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THE

MENO OF PLATO

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND EXCUŞUSES

BY

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ΘΗΣΕΥΣ
δὲ πόλει ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀνθρώποι μάτην,
tί δὴ τέχνας μὲν μυρίας διδάσκετε
καὶ πάντα μηχανάσθε κἀξευρίσκετε,
ἐν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιστασθ' οὐδ' ἐθηράσασθ' πω,
φρονεῖν διδάσκειν οἶσιν οὐκ ἔνεστι νοῦς;

ΠΠΟΛΥΤΟΣ
δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας, δότις εὖ φρονεῖν
τοὺς μὴ φρονοῦντας δυνατός ἐστὶν ἀναγκάσαι.

ΕὐΡΙΠΙΔΗΣ.
PREFACE

This book might possibly have been better if less time had been spent over it. Worked at with interruptions during a period of more than twelve years it is at last, I fear, something of a farrago. I have done my best to put myself on a level with the times in regard to the study of Plato; but I cannot pretend to have assimilated all the results of foreign scholarship; at the same time silence with regard to a work must not always be taken as implying ignorance of it. I have found Fritzsche’s recension of Stallbaum an admirable sub-structure for work on the dialogue. But it is to scholars of my own country that I have to express the greatest obligations. The number of references to the work of Dr. W. H. Thompson, Professor Campbell, R. D. Archer-Hind and J. Adam, will show how much I have derived from them. Above all I cannot
over-estimate my debt to Dr. Henry Jackson as a great pioneer in true methods of investigation in Ancient Philosophy. If I had ventured to dedicate this work to any one, it is certainly his name that I should have wished to prefix to it.

My sincere thanks are due to my friend H. Rackham, Classical Tutor of Christ's College, Cambridge, for looking through the proof-sheets, and offering many useful suggestions.

The greater part of the work I have done alone, and I have not availed myself of the counsel of friends so fully as doubtless I might have done with profit. One who attempts to interpret Plato may fairly ask to be judged in the spirit of the words: πάντα ἀνδρα χρὴ ἀγα-πᾶν, δοσις καὶ ὀτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξίων διαπονεῖται.

EWHURST, September 21, 1900.
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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. In the history of Greek philosophy we may recognize three main stages. The earliest of these may be called the Poetical. Early speculation was aroused by Wonder; it was but to a small extent self-critical, and there was occasionally present in its expounders—as is likely to be the case with those conscious of some superiority among primitive peoples—a vein of charlatanry. Even its literary form was in some cases (as with Parmenides and Empedocles) poetical; when it was clothed in prose, this sometimes had a prophetic tinge, as in the ‘dark sayings’ of Heraclitus.

This was the childhood of philosophy. Then came the time of adolescence, the period of questioning. Among the influences that led in the new phase we recognize as distinctly the most important the figure of Socrates. But that we must not assign to Socrates the undivided responsibility for the transition, is obvious enough. If we knew more about Zeno of Elea we should probably see more clearly than we do how important was the part he played. As it is, Grote (196) is certainly right in naming him with Socrates
as the great agencies in bringing about the transition to the second, or Dialectic, stage of Philosophy. (Cp. the phrases from Aristotle's *Metaph.* which Grote there quotes: Α. νε 7 = 987 b 32 οἱ γὰρ πρῶτερον διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον, Μ. πιν 4 = 1078 b 25 διαλεκτικὴ γὰρ ἰσχὺς οὖ τὸτ' ἤν. Diog. L. ix 25 quotes Aristotle as saying that Zeno was 'the discoverer of dialectic.' As to the term διαλεκτικὴ he says it was introduced by Plato, iii 24.)

The third stage is the Expository. A thinker having succeeded in framing a system that satisfies him, assuming the attitude of a teacher propounds it in a consecutive treatise. This stage really commences with its greatest representative, Aristotle. But the surpassing interest of Plato lies in the fact that in him we have the bridge from the second stage to the third. Beginning as critic and investigator, he ends as an expositor.

§ 2. The form of Plato's compositions—the dialogue—is the natural outcome of his place in the history of philosophy (Zeller p. 153 foll.; Grote i 239 foll.). One great characteristic of it is its elasticity. It ranges from a vivid reflexion of Socratic converse, with constant inquiry and criticism, chiefly in the earlier dialogues, to a thin, though not altogether purposeless, veil of consecutive exposition in the later. Plato was not indeed the inventor of this form: Diog. L. iii 47, 8 says that some attribute the introduction of it to Zeno of Elea; but that Aristotle awards it to a certain Alexamenus, of whom we know nothing. He sensibly adds, however, δοκεῖ δὲ μοι Πλάτων, ἀκριβῶς τὸ εἴδος, καὶ τὰ πρῶτα δικαίως ἂν ὄσπερ τοῦ κάλλους
oὐτω τὴς εὑρέσεως ἀποφέρεσθαι. Contrast the spiteful denial of Plato's priority in Ath. xi 505 c.

There are obviously two forms in which a dialogue may be written. Either the words uttered may be set down, the several speakers being merely indicated; or the whole dialogue may be reported by one of the interlocutors, or some one present. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. The method of reporting involves the wearisome repetition 'said I' and 'said he,' which induced Plato to abandon it in the Theaetetus (see 143 c). On the other hand the direct method precluded to a Greek anything like 'stage-directions' or comment. This no doubt was the consideration that led Plato to prefer the other in the Republic. But for this we should not have known, for instance, that at 350 d Thrasymachus blushed. Nowhere do we get the ηθος of Socrates impressed upon us more strongly than in the dialogues where, as in the Republic and Protagoras, he reports his own conversations (see Zeller, 109, 110).

The Meno, in which the accessory furniture is very simple, is written in the direct form. Consequently we do not know, and can only conjecture, at what point Anytus joins the party (see on 89 E 34). On the other hand much adroitness is shown by the way in which the actual words of the speakers illustrate the circumstances of the dialogue. For instance, Socrates' first answer serves as an introduction to the person Meno.

§ 3. The persons of the dialogue are four, Socrates, Meno, Anytus and the Slave.

The personality of Socrates is brought before us
remarkably vividly. We have indications of his irony (71 C 19 οὐ πάντα εἰμὶ μυήμων, 96 D 22 κινδυνεύομεν, ὁ Μένων, ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ φαύλοι τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σὲ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος), his unfailing good temper and courtesy (79 A 5 εἴτα, ὁ Μένων, παῖς πρὸς με, 86 D 10 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἠρχον κτὲ., 95 A 5 ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ἕαν ποτε γνῷ, οὗν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων κτέ.), his erotic tendencies (76 C 15): Meno's simile of the νάρκη 80 A not only strongly brings before us the effect of Socrates' discourse, but gives us a glimpse of Socrates' personal appearance.

§ 4. Meno is a Thessalian, young, rich, and well-born. At the time when the Meno was written Thessaly was looked upon as semi-barbarous. 'The abundance of corn and cattle from the neighbouring plains sustained in these cities a numerous population, and above all a proud and disorderly noblesse, whose manners bore much resemblance to those of the heroic times. They were violent in their behaviour, eager in armed feud, but unaccustomed to political discussion or compromise; faithless as to obligations, yet at the same time generous in their hospitalities, and much given to the enjoyments of the table' (Grote Hist. of Greece Part ii. ch. 3, cp. Liv. xxxiv. 51). It is to Thessaly that Crito, in the dialogue called after him, 45 c, proposes to smuggle away Socrates out of prison. Subsequently (53 d foll.) the Laws, in their imaginary speech, tell Socrates to what a disorderly place he will go if he accepts the invitation—ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείωσιν ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία—and how the gentle- men there, far from being shocked at his breaking
prison, will laugh at the story of his undignified escape. Compare Xen. Mem. i ii 24 καὶ Κριτίας ὑπὲρ καὶ Ἀλκυβιάδης, ἓσε μὲν Σωκράτει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθην ἐκεῖνῳ χρωμένῳ συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμῶν κρατεῖν· ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαχθέντε, Κριτίας μὲν φυγὼν εἰς Θέσπαλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώπως ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἤ δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένου.

Some ten years after the probable date of the composition of the *Meno* Thessaly assumed a prominence in Grecian affairs such as it had never enjoyed before. It was in the year 374 B.C. that Polydamas of Pharsalus came to Sparta asking help against Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly. Under Jason there was a brief chance that Thessaly might play in regard to Greece a part similar to that played later by Macedon under Philip. But at the time of *Meno*’s assumed visit to Athens—about 402 B.C.—there was no thought of this. As late as 382 B.C. the Spartans passed through Thessaly on their way against Olynthus without let or hindrance. *Meno* in Athens is something like a Russian prince in Paris during the eighteenth century.

A short disquisition on the life of *Meno*, by Gedike, is prefixed to Buttmann’s edition. Fritzscbe in his prolegomena, pp. 24 foll., has given a very thorough treatment of the subject. *Meno*’s father’s name was Alexidemus (76 Ε 47). His town was probably Pharsalus, the town of Polydamas, the most luxurious town in Thessaly according to Theopompus (see on 70 Β 7). Diog. L. ii 50 calls *Meno* Φαρόαλιος, whereas Diodorus xiv 19 calls him Λαρισαῖος. It is hard to see what can have made Diogenes call him a
‘Pharsalian’ except a true tradition; on the other hand Diodorus may easily have been led into his statement by a careless inference from 70 B 7. On this Fritzscbe well remarks ‘immo potius cum Socrates dicat oi τοῦ σοῦ ἄθαίρον Ἄριστιππον πολίται (Larisaei), verisimilium est Menonem ipsum non fuisset Larisaeum.’ (The fact that Λαρισαίον in our text there is probably spurious, makes no difference, as it is otherwise known that Aristippus was a Larisaean.)

It is probable then that our Meno belonged to the same family as the Meno of Pharsalus, who in the year 476 B.C. when Cimon was besieging Eion aided him with twelve talents and 300 horsemen, his own retainers. For this the Athenians granted him the citizenship, as we read in Demosthenes Aristocr. (23) 199. (The author of the compilation περὶ συντάξεως († Dem. (13) 23) diminishes these statements; Meno found 200 horsemen and only got ἄτελεια.) Thucydidēs (π 22) names ‘Meno of Pharsalus’ as one of the leaders of a body of Thessalian cavalry who came to assist the Athenians κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν συμμαχικὸν in the first year of the Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.). The distance of time makes it improbable that these two Menos were identical (though Westermann on Dem. Aristocr. l.c. thinks they were); but they may well have been related.

The name Meno was not uncommon at Athens. Plutarch Per. 31 tells us of a statuary Meno who accused Phidias; and Alc. 22. 5 of a Meno, father of the priestess Theano. These two may be identical. Meno is the name of the archon of 473 B.C. There was also a Meno who was sent as general to the
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Hellespont in 361 B.C. (Dem. Polycl. (50) 12) and again to Euboea in 357 B.C. (CIA. ii 64, Hicks 104). Xenophon Hell. v iv 55 mentions a Meno of Thespiae. Lastly, there is another important Meno of Pharsalus who took a prominent part in the Lamian War (Plut. Phoc. 25) and was, through his daughter Phthia, the grandfather of Pyrrhus of Epirus.

There is no reason for thinking that the Meno of our dialogue enjoyed the Athenian franchise. He was united by hereditary ties of hospitality to Anytus (see on 90 B 2). He was also the πατρικὸς ξένος of the Persian king (78 D 28, where see note).

Meno is represented by Plato as young, though no longer very young (76 B 11). He has had a good education; he knows the poets, Simonides (?) 77 B 12, and Theognis (95 D), something of the physics of Empedocles, and something of geometry. His great teacher and light has been Gorgias of Leontini, the rhetorician, who spent the last years of his long life in Thessaly. Thus he may be regarded as a product of fashionable or 'sophistic' education, but with everything to learn in dialectics; even the grasping of a general definition is at first quite beyond him.

Meno is chiefly known for the part he took in the expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes. It was owing to his favour with Aristippus that he obtained a command over a division of the Greek mercenaries: παρὰ Ἀριστίππῳ ἐτο ὦραιος ἦν στρατηγεῖν διεπρύξατο τῶν ξένων (Xen. Anab. ii vi 28). We may think, if we please, that it was this business that obliged him to return home, and curtailed his stay at Athens (76 E, see also on 76 B 11). Meno did not start from Sardis
with the force of Cyrus, but joined it with his contingent at Colossae (Xen. Anab. i ii 6). Xenophon makes no secret of his hatred of Meno (cp. Diog. L. ii 50). This may have arisen from a rivalry between Meno and Xenophon's friend and hero, Clearchus. He accuses Meno of dishonourably overreaching his colleagues at the time when Cyrus was debating with his officers about crossing the Euphrates. Meno urged his own men to anticipate the decision by crossing: so, if it was decided to cross, they would have the credit of setting the example; if it was decided not to cross and they had to retreat again, Cyrus would in future give them the preference as having shown themselves the most zealous in his service. 'Such breach of communion and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Meno' (Grote Hist. ch. 69).

Not long afterwards at a place called Charmande a fracas occurred between the troops of Meno and those of Clearchus. The outbreak was only quelled by the personal intervention of Cyrus (Xen. Anab. i v 10 foll.). At the battle of Cunaxa Clearchus commanded the right, Meno the left, wing of the Greeks. This means that under Cyrus Clearchus had the first command, Meno the second. This is hardly consistent with the words of Ctesias (Persica 58) who says that Clearchus and Meno de διάφοροι ἀλλήλοις ἐτύγχανον διότι τῷ μὲν Κλεάρχῳ ἀπαντᾷ δ' Κύρος συνεβούλει, τοῦ δὲ Μένωνος λόγος οὐδεὶς ἦν. Meno was also connected by a tie of friendship with Ariaeus, the
commander of Cyrus' Asiatic troops, and after the
death of Cyrus in the battle Meno was sent at his
own desire among the embassy to Ariaeus to offer him
the crown (ibid. ii i 5). When the rest of the emb-
bassy returned, Meno remained with Ariaeus (ii ii 1).
Ariaeus had declined the crown and seemed to
be playing false with the Greeks. So Meno incurred
the suspicion of Cleafthus; (ii v 28) ὑπώπτευε δὲ εἶναι
τὸν διαβάλλοντα Μένωνα, εἰδὼς αὐτόν καὶ συγγεγενη-
μένον Τισσαφέρνει μετ' Ἀριαίων καὶ στασιάζοντα αὐτῷ
(i.e. Κλεάρχῳ) καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντα ὅτις τὸ στρατέυμα
ἀπαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν λαβῶν φίλος ὑ Τισσαφέρνει. Sub-
sequently Meno, like the other generals, went for a
colloquy to the tent of Tissaphernes; and was there
seized. At this point there is a discrepancy in the
accounts, which are practically two, that of Xenophon
and that of Ctesias. The story of Ctesias is preserved
in Photius' summary of his Persica, and on it is
largely based the account in Plutarch's Artaxerxes,
and in Diodorus. That the Greek generals, including
Meno, were seized and sent to the King at Babylon,
all agree. Xenophon (ii vi 29) says of Meno ἄποθνη-
σκόντων δὲ τῶν συστρατηγῶν ὅτι ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ
βασιλέα σὺν Κύρῳ, ταυτὰ πεποιηκὼς οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, μετὰ
δὲ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων βάναυτον στρατηγῶν τιμωρθέεις ὑπὸ
βασιλέως ἀπέθανεν, οὐχ ὡσπερ Κλεάρχος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
στρατηγοὶ ἀποστράτησαν τὰς κεφαλὰς, ὡσπερ γὰρ
θάνατος δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ξῶν αἰκισθεὶς ἐναιτὸν ὡς
πονηρὸς λέγεται τῆς τελευτῆς τυχεῖν. But Ctesias
(Persica 60, cp. Plut. Art. 18, Diod. xiv 27) says that
it was by Meno's agency that the other generals were
entrapped into the tent of Tissaphernes and that
for this service Meno was released. (Diodorus says Τισσαφέρνης δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς δήσας ἀπέστειλε πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην ἤκεινος δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀνεῖλε, Μένωνα δὲ μόνον ἀφῆκεν ἐδόκει γὰρ μόνος οὗτος στασιάζων πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους προδώσειν τοὺς Ἔλληνας, where the word προδώσειν, if sound, would seem to indicate that future services were expected of Meno.) It is noteworthy that Meno's enemy Xenophon says nothing about any treachery of Meno towards the other generals, though he gloats over his miserable death. Of course it is quite possible that Meno was treacherous to his comrades and yet was punished at the Persian court. Grote (Hist. ch. 70) thinks he did betray them, or took credit for doing so, and perished through the agency of Parysatis, ever ready to take vengeance on any who had wronged her darling son Cyrus, or his friends.

§ 5. Xenophon in giving the characters of the slain generals reserves Meno for the last, and paints him in very dark colours. His greed of gain was undisguised; and to increase his gains he was greedy of rule and honour. He truckled to the powerful to secure a screen for his acts of injustice. Perjury and falsehood he regarded as the quickest way to the consummation of his desires; simplicity and truth were mere folly. He loved no one; with him professions of friendship were but the signal of an attack. He treated no foe with scorn; but always assumed a scornful air in talking with allies. To attack the guarded possessions of enemies was too much trouble; the defenceless possessions of friends he made his prey. He gloried in treachery, falsehood and mockery of
friends, as much as others in piety, truth and justice. He thought the best tie of discipline for soldiers was a partnership in crime. He considered himself as having conferred a boon if he associated with any one without ruining him. All this, says Xenophon, is notorious; as to still darker stories about him there may be some untruth (Anab. ii vi 21–28).

Is the portrait that we get in Plato inconsistent with this? Jowett (Meno Introd. p. 265) says 'The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also silent about the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades.' Again, p. 266, he speaks of Plato as 'regardless of the historical truth of the characters of his dialogue as in the case of Meno and Critias': cp. p. 268. This seems to me to go too far.

There is no real inconsistency between Plato's picture and that of Xenophon. Athenaeus is stupidly wrong when he says (505 b) that Plato ἔγκώμια αὐτοῦ (scil. Μένωνος) διεξέρχεται, as a counterblast, forsooth, to Xenophon, who had vilified him; and (506 b) that Plato disparages the great men of Athens, Μένωνα δ' ἐπαινεῖ τὸν τοὺς Ἑλλήνας προδόντα. It is quite clear, at least to one who reads between the lines, that Plato regards Meno as by no means an exemplary person. His arrogance (ὑβριστής γ' εἶ, ὥ Μένων κτέ. 76 Α), self-esteem (καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἄρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἰρήκα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, καὶ πάνυ

1 Jowett here falls into an error, perhaps based on Athenaeus xi 505 Α. Xenophon does not impute this treachery to Meno.
MENO

εὗ, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκοντι 80 B), vanity (γυνώσκω οὖν ἓνεκά με ἕκασσας κτέ. 80 C), want of self-control (ἐπειδὴ δὲ σῷ σαυτῷ μὲν οὐδ' ἔπιξερεῖς ἀρχεῖν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ἦς 86 D) are clearly indicated.1 The charges are made quite good-humouredly, it is true, but they are perfectly serious. Perhaps we may add that at 74 A Meno omits ὀσιώτης from the list of virtues, and remark the parenthesis 81 B δὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὦς ὀσιώτατα διαβιώναι τῶν βίου κτέ., the intention of which becomes much more obvious if it is intended for Meno's personal benefit. In Meno's favour it may be said that he is always deferential to Socrates, and he respects conventions (78 D 33).

Plato was, of course, not indifferent to common morality. The bad behaviour of some of his pupils no doubt gave occasion to some of his enemies to assert that he was. (Cp. Ath. 508 D ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ τυραννικοὶ τινες καὶ διάβολοι γενόμενοι. Much of Athenæus' material is derived from Theopompos, a pupil of Plato's rival, Isocrates.) But Meno's character was not Plato's subject. He may have been a bad man—that was a matter of comparative indifference; he certainly was a bad pupil—that is a point of cardinal importance. Compare Meno with the types of the good pupil—with Glaucon and Adimantus, with Simmias and Cebes, and above all with Theaetetus, and it is seen how appropriately he is selected as the respondent in a dialogue that is meant to show that a partial and premature attack on the fortress of the Nature of Virtue must be fruitless.

1 See too the note on the text of 72 A 20.
§ 6. Anytus is the well-known accuser of Socrates. This should be placed beyond doubt by his parting threat at 94 Ε; besides the hint at 99 Ε τούτω μέν, ὁ Μένων, καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα and the concluding words of the whole dialogue ὃς ἐὰν πείσης τούτων, ἐστιν ὁ τι καὶ Ἄθηναιοις ἀνήγεις. Moreover the name Anthemion, as in our dialogue, is given to the father of Socrates' accuser in the scholium on Apol. 18 ε, presently quoted. The same name is given by Plutarch in two places to the father of an Anytus of whom he tells a story about his infatuation for Alcibiades (Alc. 4. 5; Amat. § 27 p. 762 D; cp. Satyrus in Ath. xii 534 ε, Zeller Socr. p. 172 note); so also it is given in two places to the father of the Anytus of whom the story goes that he was the first to bribe judges (Plut. Coriol. 14. 4; Diod. xiii 64; cp. Arist. 'Αθ. Πολ. ch. 27 and see on 95 Α 5). True or false, both these stories must refer to the same man, the personage in the Meno and the accuser of Socrates. There may be more doubt about the Anytus who is said (Plut. de malign. Herod. § 6 p. 862 B) to have proposed a vote of ten talents to Herodotus, where the father's name is not given. Some information as to Anytus will be found in the notes on 90 Β 46 and 95 Α 5, and this I proceed to supplement, referring among modern works to Grote Hist. ch. 68; Zeller Socrates pp. 162, 172-74; Riddell Apology Introd. pp. ii–iv; Fr. Introd. 29, 30.

The scholium on Plato Apol. 18 Β begins οὗτος ὁ Ἀνυτός Ἀνθεμίων ᾃν νίος, Ἀθηναῖος γένος, Ἀλκιβιάδου ἔραστής, πλούσιος ἐκ βυσσοδεψίας. He was a prominent democrat in the time of the Peloponnesian
War; in 404 B.C. he was exiled by the Thirty (Xen. HelL. II iii 42, 44), and in the next year he aided Thrasylulus to expel them and restore the democracy. 'Anytus was a man of strong political convictions: he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom' (Riddell Introd. p. xxviii, cp. Isoc. 18. 23 Ὁρασίβου-λος καὶ "Ἀνυτος μέγιστον μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δὲ ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων). Anytus however appears not to have been an extreme democrat; the Aristotelian 'Aθ. Πολ. ch. 34 names him as a member of the 'middle party' of which Theramenes was the head.

When we read of a man πλούσιος ἐκ βυρσοδε-ψικῆς, who is at the same time (with whatever qualifications) a democrat, our thoughts naturally turn to Cleon. Because Socrates and the democrats were both attacked by Aristophanes, we are apt to suppose that they were in the same camp. But in the case of Anytus this is clearly not the case. The key of Anytus' character is his conversation. 'Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true philosopher' (Jowett Meno, Introd. p. 266). At the time of Socrates' trial (399 B.C.) it was the oligarchs who were the innovators; democracy was the established constitution. Though it was little more than a century old, if reckoned from Clisthenes, and much less if reckoned from Ephialtes and Pericles, prescription had won for it veneration. This found its expression in the watchword ἡ πάτρως πολιτεία, which certainly meant democracy of some kind, though how strong or how diluted might be a matter of individual taste.
INTRODUCTION

In the *Apology* 23π Socrates represents each of his three accusers as taking up the cudgels against him to avenge the insults to his own class; Meletus for the poets, Lycon for the orators, "Ἀνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. But there is reason to think that Anytus had further some private grounds for his animosity. We may well disregard the stories of his jealousy of Socrates in regard to Alcibiades; but there is a fairly well authenticated story that would assign to Anytus a motive against Socrates, which, though private, was but a particular instance of a public grievance. One of the commonest accusations against the new teaching, whether of Socrates or the 'sophists,' was its interference between parent and son (see on 92 A 3). Just such a case of interference had Anytus to resent from Socrates.¹ In Xenophon's *Apologia Socratis* (which is not, like Plato's, a speech supposed to be addressed by Socrates to his judges) we read §§ 29 foll. how Socrates, seeing Anytus passing, observes that Anytus is much puffed up at having got him condemned because he said Anytus ought not to bring up his son to his own trade. Socrates has met the son and formed a high opinion of his abilities; his mind, he told Anytus, will want a larger scope than leather-dealing affords, and if he does not get it he will fall into bad habits. So it turned out; the son took to drinking, and Anytus even after his death was in ill repute owing to his bad training of his son. We know nothing certain of the end of Anytus; on which matter, as Fritzsche says,

¹ See J. S. Mill *Dissertations* iii. 310.
‘neque inter se congruentia neque omnino probabilia memoriae produntur.’ Later writers indulge in various stories of the Nemesis that overtook him. Diog. L. (II 43) says that of Socrates’ accusers the Athenians exiled some, and put Meletus to death; that the men of Heraclea ejected Anytus on the very day on which he arrived there; (vi 9) that Antisthenes was the reputed author of the decree condemning Anytus to exile and Meletus to death. Diodorus xiv 37 says that the accusers of Socrates were put to death without trial (ἀκριτοί); Plut. de invidia 6 p. 558 A says they were subjected to so rigorous a ‘boycott’ that they hanged themselves. (See Zeller Socr. 202.) We may probably assume that Anytus was dead at the time when the Meno was written.

Meno and Anytus supplement one another. They are products of the two forces which Plato, standing as it were between two fires, was continually combating, the false teachers on the one hand, the philistines (μισολόγοι) on the other (Fritzsche Intr. p. 19 note 8).

§ 7. As to the Slave, Fritzsche saysquamquam de servuli aetate nihil injicitur, tamen quanto provectioremsumis aetate, tantum demis loco venustatis. He is not a character, but an abstraction, a typical blank mind.

§ 8. The assumed date of the dialogue depends on two considerations. Firstly, Meno is no longer very young, and he was still comparatively young when he started on the expedition of Cyrus (see § 4). This makes it difficult to interpose a long time between the dialogue and the expedition. Secondly, the nearer the time of the dialogue is placed to that of Socrates’ trial, the more point there is in Anytus’
threat at 94E. We may then assign the year 402 B.C. as probable. There is at least one anachronism in the dialogue, the mention of Ismenias at 90A.

§ 9. The genuineness of the Meno was assailed by those two ‘qui non ita multos Platonis libros de supplicio exemerunt, Ast et Schaarschmidt’ (Fritzsch.e). But that was in unregenerate days. Ueberweg at one time doubted its genuineness, but ended by believing in it. The Meno can in fact say with not many degrees less right than the Phaedo

εἰ μὲ Πλάτων οὐ γράψει, δύω ἐγένοντο Πλάτωνες.
Σωκρατικῶν δόρων ἀνθεὶα πάντα φέρω.

(Anth. Pal. ix 358.)

‘In the Menon more that is characteristic of Plato is brought together in a smaller space than in any other dialogue; if the Phaedon and the Gorgias are noble statues, the Menon is a gem’ (J. S. Mill Dissertations iii 350). And Mr. Walter Pater in his Plato and Platonism, p. 52, does justice to ‘that most characteristic dialogue, the Meno.’

Besides internal evidence, the Meno is protected by an unmistakeable reference in the Phaedo 72E (see on 81E 12), and a probable one in the Republic 506c to Meno 97B, to say nothing of other possibilities. Aristotle twice cites the Meno by name; Anal. pr. ii 21. 7 = 67 a 21 ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι λόγος, ὅτι ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις (81D) and Anal. post. i 1. 7 = 71 a 29 referring to the ἀπόρημα at 80D 1 (where see the note). It is true that Aristotle does not mention Plato as the author; but in similar style he cites the Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, Gorgias and Hippias
Minor. Further, though the Meno is not named, there is a probable reference to it in Arist. Pol. i xiii, for which see on 71 E 7.

§ 10. Hardly any dialogue of Plato is so clear-cut and simple in its construction as the Meno. The argument falls into five divisions, which correspond pretty nearly to the five scenes of which the dialogue consists.

The first scene (70 A–80 D cc. i–xiii) is between Meno and Socrates. Meno assails Socrates with the stock question ‘Can Virtue be taught?’ Socrates characteristically retorts by asking for a definition of Virtue, which Meno fails to give.

The second division extends from 80 D to 86 C (cc. xiv–xxi). The speakers are Socrates, Meno and the Slave. Meno, sore with his failure, and perhaps hoping to shelve the inquiry as to the definition of Virtue to which Socrates invites him, propounds a sceptical quibble that would imply the impossibility of a genesis of Knowledge, and consequently the futility of inquiry. Socrates by an experiment with the Slave shows that Knowledge is subject to a genesis, that its raw material is Opinion, and that we owe our power of recovering it to Reminiscence from a previous state of Existence.

The third scene, between Socrates and Meno, extends from 86 C to 90 B (cc. xxii–xxvi). Meno’s objection being thus overthrown he is again invited to the inquiry ‘What is Virtue?’ But Meno, who no doubt regards that question as merely academic and uninteresting, would much rather attack the practical question ‘Is Virtue teachable?’ Socrates will meet
him half-way. They must approach the question 'Is Virtue teachable?' from a hypothesis as to what Virtue is. If Virtue is Knowledge it will be teachable, and if not, not. But will this hypothesis stand? Yes, theoretically; for Virtue, like everything good and beneficial, may be ultimately reduced to Knowledge or Wisdom. But on the practical side a difficulty remains. Where are the teachers?

At this point Anytus, as a man of experience, is invited into the discussion, and in the fourth scene (90 B–95 A, cc. xxvii–xxxiv) he and Socrates are the interlocutors. Socrates begins by ironically assuming that just as for teaching in a special art we should go to a professional teacher, so for ἀρετή we should go to the Expert Teachers—the sophists. This excites Anytus' disgust. But when, like his colleague Meletus in the Apology (24 ε), he says that any good citizen is capable of instilling Virtue, he is soon faced with a number of conspicuous instances of failure.

Anytus having departed in dudgeon, the final scene (95 A–100 B, cc. xxxv–xlil) is left to Socrates and Meno. This paradox about Virtue is not confined to one place or time: he who has it for the most part cannot impart it: he who professes to impart it for the most part does not possess it. The only solution is that Virtue, as we see it in the world, is not the product of Knowledge, but of something like Knowledge, that is, of half-knowledge or Opinion. Opinion may simulate the results of Knowledge; but the possessor of it has not the root of the matter in him, his hold on Virtue is precarious, and not communicable. Perhaps some day there may arise a man or men
whose Virtue is rooted in Knowledge, and then we shall see great things. But we shall get no satisfactory result till we attack the problem What Virtue is.

§ 11. As to Meno’s inquiry, Jowett (Meno Intr. p. 262) says ‘No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times.’ This is hardly the place for considering why the inquiry has been superseded in modern times, if indeed this be the case. But at the end of the fifth century B.C. certain phenomena forced the matter on the consideration of the Greeks, not as a mere academic problem, but as an urgent practical question. These phenomena were mainly two. In the first place there was the obvious fact that parents failed to influence their children. Great fathers sometimes had feeble sons, good fathers vicious sons, wise fathers silly sons. With regard to the ordinary arts there did appear to be a certain power of communication; but as to the inner quality ἀρετή, that vaguely-apprehended something that made one man count for more than another, the best wishes of parents and trainers seemed almost powerless.

Just at this time arose a class of men who did profess to fill the gap that home-training obviously left—the sophists. Were they public benefactors or were they frauds? Many of the young men said the former; most of the old men said the latter. If the sophists were unsuccessful, it might either be because they were attempting something in itself impossible, or because they were attempting a possible task in the wrong way. Thus the question ‘Is Virtue teachable?’ was one to interest everybody.¹

¹ The two divisions of Socrates’ argument in the Protagoras
§ 12. What place does the *Meno* take in the order of Plato's writings? In regard to any Platonic dialogue this is at once the most important and the most difficult question that we have to answer. It results from the place of Plato in the history of philosophy that it is precisely the *development* of his views that forms the chief point of interest in them.

To Grote the question of the order of the Platonic writings seemed an unprofitable maze (see for instance his note at II 16, about the *Meno*; and II 120 on the question whether the *Protagoras* or the *Gorgias* is prior). The dialogues he regarded as pictures in a kaleidoscope, each fascinating in itself but quite discontinuous from anything before or after. I wish to speak with the utmost veneration of the work of Grote. The 'provocative shock' he gave to the study of Plato is something almost comparable in its kind with the work of Socrates. We stand on his shoulders, and how much we are thereby raised we have not to-day full means of judging. Before he wrote, all Plato's works were supposed to be parts of a finished and co-ordinated system. Inconsistencies were either ignored, or got rid of by the simple surgery of lopping off the offending dialogue from the Platonic canon. But since Grote cleared the air, much has been done, largely by British scholars, to bring the comprehension of Plato nearer than it has ever been before. Though with regard to the order of the dialogues we shall

319 A foll. (cp. on 93 B 17, 94 E 14) correspond, in inverse order, with the above-mentioned two sides from which the question was presented. So also do the two divisions of Socrates' discussion with Anytus.
always have to speak ὃς οὐκ ἐιδότες ἀλλὰ ὃς εἰκάζοντες, we must not listen to the ἄργος λόγος that any attempt on the problem is futile. Olympiodorus at the end of his life of Plato tells how Plato on his death-bed dreamed that he was a swan pursued in vain by ἰχνους; which Simmias explained to be the interpreters who should in vain endeavour to catch his thoughts. If the bird is not yet in our hands we may at any rate claim that we have closed in round it and are now able to watch its movements at closer quarters.

One great assistance to a better view of Plato's work is that it has come to be increasingly recognized that we must regard Plato not merely as a transcendentals philosopher, but as a man living amongst men, with human preferences and antipathies, and undergoing human vicissitudes. The old spirit in regard to Plato finds fine expression in the words of Goethe (Ueberweg § 39, Grote 1 201) "Plato's relation to the world is that of a superior spirit whose good pleasure it is to dwell in it for a time. It is not so much his concern to become acquainted with it—for the world and its nature are things which he presupposes (schon voraussetzt)—as kindly to communicate to it that which he brings with him, and of which it stands in so great need." It was his strong desire to get at Plato the man that made Grote cling so strongly to the authenticity of the Platonic Epistles, as 'the only occasions on which we have experience of Plato as speaking in his own person' (Grote 1 219, cp. 216 note). We have had to give up the notion that in the Epistles we have a self-revelation of Plato; though we may still gather from them some statements as to
his life, of various degrees of trustworthiness. It is hard that the very time that has shown us the importance of understanding Plato's career should also have shown us how very slender are our materials for constructing it. The fact is that the tradition is not only scanty but corrupt, and appears to have been corrupted at a very early time. Diog. L. iii 2 gives the name of Plato's nephew Speusippus, among others, as an authority for a miraculous story about Plato's birth.

§ 13. According to the most probable date of Plato's birth, the year 427 B.C., he was 28 years of age when in 399 B.C. his master Socrates was put to death. He had thus passed what has been for many great men the blossoming period of the mind. And yet his work was not begun. I think Grote's arguments (1 196 foll.) ought to be conclusive that Plato published no dialogues before the death of Socrates. Nor is it fatal to their cogency that the genuineness of the Platonic Epistles, on which Grote relied, must be given up. For the conception of the Socrates of the dialogues a certain mythical atmosphere is required, which readily gathered at no long interval after his death, but which would have been as impossible during his life-time as the appearance of his ghost.

We must beware then of expecting to find, or of thinking we detect, marks of 'juvenility' in any work of Plato. Yet it must be remembered that precocity was rare in Greek literary genius. Aristophanes is of course an instance, though his precocity has been exaggerated. We may be almost certain that Plato originally intended himself for public life, and that it was circumstances that forced him into
philosophy. For an Athenian in Plato's position to take up philosophy as a career in the fifth century would seem quite derogatory, and there was indeed no precedent for it. It was as if the eldest son of a peer should come out as a professional violinist.

For public life he had indeed one disadvantage from the start: ἵσχυς φωνῆς ἶν says Diog. L. (iii 5 cp. Grote i 118). But the execution of Socrates decided the matter; it was the first great turning-point in his life. The signs of the times seemed to show that it was unsafe for Socrates' pupils to remain at Athens; Plato with others withdrew to Megara and thence made travels. During the next years of his life we may suppose the chief influences affecting his mind to have been, firstly, a strong antipathy to the democracy, with a feeling that he himself as far as politics were concerned could but bide his time: secondly, a strong desire to make himself the interpreter of his Master, and to present to his countrymen his Master's thoughts more or less recast by his own mind.

During this period he was, as to politics, in the position of a statesman whose party is 'out'; as to philosophy he was still an amateur; that is, he held no professional position. When he returned to Athens we do not know; the extent of his travels at this time has probably been much exaggerated and we need not suppose his absence to have extended over more than two or three years.¹ The dialogues that

¹ Cp. Grote i 121; Karsten de Platonis quae feruntur epistolis pp. 164 foll.; Ueberweg-Heinze p. 142. Zeller p. 17 says 'there is great probability, and even some external evidence,
belong to this period it is most reasonable to suppose were written at Athens. His antagonists, as far as there are any, are the old (in most cases dead) antagonists of Socrates. The dialogues that compose this, the 'Socratic,' series are the Apology, Crito, Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Hippias major, Hippias minor, Io and Euthyphro. (I lay no stress on the order, and I regard both the Alcibiades dialogues as spurious.) During the later years of this period were probably written two other dialogues, the Protagoras and the Gorgias, though these rather belong to the next group of works.

Meanwhile a change was coming over the scene. Pupils of Socrates, Euclides at Megara, Antisthenes at Athens, had set up as heads of philosophic schools; Isocrates was winning a great position as an educator in rhetoric. The thought must have pressed itself more and more strongly on Plato that he should emulate them and finally cast in his lot with philosophy. It was not without a struggle that he gave up politics: τὸ πρῶτον πολλῆς μετὸν ὁντα ὅμως ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶττειν τὰ κοινά, says the author of the seventh

that long before this journey' (of 388 B.C.) 'Plato had settled in Athens, and there worked as teacher and author; even granting that at this period his instructions were confined to a select few.'

Dr. Thompson Gorgias Introd. p. xvi note derides the 'fabulous extent and duration assigned to Plato's travels'; Plato's return 'according to more than one witness must have taken place about four years after the death of Socrates, that is to say about 395 B.C.' Corinth is one of the places where, according to Aristoxenus in Diog. L. iii 8, Plato bore arms for his country. Probably this was at the battle of 394 B.C.
letter, using words which Plato certainly might have applied to himself (cp. Diog. L. iii 23: after Plato's third return from Sicily πολιτείας μὲν οὐχ ἣψατο, καὶ τοι πολιτικὸς ὄν ἕξ ὃν ἐγραψεν).

This brings us to what may be considered the second important moment in Plato's life; his first journey to Sicily and his starting as Principal of the Academy in Athens. The seventh letter (324 Α) says that Plato first went to Syracuse σχολὰς ἔτη τετταράκοντα γεγονός—that is about 387 B.C. The date of the opening of the Academy by Plato is given as 387 or 386 B.C. (Ueb.-Heinze p. 138). Lists of the σχολάρχαι or Heads were preserved, and these lists were embodied in διαδοχαι published by later authors, of whom the earliest appears to have been Sotion, a Peripatetic who lived at the beginning of the second century B.C. (Ueb.-Heinze 26, 255; R. & P. 4 A).

There is a good deal of doubt and discrepancy about this journey of Plato's as well as about his travels after Socrates' death. I think we may draw one conclusion about it with a fair amount of certainty, namely that its object was not political. It is true that the seventh letter (326 B foll.) does attribute to Plato political objects even in his first journey to Sicily; but what could he expect to effect during the tyranny of the elder Dionysius? Olympiodorus in his life says that he went to Italy on this occasion to see the Pythagoreans, especially Archytas of Tarentum, and to Sicily θεασόμενος τῶν κρατήρας τοῦ πυρὸς τοῦ ἐν Ἀῖτνη. The descriptions in Phaedo 111 B, 113 B, make it reasonable to suppose that Plato did take some interest in volcanic phenomena. To the same
effect Diog. L. iii 18: τρὶς δὲ πέπλευκεν εἰς Σικελίαν· πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ θείαν τῆς νῆσου καὶ τῶν κρατήρων, ὅτε καὶ Διονύσιος ὤμοικράτους τύραννος ὄν ἦν ἀγκασεν ὡστε συμμιξίαι αὐτῷ. Then comes the story how he quarreled with Dionysius, who dismissed him abruptly; and how he was sold into slavery, but ransomed by Anniceris of Cyrene and so reached Athens in safety again (Grote i 121, Zeller p. 24). The story of the selling into slavery has been doubted by many. If the incident occurred, it certainly made little impression on Plato's mind; no sign of an allusion to it can be traced anywhere in his writings; even the seventh letter is silent about it. Perhaps its chief importance is the tradition that Anniceris, refusing to accept the sum he had paid for Plato, which his friends wished to refund, bought with it for Plato's use the garden in the Academy. This serves to connect this voyage of Plato with the commencement of his school.¹

Among the travels of Plato after Socrates' death Diogenes (iii 6) includes a journey to Italy to visit the Pythagoreans Philolaus and Eurytus. Neither he nor any one else says anything about a visit to Sicily at this time, so that we may safely assume that Plato's visit to the island in 388 B.C. was—as Diogenes iii 18 says—his first. But it is quite possible that Diogenes is wrong about an earlier visit to Italy, and that his visit in 388 B.C. was his first to that country

¹ Diog. L. iii 8 says that the original form of the name Ἀκαδημία was ἐκαδημία—in which there lurks perhaps a fanciful etymology from ἐκας δῆμον. (But he there makes Plato teach in the Academy after his first return to Athens.)
also. This is rather more probable as Diogenes interpolates this alleged earlier journey to Italy between Cyrene and Egypt. It is surely more probable that Plato in his first tour confined his travels to Africa, leaving the West for a future time. The matter is not of great importance; but his sojourn with the Italian Pythagoreans in 388 B.C. becomes more important if it appears that this was his first personal interview with them. Not that by any means we need conclude that Plato was ignorant of Pythagoreanism before this; see Zeller p. 20, who in a note gives the stories about the purchase of Pythagorean books by Plato. But whatever these stories may be worth, no one who considers Plato's temperament will doubt that the cosmic imagery which was the glory of Pythagoreanism would receive new vividness in Plato's mind by intercourse with the leading spirits of that sect.

I conceive that Plato's travels in his fortieth year were directly connected with his resolution to start a school; whether it were that before beginning he wished to supplement his knowledge and experience in certain particular directions, or that being about to tie himself to Athens more closely, he wished to enjoy a spell of freedom while it was still open to him.

With regard to the Gorgias, both Cope (Intr. p. lxxiv) and Dr. Thompson (Intr. p. xvi) place it in the interval between Plato's return to Athens after his first travels, and his first Sicilian journey. They both recognize in it a certain buoyancy and comic spirit that imply that the writer was comparatively young. This

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1 To this view Zeller seems to incline: p. 16 note, and p. 19.
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is combined with sternness and even bitterness on certain points. Plato, when he wrote the Gorgias, was disgusted with politics, but he was not disgusted with life. Dr. Thompson inclines to the conjecture that the Gorgias was the first work, or one of the first, written by Plato after his first return to Athens. To this the chief objection I have to offer is that sufficient time is not thus allowed for the earlier dialogues, all written (I believe) after Socrates' death. It seems to me much more probable that the Gorgias was the last dialogue written before Plato's departure on his travels to Italy and Sicily with a fixed resolve as to his future career. He bids good-bye to Athens—for a time; and good-bye—probably for ever—to politics. For this last step it is the Ἀπολογία Πλάτωνος.

To make clear Plato's procedure and attitude when he returned again to Athens, I cannot do better than borrow the words of the article 'Sophists' in the Encyc. Brit. p. 268 b (by 'H. J.'), only premising that I am inclined to refer the Protagoras and Gorgias to a time when Plato was in intention, though not yet in fact, Head of the Academy. 'It may be imagined further that when Plato established himself at the Academy, his first care was to draw up a scheme of education, including arithmetic, geometry (plane and solid), astronomy, harmonics and dialectic, and that it was not until he had arranged for the carrying out of this programme that he devoted himself to the special functions of professor of philosophy. However this may be, we find among his writings,—intermediate, as it would seem, between the Socratic conversations of his first period, and the metaphysical disquisitions
of a later time—a series of dialogues, which, however varied their ostensible subjects, agree in having a direct bearing upon education. Thus the *Protagoras* brings the educational theory of Protagoras and the sophists of culture face to face with the educational theory of Socrates, so as to expose the limitations of both; the *Gorgias* deals with the moral aspect of the teaching of the forensic rhetorician Gorgias and the political rhetorician Isocrates; and the intellectual aspect of their respective theories of education is handled in the *Phaedrus*; the *Meno* on the one hand exhibits the strength and the weakness of the teaching of Socrates, and on the other brings into view the makeshift methods of those who, despising systematic teaching, regard the practical politician as the true educator; the *Euthydemus* has for its subject the eristical method; finally, having in these dialogues characterized the current theories of education, Plato proceeds in the *Republic* to develop an original scheme.'

Side by side with this should be put the summary which the same author has appended to the last of his papers on 'Plato's Later Theory of Ideas,' namely that on the *Politicus*, in *J.P.* xv 302 foll.

'In short, I think we may distinguish four stages or periods of Plato's literary career, and designate them as:

(1) Socratic, of which the *Euthyphro* is typical;
(2) educational—including the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Meno*, the *Euthydemus*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedo*;
(3) philosophical—including the *Philebus*, the
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Parmenides, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Politicus, the Timaeus;

(4) political—including the Laws.

(The list does not contain all the dialogues.)

It may be observed that in group (1) the persons criticized are mainly antagonists of Socrates; in group (2) they are Plato’s rivals, but often also Socrates himself; in group (3) they are Plato’s rivals, Socrates, and also Plato himself at an earlier stage. In the last stage of all, the Laws, Plato returns in a manner à ses premiers amours, politics. It is out of the question for him now to take an active part in Athenian affairs; but he so far returns to ‘practical’ politics as to consider in the Laws the best amendments on existing institutions. Plato’s second and third journeys to Sicily, the second in 367 B.C. when he was sixty years old, the third later, were undertaken in the vain hope of putting his political theories in practice.

§ 14. We are immediately concerned with the second or ‘educational’ group of dialogues, to which the Meno belongs. We may assume that Plato after he became Head of the Academy at once began to prepare for writing his great educational work, the Republic, and that he would not allow more time than he could help to elapse between the starting of the Academy and its publication.

Of the other dialogues of this group there are considerable grounds for placing the Phaedo later than the Republic (see H. Jackson in J.P. xv 303). The rest are all earlier than the Republic, and more or less intended to lead up to it. Assuming then that
the Protagoras and Gorgias were written before the first journey to Sicily, we have to fit in the Phaedrus, Euthydemus and Meno between Plato's return to Athens and the publication of the Republic. The Menexenus and the fragmentary Clitophon also belong to this time (see Grote III pp. 8, 25). (The Symposium is reserved for subsequent consideration.)

As to the date of the Republic, almost the only reference to external events that we have to guide us is the mention of Ismenias of Thebes (Rep. i 336 A). In the note on 90 A 40 I have given reasons for thinking that this passage was written not long before Ismenias' death, which took place probably towards the end of 382 B.C.¹ We may then conjecturally assign to 381, or the earlier part of 382 B.C., the publication of bk. i of the Republic. Probably some further portion was published with it; but the question in what instalments the work was presented cannot be discussed here.

Can we go any farther, and, assuming that the Phaedrus, Meno and Euthydemus were all written

¹ As to Plato's practice in regard to naming his contemporaries, see Dr. Thompson in J.P. viii 307 note (cp. xi 2 note): 'This reticence, of which it is not difficult to divine the motives, is most carefully practised in the case of the living celebrities who claimed like himself to be disciples of Socrates, such as Euclides, Aristippus and Antisthenes. A cursory reader of Plato has no idea that such men existed as the heads of rival sects with which the Platonists of the Academy were engaged in perpetual controversy. On the other hand Plato never scruples to name the dead, nor perhaps those living personages with whom he stood in no relation of common pursuits or common friendships, e.g. Lysias, Gorgias, etc.'
between 387 and 382 B.C., ascertain the order in which they came? Here our conclusions can only be tentative. Perhaps the best method will be to take all the educational dialogues in order, and briefly consider their relations to the Meno.

§ 15. The Protagoras. The main subject of the Protagoras is the same as that of the Meno 'Is Virtue teachable?' It brings out the looseness of popular views of Virtue, and the futility of attempting the position from the side that naturally presented itself—the practical side—before mastering the metaphysical key to it, the nature of Virtue. 'The issue of our conversation' says Socrates 'renders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in everything rather than knowledge:—on which supposition it would hardly be teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear them up; and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through the whole investigation—first, what Virtue is, next, whether it is teachable or not' (Grote II 69; cp. Fr. Intr. p. 14).

The expectation here raised is to some extent fulfilled in the Meno. Not that the Meno is by any means final; but certain important steps forward are made. There are, to begin with, some attempts at actually defining Virtue. These attempts though abortive serve to illustrate the nature of the problem.
The fourth section of the dialogue—the dialogue with Anytus (cc. xxvii–xxxiv)—goes largely over ground already traversed in the Protagoras (see § 11 above). But in the Protagoras the question whether after all there is an ἐπωτήμη ἀρετῆς is not faced; nor is there any trace of the doctrine of δόξα, by which a solution is offered of the paradox that although Virtue is of the nature of Knowledge, yet the possessors of Virtue are for the most part unable to impart it, nor of the allied topic of ‘demotic virtue’ (see on 100 A 6).

There is much ground for supposing that of the ‘Educational’ dialogues the Protagoras is the earliest. The argument is almost purely Socratic. In particular there is the well-known identification of the Pleasant and the Good. Virtue is represented in the Protagoras as a calculus of Pleasures. From this outcome of Socratic teaching, which was developed by Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, Plato shortly afterwards strongly separated himself, and he criticizes it in the Gorgias. (See Grote ii 60, 78, 119 foll.; J. & A. M. Adam’s Introd. to Prot. pp. xxix foll.)

§ 16. The Gorgias. The main point of advance in the Gorgias is the strong assertion of the intrinsic difference between Pleasure and Good (Zeller p. 121). It is true that as Grote says (ii 105) ‘Plato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good and Evil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know it: we learn only that Good is a mental perfection, Evil a mental taint, answering to

1 ‘Plato Menone hanc quaestionem, num veritatis omnino cognitio sit, primum tractavit, qua in Protagora supersederat’ Hermann Gesch. u. Syst. i 483 (quoted by Fr.).
indescribable but characteristic sentiments in Plato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this circumstance, that they have no reference either to pleasure or pain.' But we could hardly expect from Plato at this stage a full and complete utterance on a point about which he perhaps never more than half satisfied himself.

The comparative slenderness of the metaphysical basis in the Gorgias, and the simplicity of the mythical materials (Exc. VI p. 289), point to a comparatively early date for its composition. As I have already said (§ 13) I should place it as the last dialogue written before Plato's first Sicilian journey. The Pythagorean passage 492 ε foll. furnishes no argument against this view.

Another argument for placing the Gorgias before the Meno is the fact that the term ὀψα, later so closely connected by Plato with the province of rhetoric, is in the Gorgias conspicuous by its absence (see Exc. VII pp. 299, 300).

Further, the summary treatment of Gorgias' position and of the relations of rhetoric to sophistry in the Meno implies the thorough discussion of these points in the Gorgias. See on 95 C 23.

It is also just possible that in Meno 71 C the reference to Socrates' meeting with Gorgias may be a covert allusion to the earlier dialogue (cp. Exc. V p. 282).

§ 17. The Phaedrus I believe to have been written by Plato soon after his return from his first Sicilian journey, and to have been his first publication as Head of the Academy.¹ I lay some stress in regard

¹ This was the view taken by C. F. Hermann and others. Grote i 178, 561, etc., Zeller p. 104 note.
to this on the tradition that the *Phaedrus* was the earliest of all Plato's compositions.¹ The tradition is preserved by Diog. L. iii 38 λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράφαται αὐτῶν τὸν Φαίδρον, by Olympiodorus in his life of Plato ch. 3 (Teubner text vi p. 192) ὅτι δὲ τοῦ διθυράμβους ὁ Πλάτων ἔσκετο δήλον ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου, τοῦ διαλόγου πάνυ πνεύματος τοῦ διθυράμβωδους χαρακτῆρος, ἀνε τοῦ Πλάτωνος τοῦτον πρῶτον γράφαντος διάλογον, ὡς λέγεται, and lastly in the Προλεγόμενα τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας (Teubner text vi p. 217). The reasons assigned for giving the first place to the *Phaedrus* are different in each of these works and in each case somewhat frivolous; but perhaps the very inadequacy of the grounds alleged points to some real fact at the back of the tradition. If in the Academic records account was only taken of the writings of the Head in his official position, then the earlier writings of Plato would be ignored, and the *Phaedrus* would be set down as his first utterance.

In the *Phaedrus* the additional territory that Plato has added to his domain of thought is wide and diversified. I think most of these accessions may be connected with the new facts of his life, namely (1) his westward journey, (2) his professional position. The results of the first have two aspects, which are however closely connected. Plato's new intercourse with leading Pythagoreans I believe to have been in the first place the main source from which he drew the mass of mythical material with which is associated his teaching on Transmigration and Immortality (Exc.

¹ This view was taken by Schleiermacher: Grote i 172, etc., Zeller pp. 129 foll.
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VII p. 296). Further, I believe that from the same source fell the spark that kindled into life Plato’s first theory of Ideas. From an early time Plato felt that to the Universal attached a Reality that did not belong to the particulars. Perhaps the passage most clearly showing this is *Euthyphro* 6 D ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐἴδος, ὃ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν; ἕφησθα γάρ ποιν μιὰ ἰδέα τὰ τε ἄνωσια ἄνωσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια (cp. 5 D).

‘Similar passages, in which the expressions which were afterwards used in connexion with the theory of ideas occur in speaking of the Socratic λόγοι, are far from rare in the Socratic dialogue’ (J. Adam *Euthyphro*, Introd. p. xxviii: see also on 73 D 5, cp. Zeller p. 120 note). But what sort of independent existence of the Ideas was conceivable? Surely the Other World to which the Soul departed after its commerce with earth was the natural home for those Existences that were then the objects of its cognition. It is true that in the *Phaedrus* we are not very explicitly told what the Realities are on which the Soul gazes; only that it sees the very Justice, the very Temperance, the very Knowledge, οὐχ ὡς γένεσις πρόσεχετιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐστὶ ποιν ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ ὅσια ἰν ἵμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦ-μεν, ἀλλά τήν ἐν τῷ δ ἐστιν ὄν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην ὅσιαν. But that corresponding to every General Name there is an independently-existing Idea Plato probably first expressly said, or at least wrote, in *Rep*. x 596 A ἐἴδος γάρ ποτε τι ἐν ἔκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἔκαστα τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταυτῶν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν (see H. Jackson in *J.P.* x 254 foll.). But it was in the *Phaedrus* that the Universals were ‘hypostatized’ and the Ideal Theory developed. Possibly we have a hint of this in
the words (247 c) that no poet has yet hymned the ἱπποτόρανυς τότος. But the separate existence of the Ideas could only be described by borrowing the language of Sense (see on 72 C 2); indeed the mind refused to grasp them except as a kind of sensible. And thus the Ideas in receiving 'a local habitation and a name' received their death-blow; the Ideal Man, existing apart from particular men, was after all but One More, so that a new Idea was needed embodying the common qualities he had with the rest (Grote II 271).

The new aspects in the Phaedrus that may be connected with Plato's new position consists in its polemical character. In the earlier dialogues there is very little polemic against living individuals. Plato is still a free-lance among philosophers; his sympathies and antipathies to other teachers are determined mainly by loyalty to Socrates, and are very little personal. It is absurd to suppose that the Protagoras and Gorgias are attacks on the distinguished men whose names they bear. In the Gorgias there is, it is true, earnest denunciation of popular Statecraft and of oratory as her handmaiden.

1 'The Platonic Ideas are nothing more' (than 'first efforts'); 'but of all theories that have arisen in ingenious minds from an imperfect conception of the processes of abstraction and generalization, they are surely among the most plausible as well as beautiful.' J. S. Mill Dissertations III 348. [The sequel shows admirably how the Ideal theory was arrived at.] Op. J. Adam in C.R. xii 222: 'The doctrine of transcendent self-existent Ideas is a creation of the poet Plato, and has a permanent poetical if not philosophical value. It is the most powerful stimulus to the artistic imagination which Philosophy has ever supplied' (see Exc. VI p. 296).
In the *Phaedrus* the point of view is greatly changed. There is an attack upon Lysias—who is δευτάτος τῶν νῦν γράφειν (228Δ) and therefore selected for the purpose—but the attack upon him is not because he teaches rhetoric, but because he teaches it in the wrong way. There are in the *Phaedrus* references to the view of rhetoric taken in the *Gorgias*, and something amounting to a recantation of it (see 260D foll. ἄρ' οὖν, ἄ' γαθε, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τίν λόγων τέχνην ;). Rhetoric is introduced speaking in her own defence; without me, she says, however much a man may know the Truth, the Art of Persuasion will not be his. Yes, she may be answered, but there is just the question; ὅσπερ γὰρ ἀκοῦειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ τέχνη ἀλλ' ἀτεχνος τριβή. Again 269Β οὐ χρή χαλεπάνεων εἰ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὀρίσασθαι τι ποτ' ἐστὶ βητορική κτῆ. ‘This reads like a good-humoured apology for past severities’ observes Dr. Thompson, *Introd.* p. iv. The ‘faulty classification’ is the analogy drawn in the *Gorgias* between Rhetoric and Confectionery. Presently this is repudiated, and for it is substituted an analogy between Rhetoric and Medicine (270Β). Pericles, who in the *Gorgias* is involved with other statesmen in a common censure, is here praised because his oratory was founded on a basis of scientific knowledge. A large part of the *Phaedrus* (from 259 onwards) is an attempt to construct a true or philosophic Rhetoric. This is to be founded firstly on Dialectic, that is, on proper methods of Collection and Division (265Β foll.,
ep. 273 D foll.); secondly on Psychology, just as Medicine depends on a proper knowledge of the body. (For Plato's new conception of a Rhetoric see Dr. Thompson's Introd. pp. xvi-xviii). When Plato wrote the Phaedrus he held that there was room for an Art of Expression, and possibly even intended to fit it into the curriculum of his Academy.

All this tends to show that the Phaedrus is later than the Gorgias; at the same time the westward journey furnishes the sort of interval necessary to explain the transit from the old point of view to the new. A further question may be put: was not the new view the direct outcome of a visit to the birthland of Greek Rhetoric, the home of Corax and Tisias? To this I can only say that I know of no one living in Sicily at the time, who is likely to have impressed Plato in this direction; and I think his new position in Athens may have been alone the determining cause; but other speculations are not excluded.

It is in the Phaedrus that we find the first reference to Plato's rival at Athens, Isocrates (278 E foll.). The reference is friendly, and perhaps shows that Plato then really hoped to find in the 'philosophic' rhetoric Isocrates professed to furnish, an article superior to that supplied elsewhere. If this be so, the spirit of professional rivalry embittered in the

1 An approximation to Isocrates in the Phaedrus is noticeable in the tendency towards the Isocratean principle of avoiding hiatus. This appears especially in the dialogue portions: the proportion being less than half what is found in the Symposium and the Republic (Blass Att. Bered. II 426). For the early friendship of Plato and Isocrates see Diog. L. III 8.
following years the good relations with which they started. In the Euthydemus there is a distinct note of antagonism (Dr. Thompson's Phaedrus pp. 179 foll.) and a still stronger one in the Republic, if we are to recognize in the picture (495 ς) of 'the bald-headed tinker, who, having made some money, goes to the bath and washes himself, puts on a wedding garment, and proposes to marry his master's daughter, now that she is poor and desolate,' Isocrates with his patronage of poor forlorn Philosophy (Teichmüller Literarische Fehden pp. 103–105, 1881, cp. H. Jackson Proc. of the Cambridge Philol. Society 1882, pp. 13 and 41). Plato is rarely so acrimonious as this.¹

The date here assumed for the composition of the Phaedrus—say 386 B.C.—is merely part of a hypothesis which must stand or fall according as it is found to fit or not to fit the view of Plato's career which increased enlightenment shall show to be a reasonable one. Dr. Thompson (Introd. pp. xix, xx) argues against the view of C. F. Hermann that I have here adopted, and would place it later. So would Mr. J. B. Bury (J.P. xv 83 foll.). On the other hand Zeller p. 134 (see the other passages there referred to, and the note on p. 399) argues for a comparatively early

¹ See Jebb Attic Orators Introd. p. cxx 'Nothing more distinguishes Plato from later satirists of like keenness than his manner of hinting the redeeming points of the person under dissection; and whenever Gorgias comes in—whether in the dialogue that bears his name or elsewhere—it may be discerned (I venture to think) that Plato's purpose was to bring out an aspect of the man—that aspect which he considered most important—but that he allowed, and was writing for those who knew, that there was another side to the picture.'
date of the *Phaedrus*. It must be allowed that on the view here taken the amount of new material in the *Phaedrus* is very large, and these advances cannot all be connected with the external circumstances above considered. I will mention three: the tripartite division of the Soul; the method of συναγωγή and διαίρεσις, and the recognition of two distinct grades below the φιλόσοφος corresponding respectively with the φιλότιμος and the φιλοσφόματος (see Exc. VI p. 295). In the *Phaedo* the φιλοσφόματος is recognized as another stage below these three.

§ 18. The next dialogue to be considered is the *Euthydemus*. Both it and the *Meno* I regard as preceding the *Republic*; but which of the two is prior is extremely hard to say. On the whole I think it probable that the *Meno* is later. The topic of the ascendency of φρόνησις is treated elaborately in the *Euthydemus*, more succinctly in the *Meno*. See on 88 Α 7. On the other hand, the great question of the *Meno* receives summary treatment in the *Euthydemus* (282 c) εἰ ἦστι γε, ὥς Κλεινία, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ σοφία διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταύτοματον παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώπωσι· τούτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτη ἀσκεπτὸν καὶ οὕτω διωμολογημένον ἔμοι τε καὶ σοί. Ἀλλ' ἐμοιγε, ἐφι, ὦ Σώκρατε, διδακτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ· καὶ ἐγὼ ἢσθεῖς εἶπον· Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄριστε ἄνδρε, καὶ εὐ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτον αὐτὸν, πότερον διδακτὸν ἡ οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ σοφία. (The shifting of the subject of the question from ἀρετή to σοφία is not important.) It seems to me that we have here not so much a reference back to a previous discussion, as a shelving of the question at present for convenience.
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Plato had moreover already treated the question 'Is Virtue teachable?' in the _Protagoras_. (For views as to the date of the _Euthydemus_ see Grote i 561 note; ii 243 note, where Grote agrees with Ueberweg that the _Euthydemus_ is later than the _Phaedrus_; Zeller p. 84 note, p. 119, and p. 126 note 80, where it is argued that the Ideal theory is implied in the _Euthydemus_.)

§ 19. If the views just put forward be accepted, the _Meno_ may be regarded as the immediate prelude to the _Republic_. Some corroboration is to be found in the close analogy between the end of the _Meno_ and the end of Book i of the _Republic_. In both Socrates is dissatisfied; he has been led off on side issues from the pursuit of the main problem. 'I have not been well entertained,' he tells Thrasymachus, 'but that was my own fault and not yours: for as your gourmands seize upon every new dish as it goes round, and taste its contents before they have had a reasonable enjoyment of its predecessor, so I seem to myself to have left the question we were at first examining, concerning the real nature of Justice, before we had found out the answer to it . . . so that at present the result of our conversation is that I know nothing: for while I do not know what Justice is, I am little likely to know whether it is in fact a virtue or not, or whether its owner is happy or unhappy' (Davies' and Vaughan's translation).

The transference of the subject of investigation from Virtue in the _Meno_ to Justice in the _Republic_ is characteristic. In the _Republic_ we have an important development of the Socratic doctrine that Virtue is One. The cardinal virtues are now regarded as

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'broken lights' of the One Virtue, and the grounds on which their difference depends are examined. This analysis finds no place in the *Meno*, nor in Book 1 of the *Republic* (Zeller, pp. 451 foll.).

The treatment of δόξα in the *Republic* carries on that in the *Meno*: in *Rep.* 506 c we have what looks like a verbal reference to *Meno 97 A*. Further, *Meno 89 B* contemplates an Ideal State, such as the *Republic*, at 99 A we get a glimpse of the notion that the Man is the microcosm of the State, and at 100 A we have a foreshadowing of the simile of the Cave in *Rep.* vii.

§ 20. The next dialogues to be considered in relation to the *Meno* are the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo*. Both of these I regard as later than the *Republic*, and a fortiori later than the *Meno*. In spite of their great difference they have this in common, that both present an idealized picture of Socrates more full and vivid than any to be found elsewhere (cp. Grote II 227); also that Plato rises in them to what is absolutely his highest point of poetical beauty, both in imagination and in diction. One strong reason for thinking them later than the *Republic* is that in assigning the *Phaedrus*, *Euthydemus* and *Meno* (with the *Menexenus* and *Clitophon*) to the years 386–383 B.C.—during all which time Plato must have been working at his chef d'œuvre—we are sufficiently filling up his time. In the case of the *Symposium* there is nothing that may not have been subsequent to the *Republic*, whereas in the *Phaedo* there are things we may almost say must have been so (cp. p. xxxix and presently p. liv).

The main point of contact between the *Meno* and
the *Symposium* is in the development of the doctrine of δόξα contained in the latter. It is possible that at 202a (quoted on 97B 17) we have a reference not merely to the doctrine of the *Meno* but the actual treatise.¹ Whereas in the *Phaedrus* Eros is a god, the son of Aphrodite, in the *Symposium* he is relegated to the sphere of intermediary powers, and is not a god but a δαιμόν. Thus he is brought nearer to men (Grote ii 216).

The *Phaedo* is connected with the *Meno* by the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. The *Meno* is unmistakeably referred to, and its doctrine receives a further development (see on 81D 12 and § 9 above).

§ 21. A question may be raised as to the development of the doctrine of Immortality in Plato. In five of the dialogues that have now been considered this doctrine appears. These dialogues come, on the hypothesis adopted, in the order, *Phaedrus*, *Meno*, *Republic*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*. Is this order consistent with a probable view of the development of Plato’s views on this subject? The main difficulty is the position of the *Symposium*. Whereas in the *Phaedrus*, the *Meno*, and the *Republic* we have proofs offered of the immortality of the soul (though that in the *Meno* is a partial and abbreviated one, in which the argument and myth of the *Phaedrus* is probably presumed), in

¹ Grote (ii 232, note) points out that the *Symposium* must have been written between 385 B.C.—the date of the δοικία of Mantinea—and 370 B.C. when it was re-established. Zeller p. 133 couples it with the *Phaedo* as belonging ‘to a time when the philosophy of Plato, and also his artistic power, had reached full maturity.’ ‘Teichmüller has shown that the *Phaedo* is later than the *Symposium*’: see C.R. x 41.
the *Symposium* only a ‘metaphorical immortality’ is asserted: ‘the soul yearns for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific operation—by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble thoughts and feelings—by leaving a name and reputation to survive in the memory of others’ (Grote ii 223).

In the *Phaedo* the question is faced with all the solemnity and earnestness of which Plato is capable. It is the sort of work that one might expect from a man who had just gone through a serious illness or a great trouble. I believe that Archer-Hind is quite right in upholding (*Phaedo Intr. p. 21 foll.*) that Plato did in the *Phaedo* maintain ‘the immortality of particular souls as distinct from the eternity of the universal soul.’ Not but that it is possible to exaggerate the importance attached by Plato to individual immortality (see on 86 A 8).

The explanation is probably this. Plato did offer in the *Phaedrus* a very general proof of the immortality of soul (245 c). Some few years later he offered in the *Republic* another proof (Bk. x 608 d–611 A). This proof is different from that in the *Phaedrus*, to which, so far as I can see, no allusion is made. In the *Phaedo* again there is neither resumption of, nor reference to, the arguments of the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*. It would seem that Plato after writing the *Republic* became conscious that his arguments, so far at least as personal immortality is concerned, were unsatisfactory. It is strange, at any rate, that the only
reference in the *Phaedo* to any previous treatment of the subject should be to the half-demonstration in the *Meno*. After writing the *Symposium*, circumstances, we know not what, brought Plato round to renew his assault on the great problem. The result remains in the *Phaedo* as his final achievement in this direction.

§ 22. I will not enter on the difficult question of the date of the *Theaetetus*. On arriving at this dialogue we leave the stage of the 'educational' dialogues, and enter on the 'philosophic'.¹ The *Theaetetus* must be later than the *Meno*, containing, as it does, an important development of the doctrine of δόξα. At the same time it contains in matters of detail some curious parallels to the *Meno*.

1 The story of Theaetetus' attempts to define Knowledge is very like that of Meno's attempts to define Virtue (see on 71 E 1).

(2) There is a kinship between the mathematical passage at *Theaet.* 147 ν foll. and the problem the solution of which Socrates elicits from the slave. In the *Theaetetus*, it is upon surds and square numbers that Theodorus has been lecturing, and he stops at the number 16. Now it is sixteen feet that the figure in the *Meno* 83 c contains.

(3) The contrast between Theaetetus and Meno is pointed. Meno is fair in body, but not in mind; Theaetetus is just the reverse. Meno is exactly

¹ Zeller, I think, is certainly wrong (pp. 125 sqq.) in grouping the *Theaetetus* with the *Gorgias*, *Meno* and *Euthydemus*. For the hypothesis that the *Theaetetus* as we have it is an enlarged edition of an earlier work, see H. Jackson in *J.P.* XIII 244 note; Archer-Hind *Timaeus* Intr. p. 21, note.
described in *Theaet.* 150 b foll. (cp. 177 b). *Theaetetus* wonders but is not disconcerted.

(4) The simile of the νάρκη, applied by Meno to Socrates, is paralleled by that of the μαία, applied by Socrates to himself.

(5) The allusion to χρόνα and the theory of vision in 153 d and 156 may be set beside *Meno* 76.

(6) The reference to ἐρωτική 154 d, 164, 165, is just in the spirit of the *Meno*.

(7) The departure of Socrates at the end of the *Theaetetus* εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν is balanced by Anytus’ threat in the *Meno*.

§ 23. Thus the dialogues form a series, each linked to others before and after. When we have a promise of an intended work we may presume that the contents of the intended work were to some extent in the author’s mind at the time of his making the promise, though his views would shape and develop themselves in the process of execution. So Plato had much of the *Republic* in his head when he wrote the *Meno*.

We shall not be more than a year or so out if we assign the *Meno* to 384 B.C. At that time Plato was forty-three years of age and Socrates had been dead for fifteen years.¹ I proceed on the assumption that

¹ Schleiermacher thought that the *Meno* was written thirteen years after the death of Socrates. See his views, Grote II 16 note. While dissenting on some points I find it rather remarkable that in so many I coincide with a writer who has pursued his investigations on such very different principles. Rudolf Hirzel (*Rhein. Mus.* xlii 249) suggests that the *Meno* (especially the Anytus episode) was called forth by the publication of the κατηγορία Ὑσκράτους by the sophist Polycrates. This was a feigned speech, put into the mouth of Anytus, which led to
the works which, after Plato's second return to Athens, preceded the Republic, he produced because he saw some special reason for doing so. In the Phaedrus he sets forth his new view of intellectual concepts, and puts himself right as to the function of Rhetoric; the Euthydemus has for its chief object the depressing of his professional rivals Antisthenes and Isocrates; the writing of the Meno may have been forced upon him by impatient and impertinent people who pressed him for an answer on the question of the day: 'Can you teach Virtue? What do you profess?' The Meno is thus rather satirical than polemical. It is a continuation of the discussion with Protagoras, though it is not with Protagoras that the discussion is continued. For the rôle of respondent in the new discussion Plato found no one so suitable as the spoiled and arrogant young Thessalian, who, it was recorded, had once met Socrates. That Meno is a pupil of Gorgias is a mere accident. The Meno is in no sense an attack on Gorgias. 'Let us leave him out of the question,' says Socrates (71 D), 'as after all he is not here': and the explanation of Gorgias' position, that he teaches not Virtue, but the Art of Speaking, is received without a word of comment.

§ 24. It has come to be recognized of late years that an important aid to the determination of the order of Plato's works may be afforded by investigation

the later belief that it was the speech Anytus used at the trial (cp. Isocr. Bus. § 5; Diog. L. xi 38; Them. Or. 23, p. 296 c; Quint. xi 174). Hirzel's case as to the Meno is weak, and I cannot believe that the purpose of that dialogue is a defence of Socrates.
of points of style—points mostly so minute as to represent half-unconscious habits of the author's mind, and therefore likely to furnish a trustworthy clue to what we may call its 'stratification.' Opinions differ a good deal as to the degree of importance to be attached to this evidence. Still it is true to say that in 'Stylometry' has been found an occasionally useful adjunct to the old method of 'Hylometry' (if we may so call it).

It is as confirmatory evidence with regard to the main groups of Plato's writings that Stylometry is of most service. On the evidence of style alone it might be asserted that the *Meno* belongs to a different period from the *Philebus*. But it affords but little help as to the order of dialogues within one group; it does not help us to discover whether the *Meno* or the *Euthydemus* is prior.

All discussions of the order of Plato's writings based upon style (and to a less extent those based on other considerations) depend on the assumption that Plato after once issuing a work left it unaltered. May we assume this? A certain passage in Dionysius of Halicarnassus would make the assumption appear entirely unwarranted. Plato continued up to his eightieth year, he tells us, τοὺς ἐαυτοῦ διάλογους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπου ἀναπλέκων (*de compos. verborum* ch. xxv p. 208; see Jebb *Att. Or. Intr.* p. lxxiv, R. & P. 243). Then follows the story about the tablet which, they say, was found after his death, with the first words of the *Republic*—κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιὰ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀριστωνος—arranged in several different orders.
INTRODUCTION

We may well accept the view, which Dionysius is here supporting, of Plato's industry and fastidiousness in his literary work, and yet believe that Plato for the most part after publishing a dialogue regarded that edition as final. There was certainly no such general revision of his works as would have reduced them all to the level of one style, that of his later years. Conspicuous differences of style among the dialogues are obvious. With regard to subject matter the same is clear: there are abundant instances of inconsistency, development and self-criticism. I think, too, that Plato's mind was too active to allow him to spend any large amount of time in 'touching-up and titivating' published works, to say nothing of the inconvenience of having different editions in circulation at the same time.

The truth about the story appears to be this. Plato lived during a period when Attic prose was undergoing a great revolution. Beginning with a natural order, in which words were set down in the arrangement their mere sense would dictate, with little or no attention to euphonious combination, Attic writers ended with a style in which the arrangement of words was almost as severely conditioned as in verse; and this in regard to two things mainly, the collision of vowel sounds and rhythm. Plato was not a leader in this movement; it proceeded from the orators. But Plato had an exquisite ear for prose rhythm, and he could not be deaf to the effects the innovators produced. Moreover he was an experimenter in style. In the Phaedrus the influence of Isocrates is traceable; the Menexenus is an attempt to rival Lysias; in the
Symposium there is a succession of parodies of leading stylists. As time went on he elaborated more and more the order of words, and in particular became more and more sparing of hiatus.

We notice in Plato a growing tendency to fall in with the new taste in prose; but this tendency is broken by occasional experiments. This is a disturbing element that must always be taken into account when applying the stylometric method to Plato. Many writers indeed are liable to get a particular phrase or trick of style running in their head, an affection that disappears as unaccountably as it came. Such a trick we have in the use of εἰ ὅτι μάλωσα eight times in the Charmides (see on 80 D 4).

§ 25. The verdict of Stylometry as regards the Meno fortunately agrees pretty well with that which would be given on other grounds. It is marked as not belonging to the later dialogues by the comparative indifference to hiatus (see on 77 A 5, 98 C 13) and the general simplicity of the order of words (see on 89 B 26).

Prof. Lewis Campbell in C.R. III 28 gives a review of an important essay in the new method of ‘quantitative criticism’; namely Constantin Ritter’s Die Echtheit und Chronologie der platonischen Schriften (Stuttgart 1888). Prof. Campbell had himself done most important work in this direction in his General Introduction to the Sophistes and Politicus (1867). Among foreign scholars W. Dittenberger led the way in 1881 by publishing in Hermes xvi pp. 321–345 his Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge. ‘Having learned that the particle
μήν, for example, was rarely or never used by the earlier Attic prose-writers, he read through Plato with this in view, and found that the familiar formula τί μήν; was entirely absent from about two-thirds of the whole number of the generally acknowledged dialogues, and that in about half γε μήν was nowhere to be found, while on the other hand in the remaining works more than a hundred instances of τί μήν; and about sixty of γε μήν appeared.’ (Neither τί μήν; nor γε μήν are found in the _Meno_, but ἀλλὰ μήν and καὶ μήν both occur.) ‘The line of investigation thus marked out by Dittenberger has since been pursued by many scholars, of whom M. Schanz is much the most significant name. His paper in _Hermes_ xxiv pp. 439–459’ (zur _Entwicklung des platonischen Stils_, 1886) ‘has given fresh importance to this whole inquiry. The number of test-formulae has rapidly grown, and the many paths of observation successively opened show a remarkable amount of convergence.’

Among small immaterial points in which it is thought that the workings of half-conscious habit may be traced, a very large number of facts are furnished by the _formulae of answer_. Ritter after investigating these says that in the _Meno_ out of 182 instances of answer-formulae, 42, or 23 per cent, take the form ἐγώγε, ἐμοιγε or ὅκει μοι. This form is characteristic of the ‘first group’ (including _Phaedo_ and _Symposium_); is less common in the ‘second group’ (Rep., _Phaedr._, _Theaet._, and perhaps _Parm._), and is rare in the last group (_Soph._, _Polit._, _Phil._, _Tim._, _Crit._, _Laws_). I quote some results at which he arrives in regard to the _Meno_ and six other dialogues.
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These figures show in a general way a kinship between the *Meno* and the group *Protagoras, Euthyd., Gorgias* and *Republic*; from which the *Philebus* is removed and the *Laws* yet more removed. Some of the other results at which he arrives, however, diverge considerably from the views adopted in the present work.

Ritter argues that for determining the order of the dialogues language is the only test: doctrinal content, allusions from one work to another, historical references, are all illusory or insufficient.

The stylometric method has been disparaged by Ferdinand Horn (*Platonstudien*, Vienna, 1893)\(^1\); also by Zeller in the 4th (German) edition of his *History of Ancient Philosophy* and in two papers.

But the writer who has been most prominent in recent years in regard to this kind of research is W. Lutoslavski. A paper of his was read before the

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\(^1\) In an Appendix (pp. 343–358) he gives an analysis and criticism of the *Meno*, which he believes to have been written later than the *Protagoras*, but earlier than the *Gorgias*. 

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Oxford Philological Society on 21st May, 1897, of which a review is given in C.R. xi 284: 'Great numbers of stylistical peculiarities are required for correct inferences. C. Ritter investigated only forty peculiarities of style, and many other inquirers have drawn inferences from a single occurrence of a single peculiarity. The chronological conclusions drawn by Lutoslavski are based on the comparison of five hundred peculiarities representing fifty-eight thousand observations made by various investigators.' His method has been, assuming that the latest work of all is the Laws, to group in order of their approximation to this the other 'late' dialogues, Soph., Polit., Phil., and Timaeus. Then these dialogues, with the Laws, are taken as the standard of comparison for the remaining works.

So far as the earlier dialogues are concerned, his conclusions are as follows:—

(1) Gorgias is later than Meno, Euthydemus, Protagoras, and all Socratic dialogues.

(2) Cratylus, Symposium, Phaedo form a group later than the Gorgias, and were written probably in the order here mentioned.

(3) Republic Bks. ii–x were written in a few years, and are later than the Phaedo. The composition of this work was not interrupted by other labours; only Bk. i is very much earlier, probably written between Gorgias and Cratylus.

(4) Phaedrus was written about 379 B.C. and after the Republic.

In 1897 Lutoslavski's main work The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic was published in English.
INTRODUCTION

A careful and elaborate review of it, by J. Adam, appears in C.R. xii 218 foll. The work falls into two parts; the first ‘stylometric’ (of which a part of the results have just been given), the second dealing with the contents and teaching of the dialogues. The reviewer has some excellent observations on the limitations of the method of Stylometry. Lutoslavski says the method of his book is ‘a result of the author’s previous study of natural sciences and mathematics.’ He has applied the methods there appropriate too rigidly to the workings of a human mind.

Editions of the Meno

Platonis dialogi iv Meno, Crito, Alcibiades uterque cum adnotatione critica et exegetica. Curavit Ph. Buttmannus (Ed. iv 1822, Ed. v 1830). This work was based on the work of F. E. Biester, who published an edition of these four dialogues in the year 1780, in accordance with a decree of Frederick the Great, issued in the previous year, to promote the better editing of Latin and Greek works for the use of schools, and the publishing of German translations of the same.

Vier platonische Gespräche, Menon, Kríton, der erste und zweite Alkibiades, Deutsch mit Anmerkungen etc., by F. Ullrich (Ed. ii 1821). This was based on a translation by F. Gedike issued in 1780 as part of the scheme referred to above.

Stallbaum published an edition of the Meno in 1827, and again in 1836 as part of his complete edition of Plato’s works. On this is based, but with great additions and improvements, the work of R. Fritzsche (Leipzig 1885).

The Meno of Plato, with Introduction and Notes, by St. George Stock, M.A., Pembroke College, Oxford (Clarendon Press 1891). [This I believe is the only edition with English notes hitherto published.]
Explanation of some References

'Grote' = *Plato and the other companions of Socrates*, by George Grote, F.R.S. (Ed. II 1867). (When Grote's *History of Greece* is indicated it is referred to specifically. Unfortunately the paging differs so much in the different editions that it has only been possible to refer to the chapters.)

'Zeller' = *Plato and the Older Academy*, translated with the Author's sanction from the German of Dr. Eduard Zeller by Sarah Frances Alleyne and Alfred Goodwin, M.A. (new ed. 1888). (When translations of other parts of Zeller's work are referred to, they are specially indicated. In the case of the vol. on Socrates, reference is made to the 3rd ed. 1885.)

'Kühner' = *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* von Dr. Raphael Kühner. Reference has unavoidably been made to the second edition (1870) by sections ($) and paragraphs. The numbering of the sections corresponds generally with that of the new (revised) edition.


'Goodwin M.T.' (or 'Goodwin') = *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*, by Dr. W. W. Goodwin (enlarged edition 1897).

'F.E.T.' = *A Syntax of Attic Greek*, by F. E. Thompson, M.A. 1888.

'C.R.' = *Classical Review*.

'J.P.' = *Journal of Philology*.

'K. & P.' = Ritter and Preller *Historia philosophiae, etc.* ed. 7, 1888.

'Ueb.-Heinze' = Ueberweg *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Phil.* ed. 8, 1894, re-edited by Heinze.

'J.H.S.' = *Journal of the Hellenic Society*.

'Fr.' = Frizsche's edition (mentioned above).

'Sch.' = M. Schanz's edition of the text.

(= distinguished from.

A mark † is affixed to the name of any work that is regarded as spurious.

The old Latin translation of Plato by Ficinus was published in 1532 (and the following years) and that by Cornarius at Basel in 1561.
ΜΕΝΩΝ

ἡ περὶ ἀρετῆς [πειραστικὸς]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΜΕΝΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΑΙΣ ΜΕΝΩΝΟΣ, ΑΝΥΤΟΣ

I. Ἐχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄρα διδα-
κτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἄλλος ἀσκητὸν; ἢ ὅτι
οὔτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητὸν, ἄλλα φύσει παρα-
γίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ ἄλλη ταύτῃ τρόπῳ;

Σ.Ω. Ὅμως Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοῦ εὐ-
δόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησίων καὶ ἑθαυμάζοντο
ἔφι ἱππικὴ τε καὶ πλούτῳ, νῦν δὲ, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, ἢ
καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἰκίστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταῖρου
Ἀριστέππου πολίται [Δαρισιαίῳ]. τοῦτον δὲ
ὑμῖν αὐτὸς ἦστι Γοργίας· ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν
πόλιν ἔραστας ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἐιληφεν Ἀλευνάδων τε
τοὺς πρώτους, διὸ ὁ σὸς ἔραστής ἐστὶν Ἀρι-
στέππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ
tούτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγα-
λοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἕαν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὡσπερ
εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἀτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέξων αὐτὸν ὑ
ἔρωταν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ δ' τι ἄν τις

Ξ

Β
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ  

βούληται, καὶ οὖδενὶ ὅτρῳ οὔκ ἀποκρινόμενοι.
ἐνθάδε δὲ, ὃ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περι-
τι ἐστηκεν· ὅσπερ αὐχμὸς τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, οὐ
καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶν τῶν τόπων παρ᾿ ὑμᾶς
οὖχεσθαι ἡ σοφία. εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὖτως
ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὖδεὶς οὔ γελάσεται
καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὃ ἔξεν, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριος
τις εἶναι [ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθ’ ὅτῳ ἱ
τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι]. ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον
dεῖ εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὡς
οὐδὲ αὐτὸ, ὃ τι ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετή,
tυγχάνω εἰδῶς.

Β  Ἡγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς, ὃ Μένων, οὖτως ἔχω·
συμπένομαι τοῖς πολέμαις τούτοις τοῦ πράγματος,
καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὖκ εἰδὼς περὶ
ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τι ἐστὶν, πῶς
ἀν ὅποιον γέ τι <ἐστὶν> εἰδεῖν; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι 5
οἶν τε εἶναι, ὡς Μένωνα μὴ γνωρίσκει τὸ
παράπαν ὡς ἐστὶν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς
εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖος ἐστίν, εἴτε καὶ
τάναντα τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἶν τ’ εἶναι;

C  ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σὺ, ὃ Σώκρατες, 10
ἄληθῶς οὖδ’ ὃ τι ἀρετή ἐστὶν οἶς θα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἶκας ἄπαγγέλλωμεν;
ΣΩ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὃ ἔταυρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὃτι
οὐδ’ ἅλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.
ΜΕΝ. Τί δέ; Γοργία οὖκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε 15
ἐνθάδε ἦν;
ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε.
ΜΕΝ. Εἴτε οὖκ εἴδοκει σοι εἰδέναι;
Σ.Ο. Οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὡς Μένων, ὡστε ὁκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πῶς μοι τότε ἔδοξεν. ἀλλ' ἵσως ἐκεῖνος τε οἶδεν, καὶ σὺ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγεν· ἀνάμνησιν οὖν με, πῶς ἔλεγεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ· δοκεὶ γὰρ δὴ πον σοῦ ἀπερ ἐκεῖνο.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοῦγε.

Σ.Ο. Ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοῖνυν ἑώμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀπεστίω· σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὡς πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τι φης ἀρετὴν εἶναι; εἰπὼν καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐφευσμένος ὃ, ἀν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντετυχηκέναι.

III. ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπῶν, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ βούλει ἄνδρος ἀρετήν, ράδιον, ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἄνδρος ἀρετή, ἰκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοῖς μὲν φίλοις εὐ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἔχθρους κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δὲι αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὐ οἰκεῖν, σφίξουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκουν οὕσαν τοῦ ἄνδρός. καὶ ἀλλῃ ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἀρρενός, καὶ προσβυτέρου ἄνδρος, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθεροῦ, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δοῦλον. καὶ ἀλλ' πάμ-72 πολλαὶ ἀρεταὶ εἰσίν, ὡστε οὖν ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετής πέρι ὃ τι ἐστὶν· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἥλικιών πρὸς ἐκαστον ἔργον ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστὶν· ὡσαύτως δὲ, οἶμαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Πολλή γε τινι εύτυχία έοικα κεκρήσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μιαν ξητῶν ἀρετῆν σμήνος τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοι κειμένων. ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἰ μου ἐρομένου μελέτησθε περὶ οὕσιας ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπηκρίνω μοι, εἰ σε ἡρόμην ἀρα τούτῳ φής πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφεροῦσας ἄλληλων, τῷ μελέττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δὲ τῷ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τῶν τοιούτων; εἴπε, τί ἂν ἀπηκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθεῖς;

ΜΕΝ. Τούτῳ ἔγγυε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἢ μέλλει τις εἰσίν, ἢ ἠτέρα τῆς ἐτέρας.

ΣΩ. Εἴ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταύτα, τούτῳ τοῖς μοι αὐτῷ εἴπε, ὦ Μένων, ὃ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἄλλα ταύτῳ εἰσίν ἀπασιν τί τούτῳ φής εἶναι; εἴχες δὴ ποι ἄν τί μοι εἰπεῖν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐγγυε.

IV. ΣΩ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄρετῶν καὶ εἴ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἰσιν, ἐν γε τί εἰδός ταύτων ἀπασιν ἑχουσιν, δι’ δ’ εἰσίν ἄρετας, εἰς δ’ καλὸς ποι ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινάμενων

Τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλώσαι, δ’ τυγχάνει οὕσα ἁρετὴ ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὁ τι λέγω;

ΜΕΝ. Δοκῶ γε μοι μανθάνεις οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαι γε πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ ἁρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων, ἄλλῃ μὲν ἄνδρος εἰναι, ἄλλῃ δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ἰγνοίειας
καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἵσχύος ὡσαύτως; ἀλλὰ μὲν ἄνδρός δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἕγιεια, ἀλλὰ δὲ γυναῖκός; ἥ ταῦταν πανταχοῦ εἴδος ἐστίν, εάν περ ἕγιεια ἥ, εάν τε ἐν ἄνδρὶ εάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ Ἔ ὀρφοῦ ἥ;

ΜΕΝ. ᾿Η αὐτή μοι δοκεῖ ἕγιειά γε εἶναι καὶ ἄνδρος καὶ γυναίκος.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἱσχύς; εάν περ ἵσχυρά γυνή ἥ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ αὐτή ἱσχύι ἵσχυρά ἐσται; τῷ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τούτῳ λέγων οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἱσχύς εἶναι ἢ ἱσχύς, εάν τε ἐν ἄνδρὶ ἥ εάν τε ἐν γυναικί. ἥ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;

25 ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. ᾿Η δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τὸ τι, εάν τε ἐν παιδί ἥ εάν τε ἐν πρεσβύτη, εάν τε ἐν γυναικί εάν τε ἐν ἄνδρὶ;

ΜΕΝ. ᾿Εμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τούτῳ οὐκέτι όμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ; οὐκ ἄνδρος μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πῶλεν εὗ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;

ΜΕΝ. ᾿Εγγώμε.

ΣΩ. ᾿Αρ’ οὖν οἶν τε εὗ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν περὶ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσιν, δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη διοικήσῃ σουσίν;

ΜΕΝ. ᾿Ανάγκη.
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ΣΩ. Τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἰτέρ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.

ΜΕΝ. Ψάλνονται.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης μῶν ἀκόλουθοι δυτες καὶ ἀδίκοι ἀγαθοὶ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ σωφρόνεσ καὶ δίκαιοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Πάντες ἄρ άνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ εἰσίν. τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γύρονται.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν δήπω, εἰ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἤν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήτα.

V. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστὶν, πειρῶ εἰπτεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, τί αὐτὸ φησι Γοργίας εἰναι καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖνοι.

ΜΕΝ. Τί ἄλλο γὰρ ἢ ἄρχειν οἷον τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων; εἴπερ ἐν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ σε ἀνθρώπων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἄλλα ἄρα καὶ παῖδος ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὡς Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἷον τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἢτί ἂν δούλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὡς ἄριστε. ἢτι δὲ καὶ τόδε σκόπει· ἄρχειν φης οἷον τ' εἶναι· οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μὴ;
MEN. Οἶμαι ἐγώγε· ἢ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν.
Σ.Ω. Πότερον ἀρετή, ὃ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις; ἔ·
MEN. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις;
Σ.Ω. 'Ως περὶ ἄλλου ὀτουνόμοι, οἰον, εἶ βού-
λει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμι ἀν ἐγώγε· ὃτι
σχῆμα τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἀπλῶς ὃτι σχῆμα.
διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἀν εἴποιμι, ὃτι καὶ ἄλλα
ἐστι σχῆματα.
MEN. Ὅρθως γε λέγων σύ, ἐπει καὶ ἐγὼ
λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι
ἀρετᾶς.
Σ.Ω. Τίνας ταύτας; εἴπε· οἰον καὶ ἐγὼ σοι 74
eἴποιμι ἀν καὶ ἄλλα σχῆματα, εἶ με κελεύοις·
kαὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἴπε ἄλλας ἀρετᾶς.
MEN. Ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετή
eῖναι καὶ σοφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέ-
pεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι.
Σ.Ω. Πάλιν, ὃ Μένων, ταῦταν πεπόνθαμεν·
pολλάς αὐ ηὐρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ξητούντες,
ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ νυνή· τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἡ διὰ πάντων
tοῦτων ἐστὶν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.
VI. MEN. Οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι πω, ὃ Σώκρατες, β
cόσε σὺ ξητεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων,
ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.
Σ.Ω. Εἰκότως γε· ἄλλα ἐγώ προθυμήσομαι,
ἐὰν οἶος τ' ὃ, ἡμᾶς προβεβάσαι. μανθάνεις γὰρ
ποι ὃτι οὕτως ἔχει περὶ παντός· εἰ τίς σε
ἀνέροιτο τούτο, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγώ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστιν
σχῆμα, ὃ Μένων; εἰ αὐτῷ εἴπεις ὃτι στρογγυ-
λότης, εἰ σοι εἰπεν ἄπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα ἢ στρογγυλότης ἦστιν ἢ σχῆμα τι; εἰπες δήπον ἂν ὦτι σχῆμα τι.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὥστι καὶ ἄλλα ἦστιν σχῆμα ταῦτα;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὅποια, ἔλεγες ἂν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὁσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὦ τι ἦστιν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι τὸ λευκὸν, μετά ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἔρωτὼν, πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρώμα ἦστιν ἢ χρώμα τι; εἰπες ἂν ὦτι χρώμα τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ γε σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα, ἔλεγες ἂν ἄλλα, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἦττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ὡσπερ ἐγώ μετῆι τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἄει εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἄλλα μὴ μοι οὖτως, ἄλλῃ ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐνὶ τοῖς προσαγορευόμενοι ὄνόματι, καὶ φῆς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὄ τι οὖ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἑνώτια ὄντα ἀλλήλοις, τι ἦστιν τοῦτο, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἦττον κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλου ἢ τὸ εὐθῦ, ὅ δή ὄνομάζεις σχῆμα ἐκαὶ οὐδὲν μάλλον φῆς τὸ στρογγύλου σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθῦ; ἢ οὖν οὕτω λέγεις;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγώγε.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγησι, τότε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῆς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ εὐθῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθῦ εὐθῦ ἢ στρογγύλον;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήποῦ, ὦ Σωκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν σχῆμα γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῆς εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐτέρου τοῦ ἐτέρου.
ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις.
VII. ΣΩ. Τί ποτε οὖν τούτο, οὔ τοῦτο ὑμοῖς ἐστιν τὸ σχῆμα; πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχῆματος ἢ χρώματος ἐἰπεῖς ὅτι ἀλλ' οὖδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὃ τι βούλει, ὥς ἀνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὧ τι λέγεις· ἰσως ἂν ἔθαυμασε καὶ ἐπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι ξητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τούτοις ταύτων; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἰ τις ἐρωτήσῃ· τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὑ τῇ σχῆματα καλεῖς, ταύτων ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηται σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν.
ΜΕΝ. Μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σωκρατες, εἴπε. Β
ΣΩ. Βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἕθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σύ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐγωγε.
ΣΩ. Προθυμητέον τοῖνυν· ἄξιον γάρ.
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πειρῶμαι σοι· εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστιν σχῆμα· σκόπεις οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχεις αὐτὸ εἶναι·
ἐστω γὰρ δὴ ἠμιν τοῦτο σχῆμα, δὲ μόνον τῶν ὑτων 
τυγχάνει χρώματι ἄει ἐπόμενον. ἵκανος σοι, ἢ 
ἄλλωσ πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὖτος ἀγαπήν 
εἰ μοι ἀρετήν εἴποι; 
ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εἴηθες, ὡ Σώκρατεσ. 
ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις; 
ΜΕΝ. Ὅσι σχῆμα πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν 
λόγον, δ ἄει χρώα ἐπεταί. εἰεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρώαν 
τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἄλλα ὡσαίτως ἀποροί ὡσπερ 
περὶ τοῦ σχῆματος, τί ἂν οἰει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι; 
VIII. ΣΩ. Τάληθη ἐγώγε· καὶ εἰ μὲν γε τῶν 
σοφῶν τις εἰη καὶ ἐρυστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν 
ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἶποιμ· ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἰρήται· 
δε εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργου λαμβάνειν λόγον 
καὶ ἐλέγχειν. εἰ δὲ ὡσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν 
φίλοι δύνεσθε βούλοιντο ἄλληλοις διἀλέγησθαι, δεῖ 
δὴ προφόρον πως καὶ διαλεκτικῶτερον ἀποκρί-

φανερωθοί· ἐστι δὲ ἢςως τὸ διαλεκτικῶτερον μὴ 
μόνον τάληθη ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ δι’ ἐκέινων 
ἀν ἂν προομολογηθάγει εἰδέναι ὁ ἔρωτῶν. πειράζομαι 
Ε δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ σοι ὑπόθεσει. λέγε γὰρ μοι· 
τελευτῆτι καλεῖς τι; τοιώνθε λέγω οἶκον πέρας καὶ 
ἔσχατον· πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτὸν τι λέγω. ἢςως δ’ 
ἀν ἠμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο· ἄλλα σὺ γε ποὺ 
καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι· τὸ 
75 τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον. 
ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἴμαι μανθάνειν δὲ 
λέγεις. 

76 ΣΩ. Τί δ’; ἢ ἐπιπέδου καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἔτερον αὐ 
περικοῦν, οἴκον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις;
MEN. Ὅψωγε καλῶ.
ΣΩ. Ἡδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων, σχῆμα δ λέγω· κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχῆματος τούτο λέγω, εἰς δ τὸ στερεοῦν περαίνει, τοῦτ' εἶναι 25 σχῆμα· ὃπερ ἂν συλλαβῶν εἴποιμι στερεοῦν πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.
IX. MEN. Τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. Ἄλλῳ ἥσσον σὺ τοῦτ' εἴπης, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι.
ΣΩ. Κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὁ 10 Μένων, διαλεγόμενου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἰ καὶ ἔρασταί σοι ἐτι εἰσίν.
MEN. Τί δὴ;
ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὖδὲν ἄλλῳ ἡ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ὃπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφώντες, ἀτε τυρανν. 15 νεύοντες, ἔως ἂν ἐν ὀρᾶ ὄσιν. καὶ ἀμα ἐμοῦ ὀ λίσως κατέγνωκας, ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν. χαρισμαί οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.
MEN. Πάνω μὲν οὖν χάρισαι.
ΣΩ. Βούλεις οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνω- 20 μαι, ἢ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἄκολουθήσαις;
MEN. Βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὀντῶν κατὰ Ἔμπεδοκλέα;
MEN. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὗς καὶ δὲ δὲν αἰ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἀμούττειν ἐνὶ δ οἷς τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ δὴν καλεῖς τι;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐγὼγε.
ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ σύνες δ' τοι λέγω, ἔφη Πίνδαρος, ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροή σχημάτων ὑψεὶ σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητοῦς.
ΜΕΝ. Ἀριστά μοι δοκεῖσ, ὡ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.
ΣΩ. Ἡσώς γὰρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται καὶ ἄμα, οἶμαι, ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι ἔχουσι ἢν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἢ εἰσπέειν καὶ φωνὴν, δ' ἔστι, καὶ ὥσμὴν καὶ ἀλλα ἄπολλα τῶν τοιούτων.
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τραγικὴ γὰρ ἔστιν, ὡ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὡς τε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχῆματος.
ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, βελτίων' οἶμαι δὲ οὖ' ἀν σοι δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὅσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαίων σοι ἀπίεναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ' εἰ περιμεναίς τε καὶ μυθείς.
ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμ' ἂν, ὡ Σώκρατες, εἰ μοι πολλὰ τοιαύτα λέγοις.
Χ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπο-
Λείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαύτα· ἄλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὕχ οἶδος τ' ἐσομαι πολλὰ τοιαύτα λέγειν. ἄλλ' ἰδί δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σοῦ ἐμοί τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετής πέρι, ὃ τι ἔστιν, καὶ παύσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντας τὴν ἑκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτουτες, ἄλλα εάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑπὲρ εἰπὲ τί ἔστιν ἀρετή· τὰ δὲ γε παραδείγματα ἐπὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ἐληφας.

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ τούτων μοι, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητής λέγει, χαίρειν τε καλοίσι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἐγὼ τούτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι

ΣΩ. Ἀρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμήτην εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀρα ὃς εἰναι τινῶν οἱ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἐτέρων δὲ οἱ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, σἀριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Αλλὰ τινες τῶν κακῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Οἴομενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γυνώσκοντες, ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν, ὃμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀμφότερα ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ ἡ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γυνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν ὃμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστα.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Τι ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ;

ΜΕΝ. Γενέσθαι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἤγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὦφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ὃ ἄν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὡς τι 35

βλάπτει ὃ ἄν παρῇ;

ΜΕΝ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οἱ ἤγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὦφελεῖν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἱ γιγνώσκοντες ὡς βλάπτει.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ,

ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν, οἱ ἤγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὦφελεῖν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνω μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Ὠψκοιν δὴλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν

Ε κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, [οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά,] ἀλλὰ

ἐκεῖνων, ἄφοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτα γε

κακά· ὅστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἴομενοι 45

ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δήλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

ἡ οὖ;

ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύονσιν οὗτοι γε.

ΣΩ. Τι δέ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες,

ὡς φήσι σὺ, ἤγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν 50

ἐκεῖνον, ὃ ἄν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκοις δήπου ὅτι

βλαβῆσονται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη.

78 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὕτωι οὐκ οὐν-

ται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθ’ ὡςον βλάπτονται;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τούτο ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τοὺς δὲ ἄθλιους οὐ κακοδαίμονας;

ΜΕΝ. Οἴμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἀθλίος καὶ

κακοδαίμων εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὡ Σώκρατες.
ΜΕΝΩΝ

ΣΩ. Οὔκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὡς Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γάρ ἀλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλων εἶναι, ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτάσθαι;

ΜΕΝ. Κανδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὡς Σῶ-Β κρατεῖ καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακὰ.

XI. ΣΩ. Οὕκοιν νυν ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαι τε τάγαθα καὶ δύνασθαι;

ΜΕΝ. Εἶπον γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὕκοιν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πάσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γ' ὡς οὐδὲν ὃ ἐτέροις τοῦ ἐτέρου βελτίων;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἀλλος ἄλλον, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἄν εἰθ ἀμείνων.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτ' ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀρετῆ, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τάγαθα. Κ

ΜΕΝ. Παντάπασι μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐδώμεν δὴ καὶ τούτῳ εἰ ἀληθῆς λέγεις· ἵσως γάρ ἂν εὗ λέγοις. τάγαθα φῆς οἰνόν τ' εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. 'Αγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὕχι οἰνὸν ἵνα ἐν τῶ ἤτα λέγεις τάγαθα ἢ τὰ τοιαύτα;
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαύτα. 25

Σ.Ω. Εἶπεν· χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον
πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή́ ἔστω, ὡς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ
μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικός ξένος. πότερον
προστίθεις τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὡς Μένων, τὸ
dikaios kai ὁσίως, ἥ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ 30
καὶ ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὥμοιως σὺ αὐτῷ
ἀρετὴν καλεῖς;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ δήπορ, ὡ Σάκρατες.

Σ.Ω. 'Ἀλλὰ κακίαν;

ΜΕΝ. Πάντως δήπορ.

Σ.Ω. Δεῖ ἁρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ
dikaiosún̄n ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσείναι,

Ε ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς εἰ δὲ μη, οὔκ ἔσται
ἀρετή, καλπέρ ἐκπορίζουσα τάγαθά.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετῆ γένοιτο' 40
ἀν;

Σ.Ω. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύ-
ριον, ὅταν μὴ δίκαιον ἢ, μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ,
οὔκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπορία;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

Σ.Ω. Οὐδέν ἁρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιοῦτων
ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἢ ἀπορία ἢ τὸ εἴη, ἄλλα, ὡς ἔοικεν, δὲ μὲν ἄν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνεται,
79 ἀρετῆ ἔσται, δ̣ ἀν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιοῦτων,
κακία.

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.

ΧΙΙ. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν τούτων ἐκαστὸν ὄλγον
πρῶτον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἐφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαίο-
σύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα;
MEN. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Είτε, ὃ Μένων, παιδεῖς πρός με;
MEN. Τι δή, ὃ Σώκρατες; μή
ΣΩ. "Οτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεσθέντος σου μὴ κατ-
αγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος
παραδείγματα καθ' ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου
μὲν ἡμέλησας, λέγεις δὲ μοι, ὦτι ἀρετή ἐστιν ὑ
οἶον τ' εἶναι τάγαθα πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύ-
νης; τούτο δὲ φης μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι;
MEN. Ἐγώγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει εξ δυν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς,
τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν, ὃ τι ἂν πράττῃ,
τούτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον
φῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἔκαστα τούτων.
MEN. Τί ὁυν δή;
ΣΩ. Τοῦτο λέγω, ὦτι ἐμὸ το δεσθέντος ὅλον
εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν
ὁ τι ἐστὶν, πᾶσαν δὲ φης πρᾶξιν ἀρετήν εἶναι,
ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὅσπερ 
ἐφηκὼς ὁ τι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἡδὴ γνω-
σομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐάν σὺ κατακερματίξῃς αὐτὴν
κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἄρχῃς, ὡς
ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτῆσεως, ὃ φίλε Μένων,
τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα
πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἂν εἴη; [τούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶν λέγειν,
ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὦτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης
πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν.] ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν
deίσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτῆσεως, ἀλλ' οὐκ οίνα τίνα
eidêvai mòrióv ārethís o tì ēstiv, aúthhn mē
eidôta;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὦτε ἐγὼ σοι ἀπ᾿ ἐκριώματι περὶ τοῦ σχῆματος, ἀπεβάλλομεν ποὺ τῆν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τῆν διὰ τῶν ἐτὶ ξητού-

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὅρθως γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σῶ- κρατεῖ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοῖνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἐτὶ ξητο-

Ε μορίων ἀποκριṓμενοι δηλόωσειν αὐτὴν ὅτωρ, ἢ ἄλλο ὅτι τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ πρόπολεν ἔγνυν, ἀλλὰ 45 πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι ἔρωτισθεως, τίνος ὁντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἢ λέγεις· ἢ οὔδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς ὅρθως λέγειν.

XIII. ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι τοῖνυν πάλιν εὖ ἀρχής·

ΜΕΝ. Ὁ Σῶκρατεῖς, ἥκουν μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;

ΜΕΝ. Ὁ Σῶκρατεῖς, ἥκουν μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;

καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὔδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς
tię φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου;
XIV 80 D       MENΩΝ

15 τι ἀποκρίνομαι σοι. καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἰρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὦ τί ἔστιν τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθέυε τοῦ ἀποδημών· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἀλλῃ πόλει τουαίτα ποιοῖς, τάχθ᾽ ἂν ὦς γός ἀπαχ-θεῖς.

ΣΩ. Πανούργος εἰ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὄλγου ἐξηπάτησάς με.
25 MEN. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σάκρατες;
ΣΩ. Γνωρώσκω οὖν ἔνεκά με ἦκασας.
MEN. Τίνος δὴ οἶει;
ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς ἁγγείας. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὡς χαίρουσιν εἰκαζό-30 μενοί. λυπιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γάρ, οἴμαι, τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀντεικά-σομαι σε. ἐγὼ δὲ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὕτη ναρκᾶσα οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὕτη· εἰ δὲ μή, οὖ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους 35 ποιῶ ἀπορείν, ἀλλὰ πάντος μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορείν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὦ ἔστιν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἵπτον πρώτον μὲν ἢδησα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἀγαπᾶτε, νῦν μέντοι ὁμοίος εἰ οὖκ εἰδότε. οὕμως δὲ ἔθελον 40 μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὦ τί ποτε ἔστιν.

XIV. MEN. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ξητῆσεις, ὦ Σάκρατες, τοῦτο, ὦ μή οἴσθα τὸ παράπαν ὦ τί ἔστιν; ποιον γὰρ ὄν οὐκ οἴσθα προθέμενος
ξητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὁ τι μᾶλλον ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἰσε ὅτι τούτῳ ἐστὶν, δὲ σὺ οὐκ ἠδησθά; 5

Σ. Μανθάνω ὁλοὶ βούλει λέγειν, ὁ Μένων. ὁρᾷ τούτων ὡς ἐριστικοὶ λόγον ἦκατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἀρα ἔστὶν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε δ' οἶδεν οὔτε δ' μὴ οἶδεν; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γε δ' οἶδεν ζητοῖ. οἴδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιοῦτῳ ζητήσεως. οὔτε δ' μὴ 10 οἶδεν. οἴδε γὰρ οἴδεν ὁ τι ζητήσει.

81 ΜΕΝ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ λόγος οὗτος, δο Σώκρατες;

Σ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐχεις λέγειν δήγραφα; 15

Σ. Ἐγώγε. ἀκήκοα γάρ ἀνθρώπῳ τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα—

ΜΕΝ. Τίνα λόγον λεγόντων;

Σ. Ἀληθῆ, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλῶν.

ΜΕΝ. Τίνα τούτων, καὶ τίνης οἱ λέγουσιν; 20

Σ. Οἱ μὲν λέγουσι εἰσὶ τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερεῖων ὅσιος μεμέλικη περὶ δὴν μεταχειρίστην λόγον οὗτος τ' εἶναι διδόναι λέγει δε καὶ Πλάνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσιος θεῖοι εἰσίν. δ' δὲ λέγουσι, ταυτὶ ἐστίν. ἄλλα 25 σκόπεσι, εἰ σοι δοκεῖσθαι ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασί γὰρ τήν ψυχήν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἄθανατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτῶν, δὴ ἀποθνῄσκειν καλοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε. δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιβάζων ἃ τὸν βίον.

οἴσι γὰρ ἄν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος δέχεται, εἰς τὸν ὑπερθεν ἄλοιν κείνων ἐνατιφ ἐτεί
άνδιδοις ψυχαῖς τάλιν,
ἐκ τῶν βασιλῆς ἁγανοῖ καὶ σθένει κρατητὸν σοφία τε μέγιστοι

άνδρες αὐξοντες· ἐς δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν χρόνων ἔρως ἁγανοί πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται.

XV. Ἄτε όν ἡ ψυχή ἀθανάτος τε οὐσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονοῦσα, καὶ ἐωρακών καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἁιδῶν καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· διὸς ὑδένθανθαν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἀλλων οἴων τ᾽ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἀ γε καὶ πρότερον ἴππιστατο. ἂτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦσας οὐσῆς, καὶ μεμαθηκών τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαντά, οὐδέν κωσεὶ ἐν μόνω ἀναμνησθέντα, δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἀνθρώποι, τάλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἕαν τις ἀνδρεῖς ἢ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ χητῶν· τὸ γὰρ χητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλων ἑστὶν. οὐκοι δεὶς πείδεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ· οὕτως μὲν γὰρ ἄν ἡμᾶς ἄργους ποιήσεις καὶ ἔστι τοῦς μαλακῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἂδως ἀκούσαι, δεὶς δὲ ἐργαστικοῦς τε καὶ χητητικοὺς ποιεῖ· ὃς ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ τοῦ χητεῖν ἀρετῆ δὲ τοῦ ἑστὶν.

MEN. Ναι, ὁ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἢν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησις ἑστὶν; ἔχεις με τούτῳ διδάσκαι ὅπτως οὕτως ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄρτι εἶπον, ὁ Μένων, ὅτι πανούργος εἰ· καὶ νῦν ἔρωτας εἰ ἔχω σε ἑδὲ διδάσκαι, ὅσοι φημὶ διδαχήν εἶναι ἀλλ'
ΠЛАΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀνάμμησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνωμαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τὰναντία λέγων.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους: ἀλλ’ εἰ πῶς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅτι ἔχει ὁσπερ 30 λέγεις, ἐνδείξαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἔστι μὲν οὐράδιον, ὡμως δὲ ἔθελω προθυμηθήναι σοῦ ἔνεκα. ἀλλὰ μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τούτων τῶν βασιτοῦ ἐνα, ὡντινα βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι 35 ἐπιδείξωμαι.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε. δεῦρο πρόσελθε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλλην μὲν ἔστι καὶ ἐλληνίζει;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἴκογενής.

ΣΩ. Πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν, ὁπότερ’ ἀν σοι φαίνηται, εἰ ἀναμμυησκόμενος ἤ μανθάνων παρ’ ἐμοῦ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ προσέξω.

ΧΥ. ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι, ὡ παῖ, γυνώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτον ἐστιν;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐγώγει.

ΣΩ. Ἐστιν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἴσας ἔχον τὰς γραμμὰς ταῦτας πάσας, τέταρτας οὕσας; 5

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ταυταῖς τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἴσας ἔχον;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰὴ ἀν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖξον ἐναλαττον;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Εἶ ὄν ἐὰν αὐτῇ ἡ πλευρά δύοιν προδοῖν καὶ αὐτῇ δυοῖν, πόσον ἂν ἐὰν ποδῶν τὸ ὄλον;  
15 ὅδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐὰν ταύτῃ δυοίν προδοῖν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἔνος ποδὸς μόνον, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἄπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν προδοῖν τὸ χωρίον;  
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.  
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοῖν προδοῖν καὶ ταύτῃ, ἀλλ' δὲ τι ἢ δὲς δυοῖν γίγνεται;  
ΠΑΙ. Γίγνεται.  
ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἀρα δὲς γίγνεται ποδῶν;  
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.  
ΣΩ. Πόσοι οὖν εἶσιν οἱ δύο δὲς πόδες;  
25 λογισάμενος εἴπε.  
ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρες, ὁ Σώκρατες.  
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν γένοιτ' ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου ἐτερον διπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δὲ, ἵσας ἥχου πάσας τὰς γραμμὰς ὁσπέρ τοῦτο;  
30 ΠΑΙ. Ναι.  
ΣΩ. Πόσοιν οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν;  
ΠΑΙ. Ὅκτω.  
ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πειρῶ μοι εἴπειν πηλίκη τις ἔσται ἐκείνων ἡ γραμμὴ ἐκάστη; ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐ  
35 τούτῳ δυοῖν προδοῖν· τι δὲ ἢ ἐκείνων τοῦ διπλασίου;  
ΠΑΙ. Δήλου δὴ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὃτι διπλασία.  
ΣΩ. Ὀρᾶ, ὁ Μένων, ὡς ἔγὼ τούτου οὐδὲν διδάσκω, ἀλλ' ἐρωτῶ πάντα; καὶ οὐν οὗτος οἴηται εἰδέναι, ὅποια ἔστιν ἀφ' ἢ στὸ ὄκτωπον  
χωρίον γενήσεται· ἢ οὔ δοκεῖ σοι;  
ΜΕΝ. Ἔμουγε.  
ΣΩ. Οἰδένοις οὖν;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Οἶτει δὲ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας;
ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.
ΧVII. ΣΩ. Θεῷ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀναμμηνησκόμενον ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι. σὺ δὲ μοι λέγεις ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῆς τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον γλύνεσθαι; τοιώνδε λέγω, μὴ ταύτη μὲν μακρὸν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἄλλα ἵσον πανταχῇ ἐστώς ὁσπερ τούτῳ, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτῳ, ὀκτώποστον ἄλλα ὀρᾶ, εἰ ἐτί σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἔσεσθαι.
ΠΑΙ. Ἐμοιγέ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γλύνεται, ἵνα ἐτέραν τοσαῦτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε;
ΠΑΙ. Πᾶνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης δὴ, φῆς, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώποστον χωρίον, ἄν τέταρται τοσαῦται γένωνται;
ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.
Β ΣΩ. Ἀναγραψώμεθα δὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἵσας τέταρτας. ἀλλο τι ἂ τούτῳ ἄν εἰη δ' ὁ φής τὸ ὀκτώποστον εἶναι;
ΠΑΙ. Πᾶνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν ταυτὶ τέταρτα, ἰδι ἐκαστὸν ἵσον τούτῳ ἐστὶν τῷ τετράποδι;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Πόσον οὖν γλύνεται; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;
ΠΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;
ΣΩ. Διπλάσιον οὖν ἔστιν τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;
ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ Δίᾳ.
ΣΩ. Ἄλλα ποσαπλάσιον ἔστω.  
ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.  
ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἄρα, ὡς παῖ, οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.  
ΠΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.  
ΣΩ. Τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκες ἐστὶς ἐκκαίδεκα.  

οὔχι;  
ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.  
ΣΩ. Ὁκτώπουν δὲ ἀπὸ ποῖας γραμμῆς; οὔχι ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον;  
ΠΑΙ. Φημὶ.  

ΣΩ. Τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησί τούτι;  
ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.  
ΣΩ. Εἴειν τὸ δὲ ὁκτώπουν οὐ τοῦτο μὲν διπλασίον ἐστὶν, τούτου δὲ ἡμισυ;  
ΠΑΙ. <Ναὶ.>  
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἂν ἦτοσαύρης, ἀπὸ ἐλάττων δὲ ἦτοσάντω;  
ΠΑΙ. Καλῶς λέγεις.  
ΣΩ. Εἴειν τὸ γὰρ σοι δοκοῦν τούτῳ ἀποκρίνου. καὶ μοι λέγεις. οὔχ ἦδη μὲν δυοῖν ποδοῖν ἦν, ἦ δὲ τεττάρων;  
ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.  
ΣΩ. Δεὶ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὁκτώποδος χωρίον  

γραμμῆς μείζω μὲν ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τεττάρων ὁκτώποδος.  
ΠΑΙ. Δεὶ.
ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δή λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φής αὐτὴν εἶναι.

ΠΑΙ. Τρίποδα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀντερ τρίπονς ἦ, τὸ ἡμῶν ταῦτης προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπονς; δύο μὲν γὰρ οἶδε, ὃ δὲ εἰς· καὶ ἐνθένδε Ὀσαύτως δύο μὲν οἶδε, ὃ δὲ εἰς· καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὃ φής.

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν ἦ τῆς τριῶν καὶ τῆς τριῶν, τὸ ὅλον χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται;

ΠΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τρεῖς δὲ τρίς ποσοὶ εἰςὶ πόδες;

ΠΑΙ. Ἕμνεά.

ΣΩ. Ἐδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν;

ΠΑΙ. Ὅκτω.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ’ ἃρ’ ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδος πω τὸ Ὅκτω-ποὺν χωρίον γίγνεται.

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ πολας; πειρῶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβῶς· καὶ εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ἀπὸ πολας.

ΠΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὃς Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα.

ΧVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐυνοεῖς αὐ, ὃς Μένων, οὐ ἔστιν ἣδη βαδίζων ὃδε τοῦ ἀναμμυνθήσεσθαι; δοτὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἦδει μὲν οὖ, ἢ τις ἔστιν ἥ τοῦ Ὅκτωποδος χωρίον γραμμῆ, δοσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἀλλ’ οὖν φητό γ’ αὐτὴν τότε εἰδέναι, καὶ
θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδῶς, καὶ οὖν ἤγείτο ἀπορεῖν· γὰρ δὲ ἤγείται ἀπορεῖν ἡδη, καὶ ὡστερ ὁ οὖς οἶδεν, οὐδ' οἴεται εἰδέναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

10 Σ. Οὐκοῦν γὰρ βέλτιον ἔχει περί τὸ πράγμα ὁ οὖς ἤόηει;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τούτο μοι δοκεῖ.

Σ. Ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ ναρκαν ὡστερ ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σ. Προθύρων γονί τι πεποιήκαμεν, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὸ ἔξευρεῖν ὅτι ἔχει γὰρ γὰρ καὶ ζητήσειν ἃν ἡδεῖς οὐκ εἰδῶς, τότε δὲ θρᾶδες ἀν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις ἠκεῖ ἀν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίον χωρίου, ὡς δεὶ διπλασίαιν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχειν μήκει.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

Σ. Οἶει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσαι ζητεῖν ἡ μανθάνειν τοῦτο, ὃ ἤζετο εἰδέναι οὖς εἰδῶς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησεν τὸ εἰδέναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Σωκράτες.

Σ. Ἡ ἡγησάμενος ἀρα ναρκήσας;

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

Σ. Σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅ τι καὶ ἀνευρίσκεις ζητῶν μετ' ἔμοι, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἡ ἑρωτώτως ἐμοῦ καὶ οὗ διδάσκοντος φύλαττε δὲ ἀν ποιν εὗρης μὲ διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξόντα αὐτῶ, ἓλλα μὴ τᾶς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτώτα.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

XIX. Δέγε γάρ μοι σύ· ού τὸ μὲν τετράπτον
toῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστὶ χωρίων; μανθάνεις;
ΠΑΙ. 'Εγώγε.  
ΣΩ. Ἐτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθέμεν ἀν τοῦτο ἱ

Ισον;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἱσον ἐκατέρφ τούτων;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσάμεθα ἀν τὸ ἐν
tῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε;
ΠΑΙ. Πάννυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν γένοιτ' ἀν τέταρα ἱσα
χωρία τάδε;  
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε γίγνεται;
ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.
ΣΩ. Ἐδει δὲ διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι. ἢ οὖ
μέμνησαι;
ΠΑΙ. Πάννυ γε.  
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐστίν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας
eἰς γωνίαν τεῖνουσα, τέμνουσα δίχα ἑκαστον
tούτων τῶν χωρίων;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τέταρτες αὕται γίγνονται γραμ-

μαί ἱσαί, περιέχουσαι τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον;
ΠΑΙ. Γίγνονται.
ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ πήλικον τί ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ
χωρίον;
ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μανθάνω.
ΣΩ. Οὐχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἡμισὺ ἐκάστου ἐκάστη ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτέμηκεν ἐντός; ἢ οὐ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

35 ΣΩ. Πόσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔνεστιν;
ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρα.
ΣΩ. Πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ;
ΠΑΙ. Δύο.
ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τὶ ἔστιν;
ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσια.
ΣΩ. Τὸδε οὖν ποσάπτουν γίγνεται;
ΠΑΙ. 'Οκτώπτουν.
ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ πολᾶς γραμμῆς;
ΠΑΙ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης.

40 ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης
tοῦ τετράποδος;
ΠΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Καλοῦσιν δὲ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ
σοφισταῖ: ὃστ' εἰ ταύτη διάμετρον ὄνομα, ἀπὸ
τῆς διαμέτρου άν, ὡς συ φῆς, ὃ παῖ Μένωνος,
γίγνοιτ' ἀν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον.
ΠΑΙ. Πάντι μὲν οὖν, ὃ Σώκρατες.

50 XX. ΣΩ. Τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Μένων; ἔστιν
ἡμῖνα δόξαν οὖχ αὐτοῦ οὕτος ἀπεκρίνατο;
ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν οὖκ ὤδει γε, ὡς ἐφαμεν ὀλίγον
πρῶτερον.
ΜΕΝ. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. 'Ενήσαν δὲ γε αὐτῷ αὐταί αἱ δόξαι:
ἡ οὖ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τῷ οὖκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ δὲν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων δὲν οὐκ ὁδεῖ;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν μὲν γε αὐτῷ ὁσπέρ ὅναρ ἀρτι ἀνακεκίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὐταί· εἰ δὲ αὐτῶν τις ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἷοθεν ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἦττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων.

ΜΕΝ. Ἠεικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ᾽ ἐρωτή-20 σαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβῶν αὐτὸς ἕξ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι ἐστιν;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἃν νῦν οὗτος ἔχει, ὅτι ἔλαβεν ποτε ἢ ἂεi ἔχεν;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἂεi ἔχεν, ἂεi καὶ ἂν 30 ἐπιστήμων· εἰ δὲ ἔλαβεν ποτε, οὐκ ἄν ἐν γε ἐτῷ νῦν βίω εἰληφὼς εἶη. ἡ δεδίδαχεν τις τούτων γεωμετρεῖν; οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταυτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀπάντων. ἐστιν οὖν ὅστις τούτων πάντα δεδίδαχεν; δίκαιος γὰρ πον εἰ εἰδέναι, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονεν καὶ τέθραπται.
MEN. Ἄλλα οἶδα ἐγώγε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πόποτε ἐδίδαξεν.

Σ.Ω. Ἐχει δὲ ταῦτας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχὶ;
MEN. Ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σωκράτης, φαίνεται.

XXI. Σ.Ω. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ ἦδη τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἅλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε 86 καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει;
MEN. Φαίνεται.

Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν οὕτος γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ὅτι ὁ οὐκ ἴν ἄνθρωπος;
MEN. Ναι.

Σ.Ω. Εἰ οὖν ὅν τ' ἂν ἵν χρόνον καὶ ὅν ἄν μῇ ἴν ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσωταί αὐτῷ ἄληθείς δόξαι,
αὖ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεὶσαι ἐπιστήμην γίγνονται, ἃρ' οὗ τὸν ἄει χρόνον μεμαθηκεῖα ἐσται ἡ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος.
MEN. Φαίνεται.

Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἄει ἡ ἄληθεία ἤμων τῶν ὄντων Β ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἄν ἡ ψυχή εἰη, ὥστε βαρροῦντα χρή, ὃ μὴ τυχάναις ἐπιστά-
μενος νῦν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστιν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος,
ἐπιχειρεῖν ξητεῖν καὶ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι;
MEN. Εὑ μοι δοκεῖσι λέγειν, ὁ Σωκράτης,
οὐκ οἴδ᾽ ὅπως.

Σ.Ω. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὁ Μένων. καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνιν ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διαχυρισάμην· ὅτι δ' οἴομενοι δεῖν ξητεῖν, ὃ
μὴ τις οἴδει, βελτίως ἂν εἴμεν καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἅττουν ἄργοι ἢ ei οἰοίμεθα, ὃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα,
μηδε δυνατον ειναι ευρειν μηδε δειν ζητειν, περι τουτον πανυ αν διαμαχοιμην, ει οιος τε ειην, καλ λογω καλ έργω.

ΜΕΝ. Καλ τουτο μεν γε δοκεισ μοι ει δειλειν, οι Σωκρατες.

XXII. ΣΩ. Βοûλει ουν, επειδη ομονοουμεν, οτι ζητητεον περι ου μη τις οιδεν, επιχειρη-σωμεν κοινη ζητειν τι ποτ εστεν άρετη.

ΜΕΝ. Πανυ μεν ουν. ου μεντοι, οι Σωκρατες, άλλε έγινε έκεινο αν ήδιστα, οπερ έ ήρομην το πρωτον, και σκεφαϊμην και άκουσαμι, δ' ιπτερον ώς διδακτι ουτε αυτον δει επιχειρειν, η ώς φυσε η ώς τιν ποτε τρόπῳ παραγινομενης τοις ανθρωποις της άρετης.

ΣΩ. 'ΑΛΛ' ει μεν έγω ήρχον, οι Μενων, μη το μονον έμαντον άλλα και σοι, ουκ αν εσκεψαμεθα πρωτερον ειτε διδακτον ειτε ου διδακτον η άρετη, πριν ο τι εστιν πρωτον έξητησαμεν αυτον. επειδη δε συ σαντου μεν ουδε επιχειρεις άρχειν, ίνα δη ελεύθερος έστω, έμοι δε επιχειρεις τε άρχειν και 15 άρχεις, συγχωρησομαι σοι. τι γαρ χρη ποιειν.

Ε' εοικεν ουν σκεπτεον ειναι, ποιον τι εστιν ο μητω Ισμεν ο τι εστιν. ει μη τι ουν άλλα σμικρον γε μοι της άρχης χαλασων, και συγχωρησον εξ υποθεσως αυτοι σκοπεισθαι, ειτε διδακτον εστιν ου ειτε οπωσοιν. λήγω δε το εξ υποθεσως οδη, οσπερ αι γεωμετραι πολλακισ σκοπουνται, επειδαν τις έρηται αυτοις, οιον περι χωριον, ει 87 οιον τε εις τον κυκλο τοτε το χωριον τρηγωνον ευταθηναι, ειτει αν τις οτι ουπω ολδα ησ
ei ἔστιν τούτο τοιούτον, ἀλλ' ὁσπερ μὲν τινα ὑπόθεσιν προύργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πράγμα τοιάνδε· εἰ μὲν ἔστιν τούτο τὸ χωρίον τοιούτον, οἶον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρα-
τείναντα ἐξελείπειν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ, οἶον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ἦ, ἂλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι
dokei, καὶ ἂλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατον ἔστιν ταῦτα παθεῖν· ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ
sυμβαίνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν B
35 κύκλον, εἰτε ἀδύνατον εἰτε μή.

XXIII. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ
οὐκ ἴσμεν οὐθ' ὅ τι ἔστιν οὐθ' ὁποῖον τι, ὑποθέ-
μενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἰτε διδακτὸν εἰτε οὗ
dιδακτὸν ἕστιν, ὥδε λέγοντες· εἰ ποίον τι ἐστι
5 τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχήν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν
eῖη ἡ οἷον διδακτόν; πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ἄλλοιον
ἡ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἀρα διδακτὸν ἡ οὖ; ἢ ὁ
νυνὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν; διαφερέτω δὲ
μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὅποτέρον ἂν τῷ ὅνοματι χρώμεθα·
10 ἀλλ' ἂρα διδακτὸν; ἢ τούτο γε παντὶ δῆλον, ο
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἡ ἐπι-
στήμην;

MEN. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ γ' ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή,
15 δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἰη.

MEN. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
ΣΩ. Τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, οἳ
toioúde méν ὄντος διδακτόν, toioúde δ' οὖ.

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέ-
ψασθαί, πότερον ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετή ἢ ἄλλοιον ἐπιστήμης.

D MEN. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ τούτῳ μετὰ τούτῳ σκεπτέον εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ φαμεν εἰναι τήν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἤμιν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

MEN. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοίν εἰ μὲν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωρίζομενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετή οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν, δ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἂν τιν' αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν.

MEN. Ἡ ἔστι ταύτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν ἀρετή γ' ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί;

MEN. Ναί.

Ε ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ, ωφέλιμοι· πάντα γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑφέλιμα· οὐχὶ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὑφέλιμον ἐστιν;

MEN. Ἄναγκη ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων.

XXIV. ΣΩ. Σκέψωμεθα δὴ καθ' ἐκαστου ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποιά ἐστιν ἢ ἡμᾶς ωφελεῖ· ὑγιεία, φαμέν, καὶ ἵσχυς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλούτος δὴ· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ὑφέλιμα. οὐχὶ;

MEN. Ναί.

88 ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν· ἢ σὺ ἄλλως φής ἢ οὕτως;

MEN. Οὐκ, ἄλλ' οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ, ὅταν τί ἐκάστοι τούτων ἠγηταί, ὕφελει ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει; ἀρ' οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθῇ χρήσις, ὕφελει, ὅταν δὲ μὴ, βλάπτει;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἐτὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τί καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐγώγε. Β
ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ, τούτων ἄττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὕφελει; οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' οἶον θάρρους τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρὴ ἀνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὕφελείται;
ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὀσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία· ὅπως <πάντα> μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ ἄνθρωπος· μεν καὶ καταρτύμενα ὕφελμα, ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ σφόδρα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγομένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς, εὐθαμόνιαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δ' εἰς τούναντίον;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐοικεν.
ΣΩ. Εἰ ἀρα ἁρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὕφελιμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δὲι εἰναι, ἐπειδὴπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν
ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ’ αὐτὰ οὖτε ὦφέλιμα, οὖτε βλαβερά ἐστιν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήματι σεως ἢ ἄφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὦφέλιμα γίγνεται. κατὰ δὲ τούτων τὸν λόγον ὦφέλιμον γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τίν’ εἶναι.

MEN. Ἐμονγε δοκεῖ.

XXV. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἃ νυνὶ δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτον τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτέ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἀρα οὐχ ὡσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἢ φρόνησις ἤγουμενη ὦφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπολείπει, ἢ δὲ ἄφροσύνη βλαβερά, εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτως ἡ ψυχὴ ὅρθὼς μὲν χρωμένη καὶ ἤγουμενη ὦφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὅρθὼς δὲ βλαβερὰ;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθὼς δὲ γε ἢ ἐμφρών ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτήμενος δ’ ἢ ἄφρων;

MEN. Ἐστι ταύτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὖτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἐστιν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτήσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἄν εἰη τὸ ὦφέλιμον· φαμέν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὦφέλιμον εἶναι;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φρόνησιν ἀρα φαμέν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἢτοι χρήματα ἢ μέρος τι;

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὡς Σωκράτης, τὰ λεγόμενα.
ΣΩ. Οὔκειν εἰ ταύτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἀν ἐλευ
25 φύει τοι ἀγαθοῖ.
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἀν που καὶ τὸ ἦν· εἰ φύει θ
οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγὼντο, ἢσάν που ἀν Ἦμιν οἱ ἐγὼς
νώτων ὑφωτομεν ἐν ἀκροτόλει, καταστικάμη
μενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσόν, ἵνα μηδε
αὐτῶν διέφθειρε, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς
τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοντο ταῖς πόλεσιν.
35 ΜΕΝ. Εἰκὼς γέ τοι, ὁ Σώκρατες.
XXVI. ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἴσονται, ἄρα μαθήσει;
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἥδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ
dήλον, ὁ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἰπερ
ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτὸν ἐστιν.
ΣΩ. Ἰσως νὴ Δία· ἄλλα μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλὸς
ἀμολογήσαμεν.
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ μὴν εἴδοκει μὲν ἀρτὶ καλὸς λέγε-
σαι.
10 ΣΩ. Ἄλλα μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀρτὶ μόνον δὲ
αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλὸς λέγεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἐν τῷ
νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑπείτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγίες εἶναι.
ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δὴ; πρὸς τι βλέπων δυσχεραῖ-
νεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὖκ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἡ
15 ἀρετῆ;
ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἔρω, ὁ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
dιδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν, οὐκ
ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλὸς λέγεσθαι· ὅτι δὲ οὖκ
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΞΩΤΙΝ ἐπιστήμην, σκέψαι ἕαν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ· εἰ ἐστιν διδακτὸν ὡς ὅτι οὐ πράγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀυτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι;

Ε ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν τοναντίον αὕτη· οὐ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἰνεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζω εἰκάζω μή διδακτὸν εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐστι ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι;

Σ.Ο. Πολλάκις γονὺν ξητῶν, εἰ τινες εἰν οὗ ὁμοίως διδάσκαλοι, πάντα ποιῶν ὤν δύναμαι εὑρεῖν. καὶ τοὺς μετὰ πολλῶν γε ξητῶ καὶ τούτων μάλιστα, οὐδὲν οὐ χωρεῖ ἐμπειροτάτους εἰναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἀνυτὸς ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, φημεδώσεις τῆς ξητῆς εἰκότως δ' ἂν μεταδοῦμεν·

Ἀνυτὸς γὰρ ὅδε πρώτον μὲν ἕστι πατρὸς πλούσιον τε καὶ σοφοῦ Ἀνθεμίωνος, δ' εγένετο πλούσιον ὄντως ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντως τινός, ὡσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωτίς εἰληφῶς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσιμνιᾶς ὦ Θηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ τίς αὐτοῦ σοφία κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελεία, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ οὕτως υπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης

Β οὐδὲ ὑγιώδης τε καὶ ἐπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλῆς ἀνήρ· ἔπειτα τοῦτον ἐν ἔθρεψεν καὶ ἐπαιδεύσεν, ὥς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει· αἴροιται γονὺν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τοιούτων ξητῶν ἀρετής πέρι διδασκάλους, εἴτ' εἰσίν εἴτε μή, καὶ οὕτως.
XXVII. Σὲ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὁ Ἀνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τῷ σαυτῷ ξένῳ Μένωνι τῶδε, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τίνες ἃν εἶλεν διδασκάλοι. ὦδε δὲ σκέψαι εἰ βουλοίμεθα Μένωνα τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἱατρὸν γένεσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ἃν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους; ἄρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἰατροὺς;

AN. Πάνυ γε.
Σ. Τί δ' εἰ σκυτοτόμον ἀγαθὸν βουλοίμεθα γενέσθαι, ἄρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους;
AN. Ναι.
Σ. Καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως;
AN. Πάνυ γε.
Σ. ὘δὲ δὴ μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπέ.

15 παρὰ τοὺς ἱατροὺς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἃν ἐπέμπομεν, βουλόμενοι ἱατρὸν γενέ¬
σθαι· ἄρ' ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν, ὅτι δ' παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτὸν σῳφρονοίμεν ἂν,
touς ἀντιποιούμενους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἢ
touς μή, καὶ τοὺς μισθὸν πραττομένους ἐπ' αὐτῷ
tούτῳ, ἀποφήμαντας αὐτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ
βουλομένου ἱέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν; ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς
tαύτα βλέπαντες καλῶς ἃν πέμπομεν;
AN. Ναι.

25 Σ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα; πολλὴ ἦνοια ἔστι βαυλομένους αὐλητὴν τινα ποιήσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχυμούμενους διδάξεων τὴν τέχνην καὶ μισθὸν πραττομένους μὴ ἔθελεν πέμπειν, ἄλλους
de τισιν πράγματα παρέχειν [ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν
παρὰ τούτων] οὐ μήτε προσποιούνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι μήτ’ ἕστιν αὐτῶν μαθητής μηδὲς τοῦτοι τοῦ μαθήματος, δ’ ἤμεις ἄξιοιμεν μανθάνειν παρ’ αὐτῶν ἢν ἂν πέμπτομεν. οὐ πολλὴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι;

ΑΝ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἐμοιυγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρὸς.

91. Σ.Ω. Καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοῖναν ἐξεστὶ σε μετ’ ἐμοῦ κοινὴ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ξένου τουτοῦ Μένωνος. οὕτος γὰρ, ὁ ἴδιος, πάλαι λέγει πρὸς με, ὅτι ἑπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ὥς οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τάς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσιν, καὶ τὸν γόνας τοῦς ἀυτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολῖτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαι τε καὶ ἀποτείμψαι ἐπιστανται ἄξιοις

Β ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετήν ἄκοπτει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πεμπτομεῖς αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς ἀπὸ πέμπτομεν. ἢ δῆλον δῆ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον, ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτοι τοὺς ὑπισχυμομένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὐτοὺς κοινὰς τῶν Ἑλληνῶν τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τοῦτον ταξιμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους;

ΑΝ. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὁ Σωκράτης;

Σ.Ω. Ὀισθά δήπω καὶ σὺ, ὅτι οὕτω εἰσὶν οὕς

C οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστὰς.

ΑΝ. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὁ Σωκράτης. μηδένα τῶν συγγενῶν μηδὲ οἰκεῖων μηδὲ φίλων, μήτε ἃ ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὅστε παρὰ τοῦτοις ἑλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε φανερά ἔστι λάβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγενομένων.
XXIX. ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὃ "Ἀνυτε; οὐτοὶ ἂρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιομένων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὑρεγετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀφελοῦσιν, ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὃ τι ἂν τῶς αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθείρουσιν; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι δια πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι πιστεύσω· οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἦ Φεδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτως περιφανῶς καλὰ ἐργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν καὶ τοῖς ἱερείς λέγεις, εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐξαικούμενοι οὐκ ἄν δύναστο λαθεῖν τρίακονθ' ἡμέρας Ε μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτια τε καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ταχὺ ἄν τῷ λυμῷ ἀποθάνουσιν, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἀρα ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάμβανεν διαφθείρον τοὺς συγγενέμονας καὶ μοχθηρότερους ἀποτέμπτων ἢ παρ. εἰλάμβανεν πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἕτη. οἴμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθάνειν ἐγγύς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἑτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ υἱότε. καὶ ἐν ἀπαντί τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἐτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηγενικόμοιν ὅσον πέπαυται· καὶ οὐ πέλαθος Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάλιν πολλοὶ, οἵ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκεῖνον, οἵ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι δυντε. πότερον δὴ οὖν φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατῶν καὶ λωβάσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἡ λεληθέναι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς; καὶ οὕτως μαίνεσθαι ἄξιον.
σωμεν τούτων, οὗς ἐνιοί φασὶ σοφωτάτως ἀνθρώπων εἶναι;

XXX. AN. Πολλοὶ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὁ Σώκρατος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτως διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων· τούτων δὲ ἐτι μᾶλλον οἱ B τούτως ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες· πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἔωσι αὐτοὺς εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιούτων τι πολεῖν εἴτε ἀστός.

Σ.Ο. Πότερον δὲ, ὃ Ἀνυτε, ἡδικηκέ τής σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὐτώς αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἶ;

AN. Οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἐγγεγένη συγγέγονα πῶς τοτε αὐτῶν οὔδενι, οὐδ' ἂν ἀλλον ἔσωμα τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα.

Σ.Ο. Ἀπειρος ἄρ' εἰ παντάπασι τῶν ἄνδρῶν;

AN. Καὶ εἴην γε.

Σ.Ο. Πῶς οὖν ᾧν, ὁ δαιμόνιε, εἰδεῖς περὶ τούτων τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθῶν ἔχει <ἐν> ἐαντῷ εἴτε φλαύρων, οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπειρος εἴης;

AN. Ῥαδίως· τούτων γοὺν οἶδα οἱ εἰσιν, εἰτ' οὖν ἀπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμὶ εἴτε μῆ.

Σ.Ο. Μάντις εἰ ἵσως, ὃ Ἀνυτε· ἐπεί ὅπως γε ἄλλως οἰσθα τούτων πέρι, ἔξ' ᾧν αὐτῶς λέγεις θαυμάξομι ἂν. ἄλλα γὰρ οὐ τούτως ἐξήτουμεν τίνες εἰσιν, παρ' οὖς ἂν Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοι·

D θηρὸς γένοιτο· οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ, εἰ σ' ἀβύλει, έστων οἱ σοφισταί· ἄλλα δὴ ἐκείνους εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν πατρικὸν τόπος ἔταξιν εὐεργέτησον, φράσας αὐτῷ, παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοιαύτῃ
πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν νυνὶ ἔγω διήλθον γένοιτ' 30 ἀν ἄξιος λόγου.

AN. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὖ σὺ ἐφρασας;

ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ' οὖς μὲν ἐγὼ φῶς διδασκάλους τούτων εἶναι, εἰπον, ἀλλὰ τυχόνω οὐδὲν λέγων, ὡς σὺ φής· καὶ ἵσως τι λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν Ἑ 35 τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ τίνας ἐλθῇ Ἀθηναίων· εἰπὲ ὅνομα ὅτου βούλει.

AN. Τί δὲ ἔνος ἀνθρώπου ὅνομα δεῖ ἀκούσαι;

ἤτο γὰρ ἄν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν, οὔτες ἔστιν δὲ οὐ βελτίων αὐτῶν ποιήσει ἢ 40 οἱ σοφισταῖ, εἰάν περ ἑθήλη πείθεσθαι.

XXXI. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοι ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ' οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὃμος μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν οὐκ οὐτὲ ταῦτα, ἢ αὐτοῖ οὐκ ἔμαθον;

5 AN. Καὶ τούτων ἔγωγε ἄξιον παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μαθεῖν, ὅτου καλῶν κάγαθῶν· η οὐ δοκούσι σοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇ τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες;

ΣΩ. 'Εμοιγε, ὡ 'Ανυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν 10 ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι οὐχ ἤττον ἢ εἶναι· ἄλλα μῶς καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς; τούτο γὰρ ἔστιν περὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν τυχόναι ὁν' οὐκ εἰ εἰσίν ἀγαθοὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδὲ εἰ γεγόνασιν 15 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἀλλ' εἰ διδακτὸν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ πάλαι σκοπούμεν. τούτῳ δὲ σκοπούντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἢ ὅτι ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτην τὴν ἀρετήν, ἢν αὐτῷ ἀγαθοὶ
ὁμών, ἡπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλος παραδόναι, ἢ οὐ παραδοτὸν τούτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτὸν ἄλλῳ παρ’ ἄλλου. τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὁ πάλαι ξητώμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Μένων.

XXXII. Ὡδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου. Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἀν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονεναι;

AN. Ἔγωγε, πάντων γε μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἶπερ τὶς ἄλλος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἦν, κακεῖνον εἶναι;

AN. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, εἰπερ ἐβούλετό γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’, οἰει, οὐκ ἄν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ τινας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δέ που τὸν ὑδρὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ; ἢ οἰει αὐτοῦ φθονεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδίδοναι τὴν ἀρετήν, ἦν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν; ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Θεμιστο-κλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν ὑδρὸν ὑπέεα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθὸν; ἐπέμενεν γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑππών ὀρθῶν ἐστηκώς, καὶ ἦκοντιξεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑππῶν ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ εἰργάζετο, ἀ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἑπαίδευσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφὸν, ὡσα διδάσκαλων ἀγαθῶν εἰχετο. ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων;

AN. Ἀκήκοα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν ἄρα τῆν γε φύσιν τοῦ ὑδρὸς αὐτοῦ ἔτισασθ’ ἀν τις εἶναι κακήν.

Ε ΑΝ. Ἡσσὸς οὐκ ἂν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμιστο- κλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἀπερ ὁ
πατὴρ αυτοῦ, ἦδη τοῦ ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ
πρεσβυτέρου;

ΑΝ. Οὐ δήτα.

30 ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι
αυτὸν τὸν αὐτὸν ὑδν παιδεύσαι, ἢν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν
ἂν σοφός, οὕδεν τῶν γειτόνων βελτίω τοιῆσαι,
εἰτερ ἦν γε διδακτῶν ἢ ἄρετή;

ΑΝ. Ἰσως μὰ Δί' οὖ.

XXXIII. ΣΩ. Οὗτος μὲν δὴ σοι τοιοῦτος
diδάσκαλος ἄρετής, δυ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀριστοῖς
τῶν προτέρων εἶναι. ἄλλων δὲ δὴ
skeψόμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τοῦ Αυσιμάχου· ἢ τοῦ-
5 του οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ἁγαθὸν γεγονέναι;

ΑΝ. Ἑγώγη, πάντως δήτου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος τὸν ὑδν τὸν αὐτὸν
Λυσίμαχον, ὅσα μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο, κάλλιστα
Ἀθηναίων ἐπαιδευσεν, ἀνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι
10 οὕτων πεποιηκέναι; τοῦτο γὰρ ποι καὶ συγγέ-
γονας καὶ ὁρᾶς οἷς ἔστων. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Περι-
κλέα, οὕτως μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἀνδρα, οἰσθ'
ὅτι δύο ἰείς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Πάνθιππον;

ΑΝ. Ἑγώγηε.

15 ΣΩ. Τούτων μὲντοι, ὡς οἰόθα καὶ σὺ, ἐπὶ
τέας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρους Ἀθηναίων,
καὶ μουσικῆν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τάλλα ἐπαιδευσεν,
ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται, οὐδενὸς χείρους· ἁγαθοὺς δὲ
ἀρα ἀνδρὰς οὐκ ἐβούλετο τοιῆσαι; δοκῶ μὲν,
20 ἐβούλετο, ἄλλα μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδακτῶν. ἦν δὲ μὴ
ὁλίγους οἰη καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων
ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι σ
ὅτι Θουκυδίδης αὐτὸ δύο ὑείς ἐθρεψεν, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσεν τά τε ἄλλα εὗ καὶ ἐπάλαμαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων· τὸν μὲν γάρ Ξανθία ἐδωκε, τὸν δὲ Ευδώρον· οὕτω δὲ ποι ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαιεῖν· ἢ οὐ μὲν μησαι;

ΑΝ. Ἕγογξε, ἀκοῇ.

XXXIV. ΣΩ. Οἷκοιν δὴ λον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ ἔν ποτε, οὗ μὲν ἔδει διανώμενον διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὐτοῦ, οὗ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἄγαθον ἄνδρας ποιήσαι, τούτῳ δὲ οὗκ ἐδίδαξεν, εἰ διδακτόν ἦν· ἀλλὰ γάρ ἦσος ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαύλος ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων; καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἐλλησίων, ὥστε εἰπερ ἢν τούτῳ διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν ἀν ὅστις ἐμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὑείς ἄγαθοις ποιήσειν, ἦ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἡ τῶν ἔξων, εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἐταύρε Ἀνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτὸν ἀρετή.

ΑΝ. Ὡ Σώκρατες, ῥάδιος μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους· ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἂν σοι συμβουλεύσαμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι· ὅσις ἦσος μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥάδον ἐστίν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇ δὲ καὶ πάνυ· οἴμαι δὲ σε καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.

XXXV. ΣΩ. Ὡ Μένων, Ἀνυτος μὲν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν· καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω· οἴτε τι
γάρ με πρώτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἀνδρας, ἐπειτα ἦγευται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἰς τούτων. ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν εάν ποτε γνώ, οἴον ἔστω τὸ κακὸς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ· σὺ δὲ μοι εἰπὲ, οὐ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσίν καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Τι οὖν; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὐτοὺς διδάσκαλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὀμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοι τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτῶν ἁρετήν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὗ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσας ὡς διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ ὃς οὖ.

ΣΩ. Φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδάσκαλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μὴδὲ αὐτὸ τούτο ὀμολογεῖται;

ΜΕΝ. Οὗ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τι δὲ δῆ; οἱ σοφισταὶ σοι οὐτοὶ, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι σ᾽ ἁρετής;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἀγαμαί, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῦ τούτο ἀκούσας ὑπισχυμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχυμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἶται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινοῦς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἀρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὁ Σώκρατες. καὶ γάρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσιν, τοτὲ δὲ οὖ.
Δ Σ. Οίσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοι τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ· τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δ’ οὐ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνις τὸν ποιητήν ὄσθ’ ὅτι ταύτα ταύτα λέγει;

ΜΕΝ. 'Εν ποίως ἔπεσεν;

XXXVI. Σ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις οὐ λέγει καὶ παρὰ τούς τινες καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τούς τινες ἰξε, καὶ ἄνδανε τοῖς, ὃν μεγάλη δύναμις. ἐσθιμών μὲν γὰρ ἂπτ’ ἐσθιλὰ διδάξει· ἤν δὲ κακοῦσιν συμμισύγγης, ἀπολείπεις καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

ὁισθ’ ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὃς διδακτόν οὕσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται γε.

Σ. Ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ γε ὄλγον μεταβάς, εἰ δ’ ἦν ποιητῶν, φησὶ, καὶ ἐνθετον ἄνδρὶ νόημα,

λέγει ποίως ὅτι

πολλοὺς ἀν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον

οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ

οὐ ποτ’ ἂν ἐξ ἁγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἐγεντο κακός,

πειθόμενος μύθουι σαφροσίν. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων

οὐ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ’ ἁγαθὸν.

ἔννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τάναντια λέγει;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

Σ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὄτου οὐρή πράγματος, οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὀμολογοῦνται, ἀλλὰ σοὶ αὐτὸν ἐπιστήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ ποιηρός εἶναι περὶ αὑτῷ τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα οὗ φασὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι,
οἵ δὲ ὀμολογοῦμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοτε μὲν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτε δὲ οὐ; τοὺς οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὅτονοῦν φαίης ἂν σὺ κυρίως διδάσκαλος εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἑγώγη.

XXXVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὅντες διδάσκαλοι εἰσὶ τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον δι τι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε; 
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοί δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταὶ; 
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὄμολογήκαμεν δὲ γε, πράγματος οὐ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἰεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ὅμολογήκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταὶ;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἰ ἦ διδακτὸν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἶπερ ὅρθως ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμ- η μεθα. ὡστε καὶ θαυμάζω δὴ, ὡς Σῶκρατες, πότερον ποτε οὐδ' εἰπών ἄγαθοι ἄνδρες, ἥ τις ἂν ἡ τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἄγαθῶν γεγο- 

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουμεν, ὃ Μένων, ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ φαύλοι τίνες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σὲ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἱμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς 

Μᾶλλον οὐν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῶν αὐτώς, καὶ
ΤΑΤΙΝΟΣ

Δεξίων ίσος ήν τις ἐν τῷ τίνας Βελτίων

Α' ἡμείς ἦμεν δὲ τούτα ἀποκαλέσας πρὸς τὴν

ἐκ τῆς γένους. ἐν τούτοις ἂν ἀναφέρατε, ὅτι

τοῦ μου ἑσταστίνης ἐπονομάσεις ὡρῶς τί καὶ ἐν

τοῖς ἑσταστίνης τοιούτων τα συνήθεια, ἦ ἑστασί

καὶ ἀναφέρατε ὡς τοῦ Ὀμήρου, ὅπως πᾶς τότε τρόπον

προσήνθη καὶ ἐναύγη ἤκρισε.

ΜΕΝ. Τάς τούτα λέγεις, ἢ Σωκράτεις?

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἢ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια, ἢ ὁ ὅρθως ἂν

ἡμείς ἐστιν εἰς τοὺς ἑσταστίνης ὡρῶς ἡμῶν ἐμπλασθηκόμεθα

η πρὸς ἑκατέρῳ ἔθνους ἡ γῆ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Οἱ οὓς τὰ ἑσταστίνης ἐσπαρξαν, τοὺς ὅρθως ἂν

ὡς ὑπονεόμεθα τοὺς ἑσταστίνης, καὶ τούτῳ τοῦ

καλῶς ἐμπλασθηκόμεθα;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν ἂν ἡ ἐκείνη, ἐὰν

μὴ δῆλημεν ἢ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια ὡς ὁ ὅρθως ἂν

ἐμπλασθηκόμεθα.

ΜΕΝ. Πάντως ἐν ἱεράκι λέγεις:

ΣΩ. Τίνα ἔστων <εἰ> τις εἰς ἣν ὁδὸν τῆν

eἰς λάγωσαν η ὁποῖα ζωτείς ἄλλοις βαδίζων καὶ

ἄλλοις ἤροιτο, ἀλλ' το ὁρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἤροιτο;

ΜΕΝ. Πάντως γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ τις ὁρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων, ἣτις

ἐστιν ἡ ὁδὸς, ἔλθως δὲ μὴ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος,

ὁ καὶ οὕτως ἃν ὁρθῶς ἤροιτο;

ΜΕΝ. Πάντως γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἔστω γ' ἃν ποὺ ὁρθῶς δοξάζων ἔχῃ

τιμή ἢν ὁ ἄλλος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χειρὼν
ήγεμών ἐσται, οἱδόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μὴ, τοῦ τούτο φρονοῦντος.

25 MEN. Οὐδὲν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δόξα ἂρα ἀληθῆς πρὸς ὅρθοτητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμῶν φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει, ὅποιον τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι οἱ φρόνησις μονὸν ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὅρθως πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἂρα καὶ δόξα ἢ ἀληθῆς.

MEN. Ἐοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἂρα ἠττῶν ὀφελημόν ἐστιν ὅρθῃ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.

35 MEN. Τοσούτω γε, ὁ Σωκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐχὼν ἀει δὲν ἐπιτυγχάνωι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὅρθῃ δόξαν τοτε μὲν ἀν τυγχάνωι, τοτε δέ οὐ.

XXXIX. ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἀεὶ ἐχὼν ὅρθη δόξαν οὖκ ἄν ἀεὶ τυγχάνωι, ἐωσπερ ὅρθα δοξάζειν;

MEN. Ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται· ὅστε θαυμάξω, οἱ Σωκρατες, τοῦτον οὕτως ἐχοντος, ὁ τι δὴ ποτε ὁ πολὺ τιμωτέρα ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὅρθης δόξης, καὶ δι’ ὅ τι τὸ μὲν ἔτερον, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. Οἰσθα αὐν δι’ ὅ τι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἰπὼ;

MEN. Πάνυ γ’ εἰπέ.

ΣΩ. "Οτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἄγαλμασιν οὐ προσ-έσχηκας τὸν νούν· ἵσως δὲ οὐδ’ ἐστιν παρ’ ὑμῖν.

15 MEN. Πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;
Σ.Ο. "Ωστ' καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ἦν, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

Ε  ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή;

Σ.Ο. Τῶν ἐκείνων ποιημάτων λευμένων μὲν ὡς ἐκτῆσθαι οὗ πολλῆς τινος ἀξίων ἦστι τιμῆς, ὅσπερ δραπέτην ἀνθρώπου· οὐ γὰρ παραμένει· δεδεμένων δὲ πολλοῦ ἀξίων πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθείας· καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθείαι, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τὰγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἔθελον οἱ παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύοντες ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὡστε οὗ πολλοῦ ἀξίων ἐστὶν, ἕως ἂν τις αὐτὰς δῆσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν, <ὁ> [Μένων] ἑταίρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦμιν ὁμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμημα γίγνονται, ἐκεῖτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.

ΜΕΝ. Νὴ τοῦ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔσκειν τοιοῦτο τινὶ.

Β  ΧΛ. Σ.Ο. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων· ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶν τι ἄλλοις ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, <οὔ> πάνυ μοι δόκῳ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ' εἰπτερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ὅληγα δ' ἄν φαίην, ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο 5 ἐκείνων θείην ἄν ὃν οἶδα.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, δι’ ἀληθῆς δόξα ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἐκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδέν 10 χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἡ ἐπιστήμη;
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τούτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Οὐδέν ἀρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ὃ ἐχαν ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ἡ ἐπιστήμην.
15 ΜΕΝ. Ἡ ἕστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν δ’ γε ἁγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὁφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὁμολόγηται εἶναι.
ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν οὐ μόνον δι’ ἐπιστήμην 20 ἁγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἀν εἶνεν καὶ ὁφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰπτερ εἴεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι’ ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τοῦτοι δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δόξα ἁληθής, [οὔτ’ ἐπίκτητα]—ἡ δ’ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ φύσει εἶνεν ἄν.
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήτα.
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ 30 μετὰ τούτο, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστὶν.
ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδακτόν ἐδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἄρετή;
ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.
35 ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ γε διδακτόν εἰη, φρόνησις ἄν εἶναι;
ΜΕΝ. Πάντεν γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐὰν μὴν γε διδάσκαλοι εἰεν, διδάκτον ἃν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδάκτον;  
ΜΕΝ. Οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διδάσκαλοι;  
ΜΕΝ. Ἡστὶ ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Ὅμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδάκτον αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι;  
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.  
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθὸν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι;  
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.  
ΣΩ. Ὡφέλμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθὸς ἡγούμενον;  
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ὅρθως δὲ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δῦο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἂ ἔχων ἀνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης γνωρίσεως ὥστε οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη ἡγεμονία γίγνεται. ὃ δὲ ἀνθρωπὸς ἡγεμόνων ἔστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμης.  
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως.  
ΧΛ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή οὐ διδάκτον ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμην δὴ ἐστὶ γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή;  
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Δυών ἄρα ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ὡφελίμων τὸ μὲν ἔτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἐν 5 πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμόνων.  
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.  
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ
τοιούτων ἄνδρες ἡγούντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἄμφι
θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὐς ἄρτι ὁ ἄντος οὐδὲ ἔλεγεν. "Αυτοὶ οὐδὲ ἔλεγεν. διὸ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἶοι αὐτοί ἐστιν, ἀτε οὐ δὲ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιούτων.
ΜΕΝ. Ἑοίκεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὐδοξία δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται, ἢ οἱ πολιτικοί ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθούσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμοῖ τε καὶ οἱ θεο-
μάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὕτωι λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθὴ καὶ
πολλά, ἵσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὑπερ λέγουσιν.
ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Μένων, ἅξιον τούτους θείους
cαλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οὕτως νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν όν πράττουσιν καὶ
λέγουσιν;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως ἂν καλοίμενθαι θείους τε, οὕς νυν ἔλεγομεν χρησμοῖ τε καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἀπαντᾷς· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἡκιστα τούτων φαίμεν ἃν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσίᾳ, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἴδοτες ὑπερ λέγουσιν.
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αἱ γε γυναικεῖς δήποτε, ὁ Μένων,
toὺς ἄγαθους ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ
Δάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἄγαθον ἄνδρα, θείος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὕτως.
Ε ΜΕΝ. Καὶ φαίνονται γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅρθως λέγειν. καίτοι ἵσως Ἀντωνὸς ὀδε σοι ἀχθεται λέγοντι.

XLII. Σ. Οὐδέν μέλει ἐμοιγε. τοῦτῳ μέν, ὃ Μένων, καὶ αὕτης διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ νῦν ἢμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐξητήσαμεν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴν ἄν εἰθ ὀὔτε φύσει ὀὔτε διδακτῶν, ἀλλὰ θεία μοιρὰ παραγυγομένη ἄνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγυγηται, εἰ μῆ τις εἰθεὶ τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικὸν. εἰ δὲ εἰθ, σχεδὸν ἂν τι ὀὕτος λέγοι τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ξώσιν, οἷον ἐφη "Ομηρὸς ἐν τοῖς ἑθνεῖσι τῶν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἷος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἀιδοῦ, τοῦ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀῖσσουσί. ταῦτα ἂν καὶ εὕθες τοιοῦτος ὅσπερ παρὰ σκιάς ἀληθές ἂν πράγμα εἰθ' πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

Β ΜΕΝ. Κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὃ Σώκρατες.

Σ. "Εκ μὲν τοῖς τούτον τοῦτον τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὃ Μένων, θεία μοιρὰ ἢμῖν φαίνεται παραγυγομένη ἡ ἀρετὴν οἷς παραγυγηται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσώμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ἤτιν τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγυγεῖται ἀρετή. πρότερον ἐπὶ- χειρῆσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖν τὸ ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετῆ. νῦν δ' ἐμοὶ μὲν ὧρα ποι ἔναι, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα ἀπέρ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πείθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τοῦτον ἠντον, ἦν πραότερος ἦ· ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν δ' τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὄνησεις.
COMMENTARY

Chapters I, II (70 A–71 D). Meno. Can Virtue be taught?
Socrates. I do not even know what Virtue is, much less whether it can be taught. What is more, I never met any one who did know what Virtue is. Meno. Have you never met Gorgias? Socrates. Yes, but I do not clearly remember what he said. Try and tell me yourself.

The first division of the dialogue extends to the end of chap. xiii. (80 D). The speakers are Meno and Socrates. Meno attempts to frame a definition of Virtue, and confesses himself beaten.

1. ἄρα διδακτόν ἢ ἀρετή: for the philosophical import of this question see Introd. § 11. It had already been made the main subject of the dialogue Protagoras, at the end of which (361 A B) it appears that Socrates, in arguing that Virtue is ἐπιστήμη, has been implicitly arguing that Virtue may be taught, though explicitly this is the position he has denied. The converse paradox turns out to be the position of Protagoras. He, as his profession demanded, asserted that Virtue was teachable; but by denying that Virtue was Knowledge, he has implicitly contradicted himself. In the Euthydemus (282 B C) the question occurs again, though here σοφία is substituted for ἀρετή. Socrates says εἰ ἦσθι γε, ὁ Κλεινία, ἡ σοφία διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἄνθρωποις. Cleinias eagerly accepts the former alternative; Socrates applauds him, saying εὖ ἐπιστήμη ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως ποιής περὶ τούτον αὐτοῦ, πάτερον διδακτόν ἡ οὐ διδακτόν ἡ σοφία. Cp. also Clitophon 407 B. (This dialogue, if genuine, as it probably is, must be regarded as an introduction to the Republic, left for some reason unfinished. As the Meno is also in a manner introductory to the Republic, correspondences between the Clitophon and the Meno are worth noting.) In Clit. l.c. we read τῶν δ'
änderen, that there is here a definite reference to the *Meno*. 

Cp. ibid. x ix 6 γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθὸν ὤφεισαι οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἐθεί, οἱ δὲ διδαχὴ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δήλου ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς θείας αἴτια τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχῶς ὑπάρχειν: ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μὴν οὖν ἐν ἀπασιν ἱσχύῃ, ἀλλὰ δέν προδειρίγγαται τοῖς θείοι τὴν τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ ψυχήν πρὸς τὸ καλὸς χαίρεις καὶ μισεῖς. Antisthenes the Cynic, as a follower of Socrates, διδακτὴν ἀπεδέλλων τὴν ἀρετήν (Diog. L. vi 10). On the other hand, Isocrates does not believe in any τέχνη to make men virtuous; *Antidosis* (15) 274, cp. in *Soph.* (18) 21. 'Quae st tota antiquitate non desit est discipleti': Fr. Proel. p. 12 note 6, who refers to Diog. L. ii 121, 122 for tracts on the subject by Crito and Simo, pupils of Socrates. Cp. the words quoted from the μέγας λόγος of Protagoras (Zeller *pre-Socr.* ii 471 note) φύσεως καὶ ἀσκησίως διδασκαλία δείται.

2. ἀσκητῶν, 'quod exercitacione comparatur' Ast. The word appears to occur in this sense only here and in *Clit.* l.c., Arist. *NE.* l.c. and Xenophon *Mem.* i ii 23 πάντα ἐμοίγει διὸ ἡ καλὰ καὶ τάδι καλὸν ἀσκητὰ εἶναι—the only places in which the word is used by Plato, Xenophon, or Aristotle. The word is used by other writers in physical senses related to physical meanings of ἀσκέω. ἀσκέω 'I work up' or 'elaborate' may be used intransitively (Plato *Rep.* 339 c etc. 'I go into training'), or with an acc. of the result produced, or with one of the material worked upon, or with both (Xen. *Cyr.* vii vi 10 ἀσκέωι αὐτῶν καὶ τούς σων ἑαυτῷ τὰ πολεμικά). The sense of ἀσκητῶς in the passage before us is related to ἀσκέω with an acc. of the result produced. The other sense quoted by L. & S., of *persons* ('practised in'), is related to ἀσκέω with an acc. of the subject worked upon; but Plut. *Lyc.* 30. 2 ἄνδρος ἀσκητοῦ καὶ σοφοῦ is perhaps to be
referred to ἀσκητῆς rather than ἀσκητός. The word ἀσκητικός was applied first to the pursuit of profession or art (specially gymnastics), next to the disinterest of some philosophical school, and lastly, in Christian theology to the 'ascetic' life.

Practice is here distinguished from Knowledge as an avenue to Virtue. In Plato it is represented as conferring an inferior kind of Virtue: Phaedo 82 B δημοτικήν καὶ πολιτικήν ἀρετήν . . εἰς θεοὺς τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονοῦν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ. In Rep. 619 c an evil fate awaits one who has trusted too much to this, θεοὶ ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. Socrates drew no such sharp distinction; and the Cynics when they spoke of 'learning virtue' understood moral exercise rather than intellectual research (Zeller Socr. p. 313). Cp. Xen. Mem. i ii 19–23 (referred to above), also the fragment of Critias (Bergk F. L. G. 11 p. 282) ἐκ μελετῆς πλείους ἡ φύσεως ἄγαθοι. Note that the alternative ἀσκητῶν does not meet us again in this dialogue.

In ἀσκητός, used as it is here, the suffix -τος has the sense of the Latin termination -bilis; 'attainable' rather than 'attained.' A large number of Greek verbal adjectives in -τος have this sense, e.g. in this dialogue διδακτός (often), μαθητών, ἀναμνήσας (87 B), παραδοτόν and παραληπτόν (93 B), ποιητών and ἔνθετον in Theognis quoted 95 E, μελετητῶν and θεωτῶν, in Plato Clitophon and Aristotle NE. quoted above; further, γνωστόν, νοητόν, αἰσθητόν, καταληπτόν (comprehensibile Cicero Ac. i 41); likewise κτητόν, τρωτόν and many others (Kühner § 332. 6). This sense arises simply from a tendency to ignore the difference between the actual and the possible. This difference in the case of negative verbs amounts to very little, and it is to negative adjectives that this use of the corresponding Latin forms in -lus is mainly confined, e.g. invictus, immensus; but not entirely, e.g. conspectus (Forbiger ad Verg. Georg. i 206).

Riddell takes a different view, § 88.

4. ἡ ἀλή τυλί τρόπῳ anticipates the result (θελα μολφα) actually arrived at (99 E).

5. Θετταλωτι: for the omission of the article see Phaedo 57 A and Archer-Hind there: 'the article is continually omitted before national names by all Attic writers.'

7. εφ’ ἱππική: Thessalian horses and horsemanship were a commonplace with writers from Homer downward, Π. 2. 202, Hdt. vii 196. Plato Hipp. maj. 284 A ὅ ὁν κάλλιστ’ ἐπιστή- μενος ἱππικήν παραδιδόμει ἀρ’ οὐκ ἄν ἐν τῇ Θετταλίᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μάλιστα τιμήτῳ καὶ πλείοντα χρήματα λαμβάνοι: Laos 625 A, Xen. Hell. iv iii 9 (Fr.); also Athen. vii 278 E ὑποστηθέναι αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν Πυθίαν ἵππειν.
cal ploutrō: Isocrates Antidosis (15) 155 says that when Gorgias, who made more money than any other sophist, went to Thessaly, the Thessalians were the wealthiest of the Greeks. For their luxury and hospitality cp. Theopompos apud Athenaeum xi p. 527 A (he gives the palm for luxury to the Pharsalians). Again, Theopompos (apud Athenaeum vii 260 b) says that Philip of Macedon won over the Thessalians by boon companionship. Xen. Hell. vi i 3 says of Polydamas Pharsalus ἦ δὲ καλὸς φιλόσεβος τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς Ἐθελαλκῶν τρόπον. Cp. on 74 A 30.


10. Γοργίας: see on 76 C 22, 95 C 28. For Gorgias’ life in Thessaly see Cicero Orator § 176, Quint. iii i 8. He is said to have lived to the age of 109.

11. ἔραστας ἐκλογίζεται, ‘persons who run after him for his wisdom.’ Cp. Prot. 317 c: Protagoras appeared to boast ὅτι ἔραστας αὐτοῦ ἀφροδίτης ἐμε: Euthyd. 276 ν οἱ ἔρασται τῶν ἄνδρων: Phaedr. 257 ν. For the transference of amatory phrases to spiritual aspirations see Dr. Thompson’s Phaedrus App. I (especially pp. 152-3), and App. III. This is most characteristic of Plato; see especially Symp. 184 C sqq.
Olympiodorus in his life of Plato, near the end (Tübner text vol. vi p. 194), says of Plato himself πολλῶν ἔραστας αὐτοῦ καταστήσας. The contrast between ἐπί σοφία and ἐπί σοφία is intentional. For ἐπί σοφία cp. Rep. 600 d (Protagoras and Prodicus) ἐπί ταύτη τῆς σοφίας ἀπόθεσε πειγόνται ὡσε μονον ὅλῃ πειγόν ταῖς κεφαλαίς πειρήρισε αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι, Ἡππ.maj. 300 d ἀνδρὶ πλείονον ἀργόφων εἰργασμένω τῶν νῦν ἐπὶ σοφία, also 281 c; Symp. 206 c; Theaet. 161 c; Hipp. min. 372 b; Xen. Mem. iv i 1, 3; Isocr. 13. 2; 15. 111 etc.

'Αλευδέων: these were the oligarchic caste at Larisa. Similar power was wielded by the Scopadæs at Crannon, Hdt. vi 127 (Holm History of Greece (E.T.) i p. 224). The vacillating policy of the Thessalians is to be accounted for to a great extent by hostility between the common people and the δυναστεία. Hdt. vii 172, Thuc. iv 78. See Whibley Greek Oligarchies p. 117 note 3.

14. ἀφόβοι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι: this was the profession Gorgias made himself; Gorg. 447 ε Ἐπί μοι, δ Γοργίλα, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, διὶ ἀπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι δ' τι ἀν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ; ΠΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ, δ Χαιρεφῶν καὶ γαρ νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ἐπηγγελλόμεναι, καὶ λέγω δην οὐδεὶς μὲ ποι ἡρωτηκε καίνων οὐδὲν πολλῶν εύτως. His pupil Polus is not less confident, ib. 462 A. Cp. Cic. fin. ii § 1, de orat. i § 108, Quint. ii 21, 21, xii 11, 21 (Gedike).

16. παρέχων αὐτῶν ἐρωτᾶν: infinitives like ἐρωτᾶν—spece-getical, supplementary, prolate, or whatever else they may be called—illustrate the dative origin of the Greek infinitive. 'I give myself up for questioning.' The dative is one of purpose or 'work contemplated.' See Gorg. 456 β οὐχὶ ἔθελοντα, ἂ τεμεῖν ἂ καίνων παρασχεῖν τῷ λατρῷ, 475 d (see Dr. Thompson's note), 480 c, Prot. 343 A (in all which places παρέχειν is intrasitive), Phaedr. 225 ε ἐμαυτῶν σοι ἐμμελετήν παρέχειν ω πάνυ δέδοκτα, and especially Ἀρεόπ. 33 B, where Socrates is contrasting his procedure with that of Gorgias, ὑμως καὶ πλονεω καὶ πένης παρέχω εμαυτῶν ἐρωτᾶν. Also Xen. Mem. i ii 54, Ἀναβ. vi vi 18. Cp. Gorg. 497 b (ἐπιστοχεῖ). [Riddell § 230 brings these instances under 'Binary Structure,' certain idioms which 'are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one' (ib. § 204). But the infinitive hardly amounts to a separate clause.]

For the dative origin of the infinitive see Goodwin Moods and Tenses § 742. The grammarians (Kühner § 473. 7, Jelf § 669. 2, Goodwin MT. § 770, F. E. Thompson § 146, Hadley § 951, Krüger 55. 3. 20, 21) distinguish instances where the infinitive appears as a necessary completion of the sense of a
verb (e.g. ἀπεφεύγει verb of command) from the looser use with verbs and adjectives, as here, where the infinitive appears to add something extra to the sense. But the two classes are separated by no firm line.

The active (or middle) infinitive after παρέχω and the like is by far commoner than the passive. Cp. Phaedo 102 D τοῦ μεν τῷ μεγεθείν ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχων, where Madvig translates ὑπερέχειν 'superandam,' ὑπερέχον 'superantem.' So in Latin tradit diffundere ventis; and we say 'a sight to remember,' 'a house to let.' Logically the passive infinitive would be equally possible. Whether the active or passive view be taken will depend on the presence or absence in the context of a prominent noun that may be taken as a subject to the notion of the infinitive. If there is such a noun, the active construction is preferred in Greek. Such a noun is often provided, as here, by a dependent dative. Gorgias lends himself τῷ βουλομένῳ for him to ask. In the exceptional place Charm. 157 B ὅ ὅ τοι τὴν ψυχὴν παράχει τῇ ἐπιφύσῃ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευτέραν, the dative ἐπιφύει is not a person and cannot well be conceived as a subject; hence the passive construction is preferred. So Kühner, who also (§ 473, Anm. 4), quotes Isocr. 12. 156 ποιήσομαι τὴν αρχήν τῶν λεκθημενῶν ἀκούσαι μὲν τῶς τισὶν ἀνθῆ, ὑποθῆναι δὲ σοὶ ἀσώμφορον, where the passive ὑποθῆναι can be seen to be necessary, the active being impossible unless a subject were expressed with it.

17. τῷ βουλομένῳ: see on 90 D 21.

18. οὐδενὶ δερφικ: this is a case of inverse attraction. Hadley § 1003, Riddell § 199. See 71 A 23, 74 D 32; also on 96 C 7.

71 A 20. ὅσπερ, 'as it were.' This use of ὅσπερ, standing out of construction, is common in Plato: 87 A 26, Phaedr. 260 ε ὅσπερ γαρ ἄκοσμω δοκὶ τινῶν προσέγνων λόγων, 270 δ, Phaedo 77 c, 88 d, Crat. 384 c etc. (see Ast); also in Aristophanes: Clouds 1276 τῶν ἐγκέφαλον ὅσπερ σεστειθαὶ μοι δοκεῖ, Wasps 395, 713, Peace 234.

22. αὐτοὺς, 'I only know that if.'

25. ἄρετὴν γοην: ἄρετὴν is not strictly object to ἐλέναι, but is put by 'prolepsis' (Hadley § 878) or 'antiptosis' (F.E.Thompson § 330) for ἄρετὴ as subject to ἔδακτών. This idiom, perpetually occurring in Greek, and frequent in this dialogue (e.g. 71 B 6 δοσὶς Μένωνα μὴ γιγαντεύει δοσὶς ἐστὶν), is brought by Riddell § 226 under the general head of 'Binary Structure.'

26. τοσοῦτον δεω: see App. on the text.
27. δε μή διδακτόν: see on 86 D 12.

28. δι ποτ' ἠστι...ἀρετή: i.e. the real essence or nature of Virtue. This dialogue, the main purpose of which is not metaphysical but ethical, leaves the question open how Plato here regards the 'essence' of Virtue, whether as a mere logical concept, or as having a substantial separate existence. In other words, the Meno contains nothing explicitly showing that when it was written the theory of Ideas (of the Phaedrus and Republic) was full-blown in Plato's mind. But there is nothing to indicate that it was not, and the theory of Ideas is really implicitly involved in the theory of ἀνάμνησις. See on 81 D 12.

CHAPTER II

2. συμπένομαι occurs nowhere else. Where σῶν is com-
ounded with an intransitive verb, the preposition naturally qualifies the subject; e.g. the present phrase = ἐγὼ σῶν τάς πολίταις πένομαι. But where σῶν is compounded with a trans-
itive verb, the preposition generally affects the object, such con-
structions as σὺνεξαιρεῖ τῶν Σελλάσσων (Xen. Hell. vii iv 12) being less common. Cp. 80 D 40. See Jowett on Thuc. viii 46 (συγκαταδυόμεν) and Jebb on Soph. Ajax 229 and 361.

3. εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς, 'eadem structura verbi εἰδέναι 85 C 10,
92 C (add 80 D 87), ἐπίστασθαι 85 D 18' (Fr.). Cp. 72 A 14, B 22.
See on 90 B 47.

4. ἐπι μῆ οἴδα τι ἣτιν, πῶς ἀν ὅποιόν γε τί <ἠτιν> εἰδένην; We have here a very pronounced distinction between the essential and non-essential attributes of a thing. The 'Definition' or λόγος of a class-name, as presented in this dialogue, is no longer the definition obtained by a simple comparison of a number of particulars. It is one which consists in referring a class to a higher genus and then marking the specific difference (definitio per genus et differentiam). The attributes forming the Essence or Species of a thing may thus be divided into those contained in the Genus and those contained in the Difference. The doctrine of the Predicables, as developed by the school of Aristotle, recognised besides 'Essential' attributes others that were classed either as Property (Proprium) or as Accident. The distinction generally drawn between these was that a Property was deducible from the essential attributes, an Accident not so. In the present instance ὅποιόν τι represents Property rather than Accident; for the attribute διδακτόν turns out to be one deducible from the Essence of Virtue. See, for the Predicables, Jevons's Elementary Lessons in Logic pp.
98 foll., Bain's Logic i 73. See also Mill's Logic bk. i ch. vi §§ 1, 2 with ch. vii §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, for a criticism of the doctrine: where it is shown that in the more elastic view which modern Logic takes of the General Notion, the distinction between essential and non-essential attributes tends to disappear.

The phraseology τι and ἄποιν τι to express the distinction between Essence and non-essential attribute is repeated at 86 E 17, 87 B 2. See Zeller Plato p. 200 note 79. It appears in the Gorgias 448 Ε. Polus has been asked what the art of Gorgias is. He replies by a eulogy of it. Socrates says he has not answered the question.

ΠΙΑ. Τι δη, ὡς Σωκρατες;

ΣΩ. "Οτι, ὡς Πωλη, ἐρωμένον Χαρεφώντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμίαζες μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὑσπερ τινὸς ψεύνοντος, ἥτις δε ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

ΠΙΑ. Οὐ γάρ ἀπεκρίναμεν διτ εἰτή ἡ καλλιστῇ;

ΣΩ. Καλ' μᾶλθ' ἀλλ' οὔδεις ἥρωται πολὰ τις εἰτή ἡ Γοργίαν τέχνη, ἄλλα τίς (cp. 462 c foll. where the question is answered).

See also Philebus 37 ο 'Opinion (δόξα), besides being Opinion per se, may be further qualified as true or false καὶ ἐγένε τ' οὐ μὸνον δόξα ἄλλα καὶ ποιά τις ἑκατέρα. We must further consider' says Socrates 'whether, while Opinion is subject to qualification, Pleasure and Pain are not' (εἰ καὶ τὰ μὲν [sc. δόξαι] ἐστὶ ποιὰ ἄτα, ἡγοῦν δὲ καὶ λύσῃ μόνον ἀπερ ἐστι, ποίω τινε δ' οὔ γλγνεσθον). Socrates proceeds ἀλλ' οὔδεν ἄντό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν διτ καὶ ποίω τινε. πάλαι γάρ εἶρχομεν διτ μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ κτὲ.

Something similar may be seen in Symp. 201 δ foll. 'I must explain' says Socrates "τις ἐστιν ὁ Ἐρως, καὶ ποιός τις, ἢκείμεν τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶ." The three points are dealt with successively:
1) 202 δ foll. Ἐρως is a δαίμων, the son of Πειλα and Πόρος;
2) 203 c foll. he is poor, and not tender or beautiful, as people think;
3) 206 b foll. his ἔργον is described.

But the terminology is not fixed or technical. ποίος, or ποιός, often implies an added attribute, whereby a smaller class is carved out of a larger. In this sense it will correspond with Difference (in the language of the Predicables). Thus Gorg. 453 c, 454 A, 463 c ὑπογράφον μύρον, Euthyphro 12 d ποιῶν μέρος, Laches 194 δ Ε. See especially Rep. 438 b-e 'If Α be relative to B, then A qualified by some differentia will be relative to B qualified by a corresponding differentia (δητ γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα ολα εἶναι του, τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα ποιῶν τινὸς ἐστιν κτέ.). If knowledge is related to an object, a particular kind of knowledge will be related to a particular kind of object (ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθηματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστιν, ἐπιστήμη δὲ τις καὶ ποιά τις ποιῶν τινὸς καὶ τινὸς).' So Charmides 159 Α δ τι ἐστιν
kai ὀπίον τι ἡ σωφροσύνη, though we cannot be sure here that a formal definition per Genus et Differentiam is expected. Cp. 87 B 4 el ποιόν τι ἐστὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν βυτῶν ἀρετῆς, and (more loosely) Euthyphro 5 c ποιόν τι τὸ εὔσεβές φησὶ εἶναι. So Aristotle NE. ii 19 6 τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἰρθηκαί· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μένον οὕτως εἰτέων, δι᾿ ξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποια τις: Rhet. i 17 τι δὲ ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποιών τι, etc. [At Theaet. 152 d the difference of τι and ὁποιονόν τι seems to be that between a Concrete term and a Quality.]

A word is needed on the curious antithesis ὅν and τοίον τι in Ἡ Ἐπ. vii 342 ε and 343 β. For an account of the passage see Grote (1 pp. 224–5), who believes in the genuineness of the letter, and Karsten (de Platonis quae feruntur epistolis pp. 182 foll. and 197) who does not. The antithesis here, as Grote says, is between the quid or Essence (of the class) which we are searching for, and the quale or Accidents (seemingly of the particulars) which we are not searching for: δοῦν ὁτιόν, τοῦ τε δυνατόν καὶ τοῦ πιστῶν τινός, οὐ τὸ ποιόν τι, τὸ δὲ τι γνωσόντες εἰδέαν τῆς ψυχῆς κτῆ. [An attack on the genuineness of the seventh epistle should be now superfluous. See C. R. xiv, especially p. 337 b foll. It is hard to believe Plato to have been guilty of the sentence from which the above words are quoted, with its horrible accumulation of participes, almost defying disentanglement of subject and object. Many will find additional evidence of spuriousness in the fact that a document professing to be written late in Plato's life recognizes Ideas not merely of κύκλοι, but περὶ σώματος ἀπαντός σκευαστοῦ τε καὶ κατα φώσιν γεγονότος πυρὸς ὅθατός τε καὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων πάντων (342 D). See on 72 B 21.]

The distinction between Essence and Non-essential is otherwise expressed in the Euthyphro, 11 Α namely by the antithesis οὐσία and πάθος (see J. Adam's Introduction p. xx, and below on 72 B 22). In Ἡ πρα. maj. 300 Ε foll. we have the pairs εἶναι and πέπονθέναι, οὐσία and πάθος, though the ground of the antithesis is not dwelt on. In Plato we see philosophic terminology in the making, but the process of crystallization is not complete.

For the thought cp. 86 D. That Metaphysic, a knowledge of Being, should come before Practice and lie at the root of it, is the text on which is based much of the Republic. See also Laches 190 A B el γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἀρετῆν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν δὲ τι ποτε τυχάναι ὅν, τίν' ἄν τρόπων τούτων σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα ὅττιον, ὅπως ἄν αὐτὸ καλλιστα κτῆσαιτο;

6. ὅπις Μένονα μὴ γνινάσκει δότις ὕστερ: the difference in the mode of existence of the individual Meno on the one hand and the class Virtue on the other is not here for Plato's purpose important. There are many passages
in Plato in which he illustrates the definition of a class by the definition (or identification) of an individual, such as is afforded by a postal address or legal description. In the Theaetetus 208 c foll., where λόγος is treated as a knowledge of differences (ονομάζειν τὸν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν), the two examples taken for illustration are both individuals, namely the Sun, which is defined as λαμπρότατον τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὅπως ἑχει, and next Theaetetus himself, 209 a-c. In Symp. 201 d the first question raised and answered about Ἑρως is ὅτι ἐστι; In Gorg. 453 c we have a question about the definition of an individual which in its form recalls some of the questions about class-definition in this dialogue (72 B 22) ὅσπερ ἂν ἐν ἑν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ἐστιν τοῦ ἑστι τῶν ζωγράφων ζωής, οἱ μοι ἐπιτρέπει ὅτι τὸ ἱερόν ἱερῷ σε ὑπομενή ὁ τὸ ποταμῷ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν; Again compare Phaedo 102 c τῶν τῆς Σεμίλεως ἐναι with τῷ μελίττῳ ἐναι at 72 B 26. Cp. on 97 A 13. See Whately's Logic II. v. § 6. For ὅστις ἐστω see on 92 C 18.

8. εἶτε καὶ γενναῖος . . . εἶτε καὶ τάναντια: καὶ accentuates the word that follows it, in the general sense 'even.' Riddell Digest § 132. It is here put with γενναῖος as that marks the climax of the three alternatives enumerated. It is put with τάναντια as that marks the more emphatic alternative; more emphatic because more surprising. Cp. Tim. 21 b ἐντὸς δὲ δοκοῦν· αὐτῷ τὸ τέλετε ἐντὸς καὶ χάριν τινὰ τῷ Κριτὶς φέρων. Ast. under ἐντός, supplies other instances. For καὶ emphasizing one member of a contrast see Clus. 406 a τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγγὺς ὦν ἐπήνουσιν, ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπήνουσιν. 410 b τὰ μὲν ἐπανύσαν τινες, τὰ δὲ τι καὶ ψένω. Stat. 440 ἅ τις μὲν ὄστως ἐχει, τις δὲ καὶ ('after all') ov. See notes on C 12 καὶ ἀκαλῶ, also on D 26 ἐσείδη καὶ ἀπεσίν: 75 A 11, 79 D 35, and 84 D 32. Kühner § 541. Anm. 2.

10. ἄλλα ὑπὸ ὅποιος ὅποια . . . ἄλλα ταῦτα ἀπαγγέλλομεν; the uses of ἄλλα in the two instances will be felt to be different. Sentences of similar form, but not interrogative, occur 76 E 47 ἄλλα ὡς ἐστιν, ὡς ἐστιν, ᾐσθητά, Euripheusc 3 c ἄλλα' ὡσεὶν ἀποτέλους χρή φρονίτησιν, ἄλλοι δὲ ὄντα λέναι, Theaet. 146 b ἄλλα διδωρεῖν ἥξεις μὴ ἀφίσου Θεατήτου, ἄλλα ἐρώτα. Cp. 74 D 30 ἄλλα μὴ μοι ὄστως, ἄλλα κτέ. The first and second uses in each of these places are respectively typical of two uses of ἄλλα, namely:

(a) To effect a transition to a fresh subject, often with a special appeal to the person addressed. This use occurs in statements, commands (Symp. 199 c ἄλλα παρηγομεν, ἄλλα ἐρώτα), and questions (as here). In this use the matter with which ἄλλα is contrasted, is not definitely expressed.

(b) To introduce the second half of a statement which supple-ments the first half by either affirming something opposed to
what has been denied, or denying something opposed to what has been affirmed. Here the matter with which ἄλλα is contrasted is definitely expressed. Thus we have—

(1) οὐ Θεατητὸς ἐστιν, ἄλλα Θεόδωρος.
(2) Θεόδωρος ἐστιν, ἄλλῳ οὐ Θεατητὸς.

In these cases the real antithesis between the two halves of the sentence is slight. Where the sentence consists of a statement followed by the denial of its opposite, the antithesis sinks to nil; and even where this is not so clear, the first half is very little 'limited' by the second: we have rather the same fact viewed in two different aspects. In (1) we should either translate ἄλλα 'but'; or we should leave it untranslated: 'it is not Theaetetus, it is Theodorus.' In (2) we should translate ἄλλῳ 'and not' rather than 'but not'; or again we might leave ἄλλα untranslated. In sentences of this form ἄλλῳ ὦ may be replaced by καὶ οὐ, οὐδὲ (in verse), and (for emphasis) the simple οὐ (Soph. OC. 1368 αἰθ ἄνδρες, οὐ γυναίκες, not uncommon in orators, Dem. de Cor. (18) 89, Aristocr. (23) 25). Instances of sentences of forms (1) and (2) occur perpetually; see the opening of this dialogue, then 72 C 33, 73 B 46 (which in a continuous sentence would be οὐκ ἀκόλουθον ἀγαθοὶ ἀν γένους, ἄλλα σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι), 84 D 35, 85 D 20 (which = οὐ διδ-ξαντος ἄλλῳ ἐρωτησάντος τίνος), 89 B 32, Rep. 354 A B οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γ’ εἰστιμαι. δι’ ἐμαυτῶν ἄλλῳ οὐ διὰ σε· ἄλλωσ’ ὀσπερ οἱ λίχνοι κτέ.

[Where both clauses are affirmative, or both negative, the adversative force is stronger. The first half has then a concessive force, the latter a limiting. The former may be strengthened with μέν (Xen. Cyg. ν. 11 16 τα μέν καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἄλλα τα πλάγια λυπεῖ με), the latter with δυσ (Euthyphro 3 C οὐδὲν δ’ τι οὐκ ἀληθεῖς εἰρηκα, ἄλλ’ δυσ δ’ θυμοῦσιν ἡμῖν).]

But we have this 'complementary' use (cp. Riddell § 249) of ἄλλα not merely in statements, but also in commands (illustrated above) and in questions; thus

(3) ἄρ (οὐ Θεατητὸς ἐστιν, ἄλλα Θεόδωρος);
(4) ἄρα (Θεόδωρος ἐστιν, ἄλλῳ οὐ Θεατητὸς);

The brackets here show that the interrogative refers to the sentence as a whole. In (3) οὐ does not go with ἄρα, which would make the first part an affirmative question. The whole is one neutral question. This is the form of the place before us. It may be granted that the two halves of the question here are not precise counterparts, but the transition is slight. ἄλλα is 'and.' 'Do you really not know, Socrates, and are we to carry this report of you even to Thessaly?' Cp.
78D 30, 79C 30, Phaedo 58 c ὧν ὦκ ἐτῶν ὦ δραχμους παρεῖναι, ἄλλο εἴρμων ἐτελεύτα φίλων; Symp. 205 b etc.

(4) may be illustrated by Rep. 344 e ὧν σμικρῶν οἰς ἐπικείμενον πράγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἄλλον βιον διαγωγήν; Rep. 366 b τίς μῆχαι (τῶν τούτον) δικαιοσῦνη τιμᾶν ἔθελεν, ἄλλα μὴ γελάν ἐπανομ-μένης ἀκούστα; Here too ἄλλα is 'and' rather than 'but.'

See Kühner § 535. 2, 3.

[The use of δὲ for ἄλλα in such constructions is characteristic of the Laws (Riddell § 161 a). Cp. ↑ Ep. vii 343 b quoted on 71 B 4.]

12. καὶ οὐκαδὲ ἀπαγγέλλομεν, 'do you wish this repute of you to be carried even to Thessaly? '-where it would be course spoil Socrates' reputation and chance of success. The verb is treated as one of motion, hence οὐκαδὲ. Hesiod has (O. et D. 611) πάντας ἀπόδρεπε οὐκαδὲ βότρυς.

The confusion between expressions of rest and motion is very easy; cp. our 'where' for 'whither,' and (conversely) τοί 'whither?' originally locative. Phaedo 57 A Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωρίαξε τὰ ἕν Ἀθήνας.

The plural is used because Meno is speaking for himself and his party.

13. μὴ μόνον γε . . ἄλλα: from the use of ἄλλα following a negative clause to which it gives the affirmative counterpart (see note on line 10) arise a number of phrases in which the preceding negative clause is elliptical (Riddell § 158):

(a) οὐκ ἄλλα 85 C 3, 88 A 9, Prot. 343 b, Rep. 475 e, Euthyd. 277 b, Soph. 263 D, Phaedr. 286 D Σ. μεθάμως τοῖν εἰργ. ΦΑΙ. οὐκ, ἄλλα καὶ δὴ λέγω, etc., Dem. Phil. i § 27. μὴ ἄλλα 75 B 13, μὴ μοι οὖν ἄλλα, ἄλλα 74 D 30, οὐδαμῶς, ἄλλα Rep. 475 e, Theaet. 201 b, etc.; μεθάμως ἄλλα Gorg. 497 b, etc. Riddell § 250.

(b) οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα Euthyd. 286 c, 305 e, Aristoph. Frogs 58, 498, Eur. Bacch. 785. Riddell § 156.


(d) οὐχ ὅτι . . ἄλλα 96 A 22 etc. μὴ ὅτι . . ἄλλα Xen. Cyr. i iii 10. Riddell § 152.

(e) οὐ μόνον γε ἄλλα Phaedo 107 b. μὴ μόνον γε ἄλλα (that is, μὴ ταύτα μόνον ἀπάγγελλε ἄλλα) here, Euthyd. 6 c. Riddell §§ 151, 157.

(τ) οὐ μὴν ἄλλα Gorg. 449 c etc.

(η) οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα 86 C 4, Phaedo 62 b (twice), Symp. 173 b. Riddell § 155.
NOTES

(θ) μη τι πάσας τὰς ὁδονάς, ἀλλὰ Ἡιρρ. maj. 297ε. (εἰ μη τι, ἀλλὰ 86 Ε 18 is different.)

(ι) οὐ (μη, οὐδὲν, μηδὲν) ἀλλ' ἡ, 76 Β 13, 84 Δ 32. Riddell § 148.

(κ) οἴπω γ' ἀλλὰ Φαιδρ. 260 β.


15. Γοργία οὐκ ἐνέτυχες: Gorgias first visited Athens in 427 B.C. at the head of an embassy sent from his town Leontini in Sicily to ask aid against Syracuse. In the dialogue Gorgias there are passages (as the beginning, where Gorgias is clearly a new attraction, and 503 Α Περικλέα τουτὼν τὸν νεωτή τετελευτη-
κότα) which look as if Plato meant to refer the dramatic date of the dialogue to Gorgias' visit of 427 B.C. Some later historical allusions suggest that Plato may have intended a later dramatic date, perhaps a subsequent visit of Gorgias. Anachronisms are, however, a feature very natural in fictitious dialogue, where the author is constantly tempted to introduce relevant matter within his own knowledge (see on 90 Α 40). At any rate the dramatic date of the Gorgias is earlier than that of the Meno. It is not necessary to suppose a reference here to the dialogue Gorgias; but I am strongly disposed to think there is one. I have given reasons (Intro. §§ 18, 16) for believing that the Gorgias was written before the Meno.

18. εἶτα: as it were ‘after all this,’ cum admiratione. 79 Α 5, Apol. 28 Β, and often.

19. οὐ πάνυ: this phrase means originally, as we should expect, ‘not altogether,’ and is a weak negative. So Plato uses it perpetually, as here, ‘I have not the best of memories,’ 77 Δ 41, 86 Β 23, etc. Where it has the force of a strong negative (as 73 Δ 11, 98 Δ 3, etc.), this is due to ‘litotes,’ the irony whereby the point of some truth is increased by under-statement. English colloquialisms will supply many parallels: ‘rather!’ (strong affirmation), ‘not much!’ (strong negative). Cp. Munro on Lucr. iii 361, Riddell § 139, Dr. Thompson on Gorg. 457 Ε; also Apol. 19 Α, Theaet. 150 Α εἰμι δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, Rep. 419 Α μὴ πάνυ τι εὐδαιμονιας ποιεῖν. The point was cleared up by Cope, Translation of Plato’s Gorgias App. C. The strongest instance of pathetic irony is Soph. O. C. 144, where Oedipus speaks of himself as οὐ πάνυ μοῖρας εὐδαι-
μυρίας πρώτης—the only instance of the phrase in tragedy. Cp. οὗ σφόδρα Πραξιδέα 100 A.

οὗ πάνω ἐνια μνήμην: in these words, and the similar passage Prot. 334 c d & Προτάγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήμμαν τις ὅν διόμω-

τος κτλ., Plato has no doubt preserved a trick of the historic Socrates for inveigling his interlocutor into the wiles of his elenchns. It is all the more noticeable because the Greeks attached great importance to a good memory, as was natural with people who depended so little on writing. Plato himself makes it an essential requisite for the philosopher, Rep. 486 c d, Gorg. 466 A. At 86 Α 17 μνήμη stands in the list of the virtues. In Aristoph. Clouds 482 foll. Strepsiades' memory is tested, and in 629 he is taunted as ἐπιλήσμων. The 'short memory' of the Spartans (Hdt. III 46) had, like that of Socrates, its diplomatic object.

D 26. ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοῖν τῶν ἑμαν, ἐπειδή καὶ ἀπεστίν: the absent authority and the speechless book are on the same level of uselessness for the purpose of debate. Cp. Phaedrus 274 b–276 B (Grote II 239 and 256 foll.). In the same way consecutive oratory is unsatisfactory; Prot. 329 A (if you ask a point of Pericles or any orator he will make you a speech) εἰ δὲ ἐπανε-

ρουτῷ τινά τι, άπεπέρ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσι ὅστε ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅστε αὐτοὶ ἔρεσθαι, ib. 347 ε (rational beings need not resort to citations from poets for topics of conversation) οὐσ ὅστε ἀνερέθαι ὁν τρ' ἐστίν περὶ διώ λέγοντι, ἐπανεμοι τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ εν τοῖς λόγοι οἱ μὲν ταύτα φασίν τὸν ποιήμα νοεῖν οἱ δ' ἔτερα. Add Hipp. min. 365 D, quoted below. Plato's disparagement of writing, which diminished with advancing years, was grossly exaggerated by the writers of the second and seventh epistles (312 B foll., 341 B foll.), who for their own purposes tried to make out that the true Platonic teaching was an esoteric mystery only communicated orally. Grote, who accepts the epistles as genuine, overstates Plato's position (i pp. 221 foll.); for a juster view see Zeller p. 89 note; see also on 77 B 12.

ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀπεστίν, 'since, after all, he is not here'; see on 71 B 8. Cp. the similar passage Hipp. min. 365 d τὸν μὲν ὁμηρον τοῖν τῶν ἑσάσμεν ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέθαι τί ποτε νων ταύτα ἐποίησην.

27. συ δὲ αὐτὸς . . τῆ φής: Riddell § 309 'Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.' Cp. 78 C 19, 86 D 8.

28. ἐπον: the 2nd sing. 1st aor. imperat. ἐποι (so accen-
tuated, not ἐπο, see Butlerman, Excursus I) is rare in good
Attic, never occurring in tragedy. In the two instances in which it occurs in Attic prose, here and Xen. *Mem.* iii vi 3 πρὸς θεῶν, ἐφι, μὴ τόλμων ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ὑμῖν ἡμῖν, it is used in a solemn adjuration, probably for its heavier sound. See App. on the text.

καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃ: it is a strong note of Platonic dialectic, borrowed from Socrates, that a man’s intellectual powers ought to be freely at the service of his fellows for the discovery of truth. All vulgar φθόνος is out of place among philosophers, as it is in the circle of the gods (*Phaedr.* 247 Α, *Tim.* 29 Ε). The writer of the seventh epistle takes up the note, 344 Β ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις χρωμένως. See on 91 Β 14.

29. ψεύσμα: a rare word, nowhere else in Plato.

ἐψευσμόνος: the middle and passive tenses of this verb afford a curious study in the Greek voices. ψευδομαί (the moral connotation of which is much feebler than the English 'lie,' see e.g. *Rep.* 338 Β) means either (middle?) 'I speak wrongly,' 'I utter a lie,' or (passive?) 'I am wrong.' In the former case it is opposed to ἀληθεύω (*Hipp.* *min.* 366 Ε foll., *Euthyd.* 284 Α, *Crat.* 431 Β). In the latter it is opposed to τάληθεν δοξάζεω (Theae.* 194 Α). Sometimes the ‘middle’ is used transitively, Xen. *Hell.* iii i 25 ψευδετά σε οὖν. Perhaps there is no instance in Plato of the present middle used transitively; but we have the aor. in *Laws* 921 Α τὴν τιμὴν τῶν ἔργων ὑφειλέτω τὸν ὑπὸ ἕκαστον ψευδήται 'of which he has cheated the person who gave the contract.' Cp. *Rep.* 331 Β τὸ μὴ δικαζόμενα τινα ἐξαπατήσαι ἣν ψεύδομαι, where τινα is object. On the other hand it seems difficult to find the present ψευδομαί in any author as a distinct passive with an expressed agent (ψευδομαί ὑπὸ τινος).

The meanings of ἐψευσμαί exactly follow the meanings of ψευδομαί—namely, 'I have uttered a lie' (middle), 'I harbour a lie or error' = ἀμαθῆς εἶμι (passive). But it would be hard to find an instance either of ἐψευσμαί transitive, or on the other hand of ἐψευσμαί distinctly passive with agent expressed. It is not clear here whether the meaning is 'have made a wrong statement' or 'have been deceived.' Such was the temper of the Greek mind, or such the freakish development of the Greek verb, that they expressed by the same form 'I am under a delusion' and 'I deceive (perhaps wilfully) another.' And so we get the extraordinary juggle in *Rep.* ii 382 Α-Β, where it is argued that gods cannot deceive, because to deceive must imply the harbouring of error: τῇ ψυχῇ ψευδεθαί τε καὶ ἐψευσθαί καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι πάντες ήκοτα ἄν δεξαμενο: cp. ibid. 535 Ε.

ἀν φανήσει σὺ μὲν εἶδος . . ἐγώ δέ εἰρηκὼς, 'if it turns out
that you and Gorgias know, though I said etc.’ (parataxis). Kühner § 518. 6 draws a distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ or ‘rhetorical’ parataxis. The former is the primitive simplicity of language, before the mechanism of the subordinate clause has developed; the latter is a conscious retention or revival of the primitive form for special effect. He admits that no firm line can be drawn between the two classes. Cases like the present he would consider ‘artificial’ (§ 518. 9). Cp. Dem. de Cor. (18) 160 αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν τοὺς πόνους, ὡμεῖσ δὲ μηδὲ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἄνεξασθε.

Chapters III, IV (71D–73C). Meno. There are all kinds of Virtue, suitable to different persons and circumstances. Socrates. But there must be something in common that makes all these actions Virtue. I want to get at that. Meno. I do not see that Virtue is in all cases one and the same—as, for instance, Health is. Socrates. But it is by possession of the same qualities that persons exhibit Virtue in all cases. Meno. Yes.

Ε 1. ἀλλ’ οὖ χαλασόν: Meno at first naturally does not realise the difficulty of the task, and speaks with the confidence of ignorance: so presently οὐκ ἄστροφα εἰπεῖν, where the word ἄστροφα is ominous. Meno’s first answer shows that as yet he does not grasp the notion of logical definition at all. His later attempts are more or less definitions in form, though faulty. For the present, instead of giving the contents of the notion, he gives an enumeration of instances. His answer refers to the extension of the term rather than its intension.

In many of Plato’s dialogues where a definition is proposed, the first stage is devoted to exemplifying and clearing up this difficulty (Fr. Introd. p. 21 note 6).

(1) Hipp. maj. 286Ε What is Beauty? (τὸ καλὸν). Hippias, quite as confident as Meno in his mastery of the subject, gives in succession three answers, each of which is shown to be a mere exemplification of Beauty, not a general definition at all. Afterwards Socrates suggests (professedly at second-hand) three definitions, which are so far definitions that ‘they keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a derivative or a modification’ (Grote ρ 379). But they each fail to satisfy the examination to which Socrates subjects them.

(2) Euthyphro 5c What is Piety? Euthyphro. To do as I am now doing: to prosecute guilty people, even if the culprit
is your father. Socrates (6 D). That is not an answer: other things are holy too. Euthyphro’s next answer (τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφέλει) is a definition in form, though unsatisfactory. Grote I 317, 8.

(3) Laches 191 D What is Courage? Laches. There is no difficulty in telling you that. Whoever keeps his place in the rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away, is a courageous man (Grote I 473). Socrates. ‘But sometimes he that fights and runs away—like the Scythian horseman—is courageous. Yours is no definition.’ Socrates then gives a sample definition of Swiftness. Laches then gives a definition of Courage, expressed in general terms; but it turns out too large. Subsequently Nikias proposes a definition which, though on strictly Socratic lines, still leaves some difficulties unsolved. See on 88 B 23.

(4) Lastly, in the Theaetetus, Socr. asks What is Knowledge? (146 c). Theaetetus. Geometry and the other things that Theodorus teaches; and again, shoemaking and practical arts. Socrates. γενναῖος γε καὶ φιλοδόχως, ὃ φιλε, ἐν ἀκτηθεῖ πολλὰ δίδω καὶ ποιήσαν ἄνθι ἀκτιοῦ. Socrates then gives a model definition of Clay (γῆ ἢγρῳ φυραθείσα) 147 D, after which Theaetetus shows that he at any rate grasps what is meant by a class-nation. Grote II 320.

This list of dialogues might be increased. The language in the various passages deserves careful comparison. Plato laboured hard to bring out the point, then a new one, for the elucidation of which little apparatus of philosophic terms was yet provided.

2. εἰ βούλει: this phrase (also εἰ βούλεται, εἰ βούλεσθε etc.) is used in various elliptic constructions (Ullrich on 71 D 23). We may distinguish according as there is, or is not, an expressed apodosis. In the first two sentences of Meno’s speech we may fairly say there is an apodosis: εἰ βούλει (μὲ εἰπεῖν) ἀνδρὸς ἁρετῆν, ῥάδιον (εἰπεῖν) κτλ. εἰ δὲ βούλει (μὲ εἰπεῖν) γνωμικός ἁρετῆν, οὗ χαλεπῶν διελθεῖν κτλ. In the later instance εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἑλευθέρον, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δοῦλον, the words ἑλευθέρον and δοῦλον are no doubt each the relic of an apodosis, but it has practically disappeared, and εἰ μὲν βούλει, εἰ δὲ βούλει are little more than εἰτέ . . . εἰτέ.

The protasis in all these cases is incomplete, there being no infinitive dependent on βούλει. Ατ Συμπ. 177 B we have a complete protasis: εἰ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέφτασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφούς, (οὗ δεινὸς) Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαινοὺς καταλογίσαν συγγράφειν;

Above at 71 D 23 we have an instance with a real apodosis. In the following instances we have εἰ δὲ βούλει (or the like)
without τε μὲν βούλει προεέχει, the meaning being 'or again':

94B 11, Prot. 320 B, Hipp. maj. 282 B, Theaet. 196 E, Crat. 392 A, Phaedr. 230 C. In these cases there is a verbal clause succeeding, but it is not a real apodosis. Similar is 73 E 19 oloν, εὶ βούλει... εἰτομο. In the following there is no verb succeeding: Symp. 220 D εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μαχαῖς 'again, take his conduct in battle,' ib. 209 D, Hipp. maj. 301 A, Rep. 425 D, Laches 188 C, Theaet. 183 A. In the last two places the meaning is 'or rather.'

Where εἰ μὲν βούλει or εἰ μὲν βούλεσται precedes, βούλει or βούλεσται after εἰ δὲ is commonly omitted (Riddell § 253). Symp. 212 C τούτων οὖν τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς εὐγκώμιον εἰς ἔρωτα νόμισον εἰρήθη: εἰ δὲ, δὲ τι καὶ δὴ παρελθέν ὁδομάζων, τοῦτο ὁμορίτικον, Euthyd. 285 C εἰ μὲν βούλεσται, ἐφίστω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, τοῦτο ποιεῖτο, Lawes 688 B, Crat. 407 D, † Alc. i 114 B. Riddell compares the case of εἰ δὲ without a verb in Homer. This is due in Homer to the original interjectional force of εἰ. In the cases before us there is a distinct ellipsis, and they should hardly be regarded as cases of survival. Note that in Symp. 212 C and Euthyd. 285 C, the relative clauses introduced by δὲ τι take the place of βούλει and βούλεσται respectively, and would make the insertion of these words awkward. We find a fuller construction Gorg. 472 A B εἰ δὲ βούλη... εἰ δὲ βούλη... εἰ δὲ βούλη... Rep. 432 A εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, λόγου, εἰ δὲ, καὶ πλήθει ἡ χρήματα κτλ. Cp. also Prot. 342 A. See Appendix on the text, 73 A 12.

ἀνθρώπως ἄρετήν: the ἄρετή ἰδρός here set forth is the vulgar notion of civic excellence. See on 91 A 4. ἄρετή came to mean anything that conducted to pre-eminence, anything by which one could show one's self 'the better man,' even the miserable art of quibbling taught by Euthydemus and his friend, Euthyd. 275 D. When Thuc. (viii 68) says Antiphon was ἄνθρωπως τῶν καθ' ἑαυτόν ἄρετήν οὐδενός δειπτερός, this need not be read as a testimony to moral character.

4. τοὺς μὲν φίλους εἰ τοιούτως κακῶς: this is the usual pre-Christian standard. ήκοιστε ὑπὶ ἐρρῆθη ἀγαπηθής τῶν πληθῶν σου, καὶ μισήσεις τῶν ἐχθρῶν σου. έγώ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, Ev. Matth. v 43, 44.

The view is often given by Plato as the current one, but never by him accepted. See Rep. 332 A B, criticised 334 B foll., Crit. 410 A, Crito 49 B (where see J. Adam's note). The teaching of the Gorgias, κρίθηκαν ἄδικε δικαίως δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶν is directed against it. Whether Socrates took the same enlightened view is more doubtful. Bernays Phokion und seine neuen Beurtheiler pp. 46 foll. argues that Socrates acquiesced in the current view. J. Adam (note on Crito i.c. and Introd. p. xii) replies to his
arguments, I think successfully. But what he says of Socrates is also true of Plato; where Plato impugns the current doctrine it is not from an altruistic standpoint, but from a self-regarding one, the welfare and dignity of the agent's own soul (Grote ii 82 and 123, J. S. Mill Diss. iii 342 foll., Zeller 182 and 454).

It must be said in defence of the popular view that if it preaches the duty of revenge it also rates very highly the obligations of friendship. Even Callicles (Gorg. 473 b) represents as part of the misery of the man without power in the state, that he not merely cannot take his own part, but that he cannot do a good turn for a friend.

7. γυναικὸς ἄρετῆ: this also is the conventional view. One of the strongest practical results of the Socratic-Platonic theory that Virtue is One, is the ignoring of any distinction in the special excellence or moral function of the sexes. See Rep. 451 foll., Zeller p. 448, Socr. p. 121. Xenophon, Symp. ii 9, appears to report the Socratic view; but adheres to the popular view, Oec. vii §§ 22-27. Antisthenes said ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρετῆ: Diog. L. vi § 12. Aristotle, as we might expect, is on the side of 'common sense': Pol. i 13 ὅμοια τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοι ἔχειν καὶ peri τὰς ἡθικὰς ἄρετὰς: ὑπολογιστέον δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκαστῷ πρὸς τὸ αὐτόν ἔργον . . . δι'τε φανερῶν διὶ ἐστὶν ἡθικὴ ἄρετῆ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὗ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἄνδρος, οὗτ' ἄνδρια καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθότερον ἥπερ Ἴωκράτης . . . πολὺ γὰρ ἄμενον λέγων οἱ ἐξαρθμοῦντες τὰς ἄρετάς ὡσπερ Γοργίας.

The fact that Meno is here 'enumerating' virtues makes it highly probable that Aristotle is referring to the present passage, and attributing the views Meno here expresses to his master. Whether Aristotle had access to any deliverance of Gorgia himself on the subject is very doubtful (Dr. Thompson Gorgia p. 181, Zeller pre-Socr. ii 472).

Fr. well points out that the use of ἄρετῆ = 'special excellence or function' naturally led the way to such a recognition of various forms of Virtue. This use of ἄρετῆ is prominent in Plato himself. Rep. 353 b foll. οὐκούν καὶ ἄρετῆ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, ὑπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστατεῖται; κτλ., ib. 601 D οὐκούν ἄρετῆ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθὸς ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ τέμον καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι οὔ ἄλλων, ἡ τέμον ἐστὶ, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἐκάστον ἡ πεποιημένην ἡ πεφυκός; Cr. Arist. NE. ii vi 2. See the words translated below.

14. καθ' ἐκάστην κτλ., 'for corresponding to our several 72 A occupations and ages in regard to each of our functions there is for each of us a Virtue; and in like manner, I think, Socrates, a Vice.'
The style of Meno’s answer is verbose and bombastic; but it is hard to detect in it any traits that can be set down distinctly as ‘Gorganisms.’ See on 76E 43: Blass Attische Beredsamkeit I 58 foll. Agathon’s speech in the Symposium (194 foll.) is full of Gorganisms; cp. 198 c. See too Xen. Symp. ii 26, Zeller Pre-Socr. ii 492. When the rhetorician Hermogenes censures ‘Polus and Gorgias and Menon’ (Dr. Thompson’s Gorgias p. 175) for their pompous and pretentious way of writing, he probably bases his criticism of Meno on slender grounds, as there is no reason to believe that the real Meno left any literary relics.

18. τολή γι τιν εὐτυχὲς κτλ.: cp. the ironical congratulation to Theaetetus 146 D (quoted on 71E 1).


21. κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα, ‘apropos of this metaphor of the hive.’ Many uses of κατὰ with acc. come from the notion of following down (we say ‘following up’) a suggestion. Hdt. vii 142 οὐ μὲν δὲ κατὰ τῶν φραγμῶν συνεβάλλοντο τούτῳ τῷ ἔχων τεῖχος εἶναι ‘following up the notion of the stockade,’ Aristoph. Clouds 534 νῦν οὖν Ἡλέκτραν κατ’ ἐκείνην ἥ’ ἣ κωμβία ἥπον θ’ ἥθ’, Theaet. 179 B (the Heraklitians) ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται ‘are in the state of instability appropriate to their writings,’ Rep. 576 C δ’ ἐγε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννευμένην πόλιν ἐν ἑλη ὁμοιότητι. Cp. 76C 19, 28.

The mention of the hive suggests to Socrates the bee as a subject for definition. It is clear that Plato devoted much attention to zoological and botanical classification. We have elaborate examples of the former, Soph. 220 A B, Politicus 261 B 267 C, especially 266 E. It is true that these classifications stand apart from the main subject of these dialogues; but it would be a mistake to deny them intrinsic importance. Aristotle seriously criticises Plato’s zoology (Part. An. I chaps. ii and iii, especially ii i i §§ 2, 3, i iii §§ 12, 13). See W. H. T. in JP. vol. viii p. 294; also p. 315, where he quotes the satire of the comic poet Epictates on the proceedings of the Academy, who are represented as occupied in determining the genus and species of a pumpkin. See also H. Jackson in JP. vol. xiii pp. 38, 243, and Archer-Hind, Timaeus Introd. pp.
31–35, *JP*, vol. xxiv p. 52, who show that in Plato’s later view the only Ideas are those corresponding to the Natural Kinds; mainly, that is, those of plants and animals. At the time when he wrote the *Meno* Plato had not arrived at this stage; but as suggestive problems in classification the species of plants and animals must have interested him at an early stage. These species furnish the chief instances of Natural Kinds, as they were called by Mill, that is, Kinds separated from others that stand near them not by a known limited number of differences, but by an unlimited number— as, for instance, the differences between a bee and a wasp. The selection of the most suitable differences on which to ground a system of classification is the problem botanists and zoologists have to face. (See Mill *Logic* i vii § 4, iv vi § 4, iv vii §§ 2, 4; Bain *Logic* vol. i p. 63; Jevons *Elem. Lessons* p. 294.)

22. *ει μου ἑρμῆνου κτλ.*: the protasis is really triple, but one member of it appears in a participial form (*μου ἑρμῆνου*). This becomes clear by comparing the sentence with two analogous ones at 74 B and C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>72 B</th>
<th>74 B</th>
<th>74 C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(α) <em>μου ἑρμῆνου</em></td>
<td><em>ει τις σε ἀνέροιτο</em></td>
<td><em>ει ἀνήρετο</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(β) <em>ει ελεγες</em></td>
<td><em>ει αὐτῶ εἰπες</em></td>
<td><em>εἰπόντος σου</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(γ) <em>ει σε ἡρώμην</em></td>
<td><em>ει σοι εἰπεν</em></td>
<td><em>καλ (ει) ὑπέλαβεν</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The variety is characteristic of Plato.

Sentences with a *double* protasis, especially as here in summarising a supposed dialogue, are frequent in Plato.

*Hipp. maj.* 289 c *ει σε ἡρώμην — ει μου ἀπεκρίνω — ὁρθῶς αν ἀπεκέκριτω.*

*Prot.* 311 B C *ει ἐπενδεια — ει τις σε ἢρετο — τι αν ἀπεκρίνω; (bis).

*Gorg.* 458 C *ει ἑτύγχανον σε ἑρωτῶν — ει μου εἰπες — οὐκ αν δικαίω σε ἡρώμην;*

*Theaet.* 147 Δ *ει τις ἢροιο — ει ἀποκριναμεθα — οὐκ αν γελοιοι εἰμεν;*

† *Theages* 123 B *ει ἐπεθύμεια — καλ εγιω σε ἑτύγχανον ἀνερωτῶν — τι αν ἀπεκρίνω;*

In *Euthyphro* 10 ε we have a double protasis, but the second is bifurcated, each half having a separate apodosis.

In *Clit.* 408 ε we have an elaborate sentence with a triple protasis, *ει τις ἡμᾶς προστρέψει — καλ ἐπειτα ὑνείδιε — ει δ’ ἑπανηρόμεθα — εἰπεν ἄν.* In all these instances the protases are separate and co-ordinate; in translation they might be linked together by ‘and.’ A more elaborate form occurs *Phaedo* 67 ε *ει γὰρ διαβαθμηται κτλ.* Kühner § 578. 9, Goodwin *MT.* § 510.

"Hic et in proximis mirum in modum alternant imperfecta cum aoristis," *ἐλεγες, ἀπεκρίνω, ἡρώμην, ἀπεκρίνω 72 B, εἰπον,"
eîxes 73 D, ἡρχον ἐπεσκεφάμεθα 86 D. Heind. ad Gorg. 447 εἰ ἐτύγχανεν δὲν ὑποθημάτων δημοσίως, ἀπεκρίνατο δὲν, 514 D κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλούμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἰκανολ ἱατροὶ ὑπεστ., ἐπεσκεφάμεθα δὴν ἡν, omnia tamen in verbis hisce loquendi, respondendi, inquirendi' (Buttmann). Heind. refers inter alia to Prot. 311 ε (quoted above). Fr. notes 74 C D, Ἐαθηρήνω 12 D εἰ ἡρώτας εἶπον δὲν; add 99 E 3. Gorg. 453 C, Ἰον 540 D ei ἐτύγχανες ἱππικὸς δὲν ἔγγος δὲν, Symp. 199 D εἰ ἡρώτων εἶπες δὲν, Prot. 313 A ei τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν έδει τῷ —πολλὰ δὲν περιεκέψω— καὶ τὸς φίλους δὲν παρεκάλεσι: Goodwin MT. § 414, Hadley 875. 6. In many of these cases the ground of difference in the tenses comes out clearly: thus ἡρώτων refers to a process of questioning, ἡρώμην to a single question (see App. on text, 72 C 4). But certain arists and certain imperfects seem to be favoured, Theaet. 144 ε πότερον εὐθὺς δὲν ἐπιστεῖμον ἦ ἐπεσκεφάμεθα;

μελίττες πρὸς οὐσίας δὲ τῷ τοτε ἔστιν: see Exc. I.

26. τῷ μελίττας εἶναι, 'in their essential nature as bees,' i.e. τῇ μελίττων οὐσία. Ἡγρ. μαγ. 292 D τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ, δὲ παντὶ ὦ ἀν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνος καλὸ ἐκεῖνος, 299 D ἀρ' ὀφει ἢ δὲ ὄσιον ὄσιον ὄσιον διαφέρει τοῦτῳ τῷ ὢν δὲν ἐκεῖνος; Lysis 217 B σῶμα τούτου κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι οὐχι ἀγαθὺν οὕτω κακὸν. Phaedo 102 C οὐ γὰρ Σιμμίλαν (Σωκράτους) ὑπερέχειν τοῦτῳ τῷ Σιμμίλαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει (see on 71 B 6), 72 E 22 πρὶς τὸ λαχῦς εἶναι, 73 A 26.

30. ἣ μελίτας εἶσιν: this somewhat more technical expression is substituted for τῷ μελίττας εἶναι above. Cp. Pann. 145 B ἢ μὲν ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἐν διον, ἐν ἀλλῷ εὐστίον. ἢ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη δυτὶ τυχσάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ. The use becomes stereotyped in Aristotle, and is represented by the scholastic qua.

C 36. ἔγωγε: Plato spares us Meno's attempt at defining a bee. It would be interesting to see what Plato's own would have been.

CHAPTER IV

1. κἂν εἴ... ἐσόν... ἔγωγεν; in this construction the ἄν originally belonged to the apodosis. It has got drawn forward and attached to καὶ, mainly owing to the desire to mark the conditional character of the sentence at the start, but perhaps partly from the wish to avoid the hiatus καὶ εἴ.

The origin of the idiom is seen by comparing such a sentence as 76 C 25 ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὖν ἄγατην ἐλ μου ἁρέτην εἴπος, which might have been written ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν εἴ μου οὖν ἁρέτην εἴπος,
NOTES 79

ἀγαπῶν. But the ἄν has become ‘consopitum,’ and is used often where there is no apodosis that admits of ἄν, as here, Soph. 267 δ (προσεπωμέν), Rep. 477 Α (ἐκομέν), 579 δ ἐστιν ἅρα, κἂν εἴ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ (cp. 473 Α), Prot. 328 Α κἂν εἴ ὄλγου ἐστι τὸς διαφέρει . . . ἄγαπητόν, Symp. 185 c κἂν εἴ τις ἐξαπατηθεὶς δῆμος καλὴ ἦ ἀπαθή, † Theages 121 Α, 130 D. In some cases there is neither an apodosis corresponding to ἄν nor a verb with εἶ, the words ἄν and εἶ then are the relics of a vanished apodosis and protasis, and are almost otiose, κἂν εἶ being little more than καλ ’even,’ Soph. 247 ε κἂν εἴ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, Polit. 308 c εἴ τις πράγμα ὑποῦν . . . κἂν εἶ τὸ φαινότατον, συνιστησιν. In cases where ἄν retains its force, and the apodosis contains a suitable finite verb, Plato generally repeats ἄν: Soph. 256 Β κἂν εἴ τῇ μετελάμβανεν . . . οὐδὲν ἄν ἄτομον ἦ, Gorg. 514 d quoted on B 22, Phaedo 72 c κἂν εἴ συγκρίνωτο ταχῦ ἄν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξ. γεγονός εἴη: cp. Prot. 318 Β, 353 D, Menex. 236 c ὡστε κἂν ὅλγου, εἰ μὲ κελεύοις ἀποδύνατα ἄρχῃσαθαι, χαρασμῆν ἄν (where, however, Sch. brackets the last two words). [But where the apodosis is an inf. or ptcp. Plato usually does not repeat ἄν: Rep. 408 Α, 473 Α, 612 c: Phaedo 71 b: Phil. 58 c.]

In most of the above cases καλ goes with εἶ, in the sense ‘even,’ the sentence being concessive (see on 98 D 35).

On κἂν εἶ see Kühner § 398. 4, Riddell § 255, Goodwin MT. § 195, F. E. T. § 190, Buttmann note here and on Dem. Meid. § 51, Heindorf on Soph. 247 ε, Jebb on Soph. El. 1483, Aj. 1078, Cope on Aristot. Rhet. 1 i 5. The account of ὡσπερ ἄν εἶ is analogous to that of κἂν εἶ.

2. ἄν γέ τι εἴδος: here we have another word which Plato moulded to philosophical usage. The meanings before Plato are (1) ‘form,’ ‘physical appearance,’ and (2) ‘sort,’ ‘kind’ (see L. & S.). The former meaning is frequent in Plato, e.g. 80 Α 9, Rep. 402 δ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλ ἐν τῷ εἴδει, Symp. 210 b εἰ δεὶ διώκειν τὸ ἐπ’ εἴδει καλὸν (so Hug, I think rightly, but there may be a play on two senses of εἴδος). The second meaning differs but little from one of the philosophical meanings in Plato; you can hardly separate παραγωγὴν τὰ εἴδεα (Hdt. 1 94) from Rep. 363 ε ἄλλο αὕτε εἴδος λόγου, 424 c εἴδος καὶ ὑμνίκης (cp. τρόπων φθῆσι νέον just above). See CR. xi 223.

The philosophical meanings of εἴδος in Plato we may thus distinguish:

A. (metaphysical): the Form which makes a given Class what it is, whether by infusing its being into it (Participation), or by serving as an exemplar (Imitation). Phaedo 102 b ὠμολογεῖτο εἴναι τι ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἴδων καὶ τοῦτων τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπιωμιλάν ἰσχεῖν, Rep. 597 Α (ὁ
κλησθέως) οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, δὴ φαμέν εἶναι δ ἐστὶ κλῆσι, ἄλλα κλῆσιν τινά, *Parm.* 129 a–135 c, especially 132.

In the passages hitherto quoted some definite metaphysical theory or other is implied as to the relation of the εἶδος to the particulars. Of the following places in earlier dialogues, as of this place (and *D, E* presently) in the *Meno*, this can hardly be said: *Euthyphro* 6 3 ἐκείνοι αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ὅ τά πάντα τὰ δῶνα δωάν εἶναι, ἐφεσθα γάρ ποι τοῦ µαµ' ἰδέα τὸ τε ἀνώσια ἀνώσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ δῶνα δῶνα (cp. 5 D and see on 72 B 22 above), *Hipp. maj.* 289 D αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, ὡς καὶ τὰλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος. At *Gorg.* 508 E the meaning is 'visible form'; but not without suggestion of a mental type to be realised: (the true orator) οὐκ ἐκή ἐρεί, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλέστων πρὸς τιν' ὄσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημουργοὶ δηλοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργων ἐκατός ὁ τούτο οὐδὲ εἰρήγαται.]

B. (logical) (a) a genus contrasted with a smaller species, or with particulars, *Theaet.* 178 α ἐν περὶ παράγει τοῦ εἶδος ἑρωτήσας, ἐν ὧ καὶ τὸ ὕσπερ ὑπερχάει δή, 148 D ὀσπερ παράγει πολλὰς ὁδοὺς εἰνεὶ εἰδεὶ περιέλησε.

(b) a species contrasted with a larger genus, *Symp.* 205 ὡς ἄφελοντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑρωτῶς τι εἴδος ὑμοίας, ὦ τὸ δὴν ἐπιτεθῆναι ὄνομα, ἐρωτᾶ, *Rep.* 357 c, *Polit.* 258 b, 263 b, etc.

There is also a periphrastic use, *Rep.* 389 β ὡς ἐν φαρμάκων εἰς εἰς 'by way of medicine' (see L. & S.), with which cp. *Hipp. maj.* 297 β ἐν πατρὸς τινος ἰδέα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἅγαθον, *Laws* 918 ὡς ἐν μητρὸς καὶ τροφοῦ σχήματι. Σοὶ ἐν μήρει τινος (L. & S. iv 3), ἐν ἄλλος λόγῳ *Hdt.* ἰπ 120.

Whether there is any consistent distinction in Plato's usage of εἶδος and ἰδέα has been debated. Zeller (notes pp. 207 and 238) denies any such difference, and I think he is right. On the other hand see Campbell *Theaet.* App. C, and L. & S. a.v. ἰδέα. But εἶδος has in Plato all the meanings of ἰδέα. The history of the two words is precisely similar. ἰδέα had before Plato the same two meanings as εἶδος, 'physical appearance' and 'sort.' Both words occur in *Hipp. maj.,* εἶδος in a philosophical sense, ἰδέα only in the phrase ἐν πατρῶς ἰδέα (289 D and 297 B quoted above). Both occur in *Euthyphro* in a philosophical sense, ἰδέα 5 D, εἶδος and ἰδέα 6 D. On the latter passage J. Adam says 'εἶδος and ἰδέα are here practically synonymous: the only difference is that εἶδος views the thing in question more as to its content, ἰδέα more as to its form.' Cp. *Fr. Introd.* to *Euthyphro* p. 150 note 6. On *Phaedo* 103 E Archer-Hind observes, 'In fact μορφή, εἶδος and ἰδέα are in the present passage interchangeable words.' In *Rep.* 596 there is little change of meaning between εἶδος at A and ἰδέα (thrice) at B.

'We assign one εἶδος to each class of particulars: and so there are
of the bed and of the table, which the ἡμιονυγγός copies.' The key of the Ideal Theory (of the Rep.) is the representation of Intellectual processes by metaphors drawn from the world of Sense. Perhaps associations of Sense adhere rather more strongly to ἴδεα than to ἐίδος. In Parm. 132 A I can distinguish no difference of meaning: Οἷμαι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἐν ἔκαστον ἐίδος οὐσθελαί εἶναι· διὰ τῇ ἀττά μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μὲν τῆς ἴδεας δοκεῖ ἴδεα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι· ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδοντα, διέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸ μέγα ἴδεα εἶναι, περὶ όμ. τόμος τιμῶν, δὲ ἐπὶ πάσιν ἐκείνῳ τὸ νόμον ἐπὶ νοεῖ, μὲν τῷ δὲ ὀσφαν ἴδεαν· Ναὶ. Εἰσα ὅσι ἐίδος ἐκείνου τῷ νοοῦµεν ἐν εἶναι, άεὶ ἵν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πάσαν; Cr. 135 A. Again cp. Phaedr. 249 B δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνείναι κατ’ ἐίδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ τολµῶν λοιπ’ αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισµῷ ξυναρµόμενον with 265 D εἰς µᾶλλον ἴδεαν συνορώντας ἄγειν τὰ πολλὰ διεστραµένα: also Polit. 258 C, 262 B.

ἳδεα nowhere occurs in the Meno. Diog. L. iii 64 says of Plato πολλάκις δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν ὀνοµάζουν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σχισµατικόν λέγει· τὴν οὖν ἴδεαν καὶ ἐίδος ὀνοµάζει καὶ γένος καὶ παράδειγµα καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν. Plato saw that the formation of philosophical habits of thought must precede the fixing of a philosophical nomenclature: Theaet. 184 C τὸ δὲ εὐκρέστες τῶν ὀνοµάτων ταῖς ῤηµάτων καὶ θεία δ’ ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόµενον τὰ µὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, κτέ., Polit. 261 ε καὶ διαφυλάξει µὴ σκοπεῖται· τὸ τοῦ ὀνοµατος· πλούσιωτερος καὶ τὸ γῆς ἀναφανθῇ φρονήσεως: Rep. 533 D ἐστὶ δ’, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, εἰς στρατηγὸς ἀµφιστηρίως, οἱς τοσοῦτον πέρι σκέψις δος ἡµῶν ἱµῶν πρόκειται. Hostility to the word-catching methods of Eristic contributed to this feeling in him. See Campbell General Introd. to Soph. and Polit. p. xxiv, who, after quoting from Cope’s Pref. to his Translation of the Gorgias (p. xi): ‘one of the most striking peculiarities of Plato’s philosophical writings is the almost entire absence of any scientific terminology,’ shows that in the later dialogues, from the Theaetetus onwards, the tendency to technical words considerably increases.

3. εἰς δ’ ἀποβλέπουσα: cp. Euthyphro 6 έ ταύτῃ τοῖς µε αὐτὴν δίδαξαν τὴν ἴδεαν, τίς τοτε ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἴδεαν ἀποβλέπωσαν καὶ χρώμαν ταύτῃ παραδείγματος, δὲ µὲν ἐν τοιούτῳ υἱὸς φῶς δοῖον εἶναι: Gorg. 503 Ε (quoted above); Rep. 501 Β etc.

4. τουρ, opinor, 74 Β 6, 75 Ε 14, 89 Β 27, 28, 97 Β 6. Cp. 75 C 29 (Fr.).

8. τὸ ἐρωτάμενον, ‘the point of your present inquiry’; D not τὸ ἐρωτηθέν, because he is not referring exclusively to Socrates’ last question.

9. οὕτω δοκεῖ . . . ἀλλὰ μὲν: there is a seeming anacolouthon here, δοκεῖ giving the impression of an impersonal use, whereas
a subject is subsequently supplied. Fr. quotes *Rep.* 334 B τούτο ἔμουγε δοκεῖ, ὦφελεῖν μὲν τὸν πέλευς ἡ δικαιοσύνη (where the transition is rather stronger, as τούτο gives the impression of being subject to δοκεῖ), *Apol.* 25 B (see Stallbaum) ἦ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σου δοκεῖ ἔχειν. οι μὲν βελτίων ποιοῦσθε ἀυτοὺς πάντες ἅθροισθεν εἶναι, where δοκοῦσθε has to be substituted for δοκεῖ in the second clause. See on 71 C 14 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.

20. τῷ αὐτῷ ἐδεί, 'by something generically the same.' Plato leads up to this by the phrases C 2 ταῦτα ἐδοὺς ἄπασαι ἔχουσιν, D 14 ταῦτα ταναχοῦ εἶδος ἔστων, and for it he substitutes at 73 C 51 τῷ αὐτῷ ἐρώσφ. Cr. *Euthyphr.* 6 D (quoted, Intr. p. xlv).

21. τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τούτῳ λέγω, 'by the words "the same" I mean this.' λέγω = 'I mean' generally has two accusatives: *Gorg.* 498 D (twice), 491 A, etc.


29. τούτῳ οὐκέτι ὀμοιον, 'hoc non jam simile'; the same sense would be given by τούτῳ ἡ ὁνάμοιον 'hoc jam dissimile.' Crp. *Soph.* 247 B τούτῳ οὐκέτι κατὰ ταυτά ἀποκρίνονται: *Gorg.* 508 A ὧν ἀπλῶν ἦτο τούτῳ ἑρωτάς: 99 A 2. See on 83 D 52.

31. Ἐγγει: 'ubi verba dicendi vel sentiendi (ἐδόκει 89 C 8) ad superiora referuntur imperfectum usu venit. ἤτα μὴ ἐλέγον 74 B 7, 76 E 49, 78 B 1, ἀπεβάλλομεν 79 D 36, ἐλέγομεν 87 B 8, 88 D 2, 99 D 28, ὡμολογοῦμεν 97 A 7' (Fr.). But see Intr. p. lxii. (ἐτείει at 88 D 5 is somewhat different.)

35. σοφρόνως καὶ δικαίως: these are the two virtues that constitute ordinary civil virtue. *Phaedo* 82 B τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν, ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι σοφρόσυνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην (see Archer-Hind's note and his App. I), *Symp.* 209 A πολὺ δὲ μεγιστὴ καὶ καλλιστὴ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰς πτέλεων τε καὶ οἰκεῖσθεν διακοσμῆσεις, ἡ δὲ δυναμά εστὶ σοφρόσυνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη (see Hug's note); at *Prot.* 325 A τὸ δοσιν εἶναι is added. Zeller pp. 449 foll. Xenophon represents Justice and Temperance as the common ground of the sexes, *Oec.* vii 27.

42. ἄρα in conclusionibus 73 C 51, 78 A 62, 82 D 22, 83 C D E al., aliter ad 80 E 8, 81 D 12, 97 C 33' (Fr.): also 91 C 2. See on 80 E 8.

46. μῶν is rare in the early dialogues: see the table quoted from Constantin Ritter, Intr. p. lxii. It occurs thrice in the *Meno*; here, 84 B 14 and 93 A 11.
Chapter V (73 C–74 A). Meno. Virtue is the power to rule.

Socrates. But this does not suit the case of all men—slaves and children, for instance. Moreover, to make rule virtuous it must be exercised with certain characteristics—Justice, for instance. These characteristics are several species of Virtue. We have not got Virtue as a Whole yet.

Meno's second definition has at least the semblance of unity. But how has he arrived at it? He has simply taken out of the 'swarm' of Virtues above the one that fills the largest place in his mind, the ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, and ignored all the rest. Socrates shows, first, that the definition is much too narrow; next, that no progress is made so long as we still regard the term Virtue in its Extension. If we take a class of external acts, as those of a virtuous Ruler, we find they are virtuous because they manifest various qualities, Justice for instance. As these qualities are many, Virtue again, from a new point of view, appears as plural.

With Socrates' criticism here must be carefully compared which he makes on the third definition subsequently, 77 B foll.. Meno's ready assent that Rule must be Just to be virtuous, is parallel with his similar assent about Acquisition at 78 D 33.

5. κατὰ πάντων: it is worth while to notice the different D prepositional and other phrases used by Plato to denote the relation of the Universal to the Particulars, during the period of his philosophy while he either had framed no metaphysical theory of this relation, or still regarded the Idea as 'immanent in the particulars' and not, as in his later stage, merely as an exemplar. (See H. Jackson in JP. vol. x pp. 295–6, xi p. 297, Archer-Hind Phaedo Intr. pp. 34, 35.)

κατὰ πάντων here: 74 B 2, 88 E 13; cp. 76 A 23, etc.

diὰ πάντων 74 A 35: Laches 192 B el τὸ γε διὰ πάντων περικος δεῖ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἑρωτώμενον ἀποκρινομέθεα. Soph. 240 A τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων, ἀ πολλὰ εἰπών ἤξιωσας ἐν προσειπείν ὑψόματι, φθειράμενον ἐπὶ πάσιν ὡς εὐ δυ.

ἐπὶ πᾶσιν 75 A 6: Soph. 240 A (just quoted), Theaet. 185 c τὸ τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων, Sympr. 210 B τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος. The metaphor implied in the use of the preposition ἐπὶ to express this relation, and the difficulties
involved in it, are brought out in Parm. 131 διέςωσ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταύτω ἄμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖσ, οἷον ὃ ἐκ λατρείᾳ κατατετάσσα πολλοῦς ἀνθρώποις φαίης ἐν ἑπτὰ πολλοῖς εἶναι δίον: cp. 132 c. See JP. xi pp. 288–291.

ἐν πάσι: Lach. 191 τοῖς εἰς εἰς ἀνδρεῖαν, τί δε ἐν πάσι οἴοντοι ταύτων ἐστιν.

Lastly, at 74 D 34 the Universal κατέχει the Particulars. Cp. Phaedo 104 δ; see also note on 73 E 17.

The references to the Sophistes come from a portion of that dialogue where the 'Sophist' is made to assume the mantle of Socrates himself, and to ask for a definition in language which, as H. Jackson has shown (JP. xiv pp. 189, 190), 'is the very echo of that of the Meno.'

7. ἄλλα μὴν ᾧτω γε, 'yes, that is just what I am seeking for.' For ἄλλα μὴν... γε used in repeating with emphasis a word from a previous speaker cp. Euthyphro 6 καὶ ἐν ὅβρω βούλη. ἆλλα μὴν βούλομαι γε, 'yes, that is just what I do wish,' Lach. 193 εἴπερ ὁκατὸ γε. ἄλλα μὴν ὁμαί γε, and 192 c (quoted above). (Cp. Gorg. 466 6 εἰ τὸ δυνατὰ γε λέγεις ἀγαθὸν τί εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. Ὡς. ἄλλα μὲν δὴ λέγω γε.) Other uses of the combination occur 74 E 43, 77 A 1, 98 E 47, cp. 41.

10. ἢ τι ἀν δοῦλος εἶναι, 'do you think the ruler would be a slave then?'

11. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ: see on 71 C 19.

12. οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, 'I should rather think not.'

ἀριστερός implies no estimate of the character of the person addressed, any more than does 'my dear sir' (used in expostulation) or 'my good fellow' (used with contempt). See Campbell Theaetetus App. D. Cp. Carlyle Sartor bk. i ch. 3 'but I, mein Werther, sit above it all; I am alone with the stars'; and Sheridan's Rivals, where Fag profoundly observes that 'one always says "honest" to one's inferiors.' Cp. 92 C 16 ὅ δειμονίε.


Ε 17. ἢ ἀρτῆ τίς; so σχήμα and σχήμα τί presently express respectively the Universal and the Particular. A similar relation is expressed by τὸ καλὸν and καλὸν in Hipp. maj. 287 D.

19. εἰ βούλη: see on 71 E 2.

21. ὡς ἀπλῶς, 'just simply,' without qualification. Ast s.v. ἀπλῶς quotes many examples, either word preceding in-differently. Prot. 351 c etc.

74 A 29. καλ σὲ οὖν: οὖν resumes εἰπέ in the line above. For οὖν
resumptive see Apol. 28 d, Symp. 201 d, Euthyd. 285 b. ‘Velut ipse dicerem... si juberes, ita tu quoque dic.’

30. Meno here gives the four ‘cardinal’ virtues; but shows that this is no philosophical classification by adding μεγαλοπρέπεια (‘pars civilis virtutis quam intelligebat Meno Fr.), καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα. The Thessalian Admetus is markedly μεγαλοπρεπῆ (Eur. Alc. 358: cp. on 70 A 7). Perhaps it is also characteristic of Meno that he leaves out ὀσίωτης, which Socrates introduces at 78 D 30.

It may be noted that μεγαλοπρεπεία, though not standing on the same footing as δικαιοσύνη, is mentioned as one of the qualities of the true philosopher, Rep. 486 A. His character is summed up at 487 A; he must be μνήμων, εἰμαθῆς, μεγαλοπρεπῆς, εὐχαρις, φιλος τε καὶ ἐννοεῖν αἰθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης. Cp. on 88 A 16 and 91 A 4, 8. Cp. Ar. Rhet. i vi 9=1382 b 13, i ix 5, 12=1386 b 2, 18; N.E. ii vii 6 and iv ii.

Chapters VI–IX (74 A–77 A). Socrates helps Meno by giving sample definitions—first, two of Figure, the former of which is rejected as involving terms with which the respondent has not assumed himself that the other is familiar. After the second and scientific definition of Figure, Socrates gives in addition a definition of Colour, hailed with acclamation by Meno, but less scientific because it rests on a hypothesis not universally admitted.

6. ἐκ τῆς σε ἀνέφωρον κτᾶ: see on 72 B 22. The triple B protasis is expressed by thrice-repeated ἔκ—a rare combination. The change of mood (ἀνέφωρον, εἰσεῖς) is a change from a vague future supposition (Goodwin MT. § 455) to a present unreal supposition. It is important to notice that the unreal supposition, though expressed by aorists, is present, not past. For the change of mood, cp. 90 B 5 ἄν πέμπτομεν, followed by C 16 ἄν ἐπέμπτομεν, ὁ Θεόκλητος 125 b–d where the main problem is put in the optative (ἐκ ἐρωτῶ... ἔκ ἄν φαίη;), the intervening illustrations in the aor. indic. (ἐλ ήρωμεθα... ἔκ ἄν ἐπεκρινατο;) see Kühner § 576 Anm. 9, Goodwin MT. § 414. Cp. ἐκ σε ἄρωμην 72 B 24. See also 76 E 49.

As to the present passage, Kühner § 577. 9 says that the first member, ἐκ τῆς σε ἀνέφωρον, is really protasis to the second, ἐκ αὐτῶρ εἰσεῖς, the third member, ἐκ σοι εἰσεῖς, being the real protasis to εἰσεῖς δημον ἄν. ‘If in a certain case you would answer so-and-so, to a further question you would answer so-and-so.’ Goodwin (MT. § 510), on the other hand, appears to
regard the first member as 'the leading condition, to which the
rest of the sentence (including the other conditions) is the con-
cclusion.' 'If any one should ask you "What is Figure?" you
would—under certain further conditions—make such and such
an answer.' Grammatically the three protases are co-ordinate,
and might conceivably be so translated: 'suppose—and suppose
—and suppose—what then?'

7. δὲ νῦν δὴ ἐγώ ἔλεγον: for the impf. see on 73 A 31.

C 19. ἐκ περὶ χρώματος ὀπταύτως ἄντιστροτ κτέ.: see on 72 B 22.

D 29. ἐκ οὖν .. μετῆει: the complex protasis is in this
instance interrupted. It is resumed at E 2, ἐκ οὖν .. ἐκεῖς, and
the apodosis finally comes at 75 A 5 τῶς ἀν ἐθαυμασέ (Struve,
quoted by Fr.).

30. ἔλεγεν δὴ: for δὴ redundant in introducing a quotation
see 75 A 4, C 3, 87 A 25, Prot. 356 A, Rep. 453 B etc., and
Riddell §§ 279, 280.

ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι οὕτως, ἀλλὰ: ἀλλὰ transitional followed by ἀλλὰ
complemental. See on 71 C 10 and 13, Prot. 318 B (Heind.).
The ellipsis with μὴ οὕτως in these places is λέγει or the like. In
Ἡρρ. ἁγ. 299 ο μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονή .. ἀλλ' εἰ τις αὐτῷ
toú τι διαφέρει we must understand σκόπει or the like with both
members.

33. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία δυντα ἀλλήλοις: it is obvious to
us that one class may contain under it two things not merely
different but opposite. The subject has been approached in the
Protagoras c. xix (330 η foll.). It is asked 'How can Virtue be
One, and yet the parts of Virtue (μόρια ἀρετῆς) different from
each other?' Protagoras, in setting forth his view, says that
opposites have a common point (331 D), τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι
ἐστίν δὴ προσέωκε, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τάλλα καὶ
δοκεῖ ἐναντιωτάτα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις. Ὅπ. Phil. 12 καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα,
ὡς δαιμόνιε, χρῶμα κατὰ γε αὐτῷ τοῦτον' οὐδὲν διασεῖ τὸ χρώμα
eiναι πάν, τὸ γε μὴ μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγαντικομεν ὡς πρὸς
tὸ διαφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιωτάτων δυν̄ τυγχάνει' καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα
σχῆμα κατὰ ταύταν κτέ. In Phaedo 104 A B it appears that
ἀρετῆς comprises the opposites ὑπον and περίτοιν.

The passage above quoted from the Philebus opens up other
kindred matters, about which see H. Jackson's paper in JP.
Χ. pp. 263 foll. In the Philebus we are confronted by the old
difficulty of seeing how a thing can be at once One and Many.
How can One thing (e.g. Pleasure) be Many things (e.g. good
and bad)? (This was one source from which sprang Antisthenes'
denial of the possibility of predication.) Philebus cannot see
how Pleasure can be of different kinds. They may have
different or opposite origins, but in as far as they are Pleasure, they must be One and the same (12 D elôi μὲν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐναντίων, ὃ Σωκράτες, αὕτη πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὕτη γε ἄλληλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἤδων γε ἤδων μὴ ὦν μοιάζωται δὲν εἴη;). Socrates shows that the paradox that a thing is both One and Many appears under several aspects. He (Philebus 14 C foll.) recognises identification of ἐν and πολλά in three distinct senses: (1) the identification of the One particular and its Many qualities, (2) the identification of the One particular and its Many parts, (3) the identification of the One idea and its Many particulars. In the sequel the article proceeds to show that between the earlier dialogues and the Philebus the interest has shifted from the first two problems to the last. The first problem is really that of Classification, which fills so large a space in the Meno and kindred dialogues; for each of the Many qualities is a Class notion. But in the Philebus the first two problems are accounted trivial and uninteresting (δὲν ἐμεθεντα, 'played out,' 14 D); though in Rep. 523 A–526 B they are made the bases of a dialectical course. [So at Phil. 13 E Socrates says he would be a poor creature if he were not equal to seeing that one class may embrace not only dissimilars but opposites: πολλά τε αἱ ἑξαπασαί ἐπιστήμαι δόξους εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοι τινες αὐτῶν ἄλληλας; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντία τῇ γνώσει τινες, ἀρα δέος δὲν εἴην τοῖς διαλέγονται νῦν, εἰ φανθεῖσι τούτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμην γνωσθαι, κτέ.] 'Similarly in the Phaedo 102 B–103 A the first identification is discussed—in regard to the tallness and shortness simultaneously discoverable in Simmias—at a length for which Socrates thinks it necessary to make a sort of apology 102 D, while the simultaneous appearance of αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος and τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος, of the separately existent idea and the same idea distributed among its particulars—a case of the third identification of ἐν and πολλὰ—is assumed without a word of explanation' (note on p. 264). 'If again we turn to Meno 73 C sqq. we remark at once a similarity and a dissimilarity to Phil. 12 D sqq. Meno's inability to regard Virtue as a ἐν, and Protarchus' inability to regard Pleasure as a πολλά, have a common origin, and Socrates in his answer to Meno takes the same sort of line, and employs the same examples (σχῆματα and χρώματα), as in his answer to Protarchus. On the other hand there is nothing in the Meno to correspond to Phil. 14 B–15 C. The ontological difficulty insisted upon in the latter has not in the former made its appearance.' The Meno contents itself with the attempt to grasp the General Notion; in the Philebus that stage is passed; but the problem remains, 'how does the Idea enter into the Particulars?'
καὶ ταῦτα καὶ, 'and that too though,' L. & S. ôtros C ix 2.

34. κατέχα: see on 73 D 5.

35. δὲ δὴ ὁνομάζεις κτλ., 'which you call Figure, allowing the name Figure both to curved and straight.' This is hardly an instance of the ordinary transition from the relative to the demonstrative construction. This transition mostly occurs where the relative if repeated in the second clause would be in a different case. Where the relative would be in the same case, it is naturally understood in the second clause. But even under these circumstances the transition to the demonstrative sometimes occurs (Kühner § 561. 1), Xen. An. iii iii 16 'Ροδίων, ὅν τοὺς πολλούς φασιν ἐπιστασθαι σφενδόμαν καὶ τὸ βέλος αὐτῶν καὶ διπλάσιον φέρεσθαι τῶν Περαικῶν σφενδόμων. In the present place it looks at first sight as if Plato might have left out the second σχῆμα, writing δὴ ὁνομάζεις σχῆμα καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φης τὸ στρογγύλων εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθῦ. But there would then have been the danger that his reader, instead of supplying δ in the second clause as predicate, might take εἶναι in the sense 'exist.' Cp. 77 Ε 44 ὁ χωρὸς αγαθὸν εἶναι, ἐστιν δὲ τὰ αὐτά γε κακόν, 93 D 17 ὁ ἑκεῖνος αὐτῶν ἐπαινεῖται, καὶ ἐπιτίθησαν σοφῶν διὰ διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἰχετο: Theaei. 192 A δ μὲν τις οὖδὲ, ἀλλὰντει δὲ αὐτὸ μή. See on 90 Ε 32.

Ε 39. ἀρ' οὖν, δειν οὖν λέγης, 'am I to understand that when you speak thus me you are not more curved than it is straight, or that straight is no more straight than it is curved?' Dr. Jowett's translation (2nd ed.), by twice giving 'any more' instead of 'no more,' makes nonsense of this passage.

CHAPTER VII

1. τοῦτο is followed by τὸ σχῆμα exegetically. Riddell § 214.

75 A 4. εἰπες στι: see on 74 D 30.

οὐδὲ μανθάνει—οὐδὲ οἶδα: οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ are never (in Attic Greek) correlated ('neither . . . nor'); when they occur they mean 'not even . . . nor yet,' Hadley § 1005. Cp. Lysis 210 c μν ἀρα οὐδὲ σὲ ὁ πατήρ οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα φιλεί καθ' ὅσιν ἄν ἢ ἄρχηστος, Rep. 391 c, Xen. An. iii i 27 σὺ γε οὐδὲ ἄρα ὑμῶν γυνώκεις οὐδὲ ἀκόουν μέμνησαι, ne videns quidem cernis, neque audiens meministi (Kühner § 537. 2). Cp. 92 B 11.

7. ἐπὶ τούτων, 'on these terms': note the difference from the neighbouring uses of ἐπὶ with the dative, and see on 90 D 20.
But the use before us has grown out of the local use, ἕτι τούτοις being simply 'on this basis,' 'on this understanding.'

11. ὅνα καὶ γένηται: see on 71 B 8. This intensive καὶ is not uncommon in final clauses. Lach. 194 A καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ἁπτήσει κάρπερησομεν ὅνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτή ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ: Rep. 346 A μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνον ὅνα τι καὶ περαινομεν: Lyg. 204 B, Gorg. 467 C, Apol. 22 A B, Theaet. 163 C, Soph. 250 A etc.


14. βούλει χαράσσωμαι: cp. 76 C 19, 86 C 1. Goodwin MT. § 287. He quotes Rep. 372 E εἰ δ' αὐτ' βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαν-νοσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλώσει to show that in Attic Greek the subjunctive was felt as dependent upon the part of βούλομαι, not as independent. (See on the other hand Kühner § 394. 5.)

24. χρώματι ἐπόμενον: Colour is an attribute of matter much less constant, much more dependent on the state of the percipient, than is Form. Form is ranked by Locke among the 'primary' qualities of matter, Colour among the 'secondary' —a distinction which goes back to Democritus. (Zeller pre-Socrates 11 231 ; Sir Win. Hamilton, 'Reid's Works,' Note v, and index 'Qualities.') We have then here the fallacy of defining ignotum per ignotius (Jevons Elem. Lessons pp. 110 and 114). The juxtaposition of σχῆμα and χρώμα is very frequent in Plato; see Phil. 12 e, quoted on 74 D 33, and many places quoted by Ast s.v. χρώμα.

25. κἂν φοτός ἄγαπην: cp. on 72 C 1. Here the usual C hyperbaton of ἄν is avoided. But another is introduced, for φοτός really belongs to εἶναι.

29. τοῦ, 'if I understand'; a variety of the usual sense of τοῦ (opinor), in which 'it is added when with some hesitation we repeat the words of another' (Buttmann Index). Fr. quotes 79 D 36, 94 C 26 for the same sense.

30. εἶν: 'συγκατάθεαι μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφῆ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα Tim. lex,' Fr. Cp. 106 A εἶν. εἰ δὲ δὴ δὶ τὶ μᾶλλον οὐτὰ διακενόθημαι κτὲ. See J. Adam on Prot. 311 C, 357 A.

32. ἀποκεκριθαι: this tense is used as deponent and as passive by Plato with about equal frequency; passive, as here, Gorg. 453 D, where see Heindorf.
CHAPTER VIII

2. ἰμωτικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν: see Excursus V and on 83 D

50. Cf. Theaet. 154 d.

3. δι: see on 74 D 30.

D 4. λαμβάνειν λόγον, ‘to examine the statement.’ The phrase in this sense occurs Rep. 337 ε, Soph. 246 c etc.; and in the same sense δέχεσθαι λόγον, Prot. 336 c, Rep. 531 ε. It is opposed to διδόναι λόγον, ‘to stand an examination,’ 81 B 23, Prot. 336 c, Rep. 531 ε (υπέχειν, παρέχειν λόγον, Prot. 338 d, Rep. 344 d). The phrases express the respective positions of the ‘opposer’ and ‘maintainer’ of a thesis. The metaphor is probably taken from an audit of accounts; cf. Laws 774 B ἐν ταῖσ εὐθύναις τοῦ τοιοῦτον λόγον ὑπεχέω. The phrases λαμβάνειν and διδόναι δίκην furnish fairly close parallels. We have also the phrase λόγον ἐαυτῷ δούναι (Soph. 230 Α, often in Hdt.) ‘to give an account to one’s self,’ or sometimes ‘to reconcile something with one’s conscience.’ But λαμβάνειν λόγον has another sense in Plato, not connected with personal debate, viz. ‘to grasp the λόγος or true definition of something,’ Rep. 402 Α, Theaet. 148 d περὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβέων λόγον, τί ποτε νυγχάνει ὑν. Corresponding with this we have a second sense of the phrase διδόναι λόγον ‘to furnish such a definition,’ Phaedo 76 Β (see Archer-Hind), 78 D, Rep. 534 B ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικῶν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὕσεως; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὐτῷ τῇ καὶ ἄλλῳ δοῦναι, κατὰ τουτὸν νοῦν περὶ τοὐτοῦ οὐ φθοεὶς ἔχειν; cf. Gorg. 501 Α (the Art λαμβάνοντας τοῦτον οὐ θεραπέει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἄν ψάρτη, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι. Stallb. and others at the present place translate λαμβάνειν λόγον ‘loquentis partes suscipere.’ This view is rightly opposed by Fr. It is true that δοῦναι λόγον in Xen. Hell. v ii 20 does mean ‘to give opportunity for speech,’ but λόγον in these combinations in Plato always means more than ‘speech.’ At Phil. 11 Α δέχεσθαι λόγον means ‘to undertake a thesis committed to one.’

6. θαυμάζω: the mention of the present conversers (ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ) naturally introduces a transition to the plural.

7. διαλεκτικῶτερον: it is characteristic of the διαλεκτικός to be able διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν λόγον (in both the Platonic senses), Rep. 531 Ε, 534 B (quoted above); cf. Crat. 390 C, Phaedr. 266 Β. See Grote i 267, Archer-Hind on Phaedo 75 D.

On the procedure here recommended see Xen. Mem. iv vi 15 ὀπέτε δὲ αὐτῷ (ὁ Σωκράτης) τῷ λόγῳ διεξοί, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογομένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγον:
10. σειράσμα δή: here δή has the force of igitur ‘accordingly’ (Hadley 1037. 4 a). In this use it does not refer to a word, but to a clause, and is practically a connecting particle. Ast (s.v. δή p. 447 bottom) quotes some instances in Plato amongst ‘innumerable’ others. See Kühner § 500. 4. δή is in origin a temporal particle, connected with ἶδη, F. W. Thomas in JP. xxiii pp. 89 foll. The temporal force has to a great extent disappeared in Attic. ‘Now,’ which has undergone a similar widening of meaning, or ‘well now,’ will often serve as a translation; as here, Rep. 366 B, 368 A δοκεῖτε δή μοι ὃ διαλέγоω οὗ πεπείθομαι ‘well now, I really think you are not convinced,’ 494 A, Phaedr. 248 E etc. Where the result of an exposition is summed up with emphasis, δή = ‘in fact,’ ‘in a word’; Rep. 361 B ἀφαιρέτων δή το δοκεῖν, 486 B etc. Cp. on 81 B 30.

12. τελευτήν καλεῖς τι; This is the form in which the recognition of the terms to be employed is always secured, cp. 76 A 19, 88 A 16 etc. An affirmative answer to it implies a recognition not merely of the name, but of the reality of the thing corresponding to it. The phrase already occurs Hdt. ii 2 Ψαμμίτιχος ἐπινιγμένοις οἷς άνθρώπων βέκσι τι καλέοντι. Fr. refers to Xen. Mem. ii 1, iv 22, to show that such a question was part of the procedure of Socrates. Cp. Phaedr. 287 c.

13. τως δ’ ἄν ἡμῖν Προδίκου διαφύγειτο, ‘Prodicus might perhaps quarrel with us on the point,’ namely of our nomenclature. For the life of Prodicus the ‘sophist’ of Cees see Zeller Pre-Socrates vol. ii pp. 416–420; for his treatise or lecture (ἐπίδειξις Ort. 384 B) περὶ όνομάτων ὀρθῆτος ibid. pp. 489–491. Prodicus drew distinctions between words popularly used as synonymous. To this we have many allusions in Plato. In Charm. 163 B Socrates says he grasps the difference between ποῖςις and πρᾶξις, καλ γάρ Προδίκου μωρά τινα ἄκηκοα περὶ όνομάτων διαφύγειν. In Lach. 197 D Socrates says that Prodicus δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαύτα ὄνομα τα διαφύγειν. In Protagoras 314 c he is one of the sophists in the house of Callias with Protagoras; at 337 A foll. a speech is put into his mouth exemplifying, or caricaturing, his method, cp. 339 A foll.; and at 358 A he is requested for the moment to waive his insistence on verbal niceties, somewhat as here in the Meno. In Euthyd. 277 E Socrates in consoling the puzzled Clinias says πρῶτον γάρ, ὅς φησι Προδίκος, περὶ όνομάτων ὀρθῆτος μαθεῖν δεί. We know that Protagoras as well as Prodicus speculated on
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vonmaton dphthn (Phaed. 267 c, Crat. 391 c). None of the early philosophers were specialists. Prodicus’ teaching was by no means confined to questions of language. He had at least some views on rhetoric (Phaedr. 267 b), and wrote on ethics and religion (Zeller pre-Soc. II 473, 482-3, 486; see his ‘Choice of Heracles,’ Xen. Mem. II 1 21). For Socrates’ debt to him see on 96 D 23.

15. kaleis perepanthai ti, i.e. ‘perepanthai’ kaleis ti.


76 A 20. oivon taiva ta in tais gommmeiai, ‘the well-known terms, you know, used in geometrical problems.’ oivon velut, as 72 B 27, 74 A 27, 86 E 28, etc., Riddell § 16.

gommmeiai: Rep. 510 c, 511 b, 533 c, 536 d in the same sense. The plural, as often in the case of abstracts, expresses separate instances of the quality, or manifestations of the faculty: cp. evstheiai 86 A 10, evplei Prot. 354 B, evgenieai Euthyd. 279 B, Rep. 618 B (Kühner § 348. 3, Hadley § 636).

24. perepanai intransitive: see L. & S. iv, under which head this place should be quoted.

25. stereosss piras: a model definition, piras expressing the Genus and stereos the Differentia.

CHAPTER IX

B 9. katakekalympmenos, ‘blindfold.’

11. evi elon: cp. Xen. An. II vi 28 evi apaios ev. This passage, as showing that Meno was no longer very young, indicates that the dramatic date of the dialogue is shortly before the starting of Cyrus’ expedition (Intr. p. xxiv).

12. tis dhi; ‘how so, pray?’ (with surprise). This form (cp. 79 A 6, Gorg. 486 e) must be distinguished from tis de; (71 C 15, 73 A 31, B 46, etc.) or (less correctly, see Fr. prol. pp. 46, 47) tis dai; which simply draws attention to a coming question.

13. ovdenv all’ 6’ etupaties, ‘you do nothing but lay down the law.’ We should understand paeis with ovdenv. See on 71 C 13. Should we regard all’ in this usage as representing alla or alla? L. & S. explain all’ 6’ as always arising from
άλλο ἦ, the accent on ἄλλο having been lost. Ast (s.v. ἄλλος p. 108) thinks that both here and at 64D 31 we have ἄλλο, and he writes ἄλλ' ἦ (with the accent) in both places. This the MSS. do not confirm. Against the view of L. & S. may be urged (1) that in many instances of ἄλλ' ἦ we have ἄλλο already expressed earlier in the sentence: e.g. Phaedo 81 b (where Geddes remarks that in these combinations ἄλλα is properly dependent on μηδὲν and ἦ on ἄλλο), ib. 97 d, Rep. 429 b, 553 d: (2) that in many places ἄλλο is not the part of ἄλλος that would be required, e.g. Prot. 354 c μη χρησθαι ἔλαιο ἄλλ' ἦ ἄντι συμπληράτη; 358 a, Apol. 34 b τινα λόγον ἄλλ' ἦ τὸν ὀρθόν; Phaedr. 258 ε, Phaedo 83 a, Rep. 427 c. I believe that in Plato where ἄλλο ἦ is intended it is always written in full (as 80 a 4, Theaet. 195 e, Crat. 412 d, Euthyd. 277 e), and that where we have ἄλλ' ἦ the first word is always ἄλλα. (But ἄλλ' ἦ is ἄλλα ἦ, as Phaed. 91 d.) The ἦ gives ἄλλα additional point; ἦ 'than,' which comes naturally after ἄλλος, is used with ἄλλα, though it is no longer felt as a case of ἄλλος. Kühner § 535, 6 (=Jelf § 773 Obs. 1) says that the form arises from the merging together of two constructions, οὐδὲν ἄλλο . . . ἄλλα and οὐδὲν ἄλλο . . . ἦ, ἄλλα and ἦ nearly agreeing in meaning. See also Riddell § 148, Hadley 1046 c. The ἦ is not indispensable, Laws 710 c εὐτυχῆς μη καρ ἄλλο, ἄλλα κτέ. In Prot. 354 c and Symp. 181 d ἦ after ἄλλ' has been introduced against the MSS. We have the same variation in the interrogative formula ἄλλο τι; or ἄλλο τι ἦ;

14. οἱ τρυφώντες, 'spoiled children.' τρυφῶ is from a lengthened form of the stem of τρυ-ω, which again is a lengthened form of the stem of τείρω. θρυτ-τω is a further formation from the stem of τρυφῶ. The meanings of τρυφῶ, θρύπτομαι, διαθρύ-πτομαι are nearly parallel, and should be compared. The original meaning is 'broken up,' 'soft.' For the transition to the moral meaning cp. Latin fractus, de-licatus. The notion here is slackness combined with pride, 'to be exacting,' 'to expect too much from others.' So Euthyphro 11 e, 12 a τρυφᾶς ἐν τῷ πλούσιον τῆς σοφίας. ἄλλ' ὡς μακάρε ξύνητεν σαυτόν 'you are playing with the matter; pull yourself together.' Cp. ἡ Ἀλε. i 114 a. A slightly different shade is 'to be hard to please,' fastidire, Prot. 327 e νῦν δὲ τρυφᾶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοι εἰσαν ἄρετῆς: Xen. Mem. πi xi 10 τῶν ἐν τρυφήνα 'the disdainful.'

15. ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας, δτι: the regular constr. of this verb in C this sense, gen. of person, acc. of charge. F. E. T. § 102, Hadley § 752, Phaedo 116 c, Xen. Mem. i iii 10, etc.

16. εἰπεν ἡττων τῶν καλῶν: there is no doubt that Plato
here preserves a trait of the historic Socrates, to whom similar expressions are attributed by Xenophon: *Symp.* viii 2 ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω χρόνον ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔρων τινὸς διατελῶ. Cp. *Mem.* ii vi 28 ἵως δὲ ἂν τί σοι κάγῳ συλλαβεῖν ἔχομι διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι, ἰν ἰ 2 πολλάκις γὰρ ἔφη μὲν ἂν τινὸς ἐρῶν, φανερῶς δὲ ἢν οὖ τῶν τὰ σώματα πρὸς ὑμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἴ ἐπεφυκότων ἐφιέμενον. This is richly illustrated by Plato in such passages as *Charm.* 154 b, 155 d, *Lys.* 204 b. See Grote i 352, note.

In *Phaedrus* 227 c *Phaedrus* tells Socrates that the discourse he has been listening to is especially suited to Socrates, as the subject happened to be Love. Cp. 257 a. In *Symp.* 177 d Socrates is very ready to discourse on Love, διὸ οὐδὲν φημὶ ἐπιστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά: and ib. 216 d Alcibiades says ὅρατε γὰρ διὶ Σ. ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἄει περὶ τούτων ἔστι καὶ ἐπέπληκτα, *Euthyphr*. 14 c, †*Theages* 128 b. See Zeller *Socrates* pp. 71 foll., 127, 165, Dr. Thompson’s *Phaedrus* App. i p. 152, Hug *Symp.* pp. xviii foll. Now though in many of these passages (as certainly in the present and 86 D) a strong tinge of irony is to be observed, it would be a great mistake to suppose that the language is purely metaphorical, and to ignore the physical attraction out of which it grew. The story of the judgment passed by the physiognomist Zopyrus on the character of Socrates, with the latter’s explanation, may have a basis of genuine tradition. Cic. *Tusc.* iv 80 cum multa in conventu vitae collegisset in cum Zopyrus, quique naturam cujusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a ceteris qui illa in Socrate vitae non agnoscerent; ab ipso autem Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi insita sed ratione a se dejecta diceret. Cp. de *Fato* § 10. The words of Thoreau (Walden, ‘*Higher Laws*)’ may be quoted: ‘the generative energy which when we are loose dissipates and makes us unclean, when we are continent invigorates and inspires us.’ This is the truth underlying Aristotle’s representation of ὀφροσύνη as a mean between ἄρσενα and ἀναισθησία.

This is not the place for a full discussion of the erotic philosophy of Plato. (Grote ii pp. 206–210, Zeller pp. 455 foll.) But it is closely connected with the point just mentioned. As the dialectic method of Plato was grounded on the dialectic of Socrates, similarly his erotic philosophy had a root in the emotional side of his master’s character. In the *Symposium* 198 d Socrates, who earlier had professed himself to know nothing but the lore of love, recants and declares himself unable to pronounce a suitable eulogy. All that he knows of any value was communicated to him by the gifted Diotima. Thus the erotic Socrates passes into the exponent of the erotic doctrine of Plato.
The point is the more relevant because there is a close analogy between ἀξία, the main subject of the Meno and ἔρως. (Exc. vii p. 301). To Plato these two things are the great mediators between the world of Being and the world of Sense. To express the state of emotional exaltation that appeared to Plato to be (for mortals) the indispensable condition in any attempt to pierce the Veil, he found no language so apt as that drawn from physical love.

19. θεύλει ἀποκρίνωμαι: see on 75 B 14.

22. ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν δυντῶν κατὰ Ἐμπ. : Empedocles, of Acragas in Sicily, explained sensation by the hypothesis that material objects gave off films adapted to the several channels of sense. See Zeller pre-Socratics ii 165–6; cp. pp. 133–4; R. & P. § 139, especially note d; Grote i 47. The most important places in ancient writers on the point are Emped. line ν 337 (Mullach) γυνή διὰ πάντων εἰς ἄπορροα δια’ ἐγένεστο, Theophr. de sensu § 7 Ἐμπ. φησὶ τῷ ἐναρμότειν (τὰς ἀπορροὰς) εἰς τὸν πόρον τοῦ ἐκάστης (αὐθήνασις) αὐθάνασια, Aristotle de gen. et corr. i 8 = 324 b 26 foll. Cp. Rep. 530 ν κινδυνεύει, ἐφη, ὡς πρὸς ἄπορον δίματα πεπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φοράν ὡς παγηναὶ and Soph. O.T. 1387 εὶ τῆς ἀκούσας ἐτ’ ἐν πηγῇ δι’ ἄτων φραγόδε, where πηγή is much the same as πόρος: see Verrall on S. c. T. 571. We seem to have a filtration of the same doctrine put into the mouth of Euripides by Aristoph. Thesm. 16 foll.—

ψ μὲν βλέπων χρῆ πρῶτ’ ἐμηχανήσατο
δι’ ἄτων ἀντίμμων ἠλίου τρόχω
δι’ ἄτων κοάνης ὡς διεστρήνατο.

Zeller pre-Socratics ii p. 166 note 3 (cp. Plato p. 428) says that Plato’s explanation of sight in the Theaetetus (153 d, 156 b–c) and Timaeus was the same as that of Empedocles; but Archer-Hind in his note on Timaeus 45 D shows that there are considerable differences. We have the same doctrine indicated in the Phaedr. 251 B δεξάμενος τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροήν διὰ τῶν ὄρμάτων.

A similar view of sensation was taken by Democritus and the Atomists (Zeller pre-Socratics ii 230, Grote i 80). The Atomists were driven to some such view by their assumption that all influence of one thing upon another implies mechanical contact. From Democritus it was adopted by Epicurus, and we find it reproduced in Lucretius iv 42–6:

dico igitur rerum effigias tenuisque figuras
mittier ab rebus summio de corpore rerum etc.

Diogenes Laertius viii 58 quotes from Satyrus a statement
that Gorgias was a pupil of Empedocles. They were probably contemporaries, as Diogenes (ib. 74) tells us that Empedocles flourished in the 84th Olympiad (444 B.C.). Some writers appear to have confused Empedocles the philosopher with his grandfather of the same name. Quint. i. 8 says of Gorgias Empedoclis, ut traditur, discipulus, cum aequalis fere esset et potius familiaris. See R. & P. § 167 note d, § 190 note a. Words denoting 'pupil' are sometimes interchanged with ἔραξος (Zeller pre-Socratics ii 211 note) or γενόμενος (Müller FHG. iii p. 159). Cp. 79 E 2. Whether strictly a pupil or not, Gorgias could hardly fail to be influenced by his great compatriot. But Gorgias probably cared little for scientific research (Zeller pre-Socratics ii 460).

28. ἄμοιτειν: Empedocles' doctrine of sensation postulated a certain homogeneity between the perceived object and the perceiving organ. For sensation implies intermixture, and like seeks to mingle with like. The extreme form of this doctrine he expressed in the verses—

γαλη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὑπόλαμην, ὅπατι ὅ' ὄσωρ,
αἰθέρα ὅ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀναρ πυρ πυρ ἀέρηλον.

Of course the words in the present passage do not imply so much as this.

D 33. σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, 'please take my meaning': these words, used by Pindar (fr. 82 Bergk) to prefer a modest request—in behalf of another—became a catchword. Aristophanes (Birds 945) puts them into the mouth of the poet, who, having got the jerkin, delicately hints that he would like the cloak as well. Plato here and Phaedr. 236 D uses the words without reference to their original association.

ἥπη Πῦδαρος: for this form of quotation—without ὡς—

34. ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα: Gedike observes that this is nearly the same definition as Plato gives in Tim. 67 C. But there the definition is part of a reasoned system; it no longer rests on an isolated hypothesis.

36. ἄμοιτα μοι δοκεῖς: contrast Meno's enthusiasm here with his silence after the definition of σχῆμα 76 A.

Ε 43. τραγικῆ, 'high-flown.' Does the epithet refer to the language or to the matter of the definition? The former may be credited mainly to Gorgias, the latter to Empedocles. Both
these Sicilians in different ways were infected with the τραγικὸς
τόφος (cp. Diog. L. v.8 70). As to the style, possibly an echo
of Gorgias may be detected in the ring σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός.
(Cp. Hug's note at the beginning of Agathon's speech, Symp.
194 ε, and on 72 A 14.) But it is to the matter of the definition
that the epithet is chiefly directed. It is a definition in regular
form, like that of Figure, ἀπορροή σχημάτων being Genus, δήσις
σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός Differentia (δήσις goes with both adver-
tives). But the terms of the definition, though accepted by
ὁ ἐρωτήν (see on 75 D 7), are not accepted universally. The
definition assumes an unproved hypothesis; it is thus a defin-
tion for the Few. τραγικὴ is opposed to 'popular.' Cp. Heind.
ad Crat. 414 c 'Μοι τραγικὲς τὰ ὀνόματα est σεμεντερὰ καὶ
θαυμαστότερα ποιεῖ ut 418 ὀ τετραγωφημένων. Unde explicanda
illa in Menone 76 ε et Rep. 413 B.'

47. ἄλλ' οὖκ ἔστιν . . . ἄλλ' : see on 71 C 10.

οὖκ ἔστιν : I have put a comma before βελτίων, making that
predicate to ἔστιν. Buttmann says that in that case you would
need ἄτη to contrast with ἐκεῖνη. I cannot think it indispen-
sable, as the new definition is so prominent in thought.
This course seems preferable to leaving ἔστιν without a
predicate.

ὁ παῖ 'Αλεξείδμου : this form of address (πατρόθεν) is solemn
and impressive. See Thuc. vii 69, where, before the final sea-
fight in the harbour of Syracuse, Nikias goes round encouraging
each Athenian, πατρόθεν ὑμᾶς. So Plut. Pelop. 28, 4. Its
mock solemnly is well suited to the character of Socrates, who
often is made to use it; Hipp. min. 373 a, Charm. 158 b,
Euhyd. 278 ε, 279 D, Prot. 328 D, 335 D, Symp. 198 a, Rep. i
368 Δ ὁ παῖς ἐκεῖνος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, ἀλ. i at the beginning,
†Theag. 128 c, Lysis 204 B, with the youth's name added for
special effect, ὁ παῖ 'Ιερονύμου 'Ιππόβαλες : ib. 204 ε (a rather
different use) we are told that Lysis is still called 'Democrats'
son,' διά τὸ σφόδρα τὸν πατέρα γιγνώσκεθαι αὐτοῦ. The style
was also official, Xen. Oec. vii 3. So Socrates impressively
addresses Meno's slave, ὁ παῖ Μένωνος 85 B 50. So Lysimachus
addresses Socrates, Laches 180 D.

49. οὔ ἢ ἢν σοι δόξαι, εἰ μὴ ἄναγκατον : the infinitive ἢν
dόξαι represents δόξειν ἢν, and with ἄναγκατον must be supplied
ὣ. The present of εἰμι is usually omitted with expressions of
necessity and duty, and here this is extended to the impf.,
though otherwise the ellipsis of ἡμ is rare (Kühner § 354,
Anm. 2; Jelf § 376 b, and Obs. 1). For the change of mood
see on 74 B 6.
50. ἐν τῶν μυστηρίων: Meno is on his way back to Thessaly. 71 C 12. There are many passages in Plato in which he applies the phraseology of the mysteries to initiation in philosophy; Diotima uses it of her erotic doctrine, Symp. 209 Ε ταῦτα μὲν ὄντα ἐρωτικά ίνως, ὥς Σώκρατες, καὶ ὁ μυθεθής· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποτικά, οὔκ οἶδ᾽ εἰ οἶδ᾽ τ᾽ ἄν εἶχα, Gorg. 497 ο εὐθαλὼν εἰ, καὶ Καλλίκλεις, δεῖ τὰ μεγάλα μεμοῦσαι πρὸ τὰ σμακρά. In Theaet. 155 Ε the materialists are spoken of as ἄμωπτοι. In Euthyd. 277 Ε the triumph of the two sophists over Clinias is compared to a Corybantic dance around the neophyte. With bitter irony in Rep. 560 Ε the language of initiation is applied to the process by which the soul is purged of all its better elements to form the δημοκρατικὸς ἀνήρ. In the present passage the literal meaning is combined with a metaphorical. Plato seems to have entertained respect for at any rate certain of the mystic rituals (Phaedo 69 C and Archer-Hind's note, cp. Gorg. 493 Α). But he often uses language in which the regeneration thus wrought is held up as something superficial and imperfect in comparison with that effected by philosophy (Phaedo 81 Α, Phaedrus 248 B, 249 C, 250 Β C).

Chapters X-XII (77 A-79 Ε). Meno. Virtue is the love of what is noble, conjoined with Power. Socrates. But every one loves the Noble, desires the Good: that we may eliminate. May we say Virtue is the power of securing Good Things? Meno. Yes. Socrates. Well; but if you mean Material Goods, Power will not be Virtue unless it is exercised in accordance with certain personal characteristics, Justice, Temperance etc., as we saw with Rule just now. We still have not the one thing that lies at the root of these characteristics.

We here have Meno's third attempt at a definition, if we may count as one the statement at 77 B 12 and its amended form at 78 C 12. The original form is loose and poetical. It leads to an interesting parenthetic exposition of the doctrine οὐδὲς ἐκῶν κακῶς—a doctrine so closely connected with the identification of Virtue and Knowledge that some reference to it in this dialogue was necessary. The amended definition, δύναμις τοῦ πολιτεών ἄραβα δύναμις (which Socrates suggests), is far nearer the mark than anything yet put forward. 'Hanc definitionem,' says Fr. (intr. p. 16), 'Meno, si tenuisset veram et sinceram boni notionem, valenti argumentatione defendisset.' But Meno is thinking of external goods; and to obtain these virtuously the 'members of Virtue' (μωρα ἀρετᾶς) have again to be called in, as with the second definition at 73 C.
NOTES


3. ὅπως μὴ σοὶ οἶκος τ’ ἐσομαι: ὅπως μὴ is often used to introduce some idea that is repelled. The word denoting fear or prevention on which it depends may either be expressed, or, as here, understood. The repulsion to the idea may be weakened to mere caution in the entertainment of it, as here, where the meaning is 'perhaps I shall not be able.' (Contrast Phil. 48 δ ou μὴ δυνατὸς ὢ, 'I certainly shall not be able.') Where the word on which ὅπως μὴ depends is expressed, it will determine whether prevention, fear, or mere caution is expressed. (See Kühner § 552. Anm. 6; Jelf § 812, 2; Goodwin §§ 271–83, especially § 278, also § 370; F. E. T. §§ 234, 235; Kiddell § 59; see also notes on 89 C 6 and 10.)

We have ὅπως μὴ with fut. ind. after φυλάττειν Gorg. 480 Α, Rep. 421 Ε; after ἐυλαβεῖσθαι Gorg. 487 δ, Rep. 564 c; after ἀντιτεῖν Phaed. 91 c; after φόβος ἐστίν Symp. 193 Α; cp. also Gorg. 513 Α. Without any governing verb, we have at Rep. 506 Α the same phrase as here: Menex. 236 Α ἀλλ’ ὅπως μὴ μοι χαλεπανεί η̃ διδάσκαλος, δυ̣ν ἐλεγκτικὸς αὐτῆς τὸν λόγον; Prot. 313 c. Plato often has ὅπως μὴ with 2nd person of this tense as a gentle prohibition, Rep. 336 δ, 337 β, Gorg. 489 Α, Menex. 249 ε, Hipp. maj. 236 β; but apparently never ὅπως without μὴ as a gentle command, like Aristophanes etc.

(In some of the above cases the MSS give the 1st aor. subj., which recent editors mostly agree in correcting to the fut. ind., in accordance with the Canon Davesianus: see Kühner § 553. Anm. 5; Jelf § 812, 1; Goodwin § 364; F. E. T. § 239. We have a 2nd aor. ἐπαναστῇ after ὅπως μὴ depending on παρα-φυλάττωται at Laos 715 β.)

With the pres. subj. we have ὅπως μὴ after φοβεῖ Buthyphr. 4 ε; after ἐνέστηκεν Phaed. 77 β; after σκέψομεθα denoting cautious entertainment of an idea, Crat. 439 β; and without σκέψομεθα, in just the same sense, Crat. 430 δ.

Both fut. ind. and pres. subj. are thus capable of various shades of meaning in this construction, and no general difference of meaning between the uses of the two moods can be traced.

6. πολλὰ πολὺν: cf. 79 Α 7 μὴ καταγρύναι μηδὲ κεράτισεν.

8. σκέψτώτες: there seems to be reference to a similar joke in Rep. 422 ε ἐκάστη γάρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμπολλαι, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλεις, τὸ τῶν παιδέων. The scholiast and many modern
interpreters of that passage held there was a reference to the game Πόλεις. The President of Magdalen and Mr. J. A. Stewart (CR. vii 359) oppose this view, thinking that τὸ τῶν παιζοντων is simply an equivalent to σκωπτορεῖ. Prof. Ridgeway, however (JHS. xvi 288), believes there is a reference to the game πόλεις, and I incline to agree with him. It is difficult to see the point of the word πόλεις if it does not come from the game. If the πόλεις was an invulnerable combination of πέτσοι, which lost its virtue when disintegrated, the gibe is an obvious one.

κάσας : for the aor. ptcp. see 92 D 27.


12. χαίρειν τε καλοτίς καὶ δύνασθαι: the citation of the author as ὁ ποιητής would imply that he is some one of eminence. Simonides of Ceos is probably the man. (See Fr. on Bathyphr. 12 L.) He was much connected with Thessaly, and the poem of his discussed in the Protagoras was addressed to a Thessalian prince. See Cic. de or. ii §§ 352–3 and J. & A. M. Adam’s note on Prot. 339 A, where it is shown as probable that besides Rep. 338 b (where Plato quotes Simonides by name) there are two other passages in the Republic where Plato quotes, without naming, him. See on 87 E 2.

For the quotation see Bergk 4 fragm. adespota 130 (vol. iii p. 729). I do not think there is any allusion to it in Aristotle Pol. v 5 = 1339 b 1. The metre suggests that it came from a scolion, such as—

[οὕδεν φέρτερον ἐστὶν ἀνδρὶ θυνη]

χαίρειν τε καλοτίς καὶ δύνασθαι.

Meno in going to a poet for a definition is yielding to a tendency, common in many ages, to regard the works of eminent poets as of oracular authority (cp. Ov. Am. iii ix 18 sunt etiam qui nos numen habere putent). Against this spirit of bibliolatry the Platonic Socrates often protests. See Prot. 347 c foll. (Grote ii 57–8), Hipp. min. 365 c (Grote 1 388), Phaedr. 274 b foll. (Grote ii 239–240), and Butcher Some Aspects of the Greek Genius: ‘The Written and Spoken Word’ pp. 184, 188, 197, 203; see also note on 71 D 26. The dead book, at the absent master, is a poor substitute for the friction of living minds.

Plato, however, so far gives in to the notion that poets are
oracular, that he regards them as the inspired mouthpieces of words the true significance of which they know not (Apol. 22 B c, Io passim; see on 55 D 35 and 99 D 28). This must be Plato’s excuse for the great latitude he allows himself in the interpretation of poets; see Socrates’ exposition of Simonides’ poem Prot. 342 A foll. Other instances of arbitrary interpretations of poets in Plato are found Lach. 191 B, Lys. 212 E, Ἀλκ. ii 147 D. In the present instance the violence done to the poet is slight. By δύνασθαι the poet was thinking of political power, having before his mind the position of some prince or despot of cultured tastes. For δύνασθαι absullo (=δύναστειν) see L. & S. s.v. I 1. Meno gives it a different tinge by accepting Socrates’ interpretation, δυνατὸν εἶναι πολιτεσθαι τά γαθά.

The word δύνασθαι recalls two kindred passages. One is Gorg. 466 B foll., where Polus says that orators μέγα δύνασται, and is shown by an argument, parallel to the one here beginning, that the only true Power is Knowledge. The other is Hipp. maj. 295 Ε, where Hippias eagerly assents to Socrates’ suggestion δύναμις μὲν ἄρα καλὸν, ἄδυναμι δὲ ἀλοχρὸν; and is met by a similar argument (note ἐξαμαρτάνουσιν ἀκοντεῖς at 296 C in regard to a point presently discussed). A third passage closely bearing on the present is Prot. 351 B foll. Socrates puts before Protagoras the position: τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ἡ ν ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀηδῶς κακὸν. To this Protagoras answers: εἶπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γε ἡ ἡ ἠδόμενος. The reservation here made by Protagoras is parallel with the χαίρειν καλοίσι of Meno. The nullity of the reservation is brought out in a long argument, in the course of which (352 C) Protagoras admits καλὸν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γνώση γε τὰ γάθα καὶ τὰ κακὰ μὴ ἄν χρηθήναι ὑπὸ μηθένος, ὡσε ἄλλα ἀπὸ πράττειν ἡ ἄν ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύω, ἄλλ’ ἱκάνη εἶναι τὴν φρονίσσιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

The doctrine enunciated in what now follows is often labelled with the phrase οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν κακός. It is in its origin a corollary from the doctrine that identifies Virtue and Knowledge, and is Socratic (Xen. Mem. III i 4; IV vi 6). For an exposition of the view as it presented itself to Socrates see J. Adam’s edition of the Apology Intr. p. xi; Zeller Socrates 143. The view was one to which Plato adhered (with modifications) at all stages of his career. For the proof of this see Cope, Translation of Plato’s Gorgias Intr. p. xli and pp. lxiv foll. It underlies the words of the Apology 26 A δῆλον γὰρ δὴ, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι δ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. Another side of the same doctrine appears in the paradox of the Hippias minor that it is better to do wrong voluntarily than involuntarily.
In the *Protagoras* Socrates assumes the doctrine in criticising
the poem of Simonides (345 D e); it forms the basis of the
long discussion beginning 351 b (referred to above), of which the
result appears at 357 c d and 358 c d ἄλλο τι οὖν ἔπι γε τὰ κακὰ
οὖσας ἐκὼν ἔχειται κτῆ. In the *Gorgias* it appears especially 467 c
(where see Dr. Thompson’s note) and 468 c οὐκ ἀρα σφάτευσ
βούλημα σῦ ἐκ πάσης ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὖσι, χρήματα ἄφαιρεσθαι
ἀπὸ φόθου, ἄλλ’ ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμο ἢ ταῦτα, βουλήματα πράτευΔ
αὐτὰ, βλασφέρα δὲ ἄντα νῦν βουλήματα; also 509 e, where the
meaning of δύναμις and δύνασθαι in the context should be
noted. In *Sympos. 205 Α* foll. we find again a clear statement,
πάντας τάγαθα βούλεσθαι. In the second book of the *Republic*
the doctrine occurs repeatedly (see especially 358 c, 360 c,
364 Α, 366 c d), chiefly as a contradiction of the ‘sophistic’
view οὖσας ἐκὼν δικαίοις—the view that Justice is artificially
forced upon man against the dictates of his nature (see *Prot.
337 d, Gorg. 483 foll., etc.*). At 438 Α and 589 c passing references
take the doctrine for granted. Among the later dialogues it is
found in the *Philebus 22 b* (all must choose the Good) εἴ δὲ τις
ἄλλα ἡρείθ’ ἡμῶν, παρὰ φόβοιν δι τὴν τοῦ ἄλφαβου ἀρετῶν ἀλάμβανεν
ἀκὸς ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος. The notion that
Vice is Ignorance seems also involved in the doctrine of *False
Pleasures 41 Α* foll. In the *Sophistes 230 Α* foll., on the assumption
πάνταν ἀμαθίαν ἀκουσίων εἶναι, Education, especially in the
form of the ἔλεγχος, is held up as a higher purificatory agent
than νοῦθεσις. Again, *Tim. 86 b* foll. καὶ σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα,
ὅτωσι τίνων ἀκράτεια καὶ οὐνείδος ὃς ἐκὼν ἔργῳ λέγεται τῶν κακῶν,
οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζεται· κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκὼν οὖσει, διὰ δὲ ἐνεργῶ
ἐξω τινα τοῦ ὁμοιοῦ καὶ ἀπαίδευτου τροφῆν ὃ κακὸς γίγνεται
κακὸς κτῆ. (see Archer-Hind’s note). Lastly Cope refers to
*Laws 731 c, 734 b, 860 e* ; to which 689 Α foll. may be added.

The maxim, especially in its earlier and more Socratic
aspect, was asailed by Aristotle. In *Met. Δ 29* = p. 1025 a 9
he attacks specifically the position of the *Hippias minor.*
Socrates, says Aristotle, overlooked the freedom of the will;
the ἀρχή of moral action resides in ourselves; not till the
habit of Virtue is confirmed does Vice become involuntary
(Grote i 399). The doctrine is also attacked, with apparent
reference to the *Protagoras,* in *NE. vii 2* = p. 1145 b 24, *vii 3
= p. 1147 b 15* (Grote ii 62). See also for βούλησις Aristot.
*Rhet. i 8, 8* with Cope’s note. (Zeller p. 420.)

16. ἄρα λέγεις κτλ.: the argument here, as elsewhere in
Plato, depends on successive substitutions of nearly synonymous
words. The first step is to substitute ἀγαθά for καλά (so, less
explicitly, at *Prot. 351 c*). Thus any poetic tinsel adhering
to the word καλά is removed. Then the position κακῶν
ἐπιθυμοῦσι τινες is undermined piecemeal by the following division:

κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν

A οἴδεμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἁγαθὰ
einai

B τὰ κακὰ γιγνώσκοντες
ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν

B (1) ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ

(2) γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι τὰ

κακὰ βλάπτει

Though in general terms Meno has asserted the existence of B, yet it is pointed out that κακῶν must be regarded in relation to one's self (which is done first by the phrase γενέσθαι αὐτῷ and then by the introduction of the antithesis ωφελεῖν) he is shaken, and confesses that B (1) must either disappear or be merged in A (77 D). It remains to dispose of B (2). Meno is led on by a series of quasi-synonyms (βλάπτεσθαι—βλαβήσονται—ἄθλιος εἶναι—κακοδαλιῶν εἶναι) until in 'κακοδαλιῶν' he meets with a term from which he definitely recoils. Thus Meno is led to give up B altogether.

Examples of somewhat similar procedure occur several times in the Gorgias, 474 c–479 e (see Grote ii 90–101; Bonitz Platonische Studien p. 21), 495 c–497 d, 506 d–507 c, where the numerous steps include the not infrequent play on the double meaning of ἐθ πράττειν.

The first book of the Republic furnishes other examples: the argument at 348 B foll. to show that Injustice is not profitable, culminating in the phrase θεῖς ἐχθρὸς at 352 B; again 353 E foll.: the soul in which its special ἀρέτη (δικαιοσύνη) resides ἐθ ἄρεισται τὰ αὐτῆς ἑργα—ἐθ πράττει—ἐθ βιώσαται—ἐσται μακαρία καὶ εὐδαίμων—hence δικαιοσύνη λυπιτελεῖ. See also Prot. 333 b, Euthyd. 281 b c, Hipp. min. 365 D E, † Alc. i 116 b foll., and J. Adam on Euthyphr. 12 b and Crito 47 b.

Such verbal arguments are often, as Dr. Thompson says (in his note on Gorg. 497 A οὐκ οἶδ' ἀττα σοφίζει, δ管理水平, Σώκρατες), 'rather unconvincing than illogical.' Something of this Plato must have felt when at Rep. 487 A he makes Adimantus say Σώκρατες, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἶδες τ' ἐθ ἀντιπειν· ἄλλα γὰρ τοῦτον τι πάσχονι οἱ ἀκούοντες ἐκάστοτε δὲ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγούμεναι δὲ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτάτων καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἐκαστὸν τὸ ἐφώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἄθροισθεὶς τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτὴς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῦ πρώτου ἀναφάίνεσθαι κτέ. Cp. Phaedr. 261 E foll.

32. τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἡ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ; cp. Symp. 204 D ἐ δέραν τῶν καλῶν τί ἔρα; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ, and presently ὁ ἐρων τῶν ἁγαθῶν τί ἔρα; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ. κτήσει γὰρ ἁγαθῶν οἱ εὐδαιμονες εὐδαιμονες. Cp. also the analysis of ἐπιθυμία Rep. iv 437 c, ἐδ ἔν τοι ἐπιθυμιοῦντος ψυχήν οὐχ ἦτο ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἑκένων οὐ δὲ ἐπιθυμῆ, ἡ προσαγεσθαί τούτο ὅ ἀν βούληται οἱ γενέσθαι, ἡ αὐ, καθ' ὅσον ἔθελε τί οἱ πορισθήναι, ἐπινεὼν τούτῳ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐσωτερικὸν ἐρωτήματος, ἐπορευεσθεν αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσθαις:

34. ὄφελεὶν ἑκένων: the step taken by the introduction of the word ὄφελεὶν is practically what Aristotle would have expressed as that from the ἁγαθῶν in itself to the ἁγαθῶν πρὸς ἰμᾶς. Sometimes the distinction between ὄφελημαν and ἁγαθῶν sinks to nothing, as at Prot. 358 b; so at Gorg. 474 ε, 477 Λ ὄφελημαν is ranked with ἁγαθῶν as opposed to ἵν, the former representing the permanent, the latter the transient object of desire (Grote ii 105, 127–29). See too Gorg. 468 c. At Crat. 419 λ we have ὄφελημαν, ἁγαθῶν, and other words grouped together as practically synonymous, there being no object in drawing distinctions.

But with most synonyms there remains a latent possibility of drawing distinctions when that is to the purpose. The following passages may show the relation of the two terms when not synonymous. In Prot. 383 d fol. it is agreed that all ἁγαθῶν are ὄφελημα to something; cp. Xen. Mem. iv vi 8 τό ἄρα ὄφελημαν ἁγαθῶν ἐστίν ὄτι ἄρα ὄφελημαν ἡ. Here ὄφελημαν appears as a relative notion. So Euthyd. 280 b ἄρα οὖν εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν διὰ τὰ παρών ἁγαθά, εἰ μηδέν ἰμᾶς ὄφελος, εἰ ὄφελος; εἰ ὄφελος, ἐφή. ἄρα οὖν ἄρα ὄφελος, εἰ εἶναι μονὴν ἰμᾶς, χρωμεθά δ' αὐτοῦ μη; Gorg. 499 ν Ζ. ἄρα οὖν ἁγαθῶν μὲν ἄρα ὄφελημαν (τῶν ἰδιων), κακά δέ αἱ βλαβεραί; ΚΑΛ. Πάντα γε. ΣΩ. ὄφελημαν δέ γε αἱ ἁγαθῶν τι πουόσα, κακά (so the texts, but βλαβεραί) δέ αἱ κακῶν τί; Rep. 379 α το ἁγαθῶν ἀ ποιούσας κακά (so the texts). We may say that in the order of Nature ἁγαθῶν is 'prior' to ὄφελημαν and is the cause of it. But from our point of view ὄφελημαν appears as the cause why we regard something as ἁγαθῶν. So Hipp. maj. 296 ε ἀλλὰ μήν τό γε ὄφελημα το ποιοῦν ἁγαθῶν ἐστιν, cp. ibid. 303 ε. From these places, perhaps, the compiler of the Platonic "Οροι 414 ε drew his definition: ὄφελημαν το αἰτίον το εβ πάρσχει, το αἰτίον το ἁγαθοῦ. Cp. 87 E 36 and 96 E 2.

44. φόντω: 'ubis compotes sunt, error demittur.'—Fr. Cp. a somewhat similar use of the impf. Phaedr. 256 ζ γαίες ὁν διάγονας . . δουλωσάμενοι ψ κακία ψυχῆς ἐνεγεῖσκετο,
Notes

I.e. was growing, before its subjection; Rep. 352 c ἐδίλιον διὶ ἐννὶ τίς αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη.

55. The word ἄθλιος has strong associations. It is introduced with solemnity Gorg. 469 A, 507 c τὸν δὲ ποιημὸν καὶ κακὸς πράττοντα ἄθλιον: cp. Aristoph. Plut. 118 ἀνθρώπος οὗτος ἄστιν ἄθλιος φύσει.

57. κακοδαμόνας: this word, like our 'God-forsaken,' though vulgarly abused, was capable on occasion of carrying the full weight of an awful meaning. The Greeks were apt to regard crime and madness alike as visitations of the higher Powers, Aristoph. Plut. 501.

67. οὔδες βούλεσθαι: of course κινδυνεύεις is understood. B

Similarly at 96 D 23.

Chapter XI

1. Ἀλεγε: see on 73 A 31. But the answer has εἶπον. 'Were you not saying just now?' 'Yes, I did say so.'


19. ἤγειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον: see 87 E 2 and note there. We C here have the types of two great classes of bona, corporeal and external goods. The word πλουθυγεία as a synonym for 'all earthly blessings' occurs thrice in Aristophanes: Knights 1054, Wasps 667, Birds 731. We may be surprised at the prominence given to health by a people we are apt to picture to ourselves as hardly knowing illness. Cp. Rep. 583 c. Note 'interrogation emerging late in the sentence,' Riddell § 309.

21. καὶ χρυσόν λέγω καὶ ἄργυρον κτάσθαι καὶ τιμᾶς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς: the first and third καὶ serve to couple, and at the same time to distinguish, the two things, wealth and political power, each of which is denoted by a pair of nouns coupled by καὶ. Meno regards πλοῦτος as insufficiently representing external goods, and adds to it the objects of political ambition. By so doing he raises himself a stage above the lowest grade (ὑπάρχων ἡδονήν δὴ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς Rep. ix 583 A), and shows that in him the φιλοχρήματος is combined with the φιλότιμος (Phaedo 68 c, 82 c). At Apol. 29 D Ε we have the same scale: χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελομένοις... καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἄληθείας, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δπως βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖτι; In the enumeration at 87 E πλοῦτος remains
the single representative of the external goods, while in the
corporeal goods λαχύς and κάλλος are added to ὅγλεια.

23. μὴ δὲν' ἄττα: μὴ (num) puts the matter tentatively.
Meno is given a last chance of amending his conception of
Goods. τὰ γαρθά is subject of the dependent statement: 'I
suppose there are no things of a different class that your list
of Goods includes?'

25. σῶκ, ἄλλα πάντα: ἄλλα here should not be translated
(see on 71 C 10). For though Meno says 'I do not include
any other class, but I do include the whole of the class I have
indicated,' there is little emphasis on the affirmative half of
the statement. 'No, I mean everything of this sort.'

26. ἄλων: χρυσόν & δὴ: cp. 75 C 30. The δὲ succeeding
the interjection εἰν is of the same nature as the δὲ succeeding
other interjections, e.g. vocatives. Here, as Stallbaum points
out, we have a paratactic variant for the conditional con-
struction that might seem more natural: εἰν' εἰ δὲ δὴ χρυσόν
πορίζεσθαι ἄρετὴ ἐστὶ, πύτερον προστίθεις κτλ.

27. ἄρετὴ ἑστι: not necessarily the whole of Virtue, but
an instance of it, which is all S. wants for his argument.

τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως: cp. Apol. 40 D, Euthyd. 274 A,
Gorg. 470 E, Soph. 230 D. The proverbial illustration passed

28. πατρικὸς ξένος: Gedike suggests that the ancestors
of Meno may have entered into a league of friendship with
Xerxes at the time of his invasion, as the Aleuadae did
(Hdt. vii 6). As the tie was with the royal house, it hardly
implies treachery in Meno that he should help Cyrus against
his brother, the reigning king. But Xenophon represents
Meno as the personal friend rather of Ariasaeus than of Cyrus
himself (Anab. II i 5 etc.), whereas Aristippus is the friend
of Cyrus (ibid. I i 10).

πύτερον προστίθεις κτλ.: the argument which here begins
partially anticipates that at 87 E foll. showing that except φθό-
νησις no good is Good per se, all other goods being merely
contingent.

29. τὸ πόρος: for τῷ πορίζεσθαι or τῷ πορισμῷ the concrete
word is substituted; so lines 36, E 46 below. Similarly we have
at E 44 ἀπορία for τῷ μὴ πορίζεσθαι, 98 A 36 δεμω for τῷ δεδ-
σθαι, 99 B 15 εὐδοξία for τῷ εὗ δοξάσειν. See on 99 B 15.

τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὅσιος: ὅσιος had been omitted by Meno
in his enumeration of the virtues at 74 A. Now we have
ὁσιος put on an equal footing with δικαίως. Are we to suppose
that the *Meno* belongs to the dialogues written before the conception of the Four 'cardinal' Virtues—without ὑστήρας—was formed by Plato? Those who think so hold that *Meno* was written earlier than *Euthyphro*, the latter being the dialogue in which ὑστήρας as a separate virtue is eliminated. The question is argued by J. Adam in the introduction to his edition of the *Euthyphro* pp. xxxii, xxxiii (see also his and A. M. Adam's introduction to the *Protagoras* p. xxxiv). His conclusion, in support of which he quotes Bonitz *Plat. Stud.* p. 234, is that there is no reason to suppose the *Euthyphro* later than other dialogues, where Plato, adopting the popular view, mentions Piety among the other virtues. Such is the case in the *Protagoras*, where at 325 A, 329 B, 349 B ὑστήρας is included in the list of virtues. See also Zeller p. 451 n. 47. Cp. *Laws* 860 B.

33. οὐ δὴ τούτο, δὲ Σώκρατες: *Meno* shows no disposition to revolt against current notions of morality, and is thus on a par with another pupil of Gorgias, Polus, who is only partially emancipated ('Polus, the half-thinker' Cope calls him, *Gorg.* *Intr.* p. xl) as distinct from the more thorough-going Callicles (see Callicles' speech in the *Gorgias* at 482 D).

38. μόριον ἅρπης: this expression is used of the several virtues *Prot.* 329 C D; cp. *Laws* 696 B ἀνδρεία που μόριον ἅρπης εἰν.

44. ἡ ἅρπη: see above, D 29. Here the etymological meaning of ἅρπη is helped out by the fact that the word has for one of its senses 'need, poverty' (see L. & S.), much as we talk about 'being in difficulties.' We have the word played on *Apol.* 38 D ἀλλ' ἅρπη ἐδώκα, οὐ μέντι λόγων ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀνασκυπτός. Other examples of negative words used by Plato in an unusual sense are ἀνήρ, used simply as the opposite of νεότος *Phaedo* 80 B, ἀδίκανος *Parm.* 133 C, ἀσάμαντος *Phaedr.* 250 C.

CHAPTER XII

5. εἶτα: see on 71 C 18.


15. δὲ τι ἄν πράττῃ: after an infinitive of which the subject Β is indefinite (as πράττειν here) Greek prefers the third person singular, Latin the second. Sometimes τις is inserted, but often, as here, it is omitted. Many of the instances are subjunctives used with the relative and ἄν: *Euthyd*. 289 B ἐπιστήμης
18. τι οὖν δῆ; 'well, and what then?' cp. 89 D 13, 97 E 19, Crat. 398 A, Gorg. 497 D, in all which places the meaning of the combination is the same.

20. πολλοῦ δεις: A. Sidgwick (CR. III 148 b) gives this use of δεῖ ('I lack') 'entirely confined to quantities and numbers,' as an example of Personalization. See on 92 A 1.

22. ἀποτελεῖσθαι: the fallacy of which Meno has been convicted is what logicians call 'circular in defining,' when the term to be defined is itself introduced in the definition (Jevons Elem. Lessons in Logic pp. 110, 114).

25. πάλιν εἰς ἄρχής, 'making a fresh start.' So Ε 1 and often.

27. Of the instances of el with ἄν and the optative in Plato, three occur in the Meno. Besides the present place (1) we have (2) 91 D 12 τέρας λέγεις εἰ—οὐκ ἄν δύναιτο λαθεῖν: (3) 98 B 4 ἄλλ' εἶπερ τι ἄλλο φαίνει διέδεσθαι, ἐν δὲ οὖν καὶ τοιῷ θεὶν ἄν οὐδα. Other instances are: (4) Lach. 200 D ἄλλ' θρα, ὡς λυπάσασθε, εἴ τι σοῦ ἀν μᾶλλον ὑπακούοι Σωκράτης: (5) Prot. 329 ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πειθόμην ἄν, καὶ οὐ πειθόμη: (6) Phil. 58 ἐς διερνησάμενοι—εἴ φαινεν αὐτῷ: (7) Crat. 398 εἰ οὖν' εἴ τι οὐδὲ γεν εὐρείαν, οὐκ συνείσω: (8) Laws 905 ἐς δ' ἐπιδεικνύει θείον τινος ἄν εἴης, λεγόμενον ἡμών ἐπάκουε.

These instances do not all stand in the same position. In (1), (2), and (4) el does not introduce a real condition. In (1) el—ἐπεί. See Kühner § 577. 1 and cp. Xen. Mem. i ν 3 el γε μηδὲ δούλων ἀκρατῆ δεξιαμεθ' ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτὸν γε φυλάσσεις τοιῷτον γενέσθαι; Dem. 23 (Artisocr.) § 144 δικαιον δέντ γε δικαιος τῷ μεγίστῳ, εἴπερ οἱ κακοὶ καὶ φησικέφωτες ὑμᾶς κολάζοντι γε δικαιος. In (2) el—ἐπεί, as often after words of strong feeling, Kühner § 551. 8; Xen. Cyr. III iii 37. In (4) and (6) el = 'whether,' in an oblique question; Kühner § 396. 5.

In (3), (5), (7), and (8), however, el introduces a really
conditional clause. But the condition is itself conditional; it depends on an unexpressed protasis which ἄν represents. Thus in (3) εἶπερ φαίην ἄν is ‘if I should say, if asked’; in (5) εἶπερ πειθομην ἄν is ‘if I should believe, if he told me.’ These two instances are noticeably parallel; they differ, however, in that (3) has for its apodosis an optative with ἄν, while (5) has, less regularly, an indicative, πειθομην ἄν being equivalent to μέλλω πειθομη. We may translate (7) ‘no, even though I might, if I tried, discover something, I refuse to make the effort.’ See Kühner § 577. 1, Goodwin § 506, F.E.T. § 186, who quote Dem. iv (Phil. 1) § 18 οὖδ’ εἰ μὴ ποιήσαι τοῦτο ἄν ἔγω γέ φημι δειν, εὑκαταφρονητήν ἐστιν.

I have left out of account Ἀλ. i 124 B ἄν ἄλλῳ μὲν ἄν ἐν περγενομεθα, εἰ μὴ περ ἐπιμελεῖ τε ἄν καὶ τέχνη καὶ Ἀλ. ii 144 B εἰ ἀγαθοσεις τε καὶ ὀμηθεις ἄν, in both which places Sch. removes ἄν. See Appendix on the text.


36. ἀπεκρινάμην: viz. at 75 C. The aor. because it was a single answer (App. on text on 72 C 4). ἀπεφέδελλομεν: impf., see on 73 A 31. But we have aor. succeeded by impf. also at 99 E 3 ἔγινθσαμεν καὶ ἐλέγομεν. See on 72 E 22.

περὶ τοῦ σχήματος: the article recalls the particular instance of discussion; ‘about that matter, colour.’

πον: cp. on 75 C 29.

38. μήπω: see on 90 E 31.

46. τίνος δύνας ἀρετῆς κτ., ‘what is this virtue about Ε which you speak as you do?’ ‘Egregia graecii sermonis brevitas’ Gedike. Cp. 86 D 8.

Chapter XIII (79 E–80 D). Meno. You stupefy and benumb me, Socrates. I thought I understood the matter well enough, but in your hands I am helpless. Socrates. If you think it is any superior knowledge in me that benumbs you, you are much mistaken. But I am willing to go into partnership with you in the quest.

Meno has now had his ‘three falls’ (cp. Euthyd. 277 c), and confesses himself beaten. He is thus reduced to ἀποφαλα (contrast 72 A 13), the consciousness of ignorance which is the first real step to knowledge. The situation is parallel to
others in Plato. In *Euthyphro* 11 B and *Theaet.* 148 E the speakers whose names these dialogues respectively bear make a similar confession. In each case the confession is followed by a half-serious simile; in the *Euthyphro* Socrates introduces the comparison of the images of Daedalus (cp. 97 D); in the *Theaetetus* he compares himself to a midwife (*μαῖά* who, childless herself, can bring to birth the thoughts of others. Here, however, it is not Socrates but Meno who makes the comparison. 'Nowhere in the Platonic dialogues is this provocative shock' (of the Socratic elenchus) 'more vividly illustrated than in the *Menon*, by the simile of the electrical fish' Grote 11 15. Cp. also *Lach.* 194 B καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ οὖτωι δὲ νοῶ μὴ ὁδὸς τ' εἰμι εἰπεῖν. νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐμολύγη δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας δὲ τι ἑστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ' δὴ καὶ μὲ ἄρτι δεῖφνεν.

80 A  4. οὖδὲν ἄλλο ἦ: see on 76 B 13.

5. τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν: so Socrates (Theaet. 149 A) answers 'people do not credit me with the maieutic art, but say δι᾽ ἄτοπωτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.


8. 'ὅτι πρὸς ἐπαίνειν ἐπὶ ἑοὶ γυναικῶν, ναμ ἄνθρωποι οὐ. ὑπεράναγεν δὲ, εἰ τι περὶ τῶν βέλων δοκέων δεῖς; Aristoph. *Lys.* 1132 (πάντων | χασμου] ἀλλοων εἰ με μηκύνσεων δεις;) Fr. Cp. the phrase εἰ δεὶ τάληθεν εἶπεῖν.

εἰ δεὶ τι καὶ σκάφαι, 'if I may e'en have my joke': καὶ accentuates σκάφαι. See on 71 B 8 and 79 D 35.

9. τὸ τε εἴδος: the comparison is to Socrates' face, which was broad and flat (αἰμός). Cp. Theaet. 143 E: Theodorus says to Socrates that Theaetetus οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς, προσώπεικ δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε εἰμβηγὰ καὶ τὸ ἐξω τῶν ὀμμάτων; so *Plato* here. It was likened by Alcibiades to Silenus or the satyr Marsyas (*Symp.* 215 A Β, Xen. *Symp.* 4. 19, Zeller *Socrates* p. 79). See on 76 C 16.

10. ταύτη: 'notae illi: cp. 76 A 20'—Fr.

τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκη: the electric ray (torpedo): a fish allied to the skate. Fr. says that it often occurs in Greek vase-paintings. He quotes Aristot. Hist. *An.* ix 37. 3 ἦ τε νάρκη ναρκᾶν ποιῶσα ὅν ἄν κρατήσων μέλλει ἤχθων... τρέφεται τοῦτωσ' κατακρύπτεται δ' εἰς τὸν ἄμμον καὶ πηλὸν, λαμβάνει δὲ τὰ ἐπισέφυτα, δοκὰ ἄν ναρκήν ἐπισφέρημα τῶν ἤχθων. Plut. *de Solertia.* *An.* 27. 2 τῆς δὲ νάρκης ἵππῃ ποὺ τὴν ἑωμον, οὐ μόνον τοὺς διαφέρει την ἐπιφυγνουσαν, ἄλλα καὶ διὰ τῆς σαγηνῆς βαρώσα ανάρκηδη ταῦς χερῶ οἵ τῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένων.
Pliny *Nat. Hist.* xxxii 2 ‘etiam procul et ex longinquo vel si hasta virgave attingatur (torpedo) quamvis praevalidos lacertos torpescere, quemlibet ad cursum veloces alligari pedes.’ Add Claudian *Idyll* 3. Aristoph. *Wasps* 713 ὄσπερ νάρκη κατὰ χείρος μου καταχέιται. It was used for food; see Athenaeus vii 314 A, who quotes from a comedian, νάρκη γὰρ ἐφθή βρώμα χαρέν γίγνεται. Fishes of this tribe have furnished other opportunities for caricature. ‘Perhaps the reader may remember Hogarth’s “Gate of Calais,” where a fisherwoman has upon her knees a huge skate, into whose face the painter has wickedly infused an expression precisely like that of the weather-beaten, withered old dame who holds it’ (J. G. Wood *Common Objects of the Sea Shore*).

19. οὐκ ἐκτελέων ἐνδυνάμει: the stay-at-home habits of Socrates B (who has been compared in this respect and in some others with Dr. Johnson) are well known, *Crito* 52 B οὖν ἐπὶ θεωριαν πῶλον ἐκ τῆς πόλεος ἐξῆλθες, οὖν ἄλλος οὐδὲν ἐξάθλιες, εἰ μὴ τοῦ στρατευσόμενος, οὖν ἄλλην ἀποδείκνυεν ἐποίησις πῶλον, ὅσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι: *Phaedr.* 230 C (Phaedrus to Socrates) ἀπείρων γάρ εὐναγομένων τινι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ δοικατίοις οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἁστεος οὖν εἰς τὴν ύπερορθαν ἀποδήμειας, οὖν ἐξω τεῖχοις ἐμοιεῖ δοκείσ το παράνω εξεῖναι.

20. ὡς γάρ ἂναχθαίρει: ἀπάγειν, ἀπαγωγή, the regular phrases for summary arrest, a process resorted to when the facts were patent or notorious. Buttmann quotes *Gorg.* 486 A εἰ τίς εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἂναγάγῃς: cp. *Apol.* 32 B ἐτοιμῶν ἐκτός ἐνδεικνύει μὲ καὶ ἂναγεὶ τῶν ρητόρων. For the process see Dem. 22 (Androt.) § 26, and the commentators.

The context of the passage just quoted from the *Crito*, as well as the pathetic passage in the *Apology* 37 C D, in which Socrates urges the impossibility of his proposing exile for himself as an alternative penalty, not only shows Socrates’ love for his own city, but makes it probable that in any other he would have fared even worse. This passage receives illustration from the subsequent interlude in which Anytus plays a part; see especially 91 C 19 (note) and 94 E. Cp. *Gorg.* 522 B C.

23. ἀλγοὺ, ‘almost.’ The idiom is best explained by supposing an ellipsis of ὅστις (or ὅστις), Hadley 743 b, F. E. Thompson § 95, Goodwin *MT.* § 779 (b), Krüger § 47, 16. 6, and is therefore a gen. of wan; *Apol.* ad init. ἀλγοὺ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθήμεν. (Kühner § 418. 6 explains it as a gen. of price.) It is fairly common in Plato, though he never has the Aristophanic πολλοῦ ‘exceedingly,’ without ὅστις. (For πολλοῦ ὅστις see 79 B 20, 92 A 1.) Nor has he ἁμικροῦ, μικροῦ in sense of ἀλγοῦ, like Xenophon and Demosthenes.
25. η μάλιστα; 'accuratius inquirit et cum admiratione.' Fr.; 'and pray why, Socrates?' cp. Gorg. 448 D.

C 28. ηνα σε ἄντεκασω: such eikasiai were a fashionable amusement at Greek social gatherings. Walz Rhet. Gr. viii p. 789 τὸ εἰκασμά ἐστι σκόμμα κατ’ ὁμοιότητα, ὥς ἔχει τὸ παρ’ Ἐυπόλιοι—

cateikázoavn ἡμᾶς ἴσχαδι.

See Hug's introduction to Plato's Symposium pp. xiv and xxv Aristophanes gives us examples of it: Wsps 1308 foll.—

εἰρ’ αὐτῶν ὡς εἰδ’ ἕκασεν Λυσίστρατος:
"ἐξικασά, ὥς πρεσβύτα, νεοπλούτω τρυγι
κλητὴ τ’ εἰς ἀχυρμὸν ἀποδέδρακτον;"

ὃ δ’ ἀνακραγών ἄντικασ’ αὐτῶν πάρυνπι
τὰ θρὰ τοῦ τρίβουσον ἀποβεβληκτότι,
Σθενέλψ τε τὰ σκενάρια διακεκαρμένῳ.

Birds 804 foll.—

ΠΕΙΣΘ. οἶαθ’ ἤ μάλιστ’ ἐξικασά ἑπτερωμένοι;
εἰς εὔτελειαν χρηι συγγεγραμένῳ.
ΕΤΕΛΠ. σοῦ δὲ κοψίχω γε σκάφιον ἀποτετιλμένῳ.

So in Plato's Symposium 215 Α Alcibiades says he will praise Socrates δ’ eikónw. In the Republic 487 Β Socrates says he can explain the position of philosophers in existing states only δ’ eikónos. Adimantus rejoins ironically σοῦ δὲ γε οἶμαι οὐκ ἐλωθας δ’ eikónw λέγειν. Socrates, parrying the raillery, says ἄκουε δ’ οὖν τῆς eikónos, ἐν’ ετὶ μᾶλλον ἄρθρο ὡς γλυκχρως ('in what a laboured style') eikásω.

Hor. Sat. 1 v 56 would suggest that the same sort of thing was current in Italy.

It may be paralleled by the modern diversion 'what is my thought like?' that led to Lord Byron's well-known comparison of Lord Castlereagh to a pump.

29. eikáζόμενοι is probably middle:—'they like engaging in a game of eikasia, for they get the best of it.'

34. σοῦ γὰρ εὔπορων αὐτῶς: eúpórovn is simply the opposite to ἀπορών, cp. Theaeet. 150 c ἐπει τόδε γε καλ ἐμοι ὑπάρχει ὑπερ ταῖς μαλαί διόγον εἰμι σοφιάς. Meno had allowed (80 A 4) that Socrates himself ἄπορεί.

35. παντὸς μᾶλλον, 'most assuredly.' See on 96 D 24.

D 37. περὶ ἄρετῆς δ’ ἔστιν: cp. 71 B 4. Note that we have here δ’ ἔστιν (not δ’ τι ἔστιν as at 72 Α 14). This therefore is an instance of δ’ in the sense of oλον. See on 92 C 19.
Chapters XIV, XV (80 D–82 B). Meno. But how can you search for a thing of which you know nothing? How will you know you have the thing for which you are searching even when you get it? Socr. This is a well-known catch of the Eristics. I should explain the process of acquiring Knowledge by supposing that the soul of each of us had infinite experience before entering on its present life, and that what we call the acquisition of Knowledge is really merely the revival of it. I can perhaps show you this by an experiment.

We here enter upon the second of the five divisions (or acts) of which the Meno consists, extending to the end of chap. xxi (86 C). In this, which deals with the genesis of Knowledge, we have presented to us an account of the relation of Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) to Opinion (δόξα). As the upshot of the whole dialogue is that ‘popular’ Virtue depends rather on Opinion than on Knowledge, it is clear that this ‘episode’ (as it at first seems) is really most intimately connected with the main discussion. ‘Neque igitur casu quodam, ut Plato rem finxit, aut solum ad refutandum eristicum argumentum forte injectum, sed necessaria sua progressione quaestio devenit ad examinandam scientiae naturam et conditionem; qui locus tantum abest ut forte tractetur, ut caput contra et janua universae quaestionis putandus sit.’—Fr. Intr. p. 16. See Excursus VII.

CHAPTER XIV

1. καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτέ., ‘why, Socrates, how will you search for a thing when you are totally unable to say what it is? What kind of thing that you know not can you set before yourself as the object of your search?’ (καὶ admirantis).

The first two puzzles brought forward in the Euthydemus are closely connected with the present ἐρωτικὸς λόγος, namely (275 D) πότεροι εἰσὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; and (276 D) πότερον οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνονσιν α
éπιστανται ἢ καὶ ἐπιστανται; Socrates (277 ε foll.) explains the puzzles as merely verbal: Proclus, he says, would remind us that the word μανθάνει is used in two senses, firstly in the sense of acquiring knowledge, secondly as a synonym for σοφία. 'All this,' adds Socrates, 'is a mere game of words': παιδία δὲ λέγω διὰ ταύτα, δι', εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθου, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν δὲ μάλλον εἶδεν ἢ ἔχει.


It is clear, however, that the explanation which dealt with the problem as merely verbal is a partial one, and that there underlay it a problem dealing with πράγματα. ἐπιστήμη was regarded as something complete, final, and not admitting of degrees. How then could it admit of γένεσις? There is thus a certain analogy between the question of the origin of Knowledge, and that of the possibility of Motion (Zeller Socr. p. 270). These problems turn on the conception of the nature of Becoming. Difficulties in the notion of partial Knowledge give rise to many of the Megarian puzzles, especially those attributed to Eubulides: ὁ διαλαμβάνων, 'Ἡλέκτρα, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος, which as R. & P. say (226 c) are eadem argumenta diversis nominibus. Cp. Grote iii 482, Zeller Socr. p. 268.

In the spurious Platonic dialogue † Sisyphus 388 β-ε, Socrates asks γρηγορεῖ δ' οἱ ἀθρώπως πότερον δὲ δὲν ἐπιστῶνται τῶν πράγματων, ἢ καὶ δὲν μὴ ἐπιστῶνται; 'Both.' 'You mean, for instance, that one may know who Callistratus is, but not know where he is, so that searching for him is searching for something partly known, partly unknown?' 'Yes.' 'But so far as search is concerned it is only the unknown part that is the object of it. If this argument appears to you to be eristic, and not brought forward τῶν πράγματος ἐνεκα,' says Socrates, 'take another instance. Geometers do not inquire what a diameter is; they know that well enough; ἀλλ' ὑπόθεσι τὸς ἐστὶ μέτρων πρὸς τᾶς πλευρᾶς τῶν χωρῶν δὲν δὲν διατείμην. ἄρ' οὖ τούτο ἐστών αὐτὸ τὸ γηγομένον περὶ αὐτῆς; The reference to the problem of the diagonal (see 82 B fol.) makes it probable that the writer had the Meno in his thought.

In the Theaetetus (165 β) Socrates asks what he calls 'δεινότατον ἑρωτημα.' Ἄρα οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τούτο δ οἶδαν μὴ εἶδεν; 'Impossible,' Theaetetus answers. The answer is used to show that Knowledge must be different from Per-
ception; for partial Perception is possible; we can see and not see a thing at the same time, if one eye be closed; but partial Knowledge is impossible. Cp. ib. 188a and see Grote II 368.

Plato solves the problem of the origin of Knowledge by calling in δόξα as a mediate term between Ignorance and Knowledge; Aristotle, by denying the simplicity and finality of Knowledge; see Posterior Analytics (ad init.): πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προφαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως κτ.

Knowledge is not simple; there are various modes of it, and Knowledge in one mode may be increased and supplemented by Knowledge in another mode. Among the illustrations given we have one that bears on the problem dealt with by Mill (Logic bk. ii cc. 2 and 3): whether a syllogistic argument implies an addition to Knowledge. ‘Some Knowledge,’ says Aristotle, ‘is simply the recalling of previous Knowledge; sometimes Knowledge arises from an act of Perception, as when you recognize that a certain particular falls under a class you know: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πὰν τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθίας ἵνα προθέτῃ: ὅτι δὲ τόδε ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλῷ τρίγωνῷ ἐστὶν ἀμα ἐπαγόμενος ἐγνώρισεν. πρὶν δὲ ἐπαχθήναι ἢ λαβεῖν ἐκλογημένον τρόπων μὲν τινα ἱσως φατέον ἐπιστασίαν, τρόπων δὲ ἀλλον ὦν. He may know that the angles in ABC are equal to two right angles, in so far as he knows the proposition generally (καθόλου); but if he does not know that ABC is a triangle he cannot be said to know it absolutely (ἀπλῶς). ei δὲ μη, τὸ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι ἀπόρρημα συμβαίνει. ἢ γὰρ οὐδὲν μαθήσεται ἢ δὲ οἴδει.’ See Grote Aristotle pp. 211–214. Another passage bearing on the same subject, where again there is a reference to the Meno, is Anal. pr. ii xxi 7=67 a19, for which see Grote Aristotle p. 183.

In his review of this passage in the Meno Grote says (Plato etc., vol. ii p. 16 note): ‘If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I think that by doing so they rendered service to the interests of philosophy. The question is among the first which ought to be thoroughly debated and sifted if we are to have a body of “reasoned truth” called philosophy.’ To

1 It is very difficult to see any point in the words τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλῷ. What is important is simply the recognition that the figure before us is a triangle. Either the words are an interpolation, or else there must be a reference to the figure of some well-known proposition, e.g. to the proof that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. Thales, we are told, busied himself with the problem of inscribing a right-angled triangle in a circle, and thought the solution of such importance that he sacrificed an ox on accomplishing it. It became a hackneyed problem, so that to put it forward was to show one’s self behind the times: Procl. ii 23 ὡς ἐν τίς προβληματικῶς ἐγκαταστάσεις εἰσος εἰς ἡμικυκλῶν όρθων ἐντείναι γωνίαν, ἀγωνιστήτου δόξαν ἀμαλάσβοι (Schultz in Jahrh. für Philol. 1882 p. 27).
estimate justly our debt to the persons, whoever they were, who first raised the point, we should know to what extent they apprehended the full bearings of their problem, and their objects in raising it. It is clear that it was capable of being treated on two different planes, as a verbal quibble tending to stultify philosophy, or as an inquiry into the origin of knowledge. In what spirit the ‘sophists’ really approached it we cannot be sure. Plato gives us to understand that the former and lower, the ‘eristic’ object, was theirs. In that case, though our debt to them may be great, it will be similar to that we owe to the poets and soothsayers, who prophesy they know not what.

3. ποιος γὰρ δὲν οὐκ οἶδα; to what extent does the interrogative ποιος here imply feeling? The word belongs to a class used (α) with weaker accent in indefinite sense, (β) with stronger accent in exclamatory or interrogative sense. This distinction, we are told, goes back to Indo-European times (Brugmann in I. M.’s Handbuch vol. 11 § 191). With regard to (β) it seems probable that the interrogative sense developed from the exclamatory. Exclamations may be used to provoke an answer. ποιος in Homer generally expresses surprise and anger (L. & S. a.v.). The more the word is used bona fide expecting information, the less will be the amount of feeling attaching to it. In Attic writers the exclamatory force of ποιος; is strongest where it is used in repartees, picking up a word or phrase used by the previous speaker. This is common in Aristophanes, and in Plato: Euthyd. 290 ε ποιος Κτήσιππος; 304 ε ποιος χαριν; Gorg. 490 δ; Theaet. 180 β; Hipp. maj. 285 δ; Charm. 174 β; Lach. 194 δ ε δοκεῖ ἄνθρωπος τι νῦν τὰ τῶν ἀνδρεων λέγειν. Α. Πολ. δ Σωκράτες, σοφιάν; (ironical). Σ. Οὐκόκκον τῶν τούτου ἔρωτας. Α. κ. Ἑρμ. Σ. Α. εἰ δή, αὐτῷ εἴπε, δ Νικία, ποια σοφιά ἀνδρεία δν εἰς κατά τὸν σῶν λόγον (a real question). In Polit. 280 β πολλών δε ἑτέρων ξυγγεγεῖν ἀπεμελῆθη. ΝΕ. Σ. Πολ. εἴπε, ξυγγεγεῖν; the word εἴπε shows that we have here a genuine question, and there is little, if any, feeling. In repartees of the kind just mentioned the word repeated is generally a noun or adjective; but in Rep. 330 α ποιος διὰ κεκτησα τα πλεω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω; ποι' ἐπεκτήσαμην; ἔφη, it is a verb. ποιος and ποιά are similarly capable of being used in repartees: Lysis 208 β κἂν εἰ βοῦλοι λαβὼν τὴν μάστιγα τύπτειν, ἔσω δι. Πόθεν, ἦ δ' ὡς, ἔσω; ibid. C ή οὔδε τούτο ἐπιτρέποισιν σοι; ποιά γὰρ, ἔφη, ἐπιτρέπουσιν; Crat. 398 ε η σο εἰχεις εἴπε; ΕΡΜ. Πόθεν, ὡγαθέ, ἔσω; Πόθεν; is also used by itself as a scornful denial.

The prefixing of the article to ποιος does not necessarily reduce it to a colourless interrogative. The article occurs with ποιος in repartee in Theocr. 5. δ τὰν ποιαν σώργα; See Soph.
O. C. 1415 and Jebb's note; also Heind. on Soph. 240 a. When ὅ is added to ἐνοικ; it implies not so much surprise as interest in the question: Lach. 194 c ἐνοικ ὅ, ἰ ὅ ἐνοικ.; Rep. 377 c ἐνοικ ὅ (μῦθους); 'and pray what stories?'; Hipp. ma. 285 b ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ ὅ σε πρὸς θεῶν ἀκούοντες ἐνοικ; Theaet. 147 d, etc. The addition of the enclitic τι to ἐνοικ generally shows that no feeling is implied; Cobet Nov. Lect. 276 says always; but see Phaed. 260 c ἐνοικ τινα ὀλει μετὰ ταύτα τὴν ἑτεροκήν κατὰ τὸν ἑκατέρεις ὅν ἐπείρει θερίζειν;

The question whether ἐνοικ is a pure interrogative, or whether some exclamatory force still attaches to it, can often only be determined by the context. Thus in Gorg. 483 d ἐνοικ ἐρωμενος δικαίῳ Ἐρρης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐλλάδα ἐστρατεύειν; it is clear that the question is merely rhetorical. Ἀλκ. i 110 c ἐνοικ ἐρωμεν εξερρυόν; is a somewhat doubtful case. In Aesch. Ag. 278 ἐνοικ ἐρρην δὲ καὶ πεπόθηται ἐνοικ; I think that Verrall is right in thinking that ἐνοικ; 'gives the question the air of incredulous wonder,' though Shilleto in his note on Dem. F.L. § 257 quotes this as a colourless question on the ground that the καὶ is suffixed, not prefixed. In the present place Meno's whole speech is scornful and sceptical. Replies are hardly expected. Cp. 95 D 37 ἐνοικ ἐπέσων;

προθέμενον ἡμίψεις: see on 94 D 2.

4. εἰ δὲ τι μάλιστα, 'however much.' The phrase also occurs Rep. 450 c; Euthyphhr. 4 d, 9 c; Parm. 135 a; Crat. 435 b, and no less than eight times in the Charmides. Madvig (who only counts seven of these, omitting 167 b), thinks this frequency a ground for suspecting the genuineness of the Charmides (adv. Crit. vol. i p. 402 note 2). The expression, however, springs naturally from the a fortiori line of argument that plays a great part in that dialogue.

7. ἐρωτικόν: see Excursus V.

κατάγει: see App. on the text.

ἀγα καὶ ἀρα ἐστιν: the ordinary use of ἀρα is simply to mark an inference. But if the inference be one from a statement we have not fully examined, it may cause surprise; or if it be from a statement for which we do not vouch, it may be expressed with doubt or irony. In the strongest case, where a false position is exposed by a 'reductio ad absurdum,' ἀρα is generally preceded by δὲ (see on 91 E 17). So Dr. Thompson on Gorg. 498 a καὶ τούτω ἀρα τις μυθολογῶν says: 'The particle ἀρα frequently denotes an inference false but specious.' Often, as here, some particle like ὅσ shows that it is a case 'ubi aliquis non suis verbis utilius.' Fr. See Kühner § 509. 3, Jell § 788.
4, 5. Cp. 91 C 2 ὁδὸν ἀρὰ μῦνα, 81 D 12, 97 C 33 ; Apol. 26 C ὁ θαυμάσιον Μέλητο, ὁδῇ θλιψὸν ἀδὲ σελήνην ἀρὰ νομίζω θεοῦς εἶναι ; Theaet. 171 C εἰκός γε ἀρὰ ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον νυντα σοφότερον ἠμῶν εἶναι ; Rep. 358 C, 376 D, 595 C ; Clit. 408 A δούλῳ ἀμεινον ἦ εὐνούχω διάγει τῷ τοιούτῳ τῷ βίων ἐστὶν ἀρὰ ; Gorg. 508 B C (thrice) ; Prot. 331 A B. With ὦ, Apol. 40 E, Euthyphr. 11 C τὸν ἄν γε καὶ περὶ κακῶπτες ἦν ἀρὰ κτέ., Phaedr. 245 A πειθαί τὸ ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ικανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσάμενος, 249 E, Hipp. maj. 289 A, Rep. 468 E, Parm. 127 E, Laws 822 A, etc.

81 A 17. τῷ τῇ θείᾳ πράγματα : Socrates is speaking slowly and impressively, and here pauses to excite attention. The device is fairly common in Plato. Cp. Phaedr. 273 C ἀτάρ, ὁ ἐκάπε, τοῦτῳ ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μὴ — Ὁ ἦν τῷ πάλαι; 277 D, Rep. 609 D, Soph. 265 C, Polit. 277 E, Phil. 57 D, 59 E, Laws 861 A, etc. Instances seem to be rare in the earliest dialogues.

Dr. Abbott (How to write clearly p. 30) quotes from Hamlet in illustration of a similar point:

Ghost. If thou didst ever thy dear father love—

Hamlet. O God!

Ghost. Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder.

It has also its use in comedy: Ar. Ecl. 565—


21. τῶν ἱερῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἱερείων: there was in Greece no priestly caste—a point in which Greece is broadly and strongly distinguished from Egypt and other Eastern nations. The fact is used by Zeller (pre-Socrates 1 p. 56 note) to show the improbability of any considerable Oriental influence on Greek religious thought. Certain families in Greece were no doubt associated with certain religious cults. It is to be noted, however, that Plato does not refer to priests and priestesses as a class, but to those of them who have been led by the accident of their position to speculate on the meaning of the rites they performed, and give an account (λόγον διδώναι) of their practice.

It is now established that the ritual with which these speculations were associated was, chiefly if not entirely, the Orphic. The Orphic cult in Greece is at least as old as the sixth century B.C. (Zeller pre-Socrates 1 62). It was closely connected with the worship of Bacchus. Herodotus II 81 uses the names 'Bacchic' and 'Orphic' as interchangeable. This worship was imported into Greece from Thrace, a country whose people were specially susceptible to the quasi-mesmeric influences of worship of the kind to which the name 'orgiastic'
has been given. This stands quite aloof from the national Greek religions, of which the chief characteristic, as with their Art and Literature, was balance, dignity, and self-restraint. The importance of the ecstatic Bacchus-worship imported into Greece in promoting the idea of immortality has been elaborated by Rohde in his work *Psyche*. (See a notice of this by Miss Jane Harrison in the *Classical Review*, vol. viii p. 165.) It was by a kind of inspired assault that the Greeks first attempted, so to speak, to carry the heights of heaven. To this Plato superadded a more scientific investment by process of Reason; but even with him the mystic element is by no means superseded, and some appeal, though with varying prominence, is still made to the forces of divine intoxication or 'divine madness.' See Excursus VI.

23. ἀλήγε δὲ καὶ Πλενδαρός: 'there is no evidence in any Greek poet before Pindar of the hope of a future life' (Zeller *pre-Socratics* vol. i p. 127). It seems probable that Pindar derived these doctrines, not from the Pythagoreans, but directly from the Bacchic and Orphic cult, of which Thebes was a seat (Zeller l.c. p. 71). The passages in Pindar referring to a future life are chiefly to be found in the fragments of the Ṭρήνον or Dirges.

24. ἀλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν: Empedocles is chiefly meant. See on 76 C 22. The dates of his life are uncertain, but he was somewhat junior to Pindar. He was a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood as was also Aeschylus (Cic. *Tusc.* D. ii § 23). After them many others took up the tale.

δοσιν δειοὶ εἰσιν: see on 99 C 22. Socrates intends the word to be taken in its colloquial sense, 'gifted,' 'distinguished,' though for him it has a deeper meaning.

25. τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν: the best commentary on this is the *Phaedo* 70 C foll. The moment of death is not identical with the moment of re-birth. Between the two intervenes a period in which the soul is ἐκεῖ, 'yonder,' in Hades. During this it is in a state of 'death,' which is the correlative and antithesis to the state of 'life.' Cp. also Pindar *Ol.* 2. 69 where ἐκατερωθή means 'in our world and in the Other World.' On this view life and death are alternative modes of the soul's existence, so that we may say with Euripides:

\[\text{τὶς δ' οἴδειν εἰ τὸ καθ' ὑμᾶν κατ' ὑμᾶς κατ' ὑμᾶς δὲ καθ' ὑμᾶς;} \] (Gorg. 492 E).

Cp. Soph. *Ant.* 560—

\[\text{ἡ δ' ἐμὴ ψυχὴ πάλαι τεθνηκέν ὡσε τὸς θανόσαι ὦφελεῖν.}\]
Symp. 192 εκουή τεθνεώτε of lovers united in Death; Ar. Frogs 868—

δι ἡ πολιτεις οὐχὶ συντέθυηκέ μου,

τούτῳ δὲ συντέθυηκεν ὡσθ' ἔξει λέγειν.

The doctrine comes from Heraclitus, in whose philosophy the resolution of Existence into a contrast of Opposites plays a great part. See Dr. Thompson’s note on the passage in the Gorgias; R. & P. §§ 38, 39; Zeller pre-Socratics II p. 84 and notes.


30. δὲν δὲ: from these words to the end of the quotation must be regarded as a parenthesis. It has nothing to do immediately with the point under discussion: ‘How is learning possible?’ But it has a very important bearing on the final result of the dialogue. The hint is expressed so briefly that it may easily elude notice. Virtue comes to a man θελη μοῖρα (99 E); but the ‘divine apportionment’ is determined by the soul’s previous history. We have then here at least the germs of the theory elaborated in the Republic and Phaedo. δὴ here is equivalent to nota bene, ‘by the way’; not a common use. Cf. use with relatives, line 28 above: Clitophon 408 β τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικὴν, ἢν δὲ σὺ πολιτικὴν, ἢς Σωκράτης, πολάκις ἐπονομάζει: Prot. 328 β δὲν δὴ ἐγὼ οἷμαι εἰς εἶναι: also the constant use of διὸ: Gorg. 518 Α διὸ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα (τὰς τέχνας) δουλοπρεπείς εἶναι: Symp. 208 C διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀλήθειας γέγονεν δ’ Ἐρως: Phaedr. 249 C διὸ δὴ μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια.

32. οἷοι γὰρ ἂν κτλ., ‘for from whomsoever Persephone hath accepted the atonement for the ancient evil, of all these in the ninth year she sends back the souls to the upper Sun again. From these grow up glorious kings, and men of mighty strength, and men surpassing in wisdom; and for all future time they are called holy heroes among men.’

This fragment is referred to one of Pindar’s Θρήνου (Bergk 4 fr. 138). The rhythm appears to be this:

οἷοι γὰρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος (4 bars)

δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὑπερθεν ἀλιον κελνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτει (4 bars)
άνδιδοι ψυχάς πάλιν, (2 bars)

ἐκ τῶν βασιλέων ἀγανὸλ καὶ σθενεὶ κρατυνόλ σο-φι-α τε μέγιστοι

(4 bars)

ἀνδρες αθέουτ'· ἢ δὲ τὸν λαυτὼν χρόνον ἱρωες ἄγ- (4 bars)

νοι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεύται (2 bars).

οἰσι: this construction with δέχομαι occurs in Homer II. 11 186 δέξατ' ολ ('from him') σκήπτρον, XV 37 θεμάτι δέ καλλιπαρحة δέκτο δέτασ. See Kühner § 423, 24, Leaf on II. 1 596, and elsewhere in Pindar, Ol. 13. 29, Pyth. 4. 23, ibid. 8. 5, Isth. 5. 4. Porson on Eur. Hec. 533 δέξα μον ὕδαμ μοι collects a number of instances. It is not clear whether it arises from the locative dative (cp. the Scottish 'to ask at him') or from the true dative of the indirect object, of which the dativus commodi is a development. The present instance rather favours the latter view.

παλαιόν πένθος, 'the ancient trouble,' 'original sin.' πένθος is in origin a by-form of πάθος, just as βένθος of βάθος. Thus πένθος is 'an affliction.' From this meaning it passed, by an euphemism characteristic of the Greeks, to the meaning 'sin.' Cp. the history of the word συμφόρα. Stallbaum is wrong in saying that πένθος here means 'culpa in mortali corpore contracta.' It means rather the sin, or 'fall,' by which the soul, originally free, was doomed to be enchained in a mortal body. This notion of an 'ante-natal lapse' arose naturally out of the pessimistic view, to be found in Greek literature from Homer downward, that life is an evil. See Clem. Alex. Strom. III ch. 3. It was easy to infer from this that life is a punishment (see Exc. VI.). Perhaps we may compare William Blake:

Didst close my tongue in senseless clay,
And me to mortal life betray.

See Rep. 612 έ τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεὶ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, δόρα γε ἀπὸ θεῶν
...γινεται, πάντα γίνεσθαι ὑπ οἴν τε ἀριστα, εἷ μὴ τι ἀπαγκαίων
αὐτῷ κακῶν ἐκ προτέρας ἀμαρτίας ὑπέρχεν;

33. ἐκεῖνα is aor. subjunctive.

The exact meaning of these words by no means lies on the
surface. We must remember that no interpretation of the
passage is satisfactory that does not find in it an argument
grounding the position δείν δή ὡς ὁμοίωτα διαβίων τῶν βλών.
We must further remember that if we had the context of the
quotation its applicability might be much more obvious than it is
at present. Lastly, that we may indeed expect from Findar a
hint or illuminating vision, but hardly a complete or consistent
scheme. 'Findar's eschatology follows no fixed type' (Zeller
pre-Socrates i 70 note).

In considering ancient views as to man's spiritual history,
we have to take into account two causes. First, there is the
ante-natal lapse—a matter standing so remote from positive
experience that it has almost the character of an external or
fatal force, a character which is definitely given to it in the
Timaeus (41 π; see Zeller Plato p. 391). Besides this we have
to recognise as a second cause acts due to the soul's own
initiative or 'free-will.' These are the sins, and virtuous deeds,
'done in the body.' The notion that for these there is a
retribution after death is one that appeared very early in
Greece. The soul's history is thus doubly conditioned. First,
there is the struggle of Soul with Matter due to the ante-natal
lapse: this must end logically in the eventual re-emergence
of the Soul in purity. Besides this there is the moral effect of
each particular life. (See Exc. VI for further treatment.) One
hypothesis favoured by Plato is that the time for the restitution
of the Soul to its primeval state is fixed. There is a cycle of
years—9000 in the Phaedrus—and the restitution of the Soul
after this time is as much a matter of fate as the original lapse.
This cycle includes a certain number of lives, and the same
number of intervals, or 'deaths,' that follow between each life
and the next. The 'death' following each life furnishes the
retribution for the deeds done in that life. Strictly speaking,
according to this view the effects of each life will not extend
beyond the subsequent 'death,' and will not have any bearing
on any further life. It seems clear that this is not the view
that Plato takes here. For we have here no hint of punishment
as a ground for living a holy life. We have instead a clear
suggestion that the most desirable lives on earth are those that
have been earned by good conduct in previous lives, that the
elite of earth are those who, having practically squared their
account, are passing through a last earthly life before the final
release of their souls. Cp. the Buddhist doctrine of Karma.
'We are born as we deserve to be born' (Kidd *Social Evolution* p. 111). According to this view, conduct in any life will have its chief effect by influencing further lives, and perhaps also by hastening or retarding the time of the soul's final restitution. On this view the idea of a period of retribution following each life becomes possibly superfluous. But it is not necessarily excluded. See *Laws* 870 D E, where we have the view, drawn from the Mysteries, that murderers are not only punished in Hades, but are doomed in their next life to suffer the fate they have inflicted. The mention of the alternative states of death and life in the context, and the words ενάτω έτοι (see subsequent note), make it probable that such periods of retribution are contemplated here.

ες τον ἐπερθην άλιον: this implies another sun in the nether world. Plutarch cons. ad *Apoll.* c. 35 = 120 C quotes Pindar (Bergk 4 fr. 129) as saying of the righteous in Hades—

τοσι λάμπει μεν μένος ἀελίον τάν ἐνθάδε νύκτα κάτω κτέ.

So the chorus of the Initiated in Aristoph. *Frogs* 454 sing—

μύνοις γὰρ ἕμιν ἤλιος καὶ φέγγος θλαρβν έστων.


ενάτω έτοι: the words raise two questions: 'What is the meaning of the number?' and 'From what point is the time counted?' The number nine has a sacred character: it was δ' ενάτων έτοι that Minos sought the instruction of Zeus (*Laws* 624 B). But there may possibly be here a more definite reference. According to the view in the *Phaedrus* (249 A B) the period from birth to re-birth is 1000 years. This includes the period of life and that of purgation. The time of purgation is thus something over 900 years. (On the other hand, in *Rep.* 615 A B the 1000 years, the period of 'wandering' for the soul, is exclusive of the period of life, and this Vergil follows, *Aen.* vi 748:—

has omnia, ubi miile volatam volvere per annos,
Lethaeum ad fluvium deos evocat ordine magno.)

If, then, the normal period of purgation was 900 years, it seems possible the notion was that in the case of spirits on the eve of their last incarnation the 900 years was reduced to nine. But perhaps this is refining over-much.

35. βασιλεῖς ἁγαυοι κτί: there are three classes of heroes C here recognised: (1) Kings, (2) Warriors or Athletes, (3) Philosophers and Poets. With the passage should be compared Empedocles, quoted by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iv ch. xxiii φησὶ δη
kai Ἔμπεδοκλῆς τῶν σοφῶν τὰς ψυχὰς θεοῦς γινέσθαι, ὡς ἡμέρα ὑμάρας

εἷς δὲ τέλος μάντεις τε καὶ ὑμνήσκωι καὶ ἠθροῖ
καὶ πρίμοιο ἀνθρώποις ἐπιχοθοίσαι πέλασται,
ἐνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῆσι φέρονται.

Here Empedocles is speaking of souls who have reached their last stage before final restitution to the circle of the gods.

36. ἢς δὲ τὸν λουπὸν χρόνον: 'tempore post mortem futuro' Fr., referring to Rep. 469 Α καὶ τῶν λουπῶν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων θεραπεύσωμεν αὐτῶν τὰς θηκάς, and Phaedo 81 Α ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμημημένων ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λουπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγοιγη. The words ὡς ἀληθῶς look as if the phrase that follows had associations with mystic ritual. (Cp. on 78 E 50.)

ἡρωες ἀγνοι: the term ἡρωες is used here practically as a synonym for δαιμόνες. The ἡρωες and the δαιμόνες are both on the same plane, intermediate between man and God. They are bracketed Rep. 392 Α περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δὲ λέγεθαι εἴρηται,
καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἡρωες καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀθήναι. Cp. Crat. 397 Ν. But in Latoe 717Β we have a distinction: after sacrificing to the gods ὁ ἐμφρώων will sacrifice to the daemons, next to the heroes. Cp. 738 Ν. But the term ἡρωες necessarily refers to an incarnation on earth; the recognition of a deceased mortal as a δαιμόνες amounts to a sort of canonization. Thus the chorus speak of Alcestis (995 foll.):

μηδὲ νεκρῶν ὡς φθιμένων χώμα νομίζεσθω
τύμβοις σάς ἀλώχου, θεοί τε δ' ὅμοιος
τιμᾶσθω, σέβας ἐμπόρων.
καὶ τις δοξαίαν κέλευθον
ἐμβαινῶν τὸι' ἐρεί.
ἀστὰ ποτὲ προθάνναι ἄνδρος,
νῦν δ' ἄστι μάκαιρα δαίμων·
χαίρ' ὃ πτην' εὖ δὲ δολῆς.

Cp. with this Rep. 540 Β Σ; we are to assign sacrifices to men who have served their city well, ἔτι καὶ ἡ Πυθὴν ξυναμαρτήρι, ὡς δαιμονὶ, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονὶ τε καὶ θεοὺς. The word ἀγνοι recalls Hesiod O. et D. 121 foll. about the Golden Age:—

αὐτὰρ ἐπείδῃ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρ' ἐκάλυψεν,
οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἀγνοὶ ἐπιχόθοις καλέστων
ἐσθηλοί, ἀλεξάκακοι, φόλακες μερίστων ἀνθρώπων.

The upshot of the teaching which Plato here derives from Pindar is this: the θεῖος ἄνηρ is the Soul in its last incarnation,
before it rejoins the gods. After death he is regarded as a ἁρών or δαμων.

CHAPTER XV

6. ἐν γε, 'quippe quae.' 'ye indicat rei rationem afferri' Fr. Stallbaum on Euthyphr. Ὅ γε quotes many instances, including Gorg. 471 A πῶς ὁδὸν ἄδικος, ὦ γε προσήκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν, κτέ.; ibid. C, Phaedo 96 E, Crat. 403 E.

7. ἄτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συνεχῶς οὕσης, 'as the D whole of nature is bound by a tie of kinship.' It seems clear that this doctrine is stated by Plato not as something original, but as one already current. It in fact stands in much the same position as the utterances of the 'priests and priestesses' above, from which it is separated by the parenthesis δεῖν δὴ κτέ. That the doctrine was Pythagorean we may be pretty sure. It is really implied in the doctrine of Transmigration. A fragment attributed to Philolaus (Stob. Eel. 1 420 = R. & P. § 57) speaks of the universe as εἰς ἑών καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ φόντα διαπερίεμονοι καὶ περιαποθέμονοι εἰς ἀρχᾶς ἀδιός. This fragment shares the suspicion that attaches to all the remains attributed to Philolaus, and even in a greater degree than some. But the view stated follows directly from the doctrine εἰς πᾶν held by Xenophanes (Plato Soph. 242 D) and after him by Parmenides (line 81 τῷ ξυνεχές πᾶν ἑότω, ἐν γὰρ ἑώτε ρ ιχές R. & P. 96). There is evidence of connexion between Parmenides and the Pythagoreans, R. & P. 91.

The present passage represents no further stage than had already been reached by Plato's predecessors. But the doctrine is one that was subsequently developed into something that formed the very centre of Plato's system. His doctrine of the World-Soul is elaborated in the Timaeus. 'The Timaeus sums up the result of its whole cosmogony in the concept of the world as the perfect ζῴου' (Zeller p. 386). Note the emphatic concluding words: θεοτά γὰρ καὶ θάνατα ζώα λαβῶν καὶ εὖμπλησθῆναι δότα κόσμος οὕτω, ζῴον ὄρατον τὰ ὄρατα περίσσων, εἰκόνα τῶν ποιητῶν, θεῶν αἰωνιότος, μέγιστοι καὶ ὄρατοι καλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώσατος γέγονεν, εἰς οὕρανσι δότε μονογενῆς ὄν. 'Having received all mortal and immortal creatures, and being therewithal replenished, this universe hath thus come into being, living and visible; containing all things that are visible, the image of its maker, a god perceptible, most mighty and good, most fair and perfect, even this one and only-begotten world that is' (Archer-Hind's translation). Cp. ibid. 36 ε.

Important also is Phil. 30 Α ΣΩ. Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἄρ' οὖ
Later the doctrine passed into the common heritage of the Academic and Stoic schools; see Cic. Div. ii 33, 34, Acad. i 28; also Vergil Georg. iv 220 foll.:

deum namque ire per omnes
terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum, etc.

and Aen. vi 724 foll.:

principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentes
lucentemque globum Lunae, Titaniaque astra
spiritus intus alit, etc.

See Grote ii 17 note, and ii 202 note.

11. τὸ γὰρ ἰγταν ἀρα: see on 80 E 8. The combination γὰρ ἀρα occurs in Plato, either in juxtaposition (Prot. 315 D, Gorg. 469 D, Rep. 438 A, Laws 698 D) or separated, as here, Rep. 358 c. [At Symp. 199 A and 205 B Herm. and Sch. follow B in omitting ἀρα.] In some cases the reference is to a particular statement, as Prot. 315 D ἔπειθημε γὰρ ἄρα Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος 'for P. was in town, as I had expected': op. 314 c. In Gorg. 469 D ἐκν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοι δοξήθη, the ἀρα marks a parody of Polus' boasts, such as at 466 c. Here ἀρα marks a fresh link in a chain of argument that all hangs from borrowed premises.

12. ἀνάμνησις: for references to the principal places in Plato bearing on this doctrine see R. & P. 266 c. The first to be noticed is Phaedr. 249 B: οὐ γὰρ ἢ γε μὴ ποτε Ιδών τὴν ἀληθείαν εἰς τόδε (ἀνθρωπείον) ἰξεί τὸ σχήμα. δει γὰρ ἀνθρωπών ἰσχύει τὸ κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ὅπως αἰσθάνεσθε εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ἐμαυρώμενον· τούτο δὲ ἑατν ἀνάμνησις ἑκεῖνον, ἀ ποτ' εἰδεν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆς συνπορευθέσα θεί καὶ ὑπερβούσα καὶ νῦν εἶναι φανερα καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸν οὐκω.

See on this Grote ii 218. In Phaedo 72 E foll. we have an elaborate account of ἀνάμνησις, which opens with a direct reference back to the Meno: Καὶ μὴν ἐφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ' εἰκόνα γε τὸν λόγον, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄλλως ἔστω, ἐν ὑπαθας ἐλάληται, δι' ἃτιν ἢ μάθησιν οὐκ ἀλλο ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυχάναι οὔσα, καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἀνάγκη ποι ἢ μᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινι χρόνῳ μεθαθεῖνα καὶ νῦν ἀναμνησθένᾳ τούτῳ δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἂν ἢ μᾶς ἢ ψυχή πρὸς ἐν τῷ δὲ τὸν ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι· διὸ καὶ ταύτη ἄθανατον ἢ ψυχή τε θοικείν εἶναι. Ἀλλά, ὁ Κέβης, ἐφη ὁ Σωμιᾶς ὑπολαβών, ποιαὶ τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησιν με' οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἐνι μὲν λόγῳ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι
Plato defines ἀνάμνησις below 85 D 24: τὸ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμην. It is distinguished from μνήμη, Phil. 34 B c. μνήμη is σωτηρια ἀισθήσεως: when the soul without the body recovers some previous impression this is ἀνάμνησις. Cf. Laws 732 B ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρρήθης φρονήσεως ἀποκειμένης.

Does the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, as propounded in the Meno, necessarily involve the Ideal theory? Grote II 17 remarks that "in the Phaedo pre-natal experience is restricted to commerce with the substantial, intelligible Ideas, which are not mentioned in the Meno." J. S. Mill, however, makes it clear that the doctrine of Recollection does imply the knowledge of separate Universals in a previous state (Dissertations III 351). Cf. Zeller's valuable note 82 on p. 126: 'It seems equally clear to me that the doctrine of Reminiscence really supposes that of the Ideas. The objects of reminiscence can only be the universal concepts—the sensuous forms of which we meet in individual things—not individual presentations which we have experienced in our former lives.' See too p. 395: 'How could sensible things remind us of universal concepts if the latter were not known to us independently of the former?' and p. 406 foll.: 'Reminiscence is in Plato's opinion the only explanation of the possibility of thought transcending sensuous perception.' If all our previous lives were on a level with the present, the problem of the origin of Knowledge would not be solved, but only thrown back.

Cf. J. B. Bury in JP. xv 81 note: 'The argument of the Phaidon shows (cp. Mr. Archer-Hind's preface) that ἀνάμνησις was to Plato merely the defective way in which the imagination represents the kinship of the soul to the ideas.' See on 86 B 15.

Whether the Ideal theory had actually found expression at the time when the Meno was written is another question. See Intr. § 17.

14. οὖτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἁργοὺς ποιήσειν (cp. 86 B 24): in these words we see indicated the radical vice of Eristic. It is a cheap substitute for Philosophy. Its votaries are like Formalist and Hypocrisy in the Pilgrim's Progress, who come 'tumbling over the wall,' and so, by a short cut, put themselves on a level with those who have borne the burden and heat of the day. For he who can show the futility of Reason may appear as good a man as he who has attained it.
The spirit of the philosopher in regard to the duty of inquiry has never found more perfect expression than in the words of Simmias (Phaedo 85 C D): ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ σοι τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βλέψι ἡ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἣ παγχαλέσκων τι, τὸ μέντοι ἀδίκως περί αὐτῶν μὴ ὦλῃ παντὶ πρὸς ἀγέχεν καὶ μὴ προαφύτασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχὲς σκοπῶν ἀπείπη τις, πάνω μαλακοὶ εἶναι ἄνδρος· δεῖ ἀντὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξεσθαι, ἡ μαθεῖν δὴ ἢ ἔχει ἢ εἴρεν ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπινῶν λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξεληκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτον ὀχούμενον ὀφθαλμός ἐπὶ σχέδια κυνδυνεύοντα διαπλέεισθαι τὸν βιον, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκμαίοτερον ἠτε βεβαιοτέρον ὅχιματος, λόγου θείου τινὸς, διαπορευθήσαται. As a strong contrast to this may be quoted the cynical epigram (Anth. Pal. x 118):—

πῶς γενόμην; πώθεν εἰμί; τίνος χάριν ἥθεν; ἀπελθῶν.  
πῶς δύναμαι τι μαθεῖν μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος;  
οὐδέν εἷς γενόμην· ταλίν ἔσσομαι ὡς πάρος ἢ.  
οὐδέν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν μερότων τὸ γένος.  
ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι Βάκχοι φιλήσον δι' ἄνευ νάμα·  
tοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κακῶν φάρμακον ἀντίδοτον.

The analogous fatalistic argument, that would stultify all action, was definitely labelled ἀργὸς λόγος (ʻignava ratioʼ Cic. de fato § 28).

E 17. Ὡς ἐγὼ πιστεῶν ἀληθεῖ εἶναι: 'Notanda constructio composita e duabus alis πιστεῶν τούτων et πιστεῶν τούτων εἶναι ἀληθῆ' (Buttmann). Cr. Phaedo 90 b; contrast Gorg. 524 A.

18. ἢπεῖν ἁρπῇ δ τι ἔστων: the nom. is much rarer than the acc. in similar combinations. See on 71 A 25. Heindorf on Phaedr. 271 D εἴδεναι ψυχῆ διὰ εἶδη ἔχει quotes Laches 199 b οὐκ ἀρκεῖ εὐφήκαμεν ἄνδρεια δ τι ἔστων.

23. ἀρρῆ: 80 B 23.

82 A 25. δὲ σοὶ φημι, 'though I deny.' Instances where, as here, the relative introduces what is practically an adversative clause are rare. Kühner § 561 c quotes Ἰσοκρ. 17. 47 ἀλλ' εἰς ἄγωνα καταστᾶσ ὕμνη καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον πλέον ἔχειν Πασίωνος παρ' ψωνί; δὲ οὖν μὲνεν ἐνθάδε παρεκκείαμαι: 'on the contrary, I did not even intend to remain here.'

26. ινα δή: see on 86 D 14.

29. ὅπω τοῦ ἔσος: Simmias in the Phaedo 73 b is more wary: αὐτὸ δε τούτο, ἐφ' ἰδίῳ παθεῖν περί οδ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθήσαι. See on 91 E 17.

33. προσκάλεσον: perhaps the choice of the active instead
of the more usual middle of this verb is due to the fact that Socrates means not 'call him to yourself,' but 'call him before me.'

34. τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων: 'Vox propria de servis qui dominos honoris causa in publico comitabantur: Charm. 155 a, Symp. 217 a, Laws 845 a ' (Fr.). Retainers.'

35. ἐντινα βούλη: 'Stallbaum says that this allusion to B the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to illustrate conspicuously the wealth and nobility of Meno. In my judgment it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure accident —the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked upon.' Grote II 19 note. See Intr. § 7.

38. Ἐλλην μέν οὐτι: 'μέν in questions implies that if assent is not given the conversation cannot be proceeded with,' Verrall on Eur. Med. 676. Other examples in Plato are: Charm. 153 c παρεγένου μέν, ἡ δ' δι', τῇ μάχῃ; παρεγενώμην: 'I believe I may assume'; Theaet. 161 e. It is not uncommon in Euripides: Med. 676, 1129; Hipp. 316; Alc. 146; Ion 520. See also Aristoph. Birds 1214.

39. οἰκογενής, verna, not bought or captured. He was probably one of the Thessalian serfs or πεντάλ τας. Schömann Antiquities of Greece E.T. p. 132.

41. ἐν ἀναμμυκοκόμινος ἢ μανθάνων: see App. on the text.

43. ἄλλα προσέχεω: the negative clause to which ἄλλα is opposed is suppressed, and ἄλλα has little force. 'Very well; I will attend.' Cp. 75 E 17.

Chapters XVI to XIX (82 B–85 B). Socrates puts a series of questions to a Slave of Meno's, who has never been taught geometry, the answers to which show that there exist latent in the slave's mind the materials for solving a geometrical problem, namely, the construction of a square which shall be double a given square.

The dialogue with the Slave is a perfect model of Socratic procedure. It copies on a small scale the discussion with Meno himself. It consists of two parts, negative (chaps. xvi and xvii) and positive (chap. xix). These two parts are separated by an interlude between Meno and Socrates (chap. xviii). The negative portion again may be divided into two parts: (1) chap. xvi, where the slave starting full of confidence...
gives an answer hopelessly wrong; (a word or two between Meno and Socrates intervenes); (2) chap. xvii, where the Slave is shown the error of the first answer, and reaches what may be called the stage of partial disillusionment. He amends his answer. When the amended answer too has been shown wrong he is completely disillusioned, and is ready for the constructive process to begin. Grote I 530 p compares the Slave to Clinias in the Euthydemus; 'each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of Socrates into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected, nor traceable to any teaching.'

The scene attracted attention in antiquity. It is alluded to by Cicero Tusc. D. 1 § 57; by Arnobius adv. gentes II ch. 24.

Socrates makes his figures on the sand or dust—the blackboard of antiquity.

CHAPTER XVI

1. γνώσκαι τετράγωνον χώραν κτλ.: 'You recognize that a square is a thing like this.' This is the usual prefatory agreement as to the use of terms. See on 75 E 12.

C 4. εύτιν σφν τετράγωνον κτλ., 'there exists then a square having all these four sides equal,' the definition being accompanied by an assertion of the reality of the thing defined. Three lines below εύτιν is merely a copula. For εύτι as simple auxiliary with present participle see 84 A 1, E 21; Phaedr. 249 τεύτιν ὁδὸν ὑπὸ παῦς δεύορ ἕκκοιν λόγος, Gorg. 500 c καὶ τι ποτ' εὔτιν ὁδὸν ἐκεῖνον διάφερον; Soph. 267 επε διαλόγον ἐπ' ἕκκοιν τυι τεύτιν, op. 99 E 5: for other instances see Campbell, General Introd. to Soph. and Polit. p. xxxiv. The square is of course not sufficiently defined by specifying that its sides are equal, for a rhombus also has four equal sides. If, indeed, the lines διὰ μέσου presently mentioned (C 7) were diagonals, we should have the conditions of a square sufficiently expressed; for a square is the only figure that has all its four sides equal and its diagonals equal; though the definition would be a clumsy one. The lines διὰ μέσου, however, are not diagonals, but lines parallel to the side, and so help not at all in differentiating the square from the rhombus. That the figure is rectangular is assumed. The Greeks were so much accustomed to regard superficial measure as the simple product of the two linear dimensions, that it was natural to them to assume that they were dealing with rectangular figures in default of notice otherwise (see on 87 A 24). The diagonals (διαμετροί) are first mentioned at 85 B 48.

7. τανταλεὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου: the lines EG, FH. The lines
are wanted presently to show that the square on a side of two feet contains four square feet.

10. τουοτουν χωρίων, 'a similar figure'; cp. D 28; note that τουοτουν refers to shape, τουοτουν, πηλικών (85 Α 28), ποσάπουν (85 Β 41) to size. See on 87 Α 30.

13. εἰ οὖν ἡ... πόσων ἄν εἰς ποδῶν; εἰ ἦν... ἄλλο τι ἄν ἦν; a good opportunity of comparing two different classes of conditional sentences. The first is indefinite; the length has not been measured: 'say that this is two feet, of how many square feet will the whole be?' The latter is an instance of an unreal supposition.

14. πόσων ποδῶν: the same expressions are used in Greek for linear and superficial measure. You have to judge by the context whether ποδί means a linear foot or a square foot. See Thucyd. 147 ι and Campbell's note there.

15. εἰ ην ταύτη (ΑΒ) δυοιν ποδοῖν, ταύτη δὲ (ΑΕ) ἐνος ποδῶν.

16. ἄλλο τι, 'nonne.' The full and original form was ἄλλο τι ἣ, 'is aught else the case than?' which is kept at D 19 just below, 83 Β 17, and often in Plato (see Ast 107). ἄλλο τι is an irrational abbreviated form, which occurs again in this dialogue 84 Α 12, 97 Α 15, and very often elsewhere. Fr. compares the irrational abbreviation ἄλλως τε for ἄλλως τε καί at 85 Ε 37. See Kühner § 587. 17 and J. & A. M. Adam's note on Prot. 353 c.

ἀπαξ ἢν δυοῖν ποδοῖν: the genitive is an attributive genitive, and is not grammatically affected by ἀπαξ: 'the space would be one of once-two-feet.' But διπλάσιον, ποσαπλάσιον (84 Ε 15), ἡμιοιν, etc. do 'govern' genitives.

34. ἡ μοι γὰρ τοῦτω: the exposition is a good deal helped by the fact that the feminine gender can always stand for γραμμή, the neuter for χωρίων, while at 83 Ε 62 the masculine κότε can only refer to ποδότες.

36. Σειλον δὴ: the boy answers with confidence, a characteristic of the state of complete ignorance. This corresponds to Meno's answer 71 Ε 1 ἄλι' οὗ χαλεπών, δ' Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν.
37. οὐδὲν διδάσκω: it was noted by Schleiermacher (quoted by Fr. on 84A) that the questions put by Socrates are in large proportion leading questions, so that it is hardly fair to regard the Slave as the parent of the notions brought to light by Socrates’ aid. Schleiermacher adds that this is not fatal to Socrates’ present purpose, which is merely to show, from the ease with which the notions are grasped by the Slave, that they are not now for the first time implanted in his mind. Grote (II 19), after quoting Schleiermacher’s criticism, observes that the theory of ἄνδρονς: ‘is in a great degree true. Not all learning, but an important part of learning, consists in reminiscence—not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent life, but of past experience and judgments in this life.’ Grote, however, makes in these words no concession whatever to the Platonic doctrine of ἄνδρονς, the essence of which is that all knowledge of Universals depends upon reminiscence of experience that is both ante-natal and generically different from sense-experience. It was on this point that, for a long period in the history of philosophy, raged the controversy about Innate Ideas (see Bain Mental and Moral Science App. B). Is all our knowledge ultimately rooted in sense-experience? Or is the soul furnished at birth with certain notions inherent in it? The position of the one party was given in the formula: ‘Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.’ This Leibnitz amended by adding the words ‘nisi intellectus ipse.’ It must be understood that the partisans of ‘experience’ limited their view of it to sense-experience within the present life, as Grote does in the passage just quoted. Since Grote wrote the problem has entered on a new phase by a recognition of the fact that a great deal of our mental furniture is inherited. The opponents of ‘Innate Ideas’ have had to enlarge their notion of ‘experience,’ and to admit that the sense-experience of the present life is not adequate to account for the phenomena of mental development. But the doctrine of heredity does not assume any previous experience generically different from the sense-experience of the present life, and the necessity for assuming anything of the sort has by the admission of heredity been very considerably lessened.

Grote (II 20) quotes in illustration of the doctrine of ἄνδρονς Wordsworth’s ode, ‘Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,’ etc. But J. S. Mill, Diss. iii 351, points out a fundamental opposition between the two utterances. Cp. A.-H. on Phaedo 76 D, ‘According to Wordsworth we are born with the ante-natal radiance clinging about us, and spend our lives in gradually losing it; according to Plato we lose the vision at birth and spend our lives in gradually recovering it.’
38. ἀλλ' ἐξανε: see on 71 C 10.

39. ὀλεται: of mere opinion, as below, 44. Cp. 97 B 23.

ὅπολα ὑστίν: we might have expected πηλική or ὁπόση. But as lines have, for the purpose in hand, no property but length, the distinction between ὀπολα and ὁπόση disappears. Cp. 83 C 37 ἀπὸ πολας γραμμης, Ε 77, 84 A 79, 85 B 43. Similarly we have ποῖος used of time, which has no 'quality': Aesch. Ag. 278 πολον χρόνον δὲ καὶ πεπόρθηται πόλει, Eur. Η. A. 815, Aristoph. Birds 920 [see L. & S. III]. In some of these cases 'feeling' may be intended; but we might similarly say 'what sort of time?' 'what sort of distance?' See on 80 D 3.

44. ὀλεται ἰδ' γε: the γε has its separate force and emphasises ὀλεται. Cp. 95 E 9 and note there.

CHAPTER XVII

2. ἐφεξής ὡς δει ἀναμ.: see on 86 A 10.

10. αὐτη (AK), ταῦτη (AB), ἐτέραν τουσαύτην (BK): see on 83 A 82 E 34.

13. ἀντ ταῦτης: AK.

16. τοις τέταρτας: 'this is speaking inclusively, as the B line AK itself is one of the four'—Stocks.

17. τουτί: the space AKLM.
20. ταυτὶ τέταρτα: Socrates has drawn the lines CP, CQ, showing that the large square divides into four squares of the original size.

26. διπλάσιον ὁν κτ.: the steps here are very minute. But it cannot be brought out too clearly that we have not got what we wanted.

C 34. τετράων: in full, (χωρὶς) γὰρ τετράκις τετράων (ποδῶν) ἦστι (χωρὶς) ἐκκαίδεκα (ποδῶν). τετράκις cannot govern a genitive any more than ἀπα at 82 C 16. In the Theaetetus (147 b) we are told that Theodorus has carried his analysis of numbers into those which are perfect squares and those that are not, up to sixteen; and that there he stopped. Perhaps some diagram like the present illustrated his discourse. Intr. § 22.

40. ταυτὶ ταυτὶ: the deictic forms imply that he here points to the line AB and the square ABCD, whereas in the sentence before he referred to the line AK and the square AKLM. In the next sentence τοῦδε is the square ABCD, τοῦτου the square AKLM. The Greek wealth of pronouns dispenses with lettering.

D 50. τὸ γὰρ δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνοντο: the present imperative makes the injunction refer to a habit, not to a particular answer. See Appendix on the Text on 72 C 4. The injunction is an important point in Socratic procedure, as distinguished from Eristic (see Excursus V). Perhaps the best illustrative passage is Theaet. 154 C D ὁ Θεατής, ἐστ' ὅπως τι μείζον ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλος ἢ αὐξηθείς; τι ἀποκρίνει; ΘΕΑ. ἔλυ μὲν, ὁ Σώκратες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, δι' οὐκ ἐστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἑνωμία ἐπικρ., δι' ἐστὶν κτὲ. In the conversation with Thrasymachus (Republic bk. i) the point appears: 337 C (the respondent must be left free): ἥττον τι αὐτῷ οἰκί ἀποκρίνειπα τὸ φαινόμενον οὕτω ἐὰν τῇ ἡμείς ἀπαγορεύομεν ἐὰν τῇ µή; (see the context): 346 A καὶ δ' ἀνάμει μὴ παρά δόξαν ἀποκρίνων ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. Cp. 350 E. The passage at 349 B affords no real exception. Thrasymachus (unlike the waverers Polus and Meno) has not scrupled to call injustice καλὸν καὶ λαχωρὲν. Socrates compliments him on now speaking his mind sincerely. Thrasymachus rejoins τι δὲ σοι τοῦτο διαφέρει, ἐστε µοι δοκεῖ ἐστε µή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἔλεγχες; Socrates answers Ὑδέν· ἀλλὰ τοῦδε μοι πειρῶ ἐτι πρὸς τοῦτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι. Here the 'ὑδέν' is ironical; cp. Prot. 333 C. To the same effect as the present passage are Crit. 49 B, Lach. 193 C, Prot. 351 C, Gorg. 495 A, 500 B, Phil. 14 A. The importance of getting at genuine δόξαι appears at 85 C, where we see that δόξαι are the raw material from which Knowledge is evolved.
52. ἡν, 'is, as we agreed.' The source of this idiom, which is of frequent occurrence, is a transference of the time of our thought about a fact to the fact itself. It occurs most frequently in the imperfect tense: Phaedr. 230 A ἄρ' οὐ τόδε ἡν τὸ δεδόμεν αὐτῷ ὅτε ἰγεις ἡμᾶς; the existence of the tree is thought of relatively to the time when they began to approach it. This imperfect often appears, by a sort of attraction, of things permanently existing, mentioned in a narrative of past events: thus we have δεικνύοντες εἶχες 93 D 19, 94 A 8: cp. Xen. Anab. II iv 12 ἀφικνοῦτο πρὸς τὸ Μήδιας καλοθεμένων τεῖχος: ἀπείχε δὲ Βασίλιως οὐ πολύ. So often in referring to past points in a discussion, where the imperfect is equivalent to the present with ὅπερ ἔλεγομεν, ὅπερ ἕμεθα, or the like. It is sometimes called the 'philosophic imperfect'. (Goodwin MT. § 40). See Kühner § 388. 5, Jell § 398. 4. The imperfect most common is ἡν, as Polit. 264 A: Rep. 407 A ἄρα ... δὲ ἡν τι αὐτῷ ἠργον, δὲ εἰ μὴ πράττειν οὐκ ἐλεύθεροι ἡν; ibid. 436 C, 441 D, 477 A, 522 A, 609 B: Gorg. 478 C, 507 A (see Dr. Thompson's note): Charm. 159 D: Soph. 267 ο (ὁ γάρ σοφιστὴς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόους ἡν); Crat. 387 C: Phil. 41 C, 55 A. Other imperfects: 88 D 5 ὅπερ ἡ φρονήσεις ἐποίησε, τ. c. ἐποίησε, ἡν ἔλεγομεν: Crilo 47 D ἐκεῖνο ὦ τῷ μὲν δικαίω βέλτιον ἐγγύνετο, τῷ δ' ἀδίκῳ ἀπὸ τούτου (for γίγνεσθαι, ἀπὸ τούτου, ἔλεγο); Euclid. 289 C ἄρα ἐστὶν ἂν οὕτω ἡν ἐκεῖ κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι; Prot. 356 C ἂν ἂν μὲν ἡμᾶς ἑπλάνα καὶ ἐποίεις ἂν τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα; Rep. 490 A ἡγεῖτο, 614 A παρέλητο. We have a similar idiom in future time: 98 C 13, Gorg. 475 B ἀτρόν λύπη ἡ κακή ὑπερβάλλων ἀλήθεια ἐσταὶ 'will be found to be.' Certain uses of temporal particles as πω (οὐδ' ἄρα πω γίγνεσθαι, presently at E 75) and ἐτι (73 A 29, 99 A 2, where see notes) are to be explained on the same general principle. The idiom occurs in various languages, including our own. We might translate here 'was not this the square of two feet?' So in Latin, Cic. Acad. I § 23 (repeatedly), § 30 tertia philosophiae pars quae erat in ratione et in disserendo: Livy vii 1 hic annus erit memorabilis, 'we shall find this year memorable.'

(We may separate from these cases: (a) the imperfects dealt with on 77 E 44; (b) the imperfect with δέρα, as at 97 C 31; (γ) the curious use of ἡν at Theaet. 156 A (ὡς τὸ πάν κίνησις ἡν), Charm. 174 B, Rep. 505 E, Laws 628 C, which is allied to (β); for, as Campbell says, 'What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it was before the inquiry began.' We may connect with this the Aristotelian τὸ τι ἡν εἴραι, and the Aristophanic τοῦτι τι ἡν; (Wasps 183). Cp. Isaevus 11 § 17 ἐν συγγενεστάτων μὲν ἡν τῇ φύσει πάντων, and
Jebb's note on the passage in his Selections from the Attic Orators.

Σ 60. τρίποδα: this of course is a mere 'shot.' It does not follow that because four is too much and two too little, that three is right (cp. Aristot. NE. Πιθ. 7). We have here the second stage, that of partial disillusionment. The difficulty is partially grasped, and the confidence is less.

61. τὸ ήμισυ ταύτης (AB) προσληψόμεθα καὶ έσται τρίποδος (AR); δέο μὲν γὰρ οἷς (AB), ὃ δὲ εἰς (BR) καὶ έπεινδη (AT) δήσαυτος: for οἷς (πόδες being understood) see on 81 Ε 34.

75. πω refers to time of thought (see on D 52). 'We have not yet got the square containing eight feet from the three-foot base.' (Beware of translating 'the square of eight feet,' which would be at least ambiguous.)

79. εἶ μὴ βούλειν άρμαν: not without some ironical point; an exact arithmetical answer being impossible, as √2 is incommensurable with 1. Socrates himself does not give the measure of the line; he only δείκνυαν. 'The side and the diagonal represented the type of incommensurable magnitude among the ancient reasoners' (Grote III 356 note).

ἀλλὰ δεῖξον, 'at any rate.' Instances of ἀλλὰ in the sense 'saltem,' with an imperative, after a conditional clause, are not very common. But see below 86 Ε 18 εἰ μὴ τι σῶν ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν... χάλασον; Λαος 860 c εἰ δό σῶν μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ νῦν ὃν λέγοντα με τίθητε; Ἡπιπαρχιας 231 Α εἰ δό αὐτὸς ἐχεις ἀποκρύφαςβι, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ λέγοντος σκότει. This use of ἀλλὰ with imperatives may be classed with the 'appealing' force, for which see Jebb on Soph. El. 337, also L. & S. ἀλλὰ τά. They quote Soph. El. 411 ὁ θεοὶ πατρῴοι συγκεκριμένον γ' ἀλλὰ νῦν. See Aristoph. Clouds 1364, 1369 for ἀλλὰ with an indirect command.

84 Α 81. ἐγώει οὐκ οἶδα, 'I don't know.' The emphasis in ἐγώει logically belongs not so much to the pronoun as to the denial. A good example of false emphasis on a pronoun is Soph. Phil. 910 foll.—

Φιλ. ἀνήρ δε', εἰ μὴ 'γὼ κακὸς γνώμηπ εφών προδούσ μ' ἵοικε κάκλητων τὸν πλούν στελεῖν.

Νε. λιττῶν μὲν οὖκ ἐγώει, λυπηρός δὲ μὴ πέμπω σε μᾶλλον, τούτ' ἀνώμαι πάλαι.

See Postgate in CR. XI 21: καλώς σὺ ποιώ, 'and you were right.'

This marks the completion of the process of disillusionment; the destructive process is ended; the false conceit of knowledge
is eradicated. The situation is parallel to chap. xiii 79 E-80 D. Meno does not indeed there say ἐγώγε ὦκ οἶδα, but Socrates can say of him ἔμωος ἐt ὦκ εἰδὼτ. Meno somewhat resents the treatment; the Slave of course does not; and Meno is able to see (84 B) that in the case of the Slave the torpedo-shock is not unattended with good.

CHAPTER XVIII

1. οὗ ἤστων ἡδή βαθὺς ὥς τοῦ ἀναμνησκόεσθαι, 'what point on the track of reminiscence he has now reached.' Cp. Lysis 204 B πάρων ἡδή ἐτ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος. (In these cases the use of εἰμι with the present participle serves to bring out the continuous force of the tense; cp. 82 C 4.) Fr. compares Rep. 445 C ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου and Euthyphr. 4 B πάρων σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος. The genitives are 'partitive.'

Wayte on Dem. 22 (Andr.) § 16 εἰς τοὺς ἐθηλαῦθε τοῦ νομίζειν points out that a genitive infinit. is rare in this construction, and quotes the present passage.

5. In the combination ἀλλ' ὦν . . . γε, ὦν has the force 'however that may be,' as in δ' ὦν; γε at once emphasises and limits the word to which it belongs. The combination often introduces an apodosis after εἶ μή (Phaedo 91 B, Soph. 254 C, Laws 885 ε). In Prot. 327 C ἀλλ' ὦν αὐληταὶ γ' ἄν πάντες ἦσαν, as here, the construction is coordinate.

7. ἀπερ ὦκ οἴδεν κτλ., 'ut nescit ita se scire ne putat B quidem.'

18. τότε δὲ βαθὺς κτλ.: Socrates caricatures Meno's C language at 80 B 15. Geometry, to be sure, offers less temptation to rhetoric than ethics, so ignorance of it is more easily detected, and is less dangerous.

26. πρῶν κατέπεσεν: Goodwin MT. § 637: 'When the clause introduced by πρῶν, until, refers to a result not attained in past time in consequence of the non-fulfilment of some condition, it takes a past tense of the indicative.' Cp. 86 D 13, Theaet. 165 D ε. See F. E. T. § 218. The question here is equivalent to οὐκ ἐν ἐπεξείρησεν.

31. δι τι καὶ ἀνευρήσει: see on 71 B 8. Here the force of the καὶ is, 'see, what after all (in spite of his bewilderment), he will discover.' So Euthyd. 272 ἰνα εἰδὼ δι τι καὶ μαθησόμεθα; Euthyphr. 3 A λέγες τι καὶ πολυπήδα σέ φησι διαφθειρεῖν τοῦ νέου; Aristoph. Clouds 1344 καὶ μὴ δ' τι καὶ λέξεις ἀκούσαι βούλομαι; Eccl. 946.
CHAPTER XIX

1. At this point all the figures are rubbed out, and a fresh start is made. The four squares, each containing four feet, are successively constructed; first ABCD (ῥοῦρο line 2), then BKPC (ἐπτερον line 4); then DCQM (τριτον line 7), then CPLQ (τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τὸδε line 9).

Σ 12. ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ: see on 82 C 16.

85 A 21. ἐστὶν ἀντιγράμμη: DB. See on 82 C 4.

22. τεῖνουσα, τέμνουσα: see Appendix on the Text.

25. τέταρτες αὐταὶ: BP, PQ, QD, DB.

26. ἦσα: Euclid would have thought it necessary to prove the equality of the diagonals. τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον, BPQD.

31. τοῦτων, the four squares; ἐκάστη ἡ γραμμή, the four diagonals.

35. τριγκώτα, the triangles; ἐν τούτῳ, the sq. BPQD.

37. ἐν τῷ δὲ, the sq. ABCD.

Ε 41. τὸδε, the sq. BPQD. The step taken here is a comparatively long one. This led Schleiermacher to think that
something has fallen out in the text, which he reconstructs thus:

ΣΩ. Τάδε οὖν <ποσανλάσιον γλύνεται τούτον (scil. ABCD).
ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσιον.
ΣΩ. Τούτο δὲ πηλικῶν ἦν;
ΠΑΙ. Τετράπουν.
ΣΩ. Τάδε οὖν >ποσάπουν γλύνεται;

But perhaps the Slave's mind is supposed to have become more agile. Campbell Intr. Soph. etc. p. 15 points out the greater conciseness of Plato's later dialogues.

48. διάμετρος: the word is used elsewhere in Plato of the diagonal of a square: Polit. 266 A B where there seems a fantastic reference to the present problem; †Sisyphus 388 E (quoted on 80 D 1); Rep. 510 D of a rectangle (where there may be a reference to the present problem); Tim. 54 D E of a trapezium. The word διαγώνιος is much later. Of course γραμμή is to be understood with either word.

οἱ σοφισταὶ, 'the Professors.' The word is used here in its original sense, entirely without odious significnction. It implies little more than the Expert, contrasted with the ἰδιωτής. This is the usual significnction of the word in the poets: Pind. Isthm. ν 28; Diog. L. prooem. § 12 says καὶ Κρατίων ἐν Ἀρχιλόχῳ τοῦ περὶ Ὀμηροῦ καὶ Ἡσιόδου ἑπαρκῶν οὕτως καλεῖ; Eur. Hēr. 916 δεινῶν λέγεις σοφιστήν κτέ.

In Plato the word is used colourlessly as here Lys. 204 A οὐ φαύλος γε ἄνθρ. ἀλλ' ἱκανός σοφιστής: Ὁμ. 403 E οὕτω καλούσ τιμᾶς, ὡς δοκεῖ, ἐπισταταί λόγους λέγειν ὁ "Ἄδης καὶ Ἑστὶν . . . ὁ θεὸς τέλεος σοφιστής τε καὶ μέγας εὐεργετὴς τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ: †Mēnos 319 C, Zeus, the trainer of Minos, is a great σοφιστής. The only other place in the Mēno where the word occurs is 91 C 18; and there it is clear that the word, to some ears at least, excites odium. See the note there.

50. ὡς σὺ φῆς: the Slave has found the materials for the conclusion—a point presently developed.

ὁ παῖ Μενώνοι: see on 76 E 48.

Chapters XX, XXI (85 B–86 C). Socr. Observe that all the Opinions to which he has given utterance are his own. By the calling up in order of these Opinions he has recovered latent Knowledge. This Knowledge he did not acquire in this life. Therefore he must have acquired it in a previous state of existence. The soul's possession of Knowledge is thus proved to be independent of its connexion with the human form, and
so independent of death. However, this is rather by the way. I have shown practically that the transition from seeming Ignorance to Knowledge is possible; and I insist most strongly that we shall be better men if we regard research as part of our duty.

C 3. οὕτω, ἀλλ' έναντο: see on 71 C 13.

4. δέ ἱφαμεν ἀλγον πρότερον: 82 Ε.

10. τῷ οὐκ ἐδότι κτ.: see App. on the text.

14. καὶ νῦν μὲν γε κτ., 'at present these opinions have just been conjured up in him like a dream'; that is, they are still fluid and insecure. Cp. Symp. 175 ε, where Agathon says that his own wisdom, compared with that of Socrates, is φαύη καὶ ἀμφιβηθήσιμος, ὡσερ δινιν ὀδα. Similarly the metaphor of νηρί and δινιν is used to express the contrast between real Knowledge (of Universals) and mere Sense-experience or Opinion: Rep. 476 δ; cp. 533 ε, 534 ε, and Laws 969 ε, quoted on 100 Α 9.

15. 'But if some one shall question him again often and in different ways about these same things, you know that finally he will understand these matters as well as any one.' For the future condition see note on 86 Α 8 and Exc. IV.

The δόξαι now arrived at need to be clinched by repetitions of the dialectic process. For the relation of δόξα to ἐπιστήμη see 97 Β 17, with note, and Exc. VII. The intimate bearing of this discussion upon the main subject of the dialogue has been already pointed out in the note on the summary of chaps. xiv, xv. δόξα is a sort of half-way house on the road from Ignorance to Knowledge.

D 20. δὲ έφωτήσαντος: see on 71 C 10. Fr. observes that ἀλλά cancels the negative in the preceding οὐδες, and compares Rep. 386 δ, Phaedr. 260 δ, Symp. 192 ε.


28. ὅτι οὐκέν ποτε ἦν ἄλλον: the addition of τοι to the former ἦν accentuates the contrast between the two alternatives offered (Kühner § 540, 5. Pindar Nem. 6. 5 appears to be the only place where ἦ... ὅτι occurs. τοι without ἦ occurs in Plato Rep. 344 E, 400 c, 433 A). The particle τοι implies a personal appeal. The effect of it is not to press the acceptance of the member to which it happens to be attached, but
to press the choice between the alternatives, which often involves a dilemma. It cannot be made out that τοι is attached to the member the speaker desires to have accepted. At 89 A 20, the other place in which the combination occurs, Plato leaves it an open question whether φρόνησις is the whole of ἀρετή or a μέρος of it. Cp. Phaedo 76 A ἦτοι ἐπιστάμενοι γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὅστερον, οὐσ φαμέν μανίδανεν, οὐδὲν ἄλλον ἂν ἀναμμῆνησκόνται ὅστοι. Other passages are: Apol. 27 D τοῦ δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοῦ γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; Prot. 341 A: Gorg. 460 A ἄνδρας αὐτῶν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δίκαια ἦτοι πρῶτον γε ἢ ὅστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ, ibid. 467 E, 474 D, 475 A, 478 B: Rep. 453 D ἦτοι δελφίνα τινα ἀληθείνας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἄν ἢ τίνα ἄλλην ἀπορον σωτηρίαν; ibid. 330 E, 437 C: Phaedo 68 C: Parm. 131 A: Laws 898 C: Soph. Antig. 1181—

ἐκ δὲ δωμάτων ἦτοι κλύουσα παιδὸς ἡ τίχη πάρα;

Hdt. i 11 ἂλλα αἱ ἔκεισθαι γε δὲ καὶ ἀπαλλαγθαι ἢ σέ: Thuc. vi 34. 2, 38. 2, 40. 1, etc.

30. ἄλλως ἄλλον, ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλων: Socrates propounds a dilemma. If the slave always had this knowledge, then he always existed as an intelligent being. But to say that the Slave ἄλλον ἄλλων may be going too far. The knowledge may be there but latent or potential. Knowledge admits of genesis. But this admission does not destroy the tie to a past existence. If this genesis took place it was not confined to this life. Part of the work was done before. The δόξα remain as permanent relics of previous μόθος, and are capable of being reconverted into knowledge. Plato held that the soul has no beginning. In the Phaedrus (245 C D) we read ‘that as the soul is ever in motion and is the first beginning of all motion, it must be indestructible as well as underived,’ Zeller p. 398; cp. 405.

32. ἄλλως ἁπῆ: simple perfects optative are rare, save in a few perfects used in present sense, as πεποιθοῦντο τεῦχηκομι. Plato also has periphrastic forms for the plqpt. active: Phaedo 76 B ἐλπιθοῦτε δόμεν, Euthyd. 273 A περιελαμβάνετε ἣτον.

36. δίκαιος ἦ: the usual ‘personalisation.’ See A. Sidgwick E in CR. iii pp. 147 foll.

37. ἄλλως τε: the omission of καί is remarkable, as it was from the force of καί that the formula ἄλλως τε καί derived its sense (‘otherwise in general and particularly’). Like ἄλλο τε for ἄλλο τι ἢ it comes under the head of irrationally abbreviated phrases. So Buttmann, who in his note quotes Xen. Mem. i ii 59, Isoc. 2 (ad Nicias.) § 51, and Soph. O. T. 1114—
on which Jebb quotes Hdt. viii 142 (Kühner § 522. 4). In the present place some (not the best) MSS. add καὶ, which was to be expected. Cp. Hipp. min. 363 Α—perhaps the only other place in Plato.

CHAPTER XXI

86 A 5. ὅτε οὖν ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ‘before he entered into the human shape.’ For full explanation of the import of this, chap. xix of the Phaedo must be consulted, especially the end 75 β: πρὸ τοῦ ἀρα ἄρκει ἔνσω ὅραν καὶ ἀκόην καὶ τάλας αὐσάνεσθαι τυχέω ἔδει ποιν ἔλθον ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸν τοῦ λογοῦ τινι καὶ ἔστων καὶ ὅ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἀρα, ὃς ἔσκειν, ἀνάγκη ἢμᾶς αὐτὴν (τὴν τοῦ λογοῦ ἐπιστήμην) ἐλθέναι.

8. εἴ οὖν κτλ., ‘if then, alike during the time when he is, and in that when he is not, a man, true opinions are to exist in him, which when awakened by questioning become matters of knowledge, must not his soul be for all time in the possession of them? (lit. ‘be in a condition of having learnt’: cp. ἐμεμαθήκει above). For it is clear that for all time he either is or is not a man.’

The argument here is commonly regarded as fallacious (Zeller p. 127 note, p. 405 note; cp. Fr.). It is certainly highly compressed and somewhat ambiguous. It is not clear how much Plato conceives that he has proved. The argument seems to be this: ‘The human form is not essential to the soul’s existence. It existed apart from the human form before. It made its way into the human form without losing hold of its heritage of Ideas.’ So much may be said to follow fairly from the premises. But Plato has cast the argument in such a form as to suggest a larger conclusion. The tenses ὅλον τ’ ἀν γῆς χρόνον καὶ ἀν ἄν μὴ γῆ refer to indefinite future time. The implied argument is that, as the soul has safely passed the gate Birth into the human form, so she may be expected to pass the other gate Death, which, as the Phaedo explains, is its correlative. This, even if a probable surmise, has not been proved; and so we find in the Phaedo (77 c) that Kebes treats the argument for immortality drawn from ἀνάμνησις as imperfect: φαίνεται γὰρ ἦσορ ἠμῶν ἀποδείξθαι οὐ δεὶ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠμῶν ἢ γνωρίζει, δεὶ δὲ προσαποδείξθαι οὗ καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποβαλὼν οὐδὲν ἔτοις ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἢ ἀποδεῖξις έσχειν.

It must be remembered that the argument for immortality here is merely by the way. There is no reference to the general
argument given in the Phaedrus 245 c (Zeller 398). Indeed it is noticeable that the words ἀδάνατος ἄν ἡ ἰσιότητη ὡς, ὡςε might be omitted without obvious loss to the argument. Perhaps Plato's only object in referring to future immortality here is to be found in the hint at 81 B. Plato did not regard immortality as an end in itself; see Euthyd. 289 B οὐδὲ γε εἰ τις ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ὡςε ἀδικεῖται ποιεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπιστασθαι τῇ ἀδαιρετῇ χρῆσθαι, οὐδὲ ταύτης διακεῖν ὀφειλε οὐδὲν ἐστιν and Laws 661 B C.

el ἐνεσται: this is not a real future condition. It is, as Fr. says, equivalent to ἐνεσται φήσωμεν, which is pretty much what Kühner (§ 573 a; cp. § 387, 4) calls a modal signification. It thus belongs to the class of idioms treated on 83 D 52. This sense of the future is common in Plato, especially after el; but see also 78 E 38 where οὐκ έσται ἀρετή means εὑρήσομεν μὴ ἐστιν ἀρετήν. Cp. Parm. 134 D, etc. Contrast 85 C 15 el ἀνέρθησεται, where we have a real future condition. The two classes may be thus distinguished. In the 'modal' condition the pres. indic., in the 'real future' condition the subjunctive (with εἶναι) or the optative, may be substituted for the fut. indic. in the protasis with little change of meaning. Here, for instance, we might have had el ἐνεστω... μεμαθηκεύτα ἐστιν...

10. ἐπιστήμην ἐπεγερθεῖσα: cp. Phaedo 73 A quoted on 81 D 12. This art of questioning is the μαίνεται τὴν τῆν ἀρετὴν, the positive side of Socrates' work (Theaet. 149 A–151 C; art. 'Socrates' Encycl. Brit. p. 286). Plato, while giving abundant examples of this art, nowhere attempts a detailed analysis of it. Note that in Rep. 532 E Socrates when asked to give an account of dialectic says that the time has not yet come. For the plural ἐπιστήμαι cp. 98 A 38, Symp. 207 ε, etc.

11. μεμαθηκεύτα ἐσται: the fut. perf. active is not common, but cp. Charm. 174 D ἀπολελυκτός ἐσται; Rep. 582 D γεγονὼς ἐσται.

15. ἡ ἀληθεία ἡμιν τῶν δυνατῶν: this can only mean the B world of Ideas. Cp. Phaedr. 249 B οὐ γὰρ ἢ γε μὴ ποτὲ ἰδοὺσα τὴν ἀληθείαν εἰσὶ τὸ ἢ ηδὲ ἤξει τὸ σχῆμα (the human form); ibid. D τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀναμμηνουκόμενος and 247 C. See note on 81 D 12. The same is implied at Phaedo 73 C ὁμολογούμεν γὰρ δήπον, el τις τι ἀναμμηνουκόμεν, δεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀνθρώπου ποτὲ ἐπιστασθαι.
17. ἔστε θαρρούντα χρῆ κτέ.: it should be noted that to support this conclusion it is not in the least necessary that the future immortality of the soul should have been proved. All that is wanted is the admission of the soul’s previous converse with truth, and consequent power of recovering it. Even so much of the metaphysical basis as remains is presently represented as less essential than the recognition of the moral duty of research. See on 81 D 14.

20. MEN. εὖ μοι δοκεῖς κτέ.: _Meno_—‘I like what you are saying, Socrates—I hardly know why.’ _Socr._—‘Yes, Meno, and I like what I am saying.’

21. οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως: _Meno’s_ δόξαι are still unsettled. _Cp. 95 C 31_. So _Callicles_ in the _Gorgias_ 513 c οὐκ οἴδ’ οὐτινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὃ _Sókrates_. _πένθουσα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθουσι_.

23. οὐκ ἄν πάνυ: see on 71 C 19; _Cp. Gorg._ 513 c just quoted and _Phaedo_ 63 c quoted below.

ἀν... δισχυρισάμην, _asseveraverim._ The word occurs in two passages of the _Phaedo_ of similar tendency: 63 c νῦν δὲ εὖ λογε ἵτι παρ’ ἄνδρας τε ἑλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθοῦς· καὶ τούτο μὲν οὐκ ἄν πάνυ δισχυρισάμην· ἦτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσποτάς πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς, εὖ λογε ἵτι, εἰπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιοῦτων, δισχυρισάμην ἀν καὶ τούτῳ; also 114 D τὸ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα δισχυρισάσθαι οὖντο ἔχειν ὡς ἐγώ διελθοῦ, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἄνδρί κτέ. _Cp. also Rep._ 533 a. For the attitude of Plato towards _myths_ see _Zeller_ 396. Plato ‘clearly asserts that these myths were viewed by him not as mere myths, but also as hints of the truth worth serious consideration; and he therefore combines with them moral exhortations which he never would have grounded on uncertain fables. It is difficult, however, to make out precisely where that which is intended to be dogmatic ends, and that which is mythical begins. Plato himself was manifestly in uncertainty, and for that very reason betakes himself to the _myth._’ _See ibid._ pp. 160–3.

24. ὃς ἔδικεν καὶ ἐδικεῖν: we here revert to the point taken at 81 D 14.

Chapters XXII, XXIII (86 C–87 C 18 πάνυ γε). _Socr._ _Shall we then resume the inquiry what Virtue is? Meno._ _I would rather put the question as I did before, ‘Is Virtue teachable?’ Socr._ _Well, if you must have your own way, we may consider this point on a hypothesis as to the nature of Virtue. If Virtue is Knowledge it will be teachable, and if not, not._ _Meno._ _Certainly._
Here begins the third section of the dialogue (chaps. xxii–xxv). Reason is shown for connecting Virtue with Knowledge (89 A 20 φρόνησιν ἀρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἣτοι έξυπάσαν ἢ μέρος τι).

1. βούλα ἐπιχειρήσωμεν: see on 75 B 14.

4. οὐ μὲν οὖν... ἄλλα, 'not but that.' See on 71 C 13.

7. πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ δυτι αὑτῷ: we have here a dative depending on ἐπιχειρεῖν, followed by a genitive absolute clause, ὡς παραγεγομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς. Fr. refers to 79 E 47, 87 C 18, etc., for δυτι αὑτῷ, referring to ἀρετή, but attracted into the gender of the predicate.

8. τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ: note the facility with which the Greek language introduces direct interrogatives in adverbial clauses, and cp. 79 E 46, 87 B 4, and 88 A 10. Cp. _Synep._ 206 B τῶν τίνι τρόπων διάκονων αὐτῷ ἢ σπουδὴ ἔρως ἄν καλοῦτο; See on 71 D 27.

12. ἀνέ οὖ διδακτόν: it is very difficult to draw any distinction between the use of οὖ and μὴ in the second half of an indirect disjunctive question. We have οὖ here and 87 B 3; but μὴ at 71 A 27, 87 B 35, 92 C 20, 93 A 14. μὴ predominates where the predicate is not repeated (as in the last two instances). Kühner § 513 Anm. 1 says that μὴ always stands in cases where the distinction is between what is and what is not, if the predicate has to be understood in the second clause. This rule seems to be infringed by _Phaedo_ 70 C σκέψομεν ἢ ἄρα ἐν "Ἄδιον εἰσὶν αἱ φυσικαὶ τελευτασάντων τῶν ἀθρώπων ἐπε καὶ οὖ. Where οὖ stands alone the predicate to be supplied with it will generally be one that readily forms with it a privative notion; e.g. οὐ above=οὐ εἰσίν, _Rep._ 387 D σκόπητε δὴ εἰ ὁρθὸς ἐξαιρήσαμεν ἢ οὖ (=οὐ ὁρθὸς). See Jebb's notes on Soph. _Aphex_ 7 (who there quotes for alternative questions _Crat._ 425 B μὴ, _Rep._ 451 D οὖ), and on Antiphon _περὶ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φόνου_ § 14 (Selections from the Attic Orators p. 161); _F. E. T._ p. 357; Hadley § 1022.

13. πρὶν... ἧττησαμεν: see on 84 C 26.

αὑτῷ, 'the main point.' It refers not to the thing ἀρετή, but to the question δ' τι ἐστιν. Cp. 71 A 28, 100 B 21.

14. σοῦ σαντοῦ μὲν οὖ οὕτω ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν: the irony is best illustrated by _Gorg._ 491 D. Callicles says τὸ δίκαιον τούτον ἐστιν, πλέον ἐχειν τοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων, τοῦ ἄρχειν τῶν ἄρχομένων. _Socr._ τί δὲ αὐτῶν, ὥστε αὖτα; [so Schanz, rightly]. _Cal._ πῶς λέγεις; _Socr._ ἦν ἐκαστὸν λέγω αὐτὸν ἐαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα. ἤ τούτῳ μὲν οὖδὲν δει, αὐτῶν ἐαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

ἔνα δὴ: the δὴ marks that the expectation is illusory. Cp. L
19. ΙΩ οποθέσεως: the word ὑπόθεσις was familiar in Plato's time in the ordinary scientific sense 'an assumption.' L. & S. quote it from Hippocrates. Plato often so uses it. Thus, the principle of Parmenides, 'Existence is One,' is a ὑπόθεσις. When this was attacked, Zeno defended it by showing that the opposite hypothesis, 'Existence is manifold,' led to more absurd results than any that could be deduced from the principle of Parmenides (Parm. 128 d). To Zeno Plato attributes the method of investigation that consists in tracing not merely the consequences of a hypothesis, but also those of its contradictory: Parm. 135 ε χρή δὲ καὶ τὸ δὲ ἐτὶ πρὸς τοὔτῳ ποιεῖται, μὴ μὐνον εἰ ἐκατὼν ὑποθέσεων σκοπεῖν τὰ νυμβαλλόντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἄλλα καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τούτῳ ὑποθέσεως. Cr. 160 b, 161 b; also Soph. 244 c; Theaet. 183 b the maxim of the Heracliteans πάντα ἤτι is a ὑπόθεσις; Phaedo 92 d the position μάθησις ἀνάμμησις rests on a ὑπόθεσις ἀδία ἀποδείξεως; ibid. 94 b the surmise that the soul is a harmony is a ὑπόθεσις to be discarded. [We see how the meaning 'title,' 'argument,' 'summary,' was arrived at, from Parm. 127 d κελεύει τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τὸν πρώτον λόγον ἀναγνώρισαι. So the Platonic Ὄροι (415 b) give, besides the first definition of ὑπόθεσις ('ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος'), a second, 'συγκεφαλαίως λόγου."

The physical meaning 'base,' 'pedestal' seems never to occur, but it is played upon Euthyphr. 11 c. Euthyphron's definition of holiness has proved unsound. Socrates says that if it had been his own definition that had slipped away, he would have been reminded of his ancestor Daedalus (see on 97 D 12) νῦν δὲ, σαλ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶ, ἄλλον δὲ τινος δεὶ σκώμματος. So too Rep. 511 b τῷ δὲτῳ ὑποθέσεις, ὅλων ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὅρμα, 'standing-ground in the literal sense, as it were foot-holds and starting-points.'
There is a special Platonic usage of the term, to indicate a provisional definition of a common term or concept. This usage goes back to Socrates. His effort was by a comparison of particulars to find the common point in a general term. Xen. Mem. iv 6, 13 (quoted by R. & P. 194 Β) ἐπὶ τὸν ἀντίλέγον μὴν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνευ ἀποδείξεως ήτοι σοφίστερον φάσκων εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸς λέγοι ἢ πολιτικῶτερον ἢ ἀνδρειότερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγαγεν δὲν πάντα τὸν λόγον διδεῖν τις, 'he led the discourse inductively up to the formation of the concept,' namely of the πολιτικὸς, the ἀνδρειότερος, or whatever it might be. So in Gorg. 454 C ὧν συ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν δοῦν αὐτὸς βοήθηση περαινη, the ὑπόθεσις is Gorgias' definition of rhetoric.

The passages which deal with ὑπόθεσις in this sense are (1) Rep. 510 B–511 D (further explained by 532 A B, 533 B D), (2) Phaedo 99 E–101 E. See by all means H. Jackson in J.P. x pp. 145, 6, xiii pp. 263, 4, and A.-H.'s notes on the Phaedo, ad loc. The ὑπόθεσις (or λόγοι) of universals, whether gathered from observed particulars, or by class-division, are provisional and precarious. A full knowledge of any universal would imply an a priori derivation of its Idea from the original and central Idea of the Good. 'In other words, Plato conceives that whenever we can draw up a scheme of ὑπόθεσις culminating in the ἀγαθόν, so as to show that the supposed system of ἀντίλεγον is the best that intelligence working to an end could devise, we may be sure that our λόγοι, though originally derived from the inspection of particulars, are accurate representations of Ideas. The moment we pass from ὑπόθεσις to the ἀγαθόν, our λόγοι will thereby receive the attestation which they have hitherto lacked, and will be converted from ὑπόθεσις into ἀρχαὶ, whence we may descend to conclusions (τελευτάλ) as much more certain than the τελευτάλ of the geometry, as certified ἀρχαὶ are more certain than uncertified ὑπόθεσις' (H. J. J.P. x). 'When dialectic is made perfect, λόγοι will be exchanged for ἴδεια, ὑπόθεσις for ἀρχαὶ' (A.-H. on Phaedo 100 B). Plato looked forward to a great deductive scheme by which the Universe should be justified. This he attempted in the Timaeus. In the places of the Republic a broad distinction is drawn between the methods of dialectic and geometry. The method of dialectic is what has been indicated. In geometry, on the other hand, the ὑπόθεσις (namely the axioms, definitions, etc.) are arbitrary. They are never verified, or shown to be necessary, by reference to the fountainhead of the ἀγαθόν; moreover, the reasoning is carried on by means of Sense-representations.

Here the word ὑπόθεσις, as applied to the geometrical illustra-
tion, has its ordinary scientific sense; as applied to the thing illustrated, Virtue, it means a 'provisional definition.'

23. ἑπισκόπων τοις ἑσυχαῖς αὐτῶν κτέ.: the geometrical problem here may claim a second place to that of the 'Nuptial Number' in Rep. viii 546 for exercising the ingenuity of commentators. A difference, however, may be noted. In the Republic certain words (545 e) do at least give a shadow of excuse for the view that the problem is not to be taken seriously. There is nothing of the sort here, and the fact that we have here undoubtedly to deal with a seriously intended problem gives support to those who take a similar view of that in the Republic.


I follow the interpretation put forward by Prof. Butcher J.P. xvii pp. 219 foll. (1888), and render thus:

'When any one asks for instance with regard to a rectangle, whether it is possible for this rectangle to be distributed as a triangle within this circle, one might say, 'I do not know yet whether it has the required property; but I think, if I may so put it, that I have a certain serviceable hypothesis of the following nature: if the rectangle be such that when you extend it along the given line (i.e. the diameter) of the circle, it is defective by another rectangle similar to the

![Diagram](image-url)

original one, then one result follows; if not, there is a different result.'” ‘In other words' (here, and in the notes that follow, quotation-marks indicate that I borrow Prof. Butcher's words) 'if, when you apply the given rectangle ABCD to the diameter BH of the circle, it falls short of the completed rectangle ABHG upon the diameter by a rectangle DCHG similar to the original
rectangle, then a triangle BDF may be inscribed in the circle whose diameter is BH, which triangle is equal in area to the original rectangle.

'Since the rectangles ABCD and DCHG are similar, it follows that BC : CD :: CD : CH;

' : . the point D lies on the circle whose diameter is BH (BDH being a rt. ∠).

'If DC is produced till CF = DC, the point F will also be on the circle.'

(The triangle BDF consists of the two triangles BDC and BCF, which are obviously equal to the two triangles BDC, ADB, of which the rectangle ABCD is composed.)

'It is worth observing that the above solution depends on CD being a mean proportional between the segments of the diameter, and that mean proportions were among the subjects of chief interest in mathematics in Plato's time.'

24. τὸ τὸ χωρίων: that χωρίων may here be taken for a 87 A rectangle is shown by Benecke (Elbing 1867). Cp. Butcher: 'The technical ἀληθεύω here suggests reference to a parallelogram, and in geometrical problems dealing with parallelograms the right angle was constantly assumed.' See on 82 C 4.

25. τρίγωνον ἑναθείναι: τρίγωνον must be taken adverbially. See on 30. The problem cannot be whether a triangle equal to a given area can be inscribed in a given circle; for this can always be done provided that 'the given area is not greater than that of the equilateral triangle, i.e. the maximum triangle, which can be inscribed in the given circle.' Some such limitation of the problem as that adopted in the rendering given above must be assumed. With this limitation the converse hypothesis will also hold; if the rectangle DCHG is not similar, the required distribution cannot take place. And it is necessary that the converse hypothesis should also hold, if the illustration is to be an apt one for Plato's purpose.

Plato's geometrical terminology is loose; but the brief and imperfect expression here is, perhaps, partly due to the fact that he is presenting a well-known problem.

The regular word for 'inscribing,' e.g. a triangle in a circle, is εὐγραμμίζειν, used by Hippocrates. εὐπρέπειον after the present passage entirely drops out of geometrical language, so far as recorded, until we come to Proclus in the fifth century A.D. (See E. F. August Zur Kenntnis der geometrischen Methode der Alten in besonderer Beziehung auf die platonische Stelle in Meno, Berlin 1844.) In Proclus it occurs twice in one passage, of which a part is quoted on 80 D 1 (footnote), but the passage does not help us to the exact meaning here.
26. ὥσπερ: for this parenthetic use of ὥσπερ see 71 A 20 and note.

μὲν: Madvig adv. crit. I 413 proposed μὲντοι, needlessly. For μὲν with ἀλλά, not answered by δέ, see Crito 43 D, Prot. 344 A. The antithesis to μὲν is anticipated in the negative clause which precedes ἀλλά. (It is just possible we should read ὥσπερ μὲ τινα.)

27. προβργου... ἔξεν: 'i.e. ἀνυσίμως ἔξεν' Fr. But I can find no instance of προβργου adv. with ἔξεν = εἴναι; and should rather take ὑπόθεσιν as object of ἔξεν = 'have,' and προβργου, indecl. adj., as oblique predicate.

29. οἶον: Fr. says οἶον = ὀστε, quoting 100 A 7 (τοιοῦτος οἶος ποίησα), and Euthych. 11 A ἐστιν οἶον φίλεισθαι.

παρὰ τὴν δοθείσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν: 'Here αὐτοῦ might at first be supposed to refer to χωρλον and not to κύκλος. But the sense requires the reference to κύκλος; otherwise there is no mention of the circle in this clause, which defines the relations that must exist between the circle and the χωρλον.' (αὐτοῦ can hardly in any case refer to χωρλον; you can get no sense out of 'applying a figure to a given side of itself.') 'The reference of αὐτοῦ to κύκλος is less harsh if we bear in mind that the cases of αὐτοῦ are capable of a vague use which no English pronoun can bear.' Cp., e.g., αὐτοῦ at B 34. 'The γραμμή of the circle will denote its diameter in precisely a similar way, as the side of the square is repeatedly called the γραμμή of the square (e.g. 82 E, etc.).' Buttmann, however (Excursus II), thought that there was a lacuna, which he supplied by reading παρὰ τὴν δοθείσαν < τοῦ κύκλου διάμετρον κατὰ τὴν δοθείσαν > αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν κτέ.

παρατεῖναντα ἀλλιτειν: the only other place in any classical author where παρατεῖνειν occurs as a geometrical term is in Rep. 527 A. It is noteworthy that Plato there includes it among the terms in vogue in the utilitarian geometry which he disparages, perhaps not without reference to the present problem. The usual phrase is παραβάλλειν, which Euclid uses I 44, etc., and vi 27, 28, 29, where the problems are similar to the present. παρατεῖνειν was thought to have disappeared entirely from the geometrical vocabulary after Plato, till August found it in some scholia on Euclid in a Munich MS., from which he restored it almost with certainty in Proclus' commentary on Euclid I 44: ἦστε γάρ ἄρχαία, φασιν οἱ περὶ τῶν Ἐβδήμου, καὶ τής τῶν Πυθαγορείων μούνης εὐρήματα ταῦτα, ἢ τε παραβολή τῶν χωρλῶν, καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολή καὶ ἡ Ἐκλεισις. ὅταν γὰρ εὔθειας ἐκκειμένης τὸ δοθὲν χωρλὸν πάση τῇ εὐθείᾳ συμπαρα-<τεῖνηται, τότε παρα->βάλλειν ἑκείνῳ τὸ χωρλὸν φασίν κτέ.
August holds that this place in Proclus shows that \( \text{παρατείνευ} \) and \( \text{παραβάλλευ} \) are synonymous; and this may be accepted. (See Allman Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid p. 25 note e.)

Next, as to the case of \( \text{παρατείναπτα} \). If the accusative is retained, \( \text{ἐλλείπεω} \) must be taken with a personal subject, 'you have a deficiency.' In Euclid (v1 28, etc.) it is always the area that is said \( \text{ἐλλείπεω} \). But, in other senses than the geometrical, \( \text{ἐλλείπω} \) is constantly used with a personal subject: Polybius, for instance, says 'Ἀνθιβάς ἐνέλειπε τοῖς ἱππικοῖς (κυ μ. 5). By a similar 'personalization' we say 'I am short of money.' This view is taken by Buttmann, who translates 'Si est ejusmodi ut qui illud applicaverit deficiat.' Benecke follows him, observing that if Plato had written \( \text{όλον... παρατειμένων} \) \( \text{ἐλλείπεω} \) the construction would have been smooth enough, but he wanted \( \text{παρατειμένων} \) in the next line, and desired to avoid repeating the word. Plato therefore changed the construction to the active. I believe Plato chose the acc. rather than the dat. or gen. because it was distinctly masculine, and could by no possibility be taken as agreeing with any other word in the sentence. We have here a principle that may be called 'dissimilation of cases,' which Prof. Jebb well illustrates by his note on Soph. Ant. 546—

\[ \text{μηδ} & \text{μὴ θυγατέρις} \]

He explains the unusual acc. with θυγατέριω by saying that \( \text{δω} \) would have been intolerable on account of the second gen. after \( \text{παιδ} \). Cp. Aesch. P.V. 233. I think then we may hesitate to change \( \text{παρατείναπτα} \), especially in a passage whose expression still leaves much uncertain. Serranus (followed by Mollweide) read \( \text{παρατείναπτα} \), Wex \( \text{παρατείναπτας} \). Another possibility is that a word has fallen out, as \( \text{παρατείναπτα} < \text{εὐρεία} > \text{ἐλλείπεω} \). Herm., Sch., Fr. all keep \( \text{παρατείναπτα} \), the last remarking that as Plato uses \( \text{ὑπερβάλλευ} \) in both constructions (impersonal and personal), so he may possibly have used \( \text{ἐλλείπεω} \).

30. As to the problem in general, little space can be given to the discussion of other proposed solutions. Mollweide, whose explanation Buttmann gives in his Excursus II, saw that the key to it is the fact that a right-angled triangle can be cut up into two similar triangles. But he made the mistake of translating \( \text{εἰ οὖν τε τὸ δόχο τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθύματο 'if this triangular figure can be inscribed.' Buttmann, who criticises Mollweide's solution, takes the words in the same way. But see on 25 and Addendum II p. 232.

Other solutions take the \( \text{χωρία} \) to be \( \text{squares} \); some of the critics supposing that the squares already drawn for the previous
problem are used for the purpose. Such are Benecke's solution (quoted by Prof. Butcher) and that of Schultzze, adopted by Fr. with the somewhat premature eulogy 'palmaris interpretatio.' Schultzze takes .getSharedPreferences() (line 29) of the side of the square, making the square to be applied to a side of itself. One objection to making the problem refer to squares is that it then could only refer to the size of the given squares and you would expect τοιούτων διόν and τοιούτω ἄνω rather than τοιούτων ὅλωον and τοιούτω ὅλωον in lines 28 and 30. Moreover, the ὑπόθεσις would then cease to have any general character. Buttmann objects to taking τοιούτων ὅλωον of similar figures, observing that the Greek for this is ὑμοίων. No doubt it is in Euclid, but is it in Plato? See on 82 C 10.

There may possibly be an allusion to our problem in Aristot. Anal. Post. 1 i 4 quoted on 80 D 1.

The chief criticism to which the solution adopted is open, is that it seems a rather roundabout way of ascertaining a very simple point. Apply the side BC of the rectangle to the diameter BH of the circle; then if the point D falls on the circle the required condition is satisfied; if not, not. What need of the intermediate ὑπόθεσις at all? We can only suppose that Plato regarded the direct application to the circle as impracticable, and the length of the diameter (ἡν δοθείσαν γραμμήν) as the only real datum.

But if we further ask whether the geometrical illustration really helps us, or casts a light on the 'hypothetical method,' we shall be obliged to say, 'Very little.' The passage, like the more formidable one on the Nuptial Number, is simply an excrescence. Dr. Gow (History of Greek Mathematics p. 175) quotes from Hankel, who says that the text is unnecessarily difficult for describing so simple a fact, and adds, 'I am inclined to think that Plato was fond of showing off his mathematics.' In fact, Plato was rather an enthusiast for mathematics than a mathematician. His vivid mind was no doubt impressed, to an extent excessive even among Greeks, by the amazing cunning manifested in the properties of space and number. He wrote, as we are told, over the door of the Academy, μηδές ἀγεωμετρητὸς εἰσίν, thus exacting an entrance examination in geometry from all the alumni of his University. But his direct services to geometry (or mathematics generally) were small. Dr. Allman (Greek Geometry p. 215) quotes from the summary of Eudoxus' History of Geometry, preserved in Proclus: Πλάτων τῇ τῇ τούτῳ (viz. Hippocrates of Chios and Theodorus of Cyrene) γενόμενος, μεγάστῃς ἐποίησεν ἐπίδοσιν τὰ τὲ ἄλλα μαθήματα καὶ τῆν γεωμετρίαν λαβεῖν διὰ τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ σπουδήν, διὸ ἔστι δὴ καὶ τὰ συγγράμματα τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς λόγοις...


CHAPTER XXIII

1. What follows exemplifies the process described in Phaedo 101 D E. Here the υπόθεσις as to Virtue is that it comes under the genus Knowledge. The consequence of this υπόθεσις is stated; in this case it must be διδακτόν. Then at C 19 the υπόθεσις itself is investigated, by being referred to a higher υπόθεσις, 'Virtue is good.' (Cp. Phaedo 101 D ἀλήθιν σοφίαν υπόθεσιν υποθέμενος, ἣς τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίωτη φαίνοντο ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ τι λικανόν ἐλθοῖς.) This υπόθεσις μένει ἡμᾶς (D 25).

3. ἔτε σιδακτόν έστιν: see on 86 D 12.

4. εἰ τοίνυν τί ἐστιν: see on 86 D 8. Stallb. quotes Hipp. maj. 288 A εἰ τί ἐστιν αὐτό το καλόν, ταύτ' ἄν εἰτ καλά; 'Under what class of mental attributes must Virtue fall for it to be teachable, and under what for it to be otherwise?' Note the elasticity of phrase. Here we have τῶν περὶ τήν ψυχήν (cp. Rep. 618 D), at 88 A, C τὰ κατὰ τήν ψυχὴν, at 88 C τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. The prepositions represent a series of metaphors by which Plato expresses his meaning; cp. on 73 D 5. The later phraseology of the Philebus (11 D), ἐξήν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν, is more abstract and technical, and so nearer to modern idiom.

6. τρωτόν μὲν κτέ., 'to begin with, if it be of a class different from Knowledge will it be teachable or not?' Cp. C 21.

8. ἀναμνηστών, 'capable of being acquired by reminiscence.' The word does not occur elsewhere, but is formed on the analogy of διδακτόν, etc. See on 70 A 2.

διαφέρετα δὲ μικᾶν: Plato attends to one thing at a time.

10. The hypothesis is a double one: if it is ἐπιστήμη it is C διδακτόν; if not, not. See on A 25, 88 D 35. For ἐπιστήμη τίς see 73 E 17 and D 30, 31 below, and cp. 89 A 20.
17. τούτου μὲν ἄρα κτ., 'we have quickly disposed of this stage.'

18. τοιούτε, τοιούτε: a few inferior MSS. put in μή before the second τοιούτε. 'Sedulo in proximis quoque cavere videtur Plato, ne distinguat inter ἐπιστήμην et ὁν. ἐπιστήμην, cujus loco ponit ἄλλων ἐπιστήμην. Itaque hic etiam non dicit μὴ τοιούτε, sed bis τοιούτε, ut species positione notionis servetur in utroque.' Buttm.

Chapters XXIII (87 C 19) to XXV (89 B). Socr. But is Virtue Knowledge? We may find sure ground in the position that Virtue is good and beneficial, that is, good to us. Now as to goods of the body and external goods, we see they only become good to us when the mind uses them rightly; as to goods of the mind, they are only beneficial when under the conduct of Wisdom. We may conclude, then, that Virtue is Wisdom (φρόνησις), or a branch of it. This leads to the corollary that Virtue is not inborn in men.

D 23. τούτο μετὰ τούτο χρεπτείον εἶναι: Riddell § 18. Prot. 323 c τούτο σοι μετὰ τούτο περάσομαι ἀποδείξα. Laws 658 d τὸν ὅρθων νενικηκὼς ἐλή; τούτο μετὰ τούτο: 'this is the next question.'


The phraseology here is very careful, and should be compared with 89 D and 99 A, where the position that ἀρετὴ is ἐπιστήμην is modified.

35. καὶ μήν clearly marks a fresh stage in the argument.

E 37. εἰ δὲ ἄγαθος, ὄφελοι: see on 77 D 35.

πάντα γὰρ τάγαθα ὄφελοι: 'probandi negotio Plato h.l. supersedet, quia Prot. 333 d sqq. hic locus copiose tractatus est' Fr. See especially Prot. 334 A–C.

40. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὄφ.: δὴ, 'of course.'

CHAPTER XXIV

2. τοῖς ἑστὶν & ἡμῶν ὄφελεί: Dr. Reid in his note on Cic. Acad. 1 § 19 says that the τρίας or τριλογία τῶν ἁγαθῶν i.e. the division of goods into mental, bodily, and external, in the distinct shape which it assumed in later Greek philosophy, is foreign both to Plato and Aristotle. Here the bodily and
external bonae are first mentioned; the bona mentis appear presently at 88 A 15, kept separate from the others for a reason which appears at 88 E 14. The distinction between bona corporis and bona externa is not emphasised, but both classes are represented, as at 78 B, C, where the bona mentis are conspicuous by their absence. We have similar popular views of bona, confined to bona corporis and externa, Gorg. 451 ε, based on the scolion attributed to Simonides:

ιγιαλειν μεν ἄριστον ἄνδρη θυατῆρι,
δεύτερον δὲ φύειν καλὸν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτῶν ἄδολος
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἧσαν μετὰ τῶν φιλῶν.

Here we have health and beauty (bona corporis); wealth, and friends (externa). Cp. Laws 661 A τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενα ἄγαθα ὕπο ὀρθῶς λέγεται. Λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν ιγιαλείν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος, μόρια δὲ ἄλλα ἄγαθα λέγεται. (See for the sequel note on 88 A 7.) Cp. Hippi. maj. 291 B.

At Gorg. 467 ε ὅκουὼν λέγεις ἄγαθον μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ιγιαλείν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, we have samples of each of the three classes. At Euthyd. 279 A-C in answer to the question 'What things are good to us?' first is suggested τὸ πλοῦτον. Next τὸ ιγιαλεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τάλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς παρεσκευῶσθαι. Then we return to externa, εὐγενεία τε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τιμᾶς εὖ τῇ ἐννοιᾷ. 'What yet remains?' says Socrates. 'Why, τὸ ἀφέροντα τε εἶναι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἄνδρειων.' Then, last but not least, comes σοφία. Socrates mischievously pretends that εὐνυχία has been forgotten, but shows that its addition is unnecessary.

One of the most elaborate enumerations of ἄγαθα in Plato is in Laws 631 b foll., where the division is twofold, not threefold, though bona corporis and externa are both represented: διπλὰ δὲ ἄγαθα ἐστί, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δὲ θεία, ἢρτηται δ' ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα; καὶ ἕαν μὲν δεχθαι τις τὰ μείζονα πόλις, κτάται καὶ τὰ ἐλάττωνα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, στέρεται ἀμφότεροι. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐλάττωνα δὲν ἱγεῖται μὲν ἄγεια, κάλλος δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἵσχυος εἰς τε ὀρμῶν καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πᾶσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι, τέταρτον δὲ δὴ πλοῦτος ὦ τυφλῶν ἀλλ' ὡς βλέπων, ἀντερ αὖ ἐπηρεῖ φρονεῖσθαι; δ' δὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸ τῶν θείων ἱγεμονοῦν ἑστὶν ἄγαθων, ἡ φρονεσις, δεύτερον δὲ μετὰ νοῦν σώφρων ᾿φυχὴς ἔξις, ἐκ δὲ τούτων μετ' ἅνδρελας κραδέντων τρίτον ἄν εἰ δικαιοσύνη, τέταρτον δὲ ἄνδρεια.

Ibid. 697 A-B we have a recognition of three grades of honour among ἄγαθα: ἔστι δὲ ὀρθῶς ἀρα τιμώτατα μὲν καὶ
prōta tā peri tēn phvkhēn ágaðhā keiosthai, svphrosvēs ῥπαρχοσησ 
avtē, deútera de tā peri to sōma kalā kai ágaðhā, kai tríata 
viiii 365 b. See the list of ágaðhā in Aristot. Ῥηt. i vi §§8–16, 
and ii xxi 5 (with Cope's note).

The distinction between bona mentis and other bona is far 
more important than the subdivision of the latter. Plato's 
view, which really rests on a dichotomy,

Bona

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is more philosophical than the later τριλογία, which made the 
three classes co-ordinate. Diog. Laeritius iii 80 quotes Aristotle 
as ascribing to Plato the statement τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν 
φυση, τὰ δὲ ἐν σώματι, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός. Plato's writings, as has been 
seen, give some colour to this statement, which nevertheless 
does not accurately represent his position.

3. καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ, 'and wealth of course': 'καὶ—δὴ seriem 
aliquam claudit cum vi.' Buttmann on Dem. Mid. (21) § 20.

88 A 7. ἐνοτε καὶ βλάπτειν, 'are sometimes positively in-
jurious.' Cp. Ἡἱρρ. mag. 284 δ tisetai méν, ómmai, óφθελας 
ἐνεκα, ἐνοτε δὲ καὶ βλάπτει, ἐάν κακῶς τεθῇ δ νόμος. Cp. on 
71 B 8.

Of the argument that follows, showing the sovereignty of 
φρονησις, we have already had a hint at 78 C foll. See Phaedo 
69 A for a strong statement of the doctrine; also Ἡἱρρ. mag. 
i §§12–14. The argument is developed in the most elaborate 
form in the Euthydemus cc. viii–x (273 e–282 e) and cc. xvii–xix 
(288 A–293 A). Fr. quotes 281 D κινδυνεῖι σύμπαντα, δ τὸ πρώ-
τον ἐφαμέν ἄγαθα εἶναι· ἐάν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγήσαι ἁμαθία, μεῖζω 
κακά εἶναι τῶν ἐννάτων δώρῳ δυνατότερα ὑπερετέιν τῷ ἤγομενῳ 
κακῷ δυν.· ἐάν δὲ φρονησις τε καὶ σοφία, μεῖζω ἄγαθα· αὐτὰ δὲ 
καθ' αὐτά οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὗνδενδαν ἥκει εἶναι. Note 280 B E, 
and 288 E foll., where it is shown that Wealth is not a Good 
per se; if we possessed the secret of turning mountains into 
gold it would not advantage us if we did not know how to 
use the gold; and the same is true of immortality: see on 
86 A 8. Cp. Laws 661 B C (after the popular enumeration
of bona corporis and externa) υμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγώ ποι τάδε λέγομεν, ὥσ ταῦτα ἐστι ἔξωπαντα δικαιοὶ μὲν καὶ δοσίως ἀνδράσιν ἄρσια κτήματα, ἄδικοις δὲ κάκιστα ἔξωπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς υγείας κτέ. See on C 32.

The very full treatment of the subject given in the Euthydemus, set beside the concise, though not immature, treatment here, suggests the view that the Euthydemus was published before the Meno, on the principle adduced by Dr. Thompson on Gorg. 467 ε : 'Plato will often be found to take for granted in a later what he has been at great pains to prove in an earlier dialogue.' See Intr. § 18.

10. διὰν τι ἡγῇ ται: see on 86 D 8.

16. σωφροσύνη τι καλεῖς: see on 75 E 12. The list of bona menis here differs from that at 74 A in that εὐμαθία and μορφή are added, representing the διανοητική ἀρετή of Aristotle, distinguished from the ἥθικα ἀρετή (NE. i xiii 20); σοφία is omitted, to be introduced presently, on a different level from the other virtues, as εὐστήμη, φρόνησις or νοῦς.

22. οἶνον ἀνδρεία: this is an instance of 'Binary Structure'; B it was only necessary to have ἀνδρεία once, as the subject of φρόνησις ἐστι; as it is, we have for the sake of emphasis οἶνον ἀνδρεία (scil. ἐστι), a part of the thought put forward introductory of the rest. Fr. quotes Euthyd. 301 οἶνον βοῦς καὶ πρόβατα, ἄρ' ἄν ἡγοῦν ταῖτα σὰ εἶναι; For οἶνον, 'velut,' see on 76 A 20.

23. ἐκ μὴ ἐστὶ φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία: the doctrine that ἀνδρεία, like other Virtues, may be reduced to φρόνησις, is Socratic (Zeller Socr. p. 144). Xen. Mem. iv 6. 11 οὶ μὲν ἄνω ἑπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἑπικινδύνους καλῶς χρήσαντες ἀνδρεία ἐσώ, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί. In several of Plato's earlier dialogues the same view is taken. In Apol. 29 A B a particular kind of Cowardice, the fear of Death, is shown to spring from a certain kind of ἐμαθία. In the Protagoras the doctrine 'Virtue is Knowledge' is defended all round. Courage, which seems to give most difficulty to the thesis, is dealt with first in ch. xxxiv (349 ε-350 c) but in a way that arouses objection from Protagoras, and is clearly not intended to be satisfactory. The final proof comes in ch. xxxix, the conclusion being reached at 380 ν, ἡ σοφία ἀρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν. Neither the brave man nor the coward goes to meet what he believes to be ἄσειν; but the brave man knows what really are ἄσειν, the coward does not. To that exposition the present passage of the Meno looks back. The dialogue Laches, which must probably be regarded as earlier than the Protagoras, is devoted
to an examination of the virtue Courage. (Note the similarity of illustration at Lach. 193 b c and Prot. 350 A.) Laches, who is no philosopher (see on 71 E 1), at 192 b gives as a definition of Courage καρπελα τις της ψυχης. But, says Socrates, καρπελα μετ' αφοσιωθης is βλαβερα και κακουργος. We must amend the definition by saying φρονιμος καρπελα. Then the question comes ἢ els τι φρονιμος; Mere technical intelligence as to the conditions of the combat it cannot be; for the man who fights knowing he is at a disadvantage is the braver. Laches is at fault. Nikias is appealed to. He has already imbibed something of Socrates' teaching, and, objecting to Laches' definition, says to Socrates (194 D) πολλαις ακηκοα σου ληγοντος, δι ταυτα αγαθος έκαστος ήμων δεπερ σοφος, δε δε αμαθης, ταυτα δε κακως. He presently defines Courage as την των δεινων και θεραλεων επιστημης. Nikias may be taken as representing the actual position of Socrates. He soon shows (195 C D) that he sees the knowledge that constitutes Courage to be something much more than the mere technical knowledge of arms, etc. The final and most important argument comes in cc. xxvii-xxix (198 A-199 E). (We often find Plato making his ideal Socrates criticise the views the real Socrates held. See Intr. p. xxxix.) In these chapters we are led up to a conception of the Supreme Art, the knowledge of Good and Evil, through which all other Arts and Virtues are made beneficial. (This is the Kingly Art of Euthydemus 291 b foll. where, however, a further problem is raised.) Courage then (199 C D) becomes ου μονον δεινων και θεραλεων επιστημης... δλα σχεδον τι η περι παντων αγαθων τε και κακων και παντων εχωντων. 'But a man who knows thus much' (so Grote summarises the sequel), 'cannot be destitute of any part of Virtue. He must possess Temperance and Justice as well as Courage. Courage therefore, according to your definition, is not a part of Virtue, it is the whole.' A solution of the problem on what the differentiation of the Virtues rests is first offered by Plato in the Republic.

From this point till 89 C for επιστημη we find substituted the term φρονησις, the mental faculty correlative to it.

ουν θαρρος τι: for the relation of ανδρεια to θαρρος see Prot. ch. xxxiv; the conclusion ου ταυτων εναι θαρρος καλ ανδρειαν is enunciated by Protagoras (351 A). θαρρος or θαρρος (which of course must be carefully distinguished from θρασος and θρασυτης) differ from ανδρεια by being a mere emotion without rational basis. θαρρος is the antithesis of φοβος (rather than δεος: see Prot. 358 E with J. & A. M. Adam's note there) and so is coupled with it (Tim. 69 D) in the list of passions, θαρρος και φοβον, αφρονε ξυμβουλω.
27. ὁίκον καὶ σωφροσύνη ἄσωτος καὶ εὐμαθὴς: the rest of the Virtues are not treated seriatim.

As to σωφροσύνη we are told of Socrates by Xenophon (Mem. III 9. 4) sofran d kal σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν καλὰ te καὶ ἀγαθὰ γνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τῷ τὰ ἀλεξάρα εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφὸν τε καὶ σωφρόνα ἐκρινε. The earlier treatment of σωφροσύνη to which the present passage looks back is chiefly to be found in the Protagoras. In ch. xx (332 A–333 B) we have the identity of σοφία and σωφροσύνη grounded on the argument that they both have the same opposite, ἀφροσύνη. But this merely verbal argument is subsidiary to the more general one in cc. xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii (351 B–357 E), already referred to on 77 B 12 as illustrating the doctrine οὐδὲις ἐκὼν κακὸς. It is a mistake to talk of a man as ‘overcome by pleasure.’ Say rather that he mistakes in the measuring or valuing of different pleasures and pains.

The dialogue Charmides is devoted to an examination of the Virtue Temperance, in some respects analogous to the treatment of Courage in the Laches. The criticism of the first two definitions of Temperance as (1) ἡνυχίτησι τις 159 B, (2) αἰθὸς 160 E, go chiefly to show that Temperance is not a merely negative notion. See on 76 C 16. (It is unnecessary to suppose that the criticism of the first definition is directed against the view of the Gorgias that makes κόσμος an element in σωφροσύνη. See Dr. Thompson’s note on 507 A.)

The remaining definitions, τὸ τά ἐαυτῷ πράττειν, τὸ γνῶμαι ἑαυτόν κτλ., which emanate from Critias, are near akin to the Socratic view. The most important part of the criticism, which is very elaborate, is reached at 173 δ: if σωφροσύνη be identified with ἐπιστήμη we have yet to find the link connecting it with the Beneficial and the Good: ὅτι δ’ ἐπιστημώνως ἂν πράττοντες εἰ ἂν πράττομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονήσωμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὕτω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὦ φίλε Κρίτα. We are thus again led to the question, ‘What knowledge constitutes the Master-art?’ ‘Knowledge of Good and Evil,’ says Critias. "ὤ μιαρε, ἐφιήν ἐνώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλῳ, ἀποκρυπτόμενον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημώνως ἢν ἔην τὸ εἰ πράττειν τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ ἐγματασών τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶς οὕτως ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν (174 B)."

28. See Appendix on the text. The order σωφροσύνη—εὐμαθία—μανθανώμενα—καταρτυμένα is chiastic. The only other place in Plato where καταρτύειν (‘discipline’ or ‘regulate’) occurs is Laches 808 δ παῖς ἔχει πυγὴν τοῦ φρονείν μῆκος καταρτυμένην. The word is rather poetical.

33. ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρπερήματα, ‘active and passive C effort.’ The words do not correspond with μανθανώμενα and
καταρτυμένα, but are a general and exhaustive division of moral energy. The word καρτέρημα appears to be coined for the occasion.

ἡγομένης μὲν φρονήσεως: cp. Prot. 352 Β δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς
tοιοίδεις περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἵσχυρον οὐδ' ἡγεμονικόν,
οὐδ' ἀρχικόν εἶναι. With the Stoics τὸ ἡγεμονικόν became the
technical term for Reason. Cp. also the simile in Phaedr.
246 Α foll., where Reason is the ἡνίοχος and Courage and
Appetite the steeds. In the list of the virtues that constitute
the philosophic character (Rep. 485 Β foll.) first comes the love
of Eternal Truth, that is, σοφία: from this we deduce the
other virtues (τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσφοφίας φύσεως χρόνον 490 Α) in
orderly sequence. μὴ πη δοκοῦμεν σοι οὐκ ἀνάγκασα ἐκαστά
dιεληθεῖναι καὶ ἐπόμενα ἀλλήλοις; says Socrates (486 Β) after
the enumeration. The list corresponds very nearly to that
at 88 Α 16. See on Α 7.

38. ἀνάγκασιν αὐτῷ ὀφελίμῳ εἶναι: the dative ὀφελίμῳ is
due to 'Attraction'; cp. Hipp. maj. 294 Β ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς
μεγάλοις εἰναι.—Rid. § 183. Cp. 81 Ε 17.

CHAPTER XXV

D 2. πλούτῳ τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα: these words are introduced
to explain τάλα, namely, the bona corporis and bona externa
which he has dealt with at 87 Ε foll. They interrupt the
construction, but there is no reason to follow Hirschig in
bracketing the words τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλασφερὰ εἰναι.

5. ἐπολεῖ, 'makes, as we saw'; see on 83 D 52.

Ε 13. κατὰ πάντων: see on 73 D 5.

14. εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτήσασθαι: literally 'dependere'; for
the word cp. Menex. 247 ε; for the matter Laws 651 Β (quoted
on 87 Ε 2) and 968 Α ΚΛ. Τὴν δὲ γε ἄρεσθι τέσσαρα θεμένον τοῦ
ἈΘ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν. ΚΛ. Νοῦν δὲ γε τοῦτων πάντων ἡγεμόνα
πρὸς δὲν δὴ τα τὰ ἄλλα πάντα καὶ τοῦτων τὰ τρέλα δει βλέπειν. For
the supremacy of ψυχή generally over things of the Body, etc.
see Gorg. 465 Ε; the true and false arts of the Body are easily
distinguished; those of the Soul are not so: if the Soul did
not provide a Court of Appeal in the case of arts of the Body
(ei μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπιστάτει) discrimination there would
be impossible. Cp. Phaedo 79 Ε ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δοι ψυχῆ
καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάτει,
τῷ δὲ ἀρχειν καὶ δεσποτίζειν.

89 Α 17. φράσης is predicate.
20. \textit{φρόνησιν} again is predicate. The argument in bare syllogistic form is

\begin{itemize}
  \item All \textit{ωφελιμον} is \textit{φρόνησις}.
  \item All \textit{ἀρετὴ} is \textit{ωφελιμον}.
  \item All \textit{ἀρετὴ} is \textit{φρόνησις}.
\end{itemize}

With \textit{ζύμπασαν} supply \textit{ἀρετὴν}; and with \textit{μέρος τι, ἀρετῆς}. Wherever Virtue is found \textit{φρόνησις} is found. But the notion Virtue may include other elements (\textit{μέρη}) besides \textit{φρόνησις}.

24. οὐκ ἂν ἔλεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ: the form of the apodosis ἂν ἔλεν is only a polite modification of the indicative. For this form of the conditional sentence cp. \textit{Apol.} 25 ὑπὸ τολῆ γὰρ ἂν εὐθαμονεῖν ἐί ἐπὶ τῶν νέων εἶ ἐς μὲν μὸνος αὐτῶς διαθείρει. Goodwin § 403. See Appendix on the text. For the abbreviated predicate see Kühner §§ 597 f. and cp. \textit{Prot.} 325 ὁ σκέψατο ὡς δαμασσίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ (so the MSS.), and 344 τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέθθαι (scil. κακῷ).

The point now arrived at should be compared with the original statement of the problem at \textit{70 A}. There the alternatives as to the origin of \textit{ἀρετὴ} were threefold; it is either—

(I) acquired, and that (a) by teaching (\textit{διδακτον}), or (b) by practice and example (\textit{ἀσκητόν}); or

(II) native; or

(III) given ἀλλω τινι τρόπῳ.

Here alternative II (\textit{φύσει}) is eliminated, and we hear no more of \textit{ἀσκητόν}, I \textit{(b)}. In the final result (\textit{98 CD} and \textit{99 E}) we have \textit{φύσει} again discarded as an alternative. For the relation of \textit{φύσις} to \textit{θελα μοῖρα} see article ‘\textit{Δύναμις and Φύσις in Plato}’ by R. G. Bury (\textit{CR.} viii 300): ‘\textit{Φύσις may denote what is independent of human effort or volition}; so \textit{φύσει} is opposed to \textit{νόμῳ} (\textit{Prot.} 337 c, \textit{Gorg.} 482 e, etc.), to \textit{τέχνη} (\textit{Rep.} 381 A), to \textit{διδακτόν} (\textit{Prot.} 323 c), to \textit{σοφία} (\textit{Apol.} 22 c). So it indicates what is innate, instinctive—the inherited, permanent, and transmissible characteristics as opposed to the acquired and artificial.’ It is opposed to \textit{ἐπικτητήν} \textit{Rep.} 618 ν.

In the \textit{Protagoras} (323 c) the sophist is made to say \begin{math} δὲ αὐτὴν (τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν) ὅφει \textit{γρηγορήσει εἰς} οὐδὲ \textit{αὐτομάτου}, ἀλλὰ \textit{διδακτόν} τε καὶ \textit{ἐξ ἐπίμελειας παραγίγνεσθαι} \textit{ὡ} ἂν \textit{παραγίγνεται}, τοῦτό σου πειράσομαι \textit{ἀποδεῖξαι}. \textit{ὅσα γὰρ} \textit{γρηγορήται} \textit{ἀλλήλους} \textit{κακὰ} \textit{ἐχεῖν} \textit{ἀνθρωποι} \textit{φύσει} \textit{ἡ} \textit{τὰ} \textit{χρύη}, \textit{οὐδεὶς} \textit{θυμός} \textit{οὐδὲ} \textit{νομίζει} \textit{οὐδὲ} \textit{διδάσκει} \textit{οὐδὲ} \textit{κοιλάζει} . . . \textit{ἄλλο} \textit{ἐλεύθερον}. \textit{At} \textit{Apol.} 22 c it is noticeable that \textit{φύσει} is used as equivalent to \textit{θελα μοῖρα}: \textit{ἐχόνων} \textit{οὗν} καὶ \textit{περὶ} \textit{τῶν} \textit{ποιητῶν}, \textit{ὅτι} \textit{οὐ} \textit{σοφία} \textit{ποιεῖν}, \textit{ἄ} \textit{ποιεῖν}, \textit{ἀλλὰ} \textit{φύσει} \textit{τινι} καὶ \textit{ἔρθοναίδουτε}, \textit{ὡσπερ} \textit{οὐ} \textit{θεομάντες}
We appear to have a similar identification in the difficult passage Laws 642 c: μὸνοι γὰρ (’Αθηναῖοι) ἀνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτο-φῶς δελα μολφά ἀλήθως καὶ οὐ πλαστῶς εἰκὼν ἀγαθόν, for which see Archer-Hind’s Phaedo p. 184 note. Sch., however, cuts out δελε μολφά. See on 98 D 24 and 99 E 5.

28. οἱ ἐγγυωσκούν: ‘when a conditional relative clause depends on a past tense of the indicative implying the non-fulfilment of a condition, it regularly takes a past tense of the indicative by assimilation,’ Goodwin § 559; cp. § 528. Here the relative depends on the apodosis of a conditional clause, So in Charm. 171 εὕρετε γὰρ ἐν αὐτοὶ ἑπεξεργαζόμεν πράττειν ἢ μὴ ἡ πιστήμη θαυμάτη. Kühner § 399, 6 a. Such temporal sentences introduced by πρὶν as occur at 84 C 25, 86 D 13, are analogous.

31. ἐν ἄκρωτολε: as the treasury of the city. So at the end of the Laws (969 c) of ideal guardians of the city: ἐν ἀρα οἱ τε ἄνδρες ἄκρωτοι ἐκλεξθοσκοί, παιδευόμεν τε προσηκότως, παιδευόμεν τε ἐν ἄκρωτολε τῆς χώρας κατοικήσαντες φιλάκες ἀποτελεῖσθωσιν.

καταστημηνάμενοι: the allusion, as Buttmann pointed out, is not to minting, but to the putting a seal on a door, such as that of the ὁπισθόδομος, containing valuables, to mark them as public property. He refers to Boeckh Public Economy of Athens (p. 442 E.T.). See Hicks Hist. Inscr. 37 A § 6 = C. I. A. I 32: καὶ (οἱ ταυμαί τῶν θεῶν) συνοινόμοντας καὶ συγκελεύοντος τὰς θύρας τοῦ ὀπισθόδομον καὶ συστηματικῶν τοῖς τῶν τῆς Ἀθηναίας ταυμαίς. Xen. Hell. iii i 27 ὃ δὲ ἐπεὶ εἰδε πάντα, κατεξάκεισαν αὐτὰ καὶ καταστημήματο καὶ φιλάκας κατέστησεν.

Ueberweg (Untersuchungen p. 294) points out that 100 A contemplates an Ideal State, such as that of the Republic. Dr. Henry Jackson has pointed out to me that this might still more be said of the present passage; cp. Rep. 415 A. In the Meno the Gold is used as a simile; in the Republic it has developed into a pious fraud: ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἄδελφοι, ὃς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάστων, δοὺς μὲν ἕως ἱκανον ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει συνέμειξαν αὐτοῖς, κτλ. Cp. Orest. 398 A.

32. ἵνα μὴ δείξοις διάφθειρεν: ‘in Attic Greek the secondary tenses of the indicative are used in final clauses to denote that the purpose is dependent upon some unaccomplished action or unfulfilled condition, and therefore is not or was not attained,’ Goodwin MT. § 338, Kühner § 553. 7, Hadley § 884, F.E.T. § 280; Crito 44 D el γὰρ δῆθεν οἷοι τῷ εὐθὺς μέγιστο κακά ἐξεργάσησθαι, ἵνα οἰοὶ τῷ ἔτους ἀν διά ἅγαθα τὰ μέγιστα, Prot. 335 C, Symp. 181 D, etc. See App. on the text.
33. ἀλλ' ἐπείδη ἀφικοῦντο . . . γίγνοντο: 'if the purpose is future, at the time of speaking, or if it is left uncertain whether the object is or was attained, it must be expressed in the ordinary way by the subjunctive or optative,' Goodwin MT. § 336. He quotes our passage, translating and commenting: 'we should guard (in that case) in the Acropolis, that no one might corrupt them (as some now corrupt them), and that when in the future they should become of age they might become useful to their states. (Here it is not implied that they never become useful, this depending partly on the future.)' The change from ἵ να διέφθεινεν to ἵ να γίγνοντο marks a change from an unrealized supposition to a vague future supposition. [Cp. Kühner § 399. Anm. 4.]

eis τῆν ἕλικιαν, 'of age.' 'Etiam eis ἕλικιαν (Theaet. 142 D) per eminentiam de juvenili aetate: Liv. xliii 34 cum primum in aetatem veni pater mihi uxorem dedit.' Fr.

Chapter XXVI (89 B–90 B). Socr. It seems then that Virtue is a matter of teaching. But a very serious difficulty remains. Where are the teachers? I have often tried to find them without success. Let us invite Anytus here to share the quest. He appears to be an example of successful education himself, and ought to be able to help us.

This chapter forms a transition to the fourth section.

6. μὴ τούτῳ οὗ καλῶς ὑπολογῆσαι: this passage and the sequel furnish an interesting collection of usages of μὴ οὐ. We have:

(a) the present passage (μὴ οὗ with indic., dependent on no word expressed):

(b) μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀρτι μόνον δέχεται (μὴ οὗ with subj., dependent on no word expressed) C 10:

(γ) ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὗ ἐπιστήμη (μὴ οὗ with subj., dependent on ἀπιστεῖς) D 14:

(δ) οὐκ ἀναστιέμαι μὴ οὗ καλῶς λέγεσθαι (μὴ οὗ with ἁπτικ., dependent on οὐκ ἀναστιέμαι) D 18.

With these may be considered D 18 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστων, dependent on ἀπιστεῖν.

In (a) and (β) it is clear that μὴ οὗ expresses the opposite of what would be expressed by μὴ alone, and οὗ can be connected closely with some word in the context: (α) οὗ καλῶς, (β) οὗ μόνον. In these cases, then, the οὗ needs no explanation. Three uses of μὴ with the indicative mood must be distinguished.
(I) In a direct question, where μή, like nam, expects a negative answer (Kühner § 587. 11, Jelf § 873. 4, § 741 c d, Hadley § 1015). This usage appears first in Aesch. (P. V. 247 μή τοι τρόβης τῶνδε καὶ περαιτέρω; 962 μή τι σοι δοκῶ ταρβείων; Pers. 344). This usage is common in Plato; one has occurred at 78 C 23. The negative expectancy is stronger with μῶν (μή οὖν, see 73 B 46). μή is sometimes qualified by πη: Prot. 356 c, Rep. 442 d, 466 a, 486 e.

Though μή in this use ‘expects’ a negative answer, the expectation is sometimes not justified or ironical (78 C 23, Crito 44 e Kp. *Αρά γε μή έμοι προμήθει καὶ τῶν άλλων ἐπιπήδειν; ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὥς Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, Rep. 552 e μή οὖν οἴμεθα καὶ κακοφόρους πόλλους ἐν ταῖς διλιγεροχυμέναις πόλεσιν εἶναι κέντρα ἐχοντας; οἴμεθα μὲν οὖν). This is one difficulty in the discrimination between this class and (III).

(II) μή dependent on a word expressing fear, caution, etc. The verb is most frequently in the subjunctive mood; but occasionally in the future indicative (Goodwin § 367), and not uncommonly in present or past tenses of the indicative, when the object of fear is supposed to be happening now (present), or to have happened (perf.), or to have been happening (imp.). No instance of the aor. indic. is given in Attic Greek, but see Od. v. 300 (Goodwin § 369, Kühner § 589. 6, Jelf § 814 a, F.E.T. § 238, op. § 300). Good instances for comparison of the moods are furnished by Soph. Ἐλ. 580 δρα μὴ πίμη σαντῆ καὶ μετάγγοις τίθης (referring to the future) and 584 ἀλλ' εἰσόρα μή σκηνήν οὐκ οὔσαν τίθης, ‘see that you are not making a false excuse’ (she is actually making one). See Jebb’s note on 580. This usage goes back to Homer. We may say that μή introduces the idea repudiated, or the fear entertained. Op. on 77 A 3.

(III) A usage probably developed from (II): μή is used, not dependent on any word, in ‘cautious assertions’ (Goodwin § 269; ‘presumptive use,’ Riddell § 59). The subjunctive is common; instances of the indicative are few (Kühner § 394. Anm. 5; § 589. Anm. 5). μή with a past tense of the indicative (like ωμολογήκαμεν) expresses a suspicion about a past fact. Another (probable) instance of the aor. indic. in this construction is Buthyd. 291 Α (quoted below). Buttmann, asserting that the perfect was the only tense quoted in this use from prose authors, and noting that ωμολογήκαμεν is the tense used at 96 Ε 2 and 98 Ε, etc., says that one might be tempted to alter the aorist here to the perfect, but adds: ‘aptior tamen hic videtur aoristus in re praeterita quidem sed quae non firma maneant.’

This use of μή with the indic. does not appear before Plato. The use of μήποτε ‘perhaps,’ common in Aristotle and later
writers, does not occur in Plato. In *Phaedo* 78D μὴ ποτε is a question with negative tendency, and falls under (I). The difference between this usage and (1) is parallel to the difference between οὐ in statements and in questions; only with μὴ the contrast is less strong, and the tendencies are reversed. Thus: οὐ τοῦτο ἐστιν is a negative assertion: οὐ τοῦτο ἐστιν; is a question with strong affirmative tendency. But μὴ τοῦτο ἐστιν is a cautious affirmative assertion: μὴ τοῦτο ἐστιν; is a question with negative tendency.

In some of the examples that follow it is not easy to distinguish whether we have a 'cautious assertion' (III) or an *ironical* question, i.e. one not really expecting a negative answer (I).

*Prot.* 312A ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ ὅτι τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν μάθησιν ἔσεθαν. Most editors print this as an interrogation; J. and A. M. Adam, however, quoting this place in the *Meno* and others, rightly say that in all of these passages it is better to take μὴ as 'perhaps' than as an equivalent to Latin *num?*

*Gorg.* 512D ἄρα μὴ ἀλλο το τὸ γενναίον καὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν ἢ ἢ τὸ σφέειν τε καὶ σφέεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ξύν ὁπόθεν δὴ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐστίν καὶ οὗ φιλοποιητέον. (So the MSS.: Sch. writes ἢ γάρ for μὴ γάρ, and the passage has been otherwise altered, unnecessarily.)

*Lyg.* 220A ἄλλα μὴ οὐδέν τι μάλλον οὕτω τὸ γε ἀληθεῖς ἔχη· ἄλλο ἐκεῖν ἐστιν δὲ περὶ παντὸς ποιομέθεα. (Here it is not certain that the second clause is still under the influence of μὴ.)

*Euthyd.* 290E ἄλλα ἄρα, ὅ πρὸς Δίως, μὴ ὁ Κτησίππος ἢν ὁ τοιαύτα εἶτον.

Ibid. 291A ἄλλα, ὁ διαμόνιον Κρήτων, μὴ τις τῶν κρευτῶν παρὼν αὕτα ἐφθέγξατο. Heind. Herm. Sch. all print the last two as questions.

Ibid. 298C μὴ γάρ, ὁ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνω συνάπτεις. (So Heind.) 'I think you are weaving flax with not-flax,' i.e. not arguing in pari materia. (Herm. and Sch. punctuate μὴ γάρ, ὁ Εὐθύδημε· κτέ., μὴ thus being deprecatory as at 75B 18.)

*Apol.* 25A ἄλλα ἄρα, ὁ Μέλπτε, μὴ οὐ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους· ἢ κάκεινοι βελτίους ποιούσιν ἀπάντης; (Kühner § 589. Anm. 5, I think rightly, regards this as a cautious assertion, followed by a question. Most editors put note of interrogation after νεωτέρους).

As to the present passage in the *Meno*, Kühner (§ 394. Anm. 5) and *Aet* (s.v. μὴ p. 335) both regard it as a 'cautious assertion'; so does Goodwin, § 269, adding, however, that 'it may be interrogative.' I take the former view, and have therefore,
following Buttmann, printed it without a mark of interrogation, which Herm. Sch. and Fr. all add.

In *Lys.* 213 τὸ ἄρα μὴ, ὁ Μενέξεν, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ὅρθως ἔξητομεν; the ἄρα clearly marks the sentence as interrogative, and it furnishes a good example of the ironical class of direct questions with μὴ spoken of above (I). For though the sentence pretends to say 'can it be we were not right?' i.e. 'surely we were right,' the answer is οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, 'I think not.'

10. ἄλλα μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δή: there are large classes of cases, corresponding to the indicative uses (II) and (III) above, where μὴ is used with the subjunctive either, like (II), dependent on a word expressive of fear, caution, etc. (Goodwin § 365, Kühner § 389. 2, Jelf § 814, F.E.T. § 237), or, like (III), independently, as a 'cautious assertion' (Goodwin § 265, Kühner § 394. 6, F.E.T. § 300). Of the latter class Goodwin l.c. gives many instances from Plato, with whom it is a favourite construction. See 94 Β 20, Ε 14. The only real example before Plato is Hdt. v 179 ἄλλα μᾶλλον μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ μαντήθην. The instances from Homer given by Kühner (cp. F.E.T. § 309) are a somewhat different class, of the nature of wishes (Goodwin § 261). Probably the 'cautious assertion' was a later development from a construction dependent on a verb of fearing, after this had been stereotyped, whereas the dependent construction was itself developed 'from an original parataxis or co-ordination of two independent sentences,' namely an expression of fear (δειδω) followed by a repudiation of an idea (μὴ νησας ἐλωσι) (Goodwin §§ 307–309, cp. §§ 262, 368). Goodwin (§ 268) further recognizes a small class corresponding to (I) above; instances of 'μη with the subjunctive in a cautious question, with a negative answer implied.' Three instances are quoted from Plato, besides a doubtful one from the † Sisyphus.

Rep. 608 c μὴ τι ἄλλο ἢ παρά ταῦτα; οὐδὲν.

Parm. 163 c τὸ δὲ γλυκεσθαι μὴ τι ἄλλο ἢ ὡσεὶς μεταλαμβάνεις; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. (The MSS. give η. Heindorf substituted η. Herm. and Waddell keep η.)


With these may be ranked two places in Xenophon, Mem. 1ν 12 μὴ οὖν οὔ δύναμαι ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγησαθαι; Oec. 1ν 4 ἄρα μὴ αὐξινθώμεν τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα μιμησαθαι; These, although in the first person, are not 'deliberative' questions, and in both μὴ = nüm. In the real deliberative question (Goodwin § 287) μὴ either is ἀποτυπναι δὲν προείπες μηδὲν; and 554 c μὴ φῶμεν; καὶ μᾶλ’, ἐφη) or is indifferent.
ø̂uk ἐν τῷ ἀρτὶ μόνον: this is characteristic of the Socratic temper as distinguished from the 'Eristic,' at least as caricatured by Plato. See Zeller pre-Socratics ii 464, who quotes 
Buthyad. 287 b εἰτ', ἀφή, ὁ Ὁψκρατῆς, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπολαβὼν, οὕτως ἔλθος, ὥστε δὴ τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμμησάκη, καὶ εἴ 
ti πέρσων εἴπον, τοῖς δὲ ἐν τῷ παρόντι λεγομένων λόγοις οὐχ ἔξει 
δὲ τι χρῆ;

12. ὑμέν (see on 77 A 8): a very favourite with word Plato.

14. ἀπιστεῖς μὴ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη: in such a verb as ἀπιστῶ we have two notions combined, namely of denial or disbelief and of fear or misgiving. From the former point of view it will be followed by an infinit. or δι' with an indic.; from the latter by μὴ with the subjunctive. Phaedo 91 c Ἐμμιᾶς μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ἔγραμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἂν ψυχὴ προσαπολληταί. Cr. ibid. 91 ν and 70 A, Xen. Simpr. viii 14 δοκοῦσι δ' ἐμοιγε ἀπιστοῦσιν ἐκεῖαν μὴ χωρὶς γενόμεναι οὐκ ἀποτελέσω τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα. μὴ introduces the idea warded off, which is a negative one: 'You have a misgiving lest (μὴ) it be not knowledge' (οὐκ ἐπιστήμη).

17. οὐκ ἀναθεῦμαι: the metaphor is from revoking a move in a game: 'ἀπὸ τῶν πεπεσνυμένων καὶ τὰς κεκινήμενας ἡδὰ ψήφου διαδρομῶν' Harpocratio: Phaedo 87 A οὐκ ἀναθεῦμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνω χαρέσνου ἀποδεῖχται: Charm. 184 c ἐκείνων δὲ 
ti ἔγραγε μᾶλλον ἀναθείμαι (note the active ἀναθέτει = dedicant in the immediate sequel): Prot. 355 A ἀλλ' εἰ τι νῦν 
ἀναθέσσαι ἔξεστιν: Gorg. 462 A. But in Gorg. 461 D and 
† Hippiarchus 229 E the meaning of ἀναθέσσαι is to give a 
move back.

18. μὴ σοὶ καλῶς λέγεσθαι: 'after a principal sentence containing verbs and expressions of denying, hindering, forbidding, and avoiding μὴ is used with the infinit., where in English we use no negative.' F.E.T. § 298, cp. § 308; Hadley 1029; Kühner § 516. 3. See also on 90 E 28.

The explanation of the difference between the Greek and English use is that the object of these verbs may be looked upon from two different points of view. It may be either expressive of the thing denied or prevented (external object), or expressive of the upshot of the denial or prevention (internal object). English leans to the former use, Greek to the latter. There are instances in Greek where the μὴ is omitted, and the infinitive put positively as an external object (F.E.T. pp. 366 note 2, p. 369, 1; Goodwin §§ 807, 811; Kühner § 516. Anm. 9 a; Jelf 749, 1). This is chiefly with verbs of prevention, etc.; the omission of μὴ after verbs of denial is very rare. Jebb on
Soph. Ant. 442 says that after ἀρνεῖσθαι, when it means to deny, 
μὴ regularly precedes the dependent inf., but not when it means to refuse.

The ambiguity may be paralleled by a similar one in the 
word 'doubt.' We say 'I doubt if he is dead' or 'I doubt his 
being dead,' where the clause 'if he is dead' or the noun-phrase 
'his being dead' are external objects to the verb 'doubt.' But 
an old writer, or a North-country man now, would say 'I doubt 
he is dead,' where the clause 'he is dead' is really an internal 
object of the word 'doubt,' and expresses the opinion held.

When the verb of denial, etc. is itself negativated, then if the 
dependent infinitive is to remain an internal object, i.e. to 
express the upshot of the state of mind, or state of fact, the 
ordinary μὴ will have to be reversed, which is effected by ὦ.
Thus the meaning here is 'I do not revoke my position, the 
et result being that there was no mistake.' Cp. Phaedr. 87 α 
(quoted above); Gorg. 461 ο ἔιν οὐκ ἀπαρνήσεσθαι (i.e. εὐ 
λοθάνα οὐδένα ἀπαρνησθομένον) μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτασθαί τὰ 
δίκαια;

There is however considerable variety of construction 
possible. But after a verb of denial negativated, μὴ ὦ with the 
infin. is much the most common construction (Kühner § 516. 4, 
Hadley § 1084, Goodwin §§ 807, 815). Instances of the simple 
infin. however occur (Kühner § 516. Anm. 9 b, F.E.T. pp. 368, 9):
Aesch. Eum. 611 δρᾶσαι γὰρ ὡσπερ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄρνομεθα; 
Aeschines 3 § 250 ταῦτα οὖκ ἐξαρνοῦνται πράττειν. Twice in 
Soph. (Aj. 98, Ant. 443) we have οὖκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι τὸ μὴ (Goodwin 
§ 812). (We have in Plato Phaedr. 256 α μὴ ἄπαρνησθῆμαι 
χαράσασθαι, and Rep. 468 ο μηδὲν ἔξειναι ἀπαρνηθῆμαι ἤν ἄν 
βολήται φιλεῖν. But in both these places ἀπαρνῆσθαι means 
'refuse,' not 'deny."

Metrical considerations sometimes led to μὴ rather than 
μὴ ὦ: in Soph O.T. 1388, Ar. Peace 315 after a negative verb 
of hindrance we have the initial vowel of the infinitive cut off 
after μὴ, so that μὴ ὦ would have been impracticable; but this 
does not apply at Soph. Phil. 349, when μὴ ὦ might have been 
expected.

ὅτι δ' οὖκ ἦτοιν ἐπιστήμη: Kühner § 516. 3 b, Jelf 749. 2.
ἀπαιτῶ regarded as a 'verbum sentiendi vel declarandi' may be 
followed by an infinitive with μὴ, or by ὦτι with ὦ and a finite 
verb. See on Θ 14 above. The explanation of the negatives is 
similar to that in the case of ἀναιθεμαί. The clause ὦτι οὐκ 
ἦτοιν κτέ. is of the nature of an 'internal object.' μὴ with 
the infin. after ἀπαιτῶ is fairly common; Thuc. ίν 40 ἡπιστων 
μὴ εἶναι τοῖς τὰ ὑπάλληλα τοῖς τεθνεόταοι δομοὺς, 'they 
did not believe that those who had given up their arms were
like those who had fallen'; also 1 10, 11 101; Hdt. 1 68 (but 111 66 an infin. of the thing disbelieved, without μὴ); Rep. 555 λ. Politi. 301 ς; after passive, Charm. 168 ε, Laws 839 ς. ὅτι ὡς after verbs of this class is very rare, and I can find no other instance of it after ἀπωτέρω. We have ὡς without ὧν Rep. 450 οί καὶ γὰρ ὃς δυνατὰ λέγεται ἄπωτέρω ἄν, καὶ ὃς ἀριστά ἐν ἔν ἄπωτέρωσαν, and ὡς ὧν after some similar words, as ἡμελεγκτέος, Gorg. 508 ς. Cp. Euthyphr. 8 ζ, etc. (ἀπωτέρω is also treated as a verb of inquiry: Phaedo 73 ζ ἀπωτέρως πῶς μάθησις ἀνάμμησις ἐστιν.)

24. οὖ μὴ τα διδάσκαλοι μὴ τα μαθηταί εἶναι: the relative Σ clause represents a conditional clause of the same kind (εἰ — εἶναι): 'a future condition of the less vivid form,' Goodwin § 531; cp. F.E.T. pp. 201, 202, Hadley § 917. (These examples must be distinguished from the optative 'of indefinite frequency' in relative clauses referring to past time, 'when the verb in the antecedent clause denotes a customary or repeated action or a general truth.' Goodwin § 532; e.g. Thuc. Π. 52 οἷς δὲ καὶ μεγαλάνειν ἐπιβαλόντες ἑν ἀρεταῖς, διηγεσαν.) Cp. 96 C 8 and see on 92 C 18. Other places in Plato similar to the present are Phaedr. 276 θ νόμον ἔχων γένος συναρμόσω κήδειον καὶ ἱκαρια βούλουσι γενέσθαι πότερα σπουδὴ ἀνθρόπων κόσμος ἀρών χρυσῶν; Euthyd. 302 λ ὃς ὅμος ταῦτα σὰ εἴναι, ἃ σοι εἰ διὰ καὶ ἀνασάδειμα καὶ δοκεῖ δὴ καὶ σωτήρ βούλουσι θεῶν; Lys. 214 δ ἐὰν, 214 ζ ὅτι τὸν μάθημα, ὅ μὴ καὶ ὑβ' αὐτοῦ πάθη; 215 λ ἔτι δὲ μὴ ἀγαπάτω τῶς φιλίων (scil. ἥν εἰ); 215 β ἔτι μὴ ἀγαπᾶν (but Sch. ὅς μὴ ἀγαθῶν); 219 β; Hipp. maj. 284 λ, 296 β; Rep. 412 δ, 549 β, 557 ε. In all these cases the relative clause depends upon an optative (or infinitive representing an optative) with ἄν, i.e. upon an apodosis. Instances where the relative depends on εἰ with the optative (a protasis) are much rarer. See Ἄρστασις 136 εἰ τῶν ἐκάζοντες ἑκάζομαι τῶν φιλίων τις τῶν σῶν περὶ ὅδε σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἐχοις, πότερον τῶν φιλίων ἐκάζοις ἀν ὧν ἑκάζοις λάβοις;

25. καλῶς ἀν αὐτῶ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζομαι μὴ διδάσκαντο εἶναι: αὐτῶ is here transferred from its natural place after εἰκάζομαι by 'hyperbaton' (Riddell §§ 287 foll., F.E.T. p. 418, Hadley § 1062). The usual object of hyperbaton is, by changing the common order, to get, besides the direct meaning given by the syntax of the words, an additional meaning suggested by their collocation. Here the impression is for a moment left on the mind that αὐτῶ is governed by εἰκάζοντες used in a transitive sense, as at 80 C 26. See too on 98 B 2. (An occasional object of hyperbaton is to avoid the juxtaposition of like cases.
This I think is exemplified by Εὐθύδ. 275 ε ὡς τε οὖδὲ παρακελεύσασθαι μοι ἔξεγένετο ἐυλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, where τῷ μειρακίῳ, dependent on παρακελεύσασθαι, is kept well apart from μοι.)

Riddell's elaborate list of examples of hyperbaton in Plato is far from exhaustive. The present example, which he omits, would seemingly come in § 289. Add Εὐθύδερ. 11 c ἄρα περιεύθης τούτων τῶν καὶ μή μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦν ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ἐν τυπῆλες, where see Fr.'s. note. He quotes inter alia Πραεδ. 239 A τοσοῦτον κακῶν... ἐραστῆν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκῃ γνυμομένῳ τε καὶ φύσιν ἐνότων, τῶν μὲν ἁδεσθαί, τὰ δὲ παρασκεύασθαι. The tendency to elaborate the order of words grew on Plato.

26. μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι: cp. the reference to this passage at 96 C 8, where we have μήδε διδακτὸν εἶναι. We need not infer (with Buttm.) that μηδέ should be read here.

29. εἶλεν: indirect question; the optative being used because ζητῶς is here imperfect.

33. εἰς καλὸν, 'opportune, ut sescenties' Stallbaum. See Ἡππ. maj. 286 C D; εἰς κάλλιστον Εὐθύδ. 275 B.

34. Ast regards the forms ἑκαθέζόμην, παρεκαθέζόμην as always aorists in Plato; I believe rightly. No present indic. καθέζομαι or παρακαθέζομαι occurs in Plato. (The simple ζομαι in all its forms is foreign to Attic prose.) The apparent exception ὁ Ἀκιόχως 371 ε καθέζωταῖ δικασταί is significant. Nor does the imperative or infinitive occur, in which the accent would discriminate. I know of no instance in Plato where the sense would require ἑκαθέζόμην or παρεκαθέζομην or the corresponding participles to be impf.; and in all cases the aorist sense is better. Thus, here 'Anytus has just sat down'; he has not 'been sitting' for some time, for it would have been difficult to ignore him, and the share he takes presently suggests no acquaintance with the previous dialogue (Fr. p. 23). Cp. Charm. 153 ε δῆνο καθέζομενος ἡμῖν διήγησα, 'come and sit down here, and tell me all about it'; ibid. παρακαθέζομενος; ibid. 155 καθέζωτο, ἑκαθέζωτο; Λυγ. 206 D εν γὰρ εἰσέλθοντι καὶ καθέζομενος διαλέγη 'if you go in and take a seat and engage in talk'; ibid. 207 ε ἑκαθέζομενα καὶ διελεγόμενα, 'we had seated ourselves, and were in conversation'; Εὐθύδ. 274 κ ἐπεξεῖ ταῖρον καθέζομενος τοῦ Κλεώνου, 'happened to have taken a seat at some distance from C.'; Πραεδ. 61 ε καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ καθάζομενος ('assuming a sitting posture') οὖθως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. Cp. Xen. Mem. iv ii 8 παρακαθέζομένου.

ϕ μεταβόμαι: the relative here has a definite antecedent,
and so has no effect on the mood of the following verb; the subjunctive is hortatory. Goodwin § 519. Buttm. strangely regards it as final: see Goodwin § 572.


37. Ἀνθεμίανος: we know nothing of him beyond what we read here. Plato's object in eulogizing him is not, as Cobet thought (Coll. crit. p. 47), merely to furnish a foil to the faults of his son, but also to give another instance of the truth set forth cc. xxxii-xxxiv (93 B foll.) that even the best of fathers cannot communicate virtue to their children.

38. τὸ Πολυκράτους χρήματα: the name of Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos in the sixth century B.C., whose history is given by Herodotus in his third book, is here used proverbially as a type of wealth. We generally use the name of Croesus in this connexion. Fr. quotes other instances; τὰ Ταντάλων τάλαντα Euthybhr. 11 E. Cp. Laws 660 e ἐὰν δὲ ἀρα πλουτῆ Κινώρα τε καὶ Μίδα μᾶλλον.

40. Ἰσμενίας ὁ Ὑβαιος: this important man was a leader of the democratic or anti-Spartan party at Thebes. We find him in the year 403 B.C. helping the exiled Athenian democrats, Thrasybulus, Anytus, etc., to return. Justin v 9 itaque Ismene Thebanorum princeps etsi publicis non poterat, privatis tamen viribus adjuvabat. In 395 B.C. Tissaphernes, the successor of Tissaphernes, irritated by Agesilaus' successes in Asia Minor, sent over Timocrates the Rhodian to Greece with thirty talents to bribe the leaders in various states to make war against Sparta. Xenophon (Hell. iii v 1) mentions as recipients of this money Androcleidas, Ismenias, and Galaxidorus at Thebes, two men at Corinth, and 'Cylon and his friends' at Argos (Grote Hist. ch. lxxiv). The share that would thus fall to Ismenias could only be described as τὰ Πολ. χρήματα by a hyperbole. Fr. as to this shrewdly observes that nothing is more liable to exaggeration than wealth. But it is not at all necessary to suppose that the money brought by Timocrates was the only instance in which Ismenias received gifts of this kind. Believing, as I do, that the Meno was not written till at least ten years after 395, I think Plato may well have had later instances in his mind. Reference to these gifts from Persia is made in the words οὕτως δῶντος τινὸς just above; Anthemion's wealth was not, like that of Ismenias, the result of bribery. Plato in one other place (Rep. i 336 A) refers to Ismenias, whom he evidently disliked. The Meno has points of kinship with the first book of the Republic, the composition of which probably followed it at no long interval (Introd. § 19). Socrates there
thinks the definition of Justice ‘to benefit one’s friends and harm one’s foes.’ Periánôrōn einai ἡ Περίδικκον ἡ Ξέρχου ἡ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἡ τινός ἄλλου μέγα ολοκληρών δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἄνδρος. The collocation of names is not without irony, but the mention of Ismenias is made appropriate by the fact that he distinctly used his wealth as a political engine—to ‘help his friends and harm his foes.’ Ismenias was put to death in 382 B.C. by the Spartans after they had obtained control of Thebes by seizing the Cadmea. Xen. Hell. vii 35 tòte δὴ κατηγορεῖτο τοῦ Ἰσμηνίου καὶ ὃς βαρβαρίζων καὶ ὃς ἔγειρε τοῦ Πέρας ἐπὶ οὐδὲν ἄγαθῷ τῆς Ἐλλάδος γεγενημένος εἴη καὶ ὃς τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων μετείληφως εἴη καὶ διτ εὖ τῇ Ἐλλάδι παραχθῆσας ἐκεῖνος τε καὶ Ἀνδροκλείδας αὐτωτὸν εἶχεν. (See Grote Hist. ch. lxxvi.)

Were the passages in the *Meno* and the *Republic* written after the death of Ismenias? Plato very rarely mentions by name a person living at the time of his writing. But this rule is not universal. Isocrates certainly, and Lysias probably, were living at the time when the *Phaedrus* was written. Moreover, the *Meno* and the first book of the *Republic* can hardly have been written long after 382, and it is not likely that such references to Ismenias should be made immediately after his death. I think both passages were written while Ismenias was still powerful at Thebes, that is, before the end of 382 B.C., but probably not much before (Intr. §14).

We have here one of several anachronisms in which Plato introduces in dialogues where Socrates is present mention of events that happened after Socrates’ death. Cp. *Symp.* 193 A, where allusion is made to the breaking-up of Mantinea by the Spartans in 385 B.C.; *Menex.* 244 D foll.

The Ismenias here mentioned must not be confused with his son Ismenias, who in 367 accompanied Pelopidas to the court of the Great King (Plut. *Artax.* 22).

42. δοκῶν εἶναι: the editors note the anacoluthon. You would expect δοκοῦντος. But the structure of the whole sentence is loose. The πρῶτον μὲν at line 36 referring to Anytus is not answered by either the ἐπείρα at line 41, or that at 44, both of which refer to Anthemion. After the introduction of the relative sentence δι’ ἐγένετο, Anthemion becomes the main subject, and the participle δοκῶν naturally follows the case of κτησάμενος.

43. ὤγκοθης: lit. ‘b Bloated.’ The word occurs nowhere else in Plato; and is very rare in this sense elsewhere. But ὤγκος occurs often in the tragedians in the sense ‘dignity,’ ‘self-importance.’ So ὤγκοῦμαι, as Aristoph. *Frogs* 703.
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επαχθής = odiosus often in Plato, as Phaedo 87 A et μη επαχθέσεις εστίν ειπεῖν. Cp. Thuc. vi 54 επαχθής ήν ες τούς πολλούς.

44. εὐσταλῆς: not elsewhere in Plato; lit. ‘well braced,’ ‘compact,’ the opposite of ὑγκωδής. L. & S. quote Plut. Marius 34 εὐσταλῆς τῶν ὑγκῶν.

46. αἱροῦντα γενού: ‘Xen. Apol. 29 (‘Ἀνυτον) τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅρων ἀξιομενον. Creatus est σιτοφύλαξ (Lys. xxi 8) et στρατηγὸς (σ. Chr. 409, Diod. Sic. xiii 64 [Grote Hist. ch. lxiii]), et a. Chr. 403, Lys. xiii 78); Theramenes apud Xen. Hell. ii iii 42 tres principes enumerat Thrasybulum Anytum Alcibiadem; post expulsos tyrannos, quorum inter audaces fuerat oppugnatores (Lys. xiii 78 [Grote Hist. ch. lxv]), magna floreat gratia et potestate (Isocr. xviii 23) Fr. He was one of the most important men in Athens in the years succeeding 403 B.C. He is ‘undoubtedly’ (Jebb Att. Or. i 117) the Anytus who was called on the defence in the trial of Andocides in the same year as that of Socrates. See de Myst. ad fin.; Holm History of Greece E.T. iii 26.

47. ἀρτήσεις περὶ διδασκάλους: Stallbaum quotes for words of learning and teaching with περὶ and the gen. of the thing learnt or taught Lach. 186 c διδασκάλος μοι οὐ γέγονε τοῦτον περὶ, ibid. E, Menex. 235 E διδασκάλος θασα εῦ πάνω φαίη περὶ φησι κεῖται, Phaedr. 265 d, Crat. 413 c. Cp. presently περὶ τοῦτων πράγματος: also εἰδοὺς περὶ at 71 B 3 and note there. See Cope on Aristot. Rhet. 1 ix 14 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπῶν ἑδεῖν. He observes that the substitution of a prep. with its case for a simpler construction (e.g. the object of a verb) is characteristic of fourth-century, as distinguished from earlier, writers. Among other places he quotes Phaedr. 250 c, where περὶ κάλλους stands for subject, Rep. 427 Α εἰδοὺς νόμων περὶ καὶ πολιτείας, where περὶ with its case stands, as here, for the simple gen. after a noun. For the structure ἐγκεῖν διδασκάλου εἰ’ εἰδοῦν see on 71 A 25. ‘Prolepsia’ often occurs after verbs of inquiry; see 92 C 22 οὐ τούτων ἐξηγοῦμεν τῖνες εἰδοῦν.

Chapters XXVII (90 B) to XXX (92 C 20).—Socr. Suppose we wanted to make Meno a shoemaker, or a physician, or a flute-player, we should send him to a professional teacher? ANYTUS. Naturally. Socr. But, as it is, what Meno desires is political Virtue and Wisdom. I suppose we ought to send him to the paid and accredited teachers of this—I mean, of course, the Sophists. ANYTUS. Don’t name them: they do infinite mischief. Socr. Strange that they should be
so successful. No other craftsmen could succeed in imposing on the public so long. Or do they impose upon themselves as well? ANYTUS. Certainly not. They are a designing set that ought to be turned out of every respectable city. I have never had anything to do with them, and do not wish to, but I know all about them.

Here begins the fourth section of the dialogue, extending to the end of ch. xxxiv.

CHAPTER XXVII

2. τῷ σαυτῷ ξένῳ: cp. 92 D 26 τῶν πατρικῶν τόνδε ἐστάρον. Fr. (Introd. p. 24 note 2) makes it appear probable that this ξενία was inaugurated between Anthemion and the Meno who helped Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. ii 22, 2). This Meno cannot have been the father of the Meno of our dialogue, whose father's name was Alexidemus (76 E 48): he may have been his grandfather. Fr.'s reason for thinking that the ξενία between the families did not go back farther than Anthemion is that the latter had made his money himself, so that his ancestors were probably not so wealthy or prominent as to enter into such a relation.

περὶ τοῦτον τὸν πράγματος: these words do not depend on συνήγησαν, but on διδάσκαλοι, as just above. But here, for the sake of variety, we do not have the 'prolepsis' διδάσκαλοι, τίνες ἄν εἶπον.

5. ἄγαθον λατρῶν γενέσθαι: we have here one aspect of the standing paradox as to the difference of Virtue from the special Arts. See Prot. 311 b foll. Of the special arts there are special and accepted teachers. Of Virtue, or the Political art, the only visible teachers are the people called Sophists. But whereas the doctor makes you a doctor, the Sophist makes you, not a Sophist, but what? εἰτέ μοι, ἕφην ἐγώ, ὡς Ἰππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς λέναι, ἀργύρων τελῶν ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτόν, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιέρωμα καὶ τίς γηγόρωμα; ὡσπερ δὲν εἰ ἐπενεῆς παρὰ τὸν σαυτόν ὤμωνυμον ἔλθων Ἰπποκράτη τὸν Κόφων, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν κτέ. Cp. 318 b foll. See on 93 B 17; † Alc. i 124 e foll. is an imitative passage; Gorg. 514 a foll., Hipp. mag. 283 b foll. are germane. See also Xen. Mem. iv 2 and iv 5, and particularly Aristot. NE. x ix 18 ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο έπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἡ τῶν νομοθετικῶν γένους ἀν τίς; ἡ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόνον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἡ οὖχ δημοσιοφαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς
XXVII 90 D

NOTES

ἄλλος οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδίδοντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ’ αὐτῶν, οἷον οὐρανοὶ καὶ γραφεῖς: τά δὲ πολιτικά ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἰς σοφισταὶ, πράττει δ’ αὐτῶν οὐδέσι, ἀλλ’ οἱ πολιτεύμενοι, οἱ δόξας δὲν δινάμει τινὶ τούτο πράττειν καὶ ἑκπείρῳ μάλλον ἡ διανοία: οὔτε γὰρ γραφοῦτε οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τούτων φαίνονται ... οὐδ’ ἀπ’ πολιτικῶν πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱέσ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. (Grant in his note thinks there is a reference to the Meno.) Cp. Grote Hist. ch. lxviii.

Before the time of Plato the notion of general mental training, i.e. a gymnastic beneficial to the mind apart from the matter learnt, was hardly apprehended. To elaborate this view is the chief object of the 'Educational Dialogues' and one of the objects of the Republic.

16. καλως ἀν ἐπέμπομεν: contrast D 23 καλῶς ἀν πεποιηκότες. C

For the first supposition—that he is to be sent to a physician—is clearly unreal; but in the second case the supposition is generalized and so not impossible. See on 74B 6.

20. ἐπὶ αὐτῷ τοῦτο, 'avowedly for this service.' ἐπὶ with D the dat. implies condition, and may be used to express either the thing conceded or the thing received. In CR. viii 444 I have tried to show that ἐπὶ ἐκτω μέρει may mean either 'on condition of paying,' or 'on condition of receiving' a sixth part. Like the present passage is Rep. ix 590 ΄ Ἐρεφίλη ἐπὶ τῆ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ ('at the sacrifice of her husband's life') τὸν δριμὸν δεξιαμένη, Hipp. maj. 284 ΄ χρήματα ἔλαβεν ἐπὶ παιδεύσα, Ἀρ. 41 ΄ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἀν τις δέξατο; on the other hand Laws 745 ΄ φανεῖ δ’ βουλήμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴλισσεων 'on condition of receiving one half.' Often of course the conditions may be looked at from either point of view: Ἀρ. 29 ΄ ἀδιέφανεν σε ἐπὶ τοῦτο μέντοι, ἐφ’ ὑπὲ μηκετί φιλοσοφεῖ; these are the terms which the Athenians exact, and which Socrates is to concede. Cp. on 75A 7. Nearly allied is the use in ἐπὶ σοφία 70B 11.

21. τοῦ βουλήμενον: in this phrase the force of the article is exhausted in making the participle into a noun; no demonstrative force is left; so that δ’ βουλήμενοι is 'any one who chooses,' just as δ’ τυχῶν is 'any one who chances,' δ’ καλῶν 'any one to hinder.' (Something similar is τὸν Ἀθηναίον 'any Athenian' Aristoph. Birds 1035, Dem. 23 (Aristocr.) 88, etc.: cp. Gorg. 487 ξείον τινα χρή έλαβεν τῶν διάρα 'the typical man.') The phrase δ’ βουλήμενοι is common from Herodotus (1 54) downwards, especially in the orators in the legal phrase δ’ βουλήμενος Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ ήξειν 'any duly qualified Athenian' (Meier and Schömann Attische Process (564) 756). We have it in this dialogue 70C 17, 91B 14: Laws 745Α (see last note): Gorg. 521 ἐπὶ ἀποκτενεῖ με δ’ βουλήμενος, etc.
E 26. τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα; 'does not the same hold!' Herm., Sch., Fr. all print a note of interrogation after these words, understanding ἔξει, or the like. This view I have followed. Riddell § 18 regards τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα as a forestalling of the sentence that follows it, and therefore puts only a comma after ταῦτα.

τολλὴ ἄνοια ἐστί... μὴ θελεῖν: it is clear that here μὴ θελεῖν stands as a subject to τολλὴ ἄνοια ἐστὶ, and that the negative is a real negative, to be translated in English. Thus these cases of μὴ with the infinitive are to be distinguished from such as καλῶν σε τοῦτο μὴ ποιεῖν, where μὴ ποιεῖν stands as an object (see on 89 D 19), and the negative is redundant (or 'reflected') and not to be translated in English. But after such expressions as τολλὴ ἄνοια—a class which may be generalized as falling roughly into two divisions (a) expressions denoting impropriety (as the present, ἀλογόν, αἰσχρόν, οὖς δοῦν ἐστιν, etc.), (b) expressions of impossibility or improbability (ἀδύνατον, οὐ προσδοκία ἐστίν, etc.)—we more commonly, when the thing deprecated is negative, have μὴ οὐκ instead of, as here, the simple μὴ. Heind. on Prot. 352 D αἰσχρόν ἔστι καὶ έμοι σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχί πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι says 'Post αἰσχρόν ἔστι interdum simplex μὴ, frequentius multo ut h.1. μὴ οὐ cum infinitivo copulatum reperies.' He refers to Theaet. 151 D αἰσχρόν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ πρατθεῖσθαι, † Erastae 139 A, Xen. Rep. Lac. vi 2, etc. (On the other hand Laws 820 A ἐν ἐκείνων τοῦτ' ἐστὶν δὲν ἐφαμεν αἰσχρόν γεγονέναι το μὴ ἐπιστᾶσθαι.) So with the phrase before us, Symp. 210 B τολλὴ ἄνοια μὴ οὖς ἠγείραται: cf. ibid. 218 C πάντων ἄνθρωπων μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο χαρίσασθαι: with ἀλογόν, Soph. 219 B τὴν γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἄλογον το μὴ οὐ τέμειν διChi: further Theaet. 181 B οὐδὲν μὲν οὐκ ἄνεκτων μὴ οὐ διασκέδασθαι (contrast Laws 861 D τοῦτων τούτων τούτων δύοις το μὲν οὐκ ἄνεκτων, το γε η μὴ λέγειν κτλ.): Rep. 427 B οὖς δοῦν μὴ οὐ βοήθειν δικαίον ἡ: Phaedo 88 B οὐδὲν προσκεῖται. (The examples are all from class (a): examples from class (b) may be dispensed with.)

μὴ οὐ in these cases is analogous to μὴ οὐ after positive verbs of prevention or denial where the thing prevented or denied is itself negative, the μὴ being reflected from the negative idea in the previous verb, while the οὐ remains to be translated as a qualification of the object of it. On the other hand when we have μὴ οὐ with the infinit. after negatived verbs of prevention, etc. (as at 89 D 18), both μὴ and οὐ are reflected from the previous negatived negative idea, and neither remains to be translated. Kühner deals with the two classes in § 516, sections 4 and 5 respectively. See Goodwin MT. §§ 816, 817: F.E.T. pp. 367, 381. Perhaps the clearest account
is given by Mr. Whitelaw Cambridge Philolog. Soc. Transactions vol. i pp. 42, 43. In οὐχ ὣς ὡς καὶ καὶ βοηθεῖν, οὐχ ὄς ὣς is resumed by μῆ, which repels οὐ βοηθεῖν; depreciation of not rendering assistance is the state of mind of the speaker.

With such an expression as πολλὴ ἄνω we may have an infin. as a subject (μῆ ἔθελεν); but we may also have a looser ‘consecutive’ infinitive, μῆ οὐκ ἔθελεν, expressing the ‘net result’ of what is recommended.

F.E.T. is therefore right in observing (p. 381) that in these cases of μῆ ὡς we may be sure that the force of each negative was, originally at least, felt in Greek. But the idiom was sustained by an ‘irrational’ tendency in the Greek language. Mr. Whitelaw CR. x 244 b, at the end of a valuable article, says: ‘It is evident that these combinations (of negatives) had a certain fascination for the Greek mind. This appears especially in the ingenious and unnecessary developments of the consecutive μῆ ὡς.’ The fact that μῆ ὡς was pronounced as one syllable in verse is further evidence how closely the words had coalesced. Somewhat similar is the development of καὶ for καὶ (see on 73 C 1). By the time we get to μῆ ὡς with the participle we have clearly passed the bounds that separate ‘rational’ from ‘irrational’ idiom. For δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἐὰν εἰδην τοιάνδε μῆ ὡς κατοκτητῶν ἔδραν is not capable of logical explanation: it is a variant, by ‘personalization,’ for δυσάλγητον ἀν εἰδῆ μῆ ὡς κατοκτητῶν. So Phil. 12 Δ τῶς γὰρ ἤδονή γε ἤδονή μῆ οὐχ ὄμωτατον ἀν εἰδῆ; may be regarded as a variant for ἄμιθανον γὰρ ἤδονή γε ἤδονή μῆ οὐχ ὄμωτατον εἶναι. A similar method may be applied to Gorg. 509 A, Euthyd. 297 C, where also we have personalising extensions of the infinitive usage.

31. μῆτε—μῆτε: ‘the relative takes μῆ when the antecedent is indefinite’ F.E.T. p. 362, Hadley § 1021. In these cases the relative clause may be looked on as conditional. Cp. 80 D 2, 95 B 17, 96 C 7, 99 C 23. Cp. μῆπω 79 D 38.

32. μῆτε ἢστιν ἀντίκαν: ‘when a relative clause is continued by a clause co-ordinate with it, the relative word is hardly ever repeated. Where this would be necessary’ [owing to a change of the case required] ‘the relative construction is abandoned in the second clause, and the relative word is sometimes (a) entirely omitted, and sometimes (b), if in an oblique case, replaced by a personal or demonstrative pronoun’ Hadley § 1005. See on 74 D 35. As examples of (a) in Plato see Rep. 533 D, Symp. 201 B, Menex. 239 C (nom. omitted), Prot. 318 B (dat. omitted). As examples of (b)—of which the present is an instance—Stallbaum quotes Rep. 395 D διὶ φαμῖν κήδεσαν καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἀγαθὸν γενέσαι, Gorg. 452 D ὃ φῆς σου μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἴη καὶ

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σε δημουργον είναι αυτού. Kühner § 561. 1 (cp. Jelf § 833) also quotes from Plato Rep. 505 B δ ἐὴ διώκει μὲν ἀπασα ψυχή καὶ τούτον ἔσκα πάντα πράττει, Phil. 12 B, Hipp. mag. 289 D ὁ καὶ τάλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ προςγενόμενον αὐτοῦ καλὰ φανεται. Add Theaeet. 192 A δ μὴ ὀδὴ μηδὲ ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα: ibid. B ἐπερόν τι ὃν οἶδα καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σήμειον. For the (exceptional) repetition of the relative see Prot. 313 A, and J. & Α. M. Adam’s note. Analogous to the idiom now considered is the transition from a causal clause to a direct statement, as Eur. Alc. 1057 διπλὴν φοβοῦμαι μέμψειν, ἐκ τε δημοτῶν μὴ τίς μ’ ἐλέγχῃ... καὶ τῆς θανατοὺς... πολλὴν πρόνοιαν δέ τί μ’ ἔχεω. (See Graves on Thuc. v 61, and Marchant on Thuc. vi 31.) Perhaps these phenomena indicate incomplete development of the subordinate sentence.

34. οὐ πολλῇ σοι δοκεῖ κτέ., ‘does not this seem to you a serious flaw in reasoning?’ ‘Indeed it does, and brute stupidity to boot.’ Buttmann well expresses the difference between ἀλογία and ἀμαθία. The former is the case of the man who for the time fails to apply his reasoning power; the latter that of the man whose reasoning power has never been cultivated. As to ἀμαθία see Archer-Hind on Timaeus 86 B, and J. Adam on Euthyphr. 2 c.

CHAPTER XXVIII

91 A 2. ἔστι σε... βουλεύεσθαι: the subject of ἔστι is σε βουλεύεσθαι. See Kühner § 475. Anm. 1, 2. Cp. Gorg. 486 c τὸν τοίοντα ἔστων ἐπὶ κόρης τὸ τοῦτον μὴ διδότω δίκην, Polil. 290 D οὔδ’ ἔστι βασιλεύει χωρὶς λεπτικῆς ἀρχῆς; Crat. 51 D ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἥμεις ἔστιν λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπέναι, Laws 721 D. Mr. St. George Stock points out that ἔστι σε ‘is more complimentary than ἔστι σοι would have been. The latter would have meant “you have the opportunity”; this means “there is the opportunity,” i.e. “I have the opportunity of your assistance.”’

4. ταύτης τῆς σοφίας κτέ.: this corresponds pretty much to Meno’s definition of ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆ 71 E. Meno however has said nothing about treatment of parents. But he has laid stress on μεγαλοπρέπεια (74 A). Cp. Prot. 318 E foll., where Protagoras says that what he teaches is εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκεῖων, ὅτως δὲ ἄραται τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῦν, καὶ περὶ τῶν τής πολέως, ὅτως τὰ τῆς πολέως δυνατώτατον ἄν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. See Xen. Mem. iv ii 11 (quoted by Fr.) οὐ δήπον, ὧν ἐνδοδίμε, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίλει, δι’ ἂν ἄνθρωποι πολιτικοὶ γίγνονται καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ ἀρχεῖν ικανοὶ καὶ ὁφελοῦσι τοῖς τῆς ἄλλου ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐαυτοῖς... ἐστὶ γὰρ τῶν βασιλεῶν αὐτῆ (ἡ τέχνη)
NOTES

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7. τολίτας καὶ ξένους: Xen. Oec. ii 5 ἔπειτα ξένους προσήκει σοι τολίτας δέχεσθαι καὶ τούτους μεγαλοπρεπῶς. ἔπειτα δὲ τολίτας δειπνίζεις καὶ εἰς τοιείς (Fr.).

8. ὑποδέξασθαι καὶ ἀποτέμψαι: not merely the substantial duties of hospitality, but the art to welcome the coming, speed the parting, guest with all due etiquette. ‘Charondas ap. Stob. flor. xliv 40 (προοιμα νόμων): ξένου—εὐφήμως καὶ οἰκεῖος προσδέχεσθαι καὶ ἀποστέλλειν. Arist. NE. iv ii 15 ἢ μεγαλοπρέπεια—καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολὰς καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρείς’ (Fr.).


15. ταξιμένοις: aorist, because the fee is fixed once for all; πραγματικόν ού: pres., because it is exacted from time to time.

16. καὶ τίνας: καὶ indignantis. Cp. 80 D 1. Contrast Eur. Phoen. 1358 καὶ τῶς γένοις ἀν τῶν δυσποτομήτωρα; with 1363 τῶς καὶ πεπρακταὶ διτυχῶν παιδῶν φόνοι; The first question has feeling; the second asks for details. The explanation of the difference is that καὶ accentuates the word that follows it. See Shilleto on Dem. F.L. (19) § 257.

18. σοφιστάς: see on 85 B 49. For the process by which the word acquired an opprobrious sense, see the article ‘Sophist’ in Encycl. Brit., Zeller pre-Socr. ii 429 foll., Grote Hist. ch. lxvii, Sidgwick in JP. iv pp. 288 foll., v pp. 66 foll. Grote rightly protested against the representation of the sophists as a conspiracy against morality and philosophy. But he perhaps hardly attached sufficient weight to the indirect consequences of the one common attribute that they did undoubtedly possess, namely that they were professional teachers. Their forth-coming was the response to a feeling of the narrowness of the older training, and the demand for something at once more elaborate and more effective (Zeller pre-Socr. ii 396, 397; 430, 436; Sidgwick Hist. of Ethics 17-22). But the rise of the ‘professional element’ put a new aspect upon the pursuit of knowledge. ‘The introduction of payment for scientific instruction,’ says Zeller (ut sup. ii 441), ‘is a sign that now instead of honest inquiry, satisfied with knowledge of the actual, only that knowledge is sought which may be applied as a means to other ends.’ Then would follow that reaction upon teaching which must occur when it has to
be accommodated to the practical demands of the taught. No man, says Plato (Soph. 232 d), would resort to the sophists if they did not promise to make men clever in debate about Law and Politics. This suggests some of the reasons that led to the odious connotation of the word "sophist" and the unpopularity of the class. With a nation so prone to φήμης as the Greeks, the mere assumption of special knowledge easily became invidious. Already in Aesch. P. V. 944 Hermes uses the term σοφιατής as a taunt to Prometheus. Riddell Introd. p. xxvii shows how in 1791 the name 'Philosopher' became a term of opprobrium among British abhorers of the French Revolution. The title 'Professor' has before now lent itself to an uncomplimentary use. See Prot. 312 A (the conclusion of the passage referred to on 90 B 5) Σὺ δὲ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἄν αἰσχύνοι εἰς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας σαυτὸν σοφιατήν παρέχων; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐκτερ γε ἰ διανοοῦμαι χρή λέγειν. The sequel gives further evidence of the unpopularity of 'sophists.' Callias' porter (314 D) has no more discrimination than Aristophanes or Anytus; he mistakes Socrates and his companion for σοφισταὶ τῖνς, and shuts the door in their faces. Later, 316 C D, Protagoras speaks with some feeling of the odium attaching to his profession, and the great caution he has to exercise: οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν περὶ αὐτὰ φήμην τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένεαι τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί. See also Xen. Cyne. ch. xiii, from which Fr. quotes (§ 8) σοφιατήν κληθήναι, ἀ ἐστιν διεδός παρά γε τοῖς εὗρονοι. (Xen. concludes his tract in the true spirit of the country squire by advising young men to avoid the sophists and stick to hunting.) So Isocrates Antid. (15) 168 speaks of ἡ κοινὴ περὶ τοῦ σοφιστᾶς διαφορά.

19. Ἡράκλειος, εὐφήμε, ὁ Σώκρατες, 'good gracious, Socrates, spare our ears!' The source of Anytus' hostility to the sophists, and to Socrates, whom he included among them, is explained by Grote ii 27: 'He is a man of plain sense, practical habits, and conservative patriotism—who worships what he finds accredited as virtue, and dislikes the talkers and theorizers about virtue in general.' We must also take into account the circumstances of the time. After the amnesty of 403 B.C. 'the ἑπικέες of the restored people did not last long, and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal on the part of the changed institutions.' Riddell Introd. p. iv (cp. p. xxix). Culture of any kind was associated with oligarchic reaction. Not that the fear of culture was confined to democrats, for the Thirty had attempted to put down those who taught λόγων τέχνην (Xen. Mem. i ii 31). In spite of the boasted παρασκευὴ and ἔξωθλα at Athens (see Gorg. 461 ε, Rep. 557 β), the Athenian temper was at bottom intolerant.
(Holm Hist. of Greece ET. ii 293), though we may concede to Grote Hist. ch. lxviii that it was less so than that of other states. Cp. on 80 B 21.

The view of Callicles in the Gorgias is very similar to that of Anytus. Callicles too is a lover of the δήμος (Gorg. 481 D, 513 C) and a hater of the sophists (ibid. 519 E ΣΩ. Οὐκότι ἄκουεις τοιοῦτα λέγοντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ἐσε ἄρετήν; Ἐγώ γε ἀλλὰ τί ἄλλα λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὶς ἄξιων;). Callicles, like Meno, has been trained in rhetoric by Gorgias, but spurns the idea that Gorgias can teach τὰ δίκαια (482 C foll.), and disbelieves in the sophists who profess to train men in ἄρετήν. Compare his view ibid. 485 A φιλοσοφίας μὲν δὲν παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετασχεῖν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρᾶκλι ἔτι δυντὶ φιλοσοφεῖν κτέ., a view which Socrates sums up at 487 C: ἐνικὰ ἐν υἱὸν τοιάδε τις δέξα, μὴ προθυμείσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐπαθεῖσθαι παρεκκλείσθη ἀλλῆλοις δόξας μὴ πέρα τοῦ δεόντων σοφοῦτερον γενόμενοι λῆστε διαφθερέστε. See on 95 C 23. So the practical soldier Laches disparages sophists, Lach. 197 D (cp. 183 C foll.). The view of Isocrates recalls that of Callicles (Antid. (15) 268). See note on 100 A 6, Jebb Att. Or. ii p. 39, and Sidgwick in JP. v 75 foll.

It is this unpopularity, shared by Socrates with other philosophers, but in an even greater degree (Riddell Introd. xxvi), against which he protests (Apol. 28 A): καὶ τούτ’ ἐστιν δ’ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ αληθὲς, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἀντώνος, ἀλλ’ ἂν τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. Cp. Zeller Socr. 219, 220.

Rep. vi is an apology for philosophy. See 492 A ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὡσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, διαφθειρόμενοι τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιτῶν νέους, διαφθειροῦται δὲ τινὰς σοφιτὰς ἱδωτικοῦ κτέ. See by all means Grote’s vivid summary of the whole passage (iii 81, 82); also note on 95 C 23.

21. ἀστόν: cp. 92 B 7. The word is always used by Plato in contrast with ξένος (as Gorg. 514 E), or μέτοικος (as Rep. 563 A). See Laws 869 D: ‘If a fellow citizen (kills) another’ is ἐὰν πολίτης πολιτη, but ‘if a citizen (kills) a stranger’ is ἐὰν ἀστός ξένον: πολιτης being a correlative term. See 70 B 8, 91 A 7.

23. ἐστι agreeing in number with the predicate: Hadley § 610 quotes Antiphon τετρ. ii 3 § 8 αἱ χρηματία τικάνων εὐδαι- μονίας σημεῖων ἐστι. This usage must be distinguished from such instances as Ethyl. 302 C ἐστι ἑμοῖγε καὶ βωμολ, where there is no singular predicate, and the ἐστι is only justified by coming first, the number of the subject being not yet determined.
CHAPTER XXIX

1. οὗτοι ἄρα: see on 80 Ε 8.

οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι: we have here and in the sequel another aspect of the paradox referred to on 90 Ε 5. Cp. Apol. 2440 fol. : in the special Arts, says Socrates, many can spoil, few can benefit: in Virtue the reverse seems according to Meletus to be the case: the ‘man in the street’ works for good; the experts—the sophists and I—for evil.

3. δυν οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἄφελοσιν, ‘they differ so much as amounts to this—they not only,’ etc. ; see J. Adam on Euthyphr. 1140. For δυν = δώτε followed by the indicative cp. Xen. Cyr. VIII 4 τοσοῦτον ἔδει διαφέρειν δεῖ τῶν δούλων δυν οὐ μέν δούλοι ἄκουλτε τοῖς δεσπόταις ὑπηρετοῦσι: Isocr. 13 (ἐν Σοφ. 20) 43 τοσοῦτον ἀπολείμμεθα . . δον οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων αυτριάς τὴν παράδειγμα τὴν αὐτῶν ἐκλεῖν ἐτόλμησαν κτέ.; ibid. 54 τοσοῦτον ἐδεί διαφέρομεν τῶν προγόνων δυν οἴκειν μὲν τοὺς αὐτῶν προστάτασ τῇ τῆς πάλαι θητοῦν καὶ στρατηγοῦς ἱππότων; ibid. 96 τοσοῦτον γὰρ ὑπερβάλλον ἀμαρτήματι δυν οἶς πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι σφαγάς ἐποιήσαν. The instances are all after expressions of difference (Kühner § 582. 1).

D 6. τούτων: the gen. of price is here substituted for ἐπί with the dat. (ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτων) at 90 D 20.

χρήματα ἄξιοι πράττεσθαι: the taking of fees for instruction was the distinguishing note of the ‘sophists,’ who thus created a teaching profession. See on the general question Zeller pre-Socrates II 436 fol., also Hipp. maj. 281 Β–283, particularly 282 οτί τῶν ἐκείνων ὁδείς πάντως ἴσος ἄργυρον μαθόν πράξασθαι οὐδ' ἐπιδείξῃς ποιήσασθαι ἐν παντο- δαῖοι ἀνθρώποις τῆς οἰκουμείας. The context tells us that Gorgias (see on 70 Α 7) and Prodicus have made more money by their σοφία than any artist from any art, and so did Protagoras before them; but Hippias can boast of having made as much money as any two sophists. On the contrary, Anaxagoras, instead of growing rich, spent a fortune that had been left him.

8. Protagoras was the first to make σοφία a profession. So in Prot. 317 Β he avows himself a sophist, and Socrates, ibid. 348 Β, says to him καὶ οὗτοι πεντάσεικες σαυτῷ, δοὺς καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένος σύ γ' ἄναφανδον σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυκόμενοι εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, σοφιστὴν ἐποιημάτας,
σεαντον ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετής διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τοῦτον μαθην ἀξίωσας ἄρωσθαι. Diog. L. (ix 52) says of Protagoras οὗτος πρῶτος μαθὴν εἰσεπράξατο, μνᾶς ἐκατὸν. Protagoras, however, recognized that the success of the master is best attested by the pupil's recognition of the benefit conferred, and so 'left it to the pupil to decide at the end of the instructions what he would give, if the price seemed to him excessive.'—Zeller pre-Socrates π. 409 note (see Prot. 328 b c).

As to the priority of Protagoras we read in † Alc. i 119 a that two Athenians, Pythodorus and Callias, each paid 100 minae to Zeno of Elea for their instruction. The statement is probably to be rejected; for, though the date of Zeno's birth is uncertain, there is little doubt that he was older than Protagoras (Zeller pre-Socrates π. 609 note). Still it is not impossible that Zeno, like Gorgias, though older than Protagoras, may have followed an example set by his junior. The same fee is asserted for Gorgias (Diod. xi 53, Zeller pre-Socrates π. 415: he thinks these fees 'greatly exaggerated'). Euenos of Paros was content with the more modest figure of 5 minae (Apol. 20 b).

Fees were also charged for separate lectures: Diog. L. xi 50 says that Protagoras and Prodicus made collections after their readings (λόγους ἀνεγεγραμμένους ἡραίητους). See Crat. 384 b, where Socr. says he could not afford to hear τὴν πεντηκονταδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν of Prodicus, but only τὴν δραχμαίαν.

12. τέρας λέγει, εἰ ὅκ ἄν: for εἰ after expressions of wonder, etc., to express the object of the emotion see Goodwin MT. § 494. For εἰ followed by ἄν with the optative see on 79 C 27. For εἰ ὅκ see Goodwin MT. §§ 386, 387: 'When two clauses introduced by μὲν and δὲ depend upon a single εἰ, which precedes them both, ὅκ is used even more frequently than μῆ. He refers to Phaedo 97 a θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ δὲ μὲν ἐκατέρων αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἄλληλων ἦν . . ὅκ ἦσθιν τότε δύο, επεί δὲ ἐπηλεύσασαν ἄλληλος κτέ.

17. τῷ λυμῷ: words denoting affections of the mind or body when spoken of as causes (in the dative, or in the genitive with ὑπὸ), often take the article, denoting not the feeling in general but the particular occurrence of it. So here τῷ λυμῷ, 'fame quae tunc oriatur necesse est,' Fr. We have the art. with λυμὸς Ar. Peace 483, Xen. Anab. i 5, Dein. Aristocr. (23) 156. In Plato, where the word λυμὸς occurs, it is always, as here, mentioned as a cause; we have the art. here and Symp. 207 b; the art. omitted Rep. 416 a, Euthyphr. 4 d, Gorg. 464 e. At Symp. 191 a the MSS. vary: Sch. writes ὑπὸ λυμοῦ without the article. Cp. ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους 82 A 29.
31 ἀρα: the sentence as a whole is an argument by contrast ('ex contrariis conclusum'), to which the rhetoricians gave the name ἐνθόμμα par excellence. See Cicero Top. § 55, and cp. Quint. v x 1, 2; xiv 2. We have several instances of it in this portion of the dialogue.

In sentences of this sort the combination of particles δὲ ἀρα imports that a juxtaposition of two ideas reveals an incongruity. The idiom is common in Plato. The sentence is in form paratactic, the real emphasis being on the clause with δὲ. Sometimes we have ἀρα with the μὲν clause as well as with the δὲ, whereby each part of the antithesis is brought into relief (see exx. 7, 8, 9 below).

A. Sometimes the paradox is introduced by some phrase expressive of surprise, as τέρας λέγεις εἰ here.

(1) Απολ. 34 c τάχα δ' ἂν τις οὐμὼν αγανακτήσειεν εἰ ὁ μὲν ἱκτένευε... ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀρα τούτων ποιήσω.
(2) Ibid. 37 c d (I should be a fool to think that) ὑμεῖς μὲν δυντες πολιταὶ μοι οὐχ οὐκε τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμᾶς διατριβᾶς... ἄλλοι δὲ ἀρα αὐτὰς οἴσου τί δίδησω.
(3) Gorg. 512 λογίζεται οὖν δι' οὐκ εἰ μὲν τὶς μεγάλως καὶ ἀνιστος νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος ηὴ ἀπενίγη, οὕτως μὲν ἄθλως ἐστίν δι' οὐκ ἀπέθανεν... εἰ δὲ τίς ἀρα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνιστα τούτω δὲ βιωτέον ἐστίν.
(4) Theaet. 161 c (Protagoras might have jeered at us) ἐνδεκάμενοι δι' ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτῶν δοσπερ θεὸν θαυμαζόμεν εἰς σοφία, δὲ δ' ἀρα ἐπιγχανὲν ὃν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων γρηγοροῦ.
(5) Phil. 30 a b οὖ γὰρ ποιοῦντο... τούτῳ ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν... σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι... τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τούτων δυνῶν ἐν διὸ τε οὐκραίν... ἐν τούτοις δ' οὐκ ἀρα μεμονάχθαι τήν τῶν καλλίστων φύσιν.

B. Sometimes it appears as a question, as 94 B 18.

(6) Crit. 46 ὁ ἦ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθυρήσας καλῶς ἔλεγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο δι' ἄλλως ἐλέγετο;
(7) Ibid. 50 ε ὃ πρὸς μὲν ἀρα σοί τῶν πατέρα οὐκ εἷς ἤσοι ἤν τό δίκαιον... ὡστε ἀπεράντως ταύτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν... πρὸς δὲ τήν πατρίδα ἀρα καὶ τούς νόμους ἐστίν σοι;
(8) Prot. 325 b c διδακτοῦ δὲ δυντο (τῆς ἀρετῆς) τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἀρα τοὺς υἱὸς διδακτοῖν, ἐφ' όσι οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἢ ἡμῖν... ἐφ' δ' οὖν δὲ τὴν ἡμῶν θάνατος... ταύτα δ' ἀρα οὐ διδακτοῖν;
(9) Rep. 600 c d (Homer cannot really have been an educator, or his contemporaries would have made much more of him) ἄλλα Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἀρα δ' ἀριστερῆς καὶ Πρόδοκος δ' Κέιος... ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ υἱὸς σοφός φιλοῦνται... "Ομηρὸν δ' ἀρα οἶ ἐν' ἐκείνου... ἢ Ἡσιόδος βασιλεῖν ἄρθρων ἁμπιτάτοις εἶπεν;
(10) Phaedo 68 a ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν... ἀποθανόντων...
pολλοὶ δὲ ἐκοντεῖς ἠθέλησαν εἰς "Αἰδοὺν ἐλθεῖν .. φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ δει τῶν ἔρων .. ἀγανακτήσῃ ἀποθύρισεις;
(11) Ibid. 80 D καὶ δὲ μέρη τοῦ σῶματος .. δεινὸς ὡς ἔτος εἰσεὶν ἀθάνατα ἔστιν· ἣ οὖ; Να. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀείδες .. αὐτὴ δὲ δὴ ἣμῶν .. ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σῶματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσχηται;
(12) Laws 647 C ή τῇ μὲν δείλῃ τῇ ἐν αὐτῶ προεμαχόμενον καὶ νικώμασ αὐτὴν δὲ τέλεος οὕτω γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν .. σώφρων δὲ ἄρα τελέως ἔσται μὴ πολλαῖς ἦδοναι .. διαμεμαχη-

In all these places δὲ ἄρα occurs in the second half of an antithetic argument. But δὲ ἄρα often occurs without any previous antithesis, where δὲ is merely connective, and ἄρα has its usual force. For instances of this see Hipp. maj. 283 B, Euthyd. 279 A, Gorg. 493 B, 513 A, Phaedo 107 B, Laws 660 B, Hipparch. 229 C. See also on 97 C 30.

18. Ἀλάνθανεν διαφθέιρων: a similar argument is used by Socrates in his own favour, Apol. 33 D foll.: 'If I really corrupt youths, they, or at any rate their guardians, would have found it out and assailed me long ago.'

21. ἀποθανείς: according to Philochorus (sp. Diog. L. ix 55), he was drowned on a voyage to Sicily. The limits of his life appear to be about 481-411 B.C. According to Diog. L. ix 51 and 54, he was accused of impiety before the Four Hundred, exiled, and his books burnt (cp. Cic. N.D. i § 63). If we accept this story, the shipwreck may have taken place on his flight from Athens. But Mr. St. George Stock, in his note here, has pointed out that the story of his prosecution is very doubtful. The expressions here and those which Plato puts into his mouth, Prot. 317 B, seem inconsistent with his ever having suffered seriously from any attacks.

ἔγγυς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα: no other instance of ἔγγυς καὶ is forthcoming. καὶ is struck out in Γ (Coislinianus) by a later hand, and does not appear in Stephanus. Except Buttmann all the modern editors keep it. It must be explained on the analogy of καὶ after ἵνα, etc. (L. & S. καὶ Α III i). The use with ἐς (καὶ ἐς ἐβδομήκοντα μυριάδας Ἠδτ. ii 60, cp. 68; L. & S. s.v. καὶ Α ν) is not parallel.

26. οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκεῖνοι: who these were is 92 A not very clear. See on 91 D 8. Gorgias was probably rather older than Protagoras (Zeller pre-Socrates ii 413 note; Frey's dates for his life, 483-375 B.C., are accepted by Ueberweg-

Heinze § 29 and R. & P. 183 A), but he was younger in the profession. Hippias (Hipp. maj. 282 B) and Prodicas (Prot.
317 c) were both younger. (The expression of Protagoras at the place last quoted, odëvôs tòv ou πάντων ἀν ύμων καθ' ἡλικιάν πατήρ εἶναι, must be hyperbolical, as he was only about twelve years older than Socrates. Cp. 320 c.)

But perhaps Socrates here is not confining his remarks to professional sophists. Protagoras (Prot. 316 d) asserts that the wise men of old were really sophists in disguise, and this fancy Socrates seems to countenance (ibid. 342 a b).

27. οἷς δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ δυνατές: this is probably to be referred to the dramatic date of the dialogue, about 402 B.C. At that time Protagoras was dead, but the other three great sophists, Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus, were probably alive. Zeller (pre-Socrates ii 417 note) points out that Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias are all spoken of in Apol. 19 E as flourishing at the time of Socrates’ trial in 399 B.C.

CHAPTER XXX

1. πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μάλισται: cp. τοσοῦτον δέω εἰδέναι 71 A 26, and on 79 B 20. The infin. is 'consecutive,' the meaning being the same as if ὡστε accompanied it: Apol. 30 D, 37 B, Lysis 204 E, Phaedr. 228 A, Latoes 660 B. Cp. Prot. 329 B συμ-κροῦ τινὸς ἐνδεχὴς εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, 35 D (Kühner §477 e). Where the infin. is negative we often have μὴ οὐ: Euthyd. 297 B ὡστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φείγειν, 'I am far from not running away from two.' (The μὴ οὐ is a real negative, as after αἰσχρῶν, ἄδονατον, etc. See on 90 E 26.) At Theaet. 166 D we have the article with μὴ: πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἴναι.

All the above instances are 'personal': we have the impersonal πολλοῦ δεῖ at Gorg. 517 A (where with Madv. and Sch. place full stop after ὃ Σώκρατες), Apol. 35 D etc.

At Symp. 203 c πένθος δεῖ ἐστιν καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπαλὸς τε καὶ καλὸς... ἀλλὰ σκληρὸς κτέ., it is not so well to understand εἴναι (which Badham would insert) as to suppose that πολλοῦ δεῖ is stereotyped in the sense 'by no means.' We have πολλοῦ δεῖ once in this sense, Dem. Aristocr. (23) 7 τὸν εἴδει πολλοῦ δεῖν ἔξων δεῖν (Goodwin §779 a). Cp. on 80 B 23.

3. τῶν νέων: 'partitive' gen. The word is put at the end for emphasis, and is balanced by οἷς προσήκουσι. Anytus believes in 'home' teaching versus professional. Interference with home influence was one cause of jealousy against the 'sophists,' Prot. 316 c. Cp. Xen. Mem. I ii 51 for the same feeling in the case of Socrates. Intr. §6.

B 6. εἰτε ἔριος... εἰτε ἀστός: see on 91 C 21. Here ἔριος is
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characteristic of most 'sophists,' who were travellers, men without a fixed home or city—thus 'vagabonds' in the eyes of the many. By ἀστός Socrates himself is hinted at. In Soph. 223 D we have the art of the sophist divided according as he carries his wares from city to city (ἐμπορικὴ) or sells them at home (κατηλικὴ) (cp. Prot. 313 c). The wandering sophist is defined at 224 b, and then, ibid. e, follows the definition of the stay-at-home sophist, who may either retail goods bought from others, or sell goods of his own manufacture (κατηλικὴν εἰτε αὐτοπωλικὴν).

11. ὄσι.. ὄσι: see on 75 A 4.

15. The ye implies an affirmative answer: 'I am, and may C I continue so.' See App. on the text.

16. οὖσαν: see on 73 D 11.

18. ἀπειρος εἶς: see on 89 E 25. Goodwin § 531 quotes this passage, translating 'how then could you know about that thing of which you had no experience at all.' τωτοῦ is here an indefinite anaphoric (εἰς with rel. and subj.). Cp. Euthyd. 302 λαῦε & σο εἰκείη. Cobet, Coll. crit. p. 49, dissatisfied with this, proposed for τοῦτον τῷ πράγματος to read ὤνον Πράγματος. (See CR. xiv 11 for a criticism on his view, where inter alia Gorg. 450 B is quoted: εἰπέρ ταὐτην ἤμερομερήν καλείς ἥ ἄν Ἰ περὶ λόγως). Sch., on the other hand, believing that the question is not general, but concerning 'this particular matter,' reads ἀπειρος εἰ. A.N. Ἡ ῥαδίως. (One MS., Coisl., has εἰς corrected to εἰ.) I think the reply of Anytus shows that the question is put in a general form. He replies ῥαδίως to the general question, and then with τὸν τὸν γοῦν restricts himself to the particular case of the sophists. Kühner § 399. 6 b quotes this place, regarding εἶς as 'attracted' into the mood of εἰκείης ἄν; and Goodwin, at the end of § 531, where he quotes this passage, observes that 'all these examples fall under the general rule for assimilation § 558.' But the fact that the antecedent and relative clauses both have the optative mood is due to the similarity of the nature of the clauses; it is hardly necessary to call in such a cause as 'assimilation' to explain the usage. Moreover, such optative relative clauses, expressing a vague future condition, do not always depend on another optative. See 96 C 8 and Theaet. 155 λ (φήσωμεν) ὦ μῆτε προστιθῶντο μῆτε ἀφαίροντο τοῦτο μῆτε ἀδέκανοντο ποτε μῆτε ποιῶν, Kühner § 560. 4.

19. οἷον: see App. on the text. There are many places in which the relative οἷον is used in the sense of οἷος. Kühner § 562. 4 says that οἷον is often used in dependent questions, not
like τις or ὁστὸς to determine the identity of a person or thing (71 B 7), but in the sense of ὁστὸς (Lat. qui for qualis). In these cases the object is supposed known; its quality has to be determined. E.g. Thuc. I 136 (Θεμιστοκλῆς) δῆλοι δὲ ἐστίν (=qui sit, 'shows what he is,' shows his true character'); but ibid. 137 φράζει τῷ ναικελήρῳ ὁστὸς ἐστιν (quid sit, 'tells him who he is'). Cp. 80 D 37: Eur. Alc. 660 ἐκεῖνος εἰς ἔργον ἐξελθὼν δὲ ἔτη: Soph. Aj. 1259 οὐ μαθὼν δὲ οἱ φύσιν: O.C. 1171: Rep. 484 A οἱ μὲν φιλόσοφοι καὶ οἱ μὴ...ἀνεφάνησαν οἱ ἐστὶν ἐκατέρω: ibid. 559 A παράδειγμα ἐκατέρω αὐτῷ εἰσὶν: Gorg. 512 A εἰς ταῦτα δὲ αἰτῶν βελτίως ἐξεβιβάσεν ἢ οἱ ἐνέβιησαν: Εὐθυδ. 283 D (in a sophism) δὲ μὲν οὐκ ἐστιν, βούλευε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, δὲ δὲ οὐκ ἐνόν, μηκέτι εἰναι: Phaedr. 243 B ἐσπερ ἢν γὰς δὲ ἔτη. See also Kühner § 554. 2.

On the other hand we have 94 B 11 ὁμὲς ὁστὸς ἐστιν, Lach. 183 C, Menex. 249 D οἴδα οὐτὶ ἐστίν, etc.

20. εἶτε οὖν: the particle οὖν is originally confirmative; its later inferential use is foreign to Homer and Pindar, and very rare in Aesch. In alternative suppositions it is added to the one that it is desired to bring into prominence: Apol. 27 C (δαμάνων) εἶτε οὖν καὶ εἴτε παλαιά; Laws 639 B ἄν τε οὖν ναυτά ἀν τε μὴ. Sometimes both members have οὖν, if it is intended to give separate prominence to each: Apol. 34 E καὶ τοῦτο τὸνομα (σοφὸν) ἐχοντα, εἶτε οὖν ἀληθές εἴτε οὖν ψεύδος; Laws 334 D ἓν τε οὖν δυσλὼν ἓν τε οὖν καὶ ἐλεύθερον (μανῶμενον) περιφρ. Here εἴτε οὖν ἀπείρως αὐτῶν is said with dark meaning, for Anytus believes that he has at the very moment the prince of 'sophists' before him.

εἴτε μὴ: see on 87 B 35.

Chapter XXX (92 C 20) to Chapter XXXIV (95 A).—Socr. I am not concerned to defend the sophists. But who do teach Virtue if they do not? An. Any respectable man. Socr. But look at the great men of our city, Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, Thucydides; they had their sons educated in everything that could be learnt, but in ἀρετῇ they never trained them to be anything like as good as themselves. An. You have no veneration, Socrates, you will get into trouble.

22. ἐκ ἄν, 'to judge from what.' This use of ἐκ is common in Plato. Cp. 93 B 1 ἐκ τοῦ σαντοῦ λόγου, Crilo 43 D ἐκ ἄν ἀπαγγέλλοντι ἥκοντες τινες ἀπὸ Σωκράτους.

23. ἀλλὰ γὰρ: see Excursus III.

D 26. ἐκείνους: prolepsis. We expect in the sequel ταρ’
où; but after the parenthesis καὶ . . εὐεργετήσων we have the interrogative παρὰ τίνας substituted.

27. παραθύρων: see 90 B 2.

28. φράσας: the aor. ptcp. is often used with an aor. tense to express, not an action anterior to that of the main verb, but a circumstance of it. So 77 A 5 ὑπὸχειν ἀποδόων εἶπὼν, 'perform your promise by saying,' ibid. 7 εἶτας ὅλην εἰπέ, Phaedo 60 c εῦ ἐποίησας ἀναμυνήσας με (where see Heindorf's note), Euthyd. 282 c εῦ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με.

It seems impossible to separate from these, except by the general sense, instances where the aor. ptcp. used with an aor. tense denotes an anterior action, as. Thuc. 1 Βουσοῖ οἱ ἔξ Ἁρμην ἀναστάντες τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἄκησαν, Xen. Anab. 1 in 8 Κύρος συγκαλέσας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς εἶπεν, F.E.T. 139, 148, CR. 1v 425 (Campbell); v 3 foll. (Frank Carter); 248 foll. (R. Whitelaw) and vii 34 a.

29. τὴν ἀρετὴν: a similar acc. with words like ἀγαθός is common: contrast 91 B 9, and see note on the text there. Cp. 93 A 10, B 18, D 12, 19, E 31, Apol. 20 B καὶ τὸ καὶ ἄγαθῳ τῷ προσήκουσιν ἀρετῆ, ibid. D ταύτῃ (τῷ σοφίᾳ) εἶναι σοφός, Lach. 194 D, Prot. 324 D (a passage near akin to the present) ἢν δὲ αὐτὸν ἀρετὴν ἄγαθον, Gorg. 526 A, Euthyd. 292 D οὐ τί ἔσονται ἄγαθοι; Rep. 349 E.

31. τί δὲ αὕτω σοι σὺ ἐφφασάς; this form is equivalent to a forcible imperative. It is commonest in Plato and Xenophon (Kühner § 386. 10, Jelf 403. 3). The aorist is by some explained as referring to past time: 'Why did you not tell him?' i.e. 'Tell him at once!' It seems, however, that the aorist here was not felt as a past tense, as we find it with primary sequence: Prot. 317 D τί οὖν οὐ ἱππεῖκαν καὶ Ἰππιάν ἐκλέσαμεν ἵνα ἐπικούσωσιν ἡμῶν; cp. Parm. 136 c ἀλλὰ μοι τί οὐ διήλθες ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; There are certain idioms in which the indic. aor. has no sense of past time, as the exclamations ἢ τὴν, ἄταπτυσα, etc. Perhaps the same momentary or exclamatory force of the aorist developed the usage now discussed. τί οὖκ; with the aorist is rather a command than a question; τί οὖκ; with the present is rather a question than a command. The difference is similar to that between 'Why not tell him?' and 'Why do you not tell him?'

The great majority of instances are in the 2nd sing.: but see Aesch. P.V. 747 τί οὖκ ἐν τάξει ἔρρην ἐμαυτὴν τῷδ’ ἀπὸ στυφλοῦ πέτρας; Soph. O. T. 1002 τί δήπ’ ἐγὼ οὐχὶ τοῦ τοῦ φάθου σ’, ἀναξ, ἐξελυσάμην; Aristoph. Lys. 182 τί δήπ’ ταῦτ’ οὖρ ως τάχιστα ἐξωμυδάσαμεν; Plato Charm. 154 ε τί οὖν οὐκ ἀπεδό-

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The following are instances of the 2nd sing. in Plato:—

Charm. 155 ά τι οὐκ ἐπέδειξάς μοι τὸν νεαρὰν καλέσας δεῦρο;
Prot. 310 ά τι οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμᾶς τὴν συνομίλαν;
Gorg. 503 Β τι οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας;
Ibid. 509 Ε τι οὐκ αὐτὸ γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω;
Symp. 173 Β τι οὖν οὐ διηγήσω μοι;
Menex. 236 Β τι οὖν οὐ δεήλθες;
Parm. 136 ο quoted above.
Soph. 251 Ε τι οὖν οὐκ ἔφ᾽ ἐκάστου τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω;
Phil. 54Β τι οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίσω σαυτῷ, ὁ ἴωκρατες;
ΣΩ. Οἴδεν δὲ τι οδ (an assent to a command rather than an answer to a question).
† ALC. i 114 Β τι οὖν ἀπεδείξας;

Contrast with these Gorg. 504 C τι δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὁ ἴωκρατες;
ΣΘ. ὉΛΛ᾽ εἶ σου ἡδίν ἐστιν ἐγὼ ἐρώ, Prot. 310 Ε τι οὐ βαδίζομεν πρὸς αὐτὸν;
(Lysias explains it is too early),
Lysis 211 D δὲ καλεῖ με Μενέκκενον ἑρωτάν. Τι οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὂς,
οὐκ ἑρωτάς;

Ε 34. ιδως τι λέγεις, 'perhaps there is something in what you say.' Contrast οἴδεν λέγων just above, also 79 E 47, etc.

ἐν τῷ μέρει, 'in your turn'; ἐν μέρει, 'in turn.' The former looks at the succession in reference to some particular member of the series: ἐν τῷ μέρει Gorg. 462 Α, 474 ΑΒ, Symp. 198 Α, 199 Α, Soph. 225 Ε, Phil. 50 Ε (Eur. Or. 452).


38. διότι γὰρ ἐν ἐντολῇ: see on 91 C 1.

τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν: the phrase is used in a moral, not in a political sense; for Anytus was a democrat. Intr. § 6.
CHAPTER XXXI

2. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, 'spontaneously': 90 Α 39, Prot. 328 Α, + Αθ. i 118 Β (etc.).

τοιοῦτοι = καλὸι κάγαθοι. The participial clause that follows couples on what is really a separate part of the question: 'and without learning from anybody are they still able, etc.?'

5. ἄξιος, 'I expect you to grant'; cp. the (mainly trans-atlantic) use of 'I claim.' Instances where, as here, the verb is followed by a proposition in the acc. and infin. occur Gorg. 450 c τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἄξιον εἶναι πείρα λόγου, Phaedo 86 D ἐδώ τε ἄξιον κράσιν ὀδόν τὴν ψυχήν. . . ἀξιόλογαν, Apol. 18 D, Rep. 610 Α, Polit. 262 Ε, etc. Different are such places as 91 D 6 χρήματα ἄξιοι πράττεσθαι.

παρὰ τῶν προτέρων: this is the point of view of Protagoras in his apologue; see on B 17 below.

6. ἦ, like Latin an, was originally attached to the second member of a double question; then often to a question when a former member might be understood. Cp. 71 Β 5, also C 11, D 13 below, 85 Ε 32 and some of the questions quoted on 91 Ε 17.

10. καλ ἦτι, 'and, what is more.' So Buttmann: 'insuper,' 'praeterea.' This seems the best way of taking it. Another way is to take ἦτι temporally (= jam), 'before now.' A third alternative, to take ἦτι υἱοῦ ἡρετον in the sense of ἦτι μᾶλλον, 'yet more,' may be dismissed, for the litotes υἱοῦ ἡρετον would be entirely spoiled by the addition of ἦτι.

Socrates hints that the statesmen of a former generation, though he does not think very highly of them, were superior to the men of the present.

14. η ὑ: see on 86 D 12. Of course ὑ here negatives not ἄγαθοι, but Αθρτι.

17. ἄρα οί ἄγαθοι ἀνδρεῖς κτέι: see on 90 Β 5. This ground B has been gone over in the Protagoras. Socrates urges as an argument that Virtue cannot be taught, the fact that good fathers often have bad sons: 319 Ε—320 C (a passage closely akin to the present). In answer to this Protagoras relates a fable, according to which the rudimentary principles, Shame and Justice, that form the necessary moral basis of society, were implanted at the creation in every human creature. He then (324 D—326 Ε, cc. xiv, xv) explains the process of moral education to which children are subjected, by instruction, admonition, and punishment. Thence he goes on (ch. xvi) to
deal with the problem why good fathers have bad sons; the reason being that all have not the same aptitude for virtue.

In the Laches we have a similar topic. Lysimachus, son of Aristides, and Melesias, son of Thucydides, complain that they are not on a level with their distinguished fathers (179 D): καὶ αὐτῶμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἦμῶν, δι’ ἡμᾶς μὲν εἰόν τρυφάν, ἐπειδὴ μειράκια ἐγενόμεθα. They are very anxious that their own sons shall be educated so as to be worthy of their illustrious grandfathers, whose names they bear. Whence naturally follows a discussion where to look for teaching. Nearly related is Apol. 20 A foll. If Callias’ sons were colts or steers, a trainer for them could easily be found; as it is, who is to train them? ‘Euenus, of Paros, for five minae’: καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐήνου ἐμακάρια ἐν ἄληθῶς ἔχει ταῦτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμελέως (‘on such reasonable terms’) διδάσκει.†

† ALC. i 118 D foll. looks like an imitation of the passages in the Protagoras and the Meno. The author of the compilation πεπλεῖν ἀρετής (cp. on 70 A 1) 377 B foll. has incorporated this passage, 93 D 13–94 E 15, almost verbatim.

18. ᾧν: see on 92 D 29.

20. παραδοτόν, ‘transferable; παραληπτόν, ‘receivable.’ See on 70 A 2.

CHAPTER XXXII

2. Plato for his illustrations takes two pairs of rivals, Themistocles and Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides. Themistocles is remembered only as a great popular statesman. The darker memories attaching to his name are ignored. It must be remembered that the charges of complicity in the treason of Pausanias, brought against him after his ostracism, were never proved. See Dr. Thompson on Gorg. 516 D. But for Plato’s purpose the truth or falsity of such charges is not very important. In † Theages 126 A Themistocles with Pericles and Cimon are spoken of as types of men τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινολ. In Gorg. 455 ε Gorgias couples him with Pericles as achieving practical results by oratory.

It is instructive to compare the Gorgias with the Meno in regard to the treatment of prominent Athenian statesmen. The lists are different; in the Gorgias we have Miltiades and Cimon in place of Aristides and Thucydides in the Meno: see 503 c, where Callicles gives the names of four ἀγαθοὶ ἀνδρεῖς who have made the Athenians better. At 515 D Socrates disallows this claim, and at 519 A he says that the people suffering from former pampering will fall out with their present advisers:
and by comparison will praise their older leaders. The
object in the two dialogues is different: in the Gorgias it is
disparagement of their work as statesmen; in the Meno the
point is that, however good they were, they could not train
their sons. Dr. Thompson (Introd. p. xix) also compares
Theaet. 172c foll., but adds that 'there is not one of Plato's
dialogues in which the public men of the best times of Athenian
history are treated with such indiscriminating severity as in
the Gorgias.' Athenaeus, 506α, regards Plato's strictures on
Aristides and Themistocles as merely a proof of his malevolent
spirit.

7. εἶναι is imperfect. Cp. Phaedo 76ε ἀναγκαῖον... τὴν
ήμετέραν γυνὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονότας ἦμᾶς. So presently
φονεῖν, παραδίδουν, and 93c 30 βούλεσθαι. This is a 'past
particular supposition' (Goodwin § 402): 'if any one was a
teacher, he was.'

8. εἰπέρ ἐβούλετο γε: see Exc. II and cp. E 33. εἰ γε
ἐβούλετο would be 'assuming, of course, that he wished'; the
text is 'if only he wished to do so': γε points ἐβούλετο.

9. ἀν ἐβουλήθη: the 'potential indicative,' Goodwin §§ 244,
412, Kühner ii § 392. Cp. D 23 ιτίδασατ· ἀν, Αριστ. 18c ἐν
τάξι τῇ ἡμικρᾳ ἐν ὧν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύετο.

It is clear that in these instances ἀν does not point to an
'unfulfilled condition'; nor again do they fall under the
'iterative use' of which familiar examples are Thuc. vii 71. 3
εἰ μὲν τώ χειτὶς ὠφαίρε πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀν εἰθαρσὲ χὰν
τε ἀν: Αρ. Fros. 1022 δ'/θεωσάμενός ταύς ἀν τις ἀνδρὸς ἡ
δόεις εἰναι: Xen. Hell. iii 118 ἐπερρώσθη δ'/ἀν τις κάκεινο
ἴδων, Ἀγγιγάλαυον μὲν πρῶτον κτ.'

In neither of the two instances, here and at D 23 (where the
de virtute gives abidovar' ἀν) is there any expressed protasis, and
the supposed conditions summed up in ἀν are of the most general
description; indeed the omission of ἀν here would leave the
sense little altered. 94 D 10 is different.

On the subject of these constructions a 'Symposium' was
held, extending over several years, in the pages of the Classical
Review. The contributions are as follows:

iii 276 (summary of paper by Bayfield, read before the
Camb. Philol. Soc.).
iii 314, 343 (criticisms by R. C. Seaton).
iii 417 (ditto by Caskie Harrison).
iv 200 b (Bayfield).
iv 297 (Caskie Harrison).
v 397 'Conditions contrary to fact': Edw. B. Clapp.
vi 90 Bayfield replies.
VI 199 (Sonnenschein).
VI 201 Seaton rejoins.
This debate must have done a great deal to clear up the subject; but the most luminous utterance on the subject with which I am acquainted is Jebb's note on Soph. O.C. 964. 'Has not our way of translating αὖ led us to form too narrow a conception of the way in which the Greek idiom was used? Suppose, however, we treat αὖ as what in fact it is—a separate word which qualifies the statement of fact. αὖ is 'on that hypothesis': thus έλέεσαν, ἀπέβαλλεν αὖ is "if he fell, on that hypothesis he died." Thus we see how this use, though in practice restricted to the "unfulfilled condition," is large enough to include καί κτείνει "he probably slew" (Od. iv 546) and ἀνεβαργασαν αὖ "in that case they took courage."

The notion of non-fulfilment in αὖ with a past tense of the indicative is thus adventitious. When this combination is associated with a protasis containing εἰ and a past tense of the indic. the notion of unreality is inevitable; but to this form of condition may be applied the words of Allen and Greenough, Lat. Gr. p. 327 note: 'The implication of falsity in this construction (imp. and plupf. subj.) is not inherent in the subj., but comes from the transfer of future conditions to past time. Thus the time for the happening of the condition has at the time of writing already passed; so that if the condition remain a condition, it must be contrary to fact.' [These words will exemplify the quality of the book noted by Prof. Hale in his review of it, CR. ili 166: (in it) 'syntactical mechanisms are regarded not as results, intellectually perfect, of a rational mind, working with entire logic, but as results of the workings of multitudes of minds, proceeding in part logically, in part under the influence of associations of various kinds.' This is the only true attitude of mind for the study of grammar.]

Δέλλος τε ... μάλιστα δή: τε ... δή is not uncommon; in addition to the accession of emphasis expected by τε in the clause that follows it, δή imports a notion of contrast. Cp. Euthyphr. 3 ε σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἴμαι δή καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμῆν, Xen. Hell. vi ν 30 οί δὲ Ἀρκάδες τούτων τε εὐθὲν ἑποίουσιν καταλείποντες δὲ τὰ ἐπιλα οἰς ἀρπαγὴν ἑτρέποντο, Aesch. S. c. T. 579 (571) with Verrall's note.

C 11. ὅν: this is the preferable spelling, according to Sch. Plato forms the nom. and acc. sing. in the 2nd declension, and all the other forms in the 3rd, as D 17 τοῦ ὑέος, 94 B 13 νεῖτοι.

D 14. Κλέσφαντον: see Plut. Them. xxxii. 'Dictum ejus commemorat Plut. de ed. puer. 2 ὃς, δ᾽ τα ἀν ἀντάς βούληται,
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touto kai tw de'mw svndokei tw twv 'Athenaiow. & mwn gar avtov
èthe, kal h mhthn. & d' avh h mhthn, kal Theumotokh. & d' avh
Theumotokh, kal panteis 'Athenaiow.' Fr. If Cleophantus was a
'spoiled child,' we should not need to look much farther for
the cause of his failure.

διδασκατο: this raises the difficult question whether we may
regard as a separate force of the Middle Voice the meaning
to 'get a thing done by another' ('Causative Middle' F.E.T.
p. 127). Against this Riddell strongly argues, § 87. He does
not deny that διδασκομαι often means 'I have some one taught';
but contends that this sense is not peculiar to, or due to, the
Middle Voice, except in as far as it is deducible from the
general force of the Middle—the interest of the agent in the act.

He says that the ascription to the Middle Voice of this
meaning is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite
exemplification, διδασκαθαι, by some passages in the Meno. 'As
the favourite example thus falls to the ground, so do the rest.
danellēthai, for instance, is "to take a dandion," as danellēn is
"to give a danellon"; that is, the general meaning of the verb
being "to deal in danêia," the Middle means "to deal in them
for one's self." So, rather differently, "bringing a man to
justice" becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the
judge, krisen, and, on the interested side, the office of the
prosecutor, krisetha. The fact is that the Active Voice is
quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning "to get a
thing done by another"; neither Voice, however, by any
proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common
principle that "qui facit per alium facit per se,"" as we say a
man 'builds a house' or 'educates his sons.'

This view I believe to be right. But Mr. St. George Stock's
note on this place should be consulted, with CR. ii 29 a.

Neither Ast s.vv. διδασκεων, παιδευων, nor Kühner § 373. 6,
§ 374. 7, recognize a separate causal sense of the Middle. An
examination of these words will show, I think, that there is no
constant distinction between the active and middle voices.

(a) διδασκαθαι (causal as here) Prot. 325 BC (quoted on
91 E 17): Rep. 467 E kai διδαξαμένους ('having had them
taught') πεπεθεν, ακτέων επι την θεν: † Theages 122 E oik
διδάξατο σε τα πατήρ και επαθευσεν ἀπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ λοιποί
πεπειθείσης: † Ep. xiii 360 E ('if possible attend this
philosopher yourself') el δε μη, ἐκδιδαξαί των ('get some one
"coached")' لكα κατὰ σχολὴν μανθάνων βίλινν γλυγη: Xen.
Memb. iv iv 5, Cyn. i vi 2, Eur. Med. 295—

χρῆ δ' οὖν οὗτος δαστις ἀρτιφρων πέφυκ' ἀνήρ
παιδας περιυσώς εκδιδασκεθαι σοφῶς:
Aristoph. Clouds 1338 ἔδιδαζόμην μέντοι σε· Lucian Somn. init. ὁ παῖδας ἐκείνον μετὰ τῶν φίλων δὲ τι καὶ διδασκόμενο. In Hdt. ii 154 παῖδας παρέβαλε αὐτῶις Ἀλγυπτίους τὴν Ἐλλάδα γλώσσαν ἐκδιδάκτεσθαι, the last word may be either passive ('for them to be taught'); or middle in causal sense ('so as to have them taught'), as L. & S. take it: see s.v. ἐκδιδάσκω.

The middle appears in sense of the active, or 'merely with the idea of the teacher's interest superadded' (Jebb on Soph. Ant. 356) Menex. 238 b: (the gods) οἱ τῶν βιων ἡμῶν κατεσκέυασαν πρὸς τε τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν διαλειπαν, τέχνας πρῶτος παῖδας ἐκδιδάσκει μένοι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας φιλακείας διπλῶν κτήσει τε καὶ χρησιν διδασάμενοι: Find. Od. 8. 50 τὸ διδάσκοντι ὑπὸ τοι εἰσίτω ὑδάτων; Simonides (Bergk 145 = Anth. Poë. vi 213) διδασάμενοι χῶρον ἀνδρῶν: Mosch. 3. 97 διδάξαι σείο μαθητής: Bion 12 (2). 9. The use of ἐκδιδάσκατο in Soph. Ant. 356, 'hath he taught himself,' is exceptional, and seems due to the analogy of the pres. διδάσκωμαι reflexive, as in Aristoph. Wasps 2, and Simonides γηρᾶσκω δ' ἀεὶ πολλα διδασκόμενος. Cp. Aristoph. Clouds 783 οὐκ ἐν διδάσαμην στὶ στὶ (Elmsley διδάσαμι' ἐν στὶ στί, approved by Jebb l.c.): Plato Rep. 421 b καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ ὑδάτων ὑπὸ διδάσκοντο χειρον δημοφιλῶς διδάσκατον (Cobet διδάζει. The tense διδάζομαι is usually passive. See on 95D 4). On Luc. Somn. § 10 οὐκ ἐσ μακρᾶν σε διδάζομαι Heitland observes that the fut. mid. is used just like the active by late writers.

(β) διδάσκειν occurs 94 B 16, D 2, 3, where the context makes it clear that the teaching was done by means of others; Prot. 324 D (cp. διδάσκειν 325 b).

(γ) παιδευόμαι 'ἰστινιν ευρ' D 18: Rep. 546 b οὔ ηγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαίδευσαν: Eur. fr. 1053—

οὐ γὰρ τις οἶνος παῖδας ἐν παιδεύοιται

ἀλλ' ἐκ πονηρῶν μὴ ὡς κακοῦς πεφυκέναι.


(δ) παιδεύομαι, 'ἰστινιν ευρ': 93 Ε 31 παιδεύομαι 94 A 9, B 17, C 24: Prot. 319 ε ἀ μὲν διδασκάλως εἰκετό καλῶς καὶ εὐ ἐπαιδεύεσθαι: ibid. 320 A ἐν Ἀρήσσονος ἐπαιδεῦε: Cris. 50 D (the laws) παραγγέλλουτε τῷ πατρὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν μυστικῷ καὶ γυμναστικῷ παιδεύειν: ↑ Theaes. 122 ε (quoted above).

All this goes to show that the differentiation between the two voices was still incomplete. See Mr. E. H. Miles On the Early Meaning and Developments of the 'Middle' Voice, pp. 26, 7; 31. 2: also note on ψεύδο 71 D 29. Another verb that well
illustrates the intermixture of meanings in the two voices is
philasow.
A few instances of ‘causal middles’ may be added.
(1) Phil. 14 ε διαμολογοῦμεν no doubt means ‘having got
him to admit’; but this arises not so much from the voice as
from dia-. The admission which is to his interest is part of
a mutual process (cp. dia-legethai, etc.).
xxii 361A τὸν μὲν Ἀπόλλων ἐποιησάμην ‘I got the Apollo
made’: Plut. Them. v 4 αὐτοῦ ποιούμενον εἰκόνας. The notion
of procuring springs from the notion of interest.
(3) Kühner § 374. 7 points out how κατασωτάν (Xen. Hell.
v iv 7) and κατασωτάδαι (ibid. ii iv 20) are used in identical
sense ‘to put to silence,’ where the causal sense is due, not to
the voice, but to κατά (cp. κατηχεῖν, originally ‘to elicit a
resonance from,’ so ‘to test’; later ‘to catechise’).
(4) προστρίβεσθαι: Aristoph. Eq. 5 πληγάς δὲ προστρίβεσαι
toūς οἰκέτας ‘he gets stripes inflicted’ (L. & S. 111): εντρίβεσθαι
(L. & S. r 2). Here the causal sense is clear, and seems con-
fined to the middle: but it may be deduced from the notion of
interest.
(5) παρατίθεμαι, ‘I have served up to me,’ Thuc. r 130, etc.
But L. & S. s.v. B 1 quote the same verb from Od. xv 506
ὁδεῖν δέ κεν ομιὸν δοκιμορίον παραθέμων, of setting meat before
others: and from Plut. Per. 26 παρετίθεντο τῶν ἀναγκαίων διὰ
κτέ., of providing yourself.
(6) Sympr. 205 B ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν γε καὶ πόθας καὶ χείρας ἠθέλουσιν
ἀποτέλεσθαι οἱ ἀνθρώπως, which may mean either ‘to cut off
from themselves,’ or ‘to have cut off from themselves (by
another).’ It is absolutely indifferent who the agent is.

ἰπτεῖα ἐδιδαξατο ἀγαθόν: διδάσκειν and παθέον are treated
as ‘factitive’ verbs, with subst. or adj. as secondary predicates.
This appears in some of the instances quoted above. Cp. Eur.
Her. 575—
καὶ διδασκέ μοι
τοιούθεν τοῦσε παθάς ἐς τὸ πάν σοφοῦς.

Soph. O.C. 919 καὶ τοις σε Θηβαῖν γ' οὐκ ἐπαίδευσαν κακῶν: Eur.

So in the pass., Soph. O.C. 562 ἐπαιδεύθην ἔνοσ.
15. ὀρθὸς ἀστηκώς: the ‘ars desultoria.’ Cp. II. xv 680
foll.
16. ἐπαίδευσατο: see on ἐδιδαξατο (line 14 above).
καὶ ἐποίησε σοφῶν: change from rel. to demonstrative con-
struction. See on 74 D 35, 90 E 32.
19. διασκάλην ἀκέτο: for the phrase cp. 94Α 8, B 18; Prot. 319 ε, 324 δ: for the tense see on 93 D 51.

22. τὴν γε φῶν: nothing can illustrate more strikingly the difference between Plato’s point of view and ours. Because, forsooth, he had ability to learn horsemanship, he had ability to learn virtue.

23. ἢμεταρ’ ἀν τις: see on 93 C 9. Plato is fond of using αἰτιώμαι with inf.: Prot. 333 έ τὸν λόγον ἦταν δυσχερῆ εἶναι; Rep. 407 ο θείος θείωμεν ἐκ φιλοσοφιῶν ἐγγίνεσθαι; ibid. 599 ε (addressed to Homer) σε δὲ τίς αἰτιώμενα πόλει νομοθέτων ἀγάθων γεγονέναι; Crat. 396 δ καὶ αἰτιώμενο γε μάλιστα αὐτὴν (τὴν σοφίαν) ἀπὸ Βελτίωνοις προσπεπτωκέναι μοι.

E 32. τῶν γευτένων: below 94 Α 10 βελτίω ότου οὖν. Note the love of variety through this passage. τοιήσω: depends on βολεσθαι.

33. For ἀπερ... γε see on C 8 and Exc. II. There is a slight ellipse: ‘as he would have wished, if etc.’

CHAPTER XXXIII

94Α 2. ἐν τοῖς ἀριστοῖς: Kühner § 349 b 7 i, Hadley § 652. This strengthened superlative occurs in Hdt. and is commonest in Thuc. and Plato (Sympr. 178 c, etc.). The origin is probably from a phrase in which the superl. was repeated (ἐν τοῖς ἄριστοις ἀριστοῖς), and the best MSS. at Crat. 427 ε actually give ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις μέγιστον; but Sch. cuts out μεγάλοις.

4. Ἀριστείδην τὸν Δυσμάχου: see on 93 C 2. In the passage in the Gorgias in which the great statesmen of old are disparaged, the name of Aristides does not appear. In one place of the dialogue Plato recognizes Aristides’ superiority (526 A B): ‘the just use of power is very rare; still, there are some both here and elsewhere, and yet will be, καλοὶ κάγαθοι ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου διαχειρίζειν καὶ δὲ τις εἰπτρέπης· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάνω ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους “Ελληνες, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Δυσμάχου.”

8. Lysimachus and Melesias (94 C 23) appear in the Laches (see on 93 B 17). Lysimachus is there represented as an elderly man (189 c, cp. 201 b). The dramatic date of the Laches must be before 420 B.C., the date of Laches’ death. We may probably assume then that Lysimachus was born not very much after 500 B.C. He and Sophroniscus the father of Socrates were έταιρος τε καὶ φίλω Lach. 180 ε. (Socrates was born in 469 B.C.) ‘Lysimachus obscuram degebat vitam a civibus agro et argento
donatus ob paternae virtutis memoriam' Fr., who refers to Dem. Lept. (20) 115, and schol.

10. καὶ συγγένοις, 'you have actually met'; contrasted with ἀκήκοας in the case of Clephantus 93 E 27.

11. δρόζος οὖς ἐστὶν: this implies that Plato regards B Lysimachus as still alive at the dramatic date of the Meno (say 402 B.C.). According to what we gather from the Laches he must then have been at such an advanced age as to make a fair estimate of his powers difficult. Lysimachus would be some seventy years older than Meno. But Plato is not very careful about consistency in chronology. See Athenæus 505 Ε.

έι δὲ βούλει: see on 71 E 2.

Περικλέα: see on 93 C 2.

13. δύο ῥιδία: these are the two sons which Pericles had by his Athenian wife, the widow of Hipponicus. They were both carried off by the plague in 429 B.C. (Plut. Pericles 24. 5; 36. 4, 5). After their death the Athenians legitimated his son by Aspasia, named Pericles. Schol. on Menex. 235 Ε ἐκεί δὲ ὑπὸ αὐτῆς ('Ἀσπασίας) ὁ Περικλῆς νόθων νόθον, ἐφ' ὑ' καὶ ἐτελεύτα, τῶν γυναικῶν προακοδοικῶν.

The two sons (of whom Xanthippus seems to have been the elder) are mentioned in the Protagoras. At 815 Α they appear in the row of listeners walking up and down with Protagoras. At 320 Α the sophist gives them as examples of youths whose education has been neglected: νέμονται δουπερ ἄφετοι (‘browsing at large’), ἔφον τοῦ περιστόχως τῇ ἁρετῇ. In †Δι. i 118 Ε we read τῷ Περικλέους νεέ ἧλιῳ ἐγενέσθεν: with the scholiast oὖς καὶ βλυτομάμμας ἐκαλὼν. (The scholiast adds an explanation of the epithet, which, however, still remains obscure. It occurs in Aristoph. Clouds 1001, where the suggestion is that it was applied to the sons of Hippocrates.) Plut. Per. 36. 1 speaks of Xanthippus' extravagance, and his variance with his father; and Athenæus ν 220 οδ says that Antisthenes wrote disparagingly of both the youths. Lastly note Aristot. Rhet. π. xv 3 ἐξισταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφαντές γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἡθη... τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς ἀβελτριάν καὶ νυθρότητα, οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Κλίμων καὶ Περικλέους καὶ Σωκράτους, with which cp. Plato Polit. 310 C foll.

18. δὲ ἄρα: see on 91 E 17.

20. μὴ σῶκ ἢ διδακτῶν: see on 89 C 10.

23. Θεσπεδῆς: the son of Melesias (unrelated to the Τ historian), an aristocrat of unblemished respectability, is reserved for the climax. (See App. on the text Β 21). His son Melesias is introduced in the Laches (179 C) as the com-
panion and co-eval of Lysimachus. Here again the dates give trouble. For whereas Aristides died about 468 B.C., Thucydides was ostracized in 444 B.C., returned to Athens, renewed his opposition to Pericles, and perhaps survived him. His death thus was later than that of Aristides by some forty years. Are their children likely to have been coevals? Thucydides, to have a son coeval with Lysimachus, cannot have been born much later than 520 B.C. (see on A 8). This would make him at least 76 at the time of his ostracism. This is, of course, not impossible, but none of the accounts we have suggest his being so much older than his rival Pericles. Stephanus' name appears in a quotation from Polemo ap. Athen. iv 234 έ στήλη τίς έστιν, εν η ψήφισμα μεν Ἀλκιμαίδου, γραμματεύς δὲ Στέφανος Θουκυδίδου.

25. ἔταλαισεν: wrestling may have been a favourite sport of Thucydides, as is suggested by the anecdote Plut. Per. 8, Abbott's Hist. of Greece, ii 414 note.

26. ποι, 'as I understand': see on 75 C 29.

CHAPTER XXXIV

1. οὐκ ἄν ποτε: the negative refers to the whole double supposition following; or rather, if we regard the sentence as an instance of parataxis, to the latter half of it: 'he would not, while teaching his sons this, have omitted to teach them that.' This place and some quoted below are instances of argumentum ex contrariis conclusum (see on 91 E 17).

In sentences like this, where each member consists of a protasis and apodosis, we often have μὲν twice in the first number, δὲ twice in the second: Apol. 28 ε δεινά αν εἰς τοὺς εἰργαζόμενοι εἰ, δὲ μὲν με ολὸν τῶν ἑπτάτων τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκείνον ἑτάτων ἑμένον τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττωνος. ένταῦθα δὲ λίπους τὴν τάξιν: Gorg. 512 λ (quoted on 91 E 17): ibid. 514 Β C καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸ μὲν εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτὸ. Ovt. 386 λ ἐν τῷ ναι μὲν ἐν τῷ φαινεται τὰ πράγματα, τουaque μὲν ἐστιν ἐμι, οὐ μὲν οὐ μελέτες δ' αὖ σοι, τοιώθησα δὲ σοι: τ' Ἀλκ. i 108 ε αἰσχρὸν γε εἰ μὲν τις ἐρωτήσεις περὶ μὲν τῶν ἔχειν εἰλεῖν . . . περὶ δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν πέρι κτῆ. Kühner § 529. 2 quotes instances of μὲν . . . μὲν . . . δὲ . . . δὲ . . . from Hdt. (i 26, 102, 174); from Xenophon (as Oec. iv 8) and from Isocrates, whose love of παραλόγια perhaps led him to adopt this structure (see Sandys on Paneg. § 60). But often the structure is imperfect, μὲν being omitted in the first apodosis, as Prot. 313 λ ἢ εἰ μὲν τῷ σώματι ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἑκεῖ τῷ . . . πολλὰ δ' αὖ περιεκτικὸς ὁ . . . δ'
NOTES

perē pleitones ἦγεῖ . . perē δὲ τοῦτον κτὲ., Charm. 173 ο. D; or with both the first protasis and apodosis, Phaedo 78 c, Laches 194 π; or δὲ omitted in second apodosis as Xen. Oec. iv 7; or it is varied as Hdt. ii 39, where we have δὲ substituted for μὲν in the first apodosis, and in consequence ἦ for ἐ in the second protasis. See Buttmann's Demosthenes' Midias Exc. XII pp. 153 foll.

2-4. Δαπανώμενον . . ἀναλάσαντα: in both these clauses the participle contains the main thought that is dependent on ἐδείκται. Cp. Euthyd. 282 ε ἐπιστήμην ἦν δὲι λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν τε καὶ ἄγαθον ἀνδρα ἐσται. Gorg. 484 ὁ ὃς δὲι χρωμένον ὀμλεύν τός ἀνθρώπως, etc. So 50D 3 προθέμενοι, not ἐκησείς, contains the important idea.

6. ἄλλα γάρ: see Exc. III. This is an instance of ἄλλα γάρ introducing a supposed objection—a usage very rare in Plato, though Riddell (§ 147) does not think it necessary to illustrate it. Rep. 355 δ ἄλλα γάρ, φησὶ τις, ὅ ῥαδίον δὲι λανθάνειν κακὸν δυντα is the only parallel I can cite, and this itself differs from the present and other places, inasmuch as the words φησὶ τις, usually understood, are expressed. Other instances occur in the orators; Lysias κατ' Ἐρατ. § 40, Isocr. Paneg. (4) 175. See Sandys' note ibid. 140: ἄλλα γάρ ὅν ἐκ τοῦτων δικαίων ἐστὶ σκοπεῖν τὴν βασιλείας δύναμιν, ἐξ δὲν μεθ' ἐκατέρων γέγονεν, ἄλλα ἐξ δὲν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πεπολέμηκεν. He says the use is 'very common'; which can only apply to the orators. (I confess I do not understand why the two places first referred to should be printed as interrogations, and the last not.) Here ἄλλα goes with the sentence καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα; and the words from γάρ to τῶν συμμάχων really form a parenthesis, which is felt as a protasis. 'But, —as perhaps I shall be told, etc.—he was both of noble family and etc.'

7. καὶ τῶν συμμάχων: Thucydides, as an aristocrat, was likely to favour the claims of the allies.

10. ἐξαφνᾶν ἣν: see on 93 C 9. But this instance must be separated from those there treated, for here an unreal condition is implied in the words εἰπέρ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτῶν.

12. τῶν ἔπιχωρήσων: a variation for ἄστων (92 B 7). Ε

τις: this is in apposition to the object of ἐξαφνᾶν, and so might be accus., but we have an 'attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction' Riddell § 192. He quotes inter alia Apro. 41 οὐδὲν τῶν ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, εἰπέρ καὶ λέγονται ἕκει δικάζειν, Μίνως κτέ.
ei autōs μη ἐικόλαγον: cp. Lach. 179 c αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς μὲν εἰσὶν τρυφάν... τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα ἑπραγμένα. A simple past condition.

14. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, κτδ.: see Exc. III. The phrase is often used to sum up in conclusion.

μὴ οὖκ ἦ διδακτὸν ἀρετή: with the whole of the preceding discussion compare Socrates’ argument in the Protagoras 319 Α foll. The argument falls clearly into two divisions (1) public: on matters of general policy there are no expert advisers as there are with the special arts: (2) private 319 δ: if we look at the matter from the point of view of individuals, we find that even the best and wisest citizens cannot secure a similar virtue in their sons.

For μὴ οὖκ ἦ see on 89 C 10.

16. ῥαδίως often has a bad meaning; ‘lightly,’ ‘recklessly’; Fr. refers to Apol. 24 c ῥαδίως εἰς ἄγωνας καθιστά ἀνθρώπους: Crito 48 c τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινώντων: add Rep. 377 b, 378 Α, Laws 917 Β θεών ὄνομα μὴ χραίνειν ῥαδίως : Phaedo 63 Α τὶ γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἀνδρὲς σοφὸν δεσπότα ἄμεινοι αὐτῶν φεύγοντο καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοντο αὐτῶν; and soon afterwards οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσων, with which cp. the reproach of Hippolytos to Artemis (Eur. Hipp. 1441) μακρὰν δὲ λείπεις ῥαδίως ὀμιλιᾶν.

κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους: undoubtedly Socrates’ disparagement of Athenian statesmen, both past and present, was one chief cause of the suspicion in which he was held. See Apol. 23 Β foll. Of his three accusers Anytus was angered ὑπὲρ τῶν δημοὑργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. See Art. ‘Socrates’ in Encycl. Brit.

19. ὅσος μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ—ἐν τῷ δὲ καὶ: see an article by Milton W. Humphreys dealing with καὶ followed by δὲ καὶ in CR. xi 141.

20. Anytus is here no doubt referring to the facilities for prosecutions given by the system of popular juries, of which he is supposed to speak with approbation. Cp. Gorg. 521 b, etc.

21. καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι: we read in Apol. 32 b–d of two occasions, before the trial that led to his death, on which Socrates risked prosecution; but as he does not seem to have been actually prosecuted on either occasion, the reference here is probably quite general. The conversation with Anytus may perhaps be considered as a sample of those by which Socrates says (Apol. 21 c) he alienated statesmen; see Diog. L. ii 38, Zeller Socr. p. 206.
Chapters XXXV, XXXVI (95 A–96 B). _Socr._ Anytus has left us, apparently angry. He has really no reason for being so. Tell me, in your country do men eminent for virtue profess to communicate it? _Meno_. They utter no certain sound on the subject. _Socr._ Are the sophists then, who alone do profess this, teachers of virtue? _Meno_. The best of them, Gorgias, never made any profession of the sort; he only professed the art of speaking. _Socr._ What do you think yourself about the sophists' teaching of virtue? _Meno_. I cannot make up my mind. _Socr._ Observe that you find the same vacillation in the poet Theognis. A most remarkable result: those who profess to teach virtue are held not to be masters of it themselves; those who admittedly are masters of it are very doubtful whether it can be taught. These doubters can hardly be teachers, can they? _Meno_. No, hardly.

Here begins the fifth and last section of the dialogue.

**CHAPTER XXXV**

2. ἀπεκαί γὰρ κτέ.: of the two assumptions that Anytus makes, it is only the former that is distinctly mistaken. Socrates is eulogistic of the old statesmen; he only points out their limitations. As far as these limitations are concerned, he would no doubt class Anytus with them; whether as equally eminent or not makes no difference.

5. ὅλον ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν: Fr. (Introd. p. 30) thinks these words have some reference to the prosecution which Anytus himself sustained in 409 B.C. According to Diodorus xiii 64, being sent out to relieve Pylos, then besieged by the Lacedaemonians, he failed to double Cape Malea, and returned to Athens having effected nothing. This led to a prosecution: ὅ δὲ Ἀνυτος λεγότων κινδυνεύων ἐρρόσατο χρήσας τὴν ἱδίαν ψυχήν, καὶ πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων δοκεῖ δικαστήριον δωροδοκήσας. The fact that the dramatic date of the dialogue is pretty certainly later than 409 (Introd. § 8) throws doubt on this interpretation; accordingly Hermann (Gesch. u. Syst. i p. 482) finds a reference to a later prosecution of Anytus, leading to his death: of which various improbable and inconsistent accounts are given.

But we may well ask whether in such a case, or if the reference were to any prosecution of Anytus, the words παραστατικά χαλέπαίνων would be applicable. I believe we have here simply a piece of Socratic irony. To Socrates κακῶς λέγειν means 'to speak untruly, unreasonably.' Cp. Diog. L ii 35 (Socrates)
10. έθλουσις: the meaning stands between solent and volunt, as at 98 A 28. This is pretty common in Plato, of things inanimate as well as animate: cp. Phaedr. 230 D τὰ δὲνδρα αὐτὸν ἐνδέδει διδασκεῖν.

11. διδάσκαλοι τε εἶναι ή διδακτὸν ἀρετή: the sequence τε... ἦν involves a slight anacoluthon. τε expects something to be added; ἦν instead of adding anything gives an alternative: 'or, what comes to the same thing.' (It has been admitted 89 D that the propositions διδακτῶν ἡττῶν ἀρετῆ and διδάσκαλοι εἶσον ἀρετῆς are equivalent.) Wolf (in Buttmann's edition) wanted to read καὶ for ἦν, observing that MSS. often confound these two particles; but this is unnecessary. Ullrich in his note made the use of τε... ἦν clear, quoting Theod. 148 o περὶ αὐτοῦ τὲ ὅποτε λέγω... ἦν ἀδ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρυμένου, and Ion 535 ὅτι ἀν κλῖν τ' ἐν θυσίας καὶ ἑστραφε... ἦν φοβηθαί. In both of these cases, he says, τε... καὶ... might have stood; in this place in the Meno, not so appropriately. See Kühner § 520. Anm. 2. (See also on 99 C 27.)

17. οἷς: the 'dative of the personal agent' is not very common with the pres. or impf. pass. In the instances here given it will be seen that the dative may generally be explained either as a 'dativus commodi' or as a 'dative of the person judging.' The latter perhaps best explains the numerous instances with ὅμως εἰσείσαι, Gorg. 497 D, Rep. 434 D, 478 A, Phaedo 72 A, Phil. 60 B, Andoc. Myst. § 15; and with ἄμφει δηθείσαι, Lysis 638 D ἄμφει δηθείσαι δ' αὐτῷ τόνδ' ἡμῖν. Cp. γυνώσκεσαι υἱόν Isa. 11 § 15. Besides these we have (Lysis 715 B) λέγεται δὲ τόδ' ἐνέκα ταῖθ' ἡμῖν; and lastly 96 E 29 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα. Are there instances with any other verbs in Plato?

There are some examples in Thuc., as i 51. 2 αἱ Ἀθηναίων νῆσε τοῖς Κερκυραῖοι οὖσα ἐσωτήρος; ii 101. 5 ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἐπρόσει: iii 64. 4 τίνες δὲ οὗν δικαίωτερον πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλληνισμοῖς μοισώτοι 'in the eyes of' (see Classen's note); iii 82. 7 ἄρκοι ἐκατέρθη διδόμενοι 'by each party'; iv 109. 4 αἱ οἰκουμέναι συμμάχους ἐθνείς: vi 873 τῶν ἡμῖν ποιομένων.

In Xenophon An. i i 9 ἐλλίσσεται αὐτῷ συνελέγετο, the dative of interest is apparent.

Some instances in verse may be given:

Homer Il. vi 398 ἐκείθ' Εκτορὶ 'was held to wife by,' a true
dative, or datīvus commodi: v 465 κτείνεσθαι εᾶσετε λαδὺ Ἀχαίοις, viii 244 Τρόμος ἔνα δόμανσαθα Ἀχαίον, xxi 556 τούτον ὑποκλονέσθαι εᾶσω... Ἀχιλῆι are similar, the dative being helped by the verb εᾶσω: Empedocles ap. Diog. L. viii 62 ἀνδρῶν ἢδε γυναῖκι σεβίζομαι: Pind. Ol. xii 3 τιν γὰρ ἐν πῶνις κυβερνώτα τοῖς ναῖσ: Soph. Aj. 539 προστόλοις φυλάσσεται (see Jebb's note, who quotes Antig. 504 and 1215 and Menander τάλαθας ἄνθρωπων ὕδ' εὐρίσκεται): several times with ὀφει- λεσθαι, as Eur. Alc. 419: see L. & S. s. v. Π. 1. (In Aristoph. Wasps 1145 τοῦτο τοῖς βαρβάροις ψάλλεται, the meaning is 'this is woven for the barbarians.')

As the dative implies mainly the person interested in, or judging of, a result, it was naturally used chiefly with the perfect tense, by which a result or state of things is indicated. But we may have this sense with other tenses: e.g. in Thuc. i 51 the meaning is 'the Corcyreans had not the advantage of having the Athenian ships in sight.'

μηδὲ: see on 90 Ε. 31. For the subject matter Fr. refers to Ἄλκε. 1 111 Ε.

23. καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα κτῆ: Protagoras definitely pro- Cessed to teach ἄρτη. See Prot. 318 Ν πεννέσεκε, ἐσται τούνων σοι, εὰν μοι συνῆση, ἢ ἡν ἡμέρα ἐμοι συνήθη, ἄπειναι οκαδε βελτίων γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστερᾳ ταύτα ταύτα· καὶ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἐκεί ἐτὶ τὸ βελτίων ἐπιδίδοναι. Socrates presses the question 'but in what will he become better?' to which Protagoras (ibid. Ε) gives the answer quoted on 91 Α 4. It is the πολιτικὴ τέχνη which Protagoras teaches; he will make his pupils good citizens. So too Hippias promises to make men βελτίων (Hipp. maj. 283 Β), though his methods differed from those of Protagoras, being more indirect, and depending more on special arts (Prot. 318 Ε, Hipp. maj. 285 Ε). In the Euthyd. 273 Β the profession the twin sophists make is still general: ἄρτη, καὶ Σωκρατῆς, ὅμοιος ὅν τ' ἐκεῖ παραδόθηκε κάλλις τὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάξιστα—only here ἄρτη has got narrowed down to the art of quibbling (see on 71 Ε 2). On the other hand, Gorgias, in the dialogue named after him, starts by proclaiming himself a teacher of Rhetoric (449 Α). (See Zeller pre-Socrates Π 471 foll.) But it is argued that the study of Expression apart from its contents is inconceivable. So Gorgias is at last forced under press of questions to say that he will give the knowledge of δικαία and δίκαια if his pupil does not already possess it (460 Α). Thus he is driven to make practically the same profession as Protagoras, and the new frontier which he has tried to draw for his art is shown to be indefensible. Similarly in the Protagoras 312 Β, Hippocrates, at a loss to say what he will
be taught by Protagoras, suggests τι δὲν, εἰ δέομεν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐπιστάται τοῦ παιδίου δεινῶν λέγειν: "Ισθοὶ δὲν, ἦν δὲ ἔγω, ἄλληθ' λέγομεν, οὐ μέντοι ἰκανῶς γε' ἐρωτησεως γὰρ ἦτι ἡ ἀνδροφία ήμιν δεῖται: περὶ δὲν δὲν σοφίτης δεινῶν ποιεῖ λέγειν κτέ. (Cp. also Phaedr. 260 d with Dr. Thompson's note.)

On 91 C 19 reference was made to the passage from the Republic in which Socrates resists the notion that the corruption of men of exceptional ability is due to a few sophists. Socrates thus proceeds (498 A): ἐτι τοὺς σοι, ἦν δ' ἔγω, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξᾶτω. Τὸ τοῦτο; "Εκαστὸν τῶν μισθαρ- 

νούνων ἱδιωτῶν, οὐ δὴ οὖνοι σοφιστάς καλοῦι καὶ ἀντιτέκτου 

Ῥώμαται, μὴ ἀλλα παύειν ει ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δήγματα, 

δ' δοξᾶσαι διὰν ἀδροφιοθεῖς, καὶ σοφίαν ταῦτην καλεῖν. Pro- 

fessional teaching has become a mere craft how to humour that 

great beast, the Demos. It has become a teaching of Rhetoric. 

Thus while the earlier sophist, who taught 'virtue,' was looked on 

in a democracy with suspicion almost equally with the 

philosopher, the rhetor-sophist was there in his element; and 

in Gorgias 520 a b (see Dr. Thompson's notes) we have Socrates 

distinctly siding with the 'sophists,' in the older sense, against 

the ἤρωες τὴν δὲ ἀλήθεια καλλάν ἐστὶ σοφιστικὴ ἤρωκτη). 

I believe that the thorough discussion in the Gorgias pre- 

ceded the Meno, and is assumed by it (Introd. § 16).

Γοργίου ταῦτα ἄγαμα, 'I admire this in Gorgias.' This is 

a frequent construction with ἄγαμα and verbs of similar 

meaning. The gen. is in its origin 'partitive,' depending on 

tαῦτα. So Prot. 335 E, Gorg. 449 D, Laws 631 A. Stallbaum 

quotes similar constructions with θαυμάζω (Apol. 17 A, etc.), 

and ἐπιφύω (Menex. 241 B, etc.). See Kühner § 417. Anm. 10 b. 

Sometimes the acc. is replaced by a clause with ὅτι (Hipp. maj. 

291 E ἄγαμαί σου, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὐνοικώς βοηθεῖς) or διότι (Laws 

948 D). Plato seems rarely to have an unsupported gen. of the 

person admired with ἄγαμα (at Rep. 329 D καὶ ἔγω ἄγασθεις 

αὐτῶν εἰσίν ταιρα, the ptcp. approaches a gen. absol.). 

The simple gen. with ἄγαμα is found in Xen. (Mem. πi 33, 34, 

Oec. iv 21) and in ἐπ. xii ad init.; and Plato has it with 

θαυμάζω (Crito 43 B).

We also often have with ἄγαμα an acc. of the person ad- 

mired, either alone, or with a gen. of the cause: Rep. 426 D 

tοὺς ἑθέλως θεραπεύεις τὰς τοιαύτας τόλες οίκ ἄγασαι τῆς 

ἀνδρείας: Parm. 130 A (quasi-passive) ἄξως εἰ ἄγασθαι τῆς 

ἀρμίας τῆς ἐκ τούς λόγους. 'Once in Plato we have the dat. (of 

cause) substituted for the gen.: Symp. 179 D ἄγασθέντες τῷ 

ἔργῳ; cp. Xen. Cyr. πi iv 9, etc., Kühner § 425. 11.

31. ἐπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τέτονθα: see on 86 B 21.
35. Θεογνῆς τοῦ ποιητήν: for the appeal to poets see on D 77 B 12. This short episode is parallel to the longer one in the Protagoras (339 A foll.), where Simonides in one of his poems is apparently guilty of a similar inconsistency. At one moment he says ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθῶς γενέσθαι χαλεπῶν: at another he rejects the saying of Pittacus χαλεπῶν ἐσθλῶν ἐμενα.

Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides are mentioned by Isocr. ad Nic. (2) 43 as enjoying the reputation of being the best moral counsellors. Theognis is also quoted by Plato, Lysis 212 E and Laws 630 A, but nowhere else. Plato's charge against the poets does not in the Meno reach the gravity it attains in the Republic (Books ii, iii, and x). But to this charge the gnomic poets were exposed much less than Homer.

37. ἐν τοῖς ἐπεισὶ; see on 80 D 3. Perhaps some surprise is indicated. It is new to Meno that Theognis is as inconsistent on the point as himself and οἱ πολιτὶ.

ἐπι may nearly always be taken as including elegiac as well as strictly 'epic' (hexameter) verse. The elegiac couplet grew out of the hexameter, and is closely akin to it. We have ἐπι distinguished from dramatic verse: Rep. 602 B ἐν ταμβελοῦς καὶ ἐν ἐπεισὶ: Rep. 379 A ἐάν τε τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἐπεισι ποιή [ἐάν τε ἐν μέλησα] ἐάν τε ἐν τραγῳδία (the words bracketed are absent from the best MSS.); or from lyric verse: Phaedr. 241 E (after a hexameter) ἥδη ἐπι φθεγγομαι καὶ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους: Rep. 607 A (we must only have hymns and encomia,) εἰ δὲ τὴν ἱδοναμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξειν ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἐπεισι κτέ.: or from dramatic and lyric verse: Hipp. min. 368 οὗ καὶ ἐπὶ καὶ τραγῳδίας καὶ διθυράμβους: Ion 534 C ὡς μὲν διθυράμβους, ὡς ἐγκώμα, ὡς ὑπορχήματα, ὡς ἐπι, ὡς οἷς λάμβουσι. The word is used loosely sometimes of any kind of verse: Prot. 339 A ἔγω ἄνδρι παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπι ὡς δεινὸν εἶναι, before citing the poem of Simonides: Laws 810 E ποιηταὶ ἐπῶν ἐξαμέτρων καὶ ἑμιμέτρων καὶ πάντων τῶν λεγομένων μέτρων. In Aristoph. Clouds 638 πῦρετον περὶ μέτρων ἡ ροθμῶν ἡ περὶ ἐπῶν, the last word seems to mean verse of any sort.

CHAPTER XXXVI

1. ἐν τοῖς Ἀλεγείοις: the word occurs Rep. 368 A; nowhere else in Plato. It has been assumed by some that a distinction is here drawn between τὰ Ἀλεγεῖα and other works of Theognis. 'Apparit hinc Theognidem alia quoque poëmata heroico, ut videtur, metro scripsisse' Buttm. Nothing is known of these other poems. Leutsch (Philologus xxix p. 521) thought that
the poems of Theognis addressed to Cynurus were called ὑποθήκαι (cp. ὑποθῆκουμαι: Theognis v. 27 Bergk\(^4\)), and that other poems of Theognis were called ἐλεγεῖα specifically, to distinguish them from the ὑποθήκαι. Against this it may be argued that the lines now cited (vv. 33–36 in Bergk\(^4\)) stand amongst those addressed to Cynurus, and therefore would belong rather to the ὑποθήκαι. I believe no such emphasis on the word ἐλεγεῖα is intended, and have put no comma after the word. The meaning is simply 'in the lines where.'

2. See App. on the text.

3. ἰδὲ μεγάλη δυναμις: i.e. δυνάσται, oligarchs. See on 77 B 12.

4. ἐσθλῶν: Theognis of Megara, a bitter oligarch, continually uses ἐσθλός, ἄγαθος, κακός, in the political sense, which appears to be earlier than their moral one. See Grote Hist. Pt. ii, note at the end of chapter ix.

5. ἰδιάξεια: pass., as the tense generally is: Soph. Ani. 726, Eur. Andr. 739, Aristoph. Clouds 127 (but not in Rep. 421 ε). Most of the forms of the tense ἰδιαχθσομαι (which is late) are impossible in elegiac verse. Cf. on 93 D 14.


9. δὲ γε: this combination of particles occurs twelve times in the Meno. In some of the places γε accentuates some particular word: 82 E 44 'but he thinks' (opposed to οἶδεν); 85 C 7 'but (though he knew not) these opinions really existed in him.' At 77 B 8 there is a hyperbaton of γε, which accents παραδεξωμα. But often (as in the present place, 85 B 48, 88 E 10, 96 C 7, 99 A 53) γε does not point any particular word; the combination, like atqui, attaches a further premiss from which a conclusion is to be drawn. At 87 C 13, 96 C 5, 14 we simply have et γε coupled to the context by δὲ; and similar is ἐπειδὴ δὲ γε at 98 D 29. See Shilleto on Dem. F.L. § 102, with §§ 243, 318, 342. Cp. Intr. p. lxii.

ἀλλογος μεταβάς, 'in a somewhat different strain.' The word μεταβάλλειν is used technically from early times of transition to a new theme in poetry. So Od. viii 492 Odysseus says to the bard Demodocus ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβαθι, καὶ τινου κόμου δειον κτεί; ; three of the Homeric hymns 4 (Aphrodite), 9 (Artemis), 18 (Hermes) end with the line σεῦ δ' εἶγώ ἀφικέμενος μεταβάθον οὖν καὶ δομον. Cp. Phaedr. 262 A κατὰ σμικρὸν μεταβαλλόν μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθών ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον η λατά μέγα, and
265 c ὐς ἀντὶ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ἐγένετο ὁ λόγος μεταβαθμα. In the present place ὁ λόγος is ironical. The words have usually been taken as referring to citation from a MS.—‘somewhat lower down.’ From this point of view Bekker wished to read καταβάς for μεταβάς. It is no answer to this to say that the interval in our text of Theognis is a long one, namely from v. 36 to v. 435; for the order of Theognis’ verses followed by Plato may have been quite different from that of the συλλογῇ preserved to us. See note on the text of D 2. But the words used for passing to a point ‘lower down’ in citations seems to be rather ὑποβάς (as Diog. L. viii 52) or ὑποκαταβάς (see L. & S.). If μεταβάς be taken as above, no alteration is necessary.

10. See App. on the text.

φησι... λέγει: not unfrequently you have some part of φημι introduced in the middle of words quoted after a verb of saying that introduces the whole. See L. & S. So inquit is often redundant. Buttmann refers to Heindorf on Crat. 412 B: see also Heindorf on Charm. 164 ε. But the case here is different (‘singularis’ says Fr.); here φησι comes first with the line that first occurs to Socrates; and then he goes on in a tentative manner, λέγει πως, ‘he says, if I remember rightly’; the sequel being quoted loosely. Stallbaum is wrong in saying that πως here indicates miratio. It rather denotes hesitation; cp. 73 A 29. Plato is dramatic artist enough to know that the quotation is more natural, and so more effective, thus, than if reeled off fluently. Cp. on 81 A 17. See also the quotation from Pindar in Theaet. 173 ε with Campbell’s note: ‘Plato almost always thus weaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poets’ measures to the rhythm of prose.’

14. οὕτω ποιήν ἄν: the οὕτω of course does not affect πειθόμενος. The sense is as if the participial clause had come first.

20. ξέχεσ ὁντι εἰκεῖν κτι: we have here again the argument 96 A by antithesis (see 91 D 17, 94 C 1). ‘Are you able to name any other subject of which the professing teachers not only fail to get recognition as the teachers of others, but are regarded as not even understanding it themselves, and as quite inferior in the very subject of which they say they are teachers; while those who are themselves recognized as accomplished, sometimes say that it is to be taught, and sometimes not?’

εἰκεῖν πράγματος ὁβ: Buttman in his excellent note draws a distinction between this place and C 7, saying that the latter is a simple case of inverse attraction, but the present is rather an instance of anacoluthon. The first thought here was ξέχεσ
eltev allou otopoiv pragramatos didaskalou; the acc. being afterwards exchanged for a relative clause. He cites in illustration II. xviii 192 allou d' oiv tev oida tov anv klyta teixhe dów: 'ubi Achilles sententiam primariam in animo habet hanc; allou d' outinos teixhe dówmu' anv, sed statim transiens in hanc loquendi formam, oiv oida outinos teixhe dów, ambas conjunctit.' [Perhaps other instances of 'inverse attraction' may also be explained as anacolutha: cp. Aesch. S. c. T. 400—

kal výkta taúthn ἵν λέγεις ἐν' ἀσπίδος
datrados marmaírousan oudravov kurein,
tá' dvn γέννατο μάντις η ἀναλα τιν.

Ar. Lys. 408—δ χρυσοχάε, τον δρομον δν ἐπεκεφάδας,
οἰρχομένης μου τῆς γυναικὸς ἑστέρας
η βάλανος ἐκπετώκεν ἐκ τοῦ τρήματος,

'about that necklace, etc.':

Plut. 200—δης έγώ την δύναμιν ην ύμεις φατέ
ἐχειν με ταύτης δεσπότης γενήσομαι,

where the first thought was δύναμιν κεκτήσομαι.] Riddell § 191 gives both the present place and G 7 as examples of 'Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.' At § 26 D, however, he quotes the present place as an example of a 'Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after Verbs of mentioning'; adding 'Why this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191).' He had evidently changed his mind about the passage, but omitted to give his reasons in § 191.

I do not think the genitive πράγματος can be regarded as a genitive after a verb of mentioning. If the limits of this construction are strictly defined, it will be found that (1) the meaning is always to say something about something (so that περι might conceivably be supplied), not simply 'to mention'; (2) that it is nearly always helped by some substantive (noun or pronoun) on which the genitive may be regarded as dependent. Both of these conditions are satisfied by the only prose instance Riddell quotes in support, Laws 804 ε καὶ οὔδεν


φοβηθεὶς εἰπομ' ἄν τοῦτον τῶν λόγων οὗτε ἑπικιῆς οὗτε γυμναστικῆς, οῡ άνδράς μὲν πρέπον ἄν εἰπῃ, γυναῖκει δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον. As to the verse instances he quotes, Soph. Aj. 1236 πολού κέκραγας άνδρος καὶ ὑπέρφρονα not to the point, the genitive depending on the neuter plural ὑπέρφρονα; ibid. 1257 δι' άνδρος οὐκέτ' ἰντοσ ἀλλ' ἦσθι σκλαβοὺς ὑβρίζεις καθελευθερωτοσεῖς the construction is helped (α) by the participle ἰντοσ, (β) by the expectation of such a verb as καταφρονεῖς; Soph. O. C. 355 μαντεῖ' δ τοῦδ'
XXXVI 96 A

NOTES

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ἐξηρθῆ σώματος satisfies both conditions mentioned above. So
does Trach. 1122—

τῆς μητρὸς ἢ τῆς ἐμῆς
φράσις ἐν αἷς νῦν ἐστὶν.

where εν αἷς νῦν ἐστὶν—τὰς συμφορὰς.

Riddell in his note on § 26 gives up Rep. 439 B, τοῦ τοξοτοῦ
οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν κτέ., observing (§ 225) that there the genitive
τοῦ τοξοτοῦ belongs to the following clause ἀλλὰ μὲν ἢ ἀπωθοῦσα
χειρ κτέ. Similar is Rep. 375 ε ὀσθα γὰρ τοῦ τῶν γενναυὸν κυνῶν
ὅτι τοῦτο φόει αὐτῶν τὸ ἱθὸς.

The genitive which occurs in questions about things is often
supported by τί; see Rep. 469 B τί δὲ ἦπων οἰς; where, however,
the word γένος, which comes immediately before (τό τε
τῶν ὄρθων καὶ τό τῶν κυνῶν γένος), is the main support of the
genitive: ibid. 470 A τί δὲ γῆς τε τμῆσεως καὶ οἰκίων ἐμπρήσεως;
582 C; Gorg. 509 D; Phaedo 78 D; Aesch. Eum. 211 τί γὰρ
γνωσκόμεν ἢτις ἀνδρὰ νοσφαγῇ; P. V. 820; Soph. Phil. 439, 441;
Ez. 317. (See Kühner § 417. Anm. 9.)

Certainly εἰς εἰνὶ πρῶγματος can never be Greek for ‘to
mention a thing.’ I hold, therefore, with Buttmann, that we
have here a change of construction.

The present discussion is confined to the genitive after verbs
of speaking. We have more latitude in verbs of judging, etc.:

Rep. 576 D ἄλλη εὐδαίμων ὑπὲρ καὶ ἀδικήτως ῥωσάτως ἢ
ἄλλως κρίνεις;
485 B μαθήματος ἔτι ἐφών, ὅ ἠν αὐτῆς δῆλοι ἐκείνης τῆς
ὁμώλας. (But the reading is doubtful.)

Laus 646 D καὶ τῆς περὶ τῶν οἴνων ἄρα διατρῆβης (ῥωσάτως
διανοητέον). Here περὶ is supplied with the gen. from
the previous sentence, being omitted on account of the neigh-
bouring περὶ with aoc.

21. οὐχ ἐπως followed by ἄλλα οὐδὲ (see on 71 C 13) is used
in ascending to a negative idea; the sense then is non modo non.
The negative is not expressed with οὐχ ἐπως, being covered by
the wider negative in the clause to which it leads up. Rep.
591 C τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐξεν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ἐπως τῇ θηρίωδεὶ καὶ
ἀλῶνῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέπεις ἰδοςει, ἄλλα οὐδὲ πρὸς ἰγλεαν βλέπων.
Instead of οὐχ ἐπως in this construction, we also have μὴ διος,
μὴ δι, very rarely οὐχ δι: Dem. 23 (Aristocr.) 155. Kühner
§ 525. 3 c; Riddell § 152.

But οὐχ ἐπως (or μὴ δι) is also used = non modo non followed
by ἄλλα, when the second clause is not negative in expression,
but simply opposed in sense to the former. Xen. Hell. v iv 84
εἰθάρακον τὸν δῆμον ὡς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ἐπωσ τιμωρήσαντο,
ἄλλα καὶ ἐπαινέσειαν τὸν Σφοδρίαν; Kühner § 525. 3 b.
22. διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται: εἶναι is omitted on account of the neighbouring εἶναι. Presently ὁμολογοῦνται is understood with ἑπτάσηαι and παυροὶ εἶναι.

B ἀλλὰ ὁδὸν ἀλλὰ: see on 71 C 10 and 74 D 30. Kühner § 535. Anm. 1 refers to Lys. 223 A, Prot. 341 D, Symp. 211 E, for the frequent use of ἀλλὰ in successive clauses, each limiting the one before it.

28. κυρίως, 'in any real sense.'

Chapter XXXVII (96 B–Ε). Socr. There really seem to be no teachers of Virtue; therefore no learners either; so that Virtue is not teachable. Yet if Virtue be Knowledge, it must be teachable. But perhaps the practical results of Knowledge may be simulated by something that springs from a different source.

C 7. πράγματος οὖ: a case of 'inverse attraction.' Hadley § 1003 thus defines this idiom: 'The antecedent, without being incorporated into the relative clause, is sometimes attracted to the case of the relative.' If here we had οὖ πράγματος instead of πράγματος οὖ, the antecedent would be 'incorporated into the relative clause.'

Plenty of instances of inverse attraction are given in Kühner § 555. 4. The same thing occurs, but more rarely, in Latin: Verg. Aen. i 573 urbem quam statuo vestra est ('quam urbem' would be simple 'incorporation'); Roby Lat. Gr. § 1067.

The following are instances in Plato:—

Polit. 271 c τὸν βίον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς Κρονοῦ φίς εἶναι δυναστέλας, πᾶτερον ἢ γνήκε.

Lysis 221 b ὅλων τε ὁδὸν ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ ἐρωτα, τοῦτον οὖ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν; (see Heindorf).

Rep. 520 D ἐν πόλει η ἡκιστὰ πρόθυμοι ἥρκειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἀρχεῖν ταὐτὴν ἀριστα Δικαίως νεκκεῖν (for πόλιν ἢ η).

Laws 740 D πάντων τούτων ἄρχην ἢν δὲ ἡμεθα μεγάλην καὶ τιμωτάτην, αὐτῇ σκεψάβεσθαι . . ποριζόμεθα κτέ.

Also Crito 45 B, where the attraction takes place in an adverb, πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοκε, δοταὶ δὲ ἀφίκην, ἀγαπάντωσι σε (for ἄλλοκε).

We may bring under this head the instances of οὐδεὶς δοσις οὖ. See on 70 C 18.

8: ἐν: see on 89 E 25 and 92 C 18.

tοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι: cp. 89 E 26.

D 24. καὶ ἐν Πρόδικος: see on 75 E 13. Socrates' obligations to Prodicus are exceedingly hard to estimate. At Prot. 341 A
Socrates says that the wisdom of Prodicus is an ancient and wondrous thing: κινδύνευε ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θέλα τις εἶναι πάλαι: and calls himself μαθητής Προδίκου. Cf. 315 D foll.: in the hall where Protagoras was, Προδίκος ἦταν κατέκεκτο ἐγκεκαλυμένος ἐν κρύδιοι τισάν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πόλλοις ὡς ἐφαίνετο. Several were gathered round Prodicus, says S., περὶ δὲ δὲν διελεύγωντο οὐκ ἐνυάμην ἐγὼν μαθεῖν ἐξανεῖν, καὶ περὶ λεπτός ἐξων ἄκοιν τοῦ Προδίκου· πᾶσος φοβός γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἄνερ εἶναι καὶ θειός· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γεγραμμένος ἁσαφῆ ἔποει τὰ λεγόμενα. Orat. 384 b (quoted on 91 D 8) shows that Socrates did not drink deeply at the wells of Prodicus‘ etymological learning. Buttmann however points out that the present passage shows his debt to him was not confined to etymology. See also Charm. 163 D, quoted on 75 E 13. Prodicus can hardly have been older than Socrates, and was probably rather younger (Zeller pre-Socratics ii 417 note). In Ἡππ. maj. 282 c Socrates speaks of ὁ ἡμέτερος ἐταῖος Προδίκος. But, as will be seen, Socrates was older than at least one other of his ‘teachers.’ Cf. on 76 C 22.

‘All the remarks of the Platonic Socrates,’ says Zeller (pre-Socratics ii 419 note), ‘concerning the instruction which he received from Prodicus, even those in the Meno, have an unmistakeably ironical tone, and as to any historical content, nothing is to be derived from them beyond the fact that Socrates was acquainted with Prodicus, and had heard lectures from him as from other sophists. That he sent certain individuals of his acquaintance to him does not prove any special preference, for, according to the passage in the Theaetetus (151 B), he sent others to other sophists.’ (See also Zeller’s note ibid. pp. 501, 502.)

It may be noted that a similar tone is adopted by Plato towards other persons whom he makes Socrates represent as his teachers. Menex. 235 E 20. Καὶ ἐμὸν μὲν μενεκέναι, οὐδὲν σωματικὸν οὐρ τε εἰναί εἰς τεν, μὲν τυχάν τινως διδάσκαλος οὐδα ράν φαίνη περὶ ῥητορικῆς, ἀλλ′ ἐπερ καὶ ἐλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ πεποίηκε ῥήτορας, ἐνα δὲ καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περικλέα τὸν Ζανθίππου. MEN. Τῆς ἀνθή; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι Ἀσπασιάν λέγεις; Σ. Λέγω γὰρ, καὶ Κόννον γε τὸν Μητροβίου· ὅστις γὰρ μοι δός εἰςιν διδασκαλιῶν, ὃ μὲν μονοκηθισῆν, ἢ δὲ ῥητορικῆς. But Menexenus is very sceptical (236 c, cp. 249 D E) as to whether Aspasia has had much to do with the speech which Socrates proceeds to deliver. As to Conus, Socrates says he did not do his teacher much credit: euθυθυς. 272 C ἀλλ′ ἐγὼ ἐν μονὸν φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ἂν δεινός τῶν ξένων περαψήω, ὅπερ Κόννῳ τῷ Μητροβίῳ, τῷ κιβαριστῇ, ὅτι ἐμὲ διδάσκει ἐτι καὶ νῦν κιβαρίζειν· δρώντες γοὺς οἱ παῖδες οἱ συμφωνηται μοι ἐμοῦ τε καταγελῶι
καὶ τῶν Κόννων καλοῦσι γερωντοδίδασκαλον. Cp. 295 D. Again, Socrates expresses respect for the musician Damon (Lach. 180 D, Rep. 400 B c, cp. 424 c), who was himself an associate of Prodicus (Lach. 197 D, Ἀλε. i 118 C). Later authorities improved upon this and made Socrates a pupil of Damon (Diog. L. xi 19). Yet the tone in which he is treated is one of mock respect (Lach. 200 A B).

It seems inconsistent with the most essential characteristic of Socrates that he should have seriously acknowledged obligations to any one for positive instruction. That he availed himself of the opportunities of culture that Athens afforded, and spoke with 'his unsailing courtesy' of those to whose influence he had been subjected, may be assumed. Plato was not likely to estimate Socrates' debt to others more highly. In the case of Prodicus there are several reasons that may account for a somewhat hostile attitude on the part of Plato.

(1) Aristophanes had praised Prodicus at the expense of Socrates: Clouds 360 foll.—

οὐ γὰρ ἢν ἄλλῳ γ' ὑπακούσαμεν τῶν νῦν μετευροσοφιστῶν πλὴν ἢ Προδίκων, τῶ μὲν σοφιάς καὶ γνώμης οὐνεκα, σοι δὲ, διὰ τρεχόντος τ' ἐν ταῖς ὄδοις καὶ τῷφαλμῷ παραβάλλεις κάνητοδήτος κακὰ πολλ' ἀνέχει καφ' ἡμῖν σεμνοπροσωπεῖν.

(2) Prodicus was a friend of Antisthenes, Plato's rival (Xen. Symp. iv 62).

(3) Plato, from his love for elasticity of language, and dislike of pedantry, was likely to undervalue Prodicus' distinctions. Socr. after referring to these (Charm. 163 D) says ἄλλῃ ἐγὼ σοι τίθεσαι μὲν τῶν δομότων διδάσαμι διηγῆ δὲν βούλῃ ἐκαστῷν· δῆλον δὲ μόνον ἐφ' δὲ τι ἅν φέρη τονύμα δὲ τι ἅν λέγητι. (See end of note on 72 C 2: also Dr. Thompson's note on Phaedr. 267 B ἀποφθέγματα γε, ὅ Προδίκε.)

24. παράδειγμα μᾶλλον: 80 C 35 Euthyphr. 9 B, Crito 49 B, etc.

Ε ᾿τὴν ἄρτι ἡμέραν κτλ.: 'the state of the discussion as it stands now is represented by two hypothetical syllogisms, as follows:—

1. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:
   But virtue is knowledge:
   Therefore virtue is teachable.
2. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:
   But virtue is not teachable:
   Therefore virtue is not knowledge.

The minor premise of each of these two syllogisms contradicts the conclusion of the other. Both cannot be true. If virtue is not acquired by teaching, and does not come by
nature (89 A B), how are there any virtuous men? Socrates continues his argument: the second premiss of the first syllogism—that virtue is knowledge—is true but not the whole truth. In proving it we assumed that there was nothing except knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences. But this assumption will not hold.' Grote II pp. 9 foll. Notice the guarded language of 87 B: virtue is certainly not ἀλλοίων ἐπιστήμης, but we cannot say without reserve that ἀρετή is ἐπιστήμη.

29. ὅρθος τε καὶ εὖ: cp. 97 A 15.

30. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται: see on 95 B 17. The notion of interest may be traced in the dative: 'that men get things done rightly and well not only under the guidance of knowledge.'

ἡ ἱσόν κατί, 'and this no doubt is the path along which the discovery is escaping us.' Personifications of the object of philosophic quest are frequent in Plato: see Campbell’s Theaet. App. A. 'The argument itself (ὁ λόγος) is continually personified and spoken of under a Protean variety of figures. It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away “like a tale,” etc.': Theaet. 203 D καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακός οἰκάζεται. Soph. 231 C ἀλλά τοι κάκεινον (the sophist, of whom we are in quest) ἵσεσθαι χρή νῦν ἠδή σφόδρα ἄπορεν δὴ τοῖς ἐπὶ διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον. Cp. Polil. 284 B, Hipp. maj. 294 E, etc. See below on D 12. The metaphor is worked out most fully at Rep. 432 B νῦν δὴ ἡμᾶς δεὶ ὡσπερ κυνηγητὰς τινὰς βάμνων κόκλως σπευδασθαι προσέχοντας τὸν νῦν μή πη διαφόρῃ ἡ δικαιοσύνη. See App. on the text.

Chapters XXXVIII, XXXIX (96 E–98 A). Socr. For practical utility Right Opinion will serve the purpose of Knowledge. Indeed, so long as Right Opinion is held, its effects will be indistinguishable from those of Knowledge. The difference between the two appears to be that the possession of the former is precarious, the latter is bound in our minds by a chain of causal reasoning.

2. ὑμολογήκαμεν: at 87 E. For the tense see on 89 C 6 (III).

6. τοῦ, opinor, expresses hesitancy, as at 72 C 4 and often. 97 A

7. ὑμολογοῦμεν: the change from perf. to imperf. is perhaps not solely due to love of variety. The former admission had
been reached in so many words; the latter agreement they were in process of arriving at; it follows immediately from what is said at 88 C foll.

9. ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ἦ: for the matter see 88 E. For the omission of τις see on 79 B 15.

10. ὁμοιοὶ ἐσμέν ὅλῳ ὁρθῷς ἀμοισογνήκασιν: see on 80 D 39.

13. ἐὰς τις ἐλέος τὴν ὁδόν: Grote (11 383 note) observes that Plato is here illustrating the difference between Knowledge and Opinion by a matter which belongs to sensible perception. Similarly in Theaet. 201 B—the passage on which Grote is there commenting—ὁδὸν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ πεῖρὶ ὅν λείοντι μόνον ἐστιν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰς δὲ μὴ, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔρμων, the matters in question about which either Opinion (through the orator) or Knowledge (from personal observation) is obtained, are all matters of fact and sense-perception. So far as the present passage is concerned, it may be noted that it is merely an illustration, and so stands on the same footing as 71 B 6, where the existence of the class Virtue is illustrated by the existence of the individual Meno. Cp. Phaedo 73 c—74 d.

14. ὅτι οὐκεν οὔλος: this is not a case of ‘inverse attraction’ (see on 96 C 7) such as is found at Crit. 45 c καὶ ἄλλως ὅτι ἄφικη ἀγαπήσουσι σε, where ἄλλως stands for ἄλλοι by the influence of ὅτι. A simple (not ‘inverse’) attraction does often occur with οὔλος as at Gorg. 517 B ἔργα τοιαῦτα ὑλα τούτων ὃς οὗλοι εἴργασται (for ἐκείνος ὁτινά): Ion 533 A περὶ Πολυμνήτου ἦ ἄλλον οὕτως οὗλοι: Crit. 432 A ἦ διότι οὗλοι ἄλλος ἀμφότερος. But here there is no attraction at all. The full form would be ἦ διότι οὗλοι ἄλλως αὐτῶν βαδίζων.

17. ὁρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων κτῆ.: it was probably in the Meno that Plato first propounded his view of two grades of apprehension, a higher and perfect one (ἐπιστήμη), and a lower and imperfect one (δόξα) (Zeller ch. ν pp. 171—175; Grote ii 377 foll.). The relation between them is set forth as follows at the end of Bk. ν of the Republic (476 D—480 A). To the domain of Being or Reality (the world of Ideas) Knowledge is correlative, to that of Non-being, Ignorance (ἀγνωσία 477 A, ἀγνώσα 478 C). But between the realm of Being and that of Non-being lies the realm of Sense, which participates in both Being and Non-being; and to this the faculty Opinion (δόξα) is correlative. Opinion differs from Knowledge in being fallible, 477 Ε πῶς γὰρ τὸ γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταύτῳ ποτὲ τις νῦν ἐχων τιθεί: In the region of Opinion fluctuate the conventions of the multitude; 479 D τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι
kal tōn allon metaxū pout kutilindeitai touto te μη δυτως kal touto δυτος ειλικρνως. See Exc. VII.

This passage in the Meno is probably alluded to in Rep. 506 C ti de; eipov ouk ἤσθησαι τὰς ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πάντως αὐλοχραί; ὑν αἱ βελτισται τυφλαι ἡ δοκοῦσι τί σε τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὅρθω̂ι πορευομένων οἱ ἀνευ νοῦ ἀληθεῖς τι δοξάζοντες;

Another reference to the doctrine of the Meno occurs in the important passage Symp. 202 A: ὡκ ἤσθησαι δι οὗτοι τι μεταξύ σοφίας καὶ ἁμαθίας; Τι τοῦτο; ὦ δράβα δοξάζειν καὶ ἀνευ τοῦ ἐχειν λόγων δούναι ὡκ ὁ σοφ. ἢ, δι οὗτο εἰπτασθαί ἐστιν ἐλογιον γὰρ πράγμα πώς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη: οὔτε ἁμαθία τὸ γάρ τοῦ ἄνω τυχάνων πῶς ἂν εἴη ἁμαθία; ἐστὶ δε δὴ που τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθή δόξα, μεταξύ φρονήσεως καὶ ἁμαθίας.

The distinction was noted as characteristic of Plato’s teaching. Diog. L. II 28 quotes from the Τσοβολιμαίος of Cratinus (junior) (Kock Fr. Com. II p. 292)

A. ἄνθρωπος εἶδον εἰς καὶ ψυχήν ἐχεις.
B. κατὰ μὲν Πλάτωνον οὐκ οἶδε υπονοώ δ' <δ' > ἔχειν.

But though in the Meno the dominant phraseology is the antithesis ἐπιστήμη (δόξα, we have for each grade a number of synonyms. For ἐπιστήμη we find φρόνησις substituted line 27, 88 B 23, etc.; φρονών line 23, φρόνιμος A 10, σοφία 99 B 8, νοῦς 88 B 24, 28, 99 C 23, εἰδός A 13 (cp. 85 C), with no apparent distinction. In the Republīc 476 D we have δόξα contrasted with γνώμη, 477 A with γνώσις, 478 Α δοξαστὸν with γνωστόν, 479 Ε δοξάζειν with γνωστόν. For the lower grade we have here ὀλύμενος substituted for δοξάζειν, cp. 82 E, 84 A B, Rep. 506 C, where we have ὀλεθρία opposed to εἰδέναι. Sometimes πίστις represents the lower grade. Cp. on 98 B 2.

25. οἶδεν γάρ: for γάρ thus in answers cp. 78 B 3, and see Exc. III.

30. τὸ δὲ, ‘whereas,’ ‘Primus monuit Heindorffius ad C Thesact. (157 b) de formula τὸ δὲ conjunctionis loco inservienti lateinique vertenda eum tamen.’ Buttm. Aproi. 23 A τὸ δὲ κυδοείδει τὸ δὲ ὡς θεός σοφός εἶναι, and J. Adam’s note; Phaedo 109 D (or. obl.) τὸ δὲ ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ βραδυτῆς ὡς οὐκ οἶους τ' εἶναι ἡμᾶς, and A.-H.'s note; Phil. 24 E τὸ δὲ εἰς αὐθεὶς τε καὶ αὐθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ λειχαντα τὸν τε ἐρωτώναι καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἱκανός ἄρ εὐμφωνοντας ἀποφήγειν. The idiom is very common in Plato. τὸ is accusative (or rather the primitive case, which became the accusative when the nominative was differentiated from it), and the meaning is ‘in regard to this.’ It has no definite construction, and does not refer to any particular word in the context. On the other hand in Thuc. I 37. 2 τὸ δ' ἐπί
The idiom often occurs, as here, with ἄρα and the imperfect: ‘whereas it appears that true Opinion likewise is so,’ i.e. a guide to right action. See on 91 E 17. Compare Symp. 198 οὐ τούτῳ ᾧ τοῖς ἐπανείν ὑποκούσα τίρᾳ: Rep. 357 οὐ τοῖς ἂν ἀρα, ὡς θειτε, προπολούσα: 362 Τήμ. 51 οὐ τοῖς νοόν ἔριν πλήν λέγον: Laws 803 οὗ τοῖς ἂν ἔν τοῖς μὲν ἄρα ὠντ' ὧν παῖδα περικυκλων οὖν ἂν παῖδα ἀξιολογοῖ. Goodwin (§ 39) rightly distinguishes this from the ‘philosophic’ imperfect (§ 40), for which see on 83 D 52. There ᾧ meant ‘is, as we saw,’ whereas here it means rather ‘was, as we see.’

33. ὅρθη δόξα: Plato seems to use this phrase and ἀληθὴ δόξα indifferently.

36. ἐπινυγχάνοι...τυγχάνοι: ‘verbum simplex praecedente composito. Phaedr. 248 ν. ἀνεργον...ἐραν. Ad Phaedon 59 b (παρά..ῶν), Euthyphr. 14 a (ἀπεργαζότας...ἐργασίας),’ Fr. For ἐπινυγχάνειν ‘succeed’ cp. Rep. 397 c, Phil. 61 c.

CHAPTER XXXIX

D 5. οὗτος Δαδάλου ἀγάλματα: the change is merely due to love of variety.

12. τοῖς Δαδάλου ἀγάλματα: the present passage strongly recalls Euthyphr. 11 b c ζό. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὡς Ἑθικής, ἐοκεν ἐναι Δαδάλου τα ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὕτα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ὡς ἂν μὲ ἑπιθέμπτες, ὡς ἂν καὶ ἔμοι κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἐξωγεγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐργὰ ἀποδιδόμενα καὶ ὡς ἐθέλεις μὲν ὑπὸ αὐτὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑποθέσεις εἰλέν. ἀλλού δὴ τινος δὲ σκύμματος. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσιν σοι μένειν ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοὶ δοκεῖ. ‘As son of a sculptor, Socrates traced his descent to Daedalus, the eponymous hero of artists’ (J. Adam). Cp. Ἀθ. i 121 μ.
The same idea is carried farther Euthyphr. 15 Β ΣΩ. Θεαμάτει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐὰν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωσαι μὴ μένοντες ἄλλα βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αὐτίδαι τῶν Δαιδάλου βαδίζοντας αὐτῶν τοιεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲν πολὺ τεχνικῶτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιόντας τοιοῦ; see on 96 Ε 29.

The scholiwm on our present passage runs thus: τῶν πάλαι δημιουργῶν πλατύτων τὰ λεία συμμεμοκτά ἔχοντα τοὺς δραμάλους καὶ οὐ διεσθήκατα τοὺς πόδας, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν σύμποδα, Δαιδάλου ἀριστος ἀγαλματισμός ἐπιγεγονός πρῶτος ἀνατετάνυσε τὰ τούτων βλέφαρα, ὥς δόξας βλέπειν αὐτὰ, καὶ τοὺς πόδας, ὡς νομίζει βαδίζειν, διότι οὖν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεδέσθαι, ἵνα μὴ φύγοιει, ὡς δήδεν εμφύξων ἡδη γεγονότων αὐτῶν. τοῖς δεδεμένοις οὖν τὰς ἀλθεῖς ἐσσόκεια δόξας φθοί, τοῖς λευκόμενοις δὲ τούτων τὰς φευδείς. (The last sentence is perhaps worth citing for its ludicrous misinterpretation of Plato.) Fr. refers, in illustration of the scholiwm, to Strabo vi 264, Apollodorus ii 2, 2, Diod. iv 76.

Other references to moving statues of Daedalus occur: Aristotle Pol. i 4 εἰ ἡμίνατο ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἀργύρων κελευθέν αὐτοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐργον, ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φαινόντα: id. de anima i iii 11 ἔνοις δὲ καὶ κυριεῖ φασὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σώμα ἐν ἑν ἐστίν, ὡς αὐτὴ κυριεῖ, ἀλλ' Δημόκριτος, παραπληθὺς λέγων Φιλίππω τῷ κυμοφοδιδασκάλῳ φησὶ γὰρ τὸν Δαιδάλου κωμομένην ποψῆι τὴν ἐξιλήν Αἰφροδίτην ἐγχέαν' ἄργυρον χυτῶν. 'Callistratus Έκφρασ. 8 εο προγεγραμμέναι, ut dicat: Δαιδάλου ἐξῆν ἰδέαν κωμομέναν μηχανώ τὰ ποιήματα καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρωπίνην αὐτήν ἐκβιάζοναι τοῖς χαλκῶν: Gedike, Exc. iii in Buttman's ed. The scholiast on Eur. Hec. 338, quotes Eur. (fr. 373)—

τὰ Δαιδάλεια πάντα κυνεύοντα δοκεῖ
βλέπειν τ' ἀγάλμαθ' ὠδ' ἀνήρ κενὸς σοφὸς.

We find in some of these places rationalistic explanations of the legend that the statues of Daedalus could move, such as the introduction of quicksilver or clockwork, besides that which made it an exaggerated statement of the life-like effect given to the statues by opening their eyes and parting their feet. But the legend probably had no rational source at all; it was simply an expression of the marvel excited in primitive man by what seem to him triumphs of art or of invention. To this stock-in-trade of Wonderland belong the tripods and παρθέναι of Hephaestus (II. xviii 375 and 417), and the Phaeacian ships (Od. xiii 81). See too Athen. 3q1; Crates Theria fr. 1 (which seems a realisation of the state of things supposed by Aristotle Pol. i 4). Perhaps the ipsa olera olla legit of Catullus, 94, has a similar reference. To just the same category belong the stories about Amphion and Orpheus. The estimation of the achievement is strongly coloured by hero-worship. 'It is
not in times when art is mature that people are likely to tell stories of overturning town-walls or taming savage animals with it, but when it is in the elementary stage in which the personal character of the performer adds so much to the effect.' Parry Art of Music p. 24.

13. ἦσς δὲ οὖσ' ἐστιν παρ' ἐμίν, 'perhaps you have not even got them in your country.' Socrates knew well enough what the extant works of 'Daedalus' at Athens were, and is only mischievously introducing the childish fable about them, much as a Londoner might chaff a country cousin about Gog and Magog. 'Idem (Pausanias) ix x 1 2 enumerat sex Daedali statuas, quae sua aetate adhuc reliquae essent: plures sibi notas esse negat.' Gedike Exc. III in Buttmann's ed.

15. πρὸς τί; op. E 24 πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτα λέγω;

16. ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δειβάνα ἡ: for keeping slaves bound see Xen. Oec. iii 2. Symbolically, deities were represented as chained, to ensure their presence. 'Paus. iii x 5: Lacedaemoni πέθαι ἔστιν ἐχων Ἐνυάλιος, ἀγάλμα ἄρχαιον· γνώμη δὲ . . . οὕτω τῶν Ἐνυάλιων φεύγοντα οἰκεσοῦται φωνήν ἐνεχύμων ταῖς πέθαις (cp. Atheniensium Νική ἀστερος). Its symbolico vinculo tenebantur Liber Chii, Diana Ephyræae (schol. Pind. Ol. vii 95), Venus Lacedaemoni (Paus. iii x 8), Juno quondam Sami (Athen. xv 672). Plut. Quaest. Rom. 61 Τύραοι δεσμοὶ ἀγάλμασι λέγονται περιβαλέων. Lobeck Aglaoph. i p. 275' Fr.

17. ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεῖ: the former verb is an inceptive, 'to run off'; the latter expresses a state, 'to lie perdu,' 'to lurk in by-holes,' in Bunyan's phrase. ἀποδιδράσκω and δραπετεῖ are often contrasted with ἀποφεύγω; the former implies eluding by stealth, the latter by speed. Symp. 216 β (Alc. of Socrates) δραπετεῖ ὁν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω: Χεν. Αναθ. i ν 8 οὕτε ἀποδιδράσκων' οἶδα γάρ δὴ οἴχονται οὕτε ἀπο- πεφεύγας' έχω γάρ τρεῖς ὡστε έλευν τὸ ἐκεῖνων πλοῦν: ibid. ii ν 7 τῶν γάρ θεῶν πόλεμον οὐκ οἶδα, οὐτ' ἀπ' πολιον ἄν τάχους φυγών τις ἄποφεύγοι, οUvs' εἰς πολίον ἄν σκότος ἀποθαναίη: viii iii 11 τὰ φεύγοντα καὶ ἀποδιδράσκοντα διώκειν καὶ μαστεύειν. The word ἀποδιδράσκει occurs in Plato at Euthyphr. 11 c and Theaet. 203 d (see on 96 E 30 and on line 12), Phaedo 62 b (of abandoning a post).

18. παραμένειν, 'to stand by one' (περιμένειν 'to wait about for one.' Apol. 39 E διά λὲ μου παραμείνεσθαι τοσοῦτον χρόνων. So 'to stand one's ground' Phaedo 62 E, 98 E δικαίωτερον παραμέ- νοντα υπεχειν τὴν δίκην. From this comes the common name for a slave Parmeno (= 'Trusty'); cp. Maced. 'Parmenio.'

E 21. The best MSS. of Plato always give κεκτήσατα etc. after a
vowel, but generally ἐκτῆσθαι after a consonant. Schanz vol. xii praef. p. xvii. Theaet. 198 D ἢ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσθαι ἔνεκα· ἢ δὲ κεκτημένῳ κτέ.; ibid. 199 A τὸ κεκτήσθαι . . ὡ μὲν τις ἐκτήσται μὴ κεκτήσθαι; Rep. 505 B εἶ κεκτημέθα. . . κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι.

22. δραπέτην ἀνθρωπον: for ἀνθρωπος 'slave' see L. & S. who quote Philemon

καν δοῦλος ἢ τις, οὐδὲν ἤττον, δέσποτα,
ἀνθρωπος οὐτός ἔστω, ἀν ἄνθρωπος ἢ.

23. πάντα γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν: this too is in the main 'chaff.' The statues attributed to Daedalus had a certain archaic dignity, which to the 'reverent taste' was no doubt very moving; Paus. ii iv 5 Ναεδήλος δὲ ὁπότα εἰργάσατο, ἄτοπώτερα μὲν ἔστων ἐς τὴν δύναν, ἐπιτρέπει δὲ δυὸς τι καὶ ἔθεθεν αὐτοῖς. But in Hier. maj. 282 A we read τὸν Ναεδήλων φασιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι νῦν εἰ γενώσουν τοιαύτη ἐργάζοντο οὐ̣ ὣ ἄρ' ὥν τοιοῦτον ἔσχε καταγελαστὸν ἄν εἶναι.

Plato distinctly regards Daedalus as a human sculptor; in the Ion (533 A) he speaks of Daedalus son of Meion side by side with Epeus and Theodorus; in the Laws 677 D he couples Daedalus with Orpheus and Palamedes, and thinks they lived perhaps 1000 or 2000 years before his time.

24. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταύτα; see Meno's question at D 15. Fr. refers to Gorg. 453 c, Symp. 178 D, † Theages 129 A. See Rid. § 325 'Rhetorical Interrogation.' Cp. 79 B 18.

25. ἐδιδοῦσι: see on 96 B 10.

30. αἰτίας λογισμὸς, 'by a chain of causal reasoning.' The gen. αἰτίας is objective (αἰτίαν λογισμένος).

The phrase is quoted in the ιδιαγωγή of Albinus (Teubner text of Plato vol. vi p. 150) ἵνα δὲ τὰ δόγματα μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀναπόδραστα, δεσθεὶς αὐτὰ δεθήναι τῷ τῆς αἰτίας λογισμῷ. Another echo is found in † Ep. ii 318 B (it is assumed that Plato is writing to Dionysius on some point which D. has mis-apprehended) σοὶ δὲ ἰσως μὲν ἀκούσας τοι, τάχα δ' ἄν θεία μολὴ κατὰ τοῦ ὄρμης, ἔπειτα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀποδείξεις ὡς ἔξων βεβαιῶς οὐ κατεθέναι, ἀλλ' ἄπεις τοτε μὲν οὕτω ταὐτὲ δὲ ἄλλως περὶ τὸ φανταζόμενον. See Exc. VII p. 305.

It appeared at 85 C that the δόξα, in order to be raised to the level of ἐπιστήμαι, must be evoked by a process of questioning in their proper order and relation. Cp. 86 A 10 for the matter and for the plural ἐπιστήμαι.

32. ἐν τοῖς πρώσθεν: 81 C foll.

33. πρῶτον μὲν . . . ἐπαίτα: the words are not to be taken
in a temporal sense (any more than at 90 A or 95 A), for they would in becoming ἐπιστήμη at once be μὲν μὲν. The meaning is merely 'firstly' and 'secondly.'

36. δεσμῶ : 'i.e. τῶ δοδήσκας, significationem ducit ex superioribus, ut ἄριστος 78 D, εἰδοτία 99 B' Fr. The concrete δεσμῶ serves to keep the illustration before the mind.

37. ἔοικεν τολούθως τινί, 'it looks something like this.' Here ἔοικεν is impersonal, and the meaning is just the same as ἔοικεν οὖν ἦν ἐκείνος. But ἔοικα has a liking for a dat. construction. See on 80 D 39 and cp. Phaedo 99 E ἄριστος μὲν οὖν ὦ, εἰκάζω τρόπων τινά ὡς ὅτι ἔοικεν.

Chapters XL—XLII (98 B—end). Socr. Whether the simile I have given justly represents the difference between Right Opinion and Knowledge, I am not sure; but that there is a difference, I am confident. For purposes of practical utility, however, the two things are on a par. Now Virtue, whether based on Knowledge or on Right Opinion, in either case is not ours by Nature. It has been made clear too that the virtue of ordinary statesmen, not being Knowledge, does not arise from Teaching. It remains that it must be allotted to certain men by Divine Dispensation, like the inspiration of soothsayers, poets, etc. Any statesman whose art was based on Knowledge, and who thus was able to communicate it to others, would stand out among his fellows as Tiresias among the shades. But we shall understand the Origin of Virtue when we have ascertained the true Nature of Virtue, and not till then.

B 1. καὶ μὴν: 85 C 4, 87 D 35, 89 C 8, below C 16. Very similar is καὶ μὴν δή 88 D 1.

καὶ ἤγα: 'I, as well as you.'

2. εἰκάζων: the main meaning here is 'using conjecture,' but the notion 'using likenesses,' or 'speaking in parables,' is also present. It is possible there is a trace of a similar double meaning at 89 E 26 καλῶς ἀν αὐτὸ εἰκάζωντες εἰκάζομαι μὴ διδακτὸν εἴναι. εἰκάζω, 'conjecture,' is often opposed to exact knowledge: Crat. 425 C οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόγματα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκάζομεν: Phil. 55 E εἰκάζων λείπον' ἀν (if the measuring arts were removed we could do nothing but 'make shots'): †Alc. i 105 C εἴ τι οἴδα καὶ οὖν εἰκάζω: †Ep. vii 324 A οὐκ εἰκάζων ἄλλῳ ὡς εἰδώς (probably imitated from here, says Karsten, de Platonis quae feruntur epistolis p. 43): †Sis. 387 D. The terminology of Rep. 511 Κ,
534Λ, whereby εἰκασία is made the inferior division of δόξα, is expressly dropped at the latter of these passages and not resumed. (Exc. VII p. 302.)

3. οὐ πάνυ: see on 71C 19: for the general tone of the sentence cp. 86E 22 foll. (See App. on the text.)

4. εἰπερ φαίην ἄν: see on 79C 27. In the similar passage Ἀριστ. 29Β εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι κτέ., φαίην stands without ἄν. See Exc. II.

5. δ᾽ οὖν, 'at any rate.' The appearance of δὲ in ἀποδοσίς here is to be explained, as Buttm. points out, by the fact that the antithesis conveyed by δ᾽ οὖν refers to the parenthetical words ὠλγα δ᾽ ἃν φαίην.

καὶ τοῦτο, 'this too I should place on the list.' Cp. the closely parallel passage Ἀριστ. 32Β εἰπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθομέν άν, καὶ σοι πειθομει.

11. καὶ τοῦτο . . ᾧθη λέγειν: the phrase ᾧθη λέγειν became stereotyped, so that it is used with a singular pronoun: Lach. 186Λ, cp. Soph. 226Α ᾧθη λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦ τὸ θηρίου.

13. ωφελιμ: the fem. form is rare. It occurs Rep. 607D. C

At Charm. 174D οἴστε εἰ αὕτη ἐστιν ωφελίμος, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἀλλο τί ἄν εἰ ἡ ωφελίμη ἡμῖν (so B), Sch. (after Madv.) cuts out ἡ ωφελίμη, which certainly is strange after ωφελίμος just before. The reading ωφελίμη here shows indifference to hiatus.

ὁσται, 'will be found to be'; see on 83D 52.

17. ὑμολόγηται: at 87E.

19. ἐπιθή τοῖνυν κτέ.: the sentence is interrupted, and there is no apodosis. The conclusion pointed to is, as Fr. points out, not reached till 99Ε: ἀρετή ἄν εἰ ἡ ὥστε φύσις ὥστε διδακτάν, ἀλλὰ θεία μορφὰ παραγεγραμένη.

ἐπιστήμην . . δ᾽ ὥστε δόξαν, 'on the ground of Knowledge' rather than 'by means of Knowledge'; but the practical difference between the acc. and the gen. with δόξα is here, as often, small. Cp. 99Β 12.

20. ἄν εἶν . . εἰπερ εἶν: note the 'vague future supposition,' and see on 74Β 6, 82C 18; and for εἰπερ Exc. II.

23. See App. on text.

24. ὑποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν: at 89ΑΒ it was shown that Virtue, D assuming it to arise from ἐπιστήμη, was not innate. If it were, it would be the permanent possession from birth of certain gifted natures who would thus be marked out from their fellows. But can the Virtue that arises from δόξα ἀληθῆς—the other
alternative — be innate? Meno says 'no,' without giving reasons. We get a hint what these reasons would be in Prot. 323 c, quoted on 89 A 24, words which, though put into the mouth of Protagoras, may be taken as expressing the views of Plato.

26. οὐ φῶσει: we have to supply ὅποτερονοιν αὐτοῖν γιγνεται.

οὖσα οἱ ἄγαθοι φῶσει εἶναι ἄν: see 89 A 24 where also the predicate is omitted.

29. ἐπειδή δὲ γε οὐ φῶσει κτδ.: the transition here is rather abrupt. In the first place we have in ἐσκοποῦμεν a change back from an expression of opinion (εἶναι ἄν) to a history of the discussion (ἀσ ὑμολόγησατι C 17). In the second place, the subject is changed; perhaps with Schleiermacher we may fill up the ellipsis thus: ἐπειδὴ δὲ γε οὐ φῶσει (οἱ ἄγαθοι γίγνονται) ἐσκοποῦμεν τό μετὰ τοῦτο εἰ διδάκτων ἔστω (τό ἄγαθον εἴναι).

This forms a bridge to the next sentence where ἡ ἄρετή appears as subject. ἐσκοποῦμεν of course refers to 89 C foll.

35. καὶ εἰ: see note on 72 C 1. This phrase has nearly always a concessive force—‘even if.’ (An exception occurs at Phaedo 72 C καὶ εἰ κυκλοφοροῦσιν μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοντο δὲ μῆς, κτδ., where the meaning, as here, is simply ‘and if.’) In the next sentence we have καὶ εἰ, and T gives καὶ εἰ here, which may possibly be right. καὶ εἰ also is often concessive; but the instances in which it means simply ‘and if’ are not rare. See Kühner § 578. 2, F. E. T. § 226. Note ἄν repeated with the infinitive.

It is here clearly brought out that the hypothesis is a double or reciprocal one. See on 87 C 10.

Ε 41. μὴ εἰναι (ср. μὴ τε οὐ μὴ 44): as to the distinction between οὐ and μὴ with a dependent infinitive, Kühner § 541. 1 says that in general you have οὐ when the statement (belief, wish, etc.) is regarded as independent of the subject of the governing verb (e.g. ἔφη), and as assumed by the writer; μὴ, when it is dependent on the subject of the governing verb, and is expressed as a view attributed to him. Usage, however, has brought it about that with certain classes of verbs οὐ prevails, with others μὴ. With φάναι, οὐ is the rule; an instructive exception occurs in Xen. Mem. I ii 39 φαίνη δ' ἄν ἔγγορε μηδεμεν μηδεμαν εἰναι παλαίνουν παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀρέσκοντος, where Xen. is distinctly stating his private belief. With verbs containing a subjective element, on the other hand, like ὑμολογῶ, μὴ prevails; see 96 C 8, Phaedo 94 c οὐκοῦν ὑμολογήσαμεν μὴ ποτ' ἄν αὐτήν, ἀρονίαν γε οὖσαν κτδ., Prot. 336 b etc. Curious is Prot. 319 b ἥγοιμαι οὐ διδάκτων εἰναι, μη δ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρακεναστον
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ἀνθρώποις. See F. E. T. p. 353, notes 3 and 4, and J. Adam on Euthyphr. 6 b.

54. ἄξων ἀνθρώποις ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται: see on 88 C 33. The 99 A transition from the individual to the political point of view is here complete. Just as in man a certain faculty acts as guide, so the man in whom this faculty is prominent acts as guide to others. The word ἡγεῖται lends itself to this double point of view. We have here a foreshadowing of the doctrine of the Republic that the State is the Man 'writ large.' At 88 A—E we were concerned mainly with the individual, though the wider political view is latent, and indeed clearly appears in the statement 87 E 37 that all ἄγαθοι are ὄφελμοι, reaffirmed 96 E 1 and 98 C 16. The political view—identifying the Good Man with the Statesman—is the dominant one at 97 A ὄφελμοι ἐσονται ἀν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγεῖται τῶν πραγμάτων: and οὐκ ἐστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ἐστίν. Meno's conventional view of Virtue, alike with that of Socrates, implies action in a State.

55. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τούχης: cp. Aristot. Rhet. 1 x 7, where from the class of actions ὃν αὐτοὶ ἄλλοι are expressly excluded those that are due to τούχη.

CHAPTER XLI

2. ἔτι γίγνεται: see App. on the text. 'We no longer hold that Virtue is Knowledge': see on 83 D 52.

5. ἀπολλανταί, 'has been eliminated.'

9. οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλῆ: this use of ἀμφὶ, of which Ast quotes nine instances in Plato (also περὶ: Crat. 440 C, Phil. 44 c), occurs in denoting the head of a school with his followers, 'Themistocles and Co.,' 'our Gladstones.' See CR. xiii 168.

15. εὐδοξία is another instance of a word pressed to an unusual meaning by stress on its etymology: cp. 78 D 29. I do not think Plato intended any play on the ordinary meaning of the word 'good repute.' See App. on the text.

17. τὰς πόλεις ὀρθῶς, 'maintain their States.' Cp. C Lach. 181 A ἐν γε . . ὃν ὀρθῶς τῶν πατέρων: ibid. B σὺ μόνον τῶν πατέρων ἄλλα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ὀρθώντα: Laws 957 D αὐτὸν τε ὀρθῶς καὶ τὴν πόλιν. καταρθοῦν, on the other hand, is rarely used with external acc. ; but see Tim. 71 D καταρθοῦντες τὰ φαινόν ἡμῶν, and—in the physical sense—† Alc. i 121 D ἀνα-πλάττοντας τὰ μέλι τοῦ παιδός καὶ καταρθοῦντες.

18. θεομάντεις: the only other place from which L. & S. quote
the word is \textit{Apol. 22c} (of poets) \textit{ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὦσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμωδοί}. 

19. \textit{ἄληθε καὶ πολλά}: contrast with \textit{πολλά καὶ μεγάλα} below. The latter is simply ‘many great things’; the former is \textit{vera et sane multa}, the \textit{καὶ} being intensive. Stallb. refers to Elmsley on \textit{Eur. Med. 871}. 

22. \textit{θελέσι καλεῖ}: see \textit{81 B 24}. Plato takes the view that the use of \textit{θείος} as a mere expression of admiration is antique. Some support of this is to be found in Homer, with whom it is often merely ornate. The ‘divine swineherd’ of \textit{Od. xvi 1} is notorious. For the use in Herodotus see \textit{L. & S}. Plato appeals to colloquial usage as enshrining a deep truth. \textit{Cp. the two grades of meaning of κακοδαίμων (78 B 57)}. It is not long ago that a similar colloquial use of ‘divine’ was common in England; perhaps, as with \textit{θείος} at Athens, more among women than men. Plato uses this word frequently, but never, I think, without some notion of inspiration. It is used of Simonides (\textit{Rep. 381}e); of Prodicus, not without irony (\textit{Prot. 316}a, quoted on \textit{96 D 28}); of Phaedrus (\textit{Phaedr. 234}d) \textit{συνεβάλλεινευσά μετά σοι, τὴς θείας κεφαλῆς}, with reference to his rapt look, \textit{cp. 242}a; \textit{Soph. 216}b of the mysterious Stranger; of ‘grave and reverend seniors’ \textit{Laws 666}d \textit{τίς (φηθ) ἀν ὁδὸν πρέπου θείος ἀνδράσιν}; 

27. \textit{θελέσι τε}: the particle \textit{τε} naturally would come after \textit{χρησμωδούς}. The hyperbaton, by which \textit{τε} is forced forward in the sentence, is not uncommon in Plato. Buttm. refers to Heindorf’s index to the \textit{Phaedo}, and quotes Hdt. \textit{vi 86} ταύτα \textit{τε ἐν ἐπιλεγομένῳ καὶ βολευομένῳ}. Instances occur \textit{Prot. 316}d, \textit{325}b, \textit{336}c, \textit{Crito 43}b (for \textit{Ion 553}d see on \textit{95 B 11}). 

D28. \textit{χρησμωδούς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἀπαντάς}: the divine inspiration of poets is the main thesis of the \textit{Ion}; see especially \textit{533}b. See too \textit{Laws 719}c \textit{ποιητῆς ὡστάν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῆς Μούσης καθὶ κρίνει, τότε οὐκ ἐμφανώς ἔστιν (Fr.)}: and \textit{682}a \textit{θείον γὰρ οὖν ἀν ὁ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν [ἐνθεαστικὸν] ἐν γένοις ὑμνησόντων πολλών τῶν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν γιγαντιῶν ἐφάπτεται ἐκάστοτε}. The tendency to appeal to their authority is of course a natural outcome of this view. See on \textit{77 B 12}. 

29. \textit{καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς κτέ.}: in the \textit{Apol. 21}c foll. we find statesmen, poets, and craftsmen alike convicted of ignorance, but the source whence statesmen derive such skill as they have is not indicated. In the \textit{Phaedrus} (\textit{244}b foll.) we have three kinds of \textit{θεία μανία}, or divine possession, described, producing respectively the Prophet, the Purifier, and the Poet; to which at \textit{249}d is added the fourth kind, which produces the Philo-
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sopher. Nothing is said about any ἁθεία μανία of the Statesman. I think it was in the Meno that statesmen were first included by Plato in the class of the inspired. See on Ε 5 below.

32. ἵκ τοῦ θεοῦ: see App. on the text. Fr. endeavours to prove that by this phrase we can only understand Apollo. I doubt whether Plato here intends to attribute the inspiration of statesmen to any particular deity (as he does the four kinds of μανία severally in the Phaedrus). He is simply personifying the divine agency, without any mythological reference.


38. θεῖος ἀνήρ: Aristot. NE. vii i 3 καθαπερ οἱ Δάκωνες εἰδότας προσαγορεῖν, ἰδαν ἀγαθόνι τῷ φῶς τον, σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν. See H. Jackson in Phil. Soc. Proc. November 1887. It seems doubtful whether the Spartan address ὅ θεος (Laws 626 c) is really the same word as θεῖος 'divine.' See L. & S. on θεῖος.

CHAPTER XLII

2. καλὰ ἀδεία διαλεξόμεθα: this probably refers to the trial; E though we need not suppose this to be immediately impending at the time of the dialogue.

3. ἡπτίσαμεν καὶ ἐλγομεν: for the change of tense see on 72 Ε 22.

4. ἄρτη ἀν αἰὴ οὔτε φόσει οὔτε διδοκτόν: it may be noted that the view here expressed is that which Socr. really holds in the Protagoras, though there he pretends to have surrendered it in deference to the sophist; 328 Β ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ εὐπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἐν ἀγαθῷ οὐ ἀγαθῷ γίνονται. See on 70 Δ 1, 2.

5. θεῖα μορφ., 'by divine dispensation': on this important phrase see Zeller p. 176 note, Grote i 461, 462 (on the Ion). It is not confined to Plato; see Xen. Mem. ii iii 18, Cyr. iv ii 1, Hell. vii v 10; cp. too Hdt. iii 189 θεῖα τόχοι. In Plato it sometimes denotes the common divine element in man; e.g. in Prot. 322 Α ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἀνθρώπος θεῖος μετέχει μορφας: Phaedr. 230 Α (I study myself to see whether I am a Typhon) ἐτε ἰμερότερον τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον τῷ, θεῖος τινός καὶ ἀτυφόν μορφας φύσει μετέχουν. 'Oftener it denotes a privilege of
individuals: Apol. 33c (the Art of Examing has been forced on Socrates by all kinds of agencies) ἕπερ τις ποτὲ καὶ ἅλλη θελα μοῖρα ἀνθρώπως καὶ ὦτοιον προσέταξε πράττειν. It occurs continually in the Ion, contrasted with τέχνη, of the gift of poetry: 534c (also θελα δυνάμει), 535a, 536c, d, and 542a; Phaedr. 244a δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῶν γίνεται διὰ μανίας, θέλα μέντοι ὁδοίει διδομένης: ibid. c ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος (τῆς μανίας) ὅταν θελα μοῖρα γένηται: Phaedo 55b ἐν γάρ "Αιδοῦ ἔντα άνευ θελας μοῖρας νέαν: Rep. 366c (speech of Adimantus) ἀλλ' οἴδει ὅτι, πλὴν εἰ τις θελα φύσει δισχεράντων τὸ ἀδίκειν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λάβων ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος (cp. Socrates' answer 368a πάντα γὰρ θεῖον πεπόθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἀμειον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενο εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ): ibid. 492ε (a democracy offers insuperable obstacles to a virtuous training: by human agency it is impossible) θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παρομοίαν ἐξαιρώμεν λόγου: εἰ γὰρ χρῆ εἰλθέναι δίπερ ἀν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ κατατάσσει πολιτείων, θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτῷ σώσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἔρεις.

For Laws 642c see on 89A 24: ibid. 875c we have the heaven-born governor spoken of as superior to law: ἔπει ταῦτα εἶ ποτὲ τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει λαχανος, θελα μοῖρα γεννηθείς, παραλαβεὶς δυνατός εἶν, τούτων οὐδὲν ἄν δέονται τῶν ἄρτοντων ἀντοῦ. The phrase also occurs †Ep. ii 313b (quoted on 98A 30): †Ep. vii 326b (see on line 6 below): cp. 327ε θελα τοῖς τύχῃ.

Between θελα μοῖρα and φύσει in this dialogue a distinction is made, though the ground of this distinction is not made as clear as could be wished. See on 89A 24.

ἀνευ νοῦ: cp. on 70A 2 and 97B 17; also †Alc. ii 146A ἀνευ νοῦ δόξη πεποιτευκότα.


εἰ μὴ τις ἑτ τοιοῦτος κτέ.: the distinction between the philosophic and the popular statesman is parallel to that between philosophic and popular Virtue. 'Socrates had made virtue to consist entirely in knowledge. He had assumed that virtue, like knowledge, could be taught. In all these respects Plato at first followed him; as against the ordinary notions of virtue he would indeed always have acknowledged the view of Socrates to be substantially correct. But riper reflection led him in after life to modify the Socratic doctrines and to determine them more accurately. He became convinced that side by side with perfect virtue, which is no doubt founded on knowledge, the unscientific virtue of ordinary men has its value; that though the former is based on instruction, and the latter only on custom, yet that virtue of custom
precedes the higher kind as an indispensable preparatory stage' Zeller p. 448.

On the subject of δημοτική ἀρετή see Archer-Hind's Phaedo App. I. (He refers to Dr. Thompson's note on Gorg. 506d.) He clearly shows under what different aspects δημοτική ἀρετή may appear. It may be (1) the reflex of philosophic virtue, possessed, as the best of which they are capable, by men under the guidance of a philosopher. In this light it is the virtue of the Auxiliaries in the Republic, distinguished from the Rulers. Or (2) it may be a precarious guide to right action in certain directions, acquired by the individual either θεία μολότα or by habit and fortunate environment (Rep. 619c; cp. on 70A 2). This, according to circumstances, may be either practically beneficial, or deceptive and dangerous. (Exc. VII p. 301.)

J. & A. M. Adam in their Introd. to the Protagoras, p. xxxiv, say: 'Although the subject of the dialogue might seem to have expressly invited mention of that "demotic virtue" of which Plato made so much, no mention of it is made'; and add in a note—'It is in the Meno that the difference between demotic and philosophic virtue is first clearly laid down.' 'The whole discussion in the Meno brings out very clearly that the fundamental distinction between popular and philosophic ἀρετή is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge' (A.-H. loc. cit.). And in the Meno it is popular virtue and popular statesmanship that is conferred θεία μολότα.

The only true Statesman, Plato holds, is the Philosopher. For the difference between him and the popular statesman see Rep. 534b-d. How the desirable consummation may be brought about we read in Rep. 473d. Either philosophers must gain rule in the States, or else the present so-styled Kings and Rulers must sincerely and thoroughly (γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανώς) embrace philosophy. Compare ibid. 499b οὕτω πόλις οὕτος πολιτεία οὕτω γ' ἀνήρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτὲ γέννηται τέλεος, πρὶν δὲ τοῖς φιλόσοφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλγοῖς καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀρχήσοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τῶν παραβαλλήν, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μὴ, πόλεως ἐπηκελθῆσαι καὶ τῇ πόλει κατηκόρω γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις δυνῶν ὕεσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τινων θειάς ἐπιπνοιας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῶς ἑρως ἐμπέσης.

It is possible that in the latter passage Plato had in mind the affairs of Sicily. We find the writer of Τ Ἐπ. vii (addressed to the supporters of Dion) quoting it (326b) κακῶν οὐδ' οὐ δέχετο τὰ ἄθρωπων γένη, πρὶν δὲ ἢ τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων ὀρθῶς γε καὶ ἀληθώς γένος εἰς ἄρχας ἐλθη τὰς πολιτικὰς ἢ τῶν δυναστεύοντων ἐν τοῖς πόλεσιν οὐκ ὑπων μολόσθαν θείας δυνῶς φιλοσοφήσαι.

The sequel of events in Sicily affords an ironical commentary on Plato's views, in the contrast it shows between the failure of
Dion, with his philosophic training, and the success of Timoleon, with his belief in αὐτοψία or 'spontaneity' (Plut. Tim. 36).

In Plato’s identification of the Philosopher with the Statesman there is a veiled polemic against Isocrates. Isocrates believed in practical sagacity as of greater utility than theoretical knowledge. His was the sceptical view, the belief in a working rule, to which orators, as J. S. Reid observes (Intr. to Cicero’s Acad. pp. 11–13), are prone. Thus Isocrates, in his pamphlet against the Sophists (13) § 8, says we see πλείω κατορθοῦντας τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους ἢ τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἐπαγγελλομένους, which we should certainly regard as directed against Plato were it not that the date—about 391 B.C.—is too early. See Jebb Att. Or. II 51 foll. The jeers at the small fees and at the saying ὥσ νῦν δέονται χρημάτων in §§ 3, 4 seem to point at Antisthenes and his school. In the Ἀντιδοσία (15) are similar passages: §§ 264 foll. he speaks patronizingly of philosophic studies as a good gymnastic for youth, but a man must not let his mind get fossilized (κατασκευευθέσαν) over them, nor ‘get stranded (ἐξεκλαίασαν) among the theories of the old sophists, such as Empedocles and Parmenides.’ (The resemblance to the view of Callicles in the Γοργίας 434 is pointed out by Dr. Thompson, Phaedr. p. 174.) At § 271 follows a significant passage: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φόσαι τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν... ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν σοφῶν μὲν νομίζοι τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπινοεῖν ὅτι τό πολὺ δυναμένου, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φόρμαν (practical wisdom). Cp. note on 91 C 19. In the (late) Panath. (12) § 9 he says of himself τὴν δὲ φόσαι εἴδος δοξάσαι μὲν περὶ ἔκαστον τὴν ἄλθειαν μᾶλλον δυναμένην τῶν εἰδῆναι φασικτῶν. At the beginning of the Helena (10) we have successive attacks on Antisthenes, on Plato (οἰ δὲ διεξόμετο ὦς ἄνδρα καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταῦτον ἐστιν, καὶ φόσαι μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχουμεν, μᾶλλος δὲ ἐπιστήμην κατὰ πάντων ἔχουμεν), and Euclides, and come at § 5 to the statement διὶ πολὺ κρείττων ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν χρήσιμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάσαι ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστασθαι. Cp. also letter ν (to Alexander) §§ 3, 4, ‘I hear,’ says Isocrates, ‘that among philosophies you do not reject τὴν περὶ τᾶς ἐρίδας, but you think that in private society it is too aggressive, and that debate between a ruler and his subjects is somewhat derogatory’: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὖν ἀγαπᾶν σε τὴν διατριβήν, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν παιδείαν τὴν περὶ τοῦς λόγους... δὲ ἢν μὲν τε δοξάζειν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπιεικῶς ἐπιστῆσαι κτέ. See Dr. Thompson App. II on the Phaedrus.

8. σχέδον τι: Const. Ritter’s tables (Intr. p. lxii) show that the phrase σχέδον τι (together or separated) prevails in the
dialogues up to the Republic, σχεδόν in the later dialogues. This is the only place in which the word occurs in the Meno.

9. οὖν ἔφη "Ομηρός ... τὸν Τερεσίαν εἶναι: Od. x 494. Cobet refers to the anecdote told by Plutarch (Cat. maj. 27) that Cato applied this line to Scipio minor. It is quite possible that Cato knew that this line had been applied by Plato to distinguish the philosophic statesman from others and that he meant to imply that Scipio by force of education stood out in just this manner among his compeers. (We perhaps have here a foreshadowing of the simile of the Cave in Rep. vii.) Near the end of the Laws (969 b) Plato compares the specially trained Philosophers (the ‘Nocturnal Council’) with ordinary governments: ἐάν γε μην οὗτος ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος γένηται ξύλλογος, ὃς φιλοί ἔταιροι, παραδεόμενοι τούτῳ τῇ πόλει, ἀμφοτήριοι τ’ οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδεμία οὐδενί τῶν νῦν παρά ταῦθ᾽ ὡς ἔστω εἰςεῖν νομοθετῶν, ὡς ἄστι σχεδόν ὡς τιράννοι ἀποτελεσμένοι, οὐδὲ συγκριτικόν. οὐκ ἐνεργοὶ οὐκ ἔμειν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ ἐπηγάμεθα, κεφαλῆς νοῦ τε κοινωνίας εἰκόνα τινά πως ξυμμέταντες, ἐάν ἄρα ημῖν οὐ τοίς ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεξθῶσι, παθεύσησι το προσηκούτως, παθεύσητε το εἰν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας κατακτησάντες φύλακες ἀποτελεσμῶν, οὕτως ημεῖς οὐκ ἐδοκεῖν ἐν τῷ πρώτευτε βίω πρὸς ἀρετήν σωτηρίας γενομένους.

12. καὶ εὐθὺς: Buttm. (index) explains ‘idem etiam statim esset vir ejusmodi in virtute’ h.e. ‘statim appareat idem fere etc.’ The idiom falls under the class noticed at 83 D 52. Buttm. quotes Xen. Hier. ix 4 οὐκόν εὐθὺς ἐν τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἐπίχαρα διὰ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐγένετο, τὰ δὲ ἀντίτυπα διὰ ἄλλων, and observes that the use of αὐτίκα is somewhat similar.

21. αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ζητεῖν τι ποτ’ ἔστιν ἀρετή: these words appear to me to be a clear reference forward to the Republic, where the subject, though formally Justice, is really nothing less than Virtue in its entirety. Thus the Meno is designed as a prelude. Very nearly allied to this passage is the conclusion of Bk. 1 of the Republic. Socrates has ‘tasted each dish as it was handed round,’ and had no satisfaction: ὡς τε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὢς ἐστι, σχολῇ εἰσομαι εἰς ἀρετῆ τοῖς οὖσα τιρχᾶνει εἰς καὶ ὅ, καὶ πότερον ὃ έχων αὐτῷ οὖν εὐδαιμόνιον ἐστιν ἢ εὐδαιμόνιον.

22. ἀρα ποι λέναι: it is rare for Socrates to make any excuse for breaking off a colloquy. Cp. the end of the Protagoras. The conclusion of these dialogues suits their inchoate character. It says, in effect, ‘to be continued.’
ADDENDA TO NOTES ON 87A 23 AND 30

I. Investigators contemporaneous with or later than Butcher have done little to further the solution (see Ueb.-Heinze p. 150). Gercke (Archiv für Gesch. d. Philosophie ii 2. 170–174, 1889) would read τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον for τὸ χωρίου τρίγωνον. He thinks that the only problem is to apply to a circle a figure (whether triangle or anything else) and see if it fits. But where then is the ὑπόθεσις? Tannery in the same volume, pp. 509–514 (also 1889), naturally rejects this, and falls back on the solution of Benecke, which has also received the suffrages of Moritz Cantor. Tannery confesses the inexplicability of the disguise of the problem; 'puisque l'existence de la condition imposée est précisément aussi difficile à reconnaître que la possibilité de la solution.' He would cut out the words αὐτοῦ γραμμῆς in line 29. Lastly Dummler (Academica Anhang iv, 1889) expresses dissatisfaction with Gercke, and says with much point that most of the 'solutions' come to this: 'if it is possible, it is possible.' He says the place is 'stark verderbt,' and rewrites it, bringing it into relation with the tetrahedra of the Timaeus.

II. Benecke points out that while τὸ δὲ τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον certainly cannot mean 'this triangular figure,' yet Plato could hardly have written τὸ τρίγωνον χωρίον or τὸ χωρίον τὸ τρίγωνον, in that sense; inasmuch as Plato and Euclid only know τρίγωνον as a substantive, and χωρίον, unqualified, regularly means a parallelogram, and moreover a rectangle. A rectilinear figure is σχῆμα εὐθύγραμμον. To the same effect argues Tannery: χωρίον properly means a rectangle; it is by an extension of usage that the term is applied to any figure, insomuch as it can be measured under the form of a rectangle.
APPENDIX ON THE TEXT

The text of the present edition is founded mainly on the valuable recension of Schanz (Sch.). I have however not invariably followed him; but in some cases have sided with Fritzsch (Fr.) where he and Schanz do not agree. In a very few places I have given a reading that differs from both these editions. I have discussed the text at all places of any importance where Sch. and Fr. differ. Fortunately there is in the *Meno* no place, with the possible exception of 87 A, where any serious doubt as to interpretation is caused by uncertainty in the text.

Fr. has given a full and clear account of the MSS. of Plato, with reference to the *Meno*, in his edition, pp. 35 foll. The work of Sch., besides his edition of the text, is mainly contained in three tracts: *Novae comm. Platonicae*, Würzburg 1871; *Studien zur Geschichte des platonischen Textes*, Würzburg 1874; *Über den Platocodex der Markus Bibliothek in Venedig, append. class 4 No. 1*, Leipzig 1877.

The MSS. of the *Meno* fall into two classes. Of the first (α), the great representative is the Bodleian MS. This ranks first in excellence. Fr., following Bekker, marks this as Π; I follow Sch. in referring to it as B. Only one other MS. belongs to this class; a Vatican MS. (Bekker Δ), copied, whether directly or not is uncertain, from B. All the other MSS., some nineteen collated for the *Meno*, form the other class. The best MS. of this class is the Venetian, marked by Sch. as T. Sch. was the first to demonstrate its importance. He holds that all the MSS. of the second class are derived from it (*Über den Platocodex etc.*). Fr. divides the MSS. of the second class into two sub-classes. One of these sub-classes (ιη) he allows (p. 43) to have been derived from T. This contains several Paris MSS.; namely the 'Coslinianus' (Bekker Γ), once more highly esteemed than now, and Bekker's BCE and F; also
some Florentine MSS. The other sub-class (b) Fr. denies to be derived from T; he shows that in the *Meno* there are eleven places where this sub-class coincides with B rather than with T. This sub-class contains two 'Veneti,' two 'Vindobonenses,' two 'Vaticani,' two 'Laurentiani.' The most interesting among them is Laurentianus 85, 7, appropriately marked as x by Fr., who says of it 'A libris reliquis familiae saepissime secedit x, qui negligentissime scriptus tamen "multas habet egregias lectiones, quas in ceteris libris frustra quaesiveris."

The last words are quoted from Stallb. See also for this MS. Schanz *Studien* p. 70 and p. 69, note.

70 B 9. Δαρισσαλος was bracketed by Naber (*Commentationes* II 63, which appeared in the *Tydschrift vor de Nederlandsche Gymnasien*). Sch. and Fr. both follow him. (1) The word is superfluous; we are presently told that Aristippus was one of the Aleuadae, and every one knew that the Aleuadae were of Larisa. (2) With Δαρισσαλος the article τοῦ would be required. Three MSS. of the class b supply this. The Coislinianus and χ, on the other hand, correct to Δαρισσαίω. This makes it almost certain that the word is a gloss. The spelling Δαρισσαλος is better than Δαρισσαλος: Sch. prolegomena to *Phaedrus* § 1. Cp. Δαρισςαν 97 A 14.

71 A 23. ἐφέσθαι: the proper accent of the aor. is preserved by B as usual; ἐφέσθαι T. See Sch. *Phaedr.* prolegomena p. viii. At Gorg. 447 c both B and T wrongly give ἐποὺ for ἐροὶ.

25. ἀρετῆς γοῦν ἐτε διδικτὸν εἶδος ἰτύρο παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι: Naber (*Commentationes*) brackets these words, I believe rightly, though neither Sch. nor Fr. follow him. The words are clumsy and superfluous, and the use of γοῦν is, I believe, not Attic. The Attic use of γοῦν is illustrated by εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις just above, cp. 89 E 30 πολλάκις γοῦν ἢτῶν, 90 B 47 αἰροῦνται γοῦν αὐτῶν, 93 D 15 ἐπέμενον γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων. The speaker retires, as it were, to firmer ground from which he defends his former statement. So γοῦν is often used in 'quoting an example' (L. & S.); a previous general statement is narrowed down to a special instance, which, so far as it goes, supports it. Ast quoting this passage translates γοὺν videlicet; but I cannot see that he quotes any other passage where the restrictive force is absent as it is here. At *Phaedr.* 296 A ἀναγκαία γοῦν δεῖρα the meaning seems elliptical, like praeassertum cum, 'which at least you would expect, as.' In later Greek—as in Diog. Laert.—the use of γοῦν became much looser. A similar gloss containing γοῦν is expelled at *Symp.* 195 d.

26. τοσοῦτον δὲ: the MSS. give τοσοῦτον, to which
Buttmann took exception. Cobet Collect. critica 44 says: ‘Certo et perpetuo omnium Atheniensium usu dicebatur tosoütron áteξw et tosoütron déw, et polloı, plestou, mikrou ὀλγου déw et similia sine ulla exceptione, quam natura verbi déw non admitit.’ The acc. tosoütron is defended by Ullrich, and retained by Hermann. Cobet is followed by Sch. and Fr., and I have followed them. It must be noted, however, that the accusative tosoütron is logically quite defensible; indeed either of the three cases is theoretically possible, and the dative actually occurs in the MSS. of Isocr. Bus. (11) 5 tosoütr déis ápoxrήšnai. I may say ‘I am lacking of so much’ (gen.) or ‘by so much’ (dat.) or ‘in respect of so much’ (acc.). Cobet’s rule, as all such rules, assumes that Attic usage was quite uniform. The other instances of tosoütron are however all from late writers; twice in the spurious Ἀξιοχοῦ 366 b tosoütron ἄποδει τῶν περὶτων: 372 b tosoütron γὰρ ἄποδει τοῦ ἐδοκίματο (where, as Buttmann points out, there are already dependent genitives). So too Charito νυπ 1 τοσοῦτον ἄποδει τοῦ σὲ καλῶν. ‘Plut. adv. Coloten. x 6 τοσοῦτον ἐδήση τοῦ κινεῖν, qui etiam μικρὸν, ὀλγυν δέω seq. inf. vel τοῦ c. infin. aliquoties praebet’ Fr. In Plutarch and other later writers no doubt the desire to avoid hiatus influenced the use. Thus Lucian Nigr. 26 gives tosoütron déw, Pisc. 29 tosoütron déw: but Icaromen. 5 τοσοῦτον ἐδήσαν.

27. ὡς οὖν αὐτό: so the MSS., Buttm. and Fr. Sch., following Stallb., corrects ὡς to ὲστὶ. ὡς in consecutive sense, after a demonstrative, is very rare in Plato (see Prot. 330 e othan ἔχομα πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡς οὖν εἶναι κτε., with J. and A. M. Adam’s note) and perhaps unparalleled with the indic. as here. But Xen. affords examples: Ἑλλ. iv i 33 νῦν οὕτω διάκειμαι ὡς οὖν δείετον ἔχω, Symp. iv 37 οὕτω πολλὰ ἔχω ὡς μόλις αὐτὰ εὑρίσκω, ibid. ix 3. Krüger § 65. 3, 4; Goodwin MT. § 609.

5. Naber, following x, inserts ἐτύμν after ὄποιν γέ τι. I B have ventured to follow him.

28. Hirschig, Cobet and Sch. read eipet, after one Florentine D MS. (n). Fr. keeps eipou. Rutherford New Phrynichus p. 219 ‘The two (aorists, eipou and eipet) accurately supplement one another according to the following paradigm:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indic.</th>
<th>eipou</th>
<th>eipet</th>
<th>eipeta</th>
<th>eipomev</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>eipas</td>
<td>eipatou</td>
<td>eipeta</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>eipe</td>
<td>eipatyn</td>
<td>eipou</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imper.</td>
<td>eipte</td>
<td>eipatou</td>
<td>eipeta</td>
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<tr>
<td>eiptaw</td>
<td>eipatyn</td>
<td>eipontwn</td>
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This is the scheme to which Attic usage was approximating. But the process of selection and elimination must have taken
time. We should expect to see sporadic survivals, which we actually find.

72 Α 12. οί δὲ βούλει, βούλευον: Cobet (Collect. crit. 46) would omit βούλει, in accordance with general usage (see expository note). But the repetition of βούλευον here seems characteristic of Meno’s verbose style.

20. κειμένων BT, κειμένων x, which is adopted by Cobet (Collect. crit. 46) and Sch. Fr. keeps κειμένων. No one has followed Gedike, who from Plutarch περὶ πολυφίλιας, c. 1 wished to read κινομένων or κεικείμενων. This spoils the irony of the passage, for the double meaning of παρὰ σοι κειμένων, and the reference to Meno’s real character, cannot be ignored.

C 4. ἀποκρινάμενον BT was retained by Bekker and Hermann. Buttm., Sch., and Fr. give ἀποκρινόμενον, which is supported by some MS. of the sub-class b1 and by a Paris MS. (Fr.), derived from T, of small independent authority. Madv. (adv. crit. 1 418) condemns the aorist. The reading ἀποκρινόμενον given in the old printed editions, and rendered by Ficinus, is not supported by any existing MS. I think there is ground here for adhering to the aorist ἀποκρινάμενον. All the neighbouring verbs are aorists. A distinction very commonly observed by Plato is that ἔρεθα, ἐρωτήσα, ἀποκρίνασθαι are used for single inquiries and answers; ἐρωτάν, ἀποκρίνασθαι of a process of inquiry and answer. (See note on 72 Β 22.) Rep. 1 will furnish abundant instances: 332 c (aorists); 336 c μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα ἡμῖν φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδὰν τίς τι ἀποκρίνηται (aor.), ἐγγυκός τούτο, δι πρὸν ἐρωτάν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ εἰπέ, τι φόρος ἐμάς τὸ δίκαιον: 337 Ρ ἡ αὐτὸς μὲν ἡ ἀποκρίνηται (pres.), ἀλλοῦ δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον λαμβανόν λόγον. Πῶς γὰρ ἢ τις ἀποκρίνατο; (to the particular question): 338 Α ἀποκρινόμενον ‘becoming respondent,’ τόν ἀποκρινόμενον ‘the respondent’ (so Prog. 338 D): 343 Α αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀποκρίσεως ‘keeping the part of respondent’—no particular question is now before him: οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαύτα ἐρωτάν; 346 Α (pres.); 348 b (aor.); 349 b (aor.); 351 c (pres.); 352 b (pres.). At 340 b the MSS. vary between ἀποκρίεσθαι and ἀποκρίασθαι. Either would suit the sense; a single answer is referred to, but that answer is in the act of being given. In the present dialogue note 74 C 21 ὁ ἐρωτών; Ε 3 τό ἐρωτῶντι; 75 D 10, with note on text; 83 D 50 τούτῳ ἀποκρινοῦν (as a general practice). Other considerations may sometimes cause the aor. to be used of a process, as 85 D 20 οὔδενος διδάξατος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήμησαται (where the aor. ptcp. expresses priority of time); or the pres. of a single act: Phil. 19 A σκότα δὴ πyectos ἡμῶν ἀποκρινέται τοῦ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον: but just below
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dia τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι. Again, compare el τις ἀνέργου 74 Β 6 with el τις ἐρωτηθῇ 75 Α 8. At Gorg. 465 D ti οὖν ἀποκρίνει may be ‘why don’t you go on answering?’; but owing to the special use of the aor. in this idiom (see on 92 D 30) the pres. is here inevitable. See further Gorg. 462 B ἐρώτα ἡ ἀποκρίνου, ‘take which part you prefer,’ ΠΙΩΑ. Ἀλλὰ τοιχω ταῦτα. καὶ μοι ἀπόκρυναι κτῆ.: ibid. 515 B ἄκρισιν ἀποκρίνασθαι; Prot. 330 c-e; 351 D οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρην . . ἀποκρίνασθαι: Theae. 146 A ἐπιτάξει δὲ τι ἄν
βουλητη ἀποκρίνεσθαι: Phil. 24 ε τὸν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτῶμενον. In Polit. 258 A ἀποκρυμόμενον (Bekker) is right. Note ὁ ἀποκρυμόμενος for ‘the defendant’ (L. & S.); cp. ἀπερατοκρίνεσθαι Ατ. Wasp. 951; contrast ἀπόκρυναι ibid. 964, Frogs 1008, of single answers. See CR. IX 147.

17. ἵναι ϒ: all the MSS. give ἵναι τε, except x, which E gives the reading in the text, adopted by Bekker, Sch., and Fr. (See 91 D 10 for a converse instance.) ϒ was also preferred by Butt., who however mentions another alternative, which has found some favour, to omit the first kal, reading ἵναι τε καὶ ἐναι ἄνδρος κτῆ., with hyperbaton of τε, for which see on 99 C 27. ϒ and τε are confused Polit. 258 A, etc.

9. ἄρχειν οὖν τε ἐναι τοῦ δευτέρου; the MSS. all give 73 D οὖν τε, a corruption not easy to account for. Wolf read οὖ, to which Butt. rightly objects (1) that the dual implies a pair conjointly, not two separate individuals; (2) that the rest of the sentence, especially τοῦ δευτέρου, implies that the slave only, not the child, is here considered. He proposed οὖν τε or οὖν τε. The latter attraction would be awkward with the genitive δευτέρου following. Madvig adv. crit. ii. 413 οὖν τε, followed by Sch. and Fr. The language naturally repeats Meno’s οὖν τε ἐναι just above; cp. l. 13 below.

12. ἐνδὲ καὶ: so Fr. The MSS. all give ἐνδὲ γάρ καὶ. γάρ is certainly out of place; the new point is entirely separate from the former; not a support added to it. Sch. thinks that γάρ has arisen from a dittography of καὶ, and reads ἐν καὶ. On this Fr. rightly says ‘asynedeton aegre fertur’; at Soph. 239 D we have, it is true, τα τι τά νυ τοίς ὑδατι κατόπτροι ἐλθὼν, ἐν καὶ τα γεγραμμένα καὶ τα τετευμένα καὶ τάλλα, but this occurs in the middle of a list, and is not parallel, though there also Heindorf wished to insert δὲ after ἐν. Fr. gives many passages in Plato in which δὲ and γάρ are confused by particular MSS. Add Aesch. Choeph. 32 where Lacl. gave δὲ for γάρ of the MSS.; Hes. O. et D. 526 where Hermann gave οὐδὲ ο for MSS. οὐ γάρ ο, etc. See CR. xiv 433 a.
5. προβιβάσαι is given by one Florentine MS. (n) of no-great authority; but seems to be right. It was proposed by Schneider, and is adopted by Sch. Fr. with the other MSS. προσβιβάσαι. But προβιβάζειν, pronouere, is the sense required; cp. Prot. 328 ήμισ προβιβάσαι εις ἄρετην. προσβιβάζειν is admove re; neither of its senses is suitable here. Compounds of πρός and πρό are continually confused in MSS. See on 75 D 10, and Badham’s note on Phil. 45 b. At Xen. Mem. 1 ii 17 most of the MSS. give καὶ τῷ λόγῳ προβιβάζοντας, and this I should keep, but most modern editors give, after one or two MSS., προσβιβάζοντας.

21. περάμαλ σοι: so Sch.; the MSS. give περάμεθα, Naber περάσαμαι. The ‘modest’ use of the plur. 1st person is rare in prose. At 71 C 12 ἀπαγγέλλωμεν refers to Meno and his suite. Kühner § 371. 3 quotes examples from Xen. where a plural pronoun is used by a person speaking of himself; also the phrase μοι δοκοῦμεν Soph. 229 b. But in this case, as in others (as Rep. 545 c), the plural is accounted for by the fact that Socr. is regarded as taking his pupil into partnership. This is excluded in the present case by σοι (cp. Hadley § 637). I follow Sch., with some hesitation, as the corruption is hard to account for. Dr. Thompson in his note on Phaedr. 253 c (δείλωμεν) gives instances of the converse corruption of the plural into the singular.

30. σε: the MSS. give this to Socrates. Heind. (on Crat. 410 c) first saw that it was part of a continuous speech of Meno.

10. προσομολογῇ: all the MSS. give προσομολογῇ (see crit. note on 74 B 5). Gedike suggested προσομολογῇ, but none of the editors have followed him. I believe him to be right. (1) This reading is supported by 79 D 38 μὴ πώ ὑμολογημένω, where the present passage is referred to; (2) προσομολογεῖν always (in Plato at any rate) means ‘to acknowledge in addition’—a meaning not suitable here. I think Buttm. (Index) is wrong in saying that προσομολογεῖν is ‘idem quod ὑμολογεῖν,’ and Stallb. wrong in giving the rendering una cum altero fateri.

Gorg. 461 B διὶ Γ. ἡσυχώθη σοι μὴ προσομολογήσαι κτέ, ‘because Gorgias was ashamed not to grant that the rhetorician (besides his knowledge of rhetoric) would know the just etc.’

Soph. 248 c δειμέθα παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐτὶ πυθήθαι σαφέστερον, εἰ προσομολογοῦσιν κτέ., ‘if, after asserting that οὐσία has nothing to do with ποιεῖν or πάσχειν, they further grant that οὐσία can be known.’

ibid. 261 Ε ὑπὲρ ψήθνῃ ὑπολαβώντα σε προσομολογεῖν, ό what
I thought you meant when (after asserting of forms and letters that some would go together, others not) you made the further similar statement about words.'

† Hipparchus 227 D is clearest of all: αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν, 'we acknowledged in addition to it.'

L. & S. are wrong in quoting Theaet. 159 c under προσωμολογεῖν: the reading there is προσωμολογημένων.

At Soph. 241 ά the MSS. vary between προσωμολογημένα and προδιωμολογημένα. I believe the latter is required by the context, and that προσδιωμολογεῖσθαι occurs neither there nor anywhere else; προδιωμολογεῖσθαι occurs Tim. 78 ά.

In other authors the point is almost equally clear. Xen. Anab. vii iv 24 προσωμολόγουν is contrasted with ωμόλογουν above. Andoc. de Myst. § 15 καὶ ταῦτ' ὑμῖν προσωμολογεῖται ἀπαντά: after the first μήνυσι of Andromachus comes the second of Teucer. Isocr. Træpez. (17) 39, 'to acknowledge a further debt'; see L. & S. Dem. 27 § 42 = 826 end (in same sense; see L. & S.). Dem. 48 § 44 = 1179. 17, 'granted in addition to my previous collusions with him.' Dem. 56 § 6 = 1284, 17, 'they first promise they will return from Egypt to Rhodes or Athens; afterwards they further promise (προσωμολογοῦσι) they will return to Athens and nowhere else. See Aesch. 3. 53 μὴ γευσθῇ ἄλλα παλαιὰ καὶ λιαν προσωμολογημένα, 'acknowledged before proof is brought' (Weidner), 'self-evident.' (Cobet here from a minority of MSS. gives προσωμολογημένα.) προσωμολογία, 'a further admission' (L. & S.); but the one instance they quote (Dem. 39. 41) hardly bears out this rendering. Buttmann, after acknowledging that 79 D 38 favours Gedike's προσωμολογη, says 'sed in haec forma necessarium foret praeteritum προσωμολογησθη, quo non opus est in forma quoad tempus indefinita, προσωμολογεῖν.' If ἐρόμενος be read in the sequel he is probably right. This is one of my reasons for not reading ἐρόμενος.

ὁ ἐρωτῶν: all the MSS. give ὁ ἐρωτῶμενος, which is defended by Gedike and Ullrich, and retained by Hermann. It must be wrong; for it is the person who asks for the definition who must acknowledge his familiarity with the terms employed. This Meno, now ὁ ἐρωτῶν, presently does, in answer to Socrates' question ἐπίπεδον καλεῖ τι. Most editors, following Cornarius, correct to ὁ ἐρόμενος, referring to Hipp. maj. 293 ά, where all the MSS. give ἐρωτῶμενον, which is universally corrected to ἐρωμένον. In that place the aorist ἐρωμένου is no doubt right. Here, after the presents ἀποκρίνεσθαι, προσωμολογη, it comes in strangely. The interpretation of Ficinus, 'qui rogat' is adduced in support of the usual correction. But if Ficinus read ὁ ἐρόμενος, would he not rather have written 'qui
rogavit'. For these reasons I correct ἐρωτόμενος to ἐρωτῶν. The corruption arose either from a dittography {ἐρωτῶν} or because the scribes failed to see how the person who is, on the whole, ὁ ἐρωτῶν, could be expected to make an admission; and so altered ἐρωτῶν to ἐρωτόμενος.

A 4. πράγματα προστάτεις: so the MSS., which Fr. follows. Many of the editors are dissatisfied. Ast struck out πράγματα; Gedike would substitute παρατικά for it; Cobet alters προστάτεις to παρέχεις, whom Sch. follows. No doubt πράγματα παρέχεις is the usual phrase (90 E 30, etc.). But as Plato uses προστάτεις with such objects as ἔργον (Rep. 530 c, Parm. 136 d), διατάσσω (Rep. 406 c), οὗ φαίνοι Politi. 263 a, it may surely be admitted with the object πράγματα, 'trouble.' See L. & S. προστάσιον n 1. Heindorf in Buttner. quotes for πράγματα προστάτεις Xen. Oec. xvii 11, to which Fr. adds ibid. ix 16.

77 A 5. κατὰ δὸλον: this seems to be the only instance of this combination in Plato. In Aristotle the phrase became stereotyped, and was written as one word καθὸλον. L. & S. (r.v. καθὸλον) say it was written καθ’ δὸλον in 'writers before Aristotle.' But where are the instances? The letter of Philip in Dem. de Cor. (18) 77 is not genuine. Ast read καθ’ δὸλον, which occurs Tim. 40 A, 55 E. κατὰ δὸλον is the form which occurs Rep. 392 E. Possibly this is the true reading here: but κατὰ δὸλον, even though this be an isolated instance in Plato, is parallel to κατὰ πάντων at 73 D 5 etc. The hiatus need not surprise us: Fr. gives instances of hiatus between prep. and relative, all from dialogues not later than the Republic. He quotes Cicero Or. § 151, where Cicero observes Platonem hiatum non fugisse. But this is much less true of the later dialogues. See Blass Attische Beredsamkeit n 426.

8. ὑγηθ: so the MSS.; Sch. ὑγή. The old rule was 'Those adjectives in -ης that have a vowel before the termination in Attic contract -ea into -a, not -η' (Matthiae Gr. § 113). For this Hadley § 231 b substitutes an amended rule: 'ea is contracted into -a, not -η, when an e precedes: ἐνδηθ from ἐνδήθ, needly (Lach. 199 d). After s and v both vowels occur, ὑγεά and ὑγη in ὑγεῖ, ὑφα and ὑφη from ὑγεῖ, ὑφα and ὑφη from ὑφεῖ.' Sch. appears not to be uniform in practice. At Gorg. 478 c, Phaedo 89 d, Laws 684 c he gives ὑγη; but at Charm. 155 E, 156 B, 164 B, Laws 735 B, ὑγα. At Laws 857 D most MSS. and editions give ὑγη. As to other adjectives in -ης, at Rep. 386 B most MSS. appear to give ὀδη, at Ἀλκ. i 122 ὀδη, at Phaedr. 257 D ψυφοδη. Meisterhans Grammatik der Att. Inschriften
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p. 118 gives interesting statistics from Inscr. as to ὑγή: after 350 B.C. the neuter plur. and acc. sing. is ὑγή (eight places); in an Inscr. (CIA. ii 67) between 357 and 354 B.C. both forms occur, ὑγά and ὑγή.

32. I have followed Buttm. in reading ἀντῷ here, which C Sch. gives in the parallel passage Symp. 204 D E.

43. οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀφά: Cobet brackets these words, and E is followed by Sch., I think quite rightly.

4. τοῦ λέχεντος: the MSS. give τοῦτον λέχεντος, which Fr. 78 B retains. But this would mean ‘when this has been said,’ whereas we want a substantive phrase. Schleiermacher read τοῦτο τοῦ; Ast, whom Sch. follows, τοῦ.

29. Before τοῦτο τῷ πόρῳ the MSS. give τι, which Fr. D retains. But τι with a transitive verb could only be a substantive, not a qualifying adverb (50 A 12 referred to by Fr. is not parallel). Sch. substitutes τοῦ, somewhat boldly. The MSS. vary in their spelling of προστάτεις, and it seems possible that the uncertainty of the termination originated τι. Stephanus, followed by Ast, omits it.

18. MEN. Τι ὀν δῆ; ΣΩ. Τοῦτο λέγω, κτέ. The MSS. 79 B give to Meno the words τι ὀν δῆ τοῦτο λέγω; Heusdius gave the question to Socrates, who thus interrupts and answers himself, as at 97 E 24 and Prot. 343 D. But Schleiermacher pointed out that this usage only occurs to explain a statement the application of which is not obvious, which is not the case here. Buttm. (whom Fr. follows) approves the reading in the text, quoting Crat. 398 A; Gorg. 497 D; ‘unde apparebat nostro loco’ ἔγγορυς sive qualemcunque affirmandì formulam ante τι ὀν δῆ; mentes supplendum esse.’ Sch. gives the words to Socrates, but punctuates τι ὀν δῆ; τοῦτο λέγω, δεῖ κτέ.

19. δλον: this reading (Sch.) has the support of the bulk of the MSS. including B. Some MSS. however, and the old editions, give δλην, which Buttm. and Fr. retain. The fact that we have δλην at 77 A 8, where ἄρεθ is almost personified, cannot decide the point here. Cp. Prot. 361 B εἰ φανησται ἐκστήμη δλον.

25. B, with some other MSS., gives δεῖται; T δεῖ; x gives C δεῖ τι. Thus the balance of MS. authority is in favour of δεῖται (Sch. and Fr.). Buttm. reads δεῖ, denying the impersonal use of δεῖται. We have however at C 31 δεῖσθαι, at E 46 δεσσεῖσθαι (where Buttm. would read δεσεῖσθαι). Cp. Rep. 340 A καὶ τί δεῖσθαι μάρτυς; ἀλ. ii 149 c; Soph. O.C. 570 ὅτε βραχεῖα μοι δεῖσθαι φράσαι.
27. *el μετὰ μαριλου ἄρετῆς*: all the MSS. (save Paris F, in which ελ is written as a correction) give ἡ or ἦ. Ficinus (who renders *siquidem*) must have read ελ, and this seems necessary.

28. τούτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν ... ἄρετή ἐστιν: these clumsy and intrusive words are, I think, rightly bracketed by Naber. Fr. keeps the words, and so does Sch., but reading τούτο γάρ ἄρα λέγει κτλ., no doubt including this place among those to which he refers in the Notarum Index to this vol. (p. x) 'In his locis aliquot locos ita emendabam, ut emendatio profisceretur a compendio vocabuli ἄρα.'

D 43. δ τι ἐστιν, οἷον: both the best MSS. have missed the right reading here: B ἐστιν οὖ, T ἐστι σο: ἐστιν, οἷον is preserved by x, by Coislin. and some other MSS. of the b1 sub-class, by Δ (the copy of B), and by the old editions.

E 46. δεησοῦσθαι: see on C 25 above.

B 13. ναρκᾶν was bracketed by Dobree and Cobet, whom Sch. follows, I think rightly; Fr. retains the word.

E 7. κατάγεις: this is generally explained as a metaphor drawn from spinning: κατάγω = 'spin' Soph. 226 B; κάταγμα = 'yarn' Polit. 282 Α. Fr. quotes as illustrating the metaphor Hipp. min. 369 B δέ Σώκρατες, δὲ σὸ τινας τουτον (scil. captiosos) πλέκεις λόγους. The same metaphor appears in subtilis, 'fine-spun,' etc. But nowhere else is κατάγω or any of its derivatives found in a metaphorical sense. And Buttmann says with much justice 'comparatio cum filio quod nendo deducitur de tam brevi sermone locum non habet.' He suggests παράγεις, citing Dem. Androt. (22) 4 πλάτων καὶ παράγων πρὸς έκαστα τοιτῶν κακοφυγός λόγους. Ficinus renders 'in medium adduxisti,' a rendering to be got out of παράγεις, but not out of κατάγεις.

C 34. ψυχᾶς: so Boeckh, whom Sch. follows, for ψυχᾶν of the MSS. which Buttmann and Fr. retain. We might defend κείνων ψυχᾶν by Aesch. Persae 28 δεινοὶ δὲ μάχην ψυχῆς ευήλθουν δόξῃ. But the following ek tān seems conclusive for the plural.

3. καὶ πάντα χρῆματα: I have with Fr. retained καὶ, which is bracketed by Sch.; for (1) it is not clear that the division tā ένδεκ καὶ tā έν 'Aidou is exhaustive, and (2) it seems to be possible that καὶ might be taken comprehensively (denique) as Stallb. suggests.

D 16. ἔργαστικοὺς: so Fr. following B, some other MSS., the old editions and Hermann. T and its descendents give ἔργαστικος, which Sch. gives. Hermann's defence of ἔργαστικος (Praef. p. xxi) seems strong: this is from ἔργαζομαι, as ἥττησικός from
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ηπειῶ, and means ‘productive’; this is the sense it bears at Polit. 280 E, 281 A, and the sense wanted here: ἐργατικός is from ἐργάτης, ‘like a labourer,’ opposed to ἄρχιτέκτων, which sense it bears at Polit. 259 E. It must be noted, however, that ἐργάτης occurs as adj. ‘industrious’ at Rep. 554 A φειδωλὸς καὶ ἐργάτης (v.l. ἐργαστής), Euthyd. 281 C ἀργος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐργάτης.


19. ἀλλὰ τῶς . . ; this, undoubtedly the right reading, has E been preserved only by x, by r (another MS. of the b class, in the Vatican) and by Stobæus, who cites from 80 E 7 to 82 A 28. Stallb.’s argument against the reading ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς, which is given by all the other MSS., is conclusive. Meno would thus be represented as accepting Socrates’ statement in the main, and merely asking whether it was to be accepted without qualification. But this is not Meno’s attitude.

41. ei ἀναμμηνησκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων: the MSS. give η 82 B ἀναμμηνησκόμενος κτῆ, which Fr. retains. Sch. thinks the place corrupt. I have followed Ast in reading ei for the former η. At 79 C 27 and 88 B 21 we have other instances in the MSS. of confusion between ei and η. The matter is complicated, because in Homer indirect alternative questions are introduced by η . . η, and the same usage perhaps extends to tragedy; though in some of the places ei is a v. l. for the former η. The chief places are Aesch. Choeph. 756, 890 (see Verral’s note): Soph. O.C. 80 (see Jebb): Eur. Med. 492. In Aesch. P.V. 780 εἶλο γὰρ η . . η is really not an indirect question, but a proposed choice. The only prose instance given is Xen. Anab. 1 x 17 (see editors correct). See Hadley § 1017, Kühner § 587. 19. For ei . . η cp. Apol. 18 A etc.

40. τετράπον: all the MSS. give τέταρτον. Cornarius’ 83 C emendation τετράπον is generally accepted.

45. The reply of the slave has fallen out in the MSS.

1. oφ: Buttm. approved Beck’s emendation o. Cp. on 84 A 94 D 2.

21. ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τῶν τέμνουσα is the reading of the 85 A MSS. τῶν is obviously corrupt, and τέμνουσα is given as a correction in a Paris MS. (E) and by Cornarius. This Hermann has adopted. It is strongly supported by 85 B 45 ἀντὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τέμνουσά. Sch. gives the reading proposed by Wex (Soph. Antig. ii 80) εἰς γωνίαν ἀντὶ, τέμνουσα. This assumes that the first two letters of ἀντὶ were lost by ‘lipography’ after γωνία; and that the remaining τῶν naturally became τῶν. Palaeographically the two corrections are
much on a par; but in my mind 85 B 45 turns the balance in favour of Hermann's.

C 10. τῷ oύκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ἄν ἄν μὴ εἰδή ἐνευς ἀληθείς δόξαι περὶ τοῦτον ὅν οὐκ οἶδε; pleonastic as the language is, I see no sufficient reason for any excision. The reading is defended by Heindorf, Ullrich and Buttmann, and retained by Herm. and Fr. Schleiermacher, Bekker and Madv. cut out περὶ τοῦτον ὅν μὴ οἶδε; Sch. cuts out ἄν μὴ οἶδε only. The words περὶ ἄν μὴ εἰδῇ depend closely on οὐκ εἰδότι. Plato may wish to remind us that neither Knowledge nor Ignorance is universal. Meno has shown ignorance of Virtue; the slave ignorance of Geometry. 'In one who lacks Knowledge then on certain subjects, whatever they may be, there are True Opinions about the subjects on which he lacks Knowledge.'

86 A 2. ἡδή: so two MSS., Paris E and Venice Ζ; and so Stallb. (approved by Shilleto on Dem. F.L. § 83), Sch. and Fr. Most MSS. ἡδεί.

11. I follow Stallb. here in reading ἄρ' οὖ for ἄρ' οὖν, which the MSS. give and Sch. and Fr. retain. No doubt there are plenty of instances of ἄρ' οὖν in the sense noune, but are there any instances of ἄρ' οὖν resuming a previous οὖν, or indeed of ἄρ' οὖν in any other place than the beginning of a sentence? Phædo 65 ε ἄρ' οὖν ἓκεινος resumed 66 A by ἄρ' οὖν οὖσιος favours ἄρ' οὖ here.

87 A 25–30: on textual questions arising in this passage see expository notes.

B 7. ἄρα διδακτῶν ἡ οὖ: so the MSS.; ἄρα διδακτῶν που Sch.

E 37. πάντα γὰρ τάγαθα: B has πάντα (ending a line) τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ. The MS. Δ, derived from it, reads τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ omitting πάντα. All the other MSS. appear to have πάντα γὰρ τάγαθα, which Fr. keeps. Sch. πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ.

88 B 21. εἰ οὐχί: the MSS. are divided between ἡ οὐχί (B) and ἡ οὐχί (T and others). ἡ is impossible; on ἡ Heind. (in Buttm.) observes 'in Attico sermone nusquam in interrogatione ante οὖ invenias ἡ.' For confusion of εἰ see on 82 B 41.

22. Here Fr. gives ποτὲ μὲν...ποτὲ δὲ with BT. Sch. gives ποτὲ μὲν...ποτὲ δὲ. This is only supported by X (see on 81 E 19). But it is the form used elsewhere; 88 D 2, 95 B 14, C 31, D 34, 96 B 25, 97 C 37. In Theaet. 192 D καὶ ἀποτικήν ποτ' αὖτων, ποτὲ δ’ οὖ the phraseology is different; (Sch. there expunges ποτ’).

C 23. As the text stands in the MSS. and editions, the parti-
ciples μανθάνομενα and καταρτυόμενα have no substantives to agree with. For it is absurd to speak of εὐμαθία as itself μανθάνομενον, or of σωφροσύνη as καταρτυόμενον. I insert πάντα. Another remedy would be to cut out καλ μανθάνομενα καλ καταρτυόμενα. For πάντα omitted see on 87 E 37.

25, B 28, C 2: I have followed Sch. and Fr., who follow 89 A the MSS., in reading ἄγαθολ once only in the first and second of these places, twice in the third. The consensus of the MSS. is unbroken, except that in the first passage x reads οὐκ ἄν εἰην φίλος οἱ ἄγαθος ἄγαθοι. Cp. 98 D 27.

33. διάφθειρεν BT, Buttmann, Herm. (see Praef. vol. I p. vii), B Fr. διαφθείρεσι Madv. adv. crit. I 414: 'Rectum esset διαφθείρειν, si hoc significaretur, tunc neminem eos corrupturum suisse, quod nunquam fiat.' Sch. follows Madv. But I think Plato wishes to imply that now as a matter of fact they are corrupted. See J. & A. M. Adam on Prot. 335 c, who think that here we should perhaps read ἀφικοντο and ἐγίγνωτο.

34. Both here and at line 36 all the MSS. but one corrupt E the name Ἀνυτος. In the former place they give αὐτὸς δὲ παρεκαθέστο, in the latter T and most MSS. give εἰκότωs δ' αὐ μεταδοιμὲν δι' αὐτὸς γάρ κτῆ. B gives εἰκότωs δ' αὖ μεταδοιμὲν δι' αὐτὸς γάρ κτῆ. (Here the priority of the reading of B is obvious; αὐθ was a correction after Ἀνυτος had become ἄν αὐτὸς. αὐθ is not in place here. Stallbaaam extracted from it the reading εἰκότωs δ' αὐτῷ μεταδοιμὲν δι'.) The name Ἀνυτος is preserved by x alone, which keeps it in both places. It was restored to the text by Struve. Buttmann makes a strange mistake over the passage by supposing that the subj. μεταδοιμὲν is final. See Goodwin M.T. § 572. For a similar confusion between Ἀνυτος and αὐτός, cp. ΑΘ. τολ. ch. 76. See Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 670.

30. Sch. follows Naber in bracketing ἤτοιντα μανθάνειν 90 E παρὰ τούτων, and I have followed Sch. The sentence runs better without the words, and the change of number from βουλεύομενοι to ἤτοιντα is very harsh.

9. I follow Sch., who follows Cobet, in assuming a lacuna 91 B after τὴν ἄρετὴν. Cobet would supply μαθησόμενον os βουλεύομενοι αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι: κτησομενον, or ἄγαθον γενεσομενον, would be equally possible. Biester defended the MS. reading by making τὴν ἄρετὴν not dependent on σκόπει, but an 'absolute' accusative. But such an accusative of reference, connected with no word in the sentence, is impossible. At 92 D 29 τὴν ἄρετὴν γενοντ' ἄν δεξιος λόγον such a word is supplied. Buttmann, also separating τὴν ἄρετὴν from σκόπει, says the notion διδαξ-
17. I have followed Sch. in reading ὅσος, which is given by x and two other MSS., rather than Fr. who gives ὅσοι with BT and the majority. It is not a similarity between the men under discussion and the sophists, but an identity, that is asserted; and though ὅσος is used sometimes when you might expect ὅσοι (see on 92 C 18), the converse does not hold.

C

20. μηδὲ οἶκεῖον μηδὲ φιλῶν: all the MSS. appear to have μήτε οἶκ. μήτε φ. That would, as Herm. says (vol. iii Praef. p. xxii) make οἶκείοι and φιλοι an exhaustive division of συγγενεῖς. He therefore reads μηδὲ. . . μηδὲ, which Sch. and Fr. adopt. Cp. 96 C 8. μηδὲ . . μηδὲ (after μηδὲνα) are further suggestions of other classes (‘nor yet’), and then the last class (φιλοί) is subjected to an exhaustive division by μήτε . . μήτε, ‘whether they be . . or.’ Cp. Gorg. 508 D οὐ τὸ τόπτεσθαι οὐδὲ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὕτω τὸ σώμα τὸ ἔμοι οὐτε τὸ βαλλάντιον. (See on 92 E 10.) As to the sequel, B, which is supported by x, reads μήτε φιλῶν μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων. The other MSS. give μήτε φιλῶν μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων. Correcting the first word to μηδὲ (as above) we get the best reading by taking φιλῶν from one class of MSS. and ἀστῶν . . ξένων from the other. The change of case (from φιλῶν to ἀστῶν) shows the sub-division.

D

10. Φευδίαν τε: here x alone preserves the true reading τε: all other MSS. γε. Cp. on 72 E 17.

92 C

15. The emendation of Heindorf καὶ <ἀεὶ> ἐλην γε, adopted by Sch., though extremely plausible, appears to me unnecessary. Fr. defends the text successfully.

17. <ἐν> ἔντω: the preposition is supplied in x and by a later hand in Γ (Coislin.) and another Paris MS. (E).

18. ἀπειρος ἐλής: see expository note.

19. ὅλ' ἐλοι: for ὅλ' x and Γ have ὅλοι. This is adopted by Wolf (in Buttm.), Bekk., Madvig, Cobet and Herm. Buttm. defends ὅλ', and Sch. and Fr. both keep it. See expository note.

23. ἁρμονίαν: Cobet and Hirschig read ἱστομένων, which Sch. adopts. The alteration seems hardly necessary.
26. ἔστων: the MSS. give ἐστωσαν, which Fr. keeps. Sch. D ἔστων. 'The endings -τωσαν and -σωσαν, if Attic at all, belong only to the later Attic.' Hadley § 380. See J. Adam on Eucl. 9 D. Cobet nov. lect. p. 327. See Soph. 231 A MSS. ἐστωσαν Sch. ἐστων, and 244 B MSS. ἀποκρνέσθωσαν Sch. ἀποκρνέσθων: cp. Rep. 352 B.

21. καὶ τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις: I have kept the MSS. reading, to 94 B which Buttm. and Fr. adhere, though it is not free from difficulty. To suppose that the three distinguished statesmen just mentioned could be regarded by Anytus, or any one else, as φαυλοτάτοι would be absurd. But really the words ὀλίγους καὶ τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις, negativated by μὴ, form a kind of litotes. 'Neque ego aliter rem expedire possum, nisi ut neglegentius neque ullo ad superiora exempla respectu sed velut extrinsecus hunc transitum fecerit scripser ad Thucydidem quem ut hominem divitem et optimatum præsulém, aliquo modo tanquam cumulium ceteris videtur potius adicere' Buttm. See presently D 6 foll. Socrates overdoes the distinction between Thucydides and the others. Sch. (following Ast) reads καὶ <τοῦ> τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις, which appears to me to raise fresh difficulties. Stallb. (1827) and Madvig adv. crit. 1 414 καὶ <τοῦ> τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις, an objection to which is that it leaves too much stress on ὀλίγους. If the only hesitation were due to the fewness of the examples, would one more entirely remove it?

2. 3. οὗ ... οὗ: so all the MSS., which Fr. follows. Sch. D οὗ ... οὗ, which Buttm. favoured (cp. on 84 A 1). In the corresponding passage of the de virtute 378 B, the MSS. give οὗ ... οὗ. This is all the external support the reading of has here. οὗ ... οὗ is quite defensible; not, as Ullrich would take it, as a gen. of price (!), but with the local sense transferred to circumstances: 'in a case where.' Cp. Symp. 194 A ἐπί δὲ γένους οὗ νῦν ἐγὼ εἰμὶ, Theact. 172 B ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖ οὗ λέγω, Soph. Phil. 1049, etc. So ἔτου still more frequently. I doubt very much whether, admitting you can say διακανάν εῖς τι, you can say οὗ διακανά. I can find no instance of οὗ where the local sense is so much weakened; for it seems clear that this is not the case in οὗ μὲν ἀγμαὶ ἄγες (Soph. El. 404) and the like.

5. τοῦτο: the MSS. give ταῦτα; the de virtute, τοῦτο, this time probably preserving the right reading; 'tum ob proxime succedens διδακτὼν, tum ob sensum, cum ceteris artibus omnibus studium virtutis commodius opponatur ita: ταῦτα μὲν—τοῦτο δὲ—.' Buttm.

19. ῥῆκον: all the MSS. give ῥῆδιον, which is retained by E Herm. and the Zürich editors. Buttm. showed that ῥῆκον was
necessary here. Riddell § 170 includes this among instances of 'omission of μᾶλλον.' These instances have broken down. It was suspicious that so many instances of 'omission of μᾶλλον' should have taken place with a word so easily confused with its comparative as ΠΑΙΔΙΟΝ with ΠΑΙΟΝ. Heindorf on Phaedo 70 δ pointed to Rep. 370 λ as a place where in the MSS. ῥάδιον had obviously displaced the true reading ῥάον; at Phaedo 70 η one MS. has ῥάδιον for ῥάον; at Rep. 348 ε, on the other hand, the Paris MS. gives ῥάον for ῥάδιον, and so the MSS. of Diog. L. i 26. Isocr. v 115, viii 50, Lys. xii 89, adduced by Riddell, have now all been corrected. Against another possibility, of reading ῥάδιον ἐστιν, and taking ἢ εὖ in the sense 'or well,' Buttm. argues (1) that in that case the author would have written καὶ εὖ; (2) that the words ἢ εὖ (or καὶ εὖ) are then quite pointless. Ast read οὐ ῥάδιον ἐστιν, omitting ἢ εὖ, which two words are omitted, according to Buttm., in Vatican r, probably by a conjecture.

95 D 2 foll. The four lines (33–36 Bergk) appear also in an extract from Musonius Rufus (Stob. i.vi 18); lines 35, 36 are quoted by Xen. Mem. i ii 20, Symp. ii 5, Clemens Strom. v p. 572 (besides other late authors: see Bergk PLG. iv p. 121). They are twice alluded to by Aristotle: NE. ix ix 7 γίνοι τὸ δ’ αὐ τὰ καὶ ἀκριβεῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζήτον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθαρόν καὶ Θεογνίς φησιν: ix xii 3 ἀπομάττωνται γὰρ παρ’ ἀλλήλων ὅσα ἀρέσκονται, δόντες ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐσθλᾶ.

A comparison of the lines as quoted by Plato, with the other quotations, and with the MSS. of Theognis, reveals some diversities of reading.

In v 33 Bergk gives καὶ μετὰ τῶν πῶνε from the MSS. He observes, 'offensioni fuit metā iteratum, itaque variandi gratia apud Platonem priore loco parā substitutum.'

In v 35 Bergk gives (for διδάξει) μαθήσεως, from the MSS. of Theognis, Clemens, etc. Xenophon and other citators agree with Plato in διδάξεως. Bergk thinks from NE. ix xii 3 (cited above) that Aristotle read ἐσθλ’ ἀπομάττεως, which appears to me doubtful.

In v 36 the MSS. of Plato give συμμετρήσεις, and so do most of the late citators and some of the MSS. of Theognis. The best MS. of Theognis, and the MSS. of Xenophon, give συμμαθήσεις, which the modern editors of Plato restore. It is probable that the συμμετρή̐, or collection of excerpts, from Theognis, which has come down to us, was not made at the time when the Meno was written; for Isocrates, in his address to Nicocles, written at a date not far distant from that of the Meno (Isocr.
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10. The passage of Theognis stands thus in Bergk F.L.G. 4: Ε

\[\begin{align*}
\text{φῦςα χαλ θρέψα ρῆν βροτὸν, ἡ φρένας ἐσθλᾶς} & \\
\text{ἐνθέμεν' οἴδεις πω τοῦτό γ' ἐπεφάόσαρο} & \\
\text{ὦ τὶς σώφρον' ἔθηκε τὸν ἄφρονα, κάκ κακοῦ ἐσθλῶν} & \\
\text{εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτό γ' ἐδωκε θεός,} & \\
\text{ιᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀνθρᾶς φρένας ἄνδρῶν,} & \\
\text{πολλοὺς ἀν μυσθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον}; & \\
\text{εἰ δ' ἢν ποιητὸν τε καὶ ἐνθετῶν ἄνδρι νόμη,} & \\
\text{οὐ ποτ' ἀν ἔξ ἁγαθῶν πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,} & \\
\text{πειθόμενος μύθοις σαφροσί' ἀλλὰ διδακτοὶ} & \\
\text{οὐ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἁγαθῶν.} & \\
\end{align*}\]

Line 432 is quoted by Clearcous ap. Athenaeum, 256 c, etc. See Bergk p. 156. Line 434 is quoted by Aristotle NE. ix 3 εἰ μὲν ὄν ἢσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιήσαι ἐπικείμενα, πολλοὺς ἀν μυσθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίους ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεόν, καὶ ἐδεί ἀν τοῦτος πορίσασθαι.

Leutsch Philologus xxx pp. 211 foll. elaborately discusses the order and continuity of the lines, comparing Plato's quotation with the reading found in the MSS. of Theognis. But such discussions are subject to the consideration that Plato is obviously, and purposely, quoting loosely. (The MSS. of Plato give ἔγενετο for ἔγεντο in v. 436. It is quite possible that Plato wrote ἔγενετο, ignoring the metre; but more probable that the copyists finding ἔγεντο altered it to the familiar form. Cp. συμμετημένῃ above.)

8. τοῦτο μὴ διδάκτων ἀναί: the great preponderance of 96 C MSS. give μὴ τε διδάκτων, the remainder giving μὴ διδάκτων. μὴδὲ here is due to Bekker, and is adopted by recent editors. Buttm. thought that at 89 E 27 also we should read μὴδὲ διδάκτων. See on 91 C 20 for confusion of μὴ τε and μὴδὲ.

30. ἡ λόγος καὶ διαφεύγει: this reading is due to Madvig, Ε and is adopted by Sch. and Fr. The MSS. give ἡ λόγος καὶ διαφεύγειν. This is retained by Buttm. and Stallb., in the sense 'or otherwise the knowledge must escape us'; the infinitive being regarded as dependent on the notion δεῖ in προσεκτῶν and ἡγητῶν above. Of the four places adduced by Stallb. in illustration, the most apposite is Crilo 51 c ποιητέων ἀν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἡ πειθεῖν αὐτὴν κτέ. But in this (as well as in the other places cited) the notion to be extracted from the verbal is rather duty than (as here) necessity;
also, the infinitive stands much nearer to the verbal than it does here. (At Rep. 424 A the infinitive φυλάττεων is not affected by δυνεκτέων above. At Phaeadr. 245 D we have to understand δει with στήμα, but from a preceding δυνατών.)

97 A  12. Sch. brackets ὅρθως, which occurs in the MSS. and is kept by Fr. The omission is right. The fact that the word occurs twice in the speech of Socrates makes it absurd to put the question thus. Which ὅρθως does he mean? It cannot reasonably be the second, so Buttm. says the question refers to the former ὅρθως. To pass over the awkwardness of referring to a former use of a word in spite of the intervention of a latter, the great objection remains that it is not the word ὅρθως that requires explanation, but rather the words ἐν μὴ φρόνιμος ἢ. Socrates does not in the sequel explain what ὅρθως means. It keeps recurring as a known and accepted term, and it was its frequency that caused it to come in here, once too often.

13. <κ> τις: ei is unaccountably omitted in nearly all MSS.

15. Some MSS. of the b¹ class give the fuller form ἀλλο μν ἢ.

C  2. All the MSS. give οὐκ δει τυγχάνον, except x, which gives οὐκ δει ἄν τυγχάνον. The reading οὐκ ἄν δει τυγχάνον was advocated by Struve and Madvig, and is adopted by Sch. Fr. keeps the MS. reading. The present affords a good example of cases on which a sort of πόλεμος ἄκηρυκτος exists between two different classes of critics. With regard to a rare and doubtful construction, the one class urge that whereas many of the apparent instances can be easily and probably corrected, a presumption is raised against the remainder. The other class reply that as long as a single instance remains for which no plausible correction can be brought forward, this may defend others. The question is further complicated by the fact that in the early language many constructions occurred that were subsequently discarded. But how far did the process of purgation go? Naturally, poets still claimed greater license than prose-writers. But was the line limiting prose-usage a hard and fast one? The best answer is that more thorough examination of the MSS. has undoubtedly got rid of many solecisms. Further help is obtained from analysis of the exceptions remaining. This, in the case of questions with the optative without ἄν, has been given by Professor Jebb, note on Soph. Ant. 605, and Exc. on O.C. 170. He makes it clear that this construction, even in verse, is limited to places which are exclamations, rather than interrogations, adding that there is 'no real instance in prose.' We should then have no hesitation
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in inserting ἄν here. The following is a list of apparent instances of questions in Plato with the optative without ἄν—

Lach. 190 B el γάρ ποι νυ ἐπιεὶ μετά τοίς παράπαν ἃ τι ποτε τυχόντω δια, τίνα τρόπον σύμβουλον γενομέθα; (τίν' ἄν Bekk. Sch.; Cron leaves unaltered).

Euthyd. 281 C πότερον οὖν μᾶλλον ἔλαττο τις πράττει κτέ.; (so B, but T has πότερον οὖν ἄν κτέ.).

ibid. 286 B πως ἀντιλέγοι; Sch., after one Paris MS., πως <ἀν> ἀντιλέγοι;

ibid. 291 E οὖ τὴν ὑγείαν φαίης; Sch., after Ast, οὖ τὴν ὑγείαν <ἀν> φαίης; Badham omits φαίης.

Gorg. 492 B τῇ ἄληθεὶς αἰτίχνοι καὶ κάκιον εὑρ.; Sch., following Coraës, gives κάκιον ἄν εὑρ.

Rep. 352 E ἐσθ' ὅτι ἄν ἄλλω ἰδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δέητα. Τί δέ; ἀκούσαι ἄλλο ὡςίν; Οὐδαμῶς. Here we may regard the ἄν as carried on from the first question into the second. But Ast proposed ἀκούσαι ἄν.

ibid. 382 D πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἴδει τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἄν ψευδώτερο; γελοιοῖν μενταν εὗρ, ἑφη. Ποιητὴς μὲν ἁρμ ψευδής ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Ὑπολέγοις τοὺς ἑσθροὺς ψεύδοτο; Here again it is possible that ἄν may be mentally supplied from the neighbouring questions.

ibid. 437 B ἄρ' οὖν . . πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἄλλη- λων θείας; (‘would you regard all such things as opposite to one another?’). The Zurich editors read ἐναντίων ἄν ἄλληλοις.

ibid. 516 E ἄρ' οὐ σκόπουσ τούπλεως σχοῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοῖς; Herm., gives ἄν πλέως σχοῖν.

[Other exx. of ἄν apparently omitted with opt. in Plato are Charm. 156 B ἄλλ' ἀναγκαῖον <ἀν> εὑρ (Sch. after Madv.): ibid. 169 A τοὺς μὲν ἀποτίσαν <ἀν> παρέχοι (Sch. after Heindorf): Lysias 214 D ὅ οὔτο ἀντί' ἄνθρωποι εὑρ καὶ διάφορον, σχοῖν γ' <ἀν> τοὺς ἀλλοι όμοιον ἢ φίλον γένοτο (Sch. after Bekker): Euthyd. 299 A δικαιότερον <ἀν> τὸν μετέρων πατέρα τόπτομι (Sch. after Ast): Rep. 360 B οὐδεὶς ἄν γένοτο, ὡς δέξιον (the whole passage is in indirect speech): ibid. 362 D ἀδελφός ἄνδρι παρείη (quotation from an old poet): Phaedo 72 C πάντα λόρα τῶν 'Ευθυμίωνα ἀποδείξείς (Sch. pάντ' ἄν, which A.-H. adopts): ibid. 107 A οὐκ οἶδα εἰς δντιν' <ἀν> τοὺς ἄλλον καίρον ἀναβάλλοντο (Sch. after Bekker; A.-H. defends the vulgate).] See CR. vi 435, ‘J. D.’ on the ‘Remote Deliberative.’

9. ἂν εἰς τῇ θεαμάζεις: all the MSS. give θεαμάζουσ, which D shows with what caution their evidence on such points must be received.
93 A 31. The MSS. nearly all give Μένων ἑταῖρε. The omission of ὦ with the vocative in prose in an address free from emotion is rare; and the case with which ὦ would fall out probably justifies its insertion in the few cases in Plato where it is wanting. Sch. restores it at Prot. 358 ΑΕ, 359 Α; Gorg. 489 Α; in all of which cases a contiguous ω may have expelled it; also at Hipp. maj. 289 Β, Soph. 220 Β. But at Laches 198 Α he leaves υ δέ, Νικία, λέγε, and at Θαέατες 127 Β τί τοῦτο λέγεις, Θαέατες; 129 Β εἰμι δή, Σωκρατεσ. The former of the instances in the Θαέατες is a violation of Attic usage; the second instance falls under rule, as excitement is certainly intended. Cp. τί λέγεις, ἔφη, ἦ Σωκρατεσ; ibid. 129 Β. I follow Naber in supposing that here Μένων is a gloss upon ἑταῖρε which has extruded ὄ. The Florentine x gives ὄ ἑταῖρε Μένων. At Crito 52 Α, Β reads ταύταις δή φαμεν καὶ σε, Σωκρατεσ, ταῖς αἱρεσις ἐνέχεσθαι, probably rightly, as great impressiveness is intended; but inferior MSS. give ὢ Σωκρατεσ.

B 3. Practically all the MSS. omit ὦ. It appears as a correction in Paris Ε and in the edition of Stephanus. For omission of ὦ see Badham's Philebus ed. 2 p. 132, and cr. n. on 94 Β 21.

D 23. οὗτ' ἐπίκτητα: that there is something wrong about these words is obvious. Buttm. pointed out that the third οὗτε cannot stand; for you do not want a third term to add to ἐπιστήμη and δόξα ἀληθε, but something as an antithesis to φύσει. Hence Bekker read οὗτ' ἐπίκτητα. The objection to this is that it goes too far. A human attribute must be either φύσει or ἐπίκτητον, either part of the original stock or subsequently acquired. (See expository note on 93 A 24.) Much therefore is to be said for the reading ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητα given by Gedike, and supported by a correction in Paris Ε. ἐπίκτητος is opposed to φύσει in Rep. 618 Β τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχήν διτων καὶ τῶν ἐπιστήμων, and to ἥμφατοι in Phaedr. 237 Ε.

The words οὗτ' ἐπίκτητα were expunged by Cornarius, with the approval of Buttm., Madv., and Ast; and are bracketed by Sch. and Fr.

On the other hand it may be urged that the words are too foolish to have been a gloss. Fr. assumes that οὗτ' ἐπίκτητα has arisen from ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητα, but that this was a gloss. But if we had found ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητα in our texts, should we have thought of disturbing it? The corruption of ἀλλ' into οὗτ' is hard to explain, but perhaps we may assume that in the archetype the copyist carelessly ran on from two οὗτε's to a third.

99 A 2. The MSS. give ἐπιστήμη δή ἐπίγνωσης. This would mean 'is an outcome or accident of Knowledge.' So Phil.
APPENDIX ON THE TEXT

37 βδι δέξῃ επιγλυκνεσθον ψεύδος καλ ἅληθές, Ἑρ. 574 A ai ἐν αὐτῷ ἠδοναί ἐπιγλυκνώμεναι, Ἡγ. ἀγ. 303 A. But Virtue has never been described as an ἐπιγλυκνημα of Knowledge. Virtue is Knowledge—or something like it. Nor would οὐδε' have any point with ἐπιγλυκνεσθαι, whereas with the correction it is easy: 'as it is not διδακτῶν so neither is it ἐπιστήμη.' The reading in the text, adopted by Sch., Fr., and most modern editors, is due to Schleiermacher; but it is also supported by the version of Ficinus, 'Igitur cum virtus doctrina percipienque est, nequaquam scientia est.' [Herm. defends ἐπιγλυκνεσθαι.]

15. εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὔδοξα... γίγνεται; ἡ κτέ.: so Fr. B following the MSS. Sch. and most editors after Schleiermacher read εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὔδοξα... γίγνεται; ἡ κτέ. I fail to see any sufficient objection to the MS. reading, which I have accordingly kept.

24. κατορθοῦν ἄν πρ.: Buttm. proposed κατορθοῦσι δι' ἄν C πρ. which is supported by the version of Ficinus, "multa tamen et magna et agendo et dicendo disponunt."

27. ὀρθῶς ἄν καλοίμεν: so the MSS. except Χ, which has ὀρθῶς ἀρα καλοῖμεν, and the Paris F, which has ὀρθῶς οὖν ἄν κ. as a correction. Sch. defends the asyndeton by The act. 183 A καλὸν ἄν ἡμῶν συμβαίνοι. Ficinus has 'quamobrem merito divinos vocabimus,' as if he had oūv or ἂρα in his text. Fr. (after Stallb.) and Herm. read ὀρθῶς ἂρα ἄν: Beka. ὀρθῶς oūv ἄν.

32. ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ: I have followed the MS. reading, as does D Fr. Sch. reads ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ. If that had been Plato's meaning he would rather have written ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (which Cobet gives).

38. θεῖος ἄνήρ: so the MSS. Sch. gives σεῖος ἄνήρ. This no doubt represents the Laconian dialect; but it is not at all clear that Plato wished to reproduce this.
EXCURSUS I

Οὐσία as a philosophical term in Plato (on 72B 22)

We have no certain examples of οὐσία in any sense except 'wealth,' 'patrimony' in any writer before Plato. [The fragments of the Pythagorean Philolaus, in which it appears as a philosophical term in the form ἐστία (cp. Crat. 401 c), are almost certainly spurious. See Prof. Bywater in JP. i pp. 21 foll., Archer-Hind on Phaedo 61 D. For a different view see Zeller pre-Socr. i 314 and note: for a summary of the controversy R. & P. § 50 c, Ueberweg-Heinze p. 58.]

Plato in his earlier dialogues uses the term with reserve, and leads up to it by periphrases. In the present passage, for instance, we have been prepared for it by:

71 A 28 αὐτὸ δὲ τι ποτ' ἐστι τὸ παράπαν ἅρτη
71 B 3 οὐκ εἶδος περὶ ἅρτης τὸ παράπαν
72 A 14 εἰπεῖν ἅρτης πέρι δὲ τι ἐστιν

The word occurs nowhere else in this dialogue.

In Laches 190 we have similar periphrases, but the term οὐσία is never reached.

Euthyphro 11 A (see on 71 B 4) κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτώμενος τὸ δοῦν, δὲ τι ποτ' ἐστι, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δὲ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. Here the words δὲ τι ποτ' ἐστι lead up to οὐσίαν, also heralded at 6 D τὸ δοῦν δὲ τι ποτ' εἶη, and further by the words at 5 D ἢ οὐ ταυτὸν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ δοῦν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἄνδρον αὐτῷ... ἔχον μιᾶν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσίαν πᾶν, δὲ τι περὶ ἀναθυμίαν καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι;

In the Hippias major the word οὐσία occurs four times:

1. 301 B Η Hippias: διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ύμας λαμβάνει καὶ διανεκὴ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας περικυκτά. καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτον σε λέξθην, διὸ τι οἷον εἶναι τι ἡ πάθος ὁ οὐσίαν, ἢ περὶ μὲν ἀμφότερ' ἀττα ἐστιν ἀμ, περὶ δὲ ἑκάτερον οὐ.

2. 301 E Socrates: οὐ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ὦν τε διανεκελ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ Ἰππίαν ἄλλως ἔχειν.
EXCURSUS I

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71 B 3 οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν
72 A 14 εἰσείν ἀρετῆς περὶ δὲ τι ἐστὶν

The word occurs nowhere else in this dialogue.

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Εὐθυρρήτος 11A (see on 71B 4) κινδυνεύεις χρωστόμενοι τὸ δοσιον, δὲ τὸ ποτ’ ἔστι, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ ὁ χρωστός ἀλλάξεται, πάθος δὲ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. Here the words δὲ τὸ ποτ’ ἔστι lead up to οὐσίαν, also heralded at δὲ τὸ δοσιον δὲ τὸ ποτ’ ἔστιν, and further by the words at δὲ ὅτι οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ δοσιον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, και τὸ ἀνόσιον ἀδ᾽. ᾖχον μὲν μιὰ ἄδειαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πάν, δὲ τὶ περὶ δὲ μελῆ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

In the Hippias major the word οὐσία occurs four times:—

(1) (2) 301 B Hippias: διὰ ταῦτα ὥτως μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκέρ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας περικότα. καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτον σε λέξειν, ὥσε οἷον ἦν τὶ πάθος ἡ οὐσίαν, ἡ περὶ μὲν ἀμφότερ' ἄττα ἐστιν ἄμα, περὶ δὲ ἐκάτερον οὐ.

(3) 301 E Socrates: οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε διανεκεί λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ Ἰππίαν ἄλλως ἔχειν.
(4) 302 c Socrates: τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἐπ᾽ ἄμφότερα ἐπομένη.

In (2) and (4) the meaning is ‘essential nature’ (as here in the Meno). The use in (2) has been led up to by Socrates, who at 300 e has expressed the same antithesis: ὅ μὴν ἐγὼ πέπονθα εἶναι μὴν εἰμι.

In (1) and (3) the use is curious. Grote (384) says ‘The Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of reality — of breaking up the integrity of those concretes which occur in Nature as continuous and indivisible wholes’ (see his note also). I doubt whether the distinction attributed to Hippias is quite so scientific as this. He paraphrases his criticism at 304 a κνίσματα τοῖς ἐστι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων, διόπερ ἔριθεν ἔλεγον, κατὰ βραχὺ διηγημένα. It is rather a distinction of treatment, the ‘hair-splitting’ or ‘logic-chopping’ of the dialectician opposed to the broad view taken by the practical man and expressed in continuous discourse—a distinction fully illustrated by Grote at the place referred to. οὐσία here then, I think, means ‘truth.’ [But it is probable that the speech of Hippias, τὰ μὲν δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς κτλ., contains phrases actually quoted from the sophist, of which διανεκὴ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας may be one. Αἰ. κροῦσθε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ κάλον καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν διών ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες with Hipp. op. cit. 369 b δὲ Σώκρατες, δεῖ αὐτὸν ταυτότητα πλῆκτος λόγου, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων, δὲ δὲν ἦν δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἐχει κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄγων ἄγων ἐν τῷ πράγματι, περὶ ὅπως ἄν τοῦ λόγος τῇ.]

In the Prot. 329 c fol. the question is raised whether the parts of Virtue, Justice, Temperance, etc., are separate and different, ἢ τὸν οὐκ καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐπερόν οἶνον τὸ ἐπερόν, οὐτα ἢ οὖν ἐν ὅ διαμας αὐτῷ; When the same question is resumed at 349 b we have ἦν ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἀνωμάτων τούτων ὑπόκειται τῶν ὕδιος οὐσίας καὶ πράγμα ἐχει ἀνατοῦ δύναμιν ἐκαστον.

In Gorg. 472 b Plato apparently plays on the meaning ‘wealth’ and the philosophical sense ‘truth,’ ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς καὶ ἐμὸν παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλεις μὲ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, where the philosophical meaning of οὐσία is defined by καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ‘Substance’ or ‘reality’ will preserve the double meaning. Dr. Thompson, however (ad loc.) doubts if any other meaning of οὐσία than ‘patrimony’ is intended.

In the Phaedrus it is used as an accepted term 237 c, 270 e; it is slightly helped out 245 e ψυχής οὐσίαν καὶ λόγον and 247 c ἀναφής οὐσία, δύναμις οὐσία, ψυχής.

Here in the Meno το οὐσία the words ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν are added as an interpretation. So in Phaedo 65 d περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
EXCURSUS I

Heindorf on that passage observes that the interpretation shows that οὐσία as a philosophic term was not yet established. He refers to this place of the Μενο, and to Rep. 377 Β (where οὐσίαν is omitted in the best texts). So the meaning of οὐσία is driven home Πραεδο 78 ὃ ἡ οὐσία ἔστω καὶ ἑώρωντες καὶ ἀποκρύψι· as whose principle we assign being,’ 92 ὃ ὦσπερ ἀυτῆς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔκοψα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ δ ἐστὶν ‘the very substance that has the title of absolute essence’ (the translations are Archer-Hind’s). But in these places the additions are not so much for elucidation as for emphasis. At 101 μετασχήμα τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκδιδόμενον it is used as an accepted term.

In the Republic the word sometimes receives support, sometimes is used without it. In Bk. II 359 we have γένεσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνη, which is to some extent prepared by 358 τι οἶν τε καὶ δόθην γέγονε δικαιοσύνη. οὐσία does not occur again, I think, in books I to V. In the account of δόξα at the end of book V, we have always τὸ δόξ, not οὐσία. At the beginning of book VI (484 Β) we have τοῦ δεὶ κατὰ ταῖτα ὁσαίων ἐκοινοτός, but soon after (485 Β) ἐκείνη τῆς οὐσίας τῆς δεὶ ὁσίᾳ, and again (486 Α), in a very wide sense, παντὸς μὲν χρῆνον, πάντως δὲ οὐσίας. In p. 490 the word is avoided; but towards the end of the book it comes noticeably forward (509 Β) καὶ τὸς γιγανσοκλέοντος τῶν μὴ μοῶν τὸ γιγανσοκλεῖσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ άγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ προσείναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὑποτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ ἐπίκειμα τῆς οὐσίας προσβελαῖ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. In book VII we have phrases concerning the power of certain studies to stimulate the Reason, the comparison of which is instructive: 521 ὁ μάθημα ψυχῆς ὅλου ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγανσοκλέους ἐπὶ τὸ δόξ: 525 δὲ ἐλεκτικῷ πρὸς οὐσίαν: 524 ὃ ὅλου ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν: 525 ἐν γαγεναὶ πρὸς ἀληθείαν: B φιλοσόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτέων εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδυόντι: C ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπὶ ἀληθείαν τε καὶ οὐσίαν: 527 δὲ ὅλου πρὸς ἀληθείαν. We next come upon a group of instances at p. 534, where the partition of the mental faculties and their respective objects that concludes book VI, is resumed: Δ καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόθην δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν· καὶ δ’ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόθην πρὸς δόξαν. In the earlier exposition (p. 511) the term οὐσία is not used, but meanwhile we have been amply prepared for its use here: Β ὃ καὶ διαλεκτικόν καλεῖς τῶν λόγων ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας: Ο μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἄλλα κατ’ οὐσίαν προδομημένος ἐλέγχειν. The last group of instances of οὐσία as a philosophical term occurs at p. 585 in the discussion of Pleasure: Α τῶρα οὖν ἤγει τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαράς οὐσίας μετέχειν: Ε ’Ἠ οὖν ἀνομοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἦ ἐπιστήμης.
μετέχει; Οὐδαμῶς. Τι δ' ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Εἶ δὲ ἀληθείας ἤπατον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; which is repeated below at d.

In the later dialogues preparation or explanation of the term is less and less felt necessary. In the Theaet. 160 b c, 172 b, 202 b it seems used as current coin; at 185 c in answer to a question in which the words occur τὸ ἐπὶ πάσι κοινῷ, ὡς τὸ εἶστιν ἑνομοῦντις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν, Theaetetus says οὕσιαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι.

The philosophical meanings of οὐσία in Plato may be classified as follows; but many usages fall on the line between two divisions, especially between (2) and (3). The 'Ideal Theory' is implied by (2), not by (3).

(1) Being in general, opposed to Not-being and to Becoming: Rep. 525 b c, Phaedo 78 d, 98 d, Theaet. 185 c; common in Sophista, Parmenides, also Politicus and Timaeus.

(2) Essential Nature of a Species, as self-existent (metaphysical): Rep. 509 b, Phaedo 65 d, 101 c, Phaedr. 245 e (?), 247 c.

(3) Essential Nature of a Species, as apprehended by us (logical): Meno 72 b 22, Euthyphro 11 a, Hipp. maj. 301 b, 302 c, Prot. 349 b, Rep. 359 a, Phaedr. 237 c, 245 e (?), 270 b, Theaet. 202 b.

(4) Truth: Hipp. maj. 301 b e, Gorg. 472 b.

To these meanings must be added the uses Theaet. 160 b ἡμῶν (sc. 'of myself and the thing perceived') ἢ ἄναγκη τὴν οὕσιαν συνδεῖ, 160 c τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὕσιας δὲν ἔστιν. Here οὕσια = φῶς and amounts to little more than a periphrasis.

EXCURSUS II

ἐπερ and ἔγε

On 73 C 55 ἔγε μὴ ἢ ἀνὴρ ἄρετη ἤν Stallb., quoted by Fr., says: ἐλ γε usurpatur de re quae jure sumpta creditur, eoque differt ab ἐπερ, quod incertum relinquit utrum quid jure an injuria sumatur. This note appears to me obscure and misleading. Whether ἐπερ or ἔγε be used the view taken of the condition will depend on the mood and tense of the verb in the conditional clause. The meaning here is: 'this would not be the case if their virtue were not, as it is, the same': and the meaning would be very little altered by substituting ἐπερ for ἔγε. [ἔγε is similarly used 74 C 16, D 25; cp. Dem.
Aristocr. (23) 93 ἐξήν αὐτῷ μὴ γράφειν εἰ γε τὸ βέλτιστον τῷ πόλει σκοτείν ἐβούλετο; ib. 161 καλὰ γὰρ οὐ γὰρ; εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἄληθη. Euthyphr. 10 καὶ εἰ γε ταῦτα ἢ: Soph. 255 d.]. L. & S. realise this and say that elπερ is used in Attic mostly to imply that the supposition agrees with the fact: "if, that is to say"; with the impf. it implies that it is contrary to the fact; and quote Soph. Ἐλ. 312 εἰ περὶ τὲλας (but he is not); ib. 604 εἰ περὶ ἐκείνων. This is perfectly true, but does not take us far towards grasping the distinction between elπερ and εἰ γε. As diametrically opposed to the view of Stallb. it is instructive to quote a note, itself somewhat over-hasty, of Whiston on Dem. Tim. (24) 89 (78): ὡστε εἰ περὶ ὡμόν ἑκάστῳ μελεῖ τῇ τῆς πολιτείᾳ, κτέ.: 'Here εἰ περὶ is used instead of εἰ, for "if, as I assume to be the fact;" this particle always assuming the truth of the supposition which it makes. Cf. εἰ περὶ καὶ τῇ ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐνευθέρων τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται (Thuc. i 69. 1) which Mr. Shepherd correctly renders "Especially if they carry off the credit of being the liberators of Greece, as I suppose you think is the case."' (A different view of the passage in Thuc. is taken by Classen, as we shall presently see.)

To pass back to an earlier stage of the discussion, Viger p. 512 gives as the principal meaning of εἰ περὶ 'σι modo,' on which Zeune notes: 'Haec vis videtur esse praeципua, propter quod particula περὶ valet ad conditionem limitandam et coercedam'; quoting Plato Rep. 457 D οὐκ οἴμαι περὶ τοῦ ὑφελίου ἀμφιβολεῖται ἢ ὡς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινάς μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι ... εἰ περὶ οἷν τε and Dem. Olymph. I § 2 τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν ἐκείνων αὐτῶς ἀμφιλητέων ἐστιν, εἰ περὶ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε. Besides this meaning Viger recognises three others: (a) si quidem, instituendo comparationem inter diversa, tuncque particulas illas sequitur καὶ in opposito membro, quoting Dem. Tim. (24) 51 δένον δὲ κτέ., where however εἰ περὶ τοῦ καὶ ἀλλού is now read. Zeune notes that sometimes the καὶ is absent, and quotes Thuc. iv 55. 2 εἰς δὲ τὰ πολεμικὰ, εἰ περὶ ποτὲ, μᾶλλον δὲ όκηρτεροι ἐγένοντο [cp. for εἰ περὶ ποτὲ Thuc. iv 20. 1, vii 64. 2, Plato Ἐρ. vii 328 a], Xen. Cyg. iii 19 συμφέρει δ’ ύμῖν, εἰ περὶ τῷ καὶ ἀλλῷ, τὸ νικάν. He shows that there is in these cases an ellipse after εἰ περὶ, and how the ellipse is to be filled up. He gives as a stronger case of ellipse Aristoph. Clouds 226—

εἰπεν’ αὖ παρροθ τοῦ θεοῦ ἕπερφορνεῖς
ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπ’ τῆς γῆς, εἰπερ; (scil. δεὶ ἕπερφορνεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ)
and, as a case where there is no ellipse, Aristoph. Frogs 76—

εἰτ’ οὐ Σοφοκλέα, πρότερον δεὶ Ἐυρυτίδου,
μέλλεις ἀνάγεσθαι, εἰπερ γ’ ἐκείθεν δεὶ σ’ ἀνεψεν;

(β) quandoquidem (ὅτι δή, ἐπειδή): Arist. Pol. vii (vi) 2, 3=
1317 b 17 elprev tou doulov dnotos, to xin oix ou Triều boulgetai, to which Zeune adds Plato Phaedr. 245 D elprev eis arkhis dei ta pantia phnosethai.

Viger's third sense is shown to rest on a misconception, and may be passed over; but Zeune adds another real sense of elprev, 'qua sequente allda significat quamvis... tamen,' quoting Homer Il. xxii. 576—

elprev yar phamenos mun 6 oustas he白men allda te kai peri doufi peparmenou oik akolugiei alkis.

G. Hermann in his notes derides Viger's analysis: multum interest, he says, inter elprev et el ye: 'elprev dokei sou dicimus ei de quo non certo scimus quid ei placeat, aut de quo id nescire simulamus: el ye dokei sou dicimus ei de quo scimus quid ei placeat.' This is apparently the source of Stallbaum's note, which I started by criticising. Hermann's sweeping generalisation has tended to darken counsel. He was probably led into it by too exclusive attention to what Viger rightly says is the principal meaning of elprev, 'si modo.' Other examples of this are Prot. 319 A ἢ καλὸν τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, elprev ekptsaι: ib. 351 C elprev tois kalois γ', ἐφι, ἔφε, ἔφη ἕδημενοι: Euthyd. 8 D ou tolimoši λέγειν ὣς οὐχι, elprev αἵκουσιν γε, δοσεῖν δικριν: Gorg. 495 B ouk av eti met' emob lkanw tα δρα τα ἑξαιτοι, elprev παρά tα δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἔρεις. ΚΑΛ. Kal yar sou, ὦ Σωκρατες. ΢Ω. Ου τοινυ δρόμου ποιω οὔτε εγώ, elprev ποιω τοῦτο, othre sou: Phaedr. 261 E peri panta tα λεγόμενα μα τις τέχνη, elprev eiston, asth an eit: Charm. 170 C: Xen. Oec. i 8 (if a man buys a horse, and not knowing how to ride, gets a fall and is hurt, is the horse wealth to him?) ouk elprev ta χρήματα γ' εστω αγαθω: Symp. ii. 6 quoted on 70 A 1: Thuc. vi 21. 1: Eur. Alc. 303 elprev eit φονεῖς: Phoen. 524 elprev yar αἵνεκεν χρή κτ.: Aristoph. Wasps 535 elprev, δ μη γένοιθ', othos sou eθέλει κρατήσαι.

It is hardly necessary to prove that alike elprev and el ye may be used with an 'unreal condition.' Examples with el ye are given at the beginning of this excursus; for elprev I may cite Plato †Ep. vii 330 A ἢ δν οὕτως εγένετο, elprev εγένετο, Kalwota. As to other kinds of condition it may be said that either elprev or el ye (or el simply), may express every grade of acceptance of the condition from quandoquidem ('since') to si modo ('if only'). Indeed the manner in which a speaker regards a condition, is often locked within his own breast. In such cases as Euthyd. 284 A elprev λέγει αὐτὸ, and elprev λέγει τα δρα, it is impossible to say to what extent the sophist accepts as true the answer that has been given him.

There are certainly instances in which elprev assumes the
truth of the supposition it introduces, as has already been seen. To the instances given by Viger and Zeune many might be added; e.g. Lach. 197 ο φημι γάρ σε είναι σοφόν, καὶ Δάμακιν γε, εἶπερ ἐστε ἄνδρεῖοι: Prot. 312 ά εἶπερ γε δ ἰδιαοούμαι χρή λέγειν, 329 Β ἑγώ εἶπερ ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἄνδρώτων πειθοῦν ἂν, καὶ σοὶ πειθοῦμαι: Ἑρ. 515 Ω οὐκ οὗτος εἶπερ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ οἱ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν βελτίως ἔτοιλε τοὺς πολίτας: Meno 98 Β 4: Ἑρ. 351 Α εἶπερ σοφία καὶ ἁρετή ἐστι δικαιοσύνη: Phaeo 71 ο ζ ἀλλήλων γίγνεται τάῦτα εἶπερ ἐναντία ἔστιν (contrast ibid. εἰ ἐπερ εἰσὶ τὸ ἀναβιοσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶν ἀν εἰ μὲν γένοις ἂν ηὐθείᾳ, ὅπου εἰπερ is i ὁ modo): Parm. 134 ο φαίης αὖ ὡ, εἶπερ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τὸ γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτῷ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστήμην: . οὐκ οὗτος εἶπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτής ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ὥδε φαίης ἔχεις τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην: Dem. Aist.ocr. (23) 144 δικην διδοῦστε τῷ μεγίστῳ, εἶπερ οἱ κακοὶ καὶ φανακίζοντες ύμᾶς: Dem. 52. 2 δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, εἶπερ τι καὶ ἄλλα πάσατε πράγμα αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτῷ ἑνίκασατε: . οὕτως καὶ νῦν διαγνώσαι (referred to by Milton W. Humphreys, C. R. xi 140 b): Thuc. iii 113. 4 εἶπερ γε ὑπείπεν ἐν 'Ἰδομήνῳ χθές ἐμαυεθεὶς 'yes it is so, since you fought etc.' (see Classen on Thuc. i 77. 6).

On the other hand εἶ γε has as its prevalent meaning si quidem. An obvious instance is Dem. Androt. (22) 68: ἐρωτῶν εἶ μάτην τὸ δεσμωτῆριον φιλοδομήθη. καταφαίην δὲ ἐγωγε. εἰ γ’ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ σος ψεύτον αὐτὸν περ’ εὐφροσύνας, on which Weil says 'εἶ γε, si quidem, ne diffère guère de εἴπερ οὐ εἴσειδή, puissant.' But there are plenty of instances where it means simodo: as Eth. 282 Β εἰ εἶστι γε η σοφία διδακτόν: Phaed. 242. 16 εἶ γε συ’ ἄλληθ χαλεπὸν τοις λέγεις: Ἀλ. i 108 ο άλλ’ εἶ γε δὴ μὴ χαλεπὸν τοις ἐπιρήμημα, ἐθέλω: Xen. Mem. iv vii 7 τοι γάρ ἂν ἀλλω τις εἶναι σοφός, εἶ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμη;

It may be worth while to put together some instances of εἴπερ and εἶ γε with fut. indic. The instances given are modal futures, not real future conditions; but in the view of the condition I can trace no difference between εἴπερ and εἶ γε.

(See on 86 Α 8 and Exc. IV.)

Thuc. i 77. 6 εἴπερ, οῦκ καὶ τὸ ν πρὸς τὸν Μήδιον ὑπεδείξατε, ὅμως καὶ νῦν γνώστεθε 'since you mean to resolve': νι 38. 4 τοῦ ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῆς διανοιας πραμασμέναι χρή εἴπερ καὶ μὴ προ-

φυλαξάμενος τί προσπελεύσαι: Rep. 375 Α (δει τοιδεῖον εἴναι) εἴπερ εἰ μαχεῖται: Phil. 37 ε ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὖν τε, εἴπερ ἀμαρτήσατε γε ἡδονή (a possibility which Protagoras does not accept), 62 ο εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὅπως καλὸν ποτὲ βίου.

Hdt. vii 46 ο βραχῦ εἰς ὃ τὰς ἀνθρώπους βίος, εἶ (since) τοῦτων γε ἐστὶν τοιούτων οὐδέσε ἐς ἐκαστὸν ἔστω περιέσται: Xen. Mem. ii i 17 ἄλλα γάρ, ὃ Σωκράτης, οἰ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν
With regard to *el* *ye*, we must distinguish cases where *ye* emphasises *el*, or the whole conditional clause, from cases where some word intervenes between *el* and *ye* on which the *ye* throws its emphasis (Krüger 69. 15. 3). Cp. *Laches* 192 ε*el* τὸ *ye* διὰ πάντων πεφυκὸς δεί εἶπεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δει, εἶ *el* γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρυψάμεθα ἢ μὲν αὐτοῖς: Hdt. 1 60 εἰ καὶ τότε *ye* κτε., where *el* is *si quidem* and *ye* points καὶ τότε.

One point that alone should make us doubt any broad contrast between *el* *per* and *el* *ye* is that *el* *per* often occurs followed by *ye*. Many instances of this have already been given. Kühner § 511. 9 c quotes Xen. *Anab.* 1 vii 9: (the king will fight) *el* *per* *ye* Δαρελου καὶ Παρναστίδος ἕστι παῖς. Here again we must distinguish cases where *ye* immediately follows *el* *per*, and helps *per* to emphasise *el*, from cases where some word intervenes to which the emphasis of *ye* belongs: *el* *per* *ye* simply *Symp.* 205 β, *Lygis* 216 β, *Theaet.* 182 c; on the other hand *Hipp.* maj. 290 β *el* *per* χρυσῷ ἡν, *Laches* 193 c *el* *per* οὐκὸν *ye*, etc.

There are two uses of *el* *per* which are not shared by *el* *ye*. One is the elliptic use (noticed by Zeune above). This use occurs in Plato, and is common in Aristotle. Riddell § 252. *Eth. flor.* 296 β ὅδεν ἡμᾶς γε [σφαλεί], ἀλλ' *el* *per*, στέ: *Rep.* 497 ε ὅτι *el* μὴ βουλέσθαι, ἀλλ' *el* *per*, τὸ *el* μὴ δύνασθαι, διακωλύει (here we might give the force of *el* *per* by italics ‘but, if any one is deceived,’ ‘but, if anything does interfere’): *Prot.* 352 c, *Parm.* 150 b, *Laws* 667 λ, 900 ε. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* ii 5 ὡς, *el* *per* τι καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ τούτῳ μαθήτην. Even such milder ellipses as *Apol.* 21 c ὡστ' *el* *per* ἐνταῦθα, *el* *per* πον, ἐλέγξων and *Phaedo* 63 c, would not be found with *el* *ye* (Kühner § 599. 2, Jelf § 395. 2). See also for the elliptical use of *el* *per* *CR.* xi 271 b, where are quoted from the tragedians *Aesch.*. *Agam.* 934 *el* *per* τις εἰδώς γ' εἴ τὸς' ξέειπον τέλος: Soph. *Aj.* 488 ἔξευφων πατρός *el* *per* τινὸς σθένους ἐν πλείστω *Phyl.*.

The other is the concessive force, also noted by Zeune. Kühner § 578 Anm. 2 (cp. § 538. 1) only illustrates this from Homer, but see *Theaet.* 196 β ὅτι προσήκον αὐτὸς χρήσαι *el* *per* στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης ‘as if we had a right to use these terms when (i.e. though) we have no part in knowledge.’ Here *el* *ye* would give a quite different sense, ‘as if, since we have
no part in knowledge, we have a right to use them.' Classen, I believe rightly, regards εἰπέρ in Thuc. 1 69. 1, quoted above in Whiston's note, as concessive.

In this dialogue εἰπέρ occurs thirteen times, seven times with principal tenses of the indic. (73 B D, 78 A B, 89 C D, 96 D), four times with impf. indic. (93 C twice, E, 94 D), twice with optative (98 B C). With this we may reckon εάν πέρ, which occurs four times (72 D E, 73 B, 79 B). εί γε occurs six times, namely, thrice with impf. indic. (73 C, 74 C twice), thrice with optative (75 C, 98 D E).

73 B 42 εἰπέρ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθόν εἴπαι = si modo.
73 D 5 εἰπέρ εν γέ τι ζητεῖς = si quidem (?): εν is pointed by γε.
78 A 63 εἰπέρ μὴ βουλείται τοιούτος εἴπαι = si quidem.
78 B 8 εἰπέρ εστί βελτίων = si modo.
89 C 4 εἰπέρ επιστήμη εστίν ἀρετή = si quidem.
89 D 17 εἰπέρ επιστήμη εστίν (ἀρετή) = si quidem.
93 C 5 εἰπέρ τις ἄλλος διδάσκαλος ἦν κάκεινον εἴπαι = si quidem
(Viger's a).
93 C 8 εἰπέρ ἐβούλετο γε = si modo ('he was, or at least would have been, if he wished': past or unreal supposition).
93 E 33 εἰπέρ ἢν γε διδακτῶν ἡ ἄρετή = si modo: unreal supposition.
94 D 10 εἰπέρ χρόνο τι διδακτῶν: unreal supposition.
96 D 17 εἰπέρ ὁρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα = si quidem.
98 B 4 εἰπέρ φαίνειν το. . . θείν ταν = si modo: an example of this form where the meaning is not si quidem.
98 C 21 ἄνδρες δν εἴεν ωφέλιμοι εἰπέρ εἴεν = si modo.
73 C 55 εἰ γε μὴ ἦν: unreal condition.
74 C 16 εἰ γε προσαναράτα: unreal condition.
74 D 25 εἰ γε ἐκέλευε: unreal condition.
75 C 1 εἰ μεν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη future supposition. (γε points τῶν σοφῶν, being misplaced.)
98 D 35 καν εἰ γε διδακτῶν εἴη.
98 E 38 καὶ εἰ μεν γε διδάσκαλον εἴεν, διδακτῶν δν εἴπαι. In these last two sentences there is little, if any, difference, from εἰπέρ.

To conclude: it is impossible to convey in English any uniform difference in meaning between εἰπέρ and εἰ γε. For near juxtapositions of the two see Theaet. 203 D ἀλλὰ μέν τοι εἰ γε ἀνάγκη εκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἰπέρ ἀμφότερα τις γιγνώσκαι τε. : Parm. 162 A ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοὶ γε ἐστι τῶν δρτων, ὥς οὐκ ἔστων εἰπέρ μὴ ἔστων, οὐδ' ἄν μεβλητάς ποθὲν τοι (here εἰπέρ is less truly conditional than εἰ γε): Soph. 255 D οὐκ ἄν, εἰ γε τὸ δν καὶ τὸ διάτερον μὴ τάμπολον διεφερέτην. ἀλλ' εἰπέρ διάτερον ἀμφότερ γκείχε τῶν εἰδῶν ὥσπερ τὸ δν, ἦν ἄν ποτε τι
καὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐπερων οὐ πρὸς ἐτερων. The difference must be
felt by realising the force of περ and γε in general: περ is
emphatic, γε is emphatic but restrictive; εἰ περ lays stress on
the fact that the statement is conditional, εἰ γε says that at
any rate under that condition it is true. We should often
give the force of εἰ περ by italicising εἰ; the force of εἰ γε by
putting a dash before ‘if.’

EXCURSUS III

On ἀλλὰ γάρ (92 C 23, 94 D 6, E 14)

On this idiom Riddell § 147 says ‘Here we must observe
that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition
that whereas the γάρ refers to the clause immediately subjoined
to it, the ἀλλὰ belongs either to a clause understood or to a
clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such
a supposition; for the ἀλλὰ sits much closer to the clause
immediately subjoined than the γάρ does. ἀλλὰ γάρ has two
meanings: one when it introduces an objection, and is there-
fore ironical; the other, which alone needs illustration, when
it has the force of “but be that as it may,” or “but the
truth is.”’

It is one question whether the Greeks in Plato’s time were
still conscious of an ellipse in ἀλλὰ γάρ (see J. Adam on Ἄπολ.
19 D, Εὐθυγρ. 11 c); another whether this construction grew
out of an ellipse. Riddell would apparently answer both
questions in the negative. And it must be allowed that it is
quite possible to frame a theory of the origin of ἀλλὰ γάρ in
which no ellipse is implied. For γάρ (γε + ἀρα), like ἀρα, is
originally emphatic or ‘confirmative’ (Kühner § 509. 8 a), as
are also the inferential particles igitur, enim, nam, namque in
Latin (Conington on Verg. Æen. x 614). How the causal use
was developed from the confirmative Kühner explains § 544 a.
It might therefore be held that the combination ἀλλὰ γάρ was
formed while γάρ was still merely emphatic; and so it would
not be necessary to suppose any ellipse.

The evidence however is very strong, I might say over-
whelming, that γάρ was felt as causal at an early stage of the
combination, that it was used to introduce a clause which gave
the reason of what followed, much as 'for' in Shakespeare's time was used for 'because' in such a sentence as:—

'It is as lawful,
For we would give much, to use violent means
And rob in the behalf of charity.

If ἄλλα γάρ developed while γάρ was still merely emphatic, we should expect to find the words in close juxtaposition from the first. As a matter of fact, however, ἄλλα γάρ never occurs in juxtaposition in Homer. Ebeling in his Homeric lexicon says 'ἄλλα ... γάρ, ita ut verbum aliquid semper interponatur; de re certissima quae opponitur superioribus: sed enim.' The word interposed between ἄλλα and γάρ may be regarded as introducing the subordinate or parenthetical clause to which γάρ belongs, γάρ itself not being capable of beginning a clause. We have the full structure shown in such passages as—

II. xv 739 ἄλλα—ἐν γάρ Τρώων πεδίω πόλης, ἐκάκοις, ἡμεθα πατρίδος αἰθή—τῷ ἐν χερσὶ φῶς,

II. xxiii 607 ἄλλα—οῦ γάρ δὴ πόλεῖ ἐπάθες εἰνεκ' ἐμείδο—τῷ τοι περιπλομένῳ ἐπιπείχομαι.

Od. xi 393 ἄλλα—οὐ γάρ οἱ ἐτ' ἂν ἐμπέδων οὐδὲ τι κύκν—τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἱδών.

Od. xiv 355 ἄλλα—οὐ γάρ σφιν ἐφαλβευτο κέρδιον εἶναι μαλαθθι προτέρω—τοι μὲν πάλιν ἀδίς ἔβαινον.

In each of these cases we have an apodosis going with ἄλλα: in the following instances we have ἄλλα put after the γάρ-clause with the clause to which it properly belongs—

Od. x 174 ὁ φίλοι, οὐ γάρ πι πατάδουσμεθ', ἀξιόμενοι περ ἔις 'Αδεδο δόμους, πρὸν μόρσιμον ἡμᾶρ ἐπέλθη, ἄλλο αἴγετ' κτέ.

ibid. 226 ὁ φίλοι, ἐνδον γάρ τίς ἐποιχομενή μέγαν ἱπτόν καλὸν ἀουδάει, δάπεδον δ' ἄπαν ἀμφιμέμεκεν, ἡ θέδο ἱγ νυ ἄλλα φθεγγωμεθα θάσσον.

But there are even in Homer many instances in which there is no separate clause to go with ἄλλα; from which may be inferred that the separate force of ἄλλα and γάρ was already indistinctly felt; examples are II. vii 242—

ἄλλο οὐ γάρ σ' ἐθέλω βαλέον τοιοῦτον ἐπιτεθ' λάθη ἠπιτεθα, ἄλλο ἀμφαδόν, ἀ' κε τύχαμ 

Cp. Od. x 202, 568, xix 591, and, for γάρ in protasis without ἄλλα, II. vii 328 foll.

ἄλλα γάρ seems not to occur in Hesiod. But there are
instances in the elegiac poets like those in Homer, as Tyrt. 1 1
(Bergk*):

αλλ' Ἡρακλῆσο γάρ ἀνυκτητον γένος ἔστε, θαρσεῖτ'.

A very important step was taken when γάρ was allowed to follow αλλά immediately. As γάρ cannot begin a clause it was now felt to lean upon αλλά, and its significance as introducing a separate clause was disguised. The following epitaph of Simonides (Bergk* 124 α = Anth. Pal. vii 607) is amongst the earliest recorded instances:

ἄνθρωπ' οὐ Κροπίου λεύσεις τάφων, ἀλλά γάρ ἄνθρωποι
χερσητέω μύκρος τομήσοι, ἐμοὶ δ' ἐκανός.

It must be confessed that it is difficult to discover any trace of ellipse in this.

In Pindar there are the following instances of αλλά γάρ in juxta-position:—

Ol. i 55 = 87 αλλά γάρ καταπέψαι
μέγαν ὄλθον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρω δ' ἔλεον
ἀταν ὑπέροπλων.

Pyth. iv 32 = 56
αλλά γάρ νόστου πρόφασις γλυκεῖοι
κόλλευν μείναι.

Fennell ‘But (we declined to stay) for.’

Nem. vii 52 = 77
αλλά γάρ ανάπαυεσ εν παντί γλυκεία ἐργού· κόρω δ' ἔχει
καὶ μελὶ κτέ.

In the following places we have αλλά . . γάρ separated:

Ol. vi 54 = 90
αλλ' εν κέκρυπτο γάρ σχολὴ υπερενθίδα π' εν ἀπειράτῳ
τινι εξαθανει καὶ παμπορφύριοι ἀκτίσι βεβρεγμένον ἀβρον
σῶμα· το καὶ κατεφάμεξαν καλεῖσθαι μὲν κτέ.

Here αλλά really goes with the clause beginning το καὶ 'so too'; γάρ introduces the clause giving the reason of Iamus' name, from τον. At Nem. vii 30 = 44, Isth. iii 54 = iv 25, Isth. vi 16 there is no subsequent clause with which αλλά may be taken.

In Herodotus we have many examples of γάρ used with a protasis in the sense 'since.' See especially i 8 ἣν γάρ οἱ τῶν αἰχμαφόρων Γόγνης . . τούτω καὶ τὰ σπουδαιότερα τῶν προγμάτων ὑπερεπεθέτο. χρόνον δὲ οὖ πολλοῦ διελθότας—χρῆν
γάρ Κανδαλκῆ γενέσθαι κακῶς—ἐλεγε· Γόγνη οὐ γάρ σε δοκέω
πείθεσθαι (ὅτα γάρ ἀποστήτερα . . .) . . πολεῖ δικός κτέ. Here the fourth γάρ succeeds the clause of which it gives the reason. Compare i 14 αλλ', οὔδ'εν γάρ μέγα ἐργον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐγένετο,
EXCURSUS III

τούτου μὲν παρῆσομεν: IV 83 ἄλλα, οὐ γὰρ ἐπείθε συμβουλεύων οἱ χρηστά, ὃ μὲν ἐπέπαινο: VIII 8, IX 27 end, IX 109 τῆ δὲ κακῶς γὰρ ἐδει γενέσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπε, and in the same chapter ἄλλα, οὐ γὰρ ἐπείθε, διδοὶ τὸ φάρος.

Thus it still remained possible for ἄλλα γὰρ, even when in immediate juxtaposition, to be succeeded by two clauses, the former of which might be taken with γὰρ, the latter with ἄλλα. Jebb in his valuable note on Soph. O.C. 988 says that we must 'distinguish two cases of the formula ἄλλα γὰρ: (1) with an ellipse as here: "but (your charges are untrue) for"; in which cases γὰρ may be represented by in fact, indeed: (2) where there is no ellipse.'

I give instances of both classes from the dramatists, calling 'elliptical' those instances where no separate clause that might go with ἄλλα is expressed; though to what extent the Greeks were then conscious of an ellipse I do not undertake to say. It will be noted that in the majority of cases ἄλλα and γὰρ are not in juxtaposition.

Ἀ'α. Full construction (ἄλλα . . γὰρ separate).

Aesch. Prom. 941 ἄλλα εἰσορῷ γὰρ τῶν τὸν Διὸς τρόχιν, τὸν τοῦ τυράννου τοῦ νέου διάκονον, πάνως τι καινῶν ἀγγελῶν ἐλλυθεν.

(The asyndeton in the last line makes it probable that it is to be connected with ἄλλα.)

Chóérph. 375 ἄλλα διπλής γὰρ τῆς δε μαράγνης δοῦνος ἰκνεῖται, τῶν μὲν ἀρωγολ κατὰ γῆς ἤδη (scil. εἰσίν).

Soph. Ant. 392 ἄλλα ἢ γὰρ ἐκτὸς καὶ παρ' ἐλπίδας χαρὰ ἐσκεφτῷ ἄλλῃ μήκος οὐδὲν ἤδειν ἢδονῇ, ἦκε.

El. 256 ἄλλα ἢ βία γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀναγκάζει με δράν, ἄγγαντε. ἔγερνε.

Phil. 81 ἄλλα ἢδο γὰρ τοῦ κτήμα τῆς μήκες λαβεῖν, τὸλμα.

O.C. 755 ἄλλα οὖ γὰρ ἔστι τάμφανη κρύπτειν, σοι νιν κρύφων.

ibid. 797 ἄλλα οἴδα γὰρ σε ταῦτα μὴ πείθον, τοῖς.

O.T. 1409 ἄλλα οὖ γὰρ αὐδάν ἐζοθ' α μηδὲ δράν καλῶν, διαὶς τάχιστα πρὸς θεῶν ἔξω μὲ ποὺ καλύπτατ'.

Eur. Alc. 422 ἄλλα ἐκφορὰν γὰρ τοῦδε θήσομαι νεκροῦ, πάρεστε.
Med. 1067 ἀλλ' εἴμι γάρ δὴ τὴν ἑπονεστάτην ὁδὸν, παῖδας προσειπείν βούλομαι.

Bacch. 1166 ἀλλ' εἰσορῶ γάρ ἐς δόμον ὄρμωμεν· Πενθέως 'Αγαθήν μητέροι, δέχεσθε κώμον εὑλον θεοῦ.

Ar. Wasp. 320 ἀλλ' οὖ γάρ οἶδα τ' ἐτ' εἴμ' ἥδειν, τί ποιῆσον;

A. b. Full construction (ἀλλ' γάρ juxtaposed).

Aesch. Sept. 361 ἄλλα γὰρ ἦκουσα' αἰθ' ἐπὶ πράγος πικρῶν 'Αντιγόνη τ' ἦδ' 'Ισμήνη, θρήνῳ ἀδελφῶν' οὐκ ἀμφιβόλως οὖμιν σφί' ἔρατων ἐκ βαθυκόλπων στηθέων ἦσειν ἄγος ἐπάξιον.

Soph. Ant. 148 ἄλλα γὰρ ἡ μεγαλωφόμος ἢλθε Νίκα ἐκ μὲν δὴ πολέμων τῶν νῦν θέσθε λημοσύναν.

Eur. Phoen. 1307 ἄλλα γὰρ Κρέοντα λεύσων τὸνδε δεύρο συννεφῇ πρὸς δόμους στείχοντα, παῦσω τοὺς παρεστῶτας γόους.

B. a. Elliptical construction (ἄλλα . . . γάρ separate).

Aesch. Eum. 797 ἄλλ' ἐκ Δίαν γὰρ λαμπρὰ μαρτυρία παρὴν κτέ.

On this place Whitelaw remarks in a review of Sidgwick's edition, C.R. II 110 b, 'Why must ἄλλα γὰρ with a single verb be regarded as elliptical? γάρ in the combination εἰ γάρ is not a conjunction, and the possibility of putting the γάρ next the ἄλλα seems to show that it was not so regarded. This combination is found, however, sometimes when ἄλλα γὰρ = sed quia.' I am endeavouring to answer the points here raised.

Soph. Ajax. 167 ἄλλ' δε γὰρ δὴ τὸ σῶν δυμῇ ἀπέδραν παταγοῦσιν κτέ. Jebb 'No (we can do nothing) for.'

Antig. 155 ἄλλ' δε γὰρ δὴ βασίλεως χώρας χωρεῖ κτέ. Jebb 'But (let us cease) for.'

El. 228 ἄλλ' ἐν γὰρ δεινοῖς ὀδ σχῆσω ταῦτα διὰ τάρα μὲ βλὸς ἑρ. Jebb 'But (ye speak in vain) for.'

ibid. 595 ἄλλ' ὀδ γὰρ ὀδίδε νοουθετεῖν ἐξεστί σε.

O.C. 988 ἄλλ' ὀδ γὰρ ὀδίδ' ἐν τοῖσδ' ἀκοῦσόμαι κακός.
EXCURSUS III

Eur. Heracl. 480

άλλα εἰμι γάρ πως πρόσφορος, μέλει δέ μοι κτέ.

Ar. Knights 328 άλλα ἐφάνη γάρ ἀνήρ ἔτερος πολύ
σοῦ μιαρώτερος, ὡστε με χαίρειν
δι' σε παύσει κτέ.

B b. Elliptical construction (άλλα γάρ juxtaposed).

Eur. Phoen. 1782

άλλα γάρ τι ταῦτα θρηνώ καὶ μάην ἄδύρομαι;
τὰς γάρ ἐκ θεῶν ἄνδρας τυγχάνων δυντα δεῖ φέρειν.

(I have left out of account Soph. O.C. 985 άλλα ἐν γάρ οὖν
ξύνοντα, where γάρ belongs to the emphatic phrase γάρ οὖν.)

When we pass from the dramatists to Plato we find an
important further stage of development has taken place.
Among the numberless instances of άλλα γάρ in Plato I can
cite only two in which any word intervenes, namely Prot. 336 A
and Apol. 20 c, in both which cases we have άλλα οὖ γάρ. The
words άλλα γάρ have almost coalesced, and we may be pretty
sure that the Greeks were no longer conscious of any ellipse.
The use of άλλα γάρ in Xenophon is generally similar to that in
Plato: but we have γάρ with a parenthetic clause in Anab. III
i 24 άλλα—τοις γάρ άλλοι ταῦτ’ ἐνθυμοῦνται—μη ἀναμένωμεν
άλλους ἔφ’ ἡμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, and a word interposed at Cyrt. II i 13
άλλα γεγυνόσκω γάρ (Kühner § 509. 8 a).

It may perhaps be held that no discussion of άλλα γάρ is
complete which does not take account of other combinations in
which γάρ occurs. With regard to νῦν δὲ γάρ (which does not
occur in the Memo), it seems parallel to άλλα γάρ, but we have
little record of its earlier history, and it is possible that the
analogy of άλλα γάρ has mainly operated in producing it, as
also the phrase at Parm. 137 A ἐμοὶ δὲ δεῖ γάρ χαρίζεσθαι ἐπειδή
καὶ αὐτόν ἐσμεν. For καὶ γάρ Thuc. affords evidence of a
parenthetic stage, as i 137. 2 καὶ (ἂν γάρ ἀννώς τοῖς ἐν τῇ νηλ)
δεῖσαι φράσει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ δοτις ἑστὶ. Thuc. like Herodotus
abounds in parenthetic clauses with γάρ. But I do not think
it at all necessary to suppose that the history of all combina-
tions of γάρ has been similar; in some it is probable that
the original emphatic force of γάρ has been preserved
throughout, as in γάρ οὖν, in questions like πῶς γάρ οὖ; and in answers
like εἰπον γάρ 78 B 3, οὐδὲν γάρ 97 B 25, οὐ γάρ εἰκός 73 D 12.
EXCURSUS IV

El with the Future Indicative (on 35 C 15 and 36 A 8).

For el with the future indicative in present conditions, where ‘it expresses merely a present intention or necessity that something shall be done hereafter,’ see Goodwin M.T. 407. This (modal) use, as he observes (ibid. 408, 449) is equivalent to μέλλω with the infinitive: e.g. we might have had at 73 B 42 (for elπερ μέλλωσιν άγαθοι είναι) elπερ άγαθοι ἐσονται. el with the future indicative in real future conditions is treated by Goodwin ibid. 447, 448. Much has been written as to the distinction in future conditions between el with the fut. indic., ἐν with the subj., and el with the optative (see F. E. T. §§ 194, 206; Hadley § 899). It is clear that different writers have their idiosyncrasies as to the form they prefer for expressing future conditions; and that Plato rarely expresses a real future condition by el with the future indicative (see Archer-Hind on Phaedo 106 D).

The following list of places in Plato, where el is followed by the future indicative, is by no means exhaustive, but may serve to illustrate the two classes, and to show the much greater frequency of the ‘modal’ class. (Instances where el introduces an indirect question, as Rep. 387 D, Phaedo 77 B, are of course left out of account.) As real future conditions may be cited, besides 35 C 15, Apol. 28 e el τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ καὶ Ἑκτορᾶ ἀποκεντεῖς αὐτὸς ἀποβαίνει: probably also Euthyph. 3 εί μέλλοντι μου καταγελάν σύνεν ἂν εἴη ἄνδρες, εἰ δὲ συναφάσονται, τῷ τότε ἢ ἡ δικαιαία ἀποφθέγματα ἄδηλον: Prot. 338 B εί τὸ γάρ χεῖρων ἐσται ἡμῶν ὀ αἰρεῖνες, οὐκ ὁρίζως ἂν ἔχω τὸν χειρο τῶν βελτίων ἐπιστατέω: . . . εἰ δὲ αἰρὴσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φθευτε δὲ, αἰσχρόν καὶ τότε τῷ ὑπὲρ γίγνεται: Rep. 361 C εί τὸ γάρ δέξει δίκαιος εἴναι, ἐσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ διωρεῖ.

The remaining instances seem to me to be all modal, though a doubt may arise in some cases:

Ἡρρ. min. 375 D δεινόν μὲν τ’ ἂν εἴη εἰς οἱ ἐκόντες ἀδικοῦντες βελτίων ἐσονται ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες.

Lysis 213 C τι ὁδὸν δὴ χρησώμεθα εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλούντες φιλοῦν ἐσονται μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλουμένοι τε καὶ φιλοῦμενοι, άλλα καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλους εἰς φήσομεν εἴναι φιλοῦν;

Prot. 330 ε σχολὴ μὲν τ’ ἂν τι ἀλλο δοιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτῇ γε ἢ ὅσιότης δοιον ἐσται.
EXCURSUS IV

Ibid. 351 ο καθ' δ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἀρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, εἰ μή τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποθήκευται ἄλλο; Ρογ. 495 Α οὐκ ἐν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοὶ ἴκανῶς τὰ δυντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.

Ibid. 505 Ε εἰ μὲντοι ποιήσομεν (scil. engage in continuous discourse), όμως ἔγνως χρήναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκους ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἄλθεσθαι.

Ibid. 520 Ε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποίησας ἄντι εὖ πείσεται.

Ῥαεάτ. 242 Ε ἔτι δὲ ἡ ἐνθέεια αὐτῶν πάνυ ἄστελα εἰ ἄρα ἀνθρωπικός τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσετον ἐν αὐτοῖς.

Ῥεπ. 375 Α καὶ μὴν ἀνδρείων (δεί εἶναι) εἴπερ εἰ μαχεῖται.

Ῥαεάδ. 73 Σ ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήσου εἰ τὶς τὶ ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῦν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρῶτον ἑπίστασθαι.

Ibid. 108 Σ σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν τι φθοράν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ γε τὸ αδάνατον ἄδικον ὃν φθορὰν δέχεται.

Ῥαμ. 135 Β ἔτι ἄλλα πάνυ πολλά ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐτὰ καὶ ἱδέα τῶν δυντῶν καὶ ὁρεῖται τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἕκαστον ἐδός . . ἄλλα μέντοι εἰ γε τὶς δὴ αὖ οὐκ ἔσσει ἑδὴ τῶν δυντῶν εἴναι, μὴδὲ τι ὁρεῖται εἴδος ἐνὸς ἕκαστον, οὔτε ὅπως τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξέλει κτὲ. 

Ῥεαε. 161 Δ εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἕκαστῳ ἀληθείᾳ ἔσται δ ἃν δὲ αἰσθήσεως δοξάς, καὶ μῆτε τὸ ἄλλον πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μῆτε τὴν δόξαν κυρίωτεροι ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι . . ἄλλ' αὐτῶς τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον μόνον δοξάσει . . τι δὴ ποτὲ Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ἥμεις δὲ ἀμαθεστεραί τε καὶ φωτητέον ἡμῖν ἤ ναρ ἐκείνοις ;

Soph. 248 Ε τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τὶ, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ εὔμβατει πᾶσχειν.

Phil. 37 Ε ἄλλ' οὐχ οἶδα τὲ, (καλὸν δοῦμα προστιθέναι) εἴπερ ἀπαρθησάτε γ' ἠδίνη.

Ibid. 62 Σ ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἐμολγε, εἴπερ γ' ἡμῶν ὁ βιος ἔσται καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ποτὲ βιος. [Cp. ibid. B, where instead of εἰ with fut. indic. we have εἰ μέλλει ἑξευρήσειν.]

Tim. 31 Α ὁρθὸς ἐνα οὐρανόν προσειρήκαμεν) εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημοργημένον ἔσταται.

Lacus 822 Β ταύτ' οὖν εἰ πέφυκε μὲν οὐσίως, ἥμεις δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ δέξομεν . . οὐκ ὁρθῶς ομοία ἡμῖν ἂν τὰ ἐγκώμια προσάπτειν.

Add Apol. 34 C quoted on 91 Ε 17.
EXCURSUS V

ON ERISTIC (75 C, 80 E)

The art of the Eristic is Contentious Dialectic: the Eristics, 'can reduce any respondent to a contradiction, if he will only continue to answer their questions—whether what he says be true or false' (Grote i 528, on the Euthydemus).

Eristic thus presents certain points of likeness to the Socratic elenchus. Both are opposed to the rhetorical method, and imply a process of question and answer between two persons face to face. At the same time the differences between the two things are very great. Grote, comparing the pair of Eristic Sophists with Socrates, says (i 531): 'The real contrast between the competitors consists, first in the pretensions, next in the method. The two Sophists are described as persons of exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue¹ and claiming a fee as if they did teach it: Socrates disdains the fee, doubts whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to encourage or help forward a willing pupil.' As to the differences in method, the main points are that in Eristic verbal consistency is all that is aimed at; the questions must be answered categorically, without qualifications; whereas the Platonic Socrates regards elasticity and variety of language as an essential of profitable discussion. Eristic takes no heed whether the answer represents the bona fide opinion of the answerer; to the Platonic Socrates this is all important (see on 83 D 49). Lastly, the object of Eristic is victory, and 'the presence, as well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd, are essential features in the drama.' The Platonic Socrates, on the other hand, gives his attention exclusively to the respondent, and is absolutely indifferent to outside opinion (cp. e.g. Gorg. 472 B C; 475 E). To the differences recognized by Grote, must however be added a further difference which he refuses to recognize. He says (i 530) 'the contrast does not consist in this—that Socrates so contrives his string of questions as to bring out some established and positive conclusion, while Euthydemus and his brother leave everything in perplexity. Such is not the fact. Socrates ends without any result and with a confession of his inability to find any.' This surely is untrue of the Platonic Socrates, in whom the Elenchus has

¹ i.e. ἄρετη: see on 71 E 2.
developed into a maieutic art (Theaet. 149 foll.) by which unsuspected treasures of knowledge are brought to light. Even in the Euthydemus, largely satirical as it is, the amount of positive result is considerable. No dialogue can show more clearly than does the 

Meno, that the "numbing shock" was only half the work of Socrates, the indispensable preliminary to something of a constructive process. Nor with regard to the historic Socrates do we gather from Xenophon that the conversations of Socrates were barren of positive result, that they always left the hearer just where they found him, only puzzled and humiliated; though this may have been the result in the case of pupils who left him prematurely. Grote himself goes far towards admitting some positive teaching from Socrates when he allows him to profess his willingness "to help forward a willing pupil." ¹

Other important differences arise out of the fact that the Socratic elenchus was systematized and unified by having a definite object, the framing or testing of definitions (chiefly in the department of Ethics). It was a thing that could be aped, no doubt; Socrates in the Platonic Apology 23 c, declares how readily his example was followed: πρὸς δὲ τούτους οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἱ μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστιν ... αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μμαθοῦνται, εἰτα ἐπιχειροῦν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν. Pupils of Socrates are sometimes represented as playing this part by Plato. At the beginning of the Gorgias, Chaerophon has a skirmish with Polus before the two principals engage. See, too, the conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles in Xen. Mem. i ii 40–46, about Law, where Alcibiades retails the art of his master Socrates, with some success. Pericles asserts (with what truth it is hard to say) that he could do that sort of thing when he was young; to which Alcibiades, somewhat sceptical, replies that he only wishes he had known him when he was at his best in that art: Μᾶλα τοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὁ Ἁλκιβιάδης, καὶ ἥμεις τηλικοῦτοι δινεῖ δειον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἥμειν· τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἐμελετῶμεν καὶ ἐσωφρίζομεν ὅλως καὶ σοῦ νῦν ἐμὸ δοκεῖς μελετῶν, τὸν δὲ Ἁλκιβιάδην φάναι, Ἐλθε σοι, ὁ Περικλέες, σὺν συνεγεννημένῳ ὅτε δειπνότατον σαυτοῦ ταῦτα ἤθελα.

Again, in the Euthydemus, Ctesippus is the squire of Socrates and plays Iolaus to his Heracles (298 b). He engages with the Eristics, and soon learns to match them with their own weapons (see 303 b and cp. Lysis 211 b). This leads to a further consideration.

¹ 'The difference between him (the Eristic) and Socrates is that his effect is purely negative; he begins and ends with captious disputation, his skill is simply to bewilder and perplex: he is not, as Socrates, a midwife of true knowledge.' Sidgwick in J.P. iv 296.
The Elenchus was an art not to be mastered in a day; it could only be attained by an apprehension of the object to which it was directed, and in the apprehension of this lay its chief utility. On the other hand, Eristic was bound together by no common tie. It consisted of a number of isolated 'tips,' easily learnt. 'The different artifices which they (the Eristics) employed were collected from all sides, just as they presented themselves; and the attempt was never made to combine these various tactics into a theory, and to arrange them from fixed points of view. They therefore made their disciples learn quite mechanically the questions and fallacies which most commonly came before them.' Zeller pre-Socratics ii 462. In his note Zeller quotes Aristotle Soph. El. 34, 183 b 36 'καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἔρημικος λόγους μισθαρμονίων ὅμοια τις ἤν ή παιδειος τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ. λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἡμετερικοὶ οὐ δὲ ἔρημηκοις ἐθίδοσαν ἐκμαθάνειν, εἰς οὐδὲντάξις ἐμπτετευ ὕθεσαν ἐκάτερον τοῦ ἄλληλων λόγους. διὸ ὡς ταχείᾳ μὲν ἄτεχνος οὗ ἤν διδακτικαῖ τοῖς μαθηταῖς παρ' αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἄλλα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδακτες παιδεῖες ὑπελάμβανον, as if a shoemaker (says Aristotle) were to give his pupil a number of ready-made shoes instead of instruction in his trade.' Cp. Campbell, General Introduction to the Sophistes and Political, p. xil.

We must remember however that in speaking of 'Eristic,' we are speaking of something which we hardly know except from caricatures, especially those by Plato. Who were the persons who really practised and disseminated the art thus caricatured? On this matter I must refer to two papers in the Journal of Philology, vols. iv pp. 288 foll. and v pp. 66 foll., by Dr. Henry Sidgwick, especially the former of them, where, at p. 298, he says 'I am disposed to think that the Art of Disputation which is ascribed to Sophists in the Euthydemus and the Sophistes (and exhaustively analyzed by Aristotle in the περὶ Σοφιστικῶν Ἕλεγχων) originated entirely with Socrates, and that he is altogether responsible for the form at least of this second species of Sophistic' (namely eristic, as distinguished from rhetorical, sophistry). Again, p. 302, 'I conceive, then, that Socrates was seed and source of a new kind of Sophistry, the post-Socratic Sophistry, as we may call it, which it was extremely difficult for the subtlest mind to distinguish from the profession of Socratic philosophy.'

I have italicized the words 'for the form at least' in the former extract, as the point is important, and is recurred to by Dr. Sidgwick in the following page: 'I do not see from whom else' (than Socrates) 'the method could have been derived—as far as the form is concerned; for no doubt its sceptical and
destructive aim, and the logical puzzles and paradoxes which it uses, may be traced to Protagoras and Zeno.

Eristic was thus the progeny—the ‘barren hybrid’ to use Prof. Campbell’s phrase—sprung on the one side from Socrates, on the other from a line as whose ancestor we must recognize Zeno of Elea.

In an important passage of the Phaedrus (261 b foll.), Plato distinguishes between two classes of men who are skilled in the warfare of words. The first class are the Rhetoricians, of whom Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Theodorus are taken as types. The others are described as the followers of ‘the Eleatic Palamedes.’ Under this sobriquet ancient and modern commentators have recognized Zeno of Elea. Dr. Thompson says in his notes ‘That the father of the Eristic sects is here meant, the context proves to demonstration.’ ‘Zeno is well represented by Palamedes, the “sophist” of the heroic times, distinguished for his inventive genius.’ (Doubtless the character of the hero was a deduction from his name, which whether connected with παλάμιο or μήδος lent itself to the same interpretation.) Aristotle spoke of Zeno as the ‘inventor of dialectic’ (Diog. L. ix 25, 29, cp. viii 57), and we know that many of the Eristic puzzles were derived from problems that presented themselves to Zeno. (Grote i 97; Zeller pre-Socratics i 613, 4; R. & P. § 107.)

An important step in the development of Eristic took place when the problems—chiefly logical and metaphysical—dealt with by Zeno (and others) were taken up and exploited for their own purposes by professional teachers or ‘sophists.’ This was done by the man who is asserted to have been the earliest of the Sophists, Protagoras. We are told by Diogenes Laertius (ix 51) that Protagoras πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ ἄπαντος πράγματος, ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλους, ὅσι καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας. Further in §§ 52, 3, καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφελὶ, πρὸς τὸν ὅμορον διελέξθη, καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιτύλαιον γένος τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐγέννησεν. Ἰνα καὶ Τίμων φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ,

Προταγόρας τ’ ἐπίμικτος ἐριζέμεναι εὖ εἰδὸς.

οὗτος καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε, καὶ τὸν Ἀντισέβεον λόγον τὸν περίστρεφων ἀποδεικνύειν ὡς όὐκ ἔστων ἀντιλέγειν, οὗτος πρῶτος διελέξται, καθά φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυλίδημω (286 c).

The connexion of Protagoras with the subtleties of Zeno is sufficiently attested. As to the evidence of Plato, besides the place in the Euthydemus, there is the Theaetetus, where Protagoras is spoken of as a man of much dialectic subtlety. He has adopted the Heraclitean philosophy that there is naught but change,
and on it based a system that denies objective truth, and is summed up in the aphorism πάντως μέτρον ἀνθρώπος. It is not mere irony when Socrates (164 κ), after refuting this view, says they would not have disposed of it so easily if its father (Protagoras) had been alive. Even in the dialogue called after him, in which his dialectical failure is most conspicuous, he is represented as acquainted with the common fallacy of Conversion (350 κ). Aristotle also gives evidence to the same effect (R. & P. § 180), and an anecdote related by Simplicius connects Protagoras with Zeno in regard to one of the stock puzzles (R. & P. § 104).

The list of the works of Protagoras given by Diogenes (ix § 55) begins 'τέχνη ἐρωτικῶν. περὶ πάλης.' It seems probable (though a different view is taken by Zeller pre-Socr. ii 432), that we have here one work under two titles, περὶ πάλης being a metaphorical, and τέχνη ἐρωτικῶν an explanatory, title. This may be argued from Plato Soph. 232 d. The only 'practical men' (δημουργοι) here under discussion are those concerned with laws and politics. The Stranger says τὰ γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μᾶλλον ἐκάστην τέχνην, δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν τῶν δημοσίων ἀντικεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα ποιοτικά βούλομένων γεγορμένα τῷ βουλευτῷ μαθεῖν. To which Theaetetus replies τὰ Πρωταγόρεια μοι φαίνει περὶ τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ελπίζει. Here any allusion to an art of wrestling seems quite out of place. Cp. D. L. vi § 4 when Antisthenes says (surely metaphorically) that he is παλαιοτικός.

But that Diogenes attributes too much to Protagoras in making Eristic spring from him alone, Dr. Sidgwick is able to show (loc. cit. p. 299). Diogenes leaves out of account the method of application, the weapon, which was supplied by Socrates. In the Protagoras the defeat of the sophist at the hands of Socrates is represented as due to the fact that he can only make long speeches and is incapable of dialectic. 'It seems to me quite incredible that if Protagoras had really not only practised, but actually invented, Eristic, as described in the Sophistes—methodical disputation by short questions and answers—he could ever have been represented as Plato represents him in the dialogue which bears his name' . . Again (p. 300) 'Protagoras, no doubt, was in a manner Eristic, just as Zeno was, but it was in a rhetorical manner: he very likely wrote a τέχνη ἐρωτικῶν, as D. says: but if so we must suppose it merely to have contained instructions how to make speeches on both sides of a case, no doubt with the aid of logical fallacies.'

1 Prof. Campbell is, I think, using misleading expressions when he speaks of the 'negative dialectic' of Zeno, and the 'ἑλέγχος of Zeno' (notes
To this view of Protagoras' function in substance I incline to subscribe. But there are one or two considerations that seem to me to indicate that Protagoras may have made some advance in the method of disputation. Thus the mistake of Diogenes will be both smaller and more venial than it would otherwise appear. In the first place it is to be noted that Protagoras professes to be able to speak at any length that may be required. This, says Dr. Sidgwick, is only "a bit of his brag." It may be noted however that the statement is put forward by Socrates as a matter of common rumour about Protagoras, though it is a reputation which Protagoras by no means disclaims: 329 b Прοταγόρας δὲ φαθὲν μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δῆλοι, ἰκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθείς ἀποκρίνεται κατὰ βραχύ καὶ ἐρήμως περιμέναι τε καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἀ δῆλος ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα. In the latter portion of this passage a distinct claim is made to the art of Dialectic; it goes a good deal further than 334 e, where Socrates, again on common rumour, asserts that Protagoras can put a particular answer either in short or at length (cp. 335 b). This is merely a part of the art of Expression, and is a claim also made by Gorgias (Gorg. 449 c). It seems to me a question whether Plato would have made Protagoras claim, or popular rumour ascribe to him, proficiency in this art, if it had been wholly alien from his practice. It is just because Protagoras does make the claim that he is so mortified at his failure. Gorgias—though he too was influenced by Zeno—makes no claim to any cross-questioning power, and he is little affected by Socrates' success against him. Theodorus expressly repudiates the art; he has never learnt it, and he is not going to begin at his time of life (Theat. 146 b). Hippias pours scorn upon it (Hipp. maj. 301 b, cp. Hipp. min. 373 A).

It is true that Protagoras is hopelessly defeated by Socrates, and this is taken as showing that the method of question and answer, in all its forms, was unfamiliar to him. I will not insist on the point that Plato is playing both sides of the game; it may of course be answered that "the coarsest satirist would not describe a man as quite unskilled in an art which he himself invented." But the difference between the two things must be remembered. Not only were the topics of the Socratic elenchus generally different from those of Eristic, but the Elenchus was a Method; Eristic was not. The Eristic in the hands of Socrates was liable to find himself in the same pre-

on the Sophistes, p. 8). Not much stress can be laid on Soph. 217 c, attributing the method of questions to "Parmenides," as the reference is probably merely to Plato's dialogue of that name. See Art. "Sophist" in Encounter, Brit. ix 270 a.
dicament as a man in a foreign land who has tried to get up the language from a conversation-book.

In the article ‘Sophist’ in the Encyc. Brit. the view is taken that there was a large element of Erastic, contemporary with, and independent of, Socrates. See p. 267 b ‘Incidentally we gather two important facts, (1) that contemporary with the dialectic of Socrates there was an eristic, (2) that this eristic was mainly applied to ethical questions’; also the arguments adduced ibid. p. 270 a, and Archer-Hind on Phaedo 90 c.

The difficulty, however, of identifying these Erastic Sophists is great, and on the whole I believe that wherever we find in Plato the word ἐραστικός (or its synonym ἀντιλογικός) certain persons are held in view who were in fact, either directly or indirectly, pupils of Socrates. These are first and foremost Euclides of Megara and his school, of whom Diogenes Laertius says (II 106) οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Μεγαρικοὶ προσηγορεύοντο, εἰτ’ ἐραστικό, διότερον δὲ διαλεκτικό, οὐδόν ὁδόμαστε πρῶτος Διονύσιος ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐραστικόν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους διατίθεναι. In the same author (II 30) we doubtless have a tradition of some rival Socratic school: (Socrates) ὃς Εὐκλείδην ἐπουδακτόν περὶ τοὺς ἐραστικοὺς λόγους, ὁ Εὐκλείδης, ἠφή, σοφισταῖς μὲν δυνὴν χρῆσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ εὐδαμῶς.

The other school glanced at by Plato, under this name, is that of Antisthenes. In Soph. 251 b the Eleatic stranger says that by attempting predicatio (by saying that ἐστι οὐκ ἔστιν, or πολλά, ἐν τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὁδυμαθαίς θοινὴν παρασκευάκαμεν: these ὁδυμαθείς, we read, χαίροντας οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων. ἐνυγχαίνεις γάρ, ὦ Θαῖτις, ὡς ἐγώμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαύτα ἐπουδακτών, ἐνιοτέροι τὸς τὸς τοιούτου φρονήσεως κτήσεως τὰ τοιαύτα τεθαμακότα, καὶ δὴ τῇ καὶ τάσσομεν ὁλομένους τοὺς αὐτῷ ἀνευρήκεια. It was this very quibble about predicatio, arising out of a misunderstanding of the nature of the copula, that was characteristic of Antisthenes. (Grote II 434, III 521; Zeller Socrates p. 297, pre-Socr. II 456 note.)

The word ὁδυμαθῆς seems to show that the actual persons indicated were rather pupils of Antisthenes, than A. himself, who was only some five years older than Plato (Dr. Thompson Phaedrus p. 175 note). It was one point about Erastic that it took so short a time to learn that it was never too late to begin. The word νέος also has its point: mere schoolboys were able to learn Erastic: see Rep. 498 A, 539 B. The last

1 The date of his birth is uncertain (R. & P. 214; Zeller Soc. 285, 6). I do not know on what grounds Ueb.-Heinze (p. 129) place it at ‘about 444 B.C.’ Even so he would not be more than 46 at Socrates’ death.
words of the extract contain a personal hit. Antisthenes was poor in worldly goods, and yet when asked (Xen. *Symp.* iii 8) on what he prides himself, he says ἐρὶ πλοῦτῳ. Subsequently (iv 34) he explains that the wealth of which he was speaking was wealth of mind. The anecdote may well have a historical basis, and thus give point to Plato’s gibe in the *Theaetetus*, that Antisthenes was as poor in φρόνησις as in gold or lands.

The attack on Eristic in the *Euthydemus* is levelled mainly at him (Grote I 537 note; Zeller p. 119). The chief evidence for this is the mock eulogy on the Eristics pronounced by Socrates near the end of the dialogue (303 c foll.). Socrates praises them on three grounds. The first is that they only care for the approbation of people like themselves. The second is a ‘really popular and kindly feature’; by forbidding us to speak of anything as fair, or good, or white, and indeed disallowing predication altogether, they not only stop the mouths of others, but, what is more, their own; so no one can be offended: τούτω πάντων χαριν τέ εστι καὶ τὸ ἐπαγθέν τῶν λόγων ἀφαιρεῖται. The reference to Antisthenes is here unmistakable. The third point is that any one can learn the art in a short time; he has noticed how soon Ctesippus was able to pick it up.

Antisthenes, the sincerity of whose purpose cannot be doubted, and whose whole interest lay with questions of Conduct, was glad of a short cut that abridged the field of philosophy which he regarded as superfluous and which he was indeed unable to appreciate (Zeller *Socrates* pp. 292 foll.). And though sincere himself he was the father of a sect who brought philosophy into contempt, much as the mendicant friars did religion at a later day.

Plato and Antisthenes were thoroughly antipathetic. Plato loved the pleasures of Reason, and probably was not indifferent to the pleasures of Sense; Antisthenes would rather be visited by Madness than Pleasure (Diog. L. vi 3). Indeed Plato’s feud with him may well have been fiercer than against Euclides, if only because Antisthenes lived in Athens, while Euclides was at Megara.

It is important to remember that at the time when the *Meno* was written, the three men whom Plato had chiefly to regard as heads of rival schools were Isocrates the rhetor, Euclides, and Antisthenes. Each of these four men, as κεραμέας κεραμεῖς, was engaged in continual wrangle with each of the others. The works of two of them are before us to speak for themselves; the titles of the works of the two others, preserved by Diogenes Laertius, are sufficient to show the part they played. But even in reading the works of the two surviving authors we
have to work to a great extent blindfold in making out the history of this 'literary feud'; as the etiquette of the time, borrowed perhaps from Comedy, which no longer lampooned individuals by name, discouraged the introduction of the names of living persons. The terms 'Sophist,' 'Rhetor,' 'Eristic' have all become mere polemic missiles; *Isocrates includes Plato with Euclides and Antisthenes as Eristics; Plato calls Euclides and Antisthenes Eristics, and Isocrates a Rhetor or ὑπηγόρος; while each of the four was to himself a 'philosopher,' and to his brother teacher a 'sophist' (see Dr. Thompson's *Gorgias*, App. II pp. 177 foll.; Zeller *pre-Socrates* II 432). There was perhaps no form of attack to which Plato was more sensitive than that which identified him with a class of teachers whom he hated as cheapening Philosophy and bringing it into contempt. Hence his continual endeavour to draw a broad line between Eristic and the Elenchus, of which latter he felt himself the lawful proprietor as the heir of Socrates.

For a list of passages in Plato bearing on ἐρωτική or ἀντιλογική see Campbell, *Introduction to the Sophist* p. liv, note, and Sidgwick in J.P. IV 304 foll.

The earliest reference to Eristic in Plato appears to be in the *Lysis* 211 b (Socrates, about to converse with Menexenus, is addressing Lysis): ἀλλὰ δρα δεῖος ἐπικουρήσει μοί, εὰν μὲ ἐλέγχειν ἐπιθετῷ οἱ Μενέξενοι, ἢ οὐκ ὀλθὰ ἀπέριττοκός ἔστων; Ναι μᾶ Δία, Ἐφε, σφόδρα γε διὰ ταύτα τοί καὶ βούλομαι σε αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι. "Ἅνα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καταγελάτους γένωμαι; Οὐ μᾶ Δία, Ἐφε, ἀλλ' Ἰνα αὐτῷ κολάσας. Πόθεν; ἢν δ' ἐγώ. οὖ ράδιον. δεινὸς γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι, Κτησίππου μαθητῆς. Later in the dialogue, after the paradox has been broached that everything loves its opposite (216 a), εἶτε ἢν δ' ἐγώ. οὖ ράδιον. οἱ Μενέξενοι; καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς δώμενοι ἐπινιθήσονται οὗτοι οἱ πάντοποι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, and will ask us if Love is not opposite to Hate, and whether Hate loves Love, and so forth.

Here it is extremely difficult to identify the ἐρωτικός or ἀντιλογικός, though I think that a definite recognizable class is indicated. We naturally look to find in them some contemporaries of Socrates, and indeed it must be allowed that if the Eristics of Plato are always post-Socratic, an anachronism is involved in making Socrates speak of them as he does. Further, if the Eristics of the *Euthydemus* really derived their art from Socrates, how extraordinary is the position that Socrates is there made to take up in regard to them! And yet such were the dramatic exigencies when Plato had once determined to make Socrates the mouthpiece of his own views. (See

1 Sidgwick however (J.P. IV 305) thinks that the use of ἐρωτικός in the *Lysis* is 'untechnical'.}
Zeller p. 95.) And the anachronism is not greater than many others that we find in utterances put into the mouth of Socrates by Plato. The traditions of the drama demanded little of consistency or realism, nor was the philosophic dialogue much more rigorous. So I think it not impossible that in Menexenus, of whom Socrates is so afraid, we must find a pupil who has borrowed his arms (indirectly) from Socrates himself. But the complications extend farther. Ctesippus in the Euthydemus, and Menexenus in the dialogue named after him, appear as pupils of Socrates. Ctesippus, as genuine disciple of Socrates, at first vigorously takes up arms against the two Eristics, who are themselves (though Plato gives no hint of this) indirect and unrecognized disciples. Towards the end of the dialogue Ctesippus has mastered their art. The Lysis, though almost certainly earlier than the Euthydemus, may have a later dramatic date, and so regard Ctesippus as having already got up Eristic, and passed on his lightly-won acquisition to Menexenus. Thus it would seem that Ctesippus besides being son of Socrates is also his—shall we say?—great-grandson; while Menexenus, also his son, is, through Antisthenes, Euthydemus and Ctesippus, one generation yet farther removed.

A late date for the dialogue Euthydemus is claimed by Sidgwick (ut sup. p. 306), who would assign it to the same period as the Sophist. This is on the ground that it expressly identifies Eristic with Sophistic, speaking of Euthydemus and his mate as 'Sophists.' But were the successive uses of the word 'Sophist' so well defined that we can infer a late date for this dialogue from the fact that Plato therein applies the title to a class of teachers who were certainly in existence soon after the death of Socrates, and of whom Plato must always have disapproved, whether he happened to call them 'Sophists' or not? I cannot then see any necessity for placing the Euthydemus any later than the Republic, or for not placing it, as H. Jackson does, among the Educational dialogues leading up to that work.

But who were Euthydemus and Dionysodorus? Unless they, directly or indirectly, derived their art from Socrates, the whole theory of the Socratic origin of Eristic breaks down. That they were ever direct pupils of Socrates his attitude to them makes dramatically impossible. But that they may have been pupils of Euclides or Antisthenes is not at all impossible. Socrates could hardly be made to face his own spiritual children without recognizing them; the same obligation does not hold of spiritual grandchildren.

That Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were real persons may, I think, be assumed. Grote indeed (1 536) says 'That they
correspond to any actual persons at Athens is neither proved nor provable.' Schleiermacher, on the other hand, 'cannot make out who the two Sophists were personally, but he conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no notice' (ibid. p. 537 note). There is no other instance, apparently, in Plato, of imaginary persons introduced with names (Zeller pre-Socr. II 425 note 4). Euthydemus is mentioned in the Cratylus 386 d, where the phrase οὖδὲ κατ' Εἰθυδημόν γε is proverbial for οὖδὲ κατ' ἐρωτικήν. Here it is of course not impossible that the proverb should have been drawn from a fictitious character, but surely unlikely (Zeller pre-Socr. II 457 note). Euthydemus is also mentioned as the author of sophisms by Aristotle Soph. El. ch. 20 = 177 b 12, and Rhet. II ch. 24 = 1401 a 26, and it happens that the particular sophisms that Aristotle quotes are not found in Plato's Euthydemus. Dionysodorus is probably the same person who is mentioned by Xen. (Mem. III i 1) as professing the art of strategy (cp. Euthyd. 271 d).

There is no explicit allusion to Eristic in the Gorgias. 'In the Meno, which I should place between the Gorgias and the Republic, we have Sophistic and Eristic side by side and unconnected. The Sophists are still our old friends: they are not exactly attacked: they are even half-defended against Anytus. But Eristic is noticed quite independently: it is contrasted with the method of Socrates as a perverse kind of Dialectic' (Sidgwick ut supra p. 305). At a later time not only is the Eristic included by Plato in the class 'Sophist,' but it is the type which the term Sophist pre-eminently suggests.

In the Phaedrus 261 b foll. we have the distinction, already mentioned, between the two kinds of 'adverse speakers' (ἀντιλογικοί), first the Rhetoricians, Gorgias, etc.; then the 'descendants of the Eleatic Palamedes.'

In the Rep. 453 e Soc. and Glaucon have acknowledged ἄλλην φόσιν ἄλλο δεῖν ἔπιθηδεῖν, γνωκός δὲ καὶ ἄνδρος ἄλλην εἶναι. Yet they are proposing to give the same employment to men and women. How can they reconcile this? Socrates proceeds: Ἡ γενεὰ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. Τι δή; 'Οτι, εἰπὼν, δοκούσι μοι εἰς αὐτήν καὶ ἄκωτες πολλοὶ ἐμπιστεύοντες καὶ οἰδοῦν οὐκ ἔριζεν, ἄλλα διαλέγοντο, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαφορίζοντο τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκόποτεν, ἄλλα κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ δύναμις διώκειν τοῦ λεγόμενου τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, καὶ οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἄλλην χρόμαινον. Socrates in what follows applies this to their own case. They have accepted πάντα ἄνδρείως τε καὶ ἐρωτικὸς the word ἄλλην as a verbal counter, without considering whether the Otherness of sex is relevant to the Otherness of employment. Here ἀντιλογική is represented as differing from Dialectic, not by any perverse intent, but by
imperfect training and limitation of view. Somewhat later in the dialogue (498 foll.) we find it strongly insisted upon that education in philosophy shall be thorough and shall not begin too early. Those short, cheap courses taken before the mind is mature for the subject, and in the intervals of practical business (cp. Euthyd. 304 c), are worse than useless. They leave no abiding impression, and stand in the way of anything better. In fact men have never had a chance of getting acquainted with real Philosophy, which aims at Truth and keeps at a distance tā κομψά τε καὶ ἑρατικά καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τεινοντα ἢ πρός δόξαιν καὶ ἔρων καὶ ἐν δίκαιαν καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις (499 Λ). Similar is the tendency of a later passage 539 b: philosophy must not be begun too young: οἴμα χάρ σε φεν ἐλεηθέναι ὡς ἵνα οἱ μειρακίκοι, ἵνα τὸ πρῶτον λόγον γενώσαι, ὡς παθιά αὐτοῦ καταχρώνται, αἰ̑ς ἐν ἀντιλογίαις χρώμασιν, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἑξελέγχουσαν αὐτοὶ ἄλλοις ἑλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὡσπερ σκλάκια τῷ ἐλέειν τε καὶ σπαράστειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πληροῖν ἄνει. An older man approaches the thing in a more earnest spirit and is μετρώτερος (cp. the word at Soph. 216 b quoted below).

In Phaedo 89 d foll., on the ἀντιλογικόν is thrown the blame for the existence of certain μυστολογοί—haters of philosophy. (See Archer-Hind’s note on ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται 90 c.) Cp. 101 e, where their defective dialectic is pointed out. In the Theaetetus at 154 d Socrates tells Theaetetus that if he answers contrary to his opinion Εὐρυπεδεῖν τι ἐμμεθέναι· ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλυττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μὲν ἔσται, ἢ δὲ φήμη οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ἩΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἔγω τε καὶ σο ἰμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἢ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειράμενοι, συνελθόντες σοφιτικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκροῦσαν— but as we are poor ordinary creatures in pursuit of Truth, we have no time for such frivolities (Sidgwick ut supra p. 306 notes that here Eristic is definitely identified with Sophistic). Then at 165 d ε we have the picture of the Eristic free-lance, the πελαστικός ἄνηρ μυστόφορος ἐν λόγοις. Lastly, at 197 a, how will Socrates (asks Theaetetus) carry on discourse if he is debarred from such words as ἄγνωσίν and συμεναί? Socrates does not know; εἰ μὲντοι ἢ ἀντιλογικόν, he says, he would not only have professed to abstain from these phrases, but have come down sharply on any one who used them.

In the Sophistes we are introduced to a Stranger, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐκ Ἑλλήνων ἡμίφρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ ψυχομενίην καὶ ζήσεως, μᾶλλα δὲ ἀνδρὰ φιλόσοφον. Can this be some Higher Power come to convict us of ignorance, θεος ἰς τρίαν ἀλαγετικόν! asks Socrates. Theodorus replies ὤ, οὕτως ὁ τρόπος, ὁ Ἀδριατες, τῶν ξένων,
In what follows, the fourth of the 'preliminary definitions' of the Sophist clearly corresponds to the Eristic: ἄλλα μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακτῶν. He is no mere Eristic.

Following this we have a definition which unmistakeably points to Socrates himself or his true followers. It is summed up at 231 b: τῆς δὲ παρευκρίνης δὲ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοποιήσας γεγονός ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ ἔν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηθὲν ἀλλὰ ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέντων πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστικὴ.

The final definition makes the sophist a conscious impostor, and that of two kinds (Soph. 268 b foll.): τὸν μὲν δημοσία τε καὶ μακρὸς λόγος πρὸς πλῆθος εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορώ, τὸν δὲ ἰδιαὶ καὶ βραχέσι λόγος ἀναγκάζει οὐ πρὸς διαλεγομένων ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ κτέ.

In this dialogue the Sophist, as Sidgwick (ut supra p. 296) points out, is 'expressly contrasted with both the Statesman and the Rhetor.' That is, he has ousted from the title the persons who in the earlier dialogues are chiefly before one's mind when 'sophists' are spoken of. He resembles the true Dialectician 'as a wolf does a dog.'

The last passage in Plato demanding notice is Phil. 17 A. Right Classification is the special faculty of the διαλεκτικός (cp. Phaedr. 266 b): οἱ δὲ τῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ (i.e. the half-educated 'imperfect' Socrates), instead of making sub-classes, go straight from the One to the infinity of particulars: τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτῶς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς διακεχώρωσται τὸ τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἕριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τούς λόγους (See W. H. T. in J. P. vii. 301).

The chief references to Eristic in Isocrates are the following: (see Sidgwick ut supra pp. 292, 293; Dr. Thompson's Phaedrus pp. 172 foll.; also note on 100 A 6).

In the oration κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν, an early work, the word ἕριστικός does not occur; but near the beginning we read τὸ γὰρ δὲν ἔνατε τὰς καταφρονεῖν πρῶτον μὲν τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατριβῶντων οἱ προσποιοῦνται μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡσυχεῖν κτέ.; § 20 the composers of the old τέχνηι were worse τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας καλυπτομένων.

At the beginning of the Helena (10) after the references to Antisthenes and Plato, we have the followers of Euclides spoken

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1 Or, in the later summary, the fifth in 231 e τῶν ἔριστικόν περὶ λόγους τις ἄλλης, τῶν ἐριστικῶν τέχνης ἀφωρισμένως. On this definition the Encyc. Brit. Art. 'Sophist,' p. 267 a notes that it makes the matter of anti-logic 'Justice,' 'Injustice' and other abstractions (225 c): further, that it represents the earlier eristics, contemporaries of Socrates, whom it was necessary to distinguish from the teachers of forensic oratory. (See p. 278.)

2 Or at 281 e δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχῆς καθαρτῆς.
of thus: ἄλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας διατριβοῦσι τὰς οὐδὲν μὲν ὑφελοῦσας κτέ.

In the tract ad Nicoclem (2) 51 we read: περὶ μὲν τῶν γυμνα-σίων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφιαν ὄντες, καὶ
φασιν οἱ μὲν διὰ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, οἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν, οἱ
di' ἄλλων τινῶν φρονιμωτέρους ἔσεσθαι τοὺς αὐτῶις πλησιάζοντας.

In the Antidosis (15) 45 we are told that some work at
mythology, some on the poets, some on military history: ἄλλωι
di' τινες περὶ τὰς ἐρωτικὲς καὶ ἀποκρίσεις γεγονασίν, οὐς ἀντιλο-γικοὶς καλοῦσιν.

In § 258 of the same work we read τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας
απομαζόντων ἓνοι τινες δομούς βλασφημοῦσι περὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν
κοινών καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὠσπερ οἱ φαντάσιμοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
This is aimed at Plato (Sidgwick ut supra p. 293): § 261
ἡγούμαι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικῶς λόγοις δυναστεύοντας (again
Plato and his school) καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τὴν
γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν μαθημάτων διατριβοῦσαν οὐ βλά-
πτεροί ἄλλοι ὑφελεῖν τοὺς συνόντας, ἐλάττω μὲν ὑπερχοῦνται,
pλείω δὲ ὡς τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσιν.

In the Panathenaicus, his latest work, published in 339 B.C.
after Plato’s death, he adopts much the same tone as in the
Antidosis: (I have much respect for the current education) λέγω
δὲ τὴν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τῶν διαλόγων
tοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ καλομένων: but these things are only for boys;
and so forth (Jebb Attic Orators ii 131).

There are many allusions to Eristic in Aristotle. It may be
assumed that these are in all cases aimed at rival post-Socratic
schools, that is chiefly the ‘imperfect’ schools of the Megarians
and Cynics (Sidgwick in J.P. v 70, 71). The ‘Sophistici
Elenchi’—an appendix to the Topica—is a series of solutions
of eristic puzzles. At ii 2 = 165 b 7 he defines ἐρωτικὸν λόγον
as ὁ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδείξεων, μὴ δυτικῶν δὲ, συλλογιστικῶς ἥ
φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικῶς. The following places may also be
referred to: Topica viii xi 1 foll., especially δινοκαλοῦντες οὐν
ἀγωνιστικὰς καὶ οὐ διαλεκτικὰς ποιοῦσες τὰς διατριβὰς (see Grote
Aristotle p. 366); Rhet. ii 15 = 1371 a 7 (see Cope’s note) and
ii xxv = 1402 a 5 and 14.
EXCURSUS VI

THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSMIGRATION IN PLATO (OR 81 A 21 ff.)

The belief that the soul has some persistence after death, that the ghost of a man has power at least for some time after it has quitted the body, was shared by the early Greeks with many primitive races. This stage of belief we find in Homer (II. xxiii 65 foll.; Od. xi). Already in Homer we also note the emergence of a belief in certain future rewards and punishments. But from this primitive belief to the doctrines of Immortality and Transmigration is a considerable step. Transmigration implies not merely a dream-like echo of life reverberating after death, but a series of lives each as real and vivid as the present, or even more so. How was this step taken by the Greeks?

To this question Zeller answers that in this matter the mysteries, especially the Orphic, do seem to have acted as the teachers of a higher truth. 'The doctrine of metempsychosis seems really to have passed from the theology of the mysteries into Philosophy.' 'In the Orphic theology transmigration is clearly to be found, and the probabilities are very strongly against its having come there through the medium of the philosophers' (Zeller pre-Socratics, I pp. 69, 71). Plato nowhere definitely connects the notion of transmigration with the Orphics. In the Phaedo 70 c, he speaks of transmigration simply as a παλαιός λόγος. But in the Cratylus 400 c όλ αμφί ο’Ορφέα are credited with a doctrine which is at any rate closely connected with Transmigration, namely that the body is a prison in which the soul is pent in punishment for some ancient sin. With this we may connect Phaedo 62 β δό μεν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτως λεγόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὡς ἐν τινὶ φρονεῖ ἐσμέν όι ἀνθρώποι κτέ., where 'the ancient commentators explain that the Orphic traditions are meant.'

Cicero indeed (Tusc. Disp. i § 38) speaks of Pherecydes of Scyros as the first who taught the doctrine of transmigration. The evidence is late and poor, and is rejected by Zeller. It is possible that its foundation is the statement of Theopompus (Diog. L. i § 116) τότεν (Pherecydes) πρῶτον περὶ φόνεως καὶ θεών Ἐλλησι γράφα τοι. But the doctrine of transmigration may have been taught long before it was committed to writing. The
mythical element is very large in the accounts of Pherecydes. Suidas says of him that no one trained him, ἀλ' αὐτὸν ἱσχυκέναι κτησάμενον τὰ Φονίκων ἀπὸ κρυφα μββιλα, that he divides with Cadmus of Miletus the reputation of being the first prose-writer, καὶ πρῶτον τὸν περὶ τῆς μετεμψυχώσεως λόγον εἰσηγήσασθαι.

The question whence the Orphies derived their doctrine is hard to answer. Herodotus (II 123) says it was derived from Egypt: πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τώδε τῶν λόγων Ἀγυπτιοὶ εἰσὶ οἱ εἰσόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώποι φυχῇ ἀθάνατι ἔστιν, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθάνοντο εἰς ἄλλο ᾑδόν αἰεὶ γνώμενον ἐσόντας: ἐπεάν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ χερσαία καὶ τὰ βαλάσσαι καὶ τὰ πετεών, αὐτὶς ἐς ἀνθρώπον σώμα γνώμην ἐσόντας ὑπὲρμένων δὲ αὐτὴ γίνεται ἐς τρισχλίου αἴτει. τοῦτω τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἱ Ἑλληνῶν ἔχρησαντο, οἱ μὲν πρὸτερον, οἱ δὲ ὅστερον, ὡς ἤδη ἐωτῶν ἐσόντες. τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ σωματα ὑπὸ γράφων. (At ch. 81 he says that the Orphic or Bacchic rites are really Egyptian.) It is clear from this passage that some of those who taught the doctrine of transmigration in Greece, acknowledged no indebtedness to Egypt. It may be that Herodotus, finding similar doctrines in Egypt, supposed that the Greeks had borrowed them, a notion which his priestly informers naturally encouraged. Grote (II 202) speaks of the belief in metempsychosis as 'having its root in the Egyptian and Oriental religions.' But Zeller shows how easily such a doctrine may have grown up independently on Greek soil. 'If the soul is conceived as a breath-like essence which dwells in the body, and leaves it after death, . . . the question inevitably arises whenever this essence comes, and whither it goes. For answer to this question, a child-like imagination is most easily satisfied with the simple notion that there is a place, invisible to us, in which the departed souls remain, and from which the newly-born come forth. . . . From this there is but a step to the theory that the same souls which previously inhabited a body should afterwards enter another body' (pre-Socratics I p. 73 note). We may point to the sixth century B.C. as an epoch to which important advances in Greek religious thought may be referred (Anrich, das antike Mysterienwesen).

The doctrine of Transmigration played an important part in the system of the Pythagoreans. It does not appear, however, that the school claimed to have originated the doctrine; and the probable conclusion is that they received it from the Orphies, with whom they were closely connected.

Plato unmistakeably copied his mythical descriptions of the soul after death from the Pythagoreans (Zeller pre-Socr. I 482). At Gorg. 492 ε foll. we have the etymology σῶμα from σῆμα suggested, the body being the tomb of the soul. (Cp. Phaedr. 250 c καθαρόν δντες καὶ ἀνθρωπον τοῦτον δ νῦν σῶμα
That the passage in the _Gorgias_ is drawn from the Pythagorean Philolaus is made almost certain by Dr. Thompson in his note. In the words that follow, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ των Σικελῶν τις Ἡ Ἰταλίκος, the reference is still to Philolaus, not to Empedocles, as some have thought. For as the proverbial expression was Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνήρ, why should the amendment Ἡ Ἰταλίκος have been added, unless because the writer referred to was really an Italian, as Philolaus, rather than a Sicilian, as Empedocles? (Zeller _Plato_ 126, note 81). In the _Cratylus_ 400 b c (quoted above) there appears a slight divergence between the Orphics and the Pythagoreans. We are told that some (ποὺς) connect σῶμα with σήμα; these we may conclude to be the Pythagoreans, as in the passages from the _Gorgias_ and _Phaedrus_ just referred to. Socrates prefers the etymology connecting σῶμα with σφίζεσθαι, which of ἀμφὶ Ὀρφῆς support.

But however much of mythical material Plato may have borrowed from the Pythagoreans, his debt to them as regards any _philosophic_ account of the soul is almost nothing. The Pythagoreans hardly attempted to connect their views of the future state, the product of moral instinct and poetic imagination, with the more scientific parts of their system (Zeller _pre-Socr._ 1 485–7). It may be remarked that though Philolaus is once mentioned in the _Phaedo_ as discountenancing suicide, yet Kebes has 'heard nothing clear from him'; and there is no hint of Pythagorean sources in any of the philosophic theorems on which the arguments for immortality in that dialogue are based.

In much the same position stand Heraclitus and Empedocles, who held similar views. Of Heraclitus, Zeller says: 'It is doubtless his opinion that souls enter the body from a higher existence, and after death, when they have proved themselves worthy of this privilege, they return as demons into a purer life' (ut supra 11 87). But this view is in no way co-ordinated with his general philosophy.

So with regard to Empedocles. In a well-known passage he introduces a fallen spirit explaining that any δαίμων who sins is doomed to wander for 30,000 ὃμαι from the society of the Blessed,

ϕυσικοὶ παντοία διὰ χρόνου εἰδέα θυτῶν, ἀργαλεὺς βίωσοι μεταλαμποσοντα κελεύσωσι.

καὶ ἔγω ὑμῖν εἰμι, φυγάς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης.

But interesting as is this and his other utterances about the history of the soul, the whole topic is an excrescence on his
system. 'There remains only the supposition that he adopted the doctrine of Metempsychosis and all depending on it, from the Orphico-Pythagorean tradition, without combining it scientifically with his philosophic convictions advanced in another place and in another connexion' (Zeller ut supra II 177).

Thus for a long time the stream of myth and that of philosophy ran side by side, touching, but hardly commingling. 'A scientific basis was first given to the belief in immortality by Plato' (Zeller ut supra I 74). This basis is found in the doctrine of Ideas.

To examine the progress of Plato's views as shown in his various myths of the soul's history is an interesting, but very difficult task. In the suggestions that we have as to the future state in Apol. 40 et foll., there is but little advance from the Homeric standpoint. In the myth that concludes the Gorgias, the material is again of the simplest kind. After death the good are sent to the Islands of the Blest, the bad to Tartarus, and the only refinement is the distinction between curable and incurable sinners (526 b). The case is very different when we come to the Phaedrus, the Republic and the Phaedo. Whatever may have been the order in which these dialogues were written, they agree in this, that in each the mythical material is accompanied by an assertion of the soul's commerce with Ideas, and a demonstration of its immortality. Finally in the Timaeus we have myth and philosophy fused into one.

In the Phaedrus after the proof of immortality given in ch. xxiv (245 c-246 A) follows the myth of the soul's history — 'a masterpiece of the author's myth-making genius: the exemplary specimen of an art of which he has left us many other instances, but none so brilliant and elaborate.' I quote from Dr. Thompson, Intr. p. xviii, who proceeds: 'In one respect, indeed, this discourse may be said to differ from similar philosophical myths which are scattered in the Platonic writings; it is, in most of its parts, a deliberate allegory, in which the thing signified is designed to be intelligible to the instructed hearer or reader.' In his note on 246 D, however, he admits that 'the sign and the thing signified are intentionally fused.' And indeed a close examination reveals (as must be the case with almost any allegory) not merely certain gaps in the statement, but inconsistencies.

The soul is likened to a winged charioteer driving a winged pair of horses. By this we have figured the tripartite division of the soul, as explained in the Republic. The charioteer is Reason, the two steeds are Spirit and Appetite. All three elements are in the original state winged (251 B). With the gods both charioteer and horses are noble, but with other souls
the steed Appetite is of a baser strain. The 'wing' does not represent any part of the soul; but something material with which the soul is linked. Though the wing is of the nature of σῶμα, it is the finest and purest σῶμα: κεκοιμώνηκε δὲ πνεύμα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θεοῦ (246 d). It bears aloft that to which it is attached, and the Being thus upborne is an ἄθάνατον ἤλθον. It is compounded of Soul and Matter; but the union of the two is indissoluble. But the soul that loses its wings is borne down to earth, receives an earthly body and becomes θνητὸν ἤλθον. Earth, the grossest material element, cannot be indissolubly united with soul, and their union is liable to be broken by death.

The wing is thus an upward tendency acting on the soul, and counteracting a permanent downward tendency. How the loss of the wings takes place Plato proceeds to explain. There is no suggestion of any original sin to bring this about, as in the lines of Empedocles; the fall seems regarded mainly as a matter of fate (τυπικαὶ κατὰ χρηστάνη 248 c), as in the Timaeus.

A vast procession of gods and daemons (unfallen spirits) ever follows the winged chariot of Zeus, as it moves on its providential course within the heavenly sphere. The daemons severally follow the train of their patron god, and are thus already differentiated. Within this sphere there is no lack of fair sights and journeys, and here the gods, as they fulfil their several courses, may be followed by any soul that wills.

But all souls, even those of the gods, require occasional refreshing with their proper sustenance, that is by commerce with the world of Reality, the world of Ideas. So 'there is a route which they tread only on their high feast days—a route up-hill from first to last, leading to the very apex of the arch which supports the vault of heaven, and there opening upon its outer circumference, whence they can feast their eyes on the glories of the supra-celestial region, which far exceed the θεῶν ἐντός οὐρανοῦ in beauty, as the road which leads to them exceeds in difficulty the beaten highways on which the gods ordinarily go to and fro' (Dr. Thompson on 247 A). Only the chariots of the gods perform this journey with ease and certainty. With them also Reason, the charioteer, directs the two steeds, Spirit and Appetite; but in their case all the three elements are noble.

In this way the nutrition of the wing is accomplished; for the wing, as we read at 246 D, is nourished on the 'fair, wise and good'; in which words, as Dr. Thompson points out, the allegory is partially dropped. The same sense is given at 247 D where the allegory is for the time dropped altogether: the διάρωμα of the gods, and of all souls which are destined to receive their
rightful inheritance, is fed on pure intelligence (νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκριβῶς). (How it is that some souls fail to enter into 'their rightful inheritance' is explained in the sequel.)

These are borne round one 'revolution' (περιφορὰ) in contemplation of the Ideas. By the περιφορὰ here we must understand, not the Great Year of 10,000 years, but a lesser period. Every tenth millennium is spent by the souls in achieving, or attempting, the supra-celestial circuit. The remaining 9000 years consist of nine periods of 'life' followed by as many periods of 'death' (249 Α.Β, 256 Ε). Certain expressions indeed, as 248 Ε εἰς μέν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δεδομένη ἡ ψυχὴ ἔκαστῃ, οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐκ τῶν μυρίων suggest that there are 'ten millennial probations' (Dr. Thompson ad loc.) the supra-celestial περιφορὰ being exclusive of these. Such apparent inconsistencies are quite unimportant; indeed it is hard to see how the supra-celestial state could be measured by time at all. (Cp. a parallel inconsistency between the Phaedrus and the Republic pointed out in the note on 81 B 33 ἐπάτῳ ἐτελ.)

As to the word διάνωσθαι, it is used here as a synonym for the whole ψυχῆ, where the distinction between the charioteer and the steeds is not insisted on, and the allegory is for the time abandoned. (So at 256 Α. we have τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίᾳ, and οὐ πάσης δεδομένη τῇ διάνοιᾳ. Cp. also 251 B πᾶν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ πάλαι περιφορὰ with 249 Β μόνη περιφορὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας διάνοια.)

The souls run the circuit of the Ideas, Justice, Temperance, Knowledge, etc., until they come back to the point from which they have started. After its feast of truth the divine διάνωσθαι returns within the sphere of heaven, and goes to its home. There (the allegory is suddenly resumed) the Charioteer satisfies the steeds, Spirit and Appetite, with 'nectar' and 'ambrosia.'

The above description applies to the gods alone. Other souls follow with different degrees of difficulty. The noblest souls, those most godlike, succeed in keeping the head of the Charioteer in the supra-celestial sphere, and thus remain in continuous communication with the Ideas. We may identify these with the δαλμονεῖα mentioned at 247 Α as forming the trains of the several gods. A second class only enjoy an interrupted vision; sometimes Reason triumphs over the baser elements, sometimes not. A third class are permanently over-weighted by the baser elements, and are carried round ever struggling to emerge but never succeeding. With the gods the baser element is non-existent; of other souls there are:

(1) those in which the baser element is in permanent subordination;
(2) those in which there is a continual struggle, with varying result;
(3) those in which the nobler element is in permanent subordination.

(It is worth while to compare this with the more elaborate scale given by Aristotle N.E. vii i.)

In what follows it looks at first sight as if Plato had in mind the third of these three classes. It is however clear that he really means mainly the second. For the last class, having had no vision of the truth, cannot expect a human incarnation. The first class remain in the divine company, the second sink to human life, the third, we may assume, to the life of brutes. Of the unsuccessful classes, then, many souls are maimed by the fault of the charioteers. Bad training of the baser steed by the charioteer is also spoken of as a cause of mischief at 247 B ὁ τῆς κακῆς ἰδεώς μετέχων . . . ἐν ἔλθεν᾽ ἔνθραμμενος τῶν ἡμῶν. Here we do seem to have the notion that a moral cause may be assigned for the fall. Reason is τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, τὸ κυβερνητικόν, and commands the rest of the soul, as the soul commands the body (see on 88 C 33). Here we have a mythical statement of the doctrine Vice is Ignorance. In the struggle the wing suffers grievously. These souls after labour and sorrow go back to their place without attaining the vision of Truth, and feed henceforth on the 'chaff and husks of Opinion' (τραφῇ διαστῇ χρώται). This of course is the antithesis to νόμε τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκήρατος, the nutriment of the highest διάταξις. What, in the case of the less fortunate steeds, corresponds to the 'nectar and ambrosia' of the divine steeds, is not expressed.

The supra-celestial region is called at 248 B ἀληθεῖας πεδίων. The reason why there is such eagerness to attain to this is that there is found the pasturage for the best part of the soul, and that the nature of the wing is thus nourished. Here we have put before us mythically, the doctrine that all desire the Best (78 B 4). The περίδοσ is, I think, not to be identified with τὸ ἄριστον τῆς ψυχῆς.

Any soul that in company with God sees anything—that is, as Dr. Thompson explains, 'some considerable measure'—of Truth, is to be untroubled till the next revolution, and if it can always attain this, it is to be always unharmed. The περίδοσ here mentioned must be the Great Year, the period of 10,000 years from one supra-celestial journey to the next. (See Zeller p. 392, and for the Great Year his note 43 on p. 382, and note 64 on p. 412.) But any soul that, falling out of rank in the divine procession, loses the Vision, and by some evil chance founders, filled with forgetfulness and vice, and so loses
its wings and comes to earth—this soul, since it has had at some
time commerce with the Ideas, must at its first incarnation be
united with the body of a man (cf. Tim. 41 ε foll.).
According to the degree of vision they have enjoyed, they
become either—
1. ϕιλόσοφος, ἢ φιλόκαλος, ἢ μονακός τις καὶ ἑρωτικός,
2. a King, either a Law-giver, or a Warrior and Ruler,
3. a Statesman, Social Reformer, or Financier,
4. a lover of Labour, a Trainer of the body, or a Surgeon,
5. a soothsayer, or a votary of the mysteries,
6. a poet, or some other 'imitator',
7. an artisan or husbandman,
8. a sophist or demagogue,
9. a tyrant.
On this passage (248 c) Dr. Thompson remarks 'Those
whose powers are unequal to the effort' (of keeping their place
in the divine train) 'are in their first earthly genesis incarnated
as man, never as beasts; this last degradation being apparently
the result of a perverse choice deliberately made by the soul
itself at a subsequent period. Human destiny would seem
therefore to be partly the result of choice, partly of necessity
—and we have here a metaphysical problem clothed in a
mythical dress.' This is the doctrine of the Timaeus (i.e.) ; but
the description in the Phaedrus would seem to suggest that souls
of the lowest class, who perform the whole supra-celestial circuit
ὑποβρύχιον, without ever seeing the Realities, do enter into
beasts even at their first incarnation (cp. 249 β and ε). Stress
is however laid in the Phaedrus on the superior excellence of the
first life, as lying nearer to the world of Ideas, and preserving the
memory of them still fresh: each soul (252 β) imitates his patron
god to the best of his power ἐως δὲ ἀδίδαφοσ καὶ τὴν ἄθεον
πρώτην γένεσιν βιοτευχ (cp. 250 ε ὃ μὲν ὥσ πίεσεν ἄδειφαρ-
μένος οὐκ ἤξιον ἐνθεον ἐκεῖσε φάρται πρὸς αὐτῷ τὸ κάλλος). On
the other hand the Pindar fragment in the Meno suggests the
view that the highest lives on earth are those nearest the other
end of the course, on the eve of the soul's restoration—though
course in Pindar there is no thought of any world of Ideas.
As to the fate that follows the first life we read (248 ε) εἰ δὲ
τοῦτος ἀπαγωγὸς δὲ μὲν δὴ δικαλὸς διαγαγος ἄμελλωνος μορφας μετα-
διαιβάσει, δὲ δὲ ἀδίκως, χεῖρων. 'The destiny of the soul
after death is determined solely by the life it had led on earth,
without reference to the ante-natal state. How a σοφοτάς or
a τύραννος can be said δικαλος διάγενε we are not informed, and
the τοῦτος ἀπαγωγὸς must therefore probably be taken with a
grain of allowance. It is however noteworthy that, in its
first genesis, the soul's condition is fixed according to an
intellectual standard (τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν) whereas its doom after leaving the body depends on moral considerations (διὰ δικαίως διαγραφῆς).’ (Dr. Thompson’s note.)

We must remember, however, that for Plato the antithesis between ‘intellectual’ and ‘moral’ is by no means so strong as it seems to us. We have seen that the fall is represented as due in part to the fault of the ἴππος, a view which would reduce all vice and error, whether in this life or before it, to intellectual weakness. It is precisely the soul who has ‘seen most of the Realities’ in a former state, that will ‘live most justly’ in the present.

But the doctrine of the Phaedrus as to the causes of the fall is not clear, and the fatalist view, as seen above, predominates. Not merely as regards the previous state, but in regard to this life, the Phaedrus seems to recognise an element of fate or chance. The soul’s life here depends on reminiscence of the Realities; (250 a) ἀναμμένηκεσθαι δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐκείναν οὐ μάς ἀπάσχο, οὕτω δὲι βραχέως εἶδον τὸτε τάκει, οὕτω αὐτὸ πεσόσσαι ἐνυτύχησαν, δοκεῖ τὸν των ὁμολογέν ἐπί τοῦ δίκαιον προκύψαι λήθην δὲν τὸτε εἶδον λεμόν ἔχειν. ‘This may be owing,’ says Dr. Thompson, ‘to their ill-luck either in the former or in the present state of existence. In the latter case evil associations may have turned them from the right path and clouded their memory.’ With this may be contrasted the view in Rep. 617 ε, which asserts free-will and the responsibility of the individual for all the conditions of this life: αὐτία ἐλομένον· θέος ἀναίρετος.

After the first life, then, judgment follows. According to their deserts souls either are sent for the rest of the 1000 years εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαίωμα (purgatories), or are raised εἰς ὁφρανώτω· τῶν τόπων. (Cp. 256 do, where for the place of punishment occurs the phrase ἡ ὑπὸ γῆς τοπεία, which also occurs Rep. 615 α.) Then comes the choice of a second life. Here a soul that has previously inhabited the body of a man may enter into a beast, and vice versa, always provided that no soul that has never beheld the Ideas can ever enter into the human form (249 b, see on 81 d 12).

The great majority of souls have nine of these millennial periods to fulfill before they regain their wings, and restored to their original state again commence, or attempt, the supra-cestial circuit. But the soul that has thrice running chosen the lot of a guileless votary of philosophy, or of a lover in the highest sense, regains its wings at the end of the third millennial period, instead of the ninth; and so departs, not yet, we may presume, to the supra-cestial sphere, but rather to the society of the gods ἐν τῶν ὁφρανότω (249 a, cp. 256 b). Cp. Pindar Ol. 2. 68 foll.:
Apparently all souls, at least all that have ever inhabited a human form, are destined to restoration, and the recovery of their wings, after the elapse of the Great Period (248 e). In the light of this it must be interpreted the words at 249 c διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη περιστάται ἡ τοῦ φιλόσοφου διάνοια. They seem to refer to the early recovery of wings, just mentioned, according to the philosopher.

It is not necessary to follow in the same detail the remainder of the myth, in which its application to the doctrine of Ἐρως is explained. The sequel represents the recovery of the wings as a gradual process (251 b c), the chief agency in its accomplishment being Love and Philosophy. The souls of lovers who have enjoyed a pure and philosophic love even for one life only, become ἀπτεροί (256 b); their wings are sprouting, they have won one of their ‘Olympian bouts,’ but we must not suppose they are fully fledged till after the third. As it is, they have attained something ὅ μείζων ἀγαθὸν οὕτω σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη οὕτω θελα μανία δύναται πορίσαι ἀνθρώπῳ. Here σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη is not the same as σωφροσύνη δημοτική. It is the human reflexion of divine σωφροσύνη; it is conditioned by human life, but otherwise the best of which man is capable. Next among lovers are those who have only lived up to the standard of popular repute (φιλότιμοι). These also are elevated by their love. They die at last ἀπτεροί, but their wings are ready to sprout. They must not be condemned to the ‘subterranean journey,’ for they have started on the course up through heaven which will lead them at last to the supra-celestial sphere (256 d). Last we have presented the vulgar connexion, from which Love is absent, where we have οἰκειότης σωφροσύνη θυτή συγκεκριμένη. This is popular virtue in its lower aspect, the virtue of the δισεγαρχικός (see Rep. 554 c, and Phaedo 68 c with 82 A B); whereas the classes described before correspond respectively to the ἀριστός or φιλόσοφος, and the φιλότιμος of the Republic. To cast in your lot with this third grade will cause you to flit ‘a senseless shade for nine millenniums over the surface of this earth and beneath it.’

If, unblinded by the magnificence of this allegory, we attempt to analyse it minutely, we cannot help noting a certain amount of vagueness and inconsistency. The question is whether this exists to a larger extent than the nature of allegory makes necessary. I am disposed to think that the myth does show traces of not being the result of a single
inspiration. I venture to offer a suggestion that we may find in the notion of the wing the original kernel of the myth, and that the image of the charioteer and steeds was a subsequent elaboration. But in any case the myth forms a chapter of the utmost importance and interest in the history of the Ideal theory. Plato found in the heaven of Pindar and the Orphics a suitable home in which to place his embodiments of intellectual concepts.

The myths in the Republic and the Phaedo have much in common. Both of them cover a smaller field of speculation than the Phaedrus or the Timaeus. Each is associated with a proof of the soul’s immortality. That in the Republic is found at 608 D–611 A, that in the Phaedo pervades the entire work. In neither dialogue does the doctrine meet with ready acceptance; in the Republic Adimantus receives it with surprise; in the Phaedo, Kebes is hard to persuade. In both myths there is a large amount of cosmological matter. But we have nothing about the supra-celestial course, nothing about the final restoration of the soul; these myths deal with the smaller periodos, a life followed by a death. The period of wandering for the soul after death is given in the Republic as 1000 years (615 A B) and the moment of rebirth is called ἀρχή ἄλλης περιόδου βυθῶν γένους θανατηφόρου (617 D). The incentives to a righteous life are limited to its bearing on the subsequent period of death, and to the preparation of the soul for the ensuing choice of a life. This topic is elaborately handled in the Republic; the moment of choice is the grand crisis in which all the results of previous learning and conduct culminate: (618 B) ἡθα δὴ, ὁ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὃ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπως, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐπιμελητέον, διὸ ἐκαστὸς ἦμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμέλησα τούτου τοῦ μαθηματος καὶ ἔμηντησα καὶ μαθητής ἐστιν, ἐάν ποιεῖν όδος τῇ μαθείᾳ καὶ ἐξευρέω, τίς αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθε δυνατόν καὶ ἐπιστήμων, βίον καὶ χρησίμων καὶ ποιητῶν διαγωγόνωσκαντα κτέ. With this may be compared Phaedo 107 c ἐπεὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄθανατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται ὁμόν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνου, ἐν ὕ καλοιμεν τῷ ἔμην, ἀλλ’ ὑπέρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειν ἄν δεινός εἶναι εἰς τις αὐτῆς ἀμέλησε. . . οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂλλο ἐξουσία εἰς "Αἰθον ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, δ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὡφελεῖν ἠ βλάπτειν τῶν τελευτησαντα εὖδος ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσο πορείας. Cr. 81 e foll. Yet Plato believed—he could not help believing—in heredity (Rep. 424 A, 459; Polit. 310). Perhaps his teaching might not unfairly be summed up in the maxim, ‘You cannot be too particular in the selection of your parents.’

The myth in the Phaedo is contained in chapters lvii to lxii, of which the first and last (107 c–108 c, and 113 d–114 c)
are the most important. No definite time is specified for the 'wandering': τυχόντας δὲ ἔκει δὲν δὲν τυχεῖν καὶ μείναις δὲν κρῆ φρόνων ἄλλως δέντρῳ πάλιν ἡγεμών κομίζει εν πολλαῖς χρόνοι καὶ μακραῖς περιόδους (107 B). Indeed the time of wandering is not the same for all: αἱ (at the λίμνη Ἀχερόνιας) αἱ τῶν τετελευθηκόντων ψυχαῖ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφρικόνται καὶ τυποῖ εἰμαικρύμνους χρόνους μείνασι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέροις, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέροις, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζωῶν γενέσεις.

Lastly, the Republic and Phaedo agree with the Gorgias in recognizing a class of incurable sinners, of whom in the Republic (615 c foll.) Ardiaeus is the type. Compare with this Phaedo 113 B c 06: ἂν δέκωσιν ανίατως ἐχειν διὰ τὰ μεγάθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, η λειοπυλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἡ φόνου ἄδικους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἔξεργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα δόσ ταυτά τυγχάνει δήτα, τούτων δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοίρα μίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάραταρον θεν ὑπότε ἐκβαλεύοντος. On this Δ.-H. observes: 'But in Timaeus 42 c it is evident that the degenerate soul at any period of her transmigrations has the chance of reformation and final restoration to her original purity: nor is this possibility excluded in Phaedrus 248 c foll.'

The myth in the Phaedrus has most in common with the Timaeus, and the myth in the Republic with that in the Phaedo. As the Timaeus is undoubtedly the latest of these four dialogues, this might be taken as prima facie evidence that the Phaedrus is the latest of the remaining three. Such an inference would, however, I am persuaded, be mistaken. It must be remembered that the Republic and Phaedo differ from the Phaedrus chiefly in leaving a large part of the mythological material untouched.

The representation by Vergil in Aen. vi 785 foll. is very interesting. It is pretty clear that Vergil, starting with a mere imitation of the Homeric nether-world, such as he gives us in Georg. iv 467 foll., was superimposing on this a body of philosophic doctrine. But the result is unfinished and probably dislocated. (See Whitelaw in CR. v 186.) When we read at 745 foll.—

donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
concretam exemit labem, purumque relinquuit
aetherum sensum, atque aurum simplicis ignem,

we think we are reading of the ultimate restoration of the soul in purity. Yet this turns out to be merely the prelude to another mortal existence:

has omnis ubi mille rotam volveres per annos
Lethaeum ad fluviwm deus evocat agmine magno.

This is based on Rep. 615 A, 621 A.
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Δέξα AND ἐπιστήμη (97 B 17)

The antithesis of δέξα and ἐπιστήμη is prominent in Greek philosophy at least as early as Parmenides. Before him Xenophanes had already said of the speculator concerning the Gods and the Universe

εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τόχοι τετελεσμένοι εἰκῶν,
αὐτὸς δὲμὲς ὁδὸν ὁδεῖ, δόκοι δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

Parmenides’ poem Nature ‘is traditionally divided into three parts; the “Proem,” “Truth” (τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν), and “Opinion” (τὰ πρὸς δόξαν). In “Truth,” starting from the formula “the Ent is, the Non-ent is not,” Parmenides attempted to distinguish between the unity or universal element of nature, and its variety or particularity, insisting upon the reality of its unity, which is therefore the object of Knowledge, and upon the unreality of its variety, which is therefore the object, not of Knowledge, but of Opinion’ (Encyc. Brit. art. ‘Parmenides’).

He passes from the section ‘Truth’ to the section ‘Opinion’ in the following lines:

ἐν τῷ σοι παύσω πιστῶν λόγον ἡδὲ νῆμα
ἀμφὶς ἀλήθεια. δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τούδε βροτελας
μάνθανε, κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἄκοινων,

and then proceeds to propound a theory of the world of seeming and its development, pointing out, however, that, in accordance with the principles already laid down, these cosmological speculations do not pretend to anything more than probability; and ends his description with the words:

οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἐφ' ὑδὲ τάδε. (R. & P. § 102 c d.)

As to the precise import that Parmenides attached to his account of the World κατὰ δόξαν, there has been much dispute. (An important new work, Parmenides im Kampfe gegen Heraklit by Dr. A. Patin, is reviewed by Mr. John Burnet in CR. xiv 312.)

We may probably rest assured that the account was meant seriously, not ironically. Parmenides felt, as the article in the Encyc. Brit. puts it, that ‘a natural history of illusion is a
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necessary sequel to the account of Truth.' The section Δόξα springs in fact from the ineradicable desire to constitute some system for practical purposes, after it has become evident how little of our thought falls within the province of flawless certainty. Parmenides, Plato and other ancient philosophers taught that there were two paths for the mind, an upper and a lower; that the upper path was not only the nobler but the more important, and to this we ought to strive to attain. In modern times it has come to be seen more clearly that the lower path is really the only one, and that invulnerable ‘necessary’ Truth is from its nature sterile. At the same time the nature of the infirmities and limitations of the conclusions by which we practically guide our lives is better understood.

The scepticism of Socrates naturally led him to the view ‘that while scientific truth is unattainable by man, right opinion is the only ground for right action’ (Encyc. Brit. art. ‘Sophist’ 266 a, cp. art. ‘Socrates’ 237). This view strongly recalls the conclusion of the Meno, with the difference that Plato does not absolutely despair of the attainment of the higher level, Knowledge.

Among Socrates’ followers, besides Plato, the subject received attention from Antisthenes, who, as we are told by Diogenes Laertius (VI 17), wrote four books Περί δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης. R. & P. § 146 b suggest that the phrase δρόθη or δληθη δόξα may have been derived from Antisthenes.

In tracing the contrast of ἐπιστήμη and δόξα in Plato’s writings we must never forget that the contrast was familiar in Greek thought before Plato’s time. Certain points, chiefly as to the nomenclature adopted by Plato, may be of sufficient interest to justify the inquiry.

In the earlier dialogues of Plato the word δόξα hardly occurs in a technical sense. Not much stress can be laid upon Charm. 168 a, where in the discussion of the question whether there can be an ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης, a Knowledge that is Knowledge of itself simply without any external object, it is asked whether similarly there can be a δόξα δόξα; for similar questions have already been asked about Sensation and Emotion.

In the Gorgias we get a clear recognition of two different grades of apprehension, though this is expressed in other terms than δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. After Rhetoric has been defined (453 a) as πειθώς δημιουργής, the contrast between Rhetoric and Arithmetic brings out the point that there are two kinds of πειθώ, one accompanied by μάθησις, the other not. Πότερον ὅπερ, asks Socrates (454 d), ταῦτα δοκεῖ σοι ἐννυμενηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πιστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι; ΤΟΠ. Οὕτως μὲν ἐγώγε, δὸ κακρατεῖ, ἄλλῳ. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἷς- γνώσει ἐδε
In the later rhetorical dialogue, the *Phaedrus*, we get some indications of δόξα as a technical term. We can hardly reckon as such the difficult passage 237 α foIl. There are, we are told, two forces acting upon us, ἡ μὲν ἐμφυτοὶ οὐσία ἐπίθυμια ἡδονῆς, ἄλλα δὲ ἐπικτήτως δόξα, ἐφεμένη τοῦ ἀριστοῦ. . . δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀριστον λόγῳ ἄγουσι καὶ κρατοῦσι τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη θνωμα. ἐπίθυμια δὲ ἄλγως ἐλκουσι ἐπὶ ἱδνας καὶ ἀρξάς εἰν ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ δῆμος ἐπικυρίας. Here the definition of σωφροσύνη, as the product of δόξα λόγω ἄγουσα, recalls what we read elsewhere of the origin of popular Virtue. But here there is no contrast between δόξα and something higher (ἐπιστήμη): there is a contrast between δόξα and something lower (ἐπίθυμια). Nor is the phrase in the description of the noble horse (252 ε), ἀληθινὴς δόξης ἑταίρος, to the point. The words are probably spurious, and in any case ἀληθινὴ δόξα must mean something different from ἀληθῆς δόξα. (See Dr. Thompson’s note.) But the antithesis ἐπιστήμη (δόξα comes out quite clearly at 247 b, 248 b. The highest διάνοια are fed νῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀκρατώς: those who fall of the heavenly vision τροφὴ δόξας κατ᾽ θυσίας (see Exc. VI p. 292). Later in the dialogue comes the passage in which the verdict of the *Gorgias* on Rhetoric is revised. Phaedrus has heard that the Orator need not busy himself about τὰ τῷ ἐννιά δικαια ἄλλα τὰ δόξατα τῷ πλήθει (260 a; cr. 6 δόξας πλήθους). Socrates shows that knowledge of the Truth is a necessary condition of the power to persuade: λόγων ἄρα τέχνη (262 b), ὃ τῆν ἀληθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξαν δὲ τεθρηκτοὺς γελοιαν τινά, ὥς έσοικε, καὶ ἄταλην παρέβεβαι. Further in 275 A Thamus says to Th euth about his invention of writing οὐκ ομή ηθηταίς Δλλην ἐπιμνήσεως φάρακκον ἐφρασὶ σοφίας δέ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν,
οὐκ ἀληθείαν πορίσεις. But in all this we do not get beyond the old antithesis current before Plato.

The special doctrine of Plato as to the relation of δόξα to ἐπιστήμη is to be looked for in the *Meno*, the *Republic* and the *Symposium*. Of these three expositions that in the *Meno* is probably the earliest. It should be noted that whereas Parmenides made Opinion correlative to μὴ τοῦ, the nonexistent, Plato in these dialogues makes it correlative to something intermediate between Being and Not-being. Later, in the *Sophist*, we have the term μὴ τοῦ itself analyzed and its ambiguity explained. The problem presented at the end of the *Protagoras* is in the *Meno* carried a step towards solution by the doctrine of δόξα. On the other hand the doctrine of δόξα propounded in the *Meno*, etc., receives in the *Theaetetus* an important development.

In the passage of the *Rep.* (506 c), quoted in the note on 97 B 17, the epithet αἰσχρός seems discordant with the view taken in the *Meno* of the value of ἀληθής δόξα. But the context shows it is ironical. It *would* be αἰσχρόν to content ourselves with τυφλά τε καὶ σκολία on the nature of the Good, if it were possible παρ' ἄλλων ἀκοῖῶν φανά τε καὶ καλά. But Glaucon knows quite well that it is not, and is ready to acquiesce when Socrates proposes for the present to take the lower method. A similar ambiguous character attaches to the ethical counterpart of δόξα, Popular Virtue, which is honourable or dishonourable according as it is the highest standard attainable in mundane circumstances, or a lazy and specious substitute for something better. For the Good is the enemy of the Best. See on 100 A 6.

The passage from the *Symposium* also quoted on 97 B 17 is succeeded by some most important thoughts in which the view taken of δόξα and ἔρως is generalized. They fall within the function of τὸ δαιμόνιον, and that is to be intermediary between gods and men. Πάν τὸ δαιμόνιον (202 ε) μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ καὶ θανάτου. Τίνα, ἢ τὸ ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχων; Ἐρμηνεύον καὶ διαπροθέμενον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀνθρώποι τὰ παρὰ θεῶν. ἔρως, to which δόξα is correlated, is an intermediate link between Ignorance and Knowledge, between Earth and Heaven (see on 76 C 16). So the stage of aspiration, of φιλοσοφία, belongs not to the highest existences, but to those conscious of an inferiority in themselves and of an ideal outside themselves:

(203 ε) σοφίας δὲ καὶ ἀμαθίας ἐν μέσῳ ἐστὶν (Ἑρως). ἔχει γὰρ δὴ. θεοῖς ουδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ ουδ' ἐπιδυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι. ἐστι γὰρ οὐδ' εἶ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. Somewhat as for the production of mechanical energy a contact of bodies at different temperatures is necessary, so is a sense of deficiency a necessary
condition of spiritual energy or φιλοσοφία. Plato had already expressed a similar thought in Ἰεβ. 218 A: διὰ ταῦτα δὴ φαίμεν ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἄγνοιαν μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, εἰτε θεοὶ εἰτε ἄθρωποι εἰσίν ὄστι: ὁδ' αἱ ἐκείνως φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς ἄγνοιαν ἐχόντας ὑπερ' κακοὺς εἶναι· κακοῦ γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθῆ οὐδένα φιλοσοφεῖν. λειτουργοι δὴ οἱ ἐχόντες μὲν τὸ κακόν τούτο, τὴν ἄγνοιαν, μήπω δὲ ὃπ' αὐτοὶ δυστε ἀγνώμονες μηδὲ ἀμαθεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐτὲ ἤγομενοι μὴ εἶδοναι & μὴ ἴσανοι.

At Symp. 207 E we have an interesting passage illustrating the genesis of ἐπιστήμη from δόξα expounded in the Meno. Here we read no longer of an absolute changeless ἐπιστήμη; but are told how matters of human knowledge (ἐπιστήμαι) share the characteristics of growth and decay that attach to everything human: πολύ δὲ τούτων ἀποτέλεσον ὑπερ' ὃτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι μὴ δόται αἱ μὲν γίγνονται αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῶν, καὶ ὀδηγούσα οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μιὰ ἐκάστη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταύτων πάσης. οἱ γὰρ καλείται μελετάντων, ὥσ' ἐξεύρηκαν ἐστὶν τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λόγῳ γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, μελετάντων δὲ τῶν καὶ μιὰν ἐκεῖνων ἀντὶ τῆς ἀποφθέγματος σφίζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὡστε τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ σφίζεται, οὐ τῷ παντόποσι ταύτων αἱ εἴναι ὧσπερ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τῷ ἀπό δὲ τοῖς καὶ παλαιομοῦντες ἐπερ' νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἴνον αὐτὸν ἂν.

Certain places in the Republic bear upon the use of πίστις and δόξα in Plato’s nomenclature. At 505 E οἷν τίστει χρῆσαι τινα μονομικώς, πίστει is nearly equivalent to δόξῃ. At 511 E, 534 A we find πίστις made the superior division of δόξα, a sub-division which is abandoned at the latter of these passages (cp. on 98 B 2). At 601 E πίστις and δόξα are used interchangeably: οὔκοιν δὲ μὲν (the flautist) ἔξαγγέλθη περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ ποιητῶν αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ (the flute-maker) πιστεύων ποίησις; Να. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀρὰ σκέφθων δὲ μὲν τούτης πιστίν ὅρθὴν ἔχει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ ποιησιᾶς, ξωον τῷ εἴδοτι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος αἰοίνα παρὰ τοῦ εἴδοτος· ὁ δὲ χρωμένος ἐπιστήμης. Πάντως γα. Ὁ δὲ μιμητὴς πότερον ἔκ τοῦ χρησιμοῦ ἐπιστήμην ἔχει δὲν ἄν γράφῃ, εἰτε καλὰ καὶ ὅρθα εἶτε μὴ, διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δὲ δέξατε τινὰς ὑπὲρ δὲν βούλομεν. Οὐδὲτερα. Οὔτε ἀρὰ εἴσεται οὔτε δὲν δοξάσει οἱ μιμητῆς κτέ.

In the Theaetetus (201 A B) we have an advance upon the nomenclature of the Gorgias (454 D), where the result of oratory was expressed as πίστις. The term δόξας is now correlated with πίστις: οὗτοι γάρ που (οἱ φήμης) τῇ έστων τέχνη πειθοῦν, οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δὲ δέξατε ποιεῖτε δὲν βούλομεν. Ορατοί are unable διδάξειν ἰκανώς, but only πείσει. ΣΩ. Τὸ πείσατ' ζ' οὖχι δοξάσας λέγεις πειθάς; ΘΕΑΤ. Τι μὴν; ΣΩ. Οὐκόν δὰ ὅρθω πειθώσι δικασταὶ περὶ ἄν ἰδοὺ μόνον ἠκτίνει, δὲν 

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EXCURSUS VII

In the Parmenides δόξα simply appears in a list with ἐπιστήμη, αἰσθήσις and other faculties (142 A, 155 D, 164 A).

In the Timaeus 29 c, δὲ τὸ πρὸς γένεσιν ὁμοί αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπὸ πρὸς πιστεῖς ἀλήθεια, πιστεῖς ἐστιν ἐκδικασθὲν; ὃ ὁπλατὴς ἀλήθειας, ὁπλατὴς ἀλήθειας ἀλήθειας. Οὐ οὖν ἐὰν τὸ δοξαῖον, καὶ τὸ πρὸς γενεσιν ὁμοί αὐτὸ τὸ πρὸς πιστεῖς ἀλήθειας, πιστεῖς ἐστίν ἐκδικασθὲν.

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The sequent shows a strong contrast between πιστεῖς and δόξα on the one hand, which are formed when the soul is busy in the domain of the Sensible, and νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε which are perfected when the soul is occupied with the Rational.

The difference between the two planes of thought is nowhere more constantly and strongly affirmed than in the Timaeus; and the note is made prominent early in the dialogue. οὖν δὴ (says Socrates 27 D) κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαρρέοντας τάδε: τί τὸ διὰ ἀλήθειας, τί τὸ διὰ ἀλήθειας μὲν ἀλήθειας, δὲ δὲ διὸ ὅπως τὸ μὲν δῆται μετὰ ἀλήθειας, τοῦτο μὲν δῆται μετὰ ἀλήθειας ἀλήθειας, τοῦτο δὲ δῆται μετὰ ἀλήθειας ἀλήθειας. οὖν δὴ λεγόμενον ἐκείνῳ, διότι χωρὶς ἐπίστημα τὸ ἐκείνῳ κτέ. 'Summing up all previous discussions, the Timaeus declares that Knowledge (νοῦς) is implanted in us by instruction, Right Opinion by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason (λόγος), the other is without reason; the one is not to be moved by persuasion, the other may be moved; and lastly every man may be said to participate in Right Opinion, but in νοῦς only the gods and very few men.' (Zeller p. 174).

The phrase ὁρθὴ δόξα occurs several times in the Philebus.

In the context between Pleasure and Reason, it is ranked as allied with the latter (11 b); Right Opinion is a concomitant of Right Pleasures 37 D, 38 A. In the Laws 632 A, 653 A, ἀλήθεια δόξα is mentioned side by side with φρόνησις, distinguished from it though not contrasted.

The distinction of ἐπιστήμη from δόξα ἀλήθεια was preserved by Aristotle; see Anal. post. i 33 = 88 b 30 quoted by R. & P. 311 b 2: τὸ δὲ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξας δὴ ἢ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δὲ ἄναγκαιον κτέ. See too NE. vii ii 3, 4, with Grant's note.
It hardly belongs to the present place to consider at any length the development of the doctrine of δόξα in the Theaetetus. A general reference may be given to H. Jackson’s paper in *JP.* xiii pp. 242 foll.

The three sections into which the dialogue is divided correspond respectively to the definitions of ἐπιστήμη as (1) αἰσθήσεως, (2) δόξα ἀληθής, (3) δόξα ἀληθής μετὰ λόγου. The first section does not now concern us; in the second certain important points are cleared up that might suggest themselves to a reader of the *Meno.* How is False Opinion possible? (180 a) οὐκοιν τὸδε γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν, ἢτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλαμβάνεις ἀρχαὶ μεταξὺ τοὺτων ὡς ὅτα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρώνι. But it is just the omission of these things from consideration that is one main cause of our trouble: ‘in other words, so long as we ignore the states of learning and forgetting, which are intermediate between absolute knowledge and absolute ignorance, no place can be found for False Opinion’ (*JP.* xiii p. 258, cp. Zeller p. 171). The Eristic quibble about False Opinion meets us already in *Eucl. *286 c ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν οὔκ ἐστὶν; (τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται δ λόγος ἢ γὰρ;) ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ μὴ λέγει, ἢ μὴ λέγειν (The sophist agrees). Πότερον οὔν γε ἐστὶν μὲν λέγειν οὔκ ἐστὶ, δοξάζειν μὲντοι ἐστίν; οὕτω δοξάζειν, ἐφη. Οὐδ’ ἂρα γε ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἢ μὴ ἐστί ἡ λέγησιν. It here appears that another source of confusion is the ambiguity of the phrase τὰ μὴ διδάσκαλα, which may mean either ‘what is non-existent,’ or ‘what is other than the fact.’

But though the possibility of False Opinion, and consequently the legitimacy of the phrase ‘True Opinion,’ is thus demonstrated, yet the gulf that yawns between True Opinion and Knowledge still remains (201 b). This forms the transition to the third section. ΘΕΑΣΤΗΣ. O γε ἐγὼ, ὦ Σωκράτης, ἐπιστῶς τοις ἡμῖν ἐπιστῆσην, μνήμην ὑπὸ ἐμφανοῦς. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἠληθὴ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ἐναι, τὴν δὲ ἀλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης καὶ δὲν μὲν μὴ ἐστὶ λόγος οὐκ ἐπιστῆται εἶναι, οὕτως καὶ ἄλογος ὑπογίαν, ἢ μὴ ἐστὶ. The view here put forward strikingly recalls that of the *Meno.* But ὀντὸς καὶ ἄλογον must refer to the strange word ἐπιστήμη—α word which does not occur in the *Meno,* nor indeed in any place in Plato except this in the Theaetetus. This makes it probable that the passage in the Theaetetus is not a criticism on the *Meno.* Another difference between the phraseology of the *Meno* and that of the Theaetetus strengthens this view. The distinctive phrase μετὰ λόγου does not occur in the *Meno* 98 A. On the other hand we have in the *Meno* the hint that ἐπιστήμη differs from ὅρθη δόξα, αἰτίας λογισμῷ. This hint, it is true, is only put forward
tentatively; Socrates utterst it ὡς οὖν εἰδῶς ἄλλα εἰκάζων. That there is a difference between ὅρθος δόξα and ἐπιστήμη he holds as firm ground; but the problem of the nature of the difference Plato had not fully solved when he wrote the Meno. It is remarkable that the speculation suggested in the words αἱ προς ὁ λόγος ὁ λόγος, though indicated in the Gorg. 465 Α (see p. 300), is in the Theaetetus, so far as I can see, neither criticized nor developed.

Two other passages must be cited as recalling the phraseology of the Meno. In the Phaedo 96 Β, Socrates, running through his former speculations, says he inquired whether it is through the brain that we get sensations, ἐκ τοῦ ἄντων δὲ γίγνεσθαι μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἡμεῖς κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. The other is Polit. 309 Β: τῶν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων πέρι καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτων ἐναντίων ὄντως οὕσιν ἄλλῃ δόξῃ μετὰ βεβαιότερος· ὥστεν ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγγίγνηται, θεῖαν φημι ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένει.

A few words may be added on the subject of the relation of δόξα to Discourse. It appears in the Meno (85 Β) that δόξα arise in the individual soul, and that it is by dialectic, by friction with other minds, that these become converted into matters of Knowledge. We find passages in which it is noted as a mark of δόξα that it belongs to the separate workings of the mind; e.g. in Theaet. 187 Α. Socrates speaks of a certain faculty of the soul ὅταν αὐτὴ καὶ αὐτὴν πραγματεύεται περὶ τὰ ὑπακοὴν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα μὴ τοῦτο γε καλεῖται, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγώμας, δοξάζοντες. ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶκε, ὡς φιλεῖ. The same view is carried on at 189 Ε ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διανοοῦσα ἄρ’ ὅπερ ἔγω καλεῖ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν; ΣΩ. Λόγον δὲ αὐτὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴν διεξάγεται περὶ ὅν ἄν σκοπῆ. ὡς γε μη ἐιδῶς οὐκ ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰδαν ἀναλλατιστάνεται διανοομένη, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἐαυτὴν ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀποκριμομένη, καὶ φάσκονα καὶ οὐ φάσκονα. ὅταν δὲ ὀραία, ἐρέτερον, ἐρέτερον ἐπαίδευα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φιλοκρίτων. δοξάζων ταῦταν τιθέμεν αὐτήν. ὃς τ’ ἐγὼ γέρος δοξάζων ἄλλων καλῶν καὶ τῆς δοξῆς λόγου εἰρήμενον, ὦτ’ ἄλλο οἴδαι φωνῇ, ἄλλα στιχον πρὸς αὐτῶν. It makes this the easier to understand why when later the phrase δόξα ἄληθης μετὰ λόγου is analyzed, it is thought necessary to suggest as one possible meaning of λόγος ‘vocal expression’ (206 Β). Of course it at once appears that λόγος understood in this sense is a quite inadequate expression of the difference between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. (Note that while in the Republic (511 Β) διάνοια is made the inferior division of τὸ νοητὸν and to lie ἐπί τι δόξῃς τε καὶ νοῦ, in the Theaetetus διάνοια is represented as preparatory to δόξα.)

Very much the same view of δόξα occurs Soph. 263 Ε ΣΩ.
Oûkôv διάνοια καὶ λόγος ταῦταν· πλῆρος ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γεγομένος τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἡμῶν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια; ἘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἘΕ. Τὸ δὲ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ρέωμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἵνα μετὰ φθόγγον κέκληται λόγος; ἘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. Τὸ λόγος, continues the Stranger, belong assertion and negation; ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιας ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ συγῆς, πλῆρος δόξας ἔχεις δ' τι προσείης αὐτῷ; ἘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; Cp. with this the view of δόξα in Philibus 38c. You see an object indistinctly in the distance. Then follows the internal colloquy (διάνοια): What is that yonder? Is it a man? Or is it perchance an image set up by the shepherds? Καὶ μὲν τὸς γ' αὐτῷ παρῆ, τὰς πρὸς αὐτὸν ρήθεντα ἐντελέας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τῶν παλιν φθέγγειτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως δ' τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

But this distinction between δόξα and Discourse does not in the least overlie or obliterate the grand distinction between δόξα and Knowledge; indeed not long after the passage just quoted from the Sophist we have the old distinction reappearing (288 Α) ολόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα δ' δοξάζει.
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( = distinguished from.

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