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Classical Series

THE MENO OF PLATO



THE  
MENO OF PLATO  
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EDITED

*WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND EXCURSUSES*

BY

E. SEYMER THOMPSON, M.A. (CAMB. AND LOND.)

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### ΘΗΣΕΥΣ

ὦ πόλλ' ἀμαρτάνοντες ἄνθρωποι μάτην,  
τί δὴ τέχνας μὲν μυρίας διδάσκετε  
καὶ πάντα μηχανᾶσθε κάξευρίσκετε,  
ἐν δ' οὐκ ἐπίστασθ' οὐδ' ἐθηράσασθέ πω,  
φρονεῖν διδάσκειν οἷσιν οὐκ ἔνεστι νοῦς;

### ΙΠΠΟΛΥΤΟΣ

δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας, ὅστις εὖ φρονεῖν  
τοὺς μὴ φρονοῦντας δυνατὸς ἐστ' ἀναγκάσαι.

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## P R E F A C E

THIS book might possibly have been better if less time had been spent over it. Worked at with interruptions during a period of more than twelve years it is at last, I fear, something of a farrago. I have done my best to put myself on a level with the times in regard to the study of Plato; but I cannot pretend to have assimilated all the results of foreign scholarship; at the same time silence with regard to a work must not always be taken as implying ignorance of it. I have found Fritzsche's recension of Stallbaum an admirable sub-structure for work on the dialogue. But it is to scholars of my own country that I have to express the greatest obligations. The number of references to the work of Dr. W. H. Thompson, Professor Campbell, R. D. Archer-Hind and J. Adam, will show how much I have derived from them. Above all I cannot

over-estimate my debt to Dr. Henry Jackson as a great pioneer in true methods of investigation in Ancient Philosophy. If I had ventured to dedicate this work to any one, it is certainly his name that I should have wished to prefix to it.

My sincere thanks are due to my friend H. Rackham, Classical Tutor of Christ's College, Cambridge, for looking through the proof-sheets, and offering many useful suggestions.

The greater part of the work I have done alone, and I have not availed myself of the counsel of friends so fully as doubtless I might have done with profit. One who attempts to interpret Plato may fairly ask to be judged in the spirit of the words: πάντα ἄνδρα χρή ἀγαπᾶν, ὅστις καὶ ὀτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξιὼν διαπονεῖται.

EWHURST, *September 21, 1900.*

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## INTRODUCTION

§ 1. In the history of Greek philosophy we may recognize three main stages. The earliest of these may be called the Poetical. Early speculation was aroused by Wonder ; it was but to a small extent self-critical, and there was occasionally present in its expounders—as is likely to be the case with those conscious of some superiority among primitive peoples—a vein of charlatanry. Even its literary form was in some cases (as with Parmenides and Empedocles) poetical ; when it was clothed in prose, this sometimes had a prophetic tinge, as in the ‘dark sayings’ of Heraclitus.

This was the childhood of philosophy. Then came the time of adolescence, the period of questioning. Among the influences that led in the new phase we recognize as distinctly the most important the figure of Socrates. But that we must not assign to Socrates the undivided responsibility for the transition, is obvious enough. If we knew more about *Zeno of Elea* we should probably see more clearly than we do how important was the part he played. As it is, Grote (I 96) is certainly right in naming him with Socrates

as the great agencies in bringing about the transition to the second, or Dialectic, stage of Philosophy. (Cp. the phrases from Aristotle's *Metaph.* which Grote there quotes: A. VI 7=987 b 32 οἱ γὰρ πρότερον διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετείχον, M. IV 4=1078 b 25 διαλεκτικὴ γὰρ ἰσχὺς οὐ τότε ἦν. Diog. L. IX 25 quotes Aristotle as saying that Zeno was 'the discoverer of dialectic.' As to the term *διαλεκτική* he says it was introduced by Plato, III 24.)

The third stage is the Expository. A thinker having succeeded in framing a system that satisfies him, assuming the attitude of a teacher propounds it in a consecutive treatise. This stage really commences with its greatest representative, Aristotle. But the surpassing interest of Plato lies in the fact that in him we have the bridge from the second stage to the third. Beginning as critic and investigator, he ends as an expositor.

§ 2. The form of Plato's compositions—the dialogue—is the natural outcome of his place in the history of philosophy (Zeller p. 153 foll.; Grote I 239 foll.). One great characteristic of it is its elasticity. It ranges from a vivid reflexion of Socratic converse, with constant inquiry and criticism, chiefly in the earlier dialogues, to a thin, though not altogether purposeless, veil of consecutive exposition in the later. Plato was not indeed the inventor of this form: Diog. L. III 47, 8 says that some attribute the introduction of it to Zeno of Elea; but that Aristotle awards it to a certain Alexamenus, of whom we know nothing. He sensibly adds, however, *δοκεῖ δέ μοι Πλάτων, ἀκριβῶσας τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα δικαίως ἂν ὥσπερ τοῦ κάλλους*

οὕτω τῆς εὐρέσεως ἀποφέρεσθαι. Contrast the spiteful denial of Plato's priority in Ath. xi 505 c.

There are obviously two forms in which a dialogue may be written. Either the words uttered may be set down, the several speakers being merely indicated; or the whole dialogue may be reported by one of the interlocutors, or some one present. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. The method of reporting involves the wearisome repetition 'said I' and 'said he,' which induced Plato to abandon it in the *Theaetetus* (see 143 c). On the other hand the direct method precluded to a Greek anything like 'stage-directions' or comment. This no doubt was the consideration that led Plato to prefer the other in the *Republic*. But for this we should not have known, for instance, that at 350 D Thrasymachus blushed. Nowhere do we get the ἦθος of Socrates impressed upon us more strongly than in the dialogues where, as in the *Republic* and *Protagoras*, he reports his own conversations (see Zeller, 109, 110).

The *Meno*, in which the accessory furniture is very simple, is written in the direct form. Consequently we do not know, and can only conjecture, at what point Anytus joins the party (see on 89 E 34). On the other hand much adroitness is shown by the way in which the actual words of the speakers illustrate the circumstances of the dialogue. For instance, Socrates' first answer serves as an introduction to the person Meno.

§ 3. The persons of the dialogue are four, Socrates, Meno, Anytus and the Slave.

The personality of Socrates is brought before us

remarkably vividly. We have indications of his irony (71 C 19 οὐ πάνυ εἰμι μνήμων, 96 D 22 κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος), his unfailing good temper and courtesy (79 A 5 εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρὸς με, 86 D 10 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἤρχον κτέ., 95 A 5 ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν εἴαν ποτε γνῶ, οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων κτέ.), his erotic tendencies (76 C 15): Meno's simile of the *νάρκη* 80 A not only strongly brings before us the effect of Socrates' discourse, but gives us a glimpse of Socrates' personal appearance.

§ 4. Meno is a Thessalian, young, rich, and well-born. At the time when the *Meno* was written Thessaly was looked upon as semi-barbarous. 'The abundance of corn and cattle from the neighbouring plains sustained in these cities a numerous population, and above all a proud and disorderly noblesse, whose manners bore much resemblance to those of the heroic times. They were violent in their behaviour, eager in armed feud, but unaccustomed to political discussion or compromise; faithless as to obligations, yet at the same time generous in their hospitalities, and much given to the enjoyments of the table' (Grote *Hist. of Greece* Part II. ch. 3, cp. Liv. xxxiv. 51). It is to Thessaly that Crito, in the dialogue called after him, 45 c, proposes to smuggle away Socrates out of prison. Subsequently (53 D foll.) the Laws, in their imaginary speech, tell Socrates to what a disorderly place he will go if he accepts the invitation—*ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία*—and how the gentlemen there, far from being shocked at his breaking

prison, will laugh at the story of his undignified escape. Compare Xen. *Mem.* i ii 24 καὶ Κριτίας δὴ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἕως μὲν Σωκράτει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένῳ συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν· ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαχθέντε, Κριτίας μὲν φυγῶν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομία μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρωμένοις.

Some ten years after the probable date of the composition of the *Meno* Thessaly assumed a prominence in Grecian affairs such as it had never enjoyed before. It was in the year 374 B.C. that Polydamas of Pharsalus came to Sparta asking help against Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly. Under Jason there was a brief chance that Thessaly might play in regard to Greece a part similar to that played later by Macedon under Philip. But at the time of Meno's assumed visit to Athens—about 402 B.C.—there was no thought of this. As late as 382 B.C. the Spartans passed through Thessaly on their way against Olynthus without let or hindrance. Meno in Athens is something like a Russian prince in Paris during the eighteenth century.

A short disquisition on the life of Meno, by Gedike, is prefixed to Buttmann's edition. Fritzsche in his prolegomena, pp. 24 foll., has given a very thorough treatment of the subject. Meno's father's name was Alexidemus (76 E 47). His town was probably Pharsalus, the town of Polydamas, the most luxurious town in Thessaly according to Theopompus (see on 70 B 7). Diog. L. ii 50 calls Meno Φαρσάλιος, whereas Diodorus xiv 19 calls him Λαρισαῖος. It is hard to see what can have made Diogenes call him a

'Pharsalian' except a true tradition; on the other hand Diodorus may easily have been led into his statement by a careless inference from 70 B 7. On this Fritzsche well remarks 'immo potius cum Socrates dicat οἱ τοῦ σου ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται (Larisaei), verisimilius est Menonem ipsum non fuisse Larisaeum.' (The fact that Λαρισαίων in our text there is probably spurious, makes no difference, as it is otherwise known that Aristippus was a Larisaeian.)

It is probable then that our Meno belonged to the same family as the Meno of Pharsalus, who in the year 476 B.C. when Cimon was besieging Eion aided him with twelve talents and 300 horsemen, his own retainers. For this the Athenians granted him the citizenship, as we read in Demosthenes *Aristocr.* (23) 199. (The author of the compilation *περὶ συντάξεως* († Dem. (13) 23) diminishes these statements; Meno found 200 horsemen and only got ἀτέλεια.) Thucydides (II 22) names 'Meno of Pharsalus' as one of the leaders of a body of Thessalian cavalry who came to assist the Athenians *κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν συμμαχικόν* in the first year of the Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.). The distance of time makes it improbable that these two Menos were identical (though Westermann on Dem. *Aristocr.* l.c. thinks they were); but they may well have been related.

The name Meno was not uncommon at Athens. Plutarch *Per.* 31 tells us of a statuary Meno who accused Phidias; and *Alc.* 22. 5 of a Meno, father of the priestess Theano. These two may be identical. Meno is the name of the archon of 473 B.C. There was also a Meno who was sent as general to the

Hellespont in 361 B.C. (Dem. *Polycl.* (50) 12) and again to Euboea in 357 B.C. (*CIA.* II 64, Hicks 104). Xenophon *Hell.* v iv 55 mentions a Meno of Thespieae. Lastly, there is another important Meno of Pharsalus who took a prominent part in the Lamian War (Plut. *Phoc.* 25) and was, through his daughter Phthia, the grandfather of Pyrrhus of Epirus.

There is no reason for thinking that the Meno of our dialogue enjoyed the Athenian franchise. He was united by hereditary ties of hospitality to Anytus (see on 90 B 2). He was also the πατρικὸς ξένος of the Persian king (78 D 28, where see note).

Meno is represented by Plato as young, though no longer *very* young (76 B 11). He has had a good education; he knows the poets, Simonides (?) 77 B 12, and Theognis (95 D), something of the physics of Empedocles, and something of geometry. His great teacher and light has been Gorgias of Leontini, the rhetorician, who spent the last years of his long life in Thessaly. Thus he may be regarded as a product of fashionable or 'sophistic' education, but with everything to learn in dialectics; even the grasping of a general definition is at first quite beyond him.

Meno is chiefly known for the part he took in the expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes. It was owing to his favour with Aristippus that he obtained a command over a division of the Greek mercenaries: παρὰ Ἀριστίππῳ ἔτι ὠραῖος ὢν στρατηγεῖν διεπράξατο τῶν ξένων (Xen. *Anab.* II vi 28). We may think, if we please, that it was this business that obliged him to return home, and curtailed his stay at Athens (76 E, see also on 76 B 11). Meno did not start from Sardis

with the force of Cyrus, but joined it with his contingent at Colossae (Xen. *Anab.* I ii 6). Xenophon makes no secret of his hatred of Meno (cp. Diog. L. II 50). This may have arisen from a rivalry between Meno and Xenophon's friend and hero, Clearchus. He accuses Meno of dishonourably overreaching his colleagues at the time when Cyrus was debating with his officers about crossing the Euphrates. Meno urged his own men to anticipate the decision by crossing: so, if it was decided to cross, they would have the credit of setting the example; if it was decided not to cross and they had to retreat again, Cyrus would in future give them the preference as having shown themselves the most zealous in his service. 'Such breach of communion and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Meno' (Grote *Hist.* ch. 69).

Not long afterwards at a place called Charmande a *fracas* occurred between the troops of Meno and those of Clearchus. The outbreak was only quelled by the personal intervention of Cyrus (Xen. *Anab.* I v 10 foll.). At the battle of Cunaxa Clearchus commanded the right, Meno the left, wing of the Greeks. This means that under Cyrus Clearchus had the first command, Meno the second. This is hardly consistent with the words of Ctesias (*Persica* 58) who says that Clearchus and Meno ἀεὶ διάφοροι ἀλλήλοις ἐτύχανον διότι τῷ μὲν Κλεάρχῳ ἅπαντα ὁ Κῦρος συνεβούλευε, τοῦ δὲ Μένωνος λόγος οὐδεὶς ἦν. Meno was also connected by a tie of friendship with Ariaeus, the

commander of Cyrus' Asiatic troops, and after the death of Cyrus in the battle Meno was sent at his own desire among the embassy to Ariaeus to offer him the crown (ibid. II i 5). When the rest of the embassy returned, Meno remained with Ariaeus (II ii 1). Ariaeus had declined the crown and seemed to be playing false with the Greeks. So Meno incurred the suspicion of Clearchus; (II v 28) ὑπόπτειν δὲ εἶναι τὸν διαβάλλοντα Μένωνα, εἰδὼς αὐτὸν καὶ συγγεγεννημένον Τισσαφέρνει μετ' Ἀριαίου καὶ στασιάζοντα αὐτῷ (i.e. Κλεάρχῳ) καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντα ὅπως τὸ στράτευμα ἅπαν πρὸς αὐτὸν λαβῶν φίλος ἦ Τισσαφέρνει. Subsequently Meno, like the other generals, went for a colloquy to the tent of Tissaphernes; and was there seized. At this point there is a discrepancy in the accounts, which are practically two, that of Xenophon and that of Ctesias. The story of Ctesias is preserved in Photius' summary of his *Persica*, and on it is largely based the account in Plutarch's *Artaxerxes*, and in Diodorus. That the Greek generals, including Meno, were seized and sent to the King at Babylon, all agree. Xenophon (II vi 29) says of Meno ἀποθνησκόντων δὲ τῶν συστρατηγῶν ὅτι ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ βασιλέα σὺν Κύρῳ, ταῦτὰ πεποιηκῶς οὐκ ἀπέθανε, μετὰ δὲ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων θάνατον στρατηγῶν τιμωρηθεὶς ὑπὸ βασιλέως ἀπέθανε, οὐχ ὥσπερ Κλεάρχος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ἀποτμηθέντες τὰς κεφαλὰς, ὅσπερ τάχιστα θάνατος δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ζῶν αἰκισθεὶς ἐνιαυτὸν ὡς πονηρὸς λέγεται τῆς τελευτῆς τυχεῖν. But Ctesias (*Persica* 60, cp. Plut. *Art.* 18, Diod. xiv 27) says that it was by Meno's agency that the other generals were entrapped into the tent of Tissaphernes and that

for this service Meno was released. (Diodorus says *Τισσαφέρνης δὲ τοὺς στρατηγούς δήσας ἀπέστειλε πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην· ἐκείνος δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀνείλε, Μένωνα δὲ μόνον ἀφήκεν· ἔδοκει γὰρ μόνος οὗτος στασιάζων πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους προδώσειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας*, where the word *προδώσειν*, if sound, would seem to indicate that *future services* were expected of Meno.) It is noteworthy that Meno's enemy Xenophon says nothing about any treachery of Meno towards the other generals, though he gloats over his miserable death. Of course it is quite possible that Meno was treacherous to his comrades and yet was punished at the Persian court. Grote (*Hist.* ch. 70) thinks he did betray them, or took credit for doing so, and perished through the agency of Parysatis, ever ready to take vengeance on any who had wronged her darling son Cyrus, or his friends.

§ 5. Xenophon in giving the characters of the slain generals reserves Meno for the last, and paints him in very dark colours. His greed of gain was undisguised; and to increase his gains he was greedy of rule and honour. He truckled to the powerful to secure a screen for his acts of injustice. Perjury and falsehood he regarded as the quickest way to the consummation of his desires; simplicity and truth were mere folly. He loved no one; with him professions of friendship were but the signal of an attack. He treated no foe with scorn; but always assumed a scornful air in talking with allies. To attack the guarded possessions of enemies was too much trouble; the defenceless possessions of friends he made his prey. He gloried in treachery, falsehood and mockery of

friends, as much as others in piety, truth and justice. He thought the best tie of discipline for soldiers was a partnership in crime. He considered himself as having conferred a boon if he associated with any one without ruining him. All this, says Xenophon, is notorious; as to still darker stories about him there may be some untruth (*Anab.* II vi 21-28).

Is the portrait that we get in Plato inconsistent with this? Jowett (*Meno* Introd. p. 265) says 'The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded,<sup>1</sup> as he is also silent about the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades.' Again, p. 266, he speaks of Plato as 'regardless of the historical truth of the characters of his dialogue as in the case of Meno and Critias': cp. p. 268. This seems to me to go too far.

There is no real inconsistency between Plato's picture and that of Xenophon. Athenaeus is stupidly wrong when he says (505 B) that Plato ἐγκώμια αὐτοῦ (scil. Μένωνος) διεξέρχεται, as a counterblast, forsooth, to Xenophon, who had vilified him; and (506 B) that Plato disparages the great men of Athens, Μένωνα δ' ἐπαινεῖ τὸν τοὺς Ἑλληνας προδόντα. It is quite clear, at least to one who reads between the lines, that Plato regards Meno as by no means an exemplary person. His arrogance (ὑβριστής γ' εἶ, ὦ Μένων κτέ. 76 A), self-esteem (καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς ταμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνν

<sup>1</sup> Jowett here falls into an error, perhaps based on Athenaeus xi 505 A. Xenophon does *not* impute this treachery to Meno.

εὖ, ὡς γε ἔμαντῶ ἐδόκουν 80 B), vanity (γυμνώσκω οὐ  
 ἐνεκά με ἤκαστας κτέ. 80 C), want of self-control (ἐπειδὴ  
 δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ  
 ἐλεύθερος ᾖς 86 D) are clearly indicated.<sup>1</sup> The charges  
 are made quite good-humouredly, it is true, but they  
 are perfectly serious. Perhaps we may add that at  
 74 A Meno omits *δσιότης* from the list of virtues, and  
 remark the parenthesis 81 B *δέιν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς*  
*δσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον κτέ.*, the intention  
 of which becomes much more obvious if it is intended  
 for Meno's personal benefit. In Meno's favour it may  
 be said that he is always deferential to Socrates, and  
 he respects conventions (78 D 33).

Plato was, of course, not indifferent to common  
 morality. The bad behaviour of some of his pupils  
 no doubt gave occasion to some of his enemies to  
 assert that he was. (Cp. Ath. 508 D *ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ*  
*πολλοὶ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ τυραννικοὶ τινες καὶ διάβολοι*  
*γενόμενοι.* Much of Athenæus' material is derived  
 from Theopompus, a pupil of Plato's rival, Isocrates.)  
 But Meno's character was not Plato's subject. He  
 may have been a bad man—that was a matter of  
 comparative indifference; he certainly was a bad  
*pupil*—that is a point of cardinal importance.  
 Compare Meno with the types of the *good* pupil—with  
 Glaucon and Adimantus, with Simmias and Cebes,  
 and above all with Theætetus, and it is seen how  
 appropriately he is selected as the respondent in a  
 dialogue that is meant to show that a partial and  
 premature attack on the fortress of the Nature of  
 Virtue must be fruitless.

<sup>1</sup> See too the note on the text of 72 A 20.

§ 6. *Anytus* is the well-known accuser of Socrates. This should be placed beyond doubt by his parting threat at 94 E; besides the hint at 99 E *τούτω μὲν, ὃ Μένων, καὶ αὐθις διαλεξόμεθα* and the concluding words of the whole dialogue *ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τούτον, ἔστιν ὃ τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις*. Moreover the name Anthemion, as in our dialogue, is given to the father of Socrates' accuser in the scholium on *Apol.* 18 B, presently quoted. The same name is given by Plutarch in two places to the father of an Anytus of whom he tells a story about his infatuation for Alcibiades (*Alc.* 4. 5; *Amat.* § 27 p. 762 D; cp. Satyrus in *Ath.* XII 534 E, Zeller *Socr.* p. 172 note); so also it is given in two places to the father of the Anytus of whom the story goes that he was the first to bribe judges (Plut. *Coriol.* 14. 4; Diod. XIII 64; cp. Arist. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* ch. 27 and see on 95 A 5). True or false, both these stories must refer to the same man, the personage in the *Meno* and the accuser of Socrates. There may be more doubt about the Anytus who is said (Plut. *de malign. Herod.* § 6 p. 862 B) to have proposed a vote of ten talents to Herodotus, where the father's name is not given. Some information as to Anytus will be found in the notes on 90 B 46 and 95 A 5, and this I proceed to supplement, referring among modern works to Grote *Hist.* ch. 68; Zeller *Socrates* pp. 162, 172-74; Riddell *Apology* *Introd.* pp. ii-iv; Fr. *Introd.* 29, 30.

The scholium on Plato *Apol.* 18 B begins *οὗτος ὁ Ἄνυτος Ἀνθεμίωνος ἦν υἱός, Ἀθηναῖος γένος, Ἀλκιβιάδου ἑραστής, πλούσιος ἐκ βυρσοδεικῆς*. He was a prominent democrat in the time of the Peloponnesian

War; in 404 B.C. he was exiled by the Thirty (Xen. *Hell.* II iii 42, 44), and in the next year he aided Thrasybulus to expel them and restore the democracy. 'Anytus was a man of strong political convictions: he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom' (Riddell *Introd.* p. xxviii, cp. Isocr. 18. 23 *Θρασύβουλος καὶ Ἄνυτος μέγιστον μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δ' ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων*). Anytus however appears not to have been an *extreme* democrat; the Aristotelian *Ἀθ. Πολ.* ch. 34 names him as a member of the 'middle party' of which Theramenes was the head.

When we read of a man *πλούσιος ἐκ βυρσοδεψικῆς*, who is at the same time (with whatever qualifications) a democrat, our thoughts naturally turn to Cleon. Because Socrates and the democrats were both attacked by Aristophanes, we are apt to suppose that they were in the same camp. But in the case of Anytus this is clearly not the case. The key of Anytus' character is his conversation. 'Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true philosopher' (Jowett *Meno*, *Introd.* p. 266). At the time of Socrates' trial (399 B.C.) it was the oligarchs who were the innovators; democracy was the established constitution. Though it was little more than a century old, if reckoned from Cleisthenes, and much less if reckoned from Ephialtes and Pericles, prescription had won for it veneration. This found its expression in the watchword *ἡ πατριος πολιτεία*, which certainly meant democracy of some kind, though how strong or how diluted might be a matter of individual taste.

In the *Apology* 23 E Socrates represents each of his three accusers as taking up the cudgels against him to avenge the insults to his own class; Meletus for the poets, Lycon for the orators, "ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. But there is reason to think that Anytus had further some private grounds for his animosity. We may well disregard the stories of his jealousy of Socrates in regard to Alcibiades; but there is a fairly well authenticated story that would assign to Anytus a motive against Socrates, which, though private, was but a particular instance of a public grievance. One of the commonest accusations against the new teaching, whether of Socrates or the 'sophists,' was its interference between parent and son (see on 92 A 3). Just such a case of interference had Anytus to resent from Socrates.<sup>1</sup> In Xenophon's *Apologia Socratis* (which is not, like Plato's, a speech supposed to be addressed by Socrates to his judges) we read §§ 29 foll. how Socrates, seeing Anytus passing, observes that Anytus is much puffed up at having got him condemned because he said Anytus ought not to bring up his son to his own trade. Socrates has met the son and formed a high opinion of his abilities; his mind, he told Anytus, will want a larger scope than leather-dealing affords, and if he does not get it he will fall into bad habits. So it turned out; the son took to drinking, and Anytus even after his death was in ill repute owing to his bad training of his son. We know nothing certain of the end of Anytus; on which matter, as Fritzsche says,

<sup>1</sup> See J. S. Mill *Dissertations* iii. 310.

'*neque inter se congruentia neque omnino probabilia memoriae produntur.*' Later writers indulge in various stories of the Nemesis that overtook him. Diog. L. (II 43) says that of Socrates' accusers the Athenians exiled some, and put Meletus to death; that the men of Heraclea ejected Anytus on the very day on which he arrived there; (VI 9) that Antisthenes was the reputed author of the decree condemning Anytus to exile and Meletus to death. Diodorus XIV 37 says that the accusers of Socrates were put to death without trial (*ἀκριτοι*); Plut. *de invidia* 6 p. 558 A says they were subjected to so rigorous a 'boycott' that they hanged themselves. (See Zeller *Socr.* 202.) We may probably assume that Anytus was dead at the time when the *Meno* was written.

Meno and Anytus supplement one another. They are products of the two forces which Plato, standing as it were between two fires, was continually combating, the false teachers on the one hand, the philistines (*μισολόγοι*) on the other (Fritzsche *Intr.* p. 19 note 8).

§ 7. As to the Slave, Fritzsche says *quamquam de servuli aetate nihil injicitur, tamen quanto proveciore sumis aetate, tantum demis loco venustatis.* He is not a character, but an abstraction, a typical blank mind.

§ 8. The assumed date of the dialogue depends on two considerations. Firstly, Meno is no longer very young, and he was still comparatively young when he started on the expedition of Cyrus (see § 4). This makes it difficult to interpose a long time between the dialogue and the expedition. Secondly, the nearer the time of the dialogue is placed to that of Socrates' trial, the more point there is in Anytus'

threat at 94 E. We may then assign the year 402 B.C. as probable. There is at least one anachronism in the dialogue, the mention of Ismenias at 90 A.

§ 9. The genuineness of the *Meno* was assailed by those two 'qui non ita multos Platonis libros de supplicio exemerunt, Ast et Schaarschmidt' (Fritzsche). But that was in unregenerate days. Ueberweg at one time doubted its genuineness, but ended by believing in it. The *Meno* can in fact say with not many degrees less right than the *Phaedo*

εἴ με Πλάτων οὐ γράψε, δὴ ἐγένοντο Πλάτωνες·  
 Σωκρατικῶν ὁάρων ἄνθεα πάντα φέρω.  
 (*Anth. Pal.* ix 358.)

'In the *Menon* more that is characteristic of Plato is brought together in a smaller space than in any other dialogue; if the *Phaedon* and the *Gorgias* are noble statues, the *Menon* is a gem' (J. S. Mill *Dissertations* III 350). And Mr. Walter Pater in his *Plato and Platonism*, p. 52, does justice to 'that most characteristic dialogue, the *Meno*.'

Besides internal evidence, the *Meno* is protected by an unmistakable reference in the *Phaedo* 72 E (see on 81 E 12), and a probable one in the *Republic* 506 c to *Meno* 97 B, to say nothing of other possibilities. Aristotle twice cites the *Meno* by name; *Anal. pr.* II 21. 7 = 67 a 21 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι λόγος, ὅτι ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις (81 D) and *Anal. post.* I 1. 7 = 71 a 29 referring to the ἀπόρημα at 80 D 1 (where see the note). It is true that Aristotle does not mention Plato as the author; but in similar style he cites the *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Gorgias* and *Hippias*

*Minor.* Further, though the *Meno* is not named, there is a probable reference to it in Arist. *Pol.* I xiii, for which see on 71 E 7.

§ 10. Hardly any dialogue of Plato is so clear-cut and simple in its construction as the *Meno*. The argument falls into five divisions, which correspond pretty nearly to the five scenes of which the dialogue consists.

The first scene (70 A–80 D cc. i–xiii) is between Meno and Socrates. Meno assails Socrates with the stock question ‘Can Virtue be taught?’ Socrates characteristically retorts by asking for a definition of Virtue, which Meno fails to give.

The second division extends from 80 D to 86 C (cc. xiv–xxi). The speakers are Socrates, Meno and the Slave. Meno, sore with his failure, and perhaps hoping to shelve the inquiry as to the definition of Virtue to which Socrates invites him, propounds a sceptical quibble that would imply the impossibility of a genesis of Knowledge, and consequently the futility of inquiry. Socrates by an experiment with the Slave shows that Knowledge is subject to a genesis, that its raw material is Opinion, and that we owe our power of recovering it to Reminiscence from a previous state of Existence.

The third scene, between Socrates and Meno, extends from 86 C to 90 B (cc. xxii–xxvi). Meno’s objection being thus overthrown he is again invited to the inquiry ‘What is Virtue?’ But Meno, who no doubt regards that question as merely academic and uninteresting, would much rather attack the practical question ‘Is Virtue teachable?’ Socrates will meet

him half-way. They must approach the question 'Is Virtue teachable?' from a *hypothesis* as to what Virtue is. If Virtue is Knowledge it will be teachable, and if not, not. But will this hypothesis stand? Yes, theoretically; for Virtue, like everything good and beneficial, may be ultimately reduced to Knowledge or Wisdom. But on the practical side a difficulty remains. Where are the teachers?

At this point Anytus, as a man of experience, is invited into the discussion, and in the fourth scene (90 B-95 A, cc. xxvii-xxxiv) he and Socrates are the interlocutors. Socrates begins by ironically assuming that just as for teaching in a special art we should go to a professional teacher, so for ἀρετή we should go to the Expert Teachers—the sophists. This excites Anytus' disgust. But when, like his colleague Meletus in the *Apology* (24 ε), he says that any good citizen is capable of instilling Virtue, he is soon faced with a number of conspicuous instances of failure.

Anytus having departed in dudgeon, the final scene (95 A-100 B, cc. xxxv-xlii) is left to Socrates and Meno. This paradox about Virtue is not confined to one place or time: he who has it for the most part cannot impart it: he who professes to impart it for the most part does not possess it. The only solution is that Virtue, as we see it in the world, is not the product of Knowledge, but of something like Knowledge, that is, of half-knowledge or Opinion. Opinion may simulate the results of Knowledge; but the possessor of it has not the root of the matter in him, his hold on Virtue is precarious, and not communicable. Perhaps some day there may arise a man or men

whose Virtue is rooted in Knowledge, and then we shall see great things. But we shall get no satisfactory result till we attack the problem What Virtue is.

§ 11. As to Meno's, inquiry, Jowett (*Meno* Intr. p. 262) says 'No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times.' This is hardly the place for considering why the inquiry has been superseded in modern times, if indeed this be the case. But at the end of the fifth century B.C. certain phenomena forced the matter on the consideration of the Greeks, not as a mere academic problem, but as an urgent practical question. These phenomena were mainly two. In the first place there was the obvious fact that parents failed to influence their children. Great fathers sometimes had feeble sons, good fathers vicious sons, wise fathers silly sons. With regard to the ordinary arts there did appear to be a certain power of communication; but as to the inner quality ἀρετή, that vaguely-apprehended something that made one man count for more than another, the best wishes of parents and trainers seemed almost powerless.

Just at this time arose a class of men who did profess to fill the gap that home-training obviously left—the sophists. Were they public benefactors or were they frauds? Many of the young men said the former; most of the old men said the latter. If the sophists were unsuccessful, it might either be because they were attempting something in itself impossible, or because they were attempting a possible task in the wrong way. Thus the question 'Is Virtue teachable?' was one to interest everybody.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The two divisions of Socrates' argument in the *Protagoras*

§ 12. What place does the *Meno* take in the order of Plato's writings? In regard to any Platonic dialogue this is at once the most important and the most difficult question that we have to answer. It results from the place of Plato in the history of philosophy that it is precisely the *development* of his views that forms the chief point of interest in them.

To Grote the question of the order of the Platonic writings seemed an unprofitable maze (see for instance his note at II 16, about the *Meno*; and II 120 on the question whether the *Protagoras* or the *Gorgias* is prior). The dialogues he regarded as pictures in a kaleidoscope, each fascinating in itself but quite discontinuous from anything before or after. I wish to speak with the utmost veneration of the work of Grote. The 'provocative shock' he gave to the study of Plato is something almost comparable in its kind with the work of Socrates. We stand on his shoulders, and how much we are thereby raised we have not to-day full means of judging. Before he wrote, all Plato's works were supposed to be parts of a finished and co-ordinated system. Inconsistencies were either ignored, or got rid of by the simple surgery of lopping off the offending dialogue from the Platonic canon. But since Grote cleared the air, much has been done, largely by British scholars, to bring the comprehension of Plato nearer than it has ever been before. Though with regard to the order of the dialogues we shall

319 A foll. (cp. on 93 B 17, 94 E 14) correspond, in inverse order, with the above-mentioned two sides from which the question was presented. So also do the two divisions of Socrates' discussion with Anytus.

always have to speak ὡς οὐκ εἰδότες ἀλλὰ ὡς εἰκάζοντες, we must not listen to the ἀργὸς λόγος that any attempt on the problem is futile. Olympiodorus at the end of his life of Plato tells how Plato on his death-bed dreamed that he was a swan pursued in vain by ἰξευταί; which Simmias explained to be the interpreters who should in vain endeavour to catch his thoughts. If the bird is not yet in our hands we may at any rate claim that we have closed in round it and are now able to watch its movements at closer quarters.

One great assistance to a better view of Plato's work is that it has come to be increasingly recognized that we must regard Plato not merely as a transcendental philosopher, but as a man living amongst men, with human preferences and antipathies, and undergoing human vicissitudes. The old spirit in regard to Plato finds fine expression in the words of Goethe (Ueberweg § 39, Grote I 201) 'Plato's relation to the world is that of a superior spirit whose good pleasure it is to dwell in it for a time. It is not so much his concern to become acquainted with it—for the world and its nature are things which he presupposes (*schon voraussetzt*)—as kindly to communicate to it that which he brings with him, and of which it stands in so great need.' It was his strong desire to get at Plato *the man* that made Grote cling so strongly to the authenticity of the Platonic Epistles, as 'the only occasions on which we have experience of Plato as speaking in his own person' (Grote I 219, cp. 216 note). We have had to give up the notion that in the Epistles we have a self-revelation of Plato; though we may still gather from them some statements as to

his life, of various degrees of trustworthiness. It is hard that the very time that has shown us the importance of understanding Plato's career should also have shown us how very slender are our materials for constructing it. The fact is that the tradition is not only scanty but corrupt, and appears to have been corrupted at a very early time. Diog. L. III 2 gives the name of Plato's nephew Speusippus, among others, as an authority for a miraculous story about Plato's birth.

§ 13. According to the most probable date of Plato's birth, the year 427 B.C., he was 28 years of age when in 399 B.C. his master Socrates was put to death. He had thus passed what has been for many great men the blossoming period of the mind. And yet his work was not begun. I think Grote's arguments (I 196 foll.) ought to be conclusive that Plato published no dialogues before the death of Socrates. Nor is it fatal to their cogency that the genuineness of the Platonic Epistles, on which Grote relied, must be given up. For the conception of the Socrates of the dialogues a certain mythical atmosphere is required, which readily gathered at no long interval after his death, but which would have been as impossible during his life-time as the appearance of his ghost.

We must beware then of expecting to find, or of thinking we detect, marks of 'juvenility' in any work of Plato. Yet it must be remembered that precocity was rare in Greek literary genius. Aristophanes is of course an instance, though his precocity has been exaggerated. We may be almost certain that Plato originally intended himself for public life, and that it was circumstances that forced him into

philosophy. For an Athenian in Plato's position to take up philosophy as a career in the fifth century would seem quite derogatory, and there was indeed no precedent for it. It was as if the eldest son of a peer should come out as a professional violinist.

For public life he had indeed one disadvantage from the start: *ισχνόφωνος ἦν* says Diog. L. (III 5 cp. Grote I 118). But the execution of Socrates decided the matter; it was the first great turning-point in his life. The signs of the times seemed to show that it was unsafe for Socrates' pupils to remain at Athens; Plato with others withdrew to Megara and thence made travels. During the next years of his life we may suppose the chief influences affecting his mind to have been, firstly, a strong antipathy to the democracy, with a feeling that he himself as far as politics were concerned could but bide his time; secondly, a strong desire to make himself the interpreter of his Master, and to present to his countrymen his Master's thoughts more or less recast by his own mind.

During this period he was, as to politics, in the position of a statesman whose party is 'out'; as to philosophy he was still an amateur; that is, he held no professional position. When he returned to Athens we do not know; the extent of his travels at this time has probably been much exaggerated and we need not suppose his absence to have extended over more than two or three years.<sup>1</sup> The dialogues that

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Grote I 121; Karsten *de Platonis quae feruntur epistolis* pp. 164 foll.; Ueberweg-Heinze p. 142. Zeller p. 17 says 'there is great probability, and even some external evidence,

belong to this period it is most reasonable to suppose were written at Athens. His antagonists, as far as there are any, are the old (in most cases dead) antagonists of Socrates. The dialogues that compose this, the 'Socratic,' series are the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Hippias major*, *Hippias minor*, *Io* and *Euthyphro*. (I lay no stress on the order, and I regard both the *Alcibiades* dialogues as spurious.) During the later years of this period were probably written two other dialogues, the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias*, though these rather belong to the next group of works.

Meanwhile a change was coming over the scene. Pupils of Socrates, Euclides at Megara, Antisthenes at Athens, had set up as heads of philosophic schools; Isocrates was winning a great position as an educator in rhetoric. The thought must have pressed itself more and more strongly on Plato that he should emulate them and finally cast in his lot with philosophy. It was not without a struggle that he gave up politics: τὸ πρῶτον πολλῆς μεστὸν ὄντα ὀρμῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶττειν τὰ κοινά, says the author of the seventh

that long before this journey' (of 388 B.C.) 'Plato had settled in Athens, and there worked as teacher and author; even granting that at this period his instructions were confined to a select few.'

Dr. Thompson *Gorgias* Introd. p. xvi note derides the 'fabulous extent and duration assigned to Plato's travels'; Plato's return 'according to more than one witness must have taken place about four years after the death of Socrates, that is to say about 395 B.C.' Corinth is one of the places where, according to Aristoxenus in *Diog. L. III 8*, Plato bore arms for his country. Probably this was at the battle of 394 B.C.

letter, using words which Plato certainly *might* have applied to himself (cp. Diog. L. III 23: after Plato's *third* return from Sicily πολιτείας μὲν οὐχ ἤψατο, καίτοι πολιτικὸς ὢν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν).

This brings us to what may be considered the second important moment in Plato's life; his first journey to Sicily and his starting as Principal of the Academy in Athens. The seventh letter (324 A) says that Plato first went to Syracuse σχεδὸν ἔτη τετταράκοντα γεγονώς—that is about 387 B.C. The date of the opening of the Academy by Plato is given as 387 or 386 B.C. (Ueb.-Heinze p. 138). Lists of the σχολάρχαι or Heads were preserved, and these lists were embodied in διαδοχαί published by later authors, of whom the earliest appears to have been Sotion, a Peripatetic who lived at the beginning of the second century B.C. (Ueb.-Heinze 26, 255; R. & P. 4 a).

There is a good deal of doubt and discrepancy about this journey of Plato's as well as about his travels after Socrates' death. I think we may draw one conclusion about it with a fair amount of certainty, namely that its object was not political. It is true that the seventh letter (326 B foll.) does attribute to Plato political objects even in his *first* journey to Sicily; but what could he expect to effect during the tyranny of the elder Dionysius? Olympiodorus in his life says that he went to Italy on this occasion to see the Pythagoreans, especially Archytas of Tarentum, and to Sicily θεασόμενος τοὺς κρατῆρας τοῦ πυρὸς τοὺς ἐν Αἴτνῃ. The descriptions in *Phaedo* 111 E, 113 B, make it reasonable to suppose that Plato did take some interest in volcanic phenomena. To the same

effect Diog. L. III 18: τρις δὲ πέπλευκεν εἰς Σικελίαν· πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ θεῖαν τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν κρατήρων, ὅτε καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους τύραννος ὦν ἠνάγκασεν ὥστε συμμῖξαι αὐτῷ. Then comes the story how he quarreled with Dionysius, who dismissed him abruptly; and how he was sold into slavery, but ransomed by Anniceris of Cyrene and so reached Athens in safety again (Grote I 121, Zeller p. 24). The story of the selling into slavery has been doubted by many. If the incident occurred, it certainly made little impression on Plato's mind; no sign of an allusion to it can be traced anywhere in his writings; even the seventh letter is silent about it. Perhaps its chief importance is the tradition that Anniceris, refusing to accept the sum he had paid for Plato, which his friends wished to refund, bought with it for Plato's use the garden in the Academy. This serves to connect this voyage of Plato with the commencement of his school.<sup>1</sup>

Among the travels of Plato after Socrates' death Diogenes (III 6) includes a journey to *Italy* to visit the Pythagoreans Philolaus and Eurytus. Neither he nor any one else says anything about a visit to *Sicily* at this time, so that we may safely assume that Plato's visit to the island in 388 B.C. was—as Diogenes III 18 says—his first. But it is quite possible that Diogenes is wrong about an earlier visit to *Italy*, and that his visit in 388 B.C. was his first to that country

<sup>1</sup> Diog. L. III 8 says that the original form of the name *Ακαδημία* was *ἐκαδημία*—in which there lurks perhaps a fanciful etymology from *ἐκάς δήμων*. (But he there makes Plato teach in the Academy after his *first* return to Athens.)

also. This is rather more probable as Diogenes interpolates this alleged earlier journey to Italy between Cyrene and Egypt. It is surely more probable that Plato in his first tour confined his travels to Africa, leaving the West for a future time.<sup>1</sup> The matter is not of great importance; but his sojourn with the Italian Pythagoreans in 388 B.C. becomes more important if it appears that this was his first personal interview with them. Not that by any means we need conclude that Plato was ignorant of Pythagoreanism before this; see Zeller p. 20, who in a note gives the stories about the purchase of Pythagorean *books* by Plato. But whatever these stories may be worth, no one who considers Plato's temperament will doubt that the cosmic imagery which was the glory of Pythagoreanism would receive new vividness in Plato's mind by intercourse with the leading spirits of that sect.

I conceive that Plato's travels in his fortieth year were directly connected with his resolution to start a school; whether it were that before beginning he wished to supplement his knowledge and experience in certain particular directions, or that being about to tie himself to Athens more closely, he wished to enjoy a spell of freedom while it was still open to him.

With regard to the *Gorgias*, both Cope (Intr. p. lxxiv) and Dr. Thompson (Intr. p. xvi) place it in the interval between Plato's return to Athens after his first travels, and his first Sicilian journey. They both recognize in it a certain buoyancy and comic spirit that imply that the writer was comparatively young. This

<sup>1</sup> To this view Zeller seems to incline: p. 16 note, and p. 19.

is combined with sternness and even bitterness on certain points. Plato, when he wrote the *Gorgias*, was disgusted with politics, but he was not disgusted with life. Dr. Thompson inclines to the conjecture that the *Gorgias* was the first work, or one of the first, written by Plato after his first return to Athens. To this the chief objection I have to offer is that sufficient time is not thus allowed for the earlier dialogues, all written (I believe) after Socrates' death. It seems to me much more probable that the *Gorgias* was the last dialogue written before Plato's departure on his travels to Italy and Sicily with a fixed resolve as to his future career. He bids good-bye to Athens—for a time; and good-bye—probably for ever—to politics. For this last step it is the *'Απολογία Πλάτωνος*.

To make clear Plato's procedure and attitude when he returned again to Athens, I cannot do better than borrow the words of the article 'Sophists' in the *Encyc. Brit.* p. 268 b (by 'H. J.'), only premising that I am inclined to refer the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* to a time when Plato was in intention, though not yet in fact, Head of the Academy. 'It may be imagined further that when Plato established himself at the Academy, his first care was to draw up a scheme of education, including arithmetic, geometry (plane and solid), astronomy, harmonics and dialectic, and that it was not until he had arranged for the carrying out of this programme that he devoted himself to the special functions of professor of philosophy. However this may be, we find among his writings,—intermediate, as it would seem, between the Socratic conversations of his first period, and the metaphysical disquisitions

of a later time—a series of dialogues, which, however varied their ostensible subjects, agree in having a direct bearing upon education. Thus the *Protagoras* brings the educational theory of Protagoras and the sophists of culture face to face with the educational theory of Socrates, so as to expose the limitations of both; the *Gorgias* deals with the moral aspect of the teaching of the forensic rhetorician Gorgias and the political rhetorician Isocrates; and the intellectual aspect of their respective theories of education is handled in the *Phaedrus*; the *Meno* on the one hand exhibits the strength and the weakness of the teaching of Socrates, and on the other brings into view the makeshift methods of those who, despising systematic teaching, regard the practical politician as the true educator; the *Euthydemus* has for its subject the eristical method; finally, having in these dialogues characterized the current theories of education, Plato proceeds in the *Republic* to develop an original scheme.'

Side by side with this should be put the summary which the same author has appended to the last of his papers on 'Plato's Later Theory of Ideas,' namely that on the *Politicus*, in *J.P.* xv 302 foll.

'In short, I think we may distinguish four stages or periods of Plato's literary career, and designate them as :

- (1) Socratic, of which the *Euthyphro* is typical;
- (2) educational—including the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Meno*, the *Euthydemus*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedo*;
- (3) philosophical—including the *Philebus*, the

*Parmenides*, the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, the *Timaeus* ;

(4) political—including the *Laws*.’

(The list does not contain all the dialogues.)

It may be observed that in group (1) the persons criticized are mainly antagonists of Socrates; in group (2) they are Plato's rivals, but often also Socrates himself; in group (3) they are Plato's rivals, Socrates, and also Plato himself at an earlier stage. In the last stage of all, the *Laws*, Plato returns in a manner *à ses premiers amours*, politics. It is out of the question for him now to take an active part in Athenian affairs; but he so far returns to 'practical' politics as to consider in the *Laws* the best amendments on existing institutions. Plato's second and third journeys to Sicily, the second in 367 B.C. when he was sixty years old, the third later, were undertaken in the vain hope of putting his political theories in practice.

§ 14. We are immediately concerned with the second or 'educational' group of dialogues, to which the *Meno* belongs. We may assume that Plato after he became Head of the Academy at once began to prepare for writing his great educational work, the *Republic*, and that he would not allow more time than he could help to elapse between the starting of the Academy and its publication.

Of the other dialogues of this group there are considerable grounds for placing the *Phaedo* later than the *Republic* (see H. Jackson in *J.P.* xv 303). The rest are all earlier than the *Republic*, and more or less intended to lead up to it. Assuming then that

the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* were written before the first journey to Sicily, we have to fit in the *Phaedrus*, *Euthydemus* and *Meno* between Plato's return to Athens and the publication of the *Republic*. The *Menexenus* and the fragmentary *Clitophon* also belong to this time (see Grote III pp. 8, 25). (The *Symposium* is reserved for subsequent consideration.)

As to the date of the *Republic*, almost the only reference to external events that we have to guide us is the mention of Ismenias of Thebes (*Rep.* I 336 A). In the note on 90 A 40 I have given reasons for thinking that this passage was written not long before Ismenias' death, which took place probably towards the end of 382 B.C.<sup>1</sup> We may then conjecturally assign to 381, or the earlier part of 382 B.C., the publication of bk. I of the *Republic*. Probably some further portion was published with it; but the question in what instalments the work was presented cannot be discussed here.

Can we go any farther, and, assuming that the *Phaedrus*, *Meno* and *Euthydemus* were all written

<sup>1</sup> As to Plato's practice in regard to naming his contemporaries, see Dr. Thompson in *J.P.* VIII 307 note (cp. XI 2 note): 'This reticence, of which it is not difficult to divine the motives, is most carefully practised in the case of the living celebrities who claimed like himself to be disciples of Socrates, such as Euclides, Aristippus and Antisthenes. A cursory reader of Plato has no idea that such men existed as the heads of rival sects with which the Platonists of the Academy were engaged in perpetual controversy. On the other hand Plato never scruples to name the dead, nor perhaps those living personages with whom he stood in no relation of common pursuits or common friendships, e.g. Lysias, Gorgias, etc.'

between 387 and 382 B.C., ascertain the order in which they came? Here our conclusions can only be tentative. Perhaps the best method will be to take all the educational dialogues in order, and briefly consider their relations to the *Meno*.

§ 15. The *Protagoras*. The main subject of the *Protagoras* is the same as that of the *Meno* 'Is Virtue teachable?' It brings out the looseness of popular views of Virtue, and the futility of attempting the position from the side that naturally presented itself—the practical side—before mastering the metaphysical key to it, the nature of Virtue. 'The issue of our conversation' says Socrates 'renders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in everything rather than knowledge:—on which supposition it would hardly be teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear them up; and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through the whole investigation—first, what Virtue is, next, whether it is teachable or not' (Grote II 69; cp. Fr. Intr. p. 14).

The expectation here raised is to some extent fulfilled in the *Meno*. Not that the *Meno* is by any means final; but certain important steps forward are made. There are, to begin with, some attempts at actually defining Virtue. These attempts though abortive serve to illustrate the nature of the problem.

The fourth section of the dialogue—the dialogue with Anytus (cc. xxvii–xxxiv)—goes largely over ground already traversed in the *Protagoras* (see § 11 above). But in the *Protagoras* the question whether after all there is an ἐπιστήμη ἀρετῆς is not faced<sup>1</sup>; nor is there any trace of the doctrine of δόξα, by which a solution is offered of the paradox that although Virtue is of the nature of Knowledge, yet the possessors of Virtue are for the most part unable to impart it, nor of the allied topic of ‘demotic virtue’ (see on 100 A 6).

There is much ground for supposing that of the ‘Educational’ dialogues the *Protagoras* is the earliest. The argument is almost purely Socratic. In particular there is the well-known identification of the Pleasant and the Good. Virtue is represented in the *Protagoras* as a calculus of Pleasures. From this outcome of Socratic teaching, which was developed by Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, Plato shortly afterwards strongly separated himself, and he criticizes it in the *Gorgias*. (See Grote II 60, 78, 119 foll.; J. & A. M. Adam’s *Introd. to Prot.* pp. xxix foll.)

§ 16. The *Gorgias*. The main point of advance in the *Gorgias* is the strong assertion of the intrinsic difference between Pleasure and Good (Zeller p. 121). It is true that as Grote says (II 105) ‘Plato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good and Evil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know it: we learn only that Good is a mental perfection, Evil a mental taint, answering to

<sup>1</sup> ‘Plato Menone hanc quaestionem, num veritatis omnino cognitio sit, primum tractavit, qua in Protagora supersederat’ Hermann *Gesch. u. Syst.* I 483 (quoted by Fr.).

indescribable but characteristic sentiments in Plato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this circumstance, that they have no reference either to pleasure or pain.' But we could hardly expect from Plato at this stage a full and complete utterance on a point about which he perhaps never more than half satisfied himself.

The comparative slenderness of the metaphysical basis in the *Gorgias*, and the simplicity of the mythical materials (Exc. VI p. 289), point to a comparatively early date for its composition. As I have already said (§ 13) I should place it as the last dialogue written before Plato's first Sicilian journey. The Pythagorean passage 492 ε foll. furnishes no argument against this view.

Another argument for placing the *Gorgias* before the *Meno* is the fact that the term δόξα, later so closely connected by Plato with the province of rhetoric, is in the *Gorgias* conspicuous by its absence (see Exc. VII pp. 299, 300).

Further, the summary treatment of Gorgias' position and of the relations of rhetoric to sophistry in the *Meno* implies the thorough discussion of these points in the *Gorgias*. See on 95 C 23.

It is also just possible that in *Meno* 71 C the reference to Socrates' meeting with Gorgias may be a covert allusion to the earlier dialogue (cp. Exc. V p. 282).

§ 17. The *Phaedrus* I believe to have been written by Plato soon after his return from his first Sicilian journey, and to have been his first publication as Head of the Academy.<sup>1</sup> I lay some stress in regard

<sup>1</sup> This was the view taken by C. F. Hermann and others. Grote I 178, 561, etc., Zeller p. 104 note.

to this on the tradition that the *Phaedrus* was the earliest of all Plato's compositions.<sup>1</sup> The tradition is preserved by Diog. L. III 38 λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον, by Olympiodorus in his life of Plato ch. 3 (Teubner text VI p. 192) ὅτι δὲ τοὺς διθυράμβους ὁ Πλάτων ἤσκητο δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ Φαῖδρον, τοῦ διαλόγου πάνυ πνέοντος τοῦ διθυραμβώδους χαρακτῆρος, ἅτε τοῦ Πλάτωνος τοῦτον πρῶτον γράψαντος διάλογον, ὡς λέγεται, and lastly in the Προλεγόμενα τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας (Teubner text VI p. 217). The reasons assigned for giving the first place to the *Phaedrus* are different in each of these works and in each case somewhat frivolous; but perhaps the very inadequacy of the grounds alleged points to some real fact at the back of the tradition. If in the Academic records account was only taken of the writings of the Head in his official position, then the earlier writings of Plato would be ignored, and the *Phaedrus* would be set down as his first utterance.

In the *Phaedrus* the additional territory that Plato has added to his domain of thought is wide and diversified. I think most of these accessions may be connected with the new facts of his life, namely (1) his westward journey, (2) his professional position. The results of the first have two aspects, which are however closely connected. Plato's new intercourse with leading Pythagoreans I believe to have been in the first place the main source from which he drew the mass of mythical material with which is associated his teaching on Transmigration and Immortality (Exc.

<sup>1</sup> This view was taken by Schleiermacher: Grote I 172, etc., Zeller pp. 129 foll.

VII p. 296). Further, I believe that from the same source fell the spark that kindled into life Plato's first theory of Ideas. From an early time Plato felt that to the Universal attached a Reality that did not belong to the particulars. Perhaps the passage most clearly showing this is *Euthyphro* 6 D ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, φ̄ πάντα τὰ ὄσια ὄσιά ἐστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ που μὴ ἰδέειν τὰ τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὄσια ὄσια (cp. 5 D). 'Similar passages, in which the expressions which were afterwards used in connexion with the theory of ideas occur in speaking of the Socratic λόγοι, are far from rare in the Socratic dialogue' (J. Adam *Euthyphro*, Introd. p. xxviii: see also on 73 D 5, cp. Zeller p. 120 note). But what sort of independent existence of the Ideas was conceivable? Surely the Other World to which the Soul departed after its commerce with earth was the natural home for those Existences that were then the objects of its cognition. It is true that in the *Phaedrus* we are not very explicitly told what the Realities are on which the Soul gazes; only that it sees the very Justice, the very Temperance, the very Knowledge, οὐχ ἧ̄ γένεσις πρόσεστιν, οὐδ' ἧ̄ ἐστὶ που ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὐσα ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄ̄ ἐστὶν ὄν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὐσαν. But that corresponding to every General Name there is an independently-existing Idea Plato probably first expressly said, or at least wrote, in *Rep.* x 596 A εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἐν ἑκαστῷ εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἑκαστὰ τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταῦτ' ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν (see H. Jackson in *J.P.* x 254 foll.). But it was in the *Phaedrus* that the Universals were 'hypostatized' and the Ideal Theory developed. Possibly we have a hint of this in

the words (247 c) that no poet has yet hymned the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος*. But the separate existence of the Ideas could only be described by borrowing the language of Sense (see on 72 C 2); indeed the mind refused to grasp them except as a kind of sensible.<sup>1</sup> And thus the Ideas in receiving 'a local habitation and a name' received their death-blow; the Ideal Man, existing apart from particular men, was after all but One More, so that a new Idea was needed embodying the common qualities he had with the rest (Grote II 271).

The new aspects in the *Phaedrus* that may be connected with Plato's new position consists in its polemical character. In the earlier dialogues there is very little polemic against living individuals. Plato is still a free-lance among philosophers; his sympathies and antipathies to other teachers are determined mainly by loyalty to Socrates, and are very little personal. It is absurd to suppose that the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* are attacks on the distinguished men whose names they bear. In the *Gorgias* there is, it is true, earnest denunciation of popular Statecraft and of oratory as her handmaiden.

<sup>1</sup> 'The Platonic Ideas are nothing more' (than 'first efforts'); 'but of all theories that have arisen in ingenious minds from an imperfect conception of the processes of abstraction and generalization, they are surely among the most plausible as well as beautiful' J. S. Mill *Dissertations* III 348. [The sequel shows admirably how the Ideal theory was arrived at.] Cp. J. Adam in *C.E.* XII 222: 'The doctrine of transcendent self-existent Ideas is a creation of the poet Plato, and has a permanent poetical if not philosophical value. It is the most powerful stimulus to the artistic imagination which Philosophy has ever supplied' (see Exc. VI p. 296).

In the *Phaedrus* the point of view is greatly changed. There is an attack upon Lysias—who is δεινότατος τῶν νῦν γράφειν (228 A) and therefore selected for the purpose—but the attack upon him is not because he teaches rhetoric, but because he teaches it in the wrong way. There are in the *Phaedrus* references to the view of rhetoric taken in the *Gorgias*, and something amounting to a recantation of it (see 260 D foll. ἀρ' οὖν, ὦ γαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν λόγων τέχνην;). Rhetoric is introduced speaking in her own defence; without me, she says, however much a man may know the Truth, the Art of Persuasion will not be his. Yes, she may be answered, but there is just the question; ὡσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ' ἄτεχνος τριβή. Again 269 B οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν εἴ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὀρίσασθαι τί ποτ' ἔστι ῥητορικὴ κτέ. 'This reads like a good-humoured apology for past severities' observes Dr. Thompson, *Intro.* p. iv. The 'faulty classification' is the analogy drawn in the *Gorgias* between Rhetoric and Confectionery. Presently this is repudiated, and for it is substituted an analogy between Rhetoric and Medicine (270 B). Pericles, who in the *Gorgias* is involved with other statesmen in a common censure, is here praised because his oratory was founded on a basis of scientific knowledge. A large part of the *Phaedrus* (from 259 onwards) is an attempt to construct a true or philosophic Rhetoric. This is to be founded firstly on Dialectic, that is, on proper methods of Collection and Division (265 D foll.,

cp. 273 D foll.); secondly on Psychology, just as Medicine depends on a proper knowledge of the body. (For Plato's new conception of a Rhetoric see Dr. Thompson's Introd. pp. xvi-xviii). When Plato wrote the *Phaedrus* he held that there was room for an Art of Expression, and possibly even intended to fit it into the curriculum of his Academy.

All this tends to show that the *Phaedrus* is later than the *Gorgias*; at the same time the westward journey furnishes the sort of interval necessary to explain the transit from the old point of view to the new. A further question may be put: was not the new view the direct outcome of a visit to the birth-land of Greek Rhetoric, the home of Corax and Tisias? To this I can only say that I know of no one living in Sicily at the time, who is likely to have impressed Plato in this direction; and I think his new position in Athens may have been alone the determining cause; but other speculations are not excluded.

It is in the *Phaedrus* that we find the first reference to Plato's rival at Athens, Isocrates (278 E foll.). The reference is friendly, and perhaps shows that Plato then really hoped to find in the 'philosophic' rhetoric Isocrates professed to furnish, an article superior to that supplied elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> If this be so, the spirit of professional rivalry embittered in the

<sup>1</sup> An approximation to Isocrates in the *Phaedrus* is noticeable in the tendency towards the Isocratean principle of avoiding hiatus. This appears especially in the dialogue portions: the proportion being less than half what is found in the *Symposium* and the *Republic* (Blass *Att. Bered.* II 426). For the early friendship of Plato and Isocrates see Diog. L. III 8.

following years the good relations with which they started. In the *Euthydemus* there is a distinct note of antagonism (Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus* pp. 179 foll.) and a still stronger one in the *Republic*, if we are to recognize in the picture (495 E) of 'the bald-headed tinker, who, having made some money, goes to the bath and washes himself, puts on a wedding garment, and proposes to marry his master's daughter, now that she is poor and desolate,' Isocrates with his patronage of poor forlorn Philosophy (Teichmüller *Literarische Fehden* pp. 103-105, 1881, cp. H. Jackson *Proc. of the Cambridge Philol. Society* 1882, pp. 13 and 41). Plato is rarely so acrimonious as this.<sup>1</sup>

The date here assumed for the composition of the *Phaedrus*—say 386 B.C.—is merely part of a hypothesis which must stand or fall according as it is found to fit or not to fit the view of Plato's career which increased enlightenment shall show to be a reasonable one. Dr. Thompson (Introd. pp. xix, xx) argues against the view of C. F. Hermann that I have here adopted, and would place it later. So would Mr. J. B. Bury (*J.P.* xv 83 foll.). On the other hand Zeller p. 134 (see the other passages there referred to, and the note on p. 399) argues for a comparatively early

<sup>1</sup> See Jebb *Attic Orators* Introd. p. cxx 'Nothing more distinguishes Plato from later satirists of like keenness than his manner of hinting the redeeming points of the person under dissection; and whenever Gorgias comes in—whether in the dialogue that bears his name or elsewhere—it may be discerned (I venture to think) that Plato's purpose was to bring out an aspect of the man—that aspect which he considered most important—but that he allowed, and was writing for those who knew, that there was another side to the picture.'

date of the *Phaedrus*. It must be allowed that on the view here taken the amount of new material in the *Phaedrus* is very large, and these advances cannot all be connected with the external circumstances above considered. I will mention three: the tripartite division of the Soul; the method of συναγωγή and διαίρεσις, and the recognition of two distinct grades below the φιλόσοφος corresponding respectively with the φιλότιμος and the φιλοχρήματος (see Exc. VI p. 295). In the *Phaedo* the φιλοσώματος is recognized as another stage below these three.

§ 18. The next dialogue to be considered is the *Euthydemus*. Both it and the *Meno* I regard as preceding the *Republic*; but which of the two is prior is extremely hard to say. On the whole I think it probable that the *Meno* is later. The topic of the ascendancy of φρόνησις is treated elaborately in the *Euthydemus*, more succinctly in the *Meno*. See on 88 A 7. On the other hand, the great question of the *Meno* receives summary treatment in the *Euthydemus* (282 c) εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Κλεινία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σοφία διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἄσκεπτον καὶ οὐπω διωμολογημένον ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, διδακτόν εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἠσθεὶς εἶπον· Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, καὶ εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ, πότερον διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἢ σοφία. (The shifting of the subject of the question from ἀρετή to σοφία is not important.) It seems to me that we have here not so much a reference back to a previous discussion, as a shelving of the question at present for convenience.

Plato had moreover already treated the question 'Is Virtue teachable?' in the *Protagoras*. (For views as to the date of the *Euthydemus* see Grote I 561 note; II 243 note, where Grote agrees with Ueberweg that the *Euthydemus* is later than the *Phaedrus*: Zeller p. 84 note, p. 119, and p. 126 note 80, where it is argued that the Ideal theory is implied in the *Euthydemus*.)

§ 19. If the views just put forward be accepted, the *Meno* may be regarded as the immediate prelude to the *Republic*. Some corroboration is to be found in the close analogy between the end of the *Meno* and the end of Book I of the *Republic*. In both Socrates is dissatisfied; he has been led off on side issues from the pursuit of the main problem. 'I have not been well entertained,' he tells Thrasymachus, 'but that was my own fault and not yours: for as your gourmands seize upon every new dish as it goes round, and taste its contents before they have had a reasonable enjoyment of its predecessor, so I seem to myself to have left the question we were at first examining, concerning the real nature of Justice, before we had found out the answer to it . . . so that at present the result of our conversation is that I know nothing: for while I do not know what Justice is, I am little likely to know whether it is in fact a virtue or not, or whether its owner is happy or unhappy' (Davies' and Vaughan's translation).

The transference of the subject of investigation from Virtue in the *Meno* to Justice in the *Republic* is characteristic. In the *Republic* we have an important development of the Socratic doctrine that Virtue is One. The cardinal virtues are now regarded as

'broken lights' of the One Virtue, and the grounds on which their difference depends are examined. This analysis finds no place in the *Meno*, nor in Book I of the *Republic* (Zeller, pp. 451 foll.).

The treatment of δόξα in the *Republic* carries on that in the *Meno*: in *Rep.* 506 c we have what looks like a verbal reference to *Meno* 97 A. Further, *Meno* 89 B contemplates an Ideal State, such as the *Republic*, at 99 A we get a glimpse of the notion that the Man is the microcosm of the State, and at 100 A we have a foreshadowing of the simile of the Cave in *Rep.* vii.

§ 20. The next dialogues to be considered in relation to the *Meno* are the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo*. Both of these I regard as later than the *Republic*, and *a fortiori* later than the *Meno*. In spite of their great difference they have this in common, that both present an idealized picture of Socrates more full and vivid than any to be found elsewhere (cp. Grote II 227); also that Plato rises in them to what is absolutely his highest point of poetical beauty, both in imagination and in diction. One strong reason for thinking them later than the *Republic* is that in assigning the *Phaedrus*, *Euthydemus* and *Meno* (with the *Menexenus* and *Clitophon*) to the years 386–383 B.C.—during all which time Plato must have been working at his *chef d'œuvre*—we are sufficiently filling up his time. In the case of the *Symposium* there is nothing that may not have been subsequent to the *Republic*, whereas in the *Phaedo* there are things we may almost say must have been so (cp. p. xxxix and presently p. liv).

∴ The main point of contact between the *Meno* and

the *Symposium* is in the development of the doctrine of δόξα contained in the latter. It is possible that at 202 A (quoted on 97 B 17) we have a reference not merely to the doctrine of the *Meno* but the actual treatise.<sup>1</sup> Whereas in the *Phaedrus* Eros is a god, the son of Aphrodite, in the *Symposium* he is relegated to the sphere of intermediary powers, and is not a god but a δαίμων. Thus he is brought nearer to men (Grote II 216).

The *Phaedo* is connected with the *Meno* by the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. The *Meno* is unmistakably referred to, and its doctrine receives a further development (see on 81 D 12 and § 9 above).

§ 21. A question may be raised as to the development of the doctrine of Immortality in Plato. In five of the dialogues that have now been considered this doctrine appears. These dialogues come, on the hypothesis adopted, in the order, *Phaedrus*, *Meno*, *Republic*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*. Is this order consistent with a probable view of the development of Plato's views on this subject? The main difficulty is the position of the *Symposium*. Whereas in the *Phaedrus*, the *Meno*, and the *Republic* we have proofs offered of the immortality of the soul (though that in the *Meno* is a partial and abbreviated one, in which the argument and myth of the *Phaedrus* is probably presumed), in

<sup>1</sup> Grote (II 232, note) points out that the *Symposium* must have been written between 385 B.C.—the date of the διοίκησις of Mantinea—and 370 B.C. when it was re-established. Zeller p. 133 couples it with the *Phaedo* as belonging 'to a time when the philosophy of Plato, and also his artistic power, had reached full maturity.' 'Teichmüller has shown that the *Phaedo* is later than the *Symposium*': see *C.R.* x 41.

the *Symposium* only a 'metaphorical immortality' is asserted: 'the soul yearns for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific operation—by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble thoughts and feelings—by leaving a name and reputation to survive in the memory of others' (Grote II 223).

In the *Phaedo* the question is faced with all the solemnity and earnestness of which Plato is capable. It is the sort of work that one might expect from a man who had just gone through a serious illness or a great trouble. I believe that Archer-Hind is quite right in upholding (*Phaedo* Intr. p. 21 foll.) that Plato did in the *Phaedo* maintain 'the immortality of particular souls as distinct from the eternity of the universal soul.' Not but that it is possible to exaggerate the importance attached by Plato to individual immortality (see on 86 A 8).

The explanation is probably this. Plato did offer in the *Phaedrus* a very general proof of the immortality of soul (245 c). Some few years later he offered in the *Republic* another proof (Bk. x 608 D-611 A). This proof is different from that in the *Phaedrus*, to which, so far as I can see, no allusion is made. In the *Phaedo* again there is neither resumption of, nor reference to, the arguments of the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*. It would seem that Plato after writing the *Republic* became conscious that his arguments, so far at least as personal immortality is concerned, were unsatisfactory. It is strange, at any rate, that the only

reference in the *Phaedo* to any previous treatment of the subject should be to the half-demonstration in the *Meno*. After writing the *Symposium*, circumstances, we know not what, brought Plato round to renew his assault on the great problem. The result remains in the *Phaedo* as his final achievement in this direction.

§ 22. I will not enter on the difficult question of the date of the *Theaetetus*. On arriving at this dialogue we leave the stage of the 'educational' dialogues, and enter on the 'philosophic.'<sup>1</sup> The *Theaetetus* must be later than the *Meno*, containing, as it does, an important development of the doctrine of δόξα. At the same time it contains in matters of detail some curious parallels to the *Meno*.

(1) The story of Theaetetus' attempts to define Knowledge is very like that of Meno's attempts to define Virtue (see on 71 E 1).

(2) There is a kinship between the mathematical passage at *Theaet.* 147 D foll. and the problem the solution of which Socrates elicits from the slave. In the *Theaetetus*, it is upon surds and square numbers that Theodorus has been lecturing, and he stops at the number 16. Now it is *sixteen feet* that the figure in the *Meno* 83 C contains.

(3) The contrast between Theaetetus and Meno is pointed. Meno is fair in body, but not in mind; Theaetetus is just the reverse. Meno is exactly

<sup>1</sup> Zeller, I think, is certainly wrong (pp. 125 sqq.) in grouping the *Theaetetus* with the *Gorgias*, *Meno* and *Euthydemus*. For the hypothesis that the *Theaetetus* as we have it is an enlarged edition of an earlier work, see H. Jackson in *J.P.* XIII 244 note; Archer-Hind *Timaeus* Intr. p. 21, note.

described in *Theaet.* 150 E foll. (cp. 177 B). *Theaetetus wonders* but is not disconcerted.

(4) The simile of the *νάρκη*, applied by Meno to Socrates, is paralleled by that of the *μαία*, applied by Socrates to himself.

(5) The allusion to *χρῶμα* and the theory of vision in 153 D and 156 may be set beside *Meno* 76.

(6) The reference to *ἐριστική* 154 D, 164, 165, is just in the spirit of the *Meno*.

(7) The departure of Socrates at the end of the *Theaetetus εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελλήτου γραφήν* is balanced by Anytus' threat in the *Meno*.

§ 23. Thus the dialogues form a series, each linked to others before and after. When we have a promise of an intended work we may presume that the contents of the intended work were to some extent in the author's mind at the time of his making the promise, though his views would shape and develop themselves in the process of execution. So Plato had much of the *Republic* in his head when he wrote the *Meno*.

We shall not be more than a year or so out if we assign the *Meno* to 384 B.C. At that time Plato was forty-three years of age and Socrates had been dead for fifteen years.<sup>1</sup> I proceed on the assumption that

<sup>1</sup> Schleiermacher thought that the *Meno* was written thirteen years after the death of Socrates. See his views, Grote II 16 note. While dissenting on some points I find it rather remarkable that in so many I coincide with a writer who has pursued his investigations on such very different principles. Rudolf Hirzel (*Rhein. Mus.* XLII 249) suggests that the *Meno* (especially the Anytus episode) was called forth by the publication of the *κατηγορία Σωκράτους* by the sophist Polycrates. This was a feigned speech, put into the mouth of Anytus, which led to

the works which, after Plato's second return to Athens, preceded the *Republic*, he produced because he saw some special reason for doing so. In the *Phaedrus* he sets forth his new view of intellectual concepts, and puts himself right as to the function of Rhetoric; the *Euthydemus* has for its chief object the depressing of his professional rivals Antisthenes and Isocrates; the writing of the *Meno* may have been forced upon him by impatient and impertinent people who pressed him for an answer on the question of the day: 'Can you teach Virtue? What do you profess?' The *Meno* is thus rather satirical than polemical. It is a continuation of the discussion with Protagoras, though it is not with Protagoras that the discussion is continued. For the rôle of respondent in the new discussion Plato found no one so suitable as the spoiled and arrogant young Thessalian, who, it was recorded, had once met Socrates. That Meno is a pupil of Gorgias is a mere accident. The *Meno* is in no sense an attack on Gorgias. 'Let us leave him out of the question,' says Socrates (71 D), 'as after all he is not here': and the explanation of Gorgias' position, that he teaches not Virtue, but the Art of Speaking, is received without a word of comment.

§ 24. It has come to be recognized of late years that an important aid to the determination of the order of Plato's works may be afforded by investigation

the later belief that it was the speech Anytus used at the trial (cp. Isocr. *Bus.* § 5; Diog. L. II 38; Them. *Or.* 23, p. 296 c; Quint. II 174). Hirzel's case as to the *Meno* is weak, and I cannot believe that the purpose of that dialogue is a defence of Socrates.

of points of style—points mostly so minute as to represent half-unconscious habits of the author's mind, and therefore likely to furnish a trustworthy clue to what we may call its 'stratification.' Opinions differ a good deal as to the degree of importance to be attached to this evidence. Still it is true to say that in 'Stylometry' has been found an occasionally useful adjunct to the old method of 'Hylometry' (if we may so call it).

It is as confirmatory evidence with regard to the main groups of Plato's writings that Stylometry is of most service. On the evidence of style alone it might be asserted that the *Meno* belongs to a different period from the *Philebus*. But it affords but little help as to the order of dialogues within one group; it does not help us to discover whether the *Meno* or the *Euthydemus* is prior.

All discussions of the order of Plato's writings based upon style (and to a less extent those based on other considerations) depend on the assumption that Plato after once issuing a work left it unaltered. May we assume this? A certain passage in Dionysius of Halicarnassus would make the assumption appear entirely unwarranted. Plato continued up to his eightieth year, he tells us, τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων (*de compos. verborum* ch. xxv p. 208; see Jebb *Att. Or. Intr.* p. lxxiv, R. & P. 243). Then follows the story about the tablet which, they say, was found after his death, with the first words of the *Republic*—κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαῦκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος—arranged in several different orders.

We may well accept the view, which Dionysius is here supporting, of Plato's industry and fastidiousness in his literary work, and yet believe that Plato for the most part after publishing a dialogue regarded that edition as final. There was certainly no such general revision of his works as would have reduced them all to the level of one style, that of his later years. Conspicuous differences of style among the dialogues are obvious. With regard to subject matter the same is clear: there are abundant instances of inconsistency, development and self-criticism. I think, too, that Plato's mind was too active to allow him to spend any large amount of time in 'touching-up and titivating' published works, to say nothing of the inconvenience of having different editions in circulation at the same time.

The truth about the story appears to be this. Plato lived during a period when Attic prose was undergoing a great revolution. Beginning with a natural order, in which words were set down in the arrangement their mere sense would dictate, with little or no attention to euphonious combination, Attic writers ended with a style in which the arrangement of words was almost as severely conditioned as in verse; and this in regard to two things mainly, the collision of vowel sounds and rhythm. Plato was not a leader in this movement; it proceeded from the orators. But Plato had an exquisite ear for prose rhythm, and he could not be deaf to the effects the innovators produced. Moreover he was an experimenter in style. In the *Phaedrus* the influence of Isocrates is traceable; the *Menexenus* is an attempt to rival Lysias; in the

*Symposium* there is a succession of parodies of leading stylists. As time went on he elaborated more and more the order of words, and in particular became more and more sparing of hiatus.

We notice in Plato a growing tendency to fall in with the new taste in prose; but this tendency is broken by occasional experiments. This is a disturbing element that must always be taken into account when applying the stylometric method to Plato. Many writers indeed are liable to get a particular phrase or trick of style running in their head, an affection that disappears as unaccountably as it came. Such a trick we have in the use of *εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα* eight times in the *Charmides* (see on 80 D 4).

§ 25. The verdict of Stylometry as regards the *Meno* fortunately agrees pretty well with that which would be given on other grounds. It is marked as not belonging to the later dialogues by the comparative indifference to *hiatus* (see on 77 A 5, 98 C 13) and the general simplicity of the order of words (see on 89 E 26).

Prof. Lewis Campbell in *C.R.* III 28 gives a review of an important essay in the new method of 'quantitative criticism'; namely Constantin Ritter's *Die Echtheit und Chronologie der platonischen Schriften* (Stuttgart 1888). Prof. Campbell had himself done most important work in this direction in his General Introduction to the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* (1867). Among foreign scholars W. Dittenberger led the way in 1881 by publishing in *Hermes* xvi pp. 321-345 his *Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge*. 'Having learned that the particle

μήν, for example, was rarely or never used by the earlier Attic prose-writers, he read through Plato with this in view, and found that the familiar formula τί μήν; was entirely absent from about two-thirds of the whole number of the generally acknowledged dialogues, and that in about half γε μήν was nowhere to be found, while on the other hand in the remaining works more than a hundred instances of τί μήν; and about sixty of γε μήν appeared.' (Neither τί μήν; nor γε μήν are found in the *Meno*, but ἀλλὰ μήν and καὶ μήν both occur.) 'The line of investigation thus marked out by Dittenberger has since been pursued by many scholars, of whom M. Schanz is much the most significant name. His paper in *Hermes* XXI pp. 439-459' (*zur Entwicklung des platonischen Stils*, 1886) 'has given fresh importance to this whole inquiry. The number of test-formulae has rapidly grown, and the many paths of observation successively opened show a remarkable amount of convergence.'

Among small immaterial points in which it is thought that the workings of half-conscious habit may be traced, a very large number of facts are furnished by the *formulae of answer*. Ritter after investigating these says that in the *Meno* out of 182 instances of answer-formulae, 42, or 23 per cent, take the form ἔγωγε, ἔμοιγε or δοκεῖ μοι. This form is characteristic of the 'first group' (including *Phaedo* and *Symposium*); is less common in the 'second group' (*Rep.*, *Phaedr.*, *Theaet.*, and perhaps *Parm.*), and is rare in the last group (*Soph.*, *Polit.*, *Phil.*, *Tim.*, *Crit.*, *Laws*). I quote some results at which he arrives in regard to the *Meno* and six other dialogues.

	<i>Prot.</i>	<i>Euthyd.</i>	<i>Gorg.</i>	<i>Meno</i>	<i>Rep.</i>	<i>Philebus</i>	<i>Laves</i>
δήλον ὅτι . . .	15	11	15	12	47	8	16
δήλον ὡς . . .	0	0	0	0	2	5	14
σχεδόν τι (or separated)	3	2	2	1	12	0	2
σχεδόν . . . .	0	0	3	0	7	14	122
ὡς ἔλεγον impf.	4	7	19	5	43	4	6
ὡς εἶπον aor. .	0	0	1	0	7	5	24
πότερον before vowels	18	13	13	4	27	21	36
πότερον before conson.	8	15	16	8	17	0	4
πότερα before conson.	0	2	1	0	3	6	7
πότερα or πότερ' before vowels	1	0	0	0	1	1 (50D)	1
ὡσπερ . . . .	68	30	69	21	212	9	24
καθάπερ . . .	0	1	1	0	6	27	148
μῶν . . . . .	2	3	0 (rare in early dialogues)	3	3	10	29
δέ γε . . . . .	3	6	25	12	67	27	31
forms of answer ἐγωγε, ἐμοιγε, δοκεῖ μοι, etc. = % . . . . .	50 3 6	107 19 17	336 49 15	182 42 23	1260 69 5½	314 3 1	568
ἀληθῆ λέγεις .	6	3	5	4	9	2	7
ἀληθῆ . . . .	0	0	0	0	29	2	4
ἀληθῆ, ἀλ. λέγεις, ὀρθῶς λ. ἀληθέστατα, etc., superl.	6 0	3 0	5 0	5 0	48 40	6 22	22 36

	<i>Prot.</i>	<i>Euthyd.</i>	<i>Gorg.</i>	<i>Meno</i>	<i>Rep.</i>	<i>Philebus</i>	<i>Laws</i>
<i>Repetition of words from questions</i>							
with γάρ οὖν . . .	5	22	28	16	218	35	34
„ γάρ. . .	0	0	1	0	22	12	10
„ δῆτα . . .	0	1	5	2	55	0	2
„ δῆτα . . .	0	5	8	7	11	1	1
πάνυ γε . . .	3	20	48	27	40	9	4
πάνυ μὲν οὖν . . .	3	3	7	5	64	21	49

These figures show in a general way a kinship between the *Meno* and the group *Protagoras*, *Euthyd.*, *Gorgias* and *Republic*; from which the *Philebus* is removed and the *Laws* yet more removed. Some of the other results at which he arrives, however, diverge considerably from the views adopted in the present work.

Ritter argues that for determining the order of the dialogues language is the only test: doctrinal content, allusions from one work to another, historical references, are all illusory or insufficient.

The stylometric method has been disparaged by Ferdinand Horn (*Platonstudien*, Vienna, 1893)<sup>1</sup>; also by Zeller in the 4th (German) edition of his *History of Ancient Philosophy* and in two papers.

But the writer who has been most prominent in recent years in regard to this kind of research is W. Lutoslavski. A paper of his was read before the

<sup>1</sup> In an Appendix (pp. 343-358) he gives an analysis and criticism of the *Meno*, which he believes to have been written later than the *Protagoras*, but earlier than the *Gorgias*.

Oxford Philological Society on 21st May, 1897, of which a review is given in *C.R.* xi 284: 'Great numbers of stylistical peculiarities are required for correct inferences. C. Ritter investigated only forty peculiarities of style, and many other inquirers have drawn inferences from a single occurrence of a single peculiarity. The chronological conclusions drawn by Lutoslavski are based on the comparison of five hundred peculiarities representing fifty-eight thousand observations made by various investigators.' His method has been, assuming that the latest work of all is the *Laws*, to group in order of their approximation to this the other 'late' dialogues, *Soph.*, *Polit.*, *Phil.*, and *Timaeus*. Then these dialogues, with the *Laws*, are taken as the standard of comparison for the remaining works.

So far as the earlier dialogues are concerned, his conclusions are as follows:—

(1) *Gorgias* is later than *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*, and all Socratic dialogues.

(2) *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo* form a group later than the *Gorgias*, and were written probably in the order here mentioned.

(3) *Republic* Bks. II–X were written in a few years, and are later than the *Phaedo*. The composition of this work was not interrupted by other labours; only Bk. I is very much earlier, probably written between *Gorgias* and *Cratylus*.

(4) *Phaedrus* was written about 379 B.C. and after the *Republic*.

In 1897 Lutoslavski's main work *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* was published in English.

A careful and elaborate review of it, by J. Adam, appears in *C.R.* xii 218 foll. The work falls into two parts; the first 'stylometric' (of which a part of the results have just been given), the second dealing with the contents and teaching of the dialogues. The reviewer has some excellent observations on the limitations of the method of Stylometry. Lutoslavski says the method of his book is 'a result of the author's previous study of natural sciences and mathematics.' He has applied the methods there appropriate too rigidly to the workings of a human mind.

#### *Editions of the Meno*

*Platonis dialogi iv Meno, Crito, Alcibiades uterque cum adnotatione critica et exegetica.* Curavit Ph. Buttmannus (Ed. iv 1822, Ed. v 1830). This work was based on the work of F. E. Biester, who published an edition of these four dialogues in the year 1780, in accordance with a decree of Frederick the Great, issued in the previous year, to promote the better editing of Latin and Greek works for the use of schools, and the publishing of German translations of the same.

*Vier platonische Gespräche, Menon, Kriton, der erste und zweite Alcibiades, Deutsch mit Anmerkungen etc.*, by F. Ullrich (Ed. ii 1821). This was based on a translation by F. Gedike issued in 1780 as part of the scheme referred to above.

Stallbaum published an edition of the *Meno* in 1827, and again in 1836 as part of his complete edition of Plato's works. On this is based, but with great additions and improvements, the work of R. Fritzsche (Leipzig 1885).

The *Meno of Plato*, with Introduction and Notes, by St. George Stock, M.A., Pembroke College, Oxford (Clarendon Press 1891). [This I believe is the only edition with English notes hitherto published.]

*Explanation of some References*

'Grote' = *Plato and the other companions of Socrates*, by George Grote, F.R.S. (Ed. II 1867). (When Grote's *History of Greece* is indicated it is referred to specifically. Unfortunately the paging differs so much in the different editions that it has only been possible to refer to the chapters.)

'Zeller' = *Plato and the Older Academy*, translated with the Author's sanction from the German of Dr. Eduard Zeller by Sarah Frances Alleyne and Alfred Goodwin, M.A. (new ed. 1888). (When translations of other parts of Zeller's work are referred to, they are specially indicated. In the case of the vol. on Socrates, reference is made to the 3rd ed. 1885.)

'Kühner' = *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* von Dr. Raphael Kühner. Reference has unavoidably been made to the second edition (1870) by sections (§) and paragraphs. The numbering of the sections corresponds generally with that of the new (revised) edition.

'Jelf' = Jelf's *Greek Grammar* (3rd ed. 1861).

'Riddell' = *Digest of Idioms*, forming Appendix B to the edition of the *Apology* of Plato with Introduction and Notes, by the Rev. James Riddell, M.A. (Clarendon Press 1867).

'Goodwin M.T.' (or 'Goodwin') = *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*, by Dr. W. W. Goodwin (enlarged edition 1897).

'F.E.T.' = *A Syntax of Attic Greek*, by F. E. Thompson, M.A. 1883.

'C.R.' = *Classical Review*.

'J.P.' = *Journal of Philology*.

'R. & P.' = Ritter and Preller *Historia philosophiae*, etc. ed. 7, 1888.

'Ueb.-Heinze' = Ueberweg *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Phil.* ed. 8, 1894, re-edited by Heinze.

'J.H.S.' = *Journal of the Hellenic Society*.

'Fr.' = Fritzsche's edition (mentioned above).

'Sch.' = M. Schanz's edition of the text.

) (= distinguished from.

A mark † is affixed to the name of any work that is regarded as spurious.

The old Latin translation of Plato by Ficinus was published in 1532 (and the following years) and that by Cornarius at Basel in 1561.

# ΜΕΝΩΝ

ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς [πειραστικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΜΕΝΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΑΙΣ ΜΕΝΩΝΟΣ, ΑΝΥΤΟΣ

I. Ἐχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρα διδα- St. II.  
κτὸν ἢ ἀρετῆ; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλ' ἀσκητόν; ἢ P. 70  
οὔτε ἀσκητόν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παρα-  
γίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ τρόπῳ;  
5 ΣΩ. ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐ-  
δόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο  
ἐφ' ἵππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ, νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, B  
καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σου ἐταίρου  
'Αριστίππου πολῖται [Λαρισαίου]. τούτου δὲ  
10 ὑμῖν αἰτιὸς ἐστὶ Γοργίας· ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν  
πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε  
τοὺς πρῶτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἐστὶν Ἀρί-  
στιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ  
τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγα-  
15 λοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ  
εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὐτὸν C  
ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅ τι ἂν τις

Ξ

B

βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὄφρ οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος.  
 ἐνθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περι-  
 71 ἔστηκεν· ὥσπερ αὐχμὸς τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, 20  
 καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων παρ' ὑμᾶς  
 οἴχεσθαι ἢ σοφία. εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως  
 ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται  
 καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός  
 τις εἶναι [ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἶτε διδακτὸν εἶθ' ὄφρ 25  
 τρόφῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι]· ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτου  
 δέω εἶτε διδακτὸν εἶτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὡς  
 οὐδὲ αὐτό, ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ,  
 τυγχάνω εἰδώς.

B ἸΙ. Ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω·  
 συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος,  
 καὶ ἔμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ  
 ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστίν, πῶς  
 ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τί <ἐστίν> εἰδείην; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι 5  
 οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γυγνώσκει τὸ  
 παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν, τούτου εἰδέναι εἶτε καλὸς  
 εἶτε πλούσιος εἶτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν, εἶτε καὶ  
 τᾶναντία τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι;

C MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, 10  
 ἀληθῶς οὐδ' ὃ τι ἀρετὴ ἐστίν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα  
 περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἵκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;

ΣΩ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι  
 οὐδ' ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.

MEN. Τί δέ; Γοργία οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε 15  
 ἐνθάδε ἦν;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ γε.

MEN. Εἶτα οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι;

ΣΩ. Οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε  
 20 οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πῶς μοι τότε  
 ἔδοξεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνός τε οἶδεν, καὶ σὺ ἂν D  
 ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγεν· ἀνάμνησον οὖν με, πῶς ἔλεγεν.  
 εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ που σοὶ  
 ἄπερ ἐκείνω.

25 ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκείνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ  
 ἄπεστιν· σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί  
 φῆς ἀρετὴν εἶναι; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσης, ἵνα  
 εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῆς  
 30 σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκῶς μηδενὶ  
 πώποτε εἰδῶτι ἐντετυχηκέμαι.

III. ΜΕΝ. Ἄλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, ὦ Σώκρατες, E  
 εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν,  
 ῥάδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι  
 τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς  
 5 μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ  
 αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ  
 βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν,  
 ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σφίζουσάν τε  
 τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὔσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ  
 10 ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετὴ, καὶ θηλείας καὶ  
 ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει,  
 ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμ- 72  
 πολλαὶ ἀρεταὶ εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν  
 ἀρετῆς πέρι ὃ τι ἔστιν· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν  
 15 πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον  
 ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστίν· ὡσαύτως δέ, οἶμαι,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

✓ ΣΩ. Πολλῇ γέ τιμι εὐτυχία ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνήρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων. ἀτάρ, ὦ Β Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμῆνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγεσ αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην· ἀρα τούτῳ φῆς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ 25 διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἀλλῶ δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἀλλῶ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων; εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθεῖς;

MEN. Τοῦτ' ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἢ 30 μέλιτται εἰσίν, ἢ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.

Κ ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα· τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων, ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι· τί τοῦτο φῆς εἶναι; εἶχεσ δήπου ἂν τί μοι εἰπεῖν;

MEN. Ἐγωγε.

IV. ΣΩ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἰσιν, ἔν γέ τι εἶδος ταῦτόν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν, δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶσ που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον Δ τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει οὐσα 5 ἀρετῆ· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ τι λέγω;

MEN. Δοκῶ γέ μοι μανθάνειν· οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων, ἀλλῆ μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἀλλῆ 10 δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας

καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως ;  
 ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια, ἄλλη δὲ  
 γυναικός ; ἢ ταῦτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδος ἐστίν, ἐάν  
 15 περ ὑγίεια ἦ, ἐάν τε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ B  
 ὄψωσιν ἦ ;

MEN. Ἡ αὐτὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὑγίειά γε εἶναι καὶ  
 ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς ; ἐάν περ  
 20 ἰσχυρὰ γυνὴ ἦ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχυῖ  
 ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται ; τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω·  
 οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἰσχύς εἶναι ἢ ἰσχύς, ἐάν  
 τε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἢ ἐάν τε ἐν γυναικί· ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι  
 διαφέρειν ;

25 MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει 73  
 τι, ἐάν τε ἐν παιδί ἢ ἐάν τε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάν τε  
 ἐν γυναικί ἐάν τε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ;

MEN. Ἐμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκратες, τοῦτο  
 30 οὐκέτι ὁμοῖον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες  
 πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν ;

MEN. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οἶόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ  
 35 οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως  
 διοικοῦντα ;

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα. B

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν περ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως  
 διοικῶσιν, δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη διοική-  
 40 σουσιν ;

MEN. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφοτέροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.

MEN. Φαίνονται.

45

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης μὴν ἀκόλαστοι ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοὶ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο ;

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι ;

MEN. Ναί.

50

C ΣΩ. Πάντες ἄρ' ἀνθρωποὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν· τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται.

MEN. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ 55 ἦν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

V. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστίν, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ' ἐκείνου.

D MEN. Τί ἄλλο γ' ἢ ἄρχειν οἶόν τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ; εἴπερ ἓν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ 5 πάντων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ παιδὸς ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ, ὧς Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἶόν τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δούλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων ; 10

MEN. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὧς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὧς ἄριστε. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸδε σκόπει· ἄρχειν φῆς οἶόν τ' εἶναι· οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μὴ ;

15 MEN. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὧ  
Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ ἐστίν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀρετὴ, ὧ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετὴ τις ; / E

MEN. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν. οἶον, εἰ βού-  
20 λει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε, ὅτι  
σχῆμά τί ἐστίν, οὐχ οὕτως ἀπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα.  
διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα  
ἐστὶ σχήματα.

MEN. Ὅρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ  
25 λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι  
ἀρετάς.

ΣΩ. Τίνας ταύτας ; εἶπέ· οἶον καὶ ἐγὼ σοὶ 74  
εἴποιμι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύεις·  
καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἶπέ ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

30 MEN. Ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ  
εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέ-  
πεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν, ὧ Μένων, ταῦτὸν πεπόνθαμεν·  
πολλὰς αὐτὴν ἠύρηκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες,  
35 ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νυνδὴ· τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἢ διὰ πάντων  
τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.

VI. MEN. Οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὧ Σώκρατες, B  
ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων,  
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι,  
5 ἐὰν οἶός τ' ὧ, ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι. μαθάνεις γάρ  
που ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει περὶ παντός· εἴ τίς σε  
ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο, ὃ νυν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστίν  
σχῆμα, ὧ Μένων ; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυ-

λότης, εἴ σοι εἶπεν ἄπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα ἢ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι ; εἶπες δήπου <sup>10</sup> ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι.

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἐστὶν σχήματα ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὅποια, ἔλεγες ἂν ; <sup>15</sup>

MEN. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αὐτὸ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὃ τι ἐστὶν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν, πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρώμά ἐστὶν ἢ χρώμά τι ; εἶπες ἂν ὅτι χρώμά τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα ;

MEN. Ἐγωγε.

D ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώ- <sup>25</sup>ματα, ἔλεγες ἂν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἦττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ὡσπερ ἐγὼ μετήει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μὴ <sup>30</sup>μοι οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐνὶ τινι προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι, καὶ φῆς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὃ τι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις, τί ἐστὶν τοῦτο, ὃ οὐδὲν ἦττον κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα <sup>35</sup>

E καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῆς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις ;

MEN. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, τότε οὐδὲν  
 40 μᾶλλον φῆς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ  
 εὐθύ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὐθὺ ἢ στρογγύλον;

MEN. Οὐ δῆπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλα μὴν σχῆμά γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῆς  
 εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον  
 45 τοῦ ἐτέρου.

MEN. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

VII. ΣΩ. Τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο, οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά  
 ἐστὶν τὸ σχῆμα; πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ  
 ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος 75 .  
 εἶπες ὅτι ἄλλ' οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὅ τι βούλει,  
 5 ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅ τι λέγεις· ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύ-  
 μασε καὶ εἶπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ  
 πᾶσιν τούτοις ταυτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ  
 Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῶ· τί ἐστὶν  
 ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις,  
 10 ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταυτόν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; πειρῶ  
 εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ  
 τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν.

MEN. Μῆ, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶπέ. B

ΣΩ. Βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι;

15 MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ  
 τῆς ἀρετῆς;

MEN. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Προθυμητέον τοίνυν· ἄξιον γάρ.

20 MEN. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πειρῶμαί σοι εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστὶν  
 σχῆμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχει αὐτὸ εἶναι·

ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων  
 C τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἐπόμενον. ἰκανῶς σοι, ἢ  
 ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπήνῃ 25  
 εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.

MEN. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὐθες, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

MEN. Ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν  
 λόγον, ὃ ἀεὶ χροᾶ ἔπεται. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χροᾶν 30  
 τις μὴ φαίῃ εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροὶ ὥσπερ  
 περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἶε σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι;

VIII. ΣΩ. Τάληθῆ ἔγωγε· καὶ εἰ μὲν γε τῶν  
 σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν  
 ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται·  
 D εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον  
 καὶ ἐλέγχειν. εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ 5  
 φίλοι ὄντες βούλωιτο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ  
 δὴ πραότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρί-  
 νεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ  
 μόνον τάληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἐκείνων  
 ὧν ἂν προομολογῆ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτῶν. πειράσομαι 10  
 E δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν. λέγε γάρ μοι·  
 τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἶον πέρας καὶ  
 ἔσχατον· πάντα ταῦτα ταῦτόν τι λέγω· ἴσως δ'  
 ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροίτο· ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που  
 καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι· τὸ 15  
 τοιοῦτον βούλωμαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.

MEN. Ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ  
 λέγεις.

76 ΣΩ. Τί δ'; ● ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ  
 στερεόν, οἶον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις; 20

MEN. Ἐγωγε καλῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἦδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων, σχῆμα δὲ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς δὲ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει, τοῦτ' εἶναι  
 25 σχῆμα· ὅπερ ἂν συλλαβῶν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.

IX. MEN. Τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ὑβριστής γ' εἶ, ὦ Μένων· ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτη πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι,  
 5 αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν, ὃ τί Β ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.

MEN. Ἄλλ' ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτ' εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι.

ΣΩ. Κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίῃ, ὦ  
 10 Μένων, διαλεγόμενου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν.

MEN. Τί δή ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ὅπερ ποιούσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραν-  
 15 νεύοντες, ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ ὦσιν. καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ C ἴσως κατέγνωκας, ὅτι εἰμὶ ἡττων τῶν καλῶν. χαριεῖμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

MEN. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνω-  
 20 μαι, ἢ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσῃς ;

MEN. Βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινὰς τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα ;

MEN. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὗς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορ- 25  
ροαὶ πορεύονται ;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττειν ἐνί-  
D οἰς τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι ;

MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι ;

MEN. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ σύνης ὁ τοι λέγω, ἔφη  
Πίνδαρος, ἔστιν γὰρ χροῶ ἀπορροή σχημάτων  
ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός.

MEN. Ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύ- 30  
την τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται·  
καὶ ἅμα, οἶμαι, ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς  
E εἰπέιν καὶ φωνήν, ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ὄσμην καὶ ἄλλα 40  
πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.

MEN. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπό-  
κρισις, ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ  
σχήματος.

MEN. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς  
ἐγὼ ἐμαντὸν πείθω, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, βελτίων· οἶμαι  
δὲ οὐδ' ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μὴ, ὥσπερ χθῆς ἔλεγες,  
ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ' 50  
εἰ περιμέναις τε καὶ μνηθείης.

77 MEN. Ἀλλὰ περιμένομι' ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ  
μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις.

X. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπο-

λείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ ἔμαντοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα·  
 ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἶός τ' ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα  
 λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν  
 5 ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς  
 πέρι, ὃ τι ἔστιν, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ  
 τοῦ ἐνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντας τι ἐκά-  
 στοτε οἱ σκώπτουτες, ἀλλὰ εἰσας ὄλην καὶ ὑγιή  
 εἰπέ τί ἐστιν ἀρετή. τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα **B**  
 10 παρ' ἐμοῦ εἴληφας.

**MEN.** Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ  
 εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαίρειν τε  
 καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι· καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω  
 ἀρετὴν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι  
 15 πορίζεσθαι.

**ΣΩ.** Ἄρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα  
 ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι ;

**MEN.** Μάλιστα γε.

**ΣΩ.** Ἄρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἱ τῶν κακῶν ἐπι-  
 20 θυμοῦσιν, ἐτέρων δὲ οἱ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ; οὐ πάντες, **C**  
 ὄριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν ;

**MEN.** Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

**ΣΩ.** Ἄλλὰ τινες τῶν κακῶν ;

**MEN.** Ναί.

**ΣΩ.** Οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις,  
 ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκουτες, ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν, ὅμως ἐπι-  
 25 θυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν ;

**MEN.** Ἀμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

**ΣΩ.** Ἡ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων  
 30 τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν ;

**MEN.** Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις ; ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ ;

D ΜΕΝ. Γενέσθαι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο ;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκείνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι 35 βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῆ ;

ΜΕΝ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἱ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακά, ὅτι κακά ἐστίν, οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ; 40

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν E κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, [οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά,] ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων, ἃ φωντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά· ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι 45 ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὐ ;

ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῆς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν 50 ἐκείνον, ᾧ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσιν δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπ' αὐτῶν ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη.

78 ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴονται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθ' ὅσον βλάπτονται ; 55

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας ;

ΜΕΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι ; 60

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι, ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν  
65 κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι ;

MEN. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώ- B  
κρατες· καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακὰ.

XI. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαι τε τὰγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι ;

MEN. Εἶπον γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι  
5 πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτη γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων ;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων.

10 MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀρετὴ, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τὰγαθὰ. C

MEN. Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.

15 ΣΩ. Ἰδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὐ λέγοις. τὰγαθὰ φῆς οἶόν τ' εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι ;

MEN. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἶον ὑγίειάν τε  
20 καὶ πλούτον ;

MEN. Καὶ χρυσίου λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς.

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἄλλ' ἅττα λέγεις τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα ;

MEN. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα. 25

D ΣΩ. Εἶεν· χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον  
 πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ὡς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ  
 μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον  
 προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ  
 δικαίως καὶ ὀσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ 30  
 κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὸ  
 ἀρετὴν καλεῖς ;

MEN. Οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ κακίαν ;

MEN. Πάντως δήπου. 35

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ  
 δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὀσιότητα προσεῖναι,  
 E ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται  
 ἀρετὴ, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τὰγαθὰ.

MEN. Πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτ' 40  
 ἂν ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύ-  
 ριον, ὅταν μὴ δίκαιον ἦ, μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ,  
 οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπορία ;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων  
 ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς  
 ἔοικεν, ὃ μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται,  
 79 ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δ' ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων,  
 κακία. 50

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.

XII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον  
 πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τῇ δικαιο-  
 σύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ;

MEN. Ναί.

5 ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρὸς με ;

MEN. Τί δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες ; ¶

ΣΩ. "Οτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ κατ-  
αγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ δόντος  
10 παραδείγματα καθ' ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου  
μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις δέ μοι, ὅτι ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν Β  
οἶόν τ' εἶναι τὰγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύ-  
νης· τοῦτο δὲ φῆς μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι ;

MEN. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς,  
15 τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν, ὃ τι ἂν πράττη,  
τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον  
φῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων.

MEN. Τί οὖν δῆ ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο λέγω, ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον  
20 εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν  
ὃ τι ἔστιν, πᾶσαν δὲ φῆς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι,  
ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ C  
εἰρηκῶς ὃ τι ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνω-  
σομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν  
25 κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς  
ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων,  
τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα  
πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη ; [τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν λέγειν,  
ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἢ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης  
30 πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν.] ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν  
δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ' οἶε τινα  
εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὃ τι ἔστιν, αὐτὴν μὴ  
εἰδῶτα ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Δ ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτ' ἐγὼ σοι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν που τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητούμενων καὶ μήπω ὁμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 35

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες. 40

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητούμενης ἀρετῆς ὄλης ὃ τι ἔστιν οἴου διὰ τῶν ταύτης ἐμορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὄψοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ 45 πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἢ λέγεις· ἢ οὐδὲν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

XIII. ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τί φῆς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρός σου ;

ΜΕΝ. Ὁ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν 80 καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν· καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπάδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γηγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τὰλλα ταύτη τῇ πλατεῖᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ 10 αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἀπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι Β πεποικέναι [ναρκᾶν]. ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ

15 τι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι. καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδ' ὅ τι ἔστιν τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλευέσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων  
20 ἐνθένδε οὐδ' ἀποδημῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ' ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθεῖης.

ΣΩ. Πανούργος εἰ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξηπάτησάς με.

25 ΜΕΝ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Γυγνώσκω οὐ ἕνεκά με ἤκασας.

ΜΕΝ. Τίνος δὴ οἶε ;

ΣΩ. Ἴνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι. λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γάρ, οἶμαι, τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαί σε. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὐτῆ ναρκῶσα οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους  
35 ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν D περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὃ ἔστιν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ἤδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἄψασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὁμοῖος εἰ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω  
40 μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὃ τί ποτε ἔστιν.

XIV. ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὃ τι ἔστιν ; ποῖον γὰρ ὦν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος

ζητήσεις ; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ,  
πῶς εἴσει ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ σὺ οὐκ ἤδησθα ; 5

E ΣΩ. Μανθάνω οἶον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων.  
ὀρᾶς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον †κατάγεις, † ὡς οὐκ  
ἄρα ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδεν οὔτε ὃ μὴ  
οἶδεν ; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γε ὃ οἶδεν ζητοῖ· οἶδεν γάρ,  
καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως· οὔτε ὃ μὴ 10  
οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅ τι ζητήσει.

81 MEN. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ  
λόγος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμουγε.

MEN. Ἐχεις λέγειν ὅπη ; 15

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε· ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ  
γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα—

MEN. Τίνα λόγον λεγόντων ;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔμουγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν.

MEN. Τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες ; 20

ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ  
τῶν ἱερείῳ ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρί-  
B ζονται λόγον οἷοις τ' εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ  
Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσοι  
θεοῖοι εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσι, ταυτί ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ 25  
σκόπει, εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασὶ γὰρ  
τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ  
τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν, ὃ δὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καλοῦσι,  
τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέ-  
ποτε· δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὀσιώτατα διαβιῶναι 30  
τὸν βίον·

οἷσι γὰρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος  
δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὑπερθεὶν ἄλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτει

ἀντιδοί ψυχὰς πάλιν,  
 ἐκ τῶν βασιλῆες ἀγανοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφία C  
 35       τε μέγιστοι  
 ἄνδρες αὖξοντ'· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἀγ-  
 νοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται.

XV. Ἄτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὔσα καὶ  
 πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε  
 καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν  
 ὃ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ  
 5       περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν  
 ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἃ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο.  
 ἄτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, D  
 καὶ μεμαθηκυῖας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει  
 ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν  
 10       ἄνθρωποι, τὰλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις  
 ἀνδρείος ᾗ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ  
 ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μαθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὄλον  
 ἐστίν. οὐκ οὖν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τοῦτ' ἰσχυρῶ  
 λόγῳ· οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν  
 15       καὶ ἔστιν τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἠδὺς  
 ἀκοῦσαι, ὅδε δὲ ἐργαστικούς τε καὶ ζητητικούς  
 ποιεῖ· ὃ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ E  
 σοῦ ζητεῖν ἀρετὴν ὃ τι ἔστιν.

MEN. Ναί, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις  
 20       τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ μαθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἦν καλοῦμεν  
 μάθησιν ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν; ἔχεις με τοῦτο διδάξαι  
 ὡς οὕτως ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄρτι εἶπον, ὦ Μένων, ὅτι  
 πανούργος εἶ· καὶ νῦν ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ἔχω σε 82  
 25       διδάξαι, ὃς οὐ φημι διδαχὴν εἶναι ἀλλ'

ἀνάμνησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθύς φαίνομαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τάναντία λέγων.

MEN. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ἀλλ' εἴ πῶς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅτι ἔχει ὡσπερ *30* λέγεις, ἐνδειξαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥάδιον, ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω προθυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἕνεκα. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν *B* σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὄντινα βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι *35* ἐπιδείξωμαι.

MEN. Πάνυ γε. δεῦρο πρόσελθε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλλην μὲν ἔστι καὶ ἑλληνίζει;

MEN. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἰκογενής.

ΣΩ. Πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν, ὅπότερ' ἂν σοι *40* φαίνηται, εἰ ἀναμνησκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων παρ' ἐμοῦ.

MEN. Ἄλλὰ προσέξω.

XVI. ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ μοι, ὦ παῖ, γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

*C* ΣΩ. Ἐστὶν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἴσας ἔχον τὰς γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὔσας; *5*

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἴσας ἔχον;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μείζον *10* καὶ ἕλαττον;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἴη αὕτη ἡ πλευρὰ δυοῖν ποδοῖν  
καὶ αὕτη δυοῖν, πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν τὸ ὄλον ;  
15 ὦδε δὲ σκόπει· εἰ ἦν ταύτη δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτη  
δὲ ἐνὸς ποδὸς μόνον, ἄλλο τι ἄπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν  
ποδοῖν τὸ χωρίον ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ ταύτη, ἄλλο D  
20 τι ἡ̄ δις δυοῖν γίγνεται ;

ΠΑΙ. Γίγνεται.

ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα δις γίγνεται ποδῶν ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσοι οὖν εἰσιν οἱ δύο δις πόδες ;  
25 λογισάμενος εἰπέ.

ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρες, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν γένοιτ' ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου  
ἕτερον διπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δέ, ἴσας ἔχον πάσας  
τὰς γραμμὰς ὥσπερ τοῦτο ;

30 ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν ;

ΠΑΙ. Ὀκτώ.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις  
ἔσται ἐκείνου ἡ γραμμὴ ἐκάστη ; ἡ μὲν γὰρ E  
35 τοῦδε δυοῖν ποδοῖν· τί δὲ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ διπλασίου ;

ΠΑΙ. Δῆλον δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι διπλασία.

ΣΩ. Ὅρᾶς, ὦ Μένων, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν  
διδάσκω, ἀλλ' ἐρωτῶ πάντα ; καὶ νῦν οὗτος  
οἶεται εἰδέναι, ὅποια ἔστιν ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ὀκτώπουν  
40 χωρίον γενήσεται· ἡ̄ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ;

MEN. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οἶδεν οὖν ;

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οἶεται δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ;

MEN. Ναί.

45

XVII. ΣΩ. Θεῶ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀναμνησκόμενον ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ ἀναμνησκεισθαι. σὺ δέ μοι λέγε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῆς τὸ διπλάσιον  
83 χωρίον γίνεσθαι ; τοῖονδε λέγω, μὴ ταύτη μὲν μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἴσον πανταχῇ ἔστω 5 ὡσπερ τουτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὀκτώπουν· ἀλλὰ ὄρα, εἰ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἔσεσθαι.

ΠΑΙ. Ἐμοίγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γίγνεται, 10 ἂν ἐτέραν τοσαύτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄπὸ ταύτης δὴ, φῆς, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον, ἂν τέτταρες τοσαῦται γένωνται ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

15

B ΣΩ. Ἀναγραφώμεθα δὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἴσας τέτταρας. ἄλλο τι ἢ τουτί ἂν εἴη ὃ φῆς τὸ ὀκτώπουν εἶναι ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ταυτὶ τέτταρα, 20 ὧν ἕκαστον ἴσον τούτῳ ἐστὶν τῷ τετράποδι ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσον οὖν γίγνεται ; οὐ τετράκεις τοσοῦτον ;

ΠΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ ;

25

ΣΩ. Διπλάσιον οὖν ἐστὶν τὸ τετράκεις τοσοῦτον ;

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον ;

30

ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἄρα, ὦ παῖ, οὐ **β**  
διπλάσιον ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.

ΠΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τετάρων γὰρ τετράκεις ἐστὶν ἐκκαίδεκα.

35 οὐχί ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὀκτώπουν δ' ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς ; οὐχί  
ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον ;

ΠΑΙ. Φημί.

40

ΣΩ. Τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισείας ταυτησι  
τουτί ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπουν οὐ τοῦδε μὲν  
διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ ἡμισυ ;

45

ΠΑΙ. <Ναί.>

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἔσται ἢ τοσαύ- **δ**  
της γραμμῆς, ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος δὲ ἢ τοσησδί ;  
ἢ οὐ ;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω.

50

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀπο-  
κρίνου. καὶ μοι λέγε· οὐχ ἦδε μὲν δυοῖν ποδοῖν  
ἦν, ἢ δὲ τετάρων ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωριου  
55 γραμμὴν μείζω μὲν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς δίποδος,  
ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος.

ΠΑΙ. Δεῖ.

Ε ΣΩ. Πειρώ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῆς αὐτὴν εἶναι.

ΠΑΙ. Τρίποδα.

60

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ τρίπους ἦ, τὸ ἡμισυ ταύτης προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους; δύο μὲν γὰρ οἶδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ ἐνθένδε ὡσαύτως δύο μὲν οἶδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὃ φῆς.

65

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν ἦ τῆδε τριῶν καὶ τῆδε τριῶν, τὸ ὅλον χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται;

ΠΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες;

70

ΠΑΙ. Ἐννέα.

ΣΩ. Ἐδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν;

ΠΑΙ. Ὀκτώ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδός πω τὸ ὀκτώ- πουν χωρίον γίγνεται.

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀπὸ ποίας; πειρώ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβῶς· καὶ εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ 84 δείξον ἀπὸ ποίας.

80

ΠΑΙ. Ἄλλα μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐννοεῖς αὖ, ὦ Μένων, οὐ ἔστιν ἤδη βαδίζων ὃδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνήσκεισθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠδει μὲν οὐ, ἦ τις ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμῆ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἀλλ' οὖν ᾤετό γ' αὐτὴν τότε εἶδέναι, καὶ 5

θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδώς, καὶ οὐχ ἡγεῖτο  
ἀπορεῖν· νῦν δὲ ἡγεῖται ἀπορεῖν ἤδη, καὶ ὥσπερ Β  
οὐκ οἶδεν, οὐδ' οἶεται εἰδέναί.

MEN. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ  
πρᾶγμα ὃ οὐκ ἤδει;

MEN. Καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ  
ναρκᾶν ὥσπερ ἡ νάρκη, μὴν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;

15 MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Προὔργου γοῦν τι πεποιθήκαμεν, ὡς  
ἔοικε, πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει· νῦν μὲν γὰρ  
καὶ ζητήσειεν ἂν ἡδέως οὐκ εἰδώς, τότε δὲ C  
ῥαδίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις  
20 ᾤετ' ἂν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίου  
χωρίου, ὡς δεῖ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχειν  
μήκει.

MEN. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οἶει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσαι  
25 ζητεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν τοῦτο, ὃ ᾤετο εἰδέναί οὐκ  
εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος  
μὴ εἰδέναί, καὶ ἐπόθησεν τὸ εἰδέναί;

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὡνητο ἄρα νερκῆσας;

30 MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὃ D  
τι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ  
ἔρωτωντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος· φύλαττε δὲ  
ἂν πού εὔρησ με διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξιόντα αὐτῷ,  
35 ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα.

XIX. Λέγε γάρ μοι σύ· οὐ τὸ μὲν τετράπουν  
τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστι χωρίον; *μανθάνεις*;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθεῖμεν ἂν τοῦτι  
ἴσον;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἴσον ἐκατέρῳ τούτων;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσαίμεθ' ἂν τὸ ἐν  
τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν τέτταρα ἴσα  
χωρία τάδε;

Ε ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε  
γίγνεται;

ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.

ΣΩ. Ἐδει δὲ διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι· ἢ οὐ  
μέμνησαι;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐστὶν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας  
85 εἰς γωνίαν τείνουσα, τέμνουσα δίχα ἕκαστον  
τούτων τῶν χωρίων;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὗται γίνονται γραμ-  
μαὶ ἴσαι, περιέχουσαι τοῦτι τὸ χωρίον;

ΠΑΙ. Γίνονται.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ· πηλίκον τί ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ  
χωρίον;

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Οὐχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἡμισυ  
 ἐκάστου ἐκάστη ἢ γραμμὴ ἀποτέμμηκεν ἐντός ;  
 ἢ οὐ ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

35 ΣΩ. Πόσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔνεστιν ;

ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρα.

ΣΩ. Πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷδε ;

ΠΑΙ. Δύο.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τί ἐστιν ;

40 ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσια.

ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν γίγνεται ;

B

ΠΑΙ. Ὀκτώπουν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς ;

ΠΑΙ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης.

45 ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης  
 τοῦ τετράποδος ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καλοῦσιν δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ  
 σοφισταί· ὥστ' εἰ ταύτη διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ  
 50 τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φῆς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος,  
 γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίου.

ΠΑΙ. Πάννι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XX. ΣΩ. Τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων ; ἔστιν  
 ἦντινα δόξαν οὐχ αὐτοῦ οὗτος ἀπεκρίνατο ;

MEN. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ.

C

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν οὐκ ᾔδει γε, ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον  
 5 πρότερον.

MEN. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐνήσαν δέ γε αὐτῷ αὐται αἱ δόξαι·  
 ἢ οὐ ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τῷ οὐκ εἰδότε ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῆ 10  
ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ  
οἶδε ;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν μὲν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι  
ἀνακεκίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὐται· εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις 15  
ἀνερῆσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολ-  
λαχῆ, οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἦττον ἀκριβῶς  
ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων.

D MEN. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτή- 20  
σαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ  
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ  
ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμνησκεισθαί ἐστιν ; 25

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν νῦν  
οὗτος ἔχει, ἦτοι ἔλαβέν ποτε ἢ αἰεὶ εἶχεν ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν αἰεὶ εἶχεν, αἰεὶ καὶ ἦν 30  
ἐπιστήμων· εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέν ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε  
E τῷ νῦν βίῳ εἰληφῶς εἶη. ἢ δεδίδαχέν τις  
τούτου γεωμετερεῖν ; οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ  
πάσης γεωμετρίας ταῦτα ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
μαθημάτων ἀπάντων. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις τούτου 35  
πάντα δεδίδαχεν ; δίκαιος γάρ που εἰ εἰδέναι,  
ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῆ οἰκίᾳ γέγονεν καὶ  
τέθραπται.

MEN. ἼΑΛΛ' οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε  
40 ἐδίδαξεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐχει δὲ ταύτας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχί ;

MEN. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται.

XXI. ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβῶν, οὐκ  
ἤδη τοῦτο. δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε 86  
καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει ;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ὅτ'  
οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ὅν τ' ἂν ἦ χρόνον καὶ ὃν ἂν  
μὴ ἦ ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι,  
10 αἰ ἐρωτήσῃ ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται,  
ἅρ' οὐ τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἢ  
ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον  
ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.

MEN. Φαίνεται.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ αἰεὶ ἢ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων Β  
ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἢ ψυχὴ εἶη,  
ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρεῖ, ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστά-  
μενος νῦν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος,  
ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησκεισθαι ;

20 MEN. Εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων. καὶ τὰ  
μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου  
δισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι δ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν, ἃ  
25 μὴ τις οἶδεν, βελτίους ἂν εἴμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι  
καὶ ἤττον ἄργοι ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα, ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα,

Ο μηδὲ δυνατόν εἶναι εὐρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην, εἰ οἶός τε εἶην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.

MEN. Καὶ τούτο μὲν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, 30 ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXII. ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν, ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή;

MEN. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἐκείνο ἂν ἤδιστα, ὅπερ 5 ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, D πότερον ὡς διδακτῶ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἤρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ 10 μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρῶτερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅ τι ἔστιν πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ 15 ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι· τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν; E ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι, ποῖόν τι ἔστιν ὃ μήπω ἴσμεν ὅ τι ἔστιν. εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτὸν ἔστιν 20 εἴτε ὅπως οὖν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ 87 οἶόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον τριγώνον ἐνταθῆναι, εἴποι ἂν τις ὅτι οὐπω οἶδα 25

εἰ ἔστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μὲν τινα  
 ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα  
 τοιάνδε· εἰ μὲν ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον,  
 οἶον παρὰ τὴν δοθείσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρα-  
 30 τείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιοῦτῳ χωρίῳ, οἶον ἂν αὐτὸ  
 τὸ παρατεταμένον ἦ, ἄλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι  
 δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ταῦτα  
 παθεῖν· ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ  
 συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν B  
 35 κύκλον, εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή.

XXIII. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ  
 οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθ' ὃ τί ἐστιν οὔθ' ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέ-  
 μενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ  
 διδακτὸν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες· εἰ ποῖόν τι ἐστι  
 5 τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετῆ, διδακτὸν ἂν  
 εἶη ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν; πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον  
 ἢ οἶον ἐπιστήμη, ἄρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ; ἢ ὁ  
 νυνδὴ ἐλέγμεν, ἀναμνηστὸν; διαφερέτω δὲ  
 μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα·  
 10 ἀλλ' ἄρα διδακτὸν; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, C  
 ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπι-  
 στήμην;

MEN. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ ἀρετῆ,  
 15 δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἶη.

MEN. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι  
 τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτὸν, τοιοῦδε δ' οὐ.

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

20 ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέ-

ψασθαι, πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἄλλοιον ἐπιστήμης.

D MEN. Ἐμοιογε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπ-  
τέον εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ φαμεν <sup>25</sup>  
εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ αὕτη ἢ ὑπόθεσις μένει  
ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ;

MEN. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο  
χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχ' ἂν εἴη ἢ ἀρετὴ οὐκ <sup>30</sup>  
ἐπιστήμη τις · εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ὃ οὐκ  
ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἂν τιν' αὐτὸ  
ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν.

MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀρετὴ γ' ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί ; <sup>35</sup>

MEN. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ωφέλιμοι · πάντα γὰρ  
τάγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἢ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ; <sup>40</sup>

MEN. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων.

XXIV. ΣΩ. Σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ' ἕκαστον  
ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ.  
ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος  
δὴ ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα.  
οὐχί ; <sup>5</sup>

MEN. Ναί.

88 ΣΩ. Ταῦτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ  
βλάπτειν · ἢ σὺ ἄλλως φῆς ἢ οὕτως ;

MEN. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτως.

10 ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ, ὅταν τί ἐκάστου τούτων ἠγῆται, ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει; ἄρ' οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθῆ χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μὴ, βλάπτει;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

15 ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψόμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

MEN. Ἐγωγε.

B

20 ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ, τούτων ἅττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ; οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἢ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' οἶον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῆ ἄνθρωπος,  
25 βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῶ, ὠφελεῖται;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία· <πάντα> μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὠφέλιμα, ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ  
30 βλαβερά;

MEN. Πάνυ σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾶ, ἀφροσύνης  
35 δ' εἰς τὸναντίον;

MEN. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστὶν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν

ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα <sup>40</sup>  
οὔτε βλαβερὰ ἐστίν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονή-  
D σews ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερὰ τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα  
γίγνεται. κατὰ δὴ τούτου τὸν λόγον ὠφέλιμόν  
γε οὔσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τιν'  
εἶναι. 45

MEN. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XXV. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰλλα, ἃ νυνδὴ  
ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν  
ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἄρα οὐχ ὡσπερ  
τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἢ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ  
τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἢ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερὰ, <sup>5</sup>  
E οὕτως αὖ καὶ τούτοις ἢ ψυχῇ ὀρθῶς μὲν  
χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ  
ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερὰ ;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς δέ γε ἢ ἔμφρων ἡγείται, ἡμαρτη- <sup>10</sup>  
μένως δ' ἢ ἀφρων ;

MEN. Ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν  
ἐστίν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν  
<sup>89</sup> ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς <sup>15</sup>  
φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ τούτῳ τῷ  
λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον· φαμὲν δὲ  
τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι ;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἥτοι <sup>20</sup>  
ξύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι ;

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώ-  
κρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν  
 25 φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί.

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν που καὶ τόδ' ἦν· εἰ φύσει B  
 οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἥσάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οὐ  
 ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις,  
 30 οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφη-  
 νάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνά-  
 μενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς  
 αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς  
 τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιτο ταῖς πόλεσιν.

35 MEN. Εἰκός γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXVI. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ  
 ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται, ἄρα μαθήσει; C

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ  
 δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ  
 5 ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτὸν ἐστίν.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως νῆ Δία· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς  
 ὠμολογήσαμεν.

MEN. Καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει μὲν ἄρτι καλῶς λέγε-  
 σθαι.

10 ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέη  
 αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν  
 καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι.

MEN. Τί οὖν δῆ; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραί- D  
 νεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἡ  
 15 ἀρετή;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
 διδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ  
 ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι· ὅτι δὲ οὐκ

ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι ἕάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γάρ μοι εἶπέ· εἰ ἔστιν διδακτὸν <sup>20</sup> ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετῆ, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι ;

**Ε** ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούναντίον αὐ, οὐ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκά- <sup>25</sup> ζοντες εἰκάξοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐστι ταῦτα· ἀλλ' ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι ; )

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν, εἴ τινες εἶεν αὐτῆς διδάσκαλοι, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι <sup>30</sup> εὔρεῖν. καίτοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ζητῶ καὶ τούτων μάλιστα, οὓς ἂν οἶμαι ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἄνυτος ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ᾧ μεταδῶμεν τῆς ζητήσεως. εἰκότως δ' ἂν μεταδοῖμεν· <sup>35</sup>

**90** Ἄνυτος γὰρ ὅδε πρῶτον μὲν ἐστὶ πατρὸς πλουσίου τε καὶ σοφοῦ Ἄνθεμίωνος, ὃς ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντος τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφώς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ τί <sup>40</sup> αὐτοῦ σοφία κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελεία, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐχ ὑπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης **Β** οὐδὲ ὀγκώδης τε καὶ ἐπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλής ἀνὴρ· ἔπειτα τούτου εὖ ἔθρεψεν καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει· <sup>45</sup> αἰροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τοιούτων ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους, εἴτ' εἰσὶν εἴτε μὴ, καὶ οὔτινες.

XXVII. Σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἄνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σαντοῦ ξένῳ Μένωνι τῷδε, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τίνες ἂν εἶεν διδάσκαλοι. ὦδε δὲ σκέψαι· εἰ βουλοίμεθα Μένωνα τόνδε  
 5 ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους; ἄρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς C ἰατρούς;

AN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ σκυτοτόμον ἀγαθὸν βουλοίμεθα  
 10 γενέσθαι, ἄρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους;

AN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως;

AN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶπέ.  
 15 παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν, βουλόμενοι ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι· ἄρ' ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τότε λέγομεν, ὅτι D παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτὸν σωφρονοῖμεν ἂν, τοὺς ἀντιποιοιμένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἢ  
 20 τοὺς μῆ, καὶ τοὺς μισθὸνπραττομένους ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ἀποφήναντας αὐτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ βουλομένου ἵεναι τε καὶ μαθάνειν; ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν;

AN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν  
 25 ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα; πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι E βουλομένους αὐλητὴν τινα ποιῆσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην καὶ μισθὸνπραττομένους μὴ ἐθέλειν πέμπειν, ἄλλοις  
 30 δέ τισιν πράγματα παρέχειν [ζητοῦντα μαθάνειν

παρὰ τούτων] οἱ μήτε προσποιούνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι μήτ' ἔστιν αὐτῶν μαθητῆς μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἀξιούμεν μαθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν ὃν ἂν πέμπωμεν. οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι ;

35

AN. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρὸς.

91 XXVIII. ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοίνυν ἔξεστί σε μετ' ἐμοῦ κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι περὶ τοῦ ξένου τουτουῖ Μένωνος. οὗτος γάρ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρὸς με, ὅτι ἐπιθυμῆ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ἣ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰς τε οἰκίας 5 καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαι τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως B ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετὴν . . . σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς 10 πέμπομεν. ἡ δὴλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὐτοὺς κοινούς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶπραττομένους ; 15

AN. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκратες ;

ΣΩ. Οἴσθα δήπου καὶ σύ, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οὓς

C οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

AN. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκратες. μηδένα τῶν συγγενῶν μηδὲ οἰκείων μηδὲ φίλων, μήτε 20 ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορά τῶν συγγυγνομένων.

XXIX. ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἄνυτε ; οὔτοι  
 ἄρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιοιμένων τι ἐπίστασθαι  
 εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον  
 οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελούσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὃ τι ἄν  
 5 τις αὐτοῖς παραδῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθεί-  
 ρουσιν ; καὶ τούτων φανερώς χρήματα ἀξιούσι D  
 πράττεσθαι ; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι  
 πιστεύσω· οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἓνα Πρωταγόραν  
 πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς  
 10 σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτως περιφανῶς καλὰ  
 ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντο-  
 ποιῶν· καίτοι τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδή-  
 ματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἔξα-  
 κούμενοι οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας E  
 15 μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτιά  
 τε καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ' εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῖεν, ταχὺ  
 ἂν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιεν, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὄλην  
 τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανεν διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγι-  
 γνομένους καὶ μοχθηροτέρους ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρ-  
 20 ἐλάμβανεν πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη· οἶμαι γὰρ  
 αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγο-  
 νότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα· καὶ  
 ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν  
 ταυτηνὴν εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται· καὶ οὐ  
 25 μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμ- 92  
 πολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου,  
 οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. πότερον δὴ οὖν  
 φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς  
 30 ἔξαπατᾶν καὶ λωβᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἢ λελη-  
 θῆναι καὶ ἑαυτούς ; καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιῶ-

σωμεν τούτους, οὓς ἔνιοί φασι σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι ;

XXX. AN. Πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων· τούτων δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ Β τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες· πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἐῶσαι αὐτοὺς εἰσαφ- 5  
ικνεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἄστος.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δέ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, ἡδίκηκέ τίς σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἶ ; 10

AN. Οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. Ἄπειρος ἄρ' εἶ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ;

C AN. Καὶ εἶην γε. 15

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχει <ἐν> ἑαυτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον, οὐ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἶης ;

AN. Ῥαδίως· τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἷ εἶσιν, εἴτ' οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμὶ εἴτε μή. 20

ΣΩ. Μάντις εἶ ἴσως, ὦ Ἄνυτε· ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε ἄλλως οἴσθα τούτων πέρι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς λέγεις θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτους ἐζήτουμεν τίνες εἰσίν, παρ' οὓς ἂν Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχ- D  
θηρὸς γένοιτο· οὗτοι μὲν γάρ, εἰ σὺ βούλει, 25  
ἔστων οἱ σοφισταί· ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἶπέ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἐταῖρον εὐεργέτησον, φράσας αὐτῷ, παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τσοαύτη

πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ διήλθον γένοιτ'  
 30 ἂν ἄξιος λόγου.

AN. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐς μὲν ἐγὼ ᾤμην διδασκάλους  
 τούτων εἶναι, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω οὐδὲν λέγων,  
 ὡς σὺ φῆς· καὶ ἴσως τί λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν Ε  
 35 τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἶπέ παρα τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων·  
 εἶπέ ὄνομα ὄτου βούλει.

AN. Τί δὲ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα δεῖ ἀκούσαι ;  
 ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κάγα-  
 θῶν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐ βελτίω αὐτὸν ποιήσει ἢ  
 40 οἱ σοφισταί, ἐάν περ ἐθέλῃ πείθεσθαι.

XXXI. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κάγα-  
 θοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ'  
 οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὁμῶς μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν  
 οἰοί τε ὄντες ταῦτα, ἃ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον ; 93

5 AN. Καὶ τούτους ἔγωγε ἄξιῷ παρὰ τῶν προ-  
 τέρων μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κάγαθῶν· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσι  
 σοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει  
 ἄνδρες ;

ΣΩ. Ἐμοιγε, ὦ Ἄνυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν  
 10 ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι  
 οὐχ ἦττον ἢ εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διδάσκαλοι  
 ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς ; τοῦτο γάρ  
 ἔστιν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὢν· οὐκ εἰ  
 εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδ' εἰ γεγόνασιν  
 15 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἀλλ' εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ πάλαί Β  
 σκοποῦμεν. τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦ-  
 μεν, ἄρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν  
 προτέρων ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ

ἦσαν, ἠπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῃ παραδοῦναι, ἢ οὐ παραδοτὸν τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτὸν <sup>20</sup> ἄλλῃ παρ' ἄλλου· τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Μένων.

XXXII. Ὡδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σουτοῦ **Ο** λόγου· Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἂν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι ;

ΑΝ. Ἐγωγε, πάντων γε μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ <sup>5</sup> τις ἄλλος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἦν, καὶ κείνῳ εἶναι ;

ΑΝ. Οἶμαι ἐγωγε, εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', οἶει, οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ <sup>10</sup> τινὰς καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δέ που τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ ; ἢ οἶει αὐτὸν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ **Δ** καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἣν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν ; ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν υἱὸν ἰππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν ; ἐπέμενε γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθὸς <sup>15</sup> ἑστηκῶς, καὶ ἠκόντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθός, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ εἰργάζετο, ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν, ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἶχετο. ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ; <sup>20</sup>

ΑΝ. Ἀκήκοα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τὴν γε φύσιν τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ ἠτιάσατ' ἂν τις εἶναι κακὴν.

**Ε** ΑΝ. Ἴσως οὐκ ἂν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τότε ; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμιστο- <sup>25</sup> κλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἄπερ ὁ

πατήρ αὐτοῦ, ἤδη του ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ  
πρεσβυτέρου ;

AN. Οὐ δῆτα.

30 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι  
αὐτὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ υἱὸν παιδεῦσαι, ἣν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν  
ἦν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτόνων βελτίω ποιῆσαι,  
εἶπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετή ;

AN. Ἴσως μὰ Δί' οὐ.

XXXIII. ΣΩ. Οὗτος μὲν δὴ σοι τοιοῦτος  
διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς, ὃν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς 94  
ἄριστον τῶν προτέρων εἶναι· ἄλλον δὲ δὴ  
σκεψώμεθα, Ἄριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου· ἢ τοῦ-  
5 του οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι ;

AN. Ἐγωγε, πάντως δῆπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ  
Λυσιμάχου, ὅσα μὲν διδασκάλων εἶχετο, κάλλιστα  
Ἄθηναίων ἐπαίδευσεν, ἄνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι  
10 ὄτου οὖν πεποικέναι ; τούτῳ γάρ που καὶ συγγέ-  
γονας καὶ ὄρας οἴος ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Περι- B  
κλέα, οὕτως μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα, οἶσθ'  
ὅτι δύο υἱεῖς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον ;

AN. Ἐγωγε.

15 ΣΩ. Τούτους μέντοι, ὡς οἶσθα καὶ σὺ, ἱππέας  
μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρους Ἀθηναίων, καὶ  
μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τᾶλλα ἐπαίδευσεν,  
ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται, οὐδενὸς χείρους· ἀγαθοὺς δὲ  
ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι ; δοκῶ μὲν,  
20 ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδακτὸν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ  
ὀλίγους οἶη καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων  
ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι C

ὅτι Θουκυδίδης αὐτὸν δύο υἱεῖς ἔθρεψεν, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσεν τά τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων· τὸν μὲν <sup>25</sup> γὰρ Ξανθία ἔδωκε, τὸν δὲ Εὐδώρῳ· οὗτοι δὲ που ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαίειν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι ;

ΑΝ. Ἐγώ γε, ἀκοῆ.

XXXIV. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δήλον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ ἔδει δαπανώμενον διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας ποιῆσαι, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν, εἰ διδακτὸν ἦν ; <sup>5</sup> ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλείστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ; · καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλησιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτὸν, ἐξευρεῖν <sup>10</sup> ἂν ὅστις ἐμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς υἱεῖς ἀγαθοὺς ποιῆσειν, ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν ξένων, εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε Ἄνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτὸν ἀρετῆς. <sup>15</sup>

ΑΝ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἂν σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι· ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾶόν ἐστιν κακῶς <sup>20</sup> ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνυ· οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.

XXXV. ΣΩ. ὦ Μένων, Ἄνυτος μὲν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν· καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω· οἴεται

γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς  
 ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἰς τού-  
 5 των. ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ἕάν ποτε γυνῶ, οἶόν ἐστιν  
 τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ  
 ἀγνοεῖ· σὺ δέ μοι εἶπέ, οὐ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶν  
 καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὐτοὺς B  
 διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοί  
 τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτὸν ἀρετῆν ;

MEN. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ  
 15 τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσαις ὡς διδακτὸν, τοτὲ δὲ  
 ὡς οὔ.

ΣΩ. Φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι  
 τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο  
 ὁμολογεῖται ;

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

20 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οὔπερ  
 μόνον ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι C  
 ἀρετῆς ;

MEN. Καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
 ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο  
 25 ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 καταγελαῖ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ  
 λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ  
 διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ;

30 MEN. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ  
 γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπουθα· τοτὲ μὲν μοι  
 δοκοῦσιν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.

D ΣΩ. Οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοι τε καὶ τοῖς  
 ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν  
 εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεόγγιν τὸν 35  
 ποιητὴν οἶσθ' ὅτι ταῦτα ταῦτα λέγει ;

MEN. Ἐν ποίοις ἔπαισιν ;

XXXVI. ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις οὐ λέγει

καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν  
 ἕξε, καὶ ἄνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.  
 ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεται· ἦν δὲ κακοῦσιν  
 E συμμίσγησ, ἀπολείς καὶ τὸν ἕντα νόον. 5

οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς  
 ἀρετῆς λέγει ;

MEN. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,

εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα, 10

λέγει πῶς ὅτι

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον

οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ

οὐ ποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,  
 96 πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων 15  
 οὐ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἀνδρ' ἀγαθόν.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν  
 τὰναντία λέγει ;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν πράγ- 20  
 ματος, οὐ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ  
 ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλὰ  
 B οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ ποιηροὶ εἶναι περὶ  
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐ φασὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι,

25 οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κάγαθοι ἰσχυροὶ  
 μὲν φασιν αὐτὸ διδασκτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ οὐ ; τοὺς  
 οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὄτου οὖν φαίης ἂν  
 σὺ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι ;

MEN. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

XXXVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ  
 μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κάγαθοι ὄντες διδάσκαλοι  
 εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε ;

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

5 ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί ; C

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὁμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὐ  
 μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ  
 διδασκτὸν εἶναι ;

10 MEN. Ὁμολογήκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδά-  
 σκαλοι ;

MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί ;

15 MEN. Φαίνεται οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἶη διδασκτὸν ;

MEN. Οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμ- D  
 μεθα. ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
 πότερόν ποτε οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν  
 20 εἶη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνο-  
 μένων.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ  
 φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ  
 ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμέ Πρόδικος. παντὸς  
 25 μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ

ἐπιπτεον ἴσως ἐπὶ γε τοῦ τριπλοῦ βελτίους  
 ἔτι πότε· λέγει δὲ τούτῳ ἀποκλιθεὶς πρὸς τὴν  
 ἰστί ἐπιπτεον. ἡ ἴσως ἔλατ' ἀκαταγελιάτως, ὅτι  
 πρὸς μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ἰσθῆος τε καὶ εὐ-  
 πρίας ἐπιπτεον τριπτεον τα τριπτεον, ἢ ἴσως  
 καὶ ἰσθῆος ἴσως το τριπτεον, τῶς πατὲ τριπτεον  
 τριπτεον ἢ ἰσθῆος ἰσθῆος.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς τούτῳ λέγεις, ὦ Σωκράτης;

ΣΩ. Σὺ γὰρ ἴσως ἴσως μετ' αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς  
 ἰσθῆος ἢ ἰσθῆος ἴσως, ἰσθῆος ἰσθῆος  
 πρὸς τούτῳ γε ἴσως πρὸς ἰσθῆος ἴσως ἢ γὰρ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἴσως γε ἰσθῆος ἴσως, ἂν ὀρθῶς  
 ἴσως ἴσως τῶν τριπτεον, καὶ τούτῳ που  
 καλῶς ἰσθῆος ἴσως;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι εἴ σὺ εἴπω ἰσθῆος ἴσως, εἴαν  
 μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ τούτῳ ἰσθῆος ἴσως ὀρθῶς  
 ἰσθῆος ἴσως.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς εἴπῃ [ἰσθῆος] λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ εἴπω <εἴ> τις εἴσως τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν  
 εἰς Λάουσαν ἢ ὅποι βοῖλαι ἄλλοσε βαδίξοι καὶ  
 ἄλλοις ἴσως, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὐ ἴσως;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων, ἴσως  
 ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μὴδ' ἐπιστάμενος,  
 ἴσως καὶ ὀρθῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς ἴσως;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἴσως γ' ἂν που ὀρθῆν δόξαν ἴσως  
 περὶ ἴσως ὁ ἄλλος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων

ἡγεμῶν ἔσται, οἴομενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μὴ, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονούντος.

25 ΜΕΝ. Οὐδὲν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δόξα ἄρα ἀληθῆς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμῶν φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει, ὁποῖόν τι εἶη, λέγοντες ὅτι  
30 φρόνησις μόνου ἡγείται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθῆς.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἤττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθῆ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.

35 ΜΕΝ. Τοσοῦτω γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων αἰεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δ' οὔ.

XXXIX. ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις; ὁ αἰεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ <ἂν> αἰεὶ τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται· ὥστε θαυμάζω,  
5 ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὃ τι δὴ ποτε Δ πολὺ τιμιωτέρα ἢ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ δι' ὃ τι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν δι' ὃ τι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγὼ σοι  
10 εἶπω;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γ' εἰπέ.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν· ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἔστιν παρ' ὑμῖν.

15 ΜΕΝ. Πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, εἴαν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾦ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, εἴαν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

**E** ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δῆ ;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν <sup>20</sup> ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὡσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ παραμένει· δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον· πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν. πρὸς τί οὖν δῆ λέγω ταῦτα ; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ <sup>25</sup> ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τὰγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολλὸν <sup>98</sup> δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἂν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας <sup>30</sup> λογισμῶ. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, <ὦ> [Μένων] ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὁμολόγηται. ἐπειδὴν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμαι γίνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δῆ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ <sup>35</sup> διαφέρει δεσμῶ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.

ΜΕΝ. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικεν τοιούτῳ τινί.

**B** XL. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων· ὅτι δὲ ἐστίν τι ἄλλοῖον ὀρθῆ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, <οὐ> πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ' εἶπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἶδέναι, ὀλίγα δ' ἂν φαίην, ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο <sup>5</sup> ἐκείνων θεῖην ἂν ὦν οἶδα.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθῆς δόξα  
 ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἐκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν  
 10 χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἢ ἐπιστήμη ;

MEN. Καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθῆ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον C  
 οὐδὲ ἤττον ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ  
 ἀνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην.

15 MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὃ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος  
 ἡμῖν ὠμολόγηται εἶναι.

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον δι' ἐπιστήμην  
 20 ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν,  
 εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τοῦτοιν δὲ  
 οὐδέτερον φύσει ἔστιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπι-  
 στήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθῆς, [οὔτ' ἐπίκτητα]—ἢ D  
 δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὅποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι ;

25 MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ  
 φύσει εἶεν ἄν.

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ  
 30 μετὰ τοῦτο, εἰ διδακτὸν ἔστιν.

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρό-  
 νησις ἢ ἀρετή ;

MEN. Ναί.

35 ΣΩ. Κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν  
 εἶναι ;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

**Σ** ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτὸν ;

MEN. Οὕτως.

40

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὁμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διδασκάλους ;

MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὁμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι ;

45

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθὸν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγούμενον ;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

**99** ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς δὲ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται· ᾧ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμῶν ἐστίν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως.

XLI. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτὸν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀρετῇ ;

MEN. Οὐ φαίνεται.

**B** ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμων τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν 5 πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμῶν.

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σοφία τινὲ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ

τοιούτοι ἄνδρες ἡγούντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ  
 10 Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὖς ἄρτι Ἄνυτος ὄδε ἔλεγεν·  
 διὸ καὶ οὐχ οἰοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἰο  
 αὐτοί εἰσιν, ἅτε οὐ δι' ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιούτοι.

MEN. Ἐοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς  
 λέγεις.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὐδοξία δὴ τὸ  
 λοιπὸν γίγνεται, ἧ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι C  
 τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες  
 πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμοδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεο-  
 μάντις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ  
 20 πολλὰ, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.

MEN. Κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θεῖους  
 καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ  
 καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσιν καὶ  
 25 λέγουσι ;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θεῖους τε, οὖς νυνδὴ  
 ἐλέγομεν χρησμοδοὺς καὶ μάντις καὶ τοὺς D  
 ποιητικούς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς οὐχ  
 30 ἥκιστα τούτων φαίμεν ἂν θεῖους τε εἶναι καὶ  
 ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους  
 ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ  
 μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΩ. Καὶ αἶ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων,  
 τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θεῖους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ  
 Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα,  
 θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος.

**Ε** ΜΕΝ. Καὶ φαίνονται γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγειν. καίτοι ἴσως Ἄνυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται <sup>40</sup> λέγοντι.

**ΧΛΙΙ.** ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτῳ μὲν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ αὐθις διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμεν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἀνευ <sup>5</sup> <sup>100</sup> νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μὴ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἂν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζώσι, οἷον ἔφη Ὀμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, <sup>10</sup> ὅτι οἷος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀτσοῦσι. ταῦτόν ἂν καὶ εὐθύς τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιάς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν.

**Β** ΜΕΝ. Κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. <sup>15</sup>

**ΣΩ.** Ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὦ Μένων, θεία μοῖρα ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἢ ἀρετὴ οἷς παραγίγνεται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετὴ, πρότερον ἐπι- <sup>20</sup> χειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετὴ. νῦν δ' ἔμοι μὲν ὦρα ποιῆναι, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πείθε καὶ τὸν ξένου **Κ** τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πρῶτος ᾗ· ὡς ἂν πείσης τούτου, ἔστιν ὃ τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις. <sup>25</sup>

## COMMENTARY

Chapters I, II (70 A-71 D). MENO. *Can Virtue be taught?*  
SOCRATES. *I do not even know what Virtue is, much less whether it can be taught. What is more, I never met any one who did know what Virtue is.* MENO. *Have you never met Gorgias?* SOCRATES. *Yes, but I do not clearly remember what he said. Try and tell me yourself.*

The first division of the dialogue extends to the end of chap. xiii. (80 D). The speakers are Meno and Socrates. Meno attempts to frame a definition of Virtue, and confesses himself beaten.

1. ἄρα διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετή: for the philosophical import of this 70 A question see Introd. § 11. It had already been made the main subject of the dialogue *Protagoras*, at the end of which (361 A B) it appears that Socrates, in arguing that Virtue is ἐπιστήμη, has been implicitly arguing that Virtue may be taught, though explicitly this is the position he has denied. The converse paradox turns out to be the position of Protagoras. He, as his profession demanded, asserted that Virtue was teachable; but by denying that Virtue was Knowledge, he has implicitly contradicted himself. In the *Euthydemus* (282 B C) the question occurs again, though here σοφία is substituted for ἀρετή. Socrates says εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Κλεινία, ἡ σοφία διδακτὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Cleinias eagerly accepts the former alternative; Socrates applauds him, saying εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ, πρότερον διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἢ σοφία. Cp. also *Clitophon* 407 B. (This dialogue, if genuine, as it probably is, must be regarded as an introduction to the *Republic*, left for some reason unfinished. As the *Meno* is also in a manner introductory to the *Republic*, correspondencies between the *Clitophon* and the *Meno* are worth noting.) In *Clit.* l.c. we read τῶν δ'

ύων ἀμελείτε, καὶ οὐτε διδασκάλους αὐτοῖς εὐρίσκετε τῆς δικαιοσύνης, εἴπερ μαθητὸν· εἰ δὲ μελετητὸν τε καὶ ἀσκητὸν, οἴτινες ἐξασκησοῦσι καὶ ἐκμελετηθήσονται ἰκανῶς. In the spurious dialogue *περὶ ἀρετῆς* (Teubner text vol. vi pp. 86–91), which consists of little more than excerpts from the *Meno*, Socrates opens with the question Ἄρα διδασκτὸν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετῆ; ἢ οὐ διδασκτὸν, ἀλλὰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἄνδρες, ἢ ἄλλω τινὶ τρόπῳ; Xen. *Symp.* ii 6 exhibits it as a theme of debate in a genteel assembly: καὶ ὁ μὲν τις αὐτῶν εἶπε, Ποῦ οὖν εὐρήσεις τούτου [sc. τῆς καλοκάγαθίας] διδάσκαλον; ὁ δὲ τις ὡς οὐδὲ διδασκτὸν τοῦτο εἶη, ἔτερος δὲ τις ὡς εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτο μαθητὸν. The problem is referred to by Aristotle *NE.* i x (ix) 1 ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερον ἐστὶ μαθητὸν [sc. ἡ ἀρετῆ] ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητὸν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίγνεται. It is probable (especially from the use of the words ἀσκητὸν and θείαν μοῖραν) that there is here a definite reference to the *Meno*. Cp. *ibid.* x ix 6 γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως ὄηλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέειν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μήποσ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δὲν προδιεργασθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν. Antisthenes the Cynic, as a follower of Socrates, διδασκτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετὴν (*Diog.* L. vi 10). On the other hand, Isocrates does not believe in any τέχνη to make men virtuous; *Antidosis* (15) 274, cp. *in Soph.* (13) 21. 'Quaestio tota antiquitate non desita est disceptari': Fr. Prol. p. 12 note 6, who refers to *Diog.* L. ii 121, 122 for tracts on the subject by Crito and Simo, pupils of Socrates. Cp. the words quoted from the μέγας λόγος of Protagoras (*Zeller pre-Socr.* ii 471 note) φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δέεται.

2. ἀσκητὸν, 'quod exercitatione comparatur' Ast. The word appears to occur in this sense only here and in *Clit.* l.c., Arist. *NE.* l.c. and Xenophon *Mem.* i ii 23 πάντα ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ πάγαθὰ ἀσκητὰ εἶναι—the only places in which the word is used by Plato, Xenophon, or Aristotle. The word is used by other writers in physical senses related to physical meanings of ἀσκέω. ἀσκέω 'I work up' or 'elaborate' may be used intransitively (*Plato Rep.* 389 c etc. 'I go into training'), or with an acc. of the result produced, or with one of the material worked upon, or with both (*Xen. Cyr.* viii vi 10 ἀσκέει αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς σὺν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πολεμικά). The sense of ἀσκητός in the passage before us is related to ἀσκέω with an acc. of the result produced. The other sense quoted by L. & S., of persons ('practised in'), is related to ἀσκέω with an acc. of the subject worked upon; but *Plut. Lyc.* 30. 2 ἀνδρὸς ἀσκητοῦ καὶ σοφοῦ is perhaps to be

referred to *ἀσκητής* rather than *ἀσκητός*. The words *ἀσκητής*, *ἀσκητικός* we find applied first to the pursuit of a profession or art (specially gymnastics), next to the discipline of some philosophical school, and lastly, in Christian theology to the 'ascetic' life.

Practice is here distinguished from Knowledge as an avenue to Virtue. In Plato it is represented as conferring an inferior kind of Virtue: *Phaedo* 82 B *δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν . . . ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ*. In *Rep.* 619 c an evil fate awaits one who has trusted too much to this, *ἔθει ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα*. Socrates drew no such sharp distinction; and the Cynics when they spoke of 'learning virtue' 'understood moral exercise rather than intellectual research' (Zeller *Socr.* p. 313). Cp. *Xen. Mem.* i ii 19-23 (referred to above), also the fragment of Critias (Bergk *F.L.G.* 4 II p. 282) *ἐκ μελετῆς πλείους ἢ φύσεως ἀγαθοί*. Note that the alternative *ἀσκητόν* does not meet us again in this dialogue.

In *ἀσκητός*, used as it is here, the suffix *-τος* has the sense of the Latin termination *-bilis*; 'attainable' rather than 'attained'. A large number of Greek verbal adjectives in *-τος* have this sense, e.g. in this dialogue *διδασκτόν* (often), *μαθητόν*, *ἀναμνηστόν* (87 B), *παραδοτόν* and *παραληπτόν* (93 B), *ποιητόν* and *ἐνθετόν* in *Theognis* quoted 95 E, *μελετητόν* and *ἐθιστόν*, in Plato *Clitophon* and Aristotle *NE.* quoted above; further, *γνωστόν*, *νοητόν*, *αἰσθητόν*, *καταληπτόν* (*comprehensibile* Cicero *Ac.* i 41); likewise *κτητόν*, *τρωτόν* and many others (Kühner § 332. 6). This sense arises simply from a tendency to ignore the difference between the actual and the possible. This difference in the case of *negative* verbals amounts to very little, and it is to *negative* adjectives that this use of the corresponding Latin forms in *-tus* is mainly confined, e.g. *invictus*, *immensus*; but not entirely, e.g. *conspectus* (Forbiger *ad Verg. Georg.* i 206). Riddell takes a different view, § 88.

4. ἢ ἄλλω τινὶ τρόπῳ anticipates the result (*θεῖα μοῖρα*) actually arrived at (99 E).

5. *Θετταλοί*: for the omission of the article see *Phaedo* 57 A and Archer-Hind there: 'the article is continually omitted before national names by all Attic writers.'

7. ἐφ' ἱππικῆ: Thessalian horses and horsemanship were a commonplace with writers from Homer downward, *Il.* 2. 202, *Hdt.* vii 196. Plato *Hipp. maj.* 284 A *ὁ οὖν κάλλιστ' ἐπιστάμενος ἱππικὴν παραδίδοναι ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ Θετταλίᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μάλιστα τιμῶτο καὶ πλείστα χρήματα λαμβάνοι*; *Lysis* 625 A, *Xen. Hell.* iv iii 9 (Fr.); also *Athen.* vii 278 E *ὑποσιθίμενος αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν Πυθίαν ζητεῖν*

ἰέων ἀμελιῶν Θεσσαλικόν, Λακεδαιμονίην τε γυναῖκα, σύνης, ἄνδρας δ' οἱ πίνουσιν ὕδωρ καλῆς Ἀρεθούσης. ἐξ *Polit.* 264 C, *Isocr. Antid.* (15) 298. Alexander's Bucephalus came from Thessaly (*Plut. Alex.* 6). The coins of Thessalian towns often show a horse; see P. Gardner *Types of Greek Coins*, plate VII figs. 3 and 40 (Larisa); fig. 6 (Pharsalus).

καὶ πλοῦτος: *Isocrates Antidosis* (15) 155 says that when Gorgias, who made more money than any other sophist, went to Thessaly, the Thessalians were the wealthiest of the Greeks. For their luxury and hospitality cp. Theopompus apud *Athenaeum* XII p. 527 A (he gives the palm for luxury to the Pharsalians). Again, Theopompus (apud *Athenaeum* VI 260 B) says that Philip of Macedon won over the Thessalians by boon companionship. *Xen. Hell.* VI i 3 says of Polydamas of Pharsalus ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆς Θεσσαλικὸν τρόπον. Cp. on 74 A 30.

9. Ἀριστίππου: see *Introd.* § 4. 'Aristippus, G. fautor, non confundendus ille cum Aristippo Cyrenaico discipulo, dynastes erat Larisaeus ex gente Aleudarum rei equestris studiosissimum fuisse testatur *Athen.* Ἰπποτροφῶν καὶ ἡνιοχῶν τῶν Ἀλεαδῶν ἰππικώτερος. H quattuor milia conducticiorum et sex mensum aër dedit ad coercendam popularium seditionem. *Xen.* (Fr.). See also *Xen. An.* II vi 28. Besides A Meno, another leader in the expedition of Cyrus of Gorgias, Proxenus the Boeotian, *Xen. An.* II vi 16.

πολίται, 'fellow-citizens.' So often with a genitive possessive pronoun; *Prot.* 339 E ὦ Πρόδικε, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης, 315 C, *Laws* 629 A, 630 A etc. The word συμπολίτης is condemned, Rutherford *New Phrynichus* p. 255. Latin usage is similar: ἐμὸς πολίτης, meus civis, 'my fellow-citizen'; ἐμὸς φυλῆτης, meus tribulís, 'my fellow-tribesman'; ἐμὸς δημότης, meus popularis, 'my fellow-demesman.' Cf. below 71 B 2 συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις.

10. Γοργίας: see on 76 C 22, 95 C 28. For Gorgias' life in Thessaly see *Cicero Orator* § 176, *Quint.* III i 8. He is said to have lived to the age of 109.

11. ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, 'persons who run after him for his wisdom.' Cp. *Prot.* 317 C: Protagoras appeared to boast ὅτι ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἰμεν: *Euthyd.* 276 D οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῦ ἀνδρῶν: *Phaedr.* 257 B. For the transference of amatory phrases to spiritual aspirations see Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus* App. I (especially pp. 152-3), and App. III. This is most characteristic of Plato; see especially *Symp.* 184 C sqq.

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verb (c. f. souv. and aff.)

Olympiodorus in his life of Plato, near the end (Tubner text vol. VI p. 194), says of Plato himself πολλοὺς ἐραστὰς αὐτοῦ καταστήσας. The contrast between ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ and ἰσὺς ἐραστῆς is intentional. For ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ cp. *Rep.* 600 D (Protagorā and Prodicus) ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐταῖροι, *Hipp. παῖ.* 300 D ἀνδρὶ πλείστον ἀργύριον ἐργασμένῳ τῶν νῦν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, also 281 c; *Symp.* 206 c; *Theaet.* 161 c; *Hipp. min.* 372 B; *Xen. Mem.* iv ii 1, 3; *Isocr.* 13. 2; 15. 111 etc.

**Ἀλευαδῶν**: these were the oligarchic caste at Larisa. Similar power was wielded by the Scopadae at Crannon, *Hdt.* vi 127 (Holm *History of Greece* (E. T.) i p. 224). The vacillating policy of the Thessalians is to be accounted for to a great extent by hostility between the common people and the δυναστεία. *Hdt.* vii 172, *Thuc.* iv 78. See Whibley *Greek Oligarchies* p. 117 note 3.

14. ἀφόβως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι: this was the profession Gorgias made himself; *Gorg.* 447 E Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἀπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὃ τι ἀν τις σε ἐρωτᾷ; *TOP.* Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ἐπηγγελλόμεν, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδεὶς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καιρὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτών. His pupil Polus is not less confident, *ib.* 462 A. Cp. *Cic. fin.* ii § 1, *de orat.* i § 103, *Quint.* ii 21, 21, *xii* 11, 21 (Gedike).

16. παρέχων αὐτὸν ἐρωτῶν: infinitives like ἐρωτῶν—επεξε- C getical, supplementary, prolate, or whatever else they may be called—illustrate the dative origin of the Greek infinitive. 'I give myself up for questioning.' The dative is one of *purpose* or 'work contemplated.' See *Gorg.* 456 B οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ λατρῷ, 475 D (see Dr. Thompson's note), 480 c, *Prot.* 348 A (in all which places παρέχειν is intransitive), *Phaedr.* 228 E ἐμαυτὸν σοὶ ἐμμελετῶν παρέχειν οὐ πᾶν δέδοκται, and especially *Apol.* 33 B, where Socrates is contrasting his procedure with that of Gorgias, ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχῃ ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτῶν. Also *Xen. Mem.* i ii 54, *Anab.* vi vi 18. Cp. *Gorg.* 497 B (ὑπόσχεσ). [Riddell § 230 brings these instances under 'Binary Structure,' certain idioms which 'are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one' (*ib.* § 204). But the infinitive hardly amounts to a separate clause.]

For the dative origin of the infinitive see Goodwin *Moods and Tenses* § 742. The grammarians (Kühner § 473. 7, Jelf § 669. 2, Goodwin *MT.* § 770, F. E. Thompson § 146, Hadley § 951, Krüger 55. 3. 20, 21) distinguish instances where the infinitive appears as a necessary completion of the sense of a

verb (e.g.  $\alpha\tau\tau\iota$  verb of command) from the looser use with verbs and adjectives, as here, where the infinitive appears to add something *extra* to the sense. But the two classes are separated by no firm line.

The *active* (or middle) infinitive after  $\text{παρέχω}$  and the like is by far commoner than the passive. Cp. *Phaedo* 102 D τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον, where Madvig translates ὑπερέχειν 'superandam,' ὑπερέχον 'superantem.' So in Latin tradit *diffundere* ventis; and we say 'a sight to remember,' 'a house to let.' Logically the passive infinitive would be equally possible. Whether the active or passive view be taken will depend on the presence or absence in the context of a prominent noun that may be taken as a subject to the notion of the infinitive. If there is such a noun, the active construction is preferred in Greek. Such a noun is often provided, as here, by a dependent dative. Gorgias lends himself τῷ βουλομένῳ for *him to ask*. In the exceptional place *Charm.* 157 B ὅς ἂν μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν παράσχη τῇ ἐπωδῇ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευθῆναι, the dative ἐπωδῇ is not a person and cannot well be conceived as a subject; hence the passive construction is preferred. So Kühner, who also (§ 473. Anm. 4), quotes Isocr. 12. 156 ποιήσομαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λεχθησομένων ἀκούσαι μὲν ἴσως τισὶν ἀηδῆ, ῥηθῆναι δ' οὐκ ἀσύμφορον, where the passive ῥηθῆναι can be seen to be necessary, the active being impossible unless a subject were expressed with it.

17. τῷ βουλομένῳ: see on 90 D 21.

18. οὐδενὶ ἔγωγε οὐκ: this is a case of *inverse attraction*. Hadley § 1003, Riddell § 199. See 71 A 23, 74 D 32; also on 96 C 7.

71 A 20. ὥσπερ, 'as it were.' This use of ὥσπερ, standing out of construction, is common in Plato: 87 A 26, *Phaedr.* 260 E ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιώντων λόγων, 270 D, *Phaedo* 77 C, 88 D, *Crat.* 384 C etc. (see Ast); also in Aristophanes: *Clouds* 1276 τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ὥσπερ σεσεῖσθαι μοι δοκεῖς, *Wasps* 395, 713, *Peace* 234.

22. εἰ γοῦν, 'I only know that if.'

25. ἀρετὴν γοῦν: ἀρετὴν is not strictly object to εἰδέναι, but is put by 'prolepsis' (Hadley § 878) or 'antiptosis' (F.E. Thompson § 330) for ἀρετῆ as subject to διδάκτον. This idiom, perpetually occurring in Greek, and frequent in this dialogue (e.g. 71 B 6 ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γινώσκει ὅστις ἐστίν), is brought by Riddell § 226 under the general head of 'Binary Structure.'

26. τοσοῦτον δέω: see App. on the text.

27. εἶτε μὴ διδασκόν : see on 86 D 12.

28. ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ . . ἀρετῆ : i.e. the real essence or nature of Virtue. This dialogue, the main purpose of which is not metaphysical but ethical, leaves the question open how Plato here regards the 'essence' of Virtue, whether as a mere logical concept, or as having a substantial separate existence. In other words, the *Meno* contains nothing explicitly showing that when it was written the theory of Ideas (of the *Phaedrus* and *Republic*) was full-blown in Plato's mind. But there is nothing to indicate that it was not, and the theory of Ideas is really implicitly involved in the theory of ἀνάμνησις. See on 81 D 12.

## CHAPTER II

2. συμπένομαι occurs nowhere else. Where σύν is compounded with an intransitive verb, the preposition naturally qualifies the subject; e.g. the present phrase = ἐγὼ σύν τοῖς πολιταῖς πένομαι. But where σύν is compounded with a transitive verb, the preposition generally affects the object, such constructions as συνῆξαιρει αὐτοῖς Σελλασίαν (Xen. *Hell.* vii iv 12) being less common. Cp. 80 D 40. See Jowett on Thuc. viii 46 (συγκαταδουλοῦν) and Jebb on Soph. *Ajax* 229 and 361.

3. εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς, 'eadem structura verbi εἰδέναι 85 C 10, 92 C (add 80 D 37), ἐπίστασθαι 85 D 18' (Fr.). Cp. 72 A 14, B 22. See on 90 B 47.

4. ὅ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστίν, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τί <ἐστίν> εἰδῆν; We have here a very pronounced distinction between the essential and non-essential attributes of a thing. The 'Definition' or λόγος of a class-name, as presented in this dialogue, is no longer the definition obtained by a simple comparison of a number of particulars. It is one which consists in referring a class to a higher genus and then marking the specific difference (*definitio per genus et differentiam*). The attributes forming the Essence or Species of a thing may thus be divided into those contained in the Genus and those contained in the Difference. The doctrine of the Predicables, as developed by the school of Aristotle, recognised besides 'Essential' attributes others that were classed either as Property (Proprium) or as Accident. The distinction generally drawn between these was that a Property was deducible from the essential attributes, an Accident not so. In the present instance ὁποῖόν τι represents Property rather than Accident; for the attribute διδασκόν turns out to be one deducible from the Essence of Virtue. See, for the Predicables, Jevons's *Elementary Lessons in Logic* pp.

98 foll., Bain's *Logic* I 73. See also Mill's *Logic* bk. I ch. vi §§ 1, 2 with ch. vii §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, for a criticism of the doctrine: where it is shown that in the more elastic view which modern Logic takes of the General Notion, the distinction between essential and non-essential attributes tends to disappear.

The phraseology *τί* and *ὅποιόν τι* to express the distinction between Essence and non-essential attribute is repeated at 86 E 17, 87 B 2. See Zeller *Plato* p. 200 note 79. It appears in the *Gorgias* 448 E. Polus has been asked what the art of Gorgias is. He replies by a eulogy of it. Socrates says he has not answered the question.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάσεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἦτις δὲ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα· ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἤρώτα ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς (cp. 462 c foll. where the question is answered).

See also *Philebus* 37 c 'Opinion (δόξα), besides being Opinion *per se*, may be further qualified as true or false *καὶ ἐγένετ'* οὐ μόνον δόξα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις ἐκατέρα. We must further consider' says Socrates 'whether, while Opinion is subject to qualification, Pleasure and Pain are not' (*εἰ καὶ τὰ μὲν* [sc. δόξαι] *ἐστὶ ποι'* ἄττα, *ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἀπερ ἐστὶ, ποίω τινε δ' οὐ γίγνεσθον*). Socrates proceeds ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ ποίω τινε. *πάσαι γὰρ ἐπινομεν ὅτι μεγάλαί τε καὶ μικραὶ κτέ.*

Something similar may be seen in *Symp.* 201 d foll. 'I must explain' says Socrates "τίς ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως, καὶ ποῖός τις, ἔπειτα τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ." The three points are dealt with successively: (1) 202 e foll. Ἔρως is a δαίμων, the son of Πενία and Πόρος; (2) 203 c foll. he is poor, and not tender or beautiful, as people think; (3) 206 b foll. his ἔργον is described.

But the terminological is not fixed or technical. *ποιός*, or *ποῖός*, often implies an added attribute, whereby a smaller class is carved out of a larger. In this sense it will correspond with Difference (in the language of the Predicables). Thus *Gorg.* 453 c, 454 A, 463 c ὅποιον μόριον, *Euthyphro* 12 D ποῖον μέρος, *Laches* 194 d e. See especially *Rep.* 433 b-e 'If A be relative to B, then A qualified by some differentia will be relative to B qualified by a corresponding differentia (ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι του, τὰ μὲν ποιά ἄττα ποιοῦ τινὸς ἐστὶν κτέ.). If knowledge is related to an object, a particular kind of knowledge will be related to a particular kind of object (ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτῇ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἐπιστήμη δὲ τις καὶ ποιά τις ποιοῦ τινὸς καὶ τινός).' So *Charmides* 159 A δ τι ἐστὶν

καὶ ὁποιόν τι ἢ σωφροσύνη, though we cannot be sure here that a formal definition per Genus et Differentiam is expected. Cp. 87 B 4 *εἰ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετῆ*, and (more loosely) *Euthyphro* 5 C *ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φησὶ εἶναι*. So Aristotle *N.E.* II vi 1 δ *τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἢ ἀρετῆ, εἰρηται· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποῖα τις*: *Rhet.* I ii 7 *τί δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι*, etc. [At *Theaet.* 152 D the difference of *τι* and *ὁποιουοῦν τι* seems to be that between a Concrete term and a Quality.]

A word is needed on the curious antithesis *ὄν* and *ποῖόν τι* in † *Ep.* vii 342 E and 343 B. For an account of the passage see Grote (I pp. 224-5), who believes in the genuineness of the letter, and Karsten (*de Platonis quae feruntur epistolis* pp. 182 foll. and 197) who does not. The antithesis here, as Grote says, is between the *quid* or Essence (of the class) which we are searching for, and the *quale* or Accidents (seemingly of the particulars) which we are not searching for: *δοῖν ὄντων, τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ποιού τινός, οὐ τὸ ποῖόν τι, τὸ δὲ τί ζητούσης εἰδέναι τῆς ψυχῆς κτέ.* [An attack on the genuineness of the seventh epistle should be now superfluous. See *C. R.* xiv, especially p. 337 b foll. It is hard to believe Plato to have been guilty of the sentence from which the above words are quoted, with its horrible accumulation of participles, almost defying disentanglement of subject and object. Many will find additional evidence of spuriousness in the fact that a document professing to be written late in Plato's life recognizes Ideas not merely of *κύκλος* but *περὶ σώματος ἅπαντος σκευαστοῦ τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γεγονότος πρὸς ὕδατος τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων* (342 D). See on 72 B 21.]

The distinction between Essence and Non-essential is otherwise expressed in the *Euthyphro*, 11 A namely by the antithesis *οὐσία* and *πάθος* (see J. Adam's Introduction p. xx, and below on 72 B 22). In *Hipp. maj.* 300 E foll. we have the pairs *εἶναι* and *πεπονθέναι*, *οὐσία* and *πάθος*, though the ground of the antithesis is not dwelt on. In Plato we see philosophic terminology in the making, but the process of crystallization is not complete.

For the thought cp. 86 D. That Metaphysic, a knowledge of Being, should come before Practice and lie at the root of it, is the text on which is based much of the *Republic*. See also *Laches* 190 A B *εἰ γὰρ που μὴδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδόμεν τὸ παράπαν ὃ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα ὄφου, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιο;*

6. *ὅστις Μένωνά μὴ γινώσκει ὅστις ἐστίν*: the difference in the mode of existence of the *individual* Meno on the one hand and the *class* Virtue on the other is not here for Plato's purpose important. There are many passages

in Plato in which he illustrates the definition of a class by the definition (or identification) of an individual, such as is afforded by a postal address or legal description. In the *Theaetetus* 208 c foll., where λόγος is treated as a knowledge of differences (σημείον ᾧ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν), the two examples taken for illustration are both individuals, namely the Sun, which is defined as λαμπρότατον τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν, and next Theaetetus himself, 209 A-C. In *Symp.* 201 D the first question raised and answered about "Eros is τίς ἐστι; In *Gorg.* 453 c we have a question about the definition of an individual which in its form recalls some of the questions about class-definition in this dialogue (72 B 22) ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξίς, εἰ μοι εἶπες ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῦα γράφων, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῶων γράφων; Again compare *Phaedo* 102 C τούτῳ τῷ Συμμίαν εἶναι with τῷ μελίττας εἶναι at 72 B 26. Cp. on 97 A 13. See Whately's *Logic* II. v. § 6. For ὅστις ἐστιν see on 92 C 18.

8. εἶτε καὶ γενναῖος . . εἶτε καὶ τάναντία : καὶ accentuates the word that follows it, in the general sense 'even.' Riddell *Digest* § 132. It is here put with γενναῖος as that marks the climax of the three alternatives enumerated. It is put with τάναντία as that marks the more emphatic alternative; more emphatic because more surprising. Cp. *Tim.* 21 B εἶτε δὴ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ τότε εἶτε καὶ χάριν τινα τῷ Κριτία φέρων. Ast, under εἶτε, supplies other instances. For καὶ emphasizing one member of a contrast see *Crit.* 406 A τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγώ γε οὐκ ἐπήνουν σε, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπήνουν, 410 E τὰ μὲν ἐπαινῶ σε, τὰ δὲ τι καὶ ψέγω. *Crat.* 440 D ἴσως μὲν οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ('after all') οὐ. See notes on C 12 καὶ οἴκαδε, also on D 26 ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀπεστίν : 75 A 11, 79 D 35, and 84 D 32. Kühner § 541. Anm. 2.

C 10. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδ' οἶσθα . . ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἀπαγγέλλωμιν; the uses of ἀλλά in the two instances will be felt to be different. Sentences of similar form, but not interrogative, occur 76 E 47 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, βελτίων, *Euthyphro* 3 C ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρῆ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμοσε λέναι, *Theaet.* 146 B ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἤρξω μὴ ἀφίεσο Θεαίτητου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα. Cp. 74 D 30 ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι οὕτως, ἀλλὰ κτέ. The first and second uses in each of these places are respectively typical of two uses of ἀλλά, namely :

(α) To effect a transition to a fresh subject, often with a special appeal to the person addressed. This use occurs in statements, commands (*Symp.* 199 c ἀλλὰ παρήμμι, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα), and questions (as here). In this use the matter with which ἀλλά is contrasted, is not definitely expressed.

(β) To introduce the second half of a statement which supplements the first half by either affirming something opposed to

what has been denied, or denying something opposed to what has been affirmed. Here the matter with which ἀλλά is contrasted is *definitely expressed*. Thus we have—

(1) οὐ Θεαίτητός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ Θεόδωρος.

(2) Θεόδωρός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ Θεαίτητος.

In these cases the real antithesis between the two halves of the sentence is slight. Where the sentence consists of a statement followed by the denial of its opposite, the antithesis sinks to nil; and even where this is not so clear, the first half is very little 'limited' by the second: we have rather the same fact viewed in two different aspects. In (1) we should either translate ἀλλά 'but'; or we should leave it untranslated: 'it is not Theaetetus, it is Theodorus.' In (2) we should translate ἀλλ' οὐ 'and not' rather than 'but not'; or again we might leave ἀλλά untranslated. In sentences of this form ἀλλ' οὐ may be replaced by *καὶ οὐ, οὐδέ* (in verse), and (for emphasis) the simple οὐ (Soph. OC. 1368 αἰδ' ἄνδρες, οὐ γυναῖκες, not uncommon in orators, Dem. de Cor. (18) 89, Aristocr. (23) 25). Instances of sentences of forms (1) and (2) occur perpetually; see the opening of this dialogue, then 72 C 33, 73 B 46 (which in a continuous sentence would be οὐκ ἀκόλαστοι ἀγαθοὶ ἂν γένοιντο, ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι), 84 D 35, 85 D 20 (which = οὐ διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος τινος), 89 B 32, Rep. 354 A B οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γ' εἰστίμαι· δι' ἐμαντὸν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σε· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λιχνοὶ κτέ.

[Where both clauses are affirmative, or both negative, the adversative force is stronger. The first half has then a concessive force, the latter a limiting. The former may be strengthened with μέν (Xen. Cyr. VII i 16 τὰ μὲν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ καλῶς εἶχειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλάγια λυπεῖ με), the latter with ὅμως (Euthyphro 3 C οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἶρηκα, ἀλλ' ὅμως φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν).]

But we have this 'complementary' use (cp. Riddell § 249) of ἀλλά not merely in statements, but also in commands (illustrated above) and in questions; thus

(3) ἄρ' (οὐ Θεαίτητός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ Θεόδωρος);

(4) ἄρα (Θεόδωρός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ Θεαίτητος);

The brackets here show that the interrogative refers to the sentence as a whole. In (3) οὐ does not go with ἄρα, which would make the first part an affirmative question. The whole is one neutral question. This is the form of the place before us. It may be granted that the two halves of the question here are not precise counterparts, but the transition is slight. ἀλλά is 'and.' 'Do you really not know, Socrates, and are we to carry this report of you even to Thessaly?' Cp.

**78 D 30, 79 C 30, Phaedo 58 c** ἡ οὐκ εἰωνοὶ ἀρχόντες παρῆναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φιλῶν; *Symp.* 205 B etc.

(4) may be illustrated by *Rep.* 344 E ἡ συμκρὸν οἰεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίσασθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ βίου διαγωγὴν; *Rep.* 366 B τίς μηχανῆ (τὸν τοιοῦτον) δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἑπαίνου- μένης ἀκούοντα; Here too ἀλλά is 'and' rather than 'but.'

See Kühner § 535. 2, 3.

[The use of δέ for ἀλλά in such constructions is characteristic of the *Laios* (Riddell § 161 A). Cp. † *Ep.* vii 343 B quoted on **71 B 4.**]

12. καὶ οἰκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν, 'do you wish this repute of you to be carried even to Thessaly?'—where it would of course spoil Socrates' reputation and chance of success. The verb is treated as one of motion, hence οἰκαδε. Hesiod has (*O. et D.* 611) πάντας ἀπόδρεπε οἰκαδε βότρυς.

The confusion between expressions of rest and motion is very easy; cp. our 'where' for 'whither,' and (conversely) ποῖ 'whither?' originally locative. *Phaedo* 57 A Φλασιῶν οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήνας.

The plural is used because Meno is speaking for himself and his party.

13. μὴ μόνον γε . . ἀλλά: from the use of ἀλλά following a negative clause to which it gives the affirmative counterpart (see note on line 10) arise a number of phrases in which the preceding negative clause is elliptical (Riddell § 158):

(α) οὐκ ἀλλά **85 C 3, 88 A 9, Prot.** 343 D, *Rep.* 475 E, *Euthyd.* 277 B, *Soph.* 263 D, *Phaedr.* 236 D ΣΩ. μηδαμῶς τοίνυν εἴπησ. ΦΑΙ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω, etc., *Dem. Phil.* I § 27. μὴ ἀλλά **75 B 13, μὴ μοι οὕτως, ἀλλά 74 D 30, οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλά Rep.** 475 E, *Theaet.* 201 B, etc.; μηδαμῶς ἀλλά *Gorg.* 497 B, etc. Riddell § 250.

(β) οὐ γὰρ ἀλλά *Euthyd.* 286 C, 305 E, *Aristoph. Frogs* 58, 498, *Eur. Bacch.* 785. Riddell § 156.

(γ) οὐχ ὅτι . . ἀλλά *Xen. Mem.* I ix 8. Perhaps never in Plato: at *Symp.* 179 B the reading is doubtful. μὴ ὅτι . . ἀλλά often in Plato, *Apol.* 40 D μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινα ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα: *Ep.* vii 329 E. Riddell § 154.

(δ) οὐχ ὅπως . . ἀλλά **96 A 22** etc. μὴ ὅπως . . ἀλλά *Xen. Cyr.* I iii 10. Riddell § 152.

(ε) οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλά *Phaedo* 107 B. μὴ μόνον γε ἀλλά (that is, μὴ ταῦτα μόνον ἀπάγγελλε ἀλλά) here, *Euthyphro* 6 C. Riddell §§ 151, 157.

(ς) οὐ μὴν ἀλλά *Gorg.* 449 C etc.

(η) οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά **86 C 4, Phaedo** 62 B (twice), *Symp.* 173 B. Riddell § 155.

(θ) μή τι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλὰ *Hipp. maj.* 297 E. (εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ 86 E 18 is different.)

(ι) οὐ (μή, οὐδέν, μηδέν) ἀλλ' ἤ, 76 B 13, 84 D 32. Riddell § 148.

(κ) οὐπω γ'· ἀλλὰ *Phaedr.* 260 B.

14. ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ: the personal use of δοκεῖν is far more common in Plato than the impersonal. *Apol.* 36 A Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφνευα. So the 2nd person ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖς 80 A 6. See Sidgwick on 'Personalisation,' *Class. Rev.* III 148, Hadley § 944, F. E. T. p. 159.

15. Γοργία οὐκ ἐνέτυχες: Gorgias first visited Athens in 427 B.C. at the head of an embassy sent from his town Leontini in Sicily to ask aid against Syracuse. In the dialogue *Gorgias* there are passages (as the beginning, where Gorgias is clearly a new attraction, and 503 C Περικλέα τουτοῖσι τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκῶτα) which look as if Plato meant to refer the dramatic date of the dialogue to Gorgias' visit of 427 B.C. Some later historical allusions suggest that Plato may have intended a later dramatic date, perhaps a subsequent visit of Gorgias. Anachronisms are, however, a feature very natural in fictitious dialogue, where the author is constantly tempted to introduce relevant matter within his own knowledge (see on 90 A 40). At any rate the dramatic date of the *Gorgias* is earlier than that of the *Meno*. It is not necessary to suppose a reference here to the dialogue *Gorgias*; but I am strongly disposed to think there is one. I have given reasons (Introd. §§ 13, 16) for believing that the *Gorgias* was written before the *Meno*.

18. εἶτα: as it were 'after all this,' *cum admiratione*. 79 A 5, *Apol.* 28 B, and often.

19. οὐ πάνυ: this phrase means originally, as we should expect, 'not altogether,' and is a *weak* negative. So Plato uses it perpetually, as here, 'I have not the best of memories,' 77 D 41, 86 B 23, etc. Where it has the force of a *strong* negative (as 73 D 11, 98 B 3, etc.), this is due to 'litotes,' the irony whereby the point of some truth is increased by understatement. English colloquialisms will supply many parallels: 'rather!' (strong affirmation), 'not much' (strong negative). Cp. Munro on Lucr. III 361, Riddell § 139, Dr. Thompson on *Gorg.* 457 E; also *Apol.* 19 A, *Theaet.* 150 C εἰμι δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, *Rep.* 419 A μή πάνυ τι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν. The point was cleared up by Cope, Translation of Plato's *Gorgias* App. C. The strongest instance of pathetic irony is *Soph. O. C.* 144, where Oedipus speaks of himself as οὐ πάνυ μόρας εὐδαι-

μόνισαι πρώτης—the only instance of the phrase in tragedy. Cp. οὐ σφόδρα *Phaedo* 100 A.

οὐ πάνυ εἰμι μνήμων: in these words, and the similar passage *Prot.* 334 C D ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἀνθρώπος κτέ., Plato has no doubt preserved a trick of the historic Socrates for inveigling his interlocutor into the wiles of his *elenchus*. It is all the more noticeable because the Greeks attached great importance to a good memory, as was natural with people who depended so little on writing. Plato himself makes it an essential requisite for the philosopher, *Rep.* 486 C D, *Gorg.* 466 A. At 88 A 17 μνήμη stands in the list of the virtues. In Aristoph. *Clouds* 482 foll. Strepsiades' memory is tested, and in 629 he is taunted as ἐπιλήσμων. The 'short memory' of the Spartans (Hdt. III 46) had, like that of Socrates, its diplomatic object.

- D 26. ἔκεινον μὲν τοίνυν ἔωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀπεστιν: the absent authority and the speechless book are on the same level of uselessness for the purpose of debate. Cp. *Phaedrus* 274 B–276 B (Grote II 239 and 256 foll.). In the same way consecutive oratory is unsatisfactory; *Prot.* 329 A (if you ask a point of Pericles or any orator he will make you a speech) εἰ δὲ ἐπανερωτοῦ τινὰ τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσι οὐτὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι οὐτὲ αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ib. 347 E (rational beings need not resort to citations from poets for topics of conversation) οὐς οὐτὲ ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοι τε αὐτοῖς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φασὶν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν οἱ δ' ἕτερα. Add *Hipp. min.* 365 D, quoted below. Plato's disparagement of writing, which diminished with advancing years, was grossly exaggerated by the writers of the second and seventh epistles (312 D foll., 341 B foll.), who for their own purposes tried to make out that the true Platonic teaching was an esoteric mystery only communicated orally. Grote, who accepts the epistles as genuine, overstates Plato's position (I pp. 221 foll.); for a juster view see Zeller p. 89 note; see also on 77 B 12.

ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀπεστιν, 'since, after all, he is not here'; see on 71 B 8. Cp. the similar passage *Hipp. min.* 365 D τὸν μὲν "Ὁμηρον τοίνυν εἰσώμεν ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν.

27. οὐ δὲ αὐτὸς . . . τί φῆς: Riddell § 309 'Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.' Cp. 78 C 19, 86 D 8.

28. εἶπον: the 2nd sing. 1st aor. imperat. εἶπον (so accented, not εἶπον, see Buttmann, Excursus I) is rare in good

Attic, never occurring in tragedy. In the two instances in which it occurs in Attic prose, here and Xen. *Mem.* III vi 3 πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφη, μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλ' εἶπον ἡμῖν, it is used in a solemn adjuration, probably for its heavier sound. See App. on the text.

καὶ μὴ φθονήσης: it is a strong note of Platonic dialectic, borrowed from Socrates, that a man's intellectual powers ought to be freely at the service of his fellows for the discovery of truth. All vulgar φθόνος is out of place among philosophers, as it is in the circle of the gods (*Phaedr.* 247 A, *Tim.* 29 E). The writer of the seventh epistle takes up the note, 344 B ἀνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσι καὶ ἀποκρίσεσι χρωμένων. See on 91 B 14.

29. ψεύσμα: a rare word, nowhere else in Plato.

ἔψευσμένος ᾧ: the middle and passive tenses of this verb afford a curious study in the Greek voices. ψεύδομαι (the moral connotation of which is much feebler than the English 'lie,' see e.g. *Rep.* 338 B) means either (middle?) 'I speak wrongly,' 'I utter a lie,' or (passive?) 'I am wrong.' In the former case it is opposed to ἀληθεύειν (*Hipp. min.* 366 E foll., *Euthyd.* 284 A, *Crat.* 431 B). In the latter it is opposed to τάλυθῆς δοξάζειν (*Theaet.* 194 C). Sometimes the 'middle' is used transitively, Xen. *Hell.* III i 25 ψεύδεταί σε ὄστρος. Perhaps there is no instance in Plato of the present middle used transitively; but we have the aor. in *Laws* 921 A τὴν τιμὴν τῶν ἔργων ὀφειλέτω ὃν ἂν τὸν ἐκδόντα ψύσῃται 'of which he has cheated the person who gave the contract.' Cp. *Rep.* 331 B τὸ μὴδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατήσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, where τινα is object. On the other hand it seems difficult to find the present ψεύδομαι in any author as a distinct passive with an expressed agent (ψεύδομαι ὑπὸ τινος).

The meanings of ἔψευσμαι exactly follow the meanings of ψεύδομαι—namely, 'I have uttered a lie' (middle), 'I harbour a lie or error' = ἀμαθής εἰμι (passive). But it would be hard to find an instance either of ἔψευσμαι transitive, or on the other hand of ἔψευσμαι distinctly passive with agent expressed. It is not clear here whether the meaning is 'have made a wrong statement' or 'have been deceived.' Such was the temper of the Greek mind, or such the freakish development of the Greek verb, that they expressed by the same form 'I am under a delusion' and 'I deceive (perhaps wilfully) another.' And so we get the extraordinary juggle in *Rep.* II 382 A-C, where it is argued that gods cannot deceive, because to deceive must imply the harbouring of error: τῇ ψυχῇ ψεύδεσθαι τε καὶ ἐψεύεσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι πάντες ἤκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο: cp. *ibid.* 535 E.

ἂν φανῆς σὺ μὲν εἰδώς . . ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκώς, 'if it turns out

that you and Gorgias know, *though* I said etc.' (parataxis). Kühner § 518. 6 draws a distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' or 'rhetorical' parataxis. The former is the primitive simplicity of language, before the mechanism of the subordinate clause has developed; the latter is a conscious retention or revival of the primitive form for special effect. He admits that no firm line can be drawn between the two classes. Cases like the present he would consider 'artificial' (§ 518. 9). Cp. Dem. *de Cor.* (18) 160 αἰσχρὸν ἔστιν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν τοὺς πόνους, ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴδὲ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀνέξεσθε.

Chapters III, IV (71 D-73 C). MENO. *There are all kinds of Virtue, suitable to different persons and circumstances.* SOCRATES. *But there must be something in common that makes all these actions Virtue. I want to get at that.* MENO. *I do not see that Virtue is in all cases one and the same—as, for instance, Health is.* SOCRATES. *But it is by possession of the same qualities that persons exhibit Virtue in all cases.* MENO. *Yes.*

**E** 1. ἄλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν: Meno at first naturally does not realise the difficulty of the task, and speaks with the confidence of ignorance: so presently οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν, where the word ἀπορία is ominous. Meno's first answer shows that as yet he does not grasp the notion of logical definition at all. His later attempts are more or less definitions in form, though faulty. For the present, instead of giving the contents of the notion, he gives an enumeration of instances. His answer refers to the *extension* of the term rather than its *intension*.

In many of Plato's dialogues where a definition is proposed, the first stage is devoted to exemplifying and clearing up this difficulty (Fr. *Introd.* p. 21 note 6).

(1) *Hipp. maj.* 286 E What is Beauty? (τὸ καλόν). Hippias, quite as confident as Meno in his mastery of the subject, gives in succession three answers, each of which is shown to be a mere exemplification of Beauty, not a general definition at all. Afterwards Socrates suggests (professedly at second-hand) three definitions, which are so far definitions that 'they keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a derivative or a modification' (Grote I 379). But they each fail to satisfy the examination to which Socrates subjects them.

(2) *Euthyphro* 5 c What is Piety? *Euthyphro.* To do as I am now doing: to prosecute guilty people, even if the culprit

is your father. *Socrates* (6 D). That is not an answer: other things are holy too. Euthyphro's next answer (τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλέ) is a definition in form, though unsatisfactory. Grote I 317, 8.

(3) *Laches* 191 D What is Courage? *Laches*. There is no difficulty in telling you that. Whoever keeps his place in the rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away, is a courageous man (Grote I 473). *Socrates*. 'But sometimes he that fights and runs away—like the Scythian horseman—is courageous. Yours is no definition.' *Socrates* then gives a sample definition of Swiftess. *Laches* then gives a definition of Courage, expressed in general terms; but it turns out too large. Subsequently *Nikias* proposes a definition which, though on strictly Socratic lines, still leaves some difficulties unsolved. See on 88 B 23.

(4) Lastly, in the *Theaetetus*, *Socr.* asks What is Knowledge? (146 c). *Theaetetus*. Geometry and the other things that *Theodorus* teaches; and again, shoemaking and practical arts. *Socrates*. γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἐν αἰτηθείς πολλά διδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἀπλοῦ. *Socrates* then gives a model definition of Clay (γῆ ὑγρῷ φυραθείσα) 147 D, after which *Theaetetus* shows that he at any rate grasps what is meant by a class-notation. Grote II 320.

This list of dialogues might be increased. The language in the various passages deserves careful comparison. Plato laboured hard to bring out the point, then a new one, for the elucidation of which little apparatus of philosophic terms was yet provided.

2. εἰ βούλει: this phrase (also εἰ βούλεται, εἰ βούλεσθε etc.) is used in various elliptic constructions (Ullrich on 71 D 23). We may distinguish according as there is, or is not, an expressed apodosis. In the first two sentences of *Meno's* speech we may fairly say there is an apodosis: εἰ βούλει (με εἰπεῖν) ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν, ῥάδιον (εἰπεῖν) κτέ. εἰ δὲ βούλει (με εἰπεῖν) γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν κτέ. In the later instance εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου, the words ἐλευθέρου and δούλου are no doubt each the relic of an apodosis, but it has practically disappeared, and εἰ μὲν βούλει, εἰ δὲ βούλει are little more than εἶτε . . . εἶτε.

The protasis in all these cases is incomplete, there being no infinitive dependent on βούλει. At *Symp.* 177 B we have a complete protasis: εἰ δὲ βούλει αὐτὸ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστὰς, (οὐ δεινὸν) Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους καταλογάδην συγγράφειν;

Above at 71 D 23 we have an instance with a real apodosis. In the following instances we have εἰ δὲ βούλει (or the like)

without *εἰ μὲν βούλει* preceding, the meaning being 'or again': 94 B 11, *Prot.* 320 A, *Hipp. maj.* 282 C, *Theaet.* 196 E, *Crat.* 392 A, *Phaedr.* 230 C. In these cases there is a verbal clause succeeding, but it is not a real apodosis. Similar is 73 E 19 *ὄν, εἰ βούλει . . . ἐπιόμ' ἄν.* In the following there is no verb succeeding: *Symp.* 220 D *εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μαχαῖς* 'again, take his conduct in battle,' *ib.* 209 D, *Hipp. maj.* 301 A, *Rep.* 425 D, *Laches* 188 C, *Theaet.* 183 A. In the last two places the meaning is 'or rather.'

Where *εἰ μὲν βούλει* or *εἰ μὲν βούλεται* precedes, *βούλει* or *βούλεται* after *εἰ δέ* is commonly omitted (Riddell § 253). *Symp.* 212 C *τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἐγκώμιον εἰς ἔρωτα νόμισον εἰρησθαί· εἰ δέ, ὃ τι καὶ ὅπη χαιρείς ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε, Euthyd.* 285 C *εἰ μὲν βούλεται, ἐψέτω, εἰ δ', ὃ τι βούλεται, τοῦτο ποιεῖτω, Laws* 688 B, *Crat.* 407 D, † *Alc.* i 114 B. Riddell compares the case of *εἰ δέ* without a verb in Homer. This is due in Homer to the original interjectional force of *εἰ*. In the cases before us there is a distinct ellipsis, and they should hardly be regarded as cases of survival. Note that in *Symp.* 212 C and *Euthyd.* 285 C, the relative clauses introduced by *ὃ τι* take the place of *βούλει* and *βούλεται* respectively, and would make the insertion of these words awkward. We find a fuller construction *Gorg.* 472 A B *εἰ μὲν βούλη . . . εἰ μὲν βούλη . . . ἔαν δὲ βούλη*: *Rep.* 432 A *εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύει, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν κτέ.* *Cp.* also *Prot.* 342 A. See Appendix on the text, 72 A 12.

*ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆν*: the *ἀρετῆ ἀνδρός* here set forth is the vulgar notion of civic excellence. See on 91 A 4. *ἀρετή* came to mean anything that conduced to pre-eminence, anything by which one could show one's self 'the better man,' even the miserable art of quibbling taught by Euthydemus and his friend, *Euthyd.* 273 D. When Thuc. (VIII 68) says Antiphon was *ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καθ' ἐαυτὸν ἀρετῇ οὐδενὸς δεύτερος*, this need not be read as a testimony to moral character.

4. *τοὺς μὲν φίλους εἶ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς*: this is the usual pre-Christian standard. *ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐπρέθη ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου, καὶ μισήσεις τὸν ἐχθρόν σου. ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῶν, ἀγαπάτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, Ev. Matth.* v 43, 44.

The view is often given by Plato as the current one, but never by him accepted. See *Rep.* 332 A B, criticised 334 B foll., *Clit.* 410 A, *Crito* 49 B (where see J. Adam's note). The teaching of the *Gorgias*, *κρεῖττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν* is directed against it. Whether Socrates took the same enlightened view is more doubtful. Bernays *Phokion und seine neueren Beurtheiler* pp. 46 foll. argues that Socrates acquiesced in the current view. J. Adam (note on *Crito* l.c. and *Introd.* p. xii) replies to his

arguments, I think successfully. But what he says of Socrates is also true of Plato; where Plato impugns the current doctrine it is not from an altruistic standpoint, but from a self-regarding one, the welfare and dignity of the agent's own soul (Grote II 82 and 123, J. S. Mill *Diss.* III 342 foll., Zeller 182 and 454).

It must be said in defence of the popular view that if it preaches the duty of revenge it also rates very highly the obligations of friendship. Even Callicles (*Gorg.* 473 B) represents as part of the misery of the man without power in the state, that he not merely cannot take his own part, but that he cannot do a good turn for a friend.

7. *γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν*: this also is the conventional view. One of the strongest practical results of the Socratic-Platonic theory that Virtue is One, is the ignoring of any distinction in the special excellence or moral function of the sexes. See *Rep.* 451 foll., Zeller p. 448, *Socr.* p. 121. Xenophon, *Symp.* II 9, appears to report the Socratic view; but adheres to the popular view, *Oec.* VII §§ 22-27. Antisthenes said *ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ*: *Diog. L.* VI § 12. Aristotle, as we might expect, is on the side of 'common sense': *Pol.* I 13 *ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον δεῦν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον. . . ὥστε φανερόν ἐστιν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐργημάτων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς, οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης. . . πολλὴ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετὰς ὥσπερ Γοργίας.*

The fact that Meno is here 'enumerating' virtues makes it highly probable that Aristotle is referring to the present passage, and attributing the views Meno here expresses to his master. Whether Aristotle had access to any deliverance of Gorgias himself on the subject is very doubtful (Dr. Thompson *Gorgias* p. 181, Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 472).

Fr. well points out that the use of *ἀρετὴ* = 'special excellence or function' naturally led the way to such a recognition of various forms of Virtue. This use of *ἀρετὴ* is prominent in Plato himself. *Rep.* 353 B foll. *οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, ᾧ περ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; κτέ.*, *ib.* 601 D *οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζῆου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐστί, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ᾗ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός; Cp. Arist. *NE.* II VI 2. See the words translated below.*

14. *καθ' ἐκάστην κτλ.*, 'for corresponding to our several 72 A occupations and ages in regard to each of our functions there is for each of us a Virtue; and in like manner, I think, Socrates, a Vice.'

The style of Meno's answer is verbose and bombastic; but it is hard to detect in it any traits that can be set down distinctly as 'Gorgianisms.' See on 76 E 43: Blass *Attische Beredsamkeit* i 58 foll. Agathon's speech in the *Symposium* (194 foll.) is full of Gorgianisms; cp. 198 c. See too Xen. *Symp.* ii 26, Zeller *pre-Socr.* ii 492. When the rhetorician Hermogenes censures 'Polus and Gorgias and Menon' (Dr. Thompson's *Gorgias* p. 175) for their pompous and pretentious way of writing, he probably bases his criticism of Meno on slender grounds, as there is no reason to believe that the real Meno left any literary relics.

18. πολλῇ γέ τιμι εὐτυχίᾳ κτλ.: cp. the ironical congratulation to Theaetetus 146 D (quoted on 71 E 1).

19. σμῆνος ἀρετῶν: the word σμῆνος is frequently used metaphorically, *Crat.* 401 E σμῆνος σοφίας, *Rep.* 574 D ἡδονῶν σμῆνος, Aristoph. *Clouds* 297 σμῆνος ἀοιδῆς. Cp. *Rep.* 450 B ὅσον ἔσμων λόγων ἐπεγείρετε. Plutarch *Virt. Mor.* 2 borrows hence the expression σμῆνος ἀρετῶν to ridicule Chrysippus' long list of virtues. (Zeller *Stoics* p. 244 note 1.) A similar expression, 'a mob of virtues,' was applied to Aristotle's list by Schleiermacher (Whewell *Additional Lectures on Moral Philosophy* p. 18).

- B 21. κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα, 'apropos of this metaphor of the hive.' Many uses of κατὰ with acc. come from the notion of following down (we say 'following up') a suggestion. Hdt. vii 142 οἱ μὲν δὲ κατὰ τὸν φραγμὸν συνεβάλλοντο τοῦτο τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος εἶναι 'following up the notion of the stockade,' Aristoph. *Clouds* 534 νῦν οὖν Ἡλέκτραν κατ' ἐκείνην ἤδ' ἡ κωμῶδία ζητοῦσ' ἦλθ', *Theaet.* 179 E (the Herakliteans) ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται 'are in the state of instability appropriate to their writings,' *Rep.* 576 C δ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἂν εἴη ὁμοίωσι. Cp. 76 C 19, 23.

The mention of the hive suggests to Socrates the *bee* as a subject for definition. It is clear that Plato devoted much attention to zoological and botanical classification. We have elaborate examples of the former, *Soph.* 220 A B, *Politicus* 261 B -267 c, especially 266 E. It is true that these classifications stand apart from the main subject of these dialogues; but it would be a mistake to deny them intrinsic importance. Aristotle seriously criticises Plato's zoology (*Part. An.* i chaps. ii and iii, especially i ii §§ 2, 3, i iii §§ 12, 13). See W. H. T. in *JP.* vol. viii p. 294; also p. 315, where he quotes the satire of the comic poet Epicrates on the proceedings of the Academy, who are represented as occupied in determining the genus and species of a pumpkin. See also H. Jackson in *JP.* vol. xiii pp. 38, 243, and Archer-Hind, *Timaeus* Introd. pp.

31-35, *JP.* vol. xxiv p. 52, who show that in Plato's later view the only Ideas are those corresponding to the Natural Kinds; mainly, that is, those of plants and animals. At the time when he wrote the *Meno* Plato had not arrived at this stage; but as suggestive problems in classification the species of plants and animals must have interested him at an early stage. These species furnish the chief instances of Natural Kinds, as they were called by Mill, that is, Kinds separated from others that stand near them not by a known limited number of differences, but by an unlimited number—as, for instance, the differences between a bee and a wasp. The selection of the most suitable differences on which to ground a system of classification is the problem botanists and zoologists have to face. (See Mill *Logic* i vii § 4, iv vi § 4, iv vii §§ 2, 4; Bain *Logic* vol. i p. 63; Jevons *Elem. Lessons* p. 294.)

22. εἰ μου ἐρομένου κτλ.: the protasis is really triple, but one member of it appears in a participial form (μου ἐρομένου). This becomes clear by comparing the sentence with two analogous ones at 74 B and C.

72 B	74 B	74 C
(α) μου ἐρομένου	εἰ τίς σε ἀνέροτο	εἰ ἀνήροτο
(β) εἰ ἔλεγες	εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες	εἰπόντος σου
(γ) εἰ σε ἠρόμην	εἰ σοι εἶπεν	καὶ (εἰ) ὑπέλαβεν

The variety is characteristic of Plato.

Sentences with a *double* protasis, especially as here in summarising a supposed dialogue, are frequent in Plato.

*Hipp. maj.* 289 C εἰ σε ἠρόμην—εἰ μοι ἀπεκρίνω—ὀρθῶς ἂν ἀπεκέκρισο.

*Prot.* 311 B C εἰ ἐπένδεις—εἰ τίς σε ἤροτο—τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; (bis).

*Gorg.* 453 C εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν—εἰ μοι εἶπες—οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην;

*Theaet.* 147 A εἰ τίς ἔροιτο—εἰ ἀποκριναιμεθα—οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἴμεν;

† *Theages* 123 B εἰ ἐπεθύμεις—καὶ ἐγὼ σε ἐτύγχανον ἀνερωτῶν—τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω;

In *Euthyphro* 10 E we have a double protasis, but the second is bifurcated, each half having a separate apodosis.

In *Clit.* 408 E we have an elaborate sentence with a triple protasis, εἰ τίς ἡμᾶς προῤῥησε—καὶ ἔπειτα ὠνείδισε—εἰ δ' ἐπανηρόμεθα—εἶπεν ἄν. In all these instances the protases are separate and co-ordinate; in translation they might be linked together by 'and.' A more elaborate form occurs *Phaedo* 67 E εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται κτέ. Kühner § 578. 9, Goodwin *MT.* § 510.

'Hic et in proximis mirum in modum alternant imperfecta cum aoristis,' ἔλεγες, ἀπεκρίνω, ἠρόμην, ἀπεκρίνω 72 B, εἶπον,

είχες 73 D, ἤρχον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα 86 D. Heind. *ad Gorg.* 447 B εἰ ἐτύγγαθεν ὦν ὑποδημάτων δημοῦργος, ἀπεκρίνατο ἄν, 514 D κὰν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἄν, omnia tamen in verbis hisce loquendi, respondendi, inquirendi' (Buttmann). Heind. refers *inter alia* to *Prot.* 311 B (quoted above). Fr. notes 74 C D, *Euthyphro* 12 D εἰ ἠρώτας εἶπον ἄν; add 99 E 3, *Gorg.* 453 C, *Ion* 540 D εἰ ἐτύγγατες ἰππικὸς ὦν ἔγνωσ ἄν, *Symp.* 199 D εἰ ἠρώτων εἶπες ἄν, *Prot.* 313 A εἰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν ἔδει τῷ—πολλὰ ἄν περιεσκεψώ—καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἄν παρεκάλεις: Goodwin *MT.* § 414, Hadley 875. 6. In many of these cases the ground of difference in the tenses comes out clearly: thus ἠρώτων refers to a process of questioning, ἠρώτην to a single question (see App. on text, 72 C 4). But certain aorists and certain imperfects seem to be favoured, *Theaet.* 144 E πότερον εὐθὺς ἄν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθα;

μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν: see Exc. I.

26. τῷ μελίττας εἶναι, 'in their essential nature as bees,' i.e. τῇ μελιττῶν οὐσίᾳ. *Hipp. maj.* 292 D τὸ καλὸν αὐτό, ὃ παντὶ ψ ἄν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι, 299 D ἀρ' οὐν ἤδ' ἠδέος ὄτιοῦν ὄτιοῦν διαφέρει τούτῳ τῷ ἤδ' εἶναι; *Lysis* 217 B σῶμά που κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οὐτε κακόν, *Phaedo* 102 C οὐ γὰρ Σιμμίαν (Σωκράτους) ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει (see on 71 B 6), 72 E 22 πρὸς τὸ ἰσχύς εἶναι, 73 A 26.

30. ἡ μελιτται εἰσὶν: this somewhat more technical expression is substituted for τῷ μελίττας εἶναι above. Cp. *Parm.* 145 E ἡ μὲν ἀρα τὸ ἐν ὄντι, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔστιν· ἡ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ. The use becomes stereotyped in Aristotle, and is represented by the scholastic *qua*.

- C 36. *ἔγωγε*: Plato spares us Meno's attempt at defining a bee. It would be interesting to see what Plato's own would have been.

## CHAPTER IV

1. κὰν εἰ . . εἰσιν . . ἔχουσιν: in this construction the ἄν originally belonged to the apodosis. It has got drawn forward and attached to καί, mainly owing to the desire to mark the conditional character of the sentence at the start, but perhaps partly from the wish to avoid the hiatus καὶ εἰ.

The origin of the idiom is seen by comparing such a sentence as 75 C 25 ἐγὼ γὰρ κὰν οὕτως ἀγαπήσῃν εἰ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις, which might have been written ἐγὼ γὰρ κὰν εἰ μοι οὕτως ἀρετὴν εἴποις,

ἀγαπήν. But the *ἄν* has become 'consopitum,' and is used often where there is no apodosis that admits of *ἄν*, as here, *Soph.* 267 D (προσείπωμεν), *Rep.* 477 A (ἐχομεν), 579 D ἔστιν ἄρα, *κἄν* εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ (cp. 473 A), *Prot.* 328 A *κἄν* εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει . . ἀγαπήν, *Symp.* 185 C *κἄν* εἰ τις ἐξαπατηθεῖ δμῶς καλὴ ἢ ἀπατή, † *Theages* 121 A, 130 D. In some cases there is neither an apodosis corresponding to *ἄν* nor a verb with *εἰ*: the words *ἄν* and *εἰ* then are the relics of a vanished apodosis and protasis, and are almost otiose, *κἄν* εἰ being little more than *καὶ* 'even,' *Soph.* 247 E *κἄν* εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, *Polit.* 308 C εἰ τις πρᾶγμα διοῦν . . *κἄν* εἰ τὸ φανλότατον, *συνίστησιν*. In cases where *ἄν* retains its force, and the apodosis contains a suitable finite verb, Plato generally repeats *ἄν*: *Soph.* 256 B *κἄν* εἰ πῆ μετελάμβανεν . . οὐδὲν ἄν ἄποπον ἦν, *Gorg.* 514 D quoted on B 22, *Phaedo* 72 C *κἄν* εἰ συγκρίνοιο ταχὺ ἄν τὸ τοῦ Ἄναξ. γεγονὸς εἴη: cp. *Prot.* 318 B, 353 D, *Menex.* 236 C ὥστε *κἄν* ὀλίγου, εἰ με κελεύεις ἀποδύντα ὀρχήσασθαι, *χαρισάμην ἄν* (where, however, Sch. brackets the last two words). [But where the apodosis is an inf. or ptep. Plato usually does not repeat *ἄν*: *Rep.* 408 A, 473 A, 612 C: *Phaedo* 71 B: *Phil.* 58 c.]

In most of the above cases *καὶ* goes with *εἰ*, in the sense 'even,' the sentence being concessive (see on 98 D 35).

On *κἄν* *εἰ* see Kühner § 398. 4, Riddell § 255, Goodwin *MT.* § 195, F. E. T. § 190, Buttman note here and on Dem. *Meid.* § 51, Heindorf on *Soph.* 247 E, Jebb on *Soph. El.* 1483, *Aj.* 1078, Cope on *Aristot. Rhet.* I i 5. The account of ὥσπερ ἄν *εἰ* is analogous to that of *κἄν* *εἰ*.

2. *ἐν γέ τι εἶδος*: here we have another word which Plato moulded to philosophical usage. The meanings before Plato are (1) 'form,' 'physical appearance,' and (2) 'sort,' 'kind' (see L. & S.). The former meaning is frequent in Plato, e.g. 80 A 9, *Rep.* 402 D ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει, *Symp.* 210 B εἰ δὲ διώκειν τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλόν (so Hug, I think rightly, but there may be a play on two senses of *εἶδος*). The second meaning differs but little from one of the philosophical meanings in Plato; you can hardly separate *παιγνιέων τὰ εἶδεα* (*Hdt.* I 94) from *Rep.* 363 E ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος λόγων, 424 C εἶδος καινὸν μουσικῆς (cp. *τρόπον φῶδης νέον* just above). See *CR.* XII 223.

The philosophical meanings of *εἶδος* in Plato we may thus distinguish:

A. (metaphysical): the Form which makes a given Class what it is, whether by infusing its being into it (Participation), or by serving as an exemplar (Imitation). *Phaedo* 102 B ὠμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τὰλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἰσχεῖν, *Rep.* 597 A (ὁ

κλινοποιός) οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, δὲ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι δὲ ἔστι κλίην, ἀλλὰ κλίην τινά, *Parm.* 129 A-135 C, especially 132.

[In the passages hitherto quoted some definite metaphysical theory or other is implied as to the relation of the εἶδος to the particulars. Of the following places in earlier dialogues, as of this place (and D, E presently) in the *Meno*, this can hardly be said: *Euthyphro* 6 D ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ θσια θσιά ἐστίν, ἐφθισθα γάρ που μᾶ ἰδέα τὰ τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ θσια θσια (cp. 5 D and see on 72 B 22 above), *Hipp. maj.* 289 D αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴν προσγένηται ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος. At *Gorg.* 503 E the meaning is 'visible form'; but not without suggestion of a mental type to be realised: (the true orator) οὐκ εἰκὴ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος . . ., ὅπως ἂν εἰδὸς τι αὐτῷ σχῆ τούτου δ' ἐργάζεται.]

B. (logical) (α) a *genus* contrasted with a smaller species, or with particulars, *Theaet.* 178 A εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἶδους ἐρωτῶν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ἐν, 148 D ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὐσας ἐν εἶδει περιέλαβες.

(β) a *species* contrasted with a larger genus, *Symp.* 205 B ἀφελόντες γὰρ τοῦ ἐρωτός τι εἶδος ὀνομάζομεν, τὸ τοῦ ὄλου ἐπιτιθέτες ὄνομα, ἐρωτα, *Rep.* 357 C, *Polit.* 258 E, 263 B, etc.

[There is also a periphrastic use, *Rep.* 389 B ὡς ἐν φαρμάκῳ εἶδει 'by way of medicine' (see L. & S.), with which cp. *Hipp. maj.* 297 B ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέα εἶναι τὸ καλόν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, *Laws* 918 E ἐν μητρός καὶ τροφοῦ σχήματι. So ἐν μέρει τινος (L. & S. IV 3), ἐν ἀνδρός λόγῳ *Hdt.* III 120.]

Whether there is any consistent distinction in Plato's usage of εἶδος and ἰδέα has been debated. Zeller (notes pp. 207 and 238) denies any such difference, and I think he is right. On the other hand see Campbell *Theaet.* App. C, and L. & S. s.v. ἰδέα. But εἶδος has in Plato all the meanings of ἰδέα. The history of the two words is precisely similar. ἰδέα had before Plato the same two meanings as εἶδος, 'physical appearance' and 'sort.' Both words occur in *Hipp. maj.*, εἶδος in a philosophical sense, ἰδέα only in the phrase ἐν πατρός ἰδέα (289 D and 297 B quoted above). Both occur in *Euthyphro* in a philosophical sense, ἰδέα 5 D, εἶδος and ἰδέα 6 D. On the latter passage J. Adam says 'εἶδος and ἰδέα are here practically synonymous: the only difference is that εἶδος views the thing in question more as to its content, ἰδέα more as to its form.' Cp. Fr. *Introd.* to *Euthyphro* p. 150 note 6. On *Phaedo* 103 E Archer-Hind observes, 'In fact μορφή, εἶδος and ἰδέα are in the present passage interchangeable words.' In *Rep.* 596 there is little change of meaning between εἶδος at A and ἰδέα (thrice) at B. 'We assign one εἶδος to each class of particulars: and so there are

ιδέαι of the bed and of the table, which the δημιουργός copies.' The key of the Ideal Theory (of the *Rep.*) is the representation of Intellectual processes by metaphors drawn from the world of Sense. Perhaps associations of Sense adhere rather more strongly to ιδέα than to εἶδος. In *Parm.* 132 A I can distinguish no difference of meaning: Οἶμαι σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκαστον εἶδος οἰεσθαι εἶναι: ὅταν πόλλ' ἅπτα μεγάλα σοι δόξη εἶναι, μὴ τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ιδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι, nor ib. C Οὐχ ἐνός τινος, δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκείνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὶν νοεῖ, μίαν τιὰ οὖσαν ιδέαν; Naí. Εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, αἶε ὅν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; Cp. 135 A. Again cp. *Phaedr.* 249 B δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρώπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰόντ' αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον with 265 D εἰς μίαν ιδέαν συνορῶντα ἀγειν τὰ πολ- λαχῇ διεσπαρμένα: also *Polit.* 258 C, 262 B.

ιδέα nowhere occurs in the *Meno*. Diog. L. III 64 says of Plato πολλάκις δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν ὀνόμασιν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σημασινομένου χρῆσθαι: τὴν οὖν ιδέαν καὶ εἶδος ὀνομάζει καὶ γένος καὶ παράδειγμα καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίον. Plato saw that the formation of philosophic habits of thought must precede the fixing of a philosophical nomenclature: *Theaet.* 184 C τὸ δὲ εὐχρῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, κτέ., *Polit.* 261 E κἂν διαφυλάξης τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανῆσει φρονήσεως: *Rep.* 533 D ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ κερὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσοῦτων κερὶ σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται. Hostility to the word-catching methods of Eristic contributed to this feeling in him. See Campbell General Introd. to *Sophr.* and *Polit.* p. xxiv, who, after quoting from Cope's Pref. to his Translation of the *Gorgias* (p. xi): 'one of the most striking peculiarities of Plato's philosophical writings is the almost entire absence of any scientific terminology,' shows that in the later dialogues, from the *Theaetetus* onwards, the tendency to technicalities considerably increases.

3. εἰς δ' ἀποβλέψαντα: cp. *Euthyphro* 6 E ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν διδάξον τὴν ιδέαν, τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδειγματι, δ' μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ . . . φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι: *Gorg.* 503 E (quoted above); *Rep.* 501 B etc.

4. πού, ὀπίσθω, 74 B 6, 75 E 14, 89 B 27, 28, 97 B 6. Cp. 75 C 29 (Fr.).

8. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, 'the point of your present inquiry'; D not τὸ ἐρωτηθέν, because he is not referring exclusively to Socrates' last question.

9. οὕτω δοκεῖ . . . ἄλλη μὲν: there is a seeming anacoluthon here, δοκεῖ giving the impression of an impersonal use, whereas

a subject is subsequently supplied. Fr. quotes *Rep.* 334 B τοῦτο ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη (where the transition is rather stronger, as τοῦτο gives the impression of being subject to δοκεῖ), *Apol.* 25 B (see Stallbaum) ἡ καὶ περὶ ἵππουσ' οὕτω σοὶ δοκεῖ ἔχειν· οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, where δοκοῦσι has to be substituted for δοκεῖ in the second clause. See on 71 C 14 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.

**E** 20. τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει, 'by something generically the same.' Plato leads up to this by the phrases C 2 ταῦτ' ἂν εἶδος ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν, D 14 ταῦτ' ἂν πανταχοῦ εἶδος ἐστίν, and for it he substitutes at 73 C 51 τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ. Cp. *Euthyphr.* 6 D (quoted, Intr. p. xlv).

21. τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω, 'by the words "the same" I mean this.' λέγω = 'I mean' generally has two accusatives: *Gorg.* 489 D (twice), 491 A, etc.

22. πρὸς τὸ ἰσχύς εἶναι: cp. πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι just below. The attraction into the nom. is quite regular in Greek. *Prot.* 341 A διὰ τὸ μαθητῆς εἶναι. Cp. Roby *Latin Grammar* II p. xxiii. See on 72 B 26.

**73 A** 29. τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὁμοίον, 'hoc non jam simile'; the same sense would be given by τοῦτ' ἤδη ἀνόμοιον 'hoc jam dissimile.' Cp. *Soph.* 247 B τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτ' ἀποκρίνονται: *Gorg.* 503 A Οὐχ ἄπλουδ' ἐτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς: 99 A 2. See on 83 D 52.

31. ἔλεγε: 'ubi verba dicendi vel sentiendi (ἐδόκει 89 C 8) ad superiora referuntur imperfectum usu venit. Ita νῦν δὲ ἔλεγον 74 B 7, 76 E 49, 78 B 1, ἀπεβάλλομεν 79 D 36, ἐλέγομεν 87 B 8, 88 D 2, 99 D 28, ὡμολογοῦμεν 97 A 7' (Fr.). But see Intr. p. lxii. (ἐπολεῖ at 88 D 5 is somewhat different.)

35. σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως: these are the two virtues that constitute ordinary civil virtue. *Phaedo* 82 B τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν, ἣν δὲ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην (see Archer-Hind's note and his App. I), *Symp.* 209 A πολλὴ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεων τε καὶ οἰκίσεων διακοσμήσεις, ἣ δὲ βρομὰ ἐστὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη (see Hug's note); at *Prot.* 325 A τὸ δσιον εἶναι is added. Zeller pp. 449 foll. Xenophon represents Justice and Temperance as the common ground of the sexes, *Oec.* vii 27.

**B** 42. 'ἄρα in conclusionibus 73 C 51, 78 A 62, 82 D 22, 83 C D E al., aliter ad 80 E 8, 81 D 12, 97 C 33' (Fr.): also 91 C 2. See on 80 E 8.

46. μῶν is rare in the early dialogues: see the table quoted from Constantin Ritter, Intr. p. lxii. It occurs thrice in the *Meno*; here, 84 B 14 and 93 A 11.

49. ἀλλὰ σάφρονες: the ἀλλὰ is 'complemental': see on 71 C 10.

55. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν: see Exc. II.

C

Chapter V (73 C-74 A). MENO. *Virtue is the power to rule.*

SOCRATES. *But this does not suit the case of all men—slaves and children, for instance. Moreover, to make rule virtuous it must be exercised with certain characteristics—Justice, for instance. These characteristics are several species of Virtue. We have not got Virtue as a Whole yet.*

Meno's second definition has at least the semblance of unity. But how has he arrived at it? He has simply taken out of the 'swarm' of Virtues above the one that fills the largest place in his mind, the ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, and ignored all the rest. Socrates shows, first, that the definition is much too narrow; next, that no progress is made so long as we still regard the term Virtue in its Extension. If we take a class of external acts, as those of a virtuous Ruler, we find they are virtuous because they manifest various qualities, Justice for instance. As these qualities are many, Virtue again, from a new point of view, appears as plural.

With Socrates' criticism here must be carefully compared that which he makes on the third definition subsequently, 77 B foll. Meno's ready assent that Rule must be Just to be virtuous, is parallel with his similar assent about Acquisition at 78 D 33.

5. κατὰ πάντων: it is worth while to notice the different D prepositional and other phrases used by Plato to denote the relation of the Universal to the Particulars, during the period of his philosophy while he either had framed no metaphysical theory of this relation, or still regarded the Idea as 'immanent in the particulars' and not, as in his later stage, merely as an exemplar. (See H. Jackson in *JP.* vol. x pp. 295-6, xi p. 297, Archer-Hind *Phaedo* Intr. pp. 34, 35.)

κατὰ πάντων here: 74 B 2, 88 E 13; cp. 76 A 23, etc.

διὰ πάντων 74 A 35: *Laches* 192 B εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρονοῦμεθα. *Soph.* 240 A τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων, ἃ πολλὰ εἰπῶν ἤξιωσας ἐνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι, φθεγγόμενος εἰδῶλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἐν ὄν.

ἐπὶ πᾶσι 75 A 6: *Soph.* 240 A (just quoted), *Theaet.* 185 C τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις, *Symp.* 210 B τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος. The metaphor implied in the use of the preposition ἐπὶ to express this relation, and the difficulties

involved in it, are brought out in *Parm.* 131 B ἡδέως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῦτόν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, ὅσον εἰ ἰστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον: cp. 132 C. See *JP.* xi pp. 289-291.

ἐν πᾶσι: *Lach.* 191 E πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν, τί ὄν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖτοισ ταῦτόν ἐστίν.

Lastly, at 74 D 34 the Universal κατέχει the Particulars. Cp. *Phaedo* 104 D; see also note on 73 E 17.

The references to the *Sophistes* come from a portion of that dialogue where the 'Sophist' is made to assume the mantle of Socrates himself, and to ask for a definition in language which, as H. Jackson has shown (*JP.* xiv pp. 189, 190), 'is the very echo of that of the *Meno.*'

7. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε, 'yes, that is just what I am seeking for.' For ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε used in repeating with emphasis a word from a previous speaker cp. *Euthyphro* 6 E εἰ οὕτω βούλει. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν βούλομαι γε, 'yes, that is just what I do wish,' *Lach.* 193 C εἰπερ οἰοῦτό γε. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαι γε, and 192 C (quoted above). (Cp. *Gorg.* 466 B εἰ τὸ δύνασθαι γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε.) Other uses of the combination occur 74 E 43, 77 A 1, 98 E 47, cp. 41.

10. ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι, 'do you think the ruler would be a slave then?'

11. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ: see on 71 C 19.

12. οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, 'I should rather think not.'

ὦ ἄριστε implies no estimate of the character of the person addressed, any more than does 'my dear sir' (used in expostulation) or 'my good fellow' (used with contempt). See Campbell *Theaetetus* App. D. Cp. Carlyle *Sartor* bk. i ch. 3 'but I, mein *Werther*, sit above it all; I am alone with the stars'; and Sheridan's *Rivals*, where Fag profoundly observes that 'one always says "honest" to one's inferiors.' Cp. 92 C 16 ὦ δαιμόνιε.

13. προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε: cp. *Rep.* 369 D.

E 17. ἡ ἀρετή τις; so σχῆμα and σχῆμά τι presently express respectively the Universal and the Particular. A similar relation is expressed by τὸ καλόν and καλόν in *Hipp. maj.* 287 D.

19. εἰ βούλει: see on 71 E 2.

21. οὕτως ἀπλῶς, 'just simply,' without qualification. Ast s.v. ἀπλῶς quotes many examples, either word preceding indifferently. *Prot.* 351 C etc.

74 A 29. καὶ σὺ οὖν: οὖν resumes εἰπέ in the line above. For οὖν

resumptive see *Apol.* 28 D, *Symp.* 201 D, *Euthyd.* 285 B. 'Velut ipse dicerem . . . si juberet, ita tu quoque dic.'

30. Meno here gives the four 'cardinal' virtues; but shows that this is no philosophical classification by adding *μεγαλοπρέπεια* ('*pars civilis virtutis quam intellegebat Meno*' Fr.), καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι. The Thessalian Admetus is markedly *μεγαλοπρεπής* (Eur. *Alc.* 858: cp. on 70 A 7). Perhaps it is also characteristic of Meno that he leaves out *δουλιότης*, which Socrates introduces at 78 D 30.

It may be noted that *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, though not standing on the same footing as *δικαιοσύνη*, is mentioned as one of the qualities of the true philosopher, *Rep.* 486 A. His character is summed up at 487 A; he must be *μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὐχαρῖς, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενῆς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης*. Cp. on 88 A 16 and 91 A 4, 8. Cp. *Ar. Rhet.* I vi 9=1362 b 13, I ix 5, 12=1366 b 2, 18; *N.E.* II vii 6 and IV ii.

Chapters VI-IX (74 A-77 A). *Socrates helps Meno by giving sample definitions—first, two of Figure, the former of which is rejected as involving terms with which the respondent has not assured himself that the other is familiar. After the second and scientific definition of Figure, Socrates gives in addition a definition of Colour, hailed with acclamation by Meno, but less scientific because it rests on a hypothesis not universally admitted.*

6. εἰ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο κτέ.: see on 72 B 22. The triple B protasis is expressed by thrice-repeated εἰ—a rare combination. The change of mood (ἀνέροιτο, εἶπες) is a change from a vague future supposition (Goodwin *MT.* § 455) to a present unreal supposition. It is important to notice that the unreal supposition, though expressed by aorists, is *present*, not past. For the change of mood, cp. 90 B 5 ἀν πέμπομεν, followed by C 16 ἀν ἐπέμπομεν, †*Theages* 125 B-D where the main problem is put in the optative (εἰ ἔροιτο . . . τί ἀν φαίη); the intervening illustrations in the aor. indic. (εἰ ἠρόμεθα . . . τί ἀν ἀπεκρίνατο); see Kühner § 576 Anm. 9, Goodwin *MT.* § 414. Cp. εἰ σε ἠρόμη 72 B 24. See also 76 E 49.

As to the present passage, Kühner § 577. 9 says that the first member, εἰ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο, is really protasis to the second, εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες, the third member, εἰ σοι εἶπεν, being the real protasis to εἶπες δήπου ἀν. 'If in a certain case you would answer so-and-so, to a further question you would answer so-and-so.' Goodwin (*MT.* § 510), on the other hand, appears to

regard the first member as 'the leading condition, to which the rest of the sentence (including the other conditions) is the conclusion.' 'If any one should ask you "What is Figure?" you would—under certain further conditions—make such and such an answer.' Grammatically the three protases are co-ordinate, and might conceivably be so translated: 'suppose—and suppose—and suppose—what then?'

7.  $\delta$  νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον : for the impf. see on 73 A 31.

C 19. εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήπετο κτέ. : see on 72 B 22.

D 29. εἰ οὖν . . μετῆι : the complex protasis is in this instance interrupted. It is resumed at E 2, εἰ οὖν . . εἶπες, and the apodosis finally comes at 75 A 5 ὥσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε (Struve, quoted by Fr.).

30. ἔλεγεν ὅτι : for ὅτι redundant in introducing a quotation see 75 A 4, C 3, 87 A 25, *Prot.* 356 A, *Rep.* 453 B etc., and Riddell §§ 279, 280.

ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι οὕτως, ἀλλά : ἀλλά transitional followed by ἀλλὰ complemental. See on 71 C 10 and 13, *Prot.* 318 B (Heind.). The ellipsis with μὴ οὕτως in these places is λέγε or the like. In *Hipp. maj.* 299 D μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ . . ἀλλ' εἰ τις αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ διαφέρει we must understand σκοπεῖ or the like with both members.

33. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις : it is obvious to us that one class may contain under it two things not merely different but opposite. The subject has been approached in the *Protagoras* c. xix (330 E foll.). It is asked 'How can Virtue be One, and yet the parts of Virtue (μόρια ἀρετῆς) different from each other?' Protagoras, in setting forth his view, says that opposites have a common point (331 D), τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπη προσέοικε, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τὰλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις. Cp. *Phil.* 12 E καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὦ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι κατὰ γε αὐτὸ τοῦτ' οὐδὲν διοίσει τὸ χρῶμα εἶναι πᾶν, τὸ γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γινώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τὸ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὅν τυγχάνει· καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι κατὰ ταῦτόν κτέ. In *Phaedo* 104 A B it appears that ἀριθμὸς comprises the opposites ἄριστον and περιττόν.

The passage above quoted from the *Philebus* opens up other kindred matters, about which see H. Jackson's paper in *JP.* x pp. 263 foll. In the *Philebus* we are confronted by the old difficulty of seeing how a thing can be at once One and Many. How can One thing (e.g. Pleasure) be Many things (e.g. good and bad)? (This was one source from which sprang Antisthenes' denial of the possibility of predication.) *Philebus* cannot see how Pleasure can be of different kinds. They may have

different or opposite *origins*, but in as far as they are *Pleasure*, they must be One and the same (12 D *εἰσι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὡς Σώκρατες, αὐταὶ πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονὴ γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοίωτατον ἂν εἴη*);. Socrates shows that the paradox that a thing is both One and Many appears under several aspects. He (*Philebus* 14 C foll.) recognises identification of *ἐν* and *πολλά* in three distinct senses: (1) the identification of the One particular and its Many *qualities*, (2) the identification of the One particular and its Many *parts*, (3) the identification of the One idea and its Many particulars. In the sequel the article proceeds to show that between the earlier dialogues and the *Philebus* the interest has shifted from the first two problems to the last. The first problem is really that of Classification, which fills so large a space in the *Meno* and kindred dialogues; for each of the Many qualities is a Class notion. But in the *Philebus* the first two problems are accounted trivial and uninteresting (*δεδημευμένα*, 'played out,' 14 D); though in *Rep.* 523 A-526 B they are made the bases of a dialectical course. [So at *Phil.* 13 E Socrates says he would be a poor creature if he were not equal to seeing that one class may embrace not only dissimilars but opposites: *πολλὰ τε αἱ ξυνάπασαι ἐπιστήμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις: εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντίαι πῆ γίγνονταί τινες, ἄρα ἄξιός ἂν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεῖς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μῆδεῖαν ἀνόμιον φαῖναι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι, κτέ.] 'Similarly in the *Phaedo* 102 B-103 A the first identification is discussed—in regard to the tallness and shortness simultaneously discoverable in Simmias—at a length for which Socrates thinks it necessary to make a sort of apology 102 D, while the simultaneous appearance of *αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος* and *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος*, of the separately existent idea and the same idea distributed among its particulars—a case of the third identification of *ἐν* and *πολλά*—is assumed without a word of explanation' (note on p. 264). 'If again we turn to *Meno* 73 C sqq. we remark at once a similarity and a dissimilarity to *Phil.* 12 D sqq. *Meno's* inability to regard Virtue as a *ἐν*, and Protarchus' inability to regard Pleasure as a *πολλά*, have a common origin, and Socrates in his answer to *Meno* takes the same sort of line, and employs the same examples (*σχήματα* and *χρώματα*), as in his answer to Protarchus. On the other hand there is nothing in the *Meno* to correspond to *Phil.* 14 B-15 C. The ontological difficulty insisted upon in the latter has not in the former made its appearance.' The *Meno* contents itself with the attempt to grasp the General Notion; in the *Philebus* that stage is passed; but the problem remains, 'how does the Idea enter into the Particulars?'*

καὶ ταῦτα καί, 'and that too though,' L. & S. *οὗτος* C 1x 2.

34. κατέχει: see on 73 D 5.

35. ὁ δὴ ὀνομάζεις κτλ., 'which you call Figure, allowing the name Figure both to curved and straight.' This is hardly an instance of the ordinary transition from the relative to the demonstrative construction. This transition mostly occurs where the relative if repeated in the second clause would be in a different case. Where the relative would be in the *same* case, it is naturally understood in the second clause. But even under these circumstances the transition to the demonstrative sometimes occurs (Kühner § 561. 1), Xen. *An.* III iii 16 Ῥοδίων, ὧν τοὺς πολλοὺς φασι ἐπίστασθαι σφενδονᾶν καὶ τὸ βέλος αὐτῶν καὶ διπλάσιον φέρεσθαι τῶν Περσικῶν σφενδονῶν. In the present place it looks at first sight as if Plato might have left out the second σχῆμα, writing ὁ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φησὶ τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ. But there would then have been the danger that his reader, instead of supplying ὁ in the second clause as predicate, might take εἶναι in the sense 'exist.' Cp. 77 E 44 ἀ φοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακὰ, 93 D 17 ἀ ἐκείνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο, καὶ ἐποίησε σοφὸν ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο: *Theaet.* 192 A δ μὲν τις οἶδε . . ἀσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή. See on 90 E 32.

E 39. ἄρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, 'am I to understand that when you speak thus you mean that curved is no more curved than it is straight, or that straight is no more straight than it is curved?' Dr. Jowett's translation (2nd ed.), by twice giving 'any more' instead of 'no more,' makes nonsense of this passage.

## CHAPTER VII

1. τοῦτο is followed by τὸ σχῆμα expegetically. Riddell § 214.

75 A 4. εἶπες ὅτι: see on 74 D 30.

οὐδὲ μανθάνω—οὐδὲ οἶδα: οὐδὲ . . οὐδέ are never (in Attic Greek) correlated ('neither . . nor'); when they occur they mean 'not even . . nor yet,' Hadley § 1005. Cp. *Lysis* 210 C νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲ σὲ ὁ πατήρ οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα φιλεῖ καθ' ἕνα ἂν ἢ ἀχρηστος, *Rep.* 391 C, Xen. *An.* III i 27 σύ γε οὐδὲ ὄρων γινώσκεις οὐδὲ ἀκούων μέμνησαι, *ne videns quidem cornis, neque audiens meministi* (Kühner § 537. 2). Cp. 92 B 11.

7. ἐπὶ τοῦτοις, 'on these terms': note the difference from the neighbouring uses of ἐπὶ with the dative, and see on 90 D 20.

But the use before us has grown out of the local use, *ἐπι τούτοις* being simply 'on this basis,' 'on this understanding.'

11. *ἵνα καὶ γένηται*: see on 71 B 8. This intensive *καὶ* is not uncommon in final clauses. *Lach.* 194 A *καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει καρτερήσωμεν ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτῇ ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ*: *Rep.* 346 A *μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου ἵνα τι καὶ περαινῶμεν*: *Lys.* 204 B, *Gorg.* 467 C, *Apol.* 22 A B, *Theaet.* 163 C, *Soph.* 250 A etc.

13. *μή*: deprecatory. Riddell § 136, *Gorg.* 497 B *μηδαμῶς*, B ὦ K., ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἔνεκα. See on 71 C 13, and cp. 74 D 30.

14. *βούλει χαρίσωμαι*; cp. 76 C 19, 86 C 1. Goodwin *MT.* § 287. He quotes *Rep.* 372 E *εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγματούσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει* to show that in Attic Greek the subjunctive was felt as dependent upon the part of *βούλομαι*, not as independent. (See on the other hand Kühner § 394. 5.)

24. *χρώματι ἐπόμενον*: Colour is an attribute of matter much less constant, much more dependent on the state of the percipient, than is Form. Form is ranked by Locke among the 'primary' qualities of matter, Colour among the 'secondary'—a distinction which goes back to Democritus. (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 231; Sir Wm. Hamilton, 'Reid's Works,' Note D, and index 'Qualities.') We have then here the fallacy of defining *ignotum per ignotius* (Jevons *Elem. Lessons* pp. 110 and 114). The juxtaposition of *σχῆμα* and *χρῶμα* is very frequent in Plato; see *Phil.* 12 E, quoted on 74 D 33, and many places quoted by Ast s.v. *χρῶμα*.

25. *κἄν οὕτως ἀγαπήν*: cp. on 72 C 1. Here the usual C hyperbaton of *ἄν* is avoided. But another is introduced, for *οὕτως* really belongs to *εἶποις*.

29. *πουν*, 'if I understand'; a variety of the usual sense of *πουν* (*opinion*), in which 'it is added when with some hesitation we repeat the words of another' (Buttmann *Index*). Fr. quotes 79 D 36, 94 C 26 for the same sense.

30. *εἴεν*: 'συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφή δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα Tim. lex,' Fr. Cp. †*Alc.* i 106 A *εἴεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ ὁ τι μάλιστα ταῦτα διανερόμηναι κτέ.* See J. Adam on *Prot.* 311 C, 357 A.

32. *ἀποκεκρίσθαι*: this tense is used as deponent and as passive by Plato with about equal frequency; passive, as here, *Gorg.* 453 D, where see Heindorf.

## CHAPTER VIII

2. ἐριστικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν : see Excursus V and on 83 D  
50. Cp. *Theaet.* 154 d.

3. ὄτι : see on 74 D 30.

D 4. λαμβάνειν λόγον, 'to examine the statement.' The phrase in this sense occurs *Rep.* 337 ε, *Soph.* 246 c etc.; and in the same sense δέχεσθαι λόγον, *Prot.* 336 c, *Rep.* 531 ε. It is opposed to δίδοναι λόγον, 'to stand an examination,' 81 B 23, *Prot.* 336 c, *Rep.* 531 ε (ὑπέχειν, παρέχειν λόγον, *Prot.* 338 d, *Rep.* 344 d). The phrases express the respective positions of the 'opposer' and 'maintainer' of a thesis. The metaphor is probably taken from an audit of accounts; cp. *Laws* 774 b ἐν ταῖς εὐθύναις τοῦ τοιοῦτου λόγον ὑπεχέτω. The phrases λαμβάνειν and δίδοναι δίκην furnish fairly close parallels. We have also the phrase λόγον ἑαυτῷ δοῦναι (*Soph.* 230 a, often in Hdt.) 'to give an account to one's self,' or sometimes 'to reconcile something with one's conscience.' But λαμβάνειν λόγον has another sense in Plato, not connected with personal debate, viz. 'to grasp the λόγος or true definition of something,' *Rep.* 402 a, *Theaet.* 148 d περὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυγχάνει βν. Corresponding with this we have a second sense of the phrase δίδοναι λόγον 'to furnish such a definition,' *Phaedo* 76 b (see Archer-Hind), 78 d, *Rep.* 534 b ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχη λόγον αὐτῷ τέ καὶ ἄλλω δοῦναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; cp. *Gorg.* 501 a (the Art ιατρικῆ) τούτου οὐ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὦν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστου δοῦναι. Stallb. and others at the present place translate λαμβάνειν λόγον 'loquentis partes suscipere.' This view is rightly opposed by Fr. It is true that δοῦναι λόγον in Xen. *Hell.* v ii 20 does mean 'to give opportunity for speech,' but λόγον in these combinations in Plato always means more than 'speech.' At *Phil.* 11 a c δέχεσθαι λόγον means 'to undertake a thesis committed to one.'

6. βούλονται : the mention of the present conversers (ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ) naturally introduces a transition to the plural.

7. διαλεκτικώτερον : it is characteristic of the διαλεκτικός to be able δίδοναι καὶ λαμβάνειν λόγον (in both the Platonic senses), *Rep.* 531 ε, 534 b (quoted above); cp. *Crat.* 390 c, *Phaedr.* 266 b. See Grote i 267, Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 75 d.

On the procedure here recommended see Xen. *Mem.* iv vi 15 ὅποτε δὲ αὐτός (ὁ Σωκράτης) τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίει, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου :

R. & P. 194 B, Zeller p. 201, Aristot. *An. Pr.* II 16 1 = 64 b 36 *θαν τὸ μὴ δι' αὐτοῦ γνωστὸν δι' αὐτοῦ τις ἐπιχειρῆ δεικνύναι, τὸτ' αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.* Cp. on 76 E 43 and 79 D 36.

10. *πειράσομαι δὴ*: here *δὴ* has the force of *igitur* 'accordingly' (Hadley 1037. 4 a). In this use it does not refer to a word, but to a clause, and is practically a connecting particle. Ast (s.v. *δὴ* p. 447 bottom) quotes some instances in Plato amongst 'innumerable' others. See Kühner § 500. 4. *δὴ* is in origin a temporal particle, connected with *ἤδη*, F. W. Thomas in *J.P.* XXIII pp. 89 foll. The temporal force has to a great extent disappeared in Attic. 'Now,' which has undergone a similar widening of meaning, or 'well now,' will often serve as a translation; as here, *Rep.* 366 B, 368 A *δοκεῖτε δὴ μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεισθαι* 'well now, I really think you are not convinced,' 494 A, *Phaedr.* 248 E etc. Where the result of an exposition is summed up with emphasis, *δὴ* = 'in fact,' 'in a word'; *Rep.* 361 B *ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν*, 486 B etc. Cp. on 81 B 30.

12. *τελευτήν καλεῖς τι*; This is the form in which the recognition of the terms to be employed is always secured, cp. 76 A 19, 88 A 16 etc. An affirmative answer to it implies a recognition not merely of the name, but of the reality of the thing corresponding to it. The phrase already occurs *Hdt.* II 2 *Ψαμμιτικός ἐπυνθάνετο οἷτινες ἀνθρώπων βεβός τι καλέουσιν.* Fr. refers to *Xen. Mem.* II ii 1, IV ii 22, to show that such a question was part of the procedure of Socrates. Cp. *Phaedr.* 237 c.

13. *ἴσως δ' ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροίτο*, 'Prodicus might perhaps quarrel with us on the point,' namely of our nomenclature. For the life of Prodicus the 'sophist' of Ceos see Zeller *Pre-Socratics* vol. II pp. 416-420; for his treatise or lecture (*ἐπίδειξις Crat.* 384 B) *περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος* *ibid.* pp. 489-491. Prodicus drew distinctions between words popularly used as synonymous. To this we have many allusions in Plato. In *Charm.* 163 D Socrates says he grasps the difference between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις*, *καὶ γὰρ Προδικὸν μυρία τινὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιρούντος.* In *Lach.* 197 D Socrates says that Prodicus *δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν.* In *Protagoras* 314 C he is one of the sophists in the house of Callias with Protagoras; at 337 A foll. a speech is put into his mouth exemplifying, or caricaturing, his method, cp. 339 A foll.; and at 358 A he is requested for the moment to waive his insistence on verbal niceties, somewhat as here in the *Meno.* In *Euthyd.* 277 E Socrates in consoling the puzzled Clinias says *πρῶτον γάρ, ὡς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ.*

We know that Protagoras as well as Prodicus speculated on

ὀνομάτων ὁρθότης (*Phaedr.* 267 c, *Crat.* 391 c). None of the early philosophers were specialists. Prodicus' teaching was by no means confined to questions of language. He had at least *some* views on rhetoric (*Phaedr.* 267 B), and wrote on ethics and religion (Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 473, 482-3, 486; see his 'Choice of Heracles,' *Xen. Mem.* II i 21). For Socrates' debt to him see on 96 D 23.

15. καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι, i.e. 'πεπεράνθαι' καλεῖς τι.

17. ἀλλὰ καλῶ: complementary ἀλλὰ after an ellipsis suggested by οὐδὲν ποικίλον: 'I make no refinements, I accept your term.' Cp. *Rep.* 437 B πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἂν ἀλλήλοις θεῖης εἶτε ποιημάτων εἶτε παθημάτων; οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτη διόισει. ἀλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, τῶν ἐναντίων.

76 A 20. ὄλον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις, 'the well-known terms, you know, used in geometrical problems.' ὄλον *velut*, as 72 B 27, 74 A 27, 86 E 23, etc., Riddell § 16.

γεωμετρίαι: *Rep.* 510 c, 511 B, 533 c, 536 D in the same sense. The plural, as often in the case of abstracts, expresses separate instances of the quality, or manifestations of the faculty: cp. ἐπιστήμαι 86 A 10, ὑγίαιαι *Prot.* 354 B, εὐγένειαι *Euthyd.* 279 B, *Rep.* 618 D (Kühner § 348. 3, Hadley § 636).

24. περαίνει intransitive: see L. & S. IV, under which head this place should be quoted.

25. στερεοῦ πέρας: a model definition, πέρας expressing the Genus and στερεοῦ the Differentia.

## CHAPTER IX

B 9. κατακεκαλυμμένος, 'blindfold.'

11. ἔτι εἰσίν: cp. *Xen. An.* II vi 28 ἔτι ὥραϊος ὢν. This passage, as showing that Meno was no longer very young, indicates that the dramatic date of the dialogue is shortly before the starting of Cyrus' expedition (*Intr.* p. xxiv).

12. τί δῆ; 'how so, pray?' (with surprise). This form (cp. 79 A 6, *Gorg.* 486 E) must be distinguished from τί δέ; (71 C 15, 73 A 31, B 46, etc.) or (less correctly, see Fr. prol. pp. 46, 47) τί δαί; which simply draws attention to a coming question.

13. οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπιτάττει, 'you do nothing but lay down the law.' We must understand ποιεῖς with οὐδέν. See on 71 C 13. Should we regard ἀλλ' in this usage as representing ἀλλά or ἄλλο? L. & S. explain ἀλλ' ἢ as *always* arising from

ἄλλο ἤ, the accent on ἄλλο having been lost. Ast (s.v. ἄλλος p. 108) thinks that both here and at 84D 31 we have ἄλλο, and he writes ἄλλ' ἤ (with the accent) in both places. This the MSS. do not confirm. Against the view of L. & S. may be urged (1) that in many instances of ἄλλ' ἤ we have ἄλλο already expressed earlier in the sentence: e.g. *Phaedo* 81 B (where Geddes remarks that in these combinations ἄλλά is properly dependent on *μηδέν* and ἤ on ἄλλο), ib. 97 D, *Rep.* 429 E, 553 D: (2) that in many places ἄλλο is not the part of ἄλλος that would be required, e.g. *Prot.* 334 C *μη χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ ἄλλ' ἤ ὅτι μικροτάτῳ*, 356 A, *Apol.* 34 B *τίνα λόγον ἄλλ' ἤ τὸν ὀρθόν*; *Phaedr.* 258 E, *Phaedo* 83 A, *Rep.* 427 C. I believe that in Plato where ἄλλο ἤ is intended it is always written in full (as 80 A 4, *Theaet.* 195 E, *Crat.* 412 D, *Euthyd.* 277 E), and that where we have ἄλλ' ἤ the first word is always ἄλλά. (But ἄλλ' ἤ is ἄλλα ἤ, as *Phaed.* 91 D.) The ἤ gives ἄλλά additional point; ἤ 'than,' which comes naturally after ἄλλος, is used with ἄλλά, though it is no longer felt as a case of ἄλλος. Kühner § 535, 6 (=Jelf § 773 Obs. 1) says that the form arises from the merging together of two constructions, οὐδέν ἄλλο . . ἄλλά and οὐδέν ἄλλο . . ἤ, ἄλλά and ἤ nearly agreeing in meaning. See also Riddell § 148, Hadley 1046 c. The ἤ is not indispensable, *Laws* 710 C *εὐτυχῆς μὴ κατ' ἄλλο, ἀλλά κατέ*. In *Prot.* 354 C and *Symp.* 181 D ἤ after ἄλλ' has been introduced against the MSS. We have the same variation in the interrogative formula ἄλλο τι; or ἄλλο τι ἤ;

14. οἱ τρυφῶντες, 'spoiled children.' τρυφῶ is from a lengthened form of the stem of τρυ-ω, which again is a lengthened form of the stem of τείρω. θρύπ-τω is a further formation from the stem of τρυφῶ. The meanings of τρυφῶ, θρύπτομαι, διαθρύπτομαι are nearly parallel, and should be compared. The original meaning is 'broken up,' 'soft.' For the transition to the moral meaning cp. Latin *fractus, de-lic-atus*. The notion here is slackness combined with pride, 'to be exacting,' 'to expect too much from others.' So *Euthyphro* 11 E, 12 A τρυφᾶς ὑπὸ πλοῦτου τῆς σοφίας. ἄλλ' ὦ μακάριε ξύντεινε σαυτὸν 'you are playing with the matter; pull yourself together.' Cp. †*Alc.* i 114 A. A slightly different shade is 'to be hard to please,' *fastidire*, *Prot.* 327 E *νῦν δὲ τρυφᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς*: *Xen. Mem.* III xi 10 *τὸν ἐντρυφῶντα* 'the disdainful.'

15. ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας, ὅτι: the regular constr. of this verb in C this sense, *gen.* of person, *acc.* of charge. F. E. T. § 102, Hadley § 752, *Phaedo* 116 c, *Xen. Mem.* i iii 10, etc.

16. εἰμὶ ἤττων τῶν καλῶν: there is no doubt that Plato

here preserves a trait of the historic Socrates, to whom similar expressions are attributed by Xenophon: *Symp.* viii 2 ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω χρόνον ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἐρῶν τινοὺς διατελώ. Cp. *Mem.* II vi 2 ἴσως δ' ἂν τί σοι κἀγὼ συλλαβεῖν ἔχοιμι διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι, IV i 2 πολλὰκις γὰρ ἔφη μὲν ἂν τινοὺς ἐρᾶν, φανερόν δ' ἦν οὐ τῶν τὰ σώματα πρὸς ὄραν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐ κερφύκτων ἐφιέμενος. This is richly illustrated by Plato in such passages as *Charm.* 154 B, 155 D, *Lys.* 204 B. See Grote I 352, note.

In *Phaedrus* 227 c Phaedrus tells Socrates that the discourse he has been listening to is especially suited to Socrates, as the subject happened to be Love. Cp. 257 A. In *Symp.* 177 D Socrates is very ready to discourse on Love, δὲ οὐδὲν φημὶ ἐπιστάσθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά: and ib. 216 D Alcibiades says ὁράτε γὰρ ὅτι Σ. ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ τοῦτους ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκπέπληκται, *Euthyphr.* 14 c, †*Theages* 128 B. See Zeller *Socrates* pp. 71 foll., 127, 165, Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus* App. I p. 152, Hug *Symp.* pp. xviii foll. Now though in many of these passages (as certainly in the present and 86 D) a strong tinge of irony is to be observed, it would be a great mistake to suppose that the language is purely metaphorical, and to ignore the physical attraction out of which it grew. The story of the judgment passed by the physiognomist Zopyrus on the character of Socrates, with the latter's explanation, may have a basis of genuine tradition. Cic. *Tusc.* IV 80 *cum multa in conventu vitia collegisset in eum Zopyrus, qui se naturam cujusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a ceteris qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent; ab ipso autem Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi insita sed ratione a se dejecta diceret.* Cp. *de Fato* § 10. The words of Thoreau (*Walden*, 'Higher Laws') may be quoted: 'the generative energy which when we are loose dissipates and makes us unclean, when we are continent invigorates and inspires us.' This is the truth underlying Aristotle's representation of *σωφροσύνη* as a mean between *ἀκολασία* and *ἀναισθησία*.

This is not the place for a full discussion of the erotic philosophy of Plato. (Grote II pp. 206-210, Zeller pp. 455 foll.) But it is closely connected with the point just mentioned. As the dialectic method of Plato was grounded on the dialectic of Socrates, similarly his erotic philosophy had a root in the emotional side of his master's character. In the *Symposium* 198 D Socrates, who earlier had professed himself to know nothing but the lore of love, recants and declares himself unable to pronounce a suitable eulogy. All that he knows of any value was communicated to him by the gifted Diotima. Thus the erotic Socrates passes into the exponent of the erotic doctrine of Plato.

The point is the more relevant because there is a close analogy between *δόξα*, the main subject of the *Meno* and *ἔρως*. (Exc. VII p. 301). To Plato these two things are the great mediators between the world of Being and the world of Sense. To express the state of emotional exaltation that appeared to Plato to be (for mortals) the indispensable condition in any attempt to pierce the Veil, he found no language so apt as that drawn from physical love.

19. βούλει ἀποκρίνωμαι : see on 75 B 14.

22. ἀποροῦς τινος τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπ. : Empedocles, of Acragas in Sicily, explained sensation by the hypothesis that material objects gave off films adapted to the several channels of sense. See Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 165-6; cp. pp. 133-4; R. & P. § 139, especially note *d*; Grote I 47. The most important places in ancient writers on the point are Emped. line v 337 (Mullach) γυνῶθ' ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀποροαὶ ὅσας ἐγένοντο, Theophr. *de sensu* § 7 Ἐμπ. φησὶ τῷ ἐναρμόττειν (τὰς ἀποροὰς) εἰς τοὺς πόρους τοὺς ἐκάστης (αἰσθήσεως) αἰσθάνεσθαι, Aristotle *de gen. et corr.* I 8=324 b 26 foll. Cp. *Rep.* 530 D κινδυνεύει, ἔφην, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὡτα παγγῆναι and *Soph. O.T.* 1387 εἰ τῆς ἀκουοῦσης ἔτ' ἦν πηγῆς δι' ὧτων φραγμός, where πηγῆ is much the same as πόρος : see Verrall on *S. c. T.* 571. We seem to have a filtration of the same doctrine put into the mouth of Euripides by Aristoph. *Thesm.* 16 foll.—

ὧ μὲν βλέπειν χρὴ πρῶτ' ἐμμηχανήσατο  
ὄφθαλμὸν ἀντίμμοον ἡλίου τρόχῳ  
δικὴν δὲ χοάνης ὡτα διετετρήνατο.

Zeller *pre-Socratics* II p. 166 note 3 (cp. *Plato* p. 428) says that Plato's explanation of sight in the *Theaetetus* (153 D, 156 B-E) and *Timaeus* was the same as that of Empedocles; but Archer-Hind in his note on *Timaeus* 45 D shows that there are considerable differences. We have the same doctrine indicated in the *Phaedr.* 251 B δεξάμενος τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀποροὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων.

A similar view of sensation was taken by Democritus and the Atomists (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 230, Grote I 80). The Atomists were driven to some such view by their assumption that all influence of one thing upon another implies mechanical contact. From Democritus it was adopted by Epicurus, and we find it reproduced in Lucretius IV 42-6 :

*dico igitur rerum effigias tenuisque figuras  
mitti ab rebus summo de corpore rerum etc.*

Diogenes Laertius VIII 58 quotes from Satyrus a statement

that Gorgias was a pupil of Empedocles. They were probably contemporaries, as Diogenes (ib. 74) tells us that Empedocles flourished in the 84th Olympiad (444 B.C.). Some writers appear to have confused Empedocles the philosopher with his grandfather of the same name. Quint. III i 8 says of Gorgias *Empedoclis*, ut traditur, *discipulus, cum aequalis fere esset et potius familiaris*. See R. & P. § 167 note d, § 190 note a. Words denoting 'pupil' are sometimes interchanged with *ἐταῖρος* (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 211 note) or *γνώριμος* (Müller *FHG.* III p. 159). Cp. 79 E 2. Whether strictly a pupil or not, Gorgias could hardly fail to be influenced by his great compatriot. But Gorgias probably cared little for scientific research (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 460).

28. ἀρμόττειν: Empedocles' doctrine of sensation postulated a certain homogeneity between the perceived object and the perceiving organ. For sensation implies intermixture, and like seeks to mingle with like. The extreme form of this doctrine he expressed in the verses—

γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαίαν ὀπάπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,  
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀταρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον.

Of course the words in the present passage do not imply so much as this.

- D 33. σίνες ὁ τοι λέγω, 'please take my meaning': these words, used by Pindar (fr. 82 Bergk) to prefer a modest request—on behalf of another—became a catchword. Aristophanes (*Birds* 945) puts them into the mouth of the poet, who, having got the jerkin, delicately hints that he would like the cloak as well. Plato here and *Phaedr.* 236 D uses the words without reference to their original association.

ἐφη Πίνδαρος: for this form of quotation—without ὡς—cp. *Prot.* 315 B ἐφη Ὁμηρος. So φησί *Phaedr.* 260 E, *Theat.* 170 E, φασίν *Hipp. maj.* 301 c, φάη δὲν *Phaedo* 115 A, φάειν δὲν †*Alc.* i 120 B. Cp. Ar. *Wasps* 1183; Lucian *Dem.* *Enc.* § 13 φησὶν ὁ τραγικός; Diog. L. III 47 Γλαῦκα γὰρ εἰς Ἀθήνας, φάσιν.

34. ἔστιν γὰρ χροά: Gedike observes that this is nearly the same definition as Plato gives in *Tim.* 67 c. But there the definition is part of a reasoned system; it no longer rests on an isolated hypothesis.

36. ἀριστὰ μοι δοκεῖς: contrast Meno's enthusiasm here with his silence after the definition of σχῆμα 76 A.

- E 43. τραγική, 'high-flown.' Does the epithet refer to the *language* or to the *matter* of the definition? The former may be credited mainly to Gorgias, the latter to Empedocles. Both

these Sicilians in different ways were infected with the *τραγικός τύφος* (cp. Diog. L. VIII 70). As to the style, possibly an echo of Gorgias may be detected in the ring *σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός*. (Cp. Hug's note at the beginning of Agathon's speech, *Symp.* 194 E, and on 72 A 14.) But it is to the *matter* of the definition that the epithet is chiefly directed. It is a definition in regular form, like that of Figure, *ἀπορροή σχημάτων* being Genus, *ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός* Differentia (*ὄψει* goes with both adjectives). But the terms of the definition, though accepted by *ὁ ἔρωτων* (see on 75 D 7), are not accepted universally. The definition assumes an *unproved hypothesis*; it is thus a definition for the Few. *τραγική* is opposed to 'popular.' Cp. Heind. ad *Crat.* 414 C 'Μοχ τραγωδεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα est σεμνότερα καὶ θαυμαστότερα ποιεῖν ut 418 D *τετραγωδημένον*. Unde explicanda illa in Menone 76 E et Rep. 413 B.'

47. ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν . . ἄλλ' : see on 71 C 10.

οὐκ ἔστιν : I have put a comma before *βελτίων*, making that predicate to *ἔστιν*. Buttman says that in that case you would need *αὐτῇ* to contrast with *ἐκείνη*. I cannot think it indispensable, as the new definition is so prominent in thought. This course seems preferable to leaving *ἔστιν* without a predicate.

ὦ παῖ 'Αλεξιδήμου : this form of address (*πατρώθεν*) is solemn and impressive. See Thuc. VII 69, where, before the final sea-fight in the harbour of Syracuse, Nicias goes round encouraging each Athenian, *πατρώθεν ὀνομάζων*. So Plut. *Pelop.* 28, 4. Its mock solemnity is well suited to the character of Socrates, who often is made to use it; *Hipp. min.* 373 A, *Charm.* 158 B, *Euthyd.* 278 E, 279 D, *Prot.* 328 D, 335 D, *Symp.* 198 A, *Rep.* II 368 A ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, † *Alc.* I at the beginning, † *Theag.* 128 C, *Lysis* 204 B, with the youth's name added for special effect, ὦ παῖ 'Ιερωνύμου 'Ιππόθαλες : ib. 204 E (a rather different use) we are told that Lysis is still called 'Democrates' son,' *διὰ τὸ σφόδρα τὸν πατέρα γινώσκεισθαι αὐτοῦ*. The style was also official, Xen. *Oec.* VII 3. So Socrates impressively addresses Meno's slave, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος 85 B 50. So Lysimachus addresses Socrates, *Laches* 180 D.

49. οὐδ' ἂν σοὶ δοῖαι, εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον : the infinitive ἂν δοῖαι represents *δόξειεν ἂν*, and with *ἀναγκαῖον* must be supplied ἦν. The *present* of *εἰμί* is usually omitted with expressions of necessity and duty, and here this is extended to the impf., though otherwise the ellipsis of ἦν is rare (Kühner § 354, Anm. 2; Jelf § 376 b, and Obs. 1). For the change of mood see on 74 B 6.

50. πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων: Meno is on his way back to Thessaly, 71 C 12. There are many passages in Plato in which he applies the phraseology of the mysteries to initiation in philosophy; Diotima uses it of her erotic doctrine, *Symp.* 209 E ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν σὺ μνηθεῖς· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴης, *Gorg.* 497 C εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά. In *Theaet.* 155 E the materialists are spoken of as ἀμύητοι. In *Euthyd.* 277 E the triumph of the two sophists over Clinias is compared to a Corybantic dance around the neophyte. With bitter irony in *Rep.* 560 E the language of initiation is applied to the process by which the soul is purged of all its *better* elements to form the δημοκρατικὸς ἀνὴρ. In the present passage the literal meaning is combined with a metaphorical. Plato seems to have entertained respect for at any rate certain of the mystic rituals (*Phaedo* 69 c and Archer-Hind's note, cp. *Gorg.* 493 A). But he often uses language in which the regeneration thus wrought is held up as something superficial and imperfect in comparison with that effected by philosophy (*Phaedo* 81 A, *Phaedrus* 248 B, 249 C, 250 B C).

Chapters X–XII (77 A–79 E). MENO. *Virtue is the love of what is noble, conjoined with Power.* SOCRATES. *But every one loves the Noble, desires the Good: that we may eliminate. May we say Virtue is the power of securing Good Things?* MENO. *Yes.* SOCRATES. *Well; but if you mean Material Goods, Power will not be Virtue unless it is exercised in accordance with certain personal characteristics, Justice, Temperance etc., as we saw with Rule just now. We still have not the one thing that lies at the root of these characteristics.*

We here have Meno's third attempt at a definition, if we may count as one the statement at 77 B 12 and its amended form at 78 C 12. The original form is loose and poetical. It leads to an interesting parenthetic exposition of the doctrine οὐδὲὶς ἐκὼν κακός—a doctrine so closely connected with the identification of Virtue and Knowledge that some reference to it in this dialogue was necessary. The amended definition, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι ἀγαθὰ (which Socrates suggests), is far nearer the mark than anything yet put forward. 'Hanc definitionem,' says Fr. (intr. p. 16), 'Meno, si tenuisset veram et sinceram boni notionem, valenti argumentatione defendisset.' But Meno is thinking of *external* goods; and to obtain these virtuously the 'members of Virtue' (μέμρα ἀρετῆς) have again to be called in, as with the second definition at 73 C.

1. **προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω**, 'I shall not fail for want of goodwill.' So *Symp.* 210 A, *Rep.* 533 A, *Laws* 961 C, *Tim.* 20 C οὐτε ἐλλείψομεν προθυμίας οὐδέν: cp. *Aesch. P.V.* 341 *προθυμίας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐλλείπεις*. Cp. further *Rep.* 602 D *γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει*: *Phaedo* 69 D οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον . . . ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμήθην.

3. **ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι**: *ὅπως μὴ* is often used to introduce some idea that is repelled. The word denoting *fear* or *prevention* on which it depends may either be expressed, or, as here, understood. The repulsion to the idea may be weakened to mere caution in the entertainment of it, as here, where the meaning is 'perhaps I shall not be able.' (Contrast *Phil.* 48 D οὐ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ, 'I certainly shall not be able.') Where the word on which *ὅπως μὴ* depends is expressed, it will determine whether prevention, fear, or mere caution is expressed. (See Kühner § 552. Anm. 6; Jelf § 812, 2; Goodwin §§ 271-83, especially § 278, also § 370; F. E. T. §§ 234, 235; Kiddell § 59; see also notes on 89 C 6 and 10.)

We have *ὅπως μὴ* with *fut. ind.* after *φυλάττειν Gorg.* 480 A, *Rep.* 421 E; after *εὐλαβεῖσθαι Gorg.* 487 D, *Rep.* 564 C; after *ἀντιτείνειν Phaed.* 91 C; after *φόβος ἐστίν Symp.* 193 A; cp. also *Gorg.* 513 A. Without any governing verb, we have at *Rep.* 506 D the same phrase as here: *Menex.* 236 C δὲλλ' ὅπως μὴ μοι χαλεπανεῖ ἡ διδάσκαλος, ἂν ἐξενέγκω αὐτῆς τὸν λόγον: *Prot.* 313 C. Plato often has *ὅπως μὴ* with 2nd person of this tense as a gentle prohibition, *Rep.* 336 D, 337 B, *Gorg.* 489 A, *Menex.* 249 E, *Hipp. maj.* 286 B; but apparently never *ὅπως* without *μὴ* as a gentle command, like Aristophanes etc.

(In some of the above cases the MSS give the 1st aor. subj., which recent editors mostly agree in correcting to the *fut. ind.*, in accordance with the Canon Davesianus: see Kühner § 553. Anm. 5; Jelf § 812, 1; Goodwin § 364; F. E. T. § 239. We have a 2nd aor. *ἐπαναστῆ* after *ὅπως μὴ* depending on *παρὰφυλάττοντες* at *Laws* 715 B.)

With the pres. subj. we have *ὅπως μὴ* after *φοβεῖ Euthyphr.* 4 E; after *ἐνέστηκεν Phaed.* 77 B; after *σκεψώμεθα* denoting cautious entertainment of an idea, *Crat.* 439 B; and without *σκεψώμεθα*, in just the same sense, *Crat.* 430 D.

Both *fut. ind.* and *pres. subj.* are thus capable of various shades of meaning in this construction, and no general difference of meaning between the uses of the two moods can be traced.

6. **πολλὰ ποιῶν**: cf. 79 A 7 *μὴ καταγύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν*.

8. **σκώπτοντες**: there seems to be reference to a similar joke in *Rep.* 422 E *ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσι πάμπολλαι, δὲλλ' οὐ πόλεις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων*. The scholiast and many modern

interpreters of that passage held there was a reference to the *game* Πόλεις. The President of Magdalen and Mr. J. A. Stewart (*CR.* vii 359) oppose this view, thinking that τὸ τῶν παιζόντων is simply an equivalent to σκόπτοντες here. Prof. Ridgeway, however (*JHS.* xvi 288), believes there is a reference to the game πόλεις, and I incline to agree with him. It is difficult to see the point of the word πόλεις if it does not come from the game. If the πόλεις was an invulnerable combination of πεττοί, which lost its virtue when disintegrated, the gibe is an obvious one.

έσας: for the aor. ptc. see 92 D 27.

ύγιη: 'Gorg. 493 D πίθοι ύγιείς, quibus opponuntur άγγεία τετρημένα' (Fr.). Cp. *Crat.* 440 C ως ούδέν ύγιές ούδενός άλλά πάντα ώσπερ κεράμα βεί. L. & S. quote other applications of the word to inanimate things—Lys. †*Or.* 6 § 12 of the Hermae 'unmutilated'; Thuc. viii 107 of ships 'undamaged.' Cp. 89 C 12.

- B** 12. χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι: the citation of the author as ὁ ποιητής would imply that he is some one of eminence. Simonides of Ceos is probably the man. (See Fr. on *Euthyphr.* 12 A.) He was much connected with Thessaly, and the poem of his discussed in the *Protagoras* was addressed to a Thessalian prince. See Cic. *de or.* ii §§ 352-3 and J. & A. M. Adam's note on *Prot.* 339 A, where it is shown as probable that besides *Rep.* 338 E (where Plato quotes Simonides by name) there are two other passages in the *Republic* where Plato quotes, without naming, him. See on 87 E 2.

For the quotation see Bergk<sup>4</sup> *fragm. adespota* 130 (vol. III p. 729). I do not think there is any allusion to it in Aristotle *Pol.* v 5=1339 b 1. The metre suggests that it came from a scolon, such as—

[οὐδέν φέρτερόν ἐστιν άνδρι θνητῷ  
ἦ] χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι.

Meno in going to a poet for a definition is yielding to a tendency, common in many ages, to regard the works of eminent poets as of oracular authority (cp. *Ov. Am.* iii ix 18 sunt etiam qui nos numen habere putent). Against this spirit of bibliolatry the Platonic Socrates often protests. See *Prot.* 347 c foll. (Grote ii 57-8), *Hipp. min.* 365 c (Grote i 388), *Phaedr.* 274 b foll. (Grote ii 239-240), and Butcher *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*: 'The Written and Spoken Word' pp. 184, 188, 197, 203; see also note on 71 D 26. The dead book, at the absent master, is a poor substitute for the friction of living minds.

Plato, however, so far gives in to the notion that poets are

oracular, that he regards them as the inspired mouthpieces of words the true significance of which they know not (*Apol.* 22 B C, *Io* passim; see on 95 D 35 and 99 D 28). This must be Plato's excuse for the great latitude he allows himself in the interpretation of poets; see Socrates' exposition of Simonides' poem *Prot.* 342 A foll. Other instances of arbitrary interpretations of poets in Plato are found *Lach.* 191 B, *Lys.* 212 E, †*Alc.* ii 147 D. In the present instance the violence done to the poet is slight. By *δύνασθαι* the poet was thinking of *political* power, having before his mind the position of some prince or despot of cultured tastes. For *δύνασθαι* absolute (= *δυναστεύειν*) see L. & S. s. v. I 1. Meno gives it a different tinge by accepting Socrates' interpretation, *δυνατὸν εἶναι πορῖζεσθαι τάγαθά*.

The word *δύνασθαι* recalls two kindred passages. One is *Gorg.* 466 B foll., where Polus says that orators *μέγα δύνανται*, and is shown by an argument, parallel to the one here beginning, that the only true Power is Knowledge. The other is *Hipp. maj.* 295 E, where Hippias eagerly assents to Socrates' suggestion *δύναμις μὲν ἄρα καλόν, ἀδυναμία δὲ αἰσχρόν*; and is met by a similar argument (note *ἐξαμαρτάνουσιν ἄκοντες* at 296 C in regard to a point presently discussed). A third passage closely bearing on the present is *Prot.* 351 B foll. Socrates puts before Protagoras the position: *τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀηδῶς κακόν*. To this Protagoras answers: *εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γε ζῆν ἡδόμενος*. The reservation here made by Protagoras is parallel with the *χαίρειν καλοῖσι* of Meno. The nullity of the reservation is brought out in a long argument, in the course of which (352 C) Protagoras admits *καλόν τε εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἀρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἔανπερ γιγνώσκῃ τις τάγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ μὴ ἀν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδένοσ, ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἂ ἀν ἢ ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ' ἱκανῆν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ*.


The doctrine enunciated in what now follows is often labelled with the phrase *οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός*. It is in its origin a corollary from the doctrine that identifies Virtue and Knowledge, and is Socratic (*Xen. Mem.* III ix 4; IV vi 6). For an exposition of the view as it presented itself to Socrates see J. Adam's edition of the *Apology* Intr. p. xi; Zeller *Socrates* 143. The view was one to which Plato adhered (with modifications) at all stages of his career. For the proof of this see Cope, Translation of Plato's *Gorgias* Intr. p. xli and pp. lxiv foll. It underlies the words of the *Apology* 26 A *δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ μάθω, παύσομαι ὁ γὰρ ἐκὼν ποιεῖν*. Another side of the same doctrine appears in the paradox of the *Hippias minor* that it is better to do wrong voluntarily than involuntarily.

In the *Protagoras* Socrates assumes the doctrine in criticising the poem of Simonides (345 D E); it forms the basis of the long discussion beginning 351 B (referred to above), of which the result appears at 357 C D and 358 C D ἄλλο τι οὖν ἐπὶ γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἔρχεται κτέ. In the *Gorgias* it appears especially 467 C (where see Dr. Thompson's note) and 468 C οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἢ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ οὐτα οὐ βουλόμεθα; also 509 E, where the meaning of δύναμις and δύνασθαι in the context should be noted. In *Symp.* 205 A foll. we find again a clear statement, πάντας τὰγαθὰ βούλεσθαι. In the second book of the *Republic* the doctrine occurs repeatedly (see especially 358 C, 360 C, 364 A, 366 C D), chiefly as a contradiction of the 'sophistic' view οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος—the view that Justice is artificially forced upon man against the dictates of his nature (see *Prot.* 337 D, *Gorg.* 483 foll., etc.). At 438 A and 589 C passing references take the doctrine for granted. Among the later dialogues it is found in the *Philebus* 22 B (all must choose the Good) εἰ δὲ τις ἄλλα ἡρεῖθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἰρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος. The notion that Vice is Ignorance seems also involved in the doctrine of False Pleasures 41 A foll. In the *Sophistes* 230 A foll., on the assumption πᾶσαν ἀμαθίαν ἀκούσιον εἶναι, Education, especially in the form of the ἐλεγχος, is held up as a higher purificatory agent than νουθέτησις. Again, *Tim.* 86 D foll. καὶ σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα, ὅποσα ἡδονῶν ἀκράτεια καὶ θνείδος ὡς ἐκόντων λέγεται τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς θνείδιζεται· κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἔξω τινα τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακὸς κτέ. (see Archer-Hind's note). Lastly Cope refers to *Laws* 731 C, 734 B, 860 D; to which 689 A foll. may be added.

The maxim, especially in its earlier and more Socratic aspect, was assailed by Aristotle. In *Met.* Δ 29 = p. 1025 a 9 he attacks specifically the position of the *Hippias minor*. Socrates, says Aristotle, overlooked the freedom of the will; the ἀρχή of moral action resides in ourselves; not till the habit of Virtue is confirmed does Vice become involuntary (*Grote* I 399). The doctrine is also attacked, with apparent reference to the *Protagoras*, in *NE.* VII 2 = p. 1145 b 24, VII 3 = p. 1147 b 15 (*Grote* II 62). See also for βούλησις *Aristot. Rhet.* I x 8, with Cope's note. (Zeller p. 420.)

16. ἄρα λέγεις κτλ.: the argument here, as elsewhere in Plato, depends on successive substitutions of nearly synonymous words. The first step is to substitute ἀγαθὰ for καλὰ (so, less explicitly, at *Prot.* 351 C). Thus any poetic tinsel adhering to the word καλὰ is removed. Then the position κακῶν

ἐπιθυμοῦσί τινες is undermined piecemeal by the following division :—



Though in general terms Meno has asserted the existence of **B**, yet when it is pointed out that κακῶν must be regarded in relation to *one's self* (which is done first by the phrase γενέσθαι αὐτῷ and then by the introduction of the antithesis ὠφελεῖν) (βλάπτειν) he is shaken, and confesses that **B (1)** must either disappear or be merged in **A (77 D)**. It remains to dispose of **B (2)**. Meno is led on by a series of quasi-synonyms (βλάπτεσθαι—βλαβήσονται—ἀθλιος εἶναι—κακοδαίμων εἶναι) until in 'κακοδαίμων' he meets with a term from which he definitely recoils. Thus Meno is led to give up **B** altogether.

Examples of somewhat similar procedure occur several times in the *Gorgias*, 474 C–479 E (see Grote II 90–101; Bonitz *Platonische Studien* p. 21), 495 C–497 D, 506 D–507 C, where the numerous steps include the not infrequent play on the double meaning of εἰ πράττειν.

The first book of the *Republic* furnishes other examples: the argument at 348 B foll. to show that Injustice is not profitable, culminating in the phrase θεοῖς ἐχθρὸς at 352 B; again 353 E foll.: the soul in which its special ἀρετή (δικαιοσύνη) resides εἰ ἀπεργάζεται τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα—εἰ πράττει—εἰ βιώσεται—ἔσται μακαρία καὶ εὐδαίμων—hence δικαιοσύνη λυσιτελεῖ. See also *Prot.* 333 D, *Euthyd.* 281 B C, *Hipp. min.* 365 D E, † *Alc.* I 116 B foll., and J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 12 B and *Crito* 47 B.

Such verbal arguments are often, as Dr. Thompson says (in his note on *Gorg.* 497 A οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες), 'rather unconvincing than illogical.' Something of this Plato must have felt when at *Rep.* 487 A he makes Adimantus say ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἀν οἶός τ' εἰη ἀντειπεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῖονδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἠγούνται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἑαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι κτέ. Cp. *Phaedr.* 261 E foll.

**C** 26. **γινώσκοντες**: cp. *Prot.* 353 C *γινώσκοντες* ὅτι πονηρὰ ἐστίν, ὁμῶς αὐτὰ πράττειν.

32. τί ἐπιθυμῆν λέγεις; ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ; cp. *Symp.* 204 D E ὁ ἐράν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρά; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ, and presently ὁ ἐράν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τί ἐρά; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ. κτήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν οἱ εὐδαιμόνες εὐδαιμόνες. Cp. also the analysis of ἐπιθυμία *Rep.* iv 437 C, αἰετὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἐφέσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιθυμῆ, ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο δ' ἂν βούληται οἱ γενέσθαι, ἢ αὖ, καθ' ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ πορισθῆναι, ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος, ἐπορευομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως;

**D** 34. **ὠφελεῖν ἐκείνον**: the step taken by the introduction of the word ὠφελεῖν is practically what Aristotle would have expressed as that from the ἀγαθόν in itself to the ἀγαθόν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Sometimes the distinction between ὠφέλιμον and ἀγαθόν sinks to nothing, as at *Prot.* 358 B; so at *Gorg.* 474 E, 477 A ὠφέλιμον is ranked with ἀγαθόν as opposed to ἡδύ, the former representing the permanent, the latter the transient object of desire (*Grote* II 105, 127-29). See too *Gorg.* 468 C. At *Crat.* 419 A we have ὠφέλιμον, ἀγαθόν, and other words grouped together as practically synonymous, there being no object in drawing distinctions. But with most synonyms there remains a latent possibility of drawing distinctions when that is to the purpose. The following passages may show the relation of the two terms when not synonymous. In *Prot.* 333 D foll. it is agreed that all ἀγαθὰ are ὠφέλιμα to something; cp. *Xen. Mem.* iv vi 3 τὸ ἀρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστίν ὅτι ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ. Here ὠφέλιμον appears as a relative notion. So *Euthyd.* 280 B ἀρ' οὖν εὐδαιμονοῖεν ἂν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθὰ, εἰ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ, ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ; εἰ ὠφελοῖ, ἔφη. ἀρ' οὖν ἂν τι ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη μόνον ἡμῖν, χρώμεθα δ' αὐτοῖς μή; *Gorg.* 499 D ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι (τῶν ἡδονῶν), κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραὶ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ὀφέλιμοι δὲ γε αἱ ἀγαθὸν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ (so the texts, but? βλαβεραὶ) δὲ αἱ κακὸν τι; *Rep.* 379 B τὸ ἀγαθόν is ὠφέλιμον and αἴτιον εὐπραγίας. Cp. 608 E. We may say that in the order of Nature ἀγαθόν is 'prior' to ὠφέλιμον and is the cause of it. But from our point of view ὠφέλιμον appears as the cause why we regard something as ἀγαθόν. So *Hipp. maj.* 296 E ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιοῦν ἀγαθόν ἐστίν, cp. *ibid.* 303 E. From these places, perhaps, the compiler of the Platonic "Οροι 414 E drew his definition: ὠφέλιμον· τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εὐπάσχειν· τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Cp. 87 E 36 and 96 E 2.

**E** 44. **ῥοντο**: 'ubi computes fiunt, error demitur.'—Fr. Cp. a somewhat similar use of the impf. *Phaedr.* 256 B μακάριον τὸν βίον διάγονσιν . . δουλωσάμενοι ᾧ κακία ψυχῆς ἐνεγίγνετο,

i.e. was growing, before its subjection; *Rep.* 352 c δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη.

ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά: cp. on 74 D 35, 90 E 32.

55. The word ἀθλιος has strong associations. It is introduced with solemnity *Gorg.* 469 A, 507 c τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἀθλιον: cp. *Aristoph. Plut.* 118 ἄνθρωπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἀθλιος φύσει. **78 A**

57. **κακοδαίμονας**: this word, like our 'God-forsaken,' though vulgarly abused, was capable on occasion of carrying the full weight of an awful meaning. The Greeks were apt to regard crime and madness alike as visitations of the higher Powers, *Aristoph. Plut.* 501.

67. οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι: of course *κινδυνεύει* is understood. **B** Similarly at 96 D 23.

## CHAPTER XI

1. **ἔλεγες**: see on 73 A 31. But the answer has *εἶπον*. 'Were you not saying just now?' 'Yes, I did say so.'

3. **εἶπον γάρ**: cp 97 B 25 and Exc. III.

19. **ὕγιάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον**: see 87 E 2 and note there. We C here have the types of two great classes of *bona*, corporeal and external goods. The word *πλουθυγία* as a synonym for 'all earthly blessings' occurs thrice in *Aristophanes*: *Knights* 1054, *Wasps* 667, *Birds* 731. We may be surprised at the prominence given to health by a people we are apt to picture to ourselves as hardly knowing illness. Cp. *Rep.* 583 c. Note 'interrogation emerging late in the sentence,' *Riddell* § 309.

21. **καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς**: the first and third *καὶ* serve to couple, and at the same time to distinguish, the two things, wealth and political power, each of which is denoted by a pair of nouns coupled by *καὶ*. Meno regards *πλοῦτος* as insufficiently representing external goods, and adds to it the objects of political ambition. By so doing he raises himself a stage above the lowest grade (*ὑστάτην ἡδονὴν δὴ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς Rep.* ix 583 A), and shows that in him the *φιλοχρήματος* is combined with the *φιλότιμος* (*Phaedo* 68 c, 82 c). At *Apol.* 29 D E we have the same scale: *χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος . . . καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ*; In the enumeration at 87 E *πλοῦτος* remains

the single representative of the external goods, while in the corporeal goods *ισχύς* and *κάλλος* are added to *ὕγεια*.

23. *μηδ' ἄλλ' ἄττα*: *μη* (*num*) puts the matter tentatively. Meno is given a last chance of amending his conception of Goods. *τάγαθά* is *subject* of the dependent statement: 'I suppose there are no things of a different class that your list of Goods includes?'

25. *οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα*: *ἀλλὰ* here should not be translated (see on 71 C 10). For though Meno says 'I do not include any other class, but I do include the whole of the class I have indicated,' there is little emphasis on the affirmative half of the statement. 'No, I mean everything of this sort.'

D 26. *εἰεν χρυσίον δὲ δῆ*: cp. 75 C 30. The *δέ* succeeding the interjection *εἰεν* is of the same nature as the *δέ* succeeding other interjections, e.g. vocatives. Here, as Stallbaum points out, we have a paratactic variant for the conditional construction that might seem more natural: *εἰεν εἰ δὲ δῆ χρυσίον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ, πότερον προστιθεῖς κτλ.*

27. *ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ*: not necessarily the *whole* of Virtue, but an instance of it, which is all S. wants for his argument.

*τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως*: cp. *Apol.* 40 D, *Euthyd.* 274 A, *Gorg.* 470 E, *Soph.* 230 D. The proverbial illustration passed into Latin: *Persarum vigui rege beator*, Hor. *Od.* III 9. 4.

28. *πατρικὸς ξένος*: Gedike suggests that the ancestors of Meno may have entered into a league of friendship with Xerxes at the time of his invasion, as the Aleuadae did (*Hdt.* VII 6). As the tie was with the royal *house*, it hardly implies treachery in Meno that he should help Cyrus against his brother, the reigning king. But Xenophon represents Meno as the personal friend rather of Ariaeus than of Cyrus himself (*Anab.* II i 5 etc.), whereas Aristippus is the friend of Cyrus (*ibid.* i i 10).

*πότερον προστιθεῖς κτέ.*: the argument which here begins partially anticipates that at 87 E foll. showing that except *φρόνησις* no good is Good *per se*, all other goods being merely contingent.

29. *τῷ πόρῳ*: for *τῷ πορίζεσθαι* or *τῷ πορισμῷ* the concrete word is substituted; so lines 36, E 46 below. Similarly we have at E 44 *ἀπορία* for *τὸ μὴ πορίζεσθαι*, 98 A 36 *δεσμῷ* for *τῷ δεδέσθαι*, 99 B 15 *εὐδοξία* for *τὸ εὖ δοξάζειν*. See on 99 B 15.

*τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως*: *ὁσιότης* had been omitted by Meno in his enumeration of the virtues at 74 A. Now we have *ὁσίως* put on an equal footing with *δικαίως*. Are we to suppose

that the *Meno* belongs to the dialogues written before the conception of the Four 'cardinal' Virtues—without *δουδης*—was formed by Plato? Those who think so hold that *Meno* was written earlier than *Euthyphro*, the latter being the dialogue in which *δουδης* as a separate virtue is eliminated. The question is argued by J. Adam in the introduction to his edition of the *Euthyphro* pp. xxxii, xxxiii (see also his and A. M. Adam's introduction to the *Protagoras* p. xxxiv). His conclusion, in support of which he quotes Bonitz *Plat. Stud.* p. 234, is that there is no reason to suppose the *Euthyphro* later than other dialogues, where Plato, adopting the popular view, mentions Piety among the other virtues. Such is the case in the *Protagoras*, where at 325 A, 329 B, 349 B *δουδης* is included in the list of virtues. See also Zeller p. 451 n. 47. Cp. *Laws* 860 B.

33. οὐ δῆπου, ὁ Σώκρατες: *Meno* shows no disposition to revolt against current notions of morality, and is thus on a par with another pupil of Gorgias, Polus, who is only partially emancipated ('Polus, the half-thinker' Cope calls him, *Gorg. Intr.* p. xl) as distinct from the more thorough-going Callicles (see Callicles' speech in the *Gorgias* at 482 D).

38. μῦριον ἀρετῆς: this expression is used of the several virtues *Prot.* 329 C D; cp. *Laws* 696 B ἀνδρεία που μῦριον ἀρετῆς ἔν.

44. ἡ ἀπορία: see above, D 29. Here the etymological meaning of ἀπορία is helped out by the fact that the word has for one of its senses 'need, poverty' (see L. & S.), much as we talk about 'being in difficulties.' We have the word played on *Apol.* 38 D ἀλλ' ἀπορία ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυρίας. Other examples of negative words used by Plato in an unusual sense are ἀνόητος, used simply as the opposite of νοητός *Phaedo* 80 B, ἀπίθανος *Parm.* 133 C, ἀσημαντος *Phaedr.* 250 C.

## CHAPTER XII

5. εἶτα: see on 71 C 18.

79 A

7. ἀρετῆ: viz. at 77 A. For κερματίζειν of breaking up a class-entity, cp. *Rep.* 525 E. So κατακερματίζειν below, C 24.

15. ὅ τι ἂν πράττη: after an infinitive of which the subject B is indefinite (as πράττειν here) Greek prefers the third person singular, Latin the second. Sometimes τις is inserted, but often, as here, it is omitted. Many of the instances are subjunctives used with the relative and ἂν: *Euthyd.* 289 B ἐπιστήμης

δεί, ἐν ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν καί τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι τούτῳ δ' ἂν ποιῆ, *Lys.* 212 B οὐκ ἔστιν φιλοῦντα μὴ ἀντιφιλείσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου δὲν ἂν φιλήῃ; *Crilo* 49 C οὐκ ἄρα ἀνταυδικεῖν δεῖ οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπὸ τούτων. Cp. 97 A 9, *Hipp. maj.* 304 B, *Laus* 661 B. With indicatives: *Charm.* 167 B εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν τοῦτ' εἶναι ἢ οὐ, τὸ δ' οἶδεν καὶ δ' μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι ὅτι <οἶδε καὶ ὅτι> οὐκ οἶδεν, *Apol.* 29 A τὸ γὰρ θάνατον δεδιέναι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι ἔστιν δ' οὐκ οἶδεν, *Gorg.* 456 D, 505 A. The use of the third person singular without subject expressed is considerably wider in Aristotle, e.g. *προῖδει Anal. Post.* I 1, quoted on 80 D 1. See Kühner § 352 g, Jelf 373. 6.

18. τί οὖν δῆ; 'well, and what then?' cp. 89 D 13, 97 E 19, *Crat.* 398 A, *Gorg.* 497 D, in all which places the meaning of the combination is the same.

20. πολλοῦ δεῖς: A. Sidgwick (*CR.* III 148 b) gives this use of δέω ('I lack') 'entirely confined to quantities and numbers,' as an example of Personalization. See on 92 A 1.

C 22. ὥσπερ εἰρηκώς: the fallacy of which Meno has been convicted is what logicians call 'circulus in definiendo,' when the term to be defined is itself introduced in the definition (*Jevons Elem. Lessons in Logic* pp. 110, 114).

25. πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 'making a fresh start.' So E 1 and often.

27. Of the instances of εἰ with ἂν and the optative in Plato, three occur in the *Meno*. Besides the present place (1) we have (2) 91 D 12 τέρας λέγεις εἰ—οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο λαθεῖν: (3) 98 B 4 ἀλλ' εἶπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο θείην ἂν ὦν οἶδα. Other instances are: (4) *Lach.* 200 D ἀλλ' ὄρα, ὦ Ἀντισμαχε, εἰ τι σοῦ ἂν μᾶλλον ὑπακούοι Σωκράτης: (5) *Prot.* 329 B ἐγὼ εἶπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πειθόμεν ἂν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι: (6) *Phil.* 58 D διερευνησάμενοι—εἰ φαίμεν ἂν: (7) *Crat.* 398 E οὐδ' εἰ τι οἶδς τ' ἂν εἶην εὐρεῖν, οὐ συντεῖνω: (8) *Laus* 905 D εἰ δ' ἐπιδεῆς ἔτι λόγου τινος ἂν εἴης, λεγόντων ἡμῶν ἐπάκουε.

These instances do not all stand in the same position. In (1), (2), and (4) εἰ does not introduce a real condition. In (1) εἰ = ἐπεὶ. See Kühner § 577. 1 and cp. Xen. *Mem.* I v 3 εἰ γε μὴδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτὸν γε φυλάσσειν τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; *Dem.* 23 (*Aristocr.*) § 141 δίκην δόντ' ἂν δικαίως τὴν μεγίστην, εἶπερ οἱ κακῶσι καὶ φενακίζοντες ὑμᾶς κολάζοντ' ἂν δικαίως. In (2) εἰ = ὅτι, as often after words of strong feeling, Kühner § 551. 8; Xen. *Cyr.* III iii 37. In (4) and (6) εἰ = 'whether,' in an oblique question; Kühner § 396. 5.

In (3), (5), (7), and (8), however, εἰ introduces a really

conditional clause. But the condition is itself conditional ; it depends on an unexpressed protasis which *ἄν* represents. Thus in (3) *εἴπερ φαίην ἄν* is 'if I should say, if asked' ; in (5) *εἴπερ πειθοίμην ἄν* is 'if I should believe, if he told me.' These two instances are noticeably parallel ; they differ, however, in that (3) has for its apodosis an optative with *ἄν*, while (5) has, less regularly, an indicative, *πειθοίμην ἄν* being equivalent to *μέλλω πείσεσθαι*. We may translate (7) 'no, even though I might, if I tried, discover something, I refuse to make the effort.' See Kühner § 577. 1, Goodwin § 506, F.E.T. § 186, who quote Dem. IV (*Phil.* 1) § 18 οὐδ' εἰ μὴ ποιήσαιτ' ἄν τοῦτο ὡς ἔγω γέ φημι δεῖν, εὐκαταφρόνητόν ἐστιν.

I have left out of account †*Alc.* i 124 B ὦν ἄλλω μὲν οὐδ' ἄν ἐνὶ περιγενοίμεθα, εἰ μὴ περ ἐπιμελεία τε ἄν καὶ τέχνη and †*Alc.* ii 144 B εἰ ἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἴηθείης ἄν, in both which places Sch. removes *ἄν*. See Appendix on the text.

30. ἢ οὐ . . ἄλλ' οἶσι : ἄλλά complementary : see on 71 C 10.

35. εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, 'if you do but remember.' Cp. D 80 A 8.

36. ἀπεκρινάμην : viz. at 75 C. The aor. because it was a *single* answer (App. on text on 72 C 4). ἀπεβάλλομεν : impf., see on 73 A 31. But we have aor. succeeded by impf. also at 99 E 3 ἐξητήσαμεν καὶ ἐλέγομεν. See on 72 B 22.

περὶ τοῦ σχήματος : the article recalls the particular instance of discussion ; 'about that matter, colour.'

που : ep. on 75 C 29.

38. μήπω : see on 90 E 31.

46. τίνας ὄντος ἀρετῆς κτέ., 'what is this virtue about E which you speak as you do?' 'Egregia graeci sermonis brevitatis' Gedike. Cp. 86 D 8.

Chapter XIII (79 E-80 D). MENO. *You stupefy and benumb me, Socrates. I thought I understood the matter well enough, but in your hands I am helpless.* SOCRATES. *If you think it is any superior knowledge in me that benumbs you, you are much mistaken. But I am willing to go into partnership with you in the quest.*

Meno has now had his 'three falls' (cp. *Euthyd.* 277 c), and confesses himself beaten. He is thus reduced to *ἀπρωτα* (contrast 72 A 13), the consciousness of ignorance which is the first real step to knowledge. The situation is parallel to

others in Plato. In *Euthyphro* 11 B and *Theaet.* 148 E the speakers whose names these dialogues respectively bear make a similar confession. In each case the confession is followed by a half-serious simile; in the *Euthyphro* Socrates introduces the comparison of the images of Daedalus (cp. 97 D); in the *Theaetetus* he compares himself to a midwife (*μαῖα*) who, childless herself, can bring to birth the thoughts of others. Here, however, it is not Socrates but Meno who makes the comparison. 'Nowhere in the Platonic dialogues is this provocative shock' (of the Socratic elenchus) 'more vividly illustrated than in the *Menon*, by the simile of the electrical fish' Grote II 15. Cp. also *Lach.* 194 B καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ οὐτως ἂ νωὶ μὴ ὁδὸς τ' εἰμι εἰπεῖν. νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐμοίγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας δ τι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ' ὅπη με ἀρτι διέφυγεν.

80 A 4. οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ: see on 76 B 13.

5. τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν: so Socrates (*Theaet.* 149 A) answers 'people do not credit me with the maieutic art, but say ὅτι ἀποπῶτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.'

7. μαστὸν ἀπορίας, 'one mass of confusion.' Cp. *Rep.* 556 D, *Soph.* 236 E, *Theaet.* 151 A ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλανται.

8. 'δεῖ pro πρέπει vel ἔστι modeste, nam animo obversatur οὐ δεῖ. Hdt. IX 85 δοκέω δέ, εἰ τι περὶ τῶν θείων δοκεῖν δέει: Aristoph. *Lys.* 1132 (πόσους | εἰπομὶ' ἂν ἄλλους εἰ με μῆκύνει δέει);' Fr. Cp. the phrase εἰ δεῖ τάληθές εἰπεῖν.

εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, 'if I may e'en have my joke': καὶ accentuates σκῶψαι. See on 71 B 8 and 79 D 35.

9. τό τε εἶδος: the comparison is to Socrates' face, which was broad and flat (σιμός). Cp. *Theaet.* 143 E: Theodorus says to Socrates that Theaetetus οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων; so πλατεία here. It was likened by Alcibiades to Silenus or the satyr Marsyas (*Symp.* 215 A B, Xen. *Symp.* 4. 19, Zeller *Socrates* p. 79). See on 76 C 16.

10. ταύτη: 'notae illi: cp. 76 A 20'—Fr.

τῆ πλατεία νάρκη: the electric ray (*torpedo*): a fish allied to the skate. Fr. says that it often occurs in Greek vase-paintings. He quotes Aristot. *Hist. An.* IX 37. 3 ἢ τε νάρκη ναρκῶν ποιούσα ὡν ἂν κρατήσῃ μελλεὶ ἰχθύων . . τρέφεται τούτοις' κατακρούπτεται δ' εἰς τὸν ἄμμον καὶ πηλόν, λαμβάνει δὲ τὰ ἐπινέοντα, ὅσα ἂν ναρκήσῃ ἐπιφερόμενα τῶν ἰχθύων. Plut. *de Sollertia An.* 27. 2 τῆς δὲ νάρκης ἵστε που τὴν δύναμιν, οὐ μόνον τοὺς θιγόντας αὐτῆς ἐπιπηγνύουσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῆς σαγήνης βαρύτητα ναρκώδη ταῖς χερσὶ τῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένων

έμπούσαν. Pliny *Nat. Hist.* xxxii 2 'etiam procul et ex longinquo vel si hasta virgave attingatur (torpedo) quamvis praevalidos lacertos torpescere, quemlibet ad cursum veloces alligari pedes.' Add Claudian *Idyll* 3. Aristoph. *Wasps* 713 *ώσπερ νάρκη κατά χειρός μου καταχείται*. It was used for food; see Athenaeus VII 314 A, who quotes from a comedian, *νάρκη γάρ έφθή βρώμα χαρίεν γίγνεται*. Fishes of this tribe have furnished other opportunities for caricature. 'Perhaps the reader may remember Hogarth's "Gate of Calais," where a fisherwoman has upon her knees a huge skate, into whose face the painter has wickedly infused an expression precisely like that of the weather-beaten, withered old dame who holds it' (J. G. Wood *Common Objects of the Sea Shore*).

19. *ούκ έκπλέων ένθένδε*: the stay-at-home habits of Socrates B (who has been compared in this respect and in some others with Dr. Johnson) are well known, *Crito* 52 B *ούτ' έπί θεωρίαν πάπορ' έκ τής πόλεως έξήλθες, ούτ' άλλδσε ούδαμόσε, ει μή ποι στρατευόμενος, ούτ' άλλην άποδημίαν έποιήσω πάποτε, ώσπερ οι άλλοι άνθρωποι*: *Phaedr.* 230 C (*Phaedrus* to Socrates) *άτεχνώς γάρ ξεναγουμένω τινι και ούκ έπιχωρίω έοικας*: *ούτως έκ του άστεος ούτ' εις την ύπερορίαν άποδημείς, ούτ' έξω τείχους έμοιγε δοκείς τó παράπαν έξιέναι*.

21. *ώς γόης άπαχθείης*: *άπάγειν, άπαγωγή*, the regular phrases for summary arrest, a process resorted to when the facts were patent or notorious. Buttman quotes *Gorg.* 486 A *ει τις εις τó δεσμοτήριον άπαγάγοι*: cp. *Apol.* 32 B *έτοιμων έντων ένδεικνύμαι με και άπάγειν τών ρητόρων*. For the process see Dem. 22 (*Androt.*) § 26, and the commentators.

The context of the passage just quoted from the *Crito*, as well as the pathetic passage in the *Apology* 37 C D, in which Socrates urges the impossibility of his proposing exile for himself as an alternative penalty, not only shows Socrates' love for his own city, but makes it probable that in any other he would have fared even worse. This passage receives illustration from the subsequent interlude in which Anytus plays a part; see especially 91 C 19 (note) and 94 E. Cp. *Gorg.* 522 B C.

23. *όλίγου*, 'almost.' The idiom is best explained by supposing an ellipsis of *δει* (or *δειν*), Hadley 743 b, F. E. Thompson § 95, Goodwin *MT.* § 779 (b), Krüger § 47, 16. 6, and is therefore a gen. of *want*; *Apol.* ad init. *όλίγου έμαντου έπελαθόμεν*. (Kühner § 418. 6 explains it as a gen. of *price*.) It is fairly common in Plato, though he never has the Aristophanic πολλοῦ 'exceedingly,' without *δειν*. (For πολλοῦ δέω see 79 B 20, 92 A 1.) Nor has he *σικκροῦ, μικροῦ* in sense of *όλίγου*, like Xenophon and Demosthenes.

25. τί μάλιστα; 'accuratius inquirat et cum admiratione' Fr.; 'and pray why, Socrates?' cp. *Gorg.* 448 D.

- C 28. ἴνα σε ἀντεϊκάσω: such εἰκασίαι were a fashionable amusement at Greek social gatherings. Walz *Rhet. Gr.* VIII p. 789 τὸ εἰκασμὰ ἐστὶ σκῶμμα κατ' ὁμοιότητα, ὡς ἔχει τὸ παρ' Εὐπόλιδι—

κατεικάξουσιν ἡμᾶς ἰσχάδι.

See Hug's introduction to Plato's *Symposium* pp. xiv and xxv Aristophanes gives us examples of it: *Wasps* 1308 foll.—

εἶτ' αὐτὸν ὡς εἶδ' ἤκασεν Λυσίστρατος·  
 "ἔοικας, ὦ πρεσβύτα, νεοπλούτῳ τρυγί  
 κλητῆρί τ' εἰς ἀχυρμὸν ἀποδεδρακῶτι."  
 ὁ δ' ἀνακραγῶν ἀντήκασ' αὐτὸν πάρονσι  
 τὰ θρία τοῦ τρίβωνος ἀποβεβληκότι,  
 Σθενέλῳ τε τὰ σκευάρια διακακαρμένῳ.

*Birds* 804 foll.—

ΠΕΙΣΘ. οἶσθ' ᾧ μάλιστ' ἔοικας ἐπτερωμένος;  
 εἰς εὐτέλειαν χηνί συγγεγραμμένῳ.

ΕΤΕΑΠ. σὺ δὲ κοψίχῳ γε σάφιον ἀποτετιμμένῳ.

So in Plato's *Symposium* 215 A Alcibiades says he will praise Socrates δι' εἰκόνων. In the *Republic* 487 E Socrates says he can explain the position of philosophers in existing states only δι' εἰκόνας. Adimantus rejoins ironically σὺ δέ γε οἶμαι οὐκ εἰώθας δι' εἰκόνων λέγειν. Socrates, parrying the raillery, says ἀκουε δ' ὄν τῆς εἰκόνας, ἵν' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς ὡς γλίσχρως ('in what a laboured style') εἰκάξω.

Hor. *Satt.* I v 56 would suggest that the same sort of thing was current in Italy.

It may be paralleled by the modern diversion 'what is my thought like?' that led to Lord Byron's well-known comparison of Lord Castlereagh to a pump.

29. εἰκαζόμενοι is probably middle:—'they like engaging in a game of εἰκασίαι, for they get the best of it.'

34. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτός: εὐπορῶν is simply the opposite to ἀπορῶν, cp. *Theaet.* 150 C ἐπεὶ τότε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει σπερ ταῖς μαλαῖς· ἀγόνος εἰμι σοφίας. Meno had allowed (80 A 4) that Socrates himself ἀπορεῖ.

35. παντὸς μᾶλλον, 'most assuredly.' See on 96 D 24.

- D 37. περὶ ἀρετῆς δ ἔστιν: cp. 71 B 4. Note that we have here δ ἔστιν (not δ τι ἔστιν as at 72 A 14). This therefore is an instance of δ in the sense of οἶον. See on 92 C 19.

39. ὁμοίως εἰ οὐκ εἶδότε, 'you look very much like not knowing.' This perhaps is Socrates' ἀντεικασία of Meno, notwithstanding that he has just said he does not intend to attempt one. For the expression cp. 97 A 10 τοῦτο ὁμοίως ἔσμεν οὐκ ὁρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν. The dat. ptcp. is a common construction with εἶκα, especially in Plato and Xenophon. See Heind. on *Crat.* 416 A (καὶ εἰκάς γε ὁρθῶς λέγοντι).

Chapters XIV, XV (80 D-82 B). MENO. *But how can you search for a thing of which you know nothing? How will you know you have the thing for which you are searching even when you get it?* SOCR. *This is a well-known catch of the Eristics. I should explain the process of acquiring Knowledge by supposing that the soul of each of us had infinite experience before entering on its present life, and that what we call the acquisition of Knowledge is really merely the revival of it. I can perhaps show you this by an experiment.*

We here enter upon the second of the five divisions (or acts) of which the *Meno* consists, extending to the end of chap. xxi (86 C). In this, which deals with the genesis of Knowledge, we have presented to us an account of the relation of Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) to Opinion (δόξα). As the upshot of the whole dialogue is that 'popular' Virtue depends rather on Opinion than on Knowledge, it is clear that this 'episode' (as it at first seems) is really most intimately connected with the main discussion. 'Neque igitur casu quodam, ut Plato rem finxit, aut solum ad refutandum eristicum argumentum forte injectum, sed necessaria sua progressionem quaestio devenit ad examinandam scientiae naturam et condicionem; qui locus tantum abest ut forte tractetur, ut caput contra et janua universae quaestionis putandus sit.'—Fr. Intr. p. 16. See Excursus VII.

## CHAPTER XIV

1. καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτέ., 'why, Socrates, how will you search for a thing when you are totally unable to say what it is? What kind of thing that you know not can you set before yourself as the object of your search?' (καὶ admirantis).

The first two puzzles brought forward in the *Euthydemus* are closely connected with the present ἐριστικός λόγος, namely (275 D) πότεροι εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; and (276 D) πότερον οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἢ

ἐπίστανται ἢ ἄ μὴ ἐπίστανται; Socrates (277 E foll.) explains the puzzles as merely verbal: Prodicus, he says, would remind us that the word *μανθάνειν* is used in two senses, firstly in the sense of acquiring knowledge, secondly as a synonym for *συνιέναι*. 'All this,' adds Socrates, 'is a mere game of words': *παιδιὰν δὲ λέγω διὰ τὰυτὰ, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλὰ τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι, τὰ μὲν πρᾶγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον εἰδείη πῆ ἔχει.*

A similar treatment of the quibble is given by Aristot. *Soph. El.* ch. iv. §§ 1, 2 *εἰσι δὲ παρὰ μὲν ὁμωνυμῶν οἱ τοιοῦδε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι . . . τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τὸ τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην.* Cp. Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 465.

It is clear, however, that the explanation which dealt with the problem as merely verbal is a partial one, and that there underlay it a problem dealing with *πρᾶγματα*. *ἐπιστήμη* was regarded as something complete, final, and not admitting of degrees. How then could it admit of *γένεσις*? There is thus a certain analogy between the question of the origin of Knowledge, and that of the possibility of Motion (Zeller *Socr.* p. 270). These problems turn on the conception of the nature of Becoming. Difficulties in the notion of partial Knowledge give rise to many of the Megarian puzzles, especially those attributed to Eubulides: *ὁ διαλαβάνων, Ἡλέκτρα, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος*, which as R. & P. say (226 c) are *eadem argumenta diversis nominibus*. Cp. Grote III 482, Zeller *Socr.* p. 268.

In the spurious Platonic dialogue † *Sisyphus* 388 B-E, Socrates asks *ζητοῦσι δ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι πότερον ἂν ἐπιστῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ ἂν μὴ ἐπιστῶνται*; 'Both.' 'You mean, for instance, that one may know *who* Callistratus is, but not know *where* he is, so that searching for him is searching for something partly known, partly unknown?' 'Yes.' 'But so far as *search* is concerned it is only the unknown part that is the object of it. If this argument appears to you to be eristic, and not brought forward *τοῦ πρᾶγματος ἕνεκα*,' says Socrates, 'take another instance. Geometers do not inquire *what a diameter is*; they know that well enough; *ἀλλ' ὁπόση τις ἐστὶ μέτρῳ πρὸς τὰς πλευρὰς τῶν χωρίων ὧν ἂν διατέμνη.* ἄρ' οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ ζητούμενον περὶ αὐτῆς; The reference to the problem of the diagonal (see 82 B foll.) makes it probable that the writer had the *Meno* in his thought.

In the *Theaetetus* (165 B) Socrates asks what he calls '*δεινότατον ἐρώτημα.*' 'Ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδὸτα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι; 'Impossible,' Theaetetus answers. The answer is used to show that Knowledge must be different from Per-

ception; for partial Perception is possible; we can see and not see a thing at the same time, if one eye be closed; but partial Knowledge is impossible. Cp. *ib.* 188 A and see Grote II 368.

Plato solves the problem of the origin of Knowledge by calling in *δόξα* as a mediate term between Ignorance and Knowledge; Aristotle, by denying the simplicity and finality of Knowledge; see *Posterior Analytics* (ad init.): *πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως κτέ.*: Knowledge is not simple; there are various modes of it, and Knowledge in one mode may be increased and supplemented by Knowledge in another mode. Among the illustrations given we have one that bears on the problem dealt with by Mill (*Logic* bk. ii cc. 2 and 3): whether a syllogistic argument implies an addition to Knowledge. 'Some Knowledge,' says Aristotle, 'is simply the recalling of previous Knowledge; sometimes Knowledge arises from an act of Perception, as when you recognize that a certain particular falls under a class you know: *ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἰσῶς προσήδει· ὅτι δὲ τὸδε*<sup>1</sup> [*τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ*] *τρίγωνόν ἐστιν ἕνα ἐπαγόμενος ἐγνώρισεν. πρὶν δ' ἐπαχθῆναι ἢ λαβεῖν συλλογισμὸν τρόπον μὲν τινα ἰσῶς φατέον ἐπίστασθαι, τρόπον δ' ἄλλον ὀδ.* He may know that the angles in ABC are equal to two right angles, in so far as he knows the proposition generally (*καθόλου*); but if he does not know that ABC is a triangle he cannot be said to know it absolutely (*ἀπλῶς*). *εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι ἀπόρημα συμβήσεται· ἢ γὰρ οὐδὲν μαθήσεται ἢ ἀοῖδεν.*' See Grote *Aristotle* pp. 211-214. Another passage bearing on the same subject, where again there is a reference to the *Meno*, is *Anal. pr.* II xxi 7=67 a 19, for which see Grote *Aristotle* p. 183.

In his review of this passage in the *Meno* Grote says (*Plato* etc., vol. II p. 16 note): 'If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I think that by doing so they rendered service to the interests of philosophy. The question is among the first which ought to be thoroughly debated and sifted if we are to have a body of "reasoned truth" called philosophy.' To

<sup>1</sup> It is very difficult to see any point in the words *τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ*. What is important is simply the recognition that the figure before us is a triangle. Either the words are an interpolation, or else there must be a reference to the figure of some well-known proposition, e.g. to the proof that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. Thales, we are told, busied himself with the problem of inscribing a right-angled triangle in a circle, and thought the solution of such importance that he sacrificed an ox on accomplishing it. It became a hackneyed problem, so that to put it forward was to show one's self behind the times: Procl. II 23 *ὥστε εἰ τις προβληματικῶς σχηματίσας εἰποι εἰς ἡμικύκλιον ὀρθὴν ἐντεῖναι γωνίας, ἀγεωμετρήτου δόξαν ἀναλάβοι* (Schultz in *Jahrb. für Philol.* 1882 p. 27).

estimate justly our debt to the persons, whoever they were, who first raised the point, we should know to what extent they apprehended the full bearings of their problem, and their objects in raising it. It is clear that it was capable of being treated on two different *planes*, as a verbal quibble tending to stultify philosophy, or as an inquiry into the origin of Knowledge. In what spirit the 'sophists' really approached it we cannot be sure. Plato gives us to understand that the former and lower, the 'eristic' object, was theirs. In that case, though our debt to them may be great, it will be similar to that we owe to the poets and soothsayers, who prophesy they know not what.

3. *ποῖον γὰρ ὦν οὐκ οἶσθα*; to what extent does the interrogative *ποῖον* here imply feeling? The word belongs to a class used (*α*) with weaker accent in indefinite sense, (*β*) with stronger accent in exclamatory or interrogative sense. This distinction, we are told, goes back to Indo-European times (Brugmann in *I. M.'s Handbuch* vol. II §191). With regard to (*β*) it seems probable that the interrogative sense developed from the exclamatory. Exclamations may be used to provoke an answer. *ποῖος* in Homer generally expresses surprise and anger (L. & S. s.v.). The more the word is used *bona fide* expecting information, the less will be the amount of feeling attaching to it. In Attic writers the exclamatory force of *ποῖος*; is strongest where it is used in repartees, picking up a word or phrase used by the previous speaker. This is common in Aristophanes, and in Plato: *Euthyd.* 290 E *ποῖος Κτήσιππος*; 304 E *ποῖον χαρλεν*; *Gorg.* 490 D; *Theaet.* 180 B; *Hipp. maj.* 285 D; *Charm.* 174 B; *Lach.* 194 D E *δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἀνδρῶν λέγειν*. ΛΑ. *Ποῖαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν*; (ironical). ΣΩ. *Οὐκοῦν τόνδε τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς*; ΛΑ. *Ἐρωγε*. ΣΩ. *Ἴθι δὴ, αὐτῷ εἶπε, ὦ Νικία, ποῖα σοφία ἀνδρῶν ἀν εἶη κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον* (a real question). In *Polit.* 280 B *πολλῶν δὲ ἐτέρων ξυγγενῶν ἀπεμερίσθη*. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. *Ποῖων, εἶπέ, ξυγγενῶν*; the word *εἶπέ* shows that we have here a genuine question, and there is little, if any, feeling. In repartees of the kind just mentioned the word repeated is generally a noun or adjective; but in *Rep.* 330 A *πότερον ὦν κέκτησαι τὰ πλέω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτέησω*; *ποι' ἐπεκτέησάμην*; *ἔφη*, it is a verb. *πόθεν* and *πῶς* are similarly capable of being used in repartees: *Lysis* 208 B *κἄν εἰ βούλοιο λαβῶν τὴν μᾶστιγα τύπτειν, ἔφην ἀν*. Πόθεν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔφην; *ibid.* C *ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐπιτρέπουσί σοι*; *πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐπιτρέπουσιν*; *Crat.* 398 E *ἢ σὺ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν*; EPM. Πόθεν, ὠγαθέ, ἔχω; Πόθεν; is also used by itself as a scornful denial.

The prefixing of the article to *ποῖος* does not necessarily reduce it to a colourless interrogative. The article occurs with *ποῖος* in repartee in Theocr. 5. 5 *τὰν ποῖαν σύριγγα*; See Soph.

O. C. 1415 and Jebb's note; also Heind. on *Soph.* 240 A. When *δή* is added to *ποῖος*; it implies not so much surprise as *interest* in the question: *Lach.* 194 C *ποῖω δή, ὦ Νικία*; *Rep.* 377 C D *ποῖους δή (μύθους)*; 'and pray *what* stories?'; *Hipp. maj.* 285 B *ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ δή σε πρὸς θεῶν ἀκούοντες ποῖα*; *Theaet.* 147 D, etc. The addition of the enclitic *τις* to *ποῖος* generally shows that no feeling is implied; Cobet *Nov. Lect.* 276 says *always*; but see *Phaedr.* 260 C *ποῖόν τινα οἰεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἐσπείρε θερίξαι*;

The question whether *ποῖος* is a pure interrogative, or whether some exclamatory force still attaches to it, can often only be determined by the context. Thus in *Gorg.* 483 D *ἐπεὶ ποῖω χρώμενος δικαίω Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν*; it is clear that the question is merely rhetorical. †*Alc.* i 110 C *ἐν ποῖω χρόνῳ ἐξευρών*; is a somewhat doubtful case. In *Aesch. Ag.* 278 *ποῖου χρόνου δὲ καὶ πεπύρθηται πόλις*; I think that Verrall is right in thinking that *ποῖου*; 'gives the question the air of incredulous wonder, though Shilleto in his note on *Dem. F. L.* § 257 quotes this as a colourless question on the ground that the *καὶ* is *suffixed*, not *prefixed*. In the present place Meno's whole speech is scornful and sceptical. Replies are hardly expected. Cp. 95 D 37 *ἐν ποῖοις ἔπεσον*;

*προθέμενος ζητήσεις*: see on 94 D 2.

4. *εἰ δὲ τι μάλιστα*, 'however much.' The phrase also occurs *Rep.* 450 C; *Euthyphr.* 4 D, 9 C; *Parm.* 135 A; *Crat.* 435 B, and no less than eight times in the *Charmides*. Madvig (who only counts seven of these, omitting 167 B), thinks this frequency a ground for suspecting the genuineness of the *Charmides* (*adv. Crit.* vol. I p. 402 note 2). The expression, however, springs naturally from the *a fortiori* line of argument that plays a great part in that dialogue.

7. *ἐριστικόν*: see Excursus V.

E

*κατάγεις*: see App. on the text.

*ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν*: the ordinary use of *ἄρα* is simply to mark an inference. But if the inference be one from a statement we have not fully examined, it may cause *surprise*; or if it be from a statement for which we do not vouch, it may be expressed with *doubt* or *irony*. In the strongest case, where a false position is exposed by a '*reductio ad absurdum*,' *ἄρα* is generally preceded by *δέ* (see on 91 E 17). So Dr. Thompson on *Gorg.* 493 A *καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν* says: 'The particle *ἄρα* frequently denotes an inference false but specious.' Often, as here, some particle like *ὡς* shows that it is a case '*ubi aliquis non suis verbis utitur*' Fr. See Kühner § 509. 3, Jelf § 788.

4, 5. Cp. 91 C 2 οἱτοί ἀρα μόνοι, 81 D 12, 97 C 33; *Apol.* 26 C ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέληγε, οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἀρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι; *Theaet.* 171 C εἰκός γε ἀρα ἐκείνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι; *Rep.* 358 C, 375 D, 595 C; *Clit.* 408 A δοῦλω ἀμεινον ἢ ἐλευθέρῳ διάγειν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὸν βίον ἐστὶν ἀρα; *Gorg.* 508 B C (thrice); *Prot.* 331 A B. With ὡς, *Apol.* 40 E, *Euthyphr.* 11 C ἴσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες ὡς ἀρα κτέ., *Phaedr.* 245 A πεισθεὶς ὡς ἀρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητῆς ἐσόμενος, 249 E, *Hipp. maj.* 289 A, *Rep.* 468 E, *Parm.* 127 E, *Laws* 822 A, etc.

- 81 A 17. περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα: Socrates is speaking slowly and impressively, and here pauses to excite attention. The device is fairly common in Plato. Cp. *Phaedr.* 273 C ἀτάρ, ὦ ἐταίρε, τοῦτῳ ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μή—ΦΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον; 277 D, *Rep.* 609 D, *Soph.* 265 C, *Polit.* 277 E, *Phil.* 57 D, 59 E, *Laws* 861 A, etc. Instances seem to be rare in the earliest dialogues.

Dr. Abbott (*How to write clearly* p. 30) quotes from *Hamlet* in illustration of a similar point:

*Ghost.* If thou didst ever thy dear father love—

*Hamlet.* O God!

*Ghost.* Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder.

It has also its use in comedy: Ar. *Eccl.* 865—

A. ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις ἐστὼς B. τί δρᾷσεις; ἐπέ μοι. Cp. *Wasps* 1443.

21. τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν: there was in Greece no priestly *caste*—a point in which Greece is broadly and strongly distinguished from Egypt and other Eastern nations. The fact is used by Zeller (*pre-Socratics* I p. 56 note) to show the improbability of any considerable Oriental influence on Greek religious thought. Certain families in Greece were no doubt associated with certain religious cults. It is to be noted, however, that Plato does not refer to priests and priestesses as a class, but to those of them who have been led by the accident of their position to speculate on the meaning of the rites they performed, and give an account (λόγον διδόναι) of their practice.

It is now established that the ritual with which these speculations were associated was, chiefly if not entirely, the Orphic. The Orphic cult in Greece is at least as old as the sixth century B.C. (Zeller *pre-Socratics* I 62). It was closely connected with the worship of Bacchus. Herodotus II 81 uses the names 'Bacchic' and 'Orphic' as interchangeable. This worship was imported into Greece from Thrace, a country whose people were specially susceptible to the quasi-mesmeric influences of worship of the kind to which the name 'orgiastic'

has been given. This stands quite aloof from the national Greek religions, of which the chief characteristic, as with their Art and Literature, was balance, dignity, and self-restraint. The importance of the ecstatic Bacchus-worship imported into Greece in promoting the idea of immortality has been elaborated by Rohde in his work *Psyche*. (See a notice of this by Miss Jane Harrison in the *Classical Review*, vol. VIII p. 165.) It was by a kind of inspired assault that the Greeks first attempted, so to speak, to carry the heights of heaven. To this Plato superadded a more scientific investment by process of Reason; but even with him the mystic element is by no means superseded, and some appeal, though with varying prominence, is still made to the forces of divine intoxication or 'divine madness.' See Excursus VI.

23. λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος: 'there is no evidence in any Greek poet before Pindar of the hope of a future life' (Zeller *pre-Socratics* vol. I p. 127). It seems probable that Pindar derived these doctrines, not from the Pythagoreans, but directly from the Bacchic and Orphic cult, of which Thebes was a seat (Zeller l.c. p. 71). The passages in Pindar referring to a future life are chiefly to be found in the fragments of the *Θρηνοὶ* or *Dirges*.

24. ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν: Empedocles is chiefly meant. See on 76 C 22. The dates of his life are uncertain, but he was somewhat junior to Pindar. He was a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood as was also Aeschylus (Cic. *Tusc. D.* II § 23). After them many others took up the tale.

ἄσοι θεῖοι εἰσιν: see on 99 C 22. Socrates intends the word to be taken in its colloquial sense, 'gifted,' 'distinguished,' though for him it has a deeper meaning.

28. τότε μὲν τελευτᾶν: the best commentary on this is the *Phaedo* 70 c foll. The moment of death is not identical with the moment of re-birth. Between the two intervenes a period in which the soul is ἐκεῖ, 'yonder,' in Hades. During this it is in a state of 'death,' which is the correlative and antithesis to the state of 'life.' Cp. also Pindar *Ol.* 2. 69 where ἐκατέρωθι means 'in our world and in the Other World.' On this view life and death are alternative modes of the soul's existence, so that we may say with Euripides:

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν,  
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν; (*Gorg.* 492 E).

Cp. Soph. *Ant.* 560—

ἢ δ' ἐμῆ ψυχῇ πάλαι  
τέθνηκεν ὥστε τοῖς θανοῦσιν ὠφελεῖν.

*Symp.* 192 E κοινῆ τεθνεῶτε of lovers united in Death; *Ar. Frogs* 868—

ὅτι ἡ κοίησις οὐχὶ συντέθνηκέ μοι,  
τούτω δὲ συντέθνηκεν ὥσθ' ἔξει λέγειν.

The doctrine comes from Heraclitus, in whose philosophy the resolution of Existence into a contrast of Opposites plays a great part. See Dr. Thompson's note on the passage in the *Gorgias*; R. & P. §§ 38, 39; Zeller *pre-Socratics* II p. 84 and notes.

29. πάλιν γίνεσθαι: 'Servius ad Virg. *Aen.* III 68: Pythagoras non μετεμψύχωσιν, sed παλιγγενεσίαν esse dicit' Fr.

30. δὲν δῆ: from these words to the end of the quotation must be regarded as a parenthesis. It has nothing to do immediately with the point under discussion: 'How is learning possible?' But it has a very important bearing on the final result of the dialogue. The hint is expressed so briefly that it may easily elude notice. Virtue comes to a man *θεῖα μοίρα* (99 E); but the 'divine apportionment' is determined by the soul's previous history. We have then here at least the germs of the theory elaborated in the *Republic* and *Phaedo*. δῆ here is equivalent to *nota bene*, 'by the way'; not a common use. Cp. use with relatives, line 28 above: *Clitophon* 408 B τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικὴν, ἣν δὴ σὺ πολιτικὴν, ὧ Σώκρατες, πολλὰκις ἐπονομάζεις: *Prot.* 328 B ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἰς εἶναι: also the constant use of διδὸ δῆ: *Gorg.* 518 A διδὸ δῆ καὶ ταύτας (τὰς τέχνας) δουλοπρεπεῖς εἶναι: *Symp.* 203 C διδὸ δῆ καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκόλουθος γέγονεν ὁ Ἔρως: *Phaedr.* 249 C διδὸ δῆ μόνῃ πτεροῦται ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια.

32. οἴσι γὰρ ἄν κτέ., 'for from whomsoever Persephone hath accepted the atonement for the ancient evil, of all these in the ninth year she sends back the souls to the upper Sun again. From these grow up glorious kings, and men of mighty strength, and men surpassing in wisdom; and for all future time they are called holy heroes among men.'

This fragment is referred to one of Pindar's *Θρήνοι* (Bergk<sup>4</sup> fr. 133). The rhythm appears to be this:—

Γ Γ Γ Ρ | Γ Γ Γ Γ Ρ | Γ Γ Γ Γ | Γ Γ Ρ |

οἴσι γὰρ ἄν Φερσεφόνα ποιῶν παλαιοῦ πένθεος (4 bars)

Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ | Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ | Γ Γ Γ Γ Ρ |

δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὑπερθεὺν ἄλιον κελῶν ἐνάτω εἶται (4 bars)

ἄνδιδοὶ ψυχὰς πάλιν, (2 bars)

ἄνδιδοὶ ψυχὰς πάλιν, (2 bars)

ἐκ τῶν βασιλῆες ἀγανοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σο- φί- α τε μέγιστοι

ἐκ τῶν βασιλῆες ἀγανοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σο- φί- α τε μέγιστοι

(4 bars)

ἄνδρες ἀβζοντ' ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἤρωες ἀγ-

ἄνδρες ἀβζοντ' ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἤρωες ἀγ- (4 bars)

νοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται (2 bars).

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**οἶσι**: this construction with *δέχομαι* occurs in Homer *Il.* II 186 *δέξατό οἱ* ('from him') *σκήπτρον*, XV 87 *Θεμιστι δὲ καλλιπαρήφ δέκτο δέπας*. See Kühner § 423, 24, Leaf on *Il.* I 596, and elsewhere in Pindar, *Ol.* 13. 29, *Pylh.* 4. 23, *ibid.* 8. 5, *Isth.* 5. 4. Porson on Eur. *Hec.* 533 *δέξαι χάσας μοι* collects a number of instances. It is not clear whether it arises from the *locative* dative (cp. the Scottish 'to ask *at* him') or from the true dative of the indirect object, of which the *dativus commodi* is a development. The present instance rather favours the latter view.

**παλαιού πένθος**, 'the ancient trouble,' 'original sin.' *πένθος* is in origin a by-form of *πάθος*, just as *βένθος* of *βάθος*. Thus *πένθος* is 'an affliction.' From this meaning it passed, by an euphemism characteristic of the Greeks, to the meaning 'sin.' Cp. the history of the word *συμφορά*. Stallbaum is wrong in saying that *πένθος* here means 'culpa in mortali corpore contracta.' It means rather the sin, or 'fall,' by which the soul, originally free, was doomed to be enchained in a mortal body. This notion of an 'ante-natal lapse' arose naturally out of the pessimistic view, to be found in Greek literature from Homer downward, that life is an *evil*. See Clem. Alex. *Strom.* III ch. 3. It was easy to infer from this that life is a *punishment* (see Exc. VI.). Perhaps we may compare William Blake:—

Didst close my tongue in senseless clay,  
And me to mortal life betray.

See *Rep.* 612 E τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ θεῶν

γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οὐδὲν τε ἀριστα, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἀμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν;

33. *δέξεται* is aor. subjunctive.

The exact meaning of these words by no means lies on the surface. We must remember that no interpretation of the passage is satisfactory that does not find in it an argument grounding the position *δεῖν δὴ ὡς δοσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον*. We must further remember that if we had the context of the quotation its applicability might be much more obvious than it is at present. Lastly, that we may indeed expect from Pindar a hint or illuminating vision, but hardly a complete or consistent scheme. 'Pindar's eschatology follows no fixed type' (Zeller *pre-Socratics* I 70 note).

In considering ancient views as to man's spiritual history, we have to take into account two causes. First, there is the ante-natal lapse—a matter standing so remote from positive experience that it has almost the character of an external or fatal force, a character which is definitely given to it in the *Timaeus* (41 E; see Zeller *Plato* p. 391). Besides this we have to recognise as a second cause acts due to the soul's own initiative or 'free-will.' These are the sins, and virtuous deeds, 'done in the body.' The notion that for these there is a retribution after death is one that appeared very early in Greece. The soul's history is thus doubly conditioned. First, there is the struggle of Soul with Matter due to the ante-natal lapse: this must end logically in the eventual re-emergence of the Soul in purity. Besides this there is the moral effect of each particular life. (See Exc. VI for further treatment.) One hypothesis favoured by Plato is that the time for the restitution of the Soul to its primeval state is fixed. There is a cycle of years—9000 in the *Phaedrus*—and the restitution of the Soul after this time is as much a matter of fate as the original lapse. This cycle includes a certain number of lives, and the same number of intervals, or 'deaths,' that follow between each life and the next. The 'death' following each life furnishes the retribution for the deeds done in that life. Strictly speaking, according to this view the effects of each life will not extend beyond the subsequent 'death,' and will not have any bearing on any further life. It seems clear that this is not the view that Plato takes here. For we have here no hint of *punishment* as a ground for living a holy life. We have instead a clear suggestion that the most desirable lives on earth are those that have been earned by good conduct in previous lives, that the *élite* of earth are those who, having practically squared their account, are passing through a last earthly life before the final release of their souls. Cp. the Buddhist doctrine of Karma

'We are born as we deserve to be born' (Kidd *Social Evolution* p. 111). According to this view, conduct in any life will have its chief effect by influencing further lives, and perhaps also by hastening or retarding the time of the soul's final restitution. On this view the idea of a period of retribution following each life becomes possibly superfluous. But it is not necessarily excluded. See *Laws* 870 D E, where we have the view, drawn from the Mysteries, that murderers are not only punished in Hades, but are doomed in their next life to suffer the fate they have inflicted. The mention of the alternative states of death and life in the context, and the words *ἐνάτω εἶται* (see subsequent note), make it probable that such periods of retribution are contemplated here.

*εἰς τὸν ὑπερθεὶν ἄλιον*: this implies another sun in the nether world. Plutarch *cons. ad Apoll.* c. 35 = 120 c quotes Pindar (Bergk<sup>4</sup> fr. 129) as saying of the righteous in Hades—

τοῖσι λάμπει μὲν μένος ἀελίου τὰν ἐνθάδε νύκτα κάτω κτέ.

So the chorus of the Initiated in Aristoph. *Frogs* 454 sing—

μύνοις γὰρ ἡμῶν ἥλιος καὶ φέγγος διαρὸν ἐστίν.

Cp. Verg. *Aen.* vi 641 *solemque suum, sua sidera norunt.*

*ἐνάτω εἶται*: the words raise two questions: 'What is the meaning of the number?' and 'From what point is the time counted?' The number nine has a sacred character: it was *δὲ ἐνάτου ἔτους* that Minos sought the instruction of Zeus (*Laws* 624 b). But there may possibly be here a more definite reference. According to the view in the *Phaedrus* (249 A B) the period from birth to re-birth is 1000 years. This includes the period of life and that of purgation. The time of purgation is thus something over 900 years. (On the other hand, in *Rep.* 615 A B the 1000 years, the period of 'wandering' for the soul, is exclusive of the period of life, and this Vergil follows, *Aen.* vi 748:—

has omnis, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,  
Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat ordine magno.)

If, then, the normal period of purgation was 900 years, it seems possible the notion was that in the case of spirits on the eve of their last incarnation the 900 years was reduced to nine. But perhaps this is refining over-much.

35. βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ κτέ.: there are three classes of heroes C here recognised: (1) Kings, (2) Warriors or Athletes, (3) Philosophers and Poets. With the passage should be compared Empedocles, quoted by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iv ch. xxiii φησι δὴ

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τῶν σοφῶν τὰς ψυχὰς θεοὺς γινέσθαι, ὡδὲ πως γράφων,

εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντει τε καὶ ὑμνῶπολοι καὶ ἱητροὶ  
καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθόνιοισι πέλονται,  
ἐνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῆσι φέροιστο.

Here Empedocles is speaking of souls who have reached their last stage before final restitution to the circle of the gods.

36. εἰς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον: 'tempore post mortem futuro' Fr., referring to *Rep.* 469 A καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων θεραπεύσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θηκὰς, and *Phaedo* 81 A ὡς περὶ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγούσῃ. The words ὡς ἀληθῶς look as if the phrase that follows had associations with mystic ritual. (Cp. on 76 E 50.)

ἦρωες ἄγνοί: the term ἦρωες is used here practically as a synonym for δαίμονες. The ἦρωες and the δαίμων are both on the same plane, intermediate between man and God. They are bracketed *Rep.* 392 A περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι εἰρηται, καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἠρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Αἴδου. Cp. *Crat.* 397 D. But in *Lysis* 717 B we have a distinction: after sacrificing to the gods ὁ ἐμφρων will sacrifice to the daemons, next to the heroes. Cp. 738 D. But the term ἦρωες necessarily refers to an incarnation on earth; the recognition of a deceased mortal as a δαίμων amounts to a sort of canonization. Thus the chorus speak of *Alcestis* (995 foll.):

μηδὲ νεκρῶν ὡς φθιμένων χῶμα νομιζέσθω  
τύμβος σᾶς ἀλόχου, θεοῖσι δ' ὁμοίως  
τιμάσθω, σέβας ἐμπόρων.  
καὶ τις δοχμίαν κέλευθον  
ἐμβαλῶν τὸδ' ἐρεῖ·  
αἴτῃ ποτὲ προῦθαν' ἀνδρὸς,  
νῦν δ' ἐστὶ μάκαίρα δαίμων·  
χαῖρ' ὦ πότνι' εὖ δὲ δόιης.

Cp. with this *Rep.* 540 B C; we are to assign sacrifices to men who have served their city well, εἰ καὶ ἡ Πυθίη ξυναίρη, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς εὐδαίμοσι τε καὶ θεοῖσι. The word ἄγνοί recalls Hesiod *O. et D.* 121 foll. about the Golden Age:—

αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρ' ἐκάλυπεν,  
οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἄγνοί ἐπιχθόνιοι καλέονται  
ἐσθλοὶ, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων.

The upshot of the teaching which Plato here derives from Pindar is this: the θεῖος ἀνὴρ is the Soul in its last incarnation,

before it rejoins the gods. After death he is regarded as a *ἦρωσ* or *δαίμων*.

## CHAPTER XV

6. & γε, 'quippe quae.' 'γε indicat rei rationem afferri' Fr. Stallbaum on *Euthyphr.* 4 A quotes many instances, including *Gorg.* 471 A *πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος, ὡς γε προσήκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδέεν, κτέ.*; *ibid.* B, *Phaedo* 96 E, *Crat.* 403 E.

7. ἄτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενούς οὐσης, 'as the D whole of nature is bound by a tie of kinship.' It seems clear that this doctrine is stated by Plato not as something original, but as one already current. It in fact stands in much the same position as the utterances of the 'priests and priestesses' above, from which it is separated by the parenthesis *δεῖν δὴ κτέ.* That the doctrine was Pythagorean we may be pretty sure. It is really implied in the doctrine of Transmigration. A fragment attributed to Philolaus (*Stob. Ecl.* I 420 = R. & P. § 57) speaks of the universe as *εἰς ἑὸν καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ φύσι διαπνεύμενος καὶ περιηγόμενος ἐξ ἀρχᾶς ἀδίου.* This fragment shares the suspicion that attaches to all the remains attributed to Philolaus, and even in a greater degree than some. But the view stated follows directly from the doctrine *ἐν πᾶν* held by Xenophanes (*Plato Soph.* 242 D) and after him by Parmenides (line 81 *τῷ ξυνεχῆς πᾶν ἔστιν, ἑὸν γὰρ ἔνντι πελάζει* R. & P. 96). There is evidence of connexion between Parmenides and the Pythagoreans, R. & P. 91.

The present passage represents no further stage than had already been reached by Plato's predecessors. But the doctrine is one that was subsequently developed into something that formed the very centre of Plato's system. His doctrine of the World-Soul is elaborated in the *Timaeus*. 'The *Timaeus* sums up the result of its whole cosmogony in the concept of the world as the perfect ζῶον' (Zeller p. 386). Note the emphatic concluding words: *θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῶα λαβὼν καὶ ξυμπληρωθεὶς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος οὕτω, ζῶον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ, θεὸς ἀσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἀριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελευτάτος γέγονεν, εἰς οὐρανὸς ὅδε μονογενῆς ὢν.* 'Having received all mortal and immortal creatures, and being therewithal replenished, this universe hath thus come into being, living and visible; containing all things that are visible, the image of its maker, a god perceptible, most mighty and good, most fair and perfect, even this one and only-begotten world that is' (Archer-Hind's translation). Cp. *ibid.* 36 E.

Important also is *Phil.* 30 A ΣΩ. *Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἀρ' οὐ*

ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν ; ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν. ΣΩ. Πόθεν ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἶπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἐμψυχον ὄν ἐτύγγανε, ταῦτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἐτι πάντῃ καλλίονα. See Zeller p. 345.

Later the doctrine passed into the common heritage of the Academic and Stoic schools ; see Cic. *Div.* II 33, 34, *Acad.* I 23 ; also Vergil *Georg.* IV 220 foll. :—

deum namque ire per omnes  
 terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum, etc.  
 and *Aen.* VI 724 foll. :—

principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentes  
 lucentemque globum Lunae, Titaniaque astra  
 spiritus intus alit, etc.

See Grote II 17 note, and II 202 note.

11. τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἀρα : see on 80 E 8. The combination γὰρ ἀρα occurs in Plato, either in juxtaposition (*Prot.* 315 D, *Gorg.* 469 D, *Rep.* 438 A, *Laws* 698 D) or separated, as here, *Rep.* 358 C. [At *Symp.* 199 A and 205 B Herm. and Sch. follow B in omitting ἀρα.] In some cases the reference is to a particular statement, as *Prot.* 315 D ἐπεδήμει γὰρ ἀρα Πιρόδικος ὁ Κείος 'for P. was in town, as I had expected': cp. 314 C. In *Gorg.* 469 D ἐὰν γὰρ ἀρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ, the ἀρα marks a parody of Polus' boasts, such as at 466 C. Here ἀρα marks a fresh link in a chain of argument that all hangs from borrowed premises.

12. ἀνάμνησις : for references to the principal places in Plato bearing on this doctrine see R. & P. 266 C. The first to be noticed is *Phaedr.* 249 B : οὐ γὰρ ἢ γε μὴ ποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε (ἀνθρωπέιον) ἤξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ξυνιέναι τὸ κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἰόντ' αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ ἀνακύνουσα εἰς τὸ ὄν ὄντως. See on this Grote II 218. In *Phaedo* 72 E foll. we have an elaborate account of ἀνάμνησις, which opens with a direct reference back to the *Meno* : Καὶ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβῶν, καὶ κατ' ἐκείνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὄν σὺ εἰώθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμνησκόμεθα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχὴ τὴ εἶκοιεν εἶναι. 'Ἀλλὰ, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβῶν, ποῖαι τοῦτων αἰ ἀποδείξεις ; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. 'Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι

ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἣ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνούσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἴοι τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. ἔπειτα ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἀγγῆ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. Socrates carries on the further exposition from 73 B (Zeller p. 83 note), and in the sequel we have an important supplement to the argument in the *Meno*.

Plato defines ἀνάμνησις below 85 D 24: τὸ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμην. It is distinguished from μνήμη, *Phil.* 34 B C. μνήμη is σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως: when the soul without the body recovers some previous impression this is ἀνάμνησις. Cp. *Laws* 732 B ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροή φρονήσεως ἀπολειπούσης.

Does the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, as propounded in the *Meno*, necessarily involve the Ideal theory? Grote II 17 remarks that 'in the *Phaedo* pre-natal experience is restricted to commerce with the substantial, intelligible Ideas, which are not mentioned in the *Menon*.' J. S. Mill, however, makes it clear that the doctrine of Recollection does imply the knowledge of separate Universals in a previous state (*Dissertations* III 351). Cp. Zeller's valuable note 82 on p. 126: 'It seems equally clear to me that the doctrine of Reminiscence really supposes that of the Ideas. The objects of reminiscence can only be the universal concepts—the sensuous forms of which meet us in individual things—not individual presentations which we have experienced in our former lives.' See too p. 395: 'How could sensible things remind us of universal concepts if the latter were not known to us independently of the former?' and p. 406 foll.: 'Reminiscence is in Plato's opinion the only explanation of the possibility of thought transcending sensuous perception.' If all our previous lives were on a level with the present, the problem of the origin of Knowledge would not be solved, but only thrown back.

Cp. J. B. Bury in *JP.* xv 81 note: 'The argument of the *Phaidon* shows (cp. Mr. Archer-Hind's preface) that ἀνάμνησις was to Plato merely the defective way in which the imagination represents the kinship of the soul to the ideas.' See on 86 B 15.

Whether the Ideal theory had actually found expression at the time when the *Meno* was written is another question. See *Intr.* § 17.

14. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργούς ποιήσῃεν (cp. 86 B 24): in these words we see indicated the radical vice of Eristic. It is a cheap substitute for Philosophy. Its votaries are like Formalist and Hypocrisy in the *Pilgrim's Progress*, who come 'tumbling over the wall,' and so, by a short cut, put themselves on a level with those who have borne the burden and heat of the day. For he who can show the futility of Reason may appear as good a man as he who has attained it.

The spirit of the philosopher in regard to the duty of inquiry has never found more perfect expression than in the words of Simmias (*Phaedo* 85 C D): ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὐτὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπέιπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπραξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἡ εὐρεῖν ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχοῦμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλευσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναται ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιωτέρον ὀχήματος, λόγου θεοῦ τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. As a strong contrast to this may be quoted the cynical epigram (*Anth. Pal.* x 118):—

πῶς γενόμεν; πόθεν εἰμί; τίνος χάριν ἦλθον; ἀπελθεῖν.  
 πῶς δύναμαί τι μαθεῖν μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος;  
 οὐδὲν ἔων γενόμεν· πάλιν ἔσσομαι ὡς πάρος ἦα·  
 οὐδὲν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν μερόπων τὸ γένος.  
 ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι Βάκχοιο φιλήδορον ἔντυε νῆμα·  
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κακῶν φάρμακον ἀντίδοτον.

The analogous fatalistic argument, that would stultify all action, was definitely labelled ἀργὸς λόγος ('ignava ratio' Cic. *de fato* § 28).

**E** 17. ὃ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι: 'Notanda constructio composita e duabus aliis πιστεύω τούτῳ et πιστεύω τούτον εἶναι ἀληθῆ' (Buttmann). Cp. *Phaedo* 90 B; contrast *Gorg.* 524 A.

18. ζητεῖν ἀρετὴν ὃ τι ἐστίν: the nom. is much rarer than the acc. in similar combinations. See on 71 A 25. Heindorf on *Phaedr.* 271 D εἰδέναι ψυχὴν ὅσα εἶδη ἔχει quotes *Laches* 199 κ οὐκ ἄρα εὐρήκαμεν ἀνδρεία ὃ τι ἐστίν.

23. ἀρετὴ: 80 B 23.

**82 A** 25. ὅς οὐ φημι, 'though I deny.' Instances where, as here, the relative introduces what is practically an adversative clause are rare. Kühner § 561 c quotes †Isocr. 17. 47 ἀλλ' εἰς ἀγῶνα καταστὰς ὤμην καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον πλέον ἔξεν Πασίωνος παρ' ἑμῶν; ὅς οὐδὲ μένειν ἐνθάδε παρεσκευαζόμεν: 'on the contrary, I did not even intend to remain here.'

26. ἴνα δῆ: see on 86 D 14.

29. ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔθους: Simmias in the *Phaedo* 73 B is more wary: αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὐδ' ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. See on 91 E 17.

33. προσκάλεισον: perhaps the choice of the active instead

of the more usual middle of this verb is due to the fact that Socrates means not 'call him to yourself,' but 'call him before me.'

34. τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθῳν: 'Vox propria de servis qui dominos honoris causa in publico comitabantur: *Charm.* 155 A, *Symp.* 217 A, *Laws* 845 A' (Fr.). 'Retainers.'

35. ὄντινα βούλει: 'Stallbaum says that this allusion to the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to illustrate conspicuously the wealth and nobility of Meno. In my judgment it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure accident—the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked upon.' Grote II 19 note. See Intr. § 7.

38. Ἕλληγν μὲν ἔστι: 'μὲν in questions implies that if assent is not given the conversation cannot be proceeded with,' Verrall on Eur. *Med.* 676. Other examples in Plato are: *Charm.* 153 C παρεγένου μὲν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τῇ μάχῃ; παρεγενόμεν: 'I believe I may assume'; *Theaet.* 161 E. It is not uncommon in Euripides: *Med.* 676, 1129; *Hipp.* 316; *Alc.* 146; *Ion* 520. See also Aristoph. *Birds* 1214.

39. οἰκογενής, *verna*, not bought or captured. He was probably one of the Thessalian serfs or *πενεσταί*. Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* E.T. p. 132.

41. εἰ ἀναμνησκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων: see App. on the text.

43. ἀλλὰ προσέξω: the negative clause to which ἀλλὰ is opposed is suppressed, and ἀλλὰ has little force. 'Very well; I will attend.' Cp. 75 E 17.

Chapters XVI to XIX (82 B–85 B). *Socrates puts a series of questions to a Slave of Meno's, who has never been taught geometry, the answers to which show that there exist latent in the slave's mind the materials for solving a geometrical problem, namely, the construction of a square which shall be double a given square.*

The dialogue with the Slave is a perfect model of Socratic procedure. It copies on a small scale the discussion with Meno himself. It consists of two parts, negative (chaps. xvi and xvii) and positive (chap. xix). These two parts are separated by an interlude between Meno and Socrates (chap. xviii). The negative portion again may be divided into two parts: (1) chap. xvi, where the slave starting full of confidence

gives an answer hopelessly wrong; (a word or two between Meno and Socrates intervenes); (2) chap. xvii, where the Slave is shown the error of the first answer, and reaches what may be called the stage of *partial disillusionment*. He amends his answer. When the amended answer too has been shown wrong he is completely disillusioned, and is ready for the constructive process to begin. Grote I 530 D compares the Slave to Clinias in the *Euthydemus*; 'each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of Socrates into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected, nor traceable to any teaching.'

The scene attracted attention in antiquity. It is alluded to by Cicero *Tusc. D.* I § 57; by Arnobius *adv. gentes* II ch. 24.

Socrates makes his figures on the sand or dust—the black-board of antiquity.


## CHAPTER XVI

1. γινώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον κτί: 'You recognize that a square is a thing like this.' This is the usual prefatory agreement as to the use of terms. See on 75 E 12.

C 4. ἔστιν οὖν τετράγωνον κτί, 'there exists then a square having all these four sides equal,' the definition being accompanied by an assertion of the reality of the thing defined. Three lines below ἔστιν is merely a copula. For ἔστι as simple auxiliary with present participle see 84 A 1, E 21; *Phaedr.* 249 D ἔστιν δὴ οὖν ὁ πᾶς δεῦρο ἦκων λόγος, *Gorg.* 500 C καὶ τί ποτ' ἔστιν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων; *Soph.* 267 E εἶτε διπλόην ἔρ' ἔχων τινα ἔστω, cp. 99 E 5: for other instances see Campbell, General Introd. to *Soph.* and *Polit.* p. xxxiv. The square is of course not sufficiently defined by specifying that its sides are equal, for a rhombus also has four equal sides. If, indeed, the lines διὰ μέσου presently mentioned (C 7) were *diagonals*, we should have the conditions of a square sufficiently expressed; for a square is the only figure that has all its four sides equal and its diagonals equal; though the definition would be a clumsy one. The lines διὰ μέσου, however, are not diagonals, but lines parallel to the side, and so help not at all in differentiating the square from the rhombus. That the figure is rectangular is assumed. The Greeks were so much accustomed to regard superficial measure as the simple product of the two linear dimensions, that it was natural to them to assume that they were dealing with rectangular figures in default of notice otherwise (see on 87 A 24). The diagonals (*διάμετροι*) are first mentioned at 85 B 48.

7. ταυτασι τὰς διὰ μέσου: the lines EG, FH. The lines

are wanted presently to show that the square on a side of two feet contains four square feet.



10. τοιοῦτον χωρίον, 'a similar figure'; cp. D 28; note that τοιοῦτον refers to *shape*, τοσοῦτον, πηλικόν (85 A 28), ποσάπουν (85 B 41) to *size*. See on 87 A 30.

13. εἰ οὖν εἴη . . . πόσων ἀν εἴη ποδῶν; εἰ ἦν . . . ἄλλο τι ἀν ἦν; a good opportunity of comparing two different classes of conditional sentences. The first is indefinite; the length has not been measured: 'say that this is two feet, of how many square feet will the whole be?' The latter is an instance of an unreal supposition.

14. πόσων ποδῶν: the same expressions are used in Greek for linear and superficial measure. You have to judge by the context whether ποῦς means a linear foot or a square foot. See *Theaet.* 147 D and Campbell's note there.

15. εἰ ἦν ταύτη (AB) δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτη δὲ (AE) ἐνὸς ποδός.

16. ἄλλο τι, 'nonne.' The full and original form was ἄλλο τι ἢ, 'is aught else the case than?' which is kept at D 19 just below, 83 B 17, and often in Plato (see Ast I 107). ἄλλο τι is an irrational abbreviated form, which occurs again in this dialogue 84 D 12, 97 A 15, and very often elsewhere. Fr. compares the irrational abbreviation ἄλλως τε for ἄλλως τε καὶ at 85 E 37. See Kühner § 587. 17 and J. & A. M. Adam's note on *Prot.* 353 c.

ἀπαξ ἀν ἦν δυοῖν ποδοῖν: the genitive is an attributive genitive, and is not grammatically affected by ἀπαξ: 'the space would be one of once-two-feet.' But διπλάσιον, ποσαπλάσιον (84 E 15), ἡμισυ, etc. do 'govern' genitives.

34. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε: the exposition is a good deal helped E by the fact that the feminine gender can always stand for γραμμή, the neuter for χωρίον, while at 83 E 62 the masculine ἄθε can only refer to πόδες.

36. δῆλον δῆ: the boy answers with confidence, a characteristic of the state of complete ignorance. This corresponds to Meno's answer 71 E 1 ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν.

37. οὐδὲν διδάσκει: it was noted by Schleiermacher (quoted by Fr. on 84 A) that the questions put by Socrates are in large proportion leading questions, so that it is hardly fair to regard the Slave as the *parent* of the notions brought to light by Socrates' aid. Schleiermacher adds that this is not fatal to Socrates' present purpose, which is merely to show, from the ease with which the notions are grasped by the Slave, that they are not now for the first time implanted in his mind. Grote (II 19), after quoting Schleiermacher's criticism, observes that the theory of ἀνάμνησις 'is in a great degree true. Not all learning, but an important part of learning, consists in reminiscence—not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent life, but of past experience and judgments in this life.' Grote, however, makes in these words no concession whatever to the Platonic doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, the essence of which is that all knowledge of Universals depends upon reminiscence of experience that is both ante-natal and generically different from sense-experience. It was on this point that, for a long period in the history of philosophy, raged the controversy about Innate Ideas (see Bain *Mental and Moral Science* App. B). Is all our knowledge ultimately rooted in sense-experience? Or is the soul furnished at birth with certain notions inherent in it? The position of the one party was given in the formula: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.' This Leibnitz amended by adding the words 'nisi intellectus ipse.' It must be understood that the partisans of 'experience' limited their view of it to *sense-experience within the present life*, as Grote does in the passage just quoted. Since Grote wrote the problem has entered on a new phase by a recognition of the fact that a great deal of our mental furniture is *inherited*. The opponents of 'Innate Ideas' have had to enlarge their notion of 'experience,' and to admit that the sense-experience of the present life is not adequate to account for the phenomena of mental development. But the doctrine of heredity does not assume any previous experience *generically different* from the sense-experience of the present life, and the necessity for assuming anything of the sort has by the admission of heredity been very considerably lessened.

Grote (II 20) quotes in illustration of the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις Wordsworth's ode, 'Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,' etc. But J. S. Mill, *Diss.* III 351, points out a fundamental opposition between the two utterances. Cp. A.-H. on *Phaedo* 76 D, 'According to Wordsworth we are born with the ante-natal radiance clinging about us, and spend our lives in gradually losing it; according to Plato we lose the vision at birth and spend our lives in gradually recovering it.'

38. ἀλλ' ἐρωτῶ : see on 71 C 10.

39. οἶται : of mere opinion, as below, 44. Cp. 97 B 23.


ὅποια ἐστίν : we might have expected πηλική or ὀπόση. But as lines have, for the purpose in hand, no property but length, the distinction between ὅποια and ὀπόση disappears. Cp. 83 C 37 ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς, E 77, 84 A 79, 85 B 43. Similarly we have ποῖος used of time, which has no 'quality': Aesch. *Ag.* 278 ποίου χρόνου δὲ καὶ πεπόρθηται πόλις, Eur. *†I. A.* 815, Aristoph. *Birds* 920 [see L. & S. III]. In some of these cases 'feeling' may be intended; but we might similarly say 'what sort of time?' 'what sort of distance?' See on 80 D 3.

44. οἶται δέ γε : the γε has its separate force and emphasises οἶται. Cp. 95 E 9 and note there.

## CHAPTER XVII

2. ἐφεξῆς ὡς δεῖ ἀναμ. : see on 86 A 10.

10. αὐτῆ (AK), ταύτης (AB), ἐτέραν τοσαύτην (BK) : see on 83 A 82 E 34.



13. ἀπὸ ταύτης : AK.

16. ἕσας τέτταρας : 'this is speaking inclusively, as the B line AK itself is one of the four'—Stocks.

17. τοῦτ' : the space AKLM.

20. ταυτὶ τέτταρα : Socrates has drawn the lines CP, CQ, showing that the large square divides into four squares of the original size.

26. διπλάσιον οὖν κτέ. : the steps here are very minute. But it cannot be brought out too clearly that we have not got what we wanted.

- C 34. τεττάρων : in full, (χωρίων) γὰρ τετράκις τεττάρων (ποδῶν) ἐστὶ (χωρίων) ἑκκαίδεκα (ποδῶν). τετράκις cannot govern a genitive any more than ἀπαξ at 82 C 16. In the *Theaetetus* (147 D) we are told that Theodorus has carried his analysis of numbers into those which are perfect squares and those that are not, up to sixteen ; and that there he stopped. Perhaps some diagram like the present illustrated his discourse. Intr. § 22.

40. ταυτησί τουτί : the deictic forms imply that he here points to the line AB and the square ABCD, whereas in the sentence before he referred to the line AK and the square AKLM. In the next sentence τοῦδε is the square ABCD, τούτου the square AKLM. The Greek wealth of pronouns dispenses with lettering.

- D 50. τὸ γὰρ δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου : the present imperative makes the injunction refer to a habit, not to a particular answer. See Appendix on the Text on 72 C 4. The injunction is an important point in Socratic procedure, as distinguished from Eristic (see Excursus V). Perhaps the best illustrative passage is *Theaet.* 154 C D ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μείζον ἢ πλεόν γίνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν ; τί ἀποκρινεῖ ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστίν· ἐάν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἰπω, ὅτι ἐστίν κτέ. In the conversation with Thrasymachus (*Republic* bk. i) the point appears : 337 c (the respondent must be left free :) ἤττόν τι αὐτὸν οἰεῖ ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἐαυτῷ ἐάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἐάν τε μή ; (see the context) : 346 A καὶ ὦ μακάριε μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. Cp. 350 E. The passage at 349 B affords no real exception. Thrasymachus (unlike the waverers Polus and Meno) has not scrupled to call injustice καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν. Socrates compliments him on now speaking his mind sincerely. Thrasymachus rejoins τί δέ σοι τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἶπε μοι δοκεῖ εἶπε μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις ; Socrates answers Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τὸδε μοι πειρώ ἐτι πρὸς τοῦτους ἀποκρίνασθαι. Here the 'οὐδέν' is ironical ; cp. *Prot.* 333 C. To the same effect as the present passage are *Crito* 49 D, *Lach.* 193 c, *Prot.* 331 c, *Gorg.* 495 A, 500 B, *Phil.* 14 A. The importance of getting at genuine δόξαι appears at 85 C, where we see that δόξαι are the raw material from which Knowledge is evolved.

52. ἦν, 'is, as we agreed.' The source of this idiom, which is of frequent occurrence, is a transference of the time of our *thought* about a fact to the fact itself. It occurs most frequently in the imperfect tense: *Phaedr.* 230 A ἀρ' οὐ τὸς ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφ' ὅπερ ἤγες ἡμᾶς; the existence of the tree is thought of relatively to the time when they began to approach it. This imperfect often appears, by a sort of attraction, of things permanently existing, mentioned in a narrative of past events: thus we have ὅσα διδασκάλων εἶχετο 93 D 19, 94 A 8: cp. Xen. *Anab.* II iv 12 ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηθίας καλούμενον τεῖχος· ἀπείχε δὲ Βαβύλωνος οὐ πολὺ. So often in referring to past points in a discussion, where the imperfect is equivalent to the present with ὡςπερ ἐλέγομεν, ὡςπερ ψόμεθα, or the like. It is sometimes called the 'philosophic imperfect'. (Goodwin *MT.* § 40). See Kühner § 383. 5, Jelf § 398. 4. The imperfect most common is ἦν, as *Polit.* 264 A: *Rep.* 407 A ἀρα . . . ὅτι ἦν τι αὐτῶ ἔργον, ὃ εἰ μὴ πράττοι οὐκ ἐλυσίτελει ζῆν; *ibid.* 436 C, 441 D, 477 A, 522 A, 609 B: *Gorg.* 478 C, 507 A (see Dr. Thompson's note): *Charm.* 159 D: *Soph.* 267 E (ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδῶν ἦν): *Crat.* 387 C: *Phil.* 41 C, 55 A. Other imperfects: 88 D 5 ὡςπερ ἡ φρόνησις ἐποίει, i.e. ποιεῖ, ὡς ἐλέγομεν: *Crito* 47 D ἐκείνο ὃ τῶ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῶ δ' ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο (for γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἐλέγετο): *Euthyd.* 289 C ἀρὰ ἔστω αὕτη ἦν εἶδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι; *Prot.* 356 D ἡ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίησεν ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτά; *Rep.* 490 A ἡγήετο, 614 A παρείχετο. We have a similar idiom in future time: 98 C 13, *Gorg.* 475 B ἦτοι λύπη ἢ κακῶ ὑπερβάλλον ἀσχιον ἔσται 'will be found to be.' Certain uses of temporal particles as πω (οὐδ' ἀρα πω γίγνεται, presently at E 75) and ἔτι (73 A 29, 99 A 2, where see notes) are to be explained on the same general principle. The idiom occurs in various languages, including our own. We might translate here 'was not this the square of two feet?' So in Latin, Cic. *Acad.* I § 23 (repeatedly), § 30 *tertia philosophiae pars quae erat in ratione et in disserendo*: Livy VII 1 hic annus *erit* memorabilis, 'we shall find this year memorable.'

(We may separate from these cases: (α) the imperfects dealt with on 77 E 44; (β) the imperfect with ἀρα, as at 97 C 31; (γ) the curious use of ἦν at *Theaet.* 156 A (ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν), *Charm.* 174 B, *Rep.* 505 E, *Laws* 628 C, which is allied to (β); for, as Campbell says, 'What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it was before the inquiry began.' We may connect with this the Aristotelian τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, and the Aristophanic *τοῦτι τί ἦν*; (*Wasps* 183). Cp. *Isaeus* 11 § 17 ὃ συγγενέστατον μὲν ἦν τῇ φύσει πάντων, and

Jebb's note on the passage in his *Selections from the Attic Orators*.)

- E** 60. **τρίποδα**: this of course is a mere 'shot.' It does not follow that because four is too much and two too little, that three is right (cp. Aristot. *NE*. II vi 7). We have here the second stage, that of partial disillusionment. The difficulty is partially grasped, and the confidence is less.

61. τὸ ἡμῖσιν ταύτης (AB) προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους (AR); δύο μὲν γὰρ οἶδε (AB), ὁ δὲ εἰς (BR)· καὶ ἐνθὲνδε (AT) ὠσαύτως: for οἶδε (πόδες being understood) see on 81 E 34.

75. πῶ refers to time of *thought* (see on D 52). 'We have not yet got the square containing eight feet from the three-foot base.' (Beware of translating 'the square of eight feet,' which would be at least ambiguous.)

79. εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν: not without some ironical point; an exact arithmetical answer being impossible, as  $\sqrt{2}$  is incommensurable with 1. Socrates himself does not give the measure of the line; he only δεικνυσιν. 'The side and the diagonal represented the type of incommensurable magnitude among the ancient reasoners' (Grote III 356 note).

ἀλλὰ δεῖξον, 'at any rate.' Instances of ἀλλὰ in the sense 'saltem,' with an imperative, after a conditional clause, are not very common. But see below 86 E 18 εἰ μὴ τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν . . . χάλασον; *Laus* 860 C εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ νῦν ὡς λέγοντά με τίθετε; † *Hippiarchus* 231 A εἰ δ' αὖ μὴ αὐτὸς ἔχεις ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει. This use of ἀλλὰ with imperatives may be classed with the 'appealing' force, for which see Jebb on Soph. *El.* 337, also L. & S. ἀλλὰ I 2. They quote Soph. *El.* 411 ὦ θεοὶ πατρώου συγγένεσθέ γ' ἀλλὰ νῦν. See Aristoph. *Clouds* 1364, 1369 for ἀλλὰ with an indirect command.

- 84 A** 81. **ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα**, 'I don't know.' The emphasis in *ἔγωγε* logically belongs not so much to the pronoun as to the denial. A good example of false emphasis on a pronoun is Soph. *Phil.* 910 foll.—

ΦΙ. ἀνὴρ δδ', εἰ μὴ γὰρ κακὸς γνώμην ἔφην  
προδοῦς μ' εἴκοι κάκλιπών τὸν πλοῦν στελεῖν.

ΝΕ. λιπῶν μὲν οὐκ ἔγωγε, λυπηρῶς δὲ μὴ  
πέμπω σε μάλλον, τοῦτ' ἀνιώμαι πάλαι.

See Postgate in *CR.* XI 21: καλῶς σὺ ποιῶν, 'and you were right.'

This marks the completion of the process of disillusionment; the destructive process is ended; the false conceit of knowledge

is eradicated. The situation is parallel to chap. xiii 79 E-80 D. Meno does not indeed there say *ἐγωγε οὐκ οἶδα*, but Socrates can say of him *ὁμοίος εἰ οὐκ εἶδῶτι*. Meno somewhat resents the treatment; the Slave of course does not; and Meno is able to see (84 B) that in the case of the Slave the torpedo-shock is not unattended with good.

## CHAPTER XVIII

1. οὐ ἔστιν ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμνησκέσθαι, 'what point on the track of reminiscence he has now reached.' Cp. *Lysis* 204 B *πῶρρω ἤδη εἰ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος*. (In these cases the use of *εἰμί* with the present participle serves to bring out the continuous force of the tense; cp. 82 C 4.) Fr. compares *Rep.* 445 C *ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου and Euthyphr.* 4 B *πῶρρω σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος*. The genitives are 'partitive.'

Wayte on *Dem.* 22 (*Andr.*) § 16 *εἰς τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθε τοῦ νομίζεν* points out that a *genitive infin.* is rare in this construction, and quotes the present passage.

5. In the combination *ἀλλ' οὖν . . . γε, οὖν* has the force 'however that may be,' as in *δ' οὖν*; *γε* at once emphasises and limits the word to which it belongs. The combination often introduces an apodosis after *εἰ μή* (*Phaedo* 91 B, *Soph.* 254 C, *Laws* 885 E). In *Prot.* 327 C *ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληγαὶ γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν*, as here, the construction is coordinate.

7. ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδεν κτέ., 'ut nescit ita se scire ne putat B quidem.'

18. τότε δὲ ῥαδίως κτέ.: Socrates caricatures Meno's C language at 80 B 15. Geometry, to be sure, offers less temptation to rhetoric than ethics, so ignorance of it is more easily detected, and is less dangerous.


26. πρὶν κατέπεσεν: Goodwin *MT.* § 637: 'When the clause introduced by *πρὶν*, *until*, refers to a result *not attained* in past time in consequence of the non-fulfilment of some condition, it takes a past tense of the indicative.' Cp. 86 D 13, *Theaet.* 165 D E. See F. E. T. § 218. The question here is equivalent to *οὐκ ἂν ἐπεχείρησεν*.

31. ὅ τι καὶ ἀνευρήσει: see on 71 B 8. Here the force of the *καὶ* is, 'see, what *after all* (in spite of his bewilderment), he will discover.' So *Euthyd.* 272 *ἵνα εἰδῶ ὅ τι καὶ μαθησόμεθα*; *Euthyphr.* 3 A *λέγε τι καὶ ποιούντ' ἄ σέ φησι διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νέους*; *Aristoph. Clouds* 1344 *καὶ μὴν ὅ τι καὶ λέξεις ἀκοῦσαι βούλομαι*; *Eccl.* 946.

- D 32. οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἤ : see on 76 B 13.  
 33. φύλαττε δέ κτέ. : see on 82 E 37.  
 35. ἀλλὰ μή : see on 71 C 10.

## CHAPTER XIX

1. At this point all the figures are rubbed out, and a fresh start is made. The four squares, each containing four feet, are



successively constructed ; first ABCD (τούτο line 2), then BKPC (ἕτερον line 4) ; then DCQM (τρίτον line 7), then CPLQ (τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τὸδε line 9).

- E 12. ἄλλο τι : see on 82 C 16.
- 85 A 21. ἐστὶν αὕτη γραμμὴ : DB. See on 82 C 4.  
 22. τείνουσα, τέμνουσα : see Appendix on the Text.  
 25. τέτταρες αὐται : BP, PQ, QD, DB.  
 26. ἴσαι : Euclid would have thought it necessary to *prove* the equality of the diagonals. *τούτῳ τὸ χωρίον*, BPQD.  
 31. *τούτων*, the four squares ; *ἐκάστη ἡ γραμμὴ*, the four diagonals.  
 35. *τηλικαῦτα*, the triangles ; *ἐν τούτῳ*, the sq. BPQD.  
 37. *ἐν τῷδε*, the sq. ABCD.
- B 41. *τῷδε*, the sq. BPQD. The step taken here is a comparatively long one. This led Schleiermacher to think that

something has fallen out in the text, which he reconstructs thus:—

ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν < ποσαπλάσιον γίνεται τούτου (scil. ABCD).

ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσιον.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ πηλικὸν ἦν;

ΠΑΙ. Τετράπουν.

ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν > ποσάπουν γίνεται;

But perhaps the Slave's mind is supposed to have become more agile. Campbell Intr. *Soph.* etc. p. 15 points out the greater conciseness of Plato's later *dialogues*.

48. **διάμετρος**: the word is used elsewhere in Plato of the diagonal of a square: *Polil.* 266 A B where there seems a fantastic reference to the present problem; †*Sisyphus* 388 E (quoted on 80 D 1); *Rep.* 510 D of a rectangle (where there may be a reference to the present problem); *Tim.* 54 D E of a trapezium. The word *διαγώνιος* is much later. Of course *γραμμὴ* is to be understood with either word.

**οἱ σοφισταί**, 'the Professors.' The word is used here in its original sense, entirely without odious signification. It implies little more than the Expert, contrasted with the *ιδιώτης*. This is the usual signification of the word in the poets: Pind. *Isthm.* v 28; Diog. L. prooem. § 12 says καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν Ἀρχιλόχῳ τοὺς περὶ Ὀμηροῦ καὶ Ἡσίοδου ἑπαυῶν οὕτως καλεῖ; Eur. *Hipp.* 916 δεινὸν λέγεις σοφιστὴν κτέ.

In Plato the word is used colourlessly as here *Lys.* 204 A οὐ φαῦλός γε ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸς σοφιστῆς: *Crat.* 403 E οὕτω καλοῦς τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπίσταται λόγους λέγειν ὁ Ἄιδης καὶ ἔστιν . . . ὁ θεὸς τέλειος σοφιστῆς τε καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ: †*Minos* 319 C, Zeus, the trainer of Minos, is a great σοφιστῆς. The only other place in the *Meno* where the word occurs is 91 C 18; and there it is clear that the word, to some ears at least, excites odium. See the note there.

50. **ὡς σὺ φῆς**: the Slave has found the materials for the conclusion—a point presently developed.

⚡ παρὶ Μένωνος: see on 76 E 48.

Chapters XX, XXI (85 B–86 C). SOCR. *Observe that all the Opinions to which he has given utterance are his own. By the calling up in order of these Opinions he has recovered latent Knowledge. This Knowledge he did not acquire in this life. Therefore he must have acquired it in a previous state of existence. The soul's possession of Knowledge is thus proved to be independent of its connexion with the human form, and*

so independent of death. However, this is rather by the way. I have shown practically that the transition from seeming Ignorance to Knowledge is possible; and I insist most strongly that we shall be better men if we regard research as part of our duty.

C 3. οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἐαυτοῦ : see on 71 C 13.

4. ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον : 82 E.

10. τῷ οὐκ εἰδοῦτι κτέ. : see App. on the text.

14. καὶ νῦν μὲν γε κτέ., 'at present these opinions have just been conjured up in him like a dream': that is, they are still fluid and insecure. Cp. *Symp.* 175 E, where Agathon says that his own wisdom, compared with that of Socrates, is φαύλη καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμος, ὥσπερ θναρ οὐσα. Similarly the metaphor of θναρ and θναρ is used to express the contrast between real Knowledge (of Universals) and mere Sense-experience or Opinion: *Rep.* 476 D; cp. 533 C, 534 C, and *Laws* 969 B, quoted on 100 A 9.

15. 'But if some one shall question him again often and in different ways about these same things, you know that finally he will understand these matters as well as any one.' For the future condition see note on 86 A 8 and Exc. IV.

The δόξα now arrived at need to be clinched by repetitions of the dialectic process. For the relation of δόξα to ἐπιστήμη see 97 B 17, with note, and Exc. VII. The intimate bearing of this discussion upon the main subject of the dialogue has been already pointed out in the note on the summary of chaps. xiv, xv. δόξα is a sort of half-way house on the road from Ignorance to Knowledge.

D 20. ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος : see on 71 C 10. Fr. observes that ἀλλά cancels the negative in the preceding οὐδεῖς, and compares *Rep.* 366 D, *Phaedr.* 260 D, *Symp.* 192 E.

24. τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν κτέ. : see on 81 D 12. Cp. *Phaedo* 75 E εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνώμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ὡς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἶχομεν, ἀρ' οὐχ ὁ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη ;

28. ἦτοι εἰλαβέν ποτε ἢ αἰεὶ εἶχεν : the addition of τοι to the former ἢ accentuates the contrast between the two alternatives offered (Kühner § 540, 5. Pindar *Nem.* 6. 5 appears to be the only place where ἦ . . . ἦτοι occurs. ἦτοι without ἦ occurs in Plato *Rep.* 344 E, 400 C, 433 A). The particle τοι implies a personal appeal. The effect of it is not to press the acceptance of the member to which it happens to be attached, but

to press the choice between the alternatives, which often involves a dilemma. It cannot be made out that *τοι* is attached to the member the speaker desires to have accepted. At 89 A 20, the other place in which the combination occurs, Plato leaves it an open question whether *φρόνησις* is the whole of *ἀρετή* or a *μέρος* of it. Cp. *Phaedo* 76 A *ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοι γε αὐτὰ γεγονάμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὓς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀναμνησκονται οὗτοι.* Other passages are: *Apol.* 27 D *τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγοούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας;* *Prot.* 341 A: *Gorg.* 460 A *ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκαια ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ,* *ibid.* 467 E, 474 D, 475 A, 478 B: *Rep.* 453 D *ἤτοι δελφινὰ τινα ἐλπίζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἂν ἢ τινα ἄλλον ἀπορον σωτηρίαν;* *ibid.* 330 E, 437 C: *Phaedo* 68 C: *Parm.* 131 A: *Laws* 898 C: *Soph. Aníg.* 1181—

ἐκ δὲ δωμαίων  
ἤτοι κλύουσα παιδὸς ἢ τύχη πάρα;

Hdt. I 11 *ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἐκεῖνόν γε δεῖ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἢ σέ:* Thuc. VI 34. 2, 38. 2, 40. 1, etc.

30. *εἰ μὲν αἰεὶ εἶχεν, αἰεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων:* Socrates propounds a dilemma. If the slave always had this Knowledge, then he always existed as an intelligent being. But to say that the Slave *αἰεὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων* may be going too far. The knowledge may be there but latent or potential. Knowledge admits of genesis. But this admission does not destroy the tie to a past existence. If this genesis took place it was not confined to this life. Part of the work was done before. The *δόξαι* remain as permanent relics of previous *μάθησις*, and are capable of being reconverted into knowledge. Plato held that the soul has no beginning. In the *Phaedrus* (245 C D) we read 'that as the soul is ever in motion and is the first beginning of all motion, it must be indestructible as well as underived,' Zeller p. 398; cp. 405.

32. *εἰληφῶς εἶη:* simple perfects optative are rare, save in a few perfects used in present sense, as *πεποιθοῖην, τεθνήκοιμι.* Plato also has periphrastic forms for the plqpf. active: *Phaedo* 76 B *εἰληφότες ἦμεν, Euthyd.* 273 A *περιεληλυθότε ἦσθην.*

36. *δίκαιος εἶ:* the usual 'personalisation.' See A. Sidgwick E in *CR.* III pp. 147 foll.

37. *ἄλλως τε:* the omission of *καί* is remarkable, as it was from the force of *καί* that the formula *ἄλλως τε καί* derived its sense ('otherwise in general and particularly'). Like *ἄλλο τι* for *ἄλλο τι ἢ* it comes under the head of irrationally abbreviated phrases. So Buttmann, who in his note quotes *Xen. Mem.* I ii 59, *Isoc.* 2 (*ad Nicocl.*) § 51, and *Soph. O.T.* 1114—

ἄλλως τε τοὺς ἀγοντας ὥσπερ οἰκέτας  
ἐγνωκ' ἔμαντοῦ,

on which Jebb quotes Hdt. VIII 142 (Kühner § 522. 4). In the present place some (not the best) MSS. add *καί*, which was to be expected. Cp. *Hipp. min.* 363 A—perhaps the only other place in Plato.

## CHAPTER XXI

86 A 5. *δτ' οὐκ ἦν ἀνθρώπος*, 'before he entered into the human shape.' For full explanation of the import of this, chap. xix of the *Phaedo* must be consulted, especially the end 75 B: *πρὸ τοῦ ἀρα ἀρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὄρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει πον εἰληφότες ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰσού οὐ τι ἔστιν and C πρὶν γενέσθαι ἀρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῶν αὐτὴν (τὴν τοῦ Ἰσού ἐπιστήμην) εἰληφέναι.*

8. *εἰ οὖν κτέ.*, 'if then, alike during the time when he is, and in that when he is not, a man, true opinions are to exist in him, which when awakened by questioning become matters of knowledge, must not his soul be for all time in the possession of them? (lit. 'be in a condition of having learnt': cp. *ἐμαμαθήκει* above). For it is clear that for all time he either is or is not a man.'

The argument here is commonly regarded as fallacious (Zeller p. 127 note, p. 405 note; cp. Fr.). It is certainly highly compressed and somewhat ambiguous. It is not clear how much Plato conceives that he has proved. The argument seems to be this: 'The human form is not essential to the soul's existence. It existed apart from the human form before. It made its way into the human form without losing hold of its heritage of Ideas.' So much may be said to follow fairly from the premises. But Plato has cast the argument in such a form as to suggest a larger conclusion. The tenses *ὄν τ' ἂν ἢ χρόνον καὶ ὄν ἂν μὴ ἢ* refer to indefinite *future* time. The implied argument is that, as the soul has safely passed the gate Birth into the human form, so she may be expected to pass the other gate Death, which, as the *Phaedo* explains, is its correlative. This, even if a probable surmise, has not been proved; and so we find in the *Phaedo* (77 c) that Kebes treats the argument for immortality drawn from *ἀνάμνησις* as imperfect: *φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡμῶν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ· δεῖ δὲ προσποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦπτον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἔχειν.*

It must be remembered that the argument for immortality here is merely by the way. There is no reference to the general

argument given in the *Phaedrus* 245 c (Zeller 398). Indeed it is noticeable that the words *ἀθάνατος ἀν' ἢ ψυχὴ εἶη, ὥστε* might be omitted without obvious loss to the argument. • Perhaps Plato's only object in referring to future immortality here is to be found in the hint at 81 B. Plato did not regard immortality as an end in itself; see *Euthyd.* 289 B οὐδέ γε εἰ τις ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ὥστε ἀθανάτους ποιεῖν ἀνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ χρῆσθαι, οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδὲν εἶναι and *Laos* 661 B C.

*εἰ ἐνέσονται*: this is not a real future condition. It is, as Fr. says, equivalent to *ἐνεῖναι φήσομεν*, which is pretty much what Kühner (§ 573 a; cp. § 387, 4) calls a modal signification. It thus belongs to the class of idioms treated on 83 D 52. This sense of the future is common in Plato, especially after *εἰ*; but see also 78 E 38 where οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετὴ means *εὐρήσομεν μὴ εἶναι ἀρετῆν*. Cp. *Parm.* 134 D, etc. Contrast 85 C 15 *εἰ ἀνερήσεται*, where we have a real future condition. The two classes may be thus distinguished. In the 'modal' condition the pres. indic., in the 'real future' condition the subjunctive (with *εἰάν*) or the optative, may be substituted for the fut. indic. in the protasis with little change of meaning. Here, for instance, we might have had *εἰ ἐνεῖσιν . . . μεμαθηκνῖά ἐστιν*. For in the apodosis the time is not really future, and the fact that we might in English translate *μεμαθηκνῖά ἐσται* 'will not his soul be in possession?' only shows that we can use our auxiliary 'will' *modally*. But it is possible that Plato has, somewhat sophistically, used the future forms here to help the leap to *ἀθάνατος* in the next sentence. See Excursus IV.

10. *ἐρωτήσῃ ἐπεγερθεῖσθαι*: cp. *Phaedo* 73 A quoted on 81 D 12. This art of questioning is the *μαιευτικὴ τέχνη*, the positive side of Socrates' work (*Theaet.* 149 A-151 C; art. 'Socrates' *Encycl. Brit.* p. 236). Plato, while giving abundant examples of this art, nowhere attempts a detailed analysis of it. Note that in *Rep.* 532 E Socrates when asked to give an account of dialectic says that the time has not yet come. For the plural *ἐπιστήμαι* cp. 98 A 33, *Symp.* 207 E, etc.

11. *μεμαθηκνῖά ἐσται*: the fut. perf. active is not common, but cp. *Charm.* 174 D ἀπολελοιπὸς ἐσται; *Rep.* 582 D γεγονὸς ἐσται.

15. *ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων*: this can only mean the world of Ideas. Cp. *Phaedr.* 249 B οὐ γὰρ ἦ γε μὴ ποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τὸδε ἤξει τὸ σχῆμα (the human form); *ibid.* D τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμνησκόμενος and 247 C. See note on 81 D 12. The same is implied at *Phaedo* 73 C ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δῆπον, εἰ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερον ποτε ἐπίστασθαι.

17. ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρή κτέ. : it should be noted that to support this conclusion it is not in the least necessary that the *future* immortality of the soul should have been proved. All that is wanted is the admission of the soul's previous converse with truth, and consequent power of recovering it. Even so much of the metaphysical basis as remains is presently represented as less essential than the recognition of the moral duty of research. See on 81 D 14.

20. ΜΕΝ. εἰ μοι δοκεῖς κτέ. : *Meno*—'I like what you are saying, Socrates—I hardly know why.' *Socr.*—'Yes, Meno, and I like what I am saying.'

21. οὐκ οἶδ' ἔτιως : Meno's δόξαι are still unsettled. Cp. 95 C 31. So Callicles in the *Gorgias* 513 c οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εἰ λέγειν, ὡ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.

23. οὐκ ἂν πάνυ : see on 71 C 19; cp. *Gorg.* 513 c just quoted and *Phaedo* 63 c quoted below.

ἂν . . . δισχυρισαίμην, 'as severaverim.' The word occurs in two passages of the *Phaedo* of similar tendency: 63 c οὐν δὲ εἰ ἴστε ἔτι παρ' ἀνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ δισχυρισαίμην· ἔτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοῦ δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθούς, εἰ ἴστε ἔτι, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, δισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο; also 114 D τὸ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα δισχυρισασθαι οὐτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διεήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ κτέ. Cp. also *Rep.* 533 A. For the attitude of Plato towards 'myths' see Zeller 396. Plato 'clearly asserts that these myths were viewed by him not as mere myths, but also as hints of the truth worth serious consideration; and he therefore combines with them moral exhortations which he never would have grounded on uncertain fables. It is difficult, however, to make out precisely where that which is intended to be dogmatic ends, and that which is mythical begins. Plato himself was manifestly in uncertainty, and for that very reason betakes himself to the myth.' See *ibid.* pp. 160-3.

24. ἔτι δ' οἴομενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν : we here revert to the point taken at 81 D 14.

Chapters XXII, XXIII (86 C-87 C 18 πάνυ γε). *SOCR.* *Shall we then resume the inquiry what Virtue is?* *MENO.* *I would rather put the question as I did before, 'Is Virtue teachable?'* *SOCR.* *Well, if you must have your own way, we may consider this point on a hypothesis as to the nature of Virtue. If Virtue is Knowledge it will be teachable, and if not, not.* *MENO.* *Certainly.*

Here begins the third section of the dialogue (chaps. xxii-xxv). Reason is shown for connecting Virtue with Knowledge (89 A 20 φρόνησιν ἀρα φαμέν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἥτοι ξύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι).

1. βούλει ἐπιχειρήσωμεν: see on 75 B 14.

C

4. οὐ μέντοι . . . ἀλλ', 'not but that.' See on 71 C 13.

7. πρότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ: we have here a dative D depending on ἐπιχειρεῖν, followed by a genitive absolute clause, ὡς παραγινομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς. Fr. refers to 79 E 47, 87 C 18, etc., for ὄντι αὐτῷ, referring to ἀρετῆ, but attracted into the gender of the predicate.

8. τίτι ποτὲ τρόπον: note the facility with which the Greek language introduces direct interrogatives in adverbial clauses, and cp. 79 E 46, 87 B 4, and 88 A 10. Cp. *Symp.* 206 B τῶν τίνα τρόπον διωκόντων αὐτὸ ἢ σπουδῆ ἔρωσ ἀν καλοῖτο; See on 71 D 27.

12. εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν: it is very difficult to draw any distinction between the use of οὐ and μή in the second half of an indirect disjunctive question. We have οὐ here and 87 B 3; but μή at 71 A 27, 87 B 35, 92 C 20, 93 A 14. μή predominates where the predicate is not repeated (as in the last two instances). Kühner § 513 Anm. 1 says that μή always stands in cases where the distinction is between what is and what is not, if the predicate has to be understood in the second clause. This rule seems to be infringed by *Phaedo* 70 c σκεψώμεθα εἴτ' ἀρα ἐν "Αἰδοῦ εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὐ. Where οὐ stands alone the predicate to be supplied with it will generally be one that readily forms with it a privative notion; e.g. οὐ above = οὐκ εἰσὶν, *Rep.* 387 D σκόπει δὲ εἰ ὀρθῶς ἐξαιρήσομεν ἢ οὐ (= οὐκ ὀρθῶς). See Jebb's notes on *Soph. Ajax* 7 (who there quotes for alternative questions *Crat.* 425 B μή, *Rep.* 451 D οὐ), and on *Antiphon περὶ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φόνου* § 14 (*Selections from the Attic Orators* p. 161); F. E. T. p. 357; Hadley § 1022.

13. πρὶν . . . ἐζητήσαμεν: see on 84 C 26.

αὐτό, 'the main point.' It refers not to the thing ἀρετῆ, but to the question δ τι ἐστίν. Cp. 71 A 28, 100 B 21.

14. οὐ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἀρχεῖν: the irony is best illustrated by *Gorg.* 491 D. Callicles says τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλεόν ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἀρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. *Socr.* τί δὲ αὐτῶν, ὦ ἐταῖρε; [so Schanz, rightly]. *Cal.* πῶς λέγεις; *Socr.* ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχοντα. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχεῖν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

ἵνα δὴ: the δὴ marks that the expectation is illusory. Cp.

*Rep.* 420 E *ἵνα δὴ δλη ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονῆ*; *ibid.* 563 B, 610 C, *Gorg.* 495 A, *Theaet.* 183 A *ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζηται ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν*, *Polit.* 264 A, etc. : 82 A 26.

15. *ἔλευθερος*: Fr. quotes *Rep.* 576 A *ἐλευθερίας . . . τυραννική φύσις ἀεί ἀγευστος*.

E 17. *ποῖόν τι*: cp. 71 B 4 and note there.

18. *εἰ μὴ τι ὄν ἀλλά*, 'if you will not do more, at least,' etc. Riddell § 20. The *ἀλλά* here is not parallel to the uses given on 71 C 13. It belongs to the 'appealing' use, with the imperative, dealt with on 83 E 79. Cp. *Rep.* 509 c *καὶ μῆδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, πάσῃ, εἰ μὴ τι ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὐτὴ διεξιῶν*. Nearly akin is the phrase in *Symp.* 222 E *ἄλλ' εἰ μὴ τι ἄλλο, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν ἔα Ἀγάθωνα κατακεῖσθαι*.

19. *ἔξ ὑποθέσεως*: the word *ὑπόθεσις* was familiar in Plato's time in the ordinary scientific sense 'an assumption.' L. & S. quote it from Hippocrates. Plato often so uses it. Thus, the principle of Parmenides, 'Existence is One,' is a *ὑπόθεσις*. When this was attacked, Zeno defended it by showing that the opposite hypothesis, 'Existence is manifold,' led to more absurd results than any that could be deduced from the principle of Parmenides (*Parm.* 128 D). To Zeno Plato attributes the method of investigation that consists in tracing not merely the consequences of a hypothesis, but also those of its contradictory: *Parm.* 135 E *χρῆ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τοῦτ' ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτιθεσθαι*. Cp. 160 B, 161 B; also *Soph.* 244 C; *Theaet.* 183 B the maxim of the Heracliteans *πάντα βεῖ* is a *ὑπόθεσις*; *Phaedo* 92 D the position *μάθησις ἀνάμνησις* rests on a *ὑπόθεσις ἀξία ἀποδέξασθαι*; *ibid.* 94 B the surmise that the soul is a harmony is a *ὑπόθεσις* to be discarded. [We see how the meaning 'title,' 'argument,' 'summary,' was arrived at, from *Parm.* 127 D *κελεύσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι*. So the Platonic "Οροι (415 B) give, besides the first definition of *ὑπόθεσις* ("ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος"), a second, "συγκεφαλαιώσεις λόγου."]

The physical meaning 'base,' 'pedestal' seems never to occur, but it is played upon *Euthyphr.* 11 c. Euthyphron's definition of holiness has proved unsound. Socrates says that if it had been *his own definition* that had slipped away, he would have been reminded of his ancestor Daedalus (see on 97 D 12) *νῦν δέ, σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶν, ἄλλου δὴ τινος δεῖ σκώμματος*. So too *Rep.* 511 B *τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, ὅλον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὀρμάς*, 'standing-ground in the literal sense, as it were foot-holds and starting-points.'

There is a special Platonic usage of the term, to indicate a *provisional definition of a common term or concept*. This usage goes back to Socrates. His effort was by a comparison of particulars to find the common point in a general term. Xen. *Mem.* iv 6, 13 (quoted by R. & P. 194 B) εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ἢ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρείωτερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγειν ἢ πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδέ πως, 'he led the discourse inductively up to the formation of the concept,' namely of the πολιτικός, the ἀνδρείος, or whatever it might be. So in *Gorg.* 454 c ἵνα σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν δπως ἂν βούλη περαινήης, the ὑπόθεσις is Gorgias' definition of rhetoric.

The passages which deal with ὑποθέσεις in this sense are (1) *Rep.* 510 B-511 D (further explained by 532 A B, 533 B-D), (2) *Phaedo* 99 E-101 E. See by all means H. Jackson in *J.P.* x pp. 145, 6, XIII pp. 263, 4, and A.-H.'s notes on the *Phaedo*, ad loc. The ὑποθέσεις (or λόγοι) of universals, whether gathered from observed particulars, or by class-division, are provisional and precarious. A full knowledge of any universal would imply an a priori derivation of its Idea from the original and central Idea of the Good. 'In other words, Plato conceives that whenever we can draw up a scheme of ὑποθέσεις culminating in the ἀγαθόν, so as to show that the supposed system of *δυνως δυντα* is the best that intelligence working to an end could devise, we may be sure that our λόγοι, though originally derived from the inspection of particulars, are accurate representations of Ideas. The moment we pass from ὑποθέσεις to the ἀγαθόν, our λόγοι will thereby receive the attestation which they have hitherto lacked, and will be converted from ὑποθέσεις into ἀρχαί, whence we may descend to conclusions (*τελευτά*) as much more certain than the *τελευτά* of the geometer, as certified ἀρχαί are more certain than uncertified ὑποθέσεις' (H. J. *J.P.* x). 'When dialectic is made perfect, λόγοι will be exchanged for *ιδέαι*, ὑποθέσεις for ἀρχαί' (A.-H. on *Phaedo* 100 B). Plato looked forward to a great deductive scheme by which the Universe should be justified. This he attempted in the *Timaeus*. In the places of the *Republic* a broad distinction is drawn between the methods of dialectic and geometry. The method of dialectic is what has been indicated. In geometry, on the other hand, the ὑποθέσεις (namely the axioms, definitions, etc.) are arbitrary. They are never verified, or shown to be necessary, by reference to the fountainhead of the ἀγαθόν; moreover, the reasoning is carried on by means of Sense-representations.

Here the word ὑπόθεσις, as applied to the geometrical illustra-


tion, has its ordinary scientific sense; as applied to the thing illustrated, Virtue, it means a 'provisional definition.'

23. ἐπειδὴν τις ἔφηται αὐτοῖς κτλ.: the geometrical problem here may claim a second place to that of the 'Nuptial Number' in *Rep.* VIII 546 for exercising the ingenuity of commentators. A difference, however, may be noted. In the *Republic* certain words (545 E) do at least give a shadow of excuse for the view that the problem is not to be taken seriously. There is nothing of the sort here, and the fact that we have here undoubtedly to deal with a seriously intended problem gives support to those who take a similar view of that in the *Republic*.

'Virorum doctorum XXII diversas de hoc loco sententias et conjecturas congescit Patze, comm. de loco math. in Pl. Menone, Susati 1832; recentiores enumerat Schultz, Jahrb. f. Philol. 1882, p. 19 sqq.'—Fr. See Addendum I p. 232.

I follow the interpretation put forward by Prof. Butcher *J.P.* xvii pp. 219 foll. (1888), and render thus:

'When any one asks for instance with regard to a rectangle, whether it is possible for this rectangle to be distributed as a triangle within this circle, one might say, "I do not know yet whether it has the required property; but I think, if I may so put it, that I have a certain serviceable *hypothesis* of the following nature: if the rectangle be such that when you extend it along the given line (i.e. the diameter) of the circle, it is defective by another rectangle similar to the



original one, then one result follows; if not, there is a different result." 'In other words' (here, and in the notes that follow, quotation-marks indicate that I borrow Prof. Butcher's words) 'if, when you apply the given rectangle ABCD to the diameter BH of the circle, it falls short of the completed rectangle ABHG upon the diameter by a rectangle DCHG similar to the original

rectangle, then a triangle BDF may be inscribed in the circle whose diameter is BH, which triangle is equal in area to the original rectangle.

'Since the rectangles ABCD and DCHG are similar, it follows that  $BC:CD :: CD:CH$ ;

'∴ the point D lies on the circle whose diameter is BH (BDH being a rt.  $\angle$ ).

'If DC is produced till  $CF=DC$ , the point F will also be on the circle.'

(The triangle BDF consists of the two triangles BDC and BCF, which are obviously equal to the two triangles BDC, ADB, of which the rectangle ABCD is composed.)

'It is worth observing that the above solution depends on CD being a mean proportional between the segments of the diameter, and that mean proportionals were among the subjects of chief interest in mathematics in Plato's time.'

24. τῶς τὸ χωρίον: that *χωρίον* may here be taken for a **87 A** rectangle is shown by Benecke (Elbing 1867). Cp. Butcher: 'The technical *ἄλλεπειν* here suggests reference to a parallelogram, and in geometrical problems dealing with parallelograms the right angle was constantly assumed.' See on **82 C 4**.

25. τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι: *τρίγωνον* must be taken *adverbially*. See on **30**. The problem cannot be whether a triangle equal to a given area can be inscribed in a given circle; for this can always be done provided that 'the given area is not greater than that of the equilateral triangle, i.e. the *maximum* triangle, which can be inscribed in the given circle.' Some such limitation of the problem as that adopted in the rendering given above must be assumed. With this limitation the converse hypothesis will also hold; if the rectangle DCHG is *not* similar, the required distribution *cannot* take place. And it is necessary that the converse hypothesis should also hold, if the illustration is to be an apt one for Plato's purpose.

Plato's geometrical terminology is loose; but the brief and imperfect expression here is, perhaps, partly due to the fact that he is presenting a well-known problem.

The regular word for 'inscribing,' e.g. a triangle in a circle, is *ἐγγράφειν*, used by Hippocrates. *ἐντείνειν* after the present passage entirely drops out of geometrical language, so far as recorded, until we come to Proclus in the fifth century A.D. (See E. F. August *Zur Kenntnis der geometrischen Methode der Alten in besonderer Beziehung auf die platonische Stelle in Meno*, Berlin 1844.) In Proclus it occurs twice in one passage, of which a part is quoted on **80 D 1** (footnote), but the passage does not help us to the exact meaning here.

26. ὥσπερ: for this parenthetical use of ὥσπερ see 71 A 20 and note.

μέν: Madvig *adv. crit.* i 413 proposed μέντοι, needlessly. For μέν with ἀλλά, not answered by δέ, see *Crito* 43 D, *Prot.* 344 A. The antithesis to μέν is anticipated in the negative clause which precedes ἀλλά. (It is just possible we should read ὥσπερ μέ τινα.)

27. προὔργου . . ἔχειν: 'i.e. ἀνυσίμως ἔχειν' Fr. But I can find no instance of προὔργου *adv.* with ἔχειν = εἶναι; and should rather take ὑπόθεσιν as object of ἔχειν = 'have,' and προὔργου, *indecl. adj.*, as oblique predicate.

29. ὄλον: Fr. says ὄλον = ὥστε, quoting 100 A 7 (τοιούτος ὄλος ποιῆσαι), and *Euthyphr.* 11 A ἔστιν ὄλον φιλείσθαι.

παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν: 'Here αὐτοῦ might at first be supposed to refer to χωρίον and not to κύκλος. But the sense requires the reference to κύκλος; otherwise there is no mention of the circle in this clause, which defines the relations that must exist between the circle and the χωρίον.' (αὐτοῦ can hardly in any case refer to χωρίον; you can get no sense out of 'applying a figure to a given side of itself.') 'The reference of αὐτοῦ to κύκλος is less harsh if we bear in mind that the cases of αὐτός are capable of a vague use which no English pronoun can bear.' Cp., e.g., αὐτοῦ at B 34. 'The γραμμὴ of the circle will denote its diameter in precisely a similar way, as the side of the square is repeatedly called the γραμμὴ of the square (e.g. 82 E, etc.)' Buttmann, however (*Excursus* II), thought that there was a lacuna, which he supplied by reading παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν < τοῦ κύκλου διάμετρον κατὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν > αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν κτέ.

παρτείναντα ἑλλείπειν: the only other place in any classical author where παρτείνειν occurs as a geometrical term is in *Rep.* 527 A. It is noteworthy that Plato there includes it among the terms in vogue in the utilitarian geometry which he disparages, perhaps not without reference to the present problem. The usual phrase is παραβάλλειν, which Euclid uses I 44, etc., and VI 27, 28, 29, where the problems are similar to the present. παρτείνειν was thought to have disappeared entirely from the geometrical vocabulary after Plato, till August found it in some scholia on Euclid in a Munich MS., from which he restored it almost with certainty in Proclus' commentary on Euclid I 44: ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχαία, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Εὐδήμου, καὶ τῆς τῶν Πυθαγορείων μούσης εὐρήματα ταῦτα, ἣ τε παραβολὴ τῶν χωρίων, καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἑλλειψις. ὅταν γὰρ εὐθείας ἐκκειμένης τὸ δοθὲν χωρίον πάσῃ τῇ εὐθείᾳ συμπαρα- <τείνῃται, τότε παρα- >βάλλειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον φασὶν κτέ.

August holds that this place in Proclus shows that *παρατείνειν* and *παραβάλλειν* are synonymous; and this may be accepted. (See Allman *Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid* p. 25 note *e*.)

Next, as to the case of *παρατείναντα*. If the accusative is retained, *ἔλλειπεν* must be taken with a personal subject, 'you have a deficiency.' In Euclid (VI 28, etc.) it is always the *area* that is said *ἔλλειπεν*. But, in other senses than the geometrical, *ἔλλειπω* is constantly used with a personal subject: Polybius, for instance, says 'Ἀντίβας ἐνέλειπε τοῖς ἰππικοῖς (XV 3. 5). By a similar 'personalization' we say 'I am short of money.' This view is taken by Buttman, who translates 'Si est ejusmodi ut qui illud applicaverit deficiat.' Benecke follows him, observing that if Plato had written *ὄν . . . παρατεταμένον ἔλλειπεν* the construction would have been smooth enough, but he wanted *πατατεταμένον* in the next line, and desired to avoid repeating the word. Plato therefore changed the construction to the active. I believe Plato chose the *acc.* rather than the *dat.* or *gen.* because it was distinctly masculine, and could by no possibility be taken as agreeing with any other word in the sentence. We have here a principle that may be called 'dissimilation of cases,' which Prof. Jebb well illustrates by his note on Soph. *Ant.* 546—

μηδ' ἄ μή 'θιγες

ποιού σεαυτῆς.

He explains the unusual *acc.* with *θιγγάνω* by saying that *ὄν* would have been intolerable on account of the second *gen.* after *ποιού*. Cp. Aesch. *P.V.* 233. I think then we may hesitate to change *πατατείναντα*, especially in a passage whose expression still leaves much uncertain. Serranus (followed by Mollweide) read *πατατείναντι*, Wex *πατατείναντος*. Another possibility is that a word has fallen out, as *πατατείναντα <εὐρεῖν> ἔλλειπεν*. Herm., Sch., Fr. all keep *πατατείναντα*, the last remarking that as Plato uses *ὑπερβάλλειν* in both constructions (impersonal and personal), so he may possibly have used *ἔλλειπεν*.

30. As to the problem in general, little space can be given to the discussion of other proposed solutions. Mollweide, whose explanation Buttman gives in his *Excursus II*, saw that the key to it is the fact that a right-angled triangle can be cut up into two similar triangles. But he made the mistake of translating *εἰ ὄν τε τόδε τὸ χωρίον τριγώνων ἐνταθῆναι* 'if this triangular figure can be inscribed.' Buttman, who criticises Mollweide's solution, takes the words in the same way. But see on 25 and Addendum II p. 232.

Other solutions take the *χωρία* to be *squares*; some of the critics supposing that the squares already drawn for the previous

problem are used for the purpose. Such are Benecke's solution (quoted by Prof. Butcher) and that of Schultze, adopted by Fr. with the somewhat premature eulogy 'palmaris interpretatio.' Schultze takes *αὐτοῦ* (line 29) of the side of the square, making the square to be applied to a side of itself. One objection to making the problem refer to squares is that it then could only refer to the *size* of the given squares and you would expect *ροσούτων ὄσων* and *ροσούτῳ ὄσων* rather than *ροιοῦτων ὄσων* and *ροιοῦτῳ ὄσων* in lines 28 and 30. Moreover, the *ὑπόθεσις* would then cease to have any *general* character. Buttmann objects to taking *ροιοῦτων ὄσων* of *similar figures*, observing that the Greek for this is *ὁμοίων*. No doubt it is in Euclid, but is it in Plato? See on 82 C 10.

There may possibly be an allusion to our problem in Aristot. *Anal. Post.* i i 4 quoted on 80 D 1.

The chief criticism to which the solution adopted is open, is that it seems a rather roundabout way of ascertaining a very simple point. Apply the side BC of the rectangle to the diameter BH of the circle; then if the point D falls on the circle the required condition is satisfied; if not, not. What need of the intermediate *ὑπόθεσις* at all? We can only suppose that Plato regarded the direct application to the circle as impracticable, and the length of the diameter (*τὴν δοθείσαν γραμμὴν*) as the only real *datum*.

But if we further ask whether the geometrical illustration really helps us, or casts a light on the 'hypothetical method,' we shall be obliged to say, 'Very little.' The passage, like the more formidable one on the Nuptial Number, is simply an excrescence. Dr. Gow (*History of Greek Mathematics* p. 175) quotes from Hankel, who says that the text is unnecessarily difficult for describing so simple a fact, and adds, 'I am inclined to think that Plato was fond of showing off his mathematics.' In fact, Plato was rather an enthusiast for mathematics than a mathematician. His vivid mind was no doubt impressed, to an extent excessive even among Greeks, by the amazing cunning manifested in the properties of space and number. He wrote, as we are told, over the door of the Academy, *μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσέλτω*, thus exacting an entrance examination in geometry from all the alumni of his University. But his direct services to geometry (or mathematics generally) were small. Dr. Allman (*Greek Geometry* p. 215) quotes from the summary of Eudemos' *History of Geometry*, preserved in Proclus: *Πλάτων δ' ἐπὶ τούτους (viz. Hippocrates of Chios and Theodorus of Cyrene) γενόμενος, μεγίστην ἐποίησεν ἐπίδοσιν τὰ τε ἄλλα μαθήματα καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν λαβεῖν διὰ τὴν περι αὐτὰ σπουδῆν, δεῖ που δήλως ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συγγράμματα τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς λόγοις*

καταπυκνώσας ('cramming') και πανταχοῦ τὸ περι αὐτὰ θαῦμα τῶν φιλοσοφίας ἀντεχομένων ἐπεγείρων. Dr. Allman adds, 'The way in which Plato is here spoken of is in striking contrast to that in which Eudemus has in his summary written of the promoters of geometry.' Cp. Grote I 219 note.

33. τὸ συμβαῖνον . . . εἶτε ἀδύνατον : note the 'prolepsis'; see on 71 A 25.

35. εἶτε μή : see on 86 D 12. Buttmann thinks that μή here B is due to the fact that εἶτε . . . εἶτε here is an alternative condition (*sive . . . sive*), not a double question (*utrum . . . an*). This can hardly be maintained.

### CHAPTER XXIII

1. What follows exemplifies the process described in *Phaedo* 101 D E. Here the *ὑπόθεσις* as to Virtue is that it comes under the genus Knowledge. The consequence of this *ὑπόθεσις* is stated; in this case it must be *διδασκτόν*. Then at C 19 the *ὑπόθεσις* itself is investigated, by being referred to a higher *ὑπόθεσις*, 'Virtue is good.' (Cp. *Phaedo* 101 D ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἰκανὸν ἔλθοις.) This *ὑπόθεσις* μένει ἡμῖν (D 25).

3. εἶτε οὐ διδασκτόν ἐστιν : see on 86 D 12.

4. εἰ ποῖόν τι ἐστι : see on 86 D 8. Stallb. quotes *Hipp. maj.* 288 A εἰ τι ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλὰ; 'Under what class of mental attributes must Virtue fall for it to be teachable, and under what for it to be otherwise?' Note the elasticity of phrase. Here we have τῶν περι τὴν ψυχὴν (cp. *Rep.* 618 D), at 88 A, C τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, at 88 C τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. The prepositions represent a series of metaphors by which Plato expresses his meaning; cp. on 73 D 5. The later phraseology of the *Philebus* (11 D), ἔξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν, is more abstract and technical, and so nearer to modern idiom.

6. πρῶτον μὲν κτέ., 'to begin with, if it be of a class different from Knowledge will it be teachable or not?' Cp. C 21.

8. ἀναμνηστόν, 'capable of being acquired by reminiscence.' The word does not occur elsewhere, but is formed on the analogy of *διδασκτόν*, etc. See on 70 A 2.

διαφερέτω δὲ μηδέν : Plato attends to one thing at a time.

10. The hypothesis is a double one: if it is *ἐπιστήμη* it is C *διδασκτόν*; if not, not. See on A 25, 98 D 35. For *ἐπιστήμη* τις see 73 E 17 and D 30, 31 below, and cp. 89 A 20.

17. *τούτου μὲν ἄρα κτέ.*, 'we have quickly disposed of this stage.'

18. *τοιούδε . . . τοιούδε*: a few inferior MSS. put in *μὴ* before the second *τοιούδε*. 'Sedulo in proximis quoque cavere videtur Plato, ne distinguat inter *ἐπιστήμην* et *οὐκ ἐπιστήμην*, cujus loco ponit *ἄλλοιον ἐπιστήμης*. Itaque hic etiam non dicit *μὴ τοιούδε*, sed bis *τοιούδε*, ut species positione notionis servetur in utroque.' Buttm.

Chapters XXIII (87 C 19) to XXV (89 B). SOCR. *But is Virtue Knowledge? We may find sure ground in the position that Virtue is good and beneficial, that is, good to us. Now as to goods of the body and external goods, we see they only become good to us when the mind uses them rightly; as to goods of the mind, they are only beneficial when under the conduct of Wisdom. We may conclude, then, that Virtue is Wisdom (φρόνησις), or a branch of it. This leads to the corollary that Virtue is not inborn in men.*

D 23. *τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτόν εἶναι*: Riddell § 18. *Prot.* 323 C *τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. Laws* 658 D *τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς νενικηκῶς εἴη; τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο*: 'this is the next question.'

25. *αὐτὸ εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν*: Riddell § 215. *Prot.* 360 E *τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή*, etc. Cp. 73 C 2.

29. The phraseology here is very careful, and should be compared with 89 D and 99 A, where the position that *ἀρετὴ* is *ἐπιστήμη* is modified.

35. *καὶ μὴν* clearly marks a fresh stage in the argument.

E 37. *εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφελίμοι*: see on 77 D 35.

*πάντα γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα*: 'probandi negotio Plato h.l. supersedet, quia *Prot.* 333 D sqq. hic locus copiose tractatus est' Fr. See especially *Prot.* 334 A-C.

40. *καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφ.*: δὴ, 'of course.'

## CHAPTER XXIV

2. *ποιὰ ἐστὶν ἡ ἡμῶν ὠφέλει*: Dr. Reid in his note on *Cic. Acad.* I § 19 says that the *τριας* or *τριλογία τῶν ἀγαθῶν* i.e. the division of goods into mental, bodily, and external, in the distinct shape which it assumed in later Greek philosophy, is foreign both to Plato and Aristotle. Here the bodily and

external *bona* are first mentioned; the *bona mentis* appear presently at 88 A 15, kept separate from the others for a reason which appears at 88 E 14. The distinction between *bona corporis* and *bona externa* is not emphasised, but both classes are represented, as at 78 B, C, where the *bona mentis* are conspicuous by their absence. We have similar popular views of *bona*, confined to *bona corporis* and *externa*, *Gorg.* 451 E, based on the scolion attributed to Simonides:

ὕγιαίνειν μὲν ἀριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,  
 δεύτερον δὲ φῦαν καλὸν γενέσθαι,  
 τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως  
 καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

Here we have health and beauty (*bona corporis*); wealth and friends (*externa*). Cp. *Laws* 661 A τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀριστον μὲν ὑγιαίνειν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος, μῦρια δὲ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ λέγεται. (See for the sequel note on 88 A 7.) Cp. *Hipp. maj.* 291 D.


At *Gorg.* 467 E οὐκοῦν λέγεις ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, we have samples of each of the three classes. At *Euthyd.* 279 A-C in answer to the question 'What things are good to us?' first is suggested τὸ πλουτεῖν. Next τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἰκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι. Then we return to *externa*, εὐγένεια τε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ. 'What yet remains?' says Socrates. 'Why, τὸ σῶφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρείον.' Then, last but not least, comes σοφία. Socrates mischievously pretends that εὐτυχία has been forgotten, but shows that its addition is unnecessary.

One of the most elaborate enumerations of ἀγαθὰ in Plato is in *Laws* 631 B foll., where the division is twofold, not threefold, though *bona corporis* and *externa* are both represented: διπλᾶ δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστί, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα, ἡρτῆται δ' ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα· καὶ ἂν μὲν δέχηται τις τὰ μείζονα πόλις, κτᾶται καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα, εἰ δὲ μή, στέρεται ἀμφοῖν. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐλάττονα ὧν ἡγείται μὲν ὑγίεια, κάλλος δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἰσχύς εἰς τε δρόμον καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι, τέταρτον δὲ δὴ πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλὸς ἀλλ' ὄξυ βλέπων, ἄνπερ ἄμ' ἔπηται φρονήσει· δὲ δὴ πρῶτον αὖ τῶν θείων ἡγεμονοῦν ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ φρόνησις, δεύτερον δὲ μετὰ νοῦν σῶφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις, ἐκ δὲ τούτων μετ' ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη, τέταρτον δὲ ἀνδρεία.

*Ibid.* 697 A B we have a recognition of three grades of honour among ἀγαθὰ: ἔστι δὲ ὀρθῶς ἅρα τιμώτατα μὲν καὶ

πρῶτα τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ κείσθαι, σωφροσύνης ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῇ, δεύτερα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ τρίτα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα λεγόμενα. Cp. 743 E and †*Erp.* viii 355 B. See the list of ἀγαθὰ in *Aristot. Rhet.* I vi §§ 8–16, and II xxi 5 (with Cope's note).

The distinction between *bona mentis* and other *bona* is far more important than the subdivision of the latter. Plato's view, which really rests on a dichotomy,



is more philosophical than the later *τριλογία*, which made the three classes co-ordinate. *Diog. Laertius* III 80 quotes Aristotle as ascribing to Plato the statement τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ ἐν σώματι, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός. Plato's writings, as has been seen, give some colour to this statement, which nevertheless does not accurately represent his position.

3. καὶ πλοῦτος δῆ, 'and wealth of course': 'καὶ—δῆ seriem aliquam claudit cum vi.' *Buttmann* on *Dem. Mid.* (21) § 20.

- 88 A 7. ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν, 'are sometimes positively injurious.' Cp. *Hipp. maj.* 284 D τίθεται μὲν, οἶμαι, ὠφελίας ἔνεκα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ βλάπτει, ἐὰν κακῶς τεθῆ ὁ νόμος. Cp. on 71 B 8.

Of the argument that follows, showing the sovereignty of φρόνησις, we have already had a hint at 78 C foll. See *Phaedo* 69 A for a strong statement of the doctrine; also *Hipp. maj.* 295 E foll., already referred to on 77 B 12. Cp. *Xen. Oec.* I §§ 12–14. The argument is developed in the most elaborate form in the *Euthydemus* cc. viii–x (278 E–282 E) and cc. xvii–xix (288 A–293 A). Fr. quotes 281 D κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα, ἀ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι. . . ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγήται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων ὅση δυνατότερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι. ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησις τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθὰ. αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι. Note 280 D E, and 288 E foll., where it is shown that Wealth is not a Good *per se*; if we possessed the secret of turning mountains into gold it would not advantage us if we did not know how to use the gold; and the same is true of immortality: see on 86 A 8. Cp. *Laws* 661 BC (after the popular enumeration

of *bona corporis* and *externa*) ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ που τὰδε λέγομεν, ὡς ταῦτά ἐστι ξύμπαντα δίκαιοις μὲν καὶ ὀσίοις ἀνδράσιν ἀριστα κτήματα, ἀδίκους δὲ κάκιστα ξύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας κτέ. See on C 32.

The very full treatment of the subject given in the *Euthydemus*, set beside the concise, though not immature, treatment here, suggests the view that the *Euthydemus* was published before the *Meno*, on the principle adduced by Dr. Thompson on *Gorg.* 467 E: 'Plato will often be found to take for granted in a later what he has been at great pains to prove in an earlier dialogue.' See Intr. § 18.

10. **ὅταν τί ἡγήται**: see on 86 D 8.

16. **σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς**: see on 75 E 12. The list of *bona mentis* here differs from that at 74 A in that *εὐμαθία* and *μνήμη* are added, representing the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ* of Aristotle, distinguished from the *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ* (*NE.* I xiii 20); *σοφία* is omitted, to be introduced presently, on a different level from the other virtues, as *ἐπιστήμη*, *φρόνησις* or *νοῦς*.

22. **ὅλον ἀνδρεία**: this is an instance of 'Binary Structure'; B it was only necessary to have *ἀνδρεία* once, as the subject of *φρόνησις ἐστὶ*; as it is, we have for the sake of emphasis *ὅλον ἀνδρεία* (scil. *ἐστὶ*), a part of the thought put forward introductory of the rest. Fr. quotes *Euthyd.* 301 E *ὅλον βούς καὶ πρόβατα, ἀρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι*; For *ὅλον*, '*velut*,' see on 76 A 20.

23. **εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ φρόνησις ἢ ἀνδρεία**: the doctrine that *ἀνδρεία*, like other Virtues, may be reduced to *φρόνησις*, is Socratic (Zeller *Socr.* p. 144). Xen. *Mem.* IV 6. 11 *οἱ μὲν ἀρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί*. In several of Plato's earlier dialogues the same view is taken. In *Apol.* 29 A B a particular kind of Cowardice, the fear of Death, is shown to spring from a certain kind of *ἀμαθία*. In the *Protagoras* the doctrine 'Virtue is Knowledge' is defended all round. Courage, which seems to give most difficulty to the thesis, is dealt with first in ch. xxxiv (349 E-350 C) but in a way that arouses objection from Protagoras, and is clearly not intended to be satisfactory. The final proof comes in ch. xxxix, the conclusion being reached at 360 D, *ἢ σοφία ἀρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν*. Neither the brave man nor the coward goes to meet what he believes to be τὰ δεινὰ; but the brave man knows what really are δεινὰ, the coward does not. To that exposition the present passage of the *Meno* looks back. The dialogue *Laches*, which must probably be regarded as earlier than the *Protagoras*, is devoted

to an examination of the virtue Courage. (Note the similarity of illustration at *Lach.* 193 B C and *Prot.* 350 A.) Laches, who is no philosopher (see on 71 E 1), at 192 B gives as a definition of Courage *καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς*. But, says Socrates, *καρτερία μετ' ἀφροσύνης* is *βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος*. We must amend the definition by saying *φρόνιμος καρτερία*. Then the question comes *ἢ εἰς τί φρόνιμος*; Mere technical intelligence as to the conditions of the combat it cannot be; for the man who fights knowing he is at a disadvantage is the braver. Laches is at fault. Nicias is appealed to. He has already imbibed something of Socrates' teaching, and, objecting to Laches' definition, says to Socrates (194 D) *πολλάκις ἀκήκοά σου λέγοντος, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἀπερ σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακός*. He presently defines Courage as *τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην*. Nicias may be taken as representing the actual position of Socrates. He soon shows (195 C D) that he sees the knowledge that constitutes Courage to be something much more than the mere technical knowledge of arms, etc. The final and most important argument comes in cc. xxvii-xxix (198 A-199 E). (We often find Plato making his ideal Socrates criticise the views the real Socrates held. See *Intr.* p. xxxix.) In these chapters we are led up to a conception of the Supreme Art, the knowledge of Good and Evil, through which all other Arts and Virtues are made beneficial. (This is the Kingly Art of *Euthydemus* 291 B foll. where, however, a further problem is raised.) Courage then (199 C D) becomes *οὐ μόνον δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη . . . ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων*. 'But a man who knows thus much' (so Grote summarises the sequel), 'cannot be destitute of any part of Virtue. He must possess Temperance and Justice as well as Courage. Courage therefore, according to your definition, is not a part of Virtue, it is the whole.' A solution of the problem on what the differentiation of the Virtues rests is first offered by Plato in the *Republic*.

From this point till 89 c for *ἐπιστήμη* we find substituted the term *φρόνησις*, the mental faculty correlative to it.

**οἶον θάρσος** τ: for the relation of *ἀνδρεία* to *θάρσος* see *Prot.* ch. xxxiv; the conclusion *οὐ ταῦτ' εἶναι θάρσος καὶ ἀνδρείαν* is enunciated by Protagoras (351 A). *θάρσος* or *θάρρος* (which of course must be carefully distinguished from *θράσος* and *θρασύτης*) differ from *ἀνδρεία* by being a mere emotion without rational basis. *θάρσος* is the antithesis of *φόβος* (rather than *δέος*: see *Prot.* 358 E with J. & A. M. Adam's note there) and so is coupled with it (*Tim.* 69 D) in the list of passions, *θάρσος καὶ φόβος, ἄφρονε ξυμβούλω*.

27. οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία: the rest of the Virtues are not treated seriatim.

As to *σωφροσύνη* we are told of Socrates by Xenophon (*Mem.* III 9. 4) σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γυγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τῷ τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδόντα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε. The earlier treatment of *σωφροσύνη* to which the present passage looks back is chiefly to be found in the *Protagoras*. In ch. xx (332 A–333 B) we have the identity of *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη* grounded on the argument that they both have the same opposite, *ἀφροσύνη*. But this merely verbal argument is subsidiary to the more general one in cc. xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii (351 B–357 E), already referred to on 77 B 12 as illustrating the doctrine οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός. It is a mistake to talk of a man as ‘overcome by pleasure.’ Say rather that he mistakes in the measuring or valuing of different pleasures and pains.

The dialogue *Charmides* is devoted to an examination of the Virtue Temperance, in some respects analogous to the treatment of Courage in the *Laches*. The criticism of the first two definitions of Temperance as (1) ἡσυχιότης τις 159 B, (2) αἰδώς 160 E, go chiefly to show that Temperance is not a merely negative notion. See on 76 C 16. (It is unnecessary to suppose that the criticism of the first definition is directed against the view of the *Gorgias* that makes κόσμος an element in *σωφροσύνη*. See Dr. Thompson’s note on 507 A.) The remaining definitions, τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, τὸ γυνῶναι ἑαυτὸν κτέ., which emanate from Critias, are near akin to the Socratic view. The most important part of the criticism, which is very elaborate, is reached at 173 D: if *σωφροσύνη* be identified with *ἐπιστήμη* we have yet to find the link connecting it with the Beneficial and the Good: οὐκ ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοντες εἴ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοίμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὕτω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὡς φησι Κριτία. We are thus again led to the question, ‘What knowledge constitutes the Master-art?’ ‘Knowledge of Good and Evil,’ says Critias. Ὁ μαρὲ, ἔφη ἐγώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλω, ἀποκρυπτόμενος οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν τὸ εἰ πράττειν τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ ξυμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶς οὐσῆς ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ κακόν (174 B).

28. See Appendix on the text. The order *σωφροσύνη—εὐμαθία—μανθανόμενα—καταρτύνόμενα* is chiasmic. The only other place in Plato where *καταρτύνειν* (‘discipline’ or ‘regulate’) occurs is *Laws* 808 D πᾶσις ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω καταρτυσμένην. The word is rather poetical.

33. ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα, ‘active and passive C effort.’ The words do not correspond with *μανθανόμενα* and

καταρτύμενα, but are a general and exhaustive division of moral energy. The word καρτέρημα appears to be coined for the occasion.

ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως: cp. *Prot.* 352 B δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικόν, οὐδ' ἀρχικόν εἶναι. With the Stoics τὸ ἡγεμονικόν became the technical term for Reason. Cp. also the simile in *Phaedr.* 246 A foll., where Reason is the ἡνίοχος and Courage and Appetite the steeds. In the list of the virtues that constitute the philosophic character (*Rep.* 485 B foll.) first comes the love of Eternal Truth, that is, σοφία: from this we deduce the other virtues (τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χρόνον 490 c) in orderly sequence. μή πη δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἐπόμενα ἀλλήλοισι; says Socrates (486 E) after the enumeration. The list corresponds very nearly to that at 88 A 16. See on A 7.

38. ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμω εἶναι: the dative ὠφελίμω is due to 'Attraction'; cp. *Hipp. maj.* 294 B ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλως εἶναι.—*Rid.* § 183. Cp. 81 E 17.

## CHAPTER XXV

**D** 2. πλουτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα: these words are introduced to explain τᾶλλα, namely, the *bona corporis* and *bona externa* which he has dealt with at 87 E foll. They interrupt the construction, but there is no reason to follow Hirschig in bracketing the words τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι.

5. ἐποίει, 'makes, as we saw'; see on 83 D 52.

**E** 13. κατὰ πάντων: see on 73 D 5.

14. εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτήσθαι: literally 'dependere'; for the word cp. *Menez.* 247 E; for the matter *Laws* 631 B (quoted on 87 E 2) and 963 A KΛ. Τὴν δὲ γε ἀρετὴν τέτταρα ἐθεμέν πον. ΑΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΚΛ. Νοῦν δὲ γε τούτων πάντων ἡγεμόνα πρὸς ὃν δὴ τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ τούτων τὰ τρία δεῖ βλέπειν. For the supremacy of ψυχή generally over things of the Body, etc. see *Gorg.* 465 c; the true and false arts of the Body are easily distinguished; those of the Soul are not so: if the Soul did not provide a Court of Appeal in the case of arts of the Body (εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει) discrimination there would be impossible. Cp. *Phaedo* 79 E ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὡσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεῦειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἀρχεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν.

**89 A** 17. φρόνησις is predicate.

20. φρόνησιν again is predicate. The argument in bare syllogistic form is

All ὠφέλιμον is φρόνησις.

All ἀρετὴ is ὠφέλιμον.

∴

All ἀρετὴ is φρόνησις.

With ξύμπασαν supply ἀρετὴν; and with μέρος τι, ἀρετῆς. Wherever Virtue is found φρόνησις is found. But the notion Virtue may include other elements (μέρη) besides φρόνησις.

24. οὐκ ἂν εἴεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί: the form of the apodosis ἂν εἴεν is only a polite modification of the indicative. For this form of the conditional sentence cp. *Apol.* 25 B πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθεῖρει. Goodwin § 403. See Appendix on the text. For the abbreviated predicate see Kühner §§ 597 f. and cp. *Prot.* 325 B σκέψαι ὡς θαυμασιως γίνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί (so the MSS.), and 344 D τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγγυωρεῖ γενέσθαι (scil. κακῷ).

The point now arrived at should be compared with the original statement of the problem at 70 A. There the alternatives as to the origin of ἀρετὴ were threefold; it is either—

- (I) acquired, and that (a) by teaching (διδασκόν), or (b) by practice and example (ἀσκητόν); or
- (II) native; or
- (III) given ἄλλω τινὶ τρόπῳ.

Here alternative II (φύσει) is eliminated, and we hear no more of ἀσκητόν, I (b). In the final result (98 C D and 99 E) we have φύσει again discarded as an alternative. For the relation of φύσει to θεῖα μοῖρα see article 'Δύναμις and Φύσις in Plato' by R. G. Bury (*C.R.* VIII 300): 'Φύσις may denote what is independent of human effort or volition; so φύσει is opposed to νόμῳ (*Prot.* 337 C, *Gorg.* 482 E, etc.), to τέχνη (*Rep.* 381 A), to διδασκόν (*Prot.* 323 C), to σοφία (*Apol.* 22 C). So it indicates what is innate, instinctive—the inherited, permanent, and transmissible characteristics as opposed to the acquired and artificial.' It is opposed to ἐπίκτητον *Rep.* 618 D.

In the *Protagoras* (323 C) the sophist is made to say ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν (τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν) οὐ φύσει ἡγούνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδασκόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ὡς ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγούνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νοθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει. . . ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν. At *Apol.* 22 C it is noticeable that φύσει is used as equivalent to θεῖα μοῖρα: ἔγνωσιν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῦν, ἀ ποιοῦν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις

κτέ. We appear to have a similar identification in the difficult passage *Laws* 642 C: *μόνοι γὰρ (Ἀθηναῖοι) ἀνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτοφυῶς θεία μοῖρα ἀληθῶς καὶ οὐ πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί*, for which see Archer-Hind's *Phaedo* p. 184 note. Sch., however, cuts out *θεία μοῖρα*. See on 98 D 24 and 99 E 5.

- B** 28. οἱ ἐγγίνωσκον: 'when a conditional relative clause depends on a past tense of the indicative implying the non-fulfilment of a condition, it regularly takes a past tense of the indicative by *assimilation*,' Goodwin § 559; cp. § 528. Here the relative depends on the *apodosi*s of a conditional clause. So in *Charm.* 171 E *ὅσπερ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἢ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα κτέ.* Kühner § 399, 6 a. Such temporal sentences introduced by *πρὶν* as occur at 84 C 25, 86 D 13, are analogous.

31. ἐν ἀκροπόλει: as the treasury of the city. So at the end of the *Laws* (969 c) of ideal guardians of the city: *ἐὰν ἄρα οἱ τε ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεχθῶσι, παιδευθῶσι τε προσηκόντως, παιδευθέντες τε ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας κατοικήσαντες φύλακες ἀποτελεσθῶσιν.*

*κατασημνημένοι*: the allusion, as Buttman pointed out, is not to minting, but to the putting a seal on a door, such as that of the Ὀπισθόδομος, containing valuables, to mark them as *public property*. He refers to Boeckh *Public Economy of Athens* (p. 442 E.T.). See Hicks *Hist. Inscr.* 37 A § 6 = *C.I.A.* I 32: *καὶ (οἱ ταμίαι τῶν θεῶν) συνοιγόντων καὶ συγκλειόντων τὰς θύρας τοῦ ὀπισθοδόμου καὶ συσημαινέσθων τοῖς τῶν τῆς Ἀθηναίας ταμίαις.* Xen. *Hell.* III i 27 ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ εἶδε πάντα, κατέκλεισεν αὐτὰ καὶ κατεσημνήματο καὶ φύλακας κατέστησεν.

Ueberweg (*Untersuchungen* p. 294) points out that 100 A contemplates an Ideal State, such as that of the *Republic*. Dr. Henry Jackson has pointed out to me that this might still more be said of the present passage; cp. *Rep.* 415 A. In the *Meno* the Gold is used as a simile; in the *Republic* it has developed into a pious fraud: *ἐστὲ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀδελφοί, ὡς φησομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει συνέμειξεν αὐτοῖς, κτέ.* Cp. *Orat.* 398 A.

32. ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν: 'in Attic Greek the secondary tenses of the indicative are used in final clauses to denote that the purpose is dependent upon some unaccomplished action or unfulfilled condition, and therefore *is not* or *was not* attained,' Goodwin *MT.* § 333, Kühner § 553. 7, Hadley § 884, F.E.T. § 280; *Crito* 44 D *εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον οἶοι τ' εἶναι τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἶοι τ' ἦσαν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα,* *Prot.* 335 c, *Symp.* 181 d, etc. See App. on the text.

33. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο . . . γίγνοντο : 'if the purpose is future, at the time of speaking, or if it is left uncertain whether the object is or was attained, it must be expressed in the ordinary way by the subjunctive or optative,' Goodwin *MT.* § 336. He quotes our passage, translating and commenting : 'we should guard (in that case) in the Acropolis, that no one might corrupt them (as some now corrupt them), and that when in the future they should become of age they might become useful to their states. (Here it is not implied that they never become useful, this depending partly on the future.)' The change from ἵνα διέφθειραν to ἵνα γίγνοντο marks a change from an unrealized supposition to a vague future supposition. [Cp. Kühner § 399. Anm. 4.]

εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, 'of age.' 'Etiam eis ἡλικίαν (*Theact.* 142 D) per eminentiam de juvenili aetate : Liv. xlii 34 cum primum in aetatem veni pater mihi uxorem dedit.' Fr.

Chapter XXVI (89 B-90 B). SOCR. *It seems then that Virtue is a matter of teaching. But a very serious difficulty remains. Where are the teachers? I have often tried to find them without success. Let us invite Anytus here to share the quest. He appears to be an example of successful education himself, and ought to be able to help us.*

This chapter forms a transition to the fourth section.

6. μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογήσαμεν : this passage and the C sequel furnish an interesting collection of usages of μὴ οὐ. We have :—

- (α) the present passage (μὴ οὐ with *indic.*, dependent on no word expressed) :
- (β) μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέη δοκεῖν (μὴ οὐ with *subj.*, dependent on no word expressed) C 10 :
- (γ) ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ἦ (μὴ οὐ with *subj.*, dependent on ἀπιστεῖς) D 14 :
- (δ) οὐκ ἀνατίθεται μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι (μὴ οὐ with *inf.*, dependent on οὐκ ἀνατίθεται) D 18.

With these may be considered D 18 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν, dependent on ἀπιστεῖν.

In (α) and (β) it is clear that μὴ οὐ expresses the opposite of what would be expressed by μὴ alone, and οὐ can be connected closely with some word in the context : (α) οὐ καλῶς, (β) οὐ μόνον. In these cases, then, the οὐ needs no explanation.

Three uses of μὴ with the indicative mood must be distinguished.

(I) In a direct question, where *μή*, like *num*, expects a negative answer (Kühner § 587. 11, Jelf § 873. 4, § 741 c d, Hadley § 1015). This usage appears first in Aesch. (*P. V.* 247 *μή ποῦ τι προῦβης τῶνδε καὶ περαιτέρω*; 962 *μή τί σοι δοκῶ ταρβεῖν*; *Pers.* 344). This usage is common in Plato; one has occurred at 78 C 23. The negative expectancy is stronger with *μῶν* (= *μή οὖν*, see 73 B 46). *μή* is sometimes qualified by *πῆ*: *Prot.* 356 c, *Rep.* 442 d, 466 a, 486 e.

Though *μή* in this use 'expects' a negative answer, the expectation is sometimes *not justified* or *ironical* (78 C 23, *Crito* 44 e KP. \* *Ἀρὰ γε μή ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων*; *ΣΩ.* *Καὶ τὰτα προμηθεύμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά*, *Rep.* 552 e *μή οὖν οὐδέμα καὶ κακοῦργου πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς διγαρχομέναις πόλεσιν εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας*; *οὐδέμα μὲν οὖν*). This is one difficulty in the discrimination between this class and (III).

(II) *μή* dependent on a word expressing fear, caution, etc. The verb is most frequently in the subjunctive mood; but occasionally in the future indicative (Goodwin § 367), and not uncommonly in present or past tenses of the indicative, when the object of fear is supposed to be happening now (present), or to have happened (perf.), or to have been happening (imp.). No instance of the aor. indic. is given in Attic Greek, but see *Od.* v. 300 (Goodwin § 369, Kühner § 589. 6, Jelf § 814 a, F.E.T. § 238, cp. § 300). Good instances for comparison of the moods are furnished by Soph. *El.* 580 *δρα μή πῆμα σαυτη καὶ μετάγνωιαν τίθης* (referring to the future) and 584 *ἀλλ' εἰσόβρα μή σκῆψιν οὐκ ὄσσαν τίθης*, 'see that you are not making a false excuse' (she is actually making one). See Jebb's note on 580. This usage goes back to Homer. We may say that *μή* introduces the idea repudiated, or the fear entertained. Cp. on 77 A 3.

(III) A usage probably developed from (II): *μή* is used, not dependent on any word, in 'cautious assertions' (Goodwin § 269; 'presumptive use,' Riddell § 59). The subjunctive is common; instances of the indicative are few (Kühner § 394. Anm. 5; § 589. Anm. 5). *μή* with a past tense of the indicative (like *ὠμολογήσαμεν*) expresses a suspicion about a past fact. Another (probable) instance of the aor. indic. in this construction is *Euthyd.* 291 A (quoted below). Buttmann, asserting that the perfect was the only tense quoted in this use from prose authors, and noting that *ὠμολογήκαμεν* is the tense used at 96 E 2 and 98 E, etc., says that one might be tempted to alter the aorist here to the perfect, but adds: 'aptior tamen hic videtur aoristus in re praeterita quidem sed quae non firma maneat.'

This use of *μή* with the *indic.* does not appear before Plato. The use of *μήποτε* 'perhaps,' common in Aristotle and later

writers, does not occur in Plato. In *Phaedo* 78 D μήποτε is a question with negative tendency, and falls under (I). The difference between this usage and (I) is parallel to the difference between οὐ in statements and in questions; only with μή the contrast is less strong, and the tendencies are reversed. Thus: οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν is a negative assertion: οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν; is a question with strong affirmative tendency. But μή τοῦτό ἐστιν is a cautious affirmative assertion: μή τοῦτό ἐστιν; is a question with negative tendency.

In some of the examples that follow it is not easy to distinguish whether we have a 'cautious assertion' (III) or an *ironical* question, i.e. one not really expecting a negative answer (I).

*Prot.* 312 A ἀλλ' ἄρα μή οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν μάθησιν ἐσσεσθαι. Most editors print this as an interrogation; J. and A. M. Adam, however, quoting this place in the *Meno* and others, rightly say that in all of these passages it is better to take μή as 'perhaps' than as an equivalent to Latin *num?*

*Gorg.* 512 D ὅρα μή ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡ τὸ σφῆναι τε καὶ σφῆσθαι. μή γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὀπίσσω δὴ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον. (So the MSS.: Sch. writes ἡ γὰρ for μή γὰρ, and the passage has been otherwise altered, unnecessarily.)

*Lys.* 220 A ἀλλὰ μή οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθές ἐχη· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ὃ περὶ παντός ποιούμεθα. (Here it is not certain that the second clause is still under the influence of μή.)

*Euthyd.* 290 E ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Δίος, μή ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ τοιαῦτα εἰπών.

*Ibid.* 291 A ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Κρίτων, μή τις τῶν κριττόνων παρῶν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγγετο. Heind. Herm. Sch. all print the last two as questions.

*Ibid.* 298 C μή γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνω συνάπτεις. (So Heind.) 'I think you are weaving flax with not-flax,' i.e. not arguing *in pari materia*. (Herm. and Sch. punctuate μή γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· κτέ., μή thus being deprecatory as at 75 B 13.)

*Apol.* 25 A ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μή οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους· ἢ κακῆνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; (Kühner § 589. Anm. 5, I think rightly, regards this as a cautious assertion, followed by a question. Most editors put note of interrogation after νεωτέρους).

As to the present passage in the *Meno*, Kühner (§ 394. Anm. 5) and Ast (s.v. μή p. 335) both regard it as a 'cautious assertion'; so does Goodwin, § 269, adding, however, that 'it may be interrogative.' I take the former view, and have therefore,

following Buttman, printed it without a mark of interrogation, which Herm. Sch. and Fr. all add.

In *Lys.* 213 D ἄρα μή, ὦ Μενέξενε, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐζητοῦμεν; the ἄρα clearly marks the sentence as interrogative, and it furnishes a good example of the ironical class of direct questions with μή spoken of above (I). For though the sentence pretends to say 'can it be we were not right?' i.e. 'surely we were right,' the answer is οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, 'I think not.'

10. ἀλλὰ μή οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέη; there are large classes of cases, corresponding to the indicative uses (II) and (III) above, where μή is used with the *subjunctive* either, like (II), *dependent* on a word expressive of fear, caution, etc. (Goodwin § 365, Kühner § 589. 2, Jelf § 814, F. E. T. § 237), or, like (III), *independently*, as a 'cautious assertion' (Goodwin § 265, Kühner § 394. 6, F. E. T. § 300). Of the latter class Goodwin l.c. gives many instances from Plato, with whom it is a favourite construction. See 94 B 20, E 14. The only real example before Plato is Hdt. v 79 ἀλλὰ μάλλον μή οὐ τοῦτο ἦ τὸ μαντήιον. The instances from Homer given by Kühner (cp. F. E. T. § 309) are a somewhat different class, of the nature of wishes (Goodwin § 261). Probably the 'cautious assertion' was a later development from a construction dependent on a verb of fearing, after this had been stereotyped, whereas the dependent construction was itself developed 'from an original *parataxis* or co-ordination of two independent sentences,' namely an expression of fear (δεῖδω) followed by a repudiation of an idea (μή νῆας ἔλωσι) (Goodwin §§ 307-309, cp. §§ 262, 366). Goodwin (§ 268) further recognizes a small class corresponding to (I) above; instances of 'μή with the subjunctive in a cautious question, with a negative answer implied.' Three instances are quoted from Plato, besides a doubtful one from the † *Sisyphus*.

*Rep.* 603 C μή τι ἄλλο ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα; οὐδέν.

*Parm.* 163 C τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἡ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν; οὐδέν ἄλλο. (The MSS. give ἦ. Heindorf substituted ἦν. Herm. and Waddell keep ἦ.)

*Phaedo* 64 C ἄρα μή ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ θάνατος ἡ τοῦτο; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. (Bekker, Sch. Archer-Hind excise ἦ. Heind. Herm. Wohlrab, Geddes retain it.) Kühner § 587. 14.

With these may be ranked two places in Xenophon, *Mem.* iv ii 12 μή οὖν οὐ δύναμαι ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγήσασθαι; *Oec.* iv 4 ἄρα μή ἀσχυρθῶμεν τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα μιμήσασθαι; These, although in the first person, are not 'deliberative' questions, and in both μή = *num.* In the real deliberative question (Goodwin § 287) μή either is *nonne* (see especially *Rep.* 337 B μή ἀποκρίνωμαι ὡν προεῖπες μηδέν; and 554 B μή φῶμεν; καὶ μάλ', ἐφη) or is indifferent.

οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον : this is characteristic of the Socratic temper as distinguished from the 'Eristic,' at least as caricatured by Plato. See Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 464, who quotes *Euthyd.* 287 B εἰρ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπολαβὼν, οὕτως εἰ Κρόνος, ὥστε ἂ τὸ πρῶτον εἴκομεν νῦν ἀναμνησθεῖ, καὶ εἰ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι λεγομένους λόγοις οὐχ ἔξεις δὲ τι χρῆσι ;

12. ὑγιές (see on 77 A 8) : a very favourite with word Plato.

14. ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ἦ : in such a verb as ἀπιστῶ D we have two notions combined, namely of denial or disbelief and of fear or misgiving. From the former point of view it will be followed by an infin. or εἰ with an indic. ; from the latter by μὴ with the subjunctive. *Phaedo* 91 C Σιμμίτας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγώμην, ἀπιστεῖτε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ προσαπολλύηται. Cp. *ibid.* 91 D and 70 A, *Xen. Symp.* viii 14 δοκοῦσι δ' ἔμοιγε ἀπιστοῦσιν εὐκέναι μὴ χωρὶς γενόμενοι οὐκ ἀποτελώσι τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα. μὴ introduces the idea warded off, which is a negative one : 'You have a misgiving lest (μὴ) it be not knowledge' (οὐκ ἐπιστήμη).

17. οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι : the metaphor is from revoking a move in a game : 'ἀπὸ τῶν πεπτεῦντων καὶ τὰς κεκινημένας ἤδη ψήφους διορθοῦντων' Harpocration : *Phaedo* 87 A οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάννυ χαριέντως ἀποδεδεῖχθαι : *Charm.* 164 C ἐκείνων ἀντι ἐγωγε μᾶλλον ἀναθεῖμην (note the active ἀναθένη = *dedicanti* in the immediate sequel) : *Prot.* 355 A ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν : *Gorg.* 462 A. But in *Gorg.* 461 D and † *Hipparchus* 229 E the meaning of ἀναθέσθαι is to give a move back.

18. μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι : 'after a principal sentence containing verbs and expressions of *denying, hindering, forbidding,* and *avoiding* μὴ is used with the infin., where in English we use no negative' F. E. T. § 298, cp. § 308 ; Hadley 1029 ; Kühner § 516. 3. See also on 90 E 26.

The explanation of the difference between the Greek and English use is that the object of these verbs may be looked upon from two different points of view. It may be either expressive of the thing denied or prevented (*external* object), or expressive of the *upshot* of the denial or prevention (*internal* object). English leans to the former use, Greek to the latter. There are instances in Greek where the μὴ is omitted, and the infinitive put positively as an external object (F. E. T. pp. 366 note 2, p. 369, 1 ; Goodwin §§ 807, 811 ; Kühner § 516. Ann. 9 a ; Jelf 749. 1). This is chiefly with verbs of *prevention*, etc. ; the omission of μὴ after verbs of *denial* is very rare. Jebb on

Soph. *Ant.* 442 says that after ἀρνεῖσθαι, when it means to deny, μή regularly precedes the dependent inf., but not when it means to refuse.

The ambiguity may be paralleled by a similar one in the word 'doubt.' We say 'I doubt if he is dead' or 'I doubt his being dead,' where the clause 'if he is dead' or the noun-phrase 'his being dead' are external objects to the verb 'doubt.' But an old writer, or a North-country man now, would say 'I doubt he is dead,' where the clause 'he is dead' is really an internal object of the word 'doubt,' and expresses the opinion held.

When the verb of denial, etc. is itself negated, then if the dependent infinitive is to remain an internal object, i.e. to express the upshot of the state of mind, or state of fact, the ordinary μή will have to be reversed, which is effected by οὐ. Thus the meaning here is 'I do not revoke my position, the net result being that there was no mistake.' Cp. *Phaedo* 87 A (quoted above); *Gorg.* 461 C τίνα οὐκ ἀπαρνήσσομαι (i.e. εὖ οἶσθα οὐδένα ἀπαρνησόμενον) μή οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια;

There is however considerable variety of construction possible. But after a verb of denial negated, μή οὐ with the infin. is much the most common construction (Kühner § 516. 4, Hadley § 1034, Goodwin §§ 807, 815). Instances of the simple infin. however occur (Kühner § 516. Anm. 9 b, F.E.T. pp. 368, 9): Aesch. *Eum.* 611 δρᾶσαι γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα; Aeschines 3 § 250 τὰυτα οὐκ ἐξαρνοῦνται πράττειν. Twice in Soph. (*Aj.* 96, *Ant.* 443) we have οὐκ ἀπαρνούμαι τὸ μή (Goodwin § 812). (We have in Plato *Phaedr.* 256 A μή ἂν ἀπαρνηθῆναι χάρισσασθαι, and *Rep.* 468 C μηδενὶ ἐξείναι ἀπαρνηθῆναι ὃν ἂν βούληται φιλεῖν. But in both these places ἀπαρνεῖσθαι means 'refuse,' not 'deny'.)

Metrical considerations sometimes led to μή rather than μή οὐ: in Soph. *O.T.* 1388, *Ar. Peace* 315 after a negative verb of hindrance we have the initial vowel of the infinitive cut off after μή, so that μή οὐ would have been impracticable; but this does not apply at Soph. *Phil.* 349, when μή οὐ might have been expected.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη: Kühner § 516. 3 b, Jelf 749. 2. ἀπιστῶ regarded as a 'verbum sentiendi vel declarandi' may be followed by an infinitive with μή, or by ὅτι with οὐ and a finite verb. See on D 14 above. The explanation of the negatives is similar to that in the case of ἀνατίθεμαι. The clause ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν κτέ. is of the nature of an 'internal object.' μή with the infin. after ἀπιστεῖν is fairly common; Thuc. IV 40 ἠπίστων μή εἶναι τοὺς τὰ δῖπλα παραδόντας τοῖς τεθνεώσιν ὁμοίους, 'they did not believe that those who had given up their arms were

like those who had fallen'; also I 10, II 101; Hdt. I 68 (but III 66 an infin. of the thing disbelieved, without μή); *Rep.* 555 A, *Polit.* 301 C; after passive, *Charm.* 168 E, *Laws* 839 C. *στι οὐ* after verbs of this class is very rare, and I can find no other instance of it after ἀπιστώ. We have *ὡς without οὐ Rep.* 450 C D *καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται ἀπιστοῖτ' ἄν, καὶ ὡς ἄριστα ἄν εἴη ἀπιστήσεται, and ὡς οὐ* after some similar words, as ἐξελεγκτός, *Gorg.* 508 B. Cp. *Euthyphr.* 8 B, etc. (ἀπιστώ is also treated as a verb of inquiry: *Phaedo* 73 B ἀπιστεῖς πῶς μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν.)

24. οὐ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν: the relative E clause represents a conditional clause of the same kind (εἰ — εἶεν): 'a future condition of the less vivid form,' Goodwin § 531; cp. F.E.T. pp. 201, 202, Hadley § 917. (These examples must be distinguished from the optative 'of indefinite frequency' in relative clauses referring to past time, 'when the verb in the antecedent clause denotes a customary or repeated action or a general truth' Goodwin § 532; e.g. *Thuc.* II 52 οἱ δέ, καιομένου ἄλλου, ἐπιβαλόντες *δν φέροιε, ἀπῆσαν.*) Cp. 96 C 8 and see on 92 C 18. Other places in Plato similar to the present are *Phaedr.* 276 B ὁ νοῦν ἔχων γέωργος ὢν σπερμάτων κήδοιο καὶ ἔγκαρπα βούλοιο γενέσθαι πύτερα σπουδῆ ἄν θέρουσι εἰς Ἀδώνιδος κήπους ἀρῶν χαίροι; *Euthyd.* 302 A ἄρ' ἄν ἠγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι, ἃ σοι ἐξείη καὶ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θῦσαι δῶν βούλοιο θεῶν; *Lys.* 214 D δ εἴη, 214 E ἢ τί ἄν παθεῖν, δ μή καὶ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ πάθοι; 215 A δ δὲ μή ἀγαπῶτο πῶς φίλον (scil. ἄν εἴη); 215 B δ μή ἀγαπῶη (but *Sch.* ὁ μή ἀγαπῶν); 219 E; *Hipp. maj.* 284 A, 296 B; *Rep.* 412 D, 549 B, 557 B. In all these cases the relative clause depends upon an optative (or infinitive representing an optative) with ἄν, i.e. upon an apodosis. Instances where the relative depends on εἰ with the optative (a protasis) are much rarer. See † *Erasistrate* 136 C εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας ἢ τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν περὶ οὐ σὺ σπουδῆν μεγάλην ἔχοις, πότερον τῶν φιλοσόφων εἰσάγοις ἄν ἢ τῶν ἰατρῶν λάβοις;

25. καλῶς ἄν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζομεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι: αὐτό is here transferred from its natural place after εἰκάζομεν by 'hyperbaton' (Riddell §§ 287 foll., F.E.T. p. 418, Hadley § 1062). The usual object of hyperbaton is, by changing the common order, to get, besides the direct meaning given by the syntax of the words, an additional meaning suggested by their collocation. Here the impression is for a moment left on the mind that αὐτό is governed by εἰκάζοντες used in a transitive sense, as at 80 C 26. See too on 98 B 2. (An occasional object of hyperbaton is to avoid the juxtaposition of like cases.

This I think is exemplified by *Euthyd.* 275 E ὥστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαι μοι ἐξεγένετο εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μεираκιῷ, where τῷ μεираκιῷ, dependent on παρακελεύσασθαι, is kept well apart from μοι.)

Riddell's elaborate list of examples of hyperbaton in Plato is far from exhaustive. The present example, which he omits, would seemingly come in § 289. Add *Euthyphr.* 11 C τὸ γὰρ περιεῖναι τούτοις τούτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγὼ εἶμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, where see Fr.'s. note. He quotes *inter alia Phaedr.* 239 A τοσοῦτων κακῶν . . . ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκη γιγνομένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐνότων, τῶν μὲν ἡδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν. The tendency to elaborate the order of words grew on Plato.

26. μὴ διδασκτὸν εἶναι: cp. the reference to this passage at 96 C 8, where we have μὴδὲ διδασκτὸν εἶναι. We need not infer (with Buttm.) that μὴδέ should be read here.

29. εἰ εἶν: indirect question; the optative being used because ζητῶν is here imperfect.

33. εἰς καλόν, 'opportune, ut sescenties' Stallbaum. See *Hipp. maj.* 286 CD; εἰς κάλλιστον *Euthyd.* 275 B.

34. Ast regards the forms ἐκαθεζόμεν, παρεκαθεζόμεν as always aorists in Plato; I believe rightly. No present indic. καθέζομαι or παρακαθέζομαι occurs in Plato. (The simple ἐξομαι in all its forms is foreign to Attic prose.) The apparent exception † *Apochus* 371 C καθέζονται δικασταί is significant. Nor does the imperative or infinitive occur, in which the accent would discriminate. I know of no instance in Plato where the sense would require ἐκαθεζόμεν or παρεκαθεζόμεν or the corresponding participles to be impf.; and in all cases the aorist sense is better. Thus, here 'Anytus has just sat down'; he has not 'been sitting' for some time, for it would have been difficult to ignore him, and the share he takes presently suggests no acquaintance with the previous dialogue (Fr. p. 23). Cp. *Charm.* 153 C δεῦρο καθεζόμενος ἡμῖν διγγῆσαι, 'come and sit down here, and tell me all about it'; *ibid.* παρακαθεζόμενος; *ibid.* 155 C καθέζουτο, ἐκαθέζετο; *Lys.* 206 C ἂν γὰρ εἰσέλθης καὶ καθεζόμενος διαλέγῃ 'if you go in and take a seat and engage in talk'; *ibid.* 207 A ἐκαθεζόμεθα καὶ διελεγόμεθα, 'we had seated ourselves, and were in conversation'; *Euthyd.* 274 B ἐτυχε πρόρω καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλεινίου, 'happened to have taken a seat at some distance from C.'; *Phaedo* 61 C καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ καθεζόμενος ('assuming a sitting posture') οὕτως ἦδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. Cp. *Xen. Mem.* IV ii 8 παρακαθεζομένου.

φ̄ μεταδόμεν: the relative here has a definite antecedent,

and so has no effect on the mood of the following verb; the subjunctive is hortatory. Goodwin § 519. Buttm. strangely regards it as *final*: see Goodwin § 572.

36. "Ανυτος γάρ δεε: for Anytus see Introd. § 6.

90 A

37. 'Ανθεμίωνος: we know nothing of him beyond what we read here. Plato's object in eulogizing him is not, as Cobet thought (*Coll. crit.* p. 47), merely to furnish a foil to the faults of his son, but also to give another instance of the truth set forth cc. xxxii-xxxiv (93 B foll.) that even the best of fathers cannot communicate virtue to their children.

39. τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα: the name of Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos in the sixth century B.C., whose history is given by Herodotus in his third book, is here used proverbially as a type of wealth. We generally use the name of Croesus in this connexion. Fr. quotes other instances; τὰ Ταντάλου τάλατα *Euthyphr.* 11 E. Cp. *Laws* 660 E εὐὰν δὲ ἀρα πλουτῆ Κινύρα τε καὶ Μίδα μάλλον.

40. Ἴσμενίας ὁ Θηβαῖος: this important man was a leader of the democratic or anti-Spartan party at Thebes. We find him in the year 403 B.C. helping the exiled Athenian democrats, Thrasybulus, Anytus, etc., to return. Justin v 9 itaque Ismenias Thebanorum princeps etsi publicis non poterat, privatis tamen viribus adjuvabat. In 395 B.C. Tithraustes, the successor of Tissaphernes, irritated by Agesilaus' successes in Asia Minor, sent over Timocrates the Rhodian to Greece with thirty talents to bribe the leaders in various states to make war against Sparta. Xenophon (*Hell.* III v 1) mentions as recipients of this money Androcleidas, *Ismenias*, and Galaxidorus at Thebes, two men at Corinth, and 'Cylon and his friends' at Argos (*Grote Hist.* ch. lxxiv). The share that would thus fall to Ismenias could only be described as τὰ Πολ. χρήματα by a hyperbole. Fr. as to this shrewdly observes that nothing is more liable to exaggeration than wealth. But it is not at all necessary to suppose that the money brought by Timocrates was the only instance in which Ismenias received gifts of this kind. Believing, as I do, that the *Meno* was not written till at least ten years after 395, I think Plato may well have had later instances in his mind. Reference to these gifts from Persia is made in the words οὐδὲ δόντος τινός just above; Anthemion's wealth was not, like that of Ismenias, the result of bribery. Plato in one other place (*Rep.* I 336 A) refers to Ismenias, whom he evidently disliked. The *Meno* has points of kinship with the first book of the *Republic*, the composition of which probably followed it at no long interval (Introd. § 19). Socrates there

thinks the definition of Justice 'to benefit one's friends and harm one's foes' *Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδικκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίον ἀνδρός*. The collocation of names is not without irony, but the mention of Ismenias is made appropriate by the fact that he distinctly used his wealth as a political engine—to 'help his friends and harm his foes.' Ismenias was put to death in 382 B.C. by the Spartans after they had obtained control of Thebes by seizing the Cadmea. *Xen. Hell. v ii 35 τότε δὴ κατηγορεῖτο τοῦ Ἰσμηνίου καὶ ὡς βαρβαρίζου καὶ ὡς ξένος τῆ Πέρσῃ ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ἀγαθῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος γεγεννημένος εἴη καὶ ὡς τῶν παρὰ βασιλείως χρημάτων μετελιφῶς εἴη καὶ ὅτι τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχῆς πάσης ἐκείνός τε καὶ Ἀνδροκλείδας αἰτιώτατοι εἴεν.* (See Grote *Hist.* ch. lxxvi.)

Were the passages in the *Meno* and the *Republic* written after the death of Ismenias? Plato very rarely mentions by name a person living at the time of his writing. But this rule is not universal. Isocrates certainly, and Lysias probably, were living at the time when the *Phaedrus* was written. Moreover, the *Meno* and the first book of the *Republic* can hardly have been written long after 382, and it is not likely that such references to Ismenias should be made immediately after his death. I think both passages were written while Ismenias was still powerful at Thebes, that is, before the end of 382 B.C., but probably not *much* before (Intr. §14).

We have here one of several anachronisms in which Plato introduces in dialogues where Socrates is present mention of events that happened after Socrates' death. Cp. *Symp.* 193 A, where allusion is made to the breaking-up of Mantinea by the Spartans in 385 B.C.; *Menez.* 244 D foll.

The Ismenias here mentioned must not be confused with his son Ismenias, who in 367 accompanied Pelopidas to the court of the Great King (Plut. *Artax.* 22).

42. *δοκῶν εἶναι*: the editors note the anacoluthon. You would expect *δοκοῦντος*. But the structure of the whole sentence is loose. The *πρῶτον μὲν* at line 36 referring to Anytus is not answered by either the *εἴπειτα* at line 41, or that at 44, both of which refer to Anthemion. After the introduction of the relative sentence *ὅς ἐγένετο*, Anthemion becomes the main subject, and the participle *δοκῶν* naturally follows the case of *κτησάμενος*.

- B 43. *ὄγκωδης*: lit. 'bloated.' The word occurs nowhere else in Plato; and is very rare in this sense elsewhere. But *ὄγκος* occurs often in the tragedians in the sense 'dignity,' 'self-importance.' So *ὄγκοῦμαι*, as Aristoph. *Frogs* 703.

**ἐπαχθής** = *odiosus* often in Plato, as *Phaedo* 87 A *εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν*. Cp. Thuc. VI 54 *ἐπαχθής ἦν ἐς τοὺς πολλούς*.

44. **εὐσταλής**: not elsewhere in Plato; lit. 'well braced,' 'compact,' the opposite of *δγκώδης*. L. & S. quote Plut. *Marius* 34 *εὐσταλής τὸν δγκον*.

46. **αἰρούνται γόνυ**: 'Xen. *Apol.* 29 ('*Ἄντων*) τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ἀξιούμενον. *Creatus est σιοτοφύλαξ* (Lys. xxii 8) et *στρατηγός* (a. Chr. 409, Diod. Sic. xiii 64 [*Grote Hist.* ch. lxiii], et a. Chr. 403, Lys. xiii 78); Theramenes apud Xen. *Hell.* II iii 42 tres principes enumerat Thrasymbulum *Anytum* Alcibiadem; post expulsos tyrannos, quorum inter audaces fuerat oppugnatores (Lys. xiii 78) [*Grote Hist.* ch. lxxv], magna florebat gratia et potestate (Isocr. xviii 23)' Fr. He was one of the most important men in Athens in the years succeeding 403 B.C. He is 'undoubtedly' (Jebb *Att. Or.* I 117) the Anytus who was called on the defence in the trial of Andocides in the same year as that of Socrates. See *de Myst.* ad fin.; Holm *History of Greece* E.T. III 26.

47. **ἀρετῆς περί διδασκάλους**: Stallbaum quotes for words of learning and teaching with *περί* and the gen. of the thing learnt or taught *Lach.* 186 c *διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου περί*, *ibid.* E, *Menex.* 235 E *διδάσκαλος οὐσα οὐ πάνυ φαύλη περί ῥητορικῆς*, *Phaedr.* 265 D, *Crat.* 413 c. Cp. presently *περί τούτου τοῦ πράγματος*: also *εἰδώς περί* at 71 B 3 and note there. See Cope on Aristot. *Rhet.* I ix 14 *περί δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν*. He observes that the substitution of a prep. with its case for a simpler construction (e.g. the object of a verb) is characteristic of fourth-century, as distinguished from earlier, writers. Among other places he quotes *Phaedr.* 250 c, where *περί κάλλους* stands for *subject*, *Rep.* 427 A *εἶδος νόμων περί καὶ πολιτείας*, where *περί* with its case stands, as here, for the simple gen. after a noun. For the structure *ζητεῖν διδασκάλους εἰρ' εἰσίν* see on 71 A 25. 'Prolepsis' often occurs after verbs of inquiry; see 92 C 22 *οὐ τούτους ἐζητοῦμεν τίνας εἰσίν*.

Chapters XXVII (90 B) to XXX (92 C 20).—SOCR. *Suppose we wanted to make Meno a shoemaker, or a physician, or a flute-player, we should send him to a professional teacher?* ANYTUS. *Naturally.* SOCR. *But, as it is, what Meno desires is political Virtue and Wisdom. I suppose we ought to send him to the paid and accredited teachers of this—I mean, of course, the Sophists.* ANYTUS. *Don't name them: they do infinite mischief.* SOCR. *Strange that they should be*

so successful. No other craftsmen could succeed in imposing on the public so long. Or do they impose upon themselves as well? ANYTUS. Certainly not. They are a designing set that ought to be turned out of every respectable city. I have never had anything to do with them, and do not wish to, but I know all about them.

Here begins the fourth section of the dialogue, extending to the end of ch. xxxiv.

## CHAPTER XXVII

2. τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένῳ: cp. 92 D 26 τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἐταῖρον. Fr. (Introd. p. 24 note 2) makes it appear probable that this ξένια was inaugurated between Anthemion and the Meno who helped Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. II 22, 2). This Meno cannot have been the father of the Meno of our dialogue, whose father's name was Alexidemus (76 E 48): he may have been his grandfather. Fr.'s reason for thinking that the ξένια between the families did not go back farther than Anthemion is that the latter had made his money himself, so that his ancestors were probably not so wealthy or prominent as to enter into such a relation.

περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος: these words do not depend on συστήσῃσιν, but on διδάσκαλοι, as just above. But here, for the sake of variety, we do not have the 'prolepsis' διδασκάλους, τίνες ἂν εἴεν.

5. ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι: we have here one aspect of the standing paradox as to the difference of Virtue from the special Arts. See *Prot.* 311 B foll. Of the special arts there are special and accepted teachers. Of Virtue, or the Political art, the only visible teachers are the people called Sophists. But whereas the doctor makes you a doctor, the Sophist makes you, not a Sophist, but what? εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ὦ Ἴπποκράτης, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιζόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπενδύεις παρὰ τὸν σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἔλθων Ἴπποκράτη τὸν Κῶρον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν κτέ. Cp. 318 B foll. See on 93 B 17; † *Alc.* I 124 E foll. is an imitative passage; *Gorg.* 514 A foll., *Hipp. maj.* 283 B foll. are germane. See also *Xen. Mem.* IV II 2 and IV 5, and particularly *Aristot. NE.* X IX 18 ἀρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὁμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς

ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργούντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ· ὅτε γὰρ γράφοντες ὅτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων φαίνονται . . . οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. (Grant in his note thinks there is a reference to the *Meno*.) Cp. Grote *Hist.* ch. lxviii.

Before the time of Plato the notion of general mental training, i.e. a gymnastic beneficial to the mind apart from the matter learnt, was hardly apprehended. To elaborate this view is the chief object of the 'Educational Dialogues' and one of the objects of the *Republic*.

16. **καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν** : contrast **D 23 καλῶς ἂν πέμπομεν**. **C** For the first supposition—that he is to be sent to a physician—is clearly unreal; but in the second case the supposition is generalized and so not impossible. See on **74 B 6**.

20. **ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ**, 'avowedly for this service.' **ἐπί** with the dat. implies *condition*, and may be used to express either the thing conceded or the thing received. In *CR.* VIII 444 I have tried to show that **ἐπί** ἔκτῳ μέρει may mean either 'on condition of paying' or 'on condition of receiving' a sixth part. Like the present passage is *Rep.* ix 590 A 'Ἐπιφύλη ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρός ψυχῇ' ('at the sacrifice of her husband's life') τὸν ὄρμον δεξαμένη, *Hipp. maj.* 284 c χρήματα ἔλαβεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, *Apol.* 41 A ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτο; on the other hand *Laws* 745 A φανεῖ ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμίσεσι 'on condition of receiving one half.' Often of course the conditions may be looked at from either point of view: *Apol.* 29 c ἀφιμέν σε ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν; these are the terms which the Athenians *exact*, and which Socrates is to *concede*. Cp. on **75 A 7**. Nearly allied is the use in **ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ 70 B 11**.

21. **τοῦ βουλομένου** : in this phrase the force of the article is exhausted in making the participle into a noun; no demonstrative force is left; so that ὁ βουλόμενος is 'any one who chooses,' just as ὁ τυχών is 'any one who chances,' ὁ κωλύων 'any one to hinder.' (Something similar is τὸν 'Ἀθηναῖον' 'any Athenian' Aristoph. *Birds* 1035, Dem. 23 (*Aristocr.*) 38, etc.: cp. *Gorg.* 487 E ποῖόν τινα χρῆ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα 'the typical man'.)

The phrase ὁ βουλόμενος is common from Herodotus (I 54) downwards, especially in the orators in the legal phrase ὁ βουλόμενος 'Ἀθηναίων οἳ ἐξεστίν' 'any duly qualified Athenian' (Meier and Schömann *Attische Process* (564) 756). We have it in this dialogue **70 C 17**, **91 B 14**: *Laws* 745 A (see last note): *Gorg.* 521 B ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, etc.

E 26. τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα; 'does not the same hold?' Herm., Sch., Fr. all print a note of interrogation after these words, understanding *ἔχει*, or the like. This view I have followed. Riddell § 18 regards τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα as a forestalling of the sentence that follows it, and therefore puts only a comma after ταῦτα.

πολλὴ ἀνοιά ἐστι . . μὴ θέλειν: it is clear that here μὴ θέλειν stands as a *subject* to πολλὴ ἀνοιά ἐστι, and that the negative is a real negative, to be translated in English. Thus these cases of μὴ with the infinitive are to be distinguished from such as κωλύω σε τοῦτο μὴ ποιεῖν, where μὴ ποιεῖν stands as an *object* (see on 89 D 19), and the negative is redundant (or 'reflected') and not to be translated in English. But after such expressions as πολλὴ ἀνοία—a class which may be generalized as falling roughly into two divisions (α) expressions denoting *impropriety* (as the present, ἀλογον, αἰσχρὸν, οὐχ ὀσιόν ἐστιν, etc.), (β) expressions of *impossibility* or *improbability* (ἀδύνατον, οὐ προσδοκία ἐστίν, etc.)—we more commonly, when the thing deprecated is negative, have μὴ οὐκ instead of, as here, the simple μὴ. Heind. on *Prot.* 352 D αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάμαι εἶναι says 'Post αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ interdum simplex μὴ, frequentius multo ut h.l. μὴ οὐ cum infinitivo copulatum reperies.' He refers to *Theaet.* 151 D αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμείσθαι, † *Erastae* 139 A, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* vi 2, etc. (On the other hand *Laws* 820 A ἐν ἐκείνῳ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν ἔφαμεν αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.) So with the phrase before us, *Symp.* 210 B πολλὴ ἀνοία μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι: cf. *ibid.* 218 C πάνυ ἀνόητον μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο χαρίσασθαι: with ἀλογον, *Soph.* 219 E τὴν γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἀλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ τέμνειν διχῆ: further *Theaet.* 181 B οὐδὲν μὲν οὐν ἀνεκτὸν μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι (contrast *Laws* 861 D τοῦτοιον ταῖνον τοῖν δυοῖν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν, τό γε δὴ μὴ λέγειν κτέ.): *Rep.* 427 E οὐχ ὀσιον μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη: *Phaedo* 88 B οὐδενὶ προσήκει. (The examples are all from class (α): examples from class (β) may be dispensed with.)

μὴ οὐ in these cases is analogous to μὴ οὐ after positive verbs of prevention or denial where the thing prevented or denied is itself negative, the μὴ being reflected from the negative idea in the previous verb, while the οὐ remains to be translated as a qualification of the object of it. On the other hand when we have μὴ οὐ with the infn. after *negatived* verbs of prevention, etc. (as at 89 D 18), both μὴ and οὐ are reflected from the previous negatived negative idea, and neither remains to be translated. Kühner deals with the two classes in § 516, sections 4 and 5 respectively. See Goodwin *MT.* §§ 816, 817: F.E.T. pp. 367, 381. Perhaps the clearest account

is given by Mr. Whitelaw *Cambridge Philolog. Soc. Transactions* vol. I pp. 42, 43. In οὐχ ὄσιον μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν, οὐχ ὄσιον is resumed by μὴ, which repels οὐ βοηθεῖν; deprecation of not rendering assistance is the state of mind of the speaker.

With such an expression as πολλή ἀνοια we may have an infin. as a subject (μὴ ἐθέλειν); but we may also have a looser 'consecutive' infinitive, μὴ οὐκ ἐθέλειν, expressing the 'net result' of what is recommended.

F. E. T. is therefore right in observing (p. 381) that in these cases of μὴ οὐ 'we may be sure that the force of each negative was, originally at least, felt in Greek.' But the idiom was sustained by an 'irrational' tendency in the Greek language. Mr. Whitelaw *CR.* x 244 b, at the end of a valuable article, says: 'It is evident that these combinations (of negatives) had a certain fascination for the Greek mind. This appears especially in the ingenious and unnecessary developments of the consecutive μὴ οὐ.' The fact that μὴ οὐ was pronounced as one syllable in verse is further evidence how closely the words had coalesced. Somewhat similar is the development of κἄν for καί (see on 72 C 1). By the time we get to μὴ οὐ with the participle we have clearly passed the bounds that separate 'rational' from 'irrational' idiom. For δυσάλογος γὰρ ἂν εἴην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικίρων ἔδραν is not capable of logical explanation: it is a variant, by 'personalization,' for δυσάλογον ἂν εἴη μὴ οὐ κατοικίρειν. So *Phil.* 12 D πῶς γὰρ ἦδονῆ γε ἦδονῆ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοίωτατον ἂν εἴη; may be regarded as a variant for ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦδονῆν γε ἦδονῆ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι. A similar method may be applied to *Gorg.* 509 A, *Euthyd.* 297 C, where also we have personalising extensions of the infinitive usage.

31. μήτε—μήτε: 'the relative takes μὴ when the antecedent is indefinite' F. E. T. p. 362, Hadley § 1021. In these cases the relative clause may be looked on as conditional. Cp. 80 D 2, 95 B 17, 96 C 7, 99 C 23. Cp. μήπω 79 D 38.

32. μήτ' ἔστιν αὐτῶν: 'when a relative clause is continued by a clause *co-ordinate* with it, the relative word is hardly ever repeated. Where this would be necessary' [owing to a change of the case required] 'the relative construction is abandoned in the second clause, and the relative word is sometimes (a) entirely omitted, and sometimes (b), if in an oblique case, replaced by a personal or demonstrative pronoun' Hadley § 1005. See on 74 D 35. As examples of (a) in Plato see *Rep.* 533 D, *Symp.* 201 B, *Menex.* 239 C (nom. omitted), *Prot.* 313 B (dat. omitted). As examples of (b)—of which the present is an instance—Stallbaum quotes *Rep.* 395 D ὦν φαμέν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, *Gorg.* 452 D δ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ

σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. Kühner § 561. 1 (cp. Jelf § 833) also quotes from Plato *Rep.* 505 E δ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπανα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, *Phil.* 12 B, *Hipp. maj.* 289 D ὧ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ προσγενομένου αὐτοῦ καλὰ φαίνεται. Add *Theaet.* 192 A δ μὴ οἶδε μὴδὲ ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα : *ibid.* B ἕτερον τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον. For the (exceptional) repetition of the relative see *Prot.* 313 A, and J. & A. M. Adam's note. Analogous to the idiom now considered is the transition from a causal clause to a direct statement, as Eur. *Alc.* 1057 διπλῆν φοβοῦμαι μέμψιν, ἐκ τε δημοσῶν μὴ τίς μ' ἐλέγξῃ . . . καὶ τῆς θανούσης . . . πολλὴν πρόνοιαν δεῖ μ' ἔχειν. (See Graves on Thuc. v 61, and Marchant on Thuc. vi 31.) Perhaps these phenomena indicate incomplete development of the subordinate sentence.

34. οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ κτέ., 'does not this seem to you a serious flaw in reasoning?' 'Indeed it does, and brute stupidity to boot.' Buttmann well expresses the difference between *ἀλογία* and *ἀμαθία*. The former is the case of the man who for the time fails to apply his reasoning power; the latter that of the man whose reasoning power has never been cultivated. As to *ἀμαθία* see Archer-Hind on *Timaeus* 86 B, and J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 2 C.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

91 A 2. *ἔξεστί σε . . . βουλευέσθαι*: the subject of *ἔξεστί σε βουλευέσθαι*. See Kühner § 475. Anm. 1, 2. Cp. *Gorg.* 486 C τὸν τοιοῦτον ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ δίδοναι δίκην, *Polit.* 290 D οὐδ' ἔξεστι βασιλέα χωρὶς ἱερατικῆς ἀρχεῖν; *Oratio* 51 D ὧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι, *Laws* 721 D. Mr. St. George Stock points out that *ἔξεστί σε* 'is more complimentary than *ἔξεστί σοι* would have been. The latter would have meant "you have the opportunity"; this means "there is the opportunity," i.e. "I have the opportunity of your assistance."

4. *ταύτης τῆς σοφίας κτέ.*: this corresponds pretty much to Meno's definition of *ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆ* 71 E. Meno however has said nothing about treatment of parents. But he has laid stress on *μεγαλοπρέπεια* (74 A). Cp. *Prot.* 318 E foll., where Protagoras says that what he teaches is *εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων*, *ὅπως ἂν ἀριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικῶι, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν*. See Xen. *Mem.* iv ii 11 (quoted by Fr.) οὐ δῆπου, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφέσαι, δι' ἣν ἄνθρωποι πολιτικοὶ γίνονται καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ ἀρχεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι τοῖς τ' ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς. . . ἔστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων ἀθη (ἡ τέχνη)

καλ καλεῖται βασιλική. Cp. *Rep.* 600 c d. *Isocr. Antid.* (15) 285 speaks of himself and his pupils as τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθητὰς καὶ μελετῶντας, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διοικήσουσιν.

7. **πολίτας καὶ ξένους**: Xen. *Oec.* ii 5 ἔπειτα ξένους προσήκει σοι πολλοὺς δέχεσθαι καὶ τούτους μεγαλοπρεπῶς· ἔπειτα δὲ πολίτας δειπνίζειν καὶ εἶ ποιεῖν (Fr.).

8. **ὑποδέξασθαι καὶ ἀποπέμψαι**: not merely the substantial duties of hospitality, but the art to 'welcome the coming, speed the parting, guest' with all due etiquette. 'Charondas ap. Stob. flor. xlii 40 (προοίμια νόμων): ξένον—εὐφήμεως καὶ οἰκείως προσδέχεσθαι καὶ ἀποπέμψαι. Arist. *NE.* iv ii 15 ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια—καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολὰς καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεὰς' (Fr.).

14. **κοινούς**, 'open,' cp. Xen. *Cyng.* xiii 9 οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι πᾶσι B κοινοὶ καὶ φίλοι. See *CR.* xi 424 b.

15. **ταξαμένους**: aorist, because the fee is fixed once for all ; **πραττομένους**: pres., because it is exacted from time to time.

16. **καὶ τίνας**: καὶ *indignantis*. Cp. 80 D 1. Contrast Eur. *Phoen.* 1358 καὶ πῶς γένοιτ' ἂν τῶνδε δυσποτυμώτερα; with 1363 πῶς καὶ πέπρακται διπτύχων παιδῶν φόβος; The first question has feeling; the second asks for details. The explanation of the difference is that καὶ accentuates the word that follows it. See Shilleto on Dem. *F.L.* (19) § 257.

18. **σοφιστὰς**: see on 85 B 49. For the process by which C the word acquired an opprobrious sense, see the article 'Sophist' in *Encycl. Brit.*, Zeller *pre-Socr.* ii 429 foll., Grote *Hist.* ch. lxvii, Sidgwick in *JP.* iv pp. 288 foll., v pp. 66 foll. Grote rightly protested against the representation of the sophists as a conspiracy against morality and philosophy. But he perhaps hardly attached sufficient weight to the indirect consequences of the one common attribute that they did undoubtedly possess, namely that they were *professional* teachers. Their forth-coming was the response to a feeling of the narrowness of the older training, and the demand for something at once more elaborate and more effective (Zeller *pre-Socr.* ii 396, 397; 430, 436; Sidgwick *Hist. of Ethics* 17-22). But the rise of the 'professional element' put a new aspect upon the pursuit of knowledge. 'The introduction of payment for scientific instruction,' says Zeller (ut sup. ii 441), 'is a sign that now instead of honest inquiry, satisfied with knowledge of the actual, only that knowledge is sought which may be applied as a means to other ends.' Then would follow that reaction upon teaching which must occur when it has to

be accommodated to the practical demands of the taught. No man, says Plato (*Soph.* 232 D), would resort to the sophists if they did not promise to make men clever in debate about Law and Politics. This suggests some of the reasons that led to the odious connotation of the word 'sophist' and the unpopularity of the class. With a nation so prone to *φθόνος* as the Greeks, the mere assumption of special knowledge easily became invidious. Already in Aesch. *P.V.* 944 Hermes uses the term *σοφιστής* as a taunt to Prometheus. Riddell *Introd.* p. xxvii shows how in 1791 the name 'Philosopher' became a term of opprobrium among British abhorers of the French Revolution. The title 'Professor' has before now lent itself to an uncomplimentary use. See *Prot.* 312 A (the conclusion of the passage referred to on 90 B 5) *Σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἀσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν.* The sequel gives further evidence of the unpopularity of 'sophists.' Callias' porter (314 D) has no more discrimination than Aristophanes or Anytus; he mistakes Socrates and his companion for *σοφισταὶ τινες*, and shuts the door in their faces. Later, 316 C D, Protagoras speaks with some feeling of the odium attaching to his profession, and the great caution he has to exercise: *οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαι τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί.* See also Xen. *Cyrog.* ch. xiii, from which Fr. quotes (§ 8) *σοφιστὴν κληθῆναι, ὃ ἐστὶν βριδεὸς παρὰ γε τοῖς ἐφ' φρονούσιν.* (Xen. concludes his tract in the true spirit of the country squire by advising young men to avoid the sophists and stick to hunting.) So Isocrates *Antid.* (15) 168 speaks of *ἡ κοινὴ περὶ τοῦ σοφιστᾶς διαβολή.*

19. *Ἡράκλεις, εὐφῆμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες*, 'good gracious, Socrates, spare our ears!' The source of Anytus' hostility to the sophists, and to Socrates, whom he included among them, is explained by Grote II 27: 'He is a man of plain sense, practical habits, and conservative patriotism—who worships what he finds accredited as virtue, and dislikes the talkers and theorizers about virtue in general.' We must also take into account the circumstances of the time. After the amnesty of 403 B.C. 'the *ἐπιείκεια* of the restored people did not last long, and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal for their revived popular institutions' Riddell *Introd.* p. iv (cp. p. xxix). Culture of any kind was associated with oligarchic reaction. Not that the fear of culture was confined to democrats, for the Thirty had attempted to put down those who taught *λόγων τέχνην* (Xen. *Mem.* I ii 31). In spite of the boasted *παρρησία* and *ἐξουσία* at Athens (see *Gorg.* 461 E, *Rep.* 557 B), the Athenian temper was at bottom intolerant

(Holm *Hist. of Greece* ET. II 293), though we may concede to Grote *Hist.* ch. lxxviii that it was less so than that of other states. Cp. on 80 B 21.

The view of Callicles in the *Gorgias* is very similar to that of Anytus. Callicles too is a lover of the δῆμος (*Gorg.* 481 D, 513 C) and a hater of the sophists (ibid. 519 E ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετὴν; ΚΑΑ. Ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;). Callicles, like Meno, has been trained in rhetoric by Gorgias, but spurns the idea that Gorgias can teach τὰ δίκαια (482 C foll.), and disbelieves in the sophists who profess to train men εἰς ἀρετὴν. Compare his view ibid. 485 A φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετασχεῖν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ εἶναι οὐτι φιλοσοφεῖν κτέ., a view which Socrates sums up at 487 C: ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῶν τοιαύδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμῆσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλους ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γινόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. See on 95 C 23. So the practical soldier Laches disparages sophists, *Lach.* 197 D (cp. 183 C foll.). The view of Isocrates recalls that of Callicles (*Antid.* (15) 268). See note on 100 A 6, Jebb *Att. Or.* II p. 39, and Sidgwick in *JP.* v 75 foll.

It is this unpopularity, shared by Socrates with other philosophers, but in an even greater degree (Riddell *Introd.* xxvi), against which he protests (*Apol.* 28 A): καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἰρή, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. Cp. Zeller *Socr.* 219, 220.

*Rep.* vi is an apology for philosophy. See 492 A ἡ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὡς περ οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δὲ τινὰς σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς κτέ. See by all means Grote's vivid summary of the whole passage (III 81, 82); also note on 95 C 23.

21. ἄστών: cp. 92 B 7. The word is always used by Plato in contrast with ξένος (as *Gorg.* 514 E), or μέτοικος (as *Rep.* 563 A). See *Laws* 869 D: 'If a fellow citizen (kills) another' is ἐὰν πολίτην πολίτην, but 'if a citizen (kills) a stranger' is ἐὰν ἀστος ξένον: πολίτης being a correlative term. See 70 B 8, 91 A 7.

23. ἐστί agreeing in number with the predicate: Hadley § 610 quotes Antiphon *τετρ.* II 3 § 8 αἱ χορηγῆσαι ἱκανὸν εὐδαιμονίας σημεῖον ἐστί. This usage must be distinguished from such instances as *Euthyd.* 302 C ἐστί μοιγε καὶ βίαι, where there is no singular predicate, and the ἐστί is only justified by coming first, the number of the subject being not yet determined.

## CHAPTER XXIX

1. οὔτοι ἄρα : see on 80 E 8.

οὔτοι ἄρα μόνοι : we have here and in the sequel another aspect of the paradox referred to on 90 B 5. Cp. *Apol.* 24 D foll. : in the special Arts, says Socrates, many can spoil, few can benefit : in Virtue the reverse seems according to Meletus to be the case : the 'man in the street' works for good ; the experts—the sophists and I—for evil.

3. ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν, 'they differ so much as amounts to this—they not only,' etc. ; see J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 11 D. For ὅσον = ὥστε followed by the *indicative* cp. Xen. *Cyr.* VIII i 4 τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρειν δεῖ τῶν δούλων ὅσον οἱ μὲν δούλοι ἄκοντες τοῖς δεσπόταις ὑπηρετοῦσιν : Isocr. 13 (*in Soph.*) 20 τοσοῦτῳ δὲ χείρους ἐγένοντο τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας καλινδουμένων, ὅσον οὔτοι μὲν . . . ὁμως ἀρετὴν ἐπηγγείλαντο : also 8 (*de Pace*) 43 τοσοῦτον ἀπολελείμμεθα . . . ὅσον οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων σωτηρίας τὴν πατρίδα τὴν αὐτῶν ἐκλιπεῖν ἐτόλμησαν κτέ. ; *ibid.* 54 τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρομεν τῶν προγόνων ὅσον ἐκείνοι μὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς προστάτας τε τῆς πόλεως ἐποιούντο καὶ στρατηγούς ἤρουντο ; *ibid.* 96 τοσοῦτον γὰρ ὑπερεβάλλοντο ἀμαρτήμασιν ὅσον πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι σφαγὰς ἐποίησαν. The instances are all after expressions of *difference* (Kühner § 582. 1).

D 6. τούτων : the gen. of price is here substituted for ἐπί with the dat. (ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ) at 90 D 20.

χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι : the taking of fees for instruction was the distinguishing note of the 'sophists,' who thus created a teaching profession. See on the general question Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 436 foll., also *Hipp. maj.* 281 B–283 B, particularly 282 C τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἤξισεν ἀργύριον μισθὸν πράξασθαι οὐδ' ἐπιδείξεις ποιήσασθαι ἐν παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας. The context tells us that Gorgias (see on 70 A 7) and Prodicus have made more money by their σοφία than any artist from any art, and so did Protagoras before them ; but Hippias can boast of having made as much money as any two sophists. On the contrary, Anaxagoras, instead of growing rich, spent a fortune that had been left him.

8. Protagoras was the first to make σοφία a profession. So in *Prot.* 317 B he avows himself a sophist, and Socrates, *ibid.* 348 E, says to him καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας,

σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἀρνησθαι. Diog. L. (1X 52) says of Protagoras οὗτος πρῶτος μισθὸν εἰσεπράξατο, μῶς ἑκατόν. Protagoras, however, recognized that the success of the master is best attested by the pupil's recognition of the benefit conferred, and so 'left it to the pupil to decide at the end of the instructions what he would give, if the price seemed to him excessive.'—Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 409 note (see *Prot.* 328 BC).

As to the priority of Protagoras we read in † *Alc.* i 119 A that two Athenians, Pythodorus and Callias, each paid 100 minae to Zeno of Elea for their instruction. The statement is probably to be rejected; for, though the date of Zeno's birth is uncertain, there is little doubt that he was older than Protagoras (Zeller *pre-Socratics* I 609 note). Still it is not impossible that Zeno, like Gorgias, though older than Protagoras, may have followed an example set by his junior. The same fee is asserted for Gorgias (Diod. XII 53, Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 415: he thinks these fees 'greatly exaggerated'). Euenos of Paros was content with the more modest figure of 5 minae (*Apol.* 20 B).

Fees were also charged for separate lectures: Diog. L. XI 50 says that Protagoras and Prodicus made collections after their readings (λόγους ἀναγιγνώσκοντες ἡρανίζοντο). See *Crat.* 384 B, where Socr. says he could not afford to hear τὴν περτηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν of Prodicus, but only τὴν δραχμιαίαν.

12. **τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οὐκ ἄν:** for *εἰ* after expressions of wonder, etc., to express the object of the emotion see Goodwin *MT.* § 494. For *εἰ* followed by *ἄν* with the optative see on 79 C 27. For *εἰ οὐκ* see Goodwin *MT.* §§ 386, 387: 'When two clauses introduced by *μέν* and *δέ* depend upon a *single* *εἰ*, which precedes them both, *οὐ* is used even more frequently than *μή*.' He refers to *Phaedo* 97 A *θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκατέρων αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν . . οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις κτέ.*

17. **τῷ λιμῷ:** words denoting affections of the mind or body when spoken of as causes (in the dative, or in the genitive with *ὑπό*), often take the article, denoting not the feeling in general but the particular occurrence of it. So here τῷ λιμῷ, 'fame quae tunc oritur necesse est' Fr. We have the art. with *λιμός* Ar. *Peace* 483, Xen. *Anab.* I v 5, Dem. *Aristocr.* (23) 156. In Plato, where the word *λιμός* occurs, it is always, as here, mentioned as a cause; we have the art. here and *Symp.* 207 B; the art. omitted *Rep.* 416 A, *Euthyphr.* 4 D, *Gorg.* 464 E. At *Symp.* 191 A the MSS. vary: Sch. writes *ὑπὸ λιμοῦ* without the article. Cp. *ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους* 82 A 29.

**Ὅτι ἄρα :** the sentence as a whole is an argument by contrast ('*ex contrariis conclusum*'), to which the rhetoricians gave the name *ἐνθύμημα par excellence*. See Cicero *Top.* § 55, and cp. Quint. v x 1, 2; xiv 2. We have several instances of it in this portion of the dialogue.

In sentences of this sort the combination of particles *δέ* *ἄρα* imports that a juxtaposition of two ideas reveals an incongruity. The idiom is common in Plato. The sentence is in form *paratactic*, the real emphasis being on the clause with *δέ*. Sometimes we have *ἄρα* with the *μέν* clause as well as with the *δέ*, whereby each part of the antithesis is brought into relief (see exx. 7, 8, 9 below).

A. Sometimes the paradox is introduced by some phrase expressive of surprise, as *τέρας λέγεις εἰ* here.

(1) *Apol.* 34 C τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν εἰ ὁ μὲν ἴκτευσσε . . ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω.

(2) *Ibid.* 37 C D (I should be a fool to think that) ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολὺταί μοι οὐχ ὅσοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεργεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς . . ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς ὀλοοῦσι βραδίως.

(3) *Gorg.* 512 A λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ εἰ μὲν τις μεγάλους καὶ ἀνάτοις νοσήμασι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεκνήγη, οὗτος μὲν ἀθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν . . εἰ δὲ τις ἄρα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνάτα τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστίν.

(4) *Theaet.* 161 C (Protagoras might have jeered at us) ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ δ' ἄρα ἐτύγχανεν ὦν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων γυρνίου.

(5) *Phil.* 30 A B οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμεν . . τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν . . σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι . . τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν δλω τε οὐρανῷ . . ἐν τούτοις δ' οὐκ ἄρα μεμνηχάνησθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων φύσιν.

B. Sometimes it appears as a question, as 94 B 18.

(6) *Crito* 46 D ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατὰδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἐλέγετο;

(7) *Ibid.* 50 E ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοὶ τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον . . ὥστε ἄπερ πάσχοις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν . . πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατέρα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι;

(8) *Prot.* 325 B C διδακτοῦ δὲ ὄντος (τῆς ἀρετῆς) τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' ὅς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἢ ζημία . . ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἢ ζημία θάνατος . . ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται;

(9) *Rep.* 600 C D (Homer cannot really have been an educator, or his contemporaries would have made much more of him) ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος . . ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται . . Ὅμηρον δ' ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου . . ἢ Ἡσίοδον βραψυδεῖν ἂν περιμόντας εἶων;

(10) *Phaedo* 68 A ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν . . ἀποθανόντων

πολλοὶ δὲ ἔκοντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἄιδου ἐλθεῖν . . φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἔρων . . ἀγανακτήσει ἀποθνήσκειν ;

(11) *Ibid.* 80 D ἐνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος . . ὅμως ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν ἢ οὐ ; *Nal.* Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀείδεις . . αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῶν . . ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσεται ;

(12) *Laws* 647 C ἡ τῇ μὲν δειλία τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ προσμαχόμενον καὶ νικῶντα αὐτὴν δεῖ τέλειον οὕτω γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν . . σώφρων δὲ ἄρα τελῶς ἔσται μὴ πολλαῖς ἡδοναῖς . . διαμεμαχόμενος ;

In all these places δὲ ἄρα occurs in the second half of an antithetic argument. But δὲ ἄρα often occurs without any previous antithesis, where δὲ is merely connective, and ἄρα has its usual force. For instances of this see *Hipp. maj.* 283 B, *Euthyd.* 279 A, *Gorg.* 493 B, 513 A, *Phaedo* 107 E, *Laws* 660 E, † *Hipparch.* 229 C. See also on 97 C 30.

18. **Ἐάνθανεν διαφθείρων** : a similar argument is used by Socrates in his own favour, *Apol.* 33 D foll. : 'If I really corrupt youths, they, or at any rate their guardians, would have found it out and assailed me long ago.'

21. **ἀποθανεῖν** : according to Philochorus (ap. Diog. L. ix 55), he was drowned on a voyage to Sicily. The limits of his life appear to be about 481-411 B.C. According to Diog. L. ix 51 and 54, he was accused of impiety before the Four Hundred, exiled, and his books burnt (cp. Cic. *N.D.* i § 63). If we accept this story, the shipwreck may have taken place on his flight from Athens. But Mr. St. George Stock, in his note here, has pointed out that the story of his prosecution is very doubtful. The expressions here and those which Plato puts into his mouth, *Prot.* 317 B, seem inconsistent with his ever having suffered seriously from any attacks.

**ἔγγυς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα** : no other instance of ἔγγυς καὶ is forthcoming. καὶ is struck out in Γ (Coislinianus) by a later hand, and does not appear in Stephanus. Except Buttmann all the modern editors keep it. It must be explained on the analogy of καὶ after ἴσον, etc. (L. & S. καὶ A iii i). The use with ἐς (καὶ ἐς ἐβδομήκοντα μυριάδας Hdt. ii 60, cp. 68 ; L. & S. s.v. καὶ A v) is not parallel.

26. **οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου** : who these were is 92 A not very clear. See on 91 D 8. Gorgias was probably rather older than Protagoras (Zeller *pre-Socratics* ii 413 note ; Frey's dates for his life, 483-375 B.C., are accepted by Ueberweg-Heinze § 29 and R. & P. 183 A), but he was younger in the profession. Hippias (*Hipp. maj.* 282 E) and Prodicus (*Prot.*

317 c) were both younger. (The expression of Protagoras at the place last quoted, *οὐδενὸς ἔστι οὐ πάντων ἀν ἡμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἶη*, must be hyperbolic, as he was only about twelve years older than Socrates. Cp. 320 c.)

But perhaps Socrates here is not confining his remarks to professional sophists. Protagoras (*Prot.* 316 D) asserts that the wise men of old were really sophists in disguise, and this fancy Socrates seems to countenance (*ibid.* 342 A B).

27. *οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες*: this is probably to be referred to the dramatic date of the dialogue, about 402 B.C. At that time Protagoras was dead, but the other three great sophists, Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus, were probably alive. Zeller (*pre-Socratics* II 417 note) points out that Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias are all spoken of in *Apol.* 19 E as flourishing at the time of Socrates' trial in 399 B.C.

## CHAPTER XXX

1. *πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μάλισθαι*: cp. *τοσοῦτου δέω εἰδέναι* 71 A 26, and on 79 B 20. The infin. is 'consecutive,' the meaning being the same as if *ὥστε* accompanied it: *Apol.* 30 D, 37 B, *Lysis* 204 E, *Phaedr.* 228 A, *Laws* 660 B. Cp. *Prot.* 329 B *σμηκροῦ τινὸς ἐνδεῆς εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν*, 35 D (Kühner §477 e). Where the infin. is negative we often have *μὴ οὐ*: *Euthyd.* 297 B *ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φεύγειν*, 'I am far from not running away from two.' (The *μὴ οὐ* is a real negative, as after *αἰσχρὸν*, *ἀδύνατον*, etc. See on 90 E 26.) At *Theaet.* 166 D we have the article with *μὴ*: *πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι*.

All the above instances are 'personal': we have the im<sup>o</sup> personal *πολλοῦ δεῖ* at *Gorg.* 517 A (where with Madv. and Sch. place full stop after *ὦ Σώκρατες*), *Apol.* 35 D etc.

At *Symp.* 203 C *πένθης ἀεὶ ἔστιν καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπαλὸς τε καὶ καλὸς . . . ἀλλὰ σκληρὸς κτέ.*, it is not so well to understand *εἶναι* (which Badham would insert) as to suppose that *πολλοῦ δεῖ* is stereotyped in the sense 'by no means.' We have *πολλοῦ δεῖν* once in this sense, *Dem. Aristocr.* (23) 7 ὡ' *εἶδητε πολλοῦ δεῖν ἀξίον ὄντα* (Goodwin § 779 a). Cp. on 80 B 23.

3. *τῶν νέων*: 'partitive' gen. The word is put at the end for emphasis, and is balanced by *οἱ προσήκοντες*. Anytus believes in 'home' teaching *versus* professional. Interference with home influence was one cause of jealousy against the 'sophists,' *Prot.* 316 c. Cp. *Xen. Mem.* i ii 51 for the same feeling in the case of Socrates. *Intr.* § 6.

B 6. *εἶτε ξένος . . . εἶτε ἀσπός*: see on 91 C 21. Here *ξένος* is

characteristic of most 'sophists,' who were travellers, men without a fixed home or city—thus 'vagabonds' in the eyes of the many. By *ἀσπός* Socrates himself is hinted at. In *Soph.* 223 D we have the art of the sophist divided according as he carries his wares from city to city (*ἐμπορικῆ*) or sells them at home (*καπηλικῆ*) (cp. *Prot.* 313 c). The wandering sophist is defined at 224 D, and then, *ibid.* E, follows the definition of the stay-at-home sophist, who may either retail goods bought from others, or sell goods of his own manufacture (*καπηλικὸν εἶτε ἀτοπωλικόν*).

11. οὐδέ . . οὐδέ: see on 75 A 4.

15. The *γε* implies an affirmative answer: 'I am, and may C I continue so.' See App. on the text.

16. ὦ δαιμόνι: see on 73 D 11.

18. ἀπειρος εἰς: see on 89 E 25. Goodwin § 531 quotes this passage, translating 'how then could you know about that thing of which you had no experience at all.' *τούτου* is here an indefinite anaphoric (*ejus* with *rel.* and *subj.*). Cp. *Euthyd.* 302 A ταῦτα ἃ σοι ἐξέτη. Cobet, *Coll. crit.* p. 49, dissatisfied with this, proposed for *τούτου τοῦ πράγματος* to read *δοουδὸν πράγματος*. (See *CR.* XIV 11 for a criticism on his view, where *inter alia* *Gorg.* 450 B is quoted: *ἔπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς ἢ ἄν ἢ περὶ λόγους*). Sch., on the other hand, believing that the question is not general, but concerning 'this particular matter,' reads *ἀπειρος εἰ*. AN. \*H *ῥαδίως*. (One MS., Coisl., has *εἰς* corrected to *εἰ*.) I think the reply of Anytus shows that the question is put in a *general* form. He replies *ῥαδίως* to the general question, and then with *τούτους γοῦν* restricts himself to the particular case of the sophists. Kühner § 399. 6 b quotes this place, regarding *εἰς* as 'attracted' into the mood of *εἰδείης ἄν*; and Goodwin, at the end of § 531, where he quotes this passage, observes that 'all these examples fall under the general rule for *assimilation* § 558.' But the fact that the antecedent and relative clauses both have the optative mood is due to the similarity of the nature of the clauses; it is hardly necessary to call in such a cause as 'assimilation' to explain the usage. Moreover, such optative relative clauses, expressing a vague future condition, do not always depend on another optative. See 96 C 8 and *Theaet.* 155 A (*φήσομεν*) ὦ μήτε προστιθεῖτο μήτε ἀφαιρούτο τοῦτο μήτε ἀξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, Kühner § 560. 4.

19. οἷ εἰσιν: see App. on the text. There are many places in which the relative *ὅς* is used in the sense of *ὅσος*. Kühner § 562. 4 says that *ὅς* is often used in dependent questions, not

like *tis* or *ostis* to determine the *identity* of a person or thing (71 B 7), but in the sense of *os* (Lat. *qui* for *qualis*). In these cases the object is supposed known; its quality has to be determined. E.g. Thuc. I 136 (Θεμιστοκλήης) δηλοῖ δὲ ἔστιν (= *qui sit*, 'shows what he is,' 'shows his true character'); but *ibid.* 137 φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἐστίν (*quis sit*, 'tells him who he is'). Cp. 80 D 37: Eur. *Alc.* 640 ἔδειξας εἰς ἑλεγχον ἐξελθῶν δὲ εἰ: Soph. *Aj.* 1259 οὐ μαθῶν δὲ εἰ φύσιν: *O.C.* 1171: *Rep.* 484 A οἱ μὲν φιλόσοφοι καὶ οἱ μὴ . . ἀνεφάνησαν οἱ εἰσιν ἐκότεροι: *ibid.* 559 A παράδειγμα ἐκατέρων αἰ εἰσιν: *Gorg.* 512 A εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἱ ἐνέβησαν: *Euthyd.* 283 D (in a sophism) δὲ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, δὲ δ' ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι: *Phaedr.* 243 E ἔωσπερ ἂν ἦς δὲ εἰ. See also Kühner § 554. 2.

On the other hand we have 94 B 11 ὁρᾷς ὁὐκ ἔστιν, *Lach.* 183 C, *Menex.* 249 D οἶδα οἶα ἔστιν, etc.

20. εἰτ' οὖν: the particle οὖν is originally confirmative; its later inferential use is foreign to Homer and Pindar, and very rare in Aesch. In alternative suppositions it is added to the one that it is desired to bring into prominence: *Apol.* 27 c (δαίμονια) εἰτ' οὖν καὶνὰ εἶτε παλαιά; *Laius* 639 B ἂν τ' οὖν ναυτιᾷ ἂν τε μὴ. Sometimes both members have οὖν, if it is intended to give separate prominence to each: *Apol.* 34 E καὶ τοῦτο τοῖσιν (σοφῶν) ἔχοντα, εἰτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἰτ' οὖν ψεῦδος; *Laius* 934 D εἰάν τ' οὖν δοῦλον εἰάν τ' οὖν καὶ ἐλεύθερον (μακρόμενον) περιορᾷ. Here εἰτ' οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν is said with dark meaning, for Anytus believes that he has at the very moment the prince of 'sophists' before him.

εἶτε μή: see on 87 B 35.

Chapter XXX (92 C 20) to Chapter XXXIV (95 A).—SOCR. *I am not concerned to defend the sophists. But who do teach Virtue if they do not?* AN. *Any respectable man.* SOCR. *But look at the great men of our city, Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, Thucydides; they had their sons educated in everything that could be learnt, but in ἀρετή they never trained them to be anything like as good as themselves.* AN. *You have no veneration, Socrates, you will get into trouble.*

22. ἐξ ὧν, 'to judge from what.' This use of ἐξ is common in Plato. Cp. 93 B 1 ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου, *Crito* 43 D ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἠκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουλίου.

23. ἀλλὰ γάρ: see Exkursus III.

D 26. ἐκείνους: prolepsis. We expect in the sequel παρ'

οὐς; but after the parenthesis καὶ . . . εὐεργέτησον we have the interrogative παρὰ τίνας substituted.

27. πατρικὸν ἑταῖρον: see 90 B 2.

28. φράσας: the aor. ptc. is often used with an aor. tense to express, not an action anterior to that of the main verb, but a circumstance of it. So 77 A 5 ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι εἰπών, 'perform your promise by saying,' *ibid.* 7 ἕσας δλην εἰπέ, *Phaedo* 60 C εὐ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με (where see Heindorf's note), *Euthyd.* 282 C εὐ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με.

It seems impossible to separate from these, except by the general sense, instances where the aor. ptc. used with an aor. tense does denote an anterior action, as *Thuc.* I Βουωτοὶ οἱ ἐξ Ἄρνης ἀναστάντες τὴν Βουωτιαν ᾤκησαν, *Xen. Anab.* I iv 8 Κύρος συγκαλέσας τοὺς στρατηγούς εἶπεν, *F.E.T.* 139, 148, *C.R.* IV 425 (Campbell); v 3 foll. (Frank Carter); 248 foll. (R. Whitelaw) and VIII 34 a.

29. τὴν ἀρετὴν: a similar acc. with words like ἀγαθός is common: contrast 91 B 9, and see note on the text there. Cp. 93 A 10, B 18, D 12, 19, E 31, *Apol.* 20 B καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν, *ibid.* D ταύτην (τὴν σοφίαν) εἶναι σοφός, *Lach.* 194 D, *Prot.* 324 D (a passage near akin to the present) ἦν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοί, *Gorg.* 526 A, *Euthyd.* 292 D οὐ τί εἶσονται ἀγαθοί; *Rep.* 349 E.

31. τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἐφράσας; this form is equivalent to a forcible imperative. It is commonest in Plato and Xenophon (*Kühner* § 386. 10, *Jelf* 403. 3). The aorist is by some explained as referring to past time: 'Why did you not tell him?' i.e. 'Tell him at once!' It seems, however, that the aorist here was not felt as a past tense, as we find it with primary sequence: *Prot.* 317 D τί οὖν οὐ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν; cp. *Parm.* 136 C ἀλλὰ μοι τί οὐ διήλθες ἵνα μάλλον καταμάθω; There are certain idioms in which the indic. aor. has no sense of past time, as the exclamations ἤσθην, ἀπέπτυσσα, etc. Perhaps the same momentary or exclamatory force of the aorist developed the usage now discussed. τί οὐκ; with the aorist is rather a command than a question; τί οὐκ; with the present is rather a question than a command. The difference is similar to that between 'Why not tell him?' and 'Why do you not tell him?'

The great majority of instances are in the 2nd sing.: but see *Aesch. P.V.* 747 τί οὐκ ἐν τάχει ἔρριψ' ἐμαντὴν τῆσδ' ἀπὸ στυφλοῦ πέτρας; *Soph. O.T.* 1002 τί δῆτ' ἐγὼ οὐχὶ τοῦδε τοῦ φόβου σ', ἀναξ, ἐξελευσάμην; *Aristoph. Lys.* 182 τί δῆτα ταῦτ' οὐχ ὡς τάχιστα ξυνωμόσαμεν; *Plato Charm.* 154 E τί οὖν οὐκ ἀπεδύ-

σαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ θεασάμεθα πρότερον τοῦ εἶδους; *Prot.* 317 D (quoted above), *Xen. Mem.* IV vi 14, *Plato Phaedo* 86 D εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπωρότερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; ('let him answer'). The line ἀλλὰ τί μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμῶς; occurring *Pl.* XXI 562; XXII 122, is not a question but a self-exhortation.

The following are instances of the 2nd sing. in Plato:—

*Charm.* 155 A τί οὐκ ἐπέδειξάς μοι τὸν νεανίαν καλέσας δεῦρο;

*Prot.* 310 A τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν;

*Gorg.* 503 B τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἐφράσας;

*Ibid.* 509 E τί οὐκ αὐτὸ γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω;

*Symp.* 173 B τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω μοι;

*Menex.* 236 B τί οὖν ὠ διήλθες;

*Parm.* 136 C quoted above.

*Soph.* 251 E τί οὖν οὐκ ἐφ' ἐκάστου τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω;

*Phil.* 54 B τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαντῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ.

Οὐδὲν δ τι οἶ (an assent to a command rather than an answer to a question).

† *Alc.* i 114 B τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας;

Contrast with these *Gorg.* 504 C τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ σοι ἡδιόν ἐστιν ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, *Prot.* 310 E τί οὐ βαδίζομεν πρὸς αὐτὸν; (Socrates explains it is too early), *Lysis* 211 D ὅδε καλεῖται με Μενέξενον ἐρωτᾶν. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἐρωτᾶς;

**E** 34. ἴσως τί λέγεις, 'perhaps there is something in what you say.' Contrast οὐδὲν λέγων just above, also 79 E 47, etc.

ἐν τῷ μέρει, 'in your turn'; ἐν μέρει, 'in turn.' The former looks at the succession in reference to some particular member of the series: ἐν τῷ μέρει *Gorg.* 462 A, 474 A B, *Symp.* 198 C, 199 A, *Soph.* 225 E, *Phil.* 50 E (Eur. *Or.* 452).

Contrast *Symp.* 214 B ἔδοξε χρῆναι ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει λόγον περὶ Ἐρωτος εἰπεῖν with 198 C ἦνικα ὑμῖν ὠμολόγηον ἐν τῷ μέρει (in my turn) ἐγκωμιᾶσθε τὸν Ἐρωτα, *Luc. Pisc.* §§ 8, 28 ἐν μέρει 'vicissim,' *Prot.* 347 D, *Gorg.* 496 B, *Crat.* 410 D ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον προάγον εἰς φῶς, *Theaet.* 179 E, 189 E, *Soph.* 242 E, *Polit.* 265 A, *Laws* 819 B.

35. παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ: indirect deliberative. Goodwin § 677, F. E. T. p. 190, Hadley § 932, *Phaedo* 115 D ἐρωτᾶ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ.

38. ὅτω γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ: see on 91 C 1.

τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν: the phrase is used in a moral, not in a political sense; for Anytus was a democrat. Intr. § 6.

## CHAPTER XXXI

2. ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, 'spontaneously': 90 A 39, *Prot.* 323 c, † *Alc.* i 118 c (etc.).

τοιοῦτοι = καλοὶ κάγαθοι. The participial clause that follows couples on what is really a separate part of the question: 'and without learning from anybody are they still able, etc.?'

5. ἀξιώ, 'I expect you to grant'; cp. the (mainly trans- 93 A atlantic) use of 'I claim.' Instances where, as here, the verb is followed by a *proposition* in the acc. and infin. occur *Gorg.* 450 c τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιώ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, *Phaedo* 86 d εἰάν τις ἀξιοὶ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν . . ἀπόλλυσθαι, *Apol.* 18 d, *Rep.* 610 A, *Polít.* 262 E, etc. Different are such places as 91 D 6 χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι.

παρὰ τῶν προτέρων: this is the point of view of Protagoras in his apologue; see on B 17 below.

6. ἦ, like Latin *an*, was originally attached to the second member of a double question; then often to a question when a former member might be understood. Cp. 71 B 5, also C 11, D 13 below, 85 E 32 and some of the questions quoted on 91 E 17.

10. καὶ ἔτι, 'and, what is more.' So Buttman: 'insuper,' 'praeterea.' This seems the best way of taking it. Another way is to take ἔτι temporally (= *jam*), 'before now.' A third alternative, to take ἔτι οὐχ ἦρτον in the sense of ἔτι μᾶλλον, 'yet more,' may be dismissed, for the litotes οὐχ ἦρτον would be entirely spoiled by the addition of ἔτι.

Socrates hints that the statesmen of a former generation, though he does not think very highly of them, were superior to the men of the present.

14. ἦ μή: see on 86 D 12. Of course μή here negatives not ἀγαθοί, but εἰσιν.

17. ἀρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες κτέ.: see on 90 B 5. This ground B has been gone over in the *Protagoras*. Socrates urges as an argument that Virtue cannot be taught, the fact that good fathers often have bad sons: 319 E-320 c (a passage closely akin to the present). In answer to this Protagoras relates a fable, according to which the rudimentary principles, Shame and Justice, that form the necessary moral basis of society, were implanted at the creation in every human creature. He then (324 d-326 E, cc. xiv, xv) explains the process of moral education to which children are subjected, by instruction, admonition, and punishment. Thence he goes on (ch. xvi) to

deal with the problem why good fathers have bad sons; the reason being that all have not the same aptitude for virtue.

In the *Laches* we have a similar topic. Lysimachus, son of Aristides, and Melesias, son of Thucydides, complain that they are not on a level with their distinguished fathers (179 D): *καὶ αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἰων τρυφᾶν, ἐπειδὴ μεῖράκια ἐγενόμεθα*. They are very anxious that their own sons shall be educated so as to be worthy of their illustrious grand-sires, whose names they bear. Whence naturally follows a discussion where to look for teaching. Nearly related is *Apol.* 20 A foll. If Callias' sons were colts or steers, a trainer for them could easily be found; as it is, who is to train them? 'Euenus, of Paros, for five minae': *καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐθνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς* ('on such reasonable terms') *διδάσκει*.

† *Alc.* i 118 D foll. looks like an imitation of the passages in the *Protagoras* and the *Meno*. The author of the compilation *περὶ ἀρετῆς* (cp. on 70 A 1) 377 B foll. has incorporated this passage, 93 D 13-94 E 15, almost verbatim.

18. ἦν: see on 92 D 29.

20. *παραδοτόν*, 'transferable'; *παραληπτόν*, 'receivable.' See on 70 A 2.

## CHAPTER XXXII

C 2. Plato for his illustrations takes two pairs of rivals, Themistocles and Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides. Themistocles is remembered only as a great popular statesman. The darker memories attaching to his name are ignored. It must be remembered that the charges of complicity in the treason of Pausanias, brought against him after his ostracism, were never proved. See Dr. Thompson on *Gorg.* 516 D. But for Plato's purpose the truth or falsity of such charges is not very important. In † *Theages* 126 A Themistocles with Pericles and Cimon are spoken of as types of men τὰ πολιτικά δεινοί. In *Gorg.* 455 E Gorgias couples him with Pericles as achieving practical results by oratory.

It is instructive to compare the *Gorgias* with the *Meno* in regard to the treatment of prominent Athenian statesmen. The lists are different; in the *Gorgias* we have Miltiades and Cimon in place of Aristides and Thucydides in the *Meno*: see 503 C, where Callicles gives the names of four ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες who have made the Athenians better. At 515 D Socrates disallows this claim, and at 519 A he says that the people suffering from former pampering will fall out with their present advisers:

and by comparison will praise their older leaders. The object in the two dialogues is different: in the *Gorgias* it is disparagement of their work as statesmen; in the *Meno* the point is that, however good they were, they could not train their sons. Dr. Thompson (Intro. p. xix) also compares *Theaet.* 172 c foll., but adds that 'there is not one of Plato's dialogues in which the public men of the best times of Athenian history are treated with such indiscriminating severity as in the *Gorgias*.' Athenaeus, 506 A, regards Plato's strictures on Aristides and Themistocles as merely a proof of his malevolent spirit.

7. εἶναι is imperfect. Cp. *Phaedo* 76 E ἀναγκαῖον . . τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς. So presently φθονεῖν, παραδιδόναι, and 93 E 30 βούλεσθαι. This is a 'past particular supposition' (Goodwin § 402): 'if any one was a teacher, he was.'

8. εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε: see Exc. II and cp. E 33. εἰ γε ἐβούλετο would be 'assuming, of course, that he wished'; the text is 'if only he wished to do so': γε points ἐβούλετο.

9. ἄν ἐβουλῆθη: the 'potential indicative,' Goodwin §§ 244, 412, Kühner II § 392. Cp. D 23 ἠτιάσαι' ἄν, *Apol.* 18 c ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἐν ᾗ ἄν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε.

It is clear that in these instances ἄν does not point to an 'unfulfilled condition'; nor again do they fall under the 'iterative use' of which familiar examples are *Thuc.* VII 71. 3 εἰ μὲν τινες ἰδοῖεν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσησαν τε ἄν: *Ar. Frogs* 1022 ὁ θεασάμενος πᾶς ἄν τις ἀπὴρ ἠράσθη δάϊος εἶναι: *Xen. Hell.* III iv 18 ἐπερρώσθη δ' ἄν τις κάκεινο ἰδὼν, 'Αγησῖλαον μὲν πρῶτον κτέ.

In neither of the two instances, here and at D 23 (where the *de virtute* gives αἰτιάσαι' ἄν) is there any expressed protasis, and the supposed conditions summed up in ἄν are of the most general description; indeed the omission of ἄν here would leave the sense little altered. 94 D 10 is different.

On the subject of these constructions a 'Symposium' was held, extending over several years, in the pages of the *Classical Review*. The contributions are as follows:

III 276 (summary of paper by Bayfield, read before the Camb. Philol. Soc.).

III 314, 343 (criticisms by R. C. Seaton).

III 417 (ditto by Caskie Harrison).

IV 200 b (Bayfield).

IV 297 (Caskie Harrison).

V 397 'Conditions contrary to fact': Edw. B. Clapp.

VI 90 Bayfield replies.

VI 199 (Sonnenschein).

VI 201 Seaton rejoins.

This debate must have done a great deal to clear up the subject; but the most luminous utterance on the subject with which I am acquainted is Jebb's note on Soph. *O.C.* 964. 'Has not our way of translating *ἄν* led us to form too narrow a conception of the way in which the Greek idiom was used? Suppose, however, we treat *ἄν* as what in fact it is—a separate word which qualifies the statement of fact. *ἄν* is 'on that hypothesis': thus *εἰ ἔπεσον, ἀπέθανεν ἄν* is "if he fell, on that hypothesis he died." Thus we see how this use, though in practice restricted to the "unfulfilled condition," is large enough to include *κεν κτείνεν* "he probably slew" (*Od.* IV 546) and *ἀνεθάρσασαν ἄν* "in that case they took courage."

The notion of *non-fulfilment* in *ἄν* with a past tense of the indicative is thus adventitious. When this combination is associated with a protasis containing *εἰ* and a past tense of the indic. the notion of unreality is inevitable; but to this form of condition may be applied the words of Allen and Greenough, *Lat. Gr.* p. 327 note: 'The implication of falsity in this construction (imp. and plupf. subj.) is not inherent in the subj., but comes from the transfer of future conditions to *past time*. Thus the time for the happening of the condition has at the time of writing already passed; so that if the condition remain a condition, it must be contrary to fact.' [These words will exemplify the quality of the book noted by Prof. Hale in his review of it, *CR.* III 166: (in it) 'syntactical mechanisms are regarded not as results, intellectually perfect, of a rational mind, working with entire logic, but as results of the workings of multitudes of minds, proceeding in part logically, in part under the influence of associations of various kinds.' This is the only true attitude of mind for the study of grammar.]

**ἄλλους τε . . . μάλιστα δέ :** *τε . . . δέ* is not uncommon; in addition to the accession of emphasis expected by *τε* in the clause that follows it, *δέ* imports a notion of contrast. Cp. *Euthyphr.* 3 E *σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν*, Xen. *Hell.* VI v 30 *οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες τούτων τε οὐδὲν ἐποιοῦν, καταλιπόντες δὲ τὰ ὄπλα εἰς ἀρκαγὴν ἐτρέποντο*, Aesch. *S. c. T.* 579 (571) with Verrall's note.

- C** 11. **ὄν :** this is the preferable spelling, according to Sch. Plato forms the nom. and acc. sing. in the 2nd declension, and all the other forms in the 3rd, as **D** 17 *τοῦ ὄεος*, **94 B** 13 *νιέῖς*.
- D** 14. **Κλεόφαντον :** see Plut. *Them.* xxxii. 'Dictum ejus commemorat Plut. *de ed. puer.* 2 ὡς, δ τι ἄν αὐτὸς βούληται,

τοῦτο καὶ τῷ δήμῳ συνδοκεῖ τῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων· ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐθέλει, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ· ἃ δ' ἂν ἡ μήτηρ, καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς· ἃ δ' ἂν Θεμιστοκλῆς, καὶ πάντες Ἀθηναῖοι' Fr. If Cleophrantus was a 'spoiled child,' we should not need to look much farther for the cause of his failure.

**ἑδιδάξατο**: this raises the difficult question whether we may regard as a separate force of the Middle Voice the meaning to 'get a thing done by another' ('Causative Middle' F. E. T. p. 127). Against this Riddell strongly argues, § 87. He does not deny that *διδάσκειν* often means 'I have some one taught'; but contends that this sense is not peculiar to, or due to, the Middle Voice, except in as far as it is deducible from the general force of the Middle—the *interest* of the agent in the act.

He says that the ascription to the Middle Voice of this meaning is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification, *διδάσκεισθαι*, by some passages in the *Meno*. 'As the favourite example thus falls to the ground, so do the rest. *δανεῖσθαι*, for instance, is "to take a *δανείον*," as *δανείζειν* is "to give a *δανείον*"; that is, the general meaning of the verb being "to deal in *δανεία*," the Middle means "to deal in them for one's self." So, rather differently, "bringing a man to justice" becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the judge, *κρίνειν*, and, on the interested side, the office of the prosecutor, *κρίνεσθαι*. The fact is that the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning "to get a thing done by another"; neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle that "qui facit per alium facit per se," as we say a man 'builds a house' or 'educates his sons.'

This view I believe to be right. But Mr. St. George Stock's note on this place should be consulted, with *CR.* II 29 a.

Neither Ast s.vv. *διδάσκειν*, *παιδεύειν*, nor Kühner § 373. 6, § 374. 7, recognize a *separate* causal sense of the Middle. An examination of these words will show, I think, that there is no constant distinction between the active and middle voices.

(a) *διδάσκεισθαι* (causal as here) *Prot.* 325 BC (quoted on 91 E 17): *Rep.* 467 E καὶ διδασκόμενος ('having had them taught') *ἰππεύειν*, ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν: † *Theages* 122 E οὐκ ἐδιδάξατό σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν ἄπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἄλλοι πεπαίδωνται: † *Er.* xiii 360 E ('if possible attend this philosopher yourself') εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκδίδαξαι τινα ('get some one "coached"') *Ἰνα* κατὰ σχολὴν μανθάνων βελτίων γίγνη: *Xen. Mem.* IV iv 5, *Cyr.* I vi 2, *Eur. Med.* 295—

χρὴ δ' οὐποθ' ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνήρ  
παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι σοφοῦς:

Aristoph. *Clouds* 1338 ἐδιδάξαμην μέντοι σε· Lucian *Somn.* init. ὁ πατήρ ἐσκοπεῖτο μετὰ τῶν φίλων ὅ τι καὶ διδάξαιτό με.

In Hdt. II 154 παῖδας παρέβαλε αὐτοῖσι Αἰγυπτίους τῆν Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν ἐκιδάσκεισθαι, the last word may be either passive ('for them to be taught'); or middle in causal sense ('so as to have them taught'), as L. & S. take it: see s.v. ἐκιδάσκω.

The middle appears in sense of the active, or 'merely with the idea of the teacher's interest superadded' (Jebb on Soph. *Ant.* 356) *Menex.* 238 B: (the gods) οἱ τὸν βίον ἡμῶν κατεσκεύασαν πρὸς τε τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν διαίταν, τέχνας πρώτους παιδευσάμενοι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας φυλακὴν ὄπλων κτήσιν τε καὶ χρῆσιν διδασκόμενοι: Pind. *Ol.* 8. 59 τὸ διδάσθαι δέ τοι εἰδότες ῥῆτερον: Simonides (Bergk\* 145 = *Anth. Pal.* VI 213) διδασκόμενος χρόνον ἀνδρῶν: Mosch. 3. 97 διδάξασο σείο μαθητὰς: Bion 12 (2). 9. The use of ἐδιδάξατο in Soph. *Ant.* 356, 'hath he taught himself,' is exceptional, and seems due to the analogy of the pres. διδάσκει reflexive, as in Aristoph. *Wasps* 2, and Simonides γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος. Cp. Aristoph. *Clouds* 783 οὐκ ἂν διδασκόμεν σ' ἔτι (Elmsley διδάξαιμ' ἂν σ' ἔτι, approved by Jebb l.c.): Plato *Rep.* 421 E καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς ἢ ἄλλους οὐδ' ἂν διδάσκει χεῖρους δημιουργοὺς διδάξεται (Cobet διδάξει. The tense διδάξομαι is usually passive. See on 95D 4). On Luc. *Somn.* § 10 οὐκ ἐς μακρὰν σε διδάξομαι Heitland observes that the fut. mid. is used just like the active by late writers.

(β) διδάσκειν occurs 94 B 16, D 2, 3, where the context makes it clear that the teaching was done by means of others; *Prot.* 324 D (cp. διδάσκεισθαι 325 B).

(γ) παιδεύεσθαι 'institui curo' D 18: *Rep.* 546 B οὐδ' ἡγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύασθε: Eur. *fr.* 1053—

οὐ γὰρ τις οὕτω παῖδας εὖ παιδεύεται  
ὅσ' ἐκ ποτηρῶν μὴ οὐ κακοῦς πεφυκέναι.

παιδεύεσθαι like active: *Menex.* 238 D (quoted above): Eur. *I.A.* 562 τροφῆαι αἱ παιδευόμεναι: παιδεύεται humorously for τρέφει Nausicrates ap. Ath. VII 325 E (τρίγλας) ἄς κλύδων Αἰζωνικός πασῶν ἀρίστας ἐν τόποις παιδεύεται.

(δ) παιδεύειν, 'institui curo': 93 E 31 παιδεύσαι 94 A 9, B 17, C 24: *Prot.* 319 E ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἶχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαιδεύεται: ibid. 320 A ἐν Ἀρήφρονος ἐπαιδεύει: *Crito* 50 D (the laws) παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σὺ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν: † *Theages* 122 E (quoted above).

All this goes to show that the differentiation between the two voices was still incomplete. See Mr. E. H. Miles *On the Early Meaning and Developments of the 'Middle' Voice*, pp. 26. 7; 31. 2: also note on ψεύδω 71 D 29. Another verb that well

illustrates the intermixture of meanings in the two voices is φυλάσσω.

A few instances of 'causal middles' may be added.

(1) *Phil.* 14 E *διομολογησόμενος* no doubt means 'having got him to admit'; but this arises not so much from the voice as from *δια*. The admission which is to his interest is part of a *mutual* process (cp. *δια-λέγεσθαι*, etc.).

(2) *ποιούμαι*, 'I get made,' see L. & S. A I. Add Plato † *Er.* xiii 361 A τὸν μὲν Ἀπόλλω ἐποιήσασθαι 'I got the Apollo made': Plut. *Them.* v 4 αὐτοῦ ποιούμενον εἰκόνας. The notion of *procuring* springs from the notion of interest.

(3) Kühner § 374. 7 points out how *κατασιωπᾶν* (*Xen. Hell.* v iv 7) and *κατασιωπᾶσθαι* (*ibid.* II iv 20) are used in identical sense 'to put to silence,' where the causal sense is due, not to the voice, but to *κατά* (cp. *κατηχεῖν*, originally 'to elicit a resonance from,' so 'to test'; later 'to catechise').

(4) *προστρίβεσθαι*: Aristoph. *Eq.* 5 πλῆγὰς δὲ προστρίβεται τοὺς οἰκέτας 'he gets stripes inflicted' (L. & S. III): *ἐντρίβεσθαι* (L. & S. I 2). Here the causal sense is clear, and seems confined to the middle: but it may be deduced from the notion of interest.

(5) *παραιθεμαί*, 'I have served up to me,' Thuc. i 130, etc.

But L. & S. s.v. B I quote the same verb from *Od.* xv 506 ἦσθεν δὲ κεν ὕμιν ὀδοιπύριον παραθείμην, of setting meat *before others*: and from Plut. *Per.* 26 παρειθέμετο τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄσα κτέ., of providing *yourself*.

(6) *Συμπ.* 205 E ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν γε καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ἐθέλουσιν ἀποτέμνεσθαι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, which may mean either 'to cut off from themselves,' or 'to have cut off from themselves (by another).' It is absolutely indifferent who the agent is.

*ἱππία ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν*: *διδάσκειν* and *παιδεύειν* are treated as 'factive' verbs, with subst. or adj. as secondary predicates. This appears in some of the instances quoted above. Cp. Eur. *Her.* 575—

καὶ διδάσκέ μοι  
τοιούσδε τούσδε παῖδας ἐς τὸ πᾶν σοφούς.

*Soph. O.C.* 919 καίτοι σε Θῆβαι γ' οὐκ ἐπαίδευσαν κακόν: Eur. *Andr.* 601, Aristoph. *Ran.* 1020.

So in the pass., *Soph. O.C.* 562 ἐπαυδέσθην ξένος.

15. ὀρθὸς ἐστηκώς: the 'ars desultoria.' Cp. *Il.* xv 680 foll.

18. ἐπαιδέυσατο: see on ἐδιδάξατο (line 14 above).

καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν: change from rel. to demonstrative construction. See on 74 D 35, 90 E 32.

19. διδασκάλων ἔχετο : for the phrase cp. 94 A 8, B 18 ; *Prot.* 319 E, 324 D : for the tense see on 83 D 51.

22. τὴν γε φύσιν : nothing can illustrate more strikingly the difference between Plato's point of view and ours. Because, forsooth, he had ability to learn horsemanship, he had ability to learn virtue.

23. ἤτιάσατ' ἄν τις : see on 93 C 9. Plato is fond of using αἰτιῶμαι with inf. : *Prot.* 333 E τὸν λόγον ἤτιάτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι : *Rep.* 407 C Ἰλιγγους αἰτιωμένη ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνεσθαι : *ibid.* 599 E (addressed to Homer) σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιάται πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγεμέναι ; *Crat.* 396 D καὶ αἰτιῶμαι γε μάλιστα αὐτὴν (τὴν σοφίαν) ἀπὸ Εὐθύφρονος προσπεπτικέμαι μοι.

E 32. τῶν γευτόνων : below 94 A 10 βελτίω ὄτουοῦν. Note the love of variety through this passage. ποιῆσαι depends on βούλεσθαι.

33. For εἶπερ . . γε see on C 8 and Exc. II. There is a slight ellipse : 'as he would have wished, if etc.'

### CHAPTER XXXIII

94 A 2. ἐν τοῖς ἀριστοῖν : Kühner § 349 b 7 i, Hadley § 652. This strengthened superlative occurs in Hdt. and is commonest in Thuc. and Plato (*Symp.* 178 c, etc.). The origin is probably from a phrase in which the superl. was repeated (ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀριστοῖν), and the best MSS. at *Crat.* 427 E actually give ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις μέγιστον ; but Sch. cuts out μεγίστοις.

4. Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου : see on 93 C 2. In the passage in the *Gorgias* in which the great statesmen of old are disparaged, the name of Aristides does not appear. In one place of the dialogue Plato recognizes Aristides' superiority (526 A B) : 'the just use of power is very rare ; still, there are some both here and elsewhere, and yet will be, καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπη· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου.'

8. Lysimachus and Melesias (94 C 23) appear in the *Laches* (see on 93 B 17). Lysimachus is there represented as an elderly man (189 c, cp. 201 B). The dramatic date of the *Laches* must be before 420 B.C., the date of Laches' death. We may probably assume then that Lysimachus was born not very much after 500 B.C. He and Sophroniscus the father of Socrates were ἑταῖρω τε καὶ φίλω *Lach.* 180 E. (Socrates was born in 469 B.C.) 'Lysimachus obscuram degebat vitam a civibus agro et argento

donatus ob paternae virtutis memoriam' Fr., who refers to Dem. *Lept.* (20) 115, and schol.

10. καὶ συγγέγονας, 'you have actually met'; contrasted with ἀκήκοας in the case of Cleophantus 93 E 27.

11. ὄρας οἷός ἐστιν: this implies that Plato regards B Lysimachus as still alive at the dramatic date of the *Meno* (say 402 B.C.). According to what we gather from the *Laches* he must then have been at such an advanced age as to make a fair estimate of his powers difficult. Lysimachus would be some seventy years older than Meno. But Plato is not very careful about consistency in chronology. See Athenæus 505 E.

εἰ δὲ βούλει: see on 71 E 2.

Περικλέα: see on 93 C 2.

13. δύο υἱεῖς: these are the two sons which Pericles had by his Athenian wife, the widow of Hipponicus. They were both carried off by the plague in 429 B.C. (Plut. *Pericles* 24. 5; 36. 4, 5). After their death the Athenians legitimated his son by Asia, named Pericles. Schol. on *Menex.* 235 E ἔσχε δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς ('Ἀσπασίας) ὁ Περικλῆς νόθον υἱόν, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ ἐτελεύτα, τῶν γνησίων προπροθανόντων.

The two sons (of whom Xanthippus seems to have been the elder) are mentioned in the *Protagoras*. At 315 A they appear in the row of listeners walking up and down with Protagoras. At 320 A the sophist gives them as examples of youths whose education has been neglected: νέμονται ὡς περ ἄφετοι ('browsing at large'), εἰάν που περιτύχῃσι τῇ ἀρετῇ. In † *Alc.* i 118 E we read τῶ Περικλέους υἱέε ἡλιθίω ἐγενέσθην: with the scholium οὐδὲ καὶ βλιτομάμμις ἐκάλουν. (The scholiast adds an explanation of the epithet, which, however, still remains obscure. It occurs in Aristoph. *Clouds* 1001, where the suggestion is that it was applied to the sons of Hippocrates.) Plut. *Per.* 36. 1 speaks of Xanthippus' extravagance, and his variance with his father; and Athenæus v 220 D says that Antisthenes wrote disparagingly of both the youths. Lastly note Aristot. *Rhet.* ii xv 3 ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εἰφυνά γένη εἰς μακικώτερα ἦθη . . . τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα, οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος καὶ Περικλέους καὶ Σωκράτους, with which cp. Plato *Polit.* 310 c foll.

18. δὲ ἄρα: see on 91 E 17.

20. μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδακτόν: see on 89 C 10.

23. Θεουκιδίης: the son of Melesias (unrelated to the C historian), an aristocrat of unblemished respectability, is reserved for the climax. (See App. on the text B 21). His son Melesias is introduced in the *Laches* (179 c) as the com-

panion and coeval of Lysimachus. Here again the dates give trouble. For whereas Aristides died about 468 B.C., Thucydides was ostracized in 444 B.C., returned to Athens, renewed his opposition to Pericles, and perhaps survived him. His death thus was later than that of Aristides by some forty years. Are their children likely to have been coevals? Thucydides, to have a son coeval with Lysimachus, cannot have been born much later than 520 B.C. (see on A 8). This would make him at least 76 at the time of his ostracism. This is, of course, not impossible, but none of the accounts we have suggest his being so much older than his rival Pericles. Stephanus' name appears in a quotation from Polemo ap. Athen. iv 234 E *στήλη τις ἔστιν, ἐν ἣ ψήφισμα μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου, γραμματεὺς δὲ Στέφανος Θουκυδίδου.*

25. *ἐπάλαιον*: wrestling may have been a favourite sport of Thucydides, as is suggested by the anecdote Plut. *Per.* 8, Abbott's *Hist. of Greece*, II 414 note.

26. *πον*, 'as I understand': see on 75 C 29.

#### CHAPTER XXXIV

1. *οὐκ ἂν ποτε*: the negative refers to the whole double supposition following; or rather, if we regard the sentence as an instance of parataxis, to the latter half of it: 'he would not, while teaching his sons this, have omitted to teach them that.' This place and some quoted below are instances of *argumentum ex contrariis conclusum* (see on 91 E 17).

In sentences like this, where each member consists of a protasis and apodosis, we often have *μὲν* twice in the first number, *δέ* twice in the second: *Apol.* 28 E *δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένοι εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον . . τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκείνοι ἔταπτον ἔμμενον . . τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος . . ἐνταῦθα δὲ λιπομὴ τὴν τάξιν*: *Gorg.* 512 A (quoted on 91 E 17): *ibid.* 514 B C *καὶ εἰ μὲν . . ὁβρω μὲν . . εἰ δὲ . . ὁβρω δέ . .*: *Orat.* 386 A *ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δ' ἂν σοι, τοιαῦτα δὲ σοι*: † *Alc.* i 108 E *ἀσχερὸν γὰρ εἰ μὲν τις ἐρωτήσῃεν . . περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν εἰπεῖν . . περὶ δὲ οὐ . . τούτου δὲ πέρι κτέ.* Kühner § 529. 2 quotes instances of *μὲν . . μὲν . . δὲ . . δέ . .* from Hdt. (II 26, 102, 174); from Xenophon (as *Oec.* iv 8) and from Isocrates, whose love of *παρίσωσις* perhaps led him to affect this structure (see Sandys on *Paneg.* § 60). But often the structure is *imperfect*, *μὲν* being omitted in the first apodosis, as *Prot.* 313 A *ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε εἶδει τῷ . . πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέω . . δ δὲ*

περὶ πλείονος ἡγεῖ . . . περὶ δὲ τούτου κτέ., *Charm.* 173 CD ; or with both the first protasis and apodosis, *Phaedo* 78 C, *Laches* 194 D ; or δὲ omitted in second apodosis as *Xen. Oec.* iv 7 ; or it is varied as *Hdt.* II 39, where we have δέ substituted for μέν in the first apodosis, and in consequence δὴ for δέ in the second protasis. See Buttman's *Demosthenes' Midias* Exc. XII pp. 153 foll.

2-4. **δαπανώμενον . . ἀναλώσαντα** : in both these clauses D the participle contains the main thought that is dependent on ἔδει. Cp. *Euthyd.* 282 E ἐπιστήμην ἦν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα εἶναι : *Gorg.* 484 D οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὀμλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, etc. So 80D 3 προθέμενος, not ζητήσεις, contains the important idea.

6. **ἀλλὰ γάρ** : see Exc. III. This is an instance of ἀλλὰ γάρ introducing a supposed objection—a usage very rare in Plato, though Riddell (§ 147) does not think it necessary to illustrate it. *Rep.* 365 C ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ράδιον αἰεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν οὐτα is the only parallel I can cite, and this itself differs from the present and other places, inasmuch as the words φησί τις, usually understood, are expressed. Other instances occur in the orators ; *Lysias* κατ' Ἐρατ. § 40, *Isocr. Paneg.* (4) 175. See Sandys' note *ibid.* 140 : ἀλλὰ γάρ οὐκ ἐκ τούτων δίκαιόν ἐστι σκοπεῖν τὴν βασιλείως δύναμιν, ἐξ ὧν μεθ' ἑκατέρων γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πεπολέμηκεν. He says the use is 'very common' ; which can only apply to the orators. (I confess I do not understand why the two places first referred to should be printed as interrogations, and the last not.) Here ἀλλὰ goes with the sentence καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ; and the words from γάρ to τῶν συμμάχων really form a parenthesis, which is felt as a protasis. 'But, —as perhaps I shall be told, etc.—he was both of noble family and etc.'

7. καὶ τῶν συμμάχων : *Thucydides*, as an aristocrat, was likely to favour the claims of the allies.

10. **ἔξευρεῖν ἄν** : see on 93 C 9. But this instance must be separated from those there treated, for here an unreal condition is implied in the words εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτὸν.

12. τῶν ἐπιχωρίων : a variation for ἀσπῶν (92 B 7).

E

τις : this is in apposition to the object of ἐξευρεῖν, and so might be accus., but we have an 'attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction' Riddell § 192. He quotes *inter alia* *Apol.* 41 A εὐρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, ὡς περ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως κτέ.

εἰ αὐτοὺς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν: cp. *Lach.* 179 C αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἰων τρυφᾶν . . τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα ἐπραττον. A simple past condition.

14. ἀλλὰ γάρ, κτεί.: see Exc. III. The phrase is often used to sum up in conclusion.

μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδασκτὸν ἀρετῆ: with the whole of the preceding discussion compare Socrates' argument in the *Protagoras* 319 A foll. The argument falls clearly into two divisions (1) *public*: on matters of *general policy* there are no expert advisers as there are with the special arts: (2) *private* 319 D: if we look at the matter from the point of view of *individuals*, we find that even the best and wisest citizens cannot secure a similar virtue in their sons.

For μὴ οὐκ ἢ see on 89 C 10.

16. ῥαδίως often has a bad meaning; 'lightly,' 'recklessly'; Fr. refers to *Apol.* 24 C ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους: *Crito* 48 C τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύοντων: add *Rep.* 377 B, 378 A, *Laus* 917 B θεῶν ὄνυματα μὴ χραίνειν ῥαδίως: *Phaedo* 63 A τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ δεσπότης ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοντο αὐτῶν; and soon afterwards οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων, with which cp. the reproach of Hippolytus to Artemis (*Eur. Hipp.* 1441) μακρὰν δὲ λείπεις ῥαδίως ὀμιλίαν.

κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους: undoubtedly Socrates' disparagement of Athenian statesmen, both past and present, was one chief cause of the suspicion in which he was held. See *Apol.* 23 E foll. Of his three accusers Anytus was angered ὑπὲρ τῶν δημοργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. See Art. 'Socrates' in *Encycl. Brit.*

19. ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ—ἐν τῆδε δὲ καί: see an article by Milton W. Humphreys dealing with καί followed by δὲ καί in *CR.* xi 141.

20. Anytus is here no doubt referring to the facilities for prosecutions given by the system of popular juries, of which he is supposed to speak with approbation. Cp. *Gorg.* 521 B, etc.

95 A 21. καὶ αὐτὸν εἶδέναι: we read in *Apol.* 32 B-D of two occasions, before the trial that led to his death, on which Socrates *risked* prosecution; but as he does not seem to have been actually prosecuted on either occasion, the reference here is probably quite general. The conversation with Anytus may perhaps be considered as a sample of those by which Socrates says (*Apol.* 21 c) he alienated statesmen; see *Diog. L.* ii 38, *Zeller Socr.* p. 206.

Chapters XXXV, XXXVI (95 A-96 B). SOCR. *Anytus has left us, apparently angry. He has really no reason for being so. Tell me, in your country do men eminent for virtue profess to communicate it?* MENO. *They utter no certain sound on the subject.* SOCR. *Are the sophists then, who alone do profess this, teachers of virtue?* MENO. *The best of them, Gorgias, never made any profession of the sort; he only professed the art of speaking.* SOCR. *What do you think yourself about the sophists' teaching of virtue?* MENO. *I cannot make up my mind.* SOCR. *Observe that you find the same vacillation in the poet Theognis. A most remarkable result: those who profess to teach virtue are held not to be masters of it themselves; those who admittedly are masters of it are very doubtful whether it can be taught. These doubters can hardly be teachers, can they?* MENO. *No, hardly.*

Here begins the fifth and last section of the dialogue.

#### CHAPTER XXXV

2. οἷται γάρ κρέ.: of the two assumptions that Anytus makes, it is only the former that is distinctly mistaken. Socrates is eulogistic of the old statesmen; he only points out their limitations. As far as these limitations are concerned, he would no doubt class Anytus with them; whether as equally eminent or not makes no difference.

5. οὐδὲν ἔστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν: Fr. (Introd. p. 30) thinks these words have some reference to the prosecution which Anytus himself sustained in 409 B.C. According to Diodorus XIII 64, being sent out to relieve Pylos, then besieged by the Lacedaemonians, he failed to double Cape Malea, and returned to Athens having effected nothing. This led to a prosecution: ὁ δὲ Ἄνυτος ἰσχυρῶς κινδυνεύων ἐρρύσατο χρήμασι τὴν ἰδίαν ψυχὴν, καὶ πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων δοκεῖ δικαστήριον δωροδοκῆσαι. The fact that the dramatic date of the dialogue is pretty certainly later than 409 (Introd. § 8) throws doubt on this interpretation; accordingly Hermann (*Gesch. u. Syst.* I p. 482) finds a reference to a later prosecution of Anytus, leading to his death: of which various improbable and inconsistent accounts are given.

But we may well ask whether in such a case, or if the reference were to any prosecution of Anytus, the words παύσαι χαλεπαίων would be applicable. I believe we have here simply a piece of Socratic irony. To Socrates κακῶς λέγειν means 'to speak untruly, unreasonably.' Cp. Diog. L. II 35 (Socrates)

πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, κακῶς ὁ δεῖνὰ σε λέγει· καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, λέγειν οὐκ ἔμαθε. Cp. *Rep.* 377 E ὅταν εἰκάσῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἥρώων οἷοί εἰσιν. Cp. *Phaedr.* 258 D, 259 E. (A similar word-play *Euthyhd.* 284 D κακῶς ἄρα λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ κακά, εἴπερ ὡς ἔχει λέγουσιν.)

**B** 10. *ἔθελουσιν*: the meaning stands between *solent* and *volunt*, as at 98 A 28. This is pretty common in Plato, of things inanimate as well as animate: cp. *Phaedr.* 230 D τὰ δένδρα οὐδὲν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν.

11. *διδάσκαλοι τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτὸν ἀρετῆν*: the sequence *τε . . ἢ* involves a slight anacoluthon. *τε* expects something to be added; *ἢ* instead of adding anything gives an alternative: 'or, what comes to the same thing.' (It has been admitted 89 D that the propositions *διδακτὸν ἐστὶν ἀρετῆ* and *διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς* are equivalent.) Wolf (in Buttman's edition) wanted to read *καὶ* for *ἢ*, observing that MSS. often confound these two particles; but this is unnecessary. Ullrich in his note made the use of *τε . . ἢ* clear, quoting *Theaet.* 143 C περὶ αὐτοῦ *τε* ὅποτε λέγοι . . ἢ αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, and *Ion* 535 D ὅς ἂν κλάῃ τ' ἐν θυσίαις καὶ ἑορταῖς . . ἢ φοβῆται. In both of these cases, he says, *τε . . καὶ . .* might have stood; in this place in the *Meno*, not so appropriately. See Kühner § 520. Anm. 2. (See also on 99 C 27.)

17. *οἷς*: the 'dative of the personal agent' is not very common with the pres. or impf. pass. In the instances here given it will be seen that the dative may generally be explained either as a '*dativus commodi*' or as a 'dative of the person judging.' The latter perhaps best explains the numerous instances with *ὁμολογεῖσθαι*, *Gorg.* 497 D, *Rep.* 434 D, 478 A, *Phaedo* 72 A, *Phil.* 60 B, *Andoc. Myst.* § 15; and with *ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι*, *Lais* 638 D *ἀμφισβητεῖται δ' αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν*. Cp. *γεννώσκεισθαι ὑμῖν* *Isaens* 11 § 15. Besides these we have (*Lais* 715 B) *λέγεται δὲ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα ταῦθ' ἡμῖν*; and lastly 96 E 29 *τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα*. Are there instances with any other verbs in Plato?

There are some examples in Thuc., as I 51. 2 αἱ Ἀθηναίων νῆες τοῖς Κερκυραίοις οὐχ ἑωρῶντο; II 101. 5 ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἐπρόσσετο; III 64. 4 *τίνες ἂν ὄν δικαιοτέρον πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι μισοῖντο* 'in the eyes of' (see Classen's note); III 82. 7 ὅρκοι ἑκατέρῳ διδόμενοι 'by each party'; IV 109. 4 αἱ οἰκοῦνται *συμμῆκτοις ἔθνεσι*; VI 873 τῶν ἡμῖν ποιουμένων.

In Xenophon *An.* I i 9 ἄλλο στρατεύμα αὐτῷ συνελέγετο, the dative of interest is apparent.

Some instances in verse may be given:

Homer *Il.* VI 398 *ἔχεθ'* Ἔκτορι 'was held to wife by,' a true

dative, or *dativus commodi*: v 465 κτείνεσθαι ἐάσετε λαόν Ἀχαιοῖς, VIII 244 Τρώεσσι καὶ δάμνασθαι Ἀχαιοῖς, XXI 556 τοῦτους ὑποκλονέεσθαι ἐάσω . . Ἀχιλλῆι are similar, the dative being helped by the verb ἐάω: Empedocles ap. Diog. L. VIII 62 ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξὶ σεβίζομαι: Pind. *Ol.* XII 3 τιν γὰρ ἐν πόντῳ κυβερνῶνται θοαὶ νᾶες: Soph. *Aj.* 539 προσπόλοισ φυλάσσειται (see Jebb's note, who quotes *Antig.* 504 and 1218 and Menander τᾶληθὲς ἀνθρώποισιν οὐχ εὑρίσκειται): several times with ὀφείλεσθαι, as Eur. *Alc.* 419: see L. & S. s.v. II 1. (In Aristoph. *Wasps* 1145 τοῦτο τοῖσι βαρβάροις ὑφαίνεται, the meaning is 'this is woven for the barbarians.')

As the dative implies mainly the person interested in, or judging of, a result, it was naturally used chiefly with the perfect tense, by which a result or state of things is indicated. But we may have this sense with other tenses: e.g. in Thuc. I 51 the meaning is 'the Corcyreans had not the advantage of having the Athenian ships in sight.'

μηδέ: see on 90 E 31. For the subject matter Fr. refers to † *Alc.* i 111 B.

23. καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα κτέ.: Protagoras definitely professed to teach ἀρετή. See *Prot.* 318 A ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, ἐάν μοι συγῆς, ἢ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἐμοὶ λογγένη, ἀπιέναι οὐκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραῖα ταῦτα ταῦτα: καὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιιδίδουαι. Socrates presses the question 'but in *what* will he become better?' to which Protagoras (*ibid.* E) gives the answer quoted on 91 A 4. It is the πολιτικὴ τέχνη which Protagoras teaches; he will make his pupils good citizens. So too Hippias promises to make men βελτίους (*Hipp. maj.* 283 c), though his methods differed from those of Protagoras, being more indirect, and depending more on special arts (*Prot.* 318 E, *Hipp. maj.* 285 c D). In the *Euthyd.* 273 D the profession the twin sophists make is still general: ἀρετὴν, ὦ Σώκράτες, οὐόμεθα οἷω τ' εἶναι παραδόναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιιστα—only here ἀρετή has got narrowed down to the art of quibbling (see on 71 E 2). On the other hand, Gorgias, in the dialogue named after him, starts by proclaiming himself a teacher of Rhetoric (449 A). (See Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 471 foll.) But it is argued that the study of Expression apart from its contents is inconceivable. So Gorgias is at last forced under press of questions to say that he will give the knowledge of δίκαια and ἀδίκαια if his pupil does not already possess it (460 A). Thus he is driven to make practically the same profession as Protagoras, and the new frontier which he has tried to draw for his art is shown to be indefensible. Similarly in the *Protagoras* 312 D, Hippocrates, at a loss to say *what* he will

be taught by Protagoras, suggests τί ἄν, εἰ εἴπομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐπιστάτην τοῦ παιῆσαι δεῖνόν λέγειν; "Ἴσως ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, οὐ μέντοι ἰκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἐτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῶν δείται· περὶ οὗτο σοφιστῆς δεῖνόν ποιεῖ λέγειν κτέ. (Cp. also *Phaedr.* 260 D with Dr. Thompson's note.)

On 91 C 19 reference was made to the passage from the *Republic* in which Socrates resists the notion that the corruption of men of exceptional ability is due to a few sophists. Socrates thus proceeds (493 A): ἐτι τοῖνυν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάζω. Τὸ ποῖον; "Ἐκαστον τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὗς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἠγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἀ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν. Professional teaching has become a mere craft how to humour that great beast, the Demos. It has become a teaching of Rhetoric. Thus while the earlier sophist, who taught 'virtue,' was looked on in a democracy with suspicion almost equally with the philosopher, the rhetor-sophist was there in his element; and in *Gorgias* 520 A B (see Dr. Thompson's notes) we have Socrates distinctly siding with the 'sophists,' in the older sense, against the *ῥήτορες* (τῆ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιον ἐστὶ σοφιστικῆ ῥητορικῆς).

I believe that the thorough discussion in the *Gorgias* preceded the *Meno*, and is assumed by it (Introd. § 16).

Γοργίου ταῦτα ἀγαμαί, 'I admire this in Gorgias.' This is a frequent construction with ἀγαμαί and verbs of similar meaning. The *gen.* is in its origin 'partitive,' depending on ταῦτα. So *Prot.* 335 E, *Gorg.* 449 D, *Laus* 631 A. Stallbaum quotes similar constructions with θαυμάζω (*Apol.* 17 A, etc.), and ἐπαυνῶ (*Menex.* 241 B, etc.). See Kühner § 417. Anm. 10 b. Sometimes the *acc.* is replaced by a clause with ὅτι (*Hipp. maj.* 291 E ἀγαμαί σου, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὐνοικῶς βοηθεῖν) or διότι (*Laus* 948 D). Plato seems rarely to have an unsupported *gen.* of the person admired with ἀγαμαί (at *Rep.* 329 D καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, the *ptcp.* approaches a *gen. absol.*). The simple *gen.* with ἀγαμαί is found in Xen. (*Mem.* II vi 33, 34, *Oec.* iv 21) and in † *Ep.* xii ad init.; and Plato has it with θαυμάζω (*Crito* 43 B).

We also often have with ἀγαμαί an *acc.* of the person admired, either alone, or with a *gen.* of the cause: *Rep.* 426 D τοὺς ἐθέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς τοιαύτας πόλεις οὐκ ἀγαμαί τῆς ἀνδρείας; *Parm.* 130 A (quasi-passive) ἄξιός ἐστι ἀγασθαι τῆς ὁμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦς λόγους. Once in Plato we have the *dat.* (of cause) substituted for the *gen.*: *Symp.* 179 D ἀγασθέντες τῷ ἔργῳ; cp. Xen. *Cyr.* II iv 9, etc., Kühner § 425. 11.

31. ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα: see on 86 B 21.

35. **Θεογνίην τὸν ποιητήν**: for the appeal to poets see on D 77 B 12. This short episode is parallel to the longer one in the *Protagoras* (339 A foll.), where Simonides in one of his poems is apparently guilty of a similar inconsistency. At one moment he says *ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν*: at another he rejects the saying of Pittacus *χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι*.

Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides are mentioned by Isocr. *ad Nic.* (2) 43 as enjoying the reputation of being the best moral counsellors. Theognis is also quoted by Plato, *Lysis* 212 E and *Laws* 630 A, but nowhere else. Plato's charge against the poets does not in the *Meno* reach the gravity it attains in the *Republic* (Books II, III, and X). But to this charge the gnomic poets were exposed much less than Homer.

37. **ἐν ποίοις ἔπεισιν**; see on 80 D 3. Perhaps some surprise is indicated. It is new to *Meno* that Theognis is as inconsistent on the point as himself and *οἱ πολλοί*.

**ἔπη** may nearly always be taken as including elegiac as well as strictly 'epic' (hexameter) verse. The elegiac couplet grew out of the hexameter, and is closely akin to it. We have **ἔπη** distinguished from *dramatic verse*: *Rep.* 602 B *ἐν λαμβελίοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεισιν*: *Rep.* 379 A *ἐάν τε τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεισιν ποιῆ* [*ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεισιν*] *ἐάν τε ἐν τραγωδίᾳ* (the words bracketed are absent from the best MSS.); or from *lyric verse*: *Phaedr.* 241 E (after a hexameter) *ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι καὶ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους*: *Rep.* 607 A (we must only have hymns and encomia), *εἰ δὲ τῆρ ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξει ἐν μέλεισιν ἢ ἔπεισιν κτέ.*: or from *dramatic* and *lyric verse*: *Hipp. min.* 368 D *καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγωδίας καὶ διθυράμβους*: *Ion* 534 C *ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δ' ἔπη, ὁ δ' ἰάμβους*. The word is used loosely sometimes of any kind of verse: *Prot.* 339 A *ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δευρὸν εἶναι*, before citing the poem of Simonides: *Laws* 810 E *ποιητὰ ἐπῶν ἑξαμέτρων καὶ τριμέτρων καὶ πάντων τῶν λεγομένων μέτρων*. In Aristotle. *Clouds* 638 *πότερον περὶ μέτρων ἢ ῥυθμῶν ἢ περὶ ἐπῶν*, the last word seems to mean verse of any sort.

## CHAPTER XXXVI

1. **ἐν τοῖς ἑλεγείοις**: the word occurs *Rep.* 368 A; nowhere else in Plato. It has been assumed by some that a distinction is here drawn between *τὰ ἐλεγεία* and other works of Theognis. 'Apparet hinc Theognidem alia quoque poemata heroico, ut videtur, metro scripsisse' Buttm. Nothing is known of these other poems. Leutsch (*Philologus* xxix p. 521) thought that

the poems of Theognis addressed to Cyrnus were called *ὑποθήκαι* (cp. *ὑποθήσομαι* Theognis v. 27 Bergk<sup>4</sup>), and that other poems of Theognis were called *ἐλεγεία* specifically, to distinguish them from the *ὑποθήκαι*. Against this it may be argued that the lines now cited (vv. 33-36 in Bergk<sup>4</sup>) stand amongst those addressed to Cyrnus, and therefore would belong rather to the *ὑποθήκαι*. I believe no such emphasis on the word *ἐλεγείας* is intended, and have put no comma after the word. The meaning is simply 'in the lines where.'

2. See App. on the text.

3. *ὄν μεγάλη δύναμις*: i.e. *δυνάσται*, oligarchs. See on 77 B 12.

4. *ἐσθλῶν*: Theognis of Megara, a bitter oligarch, continually uses *ἐσθλός*, *ἀγαθός*, *κακός*, in the political sense, which appears to be earlier than their moral one. See Grote *Hist.* Pt. II, note at the end of chapter ix.

*διδάσκει*: pass., as the tense generally is: Soph. *Ant.* 726, Eur. *Andr.* 739, Aristoph. *Clouds* 127 (but not in *Rep.* 421 ε). Most of the forms of the tense *διδαχθήσομαι* (which is late) are impossible in elegiac verse. Cf. on 93 D 14.

E 6. *ὡς διδακτοῦ οὐσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει*: for *ὡς* thus with *gen. absol.* see Goodwin § 918: cp. *Crat.* 439 c *διανοηθέντες ὡς λόντων ἀπάντων δει καὶ ρέοντων*.

9. *δέ γε*: this combination of particles occurs twelve times in the *Meno*. In some of the places *γε* accentuates some particular word: 82 E 44 'but he *thinks*' (opposed to *οἶδεν*); 85 C 7 'but (though he knew not) these opinions really *existed* in him.' At 77 B 8 there is a hyperbaton of *γε*, which accents *παράδειγματα*. But often (as in the present place, 85 B 48, 88 E 10, 96 C 7, 99 A 53) *γε* does not point any particular word; the combination, like *αἰεὶ*, attaches a further premiss from which a conclusion is to be drawn. At 87 C 13, 96 C 5, 14 we simply have *εἰ γε* coupled to the context by *δέ*; and similar is *ἐπειδὴ δέ γε* at 98 D 29. See Shilleto on Dem. *F.L.* § 102, with §§ 243, 318, 342. Cp. *Intr.* p. lxii.

*ὀλίγον μεταβάς*, 'in a somewhat different strain.' The word *μεταβαίνειν* is used technically from early times of transition to a new theme in poetry. So *Od.* viii 492 Odysseus says to the bard Demodocus *ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι, καὶ Ἰκτου κόσμον δέισον κτέ.*; three of the Homeric hymns 4 (Aphrodite), 9 (Artemis), 18 (Hermes) end with the line *σεῦ δ' ἐγὼ ἀρξάμενος μεταβήσομαι ἄλλον ἐς ὕμνον*. Cp. *Phaedr.* 262 A *κατὰ σμικρῶν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα*, and

265 C *ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι.* In the present place *ὀλίγον* is ironical. The words have usually been taken as referring to citation from a MS.—‘somewhat lower down.’ From this point of view Bekker wished to read *καταβάς* for *μεταβάς*. It is no answer to this to say that the interval in our text of Theognis is a *long* one, namely from v. 36 to v. 435; for the order of Theognis’ verses followed by Plato may have been quite different from that of the *συλλογή* preserved to us. See note on the text of D 2. But the words used for passing to a point ‘lower down’ in citations seems to be rather *ὑποβάς* (as Diog. L. VIII 52) or *ὑποκαταβάς* (see L. & S.). If *μεταβάς* be taken as above, no alteration is necessary.

10. See App. on the text.

*φῆσι* . . . *λέγει*: not unfrequently you have some part of *φῆμι* introduced in the middle of words quoted *after* a verb of saying that introduces the whole. See L. & S. So *inquit* is often redundant. Buttman refers to Heindorf on *Crat.* 412 B: see also Heindorf on *Charm.* 164 E. But the case here is different (*‘singularis’* says Fr.); here *φῆσι* comes first with the line that first occurs to Socrates; and then he goes on in a tentative manner, *λέγει πως*, ‘he says, if I remember rightly’; the sequel being quoted loosely. Stallbaum is wrong in saying that *πως* here indicates *miratio*. It rather denotes *hesitation*; cp. 73 A 29. Plato is dramatic artist enough to know that the quotation is more natural, and so more effective, thus, than if reeled off fluently. Cp. on 81 A 17. See also the quotation from Pindar in *Theaet.* 173 E with Campbell’s note: ‘Plato almost always thus weaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poets’ measures to the rhythm of prose.’

14. *οὐ ποτ’ ἄν*: the *οὐ* of course does not affect *πειθόμενος*. The sense is as if the participial clause had come first.

20. *ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν κτέ.*: we have here again the argument 96 A by antithesis (see 91 D 17, 94 C 1). ‘Are you able to name any other subject of which the professing teachers not only fail to get recognition as the teachers of others, but are regarded as not even understanding it themselves, and as quite inferior in the very subject of which they say they are teachers; while those who are themselves recognized as accomplished, sometimes say that it is to be taught, and sometimes not?’

*εἰπεῖν πράγματος οὐ*: Buttman in his excellent note draws a distinction between this place and C 7, saying that the latter is a simple case of inverse attraction, but the present is rather an instance of anacoluthon. The first thought here was *ἔχεις*

είπεῖν ἄλλου ὄνουον πράγματος διδασκάλου; the acc. being afterwards exchanged for a relative clause. He cites in illustration *Π.* xviii 192 ἄλλου δ' ὅσ τευ οἶδα τοῦ ἄν κλυτὰ τεύχεα δύω· 'ubi Achilles sententiam primariam in animo habet hanc; ἄλλου δ' ὅστινος τεύχεα δύοιμ' ἄν, sed statim transiens in hanc loquendi formam, οὐκ οἶδα ὅστινος τεύχεα δύω, ambas conjungit.' [Perhaps other instances of 'inverse attraction' may also be explained as anacolutha: cp. Aesch. *S. c. T.* 400—

καὶ νύκτα ταύτην ἦν λέγεις ἐπ' ἀσπίδος  
ἄστροισι μαρμαίρουσαν οὐρανοῦ κυρεῖν,  
τάχ' ἄν γένοιτο μάντις ἢ ἀνοία τινί.

*Ag. Lys.* 408—ὦ χρυσοχόε, τὸν ὄρμον δὲν ἐπεσκεύασας,  
ὄρχουμένης μου τῆς γυναικὸς ἐσπέρας  
ἢ βάλανος ἐκπέπτωκεν ἐκ τοῦ τρήματος,

'about that necklace, etc.':

*Plut.* 200—ὄπως ἐγὼ τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ὑμεῖς φατέ  
ἔχειν με ταύτης δεσπότης γενήσομαι,

where the first thought was δύναμιν κερτήσομαι.] Riddell § 191 gives both the present place and **C** 7 as examples of 'Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.' At § 26 D, however, he quotes the present place as an example of a 'Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after Verbs of mentioning'; adding 'Why this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191).' He had evidently changed his mind about the passage, but omitted to give his reasons in § 191.

I do not think the genitive πράγματος can be regarded as a genitive after a verb of mentioning. If the limits of this construction are strictly defined, it will be found that (1) the meaning is always to say something *about* something (so that *περὶ* might conceivably be supplied), not simply 'to mention'; (2) that it is nearly always helped by some substantive (noun or pronoun) on which the genitive may be regarded as dependent. Both of these conditions are satisfied by the only prose instance Riddell quotes in support, *Laws* 804 ε καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς εἶπομ' ἄν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἄν εἶη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἄν πρέπον. As to the verse instances he quotes, *Soph. Aj.* 1236 ποίου κέκραγας ἀνδρὸς ὧδ' ὑπέρφρονα is not to the point, the genitive depending on the neuter plural ὑπέφρονα; *ibid.* 1257 δὲ ἀνδρὸς οὐκέτ' ὄντος ἀλλ' ἤδη σκιάς θαρσῶν ὑβρίζεις κάξελευθεροστομεῖς the construction is helped (α) by the participle ὄντος, (β) by the expectation of such a verb as καταφρονεῖς; *Soph. O. C.* 355 μαντεί' ἃ τοῦδ'

ἐχρήσθη σώματος satisfies both conditions mentioned above. So does *Trach.* 1122—

τῆς μητρὸς ἦκω τῆς ἐμῆς  
φράσεων ἐν οἷς νῦν ἐστίν·

where ἐν οἷς νῦν ἐστίν = τὰς συμφοράς.

Riddell in his note on § 26 gives up *Rep.* 439 B, τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν κτέ., observing (§ 225) that there the genitive τοῦ τοξότου belongs to the following clause ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπρωθοῦσα χεῖρ κτέ. Similar is *Rep.* 375 E οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν δεῖ τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος.

The genitive which occurs in questions about things is often supported by τί; see *Rep.* 459 B τί δὲ ἴππων οἶε; where, however, the word γένος, which comes immediately before (τό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τὸ τῶν κυνῶν γένος), is the main support of the genitive: *ibid.* 470 A τί δὲ γῆς τε τμήσεως καὶ οἰκιῶν ἐμπρήσεως; 582 C; *Gorg.* 509 D; *Phaedo* 78 D; *Aesch. Eum.* 211 τί γὰρ γυναικὸς ἦτις ἀνδρα νοσφίση; *P. V.* 820; *Soph. Phil.* 439, 441; *El.* 317. (See Kühner § 417. Anm. 9.)

Certainly εἰπεῖν πράγματος can never be Greek for 'to mention a thing.' I hold, therefore, with Buttmann, that we have here a change of construction.

The present discussion is confined to the genitive after verbs of speaking. We have more latitude in verbs of judging, etc.:

*Rep.* 576 D ἄλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις;

485 B μαθήματος ἀεὶ ἐρώσω, δ' ἀν' αὐτῆς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας. (But the reading is doubtful.)

*Laws* 646 D καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἀρα διατριβῆς (ὡσαύτως διανοητέον). Here περὶ is supplied with the gen. from the previous sentence, being omitted on account of the neighbouring περὶ with acc.

21. οὐχ ὅπως followed by ἀλλὰ οὐδέ (see on 71 C 13) is used in ascending to a negative idea; the sense then is *non modo non*. The negative is not expressed with οὐχ ὅπως, being covered by the wider negative in the clause to which it leads up. *Rep.* 591 C τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφήν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων. Instead of οὐχ ὅπως in this construction, we also have μὴ ὅπως, μὴ δεῖ, very rarely οὐχ δεῖ: *Dem.* 23 (*Aristocr.*) 155. Kühner § 525. 3 c; Riddell § 152.

But οὐχ ὅπως (or μὴ δεῖ) is also used = *non modo non* followed by ἀλλά, when the second clause is not negative in expression, but simply opposed in sense to the former. *Xen. Hell.* v iv 34 ἐδίδασκον τὸν δῆμον ὡς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὅπως τιμωρήσαντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαυτέσειαν τὸν Σφοδρίαν; Kühner § 525. 3 b.

22. διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται : εἶναι is omitted on account of the neighbouring εἶναι. Presently ὁμολογοῦνται is understood with ἐπίστασθαι and πονηροὶ εἶναι.

- B** ἀλλὰ οὐδ' . . ἀλλά : see on 71 C 10 and 74 D 30. Kühner § 535. Anm. 1 refers to *Lys.* 223 A, *Prot.* 341 D, *Symp.* 211 E, for the frequent use of ἀλλά in successive clauses, each limiting the one before it.

23. κυρίως, 'in any real sense.'

Chapter XXXVII (96 B-E). SOCR. *There really seem to be no teachers of Virtue; therefore no learners either; so that Virtue is not teachable. Yet if Virtue be Knowledge, it must be teachable. But perhaps the practical results of Knowledge may be simulated by something that springs from a different source.*

- C** 7. πράγματος οὐ : a case of 'inverse attraction.' Hadley § 1003 thus defines this idiom: 'The antecedent, without being incorporated into the relative clause, is sometimes attracted to the case of the relative.' If here we had οὐ πράγματος instead of πράγματος οὐ, the antecedent would be 'incorporated into the relative clause.'

Plenty of instances of inverse attraction are given in Kühner § 555. 4. The same thing occurs, but more rarely, in Latin: Verg. *Aen.* i 573 *urbem quam statuo vestra est* ('quam urbem' would be simple 'incorporation'); Roby *Lat. Gr.* § 1067.

The following are instances in Plato:—

*Polit.* 271 C τὸν βίον ὃν ἐπὶ τῆς Κρόνου φῆς εἶναι δυναστείας, πρότερον ἦν κτέ.

*Lysis* 221 B οἷόν τε ὄν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ ἐρώντα, τοῦτου οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν; (see Heindorf).

*Rep.* 520 D ἐν πόλει ἧ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχην οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρχειν ταύτην ἄριστα οικεῖσθαι (for πόλιν ἐν ἧ).

*Laos* 740 D πάντων τούτων ἀρχὴν ἦν ἂν θώμεθα μεγίστην καὶ τιμωτάτην, αὕτη σκεψαμένη . . ποριζέτω κτέ.

Also *Crato* 45 B, where the attraction takes place in an adverb, πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε, ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη, ἀγαπήσουσι σε (for ἄλλοθι).

We may bring under this head the instances of οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ. See on 70 C 18.

8. εἶεν : see on 89 E 25 and 92 C 18.

τοῦτο μὴδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι : cp. 89 E 26.

- D** 24. καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος : see on 75 E 13. Socrates' obligations to Prodicus are exceedingly hard to estimate. At *Prot.* 341 A

Socrates says that the wisdom of Prodicus is an ancient and wondrous thing: *κινδυνεύει ἡ Προδικίου σοφία θέλα τις εἶναι πάλαι*: and calls himself *μαθητῆς Προδικίου*. Cp. 315 D foll.: in the hall where Protagoras was, *Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κφδίῳ τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς ὡς ἐφαίνετο*. Several were gathered round Prodicus, says S., *περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἐγωγε μαθεῖν ἐξωθεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδικίου· πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκῆματι γιγνώμενος ἀσαφῆ ἔπολε τὰ λεγόμενα*. *Crat.* 384 B (quoted on 91 D 8) shows that Socrates did not drink deeply at the wells of Prodicus' etymological learning. Buttman however points out that the present passage shows his debt to him was not confined to etymology. See also *Charm.* 163 D, quoted on 75 E 13. Prodicus can hardly have been older than Socrates, and was probably rather younger (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 417 note). In *Hipp. maj.* 282 C Socrates speaks of *ὁ ἡμέτερος ἐταῖρος Πρόδικος*. But, as will be seen, Socrates was older than at least one other of his 'teachers.' Cp. on 76 C 22.

'All the remarks of the Platonic Socrates,' says Zeller (*pre-Socratics* II 419 note), 'concerning the instruction which he received from Prodicus, even those in the *Meno*, have an unmistakably ironical tone, and as to any historical content, nothing is to be derived from them beyond the fact that Socrates was acquainted with Prodicus, and had heard lectures from him as from other sophists. That he sent certain individuals of his acquaintance to him does not prove any special preference, for, according to the passage in the *Theaetetus* (151 B), he sent others to other sophists.' (See also Zeller's note *ibid.* pp. 501, 502.)

It may be noted that a similar tone is adopted by Plato towards other persons whom he makes Socrates represent as his teachers. *Menex.* 235 E ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν γε, ὦ Μενέξενε, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν οἶψ τε εἶναι εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τυγχάνει διδάσκαλος οἶσα οὐ πᾶν φαῦλη περὶ ῥητορικῆς, ἀλλ' ἤπερ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς πεποίηκε ῥήτορας, ἕνα δὲ καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου. ΜΕΝ. Τίς αὖτη; ἡ δὴλον ὅτι Ἀσπασίαν λέγεις; ΣΩ. Λέγω γάρ, καὶ Κόννον γε τὸν Μητροβίου· οὗτοι γάρ μοι δύο εἰσὶν διδάσκαλοι, ὁ μὲν μουσικῆς, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικῆς. But Menexenus is very sceptical (236 C, cp. 249 D E) as to whether Aspasia has had much to do with the speech which Socrates proceeds to deliver. As to Connus, Socrates says he did not do his teacher much credit: *Euthyd.* 272 C ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐν μόνον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὐθνεῖδος τοῖν ξένου περιάψω, ὥσπερ Κόννω τῷ Μητροβίου, τῷ κίθαριστῇ, ὃς ἐμὲ διδάσκει ἔτι καὶ νῦν κίθαρίζειν· ὁρῶντες γοῦν οἱ παῖδες οἱ συμφοιτηταί μοι ἐμοῦ τε καταγελωσί

καὶ τῶν Κόννων καλοῦσι γεροντοδιδάσκαλον. Cp. 295 D. Again, Socrates expresses respect for the musician Damon (*Lach.* 180 D, *Rep.* 400 B C, cp. 424 C), who was himself an associate of Prodicus (*Lach.* 197 D, † *Alc.* i 118 C). Later authorities improved upon this and made Socrates a pupil of Damon (*Diog. L.* II 19). Yet the tone in which he is treated is one of mock respect (*Lach.* 200 A B).

It seems inconsistent with the most essential characteristic of Socrates that he should have seriously acknowledged obligations to any one for positive instruction. That he availed himself of the opportunities of culture that Athens afforded, and spoke with 'his unfailing courtesy' of those to whose influence he had been subjected, may be assumed. Plato was not likely to estimate Socrates' debt to others more highly. In the case of Prodicus there are several reasons that may account for a somewhat hostile attitude on the part of Plato.

(1) Aristophanes had praised Prodicus at the expense of Socrates: *Clouds* 360 foll.—

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῃ γ' ὑπακούσαιμεν τῶν νῦν μετεωροσοφιστῶν  
πλὴν ἢ Προδίκῳ, τῷ μὲν σοφίας καὶ γνώμης οὐνεκα, σοὶ δέ,  
ὅτι βρενθῦε τ' ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τῷφθαλμῷ παραβάλλεις  
κάνυπόδητος κακὰ πόλλ' ἀνέχει κἀφ' ἡμῶν σεμνοπροσωπεῖς.

(2) Prodicus was a friend of Antisthenes, Plato's rival (*Xen. Symp.* iv 62).

(3) Plato, from his love for elasticity of language, and dislike of pedantry, was likely to undervalue Prodicus' distinctions. Socr. after referring to these (*Charm.* 163 D) says ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοὶ τίθεσθαι μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων διδωμι δπη ἂν βούλη ἕκαστον· δήλου δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν φέρης τοῖνομα ὅτι ἂν λέγης. (See end of note on 72 C 2: also Dr. Thompson's note on *Phaedr.* 267 B σοφώτατά γε, ὦ Πρόδικε.)

24. παντὸς μᾶλλον: 80 C 35 *Euthyphr.* 9 B, *Crito* 49 B, etc.

E 27. τὴν ἀρτι ζήτησιν κτέ.: 'the state of the discussion as it stands now is represented by two hypothetical syllogisms, as follows:—

1. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:  
But virtue is knowledge:  
Therefore virtue is teachable.
2. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:  
But virtue is not teachable:  
Therefore virtue is not knowledge.

The minor premiss of each of these two syllogisms contradicts the conclusion of the other. Both cannot be true. If virtue is not acquired by teaching, and does not come by

nature (89 A B), how are there any virtuous men? Socrates continues his argument: the second premiss of the first syllogism—that virtue is knowledge—is true but not the whole truth. In proving it we assumed that there was nothing except knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences. But this assumption will not hold.' Grote II pp. 9 foll. Notice the guarded language of 87 B: virtue is certainly *not* ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης, but we cannot say without reserve that ἀρετή is ἐπιστήμη.

29. ὁρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ: cp. 97 A 15.

30. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται: see on 95 B 17. The notion of interest may be traced in the dative: 'that men get things done rightly and well not only under the guidance of knowledge.'

ἢ ὥσως κτέ., 'and this no doubt is the path along which the discovery is escaping us.' Personifications of the object of philosophic quest are frequent in Plato: see Campbell's *Theaet.* App. A. 'The argument itself (ὁ λόγος) is continually personified and spoken of under a Protean variety of figures. It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away "like a tale," etc.': *Theaet.* 203 D καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακῶς οἰχίσεται: *Soph.* 231 C ἀλλὰ τοὶ κάκεινον (the sophist, of whom we are in quest) ἠγείσθαι χρὴ νῦν ἤδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον. Cp. *Polit.* 284 B, *Hipp. maj.* 294 E, etc. See below on D 12.

The metaphor is worked out most fully at *Rep.* 432 B νῦν δὴ ἡμᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κνηγέτας τινὰς θάμνον κόκλω περιστασθαι προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν μὴ πῃ διαφύγη ἢ δικαιούσῃη. See App. on the text.

Chapters XXXVIII, XXXIX (96 E–98 A). SOCR. *For practical utility Right Opinion will serve the purpose of Knowledge. Indeed, so long as Right Opinion is held, its effects will be indistinguishable from those of Knowledge. The difference between the two appears to be that the possession of the former is precarious, the latter is bound in our minds by a chain of causal reasoning.*

2. ὁμολογήκαμεν: at 87 E. For the tense see on 89 C 6 (III).

6. που, *opinor*, expresses hesitancy, as at 72 C 4 and often. 97 A

7. ὁμολογοῦμεν: the change from perf. to imperf. is perhaps not solely due to love of variety. The former admission had

been reached in so many words; the latter agreement they were in process of arriving at; it follows immediately from what is said at 88 C foll.

9. *ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ἦ*: for the matter see 88 E. For the omission of *τις* see on 79 B 15.

10. *ὁμοιοὶ ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁμολογηκόσιν*: see on 80 D 39.

13. *εἰ τις εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν*: Grote (II 383 note) observes that Plato is here illustrating the difference between Knowledge and Opinion by a matter which belongs to *sensible perception*. Similarly in *Theaet.* 201 B—the passage on which Grote is there commenting—*οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν*, the matters in question about which either Opinion (through the orator) or Knowledge (from personal observation) is obtained, are all matters of fact and sense-perception. So far as the present passage is concerned, it may be noted that it is merely an illustration, and so stands on the same footing as 71 B 6, where the existence of the class Virtue is illustrated by the existence of the individual Meno. Cp. *Phaedo* 73 c–74 d.

14. *ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε*: this is not a case of 'inverse attraction' (see on 96 C 7) such as is found at *Crat.* 45 c *καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη ἀγαπήσουσί σε*, where *ἄλλοσε* stands for *ἄλλοθι* by the influence of *ὅποι*. A simple (not 'inverse') attraction does often occur with *βούλει* as at *Gorg.* 517 B *ἔργα τοιαῦτα οἶα τούτων δε βούλει εἰργασταὶ* (for *ἐκεῖνος ὄντινα*): *Ion* 533 A *περὶ Πολυγνώτου ἢ ἄλλου ὅτου βούλει*: *Crat.* 432 A *ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός*. But here there is no attraction at all. The full form would be *ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε αὐτὸν βαδίζειν*.

B 17. *ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων κτέ.*: it was probably in the *Meno* that Plato first propounded his view of two grades of apprehension, a higher and perfect one (*ἐπιστήμη*), and a lower and imperfect one (*δόξα*) (Zeller ch. v pp. 171–175; Grote II 377 foll.). The relation between them is set forth as follows at the end of Bk. v of the *Republic* (476 D–480 A). To the domain of Being or Reality (the world of Ideas) Knowledge is correlative, to that of Non-being, Ignorance (*ἀγνωσία* 477 A, *ἄγνοια* 478 c). But between the realm of Being and that of Non-being lies the realm of Sense, which participates in both Being and Non-being; and to this the faculty Opinion (*δόξα*) is correlative. Opinion differs from Knowledge in being fallible, 477 E *πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμάρτητῳ ταῦτόν ποτέ τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθεῖ*; In the region of Opinion fluctuate the conventions of the multitude; 479 D *τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμῳ καλοῦ τε πέρι*

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινοῦται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἐιλικρινῶς. See Exc. VII.

This passage in the *Meno* is probably alluded to in *Rep.* 506 c τί δέ; εἶπον· οὐκ ἦσθησαι τὰς ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὦν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί· ἡ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἀνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες;

Another reference to the doctrine of the *Meno* occurs in the important passage *Symp.* 202 A: ἡ οὐκ ἦσθησαι ὅτι ἐστὶ τι μεταξύ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; τί τοῦτο; τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἀνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι οὐτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν· ἀλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; οὐτε ἀμαθία· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία; ἐστὶ δὲ δὴ που τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξύ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας.

The distinction was noted as characteristic of Plato's teaching. *Diog. L.* III 28 quotes from the *Ἰσοβολιμαῖος* of Cratinus (junior) (*Kock Fr. Com.* II p. 292)

A. ἄνθρωπος εἰ δηλόνοσι καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχεις.

B. κατὰ μὲν Πλάτων' οὐκ οἶδ' ὑπονοῶ δ' <ὁδ' > ἔχειν.

But though in the *Meno* the dominant phraseology is the antithesis ἐπιστήμη )( δόξα, we have for each grade a number of synonyms. For ἐπιστήμη we find φρόνησις substituted line 27, 88 B 23, etc.; φρονῶν line 23, φρόνιμος A 10, σοφία 99 B 8, νοῦς 88 B 24, 28, 99 C 23, εἰδῶς A 13 (cp. 85 C), with no apparent distinction. In the *Republic* 476 D we have δόξα contrasted with γνώμη, 477 A with γνώσις, 478 A δοξαστόν with γνωστόν, 479 E δοξάζειν with γινώσκειν. For the lower grade we have here οἰόμενος substituted for δοξάζειν, cp. 82 E, 84 A B, *Rep.* 506 c, where we have οἰεσθαι opposed to εἰδέναι. Sometimes πίστις represents the lower grade. Cp. on 98 B 2.

25. οὐδὲν γάρ: for γάρ thus in answers cp. 78 B 3, and see Exc. III.

30. τὸ δέ, 'whereas.' 'Primus monuit Heindorfius ad C Theat. (157 B) de formula τὸ δέ conjunctionis loco inservienti latineque vertenda cum tamen.' Buttm. *Apol.* 23 A τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, and J. Adam's note; *Phaedo* 109 D (or. obl.) τὸ δὲ ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτήτος οὐχ οἴους τ' εἶναι ἡμᾶς, and A.-H.'s note; *Phil.* 24 E τὸ δὲ εἰς ἀδθις τε καὶ ἀθθις ἴσως λεχθέντα τὸν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἰκανῶς ἂν ξυμφωνοῦντας ἀποφῆρειεν. The idiom is very common in Plato. τὸ is accusative (or rather the primitive case, which became the accusative when the nominative was differentiated from it), and the meaning is 'in regard to this.' It has no definite construction, and does not refer to any particular word in the context. On the other hand in *Thuc.* I 37. 2 τὸ δ' ἐπί

κακουργία ἐπετήδευσαν, τό resumes *ξυμμαχίαν οὐδενὸς δέξασθαι* from the previous clause, and is distinctly acc. governed by *ἐπετήδευσαν*; while at II 89. 3 τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου ἡμῶν μᾶλλον νῦν περιέσται, τό refers to *ἀνδρείους εἶναι* just before, and is nominative. Some of the instances in Plato are ambiguous: thus, *Apol.* 39 c τὸ δὲ ὑμῶν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, where I think *ἀποβήσεται* is impersonal and τό nom. nom.; cp. *Soph.* 244 A ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν, τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν τούναντίον. Again in *Laos* 731 E τὸ δὲ ἀληθεία γε πάντων ἀμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἰτιον ἐκάστω γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε, τό is independent, and does not agree with *αἰτιον*. For τὸ δὲ with questions see *Laos* 630 D, 967 E.

The idiom often occurs, as here, with *ἀρα* and the imperfect: 'whereas it appears that true Opinion likewise is so,' i.e. a guide to right action. See on 91 E 17. Compare *Sym.* 198 D τὸ δὲ ἀρα οὐ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὅτι οὖν: *Rep.* 357 A τὸ δ' ἦν ἀρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον: 362 A: *Tim.* 51 C τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος: *Laos* 803 D τὸ δ' ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἀρα οὐτ' οὖν παιδιὰ πεφυκυῖα οὐτ' αὖ παιδεία ἀξιόλογος. Goodwin (§ 39) rightly distinguishes this from the 'philosophic' imperfect (§ 40), for which see on 83 D 52. There ἦν meant 'is, as we saw,' whereas here it means rather 'was, as we see.'

33. ὀρθὴ δόξα: Plato seems to use this phrase and *ἀληθὴς δόξα* indifferently.

36. ἐπιτυχᾶνοι . . τυγχάνοι: 'verbum simplex praecedente composito. *Phaedr.* 248 A ὑπερῆρεν . . ἤρεν. Ad *Phaedon* 59 b (παρῆν . . ἦν), *Euthyphr.* 14 A (ἀπεργάζονται . . ἐργασίας),' Fr. For *ἐπιτυχᾶνευ* 'succeed' cp. *Rep.* 397 c, *Phil.* 61 d.

## CHAPTER XXXIX

D 5. δ τι . . δι' δ τι: the change is merely due to love of variety.

12. τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν: the present passage strongly recalls *Euthyphr.* 11 BC ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ᾧ Εὐθύφρον, εἰσικεν εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐπιθέμην, ἴσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες, ὡς ἀρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἐνυγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν τις αὐτὰ θῆ· νῦν δὲ σοὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶν· ἄλλου δὲ τινος δεῖ σκώματος. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοὶ δοκεῖ. 'As son of a sculptor, Socrates traced his descent to Daedalus, the eponymous hero of artists' (J. Adam). Cp. † *Alc.* i 121 A.

The same idea is carried farther *Euthyphr.* 15 B ΣΩ. Θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐάν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολὺ τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιβύτας ποίῳν; see on 96 E 29.

The scholium on our present passage runs thus: τῶν πάλαι δημιουργῶν πλαττόντων τὰ ζῶα συμμεμυκτάς ἔχοντα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ οὐ διεσθηκτάς τοὺς πόδας, ἀλλ' ἐστῶτα σύμποδα, Δαίδαλος ἄριστος ἀγαματοποιὸς ἐπιγεγονὼς πρῶτος ἀναπετάνυσσι τε τὰ τοῦτων βλέφαρα, ὡς δόξαι βλέπειν αὐτά, καὶ τοὺς πόδας, ὡς νομίσει βαδίζειν, διίστησι: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεδέσθαι, ἵνα μὴ φύγοιεν, ὡς δῆθεν ἐμψύχων ἤδη γεγονότων αὐτῶν. τοῖς δεδεμένοις οὖν τὰς ἀληθεῖς εὐκείνας δόξας φησί, τοῖς λελυμένοις δὲ τοῦτων τὰς ψευδεῖς. (The last sentence is perhaps worth citing for its ludicrous misinterpretation of Plato.) Fr. refers, in illustration of the scholium, to Strabo vi 264, Apollodorus ii 2, 2, Diod. iv 76.

Other references to moving statues of Daedalus occur: Aristotle *Pol.* I 4 εἰ ἡδύνατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελυσθὲν ἀποτελεῖν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασί: id. *de animā* i iii 11 ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ κινεῖν φασὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται, ὅλον Δημόκριτος, παραπλησίως λέγων Φιλίππῳ τῷ κωμωδοδιδασκάλῳ· φησὶ γὰρ τὸν Δαίδαλον κινουμένην ποιῆσαι τὴν ξυλλήνην Ἀφροδίτην ἐγγχεάντ' ἀργυροῦν χυτὸν. 'Callistratus' Ἐκφρασ. 8 eo progreditur, ut dicat: Δαίδαλον ἐξῆν ἰδεῖν κινούμενα μηχαναῖς τὰ ποιήματα καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρωπίνην αἰσθησιν ἐκβιάζεσθαι τὸν χαλκῶν': Gedike, Exc. III in Buttmann's ed. The scholiast on Eur. *Hec.* 838, quotes Eur. (fr. 373)—

τὰ Δαιδάλεια πάντα κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖ  
βλέπειν τ' ἀγάλμαθ'· ὧδ' ἀνὴρ κείνος σοφός.

We find in some of these places rationalistic explanations of the legend that the statues of Daedalus could move, such as the introduction of quicksilver or clockwork, besides that which made it an exaggerated statement of the life-like effect given to the statues by opening their eyes and parting their feet. But the legend probably had no rational source at all; it was simply an expression of the marvel excited in primitive man by what seem to him triumphs of art or of invention. To this stock-in-trade of Wonderland belong the tripods and παρθένοι of Hephaestus (*Il.* xviii 375 and 417), and the Phaeacian ships (*Od.* xiii 81). See too Athen. 3Q1; Crates *Theria* fr. 1 (which seems a realisation of the state of things supposed by Aristotle *Pol.* I 4). Perhaps the *ipsa olera olla legit* of Catullus, 94, has a similar reference. To just the same category belong the stories about Amphion and Orpheus. The estimation of the achievement is strongly coloured by hero-worship. 'It is

not in times when art is mature that people are likely to tell stories of overturning town-walls or taming savage animals with it, but when it is in the elementary stage in which the personal character of the performer adds so much to the effect.' Parry *Art of Music* p. 24.

13. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἔστιν παρ' ἡμῶν, 'perhaps you have not even got them in your country.' Socrates knew well enough what the extant works of 'Daedalus' at Athens were, and is only mischievously introducing the childish fable about them, much as a Londoner might chaff a country cousin about Gog and Magog. 'Idem (Pausanias) ix xl 2 enumerat sex Daedali statuas, quae sua aetate adhuc reliquae essent: plures sibi notas esse negat': Gedike Exc. III in Buttman's ed.

15. πρὸς τί; cp. E 24 πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτα λέγω;

16. ἂν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ἦ: for keeping slaves bound see Xen. *Oec.* iii 2. Symbolically, deities were represented as chained, to ensure their presence. 'Paus. iii xv 5: Lacedaemoni πέδας ἔστιν ἔχων Ἐνυάλιος, ἀγαλμα ἀρχαίων· γνώμη δὲ . . . οὐποτε τὸν Ἐνυάλιον φεύγοντα οἰχῆσεσθαί σφισιν ἐνεχόμενον ταῖς πέδασι (cp. Atheniensium Νίκη ἄπτερος). Ita symbolico vinculo tenebantur Liber Chii, Diana Ephyræ (schol. Pind. *Ol.* vii 95), Venus Lacedaemoni (Paus. iii xv 8), Juno quondam Sami (Athen. xv 672). Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 61 Τύριο δεσμοὺς ἀγάλασι λέγονται περιβαλεῖν. Lobeck *Aglaoph.* i p. 275' Fr.

17. ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει: the former verb is an inceptive, 'to run off'; the latter expresses a state, 'to lie perdu,' 'to lurk in by-holes,' in Bunyan's phrase. ἀποδιδράσκει and δραπετεύει are often contrasted with ἀποφεύγω; the former implies eluding by stealth, the latter by speed. *Symp.* 216 B (Alc. of Socrates) δραπετεύω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω: Xen. *Anab.* i iv 8 οὐτε ἀποδεδράκασιν· οἶδα γὰρ ὅπη οἰχονται· οὐτε ἀποπεφύγασιν· ἔχω γὰρ τριήρεις ὥστε ἐλεῖν τὸ ἐκείνων πλοῖον: ibid. ii v 7 τὸν γὰρ βῶν πόλεμον οὐκ οἶδα, οὐτ' ἀπὸ ποίου ἂν τάχους φυγῶν τις ἀποφύγοι, οὐτ' εἰς ποῖον ἂν σκότος ἀποδραῖη: vii iii 11 τὰ φεύγοντα καὶ ἀποδιδράσκοντα διώκειν καὶ μαστεύειν. The word ἀποδιδράσκειν occurs in Plato at *Euthyphr.* 11 c and *Theaet.* 203 D (see on 96 E 30 and on line 12), *Phaedo* 62 B (of abandoning a post).

18. παραμένειν, 'to stand by one' (περιμένειν 'to wait about for one.' *Apol.* 39 E ἀλλὰ μοι παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον. So 'to stand one's ground' *Phaedo* 62 E, 98 E δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δικήν. From this comes the common name for a slave Parmeno (= 'Trusty'); cp. Maced. 'Parmenio.'

E 21. The best MSS. of Plato always give κεκτῆσθαι etc. after a

vowel, but generally ἐκτῆσθαι after a consonant. Schanz vol. XII praef. p. xvii. *Theaet.* 198 D ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα ἡ δὲ κεκτῆμένῳ κτέ. ; *ibid.* 199 A τὸ κεκτῆσθαι . . . ὁ μὲν τις ἐκτῆται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ; *Rep.* 505 B εἰ κεκτῆμεθα . . . κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαί.

22. *δραπέτην ἀνθρώπων* : for ἀνθρώπος 'slave' see L. & S. who quote Philemon

κἂν δούλος ᾗ τις, οὐδὲν ἦττον, δέσποτα,  
ἀνθρώπος οὗτός ἐστιν, ἂν ἀνθρώπος ᾗ.

- 23. πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν : this too is in the main 'chaff.' The statues attributed to Daedalus had a certain archaic dignity, which to the 'reverent taste' was no doubt very moving ; Paus. II iv 5 Δαίδαλος δὲ ὅποσα εἰργάσατο, ἀτοπώτερα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐς τὴν θύην, ἐπιπρέπει δὲ ὁμῶς τι καὶ ἔνθεον αὐτοῖς. But in *Hérr. maj.* 282 A we read τὸν Δαίδαλὸν φασὶν οἱ ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ νῦν εἰ γενόμενος τοιαύτ' ἐργάζοιτο οἷ' ἦν ἀφ' ὧν τοῦνομ' ἔσχε καταγέλαστον ἂν εἶναι.

Plato distinctly regards Daedalus as a human sculptor ; in the *Ion* (533 A) he speaks of Daedalus son of Metion side by side with Epeus and Theodorus ; in the *Laws* 677 D he couples Daedalus with Orpheus and Palamedes, and thinks they lived perhaps 1000 or 2000 years before his time.

24. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα ; see Meno's question at D 15. Fr. refers to *Gorg.* 453 C, *Symp.* 178 D, † *Theages* 129 A. See Rid. § 325 'Rhetorical Interrogation.' Cp. 79 B 18.

28. ἐθέλουσι : see on 95 B 10.

98 A

30. αἰτίας λογισμῷ, 'by a chain of causal reasoning.' The gen. αἰτίας is objective (αἰτίαν λογιζόμενος).

The phrase is quoted in the *εἰσαγωγή* of Albinus (Teubner text of Plato vol. VI p. 150) ἵνα δὲ τὰ δόγματα μὲνη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀναπόδραστα, δεήσει αὐτὰ δεθῆναι τῷ τῆς αἰτίας λογισμῷ. Another echo is found in † *Ep.* II 313 B (it is assumed that Plato is writing to Dionysius on some point which D. has misapprehended) οὐ δὲ ἴσως μὲν ἀκούσας του, τάχα δ' ἂν θείῃ μοίρα κατὰ τοῦθ' ὀρμήσας, ἔπειτα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀποδείξεις ὡς ἔχων βεβαίως οὐ κατέδρασα, ἀλλ' ἄττεις τοτὲ μὲν οὕτω τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλως περὶ τὸ φανταζόμενον. See Exc. VII p. 305.

It appeared at 85 C that the δόξαι, in order to be raised to the level of ἐπιστήμαι, must be evoked by a process of questioning in their proper order and relation. Cp. 86 A 10 for the matter and for the plural ἐπιστήμαι.

32. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν : 81 C foll.

33. πρῶτον μὲν . . . ἔπειτα : the words are not to be taken

in a temporal sense (any more than at 90 A or 95 A), for they would in becoming ἐπιστήμῃ at once be μόνιμοι. The meaning is merely 'firstly' and 'secondly.'

36. δεσμῶ: 'i.e. τῷ δεδῆσθαι, significationem ducit ex superioribus, ut πόρος 78 D, εὐδοξία 99 B' Fr. The concrete δεσμῶ serves to keep the illustration before the mind.

37. ἔοικεν τοιοῦτῳ τινί, 'it looks something like this.' Here ἔοικεν is impersonal, and the meaning is just the same as ἔοικεν οὕτω πως ἔχειν. But εἶκα has a liking for a dat. construction. See on 80 D 39 and cp. *Phaedo* 99 E ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάξω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ εἶοικεν.

Chapters XL–XLII (98 B–end). SOCR. *Whether the simile I have given justly represents the difference between Right Opinion and Knowledge, I am not sure; but that there is a difference, I am confident. For purposes of practical utility, however, the two things are on a par. Now Virtue, whether based on Knowledge or on Right Opinion, in either case is not ours by Nature. It has been made clear too that the virtue of ordinary statesmen, not being Knowledge, does not arise from Teaching. It remains that it must be allotted to certain men by Divine Dispensation, like the inspiration of soothsayers, poets, etc. Any statesman whose art was based on Knowledge, and who thus was able to communicate it to others, would stand out among his fellows as Tiresias among the shades. But we shall understand the Origin of Virtue when we have ascertained the true Nature of Virtue, and not till then.*

B 1. καὶ μὴν: 85 C 4, 87 D 35, 89 C 8, below C 16. Very similar is καὶ μὲν δὴ 88 D 1.

καὶ ἐγώ: 'I, as well as you.'

2. εἰκάξων: the main meaning here is 'using conjecture,' but the notion 'using likenesses,' or 'speaking in parables,' is also present. It is possible there is a trace of a similar double meaning at 89 E 26 καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάξοντες εἰκάξομεν μὴ διδασκῶν εἶναι. εἰκάξω, 'conjecture,' is often opposed to exact knowledge: *Crat.* 425 C οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόγματα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκάξομεν: *Phil.* 55 E εἰκάξω λείποιρ' ἂν (if the measuring arts were removed we could do nothing but 'make shots'): † *Alc.* i 105 c εἴ οἶδα καὶ οὐκ εἰκάξω: † *Ep.* vii 324 A οὐκ εἰκάξω ἀλλ' ὡς εἰδῶς (probably imitated from here, says Karsten, *de Platonis quae feruntur epistolae* p. 43): † *Sis.* 387 D. The terminology of *Rep.* 511 κ,

534 A, whereby *εικασία* is made the inferior division of *δόξα*, is expressly dropped at the latter of these passages and not resumed. (Exc. VII p. 302.)

3. *οὐ πάνυ*: see on 71 C 19: for the general tone of the sentence cp. 86 B 22 foll. (See App. on the text.)

4. *εἴπερ φαίην ἄν*: see on 79 C 27. In the similar passage *Απολ.* 29 B *εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι κτέ.*, *φαίην* stands without *ἄν*. See Exc. II.

5. *δ' οὖν*, 'at any rate.' The appearance of *δέ in apodosis* here is to be explained, as Buttm. points out, by the fact that the antithesis conveyed by *δ' οὖν* refers to the parenthetical words *ὀλίγα δ' ἄν φαίην*.

*καὶ τοῦτο*, 'this too I should place on the list.' Cp. the closely parallel passage *Prot.* 329 B *εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπων πεθολίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι*.

11. *καὶ τοῦτο . . ἀληθῆ λέγειν*: the phrase *ἀληθῆ λέγειν* became stereotyped, so that it is used with a singular pronoun: *Lach.* 186 A, cp. *Soph.* 226 A *ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον*.

13. *ὠφέλιμη*: the fem. form is rare. It occurs *Rep.* 607 D. C At *Charm.* 174 D *ὥστε εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἢ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη ἢ ὠφέλιμη ἡμῖν* (so B), Sch. (after Madv.) cuts out *ἢ ὠφέλιμη*, which certainly is strange after *ὠφέλιμος* just before. The reading *ὠφέλιμη* here shows indifference to hiatus.

*ἔσται*, 'will be found to be'; see on 83 D 52.

17. *ὁμολόγηται*: at 87 E.

19. *ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κτέ.*: the sentence is interrupted, and there is no apodosis. The conclusion pointed to is, as Fr. points out, not reached till 99 E: *ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτὸν, ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη*.

*ἐπιστήμην . . δι' ὁρθὴν δόξαν*, 'on the ground of Knowledge' rather than 'by means of Knowledge'; but the practical difference between the acc. and the gen. with *διὰ* is here, as often, small. Cp. 99 B 12.

20. *ἂν εἴεν . . εἴπερ εἴεν*: note the 'vague future supposition,' and see on 74 B 6, 82 C 13; and for *εἴπερ* Exc. II.

23. See App. on text.

24. *ὅποτερον οὖν αὐτοῖν*: at 89 A B it was shown that Virtue, D assuming it to arise from *ἐπιστήμη*, was not innate. If it were, it would be the permanent possession from birth of certain gifted natures who would thus be marked out from their fellows. But can the Virtue that arises from *δόξα ἀληθῆς*—the other

alternative — be innate? Meno says 'no,' without giving reasons. We get a hint what these reasons would be in *Prot.* 323 C, quoted on 89 A 24, words which, though put into the mouth of Protagoras, may be taken as expressing the views of Plato.

26. οὐ φύσει: we have to supply ὁποτεροῦν αὐτοῖν γίγνεται.

οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν: see 89 A 24 where also the predicate is omitted.

29. ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει κτέ.: the transition here is rather abrupt. In the first place we have in ἐσκοπούμεν a change back from an expression of opinion (εἶεν ἄν) to a history of the discussion (as ὠμολόγηται C 17). In the second place, the subject is changed; perhaps with Schleiermacher we may fill up the ellipsis thus: ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται) ἐσκοπούμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰ διδασκτὸν ἔστιν (τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι). This forms a bridge to the next sentence where ἡ ἀρετὴ appears as subject. ἐσκοπούμεν of course refers to 89 C foll.

35. κἀν εἰ: see note on 72 C 1. This phrase has nearly always a concessive force—'even if.' (An exception occurs at *Phaedo* 72 C κἀν εἰ συγκρίνοιο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιο δὲ μή, κτέ., where the meaning, as here, is simply 'and if.') In the next sentence we have καὶ εἰ, and T gives καὶ εἰ here, which may possibly be right. καὶ εἰ also is often concessive; but the instances in which it means simply 'and if' are not rare. See Kühner § 578. 2, F. E. T. § 226. Note ἄν repeated with the infinitive.

It is here clearly brought out that the hypothesis is a *double* or *reciprocal* one. See on 87 C 10.

- E** 41. μή εἶναι (cp. μήτε . . . μήτε 44): as to the distinction between οὐ and μή with a dependent infinitive, Kühner § 541. 1 says that in general you have οὐ when the statement (belief, wish, etc.) is regarded as independent of the subject of the governing verb (e.g. εἶφη), and as assumed by the writer; μή, when it is dependent on the subject of the governing verb, and is expressed as a view attributed to him. Usage, however, has brought it about that with certain classes of verbs οὐ prevails, with others μή. With φάσαι, οὐ is the rule; an instructive exception occurs in *Xen. Mem.* I ii 39 φάσθην δ' ἄν ἐγωγε μηδεὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι παιδεύειν παρὰ τοῦ μή ἀρέσκοντος, where *Xen.* is distinctly stating his private belief. With verbs containing a subjective element, on the other hand, like ὁμολογῶ, μή prevails; see 96 C 8, *Phaedo* 94 ο οὐκοῦν ὠμολογήσαμεν μήποτε ἄν αὐτήν, ἄρμονίαν γε οἶσαν κτέ., *Prot.* 336 B etc. Curious is *Prot.* 319 B ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδασκτὸν εἶναι, μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν

ἀνθρώποις. See F.E.T. p. 353, notes 3 and 4, and J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 6 B.

54. ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγείται: see on 88 C 33. The 99 A transition from the individual to the political point of view is here complete. Just as in man a certain faculty acts as guide, so the man in whom this faculty is prominent acts as guide to others. The word ἡγείσθαι lends itself to this double point of view. We have here a foreshadowing of the doctrine of the *Republic* that the State is the Man 'writ large.' At 88 A-E we were concerned mainly with the individual, though the wider political view is latent, and indeed clearly appears in the statement 87 E 37 that all ἀγαθοί are ὠφελίμοι, reaffirmed 96 E 1 and 98 C 16. The political view—identifying the Good Man with the Statesman—is the dominant one at 97 A ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων: and οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγείσθαι ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ. Meno's conventional view of Virtue, alike with that of Socrates, implies action in a State.

55. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης: cp. Aristot. *Rhet.* I x 7, where from the class of actions ὧν αὐτοὶ αἰτία are expressly excluded those that are due to τύχη.

## CHAPTER XLI

2. ἔτι γίγνεται: see App. on the text. 'We no longer hold that Virtue is Knowledge': see on 83 D 52.

5. ἀπολλύνται, 'has been eliminated.'

B

9. οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα: this use of ἀμφί, of which Ast quotes nine instances in Plato (also *περὶ*: *Crat.* 440 c, *Phil.* 44 c), occurs in denoting the head of a school with his followers, 'Themistocles and Co.', 'our Gladstones.' See *CR.* XIII 168.

15. εἶδοξία is another instance of a word pressed to an unusual meaning by stress on its etymology: cp. 78 D 29. I do not think Plato intended any play on the ordinary meaning of the word 'good repute.' See App. on the text.

17. τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, 'maintain their States.' Cp. C *Lach.* 181 A εὖ γε . . . ἔτι ὀρθοῖς τὸν πατέρα: *ibid.* B οὐ μόνον τὸν πατέρα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ὀρθοῦντα: *Laws* 957 D αὐτὸν τε ὀρθοῦν καὶ τὴν πόλιν. κατορθοῦν, on the other hand, is rarely used with external acc.; but see *Tim.* 71 D κατορθοῦντες τὸ φαῦλον ἡμῶν, and—in the physical sense—† *Alc.* I 121 D ἀναπλάττοντας τὰ μέλη τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ κατορθοῦντας.

18. Θεομάνταις: the only other place from which L. & S. quote

the word is *Apol.* 22c (of poets) ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί.

19. ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλὰ: contrast with πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα below. The latter is simply 'many great things'; the former is *vera et sane multa*, the *καὶ* being intensive. Stallb. refers to Elmsley on Eur. *Med.* 871.

22. θεῖος καλεῖν: see 81 B 24. Plato takes the view that the use of *θεῖος* as a mere expression of admiration is antique. Some support of this is to be found in Homer, with whom it is often merely ornate. The 'divine swineherd' of *Od.* xvi 1 is notorious. For the use in Herodotus see L. & S. Plato appeals to colloquial usage as enshrining a deep truth. Cp. the two grades of meaning of *κακοδαίμων* (78 B 57). It is not long ago that a similar colloquial use of 'divine' was common in England; perhaps, as with *θεῖος* at Athens, more among women than men. Plato uses this word frequently, but never, I think, without some notion of inspiration. It is used of Simonides (*Rep.* 331 E); of Prodicus, not without irony (*Prot.* 316 A, quoted on 96 D 23); of Phaedrus (*Phaedr.* 234 D) *συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σου, τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς*, with reference to his rapt look, cp. 242 A; *Soph.* 216 B of the mysterious Stranger; of 'grave and reverend seniors' *Laws* 666 D *τίς (ῥῆθ) ἂν οὖν πρέποι θεῖους ἀνδράσιν*;

27. θεῖος τε: the particle *τε* naturally would come after *χρησμοδοῦς*. The hyperbaton, by which *τε* is forced forward in the sentence, is not uncommon in Plato. Butt. refers to Heindorf's index to the *Phaedo*, and quotes Hdt. vi 86 *ταῦτά τε ὦν ἐπιλεγομένη καὶ βουλευομένη*. Instances occur *Prot.* 316 D, 325 B, 336 C, *Crito* 43 B (for *Ion* 535 D see on 95 B 11).

D 28. *χρησμοδοῦς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας*: the divine inspiration of poets is the main thesis of the *Ion*; see especially 533 E. See too *Laws* 719 C *ποιητῆς ὁπότεν ἐν τῷ τρίποδι τῆς Μούσης καθίζηται, τότε οὐκ ἐμφρων ἐστίν* (Fr.): and 682 A *θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν [ἐνθεαστικὸν] ἐν γένος ὑμψοῦν πολλῶν τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων ἐφάπτεται ἐκαστοτε*. The tendency to appeal to their authority is of course a natural outcome of this view. See on 77 B 12.

29. *καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς κτέ.*: in the *Apol.* 21c foll. we find statesmen, poets, and craftsmen alike convicted of ignorance, but the source whence statesmen derive such skill as they have is not indicated. In the *Phaedrus* (244 B foll.) we have three kinds of *θεῖα μανία*, or divine possession, described, producing respectively the Prophet, the Purifier, and the Poet; to which at 249 D is added the fourth kind, which produces the Philo-

sopher. Nothing is said about any *θεία μανία* of the Statesman. I think it was in the *Meno* that statesmen were first included by Plato in the class of the inspired. See on E 5 below.

32. *ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ*: see App. on the text. Fr. endeavours to prove that by this phrase we can only understand Apollo. I doubt whether Plato here intends to attribute the inspiration of statesmen to any particular deity (as he does the four kinds of *μανία* severally in the *Phaedrus*). He is simply personifying the divine agency, without any mythological reference.

35. *καὶ αἱ γὰρ γυναῖκες*: Stallb. quotes *Crat.* 418c *αἱ γυναῖκες αἰπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σφίζουσι*. The secluded life of women in Greece would tend to increase their conservatism. See Aristoph. *Eccl.* 214 foll. Cp. † *Alc.* i 120 B *ἐπι τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη, φαίεν ἂν αἱ γυναῖκες, τρίχα ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*.

38. *θεῖος ἀνὴρ*: Aristot. *NE.* VII i 3 *καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εὐώθασι προσάγορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνὴρ φασιν*: See H. Jackson in *Phil. Soc. Proc.* November 1887. It seems doubtful whether the Spartan address *ὦ θεῖε* (*Laos* 626c) is really the same word as *θεῖος* 'divine.' See L. & S. on *ἡθεῖος*.

## CHAPTER XLII

2. *καὶ αὐθις διαλεξόμεθα*: this probably refers to the trial; E though we never suppose this to be immediately impending at the time of the dialogue.

3. *ἐζητήσαμεν καὶ ἐλέγομεν*: for the change of tense see on 72 B 22.

4. *ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν*: it may be noted that the view here expressed is that which Socr. really holds in the *Protagoras*, though there he pretends to have surrendered it in deference to the sophist; 328 z *ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται· νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι*. See on 70 A 1, 2.

5. *θεῖα μοῖρα*, 'by divine dispensation': on this important phrase see Zeller p. 176 note, Grote i 461, 462 (on the *Ion*). It is not confined to Plato; see Xen. *Mem.* II iii 18, *Cyr.* IV ii 1, *Hell.* VII v 10; cp. too Hdt. III 139 *θεῖα τύχη*. In Plato it sometimes denotes the common divine element in man; e.g. in *Prot.* 322 A *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἀνθρώπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας*: *Phaedr.* 230 A (I study myself to see whether I am a Typhon) *εἶτε ἡμερώτερον τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ζῶων, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτόφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχων*. Oftener it denotes a privilege of

individuals: *Apol.* 33 c (the Art of Examining has been forced on Socrates by all kinds of agencies) ὥπερ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. It occurs continually in the *Ion*, contrasted with τέχνη, of the gift of poetry: 534 c (also θεία δυνάμει), 535 A, 536 c D, and 542 A; *Phaedr.* 244 A νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῶν γίνεται διὰ μαρίας, θεία μέντοι δόσει διδομένης: *ibid.* c ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος (τῆς μαρίας) ὅταν θεία μοῖρα γένηται: *Phaedo* 58 E μῆδ' εἰς "Αἰδου λόντα ἀνευ θείας μοίρας λέναι: *Rep.* 366 c (speech of Adimantus) ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι, πλὴν εἰ τις θεία φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβῶν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος (cp. Socrates' answer 368 A πάντων γὰρ θεῶν πεπρόθυματε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἀμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ): *ibid.* 492 E (a democracy offers insuperable obstacles to a virtuous training: by human agency it is impossible) θεῶν μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου· εὐ γὰρ χρὴ εἶδέναι ὅτι περ ἂν σωθῆ ἢ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἔρεῖς.

For *Laws* 642 c see on 89 A 24: *ibid.* 875 c we have the heaven-born governor spoken of as superior to law: ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἰ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἰκανός, θεία μοῖρα γεννηθείς, παραλαβεῖν δυνατός εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναυτοῦ. The phrase also occurs † *Ep.* ii 313 b (quoted on 98 A 30): † *Ep.* vii 326 b (see on line 6 below): cp. 327 E θεία τιμὴ τύχη.

Between θεία μοῖρα and φύσει in this dialogue a distinction is made, though the ground of this distinction is not made as clear as could be wished. See on 89 A 24.

ἀνευ νοῦ: cp. on 70 A 2 and 97 B 17; also † *Alc.* ii 146 A ἀνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότα.

100 A 6. οἷς ἂν παραγίγγηται: cp. *Prot.* 323 c quoted on 89 A 24.

εἰ μὴ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος κτέ.: the distinction between the philosophic and the popular statesman is parallel to that between philosophic and popular Virtue. 'Socrates had made virtue to consist entirely in knowledge. He had assumed that virtue, like knowledge, could be taught. In all these respects Plato at first followed him; as against the ordinary notions of virtue he would indeed always have acknowledged the view of Socrates to be substantially correct. But riper reflection led him in after life to modify the Socratic doctrines and to determine them more accurately. He became convinced that side by side with perfect virtue, which is no doubt founded on knowledge, the unscientific virtue of ordinary men has its value; that though the former is based on instruction, and the latter only on custom, yet that this virtue of custom

precedes the higher kind as an indispensable preparatory stage' Zeller p. 448.

On the subject of *δημοτική ἀρετή* see Archer-Hind's *Phaedo* App. I. (He refers to Dr. Thompson's note on *Gorg.* 506 D.) He clearly shows under what different aspects *δημοτική ἀρετή* may appear. It may be (1) the reflex of philosophic virtue, possessed, as the best of which they are capable, by men under the guidance of a philosopher. In this light it is the virtue of the Auxiliaries in the Republic, distinguished from the Rulers. Or (2) it may be a precarious guide to right action in certain directions, acquired by the individual either *θελα μοίρα* or by habit and fortunate environment (*Rep.* 619 C; cp. on 70 A 2). This, according to circumstances, may be either practically beneficial, or deceptive and dangerous. (Exc. VII p. 301.)

J. & A. M. Adam in their *Introd. to the Protagoras*, p. xxxiv, say: 'Although the subject of the dialogue might seem to have expressly invited mention of that "demotic virtue" of which Plato made so much, no mention of it is made'; and add in a note—'It is in the *Meno* that the difference between demotic and philosophic virtue is first clearly laid down.' 'The whole discussion in the *Meno* brings out very clearly that the fundamental distinction between popular and philosophic *ἀρετή* is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge' (A.-H. loc. cit.). And in the *Meno* it is popular virtue and popular statesmanship that is conferred *θελα μοίρα*.

The only true Statesman, Plato holds, is the Philosopher. For the difference between him and the popular statesman see *Rep.* 534 B-D. How the desirable consummation may be brought about we read in *Rep.* 473 D. Either philosophers must gain rule in the States, or else the present so-styled Kings and Rulers must sincerely and thoroughly (*γνησίως τε καὶ ἰκανῶς*) embrace philosophy. Compare *ibid.* 499 B *ὅστε πόλις ὅστε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτε γένηται τέλειος, πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τοῦτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης παραβάλλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μὴ, πόλιος ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῇ πόλει κατηκῶ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων υἱέειν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀθηθῆναις φιλοσοφίας ἀθηθῆναις ἔρωσ ἐμπέσειν.*

It is possible that in the latter passage Plato had in mind the affairs of Sicily. We find the writer of † *Ep.* vii (addressed to the supporters of Dion) quoting it (326 B) *κακῶν οὖν οὐ λήξειν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα γένη, πρὶν ἂν ἢ τὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ὀρθῶς γε καὶ ἀληθῶς γένος εἰς ἀρχὰς ἔλθῃ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἢ τὸ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκ τίνος μοίρας θείας ὄντως φιλοσοφήσῃ.*

The sequel of events in Sicily affords an ironical commentary on Plato's views, in the contrast it shows between the failure of

Dion, with his philosophic training, and the success of Timoleon, with his belief in *αυτοματία* or 'spontaneity' (Plut. *Tim.* 36).

In Plato's identification of the Philosopher with the Statesman there is a veiled polemic against Isocrates. Isocrates believed in practical sagacity as of greater utility than theoretical knowledge. His was the sceptical view, the belief in a working rule, to which orators, as J. S. Reid observes (Intr. to Cicero's *Acad.* pp. 11-13), are prone. Thus Isocrates, in his pamphlet against the Sophists (13) § 8, says we see *πλείω κατορθούοντας τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους ἢ τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἐπαγγελλομένους*, which we should certainly regard as directed against Plato were it not that the date—about 391 B.C.—is too early. See Jebb *Att. Or.* II 51 foll. The jeers at the small fees and at the saying *ὡς οὐδὲν δέονται χρημάτων* in §§ 3, 4 seem to point at Antisthenes and his school. In the *Antidosis* (15) are similar passages: §§ 264 foll. he speaks patronizingly of philosophic studies as a good gymnastic for youth, but a man must not let his mind get fossilized (*κατασκελετευθεῖσαν*) over them, nor 'get stranded (*ἐξοκειλασαν*) among the theories of the old sophists, such as Empedocles and Parmenides.' (The resemblance to the view of Callicles in the *Gorgias* 484 is pointed out by Dr. Thompson, *Phaedr.* p. 174.) At § 271 follows a significant passage: *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν . . . ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν* (practical wisdom). Cp. note on 91 C 19. In the (late) *Panath.* (12) § 9 he says of himself *τὴν δὲ φύσιν εἰδὼς δοξάσαι μὲν περὶ ἐκάστου τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυναμένην τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων*. At the beginning of the *Helena* (10) we have successive attacks on Antisthenes, on Plato (*οἱ δὲ διεξίοντες ὡς ἀνδρῖα καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταύτων ἔστιν, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μίαν δ' ἐπιστήμην κατὰ πάντων ἔχομεν*), and Euclides, and come at § 5 to the statement *ὅτι πολὺ κρείττον ἔστι περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάσαι ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι*. Cp. also letter v (to Alexander) §§ 3, 4, 'I hear,' says Isocrates, 'that among philosophies you do not reject τὴν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας, but you think that in private society it is too aggressive, and that debate between a ruler and his subjects is somewhat derogatory': *ταύτην μὲν οὐκ ἀγαπᾶν σε τὴν διατριβὴν, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν παιδεῖαν τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους . . . δι' ἣν νῦν τε δοξάζειν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπιεικῶς ἐπιστήσῃ κτέ.* See Dr. Thompson App. II on the *Phaedrus*.

8. **σχεδόν τι**: Const. Ritter's tables (Intr. p. lxii) show that the phrase *σχεδόν τι* (together or separated) prevails in the

dialogues up to the *Republic*, σχεδόν in the later dialogues. This is the only place in which the word occurs in the *Meno*.

9. οἶον ἔφη Ὁμηρος . . τὸν Τερεσίαν εἶναι: *Od.* x 494. Cobet refers to the anecdote told by Plutarch (*Cat. maj.* 27) that Cato applied this line to Scipio minor. It is quite possible that Cato knew that this line had been applied by Plato to distinguish the philosophic statesman from others and that he meant to imply that Scipio by force of education stood out in just this manner among his compeers. (We perhaps have here a foreshadowing of the simile of the Cave in *Rep.* VII.) Near the end of the *Laws* (969 B) Plato compares the specially trained Philosophers (the 'Nocturnal Council') with ordinary governments: ἐάν γε μὴν οὗτος ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος γένηται ξύλλογος, ὃ φίλοι ἐταῖροι, παραδοτέον τοῦτω τὴν πόλιν, ἀμφισβήτησις τ' οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδεμία οὐδενὶ τῶν νῦν παρὰ ταῦθ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν νομοθετῶν, οὕτως δὲ ἔσται σχεδὸν ὅσαρ ἀποτελεσμένον, οὐ σμικρῶ πρόσθεν ὀνειρατος ὡς τῷ λόγῳ ἐφηψάμεθα, κεφαλῆς νοῦ τε κοινωρίας εἰκόνα τινὰ πως ξυμμίξαντες, ἐάν ἄρα ἡμῖν οἱ τε ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεχθῶσι, παιδευθῶσι τε προσηκόντως, παιδευθέντες τε ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας κατοικήσαντες φύλακες ἀποτελεσθῶσιν, αἰὼς ἡμεῖς οὐκ εἶδομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωτηρίας γερομένους.

12. καὶ εὐθύς: Buttm. (index) explains 'idem etiam statim esset vir ejusmodi in virtute' h.e. 'statim apparet idem fore etc.' The idiom falls under the class noticed at 83 D 52. Buttm. quotes Xen. *Hier.* ix 4 οὐκοῦν εὐθύς ἐν τοῦτοις τὸ μὲν ἐπίχαρι διὰ τοῦ ἀρχοντος ἐγένετο, τὰ δὲ ἀντίτυπα δι' ἄλλων, and observes that the use of αὐτίκα is somewhat similar.

21. αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή: these words B appear to me to be a clear reference forward to the *Republic*, where the subject, though formally Justice, is really nothing less than Virtue in its entirety. Thus the *Meno* is designed as a prelude. Very nearly allied to this passage is the conclusion of Bk. I of the *Republic*. Socrates has 'tasted each dish as it was handed round,' and had no satisfaction: ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὃ ἔστι, σχολῇ εἰσομαι εἶτε ἀρετὴ τις οὕσα τυγχάνει εἶτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.

22. ὅρα ποι λέγει: it is rare for Socrates to make any excuse for breaking off a colloquy. Cp. the end of the *Protagoras*. The conclusion of these dialogues snits their inchoate character. It says, in effect, 'to be continued.'

## ADDENDA TO NOTES ON 87 A 23 AND 30

I. Investigators contemporaneous with or later than Butcher have done little to further the solution (see Ueb.-Heinze p. 150). Gercke (*Archiv für Gesch. d. Philosophie* II 2. 170-174, 1889) would read τὸ χωρὶς τρίγωνον for τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον. He thinks that the only problem is to apply to a circle a figure (whether triangle or anything else) and see if it fits. But where then is the *ὑπόθεσις*? Tannery in the same volume, pp. 509-514 (also 1889), naturally rejects this, and falls back on the solution of Benecke, which has also received the suffrages of Moritz Cantor. Tannery confesses the inexplicability of the disguise of the problem; 'puisque l'existence de la condition imposée est précisément aussi difficile à reconnaître que la possibilité de la solution.' He would cut out the words αὐτοῦ γραμμῆν in line 29. Lastly Dummler (*Academica Anhang* IV, 1889) expresses dissatisfaction with Gercke, and says with much point that most of the 'solutions' come to this: 'if it is possible, it is possible.' He says the place is 'stark verderbt,' and rewrites it, bringing it into relation with the tetrahedra of the *Timaeus*.

II. Benecke points out that while τὸδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον certainly cannot mean 'this triangular figure,' yet Plato could hardly have written τὸ τρίγωνον χωρίον or τὸ χωρίον τὸ τρίγωνον in that sense; inasmuch as Plato and Euclid only know τρίγωνον as a substantive, and χωρίον, unqualified, regularly means a parallelogram, and moreover a rectangle. A rectilinear figure is σχῆμα εὐθύγραμμον. To the same effect argues Tannery: χωρίον properly means a rectangle; it is by an *extension of usage* that the term is applied to *any* figure, inasmuch as it can be measured under the form of a rectangle.

## APPENDIX ON THE TEXT

THE text of the present edition is founded mainly on the valuable recension of Schanz (Sch.). I have however not invariably followed him; but in some cases have sided with Fritzsche (Fr.) where he and Schanz do not agree. In a very few places I have given a reading that differs from both these editions. I have discussed the text at all places of any importance where Sch. and Fr. differ. Fortunately there is in the *Meno* no place, with the possible exception of 87 A, where any serious doubt as to interpretation is caused by uncertainty in the text.

Fr. has given a full and clear account of the MSS. of Plato, with reference to the *Meno*, in his edition, pp. 35 foll. The work of Sch., besides his edition of the text, is mainly contained in three tracts: *Novae commentationes Platonicae*, Würzburg 1871; *Studien zur Geschichte des platonischen Textes*, Würzburg 1874; *Ueber den Platocodex der Markus Bibliothek in Venedig*, *append. class 4 No. 1*, Leipzig 1877.

The MSS. of the *Meno* fall into two classes. Of the first (*a*), the great representative is the Bodleian MS. This ranks first in excellence. Fr., following Bekker, marks this as  $\mathcal{A}$ ; I follow Sch. in referring to it as B. Only one other MS. belongs to this class; a Vatican MS. (Bekker  $\Delta$ ), copied, whether directly or not is uncertain, from B. All the other MSS., some nineteen collated for the *Meno*, form the other class. The best MS. of this class is the Venetian, marked by Sch. as T. Sch. was the first to demonstrate its importance. He holds that all the MSS. of the second class are derived from it (*Ueber den Platocodex* etc.). Fr. divides the MSS. of the second class into two sub-classes. One of these sub-classes (*b*<sup>2</sup>) he allows (p. 43) to have been derived from T. This contains several Paris MSS.; namely the 'Coislinianus' (Bekker  $\Gamma$ ), once more highly esteemed than now, and Bekker's BCE and F; also

some Florentine MSS. The other sub-class (*b*<sup>1</sup>) Fr. denies to be derived from T; he shows that in the *Meno* there are eleven places where this sub-class coincides with B rather than with T. This sub-class contains two 'Veneti,' two 'Vindobonenses,' two 'Vaticani,' two 'Laurentiani.' The most interesting among them is Laurentianus 85, 7, appropriately marked as x by Fr., who says of it 'A libris reliquis familiae saepissime secedit x, qui negligentissime scriptus tamen "multas habet egregias lectiones, quas in ceteris libris frustra quaesiveris."' The last words are quoted from Stallb. See also for this MS. Schanz *Studien* p. 70 and p. 69, note.

70 B 9. *Λαρισαίου* was bracketed by Naber (*Commentationes* II 63, which appeared in the *Tydschrift vor de Nederlandsche Gymnasien*). Sch. and Fr. both follow him. (1) The word is superfluous; we are presently told that Aristippus was one of the Aleuadae, and every one knew that the Aleuadae were of Larisa. (2) With *Λαρισαίου* the article *τοῦ* would be required. Three MSS. of the class *b*<sup>1</sup> supply this. The Coislinianus and x, on the other hand, correct to *Λαρισαίου*. This makes it almost certain that the word is a gloss. The spelling *Λαρισαίου* is better than *Λαρισσαίου*: Sch. prolegomena to *Phaedrus* § 1. Cp. *Λαρίσαν* 97 A 14.

71 A 23. *ἔρεσθαι*: the proper accent of the aor. is preserved by B as usual; *ἔρεσθαι* T. See Sch. *Phaedr. prolegomena* p. viii. At *Gorg.* 447 c both B and T wrongly give *ἔρου* for *ἐροῦ*.

25. *ἀρετήν γοῦν εἶτε διδακτὸν εἶθ' ὅτε τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι*: Naber (*Commentationes*) brackets these words, I believe rightly, though neither Sch. nor Fr. follow him. The words are clumsy and superfluous, and the use of *γοῦν* is, I believe, not Attic. The Attic use of *γοῦν* is illustrated by *εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις* just above, cp. 89 E 30 *πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν*, 90 B 47 *αἰροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν*, 93 D 15 *ἐπέμενον γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἱππῶν*. The speaker retires, as it were, to firmer ground from which he defends his former statement. So *γοῦν* is often used in 'quoting an example' (L. & S.); a previous general statement is narrowed down to a special instance, which, so far as it goes, supports it. Ast quoting this passage translates *γοῦν videlicet*; but I cannot see that he quotes any other passage where the restrictive force is absent as it is here. At *Phaedr.* 236 A *ἀναγκαῖα γοῦν ὄντα* the meaning seems elliptical, like *praesertim cum*, 'which at least you would expect, as.' In later Greek—as in Diog. Laert.—the use of *γοῦν* became much looser. A similar gloss containing *γοῦν* is expelled at *Symp.* 195 D.

26. *τοσοῦτου δέω*: the MSS. give *τοσοῦτον*, to which

Buttmann took exception. Cobet *Collect. critica* 44 says: 'Certo et perpetuo omnium Atheniensium usu dicebatur *τοσοῦτον* ἀπέχω et *τοσοῦτου* δέω, et πολλοῦ, πλείστον, μικροῦ ὀλίγου δέω et similia sine ulla exceptione, quam natura verbi δέω non admittit.' The acc. *τοσοῦτον* is defended by Ullrich, and retained by Hermann. Cobet is followed by Sch. and Fr., and I have followed them. It must be noted, however, that the accusative *τοσοῦτον* is logically quite defensible; indeed either of the three cases is theoretically possible, and the dative actually occurs in the MSS. of Isocr. *Bus.* (11) 5 *τοσοῦτῳ* δέεις ἀποχρήσθαι. I may say 'I am lacking of so much' (gen.) or 'by so much' (dat.) or 'in respect of so much' (acc.). Cobet's rule, as all such rules, assumes that Attic usage was quite uniform. The other instances of *τοσοῦτον* are however all from late writers; twice in the spurious † *Axiochus* 366 B *τοσοῦτον* ἀποδέω τῶν περιττῶν: 372 B *τοσοῦτον* γὰρ ἀποδέω τοῦ δεδοκέναι (where, as Buttmann points out, there are already dependent genitives). So too Charito VIII 1 *τοσοῦτον* ἀποδέω τοῦ σε κωλύειν. 'Plut. *adv. Coloten.* x 6 *τοσοῦτον* ἐδέησε τοῦ κινεῖν, qui etiam μικρόν, ὀλίγον δέω seq. inf. vel τοῦ c. infin. aliquoties praebet' Fr. In Plutarch and other later writers no doubt the desire to avoid hiatus influenced the use. Thus Lucian *Nigr.* 26 gives *τοσοῦτου* δέων, *Pisc.* 29 *τοσοῦτου* δέω: but *Icaromen.* 5 *τοσοῦτον* ἐδέησαν.

27. *ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτό*: so the MSS., Buttm. and Fr. Sch., following Stallb., corrects *ὡς* to *ὡστ'*. *ὡς* in consecutive sense, after a demonstrative, is very rare in Plato (see *Prot.* 330 E *οὕτως* ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα *ὡς οὐκ εἶναι κτέ.*, with J. and A. M. Adam's note) and perhaps unparalleled with the indic. as here. But Xen. affords examples: *Hell.* iv i 33 *νῦν οὕτω διάκειμαι ὡς οὐδὲ δειπνον ἔχω*, *Symp.* iv 37 *οὕτω πολλὰ ἔχω ὡς μὲν αὐτὰ εὐρίσκω*, *ibid.* ix 3. Krüger § 65. 3, 4; Goodwin *MT.* § 609.

5. Naber, following x, inserts *ἔστιν* after *ὁποῖόν γέ τι*. I B have ventured to follow him.

28. Hirschig, Cobet and Sch. read *εἰπέ*, after one Florentine D MS. (n). Fr. keeps *εἶπον*. Rutherford *New Phrynichus* p. 219 'The two (aorists, *εἶπον* and *εἶπα*) accurately supplement one another according to the following paradigm:

Indic.	<i>εἶπον</i>		<i>εἶπομεν</i>
	<i>εἶπας</i>	<i>εἶπατον</i>	<i>εἶπατε</i>
	<i>εἶπε</i>	<i>εἶπᾶτην</i>	<i>εἶπον</i>
Imper.	<i>εἰπέ</i>	<i>εἶπατον</i>	<i>εἶπατε</i>
	<i>εἰπάτω</i>	<i>εἰπάτων</i>	<i>εἰπόντων.</i>

This is the scheme to which Attic usage was approximating. But the process of selection and elimination must have taken

time. We should expect to see sporadic survivals, which we actually find.

- 72 A** 12. εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου: Cobet (*Collect. crit.* 46) would omit βούλει, in accordance with general usage (see expository note). But the repetition of βούλει here seems characteristic of Meno's verbose style.

20. κειμένων BT, κείμενον x, which is adopted by Cobet (*Collect. crit.* 46) and Sch. Fr. keeps κειμένων. No one has followed Gedike, who from Plutarch *περὶ πολυφιλίας*, c. 1 wished to read κινουμένων or κεινημένων. This spoils the irony of the passage, for the double meaning of *παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων*, and the reference to Meno's real character, cannot be ignored.

- C** 4. ἀποκρινόμενον BT was retained by Bekker and Hermann. Buttm., Sch., and Fr. give ἀποκρινόμενον, which is supported by some MS. of the sub-class *b*<sup>1</sup> and by a Paris MS. (F), derived from T, of small independent authority. Madv. (*adv. crit.* 1 413) condemns the aorist. The reading ἀποκρινόμενον given in the old printed editions, and rendered by Ficinus, is not supported by any existing MS. I think there is ground here for adhering to the aorist ἀποκρινόμενον. All the neighbouring verbs are aorists. A distinction very commonly observed by Plato is that ἐρέσθαι, ἐρωτήσαι, ἀποκρίνασθαι are used for single inquiries and answers; ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι of a process of inquiry and answer. (See note on 72B 22.) *Rep.* 1 will furnish abundant instances: 332 c (aorists); 336 c μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοὶ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδὴν τις τι ἀποκρίνηται (aor.), ἐγνωκώς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥᾶον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναί καὶ εἰπέ, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον: 337 E ἵνα αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται (pres.), ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινόμενου λαμβάνη λόγον. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις ἀποκρίνατο; (to the particular question): 338 A ἀποκρινόμενος 'becoming respondent,' τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον 'the respondent' (so *Prot.* 338 D): 343 A ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι 'keeping the part of respondent'—no particular question is now before him: οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρὴν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτᾶν; 346 A (pres.); 348 B (aor.); 349 B (aor.); 351 c (pres.); 352 B (pres.). At 340 E the MSS. vary between ἀποκρίνεσθαι and ἀποκρίνασθαι. Either would suit the sense; a single answer is referred to, but that answer is in the act of being given. In the present dialogue note 74 C 21 ὁ ἐρωτῶν; E 3 τῷ ἐρωτῶντι; 75 D 10, with note on text; 83 D 50 τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου (as a general practice). Other considerations may sometimes cause the aor. to be used of a process, as 85 D 20 οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται (where the aor. ptcp. expresses priority of time) or the pres. of a single act: *Phil.* 19 A σκόπει δὴ πρότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτῶμενον: but just below

διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι. Again, compare *ei tis anérouito* 74 B 6 with *ei tis éρωτῆῃ* 75 A 8. At *Gorg.* 465 D τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει may be 'why don't you go on answering?'; but owing to the special use of the aor. in this idiom (see on 92 D 30) the pres. is here inevitable. See further *Gorg.* 462 B ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου, 'take which part you prefer,' ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καὶ μοι ἀποκρίναι κτέ. : *ibid.* 515 B ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι; *Prot.* 330 C-E; 351 D οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν . . ἀποκρίνασθαι: *Theaet.* 146 A ἐπιτάξει δ τι ἀν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι: *Phil.* 24 E τὸν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον. In *Polit.* 258 A ἀποκρινομένου (Bekker) is right. Note ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος for 'the defendant' (L. & S.); cp. ὑπεραποκρίνεσθαι *Ar. Wasps* 951; contrast ἀποκρίναι *ibid.* 964, *Frogs* 1008, of single answers. See *CR.* IX 147.

17. ὑγίειά γε: all the MSS. give ὑγίειά τε, except x, which E gives the reading in the text, adopted by Bekker, Sch., and Fr. (See 91 D 10 for a converse instance.) γε was also preferred by Buttm., who however mentions another alternative, which has found some favour, to omit the first καί, reading ὑγίειά τε εἶναι ἀνδρός κτέ., with hyperbaton of τε, for which see on 99 C 27. γε and τε are confused *Polit.* 258 A, etc.

9. ἀρχαῖν οἶόν τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου; the MSS. all give 73 D οἶω τε, a corruption not easy to account for. Wolf read οἶω, to which Buttm. rightly objects (1) that the dual implies a pair conjointly, not two separate individuals; (2) that the rest of the sentence, especially τοῦ δεσπότου, implies that the slave only, not the child, is here considered. He proposed οἶόν τε or οἶου τε. The latter attraction would be awkward with the genitive δεσπότου following. *Madvig adv. crit.* i. 413 οἶόν τε, followed by Sch. and Fr. The language naturally repeats Meno's οἶόν τ' εἶναι just above; cp. l. 13 below.

12. ἔτι δέ καί: so Fr. The MSS. all give ἔτι γάρ καί. γάρ is certainly out of place; the new point is entirely separate from the former; not a support added to it. Sch. thinks that γάρ has arisen from a dittography of καί, and reads ἔτι καί. On this Fr. rightly says 'asyndeton aegre fertur'; at *Soph.* 239 D we have, it is true, τὰ τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτοις εἶδωλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τάλλα, but this occurs in the middle of a list, and is not parallel, though there also Heindorf wished to insert δέ after ἔτι. Fr. gives many passages in Plato in which δέ and γάρ are confused by particular MSS. Add *Aesch. Choëph.* 32 where Lachmann gave δέ for γάρ of the MSS.; *Hes. O. et D.* 526 where Hermann gave οὐδέ οἱ for MSS. οὐ γάρ οἱ, etc. See *CR.* XIV 433 a.

- 74 B** 5. **προβιάσαι** is given by one Florentine MS. (n) of no great authority; but seems to be right. It was proposed by Schneider, and is adopted by Sch. Fr. with the other MSS. **προβιάσαι**. But **προβιάζειν**, *promovere*, is the sense required; cp. *Prot.* 328 B *ἡμᾶς προβιάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν*. **προβιάζειν** is *admonere*; neither of its senses is suitable here. Compounds of **πρός** and **πρό** are continually confused in MSS. See on **75 D** 10, and Badham's note on *Phil.* 45 B. At *Xen. Mem.* i ii 17 most of the MSS. give *καὶ τῷ λόγῳ προβιάζοντας*, and this I should keep, but most modern editors give, after one or two MSS., *προσβιάζοντας*.
- 75 B** 21. **πειρώμαί σοι**: so Sch.: the MSS. give *πειρώμεθα*, Naber *πειράσομαι*. The 'modest' use of the plur. 1st person is rare in prose. At **71 C** 12 *ἀπαγγέλλωμεν* refers to Meno and his suite. Kühner § 371. 3 quotes examples from *Xen.* where a plural *pronoun* is used by a person speaking of himself; also the phrase *μοι δοκοῦμεν* *Soph.* 229 B. But in this case, as in others (as *Rep.* 545 C), the plural is accounted for by the fact that Socr. is regarded as taking his pupil into partnership. This is excluded in the present case by *σοι* (cp. Hadley § 637). I follow Sch., with some hesitation, as the corruption is hard to account for. Dr. Thompson in his note on *Phaedr.* 253 C (*διειλομεν*) gives instances of the converse corruption of the plural into the singular.
- C** 30. **εἰεν**: the MSS. give this to Socrates. Heind. (on *Crat.* 410 C) first saw that it was part of a continuous speech of Meno.
- D** 10. **προσολογή**: all the MSS. give *προσομολογή* (see crit. note on **74 B** 5). Gedike suggested *προσολογή*, but none of the editors have followed him. I believe him to be right. (1) This reading is supported by **79 D** 38 *μήπω ὠμολογημένων*, where the present passage is referred to; (2) *προσομολογεῖν* always (in Plato at any rate) means 'to acknowledge in addition'—a meaning not suitable here. I think Buttm. (*Index*) is wrong in saying that *προσομολογεῖν* is 'idem quod ὠμολογεῖν,' and Stallb. wrong in giving the rendering *una cum altero fateri*.
- Gorg.* 461 B *ὅτι Γ. ἡσχύνθη σοὶ μὴ προσομολογήσαι κτέ*, 'because Gorgias was ashamed not to grant that the rhetorician (besides his knowledge of rhetoric) would know the just etc.'
- Soph.* 248 C *δεόμεθα παρ' αὐτῶν ἐτι πυνθέσθαι σαφέστερον, εἰ προσομολογοῦσιν κτέ.*, 'if, after asserting that *οὐσία* has nothing to do with *ποιεῖν* or *πάσχειν*, they further grant that *οὐσία* can be known.'
- ibid.* 261 E *ὅπερ ᾤθηθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν*, 'what

I thought you meant when (after asserting of forms and letters that some would go together, others not) you made the *further* similar statement about *words*.'

† *Hipparchus* 227 D is clearest of all: αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν, 'we acknowledged in addition to it.'

L. & S. are wrong in quoting *Theast.* 159 c under προσωμολογεῖν: the reading there is προσωμολογημένον.

At *Soph.* 241 A the MSS. vary between προσδιωμολογημένα and προδιωμολογημένα. I believe the latter is required by the context, and that προσδιωμολογεῖσθαι occurs neither there nor anywhere else; προδιωμολογεῖσθαι occurs *Tim.* 78 A.

In other authors the point is almost equally clear. *Xen. Anab.* VII iv 24 προσωμολόγουν is contrasted with ὠμολόγουν above. *Andoc. de Myst.* § 15 καὶ ταῦθ' ὑμῖν προσομολογεῖται ἅπαντα: after the first μήνυσις of Andromachus comes the second of Teucrus. *Isocr. Trapez.* (17) 39, 'to acknowledge a further debt'; see L. & S. *Dem.* 27 § 42=826 end (in same sense; see L. & S.). *Dem.* 48 § 44=1179. 17, 'granted in addition to my previous collusions with him.' *Dem.* 56 § 6=1284. 17, 'they first promise they will return from Egypt to Rhodes or Athens; afterwards they further promise (προσομολογοῦσι) they will return to Athens and nowhere else. See *Aesch.* 3. 53 μὴ ψευδῆ ἀλλὰ παλαιὰ καὶ λίαν προσωμολογημένα, 'acknowledged before proof is brought' (Weidner), 'self-evident.' (Cobet here from a minority of MSS. gives προσωμολογημένα.) προσομολογία, 'a further admission' (L. & S.); but the one instance they quote (*Dem.* 39. 41) hardly bears out this rendering. *Buttmann*, after acknowledging that 79 D 38 favours *Gedike's* προσμολογή, says 'sed in hac forma necessarium foret praeteritum προσμολογήσῃ, quo non opus est in forma quoad tempus indefinita, προσομολογεῖν.' If ἐρόμενος be read in the sequel he is probably right. This is one of my reasons for not reading ἐρόμενος.

ὁ ἐρωτῶν: all the MSS. give ὁ ἐρωτῶμενος, which is defended by *Gedike* and *Ullrich*, and retained by *Hermann*. It must be wrong; for it is the person who asks for the definition who must acknowledge his familiarity with the terms employed. This *Meno*, now ὁ ἐρωτῶν, presently does, in answer to *Socrates' question ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι*. Most editors, following *Cornarius*, correct to ὁ ἐρόμενος, referring to *Hipp. maj.* 293 A, where all the MSS. give ἐρωτῶμενον, which is universally corrected to ἐρομένου. In that place the aorist ἐρομένου is no doubt right. Here, after the presents ἀποκρίνεσθαι, προσμολογή, it comes in strangely. The interpretation of *Ficinus*, 'qui rogat' is adduced in support of the usual correction. But if *Ficinus* read ὁ ἐρόμενος, would he not rather have written 'qui

rogavit' ? For these reasons I correct *ἐρωτώμενος* to *ἐρωτῶν*. The corruption arose either from a dittography  $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{ἐρωτῶν} \\ \text{ἐρόμενος} \end{array} \right\}$  or because the scribes failed to see how the person who is, on the whole, *ὁ ἐρωτῶν*, could be expected to make an admission ; and so altered *ἐρωτῶν* to *ἐρωτώμενος*.

**A** 4. *πράγματα προστάτης* : so the MSS., which Fr. follows. Many of the editors are dissatisfied. Ast struck out *πράγματα* ; Gedike would substitute *παρανίκα* for it ; Cobet alters *προστάττει* to *παρέχει*, whom Sch. follows. No doubt *πράγματα παρέχειν* is the usual phrase (90 E 30, etc.). But as Plato uses *προστάττειν* with such objects as *ἔργον* (*Rep.* 530 c, *Parm.* 136 D), *δίαίταν* (*Rep.* 406 c), *ὁ φαῦλον Πολίτ.* 263 A, it may surely be admitted with the object *πράγματα*, 'trouble.' See L. & S. *προστάσω* II 1. Heindorf in Buttm. quotes for *πράγματα προστάττειν* Xen. *Oec.* xvii 11, to which Fr. adds *ibid.* ix 16.

**77 A** 5. *κατὰ δλον* : this seems to be the only instance of this combination in Plato. In Aristotle the phrase became stereotyped, and was written as one word *καθόλου*. L. & S. (s. v. *καθόλου*) say it was written *καθ' δλον* in 'writers before Aristotle.' But where are the instances ? The letter of Philip in Dem. *de Cor.* (18) 77 is not genuine. Ast read *καθ' δλον*, which occurs *Tim.* 40 A, 55 E. *κατὰ δλον* is the form which occurs *Rep.* 392 E. Possibly this is the true reading here : but *κατὰ δλου*, even though this be an isolated instance in Plato, is parallel to *κατὰ πάντων* at 73 D 5 etc. The hiatus need not surprise us : Fr. gives instances of hiatus between prep. and relative, all from dialogues not later than the *Republic*. He quotes Cicero *Or.* § 151, where Cicero observes *Platonem hiatum non fugisse*. But this is much less true of the later dialogues. See Blass *Attische Beredsamkeit* II 426.

8. *ὕγιᾶ* : so the MSS. ; Sch. *ὕγιᾶ*. The old rule was 'Those adjectives in *-ης* that have a vowel before the termination in Attic contract *-εα* into *-ᾶ*, not *-ῆ*' (*Matthiae Gr.* § 113). For this Hadley § 231 b substitutes an amended rule : '*-εα* is contracted into *-ᾶ*, not *-ῆ*, when an *ε* precedes : *ἐνδεᾶ* from *ἐνδεης*, *needy* (*Lach.* 199 D). After *ι* and *υ* both vowels occur, *ὕγιᾶ* and *ὕγιῆ* from *ὕγιης*, *εὐφυᾶ* and *εὐφυῆ* from *εὐφυῆς*.' Sch. appears not to be uniform in practice. At *Gorg.* 478 c, *Phaedr.* 89 D, *Laws* 684 c he gives *ὕγιῆ* ; but at *Charm.* 155 E, 156 B, 164 B, *Laws* 735 B, *ὕγιᾶ*. At *Laws* 857 D most MSS. and editions give *ὕγιῆ*. As to other adjectives in *-ης*, at *Rep.* 386 B most MSS. appear to give *ἀδεῆ*, at † *Alc.* i 122 A *ἀδεᾶ*, at *Phaedr.* 257 D *ψοφοδεᾶ*. Meisterhans *Grammatik der Att. Inschriften*

p. 118 gives interesting statistics from Inscr. as to *ύγιης*: after 350 B.C. the neuter plur. and acc. sing. is *ύγιή* (eight places); in an Inscr. (*UIA.* II 67) between 357 and 354 B.C. both forms occur, *ύγιά* and *ύγιή*.

32. I have followed Buttm. in reading *αὐτῷ* here, which C Sch. gives in the parallel passage *Symp.* 204 DE.

43. οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά: Cobet brackets these words, and E is followed by Sch., I think quite rightly.

4. τοῦ λεχθέντος: the MSS. give *τούτου λεχθέντος*, which Fr. 78 B retains. But this would mean 'when this has been said,' whereas we want a substantive phrase. Schleiermacher read *τούτου τοῦ*; Ast, whom Sch. follows, *τοῦ*.

29. Before *τούτω τῷ πόρῳ* the MSS. give *τι*, which Fr. D retains. But *τι* with a transitive verb could only be a substantive, not a qualifying adverb (80 A 12 referred to by Fr. is not parallel). Sch. substitutes *που*, somewhat boldly. The MSS. vary in their spelling of *προστιθείς*, and it seems possible that the uncertainty of the termination originated *τι*. Stephanus, followed by Ast, omits it.

18. MEN. Τί οὖν δή; ΣΩ. Τοῦτο λέγω, κτέ. The MSS. 79 B give to Meno the words *τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω*; Heusdius gave the question to Socrates, who thus interrupts and answers himself, as at 97 E 24 and *Prot.* 343 D. But Schleiermacher pointed out that this usage only occurs to explain a statement the application of which is not obvious, which is not the case here. Buttm. (whom Fr. follows) approves the reading in the text, quoting *Crat.* 398 A; *Gorg.* 497 D; 'unde apparet nostro loco "Εγωγε sive qualemcunque affirmandi formulam ante *τί οὖν δή*; mente supplendam esse.' Sch. gives the words to Socrates, but punctuates *τί οὖν δή; τοῦτο λέγω, ὅτι κτέ.*

19. *δλον*: this reading (Sch.) has the support of the bulk of the MSS. including B. Some MSS. however, and the old editions, give *δλην*, which Buttm. and Fr. retain. The fact that we have *δλην* at 77 A 8, where *ἀρετή* is almost personified, cannot decide the point here. Cp. *Prot.* 361 B *εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη δλον*.

25. B, with some other MSS., gives *δεῖται*; T *δεῖ*; x gives C *δεῖ τι*. Thus the balance of MS. authority is in favour of *δεῖται* (Sch. and Fr.). Buttm. reads *δεῖ*, denying the impersonal use of *δεῖται*. We have however at C 31 *δεῖσθαι*, at E 46 *δεήσεσθαι* (where Buttm. would read *δεήσεω*). Cp. *Rep.* 340 A *καὶ τί δεῖται μάρτυρος*; † *Alc.* II 149 c; *Soph. O.C.* 570 *ὥστε βραχέα μου δεῖσθαι φράσαι*.

27. *εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς*: all the MSS. (save Paris F, in which *εἰ* is written as a correction) give *ἦ* or *ἧ*. Ficinus (who renders *siquidem*) must have read *εἰ*, and this seems necessary.

28. *τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν λέγειν . . . ἀρετῇ ἔστιν*: these clumsy and intrusive words are, I think, rightly bracketed by Naber. Fr. keeps the words, and so does Sch., but reading *τοῦτο γὰρ ἄρα λέγει κτέ.*, no doubt including this place among those to which he refers in the Notarum Index to this vol. (p. x) 'In his locis aliquot locos ita emendabam, ut emendatio proficisceretur a compendio vocabuli ἄρα.'

D 43. *δ τι ἔστιν, οἶον*: both the best MSS. have missed the right reading here: B *ἔστιν οὐ*, T *ἔστι σύ*: *ἔστιν, οἶον* is preserved by x, by Coishin. and some other MSS. of the δ<sup>1</sup> sub-class, by Δ (the copy of B), and by the old editions.

E 46. *δέησεσθαι*: see on C 25 above.

80 B 13. *ναρκᾶν* was bracketed by Dobree and Cobet, whom Sch. follows, I think rightly; Fr. retains the word.

E 7. *κατάγεις*: this is generally explained as a metaphor drawn from spinning: *κατάγω* = 'spin' *Soph.* 226 B; *κάταγμα* = 'yarn' *Polit.* 282 E. Fr. quotes as illustrating the metaphor *Hipp. min.* 369 B ὦ Σώκρατες, *δει σύ τινας τοιούτους* (scil. *καρτίους*) *πλέκεις λόγους*. The same metaphor appears in *subtilis*, 'fine-spun,' etc. But nowhere else is *κατάγω* or any of its derivatives found in a metaphorical sense. And Buttmann says with much justice 'comparatio cum filo quod nendo *deducitur* de tam brevi sermone locum non habet.' He suggests *παράγεις*, citing Dem. *Androt.* (22) 4 *πλάττων καὶ παράγων πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων κακοῦργους λόγους*. Ficinus renders 'in medium adducisti,' a rendering to be got out of *παράγεις*, but not out of *κατάγεις*.

81 C 34. *ψυχᾶς*: so Boeckh, whom Sch. follows, for *ψυχάν* of the MSS. which Buttmann and Fr. retain. We might defend *κείνων ψυχάν* by Aesch. *Persae* 28 *δεινοὶ δὲ μάχην ψυχῆς εὐτλήμονι δόξῃ*. But the following *ἐκ τῶν* seems conclusive for the plural.

3. *καὶ πάντα χρήματα*: I have with Fr. retained *καὶ*, which is bracketed by Sch.; for (1) it is not clear that the division *τὰ ἐνθάδε* and *τὰ ἐν* "Αἴδου is exhaustive, and (2) it seems to be possible that *καὶ* might be taken comprehensively (*denique*) as Stallb. suggests.

D 16. *ἐργαστικούς*: so Fr. following B, some other MSS., the old editions and Hermann. T and its descendants give *ἐργατικούς*, which Sch. gives. Hermann's defence of *ἐργαστικούς* (Praef. p. xxi) seems wrong: this is from *ἐργάζομαι*, as *ζητητικός* from

ζητέω, and means 'productive'; this is the sense it bears at *Polit.* 280 E, 281 A, and the sense wanted here: ἐργατικός is from ἐργάτης, 'like a labourer,' opposed to ἀρχιτέκτων, which sense it bears at *Polit.* 259 E. It must be noted, however, that ἐργάτης occurs as adj. 'industrious' at *Rep.* 554 A φειδωλὸς καὶ ἐργάτης (v.l. ἐργαστής), *Euthyd.* 281 C ἀργος μάλλον ἢ ἐργάτης. Cp. *Xen. Mem.* I ii 57, III i 6.

19. ἀλλὰ πῶς . . . ; this, undoubtedly the right reading, has E been preserved only by x, by r (another MS. of the δ' class, in the Vatican) and by Stobaeus, who cites from 80 E 7 to 82 A 28. Stallb.'s argument against the reading ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς, which is given by all the other MSS., is conclusive. Meno would thus be represented as accepting Socrates' statement in the main, and merely asking whether it was to be accepted without qualification. But this is not Meno's attitude.

41. εἰ ἀναμνησκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων: the MSS. give ἢ 82 B ἀναμνησκόμενος κτέ., which Fr. retains. Sch. thinks the place corrupt. I have followed Ast in reading εἰ for the former ἢ. At 79 C 27 and 88 B 21 we have other instances in the MSS. of confusion between εἰ and ἢ. The matter is complicated, because in Homer indirect alternative questions are introduced by ἢ . . . ἢ, and the same usage perhaps extends to tragedy; though in some of the places εἰ is a v. l. for the former ἢ. The chief places are Aesch. *Choëph.* 756, 890 (see Verrall's note): Soph. *O.C.* 80 (see Jebb): Eur. *Med.* 492. In Aesch. *P.V.* 780 ἐλοῦ γὰρ ἢ . . . ἢ is really not an indirect question, but a proposed choice. The only prose instance given is Xen. *Anab.* I x 17 (which recent editors correct). See Hadley § 1017, Kühner § 587. 19. For εἰ . . . ἢ cp. *Apol.* 18 A etc.

40. τετράπουν: all the MSS. give τέταρτον. Cornarius' 83 C emendation τετράπουν is generally accepted.

45. The reply of the slave has fallen out in the MSS.

1. οὐ: Buttm. approved Beck's emendation οἶ. Cp. on 84 A 94 D 2.

21. ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τιὰν τέμνουσα is the reading of the 85 A MSS. τιὰν is obviously corrupt, and τέμνουσα is given as a correction in a Paris MS. (E) and by Cornarius. This Hermann has adopted. It is strongly supported by 85 B 45 ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης. Sch. gives the reading proposed by Wex (Soph. *Antig.* II 80) εἰς γωνίαν ἀντίαν, τέμνουσα. This assumes that the first two letters of ἀντίαν were lost by 'lipography' after γωνίαν; and that the remaining τιαν naturally became τιὰν. Palaeographically the two corrections are

much on a par ; but in my mind 85 B 45 turns the balance in favour of Hermann's.

**C** 10. τῷ οὐκ εἰδότεν ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῆ ἐνεῖσιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε ; pleonastic as the language is, I see no sufficient reason for any excision. The reading is defended by Heindorf, Ullrich and Buttman, and retained by Herm. and Fr. Schleiermacher, Bekker and Madv. cut out περὶ τούτων ὧν μὴ οἶδε ; Sch. cuts out ὧν μὴ εἶδε only. The words περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῆ depend closely on οὐκ εἰδότεν. Plato may wish to remind us that neither Knowledge nor Ignorance is universal. Meno has shown ignorance of Virtue ; the slave ignorance of Geometry. 'In one who lacks Knowledge then on certain subjects, whatever they may be, there are True Opinions about the subjects on which he lacks Knowledge.'

**86 A** 2. ἤδη : so two MSS., Paris E and Venice Ξ ; and so Stallb. (approved by Shilleto on Dem. *F.L.* § 83), Sch. and Fr. Most MSS. ἦδε.

11. I follow Stallb. here in reading ἀρ' οὐ for ἀρ' οὖν, which the MSS. give and Sch. and Fr. retain. No doubt there are plenty of instances of ἀρ' οὖν in the sense *nonne*, but are there any instances of ἀρ' οὖν resuming a previous οὖν, or indeed of ἀρ' οὖν in any other place than the beginning of a sentence ? *Phaedo* 65 E ἀρ' οὖν ἐκείνος resumed 66 A by ἀρ' οὐχ οὗτος favours ἀρ' οὐ here.

**87 A** 25-30 : on textual questions arising in this passage see expository notes.

**B** 7. ἄρα διδασκτὸν ἢ οὐ : so the MSS. ; ἄρα διδασκτὸν που Sch.

**E** 37. πάντα γὰρ τάγαθά : B has πάντα (ending a line) τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθά. The MS. Δ, derived from it, reads τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθά omitting πάντα. All the other MSS. appear to have πάντα γὰρ τάγαθά, which Fr. keeps. Sch. πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθά.

**88 B** 21. εἰ οὐχί : the MSS. are divided between ἢ οὐχί (B) and ἢ οὐχί (T and others). ἢ is impossible ; on ἢ Heind. (in Buttman) observes 'in Attico sermone nusquam in interrogatione ante οὐκ invenias ἢ.' For confusion of εἰ see on 82 B 41.

22. Here Fr. gives ποτὲ μὲν . . . ποτὲ δέ with BT. Sch. gives ποτὲ μὲν . . . ποτὲ δέ. This is only supported by x (see on 81 E 19). But it is the form used elsewhere ; 88 D 2, 95 B 14, C 31, D 34, 96 B 25, 97 C 37. In *Theaet.* 192 D καὶ ἀππομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν, ποτὲ δ' οὐ the phraseology is different ; (Sch. there expunges ποτ').

**C** 28. As the text stands in the MSS. and editions, the parti-

ciples *μανθανόμενα* and *καταρτύόμενα* have no substantives to agree with. For it is absurd to speak of *εὐμαθία* as itself *μανθανόμενον*, or of *σωφροσύνη* as *καταρτύμενον*. I insert *πάντα*. Another remedy would be to cut out *καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτύμενα*. For *πάντα* omitted see on 87 E 37.

25, B 28, C 2: I have followed Sch. and Fr., who follow 89 A the MSS., in reading *ἀγαθοί* once only in the first and second of these places, twice in the third. The consensus of the MSS. is unbroken, except that in the first passage x reads *οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοί*. Cp. 98 D 27.

33. *Διέφθειρεν* BT, Buttman, Herm. (see Praef. vol. I p. vii), B Fr. *διαφθείρειεν* Madv. *adv. crit.* I 414: 'Rectum esset *διέφθειρεν*, si hoc significaretur, tunc neminem eos corrupturum fuisse, quod nunc fiat.' Sch. follows Madv. But I think Plato wishes to imply that now as a matter of fact they *are* corrupted. See J. & A. M. Adam on *Prot.* 335 c, who think that here we should perhaps read *ἀφίκοντο* and *ἐγίγοντο*.

34. Both here and at line 36 all the MSS. but one corrupt E the name "Ανυτος. In the former place they give *αὐτὸς ἔδε παραθέξεται*, in the latter T and most MSS. give *εἰκότως δ' αὐ μεταδοίμεν ἂν· αὐτὸς γάρ κτέ.* B gives *εἰκότως δ' ἂν μεταδοίμεν ἂν· αὐτὸς γάρ κτέ.* (Here the priority of the reading of B is obvious; *αὐ* was a correction after "Ανυτος had become *ἂν αὐτός*. *αὐ* is not in place here. Stallbaum extracted from it the reading *εἰκότως δ' αὐτῷ μεταδοίμεν ἂν*.) The name "Ανυτος is preserved by x alone, which keeps it in both places. It was restored to the text by Struve. Buttman makes a strange mistake over the passage by supposing that the subj. *μεταδῶμεν* is *final*. See Goodwin *MT*. § 572. For a similar confusion between "Ανυτος and *αὐτός*, cp. 'Aθ. πολ. ch. 76. See Cobet *Nov. Lect.* p. 670.

30. Sch. follows Naber in bracketing *ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν* 90 E *παρὰ τούτων*, and I have followed Sch. The sentence runs better without the words, and the change of number from *βουλευόμενος* to *ζητοῦντα* is very harsh.

9. I follow Sch., who follows Cobet, in assuming a lacuna 91 B after *τὴν ἀρετὴν*. Cobet would supply *μαθησόμενον* or *βουλούμενοι αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι*: *κτησόμενον*, or *ἀγαθὸν γενησόμενον*, would be equally possible. Biester defended the MS. reading by making *τὴν ἀρετὴν* not dependent on *σκόπει*, but an 'absolute' accusative. But such an accusative of reference, connected with no word in the sentence, is impossible. At 92 D 29 *τὴν ἀρετὴν γένοι'* ἂν *δξιος λόγου* such a word is supplied. Buttman, also separating *τὴν ἀρετὴν* from *σκόπει*, says the notion *διδαχ-*

θησόμενον may be extracted from πέμπειν παρά τινας. Fr. rightly protests against the separation, and holds that σκόπει is to be taken twice, 'regard this Virtue and consider.' But we are not really asked to 'consider this virtue,' and such a 'prolepsis' would only be possible if the word ἀρετήν itself were understood later in the sentence, as in such a sentence as ταύτην τὴν ἀρετήν σκόπει παρά τινας ἂν πεμπόμενος ἀγαθὸς γίγναιτο.

17. I have followed Sch. in reading οὖς, which is given by x and two other MSS., rather than Fr. who gives οἰους with BT and the majority. It is not a *similarity* between the men under discussion and the sophists, but an *identity*, that is asserted; and though οὖς is used sometimes when you might expect οἰος (see on 92 C 18), the converse does not hold.

C 20. μηδὲ οἰκείων μηδὲ φίλων: all the MSS. appear to have μήτε οἰκ. μήτε φ. That would, as Herm. says (vol. III Praef. p. xxi) make οἰκείοι and φίλοι an exhaustive division of συγγενεῖς. He therefore reads μηδὲ . . . μηδέ, which Sch. and Fr. adopt. Cp. 96 C 8. μηδὲ . . . μηδέ (after μηδένα) are further suggestions of other classes ('nor yet'), and then the last class (φίλοι) is subjected to an exhaustive division by μήτε . . . μήτε, 'whether they be . . . or.' Cp. Gorg. 508 D οὐ τὸ τύπτεσθαι οὐδὲ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σώμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον. (See on 92 B 10.) As to the sequel, B, which is supported by x, reads μήτε φίλον μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον. The other MSS. give μήτε φίλων μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων. Correcting the first word to μηδέ (as above) we get the best reading by taking φίλων from one class of MSS. and ἀστὸν . . . ξένον from the other. The change of case (from φίλων to ἀστὸν) shows the sub-division.

D 10. Φαίδιαν τε: here x alone preserves the true reading τε: all other MSS. γε. Cp. on 72 E 17.

92 C 15. The emendation of Heindorf καὶ <ἀεί> εἶην γε, adopted by Sch., though extremely plausible, appears to me unnecessary. Fr. defends the text successfully.

17. <ἐν> ἑαυτῷ: the preposition is supplied in x and by a later hand in Γ (Coislin.) and another Paris MS. (E).

18. ἀπειρος εἰς: see expository note.

19. οἷ εἰσιν: for οἷ x and Γ have οἰοι. This is adopted by Wolf (in Buttm.), Bekk., Madvig, Cobet and Herm. Buttm. defends οἷ, and Sch. and Fr. both keep it. See expository note.

23. ἐξήτουμεν: Cobet and Hirschig read ζητούμεν, which Sch. adopts. The alteration seems hardly necessary.

26. **ἔστων**: the MSS. give *ἔστωσαν*, which Fr. keeps. Sch. D *ἔστων*. 'The endings *-τωσαν* and *-σθωσαν*, if Attic at all, belong only to the later Attic.' Hadley § 380. See J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 9 D. Cobet *nov. lect.* p. 327. See *Soph.* 231 A MSS. *ἔστωσαν* Sch. *ἔστων*, and 244 B MSS. *ἀποκρινέσθωσαν* Sch. *ἀποκρινέσθων*: cp. *Rep.* 352 B.

21. **καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους**: I have kept the MSS. reading, to 94 B which Buttm. and Fr. adhere, though it is not free from difficulty. To suppose that the three distinguished statesmen just mentioned could be regarded by Anytus, or any one else, as *φαυλοτάτοι* would be absurd. But really the words *ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους*, negatived by *μή*, form a kind of litotes. 'Neque ego aliter rem expedire possum, nisi ut neglegentius neque ullo ad superiora exempla respectu sed velut extrinsecus hunc transitum fecerit scriptor ad Thucydidem quem ut hominem divitem et *optimatum praesulem*, aliquo modo tanquam cumulum ceteris videtur potius adjicere' Buttm. See presently D 6 foll. Socrates overdoes the distinction between Thucydides and the others. Sch. (following Ast) reads *καὶ <οὐ> τοὺς φαυλοτάτους*, which appears to me to raise fresh difficulties. Stallb. (1827) and Madvig *adv. crit.* I 414 *καὶ <τοι οὐ> τοὺς φαυλοτάτους*, an objection to which is that it leaves too much stress on *ὀλίγους*. If the only hesitation were due to the *fewness* of the examples, would *one* more entirely remove it?

2, 3. **οὐ . . οὐ**: so all the MSS., which Fr. follows. Sch. D *οὐ . . οὐ*, which Buttm. favoured (cp. on 84 A 1). In the corresponding passage of the *de virtute* 378 B, the MSS. give *οὐ . . οὐ*. This is all the external support the reading *οὐ* has here. *οὐ . . οὐ* is quite defensible; not, as Ullrich would take it, as a gen. of price (!), but with the local sense transferred to circumstances: 'in a case where.' Cp. *Symp.* 194 A *εἰ δὲ γένοιτο οὐ νῦν ἐγὼ εἰμί*, *Theaet.* 172 B *ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὐ λέγω*, *Soph. Phil.* 1049, etc. So *ἔπον* still more frequently. I doubt very much whether, admitting you can say *δαπανᾶν εἰς τι*, you can say *οὐ δαπανᾶν*. I can find no instance of *οὐ* where the local sense is so much weakened; for it seems clear that this is not the case in *οὐ μ' ἀτιμίας ἀγεις* (*Soph. El.* 404) and the like.

5. **τοῦτο**: the MSS. give *ταῦτα*; the *de virtute*, *τοῦτο*, this time probably preserving the right reading; 'tum ob proxime succedens *διδασκῶν*, tum ob sensum, cum ceteris artibus omnibus studium virtutis commodius opponatur ita: *ταῦτα μὲν—τοῦτο δέ—*.' Buttm.

19. **ῥᾶρον**: all the MSS. give *ῥάδιον*, which is retained by E Herm. and the Zürich editors. Buttm. showed that *ῥᾶρον* was

necessary here. Riddell § 170 includes this among instances of 'omission of *μᾶλλον*.' These instances have broken down. It was suspicious that so many instances of 'omission of *μᾶλλον*' should have taken place with a word so easily confused with its comparative as *ΠΑΙΔΙΟΝ* with *ΠΑΙΟΝ*. Heindorf on *Phaedo* 70 D pointed to *Rep.* 370 A as a place where in the MSS. *ῥᾶδιον* had obviously displaced the true reading *ῥᾶον*; at *Phaedo* 70 D one MS. has *ῥᾶδιον* for *ῥᾶον*; at *Rep.* 348 E, on the other hand, the Paris MS. gives *ῥᾶον* for *ῥᾶδιον*, and so the MSS. of Diog. L. I 26. Isocr. v 115, VIII 50, Lys. XII 89, adduced by Riddell, have now all been corrected. Against another possibility, of reading *ῥᾶδιόν ἐστιν*, and taking *ἢ εἶ* in the sense 'or well,' Buttm. argues (1) that in that case the author would have written *καὶ εἶ*; (2) that the words *ἢ εἶ* (or *καὶ εἶ*) are then quite pointless. Ast read *οὐ ῥᾶδιόν ἐστιν*, omitting *ἢ εἶ*, which two words are omitted, according to Buttm., in Vatican τ, probably by a conjecture.

- 95 D 2 foll. The four lines (33–36 Bergk) appear also in an extract from Musonius Rufus (Stob. I.VI 18); lines 35, 36 are quoted by Xen. *Mem.* I ii 20, *Symp.* II 5, Clemens *Strom.* v p. 572 (besides other late authors: see Bergk *PLG.*<sup>4</sup> II p. 121). They are twice alluded to by Aristotle: *NE.* IX ix 7 γίνωτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἀσκησις τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζηῖν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεογόνης φησιν: IX xii 3 ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὄθεν

*ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά.*

A comparison of the lines as quoted by Plato, with the other quotations, and with the MSS. of Theognis, reveals some diversities of reading.

In v 33 Bergk gives *καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε* from the MSS. He observes, 'offensioni fuit μετὰ iteratum, itaque varianti gratia apud Platonem priore loco παρὰ substitutum.'

In v 35 Bergk gives (for *διδάξαι*) *μαθήσασθαι*, from the MSS. of Theognis, Clemens, etc. Xenophon and other citators agree with Plato in *διδάξαι*. Bergk thinks from *NE.* IX xii 3 (cited above) that Aristotle read *ἐσθλ' ἀπομάξαι*, which appears to me doubtful.

In v 36 the MSS. of Plato give *συμμιγῆς*, and so do most of the late citators and some of the MSS. of Theognis. The best MS. of Theognis, and the MSS. of Xenophon, give *συμμισγῆς*, which the modern editors of Plato restore. It is probable that the *συλλογή*, or collection of excerpts, from Theognis, which has come down to us, was not made at the time when the *Meno* was written; for Isocrates, in his address to Nicocles, written at a date not far distant from that of the *Meno* (Isocr.

II 43), after mentioning Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides, speaks of the making such selections from them as a task for the future: *εἰ τις ἐκλέξειε τῶν προεχόντων ποιητῶν τὰς καλουμένας γνώμας κτέ.* (Bergk II 234).

10. The passage of Theognis stands thus in Bergk *F.L.G.*<sup>4</sup>: E

- φύσαι καὶ θρέψαι ῥῶον βροτῶν, ἣ φρένας ἐσθλὰς  
 430 ἐνθέμεν· οὐδεὶς πω τοῦτό γ' ἐπεφράσατο,  
 ᾧ τις σῶφρον' ἔθηκε τὸν ἀφρονα, κὰκ κακοῦ ἐσθλὸν·  
 εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτό γ' ἔδωκε θεός,  
 ἰᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας ἀνδρῶν,  
 πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον·  
 435 εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητὸν τε καὶ ἐνθετὸν ἀνδρὶ νόημα,  
 οὐ ποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,  
 πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαφροσσι· ἀλλὰ διδάσκων  
 οὐ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἀνδρ' ἀγαθόν.

Line 432 is quoted by Clearchus ap. Athenaeum, 256 c, etc. See Bergk p. 156. Line 434 is quoted by Aristotle *NE.* x ix 3 *εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐταρκεῖς πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεόγνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι.*

Leutsch *Philologus* xxx pp. 211 foll. elaborately discusses the order and continuity of the lines, comparing Plato's quotation with the reading found in the MSS. of Theognis. But such discussions are subject to the consideration that Plato is obviously, and purposely, quoting loosely. (The MSS. of Plato give *ἐγένετο* for *ἔγεντο* in v. 436. It is quite possible that Plato wrote *ἐγένετο*, ignoring the metre; but more probable that the copyists finding *ἔγεντο* altered it to the familiar form. Cp. *συμμιγῆς* above.)

8. *τοῦτο μῆδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι*: the great preponderance of 96 C MSS. give *μῆτε διδακτὸν*, the remainder giving *μὴ διδακτὸν*. *μῆδὲ* here is due to Bekker, and is adopted by recent editors. Buttm. thought that at 89 E 27 also we should read *μῆδὲ διδακτὸν*. See on 91 C 20 for confusion of *μῆτε* and *μῆδὲ*.

30. *ἢ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγει*: this reading is due to Madvig, E and is adopted by Sch. and Fr. The MSS. give *ἢ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγειν*. This is retained by Buttm. and Stallb., in the sense 'or otherwise the knowledge must escape us'; the infinitive being regarded as dependent on the notion *δεῖ* in *προσεκτέον* and *ζητητέον* above. Of the four places adduced by Stallb. in illustration, the most apposite is *Crito* 51 c *ποιητέον ἂν κελύειν ἢ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἣ πείθειν αὐτὴν κτέ.* But in this (as well as in the other places cited) the notion to be extracted from the verbal is rather *duty* than (as here) *necessity*;

also, the infinitive stands much nearer to the verbal than it does here. (At *Rep.* 424 B the infinitive *φυλάττειν* is not affected by *ἀνθεκτέον* above. At *Phaedr.* 245 D we have to understand *δεῖ* with *στήναι*, but from a preceding *δυνατόν*.)

- 97 A 12. Sch. brackets *ὀρθῶς*, which occurs in the MSS. and is kept by Fr. The omission is right. The fact that the word occurs *twice* in the speech of Socrates makes it absurd to put the question thus. Which *ὀρθῶς* does he mean? It cannot reasonably be the second, so Buttm. says the question refers to the *former* *ὀρθῶς*. To pass over the awkwardness of referring to a former use of a word in spite of the intervention of a latter, the great objection remains that it is not the word *ὀρθῶς* that requires explanation, but rather the words *εἰ μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ*. Socrates does not in the sequel explain what *ὀρθῶς* means. It keeps recurring as a known and accepted term, and it was its frequency that caused it to come in here, once too often.

13. <εἰ> *τις*: *εἰ* is unaccountably omitted in nearly all MSS.

15. Some MSS. of the *δ*<sup>1</sup> class give the fuller form *ἄλλο τι ᾖ*.

- C 2. All the MSS. give *οὐκ δεῖ τυγχάναι*, except x, which gives *οὐκ δεῖ ἄν τυγχάναι*. The reading *οὐκ ἄν δεῖ τυγχάναι* was advocated by Struve and Madvig, and is adopted by Sch. Fr. keeps the MS. reading. The present affords a good example of cases on which a sort of *πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος* exists between two different classes of critics. With regard to a rare and doubtful construction, the one class urge that whereas many of the apparent instances can be easily and probably corrected, a presumption is raised against the remainder. The other class reply that as long as a single instance remains for which no plausible correction can be brought forward, this may defend others. The question is further complicated by the fact that in the early language many constructions occurred that were subsequently discarded. But how far did the process of purgation go? Naturally, poets still claimed greater license than prose-writers. But was the line limiting prose-usage a hard and fast one? The best answer is that more thorough examination of the MSS. has undoubtedly got rid of many solecisms. Further help is obtained from analysis of the exceptions remaining. This, in the case of questions with the optative without *ἄν*, has been given by Professor Jebb, note on *Soph. Ant.* 605, and Exc. on *O.C.* 170. He makes it clear that this construction, even in verse, is limited to places which are exclamations, rather than interrogations, adding that there is 'no real instance in prose.' We should then have no hesitation

in inserting *ἄν* here. The following is a list of apparent instances of questions in Plato with the optative without *ἄν*—

*Lach.* 190 B εἰ γάρ που μὴδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδόμεν τὸ παράπαν ὁ τί ποτε τυγχάνει *ἄν*, τίνα τρόπον σύμβουλοι γεινοίμεθα; (τίν' *ἄν* Bekk. Sch.; Cron leaves unaltered).

*Euthyd.* 281 C πότερον οὖν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω τις πράττει κτέ.; (so B, but T has πότερον οὖν *ἄν* κτέ.).

ibid. 286 B πῶς ἀντιλέγοι; Sch., after one Paris MS., πῶς <*ἄν*> ἀντιλέγοι;

ibid. 291 E οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν φαίης; Sch., after Ast, οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν <*ἄν*> φαίης; Badham omits φαίης.

*Gorg.* 492 B τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη; Sch., following Coraë's, gives κάκιον *ἄν* εἴη.

*Rep.* 352 E ἔσθ' ὅτῳ *ἄν* ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; ἀκούσαι ἄλλῳ ἢ ὤσιν; Οὐδαμῶς. Here we may regard the *ἄν* as carried on from the first question into the second. But Ast proposed ἀκούσαι *ἄν*.

ibid. 382 D πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοίων *ἄν* ψεύδοιτο; Γελοῖον μὲν *ἄν* εἴη, ἔφη. Ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ψευδῆς ἐν θεῶ ἴσκει. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Ἄλλὰ δεδιώς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο; Here again it is possible that *ἄν* may be mentally supplied from the neighbouring questions.

ibid. 437 B ἄρ' οὖν . . πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοισι θεῖης; ('would you regard all such things as opposite to one another?'). The Zurich editors read ἐναντίων *ἄν* ἀλλήλοισι.

ibid. 516 E ἄρ' οὐ σκότους ἀνάπλεως σχολίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς; Herm. gives *ἄν* πλέως σχολίη.

[Other exx. of *ἄν* apparently omitted with opt. in Plato are *Charm.* 156 B ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον <*ἄν*> εἴη (Sch. after Madv.); ibid. 169 A τοῖς μὲν ἀπιστίαν <*ἄν*> παρέχοι (Sch. after Heindorf); *Lysis* 214 D ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἀνόμοιον εἴη καὶ διάφορον, σχολή γ' <*ἄν*> τῷ ἄλλῳ ὁμοῖον ἢ φίλον γένοιτο (Sch. after Bekker); *Euthyd.* 299 A δικαιοτέρον <*ἄν*> τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτειμ (Sch. after Ast); *Rep.* 360 B οὐδεὶς *ἄν* γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν (the whole passage is in indirect speech); ibid. 362 D ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρεῖη (quotation from an old poet): *Phaedo* 72 C πάντα λήρον τὸν Ἐνδουμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν (Sch. πάντ' *ἄν*, which A.-H. adopts); ibid. 107 A οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὄντιν' <*ἄν*> τις ἄλλον καῖρον ἀναβάλλοιτο (Sch. after Bekker; A.-H. defends the vulgate).] See *CR.* VI 435, 'J. D.' on the 'Remote Deliberative.'

9. *δὲ* ὁ *τι* θαυμάζει: all the MSS. give θαυμάζει, which D shows with what caution their evidence on such points must be received.

93 A 31. The MSS. nearly all give *Μένων ἑταῖρε*. The omission of *ῶ* with the vocative in prose in an address free from emotion is rare; and the ease with which *ῶ* would fall out probably justifies its insertion in the few cases in Plato where it is wanting. Sch. restores it at *Prot.* 358 A E, 359 A; *Gorg.* 489 A; in all of which cases a contiguous *ω* may have expelled it; also at *Hipp. maj.* 289 B, *Soph.* 220 D. But at *Laches* 198 A he leaves *σὺ δέ, Νικία, λέγε*, and at † *Theages* 127 B *τί τοῦτο λέγεις, Θέαγες*; 129 C *εἶμι δὴ, Σώκρατες*. The former of the instances in the *Theages* is a violation of Attic usage; the second instance falls under rule, as excitement is certainly intended. Cp. *τί λέγεις, ἔφη, ῶ Σώκρατες*; *ibid.* 129 B. I follow Naber in supposing that here *Μένων* is a gloss upon *ἑταῖρε* which has extruded *ῶ*. The Florentine *x* gives *ῶ ἑταῖρε Μένων*. At *Crito* 52 A, B reads *ταῦταίς δὴ φάμεν καὶ σε, Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέχεσθαι*, probably rightly, as great impressiveness is intended; but inferior MSS. give *ῶ Σώκρατες*.

B 3. Practically all the MSS. omit *οὐ*. It appears as a correction in Paris E and in the edition of Stephanus. For omission of *οὐ* see Badham's *Philebus* ed. 2 p. 132, and cr. n. on 94 B 21.

D 23. *οὐτ' ἐπίκτητα*: that there is something wrong about these words is obvious. Buttm. pointed out that the third *οὐτε* cannot stand; for you do not want a third term to add to *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα ἀληθής*, but something as an antithesis to *φύσει*. Hence Bekker read *οὐδ' ἐπίκτητα*. The objection to this is that it goes too far. A human attribute must be either *φύσει* or *ἐπίκτητον*, either part of the original stock or subsequently acquired. (See expository note on 89 A 24.) Much therefore is to be said for the reading *ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητα* given by Gedike, and supported by a correction in Paris E. *ἐπίκτητος* is opposed to *φύσει* in *Rep.* 618 D *τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχῆν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἐπίκτητων*, and to *ἐμφυτος* in *Phaedr.* 237 E.

The words *οὐτ' ἐπίκτητα* were expunged by Cornarius, with the approval of Buttm., Madv., and Ast; and are bracketed by Sch. and Fr.

On the other hand it may be urged that the words are too foolish to have been a gloss. Fr. assumes that *οὐτ' ἐπίκτητα* has arisen from *ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητα*, but that this was a gloss. But if we had found *ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητα* in our texts, should we have thought of disturbing it? The corruption of *ἀλλ'* into *οὐτ'* is hard to explain, but perhaps we may assume that in the archetype the copyist carelessly ran on from two *οὐτε*'s to a third.

99 A 2. The MSS. give *ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιγίγνεται*. This would mean 'is an outcome or accident of Knowledge.' So *Phil.*

37 Β ὅτι δόξη ἐπιγίγνωσθον ψεύδος καὶ ἀληθές, *Rep.* 574 A αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ἦδοται ἐπιγιγνώμεναι, *Hépp. maj.* 303 A. But Virtue has never been described as an ἐπιγένημα of Knowledge. Virtue is Knowledge—or something like it. Nor would οὐδ' have any point with ἐπιγίγνεται, whereas with the correction it is easy: 'as it is not διδακτὸν so neither is it ἐπιστήμη.' The reading in the text, adopted by Sch., Fr., and most modern editors, is due to Schleiermacher; but it is also supported by the version of Ficinus, 'Igitur cum virtus doctrina percipi nequeat, nequaquam scientia est.' [Herm. defends ἐπιγίγνεται.]

15. εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὐδοξία . . . γίγνεται, ἢ κτέ. : so Fr. B following the MSS. Sch. and most editors after Schleiermacher read εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὐδοξία . . . γίγνεται ἢ κτέ. I fail to see any sufficient objection to the MS. reading, which I have accordingly kept.

24. κατορθοῦσιν ὦν πρ. : Buttm. proposed κατορθοῦσι δι' ὦν C πρ. which is supported by the version of Ficinus, "multa tamen et magna et agendo et dicendo disponunt."

27. ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν : so the MSS. except x, which has ὀρθῶς ἄρα καλοῖμεν, and the Paris F, which has ὀρθῶς οὖν ἂν κ. as a correction. Sch. defends the asyndeton by *Theaet.* 183 A καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι. Ficinus has 'quamobrem merito divinos vocabimus,' as if he had οὖν or ἄρα in his text. Fr. (after Stallb.) and Herm. read ὀρθῶς ἀρ' ἂν : Bekk. ὀρθῶς οὖν ἂν.

32. ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ : I have followed the MS. reading, as does D Fr. Sch. reads ἐκ του θεοῦ. If that had been Plato's meaning he would rather have written ἐκ του θεῶν (which Cobet gives).

38. θεῖος ἀνὴρ : so the MSS. Sch. gives σείος ἀνὴρ. This no doubt represents the Laconian dialect; but it is not at all clear that Plato wished to reproduce this.



## EXCURSUS I

### Οὐσία AS A PHILOSOPHICAL TERM IN PLATO (ON 72 B 22)

We have no certain examples of οὐσία in any sense except 'wealth,' 'patrimony' in any writer before Plato. [The fragments of the Pythagorean Philolaus, in which it appears as a philosophical term in the form *έσσία* (cp. *Crat.* 401 c), are almost certainly spurious. See Prof. Bywater in *JP.* I pp. 21 foll., Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 61 d. For a different view see Zeller *pre-Socr.* I 314 and note: for a summary of the controversy R. & P. § 50 c, Ueberweg-Heinze p. 58.]

Plato in his earlier dialogues uses the term with reserve, and leads up to it by periphrases. In the present passage, for instance, we have been prepared for it by:—

71 A 28 αὐτὸ δ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετῆ

71 B 3 οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν

72 A 14 εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι δ τι ἐστίν

The word occurs nowhere else in this dialogue.

In *Laches* 190 we have similar periphrases, but the term οὐσία is never reached.

*Euthyphro* 11 A (see on 71 B 4) κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτώμενος τὸ δσιον, δ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. Here the words δ τί ποτ' ἐστίν lead up to οὐσίαν, also heralded at 6 D τὸ δσιον δ τί ποτ' εἴη, and further by the words at 5 D ἢ οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ δσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῶ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὐ. . ἔχον μίαν τινα ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν, δ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι ;

In the *Hippias major* the word οὐσία occurs four times:—

(1) (2) 301 B *Hippias*: διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτόν σε λέληθεν, ὥστε οἷε εἶναι τι ἢ πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν, ἢ περὶ μὲν ἀμφότερ' ἄττα ἐστίν ἄμα, περὶ δὲ ἐκάτερον οὐ.

(3) 301 E *Socrates*: οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ Ἴππιαν ἄλλως ἔχειν.



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(4) 302 C *Socrates*: τῆ οὐσία τῆ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα ἐπομένην.

In (2) and (4) the meaning is 'essential nature' (as here in the *Meno*). The use in (2) has been led up to by Socrates, who at 300 E has expressed the same antithesis: ὁ μήτ' ἐγὼ πέπονθα εἶναι μήτ' εἰμί.

In (1) and (3) the use is curious. Grote (I 384) says 'The Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of reality — of breaking up the integrity of those concretes which occur in Nature as continuous and indivisible wholes' (see his note also). I doubt whether the distinction attributed to Hippias is quite so scientific as this. He paraphrases his criticism at 304 A κνίσματά τοι ἐστί καὶ περιμήματα τῶν λόγων, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, κατὰ βραχὺ διηρημένα. It is rather a distinction of *treatment*, the 'hair-splitting' or 'logic-chopping' of the dialectician opposed to the broad view taken by the practical man and expressed in continuous discourse—a distinction fully illustrated by Grote at the place referred to. οὐσία here then, I think, means 'truth.' [But it is probable that the speech of Hippias, τὰ μὲν δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς κτέ., contains phrases actually quoted from the sophist, of which διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας may be one. Cp. κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες with *Hipp. min.* 369 B ὦ Σώκρατες, αἰεὶ σὺ τινὰς τοιοῦτους πλέκεις λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων, ὃ ἂν ᾗ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τοῦτον ἔχει κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὄλω ἀγωνίζει τῷ πράγματι, περὶ οὗτου ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ.]

In the *Prot.* 329 C foll. the question is raised whether the parts of Virtue, Justice, Temperance, etc., are separate and different, ἄρ' ὄν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη οὐκ ἐστί τὸ ἕτερον ὅλον τὸ ἕτερον, ὅτε αὐτὸ ὅτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; When the same question is resumed at 349 B we have ἡ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειται τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον.

In *Gorg.* 472 B Plato apparently plays on the meaning 'wealth' and the philosophical sense 'truth,' ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, where the philosophical meaning of οὐσία is defined by καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. 'Substance' or 'reality' will preserve the double meaning. Dr. Thompson, however (ad loc.) doubts if any other meaning of οὐσία than 'patrimony' is intended.

In the *Phaedrus* it is used as an accepted term 237 C, 270 E; it is slightly helped out 245 E ψυχῆς οὐσίαν καὶ λόγον and 247 C ἀναφῆς οὐσία, ὄντως οὐσα, ψυχῆς.

Here in the *Meno* to οὐσία the words ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν are added as an interpretation. So in *Phaedo* 65 D περὶ τῶν ἄλλων

ἀπάντων οὐσίας δ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον δν. Heindorf on that passage observes that the interpretation shows that οὐσία as a philosophic term was not yet established. He refers to this place of the *Meno*, and to *Rep.* 377 E (where οὐσίαν is omitted in the best texts). So the meaning of οὐσία is driven home *Phaedo* 78 D αὐτῆ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι 'as whose principle we assign being,' 92 D ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ δ ἐστὶν 'the very substance that has the title of absolute essence' (the translations are Archer-Hind's). But in these places the additions are not so much for elucidation as for emphasis. At 101 C μετασχὼν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἕκαστου it is used as an accepted term.

In the *Republic* the word sometimes receives support, sometimes is used without it. In Bk. II 359 A we have γένεσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, which is to some extent prepared by 358 E τί οὖν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη. οὐσία does not occur again, I think, in books I to V. In the account of δόξα at the end of book V, we have always τὸ δν, not οὐσία. At the beginning of book VI (484 B) we have τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῖτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος, but soon after (485 B) ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὐσης, and again (486 A), in a very wide sense, παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας. In p. 490 the word is avoided: but towards the end of the book it comes noticeably forward (509 B) καὶ τοῖς γινωσκομένοις τοῖσιν μὴ μόνον τὸ γινώσκεισθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. In book VII we have phrases concerning the power of certain studies to stimulate the Reason, the comparison of which is instructive: 521 D μάθημα ψυχῆς ὀλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ δν: 523 A ἑλκτικῶ πρὸς οὐσίαν: 524 E ὀλκὸν ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν: 525 A ἀγωγὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν: B φιλοσόφω δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτεῖον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι: C ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀλήθειαν τε καὶ οὐσίαν: 527 B ὀλκὸν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. We next come upon a group of instances at p. 534, where the partition of the mental faculties and their respective objects that concludes book VI, is resumed: A καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν· καὶ δ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν. In the earlier exposition (p. 511) the term οὐσία is not used, but meanwhile we have been amply prepared for its use here: B ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἕκαστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; C μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν. The last group of instances of οὐσία as a philosophical term occurs at p. 585 in the discussion of Pleasure: A πότερα οὖν ἡγεῖ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρὰς οὐσίας μετέχειν; C Ἡ οὖν ἀνομοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης

μετέχει; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ' ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἦπτον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; which is repeated below at D.

In the later dialogues preparation or explanation of the term is less and less felt necessary. In the *Theaet.* 160 B C, 172 B, 202 B it seems used as current coin; at 185 C in answer to a question in which the words occur τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινόν, ᾧ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν, Theaetetus says οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι.

The philosophical meanings of οὐσία in Plato may be classified as follows; but many usages fall on the line between two divisions, especially between (2) and (3). The 'Ideal Theory' is implied by (2), not by (3).

(1) Being in general, opposed to Not-being and to Becoming: *Rep.* 525 B C, *Phaedo* 78 D, 98 D, *Theaet.* 185 C; common in *Sophista*, *Parmenides*, also *Politicus* and *Timaeus*.

(2) Essential Nature of a Species, as self-existent (metaphysical): *Rep.* 509 B, *Phaedo* 65 D, 101 C, *Phaedr.* 245 E (?), 247 C.

(3) Essential Nature of a Species, as apprehended by us (logical): *Meno* 72 B 22, *Euthyphro* 11 A, *Hipp. maj.* 301 B, 302 C, *Prot.* 349 B, *Rep.* 359 A, *Phaedr.* 237 C, 245 E (?), 270 E, *Theaet.* 202 B.

(4) Truth: *Hipp. maj.* 301 B E, *Gorg.* 472 B.

To these meanings must be added the uses *Theaet.* 160 B ἡμῶν (sc. 'of myself and the thing perceived') ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ, 160 C τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας δεῖ ἔστιν. Here οὐσία = φύσις and amounts to little more than a periphrasis.

## EXCURSUS II

### Εἴπερ AND εἴ γε

On 73 C 55 εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπερὶ ἦν Stallb., quoted by Fr., says: εἴ γε *usurpatur de re quae jure sumpta creditur, eoque differt ab εἴπερ, quod incertum relinquit utrum quid jure an injuria sumatur.* This note appears to me obscure and misleading. Whether εἴπερ or εἴ γε be used the view taken of the condition will depend on the mood and tense of the verb in the conditional clause. The meaning here is: 'this would not be the case if their virtue were not, as it is, the same': and the meaning would be very little altered by substituting εἴπερ for εἴ γε. [εἴ γε is similarly used 74 C 16, D 25; cp. Dem.

*Aristocr.* (23) 93 ἐξήν αὐτῷ μὴ γράφειν εἰ γε τὸ βέλτιστον τῆ πόλει σκοπεῖν ἐβούλετο: ἰb. 161 καλὰ γ' οὐ γάρ; εἰ γ' ἦν ἀληθῆ. *Euthyphr.* 10 E εἰ γε ταῦτόν ἦν: *Soph.* 255 D.] L. & S. realise this and say that *εἰπερ* is used 'in Attic mostly to imply that the supposition agrees with the fact: "if, that is to say"; with the impf. it implies that it is contrary to the fact'; and quote *Soph. El.* 312 *εἰπερ ἦν πέλας* (but he is not); ἰb. 604 *εἰπερ ἐσθενον*. This is perfectly true, but does not take us far towards grasping the distinction between *εἰπερ* and *εἰ γε*. As diametrically opposed to the view of Stallb. it is instructive to quote a note, itself somewhat over-hasty, of Whiston on *Dem. Tim.* (24) 89 (78): ὡστ' *εἰπερ ὑμῶν ἐκάστῳ μέλει τι τῆς πολιτείας, κτέ.*: 'Here *εἰπερ* is used instead of *εἰ*, for "if, as I assume to be the fact"; this particle always assuming the truth of the supposition which it makes. Cf. *εἰπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται* (*Thuc.* I 69. 1) which Mr. Shepherd correctly renders "Especially if they carry off the credit of being the liberators of Greece, as I suppose you think is the case." (A different view of the passage in *Thuc.* is taken by Classen, as we shall presently see.)

To pass back to an earlier stage of the discussion, Viger p. 512 gives as the principal meaning of *εἰπερ* 'si modo,' on which Zeune notes: 'Haec vis videtur esse praecipua, propterea quod particula *περ* valet ad conditionem limitandam et coercendam'; quoting *Plato Rep.* 457 D οὐκ οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἀν ὡς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι . . . *εἰπερ* οὐδὲν τε and *Dem. Olynth.* I § 2 τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῶν ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν, *εἰπερ* ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε. Besides this meaning Viger recognises three others: (a) *si quidem*, instituendo comparationem inter diversa, tuncque particulas illas sequitur *καὶ* in opposito membro, quoting *Dem. Tim.* (24) 51 ἀξίον δὲ κτέ., where however *εἰ περὶ του καὶ ἄλλου* is now read. Zeune notes that sometimes the *καὶ* is absent, and quotes *Thuc.* IV 55. 2 ἐς δὲ τὰ πολεμικά, *εἰπερ* ποτέ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο [cp. for *εἰπερ* ποτέ *Thuc.* IV 20. 1, VII 64. 2, *Plato Tr.* VII 328 A], *Xen. Cyr.* III III 19 συμφέρει δ' ὑμῶν, *εἰπερ* τῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ, τὸ νικᾶν. He shows that there is in these cases an ellipse after *εἰπερ*, and how the ellipse is to be filled up. He gives as a stronger case of ellipse *Aristoph. Clouds* 226—

ἐπειτ' ἀπὸ τάρρου τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς  
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, *εἰπερ*; (scil. δεῖ ὑπερφρονεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς)

and, as a case where there is no ellipse, *Aristoph. Frogs* 76—

εἰτ' οὐ Σοφοκλέα, πρότερον οὐτ' Εὐριπίδου,  
μέλλεις ἀνάγειν, *εἰπερ* γ' ἐκέθεν δεῖ σ' ἀγειν;

(β) *quaproquidem* (δτι δὴ, ἐπειδὴ): *Arist. Pol.* VII (VI) 2, 3=

1317 b 17 *εἴπερ τοῦ δούλου ὄντος, τὸ ζῆν οὐχ ὡς βούλεται, τὸ* which Zeune adds Plato *Phaedr.* 245 D *εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι.*

Viger's *third* sense is shown to rest on a misconception, and may be passed over; but Zeune adds another real sense of *εἴπερ*, 'qua sequente ἀλλὰ significat *quamvis* . . . *tamen*,' quoting Homer *Il.* xxi. 576—

*εἴπερ γὰρ φθάμενός μιν ἦ οὐτάσῃ ἢ ἐ βάλῃσιν  
ἀλλὰ τε καὶ περὶ δουρὶ πεπαρμένη οὐκ ἀπολήγει  
ἀλκῆς.*

G. Hermann in his notes derides Viger's analysis: *multum interest*, he says, *inter εἴπερ et εἰ γε*: 'εἴπερ δοκεῖ σοι dicimus ei de quo non certo scimus quid ei placeat, aut de quo id nescire simulamus: εἰ γε δοκεῖ σοι dicimus ei de quo scimus quid ei placeat.' This is apparently the source of Stallbaum's note, which I started by criticising. Hermann's sweeping generalisation has tended to darken counsel. He was probably led into it by too exclusive attention to what Viger rightly says is the *principal* meaning of *εἴπερ*, 'si modo.' Other examples of this are *Prot.* 319 A ἡ καλὸν τέχνημα ἀρα κέκτησαι, *εἴπερ ἔκτησαι*: *ib.* 351 C *εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζῶν ἡδόμενος*: *Euthyphr.* 8 D οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν ὡς οὐχί, *εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, δοτέον δίκην*: *Gorg.* 495 A B οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἰκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, *εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκούντα σαυτῷ εἶρεῖς*. ΚΑΑ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὐτ' ἐγώ, *εἴπερ ποιῶ τούτω, οὐτε σύ*: *Phaedr.* 261 E περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, *εἴπερ ἔστιν, αὐτῇ ἂν εἴη*: *Charm.* 170 C: *Xen. Oec.* i 8 (if a man buys a horse, and not knowing how to ride, gets a fall and is hurt, is the horse wealth to him?) οὐκ *εἴπερ τὰ χρήματά γ' ἔστιν ἀγαθόν*: *Symp.* ii. 6 quoted on 70 A 1: *Thuc.* vi 21. 1: *Eur. Alc.* 303 *εἴπερ εὖ φρονεῖς*: *Phoen.* 524 *εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή κτέ.*: *Aristoph. Wasps* 535 *εἴπερ, ὃ μὴ γένοιθ', οὐτός σ' ἐθέλει κρατῆσαι.*

It is hardly necessary to prove that alike *εἴπερ* and *εἰ γε* may be used with an 'unreal condition.' Examples with *εἰ γε* are given at the beginning of this excursus; for *εἴπερ* I may cite Plato †*Ep.* vii 330 A ἢ δ' ἂν οὕτως ἐγένετο, *εἴπερ ἐγίγνετο, κάλλιστα*. As to other kinds of condition it may be said that either *εἴπερ* or *εἰ γε* (or *εἰ* simply), may express every grade of acceptance of the condition from *quandoquidem* ('since') to *si modo* ('if only'). Indeed the manner in which a speaker regards a condition, is often locked within his own breast. In such cases as *Euthyd.* 284 A *εἴπερ λέγει αὐτό*, and *εἴπερ λέγει τὰ ὄντα*, it is impossible to say to what extent the sophist accepts as true the answer that has been given him.

There are certainly instances in which *εἴπερ* assumes the

truth of the supposition it introduces, as has already been seen. To the instances given by Viger and Zeune many might be added; e.g. *Lach.* 197 C φημι γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἔστε ἀνδρείοι: *Prot.* 312 A εἴπερ γε ἂν διανοοῦμαι χρῆ λέγειν, 329 B ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πειθοίμην ἂν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι: *Gorg.* 515 D οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας: *Meno* 98 B 4: *Rep.* 351 A εἴπερ σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη: *Phaedo* 71 C ἐξ ἀλλήλων γίγνεται ταῦτα εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστίν (contrast *ibid.* E εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις αὕτη, where *εἴπερ* is *si modo*): *Parm.* 134 C φαίης ἂν ἢ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην; . . . Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μάλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην: *Dem. Aristocr.* (23) 144 δίκην δίδοντες τὴν μεγίστην, εἴπερ οἱ κακῶν καὶ φευακίζοντες ὑμᾶς: *Dem.* 52. 2 δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο πῶποτε πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐδικάσατε . . . οὕτω καὶ νῦν διαγνώωι (referred to by Milton W. Humphreys, *CR.* xi 140 b): *Thuc.* iii 113. 4 εἴπερ γε ὑμεῖς ἐν Ἴδομενῇ χθὲς ἐμάχεσθε 'yes it is so, since you fought etc.' (see Classen on *Thuc.* i 77. 6).

On the other hand *εἴ γε* has as its prevalent meaning *si quidem*. An obvious instance is *Dem. Androt.* (22) 68: ἐρωτῶν εἰ μάτην τὸ δεσμοτήριον ψυχοδομήθη. καταφαλὴν ἂν ἔγωγε· εἴ γ' ὁ πατήρ ὁ σὸς ᾤχετο αὐτόθεν αὐταῖς πέδαις ἐξορχησάμενος, on which Weil says 'εἴ γε, *si quidem*, ne differre guère de *εἴπερ* ou *ἐπειδὴ, ruiusque*.' But there are plenty of instances where it means *si modo*: as *Euthyd.* 282 B εἰ ἐστὶ γε ἡ σοφία διδακτὸν: *Phaedr.* 242 D εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις: *† Alc.* i 106 D ἀλλ' εἴ γε δὴ μὴ χαλεπὸν τι λέγεις τὸ ὑπέρηγμα, ἐθέλω: *Xen. Mem.* iv vi 7 τίμη γὰρ ἂν ἄλλων τις εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμη;

It may be worth while to put together some instances of *εἴπερ* and *εἴ γε* with *fut. indic.* The instances given are modal futures, not real future conditions; but in the view of the condition I can trace no difference between *εἴπερ* and *εἴ γε*. (See on 86 A 8 and Exc. IV.)

*Thuc.* i 77. 6 εἴπερ, ὅσα καὶ τότε πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον ὑπεδείξατε, ὁμοία καὶ νῦν γνώσεσθε 'since you mean to resolve': vi 38. 4 τὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῆς διανοίας προαμύνεσθαι χρῆ, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ προφυλαξάμενός τις προπέσειται: *Rep.* 375 A (δεῖ ἀνδρείον εἶναι) εἴπερ εὐ μαχεῖται: *Phil.* 37 E ἀλλ' οὐχ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ ἀμαρτησεται γε ἡδονή (a possibility which Protarchus does not accept), 62 C εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἐστὶ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτε βίος.

*Hdt.* vii 46 ὡς βραχὺς εἴη ὁ πᾶς ἀνθρώπινος βίος, εἰ (since) τούτων γε ἐόντων τοσοῦτων οὐδεὶς ἐς ἑκατοστὸν ἔτος περιέσται: *Xen. Mem.* ii i 17 ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν

τέχνην παιδεύομενοι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούστων ἐλ γε πεινήσουσι κτέ. ; ib. III iv 2 (is not Antisthenes' appointment a good thing) ἐλ γε τοῖς στρατιώταις ἱκανὸς ἔσται τάπιτήδεια πορῆζειν : Plat. *Prot.* 330 E ἐλ μὴ αὐτῆ γε ἡ οὐσιότης ὄσιον ἔσται : *Phaedo* 106 D σχολῆ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχουτο ἐλ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον αἰδιον ὄν φθορὰν δέξεται : Dem. *Aristocr.* (23) 61 (δεινὸν μὴ ἐξείναι) ἐλ γε μὴ ἐξέσται κτέ.

With regard to ἐλ γε, we must distinguish cases where γε emphasises ἐλ, or the whole conditional clause, from cases where some word intervenes between ἐλ and γε on which the γε throws its emphasis (Krüger 69. 15. 3). Cp. *Laches* 192 C ἐλ τὸ γε διὰ πάντων πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, ἐλ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινόμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς : Hdt. I 60 ἐλ καὶ τότε γε κτέ., where ἐλ is *si quidem* and γε points καὶ τότε.

One point that alone should make us doubt any broad contrast between εἴπερ and ἐλ γε is that εἴπερ often occurs followed by γε. Many instances of this have already been given. Kühner § 511. 9 c quotes Xen. *Anab.* I vii 9 : (the king will fight) εἴπερ γε Δαρείου καὶ Παρνατίδης ἔστι παῖς. Here again we must distinguish cases where γε immediately follows εἴπερ, and helps περ to emphasise ἐλ, from cases where some word intervenes to which the emphasis of γε belongs : εἴπερ γε simply *Symp.* 205 B, *Lysis* 216 B, *Theaet.* 182 c ; on the other hand *Hipp. maj.* 290 B εἴπερ χρυσοῦν γε, *Laches* 193 c εἴπερ αὐτὸ γε, etc.

There are two uses of εἴπερ which are not shared by ἐλ γε. One is the *elliptic* use (noticed by Zeune above). This use occurs in Plato, and is common in Aristotle. Riddell § 252. *Euthyd.* 296 B οὐκ οὖν ἡμῶς γε [σφαλεῖ], ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σέ : *Rep.* 497 E οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι, διακωλύσει (here we might give the force of εἴπερ by italics 'but, if any one is deceived,' 'but, if anything does interfere') : *Prot.* 352 c, *Parm.* 150 B, *Laws* 667 A, 900 E. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* II 6 ὡς, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ τοῦτο μαθηρόν. Even such milder ellipses as *Apol.* 21 c ὡςπερ ἐνταῦθα, εἴπερ πον, ἐλέγξων and *Phaedo* 63 c, would not be found with ἐλ γε (Kühner § 599. 2, Jelf § 895. 2). See also for the elliptical use of εἴπερ *CR.* XII 271 b, where are quoted from the tragedians Aesch. *Agam.* 934 εἴπερ τις εἰδὼς γ' εἴ τὸδ' ἐξείπον τέλος : Soph. *Aj.* 488 ἐξέφυν πατρὸς εἴπερ τινὸς σθένοντος ἐν πλοῦτῳ Φρυγῶν.

The other is the *concessive* force, also noted by Zeune. Kühner § 578 Anm. 2 (cp. § 533. 1) only illustrates this from Homer, but see *Theaet.* 196 B ὡς προσήκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης 'as if we had a right to use these terms when (i.e. *though*) we have no part in knowledge.' Here ἐλ γε would give a quite different sense, 'as if, *since* we have

no part in knowledge, we have a right to use them.' Classen, I believe rightly, regards *εἴπερ* in Thuc. I 69. 1, quoted above in Whiston's note, as *concessive*.

In this dialogue *εἴπερ* occurs thirteen times, seven times with principal tenses of the indic. (73 B D, 78 A B, 89 C D, 96 D), four times with impf. indic. (93 C twice, E, 94 D), twice with optative (98 B C). With this we may reckon *ἐάν περ*, which occurs four times (72 D E, 73 B, 79 B). *εἰ γε* occurs six times, namely, thrice with impf. indic. (73 C, 74 C twice), thrice with optative (75 C, 98 D E).

73 B 42 *εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι* = si modo.

73 D 5 *εἴπερ ἐν γέ τι ζητεῖς* = si quidem (?): ἐν is pointed by γε.

78 A 63 *εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι* = si quidem.

78 B 8 *εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων* = si modo.

89 C 4 *εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετῆ* = si quidem.

89 D 17 *εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν (ἀρετῆ)* = si quidem.

93 C 5 *εἴπερ τις ἄλλος διδάσκαλος ἦν κάκεινον εἶναι* = si quidem (Viger's a).

93 C 8 *εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε* = si modo ('he was, or at least would have been, if he wished': past or unreal supposition).

93 E 33 *εἴπερ ἦν γε διδάκτων ἢ ἀρετῆ* = si modo: unreal supposition.

94 D 10 *εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδάκτων*: unreal supposition.

96 D 17 *εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα* = si quidem.

98 B 4 *εἴπερ φαίην ἄν . . θεῖην ἄν* = si modo: an example of this form where the meaning is *not* si quidem.

98 C 21 *ἄνδρες ἄν εἴην ὠφέλιμοι εἴπερ εἴην* = si modo.

73 C 55 *εἰ γε μὴ ἦν*: unreal condition.

74 C 16 *εἰ γε προσανηρώτα*: unreal condition.

74 D 25 *εἰ γε ἐκέλευε*: unreal condition.

75 C 1 *εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη* future supposition. (γε points τῶν σοφῶν, being misplaced.)

98 D 35 *κἄν εἰ γε διδάκτων εἴη*.

98 E 38 *καὶ εἰ μὲν γε διδάσκαλοι εἴην, διδάκτων ἄν εἶναι*. In these last two sentences there is little, if any, difference, from *εἴπερ*.

To conclude: it is impossible to convey in English any uniform difference in meaning between *εἴπερ* and *εἰ γε*. For near juxtapositions of the two see *Theaet.* 203 D *ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἰ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκότερον γινώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέρω τις γινώσκειται κτέ.*: *Parm.* 162 A *ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γε ἐστὶ τῶν θυγῶν, ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν, εἴπερ μὴ ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἄν μεθίστατο ποθέν ποι* (here *εἴπερ* is less truly conditional than *εἰ γε*): *Soph.* 255 D *οὐκ ἄν, εἰ γε τὸ ἄν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ ἀμπολυ διεφερέτην· ἀλλ' εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδῶν ὥσπερ τὸ ἄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι*

καὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον. The difference must be felt by realising the force of *περ* and *γε* in general: *περ* is emphatic, *γε* is emphatic but restrictive; *εἴπερ* lays stress on the fact that the statement is conditional, *εἴ γε* says that at any rate under that condition it is true. We should often give the force of *εἴπερ* by italicising *if*; the force of *εἴ γε* by putting a dash before 'if.'

### EXCURSUS III

#### ON ἄλλὰ γάρ (92 C 23, 94 D 6, E 14)

On this idiom Riddell § 147 says 'Here we must observe that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition that whereas the *γάρ* refers to the clause immediately subjoined to it, the *ἄλλὰ* belongs either to a clause understood or to a clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such a supposition; for the *ἄλλὰ* sits much closer to the clause immediately subjoined than the *γάρ* does. *ἄλλὰ γάρ* has two meanings: one when it introduces an objection, and is therefore ironical; the other, which alone needs illustration, when it has the force of "but be that as it may," or "but the truth is."

It is one question whether the Greeks in Plato's time were still *conscious* of an ellipse in *ἄλλὰ γάρ* (see J. Adam on *Apol.* 19 D, *Euthyphr.* 11 C); another whether this construction *grew out of* an ellipse. Riddell would apparently answer both questions in the negative. And it must be allowed that it is quite possible to frame a theory of the origin of *ἄλλὰ γάρ* in which no ellipse is implied. For *γάρ* (*γε + ἀρα*), like *ἀρα*, is originally emphatic or 'confirmative' (Kühner § 509. 8 a), as are also the inferential particles *igitur*, *enim*, *nam*, *namque* in Latin (Conington on Verg. *Aen.* x 614). How the causal use was developed from the confirmative Kühner explains § 544 a. It might therefore be held that the combination *ἄλλὰ γάρ* was formed while *γάρ* was still merely emphatic; and so it would not be necessary to suppose any ellipse.

The evidence however is very strong, I might say overwhelming, that *γάρ* was felt as causal at an early stage of the combination, that it was used to introduce a clause which gave

the reason of what *followed*, much as 'for' in Shakespeare's time was used for 'because' in such a sentence as:—

'it is as lawful,  
For we would give much, to use violent means  
And rob in the behalf of charity.

If *ἀλλά γάρ* developed while *γάρ* was still merely emphatic, we should expect to find the words in close juxtaposition from the first. As a matter of fact, however, *ἀλλά γάρ* never occurs in juxtaposition in Homer. Ebeling in his Homeric lexicon says '*ἀλλά . . γάρ*, ita ut verbum aliquod semper interponatur; de re certissima quæ opponitur superioribus: *sed enim*.' The word interposed between *ἀλλά* and *γάρ* may be regarded as introducing the subordinate or parenthetical clause to which *γάρ* belongs, *γάρ* itself not being capable of beginning a clause. We have the full structure shown in such passages as—

- Il.* xv 739 *ἀλλ'—ἐν γὰρ Τρώων πεδίῳ πύκα θωρηκτῶν  
πόντῳ κεκλιμένοι, ἐκὰς ἡμεθα πατρίδος αἰης—  
τῷ ἐν χερσὶ φόως.*
- Il.* xxiii 607 *ἀλλὰ—σὺ γὰρ δὴ πῶλλ' ἔπαθες εἰνεκ' ἐμέιο—  
τῷ τοι λισσομένῳ ἐπιπελομαι.*
- Od.* xi 393 *ἀλλ'—οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἔτ' ἦν ἴς ἔμπεδος οὐδὲ τι κῖκυσ—  
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσσα ἰδών.*
- Od.* xiv 355 *ἀλλ'—οὐ γὰρ σφιν ἐφαλνετο κέρδιον εἶναι  
μαλεσθαι προτέρω—τοὶ μὲν πάλιν αὖτις ἔβαινον.*

In each of these cases we have an apodosis going with *ἀλλά*: in the following instances we have *ἀλλά* put after the *γάρ*-clause with the clause to which it properly belongs—

- Od.* x 174 *ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γὰρ πω καταδυσόμεθ', ἀχρῦμενοι περ  
εἰς Ἄϊδαο δόμους, πρὶν μόρσιμον ἡμᾶρ ἐπέλθῃ,  
ἀλλ' ἄγετ' κτέ.*
- ibid.* 226 *ὦ φίλοι, ἔνδον γὰρ τις ἐποιχομένη μέγαν ἰσθὸν  
καλὸν αἰοῖται, δάπεδον δ' ἅπαν ἀμφιμέμυκεν,  
ἧ θεὸς ἡὲ γυνή· ἀλλὰ φβεγγώμεθα θάσσοι.*

But there are even in Homer many instances in which there is no separate clause to go with *ἀλλά*; from which may be inferred that the separate force of *ἀλλά* and *γάρ* was already indistinctly felt; examples are *Il.* vii 242—

*ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ σ' ἐθέλω βαλέειν τοιοῦτον ἔοντα  
λάθρη ὀπιπέυσας, ἀλλ' ἀμφοδόν, αἶ κε τύχωμι.*

*Cp. Od.* x 202, 568, xix 591, and, for *γάρ* in protasis without *ἀλλά*, *Il.* vii 328 foll.

*ἀλλά γάρ* seems not to occur in Hesiod. But there are

instances in the elegiac poets like those in Homer, as Tyrt. I 1 (Bergk<sup>4</sup>)—

ἀλλ' Ἡρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικτήτου γένος ἔστε,  
θαρσεῖτ'.

A very important step was taken when γάρ was allowed to follow ἀλλά immediately. As γάρ cannot begin a clause it was now felt to lean upon ἀλλά, and its significance as introducing a separate clause was disguised. The following epitaph of Simonides (Bergk<sup>4</sup> 124 A = *Anth. Pal.* VII 607) is amongst the earliest recorded instances:

ἄνθρωπ' οὐ Κροίσου λεύσσεις τάφον, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς  
χερρητέω μικρὸς τύμβος, ἐμοὶ δ' ἱκανός.

It must be confessed that it is difficult to discover any trace of ellipse in this.

In Pindar there are the following instances of ἀλλά γάρ in juxtaposition:—

*Ol.* I 55 = 87 ἀλλὰ γὰρ κάταπέψαι  
μέγαν δῖον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρυ δ' ἔλεν  
ἄταν ὑπέροπλον.

*Pyth.* IV 32 = 56  
ἀλλὰ γὰρ νόστου πρόφασις γλυκεροῦ  
κώλυεν μείναι.  
Fennell 'But (we declined to stay) for.'

*Nem.* VII 52 = 77  
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνάπαυσις ἐν παντὶ γλυκεῖα ἔργω· κόρον δ' ἔχει  
καὶ μέλι κτέ.

In the following places we have ἀλλά . . γάρ separated:

*Ol.* VI 54 = 90  
ἀλλ' ἐν κέκρυπτο γὰρ σχολίῳ βατὶα τ' ἐν ἀπειράτῳ  
ἴων ξανθαῖσι καὶ παμπορφύροις ἀκτίσι βεβρεγμένους ἀβρὸν  
σῶμα· τὸ καὶ κατεφάμμεν καλεῖσθαι μιν κτέ.

Here ἀλλά really goes with the clause beginning τὸ καὶ 'so too'; γάρ introduces the clause giving the reason of Iamus' name, from *Ion*. At *Nem.* VII 30 = 44, *Isth.* III 34 = IV 25, *Isth.* VI 16 there is no subsequent clause with which ἀλλά may be taken.

In Herodotus we have many examples of γάρ used with a protasis in the sense 'since.' See especially I 8 ἦν γάρ οἱ τῶν αἰχμοφόρων Γύγης . . τούτῳ καὶ τὰ σπουδαιέστερα τῶν πρηγμάτων ὑπερετίθετο. χρόνου δὲ οὐ πολλοῦ διεληθόντος—χρῆν γὰρ Κανθαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς—ἔλεγε· Γύγῃ οὐ γάρ σε δοκέω πείθεσθαι (ᾧτα γὰρ ἀπιστότερα . .) . . ποιεε ὅκως κτέ. Here the fourth γάρ succeeds the clause of which it gives the reason. Compare I 14 ἀλλ', οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα ἔργον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐγένετο,

τούτον μὲν παρήσομεν: IV 83 ἀλλ', οὐ γὰρ ἔπειθε συμβουλευέων οἱ  
χρηστά, ὁ μὲν ἐπέπαντο: VIII 8, IX 27 end, IX 109 τῇ δὲ κακῶς  
γὰρ ἔδεε γενέσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπε, and in the same chapter  
ἀλλ', οὐ γὰρ ἔπειθε, διδοὶ τὸ φᾶρος.

Thus it still remained possible for ἀλλά γάρ, even when in  
immediate juxtaposition, to be succeeded by two clauses, the  
former of which might be taken with γάρ, the latter with  
ἀλλά. Jebb in his valuable note on Soph. *O.C.* 988 says  
that we must 'distinguish two cases of the formula ἀλλά  
γάρ: (1) with an ellipse as here: "but (your charges are  
untrue) for"; in which cases γάρ may be represented by *in  
fact, indeed*: (2) where there is no ellipse.'

I give instances of both classes from the dramatists, calling  
'elliptical' those instances where no separate clause that  
might go with ἀλλά is expressed; though to what extent the  
Greeks were then *conscious* of an ellipse I do not undertake to  
say. It will be noted that in the majority of cases ἀλλά and  
γάρ are not in juxtaposition.

A<sup>a</sup>. Full construction (ἀλλά . . γάρ separate).

Aesch. *Prom.* 941 ἀλλ' εἰσρω γὰρ τόνδε τὸν Διὸς τρόχιν,  
τὸν τοῦ τυράννου τοῦ νέου διάκονον,  
πάντως τι καινὸν ἀγγελῶν ἐλήλυθεν.

(The asyndeton in the last line makes it probable that it is  
to be connected with ἀλλά.)

Choëph. 375 ἀλλά διπλῆς γὰρ τῆσδε μαράγνης  
δοῦπος ἰκνεῖται, τῶν μὲν ἀρωγοί  
κατὰ γῆς ἤδη (scil. εἰσιν).

Soph. *Ant.* 392 ἀλλ' ἢ γὰρ ἔκτος καὶ παρ' ἐλπιδας χαρὰ  
ἔουκεν ἄλλη μῆκος οὐδὲν ἠδονῆ,  
ἦκω.

El. 256 ἀλλ' ἢ βία γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀναγκάζει με δρᾶν,  
ξύγγνωτε.

Phil. 81 ἀλλ' ἠδὺ γὰρ τοι κτήμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν,  
τόλμα.

O.C. 755 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὰμφανῆ κρύπτειν, σύ νιν  
κρύψον.

ibid. 797 ἀλλ' οἶδα γὰρ σε ταῦτα μὴ πείθων, ἴθι.

O.T. 1409 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ αὐδᾶν ἔσθ' ἄ μηδὲ δρᾶν καλόν,  
ὅπως τάχιστα πρὸς θεῶν ἔξω μέ που  
καλύψατ'.

Eur. *Alc.* 422 ἀλλ' ἐκφορὰν γὰρ τοῦδε θήσομαι νεκροῦ,  
πάρεστε.

*Med.* 1067 ἀλλ' εἰμι γὰρ δὴ τλημονεστάτην ὁδόν,  
παῖδας προσεῖπείν βούλομαι.

*Bacch.* 1166 ἀλλ' εἰσοῶ γὰρ ἐς δόμους ὀρωμένην  
Πενθέως Ἀγαύην μητρί' . . ,  
δέχεσθε κῶμον εὐλου θεοῦ.

*Ar. Wasps* 320 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ οἴός τ' ἔτ' εἰμ' εἶδεν, τί ποιήσω ;

A ὁ. Full construction (ἀλλά γάρ juxtaposed).

*Aesch. Sept.* 861 ἀλλά γὰρ ἤκουσ' αἰδ' ἐπὶ πράγος  
πικρὸν Ἀντιγόνη τ' ἠδ' Ἰσμήνη,  
θρήνον ἀδελφοῖν· οὐκ ἀμφιβόλως  
οἶμαι σφ' ἐρατῶν ἐκ βαθυκόλπων  
στηθέων ἦσειν ἄλγος ἐπάξιον.

*Soph. Ant.* 148 ἀλλά γὰρ ἂ μεγαλῶνυμος ἦλθε Νίκα  
ἐκ μὲν δὴ πολέμων  
τῶν νῦν θέσθε λησμοσύναν.

*Eur. Phoen.* 1307

ἀλλά γὰρ Κρέοντα λείσσω τόνδε δεῦρο συννεφεῖ  
πρὸς δόμους στείχοντα, παύσω τοὺς παρεστῶτας γόους.

B α. Elliptical construction (ἀλλά . . γάρ separate).

*Aesch. Eum.* 797

ἀλλ' ἐκ Διὸς γὰρ λαμπρὰ μαρτυρία παρήν κτέ.

(On this place Whitelaw remarks in a review of Sidgwick's edition, *CR.* II 110 b, 'Why must ἀλλά γάρ with a single verb be regarded as elliptical? γάρ in the combination εἰ γάρ is not a conjunction, and the possibility of putting the γάρ next the ἀλλά seems to show that it was not so regarded. This combination is found, however, sometimes when ἀλλά γάρ = *sed quia*.' I am endeavouring to answer the points here raised.)

*Soph. Ajax* 167

ἀλλ' ὅτε γὰρ δὴ τὸ σὸν ὄμμ' ἀπέδραν  
παταγοῦσιν κτέ.

Jebb 'No (we can do nothing) for.'

*Antig.* 155 ἀλλ' ὅδε γὰρ δὴ βασιλεὺς χώρας  
χωρεῖ κτέ.

Jebb 'But (let us cease) for.'

*El.* 223 ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ δεινοῖς οὐ σχήσω  
ταύτας ἄτας ὄφρα με βίος. ἔχη.

Jebb 'But (ye speak in vain) for.'

*ibid.* 595 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ νουθετεῖν ἐξεστὶ σε.

*O.C.* 988 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖσδ' ἀκούσομαι κακός.

Eur. *Heracl.* 480

ἀλλ' εἰμὶ γάρ πῶς πρόσφορος, μέλει δέ μοι κτέ.

Ar. *Knights* 328 ἀλλ' ἐφάνη γάρ ἀνὴρ ἕτερος πολὺ  
σοῦ μαρώτερος, ὥστε με χαίρειν  
ὅς σε παύσει κτέ.

B b. Elliptical construction (ἀλλὰ γάρ juxtaposed).

Eur. *Phoen.* 1762

ἀλλὰ γάρ τί ταῦτα θρηγῶ καὶ μάτην ὀδύρομαι;  
τὰς γάρ ἐκ θεῶν ἀνάγκας θνητῶν ὄντα δεῖ φέρεω.

(I have left out of account Soph. *O.C.* 985 ἀλλ' ἐν γάρ οὖν  
ξύνουδα, where γάρ belongs to the emphatic phrase γάρ οὖν.)

When we pass from the dramatists to Plato we find an important further stage of development has taken place. Among the numberless instances of ἀλλὰ γάρ in Plato I can cite only two in which any word intervenes, namely *Prot.* 336 A and *Apol.* 20 c, in both which cases we have ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ. The words ἀλλὰ γάρ have almost coalesced, and we may be pretty sure that the Greeks were no longer conscious of any ellipse. The use of ἀλλὰ γάρ in Xenophon is generally similar to that in Plato: but we have γάρ with a parenthetic clause in *Anab.* III i 24 ἀλλ'—ἴσως γάρ ἄλλοι ταῦτ' ἐνθυμοῦνται—μὴ ἀναμένωμεν ἄλλους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, and a word interposed at *Cyr.* II i 13 ἀλλὰ γινώσκω γάρ (Kühner § 509. 8 a).

It may perhaps be held that no discussion of ἀλλὰ γάρ is complete which does not take account of other combinations in which γάρ occurs. With regard to νῦν δὲ γάρ (which does not occur in the *Meno*), it seems parallel to ἀλλὰ γάρ, but we have little record of its earlier history, and it is possible that the analogy of ἀλλὰ γάρ has mainly operated in producing it, as also the phrase at *Partm.* 137 A ὁμῶς δὲ δεῖ γάρ χαρίζεσθαι ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν. For καὶ γάρ Thuc. affords evidence of a parenthetic stage, as I 137. 2 καὶ (ἦν γάρ ἀγνώστῳ τοῖς ἐν τῇ νηί) δέσας φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ δοτις ἐστί. Thuc. like Herodotus abounds in parenthetic clauses with γάρ. But I do not think it at all necessary to suppose that the history of all combinations of γάρ has been similar; in some it is probable that the original emphatic force of γάρ has been preserved throughout, as in γάρ οὖν, in questions like πῶς γάρ σθ'; and in answers like εἶπον γάρ 78 B 3, οὐδὲν γάρ 97 B 25, οὐ γάρ εἰκόσ 73 D 12.

## EXCURSUS IV

## EI WITH THE FUTURE INDICATIVE (on 85 C 15 and 86 A 8).

For *ei* with the future indicative in *present* conditions, where 'it expresses merely a present intention or necessity that something shall be done hereafter,' see Goodwin *M.T.* 407. This (modal) use, as he observes (*ibid.* 408, 449) is equivalent to μέλλω with the infinitive: e.g. we might have had at 73 B 42 (for εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι) εἴπερ ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται. *ei* with the future indicative in *real future* conditions is treated by Goodwin *ibid.* 447, 448. Much has been written as to the distinction in future conditions between *ei* with the fut. indic., εἰν with the subj., and *ei* with the optative (see F. E. T. §§ 194, 206; Hadley § 899). It is clear that different writers have their idiosyncrasies as to the form they prefer for expressing future conditions; and that Plato *rarely* expresses a real future condition by *ei* with the future indicative (see Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 106 D).

The following list of places in Plato, where *ei* is followed by the future indicative, is by no means exhaustive, but may serve to illustrate the two classes, and to show the much greater frequency of the 'modal' class. (Instances where *ei* introduces an indirect question, as *Rep.* 387 D, *Phaedo* 77 B, are of course left out of account.) As real future conditions may be cited, besides 85 C 15, *Apol.* 28 C *ei* τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ καὶ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ: probably also *Euthyphr.* 3 E *ei* μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδές, *ei* δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτο ἤδη δεη ἀποβήσεται ἀδηλον: *Prot.* 338 B C εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἰρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρων τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν . . . *ei* δὲ αἰρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δὲ, ἀσχυρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίνεται: *Rep.* 361 C *ei* γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί.

The remaining instances seem to me to be all modal, though a doubt may arise in some cases:

*Hipp. min.* 375 D δεινὸν μέντ' ἂν εἴη *ei* οἱ ἐκόντες ἀδικούντες βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες.

*Lysis* 213 C τί οὖν δὴ χρῆσώμεθα *ei* μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες φίλοι ἔσονται μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλους ἐτι φήσομεν εἶναι φίλους;

*Prot.* 330 E σχολῆ μέντ' ἂν τι ἄλλο ὄσιον εἴη, *ei* μὴ αὐτὴ γε ἡ ὀσιότης ὄσιον ἔσται.

Ibid. 351 C καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἀρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, εἰ μὴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο;

Gorg. 495 A οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ θντα ἐξετάξοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σταντῶ ἔρεῖς.

Ibid. 505 E εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν (scil. engage in continuous discourse), οἷμαι ἔγωγε ἄχρηται πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθές.

Ibid. 520 E καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ἀντ' εὖ πεύσεται.

Phaedr. 242 E ἔτι δὲ ἡ εὐθήθεια αὐτῶν πάνυ ἀστέια εἰ ἀρα ἀνθρωπίσκους τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.

Rep. 375 A καὶ μὴν ἀνδρείον (δεῖ εἶναι) εἴπερ εὖ μαχεῖται.

Phaedo 73 C ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δῆπου εἰ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερον ἐπίστασθαι.

Ibid. 106 D σχολῆ γὰρ ἂν τι φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀίδιον ἂν φθορὰν δέξεται.

Parm. 135 A B ἔτι ἄλλα πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐτὰ αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν θντων καὶ ὀριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος . . ἄλλὰ μέντοι εἰ γέ τις δὴ αὐ μὴ ἑάσει εἶδη τῶν θντων εἶναι, μήδε τι ὀριεῖται εἶδος ἐνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει κτέ.

Theaet. 161 D εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάσῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι . . ἄλλ' αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει . . τί δὴ ποτε Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ' ἐκείνον;

Soph. 248 E τὸ γινώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γινώσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐ ξυμβαίνει πύσχειν.

Phil. 37 E ἄλλ' οὐχ οἶόν τε (καλὸν ὄνομα προστιθέναι) εἴπερ ἀμαρτήσεται γ' ἡδονή.

Ibid. 62 C ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἐμοίγε, εἴπερ γ' ἡμῶν ὃ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὅπως οὐ ποτε βίος. [Cp. *ibid.* B, where instead of *εἰ* with *fut. indic.* we have *εἰ μέλλει ἐξευρήσων.*]

Tim. 31 A (ὀρθῶς ἔνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν) εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται.

Laus 822 B ταῦτ' οὖν εἰ πέφυκε μὲν οὕτως, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ ταύτη δόξομεν . . οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἷμαι ἡμᾶς ἂν τὰ ἐγκώμια προσάπτειν.

Add *Apol.* 34 C quoted on 91 E 17.

## EXCURSUS V

## ON ERISTIC (75 C, 80 E)

The art of the Eristic is Contentious Dialectic: the Eristics. 'can reduce any respondent to a contradiction, if he will only continue to answer their questions—whether what he says be true or false' (Grote 1 528, on the *Euthydemus*).

Eristic thus presents certain points of likeness to the Socratic elenchus. Both are opposed to the rhetorical method, and imply a process of question and answer between two persons face to face. At the same time the differences between the two things are very great. Grote, comparing the pair of Eristic Sophists with Socrates, says (1 531): 'The real contrast between the competitors consists, first in the pretensions, next in the method. The two Sophists are described as persons of exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue<sup>1</sup> and claiming a fee as if they did teach it: Socrates disdains the fee, doubts whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to encourage or help forward a willing pupil.' As to the differences in *method*, the main points are that in Eristic *verbal* consistency is all that is aimed at; the questions must be answered categorically, without qualifications; whereas the Platonic Socrates regards elasticity and variety of language as an essential of profitable discussion. Eristic takes no heed whether the answer represents the *bona fide* opinion of the answerer; to the Platonic Socrates this is all important (see on 83 D 49). Lastly, the object of Eristic is victory, and 'the presence, as well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd, are essential features in the drama.' The Platonic Socrates, on the other hand, gives his attention exclusively to the respondent, and is absolutely indifferent to outside opinion (cp. e.g. *Gorg.* 472 B C; 475 E). To the differences recognized by Grote, must however be added a further difference which he refuses to recognize. He says (1 530) 'the contrast does *not* consist in this—that Socrates so contrives his string of questions as to bring out some established and positive conclusion, while Euthydemus and his brother leave everything in perplexity. Such is not the fact. Socrates ends without any result and with a confession of his inability to find any.' This surely is untrue of the Platonic Socrates, in whom the Elenchus has

<sup>1</sup> i. e. ἀρετή; see on 71 E 2.

developed into a maieutic art (*Theaet.* 149 foll.) by which unsuspected treasures of knowledge are brought to light. Even in the *Euthydemus*, largely satirical as it is, the amount of positive result is considerable. No dialogue can show more clearly than does the *Meno*, that the "numbing shock" was only half the work of Socrates, the indispensable preliminary to something of a constructive process. Nor with regard to the historic Socrates do we gather from Xenophon that the conversations of Socrates were barren of positive result, that they always left the hearer just where they found him, only puzzled and humiliated; though this may have been the result in the case of pupils who left him prematurely. Grote himself goes far towards admitting some positive teaching from Socrates when he allows him to profess his willingness 'to help forward a willing pupil.'<sup>1</sup>

Other important differences arise out of the fact that the Socratic elenchus was systematized and unified by having a definite object, the framing or testing of definitions (chiefly in the department of Ethics). It was a thing that could be aped, no doubt; Socrates in the Platonic *Apology* 23 c, declares how readily his example was followed: *πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν . . . αὐτοὶ πολλὰκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἴτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν.* Pupils of Socrates are sometimes represented as playing this part by Plato. At the beginning of the *Gorgias*, Chaerephon has a skirmish with Polus before the two principals engage. See, too, the conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles in *Xen. Mem.* i ii 40-46, about Law, where Alcibiades retails the art of his master Socrates, with some success. Pericles asserts (with what truth it is hard to say) that he could do that sort of thing when he was young; to which Alcibiades, somewhat sceptical, replies that he only wishes he had known him when he was at his best in that art: *Μάλα τοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ ἡμεῖς τηλικούτοις ὄντες δεινοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἤμεν· τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἐμελεῶμεν καὶ ἐσοφίζόμεθα ὁἴωμεν καὶ σὺ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς μελετᾶν. τὸν δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδην φάναι, Ἐἶθε σοι, ὦ Περικλεῖς, τότε συνεγεγόνην δὲ δεινότατος σαντοῦ ταῦτα ἦσθα.*

Again, in the *Euthydemus*, Ctesippus is the squire of Socrates and plays Iolaus to his Heracles (298 D). He engages with the Eristics, and soon learns to match them with their own weapons (see 303 E and cp. *Lysis* 211 B). This leads to a further consideration.

<sup>1</sup> 'The difference between him (the Eristic) and Socrates is that his effect is purely negative; he begins and ends with captious disputation, his skill is simply to bewilder and perplex: he is not, as Socrates, a mid-wife of true knowledge.' Sidgwick in *J.P.* iv 296.

The Elenchus was an art not to be mastered in a day; it could only be attained by an apprehension of the object to which it was directed, and in the apprehension of this lay its chief utility. On the other hand, Eristic was bound together by no common tie. It consisted of a number of isolated 'tips,' easily learnt. 'The different artifices which they (the Eristics) employed were collected from all sides, just as they presented themselves; and the attempt was never made to combine these various tactics into a theory, and to arrange them from fixed points of view. They therefore made their disciples learn quite mechanically the questions and fallacies which most commonly came before them.' Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 462. In his note Zeller quotes Aristotle *Soph. El.* 34, 183 b 36 'καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικῶς λόγους μισθαρνούτων ὁμοία τις ἦν ἡ παιδείσις τῆ Γοργίου πραγματεία. λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικῶς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικῶς ἐδίδουσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν ᾗθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους, διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἀτεχνος δ' ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ' αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, as if a shoemaker (says Aristotle) were to give his pupil a number of ready-made shoes instead of instruction in his trade.' Cp. Campbell, General Introduction to the *Sophistes and Politicus*, p. xii.

We must remember however that in speaking of 'Eristic,' we are speaking of something which we hardly know except from caricatures, especially those by Plato. Who were the persons who really practised and disseminated the art thus caricatured? On this matter I must refer to two papers in the *Journal of Philology*, vols. iv pp. 288 foll. and v pp. 66 foll., by Dr. Henry Sidgwick, especially the former of them, where, at p. 298, he says 'I am disposed to think that the Art of Disputation which is ascribed to Sophists in the *Euthydemus* and the *Sophistes* (and exhaustively analyzed by Aristotle in the *περὶ Σοφιστικῶν Ἐλέγχων*) originated entirely with Socrates, and that he is altogether responsible for the form at least of this second species of Sophistic (namely eristic, as distinguished from rhetorical, sophistry). Again, p. 302, 'I conceive, then, that Socrates was seed and source of a new kind of Sophistry, the post-Socratic Sophistry, as we may call it, which it was extremely difficult for the subtlest mind to distinguish from the profession of Socratic philosophy.'

I have italicized the words 'for the form at least' in the former extract, as the point is important, and is recurred to by Dr. Sidgwick in the following page: 'I do not see from whom else' (than Socrates) 'the method could have been derived—as far as the form is concerned: for no doubt its sceptical and

destructive aim, and the logical puzzles and paradoxes which it uses, may be traced to Protagoras and Zeno.

Eristic was thus the progeny—the 'barren hybrid' to use Prof. Campbell's phrase—sprung on the one side from Socrates, on the other from a line as whose ancestor we must recognize Zeno of Elea.

In an important passage of the *Phaedrus* (261 B foll.), Plato distinguishes between two classes of men who are skilled in the warfare of words. The first class are the Rhetoricians, of whom Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Theodorus are taken as types. The others are described as the followers of 'the Eleatic Palamedes.' Under this soubriquet ancient and modern commentators have recognized Zeno of Elea. Dr. Thompson says in his notes 'That the father of the Eristic sects is here meant, the context proves to demonstration.' 'Zeno is well represented by Palamedes, the "sophist" of the heroic times, distinguished for his inventive genius.' (Doubtless the character of the hero was a deduction from his name, which whether connected with *παλάμη* or *μηδός* lent itself to the same interpretation.) Aristotle spoke of Zeno as the 'inventor of dialectic' (*Diog. L. ix 25, 29, cp. viii 57*), and we know that many of the Eristic puzzles were derived from problems that presented themselves to Zeno. (*Grote I 97; Zeller pre-Socratics I 613, 4; R. & P. § 107.*)

An important step in the development of Eristic took place when the problems—chiefly logical and metaphysical—dealt with by Zeno (and others) were taken up and *exploité* for their own purposes by professional teachers or 'sophists.' This was done by the man who is asserted to have been the earliest of the Sophists, Protagoras. We are told by Diogenes Laertius (*ix 51*) that Protagoras πρώτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ ἅπαντος πράγματος, ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις, οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρώτος τοῦτο πράξας. Further in §§ 52, 3, καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφείλ, πρὸς τοῦνομα διελέχθη, καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιπόλαιον γένος τῶν ἐριστικῶν ἐγέννησεν. Ἴνα καὶ Τίμων φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ,

Πρωταγόρης τ' ἐπίμικτος ἐριζόμεναι εὐ εἰδώς.

οὗτος καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρώτος ἐκίνησε, καὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένης λόγον τὸν πειρώμενον ἀποδεικνύειν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, οὗτος πρώτος διελεχταί, καθὰ φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ (286 c).

The connexion of Protagoras with the subtleties of Zeno is sufficiently attested. As to the evidence of Plato, besides the place in the *Euthydemus*, there is the *Theaetetus*, where Protagoras is spoken of as a man of much dialectic subtlety. He has adopted the Heraclitean philosophy that there is naught but change,

and on it based a system that denies objective truth, and is summed up in the aphorism πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. It is not mere irony when Socrates (164 E), after refuting this view, says they would not have disposed of it so easily if its father (Protagoras) had been alive. Even in the dialogue called after him, in which his dialectical failure is most conspicuous, he is represented as acquainted with the common fallacy of Conversion (350 c). Aristotle also gives evidence to the same effect (R. & P. § 180), and an anecdote related by Simplicius connects Protagoras with Zeno in regard to one of the stock puzzles (R. & P. § 104).

The list of the works of Protagoras given by Diogenes (ix § 55) begins 'τέχνη ἐριστικῶν. περὶ πάλης.' It seems probable (though a different view is taken by Zeller *pre-Socr.* ii 432), that we have here one work under two titles, περὶ πάλης being a metaphorical, and τέχνη ἐριστικῶν an explanatory, title. This may be argued from Plato *Soph.* 232 D. The only 'practical men' (δημοουργοί) here under discussion are those concerned with *laws and politics*. The Stranger says τὰ γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὸν δημοουργὸν ἀντεπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα πον καταβέβληνται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν. To which Theaetetus replies τὰ Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνει περὶ τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι. Here any allusion to an art of *wrestling* seems quite out of place. Cp. D. L. vi § 4 when Antisthenes says (surely metaphorically) that he is παλαιστικός.

But that Diogenes attributes too much to Protagoras in making Eristic spring from him *alone*, Dr. Sidgwick is able to show (loc. cit. p. 299). Diogenes leaves out of account the method of application, the weapon, which was supplied by Socrates. In the *Protagoras* the defeat of the sophist at the hands of Socrates is represented as due to the fact that he can only make long speeches and is incapable of dialectic. 'It seems to me quite incredible that if Protagoras had really not only practised, but actually invented, Eristic, as described in the *Sophistes*—methodical disputation by short questions and answers—he could ever have been represented as Plato represents him in the dialogue which bears his name' . . . Again (p. 300) 'Protagoras, no doubt, was in a manner Eristic, just as Zeno was, but it was in a rhetorical manner: he very likely wrote a τέχνη ἐριστικῶν, as D. says: but if so we must suppose it merely to have contained instructions how to make speeches on both sides of a case, no doubt with the aid of logical fallacies.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Campbell is, I think, using misleading expressions when he speaks of the 'negative dialectic' of Zeno, and the 'ἐλεγχος of Zeno' (notes

To this view of Protagoras' function in substance I incline to subscribe. But there are one or two considerations that seem to me to indicate that Protagoras may have made *some* advance in the *method* of disputation. Thus the mistake of Diogenes will be both smaller and more venial than it would otherwise appear. In the first place it is to be noted that Protagoras *professes* to be able to speak at any length that may be required. This, says Dr. Sidgwick, is only 'a bit of his brag.' It may be noted however that the statement is put forward by Socrates as a matter of *common rumour* about Protagoras, though it is a reputation which Protagoras by no means disclaims: 329 B Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροῦς λόγους καὶ καλοῦς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρβόμενος περιμεῖναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἃ ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα. In the latter portion of this passage a distinct claim is made to the art of Dialectic; it goes a good deal further than 334 E, where Socrates, again on common rumour, asserts that Protagoras can put a particular answer either in short or at length (cp. 335 B). This is merely a part of the art of Expression, and is a claim also made by Gorgias (*Gorg.* 449 C). It seems to me a question whether Plato would have made Protagoras claim, or popular rumour ascribe to him, proficiency in this art, if it had been wholly alien from his practice. It is just because Protagoras does make the claim that he is so mortified at his failure. Gorgias—though he too was influenced by Zeno—makes no claim to any cross-questioning power, and he is little affected by Socrates' success against him. Theodorus expressly repudiates the art; he has never learnt it, and he is not going to begin at his time of life (*Theaet.* 146 B). Hippias pours scorn upon it (*Hipp. maj.* 301 B, cp. *Hipp. min.* 373 A).

It is true that Protagoras is hopelessly defeated by Socrates, and this is taken as showing that the method of question and answer, *in all its forms*, was unfamiliar to him. I will not insist on the point that Plato is playing both sides of the game; it may of course be answered that 'the coarsest satirist would not describe a man as quite unskilled in an art which he himself invented.' But the difference between the two things must be remembered. Not only were the topics of the Socratic elenchus generally different from those of Eristic, but the Elenchus was a Method; Eristic was not. The Eristic in the hands of Socrates was liable to find himself in the same pre-

on the *Sophistes*, p. 3). Not much stress can be laid on *Soph.* 217 c, attributing the method of questions to 'Parmenides,' as the reference is probably merely to Plato's dialogue of that name. See Art. 'Sophist' in *Encyc. Brit.* ix 270 a.

dicament as a man in a foreign land who has tried to get up the language from a conversation-book.

In the article 'Sophist' in the *Encyc. Brit.* the view is taken that there was a large element of Eristic, contemporary with, and independent of, Socrates. See p. 267 b 'Incidentally we gather two important facts, (1) that contemporary with the dialectic of Socrates there was an eristic, (2) that this eristic was mainly applied to ethical questions'; also the arguments adduced *ibid.* p. 270 a, and Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 90 c.

The difficulty, however, of identifying these Eristic Sophists is great, and on the whole I believe that wherever we find in Plato the word *ἐριστικός* (or its synonym *ἀντιλογικός*) certain persons are held in view who were in fact, either directly or indirectly, pupils of Socrates. These are first and foremost Euclides of Megara and his school, of whom Diogenes Laertius says (II 106) *οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Μεγαρικοὶ προσηγορεύοντο, εἰτ' ἐριστικοί, ὕστερον δὲ διαλεκτικοί, οὗς οὕτως ὠνόμασε πρῶτος Διονύσιος ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν τοὺς λόγους διατίθεσθαι.* In the same author (II 30) we doubtless have a tradition of some rival Socratic school: (Socrates) *ὄρων Εὐκλείδην ἐσπουδακῶτα περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικούς λόγους, ὃν Εὐκλείδης, ἔφη, σοφίσταις μὲν δυνήσεται χρῆσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ οὐδ' αὖτως.*

The other school glanced at by Plato, under this name, is that of Antisthenes. In *Soph.* 251 b the Eleatic stranger says that by attempting *predication* (by saying that *ἐν* is *πολλά*, or *πολλά*, 'ἐν) τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθεῖσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν: these *ὀψιμαθεῖς*, we read, *χαίρουσιν οὐκ εἰόντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακῶσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθραυμάκωσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰόμενοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀνευρηκέναι.* It was this very quibble about predication, arising out of a misunderstanding of the nature of the copula, that was characteristic of Antisthenes. (Grote II 434, III 521; Zeller *Socrates* p. 297, *pre-Socr.* II 456 note.)

The word *ὀψιμαθής* seems to show that the actual persons indicated were rather pupils of Antisthenes, than A. himself, who was only some five years older than Plato (Dr. Thompson *Phaedrus* p. 175 note).<sup>1</sup> It was one point about Eristic that it took so short a time to learn that it was never too late to begin. The word *νέοις* also has its point: mere schoolboys were able to learn Eristic: see *Rep.* 498 A, 539 B. The last

<sup>1</sup> The date of his birth is uncertain (R. & P. 214; Zeller *Socr.* 285, 6). I do not know on what grounds Ueb.-Heinze (p. 129) place it at 'about 444 B.C.' Even so he would not be more than 45 at Socrates' death.

words of the extract contain a personal hit. Antisthenes was poor in worldly goods, and yet when asked (Xen. *Symp.* iii 8) on what he prides himself, he says ἐπὶ πλοῦτι. Subsequently (iv 34) he explains that the wealth of which he was speaking was wealth of *mind*. The anecdote may well have a historical basis, and thus give point to Plato's gibe in the *Theaetetus*, that Antisthenes was as poor in φρόνησις as in gold or lands.

The attack on Eristic in the *Euthydemus* is levelled mainly at him (Grote I 537 note; Zeller p. 119). The chief evidence for this is the mock eulogy on the Eristics pronounced by Socrates near the end of the dialogue (303 c foll.). Socrates praises them on three grounds. The first is that they only care for the approbation of people like themselves. The second is a 'really popular and kindly feature'; by forbidding us to speak of anything as 'fair,' or 'good,' or 'white,' and indeed *disallowing predication altogether*, they not only stop the mouths of others, but, what is more, their own; so no one can be offended: τοῦτο πάνυ χαρίεν τέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐπαχθὲς τῶν λόγων ἀφαιρεῖται. The reference to Antisthenes is here unmistakable. The third point is that any one can learn the art in a short time; he has noticed how soon Ctesippus was able to pick it up.

Antisthenes, the sincerity of whose purpose cannot be doubted, and whose whole interest lay with questions of Conduct, was glad of a short cut that abridged the field of philosophy which he regarded as superfluous and which he was indeed unable to appreciate (Zeller *Socrates* pp. 292 foll.). And though sincere himself he was the father of a sect who brought philosophy into contempt, much as the mendicant friars did religion at a later day.

Plato and Antisthenes were thoroughly antipathetic. Plato loved the pleasures of Reason, and probably was not indifferent to the pleasures of Sense; Antisthenes would rather be visited by Madness than Pleasure (Diog. L. vi 3). Indeed Plato's feud with him may well have been fiercer than against Euclides, if only because Antisthenes lived in Athens, while Euclides was at Megara.

It is important to remember that at the time when the *Meno* was written, the three men whom Plato had chiefly to regard as heads of rival schools were Isocrates the rhetor, Euclides, and Antisthenes. Each of these four men, as κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ, was engaged in continual wrangle with each of the others. The works of two of them are before us to speak for themselves; the titles of the works of the two others, preserved by Diogenes Laertius, are sufficient to show the part they played. But even in reading the works of the two surviving authors we

have to work to a great extent blindfold in making out the history of this 'literary feud'; as the etiquette of the time, borrowed perhaps from Comedy, which no longer lampooned individuals by name, discouraged the introduction of the names of living persons. The terms 'Sophist,' 'Rhetor,' 'Eristic' have all become mere polemic missiles; 'Isocrates includes Plato with Euclides and Antisthenes as Eristics; Plato calls Euclides and Antisthenes Eristics, and Isocrates a Rhetor or *δημηγόρος*; while each of the four was to himself a 'philosopher,' and to his brother teacher a 'sophist' (see Dr. Thompson's *Gorgias*, App. II pp. 177 foll.; Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 432). There was perhaps no form of attack to which Plato was more sensitive than that which identified him with a class of teachers whom he hated as cheapening Philosophy and bringing it into contempt. Hence his continual endeavour to draw a broad line between Eristic and the Elenchus, of which latter he felt himself the lawful proprietor as the heir of Socrates.

For a list of passages in Plato bearing on *ἐριστική* or *ἀντιλογική* see Campbell, Introduction to the *Sophist* p. liv, note, and Sidgwick in *J.P.* iv 304 foll.

The earliest reference to Eristic in Plato appears to be in the *Lysis* 211 B (Socrates, about to converse with Menexenus, is addressing Lysis): ἀλλὰ δρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, εἰάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρῆ ὁ Μενέξενος ἢ οὐκ ὁσθα δι' ἐριστικός ἐστιν; Ναί μὰ Δία, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε· διὰ ταῦτά τοι καὶ βούλομαι σε αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι. Ἰνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταγέλαστος γένωμαι; Οὐ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἴνα αὐτὸν κολάσῃς. Πόθεν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ ῥάδιον· δευὸς γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, Κτησίππου μαθητής. Later in the dialogue, after the paradox has been broached that everything loves its opposite (216 A), εἰεν ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀλλόκοτον, ὦ Μενέξενε; καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἄσμενοι ἐπιπηθήσονται οὗτοι οἱ πάσσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, and will ask us if Love is not opposite to Hate, and whether Hate loves Love, and so forth.

Here it is extremely difficult to identify the *ἐριστικοί* or *ἀντιλογικοί*, though I think that a definite recognizable class is indicated.<sup>1</sup> We naturally look to find in them some contemporaries of Socrates, and indeed it must be allowed that if the Eristics of Plato are always post-Socratic, an anachronism is involved in making Socrates speak of them as he does. Further, if the Eristics of the *Euthydemus* really derived their art from Socrates, how extraordinary is the position that Socrates is there made to take up in regard to them! And yet such were the dramatic exigencies when Plato had once determined to make Socrates the mouthpiece of his own views. (See

<sup>1</sup> Sidgwick however (*J.P.* iv 305) thinks that the use of *ἐριστικός* in the *Lysis* is 'untechnical.'

Zeller p. 95.) And the anachronism is not greater than many others that we find in utterances put into the mouth of Socrates by Plato. The traditions of the drama demanded little of consistency or realism, nor was the philosophic dialogue much more rigorous. So I think it not impossible that in Menexenus, of whom Socrates is so afraid, we must find a pupil who has borrowed his arms (indirectly) from Socrates himself. But the complications extend farther. Ctesippus in the *Euthydemus*, and Menexenus in the dialogue named after him, appear as pupils of Socrates. Ctesippus, as genuine disciple of Socrates, at first vigorously takes up arms against the two Eristics, who are themselves (though Plato gives no hint of this) indirect and unrecognized disciples. Towards the end of the dialogue Ctesippus has mastered their art. The *Lysis*, though almost certainly earlier than the *Euthydemus*, may have a later dramatic date, and so regard Ctesippus as having already got up Eristic, and passed on his lightly-won acquisition to Menexenus. Thus it would seem that Ctesippus besides being son of Socrates is also his—shall we say?—great-grandson; while Menexenus, also his son, is, through Antisthenes, Euthydemus and Ctesippus, one generation yet farther removed.

A late date for the dialogue *Euthydemus* is claimed by Sidgwick (ut sup. p. 306), who would assign it to the same period as the *Sophist*. This is on the ground that it expressly identifies Eristic with Sophistic, speaking of Euthydemus and his mate as 'Sophists.' But were the successive uses of the word 'Sophist' so well defined that we can infer a late date for this dialogue from the fact that Plato therein applies the title to a class of teachers who were certainly in existence soon after the death of Socrates, and of whom Plato must always have disapproved, whether he happened to call them 'Sophists' or not? I cannot then see any necessity for placing the *Euthydemus* any later than the *Republic*, or for not placing it, as H. Jackson does, among the Educational dialogues leading up to that work.

But who were Euthydemus and Dionysodorus? Unless they, directly or indirectly, derived their art from Socrates, the whole theory of the Socratic origin of Eristic breaks down. That they were ever direct pupils of Socrates his attitude to them makes dramatically impossible. But that they may have been pupils of Euclides or Antisthenes is not at all impossible. Socrates could hardly be made to face his own spiritual children without recognizing them; the same obligation does not hold of spiritual grandchildren.

That Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were real persons may, I think, be assumed. Grote indeed (I 536) says 'That they

correspond to any actual persons at Athens is neither proved nor provable.' Schleiermacher, on the other hand, 'cannot make out who the two Sophists were personally, but he conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no notice' (ibid. p. 537 note). There is no other instance, apparently, in Plato, of imaginary persons introduced with names (Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 425 note 4). Euthydemus is mentioned in the *Cratylus* 386 D, where the phrase οὐδὲ κατ' Εὐθύδημόν γε is proverbial for οὐδὲ κατ' ἐριστικῆν. Here it is of course not impossible that the proverb should have been drawn from a fictitious character, but surely unlikely (Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 457 note). Euthydemus is also mentioned as the author of sophisms by Aristotle *Soph. El.* ch. 20=177 b 12, and *Rhet.* II ch. 24=1401 a 26, and it happens that the particular sophisms that Aristotle quotes are not found in Plato's *Euthydemus*. Dionysodorus is probably the same person who is mentioned by Xen. (*Mem.* III i 1) as professing the art of strategy (cp. *Euthyd.* 271 D).

There is no explicit allusion to Eristic in the *Gorgias*. 'In the *Meno*, which I should place between the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, we have Sophistic and Eristic side by side and unconnected. The Sophists are still our old friends: they are not exactly attacked: they are even half-defended against Anytus. But Eristic is noticed quite independently: it is contrasted with the method of Socrates as a perverse kind of Dialectic' (Sidgwick ut supra p. 305). At a later time not only is the Eristic included by Plato in the class 'Sophist,' but it is the type which the term Sophist pre-eminently suggests.

In the *Phaedrus* 261 B foll. we have the distinction, already mentioned, between the two kinds of 'adverse speakers' (ἀντιλογικοί), first the Rhetoricians, Gorgias, etc.; then the 'descendants of the Eleatic Palamedes.'

In the *Rep.* 453 E Socr. and Glaucon have acknowledged ἄλλην φύσιν ἄλλο δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύειν, γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἄλλην εἶναι. Yet they are proposing to give the same employment to men and women. How can they reconcile this? Socrates proceeds: Ἦ γενναῖα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. Τί δῆ; Ὅτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσι μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίξειν, ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἐριδι; οὐ διαλέκτω, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. Socrates in what follows applies this to their own case. They have accepted πάντων ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἐριστικῶς the word ἄλλην as a verbal counter, without considering whether the Otherness of sex is relevant to the Otherness of employment. Here ἀντιλογικῆ is represented as differing from Dialectic, not by any perverse intent, but by

imperfect training and limitation of view. Somewhat later in the dialogue (498 foll.) we find it strongly insisted upon that education in philosophy shall be thorough and shall not begin too early. Those short, cheap courses taken before the mind is mature for the subject, and in the intervals of practical business (cp. *Euthyd.* 304 c), are worse than useless. They leave no abiding impression, and stand in the way of anything better. In fact men have never had a chance of getting acquainted with real Philosophy, which aims at Truth and keeps at a distance τὰ κομψὰ τε καὶ ἐριστικά καὶ μηδαμῶσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνοουσίαις (499 A). Similar is the tendency of a later passage 539 B: philosophy must not be begun too young: αἶμαι γὰρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γέωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἔλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον ἀεὶ. An older man approaches the thing in a more earnest spirit and is μετριώτερος (cp. the word at *Soph.* 216 B quoted below).

In *Phaedo* 89 D foll., on the ἀντιλογικοί is thrown the blame for the existence of certain μισόλογοι—haters of philosophy. (See Archer-Hind's note on ἀνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται 90 c.) Cp. 101 E, where their defective dialectic is pointed out. In the *Theaetetus* at 154 D Socrates tells Theaetetus that if he answers contrary to his opinion Εὐριπιδεῖόν τι ξυμβήσεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ φρῆν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἤμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἦδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν—but as we are poor ordinary creatures in pursuit of Truth, we have no time for such frivolities (Sidgwick ut supra p. 306 notes that here Eristic is definitely identified with Sophistic). Then at 165 D E we have the picture of the Eristic free-lance, the πελαστικός ἀνὴρ μισθόφορος ἐν λόγοις. Lastly, at 197 A, how will Socrates (asks Theaetetus) carry on discourse if he is debarred from such words as ἀγροεῖν and συνιέναι? Socrates does not know; εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός, he says, he would not only have professed to abstain from these phrases, but have come down sharply on any one who used them.

In the *Sophistes* we are introduced to a Stranger, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἑλέας, ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα, μάλα δὲ ἀνδρὰ φιλόσοφον. Can this be some Higher Power come to convict us of ignorance, θεὸς ὢν τις ἐλεγκτικός? asks Socrates. Theodorus replies Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ξένου,

ἀλλὰ μετρώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐριδας ἐσπουδακῶν. He is no mere Eristic.

In what follows, the fourth<sup>1</sup> of the 'preliminary definitions' of the Sophist clearly corresponds to the Eristic: τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ἐριστικῆς δὲ τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, κτέ. (226 A). Following this we have a definition which unmistakably points to Socrates himself or his true followers. It is summed up at 231 B: τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνώμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἢ γένει γενναία σοφιστικῆ.<sup>2</sup>

The final definition makes the sophist a conscious impostor, and that of two kinds (*Soph.* 268 B foll.): τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλῆθος εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ κτέ.

In this dialogue the Sophist, as Sidgwick (ut supra p. 296) points out, is 'expressly contrasted with both the Statesman and the Rhetor.' That is, he has ousted from the title the persons who in the earlier dialogues are chiefly before one's mind when 'sophists' are spoken of. He resembles the true Dialectician 'as a wolf does a dog.'

The last passage in Plato demanding notice is *Phil.* 17 A. Right Classification is the special faculty of the διαλεκτικὸς (cp. *Phaedr.* 266 B): οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοί (i.e. the half-educated 'imperfect' Socratics), instead of making sub-classes, go straight from the One to the infinity of particulars: τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς διακεχώρισται τὸ τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους (See W. H. T. in *J.P.* VIII 301).

The chief references to Eristic in Isocrates are the following: (see Sidgwick ut supra pp. 292, 293; Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus* pp. 172 foll.; also note on 100 A 6).

In the oration κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν, an early work, the word ἐριστικὸς does not occur; but near the beginning we read τὴς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μισήσειεν ἅμα καὶ καταφρονήσειε πρῶτον μὲν τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐριδας διατριβόντων οἱ προσποιοῦνται μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖν κτέ.; § 20 the composers of the old τέχναι were worse τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐριδας καλινδουμένων.

At the beginning of the *Helena* (10) after the references to Antisthenes and Plato, we have the followers of *Euclides* spoken

<sup>1</sup> Or, in the later summary, the fifth (231 E) τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγου τις ἀθλητῆς, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένους. On this definition the *Encyc. Brit. Art.* 'Sophist,' p. 267 a notes that it makes the matter of anti-logic 'Justice,' 'Injustice' and other abstractions (225 c); further, that 'it represents the earlier eristics, contemporaries of Socrates, whom it was necessary to distinguish from the teachers of forensic oratory.' (See p. 278.)

<sup>2</sup> Or at 231 E δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρήν.

of thus: ἄλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἐριδας διατρίβουσι τὰς οὐδὲν μὲν ὠφελούσας κτέ.

In the tract *ad Nicoclem* (2) 51 we read: περὶ μὲν τῶν γυμνασίων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες, καὶ φασιν οἱ μὲν διὰ τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων, οἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἄλλων τινῶν φρονιμωτέρους ἔσσεσθαι τοὺς αὐτοῖς πλησιάζοντας.

In the *Antidosis* (15) 45 we are told that some work at mythology, some on the poets, some on military history: ἄλλοι δὲ τινας περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις γεγόνασιν, οὓς ἀντιλόγικοὺς καλοῦσιν.

In § 258 of the same work we read τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐριδας σπουδαζόντων ἐνίοι τινας ὁμοίως βλασφημοῦσι περὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὥσπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. This is aimed at Plato (Sidgwick ut supra p. 293): § 261 ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς λόγοις δυναστεύοντας (again Plato and his school) καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν μαθημάτων διατρίβοντας οὐ βλάπτειν ἄλλ' ὠφελεῖν τοὺς συνόντας, ἐλάττω μὲν ὧν ὑπισχνούνται, πλείω δ' ὧν τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσιν.

In the *Panathenaeicus*, his latest work, published in 339 B.C. after Plato's death, he adopts much the same tone as in the *Antidosis*: (I have much respect for the current education) λέγω δὲ τὴν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς καλουμένους: but these things are only for boys; and so forth (Jebb *Attic Orators* II 131).

There are many allusions to Eristic in Aristotle. It may be assumed that these are in all cases aimed at rival post-Socratic schools, that is chiefly the 'imperfect' schools of the Megarians and Cynics (Sidgwick in *J.P.* v 70, 71). The 'Sophistici Elenchi'—an appendix to the *Topica*—is a series of solutions of eristic puzzles. At ii 2=165 b 7 he defines ἐριστικοὶ λόγοι as οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δὲ, συλλογιστικοὶ ἢ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί. The following places may also be referred to: *Topica* VIII xi 1 foll., especially *δυσκολαινοντες* οὖν ἀγωνιστικὰς καὶ οὐ διαλεκτικὰς ποιούντες τὰς διατριβάς (see Grote *Aristotle* p. 366); *Rhet.* I xi 15=1371 a 7 (see Cope's note) and II xxiv=1402 a 5 and 14.

## EXCURSUS VI

## THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSMIGRATION IN PLATO (on 81 A 21 ff.)

The belief that the soul has some persistence after death, that the ghost of a man has power at least for some time after it has quitted the body, was shared by the early Greeks with many primitive races. This stage of belief we find in Homer (*Il.* xxiii 65 foll. ; *Od.* xi). Already in Homer we also note the emergence of a belief in certain future rewards and punishments. But from this primitive belief to the doctrines of Immortality and Transmigration is a considerable step. Transmigration implies not merely a dream-like echo of life reverberating after death, but a series of lives each as real and vivid as the present, or even more so. How was this step taken by the Greeks?

To this question Zeller answers that in this matter the mysteries, especially the Orphic, do seem to have acted as the teachers of a higher truth. 'The doctrine of metempsychosis seems really to have passed from the theology of the mysteries into Philosophy.' 'In the Orphic theology transmigration is clearly to be found, and the probabilities are very strongly against its having come there through the medium of the philosophers' (Zeller *pre-Socratics*, I pp. 69, 71). Plato nowhere definitely connects the notion of transmigration with the Orphics. In the *Phaedo* 70 c, he speaks of transmigration simply as a *παλαιὸς λόγος*. But in the *Cratylus* 400 c *οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφεία* are credited with a doctrine which is at any rate closely connected with Transmigration, namely that the body is a prison in which the soul is pent in punishment for some ancient sin. With this we may connect *Phaedo* 62 B *ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἀνθρώποι κτέ.*, where 'the ancient commentators explain that the Orphic traditions are meant.'

Cicero indeed (*Tusc. Disp.* I § 38) speaks of Pherecydes of Scyrus as the first who taught the doctrine of transmigration. The evidence is late and poor, and is rejected by Zeller. It is possible that its foundation is the statement of Theopompus (*Diog. L.* I § 116) *τοῦτον* (Pherecydes) *πρώτον περὶ φύσεως καὶ θεῶν Ἑλλήσι γράψαι*. But the doctrine of transmigration may have been taught long before it was committed to writing. The

mythical element is very large in the accounts of Pherecydes. Suidas says of him that no one trained him, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἡσκημένοι κτησάμενον τὰ Φοινίκων ἀπόκρυφα βιβλία, that he divides with Cadmus of Miletus the reputation of being the first prose-writer, καὶ πρῶτον τὸν περὶ τῆς μετεμψυχώσεως λόγον εἰσηγήσασθαι.

The question whence the Orphics derived their doctrine is hard to answer. Herodotus (II 123) says it was derived from Egypt: πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοι εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος εἰς ἄλλο ζῶον αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον ἐσδύεται· ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα περιέληθ' τὰ χερσαία καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὐτὶς ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσδύειν· τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῆ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλλοῖσι ἔτεσι. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσι οἱ Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἴδιον ἑωυτῶν ἔόντι· τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω. (At ch. 81 he says that the Orphic or Bacchic rites are really Egyptian.) It is clear from this passage that some of those who taught the doctrine of transmigration in Greece, acknowledged no indebtedness to Egypt. It may be that Herodotus, finding similar doctrines in Egypt, supposed that the Greeks had borrowed them, a notion which his priestly informers naturally encouraged. Grote (II 202) speaks of the belief in metempsychosis as 'having its root in the Egyptian and Oriental religions.' But Zeller shows how easily such a doctrine may have grown up independently on Greek soil. 'If the soul is conceived as a breath-like essence which dwells in the body, and leaves it after death, . . . the question inevitably arises whence this essence comes, and whither it goes. For answer to this question, a child-like imagination is most easily satisfied with the simple notion that there is a place, invisible to us, in which the departed souls remain, and from which the newly-born come forth. . . . From this there is but a step to the theory that the same souls which previously inhabited a body should afterwards enter another body' (*pre-Socratics* I p. 73 note). We may point to the sixth century B.C. as an epoch to which important advances in Greek religious thought may be referred (Anrich, *das antike Mysterienwesen*).

The doctrine of Transmigration played an important part in the system of the Pythagoreans. It does not appear, however, that the school claimed to have originated the doctrine; and the probable conclusion is that they received it from the Orphics, with whom they were closely connected.

Plato unmistakably copied his mythical descriptions of the soul after death from the Pythagoreans (Zeller *pre-Socr.* I 482). At *Gorg.* 492 E foll. we have the etymology σῶμα from σῆμα suggested, the body being the *tomb* of the soul. (Cp. *Phaedr.* 250 c καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσημαντοὶ τούτου δ' ὄν σῶμα

περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὁστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.) That the passage in the *Gorgias* is drawn from the Pythagorean Philolaus is made almost certain by Dr. Thompson in his note. In the words that follow, *καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ ἴσως Σικελὸς τις ἢ Ἴταλικός*, the reference is still to Philolaus, not to Empedocles, as some have thought. For as the proverbial expression was *Σικελος κομψὸς ἀνὴρ*, why should the amendment *ἢ Ἴταλικός* have been added, unless because the writer referred to was really an Italian, as Philolaus, rather than a Sicilian, as Empedocles? (Zeller *Plato* 126, note 81). In the *Cratylus* 400 B C (quoted above) there appears a slight divergence between the Orphics and the Pythagoreans. We are told that some (*τινες*) connect *σῶμα* with *σῆμα*; these we may conclude to be the Pythagoreans, as in the passages from the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* just referred to. Socrates prefers the etymology connecting *σῶμα* with *σφύζεσθαι*, which *οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα* support.

But however much of mythical material Plato may have borrowed from the Pythagoreans, his debt to them as regards any *philosophic* account of the soul is almost nothing. The Pythagoreans hardly attempted to connect their views of the future state, the product of moral instinct and poetic imagination, with the more scientific parts of their system (Zeller *pre-Socr.* I 485-7). It may be remarked that though Philolaus is once mentioned in the *Phaedo* as discountenancing suicide, yet Kebes has 'heard nothing clear from him'; and there is no hint of Pythagorean sources in any of the philosophic theorems on which the arguments for immortality in that dialogue are based.

In much the same position stand Heraclitus and Empedocles, who held similar views. Of Heraclitus, Zeller says: 'It is doubtless his opinion that souls enter the body from a higher existence, and after death, when they have proved themselves worthy of this privilege, they return as daemons into a purer life' (ut supra II 87). But this view is in no way co-ordinated with his general philosophy.

So with regard to Empedocles. In a well-known passage he introduces a fallen spirit explaining that any *δαίμων* who sins is doomed to wander for 30,000 *ἡμέραι* from the society of the Blessed,

φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνον εἶδεα θνητῶν,  
ἀργαλέας βιότοις μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.

ὦν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φύγας θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης.

But interesting as is this and his other utterances about the history of the soul, the whole topic is an excrescence on his

system. 'There remains only the supposition that he adopted the doctrine of Metempsychosis and all depending on it, from the Orphico-Pythagorean tradition, without combining it scientifically with his philosophic convictions advanced in another place and in another connexion' (Zeller ut supra II 177).

Thus for a long time the stream of myth and that of philosophy ran on side by side, touching, but hardly commingling. 'A scientific basis was first given to the belief in immortality by Plato' (Zeller ut supra I 74). This basis is found in the doctrine of Ideas.

To examine the progress of Plato's views as shown in his various myths of the soul's history is an interesting, but very difficult task. In the suggestions that we have as to the future state in *Apol.* 40 E foll., there is but little advance from the Homeric standpoint. In the myth that concludes the *Gorgias*, the material is again of the simplest kind. After death the good are sent to the Islands of the Blest, the bad to Tartarus, and the only refinement is the distinction between curable and incurable sinners (526 B). The case is very different when we come to the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*. Whatever may have been the order in which these dialogues were written, they agree in this, that in each the mythical material is accompanied by an assertion of the soul's commerce with Ideas, and a demonstration of its immortality. Finally in the *Timaeus* we have myth and philosophy fused into one.

In the *Phaedrus* after the proof of immortality given in ch. xxiv (245 C-246 A) follows the myth of the soul's history — 'a masterpiece of the author's myth-making genius: the exemplary specimen of an art of which he has left us many other instances, but none so brilliant and elaborate.' I quote from Dr. Thompson, *Intr.* p. xviii, who proceeds: 'In one respect, indeed, this discourse may be said to differ from similar philosophical myths which are scattered in the Platonic writings; it is, in most of its parts, a deliberate allegory, in which the thing signified is designed to be intelligible to the instructed hearer or reader.' In his note on 246 D, however, he admits that 'the sign and the thing signified are intentionally fused.' And indeed a close examination reveals (as must be the case with almost any allegory) not merely certain gaps in the statement, but inconsistencies.

The soul is likened to a winged charioteer driving a winged pair of horses. By this we have figured the tripartite division of the soul, as explained in the *Republic*. The charioteer is Reason, the two steeds are Spirit and Appetite. All three elements are in the original state winged (251 B). With the gods both charioteer and horses are noble, but with other souls

the steed Appetite is of a baser strain. The 'wing' does not represent any *part* of the soul; but something material with which the soul is linked. Though the wing is of the nature of *σῶμα*, it is the finest and purest *σῶμα*: *κεκοινώθηκε δὲ πη μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θεοῦ* (246 D). It bears aloft that to which it is attached, and the Being thus upborne is an *ἀθάνατον ζῶον*. It is compounded of Soul and Matter; but the union of the two is indissoluble. But the soul that loses its wings is borne down to earth, receives an *earthy* body and becomes *θηηρὸν ζῶον*. Earth, the gross-est material element, cannot be *indissolubly* united with soul, and their union is liable to be broken by death.

The wing is thus an upward tendency acting on the soul, and counteracting a permanent downward tendency. How the loss of the wings takes place Plato proceeds to explain. There is no suggestion of any original *sin* to bring this about, as in the lines of Empedocles; the fall seems regarded *mainly* as a matter of fate (*τινὶ συντυχίᾳ χρησάμενη* 248 C), as in the *Timaeus*.

A vast procession of gods and daemons (unfallen spirits) ever follows the winged chariot of Zeus, as it moves on its providential course *within* the heavenly sphere. The daemons severally follow the train of their patron god, and are thus already differentiated. Within this sphere there is no lack of fair sights and journeys, and here the gods, as they fulfil their several courses, may be followed by any soul that wills.

But all souls, even those of the gods, require occasional refreshing with their proper sustenance, that is by commerce with the world of Reality, the world of Ideas. So 'there is a route which they tread only on their high feast days—a route up-hill from first to last, leading to the very apex of the arch which supports the vault of heaven, and there opening upon its outer circumference, whence they can feast their eyes on the glories of the supra-celestial region, which far exceed the *θεῶν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ* in beauty, as the road which leads to them exceeds in difficulty the beaten highways on which the gods ordinarily go to and fro' (Dr. Thompson on 247 A). Only the chariots of the gods perform this journey with ease and certainty. With them also Reason, the charioteer, directs the two steeds, Spirit and Appetite; but in their case all the three elements are noble.

In this way the nutrition of the wing is accomplished; for the wing, as we read at 246 D, is nourished on the 'fair, wise and good'; in which words, as Dr. Thompson points out, the allegory is partially dropped. The same sense is given at 247 D where the allegory is for the time dropped altogether: the *διάνοια* of the gods, *and of all souls which are destined to receive their*

*rightful inheritance*, is fed on pure intelligence (νῶ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκηράτω). (How it is that some souls fail to enter into 'their rightful inheritance' is explained in the sequel.)

These are borne round one 'revolution' (περιφορά) in contemplation of the Ideas. By the περιφορά here we must understand, not the Great Year of 10,000 years, but a lesser period. Every tenth millennium is spent by the souls in achieving, or attempting, the supra-celestial circuit. The remaining 9000 years consist of nine periods of 'life' followed by as many periods of 'death' (249 A B, 256 E). Certain expressions indeed, as 248 E *eis mèn gàr tò αὐτὸ θθεν ἡκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκάστη, οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων* suggest that there are 'ten millennial probation' (Dr. Thompson ad loc.) the supra-celestial περιφορά being *exclusive* of these. Such apparent inconsistencies are quite unimportant; indeed it is hard to see how the supra-celestial state could be measured by time at all. (Cp. a parallel inconsistency between the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic* pointed out in the note on 81 B 33 ἐνάτω ἔτει.)

As to the word *διάνοια*, it is used here as a synonym for the whole *ψυχὴ*, where the distinction between the charioteer and the steeds is not insisted on, and the allegory is for the time abandoned. (So at 256 A we have τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας, and C οὐ πάσῃ δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Cp. also 251 B πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ) τὸ πάλαι πτερωτὴ with 249 C μόνῃ πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια.)

The souls run the circuit of the Ideas, Justice, Temperance, Knowledge, etc., until they come back to the point from which they have started. After its feast of truth the divine *διάνοια* returns within the sphere of heaven, and goes to its home. There (the allegory is suddenly resumed) the Charioteer satisfies the steeds, Spirit and Appetite, with 'nectar' and 'ambrosia.'

The above description applies to the gods alone. Other souls follow with different degrees of difficulty. The noblest souls, those most godlike, succeed in keeping the head of the Charioteer in the supra-celestial sphere, and thus remain in continuous communication with the Ideas. We may identify these with the *δαίμονες* mentioned at 247 A as forming the trains of the several gods. A second class only enjoy an interrupted vision; sometimes Reason triumphs over the baser elements, sometimes not. A third class are permanently over-weighted by the baser elements, and are carried round ever struggling to emerge but never succeeding. With the gods the baser element is non-existent; of other souls there are:—

(1) those in which the baser element is in permanent subordination;

(2) those in which there is a continual struggle, with varying result;

(3) those in which the nobler element is in permanent subordination.

(It is worth while to compare this with the more elaborate scale given by Aristotle *N. E.* VII i.)

In what follows it looks at first sight as if Plato had in mind the third of these three classes. It is however clear that he really means mainly the second. For the last class, having had *no* vision of the truth, cannot expect a human incarnation. The first class remain in the divine company, the second sink to human life, the third, we may assume, to the life of brutes. Of the unsuccessful classes, then, many souls are maimed by the fault of the charioteers. Bad training of the baser steed by the charioteer is also spoken of as a cause of mischief at 247 B *ὁ τῆς κακῆς ἔκπνοσ μετέχων . . . ὧ μὴ καλῶσ ἢ τεθραμμένοσ τῶν ἡμιύχων*. Here we do seem to have the notion that a moral cause may be assigned for the fall. Reason is *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*, *τὸ κυβερνητικόν*, and commands the rest of the soul, as the soul commands the body (see on 88 C 33). Here we have a mythical statement of the doctrine Vice is Ignorance. In the struggle the wing suffers grievously. These souls after labour and sorrow go back to their place without attaining the vision of Truth, and feed henceforth on the 'chaff and husks of Opinion' (*τροφῆ δοξαστῆ χρωῶνται*). This of course is the antithesis to *νοῦσ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκῆρατοσ*, the nutriment of the highest *διάνοια*. What, in the case of the less fortunate steeds, corresponds to the 'nectar and ambrosia' of the divine steeds, is not expressed.

The supra-celestial region is called at 248 B *ἀληθείασ πεδίον*. The reason why there is such eagerness to attain to this is that there is found the pasturage for the best part of the soul, and that the nature of the wing is thus nourished. Here we have put before us mythically, the doctrine that all desire the Best (78 B 4). The *πτερόν* is, I think, not to be *identified* with *τὸ ἄριστον τῆσ ψυχῆσ*.

Any soul that in company with God sees anything—that is, as Dr. Thompson explains, 'some considerable measure'—of Truth, is to be untroubled till the next revolution, and if it can always attain this, it is to be always unharmed. The *περίοδοσ* here mentioned must be the Great Year, the period of 10,000 years from one supra-celestial journey to the next. (See Zeller p. 392, and for the Great Year his note 43 on p. 382, and note 64 on p. 412.) But any soul that, falling out of rank in the divine procession, loses the Vision, and by some evil chance founders, filled with forgetfulness and vice, and so loses

its wings and comes to earth—this soul, since it has had at some time commerce with the Ideas, must at its first incarnation be united with the body of a man (cp. *Tim.* 41 E foll.).

According to the degree of vision they have enjoyed, they become either—

1. φιλόσοφος, ἢ φιλόκαλος, ἢ μουσικός τις καὶ ἐρωτικός,
2. a King, either a Law-giver, or a Warrior and Ruler,
3. a Statesman, Social Reformer, or Financier,
4. a lover of Labour, a Trainer of the body, or a Surgeon,
5. a soothsayer, or a votary of the mysteries,
6. a poet, or some other 'imitator,'
7. an artisan or husbandman,
8. a sophist or demagogue,
9. a tyrant.

On this passage (248 c) Dr. Thompson remarks 'Those whose powers are unequal to the effort' (of keeping their place in the divine train) 'are in their first earthly genesis incarnated as man, never as beasts; this last degradation being apparently the result of a perverse choice deliberately made by the soul itself at a subsequent period. Human destiny would seem therefore to be partly the result of choice, partly of necessity—and we have here a metaphysical problem clothed in a mythical dress.' This is the doctrine of the *Timaeus* (l.c.); but the description in the *Phaedrus* would seem to suggest that souls of the lowest class, who perform the whole supra-celestial circuit ὑποβρύχιαι, without ever seeing the Realities, do enter into beasts even at their first incarnation (cp. 249 B and E). Stress is however laid in the *Phaedrus* on the superior excellence of the first life, as lying nearer to the world of Ideas, and preserving the memory of them still fresh: each soul (252 D) imitates his patron god to the best of his power ἕως ἂν ἦ ἀδιάφορος καὶ τὴν τῆδε πρῶτην γένησιν βιοτεύῃ (cp. 250 E ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελής ἢ διεφθαρμένος οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθένδε ἐκέισε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος). On the other hand the Pindar fragment in the *Meno* suggests the view that the highest lives on earth are those nearest the other end of the course, on the eve of the soul's restoration—though of course in Pindar there is no thought of any world of Ideas.

As to the fate that follows the first life we read (248 E) ἐν δὴ τοῖσι θάσσιν ὅς μὲν ἂν δικαίως διαγάγῃ ἀμείνωνος μοίρας μεταλαμβάνει, ὅς δ' ἂν ἀδίκως, χείρονος. 'The destiny of the soul after death is determined solely by the life it had led on earth, without reference to the ante-natal state. How a σοφιστής or a τύραννος can be said δικαίως διαγείναι we are not informed, and the τοῖσι θάσσιν must therefore probably be taken with a grain of allowance. It is however noteworthy that, in its first genesis, the soul's condition is fixed according to a

*intellectual standard* (τὴν μὲν πλείστα ἰδοῦσαν) whereas its doom after leaving the body depends on moral considerations (δὲ ἀδίκαιως διαγάγῃ). (Dr. Thompson's note.)

We must remember, however, that for Plato the antithesis between 'intellectual' and 'moral' is by no means so strong as it seems to us. We have seen that the fall is represented as due in part to the fault of the *ἡβίλοχος*, a view which would reduce all vice and error, whether in this life or before it, to intellectual weakness. It is precisely the soul who has 'seen most of the Realities' in a former state, that will 'live most justly' in the present.

But the doctrine of the *Phaedrus* as to the causes of the fall is not clear, and the fatalist view, as seen above, predominates. Not merely as regards the previous state but in regard to *this* life, the *Phaedrus* seems to recognise an element of fate or chance. The soul's life here depends on reminiscence of the Realities; (250 A) ἀναμνησθεσθαι δ' ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα οὐ βῆδιον ἀπάσῃ, ὅτε δοῦναι βραχέως εἶδον τότε τάκει, ὅτε αἱ δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι ἐδυστύχησαν, ὥστε ὑπὸ τινων ὀμμιῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀδικον τραπόμεναι λήθην ὦν τότε εἶδον ἰερῶν ἔχειν. 'This may be owing,' says Dr. Thompson, 'to their ill-luck either in the former or in the present state of existence. In the latter case evil associations may have turned them from the right path and clouded their memory.' With this may be contrasted the view in *Rep.* 617 E, which asserts free-will and the responsibility of the individual for all the conditions of this life: αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος.

After the first life, then, judgment follows. According to their deserts souls either are sent for the rest of the 1000 years *εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιοτήρια* (purgatories), or are raised *εἰς οὐρανοῦ τινα τόπον*. (Cp. 256 D, where for the place of punishment occurs the phrase ἢ ὑπὸ γῆς πορεία, which also occurs *Rep.* 615 A.) Then comes the choice of a second life. Here a soul that has previously inhabited the body of a man may enter into a beast, and vice versa, always provided that no soul that has never beheld the Ideas can ever enter into the human form (249 B, see on 81 D 12).

The great majority of souls have nine of these millennial periods to fulfil before they regain their wings, and restored to their original state again commence, or attempt, the supra-celestial circuit. But the soul that has *thrice* running chosen the lot of a guileless votary of philosophy, or of a lover in the highest sense, regains its wings at the end of the third millennial period, instead of the ninth; and so departs, not yet, we may presume, to the supra-celestial sphere, but rather to the society of the gods *ἐν τῷ οὐρανοῦ* (249 A, cp. 256 B). Cp. Pindar *Ol.* 2. 68 foll.:

ἄσσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἐς τρίς  
 ἑκατέρωθι μέιλαντες ἀπὸ πᾶμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν  
 ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὄδδον παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν· ἐνθα μακάρων  
 νᾶσον ὤκειανίδες ἀδραι περιπνέουσιν· κτέ.

Apparently all souls, at least all that have ever inhabited a human form, are destined to restoration, and the recovery of their wings, after the elapse of the Great Period (248 E). In the light of this must be interpreted the words at 249 c διὰ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια. They seem to refer to the *early* recovery of wings, just mentioned, accorded to the philosopher.

It is not necessary to follow in the same detail the remainder of the myth, in which its application to the doctrine of *Ἔρως* is explained. The sequel represents the recovery of the wings as a gradual process (251 B C), the chief agency in its accomplishment being Love and Philosophy. The souls of lovers who have enjoyed a pure and philosophic love even for one life only, become *ὑπόπτεροι* (256 B); their wings are sprouting, they have won one of their 'Olympian bouts,' but we must not suppose they are fully fledged till after the third. As it is, they have attained something *ὄδ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ὄστε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη ὄστε θέλα μανία δύναται πορίσαι ἀνθρώπων*. Here *σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη* is not the same as *σωφροσύνη δημοτικὴ*. It is the human reflexion of divine *σωφροσύνη*; it is conditioned by human life, but otherwise the best of which man is capable. Next among lovers are those who have only lived up to the standard of popular repute (*φιλότιμοι*). These also are elevated by their love. They die at last *ἄπτεροι*, but their wings are *ready* to sprout. They must not be condemned to the 'subterranean journey,' for they have started on the course up through heaven which will lead them at last to the supra-celestial sphere (256 D). Last we have presented the vulgar connexion, from which Love is absent, where we have *οικειότης σωφροσύνη θνήτη συγκεκραμένη*. This is popular virtue in its lower aspect, the virtue of the *ὀλιγαρχικός* (see *Rep.* 554 c, and *Phaedo* 68 c with 82 A B); whereas the classes described before correspond respectively to the *ἄριστος* or *φιλόσοφος*, and the *φιλότιμος* of the *Republic*. To cast in your lot with this third grade will cause you to flit 'a senseless shade for nine millenniums over the surface of this earth and beneath it.'

If, unblinded by the magnificence of this allegory, we attempt to analyse it minutely, we cannot help noting a certain amount of vagueness and inconsistency. The question is whether this exists to a larger extent than the nature of allegory makes necessary. I am disposed to think that the myth does show traces of not being the result of a single

inspiration. I venture to offer a suggestion that we may find in the notion of the wing the original kernel of the myth, and that the image of the charioteer and steeds was a subsequent elaboration. But in any case the myth forms a chapter of the utmost importance and interest in the history of the Ideal theory. Plato found in the heaven of Pindar and the Orphics a suitable home in which to place his embodiments of intellectual concepts.

The myths in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo* have much in common. Both of them cover a smaller field of speculation than the *Phaedrus* or the *Timæus*. Each is associated with a proof of the soul's immortality. That in the *Republic* is found at 608 D-611 A, that in the *Phaedo* pervades the entire work. In neither dialogue does the doctrine meet with ready acceptance; in the *Republic* Adimantus receives it with surprise; in the *Phaedo*, Kebes is hard to persuade. In both myths there is a large amount of cosmological matter. But we have nothing about the supra-celestial course, nothing about the final restoration of the soul; these myths deal with the smaller *περίοδος*, a life followed by a death. The period of wandering for the soul after death is given in the *Republic* as 1000 years (615 A B) and the moment of rebirth is called *ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατηφόρου* (617 D). The incentives to a righteous life are limited to its bearing on the subsequent period of death, and to the preparation of the soul for the ensuing choice of a life. This topic is elaborately handled in the *Republic*; the moment of choice is the grand crisis in which all the results of previous learning and conduct culminate: (618 B) *ἐνθα δὴ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητῆς καὶ μαθητῆς ἔσται, εἰάν ποθεν οὐδὲ ἧ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν, τίς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ ποιηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα κτέ.* With this may be compared *Phaedo* 107 C D *εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. . . οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἄϊδον ἢ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας.* Cp. 81 E foll. Yet Plato believed—he could not help believing—in heredity (*Rep.* 424 A, 459; *Polit.* 310). Perhaps his teaching might not unfairly be summed up in the maxim, 'You cannot be too particular in the selection of your parents.'

The myth in the *Phaedo* is contained in chapters lvii to lxii, of which the first and last (107 C-108 C, and 113 D-114 C)

are the most important. No definite time is specified for the 'wandering': *τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας δὲ χρῆ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμῶν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδου (107 E). Indeed the time of wandering is not the same for all: οἱ (at the *Λιμνὴ Ἀχερουσιάς*) αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις.*

Lastly, the *Republic* and *Phaedo* agree with the *Gorgias* in recognizing a class of incurable sinners, of whom in the *Republic* (615 c foll.) Ardiaeus is the type. Compare with this *Phaedo* 113 E οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόβους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἢ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαλίνουσιν. On this A.-H. observes: 'But in *Timaeus* 42 c it is evident that the degenerate soul at any period of her transmigrations has the chance of reformation and final restoration to her original purity: nor is this possibility excluded in *Phaedrus* 248 c foll.'

The myth in the *Phaedrus* has most in common with the *Timaeus*, and the myth in the *Republic* with that in the *Phaedo*. As the *Timaeus* is undoubtedly the latest of these four dialogues, this might be taken as prima facie evidence that the *Phaedrus* is the latest of the remaining three. Such an inference would, however, I am persuaded, be mistaken. It must be remembered that the *Republic* and *Phaedo* differ from the *Phaedrus* chiefly in leaving a large part of the mythological material untouched.

The representation by Vergil in *Aen.* vi 735 foll. is very interesting. It is pretty clear that Vergil, starting with a mere imitation of the Homeric nether-world, such as he gives us in *Georg.* iv 467 foll., was superimposing on this a body of philosophic doctrine. But the result is unfinished and probably dislocated. (See Whitelaw in *CR.* v 186.) When we read at 745 foll.—

donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe  
concretam exemit labem, purumque relinquit  
aetherium sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem,

we think we are reading of the ultimate restoration of the soul in purity. Yet this turns out to be merely the prelude to another mortal existence:

has omnis ubi mille rotam volvere per annos  
Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno.

This is based on *Rep.* 615 A, 621 A.

## EXCURSUS VII

## Δόξα AND ἐπιστήμη (97 B 17)

The antithesis of δόξα and ἐπιστήμη is prominent in Greek philosophy at least as early as Parmenides. Before him Xenophanes had already said of the speculator concerning the Gods and the Universe

εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,  
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

Parmenides' poem *Nature* 'is traditionally divided into three parts; the "Prooem," "Truth" (τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν), and "Opinion" (τὰ πρὸς δόξαν). In "Truth," starting from the formula "the Ent is, the Non-ent is not," Parmenides attempted to distinguish between the unity or universal element of nature, and its variety or particularity, insisting upon the reality of its unity, which is therefore the object of Knowledge, and upon the unreality of its variety, which is therefore the object, not of Knowledge, but of Opinion' (*Encyc. Brit.* art. 'Parmenides').

He passes from the section 'Truth' to the section 'Opinion' in the following lines:

ἐν τῷ σοι παύσω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα  
ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας  
μάνθανε, κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων,

and then proceeds to propound a theory of the world of *seeming* and its development, pointing out, however, that, in accordance with the principles already laid down, these cosmological speculations do not pretend to anything more than probability; and ends his description with the words:

οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφην τάδε. (R. & P. § 102 c d.)

As to the precise import that Parmenides attached to his account of the World κατὰ δόξαν, there has been much dispute. (An important new work, *Parmenides im Kampfe gegen Heraklit* by Dr. A. Patin, is reviewed by Mr. John Burnet in *CR.* xiv 312.)

We may probably rest assured that the account was meant seriously, not ironically. Parmenides felt, as the article in the *Encyc. Brit.* puts it, that 'a natural history of illusion is a

necessary sequel to the account of Truth.' The section Δόξα springs in fact from the ineradicable desire to constitute some system for practical purposes, after it has become evident how little of our thought falls within the province of flawless certainty. Parmenides, Plato and other ancient philosophers taught that there were two paths for the mind, an upper and a lower; that the upper path was not only the nobler but the more important, and to this we ought to strive to attain. In modern times it has come to be seen more clearly that the lower path is really the only one, and that invulnerable 'necessary' Truth is from its nature sterile. At the same time the nature of the infirmities and limitations of the conclusions by which we practically guide our lives is better understood.

The scepticism of Socrates naturally led him to the view 'that while scientific truth is unattainable by man, right opinion is the only ground for right action' (*Encyc. Brit.* art. 'Sophist' 266 a, cp. art. 'Socrates' 237). This view strongly recalls the conclusion of the *Meno*, with the difference that Plato does not absolutely despair of the attainment of the higher level, Knowledge.

Among Socrates' followers, besides Plato, the subject received attention from Antisthenes, who, as we are told by Diogenes Laertius (VI 17), wrote four books *Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης*. R. & P. § 146 b suggest that the phrase *ὀρθή* or *ἀληθὴς δόξα* may have been derived from Antisthenes.

In tracing the contrast of *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* in Plato's writings we must never forget that the contrast was familiar in Greek thought before Plato's time. Certain points, chiefly as to the nomenclature adopted by Plato, may be of sufficient interest to justify the inquiry.

In the earlier dialogues of Plato the word *δόξα* hardly occurs in a technical sense. Not much stress can be laid upon *Charm.* 168 A, where in the discussion of the question whether there can be an *ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης*, a Knowledge that is Knowledge of itself simply without any external object, it is asked whether similarly there can be a *δόξα δόξης*; for similar questions have already been asked about Sensation and Emotion.

In the *Gorgias* we get a clear recognition of two different grades of apprehension, though this is expressed in other terms than *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*. After Rhetoric has been defined (453 A) as *πειθοῦς δημιουργός*, the contrast between Rhetoric and Arithmetic brings out the point that there are two kinds of *πειθῶ*, one accompanied by *μάθησις*, the other not. *Πότερον οὖν*, asks Socrates (454 D), *ταῦτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. Οἴομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἶε· γνῶσις δὲ*

ἐνθένδε. εἰ γὰρ τίς σε ἔροιτο· ἄρ' ἔστι τις, ὃ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς; φαίης ἂν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. Here we have no mention of δόξα, πίστις being used instead. Again at 465 A we read τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν (τὴν ῥητορικὴν) εἶ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὧν προσφέρει, ὅποι' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ θ' ἂν ἤ ἀλογον πρᾶγμα. Cp. 501 A. Here the relation of ἐμπειρία to τέχνη is analogous to that of δόξα to ἐπιστήμη. As δόξα does not occur (in the technical sense) in the *Gorgias*, so πίστις does not occur in the *Meno*. In later dialogues, as in the *Philebus* 58 E foll., δόξα is expressly assigned as the sphere of Rhetoric. It seems probable that the *Gorgias* represents a stage before δόξα had come to fill so important a place in Plato's nomenclature as it afterwards did.

In the later rhetorical dialogue, the *Phaedrus*, we get some indications of δόξα as a technical term. We can hardly reckon as such the difficult passage 237 D foll. There are, we are told, two forces acting upon us, ἡ μὲν ἐμφυτος οὐσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἀλλῆ δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου. . . δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀριστον λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα· ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἐκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῶν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὄβρις ἐπινωμάσθη. Here the definition of σωφροσύνη, as the product of δόξα λόγῳ ἀγούσα, recalls what we read elsewhere of the origin of popular Virtue. But here there is no contrast between δόξα and something *higher* (ἐπιστήμη): there is a contrast between δόξα and something *lower* (ἐπιθυμία). Nor is the phrase in the description of the nobler horse (252 E), ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἐταῖρος, to the point. The words are probably spurious, and in any case ἀληθινῆ δόξα must mean something different from ἀληθῆς δόξα. (See Dr. Thompson's note.) But the antithesis ἐπιστήμη)(δόξα comes out quite clearly at 247 D, 248 B. The highest διάνοιαι are fed νῶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκηράτῳ: those who fail of the heavenly vision τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρώνται (see Exc. VI p. 292). Later in the dialogue comes the passage in which the verdict of the *Gorgias* on Rhetoric is revised. Phaedrus has heard that the Orator need not busy himself about τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντα τῷ πλήθει (260 A; cp. C δόξας πλήθους). Socrates shows that a knowledge of the Truth is a necessary condition of the power to persuade: λόγων ἀρα τέχνην (262 B), ὃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκῶς γελοῖαν τινά, ὡς εἶκοι, καὶ ἀτεχρον παρέξεται. Further in 275 A Thamus says to Theuth about his invention of writing οὐκ οὐκον μνήμης ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον εὖρες· σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν,

οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις. But in all this we do not get beyond the old antithesis current before Plato.

The special doctrine of Plato as to the relation of δόξα to ἐπιστήμη is to be looked for in the *Meno*, the *Republic* and the *Symposium*. Of these three expositions that in the *Meno* is probably the earliest. It should be noted that whereas Parmenides made Opinion correlative to μὴ ὄν, the non-existent, Plato in these dialogues makes it correlative to something *intermediate* between Being and Not-being. Later, in the *Sophist*, we have the term μὴ ὄν itself analyzed and its ambiguity explained. The problem presented at the end of the *Protagoras* is in the *Meno* carried a step towards solution by the doctrine of δόξα. On the other hand the doctrine of δόξα propounded in the *Meno*, etc., receives in the *Theaetetus* an important development.

In the passage of the *Rep.* (506 c), quoted in the note on 97 B 17, the epithet αἰσχροί seems discordant with the view taken in the *Meno* of the value of ἀληθῆς δόξα. But the context shows it is ironical. It would be αἰσχρόν to content ourselves with τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά on the nature of the Good, if it were possible παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανὰ τε καὶ καλά. But Glaucon knows quite well that it is not, and is ready to acquiesce when Socrates proposes for the present to take the lower method. A similar ambiguous character attaches to the ethical counterpart of δόξα, Popular Virtue, which is honourable or dishonourable according as it is the highest standard attainable in mundane circumstances, or a lazy and specious substitute for something better. For the Good is the enemy of the Best. See on 100 A 6.

The passage from the *Symposium* also quoted on 97 B 17 is succeeded by some most important thoughts in which the view taken of δόξα and ἔρως is generalized. They fall within the function of τὸ δαιμόνιον, and that is to be intermediary between gods and men. Πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον (202 E) μεταξύ ἐστὶ θεοῦ καὶ θνητοῦ. Τίνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον; Ἑρμηνεύον καὶ διαπορθμεύον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν. ἔρως, to which δόξα is correlated, is an intermediate link between Ignorance and Knowledge, between Earth and Heaven (see on 76 C 16). So the stage of aspiration, of φιλοσοφία, belongs not to the highest existences, but to those conscious of an inferiority in themselves and of an ideal outside themselves: (203 E) σοφίας δὲ καὶ ἀμαθίας ἐν μέσῳ ἐστίν (Ἐρως). ἔχει γὰρ ὦδε. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι. ἔστι γάρ· οὐδ' εἰ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. Somewhat as for the production of mechanical energy a contact of bodies at different temperatures is necessary, so is a sense of deficiency a necessary

condition of spiritual energy or φιλοσοφία. Plato had already expressed a similar thought in *Lys.* 218 A : διὰ ταῦτα δὴ φαίμεν ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, εἶτε θεοὶ εἶτε ἀνθρώποι εἰσὶν οὐδοί· οὐδ' αὖ ἐκείνους φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς οὐτως ἀγνοίαν ἔχοντας ὥστε κακοὺς εἶναι· κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθῆ οὐδένα φιλοσοφεῖν. λείπονται δὴ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἀγνοίαν, μήπω δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μηδὲ ἀμαθεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐτι ἠγούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασιν.

At *Symp.* 207 E we have an interesting passage illustrating the genesis of ἐπιστήμη from δόξα expounded in the *Meno*. Here we read no longer of an absolute changeless ἐπιστήμη; but are told how matters of human knowledge (ἐπιστήμαι) share the characteristics of growth and decay that attach to everything human : πολλὰ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτερον ἐτι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίνονται αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μία ἐκάστη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταῦτόν πάσχει. ὁ γὰρ καλεῖται μελετᾶν, ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐξοδος, μελέτη δὲ πάλιν καινὴν ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπίουσης σφίξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σφίζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασι ταῦτόν αἰεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπίον καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν αἰὼν αὐτὸ ἦν.

Certain places in the *Republic* bear upon the use of πίστις and δόξα in Plato's nomenclature. At 505 E οὐδὲ πίστει χρῆσασθαι μονίμῳ, πίστει is nearly equivalent to δόξη. At 511 E, 534 A we find πίστις made the superior division of δόξα, a sub-division which is abandoned at the latter of these passages (cp. on 98 B 2). At 601 E πίστις and δόξα are used interchangeably : οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν (the flautist) ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ χρησῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ (the flute-maker) πιστεύων ποιήσει; Ναί. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκευοῦς ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν ὀρθὴν ἔξει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὼν τῷ εἰδῶτι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδῶτος· ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην. Πάνυ γε. Ὁ δὲ μιμητὴς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἔξει ὢν ἢ γράφῃ, εἶτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἶτε μή, ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδῶτι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι ὡς χρῆ γράφειν; Οὐδέτερα. Ὅσπερ ἄρα εἴσεται ὅσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητὴς κτέ.

In the *Theaetetus* (201 A B) we have an advance upon the nomenclature of the *Gorgias* (454 D), where the result of oratory was expressed as πίστις. The term δοξάζειν is now correlated with πίστις : οὐτοὶ γάρ που (οἱ ῥήτορες) τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ κελθουσιν, οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. Orators are unable διδάξαι ἱκανῶς, but only πείσαι. ΣΩ. Τὸ πείσαι δ' οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγειν ποιῆσαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μόνον; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν ὀρθῶς πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἐστὶν εἰδέναι,

ἄλλως δὲ μὴ, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ ἢ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριμαν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες εἶπερ εὐ ἐδίκασαν ;

In the *Parmenides* δόξα simply appears in a list with ἐπιστήμη, αἰσθησις and other faculties (142 A, 155 D, 164 A).

In the *Timaeus* 29 C, ὃ τί περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια, πίστις is equivalent to δόξα. On 37 B δόξαι καὶ πίστει βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς A.-H. says 'there is a slight chiasmus; βέβαιοι is appropriate to πίστει and ἀληθεῖς to δόξαι.' But πίστις and δόξα are practically synonyms.

The sequel shows a strong contrast between πίστει and δόξαι on the one hand, which are formed when the soul is busy in the domain of the Sensible, and νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε which are perfected when the soul is occupied with the Rational.

The difference between the two planes of thought is nowhere more constantly and strongly affirmed than in the *Timaeus*; and the note is made prominent early in the dialogue. ἔστιν οὖν δὴ (says Socrates 27 D) κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ἐν αἰε, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν αἰε, ἐν δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν, αἰε κατὰ ταῦτα ἐν, τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλογον δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὅντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ἐν.

Further may be quoted 51 D ὡς δ' οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμὴν αὐτὸς τίθεμαι ψήφον· εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθῆς ἔσονται δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἀναίσθητα ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἶδη, νοούμενα μόνον· εἰ δ', ὡς τισι φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθῆς νοῦ διαφέρει τὸ μηδὲν, πάνθ' ὀπίσ' αὐτὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀθανάτμεθα, θετέον βεβαίωτατα. δύο δὲ λεκτέον ἐκείνω, διότι χωρὶς γεγῶνατων ἀνομοίως τε ἔχεται κτέ. 'Summing up all previous discussions, the *Timaeus* declares that Knowledge (νοῦς) is implanted in us by instruction, Right Opinion by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason (λόγος), the other is without reason; the one is not to be moved by persuasion, the other may be moved; and lastly every man may be said to participate in Right Opinion, but in νοῦς only the gods and very few men' (Zeller p. 174).

The phrase ὀρθὴ δόξα occurs several times in the *Philebus*. In the contest between Pleasure and Reason, it is ranked as allied with the latter (11 B); Right Opinion is a concomitant of Right Pleasures 37 D, 38 A. In the *Lysis* 632 A, 653 A, ἀληθῆς δόξα is mentioned side by side with φρόνησις, distinguished from it though not contrasted.

The distinction of ἐπιστήμη from δόξα ἀληθῆς was preserved by Aristotle; see *Anal. post.* I 33 = 88 b 30 quoted by R. & P. 311 B b: τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης δι' ἣ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίω κτέ. See too *NE.* VII iii 3, 4, with Grant's note.

It hardly belongs to the present place to consider at any length the development of the doctrine of δόξα in the *Theaetetus*. A general reference may be given to H. Jackson's paper in *J.P.* XIII pp. 242 foll.

The three sections into which that dialogue is divided correspond respectively to the definitions of ἐπιστήμη as (1) ἀσθησις, (2) δόξα ἀληθῆς, (3) δόξα ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου. The first section does not now concern us; in the second certain important points are cleared up that might suggest themselves to a reader of the *Meno*. How is False Opinion possible? (180 A) οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἐστ' ἡμῶν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. But it is just the omission of these things from consideration that is one main cause of our trouble: 'in other words, so long as we ignore the states of learning and forgetting, which are intermediate between absolute knowledge and absolute ignorance, no place can be found for False Opinion' (*J.P.* XIII p. 258, cp. Zeller p. 171). The Eristic quibble about False Opinion meets us already in *Euthydem.* 286 C ἄλλο τι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν; (τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος· ἢ γάρ;) ἀλλ' ἢ λέγοντ' ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ μὴ λέγειν; (The sophist agrees). Πότερον οὖν ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν μὲντοι ἔστιν; Οὐδέ δοξάζειν, ἔφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα ψευδῆς, ἦν δ' ἔγωγ, δόξα ἔστι τὸ παράπαν· Οὐκ ἔφη. It here appears that another source of confusion is the ambiguity of the phrase τὰ μὴ ὄντα, which may mean either 'what is non-existent,' or 'what is other than the fact.'

But though the possibility of False Opinion, and consequently the legitimacy of the phrase 'True Opinion,' is thus demonstrated, yet the gulf that yawns between True Opinion and Knowledge still remains (201 B). This forms the transition to the third section. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀκούσας ἐπελελησμεν, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ ἢ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ ἔστι λόγος οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζω, ἃ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστητὰ. The view here put forward strikingly recalls that of the *Meno*. But οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζω must refer to the strange word ἐπιστητὰ—a word which does not occur in the *Meno*, nor indeed in any place in Plato except this in the *Theaetetus*. This makes it probable that the passage in the *Theaetetus* is not a criticism on the *Meno*. Another difference between the phraseology of the *Meno* and that of the *Theaetetus* strengthens this view. The distinctive phrase μετὰ λόγου does not occur in the *Meno* 98 A. On the other hand we have in the *Meno* the hint that ἐπιστήμη differs from ὀρθῆ δόξα, αἰτίας λογισμῶ. This hint, it is true, is only put forward

tentatively; Socrates utters it *ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων*. That there is a difference between *ὀρθὴ δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη* he holds as firm ground; but the problem of the nature of the difference Plato had not fully solved when he wrote the *Meno*. It is remarkable that the speculation suggested in the words *αἰτίας λογισμῶ*, though indicated in the *Gorg.* 465 A (see p. 300), is in the *Theaetetus*, so far as I can see, neither criticized nor developed.

Two other passages must be cited as recalling the phraseology of the *Meno*. In the *Phaedo* 96 B, Socrates, running through his former speculations, says he inquired whether it is through the brain that we get sensations, *ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίνονται μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν κατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην*. The other is *Polit.* 309 C: *τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων πέρι καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τοῖτοις ἐναντίων ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως, ὅπταν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνηται, θείαν φημί ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίνεσθαι γένει*.

A few words may be added on the subject of the relation of *δόξα* to Discourse. It appears in the *Meno* (85 C) that *δόξαι* arise in the individual soul, and that it is by dialectic, by friction with *other* minds, that these become converted into matters of Knowledge. We find passages in which it is noted as a mark of *δόξα* that it belongs to the *separate* workings of the mind; e.g. in *Theaet.* 187 A Socrates speaks of a certain faculty of the soul *ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα*. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, δοξάζειν. ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶει, ὦ φίλε. The same view is carried on at 189 E ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν; ΣΩ. Λόγον δὲ αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδῶς σοι ἀποφαινομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον, εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαΐσασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῆ καὶ μὴ διατάξῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἐγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρήμενον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῆ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν. This makes it the easier to understand why when later the phrase *δόξα ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου* is analyzed, it is thought necessary to suggest as one possible meaning of *λόγος* 'vocal expression' (206 D). Of course it at once appears that *λόγος* understood in this sense is a quite inadequate expression of the difference between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*. (Note that while in the *Republic* (511 D) *διάνοια* is made the inferior division of *τὸ νοητόν* and to lie *μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ*, in the *Theaetetus* *διάνοια* is represented as preparatory to *δόξα*.)

Very much the same view of *δόξα* occurs *Soph.* 263 E ΞΕ.

Οὐκοῦν διάνοια καὶ λόγος ταῦτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ρεύμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὼν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. Το λόγος, continues the Stranger, belong assertion and negation; ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὃ τι προσείπης αὐτό; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; Cp. with this the view of δόξα in *Philebus* 38C. You see an object indistinctly in the distance. Then follows the internal colloquy (διάνοια): What is that yonder! Is it a man? Or is it perchance an image set up by the shepherds? Κἂν μὲν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῆ, τὰ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνεαι εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἂν πάλιν φθέγγεαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλούμεν;

But this distinction between δόξα and Discourse does not in the least overlie or obliterate the grand distinction between δόξα and Knowledge; indeed not long after the passage just quoted from the *Sophist* we have the old distinction reappearing (268A) οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἀδοξάζει.

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