THE

PHILEBUS OF PLATO

EDITED BY

CHARLES BADHAM.
THE

PHILEBUS OF PLATO,

WITH

INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND APPENDIX;

TOGETHER WITH A

CRITICAL LETTER ON THE LAWS OF PLATO,

AND A CHAPTER OF

P A L A E O G R A P H I C A L R E M A R K S;

BY

CHARLES BADHAM, D.D.,
PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES.

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AND 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.
1878.
TO THE REV. W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.,
MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

My dear Master,

A vivid remembrance of you arises in my thoughts whenever I am called upon to occupy myself with Plato; and now that I am once more editing the Philebus, I cannot but revert to the time when I derived so much help and encouragement from you in the execution of my earlier task. What then is more natural than that I should wish to see your name appearing in the present work, which is not merely a new edition, but an attempt to redeem a hasty and crude performance by something which I shall be content to leave behind me? There are many reasons why I desire to make this record of our friendship; one is the intrinsic worth of the friendship itself as it affects me. During the two and twenty years which have passed since the First Edition, your good will has never flagged. First you spared no pains to enable me to remain in England; and afterwards when some δεύτερος πλοῦς became expedient, it was through your good opinion and the weight of your authority, at least as much as through any other cause, that I found my way to a haven not altogether undesirable. You also were one of the few who understood that among the trials of banishment not the least is the fear of being utterly forgotten; so while many good friends, and some very eminent scholars, have scarcely ever found sufficient leisure to prove that fear to be groundless, your letters have sustained my hopes. One other English Scholar, of whose friendship we are both proud, was not less considerate; and now I must record my great affection for him in a Book which he will not read. Never did any one so generously interpret the obligations of his high place to the prejudice of his own ease and comfort, and in favour of all who claimed his help, as the late Lord Lyttelton. He was,

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as you well know, a man of infinite modesty; and of the genuineness of that modesty none could doubt, who saw how perfectly free he was from any sickly fear of publicity. He took his place in the world with frank boldness, and did his work in it according to his sense of right. As an excellent scholar, and as a champion of scholarship, he did good service to a cause not overburdened with defenders; but while he was glad to seek refuge from sadder thoughts in Classical studies, he never hid himself in them to escape from any troubles or labours which could make him useful to mankind. There is yet another common friend of ours, who needs my praise as little as the other, and who is equally removed from all human comments; but this is probably the last time I shall ever publish anything, and I will not lose my only chance of glorying in his friendship. Frederick Denison Maurice was, as he informed me many years ago, an enthusiastic admirer of Plato's Philebus. He saw more deeply into it, and indeed into all Philosophy, by reason of that devout humility which made him so accurate an observer of many things which a man who is thinking half of his author and half of himself is sure to overlook. Where other men perplexed themselves with their own ingenuity and love of systems, his teachable sympathy with all that he studied led him into truths which they had neglected as unmeaning. But it is not for me to celebrate that great Heart and Mind. I merely claim him as one of those friends for whom my affection revived with peculiar vividness while I was busied with the preparations for this Book.

As for the Book itself, you will perhaps have leisure to decide, whether on the whole it contains many improvements on its predecessor: but having once addressed myself to you, I am loth to let you go, without taking some note of certain Platonic lucubrations, the fruit of the past year. They are verbal criticisms; but verbal criticisms which make an author more legible, seem to me no barren exercise. Nor will you think so, who have never had any lot or part with the supercilious and ignorant dogmatisers who have brought scholarship to so low an ebb in England. You will be glad to find any text made a little more worthy of its author, than the Graeculi have made it; and will rejoice for the sake of those who are to come after us, if they are not scared away from important works by the almost hopeless state in which
they have been left. This is why I have again taken up the same inquiry into the later books of the Laws, which I commenced in a certain Epistola. My belief is now stronger than ever, that three fourths of the bad grammar, obscenity and nonsense which we find in good authors is due to nothing more than interpolations, whether purposely inserted or accidentally derived from the Margin. Not that the other part of criticism which detects the right word lurking under the wrong has done all its work; very far from it. Take the following example from the Sophist, p. 218, d. Ἀφι σελύνν, ν ζέλο, οὐκ οὐδ’ ηποκράτις πάσιν κεφαλομένος ἴναι; if you will read Heindorf’s note, you will see that second thoughts are not always wiser. One easily confounded letter has caused all this trouble. Theaetetus says: Ἀφι τολύνν, ν ζέλο, οὐκος—Or take this in the Politicus, 286, b; where for ἔφαον δεῖσε μεμνησθαι, it is self-evident that you want ἵπτ. δ. μεμνησθαι.—In the Laws, 904, d where we now read διαφέροντες καὶ μετέβαλε τόπον αὔγων ἄλον μετακομίσθεισσα, common sense bids us read, δ. κ. μετέβαλε τόπον, ἄγιαν ὄνον μετακομίσθεισσα, leaving out what follows. I do not know whether you have seen a striking proof of the audacity of interpolators, which I adduced from the Phædo. It is in the passage 1) beginning ὅν δὲ δεῖσι σὺν τό λεγόμενον, τῆν σαυτοῦ σκῖν, where the very opposite precept is put into Socrates’ mouth in place of that which Plato had assigned to him; and all for what? Because the two forms ἵπτ. σὺν and ἵπτ. σὺν were disputing for admission, some one inserted both, but one with a change of accent and breathing, and then another came and changed χαλίνων ἑπις σὺν τό ἀπ’ ἐκεῖνης ὄρμητε, into χαλίνων ἑπις σὺν καὶ ὅν ἄποκρίνοις, ἓς σὺν τό ἀπ’ ἐκείνης ὄρμητε γείζομαι. And on this rubbish Wytenbach comments as on a sound logical precept. Another such forgery occurs in Euthydemus 305, c, d. Here ὅν δὲ τοῖς ἱδοις λόγοις and so forth down to κολούσθειν, ought to be removed back so as to precede ὅσι περὶ πᾶσιν. But because it was inserted out of its place, in order to give it some air of continuity, the scribe built for it this beautiful bridge: ἑιναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἄληθείᾳ σφ. σοφ. σοφοῦται: which Cobet, little dreaming whose work he was correcting, altered into σφ. σοφοῦται. In the same dialogue 287, b, c, we have these glaring interpolations: [ἄ το πρώτον

1) P. 101, d.
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eἰπομεν νῦν ἀναμμηνήσκει καί]—[ἐὰν λέγει]—[ἐπεὶ εἰπὲ . . . . . τοῖς λόγοις.]

But I must now enter upon the Laws. Shall I follow Pindar’s precept of πρόσασον τηλαυγές? or that given in Troilus and Cressida, which I will quote, ut obiter emendem?

1) Let us like merchants shew our fouler wares
   And think perchance they’ll sell: if not, the lustre
   O’th’ better yet to shew will shew the better
   By shewing the worse first.

I will not presume to say that the following correction is better or worse than the general run, but the passage is at all events a strikingly corrupt one, and so an emendation of it, if tenable, deserves a special place."

In the twelfth Book p. 960, c, v, of Stephens we find the following passage, which looks at first impenetrable; but by and by we discern a kind of bush-track, and at last, if I am not altogether mistaken, with a very little thought and very sober dealing with difficulties, we are able to restore an old highway in all its completeness.

ἈΘ. Ἡ Κλεινία, πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καλῶς ὤμενται, σχεδὸν δὲ σοῦ ἤκματα τα τῶν μοιρῶν προσφήματα.

ΚΛ. Ποιὰ δὴ;

ἈΘ. Τὸ Ἀλέχειν μὲν τὴν περάτην εἶναι, Κλασθῶ δὲ τὴν δεντέραν,

τὴν Ἀτροπον δὲ τῇ τοῖς, σωτηραν τῶν λεχθέντων, ἀπεικοσμένα τῇ τῶν κλασθέντων τῷ πνεύ, τὴν ἀμετάστρυφον ἀπεργαζόμενων δύναι

μον. ὡς δὴ καὶ πόλει καὶ πολεμίᾳ δὲ μὴ μόνον ὄγλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῖς σάμασι παρακεντήσειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ψυχαῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων. ἤμιν δ’ ἦτο μοι φανερεῖ δοκεῖ τούτ’ ἐλλεῖπον τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι, πᾶς χρῆ τὴν ἀμετάστρυφον αὐτοῖς ἐγγίγνε

σθαι κατὰ φύσιν δύναμιν.

I will not trouble you with the attempts already made: they are one and all random guesses, only half serious, rather indications of an obstacle than attempts to remove it. We see thus much; that as the destiny Atropos preserves the work of her sisters, τὰ κλασθέντα, so he wishes that his and his friends’ work, τὰ λεχθέντα, should be made ἀμετάστρυφα. Now Atropos cannot be σωτηρα τῶν λεχθέντων; it is therefore safe, at least provisionally so, to write τὴν Ἀτροπον δὲ τῇ τοῖς σωτηραν. τῶν ΔΕΛΕχθένταν—

1) Act 1. Sc. 3.
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The allusion to the well known τος τοῦτον καὶ σωτηρὶς is obvious, and justifies us in placing σωτηρὶς thus by itself. Then we come to ἀπεικοσμένα τῇ τῶν πλοισθέντων,— and the question is; who or what is made like to what? But that question is soon answered. The preservation of their statutes is to be made like to the preservation of the fatal thread. But as ἀπεργάζεσθαι must be the act of the old men, and as in these Books we find five or six instances of μεθα being confounded with the participial ending, μενος μενη &c., it is worth while to try ἀπεργαζόμεθα, and therefore to adapt ἀπεικοσμένοι to it. The moment this is done the rest of the sentence corrects itself. τῶν δὲ λεγθέντων; ἀπεικοσμένοι τῇ τῶν πλοισθέντων σοι ἀρι ἈΙ, τὴν ἀμεταστροφον ἀπεργαζόμεθα δύναμιν. The remainder is likewise faulty; but in the first place a little thought will soon shew us how this sentence is to be connected with the foregoing, and a little more will suffice to clear away what is at once an impropriety and a tautology. εἰ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας καὶ πολιτείας δεῖ μὴ μόνον ὑγίειαν κ. τ. ε.

A shorter but equally corrupt passage is in the tenth Book, p. 905, c. μενος κενος δὲ αὐτήν, δὲ πάντων ἀνδρειότατη, ποιῷ ἐν δειν δοκεῖς; ἦν τις μὴ μενος κενος οὐδὲ ἂν τόπον ἱδον ποτέ, οὐδὲ λόγον ἐνεμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βλεν δυνατός ἂν γένοιτο εἰς ἕναμον τε καὶ δυσδαμονον τύχην. This αὐτὴν refers to τὴν συντέλειαν. “What you call the neglect of the Gods, you so call, because you do not understand that all which they do contributes to a great whole.” We may therefore translate συντέλεια by joint action. This then the youth is told that he must know. But it is precisely what he cannot know, and, not knowing, ought to distrust his own judgment concerning the prosperity of the wicked. Eusebius in quoting this passage has προς οὐδὲν, the MS Ω has as a correction in the Margin πόσον δειν, and although this rests on MS authority, and is confirmed by the corrupt reading in Eusebius, and yields the only admissible sense, the Editors have passed it over. Again though we may use ἀνδρειότατος ironically of an unabashed man, this is not the language of monitors to a youth of infidel tendencies; and here, where they are reminding him of his weakness and incapacity, the word is altogether unsuitable. I have no hesitation in reading; μενος κενος δ' αὐτήν, δὲ πάντων ἀχρείότατη, πόσον δειν δοκεῖς; You will observe that the mere substitution of χ makes the whole difference of the
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reading.—I have before me the larger Zurich Edition; what may have since happened to the text of the Laws I know not; but I can scarcely conceive that such obvious blunders as the following can have been left as they were by any subsequent Editor. 878, β. τραυμάτων ὅν ἐνεστώτων ἐργῇ γενομένων for τ. σύν ἐν ἔστω τῶν ὁ. γ. Thus also in 829, οἱ we read τούτων δὴ τούτο ἔστι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχει, γενομένη μὲν ἀγαθῇ βίος εἰρηνικός κ. τ. ε. in place of ἄτι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχει γ. μ. ἀ. κ. τ. ε. and in 837, ὡς ἄλλοι ἢ ἑράν ἢ ψυχῇ, δεόντως τῆς ψυχῆς ἑπιτεθυμηκός κ. τ. ε., for ἢ ἑράν, ἢ ψυχῇ δὲ δύνατος τ. ψ. ἤ. 838, οἱ ἀκολουθῶν for ἀκολούθων, and πιθανῷ for πιθανῶν. 898, ε. περί- περικέναι (an absurd repetition of π) for περικέναι. 899, α. ἀντί, τοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον for αὐτοῦ οὖν δὴ ἄμεινον, omitting χρεών. 903, α. μεταχειρισθέντων τὰ πάντα, οἷον τὰ πυρὸς ὅπου ἢ πυρὶς ἢ ψυχῇ, καὶ μὴ ἥμπολλα ἢ ἐναῖ—for ἢ ψυχή καὶ μή, ἥμπολλα ἢ ἐναῖ, and lastly, in 904, οὐκ ἄγαθον ψυχῆς, διενοθηκε—for ὅσον ἄγαθον ψυχῆς διανοηθῇ. But I will pass to other places, where the correction is not so self-evident. In 828, π. ἐκ τούτων ἀποδιδόντων, the sense requires ὁ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποδιδόντων, and in ε. for τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ λόγῳ. In 832, κ. we find: τὸ δὲ τῆς νῦν πολιτείας, ἢν νομοθετούμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκπέφυγεν ἀμφότερα. There will be no more harshness or obscurity, if we read ἢν νομοθέτουμεν, ἡ λέγομεν ἐκπέφυγεν ἀμφότερα. In 833, α. for σύντοιχος which is quite foreign to the purpose, for even if you interpret it according to προσώπομεθα in the Philebus, it would amount to συμπλοκῇ, so that we should have, ἐν συμπλοκῇς συμπλοκῇ, read σύντοιχος, contenio. 834, α. τόπος καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἀκοινοίς. This would do very well even if the peltasts threw their targets at the enemy. Till this is shown to be the case, I should vastly prefer καὶ παλαιός. There is a strange order of words a few lines further: τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἵππων δὴ περὶ ἀγάνος γέγονο τῆς ἐν νομοθετούμενα. The first ΔΗ is nothing but ΔΝ in its right place, and ἐν νομοθετούμενα is a corruption from ἐν νομοθετούμεν. 836, α. I have no doubt that the nearest approach to the true reading now possible, is πρὸς δὲ τούτου, ὁ δὲ πάντως ... τοῦτο ἐν τούτω τίς σύν ὀρόλογε; τοῦτο is the aim, τοῦτο the advocate of purer manners, τούτως are the measures he recommends. 839, εκ. For ἀνέμετε γόνιμον κ. τ. ε., a new light breaks in upon us, if me read γόνιμον δὲ ἀπεχομένου ἀροῦθας τ. πάσης. Thus
we have the opposition between the absolutely sterile, and that which though fertile in itself, we do not mean to use as such. 841, c, For περιλαβὸν read παραλαβὸν, and for τὰ νῦν λέγομεν ἑστὶν εὐχαί, read τανῦν λέγομεν ἑστὶν εὐχαί τ. τ. τ. The interpolations which spoil the next sentence were probably only meant for the margin. You will see that I mean παλλακῶν and ἀφετῶν. Who can suppose that Plato would speak of their σπέρμα; 844, δ, I am altogether for the other reading, παιδίῳν Λιονυσίαδα, and in place of ἢκει χάριτος αὖθι, I have no scruple in writing ἢ Θεος ἐχαρίσατο αὖθι. The copyist wrote ἠχαί and forgot to put his dots under the first χα. Then came another, and made this absurd correction. παιδίῳ Λιονυσίας is a very suitable expression for all the fruit obtained by γρασίγενος. 846, δ, For δεόμενον ἐκπετόθειν, read δεχόμενος ἐπιτέθειν. 864, ἡ, ἔπεσαί τούτων should be ἔπεσαί τούτω. 898, β, The displacement of two words has caused a woeful confusion in an otherwise simple passage. I will merely indicate it. [μηδ' ἐν ἐνι] φερομεν γ. . . . . μηδ' ἐν (ἐνι) των λόγων κίνησις.— But I must break off from this desultory work, which is fatiguing to any reader who shall be good enough to verify my references, and keep on steadily through one Book; and as the Seventh is that on which I have been very recently engaged, I will ask of you to accompany me through it.

798, ἃ, καὶ ἐν ποῦ ἀρα ἀναγκασθή μεταβαλλεῖν αὐθίς—The sentence, having up to this point turned upon σώματα as the subject, is now varied, and we look for an individual to whom to refer ἀναγκασθῆ, συνταραχθῆς and ἀπολαβῶν. But he is not far off. For αὐθίς let us read αὖ τις, and there he is. In c we have παιδίων where it is certain that the author meant us to understand ἀνδρῶν. When these children who have made innovations in their games and amusements grow up to be men, they are different from former—children! Who can be expected to treat copyists with any respect, after such a taste of their quality? In δ the same mala sedulitas has bestowed on us the word μεταβαλλόμενα which is out of its place, and the sense of which is expressed by ἦσα . . . . πάσηι το τοιοῦτον which is in its place. In ε, the faulty redundancy in οὐδ' αὐτῶς ἐπιλαμβάνας ποιεῖ may be accounted for, if we suppose that οὐδ' ΑΑΑΑΩΩΣ was copied twice and subsequently changed by a would-be corrector.
801, a. Instead of μηδὲν ἵππαιρεταῖς, which would mean, "am I to ask no question"? I propose μηδὲ. "An ne rogare quidem oportet"? We may surely venture to restore δὲι to the margin where it must have stood as a help to beginners. c. He says that τοῖς ποιητὴν γίνεται with πάνυ ἵππαιρεταῖς in judging what men should or should not pray for: and that they might put into our mouths prayers for wealth, though we have already decreed that we shall have no gold or silver statue of Plutus in our City. What will be the result? They will make us contradict ourselves in our prayers. This is logical; but not so, that they will make us pray εὐχαὶ ὀικὸν ὀρθὰς, for they may be right, and we wrong. Therefore away with the insertion, which while it is not to the purpose of the argument, is a sore let and hindrance to the syntax. d. He has never appointed any νομοθέτας for the purpose mentioned, but certain ἄθλοθέτας, of whom he treats in 764, ν & c. 802, b. For ἵππαιρεταῖς I venture to suggest ἵππαιρετος(θάνατος δὲ)ὑμεῖν. c. The direction, νομοθέτου βούλημα, cannot begin with πάσα δὲ. No wonder then that A and Ω omit the conjunction. The γς is also to no purpose. Ought we not to read, πάσα τακτῇ ἡ τάξιν λαβοῦσα π. Μ. διαργίθη; This would refer to the originally proper compositions, and those that had been made
so by adaptation. v. Sense and Grammar call for the change of ἐμπέφεις into ἐμπέφε. vi. The passage about suiting the compositions to the sexes looks very hopeless at first; but the observation of a frequent source of mistake in these books, the confusion between the participial endings and μεθά will at once set us on the right track. ἦστι δὲ ἀμφότεροις μὲν ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμεθα ἀποδιδόναι, is nothing more than ἦπεi δὲ ἀμφότεροις μὲν ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμεθα ἀποδιδόναι. When this is replaced, and Ast's supplement introduced, we need only write τούτῳ for τούτῳ, and the passage is as simple as any in Plato.

803, i. Having settled the general characters of both kinds of songs, he goes into the details of education. But here we are left suddenly in such darkness as this: τίνα τρόπον χρῆ καὶ οἶδεις καὶ ποῖο πράττεις ἔκαστα αὐτῶν. What are ἔκαστα, and of what αὐτῶν are they the particulars? As to οἶδεις and πράττεις they help out each other; for the dative gives us a palpable hint to change πράττεις into προσάπτεις, and the succeeding sentence about τρόποις and τροπιδεῖα, and indeed the whole scope of what follows down to the end of this page of Stephanus, shew that our business is to ascertain τίνα τρόπον χρῆ καὶ οἶδεις καὶ ὅπως προσάπτειν ἔκαστα αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν ἀρρένων τε καὶ θηλεῖων. a, b. οἶνoν δὴ τῆς ναυπηγος τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχῆν καταβαλλόμενος τὰ τροπιδεῖα ὑπογράφεται τῶν πλοίων σχήματα, ταυτὰν δὴ μοι κάδε φαίνεται μαντὶ δρῶν ταῦτα βιον πειράμενος σχήματα διασηκύσασθαι κατὰ τρόπον τοῦ τῶν ψυχῶν, ὃντας αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα καταβαλ- λεῖσθαι, πολὺ μηχανῆ καὶ εἰς ποτὲ τρόποις ευνύντες τῶν βιῶν ἔρισται ὀν τοῦ πλούτου τοῦ τῆς ἱερῆς διακομματιζόμεθα, τούτο ὅσκενιν ὄρ- θως. In this passage it is a matter of controversy whether τροπιδεῖα is governed by καταβαλλόμενος or by ὑπογράφεται, and the rest of the construction will depend on this. But as Ast's oppo- sitio, that is, that τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχῆν is a sort of anticipating description of τροπιδεῖα, is in itself unlikely, for then the words might just as well be away; and seeing that, if καταβαλ- λόμενος governs τροπιδεῖα, and ὑπογράφεται governs τῶν πλοίων σχήματα, we have this result; that a man is sketching the ship's hull at the same time that he is laying down its timbers, which is at least a day too late, and lastly since the play on words requires that the stress of the antithesis should fall on τροπιδεῖα
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The text is a letter discussing the Greek text and the authenticity of certain passages. It mentions the use of the word "μηχανῇ" and its addition to the text to clarify the meaning. The author also discusses the role of the interpolator and the need for further scholarly work to substantiate the text.

The passage includes a discussion of the need for further explanation and the importance of the text to the understanding of the original work. The author mentions the importance of the Graecies of Dionysius and the role of the Graecies in the text.

The author concludes by emphasizing the importance of the text and the need for further study and correction. The letter ends with a note on the need for more thorough work on the text and the importance of the Graecies in the understanding of the original work.
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804, ή πρὸς τὸν Θεόν ἀπίδευς καὶ παθῶν—Was it once εἰκότα παθῶν; d. Perhaps you will approve of such ἐν μὲν ἃν ἀν υἱῷ βούληται [φοιτῶν] ὡς ἂν ἰήνεις [τὰς πανθείας]. d & ε. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δῇ καὶ περὶ Θηλείαν ὃ μὲν ἐμὸς νόμος ἐν εἰ- ποι πάντα, δὲσα περὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄρρενων, ἵσα καὶ τὰς Θηλείας ἄσκειν δεῖν. καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθῆς ἐπεισι, ἂν τούτον τὸν λόγον οὕτω ἐπικινήσῃ οὕτω γυναικικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράτι μὲν πρέπον ἐν εἰ, γυναιξί δὲ οὐκ ἐν πρέπον. Never was a passage more miserably inter- polated than this. First his law speaks, and then he speaks; his law would say the same about women as about men, that women ought to be trained and drilled as much. Any one who knows what ἵσα καὶ ἂς is, will welcome the conjecture, which joins ἵσα καὶ with οὐδὲν φοβηθῆς 1), and so gets rid of this repetition about women; and as the law is still the subject, the spurious ἐπεισι ἐν abscends from before it.

805, ή ἐν τῶν αὐτῶν τελῶν καὶ πάνων. This is untrue; for the women add their labour to that of the men. Read πόρων. c. ἐν τούτοις. Perhaps ἐν τούτῳ γ᾽; in the meanwhile, till he has found some better reasons.

806, 1. As ἅρον τοῦς μὲν ταλασσάς is opposed to Θηράεσσας δὲ, and not to ἀσκητικὸν τίνα βίον, for δὲ τίνα we should read δὴ τίνα. Then follows a passage which must be given in its whole state. τῶν δὲ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνοῦσας, ὡς οὐδὲ εἰς τίς ποτὲ δια- μέσοθαν περὶ πόλεως τε καὶ παιδῶν ἄναγκαια τύχῃ γλυκοῖς, οὔτ᾽ ἂν τῶξον, ὡς τίνες Ἀρμαξόνες, οὔτ᾽ ἄλλης κοινωνίας ποτὲ βολής μετὰ τέχνης ὑπάρχει, οὔδ᾽ ἀνεῖλα ἢ καὶ ὅροι λαμβοῦσι μιμῆσθαι τῷ Θεόν, ὡς πορθομένης αὐτής τῆς πατρίδος γενναίως ἀντιστάσας φό- βον γε, εἰ μηδὲν μείζον, πολεμάως δύνασθαι παφρυχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινὶ κατορθίας; Σωμομάϊτιδος δὲ οὐδὲ ἂν τὸ παράπλανον τολμῆσιν μι- μῆσθαι τοιοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαμιωθῆται, παρὰ γυναικὰς τε αὐτὰς ἀνδρῶν ἂν αἱ ἐξείλαν γυναικῶς φανεῖν. I need not point out the impossibilities of this passage, nor refute their champions. One specimen of their logic will suffice. We have κοινωνοῦσας, δυ- νάμεναι, λαβοῦσαι, ἀντιστάσας, κατορθίας. “It is nothing: the nominative may precede the infinitive”. Yes! and so may the accusative; but can both do so indifferently—and in one and the same sentence? This, and the barbarism of ὡς οὖν οὐδὲ suffice to show the condition of the text; but where is the remedy to

1) Omitting τὰς Θηλείας ἄσκειν δεῖν.
come from? From the nature of the argument. Which is the worse case? that described by πορθομένης τῆς πατρίδος, or that which is here called διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῶν φιλετῶν? The latter. Which demands most courage, to appear ἐν τάξει, or to use the weapons of close fighting? The latter. Then why does he weaken his sentence by putting the worse case, and the greatest instance of courage, first? Moreover what a clumsy arrangement is this, that he should interrupt his examples of warlike females, the Amazons, Minerva, the Sarmatian women, by a long sentence which might have as well appeared elsewhere?—It did appear elsewhere, till some blunderer left it out, and the same or some equal blunderer brought it back, not postlimino, but through a breach in the text. By re-transposing what has been displaced we surmount nearly all these difficulties, grammatical and rhetorical; for the rest we must trust to probable conjecture. τῶν θ' εἰς πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας, οὔτε (πορθομένης αὐταίς τῆς πατρίδος, γενναλως ἀντιστάτας φόβον γι' εἰ μηδὲν μεῖσιν πολεμίους δύνασαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινὶ κατορθείος);—all this depends upon φόμεν δειν ζῆν; Then follows the direct. οὐδ' εἰς τοὺς διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεως (πόσεως;) τε καὶ παιδῶν ἄναγκαια τόχη γίγνοιτο, οὕτως τάξεως, οὐκ ἰνεις Λαμάζωνες, οὔτ' ἀλλ' κοινωνοῦσαι ποντε βολῆς μετὰ τέχνης δυνάμειν (φανεῖν ἐν) οὐδ' ἄσπιδα καὶ δορά χαράσσαι με- μήσασθαι τὴν Θέαν, Σαμοφρατίδαι δὲ οὕτ' ἐν τὸ πορὰταν τομήσαν μμήσασθαι κ. τ. ἐ. c. No one need despair of making a brilliant correction: Stallbaum's οὐχί ἡμῖν founded on the reading of the best MSS, οὐ Δ' ἡμῖν is deserving of much praise. ι. For ἀποτελοῦσιν it is absolutely necessary that we read ἀποτελοῖν. The explanation offered by Ast of αὐτοῖς in παιδῶν τε ἀμα Σω- ληνῶν καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταῖς, that it is put for αὐτῶν, is only too like many of his notes on the Laws; αὐταῖς, as I need not tell you, is ipsis scorsim. But this leads me to offer a conjecture on the words immediately preceding. ἔνσωσια δὲ κατεσκευάζεσθαι τῆ χωρίς μὲν τὰ τῶν ἄνδρῶν, ἔγγυς δ' ἢ ἀγκυροῦν τά τῶν νυκτῶν, αὐ- τοῖς, instead of τα τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκεῖον which is a most vague designation. For what can οἰκεῖοι mean? Not a man’s household, for his wife and daughters are provided with a mess-table apart; certainly not his domestics, who are not members of a συσσίμων; and certainly not his friends who, being citizens, would sit with him. Of course τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκεῖων is not so bad as τῶν
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οὐταίς μητέρων, but what writer would ever dream of putting more than τῶν οἰκείων in such a case? Why the youths are apart from their fathers, but the girls are with their mothers, is obvious to that great umpire in all truisms, the meanest capacity.

807, a. Having provided the members of his city with their public meals and festive occupations, he asks whether each member has no needful and suitable work left him to do, ἀλλ' ἐν τρόπῳ βοσκήματος ἐκαστον πιασνόμενον αὐτῶν δεὶ ζῆν; I shall offer you no excuse for altering this into, ἀλλ' ἣ τ. β. ἡ ἀ. π. δισει. Immediately after, we have οὐκοῦν τὸ γε δίκαιον φαμέν οὐδὲ καλὸν, οὐδ' οἶον τε κ. τ. ἓ. where again the explainers τολμᾶσιν ἀδύνατα. I read, οὐκοῦν, (τὸ γε δίκαιον ΘΑΝΑΤΟ) οὖς καλὸν, οὖθ' οἶον τε—. b. τετραμήνων. Pray do not alarm yourself: I am not going to discuss the merits of the word; I simply copy it from the Zurich Edition and set it up as a mark to unwary readers; who, while sliding over the smooth surface, will, unless warned, find themselves suddenly in a very comfortless chasm. One whole paragraph is missing, either because a page in the source of our MSS was lost, or because the page was too τετραμήνων to be deciphered. How is this to be proved? By unfulfilled promises. He asks τίς δή τρόπος τοῦ βίου and the rest, and after a description of their messes, he again asks ἥκα οὐδὲν λειπόμενον ἐσι κ. τ. ἓ. This question he does not answer, nor has he told us how he proposes to escape from his own prophecy, that these well-conditioned citizens of his will necessarily became the prey of some wiry hungry daredevils. And yet that he has pointed out some escape is evident from the sequel, which whether corrected or left as it is, can yield but this sense. “We cannot hope that all this will be done with great minuteness, as long as citizens have separate houses.” All what? “But if the other second-best measures were tried”,—What other? “But men living so have yet another duty and that not a small one”—Living how? Hardly; as is plain from the context, and from the sequel; but these precepts of hardihood, voluntary penances or whatever they were, and their effects on the character, are all gone, and as a proof of the diligence with which Plato is read, not an asterisk marks where they were. There is some broken ground, as you would expect, on the brink of this chasm; but if I am not mistaken,
I have pointed it out before). \( έλ \ ζητοίμαν \ α\ ν \) stands its ground in all editions just now before me. The right reading seems to be; ταύτ' οὖν δή δε' ἀριστεῖας μὲν ἰκανής, ὡς καὶ νυνι ἡ ζητοίμαν' \( άν \), ἵσως οὖν ἀν ποτε γένοιτο. c. If the Zurich Editors had thought for a moment, they would have adopted Ast's emendation \( ε\ ν \ α\ ρτή\ ν \). Of course the scribes wrote \( α\ ρτή\ ν \), because it was next door to \( ιπμέλαιαν \), and they looked no further.

808, c. Are you very tired of proofs of the lacuna? Just one more, and I have done. νὺς μὲν δὴ διαγομένη τοιαύτη τοις πρὸς πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀνδρείαν ἀν τινα προσκαράιμοι π. τ. ἐ. n. For the miserable \( πω \) \( βιοτέν \), I have exhausted every verb beginning with \( π \) that I could think of, and found no plausible substitute, except perhaps \( προλεπτέν \), which the scribes would very readily change to \( προλεπτέν \). But a certain form of the \( β \), now out of use, is very like the semiuncial \( λ \) and one form of \( π \) is an \( ω \) with a lid to it. But this is dwelling in the "Meadow of Conjecture". d. ὁ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστι δυσμεταχειριστάτων. ἰδαφ γὰρ μάλιστα ἦρει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτιμένην, ἐπίσοουν καὶ δριμὲ καὶ ύβρισιτάτων θηρίων γίγνεται. To speak frankly, this is downright nonsense. "A boy is of all animals the hardest to manage: because having a germ of reason, he becomes the most rebellions of all creatures." This any one can see to be far from neat: but how much worse it becomes if we write;—"having his germ of reason not yet daunted and tamed"? Nor is the grammar a whit better: \( ἰδαφ \) \( μάλιστα \) with two positives and one superlative; the latter probably contrived "to meet the demand". Again why use \( μήπω \) for \( οὖσα \) in a direct declaration such as this? There can surely be no doubt that Plato wrote: ὁ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστι δυσμεταχειριστάτων, \( ἰδαφ \) \( γ \) \( μάλιστα \) \( ἦρε \) \( τ\ ν \) \( πηγ \) \( η \) \( τοῦ \) \( φρο \) \( νεῖ \) \( ψ \) \( μήπω \) \( κατηρτιμένου \) δὲ, ἐπίσοουν καὶ δριμὲ καὶ ύβρις ἑστὼν θηρίων γίγνεται. b. One is rather taken aback by the statement that the lad is to be sent tois διδάκτους καὶ ὦτοιον. (Τι γαρ; ἦ καὶ τοῖς κλέπτειν καὶ ἐπιφανεῖν διδάσκουσι;) And why is καὶ \( μαθήματα \) added? Grant that they are bonds; they are surely not so in the sense in which \( ο \) διδάσκοντες are so. Consider, pray, whether we have not here a corruption of καὶ ὄτου \( ΚΑ \) (καλὸν) \( ΜΑΘΗΜΑ \).

1) Book 10. 905, d. \( ε\ ν \) \( ε\ ν \) \( ιπμέλαια \) \( άν \) \( ε\ ν \) \( ε\ ν \) ης. Read \( τ\ ν \) \( ή\ ν \) \( ελλο\ ν \) \( ελ\)
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809, 2. τα μὲν οὖν δῆ χωρεῖς πέρι μελῶν τε καὶ ὄρχήσασις ἐρ-
φήθη. Not even a Dithyrambico poet, unless very drunk, would
sing of the χωρεῖα μελῶν τε καὶ ὄρχήσασις. Plato had discussed
the question concerning their employment: χρήσις πέρι. c. καὶ τοι
τὰ μὲν πέρι τὸν πόλεμον, ἡ δὲ μανθάνειν τε αὐτούς καὶ μελεταῖν,
ἔχεις τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ γράμματα πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον λύρας
πέρι καὶ λογισμὸν, ὅν ἔφασεν δεῖν, ὅσα τε πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκο-
νομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν χρήσαι ἐκάστως λαβεῖν, καὶ
πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα ἐκτις τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν Ἡθῶν,
ἀποτελεῖν τε πέρι καὶ ἦλιον καὶ σελήνης, ὅσα διοικεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι
περὶ ταύτα πάση πόλει . . . . . . ταύτα οὖπω σοι πάντα ἱκανός, ὃ
φίλε, παρά τοῦ νομοθέτου διείρχεται. In this sentence, ὅσα τε points
to things unknown and beyond discovery, χρήσις is out of struc-
ture, διοικεῖν occupies a place where μανθάνειν alone is opposite,
and this mention of arrangement seems to have dropped from the
clouds. The chief author in all this mischief is the man who
introduced ὅσα τε: λογισμῶν ὅν ἔφασεν δεῖν πρὸς πόλεμον
καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν is in perfect order.
Then follows, somewhat loosely, but in a highly Platonic manner
—χρήσις δὲ ἐκάστους λαβεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταύτα ταύτα ἐκτις τὰ χρήσιμα
tῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν Ἡθῶν, ἀποτελεῖν τε [πέρι] καὶ ἦλιον καὶ
σελήνης, ὅσα [διοικεῖν] (oh! these interpreters!) ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι
[περὶ ταύτα] πάση τῇ πόλει. (Subaudi λαβεῖν.)—I take this op-
portunity of observing that in Thuc. II, 102, where we now read,
Δέκα ταῖς, δὲ καὶ ἄλλα οἷα τῷ Ἀμφιήματι, ὅτε δὴ ἠλάσθαι αὐτῶν
μετὰ τῶν φόνων, τῶν Ἀπόλλων ταύτην τήν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰκεῖν, the
right reading is δὲ ἦσθι ἠλάσθαι.—Soon after the sense is ob-
scured through faulty punctuation; it ought to be pointed: ἐπι-
καλοῦντες τῇ τῇ λέξει, τόδε ὡς οὖπω διείρχει κ. τ. ἐ. In the next
sentence we have προσοιστέον twice; in the first place it occurs
in connexion with ἦτων: πότερον ἦτον, ὡς το παράπαν οὔδε προ-
σοιστέον. And these two verbals have the common complement of
eis ἀπολιθείων; the second προσοιστέον is followed by eis γράμματα.
It cannot be denied that such a verbal may be used in a passive
sense; but who ever heard of such an expression as προσφέρε-
σατα εἰς γράμματα? My own persuasion is that the Margin of
the Vossian MS offers a right conjecture in προσοιστέον. The pas-
sage in the beginning of the Republic, τότε μὲν εἰ ζώντες, νῦν δὲ
οὐδὲ ζώντες is in favour of repeating the same verb, and the pre-
position is added because the verb would look too bald when separated from εἰς. In the very next sentence (810, 4) we have a marginal note which changes the construction for the worse. The commands of the law are in the infinitive. προσεκέπου μὲν τοινυν φαρμεν εἰς μὲν γράμματα παιδί δεκετεὶ σχεδόν ἕνας ὑφος τε; δύνασα τρεις μὲν ἤνη καὶ δέκα γεγονόν δέχεσθαι,[μέτριος ὑ χρόνος] ἐμμείνα τ' ἡτορα τρία. I point out παράνομον which ought to be παρ' νόμον, and, in ν, τισιν οἷς, which should be οἴσις, and proceed to lay before you as corrupt a passage as any in the Book. προς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἀνυρα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων, τοῖς δὲ ἀνευ δύνθμων τημημάτων, ἀ δὴ συγκράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰσημένα μόνον, τητόμενα δυνθμοῦ τε καὶ ἄρμονις, σφαλερὰ γράμμαθ' ἤμιν ἐστι παρὰ τινων τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα· οἷς, ὀ πάντων βέλτιστοι νομοφύλακες, τί γρήγορα; To what interpreter shall we betake ourselves for help in this labyrinth, saying ἐν σοι κείμεθα γλάμονες? But behold our very invocation has helped us so far, that we may confidently read, ποιητῶν κείμεθα ἐν γράμμασι! But what are we to do with δυνθμων τημημάτων? I should certainly reject the former and retain the scornful expression τημημάτων, more especially as δυνθμων occurs very soon after. Then I propose to separate the text from the gloss upon it, thus: ἀ δὴ [συγγράμματα] κατὰ λόγον εἰσημένα μόνον, τητόμενα δυνθμοῦ καὶ ἄρμονίς, [σφαλερὰ γράμματα] ἤμιν ἐστι παρὰ τινων [τῶν πολλῶν] τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα. He cannot call them σφαλερὰ γράμματα as yet, for though τοιούτων (i.e. τητομένων δυνθμοῦ καὶ ἄρμονίας) is a sneer, he does not prejudge the question whether they shall use those books. ν. The commentators may settle it among them, whether the faulty construction of this sentence is a piece of graceful negligence, or of corruption: but τῆς αὐτῆς is very awkward, even if we understand it to mean that the same way pleases some and displeases others, and κελεύσῃς γὰρ is certainly faulty, for this has no connexion of cause and effect with ἄλθεος λέγεις. The simplest correction would be, κελεύσῃς δὲ με, ὅς ἐ. φ., ταύτης τῆς ὅδου κ. τ. ἢ.

811, ν. The parts of the dialogue are so distributed, that Clinias becomes the protagonist. The persons ought to stand thus:

ΑΘ. ... ἐν δ' οὖν τούτ' ἤξι, κινδυνόν ὁριοῦ εἶναι φέρουσαν τοῖς παιδί την πολυμαθίαν. Πῶς οὖν καὶ τῆ παρασινοὶς ἐν τῷ νομοφύλακι;
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ΚΑ. Τοῦ πέρι λέγεις;  
ΑΘ. Τοῦ προύς τι παράδειγμα ποτε ἀποβλέψας ἢν τὸ μὲν ἠῳ πάντας μανθάνει τοὺς νέους, τὸ δ’ ἀποκαλύπτω.  
ΚΛ. Ἀγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκεινε λέγων.

812, λ. c. ΑΘ. "Ἐφαρμεν, οἷμαι, τοὺς τοῦ Λεοντόου τοὺς ἔξηκοντος φόδους διαφέροντος εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περὶ τε τοὺς ἐυθυμοὺς καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρμονίων συστάσεις, ἵνα τὴν τῶν μελῶν μίμησιν τὴν εὐ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὃταν ψυχὴ γίγνεται, τὰ τῆς ἄγαθης ὠμοιόματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ἢν τὴν τὰ μὲν ἀποβάλλῃ, τὰ δὲ προφέραν εἰς μέσον ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπέδη τοῖς τῶν νέων ψυχῶν, προηαλούμενον ἐκάστους εἰς ἀρέτης ἔπεσθαι κτήσιν συνακολουθόντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων. Can any one believe that in tois pæthimasion othan psychi ginynetai is correct, or that μιμησις μεμιιθα τα ωμοιοματα means anything conceivable? When a comic actor imitates popular tragedians in a burlesque, he may be said to imitate their imitations; but the province of music is μιμεζθαι τα παθηματα; and this is, I think, enough to justify us in expelling ωμοιοματα, which was invented to fill up a fancied gap in the sense, and in reading: ἵνα τὴν τ. μ. μίμησιν, τὴν εὐ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι, δὲ ἄν ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνενται, τὰ τῆς ἄγαθῆς καὶ [τὰ] τῆς ἐναντίας, ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ἢν π. τ. ε. By this very slight change we have the true object of imitation, παθήματα; and the construction δυνατὸς ἐκλέξασθαι μιμησι μεμιμημένην καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι εἶναι complete and satisfactory. v & x. The grammar requires παραχωμενον and προσαρμότονον. Πικνήτης and μαντής appear to be well explained by Mr. Chappell, History of Music, p. 144.

813, λ. Ἀλθείστατα τοῖς. καὶ ταὐτή ἡμῖν κ. τ. ε. should be read continuously. x. διεξόδων τακτικῶν. Significantur, says Ast, exercitus in acie constituti expeditiones. If it signifies this, it signifies nothing, for this has no meaning. Διεξοδοι are evolutions, and τακτικῶν is a bad gloss. Σφατοπέδων is of no better origin; but the worst corruptions are those in the following passage. πάντων γὰρ τούτων διδασκαλίας τε ἐναι δει κοινούς, ἀρνημενούς μισθόν παρὰ τὴν πόλεως, καὶ τούτων μαθητας τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει παθι διὰς τε καὶ ἄνδρας· καὶ [κόρας καὶ γυναικας πάντων τούτων ἐναντίημονας.] κόρας μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖ πάνω τῇ ἐν ὀπλοῖς ἐφθείραν [καὶ μας χρῆ] μεμελετηκινας, γυναικας δὲ διεξόδων καὶ τάξεως καὶ θέσεως καὶ ἀναρίθμος ὀπλῶν ἡμένας, εἰ μηδενος ἐνεκα, ἀλλ’ εἰ ποτε δεότεις

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LETTER TO THOMPSON.

πανθημεί [πάθη τῇ δυνάμει] καταλείποντας τὴν πόλιν ἔως στρατεύεσθαι τοὺς φυλακάντας παιδάς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ἴκανάς εἶναι τῷ γε τοσοῦτον—I offer you the passage unaltered, but for the brackets, except that I change καταλείποντας into καταλείποντας; that I follow Α and Ω in φυλάκαντας, (those who had kept guard, youths and others, are gone out, and the women must supply their place); and that I read ἴκανάς, for which there is no authority except the sense. These then are to be sufficient at least for this purpose: and again, ὅν οὐδὲν ἀπώμενον, it being an inevitable chance, that an enemy should some day break into the town, and force them to fight pro aris et focis, πολλῆ ἐνυπαικία κ. τ. ἐ.

814, 2. Read, if you approve, Νῦν δὴ τῆς μὲν παλαιότερας περὶ δυνάμεως—. Soon after follows a long passage, which I am tempted to place before you, not in its present state, but as it must have been before it met with any misfortunes either from wounds or surgery. He is speaking of κίνησις of the body and observes: δύο μὲν αὐτὰς χρή νομίζειν εἰσι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλίστων σωμάτων τὸ σεμνὸν μιμούμενην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ φαινόν καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαινοῦν τε δύο, καὶ τοῦ σκουδαλοῦ δύο ἐκεῖνα, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὸν πύλημον καὶ ἐν βιαίοις ἐκπληκτῶν πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλῶν, ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνθρώπης, τὴν δὲ ἐν ἐκπραγμάσει τε ὑστῆς σάφορος, ἐν ὑδάναις τε ἐμέτρου. εἰρήνης δὴ ἐν τὶς λέγεν κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ὀρχήσαν λέγοι. τὴν δὲ τούτων ἄλλην ὕσιαν τῆς εἰρήνης πυρρῆξιν ἐν τῆς ὑστῆς προσαγορεύοι, ταῖς τε εὐλαβείσις πασῶν πληγῶν, καὶ βολῶν ἐκνεύσεις, καὶ ὑπελέξει πασί οὖσιν καὶ ἐκπραγμένοι καὶ ἔγνυσει, καὶ ταῖς τούτων ἐναντίως ταῖς ἐπὶ τὰ δραστικὰ φαι- μέναις αὐτῇ σχήματα, τὸν βολῶν βολῶς καὶ ἄκοντινος, καὶ πασῶν πληγῶν μυμήματε, ἐπεχειρούσαν μιμείσασθαι τὸ ῥθόν ἐν τούτως καὶ τὸ ἐντο- νον. τῶν οὖν ἀγαθῶν σωμάτων καὶ φυγῆς ὁπώτατον γίγνεται μίμημα, εὐθυφερεῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν γεγονόμενον, ῥθόν μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ τούτως τούταντον ἀποδιδόν ὑστῆς ῥθόν ἀπο- δημένῳ. Though I do not suppose that you ever joined in the charge against me, that I did not sufficiently explain the reason of my corrections, others who read this will perhaps be nursing the accusation, and if I should now leave the above passage without other comment but a recommendation to compare it with the received text, many will say, There, there! and a few will even go further and say, So would we have it. And yet what a misery it is that a man cannot change τε into γε, or ΠΑΘΟΣ
into ΠΑΘΘΟΣ, without turning showman, and pointing out what every body can see for himself. To explain an emendation is as ungraceful a performance as to comment on a joke, and as this is seldom done except when the joke is ψυχρότερων τῶν Πλάτωνος νόμων, as that ribald Lucian has it, so that had better be reserved for sorry specimens of criticism. But, assuming that any chance reader will take the same trouble as yourself, to compare the received text with that here given, I will observe that αὐτής τε ἐδη is an explanation of αὐτας, that ἔνι τὸ σεμνὸν is a Platonic elegance adapted to a wrong place, that ἐμπλεκόμενον is an Attic form preserved in our oldest copies, as likewise in the best MS of Thucydidès, that ἡδοναὶ are μέτοιχα, but men are ἐμμετροῦ, that ταπεινωσεί is probably the gloss of ἑγκύψει, or else the substitute for it when it had disappeared into ΕΝΥΨΕΙ, that the pyrrhic dance and that alone can undertake to imitate skill and vigour, and can only do so by a twofold representation, namely of defence and of attack, that, if I am wrong in inserting οὐν, I have no objection to any better mode of conjunction, that, if ἀποδιδόν is rash, you can leave a mark of hiatus, or else read ἐναντιων, (in which I should not follow you) and that ἀποδιεχόμεθα was first discovered by Ast, and is the fourth instance in this Book of similar confusion of terminations.

In turning over some loose papers, I find the following observations bearing on the next few pages of our author. They are written in Commentator's Latin or an imitation thereof, but with the help of the text, it is to be hoped that they will be intelligible. I present them as they are.

813, c. δὴν μὲν βασκελά τ' ἔστι, καὶ τῶν ταύτας ἐπομνην, δὲς Νύμφας τε καὶ Πάνας καὶ Σελήνους καὶ Σατύρους ἐπομνημένοις, δὲς φασι, μιμοῦται καταφανείον, περικαθαρούς τε καὶ τελεάς τις τοις ἀποτελούντων, ξύμπαν τούτῳ τῆς δραχῆς τὸ γένος κ. τ. ἕ. Diu mihi suspICtum fuit verbum ἐπομνημένοις. Saltationes quasdam Nympharum et Faunorum aliorumque numinum nominibus appellant. Fac Platonem illud voluisse. Sed quid porro imitantur? Eadem haec numina ebria. Quae est haec negligentia, ut eadem vocabula utpote ab ἐπομνημένοις pendentia saltationum nomina significent, ad μιμοῦναι autem relata de numinibus ipsis capiantur? Adde quod ἐπομνημένοις, δὲς φασι, ita conjuncta sunt, ut hoc ad illud necessario referatur. Quasi his saltatoribus proprium esset, ut his
nominiibus uterentur; vel potius non uterentur, sed uti se dictitarent. Quod vero ad Nymphas attinet, quis unquam illas ebrias finxit, nedum saltatione imitatus sit? Quid vero sibi volunt tōn ταύτας ἐπομένων? Si sic interpretaberis: "qui Bacchas sequuntur", praesto erit Astius, qui te commonefaciat, οἷς referendum esse ad ταύτας. Quod quoniam rectissime et ex lingue norma dictum est, sequitur ut οἷς etiam de Bacchabus ipsis intelligi oporteat, non de saltatoribus. Atqui si hoc concesseris, quid de reliqua sententia fiet? Quid multa? Corruptam orationem agnoscas necesse est; vel si forte etiamnum dubitas, vide num vera lectio te ab ista religione liberet. δὴ μὲν βακχεία τ’ ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ταύτας ἐπομένων, ὡς Νύμφας ἐπομοδότους, Πάνας καὶ Σελήνους καὶ Σατύρους ὡς φασὶ μιμοῦσαι καταφωμένους. Mulieres Nympharum partes agunt: viri Faunos temulentos Nympharum fugientium amatores imitantur. In verbis τοῦτο [τῆς οἰκήσεως] τὸ γένος, quae et infra repetuntur, non dificile est Platonem ab interpolatore dignoscere.

aliud tātēriv, neque illud fieri potest nisi hoc præcesserit. Quæ vero ad tātēriv pertinent omnia supra memorata sunt; ut jam nihil superavit quam kathērōn pānta, ēn tātēriv.


818, ἡ. ἀγριβεῖας ἓγεμύνα. "Cum perfectione conjuncta, h. e. perfecte s. exacte, ἀγριβεῖας s. δὲ ἀγριβεῖας". Sio Astius, falsa veris permissens. Lege: τάτα δὲ ἐξιμπαντα σοῦ ὑπὸ ἀγριβεῖας ἐχομένων δὲ διαπονεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἄλλα τινὰς ὁλίγονς."—Mox sequuntur hæc: δόται γὰρ πρῶτον ἄν ἐν. τὸ πλῆθει δὲ ὁσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαία καὶ ποι ὅρθωτα λέγεται μὴ ἐπισκαθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀληθῶν, δὲ ἀγριβεῖας δὲ ἐξητεῖν πάντα οὔτε ῥῆδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν δυνατὸν. Quæ sit horum verborum grammatica ratio, οὔτε ῥῆδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν δυνατὸν ἐξητέθαι. Locus sic nihi constituendus videtur: τὸ πλῆθει δὲ ὁσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαία ποι ὅρθωτα λέγεται; μὴ ἐπισκαθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀληθῶν, τ. τ. τ.

Ibid. c. ὁλος δυνατός. "Alterutrum fortasse delendum est". Ast. Imo δυνατός quantocius expellendum. De Dis loquens consulto maluit ὁλος h. e. idoneus dicere, quam de potentia eorum videri dubitate.

819, ἡ. οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακῶν. Hic οὐ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν οὐδὲ μέγιστον hand minus absurde collocantur quam μέγιστος καὶ σφοδρὸς ἱρως, quæ Cobetus, spretâ certissima nostra correctione, in Convivio legenda proposuit. Et quemadmodum illic, ubi de universo amore sermo est, τὸ σφοδρὸν, quod in partem tantum cedit, prorsus alienum est, sio in nostro loco omnium rerum ignorantiam σφοδρῶν κακῶν vocare nec Gracitae nec rei natura patitur. Lege: οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων, οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακῶν. Neque vero hinc exemplum petere possis adjectivi positivi cum superlativo conjuncti; nam δεινὸν nequaquam ad κακῶν pertinent. "Nulla in civitate periculosā est—neque est summum malum." Mox dele τοιαν.

Ibid. n. c. Lege: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοὺς ἀτεχνῶς πάρος τεταυρυμένα μαθήματα μετὰ παιδίας τε καὶ ἱδονῆς μανθάνειν. Vulgo παιδίν. Tum enumerantur τὰ μαθήματα, sc. μῆλαν καὶ σπανών διανομαλ, καὶ πυκτῶν . . . ἐθεδρείας τε καὶ συλλήψεις ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐρείξεις, [και] ἀρ σπεύδως γλίνωσθαι. Vulgo ἐθεδρείας
XXII

LETTER TO THOMPSON.

—συλλήξεως; unde effectum est ut perφūκαι sine nominativo es-
set, et genitivi a diανομαί pendere crederentur; quasi quis pugiles
spectantibus eodem modo quo poma vel coronas distribueret. Al-
terum xal omisi; quod qui inseruit, parum intellexit quid esset
ēn μήρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς, et tanquam inter se opposita essent, (quod
fuisset, ēn μ. τε καὶ ἐ.) tertium aliquid in ēs periφūκαι γλυφεσθαι
contineri putavit. Sed unumquodque par et singuli tertii prior-
es ēn μήρει excipiebant, atque hoc in omnibus deinceps fieserat.
ēs periφūκαι γλυφεσθαι adjectum est ut significaretur certam esse
harum permutationum conjunctionumque rationem, si quidem nu-
meri natura immutabiles essent. καὶ δή καὶ παίζοντες, φιάλας ἀμα
χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ ἀργυροῦ καὶ τοιοῦτων τινῶν ἄλλων κερα-
nύντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλας πως διαδιδόντες, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐὰς παιδίαν ἐνα-
mοττοντες τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἀριθμῶν χρήσεις—Tria hic præcipue
que reanda sunt. 1. Quid sit φιάλας κερανύντες, 2. quo modo ab
ὁλας διαδιδόντες differat, 3. ubi dixerit, quod hic se iterum dicere
sint. Duplex, nisi fallor, discrimen in poculis fingitur; nam et e
diversa materia facta sunt, et diversum liquorem continent. Si
hoc verum est, recte opponuntur οἱ κερανύντες τὰς φιάλας, ἢ.ο.
qui pocula vino cum aqua permixto implent, et οἱ φ. ὅλας διαδι-
dόντες, quod idem est ac φ. ἀκράτου πότου πληρεις διαδιδόντες.
Sed voceam ἀκράτος consulto vitaluit, quoniam non minus de aqua
pura quam de vino mero cogitabet. Quo autem spectant illa, ὅπερ
εἶπον? Planissime ad verba ἀρμοττόντων ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν. At-
qui non prorsus idem est, sive numeros convenire dies, sive nu-
meros accommodari; et quoniam hoc verius, malim ἀρμοττόμυναν.
Nam qui hoc dixit, idem dixit quo infra, εἰς παιδίαν π. τ. ἐ.
Preterea cum prorsus otiosum sit ἄλλων, et εἰ δὲ alterum quod-
dam sui simile flagitet, lego: ἄλλοι μὲν κερανύντες. At unde il-
lud μὲν arripui? Nempe a Cod. Κ, qui pro κερανύντες με κερα-
nύντας habere dicitur. Ceterum si quis inutilem esse particulam
πως contendet, simulque φιάλας aρετε feret, quidni φιάλας πά-
σεις reponat?

Ibid. d. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς μετρήσεσιν, ὥς, δῶς ἔχει μὴν
καὶ πλάτη καὶ βάθη, περὶ ἀπαντα ταῦτα ἐνοοῦσαν τίνα φύσει γελολαν
tε καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἄγνοιαν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι, ταῦτης ἀπαλλάττω-
sιν. Supplevi ὅς. Idem valet ὔς ἐνοοῦσαν atque κρίνοντες ἐνεῖναι.
Mox pro ἐνναῖσι λέγει ὑπνῶν.

820, 1. Εἶ δὲ ἄριστο μήτη αἰφόδρα μήτη θέμα [δυνατά ἐνια, ἀλλά]
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

Non defuturos soio, qui hos uncinos meos tanquam summe audacia exempla citaturi sint. Ego contra librarium audacia me compescere arbitror, qui talem compositionem ouv eis a illa tae mien tae d' ou, pro Platonica nobis obtulerunt. Sed cur ducat inclusi? Videamus precedentia. 'Ar' ouv ou dokei... tauta elnav metegeta proz allila; Nat. Mhkos te, oimai, proz mhkos k.t. e. Vides orationem continuari, et hec omnia a metegeta elnav pendere. "Imo", inquit, "a ducaton elnav meteinein vouzei". Atqui, ut hoc concesserim, qua ratione haec inter se conciliabas: ducaton lste taute meteinein et tauta ducata isteri? Scilicet intelligendo meteinevdhai. Et ubi erit Platonicae ille nitor sermonis, quem omnes laudant, paucissimi tuentur? Sed paucissimi illi ducaton elnav meteinein vouzei sine ulla dubitatione damnabunt.

Ibid. a. Ti d' ouv; mhkos te kal platonos proz bavoros, nplatoz te kal mhkos proz allila owste pws Ar' ouv diavounumeta peri tauta ouvov k.t. e. Sio a et a. Pro wste pws Winkelmannus infeliciter emow gte pws conject. Scribendum videtur: proz allila ouvovot, K.L. Paiz; A Th. Ar' ouv diavounumeta—.

Returning from the Latin notes the first thing we meet with in the text, that seems to require notice is in 820, c. tauta gar d' skopoonta diagignaskein anagkaien n pantapasin elnav faileon, prorhloneta te allilous asti, diatirepsin ths penteias polu charistferan preobrotoni diastirbontan, filoneikein ev taiz touzav dzeiasa scharaiz. You will probably assent to allilous—prebsynt—filoneikein, and likewise to the removal of ta matheuma in Clinias' answer. Those who want to remove ou, show that they do not understand the force of the particle in houk' y' ouv. k. The Zurich Editors have gone back to the wrong distribution of persons, which Bekker had rectified. Why should the Athenian not call Clinias oxi? And how can oukouin melatho suit any other mouth than tou Thento?

821, c. Orellius is right in proposing tauta asti, but there are worse faults in the next sentence. A Th. Tauta' lste toinun, A Mgyllte te kal Kleinia, vou h d' phym dein peri thevov touz kai oufanov touz ge nhmetrous politas te kal touz neous to mecher tosoouto maethev peri apainan toutan, mecher tou mh blassfermen peri auta, ephemein d' asti thvonta te kal ev evrxeis evomouson eusebous. How can the following bear each other's company: toinun—vou, peri thevov
XXIV  LETTER TO THOMPSON.

τών κατ’ ουρανόν—περι ἀπώλειαν τούτων, τούς πολίτας τε—καὶ τοὺς νέους; Νῦν and the celestial clause must go, and the cross division must be changed into a subdivision by removing τούς. “Those who are at once our fellow-citizens and our youth.” x. The words ἐγὼ τούτων οὔτε νέος οὔτε πάλαι ἀκῆμως σφον ἢν νῦν οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δηλώσαι δυναμην. καίτοι χαλέπα γε ὅταν οὐκ ἢν ποτὲ οἶος σ’ ἢν δηλοῦν τηλικούτοις οὔτε τηλικούτος αὖν. I have added the last word, but there are other difficulties which you will require to see solved before you will look on me as the corrector of the passage. I presume you do not approve of either νέον or νεωστι: for a man who has heard a thing οὔτε νεωστι οὔτε πάλαι can scarcely have heard it at all. Τούτων seems to have given no offence, though it is wrong both in number and case. Now as one of the possible hindrances to teaching is the age of the teacher, to which the speaker again alludes, we may restore this feature while we correct τούτων, by supposing that the old reading was τούτων (i.e. τοῦτ’ οὔτ’ αὖν) νέος—but what second hindrance does he allude to? “That he had not heard it for some time;” but the Greek for “it is long since I heard it,” would be πάλαι οὐκ ἀκῆμως, not οὐ πάλαι ἀκῆμως, and with οὔτε the same difference would hold good. I therefore incline to read: τοῦτ’ οὔτ’ αὖν νέος πάλαι: τ’ οὐκ ἀκῆμως—. Perhaps the belief that there was something wrong in οὔτε—τε induced the scribe to make the alteration.

822, a. Read: την [στην] γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅθέν, καὶ ἔκαστον . . μᾶλ ν. τ. ἢ, and soon after τῶν ἐπιμέλειαν. c. I should print the text as follows: ήρ’ οὔκ ὁλίγηθα τὸ γελοῦν τε καὶ οὐκ ἄρθὸν ἱκάζει γεγομένων ἢν, ἤπαθε τι καὶ ἐν τούτοις γέγονεθαι; Χ.Λ. Γελοῖον μέν, ἄρθὸν δ’ οὐδεμᾶς. After this I return to another scrap of Adversaria, which will lead us to the end of the Book.

Ibid. ν. ἐπὶ μείξον nullo modo ferrei potest; sed non mutandum in εἰ μείξον, quod nescio quis proposuit; nam quis dixerit hoc etiam magus, nisi qui prius alterum quiddam magnum esse contendit? Nec quae sequuntur sine offensione legi possunt. Quorum enim iteratur, ἢπερόν τι—μεταξόν τι? Deinde si quis doceat περισσῶς τι μεταξῷ νουθητήσως τε καὶ νόμων, quivis hoc intelligat; sīn ad- jiciat νουθητήσως τε ἀμα καὶ νόμων, diversa confudisse videatur, ὥσς. τὸ μετέχειν ὧμα τούτον καὶ ἐκεῖνον, et τὸ μεταξῷ τούτου καὶ ἔκει- ηνον περισσῶς. Satis patere arbitror verborum ordinem a scribis
turbatum parum feliciter a correctore aliquo constituendum esse. Quid si sie legamus? Kυνδυνεύει γὰρ δὴ νομοθέτη τὸ προστατο- μένου ἔτερον τι μεῖξον εἶναι τοῦ τούς νόμους θέντα ἀπηλλάξαι, ἥμα δὲ εἶναι μεταξὺ τοῦ νοουθετήσεσθε τοὺς πεποικός καὶ νόμων.

Ibid. Β. olov περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παιδῶν τροφῆν' οὐ γὰρ ἄγητα φαιμὲν εἶναι, λέγοντες τι αὐτὰ ἢς νόμους οἶνοσθαί τιθημένους εἶναι πολλῆς ἄναλας γέμειν. Non ἄγητα sed ἀρρητα desiderari vidit C. F. Hermannus, sed non vidit id ipsum leviter corruptum in omnibus libris haberi. Post λόγοις plenius interpungendum est, legendumque olov (τά) περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παιδῶν τροφῆν οὐτὶ ἀρρητά φαιμὲν (δείν) εἶναι, λέγοντες οὔτε αὐτὰ νόμους οἶνοσθαί τι- θέναι πολλῆς (ἀπ' ἄναλας γέμειν.


823, Β. Jampridem monui legendum: olov μάφτυρα ἐπαγόμε- νοι δηλοῖμεν ἂν ὡ βουλόμεθα μᾶλλον.

Ibid. Β. Locum sic interpungi et corrigi velim: πάμπολο δὲ καὶ το περὶ τα πεῖδα θηρεύματα [, οὐ μόνον θήριαν]. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄξιον ἐννοεῖν θήραν, τὴν τα κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ κλω- πεῖαν καὶ λειβτῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων. πολλῆ δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλλαν—Vulgo haec per amicitiam venatio, in qua procul dubio rem amatoriam, atque omnem suadendi artem et omnia blanditia- rum generae includi volobat, inter τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον θήραν atque hujus exempla media interposita est; ipsa autem verba sic cor- rupta sunt: καὶ κλωπείαι καὶ λειβτῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων στρατοπέδως θήρα. Quem nostra reponit correctio chiasmum librarius parum intellexit.

Ibid. C. Transpose sic: καὶ μετὰ θηρίας νομοθετήθεντων.

Ibid. Β. Lege διαπονομήν... aloquin nee erit quo τῆς referri
possit, et dativi illi ἴγμηγορόσι, εὐδούσι, prorsus ἀσύντακτοι erant. Ordo est, τῆς διαπονωμένης κύριοις ἁγγόν θήρας τῶν ἐνύδραν ἱμαν, μήτε ἴγμηγορόσι μήτε εὐδούσι. Mox incredibile est quem- quam in verbis μηδ' εἰς τὸν ἱδατον ἱππόθεος νοῦν ἥπασσε. Qui tot ineptias invito Platon obstruas defendunt, simul atque Plato ipse in notissimo proverbio jocari apert, statim nauseant, et cum pro- cellis jactat deciderc parant.

824, 5. Lege: ὣ τῶν δὲ ἀναπάυματα πόνον ἴχουσα. Mox pro "διευρημένος lege δὲ οἱ εἰρημένοι. Prō ἐν ἱγασίμοις δὲ καὶ ἱεροις ἱγιοίς suspicio olim lectum esse ἐν ἱγγ. καὶ ἱγιοίς, quod ultimum nescio quis per ἱεροῖς interpretatus est. Melius fecisset, si in 

ΑΙΓΟΙC veram lectionem 
ΑΤΡΟΙC latere admonuisset. In A et 
Ω διττρογια ex proba et mala lectione confita servatur 
ΑΠΡΙΟΙC.

I had hoped to wander through two or three more Books with you, picking up specimens of paleography and discoursing on them as we went. But from this egotistical design you and all others are delivered for the present by the peculiar character of this ἄντιχθαν; which, though we are not quite so remote as Philolans would place us, holds too scanty a communication with you to satisfy a garrulous correspondent, and forces me, if I would see this in print before the end of this year, to address it forth- with to the European Publisher. With heartiest respect and affection,

Believe me,

Yours ever,

CHARLES BADHAM.

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY,
FEBRUARY, 1877.
PLATONIS PHILEBUS

WITH

INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.
THE aim of this noble Dialogue is to ascertain the relation of Pleasure and of Intellect to the absolute Good.

The form of the inquiry is a controversy between Socrates and two young Athenians named Philebus and Protarchus. The latter, espousing the cause which his friend had first taken up, and then through laziness abandoned, affirms that pleasure, using the word in its largest sense, is entitled to the name of good; to which Socrates advances an opposite claim on behalf of intellect, knowledge, and all kindred species; observing that, if it should prove that some third competitor showed a better title than either of the original claimants, then, whichever of the two should be found most akin to the successful candidate would be entitled to the second prize.

Protarchus is then reminded of the great variety and discrepancy in the kinds of pleasure, and is invited to show what common nature there is in all these, over and above their being pleasant, which nobody disputes, in virtue of which he calls them all pleasures. In reply, he denies that there is any variety or discrepancy between them, in so far as they are pleasures. Socrates shows the fallacy of his argument, and points out that this reliance upon the identity implied by a common name, as if it excluded all diversity, would put an end to all reasoning. This leads to the mention of the great problem about Identity and Diversity, the delight of young arguers and the terror of quiet, respectable people, the argument of ἕν καὶ πολλά. * The contradiction between the individual as one in nature, and yet many in his many changes of circumstance, and that between the Whole as one and

* The bearing of this discussion on the main subject is twofold. The importance of the πέρας in dialectics is a suitable introduction to the part which it is to play in physics; and the necessity of the careful division of pleasure under its several heads is shown beforehand.
the Parts as many, are touched upon; but Socrates affirms that, though men now look upon these paradoxes as childish and sophistical, there exist other forms of the contradiction which are really important. For, if we consider any genus as one in itself, and then again observe that the representatives of it are many and unlimited, it is difficult to conceive how this One, at the same time that it remains one in itself, is yet one in all the individuals and in each of them. This contradiction is the inherent and unchangeable property of all objects of reasoning; but though as such we cannot remove it, there is a remedy provided against its practical difficulty. For, while all things are constituted out of the One and the Many, they have, associated in their constitution, the Limit and the Indefinite. We must therefore, in all objects of inquiry, accepting this natural constitution, begin by taking a unit, which we are sure to find if we look for it; from this we must proceed to the next definite number supplied by the object itself in its own natural divisions, and so, continually advancing through all subordinate divisions, proceed till we arrive at the point where the limit (or given numbers) ceases, and the unlimited begins. This process from the one to the indefinite by means of number, or the contrary process from the indefinite to the one, is the gift of the Gods, the true dialectical method, the origin of all discovery, and the opposite of that sophistical manner which passes per saltum from either extreme to the other. Socrates beautifully exemplifies this position by language, music, metre, and the art of writing; and proposes that the rival claimants, pleasure and intellect, should be subjected to the same method of scrutiny.

But finding that Protarchus is scared by the difficulty of the undertaking, he professes to remember a shorter solution of the problem before them, by which it can be shown that neither competitor can hope for the first prize. It lies in the very conception of the Good that it should be perfect and self-sufficient. But, if we take either pleasure or intellect in absolute isolation from each other, they are alike imperfect and insufficient; for no one would accept pleasure alone as all in all, if he had no memory, no consciousness, no faculty by which he could be cognisant of the pleasure enjoyed: nor would any one accept a life of mere intellect without at least some admixture of
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pleasurable feeling. To either of these states of being, all men would certainly prefer a combination of the two; therefore each has failed in its pretensions to be the absolute Good. But which comes the nearest to the mark? That which has most right to be considered either itself the Cause of the Combination, or at least as having most affinity with that Cause. Thus we are led to inquire into the nature of combination itself, and the laws which govern it.

Now it has already been said, that the Limit and the Indefinite* are the elements out of which all things are compounded; these, therefore, will be the first two γένη or kinds which we must consider; the Combination of these two will be the third kind, and the Cause which effects their union, the fourth.

Every quality of matter considered in its abstraction, extends indefinitely in the direction of two opposites, as in the instances of moister and drier†, hotter and colder, &c. The attempt to limit it at once dissolves the abstraction, because it fixes to a point that which is only conceivable as continually capable of more and less. All things which thus admit of more and less are comprehended in one ιδέα, and receive the name of the Indefinite, τὸ ἄπειρον. The opposites of these are the things which effect equality and proportion, and these are classed under the name of the Limit, τὸ πέρας ‡ or περιοδής. The examples of this kind are all definite numbers whatever and their relations to each other, but they can be more easily seen at the same time with the third kind, that is to say, in Combinations of τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας. In music, bodily health and strength and beauty, the temperature of the seasons, and above all, in the instance of pleasure, which would be absorbed in its own indefinite cravings, but for the imposition of law and order to limit and preserve it,—

* This doctrine Plato is said to have borrowed from the Pythagorean Philolaus, who, through extreme poverty, consented to sell him the book in which he had embodied the tenets of his sect.—See Diog. Laert. in Philolaus, and the Extract from Böckh’s Philolaus in the Appendix.

† The comparatives of all such words are used by Plato because the positive might be misunderstood as implying a ποσόν, or definite quantity, or proportion; but afterwards, he uses the positive, Ἐν δ' ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπειροῦσα οὐσία. (26, A.)

‡ πέρας is properly the ἱζάς, or that according to which they are one, and περιοδής, the γένος: τὰ περιοδής again would be the γένος, which we must not confound with γένος, as Ast and others have done, but which is the multitude contained in the γένος, its numerous specimens.
in all such instances, where qualities are blended with definite proportion, we see at once the second element of the combination, and the result of that Combination as manifested in some ἔλευθερος. In the fourth place there must be a Cause of such combinations; for that which is made cannot be the same as that which makes, but must always be subsequent to it. Therefore we may consider the first three kinds to be (1) (2) the elements* of natural things, and (3) the natural things themselves; but the fourth kind is that which operates with these and upon them.

The question then arises: To which of these four kinds does the Mixed Life of pleasure and intellect bear most resemblance? It is decided that it resembles most the third kind or the Combination. Pleasure again seems most akin to the Indefinite.

The kind which answers to Intellect is not so evident, and Socrates warns his friend against any rashness in the decision, as touching upon impiety. The gay Philebus laughs at his scruples, but Protarchus has more reverence, and is so awestruck by Socrates' manner, that he is afraid to make any conjecture. Then Socrates declares that his own solemnity was all in sport, and that it is no wonder if philosophers are so ready to pay themselves a compliment, in declaring Intellect to be the King of the Universe; but that it is worth while to see what right it has to the designation. Protarchus is then asked to choose between two opinions; one that the universe is subject to chance and blind caprice, and the other, that it is governed by intellect and mind. He unhesitatingly chooses the latter. But, argues Socrates, in this universe there are the same elements which we find also in the constitution of our own bodies, only that here they occur small in quantity and poor in quality, while in the universe they are abundant and wondrous. Now, the terrestrial elements must have been derived from the universal ones, the earthly body from the body of the universe: but our body has a mind which

* Socrates speaks also presently (29, a) of the Four Elements, as they are called, which are as old as Empedocles, and probably much older. But the elements with which we are here concerned are elements in a different sense. They are not matter, nor even properties of matter, but the ἀπόστολος is the condition of all the properties of matter, and of number itself, till controlled by πράξις. Though the Pythagoreans held ἀρίθμος to be the condition of existence and the ground of knowledge; this its virtue was derived from the decad, that is from proportion, for the decad contained every kind of proportion. Indefinite number, ἡ ἀριστοτε λεικός, was reckoned among the ἀπόστολος.
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it must have also derived from the same source; for if we men have a mind, much more must the universe, possessing as it does all that we possess, only in greater perfection, have one also: and if it is in virtue of the fourth of our kinds, viz. Cause, working through the human mind, that that mind gains credit for skill and wisdom (as when, for instance, it trains the body to health and repairs its disorders), much more must the heavens and the order of nature be recognised as effects of the same Cause, operating therein on a grander scale and through a nobler and purer mind. It follows from this, that the Cause which is the chief of the four kinds, will be supreme in heaven and in earth, being the essence of the mind and of the soul of Zeus himself.* The result of this inquiry is to establish that Intellect rules over all things, and that our intellect is therefore also akin to the fourth or highest of the kinds.

The next step is to consider Pleasure and Intellect not abstractedly, but as they are, and to enquire how they arise in living creatures.

The first kind of Pleasure noted is that which arises when the constituent elements of the creature tend towards Harmony; but, when that harmony is more or less dissolved, pain is the consequence. This is illustrated by hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, in all which there is a tendency to some loss or dissolution, which is pain, and in the relief of which there is a return to natural completeness, which return is pleasure. A second kind of pleasure (and pain) is in Expectation: this kind belongs to the mind alone, without the body participating in it.

These two classes are considered sufficient for the present purpose, and another observation is added, of which Protarchus is told that he will see the importance further on. It is, that there must be an intermediate state of the body, when it is tending neither towards completeness nor dissolution of any part; when this state prevails, there can be neither pleasure nor pain. Such a state is quite compatible with a life of mere intellect; it is also such a life as we may conceive the gods to possess.†

* That is, of the highest mundane divinity. The argument is, that ἄναξ ἐν τῷ ζζον is the highest of all the four kinds; but ἄναξ is νους, and νους is inseparable from ψυχή; consequently, ἄναξ is the ground of the highest νους and ψυχή, i. e., that of Ζεύς.

† Page 33, n. The sense I have given here is not very clearly expressed Platonis Philebus.
This, therefore, is another point to be scored in favour of νοῦς in its competition for the second prize.

It is in the second kind of Pleasure, that which springs from Expectation and belongs to the mind, that the nature of pleasure and its relation to νοῦς become most apparent. Expectation of pleasure must depend upon Memory (that is, not recollection, but the state which is the necessary condition of recollection), and this memory presupposes Sensation. If the body alone is affected, and the movement does not reach to the mind, there is no sensation and no memory. In addition to sensation, which is the common movement of body and mind, and memory, which is the preservation of sensation, we must also notice Recollection, which is the rehearsal by the mind alone of the sensations which it formerly experienced in common with the body; and lastly, Desire. For desire also is a property of the mind and not of the body, as may be shown thus: We desire the opposite of that which we feel; but desire implies memory of the thing desired; for all our relations to things desirable must be either through sensation or through memory: but sensation is occupied with the present state, whereas desire yearns for the opposite of the present state;* therefore, it must be through memory that desire is brought into relation with the thing desired; and hence it follows that desire belongs not to the body but to the mind.

A third state of pleasure (and pain) is, when, whilst the body suffers through a present void, the mind is conscious of a former satisfaction; in such a case, if there is hope of attaining the desired satisfaction, the memory of it affords a pleasure simultaneous with the bodily pain; but if there be no hope, then there is a double pain: a present void in the body, and a consciousness in the mind that the satisfaction is unattainable.

The great importance of this observation is, that it will enable us to answer a question, without settling which we cannot hope to bring the controversy to an issue: Are there False Pleasures?

Protarchus denies this, and affirms that beliefs † may be true in the original as it stands in the Editions: it would come out much more forcibly by the very slight change of γε into τε. Οὐχοῦν οὖτε δὴ ἔκκινη τε ὑπάρχει, καὶ έγὼ οὖτε ἄποικον εἰ πάντων τῶν βλέου ἐστι ζευγατάτος.

* The same argument is used by Socrates in the Convivium.

† I have rendered δόξα in this manner; it is on the whole a handier word than impressions, but is to be taken in the sense of that word as popularly used.
or false, but that pleasures are all true. And yet, says Socrates, we speak of the pleasures of dreams or of madness as false. And if it be objected that pleasure is still pleasure though the ground of it may be false, surely the same may be said of beliefs also. If again it should be said that, in such a case, the belief is false though real, but the pleasure is true as well as real, this must be shown to arise from some peculiarity in the nature of pleasure which differentiates it from belief. But we do not find any such; for both alike admit of all other qualities, such as great and small, and good and bad. There are also correct and mistaken pleasures following on correct and mistaken beliefs. And here it is worth while to consider the nature of these δοξα in general. What we believe, results from a comparison of that which we see or feel with that which we remember. This result we record either to ourselves or to others. Now, suppose the former case: then a man carries the record about with him; and it may be said to be written on his mind. Besides this power which writes impressions upon us, there is another which paints them; that is the power by which we recall to the fancy the very images which we formerly beheld with our eyes; and when the beliefs are false, these images will be false also. Among these written and painted records there will be some which have reference to future time, and these are called Hopes. The good man will have true hopes and true images of the future, and the bad will have false ones. But these images are pleasures, for it was before admitted that some pleasures arose from expectation; consequently, there are false pleasures, which bad men have, and which are the caricatures of the true pleasures of good men. Having established this analogy between δοξα and pleasure, Socrates argues that, as only those δοξα, which do not answer to things past or present or future, but are false, are admitted to be bad, so those pleasures only, which are false, are bad also. Protarchus objects to this, that the badness of pleasures has very little to do with their falsehood; but Socrates defers his answer to a later stage in the controversy, and proceeds to another and stronger proof of the possibility of the falsehood of pleasure. When the body is in pleasure, and the mind at the same time is apprehensive of pain, or the body is in pain and the mind anticipating pleasure, the simultaneous presence of pleasure and pain will produce a similar
effect to the illusion of the eyes when they attribute greater size to near objects and less to those more distant. For the immediate pleasures or pains will seem greater than they are, in proportion to those expected; but that degree of pleasure or pain by which they exceed their real dimensions will be false, and cause a false belief: so that not only false beliefs cause false pleasures and pains, but false pleasures and pains cause false beliefs also. The strongest example of falsehood in pleasure is that which is next adduced. If we suppose a state in which there is no change either towards satisfaction or dissolution, such a state will be one devoid both of pleasure and pain. Now it is true that they who maintain the doctrine of a perpetual flux* deny the possibility of such a motionless state; but it will be enough to suppose that the motion or change is not great enough to reach the sense and the mind; and that there is such a condition nobody will deny. If a man in this state should say that he has pleasure, he would say what is false, and the pleasure which he speaks of would be false. But this is the very thing which happens when a man is relieved from pain without the acquisition of pleasure, and calls this negative state by the name of pleasure; for this supposed pleasure is false, since that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot come to be truly either. But there is another set of teachers,† who tell us that these things which we have been considering as three, are in fact only two; that pleasure is a mere illusion, and is nothing more than the removal of pain. Though we shall find reasons for disagreeing with them, they have something to teach us. For if we would judge rightly of pleasure, we must take in view the highest degree of it. Now the highest degree of pleasure is that which follows the gratification of the strongest desires; but it is in morbid conditions of the body that the strongest desires arise. Upon this, Socrates enters into a painfully vivid description of the mingled sensations which are produced by the application of relief to an itching surface or an inward irritation, and of the intense pleasure alternating with pain which men in these cases experience. In all such instances the pain is the condition of the pleasure; and these may be

* The schools of Heraclitus and Protagoras. Theod. 152, 180. Soph. 146. † Antisthenes and the Cynics. A saying is attributed to Antisthenes, ἔστιν μεθέν διεσθήσασθαι. Diog. Laert. 6, 3.
classed with the former examples where the body and the mind were differently affected, either mingling its pleasure with the pain of the other. Then again, the mind by itself has pleasures inseparable from pains; for of this nature are all the passions. Such is the sweetness of anger, and the indulgence of violent grief, and the mimic sympathies with tragic heroes. Nay, in comedy also, the same principle is at work; for ridicule deals with that which is evil; e.g. the ignorant conceit of men about their wealth or their bodily perfections or their wisdom, is evil, and it is in such foibles that ridicule finds its objects. When, therefore, we laugh at our friend’s ignorance, we have, it is true, pleasure, for laughter is a sign of pleasure; but we have also pain, for taking pleasure in a friend’s evil is φθονος; and φθονος is unquestionably a pain of the mind. Thus we see that those stern despisers of pleasure are so far right, that there are many and intense kinds of enjoyment, which owe their very intensity to the pain with which they are connected.

But then there are other species of pleasure which this School has overlooked: pure pleasures not resulting from any previous perceptible want, such as those of Sight, when it has for its objects beautiful outline or beautiful colour, unassociated with desire; those of Hearing, when they are of the same kind, and those of Smelling. (It is remarkable that Touch and Taste are excluded from this list.) And lastly, there are the Intellectual pleasures, which are not preceded by any painful want, and the loss of which is not followed by any sense of void.

Such being the Impure and the Pure pleasures respectively, which are most truly pleasures? As a little White, if perfectly unmixed, is more truly white than ever so great a quantity having the admixture of some other colour, so pure and unmixed pleasure, however small, is more truly pleasure than a mixed kind, however great. Consequently, when we come to the comparison of pleasure and intellect (in order to determine which of the two is the predominant element in that Mixed Life, which was found to be better than either of them alone), we shall have to remember that the pure pleasure is the true kind, and, therefore, that by which we must make our judgment.

But before the judgment commences, Socrates proposes two more reflexions concerning pleasure. All things may be divided into
two classes; that which exists for the sake of something else, and that for the sake of which something else exists. The former will include γένεσις, temporal existence, that which is ever becoming; the latter, οὐσία, eternal being, that which is; indeed, the entire former class exists for the sake of the latter. But whereas the Good must be that for the sake of which other things exist, pleasure, we are told by certain ingenious men,* is a γένεσις; and if so, it will be in the opposite class to that of the Good. And again, if pleasure be a γένεσις, they who make it their good, and pursue it, are most irrational; for they pursue also the state opposite to pleasure, that of want or desire, on the relief of which the generation of pleasure depends; but if pleasure be a genesis or production, its opposite is a corruption; so that those who choose pleasure as the Good, choose generation and corruption rather than pure being.

There are also many other absurdities following on the supposition that pleasure is the Good, but the greatest, and indeed the sum of them all, is that, if it were so, a man would be good in proportion to the pleasure of which he partook, and bad in the opposite proportion.

The next step is, to subject νοῦς and ἔξωθημα to the same process, and to ascertain if here too we shall find purer and impurer sorts. Science is divided into the Productive and the Instructive. In the former class, some branches are more immediately associated with mathematical science, and others are content, to a great degree, with mere guesswork and practical skill. Such a difference marks some as more, and others as less, pure. But the mathematical sciences themselves may be viewed either as they are conversant with absolute properties of figure and number, or as dealing with figures and numbers in the concrete; so that we may say there is a twofold arithmetic and a twofold geometry; and so in like manner of other mathematical sciences, of which the one branch is pure, the other impure. But the pure science above all others, is Dialectic; for it is that which has for its object the absolute, invariable, and eternal, and which therefore seeks after the truest of all knowledge. Other sciences may be more immediately useful or imposing, but this is more truly science than all

* Trendelenburg gives it as his opinion that Aristippus is here meant.
others; for whereas they depend on opinions, and are busied about mere phenomenal existence, Dialectic deals with immutable realities.

Having now determined the Pure and Impure both of Pleasures and of Sciences, we are ready to blend them so as to effect that combination of which the Mixed Life consisted. But which shall we use? To begin with intellect and knowledge, shall only the purer sorts enter into the combination? If it were so, there would be an end to all practical life, which is obliged to content itself with the imperfect and impure sciences. Therefore we are compelled to admit into the combination both sorts of intellect and knowledge. Shall we do the same with pleasure? Certainly not; for while the pleasures themselves would desire an union with intellect, as that which should give to them a meaning which they have not in themselves, intellect would reject all impure and tumultuous delights, as hindering its efforts and stifling its productions; but with the temperate and healthful pleasures, and such as walk in the train of virtue, as priestesses in the procession of some deity, with these it is willing to have fellowship.

Having, then, the elements of the mixture, it remains for us to enquire according to what law they must be combined. Now, first, no combination can be worth anything which is not a true blending: Truth, therefore, is a necessary condition; and if it is a condition of combination, and the Good is a result of combination, we must look for the Good in Truth. Again, no mixture can be successful which is without Measure; on measure and proportion all combination depends, and in these, therefore, likewise the Good must abide. Lastly, the effect of measure and proportion is Beauty and symmetry; and thus we conclude that herein also the Good is to be found.

And now, having not indeed a perfect comprehension of the Good,* but a knowledge of the three shapes in which it manifests itself, we may endeavour to decide the question, which of the two, Pleasure or Intellect, is most akin to it. This is easily determined, for pleasure is false and fickle, but intellect is either the same as Truth or the nearest akin to it: pleasure is in its own nature immoderate, but intellect and knowledge depend upon Measure: pleasure has so little claim to Beauty, that it often

* Which Plato thought unattainable. See Republic, vi. 508, 509.
shuns the light, and its expression is always unseemly, but intellect is a stranger to all that is not comely and decent.

Upon arriving at this conclusion of the whole argument, Socrates delivers the joint decision of the disputants in these words: Πάντη δὴ φήσαις, ἂν Πρώταρχε, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πέμπτων καὶ παρούσι φρονής, ὥς ἴδονὴ κτῆμα ὑπὲ ήκτι πρῶτον οὐδ’ αὐ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πη περὶ μέτρου καὶ τὸ μέτρου καὶ καλίου καὶ πάνθ’ ὀπόσα τοιαῦτα ἑκ’ νομίζειν τὴν αἰδίου ἱκείθαι φύσιν. (66, 1.)

We shall presently have to consider the exact reading and interpretation of these words; it is sufficient for the summary of the Dialogue which I have attempted to give, if we gather from them that Measure and things partaking of the nature of measure are declared to be the nearest approach to the Good. Next to this, and in the second place, Socrates places the Beautiful, the Symmetrical, the Self-sufficient and Perfect; the third place is given to Intellect and Thought; the fourth to the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs; and the fifth to the Purer Pleasures. The Dialogue concludes with a short recapitulation, and a noble warning, in forming our judgment of pleasure, not to rely, as the meaner soothsayers do, on the teaching of irrational natures, but on the oracles of the philosophic Muse.

Of the difficulties presented by this Dialogue none is so important, and at the same time so perplexing, as the assignment of places to the five different Classes.

The classification proposed by Ast needs only to be stated for any attentive reader to see that it is perfectly reconcilable with the words of Plato, and with the whole tenor of the argument. He arranges them thus:—1. The Definite, which is the νοῦς βασιλεύς, the controlling and arranging principle of the world; 2. The Indefinite, which is the material substratum on which the supreme intelligence is exercised; 3. The Real Synthesis of the two former, the Pythagorean κόσμος; 4. The Ideal Synthesis, the human intelligence as the reflex of the divine; 5. Pleasure. Nothing, as Trendelenburg observes, can be more remote from the terms σύμμετρον and καλόν, than the formless and discordant elements of matter; nor are νοῦς and φρονήσις capable of being understood as the world of beauty and harmony, the living work of the supreme mind. Such manifest violence to the plain words
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of the author can only be accounted for by the desire of making a system for Plato, and the vain notion of helping out his supposed imperfect strivings after a regular gradation from the most absolute intellectual to the most sensual.

Schleiermacher proceeded on a much more reverent and a sounder principle. It seemed to him very remarkable that the two competitors whose relative claims the whole Dialogue is occupied in discussing, should appear at the final award not as second and third, but as fourth and fifth. How could the introduction of these new claimants be accounted for? His answer is, that we must look for the explanation to those treatises to which the Philebus is intended to be subordinate and introductory, the Timæus and the Republic. As in the former Plato proposed to give an account of the constitution of the world, and in the latter, that of human society, he prepares us for both by intimating that in the gradation of Good that which is universal must be placed before that which concerns men in particular. He accounts for the third place only being assigned to νοῦς and φρόνημα by observing that it is not the divine mind which is here intended, but that mind, which is itself an element in the Mixture. This mind, according to him, is the truth spoken of above as one of the three conditions of combination. ‘For the mind is the sole home of Truth, which first gives a reality to things, and it occupies therefore, as a kind of mediator, a middle place between the universal generated good, and the particular good of man.’ Few readers will be satisfied with an explanation which accounts for the introduction of new and important matter into the very conclusion of an argument, by supposing an anticipation of what is to be said elsewhere. There is an end to the unity of the Dialogue, and, indeed, to all the laws of disputation, if we are suddenly to be informed of some most important doctrines, as to the proof of which we are left to guess (for no promise of the kind is held out) that it may be forthcoming on a future occasion. But the distribution of Schleiermacher is likewise so far unsatisfactory, that he does not explain in what respect the second class differs from the first. I cannot however assent to Trendelenburg’s objection to his view of the third class, that the mind which gives reality to things is the Supreme Mind, and consequently can have nothing to do with the νοῦς.
and ἀλήθεια, which are ingredients in the Mixture. For it is evident that the meaning of Schleiermacher is, that the mind here spoken of gives to us a sense of the reality of things, and is therefore convertible with ἀλήθεια, and is thus a fit intermediate between the Universe and Man. But this question will be better discussed when we have examined Trendelenburg’s own classification.

Trendelenburg himself understands the μέτρον καὶ μέτριον κ. τ. ἐ. to include all the three conditions of combination; for, according to his view, the first class contains the absolute Idea of Good and all those Ideas which are connected with it; and the second differs from the first, as being the realisation of these same Ideas in the Universe. But it is unaccountable why Plato, if he had intended the καλόν and ἀλήθεια to occur twice in his enumeration, should have suppressed the latter altogether, and mentioned the former only in its secondary phasis; and altogether it is a strange way of indicating the same things, to designate them, first as absolute, and then as manifested in forms, by a perfectly distinct set of names. But the whole hypothesis rests on a translation which the words above quoted will not bear: "et quidquid ejusmodi aeternam naturam suscepisse credendum est." In the first place, ὅποσα χρή τοιαύτα νομίζειν κ. τ. ἐ. cannot be taken so: for this would be expressed by ὅποσα, τοιαύτες ὑπερ, χρή νομίζειν,—and though the order might be changed, the participle would still be indispensable.*

But even if we conceded such an interpretation, what would become of πρῶτον μὲν πη περὶ μέτρου? It is obvious that, in such a case, περὶ has neither meaning nor construction. But, above all, such an expression as “to have adopted (or received) the eternal nature,” is at variance with the whole method of Plato. For if the Good is to be sought for in these things, it must be because they are emanations or productions of it; whereas, according to this view, the Good is superadded to them, and that through their seeking it. But no one conversant with the language will understand ἡγίασα in the sense of παρειληφθέναι, or still less of

* The order has been changed, and most injuriously to the sense, on the authority of the Bodleian MS., from τοιαύτα χρή to χρή τοιαύτα. Χρή νομίζειν is plain enough when used of some conclusion, which, but for the argument, disputants would not have admitted. But what force or even sense is there in saying, ‘all such things as we are bound to believe have taken upon themselves the eternal nature?’ It is therefore evident that we must read ὅποσα τοιαύτα, and understand ὅποτε.
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And then, again, why have we the perfect? In speaking of a fact which has no reference to any particular time, the only proper tense would have been ἐκάθως. Those who feel these objections will not need to have them confirmed by a consideration of the unsuitableness of the sense thus extorted from them; and yet the sense is in itself very objectionable, because it would amount to this,—that Plato having sought, by a laborious argument, for that which had most affinity with the Good, at last found it—in the Idea of the Good! The continual allusions to this search, finding its neighbourhood, coming to its threshold, its taking refuge with the Beautiful and the like, all point to the true reading of the passage, which, by the slight change of ἩΙΠ into ὙΠ, removes all the objections alleged above.* It will not be necessary to do more than point out the other misconceptions on which Trendelenburg's explanations are built, viz. the supposed opposition between ἡρῴδαι and γενεῖς, which is annihilated by the particle αὖ, which shows that another kind is spoken of; and the notion that the third kind is the Idea considered subjectively, the Idea in so far as it is the ground of human knowledge. Surely if the Idea is not just this and nothing else, it is a mere abstraction, and Plato would not bid us look for the Good in that.

Stallbaum's view will be at once understood from the classification with which he accompanies that of Plato. 1. τὸ αἰτίον. 2. τὸ εὐμμεσομένον. 3. τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ πέρας. 4. τὸ καθαρὸν πέρας. 5. τὸ καθαρὸν ἀπειρον. Those who look for realities in Plato, and who believe that Plato looked for them himself, will never be brought to admit that his own desire—μεθαίνει πειράσθαι τὶ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀνθρώπην καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέρικεν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τίν' ἓδειν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτὲ μενεκτένον (64, 1) could be satisfied with a barren dialectic scheme, or that he would offer such a result to his readers. There is not a single hint (and we know how fond Plato is of hints) to show that he any longer dwells upon the fourfold division of γένη, propounded before. Nor does the classification of Stallbaum at all tally with that of Plato; for τὸ μετρὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριόν καὶ τὸ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὡς τοιαῦτα is such a way of expressing the Idea of the Good (which Stallbaum rightly looks

* For a further discussion of this point see Notes on the Text.
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upon as synonymous with αἰτιά) * as nobody would ever have thought of, unless he had been predetermined by some theory to find that meaning in the words: and this remark applies to many other interpreters of the passage under consideration.† As to the second class,—τὸ δυσμεσόμενον is, doubtless, equivalent to τὰ ὄντα; but I deny that τὰ ὄντα are intended, or could be conveyed, by such a periphrasis as τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν, καὶ τὸ τέλον καὶ ἴκανον, καὶ πάνθε ὑπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐ γιούτης ἑστίν. The only observation that need be made as to the third class, is, that it is a confusion in place of a division. The νοῦς which is αἰτία, (A), may be considered as πέρας, that is, the absolute Mind may be thought of only as contemplating its own Ideas. And, again, the νοῦς which is πέρας, (B), may be considered as so far αἰτία, that it imitates the productions of the νοῦς which is αἰτία. But B is identical with the fourth class, or ἐπιστήμη, and A is liable to the same objection as Trendelenburg's explanation; namely, that such a view supposes us to look for the Good in that which is no thing, but the mere common name or property of two things.

I will now venture to offer my own solution of these difficulties.

The Good which appeared most suitable for man was found in the combination of two human conditions. It is reasonable, then, to expect that in combination universally we approach most nearly to the universal Good; but combination depends upon three things—Measure, Beauty, Truth: and wherever we trace these, the Good cannot be far off. Now, we trace Measure in τὸ μέτρον, τὸ καλόν, and all that evinces adaptation of one to another; Beauty in τὸ καλόν, τὸ ἴκανον, τὸ τέλον, and all that is complete and harmonious in itself; Truth (subjective) in the νοῦς καὶ φερόνησις of man, as that wherein the real is distinguished from the seeming, and the eternal from the accidental: νοῦς ὦ ἤτοι ταύτων καὶ ἀληθεία ἑστίν, ἡ πάντων ὁμοίωτα. (65, ν.) But why do the three occur in this order? Not because there is any superiority of προσβεία or δύναμις in any of them, as in the case of τάγα-θόν, but because there is a difference between them as to priority

* * Phaed. 97, f0ll. Tim. 30. A. Rep. 508, foll. Nevertheless, I entirely agree with Trendelenburg, that τάγαθόν and ὁ δημιουργός were held by Plato to be quite distinct.

† The very multiplication of kindred adjectives is a proof that we are to find one object in many, not to contemplate an Idea in itself.
in thought, or because the sphere in which they are exhibited differs as to extent. Everything in the whole universe presents an example of τὸ μέτρων in some form or other; this, therefore, comes first. One of the results of this adaptation is the perfection of individual things as to beauty or use (τὸ ἱππονόν); and this, being a result and part of the former, is placed after it. The least comprehensive of the trio is Intellect and Thought; to these therefore, as the embodiment of Truth, (whence it is plain that the pure speculative faculty is meant) the third place is assigned. In the fourth place come the subordinates of νοῦς, viz. the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs. Nor are we unprepared for this division, since all along νοῦς has been used to express either the Divine Intelligence or the Human indifferently; whereas it is to the latter that, the practical faculties belong so that when the corresponding division to that of ἐπιστήμη had to be made, it was made not in νοῦς, which did not admit of it, but in the ἐπιστήμη. The Pure Pleasures will naturally come next in order.

It may be objected that something more than a greater extent of sphere is implied in the question in p. 64, c: Τὰ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἔμπνευσιν τιμωτάτον ἀμα καὶ μάλιστε αἰτίον τ. τ. ἦ, which is answered by naming τὸ μέτρων; with the further remark that from μέτρου κάλλος necessarily flows, so that the first would seem to be upheld as the antecedent condition, and the second as one of the effects of that condition. In like manner also it may be said that the third, which in the inquiry figures as ἀλήθεια, but in the declaration of the verdict is called νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις (a variation which is accounted for by the paragraph at the end of p. 63, Ὅ δέ γ' ἑμέτερος λόγος τ. τ. ἦ;) is spoken of as necessary to the καθήσεις, only because, as had been formerly said, without Truth “no true mixture can be made, nor, being made, exist”; so that this also is inferior to the first, because, though it is a condition as the other is, it is one in the quality of the ingredients, and not lying in the very conception of all mixture.

But this mode of explanation does not help us when we come to enquire why ἀλήθεια is postponed to κάλλος; why, if Socrates had intended to bring these three as rival claimants into competition, and to assign them their places according to their comparative merits, he should have made that remarkable state-
ment at the beginning of p. 65, Ὑποῦν ἐξ μὴ μὲς δυνάμεθα ἱδέως ἱγαθῶν θηρεύσας, σύντριτοι κ. τ. ἦ.; and lastly, why, in mentioning the three, which he does seven or eight times, he observes no order, but places any one of them indifferently in the middle or at either extreme of the series.

It must be remembered that the main object of enquiry is to ascertain the relative claims of Intellect and Pleasure to the name of Good, and that the question arising out of this is, not What is the Good, but Where is it? To such a question the first answer would naturally be in Measure, which is the largest sphere, (because Measure contains all things,) and in things according to Measure, which are in fact all things made conformably to the great pattern, the οὐ ηενεα, according to which the supreme αἰτία works. In brief, the wider and more populous region deserves the first mention in a question of dwelling-place, or place of manifestation, such as has here been the object of search. If we do not understand Plato thus, there is no other possible way of understanding him except as intending to tell us that mere Form is a better thing than Beauty, and Beauty than Reason, which is quite incredible.

This way of explaining the enumeration of the classes is very different from that which is given in an author quoted by Sto-bœus Ecl. Etk. ii. 6, 4, Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἄγαθον τὴν ἱδέαν αὐτῆς ἀποφαίνεται, ὅπερ ἕστι θεῖον καὶ χαριστὸν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐκ φυσικὴς καὶ ἡδονῆς σύνθετον, ὅπερ ἐνίοτε δοκεῖ κατ' αὐτό εἶναι τέλος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνου ζωῆς· τρίτον αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς φύσης· τέταρτον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν σύνθετον· πέμπτον αὐτὴν καὶ άυτὴν τὴν ἡδονῆν. This division is expressly referred to the Philebus; but when we consider that the writer was himself making a system of Plato's definitions, and dividing them under the heads τῷ γένει, τοῖς τόποις, τοῖς εἴδεις, we are prepared for a little straining of his author to suit his theory. The objections to this theory are the same as have been urged against Stalbaum, and may be summed up in this, that such a division is not reconcilable with the language of Plato. At the same time, I do not deny that Measure and all its cognates, are, according to Plato, the nearest approach to the Idea, nor that the κοινὸς βίος in its quality of ἰκανόν will come under the second denomination, in that it partakes of it; but in a discussion as to
what causes make a certain thing an object of choice, in ascer-
taining which, we find the Good, it is absurd to class the thing
itself as one of the results of our search. Else indeed, it might
be thought to have an equal right to the first place; but Plato
seems to have confined this to the instances of antecedent suitable-
ness, or of the modes of combination, and to have reserved for
the second those things which owe their own excellence to such
combinations.

The parts in this Dialogue which are confessedly Pythagorean,
namely the power of Number, the elementary and opposite pro-
perties of πίς and ἀπέχον, and the distinction between Empiri-
cal and Mathematical knowledge as applied to music, could not
be better illustrated than by setting before the reader the Ex-
tracts from Böckh's Philolaus, and the fragments of Philolaus
himself, which bear upon these topics. These will be found in
the Appendix. A few other Extracts from different authors are
added in order to illustrate various matters touched upon in the
course of the Dialogue.

For all other more or less certain information, such as the
bearing of the Philebus on the rest of the Platonic doctrines,
the date of its composition, its intrinsic value as a contribu-
tion to Moral Philosophy etc., I must leave the reader to those
who profess to teach them; I have been content to confine my-
self to the task of endeavouring to understand what appeared
on the face of the text, and of ascertaining as far as possible
the very words of the author, unencumbered by the additions of
ignorant men, and set free from the blunders of negligent trans-
scribers. I have trusted no other MS. authority save that of the
Bodleian in the first place, and of the Coislinian in the second.
Where these guides have failed to satisfy me, I have endeavoured
to constitute the text according to the principles of Criticism,
without caring to suit the taste or to defer to the prejudices of
any School. Much that I had spared, and even tried to defend,
in a former Edition I now unhesitatingly condemn, whether I
have seen my way to correcting it or not. I have known critics
to be charged with making difficulties and fancying faults for the
pleasure of displaying their ingenuity in conjecture. The charge
shows a thorough ignorance of the very frame of mind in which
a critical scholar is obliged to work: such an one well knows
that, if he durst so tamper with his own sense of truth, he would most certainly and speedily injure the one instrument on which he relies for success, his judgment. Others there are who treat all conjecturing as at best an effort of wit, and a pretty pastime. Such persons seem not to have considered that, if the ἑπιστροφή of verbal criticism consists of changes of similar letters and compendia, transpositions, bracketings and indications of hiatus, the πέρας which is to bring these elements to a γένεσις is, not a dithyrambic ecstasy which exults in its own contortions and tosses about wildly whatever it picks up, but a cold, severe, watchful calculation of probabilities, which shuns all outbreaks of fancy as interruptions of its work. But why should any one try to expostulate with the gainsayers? Some of them are too ignorant of the language to see any faults, and therefore cannot see the use of corrections. And yet it is useless to tell them so, for they can count on the applause of the many hundred minds which they have perverted. Some have tried verbal criticism and failed; and hate the pursuit which would not gratify their vanity and yield them fame. Let us dismiss the former with:

εὐδαιμονίαν ἔχον ἔχειν ἔχειν εἰς.

and the latter with:

ἀπολογεῖν ἁμήν, ἤπει σὺ δισταχεῖς;

The only kind of observation to which I do not feel indifferent, is the imputation of having offered the corrections of others as my own. But this I anticipate by saying that I possess no edition of Plato later than that of Didot, and no Philological journal except the two series of the Mnemosyne. If any one has claims on aught that appears in this Book, let him give me the opportunity of righting him, and I shall be thankful for it.
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΔΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΡΧΟΣ, ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

1. "Ορα δή, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλήβου δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρ’ ἐμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἐὰν Β μὴ σοι κατὰ νοῦν ἦ λεγόμενος. βούλει συγχειραλλομένως ἔκάτερον;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φιλήβος μὲν τοῖνυν ἄγαθὸν εἶναι φησὶ τὸ χαίρειν πάσι ζῴωι καὶ τίνι ἥδουν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τοῦτο σύμφωνα: τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἐμῖν ἀμφισβητήσῃ ἔστι μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνήσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιτών

Πρώταρχε! The dialogue is supposed to commence at the moment when Socrates turns from Philebus to Protarchus. When the speaker changes his address from one person to another, or from several to some one or more out of the whole number, σο is often omitted before the vocative, as in Πατρ. 136 δ.; Συμπ. 216 Α, 217 β.; Ευθυδ. 296 ε.; Προτ. 358 Ε, 359 Α.; Φιληβ. 12 Α, 28 Β. The same omission also takes place when the speaker is represented as calling in an especial manner on the attention of the person addressed; as in Πατρ. 489 Α, 521 Α (where Callicles would fain let the conversation drop), Συμπ. 172 Α, 175 Α, 215 Ε; Ευθυδ. 293 δ, 294 ε, 295 δ. In Συμπ. 173 Ε, if a second ἐκατός is speaking (which is probably on other grounds), the omission may be accounted for in the same manner. I confess that in Προτ. 501 Α, Σοφ. 230 δ, 234 Ε, Ευθυδ. 500 Α, the reason is not so evident: though in the first three instances there is a suspension of the argument, and an appeal to the person addressed.

ἀγαθὸν] Not τάγαθον: for Philebus’ assertion is not represented as being one about The Good in itself, but merely this: that pleasure, and that which is akin to it, has a right to the name of good in its proper signification, which Socrates denies, while claiming the name for mind, knowledge and all things belonging to that class.

τέρψιν] Why not τὴν τέρψιν? Probably because verbal forms of this kind have less of the nature of the noun than ἀρετή, δόξα, θέσις; and because, as denoting a process, and not a state, they cannot assume the article without being thereby confined to a particular instance.

μὴ τάθει] not ἄγαθε εἶναι, but ἀμείωτο γένεσθαι, which is equivalent to ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα γένεσθαι. I have no doubt that τῆς γ' ἥδονῆς is an interpolation. A still worse one is δυνατείς, which was probably inserted to fill up a lacuna caused by the obliteration of the syllable το. There is no way of avoiding an absurd repetition, but to make μετασχημ α new subject, and this cannot be done without the article.

Platonis Philebous.
ΠΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΟΒΟΣ.

αὔξοντι, δόξαν τ' ὁδήγην καὶ ἄλλῃς λογισμοῖς, [τῇς γ' ἱδον- 

c νῆς] ἀμείων καὶ λόγῳ γέφυρασθαι ξύμποσιν, ὀσατερ αὐτῶν ἡνατὰ 

μεταλαβεῖν: τὸ δὲ μετασχεῖν ὑφελιμότατον ἀπάν-

tῶν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι τε καὶ ἐσομένοις. μὲν οὖν οὗτοι πῶς 

λόγοιν, ὃ Φιλῆβε, ἐκάτεροι;

ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὃ Σάκομας.

ΣΩ. Δέχει δὴ τούτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὃ Πρώταρχε, 

λόγον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι: Φιλῆβος γὰρ ἢμῖν ὃ καλὸς ἀπει-

ρηκειν.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπον παντὶ τάλισθ' πη περαν-

έραι;

ΠΩ. ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Θι δὴ, πρὸς τούτως διομολογησόμεθα καὶ τέκε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Ὅς τὸν ἢμῶν ἐκάτερος ἔχειν ψυχής καὶ διάθεσιν ἀπο-

φαίνειν τὶν ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμικὴν ἀνθρώποις πάσι τὸν 

τικόν εὐθαίμονα παρέχειν. ἀρ' οὖχ οὗτος;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν οὕμεις μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, οὕμεις δ' αὖ 

τὴν τοῦ 

φορεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. 'Εστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν ἀλλὰ τις χρείττων τούτων φανῇ; μὲν οὖν, 

Ε ἂν μὲν ἢδονή μᾶλλον φαντάζει ἕγγενής, ἤτοι μεθανεῖ 

μὲν ἀμφό-

τεροῦ τοῦ ταύτην ἐχόντος βεβαιῶς βίον, κρατεῖ δ' ὃ τῆς ἢδονῆς 

τοῦ τῆς φρονίμησιος;

Δέχει] It is a fond fancy of one of the Editors that δέχεσθαι the διδό-

γον is a proverb; and that the answer 

'Ἀνάγκη is in allusion to this. In the 

passage quoted for the purpose (Horph. 

c 499, c) τὸ παρόν εὖ ποιεῖσθαι is the popular 

saying referred to. The oracle given 

to Myceletos ἡγέρων δ' ἢ τι δὲ τις ἐπικεί,

"be content with your portion" is quoted indeed by the Parosomia-

graphers, but it is not alluded to here. 

I take this opportunity of restoring 

another proverbial saying to one of the 

so called Platonic Dialogues. (Amatares 

134, b) 'Εγὼ μὲν, ὃ Σάκομας, ὥρησι 

to λεγόμενον δὴ τούτο καὶ νῦν γγάνηι. 

Read καὶ νῦν γγάνηι. See Laches 198, 

δ, and the Scholium thereon.

ΣΑΚΟΜΑΣ] The place of this word and 

its redundancy, to say nothing of the 

technical character of the word itself, 

inclines me to put καὶ διάκεισθαι in 

brackets.

ταῦτα ἐχόντων The common reading 

is ταύτα, which is explained as referring 

to the κρείττα φανήσαι; but though 

ἐχόντων might be used in such a sense, 

ἐχόντων βεβαιῶς shows that a real pos-

session is intended,—that is, the ἐχόν 

καὶ διάκεισθαι γγάνηι spoken of above.
ΠΡΩ. Ναλ.

ΣΩ. Ἀν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικᾶ μὲν φρόνησε τὴν ἡδονήν, ἡ δ' ἦτταται; ταῦτα συνεχείς ὑμολογούμενα φατε, ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔμοι γαίνον δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ Φιλήβου; τί φῆς;

ΦΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονή δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξα. σὺ δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσει.

ΠΡΩ. Παραδοὺς, ὁ Φιλήβε, ἢμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔτι χύσως εἶχες τής πρὸς Σωκράτη διολογιᾶς ἦν καὶ τούτων ἱπτομένων.

ΦΙ. Ἀληθὴς λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἁφορισθάμεν καὶ μαρτύρομαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ἥρων.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἢμεῖς σοι τούτων γ' αὑτῶν υπομάρτυρες ἐν εἴμεν, [ὡς ταῦτ' ἔλεγες ἢ λέγεις]. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἔξεσαι, ὁ Σωκράτες, ὑμας καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβου ἐκώντος ἢ ὡς ἐν ἐθέλῃ περιφέρεσθαι περαινεῖν.

Nor again is it conceivable that Plato would indicate these by a neuter plural, or by any plural at all, since they are not really two things, but the same thing differently viewed. The confusion between the apostrophus and the componendum for τῆς is one of the commonest which occur in manuscripts. I have changed τοῦ τ. φ. into τοῦ τ. φ. It is ridiculous to appeal to Greek Tragedy as a standard of prose syntax. The apories passage in the Birds (v. 420) κρατεῖν μὲν τὴν ξύλων, which is worthy of ὄμοιοιον ὕπερελίθοι which follows it.

ὁ δ' ἦτταται.] I formerly proposed τῆς δ' ἦτταται, but this would be almost as much a repetition as the other. Perhaps the redundancy is due to the construction with μὲν, which was wanted for the sake of emphasis.

δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξα. Unless we are prepared to suppose with Stallbaum that a certain climax is intended in these words, 'οἰκετή, et vero etiam oie- dels' we must believe τε to be indispensable, though 'all the MSS.' (that is, two independent sources, and the copies made from them) omit it.

ἀφορίσθω] Literally, yourself shall determine; you shall do as you please. Gorgias 505, c. Ἔρχετε τι σώμα ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τοῦ λόγον κατα-
ΣΩ. Πειρατέον, ἀλ' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς θεοῦ, ἢν ὥδ' Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσαθαί φησι, τὸ δ' ἀληθεσσατον αὐτῆς ὅνομι ἦδον· ἔλναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἕμων δέος, ὡς Πρώταχθε, ὁπ' ἓργος τα τῶν θεῶν ἀνόματ' οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἀνθρωπόν, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τινὶ τῶν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὡς 'εκεῖνη φίλον, ταύτῃ προσαγωγοῦν· τὴν δ' ἢδον' ὅδ' ὡς ἔστι πουκίλον, καὶ ὃπερ ἔλεον, ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχιμένους ἐκθεμείοθαπτο δεὶ καὶ σκοπεῖν ἵντινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκολεῖν μὲν ὄντως ἀπλῶς, ἐν τι, μορφᾶς δὲ σῆμα παντοίας εἰληφε καὶ τινα τρόπον ἀνο-νοιτώς ἀλλήλαις. ἰδὲ γὰρ, ἦδεσαθαί μὲν φανεν τὸν ἀκολασταί-νοντ' ἀνθρωπόν, ἦδεσαθαί δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονου̃ν ἀπ' τῷ σωφρονεῖν· ἦδεσαθαί δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίοντα καὶ ἀνοητὸν δο-ξὼν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστῶν, ἦδεσαθαί δ' α' τὸν σοφ睿νου̃ν ἀπ' τῷ σωφρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἢδων ἐκάτερας πώς ἐν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἁνόητος φαινού̃ εὔδικως;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίον, ὡς Σώκρατες, αὐτῶν πραγμάτων, οὗ μὴν αὐτὰς γ' ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίον. πῶς γὰρ ἢδονή Ε' γ' ἢδονή [μή] οὐχ ἡμοιότατον ἐν εἰι, τούτω, αὐτὲ ἐκαθ' πάν-των χρημάτων;

ἀν' αὐτῆς δὲ] Some MSS. have ἀλ', it is impossible to decide between them while the rest of the sentence remains faulty. Every one will perceive that ἀρξεμένους, or ἀρχτῶν, or some word to that effect, must have dropped out.

Τὸ δ' ἕμων δέος] That this was the real feeling of Socrates as well as of the men of his time is plain from many passages. Compare Cratylus 400, ε' where nevertheless he regards the current names of the Gods as of human invention. The fear is that there is more risk of offending Ἀφροδίτην, by giving her a new name, though even the old one is not certainly correct, or free from offence.

'καίνη] This pronoun is here used in preference to ταύτη, because the person is in her own nature remote and invisible. In the next sentence, ἵναι τὰς ἐκείνης is put for ἤπα ταύτης, on account of ὅπερ εἶκον, which makes ἦδον ἀπ-pear not as the present subject, but as that of a former proposition.

ὁπερ' ἀπλῶς] There has been a strange scruple, whether these words, which are so commonly joined together, can be so here; and recourse has been had to the expedient of a comma in order to separate them. In the double contrast which follows it is to be observed, that on one side the healthy desires and the healthy intellect are themselves the source of the satisfaction, αὐτός τά σωφρονεῖν, αὐτός τά φρονεῖν, whereas their opposites are but the channels of pleasure. This is why he adds ἀνοητῶν δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστῶν.

ποις γὰρ κ. τ. ἕ. We have above πῶς σῶς δὴν φαντάσσε, which is the ordinary construction. The μή is nothing more than a result of carelessly reading ἸΔΟΝΔΙΟΥΧ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὃ διαμόνε, [χρώματι] κατὰ γ’ αὐτὸ
tοὐτ’ οὖδὲν διόδει, τὸ χρῶμ’ ἐναι τὰν’ τὸ γε μὴ μέλαν τῷ
λευκῷ πάντες γυνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ
ἐναντίωστατ’ ὧν τυγχάνει’ καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα [σχῆματι] κατὰ
tαῦτ’ γένει μὲν ἐστὶ πάν ἐν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοὺς μέρεσιν αὐτῶν
tὰ μὲν ἐναντίωστα’ ἀλλὰ’ τὰ δὲ διαφόροτα’ ἔχοντα μισθάν
ποὺ τυγχάνει. καὶ πάλλ’ ἑτερ’ οὖτως ἔχονθ’ εὐρήσομεν, ὡστε
tοὐκ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τάνακτωστ’ ἐν
ποιούτη. ὑφοδομοῖ δὲ μὴ τινὸς ἱδονᾶς ἱδονᾷς εὐρήσομεν
ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως’ ἀλλὰ τὶ τοῦτ’ ἡμῶν βλαβεί τὸν λόγον;
ΣΩ. Ὡτι προσαγορευέσαι αὐτ’ ἄνομοι ὅν’ ἔτερον, φήσο-
μεν, ὑνόμαι. λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθά πάντ’ εἶναι τὰ ἱδέα. τὸ μὲν
ἀν’ ὑμι’ οὐχ ἡδέα ἐναι τὰ ἱδέα λόγου οἰδεῖς ἀμφιβολεῖς· κακὰ δ’
ὁν’ αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά δὲ, ὡς ἡμείς φαμέν, ὑμοὶ σὺ
προσαγορευέσαι [ἀγαθ’ αὐτά] ὑμολογοῦν ᾧν ἄνομοι εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ,

[χρώματι] This addition is due to
some blunderer, who made two
sentences out of one. Had κατὰ γ’
been the beginning of a new sentence
we should have had some conjunction.
The same reason applies to σχῆματι. Any
one may see how much elegance is
 gained by their omission.

μου[λας] This is to be understood not
of the number of differences, but of the
extent of some particular differences.
Comp. Ἀπολογ. 25, c. εν περί 
τηλικης μουλας 

φοβομεν μη μη] Compare, among
other passages, Ἱππ. 651, η.; Φάηδο
84, η., φοβομεν μη διακεχομαι, and Arist.
Nub. 498, ἐδοκον τα, ὁ πρεσβυτα, μη
πληγον δε." 

"Ον προσαγορευειση [Because, my side
will say, you call all these, though un-
ilike each other, by a new common name.
This would be assuming a second ground
of agreement between them; for that
they agree in being pleasures is proved
by their common name of pleasure; but
it does not follow that they agree in
anything else, as, for instance, in being
good. But if Protagoras asserts that
they are all alike, and yet must con-
fiess that they are not alike good, he
is bound to mention some other ground
of likeness. Socrates therefore cannot
be introduced as asking him for a proof
that they are ἀγαθας, but as wanting
to know, forasmuch as they do not agree
in this respect, in what else they do
agree. But the received text makes
him say: "You know they are not all
"good, and you are ready to admit that
"they are so far unlike; and yet you
"call them all good": which is so ab-
surd that I have changed ὑμως into
ὑμως, and put ἀγαθας αὐτα and ἀγαθων
eισιν in brackets. The worse MSS. have
πάντα before συ. Had Plato written it,
his would certainly have placed it imme-
diately next to αὐτά; but it is due to
a misconception of the meaning, caused
by ὑμως. I have supplied ὑν after
ὑμολογων, τε before ταις, and ταις be-
fore ἀγαθας for obvious reasons. The
restoration of ὑν is necessary for the
sense; it was probably absorbed by the
following word.

τῷ λόγῳ] This belongs to ὑνομα: for
προσαγορευειν implies ὑνομα, and
the ground of the ὑνομα is in the λό-
γος or description. It is worth while
to quote a passage from the Laws
which bears on this point, and which
has been suffered to remain hitherto in
a very corrupt state. Legg. 895, 896,
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ

τι τίς σε προσαναγράξοι. τί οὖν δή ταῦτα ἐν τε ταῖς κακαῖς
δυοίως καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἁγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς [ἂν ἄθανόν εἶναι]
προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σάκρατε; οὔτε γὰρ τινα [συγγενή-
σεσθαί], ἔτεκεν ήδονὴ εἶναι τὰγάθων, εἰτ’ ἀνέξεσθαι σοι λέ-
ς γονός τάς μὲν εἶναι τινας ἁγαθας ἡδονᾶς, τας δὲ τινας [ἐκε-
ρας] αὐτῶν κακᾶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὖν ἀνιμοίους γε φήσεις οὐτάς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι
καὶ τινάς ἥπαντίας.

ΠΡΩ. ὸστι καθ’ ὦσον γ’ ἡδονή;

ΣΩ. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φρεόμενα λόγον, ὦ Πρώταρχε.
οὐδ’ ἢ ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πόσας δυοίως εἶναι
φήσωμεν, καὶ τὰ παραδειγματά ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δῆ λεχέντες’ οὑδὲν
τιτρώσκειν, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐρουμεν ἀπερ οἱ πάντων φαυλ-
αὶ ταῦτα τε περὶ λόγων ἡμα καὶ νέοι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποία δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. "Ὅτι σε μιμοῦμενος ἕγιο καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἕν τολμῶ
λέγειν ὡς τό ἀνιμοιοτατὸν ἄστι τῷ ἀνιμοιοιτάτῳ πάντων ὄμοιο-

"Εστι (τι) ποι γίνα διανοιμένον ἐν
ἀλλοις τε καὶ ἐν φρείμα: τοῦτο δῆ
tο κατ’ ἐρμικόν ἄνω μὲν "Ἀρτιον,
λόγος δι’, Ἀριστοκράτης διαφορέμενος εἰς ὅποια
διὸ μένη. . . . . . Μᾶν οὖν ὧν ταῦτα
ἐκατερός προσαγορεύεσθαι, ἐν τὸ τὸν
λόγον ἐρωτημένοι τοῦτον ἐσφαλδαὶμέν,
ἐν τὸ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, "ἐρτιν" ὄν-
ματι, καὶ λόγῳ, "βία διαφορόμενο
ὑμισῶν" προσαγορευόμενος ταυτὸν δὲ;
. . . . Εἰ δ’ ἐστι τοῦτ’ οὔτως ἔχον,
ἀρ’ ἔτι (τι) ποιοῦμεν, καὶ Ικανὸς δὲ-
δικαίως ψυχήν κ. τ. ἡ. (A little lower
down after γενόμενον supply φανετός γς.)

[συγγερήσου] As εἶτα depends
immediately on the participle ἔκομεν, if
we retain συγγερήσουμεν we have two
infinitives συγγερήσουμεν and ἀνέξε-
σθαι with an equal right to a position
which cannot belong to more than one,
unless we suppose this to be Greek:
νομίζω συρρήνηται τοὺς ἀνέξεσθαις συγ-
γερήσον πάντες. Ἐτέρας is the sup-
plement of a man who had never heard
of τας μὲν τινας.

τυπρακτος] The MSS. have τυπρο-
σκες. But it cannot be said that "these
examples do not damage them"; but

only that they refuse to see it. Nor
could a new independent clause be
added by means of καί . . . οὔθεν in
place of συγγερήσου.
πατοῦ, ἕξω ταύτα σοι λέγειν, καὶ φανομένως γε νεώτερον τοῦ δόντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔκπεισόν οὐχίσεται, πάλιν οὖν αὐτῶν ἀνακρατίσθητα, καὶ τάχα ἵνα ἱόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ἵνας ἂν ποιῶς ἀλλήλους συγχωρήσωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλήθεια τῶν;

ΣΩ. Ἐμὲ θές ὑπάτα σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὁ Πρώτος.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ καὶ σοῦ δῆ.

ΣΩ. Φρονήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ κοῦ καὶ πάνθε ὁρᾶσαι δή κατ' ἀρχὰς ἡμῖν ἡμέρας εἴσον [ἄγαθον], διερωτομένος ὁ τι πνεῦ ἐστι τόμαθον, ἀμ' ὁ ταύτην παίσοντα σοῦ ἄπερ ὁ σῶς λόγος;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλαὶ δ' αἱ ἀνάλογαι ἐπιστήμης ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ ἀνάλογοι τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλους. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπαναλέον τη γίγνοντα τινες, ἃρ' ἀξίως ἂν εἶναν τοὺς, [διαλέγεσθαι τοὺς] εἰ ἧν φρονήσεως τούτ' ἀμφοτέρων μηδεμίαν ἀνάλογον φαιν ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμη γίγνεσθαι, καίπερ ἡμῖν ἀπ' ὅλον ὁ λόγος ἔσορρι μὴν ἀπολύμενον ὀχυρωτό, αὐτοὶ δὲ σωφροσύνη ἐπὶ τινος ἀλογίας;

βασταρισμοῦ τοῦ διόντος] Euthy. 295 ν, ἀρχαῖοτέρος εἰ τοῦ διόντος. Τhe latter is obviously the familiar expression, and that in the text a play upon it.

ἀνακρατίσθητα] This figurative expression, which is properly used of backing a ship, has induced some to believe that ἐκπεισόν οὐχίσεται is part of the same metaphor. But in all the instances given, ἐκπεισία is used of the casting away of a voyager, not of the stranding of a vessel. Its use here is rather singular, but it probably means nothing more than having failed. Why ἐκπεισία is in the middle voice, and whether αὐτῶν is genuine, others must determine. Perhaps we should read αὐτῶν.

tοῦ ὀμαλοῦ] We must supply λαβάς. The Scholastus explains the phrase as a metaphor from wrestling. Socrates, therefore, proposes that they should resume their former position as disputants, in order that he may show Protarchus the unfairness of the feint through which he sought to elude Socrates' question, by professing that he should consider himself bound to afford Protarchus the same grip or handle, that is to distinguish the kinds of ἐπιστήμη, when called upon to do so. As the phrase is ἐλείν, and not ἐκπεισία, εἰς λαβάς, it is better to read τάχα ἃν λάβα. With τάχα and ἂν used separately the ἃν is sometimes repeated even in prose. [ἀγαθόν] As διερωτομένος κ. τ. ἐ. contains the occasion—"which I mentioned when I was asked what was The Good",—the word ὁμαλός is as superfluous, as it is inelegant.

ἀξίω] It is altogether foreign to the spirit of Attic dialogue to speak of the being worthy of the honour of disputing &c.; and even if such a sentiment were allowed, it would have been expressed by ἄξιος διαλέγεσθαι without the article. But all that Plato wrote was: ἃρ' ἄξιος ἂν εἶναν τοὺς.

μὴδος ἀπολύμενος] It is not clear whether the original proverb was ὁ μὴδος ὄσει ὧτος οἱ ὁ μὴδος ἄπειλετο. Pho- tiius' testimony is in favour of the former: μ. ἔστη... Ἐπιφρονεῖται ὅταν λαγόμενον ὕπε ἔγκλαμα τοῖς λαγομένοις μὴ δος τοῖς παιδίσκοις. The Scholastus on
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὗ μὴν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆναι. τὸ γε μὴν μοι ἥτοι τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγον ἀφέσθειεν τολλαὶ μὲν ἰδοναι καὶ ἀνόμοιον μεγνέσθην, τολλαὶ δ' ἐπιστήμαι καὶ διάφοραι.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὥς Πρώταχε, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ τ' ἡμῶν καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατίθεντες δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἃτολμῶμεν ἢν τῇ ἐλεγχόμενοι μιρυσώσω, πέτερον ἰδονην τάγαθον δεῖ λέγειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι. νῦν γὰρ οὐ δήποτε πρὸς γ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεκοῦμεν, ὅπως ἄγω τίθεμα, τοῦτ' ἔσται τὰ νυκτὸν, ἢ ταῦθ' ἢ σῶ, τῷ δ' ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἦμᾶς ἀμφοτεροί ΠΡΩ. Δει γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ μᾶλλον δε' ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν παίσι δή; ΣΩ. Τὸν πάσι παρέχοντ' ἀνθρώποις πράγματα ἐκούσε τε καὶ ἄκουσεν ἐνιοῦ καὶ ἐνιοτε. ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φίλου πως περικόπτει θαυμαστὸν. Ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ τόλλα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν τολλά Θαυ-

this place, with less probability, explains ὅ μ. ἀπάλλετο, as used by those who find they are speaking to inattentive hearers; and he quotes the comic poets, Crates and Cratinus, as employing it, but without adding the passages. I suspect from the otherwise unnecessary redundancy in Rep. 621, ὅ μ. ἀπάλλετον kαὶ οὐκ ἀπάλλετον, that the latter is the original form, and that the former is Plato's own coinage. The allusion in this passage is to men suffering shipwreck and escaping on a raft. (Compare Phaedo 85, b.) And so the argument would, like a tale, come to nothing, and we should make our escape upon an unreason.

τολμῶμεν] This word appears to be the main difficulty of a sentence which has perplexed so many critics and editors; but for it I should have adopted Winckelmann's conjecture, and inserted ὅ λόγοι ἀπὸ ἑξιγόρουκα, but nothing can be determined with certainty till we know what alls τολμῶ-

μεν. Either some other verb has been corrupted into this, and we might read κατατίθεντες δ' εἰς τὸ μ. τῶν λόγων, ἀφέσθαι κ. v. a whole line has dropped out. The words ἀληθεστάτῳ-μεν-μεν would seem to favour the latter supposition, for there seems to be an allusion to the practice of giving up one's servant to the judicial "question". τολμῶμεν (ἐκατέρω τὸν ἕκαστον λόγον παρέχειν εἰς τὴν χρισθαν) ἐν τῇ x. τ. k. may serve to represent the sense of the missing clause. ἢ τι τρίτον ἄλλο] The best MSS. omit τι; but the sense is incomplete without it. I believe the right reading to be ἢ ἄλλο τι τρίτον εἶναι. See below 20, b, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον.

Τοῦτον τοίνυν] We should have expected τὸνε, for this λόγος has not yet been mentioned, but is now to follow. I am inclined to read τοῦτον. "Let us by question and answer make good the λόγος, not of you or me, but του ἀληθεστάτου."
μαστών λεκέδεν, και δέξιον άμφισβητήσαι τώ τοιτών ἀποτεθε- 
ούν τιθεμένοι.

ΠΡΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρωταρχον, ἕνα δ' 
γεγονότα φώτε, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους 
ἀλλήλους, μέγαν καὶ σιωπὸν τιθεμένος καὶ βαρόν καὶ κοδρόν 
τών αὐτών, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

ΣΩ. Σο μέν, ὃ Πρωταρχε, ἀφίημα τά δεδημεμένα τῶν 
θαυμαστῶν περί τό ἐν καὶ πολλά, συγκεκριμένα δ' ὡς ἐπος 
ἐπείν ὑπὸ πόνου ἡδη μή δεῖν τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀπετεθα, πατ- 
δαριαθεὶ καὶ δέξια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις εἰμόθειν ὑπολαμ- 
βατοτόν τόν γιγνεσθαι ἐπεὶ μὴ δὲ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις ἐκαστόν τά 
μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελών τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τό ἐν 
Εἰκεῖν εἶναι διομολογηθέντος, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελών ὧτι τέρατα 
δειγμάται σάνα, τό τε ἐν ὡς πόλλ' ἐστι καὶ ἀπειρα, καὶ τά 
πολλά ὡς ἐν μόνον.

Recto]

Affording a ready ob- 
jection against any one who advances 
νὴσιν ἔκαθεν π. τ. ἐ.] Unless καὶ 
joins ἐναντίους μετά τοὺς, it is of 
δεῖ, given up and admitted to be such 
the sense as clear and well-expressed 
as could be desired. Do you mean, 
when a man says of me Proterarchus, who 
then is as one by nature, that I am again 
many and opposite 'meis', bringing for- 
ward the same person as at once great 
and small, heavy and light, and so 
forth?

τῶν θαυμαστῶν] Rather θαυμάτων, 
Conjuring tricks. Συγκεκριμένα μή 
δεῖ, given up and admitted to be such 
ὡς ἐκείνοι στις ἐκείνοι πάντων. It is 
strange that one of the editors should 
not have known such a common usage.

ἐτέλ μηδὲ τά τοῖσιν] The proper con- 
struction would have been either, μηδὲ 
tῶν τοιούτων (ἐπετείκ θεῖν συγκεκ- 
ρούσοι), or ἐκαθεῖν τά τοῖσιν (συγ- 
κεκριμένοι, δεῖν αὐτῶν ἐπετείκ). But 
as the very form ἐκαθεῖ μηδὲ is col- 
loquial, a certain looseness of syntax is 
perhaps allowed, and the reader is left 
to supply μετάλλευσασε (ἐκαθεῖ ἐλέγχεσασ, 
προσφέρεσασ, δεῖν συγκεκρούσοι,) or any 
other passive answering to ἀπετεθα.

Otherwise we must look on τα τοῖσι 
as interpolated.

μέλη] Legg. 795, κ. μελῶν καὶ με- 
ρῶν. The MSS. and add. all exhibit 
μέλη τε καὶ ἄμα μέρη, which, if it 
means anything, means that the μέλη 
and μέρη are the same, whereas it is 
plain that μέρη is added because the 
body cannot be properly divided into 
μέλη only. If it were μέλη δ' ἄμα καὶ 
μέρη, there would be no objection to 
the word but its inutility. I have 
written ἄλλα, which is continually con-
founded with ἄμα by the copyists. In 
p. 17, δ' ἄμα ἐνοῦτο, the Bodleian and 
Vatican have made the opposite mis-
take.

Διομολογηθέντος] Having made 
another admit. Properly, having ad-
mitted each to the other. Διομολογη-
θέντι is to ὁμολογεῖν, what διελέγεσά 
is to λέγειν, διακελεύοσάκα to κελεύειν 
&c., δια and the middle voice together 
expressing reciprocal action. No one 
will regret to see συγκεκριμένα in 
the next speech of Proterarchus banished 
from the text; the wonder is, who could 
have taken it into his head to put it 
there. οὐ γὰρ δήν τοῖς συγκεκριμένα 
δημιουρεῖ, τα δὲ δεδημεμένα, ὅταν 
δέν, συγκεκρούσι.
ΠΡΩ. Ὧδε δὴ ποτὲ, ὦ Σίκιρτας, ἡκάθαρα λέγεις, δὲ μήπως [συγκεκριμένα] δεδῆσθαι περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τούτον λόγον;

ΣΩ. Οπότεν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μὴ τῶν γεγομένων τα καὶ ἀπολυμβάνων τις τε, καθάπερ ἄριστος ἡμείς εἴπομεν. ἐν-ταὐθὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν τῶν δὴ, συν-κεκυρίστη τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν ὅταν δὲ τις ἐν ἀνθρώπων προ-χειρῆ τιθέσθαι καὶ βοῶν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕν καὶ τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἕν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐκάθω καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ [πολυ-δή], μετὰ διαιρήσεως ἀμφιβαθής γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἰδικας δεὶ τοιαύτης εἶναι μονάδας ὑπο-λομβάνων ἀληθῶς ἀυσσας εἶτα πῶς αἱ τούτας, μᾶν ἐκάθων ὁδῶν ἀεὶ τὶς αὐτής καὶ μὴς γένειν μὴς ἀληθῶν προσεχω-μένης, ὅμως μὴ εἶναι βεβαιώτατα μᾶν ταῦτα μετὰ δὲ τούτο

ἐνταῦθι [So with Elmsley for ἐνταῦθι].

ἡ πολλὴ [πολυθή]. I once thought ἐποδή to be genuine, and therefore added δὲ after μετὰ; I am now convinced that the word is neither appropriate nor genuine, but supplied by a copyist who had in his head the well-known passage in the Phaedrus 248, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ή ἡ πολλὴ ἐποδή κ. τ. Λ. Then arises the great controversy as soon as we attempt to decide.—What else is needed? or what have we to do with the earnestness of the disputants, except indeed as a measure of their difficulty? But the difficulty being expressed, any other word is superfluous.

Πρῶτον μὲν When I endeavoured to explain this passage in a former edition, I maintained that there were only two questions proposed, although πρῶτον, εἰτα, μετὰ δὲ τούτο made it appear that there were three. As the text then stood, it was impossible to see more than two questions, that beginning with πρῶτον, and a second; for if εἰτα ..., μᾶν ταῦτα were considered as an independent question, and not rather as the beginning of that pronounced afterwards, the question would have been, how it was conceivable that that which is one and imperative should be nevertheless unchangeably one:—than which nothing could be more absurd. But the words πρῶτον, εἰτα, μετὰ δὲ τούτο ought to have opened my eyes to the absolute necessity of finding three points of enquiry, or, if they were not to be found, of treating the text as corrupt. I now feel confident that I have discovered the source of all the perplexity in the omission of μετὰ after ἐκάθως. The first question is: have these monads a real being? The second is; if each of them is one and not subject to the changes of γένεις and ἀληθῶς, how can we imagine it ever to vary in the least from this oneness? The third is; when it does so vary by entering into individuals, does the unity cease when the plurality begins, or are they concurrent?—in other words are the monads to be regarded as distributed into as many parts as there are individuals to partake of them, or as remaining as wholes in each individual, so that each monad is at once one in each, and again one in many? This last supposition is πάντων ἀδιαπάτητον, because in this case the one both agrees with itself and contradicts itself. Ἔρρα. 151, ἀ λυκοῦχον ἦτο διὸ θαύμα τοῦ εἴδους ἡ μέρους ἐκατον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μετα- λαμβάνον:—ποτέρος οὐδὲ δεξάται οὐδὲ διὸ ἐν εἴδος ἐν ἐκατον εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν, ἐν δὲ; ἡ καὶ; Ἡ γὰρ κα- λής ἐνεῖναι; ἢ ἅμα ἐν καὶ ταὐ- τῶν ἐν καθαρίᾳ χαρᾷ ἔκκω καὶ ἄν ἀληθὲς ἐνεῖται, καὶ νῷς αὐτὸ ἀυτὸ χαρὶ ἐν εἴπ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπελούσις εὔτε διεσπασμένης καὶ πολλὰ γεγονότων διὰ τῶν, ἐξ' ὅλην αὐτήν αὖτας κατείς, ὡς πάντων ἀδικοῦσαν φαίνουσι' ἄν, ταῦτα καὶ ἔν ἐμὲ ἐν ἔνι τε καὶ πολλοίς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐν οἷ καὶ πολλά, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐκεῖνα, ὡς Πρόταρχε, ἀπάθης ἀπορίας αὐτία μη καλὸς διαλογισθέντα καὶ ἐπορίας [ἐν] αὖ καλὸς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐν τοῖς χρή τοῖς ἡμᾶς, ὡς Σειστης, ἐν τῷ νῦν πρῶτον διατομήσασθαι;

ΣΩ. Ἐν γάρ ἐγὼ φαίνεσθαι ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντας τοινυν ἡμᾶς ὑπόλαβος συγκορεῖν σοι τοῦτο τὰ τοιαῦτα. Φίλοθεος δ' ἵσσος κράτιστον ἐν τῷ νῦν [ἐπε- ρωτώντα] μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.

ΣΩ. Εἰς τὸ τέλειον ὅσον τις [ταύτης] ἀξιοῖται, πολλὰς οἴσις δ' καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβηθοῦμένα μάχης; ἄρ' ἐνθέντε;

ΠΡΩ. Πώς;

ΣΩ. Φαμέν πον ταῦταν ἔν καὶ πολλά ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενον περιτρέχειν πάντη καθ' ἐκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἐκεῖ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτ' ὅτε μὴ παύσησαι ποτ' ὅτε ἤρξατο

επιφάνειας κ. τ. 4.] Not δύναι but ἐστὶ being understood, the construction with ἄν is a barbarism. The sense is not conditional; for we have the statement of a fact founded on experience no less than its opposite. The appearance of ἄν in the text is due to a repetition of αὖ, and a subsequent attempt to correct what should have been expunged.

τὰ τακαδῷς] One would rather have expected ταῦτα ταύτα, for this does not refer to the ἐν κ. π., but to the proposed investigation.

Φίλοθος] The proverbial saying was μὴ κινεῖν κακὴν εὖ κείμενον: for κακῆν he puts Φίλοθος. We had better let well alone, and not ask Philebus for his consent. But ἐπερωτώντας thus placed before μὴ κινεῖν would make it appear that the participate is a means not τοῦ κινεῖν, but τοῦ μὴ κινεῖν; and as it is quite superfluous, there can be little doubt of its origin.

[τακαδῷς] I have cancelled this word without hesitation. He is not going to begin a ἀρχή; but to begin a subject, of which the very beginning point is difficult to find, because almost everything is a matter of controversy. Besides ταύτης μάχης is bad Greek.

Φαμέν πον] The construction is not φ. π. ἐν κ. π. ὅ. λ. ταῦταν γιγνόμενα (Stallb.), for if Socrates had spoken here of the reconcilement effected between the one and the many by dialectics, it is inconceivable that Protarchus should answer, εἰ τις τρόπους ἔχει καὶ μηχανή τῇ τοιαύτῃ ταραχῆν ἥμεν εἰς τοῦ λόγου εἰμινείς πως ἀπελεύθην. Nor are the young men described as delighting in the discovery and exercise of the synthetical and analytical processes, but on the contrary, in the sophistical employment of this contradiction which is the inherent property (ἀξίωσαν καὶ ἄγριως πᾶσας) in all objects of conception, by which they throw into perplexity both themselves and others. Either therefore we must read ταῦταν . . . γιγνόμενον, or suppose that πολλὰ has by attraction affected the number of the participate, which, considering the presence of ἄν, is most unlikely.

παύσησαι] I formerly wrote παύση-
ταί in obedience to Dawes' Canon. But it is only in the older Attic that the first sorist subjunctive with οὗ μὴ need excite our suspicion; whereas οὗ μὴ with the future in this sense I take to be a poetical usage.

πάντα καὶ λόγων This is an allusion to the proverbial saying πάντα λέοντα καῦσι. But the expressions ἐκ θαύμα τέρα κυκλών, and πᾶλιν διείλθησαν, rolling them up one way, and again unrolling them another allude to the manner of handling a volume. Συμφωνοῦμεν εἰς καὶ διαφωνῆσαι are added to shew the application of the figurative words.

Δέγγον ὑστερόν This I have written in lieu of ἁλόγγον καὶ καλέ, which would mean nearly sparing. The repetition οὕσυς οὕσης was probably treated by some copyist as a blunder, and one half was left out. Then came the corrector who felt the want of a conjunction and inserted καλέ. I agree with Stallbaum as to the spuriousness of οὗ μ. τ. δ.; but ἐκλ. β. γε shews that some bolder asser- tion has just been made, and justifies τ. δ. ζ. In the next sentence I have added καλέ, because Protarchus gives two grounds for Socrates' fear, their number and their youth.

Σκέψισι 6] In this sentence Protarchus is made to offer two suppositions; "if it is possible either to conjure away the perplexity, or to find some other method of investigation", I believe that the second alternative is Socrates' suggestion. Στὶς τις τρόπος καὶ μη-χανή καλλὶς δὲν ἄνευρεν is in itself a clumsy circumlocution for τὴς τις καλλὶς δὲν, and what is the subject of ἄνευρεν? Σὲ or ἄνευς cannot be understood; καὶ δὲ would imply that the two requests put into the mouth of Protarchus are not alternative; but if so, the latter must be the means to the former, and in that case what becomes of roasting the difficulty out of the way? Σὺ τῷ πρόξυμῳ τούτῳ is quite proper as answering to τὴν τα-ρχὴν ἀπελεύθη, but as the clause now stands in immediate dependence on ἄνευρεν, πρόξυμῳ is not only enough, but rejects anything between itself and the infinitive. The New Way is said to be ἔτι τὸν λόγον, instead of out of it. For these reasons, and because it is more in keeping that Socrates should be the first to suggest some other method, I condemn δὲν —— ἄνευρεν as spurious, and ἀνέρτως as invented to give it currency. As in most cases of this kind, the interpolator has borrowed his words from the neighbourhood, καλλὶς ὑστερόν from Socrates' next speech, ἄνευ-ρετῆ from his last but one.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ.


d λέγεις, ἐὰν τις τρόπος ἐστι καὶ μηχανή τήν [μὲν] τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἠμῖν ἔχω τοῦ λόγου εἰμινὸς πως ἀπελθεῖν, [ὅδεν δὲ B τινα καλλίων ταύτης ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνεφεῖν.] σοὶ τε προθυμίῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· σοὶ γὰρ συμ-χρός οἱ παρὸν λόγος, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὅμως, γὰρ οὖν, ὥσ παιδεῦς, ὥς φασὶν ἡμᾶς προσεγγισθεῖν Φίλησσας· οὐ μὴν ἢστι καλλίων ὅδος οὕτῳ ἀν γένοιτο, ἢς ἐγὼ ἕφασις μὲν εἰμί αἱ, πολλὰς δὲ μὴ ἢδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρχομαι καὶ ἄπορον κατάστησαιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τῆς αὐτῆς; λέγεσθαι μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἦν δηλοῦσαι μὲν οὖν πάντα χαλεπῶν, χρησάθω δὲ παγ- C χαλεπον. πάντα γὰρ οὗτο τέχνης ἐκόμισθ' ἀνεφεῖν πώποτε, διὰ ταύτης φανερά γέγονε. σκότει δὲ ἦν λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγέ μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἠθεὶς μὲν εἰς ἄνθρωπος ὅσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθεὶν ἐκ θεῶν ἐφρήσῃ διά τινος Προμηθέως οἷα φανο-τάτη τινι ππερ' καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ, χρεῖτον τῶν ἤκουσεν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, τὴν φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς ἐκ ἐνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄνων τῶν αἱ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπετίθαι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐξισφυτῶν ἐχόμενον. δειν οὖν ἡμῖν τόι—D τον οὕτω διακοςμημένων αἱ μὲν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἐκά-

θεμέλιον [ἡγείται] It is difficult to see how these words can be reconciled, for how can a man look for that which he has already laid down? I strongly suspect that the passage originally ran thus; αὐτὸ μὲν ἱδέαν πρὸς παντικά ἐκα-

στοτε ἑθήνους, εὐφρήσειν γὰρ ἔνοικον, μετὰ μὲν ἱδέαν ἔτη.

[metallabemen] metallabomen is the reading of the MSS., which Stallbaum in vain endeavours to defend. In place of adopting Stephens' conjecture, κατα-

λάβομεν, I suspect that the copyist had at first omitted the verb, and written the following metá, and then on dis-

covering his mistake, neglected to place the usual dots over the superfluous letters. I have therefore put metá in brackets.

τῶν ἐν ἑκάσεων Αὐτ., with Stallbaum's approval, reads τῶν ἐν ἑκάσεω, i.e., τὰ ἑκάστα. But we must not adopt any correction of this passage which re-

moves ἑκάσα, for this ἑκάσα is evidently re-

ferred to immediately afterwards, where it is distinguished from τὸ κατ' ἄρχον ἑκάσα. But as the subordinate Ones are to be distinguished from the original One, this can only be done by speaking of the former as ταὐτά, and the latter as ἑκάσει; and this is as fatal to Schütz's conjecture—τὸ ἑκάσεων ἑκα-

στον, as it is to the received reading.

But what should prevent Plato from using τὸ ἐν, τῶν ἐν, τοῖς ἐν, if he had occasion for a plural? Thus below we have ἑκάσα τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμίν. For this reason I incline to read either τῶν ἐν ἑκαστον or τῶν ἐν τῶν ἐκαστορ ἑκα-

στον.

τολλά [καὶ ἐπηρε] It is possible by application to discover τὸ τολλά ὅπως ἔστι: but all the dialectic in the world will not enable you to find τὸ ἐπηρε ὅπως ἔστι. It is therefore inconceivable that Socrates should bid them "not only see that the original ἑκάσα is one, and many, and indefinite, but also how many it is." The word αὐτὸῦ in τῶν ἑκάσιων αὐτοῦ refers to πλῆθος.

τοῖς δὲ ἐπηρε] See Addenda.

οἱ δὲ τῶν κ. τ. ἀ.] This passage has been corrupted and interpolated so as to become quite unintelligible. I have changed βραχύτερον into βραχύτεραν, and separated the genuine parts of the sentence from the spurious. It is im-

possible to make ἑκάσα καὶ τολλά either quickly or slowly; for they are not things of man's making, but ready to his hand. What your modern captious disputers do, is to make ἑκάσα to be ἐπηρε without passing through the intermediate stages. As to βραχύτεραν, compare Pæ-

leüssus 279 c, διττ μάλιστα διὰ βραχύναν
taὐξάνειν ἐπηρε.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ μὲν πως, ὡς Ἀποκρατεῖ, δοκῶ σου μανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἐκεί σαφέστερον ἔσομαι ἡ λέγεις ἀκούσαι.

ΣΩ. Σαφές μή, ὡς Ἀποκρατεῖ, ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ἡ λέγει, καὶ λάμβανε αὐτὸ ἐν τούτοις οἶς ταῦτα καὶ πεποίθενσαι. Β. ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἔστιν τοὺς μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἤκουσα, καὶ ἀπειρὸς αὐτῷ πλήθεια, πάντων τε καὶ ἐκατόσου.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μή?

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδέτερον γε τούτων ἐσμέν πως σοφοί, οὐθ' ὅτι τὸ ἀπειρον αὐτῆς ὅμοιον οὐθ' ὅτι τὸ ἐν' ἀλλ' ὅτι πώς τα ἐστι καὶ ἡπὶ, τὸν' ἔστι τὸ γραμματικὸν ἔκατον ποιοῦν ἡμῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῶς τάτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μή καὶ τὸ μονοτρίχον ὅ τιρχάνει ποιοῦν, τὸν' ἔστι ταῦτών.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἔστι οἱ μία [ἐν αὐτῇ].

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὗ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὲ ἔστων, βαργ' καὶ ὁδυ', καὶ τρίτων ὁμότονοι.

ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. ὅτες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὕτω σοφῶς ἐν εἰς τὴν μονοτρίχην εἰδώς ταῦτα μόνα, μή δὲ εἰδώς ὅς γ' ἐπος εἰπέτι εἰς ταῦτα οὐδένος ἄξιος ἔστιν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὡς φίλε, ἐπειδ' ἂν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα ὅποσα

ἐν τούτῳς οἰσπερ] Either ὡς οἰσπερ, or ἐν τούτῳς ὡς οἰσπερ.

οὐδέτερον] The books have οὐδὲν ἐπέ-

ρω, which is inadmissible. οὐθ' ὃ ἐπέ-

ρω for ὡς οὐδέτερον would be accord-

ing to Attic usage. But if he were speaking of that whereon a man is skilled, he would say οὐδέτερον, not ὡς οὐδέτερον; the dative expresses that whereby he becomes skillful.

Φωνῇ μὲν τοῖς] The text follows the inferior MSS. in reading χαί τα——. χαί is so useful an addition, that one is justified in adopting it; nor is τὰ χαί ἐκείνον a likely variation for a scribe to have made de suo. I formerly thought that χαί ἐκείνη must refer to the first mentioned art, that of grammar, but οὖτος and ἐκείνος, though never used capriciously, as some learned men tell us, sometimes apply not to the greater or less proximity of mention, but to that of interest, as in the beginning of the Euthydemos, or to the different degrees of familiarity, as here. Of ὡς αὐτῇ I can make nothing, unless we transpose it to a place where it would be welcome if not necessary. Δύο δὲ οὗτοι ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ.

διαστήματα] These intervals are
nothing more than musical notes; δροι are musical proportions. See Plat. Τιμ. μεσα 36, b, and Cicero's translation.

[The particle γάρ marks the resumption of an incomplete sentence. The antithesis between τότε ἐγένετο σοφός, and ἔμμορφος γέγονας, is a poor verbal contrivance, and the tenses are strangely chosen, ὅταν κάρης, ἐγένετο, ὅταν ἦλθης, γέγονας. Stallbaum translates the last word by "erades" which would answer to γεγο- νας ζητε. 'Εγένετο may be defended by the well known usage of the aorist; compare παράγεγοντο in 46, κ. If the words οὕτως—γέγονας were omitted, nobody would miss them. I have followed the Bodleian in ζητεν τε for ζηταν δὲ, and in τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπὸν ὑπο. That a writer can if he likes, break his sentence so as to give more emphasis to the second half, by introducing such terms as ὀλλά συ- τε κατὰ νόμον ἀγαπεῖ τὴν στὴν δίκην, οἵμα τε καὶ ἕκα τὴν ἀρετὴν, in place of συ- τε, —ἐγὼ τε, no one will deny. But here the speaker begins with a

general precept, and then applies it to the particular instance of music, and so returns to the general rule. A very little reflection will show that in such a case if he commenced with "and indeed whatever you take up", he would have the air of opening out some new application in place of resuming a previous statement. I prefer ἐν τούτων, because it is more likely that a scribe should stumble at τῶν ὑπὲρ than invent it. The Bodleian has also περὶ τούτων which I prefer, because it is a worse reading, and so throws more discredit on a suspected passage.]

[ Τὸ δὲ ἄριστον] The reader will not fail to admire the skillful play upon the words ἄριστον, ἐλλόγιον, and ἄνάριστον. Stallbaum compares Τιμ. 55, o, τὸ ἄριστον καθορισμός εἶναι λέγαι γεγο- νας αν τὶς ὁντεσ ἄριστον τὶς ὁντες ὑμνας ἐν ἑπταούσιοι κραίναν εἶναι; and the oracle given to the Magarians, ὜μεις δ', ῞ω Μεγαρεις, οὔτε τριτος οὔτε τετάρτος Οἴ- τε διωβεκατοι, οὔτε ἐν λόγῳ οὔτε ἐν ἄριστῳ.

*** A sheet of the Editor's MS. has been lost in transmission from Sydney. The missing notes will appear in the Addenda. [Publisher's Note.]
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ὠρθῶς μεντο ταῦτα ἤμας, ὡς Πρώταχε, ἤρωτεμε Φιλήβος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ.

ΣΩ. Ἀράσω ταῦτα, δέξατον ὁμιχρῶν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς; ΣΩ. Ἐπείδη [φωνῆ ἀπειρον κατενόησεν] ἦτε τις Θεὸς ἐκεῖ καὶ Θείοις ἔνθεσατο, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἴγυπτῳ Θεόδι τινα τούτον γενέσθαι λέγων, πρῶτος τὰ φωνήσατα τῷ ἀπειρῷ κατενόησεν οὐκ ἐν ὑπαρτῇ ἀλλὰ πλείου, καὶ πάλιν ἔτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὖ, ὥστε δε μετέχοντα πνεύμα, ἀρχηγῶν δὲ τινα καὶ τούτων ἐναὶ τρίτον δὲ ἐκδος γραμματῶν διέσπασε τὸ τῶν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἤμιν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διήρει τὰ τὸ ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἐνός ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήσαντα, καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρίτον, ἑως ἀρχηγῶν αὐτῶν λαμβὼν ἐν ᾧ ἑκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπαι στοιχεῖον ἐποιήσατε. καθορῶν δ' ὡς αὐτοῖς ἤμιν σὲ ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' ἀντὶ ἀνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μᾶθοι, τούτων τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὅνῃ ἑνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, μὲν ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφεύλξατο προσεπιθήν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΦΙ. Τἀῦτ' ἐτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς Ἀλήθεια, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθεν. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ μοι τοῦ λόγου τὸν τε καὶ συμφώνον ἐμπροσθέν ἐλέησέσται.

ΣΩ. Μάν, ὡς Φιλήβε, τὸ τι πρὸς ἐτος αὖ ταῦτ' ἐστίν;

ΦΙ. Ναι, τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὁ πάλαι ἔκατος εἰκὼν τε καὶ Πρώταρχε.

Ε ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γ' ἡδη γεγονότες ἔπειτε, ὡς φήσα, πάλαι.

ΦΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ὁ περὶ φρονήσεως ἢν καὶ ἠδονῆς ἡμῖν εὖ ἀρχής ὁ λόγος, ὅποτε τοίνυν αὐτόν αἱρέτεν;

ΦΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γ' ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι φράμεν.

ΦΙ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, ἠτὸς ἐστιν ἐν καὶ πολλά αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, καὶ [πῶς μὴ ἀπειρά

he has illustrated this position of ὑς by Sophist, 243, οκτὼ ὡς ὃς σάμιην ὑμῖν, and other examples; but he should not have quoted for this purpose Arist. Clouds 256, ομοι Σωκράτη (sic) ἱδερπερ με τὸν 'Αυξάμαθ' ὅποιος μὴ ὑποτέλεσθαι. This means that the several parts of the last λόγος are consistent with each other. ἐλέησέσται, is left unperformed, is deficient. τὴ πρὸς ὅταν Ευθύδ. 295, c. ἐταὶ μεθ' ὅταν πρὸς ἄντον ἀπαρκήσας, ι. nothing to the purpose.

Kal μὴν ἐν' αὐτῷ γ'] And yet you are close upon that which, as you say, you have been some time looking for. The Zurich editors have placed a mark of interrogation after this sentence, which is certainly incorrect; but as the common formula is χάλ μὴ—γε, and Η is continually confounded with the comendium of ΧΑΛ, I have altered γε into χαλ accordingly.

πῶς ἐστιν ἐν'] The impudence of the interpolation in this passage betrays the author of it. In place of letting Socrates ask what number of kinds we can discern in ἠθίνα and φρονήσις, he makes him enquire, how they are not straightway indefinite (as if there could be a how of that which is simply negative,) and again how either of them has some number, a question which Plato himself could not have answered. I have no hesitation in condemning what appears in brackets, and in making τίνα interrogative, without which it would have no right to ποτέ. But even πῶς ἐστιν ἐν καὶ πολλά αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον is far from satisfactory. Either it is a clumsy way of asking what is more plainly asked in τίνα ποτ' ἄρσημα κάθηται, or it proposes a question which the upholders of Ideas have been content to leave unsolved (Phaedo 100, d. τοῦ καλοῦ παρουσία, ἐτι κοινωνία, εἰτ' ἐτι δὴ καὶ δὴν ποτ' ἀρσημά ἐμπροσθέν κάθηται τοῦ ἀπείρα γεγονότα. The reasons for interpolating ἐκάτερον and αὐτῶν ἐκάστα are quite obvious; the first word was repeated because of the previous supplement, and itself was thought to be inconsistent with ἀπείρα; to accord with which ἐκάστα was contrived. And the result of all this ingenuity is that we have the same things designated twice as ἐκάτερον, and once as ἐκάστα in such proximity, that a single designation was alone needful or bearable.
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εἰδής, ἀλλὰ τίνα ποι' ὄρθιµὸν [ἐκάτερον] ἐμπρόσθεν κέπτη
tα τοῦ ἀτεικα [αὐτῶν ἔκκατα] γεγονέναι;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ εἰς φανέλον γ' ἐφείση, ὁ Φίλιβος, οὐχ οὖν ὅτι ὄντανα τρόπον κόλπῳ ποὺς περιμεγχὴν ἡµᾶς ἐμβέβηλεν Ὀσκρά
tῆς. καὶ σκόπει δ' ἐπί τερὸς ἡµῶν ἀποκρίνεται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτα

μενον. ὃσος δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμὲ, τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτη
daν ἁποκρίνεσθαι σοι πάλιν τοῦτο προστάτηνεν γελοῖοτερον δ' ὁµια πολὺ τὸ B μηδέτερον ἡµῶν δύνασθαι. σκόπει δὴ τὴ δράσεων. εἰδὴ γὰρ

μοι δοξεί νῦν ἐρωτήν ἡδονής ἡµῶν Ὀσκράτης, εἰτ' ἐστιν εἰτὲ µή, καὶ ὑπὸς ἐντεὶ καὶ ὑποίᾳ τῆς τ' αὐ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ
tατά ὡσάτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθείατα λέγεις, ὦ παῖ Καλλίου· µὴ γὰρ δυνάµε
ev τὸτε κατὰ παντὸς ἕνος καὶ ὅµοιον καὶ ταὐτὸ δρᾶν καὶ
tὸν ἐναντίον, ὡς δ' ἰπαρέλθων λόγος ἐμπροσθεν, οδεῖς ἐν ἡµῶν
eis οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε γένοτο αξίος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐσόδων ἐσχεκεν ὁτιως, ὡ Σόκρατες, ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ κα-

C λὸν µὲν τὸ ἐξομπαντα γιγανοκενα τοῦ σώφρον, δεύτερος δ' εἰ-
ναι πλοῦς δοξεί µὴ λανθάνεν αὐτῶν αὐτῶν. τί δὴ µοι τούτ
εἴρηται τὰ νῦν; ἐγὼ σοι φράσω. σοὶ τίρω ἡµῖν τὴν συνοισι
να, ὡ Σόκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶν [καὶ σεαυτὸν] πρὸς τὸ διελέθαι

διάδ. παντελῶς ὑποστάντα] Having
unreservedly taken your place as your
successor. pantelos qualifies διάδοχον
ὑποστάτα as taken together. The At
tile Orators have χρησιγς ὑπάτην, ὑπο-
στήνα πρατήρα, ἐξελοτηνὴ ὑποστά
tην τριπαρχεῖν, without any infinitive to
follow. In Xen. Anab. iv, 1, εἶ τις
ἔλει αὐτις ἀνήρ ἅγιος γενέσθαι καὶ ὑπο-
στάς ἔλεοςυχα ἐπικεφαλεία αἱ, the order
of construction is, καὶ παρεξίαν ἐξε-
lοτηνὴς ὑποστάς.

οδεῖς ἐν ἡµῖν] The received text
reads ἐν ἡµῖν after οὐδένας, the ἐν being placed most pervasively in the
midst of all these negatives; but as
ἡµῖν certainly belongs to the first of
them, we may infer that the words ἐ
ἡµῖν were both omitted together,
and then restored, but to a wrong
place.

τῷ σφρόνεις] I cannot explain why
this' was added, unless there was some
current saying πάντα καὶ πάντα τοῦ σώφρον,
on which Protagoras plays by adding
γιγανοκείνεν.

ἐπιδιδάσκα] You bestowed upon us all
this conversation [and yourselves] for the
purpose of discussing what is the best
of human possessions. Compare Laws,
χιλ. 944, 4, ὑπα, ὁ Πηλεῖος φησὶν οὐ τοι-
χυς παρὰ τῶν πρῶτα ἐν τοῖς γάμοις ἐπιδοτείναι θεῖα. The difference be-
tween ἐπιδιδάσκα in such passages, and
the simple verb, is that the former
applies only to making presents. But
for these very reasons a man could
not be said ἐπιδιδόναι ἄνωτεν. The
addition is borrowed from a passage
occurring a few lines below, where the
reading of all authorities is ἕσοχας;
but this is said of a later period and
one contained within our own dialogue
(p. 16, A. B). The present reference is to

2 *
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tι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἀριστον. Φιλίβου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἦδονην καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαράν καὶ πάθη ὅτασα τοιαύτη ἔστι, D αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀντείπεις ὡς ὦ ταῦτ' ἄλλ' ἔκειν' ἐστιν, ἀ πολλαῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοὺς ἀναμιμνησκομεν ἑκόντες, ὦρθός δὲ ἔχωτες, ὦν ἐν μνήμῃ παρακείμενα ἑκάστα βασανίζεται. φῆς δ' ἡ ὡς ἔστω ὧ τὸ προσφυγῆσθομεν ὄρθως [ἀμείνων ἦδονης γ'] ἀγαθῶν εἰ- ναι νοῦν, ἔπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντες αὐτὰ τὰ τούτων ἀναγγέλλει, ἀ καίσθαι δεῖν, ἄλλ' οὐχ ἔκεινα. τούτων δὴ μετ', ἀμφισβητήσεως ἐκάστου λεχθέντων, ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδίδας ἐπειλήσομεν ὡς οὐκ ἀράφομεν δικαίᾳ σε, πρὶν ἐν τούτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἰκανὸν γένηται τι διορισθέντων. ὥς ὢς συνεχώ- ρησος καὶ ἑδωκας εἰς ταῦτ' ἡμῖν σατύν. ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγο- μεν, καθάπερ οἱ παίδες, ὅτι τῶν ὄρθως δοκίμων ἀφαίρεσις οὐκ ἦστι. πάσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τούτων ἑπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀργόμενα.

ΣΩ. Τίνα λέγεις;

20 ΠΙΩ. Εἰς ἀπορών ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνεφατών ὑπὸ δυνά- μεθ' ἐν ἰκανὴ ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰκόμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν τῶν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀποριάν. ἀλλ' εἰ δράν τοῦτο ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοι δραστέων ὑπέκουν γάρ. βουλοῦν δὴ πρὸς ταῦτ' αὐτός, πότερον ἡδονὴς εἶδό σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαμείγετον ἦ καὶ ἡτέον, εἰ τῇ [καθ' ἑτερόν] τινα τρόπον οἶος τ' εἰ καὶ βούλει δηλοῦσαι πως ἄλλως τὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν.

Β ΣΩ. Δεινὸν μὲν τούτων ἐστὶ προσόκαθιν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμὲ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο ὑπὸς ἑκέπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ἡθέν λυει πάντα

his first consenting to hold the conversation, so that savor of εὐθύδακας would be a ludicrous hyperbole.

τὸ προσφυγῆσθομένον ὄρθως [L. ἦ. γ']] See Addenda.

καθ' ἑτερόν] There cannot be a more feeble tautology than καθ' ἑτερόν τινα τρόπον πως ἄλλως. The first two words were added by a scribe who did not see that τινα τρόπον belongs to οἷος τ' εἰ.

τὸν ἑμ] i.e., me, the threatened one,
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χόδον ἑκάστων πέρι. προς δ' αὐ τούτως μνήμην τινα δοκεῖ τις μοι δεδωκέναι θεων ήμιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς δὴ καὶ τίνων;

ΣΩ. Ἀλόγον ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὡν πῃ καὶ ἐφηγοῦσώς νῦν ἑννοοὶ περὶ δ' ἠδονῆς καὶ φρονήμεσθ, ὡς οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστι τάγαθον, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἔτερον μὲν τούτων, ἀμενον δ' ἀμφοῖν. καίστης τοῦτο γ' ἄν ἑναργῶς ήμῖν φανὴν νῦν, ἀπελλάκτη καὶ ήδονή τοῦ νικάν τὸ γὰρ ἅγαθόν οὐκ ὁμὶ νῦν ἑτε τοιποτον αὐτή γέγονοι. ἦ πώς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Τῶν δὲ γ[είς τὴν διαίρεσιν] εἰδῶν ἠδονής οὐδέν ἐτί προσδεπομέθα καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν δόξαν. ἦπροϊν δ' ἐτί σαφέστερον δειξῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἰπών, οὔτω καὶ διαίρεμαν.

πρὸς δ' αὐ τοῦτως] The Bodleian has αὐ τοῦτως, which form is inadmissible here. The origin of the error, which has been corrected from Coi, is obvious.

καίτω τοῦτο γ' ἄν] The Bodleian has καίτω δύνατο γε εἶν, which Orelli changed into καί τοιπότο γ' ἄν. But this will not mean what we want. For as he has not yet named this something better, he cannot say "if it should appear such", but either "if any such thing should appear" which would require τι, or, "if this thing should appear". As γε is in the best MSS., it is admitted by Orelli into his correction: but καί—γε means "and besides", whereas καίτω—γε is equivalent to "and yet you must admit", which is the proper transition. I therefore retain τοῦτο from the inferior MSS., but adopt γε from the Bodleian.

[αἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν] In order to get rid of the awkwardness of saying: "we shall not want the εἰδήν of pleasure to serve the purpose of διαίρεσις", (as though they had to look for the εἰδήν first, and then to begin διαίρεσιν into those very εἰδήν) as well as to escape the intolerable harshness of the construction, I resorted to the expedient of taking τῶν by itself and not as the article of εἰδῶν. But this was too violent a proceeding. I now believe that any attempt to reconcile oneself to εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν is a waste of time on words which do not belong to the author. Those who understand, "ἐδην for the purpose of διαίρεσιν", will say that transposition would be a milder remedy; but Socrates intends to give up the διαίρεσις itself, and not merely some particular means towards that end.

προὶν δ' εἰς, δίκη[] The proverbial expression is, αὐτὸ δεῖξε, the event will make things clear. But we are told that both δεῖξε and ἀκούσα are used in the same manner without αὐτό. The first occurs in Arist. Frogs, 1261, where, however, μελή may be the subject, and in Herodotus III, 82, where δίκη follows the impersonal εἰκὸς. All the other instances quoted are of ἄκολος or ἀκούσα. If therefore this is a real instance, it is a very rare one. It is uncertain whether the thing which is to show itself is the ἄλλα τί τρίτον, or the correctness of Socrates' δόξα, ὃτι οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεπομέθα καὶ τ. τ. εἰ. In either case, what is the meaning of ἔτι σαφέστερον, where at present nothing is σαφές? If it be said that ἔτι belongs to προὶ, this is too admissible if εἰς τὸ ἔρμηρον or some equivalent phrase be added to it. A MS. of no authority gives δ' τι. I should prefer προὶν δ', "It will appear more clearly (whether I am right) as I proceed'.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Μικρ' ἀτεὰ τοιῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἐμί διομολογοφώμεθα.
ΠΡΩ. Τά ποία;

D ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθον μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον [ἡ μὴ τέλεον] ἐλαται;
ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δή που τελεσθατον, ὡς Ἀκρατες.
ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἰκανὸν [τάγαθόν];
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; καὶ πάντων γ' εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν άνωτων.

ΣΩ. Τόδε γε μήν, ὥς οὖμαι, περὶ αὐτὸ ἀναγκασθατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὥς πάν τὸ γεγονόςκον αὐτὸ θερεῖ εἰς ἐρήμων [βουλήμενον] ἔλειν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ καθαρίαςκα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φορτιζει [πληρ] τῶν ἀποτελομένων ἐμὰ ἁγαθοῖς.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστι τούτους ἀντεπειν.

Ε ΣΩ. Σωφρόμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τὸν θ ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρίς.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς εἴπετε;

ΣΩ. Μὴν ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις, μήτ' ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονῆ. δεῖ γὰρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τάγαθον, μηδὲν μηδὲν οὖσα προοδείηθαι. δεόμενον δ' ἐν φρατί πό-21 τερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τούτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὅντως ήμιν ἁγαθόν.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;
ΣΩ. ὸνὼν ἐν οἴ τειφρομένα βασιλείεκτος ταῦτα.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

[ἡ μὴ τάλαν] No one in his senses would ask "whether the Idea of Good necessarily implied incompleteness". And yet this nonsense has been left unchallenged since the revival of letters, nay was so perhaps even under the Ptolemies. Another evident addition is τάγαθον. For with τάγαθον we must understand ἐτι. But that the true construction is ἀνάγκη... ἐτιν ἀπειρεῖ from the answer, in which all the MSS. give διάφθερον. A third interpolation disfigures the clause ὡς ταῖν τὸ γεγονόςκον συν τὸ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐρήμων βουλήμενον ἔλειν. Ἐφεμένει is sometimes followed by the infinitive as in Eur. Ion 521, τι φιλέτον ἐφεμεί; but some one who did not know this, supposed συνατ' to be understood, and introduced βου-λήμενον to govern ἐλεῖν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνον ὅ. ΠΡΩ. Αἴσχε. ΣΩ. Ἀδεια ἃ, Πρόταρε, οὐ ζην τὸν βίον ἔπινεα ἔδο-
μενος ἢδονάς τὸς μεγάτας; ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ; ΣΩ. Ἀφ' οὖν ἐπὶ τινὸς ἄν σου προσδείχῃ ἤγοιο, εἰ τοὺν ἔχοις παντελῶς; ΠΡΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα ὅ, τοῦ φορεών καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι [τὰ δέοντα], καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μοῦν μή δεοῖ ἄν τι; ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχωμι ἄν πον τὸ χαῖρεν ἡχών. ΣΩ. Οὐκόνον οὖτω ζωῆν ἄν ἰνε μὲν διὰ βίου [ταῖς μεγίσταις ἢδοναῖς] χαίροις ἄν; ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ; ΣΩ. Νοῦν δὲ γε [καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν]

Πρόταρε] δ' seems to be omitted here on account of the pronoun being placed after the name of the person addressed, which is usual either when the speaker first turns to him, or makes an especial appeal to him.

[τὰ δέοντα] Five lines lower down the list of mental powers or qualities is again given as νοῦς, μνήμη, ἐπιστήμη, δόξαι ἀλήθεις. Of that list it will be time to speak when we come to it: but a third series follows immediately upon the second one, which tallies pretty exactly both in substance and order with that before us: 1. τὸ φρο
νεῖν=φρόνησις. 2. τὸ νοεῖν=μνήμη of past things, ἀνάδοξα of future. 3. τὸ λογίζεσθαι=λογισμὸς. 1. Consciousness or immediate Perception. 2. The Representational faculty. 3. Inference, not logical, but in its lowest type. If any one will compare this passage with the other, he will see why τὰ δέοντα ought to be rejected without hesitation.

μὲν μὴ δεοὶ ἄν τι The MSS. have μηδὲ ὅραν τι. Several scholars have proposed to change ὅραν into ἑαυτόν, but they all appear to leave τι, which in this case would be contrary to Greek usage. I made this correction in the year '55; but, unless my memory fails me, the Leipzig Edition by C. F. Herrmann appeared in '54. Any one who has that Edition will see in Herrmann’s Preface the name of the scholar to whom he attributes the emendation. I am unable to recall it, but I confess that I have been beaten by at least one year.

[ταῖς μεγίσταις ἢδοναῖς] Even sup-
posing that Plato could use χαῖρεν ἢδοναῖς in the sense of enjoying pleasures, the words τ. μ. τ. are nothing to the purpose, for the amount has been already mentioned, and the drift of this passage is, that he would be in a continual state of pleasure—and never once know it.

νοῦν δὲ γε It has been shewn above that there is an exact correspondence between the series given in the sentence beginning Ὅρα δὲ, and that which occurs in the argument commencing with προτότον. But the list now before us, though so much nearer to this last, has no such congruity. And indeed it is worse than unnecessary; for what sort of reasoning is this? “As you do not possess Memory, Knowledge, and Belief, you cannot know whether you are in pleasure or not, because you have no Consciousness.” All that Plato wrote was Νοῦν δὲ γε μὴ κατηχήμενον πρῶτον μὲν κ. τ. τ. As he has no νοῦς, he cannot have φρόνησις, which is a part of νοῦς.
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μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ], πρῶτον μὲν τούν τυπῷ αὐτῷ, εἰ ἔχαιρες ἦ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δὴ ποὺ σὲ ἐγνοεῖν, κενὸν γὰρ ἦν τα πάσης φρονίμεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὀσαίονσε μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δὴ ποὺ σὲ μὴν ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνησθα, τῆς τε ἐν τῷ παρα-χείμα ἤδινης προστάπτονσε μὴν ἄγιιν νῦν μνήμην ὑπομείνειν· δόξαν δὲ μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῶν] μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαί-ροντα, λογισμὸν δὲ στεφάμενον μηδὲ εἰς τὸν ἐπετα χρόνον δὲς χαίρεις οὖν ἄνα κατά σε λογίζοντα, τὸ γὰρ ὅτι ἀνθρώποις βλούκα τινὸς πλεύνον χαίρε σάτε [χαλάττεια] μετ’ ὀστρεύτων ἐμπυχάτα ἐκτι σωμάτων ἐστι ταῦτα, ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα ἐχομεν ἀλ-

D λως πιὸς διανοθηγάναι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. 'Αρ᾽ οὖν αἰσχετός ἢμιν βλούκα τοὐτοῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀφασίαν πανταλκασί με, ὥσκαρτες, οἴνοις ὁ λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Μήτη τοῖνυν μαλακωχόμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ μετα-λαβόντες αὐ βίον θυμόν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις δὲξει τι ὅτι τὸν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πάσαν πάντων κεκτημένοις, ἢδονῆς ἢ δὲ μετέχων μίτη μέγα μίτη σμικρόν, μηδὲ αὑτό τῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθηθε πάντων ὁν τῶν τοιοῦτων.

ΠΟΣ σε μὴν το χειδί is the reading of the MSS. But it is necessary to insert the pronoun, and Stallbaum was right in his first edition when he changed μηδὲ into μίτη. There is no reason why μηδὲ μεμνησθα should receive more stress than μηδὲ δοξαζειν or μη δοξαζειν: for though we have μηδὲ in this last instance, the "not even" or "also not" refers not to ἀνακατάρα, but to εἰς τὸν ἑπέτα χρόνον).

[Ἀληθῆ] The reason for putting ἀλη-θῆ in brackets is that any δέξα, whether false or true, would suffice πρὸς τὸ δο-ξαζεῖν χαίρειν, and, where there is no νος, there can be no δέξα.

[χαλάττεια] If Plato had cared to tell us that shellfish lived in the sea, he would not have done so by placing an adjective where it is out of construction. He would at least have written ἁλάττεια ἢτα. Let us therefore leave the commentators to decide, when they can, whether the sense is ἀνθρώποι βλάχτεια ἢτα ἐμπυχά, or ἤτα ἐμπυχή ἢτα ἁλάττεια.

μεταλαβόντες ἐπὶ ἐν μῆρει λαβότες. Compare below 51, A.

πάντων ἢτα I have supplied ἢτα, which is required by the rules of the language. Not even an inferior writer would say, μη μετέχων διὰ ἔπαθες. The syl- lable was absorbed by that which pre- ceded it.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΠΡΩ. Οδότερος δ’ βλέπω, ὃ Σωκράτες, ἔμοιγε τούτων αἱρετός, ὅδ’ ἄλλω μὴ ποτε, ὡς ἐγώμαί, φανεί.

ΣΩ. Τι δ’ ὃ ξυναμφότερος, ὃ Πρώτακης, ἕξ ἀμφότεροι συμ-22

μιχθεῖς κοινός γενόμενος;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονῆς λέγει καὶ νοῦ [καὶ φρονήσεως];

ΣΩ. Οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἔγογγε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάς δήποτε τοῦτον γ’ αἱρέσει πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων ὑποτετημον, καὶ ἁμαρτος τούτους γ’ οὐχ ὅ μὲν, ὅ δ’ οὐ.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅ τι νῦν ἦμιν ἦστι τὸ ξυμβαίνον ἐν τοῖς παράσηι λόγοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὡς τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προσέχοντες, τοῖς ὑπόν ὅ’ οδότερος ἵκανος συμ’ αἱρέσεις οὖτ’ ἄνθρωπων οὐτε ζωῶν οὖνεν.

ΣΩ. Μών οὖν οὐκ ἦδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οδότερος αὐτῶν εἶχε τάγαθαν; ἢν γὰρ ἐν ἵκανος καὶ τέλεος καὶ πάση [φιλοσοφία καὶ] ζωῶν αἱρέσεις, ὁπερ δύνατον ἢν οὕτως αἰεί διὰ βίου ζῆν. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ἡρείδ’ ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἢν τὴν τοῦ ἄληθῆς αἰρέτου ἐλαμάθειν ἄκων ἕξ ἀγαθίας ἢ τινὸς ἀνάγκης οὐκ οὐσιόμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡμών γονὸν ταῦτ’ οὕτως ἤκειν.

ΣΩ. Ὡς μὲν τοινκ τὴν γε Φιλήβου Θεόν οὖ δεὶ διανοεῖ—σοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τάγαθαν, ἵκανος εἰσφέρατι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΦΙ. Οὔτε γὰρ ὅ σὸς νοῦς, ὃ Σωκράτες, ἔστι τάγαθαν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιον ταῦτα ἐγκλήματα.

ἐξ ἀμφότερον συμμεχήναι] ἢ τοῦ συμπαθεῖσθαί. This use of the participle is very frequent in Plato. Compare Rep. 506, ν, προσμεμεριόμενον σαγηγμονων γέ-

λου ψῆφισα,—τ.ε., ἔτι τὸ προσμεμερι-

οιχα. In the next sentence καὶ φρο-

νήσεως is a manifest interpolation.

καὶ πρὸς τούτους γε] This is com-

monly understood to mean and besides; but it is evident that nothing additional is stated. Stallbaum’s defence of it, ‘notio atque via procedendi παῖς confr-

matur et augeretur,’ is only true as to con

matur, whereas augeretur is the point in

question. Schleiermacher understands, in addition to those lives (the unmixed); but this would have been ἐξαιροῖς, and, besides, how can a man choose both contraries, the unmixed and the mixed together? I cannot uphold my own former solution of this dif-

ficulty, for “in addition to my friends

here” would be ρῆς τοινκας. As some addition is intended, the only con-

ceivable addition to “every body will

choose this life”, is “and one and all

will bear me out in saying so”. This

might be, καὶ προσκρήσεται τούτων γ’

οὐχ ὅ μὲν, ὅ δ’ οὐ.

[φιλοσοφία καὶ] ζωῆς He afterwards adds, εἰ δέ τις ἡμῶν, and is evidently think-

ing of ζώα capable of choice, and pos-

sessed of intellect. It is therefore high

time these quodd were weeded out of

the text. Ἀνάγκη οὖ οὐσιομένη is one

of the many euphemisms for Madness.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΗΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν, ὁ Φίληβε, ὃς ἐμὸς· οὐ μέντοι τῶν γ' ἀληθινῶν ἂμα καὶ θείων οἷμα νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως ποις ἔχειν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικηφόρων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βλένν οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω[ς] ἐπερ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερεύοις ὅρων καὶ συκότιν χρή πέρι δὲ δράσομεν. τάχα γάρ ἄν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βιων αἰτίσμεθ' ἀν ἐκάτερος μὲν τῶν νοῶν [αἰτίων], δ' ἡ ἡδονή [εἶναι], καὶ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφισβητῶν συνέσεων ἐν ἐη, τάχα δ' ἂν αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπολέσσας πότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι. τούτου δὲ πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ πρὸς Φίληβου διαμαχομαι ἄν, ὡς ἄν τῷ μικρῷ τοῦτῳ βιων, ὃ τι ποτὸ έστι τοῦτ' ὃ λαβὼν ὃ βίος ὀστός γεγο- νεγ' αἰρετός ἂμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἡ ἡδονή ἄλλω νοῶν τούτῳ ξυγ- γενεσθέναι καὶ ὧμοιοτέρων ἐστι, καὶ κατὰ τούτων τὸν λόγον. Εἰ οὖτ' ἂν τῶν πρωτειών οὖδ' οὐ τῶν δευτερεύοις ἡ ἡδονή μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο. πορφοτέρω δὲ ἔστι τῶν τριτετείων, αἳ τι νῦν ἐμὴ νῦ δὲι πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐμοιγε δοξαί νῦν μὲν ἡ ἡδονή σοι πεπτωχεῖαι καθαπερεὶ πληγεῖσα ἐπὶ τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων τῶν γὰρ νικηφόρων πέρι μαχομένῃ κεῖται. τῶν δὲ νοῶν, ὡς 23 ἔστω, λεκτέων ὃς ἐμφόρως οὐκ ἀνεποιεῖτο τῶν νικηφόρων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἐπαύδην ἄν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερεύων στερεθεῖσα

οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ [πως]. It is difficult to account for me in this place, for he evidently renounces for ever the claims of νοώς to the first prize, and contends only for the second. Perhaps the reservation may be accounted for by his mention of the ζάκεον νοῶς, the relation of which to that of man is afterwards treated of. But then again if this had been intended, he would scarcely have used the words πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βλέων: and altogether why confuse the argument with an afterthought about some other νοῶς? I now believe me to be a mere reproduction of the preceding τῶν ἀμφαριστῶν.

[addenda]

οὕτω—οὐδ' οὕτω. Of this construction Stallbaum gives the following instances: Phileb. 42, c; Laces 840, α; Rep. 508, Β; Ibid. 436, χ; from which it appears that although ὡστε—οὐδὲ is inadmissible, οὔτε—οὐδ' οὐ or οὐδὲ γε is correct.

μετὸν] As you cannot say λέγοιται ὡς, but λέγεται εἶναι, you would here expect μετείκωσιν, not μετὸν. But μετὸν came to be looked upon as almost a noun, so that in λέγων' ἂν μετόν we understand the infinitive εἶναι. Thus in Laces 900, η, we read: ζάκεϊ δὲ ὡστε μέγα οὐδὲ σμαρήν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἀφούμεν.

νῦν μὲν] The Bodleian has no μὲν, but I think it is an accidental omission, for the opposition is between this first about and another, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτε- ρεύων—.

σοι πεπτωχεῖαι] so cannot belong to πεπτωχεῖαι, for ὡς σοί is the proper construction after πεπτόμενοι. Nor can it belong to πληγεῖσαι, for then Sokrates the agent, and λόγοι the instruments, would be made to change places. It is difficult to say what should be done with the word, for it does not look like an interpolation. Did Plato write ἀπεπτωχεῖκαν?
ΠΙΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ἡδονὴ παντάπασιν ἂν τινα καὶ ἄτιμαν σχολὴ περὸς τῶν αὐτῆς ἐφαστῶν· οὔδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἐκ ἡν ὁμοίως φαινομον καλῆ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; σὺν ἀμενον αὐτὴν ἔναν ἡδὴ καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφερόντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς οὔδεις ποι ἐν ἡμῶν μεθύσει, περὶ ἂν εἰς τέλος επεξελέηθής τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.

ΣΩ. Βαβαι ἄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχνὸν μὲν λόγῳ τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ πάνω τι ἥξνιον. νῦν γὰρ ἡ φαινεται δεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ μηχανήν, ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ τοῦ πορευόμενον, οὖν βέλη ἦχεν ἔκεισα τῶν ἔμπροσθέν [λόγων]. ἦστι δὲ έσως ἐνα καὶ ταυτά.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐχοῦν χρή;

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὕ; τίν τε γ' ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι ο πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποιαν ἤδη λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῷ διαλάβομεν, μᾶλλον δ', εἴ βουλεῖ, τρυφῇ.

ΠΡΩ. Καθως' ὦ τι φραζοῦσι ἂν.

[ῥείδων] The best MSS. have ρήδων; but the μὲν after συχνὸν appears to me conclusive in favour of the other reading. In the common text, we have ῥήδων πάνω τι τῶν νῦν. νῦν γὰρ οὐ η αὐτῆς τι.] But the enquiry is no more difficult now than at any other time; whereas we want νῦν with φ. 5. "we must now begin a new argument". Because the misplaced πάνω τι seemed an awkward delinquency, some scribe brought the νῦν into the first sentence, and contrived καθ' as the beginning of the next.

δειν [ἄλλης μηχανῆς] This is a singular construction of δειν, at once with a genitive and an infinitive; it may be said that as the ἁλλη μηχανἠ consists in έκετεν β. τ., this is added by way of explanation. But is there any beauty or propriety in such a manner of writing? Plato imitated the freedom, even the license, of common conversation, if you will. But is this tolerable even in common conversation, or is it the slipshod talk of uneducated men? Again we have another such pleasing negligence in διαθέτει τῶν ἐμπροσθέν λόγων. ΠΘΣ γὰρ οὕ; This is given in the Books as the answer to Socrates. But Οὐχοῦν χρή is the answer, and Πώς γὰρ οὕ; is Socrates' assent. Χρή is the answer to δειν ἀρχήν μηχανὴν. ἔχει, another proof of the spuriousness of ἀλλῆς μηχανῆς.

διευλαβεῖσθαι παράμεθα τιθέμενοι furnishes one of the editors with the excuse for a learned note to show that verbs and participles sometimes change hands. Surely it needed neither Haindorff ad Gorgiam, nor Scheffer on Gregorius: Corinthus, nor Seidler on the Iphigenia in Tauris to show that you can say either rescurvo ridens, or res darea rescurvum. It costs more effort διευλαβεῖσθαι than τιθέμενοι.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν ἀττα τῶν νῦν δѣ λόγων.
ΠΡΩ. Ποία;
ΣΩ. Τὸν Ἐκείνον ἐξεγομέν τοῦ τὸ μὲν ἄφησον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;
ΠΡΩ. Πάν χὰν μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δῦν τεὐθεῦθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτων
Δὲ ἀμφότεροι τοῦτοι ἕν τι ξυμμεισόμενον. εἰμι δ' ὡς ἐσθηκαί, ἐγὼ γελοῖος τῷ [ἐκ]ανοιξά, τὰ τ' εἰδή διεστάσας καὶ συναφεῖθομον
μενος.
ΠΡΩ. Τι φής; ὡς γαθεί;
ΣΩ. Τετάρτον μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνος.
ΣΩ. Τὸς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν ἀεικὸν ὅρα, καὶ τίθη μοι πρὸς τοῖς τριτῶν ἦκείνους τέταρτον τοῦτο.
ΠΡΩ. Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτον προσδείησε διάκρισιν τινὰ δυναμένου;

ἀπεριον . . πέρας] It is evident that the πέρας and ἀπεριον of 16, c, are different from those now brought forward. In the former case they express the indefinite multitude of the individuals and the definite number of species; in the latter, the unlimited nature of all quality and quantity in the abstract, and the definite proportions of the same in existing things. But in both cases we find that the effect of the πέρας is analogous; that knowledge in dialectics and life in physics are the result of a certain limitation.

πέρας] Heindorf and Schleiermacher are by no means to be followed in reading πέρας ὡς. As Birch rightly observes in his Philolaus, the opposite power to the ἄπεριον is not that which is limited, but that which limits. Unless we keep πέρας here clear from the proposed addition, and cancel ὡς in two subsequent places, we make nonsense of the whole disputation.

Τοῦτο δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν] I have adopted Stallbaum's emendation, which the context makes necessary. "Let us lay down these two, as two of the Classes required." But in the manifestly corrupt sentence which follows, something less weak and flat than γελοῖος τῷ, σὺν ἱκανοῖς κατ' εἰδὴ β. is wanted. The Bodleian has ἱκανοῖς τὰ τ' εἰδή. It is probable that in the archetypal MS. the text ran thus: ΓΕΛΟΙΟΝ ΤΙΚΑΝΟΣ, i.e. γελοῖος τῷ ἄνθρωπος, and that some scribe thought that IN ICANOS he saw ἱκανοῖς. The other various readings τα τ' appears decidedly preferable to κατα, for he is endeavouring not to separate things according to their kinds, but to point out distinct kinds, and then to repeat the catalogue of them. On the whole there is little violence done to the oldest text, and nothing left unsaid or said improperly, in the reading; αὕτως δ', ὡς ἐστηκαί, ἐγὼ γελοῖος τὰς ἄνθρωπος, τὰ τ' εἰδή διεστάσας καὶ συναφεῖς.

Πρὸς τοὺς πρωτούς] See Addenda.

Μῶν οὖν] This question and the answer given to it are of importance, being introduced by Plato not only as an example of the care which is requisite in every dialectical process to leave no distinction unnoticed which may help towards a complete classification, but still more because it serves to bring out in its full significance the αἴτια τῆς ξυμμίξεως. Had this latter been a more agent, one would expect the counter-agent to be also mentioned; but Socrates observing in his ironical
ΠΑΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν' οὐ μήρ οἶμαι γ' ἐν τῷ νῦν. ἦν δὲ τι δή, συγγνώσει ποῦ μοι οὐ μεταδοθώκοιτε [πέμπτον βίον].

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήρ;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτων μὲν δή τῶν τετετάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι, τὰ δόσ τούτων πειρώμεθα, πολλὰ ἐκάτερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ διε- σπασμένον ἱδόντες, εἰς ἑνὶ πάλιν ἐκάτερον συναγάγοντες, νοή- σαι πὴ ποτὲ ἢν αὐτῶν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἐκάτερον.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχ' ἂν ἐποίημην.

ΣΩ. Ἀέων τοινυν τὰ δόσ, ὧ προτίθεμαι, ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄπερ 24 νῦν δή, τὸ μὲν ἀπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας [ἐχον]. Ὄτι δὲ τρόπων τίνα τὸ ἀπειρον πολλὰ ἐστι, πειρασμοὶ φροζεϊν· τὸ δὲ πέρας [ἐχον] ἡμας περιμενέτω.

ΠΡΩ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δή. χαλεπῶν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον ὅ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὡμος δὲ σκόπει. Θερμοτέρων καὶ ψυχρότερον πέρι πρῶτων ὥρα πέρας εἴ πω ἐστι νοήσαι, ὡ τὸ μᾶλ-

manner, 'that he does not think he shall want any such,' prepares us to attach a higher importance to the αἴτησ than to anything yet spoken of. Nor indeed is there any θέλει διάκρισιν των δύνα- μενον. For these ἄπειρον are represented as forced into this conjunction with the πέρας, and kept so against their will. So that dissolution is not an act of the αἴτησ but a consequence of its not acting. I have changed τι- νάς into ταύτα, and further on, I have followed all later editors in bracketing βίον, which is clearly out of place; but it is probable that πέμπτον was added at the same time; at all events it is needless and worthless.

τὰ τρία] More probably τὸ τρίτον ἢ τ. γένος: for the process is not to take three out of the four, and then two from those three; nor would διελόμενον be the right word in such a sense as separating, but ἀπολάβοντες. Such a roundabout way of getting at the first two is evidently unmeaning; but we are hidden to take the κοινόν, which is the third, and resolve it into its constituents, πέρας and ἀπειρον. And this is the simplest way of arriving at those two: for the instances of the κοινόν are found in sensible objects, out of which we obtain by analysis the qualities which in their own nature are More or Less, and the proportion which limits and confines them. τὰ δόσ τού- των, if the reading is correct, must be taken to mean the first and second of these γένη. We shall find lower down another striking instance of the cardinal and ordinal numbers being confused through their being expressed by the same compendia. πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον is like μέρη διαφέρειν Pind. 383, d, and elsewhere. It is a variety of the accusasive of effect, like ψυχήνοι σέρκει, βραχὺ συστέλλειν, σμικρὰ κατακόπτειν &c.

πέρας [ἐχον]] This expression both here, and two lines lower, is certainly faulty. Τὸ πέρας ἐχον is that ἀπειρὸν which has ceased to be such by being submitted to the πέρας; so that this description belongs properly to the third γένος.

ἐπὶ ποῦ ἐπὶ ποτὲ τὰ νόσφος ἐν is the reading of all the MSS., and followed by, I believe, all editors. Nothing can be more unsuitable than the use of the optative, or rather the conditional, where all that the speaker
Β λόγον τε καὶ ήτταν εν αὐτοῖς οἰκονύνεται, τοῖς γένεσιν, έωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικηθῶν, τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψετον γίγνεσθαι γενομένης γὰρ τελετής καὶ αὐτὸ τετελεσθέντων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. 'Αει δὲ γε, φαμέν, ἐν τε τῷ Θερμοτέρῳ καὶ τῷ ψυχρότερῳ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ήττον ἐνι.

ΠΡΩ. Καί μᾶλλα.

ΣΩ. 'Αει τολμῶν ὁ λόγος σημαίσει τοῦτο μὴ τέλος ἔχειν ἀτελῆ, δὴ ἤνε τῷ παντόπασιν ἀπείρῳ γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καί σφόρα γε, ὃ Σῶρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἶ γ', ὃ φίλε Πρώταχος, ἵππαβε, καὶ ἀνεμνήσας μ' ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόρα τοῦτο, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθέγξω, καὶ τὸ γ' ἤρεμα τὴν αὐτὴν δυναμιν ἔχειν τῷ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ήττον. ὂποὺ γὰρ ἐν ἠττῷ, οὐκ ἔστων εἶναι ποσῶν ἔκαστον, ἄλλ', αἱ σφοδρῶτεροι ἀσχαίτεροι καὶ τοῦτον ἔκαστος πράξεις ἐμπονύνετο, τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔκαστον ἄπεργευθέν, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετο. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέξθη νῦν δὴ, μὴ ἀφανίσαστε τὸ ποσόν, ἄλλ' ἐκαίνετε αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ D ἠττον [καὶ] σφόρα καὶ ἄρεμα ἔδρα ἐγγενόθη, αὐτὰ ἐξερευνάται ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν χώρας ἐν ἡ ἠττή. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον ἔστην ἂν, λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν προχωρεῖ γὰρ

intends is, “tell me if you can discern.” The common copy from which our MSS. are derived was probably made by a scribe who had before him, ΕΠΟΥ ΕΓΣΤΙ ΝΟΧΑΙ, and as the Y looked very like T (with which it is continually confounded) he thought he saw ΗΟΤΕ; and out of ΗΟΤΕΤΙ he made ΗΟΤΕ ΤΙ. After this, νοθσα would necessarily pass for an optative, and the sense would suggest the correction of νοθσας ἂν. The same mood has been forced upon the next sentence through the prevailing habit among the later Greeks of confounding, (as indeed they still do), εν and αι; so that the word would pass through the following changes: ἐπιτρέψετον—ἐπιτρέψατον—ἐπιτρέψατων with ἂν. A due consideration of έωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικηθῶν would have stopped the course of this corruption.

οἰκονύνεται This is Stallbaum's correction for οἰκονυνέται. The words τοῖς γένεσιν are not to be taken with τοῖς αὐτοῖς, in the kinds themselves, which would be needlessly emphatical, but with τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψετον γίγνεσθαι, will not allow any bound to be fixed to the kinds (hotter and colder), as long as they reside in them.

ἀνθρώ, i.e., the More and the Less. ἀνθρώμενος μ') See Addenda.

[καὶ] He is no longer speaking of μᾶλλον καὶ ἠττον in the abstract, but of a new instance of them in σφοδρότερον καὶ ἀσχαίτερον, an expression which he here varies by μᾶλλον καὶ ἠττον σφόρα καὶ ἄρεμα.

λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν If they were to admit Quantity. Ας λαβόντε here — ει λαβόσην, and not ει λαβον, the optative ἔστην which rests on ἔστην in Bodl. and ἔστην in Ven. is better than ἔστην (Bekk. and Stallb.), which was conjectured by the scribe of the Vat. MS., who could make nothing of ἔστην.
καὶ ὦ μένει τὸ τε Θερμότερον ἄει καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὄσαυ-
τως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἦσθη καὶ προϊόν ἐπαύσατο. κατὰ δὲ τοῦ-
τον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγνοι τὸν Θερμότερον καὶ τοῖς-
τίνος ἀμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν, ὡ Sigmaτες ἐστι δ', ὅπερ ἐλές, ὦν ἰδία ταῦτα ἐξεύθεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰς αὕτης τε καὶ αὕτης ἰδιῶς [λεχέντα] тὸ τε ἐρωτάται καὶ τὸν ἐρωτάμενον ἰμανύς Ἐ
ἀν ἐξευθεῖσθαις ἀποφέρειν.

ΣΩ. 'Άλλ' τὸ μὲν λέγεις, καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν' νῦν
μέντοι ἀθρεῖ τῆς τοῦ ἄπειρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξίομαι κη-
μέον; ἕνα μὴ πάντε ἐπεξίστης μηρύνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. 'Οπότ' ἃν ὡμῖν φαίνεται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ήττον γνω-
μενα, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἥρμια δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λιᾶν καὶ ὂς
τοιαύτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἄπειρον γένος ὡς εἰς ἐν δεῖν πάντα 25
τάτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν ἐμπροσθέν λόγον, ὃν ἐφομεν, ὃσα
δείκνυσαι καὶ δείσιν ταυτα συναρχόντας χρώναι κατὰ ἰόνων
μὲν ἐπίσημαινοσθαί τίνα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέμνησαι.

ΣΩ. Ὅδοιον τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τοῦτον δὲ τάκαται
πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἵσσον καὶ ἰσόντια, μετὰ δὲ τὸ

τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἦσθη καὶ προϊόν ἐπαύ-
σατο] But the So Much stood still, and ceased to advance.—namely, before it
was expelled by μᾶλλον τε καὶ ήττον. This will account for the use of the
aorists. The difference between μᾶλλον καὶ ήττον and σφόδρα καὶ ἥρμια is not
such as Stallbaum expresses in his
paraphrase, 'It is an Indefinite, not
only extensively as to quantity, but also
intensively so as to quality; for the ex-
ample chosen (of heat and cold) belongs
much more properly to the latter. Be-
sides, if quantity had been intended,
be would have expressed that by πλέον
καὶ Θροτον. Intensity of degree is
meant in both instances, but the dis-
tinction is marked by the speaker him-
sel, when he adds to one τοῖς γένεσιν,
and to the other ταῖς πράξεσιν. In the
first case the quality is looked upon as
a state; in the second, as an immediate
effect. τὸ ποσὸν is the limit of the
former; τὸ μέτριον of the latter.

τὸ δὲ δὲ αὕτης τε καὶ αὕτης] The
article which formerly gave me so much
trouble is restored to its just rights by
the expulsion of the word ἐχέντα; for it gives to the words which follow
it the nature of a subject. ‘Hereafter
and Hereafter will bring us into union.’
He does not say τὰ αὕτης, because this
repetition is not to take place now, as is
evident from the opposition τῶν μέντων.
ἐν ψεύδει For δὲ I read δὲν, which de-
pends on λέγω, as implied in τὸ ποιον
δὴ ἔλεγες;

μὲν ἐπισημαινοσθαί τίνα φύσιν] To set upon them the seal of some one
nature,—i.e., by giving them a generic
name. We should have expected τοῦ-
tος, but where two regimens occur
together, as here συναρχόντας and ἐπι-
σημαινοσθαί, the case of one or the
other is suppressed. See Porson on
Medea v. 734.
ΠΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

... ἦσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τῶν ὡς τί πέρ ἄν πρὸς ἀφιθεῖν ἀμιθῆς μός ἡ μέτρον ἡ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ἡμικυκλικὰ εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενα καλῶς ἄν δοκοίμην δρᾶν τοῦτο; ἢ τῶς σὺ φῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γ', ὁ Σάκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲν. τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μικτὸν ἐκ τούτων ἀμφοῖν τίνα ἰδέαν φύσιμεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ καὶ ἔμοι φράσις, ὡς σίμαι.

ΣΩ. Θεοὶ μὲν σὺν, ἄν πέρ γ' ἐμαῖς ἑκαῖς ἐπικρίσεις γίγνεται τις θεῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐξοχον δὴ καὶ σκόπει.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῷ, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὃ Πρώταρχος, αὐτῶν φίλος ἢ μὴν νῦν δὴ γεγογένη.

C ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις τούτο; καὶ τίνι τεκμηρίεις χρῆς;

ΣΩ. Φράσω δὴλον διτ. σὺ δὲ μοι συναπολογήσῃς τῷ λόγῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Δέγα μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νῦν δὴ ποῦ τι καὶ ἤφθησατερον. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. 'Ναι.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτος δὴ ἢρνότερον καὶ ἤγοτερον αὐτοῖς, καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλατον, καὶ Ὑδάτος καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μείζον καὶ συμ- νυτέρον, καὶ ὄψια ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τῷ μᾶλλον τῷ καὶ ἤ- τον δεχόμενης ἐπίθεμεν [εἰς ἓν] φύσεως.

D ΠΡΩ. Τῆς τοῦ ἀπελόρου λέγεις;

ΣΩ. 'Ναι. συμμείγνυ δὲ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Ἡν καὶ νῦν δὴ, δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπελόρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἓν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περιτειδοῦς συναγαγ

καὶ τῶν δ τί περ ἐπὶ τ. ἦ.]' That is the triple, the quadruple, the third, the fourth, and so on with all multiples and all measures, whether in numbers or magnitudes.

[εἰς ἓν] τὶδέξαι εἰς ἓν "to place in a genus" is correct, and so likewise is τὶδέξαι τί τινος φύσεως, "to declare anything as belonging to a certain nature." But τὶδέξαι τί εἰς ἓν τινος φύ-

γένεσις is unexamplied and inconceivable.

Here again we have a specimen of that oblivion of the fourth, and on with all multiples which has ruined so many texts.

γένεσις Not 'familia genus' (Stallb.), a misconception which has led to a wrong view of the whole passage, but the whole race or family, τα δεχόμενα τὸ πέρας. See the following notes.
“I could get none to listen. I suppose any adviser would do the same by my company: εἰ δὲ σοι μνήμην ἀναφέρω τίνος ἔχειν, "he would leave us to our own device." Of the passages quoted by Winckelmann, that from the Republic Η'—ποιεῖ ταύταν, δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμενώς, needs no comment; that from Thucydides B. 2, οὖν τινα σφαίρα καὶ ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ ποιήσειν τὸ αὐτό, would not be to the purpose even were it sound; but "Read, critic." "They think they will do as much by sea." That in Thuc. B. 7. ταύταν ἢν ἐποίησεν αὐτός νικά τὸ μεγαλότερον διὰ παντός καὶ μικρότερον is very much to the purpose, and shews that an infinitive is the subject of the phrase in question, and that the phrase is (as one would expect) not ταύταν δρᾶσα, but ταύταν ποιήσατε. Another difficulty is presented by τούτων ἄμερον συναγομένων καταφεράναι κάθειν γενηται. ΠΡΩ. Ποιάν καὶ πώς λέγει; ΣΙΘ. Φην τοῦ ιδού κ. τ. τ. for beyond all doubt κάθειν refers to the third γένος which they have been sometimes in quest of. But who could help taking ποιάν to refer to κάθειν; and yet ποιά is answered by Socrates as referring to the second. If the reader will look very closely into this matter, he will see that ἄμερον συναγομενον μ. κ. γ. is an interruption to the argument. "We have (or have not) already told over the members of the παρακολουθείν family. Let us do it again (or let us do so now)." What ought to follow? Most undoubtedly the question of Protagoras: "What do you mean by family? and what family?" Then would follow the enumeration; but after this it is most surprising that Protagoras should answer—"I understand: you mean, I suppose, that if we mix them, certain products will result."— How could he say this, if something about this combination had not been mentioned after the description of the family itself? I think there cannot be any doubt that a clause has strayed from its place, and that we should restore it after ἐκπεράστηκα, at the end of Socrates' next speech.
ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἱσοῦ καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὡς ὅπως ταῦτα πρὸς Ἐ ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄντικα διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα, ἐνθείσα ἀριθμόν, ἀπεργάζεται. (τούτων δὲ ἀμφότερων συναγωγικῶν καταφάνης καθείναι γενήσεται.)
ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω φαίνει γὰρ μοι λέγειν, μιμοῦσι ταῦτα, γενέσις τινὰς ἃρ ἐκάστων συμβάινειν.
ΣΩ. Ὡς καὶ ὡς φαίνομαι.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἢ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑπερας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;
ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ δεξιᾷ καὶ βαρείᾳ καὶ ναχεὶ καὶ βάφακι, ἀπείροις

Τὴν τοῦ ἱσοῦν] Socrates describes the ἁράς family as, whatever puts an end to the contradiction in Opposites. For every Indefinite has two opposite extremes, μῆλον καὶ πῦτον, which being unlimited, and having no proportion in themselves, would be in continual contradiction, if they were not tempered and harmonised by the agencies belonging to the class of ἁράς, which effects this end by introducing in each case a suitable number or basis of proportion. He does not say τὸν ἀρίθμον, for he is speaking of particulars. This doctrine of the power of Number as the ground both of things in themselves, and of our perception of them, is the chief characteristic of the Pythagorean School, from whom it was adopted by the semi-Pythagorean Epicurians. Böckh has an ingenious remark that this basis of the Doric Philosophy stands half way between the material groundwork of the Ionic School, and the intellectual principle of the Attic. See Extracts from the “Philozaus” in the Appendix.

μιμούσι ταῦτα] The MSS. and Edd. have μιμοῦς, an anacolouthon, where such a figure is a capricious violation of grammar, serving no purpose of clearness or emphasis. I have therefore adopted the correction proposed by Kritsch.

νόσοις] The indefinite extremes of hot and cold, moist and dry, &c. τοῦτων καὶ τοῦτα τοῦτα are the γένα τοῦ ἁράτοις, instances of the Limit, not
όσιν, ἀρ' ου τοιτά ἐγγυνόμενα ταῦτα ἡ μέα πέρας τε ἀπειρά-
σατο, καὶ μονακιν ἐξίμπασαν τε τελεώσατα ἐξεστάσατο;
ΠΡΩ. Μάλιστα γε.
ΣΣ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε χειμώνι καὶ πνύγεσιν ἐγγυνόμενα τὸ
μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἀπειρὸν ἄφειλετο, τὸ δ' ἐμετερὸν καὶ ἡμα-
σύμετερον ἀπειράσατο.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΣ. Οὐκόν ἐν τούτων ὅρατι τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάνθεν ἡμῖν ἐ
γένον, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων συμμεθέντων;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖν;
ΣΣ. Καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μορὶ ἐπιλεῖπτω λέγων, οἷον μὲθ' ἐγνείας
χάλλος καὶ ἴσχυς, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὐτὸ πάμπολλα ἐκέχει καὶ
πάγκαλο. ἔχειν γὰρ πον καὶ ἐξίμπασαν πάντων πονηρὰν αὕτη
κατιδοῦσα ἡ σὺ ἦσος, ὥς καὶ Φιλήδη, πέρας ἐχόντων οὖθ'.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ιδονων ουδεν ουτε πλησιων ένων έν αυτοις, νομον και ταξιν
C περας έκθετο και ου μεν άποκραυγασαι φης αυτην, δηγω δε του-
νατην άποισις λέγω. σοι δ', ο Πρώταρχε, τως φαίνεται;
ΠΡΩ. Και μάλα, ο Σώκρατες, έμουε κατα νουν.
ΣΩ. Οίκοιν το μεν δε τρία θατ' έκλεισα, ει δυνοης.
ΠΡΩ. 'Αλλ' ομια κατανοειν· έν μεν γάρ μου δοκεις το
άπειρον λέγειν, έν δε και δευτερον τι περας έν τοις ουτετρι-
tον δ' ου σφόδρα κατέχω τι βούλει φράζειν.
ΣΩ. Το γάρ πληθος σε, ο Θαυμάσιε, έξεπληθη της του
D τριτου γένης, και τοι πολλα γε και το απειρον παρέχετο
[γένη]. δημος δ' επισφραγισθέντα τι του μάλλον και έμασγιου
'γενε έν έφανε.
ΠΡΩ. 'Αληθης.
ΣΩ. Και μην το γε πέρας ουτε πολλά έλεγεν, ουτε έδυσκο-
λινομεν ώς ουκ ήν έν φύσει.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς γάρ έν;
ΣΩ. Οίδαμοις. άλλ' τριτον φάθη με λέγειν, έν τούτο τι-
θέντα, το τούτων έκγονον άπαν, γένεσιν [είς] ουσίων εκ των
μετα του πέρατος άπειρησαμένων μέτρων.

not belong, after the second πέρας in
stead of the first.

ἀποκραυγασαι Plato uses this word in
Rep. 406, b, for to eneche. In comedy
it occurs in the sense of to bore to
dead. There is no evidence of its
being 'verbum palestricum,' as Winckel-
mann supposes; at least, not in the
sense he intends by his paraphrase,
'Deam Voluptatem rationibus et argu-
mentis tantum ictibus percurrsum con-
cidisse.' The sense is, and you say
that she has eneche them (πάντας),
but I affirm that she has saved them.

Though if we durst insert ημας after
αυτην, the το τε Λεονίτη ambiguity of
the syntax, which has led more
than one scholar a strange dance,
would be removed by the order of the
two accusatives.

γένης] The Books have γενέσεως, and one editor inform us that πληθος
tης γενέσεως means οι πολλατ γενέ-
σεις. If so, πληθος του συνρωματου will
be an equally elegant variation of οι
πολλατ ανυρωτοι. Till this is certain,
it will be more prudent to take the
word which has occurred so often, and
always in the very same acceptance.

This supplement, which I have
put in brackets, is in the true style of
the interpolator.

οινο το απειρον ελεγε] This is a strange
assertion after περας had been declared
to contain 'every possible relation of
number to number and measure to
measure,' and the instances of it were
said to be μερια. I propose δι for
οινοτ, and οινο τδ, for οινο ελ.

γένης κ. τ. 4.] 'In order to un-
derstand this passage, it is again ne-
cessary to observe the same kind of
distinction as was made in the case of
περας between the λογισμος, ημας, θο-
πλινο, on the one side, and the in-
stances of οι in Nature on the other.

το τουτων έκγονον άπαν, is here equi-
valent to the instances; these are also
included under the term γενεσεις εις
οικαν, by which is implied that every
existing thing arises from this combina-
tion. They are said to arise εκ των
μετρων, from the proportions, or pro-
portionate quantities and degrees, απερ-
γαμημένων μετα του πέρατος, which are
effectually simultaneously with the περας
ΠΡΩ. Ἑμαθὼν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρεῖς τετάφτων τι τὸν ἔσχαρεν Ε ἐμένα γένος συμπτέον. κοινὴ δὲ ὑπέννες ὡρα γὰρ εἷς σου δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γυγνόμενα διὰ τὶν ἀιτίαν γίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἑμιογεῖ πῶς γὰρ ἂν κωφῆς [τοῦτου] γίνεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ τοῦ ποιούντος φύσεις οὐδὲν [πλὴν ὄνοματι] τῆς ἀιτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰτίον ὀρθῶς ἂν εἶη λεγόμενον [ἐν];

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε ποιούμενον αὖ καὶ τὸ γυγνόμενον οὐ—27 δὲν πλὴν ὄνοματι, καθάπερ τὸ νῦν δὴ, διαφέρον εὐφρόσυνην.

ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἤρεθαι μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ [γυγνόμενον] ἕκειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πανῦ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο ἐρα καὶ οὗ ταῦτὰν αἰτία τ᾽ ἔστι καὶ τὸ δούλευον ἐις γένεσιν αἰτία.

(Proportion in the abstract), for as soon as ever the τέραξ enters into anything, its properties immediately receive their due proportion. The whole passage may therefore be translated,—But understand me to mean by the third kind the whole produce of these two, considering all such produce as one, as a coming into being, derived from the proportions produced along with the Λίμῖτ.” On looking over this old note, I feel but one misgiving; and that is as to my implied approval of the words γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν. As every γένεσις must be εἰς οὐσίαν, understanding οὐσία in a lower sense as a γεγεννημένη οὐσία, (see inf. 27, b), the redundancy is in itself suspicious; but this suspicion becomes still more serious, when we reflect that according to Greek usage this kind of apposition would be connected by a participle; for it is not a description appended, but a reason for the previous name. ἔγχυσιν γένεσιν ἄν δὲ would of course by attraction become ἔ. γένεσιν οὐσίαν.

τὸ μὲν τε τρίτον] τοῖς has been at last inserted before τριῶσ, in uis codicibus.

χωρίς [τοῦτον]] The attempts to de-
ΠΡΩ. Τι μήρ;
ΣΩ. Όσκοιν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ἧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένε;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

B ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν τέταρτον, [τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ἰκανῶς ἔτερον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἑξείδων διδηλωμένον.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγομεν ἔτερον γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. Ὄρθος μήρ ἔχει, διωφυσινοῦν τῶν τετάρτων, ἐνδὲ ἐκάστου μνήμης ἑνεκα ἐφεξής αὐτὰ καταφεμησάσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μήρ;
ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοινυ ἀπείρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἐπειδ' ἐκ τούτων τριῶν μικτὴν καὶ γεγονήμενην οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τεταρτῆς λέγων ἄρα μὴ πλημμελείην ἂν τί.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πώς;

[tὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ἰκ. ἔτερον ὑπὲρ] See Addenda.

ἔτερον γὰρ οὖν] The inferior MSS. have λέγομεν γὰρ οὖν. Stallbaum, who is always haunted by a perverse suspicion that the older MSS. are full of grammatical corrections (a fact notoriously truer of the recent copies), prefers the latter, and asserts that γὰρ οὖν is better suited to λέγομεν than to ἔτερον. But if λέγομεν means anything, it means both λέγομεν (it could not be used for λέγων ἦν ἑξείτο), and is therefore a proposal; and γὰρ οὖν is not, and cannot be, used in the asent to a proposal; whereas in the admission of a thing proved, nothing is more common. The drift of the whole argument confirms the correctness of the Bodelian ἔτερον. ποιῶν precedes, ποιομένων follows, but ποιῶν = αἰτία and ποιομένων = δοῦλον κ. τ. ้. Therefore αἰτία and δοῦλον are different. Now our first three Classes belonged to the ποιομένων = γιγνόμενα, or their elements, and as ποιῶν is different from these, it has a right to a separate (fourth) Class. (Strictly speaking only one Class, the third, is γιγνόμενον, and for that reason he uses the expression δοῦλον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτία, in order to include the first and second, and in like manner he speaks of τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ἧν γίγνεται.) The distinctness then of Cause from the other three Classes is that on which the whole stress of the sentence falls. But it was not necessary to change λέγομεν into λέγομεν. I did so, because the rules of dialogue are very strictly observed by Plato, and therefore Protagoras would have to answer to λέγομεν. But why should he not answer to both that and ἔτερον, by the adoption of both readings? For γὰρ οὖν compare in this Dialogue 14, b. 16, b. 17, c. 30, c. 32, c. 34, μὴ πλημμελείην] The Bodelian and its two followers have no μή. But as it is easier to account for its omission in some copies than for its interpolation in others, there is prima facie evidence in its favour; for, although μὴ and μὴ ποτὲ are very common forms of interrogation among the lower Greeks, μὴ μὴ is a colloquial Atticism, of which they could know nothing save from books. The following passages will show the manner in which this form of interrogation is used, and that it is employed alike where the speaker is uncertain of the answer, and where he merely demands an assent on which he has a right to reckon: Phaedo 54, c (twice) and Parmenides 163, c (in these instances ἀλλὰ τι makes the question negative) Phaedo 103, c. Crito 44, κ. Charmides 174, ο.
ΠΑΙΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθ` ὑμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος; καὶ τί ποτε βουλήθηκες εἰς ταῦτ᾿ ἀφικόμεθα; ἃρ` οὐ τὸ τότ` ἢν; δευτερεία ἐξηγούμεν πότερον ἓδονῆς γίγνοιτ` [ἐν] ἡ φρονίμεσσως. οὐχ οὕτως ἢν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ` οὖν νῦν, ἑπειδὴ ταῦτ` οὕτως διειλόμεθα, κάλλον ἢν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἕπιτελεσαίμεθα πρῶτον πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμιφραγηθέσαμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ἔσθι δὴ, νικάντα μὲν ἑθεμέν ποιόν τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἓδονῆς τε καὶ φρονίμεσσως. ἢν οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. ἢν.

ΣΩ. Ὁσκοῦν τούτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὑφαίμεν ποῖον τις τέ ἔστι καὶ ὑποίου γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μέρος γὰρ αὐτὸν φύσιμεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου, οἷμαι, γένους. οὐ γὰρ δυοίνοι τινοι ἐστὶ μικτὸν ἔκειν, ἀλλὰ ἐξημακάριστον τῶν ἀπελόφων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, ἑστὶν ὑβρίσκως διέκεισθαι οὔτως διάκοσμος μέρος ἔκειν γίγνοιτ`. ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθωτατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἴπερ. τί δ’ ὁ σῶς, ὁ Φίλημε, ἡδονή καὶ ὑμικτός ἢν; Εν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος ὑβρίσκως ἢν πρὸς λέγοιτο; ὅπερ δ’ ἀπάντησαι μοι πρίν ἀποφήγασθαι.

γύνωντ`] As the direct question is not, “to whom would the second prize belong,” but, “to whom does it,” (πότερον ἓδονῆς γίγνεται ἡ φρονίμεσσως;) the dependent question should take the optative without ἂν. I have accordingly expunged ἂν, in view codiceus.

μικτὸν ἐκαθο] As the whole γένος is meant, of which the βίος is a part, it is plain that the common reading, μικτὸς ἐκαθο, is a blunder of the copyist. The correction was long ago proposed by Schultz. It may be objected: ‘If all mixtures belong to the κοινή γένος, of course the μικτὸς βίος does so: but, as Socrates has only shown that the κοινή γένος contains all mixtures of a particular kind, namely τῶν ἀπελόφων ἐπὶ νού πέρατος δεδεμένων, unless he can first show that this βίος is compounded of ἀπειρον and πέρας, his case is not proved.’ The answer to this objection is, that the fourfold division professes to be exhaustive; there are no other elements in any mixed thing, than these two: consequently, if any thing is found mixed, we may at once conclude that it is compounded of ἀπειρον and πέρας. But later on, though we learn that ἓδονη is of the ἀπειρον, νοῦς is declared to be of close kin to ἀτίτλοι, the fourth class. To this apparent contradiction I make answer that νοῦς has more than one relation to τὰ γνῶμαν. In that it blends with the qualities of matter, and appears as consciousness, it is πέρας; in that it controls and adapts matter to its ends, it appears as χωρία, and as such resembles the χωρία of the Universal νοῦς, which is ἀτίτλοι. This remark will prepare the reader for the next turn in the dialogue.
ΠΙΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

ΦΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονή καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον; ἦ τῶν τὸ μάλλον τε καὶ ἤτον δεχομένων ἔστον;

ΦΙ. Ναὶ, τῶν τὸ μάλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἡδονή πανάγαθον ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐπύγκανε πεπροκαὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μάλλον.

28 ΣΩ. Οὔδε γ’ ἂν, ὁ Φίλιβος, λύπη πάγακαν· ὥστ’ ἀλλ’ τι νῦν ἰσχεπτέον ἦ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν, ὡς παρέχεται τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγάθοι. τούτο δὲ σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γεγονός ἔστω. φρόνησον δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς τὶ ποτέ τῶν προειρημένων, ὁ Πρώταρχε τε καὶ Φίλιβος, νῦν θέντες σοι ἂν ἀσέβοιμεν; οὐ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ συμφόρος ἡμῖν εἴναι οἱ κόπους κατορθώσαι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

B ΦΙ. Σεμιῆς γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῶν σαυτοῦ θεὸν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ σο’ ὁ ἐταιρεῖ, τὴν σαυτοῦ· τὸ δ’ ἐρωτώμενον ὅμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθὸς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὁ Φίλιβος, καὶ αὐτῷ πεισέων.

ΦΙ. Οὐκὼν ὑπὲρ ἢμοῦ σο’ Πρώταρχε, προφήτησαι λέγειν;

πανάγαθον τῶν ἀγάθων is the reading of the MSS. But whether this be taken, like πάς ἡ ἀγάθος in Soph. Ed. B. 823, as good throughout, or as being all the good that is in the world, and therefore the only good, neither of these facts would prove that it was without limit; for it might be all good so far as it went, and yet not go very far, or it might have an exclusive title to the name, and yet be δύναμιν τέ φιλον τε. Nothing therefore can be truer or more necessary than Bekker’s corrections, πανάγαθον and πάγακαν. In Philebus’ creed ἡδονή is simply the very best and λύπη the very worst thing.

Οὔδ’ γ’ ἂν, ὁ Φ.] Socrates’ just and ingenious retort supplies the omission in Philebus’ answer, and brings us to the twofold conclusion that pleasure and pain are in their own nature without limit, and that this want of a limit, since it admits pain as well as pleasure, the supposed evil as well as the supposed good, cannot be that in which the good of pleasure consists, for as it is alike the condition of both opposites, it cannot belong to either of them to the exclusion of the other.

σκεπτέον . . . ὡς] Some Editors have changed ὡς into ὧδε without authority. It could be used in the sense of “we must look for”, this would have been a plausible change. But this sense it cannot have; and therefore the suspicion falls upon σκεπτέον itself. It is possible that λεκτέον or ὑπολεκτέον is the right reading, either of which would require ὡς.

τοῦτο 84] The MSS. have τοῦτων δή. τοῦτων is a blunder due to τῶν ἀπεράντων. I have substituted δη for δή, because we need the conjunction to oppose τοῦτο to ζήλο τε. γεγονός οὖσι is somewhat unusual for ὑπολογίσας εἴη. ὁ Φιλίβος] The accidental omission of these words in the Bodleian, has supplied Stallbaum with another confirmation of his strange theory that the better MSS. have undergone the revision of fastidious critics. Fastidious critics in the eleventh century must which the good of pleasure consists, have been rara ase.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΜΟΣ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε' τών μέντων σχεδὸν ἀπορώ, καὶ δέομαι γ', ὁ Σώκρατες, αὐτὸν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήσῃ, [ἐνα] μή δὴ ἦμείς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγονιστήν ἐξαιρετάντοντες παρὰ μέλος φιλοσοφεῖ, τι.

ΣΩ. Πιστεύον, ὁ Πρώταρχε', οὔτε γὰρ χαλεπῶν οὐδὲν ἐπι- Στάττεις. ἀλλ' ὄντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε Φίληβος, σεμνῶν [ἐν τῷ παιειν] ἐδορύθησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος ὅποιον γένους εἶλεν.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι γ', ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄδιαν. πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σοφοὶ, ἑαυτοὺς ὡστος σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ἦμῖν σώματος τα καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἵππος εἰ λέγεις. διὰ μακροτέρων δ', εἴ βουλεῖ, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Δέγ' ὅπως βουλεί, μοῦν μήκος ἦμῖν ἐπιλογιζό- ΣΙ. Καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ πως ὅδ' ἐπανερωτώντες.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πάθερον, ὁ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ τόλμη τὸ καλοῦμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπως ἐτίθη: ἡ τάνατια, καθάπερ οἱ πρόφθεν ἦμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φυσικὸν τίνα θαυμαστὴν συντάττοντον διακυβερνάν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὁ Θαυμάσιος Σώκρατες, ἢ μὲν Ἕ

[ὁμ] μὴ δὴ . . . φθ. τι] The MSS. have ὃνα μηδὲν. This μηδὲν must be a correction, because μηδὲν διαφερέσθαι would be the very contrary of that which he dreads. But μηδὲν and τι are incompatible, except in the combined form μηδ' ἐν τι, which is foreign to our purpose. The most probable correction seems to be [ὅνα] μή δὴ, ὃνα having been supplied after μή δὴ was corrupted. ὃνα δὲ and μή δὴ are used where the person addressed is appealed to as to the reasonable nature of the thing expected or feared.

ΠΙΣΤΕΥΝ Κ. Τ. ο.] The connection of the clauses is this. "You thought it difficult, because I frightened you."—"You certainly did."—"Nay but it is easy." I have therefore removed the sign of interrogation after elev. The words ὅτι παιζέων are very suspicious. They explain what might be left to the intelligence of the hearer, and force semnwnon to stand alone, whereas semmnwnon διαφθίσῃ, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος is not a very violent displacement of the natural order, and any reader will see why it is made.

ἐπιλογιζόμενος] This is properly a term of book-keeping, and is used of anything which we set against the account of profit, such as κίνδυνος, τό- νος &c. ἀπεκάθαρμα, I give offence.

Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν] When Socrates offers to Protarchus the alternative belief either in capricious and hap-hazard power, and mere accident, as that which has the universe in its keeping, or in mind and marvellous intelligence, as
that which arranges and regulates it, we expect Protarous to reject the former, and approve the latter supposition. Now Oūδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is a most complete rejection, and so is Oūδὲν ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι μᾶς φαίνεται; but there is in the received text a fatal want of distinctness as to what he rejects; for Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is left by itself, and Oūδὲν ὅτι is pre-dicated of O. αὐτῶν. This shows that the copyists cannot have done their duty. The difference of the readings is remarkable. Bodd. ζ. μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν δὴ λέγεις: Coisl. ζ. μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις: Eusebius, ζ. μὲν γὰρ δὴ σὺ λέγεις. It will be seen that they all three concur in μὲν γὰρ, which is the source of all the difficulty. But Eusebius’ ΜΕΝΕΝΑΡΧΗ I take to have been the first deflection from the true reading ΜΕΝΕΑΡΧΗ, and the νῦν δὴ of the best MS. will justify the change of λέγεις into λέγεις. Oūδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is properly, Nothing like, and is so used by Isocrates. 270 init. (Steph.) 277 med. 279 med. 241 extr. (τι τῶν αὐτῶν) and περὶ Ἀντ. p. 362. Lips. 1835. We may here render it by Nothing of the kind, or Nothing like the fact.

Βούλει δὴν ἐγὼ καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ξύμφωμῳ [ὁμολογομένῳ] ξύμφωμεν, ὡς ταῦτα οὖν ἔχατε, καὶ μὴ μόνον οἰκο-μεθα δεῖν τάλλορα κἂν κυνόνον λέγειν, ἀλλα καὶ συγκα-δυνάμεθα καὶ μετέχομεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φή ταῦτα μὴ οὖνος ἀλλ’ ἀπάκτως ἔχειν;

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ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀν βουλοίμην;
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. 'Ιθι δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τοὺτων νῦν ἡμῖν λόγον ἀφεῖ. 
ΠΡΩ. Ἀγε μονόν.
ΣΩ. Τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἀπάντητων τῶν ζώων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα, καθορισμένοι ποι, καὶ γῆ, καθάπερ Β οἱ χειμαζόμενοι φαίνουν [, ἐνότα τὴν τῇ συστάσει].
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ἄντοις ὑπ᾽ ἀποφίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.
ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, περὶ ἐκάστον τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν λαβὲ τὸ τούτον. 
ΠΡΩ. Ποιον;
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴρ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σωματον μὲν τὶ τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενές θ καὶ φῶλον, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τὲ θαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλπει καὶ πόση δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ ὁδός.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλτ ἀληθές δ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται [ἐκ τούτου] καὶ ἀρχεται τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν πυρός; ἦ τοῦντιν ἐντ ἐκείνου τὸ τ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ σῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπαντ᾽ ἴσχε ταῦτα;

[ἐν τῇ συστάσει] If this means The sentence which I have relieved the σύστασις of our bodies, it is an of this burden affords us the very idle repetition; if of the Universe, it εστι from which the interpolator comes too soon. The question is, not helped himself above. "It is present whether we see the Elements in com- position, but whether we see them at all; that they are περὶ την τῶν σωμάτων φῶλον is shewn; it is impure and φύσις is assumed as the general belief. ſeble in its effects. This connexion is He argues from the elements παρ᾽ ἡμῖν, spoiled, and the grammar made to suffer, which we do see, to the same elements by the intrusion of καὶ.

[ἐκ τούτου] ἐκ τ. is quite suitable to Note the miserable repetition περὶ ἐκαστον τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν when we omit the words, the sentence τούτων ἐκαστόν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν in one becomes ten times more elegant and sentence, for this is virtually the case, forçible, ὑπὸ the quite appropriate since ὑπὸ depends on λαβὲ τό τούτον, enough for the three verbs taken together.
ΠΡΩ. Τούτο μὲν οὖν ἀποκρίσεως ἡξιον ἔρωτες.

ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς ταύτα γὰρ ἐρείς, ὥσπερ, περὶ τὸ [τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἑυπον] γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμῖν πάντων διὸν ἡμῖν τὰ διὸν ἐμπροσθέν, οὕτως ἀποκρινεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τις γὰρ ἀποκρίσεως ἄλλως ἡμιάινων ἐν ποιν πακείσι;

ΣΩ. Σχέδην οὖν διὸ δοσισοῦν. ἀλλὰ τῷ μετὰ τοῦ ἔξις ἐξων. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταύτα τὰ νῦν δὴ λεγην̄ δὴ οὖν εἰς ἐν συγκειμέναι ἰδόντες ἐπινοομάζομεν σῶμα;

ΠΡΩ. Τι μὲν;

Ε ΣΩ. Τάττον δὴ λαβὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐν κόσμων λέγουμεν. [ὅτι] τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπΟν ἐν εἶ ἡ ποιν σῶμα, σύνθετον δὲν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθωτατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τοῦτο τοῦ σώματος ὅλος τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν σῶμα, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν τοῦτο, τρέφεται τε καὶ, ὅσα νῦν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἴπομεν, εἴληφέ τε καὶ ἔσχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τὸν ἐκείνῳ, ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐκ αἴξιον ἐκφρασθέως.

30 ΣΩ. Τι δὲ; τόθ ἂρ᾽ ἡξιον; ἢ πως ἐρείς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγέ τὸ ποιόν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἡρ᾽ οὗ ψυχὴν φίλομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδιόν ὅτι φίλομεν.

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὃς φιλε Πρώταρχε, λαβὸν, ἐπετε μὴ τὸ γε τοῦ ἀρέσκον.

"Ορθῶς" Compare ἡφ. 53, 4. In instances of this kind, we must not take this word as merely expressive of assent, but rather of satisfaction that the argument is advancing as was intended. This will justify the use of γάρ in the next clause.—The designations τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἑυποι (ἡφ. 31, 4) and τῆς ἐνθάδε both apply to γῆς; but one would be sufficient, and the latter is better here as contrasting with τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ. In place of καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων I suspect that we ought to read καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ περὶ πάντων.—I have changed τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ μ. τ.

[ὅτι] τῶν αὐτῶν γ. τρόπων] The cause of its being a body is given in συνήθειαν δὲν ἐν τῶν αὐτῶν. Therefore the causal δὴ seems out of place here as well as unsuited to τρόπων. We should rather have expected κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγουν, but τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων expresses nearly the same thing. The抄ist was perhaps thinking of διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτίκα.

διὰ νῦν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἴπομεν] This refers to καὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἐρχεται. But περὶ αὐτῶν is surely out of place; for that, concerning which they are speaking here, is τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν σῶμα, and though that σῶμα contains the four elements, those elements have already passed out of the argument. ἐσχεί is both better supported than ἐχεί, and more appropriate, as Socrates is speaking of a continual derivation.

Πήδει] The reasons given seem to be two "The Universe has a soul, for
what else could have given us our souls?" and "the Universe has a soul, because it has all that we have in greater perfection". but the latter alone is intended. "if we have a soul, the Universe which has all that we have &c. must likewise have one". πάντη refers to quantity, purity, intensity &c. mentioned above.

"οὐ γάρ πως" the subject of ἐπικαλεσθαι is evidently cause. But if so, there is no predicate to τέταρτα ἔκεινα. to remedy this, some propose to read ἄνα before τέταρτα; but neither grammar nor logic allows such a contrivance. not grammar, because if plato had intended the clause to be taken absolutely, he would certainly have written ἄνα τῶν τέταρτων. nor logic, for if were to take it thus: "seeing that these four are"—we should immediately ask "are where"? if para' ἡμῖν, that could not be omitted. if every where, that is yet unproved, say the very thing to be proved, for in the next sentence of socrates the conclusion is stated ὡς ἐστιν ἀπεράντως τε ἐν τῷ πατρί κ. τ. ζ. there can be no doubt that the fourth γένη ought to be mentioned, else how can he make any conclusion about them? so that the words τα το τέταρτα ἐκεῖνα are not an interpolation. on the other hand we know that there is a hiatus in the best MS., for it omits πέρας, and though the others have it, it is just as likely that in these it was supplied by conjecture. but the hiatus may have been far greater than that of one word. my impression is that the text in this place was in a very bad condition even in remote times, and that all which intervened between ἐκείνα and καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένους was unreadable. the place was then filled up pretty nearly as we find it. but not correctly: for the enumeration of these γένη without an article is in itself most unlikely, and if καὶ αὐτόν had been mentioned here, it is scarely credible that protarchus should so very soon afterwards beg to be reminded what καὶ αὐτόν meant. i believe that a more probable mode of filling up the gap would be in this fashion: τα τέταρτα ἐκεῖνα εἰς τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν μόνος εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένους, εἰς ἄπασι τέταρτον εἰς, τοῦ εἰς μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν κ. τ. ζ. [ψυχήν τε παρέχον] he argues that αἰτία here below enjoys many and various appellations of σοφία (as we say σοφός πατριώτης, λατρέας, τέκτων, καλλικές, and so forth) and he divides the operations of αἰτία under two heads of combining and repairing (συναίνει καὶ ἄκοψιμον) and gives an example of each in σωμασίαν ἐμποιεῖν and λατρείαν (ἐμποιεῖν). it is evident throughout that he is speaking of the human ψυχή being enabled by this αἰτία to work on our inferior elements by introducing πέρας into the ἐπικράση, and, when the μέτρα thus introduced has been disturbed, by readjusting it; in other words he is speaking of human skill. And, pray, what human skill can be said ψυχήν παρέχειν? But some greek reader, who did not understand the argument, saw something about cause, and something about σώματος, and thought it was a pity that the ψυχή should be missing, and so by his ψυχήν τε παρέχον he killed all the sense of the passage. the application of these facts concerning human skill to a higher skill must be carefully noted. he does not say "there must be some other higher effects elsewhere"; but "we know of certain effects; we know that there is a φύσις τῶν καλλίτων καὶ τι-μιώτατων (i.e. the planets and the whole heavens) and this must be an
ιατρικήν, καὶ ἐν ἄλλης ἄλλα συνειδητῷ καὶ ἀκούμενον, πᾶσαν καὶ
παντικάν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖται· τῶν δ’ αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν
ὁλῷ τε εὐφέρνῳ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσεῖ καλῶν καὶ
eἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτως δ’ οἶχ ἄρα μεμηχανηθα αὐτὴ τῶν καλ-
lίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσειν.

C ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὑπάρχω τούτῳ γ’ ἐν λόγον ἔχων.
ΣΩ. Ὕποθ’ [εἰ μὴ τοῦτο] μετ’ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἐν ἐπό-
μενοι βέλτιον λέγομεν, ὡς ἔστιν, ἡ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἀπει-
ρόν τ’ ἐν τῇ παντὶ πολέ, καὶ πέρας ἰκανόν, καὶ τις ἐν’ αὐ-
τοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσα τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνσυνος τοῖς
tε καὶ φάσαι καὶ μήρας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαίωται’ ἂν.
ΠΡΩ. Λικαινάτατα δήσα.
ΣΩ. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γε-
νοίσθην.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

D ΣΩ. Ὕποθ’ ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Ἄτως ἐρείς φέουσα βασιλικὴ
μὲν ψυχῆ, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίζεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας
δύναμιν, ἐν δ’ ἄλλης ἄλλα καλά, καὶ τ’ ὁ φίλον ἐκάστος λέ-
γεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.
ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ τῶν λόγων ήμισὶ μὴ τι μάτην δόξῃς, ὁ
Προσαρχεῖ, εἰρήκειν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφημικέσως
ὡς ἄει τοῦ παντὸς νοὺς ἄρχει, ἐξεμαχος ἑκείνος.

effect of this same αἰτία operating in
a higher ψυχῆς." Ant's Lexicon will
give the student several examples of
ἐρα in this kind of reasoning, where
we would show the absurdity of deny-
ing in one case, what has been ad-
mitted in another less evident case.
I should prefer ἐν ὁλῷ τε τῇ εὐφέρνῃ.
[i.e. μὴ τοῦτο] These words are out
of construction, and redundant. Let
them be restored to the margin, or,
better still, be forgotten. In this sen-
tence the reader will perceive the play-
ful way in which ἄπειρον is called
πολύ, and πέρας ἰκανόν, and αἰτία οὐ
φαύλη, and will be able to judge of
the worth of Winckelmann's conjecture,
when he proposes to foist χοντόν νωτῆς
an epithet into the text.

Διότι Then Jove is subordinate to
αἰτία. This looks like Pantheism, but
in the Timaeus we are told of a δη-
mουργός καὶ πατὴρ by whom Jove and
all other Deities were made. He too
is not independent of αἰτία, for the
αἰτία is given which caused him to
make the world, namely that he was
good, and since in that which is good
there is no grudge, he be grudged not
the world its being, but would have
all things like himself. Thus the First
Cause is The Good, but the δημουργὸς
does not owe his being to τάγαδεν
αἰτία; but through its presence in him
he becomes the author of all things,
including the Gods. Jove himself ap-
ppears among these divine beings whom
he addresses thus: Θεοί, ὅσιν ἑως δη-
mουργὸς πατὴρ τῇ ἔργῳ, ἀπ’ δ’ ἐμοῦ
gενέμανα, ἄματα ἐμοῦ γ’ ἔξολον—
for so the passage ought to be read.
Tim. 41, 1.}
ΠΡΩ. 'Εστι γάρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ γ' ἐνὶ ἤρθε ημέρας πεποιθήσεις ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι νοεῖς ἐστὶ γεννώσῃς τοῦ πάντων αἰσθημάτων. [τῶν τεττάρων Ε ἤν ἦμιν ἐν τούτῳ.] ἔχεις γάρ δὴν ὑμᾶν ἦν ἴδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Εχω καὶ μάλιστα ἰκανῶς καὶ τοῖς με ἀποκριναμένοις ἐλεήμενα.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοθη ἡ παιδιὰ.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Νοεῖς δὴ ποιν, ὡς ἔτοιμον, ὅπως μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα 31 ποτὲ δύναμιν ἐκτεταμένον, σχεδὸν ἑπτεικός ἦμιν τὰ τὲν ἄθλον θεοῦται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἢδονή γ' ὑσαντός πάλαι τῷ γένους ἀθάνατος.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Μεμνημέθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ότι νοεῖς μὲν αἰτίας ἢν ἐγγενήσερα καὶ τοῦτον σχεδὸν τὸ γένους, ἢδονή δ' ἀπειρίας τ' αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἁρχήν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδεὶς ἔχοντος ποτὲ γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνημέθα πῶς γάρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Λεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τούτο, ἐν γραφῇ ἅπαντα καὶ ἒπει τ' ἐστὶν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ μὲν γένους, ὡς ἔργον γεγένθην, ὑπόταν γιγνησθον, ἄλλον τ' εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον ἐμπεσάμενον, οὔτω καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τοῖς κατὰ τοῦτο ἐξήνετοι ἡμῖν συνήθεις ἐν τοῖς δυναμεθ' ἰκανὼς βεβαίας.

ΠΡΩ. 'Αλλα εἰ ταῦτα χρῆ πορείσθαι, ταῦτα πορεύομαι.
Ἀρεί, οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἔμοι φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρα;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τοῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἡμαῖς φαίνεσθαι λύπη τε καὶ ἦδον γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινὸν δὲ γ', ὥσπερ Σῶκρατες, ὑπομίμησε σοὶ τι ποτὲ τῶν προειρημένων βούλεις δήλουν.

ΣΩ. Ἡμέως ταῦτα εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὅ ἦμασθε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινὸν τοῖνυ ὑπακούωμεν ὅ δὲ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτων ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ο μετὰ τὸ ἔπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες; ἐν ὑπὲρ ἵππεων, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ ἄρμονιαν, ἐπίθεον;

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δ' ὅ τι μάλιστ' ἦδη πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μοῦν.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοῖνυ, τῆς ἄρμονίας μὲν λυκόμενος ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις, ἡμῖν λύπην τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἄλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω λέγεις εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' ἄρμοντομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἔπειρον, ἢδονήν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἴ δεὶ δέ ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὅ τι τόχιστα δηχθήναι.

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν σε δρόθως λέγειν, ὡς Σῶκρατες, ἐμφανερωστέρον δ' ἢτι ταῦτα ταῦτα πεπρόμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Θυμίων τὰ δημοσία ποιν καὶ περιμασθή δόξουν συννοεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

ΣΩ. Ποίη μὲν ποιν λύσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐδώδη δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἢδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

[ἀπώφησις] The same word is again ἔδην, and τῆς ἀνθρώπως, I should be inclined to write πάλιν λογίσθη, or ἐπανούσης, which last is perhaps more like the text. On the faith of ἐλ πλῆς τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίαν
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Δίψος δ' α' αδ φθορά και λύτη [και λύσις], ή δε τού ἰχθοῦν πάλιν τὸ ξηρατήθη πληροῦσα δύναμις, ἰδονή. διάκρισις 32 δε [γ'] αδ και [диάλευς] ή παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ πτερίδος πάθη, λύτη; κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἢ δίψου πάλιν ἀπόδοσις τε και ψυξίς, ἰδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. 

ΣΩ. Καὶ [δίγγος] ἢ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ἰχθοῦν τῆς γεγονότος πήξις, λύτη, πάλιν δ' τείς ταύτων ἀπειδῶν και διακρι- 


ΠΡΩ. Ἔσωτ' δοξεὶ γὰρ μοι τούτον γε τιν' ἔχειν.

[διάλευς] This differs so little in sense from διάκρισις that it is useless, and moreover it answers to nothing in the antithesis. The opposites are διάκρισις = ἀπόδοσις, παρὰ φύσιν = κατὰ 


Schleiermacher, in view of Stobeus' reading, εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν, for εἰς ταύταν, conjectured εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν. Stall- 


Baum finds every thing to his mind: 


From this it would appear to follow that πάλιν δε ταύτης διακρινομένης was the original reading. Or perhaps it was πάλιν δε τῶν παγίω- 


τῶν διακρινομένων: but at all events it was something very different from what we now read on the authority of some unknown person who did his best to patch up a reading from his damaged copy. In what follows, the construction is purposely loose, in order to admit of more detail, and especially to pre- 


vent the φθορά being understood of anything save the dissolution of the compound formed from the union of τὸ ἰχθοῦν and πέρας: hence also the double μὲν and its double apodosis.


Philemon Philebus. 


[δίγγος] See the preceding note. But a more serious difficulty is offered by εἰς ταύταν ἀπειδῶν, which is doubtful not only because of the preposition εἰς, but also because the plural refers to nothing yet mentioned; nor does τα-


τόν satisfy me, for, though εἰς ταύταν ἰχθοὺν would do very well for the meeting of things separated, here the natural way is that of separation, as is plain from the nature of the case, and from the word διακρινομένων.


Trendelenburg's Excerpta, where there is a very good note on the word.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Τούτο μὲν τοινυ ἐν ἂν ἀλυμέθα λύπης τε καὶ ἤδων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐκατέργος.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τίς τοινυ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν ἔλαιομενον προσόδημα μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἱδέων ἐλπίζομεν ἤδω καὶ θαρραλέων, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπήρων φοβερόν καὶ ἄλγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ ὁν τοῦθ' ἤδων καὶ λύπης ἔτερον εἰδος, τὸ χωρίς τοῦ σώματος [αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς] διὰ προσόδημα γνωμένον.

ΣΩ. ὩρΘώς ὄπλαβος. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἷμαι, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δύσαν, εἰλικρίνεια ἡ ἐκατέργως γνωμομένης, τῶς δοκεῖ, καὶ

[ἔλαιομενον] It is not the expected thing, but the state of expectation which is either painful or pleasant. Nor can we put τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπίζομενον for τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπίζομενον παῖς with any shadow of propriety.

[αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς] Protarchus’ answer is an admission that there is another species of pain and pleasure independent of the body, for so he varies the expression of that which Socrates had called αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς. But this variety does not satisfy the sciolist; so he gives us a tautology in its place, by again repeating αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς.

Ὀρθώς ὄπλαβος. ἐν γὰρ] The γὰρ after ὀρθώς ὄπλαβος shows that a certain satisfaction is implied. See above 29, p.

ἐν γ. τούτοις οἷμαι] It is commonly supposed that Socrates is here speaking of the προσόδημα alone; but it would be strange that he should speak of all of them as pure and unmingled with pleasure and pain, just after he has made them appear as one kind of them. Nor is it easy to see why he should lay so much stress on this particular εἰδὸς, as expecting from it a solution of the whole question. ἐν τούτοις however manifestly means not ἐν τούτοις τοῖς προσόδημασι, but ἐν τούτοις τοῖς εἰδοῖς, for it follows immediately on Protarchus’ ἔτερον εἰδὸς. But ἐκατέργως cannot be so applied, because τοῖς here involving only two εἰδοῖς, each of them would be ἐκατέργως. This is one difficulty; and here is another. Socrates cannot speak of either εἰδὸς as unmingled with pain and pleasure, since they are kinds of them. But the plural εἰλικρίνεια &c., if they do not refer to εἰδοῖς, must refer to λύπαις τοις καὶ ἤδων, and by substituting this emendation for λύπαις τοις καὶ ἤδων, we get rid of both difficulties at once. It may appear somewhat bold to change so many terminations, but only to those who are unfamiliar with the wholesale dealing of the ancient correctors, who would think themselves quite justified in adapting all the neighbouring endings to τούτοις. I do not however admit this conjecture into the text, because, until we are certain about ὡς δοκεῖ, we must be content with uncertainty in every thing else. I once thought that these words meant, that Socrates wished to represent himself as not sure till after further examination whether he should find those pure and unmingled εἰδοῖς, but in that case he would have said ἐν συρωμένοις and οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὑρηκέναι, or any thing sooner than ὡς δοκεῖ. If we adopt εἰλ. ἡ ἐκατέργως γνωμομένης καὶ ἀμείκτος λύπαις τοῖς καὶ ἤδων, they will be the instrumental datives to εὑρέσθαι. Perhaps ὡς δοκεῖ is merely a gloss to κατὰ γε τὴν ἑμᾶς, before δύσαν was added by way of explanation.

οἷμαι, κατὰ γε τὴν ἑμῶν δύσαν] The second of these phrases modifies the confident air of the first; there is therefore no redundancy, such as some have imagined to be purposely introduced to imitate ordinary conversation!
ΠΑΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΟΠΟΣ.

Ξέλεων (motive unknown) and that ξέλεοι are ύψος, τοιχος, δρόμος and so forth. The reader need scarcely be reminded that ύψος and the rest neer periá, but the γενέσεις from them do, and it is these γενέσεις, if ξυμγός, which feel the pain or the pleasure of their jarring or blending. It is also usual to say ὁληθής λέγεται of statements and ἐντών εστὶν of facts, whereas here we have a confusion of the two. I have restored what in my opinion must have been the original text.

After δοτέν governing these several datives, the sentence requires δοτι or ὅς; I have inserted the latter.

For the MS. reading ἔστιν ὅτι, which is a mere repetition of ἔστιν, the nearest paleographical change would be ἔστιν οὐ, the Υ and Τ being often confounded; but the most appropriate and, in itself, a very probable change, is ἔστιν δέ, "on certain conditions". This I have admitted into the text.

The argument is compared, as in many other parts of Plato, to a beast of the chase being tracked.

The γενεμένων is the reading of all MSS. and Edd. in place of τὸν γενομένων. But without some qualifying adverb τ. τ. cannot be used in any other sense but "what is commonly said". And again αὐτῷ refers to no plural expressed or implied. Stallbaum tells us, that first that αὐτῷ is put for
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ἐγεὶ δὴ τοινυν, ταύτης προθυμού μεμνησθαί· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἱδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν [μεμνησθαί ταύτης]
ἐξέρχεται ἣμίν [τῇ μῆ]. βραχὺ δὲ τοι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλεις, διαπεράσωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐγεὶ τοινυν.


Β ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τῶν μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐφη βοήθη γὰρ ποι ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βιῶν μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μήτε σμικρῶν χαίρειν τῷ τῶν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ
φρονεῖν βίον ἐλομένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλὰ οὕτως ἔφησθε.

ΣΩ. Οὕτων οὕτως ἐν ἡκέινῳ ἐντάξει, καὶ ὑπος οὐδέν ἀτοπον εἰ πάντως τῶν βιῶν ἔστι θεότυτος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐθύκον εἰκὸς γ’ οὕτω χαίρειν τοῦς θεοὺς οὕτε τοῦν

ΣΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὕν οἶκοι ἡδίκησαν γονὸν αὐτῶν ἐκά
τερον γνώμων ἔστίν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκαὶ εἰς αὐτῆς

ΣΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν οἷος ἡναχθην γονὸν αὐτῶν ἐκα
τερον γνώμων ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκαὶ εἰς αὐτῆς

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τερον γνώμων ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκαὶ εἰς αὐτῆς

[μεμνησθαί ταύτης]] Protarchus is to try and remember this, because it is an important fact; not because it is impor
tant to remember it. The change from ταύτης, which the author of this fool
hish supplement saw above to ταύ
tης, which he certainly wrote, would almost make one suspect that he meant
μεμνησθαί for a passive. Just so in
the Politicus, 286, σ, we read, μή πρὸς
Ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ τῆς μετρητικῆς μέρος, ὅτα
τὸ τρόπον δὲν μεμνησθαί πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον.
But there the whole context shews that
Plato wrote μεμνησθαί.

[Τῇ] ἐλομένῳ] This again has been
borrowed from below, and placed here
so that it makes ἀποκολύειν govern a
dative. As to οὐδὲν ἀποκολύει being
used with the accusative suppressed,
this is a common idiom. "It is quite
possible to live the intellectual life in
this manner."

Οὕτων οὕτως] I ought not to have
followed two previous editors in pref
ferring οὕτως, which rests on no good
authority. The argument runs thus:
"This neutral life is compatible with
pure intelligence; for the man who
chose the life of intelligence was ob
liged to forego all delight. In this way
then (this being so) it would be the
very life which he had already chosen,
and it would also probably be the
nearest approach to the life of the
Gods." The transition from the philo
sopher to the Gods is marked by ἐκεί
νω τε καλ. The γε which has usurped
the place of τε in the Editions, is ab
solutely without meaning.

ἐπιστησόμεθα] This is Bekker's con
jecture for ἐπιστησόμεθα, which occurs
in all the Books, but is both less suit
able in itself, unusual with ἔστιν,
which requires a future, and quite in
compatible with προποθήσομεν.
ΠΑΠΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθότατα λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γ’ ἔτερον ἐδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὦ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαγεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πάν ἐστὶ γεγονός.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Μνήμην, ὡς ἔστεκ, ὦ τι ποτ’ ἔστε, πρότερον ἐναληστένον, καὶ κνυτδεύει πάλιν ἐτι πρότερον αἴσθησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πη γενή—Δ σεσθαί.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς φης;
ΣΩ. Θές τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐνάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθὴ ‘κείνην ἔσαστα, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἄμφοι ἱόντα καὶ τὶν ἄσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντεύξει ήδονες τε καὶ πλεῖον ἐκατέρω.
ΠΡΩ. Κείσθαι.
ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ δὲ ἄμφοι ἱόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχήν ἡμῶν φώμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἄμφοι μὴ λανθάνειν, δόρτ’ ὀρθότατ’ ἐφούμεν;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
ΣΩ. Τὸ τοινύν λευθέναι μηδαμώς ὑπολάβης ἃς λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθα που γένεισιν. ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξωθος: ἢ δὲ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὕτω γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ μὴ ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πω γίγνεσθαι φάναι τιν’ ἀκολούθη ἐποτιον. ἢ γὰρ;
ΠΡΩ. Τὶ μὴν;
ΣΩ. Τὰ τοινυν ὄνοματα μετάβαλε μόνον.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ἀναληστένοι Ἀπτέτων alone is the proper verb. Παραληστεῖς would be just as unsuitable as ἀναληστένοι; for they are not going to receive the information from others, but to learn it by observation. Nor is it at all likely that Plato would play on the word ἀναλησθέναι, as denoting the proper function of μνήμη. I therefore conjecture πρότροπον ἄν ἐδή ληπτένοι.
κατὰ τρόπον] This is the opposite of ἀπὸ τρόπον. See below, 84, a.
ἐνταῦθα ποῦ] Somewhere here,—i.e., in the state we have been describing.
ἡμῖν γεγονότος πω] I have adopted Stallbaurn’s conjecture for πος without hesitation.
ΠΙΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΑΠΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν ἀπαθής αὖθις γίγνεται τῶν σωμάτων τῶν τοῦ σώματος, [ἂν νῦν λήθην 34 καλεῖς.] ἀνασθήσις ἐπονομάσον

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐν ἑνὶ πᾶθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινὴ γνώμην κοινῇ καὶ κυνείσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τῷ κίνησιν ὁνομάζων αἰσθήσιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπων φθέγγοι᾽ ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὅποιον ἢδη μανθάνομεν δ' βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἰσθήσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τι μὴν;

ΣΩ. Σωπηρίζων τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὑθέως Β ἐν τῆς λέγω, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μνήμης δ' ἀνάμνησιν ἄρ' οὖν διαφέρονσαν λέγομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡσυχ.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὖν τὸ τέλος; οὖν τὸ τέλος;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Ἡσυχ, δ' ἐν τῷ σώματος ἑκατοχεῖ πσθ' ἡ ψυχή, ταύτη' ἀνεν τοῦ σώματος αὐτῇ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὁ γὰρ μάλιστ' ἀναλάμβανη, τοῦ' ἀναμνήσθεον ποὺ λέγομεν. ἡ γὰρ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡσυχ, ἀπολέσσας μνήμην εἰς αἰσθήσεως εἰς' οὖν μαθήματος, αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπόλησθαι πάλιν αὐτῇ ἐν ὁ ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταύτα ἡμίποτε ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας ποὺ λέγομεν.

[ἂν νῦν λήθην καλέσε] Protarchus does no such thing. He is bidden to use ἀνασθήσις in place of τὸ λεληθέναι, and to keep λήθη in the same sense as hitherto.

γνώρων] "Πρὸ γνωρίσαιν Sydenhamus γνωρίσατε tentat. Non video causam." Stallb. And then, of course, we are referred to Matthæus. That the compiler of a Grammar should treasure up all the anomalies and exceptional instances, which either the self-will of authors or the stupidity of scribes supplies him with, is no more than we should expect. But the province of an editor is, as far as possible, to resist such evidence and to oppose common sense to the craving after curiosities. In such a passage as this a departure from the common rule is above all things improbable, for here the notion uppermost in the mind of the writer is the joint participation in a certain state, the common effect of two things, which a singular participle would render less apparent.

πσθ' ἂ] The Zurich editors have not improved this passage by the conjunctural reading of πάς; the word πσθ adds to the clearness of the sentence, and is fully supported by analogous passages in this part of the dialogue.
ΠΡΩ. ὁφθαλίς λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ χάριν ἀπαντήσοι εἴρηται ταῦτα, ἐστι τόδε.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον;
ΣΩ. Ἰν' ἐμα τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδον ἐν χωρίς σώματος ὁ τι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναγχάσατα λάβομεν, καὶ ἂμ' ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων ποιος ταῦτα ἀμφότεροι οἴοικε δηλοῦσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Δέγωμεν τοιν ποσών, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἢδε τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἴδοντως καὶ πάσαν [τὴν] μορφὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαίον, ὡς οἶκε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρότερον ἐκεῖ φαίνεται λητέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τί ποτὲ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ γίγνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Σκοπεῖμεν τοῖνευ τοιν ποσῶν· οὐδέν γὰρ ἀπολογήσομεν.
ΣΩ. Ἀπολογήσομεν μὲν οὖν, ταῦτα γε, ὁ Πρώταρχε, εὐφῶνες ὁ νῦν ἔχομεν, [ἀπολογήσομεν] τὴν περὶ σὺνταῦτα ἀπορίαν.
ΠΡΩ. Ὁφθαλίς ἡμῖν· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειραμήθη λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πόλλα ἔτερα τοιαύτα ἔφαμεν εἰν'τας ἐπιθυμίας;
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί ποτε ἢρα ταῦτα ὑβέραντες, οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦτα· εἰν' περαιγορεύμαν ὁνόματε;
ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ δύδιοι Ίσως εἰπεῖν, ὁ Σωκράτης· ἀλλ' ὅμως λεκτόν.
ΣΩ. Ἐξείδειν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβομεν.
ΠΡΩ. Πέθεν δὴ;

"Ἰν' ἂμα The reading of all the MSS., ἀλλ' ἂμα, has sorely puzzled the editors; some have left it in despair, others have betaken themselves to πη; but this particle is in contradiction to the superlatives which follow, and would be more appropriate to an attempt than commeneing, than to a review of the ground already won. I once adopted δὴ, but with misgivings. I now see that INAMA was divided amiss, and so MA was changed into μῆ. ἂμα τοῦτο καὶ ἄμα ἐκεῖνο is a very common formula. See below 41, δ. ἂμα παρακατέθαλ καὶ ἄμα γίγνεται.

τῶν [τὴν] μορφήν] As he means every phase of it, and not its whole appearance, the article has no business here.

ἄν τῆς [ητούμα] The common reading is ἀπολογήσομεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτα γε, ὁ Πρώταρχε δ' νῦν ἔχομεν· ἀπολογήσομεν κ.τ.λ. It is impossible to make any sense of καὶ ταῦτα γε, nor is the first ἀπολογήσομεν, without a case, supported by usage. The corruption of the passage appears to have originated with the insertion of the second ἀπολογήσομεν, which probably stood at first as a gloss in the margin. Under any circumstances δ' would be untenable, for αὐτὰ ταῦτα proves that a plural must have preceded.
ΣΩ. "Διψή" λέγοντες, λέγομεν εκάστοτε τι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ; ΣΩ. Τούτο δέ γ' ἐστὶ κενοῦταί.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μήρ; ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν τὸ δὴμος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία; ΠΡΩ. Ναί, πώματος γε.

35 ΣΩ. Πώματος, ἥ πληρώσεως πώματος;
ΠΡΩ. Οίμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.
ΣΩ. 'Ο κενοῦμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔσκειν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἥ πάσχει. κενοῦμενος γὰρ ἐρᾷ πληρώσεια.
ΠΡΩ. Ξαφνίστατα γε.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενοῦμενος ἐστὶν ὑπόθεν εἰτ' αἰσθήσεις [πληρώσεως] ἐφάπτοτας ἐν ἐκείνῃ μνήμῃ τούτῳ, ὁ μήρ' ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήρ' ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πῶστον ἐπιθανεῖν; ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

Β ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν γ' ἐπιθυμίων τίνος ἐπιθυμεῖ, ομοίως.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 
ΣΩ. Οὖν ἄρ' ὁ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψή γὰρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένοις; ὁ δ' ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.
ΠΡΩ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Πληρώσεως [γ'] ἄρα πῆ τι τῶν τοῦ διψώντος ἐν ἐφάπτοτο.
ΠΡΩ. 'Αναγκαῖον.
ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἄδύνατον κενοῦταί γὰρ ποι.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφαπτομένη λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ δὴλον ὅτι τῷ γὰρ ἐν ἐκ ἄλλῳ ἐφάνητο; οὐδὲν.
ΠΡΩ. Σχέδιον οὖν ἔλεγεν.
ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὁ συμβέβηκ' ἦμιν ἐξ τούτων τῶν λόγων.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον;
ΣΩ. Σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν δὲν φησίν ἦμιν οὖσαι δὲ λόγῳ γίγνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Ὄτι τοῖς ἑκείνοις παθήμασιν ἕκαστοι ἀν οἱ παντὸς ζωῆς μηνίζει τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ὑμηθ' ἐπὶ τούτων ἄγονσα ἤ τα παθήματα δήλοι ποι μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοίς παθήμασιν ἐκαίνης.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.
ΣΩ. Τὴν ἐρ' ἐπάγονσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν ἀποδείξεως μνήμην δ' λόγος ψυχῆς ἐξῆλθεν τὴν ἡ διμήν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἄρχην τοῦ ζωῆς πανεῖσθαι ἀπέφυγεν.
ΠΡΩ. Οξεῖστατα.
ΣΩ. Ἀνείπη ὑμᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῇ ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμὴ δ' λόγος ἄρεθι.
ΠΡΩ. Αληθεύστατα.
ΣΩ. Ἐμι δὴ καὶ τὸδε περὶ ταύτα ταύτα κατανοήσωμεν. χλω γὰρ εἶδός τι μοι φαίνεσθαι βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν δ' λόγος ἦμιν ἐν τούτοις ὑπόθεσσιν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἐν τῖσι καὶ ποιοὶ περὶ βίου φράζεις;
ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροφορούσας καὶ κενοῦσας καὶ πάσιν ὡς περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζωῶν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν, καὶ εἴ τις τούτων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἦμιν ἀλγεί, τοτε δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς.
ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι ταύτα.

Τὴν ἐρ' ἐπάγονσαν| The argument, δ' λόγος αἰτεῖ| Eureses, makes good.
then, in showing that Memory is that Compare Rep. 604 c; Parm. 141 δ; which introduces one to objects of desire, Crat. 48, c. The figure of speech seems has procured that to the soul belong the to be borrowed from the draught- whole activity and desire, and the di- board.
rection of the entire creature.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΑΘΛΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Τι δ', οταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνεται;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;
ΣΩ. Μᾶς μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀληθῆ, μεμνημένη δὲ τῶν ἢδεν οὖν γενομένων παύσθη ἐν τῆς ἀληθείας, πληροῦσθαι δὲ μήπω τί 36 τότε; φῶμεν ὅ, τι φῶμεν αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθῶς ὅλως ἡ χαῖροντα;
ΠΡΩ. Μᾶ Α', ἀλλὰ διπλῆ τινὶ λύπη λυποῦμεν, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ.
ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης ἐλπίς; ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενοῦμενος ἐν ἑλπὶ διδομένος καθαίρεσθαι τοῦ πληρωθήσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τοῦτον ἀνελπιστὸς Β ἔχει;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα γε.
ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὕτω ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ με- μήναθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἢμα δὲ κενοῦμενος ἐν τούτως τοῖς χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τότε ἄρ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ τάλλα ἡμῖν ἱνεῦται Θ' ἢμα καὶ χαίρει.
ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεῖτε.
ΣΩ. Τι δ', ὃταν ἀνελπιστώς ἄρ' κενοῦμενος τεῦξω σας πλή- ρωσίσθη, ἄρ' οὗ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτ' ἐν περὶ τὰς λύπας C πάθος, ὃ σὺ τῶν δὴ κατειδὼν φήμης ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὃ Υόκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ταύτης δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε κρυφόμεθα, —
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονᾶς ἡ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν. ἡ τὰς μὲν τινὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δ' οὖ.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς, ὃ Υόκρατες, ἢν οὖν ψευδεῖς ἡδονᾶς ἡ λύπαι;
ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖ, ὃ Πρώταρχε, φόβοιν ἄλαθεῖς ἡ ψευδεῖς, ἡ προσδοκία ἀληθείς ἡ μή, ἡ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἡ ψευδεῖς;
ΠΡΩ. Λόγος μὲν ἔγωγ' ἕνοπο συχνοφοίην, τὰ δ' ἔστερα ταῦτ' οὐκ ἄν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῆς; λόγον μέντοι τινά πολυνεύομεν οὖ πάνυ σιμφόν ἐπεγείρειν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' εἰ πρῶς τὰ παρεληθῶτα, ὦ παῖ 'κείνου τάνδρος, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτόν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἡσυχα τούτο γε.
ΣΩ. Χαίρειν τοίνυν δεὶ λέγειν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς μέρεσιν ἦ καὶ ὄτων τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσήκον λεγομένων.
ΠΡΩ. Ὡρθῶς.
ΣΩ. Ἀγνε δὴ μοι ἔσωμα γὰρ ἐμὲ γ' ἔχει διὰ τέλους ἢ Ε περὶ ταύτα, ἰ νῦν δὴ προνοθέμεθα, ἀποφήματα. πῶς δὴ φῆς; ἴσως ἔλθεις, αἰ δ' ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσίν ἢδοναί;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;
ΣΩ. Οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ οὐθ' ὑπαρ', ὡς φῆς, [ἐστιν] οὐθ' ἐν μανίας οὖν ἐν παραπροφοσίναις οὐδὲς ἐσθ' ὡς τις ποτέ δοκεῖ μὲν καίρειν, χαίρει δ' οὐδαμῶς, οὖθ' αὖ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δ' οὖ.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνθ' οὗτω ταῦτ', ὥ δυσκρατεῖς, ἔχειν πάντως ὑπελήφθαι.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ὡρθῶς, ἢ σκεπτέσθον εἰτ' ὡρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ταύτα λέγεται;
ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέσθον, ὡς εἰγώ φαίνειν ἂν.
ΣΩ. Διομορφώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἐτι τὸ νῦν δὴ λεγόμενον ἴδον'τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἐστι γὰρ πον δοξάζειν ἡμῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἱδεσθαι;

'ὁ παί 'κείνου τάνδρος] The word ἐκινύς is often substituted for the proper name in speaking of an absent or deceased person with respect. Soph. Fragm. οὐ παί 'Αχιλλέως, 'ἀλλ' ἐκινύς αὐτός εἶ. In the Republic, Socrates addresses Glaucon and Adimantus as ὦ παῖδες ἐκινύου τάνδρος. It is not known who was Protarchus' father, except that Socrates above calls him Callias, but he no doubt belonged to a principal family in Athens. Stallbaum's notion that Protarchus is addressed as the disciple of that man, meaning Philobus, is, I regret to see, repeated in his last edition.

τοῖς ἄλλοις μέχρες] All other long discourses, except those which are to the purpose; ἡ καὶ ὅτεροι κ. τ. ἐ., is equivalent to, or even short ones, when they are not to the point.

ἀλλ' ἐπι ταῦτα] I have substituted ταύτα for the unmeaning τα ὑπά, of the Editions. A little further on, I have restored πῶς δὴ φῆς; from Pro- tarchus to Socrates.

[ἐστιν] I have followed Stallbaum in bracketing this word, which arose from the scribe not understanding the adverbial use of ὄναρ and ὑπα.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξάζομενον ἐστὶ τι;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;  
ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ γε, ὃ τὸ ἠδόμενον ήδεταί;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἂν τ’ ὧρθως ἂν τὲ μὴ ὦρθως
Β δοξάσῃ, τὸ γε [δοξάζειν] ὤντως οὐδέποτ’ ἀπόλλυσιν.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ ἂν;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἠδόμενον, ἂν τ’ ὧρθως ἂν τὲ μὴ ὦρ-
θως ἠδεταί, τὸ γ’ ὤντως ἠδεσθαί δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτ’ ἀπολεῖ.
ΠΡΩ. Ναὶ, καὶ τοῦθ’ οὖντος ἔχει.
ΣΩ. Ὅτι ποι’ οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθής
ημῖν φιλεὶ γιγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἠδονῆς μόνον ἀληθῆς, [δοξά-
ζειν δ’ ὤντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα διόμειτ’ εἰληφεν,] σκεπτέον.
ΠΡΩ. Ἄφα, ὅτι δόξη μὲν ἐπιγνεσθόν ψευδὸς τε καὶ
C ἀληθῆς, καὶ ἱγένετ’ οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτ’ ἄλλα καὶ ποιά
της ἐκατέρα, σκεπτέον φης τούτ’ ἕναι;
ΣΩ. Ναὶ. πρὸς δὲ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράσαν ἦμῖν
tὰ μὲν ἐστὶ ποῖ’ ἔστι, ἢδονη δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἀπερ ἐστί,
pουτ’ τὶν δ’ ὀφ γιγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἦμῖν διομολογησθένων.
ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τούτο γε χαλεπὸν ἰδέαν ὅτι καὶ ποιῶ τινε.

τάλαμον γὰρ εἶπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα
D εκάτερα γίγνονται [, λύπται τε καὶ ἢδοναί].

Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον] That which fancies, whether it fancies correctly, or incorrectly, never loses its property of really fancying. It is an actual notion, though it may not correspond to an object. The same may be said of pleasure; the feeling is actually present, though the object is unreal. Thus there is no difference as to truth and falsehood between τὸ δοξάζον and τὸ ἠδόμενον. Unless indeed we say that pleasure is of such nature that it does not admit of any quality; but this is not so, for we speak of great and little pleasures, of good and bad pleasures, and so forth: then why not of false and true? I have removed the idle supplement δο-
ξάζειν, which betrays its origin by not knowing its place.

"Ὅτι" This is the reading of the best MS. for Τῷ. I have adopted it, and added σκεπτέον as Bailer first suggested, but my σκεπτέον is that already given to Protarchus. It would exceed the compass of a note to discuss the other changes which I have made, and the reasons for them are sufficiently obvious. Let it suffice to note that the disputants do not consider, nor have they any reason for considering, why both δοξάζων and σκεπτέον have the εὖ-
τες, so that, had the sentence in brackets been as well expressed as it is clumsy, it could not have belonged to Plato.

σφόδρα [εἰκάτερα] Violently the one or violently the other, as the gloss λύ-
πατε τε καὶ ἢδονα ἔξλεισ ὁ λόγος the words.
ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. "Αν δὲ γε πνοηρία τούτων, ὦ Πρώταχε, προσγίγνεται τινι πνοηραί μὲν φίλοις οὖτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πνοηράν δὲ καὶ ἤδονήν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν, ὦ Σῶκρατες;
ΣΩ. Τι δ', ἂν ὄρθως ἢ τούτων ὄρθως τινι τούτων προσγίγνεται; μὼν οὖ ποτε ὄρθως μὲν δόξαν ἔφοβοι, ἂν ὄρθως ἴσχυ; ταύτων δ' ἤδονήν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγιαλών.
ΣΩ. "Αν δὲ γ' ἀμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ὅ, τινι δό- 
ξαν τῷ θ' ἀμαρτάνονυκαν γ' οὖν ὄρθως ὄμολογητεύον οὖθ' ὄρθως 
δοξαζόμενον;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
ΣΩ. Τι δ', ἂν αἱ λύπην ἢ τιν' ἤδονὴν περι τὸ ἔρ' ὑ 
λυπεῖται ἢ τούτων ἀμαρτάνονυκαν φωράμεν, ὄρθως ἢ ἱπ 
στήν ἢ τι τῶν καλῶν ὑμνημέατι αὐτῇ προσθέσουμεν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔχ οἷον τε, εἰπερ ἀμαρτάναται γ' ἤδονή.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐοικη γ' ἤδονὴν πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὄρ 
θῆς ἄλλα μετὰ ψευδώς ἤμεν γίγνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὦ Σῶκρατες, 
ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτω καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ, τὴν δ' ἤδονὴν αὐτῇ 38 
οὐδεὶς ἂν ποτε προσειποι ψευδῆ.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλα προθύμως ἀμίσθως τῷ τῆς ἤδονῆς, ὦ Πρώταχε, 
λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέν γε, ἄλλ' ἀπερ ἀκούω λέγω.
ΣΩ. Διαφέρει δ' ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὡς ἐταίρε, ἡ μετὰ δόξης τ' 

"Ἀν δ' γ' ἀμαρτανόμενον "If, when the object of a belief is misapprehended, the belief itself is wrong, shall we not also call that pain or pleasure wrong, which arises from a misapprehended object? If not, we must call it ὅρθη, χρυσὴ, and all manner of handsome names."

Φωράμεν] The Books have ἐφροίωμεν, which is out of the question. Inquirers are not supposed to gaze upon an error, but to detect it.

Ἄγωμεν] This is Stallbaum's conjecture for ἄλγωμεν; the change was owing to ΤΟΤΕΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ, which some copyists read as τὸν Ἑλγομέννεν, supposing the imperfect to be required after τότε. When the bad fashion began to prevail of writing the words without the apostrophus, a practice which has led to endless corruption and confusion, this would become τότε Ἑλγομέννεν.

Οὐδὲν γε] The γε is added to οὐδέν and οὐδέν before πλῆς and its equivalents. Compare Ἰσ. T. 548 (584) οὐ 
δείς γ' πλῆς ἔφυγον οὐγ λέεις φρον. 
Arist. Νεώ. 734. οὐδέν γ' πλῆς ἦ. Προ 
t. 310, ὦ, Οὐδέν γ' τί μὴ.
όρισε καὶ μετ' ἑπιστήμης ἡδονή ἥν μετὰ τοῦ ψευδούς καὶ ἄγνοιας πολλάκις ἐκάστοτος ἥμιν ἐγγυνομένης;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐκὸς γὰρ μὴ σμιχρὸν διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. Τῆς δὴ διαφοράς αὐτῶν ἐτὶ Θεωρήσει ἔλεγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγα δένη σοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τῆς δὴ ἔγνω.

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Δόξα, φαινέ, ἥμιν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθής.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπεται μὴν τούτως, ἔν δὲν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡδονή καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεὶ καὶ ψευδεὶ δόξῃ λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Οὖν οὖν ἐν μνήμῃ τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἧμιν καὶ

C τοῦ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν γίγνεσθαι ἐκάστοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ όν ἡμᾶς ὡς περὶ ταύτην ἀπαγορεύειν ἔνοχαιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἢδοντι πούροθεν μὴ πάνω σαφῶς [τὰ καθορίσματα] ἐξημβαίνως βοίλεθαι κρίνειν φαίνην ἄν ταὐτήν ἀπερ ὅρρ.

καὶ τοῦ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν] The MSS. have, with few exceptions, τὸ δοξάζειν. This is interpreted as distinguishing one notion from another. But the argument throughout turns upon the mere act of δοξάζειν, and not a single allusion is made to the distinction here introduced. The confusion of δὴ and δὲ is one of the commonest in MSS., and there is a peculiar force in δὴ which may be illustrated by Soph., 234 c, ὡστε πολὺν αἰσθητὴν δοξὰν λέγεσθαι καὶ τοῦ λέγοντα δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἀπτὴν εἶναι. In this and other instances it is of the same force as καὶ δὴ καὶ, and expresses a kind of accumulation. The word ἐγχωρεῖν has been changed on the authority of the Bodleian, &c., to ἐχωρεῖν, but to undertake is surely less appropriate here than to be capable, for so we may render the impersonal ἐχωρεῖν.

γίγνεσθαι] Most MSS. read γίγνεται, a strange elision; but the Bodleian has preserved the traces of the true reading which I have restored; for γίγνεται in that Book is one of the many examples of the compeidion for συν, the sign of the grave accent, being mistaken for an apostrophus. The sense is plain enough. "From Memory, then, and from Sensation, our notions, and indeed the capacity for forming notions at all, are derived in every instance."

[τὰ καθορίσματα] .. κρίνων .. ταὐτῆς ἀπερ ὅρρ] It is very unnecessary for a man κρίνων τὰ καθορίσματα. But whoever is capable κρίνων ταὐτῆς ἀπερ ὅρρ, will not fail καθορίσων the reason why we are thus mocked with a double object. A little further we read something from the same source in ἔστων φαινετεῖν. If any place requires simple language, it is that where such a simple
ΠΡΩ. Φαίην ἄν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκόν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀυτὸς ἀνέφοιτ' ἄν ὡς.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Τι ποι ἦρ' ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦ θ' [ἐστά-
ναι φαντασμόνων] ὑπὸ τινὶ δένδρῳ; ταῦτ' εἰπεὶν ἂν τις πρὸς ὁ ἐκατὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαύτ' ἄττα κατιδὼν φαντασθέντα ἔστη ποτὲ;
ΠΡΩ. Τι μή?
ΣΩ. Αἱ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκριθοῦσας ἂν
πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴποι ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιτυχῶς εἴποι;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάν' γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ παρασυνθεῖσι γ' αὖ τὰς ἂν, ὡς τι παρὰ ποιμέ-
νον ἔγον ὡς, τὸ καθαρόμενον ἀγάλμα προσεῖτοι.
ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.
ΣΩ. Κἂν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῆ, τὰ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔφηβεν' ἐ
ἐνείκαις εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρὸν αὐτά ταῦτα ἄν πάλιν
φθέγξατο, καὶ λόγου δὴ γέγονεν. ὡς δ' τότε δόξαν ἐξα-
λοίφησιν.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μή?
ΣΩ. Ἀν δ' ἄρα μόνος ἡ, τότε ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν δια-
νοούμενον, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλεῖον χρόνον ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεσται.
ΠΡΩ. Πάν' μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τι οὖν; ἄρα σοι φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον
ὅπερ ἐμοὶ;

every-day occurrence is described. It is
is ludicrous to see such words as
“what's that yonder by the rock under
a tree” turned into bombast which we
cannot even translate, for φαντασμόνων
ἐστάτων is not even Greek.
Πρωτο σερφ ἱπτ. Π. 387 (399).
Soph. Αἰσχ. 905. τίνος ποτ' ἄρ' ἐπραξε
χείρι δύσμορος;
ἐπερχόμενον διώκειν] Chancing on the truth
in what he says. This is afterwards
opposed παρασυνθεῖσι, straying from the
mark, or swerving.
προσέρχομαι] This is understood to
mean, He would say in addition. But
what he says here is no addition, but
a substitution. By changing ἄρτι into
ti, and adding ἄν to ἔγον, I think I
have restored the passage to its old
form and sense. “Looking upon it as
the work of some shepherds or other, he
would call what he described, a figure.”
Πρωτο τούτοι] The reading of the MSS.
is πρὶς τοῦτοι, in defence of which
one Editor quotes from Ἰπποδ. 58, A,
Οὐδὲ τὸ περὶ τῆς διήλευσίν τε, and
refers to Heindorf's note on that pas-
sage. Heindorf's note is well worth
reading and so likewise is his note to
another passage in the same dialogue
to which reference is made. But it is
very unlikely that he would have looked
upon this as an example, or have de-
fended it. The analogy is merely ap-
ΠΡΩ. Το ποιον;
ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τὸν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ βιβλέψ τινε προσευχέναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Ὁ μνήμη, ταῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐυμπληκτοσα εἰς ταῦτα, [καὶ] ἐκεῖνα ἡ περὶ ταύτας ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνεται μοι σχεδὸν ὁ λόγον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε [λόγους]. καὶ,

parent. It would be a great mistake to explain τὸ περὶ τῶν δικαίων as a change made from περὶ τὴν δικαιοπρασίαν because of ἀνουθηκτός. The main thought is περὶ τῶν δικαίων πυθόμασται; to which another is added, πυθόμασται τὰ γνώμην, or, if any one likes it better, πυθόμασται τὰ περὶ τὴν δικαιοπρασίαν. The idiom therefore arises from an attempt to make an article do more than its natural function, and to graft an additional, though more direct, object, on that first one which is attached to the verb by the preposition. Here, on the contrary, περὶ τούτων is not an object at all. Socrates does not want to know Protarchus' opinion about things of any kind, but whether what happens in this case appears to him to be such and such. The mere occurrence of the word γνώμην disposes of the whole argument; nor would περὶ τούτων be intelligible in any case, for the topic of conversation is singular; namely the man δὲ τὰ φυσικὰ ἐξολοθρεὺς ἔχουσιν ἦσαν ἐν τούτῳ περευτοῖν.

Ἡ μνήμη The reading of the Books is the same as that in my text, except that it has περὶ ταῦτα and φαίνουσαι, and, of course, I am answerable for the brackets. I will briefly point out the misconceptions which have prevailed about this sentence, and the difficulties which must have sorely perplexed every Editor or reader who desired clearness. We are told by one Editor that κάθεινα ἡ περὶ ταύτα ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα, is to be understood as "those things which belong to these faculties, namely to Memory and the Senses". But what other things besides Memory and the Senses, yet belonging to the same, are intended, we are not told, nor is it easy to guess. Nor is any example given of that most extraordinary use of παθήματα which is thus transferred from the affection of an organ, or of a power, to the organ or power itself. When I remember this, or see that, the remembering and the seeing produce no doubt παθήματα of my mind or of my sense of vision, but to call Mind a παθήμα or Vision a παθήμα is a monstrous abuse of language. Thus the second clause of the sentence must be so rendered that κάθεινα τὰ παθήματα may mean 'those above-mentioned sensations' or perceptions, and ἡ περὶ τ. ἔστιν, which are connected with these αἰσθήσεως. Well, what do these do? "They write, as it were, words in our minds." Are these words what we should call impressions? If so, it is an odd thing that Memory and the Senses and the Impressions upon them should be said to write impressions upon us. But these λόγοι, it will be said, are more than the momentary impressions, they are the abiding records, the subjective facts. If so, let us pass on: "and when this affection (here the commentators haste to the rescue, saying "Do not be alarmed at this break-down of the plural; he is here speaking of a particular case"), and like men obliged to change carriages at the small hours of the night, we try to make ourselves comfortable in this new singular, and proceed) "inscribes true things, the results are true λόγοι". That is to say, that true λόγοι are—the results of true λόγοι. At last we come to a γραμμάτευς who opens our eyes. "I am Memory, the Recorder (ὁ γραμμάτευς) also called the Writer (ὁ γραμματιστής); all that has been done above has been done by me. When I am quickened by any of the senses being moved, I write their παθήματα on your mind; and when these παθήματα which I write are true, then my λόγοι are true". Can there be any doubt about a correction which brings such light out of all this smoke?
πατώνος φιλόσοφος. 65

οτάν μὲν ἡλίους γράψῃ [τούτῳ τὸ πάθημα], δόξα τ' ἡλιός,
καὶ λόγωι αὐτῷ ἐξιμβαίνουσιν ἡλιόεις ἐν ἡμῖν γνώμονοι,
ψευδή δὲ οταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεῖς γράψῃ, τά-

ναντία τοῖς ἀληθεῖς ἀλέξῃ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν δοξεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ἐν τῇ
θέσει οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχομαι δὴ καὶ ἔτερον δημιουργον ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαίς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γνώμονον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, δὲ μετὰ τῶν γραμματιστῶν τῶν λεγομένων
εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τούτων αὐτοῖ καὶ πότε λέγωμεν;

ΣΩ. Ἡ σειταν άπ' ὅψεως ἠ τινος ἄλλης άλλης ἀλλ' ἄλλης τα τότε
δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμεν' ἄπαγογόν τις τας τῶν δοξαζόμενων
καὶ λεξικών εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῷ ὅρα τις. ἡ τούτη οὖν ἐστιν Ω
γνώμονον παρ' ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΧ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες
ἄλλεις, ἢ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ὁρῶς εἰρῆκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδε ἐπὶ τού-
τως σκεψόμηθα,

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιόν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦτ' ἡμῖν
οὕτω πάσχειν ἀρισχαίον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὖ.

ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἀπαίτων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὀδοιποὺς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἑδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι Δ

τούτων γράφειν τούτων can have no other construction here except as agreeing with λέγομένων, which does not want it, and is too far removed from it to be taken with it, and not far enough to require being repeated in it, or represented by it. It is also probable that Plato would use a different verb for the second artificer; and for these reasons I venture to propose in place of τούτων γράφει, τοὺς γραφεῖ.

On account of the second διὰ in Pleasures and Pains, (the mental class), first, that they preceded the others, διὰ προγέγοντο, and secondly, that our anticipation was thus connected with future time: ὡς ἡμιμάθων . . . ἐλαια γνώμονον. The scribes have turned this into προγέγοντο ἧν, and ὡς ἡμιμάθην. Eleven lines above we have had ἦς γνώμονον, (not ὡς γνώμονον), something that occurs; and in 42, a, we shall find the same usage. So here ἔλαια γνώμην is not a mere periphrasis of ἡμιμάθην. Another instance which I have seen quoted, is nothing to the purpose:

Plutarch Philebus.
Διαφημημένα τοις πρώτοις όσ προ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος θρό

νούν καὶ λυπῶν προφήτην, ὡς θ’ ἦμιν ἐν καλλιτεῖν το προ-

χαίρειν τε καὶ τὸ προσεύκουσιν περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἰ-

ναι γνώμοναν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὕτων τὰ γράμματα τε καὶ ἱστορίατα, καὶ μικρῶν

πρῶτον ἐπίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνουσιν, περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα

Ε καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἔστι, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀφαίο φόβῳ λέγεις, ὥσ πάντ’ ἐστι τοῦ ἔλεγχος

εἰς τὸν ἔπεμπτα χρόνον οὕσι, ἡμείς ο’ αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου

ἄτι γέμομεν ἔλεγχος;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀγε δή, πρὸς τοὺς νῦν εἰρημένοις καὶ τὸν ἀπό-

χαίραι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΣΩ. Δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως δρ’ οὖ

θεοφιλής ἔστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Τι μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τι δὲ; ἄδικος τε καὶ πανταπασι κακὸς δρ’ οὖ τοῦ-

τοῦ γείμενον ἔλεγχος;

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖς δ’ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Πολλῶν μὴν ἔλεγχον, ὡς ἔλεγομεν ἄρτι, πάντ’ ἀνθρώ-

πος γέμει.

ΠΡΩ. Τι δ’ οὖν;

ἐσχήμων γυνῶν αὐτῶν ἔκατερων γεγομένων ἕστι: “Either of these is unsightly,

when it occurs.” (Above 38, b.)

ἀνάκοινωσα τὰ Πίτεραν καὶ. I make a very bold change, but

not, as I think, a rash one. First, the argument requires it: “You admit that

mental pleasures and pains have to do with the future; then surely you cannot

say that, whereas our records and images concern the past and the present, they

have no relation with the future.” Secondly, Protagoras’ answer Σφόδρα γε is

a reply not to a question Πίτεραν, but to an assertion. Some Grammarian

who read Οὔκοιοῦ = ἔργων, and saw that

it gave the opposite sense to that in-

tended, bethought of πάντως as the

nearest suitable word, in point of

meaning, to that which he supposed to

require his correction.

παντάπασι παρακατάθηκα I am disposed to

believe, that the word παντάπασι has

been added to κακὸς by way of bringing

it into correspondence with the πάντας

of the preceding speech of Socrates,

which the interpolator supposed to be-

long to ἀγαθῷ, whereas it is in fact

intended to colour the whole question,

and to give it the air of an appeal to

the conscience or good sense of the per-

son questioned.
ΠΑΠΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Δόγοι μὴν εἰσίν ἐν ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν, ὡς ἀπίδας ὁνομάζομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματ' ἑξωγραφήμενα· καὶ τις ὀρᾷ πολλάχις ἀντὶ χρυσῶν γεγομένων ἄρθρων καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἑνεξωγραφημένων αὐτῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ χαίρωντα σφόδρα καθορθῆ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ οὖ;</p>

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοὺς μὲν ἀγάθοις ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγομένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ ἑσοφυλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὐτὸ τὸ πολὺ τοῦνατιόν, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλλα φατέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν καὶ τοὺς κακοῖς ἡδοναὶ γ' οὔδ' ἦττων πάρεισιν ἑξωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δ' αὐταί που.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ψευδαίσιν δ' ἡδοναίς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ ποιητοὶ χαίρον· οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθεῖσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰσί δὴ, κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναὶ, μεμημημέναι μεντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοίοτερα· καὶ λῦται δ' ὀσαντος.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν ἢν δοξάζων μὲν ἡντος αἰὲ τῷ τὸ παράτατον δοξάζοντε, μὴ ἐπ' οὔσι δὲ μηδ' ἐπὶ γεγονούσι μηδ' ἐπ' ἐσμὲνοις ἐνίστε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τούτα γ' ἢν, οἴμαι, τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν ἄψυχη τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδώς δοξάζειν. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναὶ.

ἐν[ἐγραφημένων] 'He sees the gold, and the pleasures which depend upon it, and moreover he sees himself, as part of the picture, rejoicing in himself exceedingly.' It is strange that any difficulty could have been occasioned by so simple and well-chosen an expression. The change of αὐτῶν into αὐτῶν is indispensable; but the Editors have thought it more prudent to make αὐτῶν mean himself, than to change a breathing. In pejus vultu proponi cereus.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἴδονοίς την τεύτων ἀντίστροφον ἔση ἐν ἐκείνοις;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὁπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῆ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοὺς οὕς μηδ' ἐπὶ τοὺς γεγονόσις ἐνότοτε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἱσως πλειστάς ἐπὶ τοὺς μηδὲ μέλλονσι ποτε γενήσεσθαι.
Ε. ΠΡΩ. Καί ταῦτα οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκὼν δ' αὐτὸς λόγος ἐν εἰλὲ περὶ φόβων τε καὶ Ὀμίων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῆ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνότοτε;
ΠΡΩ. Πάν ἐν ὑπὸν.
ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πονηρᾶς δόξας [καὶ χρηστάς] ἄλλος [ἡ ψευδείς] γνωσμένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Οἶχ ἄλλως.
ΣΩ. Τις ἤδονάς γ', οἴμαι, κατανοοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινὰ 41 ἀρμόδιον εἰσὶν πονηραὶ πλὴν τῷ ψευδεύτως εἶναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πάν μὲν ὑπὸν τούναντιν, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας.

τὴν τούτων ἀντιστροφον ἐσῳ] If all that precedes is genuine, I fear that it is a waste of ingenuity to endeavour to explain τούτων. The ἐσῃ (namely that a thing may be real, and yet rest on false grounds,) has been shown to be ἐν ἐκείνων, that is in δόξα and τὸ δοξάζειν: and we are invited to attribute an analogous ἐσῃ to pleasures and pains; but if so, until this is granted and done, it is surely premature to talk of τὴν τούτων ἐσῃ. The ἐσῇ also which we grant to these must be ἀντιστροφος to another, which is in those. This would lead us to read ἄν. ἐσῃ τῷ ἔν ἐκείνων; but as to τούτων, it is difficult to see what can be done with it, except to leave it out altogether. But what if we could reverse the direction of the pronouns, and by τούτων understand the notions and beliefs, and by ἐκείνως pleasures and pains? To do this we must remove ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἴδονοίς, and frame the sentence thus: οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν τούτων ἐσῃ ἀντιστρόφον ἐκείνως; For those who think this remedy too bold I can offer no other. Τί δέ; πονηρᾶς] Nothing is plainer than this sentence when we leave out the interpolations. καὶ χρηστάς is evidently out of place; and a little attention to γνωσμένας shows that τῇ ψευδείς is no better. The complete sentence would be ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν πονηράς δόξας ἄλλος γνωσμένας (πονηράς τῇ τῷ ψευδεύτως εἶναι);
ΠΑΝ μὲν οὖν τούναντιν] The MSS. and Edd. have all Πάν μὲν οὖν τούναντιν, which is not Greek. As μὲν οὖν, like οἵμοι, is used when one improves upon another's assertion, and this may be done either by adding to it, or by completely changing it, it denotes either assent or contradiction, according to the words which accompany it. Thus πάν μὲν οὖν implies that the answerer does not think the first speaker positive enough; it amounts, therefore, to a strong assent. But an assent is out of the question in this passage; so that nothing would remain but to join πάν with τούναντιν, which would be as absurd in Greek as to say that one thing is very opposite to another would be in English.
σχεδόν γὰρ τῷ ψευδεῖ μὲν οὐ πάντα πονηρὰς ἢ τις λύτας τε καὶ ἱδρυάς θείη, μεγάλη δ’ ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιτυώσας πονηρία.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοῖνυν πονηρὰς ἱδρυάς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὕσας τοιαύτας ἄλλον ὑστερον ἐρόμεν, ἂν ἔπο δοξὴ γάρ τάς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγχειρομένας λεκτέον. τούτῳ γὰρ ἵνας χρησά-Β μεδα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν; εἴπερ γ’ εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλα, ὡς ἔρχεται, εἰςα κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν. τούτῳ δὲ τὸ δόγμα, ἦλθος ἂν κέπται παρ’ ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ανέλεγκτον δή-
pou γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Προσιστόμεθα δὴ καθὰπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τούτον αὖ

τὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰμωνέν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ἃ οὐκ ἦλθον] ἐν τοῖς πρόοθεν, ἡς, οταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπειθήματα ἐν ἡμῖν ώστε, οὐ
dίπλα ἀρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι

dιείλθησα.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προεφρήθη ταύτα.

ΣΩ. Ουκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἢν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώμα-
tος ἑκατέρων ἔξεσθαι ἢ τότε, τῷ δ’ ἀληθῶν ἡ τίνα διὰ πάντως

ἐνδοθην ὑμῖν τῶν παρεξομένων.

τῷ ψευδεῖ I have altered τῷ ψευδεῖ into τῷ ψευδεῖ. He is speaking of the abstract quality, not of some particular lie.

τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα It is necessary to caution the reader against Stallbaum's translation of this passage. He explains τὸ δόγμα as the belief that no pleasures are false; ἢς οὖν κέπτας is consequently made to mean so long as it continues.

To such a remark as is thus attributed to Socrates, Protarchus, who was maintaining the opposite side, would scarcely have answered Καλώς. But τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα (not ἐκεῖνο) obviously refers to the preceding έστι κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμήν, and means the belief that pleasures may be false or true. This is made certain by παρ’ ἡμῖν, and no less by κέπτας; for παρ’ ἡμῖ

for παρ’ ἡμῖν must apply to both Socrates and Protarchus, and κέπτας, which is the passive of κέπτα, is a word of unequivocal force, whether applied to a law or a proposition. The sense of the passage thus becomes plain: But until this judgment (of mine) is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt from) examination. I have endeavoured to give the force of the word γίγνεσθαι, which, as will be seen, signifies a great deal more than εἴθως.

Ἔξων ἢ τότε] ἔξων, τὸ δὲ τῆν ἑλγ. is the reading of the received text. The Bodl. has however τοὺς for τὸ δὲ, that is, the copyist had before him TOTE and read it as TOYC. On this is founded the emendation ΕΘΕΩΝΗΤΟΤΕ. The
ΠΡΩ. Ἰν γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. Συλλογίζον δὴ τὸ γνώμενον ἐν τούτω.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀνακαίνεται τοῖς, ὅπως ὑποταῦτα, ἄμα παρασκευάζοντας τὸν καὶ ἴδοντάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἄμα παρ' ἀλλήλαις ἑνάκινην οὐσίαν γίνεσθαι, ὅ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἡράνη.
ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκδέν καὶ τὸ δ' εἰρήνει καὶ συμπολογισμένον ἦς ἐμπροσθεν κεῖται,
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Ὅμως τὸ μόνον τε καὶ ἤτον ἀμφω τούτων ἰδεοθεν, λύπη τε καὶ ἴδοντι, [καὶ] ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων ἐκτην;
ΠΡΩ. Εἰρήνηται. τί μην;

ΣΩ. Ὁ τίς οὖν μεγανή ταῦτ' ὄρθως κρίνεσθαι;

necessary conjunction Δ' was probably lost from its resemblance to the succeeding Δ, as it was from its likeness to N. The continual confusion of Η and AN in MSS., illustrates both these phenomena.

τινα δὲ τάκεσθε ἴδοντι. The best MSS. have πληθος for πάσος, an error which arose from a confusion of Α and Δ. But though the sentence is thus rid of a second difficulty, another still lies in the sense. Plato is speaking of that condition in which the mind desires the opposite to what the body feels; so that the addition of ἴδοντι makes the mind to desire pain. Many ways might be proposed to remove this difficulty, but the question is not what Plato might have written, but what he wrote, and the ways are too numerous to allow us to fix upon the very one. The sense would be secured by τήν δ' ἀληθῶς τήν διὰ τὴν Πάσος ἠδύν ἐν γ. τ. τ. τ. The meaning of διὰ πάσος appears to be, through actual impression, as opposed to the pleasure of expectation.

Γέρων] is not this an error occasioned by the reminiscence of the foregoing γιγνόμενον? If we read Φαίνεται, we shall get rid of the clumsy γένεται: γίγνεσθαι, and we shall have a better correspondence to ἡράνη, and to Prote-rarchus' Φαινειται γοῦν.

ἐκτην] The construction is εἰρήνειται ὦς δέχεσθαι, ὅτι εἴτην—where ὦς introduces the fact, and ὅτι the reason of it. This gets rid of the causeless departure from the ordinary rules of construction, in defence of which I formerly quoted Phado 95, d. But there also the text is not trustworthy. καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντις τῇ δῇ κ. τ. τ. e already excited the suspicion of Heindorf, though I do not assent to his mode of correcting it. By striking out ἐποροῦνται and by changing καὶ into Ἰν we clear away the two only errors. Then ἵππω would take ἵππον and ἐποροῦσται for the same reason that ὅτι takes ἐκτην.

Τίς οὖν μεγανή] The Zurich editors have adopted Stallbaum's reading, Τίς οὖν: but if Plato had wanted to use the enclitic, he would have written ἄντι τοις, or have placed the enclitic anywhere rather than at the beginning of the sentence. A better correction would have been, Τί οὖν; μεγανὴ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; There is a want of adjustment in the different parts of the dialogue. For the question here asked is not more fully explained afterwards, and it is no answer to Ἰν to or to Bekker's conjectural Ποῦ. It is not improbable that something has fallen out, perhaps to the following effect. Τί οὖν; μεγανὴ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; (τῆς δὲ σκεφτομενος πείσω ἐποροῦσται.)
ΕΙ ΤΟΔΕ ΤΟ ΒΟΥΛΗΜΑ Ι ΑΝ ΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΙΟΣ;
ΠΡΟ. ΠΗ δή καί πως;
ΣΩ. ΕΙ ΤΟΔΕ ΤΟ ΒΟΥΛΗΜΑ ΊΜΙΝ ΤΗΣ ΧΡΙΣΕΩΣ ΤΟΤΩΝ ΕΝ
ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΤΙΑΙ ΔΙΑΓΝΩΝΑΙ [ΒΟΥΛΕΤΑΙ] ΕΚΣΑΣΤΟΤΕ, ΤΙΣ ΤΟΙΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣ
ἈΛΛΗΛΑΣ ΜΕΙΞΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ ἘΚΑΤΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ [ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ ΣΡΟ-
ΔΡΟΣΕΡΑ], ΛΙΠΗ ΤΕ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΔΩΝΗ ΚΑΙ ΛΙΠΗ ΠΡΟΣ ΛΙΠΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΗΔΟΝΗ
ΠΡΟΣ ΗΔΩΝΗ.
ΠΡΟ. ἈΛΛΑ ἦστι ταυτά τε τουατά καί ἡ βούλησις τῆς
ΧΡΙΣΕΩΣ ΑΥΤΗ.
ΣΩ. ΤΙ οὖν; ἘΝ ΜΕΝ ὩΨΕΙ ΤΟ ΠΟΡΡΟΘΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΓΓΥ Theta ὅραν
ΤΑ ΜΕΓΕΘΗ ΤΗΝ ἈΛΗΘΕΙΑΝ ἈΦΑΝΙΖΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΨΕΥΘΗ ΠΟΙΕΙ ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ, 42
ΕΝ ΛΙΠΑΙΣ Δ' ἈΡΑ ΚΑΙ ΗΔΟΝΑΙΣ ΟΥΧ ἘΣΤΙ ΤΑΥΤΩΝ ΤΟΤΟ ΓΕΝΟ-
ΜΕΝΟΝ;
ΠΡΟ. ΠΟΛΛ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ, Ὡ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.
ΣΩ. ἘΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΔΗ ΤΟ ΝΙΝ ΤῊΥ ΣΜΙΡΚΟΝ ἘΜΠΡΟΘΕ ΘΕΓΟΝΕΝ.
ΠΡΟ. ΤΟ ΠΟΙΟΝ ΛΕΓΕΙΣ;
ΣΩ. ΤΟΤΕ ΜΕΝ ΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ ΨΕΥΘΕΙΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ἈΛΗΘΕΙΣ ΑΥΤΑΙ ΓΙ-
ΓΝΟΜΕΝΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΛΙΠΑΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΗΔΟΝΑΣ 'ΜΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΡ' ΑΥΤΑΙΣ ΠΑ-
ΘΗΜΑΤΟΣ ἈΝΕΠΙΜΠΛΑΣΑΝ.
ΠΡΟ. ΑΛΗΘΟΣΤΑΤΑ.

ΕΙ ΤΟΔΕ ΤΟ ΒΟΥΛΗΜΑ] Ι ΑΝ ΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΙΟΣ; I have changed
the reading and punctuation. τοτων ἐν
tooutos tis is certainly not elegant,
but by explaining toitow to be the
pleasures and pains and en tooutos
ti to be on such occasions, some of
us may be brought to tolerate it. But
το βουλημα της κρισεως διαγνωσα
pou-
letai brings its own condemnation with
it. It may be said that there is no im-
propriety in the expression—"The will
wills". But το βουλημα is not the will,
but a particular wish, and το β. της
κρισεως is the wish to judge. In the
Laws 863, B, Plato declares Pleasure
πραττειν δ' τι περ ἀν αὑτης τη βουλη-
σεις ζηληστα; but this expression though
unusual was inevitable; for Pleasure
cannot desire, and if he had said ἐπι-
ζυμαι, he would have been obliged to
forego the main ground of opposition
to ζυμαι, περιτ μετ απατης. In that
passage I will take this opportunity of
marking that βαιζοησαι written com-
pendiously has been miscopied βαιου.
But how can the wish to judge judge?
—and if it cannot judge, how can it
wish to judge? My correction is fully
borne out by Protagoras' answer — η
βουλησις της κρισεως αυτη. By leav-
ing out κατ της σφοδροτερα, the difficulty
which best της μαλλον disappears. Com-
pare above 87, δ, σφοδρος ἐκατηραι,
which answers exactly to μαλλον λυπη
&c.

Ἐναντιόν] This is perhaps the most
beautiful of all the remarks in this ad-
mirable disquisition on pleasure. For-
merly it had been agreed that notions,
as they happened to be true or false,
occasioned a corresponding difference
in the pleasures and pains depending on
them; but now it has been shown that
pleasures and pains, by their comparato-
tive distance in time, and by their mutual
contrast, produce false notions about
themselves.

Ἀνεπιμπλασαν] Observe the imper-
flect: Were found to communicate their
quality (of truth or falsehood) to the
pleasures and pleasures.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γὰ' αὐτὰ διὰ τὸ πόρφωθεν τε καὶ ἐγγράθην ἐκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμενα θεωρεῖσθα, καὶ ἕμα τεθέμεναι παρ' ἄλληλας, αἰ μὲν ἰδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηθὸν μεῖζονος φαινονται καὶ σφοδροτεραί, λέπται δ' αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ παρ' ἰδονας τοιοῦτον ἐκείνας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τά τοιαύτα διὰ ταύτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοίν, δοκεῖ μεῖζον τῶν οὐσῶν ἐκάστος καὶ ἐλάττων φαίνονται, τούτω ἀποτεμόμενος ἐκατέρω τοῦ φαινόμενου θάλλον οὐκ ὄν, οὕτως αὐτὸ ὁρθῶς φαινόμενον ἐρέσι, οὐδ' αὖ ποτέ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἰδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὁρθῶν τε καὶ ἀληθῶς τολμήσεις λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὡς γάρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τούτων ἐξει δημομένα, ἓν τεθ' ἀπαντῶμεν, ἰδονᾶς καὶ λύπας φαινόμενα ἐν μάλλῳ ἡ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὕσας ἐν τοῖς ξύσοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ποιας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἰρηναῖοι ποιοὶ πολλαῖς ὅτι, τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστων δια-

θεωρουμένης μὲν συγκρίσεις καὶ διαχρίσεις καὶ πληρώσεις καὶ

κενώσεις καὶ τιαν αἴξες καὶ φύσεις, λέπται τε καὶ ἀληθῶς καὶ ὁδύναι καὶ πάντα, ὓπόσα τοιαύτη ὅνομα τ' ἔχει, ἔμβαινε
gιγνόμενα.

ΠΡΩ. Ναι, ταῦτ' εἰρηναῖοι πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Εἰς δὲ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστήτω, ταῦτην

αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἰδονῆς ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁφθαλμός.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ἡμῶν ἢ.

ΠΡΩ. Πότε δέ τούτ' ἀν γένοιτο, ὡς Σώκρατες;

Ε. ΣΩ. Οδδέν πρὸς λόγον ἔστιν, ὡς Πρώταχος, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἦρον,
tο ἐρώτημα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διότι τὴν ἐμῆν ἐρωτήσαν σὺ κωλύει ἐμὲ διερεύσῃ σε πάλιν.

Οὐκοίν, δοκεῖ That much then, by that the appearance itself is a right ap-
which either appears greater than it really pearance, nor will you venture to call
is, that apparent and unreal quantity, that part of the pleasure or the pain
you will cut off, and you will neither say which is founded upon it, right and true.
ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν; 
ΣΩ. Εἴ δ’ οὖν μή γλυκότατο, ὃ Πρώταρχε, φίλω, τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτ’ ἀναγκαίον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν; 
ΠΡΩ. Μή μενομένον τὸν σώματος ἑφ’ ἕκατερα φής; 
ΣΩ. Οὕτως. 
ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γ’, ὃ Σωκράτες, ὡς οὖθ’ ἴδον ἡ γλυκότατον ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτ’ οὔτ’ ἐν τίς λύτη.
ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ’ εἴπετε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, οἶμαι, τόδε λέγεις, ὡς 43 ἀεὶ τοιούτων ἀναγκαίων ἡμῖν ἠξυμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοὶ φασίν: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐπεταν ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω δει.
ΠΡΩ. Αἶγοναι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσι γ’ οὐ φαύλως λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μὴ φαύλοι γ’ ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκ- 

στήριν τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοιοῦτον βούλωμα. τῇ’ οὖν δια- 

νοοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σοὶ μοι ξύμφερες.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀγέη ὅπη.
ΣΩ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνοι οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους.
οὗ δ’ ἀπόκριναι πότερον ἂν πάντα, ὅπόσα πάσης τι τῶν B ἐμπιέσεων, ταῦτ’ αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὗτ’ αὐξανόμενον λανθάνομεν ἡμῖς αὐτοῦς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν πάσχον- 

τες, ἡ πάν τοιοντίνιον; ὁλγοῦ γὰρ τὰ γε τοιαύτα λέληθε πάνθ’ ἡμῖς.
ΠΡΩ. Ἄπαν δῆτον τοιοντίνιον.
ΣΩ. Οὔ τοιον καλῶς ἡμῖν εἶχεται τὸ νῦν δὴ δηθέν, ὡς 

αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γεγονόμεναι λύτας τε καὶ ἱδο- 


νας ἀπεφεύγονται.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μή; 
ΣΩ. Ἱδ’ ἐσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγό- C 

μενον.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

Ἀδ γὰρ ἄφωνα] The passages in Plato, from which we may learn a full 

account of this doctrine of Heraclitus, are Theaet. 179—50, Sophist. 249—50, 

Soph. Aias, 82. φρο- 

νοῦντα γὰρ νῦν σὺκ εἴναι ἐξεστην δύναμιν. 

Τι μήν] This generally amounts to 

nothing more than an assever; but as 

its original meaning is What else? it is 

perfectly suitable here.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαι λύσας τε καὶ ἢδονᾶς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δ' αὖ μετώπια τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς οὐδὲτέρα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότερον οὕτως ἦ' κείνως, ὦ Σωκράτει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτ' οὕτω, πάλιν δ' τὸν δὴ ἢρθείς βίος ἂν ἦκοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖος;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἂνυτὸν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμοκῶν ἐφαμεν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις,

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὲ τούτων τιθήμεν τριττοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἦν μὲν ὑδών, τὸν δ' αὖ λυπηρὸν, τὸν δ' ἐνα μυθέτερα. ἦ πῶς ἂν φαίνῃ σὺ περὶ τούτων;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως ἐγὼ, ἦ ταύτη, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ποτε ταῦταν τῷ χάρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἄρον οὖν ἀκοῦσῃς ὡς ἢδιστον πάντων ἐστίν ἀλώπως διαστελεὶν τὸν βίον ἄψανα, τι τὸῦ ὑπολαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδὼ λέγειν φαίνεται ἐμοῦ, οὕτως τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τριών οὖν ὑπὸν ἡμῖν, ἄντινον βουλεῖ, τίθει, καλ-Ε λίσσιν ἦν ὑπόμεια χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δ' ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ μυθέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μυθέτερα τούτων ἐσθ' ἡμῖν ὑπὼς θάτερα γένοιτ' ἂν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὸς ἦ λυπηρός γενόμενος

Σπυτώνοι βουλεῖ. He is not speaking of the three lives in particular, but supposes any three things, to two of which names have been given, but the third is merely known as not either. The question then is, can it become either? See the next note.

γενόμενοι] Commonly λεγόμενοι. But when we consider how awkwardly this word is placed, and then look to the preceding γένοιτ' ἂν, it seems scarcely possible to doubt that this is one of the many instances where λεγόμενοι has usurped the place of γενόμενοι. It would be childish to say ὁ μέσος βίος is not, and cannot be rightly thought to be, that from which it has been formally distinguished; but it is necessary for the argument to show that the circumstance of its coming immediately after pain cannot alter its nature, and make it become pleasure.
ΠΑΙΔΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.


دارة ὃς ἐν ποτε, ὦν' εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοντο, ὦν' εἰ λέγοι, λεγέται, κατὰ γε τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μή, ὦ ἐπαίσι, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ δοξάζοντων αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε, ὅταν μὴ λυπώνται;

ΠΡΩ. Φασί γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὖνοι οἴονται τότε χαίρειν, οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἔλεγον ποι.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύεις.

ΣΩ. Ψεύση γε μήν δοξάζοντο περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, ἐπεὶρ χωρίς [τοῦ μὴ λυπώντοι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν] ἢ φύσις ἐκατέρων.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μήν χωρίς γ' ἢν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἰσθανόμεθα παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτ' εἶναι, καθάπερ ἄρη, τρία, ἡ δόο μόνα, λύπην μὲν κακὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν δ' ἀπαλλαγήν τῶν λυπών, αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἄγαθὸν ἐν, ἴνα προσαγορεύσεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πώς οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἐρωτόμεθα ὃς ἡμῖν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Ὁντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταχε, οὐ μανθάνεις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγεις δ' αὐτοὺς τίνας;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οὐ τὸ παράτευν ἕδονας οὐ φασιν ἐλναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τῇ μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἀυτῶν ταῦτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς, δὲ νῦν οἱ περὶ Φιλήβου ἕδονας ἐπονομάζουσιν.

ἐπερ χωρὶς See Appendix.

Πότερον οὖν αἰσθανόμεθα One alternative having been disposed of, the other is taken up: "If freedom from pain is not pleasure, is there such a thing as absolute pleasure?" And thus is introduced another question: "Is pleasure possible without pain?" I have added, in the Appendix, a translation of a passage from Kant’s Anthropologie, which may perhaps interest some readers.

τοὺς πολεμίους This is generally understood of Antisthenes. The description applies very well to what we learn of him from Diogenes Laertius. οὐ τέχνη reminds one of the many sneers against the Platonic Ideas which are attributed to him and his friends. A disposition without meanness but harsh, is also in keeping with his character, though not with Plato’s general appreciation of the Cynics.
ΠΡΩ. Τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ξυμβουλεύεις, ἡ πῶς, οὗ Σύκρατες; ΣΩ. Οὐχ, ἀλλ’ ὁσπερ μάντεσι προσχρήσθαι τις, μαν-
τευμένοις οὐ τήχη ἂν τινὶ δυσχερεία φῶσεως οὐκ ἄγεννοις λίαν μεμισθότων τὴν τῆς ἰδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ γενομικότων ὀ테-
δεν ὑγιές, ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγγεῖον, γοητευμα, D οὐχ ἰδονή, εἰναι. τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταῦτ’ ἐν προσχρήσασθαι, σκε-
ψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τὰλ’ αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, σι’ γε μοι δοκοῦν ἴδοναι ἄλληδεις εἰναι, πεῦτε, ἐν’ ἐξ ἀμ-
φοτί τοῖν λόγοιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθύμεθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.
ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Μεταδιώκωμεν ἃ τούτοις ὁσπερ ξυμμάχους, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἵνα, οἴμαι γάρ τοιόν τε τῇ λέγειν αὐτοὺς, ἀρχιμένοις ποθὲν ἀνωθεν, ὡς, εἰ βουλθεῖμεν ὄτουν E εἶδος τῆς φύσεως ἴδειν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἔν μᾶλλον συννόσαιοιν ἡ πρὸς τὰ πολλοτάτα σκληρότητα· δεὶ δὴ σε, Ὠ Πρώταρχε, καθά-
περ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτωσι τοῖς δυσχεραίνοντιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γ’ αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.
ΣΩ. Ὁδοὺν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἰδονῆς γένος ἴδειν ἐντεῦθεν ποτ’ ἐχει φύσιν βουλθεῖμεν, οἷον εἰς τὰς πολλοτάτας ἰδονᾶς ἀπο-
45 βλεπτέον ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας καὶ σφοδρότατας λεγομένας.
ΠΡΩ. Πάς ἂν σου ταύτῃ συγχυροφὴ τὰ νῦν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὖν αἱ πρόχειροι γε, [αἰτερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν ἰδονῶν,] ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σώμα εἰσὶν αὐταί.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν μεῖζον εἰσὶ τε καὶ γίγνονται περὶ τούς [χάμνοντας] ἐν ταῖς νόσους ἦ περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας; εὐλαβηθῶμεν δὲ μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκριθῆμεν πταιοῦμεν πη. τάχα γὰρ ἦσος φαίμεν ἐν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.
ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ; οὖχ αὐταί τών ἠδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ἡν ἐν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι μέγισται προφήτων;
ΠΡΩ. Τούτο μὲν ἀληθές.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὖχ οἱ πυρίττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἔχομενοι μᾶλλον διψᾶσα καὶ δραμαί, καὶ πάντων, ὅπως διὰ

which is incompatible with γε, and as γε is not found in the Bodleian and its fellow, it has been omitted in the recent Editions. But as it is impossible to account for the intrusion of the word in the other MSS., its omission in the first-mentioned must be ascribed to negligence. With γε once restored, the change of 'Ἀρ' into 'Αλ' becomes inevitable; and the latter appears to me to be infinitely more in keeping with the nature of the observation; as it is more reasonable in speaking of a matter of every-day talk, to say that we conclude it is admitted, than to ask whether it is so. But the rest of the sentence requires careful consideration. The subject for inquiry is simply this: 'Which are the greatest pleasures?' "Whether they are easily procured," does not concern the inquiry, though it may serve to designate them when found. If we remember that αὐτὰ represents αὐτὰ ἄρρητα καὶ σφαλμάτη, we see that so far there is nothing unsound in the sentence. 'Αλ' οὖν αὐτὰ πράξιμοι γε, δέ λέγειν πολλὰς, εἴον αὐτάς: but we may go further and introduce αὐτὰ τὸ σώμα. If then we look at the remainder, we see not only that it was unsuited to our purpose, but that it begins with ΑΠΙΕΠ, the same beginning as that of one of the unsuspicious parts already admitted. That is to say; a抄ist had got as far as ΑΠΙΕΠ and stopped. Afterwards he saw that he had skipped δέ λέγειν πολλὰς; so he returns to this, but forgets to cancel ΑΠΙΕΠ. "Here is some gap," says a grammarian, "which we must fill up"; and he fills it up so as to make Plato say that the common bodily pleasures which are also the greatest are the most intense. ἐν ζενωδοτί! ἐν ἱεροί ορατείς!

[χάμνοντας] I have put χάμνοντας in brackets. Plato could not use the article with one participle and not with the other, but he must use it with ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, whether the participle had it or not.

προφήτων] This is Stephens' emendment for προφήτωντας; any one who will take the trouble to attend to the Variae Lectiones of even the best collations, and see the blunders committed in πρὸ and πρό (i.e., πρός), will at once see that it is perfectly absurd to decide such differences as these by the authority of the MSS.

πάντων, ὅτι] The received text is πάντα ὅπως. I have written πάντων, both because it is necessary, and because the neglect of terminations and the habit of giving the same termination to two consecutive words is confessedly of common occurrence. ὅτι alone might leave us in doubt whether it ought not to be πρὶ πάντα; but the addition of ἄποθεματος decides the question in favour of the genitive. Stallbaum's explanatory paraphrase πάντα ἀλλ' ἦσαν πάχυνοι ὁποῖοι διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀλλ' ἦσαν πάχυνοι shows an utter misconception of what brevity authorises or not, is untrue in fact, and while it gives xαλ the office of joining two coordinate clauses, leaves τα to join two sentences.
πλατωνοσ φίλος.

τού σώματος ειώθαι πάσχειν, μάλλον τ' ἐνδειξ εξετείνονται καὶ ἀνιποληρουμένων μείζονς ἡδονᾶς έσχοναι; ἢ τούτ' οὖ γι' ἱσομεν ἀληθές εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάν νείν ἥθεν φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὦρθώς δέν φαινομεθα λέγοντες όσα, εἰ τάς μεγάλας ἡδονάς ἱδεῖν βούλοιτο, οὐχ εἰς υγίειαν ἀλλ' εἰς χάσον ἱντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν: ὥρα δὲ: μὴ με [ὑπὲρ] διανοι[μενον] ἐρωτῶν σε εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τοῦ ἤγατινων, ἀλλ' οὖν μέγεθος με ἤχειν ἡδονᾶς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα [περὶ τοῦ] τοιοῦτον ποῦ ποτὲ γίνεται ἐκάστως. νοήσαι γὰρ δεῖν φαιμεν ἤρταν φύσιν ἔχει, καὶ τίνα λέγονσιν οἱ φάσκοντες

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἔπομα [τῷ λόγῳ σου].

ΣΩ. Τάχα, ὁ Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἦτον δείξεις, ἀποκαλεῖ γὰρ· ἐν ὑβρεὶ μείζους ἡδονᾶς, οὔ πλείους λέγω, τῷ σφόδρα δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ἄπεροχούσας ὑπό τῷ ἐν τῷ σώφρον βίου· λέγε δὲ προσέχει τοιν νοῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐμαθὼν δ' ἄγως, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον ὅρω. τούς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονας ποιον καὶ τὸ παροιμιαζόμενος ἔπιστει

ξυνάδουνται. The Books have ξυνάδουνται. Τελομαὶ καὶ γενομαι (for so it is often written in MS.) are continually confounded. This I first learned from a note of Cobet in his Edition of a Fragment of Philostratus. I have since found another instance in Strabo xvi, 3, where we must read δητε χτυπάνομαι το παράδοχον "so that the marvel is intensified". Compare below 46, 1, ξύνασαι ἄργειν, and 47, 4, ξυνάσαι καὶ έλτετε περιβάλλει. I am acquainted with the fragments of Eulipus and Teledides where συναγερμαί is coupled with μάζεις and with φαγόμενοι; but they are merely comic expressions for enjoying, like Aristophanes' having an interview with grapes. Ψφοται συναγερμαί (Eup. fragm.) is a little more apposite, but συναγερμαί are only δέχεσθαι τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον δεχομένων.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν κηθήν] ντός κῆθεν is the common reading; but there is no authority but that of a worthless copy for νῦν. My impression is that οὖν should be οὗτο, which will make νῦν unnecessary.

Deal δέ] If any one still retains his belief that all the writers of our copies were scrupulous about the text, so as even to prefer nonsense to falsification (for doubtless there were some such) let him look at the words which follow δέ. διανουόμενον; then the sense demands the very thing which has been thus sacrificed, and so ηγη is invented. Again τοιοῦτον by some blunder is read or written as τοιοῦτον; immediately some one is at hand with a healing supplement, and περὶ τοῦ is plastered upon the text; in the meantime τὸ σφόδρα τοιοῦτον is utterly lost.

τῷ λόγῳ σου I have put this Alexandrian phrase in brackets.

οὐ ξύνασαι δεξαμεν Ι entirely agree with Stallbaum that it is, 'nodum in scrupo quare,' to be dissatisfied with these words; but his own translation of them has led him to suspect another word which is equally sound. The sense is, You will presently prove it (that you understand me) no less (than you now
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

λόγος ἐκάστως, ὃ τὸ Μηδὲν ἔγαγεν παρακελευόμενος, ὃ τεϊ-Ε ἔφορει: τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφόρων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἡ αφοφά ήθονη κατέχουσα περιβοήτους ἀπεργᾶται.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς καὶ εἰ γε ταῦτ' ὀφεῖς ἔχει, ἰδίον ὡς ἐν τινὶ πονηρᾷ ψυχῇ [καὶ τοῦ σώματος], ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ὀτρή μέγισται μὲν ἰδοναι, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λύπαι, γίγνονται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν τούτων τινὰς προελομένον δεὶ σκοπεῖτθαι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἔχουσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶντα νοσημάτων ἱδονάς, τίνα ποτὲ ἔχουσα τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίων;

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, δὲ οὖς ἔπομεν δυσχερεῖς μι-

σοῦι παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

ΣΩ. Οἶνον τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δάσεις τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ δὰ τουαστεῖ, οὖκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ πά-

θος ἡμῖν, ὃ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτὲ φόμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον ἱδονῇ ἦ λύπῃ;

ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τοῦτό γε [ἔρα], οὐκ Ἑκατερεῖς, ἐνθε γι-

γνεσθαί τι κακὸν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὴν ἐν Φιλήβου γ' ἐνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον. B

profess it), for you will answer my ques-

tion.

περιβοήτους] Frantic. The word is properly applied to men maddened by the noise of some Bacchanalian or other orgies, and then generally of extra-
vagant and impetuous characters. It is here opposed to the staid and seemly demeanour of the temperate.

[καὶ τοῦ σώματος]] It is impossible that this passage should be correct as we now read it. Plato has passed from the diseases of the body to ἔρᾳς, which is a disease of the mind. The presence of the article betrays the interpolator.

[ἔρα] I have cancelled ἔρα as per-

fectly unmeaning. Some scribe had written σύμμικτον τοῦτο γάρ through mistaking γς. Another came and turned γαρ into γ ἔρα.

Οὐ μὴν ἐν Φιλήβου γ'] The Cois-

linian has μήν which one Editor adopts

and so affords to another the opportu-

nity for telling the world that δὴ is

never put after μήν. A little attention to

the sense would have been better

bestowed than it is on such a truism. As

the words stand in the Books, Socrates

is made to say that he did not bring

forward these instances about itch on

account of Philebus. Probably not; but

why say so? Is he afraid lest Φιλή-

βος ἐκαλὸς should be troubled with the

complaint? Or can he think it

necessary to declare that it was not to

make fun of him that he alluded to it?

As this is out of the question, the

only other reason for bringing Phile-

bus in at all must be that Philebus is

fastidious, and will look upon him as
ΠΑΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ἀλλ’ ἄνεν τούτων, ὁ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἄδονων καὶ τῶν ταύτας ἐπομένων, ἐν μη καταφρεσκεί, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ δυναίμεθα διαφινασθαι τὸ γάρ χρονίμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀδοῦν ἰτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων ξυγγενείς, τὰς ἐν τῇ μίξει κοινωνούσας, λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐσὶ τοῖς [μίξεις] αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. τὰς δὲ σὲ σὲ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνεφιέσομεν λύπας ἡδοναῖς μιχασθάς, τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονάς τὰ χυμαμφότερα, τοτὲ δὲ λύπας ἐπικαλομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς;

ΣΩ. Ὅπωτεν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τῆς τῆς διαφορᾶς τάναντι ἠμᾶς πάθη πάθη, ποτὲ ἄγνων θέρεται καὶ θερμανόμενος ἐνιὸτε ψυχῆς, ξητῶν, ὁμοίως, τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον πικρόγλυκυ [μεμιγμένον], μετὰ Δ ἰσαπαλλαχίας παρόν, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὅστερ πένθεις ἀγρίαις ποιεῖ.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλ’ ἀληθὲς τὸ τῶν λεγόμενον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοίν αἱ τοιαῦται μίξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἱσον εἰσὶ λυτιῶν τε καὶ θερόνων, αἱ δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐτέρων πλείων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 

ΣΩ. Δὲγε δὴ τὰς μὲν, ὅταν πλεῖστα λυτὶ τῶν θερόνων γίγνονται, τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς λεγομέναις τῶν δὴ ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν. ὁπότεν δ’ ἐντὸς τὸ ἱσον ἥ καὶ τὸ φλεγμαῖνον, τῇ τρίτῃ δὲ καὶ τῇ κρίσει μὴ ἐφεκνήται τις, τὰ δ’ ἐπιτολῆς μόνον διαχές, τοῦτε φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς Ἐπούναντιον μεταβάλλοντες, ἀπορίας ἐνίοτε ἀμηχάνους [θερόνας], τοτὲ δὲ τοιάντιον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἱσον λύπας θερόνας ἐνεργεσθεὶσας, εἰς ὁπότερ’ ἐν δέσῃ, παρεσχοντο, τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βία διοικεῖν ἥ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγκεῖν ἥ καὶ ὡμοι λύπας θερόνας παραστήσειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοίν ὁπότεν [ἂν] πλεῖστον ἱσον κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἐμμυκ tamil, τὸ μὲν ἑπομεμιγμένον τῆς λύπης γαργαλίζει τε καὶ ἁγίμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεί, τὸ δ’ ἂν τῆς ἱσον ἑπί πλεῖστον ἐνεργεσθεῖσα συγκεῖν τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πειράν ποιεί, καὶ

in turning the mind back upon itself. 

Συνείπεται is used a little further on as the effect of pleasure; it is obvious that the figure of speech being derived from the strain upon a cord, is applicable alike to the rackings of pain (renes morbo tentantur acuto) or the thrill of pleasure (pertinent gaudia pectus).

Ἀγε δὴ τὰς μὲν] The first part of this passage is easy enough, when once we learn to separate the process referred to in the sentence ending with γαργαλισμῶν from that described afterwards. I have put δ’ after ὁπότεν. The first case is that where κρίσεις and τρίτες are said διοικεῖν, because they discuss the heat in the part affected. When this is insufficient, the affection being too deep-seated, then recourse is had to irritation of the surface in order to relieve the interior. This is effected by bringing the parts to the fire, and shifting the affection to the opposite place; that is to say, by producing external heat in place of internal. When men do this, they sometimes produce terrible ἀπορίας, states where pleasure and pain are confounded, and the patient does not know what to do with himself. This sense is brought out by transposing ἀπορίας, and cancelling θερόνας. The only difficulty that remains is in the last clause; they procure, as the case may turn out, sometimes great embarrassments, and sometimes mingled pleasure for the inner parts contrasted with the pain of the outer, by forcibly dissolving what is compacted and compacting what is separate, and by procuring to themselves pain mingled with pleasure. This is saying that they do a thing by doing it; what we need to be told is, how that which they do involves a mixture of pain and pleasure. I therefore propose to read τῶ τα σ. β. γ. τα δ. συγκεῖν, ὡμοι λυτὰς θερόνας παραστησέντες; procuring pain along with pleasure, by forcibly dispersing (κρίσεις καὶ τρίτες) what is congested (the accumulated heat), and determining what is dispersed (by inflaming the surface artificially).
παντοτα μεν χρώματα, παντοτα δε σχήματα, παντοτα δε πνεύ-
ματα έπαργαζόμενα πάσαν έκπληξιν και βοᾶς μετ’ ἀφροσύνης
ἀπεγαίηται.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγειν γ’, ὃ ἑταίρε, αὐτὸν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ
καὶ ἀλλὸν περὶ ἀλλοῦ, ὡς ταῦτας ταῖς ἰδιναῖς τερπόμενος
πολὺς ἀποθηηκές. καὶ ταῦτας γε δὴ θαυμάσασας ἐδε μεταδίωκες
τοιοῦτοι μᾶλλον, ὥστε ἐν ἀκολοουθότος τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος
ἀν τυχόντα καὶ καλεὶ δὴ μεγίστας ταῦτας, καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύ-
τας ὧ τι μᾶλλον’ ἐδε ξώνη εὐθαμονεύσσαν καταφεμένηται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὡς σώζετε, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν
Οι πολλῶν ἄνθρωπων εἰς δόξαν διεστέρανον.

παντοτα μεν χρώματα] It causes all
manner of changes in complexion, and
changes in posture, and changes in
breathing, which produce the utmost ex-
citement and shouting with delirium.
Though I have retained ἀπεργαζόμενα,
and endeavoured to render it as above,
the word does not seem compatible with
its own style of writing, for while the first de-
notes thoroughness of pursuit, the other
graduates the pursuit according to the
moral condition of the man. As this
whole speech is about what men say
and think, what if Plato wrote thus:
καὶ ταῦτας γε δὴ τάντας ϕασί δὲν με-
tαδιώκειν τ. μ., δόσω ἐν ἀκολοουθήτος
tω κ. ἄ. ἐν τυχόντα,"

τὰ συμβαίνοντα] One Editor approves
of Flincus' translation, omnia quo apud
multos in existimationem venissent. But
neither this rendering, nor what I once
said, that one meets with from the
common run of men as to opinion,
is in keeping with the Greek; for we
have not ἐμβαίνοντα τοις πολλοῖς nor
ἐμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν but ἐκ
τῶν πολλῶν. If this is equivalent to
περὶ ὅν πολλοὶ ἐμβαίνουσι, the sense
will not be unsuitable; but I know of
no such phrase. Perhaps Plato wrote:
τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἄν-
συρωτῶν δέξαν. I can offer no better
rendering of εἰς δέξαν than, as far as
belief. In the Euthydemos (305, b) we
have it in this sense: νικηθήτω εἰς
dέξαν οὕτως χαράς τοίς, "that they
will carry off the prize of wisdom, as
far as public belief is concerned". But
this sense would make men's agreement
a mere pretense or a delusion, which
is not intended.
Εντός [κερασθήτων] ΑS it is not the outward and inward parts which are mingled, but the pain of one with the pleasure of the other, the word κερασθήτων, which is borrowed from above, must be looked upon as a false gloss. In the rest of this sentence I have left everything as the MSS. present it, not because it is all sound, but because the remedy will perhaps not appear so certain to some as to myself. He says: "I have indeed told you all about these cases where pleasure and pain are mingled in the body; as to those where the mind contributes the opposites to the body *** those we have formerly described; one fact however we did not then bear witness to, but we declare it now, that, in the innumerable examples of mind and body being thus opposed, there is always one and the same mixture of pleasure and pain." This is true; for, when he mentioned this subject before, it was not to point out this κρύστις, but to show the nature of Desire. But in that part of his statement, where I have marked a gap, there occurs this phrase: λύπην τε αἐκ πρὸς ἰδιονύς, καὶ ἰδιονύς πρὸς λύπην. The ἰδιονύς of the mind is ἐπισμάκα; and this he has fully described; but the λύπη, which is φόβος, he has never brought forward as co-existing with present bodily satisfaction. And yet τώτα μὲν δείχθηκεν looks as if he claimed to have done this. Again in the same gap, we have οὐτι εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κράσιν ἑμαί, but this μία is the very thing which he declares that he now points out for the first time. There remains διότι τού τε ἡγούμενος ὑμών δὲ λέγομεν, ὃς θυμος πρὸς σῶμα ὁ διαφορομένης ἐν πάσι τούτοις πλήρει ἰμηχανος οὖσα μίζεσ μια λύπης τε καὶ ἰδιονύς ἐμπιστεύει γνωμομένη.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύεις ὑθόστατα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. "Ει τοῖνυν ἢμιν τῶν μίζεων λύπης τε καὶ ἰδιονύς λοιπὴ μία.
ΠΡΩ. Ποία;
ΣΩ. Φημει αύτήν τήν ψυχήν αυτή πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σύγκρασιν [ἐφαμεν].
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ τούτο αυτὸ λέγομεν;
Ε ΣΩ. Ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρήσον καὶ ἐρωτα καὶ ἐμφάνως καὶ ἐρθόν καὶ ἰσαίαν καὶ ὑσάνετα, ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεσαι τἀττας λύπας τινάς;
ΠΡΩ. Ἐγώος.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτῷ ἢδονῶν μεστὰς ἐφήσουμεν ἀμηχάνων;
ἂν δὲνεὶ δὴ ὑπομιμήσῃσθαι τὸ ὡς τῇ ἐφήσῃ πολύφρον ἐπερχέρθη, ὡς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβόμενο, 48 καὶ ταῖς ἐν τοῖς θρήσοις καὶ πόθοις ἢδονας ἐν λύπας οὖσας ἀναμεμιμημένας;
ΠΡΩ. Οὔ, ἀλλ' οὔτω ταῦτα γε καὶ οὖν ἄλλως ἄν ἐμπειριαί νομονέμενα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἂν θράσοντες κλάωσι, μέμνησις;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖν;
ΣΩ. Τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κομμωδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄρ' οἶναι' ὡς ἐστι [κάν τούτοις] μὴν λύπης τε καὶ ἢδονῆς;

Πολα] The Books have Πολα, φής; to which the answer given is Ἡν σύνημεν τ. ψ. α. π. l. σύγκρασιν ἐφαμεν. No body believes in Πολα, φής; and the rest, with the innumerable examples of the mere interrogative pronoun or adverb, he will desire a special reason for the departure from the ordinary expression; here no such reason exists, and the presence of the verb may be easily accounted for in another way. No exception has been taken to ἐφαμεν, and yet it is quite untrue that they have said anything as yet on this mixture, and Socrates declares as much in the foregoing paragraph. But if ἐφαμεν is false, can we offer the place to φαινεται; No; for until Protagoras as-
ΠΡΩ. Οὐ πάνυ κατανόω.
ΣΩ. Παντάπασι γὰρ οὐ ἡδίων, ὁ Πρώταρχε, [ἐν τούτῳ] Β ἔσηνοιν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε πάθος.
ΠΡΩ. Οὗκοιν δὲ γ' ἔσθηκεν ἐμοὶ.
ΣΩ. Ἀδερμέν γε μήν αὐτῷ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, ὡσφι σκοτεινότερον ἔστιν, ὡν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἡθον καταμαθεῖν τις οἶδος τ' ἦ μίξιν λύπης τε καὶ ἰδιούς.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγοις ἂν.
ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῦ νῦν δὴ ἡξῆν ὅνομα φθόνον πότερα λύπην τινὰ ψυχής Θάτεις, ἥ πεῖς;
ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν δ' ὁ φθόνῳν γ' ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἠθόμενος ἀναφανήσαται.
ΠΡΩ. Χρόνος γε.
ΣΩ. Κακόν μήν ἄγνοια καὶ ἢ τῇ λέγομεν ἀβελτέραν ἔξιν.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;
ΣΩ. Ἐκ δ' τούτων ἢδ' τὸ γελοῖον ἤρεινα φόσον ἔχει.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μικόν.
ΣΩ. Ἐστι δὴ πονηρία μὲν τὸς τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἢξεως τινος ἐπίκλης λεγομένη τῇς δ' αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστὶ τι τούθαντιν πάθος ἔχον ἦ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφῶις γραμματέων.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ Γνωθίς σαπετὸν λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης;
ΣΩ. Ἐγώνε. τούθαντιν μήν ἐκεῖνον δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μηδαμῇ δ γεγυνόσκειν αὐτῶν [λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμματος] ἄν εὑρ.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;
ΣΩ. Ὡ Πρώταρχε, πειρᾶ δὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τρεῖχῃ τέμνειν.
ΠΡΩ. Πὴ ψῆς; οὐ γὰρ μή δυνατὸς ὥ.

πάθος, were supposed to refer to some example or instance. Ἔστι δὴ πονηρία] The genitive ἐξεως τινος does not depend on πονηρία, but upon ἐπίκλης. There is a certain πονηρία in general, called after name of a particular habit; that is, called so from πονηρός, which denotes a particular habit. I have added τ' after ἢδ'. A subject to ἔχειν is indispensable.

[λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τ'. ζ'] It is better to bracket these words, as Beck recommended, than to think Plato capable of such a frigid joke, as Stallbaum, with some violence to the language, has extracted from them.

Πὴ ψῆς; Here is an instance of what was mentioned above. Had Socrates said not πειρατό τέμνειν, but τέμνομεν, the answer would have been Πὴ;

οὐ γ' μη δ'. ζ' οὐ μή ὥ is supported by Plato Rep. 341, c. οὐ μή οἴς τε ζ' and by Xen. Hier. xi fin. οὐ μή δύναται. The passage, οὐ μή—φωμιν
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Λέγεις δὴ δεῦν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγω, καὶ δέομαι γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν.
ΣΩ. ἂρ' οὖν ὁ τῶν ἀγνοοῦντων αὐτούς κατὰ τελ' ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἑκατον;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι πλούσιω-

Ε τεροί ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ὀψίαν.
ΠΡΩ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσί τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἑκοτες.
ΣΩ. Πλείον δὲ γε, οὐ μείζους καὶ καλλίους αὐτοὺς δο-
ξάζομε, καὶ πάντα, ὡσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς

οὐσίας αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Πολὺ δὲ πλείστοι γε, οἷμαι, περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἴδος τὸ
tῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήσασιν, ἄρετήν δοξάζοντες βελτίων

κατούχοι, οἷς ὄντες.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἄρετῶν δ' ἁρ' οὐ σοφίας [πέρι] τὸ πλῆθος
πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστῶν ἐφίδιων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ [ψευ-

δοὺς];
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;
ΣΩ. Κακῶν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἢν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὑφῶς

ἀν εἰποῖ πάθος.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Τούτῳ τοῖς ἑτὶ διαφερέτων, ἢ Πρώταχε, δίξα, εἰ

in Rep. 486, d, has been changed on
the best MS. authority. I should doubt
of the rest, but that they all refer to
being able.

πλούσιωτέροι] The MSS. have πλο-

σιώτερον, which is indefensible. The
construction of δοξάζειν may be with

ἐντάκεια, in which case the subject of a
reflexive sentence follows in the nomi-
native, or it may govern a direct accusa-
tive, as in the next sentences.

καὶ πάντα[ Ἀνδροί, as to all things
pertaining to the body, conceive themselves
to be far above what they really are.
Literally, 'to be all things which par-
tain to the body in a degree beyond the
reality which belongs to them.' The

neater πάντα is put for μακσοιοι ade-
jactives understood. See for examples
my Prefatio ad Ionem p. xvii.

τὸ τῶν] The Books have τοῦτων,
which is utterly superfluous; nor could
ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς follow τὸ εἴδος without
a repetition of the article.

ἀντεχόμενον] One Editor says: Intel-
ligendum reliquitur συντήρης. I myself
was driven to a conjecture: ἀντίτιθεν
ἀν, but fortunately I admitted it to be too
adacious. These are the shifts to which
we are driven by the dune who in-
serted πέρι. I have no faith in ψευ-

δοὺς, for who ever heard of δοξοσοφία
ἀληθῆς?
μέλλομεν τον παιδικὸν ἵδοντις φθόνον ἄτοπον ἱδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἰδοεῖται μίξειν.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς οὖν τέμνομεν δίχα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντας ἡκάσιοι ταῦτα τὴν ψευδὴ δόξαν περὶ ξανων Β ἀνοίξεως δοξάζονσι, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἄνθρωποι, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαίωσαν ἑπεζαχαί τοίς μὲν ράμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δὲ, οἷμαι, τοῦνατον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄναγχη.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοῖνυν δίελε, καὶ ὥσιν μὲν αὐτῶν εἰςι μετὰ ἀσθενείας τοιούτου καὶ ἀθάνατοι καταγελασμένοι τιμωρεῖσθαι, γελοῖος τούτοις φάσιν ἐκεῖ τάληθη φθέγξει· τούς δὲ δύνατος τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβεροὺς καὶ ἰσχυροὺς [καὶ] ἄχρονους προσαγορεύων ὅρθοταν τοὺς συνιότερον λόγον ἀποδώσει. ἄγνοια γὰρ δὲ μὲν τῶν ἵδονων ἄχρονα τε καὶ ἅχρονα· βλασφερα γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αὐτὴ τε καὶ ὅσα εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσίν· ἢ δ’ ἀσθενής Ἰοῦν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἰληφε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἰδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν μίξεις εἰς τούτοις οὕτωι μοι καταφαίνεις.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῖνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὴ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Αὕτη τὶς ἀδικίας ἐστὶ που καὶ ἱδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Τούτο μὲν ἀνάγχη.

ΣΩ. Οὕτων ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἄχρονον κακοῖς οὕτ’ ἀδικον οὐτε φθονοφόρον ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μέρος;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων δρόμοτοι ἔστι τίν ποτε κακὰ μὴ λύπεσθαι, χαίρεις δὲ, ἄρ’ σοι ἄδικον ἔστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὕτων τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πάσαιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφιᾶν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ

społ. [καὶ] ἄχρονα] I have removed the conjunction, which made τούτων εἶναι καὶ κακῶν; But instead утter nonsense of the passage, and drove me to follow Schütz's conjecture αὶ; The strong become strong δ’ οὗχ ὑμολογοῦμεν—; I have put τοῖς enemies, the weak objects of laughter. φίλων in brackets. No addition was sentence would have been ἄρ’ οὐ φατάνα

Τὴν οὖν] The completion of the over more perversely.
Εἵσα τὸν ὅμηρόθεμεν, ἐν τρισὶ λέγοντες αὐτές γίγνεσθαι, γελοίαι μὲν ὅποιά ἀνθενή, μισετά δ’ ὅποια ἐφευμένα—ἡ μὴ φῶς ὑπὲρ εἶπον ἀρτι, τῇ [τῶν φίλων] ἔξειν ταύτην. ἤταν ἔχον τῆς τὴν ἄκλαβῃ τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοίαι εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.
ΣΩ. Κακῶν δ’ οὖχ ὁμολογούμεν αὐτόν, ἰχνούς οὖν, εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Χαίρομεν δ’ ἡ λυπόμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ’ αὐτή γελόμεν;
ΠΡΩ. Αὴλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.
ΣΩ. Ἡδονήν δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἴναι τῶν [τούτο] ἀπεργαζόμενον;
ΠΡΩ. Ἄναγκη.
ΣΩ. Γελώντας ὧρ’ ἡμᾶς ἐρτί τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φη- σών ὁ λόγος, κεραυνοῦντα ἡδονήν φθὼν, λύγη τὴν ἡδονήν διε- κεραυνοῦναι: τῶν γὰρ φθόνον ὁμολογήσαται λύγη τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελάν ἡδονήν, ἀμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτῳ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθή.
Β ΣΩ. Μὴν ὅτι τὸν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν Θρήνοις τε καὶ [ἐν τραγῳδίαις,] μὴ τοῖς νόμεσθαι κύκλω τοῦ βίου ἄνα- πάση τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία, λύγης ἡδονῆς ἀμα κεραυνοῦσαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὦ Σωκράτει, εἰ καὶ τῆς φιλοσοφικοῖς πάνω πρὸς τάναντοι.
ΣΩ. Ὀργὴν μὴ καὶ πόθον καὶ Θρήνον καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προσθέμεθα καὶ ὁπότας τοιαῦτα, C ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὐφήσειν μιγνύμενα τὰ τῶν πολλὰς λέγουμεν. ἢ γὰρ;
ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

τοῦτο] φθόνον καὶ γελοία. The MSS. have seen, in the eyes of these men a gap was a place for the exercise of their
[ἐν τραγῳδίαις] This could not occur without a corresponding mention of healing powers, ἐν Θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις, has one preposition too many. The usual break after ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὐφήσειν] ἔφαμεν is my correction of the MS. reading φαμεν. The reference is to 46, ε.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι ἔφην πέρι καὶ φῶνου καὶ ὅργης πάντες ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ διαπερατίζεται; 
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν; 
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔσται τὰ λοιπὰ; 
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε. 
ΣΩ. Αἰτὶ δὴ τὸ μάλαθνος ὑπολαμβάνεις μὲ δεῖξαι σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κομψίᾳ μέξιν; ᾧ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν ὅτι τὴν γ' ἐν τοῖς φῶνοις καὶ ἔφυσι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις δήδιν κράσιν ἐπιδείξῃ; ὁ λαβόντα δὲ τὸτε παρὰ σαντῷ [ἀφείναι με] μνημείτι ἐπὶ ἐκείνα ἱστεν δεῖν μυχώνειν τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σωμα ἁνεν ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχῆ ἄνεν σώματος καὶ κοινῆ μετ' ἀλλίκοις ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μετὰ ἐστὶ συγκεκριμένης ἱδονῆς λύσεις; νῦν οὖν λέγε, πότερα ἀφίκῃς μὲ ἡ μέσας ποιήσεις νῦστας, εἰπὼν δὲ συμφορὰ οἵματι σοι τείχεσθαι μεθείναι με τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων αἵρεσιν ἐδείκησα σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ Ε' νῦν δ' ἐστὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φίλιππος ἐπικατάτηκε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες, ὁ Σωκράτης· ἀλλ' ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διεξέλθει ὅτι οἱ σοὶ φίλοι.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ φύσιν τοῖνοι μετὰ τὰς μιχθείσας ἱδιών ὑπὸ δὴ τινὸς ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμικτοὺς πορευομεθέν' ἐν τῇ μέρει.
ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστον εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Ἡγοῦ δὴ πεφάσομαι μεταλαβών μημαίνειν ἦμῖν αὐτάς.

(λαβόντα 84) When I affirmed that λαβόντα σφηναί could not depend on πίπτεσι χάριν, I was so little aware of the extent to which the text had been choked with foolish comments that sooner than suspect σφηναί, I threw the construction upon ἄρ' οὖν ὑπολαμβάνας δεῖν, confessing that δεῖν was out of its place, but pleading that there was no other possible way of accounting for these infinitives. But when we remove σφηναί με, everything is right: what Socrates has said is a pledge, that it would be easy to say more, and a proof that having given this earnest he need not prolong the conversation by proceeding to the consideration of the other passions. σφηναί με μνημείτι δεῖν μυχῶνει is a strange combination to express σφηναί με τοῖς μυχῶνεις; for while it is longer than the other, it is really more elliptical.

μέσας ποιήσεις νῦστας| Will you make it midnight? The plural is used in speaking of the progress of the night, as πάρρῳ τῶν νυκτῶν. Συμπ. 217, D.; Πρωτ. 510, B; Arist. Nub. τ. μεσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, Περ. 621, b.

μεταλαβῶν] Only a few inferior copies have this reading in place of μεταβαλῶν. But they have blundered on the truth. Socrates does not change but takes in exchange. Stallbaum has confounded these two senses in his note on 21, D. quoting passages from the Parmenides and the Symposium where μεταβαλῶν is correctly given. There is a passage in the Laws which
ΠΑΙΛΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

τούς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παίλαν πάσας τὰς ἴδονας οὐ πάντως πείθομαι, ἀλλ', ὥστε εἶπον, μάρενυ καταχρώμαι πρὸς τὸ τινάς ἴδονας εἶναι δοκιμᾶσας, οὕτας δ' οὔδαμος, καὶ μεγάλας ἐκέρας τινὰς ἀμιὰ καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, [ἐλνα δ' αὐτάς] συμπεφρομένας ὁμοί λύπας τε καὶ ἀναπλάσας ὄδυνων τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖ τίνας, ὃ Σῶματες, ἐπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς τῆς διασκορίτ' ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὰς περὶ ταῦτα λεγόμενα χρώματα, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σχήματα, καὶ τῶν όρμων τὰς πλείστας, καὶ τὰς τὸν φῶτον, καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνθέεις ἀνασκόπησας ἐχοντα καὶ ἀλώτως τὰς πληρώσεις ἀιδικῆς καὶ ἱδέαις καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδουσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ ταῦτ', ὃ Σῶματες, αὖ λέγωμεν ὀὕτως;

ΣΩ. Πάντως ἐν [οὖν] οὐχ εὐθὺς δὴλα ἄστιν ἢ λέγω, πειρατέων μὴν δηλοῦν. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ὅπερ ἢ ἐπολαμβάνοι οἱ πολλοὶ πειρώματι νῦν λέγειν, ἡ ἔνων ἢ τῶν ζωγραφικῶν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς τι λέγω, φησίν ὃ λόγος, καὶ περιφερές καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ ταῦτα τὸν ἄλογον ἐπι-

contains both words, and will shew the distinction between the two. It is here given as, in my opinion, it ought to be read. Ἁλέως, 904, π. με[ξω σ' ἕν θύρα φωτ' κατασ. ἢ ἔρημ' ὅταν μεταβάλλει διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς μεδικής τι συνεργεῖ καὶ ἐλεύθερα πάντως, ἑλάτων ἐν δεματομε- σβεία [εἰς ἔνως τινα πάντως ἑτέρων]. Compare what has preceded: μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πάντως τοῦτο τὸ κολονεν καὶ γεγονομένον αἰὲ πολαὶ ἐδραν δει μεταλλάμβανον οἰκεισθείν, καὶ τινὰς πολλὰς τῶν.

[ἐλευθ' αὐτάς] These words interrupt the continuity of the description; πολλάς φαντασθείσας appearing in many shapes, ἢ γι-su, ἢ συμπεφρομένων—because they are adulterated with pains and reliefs &c.

Ἡδεῖσας καθαρὰς λυπῶν The two last words neither require a conjunction to precede them, nor is there the least ground of suspicion against them; they are added as descriptive of the manner in which the plēρωσίς are ἱδεῖται.

Πάνω μὲν [οὖν] Nothing can be more out of place here than this frequent formula. Socrates is not correcting, but conceding; and in this sense μὲν οὖν cannot be employed. But it may be said that μὲν belongs to the sentence, and is in apodosis to a suppressed δὲ contained in μὲν, while οὖν characterises the answer, so that the combination of the two words here is purely accidental. I have no doubt that this is the true explanation of μὲν, but the particle after it in this case would most certainly be γενοῦ. We must either restore this—but γενοῦ οὖν generally becomes γενοῦν—γε, or suppose οὖν itself to be owing to the frequent combination of μὲν and οὖν. Πάνω belongs more especially to δὴ: τὰ τῶν τότων τόνων As Hesychius defines the τότων as a carpenter's instrument by which circular figures are described, ἐπικεφαλάς cannot be triangulē or quadrāta (Stallb.). The order followed is an inverted one; the products of rules and compasses correspond to the εὐθῦν οὐχίμα, and those of the τόρυνοτο τοπωρείν.
πεδά τε καὶ στερεᾶ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόνις καὶ γωνίαις, εἰ μον
μανθάνεις. ταύτα γὰρ οὖν εἶναι πρὸς τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ
ἄλλα, ἀλλ' ἂει καλὰ καθ' σύνεται καὶ τινὰς ἱδονὰς 
οίχειας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τὼν κινήσεων προσφέρεις· καὶ χρώ-
ματα δὴ τούτων τῶν τύπων ἔχοντα [καλὰ καὶ ἱδονάς]. ἀλλ' 
ἄρα μαθάθανομεν, ὥ τοῦ; 
ΠΡΩ. Πειρᾶμα μέν, ὥ Σώφρατες τειράθηκε δὲ καὶ σὺ 
σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγων.
ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων 
τὰς λείασις καὶ λαμ-
πράσις, τὰς ἐν τί καθαρὸν ἱέρασις μέλος, οὗ πρὸς ἔτερον καλὰς 
ἄλλ' αὐτάς καθ' αὐτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων ξυμφόρουσα ἱδονάς 
ἐπομένας.
ΠΡΩ. Ἑστὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τούτῳ. 
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὁμοῖας ἁπτον μὲν τούτων θείον γένος 
ῄδονων τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμείξθατε ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγχαῖοι λόγοις, 
καὶ ὅταν τούτῳ καὶ ἐν ὧν τοιχάνει γενονὸς ἡμῖν, τούτω' ἱκε-
ίνοις τίθημι ἀνίσατοφον ἄπαν. ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταύτα εἰδή 
δύο λέγομεν ἱδονάς.
ΠΡΩ. Κατανοοῦ.
ΣΩ. Ἐστὶ δὴ τοινυν τούτως προσθάμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μα-
52 ἱματα ἱδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὕτα πεῖνας μὲν μὴ 
ἐχει στὸ μανθάνων μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πεῖναν ἀληθῶς δὲ 
ἀρχῆς γενομένας.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὕτω ξυνοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; μαθημάτων πληροφορεῖσιν εὰν ὑπερο-
βολαί διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνονται, καθόρισ αὐτός ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλ-
γήδονας;
ΠΡΩ. Οὐ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλ' ἐν κιν λογισμοῖς τοῦ παθή-
ματος, ὅταν τις στερεθεῖς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρεῖαν. 

κινήσεων] This is Van Heusde's correction for κινήσεων; the same scholar also changed κινήσεως to κινήσεις in the passage above. It is strange that the Zurich editors should not have adopted these corrections.

φθόγγων] The feminine noun which denotes the description of sounds, and which has dropped out here, as is evident from the repetition of the article, is perhaps ἵδεα. Some propose φω-

wv in place of φθόγγων, but leave the second τὰς to shift for itself. It is more likely that Plato would use φθόγγων, as he had done so before, and as it is more comprehensive than φωνῶν.

λέγομεν] For this all MSS. and Edi-
tions have λεγομένων; but Plato would not speak of the real pleasures as things called pleasures.

λογισμοῖς τ. π.] The genitive does not express concerning, but λογίζονται
ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν, ὠ μακάριε, νῦν γ' ἥμεις αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μὸνον παθήματα χωρίς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραίνομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλήθει τοίνυν λέγεις, ὅτι χωρίς λύτης ἢ μὲν λήθη γίγνεται ἔκαστος ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας τοινυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους τε εἶλαι λύταις ἤτειν καὶ οὐδεμιῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφῶν ὄλγων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ ἤτειν;

ΣΩ. Οὔκ οὖν ὁ μεταίως ἡδή διαπεραίμεθα χωρίς τάς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τός σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρσης ὅρθῶς ἐν λεγθεῖσας, προσέχωμεν τῷ λόγῳ τάς μὲν κατὰ τό μέγα καὶ τό σφοδρόν αὐτῶν καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὁλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας, τῆς τοῦ ἄπειρου τ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἤτειν καὶ μᾶλλον διὰ τέ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς χερουμένου εἶναι γένους, τάς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμίμετων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις, ὧν Σωκράτες.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τοίνυν πρὸς τούτως μετὰ ταύτα τοῦ αὐτῶν διαθετέον.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χρῆ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι τὸ καθαρὸν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

τε καὶ εἰλιχμινές καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τε [καὶ τὸ] πολὺ καὶ [τὸ] μέγα, καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν;

ΠΡΩ. Τι πον' ἄρα, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἐρωτάτες βουλόμενος;

ΣΩ. Μηδέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἢδονής τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ’ αὐτῶν ἐκατέρων καθαρὸν ἔστι, Εἰ τὸ δ' ὁ καθάρου ἐκάτερον οἶδ' εἰς τὴν κραίσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ ξυνάπαι τοίοδε ὡς παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶτα.

ΣΩ. Ἡν δ' ἐν, περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὕτως διανοηθῶμεν· προελεύμονοι πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐν τι διασκοπώμεν. 53

ΠΡΩ. Τι οὖν προελεύμεδα;

ΣΩ. Τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοιν, εἰ βούλει, θεασώμεθα γένος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἢν λευκὸν καὶ τις καθαρότης ἢ μὴν εἶν; πότερα τὸ μέγιστὸν τε καὶ πλείστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν ψυχήμασιν μηδεμία μοίρα ἄλλου μηδεμίου ἐνείη;

read τὸ σφόδρα πολὺ τε καὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ ἰκανόν. Which must we consider as the first in relation to Truth? The pure and the unmixed? or the exceedingly numerous or great, and the sufficient? According to this arrangement, each member of the comparison will consist of two parts, for πολὺ ἢ μέγα or πολὺ καὶ μέγα are merely explanatory adjuncts of σφόδρα; compare below μέγιστον τε καὶ πλείστον." I leave this note as I wrote it many years ago. There is very little in it that I would wish to modify, except as to ἰκανόν. On reference to the Introduction it will be seen that μέτρον which is just disposed of, and ἄλφασα καὶ κάλλος are those Ideas which play a most important part in the concluding pages of the Dialogue. It will also be seen in the very next page that ἀληθέστατον καὶ κάλλεστον, κάλλος καὶ ἀληθέστατον, ἀληθεστέρᾳ καὶ κάλλων are dwelt on together in the conclusion of the argument here started. Now what was to be proved, must have been propounded; and it cannot have been propounded elsewhere. For this reason I have written καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν.

el τὸ μὲν ἄρ’ αὐτῶν] Not whether but if, as is plain from the addition of ἄρα. If it should prove that one part of either is pure, and another impure.

[η καθαρὸν] This depends upon μηδεμίαν ἐπιλείπετεν. Socrates wants to find all the pure kinds so far as he is able, because in these alone can the comparative merits of φύσιν and ψυχή be determined. I believe the MS. εἰς τὴν χρίσιν to be a corruption, for it is unnecessary, and occurs an inelegant repetition. As the χρίσιν was to be, 'Which ingredient was of most importance in the mixture,' and this must be determined by mixing the purest specimens of each, I have so little doubt that εἰς τὴν χρίσιν is the true reading that I have now admitted it into the Text.

ἀκρατεστῶν] The ancient grammarians inform us that this is the superlative of ἀκρατός, an usage which to our ears destroys all distinction between the superlative of this word and that of ἀκρατίς. I distrust them, but make no change.

ἄλλου μηδεμίου ἐνείη] I have changed ἄλλη into ἄλλου, which is absolutely necessary for the sense. We must not
ΠΡΩ. Αὖθι οὖν τὸ μάλιστ’ εἰλικρινές ὢν.
ΣΩ. ‘Ορθῶς. ἀρ’ οὖν ὃν τὸν ἀληθέστατον, ὁ Πρωταρχῆς, καὶ ἂρα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων θάρσεως, ἀλλ’ οὐ B τὸ πλείστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον;
ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶτα γε.
ΣΩ. Συμφωνῶ ἄρα καθαρῶν λευκῶν μεμιγμένον πολλοῦ λευ-
kοῦ λευκότερον ἂρα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον εὰν φῶμεν γίγνοσθαι, παντώταται ἐρρομεν ὀρθῶς.
ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶτα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐ δὴ πολλῶν δεσφόμεθα παραδειγμά-
tων τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἤδωνς πέρι λόγον, ἀλλ’ ἀρκεῖ νοεῖν ὧν ἂν ἴσθη, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐξίμπασα ἤδων σφυκα μεγάλης καὶ C ὁλίγης πολλῆς καθαρὰ λύπης ἠδίων καὶ ἀληθέστερα καὶ καλ-
λιῶν γίγνοιτ’ ἢν.
ΠΡΩ. Σφοδρὰ μὲν οὖν, καὶ τὸ γε παράδειγμ’ ἴκανον.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸ τοιόντε; ἄρα περὶ ἤδωνς οὖν ἀπεραίωμεν ὡς ἂν γένεις ἔστι, οὐδαμα δ’ οὖν ἔστι τὸ παράτατον ἤδωνς; κοινῷ γὰρ δὴ τινὲς οὐ τούτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἢν, οἷς δὲι χάριν ἔχειν.
ΠΡΩ. Τί δὴ;
ΣΩ. Αἰστερανοῦμαι σοι τούτ’ αὐτὸ ἐπανερετῶν, ὁ Πρώ-

tαρχὲ φίλε.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἑρώτα μοῦν.
ΣΩ. Ἐστὸν δὴ τινε ὅσο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καΘ’ αὐτό, τὸ δ’ ἂν ἐφεύμενον ἄλλον.

suppose that ἄν is omitted before ἔστη: it would be as contrary to Greek usage to employ it after a descriptive relative, as after [it] with the optative.
καθαρὰ λύπης [if it be unqualified with ραμ, which of course supposes that the other is not. ἠδων is in fact ἄρη-
stēra, but it is added because of λευ-
kότερον.
κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινὲς] Trendelenburg understands this of Aristippus, who, according to Diogenes Laertius, ii. 87, taught that all pleasure was in κίνησις. But the school of Heracleitus and of Protagoras must have held the same doctrine. These could not, indeed, have
formally denied ωὖνα to pleasure, for that would have implied their conces-
sion of it to other things; but pleasure itself would probably be one of the ex-
amples by which they supported their argument.
Τὶ δῆ;) Protagoras’ answer is not
germane to the question ὃν οὐκ ἀκτη-
χόμεν. Probably the words belong not to Protagoras but to Socrates, who stops himself and says—τὶ δῆ; διαπαράτησα
κ. τ. ἦ. To which Protagoras answers not by an ungracious Δέγα, but by Ὡ
ὦ, Δέγα κ. τ. ἦ. This will rid us of the absurd collocation, ὁ Πρωταρχὲ
φίλε.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς τοίτω καὶ τίνες λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμινικάτων ἀεὶ περιφοῦσ’ τὸ δ’ ἐλλιπτεῖ ἔκεινον.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀγγ’ ἐτί σαφέστερον.
ΣΩ. Παϊδία τοὺς καλὰ καὶ ἅγαθὰ τεθεωρήματε ἕμα καὶ ἑραστάς ἄνδρείους αὐτῶν.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Τούτων τοῖν τοινυν ἐσούτα δυόν ὀσί ὁ δ’ ἄλλα ζήτει κατὰ πάντα ὡς λέγομεν εἶναι.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον ἐν’ ἑρωτῇ, λέγει σαφέστερον, ὃ Σώκρατες,
ὅ τι λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Οἷδέν τι ποικίλον, ὃ Πρώταθεν ἀλλ’ ὁ λόγος ἔρημηρεὶ νῦν, λέγει δ’ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἔνεκὰ του τῶν ὀντων ἔστιν ἂει, τὸ δ’ οὐ χάριν ἐκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἔνεκα γεγομένου ἂεὶ γίγνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Μόνης ἔμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεξιθορά.
ΣΩ. Τάχα δ’ ἵσωσ, ὃ παί, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προελθόντος τοῦ λόγου.
ΠΡΩ. Τί γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Αὐξό δὴ ταῦτ’ ἐτερα λάβωμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ποία;
ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δ’ ὀνείαν ἐτερον ἐν.
ΠΡΩ. Αὐ’ ἀποδέχομαι σου ταιξα, ὀνείαν καὶ γένεσιν.
ΣΩ. Ὅρθοτατα, πότερον οὖν τούτων ἔνεκα ποτέρου; τὴν γένεσιν ὀνείας ἔνεκα φάωμεν ἢ τὴν ὀνείαν εἶναι γεγονέως ἔνεκα;
ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο, ὃ προσαγορεύεται οὖσια, εἰ γεγονέως ἔνεκα τοῦτ’ ἐστιν ὀπερ ἔστι, γὑν πυνθάνει;

Το τρίτον ἐπὶ ἐφα] The Books have διὰ λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρω, out of which some have endeavoured to extract a miserable metaphysical joke. [ἐρευκέω] The quotation from Par-Protaochus had already asked twice thenius in the Elym. Mag. referred to for Socrates’ meaning.—Πώς τούτω καὶ τίνες λέγεις; and again Λέγ’ ἐτί σαφέστερον. For διὰ λέγομεν εἶναι, compared above 16, c., τῶν λεγομένων ἐπινόησεν. The correction proposed by Hirsch in the Paris edition was made with greater certainty in its favour. If Piersen had known that the oldest MSS. of Plato have the η, he would have pronounced it. Εὐρευκέω seems to have been a later form.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πρὸς Θεόν, ἃρ' [ἂν] ἐπανερωτεῖς με τοιῶνδε τι; λέγ', ὃ Πρώταρχε, μου, πέτερα πλοῖων ναυτηρίας ένεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ πλοία ένεκα ναυτηρίας; καὶ πάνω ὑπόθα τοιαύτα ἔστι;

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτῷ, ὃ Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τί ὄν τι ὁικὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ, ὃ Σάφαρτες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν τ' ὁικὸν αὐτοῦ συνέκτι τοῦ λόγου συμμέτεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν ὁμὶ.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ γενέσως μὲν ἄνεκα φάρμακα τε καὶ πάντες τὰ ἐν τοῖς πρόσωποι ίσαι πᾶσιν, ἐκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλης ἄλλης οὐδας τινὸς ἐκάστης ένεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐδας ένεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσας.

ΤΟΥ. Χαρέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡδονὴ γε, εἴπερ γένεσις ἔστιν, ένεκά τινος οὐδας ἢξ ἀνάγκης γίγνουσ' ἃν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴρ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ γε μὴν οὖ ἄνεκα τοῦ ἄνεκα τοῦ γιγνόμενον ἄει γίγνεται, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖρᾳ ἐκεῖνῳ ἐστιν τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὃ Ἀριστε, μοῖραν Θεόν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαίοτατον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν ἡδονὴ γ' εἴπερ γένεσις ἔστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἂ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτῇ τιθέντες ὅρθως ἔσομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὑμὶδυτατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οἴκοιν, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐλπὶν τοῦτον τοῦ λόγου, τῷ

Πρὸς Θεόν] The MSS. and Edd. have ΠΡΩ. Πρὸς θεόν, ἃρ' ἐπανερωτεῖς με; Σω. Τοιῶν τί λέγω, ὃ Πρώταρχε μοι,—τοιαύτ' ἔστι, λέγω τοῦτον αὐτό, ὅ Πρώταρχε. It is strange that Bcker's note, 'τινὸς—here edem daut ΣΕΗ,' has never led any one to the right distribution of this passage. ἂν before ἐπανερωτεῖς has led to all manner of conjectural emendations, but I believe it to have arisen from a negligent repetition of ἃρ'. The absurdity of Socrates calling the same thing τοιῶν τι and τοῦτον αὐτό, seems not to have struck the Editors.

'γίγνεται] Commonly γίγνουσ' ἃν, which is barbarous. Had ἔκτινα ἃν ἔτι followed, γίγνοτα without ἃν would have been correct; but with ἔτι we must have either δὲ γίγνεται or ἄει γίγνεται, and even the latter would be in much better accordance with something more remote than ἔστι, such as ἔσται or ἀνάγκη εἴη.

'Ἀλλ' οὖν—γε] Here again the MSS. have the absurd reading 'Ἀρ' οὖν. The conclusion follows so necessarily from that which has been said, that it would be quite out of place to make it the subject of a question; the presence of γε shows not only the corruption, but the sure method of correcting it.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

μηνίσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μὲν, οὔσαν δὲ μηδ᾿ ἥρ-
τινον αὐτῶς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅτι οὕτως τῶν
φαινόντων ἡδονὴν ἁγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἐκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐμὲ
γενέσεις ἀποτελομένοις καταγελάστησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῶν οὐσί δεικώμενοι ἡ πεινὴν ἡ δίψαν ἡ τί τῶν τοι-
οῦτων, διὰ γένεσιν δεικτὰ, χαίροντι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἀτε ἡδο-
νῆς οὕσης αὐτῆς, καὶ φασὶ θὴν οὖν ἂν δεῖξαι μὴ διψοῦντες
tε καὶ πεινῶντες, καὶ τάλλον, ἐὰν ἔστι, πάντα τὰ ἐπο-
μένα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθῆμασι, μὴ πάσχοντες.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐκίσαι γενὸς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ γλυκεσθαί τῷ τούτοντι ἐπιστεύχει τὸ φθεί-
ροσθεὶ φαίμεν ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαίον.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὴ φθοράν καὶ γένεσιν αἱροῦτ᾿ ἂν τὶς τοῦθ᾿ ἀιρούμενος,
ἀλλ᾿ οὖ τὸν τρίτον ἑκείνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ἑσθ᾿ μήτε
χαίρει μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φανεῖσθαι δ᾿ ἂν ἄνακον ὡς οἷον το
καθόστατα.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλῇ τις, ὡς ἐσκεν, ὡς Σάκησες, ἀλογία ἔυπ-
βαίνει γλυκεσθαί, ἐὰν τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἁγαθὸν ἡμῖν τιθῆσαι.

ΣΩ. Πολλῇ, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῷ ἔτει ἔτει λέγωμεν,—

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Πάντως οὖν ἀλογὸν ἑστὶ μηδὲν ἁγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ κα-
βὸν μηδὲ ἐν σώμασι μηδὲ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴρ ἐν πυξὶ,
καὶ ἐνεταθη ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρὶ δ᾿ ἡ αὐτοκομίνὴ ἡ νοῦν ἢ τι
tῶν ἄλλοις δο[ἀγαθὰ] ἔλθε τῆς ψυχῆς, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι;

[χων Sei] The best MSS. have δεῖ. This error is of continual occurrence in
infinitives having the circumflex, which is so easily confounded with the sigla
of v.

ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος This is a bitter sneer
at Aristippus, defining pleasure as a
γένεσις, and yet preaching pleasure.
The difference between of φαίσκοντες
and of ἀποτελομένως is that between
philosophers, and men who follow a
certain mode of life. By understanding
this difference we are enabled to do
without my change of σοι into σ᾿ σοι, but I still doubt whether we do not
require ἐκδικώμενον or μακαρίων after
ἀποτελεμένων.

[ἀγαθὰ] "It is unreasonable to sup-
pose that of all the things which belong
to the mind such as courage,
temperance, intelligence, &c. pleasure is
the only one entitled to be called good."

Platonis Philebos.
This is a fair appeal to common sense; but if you add ἄγαλμα, you beg the question. Philoebus could not say that of all ἄγαλμα this is the only one without a manifest contradiction.

εἰ τῇ τι σαθρόν ἤριν The verb σαθρός, to strain or percolate, has the same relation to σαθρός as σίδη to σιδάρος. Hence the proper meaning of the word σαθρός is, that which suffers anything to run through it; it is therefore used of a leaky or cracked vessel. To ring a vessel in order to ascertain its soundness, is περιχωπεύειν (with κοιναὶ καθόλους); and then it was said either ὑγίος or σαθρόν βουμεία—ὑγίος—φιλοχωπεύεια. The conjecture on this place, σαθρόν ἄριστο, is not admissible, for if this had been the meaning, the future must have been used.

δ τῇ δὲ καθαρότατον] The common reading is ἔσος δ τῇ καθαρότατον. But ἔσος χρόμιεια is barbarous; and if we desired to retain ἔσος, no change short of the following would be really sufficient: ἔσος ἀν καθιστώμεν, καθιστός δὲ—χρυσόμειεια.

ὅτι τὴν χράσιν] Stallbaum has unsuccessfully defended χράσιν against Schleiermacher, who proposed χράσιν. There is no question of the comparison at present, but of the admixture, in order to which, as Socrates had already observed (53, α), it is necessary to have each kind in its purest state. χρῆσιν μέρους ἐκ χράσιν is as elegant as χρησιμότερα μ. ἐκ χρᾶς (τῶν μερῶν) is the reverse.

Οὖκ ἦμεν If we would understand the drift of this question, we must divest ourselves of any notion that Plato is intending to establish a formal classification. His sole object is to show that there are two elements in ἐποίημα, namely the production of tangible results, and the information of the mind. The latter is not pointed out for its own sake, but to give relief and definiteness to the former which is its opposite; and the former is mentioned, because it enables him to introduce music and several other arts under one head as χειροτεχνία. This explanation disposes of the suspicion about some portion of the text having been lost, and fully accounts for the fact that Socrates never returns to the head of arts περὶ παθέων. But why does he choose the arts which he calls χειροτεχνία as the subject of particular enquiry? Because in these again there is a twofold element; the element of certainty derived from the mathematical sciences under which they work, and the empirical element. Now as one of these is scientific (ἐποίημα ἐγκύμων) and the other not, it is necessary to show this, as determining the greater or less
pureness of these parts of Intellect, as they had already sought out the greater or less pureness of the several kinds of Pleasure. As for the text, περὶ τὰς μαθήματα is to be understood either in its widest sense, and then it is superfluous; for what ἐπιστήμη is there which is not π. τ. μαθήματα? Or it is to be taken in a restricted sense and then it is on its wrong side; for a knowledge περὶ τὰς μαθήματα is a knowledge περὶ τῆς καθεδρίας. Sydenham saw that, χειροτεχνίας being an adjective, you must understand either τέχνης, which would be ridiculous, or ἐπιστήμης; but no ἐπιστήμης have been mentioned, (only ἐπιστήμη in general) so that there is nothing to justify the omission of ἐπιστήμης here. These reasons seem to have been quite beyond the discernment of Stallbaum, who dismisses Sydenham with an authoritative "male", and one of his usual non-apposite quotations. Thirdly I have written πρώταις for reasons very obvious and very little regarded. In place of αὐτῶν, which is unmeaning, I have put αὐ which marks the second distinction. Χαριτωστὰ has been already changed into Χαριτωστά first before me. Not only ought the comparative to match the comparative, but any art which is Χαριτωστά would on the withdrawal of the scientific element cease altogether; for if the pureness is according to the presence of the mathematical science, the most pure must have this not only as predominating but as excluding all empirical admixture, and when this is withdrawn, there remains—nothing. Αὐτὴ τὴν χειροτεχνίας—[Αὐτὴ γυναῖκα] This combination is not Greek; and the second half can be omitted without any detriment to the sense. Φαύλον μὲν ἄρα] This is the form of simple assent; if, in place of repeating φαύλον, he had said φαύλωτασ, μὲν οὐν would have been added; if his assent had been restricted, γούν. There is also a shade of difference between μὲν—τοι the old reading, and μὲν δὲ the reading of the Bodleian. The former is the more suitable when the answerer adds the weight of his own authority to the mere assent.
Priesty of the word ὅμηρη depends on μελέτη καὶ πάνι, which are used of training in the palæstra. The subject of προσγραμμοὺς is the possessors of the senses, that of ἀπειραγμάτων is ἄναλματες.

This passage has suffered from the well-known practice of transcribers, who, when they could not or would not decipher terminations, invented those which the immediate neighbourhood suggested. From οὗ μέτρῳ the copyist inferred that he must write στοχασῷ and then altered μέλετη into μελέτης. The reasoning proves clearly what Plato must have written. In proportion as an art trusts less to measure and more to practice, it must be full of guesswork.

ἀντὶ καὶ ἀδικτική. The MSS. have καὶ ἡμιπασα αὐτής συλληπτική. But ἡμιπασα belongs to the summum genus, and flute-playing has no subdivisions worth notice. It was an old subject of dispute between two schools of early musicians whether questions about the intervals in music should be determined by proportions of strings only or also by ear; but in the case of συλληπτική the task of settling such questions by length of pipe was too intricate, so that there especially the empirical method was pursued.

χορής] It is unnecessary to enter into the question whether χόρης is applicable to wind instruments, although the passage quoted with such confidence by Mr. Chappell (Hist. of Music p. 146) from Plato Rep. 599, p. is quite inconclusive, being itself confessedly corrupt; and I can find no other. The very context in that passage would seem to show that Socrates objects to the flute, because the admitted defects of stringed instruments were due to an imitation of the flute. I am inclined to read τὸ πολύγροδον αὐτὸ, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παραμόρφων αὐτῶν τυγχάνει δύτα μαμήματα; But here συλληπτική is represented as hunting after the measure of the chord in a stringed instrument: that is, having no measure of its own to trust to, it derives its certainty from that which possesses such a measure.

For this word which, though a term in music (see Chappell H. of M. p. 98) is quite inapplicable here, I conjecture ὅρμος, of which the more common form ὦρμος was a gloss. τὸ πολλῆρᾳ In place of this reading, the Zurich Editors have adopted the conjectural one of ζ. This only spoils what is perfectly plain. "The things which give this art its accuracy, make it τεχνικήτερον, and therefore more akin to pure ἐπιστήμη."
ΠΙΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΑΗΒΟΣ.

λοις ἄλλοις τῆς ξιλουργικῆς. κανόν ταῖς παρεχόμεναι καὶ διαβάθη καὶ στάθη καὶ τοῖς προσαγωγὴι κακομ.- C ψευμένων.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνω γε, ὁ Σώφρονες, ὡρθὸς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θάμον τοινύν διεξ ἡ τῆς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν μονακὴ ἡνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἐργοῖς ἐλάττενοι ἀκριβείας μετα- εγχώνας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικὴ πλείονος.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, δεῖ τὸν δὲ πρῶτας ἐξισομείν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνει μοι λέγεις καὶ οὕς μετὰ ταύ- της τέχνας ἐφεξῆξε τῶν δῆ.

ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ἄλλο, ὁ Προστραχ(el RP, οὐ διπτᾶς οὐ D καὶ ταύτας λεκτένοι; ἦ τῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ποιας δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἄρ' οὖν ἄλλην μὲν τινὰ τήν τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δ' αὐ τήν τῶν ψηλοφορυκτῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Πὴ ποτὲ διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τήν δ' ἄλλην θείη τις ἐν ἀριθμητικὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὔ σμικρῷ ὅρῳ, ὁ Προστραχ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦντος ἀνίσους καταφημοῦται τῶν περὶ ἀρίθμων, οἷον στρατι- πεδα δύο καὶ βοῶς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικράτα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάν - Ἐ

κανών] κανὼν is the rule for measuring straight lines; τόρος for curved; διαβαθής the cross pieces, (in shape of a compass stretched out,) from the angle of which the plumb-line depended; στάθη the plumb-line itself; and ἐποσαγωγός is explained to be the instrument for reducing warped timber to straightness. If this is correct, it is much less κακοσμιφεμέναν than the rest, which are scientific helps, while this is a mere engine of force. Perhaps it was an instrument for taking the angles of curves. It is scarcely necessary to say that κακοσμιφεμένων has nothing to do with the workmanship, though Stall- baum translates "acutum factum:"

Ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ 8᾽ Ἀλλ᾽ This is a common ellipsis for τῆς μὲν ἀ. τῆν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς. Compare Laws 862, π which I quote for the sake of correcting it: καὶ τὸ μὲν βλαβεῖν βλαβεῖς τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ποιητέων, τὸ τε ἀπολόμενον σῶ- ξοντα, καὶ τὸ πεσόν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέλαν ἔρρησοντα, καὶ τὸ δυνατόν ἑτὶ τρει- δεὶς θυμὸς, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλοις ἐμπλαζότας τοῖς δρόμοι καὶ τοῖς πᾶσι οὐκ θυμῶντα (παράθεον) ἐκτὸς ἐξ ἀνθρόπως εἰς φιλον πε- ρατέων αἵ καθήκοντος τοῖς νόμοις.

Οὐ σμικρῷ ὄρῳ οὐ σμικρῷς ὄρῳς is the common reading. But this is out of structure, and if any one wishes to understand ἐκτ', he must at least insert the article. But the words are evidently an answer to Πὴ ποτὲ διορισάμενος.—The word σύντοσι three lines below was supplied to give a case to συναθλο- ϊασται, and the consequence is that the condition of B assenting to A is not, A changing his mind, but some third C propounding the same doctrine as B.
των μέγιστα· οἱ δ' 'οικ ἄν ποτε [ἀφοθής] συνακολουθήσωμεν, εἰ
μή μονάδα μονάδος ἕκαστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλ-
λης διαφέρονσάν τις θέμει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ' ἐπεὶ λέγεις οὐ συμφράν διαφοράν τῶν
περὶ ἁμέρων ταχαίων, ὡστε λόγον ἔχειν δι' αὐτὰς εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' λογιστικῇ καὶ μετρητικῇ ἡ κατὰ τεκτονικήν καὶ
κατ' εἰμιοτικήν τῇ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογικῆς
57 [καταμελετομένων]; πότερον ὡς μία ἑκατέρα λεκτέων, ἢ δύο
τιθέμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τοις πρὸσθεν ἐπόμενος ἔγον ἄν δῶ κατὰ τὴν
ἐμὴν ἑρώτημα ἑκατέραν τούτων.

ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς. οὐ δ' ἔνεκα ταῦτα προηγεχάμεθ' εἰς τὸ
μέσον, ἢ' ἐννοεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡσυγ, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ἀποφθέγματι τὸ νῦν
ἐρωτήμενον.

ΣΩ. Δοξεῖ τοῖνυ ἐμοῦ' οὔτος ὁ λόγος οὐχ ἦτον ἡ ὡτε
λέγειν αὐτὸν ἡχήμετα, ταῖς ἱδοναῖς ἦτοι τὰντίστροφον ἐν-
Β ταῦτα προβεβηκέναι σκοπῶν εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τις ἐκείνης ἀλλὰ κα-
θαρότερα ἑπιστήμης ἑπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἱδονής ἱδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφές τούτο γε, ὅτι ταῦτά' ἔνεκα τού-
tων ἐπικεχείρησεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἢ κ' οὖν ἐν μὲν τοις ἐμπρόσθεν ἐπ' ἄλλοις

et μὴ μονάδα] Except a man shall
consider no monad to differ from any
other single monad out of all innumerable
monads. There is an intentional redu-
dancy in this triple opposition (μονάδα
—μονάδος, μηδεμίαν—ἐ. τ. μ., ἄλλην
—ἄλλης) in order to mark the perfect
indifference of every monad from every
other.

tαντοτότων] Rep. 521 θ, Tim. 90 β,
who give their time to Arithmetic.

Τί δ' σωματικῇ? In this passage I
have changed τῆς σ. φ. γεωμετρίας τε
χαί λογικῶν, so as to render the sen-
tence complete. This is far better than
supplying διαφοράς, which would make
Socrates first ask whether two things
differ, then whether they are one, and
again whether they differ. The only
question that can by any possibility
be asked as introductory to the other
two is "How do these stand to each
other?" The word καταμελετομένων
is nothing but a wretched attempt to
bolster up the construction by making
a genitive absolute of it; and for this
purpose some one has borrowed the
remarkably elegant word from its con-
text above and used it where it means
about as much as would τυπομένων.

tαντιστροφον] I have added the ar-
ticle which is necessary to the sense.

Τί σωματικῇ? This is Schlesierma-
cher's emendation for προβεβηκέναι; it
is obvious that no πρέβλημα is put for-
ward.

Τί οὖν] In this sentence the Books
turn two distinct questions into one
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ. 103

άλλην τέχνην οὕσαν ἀνεύρισκε [σαφεστέραν] καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἀλλήν ἄλλης;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τούτοις δ’ ἄρ’ οὐκ ἦν τεχνὴ ὡς ὀμόνυμον φανερωτικόν, ἐς δόξαι καταστήσας ὡς μίαν, τέλευ ὡς ὀνόματον ἐπανεφεύρεται τούτων αὐτῶν [τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ τῇ τάσῃ] πότερον ἢ τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντων ἀκριβέστερον ἦχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα δοκεῖ μοι τούτο διερεύνων.

ΣΩ. Τίν’ οὖν, ὦ Πρῶταρχε, αὐτῷ διδόμεν ἀπόκρισιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰς Ἡμιμαστὸν διαφορὰς μέγεθος εἰς σαφήνειαν προελεύθηκεν ἐπιστήμων.

ΣΩ. Οὕτων ἀποκρινόμεθα ὤν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν; καὶ εἰρθήσω γ’ ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρονται, τούτων δ’ αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων φιλοσοφοῦντων ὁμοίως ἀμφιθαλῶν ἀκριβείας ἐκαὶ ἀληθείας περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀρίθμους διαφέρονται.

ΣΩ. "Ἑστῶ ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύοντες Ἡφαιστοῦ ἀποκρινόμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὀλιγήν—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅσο εἰσὶ δὲν ἀφημιτικαὶ καὶ δὸν μετρητικαὶ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τοιαύτα ἠναγώναζε συχνά, τὴν ἁρμακικὴν ἐξουσία ταῦτην, ὄνοματος δ’ ἐνός ἐκείνων ἡτανα.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδώμην τιχὺ ἄγαθ’ τοὺς, οὕς φης δεινοῖς ἔλεγεν, ταῦτα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς Σωκράτης.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμως ἀκριβείας μᾶλιστ’ εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

question asked twice. I have removed σαφεστέραν and for ἀνεύρισκε written ἀνεύρισκε.

ἐς δόξαι καταστήσας] The same expression occurs in Euthyd. 305 D. Compare also Craty. 431 ι, εἰς τὴν αἰκατερίαν καταστήσας.

ὅς μάλις] The MSS. have ὡς μίας, an alteration probably made to suit δυοῖν, as if the construction were the same. I have also supplied ἐν τοῖς right place, and put the absurd supplement τὸ σαφὲς . . . . περὶ ταῦτα into brackets. ἀκριβέστερον ἦχει is precisely the same as τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν. A little further on εἰς σαφήνειαν is used as to this same quality; and still further he uses ἀληθείαν and ἀκριβεία in the same sense.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἡμᾶς, ὃς Πρώταρχε, ἀναινεῖ ὅν ἦ τοῦ δια-

λεγεῖσαι δύναμις, εἵ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα δὲ ταῦτα αὐτὲ δεῖ λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Δήλον ὡς πάς ἐν τῇ γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοῖ τὴν

γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὅν [καὶ τὸ] ὀντὸς καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταύταν ἀεὶ περι-

κόρον πάντωσιν ἔγωγ’ οἴμαι ἤγείσθαι ξύμπαντα, ὅσος νῦν καὶ

συμκρὸν προσήρθησαι, μακρῷ ἀληθευτὰτην ἐλναι γνώσιν. σὺ

dὲ τί; [πώς τούτῳ, ὃς Πρώταρχε, διακρινόμεν ἂν;]

ΠΡΩ. Ἡκοοὐν μὲν ἔγγοι, ὃς Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου

ἡπολλάκης, ὡς ὃ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν.

Β πάντα γὰρ ὅρ’ αὐτῇ δούλα τὸν ἐκόντων ἄλλ’ ὃς διὰ βλας πο-

ωκῆτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εὑρ’ τῶν τεχνῶν. νῦν δ’ ὅτε

σοὶ ὀνεῖν ἔχειν βουλοίμην ἂν ἔκαντα τίθενται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δ’ ὅπλα μοι δοκεῖς βουλήσεις εἰπέναι αἰσχυνθεὶς

ἀπολιπέειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστώ νῦν ταῦτα ταῦτα, ὅτη σοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν αἴτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ἑπολαβεῖν σε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

Δήλον δὲ τι πᾶς ἂν] For this emenda-

tion we are indebted to W. H. Thomp-

son. The old reading was Δήλον δὲ τι

ἡ πάσαν. There can be no doubt that

the phrase περὶ τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ ὄντως is

incorrect. τὸ ὄντως would be rightly

placed where the question was about

the meaning of the word, but here we

are considering the objects of a given

science. But the object of Dialectic is

Truth, and Truth is found either in that

which is absolute (τὸ ὃν ὄντως), or in

that which is invariable, because it is

the effect of the absolute; and this

latter Plato expressed by καὶ τὸ κατὰ

tαῦταν ἀπὸ περικόρος (γνῶσιν). To

make τὸ ὄντως, and even τὸ κατὰ ταῦ-

τόν ἀπὸ περικόρος, mere explanations of

τὸ ὅν, as one Editor has done, betrays

great looseness of thought.

οὐ δὲ τί; [πώς τοῦτο, ὃς Πρώταρχε,

διακρίνου ἂν] I have made separate

sentences: οὐ δὲ τί; answering to ἔγωγ’

οἴμαι καὶ πῶς τ. δ. ἂν; to the general

question. But πῶς διακρίνου ἂν is so

contrary to the usual order, and a se-

cond quotation of a more vague sort

following the only question to the pur-

pose is so unworthy of our author, that

I cannot but look on it as a later ad-

dition.

ἡπολλάκης I cannot say what should

be done with this word which is quite

incompatible with ἔκκιντον. Nor can

I propose anything certain in place of

ὅτι ἔκκιντον, of which the sense seem

as necessary as the mode of expression

is objectionable. But it is not unlikely

that the right reading is ὅτι ἔκκιντον

αὐτῶν.

Τὰ δ’ ὅπλα] This is a play upon the

word τίτασκα, which Protarchus had

used merely in the sense of advancing

an opinion; but Socrates, taking up the

words ἐναντία τίτασκα, replies, Ἰδικικά

you were going to say ὅπλα, but you

were ashamed, and dropped the word.

τὰ ὅπλα ἐναντία τίτασκα is in acie

stare, as in Herod. 1. 62, καὶ ὑδία

ἐκεῖνα τὰ ὅπλα. There is a further

play upon ἀπολιπεῖν; for ἀπολιπεῖν τὰ

ὅπλα would properly mean to desert,

but here it is merely to forego or give

up the word.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΞΩ. Όδυ, ὡ φίλε Πρώταξε, τοῦτ' ἔγγοι ἐζήτουσιν πω,
τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν [διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστη καὶ ὁ
ἀρίστη καὶ πλείον ὁφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' τίς τοτε τὸ σαφὲς
καὶ τάκριβες καὶ τὸ ἀληθεστάτων ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν ἡ συμφρακά
καὶ συμφρακά ὀνήσσα. τούτω ἔστιν δ' ὅν ἐξητοῦμεν. ἀλλ' ὅτα
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπενεχθήν Ποιγία, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνῳ ὑπερέρχειν τέχνη
διδάσκα πρὸς χρείαν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, κρατεῖν δ' ἢ ἔποιον ἐγὼ
νῦν πραγματεία, καθάπερ τοῦ λεικοῦ πέρι τὸν ἔλεγον, κἂν εἰ
συμφράξω, καθαρόν δ' εἶν, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ μη τοιοῦτον διαφέ-
ρειν, τούτω γ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἕκασθα δια-
νοηθέντες καὶ ἰκανῶς διαλογισμένοι, μήτ' εἷς τῶν ὄφελειάς
ἐπιστήμων βλέπαντες μήτε τῶν ἐθοσμιάς, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέ-
φυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν σώματος ἐὰν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ἐ
ηκε τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην ἐπιτιμών διερευνηθέντες [τὸ
καθαρόν νῦν τε καὶ φρονήσωσι] εἰ ταύτην μήλιστ' εἰ τῶν εἰ-
χόων ἐκτήθηκα φαίμεν ἂν ἢ τίν' ἐτέραν ταύτης κυριστείν
ὁμίν ἔγειρέν.

Ε

[Διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστῃ I once at-
tempted to defend this construction by
such examples as that of Aristophanes
(Wasps 666) τους "οὐχὶ προβᾶσιον κ. τ.
τον." There never was an interpolation
which more clearly betrayed itself. If
Plato had used any such word as διαφέ-
ρεις, he would have made both grounds
of comparison, certainty as well as ge-
neral merit, depend upon it.

[Χητούμεν] MSS. and Edd. give Χη-
τούμεν.

πρὸς χρείαν These words are to be
taken as governing τοῖς εἰχόωντας, to
surpass as to their use to men.

κρατεῖν δ' ἢ ἔποιο νῦν πραγμα-
τείας. The reading of the MSS. and
Edd. is ὑπάρχειν (for ὑπερέρχειν) and
κρατεῖν, ἡ δ' ἔποιο. This has been ad-
duced as an instance of the ἀνακλύ-
ζον, and it will be well to look closely
into it. The case of πραγματείας, ac-
cording to this supposition, will be
owing to a construction intended to be
analogous to that of τῇ μὲν ἔν τῇ τέχνῃ
—διδάσκα, which construction is lost or
changed by reason of the long paren-
thesis, so that, when this ends, a new
construction, ταύτην ἐπιτιμῶν, is sub-
stituted. A conclusive answer to all
these subtleties is, that not only the
construction is different, but the sense
is altogether unlike. For in the first
part, if completed, we should expect ἢ
you assign, or you ought to assign, or
something which implies a claim for νοῦς:
but in the second part there is a call
on Protarchus to declare what he really
thinks about νοῦς (ταύτην ἐπιτιμῶν κ.
τον τε). Another objection to the pas-
sage as it stands is the awkwardness of
διδάσκα ὑπάρχειν κρατεῖν, which means
διδάσκα κρατεῖν, and nothing more. All
these difficulties are removed by so
simple a process that I have not hesi-
tated to introduce it into the text, and
to change the punctuation accordingly.

ταύτην ἐπιτιμῶν] This ταύτην refers
to δώσαι, the second to ἐπισκοπήματι.
τὸ καθαρὸν νῦν τε καὶ φρονήσωσι
is not the proposed object of investigation,
as the interpolator thought; they are
to search out the dialectic art itself.
καὶ νῦν δὲ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες. For
καὶ νῦν δὲ I have written καὶ νῦν δὲ,
as opposed to οὐχ ἔζητον πω. There
is some corruption in σφόδρα διανο-
ήσαις, for διανοηθέναι cannot be used
in the sense of διασκεδάζει.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπώ, καὶ χαλέπιν, ὀλμαί, συνχωρήσας τιν' ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἥ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ταύτην.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' ὅνων ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιοῦτο εἰρήκας ὅ λέγες νῦν, ὡς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταύτας πεπόνηται, περὶ-59 τὸν μὲν δόξαν χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ἄρωτον ἄνωτε-μένως; εἴτε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἠχείται τις ζητεῖν, οἷος δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅτι τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ πᾶσχε τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαίμεν ἂν ταύτα, ἡ πᾶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτες.

ΣΩ. Οὔπων οὔ περὶ τὰ ὄντ' αἰε, περὶ δὲ τὰ γεγονόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήκησαι τὸν πόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθείατα.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτων οὖν τι σαφές ἡν φαίμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἄλη-
B θείᾳ γίγνεσθαι, ὅν μὴ δ' ἔσχε μηδὲν πάσποτε κατὰ ταύτα μηθ' ἐξει μηθ' εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς; ΣΩ. Περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ πεπτημένα βεβαιότητα μηθ' ἤρθον βίος ἣν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοντι ἡμῖν καὶ ὅποιον;

ΠΡΩ. Ὅλμαι μὲν οἴδαμαι.

πεπτημένα] This word and ἄνωτε-μένως (Schulin's correction for ἄνωτε-μένως) explain each other. He is evidently speaking of pursuits which require great assiduity; but what these are it would be difficult to say, if we retained the old reading ἄστα περὶ ταύτα πεπόνηται. This has been explained by a reference to the passages in the Phaedo, where ταύτα is used of visible things; but this would at least include τὰ περὶ φύσεως ζητεῖν, which is here spoken of as a distinct branch. By means of this change we have the arts mentioned first, because they are the subject; but as the following remark turns on the means employed, it is convenient to mention the persons who follow the arts, to avoid the awkwardness of saying that the arts themselves χρῶνται δόξας, or ζητοῦσι τὰ περὶ δόξαν.

ψυχικ] If the physicist mistook what φύσις was, and while supposing that he investigated it was searching out something else, γίγνεται would be appropriate. But nothing more is meant than the usual enquiries of the Ionic Philosophy, and no intimation is given that there is any higher sense of φύσις or of the investigation of it. I therefore propose ἦργηται. For while in the handicrafts above mentioned he speaks of those who labour at them, he speaks of physical investigations as things in which men choose to engage. The tense of ἦργηται is borne out by ἄνηκησαι τῶν πόνων. In explanation of this latter phrase I observe that in those well-known combinations πολέμοι — πόνοι — κόσμοι — νεῖκοι αἰτεῖται, οἵᾳ ἀντίγραφοι may be used in place of the other verb. Some who did not notice this have proposed unnecessary conjectures. Compare Phædrus 233 c, 243 c, Læcs 921 a and b.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. ὁδ' ἄρα [νοῦς] οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν
tὸ ἀληθεύσατον ἔχονα.
ΠΡΩ. Ὁθύνων εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φιλίππων χρῆ
νυχτα χαίρειν ἐὰν, τόδε δὲ διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. ' Ὑγίᾳ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθι ἤμιν τὸ τε βέβαιον [καὶ τὸ
καθαρόν] καὶ τὸ ἄληθὲς καὶ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ
ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁπότες ἀμφικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἦ [δεύτερος]
ἐκεῖνων ὁ τε μάλιστ' ἐστὶν ἔγγενες· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερὰ
τε καὶ ἵστερα λέκτον.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύσατον λέγει τοίς.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὴ τῶν ὄνομάτων περὶ τὰ τουατα κάλλιστα ἀρ'
οὔ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαίωτατον ἀπονέμειν;
ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅνοικόν νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ φρονήσεως ἄν' ἂν τὸς τιμήσειν
d μάλιστ' ὄνοματα;
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

Οἳς' ἄρα [νοῦς] οὐδέ τ. λ.] We should have expected οὔτε .. οὔτε. But if there
is any ἐπιστήμη, however weak or vague,
there are some νοῆς, for all ἐπιστήμη
are parts of νοῶς and are discussed as
such. The νοῦς of the text is plain-
ly the opposite of that of Anaxagoras,
and throws all things into confusion.
The scribes were not familiar with the
idiom which we meet both in Homer
and in the Attic writers, ὁδ' γὰρ ὀφθ.,
οὐδ' ἀρ' οὐθή. In the 8th Epistle of
Synesius our modern texts have oύ γὰρ
οφθ' ὁμοίος ἢν ἔχοντι; but in my col-
lations I find that the best MSS. have
οὐδέ γὰρ οἴον ομοίος ἢν ἔχοντι.
Τῶν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ] See note on
20, σ. The article here has a depre-
ciating effect. It has, in fact, the force
of turning the first and second persons
into a third, or more properly still, of
abstracting the individual from his per-
sonality, and making a mere somebody
of him.

[καὶ τὸ καθαρόν] These words are
spurious. For βέβαιον cannot be se-
parated from ἄληθές, since the want
of truth in physical knowledge has been
declared to arise from the instability
of the objects. Again καθαρὸν is so
nearly the same as εἰλικρινές that it
could not occur unless in close prox-
imity to it, and the only place for εἰλι-
κρινές is that which it occupies as a
quality deduced from the other two;
and as τὰ δὲ—ὁπότες answer to
βέβαιον and ἄληθές, so does ἀμφικτό-
tατά answer to εἰλικρινές.

[δεύτερος] The Zurich Editors have
changed this into δεύτερος, which is
at least more rational than Stallbaum's
defence of it as a parenthetical proverb
with πλοῦς understood. It is incredible
that Plato should make two δεύτερα to
one and the same first. It is therefore
a waste of time to enquire how δεύτερος
should be corrected.

[ἄττ' ἂν] The common reading is ζ
ἄττ' ἂν. It is evident that this is no
place for γε. The confusion between
the two readings is of very frequent
occurrence.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ’ ἂρ’ ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὅν ὄντως ἐννοίας ἡστιν ἀπηχριβωμένα ὁρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν ἂ γ’ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἔγω τότε παρεσχόμην, οὐκ ἄλλ’ ἡστιν ἡ τάσσα τὰ ὄνοματα.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν, ὦ Σωκράτες;
ΣΩ. Ἐλεν· τὸ μὲν δ’ φρονήσεως τε καὶ ἰδονῆς πέρι πρὸς ἐτὴν ἀλλήλων μίξιν εἰς τις φαίνη καθαπετεῖ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι, παρακεῖσθαι, καλῶς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεξικάζοι.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. Τὸ δ’ ἦτα ταῦτ’ ἂρ’ οὐ μιγνώσατε ἐπιχειρησάτεν;
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐν ἔχων,—
ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποία;
ΣΩ. Α’ καὶ πρόερεον [ἐμνήσθησαν]· εὖ δ’ ἡ παροιμία δο-60 κεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δῖς καὶ τρῖς τὸ γε καλῶς ἔχον ἑπανα-πολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς· οἶμαι γὰρ οὗτω πως τὰ τότε λεγόντα δηθῆραι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Φίλημός φησι τὴν ἰδονὴν σκοπῶν ὁρθῶν πᾶσι ζῷως γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τοῦτον συγκέχοσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τάγαθ’ τους’ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἑξυπακοίαν, καὶ δὴ’ ὄνοματα, ὄγαθ’

[Σωκράτες στ. ἡ.] Although the reading of this passage has been pronounced to be verisimile, yet as the authority who states this bids us take ἐστι καλεῖσθαι together (he was perhaps thinking of ἐστι καλεῖ) and talks strange stuff about ἀπηχριβωμένα and ξείμενα, we cannot throw off all suspicion of its unsoundness. If ἀπηχριβωμένα could mean accurately proved to be (not accurately made) there would be some handle for the infinitive καλεῖσθαι. But as this cannot be, and likewise for other reasons, which good scholars will readily discern, I am inclined to read ἐστω ἀπηχριβωμένος κειμένα καλεῖσθαι. ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς] The first is the material, considered as a kind of secondary cause, out of which things are produced; the second, the same material considered as the substance in which the workman realises his art. [ἐμνήσθησαν] This is a supplement originating with some one who did not see that the verbs to be understood are εἴθομεν καὶ ἐνεμνήσθημεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς.
καὶ ἢδυ, ἐνὶ τινὶ [καὶ φύσει μακ] τοῖσιν ὅρθως τεθέντ' ἔχειν. 
Σωκράτης δὲ ἐν μὲν οὐ φησὶν τοῦτο ἐίναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ β ὄνοματα, καὶ τὸ γ' ἄγαθον καὶ τὸ ἢδυ διάφορον ἀλλήλον φύ- 
σιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον ἐίναι τῆς τοῦ ἄγαθον μοίρας τῆ 
φρόνησιν τῆ τῆν ᾿ήδουν. οὐ ταῦτ' ἔστι τε καὶ ἢν τὰ τότε λεγό- 
μενα, ὡς Πρώταρχος;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκών καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν ἕξωμο- 
λογοῖτο,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιόν;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθον διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων;

ΠΡΩ. Τότε;

ΣΩ. 'Ὅμη παρεῖ τούτ', αἰς τῶν ξώνων διὰ τέλους πάντως 
καὶ πάντη, μηδένος ἐτέρου ποι' ἢ τροποδείσθαι, τὸ δ' ῾ηκα- 
νόν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὖν

ΠΡΩ. Οὖτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκών τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιφάνειως χωρὶς ἐκάτερον ἐκα-
τέρου Θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἐκάστων, ἀμείκτιον μὲν ἵδουν φρο-
νήσιν, φρόνησιν δ' ὁσαύτως ἤδονής μηδὲ τὸ σμικρύτατον 
ἔχουσαν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἰκανον ἕδοξεν 
διὰ τοίς;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Εἴ δὲ γε παραφάσθησιν τι τότε, νῦν ὁσίοσθον ἐπανα-
λαβον ὅρθητον εἰπάτε, μήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιπάθητι 
καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἱδέας τεθέμενος, καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ 
τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξατ' ἢν οἱ καὶ δυτικοί οὖν ἐλαβον ἦ 
γιγνεθαί, 

[καὶ φύσει μακ] These words which separate τινὶ from τοῦτο and leave βιὶ without a noun expressed or implied to lean upon, and say nothing more than what is said in βιὶ τινὶ τοῦτο, are an evident contribution of some improver.

[ἐν μὲν οὖ φησι] The scribe has here confounded the ordinal and the cardinal number, both of which are written with the same compendium. α was taken for πρῶτον, which is in all the Books, but it was meant for ἄν as is plain from the antithesis ἐν μὲν οὐ, δύο δέ.

ἐπιφάνειως—θέντες [We made the experiment of placing, &c. Stallbaum compares the expression used above, (21, 4) ἐν σοι περιμένει βασιλέως ταῦτα. μὴ ὡς δὲ γ' ᾿Ηδονήν] This formula
eis μὴν ἀληθῶς δεξαίον χαίρειν, μήτε τὸ παρὰ πάντας γιγνώσκω
Εἰς ποτὲ πέπονθε πάθος, μὴ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδὲ
ἀντίκειται χρόνῳ ἔγκο. ταῦτα δὲ λέγω καὶ περὶ φρονήματις, εἰ
tις ἄνευ πάθους ἢδονής καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξατ' ἢν φρονή-
σιν ἐκεῖν μᾶλλον [ἡ μετὰ τινών ἢδονῶν] ἢ πάσας ἢδονὰς [κω-
φίς φρονήματις μᾶλλον ἢ] μετά φρονήματις αὐτοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς Σωκράτες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ὑδεί ταῦτα γε
πολλὰς ἐπερωτῶν.

61 ΣΩ. Οὐκόν τὸ γε τέλεσα καὶ πάσαν αἰτητὸν καὶ τὸ παν-
tάπασιν ἁγαθῶν οὐδέτερον ἀν τούτων εἰν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον ἁγαθὸν ἦτοι σαφῶς ἢ καὶ ὑπα τόπων αὐ-
tοῦ λήπτεον, ἢν, ἕπερ ἐλέγομεν, δευτερεία ὅτω δῶσομεν ἔχωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθώστως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν οὖν μὲν ἄν τιν' ἐπὶ τάγαθὸν εἰλήφαμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Καθάπερ εἰ τις τιν' ἀνθρώπουν ζητῶν τὴν οἰκήσιν
Β' πρώτον ὄρθως, ἢν οἰκεῖ, πῦρος' αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δὴ που πρὸς
tὴν εὑρέσθαι ἢν ἔχοι τοῦ ζησομένου.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τις λόγος ἐμῖρρουσαν ἧμιν, ἰδίερα καὶ κατ'
ἀρχὰς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ βιώ τάγαθον ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ
μικτῷ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. 'Ελπίς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μικρότερον καλῶς τὸ ζησο-
μένον ἐσεαθαὶ φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μή.

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῖς δ' Θεοῖς, ὡς Πρωταχεῖ, εὐχόμενοι κεφανώμεν,

occurs in several Attic writers. Plato
and Xenophon sometimes use merely
μὴ δ' and sometimes add δὴ only.
In the cases where γε is added, it is found
sometimes before δ', sometimes after
it. Compare this passage with one in
Demosth. against Conon, μὴ δ' γε δὴ,
and with one in Politicus, μὴ δ' δὴ'
μεταλέξει γε.

[ἡ μ. τ. ἢδονῶν] I bracket the in-
sertions which make nonsense of a
question put by Plato with the utmost
subtlety. In the words given to Pro-
tarchus, the part which purports to be
the answer is no answer at all; and
his objection to the repetition of the
question looks like an addition con-
trived to mask a corrupt sentence. Pro-
tarchus' answer ought to be ἢ 
ταῦτα, or in other words οὐκ ἢ 
tαῦτα γε.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

εἶκε Διόνυσος εἰς Ἡραίος ταῦτα τὴν τι- χθεὶς γυνὴς γυνὴς

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴ ἡμῖν καθάπερ οἰνοχόους ταῖς παρεστασίς κρη-

σεῖ, μέλιτος μὲν ἐν ἀπεικάζω τις τῆς τῆς ἴδιον, τὴν δὲ τῆς

σφονής τε νεφαντικὴ καὶ οὐσίαν αὐτήν καὶ υγιενὸς τινὸς

ίδιος· ἀς προθυμητέων ὡς κάλλιστα σύμμειναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ! ΣΩ. Φύσε δὴ πρότερον· ἀρα πάσαν ἴδιον πᾶση σφονή—

δεῖ μιγνύσεις τοῦ καλῶς ἐν μάλιστ' ἐπιτίθημεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡσως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν ἀσφαλές· η δ' ἀκινδυνώτερον ἂν μιγνύσι-

μεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τιν' ἀποφήμασθαι οὖν.

ΠΡΩ. Αἶγα τίνα.

ΣΩ. Ἡν ἡμῖν ἴδιον τε ἡταλῆνα, ὡς οἴόμεθα, μᾶλλον ἐκτε-

νας ἄλλης, καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀναραβήσερα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ

μαγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλυόμενα ἀποβλέπονσα, η δ' ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη

μαγνόμενα μὴν ἀπολλυόμενα, κατὰ ταύτα δ' ὀφθάλμως ὅντι

αἰεῖ. Εἰς ταύτην [εἰς τὸ ἄλλην] ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἦγησαμεθ' ἄκεινος ἄλλη-

θεστέραν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Οἰκοῦν [εἰς] τάλαρθοντα τρήματα ἐκστέρας ἰδομεν

πρώτον ἐνεμικατου, ἀρ' ἵκανα ταύτα ἐγκεκριμένα τοῦ ἀναπη-

τότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, ἢ τινὸς ἐπὶ προσ-

δεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μή τοιούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ δρᾶν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἑστω δὴ τις ἡμῖν φρονών ἀνθρώπως αὕτης πέρι δι-

κασιόνης, ὅ τι ἐστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἐπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ

παρεστάτων κρήναι] Winckelmann, in his Preface, observes that this is an allu-

sion to the libations in honour of the Eumenides and other divinities, which

consisted of water and honey. Compare

Esch. Eum. 107, Soph. Ed. Col. 100 Oικοῦν [εἰς] τάλαρθοντα; I have

bracketed εἰ and changed ἰδομεν into

'Ἑν ἡμῖν] I leave this passage in a corrupt state. ὡς οἴομεθα is quite hope-
δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡςαίτως διανοοῦμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡσυχ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιστήμης ἔχει, κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς Θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαίραν καὶ τοῖς κύκλωσι τούτωι οὖν, καὶ χρώματος ἐν ὁποιοδήποτε ήκαί τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄροις κανόναι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις;

ΠΡΩ. Γελοίαν διάδεσιν ἡμῶν, ὡς Σωκράτες, ἐν ταῖς Θείαις οὖσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμαις λέγομεν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φησί; ἢ τὸν ψευδούς κανόνος ἄμα καὶ τὸν κύκλου τὴν οὔ βέβαιον οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινὴ καὶ συγχρητέον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὄρθον ἔκαστον ἐξωπῆρειν οἶκαί δὲ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μουσική, ἢν ὅλιγον ἐμπροσθεν έφαγεν, στοιχείως τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστήν οὖσαν, καθαρότητος ἐνδείκνυται;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται έμοικές, ἐπετέρ γ' ἡμῶν οὗ βίος ἐσται καὶ ὅπως οὖν ποτὲ βίος.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτα, ὡσπερ Θυσιαρός ὑπὸ ἄχλου τις ὄρθος οὐκομενος καὶ βιοζόμενος, ήττηδεις ἀναπετάσας τὰς Θείας ὁρῶν πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσφεῖν, καὶ μίγνυσθαι ὦμοιοι καθαρῆς τὴν ἐνδεικτέαν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὗ τὸν ἢν ἔχειν' οἶδα, ὡς Σωκράτες, δ' τις τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάσας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμαις, ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

ΣΩ. Μεθύω δὴ τὰς ἐννομάς δεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὀμήρου καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μυσταγγείας ὕποδοξήν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μεθείμηται καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πυρῆν ἔτεον. οἷς γὰρ διενοθημεν αὐτῶς μεγάλων περὶτον, τὰ τῶν

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄροις Many notes have been written in defence and explanation of these words. If they are correct, we must understand by them, using other pattern figures in the same manner as the circles. Compare below, κείμενα παρά τοιαύτω κατ' ἄρεσις βέντες ταύτων καὶ εἰκόσια, the same as above. Εἰς μικτάκειον συμβάλλειν, ἡθρίμων υδάρ. οἷς γὰρ διενοθημεν] It is vain to
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αληθῶν μόρι οὐκ ἐξεγένετο ἤμιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἁγαντίμην εἰς ταύτων μεθείμεν ἅθροας καὶ πρόσθεν τῶν ἱδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. "Ὡρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι νῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱδονῶν, πότερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἅθροας ἁρετέον μή καὶ τούτων πρῶτας μεθείμεν ἤμιν ὅσα ἀληθείς.

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ τί διαφέρει πρὸς γ' ἀμφίλεγεν πρῶτος τὰς ἀληθείς ἀφείναι.

ΣΩ. Μεθείμενον δὴ. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἄρ' οὖν εἰ μὲν τινας ἀναγκαία, καθάπερ ἑκεῖ, ξυμμικτέον καὶ ταῦτας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ?

ΣΩ. Τάς γ' ἀναγκαίας δήποτεν εἰ δὲ γε καθάπερ τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἁθροβεῖς τε καὶ ὄφελμον ἢν ἐπιστάσθη οὐκ ἔδρα βίου, καὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτα λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἱδονῶν, εἰπερ πάσας ἱδονὰς ἢδεσθαι διὰ βίου συμφέρον θ' ἤμιν ἐστὶ καὶ ἁθροβεῖς ἀπασι, πάσας ξυγχρατεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ πῶς ποιοῦμεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἤμας, ὡς Προταρχε, διερωτῶν χρῆ, τὰς ἱδονὰς δ' αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις, διαπυκνοποιούμενος τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀλλ' ἔλθων περὶ,

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΣΩ. Ἡμέρα, ἐξ' ἱδονὰς ἤμας χεὶς προσαγορεύειν εἰτ' ἀλλω ὄντων ὀνόματι, μῶν οὐκ ἐν δεξιοθετ' οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρο-

look for any coherence in this passage so long as we retain ως γάρ. The sense requires ως γάρ. For the parts of the true sciences, with which we first proposed to mingle them, were not sufficient for us. I have also changed the place of πρῶτος, which commonly follows μόρια, where it has no meaning.

Τὰς γ' ἀναγκαίας δήποτεν] These words are commonly given to Pro-tarchus, but Ficinus had long ago seen that they belong to Socrates. Van Heusde thought them spurious. Stallbaums defends them on the ground that δήποτεν in assecerrando haud infrequens. No doubt; but with an appeal to another for his assent. "Must we mix the necessary pleasures?" "I see no objection." "I presume you do not, if they are necessary." This way of laughing at the question and answer, as if there could be anything question about what was necessary, is quite in Plato's manner. In the following sentence observe the very artistic finish of the antithesis in an inverted order. τέχνας πάσας = πάσας τέχνας; ἁθροβαί τε καὶ ὄφελμον = συμφέρον τε καὶ ἁθροβεῖς; ἐπικαταστάται = ἤθελται. This shows how false is the sagacity of those who smell out an interpolation here. In Pro-tarchus' answer, λέγομεν refers to λέγομεν, and ποιοῦμεν to ξυγχρατεῖν.

Platonis Philebus.

8
νήσεως, ἥ πάσης χωρίς [τοῦ φρονεῖν]; οἴμαι μὲν πρὸς τοῦτα τὸν αὐτὸς ἀναγκαίωταν εἶναι λέγειν,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιὼν;


ΠΡΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γ' εἰρήζατε τὰ νῦν, φίλοι.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως. πάλιν τοῖν ἐνεστὰ τοῖς, [τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνευροτέτον.] Ἀρ' ἤδονας τι προσέδεισθ' ἐν τῇ ξιγ- κράσει; φαίμεν αὖ ἄλλῳ ποιν τοῦ καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτεῦ- τες. Ποιών, φαίεν ἄν ἰσως, ἤδονας; 

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός.

D ΣΩ. Ὅ δ' γ' ἢμετέρως λόγος μετά τότε' ἐστίν οὖδε. Πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθεύσεις ἐκείναις ἤδονας, φίλοις, ἀρ' ἔτι προσέδεισθ' ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἤδονας ἐσοώνοις εἶναι καὶ τὰς αφροτά- τας; Καὶ πῶς, ὡς Σώκρατες; φαίειν ἄν, ἂν γ' ἐμποδίσατα τε μορφῇ ἤμισον ἔχοι τάς νυκτὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκείους ταφάτσουσα [διὰ μανικιάς ἤδονας], καὶ γίγνεται τὰς ἡμᾶς τὴν ἄρχην οὖν. Ε' ἔως τὰ τε γιγνόμεν ἤμισον τέχνα ὡς τὸ πολὺ, δ' ἀμέλειαν λήτην ἐμποδούσα, πανταχ' ὀδηγοῦσαν; ἄλλας δ' ἤδο- νας ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἄς εἶτες, σχέδην οἰκείας ἢμῖν νό- have μ. φ. πάσης ἡ χωρίς τοῦ φρονεῖν. There seems no ground for the omission of μάλλον in an ordinary prose passage, and the attempt at variety in φρονήσεως, τοῦ φρονεῖν, is very poor. Nor is there any fairness in the alternative “either with or without any”. For these reasons I have preferred μετά φρονήσεως, πάσης χωρίς. In the next paragraph εἰκάστης is obviously an interpolation. αὐτὴν αὐ τῇ The MSS. have some of them αὐτήν, others αὐ τῇ αὐ τῇ. The reason for this answer of the Pleasures is that they like that which appreciates the nature of each of themselves. I have therefore written ἐκάστης and cancelled etc. [τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτη- τῶν] The verbal is plainly out of keeping with φαιμεῖν ἄν, and both the repetition of νοοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν, and still more the would-be variety in “we must ask”, “we shall say, asking”, is most clumsy. Another conclusive reason against the genuineness of these words is the position of αὐτῇ for the opposition commences at πάλιν, and there was nothing to prevent the author writing τὴν φρό- νησιν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸν νοοῦν. But the simplest argument is, that if Plato had written τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοοῦν ἀνευροτέτον, he would have had no motive for adding anything whatever to φαιμεῖν ἄν. [διὰ μανικιάς ἤδονας] This is no doubt a true explanation; but who would ever dream of saying αὐτῇ ἤδονας ταφάτουσιν ἡμᾶς διὰ μανικιάς ἤδονας?
μίζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύτας τὰς μεθ᾽ ἐγέιας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἔμυμπός ἄφετης, ὁπόσας καθάπερ ἤκου ὁπαδοὶ γεγονόμεναι αὐτῇ ἐξαικελοῦντο πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνυ· τὰς θ' ἀδεί μετ᾽ ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπομένας πολλῆς παρ᾽ ἄλογῳ τῇ νὴ μηγνύναι τὸν βουλόμενον ὁ τι καλλίστῃν ἱδονά καὶ ἀσταισατοτάτην μίξιν καὶ χράσιν ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεὶν πει- 64 ράσθαι, τὶ ποιεῖν ἐν τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῇ παντὶ πέριπλοκεὶ ἀγα- θῶν καὶ τῇ ἱδεῖν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτὲ παντευτένον. ὃν ὁμί- ειρονός ταύτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἔστων τὸν νοῦν φύσιμον ὅπερ θ' αὐτοῦ καὶ μικρῆς καὶ δόξης ὁμοίως ἀποκατίσσομαι τὰ νῦν ἡμᾶς;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μή καὶ τοῦτο γ' ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὖκ ἄλλος ἦν ποτὲ γένοιτο οὐδ' ἄν ἐν.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΣΩ. 'Ω μή μίξομεν ἀλλιθειά, οὖκ ἦν ποτὲ τούτ' ἀλλιθέως γένοιτο οὐδ' ἄν γενόμενον εἶπ.
ΠΡΩ. Ἡδές γὰρ οὖν;
ΣΩ. Οὐθαμίως. ἀλλ' εἰ τινὸς ἔτι προσθεὶ τῇ συγχώσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σὺ τε καὶ Φίλιμπος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαρεῖν κόσμος τῆς ἀσώματος ἀφέων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειραγώθαι φαίνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὅ-Σύμπατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόξασθαι.

taúṭa μίγνυ· τάς] All subsequent Editors have adopted this brilliant conjecture of Van Heusde for ταύτας μι- γνύτας.
καὶ τῶν ἱδεῖν αὐτήν] Of the various changes which might be proposed for the removal of the difficulty which this sentence presents, I think the most probable would be καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἱδεῖν αὐ- τήν εἶναι ποτὲ μανευτένον. Compare Soph. 203, α. οὔ τι καὶ εἴπῃ τὰ ἔντα κατὰ ταύτα λόγωτος ἔστων εἶναι φασί.
δύνατον ἐστὶν] This is a playful allusion to the phrase νοῦν ἐγέντω.
κόσμος τῆς ἀνωμάτως ἄρξου] Socrates speaks of his present argument (δὲ νῦν λέγω), that is the speculation concern- ing combinations and what admits of them, as concluded; he compares it to the invisible power which orders the world, because it is capable of regulating man's life. Nothing can be simpler or clearer than this passage, and yet it has been twisted into the most absurd fancies, such as the following: Descripta est adhaec mixtioneis ratio, atque osten- sum, quonam ejus elementa esse debeant, ἢτα ετὸ πίσια, τ serviceProvider, et τὸ ἔμμυμα-γέμισαν in mixtione ista jam nonc conspicunc tur. (τὸ ἔμμυμα-γέμισαν in mixtione, would imply that τὸ ἔμμυμα-γέμισαν is something different from mixtio; if so, it is τὸ ἀπερών and τὸ περας.) And again: Quippe solutitas con- structæd est ælati corpus, sapientia serva συγχώση. Of all this metaphysical cob- web not a single thread belongs to Plato.
ΣΩ. 'Αρ’ οὖν ἔτι μὲν τοῖς τού τὸ ἄγαθον ὡς ἢ δια προφυσις [καὶ] τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐρεστάναι [τῆς τοῦ τοιοῦτον] λέγοντες ἵππος ἢ ὥσ τινα τρόπον φαίμεν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Τί δένε ἐν τῇ ξυμίμηζε τιμωτάτον ἄμα καὶ κάλλιον αἰτίων εἶναι δόξης ἢν ἡμῖν τοῦ πάση γεγονέναι προσφιλή τήν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τούτο γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τούτο εἰποσκεψάμεθα, εἰδ’ ἢ δοκῇ εἰτε [τῷ] μὴ προσφυγέστερον καὶ οἴκειστέρον ἐν τῇ παντὶ ξυνεστέρου.
ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως ποτ’ εἰς τὴν χρίαν ἢ μὲν ἐστὶ ξυμιφόρωτατον.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴ καὶ ξυμπάσσης γε μίξεως οὐχαλέπνον ἱδέων τῆν αἰτίαν, δι’ ἢν ἢ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἥτισον, ἢ τὸ παράταν οὐδένος.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Οὐδές που τούτ’ ἁνθρώπων ἄγονεί.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. Ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς ξυμιμετροῦ φόσεως μὴ τιχοῦσα ἤτοι καὶ ὑπωσόν ἐξικρασία πάσα δι’ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τὰ τε κεφανύμενα καὶ πρότην αὐτήν. οὐδὲ γὰρ κράσις, ἀλλὰ τὰς Εὐκράτωσις ξυμπεριφορημένη ἀληθῶς ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἐκάστοις ἔννοιας τοῖς κεκτημένοις ξυμιφορᾶ.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύτατον.
ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ καταπέφυγεν ἢμῖν ἢ τάγαθον δόμαις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετεχώσης γὰρ καὶ ξυμιμετρία κάλλος δήμου καὶ ἀρετῆ πανταχοῦ ξυμπῆςι κάλλει.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειαν γ’ ἔφασεν αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ χρίαι μεμιχέω.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.
65 ΣΩ. Ὁδέκοιν εἰ μὴ μεῖξις δυνάμει ἢ δέξει, τὸ ἄγαθον [Ἐρευ-σαί], σύντριμοι λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ξυμετρία καὶ ἀληθεία, λέ-

[kai] By cancelling this word we arrive at the right construction, ecx tois prochómosi tis tágathol oikhésos, tis tois toioúton seems to have been inserted after this intrusive xal had made tis oikhésos seem to be without an owner.

ξυμφορά] Observe the play on the word ξυμπεριφορημένη. metadeis] This answers to ἀρετῆ, and ξυμετρία to κάλλος

λαβόντες] This has nothing to do
with catching, though the scribe who interpolated ἰηρεύσαξ thought so. The infinitive to be expressed is λαβεῖν. No ἵδεις can be the instrument for ensnaring or seizing on τὰγαζῶν. We have in fact found it; and we form our notion of it, (compare ἐκαζῶν λαβεῖς, 17, c) not by a single but by a triple character. For this reason as τὸν is quite inappropriate (else we should also read σὺν μετὰ), I have written σύνταξα, and as the three characters have been repeatedly mentioned, and are soon to be mentioned again, as Beauty or Symmetry, Measure, and Truth, I have changed σύμμετρα into ἐμετρῆσα, τὸν is manifestly τάγαζῶν, and this they consider the cause τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐμμελείᾳ, which is not quite so easy as it looks. For τάγαζῶν is not spoken of as the cause of the ingredients; and if τὰ ἐν τῇ ἐμμελείᾳ does not mean these, it must be constrained to mean the three conditions of a good mixture just mentioned. But perhaps this constraint would be no longer felt, if we could find out what is lurking under the corrupt σὺν ἐν. Indeed it is not so certain that τῶν itself is correct, for the repeated ἐν in αἰτίωσιμεθ' ἐν, which I have omitted as intolerable in Attic prose, might make one suspect that αἰτίωσιμεθ' αὐτῶν was to be read, and that some word like παρουσίας had preceded. The argument is very plain. There is ἐγαζῶν in κράσεις, for all prefer the mixed to the unmixed. But μέτρον, κάλλος, ἀληθεία must be present at all κράσεις; therefore we may conclude that these three represent that one, and that ἐγαζῶν is the cause of their presence in the κράσεις, and that the κράσεις is good (τοιοῦτον) because of the Good that causes it.

[ἐγαζών] This word I have put in brackets. If any one wishes to retain it, he must insert ὑπ' ἐν. But although Socrates afterwards uses this figure of speech, —πότερον ἤδην ἐγαζῶστερον—it is not wanted, and its absence is fully compensated by the verb ἅπασιμεθέναι. “To which of the two shall we rather declare Measure, Beauty, and Truth to belong?”
ΠΡΩ. Τι δὲ χρόνου δεί; πολὺ γὰρ, οἷμαι, διαφέρετον. ἡδονή μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τάφρονθα, αὖ δὴ μέγιστα δοκοῦσιν εἴναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιφρείην συγγνώμην εὐλήρη παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθέπερ παῖδιν τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν ὑδέ τὸν ἀλήθειον ἀπετύχθη—

Δνων νοῦς δ' ἦτοι ταῦτα καὶ ἀλήθεια ἔστων ἡ πάντων ὁμολογτῶν τε καὶ ἀληθεστῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ τὴν μετριότητα ὡσάτως σχέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἡ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται;

ΠΡΩ. Εὐσχετῶν γε καὶ ταύτην σχέψιν προβέβλημας. οἱ μαί γὰρ ἡδονής μὲν καὶ περιμασίας συνέν τῶν ἄνω τευρχός ἀμετράτερον εὐθείαν ἦν γίνα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετράτερον οὐδ' ἢ ἐν ποτε.

Ε. ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἰρήμασ. ὡμοι δ' ἔτη λέγε το τρίτων. νοῦς ἢ μὲν κάλλους μετείληφη πλεῖον ἡ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὡς' εἰναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἡ τούνανειάν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὃ Σώκρατεσ, οὐ δεις πῦτον' οὔθ' ὑπαρ ὑπε' ἵναρ αἰσχρόν οὐτ' εἶλθ' ἐπενθήσεν οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γνωμόμενον οὔτε ὅντα οὔτ' ἐσόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὕφνως.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονᾶς δὲ γέ ποι, καὶ ταύτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας, ὅταν ἱδομένων ἱδομένων ὄντες, ἡ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἡ τὸ 66 πάντων ἀλήθειας ἐπόμενον ὑρωτεῖς, αὐτοὶ γ' αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἀφανίζοντες μυρίτομον οἱ τι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα δυνότε, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὅραν αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὃ Πρώταχη, ὅπω τ' ἀγγέλων [πέμπτων] καὶ παροῦσι φραζόν, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμ' οὖν ἔστι πρα'-

Δμετράτερον ἢ ἐμμετράτερον] I have followed the authority of the oldest MS. Butmann, though disposed to extend the analogy of ἡμοτέρος, σφηδρότερος &c. to compound words, and to consider 

[πέμπτων]] ὃς' ἀγγέλων φράζειν is the same as ἀγγέλους πέμπτων φράζειν.
τον οὐδ' αξίωτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τῇ περὶ μέτρων καὶ τῷ μέτρων καὶ καίρων καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαύτα χρὴ νομίζειν τῇν ἄδικον ἀληθεύει φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱσανόν καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τῆς γενεάς αὐτῇ τὰ τεῖτος ἐστίν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι τοιοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιῶν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεῖσι οὐχ ἐν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθουσι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὑσώς.

ΣΩ. Ἦρ' οὖν [οὐ τέταρτα,] ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ἄθρως λεγέσθαι, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρῶς τούτ' ὑπό τέταρτα, εἰτερ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἐστι μᾶλ- σον τῆς ἱδονῆς ξυγγεγείρει;

ΠΡΩ. Τά' ἀν.

ΣΩ. Πέμπται τοιῶν, ὡς ἱδονᾶς ἔθεμεν ἀλήτους ὁμοιομενοῖς, καθαρὰς ἐποικομήσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμας, τὰς δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως, ἐπομένας;

ΠΡΩ. Ὑσώς.

ΣΩ. Ἐκείνη δ' ἐν γενεά, φησιν Ὀρφεύς, καταπαύσατε κύριων ὀμίδος. ἀτάρ κυνόνει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἔκτε

Comp. Eur. Alcest. 737, 738. But ὅπ' ἄγγελοι πέμπτων is nothing at all.

τοιαύτα χρή] The MSS. are divided between τοιαύτα χρή and χρή τοιαύτα, the former, which alone makes sense, being supported by the inferior MSS.

τῆς ἀληθείας] These words are introduced with a certain bye-purpose of shewing that this νοῦς owes its place to the Truth of which it is the realisation.

[οὐ τέταρτα] If τέταρτα is in its right place here, it is of no use lower down; but it seems better placed there than here.

[ἐπιστήμας] The MSS. have ἐπιστήμας, ταῖς δὲ. The scribe was put out by the want of ταῖς μὲν, but it is understood in ταῖς δὲ, according to a common idiom.
Διαταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὅστε τεθαλήν ἀποδοθήναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ὑπεκοῦν χεί.

ΣΩ. "Ιτι δῆ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτήρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυρεί-μενον λόγον ἔπεξεῖλαμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίον δῆ τὸ τρίτον, ὧν Σωκρατεῖς; ὡς Φίληβος τὰ-γαγαθῶν ἐπὶθετο ἡμῖν ἠδονή εἶναι πάσιν καὶ πάντη; ὡς γὰρ ἔναικας, ἔλεγες ἄρτις τῶν ἐξ ἀρχής ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

Ε Ἐ. Ναι, τὸ δὲ γε μετὰ τούτῳ ἀκοώμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδοῦν ἄπερ τῶν δὲ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φίληβον λόγον οὐ μιὸν ἀλαὶ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶς μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς ἠδονής γε νοῦς εἶναι μακρῷ βέλτιον τε καὶ ἁμείνοιν τῷ τῶν ἐν-θράπτων βίω.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. 'Ὑποπτεύων δὲ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλά, εἶπον ὡς, εἰ φανεί τι τούτων ἀμφότερον βέλτιον, ὑπερ τῶν δευτερείων νῦ, πρὸς ἠδονήν ξυνδαιμονίην, ἠδονή δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερη-συντ.

67 ΠΡΩ. Ἐλπίζε γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γε πάντων ἱκανότατον τούτων οὐδέ-τερον [ἱκανόν] ἔφανη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπεκλάπατο καὶ ἠδονὴ μὴ τι τάγαθὼν γ' αὐτὸ μυθέτερον αὐ-

tὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτήρι] A common proverb for adding the finishing stroke to any performance. The third libation was offered to Zeus Soter.

Ποίον δῆ] If the reader will look into any other edition, he will see wherein I have departed from the received text. The reasons for so doing need scarcely be given. Φίληβος κ. τ. ἐ. in the mouth of Socrates is made to cut Protarchus' question Ποίον δῆ τὸ τρίτον; in two, making nonsense of both halves, and looking like nonsense itself. I have joined it by ὥς to that part of Protarchus' speech, where it must occur to give sense to Socrates' answer. I have also added γὰρ to the second ὥς, and for παντελῆ, which is absurd, put πάντη.

[ἱκανόν] The interpolation of this word is easily accounted for, if we suppose that the reading of the Coislinian pάντων ἱκανότατα εφάνη was founded on some old copy. For in this way there was no predicate to οὔδητε-ρον. Afterwards the correctors of the copies which, like the Bodleian, re- tained ἱκανότατα, on collation with such another copy, adopted the reading, not suspecting that it was invented as a salve to a corruption from which their own text was exempt.

ἀπεκλάπατο] This confirms my con- jecture on Thucydides 1, 138: where
τοῖν εἶναι, στερόμενον αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἰκανοῦ καὶ τελείου δυνάμεως;
ΠΡΩ. Ὄφθωτατα.
ΣΩ. Φανέροις δὲ γὰρ ἄλλου τρίτου χρείττονος τούτου ἐκατέρω, μετὰ ᾗ καὶ νῦν ἡδονῆς οἰκείωτερον καὶ πρὸςφυσίστερον Β πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νυκώντος ἒδέα.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;  
ΣΩ. Οἴκουν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ νῦν δὲ λόγος ἀπεφέρατο, γίγνεται ἢν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.
ΠΡΩ. Ἐοίκειν.
ΣΩ. Πρῶτον δὲ γε, ὡδὲ ἄν οἱ πάντες βῶς τε καὶ ὑπνοι καὶ τάλλα ἐξοπλαντά θερίαι φῶσι τῇ τὸ χαίρειν διώκουν ὀἷς πιστεύοντες, ὠστερά μάνταις ὤρνησι, οἳ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τἀς ἡδονᾶς εἰς τὸ ἧδη ἡμῖν εἴ τι κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον [ἡ τοῦ] τῶν ἐν Μοῦσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μερικανεμένων ἐκάστοτε λόγων.  
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὡ Σώκρατες, εἰρήσθαι σοι νῦν ἡ ἢ ἡ φαέμεν ἀπαντεῖς.
ΣΩ. Οἴκουν καὶ ἀφιετε μὲ;
ΠΡΩ. Σιγώρων ἐπὶ τὸ λοιπὸν, ὡ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποὺν σοι γὰρ ἀπεφείς πρότερος ἡμῶν. ὑπομνῆως δὲ σε τὰ λείπομενα.

he says in speaking of the character of Themistocles: σώσι καὶ ἱκανόν ὑμῖν ἄτακτα. “He did not shun himself up from men capable of judging.” For μὴ τι—γε the Books have μὴ τοι—γε, which is a blunder of continual occurrence.
ΠΡΩΤΟΝ δὲ γε, οδῆ ἄν] The second class of MSS. and Eusebius have the reading oὐκ ἢ, which, if it be written oὗ, ἢ would be no way inferior to that in the text.

ΠΡΩΤΟΝ δὲ γε, οδῆ ἄν] The second class of MSS. and Eusebius have the reading oὐκ ἢ, which, if it be written oὗ, ἢ would be no way inferior to that in the text.

ΠΡΩΤΟΝ δὲ γε, οδῆ ἄν] The second class of MSS. and Eusebius have the reading oὐκ ἢ, which, if it be written oὗ, ἢ would be no way inferior to that in the text.
PALÆOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

TRANSPOSITIONS AND INTERPOLATIONS.

Those who have not paid much attention to the Critical History of our Texts will probably think that they cannot have suffered much from the placing of words out of their proper order, and that consequently we ought not to rely on corrections attempted by means of transposition. But if any one will take the trouble to compare the various readings of the MSS. say of Thucydidès or Plato, he will find instances continually recurring in which one copy differs from another in this respect, although in others it presents very few diversities of reading. Again if he will search for those cases where a transposition of two or more words restores the sense of an otherwise hopeless passage, he will soon find that their number accumulates far more rapidly than he had expected. Nor will it be long before he is able to make a considerable muster of sentences in which a word has strayed so far from its place that it is found at the other end of the sentence, or even in another to which it cannot belong. And not only single words or phrases, but whole sentences have thus changed places, as in those parts of Tragedy where the dialogue consists of alternating lines or couplets, and the sense has enabled critics to discover the places to which these originally belonged. These faults of transcription are no more than we should have a right to expect: for in the first place it is nothing unusual that a scribe should leave out one or more words, or that having left them out he should place them where the reader will notice the omission, or that his copyist should in his hurry fail to observe the mark in the text corresponding to another in the margin which shewed where the words were to be inserted; or if the first writer was content to write the words in
the body of the text, with certain letters to shew that two parts of a sentence were to be read in an inverted order, it was no wonder if the transcriber neglected those letters. Some of these transpositions are so strange that one can scarcely figure to oneself the state of the MS. in which the blunder first began.

I give two instances of this; of which the first is from the

_Plotus_ vv. 119-20.

_Pln. ό Zeus μὲν οὖν οἶδ' ὃς . . . . . ιμ' τι
πῦθοιτ' . . . . . νῦν δ' οὐ τοῦτο δρᾷ;

The first place where I have left a gap is commonly filled up with the words τὰ τοῦτον μῶρα and the second with ἄν ἐπιτρίψεις. The result is that you are obliged to take τὰ μῶρα for τὴν μωρίαν, that the speaker must be understood to say τοῦτον of those whom he is addressing, that Jove is represented as likely to punish one person for the folly of two others with whom he has nothing to do, and that we have to digest such an order of words as we can find no match for in all Greek literature. But transpose these, and fill up the first gap with ἄν ἐπιτρίψεις, and the second with τοῦτομωρι, and you get

_Pln. ό Zeus μὲν οὖν οἶδ' ὃς ἄν ἐπιτρίψεις τι', τι
πῦθοιτο τοῦτ'. Χρ. δ' μῶρα, νῦν δ' οὐ τοῦτο δρᾷ;

In the _Heracleidae_ of Euripides the following verses (682 foll.) occur.

_Θεράπων._

.χιστα πρὸς σου μῶρον ἥν εἶπεῖν ἵπος.

'Ιλαος.

καὶ μὴ μετασχεῖν γ' ἀλκίμου μάχης φίλως.

_Θεράπων._

* * * * * * * * *

'Ιλαος.

τι δ', οὐ ζένομι παῦν ἢγω δι' ἂσπίδας;

_Θεράπων._

θίνοις ἃν, ἀλλὰ πρόσθεν αὐτὸς ἃν πέσοις.

'Ιλαος.

οὐδεὶς ιμ' ἠχαρών προσβιβάζων ἀνέβεται.

_Θεράπων._

* * * * * * * * *

'Ιλαος.

ἀλλ' οὖν μαχοῦται γ' ἄριθμον οὐκ ἠλάσσοσι.
PALEOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

συμφέντον το σών σήμαμα προστήθης φίλοις.

I have written μαχούνται for μαχύμαι because Iolaus is thinking of his enemies, as we see from his foregoing speech, and his plea is that at least he will help to make up the number on his side. “Our enemies shall at least fight men not fewer in number.” If this wanted confirmation, it would be confirmed by the answer συμφέντον κ. τ. ἦ. But how are we to fill up the gaps? Here are two lines for the purpose which I give from the MSS. and Editions; they both begin alike.

1. οὖν ἔστι ἐν ὠψει τραύμα, μὴ δράσης χερῶς.
2. οὖν ἔστιν, ὥ τιν, ἥτις ἢν ἡδύνοι σίθεν.

If we ask the merest beginner which answers best in either passage, he will say that nothing can be more appropriate than to remind an old man of his weakness, when he threatens to join the battle, nor more inappropriate than when he counts on his enemies flying from his very look; and that as the proper answer to the last boast would be to tell him, that looks do not wound, so the same observation is altogether foreign to the purpose, when the old man has just said, “It is not worthy of me to refuse to share the fight with my friends”. Now the Books all agree in the very opposite decision, and assign no. 1. to the first gap and no. 2. to the second; and what is far more wonderful, Elmsley mentions the change, which was first proposed by Musgrave, without giving the slightest hint that he even thinks it probable.

In the Iphigenia Taurica v. 513 foll. we find the same error. Iphigenia asks the unknown Orestes whether he will tell her something. Orestes answers that he will. And now that we are on the tiptoe to know what question Iphigenia will ask, because we naturally expect the first unravelling of the plot from the answer thereto, she breaks into a sentimental reflexion.

καὶ μὴν ποθεῖνός γ’ ἡδές ἐβ’ Ἀργοῦς μολῶν.

to which Orestes answers very naturally, “You may be glad to see me here, but I am not so glad to be here”: after which interruption the expected questioning and answering begin. But if we take this interrupting couplet out of the way and put it immediately after Iphigenia has learnt that the stranger is from Argos, in this order,
PALEOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

I. φυγαίς δ' ἀπήρας πατρίδος, ἦ ποιξ τίχη;
O. φεύγω τρόπον γε δὴ τιν' οὐχ ἐκών ἐκών.
I. καὶ μὴν ποθενώς γ' ἕθες ἢ 'Ἄγγους μολῶν.
O. οὖκον ἐματητῷ γ', εἰ δὲ σοι, σὺ τοῦτο δικά.
I. ἀφ' ἂν τί μοι φιλάσιμος ἂν ἤσθη Θέλω;
O. ὡς γ' ἐν παρόντω τῆς ἴμης δυσπραξίας.—

we find each verse naturally arising out of that which precedes and introducing to that which follows it.

For the some reason, to such a line as this (Ion 1295)

ἐμέλλεις οἰκεῖν τὰμ', ἐμοῦ βίς λαβῶν,

the retort

κατείτα τοῦ μέλλειν μ' ἀπέκτεινε φόβῳ;

ought to answer without anything intervening; but that passage would lead me into another topic, that of wilful interpolation, for the four lines πατρίδος γε—χθονὸς contain nothing but what is said with equal clearness further on.

The same reason does not apply to the passage in the Euthydemus (305, c. η) which I have mentioned elsewhere in this Book (p. iii), where the following most necessary connexion has been broken by the negligence of some copyist: οὖντι δ' ἐλναι πάντων σοφίται ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐλλαὶ καὶ δοκεῖν ἃν πάνυ παρὰ παλλοίς, ἢν δὲ τοῖς ἐλλοίς λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληθησίν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολαύεσθαι. ἐςε (τοῦ) παρὰ πάσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν ἤπιον ζωὰν εἰναὶ οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἦ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. It is true that the words which I have here introduced into their proper place, have, where they now occur, been the innocent cause of the silly interpolation, ἐλλαὶ μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἄλητεῖς σφαῖς σοφιστάντως, but they were not displaced on purpose to make room for an interpolation, like the verse in the Ion quoted above.

This whole matter of transposition may be summed up thus. If the misplacing of words is an accident of frequent occurrence in writing, and the correction of such errors is liable to be misunderstood and so to lead to further confusion; if the examples of such confusion are to be found in several places where the nature of metrical dialogue would generally be a safeguard against their occurrence; and if these examples often concern not only single words but even whole verses, it is unreasonable to refuse assent to those conjectural emendations which consist of trans-
position, when by such transposition we obtain sentences of which the grammatical construction and the sense are such as satisfy the reader, because it is most unlikely that good grammar and good sense should be produced by accident, and not be the sense and the grammar intended by the author.

The question of the a priori probability of interpolations may be disposed of in a few words; probably no one will deny the likelihood that words appearing in the margin, where they were intended as mere observations, should be mistaken by a copyist for restorations of matter omitted in the text; but some persons may feel reluctant to believe that the scribes would wilfully interpolate words of their own, and endeavour to pass them off as the words of the author, or perhaps they would concede such a possibility only where the text which the copyist had before him was corrupt or unintelligible; but this belief that the writers of our manuscripts were scrupulous and were generally guided by common sense, is altogether contrary to experience. Hundreds of passages may be adduced from all the masters of Attic prose, to shew that the scribes were in the habit of inserting unnecessary words, words which were intended to eke out the construction, and which only serve to confound it, and words which shew that the whole drift of the passage was misunderstood. Too much stress cannot be laid on the last class, for if we find a clause added which either contradicts the rest of the sentence or is utterly irrelevant to it, the scribe is at once convicted of deliberate forgery.

I have already pointed out that in Laws 710, 1, the words τοὶς δὲ ἐκφραστῶς are an antithesis invented to answer to τοὶς μὲν ἀκρατῶς, and that τοὶς μὲν ἀκρατῶς itself is a corrupt reading, for the speaker is describing that vulgar kind of temperance which is developed even in children and in beasts, to prevent their being unrestrained as to pleasure, ἐπεὶ ἐνθὸς παιδὶ καὶ θηρεῖς, τοῦ μὴ ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς, ἐμφατον ἐπαινεῖ. I have also mentioned a passage in the Phaedo, where the difference between Plato's meaning and that of the interpolator amounts to a contradiction. For while the one bids us, if we are sure of our principle, disregard any seeming contradictions that may arise out of it, (χαίρειν ἐφ' ὃν τὰ ἀν' ἴσινς ὀρμηθέντα) the other
tells us to hold our principle only provisionally, until such a contradiction arises. See Plato 101, d.

In Laurus 841, β, we read, τὸ δὴ λανθάνειν τούτων δραύνα τι καλὸν παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἐστώ [νόμιμον] ἔθει καὶ ἀγράφῳ νομισθὲν νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ μὴ πάντως δραύν. If this is correct, the writer asserts that not to do the forbidden things is not disgraceful. But so flat a truism never dropped from Plato’s pen. Remove τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρὸν, and then we see that it is not τὸ μὴ δραύν that is to be the καλὸν of these men of weak virtue, but that they are to be allowed a lower kind of καλὸν, namely τὸ λανθάνειν δραύνα. And so Plato comments on his own words, οὐτὸ τὸ τε (vulgo τοῦτο) αἰσχρὸν αὖ καὶ καλὸν δευτέρας ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γενόμενον κέιμον.

It is difficult to account for such interpolations as those which I have pointed out in my edition of the Symposium (Ep. ad Th. pp. xiv-xvi) and yet they are of continual occurrence in Plato. On the one hand we can hardly conceive how any one who knew the construction well enough to supply ἐπιστρεφεὶν ύμῖν (Laurus 817, c) should fail to see that ἔστω had already been provided for the same purpose, or why any one should have thought it necessary for the sense in Theaetetus 171, c, to add τοῦτε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ξυγχωρήσει, in order to give construction to what follows, when he had before him ἦς ἄπαντων ἄμα ἀπὸ τῶν Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένον ἀμφισβητήσει, μᾶλλον δὲ γ’ ὑπ’ ἴκείνον ὀμολογήσει.

But the interpolators are not merely intent on helping out the construction by their supplements; sometimes they endeavour to give an additional beauty to the text, as in the following passage of Demosthenes in Midium, which I quote instar omnium as a specimen of the manner in which our scribes thought they could add finishing touches to Attic oratory, 546, A. εἰθ’ ὑμεῖς τὸν οὕτως ἁμόν, τὸν οὕτως ἁγνόμονα, τὸν τηλικοῦται δι- κας λαμβάνοντα, ἃν αὐτὸς ἡδικηθαι φησι μόνον, (οὐ γὰρ ἡδικητὸ γε,) τότεν ὑβρίζοντα λαβόντες εἰς τινα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀφήσει, καὶ μὴθ’ ἐσφήτη, μὴθ’ ἐτερῶν, μὴτε νόμον, μὴτ’ ἄλλον μηδενὸς πρόνοιαν ποιούμενον οὐ καταψηφιεῖσθε; οὐ παραδείγμα ποιήσετε; If ever there was a passage where the rules of Art required that nothing should interrupt the swelling indignation of the speaker till it burst out in one single call to vengeance, it is this one which
our copyists have garnished with ἀφήσετε and οὐ καταψηφιεῖσθε. But luckily for us, this second ornament is fastened on to an accusative ποιούμενον, which refuses to hold it. Perhaps those who believe that all interpolations in Demosthenes are posterior to the MS. Σ, will allow this to be an exception; while they are making up their minds, let me inform the reader of my suspicion that τὸν οὗτος ἀγνώμονα is nothing but a foolish ditto graphia of τὸν οὗτος ὁμόν, and that μόνον is an addition but no improvement to ἤσι.

A very common source of interpolation is the attempt to fill up gaps left in the copy, or to complete passages which seem to be defective. In at least two passages of the Philebus it is pretty certain that we have supplements of this kind, but we have nothing to guide us to the detection of these, except the hopelessness of the present reading; and as long as there are ingenious men who undertake to explain everything, (Have they not even explained every Chorus in Sophocles, and that too according to various readings?) it will be difficult to hold one's ground against such adversaries, who offer positive results against a mere οὐ μονδάνω. But the tables are turned when we come to passages, where we can shew the source of the corruption or prove that there is none, as when a marginal note has slipped into the text, and then, being treated as a part of it, has been so supplemented as to bring it into harmony with its surroundings. Cobet supplies me with an instance from the celebrated fragment of the Cretans. Euripides had written φοινικογενοῦς τέκνον Ἑὐρώπης, and a Scholiast had in the Margin explained the first word by τῆς Τυρίας. This was by accident incorporated with the text and considered as a part of it; but then the Anapæstic metre required another syllable. This was soon found; and so from that day to the Epistola ad Millium, and from it to our own they write or print, φοινικογενοῦς παῖ τῆς Τυρίας τέκνον Ἑὐρώπης.

I will give an example of the same kind from the Iphigenia Taurica. In v. 464, Iphigenia prays, δέξαι θυσίας, ἐς ὑ παρ ἧμιν νόμος οὐχ ὅλας ἀναφαίνητι. Some commentator thinks it worth his while to warn the reader that παρ ἧμιν does not mean the Taurians but the Greeks, and this he does by writing one word, Ἐλίης. When this word comes to be mixed up with the rest, it is found very troublesome to the metre, but an ingenious person
discovering that if it is placed very near the end with a convenient
dissyllable of no particular meaning after it, it will give no further
trouble at least to the metrical critic. And so we have δέξα τον
σιας, ἢς ὁ πορφ. ἡμίν νόμος εὖς ζηλὰς Ἑλλησι δειδοὺς ἀναφαίνει.
A more striking example is that which I have elsewhere given
from the Medea v. 734, fol.
πέποιθα, Πελίου δ’ ἐκθρόος ἦστι μοι δόμος
Κρόνων τε τούτων δ’ ὀρκοῦσι μὲν ἤγειρες
ἀγορασιν οὔ μεθεί’ ἂν ἐκ γαλας ἄμε.
λόγοις δ’ συμβάς, καὶ θεῶν ἀνόμοτος
φόλος γένοι’ ἂν, κἀπικηρυκεύμασιν
οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο, τάμα μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενῆ,
toῖς δ’ ἄβασι διότι, καὶ δόμος τυραννικὸς.
Elmsley’s note on κἀπικηρυκεύμασι is as follows. “κἀπικηρυκεύ-
ματα legit Scholiasta. ἐπικηρυκεύματα γὰρ εἶναι τὰ διὰ τῶν κη-
ρυγμάτων γνωμένα πρὸς φιλον. τῇ δὲ εὐθέας ἄντι δοτικῆς κέρυ-
τα τὰ δε γαρ εἰπείν, καὶ τοῖς ἐπικηρυκεύμαιν ὅππο ἂν πίθοιο. Δι-
δύμος δὲ φησίν ἐλείπειν τὴν διὰ.
dias τὰ ἐπικηρυκεύματα. Paulo
ante legitur: μή ὁμός δὲ φίλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦ ἐπικηρυκεύ-
ματος. θέλει εἰπείν, ἀνί τοῦ ἐπικηρυκεύμασιν. λέεται δὲ ἦ διὰ,
Latet hic aliquid quod extricare nequeo.” Let us take account
of the difficulties in the whole passage. First there is μεθεί’ ἂν,
which ought to govern the genitive, and although Porson’s note
is an excellent one, the question still recurs, “why not ἐμοῦ
after the nearer verb?” For ἐμοῦ in the best MSS. there
is ἐμοῦ, but this old Scholium by its μὴ ὁμός δὲ supports
the former. Then we have κἀπικηρυκεύμασι in the text, but the
scholiasts most certainly read either κἀπικηρυκεύματα, or τὰπι-
κηρυκεύματα, or both. Last of all we find in all MSS. and in
the Scholia οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο, which, as Dindorf observes, is the
contrary of what was to be said. For this reason modern edi-
tions have adopted Wytenbach’s τάχ’ ἂν πίθοιο. But if we look
at the second Scholium quoted by Elmsley φίλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ
τοῦ ἐπικηρυκεύματος, we observe a new combination, which
proves that τὰπικηρυκεύματα must have been so placed that it
could be taken, whether rightly or not, as standing ἐπὶ κοινοῦ
to the two optatives γένοι’ ἂν and οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο; but this would
be impossible if the verses ran thus:

Platonis Philebus.
Therefore the verses must have been so arranged that while

made one line, φίλος γένοι ἢν followed in such a way as to ad-
mit of being construed also with the same word. And this is in
fact the key of the enigma. οὐκ ἢν πίθοιο τάπιχηνκυμάτα
should have followed immediately on χυγεῖς. But it was left out,
and afterwards restored at the side or at the foot of the page.
From hence the last part was fetched and fitted in immediately
after φίλος γένοι ἢν: after which οὐκ ἢν πίθοιο, which still re-
mained on hand, was admitted into the vacant place. But in the
meantime the sense contained in οὐκ ἢν πίθοιο could not wait
for all these adjustments; so the corrector made a line de suo,
and that is the very line which Porson defended. The passage
therefore should be restored thus:

Χηθήν ητ τούτωι φίλος γένοι ἢν, 

Kρίνων τε τούτωι φίλος γένοι ἢν, 

ὀψικτόν ἢν πίθοιο τάπιχηνκυμάτα:

λόγωι δὲ συμβάς, καὶ θεάν ἄνωνος

φίλος γένοι ἢν, τάμα μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενή,

τοῖς δ’ ὀλβὸς ἑστὶ, καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

The construction of the third line is just the same as the Homeric

ἡ φά’ νῦ μοι τι πίθοιο.

In conclusion I will point out some of the most striking inter-
polations in another Dialogue of Plato which has fared pretty
nearly as ill as the Philebus, viz. the Politicus. 286, λ. μάλλον ἢ περὶ τὰ
µείζων. 286, ν. δυσχερῶς (read ἵππη). 286, ν. δεῖν (read μεμερίσθαι
and compare 284, ι). 287, λ. τῶν τοιούτων λόγων. 287, ι. καὶ
ημεύρως καὶ ἀπόρως. (The dialogue is ill distributed, and should
be arranged thus. προσφθηγγομέθα.—Ν. Σ. καὶ µάλα γε συχνὸν
εἶδος. ξ. καὶ τῇ ξ. γε—ηπιστήµη. Ν. Σ. πᾶς γὰρ;) 288, ι.
προσαγορευθέν. 293, λ. ὄρθη (read σύ ἢν γγυπηται). 293, ν.
ηµούµεθα (comma after ἄρχοντας). 295, λ. παρατίθει. (The struc-
ture is: θήσει τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς προσήκον, καὶ τὸ ὀς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ
tὸ πως οὕτως. Read ἐν ἐκάστοις τῶν νόµων.) 295, ν. παρὰ τὴν
ἐπίδοσι. 295, ν. ποτὲ νομοθετῆθεντα. 297, ν. οἷοι τε ὁσι. 298,
λ. ἀναλαµµατα. 299, ν. ἴητεν. 303, ι. λείπεται.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

I have pointed out several passages in the Philebus where the dialogue has found its way into the wrong person's mouth. Similar blunders have been noticed in the Epistle prefixed to my Euthydemus. I will now bring forward two or three more. Pol. 287, π explained above under the head of interpolations. Pol. 304, c. N. Σ. Ταύτην ἐκπέμψαν. Σ. Τὴν δ' εἶ δεὶ μανθάνειν . . . σὺ γ' ἦμιν ἀποφαίνει δεῖν ἄρχειν; Pol. 306, π. τάντας χρήντας is a part of the Stranger's speech. Laws 811, η. πολυμαθην. πώς σὺν . . . νομοφύλακι; ΚΑ. Τοῦ πέρι λέγεις; ΑΘ. Τοὺ πρὸς τι π. . . ἀποκαλὺν. ΚΑ. Αύξη καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκαλντο λέγειν. In Euripides' Ion 1356 foll. every one is now agreed that the dialogue should run thus: Πν. λαβὼν νῦν αὐτὰ τὴν τεκώσαν ἐκπόνει. Ιον. πάσαν δ' ἐπιλείθων 'Ασιάδ', Εὐρώπης θ' ὀρούς; Πν. γνώσει τάδ' αὐτῶς.—But I quote the passage in order to complete its correction. When the second line stood as part of a continuous speech, it first acquired that δέ which the MSS. offer us. But in order to bring δέ in, a transposition was necessary; so the critic changed

'Ασιάδ' ἐπιλείθω πάσαν, Εὐρώπης θ' ὀρούς;
into πάσαν δ' ἐπιλείθων 'Ασιάδ'. Yet the old reading which he altered is obviously correct. Ἐπιλείθων would mean that he was to look for his mother after he had wandered even the world, and not while he was doing so, which would require ἐπιλίθων.

FALSE COALITION OF SYLLABLES.

Τὸ τρίτον ἐπίθρον and τὸ τρίτον ἐτ' ἑράδι would be undistinguishable in MSS. where neither accents nor breathings were used. In Dion. Halic. De Lysia, 7. the words ὅθεν εἰκὸς τούς μὲν ἐν δρασεῖ, τοὺς δὲ παθεῖν, were until Markland's time read, ὅθεν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν ἀνάθρα ακουόντα εἶ ταθεῖν. A fresh instance of this has just presented itself to me in the Politicus 290, π. ἤθη τοῖνοι μὲν ὑποκύπτειν ἑλπίζοντος ἐνοῦ . . . ἐφαπτότασι. Such is the reading of the oldest MS.; some others change γείτονος into γέτονος, but no one has yet pointed out that ΟΙΟΝ ΓΕΙΤΟΝΟΣ is a mere blunder for ΟΙΟΝΕΙ ΓΕΙΤΟΝΟΣ. Even the youngest scholar will remember Porson's correction of ἐγνώσθε στ' ἐλ αὐν καν ὑστατοίς κακοίς, and Bentley's of μὴ τίνα φάναι τα 'Ερικέπεω.
OMISSION OF OT.

One example among many of the confusion caused by the omission of οὐ is to be found in the Vatican Scholia on Euripides printed at the end of Geel's Phænissae. Androm. v. 108 Ἴλιψις μονάδα ἐστι 1 τὸ δὴ ἐνὸς προσώπου θεηνοῦντος. ἂστε τὸ "Ἀσιατίδος γὰρ σχῆμα" 2 μονάδα ἐστι. τραγῳδία γὰρ καὶ 3 οὐκ ἔδει οὗτε τὰ ἐν θεωρομενῇ θέμενα, οὐ θρηνεῖ γὰρ. Read, 1) ἴστιν ὁδή, 2) οὐ μ. ἢ, 3) σὺν ἔδει. At other times οὐ is intruded into a text by mistake for another word, or from a misunderstanding of the author's drift. Synesius in one of his letters tells his friend that the parcel must by this time have reached him, οὐ γὰρ ἐπεγέγραπτο; a most whimsical inference. But the Bishop wrote σοὶ γὰρ. In Thuc. vi. 43, οὐ γὰρ οἱ κακο- πραγοῦντες δικαιοῦσιν ἄφειδοσιν ἄν τοῦ βίου, οἵς ἤλπις οὐκ ἤσιν ἄγαθοι, the negative spoils the whole argument, which is that while the poor have something to hope for, the rich have something to fear, and that therefore the rich ought to value life less than the poor.

ΓΑΡ ΟΤΝ.

I have asserted that γὰρ οὖν is only admissible, where the speaker concedes what another has affirmed. It is not used in this sense in Agam. v. 674, where the Herald after forebodings of Menelaus' shipwreck adds γένοιτο δ' ὡς θρισταν. Μενέλαων γὰρ οὖν πρωτόν τε καὶ μᾶλλον προσδόκα μολεῖν.

Anyone may see that the apparent sense of these words is in contradiction to the fears that precede, and to the faintly hoping εἰ δ' οὖν that follows. But the passage is not Greek; for προσ- δόκα μολεῖν ought to be either προσδόκα μολεῖσθαι or π. μολεῖν ἢν. The emendation is obvious: "Let us hope that some have escaped. Menelaus at least has not the best chance."

Μενέλαων γ' ἢν οὖν πρωτόν τε καὶ μᾶλλον προσδόκω μολεῖν.
APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS FROM BÖCKH'S PHILOLAUS.

That such an association as the Pythagorean, which united religious and political aims with science, should insist on silence and should have its secrets, is suited to the nature of the case, but it admits of doubt whether the scientific matter, which from its very nature is withdrawn from the eyes of the multitude without deliberate concealment, can have required to be kept secret by means of severe commands. If need for secrecy existed, it must rather have been in relation to their doctrines concerning the Divine Nature and its relation to the world and to man, at variance as they were with popular belief; and yet these very doctrines, expressed in the Pythagorean form, could have been neither dangerous to the common people nor accessible to them. Nevertheless the ancients agree in the firm belief that the doctrines and books of the Pythagoreans were a secret of the order, and as there were no writings to be procured, either of Pythagoras, or of his older disciples or followers, we must at all events allow that they told the world nothing; not perhaps however so much because a law expressly forbade them, as because custom bred in them a certain reserve toward strangers, while for those who had capacity and inclination to receive their doctrines oral teaching within the limits of the society seemed more convenient, and lastly because under these circumstances, there was scarcely any occasion for books, whilst again the old members of the order must have been kept from writing by their political occupations, and their life of seclusion, contemplation and asceticism. Yet, if Porphyry is to be believed, Lysis and Archippus and the few others who by their absence were saved from the ruin of the order, preserved a few
feeble sparks of the doctrine, and fearing lest the name of philosophy should wholly disappear from mankind, and lest they should in consequence incur the hatred of the gods, brought together writings of the older Pythagoreans and from these, together with what they themselves remembered, composed brief memorials, which they bequeathed to their sons, their daughters, and their wives, with the order not to communicate them to any stranger; and so this injunction was handed on from generation to generation. Frequent as is the mention of unrighteous and unfaithful revelation of Pythagorean doctrines, we find little agreement as to details. Thus it is related that of the two sects, the ἄληθενμαςικοί and the μαθηματικοί, the former was recognised by the latter as Pythagorean, but the latter were recognised by the former only as the disciples of Hippasos, the first according to this story to divulge Pythagorean matter in a mathematical treatise, and who in consequence, met with his death by drowning; yet the same Hippasos, according to a more credible account, never wrote anything. And to say nothing of the poets Empedocles and Epicharmus, Lysis, in an evidently spurious letter, reproaches Hipparchus with having tasted of Sicilian luxury and even of philosophizing in public, for which offence he is said to have been banished and to have had a gravestone set up for him as for one dead. But the blame of having spread abroad Pythagorean writings applies more especially to Philolaus, although what is said concerning him is no less filled with contradictions than the rest. Neanthes, whom even Plutarch designates as credulous, informs us that until Empedocles and Philolaus abused their trust, as he terms it, the Pythagoreans had been more free in their communications; Diogenes and Iamblichus tell us that before Philolaus, nobody found out the Pythagorean doctrines, but that he first brought out the three celebrated Books which Dion the Syracusan at Plato's instance bought for a hundred minae, according to Iamblichus, from Philolaus himself, who had fallen into great and urgent poverty, a story which by the bye admirably suits a man who is said to have been put to death for aiming at despotic power. But then again in order, to some extent, to remove the guilt from him, Iamblichus adds that Dion had himself formerly belonged to the Pythagorean connection, and for this reason had been allowed to possess the Books. Among older
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authors the first I shall name is Satyrus the Peripatetic, a contemporary of Aristarchus the grammarian. Diogenes follows Satyrus in his account, and tells us on his authority, that Plato wrote to Dion about those Books, and that Dion bought them of Philolaus himself; and he adds, from the same author, that Plato became very rich through the liberality of Dionysius. Indeed one might even suppose that the whole story was invented by the spite of the Peripatetics against Socrates and the Academy, (a subject which Luzac has well treated in his essay De Dignitia Socratis,) in order to fix a charge of plagiarism upon Plato, were there not two older witnesses than Satyrus at hand. Hermippus, who was certainly not a more trustworthy man than Neanthes, but yet ancient enough (for he lived under Ptolemy Euergetes) assures us, on the authority of an ancient writer, that Plato when in Sicily bought the Book written by Philolaus from that author's relations in Dionysius' service for forty Alexandrian minae, and with its contents composed the Timæus. Others again make Plato procure the work in return for having prevailed on Dionysius to release a young man, the disciple of Philolaus, from prison. And Timon the syllographer who flourished about the 127th Olympiad, has already a palpable allusion to this story. For Gellius, after mentioning the purchase of the three Books of Philolaus, the money for which Plato is said to have received from Dion, quotes Timon as saying that Plato purchased a little Book for much money and with this as his groundwork wrote his Timæus. It is true that Iamblichus, Synesius and Proclus have referred the passage of Timon to the little Book of Timæus the Locrian, a supposititious work of a very late date and quoted by no ancient writer before Clemens of Alexandria, but Satyrus and especially Hermippus prove conclusively that what Timon said had reference to the writings of Philolaus, and Tzetzes so represents the matter. After attributing the Timæus and a great deal besides to the Book purchased of Philolaus through Dion, he represents not Philolaus himself as the seller but certain poor women and widows who sell the Book under a condition that it must not be imparted to any one save a Pythagorean; and I take this opportunity of remarking that Tzetzes makes Dion buy the Mimes of Sophron also in the same manner for Plato. However I do not reckon Timon as
the originator of the story, for he so touches upon the matter, that it can be understood only by one who knows of it already, while Hermippus appeals to an author who made a formal narration of it. It is much more likely that the tale was put in circulation by some earlier historian, not perhaps a Sicilian but apparently one of the first Alexandrians, as may be inferred from the Alexandrian mines. This reckoning according to Alexandrian money is indeed not well adapted to commend the credibility of the tale, since in Plato's time no part of Greece reckoned according to Egyptian money, and Alexandria was not yet in existence; nor is there any great probability that the sum was computed by the narrator according to its value in Alexandrian coin, and that a statement in some other coin, whether Attic or Sicilian, was the basis of this calculation. Lastly, the work could not well have been purchased from Philolaus himself, as he can scarcely have been still alive in the fourth year of the 97th Olympiad, the time of Plato's first Sicilian voyage. We should therefore have to suppose that relations or descendants of his disposed of the work, as is indeed asserted by some writers; their statement evidently resting upon the notion of the keeping secret of Pythagorean writings even after the dissolution of the order, and being at the same time intended to set Philolaus free from the reproach of having divulged them, which others in fact brought against him. But that the seers of the Pythagorean doctrine had ceased long before the age of Plato, has already been remarked by Meiners, and one can scarcely see why Philolaus, if he taught in Thebes, could have had any scruple about writing there; in which case Plato may have acquired an early knowledge of his doctrine. My conclusion is that in all these contradictory accounts about a supposed purchase of Books, the substantial basis is simply this,—that Philolaus was in fact the first to publish a Pythagorean work, that Plato had read it and used it according to his manner, that is, intelligently and not as a mere transcriber. The former fact is asserted in so many words by an author who deserves all credit, since the purpose of his Book was critical, that is by Demetrius Magnes, a contemporary of Pompey and Caesar in his work περὶ ὀμονύ-μων ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων, quoted by Diogenes: Τούτων φησὶ Απράγεριος εἰς Ὄμονύμως πρῶτον ἐξοῦναι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν περὶ φύσεως.
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After which follows the somewhat strangely worded beginning, as it purports to be, of Philolaus' work, of which we shall have to speak more than once. Now if, assuming for the present the genuineness of the extant fragments, we compare them with Plato, we shall find in the Phædrus, Cratylus, Philebus and Timæus, allusions to Philolaus, upon which however I shall advance nothing here, since it is only the consideration of the fragments themselves that can justify my assertion; in the Gorgias however it seems to me there is a much more distinct reference to Philolaus' work, and although in this as well as in the Phædo, where Philolaus' views as to the unlawfulness of suicide are touched upon, the knowledge of his doctrines is attributed to hearsay only, yet I cannot help observing that in both dialogues this reference to hearsay is put into the mouth of Socrates, who had read very few books, whereas Philolaus' tenets are quoted with such distinctness, and in the Gorgias, at least, with such particularity, as is only possible when one has an author before him in writing, seeing that attention is paid even to the expression and the words; so that this contrivance about hearsay is a mere figure of speech, which accords well with Plato's irony and by means of which he attempts to mask his somewhat unceremonious handling of the divine man. But at the same time, we cannot fail to perceive that what Plato blames, is not so much the inner substance of Philolaus' view, as the mythical character of his exposition, and more especially the want of clearness and dialectic accuracy in his investigation and the oddity of his expressions, and this is pretty broadly stated in the Gorgias as well as in the Phædo.

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that a work by Philolaus was quoted in times much earlier than the earliest date of the Pythagorean forgeries, such as those attributed to Ocellus and the Locrian Timæus. He discusses the probable contents of his Book, which he divides on ancient authority into three parts. These he supposes to have been respectively entitled, περὶ κόσμου, περὶ φύσεως, περὶ ψυχῆς. And these he further identifies with the Bacchae, a work attributed by Proclus to Philolaus, after which he continues as follows.]

Our enquiry up to this point, if the result of it is admitted, is more important for forming a judgment about the fragments of
Philolaus, than might at first sight appear: if there was only one work of Philolaus, whether spurious or genuine, nothing remains for us but either to admit all that is offered, or to reject all. Now what we have, is to a great extent so remarkable and contains such peculiar ideas, that no man can possibly be inclined to attribute it to a forger, and at the same time it perfectly coincides with that which, according to Plato, Aristotle, and the universal tradition of antiquity, must be viewed as really Pythagorean.

With the exception therefore of some pieces of Archytas, I hold these fragments and extracts to be the surest remains of the Pythagorean School; indeed Meiners also himself felt compelled to consider some few of them as genuine. Now the spirit of Pythagorism, as it appears according to the most trustworthy data, may be most clearly apprehended in contrast with the Ionic philosophy, since the Hellenic character habitually separates itself into this dualism of Ionic and Doric, and the difference of these races is perceivable in all that concerns life and culture. Pythagorism is the genuine Doric form of philosophy, and the philosophy of a people is nothing else than the peculiar mode of perception of that people, which in the deepest and most distinguished thinkers becomes itself the object of its own thought and explains itself to itself, whereas in the rest it works and creates unconsciously. On this account it is in philosophy on the prose side of literature that the popular character will always present itself most distinctly, as on the poetical side it will appear in lyrical art, because the latter springs forth most immediately from the feeling and sentiment of the people. The sensuousness of the Ionians, their attachment to what is outward, their susceptibility to outward impressions, and their lively activity in this outward world, presents itself in their materialistic view of the origin of things and in the manifold vitality and restlessness of matter, upon which all the Ionic systems rest; they all look for the essence of things in matter, they more or less derive the spiritual from it and neglect the moral element. The want of the sense of unity which is essentially connected with this, was favourable to the atomic view of physical science, and Heraclitus' doctrine, which was built upon strife, clearly expresses the restlessness of the Ionic nature, when it calls repose the death of the soul. The Doric on the contrary presents in comparison the aspect of an inward depth,
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from which at the same time powerful action bursts forth, and of a tranquil persistence in established and almost inviolable forms, through which genuine Doric characters were exalted high above the whirl of sensuous impressions, whilst a certain inward consistency was introduced into their lives, which is not found in the same degree among the Ionians. In philosophy, this tendency of their mind displays itself in ethical endeavours, although they never made their way to a complete theory; but it especially appeared in this, that they sought for the essence of things not in a ground which was purely material, but in one that was formal and which gave to things unity and order, just as Pythagoras is said to have been the first to call the world Kosmos; and although Anaxagoras makes the order of the world to be produced through Reason, yet this thought, as Socrates has already observed, did not pierce at all deeply into his philosophy. In keeping with the peculiar character of the Doriens and even with their civil life, the outward appearance of the Doric philosophy took the form of a society or order, which was subject to a discipline and rule almost monastic, or at least Moravian, to which there can scarcely be found a more suitable analogy in all antiquity than the Spartan constitution. This organisation is united with depth in religion, symbolism, mysticism and ascetism, and moreover with the practice of music, all which formed essential elements of the Pythagorean mode of life; for which reason indeed so early a writer as Herodotus speaks of Pythagorean orgies. But to return to the ground of their speculations, the Ionic philosophers, though they mostly rejected the criterion of the senses, started from matter, which is the object of sensuous cognition, and then sought by reflexion to arrive at some material ground of all things, which ground, it must be confessed, some of them did not hold to be cognizable by the senses. From this sensuous philosophy the bound was too great and violent to the Socratico-Platonic, which sought for the essence of things in pure ideas furnished through the inward intuition, and the Pythagorean view was exactly that which formed the bridge; since the formal ground which they assumed is cognizable through that mathematic intuition, δίάνοια, which hovers in the midst between the sensuous and the non-sensuous. And yet in its ideas they recognised typical forms of something higher,
though as it seems, they were unable to resolve the sense of these types so as to put them into clear intellectual light. Thus philosophy passed from a thoroughly sensuous beginning, through an intervening grade, to the unsensuous view of Plato, (who indeed had been preceded by the sagacious but one-sided members of the Eleatic school, but who by the power of the Socratic criticism had raised these partial views as well as all former views, through the proper limitation and modification of the one by the other, to the most perfect view of which the Hellenic mind was capable,) and the essence of things was thus sought in an ascending scale, first in matter, then in mathematical forms, and lastly in ideas of the reason.

* * * *

2. Ἕμεδριβούρνη does not mean limited as some have understood it but limiting, what Plato in the Philebus calls πίσος limit. ** It remains for us to consider what the Pythagorean meant by the limiting and the unlimited. The ancients, very naturally, thought of them from the numerical point of view; and in fact the limiting has been taken to mean unity, parity, and identity, and the unlimited duality, disparity, and diversity, in which sense both Nicomachus and Boethius clearly express themselves and with a distinct reference to Philolaus. ** But this view is nevertheless quite untenable, partly on this account that what is odd is not therefore necessarily to be called indefinite, because, as a determinate magnitude, for example three or five, it derives a limit from unity; and partly because, as we see quite clearly from Aristotle, the Pythagoreans rather compared the even number to the indefinite; at least they did so in a certain sense and without reference to the definite magnitude of any such number. In his Physics iii. 4, he tells us expressly that some laid down the unlimited, ἄπειρον, as the origin of all things and he says of the Pythagoreans, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι τὸ ἄφθιον. τούτῳ γὰρ ἐνακολουθήσεις καὶ ύπό τοῦ περιτου περαινόμενον παρέχει τοῖς οὖσι τὴν ἄπειρον, for which also he adduces Pythagorean testimony. ** Shall we then say that Philolaus by the unlimited meant the even and by the limiting meant the odd? Against this view likewise the same objection as before holds good, because the even also as a definite number is limited by unity, so that if the even is called by the Pythagoreans unlimited, it must have some peculiar circumstantial application.
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But this supposition is unnecessary, since according to Philolaus himself, the unlimited has no number in it, for which reason also, since, according to him, it is only through number that we understand, nothing would be intelligible if everything were unlimited. On the other hand the following explanation seems to me perfectly satisfactory. As, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held one to be both odd and even, and thus to contain both opposites, so Philolaus too set up above both these opposites a higher unity in which both have their roots. ** In the same way Plato in his Philebus sets up above the limit and the unlimited, out of which two the limited comes to be, the Cause as God. But how do the two elements proceed therefrom?—for proceed they must as from the Beginning of all things. I cannot conceive this otherwise than as follows. The highest Unity, simple Unity, what the later Pythagoreans and Platonists called the Monad, is merely One: but Unity is also conceivable as endlessly divisible, as the same authorities likewise remark. Through an opposition between the One and the Many or Indefinite, which opposition resides even in Unity itself, there is produced out of the highest Unity, which has no opposite, the twofold nature of the One and the Many, of the Limit and the Unlimited; and here we come at once to that which Philolaus means by limit and unlimited. By the former he meant the One or, as the ancients express it, the Same, by the latter the Many or the Different. And of these two the former has the more affinity with the highest Unity. These opposites are the constituents of all that is produced, τὸ γνώμενον, while the highest Unity, as being that which is not produced, is exalted above it. For, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held that Number is the essence of things, and things themselves, no less as Matter, than as the properties of Matter, or in other words Form. But the same author allows that the Pythagoreans expressly named the numbers which compose the essence of things, ἐν and ἀπεισοῦ, out of which two the περασμένον is produced. (Aristotle Metaph. i. 5.) These same elements are also called Unity and the Indefinite Duality (ἡ ἄδομισσος δύνας). Under the latter the conception of diversity or plurality simply is represented, and the definite number Two only accrues to it by a limitation bestowed by Unity. **
[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that the next step in Philolaus' work must have been to describe the evolution of the world out of the two opposite elements, and he quotes a passage given below (Καὶ πάντα γα μᾶν κ. τ. ἕ.) in which the elements are divided in the same manner as numbers. He supposes that he must have then proceeded from the combination of odd or even to that of harmony, because all the chief ratios of harmony [1 : 2, 2 : 3, 3 : 4, 8 : 9, 243 : 256] consist of an even and an odd number; and he supposes that Philolaus meant by harmony the result of reconciled opposites, and attributes to him the following passage in Nicomachus, ἔστι γὰρ ἱμονία πολυμεγέν ἐνωσις καὶ ὑμαῖρονταν σύμφωναις (of the Doric nature of which passage I entertain strong doubts).

The last extract which will be given is of great importance for the understanding of more than one passage in Plato and is the beginning of a very learned disquisition upon the music of the ancients.]

In the immediate sequel of the former passage [he refers to the passage given below, beginning Περὶ δὲ φύσις—] which sequel we shall presently quote, one is surprised by the phenomenon, that Philolaus' harmony is nothing else than the octave, but there is no objection on the side of usage to this interpretation, since the ancients called the octave "harmony", as Aristotle does (see Plutarch's treatise on Music: but it is precisely in this that we find the explanation of the Pythagorean view of the harmony of the Universe in general, and especially of the mode in which the composition of the world was conceived to have been effected out of the opposite elements of the limit and the unlimited; for Unity as we have seen is limit, while the Unlimited is the indefinite duality, which becomes definite duality when the measure of Unity has been twice introduced into it. Thus then the limitation is given through the measuring of duality by means of Unity, that is by laying down the ratio of 1 : 2 which is the mathematical ratio of the octave. The octave therefore is harmony itself, through which the opposite elements are reconciled; and every reasonable man must confess that there is a deep perception contained in this, since the unity of the One and of the Diverse (ἕτερον) or Many (πολλά,) which Plato in his Doctrine of Ideas has presented
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in a dialectic form, and the conception of which was one of the chief problems of Greek philosophy, is here expressed by mathematical symbolism. ** The magnitude of harmony, says Philolaus, is συλλαβᾶ καὶ δἰ ὀξεῖαν. Συλλαβῆ is the old name of the Fourth, because it is the first combination of concordant tones, πρῶτη σύλληψις φθόγγον συμφάνον. Δ工作报告 the Fifth, because it comes after the Fourth in the ascending scale. Now as a fourth and a fifth comprise the octave, since 3 : 4 with 2 : 3 = 1 : 2, as we see from these numbers 2 . 3 . 4, Philolaus says that συλλαβᾶ καὶ δ‟ ὀξεῖαν is the magnitude of harmony, because 2 : 4 is harmony, 2 : 3 is δ‟ ὀξεῖαν, and 3 : 4 is συλλαβᾶ. But the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the interval of a tone which is 8 : 9, as the following numbers shew, 6 . 8 . 9. For 6 : 8 is the Fourth, 6 : 9 is the Fifth, and the difference is 8 : 9 or the tone. And now to prove the truth that the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the tone, he states the position of the Fourth and Fifth in the octave, for in the ascending scale, there is from the ὑπάτη to the μέση a Fourth, but from the μέση to the νῆτη a Fifth. (See the fragment beginning Ἀρμονίας δ‟ μέγεθος.)

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Θεωρεῖν δ‟ ὅγα καὶ τὰν ἴσολαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ κατὰν δύναμιν ἀ τις ἵντιν ἐν τῇ δεκάδι. Μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελῆς καὶ παντεργᾶς, καὶ θεῖα καὶ ὑπερασύνη βιο βιο καὶ ἀνθρωπίνα ἀρχαι καὶ ἁγεμόνα κοινωνοῦσα . . . δύναμι καὶ τὰς δεκάδας. Ἀνευ δ‟ ταῦτας πάντα ἀπειρα καὶ ἀθηλα καὶ ἀρχαι. Ἡναμονικὰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἡ τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἁγεμονικὰ καὶ διαδοχικὰ τῷ ἀναφορέμενο παντὸς καὶ ἁγιουμένῳ παντὶ. Ὡ γὰρ καὶ ἡς δήλων συνένει συνένε τῶν πραγμάτων συνένε αὐτῶν ποιδιαστενίστενο, ὧστε τοῦ ἄφθαντα ἀλλο. ἐν τῇ ἡς ἁγιομοῦς καὶ ἡ τοῦτο ἐκλειστο. Νῦν δ‟ ὡς αὐτος κατὰν ἔφηκαν ἀρμόδιοιν αἰτεθήστε πάντα, γνωστα καὶ προκάτορο ἀλλοίωσο κατὰ γνωμονικόν φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται, τρισμάτων καὶ σχίζων τοὺς λόγους χωρίς ἐκάστους τῶν πραγμάτων, τῶν τῆς ἀπειρῶν καὶ τῶν πειραμάτων. Ἡδος δ‟ καὶ πενην εἰς τοῖς διαμονώσος καὶ λειτουργεῖς πράγματε γούσιν καὶ κατὰ κάθως ἁγιομενοι λογοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἱθοῖσι καὶ λόγοις πάσι παντῖ, καὶ κατὰ τῶς διαμονωτίος τῶς τεχνικῶς πάσας, καὶ κατὰ τῶν
μουσικάς. Ψευδός δὲ οὐδὲν δέχεται ἀ τῷ ἄριθμῷ φύσις, οὐδὲ ἁρ-
μονίᾳ· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰκεῖον αὐτοῖς ἦστι. Τὰς γὰρ ἀπειρὰς καὶ ἀνατό-
μοναὶ ἀλόγῳ φύσιος τὸ ψευδὸς ἦκα μὲν φθόνος ἦστι. Ψευδὸς δὲ οὐδε-
μόνας ἢς ἄριθμον ἐπιπνεύ, πολέμιον γὰρ καὶ ἐχθρὸν τῷ φύσει τὸ ψε-
δὸς, ὁ δὲ ἀλάθεια οἰκεῖον καὶ σύμφωνον τῷ τῶν ἄριθμῶν γενέθη.


Παρ' δὲ καὶ ἀφθονοῖς καὶ ἀκαταπόνατος διαμένει τὸν ἀπειρὸν
ἀιώνα. Οὕτω γὰρ ἔνεσθεν ἄλλα τις αἰτία δυναμικῶστα αὐτὰς εὑρε-
θήσεται, οὕτως ἔκτοσθεν, φθείραι αὐτῶν δυναμένα. 'Αλλ' ἦν δὲ ὁ κό-
σμος ἐν αἰώνας καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένεικα, εἰς ὑπὸ ἐνὸς ἔτους συγγενέω
καὶ πρατεῖκα καὶ ἀπειρόθεν κυβερνόμενα. 'Εχει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄρχων
tας κινάσιος τε καὶ μεταβολάς ὁ κόσμος εἰς ἑαυτόν, καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ φύ-
σει διαπερνόμενος καὶ περιπερνόμενος ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετα-
βαλὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἔστι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμεταβάλον ἀπὸ
tας τῶν περιπερνόμενος ψυχῆς μέχρι σελάνας περιπερνοῖ, τὸ δὲ με-
ταβάλλον ἀπὸ τὰς σελάνας μέχρι τὰς γᾶς. 'Επεὶ δὲ γε καὶ τὸ κινεῖν
ἐν αἰῶνας εἰς αἰῶνα περιπερνοῖ, τὸ δὲ κυνεῖκεν ὡς τὸ κινεῖν ἄγει, ὡς ἀνάπιεσθαι ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν αἰώνιον τὸ δὲ ἀμεταβάλον ἐμεῖν,
καὶ τὸ μὲν νὰ καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνάκαμα πάν, τὸ δὲ γενεισίος καὶ μεταβο-
λάς· καὶ τὸ μὲν πράτον τῷ δυνάμει καὶ ὑπερεχόν, τὸ δὲ ὑπέρτον καὶ
καθ'ὑπερεχόμενον. Τὸ δὲ ἀμφιτεθέν τούτων, τὸ μὲν ἐκθόντος
θελούν, τὸ δὲ ἀμεταβάλλοντος γεννατοῦ, κόσμου. Αἰών καὶ καλῶς
ἐγείρει λεγέν κόσμον ἦμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀπὸ τε ἐκ καὶ γενειός κατὰ
συνακολουθεῖας τὰς μεταβλητικὰς φύσις· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐκ ἀμεταβαλ-
λας κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀσάντως ἔγον, τὰ δὲ γεγονόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα
πολλά. Καὶ τὰ μὲν φθορὰς ὅντα καὶ φύσει κατὰ μορφὰς σαίζεται, τὰ
gονέων πάλιν τὰν αὐτῶν μορφῶν ἀποκαθοίκηται τῷ γεννήσαντας παιδεῖ,
καὶ δημιουργήσει.


Ἀνάγκη τὰ ἑόντα ὥλον πάντα ἡ περαίνοντα, ἡ ἀπειρα, ἡ περα-
λοντικά τε καὶ ἀπειρα· ἀπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐ καὶ ἑαυτή. Επεὶ τοιν πεῖρα
ντικα οὗτ' ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἑόντα, οὗτ' ἐξ ἀπειρῶν πάντων,
δηλοὶ ἑν' ἀρα δι' ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπειρῶν ὃ τοι κόσμος καὶ

* i.e. ὁμολογεῖν.
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ta eis autòs svasmòzès. Athetai de kai ta eis tois ेργοις· ta mèn gaè autàv en peraivnòntan, peraivnonta, ta de eis peraivnòntan te kai apèirion peraivnontà te kai ou peraivnonta, ta de eis apèirion apèirion

Kai pantà v gia mnà ta gignwaskomena èrtoimôn échontai. Oi ेφai oíon te ouçen outhe noçhèmen outhe gnoçhèmen anèn touss. "Oo gia mnà èrtoimòs echèi duo mnèn ɵnia ɵidh, peiromènon kai èrtion, trèion de de èrtoimòs outhe éthònon, ǻrtonpèrissos. Ȩkateùros de te èdisos pollai mòphai, de echèin autòtan tòðnaieis. Peri de phusios kai èrmionias outhe echèi· a mèn èstò tôn pragmatòtov èdisos ðessa kai autà moña, phusis ɵthia ìnèi kai ouk ánthropówn èndèketai gnòsth, plán na ouk ouç ouèn t' hcs ouèstov tòn èstovn kai gignwaskomenavn ɵn ph' èrmòn ge-

gevñhða, nà uparçhòsas tòs èstovs tôn pragmatòv èxi ou anènòs ðo kòsmos, kai tôn peraivnòntovn kai tôn apèirion. Êpeti de tei èrto-

chai úppàgoron ouk ðòmoviou ouòè. oupròfou ðessa, hdoi dòmoviou ðhès kai autòs kòsmos èrmionias, aì me èrmionia èpgeýneto, dì tìn èra tròshè ègë-

vèto. Ta mèn ou èrsoia kai ðòmovia èrmionias ouèn èpedèntovn, te
de èrmòuia mëphè oupròfou mëphè laòtèlè ènàgka tòs toûnta èrmionías suggkeleúsdæ, aì melèntov Æn kòsmor kateèsadæ.

'Èrmionias de me ñmovòs ìnèi sulàbà aì de' dèxiàn. To de de' dèxiàn

meìzov tòs sulàbàs èpogòdò. 'Enai ेφai apo ùpatac ès mësov sul-

làbà, apò de mësac poti neçàn de' dèxiàn, apo de neçàn ès trèin sulàbà, apò de trèin ès ùpatac de' dèxiàn. To de èn mèsoi mësac kai trèin èpòdovn. 'A de sulàbà èpgeýneton, to de de' dèxiàn ërmò-

lè, to ðia pàsac de èléloun. Òutòs èrmionia ðènta èpòdovn kai

doù dòmov, de' dèxiàn de ðel èpòdovn kai dòmov, sulàbà de de' èpòdovn kai dòmov—.

Platonis Timæus, 35 A.

Tòs Æmèròtov kai Æl kathè tautà èkoxhès ouçías, kai tòs aù

perì tòs sòmatà gignwaskmènhs ðemìsths, trèion ès Æmòvov èn èrmòs sùn-

kefàlè tòs ouçías èdisos, tòs Æl tòs ðòmovou ðènta, de èxi Ðòmov en.

* Commonly Ïatèrôv. Kaì tathè tou-

ta. I have altered the text according

to the evident requirement of the sense; and we here see that this soul partakes

The passage itself has been appended to the text as serving to illustrate the ðèròs in the

Platonis Philebus.
κεφάστατο εἰς μᾶλν πάντα Ἰδέαν, τὴν Θατήρον φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦταν ξυναμοίτατον βίον.

Ἐξ τοῦ Ἀρχότου περὶ Ἀρχῶν. Stob. Ecl. i. 35, 2.

'Ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο ἀρχὰς ἦμεν τῶν ὄντων, μᾶλν μὲν τῶν συστοίχισαν ἤξοισαν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ ὀριστῶν, ἐστάντο δὲ τῶν συστοίχισαν ἤχοισαν τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀριστάτων. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἂντιτοί καὶ λόγοι ἤχοισαν καὶ τὰ ὄντα ὁμολειωθέντα, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἄντιτα ὄρισσεν καὶ συντάσσειν· πλαστάζουσαν γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῖς γινομένοις εὐλόγας καὶ εὐθυμιῶς ἀνάγεται ταῦτα καὶ τῷ καθ' ὃλα ὀσίας τε καὶ ἱδέας μεταδίδομεν τῶν δ' ἄλογων καὶ ἀρχής τοῖς τὰ συντεταγμένα λυμαίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ δὲ γένεσιν δὲ καὶ ὀσίαν παραγομένα διαλείπει, πλαστάζουσαν γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξομοίουσαν αὐτήτης. Ἀλλ' ἢπείρερ ἄρχαὶ δύο κατὰ γένος ἀνευδιαμούμενα τὰ πράγματα τυγχάνοντι, τὰ τῶν μὲν ἁγιοποιών τὰς ἢμεν κακοποιῶν, ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο λόγους ἦμεν, τῶν μὲν ἤνα τὰς ἁγιοποιῶν φύσις, τῶν δὲ ἤνα τὰς κακοποιῶν. Διὰ τούτου καὶ τὰ τέχνη καὶ τὰ φύσει γιγνόμενα δεῖ τοὺς πρῶτον μεταξεῖ θεάσθαι, τὰς τε μορφὰς καὶ τὰς ὀσίας. Καὶ ἂ μὲν μορφῶν ἔστιν ἄ διδύμα τοῦ τόδε τε ἢμεν· ἢ δὲ ὀσία τὸ ὄρθοκειον, παραδεχόμενον τῶν μορφῶν. Οὔτε δὲ τὰ ὀσία οἷον τε ἢμεν μορφῶς μετείμην αὐτής ἢ ἄδιδύμα, οὔτε μὲν τάς μορφῶν γενίθαι περὶ τῶν ὀσίας, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐγέραν τινὰ ἢμεν αἱτίαν τών κινάσοις τῶν ἤστω τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ πλὴν τῶν μορφῶν, τουτέστι δὲ τῶν πρῶτων τὰς δύναμις καὶ καθυπερτάτων ἦμεν τῶν ἄλλων ὀνομάζομεθα δ' αὐτάν ποθόκες θεόν· ὅστε τρεῖς ἀρχὰς ἦμεν ἢδη, τῶν τε θεὸν, καὶ τῶν ἢστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν μορφῶν. Καὶ τῶν μὲν θεόν τεχνίται καὶ τῶν κινοῦντα, τῶν δ' ἢστω τῶν ὀσίαν καὶ τοῦ κινούμενον, τῶν δὲ μορφῶν τῶν τέχνην καὶ ποθ' ἀν κινεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν κινοῦντος αὐτῆς ἢστο. Ἀλλ' ἢπει τὸ κινούμενον ἐναντίας ἐαυτῷ δύναμις ἵσχε τὰς τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων, τὰ δ' ἐναντία συναρμογὰς τίνος δεῖται καὶ ἐνώσιος, ἀνάγκα ἀριθμὸν δύναμις καὶ ἀνάλογας καὶ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ γεωμετρικοῖς διεικνύμενα παραλαμβάνειν, δ' καὶ συναρμόσεαι καὶ ἐνώσεαι τῶν ἐναντίωτων δυναστεύει ἐν τῷ ἢστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ποταμῷ μορφῶι. Καθ' αὐτὰν μὲν γὰρ ἔσσα ἢ ἄδιδύμα μορφῶς ἢτοι, κινοῦσις δὲ ποταμῷ μορφῶ ἢμορφος γίνεται καὶ λόγον ἤχοισα τῶν ταῖς συντάξιοι. Ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ τὸ δὴ δ' ἢ κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον ἢστι τὸ πρῶτῳ κινών· ὅστ' ἀνάγκα τρεῖς ἦμεν τὰς ἀρχὰς, τῶν τε ἢστω τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τῶν μορφῶν, καὶ τὸ δὲ αὐτῶ κινοτοῖς καὶ πρῶτον τῇ δύναμις. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ νόον μόνον ἦμεν δεὶ ἄλλα καὶ νόμω
APPENDIX.

We may also explain these feelings by the effect which the sensation of our state produces upon the mind. That which directly (through sense) urges me to quit my state (to come out of it), is unpleasant to me, it pains me. That which in like manner urges me to maintain it (to remain in it), is agreeable to me, it gives me pleasure. But we are irresistibly carried along in the stream of Time, and through all the changes of sensations involved in the fact. Now, though the quitting of one moment of time and the entrance into another is one and the same act (that of change), yet in our thought and in the consciousness of this change there is a succession, such as belongs to the connection of cause and effect. The question then is, whether it is the consciousness of quitting the present state, or the prospect of the entrance into a future one, that excites in us the sensation of pleasure? In the former case, the delight is nothing else than the removal of pain, something negative; in the latter it would be an anticipation of something agreeable; consequently, an expansion of a condition of pleasure, and hence something positive. But we may already infer, a priori, that the former alone can take place. For time carries us from the present to the future, and not contrariwise; and the fact that we are compelled first of all to quit the present, uncertain into what other we are about to enter, only that it is another, can alone be the cause of pleasant feeling. Pleasure is the sense of that which promotes life, pain of that which hinders it. But life (animal life) is, as the physicians themselves have remarked, a continual play of the antagonism of the two.

Consequently, every pleasure must be preceded by pain; pain is always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continual advancement of vital power (which, however, cannot mount beyond a certain degree), but a speedy death for joy?

10
Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another; but between the one and the other pain must have place. It is the slight intermissions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, that together make up the healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously-felt state of well-being; whereas in fact this condition consists only of a succession of pleasurable feelings, following each other with alternations,—that is, after continually intervening pain.

Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life: without it an inanimate state would ensue.
ADDENDA.

My friend Mr E. R. Horten, who has most kindly undertaken the laborious task of superintending the edition of this work, has sent me some important suggestions as to the text of the first sheet. In the passage (12, α) he is inclined to read* τούναντιόν. I have more than once had the same suspicion, but suppressed it through fear of being taxed with the love of unnecessary changes. But I am now convinced that the construction of the sentence imperatively requires the alteration proposed. The contrary intended is not a contrary to the main part of the sentence, κύριος ἢν εἶχας, but only to the subordinate phrase τῆς π. Σ. ὁμολογίας. The alternative is not between being κύριος, and not being κύριος, but between being κύριος of the agreement and κύριος of the disagreement.

p. 13, b. Mr Horten reminds me of Dr W. H. Thompson’s conjecture ἐνορθῶν in place of ἐνόν. But my note will shew why I cannot assent to this conjecture. Protarchus is not, and cannot

* [My later view of the expression ἢ καὶ τούναντίον is that it is a troublesome interpolation. In order that the argument may proceed, there must be an ὁμολογία between Socrates and Protarchus. Cf. ὁμολογησόμεθα καὶ τόδε ταῦτα. ὅτι οὕτως ὁμολογημένα φατε, ἢ πῶς; (11, d, c and also 20, c). τούτων τῶν λόγων ἢ τι ἐνόρθῶν δι’ ὁμολογίας βεβαιωθομέθα. (14, c). The question is how far Protarchus may go to meet Socrates, since the conduct of the discussion belongs to the latter. But this question is one for himself, not Philebus, to decide. Yet Philebus by his profession of unalterable faith in his goddess, not for the present only but for the future also, δοξάς καὶ δόξα (for so the MSS. read), is endeavouring to prejudice him, even whilst in the same breath he acknowledges his freedom of judgment, διὰ τοῦ γνώσαν. With this implied interference Protarchus accordingly twits him. “Now that you have resigned your brief to me, your rights of dictation are over.”—St. Paul’s expression in 2 Cor. 1, 24; ὥσπερ δύτι καὶ δύται, εἰς τῆς πίστεως is closely analogous. The word ὁμολογία itself may be illustrated from the same Epistle (ix, 13). δοξάζοντες τὸν Θεόν ἐκ τῆς ὑποταγῆς τῆς ὁμολογίας ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ. E. R. H.]
be, asked to shew why he calls all pleasures good, for Socrates assumes already that he looks upon some as bad; but he is challenged to point out any further ground of likeness between them beyond that indicated by their common name of ἀθανάτι. As this is the only question which can be asked him without clashing with the rest of the argument, ἀγαθὸν ἐξαι is a manifest interpolation. But if we omit ἀγαθὸν ἐξαι, προσαγορεύεις is necessarily to be construed with τί ταῦτα ἔναν: else it would be without any government at all. For I do not suppose that any person will have recourse to such an intolerable ellipsis as the following: τί ταῦτα ἔναι, π. η. (τοῦτο) προσαγορεύεις; Apart from this I very much doubt whether a good Greek prose writer would say, ἔναι ἐν σοι τοῦτο, without adding some participle.


p. 17, Ὑ. ἔνοντα πάθη γιγνόμενα. "Is not one of these de trop?" E. R. H.

Most assuredly, and I thank my friend for this fresh instance of what I have before pointed out as a peculiar feature in these supplements. The word ἔνειναι under various forms has occurred several times in this sense, and it is therefore no wonder that some sciolist should insert ἔνοντα without troubling himself to look further on, where he would have found γιγνόμενα. Or perhaps he merely meant it as a note and had no intention of disturbing the text; but if so, and if this is to be the explanation of the many similar passages, this would shew the extent to which the copyists must have gone in blindly copying what they found in the Margin, as if it had been accidentally omitted in the body of the text, and afterwards supplied in the blank space.

Mr. Huxley also mentions two conjectures made by English scholars on this passage. I will briefly state my objections to each of them. It is proposed to read μᾶθης for πάθη. Now we do not want a verb, for λάβης may be easily conceived to run through the whole passage; and if we wanted one, it could not be μᾶθης, for μακανῶ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα is not such a construction as one will find in any good prose author. But we do want πάθη, because otherwise τοιαῦτα would imply διαστήματα, a word not applicable to rhythm and metre. Indeed there is no word so applicable, and for that very reason Plato employs the more general term πάθη.
It is also proposed to read ἔννοιας, but to this there are two very strong objections. In the first place ὅταν λάβῃς... καὶ ἀμα—would certainly need ἔννοιας, and in the next place the alteration runs counter to the whole arrangement of the sentence, and cannot be reconciled with γὰρ, which can stand where it now is only on the condition that it belongs to the clause immediately following the parenthesis; whereas this change would make the parenthesis end at ἔπονομάζειν. Indeed the true balance of the sentence is lost by any such change; for whereas Plato might have arranged his clauses thus: The men of old have taught us (A) the power of number in Music and Rhythm, and have directed us (B) to look for the same power in all Ἀπειρα, and so whenever you learn A, (λάβῃς), or detect B, (ἐλης), σοφός ἐγένον—, he thought fit to introduce the first part of this sentence in a kind of running parenthesis alongside of the second. By reading ἔννοιας you destroy the antithesis between what the ancients taught (καὶ ἀμα ἔννοιαν ἕτο. ἐ.) and what we are counselled to do in order to get σοφία, (ὅταν τ' ἀλλο—ἐλης,) and you put a tautology in its place.

The reader will observe that the contrast between λάβῃς and ἐλης is a real one, but that between σοφός ἐγένον and ἔμφραν γέγονας is a very paltry verbal variation, where no real contrast can take place, for while there is a difference between the man who is taught and the man who discovers, there is none in the method or in its result.

As here we have a foolish variation between ἐγένον and γέγονας, so in Euthyd. 287, α, we have a verbal antithesis between the present, which is correct, and the future, which is quite inappropriate. Οὕτω Κρόνος εἶ, ἄστε ὡ τὸ πρώτον εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμμηνήσκει, καὶ εἶ τί πέρυσιν εἴπον [· νῦν ἀναμμηνήσθηε]. I referred to this passage in my Letter (page 31), but inadvertently put the branch of spuriousness upon the wrong part of it.

But before I leave the Euthydemus, I would fain point out some other false supplements which have occurred to me quite recently in lecturing upon that Dialogue.

274, β. [τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας].
276, β. Read ἔθορφησαν for ἀνεθορφήσαν.
277, β. [καταβαλῶν].
281, λ. [τῶν ἀγαθῶν] and [τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τουότοις κρῆσθαι.] The genitives πλούτου etc. are governed by ἔγονευκη.
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281, c. [μᾶλλον].

282, a and b. This is one of the places where from not per- ceiving the interpolation I was led into a wrong mode of re- storing the syntax. Read: Καὶ παρὰ πατρὸς γε δήπορ τοῦτ’ οἰόμε- νον δεῖν μεταλαμβάνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ χρήματα, καὶ παρ’ ἑπιφόραν καὶ φίλων, τῶν τ’ ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φασκόντων ἔραστών εἶναι, καὶ ἄλ- νων καὶ πολιτῶν, διόμενον καὶ ἴκετεύοντα σοφίας μεταδίδοναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν οὐδὲ νεμέσθησον ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπηρετημάτων, προσθυμούμενον σοφῶν γενέσθαι. This is as elegant a sentence as any in Plato, and a model of symmetry without formality. The foolish writer who supplied ἐκθέλοντα has not only destroyed the construction, but has caused another to bolster it up with the clumsy contrivance of ἕνεκα τοῦτον ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἱραστῇ καὶ παντὶ ἄνθρωπῳ.

282, d. Read; οἷον ἐπιθυμώ τὸν προτερπητικὸν λόγον εἶναι.

But the most impudent attempt at improving the text occurs in 284, b. The Sophist wishes to prove ὅτι οὔτεις λέγει τὰ μὴ ὢντα, and this he does by bringing Ctesippus to admit the following propositions. 1. τὰ μὴ ὢντα οὐκ ἔστιν. 2. τὰ μὴ ὢντα οὗτες ἐὰν ποιήσεις. 3. οἵ λέγοντες πράττοντι τι. 4. οἵ πράττοντες ποιούσι. 5. οἵ λέγοντες ποιοῦσι. 6. οἵ λέγοντες τὰ μὴ ὢντα, ποιοῦσιν ἐὰν τὰ μὴ ὢντα, τούτο δὲ ὁμολογήται ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

From this it follows that the words "Ἀλλο τι οὖν οὔδαμον τὰ γε μὴ ὢντα ὢντα ἔστιν; Οὔδαμον. are quite foreign to the argument, and were probably invented to give some force to ἐν τῷ δήμῳ: and likewise that Euthydemos’ question is simply this: Ἐστιν οὖν ὅπως τὰ μὴ ὢντα ποιήσεις ἀν καὶ ὄσιον;

This quite throws into the shade such minor invasions as 297, c, ἄφιγμένω, 298, d, βοιδῶν ἃ καβάλων, 302, b, ἐφευρόν τε, 290, b, τοῦτο δ’ ἐν θηρεύσωνται, and τούτως ἐθηρεύσων, (for πόλιν θη- ρεύσαντει read either χειράςωται or χειράζονται.) 278, d, οἷον αὐτῷ ὑπολαμβάνω, and a score of others, in which I cannot with certainty include 302, d, οἷο [θεοῖ], as this may arise from a two- fold reading COI and ΘΟΙ, but in 303, b, the words ὁσθ’ ὁμο- λογεῖς—σοφούς, are so manifestly a false interpretation of οὗτο διετέθην, and so completely spoil what immediately follows, that they can be nothing but a deliberate forgery.

There are others which are yet upon their trial, such as the following, 307, a, ὅσι’ οὖν ἐγὼ ὅπως προτέρω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπι
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philosophian. Crito's faith in philosophy is already shaken by Isocrates' sneer, and by his own impressions about these ἐροτικοὶ. Otherwise Socrates' exhortation not to care about the men, but to look into the thing itself, is altogether idle. His embarrassment is ὅπως προτέρη τὸ μειράκιον, πότερον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἐπιτίθεται.

I will end this digression vineta mea cadendo. To make the question tally with the answer in 304, Ε, I formerly edited ἀπε-φαινόντο, but this is applicable only to γνώμας, and by no means the right word to use of the displays of the Sophists. But the question is rightly given in the received text: τί οὖν ἰφαινοντό σοι, "well, what did you think of them"? The answer however is corrupt, and interpolated after its corruption. I believe the true reading to be: Τί δ' ἄλλο, ἣ δ' ὅς, ἥ διε περὶ ἰτι δὴ τις τῶν τοιούτων, ληφώντων καὶ περὶ οὖδένος ἐξίαν ἀναξίαν σουδήν πουυμε-νον; "What else should they look like but what every one of the men of their class at all times looks like, a class of triflers etc."

p. 16, Ε. τότε δὴ δεῦ For τότε δ' ἢ δεῦ, the reading of most MSS., the Bodl. gives τότε δή δεῦ. For the Bodl. δεῦ, δεῦ has been substituted in the text.

p. 17, Ε. ἔλλογμον] The meaning of ἔλλογμον and that of ἐνέργειαν are so nearly the same, that one is tempted to suspect either that the former word is a later addition, or that Plato must have justified the twofold expression by a twofold reason; namely, by writing, Σι' οὐκ εἰς λόγον, οὐ'/ εἷς ἄφημδον οὐδένα ... ἀπόδειξα. But, as the importance of πάρος is uppermost in the writer's mind, any addition to ἄφημδον weakens the effect which he wishes to produce. For this reason I look upon the words καὶ οὐκ ἔλλογμον with some suspicion. It may be said, in answer to this, that λόγος and ἄφημδος are by no means equivalent, and that Shakespeare illustrates the difference when he says that certain offences "stand more for number than account", and that the Tragic ἄφημδον ἄλλως and the Horatian 'Nos numeros sumus' shew that ἄφημδος is rather the antithesis of λόγος than its equivalent. But in this passage who can doubt that the idea which ἐνέργειαν presents is identical with that presented by ἔλλογμος? Then why was it introduced?

p. 18, Α. τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφαμεν] The Books read φαμεν. But Socrates is comparing a past observation with a present one, and for this reason uses λάβων with the former, and ἐνέγχυσθη with the latter, according to the common rule as to the optative and subjunctive moods.

p. 18, Α. δὲ] I have substituted this for the δεῖ of the MSS., to accord with λάβων and ἔφαμεν.
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p. 18, b. μὴ ἔτι κ. τ. ἔ.] I have placed the absurd supplement μὴ ἔτι τὸ ἔν κ. τ. ἔ. in brackets, but there is still something amiss, and any body trying to correct it must be guided by the illustration presently offered in the discovery of the Alphabet. We want ἔτι or some equivalent to accompany κατανοεῖν, and we require that πληθύοι should have number, i.e. be definite, and not that number should have πληθύοι, which every number above one has in any case. It is not improbable that Plato wrote ἄριστον αὐτοῦ τελείως ἕκαστον ἔχον κατανοεῖν ΔΕΙ.

p. 18, b. Ἐστιν [φαινήν κ. κ.]] Unless we reject the words φ. κ. κ. as a supplement of some expounder, we have a mass of words without any construction, and furthermore a statement which Plato could not have made. The word κατανοεῖν implies that the discovery has already begun, but there is no act of κατανοεῖν in acknowledging the existence of φαινή, nor indeed of any object while still in its indefinite state; so that φαινήν ἐκατόρο κατανοεῖν is a contradiction in terms. The first stage of discovery is κατανοεῖν τὰ φαινόμενα.

p. 18, b. λέγων, πρῶτος] I retract my former conjecture of λέγω μεκ., and hold ἐκ, the reading of most MSS., and ἐκ, that of the Bodl., to be mere grammatical attempts to give coherence to that which the above named supplement had thrown out of gear. ὁ λέγων λέγει is perfectly good Greek, but the passage from the Republic 380, d, affords no example of it. We ought there to read ὁ υπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτον λέγου λέγων, "the advocate of this view." For πρῶτος τὰ φαινόμενα, read πρῶτα τ. φ. i.e. "first the Vowels, then the Mutes, after that the Liquids."

[p. 19, d. τὸ προσαρθηκομένον ὅρθος [δ. ῥ. γ']] The interpolation here is similar to that in 11, b.

p. 22, d. ἀκτιασθῆναι] ακτιαν and ακτιαν have been put in brackets, the sense and construction being complete without them.

p. 23, d. πρὸς τοῖς πρωτοῖς] Here as well as below in 26, x, the article has been inserted without the authority of the MSS.

p. 24, c. ἀνάξιοποιόμενος μ.] The pronoun με is wanting in the MSS.

p. 27, e. [τὴν αἰτίαν] ὧς ἡμ. ἐπὶ έτοι τῆς αἰτίας is here bracketed, as being an obvious marginal gloss. Nine lines above, γεγονόμενος has been dealt with in the same way and for the same reason.

p. 44, a. οὕτως ἔρμα] The Editor has omitted his reasons for bracketing τοῦ μῆνας θυσίας καί τοῦ θρήνου. He has evidently regarded the clause as a gloss on ἔκπτρον. An alternative correction of the sentence might be proposed, viz. ro retain the bracketed words and cancel ἔκπτρον.

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p. 14, D. ἐστιν μὴδὲ τὰ τουδέκα I have tried to make excuses for this phrase, and to explain the whole passage as it stands. But I cannot reconcile myself to the text for many reasons. (1) Though we may say συγχωρό μὴ δεῖν ἀπετεκαθιαὶ τῶν τοιούτων, we cannot say ταύτα συγχωρεῖται μὴ δεῖν ἀπετεκαθιαὶ αὐτῶν, and still less ἀπετεκαθιαὶ τῶν τοιούτων. (2) συγκεκριμένα ἐστι is not the same as ὁμολογεῖται, and cannot mean that we admit something concerning certain things, but that the things themselves have been given up, admitted to be true, because we wish to get rid of them and their propounders. (3) The words μὴ δεῖν τ. τ. ἀπετεκαθιαὶ sever ὑπὸ πάντων from the rest of the clause and from the participle ὑπολαμβανόντων, which is a great offence against elegance. (4) ὑπολαμβανόντων needs an accusative, such as αὐτὸ or some equivalent. (5) ἐστι μὴδὲ is only appropriate when a preceding assertion is upheld a fortiori on the ground of a statement which follows. But Socrates' instance is neither weaker nor stronger than those of Protarchus, but a mere addition of something akin to the foregoing. (6) There is no good defence to be made of μὴδὲ, unless we read τῶν τοιούτων, and even then the sentence is rendered very clumsy by the intervening παθηματικὴ κ. τ. ἐς, which separate μὴ δεῖν from μὴδὲ. These grounds lead me to the conclusion that the passage is interpolated by some one, who not understanding the artificial turn of the sentence, supposed it to be suffering from some omission. If we leave out μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἀπετεκαθιαὶ and ἐστι μὴδὲ, τὰ τουδέκα becomes the accusative to ὑπολαμβανόντων γνῶσον, and gives a kind of unexpected addition to Socrates' speech. This contrivance was adopted in order to introduce an additional example of ἐν καλ. πολλά, without resorting to a tedious and formal introduction of new matter.

p. 24, b. In my former edition I left ἀνέμηνως, as I found it, without an object. But it may be doubted whether we should read, ἀλλὰ εὖ γε, or ἀλλ' εὖ τε. Eὔ γε as a mere exclamation is well known; but here εὖ is an adverb joined with two verbs, and it does not begin the sentence. I am decidedly in favour of εὖ τε.

p. 27, b. I am responsible for τὴν αἰτίαν appearing in brackets. The reason of this is obvious; but it is not quite so obvious why I have preferred λέγομεν, according to which reading δεδηλωμένον should have been followed by a mark of interrogation, to λέγομεν which is the reading of the Bodleian. The passage as I have printed it is far from satisfactory; and I have great misgivings about this double question and answer, and fear that this λέγομεν, or λέγομεν, is a mere Will o' the wisp, which has led me into a false conjecture. For if this word is a gloss, we see at once why the oldest MS. has nothing to correspond to it in the answer, whereas the revisor of some later copy would see that it must have an answer, and so one gloss would beget another. If we continue the structure of the preceding speech Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ γιγαντεύεται καλὲ ἐὖ γε γίγανται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡ μὲν γένος—the natural sequel would be Τὸ δ' ἐν πάντα ταύτα ὅμοιοιροι τὸ τέταρτον (sc. παρέσχετο ἡ μὲν γένος) ὡς ἔτερον κ. τ. ἐς. To this Protarchus needs only to answer with the Bodleian, "Ἑτερον γὰρ εὖν.—"Ὡστ' ὑπὸ σοφίας ἐλάχιστον ὑπὲρ αἰτιών.

p. 63, b. εἰ σαί γε καλ,—καλὸν δ' ἥν ὑπὸ νόμον only admits of one καλ., and the other is a mere repetition occasioned by the interrupting sentence. But if the
second καὶ is superfluous, δὴ is something worse, for whether we join it to γίνει to εἴη, it changes the sense of either, so as to make it quite unsuitable to this passage.

p. 63, n. ἄλληλαν πέρι] That is ἐκατέρας τῶν ἐτέρων πέρι. But this is a very slovenly substitute, and moreover we have a most suspicious stranger in φρονήσεις. The plural is used for thoughts, intentions and dispositions. But here we want only the equivalent to νοῦς, and therefore the singular noun. When Plato introduces plurality to match with the plural ἡδοναί, he speaks of ἐπιστήμης, μαθήματα or τέχναι. Again αὐτὰς ought to belong to φρονήσεις as well as to ἡδοναί, but its place renders this impossible. As the address first proposed is made to pleasures only, there can be no doubt that καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις and ἄλληλαν πέρι are as unnecessary as they are incorrect. I should therefore now not scruple to edit the text thus: Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὅ Πρώταρχος, ἔδεισε, τὰς ἡδονὰς δὲ, ἀπωτικημομένους τὸ τοιόῦτο. Further on I can propose something better than what I offered in my note, namely, this: μάλιστα δὲν ἔδει δεισίως σκέψεις ἑπτάς εἰς χαρὰς τοῦ φρονεῖν; "Would you refuse to dwell with any intellect whatever?" In the answer to this question, it now appears to me that τελείας εἰς δύναμις "as thoroughly as possible" is added, to imply that the clearer the consciousness, the fuller justice is done to pleasure. But τὰλα τὰ πάντα (or rather τὰ τ' ἔλλα πάντα) requires αὐτὸν ἡμῶν in the opposite clause. Perhaps we should read, καὶ αὐτῶν τιν' ἡμῶν τελείας εἰς δύναμιν ἐκάστην. "Any one of us, each to the utmost possible degree of completeness." This use of τὰς followed by ἐκαστος can be supported by examples.

p. 65, n. Expel ξεσο. καθάπερ ὁποδὸς should be taken together. The structure is: ὡς ὣς καθαροὶ καθάπερ ὁποδὸς της ἐμπάστης ἁρτής, ἐξαναλοιμένους ἀὑτῆ πάντη. But in the text I think that αὑτή is either misplaced or altogether foreign. As to τ' ἡδεῖν αὑτῆν εἰναι ποιες μανεντοντι nothing more seems wanting than the article; τιν' τῆν ἡεῖν αὑτήν. He adds αὑτήν to contrast the Idea itself, or the absolute Good, with the forementioned (relative) Good en τ' ανθρώπῳ καὶ εν τῷ παντὶ.

p. 64, c. Read προσφυγότερον ὅν.

p. 64, d. As ήττονει and πάσα cannot both be retained, which is the intruder? Certainly ήττονει, which the scribes have repeated from above; for it so separates τυχοῦσα from ὁποδοῦς that they cannot be taken together, so that the adverb is left to itself. Read, τυχοῦσα ὁποδοῦς ἐ. πάσα.

p. 64, e. It is strange that such expressions as μετριώτης ἁρτή γίγνεται or ἐμμετρή οἱκόλος γίγνεται have passed so long unchallenged. Moderation cannot become Moral οἱκόλον or ἁρτή, nor Symmetry Physical οἱκόλος, else they would cease to be Moderation and Symmetry. Read, μετριώτητι καὶ ἐμμετρήθη.

Ibid. αὑτως] with what? If with τῷ μετρῷ καὶ τῷ ἐμμετρῷ, the author should have said τούτως. But the Bodleian has ἐκαστος, a word often confounded with ἐκάστως, which would yield a good sense. See 64, b.

p. 65, a. Proclus should have answered to λέγωμεν: but ὅρθοτα μὲν αὖν is an answer to one of two dependent clauses ὅρθοτα’ ἣν αὐτωσαίμενα. This fact renders λέγωμεν ὡς very suspicious, but I question whether αὐτϊς can govern αὑτῆ γεγονέναι.
ADDENDA.

p. 65, b. Δήλον μὲν is not only indirect, but also bald, and quite contrary to Plato's practice. But δῦμος δ' οὖν certainly belongs to the same speaker as "Ἡδή τούτον κ. τ. έ. Besides, the colour of the phrase βέλτιον τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξειλέθη is suited to the person conducting the dispute, and to no other. But whoever says this, must certainly have said something more; such as, that it is better to continue the argument in its several particulars. Now, if we add κα' ε' ἐκαστόν to βέλτιον, we not only gain this improvement, but we are also able to remove the objection, which all must feel, to κρίνωμεν without a case. Repeat ἐκαστόν, and all difficulty ceases. Read: "Ἡδή τούτων, ἧ δ' ἱκανός ήμέν γένοιτ' ἐν ὀπτίσσον κριτής . . . . καὶ ἱκανός. δῦμος δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξειλέθη βέλτιον κα' ε' ἐκαστόν. ἐκαστόν τούτων τῶν τριάδων . . . .

p. 66, d. Read διαμαρτυρόμενοι. I must ask the reader to take no notice of my proposed change of the passage beginning Ποῖον δή—and ending at δεῖν λόγον. The received text is correct in everything except παντελῆ for which I read πάντη. It should therefore have been printed thus: ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δή; ΣΩ. Φίλιππος . . . . πάσον καὶ πάντη. ΠΡΩ. Το τρίτον, . . . . ὡς ξοκακας κ. τ. έ. The apparent abruptness of Socrates' answer is explained by what follows: Νατ. το δέ γε μετὰ τούτ' ἀκούμεν. Everything in this part of the dialogue is intended to show that Socrates is in haste to sum up and conclude. The meaning of Protarchus' answer is: "Then, when you spoke of repeating a third time, it was the old argument that you meant us to repeat." But although this passage is nearly correct as the MSS. present it, the same cannot be said of what follows: ἔγω γὰρ δή καταδίων ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλίππου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυφίσον, εἶτον ὡς κ. τ. έ. It is quite foreign to Plato's intention to represent Socrates as discerning from the first the nature of the argument which he is to pursue. He follows the λόγος whithersoever it leads him; and therefore even if ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα meant the general argument, καταδίων cannot be applied to it. The most that he admits afterwards is a suspicion that there might be other claimants to the name of Good (ὑποτετεινὸν καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλά). And now we see why the oldest Manuscript has ἄπερ νῦν δὴ δυσχεράνας διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας—. Here we find the confusion, caused by some ancient misplacement of δυσχεράνας, in its undisguised condition. But if we try to conceive what must have been the appearance of the text before this displacement arose, the most probable supposition is that δυσχεράνας occurred where καταδίων was afterwards contrived to fill up the place of the missing participle. For these reasons I propose, ἔγω γὰρ δὴ δυσχεράνας ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, τὸν Φιλίππου λόγον οὐ μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκισμερόν κ. τ. έ. "For I as you know (ἡ) disliking the saying which I have just repeated (τὸν τάγαθ' ἐτύκετο κ. τ. έ.) which is the saying not of Philebus alone but of many thousand others &c."

p. 67, a. Remove the brackets from ἱκανόν, and read with the inferior MSS. ἱκανότατα. I was misled by the Zurich editors, who in spite of common sense invariably adhere to the Bodleian MS. The play on ἱκανόν ἱκανότατα is quite in the manner of the author.

CORRIGENDUM.

Page 115, Line 8 (of notes). For quonam read quacnam.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Line</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III, 5.</td>
<td>For nonsense read nonsense.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; last.</td>
<td>Correct from p. 151.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V, last.</td>
<td>For substitution read insertion [the Editor's original word]. ἀρειστάτη (ἀρ = ἀνήρ, ἀρος = ἄνδρος) is changed into ἀρειστάτη by the insertion of χ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 4</td>
<td>For 1. read ΣΩ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 12 (of notes)</td>
<td>For <em>soucre</em> read <em>sources</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 16</td>
<td>For ἀνδρώπους read ἀνδρώποις.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 10 (of notes)</td>
<td>For ἐκάτερον read ἐκάτερος.</td>
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<tr>
<td>34 last but 2 (of notes)</td>
<td>For ποσόν read ποσόν.</td>
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<tr>
<td>71 5 (of notes)</td>
<td>For καὶ τίς read καὶ τίς.</td>
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<tr>
<td>75 1 (of notes)</td>
<td>For Appendix read Addenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 last but 5 (of notes)</td>
<td>For ἐλλειψις read τὸ σφόδρα.</td>
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</table>

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