THE THEAETETUS OF PLATO

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THE THEAETETUS

OF

PLATO

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES

BY

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IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS

SECOND EDITION

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TO

EDMUND LAW LUSHINGTON,

EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,

THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S THEÆTETUS

IS ONCE MORE GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED.

L. C.

January, 1883.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Since the first edition of this work was published in 1861, there have been several important additions to Platonic literature in England. Mr. Grote's book on Plato and the other companions of Socrates appeared in 1865; Professor Jowett's translation, with the analyses and introductions, in 1871 (the second edition in 1875). These great and monumental works had been preceded by the less important effort of Dr. Whewell, who, in 1861, attempted, not without success, to popularize the dialogues in part, and to assert their educational value. Of critical editions, Riddell's Apology, with the valuable Digest of Idioms, was published in 1867 (after the author's death), Dr. Thompson's Phædrus in 1868, his Gorgias in 1871, and the edition of the Sophistes and Politicus, which forms the continuation of this Theætetus, came out in 1867. An edition of the Parmenides, by Professor Maguire, published at Dublin in 1882, is remarkable for clearness of arrangement, and also for a point of view which I venture to think more idealistic than Plato's
own. Mr. F. A. Paley published a translation of the Theætetus, with some notes, in 1875. The recent edition of this dialogue by Professor Kennedy of Cambridge is also accompanied with a translation.

Mr. Grote’s intensely real conception of Hellenic, and especially of Athenian life, his personal interest in the Sophists and in Socrates, have enabled him to throw a powerful cross-light on Plato, bringing out some features which would otherwise have remained in shadow. His intellectual sympathy with Protagoras in particular gives great piquancy to his analysis of the Theætetus. But his steadfast utilitarian point of view has made it hard for him to do real justice to Plato’s meaning here. No part of Mr. Grote’s singular exposition is more paradoxical, or has called forth more criticism, than his account of this dialogue. Mr. Cope’s just and clear rejoinder may be alluded to in passing; and an article in the Edinburgh Review for October, 1865, which contains a powerful refutation of Mr. Grote’s ‘theory of Knowledge,’ is the more noteworthy, as it is known to have been written by his friend and fellow-disciple Mr. John Stuart Mill, who, although not a Platonist in philosophy, was a warm admirer of Plato. An excerpt from the Quarterly Review for January, 1866, on the same subject, is reprinted, with Mr. Murray’s permission, as an Appendix to the present volume.
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Several interesting papers on Plato have appeared in the Journal of Philology, of which those by Mr. Henry Jackson, 'On Plato's later theory of Ideas,' are the most recent and in some ways the most important.

It is needless to refer at length to the many works on Plato which have appeared in other countries since 1861. Of books dealing generally in a critical spirit with the whole body of the dialogues, that of Schaarschmidt (1866), of which more will be said presently, is probably the most remarkable. The voluminous work of Peipers (1874) deals so far principally with the Theætetus. His exposition is learned and thoughtful, but is only occasionally referred to in this volume. On the other hand, I have made constant use, in revising my notes, of three important helps to the study of the Theætetus which have appeared in recent years:—the critical and exegetical commentaries of Hermann Schmidt (1877), the revision of Stallbaum's edition (in the case of the Theætetus amounting to a new edition) by Wohlrab (1869), and the critical edition of Martinus Schanz (1880), who has in many ways done good service to the text of Plato.

It has been no small satisfaction to me to find that many of the views advanced in my former edition have been since endorsed by writers of so
much authority. To H. Schmidt, especially, my acknowledgments are due for the close attention which he has given to my observations, and for the subtlety and acuteness which he has often expended in examining them.

A full *apparatus criticus* has never formed part of the plan of this edition. But in the year 1856, being still at Oxford, and having undertaken to edit the Theætetus, I collated the dialogue in the Bodleian MS. with the Zurich edition of 1839, and with Gaisford’s collation in his *Lectiones Platonicae* (1820). Bekker in his *Commentaria Critica* (1823) had written with reference to this work of the Oxford Professor of Greek:—‘Cogat agmen, quem solum non ipse exploravi, (24) codex Clarkianus. Eius enim causa Oxonium profectus cum Thomæ Gaisfordi lectiones Platonicas prelo paratas invenisset, nolui actum agere, totumque viri diligentissimi libellum in mea commentaria ita recepi, ut quæ ad sententiam, ad syntaxin, ad flexionem quoquo modo pertinentem, transcriberem omnia, quæ orthographica essent, ea fere speciminis loco semel atque iterum posita deinde omitterem.’ Bekker’s confidence in Gaisford’s accuracy was sufficiently well-grounded, but finality in dealing with MSS. is not soon reached, and I was able in several places to correct or supplement Gaisford’s report. To place on record every *ν ἐφελκυστικόν*, every accent
or breathing supplied by a later hand, was no part of my intention, nor has it yet been done. Any one who turns from the Theætetus in the MS. to the Sophist, Politicus, or Parmenides, which have been much less read, and are therefore more nearly as the scribe left them, will see at once how many accents in particular must have been added by later hands.

I left Oxford in 1858, and was therefore unable, at the time of bringing out my edition in 1861, personally to verify my notes. I might else have avoided one somewhat serious error, viz. that of printing ἐπὶ τοῦ instead of ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ, as the Bodleian reading in 153 B. How easily such an error might arise under the circumstances may be illustrated by a simple instance. Dindorf’s critical note on ΟEd. Tyr. 11, at least in the editions of 1861 and 1868, is as follows:—‘στεφεκαντες pro στεπκαντες a m. rec.’ This is the reverse of the fact, and M. Schanz may perhaps conjecture that Dübner, who collated for Dindorf, ‘merely inspected’ the Medicean MS. But it must be evident to a candid mind,—to borrow for a moment the language of constructive criticism,—that Dübner wrote στεφκαντες pr.: στεκαντες a m. rec., and that Dindorf misread Dübner’s note.

Schanz collated the MS. in 1870, and having tested his work on this dialogue I can bear witness to its great accuracy. He tells us that he went on
the principle of registering everything, however slight. Yet even a Schanz is compelled to place limits to minutiae. Not only are there still many changes of accent unregistered, not only is the resolution of \( \sigma, \omega \), etc., by correctors unobserved in places where it affects the reading, but the distinction between early and late corrections (b and recens b) is by no means completely noted. Also, if Schanz were supposed to have transcribed everything however slight, it might be inferred that the MS. was not punctuated. Now the Bodleian MS. as it stands has three distinct sorts of punctuation:—1. the double colon, by which in this, as in other MSS. of Plato, the speeches of the different interlocutors are kept apart. These divisions are right in some places where the earlier editors went wrong. 2. The colon, often marking even insignificant pauses. This, as well as the mark of a new speaker, has been generally inserted by the first hand. 3. The comma, frequently added by an early diorthotes so as to indicate a slight break in the sentence. This sometimes amounts to an interpretation. The same hand has often added a comma beneath the double colon, thus; where the preceding sentence is interrogative. These three marks—in different degrees certainly, and none of them in a significant degree, but still appreciably,—form part of the traditional deposit which the MS. contains. None of them, least of all the first,
should be ignored by those who undertake to register every difference however apparently unimportant.

Having perused the MS. side by side with Schanz’s edition, I may be permitted to register a few points (certainly of the very slightest moment) where his observation seems to have been at fault.

N.B.—The references are to Schanz’s edition of the Theaetetus, published at Leipzig in 1880.

Schanz, page 1, line 5. ποῦ μήν; Here as below p. 2, l. 9, b has added τ for τερψίων, which was however unnecessary, as the double colon (:) marks the new persons—hence τ is not continued.

2. 9. ‘καὶ...εἰπεν Terpsioni tribuit b.’ This is not true in the sense that B had omitted to distinguish the persons with the colon (:) ; τ is added, as before, εκ περιουσίας.

2. 15. ἐπιφυροθούμην BT, corr. bt. ἀοτέ BT (so also in 15, l. 22 μητέ).

3. 6. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἃν σε, καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἃν ἡράτων interp. B vel b.

4. 11. εὐδοκήμων Tb. (rec.): εὐδόκημων B.

10. 35. ‘ἀτόκοις BT, sed κ ex emend. B.’ The correction is by a recent hand. The note should run therefore ἀτόκοις b rec. T: ἀτόκοις B et apogr. V.’

12. 22. Post γεγονὸς commate distinxit b vetus.

12. 26. Post ἐναργεῖς distinguist B.

13. 29. ἀφαρώμαι bt: ἀφαρώμαι BT.

16. 23. ‘ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ revera B.’ This is so, but ἐπιτοπολὸ b should be added.

17. 8. τὸν κολοφώνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσῆν σειράν ὃς sic distinxit b.
19. 7. ἔγωγε is written in space of fewer letters by first hand. The former word was oxytone: qy. ἔγω?
20. 9. 'θαύμαντος BT, sed ν in ras. B.' Imo ν erasit b.
22. 1. διονυσίων (in the note) is an obvious misprint.
23. 16. ἰπερ (accent uncertain) B: ἰπερ b.
24. 15. Post ὑπαιρ distinguuit B.
27. 4. 'τε add. T. om. B.' It should be observed that ἐμὲ is at the end of a line (ἐμὲ | των).
27. 16, 17. 16. 'οὐ' ἄλλον λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέου om. BD, add. bd. 17. ἀποδεκτέου T: ἀπολεκτέου B. This is not quite accurate. The note should run οὐ | τάντας λέκτων B: Litteras τ'αντώι erasit, τ'αντώι λέκτων, οὔτ' ἄλλον λέγουν in margne sinistra supplevit, τός ἀπὸ in rasura scripsit, λ in δ mutavit, b. (The vox nihilis ἀπολεκτέου was never written.)
28. 14. τίσων B: the corrector erased the stroke which made the τ, changed ο to σ and ν to ϒ.
29. 9. 'λέγομεν' recens 'b.'
31. 1. 'πυθανολογία TV et ut videtur B: πυθανολογίαις ex emend. B.'
πυθανολογίαις is the reading of B p. m.: only, as in numberless other places, σ has been corrected by a recent hand to ιτ.
31. 9. 'ἡ ἔτερον T' et recens 'b.'
32. 29. ὀπὴν (sic) (not ὀπὴ) b.
35. 24. σῶν τε 'in marg.' recens 'b.'
36. 26. παρ' ἄν etiam b.
37. 22. ἄλλ' ἡ (not ἄλλ' ἡ) B.
38. 19. 'ἐβοήθησαν B, corr.' recens 'b.'
39. 1. αὖ τοῦτον τὸν (sic) B pr.
39. 16. τὸν σκύρρων (?) B.
40. 3. The confusion in B is increased by τo having no accent:—ὑπηρειτο.
43. 7. ταυτά B.
43. 13. ἦ b.
44. 20. 'η* B.'—Fuit ἦ.
45. 15. ἦ B pr. (?)
46. 5. ἦ τι τῶι B pr.
46. 18. ἔρα τά B pr.
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47. 27. μυρία BT: μόρια b.
48. 23. τ' αὖ B: τ' ἀὖ b.
49. 15. ἐπιδέξα B.' The accent is not by the first hand.
50. 15. καὶ σοφάλ B (Schanz has here corrected his own error).
51. 34–52. 1. B omits the division of the persons after πάντα γε, and the second μη γάρ.
52. 27. B has αὐτῶι.
53. 16. I read ἀκυροτέρα in B.
54. 9. 'ἡ* B.' Fuit ἡ.
55. 4. Post ὀπερβάλλει commate distinguet b.
55. 18. αὐτοὺς B: αὐτοῖς b.
55. 24. ὀπερητι ἄρην B: ὀπερηπια ἄρην vetus b.
57. 15. ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν statim post δοκεῖ sine puncto infert et Theodoro tribuit B.
59. 7. αὐτῶι B:—the breathing is by a second hand.
59. 16. 'ταῦτα ut videtur in margine voluit b'—recentior.
61. 33. δ· τι B (sic).
61. 34. 'ὁργάνων B, sed ν postea additum.' B wrote ὀργάνωι, and the i has since been changed to ν—probably not by the first hand.
62. 34. 'ἄμφοτέρως Τ, apogr. V et ut videtur B.' The last statement is erroneous. What may have looked like a sigma over the line is a mark of reference to the marginal note φωνήν καὶ χρόνων, which has a corresponding mark.
63. 4. τό, τε (sic) b.
64. 3. ἦ ψυχή (recens b) is not a v. r., but an interlinear gloss.
64. 10. Here is a similar error, τοῦτων δηλονότι (not δῆ) is an interlinear gloss.
64. 24. 'οὐδὲ B' (cum rasura supra v), 'ἐλ in marg.' (recens) 'b.'
64. 29, 30. The Bodleian while reading οὐ for οὖν, also loses the distinction of persons, appearing to drop a speech of Thestetetus, thus:—ἐκεῖ δὲ ἄδύνατον φαίνεται ἦ οὖ: ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς. There is this mark of uncertainty: in the margin.
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65. 1. ἰη (η in rasura) B.
66. 11. ὅπως (not ὅπως) B.
69. 18. (Here in Schanz’s text the second Σω. should be deleted and Κάλλιστα. τὸ δέ, κ.τ.λ. should be continued. There has been an oversight in proof-correcting). ἱητι.. μέρει Theeteto, κάλλιστα Socrati tribuit Hirzel.’ B reads as Schanz intends to do, only with a superfluous colon (:) after ἀνάγκη μὲν σῶν. But the lower dot is probably by a second hand.
71. 6. ἀναγκάζοιτο ... δοξάζει primus Theeteto tribuit Heindorf.’ Here B is not clear about the persons, placing the colon (:) after δοξαζεις and δοξαζεις. But the Cesena MS. divides with Heindorf.
71. 23. ἤ revera B: ἤ vetus b, sed ἤ iterum in marg. b.
72. 4. νῶι B with : in marg.
73. 10. αὐθανεται sine accentu B.
73. 21. Dele ‘αὐτοῖς B.’
73. 24. ἰὴ B. Fuit ἰὴ:
74. 11. In the marginal reading of b, which is prefaced with ἐν ἀλλοις οὕτως, τούτων is read for τούτο.
75. 15. το sine accentu B.
75. 21. αὐτοὶ sine spiritu B.
76. 4. B probably wrote επειθετο επηθετο. The corrector has erased all but the last five letters, and clumsily corrected to επηθετο.
76. 26. διαβασανωσαι b (not B). The β and ν are written over erasures of ν and μ, and the αι is cramped into the space of ε.
77. 8. ἐὼ τοῦ B pr.
78. 5. αὐτοῦ B (? or b ?).
80. 19. ‘φορῷ’ recens ‘b.’
81. 24. ἀλλα (not ἀλλωι) b.
85. 11. B began to write a colon (:) after ἀπεροιμεν, then added γένω instead, without the colon (:), and without accentuating μαι of ἀπεροιμεν.
85. 12. ‘ἀπαγορεύης B, sed η ex emend.’ Fuit et.
85. 28. αὐτη: τῶν (not αὐτη τῶν) B.
86. 14. δικαστηρία sine accentu B pr.
87. 11. αυτὸν sine spiritu B.
88. 31. 'ἀνεργήσατα B.' Sed alterum ε correctum ex a.
92. 9. b (marg.) would add ἔχης (sic) after μέρη. What Schanz reads ἕτω is the mark of reference /, corresponding to the mark over μέρη \: in the text.
93. 6. αυτῇ B.
93. 9. The \ of δύναστων seems to have been blotted off by the first hand.
99. 7. There is no division of the persons, and the accents in B are even fewer than is noticed by Schanz. ἡσκοταμένωι ει γε δη τι νυν δη ὅσερῳ B pr.
99. 23. Ἡ B : ἦ b.

More really important than Schanz’s re-collation of the Bodleian is the work which he has done at Venice. By singling out the Venetian MS. App. 4, 1, (T), as the archetype of all MSS. of the lesser dialogues not copied from the Bodleian, he has greatly simplified the task of settling the text of this part of Plato. And his use of Ven. II (Schanz’s D) as a witness to the earlier reading, where the Bodleian has been made illegible by correction or otherwise, is also very judicious.

While consulting Schanz throughout, however, I have by no means always followed him. He has introduced into the text, without marking them, several conjectural readings, which appear to me unnecessary. And he has adopted some rules of orthography, which, even if proved correct, would hardly be convenient in a work like the present.
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Dr. W. H. Thompson, the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, is so high an authority on the interpretation of Plato, that an opinion which he has kindly communicated to me must not be neglected, although his expression of it came too late to be inserted in the proper place. In the difficult passage 153 C: Kai ἐπὶ τοῦτοι τὸν κολοφῶνα, κ.τ.λ., he agrees with the late Mr. James Riddell and myself in taking τὸν κολοφῶνα as an ‘accusative of the effect:’—(he would print καὶ—ἐπὶ τοῦτοι τὸν κολοφῶνα—ἀναγκαίζω προσβιβάζων):—but he prefers to understand ἀναγκαίζω προσβιβάζων, sc. σε, ‘I get or force you to admit.’ He observes that προσβιβάζειν in the sense of πείθειν is not unfrequent, and that the accumulation of ἀναγκαίζω προσβιβάζων, when either seems sufficient, is characteristic of Plato. Dr. Thompson concurs in rejecting the old interpretation, which made τὸν κολοφῶνα accusative in regimen, and προσβιβάζων = ἐπιτιθεῖν.

I have also to acknowledge the kindness of Professor Jebb, of the University of Glasgow, in calling my attention to the oration of Lysias pro Manteitheo (xvi. §§ 13–17),—referred to also by Grote,—as an illustration of the keen interest which the Athenians of all classes felt in the battle of Corinth (b.c. 394), in which Dexilaus fell and Theactetus probably received his wounds. The inscription on the monument of Dexilaus, by naming the archonship of Eubulides, leaves no doubt as to
the year in which he died; although we may never know in what way he and his four comrades were distinguished from the rest of the Athenian six hundred.

Mr. F. A. Paley, in a note on 202 A, says that αὐτός is ‘necessarily emphatic, being in the nominative.’ This is hard to understand. Why may not the construction be the same as in Rep. 5. 472 D: ὡς καὶ δυνατόν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἀνδρα;—Mr. Paley adopts the readings of 204 C, 209 C, suggested by me in 1861.

Lastly, I may be allowed to make here a correction in the text of the Sophist, which had not occurred to me at the time of publishing my edition of that dialogue. In Soph. 226 C, the word διακρίνειν has rightly been condemned as introducing the general notion inopportune, and where a specific term is obviously required. Read δίνειν, ‘to thresh out corn,’ and compare Hesiod, Op. et D. 595, 6,

δύω τ' ἐπιστρώνειν Δημήτρεω τερόν ἀκτήν
dίνεμεν.

This emendation, although conjectural, has had the rare felicity of being adopted by Professor Jowett.

ST. ANDREWS, January, 1883.
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Although the three chief lines of thought in Plato, whether to be described as practical, speculative, mystical, or as ethical, theoretical, erotic, are rarely quite separate, and are blended in different proportions, yet the distinction between them affords a convenient enough ground for a rough classification of his dialogues. Even the simplest, which are also presumably the earliest, of Plato’s writings, such as the Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, may, without violence, be thus distinguished.

In trying to ascertain the point of view from which a particular dialogue was composed, we should therefore study it, in the first instance, less in relation to those of the same period but different subject matter, than to those before and after it which dwell upon a cognate theme:—(just as a student of Shakespeare may learn more in comparing Mids. N. Dream with the Tempest than with Romeo and Juliet, or Romeo and Juliet with Ant. and Cleo. than with Rich. II).

Now as the Gorgias is a clear sample of the ethical and the Symposium of the mystical aspect of Plato’s thought, so in the Theætetus the purely scientific tendency is in the ascendent.

Socrates’ confession of ignorance was felt by Plato to imply a certain ideal of knowledge. His eager persistent search for an irrefragable definition of each term of human interest, implied that this ideal was not merely transcendent, but must be applicable to the world and to human life. His acceptance of knowledge as the sole test of authority pointed the same way. And his resolution of blameworthy

1 More generally one might speak of the good, the true, the beautiful, or of conduct, knowledge, and aesthetic enthusiasm. But the words used in the text are more directly descriptive of Plato.
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conduct into intellectual error added a religious sanction to the pursuit of Truth.

In the simpler dialogues Plato is contented with representing Socrates as engaged in his life-work of detecting contradiction in others, and so bringing into strong relief at once their ignorance and his own,—pointing only from afar off to the conception of a Science which shall be an infallible guide. The questions, Can Virtue be taught? Are the Virtues many or one? are dimly felt to run up into the higher question, Is Virtue one with Knowledge? Once in the Charmides, where Temperance has been defined as Self-Knowledge, some difficulties concerning Knowledge itself are started by the way, as whether there can be a Knowledge of Knowledge—must not this be a Knowledge of ignorance as well?—and so on. But the problem is merely incidental and the treatment of it paradoxical and verbal. Plato knew, however, that underneath these inquiries, and behind the contrast between the Socratic and Sophistic methods, there lay deeper problems, which Socrates had not distinctly formulated, and still less fully discussed: viz. What is teaching? What is the nature of Knowledge? What is the standard of Truth? What is meant by the distinction of One and Many? In approaching the concentrated investigation of these higher problems, Plato is not content with idealizing Socrates, but enters anew into relations with the older philosophies which had possibly impressed his youth and certainly went far to constitute the intellectual atmosphere in which he lived.

In dwelling afresh upon the work of Socrates he (in common probably with Euclides) saw in it a striving towards certain general forms, which, in their perfect abstraction, could only be thought of as eternal. To Plato that was a vision which enlightened all his subsequent thoughts: but on any theory except that which denies all growth and change in him, it must be acknowledged that there was progress also in his conception of the Ideas. How far he was ever satisfied with the half-mythological presentation of them which appears in the Cratylus, Meno, and Phædo, may be left for those to determine who seem to know him better than he knew himself. However this may have been, we need not wonder, if, in passages avowedly mythical, like those in the Phædrus,
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Timæus, and Politicus, such crude unscientific notions tend to reappear.

But the new vision of Truth, however inspiring, was sometimes felt to 'raise more questions than it solved.' And it was in consequence of these questionings that Plato was led to reconsider his own and his master's relation to Hellenic thought. In order to interpret Socrates and to advance beyond the position gained by him, it was necessary to draw back in order to spring forwards, reculer pour mieux sauter, and to examine into the first principles not only of the inquiries of Socrates, but of all inquiry. In undertaking this new 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' Plato did not desert the Socratic spirit. He only carried into a region which Socrates had declined to enter, the same process of self-examination and of unwearied converse with others which Socrates practised and enjoined. In destroying dogmatism Socrates had seemed to get rid of metaphysics; but he had only made more fruitful the metaphysics of the future. In exposing the conceit without the reality of Knowledge he had only provoked the question, 'What, then, is the reality?' In controverting particular fallacies, he had set one at least of his disciples thinking, 'What then is the πράγματ᾽ ὑπόστασις—the main source of error?'

While passing his hand, so to speak, over the tangle which he had to solve, Plato found two main threads, which were often twisted into one:—the tendency to postulate in all inquiry either the non-existence or the absoluteness of difference,—the identity of opposites, or the incommunicability of attributes: either to say, Black is white, or That which is white can have no tinge of yellow.

In this more condensed treatment of first principles, Plato still retains much of the spirit as well as the form of dramatic dialogue. In the Theætetus, indeed, they are retained to the full. Only the conversation is now not merely between Socrates and his respondent for the hour, but also between Plato and other philosophers old and new. They are brought upon the stage and made to explain themselves. They are confronted with each other. They are treated with the utmost urbanity, and with a searching criticism, ironical and unsparing, until they are compelled, as it were, to give in their contributions to the sum of Truth. Philosophic
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Dialogue thus becomes the vehicle of a sort of historic fiction, containing, with the criticism of the present, at once a reproduction and an interpretation of the past. This 'History of Philosophy' is, however, penetrated with original thought, and each actual phase is represented as typical of a universal tendency and necessary moment in the realization of true ideas.

The dialogues in which Plato adopts this comprehensive standpoint are thought by some to indicate a later phase of Greek speculation generally, which is supposed to have passed out of a rhetorical into a more logical mode. But Plato's conception of what is opposed to philosophy may naturally have moved together with the aspect of philosophy which was uppermost in his own mind. And until it can be shown by some independent proof that the Euthydemus is later than the Phædrus, it is best to steer clear of such assumptions. It is antecedently by no means improbable that the Phædrus and the Parmenides represent, not different periods, but different moods. The less known cannot throw light on the more known: and Plato's thoughts are better known to us than the particular incidents of Athenian life which gave occasion to them.

The Euthydemus and Parmenides may be regarded as, in different ways, preparatory to the dialectical effort which is commenced in the Theætetus, and continued in the Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus.

The Euthydemus is a broad caricature of reigning logical fallacies.

The Parmenides is a serious statement of the difficulties which beset Idealism, whether (1) in the post-Socratic, or (2) in the Eleatic form. At the same time it contains the most uncompromising assertion of Idealism.

This is not the place for a full exposition of the Parmenides, which Professor Jowett's Introduction has rendered superfluous. But it may not be amiss to point out the significance of the dramatic situation in that dialogue.

Socrates is there represented as in early youth anticipating the theory of ἐτιθη, which has since been generally associated

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1 From the allusion to Isocrates in the Phædrus L. Spengel infers a very early date. But this presumption is balanced by other considerations.
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with the name of Plato, and would be naturally attributed to him by the reader of the Cratylus, or the Phædo, or of the fifth and tenth books of the Republic.

By means of this theory the young Socrates successfully refutes the thesis of Zeno, which that philosopher blushingly acknowledges to have been a polemical effort of his own early youth. But the aged Parmenides subjects Socrates in turn to criticism, and the wonderful boy, whose speculative impulse is praised by the old philosopher as Divine, answers each objection with a new hypothesis, which always corresponds to some actual form of idealism. He fails, however, to establish any of them: whereupon Parmenides puts him through an exercise not unknown to Zeno, in which, by the application of ordinary logic to his own transcendental theory of the One Being, he develops a series of antinomies, which Socrates is compelled at once to admit, and to declare impossible.

Is it reading too much between the lines to understand Plato here to mean: (1) that the current mode of applying the principle of contradiction, however much it might rest on the authority of Zeno, was, as he says in the Sophist (259 D), unworthy of any one who is come to man's estate; (2) that although the Platonic theory based on the practice of Socrates gave promise of a mighty grasp on truth, yet, as hitherto held and stated, it was still immature; and (3) that, in order to complete and strengthen it, it was necessary to go back once more to the great fountain of speculative thought, and appeal from the disciple to the master, from the method of Zeno to the spirit of Parmenides, who must be approached in the truth-seeking temper of Socrates?

In the Theætetus, Socrates declines to examine Parmenides. That task is reserved for the Neo-Eleatic friend who appears with Theodorus and Theætetus on the following day. The present dialogue is chiefly occupied with the consideration of what may be loosely spoken of as Heraclitean doctrines, but which, as Plato says, are really 'older than Homer.' In developing these doctrines Socrates makes use of more than one saying which is still to be found amongst the fragments of Heraclitus.

It is remarkable that Plato nowhere speaks of Heraclitus
with unqualified respect, although much in his own teaching was consciously or unconsciously a repetition or expansion of truths stated or anticipated by that great mind. If we may trust Aristotle, Plato had first known Heracliteanism in the exaggerated form in which it was taught by Cratylus, and certainly he has more to tell us of the followers, whether in Ephesus or Athens, than of their master.

Yet it is not fanciful to say that in idealizing Socrates, and connecting the remembrance of him with the great thoughts of the first philosophic age, he saw in the Elenchus an illustration in the sphere of mind, on the one hand of actual mutability and fluctuation, and on the other of an absolute standard,—in so far justifying both Heraclitus and Parmenides. Socrates can make any opinions move; no position remains fixed when he comes near. But he cannot and will not argue unless allowed to assume the reality of knowledge.

In the foregoing general exposition it has been assumed that the main body of the Platonic writings, and the dialectical dialogues in particular, are from the hand of the master.

The position so held is intermediate between that of Mr. Grote, who maintains the Alexandrian tradition in its integrity and defends even the Axiochus and the Epistles, and that of Schaarschmidt, who acknowledges only nine dialogues. The work of Schaarschmidt appeared in 1866, when my edition of the Sophistes and Politicus was in the press. He had previously given some indication of his views in the pages of Rheinisches Museum and elsewhere. He, and Socher before him, have succeeded in showing the remarkable disparity which exists between the purely dialectical dialogues and those which these writers leave unquestioned—a disparity both in the mode of handling and in the substance of the thought. The difference is not here denied,

1 The following statement of Platonic doctrine, by one of the most zealous of modern Platonists, contains the sum and substance of Heraclitus' teaching: 'Ohne Stillstand in fortwährenden Kriege wie in Schachspiele Alles in geregelte Weise seine Plätze Wechselt, so dass das Lebende zum Todten, das Todte zum Leben- dens wird und nichts sich gleich bleibt. In diesem ewigen Processe des Werdens is das einzige Constante das Gesetz.' Teichmuller, Die Platonische Frage, p. 54. Only, in the incoate thought of Heraclitus, the Law is not distinguishable from the Process.

2 Schaarschmidt carries his scepticism much further than Ast or Socher did.
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but, as in the edition of the Sophist, etc. (1867) and in Professor Jowett’s introductions (1st ed. 1871), the dialogues in question are assigned to a different period of Plato’s literary activity, in which, as Professor Jowett observes¹, ‘the style begins to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the Protagoras and the Phædrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design.’ . . . ‘The play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed never to return.’

Schaarschmidt’s three great tests, viz. literary excellence, the presence of a moral purpose, and quotation by Aristotle, are more plausible than some which previous critics have applied. And in his application of his method there is much acute criticism, although a suspicion now and then arises that insufficient grounds are being eked out by vigorous writing.

But (1) (to take first the external test) the argument from silence is especially fallacious in the criticism of ancient writings, and the question of Aristotle’s testimony to Platonic dialogues is complicated with doubts as to the genuineness of the Aristotelian treatises ².

(2) For masterly skill in composition, is there any comparison, for example, between the Symposium or Republic and the Timæus or the Laws? Is there not also in both of these last named ‘a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design?’ The cumbrousness and prolixity, which are so evident in the Laws, are accounted for on the ground that Plato is reported to have left his last work in an unfinished state. Without cavilling about the possible origin of the story, may it not be observed, in the spirit of Goethe’s pregnant saying ³, ‘It is a sketch which never could have been finished?’ On the other hand, if the subject is taken into account, the literary skill shown in the Parmenides is very great.

¹ Introd. to Philebus, sub init. ² Introd. to the Statesman. ³ The third book of the Rhetoric and the eleventh of the Metaphysics are rejected by Schaarschmidt. ⁴ Conversations with Eckermann.
own. Mr. F. A. Paley published a translation of the Theætetus, with some notes, in 1875. The recent edition of this dialogue by Professor Kennedy of Cambridge is also accompanied with a translation.

Mr. Grote's intensely real conception of Hellenic, and especially of Athenian life, his personal interest in the Sophists and in Socrates, have enabled him to throw a powerful cross-light on Plato, bringing out some features which would otherwise have remained in shadow. His intellectual sympathy with Protagoras in particular gives great piquancy to his analysis of the Theætetus. But his steadfast utilitarian point of view has made it hard for him to do real justice to Plato's meaning here. No part of Mr. Grote's singular exposition is more paradoxical, or has called forth more criticism, than his account of this dialogue. Mr. Cope's just and clear rejoinder may be alluded to in passing; and an article in the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1865, which contains a powerful refutation of Mr. Grote's 'theory of Knowledge,' is the more noteworthy, as it is known to have been written by his friend and fellow-disciple Mr. John Stuart Mill, who, although not a Platonist in philosophy, was a warm admirer of Plato. An excerpt from the *Quarterly Review* for January, 1866, on the same subject, is reprinted, with Mr. Murray's permission, as an Appendix to the present volume.
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Several interesting papers on Plato have appeared in the Journal of Philology, of which those by Mr. Henry Jackson, 'On Plato's later theory of Ideas,' are the most recent and in some ways the most important.

It is needless to refer at length to the many works on Plato which have appeared in other countries since 1861. Of books dealing generally in a critical spirit with the whole body of the dialogues, that of Schaarschmidt (1866), of which more will be said presently, is probably the most remarkable. The voluminous work of Peipers (1874) deals so far principally with the Theætetus. His exposition is learned and thoughtful, but is only occasionally referred to in this volume. On the other hand, I have made constant use, in revising my notes, of three important helps to the study of the Theætetus which have appeared in recent years:—the critical and exegetical commentaries of Hermann Schmidt (1877), the revision of Stallaub's edition (in the case of the Theætetus amounting to a new edition) by Wohlrab (1869), and the critical edition of Martinus Schanz (1880), who has in many ways done good service to the text of Plato.

It has been no small satisfaction to me to find that many of the views advanced in my former edition have been since endorsed by writers of so
much authority. To H. Schmidt, especially, my acknowledgments are due for the close attention which he has given to my observations, and for the subtlety and acuteness which he has often expended in examining them.

A full *apparatus criticus* has never formed part of the plan of this edition. But in the year 1856, being still at Oxford, and having undertaken to edit the *Theætetus*, I collated the dialogue in the Bodleian MS. with the Zurich edition of 1839, and with Gaisford’s collation in his *Lectiones Platoniciæ* (1820). Bekker in his *Commentaria Critica* (1823) had written with reference to this work of the Oxford Professor of Greek:—‘Cogat agmen, quem solum non ipse exploravi, (²) codex Clarkianus. Eius enim causa Oxonium profectus cum Thomæ Gaisfordi lectiones Platonicas prelo paratas invenissem, nolui actum agere, totumque viri diligentissimi libellum in mea commentaria ita recepi, ut quæ ad sententiam, ad syntaxin, ad flexionem quoquo modo pertinenter, transcriberem omnia, quæ orthographica essent, ea fere speciminis loco semel atque iterum posita deinde omitterem.’ Bekker’s confidence in Gaisford’s accuracy was sufficiently well-grounded, but finality in dealing with MSS. is not soon reached, and I was able in several places to correct or supplement Gaisford’s report. To place on record every *v ἐφελκυστικόν*, every accent
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or breathing supplied by a later hand, was no part of my intention, nor has it yet been done. Any one who turns from the Theaetetus in the MS. to the Sophist, Politicus, or Parmenides, which have been much less read, and are therefore more nearly as the scribe left them, will see at once how many accents in particular must have been added by later hands.

I left Oxford in 1858, and was therefore unable, at the time of bringing out my edition in 1861, personally to verify my notes. I might else have avoided one somewhat serious error, viz. that of printing ἐπὶ τὸν διὸ ἔτολον instead of ἐπὶ τὸν πολύ, as the Bodleian reading in 153 B. How easily such an error might arise under the circumstances may be illustrated by a simple instance. Dindorf's critical note on ΟΕδ. Τυρ. 11, at least in the editions of 1861 and 1868, is as follows:—'στέκαντες πρὸ στέκαντες a m. rec.' This is the reverse of the fact, and M. Schanz may perhaps conjecture that Dübner, who collated for Dindorf, 'merely inspected' the Medicean MS. But it must be evident to a candid mind,—to borrow for a moment the language of constructive criticism,—that Dübner wrote στέκαντες pr. : στέκαντες a m. rec., and that Dindorf misread Dübner's note.

Schanz collated the MS. in 1870, and having tested his work on this dialogue I can bear witness to its great accuracy. He tells us that he went on
the principle of registering everything, however slight. Yet even a Schanz is compelled to place limits to minutiae. Not only are there still many changes of accent unregistered, not only is the resolution of \( \alpha, \varphi \), etc., by correctors unobserved in places where it affects the reading, but the distinction between early and late corrections (\( b \) and \( recens \ b \)) is by no means completely noted. Also, if Schanz were supposed to have transcribed everything however slight, it might be inferred that the MS. was not punctuated. Now the Bodleian MS. as it stands has three distinct sorts of punctuation:—1. the double colon, by which in this, as in other MSS. of Plato, the speeches of the different interlocutors are kept apart. These divisions are right in some places where the earlier editors went wrong. 2. The colon, often marking even insignificant pauses. This, as well as the mark of a new speaker, has been generally inserted by the first hand. 3. The comma, frequently added by an early diorthotes so as to indicate a slight break in the sentence. This sometimes amounts to an interpretation. The same hand has often added a comma beneath the double colon, thus \( ; \) where the preceding sentence is interrogative. These three marks—in different degrees certainly, and none of them in a significant degree, but still appreciably,—form part of the traditional deposit which the MS. contains. None of them, least of all the first,
should be ignored by those who undertake to register every difference however apparently unimportant.

Having perused the MS. side by side with Schanz's edition, I may be permitted to register a few points (certainly of the very slightest moment) where his observation seems to have been at fault.

N.B.—The references are to Schanz's edition of the Theaetetus, published at Leipzig in 1880.

Schanz, page 1, line 5. ποδ κάτω; Here as below p. 2, l. 9, b has added τ for τερψίων, which was however unnecessary, as the double colon (:) marks the new persons—hence τ is not continued.

2. 9. 'καλ...είπεν Τερψιον τιμήτω b.' This is not true in the sense that B had omitted to distinguish the persons with the colon (:) ; τ is added, as before, εκ περιοντιας.

2. 15. επηνορθούμεν BT, corr. bt. ἄστε BT (so also in 15, l. 22 μητέ).

3. 6. τά ἐκείνα καὶ σὲ, καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων καὶ ἡράτων interp. B vel b.

4. 11. εἰσδοκύμων Tb. (rec.): εἰδόκυμων B.

10. 35. 'ἀτόκοις BT, sed k ex emend. B.' The correction is by a recent hand. The note should run therefore 'ἀτόκοις b rec. T: ἄτόκοις B et apogr. V.'

12. 22. Post γεγονός commate distinxt b vetus.

12. 26. Post ἐναργεῖς distinguinit B.

13. 29. ἀφαιρέσαι b: ἀφαιρέσαται BT.

16. 23. 'ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐπεράντω B.' This is so, but ἐπιποπολύ b should be added.

17. 8. τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζων προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσὴν σειράν: ὡς sic distinxt b.
19. 7. ἐγώγε is written in space of fewer letters by first hand. The former word was oxytone: qy. ἐγώ?
20. 9. 'θαύμαντος BT, sed v in ras. B.' Imo v erasit b.
22. 1. δῶνω /slick (in the note) is an obvious misprint.
23. 16. ἡπερ (accent uncertain) B: ἡπερ b.
24. 15. Post δναρ distinguishing B.
27. 4. 'τε add. T. om. B.' It should be observed that ἐμέ is at the end of a line (ἐμέ | τινος).
27. 16, 17. 16. 'οὖ' ἄλλον λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον om. BD, add. BD. 17. ἀποδεκτέον T: ἀπολεκτέον B.' This is not quite accurate. The note should run οὖ | ταύτα λεκτέον B: Litteral τ' αὐτώι erasit, τ' αὐτώι λεκτέον, οὖ' ἄλλον λέγον in margin sinistra supplevit, τος ἁπo in rasura scripsit, λ in δ mutavit, b. (The vox nihilis ἀπολεκτέον was never written.)
28. 14. τίσου B: the corrector erased the stroke which made the τ, changed ο to σ and v to γ.
29. 9. 'λέγομεν' recens 'b.'
31. 1. 'πιθανολογία TV et ut videtur B: πιθανολογία ex emend. B.'
πιθανολογία is the reading of B p. m.: only, as in numberless other places, σ has been corrected by a recent hand to st.
31. 9. 'ἡ ἔτερον T' et recens 'b.'
32. 29. ὀφέη (sic) (not ὀφῆ) b.
35. 24. οἴων τε 'in marg.' recens 'b.'
36. 26. παρ' α ἄν etiam b.
37. 22. ἄλλα' ἡ (not ἄλλα' ἡ) B.
38. 19. 'ἔβοηθησαν B, corr.' recens 'b.'
39. 1. ἄδ τοῦτον τὸν (sic) B pr.
39. 16. τὸν σκληρώνα (?i) B.
40. 3. The confusion in B is increased by το having no accent:—ὑπήρειτο.
43. 7. ταυτὰ B.
43. 13. ἦ b.
44. 20. 'η* B.'—Fuit ηλ.
45. 15. ἦ B pr. (?).
46. 5. ἦ τι τῶι B pr.
46. 18. ὑπαρ τά B pr.
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47. 27. μύρια BT: μύρια b.
48. 23. τ' αὖ B: τ' αὖ b.
49. 15. ἑπιδέξια B. The accent is not by the first hand.
50. 15. καὶ σοφαῖ B (Schanz has here corrected his own error).
51. 34–52. i. B omits the division of the persons after πᾶν γε, and the second μὴ γάρ.
52. 27. B has αὐτῶι.
53. 16. I read ἀκυροτέρα in B.
54. 9. ἦ* B. Fuit ἦ.
55. 4. Post ὅπερβάλλει commatæ distinctæ b.
55. 18. αὐτοῖς B: αὐτοῖς b.
55. 24. ὅπερητ ἄρων B: ὅπερητ ἄρων vetus b.
57. 15. ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν statim post δοκεῖ sine puncto infert et Theodoro tribuit B.
59. 7. αὐτῷ:—the breathing is by a second hand.
59. 16. ταῦτα ut videtur in marginie voluit b'—recentior.
61. 33. ὅ· τι B (sic).
61. 34. ὅργανων B, sed ν postea additum.' B wrote ὅργανω, and the i has since been changed to ν—probably not by the first hand.
62. 34. ἀμφοτέρως T, apogr. V et ut videtur B.' The last statement is erroneous. What may have looked like a sigma over the line is a mark of reference to the marginal note φωνὴν καὶ χρόαν, which has a corresponding mark.
63. 4. τό, τέ (sic) b.
64. 3. ἡ ψυχή (recens b) is not a v. r., but an interlinear gloss.
64. 10. Here is a similar error, τούτων δηλοντι (not δη) is an interlinear gloss.
64. 24. οὖδὲ B' (cum rasura supra ν), 'εἰ in marg.' (recens) 'b.'
64. 29, 30. The Bodleian while reading ὅδε for σον, also loses the distinction of persons, appearing to drop a speech of Theoctetus, thus:—ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον φανεραὶ Ἡ οὐ: ταῦτα ἔκειτο τέ καὶ τούτο καλεῖσ. There is this mark of uncertainty ·· in the margin.
65. i. δὴ (ἡ in rasura) B.
66. i i. δηλιγνοῦν (not δηλιγνοῦν) B.
69. 18. (Here in Schanz’s text the second Σω. should be deleted and Κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ, κ.τ.λ. should be continued. There has been an oversight in proof-correcting). ‘ἡτοι ... μέρες Theæteto, κάλλιστα Socrati tribuit Hirzel.’ B reads as Schanz intends to do, only with a superfluous colon (:) after ἄνάγκη μὲν οὖν. But the lower dot is probably by a second hand.
71. 6. ‘ἀναγκάζοντο ... δοξάζει primus Theæteto tribuit Heindorf.’ Here B is not clear about the persons, placing the colon (:) after δοξάζει, λέγεις and δοξάζει. But the Cesena MS. divides with Heindorf.
71. 23. ἃ re vera B: ἃ vetus b, sed ἃ iterum in marg. b.
72. 4. νῷ B with ꞌ in marg.
73. 10. ἀλθαναρα sine accentu B.
73. 21. Dele ‘αὐτοῖς B.’
73. 24. δὴ B. Fuit δῆ:
74. 11. In the marginal reading of b, which is prefaced with ἐν ἄλλοις οὕτως, τούτων is read for τούτο.
75. 15. ἃ sine accentu B.
75. 21. αὐτοῦ sine spiritu B.
76. 4. B probably wrote επειθετο επισάθετο. The corrector has erased all but the last five letters, and clumsily corrected to επισάθετο.
76. 26. διαβαλωνουσι b (not B). The β and ν are written over erasures of ν and μ, and the αι is cramped into the space of ε.
77. 8. ἡν τοῦ B pr.
78. 5. αὐτῶν B (? or b ?).
80. 19. ‘φορῶν’ recens ‘b.’
81. 24. ἀλλο (not ἀλλοι) b.
85. 11. B began to write a colon (:) after ἀπεροῦμεν, then added γέως instead, without the colon (:), and without accentuating μεν of ἀπεροῦμεν.
85. 12. ‘ἀπαγορεύης B, sed η ex emend.’ Fuit ei.
85. 28. αὐτη : τῶν (not αὐτη τῶν) B.
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86. ἵκαστημι sine accentu B pr.
87. στ. αὐθὰν sine spiritu B.
88. 31. 'ἐνεργεστἀτα B.' Sed alterum e correctum e x a.
92. 9. b (marg.) would add ἔχης (sic) after μέρη. What Schanz reads ἓσων is the mark of reference /. corresponding to the mark over μέρη / in the text.
93. 6. αὐτὴ B.
93. 9. The ἄ of ἄναστον seems to have been blotted off by the first hand.
99. 7. There is no division of the persons, and the accents in B are even fewer than is noticed by Schanz. ἐσκοπομένων eι γε δη τι νυν δη ὑσερδῶν B pr.
99. 23. ἱ B : ή b.

More really important than Schanz’s re-collation of the Bodleian is the work which he has done at Venice. By singling out the Venetian MS. App. 4, 1, (T), as the archetype of all MSS. of the lesser dialogues not copied from the Bodleian, he has greatly simplified the task of settling the text of this part of Plato. And his use of Ven. II (Schanz’s D) as a witness to the earlier reading, where the Bodleian has been made illegible by correction or otherwise, is also very judicious.

While consulting Schanz throughout, however, I have by no means always followed him. He has introduced into the text, without marking them, several conjectural readings, which appear to me unnecessary. And he has adopted some rules of orthography, which, even if proved correct, would hardly be convenient in a work like the present.
Dr. W. H. Thompson, the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, is so high an authority on the interpretation of Plato, that an opinion which he has kindly communicated to me must not be neglected, although his expression of it came too late to be inserted in the proper place. In the difficult passage 153 C: Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους τὸν κολοβῶνα, κ.τ.λ., he agrees with the late Mr. James Riddell and myself in taking τὸν κολοβῶνα as an 'accusative of the effect:'—(he would print καὶ—ἐπὶ τούτους τὸν κολοβῶνα—ἀναγκαίως προσβιβάζων)—but he prefers to understand ἀναγκαίως προσβιβάζων, sc. σε, 'I get or force you to admit.' He observes that προσβιβάζειν in the sense of πείθειν is not unfrequent, and that the accumulation of ἀναγκαίως προσβιβάζων, when either seems sufficient, is characteristic of Plato. Dr. Thompson concurs in rejecting the old interpretation, which made τὸν κολοβῶνα accusative in regimen, and προσβιβάζων = ἐπιτιθέεις.

I have also to acknowledge the kindness of Professor Jebb, of the University of Glasgow, in calling my attention to the oration of Lysias pro Mantitheo (xvi. §§ 13–17),—referred to also by Grote,—as an illustration of the keen interest which the Athenians of all classes felt in the battle of Corinth (b.c. 394), in which Dexilaus fell and Theætetus probably received his wounds. The inscription on the monument of Dexilaus, by naming the archonship of Eubulides, leaves no doubt as to
the year in which he died; although we may never know in what way he and his four comrades were distinguished from the rest of the Athenian six hundred.

Mr. F. A. Paley, in a note on 202 A, says that aυτό is 'necessarily emphatic, being in the nominative.' This is hard to understand. Why may not the construction be the same as in Rep. 5. 472 D: 'Ως καὶ δυνάτων γενέσθαι τοιούτου ἄνδρα?—Mr. Paley adopts the readings of 204 C, 209 C, suggested by me in 1861.

Lastly, I may be allowed to make here a correction in the text of the Sophist, which had not occurred to me at the time of publishing my edition of that dialogue. In Soph. 226 C, the word διακρίνειν has rightly been condemned as introducing the general notion inopportune, and where a specific term is obviously required. Read δίνειν, 'to thresh out corn,' and compare Hesiod, Op. et D. 595, 6,

διομοῦ ἔτοπτρόνειν Δημήτερος ἱερὸν ἀκτήν
dίνειμεν.

This emendation, although conjectural, has had the rare felicity of being adopted by Professor Jowett.

St. ANDREWS, January, 1883.
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Although the three chief lines of thought in Plato, whether to be described as practical, speculative, mystical, or as ethical, theoretical, erotic\(^1\), are rarely quite separate, and are blended in different proportions, yet the distinction between them affords a convenient enough ground for a rough classification of his dialogues. Even the simplest, which are also presumably the earliest, of Plato's writings, such as the Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, may, without violence, be thus distinguished.

In trying to ascertain the point of view from which a particular dialogue was composed, we should therefore study it, in the first instance, less in relation to those of the same period but different subject matter, than to those before and after it which dwell upon a cognate theme:—(just as a student of Shakespeare may learn more in comparing Mids. N. Dream with the Tempest than with Romeo and Juliet, or Romeo and Juliet with Ant. and Cleo. than with Rich. II).

Now as the Gorgias is a clear sample of the ethical and the Symposium of the mystical aspect of Plato's thought, so in the Theætetus the purely scientific tendency is in the ascendent.

Socrates' confession of ignorance was felt by Plato to imply a certain ideal of knowledge. His eager persistent search for an irrefragable definition of each term of human interest, implied that this ideal was not merely transcendent, but must be applicable to the world and to human life. His acceptance of knowledge as the sole test of authority pointed the same way. And his resolution of blameworthy

\(^1\) More generally one might speak of the good, the true, the beautiful, or of conduct, knowledge, and aesthetic enthusiasm. But the words used in the text are more directly descriptive of Plato.
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conduct into intellectual error added a religious sanction to the pursuit of Truth.

In the simpler dialogues Plato is contented with representing Socrates as engaged in his life-work of detecting contradiction in others, and so bringing into strong relief at once their ignorance and his own,—pointing only from afar off to the conception of a Science which shall be an infallible guide. The questions, Can Virtue be taught? Are the Virtues many or one? are dimly felt to run up into the higher question, Is Virtue one with Knowledge? Once in the Charmides, where Temperance has been defined as Self-Knowledge, some difficulties concerning Knowledge itself are started by the way, as whether there can be a Knowledge of Knowledge—must not this be a Knowledge of ignorance as well?—and so on. But the problem is merely incidental and the treatment of it paradoxical and verbal. Plato knew, however, that underneath these inquiries, and behind the contrast between the Socratic and Sophistic methods, there lay deeper problems, which Socrates had not distinctly formulated, and still less fully discussed: viz. What is teaching? What is the nature of Knowledge? What is the standard of Truth? What is meant by the distinction of One and Many? In approaching the concentrated investigation of these higher problems, Plato is not content with idealizing Socrates, but enters anew into relations with the older philosophies which had possibly impressed his youth and certainly went far to constitute the intellectual atmosphere in which he lived.

In dwelling afresh upon the work of Socrates he (in common probably with Euclides) saw in it a striving towards certain general forms, which, in their perfect abstraction, could only be thought of as eternal. To Plato that was a vision which enlightened all his subsequent thoughts: but on any theory except that which denies all growth and change in him, it must be acknowledged that there was progress also in his conception of the Ideas. How far he was ever satisfied with the half-mythological presentation of them which appears in the Cratylus, Meno, and Phædo, may be left for those to determine who seem to know him better than he knew himself. However this may have been, we need not wonder, if, in passages avowedly mythical, like those in the Phædrus,
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Timæus, and Politicus, such crude unscientific notions tend to reappear.

But the new vision of Truth, however inspiring, was sometimes felt to 'raise more questions than it solved.' And it was in consequence of these questionings that Plato was led to reconsider his own and his master's relation to Hellenic thought. In order to interpret Socrates and to advance beyond the position gained by him, it was necessary to draw back in order to spring forwards, reculer pour mieux sauter, and to examine into the first principles not only of the inquiries of Socrates, but of all inquiry. In undertaking this new 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' Plato did not desert the Socratic spirit. He only carried into a region which Socrates had declined to enter, the same process of self-examination and of unwearied converse with others which Socrates practised and enjoined. In destroying dogmatism Socrates had seemed to get rid of metaphysics; but he had only made more fruitful the metaphysics of the future. In exposing the conceit without the reality of Knowledge he had only provoked the question, 'What, then, is the reality?' In controverting particular fallacies, he had set one at least of his disciples thinking, 'What then is the πράγμα τῆς ψευδὸς—the main source of error?'

While passing his hand, so to speak, over the tangle which he had to solve, Plato found two main threads, which were often twisted into one:—the tendency to postulate in all inquiry either the non-existence or the absoluteness of difference,—the identity of opposites, or the incommunicability of attributes: either to say, Black is white, or That which is white can have no tinge of yellow.

In this more condensed treatment of first principles, Plato still retains much of the spirit as well as the form of dramatic dialogue. In the Theætetus, indeed, they are retained to the full. Only the conversation is now not merely between Socrates and his respondent for the hour, but also between Plato and other philosophers old and new. They are brought upon the stage and made to explain themselves. They are confronted with each other. They are treated with the utmost urbanity, and with a searching criticism, ironical and unsparing, until they are compelled, as it were, to give in their contributions to the sum of Truth. Philosophic
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Dialogue thus becomes the vehicle of a sort of historic fiction, containing, with the criticism of the present, at once a reproduction and an interpretation of the past. This 'History of Philosophy' is, however, penetrated with original thought, and each actual phase is represented as typical of a universal tendency and necessary moment in the realization of true ideas.

The dialogues in which Plato adopts this comprehensive standpoint are thought by some to indicate a later phase of Greek speculation generally, which is supposed to have passed out of a rhetorical into a more logical mode. But Plato's conception of what is opposed to philosophy may naturally have moved together with the aspect of philosophy which was uppermost in his own mind. And until it can be shown by some independent proof that the Euthydemus is later than the Phædrus, it is best to steer clear of such assumptions. It is antecedently by no means improbable that the Phædrus and the Parmenides represent, not different periods, but different moods. The less known cannot throw light on the more known: and Plato's thoughts are better known to us than the particular incidents of Athenian life which gave occasion to them.

The Euthydemus and Parmenides may be regarded as, in different ways, preparatory to the dialectical effort which is commenced in the Theætetus, and continued in the Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus.

The Euthydemus is a broad caricature of reigning logical fallacies.

The Parmenides is a serious statement of the difficulties which beset Idealism, whether (1) in the post-Socratic, or (2) in the Eleatic form. At the same time it contains the most uncompromising assertion of Idealism.

This is not the place for a full exposition of the Parmenides, which Professor Jowett's Introduction has rendered superfluous. But it may not be amiss to point out the significance of the dramatic situation in that dialogue.

Socrates is there represented as in early youth anticipating the theory of ἐτοιμασία, which has since been generally associated

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1 From the allusion to Isocrates in the Phædrus L. Spengel infers a very early date. But this presumption is balanced by other considerations.
with the name of Plato, and would be naturally attributed to him by the reader of the Cratylus, or the Phædo, or of the fifth and tenth books of the Republic.

By means of this theory the young Socrates successfully refutes the thesis of Zeno, which that philosopher blushingly acknowledges to have been a polemical effort of his own early youth. But the aged Parmenides subjects Socrates in turn to criticism, and the wonderful boy, whose speculative impulse is praised by the old philosopher as Divine, answers each objection with a new hypothesis, which always corresponds to some actual form of idealism. He fails, however, to establish any of them: whereupon Parmenides puts him through an exercise not unknown to Zeno, in which, by the application of ordinary logic to his own transcendental theory of the One Being, he develops a series of antinomies, which Socrates is compelled at once to admit, and to declare impossible.

Is it reading too much between the lines to understand Plato here to mean: (1) that the current mode of applying the principle of contradiction, however much it might rest on the authority of Zeno, was, as he says in the Sophist (259 D), unworthy of any one who is come to man's estate; (2) that although the Platonic theory based on the practice of Socrates gave promise of a mighty grasp on truth, yet, as hitherto held and stated, it was still immature; and (3) that, in order to complete and strengthen it, it was necessary to go back once more to the great fountain of speculative thought, and appeal from the disciple to the master, from the method of Zeno to the spirit of Parmenides, who must be approached in the truth-seeking temper of Socrates?

In the Theætetus, Socrates declines to examine Parmenides. That task is reserved for the Neo-Eleatic friend who appears with Theodorus and Theætetus on the following day. The present dialogue is chiefly occupied with the consideration of what may be loosely spoken of as Heraclitean doctrines, but which, as Plato says, are really 'older than Homer.' In developing these doctrines Socrates makes use of more than one saying which is still to be found amongst the fragments of Heraclitus.

It is remarkable that Plato nowhere speaks of Heraclitus
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with unqualified respect, although much in his own teaching was consciously or unconsciously a repetition or expansion of truths stated or anticipated by that great mind. If we may trust Aristotle, Plato had first known Heracliteanism in the exaggerated form in which it was taught by Cratylus, and certainly he has more to tell us of the followers, whether in Ephesus or Athens, than of their master.

Yet it is not fanciful to say that in idealizing Socrates, and connecting the remembrance of him with the great thoughts of the first philosophic age, he saw in the Elenchus an illustration in the sphere of mind, on the one hand of actual mutability and fluctuation, and on the other of an absolute standard,—in so far justifying both Heraclitus and Parmenides. Socrates can make any opinions move; no position remains fixed when he comes near. But he cannot and will not argue unless allowed to assume the reality of knowledge.

In the foregoing general exposition it has been assumed that the main body of the Platonic writings, and the dialectical dialogues in particular, are from the hand of the master.

The position so held is intermediate between that of Mr. Grote, who maintains the Alexandrian tradition in its integrity and defends even the Axiochus and the Epistles, and that of Schaarschmidt, who acknowledges only nine dialogues. The work of Schaarschmidt appeared in 1866, when my edition of the Sophistes and Politicus was in the press. He had previously given some indication of his views in the pages of Rheinische Museum and elsewhere. He, and Socher before him, have succeeded in showing the remarkable disparity which exists between the purely dialectical dialogues and those which these writers leave unquestioned—a disparity both in the mode of handling and in the substance of the thought. The difference is not here denied,

\[1\] The following statement of Platonic doctrine, by one of the most zealous of modern Platonists, contains the sum and substance of Heraclitus’ teaching: 'Ohne Stillstand in fortwährenden Kriege wie in Schachspiele Alles in geregelte Weise seine Plätze Wechselt, so dass das Lebende zum Todten, das Todte zum Leben-­dens wird und nichts verliertengeht,

Indem nichts sich gleich bleibt. In diesem ewigen Processus des Werdens ist das einzige Constante das Gesetz.' Taichmüller, Die Platoniche Frage, p. 54. Only, in the inchoate thought of Heraclitus, the Law is not distinguishable from the Process.

\[2\] Schaarschmidt carries his scepticism much further than Ast or Socher did.
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but, as in the edition of the Sophist, etc. (1867) and in Professor Jowett's introductions (1st ed. 1871), the dialogues in question are assigned to a different period of Plato's literary activity, in which, as Professor Jowett observes, 'the style begins to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the Protagoras and the Phædrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design.'... 'The play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed never to return.'

Schaarschmidt's three great tests, viz. literary excellence, the presence of a moral purpose, and quotation by Aristotle, are more plausible than some which previous critics have applied. And in his application of his method there is much acute criticism, although a suspicion now and then arises that insufficient grounds are being eked out by vigorous writing.

But (1) (to take first the external test) the argument from silence is especially fallacious in the criticism of ancient writings, and the question of Aristotle's testimony to Platonic dialogues is complicated with doubts as to the genuineness of the Aristotelian treatises.

(2) For masterly skill in composition, is there any comparison, for example, between the Symposium or Republic and the Timæus or the Laws? Is there not also in both of these last named 'a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design?'

The cumbrousness and prolixity, which are so evident in the Laws, are accounted for on the ground that Plato is reported to have left his last work in an unfinished state. Without cavilling about the possible origin of the story, may it not be observed, in the spirit of Goethe's pregnant saying, 'It is a sketch which never could have been finished?'

On the other hand, if the subject is taken into account, the literary skill shown in the Parmenides is very great.

1 Introd. to Philebus, sub init. 2 Introd. to the Statesman. 3 The third book of the Rhetoric and the eleventh of the Metaphysics are rejected by Schaarschmidt. 4 Conversations with Eckermann.
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(3) That Plato at the meridian of his powers wrote with the consciousness of a great practical aim, may be at once conceded. But is it inconceivable that a time may have arrived when experience had shown him the distance of the goal, and, without relinquishing the end, he may have applied himself for a while to the speculative treatment of intermediate problems? There are not wanting traces, even in the Republic, of a belief that if 'Geist' was ever to be the ruling power, a severer training than Glaucon could bear must be prepared for the Kings of the future. And if the legend embodied in the Epistles is not absolutely baseless, we are led by it to conceive of a time when Plato's hopes for the Hellenic world had been rudely checked,—when he was 'weary of the hateful confusion' \(^1\) of Greek politics. And what is more natural than that, at such a time, he should reconsider his whole position; and that even in bitterness and isolation, still remembering his practical aim, he should bethink him of a δεύτερος πόλις, a second best polity, which mankind might possibly receive to their advantage, though they rejected the highest and best?

For the writer of the Politicus at least, although estranged from his contemporaries, is fully bent on bettering the world through a science of Politics. And the lines sketched out by him are precisely those which Plato in his old age, with renewed calmness and mellowness of insight, carried out at length in his last great writing—the Laws \(^2\).

Protagoras. The most brilliant representative of 'ordinary thinking,' or rather of popular philosophizing, in the age of Socrates was Protagoras, whose assertion of relativity was the counterpart of Gorgias' denial of the absolute. As, in the dialogue which bears his name, he powerfully defends Hellenic education and morality against the criticism of Socrates, so here his doctrine \(^3\) is made to serve as the type of all doctrines of sensationalism and subjective relativity.

In the absence of external evidence it is difficult to determine (1) how much of what is here assigned to Protagoras is really

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\(^1\) Μεμετάμαθα τήν...πλάνην καὶ ατυχίαν. Ep. 7. 350 D.

\(^2\) For a more detailed attempt to support these views see the edition of the Sophistes and Politicus already referred to. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1867.)

\(^3\) On the real value of Protagoras' saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρων see Appendix B: also Jowett's Introduction, 2nd edition, iv. 256–9.
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his, or again (2) whether those unnamed philosophers who are called his 'disciples' were really so or not.

(1) In three places at least we may point with some confidence to traces of the real Protagoras:—(a) in the interpretation of his saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρον,—ὅσα οὐ μὲν ἢ καὶ φαινεται τοιαύτα μὲν ἐτιν ἢ μοι, οὐ δὲ σοι, τοιαύτα δὲ αἱ σοι, which recurs almost verbatim in the Cratylus, and which Plato would hardly have repeated so nearly in the same language if he were not quoting:—(b) in the defence of Protagoras (167, 8), where he contends that the bettering of mankind is possible without assuming an absolute standard of knowledge and truth;—the agreement even of the language here with the representation in the Protagoras is an 'undesigned coincidence,' which may fairly strengthen our belief in the fidelity of both:— and (c) in the confession of 'agnosticism' which is introduced casually at 162 D. So much being clear, it is natural to infer that some other points, such as the illustration of 'the wind blowing hot and cold,' may be Protagoras' own. But here it becomes impossible to speak with any approach to certainty. Of one thing, however, we may be quite certain, viz. that what Protagoras is said to have 'told as a secret,' was not to be found in his writings. When he is represented as saying that Being is an unscientific term, and should be replaced by Becoming, that is only a dialectical inference from his words¹. He had asserted the Reality of Appearance, but would have been surprised to find his assertion construed into the denial of Reality.

(2) That some actual persons are alluded to as the 'disciples of Protagoras;' and that they held a sensationalist theory, is rendered probable by the further reference, which can only be construed as a sober statement of fact, to those who maintain a modified Protagoreanism. But it would be rash to assume that the μαθηταί Πρωταγόρου held the doctrine which Plato assigns to them with anything like the clearness and consistency with which it is developed by him. It is far more probable that from scattered and inarticulate hints he has evolved the subtly woven theory which he criticises. This probability is greatly enhanced by the passage of the Sophist (246 A B) in which the contest between idealism

¹ Kennedy's Thetetetus, p. 231.
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and materialism is described. 'The idealist in defending his serene invisible height, breaks down the earthworks of his opponents bit by bit, until what they maintain for true reality (ἀληθεία) is shown by his destructive arguments as a moving process of becoming, and not as being.' This is really the manœuvre, only veiled with irony, which Plato here employs against the disciples of Protagoras. In attributing to them the refinement of acknowledging unseen processes, he 'takes them for better men than they are,' and assumes that they would make a similar admission to that which is wrung from them in Soph. 247. Those whose case is hopeless (the ἀτελεῖοι) are left out in the cold as ἀμυστολ. Plato says, in short, to the sensationalist, 'You are a kind of idealist, if you only knew it. Let me take you with me as far as you can go: and then (like the dog in Jules Verne's Voyage to the Moon) you shall be left hanging between Earth and Heaven.'

Aristippus. In favour of supposing that Aristippus was at least included amongst the men thus designated may be urged (1) the general resemblance of the doctrine of sense to later statements of Cyrenaic theory;—it is not necessary, as Peipers imagines, that the men alluded to by Plato were so thorough-going as he represents them to be:—(2) the person of Theodorus, who is connected both with Protagoras and Cyrene (not that he is himself inclined to hedonism). But this point, like many others in the historical environment of the Theætetus, must be left uncertain.

Aristippus is mentioned by name only once in Plato. In the Phædo it is emphatically remarked that he and Cleombrotus were not present at the death of Socrates. If we connect this with the strong language in which the position that pleasure is the chief good (which Aristippus held), is met in the Republic (6. 509 B: Οὐ γὰρ δήσου σὺ γε ἢδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. Ἐνθέμει, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ), it is natural to infer that he was regarded by Plato with little sympathy, and that he was probably one of those who left Socrates too early, and gave themselves the credit of their discoveries. The tone of Xenophon's representation conveys a similar impression. Attend-

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1 J. S. Mill may in like manner be said to have made admissions against which his father and Bentham (the true γρηγορεῖς) would have protested.
2 To say (with Schleiermacher) that Aristides in Theæt. 150 E is a sort of paronomasia for Aristippus may seem an extravagant suspicion, and yet it is difficult to banish it altogether.
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ing, like Socrates, to the theory of human life, of knowledge and of the chief good, he seems to have been enabled, by the impulse of Socratic inquiry, to give a philosophical form to the popular doctrine, to which his easy temper and indolent life inclined him, that the Good is nothing else but pleasure. With this he consistently enough combined the sceptical assertion, The impression of the moment is the only Knowledge. He probably supported both these principles with certain physical and logical theories: adding that nothing was by nature just, but by custom and usage, and that the same word used by different men represents a different idea.

Whether his doctrine had fully developed itself into the distinct form which is given in the Theaetetus to the hypothesis, Sense is Knowledge, it is impossible to say. That he is pointedly alluded to amongst the 'disciples of Protagoras,' if not as their chief, there seems little doubt, from what is recorded of his opinions. A comparison of the following extracts tends to establish this: although it must be remembered that the discussion of these questions by Plato and Aristotle may be supposed in some degree to modify the statements of later writers:—

Diog. L. 2. 86: Δύο πάθη ὑψιστάντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν τῷ μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τῇ ἡδονή, τῶν δὲ πόνων τραχείαν κίνησιν.


Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 7. 191: Φασίν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναίκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνονται καὶ ἀδιάψυχτα τυχάνεις, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκόσια τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτικὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψυχτον, διότι μὲν γὰρ λευκανόμεθα, φασί.

Plat. Theet. 152 D: 'Εκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἀλλαγή γίγνεται πάντα. 153 C: 'Εγὼ οὖν σου λέγω νηστείας τε καὶ γάλακτος καὶ ὅσα τουλάχιστα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἤθελικα σήμερον καὶ ἀπολλάσσει, τὰ δὲ ἔτερα σώζει;

See also Phileb. 42 E: Ρή καὶ νομιμόνι τοῦ σώματος ἐφ’ ἔκτερα .. οὖτ’ ἐν ἡδονῇ γέρνουτ’ ἢν οὐτ’ ἐν τις λύπη.

Plat. Theet. 152 C: Ἀδησθεὶς ἀρα τοῦ δῶτος δεῖ ἐστὶ καὶ ἄφενδε, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα. 157 Α B: Τὸ ποιών οὖν εἰναι τί καὶ τὸ πάσχων αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἔνδος νοσήσαι, ὡς φασίν, οὐκ εἶναι παγιώς. .. εἰ τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐθέλη κτετὸ τοῦ τούτο ποιών. 153 D: 'Ο δὴ
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καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατῶν λέγειν ἄδια-
ψευστῶς καὶ ἀνεξελέγκτως· ὅτι δὲ τὸ 
ἐμπιστούμενος τὸν πάθος λευκὸν ἔστιν 
ἡ γλυκὰ ἔστιν, οὐχ οἷον τὰ ἀποφαι-


192: Καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς 
καὶ ἱκτερῶν ὀρχαντικὸς ὑπὸ πάντων 
κυμάτων, ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμὸς ἔρυθαίται,
ό τε παραπέσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν δὲ
ὑπὸ δυοὶ κυμάτων, ὁ δὲ μεμποὺς
δισάκι ὀρᾶ τὰς Ἐθῆς καὶ διόσων
φωτάζεται τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ
τούτων τὸ μὲν ὅτι τόθε ταῖς πάθοις,
οὐκ ὁράησαι ἐκ τῶν ἠκούσας, οὐχ 
καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατον ἐστι πλέον 
τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν 
δύνασθαι.

195: Ἐνθα οὖδὲ κριτήριον φασι 
el
ναι κοινῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὄντως δὲ κοινὰ 
τίθεσθαι τοῖς κρίμασιν. 196: Δει-
κόν μὲν γὰρ τι καὶ γλυκὸ καλοῦσι 
κοινῶς πάντες, κοινῶς δὲ τὸν λευκὸν ἢ 
γλυκὸ οὐκ ἔχοντι· ἐκατοστὸς γὰρ τοῦ 
ἴδιου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

Diog. L. 2. 87: Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὖδὲ 
κατὰ μέγαρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσο-
κιαν ἢδονιν φασι ἀποτελέσσαι, ὡσπερ 
ἡμεῖς Ἐπικουρῆς, ἑκλύσεθαι γὰρ τὸ 
χρόνο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κλίμα.

Diog. L. 2. 88: Μηδὲν τε εἶναι 
φῶς τεῖ καίνης ἤ καὶ καλὸν ἢ αἰχμὸν, 
ἀλλὰ νόμος καὶ ἔθει.

The apparent force of the above parallel must be slightly quali-

fied by two observations. (1) Very similar language about the

1 This argument is met by Aristotle, 
when he is discussing the theories of 
Heraclitus and Protagoras, Met. 10. 6. 
1063 a: Ὅθεν γὰρ διαφέρειν τοὺς ἄξιον 
ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄμοι ὑπο-

Theest. 166: Αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖ 
τικὰ σοι ἡγιασθῆναι μὴν παρ-

εῖναι τὸν ἐπὶ τοιοῦτον τι ὑστα 
πάθος, οὐκ ὅτι ἐπαρχεῖ, μηκεῖ 
πᾶ-

Theest. 172: Καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἴσχρα 
καὶ δίκαια, κ.τ.λ.
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senses is ascribed to Democritus. Some of the expressions and illustrations, as well as the argument itself in different aspects, are thus proved to have had a wider currency. (2) In the early part of the Thætetus, motion is said to be good, and rest evil. In the Cyrenaic theory, and in the Philebus, three states are spoken of, smooth motion, which is pleasure, rough motion, which is pain, and the absence of both, which is a state of indifference, 'like the sea in a calm.'

But while these considerations should be allowed their full weight, it must be remembered that Aristippus and those who thought with him did resolve knowledge into shifting impressions of a changing world. And here the parallel of the Philebus affords a strong confirmation of the hypothesis we are considering. Nothing was more natural than that the boy Thætetus should attribute certainty to momentary impressions, and that the boy Philebus should petulantly assert that pleasure is the only good. Each in doing so presents a different aspect of a necessary phase of mind. But when they both (or rather Socrates for them) attempt to strengthen their theory by a peculiar doctrine of motion, which, however popular, must have had limits to its reception, it becomes highly probable that the two speakers drew some of their inspiration from a third, who is found to have upheld both pleasure and sensation, and to have supported them with this same doctrine of motion.

There remains therefore some ground for the hypothesis that, in the earlier part of this dialogue, Plato has these Pseudo-Socrates in his eye, together possibly with others. Whether Aristippus was really, or only by implication, a 'disciple of Protagoras,' and whether or not he consciously based his doctrine on the Heraclitean theory of the Universe, are questions which it is wisest to leave undecided.

It is more distinctly obvious that throughout the dialogue Megarians Plato is holding close converse with his friends of Megara. The elenchus of Socrates is whetted for the occasion by contact with Megarian logic. Both in the attack upon Protagoras and in his defence, weapons are plied which bear the distinct brand of that neighbouring workshop, and it is often hard to say whether Plato is laughing most at the doctrine refuted or at the method of the refutation. For reasons which will appear presently it suited his purpose to make the 'negative arm' preponderate in this dialogue. And the Megarian dialectic was adapted to this aim.
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It may be noticed generally, that there is a peculiarity in Plato's manner of alluding to the thinkers of his own time. He speaks not of definite schools, but of 'a certain theory,' or of 'certain men.' We do not read of the friends of Antisthenes, or the disciples of Aristippos, or of Euclides and his band (οι ἰσόζη Ἐυκλέαθον), but 'I have met many such men,' 'there are numbers who keep saying this,' or more familiarly, 'there are certain refined persons, to whom we must show courtesy.' Allowance must no doubt be made for the natural reticence of Plato, and for the irony of the philosopher, who 'knows nothing' of his neighbour.' But it is also reasonable to infer that the schools which claimed affinity with Socrates were only in process of formation, and that their boundaries were not yet well defined. It is from later writers, and not from Plato, that we learn which of the other philosophers then living exercised an influence that could survive their age.

Euclides. Euclides of Megara, Plato's contemporary and fellow-disciple, seems in his method to have combined the negative dialectic of the Elatics with the cross-questioning and with the ethical definitions of Socrates. The dialogue, written and spoken, seems to have assumed with him something of a controversial form. His ἱροτροπία must have been more earnest and philosophical than the vulgar ἀντιλογία so often ridiculed by Plato; but it was subject to the same defects, though in a less degree. We are told further, that he used to attack the conclusion and not the premises of an opponent.—One other fragment of his logic remains. He is said to have objected to definition by comparison, because if things are unlike, they should not be compared; and if like, it is better to deal with the thing itself than its resemblances

The centre of his positive teaching was the Good, which he said was one, called by many names, as Wisdom, God, Intelligence; and to what was opposed to this he denied existence. Here also the teaching of Socrates is engrafted on that of Parmenides and Zeno. The One Being, which is above growth and decay, is to be sought for, not in the universe, but in wisdom, the mind, and virtue. The non-existent is that which is opposite to, or other than the Good.

His theory of knowledge was probably less absolute than that of Parmenides, denying reality to the impressions of sense, but relying upon a sort of dialectic and upon certain ideas or forms, amongst which some diversity was allowed, so far at least as they entered into human language.

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It is not easy to determine to what extent the teaching of Euclides contained the germs of the sophisms of Eubulides, or of the paradoxes of Diodorus and Stilpo. If it had such a tendency, he must have approached Antisthenes more nearly than would otherwise appear. It seems not unreasonable, however, to suppose that Eubulides may have introduced a new element into the Megarian school. At all events he gave a new and not altogether wholesome impulse to its paradoxical side.

The following are the chief points in which the Theaetetus affords indications of its connection with the school of Megara.

1. Its controversial tone.

Socrates more than once expresses the consciousness of such a tendency. We start indeed with the virtuous determination to conduct the argument, not as professors of word-fencing, but as lovers of knowledge, and yet presently we find ourselves in danger of being on a par with 'those skilful men.' Protagoras is imagined as reiterating this reproach, and confirming it by the reflection, which is dwelt upon also in the Phædo, that controversy leads to the hatred of inquiry. We are moreover oppressed throughout the discussion with the fear of an imaginary adversary, skilled at the same sophistical weapons. And on reflecting, at each stage of the argument, what it is that has ruled throughout, and that remains triumphant, we are compelled to answer 'a negative dialectic.' The first impression of the youth, the maxims of the old philosophers, even our second thoughts and the strained effort of the imagination to substantiate them, are raised, only to be parted from the sphere of knowledge by this sharp weapon; which in another aspect is the liberating though still dividing instrument of the man-widwife Socrates. In this sense the Theaetetus may fairly be regarded as an 'eristic' or Megarian dialogue; since, although it is no mere sophistical sham-fight, it is characterized by the predominance of that dialectical exercise which consists in refuting theories. This is noticed by Plato himself in the passages just referred to, and is implied in the image of μακέρως.

And the form of refutation used corresponds to that 'reductio ad absurdum' which is described as characteristic of Euclides. In each case the proof is not impugned, but the thing proved is laid hold of and annihilated. Man is not the measure, for, if so, then why not every other creature endowed with sense? Motion cannot be the sole principle, for, if so, language would be impossible. Protagoras is made to object to this mode of treatment. Socrates imagines him as challenging them to disprove his premiss, and complaining that they use only negative proof.

1 Theaet. 164 D. 2 200 A–C.
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(a) Besides this correspondence of method, there are also some coincidences of idea.

(b) The turning-point of the whole dialogue, the fulcrum, by means of which the mind is finally lifted out of the region of sense, is the mention of the good, or expedient, which Theætetus had at first unwarily included amongst the things which are not, but become. The knowledge of what is good cannot be resolved into sensation, nor into those motions on which the doctrine of sense was founded, because it regards the future.

This thought arises simultaneously with the eloquent digression, in which a just and holy life accompanied with wisdom (μετὰ φρονήσεως) is set forth as the way from Earth to Heaven. And the form in which this idea of good occurs, is not transcendent, as in the Republic, nor, as in the Philebus, arrived at by a process of reasoning upon the combination of finite and infinite in the world. It is more simple and Socratic than in either of these. And while it is conceived of as one, Socrates is not afraid of varying the name (ἄγαθον, καλὸν, ἀφιεμένον, δίκαιον, δόσιον, φρόνησις).

(b) In its general aspect the Theætetus affords only a partial escape from the relative world of sense and opinion towards absolute being, terminating with the conception of λόγος as definition by the distinctive difference. Where it may be noticed, by the way, that the stress laid upon the perception of individual peculiarities (πρῶς ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων... δαφυρῶν τι μημείον... κατάδητα) is parallel to the saying of Euclides, that comparison does not convey knowledge.

This intermediate character of the Theætetus is indicated by Plato's own remark, that we are wavering between two factions, not siding wholly with either. Such a position is still in harmony with the philosophy of Euclides, who made some attempt to hold unity and diversity in solution together, and who rested ultimately on some form of reasoning (λόγος). It may be added, that the two conceptions with which the dialogue closes, of the separation of a whole into its elementary parts, and of the power of distinguishing the thing in question from all others, belong to the tendency combated in the Sophist, but more or less embodied in the Theætetus, to acquiesce in difference, falling short of the highest unity.

(c) In one or two points we are reminded of the later Megarian subtleties, and are led to suspect that they may have had their counterpart in the school of Euclides.

The humorous account of the man, from whom there is no escape, who shuts your eye, and asks if you see his cloak with it, may be

1 509: Οὐκ οὖσαι δότος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἱσθενεία τῆς οὖσαι πρεσβείας καὶ δυνάμει ἑπεράχονται.
2 165 B.
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compared with the ἐγκακλυμμένος of Eubulides. And when we are asked whether any one ever said to himself τὸ ἐτέρον ἕτερον εἶπαι ¹, we may find a later parallel in the paradox of Stilpo, ἐτέρον ἕτερον μὴ κατηγορεῖσθα. Such casual hints confirm the suspicion that the tendency already existed at Megara, though in a milder form than afterwards, 'to part everything from everything,' τὸ διαλύειν ἐκαστὸν ἀπὸ πάντων (Soph. 259 E). A more pleasing instance of the same analytical bias appears in the three φάσματα ² or axioms of the mind, by which it suffers itself to be bound; or in the repeated difficulty, Ἀρ' οἶον τε τὸν εἴδωτα μὴ εἴδειναι, which in fact underlies many of the later paradoxes.

There is often no more satisfactory account to be given of variations and inconsistencies in Plato, than that in different dialogues he is consciously approaching and examining different contemporary theories, adopting their tone, putting on their dress, as it were proving their armour, not without a latent confidence in the unaided strength of Mind.

This philosophical side of the dramatic genius of Plato is as real as and more important than the poetical. The dialogue is not only a convenient artistic form for bringing out the different aspects of a question; Plato is himself continually holding converse with some one: and dramatic propriety is preserved not only in minute points, but in the tone pervading a whole dialogue. Those in which an Eleatic stranger is the chief spokesman may still be Plato's, although they seem pervaded by a pedantic consciousness of method not found in others: a similar remark applies to the Parmenides: and even amongst those in which Socrates holds the first place a marked difference is perceptible; which may be accounted for by saying, (1) that Socrates is not Socrates, but Plato becoming all things to all philosophies: (2) that Socrates is not altogether Plato, but a part-representation, part-creation of Plato's, which he contemplates and converses with, and even criticises: (3) that Socrates himself has different faces, reflected partially in his different followers, the most characteristic of which, the negative 'elenchus,' was reflected in Euclides of Megara.

Recent critics, both in England and Germany, have denied all connection between the part played by Euclides in the Preface and the Megarian element of the dialogue which is generally admitted. And yet the significance of such indications in other dialogues can hardly be questioned.

¹ 190 Α. ² 155 Α.
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The prominence of Simmias and other Pythagorizing Socrates in the Phædo affords an obvious parallel. And supposing that the Preface were merely equivalent to a dedication, even a dedication often implies the acknowledgment of special affinities. That one motive is to awaken interest in the person of Theàtetus is perfectly true; but this could have been done equally by other means, for Theàtetus had many friends in Athens. In representing this dialogue as having been preserved and read at Megara by the head of the Megarian school, Plato makes a departure from his usual practice analogous to the more striking innovation of making a friend from Elea the chief speaker in the dialogues which follow.

Plato's criticism of Protagoras, both here and in the Protagoras, is friendly and respectful,—rather indicating certain necessary stages in the pursuit of truth, than destroying fatal error. But for other professed thinkers he has less tolerance. And if it were possible to ascertain who those were with whom he found it impossible to argue,—who were beyond the pale of dialectic, in short,—the fact would be of no less interest than the evidence of his close intercourse with the school of Megara.

(1) Of the enthusiasts of Ephesus, who profess to be deeply read in the wisdom of Heraclitus, it is unnecessary to say more than is contained in the description of Theodorus, whose exact soul is naturally vexed by their inconsecutiveness. 'They support their master's theory of a flux, only by the absence of fixity in their own thoughts. They are fond of explaining "ignotum per ignotius;" each follows his own inward light, regardless of the rest, and every one of them despises his fellow.' This picture, the oriental features of which are noticeable, may be illustrated from the Cratylus,—which is partly written in imitation of the same school,—where Socrates professes himself puzzled to determine what is intended by their symbol, Fire. By one it is interpreted to mean the Sun, by another the principle of Heat, by another Mind.

(2) The Cynics are probably the ὄψιαθεῖς of Soph. 251,
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who are admitted to discussion *ex gratia* for form's sake, who deny predication, and 'will not have it that a man is to be called good. Man, they insist, is man, and good is good.' And it has been usual to identify these persons with the men from whom Socrates has heard 'in a dream' that prime elements cannot be defined. But the latter doctrine is surely very different from such crude nominalism, and belongs to some one who believed too much rather than too little in the 'formal cause,' since he asserts that the essence which corresponds to definition is a definite ratio between units which are indefinable. The opinion quoted, if properly examined, is not a denial of predication, but rather the denial that anything can be predicated of the prime elements, ἐξ δὲ ἡμεῖς τε ἰγκείμεθα καὶ τἀλλα, which is by no means the same thing, and merely amounts to saying that matter is formless, or that substance in the abstract is without attributes.

The conjecture which identifies notions so different would hardly have been entertained but for some misunderstanding of a passage of Aristotle, Metaph. 2. 3. 1043 b, where 'the Antisthenians and such rude persons' are mentioned in connection with a theory of essence as a complex (συλλαβή) of elements (ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων). Aristotle says that his own view, in which ὀνόμα is the concrete, of which matter and form are the component elements, may be thought to give a certain colour to the error of those coarse thinkers who denied the possibility of definition. But ὀνόμα (the object of definition) is really neither matter nor form, although these elements in their separate abstractedness are indefinable.

Aristotle in writing thus may have had this part of the Theætetus in his mind. But the allusion to the Cynics is a mere excrescence on his argument, and, if closely examined, is seen to have but a remote bearing on the distinction of στοιχεῖων and συλλαβή. A suggestion put forth by the present editor in 1861 is more defensible, viz. that Socrates here as in other places, where he 'speaks from hearsay' (Phæd. 62, Phil. 20), is quoting some Pythagorean. The whole tenor of the passage, and the illustrations from number, measure, and music in the pages which follow, are in favour of this. He and Theætetus, however, have not heard from

1 201, 2.

d 2
the same source, and the man who, using the term ἐπωνυμά, said that what was definable was knowable, but that the undefinable was also unknowable, must have been a Socratic philosopher, and probably (as Schleiermacher also thought) was a Megarian.

Another thesis of Antisthenes, the denial of contradiction, μὴ εἰσαι ἀντιλέγειν, has a certain bearing on several parts of the Theàetetus, and in particular on the question, 'Is false opinion possible?' But a fallacy which entered so deeply into all the controversies of the time, and which Socrates acknowledges to have had a disturbing influence on his own (i.e. on Plato's) mind, is not to be exclusively attributed to men of whom Plato speaks as he does of the ὑμαθείς in the Sophist. It is safer and more profitable to pass by Antisthenes and his master Gorgias, and to refer the fallacy at once to its origin in the Eleatic logic. The same may be said of the 'eristic' difficulty which occurs both here and in the Meno, 'How will you inquire about that which you do not know?'

If the deniers of predication, who are introduced under protest, in Soph. 251, are the followers of Antisthenes, it is beforehand highly improbable that the same persons had been spoken of under another aspect in Soph. 246. And if it is true that the Cynics preferred logical and ethical discussion to physical inquiries, their nominalism can hardly be made to represent downright materialism. Thus, on two independent grounds, it is unlikely that the ἄνθρωπος of the Sophist, and the σκληροί καὶ ἀντίτυποι ἄνθρωποι of Theàet. 155 E, who are, to say the least, closely related to each other, have any connection with Antisthenes.

More features of the personal character of Antisthenes are preserved than of Euclides and Aristippus, but fewer of his philosophy. From the way in which the grave Xenophon treats him, and from the calm epithets of Aristotle, he seems to have been the butt of the Socratic school, a sort of mixture of Ajax and Thersites. He regarded Socrates with a rude half-appreciating fondness, which was reciprocated with good-humoured pleasantry. But he boasted, justly enough, of a certain strength of character, which was in fact the piece of Socrates that was continued in him. He is praised for his pure and nervous Attic style, of which we have a specimen,
possibly genuine, in a rhetorical contest between Ajax and Ulysses. His genius, however, seems to have been opposed to abstract speculation. Hence he followed rather the form than the spirit of the Socratic teaching, both on human life and on the significance of terms. His views on the latter subject were probably influenced also by his previous intercourse with Gorgias.

There are, as might have been expected, several points of outward coincidence between his teaching and that of Euclides on the ethical side. They agree that virtue is one, that wisdom (φρόνησις) is the chief good, and so on.

But the dialectic of Antisthenes seems to have been at once more rhetorical and more sceptical: approaching much more nearly to the later Megarian paradoxes, with which it finally coalesced in the teaching of the Stoics. He has been called a materialist, and no doubt the term applies to him so far as he denied ideas, but his scepticism had nothing to do with physical inquiries, which he abjured. It was a part-practical, part-logical nominalism. ‘I see a horse, equine properties I cannot see.’—‘There is only one term applicable to one thing’¹. Hence controversy is impossible, and every assertion equally true. Definition is only a complex term ², and accordingly no single thing can be defined, except in the imperfect way of comparison. You cannot say what a thing is, except by naming it, but only what it is like. Connected in some way with this theory was the saying, in which he agrees with Prodicus, that the first principle of education is the study of names. He was thus related to Aristippus in philosophy much as Gorgias had been to Protagoras: denying the absolute, while the other asserted the relative,—or rather contending that nothing existed absolutely but facts and individual things.

The one great philosophy of which Plato takes no account is Atomism. Democritus, though a contemporary of Socrates,¹

¹ See Ἰσοκράτης Ἐν Ελευσίνας ἐγκώμιον ad init. καταγεγράφασιν οἱ μὲν οὗ φασ- κότες ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἑβδώμην λέγειν, οὐδὲ ἄντιλέγειν, οὐδὲ δύο λόγων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν προκαλύπτων αὐτὴν, οἱ δὲ διεξ- ἐντεῖς ὥς ἀνθρώπως οὐδέν καὶ διακατοῦν ταύταν ἐπιστήμην καὶ ὁμοιότατον ἵστον. Socrates seems to be alluded to in the latter part of this. In the former part Protagoras and Anti- sthenes seem to be opposed.

² Μακρὸς λόγος. In which there is probably the same derisive force as in Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος, ὅσα μητίν ὑγίᾳ λέγεσιν, Δι. Μετ. Ν. 3.
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and Protagoras, is nowhere named by him, although he is continually quoted by Aristotle, who speaks of him as 'comprising in his definitions the material only.' The question is at least worth raising, whether the believers in gross matter, whose views Plato felt to be so alien to his own, were followers of Democritus and Leucippus in whole or in part. If the passage of the Theætæus only were in question, the 'uninitiated' might be supposed to be mere ordinary thinkers, the unregenerate mass of mankind. But the men in the Sophist are clearly philosophers who are ready to maintain their principles against the world, although the description may be generalized from more than one school.

The supposition that the Atomists are referred to in these passages has been rejected on the ground that according to Ar. Met. 1. 4, in upholding their 'Void,' they asserted the existence of 'Not-Being,' and not-being is of course bodiless and unseen.

The collection of the very numerous allusions to Democritus in Aristotle would be a valuable contribution to the History of the earlier Greek Philosophy. They would be found to present the student with this difficulty, that while occasionally, as in the passage above quoted, the Atomistic doctrine is spoken of as a kind of purely speculative dualism, it is much more frequently referred to in terms which indicate a distinctly physical theory. It is happily unnecessary to argue here at length a point which has been clearly established by Dr. Zeller in his History of Greek Philosophy (2nd edition), that the chief characteristic of the Atomistic philosophy from the first was the firm grasp with which it held the ideas (which to most contemporary schools were so unreal) of space, extension, solidity, and weight.

It is not hard to believe that the abstract foundation of mechanical science should thus have been laid in an age when geometry was rapidly growing to maturity: the real difficulty for us is to conceive in what manner a mechanical theory was united with, if not occasioned by, the dialectical recoil from the Eleatic Undivided Whole. Yet in the earlier stages even of modern science such a confusion of physic and metaphysic was not impossible. The 'Plenum' of Descartes has probably not been without its influence on the Interpretation of Nature.
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The Absolute Being of the Eleatics, although the object of Pure Mind and identical with it, was not yet free from the associations of extension. 'Being is full of being, it is continuous, for being touches being.' Against this aspect of their doctrine the polemic of the Atomists was directed, when they asserted the existence of the non-existent. It was the non-existent, as the space in which the existent moves: and their Existence, while uncreated and unchangeable, was also that which has extension, solidity, and weight. Parmenides and Democritus both sought for something absolute behind phenomena: the Eleatic found it in the Unity of Being: the Atomist resolved this into Space and body. The relations between these made it possible to conceive of motion and of primordial differences of bulk and form.—The weight of atoms of equal bulk was supposed uniform.—All else was relative and subjective (νόμφ): depending on the impression produced on us by the Atoms in various combinations.

How far is this view of their theory consistent with the conjecture that some friends of Democritus may be alluded to in the passages of the Theætetus and Sophist already mentioned?

(1) It does not seem impossible that Plato should accuse such persons of denying the existence of anything 'bodiless' or 'unseen.' For the 'bodiless existence' which they are represented as denying is the 'immaterial essence' of the ἐλαχιστον φλοιον; and the 'unseen process,' which they will not believe in, is the movement of the Heraclitean fire which annihilates all that is stable or tangible. Both these are very different from the 'void space' of the Atomist, which is only asserted as the necessary condition of matter and motion. And (except polemically) he would rather say that ἄτομον and κενόν together constitute the reality of sensible existence, than that Being exists and Not-being also exists. Aristotle speaks of the Atomistic principle as το ὑποκειμένου σώμα. And this, to use Plato's language, is at least κατὰ φύσιν ὀρατόν (Tim. 30 B).

(2) A presumption in favour of such an allusion is afforded by the manner in which the sense of touch and of resistance is dwelt upon. It is true that the atoms could not literally
be either seen or handled: but they had all the mechanical properties of things visible and tangible, and Plato was at least as likely as Aristotle to represent them as the objects of sense. See Ar. de Sensu, 4: ημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείονες τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατον τι ποιοῦσιν: πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπὰ ποιοῦσιν.

The sense of touch or resistance (which the Ancients hardly distinguished) is naturally referred to those 'primary' qualities of body which the Atomists upheld. Now these are dwelt upon in the two passages in question more than in the whole discussion of the doctrine of sense in the Thesetetos, and in language which is much more suggestive of something hard. Note especially the words, Theset. 155 E: Ἄπριξ τῶν χερῶν λαβέσθαι. Soph. 246: Εἰς γῆν... ἔκουσι, ταῖς χεροῖς ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ ποιοῦτων ἐφαινόμενοι πάντων δύσχυρον τοῦτ’ εἶναι μόνον δ’ παρέχει προσβολῆν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα. 247: Πότερον ὅρατὸν καὶ ἄπτόν τι αὐτῶν; Ιb.: Πᾶν δ’ μὴ δυνατοί ταῖς χεραί συμπεπέζειν εἰσὶ.

(3) It may be observed further that in the Sophist the men are driven into a corner by being pressed to define (a) whether the Soul is material, which they are not afraid to admit, and (b) whether justice and wisdom are so. Might not this mode of attack be suggested to a Socratic philosopher by the apparent contradiction between the moral sayings of Democritus and his material system?

The materialists are then imagined as retiring upon a more abstract conception of Being:—‘Everything in which there is either an active or a passive power;’—i.e. they are supposed to rise from the idea of matter to that of force. The tendency thus recognized surely indicates a different materialism from that of Antisthenes, and the close sequence of the reasoning by which it is developed is not unworthy of the tenacity and penetration which seem to be justly ascribed to Democritus. See Ar. de An. 1. 2: ημόκριτος περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων γλαφυρωτέρας ἐρηκεν:—an expression which anticipates Bacon’s praise of him.

(4) It may be urged against the above conjecture (a) that, although Democritus might fairly (from Plato’s standpoint) be called ἄμονος, as the spirit of his inquiry was alien to
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rhetoric and poetry, and ὀμόνης, for he is known to have written against the Protagorean maxim, yet the imputation of coarseness which Plato's picture conveys could not attach to him.—This objection may be partly met, however, by supposing his theory to have degenerated in the hands of his followers.—(b) That the elenchus of the εἶδων φῶς is described as levelled at the ἀλήθεια of these materialists, who would thus seem to be identified with the disciples of Protagoras in the Theaetetus. To which it may be replied, that the account in the Sophist appears to be generalized from more schools than one, not all of whom would deserve the title of 'sprung from the ground' (σπαρτοὶ καὶ ἀλήθεια). This last therefore alone strictly answers to the title 'hard and repellent' in the Theaetetus. The difficulty must, however, be acknowledged, and it remains, whatever hypothesis with regard to the allusion is adopted 1.

If these passages really contain any allusion even to degenerate followers of Democritus (who might be related to him as the Ephesian enthusiasts to Heraclitus), the fact is interesting as confirming the anticipation that no Greek thought of any permanent value failed to obtain some recognition from Plato, though it might be recognized only to be rejected. We are also reminded of Aristotle's saying, that Plato's dialectical bias unfitted him for physical studies; and of Lord Bacon's, that Time brings down the lighter goods of antiquity but drowns what is of solid worth, which may be thought no unfitting comment from the physical point of view.

(5) Democritus would also rank with those who argued from dreams and madness that nothing which appears is real (οὐδὲν ἰῶν φαύλεται ἐῶς) 2.

Plato's relation to other Greek thinkers, although of great importance, especially in connection with the dialectical dia-

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1 Another ἀλήθεια is spoken of in the Cratylus, which may perhaps be that of Antisthenes, but the reference there is evidently to a logical and not a physical theory.

2 It is possible that the δυσχερείς of the Philebus, 44, 46, who are said to be very clever in physical science, and have an account to give of pleasure while they deny its reality, may also have been in some way related to the Atomistic school. Compare, for instance, the fragment Συμμετοχὴς Συμμετοχής τὴν ἡμείς, κ.τ.λ. and the minute way in which the causes of sensation are analyzed by Democritus while its reality is denied: also the words τὰ ἀνακρίματα διαβηκεῖν ἤ τὰ διακρίματα αναγείρειν, Phil. 46 ad fin.
logues, ought not to be conceived of in a narrow or literal way. Contemporary theories must not be suffered to crowd in upon him, so as to cramp the freedom and originality of his thoughts, of which they are not the substance but the occasion. It may be impossible always to trace the threads which he has taken up and woven into the fabric of his philosophy, but this defect in our knowledge need seldom leave us in doubt of his meaning. He views existing opinions in different lights and in different combinations as he moves amongst them, just as natural objects group themselves differently according to the point at which we stand. The materialist and sensationalist, who in the Theætetus are ironically contrasted, in the Sophist appear to be combined as the enemies of ideas, differing only in the degree of their unregenerate hardness. In the Cratylus, again, Heraclitus and Protagoras are opposed.

Plato had certain men in his eye, but what interested him far more were the different aspects of philosophy. And these could not be limited to this or that individual, or extended so as to embrace his inconsistencies. A great name in the past might be wholly identified with one of the great streams of thought; but from the speculative height whence Plato surveyed the present, rival doctrines might at one time be generalized in a single view, and at another time by a change of position might be seen as wholly distinct.

The general significance of the Theætetus has been fully treated by Professor Jowett in his Introduction. In what follows I propose to touch separately on the following points: (1) Philosophy and Education, (2) The Doctrine of Sense, (3) Plato’s appeal to Experience, (4) the Ideas as Categories, (5) Connection of Theætetus, Sophistes, Politicus, (6) Plato’s psychology, (7) The digression or episode in pp. 172–7, (8) The date assigned by Plato to the reading of the dialogue at the house of Euclides.

The discussion of these topics will give an opportunity of illustrating the Theætetus from other dialogues besides those already quoted.
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1. Philosophy in Plato is inseparable from the higher education, i.e. from the evolution of true thought by the action of mind on mind. This general notion is expressed under various imagery, in each case symbolizing the development of an inherent power. (a) ἀνάμυνησις (Meno, Phædo, Phædrus). The soul is led by questions, or by the sense of imperfection, or by the vision of beauty, or by intercourse with a sympathetic mind, to the reminiscence of ideas or of an ideal, perceived by her in her prenatal state. (b) τόκος ἐν καλῳ (Symp.). The soul of man when he approaches maturity aspires to break the limits of the individual being. This is a kind of puberty or potential pregnancy of the soul, which, through contact with what is beautiful either in persons, actions, or thoughts, attains to the object of her longing, the birth of lasting truth. (c) κάθαρσις, λάρυξ (Phædo, Republic). The soul is bound by the force of desire in a prison of sense, until philosophy or dialectic gradually breaks her bonds, and purifies her from the earthly elements amidst which she has been compelled to live, and also lifts the eye of the soul from looking downwards on dark shadows to contemplate the ideas, as they are illumined by the good. Then thought attains its highest energy, the light within is married to its kindred light, and Reason and Truth are born. (d) Harmonic motion (Timæus). The soul is plunged in a turbid stream of growth and decay, and the circle of the Diverse in her is wheeling all ways, until she is steadied by the perception of number in the movements of the planets as organs of Time, and this perception gives predominance to the motion of the Same in her.

The humorous image of μακευρική, 'the art of delivering,' which is peculiar to the Theætetus, brings several of these different figures into a single form. It combines more completely than any of them the positive and negative aspect of the elenchus, the stimulating and the benumbing effect of Socrates. These no longer appear separately, as in the Charmides and Meno, but exist together in harmonious unity. The Charmides ends with the contradiction that temperance or modesty is inconceivable, and yet Charmides, the modest youth, is ready to commit violence upon Socrates, that he may gain modesty from him.
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(a) Theætetus, like the slave in the Meno, is led by questions to express what is not merely his own private thought, but, as appears from the history of Philosophy, a necessary step in the progress from unconsciousness to the possession of truth. As each hypothesis is evolved and put away, he is prepared and induced to rise naturally to the stage next following. And as he becomes more aware of the difficulty of the subject, he is more eager to proceed with the inquiry.

Socrates, who has the discernment of spirits which the Phædrus requires in the educator, perceives in Theætetus the true philosophic nature. Although 'there is no reason to doubt that Theætetus was a real person,' yet we may suppose that, like Socrates, he is more or less idealized. The qualities which are postulated in the sixth book of the Republic as necessary for the pupils of philosophy are one and all expressly attributed to him. And when he acknowledges the unity of the mind as the organ for perceiving general truths, Socrates—although the features of the youth are far from regular—declares him to be beautiful as well as good. On the other hand, the figure of Socrates himself, as the man-midwife, combines with the familiar characteristics of the real man much that is Platonic and ideal. Whilst he holds in reserve the sharp dividing instrument of the Elenchus, which separates between the mind and her offspring and discerns the false birth from the true, he also presides, as the Spirit of Dialectic, over the mental intercourse which alone can satisfy the legitimate longings of the soul.

(b) The condition which Socrates by his art perceives in Theætetus, is that on which Diotima expatiates in the Symposium:—κνοών γάρ, ἐφη, ὧν Σώκρατες, πάντες ἀνθρώποι . . ., καὶ ἐπιδόν ἐν τινὶ ἡλικίᾳ γένονται, τίκτειν ἐπιχειρεῖ ἠμῶν ἢ φῶσις. The signs of this travail (which Socrates alternately aggravates and allays) are the discontented consciousness of ignorance and the irrepressible desire of knowing the Truth. In Theætetus it already takes the highest form, not love or ambition, but a passion for ideas, and Socrates, with a skill which is comparable to that of Diotima, sets before him successive courses of wisdom, which excite or slake his

\[1\] Jowett's Plato, iv. 226.
'fancies,' but do not appease them. The humour of this conception is kept up to the end.\(^1\)

(c) At the same time Socrates is liberating Theætetus from the prison of sense and clearing his vision that he may look steadily at the Ideas.

At first he is only permitted to distinguish each individual sensation from every other, though binding them together in bundles for the convenience of naming them. Presently, perception and memory are shown to be separable from sensation; but they are still occasioned by it. The bonds are further loosened by the observation that in judging what is expedient for the future, the present impression of sense is worthless in comparison with reflection: but still the future is relative to the present and the past, and the test of past wisdom is the impression of the moment when it arrives.—Theætetus now seizes the great truth that the mind does perceive some things (unity, number, sameness, difference, etc.), without the instrumentality of the senses; but still it perceives them as attributes of the object of sense. Further inquiry is made into this process of thought. The mind can think truly and also falsely. What difference is implied in this? An attempt is made to conceive of it by reasoning from an abstract alternative,—(knowledge or ignorance, being or not-being), but we are compelled to fall back upon the conception of a process between sensation and the recollection of former sensations, or between different abstractions of the world of sense laid up in the memory. Lastly, there is allowed to float before the mind the thought of an abstract whole; first as consisting of the combination of indefinite elements, then as an indivisible elementary unit arising out of them. But if the combination is known, the elements must also be known. And even the power of analysis is an inadequate test of Knowledge. Nor is the desired criterion fully attained, even when the complete whole

\(^1\) In the notes on p. 143 a doubt has been raised concerning the description of the appearance of Socrates, which adds piquancy to the humorous image of his 'art,'—viz. whether τὸ ἀλῶ τῶν ὄμματων means 'prominence of the eyes,' or 'width between the eyes.' It is true that in Xen. Equ. 1, 9 ἀλῶ is opposed to κολλόφθαλμος. But in Ar. H. A. i. 3. 5 the words ἀλῶ and ἀλός seem to refer more naturally to the position of the eyes in the face. And the new meaning suggested is rather more in accordance with the allusions in Aristophanes and in Plato's Symposium.
which is the object of thought, has been distinguished, by its characteristic difference, from every other.

Socrates (in the language of Rep. B. 7) has gone down into the cave, and is leading Theætetus upwards, step by step, till towards the end he gives him just a far-off glimpse of the summit to be attained hereafter,—μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐν τῇ γεγονός εἴδος, ἰδέαν μὲν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ ἐχόν. But he is not himself groping his way. Each footstep is firmly planted, as by one who has tried every inch of the path and knows the country well. In other words, Plato is no longer satisfied with anticipations of truth, but is striving to bridge the chasm between ideas and facts, between crude experience and complete theory. But of this more presently. Here only remains to say (α) that in this upward progress that which most steadies the thought of Theætetus, who is a trained geometer, is the perception of number and an adumbration of the idea of good.

2. Much of what is rejected in the Theætetus as a theory of Knowledge reappears in the Timeus as a 'probable' account of the physiology of sense. The same interflow of active and passive motions, especially in vision, of which the same phenomena are mentioned, the carrying about of qualities from place to place, and several points even of minute terminology, are repeated there. This helps to show that the theory here developed as that of the disciples of Protagoras who rest their doctrine on Heraclitean principles, is not a mere occasional Essay written for the special purpose of this dialogue, but a serious piece of work having a real place in the history of thought.

There is one point of this doctrine as stated in the Theætetus, on which some obscurity still rests, between quicker and slower motions in 156 C D. The text is not quite free from uncertainty, although Cornarius is probably a consequence and not merely a cause of confused interpretation. The Scholiast not unnaturally understood the slower motions to be the sight and taste as distinguished from those of touch and hearing. Sight might naturally be supposed to have more of fire, and more of the nature of earth. But this distinction has evanescence to what precedes, and is nowhere applied in
what follows. And in the MS. text the words φέρεται γάρ . . πέφυκεν appear to refer, not to all the motions, but to the swifter only. Now in the example of wine being distasteful to the sick palate (159 D), the term φέρεσθαι, which is here introduced in formulating the theory, is deliberately applied. So that if the MSS. are right, the sensation of taste is not one of the slower motions. And the same illustration makes it manifest that in any case the subject and object, πᾶσχον and ποιοῦν, on the one hand, and on the other hand the sensation and quality together, are opposed, if not as slow and swift, yet certainly as producer and produced (γεννῶντα καὶ γεννῶμενα). And the word παριστάζω, which belongs to the slower elements, is applied not to the tongue, but to the eye.

Recent editors are agreed (even Dr. Kennedy yielding a doubtful assent) in adopting another interpretation, according to which the slower elements are the ποιοῦντα and πᾶσχοντα, the quicker elements being the qualities and sensations. Professor Kennedy's doubt is thus expressed: 'I am unable to discern the use of discriminating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and swiftness.' This remark hits the point of the obscurity, and ought to be met. The answer turns upon the motive which Socrates here attributes to the Protagoreans, viz. to develop a sensational doctrine that shall not too obviously violate common experience. With this motive, for example, they are supposed to invent the term ἄθροισμα, and to speak of each kind of concrete objects as 'an aggregate of motions.' Thus, to speak with Aristotle for the sake of clearness, they get rid of the categories of quantity and quality. But there is another category, not less surely given in experience, which they find it still more difficult to dispose of, the category of substance. There is an ineradicable prejudice in favour of thinking that I am more lasting than my impressions, the chameleon than his colours, the moon than her phases, etc. Thus, when sensations and attributes have been shown to be ever so momentary, the doubt lingers, whether there is not still something permanent, viz. the subject and object in which these severally inhere (in the language of Scoto-German Metaphysics, the Ego and the External World). To which doubt the theorists reply by saying, 'Oh, substance is only a slower motion.' It would
have been clearer certainly to have introduced the distinction between ἀλλοὶωσις and φορά, and to have said expressly that substance is altered, while sensation and quality are in locomotion. But this distinction is wanted afterwards for a serious use, and would have taken from the humour of the present passage, where the Protagorean is represented as simply bent on reducing all as far as possible to motion as such. Where he is obliged to admit a difference, it suits his purpose to call it a difference of degree. For it is not his cue in any case to recognize differences of kind. But the implied admission is turned against him by the Elenchus in the passage referred to (181 D).

Mr. J. S. Mill’s ‘Permanent Possibilities’ may be cited as a metaphysical expedient having a similar motive.

3. Plato is well aware that philosophy, to be fruitful, must begin and end with experience. This is the note, which chiefly distinguishes his method, not only from the dogmatic anticipations of the fifth century, but still more from the comparatively barren idealism of his Megarian friends. The whole spirit of Socrates, with his common instances and his resolute preference for human questions, in spite of his love of paradox, pointed in this direction. And the reader of the Platonic dialogues is often surprised, when he seems to have been carried into a region of mere abstractions, to be suddenly met by an argument drawn directly from the facts of ordinary life. The truth is that Plato is perpetually striving to reconcile thought with reality both in the individual and in the world. And although in spite of all his efforts his thought remains abstract still, and never entirely penetrates the subtlety of Nature, he continually acknowledges in practice that while all things are to be tested by logic, the conclusions of logic must be tested again by fact. ‘That sensations differ is a matter of fact’ (154 A), ‘the illusions of dreams and madness are facts of experience’ (157 E), ‘Protagoras must be wiser than others, else he would have no fees’ (161 D), ‘the world is full of examples of the truth that knowledge is power’ (170 A, B), ‘any one must acknowledge this’ (171 D), ‘States make laws with a view to future expediency’ (177 E), ‘Protagoras himself knows better than his pupil the effect which will be produced
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by a particular speech’ (178 E). All these are direct appeals to experience. And therefore the student need not be surprised when, after the subtle inconclusive argument about false opinion, the claims of true opinion are cut short with the example of the law-courts (201 A), or the question whether the knowledge of the simple or the compound comes first is settled by the experience of Theaetetus in learning to read (206 A). A similar collocation of fact and logic occurs in Soph. 264 A, where, after it has been proved with incredible difficulty by a long chain of metaphysical proof that communion is possible between not-being and some kinds of being, the further question, whether not-being in the shape of falsehood enters into speech, is decided in a moment by the mere repetition of the statement ‘Theaetetus is flying.’ So in the Republic, when the definition of justice has been reached, it is tested by vulgar instances,—τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες (4. 442 E).

It is said in the Parmenides, and the thought recurs in the Sophist and Politicus, that the mature mind despises no phenomenon in which there are the traces of a law. In the Philebus the dialectician is said to carry subdivision as far as there are forms to guide him. In the Phaedrus—where Plato’s transcendentalism is most apparent—individual experience is not forgotten: ἔξις γὰρ ἄνθρωπον σωμεναι καί εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰδῶν αἰσθήσεων εἶς ἐν λογισμῷ συναρκούμενον—ὅτι ὁ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοησάτω, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι δύναται καὶ πραγμάτευμα, ἐξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολούθειν (271 E). Indeed the Phaedrus sounds every note in Plato’s compass. And his struggle to reach the individual while holding fast the universal is nowhere more evident than in the passage just quoted. The same purpose is evinced in the remark at the end of the Theaetetus: ἶνα' ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πρότερον γε, οἶμαι, Θεαῖττεθος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἄν ἡ συμότης αὐτὴ τῶν ἄλλων συμοτήτων ἄν ἔγω ἑώρακα διάφορον τι μημεῖον παρ’ ἐμοὶ ἐνσημανμένη καταθήται, καὶ τᾶλα σῶσει εξ ὑπ’ εἰς ἑ σύ, κ.τ.λ.

4. In accordance with this clinging to experience, Plato’s ideal theory, so far as it is allowed to appear in the Theaetetus, deals not with hypostatized entities, but rather with necessary forms of thought, which are as inseparable from percep-
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tion as from reasoning. In the digression indeed, which, however luminous, has still something of a mythical tone, the philosopher is described in language which recalls the Repub-lic, as contemplating everything as a whole and as taking men up out of the sphere of personal questions into the higher region, where justice and injustice, kingship as kingship, hu-man nature as human nature, are discussed apart from parti-culars. But in the dialectical argument, the relative aspect which has been suggested by Protagoras is nowhere lost sight of. The mind perceives by herself the being of objects, their identity, difference, likeness and unlikeness, also unity and number concerning them. She also reaches after the good and beautiful, reviewing and comparing her perceptions with this aim. Knowledge is not to be sought for in particular im-pressions, but in generalizations drawn from them. The num bers eleven and twelve are forms upon the waxen block, i.e. they are remembered, or rather abstracted from perceptions of sense. In the aviary there fly innumerable birds, some gathered in groups (κατ’ εἰσόδη), some flying everywhere about (i.e. modes of thought universally applicable). Whether the whole is separable from the parts or not (χωριστών or ἀχωριστῶν) it bears some relation to them, and for the present we are disposed to think that the parts must be included in per-fect knowledge.

This manner of conceiving knowledge and being is not a mere concession to Protagoras or Heraclitus, nor is it only due to the intentionally subjective aspect of the whole dial-logue. It rather marks Plato’s advance to a more definite conception of his own meaning.

He is not now engaged, as in the Republic, with sketching a vague outline of philosophic method, but has entered upon the ‘longer way’ of dialectical inquiry, in which the highest generalizations, when he really grapples with them, are found to be conceivable, if at all, only in relation to an actual world to which they give light and order, and where affirmation and nega-tion, to have any meaning, must have reference to one another, and to the content as well as to the form of propositions.¹

¹ The obvious fact, that ὄντα in the Theaetetus is equivalent to Daseyn rather than to Wesen has not been sufficiently observed by those who question the genuineness of the Sophist because there Being = the sum of positive realities.
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5. This aspect of the Theætetus is closely connected with the Sophistes and Politicus which follow it.

In the Sophistes the criticism of sense and motion is followed up with a no less thorough criticism of the Immutable Being, and the question 'How is falsehood possible?' is answered through an examination of the idea of falsehood and of negation. In the Politicus an attempt is made to sketch an ideal outline of the application of Science to human societies, and of the false or imperfect forms of society, from which the immediate guidance of Science is withdrawn. These dialogues were to have led up to the Philosopher, in which, probably apart from controversy, Plato's ideal of Theory and Practice would have been bodied forth.

It does not appear that at the time of writing the Theætetus Plato had distinctly planned the other three. The terms in which Socrates declines to examine Parmenides might certainly lead the reader to expect a separate treatment of the Eleatic principle. And the conversation ends with an appointment to meet at the same palestra on the following day. But the Preface only contemplates Socrates, Theætetus, and Theodorus as the interlocutors. These alone are mentioned by Euclides as having taken part. Still less is there any hint of another than Socrates having taken the lead. And although the opening of the Sophist links on that dialogue to the conversation of the previous day, yet there is no direct reference to the unfinished talk about Parmenides, nor is the figure of μετρική in any way kept up, while the concrete form in which the question is bluntly put by Socrates, 'What are the Sophist, Statesman, Philosopher?' is strikingly different from the 'What is Knowledge?' of the previous day. Had Plato written the Theætetus and Sophist continuously, it is hardly to be supposed that he would not have woven them together with more art.

There are other grounds for believing that the Sophistes and Politicus were written somewhat later than the Theætetus. In my edition of those two dialogues (Oxford, 1867) I have proved by 'quantitative criticism' that in point of diction, as well as in other important respects, they are intermediate between the Republic and the Laws, while the Theætetus stands between the Phædrus and Republic.
general way Professor Jowett, whose judgment on such a question is of the highest value, remarks emphatically on the difference of style which separates the Philebus, Sophist, Politicus, Laws, and in some degree the Timaeus, from the earlier dialogues. (See his Introduction to the Sophist, sub init.) Pure Eleaticism has no doubt a great effect in drying up the springs of imaginative expression. The second part of the Parmenides, and the passage in the Theaetetus about the whole and its parts, may be contrasted in this way with other portions of the same dialogues. But this remark does not dispose of the criticisms here referred to, which relate to the whole tenour of the dialogues now in question, nor does it account for the change of manner both in Theaetetus and Socrates.

These and other reasons have led some to doubt the genuineness of the Sophistes and Politicus. I have attempted to meet such doubts by showing, as above stated, that in the same degree in which these writings diverge from the Gorgias or Republic, they approximate to the Laws. The discussion may now be summed up in the words of the English translator of Plato: 'There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of the Sophist and Politicus, if they had been compared with the Laws rather than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle, as an undoubted work of Plato.' Schaarschmidt, the latest enemy of the two dialogues, is as inconsistent in accepting the Laws, as he is consistent (however paradoxical) in rejecting the Philebus.

But to return. However different from the Theaetetus in style and external treatment, the Sophist and Statesman are connected with it in subject, and also in their point of view.

The theory of Knowledge, which at the end of the Theaetetus remains indeterminate, is completed by the discussion of first principles in the Sophist. And although the subject of the Statesman is not the nature, but the

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1 An important contribution to the more exact definition both of the place of the dialectical dialogues and of the growth of Plato's central doctrine has been made quite recently by Mr. H. Jackson, in his elaborate papers on the Philebus and the Parmenides in the Journal of Philology, Nos. 21 and 22: 'Plato's later Theory of Ideas.'
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application of Knowledge, yet there is a distinct advance in the conception of Knowledge or Science, on which the discussion is based.

The relation of Knowledge to Experience, and the nature of the ideas as categories (supr. 4, 5), have come out in the Theaetetus. But the chief conceptions of Knowledge there put forth are those (a) of rising from particulars to universals and so contemplating each thing as a whole, (b) of analyzing a whole into its parts, and (c) of being able to describe an object by its difference.

In the Sophist it is shown that to generalize, distinguish, and analyze is not enough. Ideas must not be seen only in their separate abstraction, but also in their combinations and correlations. And in the course of the Politics it appears further that Knowledge, in order to be fruitful, must take a grasp of the actual world, where the ideas are not found in elementary simplicity, but are transferred into the long and difficult syllables of action. Logical analysis must follow the lines of nature. Dichotomy must not be forced where it is inapplicable. And rash generalization (misplaced συνεργήσα) is to be equally avoided. Every nature is to be separately interrograted, until each has yielded all that its peculiar experience enables it to contribute to the sum of wisdom. It is not enough to define an art by some distinguishing mark. To know its boundaries aright, we must also know the kindred arts from which it is distinguished. There are categories not only of things in general, but of social facts: seven departments, for example, of human industry. Plato nowhere shows a deeper conviction of the extent and comprehensiveness of Science.

6. Another growth which may be traced in these three dialogues, and also in the Philebus and Timaeus, is the increasing clearness and minuteness of Plato's psychology. Such hints towards a study of the phenomena of mind as occur in the Phædo, Meno, Gorgias, Republic, or even in the Phaedrus, are comparatively vague. In the Theaetetus Plato is for the first time continuously employed in the close analysis of mental operations. The nearest parallel in the Republic is the description, in Book 7, of the effect of number
in awakening reason by giving distinctness to contradictory perceptions. But in the Theaetetus we have a whole series of similar observations:—the connection of αἰσθησις and φαντασία in the case of the wind (p. 152), the analysis of vision (153 E foll.), the logical postulates, which we are asked to contemplate steadily as ‘facts of consciousness’ (155), the further analysis of vision (156, 7), the account given of illusory perceptions (158, 159), the case of letters and sounds seen and heard but not understood (163), the relation of μνήμη to αἰσθησις (ibid.), the illustration of degrees of perception (165), the distinction between the organ and the percipient mind (184), the whole attempt to give a subjective account of false opinion (187–200), and, in particular, the description of thought as self-dialogue (189, 190), the image of the waxen-block, accounting for confusions of sense and memory (191 foll.), that of the aviary, for confusions of pure thought, (198 foll.), the three definitions of λόγος (206 foll.);—all these are instances of the working of a new spirit, which is not found in equal strength in the Republic or Phædrus.

Now to the same reflective tendency may be referred several passages of the Sophist and Philebus, and the effect of it may be traced also in the Politicus and Timæus. The following points may be especially noted:—the acknowledgment obtained from the idealists that Knowledge is a process (Soph. 248), the description of the process of dialectic (254), the meaning of denial (ἀπόφασις) (257), the distinction of λόγος, διάνοια, φαντασία, αἰσθησις (263, 4):—the origin of γραμματική (Phil. 8), the description of ἡδονή, δόξα, μνήμη, ἀνάμνησις, φαντασία (37–39):—the passage about μετρητική (Polit. 285), the reason for the argument from example (277):—the account of sensation, and the distinction of νοῦς from δόξα ἀληθής in the Timæus.

The question raised towards the end of the Theaetetus, whether knowledge is not of simple parts as well as of the complex whole, corresponds to various ἀπορλαί in the Parmenides, and also to the place in the Sophist (245) where it is shown that Becoming as well as Being partakes of completeness and unity. A cognate point is also touched upon, viz. whether the ἐιθη are χωριστὰ or ἀχώριστα. The theory that the Element (or simple idea) is unknowable, forms
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the opposite extreme to the ‘Protagorean’ assertion that single impressions only are known. The truth is indicated that an apprehension of unity and universality is present even in the simplest distinct perception. The passage which prepares the way for this conclusion may be compared with the similar ‘propædeutik’ in Rep. 4. 436.

7. The Episode or Digression, 172–177.

Throughout the earlier part of the dialogue Plato’s moral enthusiasm has been held under a severe restraint. It here bursts forth in a passage of still chastened and subdued eloquence. Socrates is represented as having hitherto found it difficult to be quite serious, while delivering the boyish mind of Theàetetus of its first crude notions, and refuting with indirect arguments, which he himself occasionally suspects of sophistry, a popular philosophy which dressed up men’s ordinary thoughts with subtle notions borrowed from past thinkers. He has accordingly been using various arts to draw the grave Theodorus into the discussion. In this he at last succeeds. But even so, his attempt at seriousness at first breaks down. He is still haunted by the humour of the previous argument, and Theodorus rebukes him for ‘running Protagoras too hard.’ On this Socrates lays hold of the admission, implied in Protagoras’ teaching, that there is a difference, if not between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, yet between better and worse conditions of individuals and communities. On this he is about to base the argument that since legislation aims at bettering the condition of states, it is proved true or false, right or wrong, as it succeeds or fails. But at this point he seems to catch the tone of his respondent, and indulges the inclination of Theodorus by interposing a pause in the game of question and answer. In the presence of the deeper subject which now awaits discussion he suspends the argument for a while, and allows his eye to range over the whole position,—reconnoitring as it were before engaging at close quarters,—contrasting the life of the philosopher with that of the lawyer and the man of the world. After this (177 D) he resumes the argument at the point where it was broken off, and, still in conversation with Theodorus, disposes finally of Protagoras and the Heracliteans. And in all that follows, although
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Socrates does not relinquish his playfulness, a deeper note is clearly perceptible. The productive power of Knowledge, the universal striving toward the good, the independence of mind in perceiving the true relations of things, the difficulty about false opinion, and other weighty topics, are handled with essential gravity and sobriety.

Thus the poetical and dialectical aspects are fused together more completely than in the Phædrus. And the correspondence is unmistakable between the contrasted lives on the one hand and the contrasted theories on the other:—as the philosopher is to the lawyer, so is the ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ to the φαντασία τοῦ αληθητοῦ. But Peipers (Untersuchungen, i. pp. 472 ff.) is too matter-of-fact, when he treats the digression as an integral part of the discussion, and as directly suggested by the mention of δίκαια καὶ καλὰ.

Teichmüller, on the other hand, would treat such semi-mythical passages in Plato as wholly secondary and subordinate to the dialectical, concessions to popular sentiment, or to ‘the child in us.’ I cannot think that Plato would endorse this view of the imaginative portions of his own writings. They express a different but not a lower aspect of the truth; and at least equally vindicate his claim to have surveyed ‘all time and all existence.’ ‘Reason touched with emotion’ need not have less hold of reality than reason pure and simple. And abstract thought without such aid is not merely less effectual (διάνοια γάρ αὐτῇ ὁμοίοι καὶ, ἀλλ’ ἐνεκά τοῦ καὶ πρακτική), but is also less complete.

The digression approaches very closely in style and substance to many passages in the Republic, as will appear in the notes. But it contains no allusion to the philosopher’s relation to an ideal state, whether (as in the Gorgias) because Plato had not yet enunciated his conception of the philosopher-king, or because he had withdrawn again into isolation,—or more probably because of the difference of the subject. The philosopher here is not merely useless to his city, but looks down upon it as from a distant height. He knows nothing of his neighbour, but is engaged in contemplating human nature in general. The conception is more ironical than in the Sophist (in this approaching the Republic), and less embittered than in the Politicus; although the con-
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tempt with which the legal spirit is described is sufficiently biting.

8. The solemnity of this passage, and the shadow which it casts over the remainder of the dialogue, is in keeping with the time when the whole conversation is imagined to have taken place. Socrates, as he tells Theodorus casually at the end, is going presently to answer the indictment of Meletus; to show, therefore, in his own person what a poor figure the philosopher makes in a law-court. This life-and-death occasion, however (διόγενος πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ), sits very lightly on him, and he is as ready as at any moment of his life to engage in philosophical discussion. Not only so, but his inexhaustible humour, if less irrepressibly exuberant than in his intercourse with Phædrus by the Ilissus, is no less ready to spring forth in the presence of a youth who is gifted with the philosophic nature. Yet there is an undercurrent of more than usual earnestness, which takes advantage from the grave presence of Theodorus, but is profoundly in keeping with the actual crisis.

Another shadow mingles with that cast by the death of Socrates, and helps to give a further personal interest to the discourse. For the reader is to imagine that at the moment when this record of his brilliant promise is being read at Megara, Theætetus himself, who has been wounded in battle at Corinth, has just been carried back to Athens, that he may die at home. The memory of one thus distinguished in action as well as in thought is intended to consecrate the whole dialogue.

The date of the battle mentioned in the Preface can only be fixed within certain limits. The suggestion of E. Munk (whose arrangement of the dialogues in the order of the lifetime of Socrates of course gives a late place to the Theætetus) that the occasion meant was in the year 369, when the allied forces under Chabrias disputed the Isthmus with Epaminondas, is sufficiently disposed of by the remark\(^1\) that Terpion cannot be supposed to have waited thirty years before ful-

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\(^1\) Wohlrab, 1869.
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filling his intention of asking to see the writing of Euclides. So late a date also, as Professor Jowett observes, 'a little impairs the beauty of Socrates' remark, "that he would be a great man if he lived." These are strong reasons for preferring the battle of B.C. 394, which seems to have stirred the hearts of the Athenians in a peculiar way, as the first great national effort after the restoration of the democracy. In that year Theætetus would be at most twenty-one. And this date does not seem impossible, for the praise of his conduct in the fight would be all the louder if he then saw service for the first time. The supposition which alone remains, that of an uncertain date between B.C. 390 and 387 (the limits of the Corinthian war), has the doubtful advantage of giving time for the distinctions mentioned by later writers as attaching to Theætetus,—at all events for the discovery of the five regular solids, which he might have hit upon even sooner than this (μαθητὸς γὰρ κἀν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν).

9. In any case, therefore, the Preface cannot have been written earlier than B.C. 394, when Plato was about thirty-five, and in all probability was written much later, for in fiction (unlike politics) the mention of an event is none the worse for being 'ancient history.' But even so much cannot be decisively maintained respecting the dialogue as a whole,—for the preface, and the concluding words, and other passages, may possibly have been written long after the main portion had been composed. Internal evidence, however, as has been already indicated, would seem to assign to the Theætetus a place, though earlier than the Sophist, yet not much, if at all, earlier than the Republic.

Teichmüller has recently, with great confidence, set up a new criterion, by which he thinks to separate once for all between the earlier and later writings of Plato. This is afforded by the simple statement of Euclides, that in finishing his transcript of the conversation he has omitted the interlocutory words. By which Teichmüller understands Plato

1 The beautiful monument to the young knight Dexilias in the Ceramicus at Athens (δαιδάνεν ἐν Κορινθίᾳ, τῶν πέντε Ιππίων) is commonly attributed to this year.

2 Ar. Eth. N. 1.
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to signify that the admixture of narrative in the Parmenides, Symposium, and Republic had been a mistake, and that this method should be abandoned by him henceforth. Our critic also assumes that Plato kept this resolution, and that consequently no narrated dialogue is later than the Theætetus, and no dialogue in which the several persons are directly introduced is to be considered as earlier. The form of the Euthydemus, Protagoras, and Phædo, where a narrated dialogue is enclosed in a dramatic setting, is regarded as intermediate, and these dialogues are therefore assumed to come shortly before the Theætetus.

That the words of Euclides are not without significance may at once be admitted. The Theætetus is the only dialogue which is supposed to have been written down. This takes from the improbability of so close and subtle an argument being repeated from memory. And the omission of 'said I' and 'said he' certainly adds to the continuity of the effect, without destroying the illusion that we have the authority of Socrates for the minute accuracy of the report. It may further be conceded that of the dialogues which are similarly dramatic in form, several of the most important are on other grounds probably the last of all,—the Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timæus, Laws. But, not for the present to state objections to an hypothesis which makes the Gorgias a later dialogue than the Republic,—not only is the Phædrus thus placed inordinately late, but the Laches, Io, Euthyphro, Crito, Meno, and Cratylus must either be rejected, or assumed to belong to the later half of Plato's career. A theory which undertakes so much is somewhat heavily weighted, and this one happens to be not very securely based. For the Preface shows, not that the Theætetus is like some dialogues in its dramatic form, but that (in having a formal introduction) it is unlike all. And the inference to be drawn from this is rather that Plato was willing to vary his style in such external respects, than that he now adopted a hitherto unthought of plan to be henceforward uniformly followed by him. Indeed, if he had laid so much stress upon this point as Teichmüller supposes, there was nothing

1 Jowett's Plato, iv. 225.
to prevent him from revising the whole series of his writings in the same sense.

10. In the Theætetus, the various notes of the most undoubted of Plato’s writings are present in felicitous harmony. While rivalling the Symposium in perfection of form, and containing touches of humour and of enthusiastic insight which recall the Phædrus, it is, of all the dialectical dialogues, the most exact in philosophical expression. And in the subdued eloquence of moral earnestness it is comparable only to the Phædo, Gorgias, and Republic.

To return once more to the vexed question of its position in the series. The Symposium cannot have been written before the division of Arcadia in B.C. 384. But in the Symposium, Plato has not yet broken with the poets (p. 209), and the Republic is therefore later than the Symposium. Now it has been seen that the indications of style in the Theætetus bring it very near indeed to the Republic, while it has close relations with dialogues which are later still. The combined maturity and freshness, complexity, subtlety, and lightness of the Theætetus are consistent with the result thus indicated, that when he wrote it Plato ‘had on his back’ years (at least) forty-eight. He has himself indicated (at 180 E) the point of view from which the dialogue was composed. The battle of the philosophies was not yet over. Socrates had set up a standard of knowledge, which, supported by his dialectic as preserved at Megara, was sufficient to overthrow the popular doctrine of mere relativity, and to cast a shadow of ‘philosophic doubt’ over the scepticism of the day. But the ground gained hitherto had been mainly in the region of negative proof. In order to win an entrance for Science upon the ‘terra firma’ of positive reality, it was still necessary to criticise afresh the first principles of dialectic itself, and to come to a final reckoning with Parmenides.

What came of this final reckoning need not be considered here. But it may be observed that the difficulties raised in the Theætetus, no less than those in the Parmenides, tend to show the inadequacy of merely formal reasoning, and to prepare the way for a provisional solution, in which an indeterminate element, whether to be known as θέτων, ἀπειρον,
INTRODUCTION.

πολλά, or ἄπειρος δύνα, is to be admitted into the region of speculative truth; — in which the composite nature of φύσις is also to be admitted, and the correlation of or communion of different categories postulated. In working out this problem, 'new weapons' have to be introduced into the Platonic armoury, while some of those here exhibited are retained in use.

1 See H. Jackson, On Plato's later Theory of Ideas, Journal of Philology, Nos. 21 and 22. This discussion throws additional light on Theaet. 201, 2.
CONSPECTUS.

The dialogue has been written down by Euclides and is produced by him on the occasion of Theætetus' expected death. The persons are, Socrates, Theodorus of Cyrene, and the boy Theætetus.

Time, just before the trial of Socrates.

Theodorus introduces Theætetus to Socrates as a youth who has all the essential qualities of the philosophic nature. Socrates acknowledges the authority on such a point of Theodorus as an accomplished teacher. He begins to question Theætetus. 'You go to Theodorus for wisdom, i.e. Knowledge. But what is Knowledge?' 'Geometry, arithmetic, astronomy; shoemaking and other handicrafts.' 'That is an enumeration of Knowledges, not a definition of Knowledge.' 'I see, you want a general expression, such as I and young Socrates here lately invented for irrational quantities.' 'Excellent, only try.' 'I want to do so all the while, but cannot.' 'Then come to me, who am the man-midwife of young minds.'

Socrates proceeds to expound the nature of his art in such a way as effectually to encourage Theætetus, whom he once more exhorts to try his best. The youth now answers,

I. KNOWLEDGE IS SENSATION.

This (1) is shown to be the same with the dictum of Protagoras, 'Man the Measure,' i.e. Things are to each man as they appear to him:—which again is proved to rest (2) on the mysterious doctrine of Heraclitus and other great men that All is Motion and that things are not but become.

(3) Sensible perception is then explained as the momentary outcome of the meeting of action and passive motions. Sensation is an instantaneous process; all attributes are absolutely relative.
(4) Sensation and quality are twin vibrations, perpetually shifting from place to place, whilst agent and patient (object and subject) change their attributes indeed, but are comparatively (though never entirely) stationary. They are slow motions, whereas the others are swift.

(5) What are known as the illusions of dreams and madness and the disordered taste of the sick palate are accounted for by this hypothesis. The unpleasantness of wine is as real to Socrates ill, as its pleasantness is to Socrates when well.

(6) Thus the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras unite to substantiate the answer of Theseius, of which they are the objective and subjective counterparts.

II. (a) 1. But the theory, if consistent, is somewhat strange.

Does it not make all percepts equally wise, and make discussion purposeless? Protagoras is no wiser than an ape: Theseus is as wise as any god.

(2) This is perhaps a superficial objection. Let us examine the statement ‘Knowledge is Sensation.’

Then to see without understanding is to know: to remember without seeing is not to know.

Further, one may know and not know the same thing, know it near but not far off, know it faintly and strongly, dimly and vividly, and the like.

(3) To this Protagoras would reply by deprecating mere verbal quibbles, and boldly accepting the facts, that memory is indistinct, that each man differs infinitely from himself, and may at the same moment both know and not know the same thing.

In supporting his thesis, he would maintain that men’s perceptions differ not as true and false, since all alike are real; but as better and worse. And the wise man is he who can change them from worse to better, whether in men or vegetables, in individuals or states.

I. (b) Theodorus being now the respondent, Protagoras’ own maxim is examined, as explained by himself:—What seems to each man is real to him to whom it seems.

Does it not seem to each man that other men are wiser than he?

If all think always truly, some think falsely.

Theodorus has trouble in maintaining his opinions. Are they false to his opponents, but true to him?

Most men dissent from the opinion of Protagoras. But his opinion justifies them in their dissent. Is the one ‘measure’
here to be preferred to the many? Or does not the one confirm the many, by asserting that they are right in thinking him wrong?

I. (γ) Protagoras is not in life, and would not be convinced if he were. But his followers will hardly maintain that all men are equally wise in knowing what is wholesome for the individual or expedient for the state. So much indeed has been already hinted in Socrates’ defence of Protagoras (I. (α) 3).

(At this point the argument is interrupted with an eloquent digression, in which the life of the philosopher, who has leisure for many arguments, which he can drop and take up again at will, is contrasted with the life of the politician).

—Well, the state makes laws with a view to expediency, of which experience is the only test. And the same is true of every judgment which regards the future. Protagoras professed himself a better judge than his disciple could be of the persuasiveness of a rhetorical speech. So far, then, the doctrine of absolute subjectivity is disproved.

I. (δ) But what of the immediate perceptions of warmth, white, and sweetness? Are they always true for the percipient at the moment? Even this cannot be maintained by those (I. (3)), who base the doctrine of Sensation upon the doctrine of Motion.

All motion is either change of place (φορά) or change of nature (ἀλλαγή). And if motion is absolute, all things are always moved in both these ways. Therefore the perception and the quality which flit between subject and object, as before described, must also change their nature in the instant of sensation, so that they cannot be so much as named. Each thing no sooner is, but it is not; it is no more thus than not thus; or rather it is anyhow and nohow.

In the course of this argument Theodorus has expressed his abhorrence of the Heracliteans of Ephesus, whose doctrine is as unstable as the Universe in their conception of it. Theaetetus now asks that the opposite doctrine,—that of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus, may be discussed.

II. Socrates avoids this task for the present, but takes Theaetetus again in hand and resumes the previous question about the nature of Perception. The sensible qualities of objects are perceived not with but through the organs of sense. And there are some attributes which the mind herself perceives without a separate organ,—number, difference, sameness, being. The mind’s own judgment of these things is called Opinion.
Now Opinion is either true or false, and Knowledge is True Opinion.

But how is false opinion possible? We have already felt this difficulty within the sphere of sense. It now returns upon us in a more abstract form.

Three answers are proposed, and each is followed into various ramifications. False opinion is (1) to think without Knowledge, or (2) to think what is not, or (3) to mistake one thing for another. For thought is the mind’s dialogue, and opinion is a silent proposition.

But each of these answers leads to insuperable difficulties, and, finding ourselves in a strait, we are driven to seek aid from the imagination.

(a) Shall we say that the mind takes impressions like a waxen block, and that mistake occurs in the process of identifying new impressions with the old, i.e. at the meeting-point of sensation and memory?

This image does not extend to mistakes in abstract reasoning.

(b) Then shall we compare the mind to an aviary containing birds, some of which are gregarious, some grouped in families, some solitary and ranging over all? We have caught them all, and have them all within the mind, but as they fly about we may get the wrong bird by the wing, and so may take a rock-pigeon for a turtle-dove, and this is false opinion. Even here the image comes short of the reality. For so far as we take hold of the wild pigeon we have it actually in hand as known, and cannot err about it.

However, leaving this subsidiary question unsolved, we find a short cut to answering the main question, whether True Opinion is or is not Knowledge. The judges in a law-court have often been brought by rhetoric to form a true opinion of matters of fact, which no arguments can demonstrate. They have True Opinion but not Knowledge, which in such cases cannot exist without ocular demonstration.

III. Wherein then does Knowledge differ from True Opinion? If we can find this, perhaps we shall at last find the definition of Knowledge.

(a) Knowledge is True Opinion with an account of the object. That of which no account can be given is unknowable.

(b) The prime elements are unknowable, while their complex or combination is known. The element can only be named. The
nature of language implies that an account comprises more elements
than one.

Here are two statements, which may be considered together.

True Opinion with an account or reason is a plausible definition
of Knowledge. But how can the complex be known if the element
is unknown? In learning to read, we learned the letters first,
then syllables. In learning music, we first learn the notes.

Yet, on the other hand, the syllable may be regarded as an in-
dependent unity springing from this combination of the letters.
And this leads up to the general question of the relation of parts
to a whole. Is the whole identical with all the parts, or separable
from them? Is 'All' in the singular identical with 'All' in the
plural? So far from simple unity being unknowable, we find that
the object of Knowledge is always one and indissoluble.

But, to return to the former of our two statements, If Knowledge
is true Opinion with an account, what is meant by the latter term?
Three answers are again proposed:—

1. Statement in words. But this is universally attainable.

2. Enumeration of parts or elements. (Definition by analysis.)
   But I may enumerate the parts, having only true opinion of them
   and not Knowledge.

3. Definition by the characteristic difference.
   But here again the question rises, Does such definition rest on
   Knowledge or on True Opinion? And if the former, then we have
   once more to ask ourselves, What is Knowledge?

The art of Socrates condemns all the answers hitherto given.
But Theaetetus, who has been delivered of more than he knew was
in him, will be more fruitfully inventive, or at least more intellec-
tually modest, in the time to come.
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.
ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ΑΡΤΙ, ο Τερψιών, ἡ πάλαι εξ ἁγροῦ; 5
ΤΕΡ. Ἐπιεικός πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἔξητον καὶ ἁγορᾶν καὶ ἑθαίμαζον, ὅτι οὐχ οἰός ὁ τ’ ἦ εὑρεῖν.
ΕΥ. Οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.
ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν;
ΕΥ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἑνετυχον 10
φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθη-ναῖς.

3. ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ] Euclides and Terpsion appear also in the Phedo as the Megarians who were present at the death of Socrates, p. 59 C: Καὶ Μεγαρόδεν Εὐκλείδης τῷ καὶ Τερψίων. Compare with the preservation of this dialogue by Euclides, and the introduction of Theodorus of Cyrene, the preservation of the Pythagorean dialogue by Phædo, and the introduction in it of Simmias and Cebes (Φιλολάφων, συγγεγυγόντων). See also Tim. 27 A.

5. For the ellipse (of ἐγνατ or some such word) cp. the omission of εἰ with ἄξιος, infr. 143

Ε. This idiom suits the conversational style.


7. καὶ ἑθαίμαζον] It is perhaps intimated that Euclides, like his master Socrates, was to be found daily in the marketplace.

9. 'Where, then?' μὴν expresses surprise.

11. ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου] For the expression compare Charm. 153 A: ἐκ Πολίδαιας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου. For the probable date of this battle see Introduction.
of whom Socrates had truly prophesied great things. Euclid has preserved the conversation, which Socrates a little while before his death held with Theaetetus, who was then a boy.

TEP. Ζώντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι;

ΕΥ. Ζώντι καὶ μάλα μόλις χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἐχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἱρέι τὸ γεγονός νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.

5 TEP. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία;

ΕΥ. Ναὶ. TEP. Οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κυνδύνῳ εἶναι.

ΕΥ. Καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ὁ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ νῦν ἥκον τινων μάλα ἐγκομιαξόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην.

10 TEP. Καὶ οὐδὲν γ᾽ ἀτοποῦν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀταρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ c Megaroὶ κατέλυεν;

ΕΥ. 'Ἡπείγετο οὐκαδὲ ἐπεὶ ἔγον ἐδεόμην καὶ 15 συνεβούλευν, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ὤθελε. καὶ δῆτα προσέμψα

1. Ζώντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι] Terpsion's fears are excited by the word φερομένη.
2. Ζώντι καὶ μάλα μόλις] 'Indeed, only just alive.' χαλεπῶς . . τινῶν] Observe the anticipatory καὶ, contrasting the wounds with the disease.
3. μὴ] 'However.' 
4. αἱρέ] 'Affects him.' Compare Soph. Ant. 606: Τὰν ὅθεν ὅπως αἱρέ θὰ ὅ παραγήρως. εἰν τῷ στρατεύματι completes the sense of γεγονός: i.e. τὸ νόσημα τὸ εἰν τῷ στρατεύματι γεγονός: but the expression is less formal.
5. οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κυνδύνῳ εἶναι] 'What a noble life is then in peril!' The worth of Theaetetus is acknowledged by his Megarian friends, and is further confirmed (though confirmation was needless, ll. 11, 12) by the praise of him which Euclid has just heard (καὶ νῦν, l. 9).
9. ἥκον] The imperfects here and below, ll. 14, 15, refer to the time spent by Euclid in company with Theaetetus and those who carried him.
11. θαυμαστότερον] So ἦν ἄν. The conversational ellipse, continuing the idiom from οὐδὲν γε ἀτοποῦν, avoids the awkwardness of repeating ἦν. (θαυμαστότερον ἦν Schol., Thom., Mag.)
14. ἐπεὶ ... ἐδεόμην] Wohlrab compares infr. 150 A B, 158 A, 167 A, etc. ἐπεὶ . . . γε in such places marks the necessity of the foregoing explanation. It was not for want of friendly insistence that Theaetetus did not stay, but because he longed to be at home.
15. δῆτα implies that there is something important to be said. 'And, I may tell you.'
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ.

p. 142. αὐτόν, ἀπίθων πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σωκράτους, ὡς μαυτικὸς ἄλλα τε δὴ ἔστε καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὅλιγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐνυχεῖν αὐτῷ μειρακία ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενος τε καὶ διαλεχθεῖν πάνυ ἀγαπήθηκε αὐτῷ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι Αθήνας τοὺς τε λόγους οὓς διελέξθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἄξιοις ἄκοις, ἔστε τε ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἵ τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἥλικιαν ἔσθοι.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἄληθε γε, ὡς ἔσκεεν, ἔσεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες τοῦ ἰςαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχους ἄν διηγήσασθαι;

ΕΥ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκον οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος· ἀλλ' ἐγραψάμην μὲν τὸν εἰδώς οὐκαδ' ἐλθὼν

1. ἀπίδων πάλιν] 'As I returned.'
ἀνεμνήσθην] Sc. 'et εἰπὲ Σ. περὶ τούτου. The sentence is modified by the introduction of the verb ἑθαύμασα. 'I recalled the words of Socrates about him, and marvelling at the prophetic insight, which, like many sayings of Socrates, they showed.'

3. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι] δοκεῖ gives a slight uncertainty to the expression. It here qualifies rather the mark of time ὅλιγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου than the infinitive ἐνυχεῖν. So below, 144 C, δόκουσι belongs more in sense to ἐλευθάμενος than to λέναι. 'I think it was a little while before his death that he met with him.'

8. εἴπερ εἰς ἥλικιαν ἔσθοι] 'If he lived long enough.' These words also, as interpreted by the event, have a prophetic sound.

εἰς ἥλικιαν] Sc. τοῦ ἐλλόγιμου γενέσθαι.

10. Καὶ ἄληθε γε . . . ἔσεν] In the editions before Heindorf these words were given to ΕΥ. But in the Bodleian MS. they are properly assigned to Terpsion.

12. The particles οὕκον . . . γε imply, 'Not, at least, in the way you mean.'

οὕτω] Compare the use of νῦν ὅτως. Heindorf quotes Xen.Mem. 3. 6. 9: Οὐκ ἂν ἔχομι σοι οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν.

13. ἐγραψάμην . . . ἐγραφαὶ] 'I wrote for my own use—I went on writing.' So the change of voice may be rendered. But ἐγραφαὶ . . . τὸν λόγον below, 143 B, has a different force, 'I made my transcript.' And in 143 C, where the notion of writing recurs without any personal reference, the middle voice is dropped. Such variations belong to the freedom of Greek idiom, and must be noticed, although of slight significance. The Bodleian MS. omits μὲν, and Schanz formerly
νπομηματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμμηνησκό- p. 143.
μενος ἔγραφον, καὶ ὁσάκις Ἀθηνάξε ἀφικοῖμην, ἑπα-
νηρῶτων τὸν Σωκράτη δὴ ἐμὲ ἐμεμήμημην, καὶ δεῖρο
ἔλθων ἐπηνυροθοῦμην· ὡστε μοι σχεδὸν τι πᾶς ὁ
5 λόγος γέγραπται.

ΤΕΡ. Ἀληθῆ· ἡκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέν-
tοι ἄει μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδείξαι διατέρμαθα δεῖρο.
アルバム τι κωλύει νῦν ἧμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε
καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὥς ἐξ ἀγροῦ Ἡκων.

(1871) proposed ἔγραψα μὲν.
But both the middle voice and
the particle are idiomatic and
expressive. And although μὲ
at first opposes the written
notes to an extemporaneous
repetition, it is quite Greek, though
not quite logical, to utilize it
for the minor opposition (with
ὕστερον δὲ) of the fair copy to
the notes or rough draft.

1. ἰπομήματα] 'Notes.' See
Phaedr. 275 A, where letters
are called ἰπομήνεσες φάρμακαν:
ib. 276 D.

3. δ' μὴ ἐμεμήμημην] = εἰ τι μὴ
ἐμεμήμημην. μὴ gives indefinite-
ness to δ'.

6. Ἀληθῆ· ἡκουσά] The clauses
are parallel and not consequent;
hence the ἀνικότερον. Heindorf's
conjecture, adopted by Schanz,
ἄλλα ἢδη ἡκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον,
although most ingenious, is less
idiomatic than the MS. text.

καὶ μέντοι, κ. τ. λ.] μέντοι op-
poses Terpsion's present con-
fession to his question in 142
D, which implied ignorance of
the story. 'And, now I think
of it, I have always meant to
ask you to show it me, but
have let opportunities slip till
now.' That which is really
most emphatic is expressed by
the participle. It has been
objected to this rendering, (a)
that δεῖρο is not used as an
adverb of time except with
μέχρις or ἄει, (β) that διατρίβεις,
meaning 'to delay,' could not
have been used here without
an adverb of place. But, (α)
such transference of adverbs
from place to time is not un-
usual, and it occurs in the case
of δεῖρο in Plat. Tim. 21 D:
'Ἡν ἢδε ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε μὲν,
διὰ δὲ χρόνων καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν ἐργα-
σαμίνων οὐ διήρκεσε δεῖρο ὁ λόγος.
In the present passage, the
deviation from common use is
softened by the neighbourhood
of ἄει. Comp. Ech. Eum. 596:
Καὶ δεῖρο γ' ἄει τὴν τύχιν οὐ μέμ-
φομαι. Such a refinement upon
a common phrase is in the
manner of Plato. And (β)
dιατρίβεις is elsewhere used ab-
solutely, with a touch of blame
in it, as meaning not simply
'to delay,' but 'to waste time.'
See Rep. 5. 472 B: Ἀγέ, καὶ
μὴ διατρίβη: Thuc. 7. 42, 43,
47: also Aristoph. Eq. 515:
Φοισι γάρ ἄφη σύντοπος διατρίβεις,
where it occurs together with a par-
ticiple, as here.

8. πάνως ἔγωγε .. δέομαι]
'Besides, as I have walked in
from the country, I should in
any case be glad of a rest.' This asyndeton is frequent, πάντως having the force of a particle. Infr. 162 A: Πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μαλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ἵππος. Polit. 268 E: Πάντως οὐ πολλὰ ἐκφεύγεις παῦεις ἐν τῇ.

1. 'Ἐρυμοῦ] 'Ἐρυμος was a spot on the Cephissus, close to Eleusis, where it was fabled that Pluto had descended with Proserpine. Paus. 1. 92. There were other places of the name.

2. ὁ παῖς] Euclides' servant.

7. οὐκ ἔμοι Σωκράτη δυναύμενον κ.τ.λ.] These words are parallel to οὐτοί τῶν λόγων, depending on ἑγραφάμην. Compare Apol. 19 C: Ταύτα . . . ἑφάρετε . . . Σωκράτη . . . περιφερόμενον.

9. τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδόρῳ] Theodorus the mathematician of Cyrene, with whom, according to a doubtful tradition, Plato once studied. He is a geometerian, and stands thus on the threshold of philosophy; and he is of Cyrene, the city of Aristippus, with whom he may be also connected as being one of the friends of Protagoras. See infr. 164 E: Οἱ έπίτροποι οὐκ Πρωταγόρας κατ-έλευσεν . . . ἐν Θεόδωρος ἐς δὲ.

10. ἦν οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, κ.τ.λ.] Imitated by Cicero, de Amic. c. i: 'Quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne inquam et inquit sæpius interponerentur.' Teichmüller finds in these words the transition from the earlier to the later manner of Plato. But this seems to prove too much. See Introduction.

11. αἱ μεταφύ . . . διηγήσεις] 'The bits of narration interrupting the dialogue.' περὶ αὐτοῦ τε] περὶ αὐτοῦ depends immediately on διηγήσεις, and ὅποτε λέγων is epexegetic. Editors have preferred αὑτοῦ, placing the comma at διηγήσεις, which makes the syntax more regular, though with an awkward inversion. The MSS. often err in reading αὑτοῦ for αὐτοῦ, but it is safer to follow them where there is no manifest error.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἂν περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρυμμένου, ὅτι ῥ. 143.
Συνέφη ἡ Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ, τούτων ἕνεκα ὡς αὐτῶν αὐ-
τοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τουάτα.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδὲν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὁ Ἑυκλείδη.

ΕΥ. Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκδόμην, δὲ
ὁ Θεόδωρος, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων,

1. ἂν περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρυμμένου] sc. λέγων. ῥ. κ.τ.λ. referring to

3. 203 B. The forms here quoted are
come commonly used for the
more emphatic places in narrated dialogue: cp. esp. Rep.
427 B, Prot. 317 D.

4. οὐδὲν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου] Comp.

5. 470 B: Καὶ οὐδὲν γε, ἂφη,

ἐπὶ τόδε εἰ πρὸς τρόπου λέγω. Also

the emphatic use of the prep.
from' in Elizabethan poetry:
e.g. Jul. Ces. 2. 3, 'Why bird
and beast from' (i.e. contrary
to) 'quality and kind.' (ἀπὸ. is
the Bodleian reading.)

5. λέγει] 'Let us hear.' Not

supposes, but more vivid and

conversational than ἀναγγέλλοντες.

In this Preface we have

been introduced to Theetetus

as a man already distinguished

among his fellow-citizens. In

what follows we are to see the

promise of his youth. We are
told of Theetetus by late

writers (besides the fact that

he heard Socrates and followed

Plato) that he taught mathe-

matics at Heracleia, and that

he was the author of the first

treatise on the five regular

solids. The interval which this

seems to require between the

trial of Socrates and the death

of Theetetus (to which it is dif-

ficult not to suppose an allusion

here) increases the uncertainty

of the date. But see Intro-
duction.

6. Ἐι μὲν... 'If my heart

were in Cyrene.' There is an

imperfect sequence of clauses,

arising out of the interposi-
tion of the clause ἤπον γὰρ

. ἐπεικεῖς. The last words

form a transition to the main

thought, to which the speaker

gradually returns. The open-
ing is characteristic of Socrates.

He begins by putting an ana-

logous case, in which the person

addressed is interested.

7. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν... ἀνηρώτω

. Digitized by Google
ΤΟΙΟΤΟΣ.

p. 143. εἴ τινες αὐτὸδι περὶ γεωμετριῶν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῦμενοι νῦν δὲ —δὴν γάρ ἐκείνους ἡ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδεναι τίνες ἦμιν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεἰκεῖς ταύτα δὴ αὐτὸς τε σκοπώ σαθ' ὡς ὡσιν δύναμι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ ὡς ἄν ὁρῶ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας ξυγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὲ οὐκ ὁλίγοισοι ἐπησιαζόνσι, καὶ δικαίως ἂξιοι γὰρ τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἐνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τινι ἐνέτυχε ἂξιος λόγον, ἦδεος ἄν πυθοῖμην.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ τε εἰπεῖν καὶ 'I should have examined you about things there and persons there.' ἐκεῖνον is masc. The Bodleian MS. reads ἃν ἤρωτων (sic), in which the repetition of ἃν may be defended by comparing Rep. 7. 526 C: οὐκ ἄν ῥάδιος οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἄν εὑρότ. But the other reading, which is supported by T, is on the whole more probable, and the compound is expressive of the thorough-going persistent questioning of Socrates.

1. ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν] 'Or other liberal pursuit.' Comp. Tim. 88 C: Μουσικὴ καὶ πᾶση φιλοσοφία προσχρέωμενοι. This word, like ἐπιστήμη, σοφιστής and others, is used by Plato sometimes in the more general and familiar, and sometimes in a more restricted and technical sense.

2. νῦν δὲ, κ. τ. λ.] It makes little difference whether νῦν δὲ is joined immediately with ταύτα δὴ, κ. τ. λ., or with a suppressed apodosis of which these words are a resumption. In the latter case we should omit the break with Wohlrab, Schanz and H. Schmidt.

4. τίνες ἦμιν τῶν νέων] ἦμιν (sc. τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις) is not emphatic. The emphasis is anticipated in τοὺςδὲ.

5. ἦμιν τῶν νέων . . (8.) I. ἦμιν τῶν πολιτῶν] Comp. Thuc. 1. 6: Οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοὶ τῶν εὐθαυμολόγων.


gentle and intelligent, a rare combination! Like a stream of oil, flowing smoothly and swiftly without a murmur.

σοὶ ἀκούσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οὗ τίνι τῶν πολιτῶν μεῖ- p. 143. ρακίως ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλὸς, ἐφοβοῦμην ἄν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι· ζυν δὲ, καὶ μὴ μοι ἄξιον, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἐξὸ τῶν ὦμμάτων· ἢπτον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ' ἔχει. ἄδεως δὴ λέγω. εὖ γὰρ ἵσθι ὅτι ὅν δὲ πότε ἐνέτυχον, καὶ πάνυ p. 144. πολλοίς πεπλησίακα, οὐδένα πω ἡσθόμην οὔτω βαμμαστώς εὗρε πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθὴ ὄντα, ὥς εἴσοφθαλμον. An imitation of this passage occurs in the Symposium attributed to Xenophon, c. 5.

τὸ ἔξο τῶν ὦμμάτων] (1) 'In having prominent eyes.' So this point in the description of Socrates has been commonly understood. But may it not rather mean (2) 'in the width between the eyes,'—a conformation sometimes accompanying a powerful brain? This suits with the τῷθαλμῷ παραθάλλων of Aristophanes quoted by Plato in Symposium 221 B (ep. Phaed. 86 D). As ἔξο with the article takes the place of an adjective, so it is used here, like a neuter adjective, for the abstract notion of 'outwardness.' Cp. τὸ σφόδρα, Symposium 210 B, Phil. 45 C.


ὡς ἅλφ χαλεπῶν] The simple
and obvious meaning of these words, 'as it is hard for another to be,' i.e. 'in a degree hardly to be equalled,' has been questioned by critics because it was thought that χαλεπόν could not be applied to qualities that are not acquired. But the word is not tied down to this preciseness of meaning. It has passed out of it even in Homer. Cp.Od. i.156: Χαλεπόν δὲ τάδε ζωός οράσθαι (which may be similarly explained as＝χαλεπόν ἄτσι τούς ζωός τάδε οράσθαι). So elsewhere in Plato χαλεπός occurs where human agency is not in question to signify 'next to impossible.' See Rep. 6.502 C: Χαλεπά γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε—viz. that philosophers should be kings, a consummation requiring, as a precedent condition, the combination of qualities which is indicated here. What Plato would think of this grammatical refinement may be inferred from his caricature of it in the Protagoras, 344 E: Σὺ δὲ φίδι, ζ Πιτακέ, χαλεπόν ἐσθλὸν ἵμμεναι τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

3. γενέσθαι (τοιοῦτον τνμα), 'I should not have thought there could have been an instance of this combination, nor do I find it usual,'


ἀλλ' ο扆 τε, κ.τ.λ.] The thought is exactly paralleled in the Republic, where the same combination of qualities is described as essential to the philosophic nature, and its rarity is dwelt upon in similar words. Rep. 6.503 C: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ δείκεις οἰοθ' ὅτι οἷς ἐθέλουσιν ἄμα φύσει καὶ νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἴοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἴδρυξας καὶ βεβαιώτητος ἐθέλεις ζην, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπ' ἄχτυτον φέρονται δην ἀν τύχωται, καὶ τὸ βιβαῖον ὅπως αὐτῶν ἐξορκεῖται. 'Ἄληθείς, ἐφι, λέγεις. Οὕτων τὰ βιβαῖα αὐ ταῦτα ὅθε καὶ οὐκ εὐμητάβαλη, οἷς τις μᾶλλον ὃς πιστοῖς χρήσατο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα δότα, πρὸς τὰς μαθησιας αὐ τοῖς ταιτάν, δυσκίνητος ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθός, καὶ ὑπόν τε καὶ χάραμε σεμπιπλάναται, διὰν τι δή τοιοῦτον διαποιέοις; So the difficulty of combining bravery with gentleness is dwelt upon, ib. 375, 6. See also Polit. 309, 310, Legg. 6.773. The essentials of the philosophic nature enumerated in the 6th Book of the Republic are, love of truth, quickness in learning, good memory, liberality, justice and gentleness, temperance, courage. Theodorus is the embodiment of this nature.


5. πρὸς τὰς ὅργαν ἐξορκοῦσι] 'Impetuous.' 'Quick in temper as in mind.'
Τέσ φέρονται δώστε τά ἀνεμάτιστα πλοία, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἣ ἀνδρείστεροι φύονται, οἱ τε αὗ ἐμβρυθεστεροί νοθροὶ πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τᾶς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ὅ δὲ οὕτω λείος τε καὶ ἀπταίστως καὶ ἄνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τᾶς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς προάτητος, οὖν ἐλαίου θέμα αἴσθητη ρέωντος, ὅστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦ τόν ὀντα οὕτω ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἕδα ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονευόντι δὲ οὖ.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τῶν ἑορτῶν προσώπων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. σὺντα ἄρτη ἐν τῷ ἕξω δρόμῳ ἥλείφοντο ἐταῖροὶ τῇ τινει

2. φύονται] Rep. 6. 503 C : ὅλη ἐθνοσυ⊿... φύονται. 'Have more the nature of madmen than of courageous men.'


5. ἄνυσίμως] 'Successfully' — 'Making rapid progress.'


9. καὶ asks for further information.

11. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὐ] Theodorus takes the interest of a teacher in the youth himself, Socrates that of a fellow-citizen in his father.

12. ἄλλα γὰρ ἐστὶ... ἄλλα σκάπει] This double ἄλλα is frequent in Plato. Comp. also Soph. Phil. 520: 'Αλλ' ἀληχρά μέντως σοῦ γ' ἐμβρυθεστερον | ἕνω τοῖς φανήσαι πρὸς το ταύτα πονεῖν.] άλλα εἴδοκε, πλέωμεν. The second ἄλλα puts definitely forward the proposition for which the first ἄλλα has cleared the way.

13. ἐν τῷ ἕξῳ δρόμῳ] The scene then is a gymnasion, perhaps the Lyceum. Compare Euthyphr. 2 A: ἐν τάς ἣν Δυκαίεις καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατριβῖς περὶ τήν τοῦ βασιλείας στοάν; taken in connection with infr. 210 D: Νῦν... ἀπαντήσεων μοι εἰς τήν τοῦ βασιλείας στοάν. Theodorus had seen the young men in the portico as he entered. The word δρόμος seems to have been applied to several parts of the gymnasion. Euthyd. 273 A: ἐν τῷ καταστήματι δρόμῳ. (See the whole passage.) Aristias ap. Polluc. 9. 43: Ἦν μοι παλαστρὰ καὶ δρόμος ξυστῶν πέλας. Archeologists are not agreed as to the exact part of the palaestra which is here indicated.

ἐταῖροὶ τῇ τινει] One of these,
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ. 11


ΣΩ. Γιγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουντέως Εὐδρομόνιος ἔστι, καὶ πάνω γε, ὃ φίλε, ἄνδρος ὁδον καὶ σὺ τοῦτο διη-γεῖ, καὶ ἄλλοις εὐδοκίμων, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα 5 πολλήν κατέλιπε. τὸ δ’ ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

ΔΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ γε ὄνομα· τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσι μοι ἐπίτροποι τινες διεθθαρκέ-ναι· ἀλλ’ ὁμοί καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθε-ρώτητα θαυμαστός, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Γεννυκόν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευ αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίσθηαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σω-κράτη.

ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κἄγῳ ἐμαυτὸν ἰν ἀνασκέψαμαι, ποιόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. φησί γὰρ ἐν Θεόδωρος ἔχεις με σοὶ ὀμοίων. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῦν ἐχόντων ἐκατέρων λύραν ἐφη αὐτᾶς ἥρμοσθαι ὀμοίως, πότερον εὑθὺς ἄν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὄν λέγειν;

Νέος Σωκράτης, is named in this dialogue, and is an interlocutor in the Politicus. The others remain mute. Such κῶσα πρό-σωπα occur in many dialogues; e.g. Lysias, Charmantides, etc., in the Republic. Observe the idiomatic use of δοκεῖν here and infr. D. Cp. supr. 142 C.

4. καὶ πάνω] καὶ is intensive. 5. καὶ μέντοι] ‘And surely, now I think of it.’ This is a reason why the youth should have been better known. The construction returns to the indicative.


11. τὸν ἄνδρα] Not meirákom. ‘He must be a capital fellow.’ καὶ, as elsewhere, adds a touch of earnestness to the imperative.

13. Θεαίτητε] The abrupt vocative, without ἄ, is the address of the master to the pupil.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Επεσκεψάμεθ' ἀν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοιούτου μὲν εὐρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἀν, ἄμουσον δὲ, ἡπιστούμεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.
ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γ' οἶμαι, εἰ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὁν λέγει p. 145. ἦ οὐ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.
ΣΩ. 'Η οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐχ, ὅσον γ' ἐμ' εἰδέναι.
ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δὴ ποὺ, ὁ Σάκρατες.
ΣΩ. 'Η καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογοτικὸς τε καὶ μονοτικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἀρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματος τι ὁμοίως φησίν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πη ἡ ψέγων, οὐ πάνω αὐτῷ ἄξιον τῶν νοῦν προσέχειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσώς οὖ.
ΣΩ. Τί δ', εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινῶν πρὸς ὃ
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 145. ἄρετὴν τὲ καὶ σοφίαν; ὅρ' οὔκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκού- σαντι προδυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἑπανεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμοις ἐαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὡς Σώκρατες.

Σ. Ὑπ' ὅρα τοῖνυν, ὁ φίλε Θεαίτης, σοὶ μὲν ἐπι- 5 δεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὅσο εὖ ἦσθι ὅτι Θεό- δωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς με ἑπανέσας ἔξονος τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπῆρεσεν ὡς σὲ νῦν δὴ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐδ' ἂν ἔχοι, ὡς Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὥρα μὴ ὁ παίζων ἔλεγεν.

Σ. Οὐχ οὖτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναθύμω τὰ ὠμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίξουτα λέ- γειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν· πάντως γὰρ οὐδέστερ ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὠμολογίᾳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

Σ. Λέγε δὴ μοι· μανθάνεις ποι παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἄττα;

indefinite use of τίς, ποι, ποθέν, etc.

9. Ἐδ' ἂν ἔχοι] 'That is good!'—'I am glad to hear it.' Or rather, perhaps, more hypothetically, 'It is well, if it is so.' For (1) cp. Menex. 249 Ε: Χάρω ἔχω τῷ εἰπόντι. Σ. Ἐδ' ἄχοι, ἀλλ' ὡς μου μὴ κατερεῖς. And for (2) Polit. 277 Α: Κυνυνεύει τέλεως ἄν ἤμιν ζημίας. Σ. Καλάς ἄν, ὡς Σ., ἡμῖν ἔχοι. δεὶ δὲ μὴ σοι μόνον ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κάμοι—ζυνδοκεῖν.


14. ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ] 'Will be found to impugn him.' The verb ἐπισκέπτεσθαι, to accuse of murder or false witness (φόνου, γεγομεναρτυρίων), is commonly found in the middle voice, because the accuser in such cases is generally an interested party. The passage of Aeschines contr. Timarch., formerly quoted in support of the active, is found to have the middle in the best MSS., and Wohlrab tries to substantiate a different meaning here, while Schanz writes ἐπισκήψεστ' αὐτῷ from conjecture, Neither is really necessary.

17. μανθάνεις] There is a stress upon the word, preparing for what follows.
Τὸ λέγειν ἐν καὶ τὸ γνῶσιν ἐστὶν. ἔστιν γὰρ ὡς οἷον τὸ ποῖον τοῦτον, καὶ τὸ ἄλλον, ὡς ὡς ἐστὶν τὸ τούτον ἐστὶν. ἀλλὰ ὡς ὡς, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρῶς, μικρὸν δὲ τι ἀπορῶ, ὡς μετὰ σοῦ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν δείκτη σκεπτόμενον. καὶ μοι λέγει: ἀρ' ὃ ὅτι τὸ μανθάνει ἔστι τὸ σοφότερον γίγνειν. σοφότερον γίγνειν.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. "Πῶς γὰρ ὥστε, ὃ τοῦτον καὶ τὸ ἄλλον, διὰ τῇ σοφίᾳ σοφοὶ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλλον διαφέρει τούτοις εἰπώντησις.

Ε ότι τῷ ποίῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Τι μὴν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο τὰ τὰ τότεν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ τὸν δυ- οὺν διὰ τοῦτον καὶ σοφοὶ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο τὰ τὸ τότεν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ τὸν δυ- τὸν καὶ τὰ σοφοὶ.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ


7. For the ironical μικρὸν τι cp. Charm. 154 D.

p. 145. ναμαι λαβεῖν ἰκανὸς παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, Ἐπιστήμη ὃ τί ποτε
p. 146. τυγχάνει ὄν. ἂρ οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτῷ; τί
φατε; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὃ δὲ ἀμαρτών,
καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φαίνων οἱ
παιδείς οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος. ὃς δὲ ἂν περιγένηται ἄ
ἀμαρτήτος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὃ τί ἂν
βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί σιγάτε; οὐ τί ποι, ὁ
Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἄγροκίζωμαι, προθυ-
μούμενοι ἡμᾶς πούσσα διαλέγοσθαι καὶ φίλους τε
καὶ προστηγόρους ἀλλήλους γίγνεσθαι;

b ΘΕΟ. Ἡκιστα μέν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἃν
ἐπὶ ἄγροικον, ἄλλα τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευε σοι ἀπο-
κρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μέν γὰρ ἄθης τῆς τοιαύτης δια-
λέκτου, καὶ οὐδὲ οὐ δυνατέοις ἡλικίαν ἐχώ. τούτην

1. λαβεῖν ἰκανός] 'To grasp adequately.' 'To get a clear
conception of.'

2. λαβεῖν ἰκανός παρ' ἐμαυτῷ] Phileb. 50 D: Λαβδώτα δὲ τούτῳ
παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφιέναι με, κ.τ.λ.

3. ὃ δὲ ἀμαρτάνῃ] 'But he who makes a blunder, or whoever
is in error from time to time.'

4. καθεδεῖται . . . ὁνο] Schol. Τῶν οὖν παυόντων ταύτα τοὺς μὲν
μικῶντας βασιλεῖς ἐκάλουσι, καὶ τί ἂν
προσετάτου τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰπτη-
κονοιν, τοὺς δὲ ἡττώμενοι ὄνους.

pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt,
Si recte facies.' Mant. Prov. 1.
34: βασιλεὺς ὃ ὄνος ᾧγον μικὼν
ὁ ἡττώμενος.' Wohlrab.

6. ἡμᾶς] So the Bodleian
MS. Others (including Cæs.)
have ἡμᾶς by a common error.
The first person is obviously
more in keeping with the ur-
baniety of Socrates.

10. προσηγόρου] The active
and passive meanings are com-
bined. 'Mutually conversable.'
Cp. Republic 8. 546 C: Ἀπὸ
προσήγορα καὶ ἐπὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα
ἀπέφθειν. There is possibly an
allusion to the mathematical
meaning here: 'to make you
friends, and bring you into
relations with one another.'
Cp. Republic 7. 534 D: 'Ἀλόγοι
ὅταν ἄστερ γραμμαί, and the
phrases Σύμμοιρα καὶ ποτάγορα,—
"Ομοία καὶ ποτάγορα, in later Py-
thagorean writings.

11. μέν is omitted in T.
12. τῶν μειρακίων τῇ] Steph.
conj. τῳ, which is also found
as a correction in one MS., but
cp. Euthyd. 277 D: Ἰονίς βασ-
τίζομεν τὸ μειράκια, βουλόμενος
ἀναπαύσαι αὐτῷ.

13. διαλέκτου] 'Conversation,'
with something of the more
technical meaning of 'abstract
discussion.' Cp. Republic 5. 454 A: "Ερωτ, οὐ διαλέκτῳ,
πρὸς ἄλληλους χρώμενοι.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

dε πρέποι τε ἂν τούτο καὶ πολὺ πλεῖον ἐπίδιδοιεν· p. 146.
tὸ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεώτης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ',
óstper ἡξίων, μὴ ἀφίεσθαι τοῦ Θεατῆτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀκούεις δὴ, ὁ Θεατὴς, ἀ λέγει Θεόδωρος,
5 ὃ ἄπιστείν, ὡς ἡγό οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐνελήσεις, οὔτε ὁ
θέμως περὶ τὰ τοιοῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώ-
τερον ἀπείθειν. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ· τί σοι δο-
κεῖ εἰναι ἐπιστήμην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς
10 κελεύετε. πάντως γὰρ, ἂν τι καὶ ἀμάρτηω, ἑπανορ-
θώσετε.

ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γε οὐί τε ᾗμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεόδωρον ἂν
τις μάθοι ἐπιστήμηα εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἄς νῦν δὴ
15 σὺ διήλθες, καὶ ἀδ σκυτηγρική τε καὶ ἃ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ
δημουργών τέχνας, πάρα τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ
ἀλλο τι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδόρως, ὁ φίλε, ἐν αἰτη-
θείς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἀπλοῦ.

2. ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει] Rep. 7. 536
D : άλωιν γὰρ ὁ πειστὸν, ὡς
γηράτκων τις πολλὰ διπλωθάδεις, ἀλλ' ἢτον ἡ τρέχειν, νῦν
δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ
πόνοι.

3. μὴ ἀφίεσθαι τοῦ θεατῆτου,
ἀλλ' ἔροται] Cp. Lach. 184 C : Χρῆ δ' ἢπερ σου ἐξ ἀρχῆς Ἐλευ,
καὶ Σωκράτη τῶν μὴ ἀφίεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐδείχαι συμβολείεναι.
Rep. 5.
449 C.

5-7. ἄπιστείν, 'to disobey,' ἀπείθειν, 'to be disobedient.'

5. οὔτε θέμως... ἀπεί-
θείν] Instead of making ἄπιστείν depend on θέμως, a new clause is
introduced expressing the particular points in this disobedi-
ence which make it unlawful.
The like change occurs often in Plato, and is part of the fulness
of his style. See above, 144
Β: 'Ὃτε θαυμάσαι, κ.τ.λ., and
note.

10. πάνω γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.] Thes-
etetus is not yet alive to the dif-
ficulty of the subject. He is
sure that Theodorus and So-
crates have entire command
of it.

14-17. ἐπιστήμηα... ἐπιστήμηα]
Thesetetus does not distinguish
between 'sciences' and 'sci-
ence.' Grammatically, the va-
ration is caused by the intro-
duction of the singular ἐκάστη.

18. Γενναίως γε] Referring to
ΤΟΙ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ.

p. 146. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὥο Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. Ἰσως μὲν οὖν οὖδέν ὦ μέντοι οἷμαι, φράσω,
ὅταν λέγησι σκυτική, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἡ ἐπιστή-
μην υποδημάτων ἐργασίας;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

Ε ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν τεκτονική; μή τι ἄλλο ἡ ἐπι-
στήμη τῆς τῶν ἔνιλων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ ἐκατέρα ἐπιστήμη,
τοῦτο ὁρίζεις;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθέν, ὡς Θεαίτης, οὐ τοῦτο ἤν,
τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οúde ὀπόσαι τινές. οὐ γὰρ Ἁριμή—p. 146.
σαί αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἡρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνώναι ἐπιστή-
μήν αὐτὸ ὁ τί ποτ' ἔστιν. ἢ οúdeν λέγω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἀρθῶς.

5 ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἰ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαιλῶν p. 147.
τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροτο, οἴον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὁ τί ποτ'
ἔστιν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρέων
καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἰπποπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλιν-
θούργων, οὐκ ἂν γελοίοι εἶμεν;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. * Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν γέ ποιν οἴομεν συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς
ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τῶν ἔρωτῶν, ὅταν ἐπιτεμεν

—1. τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οúde ὀπόσαι τινές] The first answer of Meno to the question, 'What is virtue?' is exactly analogous to this of Theaetetus about knowledge. Instead of attempting to generalize, he enumerates the several kinds of virtue. Men. 71 E: 'Ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν... γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν... παιδὸς ἀρετή, κ.τ.λ. Socrates replies (Men. 72 A): Πολλα γέ τινι εὐτυχία ἐσσα κεχρησθα, ὃ Μίνων, εἰ μιᾶν ἐκγεννητικὴς σημαίας τα ἀνευρικὰ ἀρετῶν παρὰ σαὶ κειμένων, κ.τ.λ. The whole passage should be compared with this. See also Lach. 191, 192, where Socrates finds a similar difficulty in leading the respondent to the conception of a general notion,—and Soph. 240, where Theaetetus is again entrapped into a similar mistake in defining the word ἐστὶν.'


5. εἰ τι ἡμᾶς—εἰ ἀποκριναί-
μεθα] For the double εἰ comp.

Rep. 331 C: εἰ τις λάβοι παρά φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος ὁμα, εἰ μιᾶς ἀπαιτοῦ, κ.τ.λ. τῶν φαιλῶν τι καὶ προχείρων] 'Some trivial and obvious matter.'

8. ἰπποπλαθῶν] For this, the reading of all the MSS., κοροπλα-
θῶν has been substituted in the margin of some MSS., for the sake of the uniformity which Plato avoided. See below, note on κοροπλαθῶν, p. 19. 1. i.

nego ὅποτα ὃν φθείρεσθε; We find ourselves involved in a further stage of the same absurdity at the end of the dialogue, p. 210 A: καὶ παπ-
τάτατα γε εὐήθεις, ζητοῦτων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμης, διότι φάναι ὧρθον εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἢτε διαφοράτητος ἢτε ὃτι ναύς.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 147. πηλός, είτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσβέντες είτε ἄλλων
β ὠντινομοῦν δημουργῶν. ἢ οἰεὶ τίς τι συνεισί τινος
όνομα, ὃ μὴ οἴδε τί ἔστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἑπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνήσιν ὃ 5
ἑπιστήμην μὴ εἰδὸς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Σκυτικὴν ἄρα οὐ συνήσιν ὃς ἂν ἑπιστήμην
ἀγνοῇ, οἴδε τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ ἑστιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Γελοία ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἑρωτηθέντι ἑπι-
στήμη τί ἔστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα.
tινὸς γάρ ἑπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται, οὐ τούτῳ ἑρωτηθεὶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Ευκεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἑπείτα γε που ἔχων φαύλους καὶ βραχέως 15
ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὄδόν. οἶνον καὶ
ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἑρωτήσει φαύλων ποῦ καὶ ἄπλοιν

1. εἶτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσ-
βέντες] It is in Plato's manner
to surprise us with a fresh ex-
ample at each step of the argu-
ment, instead of dwelling upon
one already adduced. Rep. 3.
333 B: Ὅσπερ ὁ κυβαριστικός,
k.v.l. Prot. 312 D: Ὅσπερ ὁ
κυβαριστικός, k.v.l., and in this
dialogue, p. 161 D: Βατράχων
γυρίσων. 169 B: Σὺ δὲ κατ'
Ἀυταῖον, κ.v.l. 178 D: Μὴ ὡς
τοῦ κυβαριστικός. 190 C: Ργειά-
ωντα ή μμικόμενον.

2. ἢ οἰεὶ τίς τι] τις is made
oxytone here because of τι fol-
lowing. οἰεὶ is parenthetical,
and therefore does not affect
the position of the elicitics.
For the sense cp. Men. 80
D: Καὶ τίνα τρόπον εὐθυνεῖς, ὧ
Σωκράτες, τοιτο, δ μὴ οἴδα τὸ
παράπαν δ τι ξοτε.

12. ὅταν... ὄνομα] 'When he
gives as an answer the name
of a particular art.' The ac-
cussative is cognate.

15. Ἡ ἑπείτα γε που] This
ought strictly to refer to the
illustration: to which the sen-
tence presently returns. But
Socrates had reverted to the
main subject in the preceding
instances.

Met. 3. 1007 a: 'Αδύνατον
ἀπειρά γ' ίσα τὰ συμβεβηκότα δια-
έλθειν ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελθεῖν ἢ
μηδέν.

17. ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἑρωτήσει] For the form of reference with
ἐν cp. Thucyd. 1. 9: 'Εν τοῦ
εὐκήπτρου τῇ παράδοσῃ. Philob.
33 B: 'Ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βιων.
The frequency of this idiom
perhaps assists the genitive
πηλοῦ, which is descriptive
rather than objective. ‘In the
question of the clay.’

1. πηλός ἄν εἶ[ ] Either, (1)
‘earth, if tempered with mois-
ture, will be (ἄν εἶ) mud,’ or
(2), ‘moistened earth would
seem to be (ἄν εἶ) the defini-
tion of mud.’

2. ὅρω is masculine (supr.
A.B), although ῥως above (p.
19, l. 13) was neuter.

3. νῦν ἐφ ὅτω[ ] ‘Now as you
put it.’ So far Thætætæus has
appeared wholly unfamiliar with
the conception of a universal
notion. But Socrates’ illustra-
tion reminds him of the com-
prehensive simplicity of geo-
metrical expressions. And thus
he finds a clue in what he
knows to the new labyrinth of
inquiry into which Socrates
invites him. Mathematical
ideas, being the first pure
abstractions obtained by the
mind, are peculiarly fitted to
guide it to the contemplation
of abstractions generally. So
at least thought Plato: Rep.
7. 522-531. On the mi-
nuteness of such illustrations
see Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. (1840)
p. 197: ‘A number of Plato’s
dialogues are intended merely
to produce the consciousness
of a general notion, which we
possess without the trouble of
acquiring it. Hence his dis-
cursiveness has often the effect
of tediousness to us.’

In reading what follows, it
must be borne in mind that, by
the ancients, arithmetic was
studied through geometry. If
a number was regarded as sim-
ple, it was a line. If as com-
posite, it was a rectangular
figure, whether plane or solid.
To multiply was to construct a
rectangle, to divide was to find
one of its sides. Traces of this
usage still remain in terms like
square, cube, common measure,
but the method itself is obso-
lete. Hence it requires an effort
to conceive of the square root,
not as that which multiplied
into itself produces a given
number, but as the side of a
square, which either is the
number, or is equal to the
rectangle which is the number.
The use of the Arabic notation
and of algebra has greatly as-
sisted in expressing and con-
ceiving the properties of num-
bers without reference to form.

6. Σωκράτει] Young Socrates
becomes the respondent in the
Politicus. To introduce him
here by name is quite in the
manner of Plato. Naber’s pro-
sposal to cancel this word, and
Meynol. suppl. 142 B, is surely
erroneous. To do so would be
to blur the outlines which Plato
has made distinct.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣΩ. 21

p. 147. ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεων τὶ ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὑπὲρ ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τριτοδοσίας πέρι καὶ πεντετόποσι ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μὴκει οὐ ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδίαίᾳ, καὶ οὔτω


δυνάμεων] In mathematical language δυνάμεως, or 'powers,' are commonly understood to be the squares, cubes, etc., of simple quantities. And the word has been so interpreted here.

But it is not clear that in Plato's time this point of terminology was fixed. And on comparing 148 A it would rather seem that δυνάμες is here an abbreviation for ἡ δυνάμεις γραμμή, i.e. to speak arithmetically, not (1) the 'power' but (2) the 'root,' and the same term is presently limited by Theonetus and young Scratrates to irrational roots. Cp. Eucl. B. 7. Def.: 'Εκ δυὸ ὀνυμάτων πρώτη, δεύτερα, etc. ἀποτομὴ πρώτη, δεύτερα, etc. This explanation suits the context best. But the question is not one of much consequence. For just as the sides of the squares which are equal to 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 are δυνάμεις σύμμετροι, the squares themselves may be described as μήκει αὐτομετροι τῇ ποδίαιᾳ, i.e. having irrational sides.

2. H. Schmidt, who is followed in this by Schanz, has deleted the comma which was placed after πεντετόποδος in previous editions.

3. τῇ ποδίᾳ.] Sc. (1) δυνάμεις, or (2) εὐθεῖα.—the unit of measurement for integer quantities. The meaning is that the line = 1 or 1 is incommensurable with the line = 3.

H. Schmidt takes τῇ ποδίᾳ (δυνάμεις) for an instrumental dative, 'commensurable by the "unit."' This is less natural than 'commensurable with unity,' and particularly awkward if δυνάμες is the square. For how can a square be the measure of a line? If the words τῇ ποδίᾳ were cancelled as a gloss, they

i.e. simple and comprehensive. He relates the discovery of the integral and potential root.
κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην προαιρούμενον μέχρι τῆς ἑπτάκα-

πέτασε, p. 147.

δεκάποδος: ἐν δὲ ταύτη πως ἐνέσχετο. ἤμων οὖν εἰσ-

ηλθὲ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειροὶ τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνά-

μεις ἑφαίνουτο, πειραθήκαι Ἐιλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν, ὅτως

διὰ πάσας ταύτας προσαγορεύομεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

καὶ εὐρετέ τι τοιοῦτον;

ὢμογε νόμοιμεν. αὐτοὶ δὲ καὶ τύ.

Δέχε.

ὢμοι. Τὸν ἄρθρον πάντα δίηκ διελάβομεν. τὸν

μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἴσας γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ

could be more easily spared than many phrases which have been excised by recent editors.
The square root of 2 was also incomensurable with the unit-line. But this had been already proved in the familiar theorem about the side and the diameter of a square, and was therefore passed over as already known.
The sides of the square could easily be found through the familiar relation between the hypotenuse and the other sides of a right-angled triangle. Thus, the diameter of 1 = \sqrt{2}.
The hypotenuse of \sqrt{2} and \sqrt{3}. And so on.

4. Ἐιλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν, ὅτιφ. ἐν

is not the antecedent of ὅτιφ; the construction is κατὰ σύνωσιν, as if it were εὑρείν, ὅτιφ, κ.τ.λ.

'To generalize and find an expression whereby we should embrace them all.' Cr. Soph.

Philoc. 341: Ῥαγαροῦν τὸ σὺν φρόσον ἀρνητῷ πάλιν ἄρα, ὅτι ἐν ἑνὶ δώσαν. Charm. 166B: 'Ἐπὶ

αὐτῷ ἢ ἤκει ἢρευνον, ὅταν διαφέρει πα-

σῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ σωφροσύνην.

9. Τὸν ἄρθρον πάντα] For this collective use of ἄρθρον cp. Phaed. 104 A: ἢ τρίας καὶ

πειρατές καὶ ἢ ἡμεῖς τοῦ ἄρθρου ἀπα. Soph. 238 A: ἀριθμόν
dὴ τὸν ἑξάκαντα.

10. δυνάμενον] Used here in its ordinary sense, without any reference to δυνάμεον above.

ἴσον ἴσας γίγνεσθαι] I.e. to be made as a square number, which, as Euclid says, is ἴσος ἴσος, ἢ ὅ ὅτι διὸ δύο ἰσοὶ ἴσοι ἄρθρων

περιεχομένοις. 'To arise by the multiplication of equal numbers.' Such technical abbreviations hardly admit of strict grammatical analysis. But this formula may be accounted for by the apposition of parts to the whole. Cp. infr. 148 A: Ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἴσας γίγνεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. 193 C: Δεξία εἰς ἁριστέρα, and note.
p. 147. τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάζαντες τετράγωνὸν τε καὶ ἠσύπλευρον προσέπομεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοῖνυν μεταξὺ τούτον, ὅν καὶ τὰ p. 148. τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὅς ἄδυνατος ἵνα ἱσάκις 5 γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἦ πλείων ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζον δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων αἰεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτῶν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήχη αὐτὸ σχῆματι ἀπεικάζαντες προμήχη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. ὃσα μὲν γράμματα τὸν ἠσύπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετράγωνοι ἑσύμμετροι, μήκος ὀρισάμεθα, ὅσα δὲ τὸν ἑτερομῆχη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ

1. tetragonon te kai isypseuropo
   The expression is amplified and varied for the sake of non-mathematical readers.
   9–13. proemhe .. eteromhe
   These terms were distinguished by the later Pythagoreans. Nicomachus says that eteromhe arithmos has one factor greater than the other by 1, proemhe by more than 1.

12. tetragonizeonai. 'Form as their squares.' This use of tetragonizein is enough to show that geometrical terminology was not yet fixed. See the notes on dynamoein .. proemh ... eteromhe.

   Os mhein ou syumetrous ekeinais, tois de epistidos dywanta.
   Translate either, (1) 'not commensurable with the former in linear measurement, but in the superficial content of their squares,' or (2) 'not commensurable with them in linear measurement, while they are mutually commensurable in the surfaces of which they are severally roots.' I.e. the lines which are (or stand for) the irrational roots are not commensurable with the integral roots or with unity (τῇ ποδίᾳ), but their squares, being integers, have a common measure. They are commensurable not in themselves, but in their squares, that is, they are potentially commensurable (duuma miou synmetroin). For the construction de dynastein comp. ai dynamen aiata in the Def. of Euclid quoted above; also, Eucl. 10. 22: 'H dynamein aiata. It remains doubtful whether the one set of roots (dynaimes) or both are the nominative to dynastein, and consequently, whether tois epistidous refers (1) only to oblong number, or (2) to both oblong and square number. The former alternative may be adopted as the simpler; although the latter would be the more accurate expression. Instead of enumerating all the
irrational roots, which seemed infinite, they conceived the idea of finding an expression which should embrace them all. They first went for assistance from arithmetic to the less abstract forms of geometry (Ar. Met. 1. 3: Αἱ γὰρ δὲξ ἐπιτέκτων ἀκριβέστερα τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων, οὐκ ἀριθμητικῇ γεωμετρίᾳ). Here they at once found a generalization. All numbers which can be produced by equal integers they called square numbers. The rest, formed of unequal factors, they called oblong. The roots of the former can be measured by unity, the roots of the latter cannot, though the numbers themselves can. Hence a general distinction, and a simple nomenclature. The roots of square numbers they called μήκη, i.e. μήκει σύμμετροι, commensurable in whole numbers, the roots of oblong numbers, δυνάμεις, i.e. δυνάμει μένος συμμετροῖς. And similarly, in regard to solid quantity, i.e. the cube roots of numbers.

In other words, \( \sqrt{16} = 4 \) or \( 16 = \boxed{4} \); and \( 4 = \boxed{1.2.3.4} \) = the line forming one of its sides.

On the other hand

\[ \sqrt{12} = 3.464 \text{ or } 12 = \boxed{2} \text{ and } 2 \boxed{6} = 3.464 \]

and \( 3.464 = \boxed{1.2.3} \), which is not commensurable with the side of the former square, although the squares are commensurable. The boys ended with the term with which they started; and yet they had gained much: they saw now as one, what they had seen as many; as a whole, what they had seen as infinite; and this by limiting the application of the term and distinguishing the thing from that with which they had confused it. In like manner an advance is made towards a true conception of knowledge, when we have distinguished it from sense and from true opinion, although we fail to define it as it is in itself.

4. οὐκ ἐνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι] 'Will not be found guilty of perjury.' Cp. supr. 1.45 C, οὕτως ἐπισκύπης, and note. The article refers to what has been already mentioned. The feminine form ψευδομαρτυρίων is used in Legg. II. 937 B.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 148. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σωκρατέ, ὦ γε ἐρωτᾶς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὁσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι σὺ γε μοι δοκεῖσ τοιοῦτον τι ζητεῖν ἀστε πάλιν αὐθεντεῖ πενθῆς ὦ Θέοδωρος.

5 ΣΩ. Τῇ δαί; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδεὶς ὀντω δρομικῷ ἐφή τῶν νέων ἐντευθεῖκεναι, εἴτε διαθέου τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχύτου ἠττήθης, ἢττὸν τι ἀν οἰεὶ ἄληθῆ τῶν ἐπαινέσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὁσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρῶν τι οἰεὶ εἶναι εξευρέαν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη ἀκρον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Νὴ τῶν Δι' ἔγωγε καὶ μᾶλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων.

15 ΣΩ. Θάρρει τοῖνυν περὶ σαυτῷ καὶ τι οἶον Θεὸς ἀκρον λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τέ ἀλλοι τέρε καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὑν.

3 καὶ[ τε καὶ Τ. 7. διαβεθων] Running a course. Comp. Prot. 335 E : Νῦν ὁ ἐστὶν ὁσπερ ἄν εἰ δεόι μου Κρίσσων τῷ Ἰμεραίῳ δρόμει ἀκμαίοντι ἐπανθα, ἣ τῶν δολικοβῶν τῷ ἢ τῶν ἠμεροδρῶν διαδεχεῖαι καὶ ἐπανθα. 9. ἄληθή is cognate or adverbial accusative, as in Menex. 242 D : ὅτι οὐκ ἄληθῆ ἀμφιβολοῦν. 11. ὁσπερ νῦν δὴ] Viz. above, 145 D : Σμικρῶν δὲ τι ἀπορῶ. 12. τῶν πάντη ἀκρων] The Bodl. MS. has ἀκρῖδων, with an accent over the α, and a dot over each of the letters ι, θ. ἄκρων is required by the words which follow. Cf. Lach. 142 C : τῶν πάνω καλῶν πραγμάτων ἥγει σύ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι; ἐδὲ μὲν οὖν ἠσθι ὦτι τῶν καλλίστων. The mistake perhaps originated in not perceiving that ἄκρων is masculine. 'Knowledge is no trifling matter to find out, but it belongs to men every way complete; ' i. e. not, like the runner, accomplished in one thing only.

14. καὶ μᾶλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων] 'Most certainly, to men complete in the highest degree.' The superlative of ἀκρος, summus, is a kind of double superlative. Cp. Legg. 10. 906 B : Τῶν παντᾶσων ἄκρων ἀποτάτων ἀποτάτων. 17. προθυμήθητι] Supr. 145 D. 18. ἐπιστήμης is governed partly by περί, but chiefly by λόγον.

But he fears that the question about knowledge is not so easy.

Socrates still urges him.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκεν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φα- p. 148. νεῖται.

ΣΩ. Ἡδί δὴ: καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω• πειρῶ μμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ 5 ταύτας πολλὰς οὕτας εἰν ἐιδει περιέλαβε, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὸ λόγῳ προσεπείν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ’ εὖ ἦσθι, ὁ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ ε αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις• ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτ’ αὐτὸς δύ- 10 ναιμαι πείται ἐμαυτὸν ὅσ’ ἰκανὸς τι λέγω, οὐ’ ἄλλου ἀκούσατε λέγοντος οὕτως ὅσ’ σὺ διακελεύει• οὐ μὲν δὴ αὐνό ὅπαλαγηναι τοῦ μέλεων.

ΣΩ. Ὀδύνεις γὰρ, ὁ φίλε Θεαίητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ’ ἐγκύμων εἶναι.


3. καλῶς γὰρ ἄριστο οὐφηγήσω] Comp. Gorg. 455 D: Αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς οὐφηγήσω. οὐφηγήσασθαι is sometimes 'to set a pattern,' as in writing or drawing. Rep. 3. 403 E, Legg. 10. 890 C.

5. ἐν εἰδεί περιέλαβε . . ἐν λά- γο προσεπείν] The processes of generalizing and of defuiling or naming, although more clearly distinguished here than suppr. 147 D (συλλαβεῖς εἰς ἐν . . ἄρ φορ προσαγορεύσεων), are still considered as different aspects of the same thing.

8. ἀκούων . . ἐρωτήσεις] Thus it is indicated that, although this is the first meeting between Theetetus and Socrates, the curiosity of the youth had been previously awakened. Those whom Socrates had puzzled, had puzzled their companions in turn. See Apol. 23 C, Symp. 215 D.

12. μέλεων] The reading is doubtful. μέλεων has on the whole the best authority; but the reading of the Schol iast, εἰρέων, which is found on the margin of several MSS., supposing it to have been originally a gloss, agrees better with μέλεων. There is an idea of uneasiness in μέλεων which suits well with the context. And although οὔδ’ ἀπαλαγήσαι τοῦ μέλεων (sc. ἰκανὸς τι λέγειν) is sufficiently Greek, yet 'to get rid of a care' is a simpler notion than 'to get rid of an incipient act.' For μέλεων used personally comp. Aesch. Ag. 370: Θεοὺς βρωτῶν δόρουσθαι μέλεων. Soph. Electr. 342: Κείσον λαθέσθαι τῇ δὲ τικτούσῃ μέλεων (where it may be impersonal, as perhaps here). Eur. H. F. 772: Θεοὶ θεοὶ τῶν ἄδικων μέλους.

ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 148. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σῶκρατες· ὃ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω.

p. 149. ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὃ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐγὼ εἶμι νῦν μαῖας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαι-

ναρέτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡδὴ τοῦτο γε ἢκουσα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα καὶ, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτήν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὖ ίσθ' ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· λέληθα γάρ, ὃ ἐταίρη, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δὲ, ἀτε ὅντες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατος εἰμὶ καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Εἴποι οὖν σοι τὸ αἰτίον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἀπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥάον μαθήσει ὁ βούλομαι. οἶσθα γάρ ποι ὡς οὐδεμιὰ αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυῖσκομεν ἐν ταῖς τίκ- 20

4. μᾶλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλο-

συρᾶς] 'Truly noble and va-

liant,' or 'commanding,' of no

common or feeble mould.'

γενναίας] 'Of the right sort.'

βλοσυρᾶς, 'burly.' Comp. Rep.

7. 535 B: Γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυ-

ρούς τὰ βῆδη.

13. ἀτοπώτατος, κ.τ.λ.] 'That I

am the strangest of mortals,

and bring men to their wit's

end.' ἀτοπώτατος is the very

word to express Socrates' idea

of himself,—αἰτίον τε καὶ τοὺς λό-

γους. Symp. 215 A: ὦ γὰρ τί

ῥάδιον τὴν σήν ἀτοπίαν ἔδω ἔχοντι

εὐπρόφως καὶ ἐφέξις καταρδῆσα,

ἀτοπώτατος εἰμὶ καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς

ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν] Comp. Men.

79, 80: "Ἡκοσοὶ μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ πρὶν

συγκεκρίσοντο σοι ὅτι σὺ οὖν ἄλλο

ἡ αὐτοὶ τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους

ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν. . . καὶ δικαιὶ μοι

παυτέλως, εἰ δεῖ τα κατάμενα, ὠμοῦ

τατοῖς εἰναι τὸ τε εἰδος καὶ τὰλα

τις τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκη τῇ βαλα-

τίᾳ. This whole passage is at

least as much in favour of the

MS. reading ἀτοπώτατος, as of

Stallbaum's conjecture, ἀπωρό-

τατος, which was suggested by

the former part of it. Men

thought Socrates a strange

being, because he made them

discontented with themselves.
τονσά ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἄλλ’ αἱ ἡδη ἀδύνατοι τίκ- p. 149. 
tεών.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Αἰτίαι δέ γε τούτου φασίν εἶναι τήν Ἀρτε- 

5 μν, ότι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἰληχὲ. στερίφας 

μὲν οὖν ἁρα οὖκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὡτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη 

φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἤ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὄν ἂν ἢ ἀπειρο- 

tαῖς δὲ δὴ ἡλικίαν ἄτοκοι προσετάξε, τιμώσα τὴν 

αὗτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς 

κυοῦσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαῖων 

ἡ τῶν ἄλλων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

15 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ δίδουσα γε αἱ μαίαι φαρμάκια 

καὶ ἐπάδουσα δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὁδίνας καὶ 

μαλακωτέρας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε τὰ 

dὴ τὰς δυστοκοῦσας, καὶ εἰὼν νέον ὄν δόξῃ ἅμβλη- 

σκεῖν, ἅμβλησκούσιν;

4. Αἰτίαι] An adjective agreeing as predicate with 

"Ἀρτεμις." 'Artemis is said to be 

responsible for this.' Cp. infr. 

150 E: Τῆς μᾶνται μααιέας ὁ θεὸς 

καὶ ἑγὼ αἰτίας.

5. ἄλοχος] Used etymologically, 

as if from ἄ priv., and 

λέχος or λοχεῖο.

6. ἁρα] According to this 

tale. Cp. φασίν supra.

ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις, κ.τ.λ.] 'It 

is not in human nature to be 

come skilful where it is not 

experienced.' This point is 

dropped in the comparison: 

unless Plato means to hint that 

the art of Socrates was super- 

human.

8. ἄτοκοι] Bodl. p.m. ἄτοποι.

The correction is by a recent 

hand. 

τιμώσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα] 'In 

honour of their resemblance to 

herself.' τιμώσα, 'prizing.' Cp. 

Symp. 179 D: οὖσα καὶ θεὶ τὴν 

περὶ τῶν ἐρωτα σπουδὴν... τι-

μώσιν.

15. φαρμάκια] The Diminutive 

is noticeable. 'Gentle reme-

dies.'

17. τίκτειν τε δὴ] Sc. ποιεῖν. 

Cp. Symp. 206 D: σκυθρώπον τε 

(Sc. γέγονοί) καὶ λυπομένων συ- 

σπειράται, κ.τ.λ.

18. νέον δ’] Sc. τὸ βρέφος, said 

here of the embryo, 'At an 

early stage,' i.e. before abor-

tion is dangerous. Cp. Hipp. 

de Morb. Mul. § 3, 97: 'Ἡ
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 149. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἢτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἠσθησα, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ὡς πάσσοφοι οὐσι περὶ τοῦ γυνώνα ποίαν χρή ποίω ἄνδρες συνούσαν ὡς ἀρίστους παῖδες τίκτευν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ τούτο οἶδα.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἵσθι ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μείζων φρονοῦσιν ἥν ἐπὶ τῇ ὁμφαλητομίᾳ. ἔννοει γὰρ· τὰς αὐτής ἡ ἄλλης οἷς τέχνης εἶναι θεατεῖαν τε καὶ ἐξυγκομιδῆς τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ ἐάν τὸ γεννόμενην εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποίων ἑτὸν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέουν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἄλλα τῆς αὐτής.
ΣΩ. Εἰς γυναίκα δὲ, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἰεὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον, ἄλλην δὲ ἐξυγκομιδῆς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκούν εἰκός γε.

p. 150. ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ. ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἄδικον τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ἐξυγαγωγήν ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικός, ἢ δὴ προσαγωγεῖα ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἀτε σεμναὶ οὖσαν αἱ μαίαι, φοβοῦμαι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αὐτήν διὰ τοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν. ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὠντῶς μαίαις οἱ μόνοις ποὺ προσῆκε καὶ προμνησάθαι ὀρθῶς.
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

μαίαιν φθείρῃ τὸ παιδίν, where the same thing is spoken of. (This explanation is adopted by Schaarshmidt, 1874, and by H. Schmidt, 1877.) For the ellipse, which is a little difficult, cp. infr. p. 161 A, το γε σὺν, sc. κόμα. δύσκολο is lost sight of as the sentence proceeds. The subject of ἀδικεῖτον (used causatively) is still αἱ μαίαι.

4. ποιαν χρή] ‘What woman should be married to what man, to produce the noblest offspring.’

13. Εἰς γυναίκα simply repeats the construction of εἰς ποίαν γῆν. In such cases the construction is often elliptical, as here.

15. τοῦ τοιοῦτον] Sc. τοῦ ποιαν σπέρμα εἰς ποίαν καταβλητῶν.

16. ἄδικον τε καὶ ἄτεχνον] ‘Unlawful and skill-less;’ contrary to morality and nature. Socrates, according to his wont, assumes that vice is simply ignorance, so that ‘vicious’ and ‘unscientific’ are convertible terms.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Το μὲν τούνων τῶν μαῖων τοσοῦτον, ἔλαπτον p. 150. δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὖ γὰρ πρόσετο γυναιξίν εὐσίτε μὲν εἰδωλα τίκτειν, ἦστι δὲ ὅτε ἄλεθνα, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ρίζιον εἶναι διαγνώσαι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆν, μέγιστὸν τινὶ καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαίως τὸ κρῖνειν τὸ ἄλθεῖς τε καὶ μῆ. ᾧ ὅψιν οἰεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕγογη.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαυεύσεως τὰ μὲν

1. Ἀλαττον δὲ[1] There is a slight irregularity in the antithesis, occasioned by the stress on τοσοῦτον. The balance of clauses is, however, completed with τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῇ, κ.τ.λ.

2. τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος] It is doubted whether δράμα here and infr. 160 B, Rep. 5. 451 C, is literal = 'function' or figurative = 'role.' In either case the unusual word ('performance' for 'work') has here a humorously imposing effect.

8. Τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαυεύσεως[1] For the well-known metaphor, which is nowhere else so completely elaborated, compare Symp. p. 206, sqq. (where Diotima proceeds to explain the mystical expression τόκος ἐν καλῷ) κούοι γὰρ, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄθροισαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐπεδίδον ἐν τοῖς ἡλικίᾳ γίνεσαι, τίκτοις ἐπιθυμεῖσαι ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. τίκτοις δὲ ἐν μὲν ἀληθῶς οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῇ καλῇ, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θείων τὸ πράγμα καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ὑμῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῷον ἀδιάνα
tὸν ἔστω, ἡ κύριας καὶ ἡ γέννησις... ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ κούοιτι τοῖς καὶ ἢδη ὑπάρχοντι πολλης ἡ πτοιχίς γενοῦς περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλη τὸ γεγονός ἀποστείωντατέχνης. Symp. 209: τούτων αὖ ὅταν τις ἐκ νεῶν ἐγκύων ἢ τὴν ψυχήν θεῖας ὡν, κ.τ.λ. to the end of the speech. Repub. 6. 490 B: Οὐκ ἐμβλύσωςο οὖθ' ἀπο
tύγχοι τοὺς ξίρωσι, πρὶν αὐτοῦ δ' ἐσ
tὶ ἐκάστοτι τῆς φύσεως ἰτιγαθάνης ἡ προσθείς ψυχής ἐφάπαυσα τοὺς τοιούτους προσθηκής δὲ συγγενεῖς ὧ
cὶ πλησίασε καὶ μεγίς τῷ ὀντὶ ὄντως, γενίσσαι νῦν καὶ ἀληθεύα, γονί
tὲ καὶ ἀληθῶς γνῆ καὶ τρέφοντο καὶ ὀντὶ ἄλθην ὄδυνα, πρὶν δ' οὖν. So far of the relation of the mind to knowledge. For the relation of the teacher and the taught see Phedr. 276 Ε, 278 Δ: Πολὺ
d', οὗτοι, καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτά
gίγνεται, οὐταί τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχ

η χρώμενοι, λαβὼν ψυχήν προσ
tήκουσαν, φυτεύσε τε καὶ σπείρα
tεπτέρειμα λόγους, οἷς ἐναυτὸ
tο τῷ τέλεσθαι βοήθειν λοιπον, καὶ ὅμως άκαρποί ἄλλα ξουητ
tες σπέρμα... δὲν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους

λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγομεν ὅνως νεῖσι
cὶ γεγονοῦσι εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν

ἐναυτῷ, ἕνως εἰςείκης ἡν' ἐπεταὶ εἰ
tois toitou ekgoin te kai aedelbo

ἀμα ἐν ἄλλωσὶν ἄλλως ψυχαις κα
d' εἶναι ἑνδυναμ. For the theory
to teaching and learning thus

illustrated see Rep. 7. 518 B:

Δεῖ δὴ, εἴπον, ήμισὶ τοιοῦτοι νομίσα
ti αὐτοῦ, εἰ ταύτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν

παιδείαν, οὐχ οὖν τοις ἐπαγγελλό

μενοι φανεροι εἶναι, τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι.

φασι δὲ ποιον οἷον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιτύχης σφαίρα ἑντεῦθεν,

οἰον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δόξην ἑντε
d' ἑνεχθε, κ.τ.λ.—where it occurs
under a different metaphor, that
of the cave.

It is always difficult to sepa-
rate the Platonic from the real
Socrates. In the present pass-
age they are indissolubly blend-
ed. That men thought Socrates
the strangest being, and that he brought them to their wit's end, is matter of fact.
The quaint humour, perhaps
even the name 'Son of a Mid-
wife,' is Socrates' own. But it
is impossible to determine how
far the theory based upon his
practice, that to teach is not to
put something into the mind
but to evolve something out of
it, or to turn the mind from
darkness to light, was con-
sciously held by Socrates him-
self, and how far it is Plato's
theory of the method Socrates
pursued. It receives its full
development in the seventh book
of the Republic, but is not
there, as here, combined with
the Socratic confession of igno-
rance.

3. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν] 'But
as its greatest triumph my art
comprises this.' δὲ answers to
μὲν above, the former δὲ being
parenthetical. μέγιστον recalls
μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον supra.

5. δυνατόν] Sc. τὸν ἔχοντα αὐ-
τὴν.

εἴδωλον] Comp. Symp. 212 A,
Rep. 7. 520 C. (From whence
Bacon probably took his Idola.)
Soph. 240 A, 264 B, 266 C.

6. ἀποθεώσει] 'Is delivered
of.' ἀπο- denotes completion or
result, as in ἀποσαφεῖν, ἀποτε-
λευτᾶν.

7. ἐτεί τὸ δὲ γε] 'For I have
the same previous condition
which the midwives have, in
being barren of wisdom.' ἐτεί
implies 'This is our highest
function, for like the midwives
I cannot pretend to what is
higher still, viz. original pro-
duction.'

12. ὁ θεὸς] Who presides over
my art as Artemis does over
that of the midwives. ὁ θεὸς
must not be identified with
τὸ δαμάσκων, though they are
probably connected (see below,
at first, make wondrous progress and do great things. If they leave me too soon, their minds miscarry: unless they return to me, when, if I am permitted to receive them, they again improve.

and cp. Apol. 40 B: το του θεου σημειων, but belongs rather to the belief expressed in Apol. 21, 23, where Socrates speaks of his cross-questioning as a Divine service, because occasioned by the oracle at Delphi; and Phaed. 85 B: 'Εγω δε και αυτος ηγουμαι ημερολογει εναι των κοινων και λειπε του αυτου θεου, i.e. sacred to Apollo the god of the true μονοικη (ib. 61 A: ος φιλοσοφιας οσαν μεγαλης μονοκης): but here, as in one or two places of the Apology, the feeling is generalized. The impression remains, however, that Apollo's part herein corresponds to that of his sister Artemia.

1. τι This is preferred as the Bodleian reading. τι, the reading of T, etc., may possibly be right. C. F. Herm. compares Phaedr. 228 B: Ει μη πανυ τι δεν μακρος.

ουδε τι μοι] 'Nor have I had such a prize of my invention born to me, the offspring of my own mind.' Perhaps there is a slight play upon the word ευριμα. Compare Soph. (Ed. Tyr. 1107: το του θεου ευριμα δεξια τι του | Νυμφων 'Ελληνων, ας πλειονα συμπαιξει; but the primary meaning is 'invention.' Cp. Phaedr. 278 Α: Υλις γησισως ... του τοι δεν ευρεθει ενι, and ευροτητες below.

2. ευριμα] This differs from γεγονος as έχω with aor. or perf. partic. differs from the perf. act. This punctuation is upheld by Burger, De Theet. 47, who, however, suggests that γεγονος may be interpolated. Most editors place the comma after τοιούτο. Cp. Lach. 186 Ε: Ου τη γερ ευρετης ουτε μαθης ουδενος γεγονων. The dierothetes of the Bodl. MS. has placed a comma after γεγονος, as in the text.


7. και τοιοτο εναργες δει] 'And that manifestly.' τοιοτο, sc. περιουσιν: viz. ευροσισμον.

εναργες δει] A strengthened form of δειλον δει. 'As clear as day.' Plato frequently thus extends an idiom. C. F. Hermann, Wohlrab, and Schanz agree in deleting the comma after εναργες. It must be admitted, however, that και τοιοτο is more usual than και τοιοτο in such a connexion. The Bodl. MS. favours the punctuation of the earlier editors.

9. ευροτητες τε και κατεχοντες] 'Holding as their own dis-
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 150. ο θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς. ὄμεν δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἢ ἡ ἐντούτω ἄγνοιῶςαντε καὶ ἐκαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἥ αὐτοί ὑπ' ἀλλὸν πεισθέντες, ἀπῆλθον πρωῒστερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ἐξῆμβλοσαν διὰ ποιημάτων ἐξουσίαν καὶ τὰ 5 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαυεκόντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπὸλεσαν, ψευδὴ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιημάννοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτώντες δὲ αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἐδοξαν ἀμαθείς εἶναι. ὧν εἰς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμαχός καὶ ἀλλοι πάνω πολλοὶ. οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν 10

coveries.' Schanz reads καὶ τε-κόντες, which is found in some inferior MS. authorities, and may possibly be right, but may also be due to corruption, through the accidental omission of καί, or to MS. conjecture. The v.r. καὶ ἔκόντες rather points to this; and κατέχοντες gives a perfectly good sense, expressing the satisfaction a man feels in the secure possession of that which he owes to the exercise of his own powers. Those who left Socrates too early had no such security. Wohlbrab quotes Symp. 175 D: ἄλλον γὰρ δεῖ εἴρεσ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔχεις.

3. ἢ αὐτὸ ἢν] 'They left me, whether it was that they despised me, or were themselves won over by some one else.' The needless emphasis has given rise to suspicion. Heindorf reads ἢ αὐτός ἢν ('of their own accord, or through the influence of others'), for which there is slight MS. authority. Schanz proposes ἢ αὖ, where αὖ is still more superfluous than the minute antithesis. If ἢ αὔτο ἢ is read, the clause may be either joined to καταφρονη-

santes or (with L. Dissen quoted by Wohlbrab) to ἀπῆλθον. The latter is more probable.

[πεισθέντες] 'Attracted,' 'captivated;' cp. Thucyd. 6. 54.

4. τὰ ... λοιπὰ] 'What more they had in them.' Cp. infr. 210 B.

5. ἐξῆμβλοσαν] Cp. Aristoph. Nub. 137: Φροντὶδ' ἐξῆμβλωκας ἐξευρημένη (where, however, the verb is used causatively as above 149 D, ἀμφισβηκούσι).

[διὰ ποιηµατού ἐξουσίαν] Symp. 206 C: Τύπτειν δ' ἐν μὲν αἰσχρῷ οὐ δύνασαι, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. Cp. infr. 151 A B. The image of μαυεκόντα is merged in that of προμηθει-

κὴ. The word ἐυνυξία expresses more than one kind of intercourse.

9. Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμαχός] We read of the introduction of this youth to Socrates in the Laches, 179 A: ἶπτει. Ἦμων εἰσὶν νεῖος οὐτοῖς, ὅπερ τοῦτο ... εἰμὲ δὲ αὖ ὅπερ παππάν δὲ καὶ ὅπερ δοῦμα ἥξει τοῦτο πατρός, Ἀριστείδην γὰρ αὐτῶν καλοῦμεν. Lysimachus and Melesias are consulting Nicias and Laches, in the presence of Socrates, about their sons, Aristides and Thucydides.
1. δαυμαστά δρόντες] 'Showing extraordinary solicitude.' ‘Going on their knees to me.' Cp. Apol. 35 A: 'Εφόρκα τως... δαύματα ἐργαζόμενος, ὡς δεικτὶ τι οἰομένως πεισόσθαι εἰ ἀποδεικνύωσιν.

2. το... δαυμόνω] Here, as always, not commanding, but forbidding; and, as generally, neuter and impersonal. This is not the place to discuss the subject. It suits well with the intensely self-reflective nature of Socrates (lost sometimes for whole days in thought) that he should pause suddenly on the eve of doing something, without being able (at the time) to explain to himself and others the motives of reason or feeling which checked his impulse.

3. οὕτω] This is the reading of T and most MSS. The Bodleian has αὕτω, which is certainly admissible, and is perhaps also preferable as the more difficult reading. ‘In some cases I am permitted to do so, and the men themselves improve.' But οὕτω is on the whole more probable.

7. ἡ ἕκεινα] T has ἢ κείνα. Schanz reads ἢ 'κείνα.

9. πῶς] Qualifying μὴ δόξος. ‘Whom, somehow, I perceive not to be,' etc.

ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 35

p. 151. ἐνεκα τοῦδε ἐμῆκυνα, ὑποπτεύον σε, ὦστερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἰεί, ὡδίνει τι κυνοῦτα ἐνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρὸς με ὡς πρὸς μαίας ύιῶν καὶ αὐτὸν μαυευτικού, καὶ ἂν ἐροτᾶ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἶδο τ' εἶ, οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. καὶ ἔκαν ἄρα σκοπούμενος τι ὡν ἄν λέγης, ἡγήσομαι ἐξοδωλ καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, ἐπα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίανε ὦστερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ πατέα. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἡδί, ὡ θαυμᾶσε, πρὸς με οὕτω διετέθησαν, ἄστε ἀπεχνῶς δάκνειν έτοιμοι εἰναι, ἐπειδάν τινα λήρου αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονται εἰνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποτέ, πόρρῳ οἴτε τοῦ εἴεναι οτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς δύνατος ἀνθράπων, οὐδ' ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλά μιο θαυμάσε τε ἐπαγχωρήσαι καὶ ἄληθές ἀφανίσω οὐδαμός θεός. Πάλιν η δὴ οὖν εἰς ἅρχης, ὁ Θεάτητη, ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν. ἀν ὦ οὐχ οἶδο τ' εἶ, μηδέποτ' εἴπης. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλη καὶ ἀνδρίζη, οὖς τ' ἔσει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχρῶν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖ μεῖοθαι ὁ τι τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστά- μενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὁ ἐπιστάται, καὶ ἂς γε νυνι φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη· ἡ αἰ- σθήσεωι.

1. ὦστερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἰεί] Cp. sufrag. i 48 D E: 'Ἀλλ' εἰν ὅλθι...
...πέπονθα λέγω.'
2. προσφέρου] Charm. 165
Β: σο μὲν ὡς πάσκαντο εἴου ἐδίναν περὶ δὲν ἐπαίνει προσφέρει πρὸς με.
6. ἐτί] Cp. Apol. 23 C:
Πολλάκις ἐμὲ μμονήνται, εἴτα ἐπι-
χειροῦν ἄλλους ἐείταζον.
ὑπεξαιρῶμαι] The MSS. have ὑπεξαιρῶμαι, Bekk. corr. See below, ἀφαιρῶμαι, where T and B pr. have ἀφαιρῶμαι.

ἀποβάλλω] ἀποβάλω B.
10. τινα λήρον] Some 'barren
stuff.'
oīoναι] Plutarch in quoting
this passage reads oīoναι με.
11. οὐδεὶς θεός] And therefore
not the presiding genius of my
Art.
18. σοὶ γε] I. e. 'You, whom
I respect so highly.'
22. ἐπιστήμη...ἀισθήσεωι] The
term ἀισθήσεωι is more simple
and more extensive than any
one by which it could be rea-
ordered in English or any modern language, in which the notion of the five senses has become fixed. ‘Sense-perception’ is too definite for it here. See below, 156 B: Λι μέν οὖν αἴσθησις τὰ τοιάδε ἠμῖν ἔχουσιν οὐδέματα, ὃς τε καὶ ἀκολούθητι καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ καύσεως καὶ ἀκούσεις ἱερὰ καὶ λυπᾶται καὶ ἐπιθυμιά καὶ φάσεις, κ. τ. λ. Perhaps ‘to see and feel is to know,’ is the nearest equivalent to what Theaetetus means. But ‘feeling’ has ethical associations which must be excluded here. The German word ‘Sinn’ presents a nearer parallel.

Before reflection begins, our individual impressions are those of which we are most conscious and most certain. And subjective certainty is the primitive meaning of τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι. Hence αἴσθησις seems at first sight identical with ἐπιστήμη.

Cp. Phaed. 83 C: ‘Οὔτοι μμερές ἀνθρώπον ἀναγκάζεται ἄμα τε ἡσυχάζω τε ἡνοωθηχαίναι σφόδρα ἐκ τω καὶ ἠγιασθαί, περὶ δὲ καὶ ἀλατοὶ ταῦτα πόσχα, τοῦτο ἐναργείωτας τε καὶ ἀληθοτάτας, οἷς οὕτως δεῖ. Aristotle, Metaph. 3. 1900 b: Ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινομένα αἴθησις ενίοες εἰς τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐλήφθην, . . . ἄλος δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν μορφήν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταῦτη δὲ εἶναι ἀλλοιοῦσα, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰς ἀνάγκης ἀλληθῆς εἶναι φασίν. The saying of Theaetetus is shown to be the meeting point of two lines of speculation; the one of which may be termed in modern language, subjective, the other objective: the one regarding all knowledge as relative and apparent to man; the other regarding things without reference to man as in a state of transience or relation; thus sense cannot be knowledge, unless knowledge is relative, and being is change. This leads to an analysis of Sensation. We are made aware of its real nature, and so taught to distinguish Knowledge from it. See Aristot. de An. 3. 3: ἰδοι δὲ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φαινέον ὄσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἶναι ἐν ἀμφοτέρους γὰρ τούτους ἡ ψυχή κρίνει τι καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὑπότων καὶ οὐ γε ἀρχαίον τὸ φαινέον καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταύτων εἶναι φασίν, ὧσπερ καὶ Ἐρμηνευτικής εἰρήνης. Πρὸς παρέον γὰρ μισθὸς ἀξέχαστοι ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις . . . ὃθεν σφίσαι αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φαινέον ἄλλοια παρασταται. Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ βούλεται τούτων καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, Τοίος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν ἐπιστημονικὸς ἀνθρώπων, αὐτὸν ἐν ἡμῶν ἄγηκεν παρὰ ἄνθρωπον ταῦτα θεώτε. 1. Ἔδε γε καὶ γενναίοι] Supr. 146 C.

2. αὐτό here—sc. τὸ ἀποφανθὲν—and supr. 148 E, has no distinctly expressed antecedent.

6. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι] ‘Well, after all, I should not wonder if…’
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 152. κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὤν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δὲ των ἄλλων ἐφ' ἐκεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶν γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρου ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἑστιν. ἀνέγνωσκας γάρ ποι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωσκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὔτω πως λέγει, ὡς οὐκ ἐκαστὰ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαύτα μὲν ἑστίν ἐμοὶ, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαύτα δὲ αὕτη σοι. ἄνθρωπος δὲ σὺ τε κἀγώ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γάρ οὔν οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Εἰκός μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἂρ οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνεύμος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ὁ μὲν ἥμων ῥίγοι, ὁ δ' οὖ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἥρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πάτερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ πνεύμα

3. ἄνθρωπον] Not 'Man,' i.e. collective human nature; nor yet exactly 'Each man.' As we have seen, p. 147, Theseus is little conscious of the universal. Hence άνθρωπος signifies to him not humanity, nor yet the individual, as opposed to it, but this or that man, 'any man you choose.' And whether or not it was so intended by Protagoras, it would certainly appear to have been so understood by his 'disciples,' to whom Socrates presently refers.

7. οὗ οἷα μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Cratyl. 365 E, 366 A: 'Ὄσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα εἰναι, τοιαύτα μὲν ἑστιν ἐμοὶ, οἷα δ' ἀν σοί, τοιαύτα δ' αὕτη σοι. This repetition of the same language affords a presumption that the explanation, as well as the original saying, is Protagoras' own.


16. ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ] ἑαυτῷ Vindob. suppl. 7. ἑαυτῷ B T.' Schanz. The accusative may be defended from Thucyd. i. 141: ὅταν τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἐκαστὸς σπεύδῃ. 4. 28: Τὸ ἐπὶ σφάς εἶναι. The prep. is used in a slightly pregnant sense, = ἐροτεῖσθαι, 'As far as to itself, and no further.' Cp. infr. 160 A: οὖδ' ἐκείνῳ ἑαυτῷ τοιούτων γενώσται. (Perhaps the accus. is also partly due to the idea of motion in πνεύμα;) ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ is sup-
πυρὸν ἢ ὁ πυρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ p. 152.
Πρωταγόρα ὢν τῷ μὲν ῥηγοῦντι πυρὸν, τῷ δὲ 
μὴ οὖ;
ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικεν.
5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἐκατέρθω ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐστὶν;
ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστι γὰρ.
ΣΩ. Φαντασία ἁρα καὶ αἰσθήσις τούτον ἐν τῷ
10 θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται 
ἐκατος, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστῳ καὶ κυνδυνεῖ εἶναι.

ported by H. Schmidt. For ἐφ’ ἔσω, which is preferred by
Wohlrab, Schanz and others,
cp. Tim. 51 B: ἄρ’ ἐστιν τὶ πῦρ 
αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἔσω. For the use
of the reflexive pronoun cp.
Rep. 4. 419 A: Καὶ ταῦτα δ’ ἔσω-
τος. This notion is carried
farther by Locke, Hum.
Underst. 2. 8. § 21: ‘The same
water may produce the sensa-
tion of cold in the one hand
and heat in the other.’

η. Τὸ δὲ ὑπὲ φαίνεται αἰσθάνε-
σθαι ἐστὶν’ ‘When you say
“appears,” it is that he has a
sensation.’ The example is kept
in view throughout. There is
MS. authority for αἰσθάνεται,
(Op. inf. 164 B: Τὸ δὲ ὑπὲ ἑνὸ 
ὅρα ὁμίληται ἐστὶ ἐπὶ καὶ 
τὸ ὅρα ἐπὶσταται.) But the
change of subject makes αἰσθά-
νεσθαι preferable. Cp. inf. 186
D: Τὶ ὁμίληται ἐπὶ συνδίδως 
ὅρα μα α. τ. ἑ.; Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐγὼ γε.
Crat. 410 C: Τὸ γὰρ γεγονὼν 
γεγονῆσθαι λέγει. And the re-
petition of the termination is a
more probable form of corrup-
tion than the recurrence of σθ
in the same word. φαίνεσθαι ap-
pears as a correction for φα-
ίνεται in some MSS.

9. Φαντασία ἁρα] I. e. ‘In
regard to heat and cold and
the like your theory and that
of Protagoras agree.’ φαντασ-
ία occurs here simply as the noun
of φαίνεσθαι, = ‘appearing,’ rather
than ‘appearance,’ and must be
kept clear from the notion of
faculty, and the associations
due to Aristotle, (see de An.
3. 3, where he defines it, κι-
νησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ’
ἐνέργειας ἐγερμοίνης.) Appearance
(or relative being) becomes a
middle term between sensation
and being, so that all is merged
in sensation. Thus, while the
answer of Theatetus is shown
to coincide with the saying of
Protagoras, the reader is gently
led to acquiesce for the mo-
ment in their common point of
view.

ἐν τῷ θερμοῖς] Cp. infra. 204
D: ‘Εν γὰρ τῶν δόντας ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ
ἐστιν. These are instances of
Plato’s tentative method.

10. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται] (1) Sc.
aivá, which however is purposely
omitted; viz. τὰ θερμά, κ. τ. λ. 
'This theory of Knowledge, then, depends upon a theory of Being, which Protagoras reserved for his disciples, to whom he 

full circle' and to complete the identification of Protagoras' theory with that of Theaetetus. Compare with ὅσ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα, infr. 160 C: Κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν.

5. Ἄρ' οὖν, κ. τ. λ.] If sensation is of Being, then Being is not Being but Change. ἄρα in such questions (cp. infr. 200 C) is more emphatic than ἄρα οὖν. Here it expresses delighted surprise. 'In the name of all that is charming, was Protagoras even wiser than we knew?' For the Graces in this connexion cp. Prot. 320 C: Δοκεὶ τοῖν μοι ... χαριστερον εἶναι μῦδον ἕμιν λέγειν.

'What! says Socrates, did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric doctrine to the multitude, and tell the truth in esoteric confidence to his disciples? Did he teach the one to believe in οὗτος, the others in nothing but γεγομένα?' Prof. Kennedy.

7. τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ] He told the real truth, not in his book which is so entitled (Ἀλήθεια), but privately to his disciples. Cp. Crat. 413 A: ἕνω δὲ, δ' Ἐρμογένες, ἄτε λαορίησ ὧν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταύτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπνυμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ. (Socrates has just given a derivation of the word δικαιοσύνη,
which he thus ironically attributes to the disciples of Heraclitus as an esoteric doctrine.) By a similar irony, he says here that the 'friends of Protagoras' have learnt their doctrine from their master 'in a mystery.' Clearly then the doctrine which Socrates proceeds to develop was not to be found in the written teaching of Protagoras, but in the interpretations of his reputed followers. The question, how far the Cyrenaics are indicated by the phrase, 'disciples of Protagoras,' has been discussed in the introduction.

There is a slight allusion here to the work of Protagoras of this name, which is more distinctly referred to afterwards.

2. καὶ μᾶλ’ οὐ φαύλον λόγον] 'I will tell you, and it is indeed a high argument.' He had spoken of a λόγος οὐ φαύλος above (151 E). Cp. infra. 179 D.

3. οὐδ’ ἀν τι προσεῖτοι] (1) 'Nor can you call anything rightly by any name.' Or (2) with H. Schmidt, making οὐδ’ the object and τι predicative.

'Nor can you rightly call it anything, or any kind of thing.' But this is less probable, and is certainly not required by what follows.—Whoever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek thought, of which Heraclitus was the most prominent exponent.

8. καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα] These words are introduced in order to include Empedocles, whose elements, however, were not subject to growth and decay, and who was probably not independent of an Eleatic influence. His Muse is called in the Sophist (242 E) μαλακτέρα (in contradistinction to the σωτονύτεραι μοῦσαι of Heraclitus), because his two principles of friendship and strife do not possess the world together, but alternately.

...
vainly attempted to defend. Even if it were clear that
Empeocles was set over against Protagoras and Heraclitus, or
that these (coupled with τε καὶ) only counted for one, the use
of the dual here would still be unnatural. Stobæus, who
quotes this passage, has ἐμφέρωται, which is possibly right.
In the Bodleian MS. there is
an erasure to the right of the omicron, which seems origin-
ally to have been ω. An accent on the penultimate has
also been erased. Thus ἐμφερίσθω (or συμφερίσθω) is
supported by the Bodleian first
hand, besides three other MSS.
'Be it assumed (since we can-
not ask them) that the philo-
sophers of all ages speak with
one voice concerning this.' For
the imperative, denoting a pro-
visional assumption, cp. infr.
word ἐμφερίσθω retains here
something of its literal meaning,
'are gathered together,' 'move
all one way.' Thuc. 7. 36. The
boldness of the language, espe-
cially the word στρατισθῶν, is
in favour of this.
3. Ἐπίχαρμος] Epicharmus,
ed. Krusemann, fr. 95: Συνε-
κρίθη, καὶ διεκρίθη, καὶ ἀπῆλθεν
δὲν ἔθει πάλιν γὰρ µὲν εἰς γάν,
πνεύμα δ' ἀνω. Ib. fr. 90: Φώνης
ἀνθρώπων ἀσκοὶ πεφυσημένοι. The
passage quoted by Diog. Laert.
3. 10 (who says that Plato
borrowed from Epicharmus),
though interesting, if authentic,
is too long for quotation here,
except the line ἐν µεταλλαγῇ δὲ
πάντες ἐνὶ πάντα τῶν χρόνων.
(Cp. Mullach, Fragment. Phil.
Gr. Epicharm. vv. 177−194.)
Epicharmus (circ. 490 B.C.) is
called a Pythagorean. One or
two of his γνώμαι remind us of
Heraclitus, although, as only
fragments from his Comedies
are preserved, we cannot tell
in any case how far the notions
expressed are his own.
τραγῳδίας δὲ, Ὄμηρος] Where
the form is in question, ἤτη are
distinguished from τραγῳδία: as in Rep. 3. 394 C. Where
this is not the case, they are
combined as tragedy, this being
another name for σπουδαία µι-
µητη: e.g. Rep. 10. 605 C:
'Ακροαώμενοι Ὅμηρον ἦ ἄλλου τινὸς
tῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν.
4. *[ὁς] εἰπών] The best MSS.
read Ὅμηρος εἰπών. A few add
γάρ, as in a similar passage,
175 D (ἀπροσ. τε κ.τ.λ.) γάρ
is added in one MS. (Ven. 2.)
δὲ εἰπών is Heindorf's very
probable emendation. The MS.
reading is to be defended, if
at all, by supposing a 'return
to the indicative.'
6. "μὴ γενέσθαι." A few MSS. have μὴ οὐ. But the omission of οὐ may be defended by the remoteness of the supposition.

Cp. Sophist 241 E: Τούτων γὰρ μὴν ἔλεγχότων μὴν ὄμολογήθην- των σχολὴ ποτὲ τις οὐδὲ τι ἐσται μὴ καταγελαστὸς εἶναι: Soph. O. T. 76, 77. "μὴ" belongs to the adj. 'Who could prove other than ridiculous?' Compare with the whole passage Cratyl. 401 E, 402 A, where, after proposing first ἔστια (fire) and then ὁσία (displacement), as derivations for ὄσία, Socrates says: Ὅ "γαθε, ἐνεκόπηκται τα συμφό οὐσίας." Ερμ. Ποιον δὴ τοῦτο; Ἔρων γελοῖον μὲν πάνω εἰσεῖν, οἵμα μέντοι τινὶ πεπλησθέντα ἔχειν, 'Ερμ. Τίνα τάσσερα; Ἔρων τὸν Ἰσημαῖον μοι δοκὸ καθόρουν πολαί: ἄτα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἄνεχως τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ἡράς, Δ καὶ Ὀμηροὶ δείκνυσι. 'Ερμ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγει; Σω. λέγει τὸν Ἰσημαῖον ἐτὶ πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποιημά τοῦ ἄρη ἀπεικονίζων τὰ διὰ λέγει ὡς διὸς τῶν αὐτῶν ποιημάτων οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίνει, κ. τ. λ. Two Orphic lines are then quoted besides this of Homer and Hesiod: Ὄκεανος πρῶτος καλλίρως ἐρεῖ γάμων, ὡς μα κατηγορήτηρ τὴν ὄμολίτρια θηλήν ὅπαινεν. 'Ερμ. λέγει ταῦτ' ὡς καὶ ἀλλὰς συμφώνει καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἡράκλειτου πάντα τείνει. The last words are a good commentary on ἦμιφορέσθως.

The theory of Knowledge, 'All impressions are true,' is shown to require the theory of Being, 'All things come and go.' And thus of the Protagorean and Heraclitean traditions there is woven a doctrine of sense, similar to that which was held by the Cyrenaics and perhaps others at this time. As a doctrine of sense it is received, as a doctrine of knowledge and being it is negativised.

Compare the way in which ὄσα is treated in the Republic, 5. 479 A: Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μᾶλλον τι ἐστι, δ οὐκ ἀληθῶν φανέρωται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, δ οὐκ ἀδικῶν; καὶ τῶν ἁμάς, δ οὐκ ἀνόσων; κ. τ. λ. τί δὲ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλώματα ἤτοι τι ἠμέτα τι διπλάσια φαίνεται; οὐδέν. Καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοία καὶ ἁραία μὴ τι μάλλον, ἢ ἐν φήμοις, ταῦτα προσφησθήσοτα ζάνων; Τί; 'Ερμ. θὰ καὶ τάδε, κ. τ. λ.] The clause ὅτι . . . ἤσχυς is added in explanation of τῷ λόγῳ σημεία. 'The theory is confirmed by the following indications of the fact that,' etc. H. Schmidt quotes Menex. 237 E: Μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι, κ. τ. λ. . . . πῶς γάρ, κ. τ. λ. Cp.
The expression has been thought harsh [dokouɛ] Schanz; and Badham proposes to read οὐ. But cp. supra. 152 D: 'Α δη φαιμεν ειναι. Inf. 153 E: Καὶ δ η ἐκασγον ειναι φαιμεν χρωμα: also 176 C: Δευ νόηται τε δοκουσα. 'Being, so esteemed.' 'What passes for Being.'

3. δ δη και ταλλα γεναι] 'Which our theory assumes to produce all other things.' The symbol of fire as the primal element is elsewhere associated with the theory of a flux. See Craly 401 (quoted above), ib. 413 B (speaking of the Heracliteans): 'Ο μεν γαρ τις φησι τουτο ειναι δικαιον, των θλων τουτων γαρ μονω διασπολαι και κανων επιπροεινει τα δομα. έπειτα ουν το τε λεγο αυτο δημησος ως καλων της ακρης, καταγελα μου ους άκουσας και έρωτα, ει ουδεν δικαιον ουμα ειναι εν τοις ανθρωποις, έπειτα δων οι δημος δημ. λιπαροντος ουν ερω δι τι αυτοις λεγει, αυτο τω πυρ φησι τουτο δε ου λαβων εστιν ειδειναι. δ δη ουκ αυτο τω πυρ φησιν, αλλ' αυτο τω θερμων τω εν τω πυρι ειναι. δε τοινυν μεν παντων καταγελαν φησιν, ειναι δε το δικαυν δ λεγει Αναξαγωρα, νοιν ειναι τουτο, κατο λα. Thus the mythology of the doctrine was rationalized by its adherents. In this dialogue every feature of it is presented, from the most sensuous symbolism (θλως, χρωμα πορα) to the most abstract principle (το των κινησις ην, 156), and its most remote application. See also the famous saying of Heraclitus (fr. Bywater): Κατων του αυτων απανων, ουτε θεων της ουτε άνθρωπων ενηποιησε, αλλ' εστιν ην τη άλλι και έσται παυ δεξιων απομενου μετα και οβιδομενου μετα. But the symbol fire was by no means confined to Heraclitus (cp. the Atomists, Pythagoreans, etc.).

5. τουτο δε κινησις] This is added parenthetically with reference to τρησεως. Τουτω δε κινησις has been adopted by editors on the authority of the Bodleian MS. But τουτο is also the reading of the Boll. first hand. The marginal note δουκως is due to the corrector (b) who changed τουτο into τουτο, instead of restoring κινησις.
Exercise is essential to the preservation and improvement both of body and mind.

5  ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ πολὺ σώζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

3. ἐπὶ πολὺ] 'To a great extent;' or 'for a long time.' The MSS. vary between (ὡς) ἐπὶ πολὺ (T etc.), and ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (B etc.), from which ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ has been conjectured. But ὡς in T was at first omitted, and ἐπὶ πολὺ gives a better sense. Cp. Thuc. 8. i: Ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἡπιστοῦν. Crat. 415 A: Τὸν ἄνευ ἐπὶ πολὺ.

5. 'Ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις] ἔξις in Plato, like φαντασία, is less technical than in Aristotle. It is simply the noun of ἔχειν, whether transitive or not. The body is said ἔχειν πως, the mind is said ἔχειν τὰ μαθήματα; hence ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἔξις, 'the condition of the body;' but ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις, 'the having in the mind.' Cp. Rep. 9. 591 B: Ὁ ψυχῆς τιμωτέραν ἔξιν λαμβάνει σαφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην . . στομήν. Ar. Met. 4. 1022. 6: ἔξις δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οὖν ἐνέργειας τις τοῦ ἐξουσίως καὶ ἐξομίλην . . ἀλλον δὲ τρόπον διαθέσεως, k. t. l.

For a similar transition from one sense of a word to another cp. 158 E: Τὰ δὲ δοκοῦντα τῷ δοκοῦντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ.

'But with regard to the having the mind, is it not through learning and practice, which are motions, that it gains what it learns, and is preserved, and becomes better?' The sentence proceeds as if ψυχὴ were the subject, at all events of the latter part. Cp. Rep. 7. 532 B: 'Ἦ δὲ γε, ἂν δὲ ἐγὼ, λύως τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν, κ. τ. ἡλ.

6. κινήσεων δυτῶν] Cp. Prot. 329 D: ὃτι ἐνος δυτῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια ἐστιν ἀ ἐρωταῖς. δυτῶν is neuter; 'things which are of the nature of motion,' like νοῦν δὲ κίνησις above. Others suppose δυτῶν to be the masculine form used for the feminine according to a well-known tendency of Attic Greek. But in this case it would be better to read κινησίων δυτῶν with Buttmann and Schanz.

7. σώζεται] (1) 'Retains' (middle), or, better, (2) 'is preserved' (passive). ἔξις, as above interpreted, the preceding κτάται τε . . καί, καὶ ἐπιλαμβάνεται in the corresponding clause, may be urged in favour of the former: for which cp. 163 D: Ἔτι ἐξουσία, μὴν τούτῳ καὶ σωζόμενον. Rep. 455 B: Μὴ δ' ἐμαθεί σώζοντα. But when σώζεται is rendered as passive, there is a more natural progress in the thought, 'gets knowledge, is preserved, improves,' while ἐπιλαμβάνεται may be as justly opposed to improvement as to retention. And we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the word is used differently here, and a few lines
above and below: cp. Symp.
208 A: Μελετή... σώζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. See the whole pas-
sage. In the indeterminate state of grammar, may there not be a real, though not uncon-
scious, ambiguity? H. Schmidt thinks that σώζει may be taken reflexively throughout
sections B to D. 'Es lässt sich in allen drei stetter medial fassen, in der ersten und dritter
als "servat se" and in der zweiten als "servat sibi."' This comes practically to the
same thing as (1).
4. τὸ μὲν ἄρα. 'The one, then, namely, motion, is good.'
There seems no reason to suspect a gloss. There would be a want of Plato's usual ex-
plicitness without κίνησιν; and the variety of genders presents no difficulty. Cp. Rep. 433 D:
'Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα—ὁ δύναμις; inf. 156 B: Τὸ δὲ αὐτῆς.
7. Ἐτι οὖν σοι λέγω... ὅτι
(1) 'Must I go on to men-
tion still weather and calms,
and the like, showing how
quietness in every case cor-
rupts and destroys, whilst its
opposite preserves: and for
my crowning instance, pressing
it into the service, shall I insist
upon it that by his golden
chain Homer means the sun?'
For προσβιβάζων, 'making it
yield to my theory,' cp. Phædr.
229 E: Αἰς ἂς ἃς ἄμαστόν προσ-
βιβάζει κατὰ τὸ εἰκόνε ἔκαστον.—'If
one is to force each of them
(the mythes) to harmonize with
probability.' Cratyl. 427 C:
Καὶ τὰλα ὡτω φαίνεται προσβι-
βάζειν—ὁ νομοβίτης, 'forcing the
sound of words to square with
the sense.' Mythology, poetry,
nature, body, mind, the ele-
ments, had already been 'pressed
into the service.' But this
final instance requires still
greater force. Thus Plato
glances, as he does elsewhere,
at the absurd allegorical in-
terpretations of Homer which
were current (amongst Hera-
clitans and others) in his day.
The position of the accusativeιν
χρυσῆ σειράν is possibly due to
the attraction of the active
προσβιβάζων, and to the previous
accusative, τῶν κολοφών, which
is in apposition to the sen-
tence (Riddell, Digest of Idioms,
§§ 11, 13). For the transitive
clause with ἄναγγέλω cp. Symp.
202 A: Μὴ τοῖνοι ἄναγγέλει, δὲ
μὴ καλὸν ἐστώ, αἰσχρόν εἶναι.
Parm. 133 C: 'Ο δὲ προτεστ ἄναγ-
γέλων αὐτὰ εἶναι. Or (2) 'And
finally, shall I clinch the proof
(or shall I compel assent) by
bringing on my crowning ar-
gument (and showing) that by
his golden chain Homer means
the sun?" For ἀναγκάζεται here cp. Rep. 10. 611 B: "οὐκ...αδιν-ατον ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ἄρτη λόγος καὶ ὁ ἄλλο ἀναγκάσθηται ἄν. In (2) προσβιβάζων is not used as in Phædr. 229 E, Crat. 427 C, and the Bodleian reading προ- βιβάζω would do equally well. In either case ἀναγκάζεται, like λόγον supra, is deliberative sub- junctive. Schanz brackets ἀνα- γκάζεται, and reads προσβιβάζω (Shall I adduce?). Dobree conjectures ἀναγκαζών προσβι- βάζω.

1. αὐτὸ μὲν ἡσυχία] There is a slight redundancy of expression in order to bring the instance in question under the general theory. Here, as elsewhere, Hirschig prunes the text.

3. τὴν χρυσῆν στεφάνον] II. 8. 18, foll. At this point Socrates has entered fully into the Heraclitean vein; as when he says of himself in the Cratylus, 407 D: "Οὐφα ὡμᾶ ὅσι Εὐθαφρόνος ἔποιη, or in the Phædrus, 238 D: ὕσκετο στόχον Διάταμάβων φόβον ἐγκόμα. This is the crowning argument, because it ad- duces the capital fact of nature witnessed to by the oldest and gravest authority (στρατηγῶν Ὅμηρον). The lines chiefly ad- verted to are 23-26: Ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτε δὲ κεν ἐγὼ πρόφθον ἐθέλωμι ἐρύσασαι, ἀυτὴν κεν γαίη ἐρύσασαι, ἀυτῆ τε βαλάντας τε σειρήν μὲν κεν ἡπειρα περὶ μίν οὐλόμωτα δησα- μεν, τὰ δὲ κ' αὐτὸ μετέφερα πάντα γένοιτο. Cp. Heracl. fr. 31, By-

water: Εἰ μὴ ἡλιος ἡν, εὐφράον ἂν ἡν. Fr. 29: ἡλιος οὐχ ὑπερ- βήσεται μέτα, εἰ δὲ μή, Ἠρμήνευ μν ἄπεισε ἐπίκουρα ἐξειρήσουσα. See also Eur. Orest. 982-4. As fire was the symbol of motion, so the sun was the still more concrete symbol of fire. See Rep. 6. 508, where the sun is allowed to be paramount in the region of sense; being essential to vision and to life. For the way in which the autho- rity of Homer and the poets is used, ironically by Plato, but seriously by those whom he imitates, cp. Cratyl. 391, where an argument is based upon the line ὣς ἔτην καλέσει θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ δεκαμέρους, and infr. 194 E: "Ὅταν τούτων λασίων τοῦ τὸ κιάρ ἦ, δ' ἢ ἐπιθύμησεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιήσῃ.

5. ἡ περιφορὰ ὡς κινομένη καὶ ὡς ἡλιος.] The motion of the whole universe, and the perpetual interchange of the different elements, was symbolized in the Heraclitean theory by the revolution of the sun, who not only rose and descended, traversing the sky, but was also quenched and rekindled daily. Nέος ἤ' ἡμέρᾳ (fr. 32). Lassalle compares Ar. Meteor. 1. 9: Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὡς κινοῦσα καὶ κυρία καὶ πρώτη τῶν ἄρχων καὶ ἐκδεδομένη ἐν τῷ φαινόμενῳ ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου φαινόμενος καὶ παγεύμονα καὶ γύρῳ τοῦ ἄκτησι πληγήν ἡ προσφέρειν, αὕτη τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθοράς ἐστι... "Εστὶ δ' ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὅσιος ἀναθυμία-
p. 153. πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ σόκετα τὰ ἐν θεῶς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις:
εἰ δὲ σταῦῃ τούτῳ ὅσπερ δεθὲν, πάντα χρήματ' ἀν δια-
θαρείτη καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἀνω κάτω πάντα;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοιε ὁδοίε, ὥ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα
δηλοῦν, ἀπερ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὥ ἀριστε, οὐτωσί. κατὰ τὰ

If the revolution of the sun and of the heaven were stopped, the order of the universe would be overthrown.'

6–10. Simpl. in Aristot. Cat. p. 1056. Bas. (quoted by Las-
salle): El γάρ το ἐπερούν ἐναντίων ἐπιλέπτει, οὕτω δὲ πάντα ἀφαν-
σθεναι διὸ καὶ μέμφεται Ὑμήρῳ Ἰράκλειτος εἰσίτητι, ἦς ἔρις κ.τ.λ.
107: (Ὡς ἔρις ἐκ τε θεῶν ἐκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο) Ἰράκλειτος
τὴν τῶν ὀντων φύσιν κατ' ἐρων συνεστάνει νομίζων μέμφεται Ὑμή-
ρῳ, σύγχυσιν κόσμον δοκῶν αὐτῶν εὐχεσθαι. In the words ἔνωρ
κάτω there is perhaps an allu-
sion to Heraclitus' ὄς ἄνω κάτω
µία. See also Phaedo 72 C.

Some of the latest guesses at truth have sometimes had a
real or fanciful resemblance to the earlier ones. See Comte in
Miss Martineau's abridgment, vol. i. p. 429: 'Amidst the con-
fusion and obscurity which exist on this subject, I think we may
conclude that no organism, even the simplest, could live in a
state of complete immobility. The double movement of
the earth, and especially its rotation,
tion, may probably be as ne-
necessary to the development of
life as to the periodical distri-
bution of heat and light.'

6. Ὑπόλαβε] If being then is motion, how are we to conceive of
knowledge, i.e. of sensible perception? This is now
evolved, a fresh appeal to ex-
perience being made at every
3. The theory is now applied. (1) Colour is not something without nor in the eye, it arises between, when the eye encounters a particular motion. Hence it is different to man and other animals, to different men, and

[Text continued]

step. Each sensation is the result of a double movement from within and from without. Hence all sensations are, (1) relative to the individual (ékαστω ἴδιον γεγονός); (2) relative to each other. (1) is proved chiefly of the sensations of colour, warmth, etc.; (2) of the perceptions of size and number.

κατά τά ὄμματα] 'In the sphere of vision.'

2. ἐπερόν τι] 'A separate thing.'

3. χώρα] Cp. infr. 156 C.

4. *δν] MSS. δν. Heind. corr. δν πού εν τάξει εἶ τίς αὐτῷ χώρα ἀποστασθείη. The change from ἄν to ἃν is more probable than the repetition of ἄν in this place. For ἔδη = 'if that were done,' cp. infr. 201 E: Ἡδη γὰρ ἄν οὐσίαν . . . προστίθηται.

10. πρὸς τὴν προστίθεντα φορά] The theory does not consider the origin of this motion. The instinctive belief in the reality of external things is already weakened.

[Text continues]
p. 154. σαίο ἀν ὡς ὦν σοι φαίνεται ἑκατόν χρῶμα, των ὅσων καὶ κυνλ καὶ ὑφοῦν γ' ὦρ;

ΤΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δι' οὖκ ἐγαγε.

Σ. Τί δὲ; ἀλλ' ἀνδράρη γρ' ὄμοιον καὶ σοι φαίνεται ὁποῖον; ἔχεις τούτῳ ἀγχυρᾶς, ἥ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐδὲ σοι αὐτῶ ταύτων διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτῶν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

ΤΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκέινο.

5. οὖκοιν εἱ μὲν ὁ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὔ ἑφαιπτόμεθα, μέγα ἡ λευκὸν ἡ θερμόν ἢ, οὔκ ἂν ποτε ἀλλ' προσπεσοῦν ἄλλο ἄν ἑγεγόνει, αὐτῷ γε μηδὲν μεταβαλλόν. ἐδὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἑφαπτόμενον ἑκατόν ἢν τοῦτον, οὔκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλον προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτοῦ μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἄν ἑγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὁ φίλε, ταχυμαστά τε καὶ γελοία τι

9. ὁ παραμετρούμεθα] Cornarins, followed by most editors, reads ἐν, taking παραμετρούμεθα actively. Although (as H. Schmidt remarks) in the example given infr. 155 B the case is altered by the supposition that Theaetetus has grown, I still adhere to the MS. text and interpret (with Jowett), 'that with which we compare ourselves in size.' The instance most in point is that adduced in the Phaedo, 102 B, where Socrates is shorter than Socrates, but taller than Phaedo. There is in any case some confusion between relativity and subjectivity. This is partially evaded by making self the subject of comparison, but would be increased if παραμετρούμεθα meant 'that which perceives size,' as if seen if ὁ is read. None of the examples given are such as to suggest the notion that higness is in the eye.

We are introduced to a new class of objects, and make a transition in the argument at the same time. All that I can see, hear, feel, etc., is seen, heard, felt, etc., by me alone, and arises solely in relation to me. Again, I view the size of other beings in relation to my own, or I compare different quantities. I cannot think of any magnitude or number as great or small, except in relation to some other magnitude or number.

13. τὸ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ ἑφαιπτόμεθα, i.e. 'the import in the one case of self-measurement, in the other of sensation.' (p. 132 A, 7 ν. 8.) ('In Phaedo, Phaed. N. 15, 4.) Ταύτῳ τ' ἀρχήν ἀρχήν τινί οὐκ ἔχει πρῶτον ἀντικρισίαν ἢ ἐς ἀρχήν μεταγενήσεως.
we allow ourselves to fall into manifest contradictions.

E.g. We say that six dice are more and fewer; more than four, fewer than twelve.

Can anything become more unless increased?

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

eὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὡς φαίνει ἂν Πρω- p. 154. ταγόμοσ τε καὶ τᾶς ὅ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνο ἐπιχειροῦν λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις;

6 ΣΩ. Συμκρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἰσὶ ἀμβούλμα. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ, ἀν μὲν τέτορας αὐτοῖς προσένεγκης, πλέους φαμέν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἕμοιών, ἐὰν δὲ δόδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἕμοιες καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἂν σε Προταγόρας ἐρητῇ τῇ τὸς ἄλλως, Ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἐσθ’ ὅποι τι μείζων ἢ πλέον γίνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθὲν; τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐαν μὲν, ὁ Σόκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν 15 νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστιν. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φιλάττων μὴ ἐναντία ἐστώ, ὅτι ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Εἴ τι γε τὴν Ἡραν, ὃ φίλε, καὶ θείος. ἀτέρος ὁμίως ἐσκεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἐστιν, Ἐπιδείην τὸ ἐμβηκήτατο. ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μὲν ἐστιν, 20 ἢ δὲ φρῆν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

1. εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα]

“We allow ourselves to be drawn into using strange and ridiculous expressions.” Protagoras would not find fault with us for calling the six dice more than the four, but for using the verb εἰσίν to express the relation.

6. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ]

The difficulty has been stated with regard to size, it is now illustrated with regard to number.


17. Εἴ τι γε... καὶ θείος] Thetetetus’ answer showed great dialectical aptitude. He perceives the contradiction, and yet will not answer para τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ. Cp. Rep. i. 346 A: καὶ, δι μακάρις, μὴ παρὰ δόξαι ἀποκρίνου, ἢν τι καὶ περαινωμεν.

19. ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα] ‘Our
Let us consider this, not in the spirit of controversy, but with calm inquiry.

What are these apparitions that have been raised within us?

7. aitá prós aitá] 'Compared with one another.' The reading of the old edd., aitá prós aitá, might be defended, but aitá is the Bodleian reading.


12. ὡς πάνιν πολλῆν σχολήν ἡγούτες] Plato does not forget, either here or infr. 172 E, that Socrates has been summoned to appear before the King Archon.

13. οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες] 'With no feeling of impatience.' Cp. Men. 75 C D: Εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἶ γὰρ ἕρησικώς ὁ ἐρώμενος, ἐποιός ἀν αὖθι, ὥστε ἤμοι
αὐτοῦς ἐξετᾶτονες, ἄττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταύτα τὰ φάσματα p. 155. ἐν ἡμῖν; ὁν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἀν μείζον μηδὲ ἐλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὅγκο μήτε ἄριθμῳ, ἐως ἵσον εἴη αὐτὸ 5 ἐαυτῷ. οὐχ οὐτῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὃ μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τούτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἵσον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρι οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρῶτερον ἦν, β

μὲν ἐφησαί εἰ δὲ μὴ ὅρθος λέγω, σοὶ ἐργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν εἰ δέ ὅστερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σοὶ νυνί φίλοι ὄντες βούλουστοι ἀλλήλους διαλέγεσθαι, δει δὴ προστερον πως καὶ διαλεκτικὸτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

1. φάσματα] These mental phenomena (that have started into prominence). The ἐπιρρία just stated have made us aware of certain 'facts of consciousness' or postulates of our own minds. These are here called φάσματα, but presently, when they have been expressed and asserted to, ὅμολογμάτα. Cp. Polit. 268 E: Ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀγρεώς τε καὶ ὑπὸστοι λεκείσας ἐρνι φάσμα. Μένος 85 C: Ὑπὸ τῆς διαφορὰς ἄριτος ἀνακαίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὕται, κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. infr. 203 A: Βασανίζομεν δὴ αὕτα ἀναλαβόντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὕτως. Prot. 331 C: Ὑπὲρ γὰρ δεόμεν τοῦτο καὶ εἰ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἄλλα ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ.

2. δοὺ πρῶτον ... φήσομεν] 'The first of which, as we look steadily at it, we shall thus put into words.'

3. ἀφαίρεσθαι] Sc. ἄν αὐτοῦ.

Or, possibly, the pronoun is here the subject: 'And it suffers no diminution.' Cp. infr. B: ἀφαίρεσθαι.

11. ὃ μὴ πρῶτερον ἦν] This may be construed in two ways. (1) 'What existed not before, but (exists) afterwards, this cannot be, without production and a process of becoming.' (2) 'What was not before, neither can that be afterwards, without production,' etc.

The latter is the more subtle interpretation, but is probably right. Schol.: 'Ὁ ὄκλοιὸς τὸ ἄλλα παρέλεκτον λέγει. 'Prorsusque ita Latinae dixeris quod non prius erat at postea id esse.' Heindorf.—'Nay but, if it was not before, it cannot be afterwards.' Cp. Soph. 265 B: Ἡ τε αὕτα γέγονεν τοῖς μὴ πρῶτερον οὖσιν ὑπὸ τοῖς γέγονειν. The position of ἄλλα in the MSS., however (ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄλλα librí omnes, W.), throws some doubt upon the reading, and ἃρα may be suggested. ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄλλα ἀνακαίνηται, κ.τ.λ., 'that, as our postulate runs, this cannot afterwards be with-
out becoming and having become.' For the addition of γίγνεσθαι cp. infr. C.

H. Schmidt observes that the contradiction is not between the assumptions themselves, but between the assumption and the fact. But μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς can only mean 'fight amongst themselves,' and if the logic of such a half-humorous passage is to be pressed, No. 3 may be supposed to say 'Socrates is what he was not; he must have changed.' 'No,' says No. 2, 'he cannot have changed, for nothing has been taken from him, therefore he is not diminished.' No. 1 then comes to the aid of No. 2.

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9. μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος] 'My size having been stripped of nothing,' i.e. 'Without anything being taken from my height.' Badham conjectures μηδὲν ἐμοῦ τοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος. But this is unnecessary.

11. ἀνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον] This axiom is supplementary to the three former. In the first, the aorist was used (γενέσθαι), the present in the second (αὐξάνεσθαι, φθίνειν). Both (γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι) are accordingly combined in the third, by means of which the two former are applied. It is now shown that the aorist implies the present. To us such refinements are difficult, because needless. The subtlety is carried still further in the Parmenides, until it is reduced to the formula, 'That which is, is.' Parm. 156 C: 'Εστέα τε πρότερον ὑστερον κυνείσθαι καὶ πρότερον κυνόμενον ὑστερον ἑστάναι, ἀνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οὐδὲ τὸ ἑστάν ταύτα πάσχειν... ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὲν μεταβάλλει ἀνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.
3. The theory is now applied.
   (1) Colour is not something without nor in the eye, it arises between, when the eye encounters a particular motion. Hence it is different to man and other animals, to different men, and

"ομάτα προτον, δ' δή καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μη' εἶναι p. 153. αὐτὸ ἔτερον τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὄμματων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὀμάται. μηδὲ τιν' αὐτῷ χάραν ἀποτάξεις. ἦδη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τι *όν που ἐν τάξει καὶ μένοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν 5 γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΛΙ. 'Αλλὰ πῶς;
   ΣΩ. 'Επόμεθα τῷ ἀρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν ἄν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὖτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκόν καὶ ὁποίων ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὁ δή ἐκαστον εἶναι φάμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἐσταῖ, p. 154. ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τὶ ἐκάστῳ ἰδιών γεγονός· δ' σὲ διάσχυρί-

step. Each sensation is the result of a double movement from within and from without. Hence all sensations are, (1) relative to the individual (ἐκάστω τίνι γεγονός); (2) relative to each other. (1) is proved chiefly of the sensations of colour, warmth, etc.: (2) of the perceptions of size and number.

καὶ τὰ δρματα] 'In the sphere of vision.'

2. ἐτέρον τι] 'A separate thing.'

3. χῶραν] Cp. infr. 156 C.

4. *όν] MSS. ἄρ. Heind. corr. ὅν ποὺ ἐν τάξει = εἰ τις αὐτῷ χώρα ἀποταξεῖν. The change from ὅν to ἄν is more probable than the repetition of ἄν in this place. For ἄν = 'if that were done,' cp. infr. 201 E: 'Ηδὲ γὰρ ἄν οὐσίαν . . . προστίθεσθαι.

10. πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φοράν] The theory does not consider the origin of this motion. The instinctive belief in the reality of external things is already weakened.


12. οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον] 'Neither that which strikes, nor that which is struck,' i.e. Neither the motion from within nor that which meets it from without. Here, as elsewhere, 'sight' is conceived of as an act, and not as a passive impression. And τὸ προσβαλλόμενον is the object, τοῦτο, δ' προσβάλλει τὰ δρματα. This is a curious use of the passive voice. But the comparison of other passages, esp. Tim. 45 C: ὀπρεπὸν ἄν ἀντειδῇ τὸ πρόσπειτον ἰδοὺ ὀν πρὸς δ τῶν ἐξω ξύνετεσον, excludes the possibility of doubt, although the expression so understood is inconsistent with the theory of active and passive elements, which is afterwards introduced (infr. 156 A).
9. φ' παραμετρούμεθα] Cornarius, followed by most editors, reads δ', taking παραμετρούμεθα actively. Although (as H. Schmidt remarks) in the example given infr. 155 B the case is altered by the supposition that Theetetus has grown, I still adhere to the MS. text and interpret (with Jowett) 'that with which we compare ourselves in size.' The instance most in point is that adduced in the Phaedo, 102 B, where Simmias is shorter than Socrates, but taller than Phedo. There is in any case some confusion between relativity and subjectivity. This is partially evaded by making self the subject of comparison, but would be increased if τό παραμετρούμενον meant 'that which perceives size,' as it must if δ' is read. None of the examples given are such as to suggest the notion that bigness is in the eye.

We are introduced to a new class of objects, and make a transition in the argument at the same time. All that I can see, hear, feel, etc., is seen, heard, felt, etc. by me alone, and arises solely in relation to me. Again, I view the size of other bodies in relation to my own, or I compare different quantities. I cannot think of any magnitude or number as great or small, except in relation to some other magnitude or number.

12. τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἡφασπτόμενον] I. e. 'I, the subject in the one case of self-measurement, in the other of sensation.' Cp. 182 Α, τὸ . . . πάσχον. Ar. Eth. N. 10. 4. § 5: Ἀδὴν δὲ (τὴν αἰσθήσεων) λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν ἤ ἐν φ' ἐστι μηδὲν διαφέρετο.
εὐχέρος πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὃς φαίη ἂν Πρω- p. 154.
ταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνο ἐπιχειρών
λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις;
5 ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν λαβῇ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἰσεὶ ἄο
βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ, ἀν μὲν τέτταρας
αὐτοῖς προσενέγχης, πλείονας φαμέν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων
καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δάδεκα, ἑλάττων καὶ ἡμίσεις καὶ
οὐδὲ ἀνεκτῶν ἄλλως λέγειν. ή σὺ ἀνέξεις;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγογγε.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἂν σὲ Πρωταγόρας ἔρχηται ἡ τίς ἄλλος, Ω
Θεαίτη, ἐσθ' ὅπως τι μεῖξον ἡ πλέον
γίνεται ἄλλος ἡ αὐξηθέν; τι ἁποκρινεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εὰν μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν
15 νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἁποκρίνομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν
πρότεραν, φυλάττον μὴ ἑναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.
ΣΩ. Ἕδ' γε νη τὴν Ἡραί, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θέλω. ἀγράρ,
ὁς ἐοικεν, ἐὰν ἁποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Ἐυριπίδειον τι ξυμμε-
βήσεται· η μὲν γὰρ γλώττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται,
30 η δὲ φρήν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

1. εὐχέρος πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα] 'We allow ourselves to be
drawn into using strange and
ridiculous expressions.' Pro-
tagoras would not find fault with
us for calling the six dice more
than the four, but for using the
verb évna to express the rela-
tion.

2. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ] The difficulty has been stated
with regard to size, it is now
illustrated with regard to num-
ber.

14. τὸ δοκοῦν] Cp. p. 157 C:
Δοκοῦται σοι.
16. φυλάττων] Not exactly
'avoiding' (φυλαττόμενοι), but
'being careful;' keeping watch
on one point only. Cp. Gorg.
461 D: 'Edv μοι ἐν μόνον φυλά-
της. Τί τουτο λέγεις; Τὴν μακρο-
λογίαν... ἤν καθείρης: infr. p. 180
A: Ἕδ' πάνω φυλάττοις τὸ μαθῦν
βέβαιον ἐκν εἴω. Also infr.
169 C: πάνω τηρεῖ τὸ τουνάδε, μή,
κ.τ.λ.

17. Ἕδ' γε... καὶ θέλω] Theate-
tus' answer showed great dia-
lectical aptitude. He perceives
the contradiction, and yet will
not answer παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ.
Cp. Rep. I. 346 A: καὶ, ὁ μακρύς,
μὴ παρὰ δάξαν ἁποκρίνοι, ἵνα τι
καὶ περαιώσαις.

19. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλώττα] 'Our
Let us consider this, not in the spirit of controversy, but with calm inquiry.

What are these apparitions that have been raised within us?
One voice says, Nothing can become more or fewer, greater or less, while it is equal to itself. Another: —That to which nothing is added, and from which nothing is taken, remains equal to itself.

Or, possibly, the pronoun is here the subject: 'And it suffers no diminution.' Cp. infr. B: ἀφαιρεθέντος.

II. δ ἡ πρότερον ἢ] This may be construed in two ways. (1) 'What existed not before, but (exists) afterwards, this cannot be, without production and a process of becoming.' (2) 'What was not before, neither can that be afterwards, without production,' etc.

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p. 155. *άλλα ύστερον τούτο εἶναι ἀνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γιγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

ΘΕAI. Δοκεῖ γε δή.

ΣΩ. Ταύτα δή, ομια, ὀμολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν 5 ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδη ὁμία, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναυτίον παθόντα, ἐν ἐναυτῷ σοῦ τῷ νέῳ νῦν μὲν μείζον εἶναι, ύστερον δὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμὸν ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δή ύστερον ὁ πρῶτερον οὐκ ἢ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἀνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι

out becoming and having become.' For the addition of γίγνεσθαι cp. infr. C.

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II. ἀνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον] This axiom is supplementary to the three former. In the first, the aorist was used (γενέσθαι), the present in the second (ἀφαιρεθέντος, φθάνειι). Both (γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι) are accordingly combined in the third, by means of which the two former are applied. It is now shown that the aorist implies the present. To us such refinements are difficult, because needless. The subtlety is carried still further in the Parmenides, until it is reduced to the formula, 'That which is, is.' Parm. 156 C: 'Εστῶς τε πρῶτερον ύστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρῶτερον κινούμενον ύστερον ἐστάναι, ἀνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷν τε ἐσται ταῦτα πάσχειν... ἀλλ' οὖν μὲν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.
πλατώνος

άδύνατον, μηδέν δὲ ἀπολλὰς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἄν ποτε π. 155.

ἐγγυνήμην ἑλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις

οὕτως ἔχει, ἐκτερ καὶ ταύτα ἃ παραβεβόμεθα. ἀπειρὸν

γάρ ποι, ὡς Θεαίττης. δοκεῖσ γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἀπειρὸν

τῶν τοιούτων ἐναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ σὺ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, ὡς Σῶκρατες, ὑπερ-

φυῶς ὃς θαυμάζω τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ ταύτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὃς

ἀληθὸς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδών.

ΣΩ. Θέοδωρος γάρ, ὡς φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς ὁ

tοπάξειν ἐπὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου

tὸ τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάξειν. οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ ἀρχὴ

3. καὶ, which implies a subtle

connexion between ταύτα and

ἀλλα μυρία, can only be ex-

pressed in English by the emphasis

on ‘these.’ Cp. Soph. Ο. Ed. Col.

276: ὁστέρ μὲ κάνεστήσαμ, δὲν

σώζεις.

ἁπαραβεβόμεθα] So. παρὰ τοῦ

Πρωταγόρου. ‘If we are to take

this at his hands;’ i.e. not

only accept, but adopt this as

our own difficulty. Cp. infr.

161 B, Charm. 162 E: ἐὰν οὖν

ξυγχωρεῖν τοὺς ἐστί αὐθεντοῦσιν

ὅπερ οὐκοῦλ λέγει, καὶ παραβιάζει

τὸν λόγον, ἔγγει πολύ ἄν ἢ ζῶν

μετὰ σοῦ δικαίου... ἀλλὰ πάνω

ξυγχωρρᾶ, ἡφι, καὶ παραβεβόμεια.

But it must be admitted that

ἑπερ καὶ ταύτην ἃ ἀποδεξόμεθα

would give a plainer sense.

*ἐπεὶ γὰρ ποι* ‘I assume this

(δῆ), for I suppose I take you

with me.’ Cp. Euthyph. 12 C:

*Επεὶ γὰρ ποι νῦν γε: Εὐθ. πά-

νυ γε. The MSS. have εἰσὶν, but

there can be little doubt of the

truth of Heindorf’s emenda-

tion. The six dice are more

when compared with four. They

were fewer when compared with

twelve. They cannot be more

without having become more,

and they cannot have become

more without increase. Pro-

tagoras would say: It is true

the same thing cannot be more

without addition, but the dice

in the two cases are not the

same thing, for they are in a

different relation.—The distinc-

tion between relative and abso-

lute quantity is so familiar to

us, that this is apt to appear a

mere verbal quibble. But the

solution of such difficulties was

one of the steps by which the

Greeks arrived at that distinc-

tion.

9. οὐ κακῶς τοπάξειν] ‘Theo-

dorus is evidently right in his

surmise about you. For this

Wonder is a true symptom of

the philosophic nature.’

11. οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ ἀρχὴ φιλοσ-


2: Διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἀνθρώποι

καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμεταρ

φιλοσοφῶν, κ. τ. λ.

Aristotle also observes that

if wonder is the beginning,

cessation of wonder is the end

of philosophy;—so reconciling

Plato’s saying with that of


2. πότερον μανθάνεις ἡδή] 'Do you begin to perceive what is the reason of this, according to the theory we attribute to Protagoras?'

Aristotle, Met. 10. 1063 A, points out that the Protagorean doctrine rests very much on the relativeness of quantity: Φαίνοντα γὰρ οἷς ἡκατά τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιφάσεις ταὐτοῦ κατηγορεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ ποσὸν ὑπεληφθέναι μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ καὶ εἶναι τετράπο-ποχος τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οἷς οἶμαι. ἢ δ' οὖνια κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ἀριστείας φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ποσόν τῆς ἀόριστου.

6. Χάριν, κ. τ. λ.] 'Shall I then earn your gratitude, if in regard to a man, or rather men, of high renown, I help you to elicit the truth of their meaning from its hidingplace in their minds?'

4. To meet these and other difficulties the 'Protagorean' doctrine is further developed. It must be concealed, however, from the uninitiate,
δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πάν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι π. 155.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκληροὺς γε λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' εἴδομοι. ἄλλοι δὲ

argument's sake, that we may be able to discourse with them. The description there is very similar. Soph. 246 A B: οἱ μὲν εἰς γὰρ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀόρατον πάντα ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χεριν ἀγχοφόροι πέτρας καὶ ὅρων περιλαμβάνεται. τῶν γὰρ τούτων ἐφαρμοίμενοι πάντων διασυναρτοῦνται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον διὰ παρείχες προσβολήν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταύτων σώμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἰς τοὺς φρονίμης μη σώμα ἔχουν εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἠθέλουσι ἄλλα ἀκούειν. 247 C : τούτων οὐδ' ἐν ἐπανσυνεξεθείναι οἱ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ τε καὶ αὐτοῦθεν, ἄλλα διατείνοντες ἐν πάντες καὶ ἐδωκαὶ ταῖς χερεὶς ἐξουσίεσσι εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τούτου οὐδενὸς τὸ παράπαν ἐστὶν.


1. γενέσεις] E. g. αἰσθήσεις, κινήσεις, ἢδηγήσεις.

Sensationalism is here treated as already a kind of idealism, whereas in the corresponding passage of the Sophist, p. 246, the doctrine of an unseen γένεσις is regarded as an inference which the idealist by his dialectic compels the reluctant materialist to accept. See Introduction.

3. σκληρούς... καὶ ἀντιτύπους] 'Hard and repellent,' i.e. stubborn and impenetrable. Cp. Soph. 246 B : 'Η δεικνύεις ἐφηρές ἄνδρας' ἢδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνὸι προσέτυχον. For the verbal climax cp. Tim. 62 B C :
θεαίτητος.

p. 156. τούτων κομψότεροι, δύν μέλλω σοι τα μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχή δὲ, ἐξ ἃς καὶ ἃ νῦν ἐξ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ζητηται, ἢδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κύνησις ἢ καὶ ἀλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδεν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο ἔδη, πλήθει μιν ἄπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχου, τὸ δὲ πάντωσιν πρὸς ἑλλικλα γίγνεται ἐκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησίας, αἰει συνεκτιπτοῦσα καὶ γεννομένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθησίες τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν οὐνόματα, ὅφεις τε καὶ ἄκοι καὶ ὁσφήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναῖ γε δὴ καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι· καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἰ ἀνώνυμοι, τούτων τῶν λόγων ἐπιχειροῦσι μην—ειν ἡμῖν ὁς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

3. ὑπ’ ‘Really is,’—according to the well-known idiom, which becomes more frequent in Aristotle. What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it was before the inquiry began. It is a transference of the reality of history to a general statement. H. Schmidt’s argument for taking ὑπ’ literally, ‘In the beginning all was motion,’ is not convincing.—The doctrine asserted above is now more minutely developed.

4. συνεκτιπτοῦσα ‘Tumbling forth to light at the same moment.’ Compare the lively expression in Rep. 4. 432 D, when justice is discovered: πάλαι, ὦ μακάριo, φαίνεται πρὸ πολλῶν ἡμῶν ἢ σῷν θυμὸν κυλινδέωσιν. For the insertion of καὶ γεννομένη ερ. Soph. Ant. 537: Καὶ εὐμεταίχω καὶ φέρω ἔτσι αἰτίας. Aesch. Prom. 331: Πάντων μετασωχω καὶ τετολμηκῶ ἢμοι. The present tense denotes a process that is always in transition.

6. τὰ τοιάδε... ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὅφεις... κεκλημέναι] The slight redundancy helps to connect the sentence.

11. The senses of taste and touch are added in the version of Ficinus: ‘olfactus, gustus, tactusque frigidorum et calidorum,’ and Cornarius inserted καὶ γενεσία καὶ θῆκες after ὁσφήνεις, perhaps with reference to the false interpretation of infr. C D, ἐφανθο... δάντω.

12. ἡδοναὶ γε δὴ] The particles mark the transition to a class of things less familiarly known by the name ἀισθησίας.

13. αἱ ἀνώνυμοι] See Locke, Hum. Und. b. 2. c. 3: ‘I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense, nor indeed is it possible if we would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for.’ Also Spinoza, Eth. 3
παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ἀνωμασμέναι· τὰ δ’ αὖ αἰσθητοῦν p. 156. γένος τούτων ἐκάστας ὁμόγονον, ὃσεὶ μὲν χρώματα
παντοδεξαῖα παντόδεξα, ἀκοῖς δὲ ὡσαυτῶς φωναί, c
καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεις τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενὴς
5 γιγνόμενα. Τὶ δὴ ὡν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὕτως ὁ μῦθος,
ὡ Θεάττης, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἁρὰ ἐννοεῖς;
ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ, ὡ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ’ ἄδρει εάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βούλεται
γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὡσπερ λέγομεν,
10 κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐν τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν.
ὁσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιά-ξοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἵσχε καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ

(quoted by H. Schmidt): ‘unicuique ex jam dictis clare constare credo, affectus tot variationes oriri, ut nullo numero definirii queant . . . plerique animi fluctuationes nominis non habent.’

2. The Bodleian, with most other MSS., has ἐκάστης.

242 C: Μὴδ’ οὐκ ἐκαίτας φαίνεται μοι διαγιάθαι πυγών ὡς οὕτων ἡμῖν, κ. τ. λ. For the spirit with which all this is done compare Rep. 8. 545 D E: Ὁμέων αὐτάς τραγκᾶς, ὡς πρὸς παῖς ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐφανερούσας, δὲ δὴ σπουδὴ λεγούσας, ὑψηλογονόμενα λέγειν;


8. 'Αλλ’ ἄδρει εάν] ‘Well, look attentively; perhaps we shall be able to finish it.’ Cp. infr. 192 E: 'Ἰδε δὴ, εάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπιστῆ. εἶπ=‘in the hope that.’


πάντα . . κινεῖται] Cp. Locke: ‘The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us, and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in.’

11. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ] ‘The slower have their motion in one spot, and in relation to what is in contact with them, and are thus the producing elements; but those which are [thus] produced are swifter; for they are carried about, and their motion is from place to place.’

For εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ cp. infr. 181 CD: ‘Ὅταν ἡ μὲν εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.
12. τὰ δὲ γεννόμενα τούτω δὴ] Schol.: Εἰς τὸ δὴ ὑποστηκένων, This only means that οὕτω δὴ is to be taken with the preceding words. The phrase has been felt to be somewhat harsh; and perhaps the second οὕτω may have crept in from the preceding clause. The (probably conjectural) interpolation of Cornarius after οὕτω δὴ [βραδυτέρα ἐστιν] δησον δὲ αὐ
p. 156. γεννώμενα τοῦτο δὴ θάττω ἐστὶν: φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπεδεῖν οὖν ὦμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτων εὐμέτρων πλησιάζαν γεννώμενα. τὰ χῦ, πρὸς τὰ πόρρῳ θοῦν τὴν κίνησιν ἵσαγε καὶ οὕτω γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὗτο δὴ] is quite unnecessary, and confuses the real sense. It was occasioned by the condensation of the language and the inversion or ‘chiasm’ in what follows, which, to correspond exactly, should have been τὰ δ’ αὖ θάττω φέρεται καὶ γεννᾶται. The slower motions are the ποιωντα and πάσχοντα, which, when in contact, produce (without changing place) the αἰσθητα and αἰσθησις (i.e. qualities and sensations), which are the ‘quicker motions,’ and pass to and fro between the ποιων and πάσχον. Cp. Inf. p. 159 C D: Κυνήματα γὰρ δὲ ἐκ τῶν προομολογημένων τὸ τε ποιων καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύττατα τε καὶ αἰσθησιν, ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα. Qualities and sensations are in locomotion, because existing merely in the act of flowing from subject to object, and from object to subject, perhaps also because they are realized now here, now there. Cp. 153 D E. When it is said that they are the swifter motions, the theory is vaguely connected with Heraclitean doctrine. Sensations and qualities are drops in the ever-flowing river of succession. The man or the tree is like the dull weed that clogs it, itself to be carried down in time. Subject and object are more of the nature of Earth, sensation and quality are sparks of the everliving Fire. That the ποιων and πάσχον are both
gennōnta appears from 159 C D: 'Κυνήματα γὰρ δὴ ... τὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, quoted above.

Sensational idealism is hampered by the necessity of dissolving 'substance' (whether matter or mind) into a series of transient processes, without too violently contradicting experience. An instance of this logical necessity has appeared since the above note was written, in Mr. J. S. Mill's 'Permanent possibilities' (Mill on Hamilton, ch. XI.), a device which unintentionally throws a vivid light on Plato's meaning here. Perception and attribute are conceived as momentary; things and persons are imagined as a gradual growth and decay. By 'slow' and 'swift' are really meant 'lasting' and 'momentary.' The distinction of kinds of motion (ἀλλοιωσις, φορα) is purposely slurped over here, that it may come in as a fresh point at a later stage of the discussion, 181 C. Cp. 157 B. See also Kant, Krit. d. r. Vern. B, 230.

3. τῶν τούτων εὐμέτρων] Men. 76 D: 'Εστὶ γὰρ χρῶν ἁπαρρόφησις σχῆματος ὑπὲρ σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθήσιος. This definition is said to be 'κατὰ Γαργάλαν.' In Tim. 67 C Plato calls colour φλόγα ὅν σωμάτων ἐκαστον ἁπαρρόφρως, ὑπὲρ εὐμετρος μάρα ἔχουσαν πρὸς αἰσθήσιν. Cp. ib. 45, 6. Plato's account of sensation in the Timæus coincides in many points with this part of the Theætetus, showing that, al-
νήστη τήν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἰσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, p. 156. ἀ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἀλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὡφεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ ε συναπτόκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα, ὅ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὡφεως ἐμπλεος ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρὰ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὗ τι ὡφες ἄλλα ὀφθαλμὸς ὀρῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυγνυήσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὗ λευκότης αὐτή ἄλλα λευκῶν, εἰτε ἐξόλον εἰτε λίθος εἰτε

though rejected as a theory of knowledge, the hypothesis is retained as a 'probable' doctrine of sense. See also Phil. 34.

3. τότε δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] 'Then it is that while these are issuing in the midst, sight from the eyes, whiteness from that which helps to create the colour, the eye is filled with seeing, and sees now, and becomes not sight indeed, but seeing eye, and that which helps to give the colour birth is covered with whiteness, and it too becomes not whiteness but white, whether stick or stone, or whatever it is that happens to have been coloured with this hue.'

μεταξὺ φερομένων] It is doubtful whether this means 'whilst they are moving,' or 'as they are moving in the midst.' The former is idiomatic Greek, but the latter seems preferable if we turn to 154 Α.: Μεταξύ τι ἐκάστοτι ἰδίῳ γεγονός, and infr. 182 Α.: Φησίσθων ἐκαστον τοις ἁμα αἰσθήσει μεταξύ τοι παινοῦστις τε καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. And the idiomatic use of μεταξύ belongs rather to cases in which one action supervenes upon another, than where both are simultaneous, as here.

9. εἰτε ἀφροῖν, κ.τ.λ.] The MS. reading is ἀποφοῖν εἰτεχρῶμα. Heind. who receives ἀποφοῖν . ὑμημα from Cornarius, adds, 'ne ipso quidem χρῆμα opus fuerit, h. l.' But ἀποφοῖν has scarcely more authority than χρῆμα. One MS. (Par. H.) has σῶμα on the margin, but ἀποφοῖν . σῶμα, though it has thus some slight authority, is not satisfactory. The real text is perhaps restored by dropping χρῶμα, and reading ἀφροῖν as in the text (ἀποφοῖν Par. F.) 'White, whether stick or stone, or whatsoever happens to be coloured with that colour.' The repetition of similar consonants is a frequent form of corruption; cp. esp. 158 C; ἀποφραχρῆ, κ.τ.λ.; where three MSS. (Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.) read ἀποφραχρῆ, κ.τ.λ. (Χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου, χράνου, occurring within the next few lines.) Also, 149 C, ἀδρόσως for ἀδρόσος Bodl. pr. Vat. pr. Ven. Π. with ἀρχοπάραστος a few lines above.

Another way is opened by the ingenious conjecture of Schanz, who reads ἀποφοῖν . σχῆμα. Cp. esp. Men. 75 B: ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τούτο σχῆμα, δ
μόναν τῶν δυτῶν τυχάνας χρωματί
άει ἐπίμακρον. Μὴν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς ἑνὸς 
νοήσαι, ἡς ἡμεῖς, οὐκ ἐίναι παγίωσι· οὔτε 
γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἀν τῷ πά-
σχοιτε ἐξελθήσθη, οὔτε πάσχου, πρὶν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι 
τό τε τῶν ἐξελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἀλλὰ αὐτοῦ προσπέσον 
πάσχον ἀνεφαίη. οὕτω ἐξ ἀπαντών τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ

become.

—The eye and its appropriate active motion come in contact. Then sight begins to a
filter from the eye and colour from the object of sight; the eye becomes a
seeing eye, and the object becomes coloured.

μόναν τῶν δυτῶν τυχάνας χρωματί
άει ἐπίμακρον. Μὴν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς ἑνὸς 
νοήσαι, ἡς ἡμεῖς, οὐκ ἐίναι παγίωσι· οὔτε 
γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἀν τῷ πά-
σχοιτε ἐξελθήσθη, οὔτε πάσχου, πρὶν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι 
τό τε τῶν ἐξελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἀλλὰ αὐτοῦ προσπέσον 
πάσχον ἀνεφαίη. οὕτω ἐξ ἀπαντών τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ

active and passive elements as
existing separately in any single case.

μὴν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς ἑνὸς 
νοήσαι, ἡς ἡμεῖς, οὐκ ἐίναι παγίωσι· οὔτε 
γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἀν τῷ πά-
σχοιτε ἐξελθήσθη, οὔτε πάσχου, πρὶν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι 
τό τε τῶν ἐξελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἀλλὰ αὐτοῦ προσπέσον 
πάσχον ἀνεφαίη. οὕτω ἐξ ἀπαντών τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ

μὴν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς ἑνὸς 
νοήσαι, ἡς ἡμεῖς, οὐκ ἐίναι παγίωσι· οὔτε 
γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἀν τῷ πά-
σχοιτε ἐξελθήσθη, οὔτε πάσχου, πρὶν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι 
τό τε τῶν ἐξελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἀλλὰ αὐτοῦ προσπέσον 
πάσχον ἀνεφαίη. οὕτω ἐξ ἀπαντών τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ

μὴν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς ἑνὸς 
νοήσαι, ἡς ἡμεῖς, οὐκ ἐίναι παγίωσι· οὔτε 
γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἀν τῷ πά-
σχοιτε ἐξελθήσθη, οὔτε πάσχου, πρὶν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι 
τό τε τῶν ἐξελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἀλλὰ αὐτοῦ προσπέσον 
πάσχον ἀνεφαίη. οὕτω ἐξ ἀπαντών τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ

μὴν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς ἑνὸς 
νοήσαι, ἡς ἡμεῖς, οὐκ ἐίναι παγίωσι· οὔτε 
γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἀν τῷ πά-
σχοιτε ἐξελθήσθη, οὔτε πάσχου, πρὶν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι 
τό τε τῶν ἐξελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἀλλὰ αὐτοῦ προσπέσον 
πάσχον ἀνεφαίη. οὕτω ἐξ ἀπαντών τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ

Neither seeing eye
nor colour-ed object
can be
thought of as existing independently of this mutual process.
We must not speak of anything as existing, but only as becoming this or that, arising, perishing, or changing. This applies not only to single things, but to those

3. οὐχ ὅτι ἦμεν] 'Though, as
I need not observe.' The irony of this appears very clearly, if we compare 157 A: 'Εἰ μὲν τινὰ ἄντιλογοκός, κ.τ.λ.

4. τὸ δ' οὐ δει[ Sc. ποιεῖν. Or rather τὸ is an accusative in opposition to the active of ἔχουσαι, κ.τ.λ.

5. οὕτω τὸν] The genitive is a point of transition to ἔμοι;

7. φθέγγεσθαι ...] 'To use the expression.' ('Man muss Ausdrücke wie γεγονότα ff. brauchen.' H. Schmidt.)


11. ὁ δ' ἀδροιζάτα ...τίθενται]
Sc. δυναμ. The subject of τίθενται is indefinite. From our Protagorean point of view, that which answers to a common name, or which counts for one, is not εἰν ἐπὶ πολλάν, nor εἰν παρά τὰ πολλά, but an arbitrary or conventional aggregate of phenomena. Cp. Parm. 165 Α, where the word ἄγος answers to ἄθροισμα here, but implies something even more vague and formless. The same terminology recurs infr. 182 Α, οὗ μακάριες ἄθροι οὐ γίνομεν, where it denotes genus as opposed to species. A doubt may be raised whether the wholes here intended are general (a class = an aggregate of individuals) or particular (a thing or person = an aggregate of attributes). The former is preferable. Cp. however Tim. 56 Β: ζυγα-θροιζάντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς ἄγοςς αὐτῶν ἀθροίζω (of the invisible particles of bodies).

12. καὶ ἐκατόν γὰρ τὸ καὶ εἰδῶν] These words, which have occasioned needless difficulty, are to be explained by the common ellipse of ἄλλα. 'Men and other animals,' 'animals and other forms.'

7. paratithemai] Suppr. 149 C: Didousai ge ai miai pharimakia kai epitoussai. See the description of the education of a Greek youth in the Protagoras, 325 E: Paratithasan autous emi ton badoyn anagryphosein poiyton agathon poimata. The genitive is perhaps partitive with paratithemai, but more probably governed by anagryphosein.

10. kai karterov] 'And with perseverance.' Boldness was all he required at first; 148 C, thaname: 151 D, eiv... anodiich.

14. eiv soi aristekei] 'Whether you are pleased with the idea that nothing is, but is ever becoming, good and noble, as well as what we have just enumerated.'

15. agathon kai kalon] As in 156 B aithrios is made to include desire, fear, etc., so, by the subtle introduction of these words, the doctrine is pushed to its farthest limits, and thus its chief fallacy is hinted at—that of arguing from sense to higher things. So afterwards Protagoras is made to assume that the doctrine applies to states as well as to individuals.

agathon kai kalon are brought in as it were accidentally, merely as a fresh example, like koreplathow suppr. 147 B. But this, to the Platonic reader, was already a tacit 'reductio ad absurdum,' and for all readers bundles of things, which men call sorts or natures.

Theaetetus is invited to acknowledge the theory so far developed. Socrates disclaims having any share in it, except that he has helped to bring it to the birth. The Good and Noble must be thought of with other things, as not existing, but arising continually.
it prepares the way for the pivot-argument from the δῆμος, ἐν δὲ ἄφιλλων in what follows, 177 ff. H. Schmidt, however, approves of Heindorf’s proposal to cancel these significant words.

2. θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἐξειν] The order is φαίνεται θαυμασίως ὡς ἐξειν. θαυμασίως ὡς is stronger than θαυμασίως, and is formed by attraction of the antecedent from θαυμάσιων ἐστὶν ὡς.

4. Μὴ τούνω] The doctrine is now so far developed that we have only to notice an objection, and it will be complete. As false opinion is our stumbling-block afterwards, so now false impressions have to be accounted for. The solution is a simple one, and confirms our theory—they are not false to him who is the subject of them. The position, Sense is knowledge, was at first made equivalent to the reality of the object of sense (p. 152). But are dreams real? Are the illusions of madness true? Is that really bitter which tastes so to the diseased palate?—If truth is wholly relative, if nothing is but what becomes, this must be so.


6. δοσα . . . τι ἄλλο] The double cognate accusative is also noticeable. ‘The cases in which it is said—to have any other illusory impression.’

10. πολλοῦ δει] This phrase has become equivalent to an adverb. Hence it is unnecessary to adopt δει from Heindorf’s conjecture.

II. ἄλλα πάν τοῦτον οὐδέν ἄν φαίνεται εἶναι] E. g. Democritus (who is believed to have written against Protagoras) said of all sensations except hardness and weight: Σημεῖον δ’ ὡς οὐκ εἶσαι φύσιν τὸ μὴ ταύτα πάσα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐξίσους, ἄλλο δ’ ἡμῖν γλυκύ, τούτ’
ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 158. ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὃ παῖ, λέεται λόγον τῷ τὴν αἰσθήσιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ φαίνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅκνω ἐπείν ὅτι 5 οὐκ ἔξω τὶ λέγω, διότι μοι γὰρ δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι β αὐτό. ἐπεὶ ὁς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβήτησαι ὡς οἱ μανιμένοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρόττουτοι οὐ ψευδὴ δοξάζων, οταν οἱ μὲν θεί αὐτῶν οἴονται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ππηθοὶ τε, καὶ ὁς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ διανω- 10 ὄνται.

ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τούτῳ ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὅναρ τε καὶ ὑπαρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιόν;

ΣΩ. *Ὁ πολλάκις σε οίμαι ἀκρούναι ἐρωτῶντων 15 τί ἂν τις ἔχων τεκμήριον ἀποδείξας, εἰ τις ἔριτο νῦν οὕτω εἰς τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἄ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρόττομεν, ἣ ἐγρηγοράμεν τε καὶ 20 οὐπάρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορὸν γε ὅτι χρὴ ἡμ ἄλλοις πικρῶν καὶ ἔτεροις ἐξοι καὶ ἄλλοις δρμὲτ, τοῖς δὲ στρυφοῖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὃδιντος.


15. *Ὁ πολλάκις] δ is not exactly governed by ἀκρούναι ἐρωτῶντων, but is cognate accusative in apposition with the whole sentence which follows. 'What question do you allude to? This. I dare say you have often heard it asked, etc.' Riddell's Digest, § 15, b. Cp. 165 D: Λ ἄλλοις ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνήρ μαθησόφορος εἰς λόγους ἐρμόμενος, κ.τ.λ., Rep. 4. 443 B: ἃ τὰ ἐννοικήτων, ὥσπερ ἑπετίσησα, κ.τ.λ., Arist. Met. 3. 6. τοῦτι A: τὰ δὲ τοιαύτα ἀπορηματα δροῦ ἐστι τὸ ἄπορεν πότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἢ ἐγρηγοράμεν. Tb. 7. 5.

20. ἀπορὸν γε ὅτι χρὴ ἐπιδείξαι] Descartes de la Méthode, p. 164 (Cousin): 'Et que les meilleurs esprits y étudient tant qu'il leur plaira, je ne crois pas qu'ils puissent donner aucune raison, qui soit suffisante pour ôter cette doute, s'ils ne présupposent l'existence de Dieu.' Descartes, however, would not say
Dreams have as much reality to the dreaming mind, as daylight impressions have to

Attention was of course early attracted by the phenomena of dreams. See esp. II. 22. 199: 'Ως δ' ἐν ὑνείρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν.

B has ήτο χρόνῳ χρή, whence Schanz formerly conjectured ήτο χρόμενον χρή, and now reads ήτο χρόνων. But T gives χρή, and χρόνων occurs a few lines below.

Ἀνσορον] Sc. τὸ ἀμφισβήτημα γίγνεται. Οὕτω, κ.τ.λ., explains the point of the difficulty.

1. πάντα γὰρ ὅσπερ ἁντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. For everything corresponds in each exactly, as if one series was the counterpart of the other.

3. ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ] This is the reading of the best MSS., though ἐν ψυπνίῳ is supported by the greater number. If the latter reading were adopted, ἐν τῷ must be changed to ἐν τῷ.

4. καὶ ὅταν δὴ] 'And when in a dream we do seem to be relating dreams,—it is strange, the resemblance of this state to that.'

Either (1) 'to tell dreams,' or (2) 'to give utterance to thoughts which are only dreams.' Cp. supr. πάντα δ ἰδιανοούμεθα ὑνεῖρασ

τομεν. ὑνεῖρασ in (2) is a sort of cognate accusative, or rather, is in apposition to the suppressed object of διγνείσθαι. ὅπως is adverbial to δοκῶμεν. (Meno 85 C: "Ωσπέρ ὅπως ἰδρυ ἀνακεκινηταί αἱ δόξαι αὕται). But the former explanation (1) is simpler and is really free from objection. ὅταν δὴ has a different force in (1) and (2). Either, (1) 'When it comes to this,' marking a climax, or, (2) 'When in fact,' marking the correspondence to the previous clause. The second interpretation (2), although in some ways plausible, seems to require Hirschig's emendation διαλεγέσθαι for διγνείσθαι. τούτως refers to the waking, ἐκεῖνος to the sleeping state, like ἐνδιδάκται ἐκεῖ of the visible and invisible world. There is a slight break in the sentence before ἄτομος, κ.τ.λ. Heindorf's conjecture ἄτομα (for ὑνεῖρατον), approved by Cobet, and adopted by Schanz, ('and when in dreams we do seem to be relating something'), is rather flat, but is more plausible if we adopt Hirschig's emendation: 'when we seem to have a conversation in our dream.'
p. 158. ὥστε ἵσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμέν ὄντα εἶναι, ἵσον δὲ ἔκειν, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ’ ἐκατέρωσι δύσχωριζόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἵσος;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ορθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τι οὖν; πλήθει χρόνον καὶ ὀλγώττητι τὸ ἄλθες ὁρισθῆσαι;

Ε Ἐ ΘΕΑΙ. Γελοῦον μέντ' ἂν εἴη πολλαχῇ.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλά τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφές ἐνδεξασθαί, ὅποια τοῦτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἄλθη; τι

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. 'Εμοῦ τοῖνοι ἄκουν οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἄν λέγοιν οἱ τὰ ἄξια δοκοῦντα ὁρίζομεν τῷ δοκοῦτι εἶναι ἄλθη. λέγοντι δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἷμαι, οὕτως ἔρωτῶτες, Ο Θεαῖ—

τητε, ὅ ἂν ἔτερον ή παντάπασι, μὴ τῇ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτήν ἔξει τῷ ἔτερῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτα εἶναι ὁ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἔτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἔτερον.

7. πλήθει χρόνον καὶ ἀλγάστῃ.] The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. 3. 5. 1009 B: το μὲν γὰρ ἄλθες οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι ὅτι προσή-

κενς σέ ἀλλ᾽ ἀλεγάστη.

10. τι ἄλλο... σαφές] 'Any other certain test.'

14. ὁρίζομεν] 'Who determine.' Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of this word to the Protagoreans.

17. μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτα] These words expand παντάπασι, and are required in order to place Thesetetus at the right point of view. Megarian subtlety is here ironi-

F 2

cally brought to the help of Protagoras, by the introduction of a fallacy in the Euthymides vein. The language of logic is applied to the sensible world: the language of ideas to things which admit of degrees. And the idea dwelt upon throughout is that of difference. The lan-

guage is humoured accordingly. Socrates ill can hardly be said to be ἄλως ἔτερον, wholly differ-

tent, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, ἄλως τοῦτο ἄλω ἐκεῖνο (159 B). Cp. Democritus sp. Ar. de Gen. et Cor. 1. 2 : Καὶ ἄλως ἔτερον φαίνεσθαι ἔνδο μετακι-

μηδέντος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία γίγνεται γραμμάτων.

C the waking mind.

And half our life is spent in dreaming.

The impressions of madness, too, though more short-lived, are real at the time to him who experiences them.

In both cases it is impossible to demonstrate which is the real world.

Our theory resolves this doubt as follows:
Τὸ ἕν ἰὸν ἄνθρωπον. 

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

8 Ἀνάγκη.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκούν πρόσθεν ἑλέγομεν ὅσ πολλὰ μὲν ἐν ἄνθρωπον ὁμοίου ὑπαρκονοῦν καὶ ἀπειρά, ὡσαύτως ἢ ἐν τῇ πάλαις ἡμῶν.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλον συμμετέχον περὶ τοῦ ἑπεξεργασίας μοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἔσται τῆς ἑπεξεργασίας μοῦ.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 69

p. 159. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τάλλῃ ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. Σωκράτης ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σω-
κράτης αὐτὸ ἄσθενοντα· πότερον ὁμοίων τούτο ἐκεῖνο ἢ
ἀνόμων φήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα τόν ἄσθενοντα Σωκράτης, ὅλον τοῦτο
λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκεῖνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτηι;

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα ἱπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνόμων δὴ ποι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἔτερον ἀρα ὀὕτως ὠσπερ ἀνόμων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἂ νῦν διήλ-
θομεν, ὁσαίτως φήσεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἀλλο ἃ
τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτης, ὡς ἔτερῳ 
μοι 
χρήσει, ὅταν δὲ ἄσθενοντα, ὡς ἔτερῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἔτερα δὴ ἐφ' ἐκατέρων γεννήσομεν ἐγώ
τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιεῖν;

2. Λέγωμεν δὴ] Phaed. 100
C: Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. Ἐπικράτης is in an imperfect con-
struction, governed partly by λέγωμεν, partly by φήσομεν. The
object here is to impress us with the assumption of the abs-
soluteness of difference.

ἡδῆ] I. e. Having laid down these premises. We now ven-
ture to apply our theory uni-
versally: not as supr. 153 D:
Kατὰ τὰ ὁμοίων πρῶτον.
12. καθεύδοντα] Par. F. marg.
add. καὶ ἐγγραφοῦσιν. Bodl.
kαθεύδοντι. Is it possible that
καθεύδοντα δὴ ἐγγραφοῦτο may
be the true reading? But cp.
supr. 149 E: Els γυναῖκα δὲ, and
see Riddell’s Digest, § 232.
— ‘Platoni satis visum est res
quasdam significasse.’ Wohl-
rab.

13. ὁσαίτως φήσεις] Sc. ἀν-
μοίων καὶ ἔτερον εἶναι τὸν ἐγγραφο-
ρότος, κ.τ.λ.

15. τι ποιεῖν] ‘To act upon
something;’ to be agents. So
tὸ ποιεῖν ἐμὲ, below. Soph.
247 D: Ἐστε εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔτερον
ὁτιοῦν.

19. ἐφ' ἐκατέρων] In either
case. Cp. Parm. 130 A: Λέ-
γωμος δὴ τὸν Σωκράτους . ἐφ'
ἐκαστοῦ ἄκθεσθαι τὸν τοῦ Παρμενί-
δην καὶ τὸν Ζήμωνα.


Accordingly, wine both seems and really is pleasant to me when well.

5. "Εγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύττατά τε καὶ αἰσθητὸν· σιν, ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἰσθησίς πρὸς τὸν πάσχοντος οὗσα αἰσθανομένη τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύττης πρὸς τὸν οἶνον περὶ αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιανοῦσῃ γλῶσσῇ ἐποίησε καὶ εἶχε καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

6. Ξειρίστηκε πάντως ὧν τὰ πρῶτα ἢμῖν οὕτως ὁμολογήτως.

"Οταν δὲ ἀπεθανοῦτα,—ἀλλὰ τι πρώτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίω γὰρ δὴ χορηγεῖν.

7. Ναι.

"Ετέρα δὴ αὐτοῦ ἐγεννησάτην ὥς τοιοῦτος ὁ ἔχων κράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶσσαν αἰσθησίων πικρόττητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρόττητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρόττητα ἀλλὰ πικρῶν, ἔμε δὲ οὐκ αἰσθησίως ἀλλ’ αἰσθανόμενον;

8. Κομιδὴ μὲν ὄνω.

απειργάσατο ] The sensation, arising on the side of the subject, renders the tongue percipient.

απεθανοῦτα ] The former construction is resumed from δεῖν. λάβῃ, supr. C.

ἐγεννησάτην ] The use of the third pers. helps to support the notion of 'Socrates being a different man.' Observe, too, the accuracy with which not the wine, but the drinking of the wine, is spoken of as the 'active motion.' The dual is expressive. 'They produce when paired.'

For this whole example cp. Symp. 186 B, where the same thing is briefly stated by Eryximachus:

τὸ γὰρ ἤμεν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν ὁμολογούμενον ἐπεράν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεὶ καὶ ἐρᾷ. ἄλλος μὲν οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐμελετήρῳ ἔρασι, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νουσώδει.
λειτήτως.

p. 159. ΘΑ. Οὐκοῦν ἔγω τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη ἀισθήσεως, p. 160. καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλοι ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὕτως εἶκεν τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μύτην· ἄλλῳ συνελθὼν ταῖς γεννήσαι τοιούτων γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννήσαι ἄλλοις γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ ἑστὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, εἰκὼς τε ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ ὦν.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη δὲ γε ἔμε τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενον γίγνομαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· εἰκὼς τε τινὶ γί

1. οὐδὲν ἄλλο . γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος] 'There is nothing else from which I can receive the same sensation.'

That ἄλλο is the object of αἰσθανόμενος is evident from what follows. For the accusative see 185 Λ: 'Α τα' εὔρικες δυνάμεις αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον ἐναί δὲ ἄλλη ταῖς αἰσθάσεις, and elsewhere. There is a stress on οὕτως. For γενήσομαι . αἰσθανόμενοι see a few lines below, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γένησαί. The words γίγνεσθαι, αἰσθανόμενοι, have become in a manner technical; cp. infr. 182. γενήσομαι αἰσθανόμενος answers to ἔγνωσάχθι αἰσθανόμενον above. The point insisted on is not the identity of the subject while in the same combination, but the difference which arises with every new combination. For ἄλλον τούτι (the Bodleian reading) cp. supr. οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἃλθειν. 'For a different object implies a different sensation, and makes him who perceives it a different man:' i.e. I and my sensation become different with every change in the object of sense.

The intention of these words is to mark the incommunicable individuality of every act of sense: i.e. not wine or bitterness, but the peculiar bitterness of a particular wine to a particular palate at a particular moment. (This view of the passage is disputed by H. Schmidt, but accepted by Wohlrab and Prof. Jowett.)

4. τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμοὶ] 'Which (in this case) affects me.' It is unnecessary to supply αἰσθα-νόμενον. Supr. 159 ζ. As the sensation changes with the object, so the quality changes with the subject.

8. τοιοῦτος] Βίβλο, οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος,

κτισθαί, όταν γλυκὴ ἡ πικρῶν ἡ τι τωιότον γλύνησαι. p. 160.

γλυκῷ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκῷ, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ, οἴμαι, ἡμῖν ἀλλήλους, εἰτ' εἰσιν, εἰναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπείστερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὕδει τῶν ἄλλων, οὖν ἄδ. ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλους δὴ λείπεται συνδεσθαι. ὡστε εἴτε τις εἴναι τι ὄνομάζει, τινὶ εἴναι ἡ τιμῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ ρητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ
t̂10 δὲ ἐφ' αὐτŏ ἡ ἡ γιγνόμενος οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὖ
t̂15 οὔτ' ἄλλων λέγοντος ἀποδεκτόν, ὡς ὁ λόγος διὰ διελ-
l̂7θαμεν σημαινεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἔμε ποιοῦν ἐμοὶ ἐστὶ καὶ

ὁ θεός ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ οἰσθάνομαι αὐτῷ, ἄλλος ὁ οὖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἰσθησίς· τῆς γὰρ

2. ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι] 'It is impossible a thing should ever become, etc.' Heindorf and others would change γενέσθαι here to γίγνεσθαι, to avoid the change of tense. But, as H. Schmidt points out, such variations are too common to allow room for objection here. And it may fairly be maintained that the aorist has the effect of making the negation more absolute in the second statement.

8. εἶναι τι οὖνομάζει] 'Uses the term Being in reference to anything.' Infr. 201 D: Οὐναί καὶ οὖομαζέων. Parm. 133 D: 'ἰδι ήμεῖς μετίχοντες, εἶναι ἐκατὰ ἐπονομάζεως.' Cp. Phaed. 92 D: 'Ἡ οὐσία ἧλιος ο ἐστὶν. The alternative is repeated below, D: τα ὅστα ή γιγνόμενα. Schanz, from Frei's conjecture, unnecessarily repeats γίγνεσθαι. The ellipse is easily supplied. The doctrine at first rejected the verb 'to be' (157 B). Now, grown bolder, it professes indifference as to the language employed, seeing that the fact has been made so clear, and the consideration of the most formidable objection has ended in triumph.


17. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὖσίας δεῖ ἐστι] (1) 'Since it is inseparable from my being at the particular time.' Cp. supr. B: ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὕδει τῶν ἄλλων.

'Wenn sie ist immer ein Stück
p. 160. ἐμὴς οὐσίας δέι ἐστι. καὶ ἐγὼ κρίνῃς κατὰ τὸν Ἑρατηκόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἐστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν.

ΤΕΑΙ. "Εοικέν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀφενδής ὄν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἡ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἶναι δινπερ αἰσθήτης;

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὖ.

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι ἤρθηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστιν ἡ ἀισθήσις, καὶ εἰς ταύτων συμπέ-πτοκε, κατὰ μὲν οὐμήρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἰν ρέειμα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφότατον πάντων χρη-μάτων ἀνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτην εἰς τούτων οὖσων ἐχόντων αἰσθήσιον ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. 15 ἡ γὰρ, ὁ Θεαίτης; φῶμεν τούτο σοῦ μὲν εἶναι οὖν νεογενὲς παιδίου, ἐμὼ δὲ μαίευμα; ἡ πῶς λέγεις;

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὖτως ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σάκρατες.

meines. Seine.' Deutchle. Otherwise (2), making οὐσίας a genitive of the object:—'For it is conversant with the Being of that which is to me.' Supr. 152 C: Αἰσθήσις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστι καὶ ἀφενδής. For a somewhat similar use of οὐσία (with a play upon the word) cp. Gorg. 472 B: Ἑρατηκόρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖ ἐκβάλλει με ἐκ τῆς οὐ-σίας καὶ τοῦ ἄληφου.


13. Πρωταγόρας τὸν σοφότατον] Prot. 309 D: Σοφότατὸν μὲν οὖν δήποτε τῶν γε νῦν, ἐν σοι δοκεῖ σοφότατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. Perhaps Plato is ironically preparing the way for what follows, p. 161 D, 162 C.

15. αἰσθήσιον ἐπιστήμην γίγνε-σθαι] The proposition which Thesetetus ventured 'out of his own consciousness' now appears as the resultant of pre-existent tendencies of thought. The doctrine 'Sense is knowledge' is the meeting-point of the two theories 'Man is the measure,' and 'All is motion.' The several topics are recapitulated in the reverse order. So Ar. Eth. N. i. 3. 8: Περὶ μὲν ἄρσοντο καὶ πῶς ἄποδεκτέον καὶ τί προτιθεῖμα.


1. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ... ἐμπεριφράσας.] Our theory is now complete. (1) First the hypothesis was ventured, Sensation is knowledge. (2) This was at once identified with the axiom of Protagoras, ‘The man the measure of what is.’ and their common meaning was brought home to us by the analysis of a familiar example. (3) The mystery was revealed which lay beneath this saying, but had been reserved for certain ‘disciples of Protagoras,’ the Heraclitean theory of the universe that ‘All is motion;’ in which all philosophers save Parmenides concur; which is witnessed to by poetry; and confirmed by the observation of nature. (4) This theory of being was then applied to the phenomena of sense; by which means the contradictions of common language were removed; and (5) in meeting the formidable objection drawn from what are commonly called false impressions, the doctrine was still further developed, and shown to be universally applicable.

At each step it has grown in distinctness, and boldness, and apparent certainty. At first only warmth, colour, and the like were spoken of; gradually our eyes were opened to the relativeness of size and number. By and by it was assumed that the term ἀληθῶς includes pleas- sure, pain, hope, fear, etc. Then we are quietly asked to concede that things good and beautiful have only a relative existence. And, being now fairly at the mercy of the argument, we cannot resist the admission that the illusions of dreams and madness are as real as our waking and sane impressions. They are real to us at the time when we experience them; which is all the reality anything is permitted to claim.

3. τὰ ἀμφιδρόμα αὐτοῦ.] Accusative in apposition to the action of περιβρεκτέων, k.t.l., like τὸν κολοφώνα, supra. 153 C. ‘And now to celebrate its birth in due form, we must really in our argument “run round about” with it, and consider, etc.’ Schol.: Ἡμέρα πέμπτη τοῖς βρέφεσιν ἐκ γενέσεως ὤν ἐκλήθη, παρ’ ὅσον ἐν ταύτῃ καθαίρουσι τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοὺς ἐν συνεργώμενοι τῆς μαη- ενίσεως, καὶ τὸ βρέφος πέρι τὴν ἔστιν θέρεις τρέχουσαν κύκλω, καὶ τοῦτο τίθεται τοῦτο, δῷ ὅ τε πέμπουσι τῷ παιδίῳ, ὡς ὑπ’ ἐπὶ πλείονοι πολυποδος καὶ σημαίας, οἱ τὲ φίλοι καὶ οἰκείοι καὶ ἀπόλοι οἱ προσκομίκτες.

ἐν κύκλῳ περιβρεκτέων] ‘All round;’ i.e. leaving out no point of view.

4. τῷ λόγῳ] ‘In our argument.’

5. τὸ γιγνόμενον] ‘That which is now born to us.’ In this and in some other cases where the reading has been ques-
p. 161. καὶ ἰεὺδος. ἦ σοι οἴει πάντως δεῖν τὸ γε σον τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἦ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὅρων, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλταπανεῖς, ἐὰν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτότο-

κού αὐτὸ ὑφαίρη; ΘΕΟ. Ἄνεξεται, ὡς Σώκρατες, Θεοῖτης· οὐδαμῶς 5 γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἶτε, ἦ αὐξ οῖκς οὕτως ἔξει;

ΣΩ. Φιλολόγος γʹ εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ὃτι με οἴει λόγων τινα ἐνια θυλακον καὶ ραδίως ἐξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὐτ ἔσαι οὕτω ταῦτα· τὸ 10 ἐν δὲ γεγυμόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὃτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξερ-
χεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀλλ' αἰε παρά τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγο-
μένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπισταμαί πλέον πλην βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβείν καὶ ἀποδε-
ζαχθεὶ μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τούτῳ παρὰ τοῦτο περά- 15 σομαί, οὐ τι αὐτὸς εἶπεῖν.

tioned, the present or imperfect tense really gives additional vividness.

3. τις σοῦ] The Bodl. first hand gave τίς τον;[[144]

ὡς πρωτότοκον] Although these words are added to the second clause, they belong in sense rather to the first, i.e. χαλαπανεῖς ὡς πρωτότοκος. Cp. 154 supr. 151 C.

5. οὐδαμῶς δύσκολος] 144 B: Μετὰ πολλὰς πραοτητοὺς. 155 A: Οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, κ.τ.λ.

6. αὐ] 'You have proved that it is so.—Is this position now to be reversed?'[144]

8. Φιλολόγος γʹ εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὡς Θεόδωρε] Phaedr. 235 E: Φιλατός εἰ καὶ ὡς ἀποθέως χρη-

σοῦς, ὡς Φαιδρ. 1b. 264 B: Χρη-

στός εἰ, δι, κ.τ.λ. χρηστός is said in a tone of good-humoured pleasantry.

'You are truly a patient inquirer and an ingenuous per-

son, Theodorus, if you take me for a sack full of different theories; and expect me without any difficulty to pull out the refutation of what has been now stated. But you do not perceive what is really taking place all the while (τὸ γεγυμόμενον).'


13. 'γώ ὡς οὐδὲ] 'But I have no advantage in wisdom be-

yond this simple skill, to receive a theory from some wise person, and accept it on fair conditions.' Cp. Rep. 7. 534 E.

15. μετρίως] 'In a spirit of
Thea. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὁ Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποιεῖ π. 161.
οὖν.

Ω. Οὐ σοδ' οὖν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὁ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἐταίρου
σου Προταγόρου;

5 Thea. Τὸ ποῖον;

Ω. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνω ἦδεος ἐίρηκεν, ὡς τὸ
dοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ ἔστι· τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ
λόγου τεθαίμακα, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς ἀλή-
θείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἔστιν ὃς ἡ κυνο-
fairness.' 179 A: Μετρίως ἀρα
ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον σου ἐίρη-
σεται.

παρὰ τοῦτο[ From Thesætus.]
Or is Protagoras meant?

3. ὁ Θεόδωρε[ Theodorus is
now gradually drawn into the
discussion, but proves a shy
respondent. He shrinks from
being made the instrument of
his friend's defeat (162 A), is
not moved by Socrates' hu-
norous challenge (ib. C), will
not accept the responsibility of
'guarding the orphan' (165
A)—he is a mere geometrician
and unused to dialectic (ibid.),
and only when Socrates de-
clares that with no one else
can he conduct the argument
with becoming gravity (168
D E) is he induced to come
forward and discuss the ques-
tion so far as his own subject
is involved in it, but no further
(169 C). He listens quietly to
the long digression (172-177),
but evinces some impatience
when the discussion is resumed
(177 C), and although at one
point (181 B) he shows un-
expected eagerness, he refuses
to be drawn into further argu-
ment (183 D).

5 Θαυμάζω[ A courteous way
of expressing strong dissent.

Prot. 329 B: Ἐπερ αὐλῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πειθοῦν ἂν, καὶ σοὶ
πειθοῦμαι· ἔδει δὲ εἰδούσα σου λέγων-
tos ... Gorg. 458 E: Ἀκονε
δή, ἢ Γοργία, δ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς
λέγομενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ. No fault is
found with the arguments of
Protagoras, only if we follow
his doctrine to its results, all
creatures that have sense must
be equally infallible. Hence
there can be no teaching and
no discussion.

6. Τὰ ... ἄλλα ... ἐρηκέν, ὃς] 'For the most part I am
charmed with his statement of
the theory that, etc.' ὃς, κ.τ.λ.
explains ἐρηκέν and not the
whole clause.

8. τῆς ἀλήθειας] 'Ἀλήθεια
seems to have been the title,
or at least one title, of Prota-
goras' work. It is often cor-
vertly alluded to in this and
other dialogues. See esp.
391 C: Εἶ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν
Προταγόρου ἀλος οὐκ ἀπόδεχομαι,
tὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀλήθειᾳ ῥηθέντα
ἀγαφῶν ὃς τοῦ δίκαια.


Lach. 196 C: Κατὰ τὴν παραμιᾶν
οὐκ ἂν πάσα ὦ γροῖς.

κυνοκέφαλος] Something more
remote even than the Muson ἔχοσα, infr. 209 B. As we might say, Why not the lemur or the chimpanzee?

2. páνα κατασφηντικῶν] 'Showing a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him.'

3. ἤτέσατο] This use of the aorist indicative with ἵνα, ὥσπερ, etc., is not infrequent. Euthyd. 304 D: Καὶ μὴ, ἐφη, ἄξιον γ' ἴνα ἄκουσί. Τί δε; ἢν δ' ἐγώ. ἵνα ἄκουσαι ἄνδρων διαλεγομένων, οἱ νῦν σοφώτατοι εἰσι. Ἀesch. Prom. 749: ὅπος πέθω σκήψαμα τῶν πάνω πάνω | ἀπηλλάγην.

5. Βατράχων has been rejected by several editors as a gloss on γυρίνου. It is sufficiently defended by Stallbaum, who quotes Bernhardy, Syntax, p. 193. The introduction of γυρίνου alone would be too abrupt, and the reference in infr. 167 B would not be clear.

7. ἄληθές ἔσται, κ.τ.λ.] The future indicative with εἰ is often used in dwelling on a supposition which is unendurable. Cp. Sophoc. Philoct. 988: εἰ μ' οὖσις ἐκ τῶν σῶν μ' ἀπάγεται βία;

10. ὅρθή ἡ ψευδής] For εἰτε omitted cp. infr. 169 D, 203 A.

13. σοφός] Sc. ἦν, anticipated from below.

δάτε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλον] The negative form of the same saying, viz. Oix εἶναι ἄστιλέγει, is in like manner turned against itself, Euthyd. 287 A: Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράγματες μῆτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοούμενοι, ὑμεῖς, δ' πρὸς Διὸς, εἰ οὖν ἔχει, τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἦκετε;

15. ᾧ] Viz. in his life-time.

17. ταῦτα] The old edd. with
γόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς p. 161. μανετικῆς σιγῶ, ὥσον γέλωτα ὀφλικάνομεν· οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπαστα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας 5 τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἐκάστου οὔσας, οὐ μακρὰ μὲν καὶ p. 162.

some inferior MSS. read καὶ ταῦτα.

1. τῆς μανετικῆς] Here Naber would again prune the text.

2. οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπαστα] Locke, Hum. Und. 13. § 88: 'But if it should so happen that two thinking men have different ideas, I do not see how they could argue or discourse with one another.'

3. η τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία] Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1006: Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τὶ σημαίνει οὐδὲν σημαίνει ἐστὶν, μὴ σημαίνοντως δὲ τῶν ὁνομάτων ἀνήρθη τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶν οὐδέν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦτα ἐν. Euthyd. 286 C: Τούτων γε τῶν λόγων πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀγκόσως δεὶ θαυμάζω. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφι Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἄρχοντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ παλαιστέρω" ἐμοὶ δὲ αἱ θαυμαστώτερα τὶς δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἀλλοὺς ἀνατρέποντα καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτών. οἴμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ καλλίστα πείσεσθαι. ἄλλο τι δὲ τὴν γεννή σε λέγον οὐκ ἐστι; τούτω γὰρ δύνασαι τὸ λόγος. Gorg. 481 C: Ἐμι μὴ τι ἤν τοὺς ἀναθρόπους πάθος, τοίς μὲν ἀλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτὸ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑκούσι τινὶ τῇ ἐπαν- σχε Πάθος δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ήν ἄλλοι ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῷ ἐαυτοῦ πάθημα.

4. ἐπισκοπεῖν] 'To contemplate,' or 'consider.' Supr. 155 A, infr. 207 C.

5. μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλίγησιν]

'Great, nay enormous.' μὲν points forwards to the alternative implied in ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιήσουσα, κ.τ.λ. 'But then perhaps he was in jest.' Others, with Buttmann on Men. 82 A, "Ελλην μὲν ἐστι, τακτ μὲν τοίον τὸν, I presume." But in that and similar passages the question is the first of a series, or at least preliminary to something which is to follow. θωλίγησιν, Schol.: Μεγάλη, ἥ ἐπὶ πολὺ διήθησα, ἀπὶ τοῦ περιβότος . . σημαίνει δὲ ζωθ' ὅτα καὶ τὸ σκοτεινόν καὶ τὸ νυκτερίν. The meaning, 'loud' (if it really existed, but it is perhaps due to a fanciful derivation from θωλός), must have been derived from the meaning 'long.' Cp. Μακρὸν ἄντειν, φωνή σφανομῆνης. The idea of vast size, or length, may again have arisen from the association of infinity with gloom. If so, the word is possibly related to ἴλιγη, ἴλη. Compare ρᾶξ, ράξ: πτήσεω, πτάσεω, etc. 'Vast in extent,' is the only meaning admissible here and in de Legg. 10. 890 D: Τί δ' οὐ χαλέπα τε ἐστι ξυνακολούθη τὸν οὕτως εἰς πλῆθος λεγόμενα, μήκη τε αὐτὸ κάπηκε διωλίγησι τοίς. This, too, is the meaning in which it is used by Neoplatonist writers. For the climax with καὶ compare 155 B: Σεληνός τε . . καὶ ἀντιτόπους. 173 E: Σμηκρὰ καὶ οὐδέν. Rep. 5. 449 D: Μέγα καὶ ἄλον.
2. Εκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τής βιβλίου.

'If the Truth of Protagoras is sincere, and was not laughing when she uttered this from behind her impenetrable screen of written words.' There is an allusion to the etymology of αὐτόν.

Cp. the celebrated passage in the Phædrus, about written teaching, 275 D: Ἀδεικνύς γὰρ σὺν, δὲ Φαίδρε, τούτω ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἄλλως ὄμοιον γραφῆς· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνη ἐκείνα ἐστὶν μὲν ὡς ἔτος, εἶναι ν’ ἀνέρ ρώς, συμώος σώος σχέσα, κ.τ.λ. For the imagery which is here resumed see above, 152 C: Τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἦν ἑξατό τὸ πολλὸς συνεργός, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τῆς ἄλλης ἔλεγε. 155 E: Τὰ δὲ ἅλθειν ἀπόκειται κρυμμαῖν. ... μὴ τις τῶν ἁμηντῶν ἐπακούσῃ. ... ἃν μελλῶ σοὶ τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ... οὔτος ὁ μῦθος. At first Protagoras himself spoke in riddles—now his 'Truth' is personified, and speaks obscurely from her hidden shrine. Plato often thus follows up a metaphor. Compare the well-known image of the wave Rep. 4. 441 C: Ταῦτα μὲν μόνος διανεύκαιμαν. 5. 453 D: 'Αν τὰ τίς εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέση ἂν τὰ εἰς μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὄμως γε νεὶ οὐδέν ἤττον. 457 B: 'Εν ὁπερ κύρια φίλους διαφεύγειν ὅπποι κατακλυσθήσι. 472 A: Τὸ μέγιστον τῆς τρικυμίας. 473 C: Ὅσπερ κύρια ἐκεῖνον κατακλύσαν. 4. ὁπερ σὺν νῦν δὴ εἶπες 161 B: Τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου. 6. παρὰ δίδαξαν 'Against conviction.' Rep. 1. 346 A: Καί, διακάρμα, μὴ παρὰ δίδαξαν ἀποκρινόν, ἵππο τι καὶ περαινώμεν. 7. πάντως καὶ] See above, 143 A, and note.


The notion is not that of a respondent who assents to everything, but of one who apprehends the drift of each question in turn. See 145 D E, 155 D E, 159 B.

9. 'Αρα καὶ εἰς Δακεδαῖμονα] It appears from this, and 169 B, that the Lacedæmonians used to compel bystanders to join in their gymnastic exercises. ('Ελκειν προς τὸ γυμνάσιον. ... ἀπέλιμος ἢ ἀποδύνασθαι κελεύουσιν.) This is probably
πρὸς τὰς παλαιστράς ἀξιόστις ἤν ἄλλους θεόμενος π. 162, 
γυμνούς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ ἔδος παραποδούμενον;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, ἐπετρέψει καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὡσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς 
πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἔαν θεασθαι καὶ μὴ ἔλκεω πρὸς τὸ 
γυμνάσιον σκηνῆρον ἤδη ὑπα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε 
καὶ ὕγροτέρῳ ὑντι προσπαλαίειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ ὀὕτως, ὡ Θεόδωρε, σοι φίλον, οὐδ’ 
ἔμοι ἔχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιάζομενοι. τάλιν δὴ ὅν 
ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἱτέων. Λέγε δὴ, ὡ Θεαι 
τήτη, πρῶτον μὲν ἄ νῦν διήλθομεν, ἄρα οὐ συνθαυ 
μάζεις εἰ ἐξελῦσθης ὀὕτως ἀναφανήσει μὴ δὲν 
χειρον 
eis σοφίαν ὄντον ὄνθεν ἀνθρώπων ἡ καὶ θεών; ἡ ἦτον 
τι οἴει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἡ εἰς ἀνθρώ 
ποὺς λέγεσθαι;

the point of the allusion here. There is no reason to suppose 
that the human form was less 
visible in an Athenian than 
in a Lacedæmonian palaestra. 
The law observed in severer 
times at Athens, which 
forbade adults to enter a gym-
nasium where boys were ex-
cerising, perhaps throws some 
light on this Spartan custom. 
(Δesch. c. Tim. p. 2, § 12.)

2. ἐνίους φαύλους] Socrates 
courteously implies his own 
inferiority. H. Schmidt objects 
that Socrates, although pretend-
ing ignorance, professes to have 
a special gift in dialectic. But 
the words have the same ironi-
cal tone as supr. 154 E, ἄρε 
λιθοτα, Rep. 2. 368 D, ἐπιείδη 
οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δενοί, and are used 
with reference to the failure of 
Socrates and Theætetus to come 
to any conclusion hitherto.

3. παραποδούμενον] 'Stripping 
beside them,' i.e. to compare 
with them.

7. σκηνῆρον] 'Stiff,' opposed 
to ὕγροτέρο, 'more supple.' 
Symp. 196 A: 'Ὑγρός τὸ εἶδος 
(ὁ ἐρως) οὐ γὰρ ἄν οἶος τ’ ἥν πάντη 
περιπτυόσσεσθαι . . . εἰ σκηνῆρος ἤν. 
Cp. Rep. 3. 410 D, where σκηνῆρον 
is metaphorically applied to 
character: 'Ἀγρυπνότος τε καὶ 
σκηνηρόττησας καὶ ἀδ μαλακίας τε καὶ 
ἡμερότητος. See too Hor. Od. 
4. 1: 'Desine . . . flectere mollibus 
Jam durum imperiis.'

8. προσπαλαίειν] Sc. se. 'Let 
more supple youth try a fall 
with you, and do not drag me 
into the gymnasium.' (Jowett.)

11. σοφῶν] 'Qui scientiam a 
σθενου esse ponendo repente sa 
piens evasit.' Heind.

12. συνθαυμάζεις] Cp. supr. δ 
θαυμάζω.

15. εἰς θεοὺς] Contrast with
p. 162. ΘΕΑΙ. Μᾶ Δι' οὐκ ἐγωγε. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾶς, τάνυ θαυμᾶζω. ἡνίκα γὰρ διῆμεν ὅν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, τάνυ μοι εἶ ἐφαίνητο λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ τούναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.

ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὃ φίλε παί- τής οὖν δημηγορίας δέξεως ἑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τίς ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Ἡ γενναῖοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ἐγκαθεξόμενοι, θεοῦ τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, οὐς ἐγὼ ἐκ τοῦ τοὺ

this Legg. 4. 716 C: 'Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἂν εἰπῇ μᾶλτα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις ἄς φαινιν αὕριωτος,—a truth of which Plato here throws out a distant hint.

4. τούναντίον] Viz. οἷκ εὖ ἑφαι- νόμενον λέγεσθαί. This word is not the subject of μεταπέπτωκε, but in apposition with the subject, forming part of the predicate. 'Nunc autem res subito in contrarium vertit. Ut Me- non, 70 C: 'Ενώδει δὲ . . τὸ ἑναντίον περιστήκηκεν.' Heind.—Riddell (Dig. of Idioms, § 13) would treat all such examples as accusatives. But with verbs of becoming, etc., the above ex- planation appears more proba- ble.

τάγα] So the Bodleian MS. with Vat. Ven. Π. Other MSS. have ταχύ.

6. Νέος γὰρ εἶ] Parm. 130 Ε: Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἑτί, φάναι τῶν Παρμενίδην, ὃ δώκειτε, καὶ οὕτω σου ἀντιληπταις φιλοσοφία ὡς ἑτί ἀντιληπται.

τῆς . . δημηγορίας δέξεως ἑπα- κούεις καὶ πείθει] 'Your ear is quickly caught, and your mind influenced, by popular argu- ments.'

9. δημηγορεῖτε] 'You talk clap-trap.'


The Bodl. MS. with its two followers, Vat. and Ven. Π, gives λέγοντες. But, the tenden- cency to the repetition of consonants, already noticed, weakens its testimony in this instance with λέγειν and λέγετε following. Compare, besides the instances adduced in the note on 156, 169 C: Ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἔγε, Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' λέγε. As regards the sense there would be a slight awkwardness in the re- petition of the same common word, which it is in Plato's manner to avoid, though, on the other hand, the expression ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν is made more pointed at first sight. But the general sense with δημηγορεῖτε is enough to occasion this, without the in- troduction of λέγοντες. And if we look closely at the expression ἐκ τοῦ μέσον λέγειν θεοῖς, it is hardly supported by comparing Herod. 6. 129: Ἐρων εἰχὼν

The confidence of the youth is shaken by these objections, but they are dis- missed by Socrates, who points out that argument should be met with argument and not with ridi- cule.
λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περί αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰςίν ἡ ὡς p. 162. οὐκ εἰςίν, ἔξωρω, καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀν ἀποδέχοντο ἀκούοντες, λέγεται ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰς μηδὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἐκατοσ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὅτου· 5 ὡς· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ᾿ ἣμιν τών λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρησθεῖ· δὲ εἰ ἔθελοι Θεόδωρος ἡ ἀλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἀξίως οὐδ᾿ ἐνὸς μόνου ἀν εἰη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σῦ τε καὶ Θεό-

ἀμφί μονοκαὶ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ οὐ
tὸ μέσον; Legg. 7. 817 C (the poets are addressed): Μή
dὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς ... ἐπιστέφειν ἡμᾶς
dημηγορεῖν ... πρὶν κρῶι τὰς ἀρ-
χὰς ἐτέρηται καὶ ἐπιτίθεται πε-
ποίησιν λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον εἰτὲ
μή. Here λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον is
not equivalent to δημηγορεῖν,
but means rather to ‘recite in
public.’ Cp. ib. 2. 664 C: Εἰς τὸ
μέσον φαίμενον. The passages
already quoted show that άγει
εἰς τὸ μέσον, meaning ‘to ad-
duce in illustration or argu-
ment,’ is quite Platonic. See
also Phil. 57 A: οὐ δ᾿ ἐνικα
tαύτα προπεργάμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον.
There is a slight expression of
violence in θεοὺς ... ἄγοντες,
‘dragging in the gods,’ which
suits the context well.

1. ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν[ Here, as 152 A, Protagoras'
opinion is quoted in his own
words. Diog. Laert. 9: Περὶ
θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδεῖναι, οὐθ᾿ ὡς εἰσίν
οὐθ᾿ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν. πολλά γὰρ τὰ
καλύπτει εἰδεῖναι, ἢ τε ἀδηλότης,
kai βραχὺν ἄν ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ ἀν-
θρώπου.]

2. ἔξωρω[ Rep. 6. 492 E: Θείων
μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παρομάν 
ἔξωρω-
μεν λόγον.

3. ἀπὸ τούτων δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην[ In
dealing with a metaphysical
theory it is not enough to have
shown its inconsistency with
common sense. It must be met
upon its own ground, and the
truth which it contains, as well
as the sources of falsehood,
clearly distinguished. This, and
not merely, as the Scholastic
says, that he may draw out
Theaetetus further, is Socrates’
motive in relinquishing the
ground he had taken in 151
C. This point of method
has two aspects, the Socratic
defiance of opinion and the
Sophistic contempt for ob-
vious facts. Gorg. 472 B:
‘Ἀλλὰ ἐγὼ σοι εἰς δὲν οὐκ ἄμολογώ
οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις.’
Soph. 293 E: Σεβ. φανέρος, δ᾿ Ἐθέ-
τητε, εἰ σοφιστήν οὐχ ἑρακλεῖ.
Θε. τι δὴ; Σεβ. δόξη σου μένει
῾η παπάσιν οὐκ ἔχει δηματι
... τὸ δ’ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐφράσθηεί
σε μόνον.

8. οὐθ᾿ ἐνὸς μόνου] Schol.: 'Εκ
tῆς τῶν κυβερνῶν συνηθείας ἔλαβε
tὸ οὐδένος μόνου, ὅταν ἐκεῖ πέτα ἐν
tῷ παῖξεν ἐν τῷ ἐξάγεσθαι.

(x) ‘Not worth an ace.’ Or,
if, as Wytenbach thought, the
phrase originated in the line
of Homer, II. 8. 234: Νῦν δ᾿
οὐθ᾿ ἔνος δεξίοι εἶμεν ἔκπορος, (2)
‘No better than a single man,’
whereas he is now ἐτέρων πολ-
lῶν ἀντάξιοι. Cp. Polit. 297
E: Τὸν ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον
THEAIHTOS.

p. 163. δωρος εἰ ἀποδέξησθε πιθανολογίας τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ
tούτων λεγομένους λόγους.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ὢν Σωκρατες, οὐτε σὺ
οὐτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἐοικεν, ὡς ὁ τε σὸς 5
καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρων λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἀλλη.

ΣΩ. Τὴδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε
καὶ αἰσθήσις ταύτην ἢ ἐτέρων' εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο που
πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ 10
καὶ ἄτοπα ταύτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ὁμολογημένοις, ἃ τῷ ὄραν αἰσθανό-
μεθα ἡ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταύτα ἀμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι;
οἷον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον 15
οὐ φήσομεν ἄκοιειν, ὅταν φθέγγωμαι, ἡ ἀκούειν τι
καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ ἂν γράμματα μὴ
ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέπωμεν εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὄραν, ἡ
ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπερ ὄρωμεν, δύσχυροιμέθα

ιατρών. See above, 143 D:
"Ἄξιος γὰρ ... γεωμετρίας ἐνεκα,
and below, 167 C: 'Ο σοφιστής
... ἄξιος πολλάν χρημάτων τοῖς
παιδεύσεωι. Bonitz questions
such a use of ἄξιος = (ἀντάξιοι),
and would read οὐδενός λόγου.

1. πιθανολογίας τε καὶ εἰκόσι]
The Bodleian reading in the
ancient hand. (Schanz doubts
of this, but the erasure of σ is
quite discernible.) Most MSS.
N. 1. 2 : Παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαί-
νεται μαθηματικότου πιθανολογοῦ-
tος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικοῦ ἀπο-
dεσθείς άπαιτει.

2. τούτων] Several MSS. have
τηλικούσων.

5. ὁ τε σὸς καὶ] Theατετας
has answered for both. See
above, οὐ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος.

9. ἢ ἐτέρων] πότερον Β.
10. τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα] The
novel doctrine of active and
passive motions, the reality of
dreams and phantasies, etc.

11. ἐκινήσαμεν] Rep. 5. 450
Δ: "Ὅσον λόγον πολέμιν, ὄσπερ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς, κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας !

13. Ἡ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] The argu-
ment is in brief as follows:
'If sensation is knowledge, we
can know and not know the
same thing; since (1) we have
perfect sensible perception of
things we do not know thoro-
roughly; and (2) we remember
(i.e. know) things which we do
not sensibly perceive.'
has never learned, does he know or not know what is said and written?

Allowing this to pass,

Can I be ignorant of what I remember?


We may naturally ask what objection Socrates would have raised, had he not feared to check Theetetus' growing intelligence. This may perhaps be gathered from below, where he ventures to puzzle him a little further, 165 D: 'ἰσος δ' ἡ, ὥθεν καὶ πλεῖον τὸν αὐτὸν' ἔπαθεν, κ.τ.λ. Socrates might have asked, Does everyone who sees the forms of the letters, or who hears the sounds, possess the sciences of them (γραμματική, μονουκή, 145 A)? Could he give an account, e.g. of the ὀψων and ὁπρωτες of what he hears? Cp. Rep. 7. 524 C: Μέγα μὴ καὶ δίφως καὶ συμφρόν έώρα, Δ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ναὶ συγκεκριμένον τί. Not even the objects of sense are known by sense, but by a higher faculty.

10. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο προσώπων, κ.τ.λ.] The implied metaphor is probably that of the wave. It is continued below, 172 B: Δόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς . . . ἐκ λόγου, μεῖζων ἐξ ἐλάττων, καταλαμβάνει: and is slightly varied, 177 C: Πλεῖον δὲ ἐπρέπετα καταχώσει ἡμῖν τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγων.

14. ἔντε έχοντα] The Bodl. MS. has ἐπέχοντα, for which error cp. Rep. 7. 532 B. H. Schmidt (as Schanz formerly) defends ἐπέχοντα, in the sense of 'main-
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 85

p. 163. τούτον καὶ σωζόμενου, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπί-
στασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅ μέμνηται. μακρολογῶ δὲ, ὡς
ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἑρέσθαι, εἰ μαθὼν τὶς τί μεμνη-
μένος μὴ οἴδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς, ὃ Σῶκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἄν εἶν ἵν 5
ὁ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δὲ. ἀρὰ τὸ ὅραν
οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὁμοίν αἰσθησιν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕγοιχε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ ἰδὼν τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν τὸ
ὁ εἴδε κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; μνῆμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὕδεν τὸ τινός;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δὴ ποι.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δὲν ἐμαθὲ καὶ δὲν ἤσθετο, τοιούτων
τινῶν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μῆν;
ΣΩ. ὃ δὴ εἴδε τἶς, μέμνηται ποι ἐνίστε;
ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται.
ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μῦσας; ἢ τοῦτο δρᾶσας ἐπελάθετο;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινῶν, ὃ Σῶκρατες, τοῦτο γε φάναι.

taining, ’keeping up,’ i.e. not allowing to fade. But τί ἐχοντα
is simpler, and is sufficiently supported by MS. authority.
5. τέρας γὰρ ἄν εἶν ὃ λέγεις]
‘The supposition is monstrous.’

Parm. 129 B: ἐκ μεν γὰρ αὐτὰ 
τὰ δρῶσιν τις ἀπέφασον ἀνόμων
γεγομένα η τα ἀνόμων δρῶσιν, τέρας
ἄν, οἷον, ἢτα. Phad. 101 B: alib.
The word τερατεύματα in Ar. Nub. 418
(with the verb τερατεύμα) is
connected with this use of τέρας.

13. τί δὲ;] So Bodl. first
hand, Vat. Ven. II. It seems
more appropriate in serious
argument than τί δαι, the com-
mon reading.

μῦσας] The particle brings
forward something hitherto lost
sight of, which may tend to
modify the foregoing statement.
We have hitherto dwelt on
αισθήσεις to the exclusion of
μῦσας, etc.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον. p. 164. εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγὼ, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἰκανῶς γε συννοῶ. ἄλλ' εἰπέ τῇ.

5 ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ ὁ μὲν ὀρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τοῦτον γέγονεν οὕτως ὁμών. ὃψις γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις καὶ ἐπι-

στήμη ταύτων ὄρμολογηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ γε ὀρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονός οὐ

10 ἔσται, εὰν μόνη, μέμνηται μέν, οὐχ ὁμώ 

ἡ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε οὐχ ὁμῶν ὁμῶς ἐπισταταὶ ἐστιν, εἴπερ δὲ 

καὶ τὸ ὁμῶ ἐπισταταῖ.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὐ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἐτὶ

μεμνημένον αὐτῶν μὴ ἐπιστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁμῶ 

τέρας ἐφαμεν ἄν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθεστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀνυμάτων δὴ τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται,

20 εάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταύτων φη ἔδω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐσοικὲν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρα ἐκάτερον φατέον.

1. εἰ σώσομεν] The use of

the optative is questioned, and

σώσομεν has been conjectured.

But see Riddell's Digest, § 77.

He observes that the time of the

infinitive after δεῖ (sc. τοῦτο

φάναι) is undefined. A simi-

larly doubtful optative occurs

in Polit. 268 D: Τοῦτο τοῖνοι

ἡμῖν ποιητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλομεν...

κατακόρυφον τοῦ λόγου. For the

sense cp. especially Phædo, 89

B: Ἐσοικὲν γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευ-

τήσθη, κ.τ.λ.

3. οὐ μὴν ἰκανῶς γε συννοῶ] 'But I do not quite com-

prehend why it is so.'


Ven. II. ὀρῶν, sc. ἐστὶν οὐ γέγονεν.

Compare the technical use of

αἰσθανόμενος, noticed above, 159

D, 160 A. Also 156 D: Ἐγένετο

οὐ τις ὄντες ἀλλ' ἀφρωδῆς ὀρῶν. See

also 160 D: Ἐπιστήμων... ὀντι

αἰσθητῆς.


264 A: Φαίνεται δὲ λέγομεν.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 164. ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ς. Τι οὖν δὴν ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη, πάλιν εὖς ἀρχῆς,
ως έουκε, λεκτέων. Καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ἡ Θεαι-
tττε, δράν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος πέρι;

ς. Φαινόμεθα μοι ἀλητροῦνος ἄγεννος δίκην,
πρὶν νενυκηκέναι, ἀποπηρήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου
ἀδεὶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

ς. Ἀντιλογικὸς εἰδικαμν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὅνο-
μάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνυμολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ
περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες
ἀγωνισται ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοί εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταῦτα
ἡ ἐκείνοι τοῖς δευνὸι ἀνδράσι πιστοῦτε.

2. παλύν] μὴ παλύν Bodl. (μή),
Vat. Ven. π. The Bodleian margin however says, ἐν ἔτορι
λείπει τὸ μή. Πο θορε were right,
the subjunctive η would be re-
quired to complete the sense.
7. ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Viz. the
theory of Protagoras, which we
have been trampling upon. Cp.
infr. E : Προταγάρικην.
5. 453 E, 454: ἡ γενναία, ἢν 6' ἐγώ, ὡ Γλαύκω, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντι-
λογικῆς τέχνης. Τι δή ; ὡς, εἰσοφω,
δοκοῦσι μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκούτε
πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἴσθαι οὐκ
ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγοντε, διὰ τὸ μὴ
dύνασθαι κατ' εἴδη διαφοροῦντες τὸ
λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ'
αὐτὸ τὸ διόρα διώκον τοὺς λεγόντως
tῆς ἐπανάστασιν, ἔριδον, οὐ δια-
λέκτο, πρὸς ἀλλήλοις χρηματίζον.
Lys. 216 A: Καὶ ἦμι εἰσοφω
ἀσμονοὶ ἐπισκότησαν οὕτοι οἱ
πάνοιοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ, καὶ
ἐρίζοντος εἰ οὐκ ἐπανατίθονταν ἐξήβρα
φιλία; The tendencies of 'Ἀντι-
λογική are, first, to argue from
contradictions of language, lead-
ing in the last resort to scepti-
cicism. Phed. 90 B: Καὶ μά-
λιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς
λόγους διαφόρα φανεῖται αὐτῇ ὅτι τε-
λευτώσωσ οὖνται σοφότατοι γεγο-
νέναι τε καὶ κατανενηκέναι ὅτι τῶν
πραγμάτων οὐδένος οὔδεν τε ἔγνων,
οὔ δὲ βέβαιον οὐθεν τῶν λόγων. Second-
ly, to confuse ideas or principles
with facts or results. Πρ. τοι Ἔ:
Ἀμα δὲ οὐ δυνόμας ὁσσι oἱ
ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τῆς ἐρωτή-
σαμεν καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἑκείνης ὑμη-
μένων, ἐπερ βούλους τὶ τῶν ὄντων
εἰρεῖν.

πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὅμολομάτων ὁμολο-
γίας] 'With a view to mere
verbai consistency.' The whole
fallacy of such formal reasoning
is elaborately exposed in the
Sophist.
154 D: ὅπως εἰ μὲν δευνοὶ καὶ
σοφοί, κ.τ.λ., echoed in ἐκείνως
toὶς δευνοὶ ἀνδρασι, below.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ γε δὴ νοῦ. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθῶν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἱδόντα καὶ μύσαντα με- 5 μνημένον, ὀρῶντα δὲ οὐ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἀμα μεμνημένον· τούτῳ δὲ ἦναι ἀδύ- νατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μύθος ἀπόλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σῶς ἄμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταυτὸν ἔστων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὗ τι ἄν, ὁμια, ὁ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἐξή, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἄν ἠμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ὁ ἐπίτροπος οὐσ Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐγέ- 15 λυσίν, ὃν Θεοδώρος ἔδει. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυ- νεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῶ βοηθεῖν.

ΘEO. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἑκείνου ἐπίτροπος· ἡμεῖς p. 165.


11. εἴπερ ὁ πατήρ] See the passage of the Phaedrus already quoted, 275 E: Πλημμελωμένος δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκει λοιπορη- 


11. εἴπερ ὁ πατήρ] See the passage of the Phaedrus already quoted, 275 E: Πλημμελωμένος δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκει λοιπορη-θείς τοῦ πατρός ἀν δείται βοηθοῦ,
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 165. δέ πως θάττουν ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεω-
μετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι [σοι] ἔξομεν,
εὰν αὐτῷ βοηθῆς.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τὴν
γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἂν τις
ἀμολογήσει μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τῶν νοῶν, ἤ
τὸ πολὺ εἰδίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ
λέγω ὑπὲρ, ἢ Θεατήτῳ;

when he came to Athens. Apol. 20 C: 'Ανδρί, ἃς τετελεκεχ χρήματα
σοφίσται πλείω ἢ ἐξομπαντες οἱ
Ἀλλοί, Καλλίς τῷ Ἰπποκάουν. Prot.
5. It hardly need to be observed
that ἐπίτροποι, like ὀρφανοί, is
used figuratively, with reference
to doctrines.

1. ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων
'From the abstractions of
dialectic.' We are accustomed to
speak of Geometry as a purely
abstract science, but see Arist.
Met. i. 2: Αἱ γὰρ ἔξ ἐλαττῶνων
ἀκριβεστερα τῶν ἐκ προσβέσεως
λογομονών, οίνα ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμε-
τρίας. The expression ψιλοῖς
λόγων is used differently in
Symp. 215 C: ψιλοῖς λόγωι
ἀνω ὀργών, but cp. Phædr.
262 C: Νῦν γὰρ ψιλὸς ποι λέ-
γομεν οὐκ ἔχοντες ικανα παραδειγ-
ματα. Antithenes is said to
have called the Ideas of Plato
ψιλαῖς ἐννοιαί. For λόγοι = δια-
λεκτικὴ cp. Phæd. 99 E: 'Ενδοθε
ἡ μοι χρήσιν εἰς τοὺς λόγους κατα-
φυγώντα ἐν ἐκεῖνω σκοτειν τὴν
ἀρδείαν. See also Arist. de
An. i. 1, where a distinction
is drawn between ψιλοσοφος,
μαθηματικὸς, and φυσικὸς.

2. μέντοι οὐ is omitted in
Bod. Vat. Ven. π. Although
retained in the text by Schanz,
it is not necessary to the sense.

If retained, it should be accent-
ed, as H. Schmidt observes.

έξομεν Theodorus speaks on
behalf of the ἐπίτροποι Πρω-
ταγόρου.

4. τὴν γ' ἐμὴ'] Cp. infr. 168 B:
Καί ἐμὴ δύναμιν, and, for the
'modest' use of γ', Crat. 44 E,
Rep. i. 329 A: Ὅλου γέμοισαντοι.

6. μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τῶν
νοῶν, ἤ τὸ πολὺ εἰδίσμεθα] By
freeing ourselves from the ha-
britual oppositions of words, we
are sometimes reconciled to
what at first appears a pure con-
tradiction. Spinoza (Cog. Met. 1.)
shows a still loftier indifference
to common language: 'At vero
si rem accuratius examinare
velemus, possemus forte ostend-
dere Deum non nisi improprae
unum et unicum vocari; sed
res non est tanti imo nullius
momenti iis qui de rebus non
vero de nominibus sunt solli-
citi.' Many of the difficulties
in Greek philosophy arose, as
Plato himself points out in the
Sophist, from the too great
stress laid upon logical alter-
natives; while the complexity
and variety of things as they
exist was lost sight of.

ἡ τὸ πολὺ εἰδίσμεθα] 'Accord-
ing to our common mode
of affirming and denying;' viz.
with a view to words.
THEO. Eis to kouvon men onv, apokrinestow de o p. 165. nevteros: sphaleis gar ypton aikhmonisai.

ΣΩ. Légoi de to deinostaton érwtima. Óste de oimai touvde ti, úra oivn te tov autov eidoa ti tê touto o oide mi eidevai;

THEO. Ti de oivn apokrinoumeba, ò Theaítete;

THEAI. 'Adúnatôn pou, oimai exagwge.

ΣΩ. Ouk, ei to orán ge épistassai théseis. Ti gar chrísei afíktov érwtímati, to leGRómenon en phrastai sunechómevo, onan érwtai anekplhtos ánhr, katalabovn ti xeiropi sou tov étener orbálwv, ei orás to imátov to kateilhmiménov;

THEAI. Oú phísow, oimai, touto ge, to méntov étérop.

ΣΩ. Oukoun orás te kai oux orás áma taiton;

THEAI. Oútw gé pow.

ΣΩ. Oúdev égô, fístei, touto oute tâttov ou târmyn, to ópws, állei ei, o épistassai, touto kai ouk


4. Æra oivn te tov autov eidoa ti . . . mi eidevai] This (Megarian) question lies at the root of most of the aporiai which follow.


en phrásai sunechómevoi 'Caught in a pit,' i.e., unable to stir hand or foot.

11. katalabovn ... tov ... orbálwv ... ei orósi to imátov] The fallacy called éygekaluménon (‘obvelatus’), which has been called the invention of Eubulides, seems to be here anticipated.


For the sense cp. Supr. 158 E: Mh upolázoverei ti men taiton einai, k.t.l. Cp. Euthyd. 295 E: Póteron epistassai to ò epistassai, h ou; 'Exwge, efh, ti ge xwrih. Oútos all, efh, prosoekázhmeta tois erwtwmov. ou gar éxwge érwtov òtw, all' ei epistassai to, k.t.l.

For the intentional abruptness of the expression (‘None of that! I never asked you for it’) cp. Phil. 28 E: Oúdev tov autov.

tou to òpws] touto, although presently explained by to òpws, is in the first instance pronominal for oútow ge pow.
p. 165. ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δ' ὁ οὐχ ὀρᾶς, ὀρῶν φαίνει. ὦμολογεῖται δὲ τυγχάνει τὸ ὀρᾶν ἐπίστασαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρᾶν μὴ ἐπίστασαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζον τί σοι συμβαίνει.

D  THEAI. 'Ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τάναντια ὦς ὑπε-5 θέμην.

ΣΩ. 'Ἰσως δὲ γ', ὁ θαυμάσας, πλεῖω ἂν τοιαύτ' ἔπαθες, ἐτ' ἂ σε προσηρήτα ἐπίστασαι ἐστι μὲν ὦξυ, ἐστὶ δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μὴ, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἥρμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἀλλὰ μυρία, ὁ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνήρ μυσθόφορος ἐν λόγοις ἔρμενος, ἣν' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθήσεως ταῦταν ἔθους, ἐμβαλῶν ἄν εἰσ τὸ ἄκοιν καὶ ὀσφαίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἥλεγχεν ἄν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἄνεις, πρὸν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν 15

7. ὁ θαυμάσας. Such addresses interposed give a tone of increased earnestness, expressing the interest of Socrates in what he is about to say.

9. ὀξύ... ἀμβλύ. These terms are properly applicable to vision.

ἐγγύθεν μὲν... πόρρωθεν δὲ μὴ. This probably refers to the sense of smell, cp. τὸ ὀσφαίνεσθαι below, perhaps also to taste and touch (so H. Schmidt).

Or ἐγγύθεν... τὸ αὐτὸ may refer to all the senses except sight.

10. σφόδρα καὶ ἥρμα τὸ αὐτό. 'To know the same thing strongly and feebly.' E.g. τὸ ψυγρύς,—152 B: 'Ρυγοί... δὲ μὲν ἥρμα, δὲ σφόδρα; but the reference here is probably to sound, cp. τὸ ἄκοιν below. (H. Schmidt takes τὸ αὐτὸ adverbially, 'stark und leise ebenso' but cp. infr. 166 B.) Aristotle does not feel the difficulty.

Met. 6. 1029 b: 'Τὰ δ' ἐκάστους γνώριμα καὶ πρώτα πολλάκις ἥρμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα.

καὶ ἀλλὰ μυρία] Cp. Phil. 14

D: Βαρνὴν καὶ κούφον τὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἀλλὰ μυρία.

11. ἃ An accusative depending chiefly on ἔρμενος, but vaguely also on all that follows.

μυσθόφορος εἰς λόγοις] 'A logical mercenary.' μυσθόφορος is aimed at the Sophist's fee.

13. ἐμβαλὼν] 'Making his assault.'


3. 411 B: 'Ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνὴρ ἀλλὰ κηλῆ. 'Keeping up the attack.' Cp. Odyssey. 19. 71: 'Τί μοι διδ' ἐπέχεις ἐκείνης θυμῷ; 15. πολυάρατον] Buttmann conjectures πολύκροτον, 'cunning,' which occurs as a v.l. for πολύτροτον in the first line of the Odyssey. Heind. conjectures πολυπρότον, but adds, 'ne hoc
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ξυνεποδιοθήσει ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὗ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενός τε π. 165. καὶ ξυνόθεος ἦδη ἀν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὅσων σοĩ τε κάκεινῷ ἐδόκει. Τίν' οὖν δὴ ὁ Προταγόρας, φαῖνς ἂν ἰσοσ, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἔρει; 5 ἄλλο τι πειρόμεθα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ταύτα τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, ὦμαι, χωρήσεται, κατὰ-φρονών ἡμῶν καὶ λέγον, Οὔτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ 10 χρυσός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθέν ἐδείσεν, εἰ

3. He would say quidem satisfacit.’ In Ven.Π. both σίσ are written over en- sures. πολυάρης occurs twice in the Odyssey, 6. 280; 19. 324: ‘Ονομαί δει τε θείς | πατός παιδί φίλορ; πολυάρης δε τοι ἐστίν. Protagoras seems to have affected certain rhetorical expressions, and he or some other Sophist perhaps may have used this word. See Phedr. 267 D; Ὀρθότεις, etc. Stallbaum quotes Themist. Orat. 22. 324. 19 ed. Dindorf.: Τὸν πολυάρητον πλοῦτον τι να καὶ λέγομεν ὅποιοι ἀγανοθέντες πολέμων ἐστίν. For the sense cp. Euthyd. 272 B: Ὁς σοφίας Ἥσ ἔγον εὐθυμῶ, τῆς ἐρυμενής. Ιβ. 273 E: Eι δὲ νων ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχετον, ἵπερ εἶστον. ἄτεχνος γὰρ ἔγονεν σφῶ δοτερ θεῖο προπαγορεῦσι. Ιβ. 296 D: Ἀλλὰ βούλθείπτης, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δε πολυτίμητο καθώμημα. Ιβ. 301 B: Ἡδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἄνδροις τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρον μεμείσας, ἄτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτής.

2. χρημάτων...ἔδοξεν] Protag. 328 B: Καὶ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μυστοῦ τοιαύτου πε- ποίημα, ἐπειδήν γὰρ τε ἡ τοι ἔμοι μάθη, ἐκεῖν, μὲν βούληται, ἄπο- δείκτην ἦ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύρων'

3. τε] Bodl. ye, which Wohlrab defends.

7. Ταύτα τε πάντα] From 162 D onwards.

8. ὁμόσε...χωρήσεται] ‘He will grapple with us.’ There is a change of construction similar to that in supr. 149 D: Καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰ δυστοκοῦσα, καὶ...ἀμβλύσκοις. Protagoras is first imagined as pushing his adversary ‘over a precipice,’ by stating the Eristic objection to his doctrine in an extravagant form, and then as turning from arguments to facts, and showing the bearing of his theory not on truth and falsehood, but on (relative) good and evil.

10. χρυσός] Here almost = εὐχερής, ‘Good easy man!’ ἐπειδὴ αὐτὴ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘When he had found a child who was terrified by the question,’ etc. For the dative cp. Rep. 1. 343 A: ὃς γε αὐτῆ...γιγνώσκεται.

παιδίον] Cp. infr. 168 D, where the same exaggeration is used.

3. τὸν ἐμὲ] The use of the article has a humorously pathetic rather than a pompous effect.

4. ὁ ὀρθῶςτατοί σώκρατες] 'Slovenly Socrates!'

7. εἰ δὲ ἄλλοια] Sc. ἀποκρυμένος σφάλεται. The former case, ἐὰν σφάληται, was contingent. This is present fact. For the sense cp. Charm. 162 C D.

8. αὐτίκα] 'To begin with.'

9. τοιοῦτον τι οὐδ' ἐπί 

3. that he is not refuted, because not fairly represented by you. He would urge that memory is far less vivid than sensation. And, while not fearing to admit that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, he would assert that the man knowing is different from the
οὐχί τούς, καὶ τούτους γεγυμνόνους ἀπείρους, εάντερ p. 166. ἄνωμοις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὄνομάτων γε δέχεται θη- ρεύσεις διευλαβήσθαι ἄλληλον; ἀλλ' ὁ μακάρις, φήσει, γενναστέρος ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὁ λέγω, εἰ δύνα- σαι, ἐξελεγξόν ὡς οὐχί ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστοτε ἥμων γίγνονται, ἦ ὁς ἴδιων γεγυμνέων οὐδὲν τι ἂν μάλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνον ἐκεῖνο γίγνοντο, ἦ εἰ ἐκεῖνον ἰδεῖ ὄνομαζεν, εὖ, ὃπερ φαίνεται. ὃς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκε- ψάλους λέγον οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑπείς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγραμμάτα μον ἀνα- πείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἔγω γὰρ φημὶ μὲν τὴν ἀλλήλων ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφαι· μέτρον γὰρ ἐκαστον ἧμῶν εἶναι τὸν τε ὄντων καὶ μὴ· μυρίοι μὲν τοιαὶ δια- φέρειν ἔτερον ἐτέρου αὐτοῦ τούτω, ὅτι τῶ μὲν ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἀλλὰ. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφῶν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δεό τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφὸν, ὃς ἂν τινα ἧμων ὃ φαίνεται καὶ ἐστὶ κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθά φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐ μὴ τῷ ῥή-

Compare a strange fancy of Comte’s, Catéchisme Posit. p. 2: ‘For each man differs from himself successively as much as he differs simultaneously from other men.’

1. καὶ τούτους γεγυμνόνους ἀπείρους] ‘Which become multiplied to infinity, if only alteration take place.’

2. ἄνωμοις γίγνηται, the reading of Bodl. Vat., admits of a possible rendering. ’If only the man become in a different way.’ i.e. when he is the subject of a different process. But the reading in the text (that of T and other MSS.) is probably right.

3. ὁ μακάρις] ‘By all that is sincere.’ Protagoras is supposed here to appeal to Socrates as an ingenuous, single-minded person. In other cases ὁ μακάρις conveys a hint of ἐκήθεα (‘Bless your simple heart!’), Phaedr. 236 D.

4. γενναστέρος] ‘In a nobler spirit,’ viz. than that of mere verbal dispute.

5. ἄνωμοίζειν] Supr. 160 B.

6. τῷ ῥήματι] ‘In a verbal
1. [μου] To be taken with λόγον.
3. φαίνεται ... καὶ ἐστὶ ... ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται] What is to be taken with λόγον. The word has here its proper vernacular meaning 'to accuse,' although this is inapplicable to the succeeding clauses, where a more general notion has to be supplied.
8. μεταβλητῶν ... ἔξις] This 'practical' view of education is in close accordance with that which Plato attributes to Protagoras in the dialogue which bears his name. See esp. 328 A: ἀλλὰ κἂν εἴ ἄλλιον ἔστι τις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσας εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἄγαπην.
συγγενή ἐαυτῆς χρηστή ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἔτερα τοι— p. 167. αὕτα, ἄ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ ἔργον. ὁ δὲ τοῦ πινίου ψυχρὸν ἡ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν.

Supr. 152 B: Πίθαρον . . . ἐφ’ ἐαυτὸ τὸ πινίου ψυχρὸν ἡ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν.

doxázontas is preferable as the reading of the best MS., as the harder reading, because the change to doxázontas was so easy with the same word occurring a few lines above. For the change from the singular ταῦτα to the indefinite plural cp. Rep. 1.344 B: Ἐπιθᾶν δὲ τις . . . αὐτῶς . . . δουλεύεται . . . ἀντὶ τοῦτον τῶν αἰχμῶν ὀνομάτων . . . μακάριοι κέκληται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, δοσι δὲ πυθοῦνται αὐτῶν τὴν ἐλην ἀδικίαν ἢδικηκότα: et passim.

‘For it is not to be supposed that anybody ever makes one who thinks falsely afterwards think truly. For it is impossible either to think what is not, or to think anything beyond the present impression, which is always real. But, I suppose, whereas men through having an inferior mind entertain thoughts of a kindred nature, a good mind causes them to have good thoughts, those, namely, which men in ignorance call true.’

If any change of reading were required, the most probable would be the transposition of ἐγιγνή ἐαυτής and ἔτερα τοιαῦτα, —πονάσα ψυχής ἐξει δοξάζοντας ἔτερα τοιαῦτα χρηστῆ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι συγγενή ἐαυτῆς.

1. χρηστῆ] Sc. ψυχή.

έτερα τοιαῦτα] Sc. χρήστα.

‘Whereas inferior minds have opinions kindred to themselves, a superior mind creates in them opinions which resemble it.’

2. φαντάσματα] This word here
ΦΕΙΔΙΤΙΣ.

Πρότασε τα πρώτα δέρα της. Αυτοί οι λόγοι, δόξας, να δεις. Και η καμίνια, όπως με τους άνθρωπους, μας χρησιμοποιείς, οι οποίοι 6

> Θα πρέπει να παρατηρείς πως οι λόγοι που έχεις δηλώσει αυτοί οι συντρόφοι μας, σε αυτούς και τους άλλους, έχουν σημασία. Συνεχίζει και η καμίνια έχει σημασία. Παρατηρώ ότι οι άνθρωποι αυτοί έχουν δηλώσει τις δικές τους δικαιοσύνες και τις δικές τους καταλογίζονται, αλλά η καμίνια τους είναι ένας από τους συντρόφους μας. Οι πρώτοι αυτοί λόγοι πρέπει να παρατηρείς.
παραθέτω αἱ ληθεῖς ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφοὺς τε καὶ ρ. 167. ἀγαθοῖς ἥτοροις ταῖσ πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν ποιηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἔτει ὅλα γ᾽ ἂν ἐκάστη θηλεί δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι 5 αὐτῷ, ἔσω ἄν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἀλλ᾽ ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ ποιηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευμένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφὸς τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδεύ- 10 θεῖσι· καὶ οὕτω σοφιστέροι τε εἰσὶν ἔτεροι ἔτεροι καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδὴ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, ἐάν τε βούλῃ εάν τε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὅμοι μετρητῇ σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος ἀρτιώς· ὅσῳ εἰ μὲν ἐχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβητεὶς, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξέλθων, εἰ δὲ δὶ ἐρωτήσεων 15 βούλει, δὲ ἐρωτήσεων. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἐχοντι. ποιεῖ μέντοι οὕτωσί· μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτών. καὶ γὰρ ἐν πολλῇ ἀλογίᾳ ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλὰ ἡ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν· ἀδικεῖν δ᾽ ἐστὶν

and the latter has no advantage in point of truth.

2. ταῖσ πόλεσι] A further step is thus made in advance. Having already (supr. 157 D) included the good and noble amongst the things of which each man is judge for himself, it is natural to apply the same theory to the State, and to law and justice. It is on this point that the dialectic of Socrates afterwards lays hold:—infr.

172 A., 177 C.

3. εἶναι has been needlessly suspected.

9. ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων] Prot. 328 B.

12. ἐν τούτοις] ‘Through the instances herein adduced.’

14. λόγοι ἀντιδιεξέλθων, κ.τ.λ.] Protagoras himself is represented as master of both styles (Prot. 329 B: ἵκανος μὲν μακρὸν λόγους . . . εἰπεῖν . . . ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀπαρκίνασθαι κατὰ βραχύν), and in the Phaedrus Socrates himself adopts both, of course to the implied disadvantage of the rhetorical. See also Gorg. 449 B C, Soph. 217 C: Πό- τερον εἶσθαι μακρὰ ἐναὶ διεξεῖν . . . δὲ δὶ ἐρωτήσεων; εἰ δὲ δὲ ἐρωτήσεων βούλει] Sc. διεξέλθειν. Protagoras is supposed to add this out of compliance with Socrates’ humour. μὲν in the preceding clause really looks forward to ποιεῖ μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.
ΘΕΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 167. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τίς μὴ χωρίς μὲν ως ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιήσας, χωρίς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ πάγιῳ τε καὶ σφάλλη καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ εἶναι εὐδικνύμενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς υφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ καὶ

p. 168. τῶν προτέρων συνονυσίων παρεκκλείσατο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ ὁποῖας ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἄλλα οὐ σέ, καὶ σε μὲν διάξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισῆ- 10 σουσι, καὶ φεύξονται αὕτῃ ε ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ὅλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγός τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἦσαν· ἐὰν δὲ τάναντα τούτων δρᾶς ὀστερὸι οἱ πολλοὶ, τάναντα ἐξεμβηστέατο σοι καὶ τῶν ἐξυνόντας ἀντὶ φιλο- βόσφοφοι μυσόντας τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπει- 15 δὰν πρεσβύτεροι γένονται. ἡν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθη, δὲ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρεθή, οὐ δυσμενῶς οἰδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἄλλα

1. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] Sc. ἐν τῷ ἑρωτώτῳ, ἐν λόγοις, supr. 'To play false in this particular game.'
Cp.infr. 187 D: 'Εν τοῖς τοιούτοις.
207 E: 'Εν τῷ τοιούτῳ καρφ. Ast and others take τοιούτῳ of what follows: 'There is false play in such a case as this, viz. when,' etc. This is also possible, but the context points the other way. The whole passage contains a covert censure of the eristic method which has pervaded the argument hitherto.
Cp. Rep. 6. 487 B, where perhaps Socrates himself is gently criticized: 'Ὑπούνται ὡς τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἐκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὰ παραγόμενοι, ὡς τελευτής τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρῶτοι ἀναιρεύεσθαι.

5. ἐκεῖνα . . τὰ σφάλματα]
'Those slips and deviations which are due to himself and to the company he has previously kept.' παρασκούν (to deflect) is said to have been a wrestler's term. The language recalls supr.
150 E: Διὰ πονηρῶν ἐξυνοσίαν.
11. ὃ ἀλλοι . . ἦσαν] Protagogoras here applies his theory.
Supr. 166 B.
15. μυσόντας τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα]
Viz. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, i.e. μυσόλογοι γεγονόσας. See the remarkable passage in the Phaedo on this subject, 89, 90; where a parallel is drawn between the growth of misanthropy and scepticism.
16. δ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρέθη] Viz.
supr. 166 C: Γενναυατέρως ἐπʼ αὐτῷ ἐλάθω δ λέγω.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΟ. Παίξεις, ο Σώκρατες πάνυ γὰρ νεανίκως τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὁ ἑταῖρε. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· ἐνενόησάς 15 ποὺ λέγοντος ἀρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος ἥμιν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμεν τῷ τοῦ διὰ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἄγωνιομέθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαρι-

1. ἡλψ τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τι ποτε p. 168. λέγομεν, κινεῖσαί τε ἀποφαίνομεν τὰ πάντα τὸ τε δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ ἔχων ἰδιότητι τε καὶ πόλει. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει εἰτε ταὐτόν εἰτε καὶ ἄλλο

5 ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ’ οὐχ, ὡσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ συνηθείας ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, αἱ οἱ πολλαὶ ὅτι ἀν τύχωσιν ἔλκουσε ἀπορίας ἄλληλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχοντοι. Ταῦτα, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἑταῖρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν τῆς ἐποιήσεως καὶ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, συμκρὰ

10 ἀπὸ συμκρῶν· εἰ δ’ αὐτὸς ἐξή, μεγαλειότερον ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

100
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 101

p. 168. εντισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἢμᾶς διεκλείσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὁ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείδεσθαι αὐτῷ;
ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλην σοῦ παϊδία ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ εὑρωτώντας τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὲνα μή τοι τοῦτό γὰρ ἔχει ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παῖζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὖ τούτον τὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δ'; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πάγωνας ἐχόντων ἀμεινὼν ἣν ἐπακολουθήσεις λόγῳ διερευνομένῳ;
ΣΩ. Ἄλλα ὦ τι σοῦ γε, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ἀμεινὼν. μὴ οὖν οἴου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἑπάρφ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν p. 169. παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαρμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ' ἢδε, ὦ ἀριστε, ὄλγων ἐπίστοι, μέχρι τούτον αὐτοῦ ἑως ἃν εἰδῶμεν, ἵπτ' ἁρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων περὶ μέτρον 20

'Giving a bad name of "quibbling" to our argument and exalting the respect due to his maxim, he bade us be in earnest when we are dealing with his theory.' For τὸ πάντων μέτρον cp. Phil. 20 B: τὸ . . . εἶ βούλει. The sentence continues as if ἐνενόησας ὦτι had preceded. For χαρακτισμὸν cp. supr. 167 E, and for ἀποσεμύνων 166 C. τοῦ (which Schanz omits with pr. T.) adds a touch of humorous earnestness to the request of Socrates. 7. τάδε πάντα] Viz. These- tetus, the younger Socrates, and their companions. Supr. 144 C, 146 B.

11. αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον] Coisl. p. m. Αὐτοῦ τὸ λόγον. The Bodl. p. m. had αὐτοῦ τὸν τὸν λόγον. Cp. 166 D: Τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτῷ μή τῷ ἤματι μου διάκε. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, if correct, refers to the fresh arguments which Protagoras had assumed in his defence, and the discussion founded on them.
13. σὲ δὲ μηδενί] The pronoun is simply used to strengthen the negative. Cp. Soph. Εδ. Τύρ. 1019: Καὶ πῶς ὁ φύσις εἴ ἢσον τῷ μηδενί; 20. διαγραμμάτων . . . ἀπρονομία] Note the variety, and cp. supr. 147 A B.
εἰναι, εἰτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοι ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς τε τῆς ἁπτομεμεῖλον καὶ τάλλα δῶν δή σοι πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ, ὡς ὁμολογεῖτε, ἔτι παρακαθήμενον
5 μη διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἢ υἱὸν παρελήφη σφάσκον σε ἐπιτρέψεως μοι μη ἀποδύσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἀναγκάζειν καθάπερ Λακεδαμώνων, σοὶ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν
Σκύρρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακεδαμώνων μὲν γὰρ 
ἀπείναι ἢ ἀποδύσθαι κελεύονσι, σοὶ δὲ καὶ
τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δράμα δρᾶν. τὸν γὰρ προσ-
σεθόντα οὐκ ἀνήκει πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις προσπαλαίσαί.

ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γε, ὡς Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπεί-
κασάς: ἰσχυρικότερος μὲντοι ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνοι. μυρίοι
15 γὰρ ἦδη μοι Ἡρακλείς τε καὶ Ἐσθοῖς ἐνυγχά-

2. αἰτίαν ἔχεις] ‘You are re-
puted.’ Rep. 4. 435 E: Οὐ δὲ καὶ
ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν αἰτίαν (τοῦ θυ-
μοειδεῖας εἶναι), Gorg. 503 B. Cp.
the use of αἰτίαμαι in Rep. 10.
599 E, 4. 435 E.
8. τείνειν] Cp. Phaed. 65 A:
'Εγγύς τι τείνει τοῦ τεθνάσας.
'You come nearer to the an-
alogy of Sciron.'
9. καί Ἀρταῖον] The allusion
to the Lacedæmonian custom
(supr. 162 B) is repeated, but,
as usual, with fresh imagery,
and additional point. The
Lacedæmonians tell one to
strip or go away. But you,
like Sciron, strip all you meet
with, and, like Antæus, force
them to wrestle with you. H.
Schmidt needlessly suspects
καί Ἀρταῖον. There is a slight
inversion for the sake of em-
phasis. The natural order
would be μᾶλλον τι καί Ἀρταῖον.
10. τὸ δράμα δρᾶν] (1) ‘To go
about your work.’ Or (2) ‘To
perform your part.’ Cp. supr.
150 A: ‘ἐλαττόν δὲ τοῦ ἔμοι
δράματος, and note.
11. πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃ] Schanz,
following Heindorf, thinks it
necessary to read πρὶν ἀν. ἀν
might of course easily fall out
before ἀναγκάσῃς. But its omiss-
ion may be defended on the
ground that ἀνήκει contains a
general statement.
ἀποδύσας] ‘Having stripped
him of every pretext.’
13. For νόσον Heindorf aptly
compares Phædr. 228 B: Τῷ 
νοσοῦτί περὶ λόγων ἠχοῦν.
14. ἰσχυρικότερος μέντοι ἐγὼ
ἐκεῖνοι] ‘But I have more of
the athlete in me than they
had;’ (ἰσχυρικός = 'given to
trials of strength.'
15. Ἡρακλείς τε καὶ Ἐσθοῖς]
Winkelmann (Fr. Antisthenes)
suspects an allusion to Antis-
thenes here. But the Scholiast
\section*{ΘΕΙΤΗΣ.}

p. 169. \textit{νοντες καρπηροι προς το λέγειν μάλ' ε\' ἕγγυεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι. οὔτως τις ἔρως \c{d}εινὸς ἐνδεδυκε τῆς περὶ ταύτα γνωμασίας. μὴ οὖν μυδε \συ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτὸν τε ἀμα καὶ ἐμε ὑνήσαι.}

\section*{ΘΕΟ.} \textit{Οὐδέν ἐτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἀγε ὅπη ἔθελες· πάντως την περὶ ταύτα εἰμαρμένην, ἦν [ἐν] συ ἐπικλώσης, δεὶ ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὧν προτίθεσαι οὓς τ' ἔσομαι παρασχείν ἐμαυτὸν σοι.}

\section*{ΣΩ.} \textit{Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καὶ μοι πάνω το} \textit{τίρει το τοιοῦτο, μη} \textit{πον παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν ἔδος των λόγων ποιούμενοι, καὶ τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτό ὑνείδιση.}

\section*{ΘΕΟ.} \textit{Ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαι γε καθ' ὃσον ἂν ὑπομοι.}

\section*{ΣΩ.} \textit{Τοῦδε τοῖνυν πρὸς τὸν πάλιν ἀντιλαβόμεθα}

is probably nearer the mark:

1. \textit{καρπηροι πρὸς τὸ λέγειν }'Men of valour in the art of controversy.'

2. \textit{οὐτω} \textit{τις ἔρως} \textit{δεινὸς ἐνδεδυκε} \textit{Sc. με implied in} \textit{εγὼ} \textit{supr. It is left doubtful whether} \textit{οὐτω} \textit{is to be joined with} \textit{δεινὸς} \textit{or} \textit{ἐνδεδυκεν. 'So strong a passion for this kind of exercise has taken possession of me.' It is not forgotten that Socrates says this at the close of his career. For} \textit{ἐνδεδυκε} \textit{cp. Phaed. 89 D:} \textit{Ἡ τε γὰρ μασυνθρωπια ἐνδύεται.}

3. \textit{δεινὸς} \textit{For the inversion (=οὐτω δεινὸς τις ἔρως) cp. Rep. 3. 391 D, 6. 500 A.}

4. \textit{προσανατριψάμενος} \textit{Giving me a grip,' 'trying one fall with me.'}

5. \textit{ἄλλ} \textit{ἀγε] The Bodl. has} \textit{ἄλλα λέγει. See above 162 D:} \textit{Eis τὸ μέσον ἄγωντες, and note.} \textit{ἀγε} \textit{is more vivid and in better agreement with the image which follows. Hermann's objection is well answered by H. Schmidt.}

6. \textit{[ἀν]} \textit{ἄν has weak MS. authority. Cp. supr. B: Πρίν, κ. τ. λ. and note.}

7. \textit{[ἐν] προτίθεσαι} \textit{Viz. διαγραμμάτων πείρα, supr. A.}

8. \textit{λάθωμεν]} \textit{Cp. supr. 164 C: Λαθάνωμεν ταΐτα γ. ποιούμενες. There is exquisite humour in Socrates' warning Theodoras against being sportive in argument.}

9. \textit{τις]} \textit{Somebody; i.e. Protagoras.}

10. \textit{ἀντιλαβόμεθα} \textit{'Let us at-}
παλατώνος

οὕτερ τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ ἰδωμεν, ὅρθως ἡ οὐκ ὅρθως p. 169. ἐδυσχεραίνωμεν ἐπιτιμῶμες τὸ λόγον, ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἔκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῶν ἔννεφον σεν Πρωταγόρας περὶ τοῦ ἀμείνον καὶ χείρων δια-5 φέρειν τινάς, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ εἴναι σοφόν. οὐχὶ; τὸ ὑ.

ΘΕΟ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν αὐτὸς παρὸν ὄμολογει, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡμεῖς βοηθοῦμεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἐν ἀν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσαί νῦν 10 δὲ τάς ἀν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκόρους τιθεί τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὀμολογίας. διὸ καλλίων ἐχει σαφέστερον περὶ τοῦν αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασαί. οὐ γὰρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχου ᾧ ἀλλῶς.

ΘΕΟ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν δι' ἀλλῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ὅσ διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τῆν ὀμολογίαν. p. 170.

tack the question from the same point as before.' Cp. Rep. 8.544
Β: Πάλιν... ὅπερ παλατών ὑπὶ αὐτὴν λαβήν πάρεξεν.
D: Οὐκ δὲ πάντας, κ.τ.λ. καὶ καὶ ξυνεχωρήσας ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. (Others, with Heindorf, 'and whether Protagoras was right in admitting.') In conceding for Protagoras that some men are wise, we went beyond his own words. We must try to prove it out of his own mouth. He says, What appears to each man, is to him. Now it certainly appears to every man that some are wiser than himself, and some less wise; that some think truly, others falsely. Therefore, whether Protagoras be right or wrong, it is the case that some think truly, and some falsely.
11. καλλίων έχει] 'It would seem the less exceptionable course.' The rare form of the adverb in -es avoids the ambiguity of καλλίων έχει.
12. διομολογήσασαί implies greater thoroughness than ἰω-ομολογησάμενοι, supr. 164 C.
οὐ γὰρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει] 'It is of no small importance to the question at issue.' So- crates appeals again to the geometrical consciousness of Theodorus, to whom possibly παραλλάττει, a half-technical word, may express more than the simple διαφέρει.
15. δι' ἀλλῶν... εκ τοῦ... λόγου] 'Not through any third person, but from the data supplied by himself.'
p. 170. ΘΕΩ. Πώς;

ΣΩ. Οὔτωσι. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι φησί ποὺ φ' δοκεῖ;

ΘΕΩ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, ὃς μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμέν οὐδένα ὧν τινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφότερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγάλοις κυνύοις, ὃταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν βαλαττῇ χειμάζωνται, ὁσπέρ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τὸ b τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀρχοντας, σωτήρας σφῶν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέροντι ἢ τῷ εἴδεναι. καὶ πάντα ποὺ μεστὰ τὰνθρώπων ἐξουσίων διασκάλους τε καὶ ἁρχηντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμῶν τῶν τε ἐργασίων, οἰκομένων τε αὐτῶν καὶ διάσκειν, τούτων δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄπασι τῷ ἄλλῳ φήσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρωπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἁμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσων;

ΘΕΩ. Οὐδέν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἁληθῆ διάκοινον οὖ ἡγούνται, τὴν δὲ ἁμαθίαν ψευδὴ δόξαν;

ΘΕΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;

6. καὶ φαμέν is paratactic for λόγοις.
10. χειμάζωντας] There is a zeugma only so far as the verb is used literally with ἐν βαλαττῇ and figuratively with ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις. Cr. Lach. 194 B: 'Ἀνθρώπος λόγος χειμάζων- μένος ἐν λόγῳ... βοηθήσον.' ὁσπέρ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν] Cr. Rep. 6. 489 C: ὁ τὸ δ' ἀλλες πέφυκεν, εάν τε πλούσιος εάν τε πένης κάμης, ἄναγκα τινα εἶναι ἐπὶ lαπρὸν δύρασι λεινα, καὶ πάντα τῶν ἁρχηντας δεδομένην ἐπί τάς τού ἁρ- χεῖν δυνάμενον. On the omission of πρὸς with the second word see Cobet, Var. Lect. pp. 163 sqq.

23. ὁ Πρωταγόρα] Bodl. Vat. pr. VEN. Π. have τῷ Πρωταγόρα. But the Bodleian has ὁ in the margin by an ancient hand. The reading τῷ may have been suggested by τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωτα- γόρα infr. Ε.
πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἃ ἐπὶ 170. ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδή; εἴς ἀμφιτέρων γὰρ ποὺ ἐχμιδαίαι μὴ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλ’ ἀμφότερα αὐτοὺς 

doxázειν. σκόπει γὰρ, ὁ Θεάδωρας, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἂν τίς ὁ 5 ἄμφις Πρωταγόρας ἦ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδὲς 

ήγειται ἔτερος ἔτερον ἀμαθῇ τε εἰναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

Tho. Ἅλλ’ ἀπειτου, ὁ Σώκρατης.

Σω. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τούτῳ γε ἀνάγκη οἷον ἥκει ὁ δ’ 

πάντων χρημάτων μέτρου ἀνθρώπου λέγων.

10 Tho. Πῶς δὴ?

Σω. Ἡ ὁταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτὸ πρὸς μὲ ἀπο-

φαίνῃ περὶ τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν 

ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθῆς ἐστα, ἢ μὲν δὴ τοὺς ἄλλους 

περὶ τὴς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἐστὶν κριταῖς γενέ-

τας, ἡ ἀεὶ σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἡ μυρίοι 

ἐκατόστε σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζουσε, ἡγοῦμενοι 

ψευδῇ κρίνεις τε καὶ ὅσεσθαι;

Tho. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατης, μάλα μυρίοι εἰ 

δήτα, φησὶν Ὄμηρος, οἱ γε μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων 

20 πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

Σω. Τὶ οὐν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτὸ 

μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοὺς δὲ μυρίοι ψευδῆ;

Tho. Ἐοικεν ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἴναι.

8. εἰς τούτο ἰναργεῖς ἥκει] 'Is driven to this,' 'Is re-

duced to a point where this is inevitable.' Cp. Soph. Εδ.

Τύρ. 687: ὃρας ἐν ἥκεις;

18. Ἡ τὸν Δία ... παρέχουσιν 

'Yes, truly, Socrates, I have 

opponents more than I can tell, 

as Homer says, and they give 

me worlds of trouble.'

19. φησὶν Ὅμηρος] Od. 16. 121: 

Τὸ τὸν δυσμενέα μαλα μυρίοι εἰοὶ 

ἐν ὁχῷ.

τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα] 

'The trouble of the world,' i.e. 

troubles, the greatest that can 

come from all men. Cp. Εscbin. 

c. Timarch. 9: Τῇ δὲ τελευταίῳ 

δήσαυτε πρὸς τὸν κίονα αὐτὸν τῶν 

Πιστῶν ὁμοτίγους τὰς εἰς ἀν-

θρώπων πληγαὶ οὕτω πολὺν χρόνον 

ἀπε, κ.τ.λ. A somewhat similar 

use of ἀνθρώπων occurs in Soph. 

Phil. 305: ἦ πολλὰ γὰρ τάς ἐν 

tῷ μακρῷ γένοις ἐν ἰνθρώπων 

χρόνων.' Respondeit vulgare illud 

nostratium, alle menschenmö-

gliche.' Heindorf.
THEAITHTOS.

ΣΩ. Τι δὲ αὐτὸς Πρωταγόρα; ἃρ' οὖχ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μὴ δὲ αὐτὸς ἥπετο μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρώπων μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὁσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδὲν δὴ εἶναι ταύτην π. 171. τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἢν ἐκείνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ἥπετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοιεύεται, οἷοθ' ὅτι πρῶτον 5 μὲν ὁσφ πλείους ὀϊς μὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ὅϊς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. "Επειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον ἐκείνοις ἡ ἐπιγείην περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰσεῖσιν τῆς τῶν ἀντιδοξάζοντων οἴνομα, ἢ ἐκείνον ἴσονται πειθότα, συγχωρεῖ που ἁληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ οὕτα δοξάζειν ἀπαντας.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁικοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἄν ψευδὴ συγχωρέοι, εἰ τὴν 15 τῶν ἰσομείων αὐτοῦ πειθότα ὁμολογεῖ ἁληθῆ εἶναι;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ γ' ἄλλοι οὖ συγχωροῦσιν ἐαυτοὺς πειθότα;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Ο δὲ γ' αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἁληθῆ τὴν δόξαν εὖ ὀν γέγραψεν.

ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται.

1. Ti de aitpo Protaygra; ] Sc. anagke estin; Or rather, as H. Schmidt points out, a more general notion: 'What follows for Protagoras? Is he not compelled?'

2. mide, mide ] 'If Protagoras himself also did not think so, nor yet the majority, as indeed they do not.'

5. synoietai ] This is present, because it has been asserted just above in osper, oinonta.

For instance, they condemn Protagoras. His opinion therefore may be true for him, but, on his own showing, it is false for all men besides. Its truth is to its falsehood, as one man is to all mankind. But further, in saying that they think truly, he confirms them in saying that he thinks falsely: and uphold them in denying that they are wrong. Thus the unanimity of dissent is not broken even by Protagoras himself.
Σ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀρά ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἁρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσει, μάλλον δὲ ύπό γε έκείνου ὁμολογήσει,—ὅταν τῷ τάναντι λέγοντι συγχωρήγηθε άληθής αὐτῶν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγ- οί χαρῆσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἀνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ένός οὐ ἄν μη μάθη. οὐχ οὖτως;

ΤΕΟ. Οὔτως.

Σ. Οὔκ ουν ἐπειδή ἀμφισβητεῖται ύπὸ πάντων, οὐδὲν ἄν εἳ ἣ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀλήθης, οὐ τε τινι ἄλλοι οὐτ᾿ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

ΤΕΟ. Ἄγαν, οὖ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἑταίρον μου καταθέομεν.

Σ. 'Αλλά τοι, ὃ φίλε, ἀδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν

1. 'Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀρά] 'So then, the result obtained from them all is this.' Cf. Soph. 245 E: Τοῦ δὲ ἄλλος λέγοντας αὐθετείν, ἵνα πάντων εἰδόμεν ὅτι τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἄντος οὐδέν εἰσφορότερον εἰσέχει δὲ τί ποτε ἐστιν. Αρ. Μετ. 988 a: Τοσούτων γὰρ ἔχομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. The preposition is probably suggested by ἐξ δὲ immediately preceding. 'On all hands, then, including Protagoras, we find it disputed, or rather on his part it is admitted.' This use of ἐξ has been needlessly disputed by Heindorf and others, and Schanz reads ἵνα 'ἀπάντων. Badham suggests ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀρά ἀπὸ τῶν Πρωταγόρου.

3. ὅταν... συγχωρήσει·] These words are explanatory of ὑπὸ ἐκείνου ὁμολογηθήσαται, and what follows, from μήτε onwards, depends immediately on συγχωρήσει·, but really also on all that precedes. The construction of a sentence is frequently thus disturbed by the introduction of an explanatory or appositional clause. Cf. Rep. 7. 529 B: οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἃνω ποιεῖν ψυχήν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκείνο, δὲν περὶ τὸ δὲ τι καὶ τὸ δάρατον, εάν τε τις ἄνω κεχρησκό ἢ κάτω συμμεμερικός τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπικρίσεως μαθάναι, οὔτε μαθεῖν ποτὲ φημι αὐτῶν, οὔτε ἄν άλλα κάτω καταστρωμένης ἡς ἡς ἡς ἡς ψυχῆν, καὶ ἐξ ὑποτε νέων ἐν γῇ ἐν θαλάσσῃ μαθάναι. The futures middle are used with passive meaning.

5. μήτε κύνα] Supr. 154 A.

12. Ἄγαν] 'We are urging my friend too vehemently,' 'running him very hard.'

καταθέομεν] Cp. Logg. 7. 806 C: Τι δράσωμεν, ὡς κλεινία; τὸν ζέινον ἐάσωμεν τὴν ἕπατην ἥμιν οὖν καταθεμεῖν;

14. 'Αλλά... ἀδηλον] 'But it does not appear that we are outrunning what is right,' i.e. I do not see that we are transgressing any rule of truth or fairness. τὸ ὄρθων means simply
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 171. τὸ ὄρθων. εἰκὸς γε ἃρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ὑντα σοφότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι. καὶ εἰ αὐτικά ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψει μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἔμε τε ἐλέγξας λῃστῆνα, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, καὶ σε ὁμολογούντα, καταδύς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ἀνάγκη, οἴμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν 5 αὐτοῖς, ὁπωσὶς τινὲς ἔσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκούντα αἱ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἀλλο τὰ φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοιτὸ γε ὡντιοῦν, τὸ εἶναι σοφότερον ἔτερον ἐτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἱστασθαι τὸν λόγον,

(as in Rep. 7. 540 D: τὸ ὄρθων περὶ πλειστον ποισάμενον. Meno, 99 A: 'Ἡγεμὼν .. ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρθων), 'What is just and true.' There is no necessity therefore for making parabē̂n (with the accusative) mean 'to swerve from.'

1. εἰκὸς γε ἃρα] Socrates admits that there is some ground for Theodorus' remonstrance. 'It is reasonable, I grant, to presume that as he is older so he is wiser than we are.' ἃρα refers to an implied argument; 'as your words imply.' For εἰκὸς γε cp. infr. 202 D.

4. καὶ σε ὁμολογοῦντα] Sc. λη- ρῶθη. Steinhart suggests that the notion of Protagoras putting up his head and disappearing again is perhaps taken from the use of 'Charon's steps' in the theatre. H. Schmidt well observes that καταδύς . . . ἀποτρέχων implies that the Sophist would not have waited for a rejoinder.

Cp. Rep. 1. 344 C D, esp. the words ἀ δαιμόνως Θερασύμαχε, οἴον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν τῇ ἡξεῖς αἰτίαις, πρὶν διδάξαι ικάνος ἢ μαθῶν εἶτε οὔτως εἶτε ἄλλος ἡξεῖ.

5. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν] Socrates returns to the charge with the second ἀλλα.


11. ταύτη ἂν ... Πρωταγόρα] 'Will be most likely to take up this position, which we sketched out for it in our defence of Protagoras.' Cp. II. 11. 570, 1: Ἀθηνίος δε Τρώων καὶ Ἀχαϊών θύεις μεσθήν | ἱστάμενος. Ib. 590, 1: 'Ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἂντιν ἱστασθ' ἀμφ' Ἀλκαία μέγαν. Parn. 130 D: Ἐκὸν ταύτῃ στῷ. 'The argument' is personified, as so often in Plato (cp. Rep. 6. 484 A: Διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντος λόγου, Ib. 503 A: Τοιαίτ' ἂττα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξήκοντα καὶ παρακαλετούμενον τοῦ λόγου), and is the subject of συγχωρήσει, ἐκθέτωσι, ὁμολογήσει and τολ- μήσει, in what follows. (If Protagoras were the subject, as H. Schmidt suggests, the dative Πρωταγόρα should have been αὐτώ). ἱστασθαι depends
It is clear, too, that the strength of the position lies in the region of sensible things, which we made the basis of our defence of Protagoras.

(Transition to the conception of the Beneficial.)

If the theory would concede anything, immediately on φόμεν.—May there also be a slight play upon the word ἑστασθαί? 'This unstable theory will make a stand heretofore if anywhere.' See also Thuc. 6. 34: Πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γνώμαι ἴσταναι.

1. ἢ ἡμεὶς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρα, ós tā ῾r p. 171. mēn pollá ἢ dōkeī tāyτη kai ēstion ekástron, θερμά, ἕηρα, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου: ei de pou en tis συγκωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλον, 

5 peri tā ὑγείαν kai νοσώδη ἔθελησαι ἂν φαίνει μὴ τῶν γύναιων kai παιδίων kai θηρίων dé ikaíon εἶναι ίασθαι αὐτὸ γυνώσκον ἐαυτῷ τὸ ὑγείων, ἄλλα ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλον διαφέρειν, εἴπερ του ἘΘΟ. ἔμοιγε dōkei οὕτωs.

10 ΣΩ. Ὑκοῦν kai peri πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν kai p. 172. αὐτοῦ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀδίκα kai ὅσια kai μῆ, οἶα ἄν ekástron pόλις οἰγθεῖσα δήται νόμιμα ἐαυτῇ, ταύτα kai εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ekástar, kai ἐν τούτοις mēn oúdeν σοφότερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτων οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως So in what follows, 172 A, the words εἴπερ του, οὐκ ἀπὸ πάνω τολμήσει, imply certain preconceptions and tendencies.

6. kai θηρίων δὲ] 'Nay, even every inferior animal.' Vegetables might have been included. Supr. 167 B C.

10. Ὑκοῦν ... peri πολιτικῶν] The distinction in the case of sensible things between the impressions of sense, and the knowledge of what is good, is evident enough. The analoguous distinction in the case of things moral and social is less obvious. See, amongst other passages, Rep. 6. 505 D: τί δὲ; τὸ δὲ νῦν φανερόν, ὡς δίκαιον μὲν kai ἄλλα πολλοὶ ἐν ἑλοντο τὸ δοκοῦντα καὶ μὴ δὲ ὅμως ταύτα πράττειν kai κεκτήσθαι kai δοκεῖν, ἀγαθά δὲ τούτην ζητοῦν, τνὶ δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ὅψ τὰς ἀπτεραίζει;

12. οἰγθεῖσα] Sc. καλά, δίκαια, k.t.l.
8. έθελουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι] He drops the figure, and passes from what the 'argument' would be apt to say, to what certain persons, who are presently defined, actually do say. For a somewhat similar transition from 'arguments' to 'certain persons' cp. Gorg. 457 C: Ὀμαί, Ὄ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἐμπειρόν εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρηκέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιοῦτο, ὅτι τούτως δύναται περὶ ἓν ἐν ἐπιχειρήσεωι διαλέγεσθαι διαφορέμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθότες καὶ διδάσκαλους αὐτοὺς ὅπως διαλείπει τὰς συνοπτικὰς καὶ ἐνοὶ γε τελευταίας (cp. καὶ ὅσοι γε in the present passage), κ.τ.λ.

11. μὴ παντάπασι] 'In part only.' For the negative form cp. Soph. 247 B: Τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτα ἀρχομένως πᾶν ('here they make a certain distinction'). Aristotle (Met. 1008 a) uses the expression τοῖς τῶν Πρωταγόρου λέγοντες λόγων.

12. ὅτε πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι] 'Conduct their philosophic procedure thus.' 'Proceed somewhat on this wise in their philosophy.' Cp. Men. 80 E: ὃς τούτων ὃς ἰσχυρισμὸν λόγον κατάγεις;

13. μείζων ἐξ ἑλάττων] The question of Justice and Injustice, etc. is greater than the question of the relativity of Sense. The greater question is not fully resumed in the pre-
sent dialogue, but is treated at large in the Gorgias and Republic.

1. Οὐκοῦν σχολήν ἄγομεν]
Compare the opening of the digression in the Phædrus, 258 E: Σχολή μὲν δὴ ἡ ὅσοι... and Cic. de Amic. 5: 'Etsumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi.' We must suppose that the impending trial of Socrates, although not alluded to until the end of the dialogue, is in Plato's mind throughout this passage. Cp. Gorg. 522 B.

2. δὲ δαιμόνε] 'In sober truth.' The words add a touch (not here of expostulation but) of solemnity.

4. ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις] 'In scientific pursuits.' Supr. 143 D: Γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν. Tim. 88 C: Μουσική καὶ πάση φιλοσοφίᾳ. Socrates takes common ground with Theodorus, Cp. infr. 173 E: Τὰ τὲ γὰρ ἐπίνειον καὶ τὰ ἐπίσεια γεωμετρόσα, οὕτωσον τὸ ὅπερ ἀστρονομώσα. Compare with the whole passage the opening words of the Apology (esp. ἀρμολογοῦν ἢ ἔγονεν οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ἄρτος), and the dispute of Socrates with Callicles in the Gorgias.

8. ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι] 'Who have knocked about from their early days.' Compare Aristophanes' περίτριμμα δικών (Nub. 447), and Dem. de Cor. 269. 

κυλινδούμενοι] 'The word expresses contempt for the 'casual,' 'hand to mouth,' intellectual existence of the lawyer.' Cp. Rep. 5. 479 D: Μεταξὺ ποιον κυλινδεῖται, Phædr. 257 A, Polit. 309 A.

10. πρὸς ἐλευθέρους] Soph. 253 C (referring to this): 'Ἡ πρὸς Δῶς ἄλαθον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἔμπειροντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κυλινδούμενοι ζητούμεν τῶν σοφιστῶν πρότερον ἀνεφερκέναι τῶν φιλοσοφῶν; Rep. 6. 499 A: Οἶδε γε αὐτὸν ἀλώ, ἡ μακάριη, καλῶν τὰ καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἰκανῶς ἐπήκοας γεγόναις, οἷον ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἄλλης, κ.τ.λ. 7. 536 D: Οἶδεν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλευθέρον χρὴ μαθανθῶν— and the whole image of the cave with its captives and their liberation. See also Aristot. Met. 1. 2: Δὴ λοιπὸν οὐκ ὡς δὴ οἰδείμεν αὐτῷ ζητούμεν χρεῖαν ἐπέρα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀνθρώπος φάμεν ἐλευθέρος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου διν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὕτω τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.
Σ. Η τοῖς μὲν, τοῦτο ὁ σὺ εἶπες, ἀεὶ πάρεστι σχολὴ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν ἐρήμῃ ἐπὶ σχολὴς ποιοῦνται, οὕστε ἤμεις νωνὶ τρίτων ἦδη λόγου ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κακεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοῦ ὁ ἐπελθὼν 5 τοῦ προκεκμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέστη καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἡ βραχέως μέλει οὐδενὶ λεγεὶν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὅντος: οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἀεὶ λέγουσιν (κατεπείγει γὰρ ὑδὼρ τέσσερι) καὶ οὐκ ἐγχώρει περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἁνάγκην 10

2. τοῦτο δ’ σὺ εἶπες] Η. Schmidt would delete the commas, because Theodorus had only spoken of himself and Socrates. But such ‘apposition of general and particular’ is common in Plato.

3. τρίτων ἦδη λόγου ἐκ λόγου] ‘We are for the third time beginning a fresh argument.’ The first fresh λόγος was the criticism of Protagoras and his defence; the second begins where Theodorus is induced to accept Socrates’ challenge (see the doubtful words, 168 Ε: Ἀδ τοῦτον τῶν λόγων; the third and greatest (αἰσχών, supra. B) arises with the mention of the whole-some and expedient, and the partial supporters of Protagoras. Cf. Rep. i. 354, where Socrates owns to a similar discursiveness, and is by no means exact in recapitulating.

5. οὐνα κακεῖοι] Σκ. μεταλαμβάνοντες. This part of the sentence (from ὠσπέρ ἐπ.) stands in apposition to what precedes. Cf. supra. 171 C: Τότε καὶ ὁ πρωταγόρας . . , and note; also Rep. 8. 557 C: Κινδυνεύει, ἂν ὅ’ ἐγὼ, καλλίστῃ αὐτή τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι: ὠσπέρ ἢμάτιον ποικίλου πάσιν ἀνδρὶ πεποικίλημιν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτή πάσιν ὑδείς πεποικίλημιν καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο. Also ib. 7. 532 Α: ὦστω καὶ δὴν τῆς διαλέγεσθαι ἐπικεφήλη, ἀν ἐνλειών τῶν αἰσχρῶν διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ’ αὐτό ὅ ἐστιν ὄρμα, καὶ ὑποπτὴ πρὶν ἂν αὐτό ὃ ἐστιν ἁγάδον αὐτὴ νοσεῖ λάβῃ, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὡσπέρ ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ. But as the verb is omitted in the second clause, the comma is preferable to a colon after ποιοῦνται.

6. καθαπερ ἡμᾶς] Such slight redundancies are natural in conversation.

ἀρίστερον governs the accumulative where it means to satisfy. It has the dative supra. 157 D. The whole sentence is in construction with Ἡ.


10. ἁνάγκην] Hesych. ἁνάγκη δικαστικῆς κληρυδρᾶ, Pollux, 8. 17: ἑναὶ δ’ ὅντας καὶ ἁνάγκην σκεύος εἶναι δικαστικῶν. The latter quotation expresses doubt. May not the notion mentioned by the grammarian have arisen from the present passage? The structure of the sentence (τε—καὶ) forbids our identifying

we pause to reflect upon the happiness and freedom of the philosophic life, which has leisure to take up fresh topics or to lay them down at will. Not so the mind which is exercised in the courts of law. The
πλατωνοσ

ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγ— p. 172.
γνωσκομένην, ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέων· (ἡν ἀντωμοσίαν
καλοῦσιν·) οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὀμοδούλου πρὸς δε-
σπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ
5 ἄγνωσε οὐδὲσποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἄλλῃ ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ-
πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος· ὅστε εἴ ἀπάν— p. 173.

ἀνάγει here with the clepsydra, which has been already alluded
to. It is rather 'the strong arm of the law,' which the ad-
versary could bring to bear, if the speaker wandered from the
dictament. (So also Ast and H. Schmidt.) 'But the other
sort are always pressed for time; for the ebbing water
hurries on the speaker: and he has no liberty to follow
whither fancy leads him, but the adversary is at hand to
wield over him the resistless logic of coercion, holding a
written outline of the points to which he must confine him-
self, which forms a running commentary to his oration.'

2. ὃν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέων ὑπογραφὴν
retains its verbal force nearly
as if it were ὑπογραμμένα, but
is not the antecedent to ἦν.
See 147 Ξ, note on ὅρα.

ἡν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν] 'What
they call their affidavits.' The
affected unfamiliarity with legal
terms is in good keeping. Com-
pare Rep. 3. 400 B: Καὶ, ὡς ἐγγυ-
μαί, ἵμβον καὶ τιν' ἄλλων τραχων
ἀνώμαζε.

3. πρὸς δεσπότην] Not simply
the dikastēs, but rather δῆμος or
ὔμος, whom here represents.
Compare the passages in the Repub-
lic in which Δῆμος is spoken of as
the master of the ship (488), as
the great Sophist (492), and as a
mighty beast (493); and cp. Eu-

θύρφρ. 2 C: 'Ερχεται κατηγορή-
σων μου, διστάρ πρὸς μητέρα, πρὸς
τὴν πόλιν. Also Herodotus, 7.
104 'of the Spartans': 'Επετει
γὰρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑπο-
δειμαίνονοι πολλῆς ἦτο μάλλον, ἡ
οὐ σιν νέ. Pindar, 3. 38: Νόμος
πάντων βασιλεῖων.

4. τινα δίκην] So the Bod-
leian MS. ‘Some cause or
other.’ This reading suits the
distant, unfamiliar tone, in
which judicial proceedings are
here described. The other
reading, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην
ἔχοντα (T, etc.), gives a different
force to ἐν χειρὶ . . . ἔχοντα,—not
merely ‘engaged with’ but
‘having in his power.’

καὶ οἱ ἄγνωσι] ‘And the trial
is never for an indissoluble stake,
but always immediately con-
cerns the speaker.’ αὐτὸ is
surely masculine not neuter (as
Stallb. and Wohlrab).

6. περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος
Π. 22. 161 (of Achilles and
Hector) : ‘Επεῖ οὖν λεμένον, οὖδὲ
βοεῖν αἴρεται, δὲ τοὺσ τεῦχα
γίγνεται αὐτῶν· ἄλλα περὶ ψυχῆς
θεῖον ἔκτος ἱπποδάμου. In He-
rodotus, 7. 57: Περὶ ἵππων
τρέχων (said of Xerxes), the
metaphor is already softened
down. Cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 375:
Ποιησο δεκάιν | τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὸν
περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμον | δραμεῖν. The
expression τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ is
suggested by τὴν ἄλλως.
Thetaititos.

p. 173. twn toútwn éntovoi kai drmeíes génoontai, épistámeioi tòn deospóthn logof te thapseúsai kai érugo charísaðh, smkroì dé kai ouk órðoi tás psuchás. tñn gàr aúzhì kai tò eðbò te kai tò élèuberon ð ëk néwon douleía àphrìhetai, anagkáousoa práttew skolìa, megálwos 5 k nudwos kai fóbous ëti ápalaís psuchás épìbál-

lousa, ou ñ ou dúmàmewo metà tou dýkaion kai áltheois úpoférein, eðbìs ëpi tò ðeúdo tè kai tò álhlwos àntadikew trespémeon pollà kämpontai kai súng-

klowntai, ðost' ùgíes ouðen ëxountes tìs dianoiow eis 10 àndras ek meirakwos téleutówos, deixw te kai sofoi geynótes, ñs omontai. Kài outw mév ðè toúwto, ñì

1. étanwv kai drmeíes] 'Keen and shrewd.' As H. Schmidt observes, the former epithet points to concentration of will, the latter to mental penetration.

3. tñn gàr aúzhì . . élèuberon] 'Of all mental growth, and all honest and liberal culture;' 'of self-respect and the spirit of upright independence.' Both meanings are expressed in the Greek.

7. ou ou dúmàmevow] 'So that, not being able to undergo these consistently with righteousness and truth, they betake themselves forthwith to falsehood, and to avenging themselves on one another by wrong, and so are repeatedly bent and stunted; whence they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness in their mind, but supposing themselves to have become capable and accomplished men.'

Cp. Rep. 7. 519 A: 'H óðw ewenëpíkhas tòw leugmènów poñprhów mév sofoi dé, ou drwìw mév blèptai tò psuchìw v kai óðwos ñwòr tìta ðì' ñ tétraptai, ñs ou fálhrh

éxon tìn ðwn, kàkì ðì ñagkaqemè-

nów ùprtewì, ñste ðaw ñw ñé-

terw wblèwì, tosoùtv ñleìw kàkì ërhoqììmènów. . . Tòwto méwòtì, ñì ðì

ègwì, tò tìs twòpheìs ðwswów, eì ëk

pàdòs eðbìs kòpòmevìn perìkóta
tòwù tòw géwsws syngezëw ñwster

mòplèdikas, ñì ñì ñwódwòw te kai
tòw toúwtoù ðèwñwòw te te kai lìxwìeis

proòfowì geynòmènì, peri tà kàw

strefowì tìrì tòw ðwswìs ðwn, k.

9. pollà kämpontai kai súng-

klowntai] 'Are continually thwarted and cramped in their growth.' Rep. 6. 495 D: 'Àgelèis méw tòw ðwswów, ðò ðì ðì twòw te kai

bavswwòw ñwster tà ñwìmàa

telaìhénta ñtòwò te kai tòw ðwswìs

ënugkëklamènì te te ñkòðtrìgmè-

mévor ðì tàs bavswías tughwòw-

swìw. 10. 611 C: Tèvèwëwìa méwò tìs

diakëmènów autì, ñwster ol tòw thá-

láttwìw Gàwòw gròntes ñíkìn ñì ìn

ðì ñì ñðìwìs autìw ìmowìw tìs

ðrwì wì ðwswìs ñwòwì, ðò ðì tà tàw

pàlài tàw ñwìmòs méw tí méw ënugkëklasìwì, ñì ñì ñwòtìw ñlè-

wìsìwìw ðò ðì tàwìw kumàiwìw. Gòrgì.

525 C-E
πλατωνος

116

Θεόδωρε, τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει p. 173. 

dielthóntes ἢ έσάντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπό-
μεθα, ἵνα μὴ καὶ, ὅ τὸν δὲ ἐλέγομεν, λιasion πολὺ τῇ
ελευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρόμεθα;

5 ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμώς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ dielthóntes. 

πάνω γὰρ εὗ τοῦτο εἰρήκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἥμεις οἱ ἐν τῷ

tοὐδε χρεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ’ οἱ λόγοι

τοι ἡμετέροι ὀσπερ ὁκέται, καὶ ἔκαστος αὐτῶν περι-

μενεί ἀποτελεσθῆναι όταν ἥμιν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικα-

τῆς οὔτε θεατῆς, ὀσπερ ποιητῶς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ

ἀρξὼν ἐπιστατεί παρ’ ἥμιν.

1. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ] 


Β: Ὅμοργνονα κατιδὼν τὸν περὶ τὰ τῶν πολέων πράγματα χορῶν. 

The metaphor is continued in the words οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιὸδε χρεύο-

ντες... οὔτε θεατῆς ὀσπερ ποιητῶς... περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων...

2. dielthóntes] The expression is a little confused: for the 

words πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπό-

μεθα, as understood with diel-

θόntes, are unemphatic, while in the 

second part of the clause they are emphatic. Probably 

probably but for the attraction of the 

other participle, dieλθόντες would 

have been dieλθομεν. (Coisl. 

τραπέμεθα.) 

3. έςαντες] Since here, as in the 'Sophist' (253 D), we have 

stumbled prematurely on the 

philosophic life. 

4. δὲ νῦν δὲ... μεταλήψει] 

'Our freedom, which consists, 

as we have said, in the power 

of ranging from one topic to 

another.' The words δὲ νῦν δὲ 

ἐλέγομεν belong to ελευθερία καὶ 

μεταλήψει and not to λιasion πολὺ 

καταχρόμεθα. But in deleting 

the comma H. Schmidt is again 

led by too strict a requirement 

of minute logical coherence. 

Cp. Tim. 26 E: Κάι τιν’ ἄν, 

ὡς Κρίτη, μᾶλλον ἀντὶ τοῦτον με-

ταλάβομεν; Polit. 257 C: Διαμ-

παύσωμεν αὐτῶν μεταλάβοντες αὐ-

τῶν τὸν συγγνωματην τόθε δύο-

κράτη;... Καθάπερ εἴπετε, μετα-

λάμβανεν.

6. τοι ἡμετέροι] The article 

is rather doubtful. If genuine, 

it still belongs to the predicate, 

— 'our servants,' i. e. those 

which, as philosophers, we have 

περιμένει; 'Waits our plea-

sure for its completion.' 

7. The word δικαστῆς re-

calls the previous description. 

With οὔτε θεατῆς ὀσπερ ποιητῶς 

a new illustration is brought 

in. Cp. supr. 147 B. The 

θεατῆς is the same διεπόθης (viz. 

Δήμων) in another aspect. The 

image of dramatic poetry was 

suggested by Socrates using the 

expression τοῦ τοῦ ἡμετέρου 

χοροῦ.

10. ἐπιστημών... ἐπιστατεῖ] 

'Stands over us to criticise and 

to compel.'
They know nothing of politics or of public life, still less of revells and intrigues for power.
The philosopher’s ignorance of these things and of his neighbour’s pedigree, is not ironical but real. His body is at home in the city, but his mind is

κακὸν ἔστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ π. 173. γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτῶν λέληθη ἢ ὤ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντα οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, εἰ οἶδεν: οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, 5 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὦτι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπίθημε, ἢ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγομα-μένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῦ φέρεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τὰ τε γὰς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἑπίπεδα

says, ‘Si quis alius, certe philosophos scit, quid recte, quid secus in república fiat.’ But if he is ignorant of what is passing, how can he judge of it? See above, nótos δὲ καὶ ψφοι-ματα, κ.τ.λ., and infr. 174 C: Οὐκ εἶδος κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελητήκεια. And cp. Rep. 6. 496. This reading is consistent with the spirit of paradox which is unmistakably present throughout. No part of the description except the absence of rhetoric would apply to the real Socrates. Even in this dialogue we have seen that he knows some of the antecedents of Theetetus and is interested in knowing more.


4. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν] Cp. Ar. Eth. N. 4. 3. §§ 27, 28 (of the high-minded man)—πρὸς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ λέναι... εὐφρᾶν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς.


8. κατὰ Πίνδαρον] The fragment is thus quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. 20. 707: Πέταται κατὰ Πίνδαρον τὰς τε γὰς ἐπένερθεν ὁδ-ρανοὺ τὸ ἐπερ ἀστρονομῶν, καὶ πά-σιν πάντων φώνων ἐρευνάμενος (v. l. ἐρευνάμενοι). He seems to have had the poet’s words, as well as this passage, in his mind. Plato therefore seems to have changed πέταται into the more prosaic φέρεται (πέταται occurs as a marginal reading), and to have introduced the words καὶ τὰ ἑπί-πεδα γεωμετρίας (perhaps also ἀστρονομίας), in compliment to Theodorus, adding τῶν ὀστῶν ἐκάστων, κ.τ.λ. Plato almost always thus interweaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poet’s measures to the rhythm of prose; e.g. Rep. 2. 365 B: Πάτερον δὲ ἡμεῖς τό ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ἡ σκολίαι ἀπάτας ἀναβᾶς καὶ ἐμαυ-τὸν οὐκ ἐπερφέραν αἰσθήσια; Ib. 364 D: Ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐδρῶτε θεοὶ προφόρωθεν ἐθανάτω καὶ ταῦτα ἀδύναμα τε καὶ αἰνίτητη. Protag. 340 D: "Ὅταν δὲ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἑκατά, ῥήθηκε ἢ ἐπείτα πέλειν, χαλεπών περί ἐφύσω ἐκτίθησαι. τὰ τε γὰς] Bodl. τὰτε (but with an erasure over ὁ). Is it possible that Plato wrote τὰ τε, as in the quotation of Clement? This seems probable, when it is considered that τὰ ἑπίπεδα, κ.τ.λ. is an afterthought, to which the transition as the words stand in the text is
somewhat abrupt; and also that the term γεωμετροῦσα is more naturally applicable to the surface than to the lower parts of the Earth.

2. τῶν δύτων ἕκαστον ἄλογον ἑλθον] ἦν γάρ συνοπτικός διαλεκτικός, δὲ μή, οὐ. (Bep. 7. 537 C.) See the humorous illustration of this in the Republic, 5. 474 C: "Οὐτώ δὲ ἂν φωμεν φίλε δι, δέ φασιν αὐτῶν, ἐν πρὸς λεγήται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκεῖνον, τὸ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ παν στεροῦντα, κ.τ.λ. And ib. 6. 486 A: Ἐναντίωσενον συμμετρολογία ψυχῆς μελλοντὸ τοῦ ἄλογον καὶ παντὸς ἀλλοπροσεχθεὶ θείον τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνον... ἐὰν ὑπάρχη διανοή μεγαλαπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ εὐσίας, οἷον τε οἷον τούτῳ μὲν τι δοκεῖν έξαιτά τοῦ ἀνθρώπουν βίον; Ibid. 500 B.

3. ἄλογον] 'In its universal aspect.'

εἰς τῶν ἔγγος] 'Not lowering herself to contemplate any of the things surrounding her.'

4. Theodorus does not at once understand the contrast between 'things universal and things near.'

6. ἐρήμωσεν] 'Ερήμωσαν ο πα- Τριαρχίαν ἅντον ἱκεῖτο. ἐμελής autem h. l. ad leporem et ve-

nustatem in jocando trehabdam
docuit Ruhnken. ad Longin.
p. 261. Fabellam hinc forte
duxit Laërt. i. 34.' Heind.

Does not ἐμελής rather refer to the slave's neatness in her own department? Cp. τορώς καὶ άξίως 175 E. 'A trim and
dainty Thracian handmaid.'
The opposite is implied in

ἀσχημοσύνη... ἀβελετεία, infr. C.
The same jest occurs in Chaucer,
The Millère's Tale, 3458–60:

'He walked in the feldes for
to prie
Upon the starres, what ther
should befalle,
Til he was in a marlepit
yfalle.'

10. ταῦταν δὲ ἄρκι σκάμμα] 'The same piece of raillery does
not fail to apply,'—'will serve.'

For the metaphorical use of

ἄρκειν ἐπὶ cp. Soph. Ant. 611:

Το τ' ἐπειτα καὶ το μέλλον καὶ το
πριν επαρκέσει νόμος ἔδε.

For the application of the

σκάμμα in the mouth of an
enemy see the speech of Cal-

cides in the Gorgias, 484 sqq.,
which presents many points of

similarity to the present pas-
sage.
σοφία διάγονοι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τῶν τοιοῦτον ὦ μὲν ὦ 174.
πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέηθεν, οὐ μόνον ὦ τι πράττει,
ἀλλὰ ἀλέγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν ἦ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα-
tι δὲ ποτ' ἐστίν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῇ τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει
προσέχει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν,
ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' εἶχε διερευνόμενος. μανθάνεις
γὰρ ποι, ὦ Θεόδωρε. ἢ οὖ;

ΘΕΟ. ἦγωγε. καὶ ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἱδία τε συγγνώμενος ὦ
τοιοῦτος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἄρχομενος ἔλεγον, ο
ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἦ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ
τῶν παρὰ τόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι,
γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Ὁράττως ἄλλα καὶ τῷ
ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρεάτα τε καὶ πάσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπὶ-
15 πτων ὑπὸ ἀπερίας, καὶ ἡ ἁσχημοσύνη δευτ., δόξαι
ἀβελτεριας παρεχομενη. ἐν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις
ἰδιον εἶχει οὐδέν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν, ἀτ' οὐκ εἰδος κακὸν
οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελητηκέναι ἀπορῶν οὖν
γελοῖος φαινεται. ἐν τε τοῖς ἐπαύνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν
20 ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ προσποιήτως, ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι
γελῶν ἐνδήλος γιγνόμενος ληρώθης δοκεί εἶναι. τῦ-
ρανὸν τε γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία ἐγκωμαζόμενον ἐνα τῶν

4. τῇ τοιαύτῃ] Sc. ἀνθρωπίνη. 
10. ὅπερ ἄρχομενος ἔλεγον] These words refer only to δη-
μοσία, and recall 172 C.
14. εἰς φρέατα] 'Into pitfalls 
and all manner of perplexity.' 
Cp. supr. 165 B: Τὸ λέγομεν
ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος. But the
words immediately refer to
supr. A: Πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ.
15. ἡ ἁσχημοσύνη] 'And the
awkwardness of the position is
terrible, making him seem no
better than a fool.'
17. Ἐδιω] I. e. he cannot use
personality in invective.
20. οὐ προσποιήτως, ἄλλα τῷ
ὄντι] Cp. 173 E: οὐ γὰρ αὐ-
tῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκεῖν χάριν,
k.τ.λ.
21. τῦρανον... ἐγκωμαζόμενον] 
Governed (1) by ἀκοίνων, im-
plied in ἀκοίνων below: or (2)
more truly, an accusativus pen-
dens. τε is answered by δέ in
γῆς δέ, κ.τ.λ. infr.
22. ἐν τῶν νομῶν] Comp.
the Politicus, 266 D, where
this is regarded as the most
universal conception of the
kingly office; contemplating
nomenvik as a whole, the phi-
losopher thinks of basicik only
as a part of it: 'Oti tý toûtho
meðòdor tôn lógon oûte semnóterou
mâllon émélçen ì mì, tôn te sym-
kreston ouêden ëtìmka prò ton
meîzonos, deî de kath àutìn peraìnei
tàllhèstaton. Soph. 227 A:
Tý tôn lógon meðòdor spogygiotikè
ì pharassonixias ouêden ëhtton ouêde
ti mâllon tughànanes melònos, eî tì mèn
symká to de megálî ñoèlêi ìmìas
cabàron, tôo ñárá týmãsa tantalou
ènèka
voûn pásôw techón to ëxynènes
kai to mì ëxynènes katanôw pi-
rrómeni tìma pròs toucò eì ìson
pásas, kai ñàterà tôn ëtèron kata
tûn òmòôntita ouêden ëgêîta gei-
loîteron, semnóteron de ti tôn ìuà
sytïnikès ì phonorînikès dé-
lùnutò ñhæneîn ouêden neômìken,
ìllì ìw tî polû xauõnteron.

The latter passage has also
a slight tinge of the irony of the
text. The figure may have
originated in some saying of
1. 2. § 32: 'Oti ñaumastòn oî
dókoî ìwâna, èi tìs genõnìnes boùn
ámëgesi nomènes kai tás boûs ëlâm-
tou te kai ñêipos poûwn ìì òmòlo-
}
μυρίδες . . ἀναρίθμητοι] This expression recurs frequently in later Greek authors.

6. βαρβαροί τε καὶ Ἑλληνες] These words belong to all the preceding nouns.

7. ἐπι πέντε . . προγόνων] The order is ἐπὶ καταλόγῳ πέντε καὶ εἶκος προγόνων.

8. ἀναφερόντων] Sc. τὸ γένος, or τὴν εὐγένειαν. The genitives depend upon σμικρολογία, or rather, more vaguely, upon the sense of the words ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, as δυναμένων ὑπὸ γελᾶ below, κατα-

9. ἄτοπα . . τῆς σμικρολογίας] The genitive is not quite analogous to ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας, Apol. 41 C, which is rather quantitative:

nor is it exactly equivalent to ἄτοποι ἡ σμικρολογία (like ἄσημα . . βοῖν, . . φῶτων αἴλιων λείηρων, in Sophocles), though, as in these last cases, the adjective is isolated for the sake of emphasis; but the genitive has the additional meaning, 'in respect of,' as after interjections and epithets. Cf. Protagoras 317 B: Πολλή μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπικεφαλῆματος. Rep. 1.328 E: Χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου (for its way of life?) 7.531 D: Πάμπολυ ζηγον ἄλεγε. τοῦ προσώμου, ἢ ὃ ἐγὼ; Phaed. 99 B: Πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ἁθηματικ passages . . ἄτοποι φαίνονται τῆς σμικρολογίας καὶ σμικρολογίας καὶ ἀναφερόντων . . ἄτοποι φαίνεται ἡ σμικρολογία.
ΟΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 123

p. 175. καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφι- βρύωνος εἶς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαιεκοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἤ, οὐα συνεῖδαν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, γελάδεν δὲ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χανόντητα ἀνοίγειν ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἁπασι δὲ τούτων ὁ 5 τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταθέται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερ- χάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσίν ἁγνοῦν τε καὶ ἐν ἕκαστοις ἄπορον.

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, ὥς Σώ- κρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὲ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὥς φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἔκβιναι ἐκ τοῦ Τί ἔγω σὲ ἄδικο ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄδικιας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ ἀλλήλων διαφέρετο; ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Εἰ βασιλεὺς εἰδαίμων 15

2. οὐα συνείδαν] The Bodl. 
11. Ὅταν δὲ γέ, κ.τ.λ.] Compare 
12. καὶ... αὐτῷ] And he finds 
read The Bodl. 
Rep. 7. 515 E, 516: Εἰ δ', ἢν δ' ἔγω, ἐπειδὴν ἐλκοι τις αὐτῶν βία διὰ 
τραχείας τῆς ἀνάβασεως καὶ ἀνά- 
τους, καὶ μὴ ἄνει διὰ ἐξελκύσεω 
πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, δρα, οὐχὶ 
δύσασθαι τε ἐν καὶ ἐγανάκτειν 
ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς 
ἔλθο, αὐγῆς ἢ ἐξοφτα τὰ διμα 
μεστὰ ἕραν οὐδ' ἢ ἐν δύσασθαι 
tῶν τῶν λεγομένων ἔλθον.

But when he takes 
the other 
up into his 
own region, 
from ques-
tions of 
private wrong, 
to inquire 

some one willing.' Supr. 154 
E, Rep. 1. 343 Ἄ, etc.
15. Εἰ βασιλεὺς εἰδαίμω] See 
the passage of the Gorgias 
(471), in which Polus con-
tends that Archelaus is happy. 
(Diog. L mentions a diatribe 
of Antisthenes, called Ἀρχέλαος, 
ἡ περὶ βασιλείας, in which Gorgi-
ias was assailed.)

Buttmann thus defends ἐi, 
which a few MSS. omit: 
'Quamvis certum exploratum-
que haberent vulgares illi orato-
tores, regem propter divitias 
suas unice beatum putandum 
esse, tamen rem ita in encomis 
tractabant, ut, quasi dubia ea 
videri posset, multis eam exem-
plis argumentisque probarent. 
Quidni igitur v. c. encomii 
alectus in Crœsum argumentum 
tum his verbis indicari potu-
erit; ἢ Κροῖος εἰδαίμων;' If 
ἐi is retained, a certain point 
may be given to ὁ (with Cou-
what justice is, from diatribes on the theme ‘Is a king happy?’ to contemplate the idea of the royal office and of human happiness. Then that dwarfed shrewd legal mind is

κεκτημένον τ' αὖ πολὺ χρυσίον, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ π. 175. ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἄθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίω τ' ἔστων καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἀπο-5 φυγεῖν,—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ὅταν αὖ δὴ λόγον διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἔκεινον τὴν ψυχήν καὶ δρμῶν καὶ δικανίκων, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδοντοι ἰλλυγιῶν τε ἀπὸ ύψηλοι κρεμασθείς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀπέδειας, ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν

sin, Wagner, H. Schmidt) by supposing βασιλεύς and κεκτημένος to be distinct subjects: ‘Is a king, or, again, one possessed of much gold, to be accounted happy?’ It may be questioned, however, whether ἡ βασιλεύς might not give a better meaning.

In any way of taking the words as they stand, τε seems to impede the sense, and ἂν is superfluous. If Plato is really quoting from a rhetorician, this is possibly not a fatal objection, though the conjectures πάντων πολύ, πάμπολω, (Heusd. Hirschig. Badh.) would seem probable. (Schanz reads from Madvig’s conj. βασιλεύς εὐδαίμονες κεκτημένοι τά τυχοῦσιν.) Possibly, however, the words βασιλεύς... τυχοῦσιν are adapted from some poet. (Cp. Theogn.: Εὐδαίμονες εὖν, καὶ θεϊς φιλος ἀτανατος, Κύρν', ἀρετής δ' ἄλης οὐδεμιάς ἐραμαῖ.) In which case γὰν πολυ-χρυσοῦν is perhaps the true reading. For κεκτημένος in such an adaptation, cp. (besides Protag. 340 D quoted above), the quotation of Tyrtaeus in the Laws, 629 A: Οὔτ' ἂν μη-σαίμην οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνθρα τυθεί-μυν, οὔτ' εἰ πλουσιότατος ἄνθρω-πων εὖ, φησίν, οὔτ' εἰ πολλὰ

ἀγαθα κεκτημένοις, εἰτὼν σχεδον ὀπιστὰ, κ.τ.λ. (E.g. the lines might run Εἰ βασιλεύς εὖñ, ἵσχυ-σιν δι γὰν πολύχρυσον.)

There is a close parallel between the present passage and 174 B: Τοιαύτα, κ.τ.λ. Cp. τί ἐγὼ σε ἀδικω with εν διακοσμηρ... ἀναγκαζοθ' λέγων: ἢ σὺ ἐμε with εν ταῖς λαοδορίαις: εἰ (or ἡ) βασιλεύς... with τυ-ραννον τε γὰρ ...


8. διενεργῶν τι 'He gives the philosopher his revenge; (for) dizzied by the strange experience of hanging at such a height and looking downwards from mid-air, and being dismayed and lost, and broken in his utterance, he is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaids, nor by any other of the uneducated, for they do not perceive his plight; but by all whom nurture has been the reverse of servile.'

The sentence probably divides after ἀθείας, and ἀδημονῶν τὲ... answers to διενεργῶν τε. (διενεργῶν τε. γὰρ add. Ven. Ζ. This is quite unnecessary.)
p. 175. καὶ βαρβαρίζων, γέλωτα Θράττας μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ ἀπαίδευτῳ οὐδὲν, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίως ἢ ὑπὸ ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσιν ἀπασίν. Οὕτος δὴ ἐκατέρω τρόπως, ὃ Θεόδωρος, ὃ μὲν τῷ οὖτι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένον, ὅν δὴ φιλόσοφος φον καλεῖς, δὴ ἀνεμέστηντον εἰρθεί δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδὲν εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἔμπεστη διακονήματα, οἷον στροματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευάζασθαι μηδὲ ὅνου ἡδύναι ἡ ἡπλώς λόγοις. ὃ δὴ αὐτὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένον τοῖς τε καὶ ὄξεος δια-κονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδεξίᾳ

1. βαρβαρίζων] Lit. ‘Speaking in a strange dialect;’—strange i.e. to the inhabitants of the higher region. Schanz admits into the text Pierson’s conjecture βαρταφίζων (‘stammering’), founded on a passage in Themistius which seems an echo of this; Themist. 22. 278 b: “Οὐ μερὶ γὰρ ληγμοῖς εὐθέως καὶ λογικομένη καὶ βαρβαρίζουσαν. But there is no sufficient reason for rejecting βαρβαρίζων.

6. τοῖς ἀνεμέστηντοι ‘Who may, without our surprise or censure, appear simple and a mere cipher, when some menial service is required of him, if he has no skill, for instance, in tying up bedclothes with the proper knot, nor in flavouring a sauce, or a fawning speech:—the other character is that of the man who is able to do all such service with smartness and despatch, but has not the skill to throw his cloak over his right shoulder with a gentlemanly grace; no, nor to celebrate ariot with the music of discourse, in his turn, that life which is lived in truth by the immortals and by heaven-favoured men.’

Cobet requiescendus vor obedi. But the dative, whether masculine or neuter, is analogous to Soph. ΚΕ. ΤΥΡ. 1019: ‘Εξ ισον τῷ μηθεί, and agrees better with εὐθεῖα.


11. ἀναβάλλεσθαι... ἐπιδέξιᾳ] Probably, (1) ‘to wear his garment over his right shoulder in a gentlemanly fashion.’ Aristoph. ΑΥ. 1567: Οὕτως, τὶ δρᾶς; ἐν ἀριστῳ οὕτως ἀπέγει; ὃ μεταβαλεῖς δοξάσεται ἐπὶ δεξιά; Or, possibly, ἐπιδέξια may mean ‘cleverly,’ ‘deftly.’ Cp. Hor. ΕΡ. I. 1. 96: ‘Si toga dissidet impar, Rides. Quod, mea cum pugnat sententia secum?’ (2) A possible rendering at first sight is, ‘to strike up the song in his turn.’ Cp. οὐδὲ γ’ ἀρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντα, and cp. Rep. 4. 420 Ε: Κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξαὶ πρὸς τὸ πύρ διαπίνοντας. Symp. 177 D: Ἐντευ ἔπαινον Ἐρωτος ἐπὶ δεξαί. But one person could hardly be
said to sing ἐπί δεξία, and the antithesis requires the other rendering. The slave can tuck in and pack up bedclothes, the freeman wears his garment with a grace. Theslaves' contribution to the banquet is literally ὄφον ἱδώνα, figuratively ὑπαίτια λόγον ἕδωναι. Supr. 173 Α. (Cp. Gorg. 465 D: ἢ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀντιστροφαὶ ὄφοναῖς ἐν ψυχῇ ὥς ἐκεῖνόν ἐν σάματος.) The 'freeman's' part is literally the lyre and song; in a higher sense, discourse of philosophy and virtue. This is his proper ἔρως. Cp. Symp. 177 D, where the minstrel is proposed, and Eryximachus is proposed that they should discourse of the praises of love: δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι χρήναι ἐκαςτὸν ἡμῶν λόγον ἐπείν ἐπαίνων ἔρως ἐπὶ δεξία ὡς ἐν δύναται καλλιτεύς, Prot. 347 E. There is a further 'harmony' between the discourse and life of the philosopher; Lach. 188 D: καὶ κομίδα μοι δοκεῖ μονοκλικόν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἀρμονίαν καλλιτεύς ἡμοσῳδόνος ὑμῖν λύρας. οὐδὲ πανθῖα δρόμοι, ἀλλὰ τῷ δυτὶ ζην ἡμοσῳδόνος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν βιῶν ζυγώμενον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀνεχθῶν διαρίματι ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ οὐκ ἔστη, οὐ μαί δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγισθη οὐδὲ λυπισθή. Συνάντων εἶναι.

There is an allusion to the well-known custom of taking the lyre in turn. ὑπαίτια λόγον is perhaps rightly supposed by Ruhn. ad Tim. p. 146 to be a poetical expression, quoted perhaps from Euripides or Epicharmus.

2. ἦθος τοῦ καὶ ἄνθρωπον εὐδαιμονὶ βιῶν ἀληθῆ] There is a rhythmical cadence in the words, cp. Phaedr. 261 A: Πάρηλα δὴ, ὅρματα γενναία, καλλιτεύς τε Παιδῆρο πείθετε, Rep. 617 D: Ἀνάγκης θυγατρός κόρης Λαγέσεως λόγος, κ. τ. λ. Symp. 197 E, the end of Agathon's speech. This is not improved by deleting ἀληθῆ with Cobet, and so leaving an iambic ending —ο,—. 7. ὑπεναντίον γάρ] Compare the saying of Heraclitus, Fr. 56: Παλάπωνοι ἀρμονίαν κόσμου ἄκωστερ λύρας καὶ τόξον. The preposition conveys the idea of 'bearing up against.' 9. τόνδε τῶν τόπων] Viz. τῶν σωματοειδῶν τε καὶ ὅρατων τόπων, Rep. 7. 532 D. The imagery of place in which Plato's philosophy is enfolded appears most prominently in the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, and Rep. 6 and 7.

The notion that evil must
exist in everything but the Divine Nature reappears in a curious mythical form in the Politicus, 270; and is implied Tim. 48 A: Εξ ανάγκης καὶ νοῦ νυκτάσισας. 86 B: Τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν (sc. νοσήματα) διὰ σώματος ἔξω, κ.τ.λ. Ιβ. 69 D: Συγκεκριμένοι τ' αὐτὰ ἀναγκαῖοι τὸ θετικὸν γένος ἔυνθεσαν. In the Phaed evil is almost identified with the bodily principle. Our ignorance on the subject is, however, confessed in the Lysis, 220 E, 221: Πάντων, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόλητα, οὐδὲ πεινὴν ἃ ἐσται οὐδὲ δυσφήν ὁδὴ ἀλλο οὐδὲ τῶν τοιοῦτον; .. ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἔρωτμα, δὲ τὸν ἐσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἐσται; τὸ γὰρ οἶδεν;

2. φυγή δὲ ὀμοίωσις θεῷ]
Phaedr. 252 E, 253: Ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνεφίκησεν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν, εὑροῦντο διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἰμακακάθεια πρὸς τὸν θεόν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ μυθήσει, ἐνευώνοντες, ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνοντα τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὰ ἐπειδήματα, καθός δεν δυνατὸν τοῦ ἀνδρόποτι μετατρέψειν.

Ἡρ. 10. 613 Α: Οὗ γὰρ δὴ ἐπὶ γε θεοῦ ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, δὲ ἂν προθυμεῖναι ἐδοξάσω γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς δον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὀμοίωσιν θεῷ. Ιβ. 6. 500 B: οὐδὲ γὰρ ποι, δ' Ἀδείμασθε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ἀκριβῶς πρὸς τοὺς οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κατὰ βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας καὶ μορφώνεις αὐτοῦ φόδον τοῦ καὶ δυσμενεῖς ἐμπληκασθαι, ἄλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἀντα καὶ κατὰ ταύτα ἄλλον ἀρωταν καὶ θεωμένως ὁμοῦ ἀδικοῦντα οὕτω ἀδικούμενα ἐπὶ ἀλλήλων, κύριορ γὰρ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταύτα μεμεινόντας ταῦτα καὶ ταῦτα ἀποφυγή κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλην τοῦ ἀτέλειοθῆν τε καὶ φρονηματίκην γενέσθαι. Τιμ. 90 B: Τὸ δὲ περὶ φιλομάθειαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀλήθειας φρονήσεις ἐπιστολικὸν καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τῶν αὐτοῦ γεγενεμενὸν φρονεῖν μὲν ἀδάκταν καὶ διὰ, ἀντίτι ἀληθείας ἐφάπτοτα, πάσα ἄντικην ποι, καθός δὲ αὐτὸ μετατρέψειν ἀνθρώπην φύσις ἀδακτας εἴδεται, τοῦτον μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν; διὰ τὸ καταμαθάνειν τὰ τῶν παντὸς ἀρμονίαν τε καὶ περιφορὰς, τὸ κατασκοεῖν ὄνομαίσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίν φύσιν.

3. ὀμοίωσις δὲ; 'And to be made like to Him is to become righteous and holy, not without wisdom.'

μετὰ φρονήσεως] Is virtue possible apart from knowledge? This question is discussed in the Protagoras and the Meno. The answer given is, that practically it would appear so, but that perfect virtue must be inseparable from knowledge. And in the Meno the paradox is solved by saying that practical virtue is a Divine gift, being μοῖρα προσογγιωμενή ἄνω νοῦ, but that if ever there should be a virtuous man who could teach virtue, he would be like Teiresias amongst the shades; ὅσπερ παρὰ σκότος ἄλθεις ἀν πράγμα εἴη πρὸς ἄρετην.
the more dialectical dialogues one side of the contradiction disappears, and it is assumed that philosophy is essential to real virtue. Phæd. 69 A B: ‘Ο μακάρες Σωκράτης, μη γάρ σοι αὐτή ἡ ὑπὲρ ὅτι ἔργοι πρὸς ἄρετὴν ἀλλαγῆ, ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονάς καὶ λυπῶσις πρὸς λύπας καὶ φοβίαν πρὸς φόβον καταλλακτεῦσθαι . . . ἄλλ’ ἡ ἐκείνῳ τὸ κύριόμα ὄρθιον, . . . φρονῆσαι, . . . καὶ ἐξήλθησιν ἀληθῶς ἐρετὴν ἡ μετὰ φρόνησιν, . . . χωριζόμεναι δὲ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀλλατίσματα ἄπτον ἀλληλον, μή σκιαγραφία τις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐρετή, κ. τ. λ. In the Republic it is again acknowledged that it is possible to partake of virtue without philosophy, but in an imperfect way; e. g. in the case of the soul which laments its choice of another life; 10. 619 C: Εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόνων, ἐν τεταγμένη πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ πρωτόφρον βιῷ βεθωσκότα, θεὶ ἀνών φιλοσοφίας ἐρετῆς μετειληφότα. And the education of the φύλακες generally (not of the rulers) is independent of reason, though in harmony with it. Rep. 3. 401, 402. (In the Philebus also the perfect life contains the knowledge of practical things. The philosopher must know his way home.) Thus the contradiction felt at first is reconciled by acknowledging the existence of different parts of our nature, which, though connected, and indispensable to each other’s perfection, are not identical. There is a slight emphasis on μετὰ φρόνησιν in opposition to what follows.

4. ἢμεν . . . δοκῆ ἦναι . . . ἀγωνίου γάρ γε ζημίαν ἀδικίας] The whole of this passage is parallel to the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second book of the Republic, and the same thought is differently worked out in the Gorgias.

5. ὁ λεγόμενος γραών ὢδηλον] ‘This is what men commonly repeat, an old wives’ fable, as appears to me.’ The meaning of λεγόμενος here (not ‘as the saying is’) seems determined by λεγόμεν following.

9. περὶ τοῦτον] ‘Moreover a man’s real ability, or else his nothingness and want of manhood, is concerned with this.’ περὶ τοῦτο is read in the quotations of Iamblichus and Theodoret. It is approved by Cobet, and has been adopted by Schanz. The genitive is accounted for by the indeter-
minateness of the point in question. 'On this, one way or other, depends,' etc. ἀναθήματα is suggested by ἄνθρωπος.

5. φορτικά...βάναυσον] Vulgar—'mechanical,' or 'mean.' The contrast here is not between truth and falsehood, but, as in the Politicus, between the actual and the ideal.

6. τὸ οὖν ἄδικον, κ. τ. λ.] This very favourite thought is developed in the Gorgias. See esp. 524–7.

7. τὸ μὴ...ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι] 'Not to admit that villany constitutes him a clever man.'

9. οὐ λήρων] 'That they are not mere absurdities, cumbering the ground:—not solecisms,' as Carlyle might say.


λήρων] Charm. 176 A: 'Εμὲ μὲν λήρων ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδικονομάτων λόγω ὑπο λήρων ἀσέβειας καὶ ὀνομάτων ἀν φαίνοντο.

10. οἴσις...τὸς σωθησόμενος] 'Such as all must be in the city who are to live securely there.' 'Such as those must be in the state whose lives are not to be forfeit,' i.e. endangered by every accusation (Wohlrab). Cp. Soph. Ant. 189: 'Ἡ ἡ ἕστγε ἡ σώζοντα, ἕντο εἰναι τις ἀδίκοντες, ἀδίκοντες, ἀδίκοντες.' Which men often escape entirely in doing wrong,' ἐν δέδομα ab 证监会. Heindorf.

10. τῶν καθορῶν] Viz. πλάνης καὶ ανοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ αἵρεσιν ἐφορίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καθορῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίων, Phaed. 81 A.

καθαρῶν] Phaed. 83 D: 'Εκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδεχόμεν ὑπὸ σώματι καὶ τοὺς αὐτούς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται, οὐμαί, ὁμότραπος καὶ ὁμότραπος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲς μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς Ἀιδοὺς ἀφικέσθαι ὧλ’ ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἀναλέα εἶχενα, ὡστε τυχὸν πάλιν πιέστως ἐκ ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ δωπερ σπερμόμην ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συννοιάς.

Ibid. 69 C: Καὶ ἡ σαφροσύνη, κ.τ.λ. καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρὸς τὸ θείον καὶ κωδικούσα καί οἱ τὰς τελετὰς . . . καταστήσαντες . . . πιὸς αἰνήσθαι ὅτι δὲ ἰον ἄμοιος καὶ αἰνίεστος εἰς Ἀιδοὺς ἀφικνηται, ἐν βορβόροις κεῖται, ὁ δὲ καθαρομένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἀκειμενομένος ἀφικνητα μετὰ θείων ἀκοής.

Ἀτοῦς ὁμοιότητας τῆς διαγωγῆς] I. e. (as H. Schmidt remarks) τῆς αὐτούς ὁμοιότητας τῆς διαγωγῆς τοῦ ἱσού. 'They will always retain their way of life like to themselves—evil as they are, associating with evil things.' Compare the well-known passage of the Phaedo, 81 C—82 A: 'Αλλα διελημμένη γε, οὐμαί, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδός . . . κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελετῆς (imitated by Milton, Comus, 467—9):

'The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose
The divine property of her first being.'

11. κακοὶ κακοὶ συνόντες] κακοὶ is probably neuter. See H. Schmidt, Exegetischer Commentar, p. 139.

12. καὶ παντάπασιν ὃς δεινὸς}
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 177. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δή, ὁ Σάκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οἶδά τοι, ὁ ἐταῖρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἠδὴ λόγον δέχῃ δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσί, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικὸς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείναν καὶ μὴ ἀνάδρομος φεύγειν, 5 τότε ἀτόπως, ὃ δαιμόνι, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκοσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγοντες, καὶ ἡ ῥήτορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὅστε παῖδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἄποστομεν — ἐἰ δὲ μὴ, πλείω ἀεὶ ὁ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγου. — ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ ἐμπρόσθεν ἱσμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΟ. 'Εμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὁ Σάκρατες, οὐκ ἀρδεύστα ἀκούεις; ῥῶ γὰρ τηλικότερον ὅντι ἐπακολουθεῖς, εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανώμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθα ποι ἡμῖν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν δὴ I. e. the feeling of superiority will only be confirmed in them. The force of ὡς extends to ἀναφήγουν τινός.

2. Οἶδα τοι, ὁ ἐταῖρε] 'I am quite aware of it, my friend!' I. e. I know the full extent of the ridicule that they will pour on us.' He refers to the emphatic answer of Theodorus. (This explanation is accepted by H. Schmidt.)

3. ἰδία] 'Singly.' I. e. in conversation with one person, instead of haranguing εἰς τό μέσων.


7. ἡ ῥήτορικὴ ἐκείνη ποι ἀπομαράϊνεται] 'That brilliant rhetoric of theirs fades utterly, leaving them to appear no better than children.' Meletus, in Apol. 24—27, is a case in point. For τῶς cp. supr. 144 B.


10. πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγου] 'They will come in like a flood and bury our main argument.' The image is that of a torrent covering with its 'drift' the works of man. Cp. Crat. 414 C: Τὰ πρῶτα ὑψόμεθα τεθεῖτα κατακλώσας ἴση ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγῳδεῖν αὐτά. Polit. 302 C: Τοῦ τῶν ἐπικεχυμένου λόγου κατ' ἀρχάς. Legg. 7. 793 B. A still more lively image is employed below, 184 A.

3. εν μέν... περὶ δὲ τάγαθου] 'In other cases they would insist strongly on the truth of their principle;—with respect to justice in particular they would insist that the enactments of any state are just for her, so long as they remain in force;—but when good is in question—'
4. περὶ τὰ δίκαια... περὶ τάγαθου] 'In regard to what is just—concerning what is good.'
6. ἐσωπηρ ἐν κέρτα] Supr. 172 B: 'Ὅσον ἐν δοκῇ κρόνον,
περὶ δὲ τάγαθου] Rep. 6. 505 D: 'Ο δὲ διώκει μὲν ἄσπασα ψυχή καὶ τούτων ἐνεκα πάντα πράττειν, ἀπομανεμομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ, κ.τ.λ. What is good cannot be apparent merely. (Compare the saying of Des Cartes and Spinoza: ‘The idea of God implies His existence.’) This was not, however, universally admitted. Ar. Eth. N. τ. 3. § 3: Τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πάλιν ἔχει καὶ τάγαθα, κ.τ.λ.
τάγαθος...ἀφέλμα] Rep. 5. 457 B, 458 E: Κάλλιστα γὰρ τὸν καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέγεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀφέλμον καλῶν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρῶν... γάμους... ψυ-
p. 177. ἐστι τοσοῦτον χρόνου ὅσον ἄν κέπται ὧφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὅνομα λέγοι· τὸτε δὲ ποὺ σκῶμ' ἄν εἴῃ πρὸς ὁ λέγομεν. οὐχί;
ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὅνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα 5 ὁ ὅνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται.
ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γὰρ.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ὃ ἂν τούτῳ ὄνομάζῃ, τούτου δὴ που στοχαζέται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἴεται τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὁφελιμοτάτους το ἐαυτῇ τίθεται. ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθε-
τείται;

p. 178. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. 'Η οὖν καὶ τυχχάνει ἄει, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ δια-
μαρτάνει ἑκάστη;

1. πλήν εἴ τις . λέγομεν] Rep. 7.533 D: Ἐστι δ', ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, οὖ περὶ ὅνοματος ἀμφισβήτησιν, οἷς τοσοῦτων πέρι σκέψεις ὅς ὅν ἡμῖν πρόειναι. The scoffer is supposed to say that the legislature may give the name ὧφέλιμον to what it will. Cp. Charm. 163 D.

3. πρὸς δ λέγομεν] In respect of that which we mean.

5. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὅνομα] 'Let him not intend the name but the thing which is contemplated under it.' γὰρ refers to Theodorus' πάνυ γε. Badham's conjecture, τὸ πράγμα δ ὅνομαζόμεν θεωρεῖται, has received a curious apparent confirmation from the variant which appears on the margin of two MSS. (Ven. Π and Ces.), ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα τὸ ὅνομαζόμεν θεωρεῖται. But it may still be doubted whether this is not a coincidence of conjectures.

For λέγειν in Plato is rather 'to mean' than 'to say.' For the sense cp. Ar. Met. 1. 1006: Τὸ δ' ἀποροφύμον οὐ τούτῳ ἢ τάσιν, εἴ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρωπον τὸ ὅνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα.

7. Μὴ γὰρ] These words were put into Socrates' mouth in the edd. before Heindorf. Cp. Soph. 255 B: Μὴ τοῖνος λέγουσα, κ.τ.λ. Θε. μὴ γὰρ.

8. δὲ τούτῳ ὀνομάζῃ[7] 'Whatever name the State gives to this' (τὸ πράγμα, supr.).

10. καθ' ὅσον οἴεται τε καὶ δύ-

ναται] 'To the extent of her opinion and her power.' I. e. She prescribes what she thinks beneficial, so far as she is able to enforce it. (She may be blind to her true interests, or a stronger power may prevent her from legislating according to her own views.) Cp. Rep. 1. 338 foll.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΟ. Οίμαι έγγειγ καὶ διαμαρτάνειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐτὶ τοὺνν ἐνθέντε ἀν μᾶλλον τὰς τις ὁμολογήσει ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντὸς τις τοῦ ἔδους ἐρωτήτε, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὁφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὁν. ἔστι δέ 5 πον καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετώμεθα, ὃς ἐσομένοις ὁφέλιμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγομεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡθι δή, ύπωσι ἐρωτῶμεν Προταγόραν ἢ ἄλλον τινά τὸν ἐκείνον τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων, Πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὡς φατὲ, ὃ Προταγόρα, λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅστον οὐ τῶν τοι-σύτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κρίτηριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἶα

2. ἐνθέντε] 'From the following point of view.'

4. ἐν ᾧ καὶ[ For the method cp. Rep. 6. 491 C: Λαβοῦ τοῖνν ἄλλον αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ... πάντος περὶ σπέρματος ἡ φύσιν. By analysing the term 'beneficial' into 'future good' Socrates is able to extend his proof to sensible things, and thus directly to refute Protagoras. For not only 'future good,' but 'future hot,' 'sweet,' 'tuneful,' 'persuasive,' is known by the ἐπιστήμων, and by him alone. Plato also brings out the significant principle that 'prediction is the test of science.'


Whatever is expedient is also referrible to future time. As elsewhere, the connotation of the term is limited by the example given, so that τὸ ὁφέ-λιμον here really=τὸ ἐν νομοθετήτῳ ὁφέλιμον. 'Expediency as a principle of legislation.'

Cp. infr. 179 A. And, for the use of καὶ, supr. 152 B: οὐκοιν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἐκατέρωθεν.

7. τοῦτο δὲ] Cp. τὸ ἐσόμενον εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.

μέλλον] The MSS. vary between μέλλον (Bodl. Vat. Ven. π.), μᾶλλον μέλλον (Coisli.), and μέλλον μᾶλλον (Τ. pr. cett.). But μᾶλλον is given by the corrector of Τ.

13. λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅταν οὐ] Cp. supr. 171 E: Ἡθὶ μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ ταύτη καὶ ἐστὶν ἱκάστη, θερμά, ἔρημα, γλυκεὰ, πάντα δὲ τῶν τύπων τούτων. And, for the omission of μελάνων, supr. 159 C, καθεύδοντα, and note.

14. τὸ κρίτηριον] The word is formed from κρίτης, on the analogy of δικαστήριον. Cp. Legg. 6. 787 B: Δίῳ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐστῶ κρίτηρια. The present is probably one of the earliest instances of its use.
The text appears to be a page from a Greek text, possibly a philosophical work. It contains references to philosophical concepts and discussions, including the use of accusative forms and the mention of future time. The text is likely discussing the nature of knowledge and its implications on future events. The text is numbered 135 and is part of a larger work, possibly a dialogue or a treatise on philosophy. The page contains Greek text and English annotations, indicating a discussion of Greek grammatical and logical concepts.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

στηρότητος μελλούσης ἐσεσθαι ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, p. 178. ἄλλ' οὖχ ἡ τοῦ κιβαριστοῦ, κυρία.

ΘΕΟ. Τι μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρ-5 μόστον ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσει μονοικοῦ, δ' καὶ ἐπείτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δοξεὶ εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὕκων καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑστιάσεσθαι μὴ 10 μαγειρικοῦ ἄντος, σκευαζομένης θοινῆς, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὄψισιν περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἂδε ὄντος ἐκάστῳ ἢδεος ἡ γεγονο- 15 ἕ τος μηδὲν περὶ λόγῳ διαμαχόμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξεω καὶ ἑσεσθαι πότερον αὐτῶς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτῆς, ἢ σὺ, ὁ Προταγόρα, τὸ γε περὶ λόγους πιθανῶν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσῃς ἡ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὀστισοῦν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, τοῦτο γε σφόδρα 20 ὑπισχεύετο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτῶς.

ΣΩ. Νὴ Δία, ὁ μέλε. οὖδεὶς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διε- 4. ἀναρμόστου . . ἐσομένων] The neuter is used without the article here, because the question refers to a particular case.

9. Here, as in the Gorgias, (403, 4) cookery prepares the way for rhetoric. Cp. supr. 175 D. Even ὄψισιν, however, is not an ἄτεχνο τριβή if it can foretell consequences.

13. μηδὲν περὶ λόγῳ διαμαχόμεθα] The certainty of present impressions is afterwards swept away together with the doctrine of motion, infr. 182. And the relation of present to past impressions is further discussed under the guise of a new inquiry, 191 foll. (See especially the word μημεῖον.)

15. τὸ γε περὶ λόγους πιθανῶν] A further homestretch at Protagoras, of a different order from his own ὄψις supr. 166 C.

16. ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον] 'That which each of us will find persuasive to be spoken in court.' 'Each of us' includes not only those who are to hear, but the man who is to speak the speech in court.

21. ὁ μέλε] This comic ad-
dress, nowhere else used by Plato, marks Socrates' exquisite enjoyment of the humour of the situation.

1. *δή* The MSS. have all *εί μή*. Heindorf corrects this to *εί πη*, and gives the following note:—'Profecto in futurarum quoque rerum cognitione omnibus precellere se Protagoras profitebatur, aut nemo ipsi magnam doctrinæ mercedem solvisset, si quo modo persuassisset discipulis, etiam de futuris rebus neque vatem neque alium quemquam melius possee judicare, quam ipsum sibi unumqueaque.' V. ad Gorg. § 75. 47. Platonis autem sententiam restituisse unius litterarum mutatione. Quippe vulgo scriptum *εί μή τούς συν*, unde contrarius prorsus et absurdo sensus efficitur. Quam scripturam nequis tuendam arbitretur verbo αὐτός ad Protagoras trahendo et αὐτῷ mutando in αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ συνώντι), manifesta h. l. est superioriorum verborum πάτερον αὐτός αὐτῷ ἀριστος κρατίς repetitio, neque tum ferri posset hoc αὐτῷ: adeo id moleste redundaret. Idem vitium insidet Phileb. 34 C: *ίνα μή την ψυχήν ἡδονήν χωρίς σώματος ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἑναργεύτερα λάβομεν. Corr. *ίνα πη, et Protag. 331 D: καὶ γὰρ ὅτι οὐ προφθαμηγέτη προσθοικεν τὸ γὰρ λεκον τῷ μέλαιν ἐστιν μή (l. διδυ) προσθοικεν καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τὸ μάλακα.*

This reasoning is in the main correct. But δή, which is the received correction of Phil. l. c., seems more forcible here than πη, which has no particular aptness in this passage. 'If it had really been his wont to persuade them of that which has been now suggested.' Cp. 166 C: εἴ δὲ ἄναμάτων γε . . . . . alib. The corruption probably originated in the slightly obscure reference of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, or perhaps simply from the neighbourhood of Νή (written ρή). [Schanz also, it would seem independently, suggests εἴ δή.]

Schleiermacher solved the difficulty by omitting αὐτῷ (which, as H. Schmidt observes, might be suggested to an emendator by πάτερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, supra 178 E), and referring αὐτός to Protagoras. But this destroys the force of καί, and the question is not between one oracle and another, but between the opinion of the master and of the common individual. For αὐτῷ referring to an indefinite subject cp. Apol. 39 D: οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὐτῇ ἢ ἀπαλλαγῆ ὤστε πάνω δυνατή ὀστε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ βαστή, μή τούς ἄλλους κολονεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν παρασκευάζων δόσω ἐσται ὡς Βελτιστος. For the change from plural to singular, which has been elsewhere illustrated, cp. esp. Rep. 1. 344 B C.

The μάς is introduced as being ἐπιστήμων of the future generally, just as the physician is of future health or sickness, the musician of future harmony, etc. τις ἄλλος points distantly at Protagoras himself, and his position as the prophet of the school is hinted at. Cp. supra 162 A: ἔκ τοῦ ἄδυτου τῆς βύθου ἐφθέγξατο,
μάντις οὖτε τις ἄλλος ἀμενον κρίνειν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς p. 179.
αὐτῷ.

ΤΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὧφελιμον
5 περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστὶ, καὶ τάς ἂν ὀμολογοῦν νομοθετο-
μένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὧφελιμοσά-
τον ἀποτυγχάνειν;

ΤΕΟ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον σου
10 εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὀμολογεῖν σοφάτερον τε ἢ
ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρου εἶναι,
ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμουν μηδὲ ὑποστοῖν ἀνάγκην
eἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἡναγκαζέον ὁ ὑπερ
ἐκεῖνον λόγος, ἐτὶ ἐβουλόμην ἐτε μῇ, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

15 ΤΕΟ. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὥς Σώκρατες, μάλιστα
ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλησκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, ἢ τὰς
tῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὐτῶ δὲ ἑφανθὰ
τῶν ἐκεῖνον λόγους οὐδαμὴ ἀληθεὶς ἠγούμεναι.

ΣΩ. Πολλαχῇ, ὥς Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τὸ γε σ
20 τοιοῦτον ἄλοιπη, μὴ πάσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι.

H. Schmidt remarks that the
descriptive imperfections are con-
tinued from ὕπαρχειν αὐτῷ.
4. αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὧφελι-
μον] 'Legislation and expedi-
cy' (which is the principle of
legislation).
5. πᾶς ἂν ὀμολογεῖ] An ap-
peal to common sense like
supr. 171 D: Ὀμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό
γε ὑπνοῦν. Thus we return
to the chief statement, which
has been reinforced with the
additional argument beginning
with οὖν ἐκεῖνον, supr. 178 A.

Arist. Met. 11. 1063 a: Τοῦ-
του δὲ διὸ τοιοῦτον, τοὺς ἐτέρους
μὲν ὑποληπτῖους μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς
8 ἐτέρους όμοι ὑποληπτῖοι.
12. τῷ ἀνεπιστήμουν] Supr.
150 C.
13. ἂς ἄρτι] Supr. 167 D.
15. Ἐκείνη... ταύτῃ] The
position which Theodorus has
previously accepted is nearer
and more familiar to him than
that to which he points as still
in the hands of Socrates. Hence
the use of the demonstratives.
16. καὶ ταύτῃ] 171 f. foll.
20. μὴ] Cp. supr. 166 C.
το τοιοῦτον is either (1) the
theory, or (2) (as cognate sub-
ject of ἄλοιπη) the refutation
of the theory.
1. *perι* δὲ τὸ παρόν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, εξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπότερον ἐλείν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθείς. Ἡσος δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτον γὰρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσὶ, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἃν οὐτα λέγοντες, καὶ Ἡθικόντος ὅς ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταύτων θέμενος. προστείτων οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, δ ὡς ὃ ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτεῖον

6. οὖν ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν] Hom. Odysse. 1.344: ὁ φίλος, οὐ μᾶλὰ ἄπο του σκοποῦ οὔ ἀπὸ δόξην ἀλλὰ βασιλεία περί- φροι. 8. ὡς . . . ἐπέτατε] Suppr. 166 C, 168 B. In the previous section Socrates was dealing directly with Protagoras. He now goes still more closely to work by grappling with the principle on which the theory of Protagoras is grounded by his disciples, especially by those who are also followers of Heraclitus. We have already answered him (supr. A) in his own person, but we have not quite done with him (infr. 183 B) until the Heraclitean ‘flux’ has been finally disposed of.

σκεπτεῖον . . . διακρούοντα] Soph. 246 B: Τοιγασόν οἱ πρὸς αὐ- τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μᾶλλα εὐλα- βοῦς ἤτοι ἐξ ὥσπερ τοῦ παθέων ἀμύνοντας, νομὶα ἄτοτα καὶ ἀσώ- ματα ἥτις ἔχουσιν τῶν ἀληθεῖσιν ὑποτασσόμενοι τὰ εἰς ἐκέντρας σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἀλή- θειας κατὰ συμπλήρωσιν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσεν ἄντι σωτερίας φερομένων τινὰ προσαγωγοῦνας. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταύτα ἀπέλευσαν ἀμφοτέρων μάχῃ ταίς, ὁ Θεάστης, δὲν ξυνήσατεν. This combat is somewhat differently de-
Perhaps this is improbable, but let us approach, and try whether its foundation in the doctrine of motion is secure.

I. 8. Criticism of the principle. All is motion. Final rejection of the doctrine of sense.

scribed in the present passage.

1. τὴν ρεμομένην ... ὀνομαὶ] ταύτην refers to the conclusion in 160 C and the preceding argument from 156 A onwards.

diakροῖντα] (ἀκούοντα Bodl.) Schol.: 'Εκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν διακροίνων τὰ κεράμα, εἱ ἀκριβῶς εἶσαι. Cp. Phileb. 55 C: Γενναῖος δὲ, εἰ τὴ σαβδὼν ἔχει, τὰν περικροῖονει. Compare the English expression, 'As sound as a bell.'

5. ἐπιδιδοῖσα πάμπολ] 'Gains in importance,' 'is waged with increasing energy.'


It would appear from this that the Heracliteans of Ephesos upheld a doctrine akin to that of the Cyrenaics.

'toūτου τοῦ λόγου] λόγοι is here almost equivalent to 'school of thought.' Cp. supr. τοῦ τούτου ἡμετέρου χροοῦ, κ.τ.λ., infr. τῶν ἐπεισκομαζόντων λόγων.

8. Ἐκ τοῦ] 'We are the more bound to consider the question, and that in the light of its first principle, even as they present it to us in the discussion.' Gorg. 448 E: 'Ωσπερ σοι τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ὑπειπεδο- ναρο Χαρεψῶν. (καὶ εἰ χρῆσις is the Bodleian reading, εἰ χρῆσις T. The words ἡ τοῦ ὁδός σηχύης . μᾶλλον εἰ χρῆσις εἰ ὁν in occur in Lach. 189 E.

9. ὡσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνωται] Viz. in referring everything to a first principle, whether of fire or motion.

II. τῶν 'Ἡρακλείτειῶν] Sc. δογμάτων. περὶ τοῖτων, κ.τ.λ. depends verbally partly on διαλεχθήναι, partly on ἑμπερίο, but really upon the notion 'there is no discussion possible.' Cp. infr. 180 C: "Ὅσπερ ἢ ἐρών. If the genitives were masculine, and out of construction, the use of ἑμπερίο without an object would be too abrupt. Compare, however, παρὰ μὲν τούτων, below.
Great has been the conflict and many the combatants on either side. The

little.' For πρὸς compare
Soph. 248 C: "Όταν τὰ παρῆ ἡ τοῦ πάσχεις ἡ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις. And for
μηδὲ σμικρὸν cp. Phileb. 60 C: Φρόνισον . . . ἡδονὴ μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν. See also Phædo,
93 B: 'Αστε καὶ κατά τὸ σμικρότατον . . . ἐπὶ πλέον . . . ἡ ἐπ᾽ θλαττόν . . . αὐτὸ τούτο εἶναι.

Here it is assumed that by a stretch of hyperbole, made possible by the negative sentence, μηδὲ σμικρὸν is substituted for σμικρότατον. Cp. ἤτον . . . ἡ τὸ μηδὲ, supr. There is a similar emphasis, though with less complexity, in Ὑσμ. 192 C: Ὅτι ἐθέλοντες, ὡς ἦσαν εἰς εἰς, χαρίζεσαν ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον . . . (where οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον might be rendered 'any
time at all'). οὐ τῇ ἐφεξῆς is here taken as impersonal, and τῇ, κ.τ.λ. as expository. The
use of μη (not οὐκ) is occasioned by the hypothetical τὸν = οὐδὲ εἰ μηδὲ σμικρὸν εἰς. The
genitive ἡσυχίας is postponed.

(2) Mr. Riddell, in his Digest of Idioms, § 246, observes that 'τὸ τὸ οὐδὲ οὐδὲν must be
supplied εἰναι:' i.e., he would render 'the utter absence of it is extraordinary, in regard
of the entire absence of rest in the men even in the least
particular.' But this is surely too harsh.

(3) H. Schmidt (Fleck. Jahrb. 103, 806) suspects the
whole sentence (μᾶλλον . . . . ἡσυχίας) as interpolated.
friends of Heraclitus in Ionia defend the doctrine of motion with all their might.

But we must take their theory into our own hands to test it. For the men are in a flux, and offer us no hold for argument.

15 ΣΩ. Ἡσσως, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἀνδρας μαχομένους ἐώρακας, εἰρηνεύοσι δὲ εὐ τυγχάνονας. οὐ γὰρ σοι τηρητικὰ . . . ἀποτοξεύονας]

The point in ὑπερβάλλει is, not that οὐδ’ οὐδὲν is a stronger expression than μηδέ
δεν (it should be compared with ἢττον . . . ἢ τὸ μηδέν), but
(a) the negation is put more strongly by being affirmed;
(b) ὑπερβάλλει assists the climax, as being a stronger word than any in the former clause; and,
(c) if the first rendering is correct, what was at first spoken of only with reference to argument, is now asserted generally (πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ συμφέρον). Cp. infr. Μητ’ ἐν λόγῳ μητ’ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς.

5 ὡσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας, κ.τ.λ.]


16. οὐ γὰρ σοι ἔτοιροι εἰσιν]
The dislike of a geometrician to the Heraclitean ‘method’ is not unnatural. And it is unmistakably evident here
that Plato has used a 'tour de force' in bringing together the Heracliteans and the 'disciples of Protagoras.'

1. τὰ τοιαῦτα] Sc. εἰρημέκα (Heindorf) or, rather, τὰ βίβαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

4. Ποιοὶς μαθηταῖς] 'Disciples forsooth!' Rep. i. 330 B: Ποί ἐπετηρήσαμι, ὄ Σώκρατες; alib.

5. αὐτῶματοι ἀναφύονται] 'They spring up unbidden, wherever each happens to have caught the afflatus.'

6. ὡσεὶ ἐν τῷ χῷ...ἐνθουσίως] Contrast with this Hegel, G. d. Ph. ed. 1840, p. 55: 'It is the very spirit of this whole recital, that the more developed Philosophy of a later age, is really the product of the previous labours of the thinking mind: that it is required and determined by these earlier views, and has not sprung of itself independently from the ground.' ('Nicht isolirt für sich aus dem Boden gewachsen ist.') For the expression αὐτόματων ἀναφύονται cp. Rep. 7. 520 B: Αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσεις τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ. As in supr. 172 foll. we had a description of the man corresponding to Protagoras' theory, so here we have the men of Heraclitus. The wildness and the enthusiasm, at once speculative and irrational, are Oriental rather than Greek, and are probably due rather to the soil than to the germ. Comparatively little of this is to be found in Heraclitus himself, although for their abrupt quaintness his sayings might be called ἰηματίσκεις αἰνιγματώδη.

8. οὐκ ἃν ποτε λάβοις λόγον] Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1066 a: Γελοιον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μιθεῦν ἔχοντα λόγον, ἢ μὴ ἔχειν ὀμοιος γὰρ φυτῷ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἢ τοιοῦτος ἤδη. 10. 1063 a: Μηθὲν γὰρ τι σοι ἄναρχαν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἔλος λόγον, ὡστε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους οὐκ ἔστιν λόγος.

9. αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβὸντας] 'But we must take the doctrine out of their hands, and con it over by ourselves like a geometrical theorem.' Theodorus speaks as a mathematician. The object of παραλαβόντας is vague; neither λόγον in the sense just used, nor ἀρχὴν; but τὰ Ἡρακλείτεια ταύτα, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ


ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ παρὰ
tοῦτος εἰκονικομένων τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ὡ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὀκεανός
tε καὶ Τηθὺς ἱερότα

τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἄτη
tοῦτοι, ἀναφαγόν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ

σκυτοσύμοι αὐτῶν τῇ σοφίᾳ μᾶθωσι ἁκούσαντες

καὶ παύσωνται ἡλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι, τὰ
dὲ κινεῖθαι τῶν ὑπών, μαθῶντες δ’ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖ-
tοι τιμῶσιν αὐτοὺς; ὁλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὃ Θεό-
dωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὐ τάναπτα τοῦτος ἀπεφήγαντο, Ὀλων

ἀκίνητον τ’ ἐπέλεθε, τῷ πάντῃ τ’ ὄνομι ἐδείκτην, καὶ ἄλλον ὅσον

Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντίον του ποιοτοι
dιάχυρονται, ὡς ἐν τῷ πάντα ἑστὶ καὶ ἐστηκν

1. τὸ γε δ’ πράβημα] ‘Well,

the theorem, as you call it.’

Compare with the repetition

g. γε the double use of γαρ, ἁλλα, κ.τ.λ.

2. παρειλήφαμεν . . . ἀποδεικνυμένων] ‘The doctrine

comes to us from ancient and from

modern sources. The ancients

indeed veiled their meaning

from the multitude and said,

etc.; but the moderns openly

declare their meaning.’ See

H. Schmidt, Krit. Comment.,

p. 509.

4. ἱερότα τυγχάνει] Sc.

ἐκτο, which is purposely (or

instinctively) omitted. Ὀκεα-

νός τε καὶ Τηθὺς are in appo-

sition with ἡ γένεσις, and ἱε-

ρότα is predicate. ὡς, etc.

expresses not what the poets

said, but what they meant,

depending partly on παρειλή-

φαμεν.

7. σκυτοσύμων] I. e. The


324 C: ὡς μὲν . . . εἰκόνως

ἀποδέχονται . . . καὶ χαλκεὺς καὶ

σκυτοσύμων συμβουλευόντως τὰ πο-

λυτικά : αλίπ.

10. τιμῶσιν αὐτοὺς] These

words merely satirize the φι-

λοσία of the Sophist. H.

Schmidt’s remark that the

multitude are predisposed to

extol a doctrine which reflects

the arbitrariness of their life,

introduces a subtlety which is

not present in the text.

11. Ὀλων] MSS. Ὀλων. But the

words of Simplicius in Aristot.

Phys. f. 7. a. are decisive :

Ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμέθει καὶ μᾶνον

ὡς πάντων εὐθυμένην.

12. ἐπέλεθε, τῷ πάντῃ] So all

the MSS. Buttm. conjectured τ’ ἐξέβαλον τῷ πάντῃ. This is gathered

from the quotations of Simplici-

cus, and is probably right.

Cobet, relying on the same

source, changes ὅλων to ὃλων.

14. ἐστηκεν αὐτό. ἐν αὐτῷ] ‘All

Being is One, and stand-

eth self-contained, not having

any space in which it moves.’
Their vehemence almost makes us forget the oppo-

The nearest approach to this latter assertion in the fragments of Parmenides is in the lines—

(78–85 Mullach) Οὐδὲ διατρητῶν ἂν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἂν ὅμως, ὅ τι ἐν τῷ μᾶλλον τὸ κενόν ἐγινεκεσθαι, ὅ ὅτι τῇ χειρότερᾳ πάν ἐν πλοῦτῳ ἀτομον. ἄν ἔχεις, ἐν γὰρ ἄστι, καὶ ταῦτα παλιότερα, ἐν μέσῳ ἐνέκειον μεγάλων ἐν περατείᾳ διεσώρῳ ἂν ἔχεις, ἀνάρχου, ἀπαντούν, ὑπερεστήσαι καὶ ἀποδοθῆσαι τῇ μᾶλ' ἐπέλαβόσις, ἀπεσεῖ σις ἐνεργῆς. ταῦτα δὲ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μένῳ καθ' ἄντω τε κείται.

He asserts, however, that Being is not without boundaries, else it would be imperfect.

Zeno appears to have said, that being was neither with nor without boundaries. Cp. Arist. de Xenoph. Gorg. et Melissos, c. 3: 'Αὐτόν δὲ δνα καὶ ἐνα καὶ σφαροειδῆ, οὐτ' ἀπειρον, ὅτε πεπερασθαί 'Ἀπειρον γάρ τοῦ μῆ' ἐναι... τὸ δὲ ἐν ὁμοῦ τῷ οὐκ ἄντω τοῖς πολλοὶς ὅμοιοις ὄρθοις. ἔν γάρ ὅπος ἤχει πρὸς δὲ τι περαιεί.

'Dasz hier Melissus als Vertreter der Eleatischen Schule genannt wird, hat seine Grund darin, dass der Beweis ... έστηκε εν αὑτῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχουν χῶραν ἐν ἢ κείται nach der von Heindorf angezogenen Stelle Aristot. Phys. 4.6, dem Me-

lissus angehört.' H. Schmidt.

The Eleatics did not abstract the idea of Being from that of extension, although its fulness destroyed the idea of space. It was here that the Atomists joined issue with them. To Leucippus and Democritus the relations of body were not symbolical but real. They felt that they must account for motion. Hence their assertion of the existence of empty space, to κεκόν, or, in other words, τοῦ μη ἐν in the material sense.


dιά γραμμῆς παίζοντες] A game, like our French and English, was called δικλειστία.

7. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι] 'I think therefore we ought first to examine the one faction, to whom we first addressed ourselves, these wavering movers of unrest,' and if we find any truth in them, we will join our efforts with theirs to pull us to them, endeavouring to shake the others off. But if
site faction, who say that the One Being which fills all things doth not move.

We find ourselves on the dangerous middle ground between these armies. With which side shall we go? Shall we declare for the inviolable constitution of all things, or for the

broken Whole of Being seem to speak more reasonably, we will desert to these again from the revolutionary violence of the movement party.'

1. τοὺς ἰδέοντας] ‘The unstable philosophers.’ (‘The river-gods,’ Jowett.) They are humorously identified with their principle. Vid. supr. ἀγχώς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέροντα. This way of taking ἰδέοντα—not as causative—is also confirmed by the parallel passage in the Cration, 439 C: Αὐτοὶ τε ὠσπέρ εἰς τιμα δύνην ἐμπεσότες κυκώνται καὶ ἴμας ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμβάλλοντι. Socrates adopts the jest of Theodorus, supr. 180 B: Μηδὲν βιβασαν ἢν ... ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ὕψωσις.


5. ἵπτ᾽ αὖ τὸν] (ἵπτ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν Boll. Vat. Ven. Π. παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἵπτ᾽ αὐτῶν T cett. Schleierm. corr.: αὖ ἀπὸ τῶν Bekk. But for the position of αὖ cp. supr. 161 A, and note). We pass from the image of a game to that of a civil war, in which the Heracliteans are the ‘movement,’ or revolutionary, party. There is probably a slight play on the word στασιώτα, and certainly also on the phrase τὰ ἀκίνητα κινέων. For ‘to move what may not be moved’ was, as the scholast indicates, a proverbial way of speaking of sacrilegious actions. See esp. Legg. 8. 842 E: Δῶς ὀρίου μὲν πρῶτος νόμος ὅ ὀδὴ ἐκφράζω μὴ κυκείον γῆς ὀρια μυθίσε ... νομίσας τὸ τακίνητα κινέων ἀλήθεα τούτο εἶναι. Thuc. 8. 15: Τὰ τὲ ἁλίᾳ τάλαντα ... κινέων.

7. μηδὲν μέτρων] ‘Nothing worthy of our reception.’

12. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν] ‘Nay, Socrates, we can by no
ΣΩ. Σκεπτόμεν ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε οὗτο προθυμομένου.

Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἄρχῃ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως πέρι,

ποιόν τι ποτὲ ἀρα λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι.

βοῦλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνυν. πότερον ἐν τὶ εἴδος

αὐτῆς λέγοντι ἢ ὁσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δῦο; μὴ μέν

τοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σὺ, ἢν

κοινὴ πᾶσχωμεν, ἢν τι καὶ δεῖ. καὶ μοι λέγε. ἢ ἢ

κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἢ χώρας μεταβαλλή

ἡ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν τοῖνυν ἐν ἔστω εἴδος. ὅταν δὲ ἢ

μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκει δὲ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ

σκληρὸν ἢ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἄλλοιω-

σιν ἄλλοιῶτα, ἢ ἢ ὅτι ἔξον ἐτερον εἴδος φάναι κι-

νήσεως;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοῦγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δῦο δὲ λέγω τούτῳ εἴδῃ

κινήσεως, ἄλλοιώσιν, τὴν δὲ ἀπεριφοράν.

means endure to stop short of thoroughly examining the meaning of both sets of thinkers.' oδδέοις, of course, adverbial. Madvig’s conjecture, αὐτῶν, had occurred to others. But the humour of the place, where Theodorus, who had been so backward, is now become so eager and ἄτεχνως φιλολόγος in the hands of Socrates, is more pointedly expressed by ὀντοῦ, the MS. reading.

1. σοῦ γε] I. e. Υοῦ, that were so reluctant to enter on the discussion. Cp. supr. 169 C: οὐ μέντοι παρατέρω γι δὲν προθεσθαν οἶος τῇ ἐστοι παρα-

σχεῖν ἐμαντὸν σοι.

2. ἄρχῃ] This is the predi-

cate, the subject being con-

tained in what follows. Hence

no article is required.

5. ἢ ὁσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται,

δῦο] Parm. 138 B: Κινοῦμενον

γε ἢ φέροντο ἢ ἄλλοιώτα δὴν αὐτὰ

γὰρ μόνας κινήσεις. No argu-

ment can be drawn from this about the comparative dates of the two dialogues, ἄλλοιώσις as yet includes αὐξήσεις.

Aristot. Phys. Ausc. 8. 3.

§ 3: Πρὸς οὖς, καίστε ὡς διορίζον-

tας ποιαν κίνησιν λέγουσιν ἢ πά-

ςας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπατήσεια.

6. ἢν κοινὴ πᾶσχωμεν] Socrates continues the notion of danger from supr. A B, and with his usual irony professes fear of τῶν τὰ ἀκινήτα κυνῶν.

11. ὅταν δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ]

Cp. supr. 156 C D.

18. ἄλλοιώσιν, τὴν δὴ ἀπεριφο-

ράν] 'Coisl. τὴν μὲν ἄλλοιώσιν,
On their granting this, we ask, Do you mean that all things move in both these ways? And they must say, Yes; or else it will be as true to say that things stand still, as that they move.

THEO. 'Orðwos γε λέγων.

Σω. Τούτο τοῖνυν οὔτω διελόμενοι διαλεγόμεθα ἥδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκοντι κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑρωτόμενον πότερον πᾶν φατέ ἀμφιτέρως κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενὸν τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἡ τὸ μέν τι ἀμφιτέρως, τὸ δὲ ἑτέρως;

ΤΕΟ. 'Ἀλλὰ μᾶ Δί ἐγὼ γε οὐκ ἔχω ἐιπεῖν· οἶμαι δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφιτέρως.

Σω. Εἴ δὲ γε μή, ὦ ἐταῖρε, κινούμενά τε *αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἐξει ἐιπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἑστηκεν.

ΤΕΟ. 'Ἀλήθεστατα λέγεις.

Σω. Οὔκοιν ἑπείδη κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μή κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἑνειναι μηδενε, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἐστιν

15 δὲ κινεῖται.

tην δὲ περιφοραν—quod glossema sapit.’ Stabl. Cp. Soph. 221 E, alib. It may be asked why circular motion should be chosen to represent φορά. The answer possibly is, that the revolution of the Heavens is conceived of as embracing all other kinds of motion. Cp. supr. τοις μεν ἀπειροφορά γε κινούμενα καὶ ὁ ἡλιος.

Perhaps also the revolution of the Heavens (or of the Sun) is symbolic of the Heraclitean cycle of elements. (Lassalle.) For περιφορά interchanged with φορά cp. Rep. 7. 528 A: 'Ἐν περιφορᾷ ἡδή ὁ περιφορὰ λαβώντες . . . ἀστρονομιαν ἐλεγον, φοράν οὖσαν βάθους.

It must be admitted that φορά would be more exact. But the compound is more rhythmical, and, as περιφερεσθαι does not always mean 'to revolve,' it may be used here for locomotion in general. See Tim. 70 B, Apol. 19 C, Rep. 3. 402 A–C.

2. διαλεγόμεθα ἥδη] Imagining them, for the sake of our argument, to be less impracticable, ὑποστηρίζοντο πορμοῦσαν αὐτοῖς ἢ νῖν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. (Soph. 246 D.)

5. το μέν τι . . . το δ'] Rep. 4. 436 C.

6. ἑτέρως] ‘In one or other of these two ways.’ Cp. Soph. 226 A: Οὐ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ληπτεῖν.


14. ἑνειναι] Almost all the MSS. have ἐν ἐναι. But the correction of the Boll. MS. to ἑνείναι appears to be in an ancient hand.
Let us now recall their theory of sensations and qualities, which were said to fit between the subject and the object.

2. Ἐκάστευ δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν. 'I would have you consider this point in them,' i.e. in their theory. Cp. 149 D: "Ἀρ' οὖν ἐκαὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἔγνωσεν;" Supr. 156, 157, 159.

5. τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητόν. The MS. reading αἰσθητόν is inconsistent with the context, and with the language used elsewhere in the dialogue. Buttmann conjectured αἰσθήτην, to which Schleiermacher objected that τὸ πάσχον means the sensorium, and not the sentient subject. But the distinction between them is not clearly marked from the Protagorean point of view. Indeed the conception of a 'sensorium' nowhere appears, at least in this part of the dialogue. It is only in speaking of a particular sense that τὸ πάσχον means, for instance, the eye (157).

In 159 A it appears doubtful whether τὸ πάσχον means the tongue of Socrates, or more indefinitely the 'perciptum.' And even if τὸ πάσχον is limited to the organ of sense, there is no reason why αἰσθητής should not be used of this. (Cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 4. 5: Ἡ γλώσσα γρώμων τούτων ἐνεργάθη.)

The noun αἰσθητής appears to be suggested in 160 D by the use of ἐπιστήμων just before. In the present place it might recur naturally, as it is in the manner of Plato to recall a train of thought by repeating some remarkable word. (Rep. 488 Α: οἱ ἐπιστήμονες. Supr. 180 С: Τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα.) To which it may be added, that there is a consciousness of technicality observable in the present passage. (Ἡ γλώσσα γρώμων τούτων ἐνεργάθη.)

Apart from these considerations, the rareness of the word, which would be a strong argument in its favour if it had MS. authority, must be allowed to weigh against it as a conjectural reading. And it may also be urged, that the masculine gender of αἰσθῆτης would impair the effect of the passage, in which everything seems to be made, as far as possible, neuter and impersonal.

But Hеиндорф's emendation, αἰσθητόν, agrees perfectly with the context and with all that precedes (esp. supr. 159 Е, 160 Α), and it is quite possible that αἰσθῆτης may have slipped in instead of it by an unconscious logical inversion on the part of the copyist. This conjecture is therefore adopted in the text.

6. Τ. Ι. I. e. when we carry
ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὗ ποιότητα; ἵως οὐν η' ἡ p. 182. ποιότης ἀμα ἀλλόκοτον τε φαίνεται ἄνωμα καὶ οὗ μανθάνεις ἄθροον λεγόμενον· κατὰ μέρη οὖν ἄκουε. τὸ γὰρ ποιῶν οὐτὲ θερμότης οὐτὲ λευκότης, θερμὸν ὅ δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τάλλα οὖτω. μέμνησαι γάρ που ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὖτως ἑλέγομεν, ἐν μηδὲν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ ἑναι, μηδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ποιῶν ἕ πάσχοι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἀλληλα συγγεγυμνεύων—τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

our analysis beyond the act of sensation to that which underlies it. ἐν is omitted in one MS., and Schanz reads ἀρα instead.

1. ποιῶν τι] MSS. ποιοῦντι. But the Bodleian margin has ποιῶν τι, with marg. F, corr. E. ἥ ποιότης] Two difficulties stand in the way of the reception of any new ' term of art,' the strangeness of the word, and the effort required to follow the generalization which it presupposes.

2. ἀλλόκοτον] 'Strange and uncouth.' ἀλλοκοτότερον is a v. r.

3. ἄθροον λεγόμενον] 'The collective (i.e. general) expression.' This harmonizes with the language adopted above, 157 B: δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὗτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἄθροισθείσων, ὥ δὲ ἄθροισμα ἄθροισθεῖν τε τίθεναι καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκατον ἔφοι τε καὶ εἶδος.

The conception of quality is of later growth than that of kind or form; since the latter is less abstract, and still retains a tinge of metaphor.


7. μηδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ποιῶν ἕ πάσχον] Supr. 157 A. αὐ distinguishes the active and passive elements from the crude notion of an object, which is analysed into these.

8. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ... αἰσθανόμενα] 'But out of both as they come together—they become, while producing sensations and sensible things, the one of a certain kind, the other percipient.' Attribute and perception arise together in the act of sense out of the meeting of agent and patient, neither of which has any independent existence. The text is not grammatical, but neither is it really open to suspicion, and Madvig's conjecture, ἀποτεληθεῖν, makes nonsense. The construction may be explained by substituting ἐκ τοῦ συγγεγυμνατ' ἄμφοτέρα for ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων συγ- γεγυμνομένων,—or the sentence from τὰς αἰσθήσεις to the end may be taken as an expansion of γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιαῦτα φαίνειν. Cp. the construction of infr. 194 C D, where, conversely, τὰ ἱότα should in strict grammar be a genitive governed by τὰ σημεῖα.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 151

p. 182.  ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαιν: πῶς ὃ' ὦ;

Σ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, έχε ἄλλως εἶτε οὕτως λέγουσιν: οὗ δ' ἐνεκα λέγομεν,

τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττομεν, ἐρωτώντες. Κινεῖται καὶ ῥεῖ, ὡς φατέ, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γὰρ;

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

Σ. Οὐκόν ἀμφοτέρας ἃς διελόμεθα κινήσεις,

φερόμενα τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; εἰ πέρ γε δὴ τελέως κινῆσεται.

Σ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἡλλοιούτο δὲ ἰο

μῆ, εἶχομεν ἂν που εἰπεῖν, ὁδὰ ᾠτὰ ῥεῖ τὰ φερόμενα:

ἡ πῶς λέγομεν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὔτως.

δ̣ Σ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖδ' τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ῥεῖν
tὸ ῥέον, ἄλλα μεταβάλλει, ὡστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον 15

ἐίναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκόττητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην

χρώαν, ὅσοι θ' ἀλλ' ταύτη μένουν: ἀρά ποτε οὐν τὲ τι

προσεπείν χρώμα, ὡστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τὸς μηχανή, ἢ Σόκρατες; ἡ ἄλλο γέ

τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ ἄει λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἀτε 20

δὴ ῥέον;

2. εἰτε ἄλλος . . . λέγουσιν] We need dwell no longer on

the details of the theory, since

our business now is with its

first principle—κίνησις.

7. Οὐκούν, κ.τ.λ.] Sc. κινεῖται
tὰ πάντα.

12. λέγομεν] λέγομεν Τ.

17. ἰνα μή ἀλα ταύτῃ μένον] Crp. supr. 154 D: Φιλάστων μή ἑναπτί εἰσο. Infr. 183 Λ: ἰνα δὴ εἰκονίν ἢ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθῆς φανή. And, for the argument, Cratyl. 439 D: ὁρ' οὖν οὖν τε προσεπεί

πείν αὐτο ὀρθῶς, εἰ δὲν ὑπεξέρχε
tαι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνο ὑπότι

ἐπείτα ὅτι τοιούτον, ἢ αὐτή ἀμα

τηνλεύκωτον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ εἴδος

γιγανθείται καὶ ὑπεξέρχεται καὶ μηκέτι

οὕτως ἔχειν;

τι προσεπείν χρώμα] To give

the name of any colour (to an

object)—To use the name of

any colour so as to apply it

rightly.

20. τῶν τοιούτων] Viz. τῶν

αισθήτων, i.e. the remark ap

plies to all sensible attributes

and not to colour only. For

the step which, for the sake

of brevity, Theodorus is in

allowed to make by him

H. Schmidt well con

supr. 158 C E, 180.
And the same argument applies to the sensations, and to Sensation, which we said was Knowledge. Therefore when we said Sensation was Knowledge, it would have been equally true to say, Not knowledge. The principle of motion has proved a fallacious support, since according to it every answer, whether Yes or No, is, or rather

1. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἔρουμεν ὑποικοσύνη; p. 182.

5  ΤΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥ ὅΡΑΝ ἦ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὅραν ἦ ἀκούειν;

Ε  ΘΕΟ. Οὐκ οὖν δὲι γε, ἐπερ πάντα κυνεῖται.

5  ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἀρα ὅραν προσφητεύων τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὅραν, οὔδε τιν' ἀλλην αἰσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ, πάντων γε πάντως κινομένων.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μην αἰσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἐφαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

ΘΕΟ. 'Ἡν τοῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὔτεν ἀρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτόμενοι ὃ τι ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΟ. Ἕοίκατε.

15  ΣΩ. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανώθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθέων ἀποδείξει σιτι πάντα κυνεῖται, ὡς δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φαιν., τὸ δ', ὡς ἐοίκεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κυνεῖται, πάσα ἀπόκρισις,

1. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως[ So far of αἰσθήτα, now of αἰσθήσεις.

2. μένειν] Sc. τὴν αἰσθήσιν.

5. Οὔτε ἀρα, κ.τ.λ.] 'Then we must not at all predicate seeing in preference to not-seeing, nor any other sensation rather than the absence of it, since all things move in every way.' Join ὡστε μᾶλλον.

6. Bekker reads ὡστε... ωστε, perhaps rightly.

12. Οὔδεν is adverbial. For ἐπιστήμην... ἀπεκρινάμεθα cp. supr. 147 B: "Οταν ἀποκρίνηται τῆς τινὸς συμβ. We gave 'sense' as an equivalent for Knowledge. But 'sense' = 'not-sense,' therefore if 'sense' = 'knowledge,' 'sense' = 'not-knowledge.'

15. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν] 'Here is a fine result of having corrected (or completed) our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest, and so to make it clear that that first answer was right, whereas it would seem to be made clear that if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right, both "it is so" and "it is not so," or, if you choose, "becomes so," that we may say nothing that would bring them to a stand-still." For the asyndeton, and for ἂν ('would seem to') Heind. well compares Rep. 10. 602 A: Χαρίεις ἂν εἴη, κ.τ.λ. Badh. conjectures Καλὸν ἂρ' ἡμῖν συμβαίνει.
p. 183. περὶ ὅτου ἄν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμολόγος Ὄρθη εἶναι, οὖτω τ' ἐχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὖτω, εἰ δὲ βουλεῖ, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ὄρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πλὴν γε, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι οὖτω τε ἔίτον καὶ οὐξ οὖτω. δεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο *τὸ οὖτω λέγειν· οὔδὲ γὰρ ἢ ἐν ἐτι κινοῦτο. *τὸ οὖτω· οὔδὲ αὖ μὴ οὗτω· οὔδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κίνησις· ἄλλα τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέων τοῖς

1. οὖτω τ' ἐχειν φάναι] These words are added in explanation of πάσα. While you are naming a quality, it is altered and slips away; and while you are naming a sensation, it has given place to another. While you say the words 'Sense is knowledge,' your theory of change compels you to utter in the same breath, Sense is not knowledge. In supporting your answer by the doctrine of motion, you have made this and every other answer alike unstable.

3. ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς] 'That we may not arrest them (τοῖς βίονται) in their flow.' Cp. supra. 181 D, E, 182 A. The humour is lost by reading αὐτοὺς.

5. Πλὴν γε, ὃ Θεόδωρε] μὴ is changed to οὐξ, because the words are taken out of their hypothetical connection.—Compare the conclusion of the Parmenides.

6, 7. *τὸ] The articles, which seem necessary, were added by Schleiermacher. Their absence is defended by Wohlrab, who quotes Soph. 244 A: Ὑπόταν ὑφεβγεγοθή.

7. οὐδὲ γὰρ] 'For when we think of "so," there is no motion in it: nor yet in "not so."' becomes, equally true, except that both Yes and No are falsified while we are uttering them. A new dialect should be invented to carry out this theory. The only
word for it in existing language is, 'No-how.' Thus we are rid, not only of Protagoras, but also of the theory of sense, so far as it is based on motion.

5 ΘΕΟ. Оикеіστάτη γούν διάλεκτος αўτή αυτοῖς.

ΣΩ. Ούκοιν, ὃ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σου ἑταῖρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ ὦπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ᾽ ἀνδρὰ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐναι, ἃν μὴ φρόνι-θέν \( \muόσ \) τις ἦ· ἐπιστήμην τε αἰσθήσιον ὧν συγχωρησόμεθα κατά γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. \( \) εἰ μὴ τί πως ἄλλος Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει.

ΘΕΟ. 'Αριστ' εἰρήκας, ὃ Σώκρατες· τούτων γὰρ περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινό-μενον κατὰ τὰς συνθῆκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρω-

15 ταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ πρίν γ' ἂν, ὃ Θεόδωρε, Σώκρατες τε καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὐτὸ τὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι διέλθητε, ὃ \( \) ωσπερ ἄρτι προθέςθηε.  

δυνάμει ὃν καὶ μὴ ἐπελεξεῖν τὸ ἄριστὸν ἔστων.  

2. τὸ οὐδ' ὦρας . ἀπειρον λεγό-

μεν] With most of the Greek philosophers the Infinite was a purely negative idea. At this point sensation appears to be annihilated. And yet if we view the dialogue as a whole, the impression we receive from it is rather this:—Sensations are purely relative to the individual, and infinitely diverse: taken alone, therefore, they cannot be the objects of knowledge and thought: but it is not denied that they are the occasions of thought and the conditions of knowledge. (186 D: 'Εν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθή-


6. τοῦ τε σοῦ ἑταῖρον] This te is answered by ἐπιστήμην te... καὶ is epexegetic.  

Aristotle, Met. 3. 4. 1009 a, expresses the same sense of reli:

10. εἰ μὴ τί πως] Themistetus is to follow the argument, but Socrates has no intention of relinquishing Theodorus, now that he has dragged him in. This gives occasion for the banter which follows.

15. σχοίη] The optative depends on συνθῆκας. 'As it was agreed I should, when the discussion of Protagoras' argument should be completed.' Supr. 169 C.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 155

p. 183. ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὁ ὁ, ὁ Θεαίτητα, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικείν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζον ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δῶσεις λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐαίπερ γε βούληται. ἦδιστα μέντ' ἂν 5 ἦκουσά περὶ ὁν λέγω.

ΘΕΟ. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Ἴσωρατῇ εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενοι· ἐρώτα ὅν καὶ ἀκούσει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ, ὁ Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ὅν κε-10 ε λευτε Θεαίτητος, οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δ' ὅν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Μελίσσων μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὃ ἐν ἑστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, ἀἰσχυνόμενον μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶ-15 μεν, ἦττον ἀἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἕνα ὅντα Παρμενίδην. Παρ-μενίδης δὲ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὄμηρου, αἰδοῖος τε ἰν11 μοι εἶναι ἁμα δεινός τε. συμπροσέμεξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ
1. τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους] Viz. Socrates, who, in his character of Sciron (supr. 169 A), is not likely to be over-scrupulous.
3. τῶν ἐπιλοίμων] Viz. the discussion of the Eleatic principle according to Socrates' own proposal, supr. 181 A.
7. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον] 'You challenge cavalry to an encounter in the open plain.'
11. Τί δ' ἂν οὐ] Either 'in what respect?' or 'for what reason?' The former is preferable. Theodorus is puzzled, as supr. 161 A. 'How do you mean, Socrates, that you will not comply with his request?'
12. ἐστός] So Bodl. (though rather doubtfully) with Vat. Ven. Π, and other MSS.
16. εἶναι ἁμα] This is the reading of the Bodl. MS. and of T. συμπροσέμεξα γὰρ . . τῷ ἀδρι πάντως πάντων πρεσβύτη] In what connection do these words stand with the Parmenides? Do they imply that Plato had already written it, or that he
had conceived it? or do they refer to a fact or to a supposition which was the germ from which that dialogue sprang, or which was used to ornament it, by Plato or by some one else? Or did Plato add the present passage after both dialogues had been written? Some light is thrown upon this question by comparing Soph. 217 C: Οἶον (ὅ' ἐφόσφεον) καὶ Παρμενίδης χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξάγοντα λόγους παρ- κάλους παρεγενόμενον ἕγω νέος ὁν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε δότος προσ- βύτου. This passage conveys the impression that the written dialogue is referred to. At all events, the repeated reference helps to mark the Parmenides as belonging to this series of dialogues. (See Introduction.) The same conception of the time at which Parmenides lived, and the same reverence for him, is implied in the words of the Eleatic stranger (his professed disciple), Soph. 237 A: Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, δὲ παῖ, παιδὶ ἡμῖν ὄνομι . . . ἀπεμαρτύρατο . . . ἔδει ἐκαστοί λέγων.

1. βάδος . . . γεγνάων] 'A magnificent depth of mind.' Schol.: Φαίνεται καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης σεμνύνων τὸν Παρμενίδης.

2. οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα] It is remarkable to find already in Plato such a distinct perception of the difference between the grammatical sense and the real drift of an author. The expression ὁ διανοούμενος ἡρόμοι occurs in Lach. 190 E.

5. ἄσκεπτον . . . λόγων] 'Should fail to be considered through the endless intrusion of alien subjects of inquiry.'

6. τῶν ἐπεισκομαζόντων λόγων] We pass from the image of a flood (supr. 177 B) to that of a disorderly crowd of discussions. Compare Philebus, 62 C: Βούλευ δήτα, ὥσπερ θυραρός ἵππ' ὄχλου τις ὑδωρίμους καὶ βια- ξόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπέσεις τὰς βύρας ἄφο πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰροῦν καὶ μὴν ἰσαραὶ ὁμοί καθαρὰ τὴν ἐνδεκτέραν; See also Shakespeare, Lucrece, 1301, 2: 'Much like a press of people at a door Throng her inventions, which shall go before.' For the use of the verb see Rep. 6. 500 B: Ἐπισκεκακοκατὰς . . . said of the bad philosophers.

εἰ τις . . . πέλεσται] 'If we once let them in,'—'give them a hearing.'

p. 184. ἀμήχανον, εἰ τέ τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξιον πάθοι, εἰτε ἴκανος, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανεῖ. δει δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὅπως κυκλίβερε περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρασθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μανευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολύσαι.

ΘΕΟ. 'Ἀλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιῶν.

ΣΩ. 'Ετε τοίνυν, ὅ Θεαίτητε, τοσοῦτοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. ἀξιόθεσιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω. ἡ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὅπως ἐρωτήητο τῷ τὰ λευκά καὶ μέλανα ὁρᾶ ἀνθρώποι καὶ τῷ τὰ ὄξεα καὶ βαρέα ἄκονε; εἴποις ἄν, οἴμαι, οἴμασί τε καὶ ὁσίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εγώγε.

c ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερές τῶν ὑμομάτων τε καὶ ὑμημάτων καὶ μὴ δὲ ἀκριβείας ἐξετάζομεν τὰ μὲν πολλά οὐκ

1. εἰτε τις, κ.τ.λ.] The reasons given here for avoiding a criticism of Parmenides and the Eleatic doctrine are not such as would prevent its being discussed in another dialogue. It would therefore be a mistake to argue from them against the genuineness of the Sophist. Compare with the expression ὅν ἐννέαμεν εξέλθεις ἀμήχανον. Rep. 5. 450 B: ὅσκ ἐτού ὡσον ἔμοιν λόγων ἐπεγείρετο.


ἐν κυί[ περὶ ἐπιστήμης] Supr. 149 E. This reference to maenetic prepares us for the ‘appeal to experience’ in what follows.—A different method is required for the ontological problem.—Theaetetus’ first answer has been disposed of, but his second is to be evolved through a final criticism of the first. He is now prepared to see the limits of sensation and to pass beyond them. The present criticism was already implied in the language of 179 C.

5. ἀπολύσαι] ‘To deliver.’

eyes and ears, or through them?

We are not each of us a sort of Trojan-horse full of disconnected faculties. There is one presiding nature, in which they all meet. This it is with which we see through our eyes.

15 Toiđe toj ŋeke aútā sōi diakriβōumai, eί twn ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνομέθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐτέρων αὖ τινῶν καὶ ἔξεις ἐρωτῶμεν πάντα τὰ τού- ε

1. ἐπολαθέθαι...ἢ ὁκ ὀρθῇ [To check your answer and show where it is erroneous.]
2. ἐπολαθέθαι...ὁ δὲ ὀρθῇ

9. Dei[ν ἀργο] [Would it not be strange, if in each of us there were perchel, as in a sort of Trojan-horse, a number of separate perceptions, and these did not all meet in some one nature, the Mind or what you will, with which, through the medium of which, we perceive the various objects of sense?]

10. δομπερ εν δοιρείον ἵπποισ [The plural is caused by ἡμῖν. As if each of us were a sort of wooden machine, like the Trojan horse (‘a sort of Noah’s ark,’ as we might say).—Man cannot be regarded as a bundle of separate faculties having no higher unity; that would be too mechanical a conception of his nature. The term ‘organ of sense’ perhaps originates with this passage. The difference between δὲ and δὲ ὅ, direct and indirect instrumentality, is obvious, but difficult to render exactly.

11. ἡδία is used in the concrete vernacular sense; Thuc. 2. 51: Τοιαῦτα ἦν ἐπὶ πᾶν τῷ ἱδαίαν.

15. Toiđe toj ŋeke [‘It is with a view to this that I am so precise with you, namely, to the inquiry whether,’ etc. Toiđe (better than τοῦ δὲ) has a double reference to εἰς μιὰν τῶν ἴταν...οἰσθήτα and to εἰ τιμ., κ.τ.λ.

18. πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα must mean ‘all attributes,’ preparing
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p. 184. αὕτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἵσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὕτα ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἡ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγε. θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κούφα καὶ γλυκέα δι’ ὅν αἰσθάνει, ἀρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἡ ἄλλος τινὸς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἀ δι’ ἐτέρας p. 185. δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι’ ἄλλης ταὐτ’ αἰσθάνοις, οὖν ἀ δι’ ἀκοῆς, δι’ ὑψως, ἡ ἀ δι’ ὑψως, δι’ ἀκοῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τι ἄρα περὶ ἄμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὄργανου, οὖδ’ αὐδ’ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἄμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοις ἂν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δ’ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρώας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τούτῳ περὶ ἄμφοτέρων ἡ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἄμφοτέρω ἐστον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τε ἔγογγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκάτερον μὲν ἐτέρον, ἕαυτῷ δὲ ταὐτὸν;

the way for the suprasensual attributes to be adduced below. For τῶ αὐτῷ cp. Rep. 4. 436 A. ἐν καὶ ἐξεῖς... ἀναφέρειν; the question is put more strongly instead of continuing καὶ εἰ... ἐνά γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀναφέρειν εἰς μὴ σωματικὸν τι. This passage is differently interpreted by H. Schmidt, who takes εἰ τινὶ, κ.τ.λ. as hypothetical, and supposes the apodosis to be deferred, where Socrates breaks off at ἵσως δὲ, κ.τ.λ.

3. πολυπραγμονεῖν] Socrates will not, if he can help it, act beyond his part as questioner and μανετὴς.

7. ἀ δι’ ἐτέρας δυνάμεως] The object of one sense cannot be perceived by another. Therefore if I perceive anything about the objects of two different senses, it cannot be through either of them.

12. οὐκ ἂν... αἰσθάνοις ἂν] ‘This cannot be a perception of either sense which embraces the objects of both.’

17. ἡ διανοεῖ] ‘I wonder if you have this notion,’ i.e. ‘Surely you have.’ Cp. supr. 145 Α.; and for the position of η, Rep. 2. 396 B, ἵπποις, κ.τ.λ. ... ἡ μῆθι σοφτὰ;
they are different from each other, and each the same with itself. That both are two, and each is one. That they are like or unlike.
Through what organ do we perceive these things? If I had asked, through what do we perceive that they are salt, you would have said 'the tongue.'
Through what, then, do we perceive being and not-being, sameness and

8. τὸ κοινὸν] 'That which regards them both.' You can refer any particular sensation to its proper organ. Can you do so in the case of these common perceptions?
Cp. Rep. 7: 522 C: Οἶνον τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν, ὁ ζῶσαι προσχρόνων... ἐπιστήμη... τὸ ἐν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγενφόσκειν.
10. ἀμφοτέρω] So B: ἀμφοτέρως Τ.
16. τὸ τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις] 'Which is common not only to these sensible objects, but to all things.' H. Schmidt would confine πᾶσι to objects of sense (εἰς τοὺς αἰσθητοὺς), referring τούτοις to φωνή, χρόα, χυμὸς only. Although this is more strictly logical, it seems improbable that the notion of ἐπὶ πᾶσι (and of ἐπὶ πάντων, 186 A) should be thus narrowed.
18. ἃ νῦν δὴ ἡρωτήμεν] Viz. as Theaetetus understands it, ὀμοιότητα καὶ ἀνοιγότητα, καὶ τὸ τούτον τε καὶ τὸ ἐτερον, ἐπὶ δὲ ἐν τὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀμφήνειν περὶ αὐτῶν, referring to what has just preceded.
'Ὑπέρην] This warm praise of Theaetetus for dialectical apprehension prepares the way for the unwatched outburst of admiration which follows.
19. περὶ αὐτῶν] Concerning the objects of sense,
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 185. ὄργανα, δι' ὂν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἐκαστὰ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕσιν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνα, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῖτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, δέ θαῦμα τοῦ ἂν ἄρτι τὸν ἄρτι περὶ αὐτῶν. δήλον δὲ ὃ ἂν καὶ ἄρτι τὸν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἔρωτας, καὶ τὰλα ὅσα τούτων ἐπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ὑπέρεν, ο Ἑθαῖτῆς, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἐστὶν ἃ ἔρωτι αὐτᾶ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μᾶ Δία, σοί Ἐσκρατεῖς, ἔγγειας οὐκ ἂν ἐχοῖμι εἰπεῖν, πλὴν γ' ὦτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἁρχὴν οὐδὲ ἐναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτως ὑμάντων ἰδίων ὄσπερ ἐκείνους, ἀλλ' αὐτή δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχῆ τὰ κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ο Ἑθαῖτῆς, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός: ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλὸς τε κἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εἴ ἐποίησά με μάλα

13. ὑμαντων ἰδιων The Bodl. MS. has ὑμαντων.

16. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ] The enthusiasm with which Socrates accepts Thetetetus' acknowledgment of the truth that the mind has its perceptions, independent of sense, belongs to the most interesting aspect of Greek Philosophy. 'Gradually it threw off the garment of sense; it revealed a world of ideas. It is impossible for us to conceive the intensity of these ideas in their freshness: they were not ideas but gods, penetrating into the soul of the disciple, sinking into the mind of the human race; objects not of speculation only, but of faith and love.' (Jowett.) Compare, as another instance of this religious feeling, Soph. 265 D: 'Núν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οὐκ ἔχεις σαν κατὰ γε δεῖν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτη καὶ αὐτός νεόμυκα. Καλῶς γε, ο Ὑθαίτῆς. καὶ εἰ μέν γε σε ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἑπταχρόνων ἄλλως πως δοξαζόμενον εἶναι, μὲν αὐτὸ τὸ λόγον μετὰ πειθῶν ἀναγκάζει εἰπεῖνε μοι ὑμολογεῖν ἐπιμήκης δὲ σοῦ καταμαθάνων τὴν φύσιν, δι' αὐτὴν ἄλλως ημῶν λόγων αὐτῆς πρόσεισαν ἐφ' ἄπερ νὲν ἔκειςσα σάς, εἰςως χρόνους γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοντ' ἀν.

17. ο γὰρ καλὸς λέγων, κ.τ.λ.] Rep. 3. 402 E.

18. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ] (1) 'Ad kalō ex præced. mente repetendum εἶ δια, quæ notatu dig- num est eclipsum, quum post
The Good and Beautiful are also thus perceived.

The latter (2) is right. 'Besides this beauty you have shown, you have done me a kindness.' Cp. Eurip. Hec. 382: 'Hara μὲν εἶπας, θύγατερ, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ ὁ λόγος πρόσεστιν.' Thuc. 4. 98. 2. The phrase in Symp. 195 C ought to be similarly construed.

6. τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέδειπται] I.e. ἐπὶ πάσιν κοινοῖν ἐστι (supr. 185 C). It will serve therefore as a sort of crucial instance.

9. ἐπορέγεται expresses Plato's notion of the intuitive action of the mind (νόημα), not as mere contemplation, but as a passionate outgoing. Rep. 6. 490 A B.

15. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] In this and similar phrases the article retains its demonstrative force, as is evident where the words are separated; e.g. Euthyd. 303 C: 'Ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῖς μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι. Soph. Οἰδ. Col. 742: 'Εκ δὲ τῶν μάλιστον ἐγώ. '16. πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι] 'To consider in relation to each other:' viz. as opposites. Thesetetus is probably thinking of the recent argument in which ἀγαθὸν, ὠφέλιμον, μέλλον, were identified. The 'idea of good' is still regarded by him 'hypothetically,' and, as it were, from beneath. But he is no longer capable of the fallacious admission into which he fell unwarily, supr. 157 D. The
ΘΕΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 163

p. 186. ἐν ἐαυτῷ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέληστα.

ΣΩ. Ἡχε δὴ ἀλλο τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληροῦτα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὀσσεῖται;

ΘΕΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὲ γε οὕσιν καὶ ὁ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίοτητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπαινούσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἀλλήλα κρίνειν πειράται ἢ μὴν.

ΘΕΙ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὖθες γενομένοι πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώπως τε καὶ θηρίως, ὡσα διὰ τοῦ σῶματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνειν

question pressed by H. Schmidt, ‘How past and future enter into the notion of honour,’ is hardly present in the Greek, but may be answered by the familiar example of an act of ordinary courage, in which the fear of future disgrace overcomes that of instant danger. The sense of honour emphatically belongs to a creature of ‘large discourse, looking before and after.’

ἀναλογεμένῳ ‘Thinking over the past and present with a view to the future.’

3. Ἡχε δή] ‘Hold there!’ Socrates sees his opportunity of furthering the argument by applying the last expression of Thesetetus, and therefore bids him pause over it.

4. Τὴν δὲ γε οὕσιαν] Sc. τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. ‘The fact that they exist’ (Germ. ‘Dasein’). In this and similar passages Plato may be said to be appealing to the consciousness of his reader.

5. ἐπανούσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα] Returning upon (reviewing) the sensations, it perceives the Being of their objects, and comparing these together, perceives their opposition, and the Being of this again.


7. Ἡχε δή καὶ συμβάλλουσα] ‘Thinking over the past and present with a view to the future.’


12. Phileb. 33 D: Θέες τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθήματος τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σῶματι κατασβενόμενα πρὸς ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῆς ἐκείς ἐάναντα, τὰ δὲ διὰ ἀμφοῦ ἔοιτα, καὶ τῶν δισεπερ σεισμῶν ἐπίστευτα ἰδίων τε καὶ κοινῶν ἐκάτερον.
this opposition is, the mind itself seeks to decide, returning over its sensations, and comparing them.

The one power belongs to all live creatures from their birth: the other is slowly attained, and only by some men. Sensation does not reach being, there-

1. ἀναλογίσματα] ‘But what the mind discovers by reflecting upon these.’ The idea of proportion (τὸ ἀναλόγων) does not seem to enter into the verb ἀναλογίζομαι and its derivative noun. ἀναλογίζομαι is rather eis eidos τığı anaphérein tó logos.

οὕσια] German critics raise the doubt whether οὕσια is to be taken in the same sense throughout this passage. Plato had not present to his mind the distinctions between ‘Sein,’ ‘Dasein,’ ‘Wesen,’ ‘Fursichsein,’ etc., but if one meaning is to be held throughout, it is rather the ‘fact’ (‘Dasein’) than the ‘mode’ (‘Wesen’). If this is emphasized, μηδὲ (1. 6) retains the force of ‘not even.’

5. μηδὲ οὕσια] (1) ‘Ad dat. hunc d repetendum est ὡς τὲ (potestne illud verumasse qui quod ne οὕσια quidemasse quidem potest?), ut declarant illa mox, ξύπναν ἡρ’ αὐτὸ καλεῖ αἰσθήσειν; ‘Ανέγκη. Οἷς, φάμεν,  ὦ μέτεστοι ἀληθείαις ἄφασθαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.’ Heindorf. And so H. Schmidt.

But (2) in the present connection Ψ is probably masculine. ‘Is it possible for him to reach truth who misses truth?’ (Wohlrab assents to this.) There is a transition in the next question from the subject to the object, from αἰσθανόμενος to αἰσθητόν. ‘But can one have knowledge of that, the truth of which he misses?’ A third way may be mentioned, but only to be rejected, viz. (3) making Ψ instrumental dative. ‘Can one reach truth with that,’ etc. Schanz reads οὗ from Heindorf’s conj.

11. ἐν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ] Something very different from syllogism is meant, and more nearly analogous to generalization. Cp. Φασαρ. 249 Β: Δεὶ γὰρ ἀδιδότως συνεῖναι κατ’ εἰδος λεγόμενον, εἰ πολλῶν ἢν αἰσθητήσεως εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον. Phil. 41 C.
fore it fails of truth, and is not knowledge. This lies not in our impressions, but in that which the mind collects from them.

Sensation, therefore, has no share in knowledge. They are wholly distinct.

We have found what knowledge is not. Our aim was to find what
We venture accordingly on a second definition:—

receives impressions from without through certain bodily organs; but knowledge implies the comparison of the impressions received through different organs, and this must be the immediate function of the mind. The whole of this last section should be compared with Rep. 7. 522–6.

5. ἔκεινα τῷ ὀνόματι] ‘But in that other term, whatever it is, which is applied to the mind when engaged alone with being.’

The form of expression is partly influenced by the words (186 D), Τὶ ὄν ἔκεινα ἀποδίδωσ ὄνομα; κ.τ.λ. The distinction between ὄνομα and ῥῆμα is not observed here.

10. πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας] As if in a mathematical demonstration.


As in finding the mathematical δύναμις Theaetetus used a word which had been employed in the previous inquiry, so here. But hitherto δόξα has been bound up with φαντασία and αἰσθήσεως, and even where Socrates had preserved the distinction between apprehension and judgment (179 C), this had passed unnoticed.

16. ὅπερ τὸ νῦν} Sc. φανερώτατο. 17. Ἀλλά τι (‘something else’) is not adverbial here.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 167

p. 187. ΣΩ. Οὖν μέντοι χρή, ὁ Θεάττης, λέγειν προβο-μως μᾶλλον ἢ ὁς τὸ πρῶτον ἀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐὰν γὰρ οὖν δρῶμεν, δυνὸν θάτερα, ἢ εὐρήσομεν ἐφ’
ο έρχόμεθα, η γὰρ τον οἰσιόμεθα εἰδέναι ὁ μηδαμὴ
Ἰσμῆν: καὶ τοις οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος. 5
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φής; δυνğun οὖν εἰδέοιν δόξης, 
tοῦ μὲν ἅληθινον, ψευδός δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου, τὴν ἅληθῆ
dόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγε: τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτ νῦν μοι φαίνεται. 
ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν εὖ έξειν περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν io
πάλιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιόν δὴ λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Θράττεῖ μὲ ποσς νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ ποι-
λάκις, ὅστ’ ἐν ἀπορία πολλὴ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς
ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχουται εἰπεῖν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τοῦτο 15
τὸ πάθος παρ’ ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα πρόπον ἐγγεγομένον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιόν δὴ;
ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινά ψευδῆ. σκοπῷ δὴ καὶ νῦν

3. εἰς . . . δρῶμεν] For the first person cp. infr. 210 B.
10. ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν] 'To take up a thread of the previous argument.'

Though we have dismissed the saying of Protagoras, so far as it is bound up with sense, τὸ δοκοῦν εἰκάτω τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι, (φαντασία being σύμ-
μεισσαι οἰσιόθεσέι καὶ δόξης, Soph. 264 B), yet the same ques-
tion returns upon us in re-
gard to opinion considered by itself. This forms a link of connection between the present inquiry and the fore-
going. ΣΠ. ΚρατΥλ. 429 Δ:

'Ἀρ’ ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν
οὐκ ἐστιν, ἃρν τοῦτο σοι δυνάται
ὁ λόγος; σχοινί γὰρ τως οἱ
λέγοντες, ὁ δὲ Κράτυλος, καὶ νῦν
καὶ πάλιν.

See also Euthyd. 284 Α, 286 C, where the ἀπορία (ὅτι ψευδεσθαι, ἀντιλέγεν, οὐκ ἐστιν) is ascribed to the followers of
Protagoras amongst others. It has generally, however, been associated with the name of Antisthenes.

15. τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ’ ἡμῖν] 'This experience of the human
mind.' Cp. supr. 155 Α.
18. σκοπῷ δὴ καὶ νῦν έτι] Though the past discussion
has been 'wiped out,' this still
remains 'to trouble the mind's
eye.' Badham would read.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἐτι διστάξων, πότερον ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψόμεθα p. 187. ἄλλων τρόπων ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατε, εἰ πέρ γε καὶ ὅπη- ὦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἀρτὶ γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ 5 Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολὴς πέρι, ὡς οὖδὲν εἶν τοῖς τοι- ούσι δὲ κατεπέγει.

ΣΩ. Ὄρθως ὑπέμνησας. ἱσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καὶ- ῥοῦ πᾶλιν ὁστερ ἰχνος μετελθεῖν. κρείττον γὰρ πον ἀρι- σμεν εἰ ἡ πολὺ μὴ ἰκανὸς περᾶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδὴ φαμὲν ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δοξαζεν, καὶ τῶν ἡμῶν δοξάζεων ψευδή, τῶν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἰχνα, ὡς φύσει οὐτως ἔχοντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γὰρ δὴ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸδε γ' ἐσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ p. 187. καθ' ἐκαστον, ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν

δ θράττει, but the asyndeton is expressive. δὴ also has been changed to δὲ (Buttmann), but without reason.

2. ἄλλων τρόπων ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον] I. e. not with reference to sensation and motion (supr. 164, 167, 171, 180), but in a more abstract way. The new ‘manner’ has something in it of the Eleatic spirit. For the expression compare Soph. 245 E: Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους λέγοντας αὐ τοῖς θεατοῖς.

3. ὅπηρον] The Bodl. has ὅπηρον. But the second γε is awkward, and ὅπηρον has good authority in T.

4. κατεπείγει] Supr. 172 D.

5. πᾶλιν ὁσπερ ἰχνος μετελ- θεῖν] We seemed to ourselves to be launching into a wholly new inquiry, but we have fallen into the same track by a different route. Cp. Aristot. Eth. 1. 7. 2 : Μεταβαίνουν δὴ ὁ λάγος εἰς ταύτων ἀφίεσαι. Aesch. Prom. 845: Ταύτων μετελθοῦν τῶν πᾶλιν λάγον ἰχνος.

κρείττον ... περᾶναι] This is said in order to obviate the discouragement which may be felt at having to return again upon our footsteps. Cp. Soph. 261 A B.

13. ἰχνοτῶν is neuter. For the plural cp. Rep. 2. 375 C: Ταύτα δὲ αὐθαίνασι ἐσκε.

16. ἢτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι] Socrates here takes up the thread of reflection introduced above, 165 B: ἡ ἀρετή ὃν τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τούτο δὲ ὀδοὶ μὴ εἰ- δὲναι; It was one weakness of the sensation doctrine that it led to this contradiction. The same opposition considered in the abstract is now used to
THAIGHTHOS.

p. 188. γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλαλθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τοῦτων ὡς ὑντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· γὰρ γὰρ ἡμῶν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν.

THA. Ἄλλα μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδέν λείπεται περὶ έκαστον πλῆν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢδη ἀνάγκη τοὺν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὁν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἴδεν;

THA. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ 10 εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.

THA. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδή δοξάζων, ὁ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἑτερα ἁττα ὁν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδῶς ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφότερα;

THA. Ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες. 15

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀρα, ἢ μὴ οἴδεν, ἣγείται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἑτερα ἁττα ὁν μὴ οἴδε, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστι τῷ μὴ Ἡθα- prove the impossibility of falsehood in opinion.

The discussion which follows probably bears some relation to the notions of Gorgias, and perhaps of Antisthenes. At all events it would seem to be a fragment of Eleticism; being exactly analogous to the difficulties raised by Zeno against the possibility of motion. It runs parallel also to the subtleties of the later Megarians.

1. μεταξὺ... λέγω] The construction follows the analogy of χαίρειν ἐόν. Cp. Soph. 258 E, where the phrase again occurs in a loose construction.

2. γὰρ γὰρ ἡμῶν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν] Because we choose to dwell on the absolute alternative, knowledge or ignorance. Cp. supr. 158 E: ἡμὶ ὑπολαβωσαν, κ.τ.λ., where a limited 'Standpoint' is similarly emphasized.

Plato thus hints at the true solution of the difficulty, viz. the conception of a gradual process, which is afterwards presented under the image of the impressions on wax, etc.

The doctrine of ἀναμνησις which had been developed in the Meno and Phaedo, is perhaps also held in reserve.

5. λείπεται] 'Remains'—when learning and forgetting are left out.

6. ἢδη] 'Since that point is settled.'

7. ἢν τι οἴδεν] For τι thus interposed cp. infr. 192 A.

12. ὁ τὰ ψευδή δοξάζων] The articles refer to supr. 187 E.
τητον μὴτε Σωκράτη ειδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβέων p. 188. 
ῶς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν;

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὐ μὴν, ἥ γέ τις οἴδειν, οἴειται ποῦ ἀ μὴν
5 οἴδειν αὐτὰ εἰναι, οὐδ' αἰ̔ ἂ μὴ οἴδειν, ἄ οἴδειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἐσταί.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν τις ἢ τε ὑνευὴ δοξᾶσειν; ἐκτὸς
γὰρ τοῦτον ἀδύνατον ποὺ δοξᾶσειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ πάντ' ἦ
ἵσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἢσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδάμου φαίνεται
10 ἀδύνατον ψευδή δοξᾶσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. 'Αρ' ὅσον οὐ ταύτη σκεπτόμεν ὁ ξητοῦμεν, κατὰ
τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰναι
καὶ μὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὡντα περὶ ὅτου οὖν
δοξᾶσων οὐκ ἐσθ’ ὥς οὐ ψευδὴ δοξᾶσει, κἀκεῖνοι
ἀλλὰς τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχει.

4. 'Αλλ' οὐ μὴν . . . ἄ οἴδειν]
'But surely when a man
knows anything, he cannot
take for that thing one which
he does not know, nor for what
he does not know can he take
what he knows.' Cp. infr.
191 A, and note.

5. αὐτό] Cp. Phaed. 99 B:
"Ο δὲ μοι φαίνονται . . . ὡς αἰτό
αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν: and see
155 E.

6. Τέρας] Supr. 163 D,
and note: Τέρας γὰρ ἄν ἐν Ἕ
λέγεις. Phaed. 101 B, αἰλόμ.

9. ἐν δὲ τούτοις'] 'And
under this alternative, viz. as
developed in the above in-
stances.

MS., by an obvious error, has
εγξητοῦμεν. Cp. Polit. 276 C:

'O λέγομεν, and v. rr.

13. εἰδή] So the Coislinian
MS. and the corrector of T.
Most MSS. have εἰδέναι.

16. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν] 'May not
the case possibly be simply
thus?' μὴ expresses suāpiciōn
='I should not wonder if.'
Cp. Phaed. 67 B: Μὴ οὐ θεμιτῶν
ἔρικ. Ibid. 69 A: Μὴ γὰρ οὐκ
αὐτὴ ἢ ἢ ἄρθη ἀλλαγή, κ.τ.λ., μὴ
σκιαγράφα τις ἢ ἢ τοιατῇ ἄρετῃ.
Crit. 48 C: Μὴ . . . ταῦτα . . .
σκέμματα ἢ: and see Ast, Lex.
sub v. For ἀπλοῦν in this
sense cp. supr. 147 C: 'Απλοῦν
306: Πόστερον οὖτος ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ
τοῦτο ἢ . . . ἤχει διαφόραν . . .
Aristot. Eth. Ν. 5. 9. 9: 'Ἡ οὖδὲ
tοῦτο ἀπλοῦν.
ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 188. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς γ’ αὕτη, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πώς οὖν; τί ἑροῦμεν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, εάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ; Δυνάτον δὲ ὅταν δὲ ἴδεῖς τί λέγεται, καί τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὅν δοξάσεις, εἶτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἶτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ; Καί ἡμεῖς δῆ, ὡς ἑοίκε, πρὸς 5 ἐκείνων φήσομεν "Ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἴομεν.

ἡ πῶς ἑροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθι ποι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁποίου ἴστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τις ὁρᾶ μὲν τι, ὁρᾶ δὲ οὐδὲν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἐν γε τὶ ὁρᾶ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾶ.

ἡ σὺ οὐεί ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὕσιν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐγὼ γε.

ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα ἐν γε τι ὁρᾶν ὃν τι ὁρᾶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

p. 189. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἐν γε τὶ ἀκούει καὶ ὄν ἀκούει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

3. ἢ λέγεται] 'Which is herein asserted.' Buttmann and Bekker conjecture λέγεται, which seems probable, but not necessary. Op. Phed. 77 D: Ἀποδέδοκεν μὲν οὖν ὁ πάντα λέγεται καὶ νῦν, where there is a similar doubt.

11. E] Interrogative. 'I mean to ask whether (for example) a man who sees something, sees no single thing?'

13. εἰ ἐν γε τι ὁρᾶ] The converse argument is used Rep. 5. 478 B (where it is asked, 'What is opinion concerned with?') Ἡ ὁλὸν τι αὐτὸ δοξάζειν μὲν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδὲν; Ἀδώνατον. Ἀλλ' ἐν γε τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζειν; Ναὶ. Ἐν γε τις μὴ δὲ γε οὐχ ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἀριθμάτω ἐν προσα- γορεύοντα. Πάντα γε. This close relation between the ideas of unity and being, derived from Parmenides, appears frequently. See especially Soph. 237 D: Ἀνάγκη τοῦ τι λέγεται ἐν γε τι λέγειν. The mind cannot recognise Being except where it finds its own impress of Unity.

Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1066 b: Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνον νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦσα ἐν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτομενος δή του, εὖς γέ του ἀπτεται p. 189.
καὶ ὕντος, εὑπερ ἐὼς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτο.
ΣΩ. 'Ο δὲ δή δοξάζων οὐχ ἐν τι δοξάζει;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. 'Ο δ ἐν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ξυγχωρό.
ΣΩ. 'Ο ἁρα μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδεν δοξάζει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν ὁ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν
οὐδὲ δοξάζει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἐοικεν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἁρα διόν τε τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλο τι ἄρ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ
μὴ οὕτα δοξάζειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλο ἐοικεν.
ΣΩ. Οὐ *τε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὁλίγον πρότερον
ἐσκοπούμεν, ψευδὴς ἐστὶ δοξα ἐν ἡμῖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὕν δὴ.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ’ ἁρα ὡδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγω-
ρεύμεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

13. περὶ τῶν ὄντων] Arist. Met. 3. 2. 1004 a: Ἀπόφασιν
dε καὶ στέρησιν μᾶς ἔστω θεωρήσαι
dιὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρήσωμεν τὸ ἐω, οὗ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἡ στέρησις (ἡ
gαρ ἀπόφασις η δοξάζειν ἀκόμη ἡ
tων γεωργοί, κ.τ.λ.)
19. οὗ *τε γὰρ] MSS. οὐ γὰρ, τε seems required (as Van
Heusde observed), but γὰρ is right. Cp. 190 Ε: οὗτος γὰρ
tαύτῃ, κ.τ.λ.

188 C.

22. 'Αλλ’ ἁρα ὡδε γιγνόμενον]
'But may it be supposed, then,
that what we express by this
name arises in the following
way?;' 'In what way?' 'That
what we call false opinion is
really a sort of crossing of
opinions.'
3. Can it then be a cross-application or transference of thought: i.e. When I think one existing thing to be another! Theaetetus believes this must be the true falsehood.

Socrates claims credit for moderation in not pressing this contradiction in terms, and passes on.

1. 'Ἀλλοδοξίαν' This seems to have been a prevalent conception. Vid. Arist. Met. 3. 5.


'φαμέν] In apposition with the preceding verb, introduced by ὅσον.' This third case is linked on to the second, but is not, as H. Schmidt supposes, a subdivision of it. The three cases are (1) thinking what we do not know, (2) thinking what is not, (3) thinking cross-wise.


17. ἵνα μὴ μάτην ταρρήσῃς] Supr. 163 C: ἢνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. He refers to the boldness with which Theaetetus now answers, supr. 187 B: Οὕτω... χρή... λέγειν προθύμως.
ΣΩ. "Εστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἑτερῶν τι ὡς p. 189. ἑτερον καὶ μή ὡς ἑκέστο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίδεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. "Οταν οὖν τοῦθ’ ἡ διάνοια του δρα, οὐ καὶ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἦτοι ἀμφότερα ἤ τὸ ἑτερον διανο- εἰσθαι;

*ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν ἦτοι ἰμα γε ἦ ἐν μέρει.

*ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ’ ὦ περ ἐγὼ

10 καλεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν;

ΣΩ. Λόγον οὖν αὐτῆ πρὸς αὐτήν ἢ ψυχή διεξέρ- χεται περὶ οὖν ἄν σκοπή. ὡς γε μή εἰδώς σοι ἀπο- φαίνομαι. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι ἱνδάλλεται διανοομεῖν, ὅυκ

2. ὡς ἑκέστο] Referring to the first ἑτερον.

5. τὸ ἑτερον] 'The one or the other.' ἑτερος here = alteruter.

η. ἦτοι ἰμα γε ἦ ἐν μέρει] The bearing of these words is not quite clear. Perhaps they are meant to introduce the analysis of thinking, in which things are present to the mind at first successively, afterwards in one view. Most MSS. arrange the persons thus: Θε. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν. Σω. Ἡτοι . . . μέρει; Θε. Κάλλιστα. Σω. Τὸ δὲ . . . καλεῖς; (In the Bodl. MS., however, it is not clear that the double colon after οὖν is in the first hand, and ἦτοι κ.τ.λ. is given to Socrates in continuation as in our text.) Hirzel, followed by Schanz, gives ἦτοι . . . μέρει to Thesetetus, and κάλλιστα to Socrates. Theat. 'Certainly, either at once or by turns.' Soc. 'Well said; but I wonder if your conception of the thinking-

process agrees with mine.' There is much to recommend this arrangement, which is adopted also by H. Schmidt. He proposes, however, to delete the words ἦτοι . . . μέρει.

Compare with the following account of thinking Phileb. 38 C, 39, where the mind not only talks with itself, but has a writer and a painter within it: Ἄρ’ οὖν ἤμας . . . κ.τ.λ. Soph. 263 Ε: Οὐκὼν δίων μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτῶν πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἂνεν φανῆς γεγομένος, κ.τ.λ.

12. Λόγον is here used in the first of the three meanings given below, 206 D.

13. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδώς] 'As one who does not know,' who is not to be supposed to know.' The use of μὴ assists the ironi-
cal tone of Socrates, who avoids categorical statements. 'You must not assume that I speak as if I knew.'

14. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι] Plato was
probably thinking of Odyssey 19. 224: ἔρεω, δὲ μοι ἱδόνοις ἦτορ. Compare the φάσματα in the beginning of the dialogue. The semblance which the mind presents to me, when it thinks, is simply that of conversing, and of being engaged in question and answer with itself. 2. ἵνα δὲ ὁρίσασα] ‘But when it has come to a determination, whether slowly, or by darting swiftly to its conclusion, and so is now at one and not divided in judgment, we call this its opinion.’ 13. παντὸς μᾶλλον...παντᾶσαιν ἄρα...ἀνάγκη] These adverbs give an almost dramatic vividness to the description of the process of thought. Note especially the liveliness of τοι, which some critics have rejected. Cr. Phil. 38 C: Λυτῶν...ἀνέφιετο ἐν ὅδε...τὶ ποτὲ ἄρα ἔστι το παρὰ τήν πέτραν...

The Greek language from Homer downwards was peculiarly apt to suggest such reflections as these. διαλέκτικη was its proper development. The following remarks of Col. Mure (Lit. of Greece, 2. 14. § 1) on the self-dialogue of Homer, apply in some degree to all Greek literature: ‘Exclusively proper to Homer is his power of dramatizing, not merely action, but thought; not merely the intercourse between man and man, but between man and himself, between his passions and his judgment. The mechanism of which the poet here chiefly avails himself is to exhibit the person under the influence of excited feelings as communing with, or, as Homer defines it, addressing his own mind; discussing the subject of his soli-}
to himself, ‘Surely fair is foul,’ or ‘wrong is right,’ or ‘odd is even’?

Or, ‘the cow must be a horse,’ or ‘two is one.’

Therefore when I mistake this for that, I cannot have both in my mind.

so nicely adapted to the turns of the self-dialogue, that the breast of the man seems to be laid open before us, and in the literal sense of the term, we read his thoughts as they flit through his bosom.

4. ἐν ὑπνό... ὑγιαίνοντα ἡ μαυόμενον] Note the liveliness with which fresh touches are thrown in. It must be remembered here that sensible perception is excluded from consideration for the present, as well as learning and forgetting. Everything is either known or unknown: present to the mind, or not present.

8. ὑγιαίνοντα ἡ μαυόμενον] These words have been unreasonably questioned, on the ground that no limit can be set to the illusions of madness. Not to dwell on the general weakness of such minute philosophy,—the critics forget that τὸν βοῶν is the ox, thought of as such. Cp. the words ἄμφοτερά γε... τῇ ψυχῇ just below. This reference to the extreme case of madness which has been already cited (supr. 157 E) is quite in Plato’s manner.

15. ἔσται δ’ ἐστιν οὗ τὸ... ιτέρον έστιν, in supr. B. Several of the MSS., including Bodl. and Coisl., have ἔσται δ’ καὶ καὶ σοι τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπεὶ δὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐτέρον τῷ ἐτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταῦτα ἐστὶν περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου, where ἐπί τῶν ἐν μέρει evidently refers to 180 B: Ἐνοι οὖν γε ἡ ἐν μέρει. This cannot be adopted without rejecting περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου as confusing the sentence. The drift would then be, ‘You must not dwell upon the words as regards
things alternately presented to the mind, seeing that the word ἔτερον, as far as the word goes, is the same as applied to both.' This would be an imperfect way of developing the distinction thrown out above, and unlike Socrates, who, especially in this dialogue, always waits for Theaetetus to follow him. And it is equally necessary to 'let the word alone,' whether the objects are conceived alternately or both at once. The words εἰς τῶν ἐν μέρει may therefore confidently be rejected as a mistaken gloss.

If the words ἐπειδὴ . . . ταύτων ἔστι are genuine, περὶ τοῦ ἔτερον must either be omitted or transposed. But it is possible that ἐπειδὴ, κ.τ.λ., has also crept in from the margin, and this suspicion is so far confirmed by the fact that the Bodl. p. m. wrote ἐστιν. We thus revert to the reading of T and several MSS. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ σοι τὸ βῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἔτερον. περὶ is often used rather vaguely, e.g. Rep. 7. 538 Ε: ἐκ περὶ δικαίου ὄσσων καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. If δὲ καὶ σοι is retained, καὶ may be understood with reference to supr. 189 D, where Socrates takes credit for not pressing the words ἀληθὲς ψείδος. 'You, too (as I did in the former case), must let the word alone in regard to the Other.'

But this is rather strained. The version of Ficinus led some critics to conjecture εἶ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ. But this, as Buttmann observes, would not harmonize with Theaetetus' reply. I have ventured to change δὲ καὶ σοὶ to δ' ἐσται σοι, an emendation which has often occurred to me in reading the passage. For the sense cp. Euthyd. 301 Α, where the word is dwelt upon: Τίνα τρόπον, ἦφη, ἐτέρου ἐτέρω παραγωγεμένου τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον ἄν εἴη; Ἄρα τούτῳ, ἦφην ἀγών, ἀπορεῖς; . . . ἀλλ' ἔγω, ἀπορεῖς; ἄλλον τεύχων αὐτοῦ ἀπορήσαι ἢν οὐ τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον ἔστω.

12. ἀναγκάζομαι . . . δοκάζει.
which I am not thinking.

This transference, therefore, is also inconceivable.

We are in great straits. But we dare not face the consequences of failure until we have turned every stone.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποία δῆ; 

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔρω σοι πρὶν ἤν πανταχὺ πειραθῶ σκοτᾶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπέρ ἡμῶν, εἰ φ’ ἀποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οSystemServiceα λέγω. ἀλλ’ εὰν εὑρόμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενόμεθα, τότ’ ἤδη περὶ τῶν p. 191.

15 ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων, *αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἔστωτες; εὰν δὲ πάντη ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινω- These words are clearly given to Theetetus in the Cesena MS., as well as in Heindorf’s edition.

3. ὡς ταύτῃ ‘The truth is, that the existence of false opinion in our minds does not appear on this any more than on the (two) former grounds.’ The clauses, though connected outwardly by γὰρ, are rather parallel than consequent, as in 152 C. Cp. also supr. 183 B. In all these places some would change γὰρ to ὅρα.

8. πολλὰ . . καὶ ἄτομα] E.g. that it is impossible to distinguish the sophist from the true philosopher; and the other difficulties brought out in the Sophistes.


12. αἰσχυνοίμην . . λέγω] ‘I should feel ashamed on our behalf, if, while we were still in doubt, the strange consequences I refer to were pressed upon us.’

15. *αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἔστωτες] ‘When we are ourselves free from the absurdity,’ ‘exempt from the ridicule.’ This point is not attained in the Theetetus; and this whole passage may be regarded as an anticipation of the Sophistes.—The MSS. have πάσχαται αὐτό (so. to ἀναγκαζομένως ὁμολογεῖν τούτο, Wohlrab). But Ast’s correction, αὐτοῖ, is extremely probable. Heind. conjectures πάσχαται αὐτό, αὐτοῖ, κ.τ.λ.
1. παρέξομεν... πατέων] Gorg. 475 D: Γενναίως τοῦ λόγου ὁσπερ ἰατρὸς παρέξειν ἀποκρίνειν, alib. There is an allusion to the proverbial situation described in Soph. Aj. 1142 foll.: "Ηδή ποτ' ἐδοξήσατο ἐγὼ γλώσσῃ θρασύνων ἡ ναυτάς ἐφορμήσατο χειμώνοις το πλεῦρ' ὅ φεύξατ' ἂν οὐκ ἄν εὑρέτηκα ἡ παρέξειν πατέων τῷ ἀκούοντι ναυτίλων. The position imagined is something like that reached at the end of the Parmenides. The point is of course the despair of a bad sailor in a storm. Naber's conjecture, παυσάνντες, is unnecessary, and his alternative, ἡ ναυ-τιλαὶ ἀκούοντες, is clumsy as well.

The argument from 187 to 191 may be thus condensed:—

We no longer search for knowledge in sensation, which is neither true nor false, but in opinion, where the mind is engaged with its own objects by itself. But here an old difficulty meets us in another form. It seemed that sensation could not be false, because it was relative to the subject. It now seems as though opinion cannot be false, because a thinking subject is necessarily related to knowledge and being. What I do not know cannot be present in thought. Neither can I lay hold in thought on that which is not. But can I take one thing which is for another which also is? Thought being silent speech, if I lay hold of both, (i.e. if both are present to the mind,) I cannot mistake them; e.g. No one ever said to himself, Good is evil. And if only one is present to me, I cannot discourse about them, e.g. if I am thinking only of the good, I cannot say, Good is evil. We are in great straits. For the result at which we seem in danger of arriving is contradictory to most important facts.

We must not appeal to these, however, until we have extricated our minds, if possible, from this metaphysical tangle. For logical and metaphysical difficulties are not to be solved 'ambulando,' but by a higher criticism of the forms of thought which have occasioned them.

In what follows, we are brought gradually back from the simple to the complex, from the more abstract to the more concrete. We are compelled to image to ourselves, what was discarded at a former stage of the inquiry (supr. 188 A), a process between the relativeness of sense and the absoluteness of knowledge, which, like every process, admits of degrees. Thus, it may be said, the idea of Motion returns upon us in a higher form.

The mind is a storehouse of old impressions, in which we are continually looking for the types of new ones. But the old impressions fade and get confused, and we fail to bring them with precision and clearness into contact with the new. Hence we sometimes think falsely.
ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὁρθῶς ὀμολογήσαμεν, ἡνίκα ὀμολογήσαμεν, ἃ τις οἴδε, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ οἴδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ ψευσθήναι· ἀλλὰ περί δυνάτων.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὥς καὶ ἔγω τότε ὑπάστευσα ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ἐφαμεν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι εἰνότ' ἔγω γεννάσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὄρον ἄλλον ἢν ὑν γεγονόσκω, φήσθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὧν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ὁ οὗν λέγεις.

10 ΣΩ. Ὠνικοῦν ἀπέττημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὁ ἓσμεν, ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθόμεν, ἀλλ' ὅδε· ἵσως τῇ ἡμῶν συγχωρήσεται, ἱσώς δὲ ἀντιτεινεῖ· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐνο

2. ἡνίκα, κ.τ.λ.] Supr. 188 C: 'Αλλ' ὃν μὲν, κ.τ.λ. This passage proves that the phrase nearest to εἶναι in all these expressions is the subject, and the more remote phrase, generally preceding it, contains the predicate.

5. τότε ὑπάστευσα] This surmise was naturally suggested by the impossible case, which had been just stated, of Theoctetus being mistaken for Socrates by one who knew neither of them.

6. τοιούτων εἶναι] Sc. αὐτό, τῷ ἔνωδ' ὄφλασι: τοιούτων supplies the antecedent to αὐτό. Others (Stephanus, H. Schmidt) omit the comma after ἐφαμεν, and take τοιούτων as—ἀδύνατον.

13. οὕτω] So as to imply knowledge of what we do not know.

διὰ ἵσως] This is the punctuation of the Bodleian MS. καὶ ἵσως, the reading of T and other MSS., is unnecessary. A qualifying clause is sometimes thus introduced before ἀλλα—without any particle of connection with what precedes. Compare Soph. El. 450: ἐμφαρὰ μὲν ταῦτ', ἀλλ' ὅμως ἢ ἅγω, ὅσ' αὐτῷ. Ed. Col. 1615: ἕκαστρυν μὲν, οἴ δα, παῖδες' ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ μονούν | τὰ πάντα λιστε ταῦτ' ἐσομ' ὁρθῆσια. Eur. Alc. 353: ὅμορχαν μὲν, οἷς καὶ τερμὼν' ἀλλ' ὅμως βάρος | ψυχής ἀπαντάλογαν ἐν. Supr. 171 C: ἔκλεις γα' ἵσως ... ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ἀναγκῇ, κ.τ.λ. Compare also the frequent asyndeton with πάντως. For ἵσως ... ἵσως δὲ cp. Apol. 18 A: 'Ισως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἵσως δὲ βεβηλῶν ἄν εἴῃ ... 'Perhaps the difficulty will not resist our treatment, or perhaps it will.'

risk the chance of failure, for;' etc.

3. μαθείω] The tense is noticeable. Whatever difficulty may attend the conception of the process of learning and forgetting (μαθάνειν, ἔμπλασάνει- σθαι), it is certain that things are learnt and forgotten (μαθείν, ἐμπλησάναι.) In what follows the process itself is imagined rather than analysed.

7. θεία] Cp. Phileb. 33 D: θεία τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν. . . πα-θηματῶν τὰ μὲν, alibi. The image (which was repeated in later Greek philosophy) is not unlike Locke's illustration of the different kinds of memory. Hum. Und. 2. 10. §§ 4, 5: 'The brain in some retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone, and in others little better than sand.' Ib. 29. § 3: 'If the organs or faculties of perception, like wax overhardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal from

the usual impress wont to imprint it, or like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it when well imprinted; or else, supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with sufficient force to make a clear impression—in any of these cases the print left by the seal will be obscure.'

8. κήρυκόν ἐκμαγεῖον] Plato's image is not the common one of a waxen tablet, but of a 'block of wax,' such as was used for sealing. The word ἐκμαγεῖον is used first of the whole mass, afterwards of those parts of it which have received the particular impressions. 'Hanc notionem Plato a Pythagora videtur mutuatus esse. Cp. Hemsterhusius ad Poll. 9. 130.' Wohlrab.


13. τῆς τῶν Μονών μητρός] Hes. Theog. 54, Aesch. Prom. 461: Μητρόν Θ' ἀπαίτην μονο-
means of the following image. Each of us has in his mind a block of wax, on which he receives the stamp of those sensations and perceptions which he wishes to remember. That which he succeeds in stamping there is remembered and known so long as the impression lasts, but that of which the impression

"Ευήγησεν. Plat. Euthyd. 275 D: Καθάπερ οι ποιηταί δόμαι δραχμένοι τής δυνάμεως Μούσας τε καὶ Μηνοσύνην επικαλέσθαι.
1. εἰ τοῦτο ... ἀποστυπώσεις] 'To stamp them upon this, as if we were taking on it the impressions of seal-rings.'
2. ἀκούσομεν] ἀκούσομεν B T.
3. ἢ αὐτὸς ἐννοοῦμεν] This addition is occasioned by the account of δόξα given above in 184-187, and prepares the way for the case which follows. infr. 195 E. But, although stated here, it is not immediately applied.

"ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι" Sc. ἔργα.
4. ἀποστυπώσεις] Sc. ἔργα.

For the image of the seal cp. Phaed. 75 D, where it is used of the mind impressing its own idea of Being upon things.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 191. ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;

p. 192. ΣΩ. Δέι ὁδὲ λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις οἶδε σχῆν αὐτοῦ μημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτῷ μῆ, τούτῳ οἴηθηναι ἔτερον τι ὃν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνον τύπον, αἰσθα-5 νόμενον δὲ μῆ, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὃ γε οἶδεν αὐ. οἴηθηναι εἶναι ὃ μῆ οἶδε μή ἐχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα· καὶ ὃ μῆ οἶδεν, ὃ μῆ οἶδεν αὐ· καὶ ὃ μῆ οἶδεν, ὃ οἴδε· καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται γε, ἔτερον τι ὃν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθήναι εἶναι· καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται, ὃν τι μῆ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μῆ 10 αἰσθάνεται, ὃν μῆ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μῆ αἰσθάνεται, δ ν αἰσθάνεται. καὶ ἔτι γε αὐ ὃν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημείον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν, οἰηθήναι αὐ ἔτερον τι ὃν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐ καὶ ἐκεί-νου τὸ σημείον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν, ἀδυνατῶτερον ἐτί 15 ἐκείνων, εἰ οἶδον τε. καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ ἄδ αἰσθάνεται ἔχον

2. ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους] 'Laying down the following preliminary aphorisms.' These are in fact a restatement of the points already agreed upon. There is a change of subject—δὲ ἡμᾶς λέγων.

6. ὃ γε οἶδεν] Sc. μὴ αἰσθάνο-

5 μενος. I. e. not supposing him to have a sensible perception of either object.

8. καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται γε] Sc. μὴ
eἰδὸς. I. e. not supposing him to know it. Both the above cases are distinguished from that in which the predicate is something both known and perceived.

13. καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημείον κατὰ τὴν

αἰσθήσιν] He holds the stamp left by the former sensation in a line with the present sensation, so that the two impressions coincide. Sc. inf. 194 B: Καταντόμεν ὁπδ καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰδό.

This is added so as to bear upon the case below, C D: ἃν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, κ.τ.λ.

16. The second 6 is justly questioned by Bonitz.

Ἐξων τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς] Cp. such expressions as ὀρθῶς δι-

μασθεῖν, εἰ ὀρθοὶ γραμμένοι.

The above statement may be put shortly thus: Mistake is impossible—1. Between things not perceived by sense, when we know both or one or neither of them. 2. Between things not known, when we have a sensible impression of one or both or neither of them. 3. Still more impossible, if that may be, between things, (a) both of which are known, both perceived by sense, and the knowledge of each of which is identified with its proper sensation: (b) One of which we know and also perceive sensi-
without sensation. Still less when two things are known and present to sense, and when the sensation and the old impression coincide: or when neither is present to the mind at all. But when something, either known or unknown, is present to sense, and the mind brings to meet the

bly, and identify the knowledge of it with the sensation: (b) Both or either of which we neither know nor perceive sensibly.

The only cases left, in which mistake is possible, are (1) when one thing is known and another perceived sensibly; or (2) when two things are known and also present to sense, but we fail to connect knowledge and sensation rightly.

3. καὶ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ τὸν ἢ μὴ αἰσθάνεται] In order to exhaust every conceivable case, the converse or negative of each of the foregoing cases, in which knowledge and sense were combined, must be fully stated.

6. ὑπερβάλλει αἴλουμα] Cp. suppl. B: Ἀναπάντητον ἢ ἀκείνων εἰ ὁδὸν τε. The genitive is governed by ἀλυμαία. 'All these cases are beyond everything in regard to the impossibility of any man's thinking wrongly in any of them.' Cp. supra. 180 A.

9. εἰνάρα εἴ οὐκ ἂν τι μᾶλλον μάθω] 'For perhaps if you state them, I may better perceive your meaning.' Cp. supra. 156 C: 'Εάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. The question here = λέγει.

14. ἐν αὐτῷ... καὶ αἰσθάνεται] Error arises amongst things already known, when we mistake for these either (1) other things already known and now perceived through sense, or (2) something now perceived by sense but not previously known, or (3) when for something known and perceived we mistake something else which is also perceived and known. Cp. supra 191Α: Ἡνίκα, κ.τ.λ., and note.

15. ἀπελεύθη] 'I am lost.' For this use of the aorist of the immediate past, where a person reflects on his own state,
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 192. Ἡ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε: ἐγὼ εἶδος Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἷς ἐστί, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταύτα, ἀλλὰ τί εἶνοτε μὲν ὅρῳ αὐτοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἀπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, καὶ ἀκούω ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ' αἰσθήσιν μὲν οὐδεμιᾶν ἢ ἄλλην ἢ περὶ ἕμων, μέμνημαι δὲ ἕμαι οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ.

δ) ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὅν βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ὡς ἐστὶ μὲν ἂ ὅδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἐστι δὲ οὐ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἂ μὴ οὖδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον; Ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. 'Εδ' ὅ, ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίστη. Σωκράτης

p. 193. ἐπιγυνώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὅρᾳ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἰσθήσισιν αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν: οὐκ ἦν ποτὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειν ὡς οὐ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ Θεόδωρος. λέγω τί ἡ οὖδὲν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι, ἀληθῆ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνυν ἐκεῖνον πρῶτον ἢν ὅν ἔλεγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον τοῖνυν, ὡς τὸν μὲν γυνώσκον ἢμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γυνώσκον, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἦν ποτὲ αὐτὴν αἰσθανόμενος, ἦν οἶδα, εἶναι δὲ μὴ οἶδα.

cp. Soph. Aj. 693: Ἐφεσι ἐφοτε περιχαρῆς δ' ἀνεπτομαί, ἄληθος δὲ λειψθαιναι is the opposite of ἐφεσθαι.

1. οὐδὲ δὴ... ἄκουε] Cr. supr. 182 Α.Β.

16. Σωκράτης, κ.τ.λ.] This putting of the case is equivalent to an hypothetical clause: hence the use of μηδέτερον and the apparent asyndeton in οὐκ ἦν ποτὲ, κ.τ.λ.
ΘΕΑI. Ὄρθως.

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ, μηδέτερον γιγνώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθα-νόμενον οὐκ ἄν οἰηθεῖν, ὅν μὴ οἶδα, ἔτερον τιν’ εἶναι ὃν μῆ οἶδα. καὶ τάλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθε ἐξῆς νόμιζε 5 πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτε ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδή δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε ἀγνών ἀμφω, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δ’ οὐ γιγνώσκων. καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεως κατὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ἄρα ἔτει.

ΘΕΑI. Ἐπομενι.

10 ΣΩ. Δείπτεται τοῖνυν τὰ ψευδή δοξάσαι εἰν τῶδε, ὅταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεοδώρου, καὶ ξύων ἐν ἔκεινῳ τῷ κηρύξῃ ὅσπερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἀμμῳδὲν τὰ σημεῖα, σοὶ διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ικανοίς ὀρῶν ἀμφώ προδημηθῶ, τὸ όικεῖον ἐκατέρω σημείου ἀποδοῦσ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὅψει, ἐμ-βιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ξύνος, ἑνα γενη-ταῖς ἀναγνώρισι, ἑτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ ὅσπερ οἱ ἑμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξει προσβάλω τῇ ἐκατέρω ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημείουν, ἦ καὶ οἶα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὅψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀρι-
p. 193. **στερά μεταρρέουσης, ταύτων παθῶν διαμάρτων. τότε**

**ΘΕΑΙ.** *Εοικε γάρ, ὁ Σώκρατες· θαυμασίως ὡς λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

**ΣΩ.** *Εγὼ τούν καὶ οὐτάν ἀμφοτέρους γυγνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γυγνώσκειν αἰσθάνομαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ, τὴν δὲ γυγώσιν τοῦ έτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καὶ μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.

**ΘΕΑΙ.** Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

**ΣΩ.** Τούτῳ μὴν ἔλεγον, ὃτι γυγνώσκων τὸν ἐτέρον καὶ αἰσθανόμενον, καὶ τὴν γυγώσιν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν αὐτοῦ ἔχων. οὐδὲπετε ὁς ἔτος ἔτος ἔτος αὐτοῦ ἐτέρου τινα ὑπὸ γυγνώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθανόμενα καὶ τὴν γυγνώσκειν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ τὴν γυγνώσκειν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα.

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3. ὡς] So Bodl. and other MSS., but some have ἡ 'Your description tallies wonderfully with one's experience of what Opinion is.' The other reading (which is possibly right) requires a comma at Σώκρατες, 'One's experience of opinion tallies wonderfully with your description.' (Ces. 2. Schanz is silent about the reading of T.)

7. τοῦ ἐτέρου] Viz. of the former, which is present to sense.

8. ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] This refers to the expression τὴν γυγώσιν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν ἔχειν. Cp. supr. 192 B C.

11. Heind. would insert ὁ before γυγωσκων: but for the transition from the 1st to the 3rd person when the nominative is indefinite cp. infr. 196 D E οἷς . . . ὁπότεν.
preferable to ἕνεκα, the reading of T. The reference of ἕκειν is thus made more distinct.

1. ἦν γὰρ τούτο;] 'We agreed to this?'

6. ἧν δὲ ... ἔχων] 'Or having some other sensible perception of them, to fail in holding the previous impressions of both, each over against the sensation which belongs to it.' This reading of Van Heusde is supported by T and other MSS., which read τῷ σημείῳ. The Bodl. has τὸ σημεῖον. Stallb. reads τὸ σημεῖον . . . ἐκείνου, Heindorf, τῶν σημείων . . . ἐκείνων.

8. ἀλλ' οὖν τὸ ξυπτῷ φαύλον] I. e. we try, sometimes in vain, to make our memory coincide with present facts. We are beginning to have a livelier conception of the movement of the mind and of the remoteness of sensible things from our notions of them.

12. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν] 'So likewise when,' etc. In the former case both objects were known, and both present in sensation: in this, while both are known, one only is present to sense.

13. τὸ δὲ ... ἀπόφθες τοιαθήσεως] Sc. σημείων.


15. ἐπιθετῷ] Sc. αὐτῶν. Most MSS. read μηδὲ ἔμπροσθεν, but the correction of the Bodl. is in the ancient hand.

18. ἐν αὐτοῖς . . . δέξα] 'Here, and here alone, opinion twists
ΤΕΛΙΤΗΣ.

194. στρέφεται καὶ ἔλλετται ἡ δόξα ἰευνῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς γηγυνομένη, καταυτικρὶ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ἰευνῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὁ Σόκρατες, λέγεται; 5

ΣΩ. "Ετι τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τάληθες δοξᾶειν καλὸν, τὸ δὲ ἰευδεσθαι αἰσχρὸν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὲ οὕ; 10

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν φασίν ἐνθέωδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθὺς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὁργασμένος ἦ, τὰ ἱόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐντομαίονα εἰς τούτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, δὲ ἐφ' Ὀμηρὸς αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ δ ὀμοίωτητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτους καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα εἰς ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνια and twists about, becoming true and false alternately.' Cp. the language of Rep. 5. 479 D: "Οτε τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλά νόμμα..." μεταξὺ ποὺ κυλινδεῖται, ἐ.τ.λ.

3. ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους] (1) τύπος is here the present impression, which we endeavour to fit into the mark left by the former one (ἀποτυπώμα). τύπος can scarcely be (2) 'the form of the object.' This would be inconsistent with the previous use of the word, 192 A.

6. μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς] Plato is satirizing the fallacy of supposing that physical illustrations can serve to explain the operations of the mind.

10. φασίν] This may or may not imply a reference to some contemporary doctrine. It indicates the half mythical tone which Socrates has assumed. He knows nothing of himself, but only repeats what he has heard.

12. ὁργασμένος] 'Tempered.' This word has been restored from Timæus to Suidas, the latter of whom quotes this passage. MSS. ὁργασμένος.

14. κέαρ] The Homeric form is κηρ. But κέαρ, although still a poetical form, might be felt to harmonize better with Attic Greek. See above, 173 E, and note.

16. ἱκανῶς... ἐξοντα] 'Being adequate in respect of their depth.'
impure, whence the impressions are either imperfect or faint, or short-lived, or crowded, or coarse and dim, so that it is difficult for the mind to make each sensation correspond to its proper footprint.

2. τῶν αἰσθήσεων] ‘Do not fail in identifying the new impressions with the old.’ The genitive depends on παραλλάττουσι, like τοῦ σκοποῦ above.

3. σαφῆ γὰρ καί εἰς εὐρυχωρία δοτὰ... καλεῖται] (1) There is here a similar irregularity to that noticed above. The sentence begins as though it were to be σαφῆ γὰρ... δοτα (sc. τὰ σημεῖα) ταχὺ εὐρίσκομαιν, or something of the kind: but the thought grows as we proceed: and σαφῆ... δοτα is left as an accusative of purpose. What follows is to be construed thus: ταχὺ διανέμουσιν (οἱ τοιοῦτοι τοῖσα) ἃ δὲ δοτα καλεῖται, ἐκατὰ εἴτε τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκμαγεῖα. ‘Such persons quickly distribute things (as we term them) each to the place of its own former impress upon the block.’

Or (2) ἐκμαγεῖα may possibly here, as in Legg. 7. 800, 801, mean the mould or form of the seal which gives the impression. Cp. supra, note on ἀποστυράματα καὶ τόποις, (2). This gives a simpler construction and a good meaning, but ἐκμαγεῖα is used in the other sense infr. E. ‘For they quickly assign them (τὰ σημεῖα) as being distinct, and having room enough, each to its proper (sensible) original, or so-called reality.’

5. ἃ δὲ δοτα καλεῖται] Supr. 152 D: ‘A δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, 153 E. The latter part of the dialogue does not forget the earlier part.

8. λάσιον... κέαρ] Π. 2.


In Homer the epithet ‘shaggy’ is transferred from στῆδος to κηρ,—but is here understood of a rugged surface that will not take clear impressions. The wisdom of Homer consists in his knowing of the κηρός, rather than in his praise, which is, of course, mistaken. But Plato is satirizing the allegorical method of interpretation, which may have been often not less absurdly applied.

9. ἃ πάντα σοφὸς ποιήσε[To appreciate the irony here, it is well to compare Soph. 233 D E, where the parallel is drawn between the man who ‘creates’ everything and the man who knows everything; as well as Rep. 10. 596, eqq.
p. 194. καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἡ υγρὸν σφόδρα ἡ σκλη-
ρόν, ὅν μὲν υγρὸν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γί-
γονται, ὅν δὲ σκληρόν, τἀναντία. οἱ δὲ ἡ λάσιον
καὶ τραχύ, λιθώδες τι ἡ γῆς ἡ κόπτου συμμεγέισης
ἐμπλευ, ἐχοντες, ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεία ἴσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ 5
δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά· θάνατος γὰρ οὐκ ἐν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ
p. 195. καὶ οἱ τὰ υγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχείσθαι ταχὺ γίγνε-
ται ἀμυδρά. εἰ δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐν' ἀλλήλων
συμπεπτοκότα ἢ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐὰν τοῦ σμικρῶν
ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἐπὶ ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν 10
οὗτοι γίγνονται οἱ δοξάζειν ψευδή. όταν γὰρ τι
ὁρῶσιν ἡ ἅκούσσων ἡ ἐπινοοῦσιν, ἐκατε ἀπονέμειν

3. τἀναντία I. e. δυσμαθῆς
μὲν, μύημονθε δὲ. Plato is again
thinking of the rare combina-
tion of brilliance with solidity,
which is present in Thestetus,
supr. 144 A.

λάσιον] 'Shaggy.' Here, as
in the case of βλοσυφός, we
experience what is a frequent
difficulty in Plato, that of de-
termining the precise ethical
meaning with which he adapts
an Epic word.

4. λιθώδες τι] 'Those in
whom it is shaggy and rugged,
a gritty substance, or one filled
with an admixture of earth or
dung.' The correction λιθώδες
τι (Picin. Heusd.) avoids the
inconsistency of putting as a
single case what are spoken of
above as two (λάσιον... ἡ...
koptrōdes): 'In whom it is
shaggy and rugged and stony,
or full of the admixture of
earth or dung.'

A: ὡς δριμὸ βλέπει τὸ ψυχά-
ριον.

191 D: 'Η αὐτοί ἐννοίσωμεν.

It may be asked, whether
these expressions do not pro-
vide for the difficulty that is
raised afterwards about 11
and 12? The answer proba-
bly is, that the difficulty
which is brought into full
light afterwards, is here silently
anticipated. (Compare the in-
troduction of ἀγαθὸν and καλὸν
in 157 D, and the deliberate
slurring over, in 188 C, of the
case which is afterwards to be
recognized, 191 A. The in-
consistency must be admitted,
but it is not necessary, with
H. Schmidt, to condemn the
words.

The case supposed, though
not distinctly stated, may be
that in which an impression of
sense calls up an alien asso-
ciation: i.e. the second of the
two cases given above, 194 A.

As we dwell upon the
image we have raised, we find
that it is too simple to express
more than the relations of
sense and memory, and in-
stead of multiplying ἐρωτα
πλάσματα, a fresh image is in-
taξεω ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τε εἰσι καὶ ἀλ-
λοτριωμοῦντες παρορόσαι τε καὶ παρακούοντε καὶ
παρανύσαι πλείοστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αἱ οὗτοι ἐφευ-
σμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

5 ἩΕΑΙ. Ὅρθοτατα ἄνθρώπων λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες. ὁ
ΣΩ. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;
ἩΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δή;
ἩΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

10 ΣΩ. Ἠδὴ οὖν οἰόμεθα ἰκανός ὁμολογήσαται ὁτι
παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔστων ἀμφοτέρα τούτῳ τὸ δόξα;
ἩΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυὼς μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Δεινὸν τε, ὁ Θεαῖτης, ὃς ἀλήθως κινδυνεύει
καὶ ἀθὰν ἰδίως ἐστὶν ἄνηρ ἀδολέσχης.

15 ΗΕΑΙ. Τί δὲ; πρὸς τί τούτω ἐπετεῖς;
ΣΩ. Τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ὁ
troduced in Plato's usual man-
ner. The touches of humour
have led some critics to sup-
pose that Plato is alluding to
contemporary opinions (supr.
191 C, note on l. 8). But may
he not be laughing at himself?

The description of the act
of recollecting in the Philebus,
34 B, should be compared
with the present passage:
"Ὅταν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχε
πάθη ἡ φυσική, ταῦτα ἄνω τοῦ σώ-
ματος αὐτή ἐν εὐθείᾳ δὲ μέλος
ἀναλαμβάνει, τότε ἀναμυσσόμεθα
ποιν λέγομεν. ἦ γάρ; Πάνω μὲν ὡν.
Καὶ μὴν ὅταν ἀπολύσασα μνῆ-
μαν ἐπειτε αἰσθήσεως εὑρεῖ ἀδὸ
μαθη-
ματος ταῦτα ἀναπολῆσθαι ἐν
εὐθείᾳ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξάπαντα ἀναμυ-
σεῖς καὶ μήνας ποιν λέγομεν. The
former and simpler process
corresponds to the search for
the impression upon the wax;
the latter to the hunt in the
aviary for a missing bird.

ἐκάστα...ἐκάστοις] (1) τὰ ὄντα
τοῖς ἐκμαγείοις, or (2) τὰ σημεία
τοῖς οὖσιν. See above, note on
σαφῆ γάρ, κ.τ.λ. (194 D, l. 3).
1. ἀλοτριωμοῦντες] 'Mis-
appropriating,' i.e. 'Assigning
wrongly.'

3. καλοῦνται αὖ οὖν] αὖ re-
fers to supr. 194 D: Καὶ σοφοὶ
δὴ οὗτο καλοῦνται. ἀμαθεῖς is the
opposite of σοφοί, the words
ἐφευσμένοι τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων being
inserted by way of explanation.

13. Δεινὸν τε] The old edi-
tions had γε. The abruptness
of the reading in the text is
better than such a meaning-
less connection. Socrates breaks
out, after a pause, with an
expression, the relevancy of
which does not at once ap-
pear.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 195. ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἃν τις ἄλλο θεῖο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τούς λόγους ἐλκῃ τις ὑπὸ νοθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ὑ δυσαπάλλακτος ἀφ’ ἐκάστου λόγου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνοι μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ δέδοικα ὅ τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἀν τις ἔρημαι μὲ. Ὡ Σώκρατες, εὐρηκας δὴ ψευδὴ δόξαν, ὃτι οὐτὲ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἔστι πρὸς ἄλληλαις οὐτὲ ἐν ταῖς διανοίασι, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγὼ, οἴμαι, 10 καλλοπικίζομενος ὃς τι εὐρυκότων ἦμων καλὸν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀμφιρχοῦ ἐναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὄρομεν δ’ οὐ, ἵππων οὐκ ἂν 15 ποτὲ οἰκεθημένοι εἶναι, ὃν ἂν οὔτε ὄρομεν οὔτε ἀπτομεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ’ οὔδεν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἴμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε.

Ε ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, *φήσει, τὰ ἑνδεκὰ, ἂ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἆ 20 διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ οἰκεθη δῶδεκα εἶναι, ἂ μόνον αὖ διανοεῖται; Ἡδι οὖν δὴ, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐλλ’ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὄροι μὲν ἃν ἃς ή

2. ἂνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἐλκῃ τις]. Compare the still livelier image supra. 191 C: Ἐν δὲ ἀνάγει πάρτα μεταστρέφοντα λόγων βασανίζειν.

14. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὖ] 'Is it not then part of your hypothesis, he will say, that on the other hand...?' If mistake arises upon the wrong union of sensation and thought, thought cannot be mistaken when unaccompanied by sensation. (Cp. supra. 190 C.) The opposition between these two cases is expressed by αὖ. Most MSS. have φησι. But φήσει is in Par. 1812.

16. ἄν ἂν] 'Which again,' i.e. as well as the man.


But, when we consider it, the hypothesis is not adequate to the phenomena. E.g. The numbers eleven and twelve are not objects of sensation, but of thought, i.e. they are impressions on the waxy block, and yet in adding 7 and 5 people sometimes take eleven instead of twelve.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

έφαπτόμενος οὐθεὶν τὰ ἑνδεκά δώδεκα ἐναι, αὐτοὶ πρὸς 14. ἐὰν δὲ γὲ] Theseutus is
καὶ μέντοι p. 195. έν τῇ διανοίᾳ έχει, οὐκ ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα
δοξάσειν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἶει τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ 5 πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπων ἐπτά καὶ p. 196.
pέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, ἀ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεία ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖον ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ ἐὰν τις ἀνθρώπων ἥδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο

10 λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἔρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις ἐπεν οὐθεὶς ἑνδεκά αὐτὰ ἐίναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἦ πάντες λέγουσι τε καὶ οἴουσι δώδεκα αὐτὰ ἐίναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ ὁ καὶ ἑνδεκά· ἐὰν δὲ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπήται, ἐὰν 15 μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γὰρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

7. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά] The insertion of the article after αὐτά does not seem necessary, though it may possibly be right.

ἐκεῖ... ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖον] ‘In that block of which we spoke.’

μνημεία] ‘Records.’ At this stage of psychological inquiry, Memory is made to do the work of Abstraction.

9. εἰ τις ἀνθρώπων] The question is resumed with εἰ, depending on λέγω, which has broken the regularity of the sentence. ‘I mean to ask if...’ If the sentence had proceeded regularly, it would be followed by σκοπάμενον... εἰπέων. But εἰ τις, κ.τ.λ., follows λέγω = ἐρωτῶ.

10. λέγων πρὸς αὐτῶν] Socrates refers to his own description of the process of thinking, supr. 189, 190.

14. ἐὰν δὲ γὲ] This Eutetus is permitted to enlarge a little upon the subject of calculation, with which he is familiar (supr. 145 D). We seek to identify the sum of 7 and 5, of which we have thought (ἐπενοόσαμεν) with the corresponding number in our minds: and by mistake we identify it with 11 instead of 12.

The statement of this case shows the inadequacy of the figure we have adopted. For where are the 7 and 5 and the sum of them of which we think? They are not in sensation: must they not then be in the waxen block? The former difficulty returns—we have taken one thing which we know for another thing which we know.
ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς γὰρ οἶει. καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μὴ τί *τότε γίγνεται ἀλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἐνδεκα οἰσθήναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικὲ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρῶτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγος γοὺς; ὃ γὰρ τούτῳ παθῶν, ὃ οἶδεν, ἔτερον αὐτὸ οἶεται εἶναι ὃν αὐτῷ οἶδεν, ὃ ἐφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ οὗναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὃν αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἶδος μὴ εἰδέναι ἁμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἁλλ' ὅτι οὖν δεῖ ἀποφαίνει τὰ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἡ διανοίας πρὸς αἰσθησιν παραλλαγῆς. εἰ γὰρ τούτῳ ἢν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτῶι τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐπεφεύγουσα. ὥν δὲ ἦτοι οὖκ ἔστι ψευδῆς δόξα, ἡ ἡ τε οἶδεν, οἷον τε τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων τὰ πότερα αἰρεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀπορον αἴρεσιν προτίθης, ὡν Σόκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερα γε κινδυνεύειν ὁ λόγος οὖκ εἴσεν. ὁμοι δὲ, πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν;


5. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρῶτους] 'The discussion has reverted to its first stage.' Supr. 188 B. Comparing Phil. 43 C, one is tempted to read ἢν ἕκοι.

8. ἡναγκάζομεν . . . ἀναγκάζοιτο] 'It was by this very argument we tried to make the non-existence of false opinion inevitable, because otherwise it would be inevitable that the same person should know and be ignorant at once.'

11. Ἄλλ' ὅτι οὖν] 'Anything but this.' So Bodl. Most MSS. give ἄλλο τι οὖν.


19. τι . . ἀναισχυντεῖν] 'How, if we were for once to venture on a shameless course!' The distinction between potential and actual now to be made requires a definition of the act of knowing. The difference meant is analogous to that observed by Aristotle between ἑπιστάσθαι and θεωρεῖν; which is his favourite example of the difference between ἔξω and ἐννοεῖα. Cp. Eth. N. 1, 8: Διαφέρει δ' οὖ μικρὸν εὖ κτῆσει ἢ ἐν χρήσει τῷ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν. The ten-
To meet this difficulty, we venture to say what it is to know, — (a daring step, as we are still to seek for the definition of Knowledge.)

\[ \text{ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;} \]

\[ \text{ΣΩ. 'Εθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποιὸν τὶ ποτὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι.} \]

\[ \text{ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τὶ τούτῳ ἀναισχυντον;} \]

\[ 5 \text{ΣΩ. 'Εσοκας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ήμων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὅσ οὐκ εἰδοὺ τὶ ποτὲ ἐστὶν.} \]

\[ \text{ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν ὡςν.} \]

\[ 10 \text{ΣΩ. 'Επετὶ οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι οἷον ἐστὶν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃ Θεαῖττε, πάλαι ἔσμεν ἀνάπλεον τοῦ μὴ καθαρὸς διαλέγεσθαι. μυρίακες γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐπιστήμης ἐν ἐννοίᾳ.} \]

Dendy to this distinction appears in Sophocles, Ant. 1278:

\[ 'Ο δεσπόδη, ὥς, ἔχων τε καὶ κακτεμένος, κ.τ.λ. \]


11. \[ ἀνάπλεον τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι 'Infected with logical imperfection.' Op. Charm. 175 B: Καίτοι πολλα γε ἐννεκορήκαμεν οὐ διμβαινοῦ ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. \]

In other words, we have felt our way hitherto, not by abstract definition and inference, but (as it is expressed in Rep. 7. 533 C) τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναρέουσαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν. We first ventured the hypothesis αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμης. This was rejected, but the difficulties we met with pointed to a further hypothesis, ὅτι ἡ ἀλήθεια δόξα ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶν. Here again we are met by fresh difficulties, but the discussion of these leads to a fresh hypothesis, viz. that we may know, without having knowledge in hand.

12. \[ μυρίακες γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν 'We are haunted throughout by a difficulty respecting the search for knowledge akin to that respecting its definition. Can we know it, and yet not know it? To inquire about it implies ignorance of its nature, and yet how can we use the name even in inquiry without knowing the meaning of the name? ' \]

147 B: \[ Ἡ αἰτία τὶς τις συνηκά τις ὁνόμα, δ μὴ οἴδε τὶ ἐστὶ; \]

210 A: \[ Καὶ πανταπαταί γε εἰδῆς ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην δόξαν φανερὸν ἐστὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης. \]
σκομεν καὶ οὐ γεννώσκομεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὅς τι συνείτες ἀλλήλων ἐν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παράνυτι κεχρήμεθ' αὐ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς προσήκουν αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπὶ στήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὁ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος;

ΣΩ. Οὐδένα ἂν γε ὃς εἰμὶ· εἰ μέντοι ἣν ἀντιλογικός· οἶδο τὸν καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τὸ ἐφί συνεχέσθαι καὶ ἦμων σφόδρ' ἂν · ἔγω λέγω ἐπέπληστεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προθύργου τι ἄν γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τούτων νὴ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπε- ἀπε- 15 χομένῳ σοι ἐστὶ πολλῇ συγγνώμῃ.

7. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὁ Σώκρατες] Compare what was said of being, 157 B: τὸ δὲ εἰμὶ παραπόθεν ἐξαιρέσεων, οἷς διὰ καὶ ἡμέις πολλὰ καὶ ἀρτὶ ἡγαγόμεθα ἢ ποτὲ συνείναι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοῦσις χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ.

That there is such a thing as absolute knowledge and absolute being is the postulate of Plato's mind. That he himself or any man can wholly grasp either is more than he will dare to say. The sacredness of this belief, which it would be impious to relinquish, appears also in Thetetus' answer: Toúton δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ ἐσται σοι πολλῇ συγγνώμῃ. Cp. Parm. 135 C: τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; ποτε τρέψει ἀγνωσμένων τούτων;


ei méntoi hō anatologikós] The apodosis (diapolemon an ows touton apexomemos) is omitted, and the construction changed, because, from supposing himself antilogikos, Socrates proceeds to imagine the effect of the presence of such a man upon the discussion.

10. touton t' an efhi apéexesthai] Not exactly with Heind., Stallb., 'abstinere nos jubeatur,' but (1) (sub. δεῖν) 'would have dwelt on the necessity of abstaining,' or, possibly, (2) (throwing an emphasis on ἦμων), 'Would have professed to abstain.' The kind of sophistry intended is illustrated supra. 157 B, 165-7. touton apexomemos is not, as some interpreters would have it, 'without definition,' but 'without assuming the reality of knowledge.'
ΣΩ. Ἀκήκοας ὁ δὲ νῦν λέγοντι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; p. 197.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἠσος· οὐ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνη-
μονεύω.
ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμης ποι ἔχων φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι. b
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.
ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοῖνυν σμικρὸν μεταθῶμεθα καὶ εἰ-
πομεν ἐπιστῆμης κτῆσιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τούτῳ ἐκείνῳ διαφέρειν;
ΣΩ. Ἠσος μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας
συνδοκίμαζε.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν πέρ γε οἶός τ' ὁ.
ΣΩ. Οὔ τοινυν μοι ταύτων φαίνεται τῷ κεκτήσθαι
tὸ ἔχειν. οἶον *ei ἵματαν πρᾶμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατής
οὖν μὴ φοροῖ· ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, κεκτήσθαι
de γε φαίμεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς γε.
ΣΩ. Ὁρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὐτω κε-
κτήσθαι μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὀσπέρ ἐι τις ὄρνθα ἄγριας,
περιστερὰς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκου κατασκευασά-
μενος περιστερεώνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἄν ποὺ
tωνα φαίμεν αὐτὸν αὐτῶς αἰε ἔχειν, ὡς δὴ κέκτησαι.
ἡ γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

4. 'Επιστήμης .. ἔχων] Euthyd. 277 B: Τὸ δ' ἐπιστασθαι .. ἄλλο
τι ἂν ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἤδη ἐστίν; Phaed. 76 B.
13. *ei ἵματαν] Stallb. at-
tempts to defend the optative
without εἰ (which has only
slight authority), from Rep.
549 A, ἄγριος εἰ, which is not
quite parallel, (and there is
MS. authority for inserting ἄν.)
The comparison of 193 A: Ἱσ-
κράτεις ἐπιγγένωσκει, κ.τ.λ., sug-
gests the conjecture ὀσπέρ as an
alternative reading. The Bodl.
has ὀσπέρ as an early correc-
tion.
18. μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ'] This oppo-
sition between minute parts
of a sentence is characteristic
199 A B.
ὁσπέρ] The apodosis (sc.
οὗτον τὴν ἐπιστήμην κέκτησα) is
suppressed,—the main thread
being resumed in πάλιν δὴ, κ.τ.λ.
Cp. Rep. 3. 402 A—C. Join
οἴκου τρέφοι.
THEAITHTOS.

p. 197. ΣΩ. Τρόπον δε γ' ἄλλον οὐδὲμιαν ἔχειν, ἄλλα δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτᾶς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποίησατο, λαβεῖν δ' καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὴν βουλήται, θηρευμένῳ ἢν ἂν αἱ ἔθελη, καὶ πάλιν ἀφίμεναι καὶ τούτο ἔξειναι τοιεῖν, εἰς ὁποιάκι ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ στί ταύτα.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δῆ, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόοθεν κήρυνον τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ἡ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖν ἐν ἐκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεώντα τινα ἐν παντοδαπῶν ὑρνίδων, τός μὲν κατ' ἄγελας οὐσίας χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων, τῶς δ' κατ' ὁλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὑπὴ ἂν τύχοσι πετομένας.

ὅ ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποίησθος δῆ, ἄλλα τι τούντεύθεν;

ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν ὄντων, φάναι χρῆ, ἐλναι τοῦτο 15 τὸ ἀγγείον κενόν, αὐτὶ δὲ τῶν ὄρνιθων ἐπιστήμης νοῆσαι ἢν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθερήξῃ εἰς

2. δύναμιν μὲν] Heind. well compares infr. 201 B; Πέωα μὲν,
3. λαβεῖν...ιδῆ] 'To take and to hold, when he desires to do so, any one of them which he chooses to catch."
8. κήρυν τι] 'We sought to establish in the mind a sort of moulding-block of wax.'
10. ποιήσωμεν] 'Let us frame.'
Cp. Rep. 9. 588 D.
11. τὰς μὲν κατ' ἄγελας, κ.τ.λ.] The distinction indicated is probably that between: (1) individuals in the aggregate (πολλὰ δέρασθείνα, 157 B); (2) intermediate abstractions, as the virtues, numbers, etc.; (3) the highest abstractions, as Being, Goodness, resemblance, difference, etc. Little is thought, however, of any distinction between memory and abstraction, as appears from the interchange of the terms μνημεῖον and διωκόμα in what precedes.
12. κατ' ὁλίγας] E.g. the virtues, arts, etc.
15. ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν] E.g. τὴν οἰκίαν . . . τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέσται, 186 A. The supremacy of certain universal forms, or categories, is a conception which belongs to the maturity of Plato's thought. (See Introduction.)
16. ἄγγειον] 'Receptacle.'
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ εὑρηκέναι p. 197.
tὸ πράγμα οὐ ἤν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι
tοῦτ' εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἩΕσω.

5 ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῖνυν πάλιν ἢν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστή-
µῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἵσχειν καὶ αὖθις ἁρίεναι,
σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὑνοµάτων, εἰτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἢν τὸ
πρῶτον, ὅτε ἔκτασο, εἰτε ἑτέρων. μαθήσει δ' ἐνθεῦκε
σαφέστερον τι λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις

10 τέχνην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θύραν ἐπιστήµῶν ἁρτίου
τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντὸς.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἩΥπολαµβάνω.

15 ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτὸς τε ὑποχει-
ρίους τὰς ἐπιστήµας τῶν ἁρίθµῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλῳ πα-
βεῖα παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδόως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν,
20 παραλαµβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κε-
κτήσαι εὖ τῷ περιστερεῶν ἐκεῖνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ δὴ ἐνετεύθεν ἦδη πρόσοχῃς τῶν νοῶν.
ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὃν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἁρίθµονος

The arithmetician has know-

8. ἐνθεῦκε] The Bodl. MS.
has ἐνετεύθεν, which might mean,
'If you will come and look
from where I stand.'
15. ὑποχειρίους] ‘Under (in
the power of) his hand.’ (Supr.
197 C.) But not necessarily
προχειρίους, 'in hand.'
16. ἔχω] The omission of
the subject (ὁς, ὃς ἔχω) is sup-
plied in the next clause by the
addition of ὁ παραδίδους.

23. Τῷ δὴ ἐνετεύθεν] δὲ δὴ, the
reading of the Bodl. and its two
companions, has probably slip-
ped in from ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ above.
The example is not merely in-
tended to illustrate the dis-
tinction between having and
holding, but more immediately
to show how we are to con-
ceive of the process of realiz-
ing knowledge.
Yet in calculating he searches for what he knows, putting his hand as it were into the cage.

4. ἢ αὐτάς πρὸς αὐτῶν αὐτὰ] This is the reading of the MSS. with the exception of Vat. Δ, which omits αὐτά: the reading ἐντὸς is a conjecture of Cornarius. The common reading is defensible. If αὐτά is omitted, the antithesis is imperfect; and if grammatical symmetry were desired, it could be restored by substituting αὐτά for αὐτά. But there is no real flaw, for τι is cognate accusative, and ἄριθμοι τι = cast up a sum. The second accusative in the plural, of the things which constitute the sum, is therefore perfectly admissible; and it is also pointed, referring to αὐτά πέντε καὶ ἑπτά in supr. 196 Α. ' Might he not cast up a sum, either of abstract numbers in his head, or of things about him that happen to be numerable?'

As in theParmenides, where unity is provisionally negated, so here, where it has not been fully reached, the objects of Knowledge (or rather Knowledges themselves) appear in loose bundles which fly as we approach them.

9. πόσος τις ἄριθμος τυγχάνει ὃν] 'What such-and-such a sum amounts to.' (ἀριθμητικὴ here seems to include λογιστικὴ.)

11. The question here is not of error, but of inquiry. The pursuit of knowledge implies ignorance even where the process is correct.

ρών κτήσει τε καὶ θῆρα ἔροιμεν, ὃτι διττῇ ἤν ἡ θῆρα, p. 198. ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσθαι ἕνεκα· ἡ δὲ κεκτημένος τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερόιν ἄ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὃν πάλαι ἐπιστήματι ἦσαν αὐτῆς, 5 μαθόντι καὶ ἰπτόστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν ταύτα ταύτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου καὶ ἵσχυστα, ἢν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ ἔχει τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΤΕΛ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΟ. Τούτῳ δὴ ἄριστη ἴσχυς, ὅπως χρή τοῖς ὁνόμασι χρόμενοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡσαν ἄριθμήσων ἢ ὁ ἀριθμητικός ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικός, ὥσαν ἐπιστήμονες ἀρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ' ἐαυτοῦ ἄ ἐπιστάται;

ΤΕΛ. Ἀλλ' ἀποτοῦν, ὁ Σάκκαρτες.

ΣΟ. Ἀλλ' ἀν οὐκ ἐπιστάται φῶς αὐτῶν ἀναγνώσεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδοκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπιστασθαι;

ΤΕΛ. Ἀλλ' καὶ τούτ' ἄλογον.

ΣΟ. Βούλειν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὅνωμάτων αὑτῶν ἡμῶν μέλει, ὅπη τις χαίρει ἐλκών το ἐπιστασθαι

We shall say then that it is

1. ἢν] The past tense implies 'We have found it to be . . . ' Supr. A.

2. πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι] So the MSS. And it is unsafe to change to κεκτήσθαι, as such variations may have depended on some law of euphony. Cp. Sophocl. O. C. 5; Σμερᾶν μὲν ἔξωτον, τοῦ μικροῦ δ' ἔτι, κ.τ.λ.

3. πρόχειρον] As we say, 'at his fingers' ends.'

10. Τούτῳ] Accusative in apposition with the action of the verb, as τάστα is very frequently used. 'This was my drift in asking,' etc. Cp. Rep. 2. 377 A.

20. ἢν, κ.τ.λ.] The question asked above, 198 A, was τὸ . . . θερέων, κ.τ.λ., τῶν δεῖσα όνομάτων. But the illustration has thrown so clear a light upon the subject that in giving our answer we may dispense with nominal definitions.

21. ὅπη τις χαίρει ἐλκών] 'Whatever confusion may be willfully made with the verbs to learn and to know,' i.e. in the αἵματάδισεις above referred to, that a man cannot learn
what he knows nor what he does not know. For the language cp. Soph. 259 C: Χαίρει τότε μὲν ἐπὶ βάτερα τότε δ' ἐπὶ βάτερα τὸν λόγον ἔλκων.

4. [ὅπως ὀδηγεῖται] ‘So that in no case does it come to pass that a man is ignorant of what he knows, but still he may get hold of a wrong notion in regard to it; for he may not have in hand the knowledge of the particular thing in question, but another instead, when in hunting up some particular knowledge from his stock (τοῦ δ' κεκτησαί) he gets hold of the wrong one by mistake as they fli across him: that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the knowledge of eleven instead of that of twelve.—in other words, the rock-pigeon that was caged within him instead of the dove.’

5. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν] These words are put emphatically forward in antithesis to μὴ κεκτήσασαι. When hunting for some particular knowledge amongst what he possesses and knows, he catches one for another as they fly about: e.g. the arithmetician makes a mistake in regard to number when he seeks in the flock of numbers for that which = 7 + 5, and takes hold of 11 instead of 12.

The germ of the present metaphor appears in the Euthydemus, 290 C, 291 B: Ἡθεντικὸς γὰρ εἰς καὶ οὗτοι (οἱ λογιστικοὶ) κ.τ.λ. αὐτῶν γὰρ (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) οὐκ ἐπιστάταις χρήσαται τούτοις δὲ ἐθήμενοι, ὅσπερ, οἵμα, οἱ ὀργυγοθῆκαι τοὺς ὀργυγορόφους παρακθᾶσαι σ. . . ἀλλ' ἤμεν πάντα γελοῖοι, ὅσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τούς κορόδους διώκοντα, οἷς ἐσθένον, τοὺς ἐπιστημονίων αὐτίκα λήψεσθαι' αὐτῇ δ' ἐλεύθερην. Compare also Arist. Met. 1. 5, 1009 b: Τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἰν εἶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

7. ἀν' αὐτοῦ] The difficulty of the sentence lies in these words. They probably refer to δ' κεκτήσαται . . . δ' ὁδε above. For it is difficult to imagine that αν' αὐτοῦ and περὶ αὐτοῦ above do not refer to the same thing. If this be so, the meaning is, that he makes a mistake concerning some general subject, e.g. concerning number in general, when he takes one particular thing contained in it for another. τοῦτον therefore has a narrower reference, and means, ‘of this particular thing,’ viz. which he is in search of. For a similar use of τοῦτον, without anything to which it immediately refers, cp. supr. 180 A: Καὶ τοῦτον ζητεῖ λόγον λαβέων, τι εἰρήκει. Infr. 222 C: Τὸν μὴ δεικνύουσαν δούναι τε καὶ δεξαμενος λόγον
for another
that he
knows,
when, fail-
ing in this
after-
search, he
takes the
wrong
knowledge
in hand.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. "Εχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.
ΣΩ. Οταν δὲ γε ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβη, ἀφευν-
δεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι
ἀληθῆ τε καὶ πευκῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὁν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ο
ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδίων γίγνεσθαι; ἵσως οὖν
10 μοι συμφήσεις. ἢ πῶς ποιῆσεις;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀ ἐπιστανται μὴ ἐπιστασθαι
ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἄ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτήσθαι οὐ-

ἀναποτήμονα εἶναι περὶ τοῦτον (sc.
οὗ ἢ μη δύνηται, κ.τ.λ.). διαπο-
μένων is genitive absolute, in
partial construction with ἔτεραν.
The words ἡρ᾽ αὐτοῦ have been
questioned by many critics.
Ἀπὶ τῶν δὲ αὐτοῦ is the most
plausible of the conjectural
emendations.

1. δὲ ἁρὰ . . . ψῆθη εἶναι, . .
λαβῶν] We pass from ὡς τον to
δὲ ἁρὰ, because reference is
now made to the case actually
in question. The participle
λαβῶν is epexegetic to the verb
understood in what precedes.
'He has hold of something
else: that is (in the case above
adduced) taking the knowledge
of eleven for that of twelve,'
As if ἤξειν . . . οὔτως τέ were τὰς
ἀν ἤξοι. The change to the
nominitive is partly occasioned
by ὡς λαβῆι coming in between.
ἀρὰ = 'as in our illustration.'

For a similar epexegetics cp.
Legg. 3. 690 E: 'Ἀρνοῦσας
tὸν Ἡσίοδον ὁρθότατα λέγοντα ὡς
τῷ ήμισ τοῦ πατέως πολλάκις ἐστι
πλέον ὡς τὸ μὲν δλον λαμ-
βάνεις ἡμιδεῖς, τὸ δ ἠμᾶς μέ-
τρων, τότε τὸ μετίρων τοῦ ἀμέτρου
πλέον ἡγίσατο, ἀμέων δν χεί-
ρων.

6. αφευνδεῖν] In construction
with φαμέν, supr.

12. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν . . . μέντοι]
'For indeed we have got rid of
the trouble of men not knowing
what they know . . . notwithstanding there is a still worse
danger which now looks in
upon us.'

ἐπιστανται] So the Bodleian
with all the other MSS. except
pr. Ven. Π. This is hardly suf-
cient authority for the change
to ἐπιστασθαι. The transition from
singular to plural is not more
remarkable than that from the
3rd person to the 1st in κεκτή-
μεθα, infr. It may be accounted
for by the fact that Socrates is
speaking generally, and no
longer with reference to the
individual case supposed above.
Compare especially Rep. 7.
537 E and v. rr.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 199. δαμού ἐτι συμβαίνει, ὥστε ψευδεῖσι τίνος ὥστε μὴ.
δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἀλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι
δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῦν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδῆς γε- 5
νήσεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τινὸς ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο
αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖ, μὴ ἀγνωσοῦνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπι-
στήμην· ἔπειτα ἔτερον αὐτὸ δοξάζειν, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον 10
τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενο-
μένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδὲν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ
πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου καλῶς οὐδὲν καὶ
ἀγνοοιαν παραγενομένην γνῶναι τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλο-
τητα ἰδεῖν, ἐπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῆσαι ποτε τινὰ 15
ποιῆσαι.

Ε. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσως γάρ, ό Σῶκρατες, οὐ καλῶς ὡς
όρισθας ἐπήθεμεν ἐπιστήμασι μόνον τιθέντες, ἐδεὶ δὲ
καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαποτομένας
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτε μὲν ἐπιστήμην 20

2. παραφαίνεσθαι] As it were, 'looking in at the window.'
The reading παρεμφαίνεσθαι (Ven. Ε etc.) deserves mention.
5. Εἰ . . . γενήσεται] εἰ with the fut. ind., as usual after δει-
νῶν, expresses alarm or indignation, 'to think of such a
possibility!'
8. τὸ τινὸς] These words de-
pend immediately on δεινότερον,
in common with εἰ ἡ τῶν . . . δόξα:
but πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία also has
reference to them.
9. ἀγνωσοῦνη] Used here
in its most literal sense, = τῇ
μὴ γνωσόσκειν, 'from being un-
acquainted.'

τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ] Viz. which
he possesses, ὃ τι δὲ ἐχει τε καὶ
κέκτηται, referring to ἔχοντα.

Ι. Πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία] The
clause which follows this is a
more particular statement or
explanation of that which pre-
cedes. Compare the structure
of Rep. 4. 445 B: Τὴς δὲ αὐτοῦ
tοῦτον ὧν ζομεν φύσεως ταρατ-
μένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτῶν
ἄρα ἔσται, εἰ τὲ περ τις ποιή δὲ ἢ
βουληθῇ ἀλλο πλὴν τούτο ὡσθέν
κακίας μὲν καὶ ἄκιντας ἀπολαγη-
σέται, κ.τ.λ., supr. 144 A.

19. ἀνεπιστημοσύνας] Cp. the
Charmides, 166 E, etc.
λαμβάνοντα, τοτε δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι, p. 199.
ψευδή μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀλήθη δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ ράδιον γε, ὁ Θεάτης, μὴ ἐπιανεῖν σε.
5 ὁ μέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς
λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδή p. 200.
μὲν, φήσ, δοξάσει. ἦ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ ποὺ καὶ ἡγήσεται γε ψευδὴ δοξάζειν.
10 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ;

ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ' ἀλήθη γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδῶς διακείσεται περὶ
δὲν ἐφευσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. 'Επιστήμην ἀρα οἰνησται τεθηρευκὼς ἕχειν,
15 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δὴλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν
πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικός ἐκείνος
γελάσας φήσει. Πότερον, ὁ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας θ
τις εἰδῶς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἢν
οἴδει, ἐτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεται τινα εἰναι ὁν οἴδει; ἡ οὐ-
δετέραν αὐτοῦ εἰδῶς, ἡν μὴ οἴδε, δοξάζει ἐτέραν ὁν
οὐκ οἴδει; ἡ τὴν μὲν εἰδῶς, τὴν δ' οὐ, ἢν οἴδε, ἢν μὴ
οἴδε; ἡ ἡν μὴ οἴδε, ἢν οἴδει ἡγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὐ

4. Οὐ ράδιον γε, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates
is again charmed by the dialec-
tical readiness of Theaetetus,
and yet is compelled to refuse
his suggestion. Cp. supr. 184
C, infr. 204 E: Ἀνδρικὸς γε,
k.τ.λ. Phædo, 62 E: ἢ θεῦναί
tε μου ἐδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κύβητος πραγ-
ματεῖα, κ.τ.λ.

17. ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν
ἀπορίαν] 'We find ourselves
again confronted with the same
difficulty which encountered us
at first.' Cp. Phil. 13 C: Πά-
λιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον,
τὸ ἐπώραξε.

18. ὁ ... ἐλεγκτικός ἐκείνος]
Supr. 165, 195 C, 197 A.

20. ἢν οἴδει, κ.τ.λ.] Supr. 188
B, 192.

22. αὐτοῦ] Most MSS. have
αὐτήν, from the preceding line.
p. 200. Μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης εἰσὶν αὐτ ἐπιστήμης, ὥσ τὸ κεκτημένου ἐν ἔτεροις τισὶ γελοῖος περιστερεῶς ἡ κηρύνοις πλάσμασι καθερ- c ἡς, εἰς περ ἀν κεκτήτω, ἐπίστατα, καὶ ἔαν μὴ προ- χείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὐτοῦ δὴ ἀναγκασθῆ- 5 σεσθε ἐις ταῦταν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες; Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Θεαίτης, ἀποκρινοῦ- μεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα μὰ Δία, ὁ Σοκράτης, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὁ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπι- πλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὅρθος ἰσόν ὁ ὑποτέραν ἔποικεμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ δ’ ἐστὶν ἄδυνατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἀν τις ἐπιστήμην ἰκανὸς λάβῃ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σοκράτης, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ ποι ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω.

3. γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν] It would be rash to infer from this ridicule that the image is not Plato’s own. Is Socrates never made to accuse himself of absurdity? Rep. 1.354 A: Οὗ με- τὸι καλὸς γε ἐλεύθημαι δὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἄλλ’ οὐ διὰ σέ. Prot. 340 E: Ἐλμί τις γελοίος λαρδός. He is here speaking dramatically in the person of the ἐρωτηθέος ἀνήρ, who is bent on exposing their weak points. Cp. supr. 162 D, 166 A.

5. καὶ οὗτο δὴ, κτλ.] Cp. esp. Charm. 167 foll., and, for the ‘ad infinitum’ argument, Parm. 132 E foll.

11. δ’ λόγος] Either this particular argument, or rather the discussion generally, in the form of an imaginary disputation. Supr. 195 D.

13. ἐκείνη] ἰσόν δὸξα is the subject immediately in hand, hence ἐκείνη stands for ἐπιστήμη as the more remote.

τὸ δὲ] Sc. ἰσόν δὸξα τι ποτ’ ἐστίν.

15. ἰκανὸς λάβῃ] Supr. 145 E.

19. ποι is the reading of Ven. P., and is probably right. (Cett. pò.) Schanz reads οὗ γε πω ἀπεροῦμεν. This is partly confirmed by the scribe of the Boll. MS. having begun to punctuate after ἀπεροῦμεν, and in then adding γε πω, having forgotten to accentuate the last syllable of ἀπεροῦμεν.

The truth is, we have no right to be searching for false opinion until we have
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡκιστα, ἐάντερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύσης. p. 200.
ΣΩ. Δέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτῷ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἦκιστ ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἑναντιωθεῖμεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὠσπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὁ Σάκρατης, ἐν τῷ ἐν 5 πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδὲν.
ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθὴ δόξαν ἔπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητον γε ποῦ ἐστὶ τὸ δοξάζειν ἁληθῆς, καὶ τὰ ἢπ' αὐτοῦ γέννημεν πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.
10 ΣΩ. Ὁ τῶν ποταμῶν καθηγούμενος, ὁ Θεαίτης, ἔφη ἄρα δεῖξειν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἴστις ἑρευνῶμεν, τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτῷ φῆμε τὸ ἐξομάκ. p. 201. νον, μένουσι δὴ δῆλον οὐδὲν.

8. καὶ τὰ ἢπ' αὐτοῦ γέννημα πάντα] True opinion guides to right action, but it is a blind guide. See esp. Rep. 6. 506 C: Ὠικ γράθησας τὰς ἄνες ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ἃς πᾶσαι αὐχραὶ, κ.τ.λ.
10. Ὁ τῶν ποταμῶν ὃς ἦν τὸ ποτάμιον ἐξε. The man who had to show where the river was fordable is reported (ἄρα) to have said, Go on, and you will find.’ For the expressions αὐτὸ δεῖξειν, τάχ' ἂν αὐτὸ φήμεν cp. Phileb. 20 C: Προὶ ἡ ἡ σαφίστερον δείξειν. Protag. 324 A: Ἀύτῳ σὲ διδάξειν. Cratyl. 402 C: Τοῦτο γε ἐλάχιστον αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι πρήξη δυσμα ἐπίκε- κρυμμένοι ἵστ. Hipp. Maj. 288 B: ἡ δ' ἐπικρήσεις ἐστιν κατα- γελαστος, αὐτὸ δείξειν. The Scho- liast says: Δείξειν αὐτὸ, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ πείρας γεγονόκινων, κα- τότου γάρ τινων εἰς ποταμὸν πρὸς τὸ διαπέρασαι ἤρετό τις τῶν ἐπηγούμενοι εἰ βάθος ἔχει τὸ υδατ. ὁ δὲ ἢφη, αὐτὸ δείξειν.
The explanation is probable, though the authority is uncertain.
See above, πλεῖον ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέ- οντα. τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον; and cp. Rep. 5. 453 D: Ἐὰν τῇ τῆς εἰς κολυμβήθρας μεμικαὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐὰν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πελαγὸς μέσον, ὅμως γε νῦν οὐδὲν ἤθον.
12. τάχ' ἂν...ἐξομάκ] Either (1) (Heindorf), ‘Perhaps by giving us trouble, it may of itself bring to light that of which we are in search,’ or (2) ‘Perhaps the very thing we are in search of may come in our way and show itself,’ or (3) taking ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον with τοῦτο and αὐτὸ φήμεν τὸ ἐξομάκ as a new sentence. ‘If we proceed with this inquiry, perhaps, through its giving us trouble,—the very object of our search may show itself.’ In (2) ἐμπόδιον is used with a forcing of the derivation, like πρόκειτον supr., ‘amongst
our feet.' Both in (2) and (3) the idiomatic use of δεικνυμι is extended to φαίνω.

έμποδων γενόμενον] 'Coming in our way,' i.e. giving us trouble. Those fording the river were feeling the bottom with their feet. Compare the way in which justice 'turns up' in the Republic, 4. 432 D: Πάλαι, & μακάρε, φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἠμῖν κυλισθέον. Prof. Jowett translates, 'We may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for.'


4. αὐτό] Sc. τὸ εἰρημένον, i.e. δόξα αἰλήθεις.

6. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν

The irony is almost as transparent as in Polit. 266 C: γὰρ τῷ τῶν διττῶν γενναστάτῳ καὶ ἀμα εὐχερεστάτῳ. Cp. Phaedr. 260 C sqq., Gorg. 462 C, alib. μεγίστων is masc. antec. to οὐσ. (ἡ om. Bodl.)

In what follows the Bodleian MS. gives τούτους with Vat. Α. Ven. Π. This is better than τούτοις, which can be defended only by supposing the plaintiff to plead his own cause. Trans. 'Or do you suppose there are such clever teachers in the world, as to be able to convey to others the reality of what happened to men, of whose being robbed or otherwise assaulted the hearers were not eyewitneses?' Schanz reads, from Naber's conjecture, σὲ μὴ ... τούτους . . .


Failing to conceive of false opinion, we return to examine the theory of Knowledge which identifies it with true opinion. We have not to search far; for in the familiar case of judicial evidence, a true opinion may be
formed by the judges without the possibility of knowledge; since in questions of fact nothing short of personal observation ensures certainty. The definition 'Knowledge is true opinion,' is therefore inadequate. And the example given is calculated to suggest the next definition—δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου.

The question returns, Are the above conceptions and images Plato’s own, or is he repeating in them some contemporary theories? The comparison of other dialogues and the close examination of the passage itself tend to the conclusion that although they may have been suggested to him from without, they may be fairly regarded as his own creation. See especially the passage in Phil. 44 C fol., in which, after certain men have been brought forward as 'soothsayers' or 'allies,' there follows the analysis of the pleasure derived from Comedy, which is one of the most original and 'modern' passages in Plato. The image of the 'impressions' on the wax has not only been revived in speculation, but perpetuated in common language. And that of the aviary has probably been less fortunate only from its greater boldness and subtlety.


Π. ἃ καὶ δικαστήρια] Several MSS. read δικαστήριον. These words were rejected by the older critics, except Buttmann, who conjectured καὶ δικαστήρια, very aptly for the sense, if the word can be made to signify ‘worthy of a good judge.’ See the words εἰπέρ εὔδικασαν... ὀρθα πότ’ ἐν δικαστῆς άκρος ἐξοφλεῖν. It is in Plato’s manner thus ostensibly to restrict himself to the case in point. Cr. 152 C: Ἐν τε βεροῖς καὶ πάσι τούτοις τούτοις. 204 D: Ἐν γε τούς διὰ εἴ δρῳμοι ἔτοιν. Possibly (1) καὶ δικαστοῦ ἀξία may be the true reading. Cr.
to be mistaken about these ideas themselves apart from impressions from without. But in fact we do mistake in things independent of sensation. E.g. a scientific calculator, who possesses the knowledge both of 11 and 12, will sometimes say that the sum of 7 and 5 is 11. We resort therefore to a less simple conception of knowing, and to a more complex image. To know is to possess knowledge. We may possess it without having it in hand. We therefore image to ourselves false opinion thus. We have caught, as it were (in learning), various species of knowledge, some gregarious, some domestic, some noble and solitary, (i.e. highly abstract), and have caged them in the mind, like birds. We try to take in hand one of these birds which we possess, and as they flutter about, we take hold of another instead of it. But then, if we have this one in hand, how can we mistake it for the other? How can Knowledge be the means of error? Perhaps (Thetetus suggests) there were ignorances flying about amongst the knowledges, and we have taken one of them. But if I have an Ignorance in hand, how can I take it for a Knowledge? Must we imagine another cage or waxen block to contain the Knowledge of the knowledges and ignorances? This would be endless.

3. "Ο γε... ἐπολελήσθημεν..." A distinction, Socrates, which...
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true opinion, unless accompanied with an account of its object, is not knowledge.

Socrates identifies the saying thus quoted with what he himself has heard from certain 'as in a dream;' viz. that

once heard expressed in a way which until this moment I had forgotten.'

I. τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν] Cp. Meno, 97 E, 98: Καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν χρόνον παραμένων, καλῶν τὸ χρῆμα, καὶ πάντα τά γάρ γέραζονται, πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐδέλουσιν παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύοντος ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοὶ δὲ έχει εἰπώς ἦν τις αὕτης δήσῃ αὐτίας λογισμῷ... οὐ μεν δὲ δεῖδων, πρῶτος μὲν ἐπιστήμη γίνονται, ὑπεταί μοίμως καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὲ τιμωτέρων ἐπιστήμη ὑπὸ δόξης ἐστὶ, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὑπόδης δόξης. See the whole passage. Also Polit. 309 C: Τὴν... δύτως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως. Symp. 202 A: Ἔστω οὖν ἦν οὗτος ὁ πρῶτος σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; τι τούτο; τὸ ὁρὲ δοξάζει καὶ ἀνέν τοῦ ἐχει λόγον δούναι οὐκ ἀδίκος, ἢ φή, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπισταθεὶς ἔστω λόγον γὰρ πράγμα πῶς ἄρα ἐπιστήμῃ; οὔτε ἀμαθία τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δύτως τυχόντος πῶς ἄρα ἡ ἀμαθία; ἢ οὔτε δὲ ἄρα τοιούτων ἢ ὁρὲ δοξά, μεταξύ φρο- νήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Rep. 6. 506 C: Ὅπως ἦσθησα τὰς ἀνέν ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὅσοι πᾶσαι ἀλχραίοι; δὲν αἱ βελτιστὰς τυφλὰ; ἢ δοκοῦσι σοι τὶ τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ἄρα ἄρας περιουσίων οἱ ἅπειροι σοι γὰρ δοξάζοντες; 4. οὐσαί καὶ ἀναμῶσαν] I. e. using this strange term ἐπι- στήμη. Inf. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστήμη ταῦτα. (For the participle cp. Gorg. 493 B: Τὸ αἰείδες ἄρα λέγοντον, Sophocles. Phil. 64.) ἐπιστήμη ἄπα αἰσθήσεως καὶ ποιήσεως, supra, 150 D, 182 A, is a novel word, and is formed on the analogy of αἰσθήσεως.

6. 'Ἡ... λέγεις] 'Truly, that is fortunate.' 'A timely recollection, indeed!' Gorg. 447 C.

7. εἰ ἢ ἢ] 'That I may know, whether.' Cp. supr. 192 C: 'Εἰαν ἢ ἢ... μάκαρον... ἢ οὐκ ἢ... τάρτα σύ τε κἀγὼ ἄρχεσθαι...' Had they both heard from the same source? Or is Plato here, as in the beginning of the dialogue, weaving together two distinct theories? If infr. 206 C is to be construed strictly, the latter is true. (See Introduction.)

II. ὡς] Cp. Phileb. 20 B: 'Δόξαν ποτὲ τινων πάλαι ἀκούονασ
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p. 201. ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινὸν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἰοντερεῖ ἐστοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἦμεν τε συγκείμενα καὶ τὰλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχον· αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν ὑπομάςαμεν μόνον έπι, προσεπείνει δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατὸν

p. 202. οὐδ’ ὁς ἔστιν, οὐδ’ ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἡδὴ γὰρ ἄν οὐσίαν ἃ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, ἰσθαίνει δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκείνο μόνον τις εἶπε. ἑπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκείνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκαστὸν οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον οὐδὲ τούτο προσωπεῖτον, οὐδ’ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα.

διάρ... νῦν ἐννοο... Phaed. 61 D: Ἀλλὰ μὲν κάγω ἐξ αἰκαῖς... λέγω. It suits Plato’s humour to speak in this distant fashion of a school towards which he felt an ‘imperfect sympathy.’ What Socrates has heard carelessly, as well as that which Thespheus once heard but had forgotten, is compared to a dream.

1. ἐδόκον [αἴτει] ‘I heard in my dream.’

τὰ πρῶτα οἰοντερεῖ στοιχεῖα] ‘The first rudiments, so to speak, of things.’ In what follows it is vain to distinguish between different senses of στοι- χεῖον. The word is here regarded by Plato as a generic term, of which the denotation of the letters of the alphabet is only the most familiar use. ‘Everyone will acknowledge that musical notes are also στοιχεῖα’ (206 B). In fact the unit of apprehension in every subject is the στοιχεῖον of that particular subject-matter. The word συλλαβή is similarly generalized, so that in passing from language to other things there is no change in the meaning of the word. Cp. infr. 202 E: Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεία τα καὶ συλλα- βάς, ἢ οὐί ἄλλος ποι βλέπωντα ταῦτα εἴπειν τὸν εἰπότα δ’ λέγομεν.

For such figurative generalization, which is different from poetic metaphor, cp. esp. Legg. 7. 823 B: ὥσπερ γὰρ παραπλοῦ τι πράγμα ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. See some valuable remarks of Prof. Jebb’s on the use of metaphor in Pindar, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 3. 1. 167.

3. αὐτὸ γὰρ... εἶπ] ‘For that each element in its proper self- existence can only be named.’

Cp. especially Soph. 251 B: Καὶ γὰρ ὑπάνετε ἁγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἄλλα τὸ μὲν ἁγα- θὸν ἁγαθὸν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄν- θρωπον.

4. προσεπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυ- νατὸν] ‘But it is impossible to go on to predicate anything of it (the element), either affirmatively or negatively. For in so doing there is added the idea of existence or non-existence: but nothing must be added, seeing that you can only speak of the element by itself.’

5. ἡδὴ γὰρ] Sc. εἶν ἄλλο τι προσεπίθη τις.

9. οὐδὲ τοῦτο] This has given needless trouble. Heindorf thought the article was required as with the other words, and inserted it. Buttmann objected to τοῦτο being so far se- parated from ἑκαίο, and ingen-
etera ónita ekéinwn ois prosstíthetai, déin dé, éiper ñun
dynaton autò légesethai kai éxhen oikeion autòtò lógon,
nèn tois ìllwos apántow lêgesethai. Nòn dé adýnaton
5 einai otiówn tois pròstw rëthnai lógoi ou yar einai vô
autò álì h ñonomaísethai mónon ñonoma yar mónon
èxw. Ta dé èk toûtwn ñðh synkeímena, ówisper autà
plexekta, óutw kai òa ónomaída autówn symplakênta
lógon yegonévai ñonomatów yar symplókyn einai
10 lógon ouñían. Oútò ðò tà mèn stoicheia àlloga kai
ously conjectured oðdè tò tò. Both objections are obviated by observing that autò, ekëwô,
ëkastos, mónon, occur in the preceding lines. For this reason they are put first, and with the
article, and oðdè tòtò . ou dé álìa pollá toûautà is added afterwards.
Cp. supr. 157 B : Tà B' einai pantaxónden êxarêtov . . .
où dé . ou te égwyren oû te
ou ou te ëmò ou te tòde ou te' ekëwô
ou te álìa ouðèn ñwoma ò te òn ñstò.
Accordingly in the reference to
this passage, 205 C (which
Buttmann must have over-
looked), the article is intro-
duced—oðdè tò tòtò.
1. peritrepontta pañi prosfè-
reseithai] Cp. supr. 197 D : 'Enías
dè mónas dia pasow ñtì òn toùs
patronía. Rep. 3. 402 A : Tà
stoicheia . . . õn ñsai . . . perifere-
rómäa. Polit. 278 D ; Phil.
15 D.
2. éiper ñun dynaton autò lége-
seithai] autò is not emphatic. 'If
it could be spoken of, lêgesetha
is the emphatic word. lógos
is here equivalent to 'predica-
tion.'
6. autò] Bonitz conjectures
autò. - But the dative suits
better with éxw following.
7. ἥδη] I.e. 'when we come
to them.'
9. ñonomatów yar symplókyn einai
lógon ouñían] Cp. Sophist, 262 D:
where it is described more ac-
curately as sympléktov tò rëmata
tòs ñwma. See the whole
passage.
A passage of Aristot. Metaph.
7. 3. 1043 b, is closely parallel
to this. He has just shown that
sensible reality (aòðéthē
ouñía) consists of matter or
potentiality (òln, ówma), and
form or actuality, (morphp, év-
nyeia): 'Ousth ñ atopia ñn oi
Autò-
tiosthneiva kai oi ñstos
apáideu-
toû ñðwov, ìxhì tû tû
kàrôn,
òtì ouk ëste tò tì ñstov ðré-
ssasth (tà yar ñroû lógon einai
mákrw), òllà ñwov mú tì ñstov
ëndèkètai kai ñðwov, òssper ñgru-
ròv tì ñstov, ou, ou te 8' óon
keittéròs. òssai ouñías ñstai mèn
ñë ñndèkètai ñwai ñroû kai lógon,
òw tès swbòtòs, òw òa ñdòthétì
òtì tò ñpétì ñ' ñ ñw 8' autòtò prò-
wov, ouk ñstov, éiper te kàtò tìn
sémantë ñ lógos ñ ñrastikòs, kai
dèi tò mèn òssper ñlhr ñwai, tò tì ðè
òs morphèn. (See Introduction.)
Locke's 'simple ideas' are
not very different from the
meaning of stoichèion here.
p. 202. ἁγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δὲ· τὰς δὲ συναλλαβῶς γνωστὰς τε καὶ ὑπερτὰς καὶ ἀληθὲι δόξη δοξαστὰς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθὴ δόξαν τινὸς τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχήν περὶ αὐτὸ, γιγνώσκειν δὲ οὐ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμων εἶναι περὶ τούτου προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατὸν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Ὁυτος σὺ τὸ ἐνόπτυνον ἡ ἄλλως ἄκικος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτῷ μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν. ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, δόξαν ἀληθὴ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομὸν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ', ὥς Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὖτω τῆς τῆς ἡμέρας

1. τὰς . . . συναλλαβῶς] This word, like στοιχεῖα supr., is of course to be taken in the figurative sense, for the ‘combinations of simple objects or ideas.’

2. καὶ ὑπερτὰς] There is possibly an allusion, as in ἄλογον supr., to the mathematical use of the word. Cp. Rep. 8. 546 C: Πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥήτα πρὸς Ἀθληλα αὖθισθαν. Ἡθ. 7. 534 D: Ἀλόγους δοστερ γραμμασ. But the immediate reference is to ἡθικα λόγο, ‘Capable of expression.’

4. ἀληθεύειν . . . περὶ αὐτὸ] ‘Is exercised truly with regard to it.’

6. περὶ τούτου] Sc. οὐ ἄν μὴ δύνηται δοῦναι λόγον. Cp. supr. 199 Α.

7. δυνατὸν . . . ταύτῃ πάντα] Sc. ἀληθεύειν καὶ γιγνώσκειν καὶ δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. On this kind of pronominal expression see Riddell’s Digest, § 55 and §§ 17 foll.

Contrast with this Arist. Phys. Ausc. i. i (who points out that the elements, or simple ideas, are known not by sensation, but by analysis; and that definition distinguishes, while the name signifies an undivided whole):

‘Εστι δ’ ἡμῶν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχεχυμένα μᾶλλον ὅστερον δὲ ἐκ τῶν γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεία καὶ αἱ ἄρχαι, διαφορά ταῦτα . . . Τὸ γὰρ διὸν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσεως γνωριμότερον. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου, διὸν τί εἰστι. Πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. Πέπονθε δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτο τρόπον τινα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον. “Ολον γὰρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος’ ὁ δὲ ὀρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα.

II. Ἀρέσκει . . . σε] Supr. 172 D.

14. νῦν οὖτω] I. e. ‘in a casual conversation.’ Supr. 142 E.
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εἰλήφαμεν ὁ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ἦτοιντες p. 202. πρὶν εὑρεύν κατεχήρασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὁ Σάκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥήθειν.

5 ΣΩ. Καί εἰκὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐτι ἐπιστήμη εἰς χωρίς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθὴς δόξης ἐν κένοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. ὁ καί δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα· ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστόν.

Ε

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἰστέων δή· ὀσπερ γὰρ ὀμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα

15 ταῦτα.

1. καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν] 'Many a philosopher.' καὶ πολὺς, like καὶ μᾶλα, is an intensive form. Rep. 8. 562 C.

5. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] 'The definition itself,' whatever may be said of the theory that has been stated as a ground for it. Heindorf's conjecture, εἰκὸς γ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο, would give a different turn to the sense. 'It is natural to suppose that we have said well.'

9. λέγεσθαι κομψότατα] 'To be the cream of the whole theory.'

10. τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος] The 'complex mode' is a natural class or genus, which these philosophers suppose themselves to have discovered. Cp. infr. 206 B: ὁ τῶν στοιχείων γένος.

13. Ἰστέων] Symp. 217 C. Cp. τὰ' εἰσαγωγά, Euthyphro, 9 E.

δοστερ ... ὀμήρους] So that if we put them to the torture, we may bring him (τῶν λόγων) to terms.

14. τὰ παραδείγματα] Cp Polit. 277 E, 278 D, where the same example, that of letters, is introduced to illustrate the nature of Example: ὁτι τῶν στοιχείων ἔκαστον εἰς ταῖς βραχνύταται καὶ μόστας τῶν συλλαβῶν ἱκανός διασαφάνεια... μετατίθεμαι δ' εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρᾶς καὶ μῆ βαδίας συλλαβᾶς ταῦτα ταῦτα πάλιν ἄγοιτοι.

H. Schmidt observes that παραδείγματα here are rather archetypes (Vorbilder) than examples (Beispiele). And it is true that the argument from letters is not so much an illustration as the very foundation of the theory.

ἐὰν] Sc. the person from whom Socrates and Theaetetus are supposed to have heard.
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ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖα τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἦ οἱς ἄλλοσε ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἄ λέγομεν;

ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐκ, ἅλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.

p. 203. ΣΩ. Βασανίζομεν δή αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἡ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἄρ' άι μὲν συλλαβαί λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;

ΘΕΛΙ. Ἡσώς.

ΣΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕμοι φαίνεται. Ὁσκράτους γοῦν εἶ τις ἐρωτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβήν οὕτως, Ἡ Θεαίτητη, λέγε τί ἐστι σῶ, τί ἀποκρυνεῖ;

ΘΕΛΙ. Ἡστι σήμα καὶ αὐτῷ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

ΘΕΛΙ. Ἡσώς.

b ΣΩ. Ἡδ' οὖτως εἶπε καὶ τὸν τοῦ σήμα λόγον.

ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἔρει στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὅ τῷ όσκρατες, τὸ τε σήμα τῶν ἀφάνων ἐστι, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἶδον συριττοῦσης τῆς γλώττ-

the theory 'in a dream.' Cp. supr. 201 C: Εἰπόντος τοῦ ἀδικοῦσας. Infr. 206 E.
6. Basanizomene de ou. 'Let us take and examine them, or rather let us put the question to ourselves.' The image of hostages, whom we may treat as we please, is kept up.
7. outhes he ouchos outhes. For eite omitted cp. supr. 169 D.
8. logos is predicative. 'You have this for an account.'
9. Kai pous ... stoicheia]

How is one to spell each single letter?
10. to te sýma ... tou' de ad býta] For te followed by de cp. Rep. 3. 394 C.

Theetetus extemporizes the theory of phonetics, which is given more fully in Phil. 18 B foll. Sigma is a semivowel.
20. oðon syrtitou'sis tis glwto-

This mode of definition reminds us of the Antisthenean saying quoted by Aristotle—πολὺ μὲν τὶ ἐστιν ἐνδε-

chiastai kai didáxai, κ.τ.λ.; and also of Euclides' objection to definition by comparison.
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τῆς τοῦ δ’ αὐτήν οὔτε φωνή οὔτε ψόφος, οὔδε τῶν ρ. 203. πλείστων στοιχείων. ὡστε πάνω εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἅλογα, δόν γε τὰ ἑαυτέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπτὰ φωνῆ μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ’ ὄντων ὁν.

5 ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν ἄρα, ὁ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φανομέθα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ο ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβήν, ἄρ’ ὀρθῶς ἀποδείγμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβήν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἄμφοτερα στοιχεία, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονότας συντεθένταν αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἀπαντὰ ἐμοῦ γε δοκοῦμεν.

10 ΣΩ. Ὁρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυνοῦν, στίγμα καὶ ὁ. ἄμφοτερά ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβή τοῦ ἐμου ὄνοματος. ἄλλο τι ὁ γιγνόσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἄμφοτερα γιγνώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ στίγμα καὶ τὸ ὁ ἄρα γιγνώσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

15 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἐκάτερον ἄρ’ ἁγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὸς ἁμφοτέρα γιγνώσκει;

3. ἑαυτέστατα] Bodl. ἑαυτέστατα, sed ex em., the second ε being in rasura.

9. ἀποδείγμεθα] Heindorf conjectured ἀποδείγμεθα, for which MS. authority (Coisl. et Par. E. ex corr.) has since been found; and it has been received by Bekker. But Stallbaum rightly defends ἀποδείγμεθα in the sense ‘we have declared our opinion;’ in which meaning the pf. pass. is used by Xenophon and Lysias. Cp. supra 180 D: Ἀποδείκνυ-

15 μένων, 195 D: Τὸ νῦν ἀποδείγμενον. Cp. however infr. 205 C: Ἀπεδείκνυμεν ἡγούμενοι εἰς λέ-

γεσθα. But this refers to a part of the theory which has been accepted in the words τούτο μὲν . . κατωρθώκαμεν.

11. τὴν συλλαβήν] Arist. Met. 7. 3. 1043 b: Οὖ γὰρ οὖσαν ὁ συλλαβῆ ἐκ τῶν στοι-

χείων ὁσα καὶ συνδέεσθως.

The word συλλαβῆ is used probably not without the consciousness of its etymology.
p. 203. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλα δεινόν καὶ ἄλογον, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἐγε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γνωστοῦ καὶ μέρος τὸ στοιχεῖα ἄπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι ποτε γνωστοῦς συναφεῖς, καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἄλογος λόγος 5 ἀποδεκάτω ἀναλύσει,

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μᾶλα γε ἐξαιρήσεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλὸς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. Χρῆν γὰρ ἰσως τὴν συναφείαν τίθεσθαι μη τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλὰ ἐὰν ἐκέινον ἐν τῷ γεγονός ἐδοὺς, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸν ἀυτόν 10 ἐχον, ἐπερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ τάχα γ' ἀν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἡ ἐκεῖνος ἐχοι.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτεῖν, καὶ οὐ προσδέουν οὕτως ἀνάγρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμινὸς λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

p. 204. ΣΩ. Ἐξέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκά- 5. ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεκάτω ἀναλύσει[The image is that of the disappearance of a favourite slave (Prot. sub init.). Compare with the humorous pathos with which this is spoken Phaed. 89 B: Τήμερον, ἐφῄ, κἀγώ τάς ἐμᾶς καὶ σοῦ ταύτας, έσπερ ήμιν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβίωσαν. "καὶ ἔγορα' ἐν, εἰ σοῦ ἐφῄ καὶ με διαψάξων ὁ λόγος, ἑνροκόν ἀν ποιησάμων διαλ. Ἀρχεῖον, μὴ πρό- τερον κομψαίνῃ πρῶτον ἀνιῴσω συμμαχόμενος τον Σαμίον τε καὶ Κέβδης λόγον.]

10. ἐδοὺς, ἰδέαν ἐδοὺς is here rather more concrete, ἰδέα more abstract; but ἰδέα is used for ἐδοὺς a few lines below. Generally, ἐδοὺς is more logical, implying distinction; ἰδέα more metaphysical, implying unity. (See Appendix D.)

15. μέγαν τε καὶ σεμινὸς λόγον[In these words, as in the figure of the dream, and in κομψαίνῃ supra. 202 D, the Socratic irony is manifest. For μέγαν cp. Phaedo, 62 B.]

17. Ἐξέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα] There is no occasion to suspect the reading, or to conjecture μίαν ἰδέαν. Ἐξέτω ὡς = ἵστο τὸ δ' . . . , and the whole clause μία . . . συναφείς is in apposition to ὡς . . . φαμέν. Cp. Rep. 7. 517 B: ὡς δ' ἐμαι φανερῶς ὁμοίως φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ θεοτυπίῳ τελευταίᾳ ή τοῦ ἀγάλματι ἰδίᾳ καὶ μάγε χράσθαι.

'Let the case be then as we have now put it, that the syllable or complex (whether of letters or of anything else in the world) is a simple form
have parts: unless we regard every whole in the same way as something different from all its parts, although resulting from them.

With a view to this we venture to assert that the Whole is different from the All.

arising out of each combination of harmonious elements.

The words ‘Exétw dh wós take up the thread of tάχ’ àn μάλλον οὕτως ἡ ἐκείνος ἔχω. In the conjectural reading the words ἔχειτο . . . μιὰν ἱδίαν would of course refer to ἱδίαν μιὰν αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ ἔχον. Schanz reads ἔστω.

But the anacoluthon is not more harsh than in supr. 173 D: Ἐπονδαί δὲ ἐταμιῶν ἐτ’ ἀρχάς, κ.τ.λ. Soph. 218 E: Τί δή τα προ-

ταχαίμεθ’ ἐν εὐγνωστόν, . . . οἷον ἀσπαλαμπῆς; Ἀπολ. 21 C: Διαλε-

γόμενοι αὐτῷ, . . . ἔνδοξε μου. See Riddell’s Digest, §§ 270, 271.

For μιὰ ἱδία = ἐδος ἱδίαν μιὰν ἔχω cp. Euthyphr. 6 D: τὸ ἐδος ὡς πάντα τὰ οὖσα διὰ ἔστων; ἐφησάω γὰρ πον μιὰ ιδίᾳ τὰ τε ἀνάφως ἀνάσα ἱδίαι καὶ τὰ διὰ οὖσα. Infr. 205 C: Μία τὰς ἱδίας . . . συλλαβῇ ἀν ἐν.

18. Δεὶ δὲ γε δή] Sc. καὶ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὀρθῇ ἔστω.

ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 204. ΘΕΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Τι δὲ δὴ; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄρθρ’ ὁ τι
diaφέρει; οἴνον ἐπειδὰν λέγομεν ἑν, δύο, τρία, τέτ-
cταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ εἰπάν ὑπὸ τρία ἤ τρις δύο ἢ τέταρτα
tε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἑν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι 5
tούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἔτερον λέγομεν;

ΘΕΙ. Ταῦταν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρθρ’ ἀλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;

ΘΕΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ’ ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ 10
eἰρήκαμεν;

5. ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἑν] The words ἢ πέντε καὶ ἑν, which
were introduced by Cornarius,
are anticipated in the simple
enumeration ἑν, δύο, etc. They
do not occur in the Bodleian
or any other MS.

10. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ’ ἐκάστης λέξεως
πάντα τὰ ἕξ ἐφ’ ἐρήκαμεν;] So far
the MSS. give a meaning per-
fectly clear and natural. The
words which follow are not so
clear. The only way in which
it seems possible to construe
them is as they stand in the
MSS., viz. πᾶλων ὑδάλεγομεν
τὰ πάντα λέγομεν; is by laying
an unnatural stress on ἐφ’ in
ὑδάλεγομεν. ‘Again, while we speak
of all (in the plural), is there
no one thing of which we
speak?’ This is brought out
more distinctly by C. F. Herm-
mann’s conjecture, ὑδάλ ἐφ’.

In my former edition I pro-
posed to substitute πᾶν for
πᾶλων. But πᾶλων is probably
to be retained. Cp. Symp. 183 D:
Εἰς δὲ ταύτα τις αὐτὸ 
μεθόδος ἑγγίζων’ ἄν πᾶλων, κ.τ.λ. Phil. 14
D: Πολλοίς εἶναι πᾶλων. And
I now think the most probable
solution is to suppose πᾶν to
have dropped out from its simi-
larly to πᾶλων. H. Schmidt
justly observes that this line
of conjecture is more logical
than that followed by Heindorf
and others, who substitute the
awkward expression πᾶν τὰ ἕξ
for πάντα τὰ ἕξ in the previous
line. ‘Do we not repeat some-
thing when we say τὰ πάντα’,
is not a satisfactory sense.
The present passage is one in
which a reader of Plato will
expect extreme clearness and
minuteness of logical sequence.
And to put πᾶν τὰ ἕξ in the
beginning of the argument
would be to assume bluntly
that which it is intended to
prove, viz. that an aggregate
may be regarded as one thing.
With this object it is neces-
sary to reason from the plural
to the singular, and to do so
gradually. The above argu-
ment might lead to the sub-
stitution of τοῦ πῶς for τὰ
πάντα (a suggestion adopted by
Schanz, and in pr
rab, who reads
‘In counting six
six” (in the plural). Again, in speaking of all, in the singular, is there nothing which we express?” ‘There must be.’ ‘And is not this six?’ ‘Yes.’ But there is needless obscurity in the logical inversion by which, after reasoning from the number, we should then reason to it. The required sequence is restored by reading as in the text. The passage may then be rendered, ‘Have we not, then, in each expression, spoken of all the six?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But again, while speaking of them all, is there no one thing all of which we express?’ ‘There must be.’ ‘And is that anything but the six?’ ‘Nothing.’ This gives much greater force to the inference here and in E. Compare with the resumption of the previous admission in τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, Soph. 238 E: οἶκοιν τὸ γε εἰναι προσάπτειν πειράματος ἐναντία τοῖς πράσοοιν διέγειν; Φαίνει. Τι δὲ; τοῦτο προσάττων οὐχ ὅσ ἐν διελεγόμεναι. After ἀνάγκη, we must understand πάν τι λέγειν. Compare Symp. 192 E: οὐδ’ ἄν εἰς ἔξωροθειὴν ἀλλ’ ὀντ’ ἄν (sc. πᾶς τις), κ.τ.λ. alib. The reasoning of Parm. 144 C may be advantageously compared. See also Aristot. Poet. 1451 α. And for the abrupt form of the question with οὐδ’-cp. Gorg. 474 D: Τι δὲ τάδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα . . . εἰς οὐδ’ ἀποβλέπουν καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλά;

7. Ταῦτα . . . προσαγορεύομεν] ‘We give the names πάν and πάντα to the same thing.’

10. λέγωμεν] Several MSS. have λέγωμεν. If λέγωμεν is right, it refers, not to the present sentence, but to the argument which it introduces about the relation of parts to a whole.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 204. ἘΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὑπὸ πᾶν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναῖ.
ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἐκαστῶν ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἀλλο τῇ ἡ μέρη 5 ἐστὶν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.
ΣΩ. Ὑσα ἁρὰ ἐχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἄν εἰ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖ- 10 ται, ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἐστιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Τὸ ὅλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἐστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἀν εἰ, τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ μέρη.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐοικεν.
ΣΩ. Μέρος δὲ ἐστι' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ἐστὶν 15 ἡ τοῦ ὅλου;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ παντὸς γε.

p. 205. ΣΩ. Ἀνδρικὸς γε, ὁ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστὶν; 20

2. ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς] Ἡ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς ἐκαστῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ πᾶν ἐκαστὸν. 'The number of each taken altogether is each real thing taken altogether;' or 'each taken altogether so far as it exists.' Stallbaum's conjecture, ἐκαστοῦ, would be more convenient, but we cannot venture to say that ἐκαστοῦ is wrong. τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκαστοῦ = ἐκαστοῦ, δ ἐστίν. Cp. Rep. 6. 490 B: Λίητο δ ἐστὶν ἐκαστοῦ τῆς φύσεως. It must be admitted, however, that the text becomes more uncertain in the last few pages of the dialogue.
5. Ὁ δὲ ἐκαστῶν ἀριθμὸς] The word ἀριθμὸς implies plurality. Hence ἐκαστῶν, unless it is corrupt. We are now reasoning from singular to plural, as before from plural to singular.

20. αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστι[ This very thing all, just as above, ἐστίν ὑπὲρ ἐστίν, πᾶν being predicate, does not need the article.
We cannot therefore view the whole as different from the all. But, if the whole is all the parts, the complex, if distinct from its elements, is not the whole of which they are the parts.

2. "ολον] To be taken predicatively, like πᾶν immediately above.

3. οὔτε δὲ λον οὔτε πᾶν] Sc. ἐσται γενόμενον. 'Will have become at once not-whole and not-all.'

4. ἀμα γενόμενον, κ.τ.λ.] 'Being changed in the same instant from forms which are identical to other forms which are likewise identical.

5. τὸ αὐτὸ] Viz. ὄλον =οὐ ἁμα ἀποστάτη =πᾶν.

6. τὸ αὐτὸ] οὔτε δὲ λον οὔτε πᾶν.

'Both equally lose their entirety of nature.' (Jowett.)

7. ἐλέγομεν] The argument is resumed from 204 A: "Ὅτι οὔ τὸν ἡ μέρη, τὸ λον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι.

10. Πάλιν δὴ . . ἀνάγκη] 'Then I may repeat, what I was trying to suggest a little while ago, that if the syllable is distinct from the letters, they are not its parts; else, if they are, it must be indistinguishable from them, and no more knowable than they are.' In fact it was shown that the knowledge of the letters was a condition of syllables being known.

Supr. 203 D, 204 A: Προγγωμοσκεια τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀπασα ἀνάγκη τῇ μελλοντί ποτὲ γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, . . οὐκοῦν μήρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

12. τὸ ταύταν οὔταν αὐτοὶ ὀμοίως ἐκεῖνος γνωστὴν εἶναι] For the turn of the sentence compare Rep. 6. 490 A: 'Ἡγέτε δ' αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἡν διάκειν αὐτῶν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ζησεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ὅτι μηδὲν μετέχειν φιλοσοφίας ἀληθῆς. Ib. 503 A: 'Ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μημονευείς, δεῖν . . τὸ δόγμα τούτο μὴ τοῦ πάνυ καὶ μὴ τοῦ πάντων. Ib. 7. 525 B: 'Διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτῶν εἶναι γενόσεως ἐξαναδύοντι ἡ μηδέποτε λογιστικά γενέσθαι,
ΤΟΙΩΤΟΣ.

p. 205. Σ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἑνα μὴ γενηται, ἐτερον αὐτῶν αὑτὴν ἔθεμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Σ. Τί δ'; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συνλαβῆς μέρη ἑστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλα ἁπτα ἐπείν, ἀ μέρη μὲν ἑστὶ συλλαβῆς, οὐ μὲντοι στοιχεῖα γ' ἐκεῖνης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γὰρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύτης συγχωροῖν, γελοίον που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἴηναι.

κ Σ. Πανταπασὶ δὴ, ὃ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συνλαβῆ ἢν ἐη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἠ' Εοικεν.

Σ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὃ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον εἰς τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὐ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρῶτων οὐκ εἶ ὁ λόγος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν εἶ ἁυσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἐχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ τούτο, ὃς ἔτερα καὶ ἄλλατρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογον τε καὶ ἁγιωτοῦν αὐτὸ τοὐοι; ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνημαι.

δ Σ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἡ αὐτή ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοεἰδὲς τε καὶ ἁμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὀρῶ ἄλλη.

11. συνλαβῆ] The absence of the article marks our unfamiliarity with the word, and also gives it a certain indefiniteness: as in the expression πάντων μέτρων ἀνθρωπος. Ορ. Ρεπ. 2. 369 Β: Γρηγοριον τοῖνυν . . . πόλει . . . ἐπειδή, κ. τ. λ.

21. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις] 'And is not this same thing (viz. that it is uncompounded) the cause of its having a simple form without parts?' The same cause makes it to be unknowable and without parts. Therefore if the 'syl- lable' or complex is without parts, it must be unknowable. Bonitz objects to the logic of this and reads τὸ for τῆ. This is tantamount, and Bonitz' reasoning is rightly rejected by H. Schmidt. See below, E. For illogical conversion in Plato cp. suppl. 152 Β. C, 159 Α.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μεν οὖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γὰρ, εἰπέρ τῇ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοιοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, δό ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβήν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τούναντιν.

ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 206. ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ ἔκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἦ θέσις σε ταράττωι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθεύστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. 'Εν δὲ κιβαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μόνον ἀλλο τῇ ἡ τῷ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἐκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακο- 

λουθεῖν, ποίας χορδής εἰς... ἃ δὴ στοιχεία πάς ἂν ὁμο- 

λογήσεις μονουκής λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἀλλο.

ΣΩ. Ὡν μὲν ἀρ' αὐτοὶ ἐμπεριοῖς ἐσμὲν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δὲν ἀπὸ τοῦτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργε- 

στέραν τε τῇ γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήμοις καὶ κυριώτεραν 

τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἐκαστοῦ μά- 

θημα, καὶ ἕαν τις φής συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἀγνω- 

στὸν δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἐκόντα ἡ ἄκοντα παίζειν 15 

ἡγομένθ' αὐτῶν.

15. ἐκόντα ἡ ἄκοντα παίζειν]

' Τὸ θανάτοις παίζειν]

'That he is either playing with us, or talking nonsense.'

The tendency of the present passage is to rise from the con- 
ception of elementary objects of sense (simple ideas of sensa- 
tion) to that of abstract ideas, (universals, predicables), as the 
true elements of Knowledge.

Cp. Αρ. Μετ. 1, 995 b: Πότερον αἰ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γῆν ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς ὃ διακρίνεται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἔκαστον.

This may be illustrated from the frequent use by Plato of 
the example of letters, elementary sounds, etc., to represent 
the Ideas and the mode of be- 
coming acquainted with them.

The following passage,—

Rep. 3. 402,—is an instance of this:—

"Οστρέφ ἄρα... γραμμάτων πέρι 

τότε ἰκανῶς εἴχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοι- 

χεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ἄλλα δυτὶ ἐν ἄπασιν οἷς ἐστὶν περιφρόμενα, καὶ οὔτ' ἐν συμφρ. οὔτ' ἐν μεγαλῷ 

ητιμαζομέναι αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δέοι αἰσθάν- 

νόμες, ἄλλα πανταχοῦ προδημοῦ- 

μεθα διαγωνότες, ὡς οὐ πρότερον 

ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοί πρῶτοι οὕτω 

ἐξομοῖ. Ἀληθή. Οὐδὲν καὶ εἰκό- 

νας γραμμάτων, εἰ ποτὲ ἦν ἐν ὅσισι 

ἢ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφανώσθη, οὐ 

πρότερον γνωσμέθα, πρῶτον ἄν αὐτά 

γνώμεναι, ἀλλ' ἐστιν τῆς αὐτής τήτης 

τε καὶ μελέτης: παντάπασι μέν ὅνων, 

Ἀρ' οὖν, δ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτω 

οὐδὲ μονοκάλαβοι πρότερον ἐσόμεθα, 

οὔτε αὐτοὶ, οὔτε οὐς φαρμέν ἡμῶν 

παιδετικών εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρῶ 

τὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης ἑκατον καὶ ἀν- 

δρείας καὶ συνεργείας καὶ μεγα- 

λοπρεσσίας καὶ ὡς τῶν ἄλλοι καὶ 

τὰ τῶν οὐ ἐκατά πανταχοῦ 

περιφρόμενα γνωρίζομεν καὶ οὕτω 

ἐν οἷς ἐστιν αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ αὐτά 

καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν συμ- 

κροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγαλοῖς ἀτιμαζομεν,
This need not, however, affect the truth of our third answer.

At the same time it is hinted that the sensible elements, so far as each of them can be regarded as one individual thing, are also objects of Knowledge.


To resume the argument from 201. Theaetetus has heard it said that true opinion with a reason was knowledge; and that nothing which had not a reason could be known. This reminds Socrates of a theory which said that of the elements (or alphabet) of things no account could be given—they could only be named. But of their combinations an account could be given, and these could be known. Knowledge according to this consists in being able to give an account of anything. This, however, may be true, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. Testing this by the example of letters, we find that of the syllable σω an account can be given (it can be analysed), but not of its constituents σ and ω. But is the syllable known, the letter unknown? If so, in what way are we to conceive of the syllable? As all the letters? How then can I know them all, and yet none singly? Or is it a simple unity formed out of them? It cannot then be related to them as a whole to its parts,—unless we can establish a distinction between whole and all. But all (singular) cannot be distinguished from all (plural); and this, containing all the parts, can scarcely be distinguished from the whole. Hence whole and all are indistinguishable. Therefore either the syllable has parts, and, consisting of things unknown, must be itself unknown; or, not having parts, it is uncompounded, and therefore itself, according to the theory, unknown. But our own memory ought to teach us that we first learnt to know the letters, and then the syllables and combinations of them.

Though the theory is rejected, we gain through criticising it the notion of a complex whole.

2. καὶ ἄλλα φανεῖν ἀποδείξεις] The train of thought here broken off is resumed in the Sophist, where the ἀσώματα ἐλθη are treated as elements, and combinations of them are shown to be possible; also in the admission of θάτερον. Cp. Phileb.

4. δὲ δὲ γεγονότα] There is here a beginning of the formal or pedantic rhythm which is more common in the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus. Indeed the manner of Socrates in this part of the Theaetetus bears a close resemblance to that of the Eleatic Stranger.
p. 206. μετὰ δόξης ἀληθῶς λόγου προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρῆ ὅραν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαίνει; τριῶν γὰρ ἐν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίναυν δή;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰθ ἀν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὑνομάτων, ὡσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὤδορ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυποῦμενοι εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ρῆμα. ἢ οὐ τοῦ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγον εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡμοιγέ. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατός θάττων ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου αὐτῷ, ὃ μὴ ἐνεός ἢ κωφὸς ἢπ αρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως οὐκ οἱ τι ὀρθῶν δοξᾶσθαι, πάντες αὐτῷ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἤχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἐτί ὀρθῇ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γεννήσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοῖνοι ράδιος καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μη-

4. τί ποτε βούλεται The subject is either ὁ ταύτα λέγων (cp. infr. Ε': Τὸν ἀποφράμενον ἐπιστήμην ἡ νῦν σκοποῦμεν, οὐ τὸ λόγος, νῦν τοῦ δόξης ἀληθῶς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτά-

2. τοῦ λόγου . . σημαίνει] Id. qu. τοῦ λόγου εἰτῶν σημαίνει. 'What are we to understand by the term λόγος?' Three meanings are put forward as possible: (1) Expression in words. (2) Analysis. (3) Definition.


10. ἐκτυποῦμενον] Imaging.

Cp. the saying of Democritus, λόγος ἔργον οἰκία.

Fοr τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος βοήν cp. Tim. 75 E: Τὸ δὲ λόγων νάμα ἔξω ῥέων καὶ ὑπερτοῦ φορνάτης καλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον πάντων να-μάτων. Sopl. 263 E.

14. Οὐκοῦν] Ven. II. and an- other MS. give οὐκοῦν σα.

21. καταγιγνώσκωμεν] 'Accuse in our minds,'

τὸ μηδέν] 'Nothing at all,'
δὲν εἰρήκεναι τὸν ἀποφημάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὁ νῦν p. 206.

σκοτοῦμεν. ᾠς ὑμᾶς ὁ λέγων οὐ τούτῳ ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ
τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τὶ ἐκατον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρι-
σιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρωτηθέντα.

p. 207.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον τί λέγεις, ὡς Σάκρατες;

Σ. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσίαδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ
ἐκατὸν δὲ τε δοῦραθ' ἀμάξης. ὁ ἔγω μὲν οὐκ ἂν
δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἷοι δὲ οὐδὲ σὺ. ἀλλ' ἀγαπῶμεν
ἀν ἐρωτηθέντες τὶ τί ἐστιν ἀμάξα, εἰ ἔχουμεν εἰπεῖν
10 τροχοῖ, ἄξων, ἔπερπερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Σ. ὁ δὲ γε ἵσως οὖσιν ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὁσπερ ἂν τὸ
σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντα καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ
συλλαβήν, γελοίους εἰναι, ὁρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ Β
15 λέγοντας τί λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἰναι
καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικὸς τὸν τοῦ Θεα-
τῆτον ὄνοματος λόγον. τὸ δ' οὖν εἰναι ἐπιστημονῶς

i. e. 'utter nonsense.' Cp. supr.
180 A: Ἡττον ... ὁ τὸ μηδέν.
Tim. 77 B: 'ς ... τοῦ μενέστη το
μηδέν. This is better than to
take the article with the infinitive,
because the sense passes on more smoothly from καταγγ

Otherwise expressed, μὴ καταγγλοφοκομον το ... ἀποφηβο-

3. τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα, κτλ. This
is suggested (μακανιτικὸς) by the
preceding argument (206 A B).
6. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσίαδος] Cp. et
D. 454: Φρέν ὧν ἀνὴρ φρέινας
ἀφείοι πέξασθαι ἀμάξαν, μῆνιος,
οὐδὲ τὸ οὖ, ἔκατον δὲ τὴν δοῦραθ'
ἀμάξα.

Cp. Arist. Met. 2. 3. 998 b:
"Ετέρος δ' ἔστι τὸ διὰ τῶν γενό
δρισμός καὶ ὁ λέγων ἢ ᾧ ἐστιν

ἐπιστημονῶς.

10. ἕπερπερία] The MSS.
have ὑπερπερία, or ὑπερπήν.
12. ὁ δὲ γε ἵσως οὖσιν ἂν ἡμᾶς
ὁ δὲ, οὖς ὁ λέγων, supr. The
apodosis is deferred, as is often
the case when an illustration
has been introduced with ὁσ-
perse. It is resumed with οὖν
τοιν. Cp. Rep. 3. 402 A:
"Οσπερ ἄρα ... γραμμάτων πέρι ... "Αρ' οὖν, ὁ λέγων, πρὸς θεῶν, οὖτε
οὐδὲ μονωκολ, κτλ.
14. γελοίους εἰναι(οὐσίοτορ)he-

15. οἱ οὐν εἰναι] 'Whereas,
he would say, it is impossible.'
Cp. 157 B: τὸ δ' οὖ δὲ, and
note.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 231

p. 207. οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἀν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἐκαστον περαινη τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ποι ἔρρηθη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὗτοι τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὅρ- 5 θην ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐκατον ἐκείνων δυναμενὸν διελθεῖν αὐτής τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τούτο, λόγων τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεὶ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικού τεχνικοῦ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγονόνει, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περαιναντα. 10

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ δοκεῖ σοι, ὡΣόκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοι, ὡ ἐταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἐκατον λόγων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μείζων ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτόν μοι λέγει, ἵν' αὐτῷ ἐπισκοπῶμεν. 15

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πάνω ἀποδέχωμαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμοναι εἶναι ὄντων ὀτιοῦν ὀτιοῦν, ὡστε τὸ αὐτῷ ὅτε μὲν τοῦ αὐτῶν δοκή αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτέ δὲ ἐτερον, ἡ καὶ ὡστε τοῦ αὐτῶν τοτέ μὲν ἐτερον, τοτέ δὲ ἐτερον δοξάζει; 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Εἰτὰ ἀμφιμονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει καὶ ἄρχας σαυτῶν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτε μὲν 25

2. εἰν τοῖς πρόσθεν [206 Α: Ἡς οἰδέν, διὸ μανθάνων διετέλεσας, κ. τ. λ. 11. εἰ] Sc. οἰκοθαι, from οἰκοθαι
 disen, supr. Α.
 12. Ei soi] ei is interrogative, depending on τοῦτο μοι λέγει.
 15. αὖτα] 'Your answer.'
 228 Α.
 18. τὸ αὐτῷ ὅτε μὲν...] E. e. thinking τ to be the first letter both of τε and θε. For the construction cp. Phaed. 59 Α, supr. 192 D.
19. τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτε μὲν] E. e. thinking the first letter of θε at one time δ, at another τ. 24. αὖτα] 'What I have de-
scribed.'
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

έτερον, τοτὲ δὲ έτερον ἡγομένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ p. 207.
αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην 
τιθέντας συλλαβήν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Μᾶ Δἴ οὐ τοῖνυν ἀμημονῶ, οὐδὲ γέ τω 
ἠγομένῳ ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον 
γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἶ ὦνται τε δεῦ γράφειν καὶ 
γράψῃ, καὶ αὐτοὶ Θεόδωρον ἐπίστευον γράφειν ταῦτα καὶ p. 208.

10 εἰ ὦνται τε δεῦ γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἀρ′ ἐπιστασθαί 
φήσομεν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὄνομάτων 
συλλαβήν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἢρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν τοῖς οὕτως 
ἔχοντα μέτω πειδέναι.

15 ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλα-
βήν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γε.

ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείων διεξὸδον 
ἔχουν γράψει Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθὴς δόξης, ὅταν ἔξης 

20 γράφῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰτὶ ἀνεπιστήμων ἂν, ὥρθα δὲ δοξά-

εἰς, ὥς φαμέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

7. ἐν... καιρῷ] Sc. καὶ ἀρχάς 
τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσεως.

17. οὐδέν γε] Sc. κωλύει.

'Certainly not.' γε assents to 
the meaning of the question.

Cp. Phil. 38 A: οὐδέν γε. ἀλλά 
ἀπέρ ἄκοιν λέγω.

18. "Αρ' οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] 'Soc. Then 
in writing out correctly the 
word Theætetus, he will do so 
not only with right opinion, 
but with command of the enu-
meration of elements; will he 
not? Th. Clearly he will. 
Soc. And that while still without 
knowledge, though with right 
opinion. Is not that what we 
say? Th. Yes. Soc. And yet 
with definition added to right 
opinion. For he wrote with 
command of the way through 
the elements; and this we ad-
mitted to be knowledge.'
ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 238

p. 208. ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἐξαν μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἐξαν ἔγραφεν, ἢν δὴ λόγον ὁμολογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. 'Εστιν ἄρα, ὃ ἐταίρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, 5 ἢν οὐπώ δεὶ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὅναρ δὴ, ὡς οὐκεκεν, ἐπιστησαμεν οἱθέντες ἐχειν τὸν ἀληθεστατὸν ἐπιστήμην λόγον. ἢ μήπω κατηγοροῦμεν; ἵσως γὰρ οὐ τούτο τις αὐτῶν ὁμοίωσαν, 10 ο ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰδὸς τῶν τριῶν, ὡς ἐν γε τι ἐφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὀριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθῆν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως ὑπέμνησας· ἐτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπῶν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢν διαλογια ἐν φωνῇ ὡσπερ εἰδῶλοι, τὸ δὲ ἔριξεν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὀλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτων τι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅσπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπιστεύ̣, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημείον ἐπιστείν ὁ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἱον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν; 20

ΣΩ. Οἱον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανὸν ομαί σοι.

8. "Οναρ. ἐπιστήσαμεν" Cr. Polit. 277 D: Κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἵμων καθος οἶνον ὄναρ εἶδος ἄπαντα, πάντ᾽ αὖ πάλιν ὡσπερ ὑπάρ ἀγγειών. 278 E: ἴνα ὑπάρ γενές ὁλοράτος ἡμών γέργης, Lys. 218 C. The expression is proverbial, and there is no distinct reference to the 'dream' of Socrates. Supr. 201 D.

9. ἐπιστήμης λόγον] λόγος is used here in a double sense.

10. τις] Viz. the nameless author of our theory.

18. "Ὅσπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπιστεύ̣] The two former were inferences from different meanings of λέγειν;—'to express' and 'to enumerate.' See 206 D: Τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.

20. ἱκανῶν . ἀποδέξασθαι] 'Sufficient to obtain your assent.' ἀποδέξασθαι is an epexegetical infinitive.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ

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eίναι ἀποδεξάσθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατον ἐστὶ τῶν κατὰ p. 209.
tὸν οὐρανὸν ἰὸντων περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λαβὲ δὴ ὦν χάριν εἰρηταί. ἔστι δὲ ὑπερ ἄρτι
5 ἑλέγομεν, ὡς ἀρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστον ἀν λαμβάνης
ἡ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς φασὶ τινες, λήψεις.
ἔως δὴ ἀν κοινῷ τινὸς ἐφαύτη, ἑκέινῳ περὶ σοὶ ἐσται
ὁ λόγος ὧν ἀν ἡ κοινότης ἡ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω· καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἐχεῖν λόγον ἐ
10 τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. "Ος δὲ ἂν μετ' ὀρθὴς δόξης περὶ ὑπονοῦ τῶν
ὁντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ αὐτοῦ,
ἐπιστήμων γεγονός ἐσται ὁ πρῶτον ἡν δοξα-
στὴς.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὐτώς.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἐγώγη
ἐπειδὴ ἐγνύο οὕπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ
λεγομένου, ἔννημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἔως δὲ ἀφεστήκη
πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετο τί μοι λέγεσθαι.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τούτο;

ΣΩ. Φράσω, ἐὰν ὦσ τε γένομαι. ὦρθὴν ἐγώγη p. 209.
ἐχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν

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4. Λαβῇ I.e. μάθε. 'Let me explain to you.'
6. ὥς φασί τινες] The τινες are certainly Socratics, and probably the Megarians are meant. (See Introduction.)
12. αὐτοῦ.] This punctuation appears preferable when it is observed that there has been a tendency in the last few pages to accumulate genitives. τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων, 'Its distinction from other things.'
Others join αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων.
69 B: Μὴ σκιαγραφία τίς ἢ τά τις ἀφετή.
235 E, Parm. 165 C. The illusion of σκιαγραφία depended on distance, and the picture would seem unmeaning from close at hand. Soph. Fr. 773 (N.): Πάροι δὲ λέοντας, ἐγγύτειν
dὲ πᾶς τυφλός.
20. Πῶς τί τούτο] 'What do you mean? and why is it so?'
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 209. σὸν λόγου, γιγνώσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δοξάζω μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Λόγος δὲ γε ἦν ἢ τῆς σῆς διαφοράτητος ἐρμηνεία.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡνύκ οὖν ἐδοξάζον μόνον, ἀλλο τῷ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεισ, τούτων οὐδὲν ἦπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Όικ ἐσκεν.

ΣΩ. Τῶν κοινῶν τί ἄρα διενοούμην, δὲν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.

B ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· τῶς ποτὲ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδοξάζον ἢ ἄλλον ὀντικόν; θές γὰρ μὲ 15 διανοούμενον ὡς ἐστὶν οὕτως Θεαίτητος, ὅσ ἂν ἢ τε ἀνθρωπός καὶ ἔχει ῥίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ ὀστό δὴ ἐν ἑκαστὸν τῶν μελῶν. αὐτὴ οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἐσθ' ὁ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον; 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γὰρ;

1. δὴ] According to the hypothesis.
4. ἢ] ‘Is,’ according to the hypothesis.
5. σῆς διαφοράτητος] ‘Of your differentia.’ Plato affects this abstract termination. Cp. esp. δικαίωσις, Prot. 331 B; Gorg. 508 Α.
7. τῷ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδένος] It occurs to Socrates while speaking that the ‘Difference’ of one person from another is not one but many. Hence the inexact correlation.
12. ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει] The verb (ἔχει) is attracted by τις ἄλλος.
20. τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν] The phrase Μυσῶν ἔσχατος is strengthened by the insertion of the article. The earlier editors (under protest from Buttmann) read τὸ λεγόμενον. There is no reason for this. Cp. supr. 173 D: οἱ τῆς διαλέξεως λεγόμενοι χῶν. Arist. Eth. N. 8, 3: Δεὶ γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων ἄλλα συναντῆσαι. In the examples quoted by the Scholiast the proverb is used to express contempt. Here it rather conveys the notion of indifference.
ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μονὸν τῶν ἐξοντα ῥῦνα καὶ ἂν ὁφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σημών τε καὶ ἐξ- c ὁφθαλμοὺ, μὴ τι σὲ αὐ μᾶλλον δοξάζω ἡ ἐμαυτόν ἡ ὁσιω τοιοῦτοι;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὗτοι.

ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ' οὐ πρῶτον γε, αὖμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἄν ἡ σιμότης αὐτῇ τῶν ἀλ- λων σημώντων ὃν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορον τι μνημείον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημαναμένη καταθήκαι,—καὶ τάλαλα ὡτός ἐξ ὧν εἰ σὺ,—[ἡ] ἔμε, καὶ ἐὰν αὑρον ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὅρθα δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τὴν διαφόροτητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ν ἄν ἐμα ἐκάστου πέρι.

2. τῶν σημών τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλ- μοὺς] Supr. 143 E. In Xen. Cyg. 1. 9 ἐξόφθαλμοι is opposed to κολάφθαλμος. But in Ar. H. A. 1. 8. § 5 the words ἐκτός and ἐκτὸς seem rather to refer to the position of the eyes.

8. μνημείον... ἐνσημαναμένη] Cp. 191 D, 192 A, 194 C, 196 A. The theory which has been rejected is still permitted and intended by Plato to leave an impression on the mind.


εἴ σὺ ἡ ἔμε καί: Ces. εἴση ἔμε καί: Ven. Σ. γρ. οἴση ἔμε: cett. εἴση ἔμε καί. The reading is uncertain. That adopted in the text is the most plausible which can be said to rest on MS. authority. ἡ refers back to ὡτός ἡ σιμότης, passing over τάλαλα ὡτός ἐξ ὧν εἰ σὺ, which is added διὰ μέσου and answers to ἐξόφθαλμον in the previous sentence.

Heindorf's conjecture, δ, referring to μνημείον, is unsatisfactory, because it is rather the object of sense, which, by fitting the μνημείον, would be said to remind. Hence ἔμε καί (adopted by Wagner) would seem a fair emendation. But a still simpler line of conjecture is to suppose, as in my former edition (1861), ἔμε καί in the Bodleian reading to have been transposed from καί ἔμε. This gives the same meaning (the sentence as usual passing out of the relative construction), and accounts naturally for the corruption. If this emendation is right, the sentence must be supposed to revert by a conversational licence to the indicative mood. Cp. supr. 149 D: Ποιῶ καί... ἀμβλασκουσών, and note. Schleiermacher's conjecture, ἔμε καί, κ.τ.λ., leaves the subject of ἀναμνήσει doubtful. That of the Zurich editors, εἴση σὺ ἔμε, καί ἔμε, introduces an abrupt and awkward inversion.
And the use of οίδα in this sense is questionable.

9. ὑπέρον...περιτροπή] ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ποιούσιν πολλάκις καὶ μηδὲν ἀνώτατον, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ταχύως τι πραττόντων. μέμηται δὲ αὐτῆς Φιλήμων εἰ "Ηρωαί καὶ ἑναῦθα πλάτων." (Schol.)

10. οἴδεν ἄν λέγωι] Ἡ. λύρος

Δ. Λέγουσιν ἄργους ὅτι λύρος πρὸς χρυσόν τε καὶ δραγ-γοῦν ἐστιν ἐκάστοτε τὰ λέγομεν τίμαι καὶ καλὰ κατὰ πάλιν.


14. **τεί γε δὴ**] Sotho Bodeleian MS. (but with no accents by the first hand.) Ven. T. has εἰςτι, with the rest, except Vat. Δ, which has εἰ. The Bodleian continues without punctuation from ἔσκοτομένον, and accents as above. But the accents appear to have been added by a later hand. Is it possible some words may have slipped out? such as Τι οἶδεν δὲ; εἰ γε δὴ τι

—'Well, what then?' If, as I presume, your question just now' (supr. D) 'prepared the way for some announcement.' The reading of Vat. Δ (εἰ δὲ δὴ...τι, κτλ.) admits of being rendered, however: 'Well, but if,—what were you just now going to say, when you asked the question?' Most of the editors give ביום. The question referred to is τὸ οὖν προσ- λαβεῖν...τι ἴν ἔτ. ἔτη; This is a little difficult; and Badham, reading Εἰ δὲ, most ingeniously conjectures τι οὖν δὲ ὡς ἔτερον ὑπέρου, i. e. 'what was the suppressed alternative implied by your use of μὲν?' But ὑποτίθε-σθαι elsewhere refers to a distinctly expressed postulate or condition (Rep. 1. 346 B), and if it could be used of something merely implied, the imperfect tense would be required in such a reference. πυθήσασθαι and

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὃς ἔοικε, τί ἔστιν ἐπι- στήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὅρθη μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἃν εἶ ὃ 10 κατ' ἐκεῖνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασι γε ἐπιθεῖ, ἥττουῦντων ἣμων ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὅρθην εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἶτε διαφορότητος εἰτε ὑπονοοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα ἀδισθησις, ὃ Θεαίηστη, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθῆς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς 15 δόξης λόγος προσγεγυμνομενος ἐπιστήμη ἃν εἶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ὁδὸν ἐπὶ κυοῦμεν τι καὶ ὁδινομεν, ὃ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἥ πάντα ἐκτετάκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δι' ἔγονε πλείω ἢ ὅσα ἔχων 10 ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ ἐξηκα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαυετικὴ ἡμῶν τέχνη ἀνεμισαία φησὶ γεγενήσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τρο- φῆσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν ὁδῷ.

ἔρεσθαι are nearly synonymous in Plato. Theetetus very pro- 7. ἀποκρινεῖται] Sc. ὁ λόγος. p 209. perly recalls Socrates from his 12. φάναι] ἐκείνων sc. The 2. ἢδυ χρῆμ' ἃν εἶ ὑ τοῦ] The absurdity is in fact the same as in Theetetus' first attempt, genitive is due to a sort of at- 17. For the 1st pers. plural cp. supra. 154 D. It may be tractive ethical force in ἢδυ, cp. cp. supra. 147 B. called the good physician's 20. ἄρα μὲν τοῦ κτήμα τῆς νῦν λαβεῖν. 19. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δι' ἔγονε πλείω] σκοτειν. 147 B. 81: 'Ἀλλ' ἢδυ γὰρ τοῦ κτήμα τῆς νῦν λαβεῖν. 'An amusing sort of creature does our fairest of the accounts of knowledge prove l'
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 210. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τούτων ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπι-
χειρῆς γίγνεσθαι, ὁ Θεαίτητος,—ἐὰν τε γίγνης, βελτίω-
νων ἔσει πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐὰν τε κενῶς
ἡς, ἢπειρο ἑσεὶ βαρὸς τοῖς συνούσι καὶ ἱμερώτερος,
σωφρόνως οὐκ οἴομενος εἰδέναι αὐτήν οἴσθα. τοσοῦτον 5
γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλείον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδὲ
τι οἶδα ὅπι οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄν-
δρες ἐστὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μακειαν ταύτην
ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μὴ τηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχιστον, ἢ μὲν τῶν
δ' ἡνωμάκων, ἐγώ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὁσοὶ 10
καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ
βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἂν μὲ
γέγραπται· ἐσθεν δὲ, ὁ Θεόδωρος, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαν-
tῶμεν.

καὶ πλείω, 'even more:'—val μᾶ
Δ' ἐγώ is interposed.

1. Ἐὰν... ἐὰν τε... ἐὰν τε] For
this hypothesis within hypo-
thesis cp. supr. 147 A, and note.
ἐὰν τε... ἐὰν τε are correlative.

'Then, Theætetus, should
you go about hereafter to con-
ceive afresh,—whether you do
conceive, your state will be the
more promising for what you
have now gone through, or
whether you remain barren,
you will be gentler and less
offensive to those about you,
for you will be too modest to
think that you know what you
do not know.'

9. ἐκ θεοῦ] θεός is here ge-
neralised. Cp. supr. 149 B,
150 C.

10. ὁσοὶ καλοὶ] Supr. 185 E:
'O γὰρ καλὸς λέγων καλὸς τοῖς κα-
γαθοῖ. The word accentuates
Socrates' satisfaction with The-
ætetus. Cp. supr. 142 C: Πάνω
ἄγασθημι αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν.

II. τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν] In-
dictments for impiety were laid
before the ἄρχων βασιλέως, who
was the representative of the
ancient kings in their capacity
of High-Priest, as the Rex Sa-
crificulus was at Rome. (Smith's
Dict. of Ant.) It is at this
point that the Euthyphro is
supposed to open.

13. ἐσθεν δὲ, κτλ.] These
words may have originally be-
longed to the dialogue without
implying the promise of a con-
APPENDIX A.

Heraclitus and Parmenides.

As after-ages saw amongst Plato's contemporaries distinctions which were only partially developed in his time, so in a less degree, and with the difference which his genius implies, Plato viewed the past through a generalization and an antithesis. Heraclitus and Empedocles, and from another point of view Protagoras, were the representatives of one tendency, Parmenides and his followers, of the contrary one. The opposition between them is that between rest and motion, unity and diversity, absolute and relative, universal and particular, finite and infinite, positive and negative, between knowledge and opinion, ideas or conceptions and impressions.

In endeavouring to conceive what Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Protagoras really were, it is necessary to divest our minds of this contrasted form under which we are led to think of them in reading Plato.

It would only be an approximation towards a true estimate to earlier say that Parmenides represents the idea of unity, being, or rest, Heraclitus that of dualism, of a process, or motion, and Pythagoras that of harmony and order, or definite proportions, as intermediate between the other two.

Philosophy was yet too near its origin for its streams to have diverged very far. As we come nearer to those early thinkers, we find that they had more in common than we supposed. They have a common mythological element, the atmosphere in which their thoughts move, and which they strive to pierce, although it veils their meaning partly from themselves; inhaled by some in the Greek and Sicilian valleys, by some, perhaps in earlier purity, on the Eastern plains, but in all finding its highest sensuous embodiment in the Sun or Fire. The notion of Διός is common to Heraclitus and Parmenides, the εἰμαρψίν of the one is paralleled by the ἄγαγος of the other.
The endeavour to pierce this veil of language\(^1\) is accompanied in all of them by a melancholy scepticism and contempt for the common opinions of men. The words of Plato in the Phædo, *οι πολλοὶ ψηλαφώτες δισταφεῖν ἐν σκότῳ*, might have been applied by any of the earlier philosophers to the condition of men, who believe the testimony of their senses before that of reason, and cling to their own narrow thoughts instead of being conformed to the law of Nature or Being.

With this scepticism is combined in all of them what may be termed an ideal Pantheism: the speculative and religious intellect filling the void of observation with the intensity of its own early thought\(^2\). All that is particular owes its being to Wrong, in the universal alone is harmony and righteousness and peace. The world of opinion is a world of *nought and night*; the fullness of being is absolute, and commensurate with thought. The nature of things, says Philolaus, belongs to divine, and not to human knowledge.

Such being the ground colours more or less discernible throughout the philosophy of the sixth century B.C., what were the distinguishing features by which they were relieved? It is now proposed to consider this in the case of Heraclitus and (more briefly) of Parmenides; and it may be remarked in passing, that, historically speaking, it does not seem very probable that either of these philosophers pursued his reflections with direct reference to the other. The idea of the History of Philosophy is a little apt to intercept our view of the History itself. As a Platonist sees in the Ionian and Eleatic two opposite poles, so the Hegelian is tempted to trace the progress of thought from Parmenides to Heraclitus, while a Kantian may view the Eleatic transcendentalism as the higher. Such thoughts may supply a valuable theory, but they are not strictly historical. Parmenides and Heraclitus were nearly contemporary, Heraclitus being the earlier of the two: they lived far apart, and were subject to different influences.

**Heraclitus.** I. Heraclitus of Ephesus was an Eastern Greek, and it is not merely fanciful to find an analogy between his thoughts and the more dreamy speculations of the remoter East. But they have a greater interest for the student of philosophy, not only as having contributed primarily to the speculative impulse of the Greek mind, but as permanently valuable in themselves, and anticipating some of the most fruitful of modern ideas. Bacon drew

\(^1\) Ov. Parmen. *Πλάμηνει κροτάφων ἀπὸ χερόλ καλύπτεις.*

\(^2\) Ὁ γάρ πλευρ ἐστὶ νόημα, Parmen.
APPENDIX A.

from them some of his happiest expressions; and Hegel professed to have embodied in his own Logic every principle which they contained. "The voice of the Sibyl," says Heraclitus, "although its notes be harsh and rude, yet penetrates to a thousand years." This pregnant saying may be well applied to the obscure utterances of Heraclitus himself. Half understood even by his own followers, imperfectly appreciated by Plato and Aristotle, he exercised a wide-spread influence, second only to that of Parmenides in its intensity. Caught up afresh by the Stoics and Neo-platonists, and by the Fathers of the Christian Church, and read by them in the light of deeper wants, his words received a new interest from their sublime spirit of awe and sadness. And thus many of them have been preserved to us; and reveal in dim and broken outline the proportions of a most noble and far-seeing intellect.

It is the common fate of great thinkers in an early time, that for the most part only the negative side of their teaching 'lives after them.' One reason is, that it is the most distinct and intelligible to themselves and their contemporaries. Deep intuitions, but unsubstantial, though clothed in palpable imagery; anticipations, vague and unsupported by proof, of the human mind, dreaming on thoughts to come, partly become engulfed by time, partly remain dead and fruitless and unknown, until their meaning is revealed by the development of cognate thoughts in distant ages, and a late sympathy detects what is hidden there in germ. So the doctrine of Heraclitus, which undoubtedly contained an element of order and unity, if not of rest, and had been as ideal as any, was degraded to be the support of the doctrine of sense, although it again enters to restore the balance of philosophy when in danger of being bound fast in the Eleatic One.

Heraclitus himself had followed in the wake of previous thinkers. As the emigrant Xenophanes had 'looked up to the vault of heaven and said that the One was God,' so Thales had looked forth on the expanse of the Ægean and said that Water was the All, with a vague sense that Nature must be simple and all-pervading. The tendency of his successors had been towards the idea of an homogeneous Infinite. Heraclitus rose to the conception of Nature as a universal ever-acting Law.

He felt deeply the falseness and contradictoriness of sensation and opinion, not because he contrasted their objects with that of knowledge, but because he felt that these are presented as being

1 Thus the dialectic of Plato, Rep. 6 is a sort of ὁδὸς ἀκραίω μία. See also the Sophist and Parmenides.

B 2
something in themselves,—‘not fluctuating but fixed,’—and not as moments in the Universal Process. This is itself unseen, but is symbolised in several ways. ‘The Order that embraces all things is an everliving Fire, Eternal, Uncreated, kindling itself by measures and extinguishing itself by measures;’ i.e. The Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity and perfect law. This Idea is also represented as ‘the invisible harmony’ which is ‘better than the visible,’ as the ‘Thought which guides all through all,’ as the ‘Universal Word’ or ‘Reason,’ as the ‘One Wisdom,’ as ‘Time,’ as ‘Righteousness,’ as ‘Fate,’ as the ‘Name of Zeus.’ This Eternal process, which is at the same time a law or harmony, is inseparable in the mind of Heraclitus from the notion of dualism. The process is from This to That and back again, the harmony is between opposites, which do not cease to be opposites, although the one passes into the other. This was not lost upon Plato. ‘The universe is ever drawn asunder and together at once, says the muse of firmer tone,’ viz. the Ionian: Plat. Soph. 242. It is implied in the blunt words, ‘War is the Father of all things:’ and in a saying of more doubtful meaning, Παλιστον ε δραμονη κωσμου, δεκωσερ λυρη και ροϊς. Different interpretations of this have been suggested. Perhaps it might be paraphrased, ‘As the arrow leaves the string, the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cp. Plato, Rep. 4. 439), and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention; the secret of the Universe is the same.’ Thus Homer is blamed for praying that strife may be no more, since without strife there can be no harmony. ‘The Deity is Day and Night in one, winter and summer, war and peace, fulness and hunger.’ Each thing is ever producing or passing into its opposite—evil into good, and good into evil: light into darkness and darkness into light. This Eternal process is the world: ‘All coming out of one, and one arising out of all.’ Its nature is to reveal itself in contradictions: ζυγάτειας οδη και οδη οδη, κ.τ.λ. ‘Εν το οσφυν μονον λέγεσθαι οικ εθελε και εθελε, Ζηνος ονομα.  

But it is more particularly described as the way upwards and downwards, which is the same. In everything there is contrariety, and the action of the all-embracing, all-dividing fire. But there is a more general contrariety between the fire itself and its grosser forms, i.e. between the absolute process itself and

1 Fr. 56 (Bywater).
2 Hor. Epist. 1. 12. 19; ‘Quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors.’
3 Fr. 59.
4 Fr. 65.
the elements which are at once the subjects and the products of its Law. Fire is becoming all things, and all things are becoming fire;—the things are typified as air and water and earth. Here it is more difficult to separate the symbol from the thought. There is an effort made to give greater outward reality to the process, and the language becomes more sensuous accordingly. The way upwards is the way from earth through water and air to fire, the way downwards is from fire through air and water to earth. Both processes are ever moving on together; and each element has its own harmony or law. There is then not only contrariety and harmony in the world, but also a lower and a higher. This is more simply expressed by the distinction between the moist and dry exhalations; e.g. the clouds and the sun: the one dark, the other light; the one tending downwards, the other upwards. These are, as it were, the body and soul of the world. The death of either is the other's life. The Universal Process is perpetually circling between them. At this point we return to the world of sensible things. They exist only by perpetual strife, life and death work together in them; their birth is a death, their death or absorption into the higher region is the true life; the only harmony amongst them is due to war. But is there war in heaven? Is there no escape from this region of conflicting elements? Is the fire itself, the origin and goal of the struggle of existence, torn asunder by a similar struggle? We may possibly imagine the primordial activity and its law (πῦρ, μέτα) as two coexistent and opposite principles, the balance of which is order (κόσμος); but it is probably nearer the truth to say, that the fire is inseparable from the world, and therefore from the conflict of things: as these in their war are ever coming into existence and absorbed again, so the fire is ever parted asunder so as to become all things, and at the same time united out of them\(^1\), quenched into the lower forms and kindled into itself again. But then this process is all-embracing; not isolated like the war of particular things: and for each thing to rise from earth to fire, that is, from particular existence to the Universal Process, is to attain to peace. This seems to be implied in the notice of Diog. L. (9, 8): Τὸν δὲ ἐνεργῶν τὸ μὲν εἰς γένεσιν ἄγων καλεῖται πόλεμον καὶ ἐρυν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκπυρωσιν ὀμολογίαν καὶ ἐρήμην.\(^2\) On the other hand, that which is wearied with the 'Eternal process moving on,' is carried downwards by a weak desire of rest and of particular being: and to this is

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1. Διαφέρουσιν
2. Ср. τοιούτους ἄνω καὶ ἀγαθόν, —κάματος ἀνά-
attributed the origin of the individual soul. (See Lassalle, Her. vol. i. pp. 123 sqq.)

What is the bearing of this theory on the mind, on human knowledge, and on human life?

1. The universal law or process may be conceived of as a continued act or utterance of mind (γνώμη και ευθερμίαν πάντα, το έν σοφόν, Θεῖος λόγος). This, though more or less personified (as Zeus, Δίκη, Θεός), is nowhere distinctly personal. The act or utterance itself is the soul of the World, not exactly 'immanent,' but ever moving throughout all, passing into everything and returning into itself again. Yet while thus pervading all things, it essentially holds the upper ethereal region, and embraces all, being opposed to the things beneath it as universal to particular.

2. Knowledge therefore is the acquaintance and union with this universal and pervading mind or law. That human mind is the best, which most partakes of it; that which lives in its own world of particular impressions and notions, is 'nearer earth and less in light.' This idea finds a symbolical and also an abstract expression. 'A dry soul is the wisest and best, flashing through the body as lightning through a cloud' (επ. ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίας). 'The soul that is moist (e.g. with wine) "embodies" itself like a gathering cloud' (επ. ἵγρα ἀναθυμίας). 'The Law of things is a law of universal Reason, but most men live as if they had a wisdom of their own.' 'To live in the light of the universal Order is to be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is to go to sleep.' 'Most men even when they hear are as though they heard not, their speech bewrays that though present they are absent mentally.' It is an obscure question, and one which Heraclitus probably did not distinctly ask himself, by what path, according to this theory, the mind passes from sense to knowledge, from the darkness of the particular into the light of the universal. The answer would probably be little more than that the eye of the soul is opened. As the faculty of sight is quenched in sleep, so the mind is quenched while it is concerned only with the things surrounding it. But if a man is awake, the fire within him finds its kindred fire, and flashes through the clouds of the sensible world. Thus living in the universal order he becomes a partaker of the mind which follows all through all. Sensation is not annihilated, but is absorbed into the grander movement of the mind, and becomes the transparent medium of true vision. (See the expression κατὰ φῶς ἐπάλειν, where the transition from sensible to mental perception is not marked.) While the mind is thus acquainted with the universal
law, it must also follow the swiftness of the universal motion (Plat. Cratyl. 412: Δια του λόγου άνευ παρούσα), distinguishing all things into their true elements (διαφόρων ἐκατον κατά φύσιν καὶ φράξιον ἰκει), perceiving their transformations, comprehending their unseen harmony (πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθόν κρινει καὶ καταλήγεται). Heraclitus could not be unconscious that this was an ideal state for man, who 'lights a taper for himself in the night,' and 'is but an ape to compare with God.' The subtlety of Nature far exceeds the subtlety of man's intellect, and her energy far exceeds his power to grapple with it. Hence as in the Heaven of Heraclitus there is no rest, so in his philosophy there is occasionally a despairing tone. This, however, never occurs in speaking of the Eternal process, but only of its comprehension by man.

3. For in comparison with the grandeur of the Universal Law, human life becomes a very little thing, if it be not more fitly called a death. Indeed, as in all things else, so in man, life and death are ever working together. His body is ever absorbed into his soul, his soul is ever dying into his body; his birth into the world is the entombment of a higher life, the death of what is earthly in him is the awaking of the God. As the Reason is but a small part in any man, so the good amongst men are few, and misunderstood (for dogs also bark at him they know not). Even the philosopher is like the gold-digger, who toils much and finds little⁵, and often his truest wisdom is to know himself, and to feel the nothingness of his individual Being in the presence of the Universal Order. Yet public law is to be zealously maintained, as more general than the private will, the excesses of which are to be quenched as a dangerous fire⁴.

Such is the bare outline of a thought the grandeur of which was far beyond the comprehension of that time. The Αἶγος or Law of Heraclitus was not exactly a law of progress, for his elements are ever circling in one round, yet it is as near an approach to that Idea as is to be found in Ancient Philosophy. A still nearer approach is made to the conception of the infinity and simplicity of Nature. And while we feel that the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle owe much of their strength and reality and perfection to the One Being of Parmenides, and in part also to the Pythagoreans, in whose philosophy finite and infinite were already combined, it is im-

¹ Fr. 2.  ² Fr. 26.  ³ Cp. Plat. Rep. 5. 450.  ⁴ Τῆριν χρή σβεννείν μᾶλλον ή πυρειαίν, Fr. 103.
possible not to recognise in Plato a nearer kindred to Heraclitus than to any other of his predecessors. The union of Imagination and Reason, the plasticity of mind, the tendency at once to soar and to roam, may be mentioned as some of the points of communion between them. Many scattered thoughts, as well as the spirit pervading whole passages, might be quoted in confirmation of this. It is not surprising therefore if Plato grasped the thought of Heraclitus more firmly than the dark philosopher’s own followers had done 1.

The fate of Heraclitus’ teaching at Ephesus 2 reminds us of his own picture of the soul that is too weak to follow the Universal motion, and falls away from it to take an individual shape. The very multiplicity of his symbolism seems to have contributed to this result; each disciple interpreting the whole theory by the figure which was most intelligible to himself: one fastening on the Fire, another on the Sun, another on the dry exhalation, another on the more abstract Righteousness, or the ruling Mind, while some appear to have seized upon his habit of teaching by strange outward signs, if there be any truth in what Aristotle gravely asserts, that Cratylus at length

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1 The two passages in which this appreciation appears most distinctly are, Sophist. 243: Διαφερόμενον γαρ (sc. τὸ δὴ) δὲ ξυμφόρεται, σαφένει τὸν κυριάκοντα τῶν Μουσῶν (with which contrast Sympos. 187, where the saying is explained away), and Cratyl. 412: ὁ οὖν γὰρ ἡγούνται τὸ πῶς εἶναι ἐν πολλοῖς, τὰ μὲν πολλά αὐτοῦ ἐπιλαμβάνον τούτου τι εἶναι, οἷον οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἤ χαράει, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι τί διεξεῖ, δι’ αὐτὸ πάντα τὰ γεγο-μένα γίγνεται, εἶναι δὲ τάξιστον τοῦτο λεπτότατον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ δύνασθαι ἄλλοις βλέπειν τὸ λόγος λέγει παντὸς, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατον τε ἁπάντως, ὅσα αὐτὸ μὴν στέγει, καὶ τάξιστον, ὅστε χρῆσθαι διὸ πρὶν ἐσται τοῖς ἄλλοις. ὡς τὲ ὅσον ἐπιτρέπεται τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαίων, κ.τ.λ.

2 This may be illustrated by the continuation of the passage of the Cratylus just quoted. Μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἄντωθα, δὲ νῦν ἐξαγωγαί, παρά πολ-λοῖς διαλογίζεται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. ἐξὼ δὲ, οὐ ἔφευγεν, ὅπως λεγέναι δὲν πέρι αὐτοῦ, τάτα μὲν πάντα διαιέται-μαι ἐν ἀπορίας, δι’ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ δί-καιον καὶ τὸ αἰτίον—δι’ ὑδρὸ γίγνεται, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰτίον—καὶ ὅλη καλεῖν ἑφ’ τις τοῦτ’ ὑδρὸς ἤχειν διὰ ταῦτα’ ἑπιείκειαν δ’ ἢμία αὐτοῦ ἑπαφέως ἀκούσας ταῦτα μεθυνόντι. Τί οὖν ποτ’ ἐστιν, ὅγαθε, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο ὅτι οὖν ἤχει; δικαίω δὲ τὸ ἄγα τοῦ προ-θηκοῦτος ἑστάτω καὶ ἦστ’ το τεκμήριαν ἀλλοιοθέν. ἦσθαι γὰρ μὲ φαι τινί πεποίηθαι καὶ ἀνασκόνει καὶ ἐπιχειρεύει, βουλεύ-μενον αὐτόν ἐπιτελεῖν. ἄλλος οὖν ἢ λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτ’ αὐτοφανεῖν. οὐ μὴν γὰρ τίς φησὶν τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἑς τὸν τοῦτον γὰρ δὴν διαίων ἄλλοτρον ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ ἄλλα. ἐπειδὴ οὖν τοῦ λέγει αὐτὸ δὲν μένος ἀλλ’ ἄλλος διαίων καὶ κάποιον ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ ἄλλα. ἐπειδὴ οὖν τοῦ νῦν αὐτὸν ἀλλ’ ἄλλ’ ἄλλο τὸ ποιεῖν λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησὶν τοῦτο δὲ οὐ μὴν εἶναι εἰναι· οὐ δὲ οἰκον αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησὶν, ἄλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμόν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἄν. οὐ δὲ τοῦτον μὲν πάντων καταγελάως φησίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο τὸ λέγει· Ἀναστάσεις, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο, αὐτοκράτειρα ἢ λέγαν αὐτὸν καὶ οὐδὲν μεμυχμένον πάντα φησίν αὐτῷ κατεχόμενα τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἄντωθα. ἐν τῷ ἐγώ, ὅ, φῶς, ποιό ἐν πλείονι ἀπορίας εἰμὶ ἢ πρὶν ἐπιχειρεῖται μιανάνες περὶ τοῦ δίκαιου, οὐ τοῦ ἑς ἐστιν.
only moved his finger. These divided members of Heraclitus continued after him a partial and spasmodic life, and the system ended consistently in a kind of war.

Until the end of last century the fragments of the early Greek philosophers were only accessible to the few scholars whose reading extended over a large field. These of Heraclitus were first collected by Schleiermacher in 1807. But the discovery of the Philosophumena in 1851 gave materials not previously accessible. For Hippolytus, or whoever wrote that treatise, sought to discredit Noetius by identifying his teaching with that of the old Ephesian, and to this pious wish we are indebted for several fresh quotations from the Περὶ Φιλόσωφων. The sentences containing these additional fragments were carefully re-edited in 1854 by Jacob Bernays, by whom the study of Heraclitus has been otherwise greatly advanced (Heraclitea, 1848, etc.). More recently, in 1869, there appeared from the same acute and learned pen Die Heraclitischen Briefe, ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und religionsgeschichtlichen Litteratur, a memorable essay towards determining the complex question, 'What kind of evidence can be obtained from spurious writings?' In this work, and also in his Heraclitea, Prof. Bernays has pointed out many echoes of Heraclitus in subsequent literature.

Mr. Bywater\(^1\) has conceived the design of presenting in one view the substance and the shadow of Heraclitus, of letting us hear the 'voice of the Sibyl' and its reverberations; not by weaving the scattered fragments into a complete whole with the help of unlimited conjecture, as was done by Lassalle (more theologian than scholar) in 1858, and more recently by Schuster in a laborious effort of 'constructive criticism' (Teubner, 1873), but by displaying the relevant facts, including the citation of authorities, with as much exactness and with as little admixture of conjecture as possible.

The citations throw considerable light both on the interpretation of Heraclitus and on the history of his influence. An obscure phrase often becomes clearer when we see how it was quoted (see esp. Fr. 60); and even the names of the authors are instructive. We are reminded by them how a secondary phase of Heraclitus' doctrine came to be woven into the philosophy of Plato; how

\(^1\) Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae. Recensuit J. Bywater, Coll. Ex. Soc. Oxon. 1877. Some of the remarks which follow here were printed in an article for the 'Academy' of that year.
the dark speaker was compelled by Aristotle to render up his logical account, as Locke and Leibnitz are by our Hegelians at the present day; how the Stoics gave him fresh currency, having been attracted to him both by the austerity of his spirit, and by the kindred nature of his symbolism (πορική, ἐπιφανείας); lastly, how the Fathers of the Church employed him as they did other heathen writers, now wresting him to their side for the condemnation of Pagan superstition, now seeking to overthrow an adversary by comparing him with the infidel philosopher.

The reproach of obscurity was more deserved by Heraclitus than that of melancholy, which became proverbial perhaps in consequence of his association with Stoicism, although it is true that the philosophy of change, which saw 'man kindled and extinguished like a spark in the night' (Fr. 77), was in close accord with the sadness which had characterised much of the earlier Ionian reflexion (Mimnermus, Fr. 2; Hdt. 7.46). But it may be questioned if he were more obscure than other prophets of the mind, who in the sixth century B.C., perhaps unconsciously moved by some Oriental influence, strove to catch the universe in aphorisms. And if his Περὶ Ψυχῆς were now extant, abrupt and disjointed as it would probably still appear (not, as Bacon thought, outweighing Plato), it might be more intelligible to us than it was either to Aristotle or to the Stoics.

The 'transcendent Pantheism,' whether of Heraclitus or Parmenides, is an open secret to the student of Descartes and Spinoza. The Hegelian, for whom the true individual is the true universal, and all thought proceeds by collision of opposites, can understand his master's saying that he had taken up the philosophy of Heraclitus into his own. And some of our modern φυσικὸς might be surprised to find, in what they supposed to be a fistful of air, the expression of principles which they have verified, such as the permanence of the sum of energy, the interchangeableness of energy and heat, the reciprocal transmutation of elementary forces, the transience of phenomena, the permanence of law, the relativity of perception to the organs of sense (Fr. 37), and might acknowledge that 'Anticipatio Naturae' was less a term of opprobrium than they had imagined. But the wonder would be all on their side, for Heraclitus would have wondered at nothing so much as if these things had turned out otherwise.

The scholar might find germs of Platonic thought and expression (Fr. 115, 114; cp.Rep. 2.376,7.540); the general critic, unconscious
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coincidences with remote literatures, like that between Fr. 69, ‘Time is a child at chess,’ and the well-known lines of Omar Khayyám. The agnostic and the mystical theologian might both find meaning in the deep saying, ‘God at once reveals and hides himself;’ while the religious reformer would rejoice to see that Greek no less than Hebrew prophets felt the abomination and absurdity of sacrifice. ‘They think to purge their sins by polluting themselves with blood’ (Fr. 130). So rich in germinal expression was this prophetic soul, who, in clinging to a seeming paradox, was really presaging thoughts of many generations.

The character of Heraclitus came nearer than that of Socrates to Plato’s description of the great mind born in a little State and despising her birthplace, but soaring aloft to survey things in Heaven and Earth. The pride shown in his contempt for Pythagoras and Xenophanes, and his grudging praise of Bias, may help to account for the conceit which Plato noted in his followers: but there is a Socratic loftiness in the tone in which he speaks of death (as an emanation, Fr. 37, a sloughing-off of the body, Fr. 85), and in his outburst on behalf of Hermodorus we see a trace of underlying kindliness and of the passion for justice which is the best note of the philosophic spirit. We gather from Fr. 73 that he was more austere in his habits than Xenophanes.

II. The sublime thought of the Eternal movement of an infinite law was not, however, destined to be the final conception of the Greek mind. While life and death and the succession of phenomena were thus idealized on the Eastern shores of the Ægean, a different, though parallel impulse was preparing elsewhere, it is said at Elea in Magna Græcia: an impulse equally if not more sublime, yet by itself no less incapable of giving rise to such a philosophy as Plato’s. Xenophanes had already said—

‘There is one God above all in heaven or earth, not like to mortals either in form or mind.’ ‘He is all sight, all thought, all hearing.’ ‘He ever abides immoveable in one stay: nor does it become him to waver to and fro.’

Inspired with this thought Parmenides rose at once into an ideal world of mind and being, not seeking there an explanation of the sensible universe, nor endeavouring to grasp its law, or idealize its continual process, but dwelling solely on the all-sufficient object of Absolute and Perfect Being. From
the world in which his thought reposed, growth and decay were exiled far, into a region which Pure Being did not enter, a world of nothingness, which yet seemed to satisfy the minds of ordinary men, who trusted in the blindness of opinion and sense, and lived amongst contradictions. For in this lower world of opinion, opposite principles ever strove, light and darkness, heat and cold. But Pure Being is one, a rounded whole, perfect and full, identical with the Absolute Mind. The only symbol of Parmenides is the Perfect Sphere.

The main effort of Plato's dialectic, as is well known, is to bring these opposite poles of thought, the Eleatic and Ionian, into organic and well-balanced harmony. In its most abstract conception it is the problem of the one and the many (τῶν λόγων ἀγήρων πάθος παρ' ἡμῶ), or of motion and rest. In this effort he was assisted by the Pythagoreans, who had already found a sort of middle term in Number.

The doctrine of Parmenides does not enter directly into the Theaetetus, from which the discussion of it is expressly excluded: but his influence is notwithstanding present in the Megarian method, which was in part derived from Zeno (see Introduction), in whose hands the One had acquired a negative power, and was used rather to distinguish than to comprehend, so becoming rather the form than the sole object of thought. This Eleatic influence appears chiefly (1) in the relentless way in which sensation and motion are reduced to nothingness, and because they have no unity are shown to present no object to the mind: (2) in the crowning point of the dialogue, where it is admitted that there are universal perceptions of pure mind, and that Being is the principal of these: (3) in the paradox about false opinion, which is similar to that of Zeno about motion,—not 'it is impossible for a thing to be in two places at once,' but 'it is impossible to know and not to know at the same time,'—and is solved in the same way by reverting to the conception of degrees: (4) in the form of argument with which this paradox is enforced, ὅ ἐν γί κρ ἀφῶν ἐν κρ ἀφῶ; (5) in the question about the whole and its parts, pp. 203, 204.
APPENDIX B.

"Ανθρώπος μέτρον.

Protagoras, who gives to the inquiry in the Theaetetus its subjective turn, and some part of its dramatic interest, had died at the age of seventy, some ten or twelve years before the trial of Socrates, which is the supposed date of the conversation. The real share borne by him (or by his Shade) in the dialogue is less than appears at first sight. It is to his 'disciples' that the doctrine of sense based on that of motion is attributed, and though he is made to bear the brunt of the attack, because the guardians whom he has left will not defend his 'orphan' theory, yet when challenged to meet him upon his own ground, Socrates falls back upon the saying quoted at first, 'Man is the measure of all things,' and the explanation of it, 'Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.' The same words occur also in the Cratylus. This, then, is nearly all that we can with any certainty point to in this dialogue as Protagorean, except the name of his treatise 'Αλήθεια, the sceptical fragment about the existence of the gods, and perhaps one or two rhetorical words, such as μεγαλειονέρος, πολυάρατος. For it is evident that the doctrine of motion and becoming, which he is said to have entrusted to his disciples 'in a mystery' (cp. Cratyl. 413), cannot have been extant in his writings. It is therefore surprising to find Sextus Empiricus representing the tenets of Protagoras in language closely resembling that used in the Theaetetus. The wonder is abated, however, if we reflect that there was really a very close affinity between Protagoras and the Cyrenaics, and that of this affinity Plato is in this dialogue the interpreter. Aristotle follows Plato in identifying the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus. And there are thus three sources, independent of Protagoras, from which the account of Sextus may have been derived: the Cyrenaics, the Theaetetus, and Aristotle. The similarity of the language in which different sensationalist theories are described in later times may possibly indicate
the influence of this very dialogue in fixing the terminology of
that aspect of thought.

It is therefore the more interesting to examine the one say-
ing of Protagoras which is here preserved: Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον
ἀθρόπον είναι, τῶν μὲν ἄνων ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μη ἄνων ὡς οὐκ ἐστι.
Might not this seem at first sight to imply something less than
the absolute relativeness of knowledge? Might it not even be
interpreted to mean, 'quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab om-
nibus?' In answer to this it may be remarked, first, that Pro-
tagoras appears so far at least to have interpreted his own
saying, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἑμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαύτα μὲν ἐστιν ἑμοὶ, οἷα δὲ σοι,
toιαύτα δὲ ἀδ σοι. But it may be added, secondly, that the dis-
tinction between the race and the individual, between the general
term 'man,' and the singular term 'this man,' was probably not
distinctly present to his mind. When we reflect on the absence
of any abiding consciousness of the universal and of the dis-
tinction between abstract and concrete, exhibited, for instance,
in the first answer of Theaetetus, or in the attempt of Meno to
define virtue, it becomes evident that the term man, thus barely
used by a popular teacher, would naturally call up the idea, not
of human nature or of the human mind, nor of the race col-
lectively, but of 'a man,' 'this or that man,' an individual, 'you
or me,' not, however, conceived of as an individual, nor conscious-
distinguished from any abstract or generic notion of man, but
simply present to the imagination.¹

Protagoras saw that men were weary of systems which had no
reference to human life, and seemed to make knowledge unat-
tainable. He saw persons teaching astronomy and the nature of
Being to those who wanted to learn how to become able and
successful citizens. Like other popular teachers, he had a keener
eye for the immediate wants of those who came to him than for
abstract truth. The theory of Parmenides, which had its warm
advocates at Athens, was one purely objective; although beginning
and ending in the mind, it was wholly independent of any human
standard: the highest aim for man was to rise by pure thought
into the world of being.

Protagoras felt, like Socrates, that the truth which man requires
is relative to man, but, unlike Socrates, he made this the end and
not the starting-point of his inquiry, and instead of searching by
reflection for that one truth by which man ought to live, he

¹ Cp. τοῖς ἄθρόπων, Thuc. i. 140, which does not correspond to the modern
generic use of the word.
was contented with inferring that truth was variable, according

to the common notion, 'many men, many minds.'

As embodied in the Theaetetus, the above doctrine receives some
fresh characteristics, first, as being made the type of a contem-
porary theory, and being interwoven with that of Heraclitus;
secondly, as holding one side of an antithesis, which gives a
sharpness and precision to the term \( \alpha \nu \theta \rho \omega \sigma \tau \sigma \), as equivalent to
\( \varepsilon \kappa \alpha \sigma \tau \omega \varsigma \ \eta \mu \omega \), which it probably had not when first used; and,
thirdly, by being pushed to its minutest results, according to the
Megarian method,—not only 'man' but 'each man,' not only so,
but 'every creature,' and even the same person at different times.

APPENDIX C.

Protagoras and Mr. Grote

I. Knowledge is relative in two senses, not wholly unconnected
with each other, which in ancient philosophy were not yet clearly
distinguished. There is the relation of subject to object, and
the relation of the universal to the particular. For the sake of
clearness, these different aspects of the relativity of knowledge
may be treated separately, although the study of either involves
the consideration of both.

(1) Knowledge is relative to the mind. But here also there is a
distinction which must not be overlooked. For there is a general
and a particular subjectivity. (a) There can be no knowledge
apart from the mind which knows. An object of knowledge
without a subject is inconceivable. Or rather, knowledge cannot
be conceived except as the joint working of the mind and of
that which is external to the mind. All knowledge is neces-
sarily in this sense subjective. But this condition in no way
limits or impairs the certainty or perfection of knowledge.
Relativity of this sort is not inconsistent with the existence of
Absolute Truth. (b) It is otherwise with the peculiar subjective
conditions of individual minds. These modify and render de-
fective the knowledge of particular men, 'who see and know but
in part, and have different prospects of the same thing according

1 From an article in the Quarterly Review for January, 1866.
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to their different positions to it. Yet even this partial knowledge, in so far as it is knowledge, has an objective and universal reality.

Now, although it is mere nonsense to talk of eliminating the subjective element, if by object-without-subject is meant knowledge minus mind, there is no such absurdity in supposing that knowledge, while remaining under the conditions of mind, may become perfect through being purified from the effect of bias. Nor is it chimerical to hope that to this ideal an indefinite approximation may be made in the growth of science, in which every forward step is the relinquishment of that which some have thought, for that which all who understand the proofs must think. This process is, in effect, the enlightenment or enfranchisement of individual minds. The aim of every scientific inquirer is to come forth from the den and stand under the open heaven; to correct the inequality of the mirror of a particular mind by a method valid for all minds; to shake off the idols of the tribe and theatre, and become the denizen and pupil of the universe, and no longer of a country or of a sect only. Such are the images, borrowed from the old philosophy, in which Bacon described the progress of knowledge. Those who believe in the reality of inductive science will hardly maintain that they are illusory. And they point to an idea of knowledge as something wholly different from individual opinion; as containing what, in contradistinction to the particular subjective, may be called the subjective-universal.

Closely parallel to this, if account be taken of the intellectual circumstances of the time, was the idea of knowledge which Plato derived from Socrates. He looked for a definition that should hold universally, an irrefragable hypothesis, an opinion which could not be shaken by examination. In other words, he sought for that which is true, not for the individual thinker only, but for all who think. He everywhere acknowledges, however, or rather insists, that general truths cannot be attained or imparted except through the awakening of individual minds. There is no vision until the eye is turned in the direction of the light. It is only the coarse Thrasy machus who imagines that he can take and thrust his notions bodily down his hearer's throat. And Socrates, in attempting to answer him, is unable to say anything but what he individually thinks. The Socratic dialogue represents the meeting-point of a particular conscious-

1 Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding, § 3.
ness with universal reason, and the process which results is an approximation on the part of two individuals to a universal truth. In none of the dialogues in which Socrates is the chief speaker is there any element of authority; but they are equally removed from sanctioning an arbitrary or capricious 'private judgment.' No testimony is admitted but that of the respondent's own mind; no persuasion or enforcement, except that of argument, is applied. The single duty recognised is that of obeying reason. But there is no dispensation from this duty. Except in passages which are clearly playful or ironical, mere verbal juggling and all opinionativeness are earnestly deprecated, and the speakers simply endeavour, by means of dialectic, to obtain and exhibit Truth. 'We must use our own faculties, such as they are, and say what we really think.' 'We must follow, at all risks, whithersoever reason guides.' 'No logical puzzles can frighten us from pursuing the path of knowledge.' 'We have to consider, not who said this, but whether that which is now said be true.' 'It is my way, Crito, to yield to no influence of those surrounding me, but to the reason, which, when I think, seems to me the best.' This is the reply of Socrates, when urged to escape from prison: and so in the same prison he advised his friends. 'Care not for Socrates, but care much rather for the truth.' This position was contrasted by Plato with that of Protagoras, who asserted the subjectivity of all knowledge without distinguishing the universal from the particular subject. His formula was rude, but intelligible: 'Man is the measure; that is to say, things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.' This Plato understood as the denial of that belief in a common measure or universal truth which was implied in the work of Socrates, and he joined issue with Protagoras accordingly. Mr. Grote has given fresh life and interest to this ancient controversy by taking the part of Protagoras against Plato. Himself holding that while the subjective feeling of belief is universal, the object or matter of belief varies in each particular case, and apparently thinking that this radical imperfection is incurable; not distinguishing, as it would seem, between the propositions, 'My belief is my belief,' and 'My belief depends wholly upon my individual peculiarities'—or, at least, not recognising the difference between belief

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1 Theet. 171 D.
2 Rep. 3: 394 D.
3 Theet. 197 A; Men. 81 E.
4 Charm. 160.
5 Crito, 46.
6 Phed. 91 C; cf. Soph. 146 D.
grounded on sufficient and insufficient reasons—he can imagine no alternative between a blind dogmatism and the entire relativity of truth. Either one individual opinion is the infallible standard by which all other opinions are to be judged, or else every opinion is alike valid, not indeed for those who question that opinion, but for the person holding it. But is not a third case possible? That which is different need not be wholly different; and may there not be in all human experience, however diverse, a common element? If belief is universal, so also is the process of reasoning. May not the exercise of this on the facts of experience bring men gradually to the acknowledgment of universal truths—not such as have been laid down by dogmatists, but such as are found, at least approximately, after long inquiry, when out of many ingenious hypotheses some have been verified beyond the possibility of doubt? It is not necessary that these should be dogmatically taught. Indeed, they cannot be imparted thoroughly unless the learner is led to repeat the process of invention. His curiosity must be aroused and satisfied, his reason must be awakened to perceive and solve the difficulties surrounding each hypothesis. Otherwise, he may believe, but cannot know.

Mr. Grote accuses Plato of first misrepresenting Protagoras and afterwards following him, and of misrepresenting him in two ways: in identifying his doctrine with another and a different doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception, and in having suppressed the characteristic addition 'to me,' 'to you,' as if Protagoras had said that relative truth was absolutely true.

The weight of the former charge depends on the intention of Plato in blending the two theories, and on the exact signification of the term which we translate Sensation or Perception. Now it should be observed that the word ἔσθεσις is expressly said to include, according to the theory, the feelings of pleasure, pain, desire, and fear, and apparently also the distinction between good and evil. The common characteristic of these impressions and of knowledge, according to this theory, is that of constituting the experience of an individual at a particular moment (τῶ παρὼν ἐκάστου πάθος). Such present impressions are regarded as more certain than the fainter repetition of the same in memory; and the active operation of the mind, in reviewing and reasoning over her impressions, is supposed to be

1 See Theæt. 158 E.
2 Ibid. 152 B.
3 Ibid. 157 E.
4 Theæt. 166 A, compare Hume.
APPENDIX C.

left out of view. Protagoras might possibly have exclaimed at this, and said that the individual was the measure to himself in thought as well as in sensation. But he seems to have drawn his examples from the facts of sense; and Plato’s object is to show that while the impressions of sense and feeling have in themselves only a momentary value, it is not so with the reasonings of the mind by which these are compared and generalised, and which are often justified not at the moment, but long afterwards in the actual experience of those who did not share them at the time.

This brings us to the other accusation, that Plato has suppressed the words (‘to me,’ ‘to you,’) which mark the essential relativity of Protagoras’ ‘Measure.’ He has certainly not forgotten them, for he has been at some pains to illustrate this very point, where it is shown how the theory justifies the illusions of a sick palate; and, again, where it is observed that the opinion of the true prophet proves not less true for those who did not believe him. If Plato is unfair to Protagoras, it is in making an addition, which may or may not have been consciously implied in the formula, ‘Each man is the measure of what is true to him.’ To this Plato adds in effect, ‘and there is no other standard of true being.’ But this negative aspect of the doctrine necessarily becomes explicit, when the statement is viewed as having a controversial import. The assertion ‘Man is the measure’ is unmeaning, unless this measure is brought into competition with some other, such as the Eleatic Being. Now, if the formula is thus interpreted, there are two less exact modes of expressing the same thing. Either ‘nothing is true’ (i.e. absolutely), or

1 The difference between ancient and modern philosophical language is repeatedly exemplified in this discussion; what Mr. Grote calls ‘compared facts of sense,’ e.g. weighing, measuring, etc. (iv. 164), Plato would probably have treated as the conclusions of the mind on reviewing her passive impressions.

2 Theot. 152 B: ἑσακολουθήσωμεν ὅντων αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.

3 They are true to the sick man during his sickness. Mr. Grote says (ii. 353), ‘Socrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras—‘Your doctrine is pronounced to be false by many persons; but you admit that the belief of all persons is true; therefore your doctrine is false.’ Here also Plato omits the qualification annexed by Protagoras to his general principle—Every man’s belief is true—that is, true to him. That a belief should be true to one man, and false to another, is not only no contradiction to the formula of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula contemplates.’ Plato is more wide awake than Mr. Grote imagines. He points out that Protagoras did not hold the principle of relativity to be only relatively true; otherwise he must have admitted that all the world, who differed from him, were not to themselves measures of truth, and that he himself in their judgment, that is in relation to them, was not a measure, so that his principle was not applicable to them.
Everything is alike true' (i.e. relatively). Either 'there is no absolute,' or 'the relative is the only absolute.' Both forms of expression are found in the Theaetetus. But it is not fair to infer from this that Plato has argued 'a dictum secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.' The same cavil would apply at least with equal force to the language of Protagoras himself, who called his treatise 'Αλήθεια, real (not phenomenal) truth.

'There can be no discussion without reference to a common ideal standard.' 'There can be no discussion without reference to individual belief.' Mr. Grote's whole argument proceeds on the implied assumption that these two propositions are irreconcilable. Hence he charges Plato with inconsistency in at one time appealing to an imaginary expert or wise man (the βασιλευς τεχνών of the Politicus), the personified ideal of knowledge, and at other times repudiating all authority except that of the consciousness of the respondent in the dialogue, and thus upholding what Mr. Grote characteristically styles the 'autonomy' of the individual reason. But the whole spirit of Plato's dialectic lies in bringing together the individual and the universal consciousness, and if cross-questioned on the point he would probably have said, as he has said of the kindred antithesis of the one and many, that this union is essentially inherent in the nature of thought, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν αδύνατον τι καὶ αγίρων πάθος. Those beliefs, however, which are more particularly the respondent's own, which he derives from natural idiosyncrasy or from previous intercourse, are invariably shaken and removed by Socrates, and much also of what is evoked during the conversation by his suggestive art, is in turn criticised and cut away. That which is allowed to remain as the result of the discussion (though still open to further examination) is certainly the present belief of the respondent; but is different in kind from the belief with which he entered on the argument. He began with loose impressions gathered from hearsay or from his own half-reasoning; he ends with a conviction which has been evolved by an active exercise of the reason, in which reference has been made at every step to an ideal standard of knowledge. This result is not adequately described by saying that the beliefs and convictions of one person are modified by another. Plato appeals at once to the requirements of the argument, and to the consciousness of the individual reasoner, and, whether his position is tenable

1 Theaet. 152, 166, 167; cp. 179 B. The former expression, 'Nothing is true,' is however more frequently assigned to Gorgias. 2 Phil. 15 D.
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or not, he cannot be accused in this of alternating between opposite points of view. If the two appeals are mutually destructive, he makes them, not alternately, but together. The horns of Mr. Grote’s dilemma pass harmlessly on either side of Plato. Even one who professed to have found absolute truth, might hold that this could only be communicated by awakening gradually the individual mind. But Plato in most of his dialogues professes to be still seeking for the truth in whose reality he believes, and invites others to help him in the search. He views universal truth as neither hopelessly lost, nor actually found, but in continual process of discovery. He certainly does hold inquiry to be a real endeavour, and not a mere mental exercise, and believes (in spite of difficulties which he keenly appreciates) that the distinction between truth and error has a value that is independent of human opinions. And it is here that he parts company with his English critic. Mr. Grote urges, in language nearly similar to that with which Socrates in the Theetetus affects to defend Protagoras: ‘To say that a man is wise, is to say that he is wise in some one’s estimation, your own, or that of some one else.’ This is undeniable: but then every such estimate must be either true or false, nearer to or farther from a perfect estimate. Of this difference, indeed, no man is an infallible judge, though one man can judge more correctly than another, as experience proves. God, not man, is the measure, as Plato himself has said. But it is not less clear on this account that the degree of approximation is something real, and that he who judges more correctly of this is in reality the better judge. Mr. Grote admits that, in his own opinion, in matters involving future contingency most men judge badly: only a few persons, possessed of sufficient skill and knowledge, judge well. He believes the distinction to be real and important, and allows that most other persons believe the same. He adds, ‘In acting on this distinction, I follow out my belief, and so do they. This is a general fact, respecting the conditions which determine individual belief. Like all other causes of belief, it

1 Phed. 75 E: “Ὁ καλούμεν μαθή-

niej, οἶκεῖαν ἔποιήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν

τὰ εἴη.

2 Theet. 166, 167.

3 Vol. ii. p. 252.

4 Logg. 4: 716 C.

5 This language, like that in the
defence of Protagoras (Theet. 167),

seems to be adopted (unconsciously)
to avoid the words true and false.

But it is at least as arbitrary to with-

hold the terms true and false from

judgments, as to apply them to plea-

sures, which Plato has been censured

for doing in the Philebus. See also

vol. ii. p. 351, where the question of
degrees of mental force is substituted

for the question of truth or reality.
-operates relatively to the individual mind.’ (Vol. ii. p. 355.) This is indisputable: but those who believe the distinction to be real and important, believe in a measure of truth, which they do not suppose to alter with the variations of belief. They believe the distinction to be important for others as well as for themselves. ‘When a man speaks of truth, he means what he himself (along with others, or singly, as the case may be) believes to be truth:’ he does not mean only what is true to him. Once more, Mr. Grote says, ‘You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you cannot support your opinion by evidence on authority which satisfies his senses or his reason, he remains unconvinc’d. Your individual opinion stands good to you, his opinion stands good to him. You think that he ought to believe as you do, and in certain cases you feel that he will be brought to that result by future experience; which of course must be relative to him and his appreciative powers. He entertains the like conviction in regard to you.’ (Vol. ii. p. 515.) This is freely admitted—and amounts to this, that each (either truly or falsely) believes his own opinion to be true. When Mr. Grote says he thinks the doctrine of Protagoras respecting pleasure ‘nearer to the truth’ than that of Gorgias, and that of the Republic ‘utterly at variance with the truth,’ does he mean nearer to and at variance with what is true to him? No man ever held fast an opinion merely as his opinion, but as the truth. And this implies reference to a standard which is independent of individual judgments. But to confound mere individual belief with belief grounded on evidence, or rather not to admit the difference between them, would take us back to Pyrrho and the ancient sceptics. Nor is there any modern theory of knowledge, whether that of Locke or Kant or any other, on which such a doctrine, which is really the denial of knowledge, is tenable. The same misunderstanding may be made apparent by analysing a favourite expression of Mr. Grote’s, viz. ‘individual reason.’ Granted that nothing is true for me but what I in my own person believe—that it is impossible, even were it desirable, to force conviction—that when I yield to an authority, I exercise my private judgment in pronouncing the authority sufficient,—still the question may be asked, wherein differs the assent of the individual reason from impressions of sense or creations of fancy? And it would be difficult to find any distinguishing note, except the consciousness that the object of assent cannot be otherwise, and claims the belief of all who think. Mr. Grote will say that this con-
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sciousness often proves delusive, and that the case of sensation
is exactly parallel 1. Those whose minds are constituted alike
have similar thoughts, as those whose organs are alike have
similar perceptions 2. To this Plato would answer that but for the
hope which lay at the root of the endeavour of Socrates, that
differing minds may be brought by dialectic nearer to one an-
other, by being brought nearer to unchanging principles of truth,
and that the eye of reason may be thus purged to see the light,
philosophy would be an idle pursuit, the turning of an oyster-
shell or a scytalè, a cycle without the hope of progress, an
endless process never moving on, a 'purpose' not 'increasing
through the ages,' but terminating in failure and despair.

How far Plato ever viewed universals as wholly objective is a
question which cannot be determined without taking into account
the differences of ancient and modern thought. The distinction
between the mind and external objects had not yet been clearly
made. Both poles (the objective and subjective) were absorbed
in the antithesis of Being and Phenomena, which the Eleatics
had placed far asunder, leaving their reconciliment as the great
problem of the succeeding age. The tendency of the early
speculation had been to give to psychological problems what in
modern language must be called an objective treatment, in saying
which we ought not to forget that we are applying a distinction
which was then unknown 4. Parmenides and Heraclitus were not
unconscious of the working of the mind, but their thought did
not assume the form of self-reflection. The unity or the energy
of scientific intelligence appeared to them as the Permanent Sub-
stance or the Law of Change, which constituted the Universe.

1 Vol. ii. p. 361, note.
2 See a curious note in vol. ii. p. 285, where it is said that the contro-
versy between Mr. Mill (who holds
the common attribute of many objects
to be one) and Mr. Spencer (who says
that the same abstract word denotes
one attribute in subject A. and another
exactly similar in subject B) illus-
trates forcibly the extreme nicety of
the question between the one and the
many, under certain supposable cir-
stances. Also vol. ii. p. 329.

3 The Entia Rationis exist relatively
to Ratio, as the Entia Perceptionis
exist relatively to Sense. You do
not, by producing the fact of innate
mental intuitions, eliminate the intu-
ent mind; which must be done in
order to establish a negative to the

Protagorean principle.'

4 Mr. Grote sometimes speaks of
reason in language which appears to
us happily inconsistent with his argu-
ment in the present discussion. See
for instance his touching and impres-
sive words on the death of Socrates
(vol. i. p. 302, note). 'He contem-
plates death with the eye of calm
reason; he has not only silenced "the
child within us who fears death,"... 
estimating all things then as before,
with the same tranquil and indepen-
dent reason.' Was his estimate really
true? Or was Socrates really pitiable
to those who pitied him?

4 See for instance the verse of Par-
menides, το γάρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔτιν ὑπὸ

καί ἐνεπε.
But the theory of Protagoras, and the more potent influence of Socratic inquiry, gave to philosophy what may with equal propriety be called a reflex or subjective turn, and side by side with Existence and Appearance, or Becoming, rose the corresponding difference of Knowledge and Opinion, or Sense. Now Knowledge, according to Socrates, is of Universals, and these Universals Plato identified with Being. He often speaks of general ideas, and especially of the Idea of Good, in language which implies that their reality is independent of particular minds, but yet when Socrates suggests, in answer to Parmenides, that they are of the nature of thought, he gives utterance to a mode of conceiving them which is never entirely absent, but is latent even where not expressed. This frequently appears from phrases dropped by the way, as when the form \( \zeta\iota\sigma\sigma \) is identified with the definition \( \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\sigma\omicron \), or when, in the midst of a poetical description of the ideal world, it is said that the human soul must have seen the forms of Truth, because it is necessary that Man should comprehend the meaning of general terms. And in the well-known passage of the Republic, where the highest truth is set over against the highest knowledge, they are both viewed in relation to the mind, which, through intercourse with the Existent, begets Thought and Truth; and the Idea of Good is regarded not only as the transcendent Form of Being \( \iota\pi\kappa\epsilon\iota\varepsilon\nu\alpha\; \tau\iota\varsigma\; \sigma\omicron\sigma\io\varsigma\sigma\iota\sigma\varsigma\varsigma \) but as the crowning study or act of intelligence. A transition is thus made from what at first appears a fanciful ontology towards a true psychology, which in the Theætetus, Sophistes, Philebus, and the seventh book of the Republic, is seen to have made considerable progress in the analysis of mind.

(2) The question of Subjectivity has already led us to distinguish between particular and universal, between the modifications of the individual consciousness and true knowledge, in which these differences are lost. And we have seen that this distinction corresponds nearly to that made by Plato between the transitoriness of Phenomena and the permanence of Being, and, still more closely, to his antithesis of Sensation or Opinion and Science. But the knowledge of universal truths would

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1 \( \text{Μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἰσατὸν ἕτος τῶν νόμων, Parm. 132.} \)
2 \( \text{Theat. 148 D.} \)
3 \( \text{Phaedrus, 249 B.} \)
4 \( \text{Γενετέρας νουν καὶ αλήθειαν, Rep. 6. 490 B.} \)
5 \( \text{Μέγιστον μάθημα, Rep. 6. 505 A; ἐν τῇ γνωστῷ τελευτα, Rep. 7. 517 A.} \)
6 \( \text{See esp. Theat. 185, 186, 189 E, 194; Soph. 261-2; Phileb. 33-43; Rep. 7. 523-4.} \)
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be of less value, if these were not applicable to particular facts. And hence the inductive, generalising process, is followed by one deductive and specialising. But this is not merely a return to the subjective particular from which the mind set out. For a phenomenon seen in relation to other phenomena by the light of general laws, is different from the same phenomenon, when at first presented to the inexperienced and unreflecting sense. Therefore the particular modification of the individual subject is to be distinguished from the true particular, which has objective as well as subjective reality. Now as Plato, in the infancy of Induction and of Moral Science, had a notion of universal knowledge, which he believed in but could only partially realise, through an imperfect method of hypotheses and exclusions—so in the absence of any adequate means of verification, he saw the necessity of connecting the universal forms of knowledge with particular facts. The powerful impulse which he received from the Eleatic philosophy tended to the sublation of all diversities of existence, as well as thought, into a merely abstract Unity. But on the other hand, the method of Socrates, whose generalisations were sifted through examples, and the genius of Plato himself with his manifold affinities to the world, required the Muse of Philosophy to descend from these heights, even into the den if necessary\(^1\), and to hold intercourse again with the objects of sense and with mankind. Plato sometimes speaks, especially in his more imaginative moods, as if he wished to repeat the Eleatic contrast of Being and Phenomena in a new form: as if the real and apparent, the Ideal and the Actual, were separated by an impassable chasm. This way of speaking has become stereotyped in what is called the Platonic theory of ideas, including the doctrine of reminiscence: a theory which, in seeking to account for the knowledge of phenomena, creates new difficulties, which it fails to solve. But in those which Plato probably regarded as his more exact writings, the half-mythical crudities of this hypothesis have disappeared, the necessity as well as the difficulty of reconciling the abstract with the concrete, the Ideal with the Actual, is clearly recognised, and more than one dialogue is chiefly devoted to this task. An approach is made to a new and larger idea of knowledge, not merely as the Universal in which subjective peculiarities are done away, but as the Union of all permanent relations in the contemplation of

\(^1\) Rep. 7. 519.
the mind\(^1\). A change of this kind, especially when made gradually by a writer who often ironically half reveals and half conceals his thought, is apt to expose him to the charge of inconsistency. That Plato, in falling into Mr. Grote's hands, has not escaped this fate, is partly due to those who have hitherto represented the philosopher as a mere transcendentalist. But Mr. Grote sometimes speaks as if knowledge could not comprehend the universal with the particular, as if generalisation and specialisation were incompatible. He says (vol. ii. p. 253): 'It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that nothing can deserve the name of art except what is general—capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed beforehand: then to include in art the special treatment required for the multiplicity of particular cases.' He finds fault with the examples drawn from facts of sense to illustrate knowledge in the Theaetetus\(^2\), and truth and falsehood in the Sophist\(^3\). See also a passage in the chapter on the Politicus (vol. ii. pp. 471–3), where the relative or specialising aspect of Plato's doctrine is very forcibly characterised. We may notice, as affording a point of transition towards the same mode of thought, a passage of the Philebus, where, besides the abstract knowledge of measures, numbers, and forms, the knowledge also of concrete existence is allowed to be necessary for the perfect life 'if a man is to know the way to his own door.' But it is not fair to accuse Plato of returning to the doctrine which he had rejected that 'sense is knowledge,' because he admits that knowledge is related to particulars, any more than it is fair to speak of the argument of the Theaetetus as the rejection of individual reason (vol. i. p. 295). He has not relinquished his belief in the immutable nature of true knowledge. 'Where there is not absolute permanence there can be no reason' is an emphatic statement of the very dialogue which asserts the relativity of the ideas\(^4\). Here we repeat that if Plato holds contradictory opinions, he holds them not alternately, but together. While expatiating on the 'plain of truth,' he speaks of general notions as passing from many sensations to a unity comprehended by reasoning\(^5\). And after describing the happiness of the philoso-

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\(^1\) See esp. Sophist. 259 C; Polit. 72 A, 285 B.

\(^2\) Viz. the facts of a case of assault or robbery. Plato purposely chooses the simplest examples. But when Mr. Grote represents him (vol. ii. p. 383) as saying that to be personally present and look on is 'essential to knowledge or cognition,' there is a qualification suppressed. It should be 'knowledge of a concrete fact.'

\(^3\) 'Theaetetus is sitting—Theaetetus is flying.'

\(^4\) Sophist. 249 C.

\(^5\) Phaedrus, 249 B.
pher who knows nothing of his neighbour but studies the universal nature of man, he speaks of the mind as abstracting and generalising from her impressions. The Phaedrus, as Mr. Grote has observed, combines the extreme of generality with the extreme of specialty. But the special is supposed to be enlightened by the general, and this position, whether tenable or not, is in no sense a return to the mere subjective relativity of Protagoras. The Parmenides, Theætetus, Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus, do, however, show a change or growth in Plato’s theory of knowledge, which may be briefly stated thus. The difficulty of finding a way down from the Ideas to sensible things is clearly stated in the Parmenides, and again touched slightly in the Philebus, where, however, the Ideas are conceived somewhat differently as unities amidst plurality, and knowledge, as we have already noticed, is made to include particulars. The Theætetus presents a similar class of difficulties from the subjective side, arising from the co-existence, not of Being with phenomena, but of Knowledge with sensation and opinion. It is natural to suppose that Plato was led by these difficulties towards the modified view which he has expressed in the Sophistes and Politicus, where the ideas appear as logical wholes, standing in relation to each other, genera comprising species and species individuals under them; where the distinction of absolute and relative, or, in Greek language, of rest and motion, disappears in the notion of a complexity of fixed relations, and universal and particular meet in an all-embracing harmony or law (μέτρον).

APPENDIX D.

εἴδος, ἱδέα.

§ 1. The words εἴδος and ἱδέα are throughout nearly synonymous in Greek, but there is a tendency observable to a difference in their use, perhaps in some way connected with the difference of gender. εἴδος seems earlier to have shaken itself clear of metaphor, and to have settled into an abstract meaning. Thus in Thucyd. 2. 20

1 Theæt. 175–186.
2 The important word μιθέως, ‘participation in the idea,’ occurs only in the Parmenides and Sophistes in Plato. See Ast’s Lectures, n. v.
τὸ ἔδος τῆς νόσου means simply the nature of the disease, but in 2. 21 τοιαύτη ἦν εἰς πᾶν τῷ ἑδῶς, 'was such in its general phenomena.' ἑδῶς calls up a picture, while ἔδος simply designates a class or kind of thing. So πάσα ἑδή...θανάτου, Thuc. 3. 81, is not 'every kind of death,' but 'death in every form.'

§ 2. The word ἔδος occurs frequently in Plato in its ordinary sense. Thus in Theae. 157 C: "Ἀνδρωπον τε τίδενται καὶ λίθον καὶ καθ ἐκαστὸν ζῴον τε καὶ ἔδος, the word is scarcely more abstract than in Herodotus, i. 94: Τὰ...τῶν παιγνιών ἑδή.

A more philosophical application of the same use occurs 181 D, where we have the δῶν ἑδή κυήσεως.

§ 3. But it occurs also in a more abstract sense, which we may possibly be right in attributing to Socrates, as a distinctly logical term. ἔδος then means a class, or species, as that to which particular things are referred, which contains them, and marks them off from others, and which itself answers to their definition. See Theætæus, 148 D: Ταῦτα πολλὰ υδάτα ἐν ἑδές περιλαβέως. 205 D: Εἰς ταῦτα ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβή ἔδος ἐκεῖνη.

§ 4. It may be doubted whether in Plato the word ἔδος ever loses entirely the association of its earliest meaning (in which he frequently employs it) of outward appearance, form. (See Ast, Lex. sub voc.) But as it approaches to its technical use in his philosophy, it tends to regain metaphorically the association of visible shape, which in a literal sense it has cast off. The metaphor is not perfect, however, until the word has been changed to ἑδή. Or if we choose to put it so, ἔδος expresses the general shape and contour of a thing; ἑδή implies also the colour and the whole appearance. ἔδος is a colourless ἑδή. See Theæ. 203 E: "Ἐν τῷ γεγονός ἔδος, ἑδῶς μίαν αὐτῷ αὐτῶν ἡχόν. And there is a real difference underlying the figurative one. For a comparison of passages tends to prove that ἔδος is applied to the universal forms of existence as they are distinct from one another; ἑδή rather as each of them has a unity in itself. Thus in Theæt. 1. c. we have ἐν τῷ γεγονός ἔδος, ἑδῶς μίαν αὐτῷ αὐτῶν ἡχόν, ἔτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων. Again, 204 A: Μία ἑδή εἰς ἐκάστω τῶν συναρμοτῶν στοιχείων γένομέν. Ib. A: "Ἐν τῷ ἔδος ἔτερον τῶν πάνω μερῶν. 205 C: Μία τὸς ἑδή ἀμέριστος συλλάβη ἄν εἶ̣. 205 D: Καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἑδή. Op. 184 D: Εἰς μίαν τῶν ἑδῶν...συντείνει.

It should be noticed, that in the above passages the use of both words is in a transition state, assuming rather the form of an adapt-

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ation of the ordinary use, than of technical phraseology. Plato may perhaps be teaching the doctrine of ideas by example; but he does not avowedly give to the words the ‘second intention’ with which they are used in many passages to express the eternal forms of Being. There is also an intermediate transition noticeable in the use of ἴδεα, from the abstract to the concrete, i.e. it passes, by a kind of synecdoche, from meaning the sum of the attributes to mean that to which they belong. So in Thuc. l. c. πάντα ἴδεα διαίτητος =διάμερος πάντας ἴδεας. And in Theet. 184, 205, μία ἴδεα is used synonymously with ἐν εἴδος, ἴδεαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἡχον. It is more to the purpose, however, to observe generally, that the word εἴδος tends to a use at once more logical (ὅτερον εἴδος, διὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ εἰδή διάφορα, καὶ εἰδή τίμιαν) and more concrete—(the ἴδεα is spoken of as inherent in it): the word ἴδεα to one more metaphysical (σι καὶ ἴδεαν συνορύχτα ἅγει τὰ πολλὰ διεσπαρμένα, μίαν ἴδεαν διὰ πολλῶν πάντη διαισθητὴν λεγών διαισθάνται), more abstract, and at the same time more figurative.

The word ἴδεα is a fair symbol of the union of reason and imagination in Plato.

APPENDIX E.

The Theaetetus and Aristotle.

One chief source of difficulty in the Theaetetus to the modern reader is the imperfect development which it presents of the conception of the Proposition1. In the earlier part, the ever-varying succession of phaenomena, bound up with the ever-varying impressions of sense, are only dimly felt to belong to any Subject. Indeed as the argument proceeds, the unity of that which is the subject of different impressions or qualities is expressly denied. At a further stage, where the question arises, How is false opinion possible? there appears indeed a sort of consciousness that all predication implies a subject (188: οὔτε περὶ τῶν δυτῶν οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό), and that to think is to say to oneself, ‘This is that;’—which first shows itself in the example, ‘I think Theaetetus is Socrates,’ and is afterwards more distinctly expressed where it is said that

1 Συλλογισμός in the Theet. (186) is nearly equivalent to ‘abstraction and generalization.’
thought is the mind's silent discourse. But that which remains unnoticed is the relation of subject to predicate in any proposition. Thus it is assumed that when one predicate is substituted for another (as when, in the propositions, 'Yonder man is Socrates,' or 'Thersites was handsome,' the terms 'Socrates' and 'handsome' have been substituted by mistake for 'Theaetetus' and 'ugly'), this is the same thing as if the terms so confounded were predicated of each other (thus, 'Theaetetus is Socrates,' 'What is ugly is handsome').

The relation between the terms of a proposition where the subject is something immediately perceived by sense, is brought out afterwards by the image of the waxen block; but the same indistinctness still hangs about abstract propositions. The line is not clearly drawn between saying, 'the sum of 7 and 5 is 12,' and saying '12 is 12.'

Lastly, when it is asserted that the combination of names in speech corresponds to the combination of elements in the object of knowledge, we are still left in the dark as to the exact relation between words or things which is implied in either combination.

This confusion between subject and predicate is, in other words, to use Aristotelian language, the confusion of matter with form, and of ἰδέα with ἐνέργεια. The subject is all its predicates ἰδεῖμαι, and is that which, together with the new attribute, becomes ἰδεῖ τι. Thus Καλλίας ἰδεῖνος becomes ἰδεῖνος: hence Callias is in one sense the material part.

It may be said, therefore, that in the earlier philosophy, when the matter changes from one form to its opposite, or from a privative to a positive state, it is lost sight of that the form cannot properly be said to change, and that the matter or subject, as such, remains unchanged, while assuming different forms.

1. It is this aspect of the questions raised in the Theaetetus which is taken up by Aristotle, who follows Plato in pointing out that the views of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet in one. Their views are thus identified and criticised at length in two very similar passages of the Metaphysics (3, 1005 b-1012 b, 10. 1061 b-1063 b), in both of which Aristotle is engaged in defending the principle of contradiction.

The theory of Heraclitus is stated in its most abstract and logical form, 'Everything at once is and is not.' This is at

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1 A close study of this passage (180, 190) will afford convincing proof of the indeterminate state of the science of logic at this time, and the necessity of getting behind Aristotle (if the expression may be permitted) in order to understand Plato.
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first put forward with the qualification, 'Some (i.e. Plato?) think that Heraclitus means this:' but afterwards it is made to figure as the Heraclitean theory, 'adopted by many physical philosophers.' The theory of Protagoras is shown to come to the same thing; for if every man's impression is true, then contradictories are true (and not true) together.

Aristotle does not profess to use direct proof in defence of what he assumes to be self-evident and the basis of all reasoning, but he brings forward a number of indirect arguments, which throw considerable light upon the nature of the question. These are intended for such persons as really feel the difficulty: there are others for whom a more summary method is required (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πείθουσι δεύτερα, οἱ δὲ βλασ' 1). Amongst these arguments there are two which deserve especial notice here, as being of a different kind from any which are to be met with in the dialogue.

(a) 'We will not say that the act of predication must either be or not be something, lest they should accuse us of begging the question; but we will say, that every predicate means something, and that its meaning is one, and not indefinitely various; otherwise language and even thought is destroyed. And to predicate it in this one meaning of a particular subject is either true or false. Hence, "man" and "not man" cannot be truly predicated together of the same subject.'

(b) 'The difference between the same man's impressions at different times regards not the quality, but the subject of it. Sweet and bitter are the same to the sick as to the healthy man: it is the wine that appears to him at one time sweet and at another bitter. The idea of sweet is the same to him in the past, present, and future.'

There are other points in which the discussion is characteristic of Aristotle (as where it is said that the principle of motion rests on a too narrow induction; or that if all creatures having sensation were destroyed, the universe would still exist; or where he points out that the admission of degrees, e.g. 'nearer and farther from the truth,' necessitates a standard of truth to which the approach is made); but the influence of this dialogue and of the discussions (Megarian and Platonic) which preceded and followed it is also very apparent. The following points of coincidence are worth mentioning:—

1 Cp. Hom. II. 2. 188–199: "Ὀντινα μὲν βοσκῷ καὶ ἔχουσιν ἄθρα κυκεῖται, τὸν δὲ ἀγανὸς ἐπέκεισιν ἐρητοῦσαν ψαραστὰς | "Ον δὲ ἄθροι ἐφαπνοὺς ἔφρωσεν | τὸν σχιστὺς ἐλπίζοντες τὸ μύθον.
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(1) It is assumed, as part of the theory, that everything is thus and not-thus (οὐρως καὶ οὐχ οὐρως). But this is nearly the last point to which the principle of motion is reduced in the Theaetetus (183 A B). Aristotle proceeds to infer that everything must be infinite; and this in two ways: first, as 'not-this' means 'everything but this,' it follows that everything must be everything else; and, secondly (with Plat. Theaet. loc. cit.), if οὐρως καὶ οὐχ οὐρως is true, then its contradictory (οὐδ' οὐρως οὐκ οὐχ οὐρως) must also be true; and this, he adds, must go on to infinity. The theory gives an indefinite, that is, a purely negative account of Being (τὰ μὴ εἰναι λέγοντες).

(2) Further, in reference to Protagoras it is shown that, in making all impressions true, he makes them also false,—his own theory amongst the rest.

(3) The Heraclitean or Protagorean philosopher is seen to avoid tumbling into a ditch. It is evident therefore that he acknowledges the distinction between good and bad. Everything then is not equally indifferent. And if there are impressions to which the theory does not apply, so much has been conceded. Or, 'as Plato puts it,' with regard to the future, the physician is a better judge of what will prove wholesome than a chance person.

(4) Aristotle further points out the absolute relativeness of the doctrine. They cannot say, 'What appears, is,' but 'What appears to me, is to me.'

The following scattered touches may be quoted without comment:—

'The theory of Protagoras is called ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀληθεία;'

'My eyes may each receive a different impression from the same thing.'

'The doubt about the criterion of knowledge is like the question whether the waking or the dreaming life is real.'

'Socrates is not a different person for every different attribute.'

'When a pleasant thing appears bitter, this is in consequence of a manifest defect, viz. disease. The one state then (i.e. the healthy one), and not the other, is to be held the measure of things.'

'Language is made impossible.'

'The man thinks thus and not thus: i.e. it is equally true that he is not thinking as that he thinks. He is reduced to the condition of a vegetable.'

(5) Lastly, Aristotle, like Theodorus, remarks upon the difficulty of reasoning with the men, because they will not lay down anything to start with, and allow it to remain firm.

Aristotle’s view may be summarily described by saying that he

1 Καὶ γρηγορεῖ δὴ τὸ Ἀναζαγόρου, ἐρωτὸν πάντα χρηματά. Aristotle thinks that if this argument had been put to Heraclitus himself, he would have been compelled to acknowledge its force.
meets the indefiniteness of the physical and sophistic theories by
asserting the distinction between form and matter and the eternity
of form.

2. But he does not deny that a continual process takes place
between them, or that there is a world in which growth and decay,
generation and corruption, are ever going on, viz. the world of
sensible things, which in Aristotle reasserts its reality, as being
inseparable from the natural forms, and perhaps even from the
relations expressed in mathematics.

This is not the place for the discussion of Aristotle's theory
of becoming. It is enough to notice (1) that he adopts from
the early philosophers, whom he classes together as upholding
the material cause, on the one hand the dualism, and on the other the
indeterminateness of matter (Phys. Ausc. 1), and points out that
therefore it can only be the object of knowledge 'by analogy,'
with reference to the form. And (2) his conception of sensation
as a realization of mental life is very similar to that expressed
in Theaetetus and Timeus. The ἐνέργεια αἰσθησις, which is
inseparable from the ἐνέργεια αἰσθητοῦ, is the meeting point of active
and passive elements in motion. (In modern language it is a pro-
cess between object and subject.) But the ἰστοσοια or mental
image, which accompanies sensation but is separable from it in
thought, in the Theaetetus is merged in sensation, although the
term as here used is simply the noun of φαινομα (ἰστοσοια ἡρα καὶ
αἰσθητοῦ ταῦτα), but is clearly distinguished from it by Aristotle.
The distinction is made the ground of an argument for the pos-
sibility of error.

3. The same distinction between matter and form is also applied
to the solution of the doubt, whether the complex whole is one or
many, e.g. whether the syllable is all the letters combined, or
something above and beyond them. Aristotle shows that neither

1 (Met. 1. 1010 b: Ὡδ' ἡ αἰσθησις where the ἰστοσοια is false the δόξα
φεύγει τοῦ ἄλογον ἄλλῃ ἡ ἰστοσοια may be true. De Somn. 3. Cp. de
ἢ ταῦτα τῇ αἰσθησις.) Again, even An. 3. 3.

The difference between Aristotle and Plato (in this dialogue), on this point
of psychology, may be illustrated by the following tabular view:—

Aristotle thus traces the gradual Plato distinguishes
ascent of the human mind from ἰστοσοια
sense to knowledge: from μὴν
7. σοφία. μὴν
6. ἰστοσοια. These two are in { δόξα }
5. τέχνη. accompanied by { αἴσθησις. } ἰστοσοια.
4. ἐφεισία. some cases inseparable. { αἴσθησις. }
3. μὴν.
2. ἰστοσοια.
1. αἴσθησις.
the parts nor their arrangement can create the form of the whole: much rather it is this mould which determines the arrangement of the parts. It is prior to them, and is eternal and uncreated. They affect the nature of the compound thing only by being capable of receiving a certain form.

At this point Plato (in the Theætetus) and Aristotle seem almost to touch one another, except that in Aristotle the conception of the end (τὸ ἐν ἔννοια) is bound up with that of the form.

As the tendency in the Theætetus is to rise from the ordinary notion of an element to that of elementary Ideas, so Aristotle points out that the universal is in one sense an element: (i.e. logically.) (Met. 4. 1014 b.)

4. Among the germs which the Theætetus (like most of Plato's dialogues) contains of Aristotelian formulae, the most remarkable is the distinction between possessing and having Knowledge, which obviously corresponds to Aristotle's distinction between Knowing and Contemplating (ἐπισταμένος, θεωρών),—his favourite illustration of the difference between possession and use, or between a potential and an actual state. No such general application is made of it by Plato. The notion enters into the Theætetus only as a last ineffectual attempt to reconcile the existence of Knowledge with the possibility of error, and it is expressed through an imaginary symbol. But the distinction latent in the image—between the potential and the actual—is the same by which Aristotle afterwards solved this and other difficulties, if not finally, yet with admirable completeness.

APPENDIX F.

Platonic Idioms in the Theætetus.

Ἀλλ' οὗ πρῶτον γε, άμα, θεώτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν δὲ ἡ σμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σμοτήτων ἀν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορον τι μημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημανμένη καταθήκα, Theæt. 209 C.

The words of Socrates, it is said in the Euthyphro (11 B, 15 B), are like the words of Dædalus; they are endued with motion. This image expresses the most characteristic peculiarity of Plato's style, the source of much both of its beauty and of its difficulty. His thoughts are not fixed and dead, like specimens in a museum.
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or cabinet, but flying as he pursues them, doubling, hiding, re-
appearing, soaring aloft, and changing colour with every change of
light and aspect.

The reader of the Theaetetus, for example, is disappointed, if he
looks for perfect consistency with the Republic, or if he expects to
find the logical statement of a definite theory. The ground is
shifted several times. One line of inquiry is abandoned, and yet
the argument presently returns from a new starting-point upon the
former track. A position is assumed and then relinquished;—the
figures are erased,—and yet the subsequent discussion is not without
reference to the hypothesis which has been demolished. The doc-
trine of sense, for instance, is wholly negativ, and yet it cannot
be said that we are not intended to gather something from it.

Plato's metaphors are 'living creatures' rather than figures of
speech; he regards them not as airy nothings, but as realities; he
recurs to them with fondness, as Lord Bacon does. But no ex-
pression is ever merely repeated in Plato. If an image is recalled,
it is with some additional or altered feature: if a conception is
resumed, it is not merely copied, but a fresh picture is drawn from
the life. Even in recapitulating, some modification is often made,
or the argument is carried further. Thus the photograph, as it has
been called, of the connection is apt to be blurred, from the thought
moving as we read. Even in the same passage, where an ordinary
writer would be contented with referring to an example or illus-
tration just adduced, Plato surprises the reader with a different one,
which perhaps gives a new direction to the current of thought.
A fair instance of this occurs in Theæt. 169 A, where Theodorus
says: 'It was mere nonsense in me to hope that you would excuse
me and not compel me to strip for the contest, as the Lacedæ-
monians do. You are rather to be compared to Sciron: for they
tell one either to strip or go away; but you are rather like Antæus
in your way of doing business, for you will let no man go till you
have stripped him (like Sciron) and compelled him to wrestle with
you (like Antæus).'

The argument itself (δ λέγος) is continually personified and is
spoken of under a Protean variety of figures.

It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who
runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away
'like a tale.' More frequently it has power over us, like a General
commanding us, like a sea in which we must swim for our lives,
while it rolls its successive waves over us, like a wind which car-
ries us we know not whither. Sometimes 'its name is legion,' and
it is multiplied into a swarm or an impetuous throng. Or it takes
a milder form, as the raft, or dolphin, on which we seek to escape
from a sea of doubt, or the wall behind which we screen ourselves
from the driving shower. The Argument talks with us, it goes
through a subject, takes up a position, hides its face from some
threatening objection and passes on. It rebukes us for unfair
 treatment of itself, it can be insulted, it stands in need of help,
it has a father, and guardians of its orphanhood.

This movement or plasticity of ideas, which penetrates the whole
of Plato's writings, is closely connected with their conversational
form, and manifests itself in what may be called his poetical use of
language.

The observation of both these elements of Plato's style is of im-
portance to the student, because it saves him from the necessity of
resorting to some forced construction, or flying to conjecture, upon
each occasion of grammatical perplexity.

I. Conversationalisms. In Plato we often meet with irregularities
of construction, which in an oration or set treatise would be referred
to looseness or inelegance of diction, but which only make the dia-
logue more easy and lively and natural.

a. Changes of construction. The following are a few out of
several instances in the Theaetetus:—

(1) 144 A: Το γὰρ εὐμαθῆ δύνα... πρὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι... ἔγω μὲν οὖν
ἀν φῶς γενέσθαι οὖν ὁρᾶ γεγομένους. Theodorus begins by
simply expressing his surprise, but proceeds to dwell upon
his previous anticipations and experience to account for it.

(2) 153 B: Η δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔζει... κατὰ τε μαθήματα, κ.τ.λ. Σφ.
173 D: Σπουδαί δ' ἔταιρεῖων ἐν' ἀρχάς... οὖν δ' ἔναρ πράττειν
προσίστασιν αὐτοῖς.

The emphasis on the first words causes the sentence to begin
vaguely, and the construction is determined as it proceeds.

(3) 167 B: Πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔζει δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς.

Here, unless something is corrupt, a transition is made to the
reflexive pronoun, as if ψυχῆ were the subject of δοξάζοντας: a transi-
tion from the persons who think to the mind which thinks.

(4) 172 B: ὁν κἂν τολμήσει φήσαι (ὁ λόγος)... ἐθέλουν
λογοφιλέσθαι. He passes from what the argument would say,
to what certain persons do say. So elsewhere there is often
a transition from the indefinite singular to the indefinite
plural.

To this may be added the occasionally difficult use of the cases of
nouns: e.g. Theaet. 147 C: Ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πηλοῦ ἔρωτής, without peri:
just as we might say in conversation, 'the mud-question,' for 'the question about the mud.'

\(\beta\). Resumption. A thought is frequently resumed in the same sentence, for the sake of modifying it, or of particularizing the aspect in which it is considered, or merely for the sake of clearness. The introduction of the pronoun αὐτός, to recall a noun which has been thrown back for the sake of emphasis, is a familiar instance of this.

E.g. 155 D: Ἐὰν σοι ἀνθρώπων... τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν... συν-εξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν;

Perhaps the most marked instance of resumption in the Theaetetus occurs 171 B: Μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκεῖνον ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τάπινῳ λέγωμεν ἐνεχθή αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸν συγκωρήσεται.

\(\gamma\). Redundancy. There are other ways in which regularity of construction is sacrificed to fulness of expression.

E.g. 153 C: Ἐστι οὖν σοι λέγω ἀναμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ δοσα-τιτία, ὅτι αὐτὲ μὲν ἰσχύει σήπονοι καὶ ἀπολλύσαι, τὰ δ’ ἔτερα σώζει.

172 D: Τούτω λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολὴς ποιοῦνται, ὅσπερ ἡμεῖς δὲν τρίτων ἢδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεινον, ἢν αὐτοὺς ἡ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἥμας, ἀρέσθη.

199 B: Μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦτον οἷον τε, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρων ἀντ’ ἐκείσης, ὅταν... ἀνθ’ ἐτέρως ἐτέρων ὁμαρτών λάβῃ, ὅτε ἄρα τὰ ἐν-δεκα δώδεκα ὑφήθη εἶναί, τὴν τῶν ἐνδεκα ἐπιστήμην αὐτὴ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβών, τὴν ἐν ἐναυτῷ οἷον φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.

An occasional consequence of this fulness of expression is the deferred apodosis, which sometimes occurs, especially after ὅσπερ: e.g. Rep. 3. 402 B: Ὅσπερ ἄρα... Ὅροι σοι, ὅ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως, κ.τ.λ. Theaet. 207 A: Ὅσπερ ἄν... οὕτω τοῖς, κ.τ.λ.

\(\delta\). Also connected with the conversational form of Plato’s writings, and the plastic, growing condition of his thoughts, is the imperfect kind of argument which he sometimes employs. It is a saying of Aristotle’s that Dialectic deals tentatively with those subjects on which Philosophy dogmatizes (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ περιστατική περὶ ὑπὸ ἡν ὁ πρὸς ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριμία); and Bacon speaks of a Socratic induction. To this, and to a certain economy used towards the respondent, is to be attributed the frequency of the argument from example (the example often covering more ground than is quite fair), and of the inference, by means of simple conversion, from particular to universal.
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The immaturity of the science of logic no doubt renders this mode of reasoning more easy and natural than it could be in a later age, but it is not explained without allowing for the fact that the inquiry is conducted, at least on the part of the respondent, in a tentative and inductive spirit.

An instance occurs in the Theætetus, 159 A, when it is argued that if what is different is dissimilar, then whatever is dissimilar is wholly different, and what is similar is the same. That Plato was fully aware of the inconclusiveness of the form of argument thus ironically adopted, appears from Protag. 350 C, where Socrates is checked for it by Protagoras, who says, "Ἐγώγε ἐρωτηθείς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι θαρραλεῖοι εἰσίν, ἠμαλόγησεν εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλεῖοι ἄνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήσθην εἰ γὰρ μὲ τοὺς ἦσον, εἴπον ὅτι οὐ πάντες.

And sometimes, even where an instance is really meant to cover a large conclusion, its power is ostensibly limited with persuasive modesty: as in Theæt. 152 C: Φαντασία ἁρα καὶ ἀσθητος ταῦταν ἐν τε θερμῶι καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις... Ἀσθητος ἁρα τοῦ ἄντος ἀεὶ ἐστι.

Πb. 204 D: Ταῦταν ἁρα ἐν γε τοῖς δοσα ἕξ ἄριθμοι ἐστι, τὸ τε πᾶν προσαγαρφεύοιμεν καὶ τὰ ἄπαντα.

ε. It is difficult to separate between the conversational and the poetical element in Plato. Their combination gives him the power of 'saying anything.' Just as there is a freedom of expression possible in conversation, which we feel to be impossible in writing, or as the poet can express with grace and dignity what by other lips were better left unsaid.

II. This leads us to the Poetical use of language. Plato's words have frequently a different value from any that could be given them by a mere prose writer. The language as well as the thought is instinct with a creative power, which gives it a dramatic vividness and refinement; at times even a dithyrambic cadence, or a lyrical intensity. The poet whom Plato most resembles in this is Sophocles; but his style may be regarded as the mirror of all Greek literature.

a. Poetical use of single words.

(1) Choice of a more sensuous expression (πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν).

150 D: Ἐναργεὶς ἐστίν ὅτι γὰρ δήλον ὅτι ('as clear as day').
155 A: Ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα.
156 B: Συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη.
160 D: Μὴ πταιῶν τῇ διανοίᾳ.
162 A: Διωλόγου φλυαρία.
165 B: Σφαλέος γὰρ ἢττων ἀποχμουησε.
169 B: Μαλ’ τ’ εὐγενεκτίφασιν.
171 D: Ταῦτη δὲ ὑποτιθα τὸν λόγον.
172 E: Ἄναγχην έχον ὁ ἀντίδεκος (wielding coercion).
202 A: Ταῦτα . . . περιτρέχοντα πάσι προσφέρεσθαι.
To which may be added the ‘hypocoristic’ use of diminutives.
149 C: Φαρμάκια.
195 A: Ἐάν του συμμετρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον.
(2) Use of Epic words, the meaning of which is sometimes spiritualized.
149 A: Μαλα γενναίας καλ βλασφήμα.
162 E: "Αξίου ὀδ’ ἐνε μούνον.
174 D: Πολὺ βδάλλοντα.
189 E: Τούτο γάρ μοι ἤδη σαλλεῖ διανοοῦμεν.
194 E: "Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιον τοῦ τὸ κέαρ ἢ.
(3) Playing upon a word.
150 C: Εὐρημα. (Cp. Soph. ÓEd. Tyr. 1108.)
152 A: Τὴν αὐλήτειαν.
181 C: Τοὺς βίοτας.
194 C: τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ.
208 B: Ἀληθιστατων ἐπιστημῆς λόγον.
Closely related to this is (4) the etymological use of words: i.e. when, by dwelling upon its etymology, a word is made to express something different from, or more than, its ordinary meaning.
149 B: "Οτι αἶλος ωσα τὴν λοχεῖαν ἐληπεν.
152 E: (perhaps) ξυμφερέως (let them march one way).
160 E: τὸ δμιφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιβρεχτών.
193 C: Ὀστερ οὶ ἵπποι ὑποδούμεναι παραλλάξας.
198 D: Πρόχειρον τ’ οὐκ εἶξε τῇ διανοίᾳ.
(5) Poetical use of particles: e.g. the frequent use of ἀρα, helping to keep up the idea that Socrates is repeating what he has heard, the occasionally difficult reference with γάρ (152 C: ὁτα γάρ, and note), the hyperbaton of καί (154 E: Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγεν), and generally the dramatic liveliness with which successive clauses are contrasted, as if each were put into the mouth of a different person.
Speech thus becomes literally a ‘self-dialogue.’ See especially 155 B: 'Ο μὴ πρότερον ἤν, ἀλλὰ ὑστερον τοῦτο εἶναι (!) and 190 B: "Οτι παντὸς κακὸν . . ὃς παντὸς κακὸν . . ὃς παντάπασιν ἢρα . . ὃς ἀνάγκη . . , with which the supposed answers of the mind to itself are introduced.
Compare Phil. 38 C: Τί ποτε ἢρα ἐστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ’ ἐστιναι φανταζόμενον ὑπὸ τινι δέντροι.
β. The same poetical energy shows itself in the
some of the ordinary forms of grammar. In this also Plato reflects the general tendency of the Greek language.

(1) Apposition. The use of the apposition of clauses (as a form of exegesis) deserves to be reckoned among the more striking peculiarities of Plato's style. One example from the Theaetetus will suffice to indicate what is meant.

175 D: Πάλιν αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναφοράτα ἀποδίδοντα... λέγγαν τε ἀφ’ υψηλοῦ κρυστάλλου... ἀπορών τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων... γέλαστα... παρέχεται, κ.τ.λ., where another writer would probably have inserted γάρ. (Cp. Lach. 182 B.)

Sometimes a sentence is thus placed in apposition with a pronoun such as τοῦτο (189 E ad fin.) or ὅ (158 B). Compare the use of τὸ δὲ, e.g. 157 E. A slightly different use is that of the accusative in apposition to the sentence. Instances of this are 153 C: Ἐπὶ τοῦτοι τῶν κολοφώνων, κ.τ.λ.; 160 E: Ἡ άμφιθρομία αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ. (Many of the examples of resumption and redundancy above referred to would fall grammatically under this head.)

(2) Attraction. E.g. where a main verb was to be expected, we find a participle. It can be accounted for; but there is reason to believe that it is partly due to the neighbourhood of another participle, or of some word that is usually construed with a participle.

173 B: Τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλεις διέλθωτες ἡ ἐδάκτας πᾶλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τριπόλεμος; where we should have expected διέλθωμεν.

150 D: Ὡς μὲν πρῶτον φαινομένα... καὶ πάνω ἁμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προοίμησε τῆς συνοικίας... βαμμαστῶν διὸν ἐπιθύμωσε, ὥς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι: where, but for the proximity of ὥς... ἐπιθυμώσετε would probably have been ἐπιθυμήσατε. See also λαβῶν, 199 B, which but for ὅταν... λάβῃ would be λαβώσατα.

γ. To the same self-consciousness of language which betrays itself in the foregoing instances may be attributed the minuteness of anti-thesis, which, though common everywhere in Greek, is strikingly so in Plato.

150 E: Ἕρωι δὲ καταφρονῶσας, ἡ αὐτοὶ ἐν' ἄλλων πεισθέντας (?). 197 C: Εἶ δυνατῶν αὐτῶν κεκτημένοις μὴ ἔχειν, ἄλλ' ὁστερ, κ.τ.λ.

δ. This power of refining upon language is turned to account in adapting the mode of expression to the exigencies of the argument. E.g. 152 B, where we are gradually led from the example of the wind, which one man feels cold, and another not, to the position that sensation is the correlative of reality. See also 158 E, 159 B, where, as the argument proceeds, (ἐτερον) ἂν τουτό ἄλφ ἐκείνη is substituted for ἄλος ἐτερον.
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The care which is taken of the rhythm is a further peculiarity of Plato's style, and may be treated as a poetical element. This is especially noticeable (1) in the manner in which quotations from poetry are shaded off so as to harmonize with the surrounding prose, and (2) in the occasional elaboration of prose writing to something like a metrical cadence.

(1) 173 E. In the quotation from Pindar, φέρειαι is probably substituted for πέρειαι (see note on the passage), the words ῥά ἐκ-πεδα γεωμετρουσα are inserted, and τῶν δύο ἐκάστου διου is added at the close. Thus the poetical language is interwoven with the sentence, so as to embellish it without interrupting its harmony.

194 C. The substitution of the (early) Attic κύρως for the Homeric κυριως is probably due to a similar motive.

(2) Dithyrambic and lyric cadences are more frequent in some other dialogues than in the Theaetetus. See especially Symposium, 196, 197, the close of Agathon's speech, especially the last few lines, in which the rhetorical antitheses have more the effect of rhythm than of argument: Phædr. 238, 241, alibi; Rep. 8. 546, 7; 10. 617, 18; and several places of the Timæus, e.g. 47 B: ἦν ὁ μηθήμορος τυφλοθῆκε ἐδυράμενος ἔν θρηνοι μάθη. With such passages may be compared Theaet. 176 A: οὐδὲ γ' ἀρμονίαν λόγων λαβώντος ὀρθῶν ὑμνησαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐνδαμώνων βλου ἀληθῆ.

The same power shows itself more slightly in an occasional inversion of the order of words for the sake of emphasis.

158 B: οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν εἰσανται εἶναι.

160 D: Κατὰ δὲ Προταγόραν τὸν συνόφαστον πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρωπον μέτρων εἶναι.

A few words may be added in conclusion on the artificial structure of Plato's dialogues, of which the Theaetetus is acknowledged to be a prominent example.

There is a unity in each of them, approaching to that of a living organism:—the spirit of the whole breathing in every part:—a continuity independent of the links of question and answer, by which it appears to be sustained; which may be viewed apart from the scenery and the changes of persons, and the passages of humour and pleasantry by which it seems to be interrupted.

And while it is comparatively easy to distinguish the principal stages of the argument, yet there is such a dovetailing and interpenetration of the parts, that it is difficult to adopt an exact division without doing violence to the real harmony, or even to find the exact point of transition from one hypothesis to another.

An instance of this is the way in which the read...
for the argument from the idea of expediency, which may be said to be anticipated as early as 157 D: Ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν. (Compare the anticipation, at the very beginning of the dialogue, 144 E: Ἐπειδὴ ἴσως ἔνε ἡ τιμία ἡ ὁμοιοῦντα, of the conclusion arrived at 179 B: Ἀριστείαν τε ἄλλον ἄλλοιν εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.) The difficulty of reconciling the ideas of goodness and wisdom with the doctrine of sense appears more distinctly in the defence of Protagoras, 167 Α, and presses for solution as an element of the common opinion of men, 170 Α: Καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγίστους καθίσμοις . . . παρὰ σφαῖραν.

These two passages have prepared the way for the statement in 171, 2, of the ‘semi-Protagoreanism’ of those who will not venture to say that every creature knows what is for its own health, nor that every individual and every state knows equally what is expedient in legislation. When a breach has thus been made in the enemy’s lines of defence, a rest is afforded to the reader by the vision of the Divine Life which follows, in which, however, the ideas of wisdom and holiness and righteousness have a direct bearing upon the conclusion towards which we are being carried step by step, and its effect upon the tone of the discussion is apparent in the words 177 D: Πλὴν εἰ τις τὸ άνωμα λέγοι τούτο δὲ ποιεῖν σκόμμι ἀν εἴη πρὸς δ λέγομεν οὐχὶ; κ.τ.λ. At this point the argument from Expediency is fully entered into. But it is difficult to say exactly where it began.

A similar gradation may be observed in the development of the difficulty about false opinion.

Note also the artfulness of the transition from sensation to thought, 184–187, and from ‘true opinion’ to ‘true opinion giving an account of itself,’ 201.

And while the earlier part is written with a view to what is in reserve, the previous discussion is not forgotten as the inquiry proceeds. See 194 D: Ἐν δὲ ἠδύν καλεῖται, compared with 152 D: Ἀ δὲ φαίνει εἶναι, οὐκ ὑφθαλὲς; and 209 C: Μνημεῖον παρ’ ἐμοὶ ἑσπερομενόν καταθήσαται,—an application of the (relinquished) conception of the waxen block.

Plato’s philosophy has been compared to a building, of which the Republic is the superstructure, while the other dialogues are the pillars and fretted vaults upon which it rests.

The image fails to give an adequate idea of the perfection of Art,—or rather of Nature conscious of itself,—which gives harmony, but not regularity, a growing, not a fixed, consistency, both to its parts and to the whole.
His writings are the creations of a great master, whose sketches are worked up into the larger monuments of his genius, a cycle surrounding an eternal Epic poem, bound together by the unity not merely of a particular age and country, but of an individual mind.

*Ω θαυμάσσε, ὧ δαμόν, ὧ ἔταψ, ὧ μέλε.

These and the like phrases are apt to be slurred over in translating or interpreting Plato, from the frequency of their recurrence and the difficulty of appreciating their exact force in each connection. They belong to that conversational sprightliness and play of fancy which it is impossible to bind to any rule.

Here, as elsewhere, Plato carries further an existing tendency of the Greek language. Such addresses as δαμόν, δαμόν, ἢδεσ, in Homer (Π. 6. 407, 486, 518, 521; cp. Plat. Rep. 344 D, ὧ δαμόν ἔρασομαι) vary in signification according to the mood of the speaker. The same may be said of ὧ δαμόν, ὧ μέλε, in Aristophanes.

In Plato the variety of such addresses is much greater, and the variety of their meaning greater still. They can often be more perfectly rendered by a changed expression of the voice or countenance, than by any words. All that can be said of them generally is, that they give an increased intensity to the tone of the conversation at the moment, whether this be grave or humorous, respectful, ironical or familiar.

ὁ θαυμάσσε in its simplest use conveys a remonstrance, 'I wonder at you.' The most decided instance is in the Phaedo, 117 D: ὁτι, ἐφι, ποιεῖτε, ὧ θαυμάσσει. 'What are you doing! I am amazed at you.' It may also sometimes convey admiration. But it is frequently used where the subject of wonder or surprise has nothing to do with the person addressed: e.g. Cratyl. 439 C, where it indicates Socrates' intense interest in the mystery of the Ideas. Compare the use of the form of congratulation ὧ μακάρε (see Aristoph. Nub. 167) to express Socrates' own delight at some great discovery: e.g. Rep. 432 D, where Justice is discovered; Phaed. 69 A, where Socrates congratulates himself as well as Simmias on the superiority of the philosophic life.—In Theest. 151 C, ὧ θαυμάσσε can hardly be rendered except by a note of admittance: Do you know that many have been ready to bite me!
Nearly the same is true of δαμάωνε, 180 B, though it here retains a slight tone of remonstrance. 'Disciples, my good sir!' 'Disciples, did you say?' While in 172 C it wears quite a different expression, conveying Socrates' genuine admiration for the philosophic life, and is more difficult to render. 'Ah! my good friend, this is not the first time I have observed how natural it is that a philosopher should make a poor figure at the bar!'

The affectionate confidence and familiarity expressed in δ ἐταίρε, δ φίλε, δ φίλε ἐταίρε, acquires, in δ μέλε, a degree of humorous or triumphant gaiety. Theæt. 178 E: Νὴ Δία, δ μέλε, 'My dear fellow! I should rather think he did.'

The use of quaint adjurations and addresses in Shakspeare affords an interesting illustration of this feature of Plato's style. For example, when Hamlet says, 'O good Horatio, I'll take the ghost's word for a thousand pound,' the address is prompted not this time by Horatio's worth, but by the relief caused to his own mind by the discovery of the king's guilt.

THE END.
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