."

The converse or complementary tendency, to have a word for everything and to invent new terms to express novel distinctions, has been less observed. Yet in comparing Plato's language with that of Thucydides or Antiphon, or the tragic poets, or even Lysias or Isocrates, it is impossible not to be aware that the discarding of picturesque or 'coloured' synonyms was accompanied with the invention of many novelties in the expression of abstract notions. This increasing copiousness, forming part of the improvement and development of prose-writing, is of unquestionable significance, and exercised a marked influence on all the subsequent literature.

Plato himself remarks on the introduction of new-sanged terms by Protagoras and others ¹, and on Prodicus' affected love of minute verbal distinctions. He himself might have been asked by a malicious questioner why he should employ δικαιότης and διαφορά when such old friends as δικαιοσύνη and διαφορά were available. The answer is that similar changes were multiplying on every side, and had become a part of the natural medium of cultivated expression. 'Correct' writers like Isocrates might be sparing in their use, but the extent to which they had found their way into general currency may be estimated from Xenophon. Δικαιότης, for example, is one of a large number of derivative words that are found in Plato and Xenophon, and in no earlier writer.

A few others, of which the same remark is true, may be § 2. cited here in passing. To name them all would occupy more space than can be fitly given to a mere collateral illustration.

| άνδρείκελον | ἀμελέτητος |
| πειροκαλλα | ἀνυπόστατος |
| ἀνυποδησία | ἀνύσιμος |

¹ Ὀρθώτειά γε τις ... καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ Phaedr. 267 c.
§ 3. Some doubt is thrown on the whole inquiry, because it is necessarily limited to the extant remains of Greek literature. It is impossible to trace the steps by which the change referred to was gradually realized. But the following list of derivative and compound words which are found in Plato and in no earlier writer\(^1\) may serve roughly to indicate the general fact that in the time of Plato a large class of words had recently come into use (he may even have added to the number) to express abstract notions of various kinds. This effervescence of language is naturally correlated to the stir and eager alacrity of thought which the Sophists set in motion and to which Socrates himself contributed. We may trace the beginnings of it in Antiphon's use of such derivative words as μαρία, αἰτίασις, βιαίωτης\(^2\). It would be interesting, were it only possible, to ascertain how far the language of Democritus or of Hippocrates had advanced in this direction. But Democritus is too often paraphrased by those who quote him, and the works ascribed

\(^1\) It has been assumed for the purpose of this Essay that the first occurrence of a word in Greek literature is pretty sure to have been noted in the edition of Stephanus' Thesaurus by Dindorf and others.

\(^2\) Or, to go further back, in the use of ἀσφαλία by Herodotus iv. 134.
to Hippocrates are of doubtful authenticity. For this reason no account is taken here of many words which are common to Plato and Hippocrates, or the Pseudo-Hippocrates. Where a word recurs in later writers, I have added the names of those by whom it is used. The influence of Plato on the subsequent usage is often apparent.

(a) New Derivatives.


-εια : —

ἀπομῆθεια Lach. 197 b : Josephus.
εἰμάθεια Rep. 490 c : Callimachus.
νάθεια Phaedr. 235 D, Theaet. 195 c : Lucian.
δροκέπεια (due to Protagoras) Phaedr. 267 c : Dionys. Hal.

-εια : —

γοητεία Rep. 584 A : Diodor., Lucian, Dio C.
ἐθελοδουλεία Symp. 184 c : Lucian.
ἐπιτροπεία Phaedr. 239 E (ἐπιτροπία (sic) occurs in a fragment of Lysias) : Dionys. Hal.
προπαθεία Rep. 536 D : Clem. Alex.

-ια : —

αβελτερία Theaet. 174 c, Symp. 198 d : Aristot., Plut.
ἀκαρία Symp. 182 A : Dem., Aristot.
ἀλλοδοξία (-εια) Theaet. 189 b : Dio C.
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ἀναλογία Rep. 534 A. Frequent in later Greek.
ἀναρρωσία Phaedo 93 C: Lucian, Plut.
ἀπεργασία Prot. 312 D: Plut.
ἀρρενωπία Symp. 192 A: Zeno Stoic.
ἀσυμμετρία Gorg. 525 A: Aristot., Theophr.
βασκανία Phaedo 95 B: Aristot., Philo.
γυμνολογία Phaedr. 267 C: Aristot., Plut.
*ἐκονομολογία Phaedr. 267 C, 269 A.
ἐλεεινολογία Phaedr. 272 A: Schol. in Sophocl.
ἱσορροπία Phaedo 109 A: Plut.
ἱστοργία Symp. 197 A: Theophr.
κηδεμονία Rep. 463 D: Dio C., Philo.
μακρολογία Prot. 335 B, Gorg. 449 C: Aristot.
μελοποιία Symp. 187 D: Aristot.
μετεωρολογία Phaedr. 270 A: Plut.
μυσανθρωπία Phaedo 89 D: Dem., Stobaeus.
μυσολογία Phaedo 89 D: Plut.
*νεκροσωλία Rep. 469 E.
οἰκοφθορία Phaedo 82 C: Plut.
*ὁλιγογονία Prot. 321 B.
παιδεραστία (-ϊω) Symp. 181 C: Plut., Athen., Lucian (the verb only).
παιδογονία Symp. 208 E: Heliord., Theodoret.

* Words marked with an asterisk are found in Plato only.
πολυειδία Rep. 580 D: Cyrill. Alex.
πολυχορδία Rep. 399 C: Plut., Athen.
ραψῳδία Ion 533 B, Tim. 21 B: Aristot., Athen., Lucian, &c.
συμφωνία Crat. 405 D, al.: Aristot., Plut.
φιλεραστία (-ης) Symp. 213 D: Aristaen. (-ία), Aristot. (-ήν).
φιλογνωμασία (-έω, -ικός) Symp. 182 C, al.: Athen., Plut.
(verb only).

-ον (Diminutives):—
§ 5.

ηματίσκοιν Theaet. 180 A: Theodoret., Themist. ap.
Budaecum.

σκολόθρουν Euthyd. 278 B: Pollux.
τεχνίν Rep. 495 D: Athen., Dio C.
τεχνόδρουν Rep. 475 E: Clem. Alex.

-μα (neut.):—
άμφισβήτμα Theaet. 158 B: Plut.
*άναλόγισμα Theaet. 186 C.
*ἀπείκοσμα Crat. 402 D, 420 C.
ἀποβλάστημα Symp. 208 B: Theophr.
ἀπολόγημα Crat. 436 C: Plut.
ἀπόσπασμα Phaedo 113 B: Galen.
*ἀφομοίωμα Rep. 395 B.
διακόνημα Theaet. 175 E: Aristot.
δυσχέρασμα Phileb. 44 D: Suidas.
*καρπέρημα Meno 88 C.
*λήρημα Gorg. 486 C.
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μυθολόγημα Phaedr. 229 C: Plut., Lucian.
ὀμολόγημα Phaedo 93 D, al.
*περίπτωμα Prot. 345 B.
πρόσημα Charm. 164 E, Phaedr. 238 B: Plut.
*σκιαγράφημα Theaet. 208 E.
χειρόγραφημα Gorg. 450 B: Dionys. Hal.

-μος:

βαδισμός Charm. 160 C, al.
σφαδασμός Rep. 579 E: Eustath.
χωρισμός Phaedo 67 D: Theophr., Plut.

§ 6.

-της (fem.):

ἀλλοτριώτης Symp. 197 C: Dem., Plut.
ἀνωτέρης Phaedo 74 B: Aristot.
ἀνωμαλήτης Tim. 57 E, al.: Plut.
διαφορότης Theaet. 209 A, Rep. 587 E, Parm. 141 B, C:
Stobaeus.

ἐτεροντής Parm. 160 D: Eustath.
ὁμαλότης Tim. 57 E: Aristot., Plut.
ποιότης Theaet. 181 A: Aristot., Hermog.
στραγγυλήτης Meno 73 E: Aristot., Theophr.

-συνή:

ϕιλοπραγμοσύνη Rep. 549 C: Dem., Pollux, Strabo.

§ 7.

-ας:

ἀράνυσις Euthyd. 302 E: Theophr., Plut.
*ἀνομλῶνις Theaet. 166 B.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

ἀντιβόλησις Symp. 183 A: Themist.
ἀπόφασις Crat. 426 D: Aristot., Themist.
ἀνήκησις Prot. 327 B: Aristot., Stobaeus.
диακόσμησις Symp. 209 A: Plut.

*ἐπιπίστωτος Phaedr. 266 E.
ηυφόκησις Phaedr. 246 B: Philostr., Philo, Dio Chrys.
ἔλατρευσις Rep. 357 C: Aristot.
ἰδίωσις Rep. 462 B: Plut.
κατάλευπς Phaedr. 257 E: C. I. 4369: Hesych.
κούμησις Symp. 183 A: Josephus, Sirach.

*μετάσχεσις Phaedo 101 C.
*μετοίκησις Apol. 40 C, Phaedo 117 C.
*νομήσις Crat. 411 D.


*σφρηγίσις Phaedo 111 B, Theaet. 156 B: Aristot., Theophr., Galen.

*προήθοσις Rep. 584 C.
*προλύπησις Rep. 584 C.
*πρόσεξις Rep. 407 B: Def.

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συνκοίμησις Phaedr. 255 E, Rep. 460 B: Plut., Dio C.
*συμπλεκις Crat. 427 A.
σύνερξις Rep. 460 A, Tim. 18 D: Dio C., Galen, Plotinus.

§ 8.  
-της (masc.):—
*αλαθητῆς Theaet. 160 D.
ἀναλωτῆς Rep. 552 B, C: Dio C.
πάδευτῆς Rep. 493 C: Plut., Polyb., Diog. L.
-τῆριοι:—
-τῶν:—

Verbals in -α or -η:—
*μεταστροφή Rep. 525 C, 532 B.
συμπλοκή Soph. 262 C: Aristot., Polyb., Lucian, Dionys. H.

§ 9.  
β. Adjectives in
-δης:—
ἀειδῆς Phaedo 79 A, al.: Aristot., Theophr., Plut., Philo, Dio C.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

άληπτηριώδης Rep. 470 D: Plut., Pollux, Dio C. 
κηφηνώδης Rep. 554 B: Cleomedes. 
μονοειδής Phaedo 78 D, al.: Theophr., Polyb. 
*σοιληνώδης Symp. 217 D. 

-ιος:— 

-κός:— 

§ 10.

*άγοραστικός Crat. 408 A. 
άναλωτικός Rep. 558, 559: Clem. Alex. 

*αὐλοποιικός Euthyd. 289 C. 

δοξαστικός Theaet. 207 C: Aristot. 

*έλλημενικός Rep. 425 D. 

ζητητικός Meno 81 D, Rep. 528 B: Philo, Photius. 

*νιοχικός Phaedr. 253 C: Philo, Eustath. 
κολακευτικός Gorg. 464 C: Pollux, Lucian. 
λογογραφικός Phaedr. 264 B: Pollux, &c. 

*λογοποιικός Euthyd. 289 C. 

μετρητικός Prot. 357 D.
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*μυθωτικός Rep. 346 A.
μυθικός Phaedr. 265 C: Plut., Athen., Dionys. Hal.
μυθολογικός Phaedo 61 B: Pollux.
οικοδομικός Charm. 170 C: Aristot., Theophr., Plut.
παρακελευστικός Euthyd. 283 B: Pollux.
παρακλητικός Rep. 523 D: Dionys. Hal. (κῶς, Clem. Alex., &c.).
πετευτικός Charm. 174 B, al.: Eustath.
πιστευτικός Gorg. 455 A: Aristot.
*πρωμητικός Theaet. 150 A.
*ραψωδικός Ion 538 B.
*σειληνικός Symp. 222 C.
στατικός Charm. 166 B: Aristot., Strabo, Arrian.
στοχαστικός Gorg. 463 A: Aristot., Clem. Alex.
/ σφενδυνητικός Lach. 193 B: Schol. in Lyc. 633.
telesτικός Phaedr. 248 D: Plut., Tetrab. in Ptolemaeum, Budaeus.

*φιλογιμναστικός Rep. 456 A.
-λός:—
-ρῆς:—
αίσχυντηρός Gorg. 487 B: Hesych.
-τος:—
*ἀναμνηστικός Men. 87 B.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

*παιδευτός Prot. 324 B.
παραληπτός Meno 93 B: Plut.
*παρασκευαστός Prot. 319 B, 324 A, C.
πλανιτός Rep. 479 D: Hesych.
πρόκριτος Rep. 537 D: Aristot., Dio C.
προσποιήτως Lys. 222 A: Aristot., Dem., Dio C., Philo,
Dionys. Hal., &c.
σταθμός Charm. 154 B: Pollux, Suidas.
σύστατος Symp. 190 E: Athen., Pollux, Hesych.

γ. Adverbs in § II.

-ος:—

άγαμένως ¹ Phaedo 89 A: Aristot.
άπαρακάλυπτως Euthyd. 294 D: Heliodorus.
*άπταλότως Theaet. 144 B.
*ἐμποδιζόμενως ¹ Crat. 415 C.
*ἐπιθυμητικῶς Phaedo 108 A.
*ἡμαρτημένως ¹ Meno 88 E.
*καρπερούντως ¹ Rep. 399 B.
*μεμελημένως ¹ Prot. 344 B.

παρακυδωνευτικῶς Rep. 497 E: Longinus.
παρατεταγμένως ¹ Rep. 399 B: Iamblichus.
πεπλασμένως ¹ Rep. 485 D: Aristot.
προσποιήτως Theaet. 174 D: Dio C.
*συγγραφικῶς Phaedo 102 D.

*φαυτικῶς Crat. 388 C.
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-ετάτι Euthyd. 278 E: Plut., Lucian.
-ψοφητί Theaet. 144 B: Aristot., Theemist., Lucian.

-ος:—

*πλεοναχή Rep. 477 A.

-ος:—

*μηδαμός Rep. 499 A.

¹ From participles.
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§ 12. § 12. § 12.

8. Verbs in

-ἀίνω :—


-ἐνω :—

gelasei Phaedo 64 B: Damasc. ap. Suid., Euseb.

-τῶ :—

gyptew Phaedo 81 B: Plut., Lucian.

-ἐω, -δομαι :—

ἄβουλεω Rep. 437 C: Plut., Dio C., Philo.


Theophr., Dionys. Hal., Lucian.

ἀλλοτριονομέω Theaet. 195 A: Dio C.

*ἀναμοστέω Rep. 462 A.

ἐρεσχηλεω Rep. 545 E: Lucian, Philo.

λευκειμονεω Rep. 617 C: Herodian, Strabo.

μετεωροπορεω Phaedr. 246 C: Plotinus, Philostr., Aelian.

όμοδοξεω Phaedo 83 D: Theophr., Strabo, Polyb.

παιδοπορεω Phaedr. 250 E: Aelian.

-παρασιτεω Lach. 179 C: Diphilus ap. Athen., Plut.

ταριχοπωλεω Charm. 163 B: Lucian.

ὑψηλολογόμαι Rep. 545 E: Themist.

φιλογμναστεω Prot. 342 C: Plut., Athen., Iambl.

φιλοτεχνεω Prot. 321 E: Epictetus, Athen., Aelian, Polyb.,

Diod.


-λω, -δομαι :—

ἀποστοματίζω Euthyd. 277 A: Aristot., Plut., Themist.,

Athen., St. Luke.

αυθαδίζομαι Apol. 34 D: Themist.

γαργαλίζω Phaedr. 251 C: Clem. Alex.

*ἐνθονωσίζω Apol. 22 C, al. (elsewhere -άω).
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

μεσημβριάς Phaedr. 259 A: Porphyry.
⁻ω, -όμαι: —
ἀνομοιώ Rep. 546 B: Themist.

(b) New Compounds. § 14.

a. Substantives: —
κλωνοποίος Rep. 596 B: Dem.
*Kλωυφόγος Rep. 597 A.
συνοπτάσις Phaedr. 248 C: Themist., Iamb., Clem. Al.
ψευδόμαρτυς Gorg. 472 B: Aristot., Athanas., Cyrill.,
Pollux.

β. Adjectives: —
ἀδιάνόητος Soph. 238 C: Athen., Olympiod.
ἀδιάφθορος Phaedo 106 D: Dem., Plut., Aelian.
*Kάθερμος Phaedo 106 A.
ἀκευντρός Rep. 552 C: Plut., Philo, Athen.
ἀκροσφαλής Rep. 404 B: Plut., Hesych., Themist., Polyb.,
Clem. Al.
ἀμερής Theaet. 205 E: Aristot., Lucian, Plotinus.
Al., Iamb., Dionys. A.
ἀμετάστροφος Rep. 620 E: Themist.
ἀναφής Phaedr. 247 C: Plut., Lucian, Philo, Dionys. A.
ἀνέγγυνος Rep. 461 B: Plut., Dio C.
ἀνεξήστατος Apol. 38 A: Aeschin., Dem., Plut., Themist.

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ἀνεμάτιστος Theaet. 144 A: Plut., Themist., Theodoret., Dio C.
ἀνομολογούμενος Gorg. 495 A: Aristot.

*δικοκουνώτητος Rep. 371 E.
*ἀρρατος Rep. 535 C, Crat. 407 D.
ἀρτεμελής Rep. 536 B: Dio C., Themist.
ἀρτιτελής Phaedr. 251 A: Himer., Nonn.
ἀσύνθετος Phaedo 78 C: Dem., Aristot., Theodor., Polyb.
ἀσχημάτιστος Phaedr. 247 C: Plut., Plotin.
ἀσώματος Phaedo 85 E: Aristot., Plut.
ἀτηκτος Phaedo 106 A: Aristot., Galen.
ἀφρουος Phaedr. 256 C: Aristot., Plut.

*ἀψυκτος Phaedo 106 A.

βραχυλόγος Gorg. 449 C: Plut., Suid.
βραχυπόρος Phaedr. 253 E: Aristot., Diodor.
δοξόσοφος Phaedr. 275 B: Aristot., Clem. Al.

*δυργοντευτος Rep. 413 E.

δυσδιερεύνητος Rep. 432 C: Dio C., Themist.

*δωδεκάκυκτος Phaedo 110 B.

*ἐπεισαγώγιμος Rep. 370 E.

ἐπεξελέγχος Phaedr. 267 A: Aristot.

*δησαυροσποίδ Rep. 554 A (quoted by Pollux).
λογοδαιδαλος Phaedr. 266 E: Pollux.

μεγαλόθυμος Rep. 375 C: Eustath.
μελίρρυτος Ion 534 A: Eustath., Nonn.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

*μετεωροσκόπος Rep. 488 E.
μισόλογος Phaedr. 89 C, al.: Galen, Pollux.
*μυθολογικός Phaedo 61 B (Pollux).
νεοτελής Phaedr. 250 E: Lucian, Phot., Hesych., Himer.
ap. Phot.
nομογράφος Phaedr. 278 E: Suid., Diodor.
nυμφόλητος Phaedr. 238 D: Plut., Pollux, Synes.
*οικτρόγοος Phaedr. 267 C.
Apost.
δύσωφής Phaedo 86 A: Theodoret., Cyrill., Psellus.
δύσπροτος Theaet. 144 A, Rep. 411 B: Theophr., Pollux,
Aristaen., Theodoret.
*παγγέλλων Phaedr. 260 C, al.
πάμμεγας Phaedr. 273 A, al.: Lucian.
παμπάλαιος Theaet. 181 B: Aristot., Plut., Athen., Themist.
παναρμόνιος Phaedr. 277 C, Rep. 399 C: Lucian, Dio C.,
πάνθειος Rep. 610 D: Dem., Dio C., Lucian, Galen.
πολυνήκοος Phaedr. 275 A: Philostr., Cleobul. ap. Stob.,
Damasc. ap. Suid.
πολυκρήλητος Phaedo 100 B, Rep. 566 B: Polyb., Lucian,
Galen, Theodoret.
πολυμελής Phaedr. 238 A: Pollux.
*πτερόνυμος Phaedr. 252 C.
*σιμοπρόσωπος Phaedr. 253 E (Pollux).

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συμμαθήτης Euthyd. 272 C: Pollux, Phryn.

*συμπεριγωγός Rep. 533 D.
σώψηφος Gorg. 500 A: Dem., Plut., Diodor.
tερατολόγος Phaedr. 229 E: Philostr., Liban.
ψηφλώνος Phaedr. 270 A: Plut., Themist., Damasc.
φιλαναλωτής Rep. 548 B: Pollux, Dio C.
φιλεραστής Symp. 192 B: Aristot.
φιλογυμναῖς Symp. 191 D: Aristaen.

*φιλοποιήτης Rep. 607 D.

*φιλόρπτεξ Lys. 212 D.

φιλοσώματος Phaedo 68 B: Plut., Pollux, Philo, Euseb.


§ 15. γ. Verbs:—

ἀναβιώσκομαι Phaedo 71 E: Theophr.
ἀναβρυχάμαι Phaedo 117 D: Philostr., Suid.
ἀνακαγχάξω Euthyd. 300 D: Plut., Lucian, Athen.
ἀνερευνάω Phaedo 63 A: Plut., Dio C., Lucian, Philo.
ἀνομολογέομαι Symp. 200 E: Dem., Plut., Lucian.
ἀντερωτάω Euthyd. 295 B: Plut., Clem. Al.
ἀντιδέομαι Lach. 186 D: Liban., Herenn.
ἀντιδοξάζω Theaet. 170 D: Diog. L.

*ἀντικακουργέω Crit. 49 C.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

ἀντιπαρατείνω Phaedr. 257 C: Iambl., Dio C.

*ἀντοίνομαι Theaet. 178 C.
ἀπαθανατίζω Charm. 156 D: Aristot., Lucian, Diodor.
ἀπανασχυντέω Apol. 31 C: Dem., Cyrill., Porphy.
ἀποδέω Symp. 190 E: Aristot., Theophr.
ἀποθρόπτω Rep. 495 E: Joseph.
ἀπομαντεύομαι Rep. 505 E: Dio C., Galen, Iambl.
ἀπομειστόμαι Phaedr. 255 C: Plotin.
ἀπομηκτόνω Prot. 336 C: Plut., Lucian, Themist., Dionys.

Hal.


*ἀποπολεμέω Phaedr. 260 B.
ἀποσαφέω Prot. 348 B: Lucian, Dio C., Galen, Joseph.
ἀποσκιάζω Rep. 532 C: Dio C., Budeus.
ἀποσκόπτω Theaet. 174 A: Lucian, Dio C.

ἀποτίκτω Theaet. 150 C: Aristot., Lucian, Philostr.
ἀποτοξεύω Theaet. 180 A: Dio C., Lucian.
ἀποτυπώ Theaet. 191 D: Theophr., Lucian, Porphy.

*διαμαστιγῶ Gorg. 524 E.
*διασκευορέω Rep. 540 E.
ἐξαγωγιῶ Lys. 206 B: Plut., Philo, Joseph, Dio C.
*μεταδοξίζω Rep. 413 C.


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*παραποδόμομαι Theaet. 162 B.
προδοξάζω Theaet. 178 E: Aristot.
προκολακεύω Rep. 494 C: Plut.
προλυπέομαι Phaedr. 258 E: Aristot., Dio C.
προμομολογέω Phaedo 93 D: Aristot., Philo.
συγκορυβαστάω Phaedr. 228 B: Euseb., Suid., Synes.
συμπαρακαθίζομαι Lys. 207 B: Dem., Themist.
*συμπένθομαι Meno 71 B.
συμπεριπατέω Prot. 314 E: Plut., Themist., Lucian, Athen.
*συμπροσμήγγυσι Theaet. 183 E.
συμπασφερόμαι Phaedo 112 B: Plut., Aristaen.
συμπασφονίκτω Theaet. 156 E: Pollux.
συμβούλω Pharr. 136 D: Dem., Plut., Dio C.
συμδιαπεραίω Gorg. 506 B: Gregor.
*συμδιαπέτομαι Theaet. 199 E.
συμδιασκοτέω Prot. 349 B: Philo, Joseph., Athanas.
συμδιαστελέω Phaedo 91 B: Dem.
συμεπιστατέω Rep. 528 C: Eustath.
Part II: Diction—Vocabulary.

συνθαμβίω ION 535 E.
συνοδόρομαι Menex. 247 C: Plut., Gregor.
συνοίσμαι Rep. 500 A.

Obs.—The above list is not exhaustive, and in particular, it does § 16. not include what has been characterised as the peculiar vocabulary of the later dialogues.

This is marked (1) by a further stage of the process which has now been described. Such words as the following are foreign not only to earlier Greek, but to most of the dialogues of Plato.

(1) díaklastos Tim. 91 D.
θεότης Polit. 308 E, Laws xii. 967 C.
ἀνατησθηνος Critias 110 A.
ἀνασθησια Phil. 34 Α, Tim. 52 B, 74 E.
ἀνατησιμον Phil. 12 D.
ἀτασσαι Laws ii. 669 E.
ἀστρωσια Laws i. 633 C.
ἀφοβία Laws i. 649 A, B, C.
βλάψις Laws xi. 932 E.
γεφρήμα Laws ii. 674 C.
δυσχεράσμα Phil. 44 D.
δύρασις Laws ii. 657 D.
ἐπιστήμα Laws xii. 958 E.

ἔπυγδειώτης Laws vi. 778 A.
ἐψυχαμίνων Laws x. 897 A.
θεώρησις Phil. 48 A.
κάμψις Tim. 74 A.
κωμίδημα Laws vii. 816 D.
νομοθέτησις Laws ix. 876 D.
παραφορής Tim. 87 E.
ρύψις Tim. 65 E.
στασωτεία Laws iv. 715 B, viii. 832 C.

(2) The late dialogues show an increasing tendency to return to earlier Attic or Ionic, and especially to tragic forms. When Dionysius couples Plato with Thucydides as employing the earlier Attic style, he must be thinking of the Laws and kindred dialogues. The occasional use of τίκνου for παθιον is one of many examples of this. Another is the preference of φλαώρις to φαύλος.

(3) Certain changes in Plato’s philosophical terminology will be noticed under a separate head.

1 For a full treatment of this subject see Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, edited by L. Campbell, Oxford University Press, 1867, and compare the Essay on Structure, &c., Excursus, above, p. 46 ff.
2 See also αἰνιγμός, κλαυμονή, πάθη, τίρμις, χαρμόνι, &c.
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§ 17. ii. Selection and Use of Words.

The foregoing enumeration serves to illustrate some novelties of diction which had become rife in Plato's time. Certain peculiarities in his choice of words, and in his special employment of them, may be treated more briefly under the following heads:—

(a) Vernacular words, including those borrowed from the arts of life.

(b) Picturesque uses, (1) borrowed, or (2) imitated from Epic, Tragic, and Lyric poetry.

(c) Metaphorical Generalization.

(d) Playing with words (1) ironically, and (2) etymologically.

(a) Vernacular words.

Words of common life.

Plato's use of such expressions may be illustrated by reference to the writers of the Old Comedy. Compare, for example, the use of the following words in Plato and Comic poets.

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<tr>
<th>Word</th>
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<td>ἀμέλει</td>
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<td>Symp. 185 D</td>
<td>Eupolis Phil. 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>βαλανεύς</td>
<td>Rep. I. 344 D</td>
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<tr>
<td>ἐξ ἐωθυνοῦ</td>
<td>Phaedr. 227–8</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>κροῦμα</td>
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<tr>
<td>λαβή</td>
<td>Phaedr. 236 B</td>
<td>„ Av. 1354</td>
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<tr>
<td>λυγίζομαι</td>
<td>Rep. III. 405 C</td>
<td>„ Eq. 841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μάζα</td>
<td>Rep. II. 372 B</td>
<td>Eupolis incert. 44</td>
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</table>

Ar. Eq. 55
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μελαγχολάν Phaedr. 268 E Ar. Av. 14
μυνρίζω Rep. III. 411 A " " 1414
μορμολυκείον Phaedo 77 E " Thesm. 417
μορμολύκτομαι Gorg. 473 D " Av. 1245
ναυτιάω Theaet. 191 A " Thesm. 882
νεοτιά Rep. VIII. 548 A " Av. 642
νευρορράφος Rep. IV. 421 A " Eq. 739
περινοστέω Rep. VIII. 558 A " Plut. 494
πόπανον Rep. V. 455 C " Thesm. 285
σκάμπους Prot. 310 C " Nub. 254
σποδίζω Rep. II. 372 C " Vesp. 329
τέλμα Phaedo 109 B " Av. 1593
τίτη Rep. I. 343 A " Eq. 716
τρίβων Prot. 335 D " Ach. 184
χώνη (χοάνη) Rep. III. 411 A " Thesm. 18
ψήτα Symp. 191 D " Lys. 115

We may distinguish (a) trivial or familiar expressions, (β) 'household words,' in the literal sense (tà οικετικά ὀνόματα Soph. 226 A, B), (γ) words belonging to special arts and handicrafts. And we shall not depart from Plato's own view of the matter if we include under this head the 'cant' or 'slang' terms of the rhetorical schools.

(a) Amongst the familiar idioms which Plato adopted to give the natural effect of conversation to his writings, the following may be specially noted:—

The insertion of ὃ δαμόνε, ὃ θαυμάσε, ὃ μακάρε, ὣγαθε, ὃ τὰν, and other appellative formulae, some probably the humorous inventions of Socrates or Plato.

The familiar ἤ ὁ ὅ &c. (found in Cratinus and Aristophanes). The phrase is a survival from the Old Attic speech.

Socrates' familiar oath νὴ τὸν κύνα.

The pleonastic use of ἐκω with participles to denote recurrence (Phaedo 60 C ἐκεῖν δῆ, κ.τ.λ.: Rep. V. 456 B ἐκομεν ἀρα εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι).
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ποιος, denoting various moods of amusement or scorn, as in Rep. i. 330 A ποῖ έπεκτησάμην; Gorg. 490 D ποιών ιματιῶν;

The epexegetic ἱδείν with adj. (Phaedr. 253 D λευκὸς ἱδείν &c.).

The deictic οὕτως Rep. i. 330 B.
πολλάκις (= 'perhaps'), ποιέω ('I behave myself so and so'), ποιοῦμαι pass. ('I am accounted so and so'), αἰτίων εἴχο, 'I am reputed' (Theaet. 169 Α): the words ἄγαπώ ('I am content'), ἀδολέσχης, ἄκκιζομαι, κυνοῦντο ('I am likely,' cp. Hdt. iv. 105), μελαγχολῶ, ναρκῶ, ναιτιό, νεανίκος, περικρούω, σκληρός, τρίβων, χαμάζηλος, χαμεύων, and the expletive use of ἐπιχειρεῖν.

Obs. 1.—The idiomatic use of ποιω with adverbs = 'I behave myself so and so,'—cp. Thuc. ii. 59 ποιώντας ἄηδεν αὑτός ἠλπίζει—occurs in Rep. i. 330 c, ii. 360 c, 365 Α, iii. 416 B, vi. 494 C.

Obs. 2.—The special use of ποιοῦμαι (passive) is more dubious, but see the notes on Rep. vi. 498 Α, vii. 538 c, where it appears that the meaning 'are esteemed or held to be' is alone suitable.

But in Laws xi. 930 Α τῶν ποιούμενων = 'of those who claim it as their child.'

Obs. 3.—Plato sometimes quotes vernacular idioms from other dialects—

Rep. ix. 575 D μπρίδατε, Κρήτες φασι.

Phaedo 62 Α ἢττω ζεύς, τῆς, τῷ αὑτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών.

Obs. 4.—Other idiomatic uses, obviously derived from common parlance, are the following:—

λαμπρός, of a distinguished entrance, 'making a great impression,' Rep. viii. 560 Ε (cp. Soph. El. 685, Eur. Heracl. 280, Phoen. 1246, Dem. de Cor. § 313 εν τίσιν οὖν σὺ νεανίας καὶ πηνίκα λαμπρός);

παιδαγωγέω, 'I conduct personally' (I. Alc. 135 D): cp. Rep. x. 660 Α αὐτοί δὲ ἐπαιδαγώγουν. 'They would have been his inseparable followers.'

κέιμαι, 'I am ruined' or 'undone' (cp. Herod. vii. 176, § 8 τὸ πλέον αὑτοῦ (τοῦ τείχους) ἤδη ἔπο χρόνου ἐκείνο), Rep. iv. 425 Α, v. 451 Α.
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ἀλέκα, 'I gain an advantage,' Rep. ii. 359 λ. iii. 410 b. ἀμφατός λόγων, the common idiom, Rep. iv. 440 b, slightly modified, Rep. x. 607 b ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἔριξ.

οὐ δοκῶν, 'pretending not,' viii. 555 e οὐ ... δοκούντες ... ὅραν, 'pretending not to see' (cp. Eur. Med. 67 οὐ δοκῶν κλύειν).

δράστομαι, 'I seize by handfuls,' Lys. 209 e.

ἐννυρον, 'case,' 'outside,' Rep. ix. 588 e.

(β) 'Household words.' Cooking, nursing, familiar ob. § 18.

ἀμφισφῆμα Theaet. 160 e.
ἀνεμισθὸν Theaet. 151 e.
ἀνθη Phaedr. 230 b.
ἀπομυτώ Rep. i. 343 A.
βαλάνευς Rep. i. 344 D.
βράττω Soph. 226 b.
γυρίων Theaet. 161 D.
διαντίω Soph. 226 b, Crat. 402 c.
ἐγὼ Euthyd. 285 c.
ἐδυσμα Rep. i. 332 D.
λύστη Symp. 193 A.

λύγξ Symp. 185 D.
οὖλα Phaedr. 251 c.
ὀφων Gorg. 518 b.
πέμμα Rep. ii. 373 A.
σκίμπων Prot. 310 C.
σκολόθριον Euthyd. 278 b.
σποδίς Rep. ii. 372 c.
τεμάχιον Symp. 191 e.
τίτθη Rep. i. 343 A.
φορμίκος Lys. 206 e.
χόνη Rep. iii. 411 a.

Obs. 1.—Words belonging to games of strength or skill are intermediate between this and the next heading,—i.e. they are at once vernacular and technical—

ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω θείν (?) Rep. x. 613 b.
ἀποκλείσμα Rep. vi. 487 c (as a term in draughts).
ἀρτίδω Lys. 206 e.
ἀσκωλίαν Symp. 190 d.
ἀστραγαλίζω Lys. 206 e.
ἀρίμων ἄκμη Rep. v. 460 e.

λαβή Phaedr. 236 b.
λυγίζομαι Rep. iii. 405 c.
δλυμπίκων Rep. ix. 583 b.
παρακρινώ Lys. 215 c.
στράβλων Rep. iv. 436 d.
ὑσπανή Phaedr. 254 e.

Obs. 2.—Allusions to banqueting customs are of course frequent;
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and amongst these may possibly be reckoned τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐστιάσεωι... ἐπιμυθοπρίζουσιν ἓναι Rep. v. 479 B. See note in loco.

§ 19. (γ) Handicrafts and other arts.

Agriculture.

ἀποχετεύω Rep. vi. 485 D. 
ἀφετος Rep. vi. 498 C. 
Prot. 320 A.

βαλλω Theaet. 174 D. 
βλίττω Rep. VIII. 564 E. 
δινω] Soph. 226 B (MS. δια-
κρίσεωι).

καυθήλιος Symp. 221 E.

Hunting.

θάμνος Rep. IV. 432 B. 
ιχνος Rep. IV. 432 D.

κυνηγείον Rep. III. 412 B.

Medicine.

ίλιγγιαν Phaedo 79 C. 
ιλιγγος Rep. III. 407 C. 
κατάρρος Crat. 440 D. 
ναρκίω Meno 80 B. 
δραφαλητομα Theaet. 149 D. 
δέιμα Rep. III. 405 D. 
Crat. 440 D.

σφόζω Phaedr. 251 D.

κυνηγείον Rep. III. 412 B.

μελεγμα Rep. VIII. 564 B. 
μελέμαινω Rep. II. 372 E. 
μελεγματωδης Rep. III. 406 A. 
φυσα Rep. III. 405 D. 
χάσμη Rep. VI. 503 D (χασμά-
ομαι Charm. 169 c).

χολη Rep. VIII. 564 B. 
ψωραί Gorg. 494 C.

Music, dancing, the drama.

ἀρμονία Theaet. 175 E. 
διὰ παςῶν Rep. IV. 432 A¹. 
δραμα Rep. v. 451 C. 
Symp. 222 D.

ἐργολάβοις Rep. II. 373 B. 
λυδιστὶ &c. Laches 188 D.

μελοποία Symp. 187 D. 
νέατη Rep. IV. 443 D. 
ποιεῖν, 'to dramatize' (a 
fable), Rep. II. 379. 

ραψφόδος Ion 530 C. 

¹ Prob. also πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν (sc. χορῆν) Rep. III. 397 B.
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υποκρίτης Charm. 162 D.
χορευτής Phaedr. 252 D.
χορός Euthyd. 279 C.

ό διὰ πάντων κριτής Rep. IX. 580 B (see note in loco).

Painting, statuary, pottery.

άνδρείκελον Crat. 424 E.
άποχραλον Rep. IX. 586 B.
διαγράφω Rep. VI. 500 E.
διαζωγραφω Tim. 55 C.
ἐκκαθάρω Rep. II. 361 D.
ἐκμαγείειν Tim. 72 C.
ζιόν, 'a figure,' Rep. IV.

420 C, VII. 515 A, and χυτρεύς Rep. IV. 421 D.

probably Phaedr.264 C.
Cp. Polit. 277 C.

κοροπλάθος Theaet. 147 B.
μελίχλωρος Rep. V. 474 E.
πλινθουργός Theaet. 147 A.

σμίλη Rep. I. 353 A.

420 C, VII. 515 A, and χυτρεύς Rep. IV. 421 D.

Spinning, weaving and clothes-making.

ητριόν Phaedr. 268 A.
κατάγω Soph. 226 B.
κερκίζω Soph. 226 B, Crat.

388 A.

νευρορραφός Rep. IV. 421 A.
νήσος Rep. X. 620 E.

Οbs.—Allusions to the arts of the fuller (γραφεύς), currier (εκλει- αίω), dyer, ἀλουργόν, ἀνθος, δευσοποιόν, ἐκκλύτειν, βαφεύς, &c., are also frequent.

Navigation.

κελεύειν, to act as coxswain,

Rep. III. 396 A.

κυβερνήτης Rep. I. 341 C.

ναύκληρος Prot. 319 D.

θέωτες ἦδη τότε ἐγγύτατα

πλωτήρ Rep. VI. 489 A.

τῶν δευτερον πλούν Phaedo

sub fin. 99 D.

The Mysteries.

ἐποπτεύω Laws XII. 951 D.

250 C, Gorg. 497 C,

ἐποπτικά Symp. 209 E.

Phaed. 81 A, Men. 76 E.

θρόνωσις Euthyd. 277 D.

ναρθηκοφόρος, βάκχος Phaed.

μυείσθαι Symp.209E,Phaedr.

69 C.

Rhetorical Schools.

δεύκοις Phaedr. 272 A.

ἐλκονολογία Phaedr. 267 C.

διπλασιολογία Phaedr. 267 C.

ἐπιπλοτωσίς Phaedr. 266 E.


§ 20. (b) Epic, Lyric, and Tragic elements.

(Rep. VIII. 545 E φωμεν αυτὰς τραγικάς, ὥσ πρὸς παιδας ἡμᾶς παιζοῦσας καὶ ἔρωςχηλοῦσας, ὥσ δὴ σπουδὴ λεγοῦσας, ὑψηλολογομενὰς λέγειν ;)

Plato's dialect is for the most part the purest Attic. But, besides quotations from poetry, which he occasionally weaves (with adaptations) into his prose, he frequently makes conscious use of words borrowed from the poets, and properly belonging to the diction of an earlier time. In adorning his style with these, sometimes half-humorously, sometimes in genuine earnest, he not unfrequently modifies their meaning by adding an ethical significance to what in the earlier and simpler use was merely physical. (E.g. βλοσυφός in Homer means 'rugged in appearance,' in Plato 'sturdy in character,' &c.)

(a) It must suffice here to give a short list of the more striking examples: the graphic language of Herodotus being counted for this purpose as poetic diction.

ἀδελφός (adj.) Rep.IV. 421 C. ἱκταρ Rep. IX. 575 C.
ἀκτῆς Tim. 78 D. ἴννάλλοιμαι Rep. II. 381 E.
ἀλγηδῶν Phaedo 65 C. καθαμάσω Phaedr. 254 E.
ἀλκιμός Rep. X. 614 B. κυμαινω Phaedo 112 B.
ἀνακηκίω Phaedr. 251 B. μελληγος Phaedr. 269 A.
ἀπτῶς Rep. VII. 534 C. μήνιμα Phaedr. 244 D.
ἐλιμριμένη Phaedo 115 A. ναυτίλλομαι Rep. VIII. 551 C.
θίμις Symp. 188 D. ὅμαδος Rep. II. 364 E.
θεοειδῆς Phaedo 95 C. παραταλω Symp. 173 E.
θεοεἰκελος Rep. VI. 501 B. πολυφατος Theact. 165 E.
θεσπένιος Rep. II. 365 B. πόρμιμος Symp. 203 D.

1 This use is rare in Attic prose, but see Isocrates, Paneg. p. 55, § 71 (Bekker).
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πότιμος Phaedr. 243 D. χαμαιτής Symp. 203 D.
σταθερός Phaedr. 242 A. χαρτός Prot. 358 A.
ταυρηδόν Phaedo 117 B. χύτει Phaedr. 239 D.
ὑπηχέω Phaedr. 230 C. χθόνιος Rep. X. 619 E.
ὑψηλόφων Rep. VIII. 550 B. χλιδή Symp. 197 D.

(β) In this connexion it is right to observe the frequent transference from a physical to an ethical meaning.

ἄβυθος Parm. 130 D. βλοσυρός Rep. VII. 535 B.
ἀδαμαντῖνος Rep. X. 618 E. ἐκκαθαίρω Rep. II. 361 D.
ἄθων Rep. VIII. 559 D. ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι (cp. Herodot.) Phaedo 79 A.
ἀντίτυπος Crat. 420 D. (κατα-) Rep. III. 395 B.
ἀπομαραίνομαι Theaet. 177 B. καταχώνυμι Gorg. 512 B.
ἀρρενωπία Symp. 192 A. μετάβασις Rep. VIII. 547 C.
ἀίχμος Meno 70 C.

A similar (although more naïve) use of graphic words to express mental things is observed in Herodotus: e.g. χαλεπῶς ἔλαμβάνετο (II. 121 8), &c.

(γ) Poetic Allusions. These will be mentioned in the notes. In a few cases the reference is doubtful, as in ἡ Διομήδεα λεγομένη ἀνάγκη in Rep. VI. 493 D.

Καδμεία νίκη (Laws I. 641 C) involves some mythical allusion to which the key is lost. The supposed reference to the σπαρτοῖ is not sufficiently clear.

(δ) Parody and Imitation.

For humorous imitations of poetic diction, see especially Rep. VIII. 545 E δπ(π)ως δὴ πρῶτον στάσει ἔμπεσε.
Phaedr. 237 A, B ἀγετε δή, ὦ Μοῦσαι, . . . ζῦμ μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου.

Ibid. 252 B, C (ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπών) τῶν δ' ἦτοι θυρτοὶ μὲν Ἐρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηρών, | ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτερόφοιτον ἀνάγκην.
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Rep. VIII. 550 C ἀλλ' ἄλλῃ πρὸς πολλ' τεταγμένον.

In a similar spirit, if the reading be sound, a humorous turn is given to the quotation from Homer in Rep. III. 388 Α τὸτε ὁ ἄρης ἀναπόταται | πλατθείτε ἀλόντ' ἐπὶ θε' ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτωο.

§ 21. (c) Metaphorical Generalization.

In all philosophical writing, thought inevitably reacts on language. The effort to define, distinguish, generalize, leads insensibly to novel uses of words. And Plato's method, like that of his master Socrates, largely consists in the attempt to rise to universal conceptions through the analysis of ordinary speech. At the same time he casts his thoughts in an imaginative mould, and his turn of mind, as exhibited in his writings, is eminently plastic and creative. Hence it is difficult, in describing his use of words, to draw an exact line between the work of fancy and that of logic, between metaphor and classification.

The extension of the meaning of θηρευτής, for example, in Rep. II. 373 B (side by side with that of μυητής) appears at first sight to justify the remark ταύτ' εστὶ ποιητικὰς λέγειν μεταφοράς. But in the Sophistes it is gravely stated that the genus Huntsman comprises several species, as General, Lover, Sophist, Fisherman, &c. Thus what a modern reader would assign to fancifulness—in this particular instance tinged with irony—Plato himself attributes to συναγωγή.

a. The use of μονοκή in the Republic is here directly in point. Because in Plato's view melody is inseparable from words, and words from thoughts, not only μονοκή, but the cognate terms ἀρμονία and ὕβθος are used by him in a greatly extended sense. See especially

Prot. 326 B πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τῶν ἄνθρωπον εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐμορφιώτατα δεῖται.

Phaedo 61 A ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσίας μεγίστης μονοκής.

Theaet. 175 E οὐδὲ γ' ἀρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος, κ.τ.λ.


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β. Under the same heading of figurative abstraction may be fairly brought the graphic use of words denoting physical states to indicate mental phenomena. See above, p. 287 (β).

(1) ἀνατίθεμαι, 'I retract,' literally 'take back a move' (in draughts), Phaedo 87 A.

διαβολή, 'prejudice,' lit. 'calumny,' Rep. VI. 489 D.

ἐπαφρασι (adj.), 'akin to,' lit. 'companion of,' Rep. X. 603 B.

θῆρα, 'pursuit,' lit. 'chase,' Phaedo 66 C.

θρήμα, 'creature' (used of an argument personified), Phaedr. 260 B.

κέρας, 'an offensive weapon,' Rep. IX. 586 B.

κυρίττω, 'I attack,' Rep. IX. 586 B.

μοσθία, extended to include philosophy, Rep. VI. 499 D.

ὄναρ, 'dream,' i.e. 'impression,' Rep. VIII. 563 D.

ὀνειροτεύτω, 'I have vague (unverified) impressions,' Rep. VII. 533 C; cp. V. 476 C.

ἄξημα, 'vehicle,' i.e. ground of belief, Phaedo 85 D.

παναρμόνιος, transferred from music to discourse, Phaedr. 277 C.

συλλαβή, transferred from letters to ideas, Theaet. 203 C.

ὕπαρ, 'with clear thoughts,' Rep. V. 476 C, D.

φυτών, 'organized being,' 'organism,' Rep. II. 380 E, VI. 491 D.

ψυχαγωγία, extended to include rhetoric, Phaedr. 261 A.

(The usual meaning appears in ψυχαγωγός Aesch. Pers. 687, Eur. Alc. 1128.)

Obs.—A word which properly belongs to an aggregate is applied to a constituent part, which is thus regarded in a more general aspect.

πλήρωμα Rep. II. 371 E.

So ἱκανόν λόγον, Rep. II. 376 D, means one which is necessary to completeness.

(2) For bold graphic uses, see

ἀναλογιστρέω, 'to re-illumine' (the eye of the mind), Rep. VII. 527 D.
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ἀπρατος, ‘indefatigable’ (in Cratyl. 407 D = σκληρός), Rep. VII. 535 B.


§ 22. (d) Playing with words.

The Cratylus shows what might be made of the Greek language by ‘victorious analysis’ at play. The freedom which is there sportively abused has left many traces in other dialogues. Sometimes ironically, but sometimes also quite gravely, words are employed in new senses suggested by analytical reflexion.

a. Ironical Catachresis.

β. Etymological Analysis.

a. The exact meaning is made evident by the context. A good instance is the singular use of νεωκορεῖων in Rep. IX. 574 D, to denote an act of sacrilege, ‘He will industriously clean out some temple.’ For other instances consult the Lexicon under the ‘facetious words’ ἀγεννής, ἀστεῖος, γεννάδας, γενναῖος, γήισχρός, εἰδαιμών, καλός (especially VIII. 562 A), κομψός, ὑγιαῖος, φαίλος, χαρίεις, χρηστός.

It may be observed by the way that the word εἰρωνεία, from meaning ‘dissimulation,’ generally acquires in Plato the specific meaning of ‘pretended ignorance.’

Obs. 1.—A return is sometimes made (above, p. 250) from the ironical to the serious meaning.


Rep. IV. 426 Α, Β τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίειν; . . . οὐ πάνυ χαρίειν.

Obs. 2.—The constant use of ἐπιεικής for χρηστός or ἀγαθός, although not ironical, partakes somewhat of the general tendency to understatement. So also μετρίως, ἱκανός (Rep. VI. 499 Α), &c.

β. Etymological Analysis.

(i) Sometimes a word is used quite simply in the etymological sense, which, however, is indicated by the context: Theaet. 149 Β ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν ἐληχε, ‘the goddess of childbirth, although not a mother.’
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(2) More frequently the play on words takes the form of an oxymoron or a downright pun.

Rep. II. 382 A τὸ γε ὃς ἄληθῶς ψεῦδος.
Symp. 198 A ἄδεες . . . δέος.
Phaedr. 247 C, D τὸ γε ἄληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἄληθελας.

Rep. VI. 509 D ἵνα μὴ ὀφρανὸν εἰπὼν δάξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι.
Rep. VI. 507 Α κίβδηλον ἀποδίδοις τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου.
Rep. VII. 527 Α, IX. 574 B, C ἀναγκαῖος.
Rep. VII. 540 C δαλμοσί . . . εἰδαλμοσί.

Obs. 1.—This tendency becomes exaggerated in Plato's later manner:—Soph. 254 Α τριβῇ, Tim. 90 C εἰδαίμον, Phileb. 64 Ε ξυμφορά, Tim. 55 C ἀπειρός, Laws II. 656 C παυδεία, ib. iv. 717 B νόμος.

Obs. 2.—Plato's fanciful etymologies afford no real ground for critical judgement on his text. See note on Rep. I. 338 Α, Β φιλονοέκτων (ep. IX. 581 Α, Β), E. on Text, p. 131.

iii. Philosophical expression.

It has been suggested in the preceding section that § 23. the growth of reflexion and, in particular, the Socratic search for definitions had in Plato's time already exercised a natural and inevitable influence on words. This was the beginning of a process which tended ultimately to give an approximately fixed connotation to the chief terms of constant use in mental and moral philosophy. But the result was still far distant, and even in Aristotle the appearance of definiteness is often illusory.

In all ages philosophers have been apt to dream of a language which should be the exact, unvarying counter-
part of true conceptions. The dream has not been realized, and if it were, would not the very life and progress of thought be arrested? Philosophy reacts on common language, and in employing it again, is sure to modify it further. But the process cannot have, and ought not to have, either finality or absolute fixity. In some departments of knowledge, Mathematics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Anatomy, Jurisprudence, such an aim is obviously legitimate;—the use of technical terms in them is clearly necessary. But Mental Philosophy is in danger of becoming hidebound, if it be not permitted to her to draw afresh, and to draw freely, from the fountains of common speech.

In Plato, at all events, philosophical terminology is incipient, tentative, transitional. And although this remark applies with especial force to what have been called the 'dialogues of search,' where the method is 'peirastic' or 'maceutic,' leading to an avowedly negative result, it is a serious error even in dealing with the more positive and constructive dialogues to assume strict uniformity of expression. In a few rare instances the metaphysical significance acquired by a word or phrase in one dialogue may be thought to have influenced the use or application of the same term in another. Thus in the Timaeus the meaning attached to οὐσία (35 B), and to θανάτου φύσις (35 B, 74 A), may bear some relation to the definitions in the Philebus (26 D) and Sophist (257 D). But even where such connexion may doubtfully be traced, it by no means precludes the occurrence of other philosophical uses, still less the continued employment of the word or phrase in its ordinary vernacular sense. And the instances which have been adduced are quite exceptional. The contrary

1 See Ward in Encyc. Brit. ed. ix. Art. Psychology: 'It seems the fate of this science to be restricted in its terminology to the ill-defined and well-worn currency of common speech, with which every psychologist feels at liberty to do what is right in his own eyes, at least within the wide range which a loose connotation allows.'
practice is more frequent. The special meanings assigned to διάνοια and πλούς in Rep. VI. 511, VII. 534 A are not to be found elsewhere in Plato. Even the definition of Justice, so carefully elaborated in Rep. IV, though once alluded to in IX. 586 E, can hardly be said to affect the connotation of the term elsewhere. Nor does the definition of δύναμις by the young mathematicians in Theaet. 148 B for a moment supplant either the ordinary or the scientific uses of the word.

Thus, while attempts are made to give a precise meaning to words denoting philosophical conceptions, such attempts are inchoate, intermittent and casual. The very nature of dialectic, as an 'interrogation' of language, forbids the assumption of technicalities, nor can Plato's literary instinct tolerate the air of pedantry, which such buckram stiffening involves. The formal terminology of Rhetors and Sophists (ὁρθοδόξεια, ἀπορροή, &c.) is the object of his frequent ridicule. In two of the most elaborate of his dialogues he reminds the reader that precise verbal distinctions, such as Prodicus affected, are rarely of any use in philosophy, and warns young men that a liberal indifference to mere words is the condition of growth in wisdom; just as in the Cratylus he had long since pronounced against looking for the truth of things in words. That second course (δεύτερος πλοῦς), for which Socrates declares in the Phaedo as preferable to the bare assertion of an unapplied first cause, —the endeavour to find in the mirror of language, however confusedly, some reflexion of eternal truths,—is really a method which dissolves the apparent fixity of ordinary speech, and awakens thought to new conceptions which, the more firmly they are held, can be more freely and variously expressed.

These remarks are here to be exemplified by the con-

1 See esp. Laws I. 631 c.  
2 Theaet. 184 c; Polit. 261 E.  
3 Cratylus 439 A, B.  
4 Phaedo 99 D.
sideration of a few cardinal expressions¹, which may be roughly classified as (a) Metaphysical, (b) Psychological, and (c) Dialectical, although such distinctions are not clearly present to the mind of Plato.

§ 24. (a) METAPHYSICAL TERMS.

Eidos.

This word, which Aristotle and others have made the symbol of Platonism, is used by Plato himself with entire freedom, and very seldom with a pronounced metaphysical intention. He has nowhere defined it.

Ordinary meanings.

The word was in common use amongst contemporary writers.

a. Eidos was still used, as in Homer, in the literal sense of ‘outward appearance,’ ‘visible form.’

(1) Xen. Cyrop. IV. 5, § 57 ἐκλεξάμενος αὐτῶν τῶν τὰ εἰδή βελτιστῶν.

(2) In Xenophon (Cyn. 3, § 3 ἐν δὲ σκληρωτὰ τὰ εἰδή [κύνες]: ib. 4, § 2 ἴσχυροι τὰ εἰδή), Eidos nearly = ἰδέα, bodily constitution or condition.

b. But it had acquired the secondary meaning—

(1) Of ‘a mode of action or operation’; so in Thuc. II. 41, § 1 ἐπὶ πλείον ἀν εἴδη . . . τὰ ὁμά αὐτάρκες παρέχοντα, ‘to adapt himself to the most varied forms of action,’ ib. 50, § 1 τὸ εἰδῶς τῆς νόσου, ‘the course of the disease,’ III. 62, § 3 ἐν οἷς εἴδει . . . τοῦτο ἐπραξαν, ‘the peculiarity of the course they took,’ VI. 77, § 2 ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἰδῶς τρεπομένους, ‘be-taking themselves to this policy,’ VIII. 56, § 2 τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόῦτο εἴδως, ‘had recourse to such a method of proceeding,’ ib. 90, § 1 ἐναντίοις ὄντες τῷ τοιούτῳ εἴδει, ‘opposed to this policy’ or ‘platform’ (εἴδος here seems more definite than ἰδέα in τῇ αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ preceding).

(2) In the language of rhetoric this use was naturally transferred from action to speech, so that in Isocrates,

¹ ἵνα μὴ ταραττῶμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς (Soph. 254 c).
Antid. § 80 ὁλος εἶδει προειλόμεν ἵρηθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, it seems to mean an entire course or line of argument, as distinguished from a single phrase.

c. Εἶδος was already used in common speech, with associations from the primary meaning, in a still more general sense, approaching to the abstract notion of 'mode,' 'sort,' 'kind.' Hippocrates περὶ ἀρχαῖς ιατρικῆς, § 15 αὐτό τι ἐφ' ἐωτοῦ θερμῶν, ἡ ψυχρόν ... μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ εἶδει κοινωνέον.

Thuc. III. 82 τοῖς εἰδει διηλλαγμένα, 'differing in character.'

Isocr. 190 D, E (Evagoras, § 10) τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ δέδοιται κόσμοι ... καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλώνει μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὄνομασιν, ... ἄλλα πάσι τοῖς εἴδει διαποίκιλαι τὴν ποιήσιν.

Isocr. 294 D (κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν § 20 Bekker) δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητήν πρὸς τῷ τῆς φύσει ἔχειν οἷαν χρῆ τα μὲν εἰδὴ τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

These, the ordinary uses of the word, may be all be readily § 25. exemplified out of Plato.

Charm. 154 D τὸ εἴδος πάγκαλος.
Symp. 189 E τὸ εἴδος στρογγύλον.
Prot. 352 A ἄθρωπον σκοτών ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους.
(2) Rep. III. 402 D ἐν τῇ γυνῇ ... ἑνότα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει, 'in mind and body.'

Symp. 196 A ὠγός τὸ εἴδος, 'of flexible make.'

b. (1) Rep. IX. 572 C ἀρμήσας εἶς ὑβρίν τε πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων εἴδος, 'their way of life' (where ἡδος has been needlessly conjectured).

(2) Rep. V. 449 C εἴδος ὅλων ὥς τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκκλείστειν τοῦ λόγου, 'a whole chapter.'

III. 392 A τὶ ... ἡμῶν ... ἐτί λοιπῶν εἴδος; (cp. Laws VI. 751 A).
II. 363 E ἄλλο αὖ εἴδος λόγων.
See also Phaedr. 263 C καλὸν γοῦν ἄν ... εἴδος ἐνα κατανενοχκώς.

c. Rep. II. 357 C τρίτου δὲ ὁρᾶσ τι ... εἴδος ἁγαθοῦ, 'a third kind of good.'
Gorg. 473 E ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἑλέγχου ἔστιν;

Rep. III. 406 C οὖν Ἀπειρά τοῦτον τοῦ εἴδους τῆς λατρείας,
'this mode of practice.'

IV. 424 C εἴδος . . . καὶ ἄνθρωπον μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν, 'a new style
in music.'

And therefore in passages of more distinctly philo-
sophical import the interpreter is by no means bound to
drag in a ready-made 'doctrine of ideas' (ἐἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ
eἴδη) wherever the word εἴδος happens to occur. This can
hardly be done without violence, for example, in the
following places:—

Rep. II. 380 D ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἴδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφὰς.
VI. 511 A τοῦτο τῶν νοητῶν μὲν τὸ εἴδος ἔλεγον.
VII. 530 C οὐ μὴν ἐν, ἄλλα πλεῖο . . . εἰθὶ παρέχεται ἡ φορά.
VII. 532 E (ἡ τοῦ διαλέγοντος δύναμις) κατὰ ποίᾳ δὴ εἰθὶ
diēsīsēk.

VIII. 544 D διὶ καὶ ἄνθρωπων εἴθη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων
eἶναι, δοσατέρ καὶ πολιτεῖαν.

And in the concluding passage in Book VI, where εἴδος is
the cardinal term, it is applied to the visible forms as well
as to the invisible (510 D τοὺς δρωμάνους εἴθες προσχρώνται,
compared with 511 B, C αὕτην παντάπασιν οὐδὲν προσχρώ-
μένος, ἀλλ' εἴθεςιν αὐτοῦς δὲ αὐτῷ εἰς αὐτὰ, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴθη).

Obs.—In Phaedr. 249 b where εἴδος has been used in the logical
sense (infra p. 298, γ) it recurs in the same passage (1) for the
imaginary form or nature of the soul, and (2) for the form and
appearance of the noble steed.

§ 26. Platonic uses.

Εἴδος as employed by Plato is a word of extremely wide
significance, and even where its use is avowedly technical
(as in Phaedo 102 A) it receives not a new meaning but
a new application. It is applied so variously that it
can hardly be defined more closely, as a philosophical
term in Plato, than by saying that it denotes the objective
reality of any and every abstract notion. Nor is the word
in this its philosophical sense by any means confined to
the Platonic 'ideas.' The crude idealists of Soph. 246 are no less than Plato himself believers in ἔῶν. And in the passage of the Republic just referred to (vi. 510, 511) the connotation of ἔῶος is not confined to the classification of natural objects, nor to mathematical principles, nor to moral truths. It includes also ἐπιστήμη, ἀλήθεια, οὐσία, ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱδα and all other philosophical conceptions to which the mind of Plato had attained when the book was written.

The application of the term in different passages, even within the limits of one dialogue, is by no means uniform.

a. ἔῶος is an ethical notion regarded as an object of § 27. thought.

The chief instance of this use in the Republic is III. 402 B, C οὐδὲ μονοικοὶ πρότερον ἐσῶμεθα... πρὶν ἄν τὰ τῆς συφροσύνης ἔῶν καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριάτητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ζωὰ τοῦτων ἄθελῳ καὶ τὰ τοῦτων αὐθέντα πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνότα ἐν οἷς ἐνεστὶν αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν συμπρός μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις ἀτιμάζωμεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐθείας ὁμομεθε τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελετής; where observe that two lines lower down the word is used in the vernacular meaning of 'bodily constitution' (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ... καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐδών: supra p. 294, a (2)).

Cp. Parm. 130 B δικαίον τι ἔῶος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντων... τῶν τοιούτων.

Ib. 135 C καλὸν τε τί καὶ δικαιον καὶ ἀγαθον καὶ ἐν ἐκαστον τῶν ἐδῶν.

β. This meaning is extended from ethical universals to all universals, implying at once the abstract notion and the essential nature of the thing.

Phaedo 100 B, C εἰναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τάλλα πάντα, resumed in ib. 102 B with εἰναι τι ἐκαστον τῶν ἐδῶν.

Crat. 440 B εἶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔῶος μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἀμα τ' ἄν μεταπίπτοι εἰς ἄλλο ἔῶος γνώσεως, κ.τ.λ.

Rep. V. 476 A, X. 596 A ἔῶος γὰρ ποῦ τι ἐν ἐκαστον
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eἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἐκαστα τὰ πολλὰ, οἷς ταύτων οὕτως ἐπι-
φέρομεν.

Parm. 135 D. (See also ib. 130 C, D where the doubt is
raised whether there is any such essential nature attaching
to dirt, mud, hair, and other insignificant things.)

γ. Εἴδος is the reality of a general concept.

Phaedr. 249 B δεὶ γὰρ ἀνθρωπον ἕννεπεν κατ' ἐίδος λεγό-
μενον, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 277 C, Rep. VIII. 544 D ἡτὶς καὶ ἐν ἐίδει . . . κεῖται;

Men. 72 C.

(1) Εἴδος is thus a logical whole, containing the particulars

148 D.

(2) But it is also a part, i.e. a subordinate species:

Phaedr. 265 E κατ' ἐίδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, Rep. v. 454 A διὰ τὸ
μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' ἐίδη διαμορφεῖν . . . ἐπισκοπεῖν, Theaet. 181 C,

187 C.

Obs. 1.—Εἴδος when thus employed signifies a true and natural,
as opposed to an arbitrary division. Cp. Polit. 262, 263.

Obs. 2.—In the passage of the Phaedrus p. 265 ff., the word is
also used in the familiar idiomatic sense of a line of argument or
mode of reasoning (see above, p. 295 b (2)) τούτων δὲ τινῶν ἐκ τούτης
μηδένων δυνών εἰδοῦν . . . τὸ δ' άτερον δὴ εἴδος τὶ λέγεις; See also ib.

263 B, C.

δ. Εἴδος is applied, not only to the species into which
a genus is divided, but also to the parts of an organic
whole. These two conceptions are, in fact, not clearly
kept apart by Plato.

Thus the Soul in Rep. iv. 435 ff. is shown to have three
forms or natures (ἐννη), which are her parts (μέρη, p. 442),
but are also species, having varieties under them (VIII.
559 E, alib.), and are repeatedly spoken of as γένη.

ε. Εἴδος is the type of any natural kind, comprising its
essential attributes.
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Theaet. 157 B, C ἀνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστὸν ἵθεν τε καὶ εἴδος.

 Parm. 130 C ἀνθρώπου εἴδος χαρίς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκί ημεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτῷ τι εἴδος ἀνθρώπου ἡ πυρὸς ἡ καὶ ἦθος.

Obs.—This is the μονὰς of Phileb. 15 Α ἡν ἀνθρωπον ... καὶ βοῶν ἑνα, κ.τ.λ., about which there, as in Parm. 130 C, D, Socrates expresses himself doubtfully.

ζ. Εἴδος is also used of an abstract whole, conceived as separable from the parts, as in
Theaet. 204 A ἡ καὶ τὸ δῶν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὼς ἐν τι εἴδος ἐτεροῦ τῶν πάντων μερῶν;

η. Εἴδος is used not only for the type of a natural kind § 28. (man, horse, stone, &c.),—though on this point, as we have seen, there is in Plato's mind a lingering doubt,—not only for generic attributes (good, beautiful, wise, &c., Phileb. 15), but also to denote an idea of relation, as for example, the idea of similarity.

Parm. 128 Ε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἴδος τι ὁμοιώματος.

In Rep. V. 454 B τι εἴδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τί τεινον ὡρικόμεθα; the meaning of εἴδος is further explained by πρὸς τί τεινον. And in Phaedo 74, 75, although the term εἴδος is not expressly used of αὐτὸ τὸ ἱσον, yet the whole course of reasoning implies that this, together with μειζόν καὶ ἐκαστον, is included amongst the εἴδη spoken of in ib. 102 Α.

θ. Lastly, εἴδος is applied to each of the primary forms or elements of thought. These come into question most in the dialectical dialogues (Theaet., Soph., Polit., Phileb.), but the use referred to is much the same with that which occurs already in Phaedr. 263 Β ἐληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτήρα ἐκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους. See especially Parm. 129 D, E, Theaet. 184, 185, 197 D, 202 Α, Soph. 254 C, Phileb. 23 B, C, and again Soph. 258, where the θατέρου φύσις is described as an εἴδος, and also as having an εἴδος (i.e. a real nature corresponding to its definition).
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The chief meanings or applications of ἐἶδος as a philosophical term in Plato may accordingly be thus tabulated:—

Εἶδος is

1. an ethical notion, Rep. III. 402 C, D, &c.
2. a universal nature, Phaedo 100 B, C.
3. a logical whole, Phaedr. 249 B. a. genus, Rep. V. 474; β. species, Phaedr. 265 E.
5. the type of a natural kind, Theaet. 157 B.
6. a pure abstraction, e.g. the whole as separable from the parts, Theaet. 204 A.
7. an idea of relation, Rep. V. 454 C.
8. any primary form or element of thought, Theaet. 184, 185, Parm. 129 C–E, Soph. 254 C, &c.

γένος.

γένος often occurs in the Republic, Parmenides, and later dialogues, interchangeably with ἐἶδος, though suggesting rather the notion of kind, than of form or nature.

Rep. V. 477 B, C φήσωμεν δυνάμεις εἶπαι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων ...

εἶ δὲ μαθήματι δ θεολογίας λέγειν τὸ ἐἴδος ... ib. D, E εἰς τι γένος ... ἢ εἰς ἄλλο ἐἴδος;

Parmenides 129 C αἰτά τὰ γένη τε καὶ ἐἴδη.

See also Polit. 285 C, 286 D.

This use is especially frequent in the Sophistes.

γένος is combined with ἰδέα in Laws VIII. 836 D τὸ τῆς σφήκφρονος ἰδέας γένος.

Obs.—The use of γένος becomes more frequent in the later dialogues and at the same time the applications of ἐἴδος and ἰδέα become more varied. For confirmation of these assertions the student may consult the following passages:—


ἰδέα Soph. 235, 253, 254, 255: Polit. 258, 289, 307, 308: Phil,
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16, 25, 60, 64 (twice), 67: Tim. 28, 35, 39, 40, 58, 60, 70, 71, 75, 77: Laws viii. 836 d (τὸ τῆς σῶφρονος ἱδέας γένος).


§ 29.

 IDDÉA.

IIDÉA is the feminine form of eIDOS. It is naturally the more picturesque word and is accordingly more frequent in the more imaginative and exalted passages. From this cause, and from its adoption as a term of Stoicism, the word has passed over into Latin and thence into modern literature and philosophy.

Ordinary meanings.

a. In the literal sense,—'form,' 'appearance,' IIDÉA is used by Pindar, Theognis, Euripides, Aristophanes, Herodotus, and Thucydides (VI. 4 δρεπανοειδὲς τὴν ἱδέαν ὅ ὁ χωρίον ἐστι).

b. In Herodotus it has the slightly more abstract meaning of Nature, description (I. 203 φύλλα τοιχῶδε ἱδέης, 'leaves of such a nature'; II. 71 φύσιν . . . παρέχουσα ἱδέης τοιχῶδε, 'their nature and description is as follows'; VI. 119), and even of a line of thought or policy, VI. 100 ἐφρόνεων δὲ διάφανα ἱδέας.

c. In Thucydides, where (acc. to Bétant) the word occurs fourteen times (see esp. III. 81, § 5 πᾶσα τε ἱδέα κατάστηθανατου), it has acquired the further meaning of a plan, or mode of operation (see above, eIDOS, p. 294, b (1)).

II. 77, § 2 πᾶσαν ἱδέαν ἐπευγόων, 'they devised every plan.'

III. 62, § 2 τῇ . . . αὐτῇ ἱδέα στερεοῦ . . . ἀπτικόςα, 'on the same principle.'

b. In Isocrates IIDÉA already signifies a form (1) of life, (2) of speech, (3) of thought (see also Aristoph. Nub. 547 ἄλλα ἄν κακῶς ἱδέαν εἰσφέρων σοφίομαι, Ran. 384, Av. 993).
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(1) Isocr. p. 21 D (Nicocl. § 46) δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι μὲν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἒδεαῖς ταύταις (dignity and urbanity).

32 E τὰς μὲν μὴ μετεχοῦσας τούτων τῶν ἒδεων (ἀρετῶν) μεγάλων κακῶν αἰτίας οὖσας, ‘those virtues that have no share of temperance and justice.’

The ἒδεα referred to are σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη.

36 A ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἒδεαις (explained by ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις, ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις, &c.).

259 E (Panathen. § 141) τὰς . . . ἒδεαι τῶν πολιτείων τρεῖς εἶναι.

(2) 42 C (Panegyr. § 7) εἰ μὲν μηδαμῶς ἄλλως οἶδον τ’ ἢν δηλοῦν τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις ἄλλ’ ἢ διὰ μᾶς ἒδεας.

210 E (Helen. Encom. § 16) ἔστι δ’ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἒδεων . . . δ λόγος, 294 C (Sophist. § 18).

(3) 312 C (Antid. § 12) τοσαῦτα ἒδεας καὶ τοσοῦτον ἄλληλων ἀφεστάσας συναρμόσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν, ‘notions so important and so remote from one another.’

(4) A special use occurs in 216 E (Helen. Encom. § 62) ὅσα ταύτης τῆς ἒδεας κεκοιμώνηκε, where αὐτὴ ἡ ἒδέα is the attribute of beauty.

(The word is hardly, if at all, used by Xenophon.)

§ 30. Thus it is evident that by the time of Plato the word ἒδέα was ready for his philosophical use. But before touching on this, it is important to observe, as in the case of ἐἶδος, (1) that he also employs it freely in all the senses (except perhaps that marked c) above-mentioned, and (2) that even in philosophical passages it is by no means always used with a scientific or technical intention. Such an intention is only to be assumed when the context places it beyond doubt.

Phaedr. 251 A ἡ τίμα σώματος ἒδεαν.
Phaedo 108 D τὴν . . . ἒδεαν τῆς γῆς.
Polit. 291 B ταχύ δὲ μεταλλάττονσι τὰς τε ἒδεας καὶ τὴν δύναμιν εἰς ἄλληλους.

b. Rep. II. 369 A τὴν τοῦ μεῖζους ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ
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δώστοις ἴδεα ἐπισκοποῦντες, 'the resemblance of the greater in the form of the less.'

Rep. II. 380 D φαντάζονται ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ἴδεαις.

Tim. 58 D τὴν τοῦ σχήματος ἴδεαν, 'the shape of the figure.'

a. This meaning is possibly approached in Rep. vi. 507 E ὑπὸ σμίκρα ὄρα ἴδεα, κ.τ.λ., 'by a notable expeditious' (?) ; Phaedr. 237 D, 238 A. But it is hard to find in Plato an exact parallel for the Thucydidean use.

b. Phaedr. 253 B εἰς τὸ ἐκείνον ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἴδεαν ἁγιούσιν, 'into conformity with his practices and way of life.' Cp. εἴδος, p. 294, b (1).

Even where the context is highly philosophical, ἴδεα often retains its usual, vernacular, meaning. Thus in Phaedr. 246 A it is used not of absolute Justice, Beauty, &c., but of the nature or conformation of the soul, as it is there figuratively described. And in Theaet. 184 C, D the word is similarly applied, not to Being, sameness, difference, and the other primary notions, but to the nature of the mind perceiving them—εἰς μιᾶν τινὰ ἴδεαν, ἐκεῖν ὡς ἔτει ὀτι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ἐπιτείνει.

Platonic uses.

The transition to the specially Platonic use is well marked in Parm. 131 E, 132 A οἷμαι σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτο ἐν ἐκαστὸν εἴδος οἰσθαι εἶναι. ὅταν πόλλ' ἄτα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μᾶλλον ὡστε ἴδεα ἡ αὐτή εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδοντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἰδεῖ εἶναι, 'when you look at them together, there appears to you one and the same form (or idea) in them all.'

a. ἴδεα, as a philosophical term, signifies rather form than kind. The meaning of a class, which εἴδος often essentially connotes, attaches only accidentally to ἴδεα. The latter term immediately suggests the unity of a complex notion as present to the mind. It is thus used to describe the work of συναγωγή, where εἴδος denotes the result of διάφορος :

Phaedr. 265 D, E εἰς μιᾶν τε ἴδεαν συνορώντα ἄγειν τὰ
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πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, κ.τ.λ. . . τὸ πάλιν καὶ εἰδὴ δύνασθαι τέμνειν.

Theaet. 205 D, E, Soph. 253 C, D, Phileb. 60 D.

Observe the frequent combination of μία ἰδέα.

See also Phaedo 103 D, E—where at first sight the terms may seem to be interchanged—μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδός ἄξιονθαί τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ὑόματος εἰς τὸν αὖ τὸ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὅ εἰσι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἐξεῖ δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν αὖ ὁμορφήρ̣ . . . 104 C οὔδε ταύτα ἐν τοῖς ἐξομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἄν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὠνθή ἐναντία ἤ. On a closer inspection it is seen that ἰδέαν corresponds not to εἰδός but to μορφήν in the preceding sentence.

§ 33. It follows that each εἰδός, or distinct and definite kind, has its own ἰδέα, or notional form.

Euthyphr. 5 D τὸ ἀνόμου . . . αὐτὸ δὴ αὐτῷ δυμον καὶ ἐχον μίαν τινα ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ὁσίωτοτητα.

Phil. 25 B τὸ μικτὸν (εἰδός) . . . τίνα ἰδέαν φήσομεν ἐχεῖν;

β. In Rep. vi, where Plato dwells on the unity of knowledge and characterizes the philosopher as a spectator of all time and all existence, the term ἰδέα, in the more precise philosophical sense, occurs with special frequency.

VI. 486 D, E ἦν (διάνοιαν) ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ δυτος ἰδέαν ἐκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυές εὐάγγελον παρέξει.

VI. 507 B, C τὰς . . . ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὀρᾶσθαι δ’ οὖ.

And the process so indicated naturally culminates in the contemplation of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Closely akin to this last is the use in Phil. 67 B οἴκειότερον . . . τῇ τοῦ μικῶτος ἰδέα.

And in the more imaginative description of the parts of the Soul towards the end of Book IX ἰδέα again takes the place of εἰδός:—

588 C, D μίαν μὲν ἰδέαν θηρίου ποικίλον . . . μίαν δὴ τοῖνυν ἄλλην ἰδέαν λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἀνθρώπου (he had just said in illustration συνεπαί λέγονται ξυμπεφυκοῦσα ἰδέα τολλαί εἰς ἐν γενεσθαί) 1.

1 To estimate Plato’s freedom in the use of terms, words like ὃς, τῶς,
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γ. Ἰδέα is also preferred in speaking of an organic whole, in which the parts or elements are merged:—

Theaet. 204 A μὴ ἰδέα ἕκαστων τῶν συναρμοτόντων στοιχείων γνωμενή.

The word ἰδέα may be regarded as symbolizing the union of thought and imagination in Plato.

Αὐτὸς.

α. The emphatic use of ἀυτὸς is the most constant and § 33. characteristic of the various modes in which Plato expresses his belief in the absolute reality of universals. The term ἰδέα in its technical sense is absent both from the myth in the Phaedrus and from the discourse of Diotima in the Symposium, where ἐνδος, too, only comes in by the way. But the pronominal use now in question perpetually recurs. It is needless to quote passages at length: it is enough to refer to Lys. 220 B, Crat. 439 C, D, Phaedr. 247 D, Phaedo 74 B, 76 C, 100 B, C (ἀυτὸ καθ’ ἀυτὸ, cp. Rep. VI. 485 D, X. 604 A), Symp. 211 B (ἀυτὸ καθ’ ἂυτὸ μεθ’ ἂυτοῦ), ib. D (θεωμένῳ ἂυτὸ τὸ καλὸν), Rep. I. 342 A, II. 363 A, IV. 438 C, V. 472 C, 476 A–C, 479 A, VI. 493 E, 506 D, E, VII. 532 A, X. 612 A, Parm. 133 D, &c., Theaet. 175 B, C (ἀντὶς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄδικλας).

β. Yet, while thus consecrated to special use, the § 34. pronoun is far from losing its proper idiomatic sense. Words like ἀυτοδικαιοσύνη belong to later Platonism, although, through a not unnatural error, they have found their way into MSS. of Plato (E. on Text: above, p. 71). Such a form as ἀυτοὰνθρωπας nowhere occurs, and, though the neuter pronoun is often joined to a feminine abstract word, frequent changes of the order clearly prove that they do not adhere together as in a compound. See for example

μορφή, μονάς (Phileb.), μοῦρα, φίλον (Polit.), μέρος, μέλος, στοιχεῖον, μέρον, σχήμα, ἴδας, should be considered. This is more noticeable in later dialogues. The expression is more varied, as the philosopher becomes more sure of his ground.

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Rep. I. 331 C τούτο δ’ αυτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην...
Theaet. 146 E ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ δ’ τ’ ποι’ ἐστίν.

And consider the context of II. 363 Α οὐκ αὕτη δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινούστε, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς εἴδοκεν, where Par. A reads αὐτοδικαιοσύνην.

Once more, the Platonic student must often refrain from Platonizing. Even in passages where the ‘doctrine of ideas’ is immediately in question the emphatic αὑτό occurs in the ordinary vernacular sense. The context must decide. Thus in Rep. VI. 510 Ε αὕτα μὲν ταῦτα...
511 Α αὑτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικοσθέεις, the pronoun refers to τοὺς δρωμένους εἶδεν supra, individual objects themselves as opposed to their shadows or reflexions, although in the words τοῦ τεταγμένου αὑτοῦ ἐνεκα...
καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, what has here been called the special use of αὑτός has intervened. Compare Parm. 130 Ν χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἴδος εἶναι χαρᾶς, δι’ ἄλλο αὑτῶν δὲν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα,—‘the actual hair, mud, dirt, &c., of common life’: Soph. 241 Ε (περὶ) εἰδώλων...
εἶτε φαντασιμάτων αὑτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν, κ.τ.λ., ‘illusions themselves or the arts concerned with them.’

γ. It follows that there is nothing specially Platonic in such uses as Crat. 432 Ο τὸ μὲν αὑτό, τὸ δὲ οúdoma (‘name and thing’), or Theaet. 202 Α αὑτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸν τις ἐρεί (‘the term by itself apart from attributes’).

§ 35. Εἶναι, δ’ ἐστι, τὸ δὲν, τὰ δὲντα, τὸ δὲν ἐκαστον, δεντως, οὐσία.
(Theaet. 186 Α τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.)

In all Greek philosophy, and not in Plato alone, metaphysical truths are expressed through εἶναι, its inflexions and derivatives. The cause of this is partly to be sought in Eleaticism, but largely also in the Socratic form of questioning, τί ἐστι;

The student who would learn of Plato in simplicity should clear his mind of Aristotelian distinctions, such as those in the third book of the Metaphysics, and, still more carefully of Daseyn, Wesen, Ansich, Fürsich,
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Anundfursichseyn, and other terms of modern German philosophy.
a. οὐσία is the truth of predication, as sifted out by § 36.
dialectical discussion (Prot. 349 B); in other words, it is
the reality of definition:

Rep. X. 597 A δ ἤθη φαμέν εἰναι δ ἐστι κλάμη.
Phaedo 75 D peri ἀπάντων ὦς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο,
δ ἐστιν: ib. 65 D.
Phaedo 78 C αὐτή ἡ οὐσία ἦς λόγου διδομέν τοῦ εἶναι:
Polit. 285 B.
Phaedr. 245 E ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγου τούτων αὐτῶν τις
λέγων ὦν καὶ αὐθεντεῖται.

Being, so conceived, is called in Phaedo 76 C, D ἡ τοιαύτη
οὐσία.

β. τὰ ὄντα, τὸ δ' ἕκαστον, have nearly the same force.
Phaedr. 247 E καὶ τάλα ὄσαντως τὰ ὄντα ὅταν θεασαμένη:
ib. 262 B δ μὴ ἐγνώρικὼς δ ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων.
Theaet. 174 A τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ἔλου.
Rep. VI. 484 D τοὺς ἐγνώκοτας μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ δ'.

γ. But sometimes, in moments of exaltation, the whole § 37.
of Being (like the sea of Beauty in the Symposium) is
spoken of as one continuum, which, as the object of
intellectual contemplation, exists in a region above the
Visible:—

Phaedr. 247 C ἡ γὰρ ἄχρωματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ
ἀναφῆς οὐσία ἄρτως ψυχῆς οὐσα κυβερνητὴ μόνης θεατὴ ὑπ':
ib. D, E ἐπιστήμη, οὐχ ἡ γένεσις πρόσετων, οὗτ' ἡ ἐστὶ ποι
ἐπέρα ἐν ἐπέρα οὐσα ὅν ἴσεις ὦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τήν ἐν τῷ
δ ἐστιν ὄν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὗσαν. (Cp. Tim. 29 C, 35 A.)
The white light of Being so conceived is parted into
the primary colours, as it were, of Knowledge and Truth, as
for example in Rep. VI. 508, 509, where, however, the ιδέα
tοῦ ἀγαθοῦ dominates over οὐσία as well as over ἐπιστήμη and
ἀλήθεια. See also for the totality of Being, VI. 486 A
θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας. And, for οὐσία
as abstract truth, VII. 525 C ἐπ' ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν.

x 2
§ 38. δ. In the dialectical dialogues ὄντως and τὸ ὅν have again the more logical meaning, ‘Reality, answering to truth of conception;’ or the essence of a thing as defined (Polit. 283 E, Phil. 32).

For example, in the strikingly modern passage of the Theaetetus quoted above, this sentence occurs, 186 B τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθητεῖαι, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ἀσάστωσ . . . τὴν δὲ γε ὀοτιαν καὶ δ ο ἡ τοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτή τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανυφάσικα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἀλληλα κρίνειν πειράται ἡμῖν. And, just below, τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ἄφθειαν (‘what they are and what good they do’) μοίχει καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδεῖας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἄν καὶ παραγίγνεται.

And in the main argument of the Sophistes, τὸ ὅν is positive truth or reality, as opposed to negation. The verb of existence is attenuated to the copula, passing from the notion of essence to that of relation. Yet this dialectical procedure does not preclude a recurrence to the language of ‘ontology’;—

Soph. 254 A, B δ ἔ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ᾐτοῦ δὲ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδεῖ, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὐ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὑπτής ὀφθηναί τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὅμως καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἄφολον ἀδύνατα.

A different shade of meaning is observable according as ἐιναί is opposed to γίγνεσθαι or φαίνεσθαι (Tim. 27 D, Parm. 165 A).

ε. A special meaning of ὄντως = μικτή ὄντως, ‘concrete reality,’ is formulated in Phil. 27 B, and applied in Tim. 35 A. But to examine this at present would be to travel too far beyond the stage of Platonism embodied in the Republic.

ζ. If the philosophical meanings of ἑιδός, ἰδέα, αὐτός, are crossed by the vernacular meaning, this happens inevitably also in the case of ἐιναί in both its meanings, (1) as the copula and (2) as the substantive verb.
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(1) Rep. vi. 507 B πολλά καλά ... καὶ πολλά ἀγαθά καὶ ἔκαστα οὗτος εἶναι φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ.

(2) Parm. 135 D, Ε ὀδύνειν χαλεπῶς ... ὄτι τά ὅτα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν.

So οὖσα in the sense of 'property' occurs in Phaedr. 252 Α καὶ οὖσας δὴ ἀμέλειαν ἀπολλυμένης παρ' οὗδεν τίθεται. And there is a play on both uses of the word (property and truth) in Gorg. 472 B ἐπιχειρεῖσ ἐκβάλλει μὲ ἐκ τῆς οὖσιας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

Μετέχειν, μέθεξις, μετάσχεσις, ἔχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, προσχρήσθαι, § 39. μετάληψις, κοινωνία, μετείχαι, παρείχαι, παρουσία, ἂγγειον (Lys. 219 D), ἔνειχαί, προσγίγνεσθαι, προσεῖναι, παραγίγνεσθαι, ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὅμοιώσαν, μίμησαν, παράδειγμα, περιφέρεσθαι, περιτρέχειν, μετατίθεσθαι, πεποιθέναι, πάθος ἔχειν, συμπλοκή.

(ἐίστε παρουσία, ἐίστε κοινωνία, ἐίστε ὅποι δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευμένη,—οδ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ διασχιζόμαι. Phaedo 100 D, cp. Rep. v. 476 C, D.)

See Arist. Metaph. i. 6, § 4 τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν, Ἦτις δὲν εἰ ὅτι τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφείων ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.

a. In his first discovery of the supreme reality of universals, Plato lightly assumes the correlation between them and the particulars of experience. He is more concerned in asserting this than in explaining it. And he expresses his conception in a variety of ways. When Socrates in the Phaedo substitutes a dialectical for a physical method, he implies a causal relation of idea to fact—ἐρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἴδος ὅ πεπραγμάτευμαι (Phaedo 100 B), and he explains this by participation: ib. c εἴ τι ἑστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλῆν αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, οὔτε δὲ ό ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ. He does not, however, confine himself to the word μετέχειν, as if this were the chosen term of the school: μεταλαμβάνειν (102 B) is freely substituted, also κοινωνία (100 D). And it is observable that the abstract nouns, μέθεξις, μετάληψις (Parm. 131, 132, 151 E), do not seem to have been at this time in use.
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§ 40. β. The participation of the particular in the universal is otherwise spoken of as the presence of the universal in the particular: Phaedo 100 D ἐκεῖνον τοῦ καλοῦ εἶστε παρωνία, εἶστε κοινωνία. Cp. Lys. 217 D καὶ μὴν παρελθῇ γ' ἀν αὐταῖς λευκότης: Charm. 158 E. 'Ἐνεῖναι—'to inhere' is similarly used in the Republic: III. 402 C τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδο... ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν οἷς ἐνεστὶν. In the same passage these moral attributes are spoken of as 'carried about' παραχοῦ περιφερόμενα; and in Theaet. 202 A, though not in stating Plato's own theory, general predicates are said to run round about, περιτρέχει, amongst particular subjects.

§ 41. γ. The relation of the universal to the particular is elsewhere regarded as the relation of the Perfect to the Imperfect, or of the Ideal to the Actual. Plato in the Phaedo does not feel this point of view to be inconsistent with the former. In that dialogue (p. 74) the reminiscence which is the germ of knowledge is accounted for by the resemblance of things transitory to eternal truths, known by us in a pre-existent state. The perception of equality and inequality, for example, is referred to the recollection of Ideal Equality (αὐτὸ τὰ ἑνών). Sense-perceived equality recalls this by resemblance, but falls short of it. ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὄμοιων ἀγαμμήνησκεται τὰς τὰ δὴ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον... ἔννοεῖ, εἰτέ τι ἔλλειπε τῷ οὐκ ἑαυτῷ κατὰ τὰ ὄμοιά ἐστε μὴ, κ.τ.λ. In Phaedo 69 B the ordinary Virtue is called a σκιαγραφία, and in 76 D occurs the phrase, ταύτα (τὰ ἐκ τῶν αὐθὸσεων) ἐκεῖν ἡ ὕψοσι ἀπεικάλομεν.

§ 42. This form of Plato's Idealism appears principally (1) in passages marked by strong ethical aspiration, or (2) where his speculation takes a cosmological turn. The image often employed is that of pattern and copy, borrowed from the 'imitative' arts, especially from the art of painting.

(1) Moral improvement is continually represented as a process of assimilation to the Divine (see esp. Theaet. 176 B). And in this connexion Plato treats the notions of participation and assimilation as interchangeable. For
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instance in Phaedr. 253 A the words καθ' ὅσον δυνάτων θεοῦ ἄνθρωπῳ μετασχέων are immediately followed up with ποιούσιν ὡς δυνάτων ὁμολόγων τῷ σφετέρῳ θεᾷ. See Arist. Met. i. 6, § 3 τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τὸν νομομορφόν μὲν ἐμπλήκει τὰ ὀχτά φασιν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τὸν νομομορφὸν μεταβαλὼν. τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μιμησιν, ἢτις ἀν ἐκ τῶν ἑλθὼν, ἀφείσαν ἐν κοινῷ φησιν.

In the Republic, the perfect or ideal state is more than once described as a pattern of which the actual state is to be a copy:—V. 472 D, Ε ἐπαράδειγμα ἐποιούμενι λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως, VI. 500 E οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρῶμεν ζωγράφοι. And the same ideal is to be the pattern for the individual, whether the perfect state is realized or not,—IX. 592 B ἀλλ' ... εὖ σφανφί ὅσοι παραδείγματα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ δραί καὶ δράττη ενακτάν κατοικίζειν. This comes near to the exalted tone of Thaet. 176 E παραδειγμάτων ... εὖ τῷ ὤσι ἐστάτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εἰδαμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιώτάτου ... λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιόμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιόμενοι, where the conjunction of opposites has a similar effect to that in Phaedo 74 D.

And in the Politicus (273 B, 293 E, 297 C) the true statesman is represented as imitating from afar the principles of Divine Government.

Similarly in Rep. vi. 500 C, Timaeus 47 C, the philosopher is described as imitating the universal order. See also Tim. 88 C κατὰ δὲ ταῦτα ... τὸ τοῦ παρτός ἀπομικρύμενον ἑδος.

(2) In the last-mentioned passages there is a union of § 43, the ethical with the cosmological strain. The following may serve to illustrate the place which μιμησις holds from time to time in Plato's cosmogony. In the mythical description of the Earth in Phaedo 110 foll., the colours and the precious stones known in human experience are but meagre samples (δελγματα) of those on the upper surface of the globe as seen from above. In the vision of Judgetment at the close of the Republic (not to dwell on the
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βίων παραδείγματα) the orrery turning on Necessity's knees, although partly pictorial, is partly also an ideal pattern (and in some occult or inconsistent way an efficient cause) of the revolutions of the planets.

In the Phaedrus, 250 B, earthly realities are ὄμοιόματα τῶν ἔκει; and each lover makes himself and his beloved like his god (ἀγάλμα).

And in the allegory of the Cave (Rep. VII) into which less of what is purely mythological enters, natural objects in their most essential forms are described as σκευαστὰ εἴδωλα, things manufactured after the supreme realities, and moved by hands unseen so as to cast their shadows on the wall. Elsewhere in the Republic, the figure of substance versus shadow repeatedly appears: II. 365 C, 382 D, III. 401 B, 402 B, C, IV. 443 C, V. 472 C, VI. 510, 511, VII. 516 A, 520 C, 534 C, IX. 587 D. Cp. Lysis 219 C, D, Phaedr. 250 A, B. And a similar strain of metaphor is carried further in the Timaeus, where the world is an εἰκών, or true image (not σκιά, an imperfect likeness) of the νοητόν εἴδου, whose forms are stamped upon the chaotic receptacle of space 'in a strange and hardly explicable way.' (Tim. 50 C.)

§ 44. Meanwhile the other metaphors of participation in the ideas, real presence of the ideas, communion with the ideas, are by no means discarded. For the Republic it is enough to quote V. 476 C, D, where indeed the two modes of expression (τὰ ὄμοιοι . . . τὰ μετέχοντα) are conjoined,—as they are in Parm. 133 D. See also VI. 505 Α ἡ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τάλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὀφέλιμα γίνεται.

In the later dialogues (Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Laws) the relation of the individual to the universal is altogether less in question. See Excursus, Essay on Structure, p. 46 f. But μέθεξις still takes place between subject and predicate, or between substance and attribute.

1 Cp. Tim. 48 E, 49 A ἐν μὲν ὧς παραδείγματος εἴδος ὑποστεθέν, νοητὸν καὶ δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ὃν, μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος δεύτερον, γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ ὄρατον.
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Soph. 247 Α δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ παρουσία (L. C.’s conjecture δ. ζ. κ. φρονήσεως has been approved by Schanz, but see the words which follow, τὸ γε δυνατόν τῷ παραγγέλλοντα καὶ ἀπογγέλλεσθαι πάντως εἶναι τι φήσοντο1), which show that the correction is not absolutely necessary.

Ib. 248 C ὅταν τῷ παρῇ ... δύναμις.
Ib. 256 Α διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὖ πάντ' αὐτοῦ.
Phil. 16 D μίαν ἱδέαν περὶ παντὸς ... ζητεῖν εὐρήσεων γὰρ ἐνώπιον.

Ib. 60 B, C τὴν τάγαθον διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷ τῶν ἄλλων. τίνι;
φ' παρείξα τούτ' αὖ τῶν ζῴων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντη,
μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδείκησιν, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεότατον ἐξήνει.

Polit. 268 Β μουσικής ... μετεληφθεί.
Ib. 269 D πολλῶν μὲν καὶ μακρῖνα παρὰ τοῦ γεννήσαντος
μετεληφθεῖ, ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ κεκοιμώμενος γε καὶ σώματος, κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 273 B, 275 D οὖ μετὰ.

Tim. 34 E μετέχουσα τοῦ ... εἰκῆ, 36 E, 58 Ε μετάσχει μάλλον
κινήσεως, 77 A, B μετάσχη ... μετέχει, 90 C καθ' ὅσον ... μετασχεῖν
ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀδιανόητα ἐνδέχεται.

3. The ἀπορρήματα raised in the Parmenides, then (with § 45.
which cp. Phil. 15), have not had the effect of banishing
‘participation’ (see esp. the examples just quoted from
Polit., Phileb.). Yet it was there shown that particulars
could not partake in the universal εἶδος, either (1) wholly,
or (2) in part, nor (3) as individuals in a common form, nor
(4) as objects of thought, nor (5) as copies of a pattern (καὶ
ἡ μέθεξις αὐτή τοῖς ἄλλοις γέγονεν ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἡ
ἐἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς). Nor are these difficulties solved in the
latter portion of that dialogue. What is really shown
there is the inadequacy of the Zenonian dialectic, since by
subjecting to it the Eleatic hypothesis of One Being, this
is proved (1) to have no predicates, (2) to have all predi-

1 In Parm. 133 p there are two stages in the descent from the ideas
to individuals, (1) δρομώσει, subsisting between the idea and its δρομώμα or
concrete type, and (2) μέθεξις τοῦ δρομώματος.
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cates, and (3) to have neither all nor none, but to be in transition between them. Plato thus hints indirectly at the root-fallacy which he has ridiculed in the Euthydemus, and of which he finally disposes in the Sophistes—the blank absoluteness of affirmation and negation. By the series of inferences which Parmenides himself sums up in the concluding paragraph, Plato, it may be fairly said, ἐξήμφοτέρικε τὸν τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγον (cp. Euthyd. 360 D).

§ 46. e. This is not done without a motive, and the motive may be gathered in the words of Socrates, Parm. 129 c–E el . . . αὐτὰ τὰ γένε τε καὶ ἐθή ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνω τὰναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἀξιον θαυμάζειν . . . ἐὰν . . . πρῶτον μὲν διαίρισι χωρὶς αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐθή, οὐτον ὁμοιότητα τε καὶ ἁνομοιότητα καὶ πλήθος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιάτα, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα εὐνύμενα συγκεράνυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἀν ἐγώ, ἕφη, θαυμαστώς. Cp. Phileb. 14 D. The discussion of those ἀπορίαι has cleared the ground for truer modes of conception. Something like a theory of predication is at length formulated. But even in the Philebus the construction of ideas into a κόσμος τις ἀσώματος is carried only a little way, and after the relativity of ideas is proved, Plato still speaks of them as absolute, and still employs metaphorical language to indicate metaphysical relations. Yet the point of view is no longer quite the same as before.

As the conception of the nature of predication becomes more distinct, a new stage of inquiry is reached in the search for an order and connexion of ideas. A rational psychology begins to clear away the confusions of a crude ontology. And while in the untried effort to account for γένεσις, language is still affected with dualism and tinged with mythological imagery, a far less dubious light is already shining on the world of thought.

§ 47. In the Phaedo and elsewhere, moral and other ‘ideas’—αὑτὸ τὸ καλὸν, ἀγαθὸν, δίκαιον, δογμα, ἴσον, μέγα—were ranked together as coordinate, or summed up as ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ
set over against the transitoriness of individual objects, τὰ τοῦτων (sc. τῶν εἰλθῶν) μετέχοντα. But in the concluding passage of Book VI, and in what follows it, there is a revelation of the unity and organization of knowledge, implying (1) that there is an order in the intellectual world, and (2) that there is a way upward and downward between intellect and sense: moreover that above knowledge, truth and being, there is the supreme domination of the good.

But the statement is in general terms, and no account is taken of the difficulties which are raised, without being solved, in the Parmenides. In the Theaetetus (185 C) it is clearly seen that Being, Unity, Number, likeness, difference and goodness (even when relative) are notions of a higher order than other generalizations of experience—they are birds that fly everywhere about the cage—and also that there are relations between them (Theaet. 186 B τὴν οὐσίαν...τῆς ἐναρτιότητος). The existence of such relations amongst the highest ideas (or primary forms of thought and being) is what the Stranger in the Sophistes undertakes to prove; and here the long-familiar words κοινωνία, μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνει, ἐνεών (also ξύμμεξις, ἐνοικεῖν, συνοικεῖν, δέξεσθαι, προσάπτεσθαι, περιτρέχειν, μετατίθεσθαι, μιξθῆναι, ἀρμότεροι, προσ- αρτάσθαι, συμφωνεῖν, σύμφυτον Ἐχειν) are again in frequent use. Even the dim form of Space in the Timaeus, the γενέσεως τιθήμη, is spoken of as εἰλθὸς τι...μεταλαμβάνον...πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ, and again as (εἰκόνα) οὐσίας ἄμως γέ πως ἄντεχομένη. At the same time the other metaphor of Pattern and Copy comes once more into service, not now, however, merely to express the relation of particular to universal, but to throw light upon another difficulty, the possibility

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1 Cp. Heracl. Fr. 69 (Bywater) ὰδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ἄυθὴ.
2 Theaet. 197 D : cp. Soph. 254 C.
3 See Soph. 216, 223, 228 A, 235 A, 238, 248, 249 A, 250 C, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 259; Polit. 309; Phil. 15 24, 37, 57, 60, 66.
4 Tim. 45 D, 51 A, 52 C: cp. ib. 64 D λύπη δὲ καὶ ἡδονής οὐ μετέχων. The simple words Ἐχειν, λαμβάνειν, κεκτήσεσθαι are often similarly used. So too μὴ στέρεσθαι Phileb. 67.
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of false opinion (ψευδὴς δόξα) and of falsity (ψευδὴς λόγος). And as the idea of predication becomes more distinct, other modes of expression of a more definite kind are introduced—πεπουθήναι Parm. 148 A, πάθος ἔχει Soph. 245 A, πάθημα πᾶσχει Soph. 245 B, συλλαβῇ Theaet. 202, συμπλοκῇ Theaet. 202 B, Soph. 262 C, 240 C, σύγκρασις Polit. 273 B, &c., Phil. 64 D, &c., κόσμος ἀσώματος Phil. 64 B.

§ 48. We are at present concerned not with Plato's philosophy, but with his use of Language. Else more might be said not only of his various modes of expression, but of the increasing clearness of his thoughts, and of an approach to system.

His expressions are various, because almost always figurative. Metaphorical language about philosophical notions is necessarily broken and inconsistent, and cannot without confusion be tested by a logical standard. Many phases of the Ideas occurred to Plato's mind. They are universals, realities, absolute, relative: they represent the most abstract and the most concrete notions: they are isolated, and also 'flying about' everywhere among objects: they are akin to numbers, though not the same with them. Plato does not attempt to harmonize all these different views; they are experimental conceptions of the Universal, which he gradually brings back more and more to what we term common sense,—to psychology and logic from a fanciful ontology. His language about them in the Phaedrus, Meno, Phaedo, is different from that which he uses in the Philebus and the Laws; or rather in the two latter dialogues the transcendental form of them has almost disappeared. If instead of dwelling on his use of terms we consider his thought and intention\(^1\), we find that in the dialectical dialogues and those which go with them (Tim., Critias, Laws), through grappling with the difficulties which his own theories have raised in relation to

\(^1\) τί... διανοημένοι εἶχε (Theaet. 184 A).
contemporary opinion, he is confronted more and more closely with the great central questions of all philosophy, the essence of thought, the meaning of the Universe, the conditions and possibilities of human improvement for the individual and for communities. The last word of Plato on the nature of Mind is hardly different from the language of Modern Philosophy. What can be more 'modern,' for example, than the definition of Thought in Soph. 265 D, E, or than several of the psychological distinctions in the Philebus?

Other terms having a metaphysical significance may be dismissed more briefly.

§ 49.

The word φύσις (after appearing once in Hom. Od. x. 303, for the 'virtues' of a drug) occurs in writers from Pindar to Aristophanes with various shades of meanings:—birth, growth, stature, native character or disposition, inherent power or capacity, as well as in the more general sense of that which is natural, or in accordance with experience, as opposed to what is artificial, acquired, conventional, or monstrous.

Herodotus II. 45 already has the idiomatic phrase φύσις εξελεύτησεν ἡ Ήρακλέει ... καὶ φύσιν εξελεύτησεν πολλὰς μυρίθας φονεύονται. Thucydides repeatedly speaks of 'human nature' (ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις I. 76, II. 50, III. 45, 84; see also III. 82, § 2 ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἰδίᾳ) and in V. 105, § 2 ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαλάς, he alludes to the inevitableness of 'natural law.'

Professor Burnet in his able work on Early Greek Philosophy argues with much force in favour of the thesis that 'the word which was used by the early cosmologists to express the idea of a permanent and primary substance was none other than φύσις, and that the title περὶ φύσεως so commonly given to philosophical works in the sixth and

1 Also in the Batrachomyomachia, in the sense of natural endowments.
fifth centuries B.C. does not mean "on the nature of things," —a far later use of the word,—but simply "concerning the primary substance"; and that 'in Greek philosophical language φύσις always means that which is primary, fundamental and persistent as opposed to that which is secondary, derivative and transient, what is given as opposed to what is made or becomes.'

The preciseness of this statement can hardly be borne out by quotations, but it may be accepted as an expression of the fact that the early philosophers in writing περὶ φύσεως had given to the word a new depth of meaning by choosing it as an expression for the uniformity of experience for which they sought to account. Hence κατὰ φύσιν, φύσει, παρὰ φύσιν, are phrases in common use. And the opposition of the natural to the conventional (φύσει το νόμῳ) was a common-place of sophistical disputation, Isocr. Panegyr. p. 62 d, § 121 (Bekker) φύσει πολίτας δυνα το νόμῳ τῆς πολιτείας ἄποστερείσθαι.

§ 50. In Plato the connotation of φύσις has not more fixity than that of other philosophical terms. The particular meaning is to be determined by the context in each case.

The following uses appear to be specially Platonic:—

1. Phaedo 103 c τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίου πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, ἐν δὲ δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει.

Here are three grades of reality 1, (1) the actual thing or object in which the idea is embodied (τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἐλθον), (2) the idea as so embodied or 'immanent' (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν), (3) the idea as self-existent, absolute, 'transcendent' (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει). Φύσις, therefore, in this passage is the sum of self-existences, the immutable nature of things.

Compare Rep. x. 597 B μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα, ἡν

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1 As in Parm. 133 d, quoted above, p. 313, note.
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φαίμεν δὲν, ὡς ἐγγύιαι, θεοῦ ἐργασάσθαι, ἦ. η. 501 Β πρὸς τε ἡ
φύσιν δικαίων ... καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνῳ αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

2. But elsewhere the supreme agency of Nature is
regarded as an heretical doctrine, opposed to the sovereignty
of Reason and of God. Soph. 265 C τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι ...
τῷ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῷ γενναίρ κατά τινος αὐτὴς αὐτομάτης καὶ
ἀνευ διανοιας φυσώσης. ‘Nature’ is here not Eternal Law,
but mere blind, unconscious energy, as opposed to Mind.
Cp. Laws X. 892 C φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ
tὰ πρῶτα, κ.τ.λ.¹

3. In Phaedr. 270 φύσις is an extremely comprehensive
word, including both worlds, the inward and the outward.
This appears from the allusions to Anaxagoras and
Hippocrates. Φύσις in this sense differs from οὐσία chiefly
in referring more distinctly to the parts which make up
the whole.

4. According to another mode of expression, the subject
of philosophy is not all nature but every nature, Theaet.
173 E, Polit. 272 C.

In so denoting single or particular natures, φύσις is
sometimes (a) the nature of the thing described, and some-
times (b) the thing itself as characterized, and the word
in this sense is applied equally to natural kinds and to
abstract notions.

(a) Rep. II. 359 B ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαίωσύνης ... ἀληθὴ²
(including both γένεσις and οὐσία, see context).

Phaedr. 245 E ἄθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ όφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινο-
μένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγου τοῦτον αὐτὸν τοῖς λέγον ὄν καὶ
αληθεύεται. πάν γὰρ σῶμα, ὃ μὲν ἐξωθεὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἰδρυχών,
.sendKeys δὲ ἐνδοθεὶν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἰδρυχών, ὃς ταύτης οὕσης φύσεως
ψυχῆς (sc. τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν).

¹ Plato here claims that if the study of nature is the study of primary
substances, it ought to begin with the study of mind, since mind is prior to
the elements. He tries to wrest from the natural philosophers their chief
catch-word—more openly and disputatiously than in the Phaedrus.

² The ‘Naturalist’ theory is in question, see περιοδέων: Rep. II. 358 E.
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Rep. vi. 493 c ἔν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φῶς, κ.τ.λ.
Ib. vii. 525 c ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φόσις.
Ib. x. 611 B μήτε γε αὖ τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φῶσι τοιοῦτον εἶναι
ψυχῆς.
Soph. 245 c, 258 B, C; Phil. 25 A, 44 E.

(6) In the following places the nature is identified with
the thing:—

Rep. ii. 359 C ὀ πᾶσα φῶσις (= 'every creature') διάκειν
πέρικεν ὡς ἀγαθόν.
Ib. iv. 429 D μίαν φῶσιν τῆν τῶν λευκῶν.
Ib. vi. 491 A ολαὶ οὐδεὶς φῶσις ψυχῶν.
Polit. 306 E.

§ 51. 5. There is a pleonastic use of φῶσις with a genitive, in
this latter sense, which, like other periphrases, occurs more
frequently in the later dialogues. But the Phaedrus affords
more than one example:—

Phaedr. 248 C ἡ . . . τοῦ πτεροῦ φῶσις.
Ib. 254 B τῆν τοῦ κάλλους φῶσιν.
Soph. 257 ἡ τῶν γενῶν φῶσις.
Ib. 257 C, D (bis) ἡ θατέρου φῶσις.
Polit. 257 D τῆν τοῦ προσώπου φῶσιν.
Phileb. 25 E τὴν ἵππιας φῶσιν.
Ib. 30 B τῆν τῶν καλλιστῶν καὶ τιμωτῶν φῶσιν.
Tim. 45 D τῆν τῶν βλεφάρων φῶσιν.
Ib. 74 D τῆν τῶν υἱήμων φῶσιν. Ib. 75 A τῆν τῶν λαχλῶν φῶσιν.
Ib. 84 C ἡ τοῦ μυελοῦ φῶσις.
(Cp. for similar periphrases ib. 75 A το τῆς γλώττης εἴδος,
70 C τῆς τοῦ πλεύμονος ἱδέαν.)

Laws VIII. 845 D τῆν ὅδας φῶσιν.
Ib. IX. 862 D τῆν τοῦ δικαίου φῶσιν.

The same use recurs in Aristotle. See Bonitz’ Index
Aristotelicus, p. 837 b.

6. Φῶσις is constantly used in the Republic in the
ordinary sense of natural disposition or capability (esp.
Apol. 22 B, C) as distinguished from the complete develop-
ment of mind or character:—
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III. 410 D τὸ θυμοειδὲς . . . τῆς φύσεως.
VI. 485 A τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν.

The great frequency of the term φύσις in Plato’s dialogues represents, what has too often been ignored, the experiential aspect of his philosophy.

(6) PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS.

As Plato’s philosophical language becomes (1) more § 52.
subjective and (2) more accurate, his use of words to signify mental states, processes, or faculties, becomes at once more frequent and more precise. It would be an error, however, even in his latest dialogues to look for consistency or finality. When it is found that the definition of δικαιοσύνη, obtained with so much labour in the Republic, is tacitly set aside in the Laws, and that the disjunctive-hypothetical method so energetically put forth in the Parmenides nowhere distinctly recurs, it need not surprise us that the significance of διάνοια in Theaet. 189 E, Soph. 265 D, E differs essentially from that assigned to the same word in Rep. VI. 511, or that αἰσθησις, δόξα, φαντασία, τέχνη, ἑπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία, can only be said to have an approximate fixity of meaning.

Αἰσθησις.

a. Any immediate perception, intuition or consciousness.

Charm. 158 E, 159 A δήλων γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ σοι πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ του ἐνοοῦσαν αὐτήν, εἰπερ ἐνεστιν, αἰσθησίν τινα παρέχειν, εἰς ἡς δόξα αὐτὴν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἶη, δὲ τι ἐστὶν ὁποῖον τι ἡ σωφροσύνη.

This is the ordinary meaning as exemplified in Antiphon, Herod. p. 134, § 44; Thuc. II. 50, 61; Eur. El. 290; Xen. Hell. v. 1, § 8; Anab. iv. 6, § 13.

Obs.—Euripides (Iph. Aul. 1243) already has αἴσθημα, which, though frequent in Aristotle, does not seem to occur in Plato. A special meaning = ‘scent’ as a hunting term occurs in Xen. Cyn. 3, § 5; cp. Rep. II. 375 λ.

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β. Sense-perception in general, as opposed to νῶσις, cognition, νόησις, intellection, λογισμός, reasoning: imperfectly distinguished from δόξα and φαντασία.

Without entering here on the discussion of Plato’s philosophy of sensation, it may be observed that a comparison of Phaedo 79, Phaedr. 249, 250, Rep. VII. 524, with Phileb. 33, 38, 43 A, B, Tim. 43 C, shows that the reasonings attributed to the disciples of Protagoras in the Theaetetus, though rejected as a definition of knowledge, exercise a decided influence on the evolution of Plato’s psychology.

γ. Special modes of sensation, including the five senses, with others not separately named.

Phaedo 65 D ἡ δειν πάντωτι τι τῶν τουτών τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶις εἶδες; Ὁδηγός, ἦ δ’ ὅσ. Ἀλλ’ ἄλλη τωι αἰσθήσις τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐξήγη αὐτῶν; Rep. VI. 507 E ἦ τοῦ ὄραν αἰσθήσις.


Thus the ἐναντία αἰσθήσεως of Rep. VII. 523 B, Soph. 266 C is an opposite impression of the same sense.

Obs.—Αἰσθητός in Men. 76 δ is said to be an expression in the manner of Gorgias: otherwise the word occurs first in Plato; and αἰσθητής, ἀπαί εἰρημένων in Theaet. 160 δ, appears to be invented on the spot. It is cited by Pollux as an unusual word.

§ 53. Ἀδεξα.

The opposition of δοκεῖν at once to εἶναι and ἐπίστασθαι leads to the association of δόξα as the lower faculty with αἰσθήσεις. For example in Rep. VI, VII, where the clearness of a faculty is said to be proportioned to the nature of its object, δόξα seems to be concerned with the shadows, i.e. the visible world; in Phaedo 96 it is an involuntary judgement resulting from sense and memory, and in the Phaedrus the unlucky charioteer regales his steeds with τροφῆ δόξασθη, because of his poverty in the ideas. But in
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Theaet., Soph., Phil., it becomes manifest that ὅξα is simply a judgement, given by the mind in answer to herself, which may or may not be coincident with an impression of sense, and may be either true or false. This is in accordance with the advance in psychological clearness which marks the dialectical dialogues.

In the earlier part of the Theaetetus, ὅξα φαντασία ἀλήθεια are very closely associated, although in such an expression as in 179 C τὸ παρὰ ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἀλήθειας καὶ ἂν κατὰ τάτας δόξαι γίγνονται, the distinction between ἀληθείας and ὅξα is accurately preserved (cp. Charm. 159 A quoted above). It is only after the discussion in pp. 184–190, however, that the definition of ὅξα as διανοιάς ἀποτελεύτης (Soph. 264 A) becomes possible. For it has now been clearly brought out that ὅξα, opinion or judgement, is an operation of the mind, silently predicaing one thing of another. Such predication or judgement may refer to any subject matter, but it may be false as well as true, and this gives occasion for the question, How is false opinion possible? See esp. Phileb. 37 C, D.

Opinion, so understood, is still distinguished from Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which is always true, although this opposition is not sufficiently accounted for by the definition of ἐπιστήμη as δόξα ἀλήθης μετὰ λόγου. Δόξα ἀλήθης holds a higher place in subsequent dialogues, Sophist, Philebus, Timaeus, than in the Republic, where it is condemned as ‘blind.’ Rep. vi. 506 C : cp. iv. 430 B.

For the vernacular crossing the specific meaning, see esp. vi. 490 A παρὰ ὅξαν . . . δοξαζόμενοι.

Obs.—The naturalness of the association of ὅξα with ἀλήθεια appears from the passage of the Charmides (159 A) above quoted. On the other hand, the constant use of δοκεῖ μοι in expressing a judgement of the mind, suggested the other meaning in which ὅξα is opposed to ἐπιστήμη. As the two meanings were not consciously distinguished, a confusion arose which helped to accentuate
Plato's view of the uncertainty and fallaciousness of sensation; to which, however, Philosophy had from the first been predisposed, as appears from well-known sayings of Heraclitus and Parmenides.

§ 54. Φαντασία.

Φαντασία is properly the noun of φαντάζεσθαι (Soph. 260 E, Rep. II. 382 E), but is treated in Theaet. 152 C, 161 E as the noun of φανέρωσθαι. In Soph. 264 A, B τὸ φανέρωσθαι is defined as δόξα μὲν' αἰσθήσεως or συμμεῖας αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξας. In Phileb. 39, however, there is a more elaborate description of imagination or presentation (Vorstellung). Opinion or judgement having been characterized under the figure of a scribe who writes down sentences in the mind, it is added that the scribe is corroborated by a painter, who illustrates what is written down. And the pictures of this artist may have reference to the past or future, and like the judgements which they accompany, they may be either false or true. The pleasures of Hope are thus accounted for. The word φαντασία does not occur in this passage. But it is obvious that the thing meant might be denoted by the term, and the mental images in question are spoken of as ζωγραφήματα (39 D) τὰ φαντάσματα ἐζωγραφημένα (40 A). In Rep. II. 382 E, where φαντάζεσθαι (380 D) has preceded, φαντασία are 'illusory apparitions.' The word carries a similar association in Soph. 260 E, &c.

The noun, although common (with its derivatives) in later writers, does not occur before the time of Plato.

§ 55. Διάνοια.

In the concluding passage of Rep. VI the word διάνοια acquires a specific meaning, to denote the faculty, or attitude of mind, intermediate between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, or between πλοῦς and νοῦς. This definition stands in close reference to the context in which it occurs, and it is observable that διάνοια in this exact sense is hardly to be found elsewhere in Plato. The definition appears to rest on a false etymology, viz. δια-νοια, 'mediate intellecction,'
'thinking through something,' as distinguished from pure intuition on the one hand and mere impressions on the other; because the abstract truths of mathematical science are studied through visible symbols (VI. 511 D ὡς μεταξὺ τὴν δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ, cp. VII. 533 D, E). The psychology of the Theaetetus supplies a more accurate explanation of the term, as＝‘mental discourse,’ passing between subject and predicate, or predicate and subject. This view of διάνοια recurs in the Sophistes (263 D). Διάνοια, so understood, is not above and beyond δόξα, but is the necessary preliminary to it; since the mind puts her questions before she answers them, and opinion, however seemingly instantaneous, is the consequence of thought. Thus δόξα rises in the scale, and διάνοια, as a subjective fact, is correctly analysed.

In the great majority of instances διάνοια (with its verb διανοεῖσθαι) is used in the ordinary Greek acceptations of (1) mental activity, (2) mind in act, (3) a particular thought or conception, (4) meaning, (5) intention.

§ 56.

*Εξίς.

*Εξίς, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν πως, is properly a state or condition whether bodily or mental. But the psychological use of this word also is affected in Plato by a false etymological association from the active use of ἔχω. The active use of Εξίς occurs in Rep. IV. 433 E ἦ τοῦ οἴκειον τε καὶ ξανθοῦ,*Εξίς τε καὶ πράξεως, Soph. 247 A δικαιοσύνης ἰσίου καὶ παρουσία, Theaet. 197 A ἐπιστήμης . . . ἰσίου. And it seems probable that in such passages as Phaedr. 268 E τῶν τῆς σῆν ἰσίου ἔχοντα, Rep. VI. 509 A τῆς τοῦ ἄγαθον ἰσίου, IX. 591 B ἐν ἡ παραθετέρα ἰσίου λαμβάνει, although the ordinary meaning of 'condition' is present, Plato has the other association in his mind. For the more familiar meaning, see esp. Phileb. 11 D ἰσίου παραθήκης καὶ διάθεσιν, κ.τ.λ.

Τέχνη—practical skill.

a. Skill as opposed to inexperience, Phaedo 89 E ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τάνθρωπεια.
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§ 57. Ἐπιστήμη.

As in other cases (above, p. 292 ff.) the philosophical is to be distinguished from the ordinary use.

a. (1) The proper note of Ἐπιστήμη, as distinguished from δόξα, is certainty (Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1115):—

Rep. v. 477 B Ἐπιστήμη ... ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γνώναι ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν.

(2) Hence in the specially Platonic sense, Ἐπιστήμη is distinguished from τέχνη as speculative from practical knowledge.

Rep. iv. 438 C Ἐπιστήμη ... αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ Ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν.

Parm. 134 A αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστιν Ἐπιστήμη, τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, αὐτής ἀν ἔκλειψ ἢ Ἐπιστήμη ... ἔκάστη δὲ ἀδ τῶν Ἐπιστημῶν ἢ ἔστιν, ἔκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἰ οὐ Ἐπιστήμη.

It is in this ideal sense that vain attempts are made in the Theaetetus to define Ἐπιστήμη. And this is the meaning of the word in Rep. vi. 508 E and similar places.
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β. The more ordinary use of the word, in which it is nearly equivalent to τέχνη, is sometimes guarded by the addition of the specific object:—

Rep. IV. 438 D ἐπειδὴ οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη ἔγένετο, διήγεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὡστε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθῆναι.

Or by some qualifying word such as λεγομένη. See Rep. VII. 533 D ὡς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσέπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέουται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἑναργειτέρου μὲν ἡ δόξης, ἀμυνοτέρου δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμης.

But this meaning of ἐπιστήμη also occurs without any qualification, especially in the plural, and quite as often in the later as in the earlier dialogues.

Rep. VII. 522 C φίλος τις προσχρώνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοια ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις.

Polit. 308 C τῶν συνθετικῶν ἐπιστημῶν: Phileb. 62 D.

The singular also appears in the sense of ‘practical skill’ (as in Thucydides, &c.).

Phaedr. 269 D προσλαβόν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην.

Gorg. 511 C ἡ τοῦ νεῶν ἐπιστήμη.

§ 58.

The abstract noun as well as the adjective φιλοσοφος occurs in Isocrates, but not elsewhere before Plato, although φιλοσοφεῖν was in ordinary use (Herod. I. 30, Thuc. II. 40).

a. Φιλοσοφία is defined in the Republic (v. 475 E ff.) as the love of the whole, (VI. 486 A) θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνον, πάσης δὲ οὐνομασίας, and is elsewhere (Sophist. 253 E) identified with διαλεκτική.

β. But the word is also used in the more ordinary sense of ‘mental culture,’ ‘scientific pursuit’:—

Theaet. 143 D γεωμετρεῖν ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν.

Tim. 88 C μουσική καὶ πάση φιλοσοφία προσχρώμενον.

In Theaet. 172 C οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον δια-τρίψαντες, the plural seems to include Theodorus as a man of scientific culture.
§ 59. θυμός, τὸ θυμοειδὲς.

A tripartite division of ψυχή appears in the Phaedrus-myth (Phaedr. 246 foll.), in Rep. IV. 435 foll., IX. 580 foll., and in Tim. 70. On the other hand in Rep. X. 612 a doubt is expressed whether the Soul in her true nature be divisible at all, and in Phaedo 80 B, C pure Soul is akin to the μονοειδὲς. In the Timaeus θυμός, or resentment, is expressly said to belong to the lower and mortal part, or aspect, of the Soul. But the function assigned to it is much the same as in Rep. IV. In Rep. IX. 1. c., this part of the soul is more exactly described as φιλότιμον, and in the same passage the love of honour is resolved into the love of power. In the imagery which follows, the θυμοειδὲς is further analysed into the nobler and meaner forms of anger, the "lion" being reinforced with a crawling serpent brood: IX. 590 B τὸ λεοντιδές τε καὶ ὀφεώδες.

The conception mythically expressed in the Phaedrus is less distinct, and though closely akin to the psychology of the Republic and Timaeus, is not precisely the same. The white horse yoked to the winged chariot is altogether of a noble strain (καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων), "a lover of honour, with temperance and chastity," a comrade of right thinking, obedient to the voice of Reason." He thus corresponds rather to the ideal in conformity with which the θυμοειδὲς is to be trained than to the θυμοειδὲς as such. Nor is the nobler steed entrusted with control over his

1 Tim. 70 A τὸ μετέχων ὁς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνδρίας καὶ θυμοῦ, φιλόνεικον δὲ, κατάφειαν ἀγαθὸν τῆς κεφαλῆς . . . ἵνα τοῦ λόγου κατήκος αὐν κοινῇ μετ' ἑαυτοῦ βιά τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν κατήκοι γένος, ὥστε τῆς ἀριστοκράτειας τῷ ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ μηδαιμών πείθουσα ἐκὸν ἑβδο. τὴν δὲ δὴ καρδίαν . . . εἰς τὴν δορυφορικὴν ὁμοθυμον κατάστησαν.

2 Shakespeare, Macbeth ii. 1:

Macbeth. 'When 'tis,
      It shall make honour for you,'
Banquo. 'So I lose none
In seeking to augment it, but still keep
      My bosom franchis’d and allegiance clear,
      I shall be counsell’d.'
baser yoke-fellow. His work is done if he run his own course obediently.

It is probable that in the partition of the Soul in the Republic, Plato has not forgotten the Phaedrus. But he has also in mind the special requirements (practical as well as speculative) of the work in hand, and in particular the close analogy between individual and state, and the position of ἄνδρεια amongst the cardinal (civic) virtues.

Now θυμοειδῆς, 'spirited,' is applied by Xenophon to a high-bred horse, such as that which symbolized the nobler passions in the Phaedrus—the word does not occur in earlier Greek: and θυμός is the crude form of ἄνδρεια. ἄνδρεια is the virtue of the guardians, who are φίλακες τῶν τε ἐκτὸς πολεμίων καὶ τῶν ἐντὸς φιλίων, and τὸ θυμοειδὲς is now formulated as the corresponding part of the individual Soul.

(c) Dialectical Terms. § 60.

No terms in Plato so nearly attain the fixity of technical use as those which bear on method, such for example as συνάγειν, 'generalize,' διαφεύγειν, 'distinguish,' λαμβάνειν, 'apprehend,' διαλαμβάνειν, 'divide,' ἀπολαμβάνειν, 'specify,' μετείναι, 'treat,' μέθοδος, 'treatment.' This is most apparent in dialogues which represent the conversation of Socrates with his disciples—as in the Phaedo, Republic and Philebus. See Rep. vii. 532 D where Glaucon says, οὐ γάρ ἐν τῷ ὅν παράντι μόνον ἀκουστέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὖθις πολλὰς ἐπανυπέλ.

Διαλεκτική—Διαλέγεσθαι—Διάλεκτος.

Διάλεκτος is rational conversation, with associations derived from the practice of Socrates, and is opposed to barren disputation:—Rep. v. 454 A ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρόμενοι. Hence ἡ διαλεκτική (sc. τέχνη, s. μέθοδος) is the Platonic ideal of method. But the connotation of the term inevitably varies with the shifting aspects of that ideal.
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Meno 75 D εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἶ ἣ καὶ ἐρωτικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρῶμενος, εἰπομι’ ἀν αὐτῷ . . . κ.τ.λ., εἰ δὲ ὄσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν φιλοί δυτε βούλουμεν ἀλλήλους διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πρασίτερον πως καὶ διαλεκτικότερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

In the sequel it is explained that a dialectical answer is one having a true relation to the respondent’s previous admissions.

The word therefore has no reference here to any assumption of supra-sensual εἶδη, but only to that living intercourse of mind with mind, which was the secret of Socrates 1. In the Phaedrus διαλεκτική is again associated with the same vivid reciprocity of thoughts. But both the Socratic method and its intellectual aim are now viewed under the glow of Platonic idealism at its most fervent heat, and the διαλεκτικός is now the master of knowledge that is at once comprehensive and distinct, seeing as one what is a whole in Nature, as different, what Nature parts asunder; overtaking the subtleties of reality with the movement of mind — his thought adequately grasping and following the Nature of things, at once in their infinity and unity. Thus he realizes the privilege which belongs at birth to every soul which takes the form of man: δεῖ γὰρ ἄθρωπων ἔννεπεν κατ’ εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ὧν 2 αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ἔννοιαφορώμενον. τότε δὲ ἔστιν ἀνάμμησις ἐκείνων, δ’ όποτε εἶδος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἄ νῦν εἶναι φάμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ δὲ δυτικος. διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη περεύται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια: πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνους δεὶ ἐστὶ μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἶσπερ θέος τὸν θείός ἐστι. These latter words are of course taken from the myth (249 c), but in the later portion of the same dialogue (266 B, &c.) the method referred to, if not exactly formulated, is more precisely indicated. True eloquence, it is

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1 So in the Theaetetus Protagoras is made to claim fairness from a dialectical respondent. Theaet. 167 ε χωρὶς μὲν ὄς ἀγωνιζόμενος . . . χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος. Cp. also Crat. 390 c for the simpler meaning.

2 W. H. Thompson conjectured ὤντι'.
there said, must be based on a scientific estimate of the human mind and of truth in all its aspects, and also of the mutual relations between these and various minds. This science is compared to that of Hippocrates, whose medical practice was based on profound study of the human body. Such an ideal, though vaguely sketched, is by no means severed from experience. Its unattainableness, indeed, lies rather in the infinity of nature than in the abstractedness of knowledge. In the Republic, on the other hand, the allegory of the cave and the ladder of the sciences carry off the mind into a region where actual experience seems of little account, and philosophic thought is imagined as moving among pure ἐϊδος,—εἰδεσιν ἀδρόθε ἀδρόθε εἰς αὐτά. Yet here also, while the dualism is more evident, it is hard to tell how much is allegorical. For Socrates maintains that the philosopher, who has been trained in dialectic, will be no whit behind his fellow-citizens in practical wisdom, but on the contrary will be infinitely more capable, with equal opportunities, of dealing with any actual emergency 1.

Συναγεγραφη—συναγεγραφη

§ 61.

The most pervading note of διαλεκτική, and this appears both in the Republic and the Phaedrus, is comprehensiveness accompanied with clearness.

VII. 537 C ὁ ... γὰρ συνοπτικός διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὐ. Cp. Tim. 83 C, where Socrates admires the man who gave the name of χολή to phenomena so diversified as those to which it is applied. This is again insisted on in Soph. 253 C, D—esp. in the words ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατός δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ... πάντη διατεταμένη ἰκανὸς διαποθάνωσι—another locus classicus on the subject. By this time, however, the questions turning on predication have come to the front,

1 In the Republic Socrates refuses to define διαλεκτική: but he describes it thus—ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὴν καλεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου ἀρμόδιου τῆς ὁδος; This follows a passage in praise of διαλεκτική in the light of the account of the mental faculties in Book vi.
and the method indicated is one of logical determination, according to the real participation of things in ideas, and of ideas or kinds in one another: τοῦτο δ’ ἐστιν, ἣ τε κοινωνεῖν ἑκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μὴ, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπιστασθαι. In the Politicus again, and also in the Philebus, the notion of method becomes still more concrete, involving not merely relation but proportion—τὸ μέτριον, μικτὴ φύσις, μέτρον. An increasing sense of the complexity of the world makes more apparent the hindrances to adequacy of method. At the same time dialectical improvement, the preparation and sharpening of the instrument, is prized apart from the immediate results. The notion of adapting logical weapons to the subject to be attacked is curiously expressed in Philebus 23 B φαίνεται δειν ἄλλης μηχανῆς ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον οἷον θλή ἕξειν ἄτερα τῶν ἐμπροσθεν λόγων ἐστι δὲ ἦσως ἐνια καὶ ταύτα. And the conception of science, without losing the associations originally suggested by the conversations of Socrates, now includes not only the ascertainment of differences, but of finite differences, not only the one and many, but the ‘how many,’ Phil. 16 D.

Plato’s ‘dialectic,’ then, is not merely an ideal method, but the ideal of a method, which at best is only approximately realized\(^1\), and presents different aspects according to the scope and spirit of particular dialogues. It is a conception which grows with the growth of Plato’s thoughts. In the Protagoras and Gorgias it is contrasted with popular rhetoric—the one exact and truthful, the other loose and careless of the truth; in other places to ἐριστική (ἀντιλογική, ἀγωνιστική). Its end is neither persuasion nor refutation, but the attainment and communication of truth, of which the tests are universality and certainty.

\(^{62}\) Ἐριστική.

The marks of ἀντιλογική or ἐριστική also vary with the stages of Platonism\(^2\); but that which is most pervading,

\(^1\) Theaet. 196 ε, Rep. iv. 435 c.

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and which comes out most clearly where Plato’s own philosophy is ripest, is the crudeness of affirmation and negation, the root fallacy of confounding dictum simpliciter with dictum secundum quid.

Διαίρεσις: διαιρεῖν, διαιρεῖσθαι, διαλαμβάνειν, διακρίνειν, τέμνειν, § 63.
μέρος, μόριον, τμήμα, τομή, διαφυή.

While διαιρεῖν or διαιρεῖσθαι is the term most commonly used for logical division, and μέρος for the result, it is observable that in the later dialogues, where classification becomes more frequent, the expression is varied, some other word from the list given above being used instead.

Obs. 1.—‘Διαλόγιον has two meanings, (1) admitting no further division, (2) true without qualification or distinction. (Gorg. 503 λ, Phaedr. 244 λ.)

Obs. 2.—‘Ἀπολαμβάνειν is to ‘specify,’ and for this ἀπονέμεσθαι is used in Polit. 276 δ and elsewhere.

The aor. participle ἀπολαβόν is used absolutely in Rep. iv. 420 c τὴν εὐθαμων πλάτωμεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες.

Cp. ἀπομερίζω, ἀποχωρίζω.

λαμβάνειν.

The simple λαμβάνειν has also a special use, nearly= ὑπολαμβάνειν, ‘to conceive,’ or ‘formulate,’ sometimes with the addition of λόγῳ.

Phaedr. 246 D τὴν ... αἰτίαν ... λάβωμεν.
Rep. VIII. 559 A ἑν τόπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς.
Ion 532 E λάβωμεν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ.
Rep. VI. 496 D ταύτα πάντα λογισμοῖ λαβών.
Rep. VII. 533 B οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν ἄμφισβητήσει λέγονσιν, ὅπε αὐτοῦ γε ἐκάστου πέρι, ὅ ἐστιν ἐκάστου, ἀλλὰ τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὑδῷ περὶ παυτὸς λαμβάνειν.

Phileb. 50 D λαβώντα ... τούτῳ παρὰ σαυτῷ.

Ὑπόθεσιν, ὑποτιθεθήσθαι.

§ 65.

‘Ὑπόθεσις in Plato is ‘an assumption,’ adopted as a basis of reasoning, either (a) dogmatic, or (β) provisional. Cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 6, § 13.
On Plato's use of Language.

a. Theaet. 183 B ὃς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὖκ ἔχωσι βήματα, viz. the dogmatic assumption that all is motion: Soph. 244 C τῷ ταύτῃ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ, the doctrine of ἐν τοῖς πάν.

β. Meno 86 E ἐξ ὑποθέσεως...σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐστι διδακτῶν ἐστιν ἐστι ὑπωσόν. Here the nature of such hypothetical reasoning is illustrated by a geometrical example: 'If the figure applied to the base of the triangle is similar to it, then one thing follows, but not otherwise' ☐. In this sense the word is used with reference to the Zenonian dialectic, of the proposition which is subjected to the indirect proof that it is untenable.

Accordingly, in Socratic reasoning, which proceeds by testing successive assumptions with negative examples, each proposed definition, while it maintains its ground, is called the ὑπόθεσις.

Euthyphr. 11 C νῦν δὲ, σαι γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν.

Phaedo 107 B οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη, ὡς Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταύτα τε εὖ λέγεις (Simmias has just spoken of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man), καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσίν, δῶς ἐπισκεπτεῖαι σαφέστερον' καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἴκανῶς διέλθη, ... ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' οὖν δυνατὸν μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπικολούθησαι' καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ σαφές γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητησεῖς περαιτέρω.

We may remember that it is the same Simmias, who earlier in the dialogue (85 D) puts forth the touching image of a raft, to represent the provisional nature of every human theory, in the absence of a divine, or superhuman, principle.

Now of these primary hypotheses, or first premisses, one of the chief is clearly that notion of true causes insisted on in Phaedo 100 B, 101 D, as the outcome of the procedure of Socrates, viz. that each thing is what it is by participation (μετάχεσις) in the idea. 'All other modes of causation you will leave, says Socrates, to those who are cleverer than you.
are. Fearing, as the proverb says, your own shadow, you will hold on to that sure ground of the assumption (τῆς ὑπόθεσεως). And if any one attacks you there, you will not answer him until you have tested all the consequences of the hypothesis itself. And if in the end you have to examine the grounds of your assumption, you will do so by a similar process, having framed a new and higher hypothesis, by the best lights you have, and so on until you reach a satisfactory result. But you will not, as the eristics do, confuse in argument the principle with its consequences; that is not the way to discover truth.’

Here the ἀρχή is the same with the ὑπόθεσις. It is therefore somewhat startling to find in Rep. vi. 511 C this very identification (αὐτὶς ὑπόθεσεις ἄρχαι) made a ground of objection to the actual condition of the sciences. It will be said that this applies only to the mathematical sciences, and to them only in so far as they work through visible symbols, but this view is inconsistent with VII. 517 D; see the notes.

The apparent discrepancy arises out of what may be termed the overweening intellectualism of this part of the Republic, the same temper which prompts the notion of an astronomy without observations, and a science of harmony independent of sound. Plato is aware that he is setting forth an impossible ideal, but for the education of his ‘airy burghers,’ nothing short of the absolute will satisfy him. Allowing for this difference of spirit, the two passages just quoted from the Phaedo, for the very reason that they are less aspiring, throw light on the description of the true method in Rep. VII. 533 C ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταῦτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑπόθεσεις ἀναρίθμητα ἐπ’ αὐτῇ τῆν ἄρχην, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, and the corresponding passage in VI. 511. For example, though it is by no means clear that by the ἱκανὸν τι of Phaedo 101 D, Plato means the same thing with the ἀνυπόθετον or the ἱδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, yet the description of the progress from the lower to the higher hypothesis is
parallel to the ladder of ideas in VI. 511 B τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ δυν. ὑποθέσεις, οἶνον ἐπίβασεις τε καὶ ὀρμᾶς, ὥσα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ πᾶντος ἀρχήν ἱδών, κ.τ.λ. The contrast between arguing about principles and their consequences also corresponds to this upward and downward way. And the words in Phaedo 107 B ἐὰν αὐτὰς (τὰς ὑποθέσεις) ἱκανῶς διέλθητε . . . ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ’ ὅσον δυνατῶν μάλιστ’ ἀνθρώπων ἑπακολουθήσαι, further illustrate the notion of a 'higher analytic,' which in both dialogues is imperfectly shadowed forth: while the ultimate cause in the Phaedo 98 A, 99 C the 'reason of the best,' is a conception not far removed from the Idea of Good. It becomes apparent, when the whole tenour of these kindred passages is considered, that what Plato censures in the actual methods of 'Science' is not the use of assumptions, but the habit of regarding them as fixed and self-evident, VII. 533 C ἵως ἄν ὑποθέσεις χρωμέναι ταῦτας ἀκαθήτους ἐδοκι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν.

Obs.—The simple τιθέμαι (sometimes τιθεωθαι)—in frequent use—is to 'posit' or 'assume,' not necessarily as the first step in an argument. Theaet. 190 A δάκων ταύτης τιθεμαι αὐτης.

§ 66. ἐν καὶ πολλά—στοιχείων.

It is clear from the classical passage of the Philebus 16 ff., that 'one and many' had become a recognized formula in the Platonic school. But it is also clear from the passage itself, especially when other places are compared, that the formula had different meanings and applications. (a) Single objects have many attributes. (β) Many individuals 'partake' in common of one ἴδεα: the ἴδος is therefore one and many. (γ) Ideas themselves are complex, and variously correlated, yet many are bound in one under some higher notion, all partake of number and being, and Being is itself absorbed in the Good.

It is characteristic of Plato's later theory, that in the
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Philebus he not only dwells on this last aspect of the truth, but also speaks of it as a πάθος τῶν λόγων... παρ’ ἡμῖν, ‘an affection or attribute of human discourse.’ This point of view is all the more significant, when it is remembered that the discussions in the Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Sophist have intervened.

α. The first and simplest aspect of the ‘one and many’ § 67. appears in Plato, (1) as a Zenonian or Heraclitean paradox, (2) as a proof of the necessity of the Idea.

(1) Phileb. 14 C διαν τις ἐμὲ φή... ἀνα γεγονότα φότει, πολλάς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμέ, κ.τ.λ., τιθέμενος.

Parm. 129 C el δ' ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει δυτα καὶ πολλά, κ.τ.λ.

Theaet. 157 B τῶν εἶναι τιμα, ἀλλ’ οὐχί τούς, καὶ τούτους γεγομένους ἀπείρους, ἐντεπε ἀνομοίωσις γίγνεται.

In the Protagorean theory, as the mind is a bundle or succession of momentary impressions, each substance is a bundle or aggregate of transient attributes or presentations, Theaet. 157 B, C φ' δὴ ἀνθρώπων τε τίθενται καὶ λίθων καὶ ἐκαστον ζητῶν τε καὶ εἴδος.

(2) In Rep. vii. 523 it is shown by an example how the mind passes through the consciousness of diversity to the perception of unity. The finger is both rough and smooth; this awakens thought to the existence of roughness and smoothness, each as one several thing, and of their opposition as a reality. This is the psychological counterpart of many other passages where the diversities of sense are made the ground for assuming abstract unities.

β. One idea or form is shared by many objects. Beauty § 68. is one, the beautiful are many, &c. This point of view, with the difficulties attending it has been already discussed (above, p. 309 ff.; Μέθεξις, &c.). It may be called the formula of crude realism.

γ. The problem of solving these difficulties emerges together with the third and highest aspect of the ἐν καὶ πολλά in the dialectical dialogues. It is now that, as we have seen, clearer views of predication, a more subjective
point of view, and a higher comprehension of the ideas as
forms of thought, of their interrelation and sequence, lead
the way towards a rational metaphysic and psychology.
The result is a scheme of thought, or as Plato himself
terms it, a κόσμος τις ἀσώματος (Philebus 64 B), which is
indeed empty of content, but has no insignificant bearing
on the after progress of the Sciences.

In Theact. 202, Plato deals tentatively with this later
phase of the question through the contrast of στοιχείων and
συλλαβῆς. Here συλλαβῆς is the complex idea, which is itself
resolved into a higher unity—e.g. the harmony of treble
and bass notes, or the art of music as comprising various
harmonies.

But in Polit. 278 B–D 1, as well as in Rep. III. 402 A–C,
the στοιχείων is the idea, while the συλλαβῆς is the combi-
nation of ideas in fact. Thus justice is justice, whether
in commerce, war, judicial pleadings, or any other of the
varied circumstances of human society.

§ 69. παράδειγμα.

παράδειγμα has two very different meanings in Plato,
one of which has been already discussed (above, p. 310 ff.).
The artist copies from a pattern (1); the merchant, for
convenience sake, carries about (2) examples of his wares
(δείγματα Phaedo 110 B). The latter would seem to be the
figure implied in the logical use of παράδειγμα for the illus-
tration of one species by another of the same genus, the
complex by the simple, the obscure by the familiar, the
unknown by the known. A full account of this mode of
argument is given by the Eleatic Stranger in Polit. 277 D ff.
218 D.

For other ‘dialectical’ terms, expressing various aspects
of predication, such as προσαγορεῦω, προσάπτω, προστίθημι,

1 This passage is a good example of the concrete mode of conception
which belongs to Plato's later style.
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προσαμότος, σωμπλέκειν, ὄνομα, βῆμα, πρόσημα, φάσις, ἀπό-φασις, see the Lexica.

The wide gap which separates Plato's use of philosophical terms from Aristotle's may be briefly instanced in the case of (1) ὁνήμα, (2) διαλεκτική, and (3) συλλογισμός.

(1) The chapter of Aristotle's Metaphysics, IV. 8, in which various meanings of ὁνήμα both as substance and essence are distinguished, would hardly have been intelligible to Plato, although between the transcendent Being of Rep. VI, and the μικτή ὁνήμα of Phil. 27 B, a long step has been made towards the conception of concrete existence.

(2) Διαλεκτική in Aristotle is intermediate between philosophy and common sense, a sort of tentative philosophizing which falls short of certainty—Met. III. 2, § 20 ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ἅν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική. To Plato, as we know, the same term represented the highest reach of philosophic method.

(3) The word συλλογισμός occurs only once in Plato, Theaet. 186 D, where it is used quite simply, much as ἀναλογίσματα (ib. supr. c), to express the action of the mind in forming judgements from impressions of sense. The verb συλλογίζεσθαι, 'to reason,' 'collect,' 'infer,' is not infrequent, but is also used quite simply, as it might occur in ordinary discourse:—

Rep. VII. 531 D καὶ συλλογισθῇ ταῦτα ἐστὶν ἄλληλος οἰκεία, 'and these things are reasoned of from that general point of view in which they are mutually akin.'

Ib. 516 B μετὰ ταῦτα ἀν ἢδη συλλογίζομεν περὶ αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ., 'in the next place he would proceed to infer that it is the Sun who,' &c.

How far such uses are removed from the Aristotelian doctrine of the Syllogism appears on comparing any one of numberless passages:
On Plato's use of Language.

Rhetor. I. 2, § 8 ἀνάγκη συλλογιζόμενον ἢ ἐπάγοντα δεικνύναι δι᾽ ὅτι οὖν.

Analyt. Pr. I. 1, § 6 συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν τινῶν ἐτερών τιῶν κειμένων εἰς ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.

Met. IV. 3, § 3 συλλογισμὸς οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκ τῶν τριῶν δι᾽ ἐνὸς μέσου.

Analyt. Pr. I. 7, § 4 ἐστὶν ἀναγαγόντα πάντα τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἰς τὸν ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ σχήματι καθόλου συλλογισμοῦς.

See also esp. Soph. Elench. c. 33 sub fin.

But it is observable that even in Aristotle both verb and noun occur elsewhere in the ordinary Greek sense. See Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s. vv.
## INDEX TO VOL. II.

### I. ENGLISH.

Conventions: Str. = Structure; R. = Relation to other dialogues; Ess. = Essay; Exc. = Excursus on Essay on Structure; T. = Text; App. = Appendices to Essay on Text; St. = Style; Syn. = Syntax; D. = Diction.

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