THE APOLOGY OF PLATO.
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OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

AND A DIGEST OF PLATONIC IDIOMS,

BY THE

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COMPLETE in itself, this volume is yet but a fragment of a larger undertaking. In the Oxford series of Plato's works, which commenced with Mr. Poste's edition of the Philebus in 1860, the Apology, Crito, Phædo, and Symposium were undertaken by Mr. Riddell. Had he lived, all four would probably have appeared together. The Digest of Idioms, founded on an examination of all the writings of Plato, which he had prepared to accompany his edition of these dialogues, would not have seemed out of proportion to the other contents of such a volume. His death on the 14th of September, 1866, left the undertaking incomplete. The preparations which he had made for the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium, though extensive and valuable, had not received their final shape. But the Apology seemed to be ready for the press. Its text was settled, a critical and exegetical commentary was written out fair, and a full introduction had been provided, together with an appendix
on the δαυμόνιον of Socrates. The Digest of Idioms also, to which frequent reference was made in the commentary, appeared to have been transcribed for the printer, although a few pencil notes (which have been printed in this volume at the foot of the pages to which they belong) showed that additions would have been made to it, if the writer had lived to print it himself, and perhaps in some instances a different expression would have been given to the views which it contains. Under these circumstances it has been thought advisable to publish the Apology and the Digest of Idioms by themselves. My task has been only, in conducting them through the press, to remove clerical errors and to verify references.

It may be convenient to state that Plato is cited in this volume according to the pages of Stephanus. In reference to the Orators the sections of Baiter and Sauppe's Zurich edition have been given together with the pages of Stephanus in the minor Orators and Reiske in Demosthenes. In the Dramatists Dindorf's numbers are followed as they stand in the edition of the Poetæ Scenici published in 1830. With regard to quotations, the text of the Zurich editions has been used both for Plato and for the Orators, the text of Dindorf (from the edition of 1830) for the Dramatists. Wherever a reading is quoted which is not found in these editions, I have endeavoured to indicate the source from which it has been derived.
The text of the Apology itself is in the main that of C. F. Hermann. Even the punctuation is his. Some of the brackets found in his edition have been silently omitted: but, with this exception, every instance in which he has not been followed is mentioned in the commentary.

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INTRODUCTION

PART I.

THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

1. Nature of the Proceeding.

The trial of Socrates took place before a Heliastic court, according to the forms of an ordinary γραφῆ δημοσία. The indictment (ἐγκλήμα) is called ἀντωμοσία 19 B, 24 B, and ἀντι-γραφῆ 27 C,—terms which allude to the proceedings of the ἀνάκρισις before the Archon Basileus, before whom both the indictment and the plea in answer to it were presented in writing and confirmed severally by oath. And the terms ἀντιγραφῆ, ἀντωμοσία, proper at first to the defendant, came to be used of the prosecutor, and even were transferred to the indictment (ἐγκλήμα) itself, thus presented in writing and sworn to.

2. The Accusers.

The indictment was preferred by Meletus; see below the form preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and compare Plato's Euthyphro 2 B. Hence it is Meletus who is called on by Socrates to answer arguments as to its words and meaning in the Apology. Hence again Socrates asks why did not Meletus bring witnesses (34 A), and again observes (36 A) that the penalty for not obtaining \( \frac{1}{3} \) of the votes would have fallen on Meletus. Little account can be taken of the statement of Maximus Tyrius, Disp. xxxix. p. 228, Μέλιτος μὲν ἐγράψατο Ἄνωτος δὲ εἰσήγαγε Λύκων δὲ ἐδώκε. For authors vary on this distinction, and the continuation of the passage—κατεδίκασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδόσαν δὲ οἱ ἐνδεκα ἄπέκτεινε δὲ ὁ ὑπηρέτης—shows that these words are, as Stallbaum says, magis oratorie
quam vere dicta. See Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Process, p. 709. n. 19.

Of Meletus, the ostensible prosecutor of Socrates, in reality little more than the tool of Anytus, we only know that he was a young tragic poet. He is characterised by Plato (Euthyphro 2 B) as νεός τίς καὶ ἄγνως, and is ridiculed as a poet by Aristophanes (Ran. 1302). The Meletus (Andoc. de Myst. 94. p. 12) who was one of the four who arrested Leon (Apol. 32 C) may have been this Meletus’ father, who bore the same name, but there is nothing to show it.

Lycon, a rhetorician, is mentioned by Aristophanes (Vesp. 1301) with Antipho.

Anytus was by far the most considerable of the three accusers, whence they are described (Apol. 18 B) as τῶν ἀμφί Ἀνυτοῦ, and Socrates is called by Horace (Sat. II. iv. 3) Anytireus. He was a leather-seller (Xen. Apol. Soc. 29), and had been a rich man. As a sufferer and worker for the popular cause he had earned a reputation second only to Thrasybulus. With Thrasybulus he had fled from Attica, and the Thirty had confiscated his estates and included him in the decree of banishment (Xen. Hell. II. iii. 42). He held a command in the camp at Phyle (Lys. xiii. 78. p. 137), and at the restoration was joint author with Thrasybulus of the Act of Amnesty (Isocr. xviii. 23. p. 375). Plato (Meno 90 B) represents him as high in popular favour. His was nevertheless (Atheneus XII. p. 534 E) not a spotless character. Aristotle moreover (acc. to Harpocrates on the word δεκάζειν) says that he was the first man who bribed an Athenian court; and Diodorus, who repeats this (xiii. 64), adds that it was on his trial for treason (Zeller, Philos. der Griech. II. p. 142 n.). As Anytus was the most influential accuser, so there is reason to think he was the most inflamed against Socrates. Meletus and Lycon were actuated at most by a class-prejudice,—if indeed we should not rather regard them as mere tools of Anytus. All three however belonged to classes 1 which Socrates had offended by his incessant censure

1 Socrates is made by Plato (Apol. 23 E) to represent his three accusers as all actuated by class-feeling in their attack upon him. Ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτοῦ καὶ Δικανόν, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἀνυτοῦ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Δικανόν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥήτωραν. The contrast which is implied in this sentence between ῥήτορες and πολιτικοὶ shows that the words severally denote definite classes
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of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account. Nowhere is this cause of offence traced more connectedly than in the Apology itself of Athenian citizens. There seems no ground for thinking with Wiggers (Sokrates p. 97) and others, who have followed in this view Petitus’ Comment, in Legg. Attic. Lib. III. Tit. iii., that there was any order of ῥήτορες, ten in number, appointed yearly, and deriving their origin from Solon. Any such institution could not but have interfered with the λαγγορία which even to the time of Demosthenes was the cherished charter of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, even the precedence which was allowed by Solon in the assembly to speakers above the age of 50 seems to have fallen into abeyance. But we find that in the time of the Orators or earlier (see the latter part of Cleon’s speech in Thucyd. III. 40) these ῥήτορες had attained a mischievous importance. Ἀσχίνηs speaks of them (iii. 3. p. 54) as δύναστες εἰς τοὺς περισσότερους, and in Alcib. II. 145 Α it is said that δε σὴ δὴ ποτὲ ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥήτορῶν ἐξαμβουληθῆ ἄπαντα γένεται. To be a ῥήτωρ had become a regular profession. A new art had arisen, designated by the name ῥητορική, which is seen to have been itself a new word from the way in which it is used in the Gorgias (448 D)—τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικήν. In their capacity of συνήγοροι the ῥήτορες were brought into prominence (Heeren, Polit. Hist. of Anc. Greece, c. 13. p. 232 of Eng. Transl.) by the frequency of state trials in the time succeeding the Peloponnesian war. But it was no less as σύμβουλοι to the Assembly that the ῥήτορες were in requisition. In all questions of legislation and of policy the debate was mainly in their hands. The epoch of this ascendancy is dated by Isocrates (viii. 121. p. 183, where he calls it τὴν ἐπί τοῦ βήματος δυναστείαν) from the Decelean war, or subsequent to Pericles (ib. 126. p. 184). The two species, συμβουλευτική and δικαική, of Aristotle’s triple division of ῥητορική in his treatise correspond with this double scope of the ῥήτωρ’s profession. The πολιτικὸς as a class must have emerged at the same time as the ῥήτορες. In itself πολιτικὸς means no more than ‘Statesman’ in the sense in which this term might have been applied to Pericles. But an Athenian of Plato’s time, speaking with reference to Athens, would mean by πολιτικὸς that class of men who made public business their profession,—τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λεγομένους, Plat. Politic. 303 C. Our conception of the πολιτικὸς will be best completed by comparing them with the ῥήτορες. Down to Pericles’ time there would be no distinction. He united both characters like the great men before him. But afterwards the debates came into separate hands, and the speakers in the Assembly were for the most part no longer the great commanders in the field and the bearers of the highest offices. The fact and the reasons are stated by Aristotle (Pol. V. v. 7), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἡδρίημεν οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγαγούσι μὲν δὲ ἀπερίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται. At the same time, inasmuch as counsel as well as action was needed for the conduct of the state, those who were engaged in the different branches of this common work were not absolutely contradistinguished: cf. Plato, Gorg. 520 Α, Phelr. 258 Β, and the general terms in which the ῥήτορες are described—e. g. by Lysias (xviii. 16. p. 150) as οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες.
Illustrations occur also abundantly elsewhere. We see from the Ion (533 E) how poets were brought under this censure for parading inspiration as the substitute for reason. The rhetoricians 2 again as in the Gorgias were censured for producing persuasion without knowledge. Yet stronger and yet more incessant was the denunciation of the mischievousness and presumptuousness of undertaking politics ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου (Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 3), or without knowledge of principles (Alcib. I. 113 C). But Anytus was actuated, over and above such a class-feeling, by personal animosity. One ground of this has been said to have been his "amor spretus Alcibiadæ": 3 so Luzac and Wiggers. Plato further (Meno 94 E) makes him threaten Socrates with mischief in bewilderment and mortification at being told, in effect, that in teaching 4 his son the family business he had done nothing towards his real education. These personal motives, however, remained in the back-ground; and so again, if he entertained yet another grudge against Socrates as the teacher of Critias, the avowal of it was incompatible with the Act of Amnesty. Therefore he made the attack under cover of defending the democracy. The ἑπείκεια of the restored people did not last long (Plat. Epist. VII. 325 B), and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal for their revived popular institutions.

3. NUMBER OF THE JUDGES.

The statement of Wiggers (Sokrates p. 132 note), and of Matthiae (Miscell. Philol. vol. I. p. 252. note 35), that the number of the judges on Socrates' trial was 556 or 557, has been repeated without question even by Mr. Grote (Hist. Gr. vol. VIII. p. 654, chap. 68). It is, however, as Dr. Cron 5 remarks (in his note on Apol. 36 A), merely an assumption from the false reading τρεῖς in this passage, taken in connection with the

2 The enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates' death to the Socratists (Luzac de Dig. Socer. Sect. II. § 4).

3 The story of this "amor Alcibiadæ" rests on the testimony of Plutarch and of Satyrus apud Athenaeum, but is unlikely in itself, and because Plato and Xenophon are wholly silent about it.—Zeller II. p. 141 note.


5 Plato's Ausgewählte Schriften erklärt von Christian Cron und Julius Deuschle.—Teubner, 1865.
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statement of Diogenes Laertius (II. v. 40), κατεδικάσθη διακο- σίως ὑδοϊκοντα μὴ πλείοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολυουσῶν, whence the numbers are supposed to have been 281 for condemnation, 275 for acquittal.

There is no reason (as Mr. Grote allows) for mistrusting the precise statement of Diogenes, nor is there any more reason, if we have regard to Greek habits of expression, for doubt that the 281 represented the aggregate majority, not the amount by which it exceeded the minority.

Hence, accepting the reading τριάκοντα here, the whole number cannot have been 556 or 557. An independent argument against such a number would be that it resembles no other recorded numbers on trials. Those which we find, such as 200 (Dem. in Mid. 223. p. 585), 500 (frequently), 700 (Isoer. xviii. 54. p. 381), 1000 (Dem. in Mid. 223. p. 585), 1500 (Plutarch. Vit. Periclis, 72), 2000 (Lysias, xiii. 35. p. 133), 2500 (Din. in Dem. 52. p. 96), 6000 (Andoc. i. 17. p. 3), even if they are only approximate, must stand for something near multiples of 100.

Now Pollux (VIII. 48) mentions 401 and 201 as the numbers in two different cases of φάσις, and elsewhere 1001 and 1501. This affords the clue to a conjecture of much probability (Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Process, p. 140), that this was a provision not exceptionally but uniformly for an odd number of judges, (frustrated sometimes, it would appear, by the default of individuals at the last moment), but that the common way of indicating the number was, for brevity's sake, to mention the variable constituent, omitting the invariable 1. And Hefster (Athen. Gerichtsverfassung, p. 55) clenches this by a passage from Ulpian's Commentary on Demosthenes' oration against Timocrates: διὰ τούτων δὲ ὃ εἰς προσετίθετο ἄεὶ τοῖς δικασταῖς ἦνα μὴ ἱσαὶ γένοιτο αἱ ψήφοι. Thus a Heliastic court always consisted of some multiple of 100, + 1.

Accordingly, if we take the total number of Socrates' judges

6 [Ulpian's note is on the words δικαστηρίων δυνῶν εἰς ἑνα καὶ χιλίων ἐφηφεσμένων (Dem. c. Timoccr. 9. p. 702) and stands as follows: ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις καὶ ἐστονδικασμένοις πράγμασι συνήγαγο τι δύο δικαστηρίων πλη- ρούντες ἀριθμὸν χιλίων καὶ ἑνός. διὰ τούτων δὲ ὃ εἰς προσετίθετο ἄεὶ τοῖς δικασταῖς ἦνα μὴ ἱσαὶ γενομένων τῶν ψήφων εἰς ἑστη ἀπέλθοις οἱ δικασμένοι ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος δόξη νικήν ὡ ἀν ὃ εἰς προσετίθη.]
as 501 (which is also Heffter’s conclusion), and the number of those for condemnation as 281, we have 220 for his acquittal.

Then 31 exactly, or 30 in round numbers, changing sides, would have effected his acquittal. Cron, not allowing for the odd 1, reckons 219 for acquittal.

4. Form of Indictment.


From Ἀσχενίν (iii. 197. p. 82) we learn that in a γραφὴ παρανόμων the time assigned for the trial was divided into three equal lengths: ἔγχειται τὸ μὲν τρόπον ὦδωρ τῷ κατηγόρῳ . . . . . . . τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὦδωρ τῷ τῆς γραφῆς φεύγοντι καὶ τοῖς εἰς αὐτῷ τὸ πρῶτον λέγουσι (i.e. τοῖς συνηγόροις, not the witnesses whose examination was extra to the time allowed for the pleadings: cf. Λυσ. xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166, 167, καὶ μου ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὦδωρ) . . . . . . . . τὸ τρίτον ὦδωρ ἔγχειται τῇ τιμήσει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ψυχῆς (i.e. for the prosecutor to speak again on the amount of penalty, and the defendant to reply, and the judges to vote).

The second of these lengths then would be occupied by the defence of the accused and his συνήγοροι, represented by the main part of the Apology, i.e. as far as 35 E. The Χενοφοντεύαν Απολογία says (22) that speeches were made ὑπὸ τὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ, but the Platonic manifestly would have us think of Socrates defending himself alone.

Then would follow the taking of the votes of the judges, and the announcement of the result, by which the charge is declared proven.

The third length then begins with the second speech of the

7 [Favorinus wrote a work on Socrates in the time of the Emperor Hadrian.]
prosecutor in advocacy of the penalty he had named; and the remainder of it would be occupied by Socrates' ἀντίτιμος, where the Apology again takes up the thread (35 E—38 C). It was open to the prosecutor to ask now for a lighter penalty than that which he had named in the indictment. It was in the defendant's speech on the ἀντίτιμος that he brought forward his wife and children ad misericordiam.

Then would follow the voting of the judges upon the amount of the penalty.

Here the formal trial would end, and the condemned person would be led away by the officers of the Eleven (cf. Apol. 39 E). This is the moment, however, to which the concluding portion of the Apology (from 38 C) belongs. Whether or not the indulgence of such a concluding address was historically conceded to Socrates, there must have existed sufficient precedent for it to give verisimilitude to the ascription of it to him. The Xenophontean Apology (24) agrees here.

The raised platform, called βῆμα, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses, whence the phrase ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, Apol. 34 A, and similarly Andoc. i. 26. p. 4, καὶ σωπῶ καὶ παραχωρῶ εἶ τις ἀναβαίνειν βούλεται, and Ἀesch. iii. 165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ βήματος ἐως ἀν ἐπης.


We find that speeches were made by all the three. Compare for Meletus Apol. 34 A, and for the other two Apol. 36 B, ἀνέβη "Ἀντός καὶ Λύκων. It is implied however that Meletus spoke first.

Grote (VIII. 647. c. 68) conjectures that they made a partition of their topics, "Meletus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lycon would dwell on the political grounds of attack." More accurately, Meletus' business would be to support the indictment proper, while the political charges and insinuations would be dwelt on by Anytus as carrying with him ἣδικη πίστις in this topic, and by Lycon as familiar with it in his capacity of ὀψωρ. The only citation in Plato's Apology which is referable to one accuser rather than another is the saying ascribed to Anytus (29 C), εἶ δια- 

Nevertheless, the Accusers:
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The other citations are general; e.g. 17 A, χρή ύμας εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοὶ ὄντος λέγειν, and 33 B, καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἶτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἶτε μὴ οὐκ ἄν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχομαι—an allusion to the alleged deterioration by him of Critias and Alcibiades, which was made much of by the prosecution according to Xenophon.

In the Memorabilia of Xenophon likewise the citations are all ascribed in general terms to ὁ κατήγορος. Mem. I. ii. 9, Ἀλλὰ νῦν Ἔλα, ὁ κατήγορος ἐφή, ὑπερορθῶν ἐποίηκε τῶν καθεστῶν νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων ὡς ἑαυτὸν εἶν τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἀρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμου καθιστάναι θαλαττης καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίως. Ib. 12, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὴ γενομένῳ Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα κακά τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. Ib. 49, Ἰδιά, ὁ Σωκράτης... τοὺς πατέρας προπληκτίζει οὐδὲν τῶν μὲν τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐξείλαντο παρανοίας ἐλύσατο καὶ τὸν πατέρα ὄρησεν, τεκμηρίως τούτῳ χρώμενος ὡς τὸν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμων εἶν πείθεται. Ib. 51, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίηκεν ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς αὐτῷ συνόντας, λέγειν ὡς δικαίως μὲν ὑπέκαθης τοῖς δικαζόμενοις οἱ συγγενεῖς ωφελοῦσιν ἄλλα τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἰατροὶ τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖς ἐπιστάμενοι. ἐφή δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτῶν λέγειν, ὡς συνδέοι όφελος εὖνοι εἶναι εἰ μὴ καὶ όφελεῖν δυνήσονται μόνος δὲ φάσκειν αὐτῶν ἄξιαν εἶναι τιμῆς τοῖς εἰδότας τὰ ἰδέατα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσατο δυναμένους. ἀναπέλθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτῶν ὡς αὐτῶς εἰς σοφώτατος τε καὶ ἄλλους ἰκανότατος ποιήσατο σοφοὺς, οὕτω διατίθεναι τοὺς αὐτῶς συνόντας ὡστε μηθαμοῦ ταύτα τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸ αὐτῶν. Ib. 56, ἐφή δ' αὐτῶν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξότατον ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ λυπηφότατα καὶ τούτοις μαρτυρίοις χρώμειον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακοίρους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικούς, 'Ἰσιδοῦν μὲν τὸ

'Εργὸν δ' οὖν ὑπεγείρος ἐργεῖν ἐτ' ὑπεδοσι',

tοῦτο δὲ λέγειν αὐτῶν ὡς ὁ ποιητής κελεύει, μηθένοις ἔργον μήτε ἄλλοικοι μῆτε ἀληθροῦ ἀπεχεῖσθαι ἄλλα καὶ τούτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει....τὸ δὲ Ὑμήρου ἐφή δ' ὁ κατήγορος πολλάκις αὐτῶν λέγειν ὃτι Ὀνυσσεύς

"Οντινα μὲν βασιλῆα κ. τ. λ."
Socrates speaks in presence of a large audience of Athenians over and above his judges (cf. Apol. 24 E, where he speaks of οδέ οί δικαισταί in pointed distinction from οί δικασταί), but he is addressing professedly his judges alone⁸ (cf. Apol. 17 C, εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσέναυ, 18 Α, δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή). It is therefore these alone who are designated by the ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι at the opening and throughout: Steinhart observes that the appellation ἀνδρείς δικασταί is reserved until the final address to be applied only to the judges who vote for acquittal. For mention of such audiences cf. Lysias xii. 35. p. 123, πολλοῖ καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ήκουσιν εἰσόμενοι τίνα γνώμην περὶ τούτων ἐξετε, Ἐσχ. i. 117. p. 16, ὅρων πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν νεωτέρων

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⁸ The δικασταί were very animated listeners. They answered speakers on being appealed to: cf. Ἐσχ. iii. 202. p. 82; so Ανδοκ. i. 33. p. 5, εἰ μὲν ὤν ὑμῶν δικαιότερος περὶ τούτων ἀπολογηθήσατι δηλώσατε μεν ἵνα προβιβασθησί τον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολογιμα. Or they stopped a speaker to put a question: cf. Ανδοκ. i. 70. p. 10, εἰ τίς τι ὑμῶν ποθεὶ ἄνασται ὑπομνηματί, and Ἐσχ. ii. 7. p. 29. They used the interpellation of κατάβας Aristoph. Vesp. 979. It seems to have been a common practice not only of political but even of judicial assemblies to express their pleasure or displeasure at what was said. The general word for such expressions of feeling was θύρωμα. That it was a word mediae significationis we see from Plato, Pol. 876 B, δικαστήρια . . . . . . . ὡς τῶν σοὶ τοιούτων, τοῖς εὐφήμοροι, τοῖς καλοῖς τοῦτον καλοῦντα. Thus also the word occurs in an unfavourable sense in Plato, Protag. 319 C, καταγελάσαι καὶ θύρωμα, Ἀνδ. decides ii. 15. p. 21, Lysias xii. 73. p. 126, θύρωμα, εἰς τὴν πόλιν τοῦτο μηδεμίον ἀποκλιθήσασθαι, 74. p. 127, εἰπεν ὅτι ὦ μέλει αὐτῷ τοῦ ἡμετέρου θύρωμα. It was unrestrained in its nature: cf. Ἐσχ. ii. 83. p. 11, μετὰ γέλωτος θύρωμα, 164. p. 23, πολιτική κραυγὴ παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσασθαι, iii. 122. p. 70, κραυγὴ πολιτική καὶ θύρωμα, Ἰσορ. xx. 272, θύρωμα καὶ βοήθησαι ἡμᾶς ἐμπλήσατε τὸ δικαστήριον. On the other hand it expressed applause unequivocally: cf. Ἰσορ. xii. 264. p. 288, ὡς θύρωμα δὲ ποιεῖ τινὰ ἐμπλήσασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν χιλιοντόων διελεγμένοις αὐτῷ ἀνεβήσασθαι ὡς ὑπερβαλλόντως εἰρηκότος. The θύρωμα which Socrates deprecates was of the unfavourable kind. This is implied by his urging that it is not his fault if the truth is unpalatable. θύρωμα would thus seem to be confined to the δικασταί, not joined in by the ανδρείς. The word is applied to Meletus in Apol. 27 B merely in the sense of interrupting by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering.
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It has been questioned by C. F. Hermann whether Plato intended the reader of the Apology to imagine any introduction of witnesses to take place. It can hardly be doubted that he did: it is part of the verisimilitude which characterises the whole speech. At 19 D Socrates, wishing to appeal to the judges as witnesses, employs the common formula for doing so—μάρτυρας δ' αυτόν ύμων τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι. Cf. Ἀesch. ii. 122. p. 44, καὶ τούτων ύμεῖς οἱ τὴν ψήφον μέλλοντες φέρειν ἔστε μου μάρτυρες. Similarly, when at 21 Α—καὶ τούτων πέρι δ' ἀδελφὸς ύμών αυτοῦ οὕτως μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε—he uses the very circumstantial formula commonly in use in such a case, he must intend us to go on to fill up the picture with the actual production of the witness. And at 32 Ε καὶ τούτων ύμων ἐσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες must mean that the production of the witnesses is to follow, coming so near as it does to the common formula τούτων δ' ύμων τοὺς μάρτυρας παρέχομαι (cf. e. g. Antipho v. 20. p. 131, and Lysias x. 5. p. 116). The future consistently used in the two last cases (contrast the present in the first case) would not suit the supposition of mere reference to persons who are not to be produced. Again, 34 Α, τοῦτον τὰν τοὺναντίλον εὑρίσκει is very like an implied promise to produce evidence. Lastly, the employment against Meletus of the common topic (34 Α)—'Why did he not call witnesses who if what he said was true could not have failed to establish it?'—and the subjoining of the conventional challenge εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάβετο νῦν παρασχέσθω· εγὼ παραχωρῶ would be suicidal in a speaker who forbore to call witnesses himself.

Interrogation of the accuser.

In accordance with the law (Demosth. e. Steph. B. 10. p. 1131, τοὺς ἀντιδίκους ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρώνασθαι ἀλλήλους τὸ ἐρωτῶμεν μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ), and with the common practice (cf. Lysias xiii. 30, 32. p. 132, where spaces are left for a
formal ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ, as for ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ elsewhere, and add Lys. xii. 24, 25. p. 122, where a specimen is given at length), Meletus is questioned by Socrates in 24 C and the following paragraphs. In 25 D Socrates himself appeals to the law in support of his right to put such questions—ἀπόκριναι, ὃ 'γαθέ καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

(ii.) Ἡ ἀντιτίμησις.

In the Xenophontean Apology (23) it is denied that Socrates made any ἀντιτίμησις—οὔτε αὐτῶς ὑπετιμήσατο οὔτε τοὺς φίλους εἶσαν ἄλλα καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογοῦντος εἰη ἄνι-κεῖν. The Platonic ἀντιτίμησις, both of the σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ and of the 30 minæ, is (waiving the question of its being historical or not) wholly ironical: there could be no serious expectation that such an offer would be accepted. Diogenes Laertius says that this ἀντιτίμησις turned 80 more of the judges against him—καὶ οἱ δάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν προσθέντες ἄλλας ψήφους ὑγοῦσιν. (iii.) The last words.

The latter part from τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένοις (29 E) we are to imagine as spoken ἐν ὧν ὡς ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἤγον, and only those who chose would hear it (cf. παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνων, ibid.).
PART II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APOLOGY.

1. ITS ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

i. Its employment of commonplaces (τοποί).
ii. The "old accusers."
iii. The Delphic response.
iv. The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.
v. Its dramatic framework.

2. HOW FAR CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCRATES.

3. ITS ADEQUACY AS A DEFENCE.

1. ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

A close examination of the structure of the Apology resolves the question how far it preserves to us the actual defence made by Socrates. The criticism of Wiggers and Schleiermacher, that the Apology is the purest extant relic of Socrates, falls to the ground before the internal evidence which the Apology itself supplies. Xenophon (Mem. IV. viii. 5) tells us that Socrates turned his thoughts away from the preparation of any defence—"ἡδη μον ἐπιχειρούντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τῶν δικαστῶν ἀπολογίας ἡναντιώθη τὸ δαμόνων. Now the Apology is artistic to the core, whether in respect of the recurrence of received τόποι of Attic pleaders, or of the arrangement and outward dress of the arguments (observe especially the artifice of "the old accusers," of which presently), or of the tripartite dramatic arrangement of the whole. The art and the manner, worthy as they assuredly are of Plato, are also distinctively characteristic of him. The subtle rhetoric of this defence would ill accord with the historical Socrates, even had the defence of Socrates been as certainly as we know it not to have been the offspring of study and premeditation.
We may trace this in detail through the defence or the first of the three parts of the oration.

The exordium may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators. The imputation of conjoint falsity and plausibility, the denial of being δεινὸς λέγεω (cf. Lys. xix. 1, 2. p. 152, Isæus x. 1. p. 79), the asking pardon for λόγους πολὺ τῶν εὐθυμενῶν λέγεσθαι παρ' ύμῳ ἐξηλλαγμένους (as Isocr. xv. 179 expresses it), the plea of unfamiliarity with law-courts (Isocr. xv. 38. p. 318, οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν), the begging for an impartial hearing (Lys. xix. 2, 3. p. 152), the deprecation of θόρυβος (cf. e. g. Æsch. ii. 24. p. 31, ἐπανῶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὑμᾶς, ὡ ἀνδρες, ὅτι σιγῇ καὶ δικαίως ἡμῶν ἀκούετε), the disclaiming a style unbecoming an old man (cf. Isocr. xii. 3. p. 233, ἡγοῦμαι γάρ οὐχ ἀρμόττευν),—these topics, of which the exordium of the Apology is wholly made up, occur continually in the Orators.

Next, in meeting the judges' prejudices, advantage is taken of another common topic—allegation of the existence of διαβολαί (cf. Lysias xix. 5. p. 152). The way in which the charge of being a σοφὸς is dealt with has many parallels: cf. e. g. Isocr. xv. passim. No accusation was more indiscriminately launched than this, and the answers to it assumed consequently, in great measure, the character of commonplaces.

Socrates twits Meletus with having instituted the whole of the proceedings for his own amusement (24 C); so Lysias xxiv. 18. p. 170; and again with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court; cf. Lys. xxvi. 5. p. 175, ταῦτα χρὴ ύπολαμβάνειν μη εὐθείας αὐτῶ εἶναι ὁδηγητε.

Socrates alleges (32 A), though in a refined way, the meritorious acts of his past life;—a common τόπος. Cf. Lys. xvi. 13, xxi. 1. pp. 146, 161.

Compare again ἕγω δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδὲνός πῶτερ' ἔγενόμην (33 A) with Isocr. xv. 85, ἕγω δὲ τῶν μὲν ἐνιαυτῶν οὐδένα πῶτερ φανήσομαι παρακαλέσας ἐπ' ἐμαυτόν τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅλην περῶμαι πείθειν τοιούτως πράγμασιν ἐπιθετεῖν εξ ὧν αὐτοὶ τε εὐθαμονή-σοναι κ.τ.λ.

The answer to the charge about perverting the youth is
paralleled by Isocr. xv. 240, τοὺς πατέρας ἄν ἐωράτε τῶν συνώντων ἡμῶν καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους ἀγανακτούντας καὶ γραφομένους.

The particular form of challenge is paralleled by Andoc. i. 35, p. 5, τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ἁνδρῶν οἱ μὲν ήκουσι καὶ εἰόνιν ἐνθαδέ τῶν δὲ ἀποθανόντων εἰσὶ πολλοὶ προσήκοντες ὡσι δόσις βούλεται ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ λόγῳ ἀναβάς με ἐλεγχάτω.

The argument (34 A) καὶ ἄλλον πολλοῖς ἐγὼ ἐμὸν ἔπειτα ὡν τριά ἔχον μᾶλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῷ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυς is a stock argument against an adversary who does not produce witnesses. Cf. Arist. Rhet. I. xv. 17. The avowal of disdaining to solicit compassion is to be compared with Isocr. xv. 321, p. 345, and Lys. xviii. 24, xx. 35, pp. i, 161.

The leaving the event to God (19 A), τοῦτο μὲν ὅτι ὅτι τῷ θεῷ φιλοῦ, and (35 D), ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέπει καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνεις περὶ ἐμοῦ is not characteristic of Socrates, for it occurs in the typical oration of Antipho (i. 20, p. 113, ἡ δ' αἰτία......ἐξε ἐπίσχεψιν], ἔπεις τε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ θέλωσιν, and ibid. 25, 31, p. 114), though indeed sparingly in the Orators generally. The Gods are invoked at the outset of Demosthenes’ speech on the Crown (p. 225).

(ii.) “The old accusers.”

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (III. xv. 1.) remarks, περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὀν τὸ ὑπόληψιν δυσχερή ἀπολύσαιον οὐδέν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰτε εἰπόντος τῶν, εἰτε μή.

An artifice in the Apology which demands separate notice is the way in which the prejudices of the judges are dealt with. The attack on them is so carefully masked that its point might be missed by a cursory reader. The strength of the prejudice which existed against Socrates demanded that a substantive and prominent portion of his defence should be directed specially against it. He could not hope to combat the charges of his prosecutors on their own merits in presence of a general aversion which was in harmony with these charges. Worst of all, this aversion was too well reflected by the Court itself. It was matter of exigency, therefore, to deal with it at once, and so we find it succeeding the exordium almost hurriedly. But to this was joined the necessity of avoiding both the direct imputation of it to the judges, which would have been to offend
them further, and the designation of it at once as a vox populi, which would have been to acknowledge its weight.

It is therefore introduced to the judges under a disguise. Their attention is drawn to it not as the attitude of their own minds, not as matter of common fame, but as emanating from certain individuals who with time and perseverance have done their work. The calumny, now so wide-spread and influential, is all traceable to them. It is not possible to single them out ("except perhaps a certain play-writer"); in default of which,—the only fair method,—they are individualised in imagination. They are marked off by a special designation,—"the original accusers,"—and their calumny is made more tangible by throwing it into the form of a technical indictment supposed to be preferred by them and read before the Court.

Οἱ πρώτοι κατήγοροι are but a figure for ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή, and what makes the neutralising of this διαβολή at once so necessary and so delicate a matter is that it is that ἦν ὑπείκ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχέτε. But these two identifications emerge in one or two places only. Twice only is the reference to the judges pointedly disclosed,—"I hope, if possible, to convert you from a prejudice which you" (the repeated pronoun is emphatic) "have so long harboured" (19 A, 24 A). Immediately, however, after these disclosures, the argument resumes its disguise. In like manner once only, considerably later (28 A), when he notices the inferior importance of the charges of Meletus, which he has just answered, to the older charges, he acknowledges these as vox populi—ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φόνος.

The seriousness of tone which marks the answer to "the old accusers," the ἡθική πίστις which is thrown into it, and the absence of irony, contrast sharply with the banter with which the charges of the real indictment are met immediately afterwards. This earnestness and almost anxiety of tone, the prominent position of this portion of the Apology, the irrelevance of its ostensible reference, the very technicality with which it is drawn up, forbid a more literal acceptation of its drift, and constrain us to find in it a signal exercise of rhetorical art.

(iii.) The Delphic response.

Again, as the objective prominence given to "the old
"accusers" is a rhetorical cloak for an attack on the prejudices of the judges, so the prominence given to the Delphic response (20 E sqq.) is a device of a semi-rhetorical character under cover of which Socrates is enabled to avoid an avowal of the real purpose which had animated him in his tour of examination,—which was to effect an intellectual revolution by substituting a sounder knowledge for the prevalent pretensions to knowledge, of the hollowness of which he entertained the deepest conviction. Such an explanation would, to say the least, not have been appreciated. What is to be noticed is, that he does not plead the oracle, (the authenticity of which there is no ground for doubting), as an after excuse for his necessarily unpopular mission,—which would have been natural enough. But he goes beyond this, and represents the oracle as the cause of his engaging in that mission; whereas (as Zeller observes) he must have already been committed to this and already been a marked person, before any such question as that put to the Pythia by Chærephon could have had any point or elicited any such remarkable answer. The representation of the oracle as giving him the first suggestion of his crusade against fictitious knowledge, as having throughout been the lodestar to which he shaped his course, and as having sustained him in the thankless labour of years, is unhistorical; but Socrates employs it in the exposition of his antecedents in a semi-rhetorical spirit, to bring the audience a certain distance on their way without the offence which a direct avowal of his purpose would have aroused in their minds.

(iv.) The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.

Every care has been taken to marshal the topics of the defence to the best advantage. The answer to the indictment itself is placed in the middle of the speech, where least attention naturally falls upon it. The arrangement is the same as that of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown, but the reasons are different in the two cases. In both the technical argument is introduced, where it will least challenge attention; but there because it is the weak point of Demosthenes' case, here because, though easily established, it is comparatively immaterial to the issue. The real effort of the defence needed
to be exerted first in combating the general prejudices which affected Socrates as a reputed Philosopher and Sophist, and secondly in offering a somewhat more particular personal justification of Socrates. Accordingly the portions of the defence which are concerned with these two points, as they are the fullest and most earnest, are also the most conspicuous by position. The first confronts us at the outset, and the other engages us after Meletus has been dealt with.

(v.) Dramatic framework.

The customary procedure of an ἀγών τύμητος has prompted Plato to crown the Apology of Socrates with a further artistic completeness. The oration becomes a drama. An action in three stages passes before us; the tone changes with the action; there is even some change in the dramatis personae. We take our stand among the listeners who crowd the court. The first Act comprises the defence, with the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus, the voting of the judges, and the declaration of their verdict. The second comprises the τύμησις of the prosecutor, Socrates' ironical ἀντιτύμησις, the intervention of Plato and other friends of Socrates, the first suspense, and then the final verdict. In the third Act the judges appear before us distinguished into two separate bodies, addressed separately by Socrates, the one his friends, his true judges, the other divested of the name and doomed to the consequences of their unrighteous deed. The tone of apologetic argument in the first Act is succeeded by dignified irony in the second, and this again in the third by a strain of lofty prophecy.

2. How far is the Apology characteristic of Socrates?

Zeller (II. 134. note) insists that there is an absence in the Apology of that free artistic handling which characterises the Dialogues, and claims this as an evidence that Plato has bound himself to follow the line actually taken by Socrates. But the strength of this position is diminished by several considerations. In the first place we have seen how great an amount of art has found its way into the structure of the Apology; we have seen too how that same art has not been
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restricted to the arrangement and outward dress of the speech, but so penetrates its very substance, that even here it is impossible to ignore or definitively to limit the rhetorical element. It is only with this considerable abatement that Zeller's assertion of the absence of free artistic handling can be admitted. But, in the second place, so far as the fact remains,—and to a certain extent it does,—it is referable to more obvious causes than that of fidelity to the speech of Socrates. The conditions which Plato had to fulfil were those of a speech in a court of justice, pronounced on a definite historical occasion; he had to consult the exigencies of forensic verisimilitude, and to embody a reply to the definite charges of a well-known indictment. And although with him (as with Xenophon in the Memorabilia, though in a different manner,) the main object certainly was the ultimate one of presenting to the world a serious and adequate justification of his adored teacher, yet he was none the less under the necessity of adopting for his framework the circumstances of the actual trial. In the third place,—in presence of little or no independent testimony as to what Socrates actually said,—we have the fact before us that the Platonic Apology was not alone in the field as a professed record of the great teacher's defence. The Xenophontean Apology, devoid as it is of authority, being perhaps a compilation from Xenophon's Memorabilia I, ii, IV, viii (see Steinhart's Anmerkungen I. 2 in Platon's Sämtliche Werke über- setzt von Hieronymus Müller, Leipzig 1851), is a case in point. Had the Platonic Apology been a record of confessed history, is it possible that the Xenophontean Apology should have been so framed as to differ from it not only as to what was said but as to what was done,—as for instance in the statement (22) that Socrates' friends spoke at the trial as συμήγγειοι, and again (23) that Socrates refused ὑποτιμᾶθαι altogether, both which statements conflict with the Platonic representation? But there were yet other Apologies extant besides these. Aristotle in the Rhetoric (II. xxiii, 13) quotes from a Socratic Apology of Theodectes, as containing the following passage, εἰς ποιόν ἱερὸν ἡσέβηκε; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὡς ἡ πόλις νομίζει; and besides in the same chapter he quotes the following passages without mention of their authors but obviously from similar compositions; μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ
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It is then too much of an assumption, though countenanced by Zeller and Mr. Grote as well as by many older writers on the subject, that we can rely on the Platonic Apology as a substantial reproduction of the speech of Socrates. Independently of Plato's representation we know not what Socrates said, or whether he said much or little, or how far he concerned himself with a direct reply to the charges laid against him; nor, when we have studied that representation, do we know these things any the better. Even if the studied speech of Plato embodied authentic reminiscences of the unpremeditated utterances of his master, to disengage the one from the other is more than we can assume to do.

Notwithstanding, we can seek in the Apology a portrait of Socrates before his judges and not be disappointed. Plato has not laid before us a literal narrative of the proceedings and bidden us thence form the conception for ourselves: rather he has intended us to form it through the medium of his art. The structure is his, the language is his, much of the substance may be his; notwithstanding, quite independently of the literal truth of the means, he guarantees to us a true conception of the scene and of the man. We see that "liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam non a superbia" (Cic. Tusc. I. 29), and feel that it must be true to Socrates, although with Cicero himself we have derived the conception from Plato's ideal and not from history. We hear Meletus subjected to a questioning which, though it may not have been the literal ἐρώτησις of the trial, exhibits to us the great questioner in his own element. We discover repeated instances of the irony, which, uniting self-appreciation with a true and unflattering estimate of others, declines to urge considerations
which lie beyond the intellectual or moral ken of the judges. Here we have that singularity of ways and thoughts which was half his offence obtruding itself to the very last in contempt of consequences. Here we have that characteristic assertion of private judgment against authority which declares itself in the words ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἀνόρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἦ ὑμῶν (29 D). Here we have also his disapproval of the existing democracy of Athens which he rather parades than disguises. And lastly, the deep religiousness which overshadowed all his character breathes forth in the account he renders of his past life, in his anticipations of the future, and in his whole present demeanour.

Thus while the problem of the relation of the Apology to what Socrates actually said must remain unsolved, there is no doubt that it bodies forth a lifelike representation; a representation of Socrates as Plato wished us to conceive of him, yet at the same time as true to nature as the art of Plato could render it.

3. THE ADEQUACY OF THE APOLOGY AS A DEFENCE.

That the Apology aims at much more than a refutation of the indictment of Meletus is already sufficiently evident. We have seen that the avowed answer to Meletus is that part of the speech which by its position least challenges attention, and which is least characterised by an air of serious concern. The statement is besides repeatedly made, that the real strength of the prosecution lies outside of the indictment, and requires a commensurately wider effort to meet it.

The worth, then, of the Apology as a defence must be measured, in the first instance, if we will, by its sufficiency as an answer to Meletus, but chiefly and ultimately by its sufficiency as a justification of Socrates' whole manner of life.

It will not much affect our estimate, whether we regard the Apology as no more than a defence adapted to the historical occasion of the trial and to judicial ears, or as a posthumous justification of the great master in the eyes of the Hellenic world. Though the more comprehensive aim is doubtless the real one, yet public opinion had undergone so little change

10 As a matter of fact, the Athenians never repented of Socrates' death. The story of their passionate remorse being evoked by the repre-
in favour of Socrates since his death, that the justification which was most calculated to satisfy it was identically that which would have been most to the purpose at the trial.

First, then, what sort of an answer is offered to the indictment of Meletus?

That indictment divides itself into two allegations, under the heads respectively (as we should say) of religion and of morality. The mischief to morality is the perversion of the youth; the offence against religion is the setting forth of strange gods in the place of those of the state.

Now though these are put into the form of specific charges against Socrates, they are so (all but that of the καυνά δαυμόνα) in appearance alone; they are really selected from the string of imputations currently brought against Philosophers and Sophists. The Philosophers, i.e. Physicists, were popularly associated with atheism, the Sophists with perversion of the youth. The allegations of "the old accusers," to which the Apology first addresses itself, are drawn from the same repertory, and arraign Socrates in like manner under the two heads of religion and morality as Philosopher and Sophist. It is true that the particular complaints there expressed are not the same; but it is not that the charges put forward here are less general than those. They are only omitted there because they were to come under consideration here. In the Clouds both these and those are put forward against Socrates, one after the other. And in the Apology itself (23 C—D) "the old accusers" are represented as eventually appending both "perversion of the youth" and "atheism" to their other charges.

The indictment therefore of Meletus contained no charge, save that of δαυμόνα καυνά, which would not be met (so far as might be) by the explanation Socrates had rendered of the deeper and wider and older prejudices, personified in "the old accusers," or by the justification he might be able to offer of the general method of his life.
Here therefore Socrates contents himself with a dialectical victory over Meletus; instead of entering into the merits of the question with him, he disposes of him summarily by adding him to the list of pretenders. If the charge of δαμώνια καίτω is subjected to the same treatment,—a treatment characterised by Döllinger as little better than sophistical,—it is because that charge is itself a sophistical one. It wrests τὸ δαμώνιον into δαμώνια, the divine agency of which Socrates consistently spoke into divine beings. Socrates therefore is only returning Meletus' sophism upon himself, when he treats the δαμώνια of the indictment as if it had been δαμώνια πράγματα. His whole dealing with the question of heterodoxy has an observable air of carelessness. Though he explicitly disavows atheism, and calls the sun and moon gods, yet he nowhere commits himself to a distinct recognition of the state gods, any more than he repudiates belief in any others. But it must be remembered that in those days few could have cast a stone at Socrates for such reticence: and that if a man's practice was religious, there was little enquiry into his opinions; and that Socrates' character as a religious man, his strictness and frequency in religious observances, was beyond doubt and made proof superfluous,—though the Xenophontean Apology enters into it at length. From the personal imputation of irreligion, in short, Socrates had little to fear, and he could afford to deal with it lightly; whereas to that of perverting the youth he addresses himself twice elsewhere, in addition to the dialectical refutation of it here.

Thus what was really formidable in the indictment of Meletus resolved itself into the more general imputations which connected Socrates with those two suspected classes of men, the Philosophers and the Sophists; and, keeping in view the fact that the Apology addresses itself elsewhere in full to those imputations, any fuller treatment of them under the head of the indictment can be spared.

The remainder of the defence is taken up with two lines of argument: the first, at the outset of the speech, deals with the general prejudices, which existed against Socrates as Philosopher (Physicist) and Sophist; the other, which follows the special reply to the indictment, offers a particular justification for Socrates' manner of life as a citizen.
In the earlier portion Socrates does what he can, first to separate himself from those two suspected classes, and then to explain how the prejudice arose in the public mind, and how it became strengthened by personal animosity.

It is hardly necessary to show that the imputations of "the old accusers" contain nothing of an individual character, but are (as Socrates alleges) mistakenly transferred from the popular notion of the Philosophers and the Sophists. The title σοφὸς ἄνηρ, which Socrates takes such pains to disclaim, is the appellation originally bestowed on the Ionic philosophers, as men whose speculations had fathomed the universe, and from this association was matured that distinction between it and φιλοσόφως which we find in Aristotle (Ethic. Nic. VI. vii. 5, Ὡσαλίν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ᾽ οὐ φασὶν εἶναι). It was in connecting Socrates with a supposed class of speculative men that the force and odiousness of the designation σοφὸς ἄνηρ consisted. The imputation contained in the words τὰ μετέωρα φροντίζων ἤ ζητῶν, i.e. τὰ οὐράνια, is equally general. The Scholiast on Aristoph. Nub. 96 says, κοινῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀπάντων ἐγκλημα. In 431 B.C. Diopeithes, a fanatical Rhetor, carried the law εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεία μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρρυθμῶν διδάσκοντας (Plutarch. Vit. Pericl. 169 D, Aristoph. Vesp. 380). Euripides (Fragm. Com. ed. Meineke, II. p. 490) says of Protagoras, ἀλαζονεῖται μὲν, ἀλήτρως, περὶ τῶν μετεώρων. Once more, the reference in τῶν ἴττω λόγων κρείττων ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλων ταύτα ταύτα διδάσκων is palpably general. The earlier Sophists, as teachers of pleading, first incurred and perhaps courted the imputation of τῶν ἴττω κ.τ.λ., and from them the imputation was derived to others. Isocrates (xv. 15. p. 313) speaks of the charge being made against himself, ὡς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἴττους λόγους κρείττους ὀνομαμαί ποιεῖν, and again (30. p. 316), ὡς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοὺς ἄγασι πλεονεκτέων. Odium also attached to the profession of an instructor in speaking. Hence AEschines' designation (i. 94. p. 13) of Demosthenes as λογογράφος, and (117. p. 16) ὦ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατασαγγελλόμενος τοὺς νέους διδάσκειν, crowned by the

11 Λόγων τέχνη <μη> διδάσκειν (Xen. Mem. I. ii. 31) was a law of the Thirty Tyrants against liberty and freedom of speech. How came the suspicion of Λόγων τέχνη to survive the Tyranny?
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designation σοφιστής (125, p. 17): cf. ii. 165, iii. 173, pp. 50, 78. Hence, weightier for its dispassionateness, a remark of Thucydides (VIII. 68) about Antiphon ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακεῖται, τοὺς μέντοι ἄγωνιζόμενοι καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ πλείστα εἰς ἄνηρ, δόσου ξυμβουλεύσατο τι, δυνάμενος ὀφελέων. This odium, in which the profession was held, was akin to fear; Isocrates (xv. 230) explains it thus, ἥ περι τοὺς λόγους δεινότης ποιεῖ τοὺς ἄλλοτρίως ἐπι-βουλεύειν.

Thus the charges recited present us with nothing individually characteristic of Socrates, but only (as he himself calls them 23 D) τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦσιν πρόχειρα. These were the materials for the popular representation of Socrates, which accordingly (like the caricature in the Clouds) is a compound of the conventional lineaments of the Philosopher (Physicist), and of the Sophist. The μετέωρα φροντίζων is due to the Philosopher, and the τῶν ἦττω λόγον κ.τ.λ. to the Sophist, while the title σοφὸς ἄνηρ stands12 alike for the one and the other.

To relieve himself from the yoke of these imputations Socrates fairly draws attention to the want of connection between himself and these two suspected classes. Of those speculative studies he13 denies any knowledge, and as to his having ever discoursed on them to others he courts further the testimony of his judges, of whom many had frequented his society.

The line of argument which he takes in distinguishing himself from the Sophists seems less cogent than it might have with the fact, that he used to call attention to the evidence of design in nature as a help to piety (Xen. Mem. VI. iii. 3 sqq.), that he is in fact (as Zeller remarks, II. p. 117) the parent of the teleological idea which has given unity and ideality to the study of nature ever since his days. This half-religious view of his had nothing in common with those indemonstrable hypotheses, which the Physical Philosophers tried in turn to fit to the universe.

12 Plat. Apol. 20 A, Evenus άνηρ. Πάριος σοφός, Xen. Mem. II. i. 21, Προδικοὶ ὁ σοφὸς is mentioned; as on the other hand σοφιστής is borrowed to express Philosopher.

13 There is no want of harmony between Socrates' disclaimer here and what he tells us in the Phaedo of his having taken up physical speculation in early life. He had given it up forthwith, on finding no satisfaction in it; and he could truly say (Apol. 10 C), ἐμὸι τοῦτον οὔδὲν μέτεστι. Nor again is his disclaimer at variance
been. He dwells on the most external difference alone. He points to the Sophists giving courses of lectures on various subjects, professing to turn out finished politicians, pleaders, debaters, and the like, pursuing this as a regular trade, and flourishing by it; he flatly disclaims any such characteristics (for even these, it seems, had been attributed to him, εἰ τινος ἀκηκόατε κ.τ.λ. 19 D), and so passes on. Here certainly was a sufficiently palpable dissimilitude, demanding no acuteness to appreciate it; but why was it not worth while to clench the argument by going more thoroughly into the contrast? We miss the manifold and deep divergence which might have been traced between a system which relied on the attainment of objective certainty, and one which, while it questioned received opinions, had no interest in either substantiating these, or establishing truer ones in their place; between a system which opened out a method of truth-seeking investigation, and one which, had it prevailed, would have made philosophy thenceforth an impossibility (Zeller, II. p. 130); between a system which proposed to place all human action on an intelligible principle, and one which professed to furnish the intellect alike for any use, regardless of principles. All this and more could have been pleaded in evidence of the wide gulf which separated Socrates from the Sophists; we can only suppose that the Court, or the people of Athens (to which ever we suppose for the moment the justification to be directed), were incapable of appreciating the fundamental unlikeness, and that the dropping of the subject here is at once true to the Socratic irony, and at the same time suggests that the real position of Socrates was never understood by the mass of his countrymen or by their compendious representative the Heliastic Court.

The sequel of this disclaimer of the popular identification is a setting forth of the facts which were the occasion of it. A man who himself exercised no practical profession, was ever showing himself dissatisfied with received empirical rules and maxims, and ever requiring from others a reason for tenets which they had never questioned, while in doing this he evinced matchless dialectical powers and forced a confession of ignorance from men known to be perfectly self-satisfied,—such a man answered sufficiently well the description of Philosopher.
and Sophist when once Aristophanes had given the hint. This was the naked explanation of the popular identification, and this it is in fact which lies couched under Socrates' parables of the wisdom which consisted in knowing his own ignorance, the Delphic Response, and the tour of questioning (Apol. 20 D—E, 23 A—B). And this account, which has all the appearance of truth, must stand good, in our estimate of the defence, as a plea which ought to have commanded attention. The speaker himself indeed despairs of its obtaining entrance into minds preoccupied; it was likely, he says (20 D), to sound to them like a jest. But the cause for despair lay not in the insufficiency of the plea, but in the invincibility of the prejudice to be combated. Nor has the whole strength of that prejudice yet been indicated. Had Socrates been really a Philosopher or a Sophist, there would have been nothing to be added; the supposed mischiefs of his teaching would have been alone in the scale. But so far as popularity was concerned, the difference between Socrates and Philosophers or Sophists told against him and not in his favour. The moral suspicion harboured against what he was supposed to be was aggravated by personal animosity against what he was. The ever busy talker, the merciless questioner, who avowed the exposure of self-deceived pretenders to be the mission of his life, and pursued this mission uncompromisingly for a quarter of a century and more in such a narrow society as was comprised within a Hellenic state, without ever even stirring from the midst of them, encountered enmities which never lighted on the head of Philosopher or Sophist; a specimen of which is the individual grudge which Anytus is said to have borne Socrates.

It is then a mistaken moral prejudice, intensified and quickened by the actual smart of personal affronts,—the former refuted to no purpose, the latter absolutely intractable,—which here threatens to overbear the defence. It is this aggravated prejudice, the working of which is foreshadowed in those discerning words (28 A), καὶ τὸ ὄντ’ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐμὴ αἰρήσει, ἐκαντερ

14 Zeller remarks that the fact of the Aristophanic caricature having stuck to Socrates to the end of his life shows that Aristophanes hit the popular conception. May we not rather suppose that he led it, and regard the Apology here as elsewhere as true to facts?
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On Socratic principles, a defence had discharged its office when it had set before the Court not grounds of feeling but rational grounds for its acceptance. Socrates has hitherto disproved (as fully as the range of the popular mind admitted) the mistaken identification of him with Philosophers and Sophists. He has given the explanation of the mistake, and he has pointed out how that very explanation accounts for the confirming of the mistake irrationally through personal animosity. He has exhausted his armoury; against this animosity itself he has no weapons; if his judges or the public will allow it to affect their verdict, it cannot be helped—

Beyond the reply to Meletus' indictment we find a fresh branch of the defence before us. Socrates is no longer overtly answering charges, old or recent, but rather directly justifying the usefulness of his life. He takes a view of himself, as it were from further off, and reviews his whole attitude as a citizen.

The question arises, how this part of the speech serves any direct purpose of the defence.

Of the strong points on the side of the prosecution, one has remained hitherto almost untouched: it is not one which appears in the indictment proper, or in that of "the old accusers;" nor again has it that stamp of inveteracy which would have marked it had it been part of the Aristophanic caricature. But it was the moving cause of the present indictment being preferred at all.

15 The mob who in 1791 sacked Dr. Priestley's house at Birmingham in consequence of his espousal of the principles of the French Revolution, of which the news had just reached England, proceeded to threaten all with whom Priestley had been associated not in politics or religion but merely by a common devotion to chemistry and invention. "A common cry among the mob was, 'No "Philosophers!' 'Church and King for 'ever!' And some persons, to escape "their fury, even painted 'No Phil- "losophers' on the walls of their "houses! . . . Boulton and Watt were "not without apprehensions that an "attack would be made on them, as "the head and front of the 'Philo- "sophers' of Birmingham.'—Smiles Life of Boulton, ch. 20.
It is tolerably clear from the accounts of the speeches for the prosecution that political charges entered freely into them. See Xen. Mem. I. ii. 9, 12, &c. To Socrates was there ascribed the evil done to their country by Critias the oligarch and Alcibiades the demagogue; the strange doctrine that the poorer private citizens were a fair mark for ill usage; the unfriendly criticism on election to offices by lot,—which was probably made use of as a special ground in support of the accusation of perverting the youth, since the ventilation of such doctrines tended to make them disloyal or insubordinate. A line of Hesiod was alleged to have been wrested by him to a like purpose, as countenancing rapacity.

There were indeed independent and domestic proofs alleged for perversion of the youth, but those which have been noticed were political. All these topics had been employed by the prosecution, and it is scarcely likely that in addition to them Socrates' abstinence from public affairs, his relations to Charmides, another of the Thirty, and to Xenophon, the friend of Sparta, and under sentence of banishment at the time, and perhaps his depreciating mention of the tradesmen in the Ecclesia (Xen. Mem. III. vii. 6), were not also brought up against him. Such charges and insinuations as these were indeed foreign to the indictment, but they were calculated to have considerable weight with the Court.

For one characteristic of the moment was the keen feeling with which since the restoration of the democracy the Athenians cherished their particular conception of political loyalty. That conception was somewhat narrow and exacting. The primary requisite was not only 'assent and consent,' but enthusiasm towards the letter of the constitution; and second only to this, as the natural reaction from the depression which the usurpation had caused, was a devotion to the material interests of the state, and the display of energy in amassing wealth.

The prosecutors, or at least the leading spirit among them, were no doubt actuated in their institution of the proceedings by the same political sensitiveness which they sought to inspire in the judges and betrayed in their speeches. Anytus was a man of strong political convictions; he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom. And if he
was partly animated by a personal grudge against Socrates, he was none the less the person to take up a political grievance against him.

There must have come to the surface some fresh element for the old prejudice so to pronounce itself. As Sophist or Philosopher, Socrates' cup had long been full; nor was there any reason in that point of view for its overflowing now if it had not before. Aristophanes had ceased to attack him. As a mark for personal enmity he had been more prominent and defenceless either in connection with the Hermas trials or after the battle of Arginusæ. It would be a difficult problem, why the extreme step was taken now and not till now, did we not take into account the political sensitiveness which, as the offspring of the restored democracy, formed a new element in public opinion as it affected Socrates.

We shall not be unprepared, then, to find that the remaining part of the defence is in some sense political,—as much so, as that of a non-political man could be. It is the defence of a reformer, though not of a political reformer. To ignore the political charge altogether in the defence would have been either a confession of weakness or a dangerous oversight, however fully the indictment might have been disposed of. But, moreover, political insinuations had been pressed into the service of the indictment itself in connection with the charge of perverting the youth.

It is obvious, that Socrates was precluded from meeting these charges in the way which would best have pleased his judges. He could have said that he had never transgressed the laws; he could say (as in fact he does say) that he loved his countrymen intensely; but for the existing constitution he could profess no enthusiasm. Yet here we must observe, that his coldness did not arise from frank political dislike of democracy, nor is his dissatisfaction to be measured by the one or two well-known criticisms which he passed upon it. He cared

18 Cf. Zeller, II. p. 152. The usur-
for politics only as involving the interests of the individual (Xen. Mem. III. iv. 12), and it is to his view of individual well-being that we must look, if we would understand the degree or the significance of his reserved attitude towards the constitution. Its faults connected themselves in his mind with other faults at once further from the surface and far graver. To him the alarming symptoms were such as these,—that this system extolled as so perfect could coexist with an utter abeyance of principles; could be carried on by men, who, in knowledge of it, were mere empirical adventurers; that it neither undertook nor directed education; that much might be going wrong within it, without its giving any check or warning; that morality might share the general wreck and not be missed;—and that, all this while, the Athenian mind should throw itself without misgiving into such a system, and find all its wants satisfied, and its self-complacency encouraged; that, while intolerance was stimulated, the belief in any unwritten law of right beyond and above the positive enactments of the state had all but died out, and a belief in divine sanctions was scarcely felt (Apol. 35 D).

It was for these deeper reasons that Socrates was totally out of harmony with the political optimism of his countrymen. Here was the cause of the gravest manifestation of his irony. The discord was the more complete, because it turned upon considerations of the well-being of individuals rather than upon political predilections and fancies. And out of those considerations there rose up before his mind a clear vision of a great need, and of the remedy which would remove it, and of an obligation upon himself to be the applier of that remedy.

The discord had jarred upon the sensitive ear of restored democracy, and filled it with a feeling of offence which presently found interpreters in Anytus and others. The whole deep disharmony did not strike them; but, conscious of its presence, they detected and treasured up superficial results of it, such as the detached adverse criticisms upon the government, and perhaps followed with a like jealousy the abstinence from public life; and they added to these other irrational aggravations, such as the connection with Critias and Alcibiades, and the well-known cry of perversion of the youth. It was the
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same offended sense which prompted the decisive step and brought Socrates to trial; and which, while the charges brought were the old and staple cries against the Philosophers and Sophists, aggravated these with a new political stigma.

But it is time to return to Socrates, and to the part of the Apology which still remains to be considered. We are now in a position to judge of it as a political defence, if such it shall turn out to be.

Of the particular political charges we find Socrates here only touching upon one, and that allusively,—the charge of being answerable for the misconduct of Critias and Alcibiades and perhaps others (33 B). The line he mainly follows is general.

We have analysed the attitude of Socrates towards the state of which he was a citizen into the following parts;—first, dissatisfaction, chiefly on moral grounds, with the prevalent state-theory; secondly, conception of the remedy to be applied to it; and, thirdly, conviction that the application devolved upon himself. And in a full general justification of himself in a political point of view, he would have had to expound all these points seriatim. We find him however reticent as to the first point: at most he only hints at it in the simile (30 E) of the high-bred horse, whose greatness of frame makes him somewhat sluggish, and who needs some gadfly to stir his spirit, and in the remark (31 A) that it is an extreme boon to be so roused. He interweaves the second point with the third, yet sparingly, and only in the way of explanation. It can hardly be said that the conception of the remedial plan is completely unfolded; though we find notices of it in the doctrine (29 D sqq.) that the care and improvement of the soul, and the pursuit of wisdom, truth, and virtue, are to be ranked infinitely above the pursuit of riches; the doctrine (36 C) of the need of consciously-possessed principles of individual and political action, tested (29 E, also 38 A) by self-examination; and the doctrine (33 A) of the imperative duty of adhering to what is just, alike in public and in private life. It is the third point, the assumption by himself of this mission, into which the speaker throws his strength: with this he starts, and to this he limits his justification. His first and paramount plea in this justification is that (28 B sqq. and 33 C) the work was under-
taken in obedience to the above-mentioned divine call, i. e. was
an indefeasible duty, and therefore to be performed without
respect of consequences, or counter-inducements, or human in-
hibition (29 D),—the proof of the divine call, i. e. of the reality
of the obligation, being that nothing else would have sustained
him in such a course of self-sacrifice (31 B). His other plea
is that his assumption of this work was an incalculable benefit
to his countrymen. In what remains he sets forth, in answer
to supposed objections, first, that to have entered public life
in preference to dealing with individuals would have been
neither a practicable nor an effective method of pursuing this
mission (31 C sqq.); and, secondly, the innocent tendency of
his work (inculcating righteousness, not training for professions
or imparting knowledge, 33 A), excluding the suspicion of per-
verting the youth,—a suspicion which is also refuted inde-
pendently (33 C).

To have enlarged upon the first point would obviously have
stood Socrates in little stead. He could not have done so
without appearing to admit the political allegations of his
accusers in their entire force; and thus the vindication of
himself as a reformer lacks the support which it would have
gained from a premised statement of the need of reform.
But, to pass on from this first drawback to its effectiveness,
the actual vindication offered must in itself have seemed to
the majority of the Athenians partly paradoxical and partly
visionary. In representing himself as having done good
service by urging on them the care of their souls, by unswerv-
ingly insisting on righteousness in them and in himself, So-
crates was traversing ground where they could not follow him.
These things had for them no meaning. They required devo-
tion to the letter of their constitution, they were on the verge
of a panic at the appearance of disaffection; and this was their
righteousness. With this they were content, when the sub-
stance of the old religion and the old morality were really
departed from them. They were necessarily far from believing
that it could be any man's duty or mission to set himself up
among them as a preacher of righteousness,—as he himself
says expressly in the ἄντιτιμησις (37 E—38 Α). To us there
may seem to be nothing so far out of the common in the moral
work of which Socrates claims to be the sole promoter, as to
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elevate him to a position of singularity. But it was a novel work enough to his contemporaries. It is a difficulty throughout in the way of appreciating Socrates, that positions, which ever since his time have been household words, not in moral philosophy merely but in common life, were in his mouth, to the men of his generation, original and novel; and that the simple principles he lays down here, so far from being commonplace to his audience, must have rather transcended their moral apprehension.

Nor must it be forgotten that their old distrust of the Sophist came in to the aid of their distaste for the reformer. So far from believing in his principles of moral reformation, they were confusedly identifying these with the old sophistical teaching. Hence it is that the disclaimer ἐγὼ διδάσκαλος οὐδενός κ. τ. λ. finds place here.

There were ample reasons, then, why this part of the defence should fail. Socrates stood before his countrymen a confessed reformer, and they were strangers to the idea of reformation except in a political sense,—a sense in which the Athens of the day had no room for reformers.

But the failure of the defence here urged by Socrates upon his countrymen is to be laid not to his charge but to theirs. The point upon which our whole judgment must turn is this. Was the need of a reformation so urgent as Socrates supposed it to be? If so, then Socrates was no less in the right, no less a benefactor, because they failed to feel the need, and they in crushing 19 him were no less guilty of a national hypocrisy.

There is no need to sum up at any length the results of our

19 It is a poor sophism to urge that the stages of an ἐγὼν τιμητός, or the venality of Athenian jailors, made Socrates' death his own act,—an eventuality which his accusers themselves never contemplated. This last assumption (which Köchly espouses) is directly at variance with the Apology, which (29 C) makes Anytus responsible for the argument that it were better Socrates should never have been tried, than that he should escape with his life. To excuse the judges as having been after the first step unwilling instruments of a legally unavoidable catastrophe, is a plea which we never think of allowing to the eastern despot, who after betraying his righteous minister "laboured " till the going down of the sun to deliver him." The justice or injustice of the catastrophe is involved in that of the first step. The whole responsibility fell upon the judges from the moment when, in affirming the accusation Ἀθωράτης ἄδικις κ. τ. λ., they gave their voice against the truth.
inquiry into the worth of the Apology as a defence. Its art is consummate; its statements are (as the exordium promised) unalloyed truth; its reticences are condescensions to the audience with whom it deals. It is exhaustive; it lays open by turns all the motives and influences which were at work against Socrates; and the more pains we are at to represent these to ourselves by means of an independent investigation, the more reason we shall find to acknowledge that the true clue lay all the while close to our hand in the Apology.

20 That the Sophists had no hand in bringing about the condemnation of Socrates is clear. Anytus was the enemy of Sophists. The Sophists had no political influence, and were themselves too much under the same suspicion with Socrates to have dared to inflame that suspicion. Cf. Zeller, II. p. 139.

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.

V = Vulgar text, settled originally by Stephanus.
B = Bekker.
S = Stallbaum.
Z = Zurich editors.
H = Hermann.
Oxon. = the Bodleian MS. known as 'Codex Clarkianus.'

[Dr. Gaisford first published the readings of this MS. in 1820. Mr. Riddell collated the Apology anew for this edition, and also the Crito, Phaedo, and Symposium.]
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

I. "Ὁ τι μὲν ὄμεις, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ ὀίδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὄλγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανὸς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοι ἄλλης γε, ὡς ἔποσ εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασί. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαϊμάσα τῶν πολλῶν ὄν ἐφεύσατο, τούτῳ ἐν ὧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρήν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δει-βνοῦ ὡτος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργος, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὀπόσο- 10 τιῶν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τούτῳ μοι ἐδοξέων αὐτῶν ἀνασχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἁρα δεινῶν κα-λοῦσιν ὡτοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτῳ λέγουσιν, ὀμολογοῖν ὡν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τοῦ-τος εἶναι ἥττωρ. ὡτοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, 15

5. ὡς ἔποσ εἰπεῖν] This qualifies the οὔδεν following, making it equivalent to ητι η οὔδεν below.

8. μὴ — ἐξαπατηθῆτε] This sentence is not affected by the tense of the main construction, because the contingency it expresses remains still future at the moment of its being al-}

A. The Defence.
Exordium.

5. οὐς ἔπος εἰπεῖν] This qualifies the οὔδεν following, making it equivalent to ἦτι ἦ οὔδεν below.

8. μὴ — ἐξαπατηθῆτε] This sentence is not affected by the tense of the main construction, because the contingency it expresses remains still future at the moment of its being al-

luded to by the speaker. Digest of Idioms, § 90.

14. οὐ κατὰ] A thorough litotes: 'far above these:' 'a far greater orator than they.' Cf. Hdt. i. 121, πατέρα καὶ μητέρα εὑρήσεις, οὐ κατὰ Μιτραδάτην τε τῶν βουκόλων καὶ τῆν γυναικα αὐτοῦ.
1. η τι η ούδεν άληθες ειρήκασιν ήμείς δ' εμοῦ άκοῦ- This form of expression we have from Homer, Od. iv. 80, ἄνδρων δ' η κέν τις μοι ἐφισεται, ήε καί ούκι. So Hdt. iii. 140, ή τις η ούδεσ. And Eurip. Dan. Fr. vi. Κρείσ- σων γάρ οὕτως χρημάτων πέφυκ' άνηρ, Πλην εί τις' δοτις δ' ούτος έστιν ούχ άρι. έστιν.

2. οὔ μέντωνι] Opposed to άκουσθεθε π. τ. ἄλ.—You shall have the truth entire, but not drest up. This contrast is only carried as far as άνόμασι after which the idea of the contrast between truth and falsehood is resumed (that is, πιστεύω γάρ κ.π.λ. gives the rationale of ήμείς δ'—άληθειαν') and continues to εστίναι,—since πλάτ- τουτι λόγους refers not to artificial language but to falsification; a μερικον, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric.

3. άσπερ οί] The nom. is the regular construction, where the noun brought into comparison can be made the subject of the clause introduced by άσπερ. The attracted construction, exemplified by άσπερ μερικόπω below, is less common. Dig. 176.

4. λήματι ... άνόμασι] What do these two terms mean here? For in Sophist. 262 a, b, they distinctly mean 'verb' and 'noun,' in Cratyl. 399 b, c, as distinctly 'expression' and 'word' (Δι άφιλος is the ρήμα, δίφιλος the άνόμα). Now the conjoint phrase seems to have had a familiar rhetorical signification; cf. Symp. 198 b, το δ' επὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν άνόματων καί άρηματών τίς ούκ ἄν ἐξεπλάγη άκον; 199 b, άνόμασι καί θέσθι άρημάτων, 221 ε, τοιαύτα καί άνόματα καί άρηματα: whence we may conclude that the association here is similar. And if we compare passages of rhetorical criticism in the Orators, where these words occur, we shall find the meaning approaches to that in Cratyl. rather than that in Sophist.; cf. Ἀσχίν. iii. 72, p. 64, οὔ γάρ ἐφη δεῖν (καὶ γάρ το άρημα μέμνη- μαι ὡς εἰπε, διὰ τὴν ανήδια τοῦ άνόματος) ἀπορρίζασι τῆς ειρήνης τῆς συμμαχίας—where the άρημα is the whole expression, the άνό- μα is ἀπορρίζασι. Further, as Socrates could not speak without 'expressions' and 'words,' it is the artistic use of them he here disclaims; which, in the case of άνόματα, would consist in what Ἀσχίν.—ii. 153, p. 48—calls ή τῶν άνόματων σύνθεσις, and also in tropes and other figures of speech, and choice of unusual words, cf. Ισορ. ix. 9. p. 190, μη μόνον τοίς τεταγμένοις άνόμασι, ἀλλα τὰ μὲν ἔξοις τὰ δὲ καώνιος τὰ δὲ μεταφοραίς' while άρηματα would extend to whole expressions, cf. Ἀσχίν. cari- cature, iii. 166. p. 77, τὰ μαρα αὐτοῦ καί ἀπίθανα ρήματα.
4. ὄσπερ—εἰσίναι] Three peculiarities; 1. μειρακίω is attracted into the case of πλάττοντι, cf. Dig. 176; 2. πλάττοντι is attracted into the case of ἡλικία; and 3. the gender of πλάττοντι notwithstanding follows the thought, cf. Dig. 184.

5. καὶ μέντοι] A stronger form of καὶ—δὲ. Dig. 145.

7. τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] This has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὴ θαρυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. But, as something like this was recognised in ordinary pleadings under the name of ἐρώτησις (see Introd. p. x.), the reference here probably extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 23 e), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, c).


10. οἱ πολλοί] άυμών is emphatic. As Stallb. remarks, the frequenters of the τράπεζα would be of the richer class.

11. ἐπὶ δικαστηρίων] The prep. has the notion of 'presenting oneself to' the court. Cf. Isaeus, Γ' v. vii. 11. 15, λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίων. The ἀπειβάζειν refers to the θέμα, cf. Introd. p. xv.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ἔξως ἐξώ τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὡσπέρ p. 17, οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῶ ὄντι ἔξος ἐτύγχανον ὄν, ἔπειτα ἄν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκεῖνῃ τῇ φονῇ τε καὶ τῷ p. 18, τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, εἰ ὡσπέρ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τὸ τοῦ ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γάρ ἐμοὶ δόκω, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐξών ἱστος μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἱστος δὲ βελτιών ἄν εἴη ἀυτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγο ἡ μὴ δίκαιοτεροῦ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆ ἀρετῆ, ρήτορος δὲ τάληθε λέγειν.

Π. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, προς τὰ πρῶτὰ μου ψευδή κατηγορεῖν καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὑστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοὶ γὰρ πόλλοις κατηγοροὶ γεγόνασι πρὸς ύμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἡδικεῖ ταῖς καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθεῖς λέγοντες, οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἡ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀντων, καίπερ οὖντας καὶ malui, quia doctius additamentum est quam quod ad interpolatum referamus. Immo facile cicer poterat propter Criton. 52 e, videturque jam Apollodoro ignotum fuisse, qui apud Diog. La. II, § 44. ipso septuagesimo ante mortem annum natum statuit; at duos ut minimum annos adiiciendos esse scire Bocchihius Corp. Inser. II. p. 341 probavit, nosque mox comparato Synes. Calv. Encom. c. 17 confirmavimus; cf. de theor. Deliac. p. 7." Zeller agrees, but makes 72 years the extreme limit.

5. δίκαιω] 'I request this of you as a piece of justice.' Cf. 41 d, χρὴ . . . τοῦτο διάνοιασθαι ἀληθείς, Legg. 795 c, ταυτῶν δὴ τοῦτ. . . . ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις πάσα χρὴ προσδοκών ὄρθον 'as the right thing.'

6. ἵστος μὲν γὰρ] The reason urged is a general one. The consideration of style, if allowed at all, will be operative just in those cases where it is better or worse than the case deserves,—just where it will interfere with true judgment.

9. αὐτῇ] This represents the preceding clause αὐτῶ—ἡ μῆ being in fact τοῦτο, attracted into the gender of ἀρετῆ. Dig. 201.

14. καὶ πάλαι] This καὶ only emphasises πάλαι. Dig. 133. And in καὶ οὔδεν—λέγοντες we have the common καὶ after πολλοῖ.—It was 24 years since the Clouds were represented: Forster.
2. τοὺς πολλοὺς] Closely with ἐκ παίδων. They ἐπειθὼν all, but only most, not all, as children. Cf. below, παίδες ὄντες, ἐνοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.

3. μᾶλλον] With ἐπειθὼν and κατηγόρων just in the same way as πολὺ μᾶλλον [κατηγ.], below, c. Here it is intended to balance the comparative δεινότεροι —‘were more busy in accusing me and trying to persuade you.’

4. σοφὸς—ποιόν] This “accusation,” both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. See Introd. p. xxiii. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist: the μετέφορα φροντ. points to the Philosopher, the τὸν—ποιόν to the Sophist. The title σοφὸς ἀνήρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation,—cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so as distinctly to exclude those of Sophist. See Introd. p. xxxii.

12. 13. παίδες ... μειράκια] We should have reversed the order, and said, ‘when you were all of you young, and most of you mere children.’

14. ὃ δὲ—ὁτι] This is not a changed but an abbreviated

a. Existence of such prejudices, and their nature, viz. that Socrates was, as a Physicist and a Sophist, a subverter severally of religion and of morality.
πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὄνοματα οἶνον τερ. 18. αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τίς κωμῳδιοποιὸς δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν· ὅσιο δὲ φθόνο φαι διαβολὴ ἤρωμενοι υμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείδοντες, ὁδόν πάντες ἀπορώτατοι εἰσίν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἶνον τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθ᾽ οὐδ′ ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνὸς ὦστερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογοῦμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιόσατε οὖν καὶ ύμεῖς, ὦστερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοὺς μοι τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἐτερους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτη κατηγωρίσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὖς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οὐκήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους προτότον μὲ ἀπολογησάσθαι καὶ γὰρ ύμεῖς ἐκείνους πρότερον ἥκοσατε κατηγοροῦντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον construction. In full it would be ὃ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐστὶ τούτῳ, ὅτι. Dig. 247. 2. εἰ τις Aristophanes is named below, 19 c, and is doubtless chiefly meant, but not exclusively. Eupolis had said (Meineke ii. p. 553), Μισόδ' ἡγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην, τὸν πτωχὸν ἄδυντοςχήν, οὐς τὰλα μὲν πεφρῶντικεν, ὡπόθεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἐχοῦν Τοῦτον κατημελῆκεν. And a play of Ameipsias, represented with Aristophanes' Clouds, was called the Connos, and the Chorus was of Phrontiste (Athen. v. p. 218). It is likely enough (Zeller, ii. p. 41. note 3), that Ameipsias introduced the same fact, or the same fiction, as Plato (Menex. 235 e, Euthyd. 272 e), and made the music-master Connus Socrates' instructor. 3. ὅσιο δὲ includes all but the εἰ τις that is, ὅσιο stands for ὅσιο ἄλλοι. Cf. Theæt. 159 b, where πάντα ἄ is equivalent to πάντα τάλλα ἄ. This ὅσιο ἄλλοι is then subdivided into ὅσιο μὲν φθόνο χρώμενοι and ὅσιο δὲ—πείδοντες. The ὅσιο μὲν is supplied from ὅσι δὲ by anastrophe; Dig. 247. The ἄλλοι πείδοντες is put in to make the sense clear, but virtually repeats the idea of υμᾶς ἀνεπίθου it does not affect the regularity of the construction.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 49

p. 18. ἣ τόνδε τῶν ὑστερον. εἰεν' ἀπολογητέον δή, ὥ ἄν-
p. 19. δρεσ Ἀθραίοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρήτεον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν
dιαβολὴν, ἦν ύμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχετε, ταύτην
ἐν οὕτωσι ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο
οὕτω γενέσθαι, ἐν ἂν ἄμεινον καὶ ύμῖν καὶ ἐμοῖ, καὶ
πλέον τί με ποιήσαι ἀπολογούμενον' οἰμαὶ δὲ αὐτὸ
χαλεπὸν εἰναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἶον ἐστίν.
οὗς τοῦτο μὲν ἢτο ὑπῆ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ
πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβομεν οὖν ἢς ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγο-
rία ἐστίν, ἢς ἡ ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ
b πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγγάφατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.
εἰεν' τί δὴ λέγοντες διεβάλλον οἱ διαβάλλουτες;
ὡσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαιν δεὶ ἀναγνω-

3. ἐσχετε] BZH; ἐχετε V. The preposition ἐν would be strange
with ἐσχετε if the meaning were ‘have entertained during so long
a time.’ ἐν means rather ‘within the limits of,’ and so, with
respect to the further limit, ‘at the distance of.’ Thus ἐσχετε
exactly falls into its place; ‘ye first came to have so long
ago.’

4. ἐν οὕτως] Though this collocation is rarer than
οὕτως ἐν ὀλ., yet it occurs; e.g. below 24 a (where this passage
is alluded to); Isæus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πᾶν ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ, Lysias,
xix. 8. p. 152, ἐν οὕτω δεινῷ καθέστηκεν. The rhythm probably
determines the order. There is no need for the οὕτως of V.

2. τὴν διαβολὴν] Not the
name of σοφός (cf. 20 d, τὸ τε
ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, and again
23 a); nor ‘calumny’ simply
(cf. below, ἡ κατηγορία . . . ἢς ἡς
ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ); but calumny
believed, i.e. ‘prejudice.’

7. οὐ πᾶν here as elsewhere
retains its meaning of ‘hardly,’
‘scarcely;’ but this is to be in-
terpreted as a litotes:—‘I can
hardly say I do not know.’
Dig. 139.

11. ἢ δὴ] The antecedent of
ἡ is διαβολή. Cf. 28 a, καὶ τοῦτο'
ἐστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, . . . οὐ Μέλη-
tός, . . . ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δια-
βολή.

13. διεβάλλον οἱ διαβάλλουτες]
This fulness of expression is
common in Plato, and gives
the air of deliberateness. Dig.
262.

14. ὡσπερ qualifies not only
catηγόρων but also ἀντωμοσίαν
and ἀναγνώσαν. They are quasi-
prosecutors; it is a quasi-in-
dictment; and Socrates makes
believe to read it.

ἀντωμοσίαν] So 24 b. This
ναι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἀδικεί καὶ περιεργάζεται ἡ—p. 19. τῶν τα τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια, καὶ τὸν ἢπτω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταύτα ταύτα διδάσκων. ε τοιαύτη τίς ἔστι· ταύτα γὰρ ἔωράτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν 5τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδία, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεὶ περι- φερόμενον, φάσκοντα τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολ- λὴν φιλαρίαν φιλαροῦντα, ὃν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα ous μικρὸν πέρι ἐπάθω. καὶ οὐχ ὃς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τίς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων 1οσοφὸς ἔστι· μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτασ


term, like ἀντιγραφή 27 a, is used to designate the ἐγκλη- μα. Both ἀντιμοσωία and ἀντι- γραφή were properly said of the defendant’s plea, presented in writing and sworn to, in the ἀνάκρισις, or preliminary proceeding before the Archon Basileus. But as the ἐγκλημα was likewise then presented in writing and sworn to, the same words came to be applied to it also. See Introd. p. ix.

7. ἐν ἐγώ] The antecedent of ἐν must be the matters in the ἀντιμοσωία, not the imme- diately preceding words.

οὔτε οὔτε μέγα] Accus. cognate, not accus. of the object; Dig. 6. Ἐπαίω is intransitive. 8. καὶ οὐχ ὃς—ἔστι] This is well-marked irony. Socrates declines here to pronounce, before an audience who would have welcomed it, a condemnation of studies against which at other times he had freely declared himself, on the double ground (1) that human nature ought to be studied first, Xen. Mem. I. i. 12, and (2) that the Physicists got involved in questions which were really beyond the powers of the human mind, ib. 11, and arrived moreover at impotent conclusions, ib. IV. vii. 6, 7.

10. τοσαύτα] ‘Upon so grave a charge’ as that of pronounc- ing upon things of which he
was ignorant,—the fault he himself so strongly reprobated in others.

1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ 'But the truth is.' Dig. 147.


ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν] This is a hysteron proteron: Dig. 308. With φράζειν is to be supplied of course ἀλλήλους, dropped by an idiom of abbreviation: Dig. 233.

14. ὡσπέρ Γοργίας] Gorgias is spoken of by Isocrates as having made greater profits by teaching than any other man of his profession. Yet the sum was but small: ὡ δὲ πλείστα κτησάμενος ἄν ἰμεῖς μημονεύομεν, Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος, though a single man and unburdened by Liturgies, χιλίους μόνους στατήρας κατέλιπε. Isocr. xv. 155. p. 83. The ὑποκρίται, he says, ib. 157, made much greater fortunes. Nor indeed is Socrates saying that the profits made by the Sophists were great. The sum which Socrates mentions below, 20 b, as Evenus' price, 5 mine (500 francs), seems to have been above the average: Isocrates, xiii. 3. p. 291, speaks of 3 or 4 mine (3–400 fr.) as a common price. Isocrates has been said, it is true, to have taken as much as 10 minae for his rhetorical course; Gorgias and Prodicus even 100. But what made the frequenting of Sophists' courses expensive was that people never thought they had had enough of them.
Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κέιος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. p. 19. τούτων γὰρ ἑκατός, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, οἷος τ᾽ ἐστὶν ἵνα εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, ὅς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖαι ὅ ἂν βούλωνται, 5 τούτους πείδουσι τὰς ἑκείνων ἔννοιασ ἀπολιπόντας p. 20. σφιάτες ξυνεῖαι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἑστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφὸς, ὃν ἐγὼ ἁσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα ἐτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἄνδρὶ ὅς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφιστᾶς 10 πλείον ἢ ἑξύμπαντες ὁι ἄλλοι, Καλλία τὸ Ἰππονίκου τούτων ὃν ἀνθρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο ψει—ὡς Καλλία, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου τῷ ψει πῶλῳ ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἶχομεν ὃν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λα- βεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὁς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε καὶ 15 ἀγαθῷ ποιήσεων τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετῆν ἣν δ᾽ ἂν ὁ δ᾽ τῶν ἰππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδή ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρω- πίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἑστὶν; οἵμαι γὰρ

14. καλῷ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ] So Oxon. It seems unnecessary to introduce a synalepha.

5. τούτων πείδουσι] The construction is changed from the infin. to a finite verb. Dig. 277. The change of construction is not gratuitous, but expresses (ironical) admiration. The passage in Theages, 128 a, is a reminiscence of this passage, including the change of construction.

6. προσειδέναι] The πρὸς stands compounded in its adverbial and not in its propositional sense. Dig. 129.

7. ἐπεὶ καὶ] The connecting thought is—and at Athens there is quite as good a field for professed teachers as elsewhere.’

8. ὅν ἐγὼ ἁσθόμην] Socrates implies that he speaks from hearsay when he states ἑστὶν ἐνθάδε.

The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to σον \("What is it, then, that \(you\) (since we are not to identify \(you\) with the \(σοφοί\)) have been about?\)"

**9. 'Υπολάβοι ἀν ὄν \(\text{So Oxon. and 2 other MSS.} \) \(\text{έγω} \) \(\text{εί} \) \(\text{not wanted} \) here.**

Socrates, though still ostensibly occupied with "the old accusers," passes from the denial of the imputations current against him as a reputed \(σοφός\) to an account of the personal dislike which had befallen him individually. See Introd. p. xxxiv.

**10. πράγμα\]** In the sense of pursuit, or plan of life or study or the like. Cf. Crito 53 d, τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα, Euthyd. 304 a, τὸ τοῦ πράγματος σφόν, e, χαριέν γέ τι πράγμα ἐστιν ἡ φιλοσοφία.

The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to σον \("What is it, then, that \(you\) (since we are not to identify \(you\) with the \(σοφοί\)) have been about?\)"

c. Exposition of the veritable peculiarities in himself, which had been mistaken for those of Physicist and Sophist,—viz. his conviction of the holowness of the prevalent pretensions to knowledge,
The verse in the Melanippe was θυίω ἐμόν ὁ μίθος ἀλλ' ἐρήμος πάρος πάρος. Πλατόνος 113 c. The verse in the Melanippe was ὁ μίθος ἀλλ' ἐρήμος πάρος πάρος. So Eur. Hel. 513. Αἴος γὰρ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐμόν ἐμόν, σοφόν δ' ἐπιστεύειν.
3. μάρτυρα—Δελφοίς "There is no need (says Zeller, Phil. der Griechen II. p. 45, note 2), to deny the authenticity of the oracle, but we cannot regard it as having given the primary impulse to Socrates' tour of enquiry. Socrates must have been already a known personage for Chærephon to have put his question to the Pythia, or for her to have taken it up." It is therefore semi-rhetorically that the oracle is here represented as the cause of Socrates' eccentric and unpopular proceeding. The Iambic form,—σοφός Σοφοκλῆς &c.—in which the response appears in Diog. III. 37, and Suid. σοφός, is a later invention—an expansion of the Pythia's simple negative recited here.

6. καὶ ὑμῶν—κατάλειπε] This allusion to Chærephon's antecedents is added not without purpose,—to dispose the court to hear more indulgently the story which is to follow.

In detail:—The full point of the phrase πλήθει ἑταίρος is to be found in the contrast of the adherents of the Thirty; more especially the ἑταῖροι of the oligarchical clubs, and the body of 3000 hoplites organised by the Thirty from their partisans. φυγήν refers to the subsequent expulsion of all not included in the 3000 from Athens, and their withdrawal presently after (when they found no safety in Attica) to Thebes, Megara, Oropus, Chalcis, Argos, &c. This flight, as an event still vividly remembered, is called ταύτη, 'the recent.' So Isoc. matches it with the old troubles under the Πισιστρατίδα;—τὴν δημοκρατίαν . . . διὸ ἦδη καταλείψεισαν, καὶ τὰς φυγὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τράκματα γενομένα, viii. 123. p. 184. With κατάλειπε cf. Lysias, x. 4 p. 116, ἐξ ὅσον ὑμεῖς κατελαθάτε: it is the recognised description of the restoration of democracy and end of the eight months' reign of the Thirty, signalised by the solemn return of Thrasybulus and the exiles from Piræus to Athens.
sophoteron einaí. kai touton peri ó adelphos úmín p. 21. autóú oustó méarturhítei, epeid'h ékeínos teteléut-

VI. Sképhasde ò òn eneka tauta légoi mélllo ò
5 gár umás didáxein, òn en òu ò diabolí gégone. tauta gár égo akouías énebímouýmèn oustow; tî pote légei ó theos, kai tî pote aiwíttei; égô gár òn òu te méga ouste smikroú ýónoida émauto soufòs ouv tî ouv pote légei fáskous eîme sofóstaton einaí; ou gár déptou psêuðetai ge ou gár thems autòú kai polyí
mén chrónon ἱπόρον, tî pote légei, eîteita mògís
pánv eîi zhtísiw autou touáütan tîa étrapómèn. 
klhov eîi tîa tón dokouútwon soufòn einaí, òs e
ēntaútha, eî pèr pòu, elégýxov to mánteion kai apo-
10 fánov to chrísmó òti oustos émuò sofóteros èstí, 
ou ò éme ífísthà. diauskopóñ ouv tou tôn —ónómati
gár ou'deñ déomai légein, òn de tîs tôn politikówn, 
pros ou égo skopòw tòuou tî épíadov, ò òndres
'Athenaios—kai dialegóménoi autòú, edózè moó oustos
20 ò ánηρ dokein mén einaí soufòs állois te polyloíos

2. marturhítei] The marturia
is to be supposed to follow at once. Introd. p. xviii.
10. ou gár thems autò] Cf. Pind. Pyth. ix. 42, tôn ou theu-
tòv psêuðei thewv.
17. tôn politikòw] In itself this word means no more than 
'statesman,' in the sense in which it might have been ap-
plied to Pericles, and is applied, Legg. 693 a, to the old law-
givers and settlers of Hellas. But an Athenian of Plato's
time speaking of Athens would

and the course of experi-
ments by which he had con-

mean by polítikós that class of
men who made public business
a profession,—toûs polítikóus
leugómeivos (Politic. 303 e). As
distinguished from the rétopes,
they were men who sought
appointments to public offices,
while the rétopes were pro-
fessional speakers in the Ec-
clesia. Cf. 23 e, and see Introd.
p. x. note 1.
19. dialegóménoi autò, edózè
moú] This inversion of govern-
ment is of common occurrence
among the forms of changed
construction: Dig. 271. edózè
is 'I came to think,' as 32 b.
What was meant by this oath is clear from Gorg. 482 b, μάν τών κύων τῶν Ἀργυρίων θεῶν,—that is, the dog-headed or, more correctly, jackal-headed Anubis. In Plato this oath is only found in the mouth of Socrates. In Aristoph. Vesp. 83, a slave, Sosias, uses the same oath.
tos, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ p. 22. γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἃ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς b ἀλλους, ὅς ἑυταθὰ ἐπ' αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψόμενος ἑμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεύσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρότων ἃν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνομι παρ' αὐτῶν. αὐγχυνομαί οὖν ὡμῶν εἰπτεῖν, ὃ ἄνδρες, τάληθη' ὀμος δὲ ὅρητέων. ὅς ἑτος γὰρ εἰπτεῖν ὀλίγον αὐτῶν ἀπαντεῖ ὁ παρόντες ἃν βέλτιον ἐλεγον περὶ ὄν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκαν. ἐγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ

1. καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος] H's conjecture καὶ ἐλεγκτός (1) is mere conjecture; (2) would not give the sense he wishes, since ἐλεγκτός is not 'contradicted' but 'admitting contradiction'; and (3) if it did, would spoil the general meaning, since Socrates' leading principle throughout is that the oracle must be true, and that the proof of this would come out simultaneously with the true sense. 12. ἐν ὀλίγῳ] H's conjecture ἐνι λόγῳ is needless. For ἐν ὀλίγῳ means the same, viz. 'in short,' not 'in a short time'; just like ἐν βραχεί, Symp. 217 a, ἐν ἐλαχιστο, Isocr. i. 40. p. 11. Of course ἐνι λόγῳ occurs also, e.g. Lysias, xiii. 38. p. 133; and H might have argued something from the variation of reading between καὶ ὀλίγον and κατὰ λόγον, Thuc. vi. 34. med.

1. ἵνα μοι — γένοιτο] 'With the object of finding positively unimpeachable proof of the divine declaration.' A double meaning is wrapped up in μοι, — it is both 'by my agency' and 'for my satisfaction.' καὶ signifies the superaddition of demonstration, which all the world must accept, to the certainty which had been in Socrates an exercise of faith. μαντεία signifies (1) the process by which oracles are obtained, or (2), as here, and 29 a, the fact oracularly communicated. This signification still remains distinct from that of μαντείων, which was the form of words in which the oracle was given; μαντεία is the meaning of the μαντείων a distinction to feel which we have only to remember that to get at the meaning from the words was in the case of oracles a process involving exactly that degree of difficulty which suited the god or his prophet.

II. οἱ παρόντες] With Stallb. and against Wolf, we must take this to mean 'those present at each several time,' and not 'the present audience.'
The usage of the orators proves this; cf. Antipho ii. A. a. 9. p. 116, and (esp.) γ. 5. p. 118, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅστις τῶν παρ-όντων οὐκ ἂν ἤκηρότερος . . . ἦν. Lysias uses in the same meaning, but without the same possibility of question, οἱ παραγε-νόμενοι. The expressions used, whether for the audience or for the court, are different; e.g. Antipho vi. 14. p. 143, πολλοὶ τῶν περιστώτων τούτων ταῦτα πάντα ἄκριβος ἐπιστᾶναι, Andoc. i. 139. p. 18, οὐδὲ ἐμὸν τῶν καθημένων οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπηρέησε. 16. ἢδοξαν] The nom. is καὶ οἱ ἄγαθοι δημιουργοί. The force of the aor. is, as in 21 c, ἢδοξαμ, 'I came to see.' 18. τὰ μέγατα] Politics are especially meant.
which experiments further supplied the key to the intensity of the prejudice against Socrates individually, in the personal enmities which they had excited;  

IX. ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὁ ἀνδρεσ Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγόνασι καὶ π. 23, ὁμι χαλεπόταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὡστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὀνόμα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι,

10 σοφὸς ἐινα. οἴονται γὰρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτοῦ ἐινα σοφὸν, ἃ ἀν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω τὸ δὲ κινδυνεῖν, ὃ ἀνδρεσ, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεός σοφὸς ἐιναι, καὶ εν τῷ χρησμῷ τοῦτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνδρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ’ οὐ λέγειν τὸν Ἐκκράτη, προσκεκρησθαί δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιοῦμενος, ὡσπερ ἢ ἀν εἶ ἐποί ὅτι ὁὗτος ὑμῶν, ὃ ἀνθρωποι, σοφῶτατος ἐστιν, ὅστις ὡσπερ Ἐκκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μάρτυς, ἀπείρηκα, Πάθεο 99 ἰ, ὅφω ἱβ. 98 ἰ, ἄμα ν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὔτως π. 22, ὡσπερ ἐχὼ ἐχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὁν τῆν ἐκείνον σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τῆν ἁμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ ἐκείνοι ἐχουσιν ἐχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοὶ ὡσπερ ἐχὼ ἐχειν.

9. ὀνόμα δὲ—ἐναὶ ἐναὶ ὁμα τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦτον τοῦ Ἐκκράτης, προσκεκρησθαί δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιοῦμενος, ὡσπερ ἢ ἀν εἶ ἐποί ὅτι ὁὗτος ὑμῶν, ὃ ἀνθρωποι, σοφῶτατος ἐστιν, ὅστις ὡσπερ Ἐκκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ Accus. of pronoun neuter, standing for the whole sentence immediately following: Dig. 19.

11. ὁμι τῷ ἀνθρωποι, σοφῶτατος ἐστιν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ Accus. of pronoun neuter, standing for the whole sentence immediately following: Dig. 19.

12. ὅτι ὁὗτος ὑμῶν, ὃ ἀνθρωποι, σοφῶτατος ἐστιν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ Accus. of pronoun neuter, standing for the whole sentence immediately following: Dig. 19.
p. 23. μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ (κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἥν τινα οἶωμαι σοφὸν εἰναι καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τὸ θεὸ βοηθῶν ἐν-δείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ σοφὸς. καὶ ύπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὕτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολή γέγονεν ἢξίων λόγου οὕτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλὰ ἐν πενίᾳ μνημία εἴμη διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

c X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτων οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἰς μάλιστα σχολή ἔστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιοτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίροντες ἀκόουντες ἐξετάζομεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται εἰτε ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν κάπετα, οἴμαι, εὑρίσκονται πολλήν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐνετεύθεν οὖν οἱ υπ' αὐτῶν ἐξετάζομεν ἐμοὶ ὁργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγοντιν ὁς Σωκράτης τῖς ἔστι μιαρωδὸς τατός καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους καὶ ἐπειδὰν τίς

1. μὲν ἔτι] Oxon. gives μὲν ἔχω ἔτι, but in the hand of a restorer, and not on the traces of the old letters. (Gaisf. wrongly represents ἔχων as the reading. ἔχων would be redundant, like ἔχων φιλαρεῖς, &c.) 2. καὶ ξένων] So Oxon. and 3 other MSS. Edd. καὶ τῶν ξένων. But the variation is in the spirit of Plato: cf. Dig. 237, and add Phædo 85 a, αὕτη ἢ τὸ ἄρθρον καὶ χειλίδων καὶ ὁ ἐποψ. 11. μιμοῦνται] So Oxon. &c. μιμούμενοι is a conjecture of Hermann.

4. ύπὸ ταύτης] Later, 31 c, he gives a second reason for abstaining from public life.
6. ἐν πενίᾳ μνημία] Cf. Legg. 677 e, the beautiful expression μνημία των φοβερῶν ἐρήμων, Rep. 520 c, μνημό βελτίων.

For the fact, with respect to Socrates, cf. with Stallbaum Xen. Econ. ii. 3.

and lastly, in combination


4. τάτα] Latin ista; idiomatically expressive of contempt, Dig. 318.

οτί τα μετέωρα] Understand έγώ or the like, by comparison of 19 b.

12. έκ τούτων] 'It is upon this footing'—namely that of an old general prejudice, aggravated by supervening personal animosity,—'that I am now attacked by' &c. The meaning 'in consequence of' would be too strong, both for the sense here, and for the idiomatic use of the phrase; cf. Dig. 116: the meaning 'upon the strength of' would also exceed the warrant of the Greek, though not of the sense, cf. 19 a, ή δή καί πιστεύον Μέλητος κ.τ.λ.

καί Μέλητος — ρήτορον] For an account of Socrates' three accusers and their motives, and of the classes of persons called here πολίται and ρήτορες, see Introd. p. x. note 1.

The δημιουργοί are here joined with the πολίται, because Anytus represented a trade himself, and herein was but one of many instances of the same conjunction of pursuits in those times at Athens. Socrates was wont to speak slightly of mechanical arts (Xen. Evon. iv. 3), —a view which would seem to connect itself with his praise of σχολή (Diog. ii. 31, Εί. Var. x. 14): and a conversation, in which he pressed an uncommercial view of education upon Anytus himself with reference to his son, seems to have been among the causes of Anytus' personal hatred of Socrates. (See again Introd. p. xii.)
AHOAOriA 2OKPATOY2.
p. 23. "Anvutos kai Lúkow, Mélethos mèn úpèr tōn poiētōn áxhómenos, 'Anvutos dè úpèr tōn ὑμιουργοῦν kai
p. 24. tōn politikōn, Lúkow dè úpèr tōn ρητόρων' ὥστε, ὀπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζομι ἂν εἰ οἶδος τ' ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολήν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν 5
οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονων. ταῦτ' ἐστιν ὑμῖν, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, τάληθη, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὕτω ὑποστειλάμενος. καὶ τοι οἴδα σχέδου ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι. ὃ καὶ τεκμῆριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω 10
be kai ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἰτία ταύτα ἐστὶ. καὶ εἶ λε ὑν ἕαν τε αὐθις ξητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὅσι πρῶτοι μου κατήγοροι κατηγοροῦν αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἰκανή ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμῶς' 15
πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὃς φησί, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταύτα πειράζομαι ἀπολογείσθαι. αὐθις γὰρ δὴ, ὅσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγοροῦν, λάβωμεν αὐτὶ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμο-
σίαν. ἐξεῖ δὲ πῶς ὅδε. Σωκράτη φησίν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς 20
tε νέους διαφθέειοντα καὶ θεοὺς οὗς ἡ πόλις νομίζει
c οὐ νομίζουν, ἑτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καὶα. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλῆμα τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ τούτων ἐτοῦ τοῦ ἐγκλῆματος

1. ὑπὲρ] We are to under-
stand, not that the accusers
were acting on behalf of their
respective classes, but merely
that they were to be regarded
as representatives of the feel-
ings of those bodies.
9. τοὺς αὐτοῖς] Lit. 'through
the same things:' that is, in
stating the facts I am virtually
reiterating and attesting the
charges.
11. ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ] Empha-
sis is of course on διαβολὴ.
'This is,'—i.e. 'in this con-
sists—the prejudice against
me.'
16. ἀγαθόν] 'Public bene-
factor.'
20. ἐξεῖ δὲ πῶς ὅδε] See In-
trad. p. xiv.

Second part of Defence.—
Justification of himself as
against the counts of the
indictment, separately;—
a. Perversión of the youth.

En ekaston: ἑξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους P. 24. ἀδικεῖν μὲ διαφθείροντα. ἔγο δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φησὶ Ἡνικὴν Μέλητον, ὅτι σπονδὴ χαριευτίκεται, μίδιος εἰς ἁγόνας καθιστᾶς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζει καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὃν υδὲν τοῦτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὃς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ υἱῶν ἐπιδειξαί.

XII. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ: ἄλλο τι ἦ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὃς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι d 10 ἔσονται; Ἡγωγε. Ἡθὸν δὴ ψῦν εἰπέ τοῦτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βέλτιστοι ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρόν, ὡς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τοῦτοις καὶ κατηγορεῖς τὸν δὲ δὴ βέλτιστοι ποιοῦντα ἦθι εἰπέ καὶ μὴνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἔστιν. 15 ὁρᾶς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾶς καὶ ὃν εἴχεις εἰπέων; καὶ τοῦ ὃν αἰτηρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ἱκανῶν τεκμήριον ὃδὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι ὑδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὦ γαθε, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ' ε 18 ὃ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἴδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὔτοι, ὦ Σῶκратες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ

3. σπονδὴ χαριευτίκετα] Οξυμορον: 'is playing off a jest under solemn forms.' The machinery of the law, with all its solemnity of circumstance and all its serious consequences, is set in motion by him for his mere amusement. Cf. χαριευτίκετα in the same sense 27 a, where it is explained by παύοντος.

8. Καὶ μοι κ.τ.λ.] The examination of Meletus by Socrates, which now follows, though it naturally affords scope for exhibiting Socrates' characteristic talent, is legally speaking the customary ἔρωται, to which either party was bound to submit at the requisition of the other. Introd. p. xviii.

18. ἀμείνου] 'Better citizens;'—better toward others: whereas βέλτιστος above means, strictly speaking, better in themselves.
p. 24. Μέλητε; οίδε τοὺς νέους παϊδεύειν οὐί τε εἰσί καὶ 
βελτίων ποιούσι; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἀπαντεῖς, ἢ 
oi mēn αὐτῶν, oi dι oυ; "Ἀπαντεῖς. Ἐδ γε νῆ τῆν 
"Ἡραν λέγει, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὀφελοῦν-

p. 25. των. τί δὲ δή; οἴδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίων ποιοῦσιν, s 
ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταὶ; Καὶ οἱ βου-
λευταὶ. Ἀλλ’ ἁρὰ, ὃ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ εὖ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, 
oi ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ 
kάκεινοι βελτίων ποιοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κάκεινοι. Πάν-
tes ἁρὰ, ὃς ἔσκεν, Ἀθηναίοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι 
πλὴν ἔμοι, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὔτω λέγεις; 
Pάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ’ ἔμοι κατ-
έγνωκας δυστυχίαν, καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι ἢ καὶ περὶ 

b ἰππον ὀὔτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν οἱ μὲν βελτίων ποι-
oύτες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρωποί εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τίς οὐ 
διαφθείρων; ἡ ἄναντιν τούτον πᾶν εἰς μέν τις ο 
βελτίων οὖς τ’ ὅν ποιεῖν ἡ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἰππικοὶ; 
oi δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ἔξυπνοι καὶ χρῶνται ἰππον, δια-
φθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὔτως ἔχει, ὃ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ 
ἰππων καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων ζῶων; πάντως δή—20 
pou, εάν τε σὺ καὶ "Ἀνυτος οὐ φήτε εάν τε φήτε; 
πολλὴ γὰρ ἄν τις εὐδαιμονία εὕ̄ περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ 
éis μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι ὀφε-
c λοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃ Μέλητε, ἰκανοὶ εὐπειδεύκυσα 
ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφροντισάς τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφὸς 25 
ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτού ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέ-
ληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

24. ἀλλὰ γάρ] 'But the truth is;' as above 19 c, &c. Dig. 147. 26. ἀποφαίνεις—ἀμέλειαν] Be-
tween ἀμέλειαν and Μέλητε a play upon words is doubtless intended; see several instances in Plato collected Dig. 324. In this case the probability is strengthened by the constant
XIII. "Ετι δὲ ήμιν εἰπὲ ὦ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε, πρὸς Δίως Δίως Μέλητε, p. 25.

πότερον ἑστίν οἰκεῖν ἀμενων ἐν πολιταις χρηστοῖς ἡ πονηροῖς; ὦ τάν, ἀπόκριναι οὐδέν γάρ τοι χαλέτον ἐρώτω. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακῶν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς αἱ ἐγγυτάτω ἐαυτῶν ὑντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τί; Πάνω γε. Ἡ ἑστίν οὖν στupidity / v v / -v / * of it. ... of thyph. 2 b, c, and below 26 e

10 ὁ, πότερον ἡμὲ εἰςάγεις δεύρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιούντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα; Ἐκόντα ἐγώγε. Τί δήτα, ὁ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφότερος εἰ τηλικούτων ὄντος τηλικόσοδε οὖν, ὃστε σὺ μὲν ἐγνώκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακῶν τι ἐργά-15ζονται αἱ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἐαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἁγαθοὶ ἁγαθόν εὖγ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἁμαθίας ἦκῳ, ὃστε καὶ τοῦτ ἀγνοῦ, ὅτι, εάν τινα μοχθηρόν ποιήσω τῶν ἕννοντων, κινδυνεύσω κακῶν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὃστε τούτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς 20φής σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὃ Μέλητε, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα: ἂλλη ἢ οὐ πρὸς. διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἀκὼν, ὃστε σὺ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἀκὼν διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεύρο νόμος εἰσά-25γειν ἑστίν, ἀλλ' ἵδια λαβόντα διδάσκεω καὶ νουθετεῖν'

recurrence of the juxtaposition; see 24 c above, and 26 b below.

1. eιπὲ — Μέλητε] The address ὁ Μέλητε has suffered

timesis by the interlacing of eιπὲ πρὸς Δίως with it: Dig.

288. See also Rep. 332 c, τι oieί, ὃ πρὸς Δίως, ἢν δ' εὖγ, and

26 e below.

8. ὁ νόμος] See note, 24 c.

13. τηλικόσωδε] Meletus was a very young man: cf. Eu-
thyph. 2 b, c, and below 26 c

extr.—Stallb.
ΑΠΟΔΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 67

p. 26. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἔαν μᾶθω, παῦσομαι ὁ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ἔυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἡθέλησας, δεύρῳ δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἴ νόμος ἑστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεσμένους, ἀλλὰ οὐ μαθήσεως.

XIV. 'Ἄλλα γάρ, ὥς ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν 5 b δῆλον ὡδὴ ἑστίν, ὁ ἐγὼ ἐλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτων οὗτε μέγα οὗτε σμικρὸν πῶποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὥς Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν, ἦν ἐγγάρω, θεοὺς διδάσκατον μὴ νομίζειν οὐς ἡ πόλις 10 νομίζει, ἐτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καὶ; οὐ ταύτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνω μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταύτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοῖνυν, ὥς Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, δὲν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἑστίν, εἰπὲ ἐτὶ σαφέστερον καὶ c ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδρασί τουτοσί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὗ δύναμαι 15 μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι τινας θεοὺς, (καὶ αὐτῶς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτη ἄδικο,) οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐτέρους, καὶ τούτ' ἑστίν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους' ἡ παντάπασι με 20 φῆς οὗτε αὐτῶν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὅς τὸ παράπαν οὖ νομίζεις

2. ἐφυγες] 'Didst decline.' Cf. Ar. Ach. 717, Καζελάεινειν χρὴ τὸ λοιπὸν, καὶ φύγῃ τις ἐξ- ἐμοῦν. With Plato, however, this meaning of the word is more common in the compound διαφθείρειν. Cf. Symp. 174 a. ἐφυγες and οὐκ ἡδ. form a hysteron proteron, though not a strongly marked one.

7. οὗτε — σμικρὸν] Accus. cognate after ἐμέλησεν, not nom. to ἐμέλησεν. Dig. 6.

14. δὲν νῦν] 'Whom the argument at present concerns:' equivalent to οὗ τα λέγομεν as distinguished from περὶ δὲν λέ- γομεν. — Stallb., rightly. Cf. Soph. 263 a, σὺν ἐφρον δὴ φρά- ζειν περὶ δὲν τ' εἰστὶ καὶ ὅτου [ὁ λόγος], Legg. 678 a, πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας περὶ καὶ νομοθεσίας, δὲν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν πιερεστηκεν, ... μὴν εἰναι.
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most the διαγράφησις could demand for any place was a drachma; the price for an ordinary place was two oboli. See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, p. 223. n. 315 of 2nd edition.

2. ἄλλως τε καὶ] Which the youths must know are not mine, 'to say nothing of their singularity,' which would make the theft still more glaring. Steinhart has well observed that the meaning of ἄτοπα is not 'absurd,' but 'uncommon' or 'peculiar,' etymologically, what cannot be assigned to any known place or origin. He further remarks that neither Socrates nor Plato would have rejected these notions as 'absurd.' Cf. the striking passage in Legg. 886 d, where Plato declines to controvert these positions although he would uphold the gods.

3. οὕτωσι—ἐναι] The two sentences οὕτωσι σοι δοκῶ and οὐδενα—ἐναι are both descriptions of the same fact, the re-statement being the more precise; οὕτωσι σοι δοκῶ stands by a sort of attraction for οὕτωσι σοι δοκῶ περὶ ἐμοῦ, of which the filling up in the re-statement would have been ἐμε οὐδένα—ἐναι. Dig. 207, 208.

5. "Ἀποστός κ. τ. λ.] The question Meletus had answered affirmatively was, not whether Socrates was an atheist, but whether it was his opinion that Socrates was an atheist,—οὕτωσι σοι δοκῶ; Socrates' comment on this is 'Very well; nobody else will believe that, and I am pretty sure you do not yourself,' i. e. I am pretty sure you are saying what you know to be untrue.
ὁσπερ ἀνυγμα ἔνυνθεντι διαπειρωμένω, ἄρα γνώσε— p. 27. ταί Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμὸν χαριστικομένου καὶ ἐναντί ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἣ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὕτος γάρ ἐμὸς φαινεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτῶς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὡσπερ ἂν εί ἐποίη ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομιζῶν, ἀλλά θεοὺς νομιζον. καὶ τοι τοῦτο ἐστὶ παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαινεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἤμιν ἀπόκριναι, ὃ Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχάς ὑμᾶς παρηθησάμην, μέμνησθε μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν εἰ τῷ εἰσδοθέ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους πουώμαι. ἐστιν ὡστίς ἀνθρώπων, ὃ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ὑμῖν νομίζει; ἀποκρινόεσθο, ὃ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἐσθ' ὡστίς ἢποις μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, ἢπικά δὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐλητας μὲν οὐ νομίζει, αὐλητικά δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἐστιν, ὃ ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλεις ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς

1. διαπειρωμένω] 'He is like one, who, by framing a mock-riddle, is trying (as he says to himself) whether will Socrates,' &c. We have here one participial clause (ὡσπερ — ἔνυφθ) within another (διαπείρω).; as Rep. 555 ε, τῶν οἰκοτιμεῖται ἐνώτεις ἀργόν τυφρῶσκοτες. Notice, that it is ὡσπερ ἄνγυμα, 'a mock-riddle,' one which has no answer.

2. ἐμὸν χαριστικό] The use of the genitive, after verbs of knowing, seeing, and shewing, seems to be limited in Attic Greek to a noun joined with a participle. After verbs of meningation, it is not so limited. Dig. 26. Cf. Lobeck on Soph. Αj. 136.

15. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα] Similar expressions are—Enyh. 273, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέπτοντες, Phdr. 235 α, ὅς ὁ δε τὸν τοῦτον τετερωμένως ἀμφοτέρως ἐπείχεν ἀριστα, 271 δ, ἐστιν οὖν ἐδή τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοία καὶ τοία, Legg. 721 β, χρησιμοὶ μὲν τῶντοι καὶ τάσοι, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀτημία, Philo. 24 d, τὸ εἰς αὐθά τε καὶ αὐθά.

16. θορυβεῖτω] Merely by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering;—brawling, as we might say.
6. ὁμώνια γε] To make the reasoning sound, ὁμώνια here and ὁμώνια πράγματα above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of ὁμώνια καθὼς was based simply on Socrates’ ὑμῶν. Now by this Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adjectival θείων τι καὶ ὁμώνιων 3 τις. See Appendix A, on τὸ ὁμώνιον.

8. ἀντιγραφῆ. The ἐγκλῆμα is so called, as it has been already called ἀντιφωσία. See 19 b note.

18. ἐκ τινων ἄλλων ὄν] That is, ἐξ ἄλλων ὄν τινων.
6. πείθοις ἄν ὡς ὁυ] The ὤ is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational. It is a confused anticipation of the coming negative oúdeμία. Dig. 264.

18. oúdeν—στή] ‘The rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case.’ This use of oúdeν δεινὸν is idiomatic: cf. Gorg. 520 d, oúdeν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μὴ ἀληθῇ, ‘we need not apprehend for him any injury,’ Phædo 84 b, oúdeν δεινὸν μὴ φοβήσῃ, ‘we need not apprehend that the soul will have to fear.’ The ‘apprehension’ is supposed to affect the speaker and his hearers, as interested in the contingency under discussion. So here Socrates is speaking half ironically, interesting himself, as it were, for the rule, against himself. στή is also idiomatically used, as a quasi-impersonal;—that is, a vague nominative, such as ‘the course of events,’ is understood. See Dig. 97; where among other parallels is given Αρ. Ἐθ. Νικ. VI. ix. 9, στή· στήσατα γὰρ κάκις. στή is literally ‘come to a stand-still.’ Stallb. is wrong here.
4. ἔπολογίζεσθαι] See below, d note.
5. ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρῶν] 'A man of any worth at all.' This idiomatic concurrence of καί with σμικρῶν τι is frequent: Dig. 132.
10. ὅ τῆς Θέτιδος] The same illustration is used Symp. 179 e. The reference in what follows is to Hom. II. xviii. 90.
23. ὃ ἄν τις κ.τ.λ.] The former ἦ in this sentence is hyperbolically postponed to ἄν τις τάξη, which in sense is included under it. Dig. 290*.

a. That first and foremost it was undertaken in obedience to the already mentioned divine call, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences or counter-inducements.
κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε p. 28.

1. ΧVII. Ἑγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἀν εἰην εἰργασμένος, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, οτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, εἰ οὖς ὑμεῖς ἐφέσοθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαία καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιτόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ὅσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκεῖνῳν ἀποδείκνυε τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς εἰγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντα με δεῖν ἐκαὶ καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἑνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς p. 29. ἡ δὲ τάτταν ἡ ἄλλο ὁτιῶν πράγμα λίπομι τὴν τάξιν.

2. δεινὸν μὲν’ ἀν εἰην, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν ἀν μὲ δικαίως εἰσάγων τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδωκός θάνατον καὶ οἷόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὅμοιον τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τάτταν δεδείκην, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα: δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστιν ἀ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδείς τοῦ θάνατον οὐδ’ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὁν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασεν ὃς εὐ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστί. καὶ b τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὐτή ἡ ἐπονειδίατος, ἡ

1. ὑπολογιζόμενον] ‘Giving any countervailing weight to;’ literally, ‘reckoning per contra.’ The ὑπό conveys no image of subtraction, according to our notion of the operation, but the signification of meeting from an opposite direction: see Dig. 131.

5. Ποτιδαία—Δηλίῳ] At Potidaea (see Charm. init., Symp. 219, 220) between 432 and 429 b.c., Socrates rescued Alcibiades but resigned in his favour his claim to the reward of bravery. Delium, 424 B.C., witnessed his famous retreat, (Symp. 221 a, b, Lach. 181 b). Of his campaign before Amphipolis, 422 B.C., we know less.

10. ἑνταῦθα δὲ] ἑνταῦθα repeats τοῦ δὲ τάττοντος κ.τ.λ.—δὲ marks the apodosis.

20. καὶ τοῦτο . . . . αὐτή] Not pleonastic; but ‘what is this but that very same reprehensible ignorance?’ τοῦ οἷος ὃς, which follows is a genitive epexegetic of ἀμαθία. Dig. 24.
2. τούτω καὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'In this province also [of the unseen] I believe I am distinguished from the mass of mankind herein, and if I were to say I was wiser in any point than any other person, I should say it was herein, that' &c. The former as well as the latter τούτω both relate to the same fact, to the same οτι,—upon which a strong emphasis is thus made to converge. Cf. Gorg. 484 ε, λαμπρός τ' ἐστιν ἐκαστός ἐν τούτω, κατὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται, Νέμων τὸ πλείστων ἣμέρας τούτῳ μέρος, 'ἐν αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ πνεύματος βέλτιστος ὄν. The suppression after τούτω ἢν is a graceful evasion of self-assertion. See Dig. 255.

10. ἀπιστήσαντες] 'Disbelieving' the representation urged by Anytus as the reason why Socrates should die; not 'refusing to follow Anytus' counsel' to put Socrates to death. It is therefore to be connected, not with the words immediately following (ὁς ἐφ'—ἀποκτεῖναι με), but with those next to them (λέγων—διαφθαρήσουται). Stalib. differs.

13. ἦδη ἢν] The construction of the fut. indic. with ἢν is abundantly established. ἢν here belongs to διαφθαρήσουται, and to refer it to the part. ἐπιτίθενται is a shift which will not apply to other passages (Dig. 58), and dislocates this. Observe, as to διαφθαρήσουται itself, that its not being affected by the Oratio Obliqua is to be accounted for regularly; it is because the event it denotes is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by Socrates. Plato is never arbitrarily irregular in this class of constructions: Dig. 90. It might be said here, that διαφθαρήσουμαι denotes an event equally in the future. But
the plan being, to teach the paramount value of the soul, and the duty of caring for it, and the need of consciously-possessed principles of action.

then it is not an event which is assumed as about to happen at all.

4. ἐφ' ὑπὲρ . . . . . φιλοσοφεῖν] For constructions of relative pronouns and adverbs with the infinitive, see Dig. 79.

8. ἀστάξαμαι καὶ φιλῶν] "Ἀστάξαμαι est aliquem salutare ita, ut cum ampectaris; φιλῶν ita, ut cum ascoleris."—Stallb. Here of course both words are used, by transference, for the feelings which those actions betoken. Note too, that the transference affects both: it is not that φιλῶ already expresses a feeling, and thus gives the turn to ἀστάξαμαι their co-ordination in the phrase requires that they should enter into it homogeneously.

πεῖσομαι—ὑµῶν] The parallel is striking to the declaration of the holy apostles, Acts v. 29, πειθαρχεῖν δει Θεῷ μᾶλλον ἡ ὀνθρώπως.

14. ἰχθύων] Stallb., after Fischer, "de animi magnitudine et fortitudine."
p. 30. δὲ, ὁνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἑλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φανλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεοτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτω ἄν ἐνυγχάνο, ποιήσω, καὶ ἑκὼ καὶ ἀστός, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστόις, ὅσοι μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ο θεός, εὐ 5 ἵστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὐδέν πω ύμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ πόλει ἡ τῇ ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ύπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἡ πείθων ύμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων
b ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρώτερον μηδὲ οὖτως σφόδρα ως τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὁς ἄριστη ἐσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετή γίγνεται, ἀλλ' εἷς ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τάλαν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τουσ νέοις, ταῦτ' ἂν εὖ βλαβερὰ εἰ δέ τις μὲ ἐς ἡς ἄλλα λέγει γιὰ ταῦτα, οὐδέν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίνω ἂν, ὁ 'Ἀθηναῖος, ἡ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτω ἡ μή, καὶ ἢ ἄφιετε ἡ μὴ ἄφιετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος
c ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες 'Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατε μοι οἷς ἐδέχθην ύμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν εὖ' οἰς ἄν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν' καὶ γάρ, ὅσ ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ὄνησεθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ύμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, εὖ' οἰς ἰσως βοήσεσθε' ἀλλὰ μηδαμός ποιεῖτο τοῦτο. εὗ γὰρ ἱστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοῖς οὖτον ὅντα, οὖν ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζον βλάψετε

15. ταῦτ' ἂν εὖ] 'If preaching virtue is perversion, then indeed I am a mischievous person; for I never rest from preaching it.' The ταῦτα is not identical with the ταῦτα of the line before, but is more comprehensive; it stands for the whole clause referred to in the phrase ταῦτα λέγων, and means 'this practice of mine.'

ὁ ύμᾶς αὐτοῦς: ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειν ἔπ. 30. οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε "Ανυτος: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο δ' οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνου ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνει μὲν ιν ἰσος ἡ ἐξε- 
λάσειν ἡ ἀτιμάσειν: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος ἱσος οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τὸν μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἴομαι, 
ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἂν οὗτος νῦν ποιεῖ, ἀνδρα ἀδίκος ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινώναι. νῦν οὖν, ὥ ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναίοι, πολλοί δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολο- 
γείσθαι, ὃς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἄλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι 
ἐξαιμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμὸν κατα-
ψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως ε 
ἄλλου τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἄτεχνος, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον 
εἶπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ 
ὕππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ μωθη-
στέρω καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύσπους τινος' 
οἰον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθείκειν 
τοιοῦτον τινα, ὃς ύμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὅνει-
δίζου ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἠμέραν ὀλήν ἔπ. 31. 
πανταχοῦ προσκαβίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ βρα-
dίως ύμῖν γενήσεται, ὥ ἄνδρες, ἄλλ' εὰν ἐμοὶ πεί-
θησθε, φείτεσθε μον ὑμεῖς δ' ἱσος τάξ' ἂν ἀχθό-
μενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κροὐσάντες 

5. ἀτιμάσειν] Η substitutes a conjecture of his own, ἀτιμώσειν, quite needlessly; for ἀτιμάζο, though it properly means to treat or regard as ἀτιμός, while ἀτιμῶ is to make ἀτιμος, yet also has this technical sense: cf. Legg. 762 d, περὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ἀρχαίς ἡτη-
μάσθω πάσας. 23. κρούσαντες] Another unhappy conjectural substitution of Η occurs here,—ἀροῦσαντες, because (he says) 

13. εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον refers not to the words immediately succeeding, namely, προσκείμε-
νον—θεοῖ, but to the simile which follows them. 23. κρούσαντες] 'With a sin-
gle tap,'—as you would a 

μέσῳ.
p. 31. ἂν μὲ, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτω, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείνατε,
edta ἐκ τὸν λοιπὸν βίων καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ’ ἂν, ei μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς υἱῶν ἐπιπέμψει κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ’ ἐγὼ τυχχάνω ὡν τοιούτος, οίος ὑπὸ τούθεω τῇ πόλει δεδόθαι, ἐνθεῦ δὲ ἀκατανοῆσατε: οὕ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ οὐκ ἔμε τὸ ἐμὲ τὸν μὲν ἐμαυτὸν ἀπάντωτον ἠμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἄμε-
λουμένων τοσαῦτα ἥδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἂεί, ἱδία ἐκάστῳ προσίοντα ὡσπερ πατέρα ἡ ἀδελφόν προσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἄρετῆσ. καὶ εἰ μὲν τοι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυνοι καὶ μισθὸν λαμβά-
νων ταῦτα παρεκλευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγουν νῦν δὲ ὀρᾷτε δή καὶ αὐτοὶ, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τὰλλα πάντα ἄνασχυντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τούτο γε οὐχ οἰοί
c te ἐγένοντο ἀπανασχυντήσαν para σχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὥσ ἐγὼ ποτε τινα ἡ ἑπραξάμην μισθὸν ἡ ὑτήσα. ἰκανὸν γὰρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ἀλῆθη ὡς λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.
XIX. Ὅσος ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἀτοποῦν εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ

κρούσαντες is ‘debile pulsandi verbum.’ Such a word however is just what was wanted.

10. καὶ εἰ μὲν τοι] Ἔ drops the τοι, probably for want of considering that the collocation is hyperbatical for καὶ μέντοι εἰ τι.

Cf. 41 c.

14. οὐχ οἰοὶ τε] They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d: but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it. That is, grammatically speaking, the primary intention of the sentence ὀπανασχυντήσα — μήρτορα lies in the participial clause, and not in the verb ὀπανασχυντή-
sa. See Dig. 303.

19. Ὅσος ἂν οὖν] The dominant reason of Socrates’ abstinence from public affairs was not so much the impossibility of maintaining himself in a public position without sacrifice of principle or of life; but rather, that he felt his mission to be a moral and an individual one, and that from his point of view it was infinitely less important to rectify a


supposed objection) that to have entered public life, in preference to dealing with individuals, was not a method practically possible for a righteous man,

5. γίγνεται φωνή] All MSS. have this φωνή, and all edd. except V bracket it. Needlessly; Fischer points out the parallel to the next sentence, τούτ’ ἐστιν ἐκ παιδός ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη. 9. τούτο ὦ ἄν] Edd. prefer τούτοι. But ἀποτρέπει πράττει τοῦτο is a construction borne out by Theaet. 1.51 a, ἐναυ μὲν τὸ γεγομένον μοι δαμόμον ἀποτρέπει ἤνεινα, [Dem.] Proem. xx. p. 1431, δείξας ἃ τότε ἡμαρτέτη, ὡν ἀποτρέψα ταύτα παθεῖν, and analogous constructions such as Xen. An. III. i. 20, πορίξασθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια κατέχουσιν ἡμᾶς. τοῦτο here is the reading of five MSS. besides Oxon. It is moreover less likely to have been invented than τοῦτο. 15. καὶ μοι μὴ] H alters this into καὶ μὲν μοι, comparing Phaedo 105 b. But καὶ μοι is a common commencement of a sentence in the Orators.

particular policy, than by laying hold of individuals and making statesmen of them to raise the standard of statesmanship.

2. ἀναθέατον] To the Πνυξ; as in the famous πᾶς ὁ δήμος ἄνω καθήκον, Dem. de Cor. 169. p. 285.

5. θείων τι καὶ δαμόμον] See Appendix A, on τὸ δαμάμον. 6. ἐν τῇ γραφῇ When he spoke of the ἐτέρα καὶνὰ δαμόνια,—a perversion of the truth which Socrates characterises as a caricature by his use of the word ἐπικομβῶσον, which seems to mean ‘selecting for caricature.’ So σκώστειν is to mock at, ἐπισκώστειν to mock at some particular trait in a person.
p. 31. γὰρ ἐστιν ὡς ὁ ἀριστοκράτῳ τοῖς ὁμοίωσις ὁμολογεῖ καὶ δια·
p. 32. κωλύουν πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχού-μενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὁλίγον χρόνον 5
σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύον ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ’ ἔγοινεν ὡμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξωμαι
tούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὧν μείει τιμᾶτε, ἐργα. ἀκού-
sατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοί ξυμβεβήκοτα, ὡν εἰδῆτε ὁτι οὐδ ἄν ἐν ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεῖσας θάνατον, 10
μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἁμα κἀν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν ἐφ-
θικα μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δὲ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὁ’ Ἀθη-

11. ἁμα κἀν] This is Ast’s conjecture. MSS. are chiefly divided
between ἁμα καὶ ἁμα ἀν (which Oxon. exhibits), ἁμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην,
and ἁλλα καὶ ἁμ’ ἁν ἀν. Of the edd., VSZ have ἁμα καὶ ἁμ’ ἁν,
Β ἁμ’ ἁν ἀπολοίμην. H ἁμ’ ἁν καὶ ἀπολοίμην. It seems vain to find
more than a shadowy justification for ἁμα καὶ ἁμα. The variants
may easily have come from ἁμα καὶ, in the form ἁμα καὶ ἁν. My
friend Mr. Campbell ingeniously proposes ἁλλα καὶ ἁλ’ ἁν ἀν.,
‘should be ready to meet death in sundry forms;’ cf. Soph.
O. T. 661, δ τι πάπαν ὅλοιμαι. 12. δικανικά] H conjecturally
prefixes οὐ, observing “quis credat, Socratem, qui statim a prin-
cipio se ξένως ξέειν τῆς εἰθαδε λέεως professus est, nunc judicalia
verba promittere?” But equally how then should Socrates know
that what he was going to say was not δικανικά? Besides, the
speech in point of fact betrays abundant knowledge of techni-
calities; cf. 34 a, εἰ δὲ τότε κ.τ.λ. See Commentary below.

8. δ—ἐργα] ‘What your
body is wont to appreciate
highly, the actions of a life,’
ὡς (says Socrates),—not as
individuals, but as represent-
ing Athenians generally, when
acting as judges in the Ecclesia,
or the Heliaea,—‘you parti-
cularly are susceptible to such
appeals.’

Here appears, in a refined
form, the common τόπος of
rehearsing a man’s past ser-
vice in his defence; of which
practice Lysias, xii. 38. p. 123,
says, ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰθαδείμονον
ἐστι, πρὸς μέν τα καταγρημένα
μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ σφόν
αὐτῶν ... ὥστρατιστάτω ἀγαθοὶ
eἰστι κ.τ.λ. Whence again So-
crates says just below, he is
‘about to employ a topic of
vulgar use, and one that sa-
vours of the law-courts.’

11. μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ] ‘But would
be ready to perish at once as
the price of not yielding,’
φορτικά καὶ δικανικά] φορτικά
stands here in its simple meaning of 'vulgar' in the sense of 'common,'—not as implying (as Fischer and others think) self-assertion or bad taste; a meaning which (1) would make ἔρω ὑμῖν sound blunt even to harshness; (2) does not harmonise with δικαωκά, for an arrogant tone is not characteristic of persons addressing their judges; and (3) does not suit the parallel passage Gorg. 482 e, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἔγεν φορτικά καὶ διηνεφρικά, . . . ἀφύσει μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ καλά, νόμος δὲ, δικαωκά is likewise a colourless word;—not 'lawyerlike' in the sense of 'dry,' nor yet 'streitsüchtig' (Steinhart), but simply 'characteristic of speakers in courts of justice.'

7. τοῖς δέκα] Strictly only eight; for Conon was not included, and another of the ten was dead. Xenophon, in one of his accounts (Mem. I. i. 18), speaks with more definite inaccuracy of ἐννέα στρατηγοῖς.

5. παραπόμος, in two respects; (1) that they were tried ἄθροι (see Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol. IV. App. 2, where it is shown that this right of separate trial is not to be traced to the decree of Cannonus); and (2) that they were not heard in their own defence; for in the assembly in which the charge was brought first informally, they only (Xen. Hell. I. vii. 5) βραχεία ἐκαστὸς ἀπολογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προτέθη σφιτὶ λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον and in that in which they were condemned they were not heard at all.

7. ἡναπτιώθην . . . ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην] What is the precise reference of these expressions? Was ἡναπτιώθην a refusal to put the question? This is left for uncertain by Mr. Grote, who says that upon Xenophon's shewing 'it can hardly be accounted certain that Socrates was Epistates.' (Hist. Gr. ch. 64.) Again, to what act does ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην refer?

It may be well to give the other accounts of this occurrence at length:—

(a) Xen. Mem. I. i. 18, βουλεύσας γὰρ ποτε . . . ἐπιστάτης ἐν
that Socrates was Epistates is at least a probable conclusion from (a), (b), and (d), to say nothing of (e); in further support of which, (b) and (d) imply that he carried his point, which he could not have done but as Epistates.

The other clause, ἐναντία ἐψηφ., is, equally with ἡμαρτιώθην, in connection with μόνος τῶν πρωτάνων, the structure of the sentence points to this inevitably. Now against referring this to the eventual voting in the assembly is (1) the unlikelihood that Socrates should be the only one of the prytanes who voted in the minority, when several of them had come to see that the bill was illegal. And (2) what if he had been the only one? it was no marked distinction: the minority was large, and he and the rest of the prytanes would merely vote as individuals. So likewise to refer it to the stages immediately preceding that final voting, would be in contradiction with the mention made in the accounts of the opposition of others beside Socrates. To refer it, again, to the debate on the bill in the council, before it was adopted as a
προβολέμα, would be to lay the scene of it too far from that of ἡραντώθην ὑμῖν with which it is coupled, and would make μόνος τῶν προβολέμων flat, since the προβολέμες had no prominent functions in the council. The remaining alternative, and this is in itself a plausible one, is to refer it to the first stage of proceedings in the assembly, where, preparatorily to the προβολέμα being read out by the κήρυξ, it was handed to the proedri, who with the nomoθετα had to pronounce whether it contravened any existing law. Here was the precise moment at which legal provision had been made for entertaining the very objection taken by Socrates. We may then, with at least some probability, refer ἐναστία ἐφημοσύνη to Socrates’ condemning the bill as illegal when it was referred in due course to the joint consideration of the proedri and nomoθετα. The hysteron proteron is on Greek principles natural: ἡραντώθην—νόμου πρεcedes, because it, and not the earlier opposition, was the conspicuous and crowing act in Socrates’ whole proceeding; Dig. 308.

With Socrates’ more glorious refusal to put the question may be compared the conduct contemptuously attributed to Demosthenes by Ἀσχιν, ii. 84. p. 40, ἀναγγείλετος τού ψηφισματος, ἀναστάς εκ τῶν προεδρῶν Δημοσθένεως οὐκ ἐφή το ψηφισμα ἐπιψηφίζειν. βοώντων δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ τού πρεσβευτώς ἐπὶ τὸ βήμα κατ’ ὑμᾶς καλούστων, οὔτως ἄκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ ψηφισμα ἐπεφράζειν.

The series of checks which the forms of the Ecclesia imposed on bills in progress, with a view to guard existing laws, was as follows:—1. The προβολέμα was handed to the proedri, who after conferring with the nomoθετα pronounced whether or not it contravened existing laws; and, if they passed it, it was read out by the κήρυξ. 2. After this, it was open to any citizen to stop it by lodging an ὑπομοσια in earnest of his intention to bring against its author a γραφή παρανόμων. 3. Or the Epistates might refuse to put the question—under liability, of course, to ἐνδείξεις if he refused improperly. 4. Or the rest of the proedri (by a majority, we may suppose,) might in like manner refuse their consent. See Ἀσχιν. ii. 65, iii. 39. pp. 36, 59.—Schömann de Com. Ath. ch. xi.

1. ἐνδείκνυαι καὶ ἀπάγειν] ‘To procure my suspension or arrest.’ The processes of ἐνδείξεις and ἀπαγωγή are often mentioned in conjunction, as here, and Dem. c. Timoc. 146. p. 745, Lept. 156. p. 594, Anti-pho v. 8, 9. p. 130, &c., and in the βουλευτικὸς ὁρκος as it stood after the amnesty. Amid several divergent accounts of these processes, the best is Heffter’s (Ath. Gerichtsverf. p. 195). Ἐνδείξεις might be instituted, among other cases, against any who should hold an office while he owed public money; or (a luculent
instance) against any prytanis or proedrus who in discharge of his function in an assembly of the people should depart from the form of proceeding prescribed by law (Dem. c. Timocr. 22. p. 707). In the latter case, offenders were liable to a fine, and to ἐνδειξις, which ἐνδειξις was not only an expedient for levying the fine, but had the immediate effect of suspending them from office until the fine was paid. The Thesmothetēs had exclusive cognisance of ἐνδειξις. The statement of Pollux, that it pertained to the Archon Basi-
leus, is unsupported; likewise his definition of ἐνδειξις, on which some writers rely,—that it was ὀμολογομένου ὀδικήματος, οὐ κρίνεις ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας δεο-
μένου,—is called by Heffter ‘a mere jingle of words.’ Ἀπα-
γωγή was of wider application than ἐνδειξις. Moreover, its object was the bringing of the offender into custody, which in ἐνδειξις was not the rule. ἐνδειξις was an interdictory procedure, ἀπαγωγή a proce-
dure of summary arrest. To be liable to it, a person must be taken ἐπ’ αὐτοβόροφῳ, in per-
petration of an illicit act. The body which had cognisance in ἀπαγωγή was the Eleven, who registered (Heffter p. 210) the apprehension of the criminal and the cause of arrest (Lys. xiii. 86. p. 138), and who fur-
ther, supposing the arrested person to be already under sentence of law, had charge of the execution of this sentence.

7. βόλων] The building where the pryta-
nes, and while they lasted the Thirty, daily ban-
queted and sacrificed. It was near the council-chamber.

10. ἀναλήψας] This word, like implere in Latin, is used idio-
matically of communicating pollution; whence here ‘im-
plicate.’ See for example Phae-
do 67 a; and cf. especially with the present passage Antipho,
ii. Α. α. 10. p. 116, συγκαταμε-πλάναι τοῖς ἄνωτοι.
(In answer to a supposed objection)

that the innocent tendency of the reformatory doctrine, which was simply to teach uncompromising adherence to righteousness, and not to train for professions or impart knowledge, excluded the suspicion of perverting the youth,

9. ἵμων] So MSS. and edd. generally. ἵμων is a conjecture of H.

The martyria are supposed to follow here. Introd. p. xviii.

20. διδάσκαλος οὐδενός] He means (see b below) that he imparted no μάθημα,—no professional knowledge; even of καλοκαγαθία he never ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος ἦναι Xem. Mem. I. ii. 3. Cf. his declining ἐπιμε-
p. 33. διαλέγομαι μη λαμβάνων δ' ου, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλούσιω καὶ πενητὶ παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτάν, καὶ εἶν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἄν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἶτε τις χρηστὸς γίνεται εἶτε μή, οὐκ ἄν δικαιῶς τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμ, ὃν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μὲνδεν μὴ δὲν πῶς ποτὲ μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δὲ τίς φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πῶς ποτὲ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἴδια ν ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἵστα ὃτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί π ταῖς πολὺς χρόνους διατρίβουσθε; ἀκηκόατε, ὃ ἂν ἔρες Ἀθηναίοι· πάσαν υμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὃτι ἀκούσαν χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοι τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὔτε δ' οὐ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἄρδες. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὥς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ εξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ πρόσφορ, ῥ̣̣περ τὰς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπω καὶ ὄτιον προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὃ Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστι καὶ εὐθελεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διεβ-θαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἶτε τὶς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἐγνωσαν ὃτι νέωσ οὖν τοὺς εἴγο κακῶν πώς περι τοὺς ἐνυξυβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἥθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' 25


2. καὶ ἐὰν τις] This is a soft way of saying, 'And I am ready to question him, if he chooses.'

12. ὃτι ἀκούσατε [Stallb. rightly joins this with ἀλλὰ διὰ τὶ—diatrizboutes; the ἀκηκόατε—εἶπον' being interjected. Then ὃτι is because.' See the examples which Stallb. quotes—Euthyphilo 3 b, Rep. I. 332 a, III. 402 e, 410 d.
2. and 
ti 
ti 

4. 

κριτοβοῦλου . With 

Crito.

B. S. 1.

with 

Eschines,

Distin-

guished 

from 

others

of 

the 

name 

as

Σωκράτικος

Socrates

holding

conversation

in

Xen.

Mem.

I.

iii.

II.

vi.

He

was

mentioned 

also in

Athen.

V.

220a,

with

Aristippus,

Diog.

Laert.

II.

60), who afterwards became a teacher for money of the Socratic doctrines, and wrote Socratic dialogues (Schol. in Menex.).

He was at variance with Aristippus (Luzac de Dig. Soc. sect. II. § 2), and there is a fragment of an invective written against him by Lysias, illustrating the enmity of the Orators against the Socratics: he is of the company named in the Phaedo (59 b).

Epigenes is mentioned Xen.

Mem.

III.

xii.

1, and Phaedo

59 b: his father Antipho is not otherwise known. Demo-
docus, the father of Paralus and Theages, is an interlocutor in the Theages. Of Theages it is said, Rep. 496 b, εἰ δὲ ἀν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου Θεάγονον χαλίνος οἷος κατασχεῖν καὶ γὰρ Θεάγη τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρε-

κεκυασαν πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλο-

σοφίας, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσο-

τροφία ἀπείρουσα αὐτῶν τῶν πο-

λιτικῶν κατέξει. Adimantus is an interlocutor in the Rep. (357–368, 548). Apollodorus appears in the Phaedo (59 a, 117 d) as passionately attached to Socrates, and in the Symp.
says of himself (172 e), ἐγὼ Σωκράτεις συνδιατρίβω καὶ εἰπεῖλες πεποίημαι ἔκαστης ἡμέρας εἰδέναι δὲ τι ἂν λέγῃ ἡ πράστη, and is said (173 d) to have got τὸν ἐπικεφαλής τὸ μανάκις καλείσθαι. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Par-

lus, and Λαυτοδότος are only mentioned here.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 89

p. 33. τετελεύτηκεν, ὡστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνος γε αὐτοῦ κατα-
p. 34. δεηθεί—, καὶ Πάραλος ὁδὲ, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὐ ἢν 
Θεάγης ἀδελφός. ὁδὲ δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀριστωνος, 
οὐ ἀδελφὸς οὕτως Πλάτων, καὶ Αιαντόδωρος, οὐ 
Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁδὲ ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὅν τινὰ ἐχόμην μάλιστα μὲν ἐν 
tῷ ἑαυτῷ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα: 
εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα-
χωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου 
pῶν τούναντίων εὐρήσετε, ὥ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ το 
βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείρουτι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζό-

XXIII. Εἰπέν δὴ, ὥ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχομι ἐν ἄν 
ἀπολογείσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστι ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα ἵνα 
τοιαύτα. τάχα δὲ ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσεις ἀνα-

1. καταδεηθεί—] The kata-

8. ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ] The full 

165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ 

βήματος, ἢν ἐν εἰπης. Note by 
the way, that the examination 
of witnesses was extra to the 
time allowed for the pleadings; 
the mercy of the court.

26. ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρα] 'And then 
finds that I.'
οὔδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, π. 34.

ὡς ἄν δοξαίμι, τῶν ἐσχατον κινδυνον. τάχι οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἄν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργισθέις αὐτοῖς τούτοις θείτο ἄν μετ’ ὀργῆς 5τὴν ψήφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὔτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἄξιόν α μὲν γὰρ ἐγώγε· εἰ δ’ οὖν, ἐπιείκη ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τούτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἔμοι, ὃ ἀριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν τοῦ τινος καὶ οἰκείοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὖν ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρῶς οὖν ὑπὸ πέτρης πέ-

10 φυκα, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀνθρώπων, ὡστε καὶ οἰκείοι μοι εἰσὶ καὶ νεῖσι, ὃ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναίου, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἡδή, δύο ἐπὶ παιδία· ἀλλ’ ὁμοὶ οὐδέν αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβαθασάμενοι δεῖσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὔδεν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδικώμενος, ε

15 ὃ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναίου, οὔτος ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν βαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἐξω πρὸς θάνατον ἡ μή, ἀλλὸς λόγος, πρὸς δ’ οὖν δοξαν καὶ ἔμοι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῆ πόλει οὖ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὔδέν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε οὔτα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα, εἰτ’ οὖν ἀλλήθες εἰτ’ οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ’ οὖν δεδογμένον γε ἐστι τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τυί τῶν πολλῶν

21. τῷ Σωκράτει] VBS τῶν Σωκράτης, ZH τῷ Σωκράτη, both with some MS. authority. The last is worst; for such an emphatic use of the name Socrates palpably requires the article. And

2. ὡς ἄν δοξαίμι] Refers to κινδυνον, not to ἐσχατον—‘danger, as he would think it.’

5. οὐκ ἄξιον μὲν γὰρ] γὰρ refers to εἰ—[‘I say if,’] for though I do not expect it of you, yet [making the supposi-

6. επιείκη] Conciliatory.’


Sophrioniscus and Menexenus (Phaedo 116 b).

15. εἰ μὲν] ‘Whether I can look death in the face or not.’ —Whewell.

19. τοῦνομα] The name of σοφός: cf. 20 d, and below, εἰτε σοφία εἰτε κ.τ.λ.
against both this and τῶν Σωκράτης stands the consideration, that the meaning would be 'people have made up their minds that Socrates is to differ:' it is the form of a resolution which is to take effect; whereas the meaning required is 'they have made up their minds that Socrates differs' now. τῷ Σωκράτει leaves this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.; and in accepting it we follow Bernhardy (Syntax, p. 94), who supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

2. ἀνδρεία] Oxon. here has ἀνδρία, but is not consistent. Dindorf (on Ar. Nub. 510) says ἀνδρεία alone is the true form, —as proved (1) by the Ionic diaeresis ἀνδρηία (2) by the fact that in poetry it never occurs where the metre would require ἀνδρία (except in Eur. Here. F. 475, παθή ἐπιργου, μέγα φρονῶν ἐπ' ἀνδρία, which Elmsley has emended εἰνανδρία); (3) by the testimony of Etym. M. p. 461. 53, that the traditional orthography was ἀνδρεία till Apollonius invented ἀνδρία (4) by the preponderating adherence of the MSS. to ἀνδρεία.

I3. οὕτε ὡμᾶς] VII ὡμᾶς, BSZ (following 2 MSS.) ὡμᾶς. H says "ὡμᾶς commodo sensum praebet; nec plebem, modo aliquid loco haberi velit, facere, nec si singuli faciant, permittere debere."

3. ἵσονται] 'If we are to have such conduct on the part of those,' &c. ἕν would have given a different turn to the meaning.
9. ὁμώμοκεν] Part of the judge's oath was ἡ μὴ ὁμώμοιον ἀκροασεθαι τῶν κατηγορούντων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογούμενων: Êsoer.  


χαριείσθαι] 'That he will not favour whomsoever he feels inclined to favour.'  

10. ἡμᾶς] Defendants in general.  

11. ἐθίζεσθαι] 'Allow yourselves to be habituated,' an instance of the semi-middle sense. Dig. 88.  

15. ἄλλος—καὶ] 'But, by Zeus, especially, when I am on my trial at Meletus' instance for impiety.' A remarkable hyperbaton. The phrase ἄλλος τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the μέντοι νὴ Δία (which is also a familiar sequence, Phaedo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a), which could have found no other convenient place. What makes such a tmesis possible, without prejudice to perspicuity, is the very fact that ἄλλος τε πάντως καὶ is a sufficiently familiar phrase to admit of this dismemberment and yet be recognised: Dig. 294. Thus Bekker, in reading arbitrarily ἄλλος τε πάντως νὴ Δία μᾶλιστα μέντοι καὶ, is wide of the mark.
e XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἅθη-
p. 36. ναῖοι, ἐπὶ τοῦτο τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψυχήσασθε, άλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ Ἐφιμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστών μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τούτο, ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον θανμάξω ἐκατέρω τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀρίθ. 10 μόν. οὐ γὰρ ὁμιν ἐγώγε οὗτω παρ’ ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἄλλα παρὰ πολὺν νῦν δὲ, ὥς ἐοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα

12. τριάκοντα] So ZH; τρεῖς VBS. Of MSS., Oxon. with five others has τριάκοντα' which also approves itself independently.

5. καὶ ύμῖν] The defence of Socrates, which would occupy the second division of the pleadings, being thus concluded, there would follow here the voting of the judges, and the announcement of their verdict, declaring the charge proven. Then would begin the third division of the pleadings, consisting firstly of a speech on the side of the prosecution in advocacy of the penalty named, and secondly of Socrates' ἀντιτίμησις, where the Apology again takes up the thread. Introd. pp. vi, xi, xvii.

8. καὶ οὐκ—τοῦτο] The halting connection (grammatically speaking) between this clause and the preceding part of the sentence is idiomatic. The shortest way is taken to arrive at the particular which is the point of the sentence: Dig. 258. It is incorrect to supply, as Stallbaum does, καὶ ἃ kai toûto òti] ouk, k.t.l. Rather there is a substitution of a shorter form of expression, complete in itself, but not agreeing with the plan on which the sentence set out.

11. οὗτω παρ’ ὀλίγον] Hyperbatical for παρ’ οὕτως ὀλίγων. Dig. 298. Lit. 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared: i.e. 'so close.' Dig. 124.

12. τριάκοντα] The number of condemning votes was 281, out of a court of 501: so 30 in round numbers, or 31 exactly, changing sides, would have effected an acquittal. See, for the fuller discussion of this point, Introd. p. xii sqq.
The implication in μόνα that the majority was small would recommend the corruption of τρίκοστα into τρεῖς. In Andoc. iii. 4, p. 23, πειρήκοστα is a necessary emendation for πέντε. Cf. Taylor, Lectt. Lys. cap. vi.

2. ἀποπέφευγα] Half in jest, in allusion to his accusers being three to one, Socrates represents the majority as obtained by the joint influence of the three: supposing then each accuser represented by one-third of the majority, Meletus gets less than 100, i.e. less than one-fifth of the whole. The indictment stood in Meletus' name, but the really formidable accuser was Anytus: see again Introd. p. x.

6. τὸ πέμπτον μ.] Not 'a fifth,' but 'the' indispensable 'fifth.'

10. παθέων ἡ ἀποσίσαι] A technical legal expression; ἀποσίσαι applies to a pecuniary penalty, παθέων to death, imprisonment, or the like. So Dem. Mid. 47.

p. 529, ὅτου ἄν καταγροῦ ἡ ἡλιαία, τιμᾶτω περὶ αὐτοῦ παραχρῆμα, ὅτου ἄν δοκῇ άξιος εἶναι παθέων ἡ ἀποσίσαι (part of the κόμος ἦμερος), in Timocrat. 105. p. 733.

ὁ τι μαθῶν] 'For having taken it into my head, in the disposal of my life, to deny myself rest.' ἐν is not 'during.'

13. ἄλλων] Here is the idiomatic use of ἄλλος for 'besides:' Dig. 46. ἄλλων agrees with all three genitives following: 'and what not besides,—magistracies, clubs, and factions.'

ἄνωμοσίων] These associations were as rife at Athens under the Thirty as in the Peloponnesian war.
5. ἕπι δὲ—εὐφρεσίαν] This clause is repeated in the word ἐνταῦθα, and governed by ἃν and the Ἰῶν with εὐφρεσίαν is a redundancy. (At the same time probably another clause is confusing itself with this in the speaker's mind, to which Ἰῶν would be essential, namely, οἱ δὲ ἰδίᾳ ἑκαστὸν ὡμαλλὸν Ἰῶν εὐφρεσίαν, i. e. οἱ δὲ Ἰῶν ὡμαλλὸν ἰδίᾳ ἑκαστὸν εὐφρ.)

14. τιμᾶσθαι] 'That I should lay the penalty.'


17. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὔτως ὡς] This is the form of comparison with ὡς, complicated by the redundant insertion of οὔτως. Dig. 164.

20. ἠγαθός] Here this word plainly stands for three or four horses. Hesychius in voc. says καὶ ἕπι τριῶν καὶ τεσσάρων ἐτασσόν.
finite instead of a participial construction: Dig. 279.
23. τόις ἐνδέκα] εἰς ἀφ' ἐκάστης φιλίς ἐγγύτερο, καὶ γραμματεὺς ('secretary') αὐτοῖς συνηρμένοι. Poll. viii. 102. They had charge of the prisons, as well as of the execution of sentences.

b. Compromise, ironical also.

12. ἄλλοις ἄνθρωποις] The Lacedaemonians, for instance. See Thucyd. i. 132.
21. ὅν—ὅτιν] Genitive of a noun with participle after verbs of knowing, &c.: Dig. 26. The clause however is complicated by the presence of ἃτι, indicative of a momentary intention to adopt a

"Istos oûn ymín kai tauti légwn para-
plēsimos dokô légeun õôster perí tou óiktou kai tês
ántiβolísēsws, ápavthadízômenos: to òde ouk èstiv, ò
Athnymioi, toioîtou, allà toioûde mállon. Pépeteıma
êgô ëkôn einai mhêdêna àdikeîn ãnthrîptoum, allà ùmâs
10 toûto ðe peîthô: õlîgôn yàp χρónon allîlios die-
lêgîmeta: ðetê, õs êgôîmai, ði ÷n ymîn nómos, õôster
kai allîs ãnthrîptou, perî ðavântou mh miâν ëmêran
b mónon krîneû, allà tollâs, ðpetísêthte õv vûn ð ou
râditou õn χρîonô õlîgô megálas diàbolâs ãpòlû-
15 ësthai. Pépeteımenos ð ògô mhêdêna àdikeîn tollôû
dêw èmavûn gê àdikeîseuwn kai kâr' èmavûu èréiv aú-
tôs, õs àxiôs eimî tou kakeû û tiîmîsesthai toioûto
twû èmavû, tî ðeîsas; ÷ mh ðâðw tóûto, ou
Mêlhtûs mou tîmîatai, ð ðhîmî ouk eîdêwai ou't êi
20 agathô ou't êi kakeûn èstiv; ântî toûto ð ðê èlîwai
ðn êv ðiî ÷tî kakeûn õûtou, toûtoî ðîmîseûmenos;
pôteron ðêsîmou; kai tî me ðeî ñîwv ên ðêsîstîrîw, e
ouleîvûta tû ÿ àei kathîstamênê árçhê, tôis õûdekà;
allà χρηmâtnô, kai dedêsthai êwos ãn êktîsw; allà

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ô mên yàp ùmâs poieî evdaîmônas dôkeîn [êinai], êgô p. 36.
de eînai: kai ð mên trôphiês ouûdên deîtai, êgô de e
démîai. ði oûn deî me kata' to dîkâion tûs àxiâs ti-
mâsthai, toûtoû tîmîmai, ùn prutaînîsî stîtîsews.

5 XXVII. "Istos oûn ymín kai tauti légwn parap-
plêsimos dokô légeun õôster perí tou óiktou kai tês
ántiβolísēsws, ápavthadízômenos: to òde ouk èstiv, ò
Athnymioi, toioîtou, allà toioûde mállon. Pépeteıma
êgô ëkôn einai mhêdêna àdikeîn ãnthrîptoum, allà ùmâs
10 toûto ðe peîthô: õlîgôn yàp χρόnon allîlios die-
lêgîmeta: ðetê, õs êgôîmai, ði ÷n ymîn nómos, õôster
kai allîs ãnthrîptou, perî ðavântou mh miâñ ëmêran
b mónon krîneû, allà tollâs, ðpetísêthte õv vûn ð ou
râditou õn χρîonô õlîgô megálas diàbolâs ãpòlû-
15 ësthai. Pépeteımenos ð ògô mhêdêna àdikeîn tollôû
dêw èmavûn gê àdikeîseuwn kai kâr' èmavûu èréiv aú-
tôs, õs àxiôs eimî tou kakeû û tiîmîsesthai toioûto
twû èmavû, tî ðeîsas; ÷ mh ðâðw tóûto, ou
Mêlhtûs mou tîmîatai, ð ðhîmî ouk eîdêwai ou't êi
20 agathô ou't êi kakeûn èstiv; ântî toûto ð ðê èlîwai
ðn êv ðiî ÷tî kakeûn õûtou, toûtoî ðîmîseûmenos;
pôteron ðêsîmou; kai tî me ðeî ñîwv ên ðêsîstîrîw, e
ouleîvûta tû ÿ àei kathîstamênê árçhê, tôis õûdekà;
allà χρηmâtnô, kai dedêsthai êwos ãn êktîsw; allà

12. ἄλλοις ἄνθρωποις] The Lacedaemonians, for instance. See Thucyd. i. 132.
21. ὅν—ὅτιν] Genitive of a noun with participle after verbs of knowing, &c.: Dig. 26. The clause however is complicated by the presence of ἃτι, indicative of a momentary intention to adopt a
p. 37. ταύτων μοι ἐστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον' οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὅποθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμή-
σωμαι; ὅσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτον τιμήσατε. πολλῇ
μὲν ἂν με φιλοψυχίᾳ ἔχου, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι,
οὔτε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες 5
πολιταί μου οὐχ οἴοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τάς ἐμᾶς
diatribas καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γε-
γόναι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὅτε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν ὑπὶ
ἀπαλλαγῆμαι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἀρὰ αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ράδιος.
πολλοῦ γε δε, ὃ Ἀθηναίων. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος 10
eἰπ' ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην εἷς ἄλλης
πόλεως ἀμειβομένω καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ὑπὶ. εἰ
γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἕλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροά-
σονται οἱ νεὸι ὡσπερ ἑνθάδε· καὶ μὲν τούτοις ἀπε-
λαύνω, οὕτω εἰμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξέλωσι, πεῖθοντες τοὺς 15
eπρεσβυτέρους· εάν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τοὺτων πα-
tέρες τε καὶ οἰκείωι δὲ αὐτῶι τούτωι.

XXVIII. Ἰσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ
ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἶος τ' ἐσεὶ ἡμῖν
ἐξελθὼν ὕπι; τούτι δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατοι 20
πείσαι τινας ὑμῶν. εάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ
ἀπειθεῖν τούτι· ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν
p. 38. ἀγειν, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι ὡς εἰρονεομένωρ' εάν τ' αὖ
λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἄγαθον ὑπ' ἀνθρώπῳ
tούτῳ, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἁρετῆς τὸσ λόγους ποι- 25
εἰσθαί καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὅν ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ ἀκούετε

20. τουτι[ Cf. textual note on ταυτησ, 22 ε.

2. ἀλλὰ δὴ] Introduces the
last of a series of suppositions.
Dig. 142.
9. ἄλλοι δὲ ἀρὰ] Ironical.
11. ἐξελθώντι] 'If I quit the
city.' as below e, ἐξελθὼν ὕπι.
20. τουτι] Namely, ὅτι οὐχ
οίος τε ἔσομαι.
The interrogatory discipline which Socrates thus extols was that to which he sought to bring all with whom he conversed. The subject, about which the answerer was questioned, was himself: which is the reason why Socrates always identified the process with the carrying out of the Delphic precept, ἱνά δει σαυτών. The branches of enquiry to which it led were manifold:

(1) knowledge of one's own natural endowments and position, with a view to living for the greatest good of oneself and others:—ὁ ἐαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος ὅποιός τίς ἔστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα χρείαν κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 25:

(2) review of the actual use to which one has been and is putting one's life—Laches 187 c, ἰδίων περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγων, ὡσπον τρόπον νόν τε ὡδυ καὶ ὡσπον τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον βεβίωκεν and below 39 c, ἱδίων ἐλεγχον τοῦ βίου:

(3) examination of one's opinions,—their coherence, their consistency, the history of their formation; of which the results are—consciousness of one's own ignorance, and consciousness of the grounds of one's knowledge: Xen. Mem. III. ix. 6, Soph. 230 b—d:

(4) investigation of the principles of human life and action (for which the knowledge of one's own nature is a prerequisite:—Alc. I. 133 c, ἀρτοῦ ὡν ὥγγραφοσκοτες ἡμᾶς αἰτοῦ... διναῖμεθ' ἄν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αἰτῶν κακά τε καὶ ἁγαθά;)—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16, πέρι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων δει διελέγετο σκοπῶν τί εὑρεσέτε, τί ἀσέβες, τί καλῶν, τί αἰσχρῶν, τί δίκαιων, τί ἄδικων, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δελία, τί πόλεις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὰς ἁνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τους μὲν εἰδώτας ἥρειο ἀλλού κάγαδος εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἄγνωστα ἀναπαθοδοξίας ἄν δικαίως κεκλησαν: and here (just above) τυχάνει μέγαστον ἡγαθῶν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπω τούτῳ, ἐκάσης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετής τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται.

But this examination was not a mere discipline ending in itself, but a preparation to qualify a man for receiving culture and improvement (Alc. I. 124 d, ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, Laches 188 b, ἄξιοντα μανάθειν ωσπορ ἡ ἡγαθῶν ἀνθρωπωςτικῶν τινί, for attaining connectedness of knowledge and rational method in action, and for doing the best by himself and the state.

Socrates seems to have employed the strongest terms he could find to assert the indispensable nature of this discipline:—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16 (quoted above), III. ix. 6, τὸ ἅγγιστον ἔαστον, καὶ ἃ μη ἄδει δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἰσθαί γγρωφίκας, ἐγγυώτω μανίας ἔλογκοτέ αἴναι, Soph. 230 d, τὸν δ' ἀναληγκὺν ὁ νομιστέων, ἃν καὶ τυχάναι βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὄνω, τὰ μέγιστα ἁκάθαρτον ὡντα, ἀπαίδευτον τε καὶ αἰσχρόν κ.τ.λ., Hip. Ma. 304 c, τὸ καλὸν ἅγγιστον καὶ ὀπτο ὀντος διακέεσσαι, οἷς σοι
p. 38. ἐπὶ ἤττουν πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὔτως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὃ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ ὑπὸ τάξιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἄµεν οὐκ εἰδίσμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἄξιονύν κακοῦ οὔτε δενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἤν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἄν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀν ἐβλάβην νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ γὰρ ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἁρὰ ὅσον ἀν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσοῦτον βούλεσθέ μοι τιμήσαι. ἦσως δ' ἦν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι οὐκ οὖν ἀργυρίου τοσοῦτον οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ οδε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρῖτων καὶ Κρίτοβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνὸν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυάσθαι τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτον, κελεύσαντες ἔγγυσθαι τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὕτω ἀξιόχρεοι.

κρείττων εἶναι ξὺν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνάναι; and in the passage before us.

And was there not a cause? The current opinions, drawn from men's practical exigencies, imperfect observation, and debased morality, were no sounder than their sources. It was abhorrence of this mass of error and conventionality (which meanwhile the Sophists were accepting as the material of their system), which impelled Socrates to seek to reconstruct human opinion on a basis of 'reasoned truth.'

3. καὶ ἐγώ ἄµ' A supplementary reason;—'Were silence possible, it would be no less a κακῶν which therefore I should decline imposing on myself.'

6. νῦν δὲ όὐ γὰρ] This combination of particles occurs always in setting aside a hypothetical case which is the opposite of the existing state of the case. The δὲ and the γὰρ enter simultaneously into the combination, where there is no ellipse nor aposiopesis. Dig. 149.


13. ἀξιόχρεο] The third and last division of the pleadings being thus concluded, there would follow first the final voting and then the final verdict of the judges: by which the formal trial would be concluded.

After this, however, some 'last words' are still conceded to Socrates, who continues to address those of his judges
C. Last reflections, addressed to the judges: a. to those who had voted for his condemnation;

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ’ ἐνεκα χρόνου, ὃ ἄνδρες p. 38. 'Αθηναῖοι, ὦνομα ἐξετε καὶ αὐτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλο-
μέων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφὸν φήσουσι γὰρ ὅτι μὲ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ
καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἳ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν, εἰ οὗν
περιεμένατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἄν
ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ ὅτι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι
πόρρω ὑδὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω
dὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ d
καταψηφισαμένους θανάτον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς
tοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς. ἰσως μὲ οἴσσεθε, ὃ ἄνδρες,
ἀπορία λόγου ἐαλωκέναι τοιοῦτων, οἷς ἄν ὑμᾶς
ἐπειστα, εἰ φιλὴν δεῖν ἀπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὡστε
ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλὰ ἀπορία
15 μὲν ἐαλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμην καὶ ἀνα-
σχυτίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαύτα,
οἱ ἄν ὑμῖν ὑδίστῃ ἢν ἀκούειν, θηρυνύτος τέ μου καὶ
ὀδυρμόμενοι καὶ ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ
cαὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι: οἰα δὴ καὶ εἴδωθε
20 ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ’ οὔτε τοτε φήθην

who choose to remain and hear him.

Whether such a concession was actually made to Socrates, or whether it was only a sufficiently common practice to give verisimilitude to the fiction, is a question which can hardly be determined. See Introd. p. xv.

1. οὐ πολλοῦ γ’ ἐνεκα χρόνου] Socrates is telling the Athenians that they would not have had to wait long to be saved the reproach of putting him to death, by letting nature take her own course. 'It was but a brief space after all, by fore-stalling which they were entailing on themselves the reproach.' ἐνεκα marks here the efficient not the final cause; the meaning is not 'you will incur reproach for the sake of taking from me a brief remainder of life,'—but 'a brief space will be the cause of your incurring it.' The 'brief space,' accordingly, is not that between the present moment and his execution, but that between his execution and the moment when he would have died in the course of nature.
p. 38. δειν ἕνεκα τοῦ κυνόνυν πραξαί οὔδὲν ἄνελευθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὔτως ἀπολογησάμενῷ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι δόδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκεῖνως ζῆν οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ'.

p. 39. ἐμε οὔτ' ἀλλον οὔδενα δεί τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως 5 ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθαναίν ἀν τις ἐκφύγων καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων καὶ ἀλλαὶ μηχανὰ πολλαὶ εἰσὶν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κυνόνυνις, οὕτε διαφεύγειν 10 θάνατον, εὰν τις τολμᾶ πᾶν ποιῶν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὗ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπῶν, δ' ἀνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηριὰν θάττον γὰρ θα- b νάτον θεί. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἂτε βραδὺς ὄν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδύτερον ἐὰλων, οἱ δ' ἐμὸ 15 κατήγοροι ἂτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὄξεις ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάτ- τονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἂπειμι υφ' ύμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλών, οὕτω δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας

7. τὸ γε ἀποθαναίν ἀν τις] Before ἀν VH have μᾶν BSZ reject it. H errs in thinking that μᾶν exists in Oxon.—no doubt misled by Gaisf. Lectt. Plat., in whom "p. 39 a 3 μᾶν" must be an erratum for "μᾶν om."

4. ἐκείνως] Understand ἀπο- λογησάμενος again.

12. μι] ... ἢ] An instance of the presumptive variety of the deliberative conjunctive. It is confined to negative sentences. Dig. 59 note.

13. βατόν γὰρ θ. θεί] This refers to the reflex effect of wickedness on the evildoer's soul, which it degrades and ruins. Cf. Crito 47 e, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου (sc. the soul) ἅρα ἡμῶν, βιωτῶν διεφθαρμένου, ὁ τὸ ἀδικου λαβάται κ.τ.λ.; Gorg. 509 a, μεγίστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδικία τῷ ᾧδικοῦσε. Between danger and death there is many a chance of escape, as Socrates has just before said; but none between the evil deed and its internal consequences. Stallb.'s quotation of Odys. viii. 329, Ὁύκ ἄρετὰ κακὰ ἔργα καίχανε τοι βραδὺς ὄκνυ' is not to the point.

18. ὑπὸ—ἀφθαρσίας] 'Sentenced by Truth to receive the penalty of.'—Whewell.
After ioímenoi H inserts conjecturally méν, taking this to be suggested by ioímenoi με of some MSS., and by an erased blank in Oxon. The erasure in Oxon. was probably με, for an accent has been erased also from —οι. This however may have been an erasure by the original scribe; such as for instance must have been that at Crito 53 δ, where stands δι φθέραν with an erasure between—διφθέραν being plainly the true reading.

1. έγω τε . . . καί οὐτοι] ‘I as well as they.’ έγω has the stress, and stands (in accordance with Greek arrangement) first for that reason. Dig. 307. 6. έν φ—χρησιμοδούσων] The opinion, which connects prophetic enlightenment with the approach of death, has maintained its hold upon mankind in all ages. Patroclus foretells Hector’s death, II. xvi. 851, and Hector the death of Achilles, II. xxii. 358: instances to which classical writers often appeal; thus Xen. Αρρ. 30, ἀνέθηκε μὲν καὶ ὅμορος ἐστίν οἷς τῶν ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου προ-

illud est Calani, de quo ante dixi, et Homericī Hectorī qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat. So Shak-

speare, Rich. II. Act II. Sc. i.

(Gaunt)” “Methinks, I am a prophet new inspir’d; And thus, expiring, do foretell of him.” And Sir H. Davy (“Remains,” p. 311) speaks of himself as “looking into futurity with the prophetic aspirations belonging to the last moments of existence”—in a letter dated just two months before his death.

9. οἱ{are] Sc. τιμωρίαν. A vir-
tual cognate accusative after ἄπεκτωνέτε. Dig. i.

11. ἔδιδοναι ἔλεγχον. Namely, under the process of εἰτάραι. cf. 38 a note, and esp. Laches 187 e there quoted.
The direction I am wont to receive from the divine voice." See App. A, on τὸ διαμονόν.

24. πάνω ἐπὶ σμικρὸς] ἐπὶ sepa-

rates πάνω from σμικρὸς, to

which it belongs: Dig. 298.
XXXII. 'Εννοούσομεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι. δύοις γὰρ θάτερον ἐστὶ τὸ τεθνάναι. ἦ γὰρ οἶνον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἰσθήσιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἦ κατὰ τὰ 5. μέλλοντι τὶ] This accurately represents the reading of Oxon., which stands μέλλοντι (τὶ being prima manus), importing that τὶ should follow μέλλοντι. Gaisford here is inexact in his representation. 7. ταύτην] So VBH; αὐτὴν SZ. It is impossible to find a clear meaning for αὐτὴν, which is the reading of Oxon. and five other MSS. Cf. Phædo 60 a, where Oxon. (alone) has ταύτην for αὐτὴν.

4. ἐνταυτώθι ἐπὶ τὸ δικ.] An emphasised equivalent of ἐπὶ τὸδε τὸ δικ. Cf. Legg. 679 d, κατὰ πάλιν μίαν αὐτοῦ, equivalent to κατ' αὐτὴν μίαν τὴν πάλιν, Thucyd. vii. 16, τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ δύο προελεύσατο, viii. 28, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μύητον αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον καθιστάσι. 18. οἶνον] 'As it were.' Parenthetical to the construction. The words which it qualifies are μηδὲν εἶναι. (The subject of μηδὲν εἶναι is τὸν τεθνεῶτα). Dig. 16. Cf. below, οἶνον ὑπὸς, and again e, οἶνον ἀποδημήσα. 19. τὰ λεγόμενα] In the popular religious teaching.
π. 40. τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθέους εἰς ἄλλου τόπου.
καὶ εἶ γε μηδεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ οἴον ὑπνος,
ἐπειδὰν τις καθεύδων μηδὲ ὄναρ μηδὲν ὀρᾷ, θαυμά-
σιον κέρδος ἂν εἰσὶ οὐ χάνατος. ἔγω γὰρ ἂν ὀμοί, εἶ
tinα ἐκλεξάμενον δεῦ ταύτην τὴν νῦκτα, ἐν ὂ τοῦ κατέθεν,
ὁστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τάς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ἀντι-
παραδέχεται ταύτη τῇ νυκτὶ δέους σκεψάμενον εἰσεῖν,
πόσας ἂμενον καὶ ἱδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτῃς
tῆς νυκτὸς βεβάιοις εἰς τῷ ἐαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἴμαι ἂν μῆ 10
e ὅτι ἱδιώτην τινά, ἄλλα τῶν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαρθυμή-
tους ἂν εὑρέιν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ
νύκτας. εἰ ὄνων τοιοῦτον οἱ χάνατος ἐστι, κέρδος ἐγγύη
λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλεῖών ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται
οὔτω δὲ εἶναι ὡ μία νῦξ. εἰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀποδημησάτι
ἔστων οἱ χάνατος ἐνθέους εἰς ἄλλου τόπου, καὶ ἡλήθη
ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα εἰκεί εἰσίν ἀπαντεῖς οἱ τεθ-
νεῶτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθον τούτου εἰς ἂν, ὡ ἄνδρες
p. 41. δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἁιδοῦν, ἀπαλ-
λαγεῖ τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρή- 20
σει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οὕτε καὶ λέγωνται
ἐκεί δικαζεῖν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθις καὶ Αἰακὸς

21. ὡς] So VBS; ZH omit. Oxon, has it above the line but
in first hand. The ὡς is constantly added where it is a popular
appellation of which the propriety is recognised, and is frequently
found after the article, as Phdr. 256 b, τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὅλυμπιακόν,
Rep. 345 e, τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρχοντες, &c., &c.

1. τῇ ψυχῇ] An intensified
form of the dative of reference,
equivalent nearly to a genitive: 
Dig. 28.
12. αὐτῶν] A resumption of
ἰδιώτην τινά and βασιλέα, after
the intervention of εὐαρθυμ. ἂν
εὑρέιν.

22. Μίνως τε—ἀλλοι] These
nouns are in the nominative
by attraction to the interposed
relative clause, as the nearest
construction: Dig. 192.
Nowhere else does Triptole-
mus occur as judge of the
dead (though in Hom. Hymn.
Demet. 153 he sits in judgment on earth). Also Plato is the only Greek who styles Æacus judge of the dead, here and Gorg. 523 e; though many Romans mention him thus. But the same principle accounts for the ascription of such a subterranean preeminence to these two, and to the remaining two more widely recognised judicial personages named here. All four were connected with the secret rites, or mysteries, of their native places; Minos with the Cretan mysteries, which through the Orphic influence were widely known. Rhadamanthus, his assessor, is his countryman. Æacus was the hero of Ægina, where there were (Pausan. II. 30, Origen adv. Cels. vi. 290. c. 22, Lucian, Navig. 15) mysteries of Orphic origin. And Triptolemus was connected, of course, with Eleusis. These judges are an instance of the fact that certain features of the Greek mythology were first the product of the mystery-worship, and thence made their way into the popular mind.—Döllinger, Gent. and Jew, Vol. I. Bk. iii. p. 175. The same account may be assumed to hold of the Æoloi τῶν ἡμιθεῶν, who are subjoined to these four; for very many places had mystery-rites. Rhadamanthus is mentioned in Homer, (Od. vii. 323), and therefore antecedently to mysteries, as a judge, but on earth and not in the nether world.

6. ἐμοικε καὶ αὐτῷ] I. e. 'I should have a pleasure peculiarly my own.'


8. ὅποτε—τέθηκεν] This depends upon ἀντιπαραβάλλωντι. The whole sentence ὅποτε—ἂνδει εἰν is a re-statement more at length of θαναστῇ ἂν εἰν ἐ διατριβῇ, which it follows asyndetically,—an instance of Binary Structure: Dig. 207.

9. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι] Socrates' comparison of himself with Palamedes recalls the fable of the representation of the Palamedes of Euripides soon after Socrates' death, when, at the words ἐκάνετε ἐκάνετε τῶν πάνσοφον, ὥθε τῶν ἄνθρωπων μερισμένον, ἐν εἰς των ἔλλων τῶν ἀριστο, the whole
p. 41. λοντι τα ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τα ἐκεῖνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οὖν, οὐκ ἄν ἄδεσ εἰη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἑξετάζοντα καὶ ἑρευνῶντα ὡσπερ τοὺς ἐνταύθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφὸς ἔστι καὶ τίς οἴεται μὲν, ἐστι δ᾽ οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ᾽ ἄν τις, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δὲξαιτο ἑξετάζαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαιν ἄγοντα τὴν πολλὴν καὶ στρατιάν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ᾧλλος μυρίων ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἤπειραι καὶ ἑξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἄν εἰη εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δῆπον τούτον γε ἑνέκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονεύστεροι εἰσίν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἡδὴ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοι εἰσίν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστίν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρῆ, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταῖ, εὐελπίδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τι ἅπ. τοῦτο διανοεῖςθαι ἄληθες, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄνδρὶ ἄγαθῷ κακῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζωτὶ οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα: οὐδὲ τὰ ἑμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἄλλα μοι δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἡδη τεθναίαν καὶ ἀπηλλάξθαι πραγ- 20

6. ἄγοντα] Edd. ἄγαγόντα. But there is strong syntactical justification (besides the weight of Oxon. and five other MSS.) for ἄγοντα. See Commentary.


6. ἄγοντα] Participle of the imperfect, which gives greater fullness and vividness than the aorist would have given. Cf. Legg. 635 a, καβύσει μάλτις ἀπὸν τῆς τῶτε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὐτά (meaning Lycurgus or Minos), 677 c, Θάμεν δὴ τὰς ἐν πεδίῳ πόλεις ... ἀρδην ἐν τῷ τότε χρῶνο διαφθείρεσθαι (meaning at the Deluge).

7. ἢ ᾧλλος—ἐπταί] The desire for brevity in the summing up of the enumeration breaks off the legitimate plan of the sentence: Dig. 257.

16. ἄληθει] 'As a verity.' See 18 a, note.

6. deōmai mēntoi autōn] Edd. mēntoi autōn deōmai, and so all MSS. except Oxon. But which collocation most exactly suggests the emphasis required? The position of mēntoi has often to be referred to a subtle ear. Cf. 31 b, kai ei mēntoi ti, and Dig. 294. 17. ἡ] So edd., rightly. The weight of Oxon. with four other MSS., giving ei, is diminished by the itacism.

7. ἐπιμελείσθαι ἡ ἀρετής, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶι τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, οὐνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, οὔπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὅν δεῖ, καὶ οἴοντα τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιήτε, δίκαια πεπον—p. 42. θῶς ἐγὼ ἐσομαι ύψι πῦ ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ νιείς. 15 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἥδη ὀρα ἀπειναί, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανομένως, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένους ὦπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἀμείνων πράγμα, ἀδηλον παντὶ πλῆν ἡ τῷ θεῷ.

3. οὐ πᾶν] Here, as elsewhere, οὐ πᾶν marks only a bare denial: Dig. 139. Socrates is satisfied with saying, 'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.' His εἰρωνεία would in no case have suffered him to say, 'I am far from being displeased.'

8. ταύτα ταύτα λυποῦντες] By plying them unweariedly with warning and remonstrance.
APPENDIX A.

Τὸ δαμόνιον.

The word δαίμων was used to denote either θεὸς or a spiritual being inferior to θεὸς. Its distinctive meaning as applied to either class is that it denotes such a being in his dealings with men. From Homer to Plato δαίμων is persistently marked by this meaning. Δαμόνος therefore denotes a connection with divine agency; and τὸ δαμόνιον denotes sometimes such an agency, and sometimes the agent itself. So Aristotle (Rhet. II. xxiii. 8), τὸ δαμόνιον οὗδεν ἐστιν ἄλλ᾿ ἢ θεὸς ἢ ἡ θεόν ἔργον, and for this distinction we may compare Plato (Phdr. 242 e), εἰ δ᾿ ἐστιν ὅπερ οὐν ἐστὶ θεὸς ἢ τι θεῖον ὁ Ἑρως. When we read in Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 2), διεσκεδύθη ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαμόνιον ἐαυτῷ σημαίνει τὸθεόν ἢ καὶ μελιστά μοι δοκοῦν αὐτὸν αὐτίκαισασθαι καὶ δαμόνια εἰσφέρειν, both senses of the word are exemplified. Socrates meant by τὸ δαμόνιον a divine agency; Meletus wrested this into the sense of a divine being. In the Apology Socrates marks the position as a caricature by the expression ἐπικομιωδῶν, and then gives the interpretation consistent with his own meaning—viz. δαμόνια πράγματα. That Socrates is not speaking of a being is clear from other passages also, as when he says (Apol. 31 c), ὅτι μοι θεῖον τι καὶ δαμόνιον γίγνεται, or (Phdr. 242 b), τὸ δαμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον γίγνεσθαι, or (Euthyd. 272 e), τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαμόνιον, or (Theaet. 151 a), τὸ γεγραμμένον μοι δαμόνιον. Nor does Plato, who recognises the common notion

1 In Plat. Symp. 202 d — 203 a, this view of δαίμων appears very distinctly, though there, as the doctrine held is that θεὸς ἄνθρωπος οὗ μέγερυς, all μαντικῆ is the province of the δαίμων.

2 Whence the phrase of Ἐσχινές (iii. 117. p. 70) ἢ συν δὲ καὶ δαμόνιον τινὸς ἔξωσμερτάνειν αὐτῶν προαγομένου is indeterminate.
of a personal attendant δαίμων (Legg. 730 a, Tim. 90 a), ever give
this name to the phenomenon in question. Even Theages (as Zeller
remarks, II. 65. n. 2) gives no personality to τὸ δαίμονον. 'Ἡ φωνή
ἡ τοῦ δαίμονον (Theag. 128 e) is ambiguous. Plato’s use is some-
times adjectival (e. g. τὸ δαίμονον σημεῖον), and sometimes elliptically
substantival. Grammatically, Xenophon confines himself to the
latter use only,—still merely in the signification of a divine agency.
Zeller notices that the interpretation of Socrates’ δαίμονον as a
being remained peculiar to his accusers (Cicero translating it by
divinum quiddam, Divin. I. 54, not by genius) until it was revived
by Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers.

What then were the nature and function of this δαίμονον σημείων?

Let us first consult Xenophon, in whom the chief passages are
these:

Mem. I. i, 2—5, διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίνη Σωκράτης τὸ δαίμονὸν
ἐαυτῷ σημαίνειν ὅθεν δῆ καὶ μαλλιστά μου δοκοῦν μαυτὸν αἰτίασθαι καὶ
δαίμονα εἰσφέρειν. ὃ δὲ οὐδὲν κανονέρον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὡσθον μα-
νεῖκην νομίζουσιν οἶονοι τε χρώματι καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβουλαῖς καὶ δυναῖς,
οὐκὲ τὰ γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντων οὐ τοὺς ὀρνίθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντώντας εἰδέμε
τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τοῦτον αὐτὸ σημαί-
νευν, κάκειον δὲ οὔτος εὐμύχειν. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν πλείστοι φασίν ὑπὸ τε τῶν
ὄρνιθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπθη τοι διὰ καὶ προτρέπεται Σωκράτης
dὲ, ὡσπερ ἐγίγνοσκεν, οὔτως ἔλεγε. τὸ δαίμονὸν γὰρ ἐφή σημαίνειν καὶ
πολλοὶ τῶν ἐφικόνων προηγήσεν τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τὸ
δαίμονὸν προσημαίνοντο. καὶ τοὺς μὲν πειθομένους αὐτῷ συνεφέρε, τοῖς δὲ
μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.

IV. iii. 12—13, Σὺ δ’ ἐφή, δ’ Σώκρατες, έποικαίν ἐτὶ φιλικότερον ἦ
ἄλλοις χρήσατα [ὁ θεό], εἰ γε μὴδε ἑπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσι
σοι ἀ τε χρή ποιεῖν καὶ τί μη. "Οτι δὲ γε ἀλήθη λέγω καὶ σὺ, δ’ Ἐιδίδθημε,
γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς ἑως ἃν τὰς πορφάς τῶν θεῶν ἠδή, ἀλλ’ ἐξαρκῇ σοι
τὰ ἐργά αὐτῶν ὀρθῶτι σέξεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς.

IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαίμονὸν ἐαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἀ τε δει κα
καὶ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη διάνοιας.

IV. viii. 5—6, Ἀλλὰ νῦν τὸν Δία, φαίνει αὐτοῦ, ὁ ’Ερμόγενες, ἐσθη μου
ἐπιχειροῦστος φρονίσεις τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἁπολογίας ἡμαρτώθη τὸ
δαίμονὸν, καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν, Θαυμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸν δὲ, Θαυμάζεις, φαίνει,
ei τὸ θέο δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελεύταν τὸν θλὶν ἐσθη;  

IV. viii. 11, εἰσεβῆς οὕτως ὡστε μὴ δεῖν αὖν τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν.

Συμπ. viii. 5, τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαίμονὸν προφασιζόμενον οὐ διαλέγει μι
ποτὲ δ’ ἄλλου τοῦ ἐφαίμενος.
To which must be added still from the Memorabilia, I. i. 19, 
Σωκράτης ἤγειτο πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ 
tὰ συγγ. βουλευόμενα, πανταχῶ δὲ παρείναι καὶ σημαίνει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους 
περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.

Thus we see that Xenophon tells us nothing as to the nature of 
Socrates' δαμόνιον, save that it was the instrument through which 
divine intimations reached him unsolicitedly. He adheres (unless 
we admit as his the θεοῦ μοι φωνῆ φαίνεται in § 12 of the Xeno-

phontean Apology) to the expression σημαίνει τὸ δαμόνιον, meaning 
by this expression (as already said) that τὸ δαμόνιον is but the 
instrument, while it is the gods who are the agents, whence in 
other passages we have as equivalent expressions [θεοὶ] προσημαίνοντο 
(Mem. IV. iii. 12), τὸ θεῷ δοκεῖ (ib. viii. 6), θεῶν γνώμη (ib. 11). Its 
intimations differ from those obtained by μαντική in being given 
spontaneously. Socrates is represented as having thought himself 
singular, as a matter of fact, in possessing this gift. He did not 
urge others to seek for a similar sign. Although he believed (Mem. 
I. i. 19) πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι . . . . πανταχῶ δὲ παρείναι καὶ σημαίνει τοὺς 
ἀνθρώπους περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων, he seems either to have 
directed others to μαντική (Mem. I. i. 6), or the oracle (Cic. de Divin. 
i. 54), or to have given them the benefit of his own divine intima-
tions (Mem. I. i. 4). He however believed that if others had not 
this gift, it was by their own fault (Mem. IV. iii. 13).

What its function was according to Xenophon, we gather from 
the identification of its province with that of μαντική, which is 
defined in Mem. I. i. 6–9, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τάδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους· 
tά μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία συνεβολέευε καὶ πράττεν ὡς ἐνόμιζέν ἄριστ' ἃν πραγμά-
ναί περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποθέσοιτο μαντευσομένων ἐπεμπενεὶ ποι-
ητέας καὶ τοῦ κέλους οἴκους τε καὶ πύλεως καλῶς ὀκήσεις μαντικής ἥδη 
προσδείσθαι τεκτονικῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ χαλκευτικὴ ἡ γεωργικὴ ἡ ἀνθρώπων 
ἀρχικὴ ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἐργῶν ἐξεταστικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἡ ὁικονομικὴ ἡ στρα-
tητικὴ γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπων γνώμη αἰρέτα 
ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἥδη τοὺς θεοὺς ἐάντως κατα-
λείπεσθαι, ὥσπερ δὴ οὐχ ἐξαιτία τοὺς ἀνθρώποις . . . . ἥδη δὲ δεῖ, ἃ μὲν μαθών-
tας ποιῶν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μαθάνειν, ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, 
πειράσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς 
ἂν δῶσιν ἱλέω σημαίνειν.

This accords with Plato, Apol. 40 a, ἢ εἰσθητὴ μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ 
δαμονίου. It was no such guide in the matter of right and wrong 
as conscience is; nor yet an universal oracle to reveal truths of 
science or of futurity. Its function was on the one hand practical
—to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, of which Socrates had cognisance, either as himself a party to it or in the interest of his friends,—on the other hand it pronounced not on the morality but on the expediency (in the Socratic sense of what was really for the best) of the proposed course. This would not exclude from its decision moral questions, where the obligation either was obscure or mainly depended on the consequences. It was not a mere presentiment, a foreboding of chance misfortune or of chance success, the mere reflection of a man’s own feelings of happiness or gloom while in spite of them he carries out his course of action. It stamped in Socrates’ belief a definite character of expediency or inexpediency on the course intended, and he never disobeyed it.

In Plato the notable passages are these:—Apol. 31 c-d, toátou dé aítwów éstw ó òmeis émov polllákis ákkrwaste polllaxoú légyontos, óti mói théwv ti kai daimówv gíghetai fofin, ó dé kai én tis gráphi épikomwóv Mélitos égráfes. émou dé toút' éstw ék pайдou órphámev, fofiv tis gevrwemiv, h ótan géntetai aei ápotrpétei me toútou, ó án méllw práttein, protprétpe dé oupote, toút' éstw ós mói énantiwtn tâ politiâkâ prâttein. 40 a-b, h yápr eisodwía móu xwristikâ h tis daimóniov én mév tâ prósden xrmwv pânti pánv puvniv aei h hãng kai pánv épî sýmkrwos énantiwumiv, eî ti méllwmoi úi orðwos prâxein. voví dé euvphitékhe móu, áper órâte kai avtou, táuti, ó ge dé oikhêa òn tis kai nómizetai õsgkata kakwv éinw. émou dé ouâte eîxwnti eswvthen ókóthen hраntwth to tóo thewv stmeiow, ouû híka ánèbainov éntauðov épî tâ dikasthrión, ouî' épî tî lógov ouðamov méllowti tî èrèwv kai tou év állovs lógovs polllaxov òh me épêsche légwta meta'ézv. voví dé ouðamov peri tâútyn tîn prâxein ouâ' épî én évrmw ouðéev ouâ' épî én lógov hraantiwastai móu.—Euthyd. 272 e, kathá thèwv ýa prîa evxovn káthimwv éntauðha, ouâper sô mi eîdes, étî tî ópoudwtrprôv mówos, kai õdêi épî ýov eîxovn ánastîshai. ánastâmevov dé móu éngentô to éiowos stmeiow tî daimóniov, pâlîv oûn eikavêlîwv.—Phdr. 242 b, hýka' émellov, ógavê, tôo òstovn díavâvnev, tôo daimóvn te kai tôo éiowos stmeiow móu géywevtei éngentov—âli dé me épíaxheî h án méllw prâttein—, kai tôa fofivn édová aútôvhe akóúnta, h mi ouk ei' ápínaî prîn án afroswwmai, ós tôi hrmptikôta eîs tô òthovn.—Alcib. I. init. 103 a-b, toútou dé tô aítwov géwnev ouk ánthropw- peion, álalô tô daimóvnw énantiwma, ou sô tî dîwma kai ùstovn peuvae. vûn o' épîaXh eîkêta énantiwtna, ouûw prosozêlîwv. eîdëtis dé eîm kai tôo lôpov ùi'énantiwosstha aútô.—Theat. 151 a, éiowos mêv tô gynwmenov

3 Wiggers and Zeller have noticed this. Remark the contrast in the Apology. The matter of duty—not to desert the post of preacher to the Athenian people—is thrown on the divine mission (28 e), the matter of judgment—to abstain from politics—is attributed to the daimón (31 d).
μοι δαμόνον ἀποκαλέει ἔννειαν ἐνίοις δ' ἐκ. — Rep. 496 c, τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον
οὐκ ἐξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαμόνον σημεῖον ἢ γάρ πού τιν ἄλλο ἡ υἱοθεί τῶν
ἐμπροσθεν γέγονε. The passages in the Theages consist in part of
parrot-like repetitions of descriptions of the phenomenon culled
from various dialogues, in part of inventions founded on these.

The account in these passages exhibits some additions and vari-
ations as compared with that of Xenophon.

As to the nature of the phenomenon, it is explained to be a sign,
which consists of articulate words, and the use of which corresponds
to the μαντική of other men. It is represented as a gift almost
peculiar to Socrates, though by him possessed from his childhood
upwards.

Its function seems somewhat heterogeneous, compared with what
we have found it in Xenophon. Besides giving warnings as to an
intended course of action, it reminds of a duty unperformed (Phdr.);
or an advantage accrues from obeying it, which has no rational
connection whatever with the obedience (Euthyd.). The tales of
the Theages dwell on the marvel exclusively; yet, while they leave
the φωνή unconnected with any act of the judgment, they leave
room for supplying such a connection. Plato further tells us that
its function was a negative one — ἐϊ ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει δε ὀπτοτε
(Apol.). The importance of this limitation shall be considered
presently.

From these data we may now seek to arrive at a conclusion for
ourselves. According to both Xenophon and Plato the fact itself,
which Socrates accounted for by the δαμόνον σημεῖον, was a sudden
sense, immediately before carrying a purpose into effect, of the
expediency of abandoning it, — or, Xenophon would add, of prose-
cuting it. Meanwhile we are not bound to accept Socrates' account
of the cause of this sudden feeling; first, because he was no psy-
chologist, and, while in his own belief he was merely describing his
own consciousness, — or, as Xenophon says, ὅστερ ἐγὴνωσκεν οὕτω καὶ
ἶλεγε,— he was really importing into his description an inference
of his own; secondly, because he rather diminishes the weight of
his own testimony for us, not merely by his attention to dreams
(Phædo 60 e), but more by his absolute faith in μαντική and its use
in obtaining for others the same divine guidance which he obtained
unasked through the σημεῖον; and, thirdly, because while he believed
himself to have detected divine agency here, he was perfectly un-
conscious of it in its more ordinary province, as the author of "all
holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works." If, then,
To ἀμώνιον.

decaying Socrates' account, we are disposed to refer the phenomenon to ordinary psychological causes, we can do so satisfactorily, provided we confine our attention to Xenophon's account alone. All Xenophon's notices of it encourage the view, that it was a quick exercise of a judgment informed by knowledge of the subject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect without consciousness of the process. In a mind so purified by temperance and self-knowledge, so single of purpose and unperturbed by lower aims, endowed with such powerful natural faculties, especially those of observation and of causality, the ability to forecast and forejudge might become almost an immediate sense. But it must be confessed that some of the features in Plato's account are a little embarrassing to this view. The singularity ascribed by Plato (Rep. 496 c) to the gift need not rank among these difficulties, since Xenophon mentions it as a singular characteristic of Socrates (Mem. IV. viii. 11) that he was φρόνιμος ὅστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω, μηδὲ ἄλλοι προσδεῖθαι ἄλλ' αὐτάρκης ἐναὶ πρὸς τίν τούτων γρῶσιν, which is the rationalised description of this very phenomenon. But the statement that Socrates enjoyed the gift from his earliest days is not fully consistent with the explanation just put forward,—with any consideration, that is, of the effect of observation, experience, moral training, or habit of mind. Again, as we have seen, two of the instances of the occurrence of the σημείων which are related in Plato preclude the explanation of an act of judgment. It is no judgment, however penetrating, which recalls Socrates from the stream he had purposed crossing and brings him back to Phaedrus, or which forbids him to leave his seat just before the fortuitous entrance of Euthydemus and his companions. If we are to accept these features as historical, we must give up all attempt to rationalise the phenomenon at all, and fall back upon Socrates' own account as final. But, first, we have seen that there are reasons against accepting his account, and, secondly, against the historical probability of these two instances stands the fact that, though paralleled in Plutarch, they are unlike any other instances given by Xenophon and Plato; for (setting aside the Thages as apocryphal) in all the other instances it is implied that the course of action forbidden by the warning is prejudicial, not through its fortuitous consequences, but through something amiss in itself, and that the course upon which the agent is thrown back leads to the good result by a chain of means and not by a chain of accidents.
We must therefore adopt the alternative which involves less considerable difficulties, and regard Plato as less faithful than Xenophon in his illustration of the phenomenon. It is not difficult to suppose that by tracing it back to Socrates' boyhood nothing more may be intended than that his memory did not serve him to indicate the first beginning of those habits of observation and that moral and mental training from which the faculty grew. And as to the heterogeneous instances of warnings given by it, since as individual instances they are certainly inventions, part of the machinery of the dialogues in which they stand, it is doing no violence to Plato's genius to suppose, that as an inventor he has not scrupled to travesty the character which belonged to the actual and serious use of the gift, and to extend its operation playfully into the domain of chance.

There remains to be noticed in Plato's account the well-known restriction of τὸ δαμόνον to negative functions. In describing the sign as a voice, Plato adds (Apol. 31d), ἀεὶ ἀποστρέπετε με τούτο ὃ ἀν μὲλλω πρᾶττειν προστρέπετε δὲ οὕποτε. One difficulty lies in the nature of the case. What kind of divine communication or what kind of judgment could that be which yielded only negative utterances? Certainly no act of judgment could be such: the same penetration which could discern the inexpediency of a course of action would serve for the discerning of the more expedient alternative. A divine communication might be imagined under any self-imposed restriction; still the restriction would, in proportion to its arbitrariness, discredit yet more this hypothesis, which we have already seen reason to abandon. Another difficulty lies in the conflict of testimony as to this peculiarity. Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as disapproving force (Mem. IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτῶ τὸ δαμόνον ἐγαεφ προσημαίνειν ἀ τε δέοι καὶ ἄ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν. cf. I. i. 4, as quoted above). Cicero (De Divin. i. 54) simply echoes Plato. Plutarch (De Socr. Dæm. c. 11. p. 1015), agreeing with Xenophon, represents the sign as κολεῦν ἣ κελεῖν.

These are the two difficulties which have to be met. No attempt has been made to meet the first: the second has been met by swallowing the first whole, and supposing Xenophon to be in error in not distinguishing the actual communication made by the sign, and the inference which Socrates made from it, and which might (as in Apol. 40 a) be positive. But we shall meet both difficulties by some such explanation as the following. As to the reconcilement of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say ἀεὶ ἀποστρέπετε με, he
describes it by its most perceptible act, for its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable. It was only when the presentiment ran counter to his will that Socrates became distinctly conscious of it. An illustration of this oversight occurs in the statement of some moderns concerning conscience, that it has only a negative function,—as if there were no such thing as "an approving conscience." In this case also the origin of the misstatement is the same, the more acute and marked character of the negative function. Thus it is the statement of Plato which needs to be supplemented, while that of Xenophon, so far from needing qualification, is alone commensurate with the common sense of the case. As to the fact to which Plato's notice points, the words προτέρει δὲ οὐποτε would seem not to be an idle tautology, a reiteration of what we have seen to be a defective statement, but to mark another feature in the case. The Voice was no impulse; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgment on a purpose already in being. Motives, on the other hand, impel the will always in some direction; they cannot be negative. Thus the setting forth the first part of the statement on the negative side only is justified in a way by the antithesis. And the meaning of the two clauses together is, that the Voice is a reflexive judgment on purposed actions, but does not supply motives of action.

The fact which τὸ δαμόνων represented was an unanalysed act of judgment,—not on a principle, but on a particular course of action already projected; not on the morality of this, but on its expediency in the Socratic sense of the term. It was κριτική, not ἐπιτακτική. Whatever connection it might really have with the springs of the will would certainly be left out of the statement by one who could identify virtue with knowledge. It was Socrates' substitute for μαυτική. This implies that in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being (as we have seen) the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.

No Christian would be startled by a view which recognised every
part of his mental processes as performed in dependence on God,—
nor on the other hand would he be shocked to hear them spoken
of as independently and properly his own. So long as each view
reached the whole way, he would be satisfied with it, and would
comprehend it. What Socrates did was to halve each of these
views, and to speak of his mental processes as human up to the
point where he could still follow them,—beyond that as divine.
§ 1. Idioms of Nouns:—Accusative Case.

Besides the Accusatives governed by Verbs Transitive, as such, occur the following, of a more Adverbial character.

A. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Cognate Accusative.

a. Direct and regular instances of the Cognate Accusative. It will suffice, as a notice of these, to point out that they are of two kinds only, viz.—

a. the Accusative of the Act or Effect signified by the Verb.

b. the Accusative of the Process indicated by the Verb.
Virtual Cognate Accusatives, i.e. such as are cognate in sense only and not etymologically, are intended to be here included. The "Accusative of the General Force of the Sentence" is really an Accusative of Apposition. See below, F (§§ 10-12).

§ 2. b. Accusatives which must be analysed as Adjectives or Pronouns in agreement with an unexpressed Cognate Accusative. These are commonly neuter (not always; cf. Hdt. v. 72, κατεδήσαν τιν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ).

Phædo 75 b, ἀφάν καὶ ἀκόινων καὶ τὰλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι—'perform the other acts of the senses.'

Ib. 85 b, ἕγομαι ... οὗ χείρον ἐκλίνων τὴν μαντικὴν έχειν.

Symp. 205 b, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀλλοισ καταξιώμεθα νόμασιν, i.e. 'in the other cases.' Stallbaum takes this of 'the other (εἶνη) species of things' which have to be named, 'quod ad cæteras attinet formas.' This might be; but the construction of the particular verb χρήσαται leads us the other way; cf. Thuc. ii. 15, τῇ κρίνῃ ... ἐγγὺς οὕση τὰ πλείστου ἄξια ἓχρωντο, Hdt. i. 132, χρήσαται [τοῖς κρέασιν] ὅ τι μν λόγος αἴρεει.

Phdr. 228 c, (A)'δς μοι δοκεῖσ σφ οὐδαμῶς με ἄφησεν κ.τ.λ. (B)

Πάνω γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.

Theæt. 193 c, δεξία εἰς ὑμιστερα μεταφρέωσης.

Legg. 792 c, τοῦτο  οὐκετὶ ἄν ἐγώ ἔνακαλολούθησαιρ' ἄν—'this is one step further than I can go with you.' Exactly parallel are the Homeric τὸδ' ἱκώεις, τόδε χάος, &c.

Crat. 425 c, εἰ τι χρηστῶν ἔδει αὐτὰ διελέσθαι.

§ 3. c. Adjectives as well as Verbs are followed by a Cognate Accusative, or by one referable to the same principle.

Apol. 20 b, καλὸ τε καὶ ἄγαθω τίν προσήκουσαν ἀρετῆ.

Ib. d, καδογνείω [σοφίαν] ταύτην εἶναι σοφός.

Meno 93 b, ταύτην τὴν ἀρετῆν, ἣν αὐτοὶ ἄγαθοι ἤσαν.

Rep. 349 e, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀπερ φρόνιμον ἄγαθον [εἶναι λέγεις];—'good at those things in which he is wise.'

Ib. 579 d, δούλος τὰς μεγίστας ὁμολογεῖς καὶ διολείπασ.

Laches 191 c, τοῦτο τοῖνυν αἴτιον ἔδειγον ὧν ἐγὼ αἴτιος.

So Thucyd. i. 37, αὐταρκῆ θέσιν κειμένη, v. 34, ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν ἀτίμων τοιάνθε.

(B, C, and D, which follow, are to be regarded as very near akin to each other.)
§ 4. B. Accusatives of the part to which the action, or characteristic, is limited, as περαν πόδα, βρύχειν ὄδωρας. (Lobeck). Adjectives as well as Verbs, of course, are followed by this Accusative.

Charmid. 154 c, δαμαστός τὸ κάλλος.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 371, τυφλὸς τὰ τ' ὅσα τῶν τε νοῦν τά τ' ὀμματ' εἶ.

§ 5. C. Accusatives Quantitative (or, in all the instances following, Adjectives in agreement with such Accusatives), expressing how much of the subject is brought under the predication.

Legg. 958 d, ἂ δὲ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τοῦτ' αὐτὸ μόνον φύσιν ἔχει, ... ταῦτα ἐκπληροῦν.

Ib. e, ὅσα τροφὴν ... ἡ γῆ ... πέφυκε βοῶσθαι φέρειν.

Rep. 467 c, οἱ πατέρες, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἀμαθέως ἔσονται—'to the extent of human capacities.' It is hard to hit upon the exact ellipse, comparing other instances; but it cannot be wrong to look on the Accusative as quantitative.

Crito 46 c, σὺ γὰρ, ὅσα γε ταῦτα ὑπερβάλει, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθη-

σκεῖν αὐριον.

Ib. 54 d, ἀλλ' ἵσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦτα, εἶν τι λέγης παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖ.

Rep. 405 c, ιατρικὴς δείσθαι ὃ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἠνεκα, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἁργίαν.

Pladr. 274 a, σὺ γὰρ ... ὠμοδούλους δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετῶν ... , ὃ τι μὴ πάρεργον.

Tim. 42 e, ἀριστά τὸ θυτὸν διακυβερνάν ζώον, ὃ τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ γίγνοντο αἰτίων.

Ib. 69 d, σεβόμενοι μαίνειν τὸ θεῖον, ὃ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἤν ἀνάγκη.

Ib. 90 e, διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμυηστεῖν, ὃ μὴ τίς ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν.

§ 6. Hither are also to be referred the following instances, with the distinction that here the quantitative accusative is applied metaphorically, as the measure of the degree of the act or process.

Legg. 679 a, οὐδὲ εἶ προσδέονται σιδήρου. As we say, 'not one bit.' Cf. τὶ δεῖ; ('what need?' not 'why is there need?') illustrated by Isæus, ii. 39, τὶ δεῖ αὐτοῦ ὁμιλεῖ ... ; οὐδὲ εἶν δήπον.

Phædo 91 d, σῶμα γ' ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται—'ceases not one bit.' To join it with σῶμα would ruin the sense. And cf. 100 b, ἄτερ ... οὐδὲν πέταυμα λέγων, and Euthyphro 8 c, οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύεται ταῦτ' ἀμφισβητοῦστε.
ACCUSATIVE CASE.

Phædo 99 c, τάγαθον καὶ δέον ἐνυδεῖν καὶ ἐνυδέχειν οὐδέν οὐνταί.
Euthyd. 293 c, ἤστων οὐν τι οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἰ;
Charm. 174 c, ἤστών τι ἡ ἁρμοκή ὑμαίνειν ποιήσει;
Crito 47 c, τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαιονταν. Note, that ἐπαιονταν is intransitive (as infra d, εἰ τις ἐστὶν ἐπαίον), and therefore μηδὲν ἐπὶ. is not 'who understand nothing,' but 'who do not understand one bit.'
Apol. 19 c, δὴν ἐγὼ οὐδέν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίον.
Ib. 21 b, ἐγὼ . . . οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιτα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὦν.
Ib. 26 b, Μελήτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν—where, in accordance with the two last instances, οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν is not the Nom. to ἐμέλησεν, nor in regimen with τούτων, but in agreement with the Acc. Cognate after ἐμέλησεν. In Crat. 425 c, οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας, and Legg. 887 c, ὁσοι καὶ σμικρὸν νῦν κέκτηται, the case is different.
Crito 46 c, πλείω τῶν παρόντων . . . ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται.
Phileb. 23 e, πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον.
Symp. 193 a, ἀπαντα ἐπιστηκεῖν περὶ θεοῦς—'in all his acts to act piously towards the gods.'
Apol. 30 c, ἐμὲ μείξω βιλάψετε.
Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάπτω δύναται σῶζειν.
Cf. Homer's πάντα, as in Od. iv. 654, τῷ ὅτι αὐτῷ πάντα ἐφέκει, and the common expression τά μὲν—τά δέ.

§ 7. D. Accusatives of the way, or manner—

Symp. 207 d, τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνω χόροιν, ἡ δεύτη φύσις διήκει αὐτὶ εἰναί.
Politic. 296 e, τῶν ὄρων . . . ων ὁ σοφὸς . . . διωκήσει τα τῶν ἀρχο-μένων.

Rep. 416 b, τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένοι—'on a footing of the greatest possible caution.' (τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας like τὴν πλείστην τῆς στρατιάς, Thuc. vii. 3, &c.)
Cf. Ar. Pax 232, καὶ γὰρ ἐξείηνα, γνώμην εἰμῖ, μὲλλει.

§ 8. Refer to this the common phrase τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων, &c.: and, probably, the "Accusative Absolute,"—'on such and such a footing.'

Protag. 314 e, δοξὰν ἡμῶν ταῦτα, ἐπορευόμεθα.

Critias 107 c, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχώμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἀν μὴ δυνάμεθα πάντως ἀποδοῦναι συγγεγρώσκειν χρέων.
Phileb. 13 b, τί οὖν δὴ ταύτων . . . εἰνόν, πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι
§ 9. E. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Accusative of Time or Space.

To designate them thus is not an idle periphrasis; it seems to include, together with the instances of an Accus. of Time or Space in the literal meaning, those in which the notions of Time or Space are applied metaphorically. Only the latter need be noticed here.

Phileb. 59 c, τὸ δῆ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀρ' οὖν μεγίναι αὐτὰς ἐπιχειρητέον;—where 'after' means in the order of discourse.

Soph. 259 b, τὸ ὅν ... μυρία εἶπι μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι—'ten thousand times twice told' for 'in so many instances.'

Phdr. 241 d, οὐκὲτ' ἄν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ λέγοντος—'saying anything further' for 'saying anything more;'—a real metaphor, as discourse only metaphorically takes up space. As to the construction, τὸ πέρα is not governed, transitively, by ἀκούσας, but follows λέγοντος.

Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ' εἶπε τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὖκ ἄν ἔζεπλαγη ἀκούσων; τὸ εἶπε τελ. is a metaphor from space, probably, rather than time. Either way, Stalib. is wrong in explaining the construction by his favourite 'quod attinet ad.'

§ 10. F. Accusatives in Apposition with, or standing for, sentences or parts of sentences.

These Accusatives may be either (1) Noun-Phrases; see a below: or (2) Pronouns Neuter, agreeing with Nouns understood,—viz. either Relative Pronouns; see b below: or Demonstratives, &c.; see c below.

The doctrine here advanced asserts two positions, which are worthy of notice; viz.

§ 11. (i.) These Noun-Phrases and Neuter-Pronouns are Accusatives. The prevalence of the Neuter Gender makes this difficult to prove; but such instances as are decisive afford an analogy for the rest:—

Theæt. 153 c, ἓπι τούτοις τὸν κολοφώνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 603, Καὶ τὸν ἕλεγχον ... πεῦθον, and the Adverbs ἀρχήν, ἀκμήν, τὴν πρώτην, &c.

§ 12. (ii.) They represent, by Apposition or Substitution, the sentence itself. To say, that they are Cognate Accusatives, or in Apposition with the (unexpressed) Cognate Accus., would be inade-
quete to the facts. For (i) in most of the instances the sense points out that the Noun-Phrase or Pronoun stands over against the sentence, or portion of a sentence, as a whole; (2) in many of them, not the internal force but merely the rhetorical or logical form of the sentence is in view. It might be said that they are Predicates, while the sentence itself is the Subject.

§ 13. a. Accusative of Noun-Phrases in Apposition—

Legg. 736 a, τούτοις, δι' εἰσημίας ἀπάλλαγην, ὅνομα ἀποκλαν τιθέ-μενοι.

Crat. 395 d, δὸν καὶ τέλος, ἡ πατρίς ἀνετράπετο.

Crito 45 d, τὸ σῶν μέρος, δ’ ἂν τὺχωσι τούτο πράξουσι.

Soph. 260 a, τὸ μὲν μέγηστον, φιλοσοφίας ἀν στερηθήμεν.

Apol. 25 b, ἡ τοῦναντίον τούτον πάν, εἰς μὲν τις κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 691 a, τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολύ, βασιλέως τοῦτο εἶναι νόσημα.

Politic. 293 a, ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτῳ, τὴν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν δὲi ζητεῖν.

The Accusatives in the instances which follow characterise the logical or rhetorical form—

Syrp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, ἐπὶ πᾶσα ἡ ... ἐπιθυμία ... ἔρως.


Theæt. 153 c, ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφώνα, ἀναγκάζοντες προσβαλόντων κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 66 c, δυοίνθ θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοὶ ἐστὶ κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι, ἢ κ.τ.λ.

Similarly 68 c (plural), and Charm. 160 b.

Illustrations from other writers begin with Homer: II. iv. 28, Λαὸν ἄγερφον, Πριμύφ κακά, 155, βάντων νῦ τοι ὁρκῇ ἔταιμον, ix. 115, οὐ τι πεσόντο μᾶς ὅταν κατέλεξας, xxiv. 735, ὄψε... ἀπὸ τύργον, λυγρὸν ὀλέθρων, Od. xxi. 35, ἔξος ἐδακαίν, Ἀρχήν ἐνενο-σύνης. Æsch. Ag. 225, θυτήρ γενέσθαι θυγατρός, γυνακοποίην πολέμων ἀρωγῶν, 1406, νεκρός... τῆς δὲ δεξιᾶς χερὸς ἔργον, Cho. 200, ἐπὶ συμπενθέων ἐμοὶ Ἀγαλμα τύμβων, κ.τ.λ., 205, Καὶ μὴν στίζοι γε, δεύτερον τεκμήριον, Ποδῶν ὀρείῳ, τοῖς τ᾽ ἐμοίσκον ἐμφερείς. Eur. Or. 1105, Ἐλεύθη κτάνομεν, Μενέλεφ λύπην πικρᾶν. Ar. Acharn. 411, οὐκ ἐτὸς χαλώοις ποιεῖς. (So Virg. Æn. xi. 383, Prouindona eloquio, soliton tibi.) Thucyd. iii. 111, πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχανισμὸν ἐξελώνυτες (and similarly v. 80): cf. the Homeric precedent II. xix. 302, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες, Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν, ὑφόν δ᾽ αὐτῶν κῆδε' ἐκάστῃ (not, as Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 580, πρόφασιν in Apposition to Πάτροκλον). Ar. Vesp. 338, Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐφεξῶν, ὧ μάταις, ταύτα δρᾶν σε βούλεται; Antipho v. 63, p. 136, ἀλλ', αὐτό
§ 14. The formula of Quotation falls under this head—

Alcib. I. 121 d, ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ κομμωδοποιοῦν, οὗδ' οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα αἰσθάνονται.

Apol. 34 d, καὶ γὰρ, τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ 'Ομήρου, οὓ' ἐγώ ἀπὸ δρυῶς κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 77 d, δοκείς . . . . δεδίεναι, τὸ τῶν παιδῶν, μή ὡς ἄλληδος ὁ ἀνεμος κ.τ.λ.—where τὸ τῶν π. is not connected with δεδίεναι, but refers to the sentence ὁ ἀνεμος αὐτήν . . . . διασκεδάζωσιν that is, does not mean 'to fear, as children fear;' but 'to fear lest it be as children think it is, that the soul goes into the air.'

§ 15. b. Accusative of Relative Pronoun Neuter in Apposition, with a sentence following—

Protag. 352 ε, τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὁ φασίν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττάσθαι—

'which is what men describe when they say they are,' &c.

Soph. 217 c, δι' ἑρωτησίων, οἷον ποτὲ καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενάμην ἐγώ. The illustration which Socrates means to impress on the stranger is not simply Parmenides' use of ἑρωτήσεις, but the whole scene,—the λόγοι πάγκαλοι in which the ἑρωτήσεις were interwoven, and his own presence on these occasions. Cf. Thucyd. ii. 40, ὅ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος λογισμὸς δὲ ὅκινον φέρει and vi. 55, οὐχ ὃς ἀδελφὸς νεῶτερος ὑπὸ ἡπόρησεν ἐν φ' οὐ πρότερον ἔστησεν ὁμιλήκει τῇ ἀρχῇ—where ἐν φ' is not = ἐν τούτῳ ἐν φ', but = ἐν τούτῳ φ', i.e. 'in a predicament which was that of his not having,' &c. And in the common expressions ἀναὶ ὅν = ἀντὶ τῶν, ἀ, and οὖνεκα = ἕνεκα τοῦ, ὅ, the Relatives ἀ and ὅ are instances of the same construction, agreeing with the sentence which they introduce.

Gorg. 483 a, ὅ δὴ καὶ σὺ, τοῦτο τὸ σοφῶν κατανεονήκως, κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—'and this is exactly how you, profiting by your knowledge of this subtilty, cheat in argument.'

Theat. 158 b, (A) ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τουόνει ἀμφισβήθημα ἐννοεῖς . . . . ; (B) Τὸ ποίον; (A) δ' πολλάκις σε σὺμαί αἰσχροίναι ἑρωτότων, τί ἐν τῆς ἔχων τεκμήριον ἀποδείξει κ.τ.λ.—'that which is expressed by the question, which I dare say you have often heard, what,' &c.

Symp. 188 c, ὅ δὴ προστέτακται τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπέων τοὺς ἑροτας—where ὅ δὴ agrees with the whole of what follows—'And thus it stands, accordingly ;—μαντικῇ is charged with the care of,' &c.
§ 16. ACCUSATIVE CASE. 125

Symp. 222 b, ἀ δὴ, καὶ σοὶ λέγω μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦτον—"and thus accordingly, I press upon you also not to be,' &c.

§ 16. So with the 'parenthetical' ὦν,—in Apposition with the entire sentence—


Euthyphro 13 a, λέγομεν γὰρ πον,—ὁ ὦν φαμὲν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταταί θεραπεύεις κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 267 c, ὦν οἱ ἕμποροι καὶ γεωργοί καὶ . . . διαμάχοντ' ἂν οὕτω εύμπαντες κ.τ.λ.

Or with a portion of a sentence or a single word.

Phdr. 243 d, ποταμῷ λόγῳ ὦν ἄλμυράν ἄκοιν ἀποκλύσασθαι.

Politic. 277 c, τὴν ὦν τοὺς φαρμάκους καὶ τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνάργειαν.

Phædo 64 d, ἣδονας τὰς τοιάσθε, ὦν σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν.

Ib. 73 c, (A) πῶς λέγεις ; (B) ὦν τὰ τοιάδε.

Ib. 78 d, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν ὦν ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 83 b, κακὸν ἔπαιθεν ἄν' αὐτῶν . . . ὦν ἦ νοσότας ἦ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 40 c, δεῦοι βάτερον ἐστὶ τὸ τεθνῶν; ἢ γὰρ ὦν ὑδένεν εἶναι . . . τὸν τεθνῶτα ἦ κ.τ.λ.

All these instances of ὦν show that it stands outside the construction of the sentence. But its being in a particular number and case still requires explanation, and the only explanation is, that it is in Apposition with the sentence or some portion of it. Note, that this ὦν has two shades of meaning, according as it introduces (a) a metaphor, when it means 'as it were;' or (b) an instance, when it means 'for instance.' A different analysis is required for ὦν δὴ, ὦ ὅ, ὦ, e. g. in

Critias 112 c, ὦ σόμοις, κατεχρόντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα αὐτῶις.

Symp. 203 b, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαντίγουσα ὦν ὅ ἐσοψ οὐσης ἀφικέτο ἦ Πενία.

Here the same principle so far appears, that the Neuter Antecedent to which the Relative refers is (not a Cognate Accus. but) the whole clause,—viz. in the former instance, κατεχρόντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα αὐτῶις, in the latter προσαντίγουσα. The Relative sentence is elliptical; cf. the use of Relatives generally with δή, and the fuller expression in

Phædo 60 a, τοιαύτ' ἄττα εἶπεν ὦ σόμ ὅ ἐλώθασαν αἱ γυναῖκες.

1 The ὦν in ὦν ὦ stands exactly in the same position.
§ 17. c. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (not Relative) standing for a sentence or portion of a sentence, expressed previously or immediately after.

a. For a previously expressed portion of a sentence—

Soph. 238 a, ἐτὶ γὰρ, ὥ μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτά γε τῶν ἄποριῶν ἡ μεγάστη—where ταῦτα is the pronominal substitute for ἐτὶ ἔστι.

Legg. 630 e, ἄρετῆς μόριον, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαυλότατον—where ταῦτα is the substitute for μόριον.

Euthyd. 299 d, (A) χρυσῶν ἄγαθῶν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔξειν; (B) πάντω λεγομένου, καὶ ταῦτα γε τοῦ τοιούτου ἔξειν—where ταῦτα is the substitute for χρυσῶν ἔξειν.

Rep. 341 e, νῦν γονὸν ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδέν ὑπὲρ καὶ ταῦτα—where ταῦτα = ἐπεχείρησας, which thus is brought close to οὐδέν ὑπὲρ, with contemptuous emphasis.

Symp. 210 b, καταστήματι πάντων τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἔρατην, ἐνός δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι—where τοῦτο stands for καταστήματος ἔρατην, and therefore becomes ended with the capacity of governing ἐνός (for which cf. Legg. 723 d, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δράν).

Phileb. 37 d, μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν ἄν ὀρθότητα ἵσχε; ταῦτων δὲ ἡδονήν; where ταῦτων stands for μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν ἐροῦμεν ἄν ὀρθότητα ἵσχε repeated from the other clause.

Gorg. 524 c, εἴ τινος μέγα ἰν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἡ τροφή ἡ ἀμφότερα.

Phædo 68 c, καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἢτοι τὰ ἐτερα τούτων ἡ ἀμφότερα.

Hom. II. iii. 179, Ἀμφότερον βασίλειός τ' ἄγαθος κρατερός τ' αἰχμήτης.

§ 18. β. For a previously expressed whole sentence—

Legg. 658 d, τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἄν νεκρηκώς εἴη,—τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο; ('the next question,'—as Protag. 323 c).

Theæt. 189 e, λόγον ἄν αὐτῇ πρός αὐτῆν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξήρχεται . . . τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἱνδάλλεται . . ., οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ διαλέγονθαι.

Tim. 27 c, (A) σοῦ οὖν ἐργὸν λέγειν . . ., καλέσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεοῦς.

(B) 'Ἀλλά, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τοῦτο γε δή, πάντες . . . εἰπ̣ ταυτός ὀρμη . . . πράγματος θεῶν δεῖ πον καλοῦσιν.

(In the two last instances we have the Neut. Pron. τούτο, which stands for the previous sentence, connected with a sentence succeeding, in which the Pronoun is virtually restated at large. Thus, as to meaning, τούτο is placed between the two sentences as a
symbol of equivalence: but as to grammar, its relations to each are different; it stands for the sentence preceding, and is in apposition with the sentence following. So in the instances which are subjoined)—

Politic. 262 e, (A) κάλλιον δὲ που κατ' εἶδη καὶ δίχα διαφορὰ́ ἂν, εἰ κ.τ.λ. (B) Ὠρθότατα ἄλλα γὰρ τούτο αὐτό, πῶς ἂν τις γένος καὶ μέρος ... γνώιη;

Meno 90 d, οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως ... τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, πολλὴ ἀνοιὰ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. So Symp. 178 e.

Symp. 204 a, οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἄμαθεῖς ... ἐπιθυμοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι: αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἄμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα ... δοκεῖν αὐτῷ ἐστι—where αὐτὸ τοῦτο, standing for the sentence preceding, is in Apposition with τὸ μὴ ὄντα ... ἐστι, which is also, as to meaning, the virtual re-statement of the Pronoun.

As to the construction of this sentence, τὸ μὴ ὄντα—ἐστι evidently contains the reason for ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἄμαθίαν only that it is expressed not in the regular causal form, ὡς τις οὐκ ὄν ... δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἐστι, or παρὰ τὸ μὴ ... δοκεῖ, but under the form of the Apologetic Infinitive (see § 85).

It follows, that the αὐτὸ τοῦτο introduces the preceding sentence as a reason. In other words, αὐτὸ τοῦτο here stands in three relations; (1) to the sentence preceding it is related Pronominally, as standing for it; (2) to τὸ μὴ ὄντα ... ἐστι it is related Appositionally; and (3) to ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἄμαθία it is related causally.

The explanation of this last instance will apply to all which follow under this head:—the Neuter Pronoun introduces a preceding sentence in a causal relation to the principal construction of the sentence to which the Pronoun is joined. The cause is not necessarily re-stated, but, if it is, the Pronoun is in apposition to it—

Protag. 310 e, αὐτὰ ταῦτα (‘this is just what it is’) ... ἦκω παρὰ σὲ ἣνα ὑπέρ ἐμοῦ διαλέξθησ αὐτῷ.

Euthyphro 4 d, ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὁ πατὴρ ... ὡς ἐγὼ ... τῷ πατρὶ φόνον ἐπέξερξομαι.

Symp. 174 a, ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην ἦνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἰω.

§ 19. γ. For a sentence expressed immediately after—
Phædo 105 a, ὧρα δὴ εἰ ὄντως ὀρίσει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαί, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείνο,—ο ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τὶ ἐναντίον . . . ἐναντιτιτη μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.
Protag. 326 a, οὐ τ᾿ αὖ κιδαρισταῖ, ἔτερα τοιαῦτα, σωφροσύνη ἐπιμε λοίνται.
Rep. 334 b, τοῦτο μέντοι ἐμοίγε γοκεὶ ἔτι, ὀφελείν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.
Soph. 248 d, τὸ δὲ, ὡς τὸ γεγρώσκειν εἰσπέρ ἔσται ποιείν τι, τὸ γεγρώ σκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐθ συμβαίνει πάσχειν.
Legg. 630 d, τὸ δὲ,—πός χρὴν ἡμᾶς λέγειν;
Ib. 803 d, τὸ δ᾿,—ἤν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὔτ΄ οὖν παιδία πεφυκνία οὔτ’ αὐθ παιδία.
Apol. 23 a, τὸ δὲ,—κινδυνεῖι . . . τῷ δὲτί ὁ θεός σοφὸς εἶναι.
Cf. St. Paul, 2 Cor. ix. 6, τοῦτο δὲ, ὁ σπείρων φειδομένως, φειδομένως καὶ θερίσει, St. Mark ix. 23, τό, εἰ δύνασαι πιστεύσαι—(the το throws emphasis on the succeeding words). Cf. also the common idiom τοῦτο μὲν—τοῦτο δὲ (each a pre-statement of the clause which it introduces).

§ 20. δ. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (generally τις or ὁδὸς) standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed—
Phædo 58 c, τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τῶν θάνατον; τί ἢν τὰ λέξθέντα κ.τ.λ.
Symp. 204 d, (A) ὁ ἐρώτων τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾶ; (B) Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ—
where τί stands for a whole dependent sentence, thus; ‘he who desires things beautiful desires that they should—what?’
The dependent sentence is thus left unexpressed, but that τί stands for it is proved by the answer, which supplies one.
Exactly parallel is Ἀσχ. Ag. 953, (A) Τί δ᾿ ἂν δοκεὶ σοι Πράμος, εἰ τὸδ᾿ ἡμύνσε; (B) Ἐν ποικιλοῖς ἂν κάρτα μοι βῆναι δοκεῖ. So St. John xxi. 28, Κύριε, οὕτω δὲ τί;—where τί is the implicit completion of the sentence.

DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 19, 20.]

Eur. Androm. 209, Σὺ δ᾿ ἢν τι κνισθῆς, ... Μενέλεως δὲ σοι Μείζων 'Αχιλλέως ταύτα τοι σ᾿ ἐχθεί πόσις. 2 St. Pet. i. 5, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δὲ, σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες, ἐπιχορηγήσατε κ.τ.λ.
On this principle are to be explained the phrases which follow.

Apol. 26 d, iva TiTavra λέγεις; (similarly Symp. 205 a.)—There is no γένηται to be supplied; τι in itself is the full representative complement of the sentence; the actual complement is of course suspended in the interrogation.

Meno 86 e, ei μή τι (similarly Rep. 509 c), and Symp. 222 e, ei μή τι ἄλλο. The sentence is complete; the τι and the τι ἄλλο stand for full propositions.

Symp. 206 e, (A) οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστίν ὁ ἐρως . . . (B) Ἀλλὰ τί μῆν; (A) Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. Here the τί refers back to the words τοῦ καλοῦ, and itself stands for a similar phrase; which is proved by the answer Τῆς γεννήσεως. Except on the principle now before us, the phrase would have been variable, and we should in the present instance have found (what Steph. conjectures) Ἀλλὰ τίνος μῆν; Similarly 202 d. The phrase may of course equally stand for a whole sentence, as Rep. 362 d, 438 b ('and what then?'). The same explanation holds of the τι in the phrase of polite assent, τι μῆν; 2 (literally 'if not, then what?') The explanation of τι; in the sense of 'why?' is the same; and of the answering particle ὅτι, 'because.'

§ 21. In the following instances the significance of the τι is hinted in a second interrogation following.

Phadr. 234 c, τί σοι φανεται ὁ λόγος;—οἷς ὑπέρφυνον εἰρήσθαι;
Protag. 309 b, τι οὖν ταίνιν;—ἡ παρ' ἐκείνον φαίνει;
Soph. 266 c, τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην;—ἄρ' οὐκ αὕτην μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικὴν φύσιμεν ποιεῖν;
Phaedo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . .; ἀρα κατὰ ταύτα ἐξει, ἦ κ.τ.λ.; (The genitive τῶν—καλῶν is suspended in a loose construction, which the second interrogation supersedes.)
Phileb. 27 c, τί δὲ ὁ σῶς [βῶς] . . .;—ἐν τίνι γένει ἄν λέγετο;
So probably Phaedo 64 d, (A) φανεται σοι φιλοσοφοῦν ἀνδρός είναι ἕπτουδέκατα περὶ τὰς ἱδρυμάς καλομεῖνας τὰς τοιαύτας κ.τ.λ.; (B) Ἡρίστα. (A) Τί δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων; (B) ὀδημῶς. (A) Τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σώμα θεραπεῖας;—δοκεῖ σοι ἐντιμοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; See more instances under Binary Structure (§ 207).

Legg. 630 c, οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν μᾶλλα βλέπων

3 Add τί μέλλει; as in Hipp. Mi. invariable, though attracted some-

373 d, Rep. 349 d. μέλλει can be times into μέλλομεν.
§ 22. The Adverbial Interrogatives 

"\( \alpha \lambda \lambda \) \( \tau i \) \( \tilde{\eta} \) and \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \) \( \tau i \) are instances of the same principle; and may conveniently be discussed here once for all.

They have the following points in common: (1) as to their use, they both expect an affirmative answer; (2) as to their construction, the \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \) in both (as in the instances heretofore given) is used proleptically; and (as we have said) both are instances of the Neuter Pronoun Accusative standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed.

But from this point we must investigate them separately.

"\( \alpha \lambda \lambda \) \( \tau i \) \( \tilde{\eta} \) challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence. It may be that it sometimes affects the whole; but (unlike \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \) \( \tau i \)) it can, and in most instances does, affect a particular portion of the sentence. And the interrogation is, in strictness, limited to the part affected.

Apol. 24 c, \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \) \( \tau i \) \( \tilde{\eta} \) \( \eta \) \( \pi e r i \) \( \pi o l l o u \) \( \pi o i e i \), \( \delta \pi o s \) \( \\omega s \) \( \beta \lambda \lambda \tau i \tau o u \) \( o i \) \( n e o \tau e r o u \) \( \tilde{\varepsilon} o n o n a i \); The interrogation is made as to \( \pi e r i \) \( \pi o l l o u \) \( \pi o i e i \).

Rep. 372 a, \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \) \( \tau i \) \( \tilde{\eta} \) \( \sigma i t o n \) \( \tau e \) \( p o i o \nu n t e s \) \( k a i \) \( \iota p o d \tilde{o} \mu \) \( \mu a t a \); The interrogation is made as to \( \sigma i t o n \) \( \tau e \) \( \pi . \) \( k . \) \( \iota p o d \tilde{o} \mu \) \( \mu a t a \), to the exclusion of the Verb \( \delta i a w t \tilde{\varepsilon} o n o n a i \).

Aie. I. 129 b, \( \tau \tilde{\omega} \) \( d i a \lambda \gamma e i \) \( \sigma o \) \( \nu \nu \); \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \) \( \tau i \) \( \tilde{\eta} \) \( \epsilon m o i \); The phrase gets its meaning thus; the speaker, about to name a certain fact or thing, gives it emphasis by first asking whether any other ought to be named instead of it.

Some doubt might be felt whether \( \tilde{\eta} \) is 'than' or 'or.' Certain phrases would point to 'or,' such as...
ACCUSATIVE CASE.

Gorg. 459 b, τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;
Politic. 266 b, (A) μῶν ἄλλως πως πέφυκεν, ἢ καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.; (B) οὐκ ἄλλως.

Legg. 683 e, βασιλεία δὲ καταλύται ἢ καί τις ἄρχῃ πώποτε κατελύθη μῶν ὑπὸ τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν;
Protag. 330 c, τίν ἢν ψήφοι θείο; τήν αὐτήν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην;

But more decisive for ‘than’ are
Protag. 357 e, διὰ τὸ οἴσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, and the variations,
Soph. 220 c, τὰ τοιαῦτα μῶν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἔρκῃ χρῆ προσαγορεύειν;
Phaedo 91 d, ἅρα ἄλλ’ ἢ ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ἢ κ.τ.λ.; and the common formula οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ and τι ἄλλο ἢ which are not ambiguous.

᾽Αλλο τι challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.

Rep. 337 e, ἄλλο τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὔτω ποιήσεις;—you mean, do ‘you, that you will do so? ’
Ib. 369 d, ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μεν εἰς, ὡ δὲ οἰκοδόμοις, ἄλλος δὲ τις ὑφαντής;—where the force of the ἄλλο τι cannot stop short of the whole sentence.

Gorg. 467 d, ἄλλο τι οὖν οὔτω καὶ περὶ πάντων,—ἐάν τις τι πρῶτη ἐνεκί του, οὐ τούτο βουλεταί κ.τ.λ.;—where the interrogation must go on to the end; and, besides, the whole sentence is gathered up in the pre-announcing clause οὔτω καὶ περὶ πάντων.
Phaedo 79 b, (A) Φέρε δὴ, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σώμα ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ ψυχῆ; (B) Οὔδέν ἄλλο.

Symp. 201 a, ἄλλο τι ὁ ἐρως καλλοὺς ἀν εἰπ ἐρως, αἰσχοὺς δ’ οὐ;
(In Euthyd. 286 c, ἄλλο τι ἡ ψευδή κ.τ.λ., the interrogation goes through several clauses: but here two MSS. omit ἢ.)

Thus ἄλλο τι affects the whole of the sentence, like the French n’est ce pas que. The interrogation it makes is not restricted to any particular portion of the sentence.

But how does it come to have its meaning? For there is no colour for supposing that it stands for ἄλλο τι ἢ.

It represents an unexpressed sentence (according to the use of the Neuter Pronoun at present before us);—namely, ‘any different’ proposition from that about to be enunciated. The speaker, by ἄλλο τι, ‘puts the question’ about this shadow of a proposition, but anticipates the judgment by offering simultaneously for acceptance his own view. Thus the interrogation strictly speaking belongs to
the ἄλλο τι alone, though it spreads from it to the whole sentence beyond.

§ 23. The last use to be mentioned of the Neuter Accusative of ἄλλος as standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed, is in winding up an enumeration.

Symp. 176 a, ἃσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τᾶλα τὰ νομιζόμενα.

Theaet. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδοντα δῇ καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν δύθησομεν. (I class this passage under the present head, because by the sense πάντα must stand for τᾶλα πάντα. Cf. § 249.)

In neither of these passages can the Accusative be said to be Cognate, as if it were subjoined by καὶ to the unexpressed Cognate Accusatives of ἃσαντας and καθεύδοντα for it is really other participles that are added, co-ordinate with ἃσαντας in the one case and καθεύ-δοντα in the other.

Theaet. 145 a, ἢ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ μονοικὸς καὶ ὅσα παρεῖσαι ἔχεται;

Phdr. 227 c, πέντε μᾶλλον ἢ πλοισίω καὶ πρεπεῖντερ ἢ νεωτέρος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐμοί πρόσεχτι.

Ib. 246 c, τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλῶν συγγόν ἀγαθῶν καὶ πῶν ὁ τι τοιοῦτον.3

§ 24. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—GENITIVE CASE.

A. Genitive of Epexegetis.

Apol. 29 b, ἀμάθεα ... αὕτη ἡ ἐποιεῖσθαι, ἡ τοῦ ὀίσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἴδεν.

Phædo 78 b, τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ... , τοῦ διασκεδάζωσθαι. [So Oxon. and one other MS.]

Ib. 96 b, ὥς τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἄκουσε καὶ ὅρμη καὶ αὐσθάνεσθαι.

Ib. 97 a, αὕτη ἐὰν αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἄλληλων τεθηκαί.

§ 25. B. Genitive of a Substantive with ὅς, loosely, denoting the agent to whom a particular effect is to be referred.

Symp. 212 c, καὶ ἐξαίφνης τὴν ἄδειαν θύραν κρονομένην πολὺν ψύφον παρασχεῖν ὅς κομαστῶν—where ὅς κομαστῶν does not closely follow ψύφον, but characterises the general effect produced.

3 [Under these three examples is written in the MS. "Proof to be subjoined that these are Accusatives."
GENITIVE CASE.

$\S$ 26. C. Genitive of a Noun with a Participle, after Verbs of knowing, seeing, shewing.

Apol. 27 a, ἢ ἄρα γνώστεσαι Ἐσκράτης ὅ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου;

Ib. 37 b, ὅν εὖ οἷῷ ὃ ὁ κακῶν ὄντων.

Crat. 412 a, μηνίει ὃς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπομενής τῆς ψυχῆς.

Rep. 558 a, ἢ οὖν πῶς ἐδέσ... αὐτῶν μενῶντων;


Probably of the use of these Verbs with a Genitive unaccompanied by a Participle there is no clear instance in Plato.

In Charm. 154 e, ἠθεασάμεθα... τοῦ εἴδους, the Genitive is very possibly Partitive, as also in

Rep. 485 b, μαθήματος... ὃ ἀν αὐτοῖς δηλοὶ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας.

In Legg. 646 d, καὶ τῆς περὶ τῶν οίνων ἀρά διατρῆσα ὠσαίτως διανοητέον, the Genitive has tacit reference to περὶ in the question previously put, οὕκοιν χρή καὶ τῶν ἁλλῶν ἐπίπτειναίν τόν περὶ δια

In Rep. 375 d, οἴσθα γαρ ποι μὲν γενναίῳ κυνῷ, ὅτι τοιὸ φέσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἰδιός, κυνῶν is governed by ἰδίος.

D. Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after Verbs of mentioning.

Meno 96 a, ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἁλλον ὄντοιν πράγματος, οὗ κ.τ.λ.;—Why

4 The passage, Rep. 439 b, τοῦ τοιοῦτον οὗ καλὸς ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., is to be construed otherwise; τοῦ τοιοῦτον is governed by χεῖρ. See under Binary Structure ($\S$ 225).
this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191.)

Legg. 804 e, καὶ οὐδὲν φοβοθεῖς ἐπομεν’ ἀν τοῦτον τῶν λόγων οὔτε ἰππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἀν εἴη, γυναῖξι δὲ οὖν ἀν πρέπον.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1236, Ποιον κέκραγας ἀνδρός δι’ ἐπέρφονα; and ib. 1257, Ο. C. 355, "Α τούδ’ ἐξχύσθη σῶματος, Trach. 1122, Τῆς μετρός ἢκω τῆς ἑμὶς φράσον.

In Homer, Verbs of knowing &c. also thus govern a Genitive of a Noun without a Participle.

II. xii. 229, Εἰδείη τεράσων, Od. xxii. 36, Γνώτην ἀλλήλων, and so xxiii. 109, Γνωσόμεθ’ ἀλλήλων. II. xiv. 37, ὡψείωτες ὀὕτης, xvi. 811, διδασκόμενος πολέμου.

§ 27. E. Genitive of a Noun placed at the beginning of a construction, for the sake of premising mention of it, without any grammatical justification of the genitive.

Phaedo 78 d, τι δε τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ; ὤρα κατὰ ταῦτ-ά ἐξε, ἡ κ.τ.λ.; Gorg. 509 d, τι δε δὴ τοῦ ἀδικείν; πότερον . . . ἢ καὶ κ.τ.λ.;

Legg. 751 b, δήλων . . . στι . . . τοῦ πόλεον εὐ παρεσκευασμένην ἀρχάς ἀνεπιτηθείων ἐπιστήσατο τοῖς εὖ κειμένοις νόμοις, . . . οὐδέν πλεόν εὐ τεθέισον [έστι].

Rep. 576 d, ἄλλ’ εὔδαμονὶα τε αὐ καὶ ἀθλίοτητος, ὡσαύτως ἡ ἄλλης κρίνεις;

Cf. Λ. Esch. Ag. 950, Τούτων μὲν οὔτως and Eum. 211, Τὶ γὰρ γυαλ-κὸς ἢτις ἀνδρα νοσφίσῃ; also Arist. Pol. I. iv. 1, ὠσπέρ δε ἐν ταῖς ὀρνεμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαίον ἄν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μελέτε ἀποτελεσθήσεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὔτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.

The principle seems to be that the intended mention of the thing is regarded from the side of the genitive as limited and occasioned by it. Near this use stands also

Legg. 969 c, τὴν πόλιν ἐατίνον τῆς κατοικίσεως.

§ 28. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—DATIVE CASE.

Certain intensified uses of the ‘Dative of Reference’ are noticeable. a. Where the Dative is only justified by making the notion of Reference concentrated enough to include Possession.

a. Dative of Nouns.

Apol. 40 c, μεταβολὴ τις τυχχάνει οὕσα καὶ μεταίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ.

Phaedo 62 b, ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.
§ 29. b. Where the Dative is justified by making the notion of Reference include that of the Object.

a. In the case of the latter of two Substantives.

Symp. 194 d, ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ "Ερωτὶ.

Rep. 607 a, ὑμνοὺς θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

Legg. 653 d, τὰς τῶν οἰρτῶν ἀμοιβὰς τοῖς θεοῖς.

Ib. 950 e, ἀγώνων τούτοις τοῖς θεοῖς.

b. In the case of the remote Object after a Verb.

This usage is partly owing to the force of Attraction, and the instances are given under that head (§ 183).

§ 30. IDIOMS OF THE ARTICLE.

a. As a Demonstrative Pronoun Antecedent.

Theaet. 204 d, ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἔξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστι. So Protag. 320 d, Phileb. 21 c.

Soph. 241 e, τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῖτα εἰσί.

Phdr. 239 b, τῆς ὠθεὶν ἀν κ.τ.λ. (referring to συνουσία.)

Ib. 247 e, ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὃν οὐτώς.

Phileb. 37 a, τῷ ὅ τῷ ἠδόμηκεν ἤδεται.

Tim. 39 e, τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζώον.

Critias 115 b, τῶν ὑσος ἔλευνος (referring to καρπὸς.)

Legg. 761 e, περὶ τοὺς δὲν ἐπιμελοῦνται.

Ib. 905 b, ἐκεinos τῶν ὅν κ.τ.λ.
Phædo 75 a, ἐκεῖνον ὄρεγεν τοῦ δ ἐστίν ὑσον.
Ib. 102 c, τῷ ὑπὶ Φαῖδων ὅ Φαῖδων ἐστίν.
Jelf, G. G. § 444, notices that "this idiom is peculiarly Platonic," adding however one or two instances from the Orators.

§ 31. b. Prefixed to Personal Pronouns, laughingly.
Theæt. 166 a, γελῶσα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὑπέδειξε.
Soph. 239 b, τὸν μὲν τοῖνευ ἐμὲ γε κ.τ.λ.
Phileb. 20 b, δεινῶν προσδοκάν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ.
Ib. 59 b, τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φιληβίων χρή συχνὰ χαίρειν ἑαυ.
Lysis 203 b, παρὰ τίνας τούς ἵμας;
Phdr. 258 a, καὶ οὐ εἶπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων, κ.τ.λ.
Jelf, G. G. § 452, says "this construction seems to be confined to the Accusative."

§ 32. c. When the Substantive has a plurality of Adjectives qualifying it, the order is disturbed, with a view of relieving the heaviness of the term, in various ways.

a. By postponing the Substantive, when one of the Adjectives ought to have followed it.
Crat. 398 b, ἐν τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ.
Ib. d, τὴν Ἀττικῆν τὴν παλαιάν φωνήν.
Symp. 213 e, τὴν τούτου ταυτής τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλήν.
Legg. 732 e, τὸ θυητὸν πᾶν ζώον.
Phædo 100 a, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὠντων [so Oxon. and seven other MSS.]—i. e. τῶν ἄλλων ὠντων ἀπάντων.

β. By bringing in the Substantive before its time.
Phileb. 43 a, τῶν λόγων ἐπισυφωμένων τούτων.
Legg. 659 d, τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγων ὄρθων εἰρημένων.
Ib. 790 e, τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων.
Ib. 793 b, ὃ νῦν δὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπιχυθεῖς.

§ 33. Upon these principles are to be explained the seeming anomalies which occur, in the Tragic Poets especially, in the collocation of Substantives with a plurality of epithets preceded by the Article.

a. Αἰσχyll. Cho. 496, φιλαττον τὸ σῶν κάρα (for φ. κάρα τὸ σῶν), Suppl. 9, αἰτογενὴ τὸν φιζάφορα γύμων (for γάμου τὸν φυ.). Soph.
Phil. 133, Ἐρμῆς οἱ πέμπτων δόλιος (for Ἐ. δόλιος οἱ πέμπτων). Thuc. i. 126, ἐν τῇ τοῦ Δίως τῇ μεγάστῃ ἑορτῇ. Lysias vii. 24. p. 110, ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἔμοις χωρίως. Λτ. Eq. 1323, Ἐν ταῖς ισοτεφάνωσιν οικεῖ ταῖς ἀρχαῖαις Ἀθηναῖς (the last three instances from Jelf).

β. Ἀesch. Agam. 1642, ὁ δυσφίλει σκότῳ Λιμός ἄνωκος (where λιμός is anticipated), Enum. 653, τὸ μωτρὸς αἱμῇ ὄμαιον (perhaps, for the αἱμῇ ὄμαιον might otherwise be regarded as virtually a single word, as in Ἀeschin. iii. 78. p. 64, ὁ γὰρ μισότεκνος, καὶ πατὴρ ποιηρός, οὐκ ἀν ποτὲ γένοιτο ἀνταγωγός χρηστός, where πατήρ ποιηρός is for the purpose of the sentence a single word), Suppl. 349, τὰν ικέτων φυγάδα περιδρομον. Soph. Aj. 134, τῆς ἀμφίρυτον Σαλαμίνος . . . ἀγχαλίου, ib. 1166, τὸν ἀείμωστον τάφον εὐφῶντα, Phil. 394, τὸν μέγαν Πάκταλον εὐχρυσον, O. T. 671, τὸ σὸν . . . στόμα Ἑλευνοῦ, ib. 1199, τὰν γαμψυώνα παρθένον χρησμοῦν. Pind. Ol. V. 4, τὰν σὰν πόλιν . . . λαστρόφον. Thuc. i. 96, ὁ πρῶτος φίλος ταχθεῖς, v. 11, πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὔσης (these two from Jelf).

The anomalies which remain unexplained are those in which a Possessive Pronoun is concerned,—in all the instances ἐμῶς. Ἀesch. Agam. 1226, τῷ μοιχῷ δεσπότῃ Ἐμῷ. Soph. Aj. 572, ὁ λυμεῶν ἐμῶς, O. T. 1462, Ταῦν ὁ ἀθλίαν οἰκτραῖν τε παρθένον ἐμῶν. Eur. Hipp. 683, Ζεῦς ὁ γεννῆτορ ἐμῶς. All that can be said in explanation of the exceptional form of these passages, is that they are exceptional in meaning. Generally, where there is a Possessive Pronoun attached to the Substantive, it is that which makes it definite; here the Substantive is perfectly defined in its application independently of the Possessive Pronoun.

§ 34. d. Omitted with the former of two Substantives in regimen. Observe, that a different shade of meaning results from this deviation from the common form; a shade of meaning which would be rendered equivalently by attaching the second Noun more loosely to the former.

Rep. 395 c, ἐπιμουργοίς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως—'artificers of freedom for the city.'

Symp. 182 c, συμφέρει . . . φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων—'that high-spiritedness in the ruled should be strongly developed.'

Ib. 196 b, περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ—'beauty as attributable to the god.'

Theæt. 175 a, ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας—'a marvel in the way of minuteness.'
Crat. 391 b, ύφιστάτη της σκέψεως—'truest manner of viewing'—
η ύφιστάτη would have been 'the truest part of the view'.

Hip. Ma. 282 a, φθόνον των ξώντων—'envy against the living.'

Cf. Thuc. iii. 82, τῶν ῥ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιπερηχήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωρίων ἀποστία, vi. 76, επί τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρία. Hdt. ii. 19, τοῦ ποταμοῦ δὲ φύσιος πέμ (φύσιον being a topic of enquiry).

Different are addresses, as Legg. 662 c, ὁ ἀριστοκ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, 817 a, ὁ ἀριστοκ τῶν ξένων, 820 b, ὁ βέλτιστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, where the Vocative supersedes the Article.

§ 35. e. Omitted with the latter of two Substantives in regimen. The meaning indicated by this peculiarity is the close union of the notions represented by the two Nouns.

Symp. 187 c, ἐν αἰτῇ τῇ ανατάσει ἀρμονίας τε καὶ ἄρμον.  
Cf. Thuc. iv. 92, τὸ ἔσχατον ἄγένος. Hdt. i. 22, τὸ ἔσχατον κακοῦ.

§ 36. Different is the case where the latter Substantive is the name of a country or of the inhabitants of a country or city; for before such Nouns the Article is habitually omitted. This is worth observing, for the sake of precluding misapprehension of the construction, where there is a concurrence of Genitives.

Phædo 57 a, ο一个职业 γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδὲς ἐπιχειρησεί τὰ νῦν Ἀθήνας—'for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen,' &c.  
That is, Φλιασίων is governed by οὐδὲς τῶν πολιτῶν.

Legg. 625 c, τῷ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσι—where Κρήτης is governed by χώρας φύσιν.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 109, τῶν ἔστρατηγῶν Ἀκαρνάνων, vii. 30, διέφθειραν ἐν τῶν Ἑλληνῶν Ἐπαρχών Ἑλληνῶν.

§ 37. f. Omitted after ὅτος preceding a Substantive.

Rep. 399 c, ταύτας δὲ ἀρμονίας.  
Ib. 621 b, ὅτος, ὁ Γαλακτὸς, μεθος ἐσώθη.

Symp. 179 c, τούτῳ γέμας.  
Soph. 237 d, τὸ τί τούτῳ ἤμα.

Gorg. 489 b, ὅτοισι ἀνὴρ.  
Ib. 505 c, ὅτοισι ἀνήρ.

Phileb. 16 c, ταύτην φήμην.

Tim. 52 d, ὅτος . . . δεδοσθε λόγος.

§ 38. g. Omitted before ἀνήρ or ἀνθρωπος standing (as Forster expresses it) "pronominis loco."
§§ 39—41.] PRONOMINAL WORDS.

Phædo 58 ε, εἰδαίμων γὰρ μοι ἀνήρ [so Oxon. and three other MSS.]
ἐφαίνετο, δ' Ἐκέκρατες—(ἀνήρ being the subject.)

Ib. 98 b, ἐπειδὴ προίκων καὶ ἀναγεγρώσκων ὀρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρόμενον.

Cf. AEschin. ii. 57. p. 35, σκέψασθε δὴ δεινὴν ἀναιοχυντίαν ἄνθρωπον—
also iii. 99. p. 67, καὶ γὰρ τούτο ἄνθρωπος ἴδιον καὶ οὐ κοινὸν ποιεῖ,
and 125. p. 71, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τὴν πόλιν ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἥδυνατο σφῆλαν.

§ 39. h. (from Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 459) "Ταῦταν, θάτερον, sometimes
take the Article, as, their original Article being lost in the Crasis,
they are regarded as simple words:

Tim. 37 b, περὶ τὸ ταὐτόν.

Ibid. ὁ τοῦ βατέρου κύκλος.

Ib. 44 b, τὸ τέ θάτερον καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν."

§ 40. IDIOMS OF PRONOMINAL WORDS.

Dialogue gives great occasion for the use of Pronouns, and Plato
has imparted to his use of them a great appearance of freedom and
variety. It is like a skilful chess-player's use of his pawns.

A. Use of Neuter Pronoun to represent a sentence, or portion
of a sentence. This has been treated of at length under the Accu-
sative Case (§§ 15—23).

§ 41. B. Use of Plural Neuter Pronoun to express a singular fact.
This usage contributes to the enrichment of the style; firstly, by
varying it; and secondly, by representing the fact as a complex
phenomenon, an aggregate of many parts, the sum of many con-
stituents, the meeting-point of many relations.

Ταῦτα is so constantly thus used, that it is only remarkable in
particular juxtapositions:—

Protag. 323 c, ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . ἀποδείκνυται κτ.λ., ταῦτα λέγω ὅτι δὲ
κτ.λ., τοῦτο σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι.

Symp. 173 c, εἰ οὖν δὲ καὶ ἐμὸν διηγήσασθαι, ταῦτα χρῆ ποιεῖν.

Ib. 198 b, οὐχ οἶδος τ' ἐσομαι οὐδ' ἐγγὺς τούτων—where τοῦτων = τοῦ
οἶδος τ' εἶναι.

Ib. 204 b, "Ερωτα . . . μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἄμαθος. αὐτία δ' αὐτῷ
καὶ τούτων ἥ γένεσις.

Phædo 62 d, τάχ' ἂν οἰηθεὶν ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου.
Phædo 105 d, τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον . . τὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτα [so Oxon. and Ven. II] ὀνομαζόμεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.
Tim. 37 b, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἄλλος λόγων.
Alcib. I. 109 c, πρὸς ταῦτ’ ἄρα, τὸ δίκαιον, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσει.
Legg. 864 a, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἁρύστου δόξαν, ὑπήπερ ἄν ἐσεύθαι τούτων ἥγησωσται πώς ἐ είτε ἰδιώτα τινες.
§ 42. Αὐτά.
Phædo 60 c, εἰ ἐνενοῆσεν αὐτὰ Λύστωπος.
Τὰ ἐτερα, ἄμφωτερα, πότερα, &c.
Phædo 68 e, πυγχάνει δὲ καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἢτοι τὰ ἐτερα τούτων ἤ ἄμφωτερα.
Crito 52 a, δυνὸν δάτερα. So Phædo 76 a [δυνὸν τὰ ἐτερα Οχον. and Ven. II].
Legg. 765 d, παθὴρ μάλιστα μὲν νίεν καὶ θνατέρων, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δάτερα.
Cf. Isæus i. 22. p. 37, δυνὸν τῶν ἐναντιωτῶν δάτερα, iii. 58. p. 43, δυνὸν τὰ ἐτερα. Xen. Mem. II. ii. 7, πότερα οἷει θηρίον ἁγρίωτητα δυσφορωτέραν εἶναι ἢ μητρός; Antipho v. 36. p. 133, ποτέρῳ χρῆ- συνται τῶν λόγων; πότερα οὗ πρῶτον εἶπεν ἢ οὗ ὑστερον; Lysias iv. 15. p. 102, ἢ μὲν ἐκεῖνον ἀδεραν, ἐλθόντας ἡμῶς ὡς τούτων, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὅμολογοιμεν.
§ 43. The same tendency is observable in the case of Adjectives which admit of it: a chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.
Tim. 69 a, οὐ δυνατὰ [ἐστί].
Alcib. I. 134 e, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα.
Legg. 828 a, ἔχωμαι ἐστι τάξισθαι . . ἐορτᾶς.
Menex. 235 b, ἡμέρας πλείω ἢ τρεῖς.
Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάττω δύναται σῶζειν.
Apol. 30 c, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζων βλέψετε.
And primarily Homer.
§ 44. C. Use of Irregular Pronominal Correlatives.
As Pronouns form a prominent feature in contrasted or cor-
relative clauses, so they also contribute their share to the want of symmetry which such clauses often exhibit.

We find ὁ μὲν—ὁ ἑτέρος, ὑπὲρ—οἱ δὲ, &c. as Correlatives: or by Anastrophe the former Correlative is omitted. For instances at length see below under Abbreviated Construction (§ 241).

§ 45. (The heads which remain treat of the uses of particular Pronouns.)

D. a. Use of ἄλλος and ἑτέρος.

Though these words are not equivalent, they are often interchanged by Plato. Every ἑτέρος is an ἄλλος, though the converse is untrue: and, under this limitation, the words circulate into each other's place in every possible way. Wherever there is question of two parties or things, both words are liable to be called into requisition. Even when the number exceeds two, for the first two of the series either word is used. Or the whole former part of a series is thrown into an aggregate, to justify the use of ἑτέρος in the latter part.

Legg. 872 a, ἔως θαλάσσης θάνατόν τις ἄλλος ἑτέρος (though equally we have 879 b, ὡς δ' ἂν ἄκοι ἄλλος ἄλλοιν τρώσῃ.)

Critias 109 b, τὸ μᾶλλον ἄλλοις προσήκον, τούτο ἑτέρους αὐτοῖς κτάσθαι.

Euthyphro 2 b, (Α) οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο γε καταγράφομαι, ὡς σὺ ἑτέρου [γέ-γραφαι]. (Β) οὐ γὰρ οὖν. (Α) 'Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος; (Β) Πάν' γε.

Phileb. 61 d, ἡδονή ... ἑτέρας ἄλλη ... ἀκριβεστέρα.

Politic. 262 a, τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἑτέρα τίς εἶναι, τῶν δὲ αὖ θηρίων ἄλλη τροφή.

Soph. 224 c, τὸ μὲν ... ἑτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ ... ἄλλῳ προσρητεῖν [ἁπλόματι].

Ib. 232 d, (Δ) τὰ ... περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ... (Β) Καὶ πολλῶν γε ἑτέρων.

Symp. 196 e, ἀ γὰρ τίς ἡ μὴ ἔχει ἡ μὴ οἴδειν, οὔτ' ἂν ἑτέρῳ δοιη οὔτ' ἂν ἄλλων διδάξει. Here it is possible that the words would have lost appropriateness by being reversed; because a thing can be given only to one, while it can be taught to any number.

Theaet. 184 c, ἂ δὲ ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἄδινατον εἶναι δὲ ἄλλης ταύτ' αἰσθάνεσθαι.

§ 46. β. ἄλλος, 'besides.'

Gorg. 473 c, πολιτών καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔξων.

Apol. 36 b, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ ὀικονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημο-γορίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχων καὶ ἐνυπομονοῦν καὶ στασέων.
§ 47. E. Uses of αὐτός.

a. Αὐτό. The Neuter Singular of αὐτός is used peculiarly in Apposition to express the essential nature of a thing, sometimes in the Platonic and sometimes in a more popular sense.

Rep. 363 a, οὔκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινόντα. So 472 c.
Phaedo 65 d, φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτό ἣ οὐδὲν;
Protag. 360 c, τί ποτ’ ἐστιν αὐτό ἣ ἀρετή.
Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ἣ νόσαις.

In the more popular sense, but not in the Platonic, αὐτός in Concord, and αὐτὸ τοῦτο in Apposition, are used also. E.g.
Philcb. 62 a, αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης.
Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.
Phaedo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ... ψιχῆν.

The remaining uses of αὐτός are not exclusively Platonic.

b. αὐτός in the sense of spoule.

The most noteworthy instances are with Semi-Impersonal Verbs, and will be found below (§ 99).

γ. αὐτός in the sense of solus.

Symp. 179 a, οὐδεὶς οὔτω κακὸς οὔτων οὐκ ἄν αὐτός ὁ Ἐρως ἐνθεοῦν ποίησει πρὸς ἀρετὴν.
Ib. 187 c, ἐν μὲν γε αὐτῆ τῇ συντάσει ἄρμονιας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπῶν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ διαγγελώσκειν.
Ib. 198 d, τάληθη λέγειν ... ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκλε-γομένους ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα τιθέναι.

Apol. 21 d, σμικρῷ των αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος.

Euthyd. 293 c, (A) οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἰ; (B) Πάνυ γε, τούτων γε αὐτοῦ.

Legg. 836 b, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἔσμεν.

Rep. 437 c, αὐτὸ τὸ δεσπὶ ... ἐπιθυμία ... αὐτοῦ πόματος—‘thirst, according to the simple notion of it:’—whence we see how Use a flows from this.

§ 48. δ. αὐτῶ (Adverbial) in the sense of ‘on the same spot as heretofore.’

Symp. 216 a, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶ καθῆμενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγγέλασο—i.e. not ‘here’ nor ‘there,’ but ‘rooted to the spot.’
Ib. 220 c, ἔφυσαν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἐσθιέν τι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν. (The order is hyperbatric for ἔφυσαν εἰς ἐσθιέν τι, αὐτόθι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν)
—‘stood without moving from the spot where he was.’
§ 49. PRONOMINAL WORDS.

Soph. 224 d, αὐτὸς καθιδρυμένον ἐν πόλει.

Cf. Hom. II. ii. 237, τοῖδε δ' ἔωμεν Αὐτοῦ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ γέρα πεσσέμεν, 332, ἈΛΛ' ἀγα, μῖμητε πάντες, εὐκημάδες 'Ἀχαιοί, Αὐτοῖ, εἰσόκεν ἄστυ μέγα Πρώμοιο ἔλωμεν. Thuc. iii. 81, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκέτων διεδέχεραν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἄλληλον, viii. 28, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Ψίμππιν καθιστάσας.

§ 49. F. Use of ἐκείνος.

Instances occur frequently in Plato, in which the same object is designated successively, in the same sentence or contiguous sentences, by οὗτος or the oblique Cases of αὐτός, &c., and ἐκείνος. This mobility of language serves as an index of the onward movement of the thought, and helps and incites the hearer (or us the readers) to keep pace with it. As new objects are brought into the centre of the field of observation, the objects which were just now full in front drop behind.

(Two or three of the following instances are quoted by Stallbaum.)

Phædo 60 d, λέγε τοῖν αὐτῷ . . . ὅτε οὐκ ἐκεῖνος βουλήμενος . . . αὐτοῖς ἔστω ἐποίησα ταῦτα. Here ἐκεῖνος is identical with αὐτῷ.

Ib. 68 ε, φοβοῦμεν οἱ ἐπόροι ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλων ἀπέχουσται ἐπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. The ἐκείνοι are identically the ἔτεραι.

Ib. 73 c, εάν τὸς τις πρώτον ἦ ἵδων ἦ ἄκουσα . . ., μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτερον ἐννοήσῃ.

Ib. 100 b, εἴ μου διδωτε καὶ ἐγχυροίς εἶναι ταῦτα . . ., Σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνου. Cebes' answer has intervened, and Socrates refers in ἐκείνοις to the same things which he had just called ταῦτα.

Ib. 106 b, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περίττον μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστῶς τοῦ ἄρτιον, ὡσπερ ἀμολογήσαται, ἀπολογεῖν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄντ' ἐκεῖνον ἄρτιον γεγονέναι. The αὐτὸς and ἐκεῖνο both refer identically to τὸ περίττον, αὐτὸς becoming ἐκεῖνον as ἄρτιον is brought forward.

Ib. 111 b, τἀς δὲ ὄρας αὐτοὺς κράτιν ἐχεῖν τοιαύτην, ὡστε ἐκεῖνον ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον ἐξινο πολὺ πλεῖό τῶν ἐνθάδε—where αὐτῶς fades into ἐκεῖνον as mention τῶν ἐνθάδε approaches.

Crat. 430 c, δείξα αὐτῷ, ἐν μὲν τύχῃ, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα.

Laches 186 b, εἰ τις ἤμων . . . ἔχει . . . ἐπιδείξα τίνες 'Αθηναίων . . . δὲ ἐκεῖνον ὀμολογουμένον ἀγαθοὶ γεγονάντων.

Politic. 277 c, τῶν στοιχείων ἐκαστων ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ ράστας τῶν συλλαβῶν ἰκανῶς διαστάνονται, καὶ τάληθη φράζετι περὶ ἐκείνων δυνατοὶ γίγνονται . . . ταύτα δὲ γε ταύτα ἐν ἄλλοις ἀμφιφορούντες.
§ 50. G. Uses of τις (indefinite).
In the sense of 'a particular this or that,' τις is made to contribute to give liveliness and variety to the language. Thus

a. In illustrations τις gives the force of 'for instance,' or rather the French 'par exemple.'

Phaedo 66 c, ἀν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν.
Phdr. 230 d, θαλλὼν ἡ τινα καρπὸν προσείοντες.
Hip. Ma. 292 a, δεσπότης τίς σου ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἐστὶ;

§ 51. β. Or it draws the attention away from the particular illustration given to the kind of notion intended by it,—thus softening the effect of it.

Phdr. 261 c, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστωρά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἡ τινα Θασύμαχοι τε καὶ Θέαδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.
Phileb. 16 c, δαί τινος Προμηθέως.
Cf. Ἀσχ. Ἁγαμ. 55, ἄπατος δ' αἰών ἡ τίς Ἀπάλλων ἡ Πᾶν κ.τ.λ.
Ar. Ran. 912, 'Ἀχιλλέα τιν' ἡ Νιώθην κ.τ.λ.

§ 52. γ. In enumerations it has the force of 'this or that:' but, specially, added (capriciously, as one might say) to one member of the enumeration, it serves the purpose of creating variety, which in enumerations Plato specially affects for the purpose of keeping the attention alert.

Symp. 203 a, ὅ . . . περὶ τέχνας ἡ χειρουργίας τινίς [σοφὸς] βάρκανος.
Phaedo 65 c, μήτε ἀκόλυφη μήτε ὑψις μήτε ἀληθῶν μηδὲ τις ἡδονή. [So Hermann from Oxon.]

Apol. 27 d, εἰ οἱ διάμοιρες θεῶν παῖδες εἰς νόδοι τινες ἡ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἡ ἐκ τινον ᾠλλον.
Phdr. 235 c, ἡ ποι Σαπφοῦς . . . ἡ Ἀνακρέοντος . . ., ἡ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν.
Politic. 305 b, μήθ' ύπό τινον δώρων μήθ' ἐπὶ φόβων μήτε οὐκοτον μήθ' ἐπὶ τινον ᾠλλην ἐχθρας μηδὲ φαλίων.
§ 53. H. Uses of τοιοῦτος.

a. Conversationally, for 'such as I am thinking of,'—but have not yet explained.

Smyth. 210 d, ἐπιστήμων μίαν τοιαύτην, ἥ ἦστι καλοῦ τοιοῦτο . . . δὲ γὰρ ἀν . . . παθηγωγηθη, . . . κατούφεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλῶν κ.τ.λ.—the explanation of τοιαύτην beginning immediately after it, with ἥ ἦστι.

Phaedo 73 c, . . . ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγένηται τρόπῳ τοιοῦτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόδε: [so Stallb. and Herm.] εἶν τις κ.τ.λ. The τοιοῦτῳ expresses that it is such as the speaker has in his mind; his explanation of it to others follows at λέγω δὲ.

§ 54. β. As a mere substitute or symbol for a particular word preceding, to avoid repetition of the same sound.

Phaedo 67 a, καὶ οὐτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττάμενοι . . . μετὰ τοιοῦτων ἔσομέθα—i. e. μετὰ καθαρῶν.  
Ib. 80 c, εἶν μὲν τις χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ἄφα—where τοιαύτῃ simply means χαριέσθη.
Ib. d, ἥ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ αἰείδες, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἰχόμενον—where τοιοῦτον ἔτερον means αἰείδη.  
Ib. 84 a, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη . . . σῆται, . . . ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι—where τοιοῦτον stands for τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον.  
Ib. 79 c, πλανάται καὶ παράττεται κ.τ.λ. ἀτε τοιοῦτον ἔφαπτομένῃ—where τοιοῦτον is a substitute for πλανομένων καὶ παρατυμένων.  
Smyth. 208 d, ὑπὲρ ἄρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης.  
Legg. 723 d, οὐδὲ γὰρ ᾧσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν—where ᾧσματος is actually governed by τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν, because this is the substitute for προτεινομένῳ in the foregoing sentence : cf. Smyth. 210 b, quoted above (§ 17).

§ 55. This Idiom extends to other kindred Pronouns.

Rep. 507 b, πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ἁγαθὰ καὶ ἑκαστα οὕτως—where οὕτωσ personates πολλά.  
Legg. 853 b, νομοθετεῖν πάντα ὁπόσα νῦν μέλλομεν τοῦτο δρᾶν—where τοῦτο δρᾶν represents εἰς δικαστὰς ἅγεν or the like, implied from ἧν δὲ λαμβάνειν αὐτὸ τιμωρίαν καὶ τίνων ποτὲ δικαστῶν τυγχάνειν preceding.

I.
Cf. Hdt. iii. 82, ἀνδρὸς γὰρ ἐνός τοῦ ἀρίστου οὐδὲν ἀμεινὸν ἃν φανεῖ γνώμη γὰρ τοιαύτη χρεώμενος—i. e. ἀρίστη. Ar. Eth. I. x. 11, ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ἐξαιρετόν τῷ εὐθαμένου καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιούτο—i. e. εἰδαίμων, and VIII. iv. 1, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἀλλήλους οἱ ἀγαθοὶ—i. e. χρήσιμοι. Add IX. vii. 6, ἰδίωτων δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητῶν ὅμοιοι. Thuc. ii. 49, καὶ πολλοὶ τούτο καὶ ἔθρασαν eis φρέατα—i. e. ἐρήμουν σφάς αὐτούς, and iv. 64, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δικαίως ταῦτα μοι ποιήσω, ὅφει ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τούτω παθεῖν—i. e. ἡσσάσθαι. Ar. Eth. IV. i. 11, φιλούνται δὲ οἱ ἑλευθέριοι ὁφέλιμοι γὰρ, τούτῳ δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει—where τοῦτο stands for ὁφέλιμοι εἰσι, V. vi. 5, διὸ οὐκ ἐόμεν ἀρχαῖον ἀνθρωπὸν, ὅτι ἕαντο τούτῳ ποιεῖ [sc. ἀρχεῖ], VIII. xiii. 7, ἡ δὲ ἡδικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς ϕίλω δωρεῖται, ἡ ὀτιθήποτε ἄλλο.

§ 56. Idioms of Verbs.

A. Mood.

a. Indicative Constructions.

a. The meaning assigned to Indicative Imperfects, Aorists, or Pluperfects, with ἐ, depending on a similar Apodosis with τῶν, holds equally (1) when they depend on a simple Infinitive.

Crito 52 c, ἐξῆν σου φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, ἐλ ἔβοιλον.

Ib. 44 b, οἷος τ' ὄν σε σώζειν εἰ ἰδέλων ἀναλάσκειν χρῆματα, ἀμελήσαι.

Phaedo 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἕπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ . . . οὐκ ἐξαρκέν.

Soph. 246 d, [δοκεῖ δεῖν] μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ τη βυνατῶν ἢν, ἐργα βελτίως ποιεῖν.

Legg. 790 c, οἰκεῖν [ἐξυμφέρει], εἰ δυνατῶν ἢν, οἶον ἀεὶ πλέοντας.

§ 57. (2) In clauses connected by a Relative Adverb or Pronoun with an Indicative of unfulfilled past contingency.—The principle of Sequence here illustrated has not been observed except in the case of Indicatives following Relative Adverbs: whereas (besides the other outlying instances which come before us here) the principle applies equally to the Optative (see below, § 72).

Euthyd. 304 e, ἄξιον γ' ἢν ἀκούσα κ.τ.λ., ἢν ἢκουσα κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, εἰ γὰρ ὁφέλον . . . οἰοὶ τε εἰναι κ.τ.λ., ἢν οἶοι τε ἢσαν κ.τ.λ.

Theoct. 161 c, τεθαύμακα ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν κ.τ.λ., ἢν μεγαλοπρεπώς . . . ἢπειστο κ.τ.λ.

§§ 58, 59.] VERBS.

Gorg. 506 b, ἕδεως ἂν Καλλικλεὶ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἐὼς αὐτῷ . . . ἀπέδωκα κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 171 c, τούτῳ δ' ἦν ἂν, οὐ ἐπιστήμην εἰπον—'this would have been the case of which they had knowledge.'

In the next instance ἂν heads a second clause in a different meaning.

Meno 89 b, οὐς . . . ἂν ἐφυλάττομεν, ἂν μὴ δεῖσ αὐτοῖς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἥλικιαν χρήσιμον γίγνοιτο.

In the next, ὅπως loses its power over the second of two clauses, and the meaning is supplied by ἂν.

Legg. 959 c, ζωντι ἐδει βοηθεῖν, ὅπως ὁ τι δικαιότατος ἂν καὶ ὅσιότατος εἶξε τῷ ἔσω καὶ τελευτήσας ἀτιμώρητος ἂν ἐγένετο.

Instances need not be multiplied: as an illustration, we may notice in conclusion the virtually but not formally identical construction in Soph. El. 1022, Εἴρ' ὡφέλες κ.τ.λ. πάντα γὰρ κατεργασμοι—where consequently we need not suppose an ellipse of ἂν. The usage begins with Homer: cf. Π. vi. 348, "Ἐνθα μὲ κῦρ' ἀπόφερε.

§ 58. β. Future Indicative with ἂν.

Rep. 615 d, οὐχ ἦκε, οὐδ' ἂν ἦξει δεῦρο.

Apol. 29 c, ἤδη ἂν . . . ἐπιτηδεύοντες διαφθορήσονται.

Symp. 222 a, ἱδὼν ἂν τις . . . εὑρήσει.

Euthyd. 287 d, καὶ νῦν οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀποκρυεί;

Phdr. 227 b, οὐκ ἂν οἰεὶ με καὶ ἁγιώλια ὑπέρτερον πράγμα ποιήσεσθαι;

The Future exceptionally retains this ἂν in Oratio Obliqua.

Legg. 719 e, τῶν αἰτῶν ἂν ἐπανέσοι.

Cf. Ισαίας ι. 32, προσηπείλησεν ὅτι δηλώσαι ποτ' ἂν.

§ 59. b. Conjunctive Potential Constructions.

The Conjunctive Potential has always a deliberative meaning, which however admits of further distinctions, according to various kinds of sentences.

a. In matters of abstract opinion, it is 5 Presumptive.

In matters in which the will is concerned, it is

β. Deliberative (in a more special sense) when the sentence is interrogative:

γ. Hortatory or dehortatory, when the sentence is not interrogative:

Only the first of these heads requires illustration by examples here.

5 This use is confined to negative sentences.
a. Presumptive use.

With μή.

Gorg. 462 c, μή ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἄλλης εἰπέιν.
Rep. 603 c, μή τι ἄλλο ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα;
Symp. 194 c, ἄλλα μή οὐχ οὕτω ἤμεις ὦμεν.
Apol. 39 a, μή οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπῶν.

The Indicative is also used with μή and μή οὐ similarly: e.g. Euthyd. 298 c, μή οὐ λίων λίωφ συνάπτεις; and (not interrogatively) Protag. 312 a, ἀλλ' ἄρα μή οὐχ ἵππολαμβάνεις—'but perhaps, then, you do not suppose.'

With ὅπως μή.

Crat. 430 d, ὅπως μή ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμαισιν ἢ τοῦτο, . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὄνομασιν οὗ.

The Indicative is also used with ὅπως μή.

Meno 77 a, ὅπως μή οὐχ οἶος τ' ἔσουσι.

Phædo 77 b, ἐνέστηκεν δ' νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε . . . , ὅπως μή . . . διασκεδάζονται ἡ ψυχή.

§ 60. With οὖ μή.

Passing by the common use (Aorist), we have the Present with οὖ μή in

Rep. 341 c, οὖ μή οἶος τ' ἔσης.
Phileb. 48 d, οὖ μή δυνάτως ὁ.


The following is only a variation of the use with οὖ μή, πολλοῦ δεὶ standing as a mere Adverb for οὖ.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεὶ μῆποτέ τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται.

§ 61. c. Conjunctive Subjunctive Constructions.

The following alone need be mentioned.

a. After σκοπεῖν, ὁρᾶν, and the like, with μή. (This is as it were the Oratio Obliqua of b. a.)

Phdr. 260 a, σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσιν.
Gorg. 512 d, ὁρὰ μή ἄλλο τι τὸ γεννάιον καὶ τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἢ.

§ 62. This use is frequent in the Indicative: e.g.

La. 179 b, ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικλας οἴσται τι λέγειν.
Soph. 235 a, διστάζομεν ἐπὶ μὴ τυγχάνει κ.τ.λ.
Ly. 216 c, σκεψώμεθα μὴ ... λανθάνει κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 218 d, φοβούμαι ... μὴ ... ἄντετυχόμεν.
Phaedo 84 e, φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερον ... διάκειμαι.

§ 63. β. After πρὶν, without ἄν, in negative sentences.
Phaedo 62 c, μὴ πρότερον αὐτῶν ἀποκτινώναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἄνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιτέμψῃ. [So all the MSS.]
Theæt. 169 b, τὸν γὰρ προσελθώντα οὗ ἄνηθι πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃ ... προσπαλάσαι. [So all the MSS.]
Legg. 873 a, οὐδὲ ἐκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίνεσθαι τὸ μιανθὲν πρὶν φῶνον φῶνο ὡμοι ὡμοιον ἡ ὑμάσασα ψυχῇ τίτῃ.

§ 64. γ. After σκοπεῖν, ὄραν, and the like with ἄν.
Crito 48 e, ὅρα τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἄν σοι ἰκανῶς λέγηται.
Phaedo 100 c, σκοπεῖ δὴ τὰ ἔξην ἐκεῖνοι, ἄν σοι ἔωσθοκ ὡσπερ ἐμοί.
Gorg. 510 b, σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄν σοι δοκῶ εἴδε λέγειν.
Charm. 167 b, σκέψαι ἄν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐπορώτερος φανῆς ἐμοῦ.
Cf. Lysias xv. 5. p. 144, σκέψασθε ἄν ἰκανὸν γένηται τεκμήριον.
Andoc. i. 37. p. 6, ἀναμμῆνησθαί ἄν ἀληθῆ λέγω. And primarily Homer (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 877), Il. xv. 32, ὃφρα ἰδη, ἣν τοι χραιάσῃ.

What is worth noticing upon this usage is, that ἄν gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual εἰ. The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas εἰ would hint the speaker's foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. Ἐάν is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as those just given, which relate to the conduct of the dialogue.

§ 65. 8. With ὅς ἄν.
The different shades of meaning presented by ὅς with the Indicative and ὅς ἄν with the Conjunctive are parallel with those just pointed out in the case of εἰ and ἄν after σκοπεῖν. The meaning of ὅς ἄν bears upon a doubtful reading in Phaedo 96 a, presently to be mentioned.

Ly. 217 c, οἶον ἄν γά τὸ παρὸν, τοιαῦτα ἐστί—where οἶον ἄν γά leaves it quite undetermined of what kind τὸ παρὸν is.
Phaedo 98 e, ἐμοὶ βελτίων δεδοκτα ἐνθάδε καθήσομαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχει τὴν δίκην ἦν ἄν κελεύσωσι. Here it is not that ἦν ἄν κελεύσωσι has any future force, for the penalty had
been awarded; but it gives the meaning 'that it is right to stay and abide the penalty, whatever it be, which they have awarded.'

Phædo 96 a, ἐὰν τί σοι χρῆσιμον φαίνηται ὅν ἄν λέγω, πρὸς τήν πειθώ περὶ ὧν ἄν λέγης χρῆσει (taking for granted here the reading ὧν ἄν λέγης)—'you can apply it to satisfying yourself with respect to your objections, whatever they be.' It is true that the objections had preceded; but this only makes the instance parallel to the last: and what ὧν ἄν intimates is, that Socrates does not wish to bind Cebes to the precise case he has stated. As just before he had said ἐξεπείθησες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἶ τέ τι βούλει προσθῆς ἢ ἀφέλης,—to which Cebes had guardedly replied ἅλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθείναι δέομαι,—he now, by giving a general turn to the sentence, leaves a loophole open for future qualification.


a. Without ἄν, expressing simple possibility.

Legg. 777 c, πρῶς ἄ τις ἀπαντα βλέψασι διαπορήσει.

Euthyd. 298 e, (A) ὄθκοῦν τὸν σαυτὸν πατέρα τύπτεοι; (B) Ἡλύ μεντοι δικαύσθερον τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτομι.

Gorg. 492 b, τί τῇ ἅληθεια αἰσχρον καὶ κάκιον εἴη;

Phædo 88 c, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἥξιοι εἰμεν κριταί, ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἀπίστα ἢ—where the Optative, as distinguished from the Conjunctional, denotes a transitory as opposed to a permanent contingency.

§ 67. α. Without ἄν, this being understood from a preceding coordinate sentence.


Symp. 196 c, κρατοῖτ' ἄν ἢπο ἔρωτος, ὁ δὲ κρατοῖ.

Phædo 99 a, εἰ .... λέγοι, .... ἀληθῆ ἄν λέγοι ὃς μὲντοι .... ποιῶ, .... πολλῇ καὶ μακρᾷ ῥαθυμίᾳ εἴῃ τοῦ λόγου. [So Oxon. and three other MSS.]

Charm. 174 e, (A) .... ὀφελοῖ ἄν ἡμᾶς. (B) Ἡ καὶ ἐγκαίνειν ποιοὶ;

6 It is the reading of Oxon. and one other good MS. But perhaps the other reading—ὡς λέγεις—ought to be preferred. So Hermann and the Zurich editors.
§§ 68—70. VERBS.

Rep. 382 d, (A) πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαῖ τὰ ἄφομοιαν ἄν ψεῦδοιτο; (B) . . . (A) Ἀλλὰ δὲ δειδὸς τοὺς ἔχθροὺς ψευδοῖτο;

§ 68. γ. With ἂν in clauses where the ἂν adheres closely to the Verb, and not to the Relative Pronoun or Particle by which the clause is introduced.

Symp. 187 d, ὥς ἂν κοσμιμώτεροι γίγνοντο . . . , δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι.

Ib. 190 c, δοκῶ μοι ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὥς ἂν εἶν κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 230 b, ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἀνθῆς, ὥς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον.

Gorg. 453 c, ἂν ὦτῳ προ pBuffer, ὥς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῶν καταφανές ποιοῖ.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, οὐχ οἷος τ' ἡθα πείθειν, ὥς . . . ἂν . . . ἐπιδιδοίεν.

Phedo 82 e, δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὥς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτός ὁ δεδημένος συλ-

λήπτωρ ἔη.

Protag. 318 e, εἰβουλία . . . ὡσ ἂν ἄριστα διωκοῖ.

Ly. 207 e, προθυμοῦνται ὡσ ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν.

Crat. 395 a, κινδυνεῖει τοιούτος τις εἶναι ὁ Αγαμέμνων οἰός ἂν ἂν δόξειν ἀυτῷ διαποινεῖσθαι.

Ib. 398 e, οἶδ' εἰ τι οἷος τ' ἂν εἶν εὐρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω.

Legg. 700 c, ἥδων ἃς τῇ τοῦ χαύρωτος, ἐίτε βελτίων ἐίτε χείρων ἂν

ἐιή τις, κρίνωτο ὀρθῶτα.

Cf. Antipho i. 17. p. 113, ἐβουλεύετο ἡ ἄνθρωπος ὡσ ἂν αὐτοῖς τὸ

φάρμακον δοῖ, πότερα πρὸ δείπνου ἡ ἂπῳ δείπνου.

It may be noted, that these clauses are not Subjunctive, and that this difference marks off these instances from such as Rep. 412 d, ψιλοῦ, . . . ὡσ ὀνίωτο κ.τ.λ., Legg. 661 c, ἔλαστον [ἐστί κακὸν]

ἀν ὡς ὀλίγοντο ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζῇ, which must be separately accounted for.

§ 69. δ. With ἂν, equivalently for the Future.

(δ') Following a Future in the Protasis.

Phaedo 107 c, ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἰ τις αὐτῆς

ἀμελησεῖ.

Apol. 35 a, εἰ . . . ἐσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἰη.

§ 70. (δ") Following a Conjunctive with ἂν in the Protasis.

Rep. 556 a, εἰάν τις προστάτηγ . . . , χρηματίζοντο ἂν. So 402 d.

Symp. 200 c, ὡσ τις λέγῃ, εἴπομεν ἂν.

Phdr. 244 b, εἰάν δὴ λέγωμεν . . . , μηκόνωμεν ἂν.

Phileb. 55 e, ἂν τις . . . χωρίξῃ . . . , φαῖλον . . . ἂν γίγνοντο.
§ 71. (§) Following an Indicative, involving a Future meaning.

Symp. 208 c, ei ἔθελες εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι, θαυμάζοις ἄν . . . ,
ei μὴ ἐννοεῖς κ.τ.λ.—where ei ἔθελες βλέψαι is a virtual Future.

Apol. 37 c, πολλὴ ἂν μὲ φιλοψυχία ἔχουι, ei οὖτως ἀλόγιστός eiμι κ.τ.λ.
because the fact is not so as yet.

Protag. 349 c, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομι, ei . . . ἔλεγες—because I do not
know the fact as yet.

Crat. 428 b, ei μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν
θαυμάζομι.

Laches 186 c, ei δὲ Νικίας . . . μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι.

§ 72. e. Optative Subjunctive Constructions.

a. Under principal Optative sentence with or without ἂν (see
above, §§ 66, 67)—the Subjunctive sentence being
(a') Relative.

Gorg. 512 c, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτων ἄν μέλλων χρόνον βιώναι ὡς ἄριστα
βιώσῃ;

Meno 92 c, πῶς οὖν ἂν εἰδεῖς περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος . . . , οὖ
παντάπασιν ἀπειροὺς εἴης;

Cf. Hom. Od. xiii. 291, Κερθάλεως κ' εἰη . . . ὃς σε παρελθοῦν, ἰ.ν. 222,
'Ōs τὸ καταβράζειν . . . ὃς κεν βάλοι, XV. 358, Λευγαλέως θανάτω, ὡς
μὴ βάνοι ὡς εἰμαι . . . τιμοῖς εἰη.

§ 73. (a') Adverbial.

Legg. 730 c, μετόχοι εἰη, ἵνα ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ἅληθή ὃν διαβιοί.

Meno 98 c, ὠφέλιμοι ἄνδρες ἄν εἰην . . . εἰπτερ εἰην.

Rep. 541 a, ὃς ἂν γένοιτο, εἰπτερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς ἐν εἰρήκειαι.

Politic. 295 c, εἴπωμεν . . . λατρῶν μέλλουτα . . . ἀπέσεσθαι . . . συχνῶν,
ὡς ὀικεῖο, χρόνου, ἂν ἔθελεν κ.τ.λ.;

Cf. Hom. II. v. 214, ἅτ' ἔμειο κάρῃ τάμοι ἄλλοτροι φῶς, Εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ
tάδε τόξα φαινῷ ἐν πυρὶ θείην, Od. xii. 106, μὴ σὺ γε κείθι τύχοις,
ὁτε ῥουζόθεσεν, ἱβ. 114, Τῆν δὲ κ' ἀμυνάμην ὅτε μοι σινοῖτο γ' ἐταίρους, xxii. 114, ὃς κ' μοι ἀκυμνένον τάδε δόματα πότινα μήτηρ
Λειπτοῦ ἁμ' ἄλλο ϊοῦ' ὅτ' ἐγὼ κατόπισθε λιστοῖμην.

§ 74. b. Under principal Indicative sentence, when the dependent
Verb is intended to belong to all time—the Subjunctive sentence
being
(b') Relative.

Legg. 759 b, οἷς μὴ καθεστήκοι καταστατέων [ἐστίν] ἱερέας.

§ 75. (β) Adverbial.

Rep. 410 c, οὐχ οὖν ἐνεκά τινι ώστιν καθιστάσιν, ἵνα ... σιραπέυοντο. Euthyd. 296 c, οὐκ ἕχω ὅμων πῶς ἁμφιμεθηποίην ... ὅπως οὐ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι. Gorg. 448 c, οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾶ, ποία τις εἰρ’ ἡ Γοργήν τέχνη. [So most if not all of the MSS.]

Alc. I. 135 a, τυραννουντι δέ, ὅσ μηδὲ ἐπιπλήττω τις αὐτῷ, τί το συμβοροθείμενον;


§ 76. (β) Adverbial with ei.

Politic. 268 d, τοῦτο ... [ε’τε] ποιητέον, εἰ μὴ μελλομεν κ.τ.λ. Meno 80 d, εἰ εντύχοις αὑτῷ, πῶς εἰσεί ὅτι τοῦτο ἐστιν;

Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὥρα γὰρ, εἰ ... τοῦτο φαίμεν εἶναι καλὸν. Legg. 642 a, ὀρᾶτε τί ποιῶμεν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐάσαμεν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 658 c, εἰ ... τὰ πάνω σμικρὰ κρίνοι παιδία, κρινοῦσι τὸν τὰ βαίματα ἐπιδεικνύσα.

Charm. 173 c, εἰ δὲ βοιλιοὶ γε, ... συγχωρήσωμεν κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 91 a, οὐ γὰρ ὅπως ... δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προδομηθῆσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον. Cf. the same phrase, but under an Infinitive sentence, Rep. 411 e; and Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 5, λέγεται ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν εἰπ’ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἴκειον ὁνόμα εἰη, τὸ κέρδος.


§ 77. γ. Under an Infinitive sentence—which necessarily leaves the time of the Dependent Verb, as under the last head, undefined.

Charm. 164 a, εἰ δοκεῖ τις ἀφέλιμα καὶ έαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἑκείνῳ ὅν ἵπτο.

Lysis 212 d, εἰ ὁ ἑτερος φιλό, φιλῶ εἰναι ἁμφω. Theat. 164 a, δεὶ γε μέντοι [τοῦτο φάναι], εἰ σώσωμεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον.
Phædo 95 d, προσήκειν φύσ φοβείσθαι, ει μή ἀνώτος είη, τῷ μῆ εἰδότι.

Protag. 316 c, οὕτω τούτο γενέσθαι, εἰ σοι ξυγγένειοι.

Legg. 927 c, τῶν νοῦν, ὡς καὶ βραχές ενείη, προσέχοντα εὕρεγετών.

Phædo 85 d, κυνωπενόντα διαπλεύσαι τὸν βλον, εἰ μή τες δύνατο ἀσφα-λέστερον ... διατριβεθήναι.

Cf. Hom. II. iv. 262, σον δὲ πλείον δέπασι αἰεὶ "Εστήκ`, ὥσπερ ἐμοί, πιέειν ὅτε θυμός ἀνώγοι, Od. xxiv. 253, Τουότω δὲ ξοικας, ἐπεὶ λούσατο φάγοι τε, Εὐδέμεναι μαλακῶς. Thuc. i. 120, ἀνθρών σω-φρώνων ἐστίν, εἰ μή ἀδικοῦτο ἰσυχάζειν.

§ 78. Note that the principle of the Optatives classified under (β) and (γ) is the same essentially. Hermann (De Part. ἄν) notices the usage under (γ): but the extent of the principle has not attracted attention.

§ 79. f. Infinitive Constructions.

Infinitive after Relative Pronouns and Adverbs.

Rep. 415 e, εὐνάς ... τοιαύτας, οἱς χειμώνος τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ἰκανός εἶναι.

Gorg. 457 d, εἰπόντες τοιαύτα, οίκαι καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι.

Protag. 334 c, χρῆσθαι ἑλαίῳ ... ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατα-σθίσαι.

Theet. 161 b, οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον, πλήν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἐτέρων σοφοῦ λαβεῖν.

Protag. 330 e, φαίναι τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα ... , ὡς οὐκ εἴναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 213 a, παραχωρήσασι τῶν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκείνον καθίζειν.

Euthyd. 306 c, καὶ μοι δοκεί ... ἀλλάκτωσ εἶναι, ὡς γε πρός σε τάλθης εἰρήσθαι.

Apol. 29 c, ἀφιεμέν σε, ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν.

Phdr. 269 d, τὸ δύνασθαι ὡςτε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι.

Protag. 338 c, αὖν παρατηρον ὡμίν ὡςτε Πρωταγόρου τούτε σοφιότερόν τινα ἀλέσθαι.

Politic. 295 a, ἰκανός γένοιτ' ἄν ... ὡςτε ἐκάστῳ προστάττειν τὸ προσ-ήκον.

Phædo 103 c, ἐστιν ἀρα περὶ ἕνα τῶν τοιούτων, ὡςτε μὴ μονον αὐτῷ τῷ εἶδος ἰδιούσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 2, νεμόμενοι τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκαστοι, ὃσον ἀποκη. And likewise
§§ 80—82. VERBS.

Soph. Ant. 303, Χρόνος ποτ' εξέπραξαν ὡς δοῦναι δίκην, Aj. 378, Οὔ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν ταῦθ' ὅπως οἷς ὦδ' ἔχειν, 924, Ὤς καὶ παρ' ἐχθροῖς ἄξιος θρήνων τυχεῖν.

§ 80. g. Infinitive Uses.

a. Future following ὥσ τε, δυνάτος, &c.

Phædo 73 a, οὐκ ἂν οὐδ' τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιήσεων.

Phdr. 277 d, οὐ πρότερον δυνάτον τέχνη ἔσεσθαι.

Cf. Lysias xxvii. 2. p. 178, ὅποτε ἄν δοκῶσαν αἴτου ἐκνεφεύσθαι ἐπίκες. Isocr. xiii. 2. p. 291, ἢμῖν ἐνδείξεσθαι βουλομένους. [The Zurich editors give ἐνδείξεσθαι.]

§ 81. β. Aorist equivalent in meaning to Future.

Symp. 193 d, ἀληθάς παρέχεται [ἐμάς] εὐθαίμονας ποιήσαι.

Euthyd. 278 e, ἐφάρμι ἐπιδείξεσθαι τῷ προσφερτικῷ σοφίᾳ.

Protag. 316 c, τούτῳ δὲ οἷς μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ οἷς ἔγγεγένητο.

Cf. Hom. II. ix. 230, ἐν δοιχ ἡ δ' σασσίμεον ἡ ἀπόλεσθαι Νῆς, xiii. 666, Πολλάκι γὰρ οἱ ἑπετε γέρων ἀγαθὸς Πολύτιδος Νοῦσῳ ὑπ' ἀργαλέα φθίσαθα, xxii. 119, ὅρκου ζῶμαι Μή τι κατακρύσσειν ἄλλ' ἄνθισα πάντα δάσασθα, Od. ii. 171, φημὶ τελευθήσημι ἀπαντα, iv. 253, "Ὀμοσα μὴ μὲν πρὶν ἀναφηνά, ἰξ. 496, φάμεν αὐτόθ' ὀλέσθαι. Thuc. i. 26, προείσον ... ὡς πολεμίους χρήσασθαι, 81, εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίων ... μὴ τῇ γῇ δουλεύσαι (so with οὐκ eikós iii. 10, iv. 85, viii. 46), iii. 46, τίνα οὔσθε ἤμνια οὐκ ἁμενων παρασκευάσασθαι; v. 22, οἱ δὲ ... οὐκ ἐφασαν δέξασθαι, ii. 3, ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθέμενου μαθίως κρατήσασθαι, iv. 63, τὸ ἀλλιτές ... ἰκανῶς νόμιστες εἰρχθήναι, i. 126, τῷ Κύλων ... ἀνέλευ ὁ θεὸς, καταλαβεῖν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. Aisch. Pers. 173, ἵσθι ... μὴ ἐν δις φράσαι, Agam. 1262, ἐπεύχεσθαι ... ἀντιτίσασθαι (not 'prays' but 'boasts'). Soph. Phil. 1329, πάυλων ἵσθι τίσεθε μὴ ποτ' ἐντυχεῖ Νόσσον, Aj. 1082, Ταῦτην νόμισε τὴν πόλιν χρόνῳ ποτὲ Ἔξ οὐρίων ὁμοίως εἰς βεβήν πεσεῖν (not aor. of custom, as Herm. and Linw.). Eur. Andr. 311, Σὲ μὲν γὰρ ἡχεῖς θέας βρέτας σώσαι τόδε. Hdt. i. 53, προλειγοῦσα ... μεγάλην ἄρχην μν καταλέσα, vi. 62, τὰ ἄλλα ἐφ' κατανέσαν. Lysias xiii. 15. p. 131, οὐκ ἐφασαν ἐπιτρύψαι, ib. 32. p. 132, οὐ γὰρ οὐμαί σὲ ἐξάραν γενέσθαι, xxxiii. 2, ἡγήσατο τὸν ἐνθάδε σύλλογον ἄρχην γενέσθαι. [So Bekker: the Zurich editors have γενέσθαι.] Ar. Nub. 35, ἐνεχυράσσεσθαι φασιν.

§ 82. γ. Present equivalent in meaning to Future.

Crito 52 c, ὅμοιόγες καθ' ἐμάς πολιτεύεσθαι.

Gorg. 520 e, μὴ φάναι συμβούλευεν, εὰν μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδό. 
§ 83. 8. Infinitives following certain Verbs (of saying, thinking, &c.) sometimes contain a Dictative force. They are in fact Infinitives Oblique of the Deliberative Potential. In consequence of this force of the Infinitive in these cases, the governing Verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to ‘say’ becomes to ‘recommend’ or to ‘pray’: to ‘think’ becomes to ‘think fit,’ or to ‘give counsel.’ But it is through the Infinitive, as being an Infinitive of the Potential, that the meaning of the governing Verb is strengthened; and not vice versa.

Protag. 346 b, Σιμωνίδης ἤγγισα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ... τύραννον ... ἐπαινεῖσα—‘thought fit’—lit. ‘thought it-was-incumbent-on-himself-to-praise.’

Crat. 399 d, ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι.

Hip. Ma. 291 a, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ... ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι κ.τ.λ.—not ‘that we say’ but ‘that we should say.’

Phaedo 83 c, οἱ δικαίοις φιλομαθεῖς κόσμου τῇ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρείου οὐκ ὅν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκά φασί. Here the meaning is not ‘for the reason which the world attributes to them,’ but ‘for the reason for which the world says people ought to be [temperate].’ That is, φασί is followed by κοσμίως εἶναι understood, and this εἶναι contains the Dictative force.

Ib. 104 e, ὅ τοι ἐλεγον ὀρίσασθαι—‘what I proposed that we should define.’

Cf. Hom. II. iii. 98, φρονώ δὲ διακρινώμεναι ἦδη Ἀργείου καὶ Τρώας (‘I think good’). Thucyd. iii. 44, νομίζω περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς βουλεύονταί, ἰν. 86, οὐδὲ ἀσαφή τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, vii. 42, νομίσας, οὐχ οἶνον τε εἶναι ..., οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ Νικίας ἐπιθεῖν (where the Dictative force is possessed by the second Infinitive only), ii. 42, τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἠγαθίμενον ἢ τὸ κ.τ.λ., ν. 40, ἡγούμενοι, ὡτ' ἄν ἐνυγχωρῆ, ἡσυχῶν
§ 84. c. Infinitive as a Noun Substantive, without the Article.


In Apposition.

Apol. 23 a, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι.

Protag. 323 b, ὦ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἐγείροντο εἶναι, τάληθε λέγειν.

Under government.

Rep. 429 b, κύριοι ἄν εἶν ἢ τοιαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοιαν.

Symp. 209 b, εἰπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ οἴνον χρῆ εἶναι τῶν ἄνδρα.

§ 85. ζ. An Accusative7 of the Infinitive, with the Article, sometimes occurs subjoined in justification of some expression of feeling just preceding. The "τὸ indignantis" is included in this use (it is exemplified in the first two passages following); but a more commensurate designation would be the 'Apologetic Infinitive.'

Phaedo 99 b, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἰς τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἶνον τῆς εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 177 a, οὐ δεινὸν, ἄλλοις μὲν τοις θεῶν ὄμνοις κ.τ.λ.; . . . Ἡρακλέους καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπάνους . . . ἄλες ἐπαυνων ἔχοντες . . . καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα συχνὰ θεῶν ἐγκεκομμασμένα, τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλῆν σπουδῆν ποιήσασθαι, ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα πῶς ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.

The speaker justifies the warmth with which he has spoken by subjoining a studiedly dispassionate statement of the case.


Phaedo 60 b, ὡς ταμασίως πέφυκε [τὸ ἣδυ] πρὸς . . . τὸ λυπηρῶν, τὸ ἀμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἑβάλειν παραγίγνοντα τῷ ἀνθήρῳ. The τὸ ἀμα κ.τ.λ. (taking for granted the reading here) is the justification of the expression ὡς ταμασίως, [τὸ is the reading of Oxon. and one other MS.]

7 If an opinion must be hazarded as to the force of this Accusative, it must be that it is Causal. See § 18 above.
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 86, 87.


Symp. 204 a, αὐτὸ γὰρ τούτῳ. ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλῶν κάρυμμαν μπέρ φρόνιμων δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ικανόν. Here τὸ μὴ κ.π.λ. contains the reason for ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία: but, as it is not in the common Causal form, but under this apologetic form, it also justifies the tone of impatience in which ἀμαθία has been mentioned.

§ 86. η. The Accusative of the Infinitive, expressing the result, in negative clauses, is common.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν... ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ἐξυμβάλλεται κ.π.λ.

Phædo 74 d, ἦ ἑσέι τι ἐκεῖνον τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι; [So Hermann without MS. authority.]

This use would seem to be confined to negative clauses.

Lach. 190 c, ἐγὼ αἰτίος... τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τούτῳ διανοοῦμενος ἥρῴην ἄλλ' ἐπερον, is no exception, since the negative is but postponed.

The Genitive of the Infinitive expresses the cause or purpose primarily, rather than the result, in both affirmative and negative clauses.

§ 87. B. Voice.

a. "Third sense of Middle Voice." The ascription to the Middle Voice of this meaning,—'to get a thing done by another,'—is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (ἐδώσκεσθαι), by some passages in the Meno.

Meno 93 d, ἦ οὐκ ἀκήκων ὧτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεώφαντον τὸν ὑπὸ ἰππέα μὲν ἐδόξαζο ἀγαθόν; and, just after, ἐπαίδευσατο—where the whole point of the passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself distinctively.

On the other hand, we have

Meno 94 c, Θαυκακίδης αὖ δῶο νυείς ἐγέρσε... καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσε τά τε ἄλλα εἰ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα δ᾿ Ἀθηναίων τὸν μὲν γὰρ Σαῦθιά ἐδώκε τὸν δὲ Ἐδώρφῳ—where the Active ἐπαίδευσε is as distinctively used of the father's getting his sons taught by others. Similarly ib. b, d, ἐδώκε. 
As the favourite example, διδάσκωσθαι, thus falls to the ground, so do the rest. Δανείσσωσθαι, for instance, is 'to take a δανείον,' as δανείσσω is 'to give a δανείον' that is, the general meaning of the Verb being 'to deal in δανεία,' the Middle means 'to deal in them for oneself.' So it is with other Verbs expressing transactions to which there must be two parties: χράω and χρῆσθαι express the active and passive side of 'dealing in oracles.' So, rather differently, 'bringing a man to justice' becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the judge, κρίνει, and, on the interested side, the office of the prosecutor, κρίνεσθαι. 

The fact is, that the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning 'to get a thing done by another;' neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle that "qui facit per alium facit per se."

Examples of the Active Verb having this meaning may be found in Ἀσκ. Ag. 594, "Ομος ὤ, ἔθνον,—where Clytemnestra attributes to herself the same action which was in v. 87 described by the words περὶπεμπτα θυσικεῖς,—in Ἡδ. iii. 80, [ἀνὴρ τύραννος] κεῖνει ἀκριτοὺς, &c.

§ 88. b. There is a genuine inherent sense of Verbs, which deserves more distinct notice than it has received. It stands halfway between the Middle and the Passive.

'To allow oneself to be,' 'to expose oneself to be,' 'to get oneself,'—subjected to this or that, may be designated the Semi-Middle sense. The following are examples.

Crito 48 d, ἐξαγωνίται καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι—'allowing ourselves to be carried across the border.'

Phædo 67 a, ἀναπιμπλώμεθα—'allow ourselves to be infected.' And so Ἠρ. Ma. 291 a.

Soph. 253 b, [φθόγγους] τοὺς συγκεραυνμένους τε καὶ μή—'which allow themselves to be united'—i. e. 'which harmonise.'

Μενο 91 c, μηδείνα... τοσαυτή μανία λάβοι, ὅτε παρὰ τοὺς ἐλθόντα λωζηθήσαι—'get himself into disgrace.'

Phileb. 58 e, ἀπεχθήσεις Γοργία—'you will incur the hatred of Gorgias.'

διδάσκωσθαι also means 'to take a pupil.' So Pind. Ol. viii. 77, τὸ διδάσκατον δὲ τοι εἰδότι μίτερον, Simonid. ap. Gaisf. Fr. liv. p. 377, διδαχάμενος χορῶν ἀνδρῶν, Arist. Nub. 783, 'τολείαν ἀπείρ', ὅπο ἄν διδαχάμεν σ' ἐτί (Soocrates speaks.)
Apol. 35 c, χρη οὕτε ἡμᾶς ἐδίζευν ὑμᾶς ἐπιρκέων, οὐθ ἡμᾶς ἐδίζεσθαι.

Equally marked is the existence of this use in other authors.

Hom. Od. ii. 33, ὀνήμενος—‘one that earns a benefit,’ iv. 373, ἑς δὴ δὴ ἐνὶ ἐπισφ έρωκέα—‘allowest thyself to be detained’ by Calypso. Thuc. i. 77, ἔλασσούμενοι ἐν ταῖσ ἐξυμβολαίας δέκας, ‘letting ourselves be curtailed of our due,’ similarly iv. 64, ὅπως εἴκε ἴσσοθσαι. Eur. Phen. 602, (A) Καὶ σε δειπερῶν γὰ αὐτῶ σκηπτρα καὶ θρόνους χθονός. (B) Οὐκ ἀπατούμεσθαι. Soph. Aj. 217, νῦν θερος άλας ἀπελοζήθην. Dem. de Cor. 277. p. 318, τὴν ἐμὴν δεινότητα ... εὐρήσετε πάντες ἐν τοῖσ κοινοῖς ἐξεταζομένην ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν δεί, c. Dionys. 14. p. 1287, ἤγούμενοι δεῖν ἑλάττοισθαι τι καὶ συγχροειν. Add στεφάνοισθαι, so common in Pindar (e.g. Ol. vii. 15, Nem. vi. 19) for ‘winning a crown.’

Hence also the double sense of Verbals in -τός, as γραµτός, from γραφύσκειν, ‘known;’ γρνστός, from γραφύσκεσθαι, ‘capable of being known’ (lit. ‘allowing itself to be known’). And in privatives— ἀλυτός, from λύειν, ‘unbroken;’ ἀλυτυ, from λύεσθαι, ‘that does not allow itself to be broken,’ ‘unbreakable.’

The same sense extends into Latin. Livy iii. 42, Natura loci ac vallo, non virtute aut armis, tutabantur, lit., ‘let themselves be protected by the strength of their position’—i.e. ‘were fain to let their natural and artificial defences protect them.’ So Juv. xv. 157, defendier isdem Turribus, Virg. Æn. ii. 707, cervici imponere nostrae. So juris consultus is ‘one who lets himself be consulted in matters of law.’

§ 89. C. Tense.

A Dependent sentence following a Main Past Construction is not affected (in Tense or Mood) by the Tense of the Main Construction in the following cases.

a. When a fact contemplated in the Dependent clause as already extant continues so at the time of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Phaedo 98 b, ἀπὸ δὴ βαυμαστῆς ἀλπίδοις ψύχαιν φερόμενος, ἐπειδή ὅρῳ ἀνδρὰ τὸ μὲν νῦ ὡθεῖν χρώµενον κ.τ.λ. The fact of which Socrates had become aware was one which, with its consequence of disappointed hopes, still remained in full force at the time at which he was speaking.

Ib. 99 d, ἐδοξε τοῖνυν μοι μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἅπειρηκα τὰ δότα σκοπῶν,
The pursuit then already renounced had never since been resumed.

Apol. 21 b, ἡπόροιν τὰ ποτε λέγει. The judgment of the Oracle once uttered is regarded as remaining on record for all time.

Phaedo 88 c, ἐδόκουν ... εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν ... μὴ οὖνεν ἄξιοι εἰμὲν κροταὶ, ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἀπίστα ἢ. There are here two Dependent clauses: the former, expressing a transitory contingency, is affected by the Main Construction and thrown into Oratio Obliqua; the second, expressing a hypothetical fact which if verified must be permanent, is not affected.

Tim. 32 c, ἔννεστησεν ὁ ἐνστᾶς ... τάδε διανοηθεὶς, πρῶτον μὲν ἴνα ... τέλεον ... εἶ, ... ἔτι δὲ ἴνα ἁγίον καὶ ἁγιον ἢ.

Cf. Iysias i. 6. p. 92, ἐπειδὴ ... γυναῖκα ἲγαγόμην ... ἐφύλαττον ... ἐπειδὴ δὲ μοι παθίδιον γίγνεται κ.τ.λ.

§ 90. β. When the event contemplated as future in the Dependent clause is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Apol. 17 a, ἔλεγον, ὡς χρήν ἴμας εὑλαβείσθαι μὴ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξαιτηθῆτε —because the deception threatened was to be looked for in the speech which was now but begun.

Smyr. 193 c, πάντως ἐν ἐφοβοῦμην, μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων ... νῦν δὲ ὁμοὶ βαρῷ. At the moment at which this is said, the point of time when the contingency of ἀπορήσαι will be decided is still future.

Apol. 29 c, ἔφη ... λέγων πρὸς ἴμας ὡς, εἰ διαφευγόμην, ἤδη ἐν ἴμον οἱ νεῖσι διαφθαρόμενοι. The reason why διαφευγόμην is affected by the Oratio Obliqua, though equally future with διαφθαρόμενοι which remains unaffected, is that the Protasis describes an event purely hypothetical, not one assumed as about to happen at all. εἰ διαφευγόμαι would have implied an assumption that Socrates would be acquitted.

Smyr. 198 b, ἐνθυμούμενοι ὅτι οὖν οἷος τῇ ἔσομαι ... οὐθέν καλὸν εἴπειν, ὑπ’ αἰσχύνης ὁλίγον ἄποδρας φίλομην. He has still the task before him, and still the feeling that he will be unequal to it.

Hb. 198 c, προηγηθῇ γάρ, ὡς έικέν, ὅπως ἐκαστός ἴμων τὸν Ἐρωτα ἐγκομιάζειν δόξει.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 85. p. 254, ἀ νῦν οὖντος ἔφη συμβῆσεσθαι, εἰ安东尼 εὐο στεφανώμαι.
§ 91. The use of this construction is in Plato so carefully restricted to the cases just specified, that it would be unjustifiable to confound it with the simple irregular recurrence to the Oratio Recta, which is so common in other writers.

Symp. 190 c, ἐβουλεύοντο δ' τι χρή αὐτοῖς ποιήσαν would be an exception to the rule, if χρή were an ordinary Verb.

The rule seems to hold in Homer, II. v. 127, Od. iii. 15, and v. 23, and viii. 44, and xiii. 417, &c. Nitzsch (on Od. iii. 76) denies that the principle here pointed out is the true one. He points out two passages, II. v. 567 and xv. 596, as refuting it. But in both these (1) the reading varies between Optative and Conjunctive, and (2) in both two purposes are mentioned, so that if the Conjunctive is the right reading it may well have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing the nearer and the remoter purpose.

§ 92. b. Imperfect Tense used for the Oratio Obliqua of the 'Prophetic Present.'

Symp. 190 c, οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείναιεν εἶχον . . . , αἳ τιμαί γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἵππα τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἥφανίζετο—where, just as οὐκ εἶχον is the Oblique Narration of the thought οὐκ ἔχων, 'they could not, they thought,' so ἥφανίζετο represents them thinking αἳ τιμαί ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ. ἅφανιζεται. Νυν ἥφανιζεται would have been a 'Prophetic Present,' and so ἥφανίζετο is the Oblique Narration of this.

Cf. Antipho ii. A. β. 9, p. 117, ἀλοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν τῆς μὲν οὗσις ἤδειν ἐκστησόμενος, τῆς δὲ πόλεως καὶ τοῦ σώματός οὕτω ἐστεροῦμεν—'I felt I could not be.' Andoc. i. 58–60, p. 8, φονεῖς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγνώμην κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα σκοπῶν εὕρισκον κ.τ.λ.—where the σκοπῶν shews that ἐγνώμην means 'I felt I was on the way to become.'

§ 93. c. Aorist.

a. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the construction in which it stands.

Phdr. 249 α, αἳ δὲ ἄλλαι, ὅταν . . . τελευτήσωσιν, κράσεως ἔτυχον.

Gorg. 484 α, ἐὰν . . . φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἄνηρ, . . . ἐπαναστάσαν ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος.

Phileb. 17 d, ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένουσα σοφός.

Lysis 217 d, ὅταν δὲ τὸ γῆρας αὐταῖς ταύτων τοῦτο χρώμα ἐπαγάγη, τότε ἐγένοντο . . . λευκάι.

The Subjunctive construction with αὔ, not admissible with a past
Tense, constrains us to see in the Aorist the expression of an action instantaneously complete, rather than of an action necessarily past.

§ 94. β. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the context.

Phaedo 88 d, πον ὑπεράτης μετήλθε τῶν λόγων; lit. 'overtook' (same metaphor as 89 e, εἰ... μὲ διαφέρειν [Hermann from first hand of Oxon.]). Cf. Pind. Ol. vi. 62, μετάλατσέν τέ μν. Antipho ii. A. a. 3. p. 118, ἕως ἄν διωχθῆ, 'until he is caught.'

Ib. 108 c, ἢ μὲν] φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῆν πρόπουσαν οἴκησιν: ἢ δὲ... φιλεῖ τὸν αὐτῆν ἑκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα—'the good soul, without a moment of suspense, or sensible lapse of time, 'at once finds a home in' &c.

Symp. 172 a, οὖσος, οὐ περιμένεις; Καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστᾶ θερμέμενα—not 'waited for him to come up with me,' but 'let him come up with me.'

Ib. 173 b, τί οὖν οὐ δειγμάτω μοι; Saine phrase Protag. 310 a, 'why not at once relate it to me?' So Phaedo 86 d, Soph. 251 c, &c.

Cf. Arist. Vesp. 213, Τί οὐκ ἀπεκομισθῆμεν;

Symp. 209 a, ἄν θυμίζω προσήκει καὶ κύησαι καὶ κνεῖν. κυήσαι is the first moment of the state κνεῖν.

Hence Apol. 21 c, 22 d, ἐδοξεῖ, ἐδοξεῖν, 'I came to think.'

§ 95. D. Impersonal Verbs.

Impersonal Verbs in the same rigid form as in Latin do not exist in Greek. Even those which express the processes of inanimate nature, as ἐνε, νιφέε, ἔσεσε (Thuc. iv. 52), are only impersonal in that particular use, and not always so even then.

We find, however, in addition to these,

§ 96. a. Passive Impersonals (the nearest approach in Greek to strict Impersonals).

Phdr. 232 a, οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτῶς πεπόνηται.

Ib. 261 b, λέγεται τε καὶ γραφεται.

Politic. 299 a, δὲν δὲ ἄν καταψηφισθῇ.

Legg. 914 a, δηλωθέντων (Genitive Absolute).

§ 97. b. Quasi-Impersonals (as we may call them), where a vague Nominative, such as 'the circumstances,' 'the event,' 'the course of events,' is understood. The common words ἐνδέχεται, παρέχει (Thuc. iv. 85 &c.), the phrase οὖσος ἐχεῖ, &c., are such cases. We do not know always whether the vague understood Nominative is Plural or Singular, except where the Verb is represented by a periphrasis
§ 98. In the next instance, we find an Impersonal clause representing the Verb.

Tim. 24 e, εἰ δὲ ἐπιθατῶν ἐπὶ τᾶς ἄλλας νῖσους . . . ἐγένετο.

§ 99. In the following instances we find an Adjective or Participle in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Phileb. 20 c, προὶδν δ' ἐτὶ σαφέστερον δείξει—'the sequel of the argument will make this yet clearer.'

Phaedo 117 b, καὶ οὗτως αὐτὸ ποιῆσει—'the agent left to itself will complete its work.' There is delicacy in the vagueness with which both the deadly agent and its effect are designated.

Theaet. 200 c, ὁ τῶν ποταμῶν καθηγούμενος ἐφη ἃρα δείξειν αὐτῷ. A man who goes first through a stream, if asked, "How deep is it?", says, "How can I tell beforehand? we shall see." From this passage we gather that the expression was in popular use.

Critias 108 c, τούτῳ μὲν οὖν οἷὸν ἔστω, αὐτὸ σοὶ τάχα δηλώσει.
Hip. Ma. 288 b, ὅτι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσει εὖ οἶδα· εἰ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγελαστος αὐτῷ δεῖξει—'we shall see by the event.'

Protag. 324 a, αὐτῷ σε διδάξει.

Ib. 329 b, ἱκάνος μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δῆλοι.

§ 100. Cf. Hdt. v. 78, δῆλοι δὲ οὐ κατ' ἐν μούνον, ἄλλα πανταχῇ, ἡ ἰσηγορία δὲ ἔστι χρήμα σπονδαίων, τῷ 86, οὗτε μέμιμαι τό πρήγμα, οὗτε με περιφέρει οὕδεν εἰδέναι τούτων τῶν ὑμεῖς λέγετε. Ἀξε. Choe. 993, Φίλων πέως, νῦν δ' ἔχθρον, ὡς φαίνει, κακών ('as the event shews.') Ἀξε. Χι. 420 ο. 6, ὡς αὐτῷ τούργον ἐδείξεν. Αντιφ. ν. 60. p. 136, αὐτῷ μοι πρόβασιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει ἀποκτείναι τῶν ἀνδρ. Lysias x. 20. p. 118, δηλώσει δε' (sc. id quod sequitur δηλώσει) οἰχήσεται γάρ.

§ 101. We find also Non-impersonal sentences on the model of some of the foregoing, e. g.

Crat. 393 ε, τὸ δύναμα, ὁ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν δηλώσει κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 402 c, τοῦτο γε (τὸ δύναμα) ὄλγον αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 237 b, καὶ μάλιστα γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτός ἢν δηλώσεις.


§ 102. E. Intransitive use of Verbs Transitive.

Some Verbs Transitive recede, in particular significations, into Intransitive Verbs. At the same time, they do not cease to be Active; neither do they become strictly Reflexive. This happens in two cases.

§ 103. a. When that, to which the action was originally represented as passing on, is, or comes to be regarded as, a part of the Agent; and when further the mention of it can be dropped without marring the sense. *ἐχειν, in several of its senses, exemplifies this process.

From ἐχειν governing an Accusative of part of the Subject we have, e. g. Hom. Od. xix. 38, κιόνες ὑψό' ἐχουσε—'holding,' properly not themselves, but their heads, or, vaguely, parts of themselves, aloft. So Hdt. i. 181, ἀνάβασις εἰς αὐτοῖς ἔχωθεν κύκλῳ περὶ πάντας τοὺς πύργους ἐχουσα πεποίηται—where ἐχουσα has for its Object each part of the ἀνάβασις in succession.

From ἐχειν governing an Accusative of that which comes to be regarded as part of the Subject, we have e. g. Od. iii. 182, αὐτῷ ἔγωγε Πώλονδ' ἐχον—'held my ship on her course for Pylos;'—the
ship, as following the will of her captain, is, when we are speaking of his movements, virtually part of him; —whence simply 'I held on for Pylos.'

On the other hand, in the following passage κατέχειν has for its Object that which is literally a part of the Subject.

Phædo 117 e, έιδοί ' ἦσαν κατέχειν τό μὴ διακρινεῖν—' to keep themselves,—but properly those parts of themselves which had to do with the particular affection in question.

So again the common ἔχε δύ (Crat. 439 a, Gorg. 490 b, Lach. 198 b, Legg. 639 d) is 'hold,' scil. your foot from advancing—your tongue from speaking—your thoughts from running on—(as the case may be).

Gorg. 475 d, τῷ λόγῳ δισπερ λατρῶ παρέχων—' offering,' not strictly oneself, but the particular limb or part needing treatment.

§ 104. Other examples in Plato are
Rep. 388 e, έταν τις έφι μεγίτωρ γέλωτι. So 563 a, έυγαθίεια.
Ib. 422 c, άναστρέφειν. So Lach. 191 e.
Ib. 467 b, άμαλαζεόν.
Ib. 473 b, μεταβάλειν.
Ib. 540 a, 591 c, παρακινεῖν. So 573 c, ύποκινεῖν.
Phædo 65 a, έγγύς τι τείνειν τού τεθύναν.
Ib. 98 d, χαλώντα καί ξυπούντα τά νεύρα.
Phdr. 228 e, παύε. Jelf instances this also in Hom. Od. i. 340, iv. 659. [In Od. i. 340 the reading seems doubtful.]
Politic. 258 a, θεωρήτω. . . . έννέμεξα.
Phædo 72 b, ει τό καταδραθεῖν μεν εἰγ, τό δ' άνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνατοδοδόν—lit. (as we might say) 'put in an appearance on the other side.'

§ 105. This Intransitive use of these Verbs becomes so natural, that, after it is established, when in particular cases it is convenient that the Object should be expressed, it is expressed in the Dative.

E.g. Il. xxiii. 686, ἀνασχομένω χερώ στριβαρην. The language had been accustomed to ἀνασχέσθαι Intransitive for holding up the hands; so that when, in order to characterise the hands, the poet desires to express the Object, it falls more naturally into the Dative.

So Od. ix. 489, 'ἐμβάλειν κώπης—ἐμβάλειν being used alone, e.g. in Aristoph. Ran. 206, for 'dashing in the oars.' (An erroneous interpretation of this last passage arises from neglect of the principle we are noticing.)

So Od. x. 140, ἦν κατηγαγόμενα.
§ 106. b. When the Accusative of the Object, not being in any way referable to the Agent, is nevertheless so natural a sequence to the Verb, that the Verb itself will suggest it if omitted.

Symp. 196 d, πειρατεύω μή ἐλλείπει—'to fall short'—lit. 'to leave a deficiency of so much in a given quantity.'

Phdr. 237 d, θέμενοι ὄρον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀποθέοντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα, ἀναφέροντες, 'referring,' scil. our assertions and reasonings.

Gorg. 512 e, ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ—'entrusting,' scil. the decision.

§ 107. Some uses of ἔχειν illustrate this process also.

We find, Thuc. iii. 89, τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων—there is no need to express what they pervaded or occupied, since σεισμοὶ (so used) must be σεισμοὶ τῆς γῆς. Or when ἔχειν is used of an army occupying a position, the Verb alone suffices to express this. And (as we have seen in the parallel case) so fixed may this use become, that when the position occupied needs to be expressed, another construction is found for it; cf. Thuc. iii. 34, ἐν διανείκασματι εἶχον so viii. 28. Similarly a general moving his army is said ἔγειν, without any Object expressed: whence the next step is that the whole army, which strictly ἔγεισα, is said ἔγειρε—cf. Thuc. v. 54, Ἄργειοι δ' ἔγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσέβαλον. [So Arnold: ἐσέβαλλον Poppo and Gäller].

§ 108. This is the account of a variation, which might else be taken merely for one of government:—

Phedo 58 e—59 a, ὅπερ γὰρ ὅσιον βασιλέα παράγοντα μὲ ἀυθρόν ἐπιτηδεύον ἔλεος εἰσῆλθε... διὰ δὴ τούτα οὐδὲν πάντως μοι ἔλεεν ἄλλης ἐισῆλθε. An emotion may be said either to enter the person himself (as in ἔλεος με εἰσῆλθε), or to enter his soul; but in this case if the reference to the person be made clear the mention of the soul may be spared; that is, the Verb becomes Intransitive, and is followed by a Dative of the person (as in the latter sentence of the passage quoted).

§ 109. F. Uses of the Participle.

a. Periphrastically, with Auxiliary Verb Substantive.

Politic. 273 b, πολλῆς ὡς μετέχον ἄναξιας.

Ib. 274 c, εἶναι γεγονός. 289 a, ἦν ὃν τεθέν. 308 c, ἐστὶ τείνοντα.

Tim. 38 c, ἔστιν ὁλ. 68 d, ἣγγικώς ὁν εἰ. 77 e, εἰ ὁ αἰῶν ὁμοιομενον.
§ 110. β. Peculiar Intransitive use of ἐχων with Verbs.

Euthyd. 295 c, ἐχων φλιαρείς.
Phdr. 236 e, τί δήτα ἐχων στρέφει;

§ 111. IDIOMS OF PREPOSITIONS.

'Ανά.

In Composition.

Phaedo 87 a, ἀνατίθημαι. Of withdrawing any deed or word. Not a metaphor from draughts particularly, though capable of being so applied—as in


'Από.

Of the use of the bodily members.

Rep. 613 b, δράσαν ὁπερ οἱ δρομῆς ὃσου ἀν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἂνῳ μή—'who run fairly with their legs, but with the upper part of their bodies (head, neck, arms) in bad form.'

(Even supposing that κάτω could refer to the starting point and ἂνῳ to the turning point, which can scarcely be supported by instances, the absolute use of τὰ κάτω and τὰ ἂνῳ in this meaning is inconceivable.)

Legg. 795 b, ὁ τελέως παγκράτιον ἡσκήκως . . . οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἀπεικότος ἐστὶ μάχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 656, λόγισαι φαύλως μὴ ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἀπὸ χειρός.

§ 112. Διά.

a. With Accusative; 'by help of.' This is the use so common afterwards in the Orators.

Rep. 352 e, ἐνὶ τῷ αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, . . . δὲ ἢν ἐπράξαν ἃ ἐπράξαν.

b. With Genitive.

Phaedo 82 e, τὴν ψυχήν . . . ἀναγκαζομένην . . . σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ἄντα . . . μὴ αὐτὴν δὲ αὐτῆς—′acting only by and through itself,' independently of anything external to itself.

So Rep. 510 b, αὐτοῖς εἰδεσί δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιομένη, and similarly 511.
§§ 113—115.] PREPOSITIONS. 169


Rep. 463 e, εἰ ὄνοματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φθέγγοντο.

Ib. 580 b, ὃ διὰ πάντων κριτῆς ἀποφαίνεται—‘the paramount judge decides absolutely.’ An ordinary sense of διὰ πάντων, beginning with Homer.

Meno 74 a, τὴν μίαν, ὃ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστὶ—‘which is out beyond all these,’ i. e. ‘which all these run up to,’ ‘which is paramount to all these.’

Rep. 343 b, διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας—‘night after night and day after day.’

Ib. 621 a, πορεύεσθαι διὰ καῦματός τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ.

Symp. 220 b, ἀνυπόθετος διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ἐπορεύετο. This use of διὰ in prose is unique: see Bernhardy’s Syntax, p. 234. It obtains in poetry, beginning with Homer’s διὰ νήσου ίων in Od. xii. 335. Is its employment in the text intended for the sake of grandiloquence?

c. In Composition.

Symp. 221 b, διαπορεύεσθαι, and Critias 106 a, διαπορεία—of traversing a certain interval of space between two defined points, —‘doing the distance.’ Cf. διαβείν, Protag. 335 e.

§ 113. Eīs.

a. Of progress along or in a certain route.

Phædo 114 b, φέροντα . . . εἰς τούς ποταμοὺς—not ‘into’ but ‘along’ or ‘down’ the rivers. 9

§ 114. β. ‘To the number of.’

Legg. 704 b, ἀπέχει θαλάττης εἰς τινας ὁγιοθοκοῦντα σταδίους.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 124, ἀλίγου εἰς χιλίους. So Xenophon and Demosth.

§ 115. γ. ‘In regard to,’ ‘in the point of,’ ‘with a view to.’

Symp. 184 b, εὑρεγετούμενος εἰς χρήματα.

Ib. d, ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ξυμβάλ-λεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παιδεὺσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτάσθαι.

Ib. 196 c, εἰς γε ἀνδρίαν “Ἐρωτε αὐθέντα” Ἀρης ἀνθίσταται.

Ib. 219 d, ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ οἶον ἐγὼ οὐκ ἄν ὄμην ποτὲ ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρπερίαν.

Theæt. 169 a, ἰκανὸν ἐαυτοῦ εἰς ἀστρονομίαν.

9 [Under this example is in the MS. “Cf. Odyss.”]
Theot. 178 e, το περὶ λόγου πιθανόν έκάστο τοις τοις νόμοις μεταξύ ἤ τοις ρηματον οὐσίσκοιν;
Legg. 635 a, ἐστὶ ταῦτα οὕτως, εἰς ἄ κα καὶ μηδὲν γε ἁνὴς ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ήμῶν.

Euthyd. 305 d, τὰ νικηθήρα εἰς δοξαν οἴσεσθαι οὐσίας πέρι.

§ 116. Ἐκ.
a. Euthyd. 282 a, ἐκ παυτὸς τρόπου παρασκενίζεσθαι.
b. Apol. 23 a, ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μελητὸς μοι ἐπέδετο—'hereupon:' the notion is of sequence of time rather than consequence.

§ 117. Ἐν.
a. 'In the point of.'
Rep. 402 d, ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα—'agreeing in their aspect.'
Symp. 213 c, νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπους.
Theot. 206 a, τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ὁψεὶ διαγεγραμμέναι πειράμενοι.
b. Adverbially compounded.
Gorg. 457 b, ἐμβραχύ. Cf. the form καθεῖς in St. John viii. 9, εἰπρ-χοντο εἰς καθεῖς.

§ 118. Ἐπὶ.
a. With Dative;—'in connection with'—signifying a more material connection than it signifies with the Genitive.
Rep. 376 c, ἐστι δὲ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστικῆ, ἡ δ’ ἐπὶ ψυχῆ μυστικῆ.
Ib. 408 b, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτως τήν τέχνην δείν εἶναι.
Ib. 532 c, ἐπὶ ἀδυνάμια βλέπετων.
Symp. 186 a, [Ἐρώς] οὐ μονὸν ἐστίν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Ib. 184 c, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθήναι οὐδὲν ισχύρων.
Ib. 186 b, ἄλλος μὲν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑμεινῷ Ὕρως ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νυσώδει.
Ib. 210 a, τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὄτου σόματι.
Ibid. b, τὸ ἐπὶ εἶδει καλῶν.
Soph. 247 d, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτως ἁμα καὶ ἐπὶ ἐκείνως ἐξιμιφυές γεγονός.
Politic. 310 a, ἐπὶ τούτως ὅτι τοῦτ’ εἶναι τέχνη φάρμακον.
§§ 119—122.] PREPOSITIONS.

Tim. 48 e, ἵκαν ἂν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν λεχθεῖσιν.  
Cf. Andoc. i. 25. p. 4, τῶν φευγόντων ἐπὶ τοὺς μυστηρίους.

§ 119. b. Adverbially compounded.  
Legg. 697 c, ἐπὶ ἑκέρουν.  

§ 120. c. In Composition.  
Crito 43 c, ἐπιλύεται—'exempts.' Perhaps the meaning of ἐπὶ is 'with a further result' or 'condition,' and so ἐπιλύεσθαι would be to obtain a man’s release, under the condition of a ransom to be paid. Similarly would ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι be 'to announce so as to bind oneself in time to come,' and so 'to offer,' 'promise.'  
Symp. 172 a, ἐπιστάσις περιέμεινα. ἐπιστήμων is to stop in the course of progress from one point to another. ἰστήνωσ is to stop, without any reference to moving again. So ἐπιλέγοντο is to pick out, e.g. in passing along a line. ἐπιστάσις περιέμεινα is equivalent to the one word ἐπέμεινα. For ἐπιμένειν see under πέρι, § 127.  
Phædo 62 c, ὁ Σωκράτης... ἐπιθέλεσα πρὸς ἡμᾶς. From the notion of succession here again we should get 'looking [from Cebes] to us,'—'turning to us.' Cf. Apol. 31 d, ἐπικωμφδῶν.

§ 121. Kata.  
a. With Accusative.  
Legg. 918 a, ἐπεταὶ κατὰ πόδα—'in close succession.'  
Soph. 243 d, κατὰ πόδα γε, ὡς θεαίνητε, ὑπελαβές—'you have caught at once the train of the thought.' This is of course a pregnant use of the Preposition, implying κατὰ πόδα ἐπόμενος.  
b. With Genitive, in Attributive sense.  
Meno 74 b, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων.  
Pl. 76 a, κατὰ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω.  
Pl. 77 a, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι.  
Phædo 70 d, μὴ τοῖνυν κατ’ ἀνθρώπων σκόπεται μόνον τούτο—'consider this not as an attribute of mankind only.' The κατὰ, in a pregnant use, stands for ὡς κατ’ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενον.  
Phdr. 260 b, συντιθεῖς λόγον ἐπανοῦ κατὰ τοῦ ὀνοῦ.

§ 122. c. In Composition.  
a. Symp. 219 c, καταδιαφθάνεῖν—'to earn by sleeping.'  
b. Of doing a thing without regard to other considerations.
Apol. 33 e, οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδειθεῖν—implying the request to be unprincipled or arbitrary.

Legg. 861 b, δόου δὲ οὐδένα λόγου ὡς ὄρθως εἴρηκε, κατανομοθείσει.

Cf. Lysias vi. 3. p. 103, ἡ κατελείψαι ἡ καταχαρίσασθαι Ἀνδροκίδη.

Isaeus vii. 38. p. 67, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀποδοῦναι τὰ ὄντ᾽ αὐτῷ κατα-

ναγκάσασθαι—‘peremptorily compelling.’

This κατά often, but not always or necessarily (see the last in-

stance), gives an unfavourable meaning to the word.

§ 123. Μέχρι.

Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 487 e, μέχρι ὅπου.

§ 124. Παρά.

a. With Accusative.

a. Soph. 242 a, παρὰ πόδα μετὰ ζαλῶν ἐμαυτόν.


β. Apol. 36 a, οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον—literally, ‘up to so little’ dif-

ference from the other quantity compared, i. e. so near it.

γ. In Comparison; signifying not ‘beyond’ but ‘contrasted

with’ (lit. ‘put coordinate with’).

Phdr. 276 e, παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδίων.

Theaet. 144 a, ἀνθρέιον παρ' ὄντινοιν.

For other instances see Idioms of Comparison, § 174. Cf. Thuc. v.

90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαμον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε.

b. With Dative.

Rep. 366 b, κἀ παρὰ θεοὶ κἀ παρ' ἀνθρώπωσ πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν—

‘our dealings both with gods and with men will be what we

desire.’

Symp. 188 d, ὁ περὶ τάγαθα μετὰ σωφροσύνης . . . ἀποτελούμενος καὶ

παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοὶ ["Ερως"]—‘temperance exercised in deal-

ings between ourselves (men) and with the gods.’

§ 125. c. With Genitive ;—‘obtained from’ or ‘proceeding from,’

—of a sentiment or opinion.

Legg. 733 a, τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρή λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν.

Soph. 226 d, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμὸς τις.

Legg. 692 b, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν γεγονόκεκαθαί ταῦτα . . . οὖθεν σοφών—

‘that these things should receive recognition from us.’

Crat. 412 e, παρὰ πολλῶν ὄμολογεῖται.
§§ 126, 127.] PREPOSITIONS. 173

Politics. 296 a, λόγον τὸν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον.
Critias 107 b, τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν ῥηθέντα.
Protag. 312 b, ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.
Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακλείεσις τῷ ἐρώτητι παρὰ πάντων θανμαστῇ. (παρὰ πάντων follows παρακλείεσις.)
Cf. Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογουμένως ταῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει.

§ 126. In the remaining instances the Preposition has a pregnant force: that is, the fact that an opinion or sentiment is referred to is left to be understood from the παρὰ.

Rep. 362 c, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον.
Ib. 461 e, βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.
Ib. 612 c, χωρίον ... δοσοῦ τε καὶ οἰκους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν.
Ibid. d, ὁστερ ἐξει δόξης καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων.
Tim. 52 d, οἰκοτ ... παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς ψῆφου λογισθεῖς εἰν κεφαλαίῳ δεδόθει λόγος.
With this use of παρὰ cf. that of πρὸς, Hdt. iii. 137, ἢν φιλή πρὸς Δαρείου εῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐωτοῦ δόκιμοι. Antiphon i. 25. p. 114, καὶ γὰρ ἂν δικαίωτερον καὶ δισιώτερον καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένοιτο ὑμῖν.

§ 127. Περὶ.

10 With Dative—‘in the sphere of,’ literally.

Protag. 314 a, ὃρα μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλότατοι κυβεῦσι τε καὶ κυνονεῖσι.
Phædo 114 d, θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτῷ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα. The feeling is represented as locally watching over its object.

d. In Composition.

Phædo 59 c, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρὸς ... εἴπε περιμένειν, καὶ μὴ πρότερον παρεῖναι κ.τ.λ. The meaning of περιμένειν will be elucidated by distinguishing it from ἐπιμένειν. ἐπιμένειν is to stop in the course of a progress from one point to another until somebody comes or something happens. The ἐπὶ, as in ἐπιστῆναι, is local, and it also presumes that the progress is to be resumed. It answers to the Latin præstolari. περιμένειν is to defer any intended proceeding, to remain in statu quo, until

10 [In the MS. the uses of περὶ with the Dative are lettered b., its uses in Composition d. Apparently uses with the Accusative and the Genitive were to have come in, lettered a. and c.]
a certain future moment. The περί has reference simply to the lapse of the interval of time. Hence περιμένω here is 'to wait a certain time,' which time is specified in the next words. ἐπιμένειν would be unsuitable, as the admission of the visitors into the prison could hardly be regarded as a continuation of their walk to the prison.

Symp. 172 a, ὁ Φαληρεύς, ἔφη, οὗτος Ἀπολλόδωρος, οὐ περιμένεις; Κἀγὼ ἐπιστάσ περιμένεια. Here the addition of the local ἐπιστάσ in the second sentence shows that περιμένειν is not local. οὐ περιμένεις; 'wait a moment' is more civil than 'wait there.'

§ 128. Ἰ. 

a. With Accusative. Pregnant force;—i.e. not 'for' but 'in regard of fitness for': in other words, the Preposition is related to the sentence, in which it stands, not immediately, but through the medium of an unexpressed clause.

Phaedo 117 b, τι λέγεις περί τοῦτο τοῦ πόματος, πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τω;—'what sayest thou as to this draught admitting of a libation to a deity?' lit. 'in regard of its fitness for a libation.'

Protag. 328 b, νοῆσαι τω, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι—'to notice a person [favourably] in regard of his fitness for becoming' &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνίσαν ἄλεις ἑπάνων θαυμάσιον ἔκοπτες πρὸς ὀδήλειαν.

Legg. 757 c, νέμει τιμᾶς μεῖζον μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἄει μεῖζον. k.t.l.

Phaedo 69 a, ἢ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ—lit. 'right in regard of fitness for making men good.'

Rep. 581 e, ἀμφιαξηκτοῦντα ἐκάστοτο τοῦ εἴδους αἰ ἡδονᾶ... πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἰσχρον ζῆν.

b. With Dative.

Phaedo 112 e, ἰανατες γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφιτέροις τοῖς μείμασι τὸ ἐκάτερωθεν γίνεσται μέρος. [So Oxon.]

Ib. 84 c, πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν—'absorbed in.'


§ 129. c. In Composition with a Verb πρὸς sometimes has the general meaning of 'additionally,' and therefore rather qualifies the whole sentence than unites with the Verb, and does not affect in any way the meaning of the Verb.

Rep. 521 d, δεὶ ὁ ἥρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχεσθε τὸ μάθημα—'to have in addition.'

Ib. 607 b, προσεπομεν δὲ αὐτῇ—'and let us say to her moreover.'
Theaet. 208 e, τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ—‘apprehends in addition its difference from other things.’ So 209 d, προσδοξάσαι.

Apol. 20 a, σφίσαι ἔννεινα χρήματα διδόντας, καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι.

Phædo 74 a, τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἵννοεῖν.

Gorg. 516 d, Θεμιστοκλέα ταύτα ταύτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσέγ-μισσαν.

§ 130. Ὑπέρ.

‘With a view to.’

Phædo 107 c, ἐπιμελείας δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τοῦτον μόνον ἐν ὁ καλοίμεν τὸ ζῆν.

Protag. 318 d, εἰπτὶ τῷ νεανίσκῃ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦτον ἐρωτώντα.

Cf. Lysias xii. 78. p. 127, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀποθανόντος Θηραμένου ἄλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ πονηρίας.

§ 131. Ὑπό.

a. Adverbially compounded.

Phdr. 242 d, ὑπὸ τί αἰτηθῇ [λόγον]—‘somewhat impious.’

Gorg. 493 c, ὑπὸ τί ἀτόπα.

b. In Composition.

a. ὑπολογίζεσθαι.

Apol. 28 d, Crito 48 d, Phdr. 231 b.

Similarly,

Protag. 349 c, ἔφογε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι.

Lach. 189 b, λέγ’ οὖν μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέρων ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος. Note, that ὑπολογίζεσθαι is not restricted to an unfavourable sense; cf. Lysias xxx. 16. p. 184, οὐδὲν εἰκὸς αὐτῷ ὑπὸλογον γενέσθαι [so Bekker; οὐδένα . . . τοῦτον Zurich editors]—where αὐτῷ means ‘in his favour,’ and xxviii. 13. p. 180, οὐδὲ ἀδίκος τούτως φημὶ ἄν εἶναι ὑπόλογον τὴν ἐκείνων φυγήν,—not, as Taylor, ‘honestam excusationem in suo exsilio habere,’ but ‘non injuria iis laudi imputandum.’

The word does not mean ‘to subtract,’ according to our notion of the operation; but ‘to reckon against,’ ‘per contra’ :—the same meaning of ὑπὸ which we get in ὑπαντῆν, ὑπωμοσία (‘an affidavit to stop’ proceedings), ὑποτιμᾶσθαι (equivalent to ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι).

B. ὑποτίμειν.

Rep. 372 d, μετρίως ὑποτίμωντες.
§ 132. IDIOMS OF PARTICLES.

A. Kaí expletive,—preceding and indicating the emphatic word.

a. In Relative Interrogative or Conditional sentences. Here kai may generally be rendered ‘at all.’

Phædo 77 b, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι—‘before it came at all.’

Ib. 88 a, πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς—‘before we came into being at all.’

Ib. 110 a, ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ἔ—‘exists at all.’

Apol. 22 a, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γίγνοτο. Here καὶ fastens itself to the latter portion of the compound ἀνέλεγκτος—not to be called in question at all.’

Phædo 66 d, εἶν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται.

Ib. 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην—‘if I even had had the knowledge.’

Ib. 110 b, εἰ δει καὶ μιθὸν λέγειν καλῶν—‘if it is allowable to narrate a fiction at all.’

Cf. Thuc. i. 15, ἰδεῖν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγίνετο.

This καὶ frequently enters into a set phrase with the Adjective σμικρὸς.

Apol. 28 b, ὅπου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὑφελός ἔστιν.

Soph. 247 c, εἰ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἔθελουσι συγχωρεῖν.

Ib. 261 b, θαρρέων χρῆ τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν τι δυνάμενον.

Phileb. 58 a, ξύμπανται ὅσοι νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρθηται.

Politic. 278 d, πῶς ... δύνατ’ ἂν τις ἄρχημεν ἀπὸ δόξης ψευδοῦς ἐπὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ σμικρὸν μέρος ἀφικόμενος κτήσασθαι φρόνησιν;

The remaining passages shew the καὶ entering into Interrogative phrases.

Euthyphro 3 a, τι καὶ ποιοῦτά σε φησί διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;

Ib. 6 b, τι γὰρ καὶ φήμομεν;

Phædo 61 c, τι γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοὶ ἄλλο;

Laches 184 d, τι γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοὶ;

Perhaps it is better to say that the key to these passages is e. g. Thuc. ii. 11, ὅσκουν χρῆ, εἰ τῷ καὶ δοκοῦμεν πληθεὶ ἐπιέναι, τούτου ἐνεκα ἀμελεστερὼν τι παρεσκευαζόμενους χωρεῖν—‘if any one considers that we are a numerous force, as we are,’—or rather ‘if we are a numerous force, which it might strike any one we were.’ So Arist. Eth. Nic. V. xv. 9, εἰς & δὴ βλέπονσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν—‘upon this view there is, what we are inclined to think there is, injury of oneself.’
There is a latent affirmation in a simple Interrogative sentence with τι. The καί neutralises this affirmation. 'What have you done?' implies that you have done something: the first instance above shews how this implication is neutralised. It is not so with πώς καί, ποῦ καί, &c., where the καί affirms the implied Proposition: Ἀesch. Choeph. 528, Πῶς καί τελευτᾷ...άλογος; 'what was the issue?' —implying expectation of one. [Dindorf with the MSS. reads Καί ποί. Cf. however Eurip. Phæn. 1354, Πῶς καί πέπρακται διπτύχου παίδων φῶνος;]

β. In Affirmative Independent sentences. Here the force of καί is often difficult to render by a word, but it seems to be always identical with the emphasis.

Phileb. 23 a, παντάπασιν ἀν τίνα καὶ ἀπομιᾶν σχοῖνη.
Euthyd. 304 e, οὕτωσι γὰρ πως καὶ εἶπε τοῖς ὄνομασί.
Rep. 328 c, διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐωράκεν αὐτῶν.
Ib. 395 e, πολλόν καί δείσομεν. This phrase often recurs.

Symp. 177 a, φάναι δὴ πάντας καὶ βούλεσθαί.
Ibid. b, καί τούτο μὲν ήττον καὶ διάμαστον—where Stallbaum well compares Thuc. vi. 1, ἥ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπέδειντο, but wrongly joins καί, both there and here, with the Adverb. [So Stallbaum, but his reference is wrong. He seems to mean Thuc. iv. 1, where the old editions have ἥ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπετίθεντο, Poppo and Gyller with most of the MSS. ἥ καί μᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο.]

Phædo 107 c, ο δ κίνδυνος καί δοξεῖν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι.
Phileb. 25 b, σὺ καί ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.

§ 133. Adverbs of intensity are often thus emphasized.

Apol. 18 b, καί πάλαι πολλά ἄδη ἔτη.
Rep. 342 c, συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μᾶλα μόγις.
Symp. 189 a, ἐφ᾽ εἰσεῖν τῶν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μᾶλ' ἐπαύσατο.
Ib. 194 a, εὖ καὶ μᾶλ' ἂν φοβοῦι.
Phædo 117 b, καὶ μᾶλα ὑλεῖς. Ibid. c, καὶ μᾶλα εὐχέρων.
Protag. 315 d, οἰρώμασι καὶ μᾶλα πολλῶν.
Legg. 832 a, καὶ μᾶλ' ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἀφθεῖς ὑπάτας.
Phædo 61 c, καὶ γὰρ ἰσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδη-μεῖν διασκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 404 b, ἀπλῆ που καὶ ἐπιεικής γυμναστική καὶ μάλιστα ἡ περὶ τῶν πόλεμον.
§ 134. Kai is subject to Hyperbaton in this use as in others. In the foregoing examples the Kai indicates the stress laid on the word next following it: but when the word to be emphasized begins the clause the Kai is sometimes postponed.

Phaedo 63 c, ἐπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τούτων, διασχυρισάμην ἄν καὶ τοῦτο —where the Kai emphasizes διασχυρισάμην.

Ib. 68 c, ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἦν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄνομάζονσι σωφροσύνη—where the stress of Kai includes ἦν.

Gorg. 620 b, μόνος δὴ ἐγώγε καὶ ὄμην τοῖς δημηγορίαις καὶ σοφισταῖσ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ—where Kai emphasizes μόνος.

Cf. Hdt. i. 191, ἐς θῇ καὶ τὸ κάρτα ἐπίθυμοτο—i. e. (if the order allowed it) τὸ καὶ κάρτα.

§ 135. ὡς.

a. In Indicative sentences expressing a negative supposition.

Theet. 192 e, Σωκράτης ἐπιγγευόσκει . . ., ὅρα δὲ μηδετέρον—'but sees, by the supposition, neither.'

Phileb. 18 e, τούτ' αὐτὸ τοῖς ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαντεῖ πῶς ἔστιν ἐν καὶ πολλά αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα εἰδῆς ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 106 d, σχολὴ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθοράν μὴ δέχοτο. The meaning is not 'of all things that exist scarce anything could be, in such a case, exempt from corruption,' but 'there could hardly exist anything not admitting corruption.' The existence of the whole class 'incorruptible' becomes questionable.

Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὃ ἄν χάριεω ἡμᾶς ποιῇ, μὴ τι πάσας τάς ἡδονάς, ἄλλα ὃ ἄν διά τῆς ἀκοῆς—'suppose we say, not.'
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Hip. Ma. 299 d, ἄρ' ὅν ἦδον ἦδεος . . . διαφέρει τῷ ἦδον εἶναι; μή γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἦδον ἥ εἰλάτων.

Politic. 292 ε, πεπειναλ τοσοῦτοι οὖκ ἂν γένουτο ποτε, μή τι δὴ βασιλεῖς γε—'let alone kings.' Comparing this with the last instance but one, we see how the force of μή τι is enhanced by its following the clause with which it is contrasted.

Tim. 26 ε, λέγειν εἰμὶ ἑτοιμος, μή μονον ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 295 ε, μή ἐξεστῶ δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄτερα προστάτευε; ('is he to be forbidden?')

Cf. Ἀσχιν. iii. 21. p. 56, ὅτι ἢρξα, μὴ ἀποδημήσω; ('am I not to ' &c.?)

The μὴ in the Brachylogical combination μὴ ὅτι comes under this head; for instances see below, § 154.

§ 136. β. In the Deprecatory form of contradiction.

Euthyd. 294 ε, (A) οὖκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι ἀκούσαι κ.τ.λ.; (B) Μηδαμός· ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 300 α, (A) τ' δὲ; (B) Μηδέν.

Protag. 318 β, τοῦτο μὲν οὔδεν θαναστὶν λέγεις· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως.

Meno 75 α, (A) πεἰρῶ εἰπεῖν. (B) Μὴ, ἀλλὰ σὺ εἰπέ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 854, (A) οὐδος σὺ, ποι θείς; ἐπὶ καθίσκους;

(B) Μηδαμός.

§ 137. γ. In the sense of 'whether.'—For instances see above, § 61.

§ 138. δ. In the sense of 'perhaps'—from which the sense of 'whether' just mentioned flows. See above, § 59.

Euthyd. 298 ε, μὴ γὰρ, δ' Ἐκδύσημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις;—'are you perhaps not joining' &c.? i.e. 'perhaps you are not joining.'

Protag. 312 α, ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὖχ ύπολαμβάνεις—'perhaps, then, you on the contrary do not suppose.'

§ 139. Οὗ πάνω.

The universal meaning of οὗ πάνω is 'hardly,' 'scarceley.'

Theaet. 149 d, οὗ πάνω τούτο οἶδα.

Ib. 172 b, οὖχ ἂν πάνω τολμήσει φήσαι.

Symp. 180 c, οὗ πάνω διεμνάσθεν.

Ib. 204 d, οὗ πάνω ἐφην ἐτι ἐχεῖν ἐγώ προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι.
Phædo 63 a, où páṇu eὐθέως εἴθελε πείθεσθαι.
Ibid. c, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διασχυρισάμην.
Ib. 85 d, οῦ πάνυ φαίνεται ἰκανός εἰρήσθαι.
Ib. 100 a, οὐ πάνυ ἑγγχωρό.
Theet. 145 a, οὐ πάνυ ἀξίου τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.
Ib. 176 b, οὐ πάνυ ράδιον πείσαι.
Phædo 59 a, οὔδὲν πάνῳ μοι ἔλεεινώ εἰσηγεί.
Apol. 41 d, καὶ ἔγογξε τοῖς καταψηφήσαμένοις μοι καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὗ πάνῳ χαλεπάϊνῳ.
The following three instances are decisive for the meaning 'scarcely.'
Euthyphro 2 b, οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γεγρώσκο, ὧν Ἐὐθύφρον, τὸν ἄνδρα.
Protag. 331 e, οὐ πάνω οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς οὐ μοι δοκεῖσ οὐεσθαί.
Phileb. 41 a, σχέδων γὰρ τῷ ψεῦδει μὲν οὗ πάνω πονηρᾶς ἄν τις λύπασ τε καὶ ἡδονᾶς θεία, μεγάλη δὲ ἀλλή καὶ πολλή συμπιπτούσας πονηρία.
The following three are to be interpreted on the principle of Litotes.
Symp. 195 e, κρανίων, ἃ ἐστιν οὗ πάνω μαλακά—'skulls, which can hardly be said to be soft things.'
Apol. 19 a, οἴμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπῶν εἶναι, καὶ οὗ πάνῳ με λανθάνει οἷον ἐστιν—'I can hardly say I do not know.'
Ib. 41 d, καὶ ἔγογξε τοῖς καταψηφήσαμένοις μοι . . . οὗ πάνῳ χαλεπάϊνῳ —'I can scarcely say I am displeased'—'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.'

§ 140. Different is Laches 183 c, οὗ πάνω ὀλγοῦς ἐγὼ τούτων παραγένω—where πάνω goes closely with ὀλγοῖς. Quite different also are πάνω οὗ, παντάπασιν οὗ, &c.

§ 141. οὐδὲ.
The use of οὐδὲ for καὶ οὗ in the sense not of 'and not' but of 'also not' is worth pointing out in cases where the οὐδὲ qualifies specially not a Substantive (the common case) but some other Part of Speech.
Phileb. 23 b, σχεδοῦ δὲ οὐδὲ μάδιον—for σχεδοῦ δὲ καὶ οὗ μάδιον.
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Legg. 730 d, τίμως μὲν δή καὶ ὁ μὴ δὲν ἀδικών ὁ δὲ μηδ’ ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἀδικοῖσιν ἀδικεῖν πλέον ἡ διπλασίας τιμῆς ἄξιος ἐκεῖνον—'but he who beyond this does not allow' &c.

Euthyphro 15 b, μέμνησαι γάρ ποι ὃτι κ.τ.λ. ἡ οὐδε ἐμέμνησαι;—for ἡ καὶ οὐ μέμνησαι; 'or on the contrary,' lit. 'or, which is also an alternative.'

Phædo 72 a, ἵδε τοίνυν οὕτως ὃτι οὐδ’ ἀδίκως ὀρμολογήκαμεν—i. e. ἱδε τοίνυν καὶ οὕτως ὃτι οὐκ ἀδίκως ὀμ.

Crito 44 b, ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποδάνης, οὐδέ μία ἕμφαρα ἑστίν, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Taking this reading now for granted [Oxon. and one other MS. have οὖνδαμα], it will be explained by resolving the οὗδε, and attaching the καὶ to ὡς, 'since moreover the event of your death is to me not one misfortune, but' &c.

Ib. 45 a, καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τάργαύριον ἑστὶ—for καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 45 c, ἵτι δὲ οὐδὲ δίκαιον—for ἵτι δὲ καὶ οὐ δίκαιον.

Cf. Isocr. xviii. 65. p. 383, ὃτ’ οὐδ’ οὕτω μάθη ἡ χρισμική ἑστήκει, ἄλλα ἐπιστεύετο ὄμη γὰρ τάργαύριον ἑστὶ—'when, besides, it was not easy.' Ar. Eth. V. viii. 10, ἵτι δὲ οὐδὲ—for ἵτι δὲ καὶ οὐ.

§ 142. ἀλλὰ.

a. Introducing a supposed objection.

Rep. 365 c–d, we have seriatim ἀλλὰ γὰρ—ἀλλὰ δή.

Apol. 37 b–c, we have the series πότερον—ἀλλὰ—ἀλλὰ δή.

β. Introducing an instance.

Symp. 196 d—197 a, we have the series πρῶτον μὲν—καὶ μὲν δή... γε—ἀλλὰ.

§ 143. εὖβος, νῦν, αἰτίκα, πολλάκις, &c.

a. εὐδος, 'from first to last,' Phdr. 259 c.

β. νῦν, 'as the case now stands,' Crito 54 b, Apol. 38 b.

γ. αἰτίκα, 'for instance,' Theæt. 166 b, Protag. 359 e, Phdr. 235 c, Legg. 727 a, Gorg. 483 a, ὥσπερ αἰτίκα, Laches 195 b, ἕτει αἰτίκα.

δ. πολλάκις, 'perchance,' after μῆ, Protag. 361 c: after εἰ ἄρα, Phædo 60 e, Laches 179 b, 194 a, Politic. 264 b, εἰ τινῶν πολλάκις ἄρα διακήκοις, Phdr. 238 d, ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφολιπτος γένομαι. And perhaps Phædo 73 d, ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἴδων πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνειμάσθη.

e. ὅτε, 'whereas.' 'Οτ’ οὖν δὴ equivalent to ἐπειδῆ οὖν, Soph. 254 b, Tim. 69 a. Σο ὅπατε, Euthyd. 297 d, Laches 169 d.
§ 144. The remaining heads treat of Particles in combination.

B. In order to understand and to interpret certain combinations of Particles, regard must be had to the fact, that they enter simultaneously into the sentence, as it were speaking at once rather than in succession.

a. A familiar instance is the combination καὶ—δὲ, e. g.

Rep. 573 b, ἐος ἀν καθήρη σωφροσύνης, καὶ μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. The δὲ and the καὶ enter into the meaning abreast of one another.

§ 145. b. Καὶ μέντοι only differs from καὶ—δὲ in that the μέντοι is stronger than the δὲ, and that the two Particles are not necessarily separated by the intervention of other words.

Symp. 214 c, καὶ μέντοι οὔτωσι ποίησον.

Ib. 222 a, καὶ μέντοι οὐκ ἐμὴ μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἄλλα καὶ Χαρ-μιθρὶν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 17 c, καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ τούτῳ ἤμων δέομαι.

Ib. 26 c, ἄπιστός γ' εἰ, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι σαντῷ.

Ib. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπο τούτων ἀπέλαυν κ.τ.λ.

Euthyd. 289 c, καὶ μέντοι οὐδέν θαυμαστῶν.

Alec. I. 113 c, καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις.

§ 146. c. Such a combination again is καὶ οὖν καὶ.

Protag. 309 b, καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμὸν εἰπε, ἄνθρωπον ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι.

d. Such again is δ' ἄλλα.

Soph. 235 d, σὺ δ' ἄλλα εἰπε πρῶτον.

e. And again δὲ—μέντοι.

Phdr. 267 c, Πρωταγόρεια δὲ οὐκ ἢν μέντοι τοιαύτ' ἀττα;

§ 147. f. ἄλλα γὰρ.

Here we must observe that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition that, whereas the γὰρ refers to the clause immediately subjoined to it, the ἄλλα belongs either to a clause understood or to a clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such a supposition: for the ἄλλα sits much closer to the clause immediately subjoined than the γὰρ does. ἄλλα γὰρ has two meanings: one when it introduces an objection, and is therefore ironical; the other, which alone needs illustration, when it has the force of 'but be that as it may,' or 'but the truth is.'
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Symp. 180 a, Αἰσχύλος δὲ φιλοφιλεῖ κ.τ.λ.: ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι κ.τ.λ.
Phdr. 228 a, εἴ ἐγὼ Ψαῦδρου ἄγνω, καὶ ἐμαντοῦ ἐπιλέξησαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερα ἐστὶ θεύσιν.
Phædo 87 d, μέτρι᾽ ἂν μοι φαύνωτο λέγειν, ὡς ἢ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνων ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἀληθευόμενως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαύνῃ ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σῶματα κατατριβέσω . . . ἀναγκαῖον μὲν᾽ ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ.—‘but, he might say, be that as it may,’ &c.
Ib. 95 c–d, μηνύειν . . . ὅτι πολυχρόνων ἐστὶ ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀδάνατον.
Meno 94 e, ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥ ἐταῖρε, μὴ οὐκ ἡ διδακτῶν ἀρετῆ—‘but the truth is.’
Apol. 19 c, καὶ οὐκ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θεύσιν, ὥ ἂνθρε ’Ἀθηναίου, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. So Ibid. d, Ib. 25 c, &c.

§ 148. g. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ, πλὴν ἡ.

The joint meaning is ‘except.’ By the ἀλλὰ the exception to the negative which has preceded is stated flatly: the ἡ allows the negative statement to revive, subject to this exception alone.

Symp. 189 e, νῦν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστεν [ἀνθρόγνυν] ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἐν ὑνεῖδε ὄνομαι κείμενον.
Phædo 82 b, μὴ φιλοσοφήσατι οὐθέν ἄφικνεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῷ φιλῷ—μαθῆί.
Ib. 81 b, ὅστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἄληθες ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῷ συμπολεμεῖς.
Ib. 97 d, οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπέων προσίκειν ἀνθρώπω . . . ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῷ ἁμαρτον.
Protag. 329 d, οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μεγέθει καὶ συμπρᾶστη.
Ib. 334 c, μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαῖο, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ δ᾽ τι συμπρᾶστῳ.
Ib. 354 b, ἡ ἔχετε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, . . . ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἱδονάς τε καὶ λύπας.—The interrogative is equivalent to a negative; so that the rule stands good that ἀλλ᾽ ἡ occurs only after a negative in the main construction. The ἄλλο is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.
Apol. 42 a, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἡ τῷ θεῶ—again a virtually negative sentence, the ἄδηλον παντὶ being equivalent to δὴλον οἰδεν. The analogy of ἀλλ᾽ ἡ perfectly justifies, so far as Syntax is concerned, the disputed reading πλὴν ἡ. The πλὴν and the ἡ enter the meaning simultaneously, introducing the exception.
each in its own way; πλὴρο implies ‘it is known to none—saving that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God;’ ἕ, less harshly, ‘it is known to none, or however [only] to God.’

Cf. Thuc. v. 60, ὡς μετὰ τῶν πλευρῶν βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐν ὑμᾶς κοινώσας, 80, ἐξεφθάνατο . . . μὴ ἔμμαθεν τῷ ἀλλ’ ἡ ἁμα, vii. 50, οἰκείων ὁμοίως ἡμιτελῶς, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὴ φανερῶς γι’ ἐξίων ψηφίζεσθαι, viii. 28, ὡς προσδεχομένων ἀλλ’ ἡ Ἀττικᾶς τῶν ναὺς εἶναι.

§ 149. h. νῦν δὲ . . . γὰρ. This combination is always preceded by a hypothesis of something contrary to facts, and is parallel to the Protasis of that sentence, which it contradicts. The δὲ and the γὰρ exercise a simultaneous force; δὲ represents that the condition stands differently in fact from what it is in the supposed case, and γὰρ further represents that the inference must be different.

The combinations νῦν δὲ . . . γὰρ and ἀλλὰ γὰρ approach each other in meaning as well as in structure. Νῦν δὲ . . . γὰρ is however only used in contradicting the Protasis of a hypothetical proposition. There is of course no Ellipse to be supplied; that is, we are not to look on to a sentence beyond to supply a clause to the νῦν δὲ. The δὲ sits as close to the clause immediately subjoined as does the γὰρ. the νῦν (‘as the case actually stands’) belongs to both Parts equally. Some of the instances which follow would admit of the Elliptical explanation of the νῦν δὲ but none of them necessitate it, and some others do not admit of it.

Euthyphro 11 c, καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἥτατο ἡν μὲ επίσκοπτες’ νῦν δὲ σαι γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν’ ἄλλον δὴ τινὸς δεὶ σκόμματος.

Ib. 14 c, ὡς ἀπεκρίνο, ἱκανὸς ἡν ἰδι ἔμμαθησι, νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γάρ τὸν ἐρωτώτα τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν’ τι δὴ αὐτ ἔγεις κ.τ.λ.;

Apol. 38 a, εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι χρῆσαι, ἐτιμησάμην ἡν’ νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν.

Protag. 347 a, σε οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἡν ποτε ἐφεγοῦ. νῦν δὲ σφόδρα γάρ ψευδομένος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν’ διὰ ταῦτα σε ἐγὼ ψέω.

Charm. 175 a—b, οὐ γὰρ ἦν που . . . ἀνωφελές ἐφάνη, εἰ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν. νῦν δὲ πανταχῆ γὰρ ἤττωμεθα.

Laches 184 d, εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθην τώδε, ἤττον ἦν τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἔδει. νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐκαστίαν γὰρ Λάχης Νικία ἔβετο. εὐ δὴ ἔχει ἄκοιτασ καὶ σοι.

Ib. 200 c, εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., δίκαιον ἦν ἢν κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα. τί οὖν ἦν τις κ.τ.λ.;
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Legg. 875 c, ἐπὶ ταῦτα εἰ ποτὲ τις ἀνθρώπων . . . παραδείσειν δυνατός εἶν, μόροιν οὐδὲν ἐν δέιτο κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστων οὐδαιμον οὐδαιμώς ἄλλ’ ἢ κατὰ βραχύ. διό δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἰρετέον.

Cf. Lysias xii. 61. p. 125, ὅμως δὲ ἐγώ γὰρ δέομαι ἀναπαύσασθαι.

§ 150. i. The cases of οὗ μὴ and μὴ οὗ, when they make one negative, must be explained upon this principle of simultaneity of force. The resulting negation, though single, is both subjective and objective.

Of οὐ μὴ a single instance may suffice.

Laches 197 d, καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ οὐδὲ μὴ γίγνεται ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Of the uses of μὴ οὗ Mr. Campbell, Theætetus, Appendix B, has given a happy analysis and explanation. But it may be noticed that in a peculiar instance his restriction of μὴ οὗ to a Dependent clause, with the Infinitive or Participle, does not apply.

Phileb. 12 c, πῶς γὰρ ἤδονη γε ἤδονη μὴ οὐχ ἀμοιάτου ἐν εἴη ;—which however is virtually equivalent to πῶς γὰρ ἐν εὐδέχοτο, ἤδονη ἤδονη μὴ οὐξ ἀμοιάτου εἶναι;

§ 151. C. Many combinations of Particles are Elliptical. Such are those of a Negative with ὅτι or ὅπως which follow.

a. οὐ μόνον ὅτι—'I was not only going to say' (parenthetically).

Symp. 179 b, ἐθέλουσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 731 b, οὐ μόνον οὐδέν πλέον εὗ τεθέντων, οὐδὲ ὅτι γέλως ἐν πάμπολος ἐξαιρεῖται, σχέδον δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 85, καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἳ ἐν ἐπίῳ, ἥσσον τις ἑμοὶ πρός εἰσι.

§ 152. b. οὐχ ὅπως has a similar meaning in Negative sentences. Whence moreover οὐχ ὅπως is said to be equivalent to οὐχ ὅπως οὐ which means that the Negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the οὐχ ὅπως clause.

Meno 96 a, οἱ φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦσιν, ἄλλ’ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι.

Cf. Thucyd. i. 35, οὐχ ὅπως καλυταὶ . . . γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . περιώψεσθε (where the Negative is borrowed by καλυταὶ γενήσεσθε from περιώψεσθε, which being its opposite is a virtual Negative), iii. 42, οὐχ ὅπως ξημούν ἄλλα μὴν ἀπιμάζειν.

§ 153. c. οὐχ ὅτι—'not but that;' lit. 'I was not going to deny
that' (parenthetically). Occurring in sentences of Negative form, it borrows their Negative. It is quite different from "sed".

Theat. 157 b, ὧστε ἡ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὧπερ ἡ ἀρχής εἶλέγομεν, οἱ δὲ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ . . . τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαρτησίων, οὐχ ὅτι ἤμεισ . . . ἤγαγάσμεθα . . . χρηστά αὐτῷ.

Protag. 336 d, Ἐκφράστη ἐγγυώμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παιξεί—'for all it be true that' &c.

Gorg. 450 e, οὐδεμιῶν οἷμαι σε βουλεύσωμαι ῥητορικήν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὖτως εἴπει.

Lysis 219 e, πάσα ἡ τουαύτῃ σπούδη οἷς ἐπὶ τούτωι ἐστὶν ἐσπουδασμένη . . . οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.

§ 154. d. Μὴ ὅτι—' nedum,' 'much less' or 'much more,' according as the sentence is Negative or Affirmative: 'not to say,' i. e. not superseding us to say.

Symp. 207 e, Μὴ ὅτι . . . ἄλλα καί. So 208 a.

Apol. 40 d, μὴ ὅτι . . ., ἄλλα.

Protag. 319 d, μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι . . . ἄλλα.

Legg. 799 e, πᾶς πον νέος, μὴ ὅτι πρεαβύνης.

Crat. 427 e, οὕτων πράγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον.

Phileb. 60 d, καὶ ὅτι οὖν εἶναι η γέφυρα με, μὴ ὅτι δὴ γε ἱδονήν.

Phdr. 240 e, ἃ καὶ λόγῳ ἀκοὸν οὖκ ἐπιστεπτές, μὴ ὅτι δὴ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 512 b, δὲ οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυρευήτου, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδενός ἐλάττω ἐνίστο ὅπως σώζειν.

§ 155. D. Elliptical also, but in a still greater degree, are the combinations which now follow.

a. Οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα—'yet, so far from the contrary.' After οὐ μέντοι is to be understood a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἄλλα.

Symp. 199 a, χαυρέτῳ δὴ οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐγκωμίαζο τοῦτον τῶν τρόπων οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα τά γε ἄληθή . . . ἔθελω εἰπεῖν—'yet not so that I am unwilling,—on the contrary I am willing,—to utter the truth.'

Meno 86 e, (A) βούλευ τούν κ.τ.λ.; (B) Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, οὐ μέντοι, ὥς Σώκρατες, ἄλλ' ἐγώ ἐκείνῳ ἄν ἥδιστα σκεφταίμην—'yet not so that it would not,—on the contrary it would,—be most to my taste to' &c.

Crat. 436 d, ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἰκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνη ἑπόμενα. οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα θαυμάζομαι' ἂν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὠνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς—'yet I do not mean by this, that I should not wonder,—on the contrary I should wonder,—if' &c.
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Cf. Thuc. v. 43, οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἱραντιώτο. So viii. 56, ἐνταῦθα δή οὐκέτι ἄλλ’ ἀπορὰ νομίζονται κ.τ.λ.

§ 156. b. Of οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα the same explanation holds;—‘for not the contrary, but,’ i. e. ‘for, so far from the contrary.’

Euthyd. 305 e, τί οὖν; δοκοῦσι σοι τι λέγειν; οὐ γὰρ τοι ἄλλ’ ὃ γε λόγος ἐξει τινὰ εἰστρέπειαν—‘for I must say,’ &c.: more literally, ‘for, do you know, so far from the contrary,’ &c.

Ib. 286 b, πῶς λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ τοι ἄλλα τούτων γε τὸν λόγον . . . δεὶ θαυμάζω—‘for, do you know, I must say I’ &c.

Phaedo 83 e, κόσμοι τ’ εἰσι καὶ ἀνθρεῖοι, οὐχ δὲν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκα φασώ . . . οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ’ οὔτω λογίσαιτ’ ἄν φυχῇ ἀνθρός φιλοσόφου—‘for, so far from the contrary,’—i. e. ‘for, most assuredly.’

§ 157. c. Οὐ μόνον γε ἄλλα.

Phaedo 107 b, οὐ μόνον γ’ ἄλλα ταύτα τε εὐ λέγεις, καὶ ταῖς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ἐμὲν εἰόν, ὃμοι ἐπισκεπτέα. The full construction is οὐ μόνον γε ταύτα εὐ λέγεις, ἄλλα ταύτα τε εὐ λέ- γεις καὶ κ.τ.λ.—‘not only is what you say true, but a further observation in the same direction is true,’ namely τὰς ὑποθέ- σεις κ.τ.λ.

§ 158. What is to be noticed as to all the three expressions, οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα, and οὐ μόνον γ’ ἄλλα, is, that the οὐ is not retrospective but proleptic, referring to a proposition which is not expressed but is indicated by its contrary expressed in the ἄλλα clause.

§ 159. E. Other noticeable combinations of Particles are such as follow.

a. Μέν γε answered by δέ, in working out a contrast between two characters.

Symp. 180 d, πῶς δ’ οὐ δύο τὸ δεῖα; ἡ μέν γε κ.τ.λ. ἡ δέ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 215 b, πολύ γε θαυμασιώτερος ἔκεινον’ ὁ μέν γε κ.τ.λ. οὐ δέ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 70, οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοῦνται. Dem. de Cor. 93. p. 257, ὁ μέν γε σύμμαχος ὄν. [So Bekker: ὁ μέν γὰρ Zurich ed.]

Æschin. iii. 63. p. 62, ὁ μέν γε τὴν ἐξωσιάν ἐδώκει.

b. καὶ μήν οὐδὲ . . . γε.

Legg. 728 d—c, τίμων ἑναι σώμα οὐ τὸ καλόν οὐδὲ ἑσχυρῶν κ.τ.λ., καὶ μήν οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων γ’ ἑναιτία, τὰ δ’ εν τῷ μέσῳ.

§ 160. The following are various combinations with δή, to which γε is often subjoined.
c. Kai μὲν δή, with and without ye subjoined.

Rep. 409 a, διό δή καὶ εὐθές εἰς . . . φαίνονται κ.τ.λ. \(\text{καὶ μὲν} \, \text{δή, ἕφη, σφόδρα} \, \text{γε} \, \text{αὐτὸ} \, \text{πάσχουσιν.}\)

Symp. 196 c, ὧ δὴ πρέπει ἡμᾶς μαρτυρίῳ χρήσθαι, ὅτι ποιητῆς ὁ Ἔρως . . . πᾶσαν ποίησιν τὴν κατὰ μουσικὴν . . . καὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν γε τῶν θῶν ποίησιν τίς ἐναντιώσεται κ.τ.λ.;

Soph. 217 b, καί μεν δη κατὰ τίχην γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβον παραπλησίων κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 231 d, καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. So 232 b, 233 a.

d. 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, without or with ye.

Crat. 428 b, ἄλλα μὲν δὴ—'well, no doubt.'

Crito 48 a, ἄλλα μὲν δὴ . . . γε—'well, but then' (in the mouth of an objector).

Phaedo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d, ἄλλα μὲν δὴ . . . γε—'but further'—in a consecutive proof.

e. 'Ἄταρ οὖν δῇ . . . γε. Politic. 269 d.


g. Οὐ γὰρ δῇ . . . γε. Phaedo 92 b.

h. 'Ὡς δῇ τοι—'how true is it that.' Rep. 366 e, Tim. 26 b.

i. 'Ὡς δῇ σὺ—'ironical. Gorg. 468 e, 499 b.

j. Kai δὴ Kai—'then, I suppose,' ironically. Apol. 26 d.

§ 161. F. Correlative Particles.

a. It is worth observing that in the Laws of Plato οὐ has more frequently δὲ contrasted with it than ἄλλα.

b. Instead of the common ἄλλως τε καί we find sometimes καὶ ἄλλως καί, as Laches 181 a, 187 c.

c. Irregular Correlatives.

Tim. 20 d, μᾶλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασι γε μὴν ἄληθούσ.

Legg. 927 b, δὲ μὲν ἀκοίνουσι, βλέπουσι τε δὲ γῦ.

Symp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφαλαίου, κ.τ.λ. ἅλλ' οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Lb. 177 b, καὶ τούτῳ μὲν ἤττον καὶ θαυμαστῶν, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 38 d, ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μὲντοι λόγων.

§ 162. Note, that μὲντοι is used, and not δὲ, (1) when particular emphasis has to be given to the opposition; (2) where, as in the instance here quoted, δὲ could not be conveniently used; (3) in expressing opposition to a clause which is itself introduced by δὲ.
§ 163. Idioms of Comparison.

A. Syntax of words of the Comparative Degree.
B. "", words of the Superlative Degree.
C. "", other Comparative words and formulae.

A. Comparatives.

a. Ordinary form.

The only case needing remark under this head is that of a clause compared by ἐτε, while its pronominal pre-statement (see above, § 19) is compared in the Genitive.

Phædo 89 d, οὐκ ἦν τὸς μεῖζον τοῦτον κακῶν πάθοι, ἣ λόγους μισήσας.

Crito 44 c, τίς ἄν αἰσχών εἰπη ταύτης δόξα, ἣ δοκεῖν κ.τ.λ.;

So Lysias xxv. 23. p. 173, οὔδεν γὰρ ἦν εἰπ αὐτοῖς χαλεπώτερον τούτων, ἥ πιθανέσθαι. We trace the Idiom back to Homer, Od. vi. 182, ὦ μὲν γὰρ τούτης κρείσφον καὶ ἁρισον, Ὁ ὥθ' ὀμοφρονέοντε νομίσασιν οἶκον ἔχθρον Ἄνηρ ἤδε γυνή. So Hdt. i. 79, ὡς οἱ παρὰ δόξαν ἐσχε τὰ πρήγματα, ἥ ὡς αὐτὸς καθεδόκεε.

§ 164. b. Rarer forms.

a. ὡς as the Conjunction of Comparison.

Rep. 526 c, ἣ γε μεῖζω πόνον παρέχει ὡς ἦν μακᾶς οὔδε πολλὰ ἦν εἰρος ὡς τοῦτο.

Apol. 36 d, οὐκ ἦσθ' ὡς τι μάλλων πρέπει ὡς τούτως ὡς . . . συνείσθαι.


§ 165. β. Comparative followed by Prepositions.

Παρὰ. Note, that the παρὰ in this construction is not 'beyond,' but 'contrasted with' (lit. 'put co-ordinate with.') Cf. Phdr. 276 c, παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαίλην παθὰν. And Thucyd. v. 90, ἐπειδή παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἐμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε.

Politic. 296 a, εἰ τις γνώσει παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἐμπροσθεὶν βελτίων νόμους.

Legg. 729 c, ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἐξενων καί εἰς τοὺς ἐξενους ἁμαρτήματα παρὰ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς θεῶν ἀνηρτημένα τιμωρῶν μᾶλλον.

Πρό.

Phædo 99 a, δικαιώτερον . . . εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν . . . ὑπέχειν . . . δίκην.

Crito 54 b, μὴπε παιδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μὴπε τὸ ζῆν μὴπε ἀλλο μυθεῖν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου.

Cf. Hdt. i. 62, οὐσὶ ἡ τυραννίς πρὸ ἔλευθερίας ἢν ἀπαστάτουτερον.
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'Αντι.
Rep. 619 c, αἰτιάσθαι τῶν κακῶν πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ.

'Εν.
Euthyd. 303 c, πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τούτῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.

Κατὰ after ἑ.
Phaedo 94 c, πολὺ θειοτέρου τινός πράγματος ἡ καθ' ἄρμονίαν.

§ 166. c. Irregularities.
a. Pleonastic form.
Crat. 433 d, ἐχεῖς τίνα καλλίω τρόπον . . . ἄλλον, ἡ κ.τ.λ.;
Gorg. 482 b, οἵματι τὴν λύραν μου κρέιττον εἶναι ἀναμορμέστειν . . . μᾶλλον ἡ ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι.
Charm. 159 c, Politic. 286 a, Legg. 729 c, 854 e ;—all instances of a Comparative Adjective or Adverb with μᾶλλον or ἡττον.

§ 167. β. Comparative in regimen twice over.
Protag. 350 b, θαφφαλεωτέροι εἰσίν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἑπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἡ πρὶν μαθεῖν.
Symp. 220 e, προθυμότερος ἐγένον τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἡ σεαυτῶν.
A compendious way of saying two things; one, that Socrates was anxious that Alcibiades should be chosen rather than himself; the other, that, though the generals too were anxious for this, Socrates was more anxious than they. This construction is illustrated by the other simpler instance.
Exactly parallel is Thuc. vii. 66, τό γ’ ὑπόλοιπον τῆς δάξης ἀθεονέστερον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν ἡ ἐκ μηδ’ φόβησαν.

§ 168. γ. Case after ἡ assimilated to the Case before it, by Attraction.
Phaedo 110 c, ἦκ [χρωμάτων] λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἡ τούτων.
Menu 83 c, ἢπ' ῥείζονος ἡ τοσιάτης γραμμῆς.
This does not appear to be the regular construction. Compare the constructions with ὅπερ, §§ 175, 176, below. The Homeric use with ἡ varies: on the one hand we have, II. i. 260, καὶ ἄρείων ἥπερ ὑμῶν 'Ἀδριάν ὁμίλησα' on the other hand, II. x. 557, ἄρείωνας, ἡ περ ὥδε, "Ἰπποὺς διώρησαν" Od. xvii. 417, σὲ χρῆ δομένα καὶ λῶν ἡ περ ἁλλο, II. xxiv. 486, Μνήσα τιτρός σεῖα . . . Τηλίκου ὄπερ ἑγόν. In Demosth. also there are both constructions with ἡ e. g. F. L. 27. p. 349, οὐδὲν ἔλαστον ἡ τούτων’ but De Cor. 162. p. 281, τῶν πρότερον
§§ 169—172. COMPARISON.

ἡ ἔγδο δοκιμασάντων, ἵβ. 178. p. 287, ἡμῶν ἀμεινον ἢ 'κείνοι προορω-
μένων.

§ 169. δ. Omission of ἡ.

Legg. 956 a, ὑψήν δὲ μὴ πλέον ἔργων γυναικὸς μίας ἐμμὴν. ἵβ. 958 e, ὑψηλότερον πέντε ἄνδρών ἔργων.

Phædo 75 a, οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἵππου . . . μᾶλλον τι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.

[Oxon. alone omits ἡ here. The other MSS. and the edd. have ἡ καί.]

§ 170. ε. Omission of μᾶλλον.

Rep. 370 a, ἀλλ' ἰσος οὖτω ράδιον ἢ 'κείνως.

Men. 94 e, ἰσος ράδιων ἐστὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωποις ἡ εὖ. Cf., as the
Zurich editors suggest, Lysias xii. 89. p. 128, Isocrat. v. 115.


Tim. 75 c, ἐφεδοξει τοῦ πλείωνος βίον φαυλότερον δὲ τῶν ἑλάττονα
ἀμεινόν ὅτα παντὶ πάντως αἱρετέον.

Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. iii. 9, εἴ ἄρα τι ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργων ἡ ('other
than') ἄνθρωποις θεραπεύειν. Lysias ii. 62. p. 196, ἰδίαν μετ' ἐλευθερίᾳ αἱρόμενοι ἢ βίον μετὰ δοσκειάς, xxi. 22. p. 163, οὐκ οἶδ' οὖς τις ἡ ἐμᾶς ἐξουλθῆθην περὶ ἐμοὶ δικαστὰς γενέσθαι.

§ 171. B Superlatives.

a. Ordinary form.

b. Rarer forms—with Prepositions.

Ἐπὶ.

Tim. 23 b, τὸ καλλίστον καὶ ἀριστον γένος ἐπ' ἄνθρωποις.

Perhaps this is consciously Homeric: cf. e. g. Od. xxiii. 124, σὴν
γὰρ ἀριστὴν Μῆτων ἐπ' ἄνθρωποις φῶς' ἐμμεναι.

Periphrastic with ἐν.

Legg. 742 e, τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἄνθρωπων πλείστον νομί-
ςματος ἀδια κτῆμα.

Ib. 892 a, ὅσ ἐν πρῶτοι ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἐμπροσθεῖν πάντων γενομένη.

§ 172. c. Irregularities.

a. Legg. 969 a, ἄνθρευτας τῶν ὑστερον ἐπιγεγομένων. Cf.
Phædo 62 a, τοῦτο μῶν τῶν ἀλλων ἀπάντων.

b. Pleonastic.

Symp. 218 d, τοῦ ὅς ὅ τι βέλτιστον ἐμε γενέθαι.

Legg. 731 b, πρίνον ὅς ὅ τι μᾶλλον.

Ib. 908 a, ὅς ὅ τι μᾶλλον ἐγριώτατος.
§ 173. C. Other Comparative words and formulae.

a. With ἥ.

Rep. 330 c, οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλὴ ἡ οἱ ἄλλοι ύσπάζονται αὐτά.

Ib. 534 a, ἕνα μὴ ἦμας πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἡ ὡςοι οἱ παρελθόντες.

Ib. 455 c, διαφέρονται ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν.

Phædo 95 c, διαφέρόντως ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων βίων βιώσ ἐτελείτα.

Phdr. 228 d, διαφέρειν τὰ τοὺ ἐρώτοντι ἢ τὰ τοῦ μή.

Crat. 435 a, ἄπο τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὁ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι.

Phileb. 35 a, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. So Phdr. 275 a.

Gorg. 481 c, ἄλλα τις ἦμον ἦν καὶ ἐπέτασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Crito 53 e, τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχοῦμενοι εἴν Θετταλίᾳ;

§ 174. b. With παρά.

Rep. 337 d, ἔτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἐβελτίω τούτων.

Phædo 105 b, παρ’ ἦν τὸ πρώτον ἐλεγον ἄλλην.

Laches 178 b, ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν.

Ib. 181 d, ἐὰν δ’ ἔχω τὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα.

Legg. 927 c, πουκλλούστε ἐπιτιθεμέασιν ἦν οἷος τῶν ὀρφανῶν βίων παρὰ τῶν τῶν μή.

And, with παρὰ simply, Theæt. 144 a, ἀνθρείον παρ’ ὄντινοιν.

§ 175. c. With ὡσπερ and the like Adverbs; and with correlative Adjectives of likeness.

Phædo 86 a, ἐὰς τις δισχερείζοται τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ σύ.

Ib. 100 c, ἐὰν σοι ἑυνυδή ὡσπερ ἐμοί.

Gorg. 464 d, ἐν ἀνθράσιν αὐτῶς ἀνόητος ὡσπερ οἱ παίδες.

Apol. 17 b, κεκαλλιευμένος λόγους ὡστέροι οἱ τούτων.

Politic. 274 d, ἔδει τὴν ἐπιμελείαν αὐτῶς αὐτῶν ἐχεῖν καθάπερ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος.

With Adjectives.

Gorg. 458 a, οὐδεν οἷοι τοσοῦτον κακῶν, ὡςοι δόξα ψευδῆς.

Tim. 78 b, πλέγμα εἰς ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς ὡςοι οἱ κύρτοι ξυσυφφράμενοι.

Protag. 327 d, γυμνοὶ τίνες, ὡσπέρ οὐς πέρισε Φερεκράτης ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ λημφά. So Crat. 432 e.

§ 176. Note, that where the Noun brought into comparison by ὁσπερ is the Subject of the Relative clause, there is a preference for the Nominative, in spite of such an Ellipse of the Verb as might have led to an Attracted Construction.

Cf. Hom. II. xxiv. 486, ἔναρε ταὐτά τις ἵκιν, θεὸς ἐπιεικέλ' Ἀχιλλεῦ, Τηλίκον, ὁσπερ ἐγὼν. Lysias vi. 32. p. 106, λυπουμένῳ ὁσπερ οὕτος. Isocr. xviii. 47. p. 380, τούς ὁσπερ Καλλίμαχος βεβιωκότας. This non-admission of Attraction often secures the meaning; as Ἀεσchin. ii. 120. p. 44, τούς μυκροπολίτας, ὁσπερ αὐτὸς, φοβεῖν τὰ τῶν μειζόνων ἀπόρρητα. [So Bekker: αὐτοῦς Zurich ed.] Jelf (Gr. Gr. § 869) notices, as rare instances of Attraction, Thuc. vi. 68, οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὁσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς, Soph. O. C. 869, δοιη βίων Τοιοῦτον οἰὼν καὶ γηράναι ποτέ, Lys. 492. 72, [i.e. xiii. 72. p. 136] οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἐστιν Ἀγάφατον Ἀθηναῖον εἰνάι ὁσπερ Ὀρασύβολον. We may add, however, from Plato, the instance in Apol. 17 c, οὐ γὰρ ἀν πρέποι τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὁσπερ μειρακίω πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίναι,—where μειρακίω is affected by Attraction to πλάττοντι.

§ 177. d. Comparison of one Sentence as a whole with another.

Symp. 179 e, διὰ ταύτα δίκην αὐτῷ ἐπέθεσαν, ... οἷς ὁσπερ Ἀχιλλέα ἐτίμησαν.

Πb. 189 c, δοκοῦσι ... θυσίας ἂν ποιεῖν ... , οἷς ὁσπερ νῦν τούτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται.

Πb. 213 b, ἐλλοχῶν αὖ με ἐνταῦθα κατέκειστο, ὁσπερ εἰώθης ἐξαίφνης ἀναφαίνεσθαι.

Πb. 216 d, ἔρωτικός διάκειται ... , καὶ αὖ ... οὐδέν οἴδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ ξειληνάδες; This sentence becomes an instance under the present head by the removal of the stop after τούτο. The liveliness of the passage gains by this, as much as it suffers by the common punctuation. The conversion of a categorical sentence at its close into an interrogative one is natural and common. [The Zurich editors have the common punctuation.]

Thetz. 187 b, χρῆ, δ' Ἡεαίητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὑκεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Apol. 39 c, τιμωρίαν ὑμᾶν ἤζειν ... χαλεπωτέραν νη Δι' ἢ οἰαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.

Cf., perhaps, Thuc. i. 19, ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἢ ἵδια παρασκεύῃ μείζον ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστα ποτὲ μετὰ ἀκραφνοῖς τῆς ἔμμαχίας ἠρθησαν—taking ὡς to be not 'when' but 'how;' but
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 178, 179.

primarily Hom. Od. xxiv. 195–199, ὃς εὖ μέμνη 'Οδυσσήος ...

§ 178. We may notice the graceful use of the vague Comparative expressing a modified degree.

Symp. 176 c, ἥττον ἂν εἶναι ἀνάδηκς.

Politic. 286 b, ἐσχε μήκος πλέον.

Phaedo 115 b, ἀπερ ἄει λέγω, οὐδὲν καινότερον.

Charm. 174 c, ἥττον τί, Euthyd. 293 c, ἥττον οὖν τι, in Interrogative sentences, are a soft οὐκ and οὐκοῦν.

Cf. the Latin si minus.

§ 179. IDIOMS or SENTENCES:—Attraction.

A full scheme of all the varieties of Attraction may be constructed upon the instances found in Plato. The varieties which are treated of here include all but some of the most common.

A. Attraction of Dependent sentences.

a. Infinitival sentences.

a. The ordinary form of Attraction here is that to be seen in Ar. Eth. III. v. 3, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικές καὶ φαύλους εἶναι, or Lysias xxviii. 10. p. 180, τοῖς ἄρχονσιν ... ἐπιδείξετε πότερον χρή δικαιοῦ εἶναι,—in distinction from the unattracted form, e.g. Aesch. Choeph. 140, Λύτη τε μοι δὸς σωφρονεστέραν πολὺ Μητρὸς γενέσθαι.

Crat. 395 c, κατ' ἐκείνον λέγεται οὐδὲν οἶον τε γενέσθαι προνοηθήναι.

Hip. Ma. 292 c, τὸ καλὸν, οὐ παντὶ, ὃ ἄν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλὸ εἶναι.

It will be seen here that to present an opportunity for Attraction, there must be Ellipse of the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, and moreover its Copula and Predicate must be in distinct words. Where the subject of the Infinitival sentence is also the subject of the principal sentence, Attraction is invariable, and the construction cannot be conceived without it,—as βουλομένων ἐμῶν προθύμων εἶναι, Thuc. i. 71; where notwithstanding there is Attraction (though Lobeck denies it).

β. A form, which in one or two particular Idioms is common, is developed in greater variety in Plato: where the Infinitival sentence is dismembered, and the Subject or some other prominent Noun of the Dependent sentence is placed in advance, under the direct government of the principal sentence.
One common type is (e.g.) Hdt. v. 38, ἔδεε ἄνουχής οἱ μεγάλης ἔσευρεθναι. And primarily Homer, II. xviii. 585, Οἱ δ’ ἦτοι διακέεν μὲν ἀπετρωγώντο λεόντων, and vii. 409. Another common, though peculiar, type is ἔγ' δίκαιος εἰμι τούτῳ ποιεῖν—which stands for δίκαιον εστίν εἰμί τούτῳ ποιεῖν—the εἰμί being attracted out of the Infinitival government into that of the principal sentence. Cf. Hdt ix. 77, ἄξιοι ἔφασαν εἶναι σφέας ζημιώσαν.

§ 180. Of the Platonic type only specimens need be given here; for the rest cf. 'Binary Structure,' §§ 214, 220, below.

Symp. 207 a, εἰπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ἄει ἔρως ἐστίν—where τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, is separated from it, and placed under the government of ἔρως ἐστίν in the principal construction.

In the following it is not the subject, but some other Noun, of the Infinitival sentence, which is attracted.

Rep. 443 b, ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν.

Gorg. 513 e, ἑπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστί τῇ πόλει καὶ τῶς πολίταις θεραπεύειν.

Legg. 790 c, τρόπον ὅπερ ἢργυθελα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραίεσθαι.

§ 181. γ. In the following the two forms above exist together. The Subject of the Infinitival sentence suffers Attraction in the manner just mentioned, and secondly the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence is attracted into agreement with it.

Rep. 459 b, δεὶ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχώντων.

Euthyd. 282 d, οἶον ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρπητικῶν λόγων εἴναι.

§ 182. Note, however, that when both constructions have the same Subject, the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence reverts to the main construction.

Legg. 773 b, τῶν αὐτῶ ἐννειδότα φερόμενον.

Charm. 169 a, οὐ παστεῦο ἐμαυτῷ ἴκανός εἴναι.

§ 183. δ. In another type, affecting the same class of sentences as the last, we have the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, after δίκαιον ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη ἐστίν, οἶον τε ἐστίν, and the like, or after Verbs of judging, turned into a forced Dative of Reference after δίκαιον &c. Doubtless, the Dative of Reference often finds its place in the meaning as well as the syntax; but this is not always the case,
e.g. in the passages from Hip. Ma. 294 b, Meno 88 c, and Crat. 392 a: whence the true account of it is Attraction.

Rep. 334 c, ἀλλ' ὡμος δίκαιον τότε τούτως τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὀφελεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Crito 50 e, καὶ σοι ταύτα ἀντιστοιεῖν οἷς δίκαιον εἶναι;
Phædo 75 c, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.

Hip. Ma. 289 e, τὸ ὀρθῶς λεγόμενον ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι.
Ib. 294 b, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι.

Charm. 164 b, γεγυγώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἱατρῷ.
Meno 88 e, εἶ ἄρα ἄρετή τῶν ἐν τῇ Ψυχῇ τί ἐστι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὀφελίμωρ εἶναι.

Laches 196 e, ἀναγκαῖον οἷμαι τῷ ταύτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίον ἀποδεχεσθαι ἀνδριάν.

Menex. 241 a, οἷον τε ἀμώνεσθαι ὀλίγους πολλοὺς.
Phædo 106 b, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ ἀπολλυσθαι.
Phdr. 242 b, αὕτιος γεγενησθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥήθηναι.

Phileb. 33 a, τῷ τῶν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐλομένῳ βίον οἷσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζήν.

Crat. 392 a, ὀρθότερον ἐστίν καλεῖσθαι χαλεῖς κυμώδους τῷ αὐτῷ ὄρνηφ. 
Phædo 92 c, πρέπει ξυνοδὸν εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας [λόγῳ].
Soph. 231 e, ἑθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξαῖ ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχῆς καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

Rep. 598 d, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ὅτι εὐθῆς.

Apol. 54 e, δεδογμένοιν ἐστὶ τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. [So Oxon. See note on the text, p. 90, above.]

Cf. Philolaus ap. Stob. p. 458, οὐχ οἷον τ' ἂς οἱθείν τῶν ἔντων καὶ γεγυγώσκειν ὑπ' ἀρμῷ γνωσθῆναι, and again ib., ἀδύνατον ἃς ἰν καὶ αὐτῶς κοσμηθῆναι. [Quoted by Boeckh in his Philolaos, p. 62.]

Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, τάδε ὑμῖν ἄξιον ἐνθυμηθῆναι.

On the other hand we have, unusually,
Gorg. 458 d, αἰσχρῶν δὴ τῷ λοιπὸν γίγνεται ἐμι γε μη ἐθέλειν.

§ 184. b. Attraction of Participial clause attached to the Infinitival sentence.

Here the unattracted form would be e.g.

Crito 51 d, προαγορεύομεν Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ ... ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπείνα.

Instances of the attracted form are

Apol. 17 c, οὕτε γὰρ ἂν πρέποι τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ . . . πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ἕμας εἰσιάσαι—where πλάττοντι is attracted into correspondence with ἡλικίᾳ though the Gender follows the thought, as in Legg. 933 a, ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώτων δυσοποιομέναι πρὸς ἄλληνοις. Cf. Hom. II. iv. 101, Εἴδεχο . . . μέειν ἐκατόμβην . . . , Οἴκαδε νοστήσας.

§ 185. Reference to the unattracted form explains such places as

Symp. 176 d, οὕτε αὐτὸς ἐθελήσαμεν ἂν πιεῖν, οὕτε ἄλλω συμβουλέυσαμεν, ἄλλως τέ καὶ κρασιλῶστα—where κρασιλῶστα agrees regularly with the subject of the πιεῖν understood after συμβουλέυσαμεν. And somewhat similarly

Phdr. 276 e, τοῦ δυναμένου παιξειν . . . μυθολογοῦσα—this Accusative arising from a mis-recollection of the Infinitive construction last preceding.

§ 186 c. Dependent sentences introduced by Conjunctions or Oblique Interrogatives.

a. Here, too, as in the Infinitival sentence, the sentence is torn asunder, and a portion of it, consisting of a Noun or a Noun-phrase, brought under the direct government of the principal construction.

This Attraction manifests itself in an ordinary type in e.g.

Laches 196 a, τοῦτον οὐ μανθάνα δι' ἄλλην κέλευε. More remarkable Platonic forms are e.g.

Soph. 260 a, δεὶ λόγου ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, τί πορ' ἐστίν—where λόγον has been attracted into the principal construction, although this can supply only a loose government for it.

Phædo 64 a, κυδυκεύσατε ὅσοι τυγχάνονσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπότιμοινοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τούς ἄλλους ὧτι οὐδεν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύσασιν ἡ ἀποθησκεί. This is an Attraction for κυδυκεύσει λεληθέναι τούς ἄλλους ὧτι ὃσοι κ.τ.λ.

§ 187. In the following it is not the Subject, but some other Noun or Noun-phrase, of the Dependent sentence, which is attracted.

Phædo 102 b, ἀμολογεῖς τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οἱ καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλληθεν ἔχειν—where τὸ . . . Σωκράτους is the Accusative attracted under government of ἀμολογεῖς (compare δεὶ λόγου ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, above).
Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δήλα τὰ παρόντα νῦν, ὅτι οίοι τ’ εἰσίν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ
tὰ συμκρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐργάζεσθαι—ἰ. ε. δῆλον ἔστιν ὅτι οἱ αὐτὰ
tὰ παρόντα ἐργασάμενοι, οἱ πολλοὶ, οἵοι τ’ εἰσίν οὐ τὰ κ.τ.λ.
Phædo 82 a, δήλα δὴ καὶ τάλλα οἶ ἀν ἐκάστῃ ίοὶ—ἰ. ε. δῆλον ἐστὶ δή,
οἰ ἄν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστῃ ίοὶ.

For the rest of the instances under this head see ‘Binary
Structure,’ §§ 213, 218, below.

§ 188. β. Comparative sentence introduced by ἥ, attracted, after
omission of the Copula, into agreement with the principal con-
struction.

Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἥ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς.
(See the remarks under ‘Idioms of Comparison,’ § 168, above.)

§ 189. B. Attractions involving the Relative.

a. Attraction of Relative to Antecedent.

a. From Accusative into Genitive.

Apol. 29 b, κακῶν δῶν οἴδα ὅτι κακά ἔστιν.
Phdr. 249 b, δείως οὐ δείωσαν βίον.
Cf. Hom. II. v. 265, Τῆς γὰρ τοι γενεῆς, ἥς Τροί περ ἐφύνοπα Ζεὺς
Δῶκε.

β. From Accusative into various cases before βούλει ¹², which
with the Relative forms almost one word, like Latin quīvis.

Crat. 432 a, τὰ δέκα ἡ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἄριθμὸς.
Gorg. 517 a, ἐργα . . . τα τοῦτον ὃς βούλει εὑργασται.
Phileb. 43 d, τριῶν ὧντων ὄντων βούλει.

γ. From Dative into Genitive.

Legg. 966 e, πάντων ὧν κινήσεις . . . οὐσίαν ἐπάρμενεν.

δ. From Nominative into
Genitive.

Theæt. 165 e, ἕνεποδίσθη ὡτ’ αὐτοῦ, οὗ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενοι . . . ἂν
ἐλύτρων.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 130. p. 270, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὧν ἔτυχεν ἥν—ἰ. ε. τοῦτων
ἀ ἔτυχεν.

¹² Compare (though these do not involve the Relative)

Rep. 414 c, ἐβ’ ἡμῶν ὧν ὧν γεγονὼς οὖθε εἰ γενόμενον ἄν.
Symp. 216 d, ἐνδοθεὶν δὲ ἀναχθείς πόσης οἴκεθε γέμει σαφροσύνης;
Euthyphr. 15 a, τί δ’ οἰεί ἄλλο ἡ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα;
Phædo 59 c, τίνες φίλ’ ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;
§ 190. e. Preposition, by which the Relative is governed, absorbed by Attraction.

Rep. 520 d, ἐν τολεί ἡ ἤκιστα πρόθυμον ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν.

Ib. 533 d–e, οἷς τοσοῦτον πέρι σκέψεις ἄσων ἡμῶν πρόκειται.

Laches 192 b, τίς οὐσα δύναμις ἡ αὐτῇ ἐν ἀπασιν οἷς νῦν ἰὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτῷ εἶναι, ἐπειδή αὐθαίρετα — where ois must be for ἐν ois.

Crat. 438 e, ἄρα δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ ἢ ὁπέρ εἰκὸν;

Gorg. 453 e, πάλιν δὲ εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὁπέρ νῦν ἰὴ.

Stallbaum (on Apol. 27 d) cites other instances from Plato, but he is not warranted in giving them the same interpretation. Thus Apol. 27 d, ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἰὴ καὶ λέγονται is simply 'or [sprung] from some other beings, whose children accordingly they are called.'

Phaedo 76 d, ἐν τούτῳ [τῷ χρόνῳ] ἀπόλλυμεν ὁπέρ κ.τ.λ. Here the best and most MSS. have ἐν ὁπέρ.


§ 191. b. Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.

Meno 96 a, ἅχεις οὖν εἰπέων ἄλλου ὑπονοοῦν πράγματος οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι κ.τ.λ.;

Politie. 271 c, τῶν βιῶν οὖν κ.τ.λ. πότερον . . . ἵνα κ.τ.λ.;

Meno 96 c, ὁμολογήκαμεν δὲ γε, πράγματος οὔ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταί εἶναι, τούτῳ μηδὲ διδακτόν εἶναι.

Crito 45 b, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλος εἶποι ἂν ἄφικη.

The last of these instances is of a peculiar type, though the
former are common, and have their prototypes in Homer: cf. II. x. 416, φιλάκας δ' ἦσε ἔρεα, ... Ὑπίσ kēkri-mēn ῥύεται στρατόν, Od. viii. 74, δειδέμεναι κλεα ἀνδρῶν, Οἰμής τῆς τότ' ἄρα κλέος κ.τ.λ., xxii. 6, σκοπὸν ἄλλον ὧν οὔπω τις βᾶλεν ἄνηρ Εὔσομαι α' κε τύχωμι, xxiii. 356, Μῆλα δ' α' μοι κ.τ.λ., Πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔγιν ηλισσόμαι, ἄλλα δ' Ἀχιαὶ Δώσουσι' (where μῆλα represents ἀντὶ μῆλον). On Od. viii. 74 Nitzsch holds οἴμης to be attracted from οἴμη not οἴμηρ' because elsewhere the attracted word is the forerunner of a principal sentence to be completed, whereas here it is in sense but part of the exegetic Relative sentence. Thus the sentence would be one on the model of Od. i. 50, Νήσῳ ἐν ἀμφιμύη... Νήσος δευδηρήσεσα, or II. vi. 396, 'Ηετίωνος' 'Ηετίων, ὡς ἐναιει κ.τ.λ.

§ 192. c. Construction changed after Relative clause by Attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction.

N.B. This principle, of Attraction to the nearest construction, extends also to other cases where there is no Relative clause. See §§ 201–203, below.

Rep. 402 b, οὐδὲ μουσικὸν πρῶτερον ἐσώμεθα οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὐς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας.

Phaedo 66 c, ἡμῖν ἔσται αὐτοὶ φαμεν ἔρασται εἶναι φρονήσεως.

Protag. 342 b, σοφία τῶν Ἕλληνων περίεσιν, ὡσπερ ὄν Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, τοὺς σοφιστάς.

Crito 48 c, ὡς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις ... , μη ὡς ἀληθῶς ταύτα σκέμματα ἦ κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 281 c, ἐκεῖνοι δὲν ὅν τάσματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία, Πιπτακοῦ κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 200 d, ἐκεῖνοι ἔραν ὅ οὔπω ἐποίησαν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον ταύτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρώντα.

Apol. 41 a, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς ὡσπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάξειν, Μίνως κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Hom. II. ix. 131, μετὰ δ' ἔστησαι ἤν τῶν ἀπηγώνων, Κούρην Βρωσῆς.

§ 193. It is not to be supposed that the Nouns which follow the Relative clauses in the first three of these examples are Antecedents to the Relatives. As in the fourth example the Relative has an expressed Antecedent ἐκεῖνοι, so in the others it has one understood; and the Nouns τοὺς φύλακας, τοὺς σοφιστάς, ταύτα, are respectively exegetic of the understood Antecedent. (Ταύτα represents a Feminine Noun by another Attraction, which see below, § 201.)
Cf. Horn. Od. i. 69, Κέκλωσος κεχόλωται ὧν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλάωσεν, 'Αντιθεον Πολύφημον. Also Il. xii. 18-20. To this explanation must be also conformed that of Soph. Antig. 404, ὅν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπείπας.

§ 194. The same principle accounts for the following also.

Symp. 206 a, οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὗ ἐρῶσιν ἁθροποι, ή τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Phædo 89 a, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος οὐδέν ἄτοπον—where ἐκεῖνος is attracted from ἐκεῖνον, since it is ἔχειν and not λέγοι which requires this Pronoun as its Subject.

Symp. 199 c, καλῶς μοι ἐδοξάσα ταῦτα τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ αὐτὸν ἐπιδείξαι ὅποιος τίς ἐστιν οὗ ἔρως, ὑστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ—where we should have had αὐτὸν . . . τὸν ἔρωτα but for the intervention of ὅποιος τίς ἐστιν, which prevented recurrence to the Accusative.

The same bias shews itself abnormally in Lysias xxv. 18. p. 173, ο฿εσθε χρύναι, οὖν ἐκεῖνον παρέλιπον . . . , ὑμεῖς ἀπολέσαι.

§ 195. d. Attraction of the entire Relative clause (i. e. of Subject and Predicate,—Copula having been omitted) to the Antecedent.

a.

Symp. 220 b, ὅτους πάγον οἰον δεινοτάτου.

Phædo 104 a, τοῦ περιττοῦ ὅτος οὐχ οἴπερ τῆς τριάδος.

Soph. 237 c, οὕρ γε ᾧς παντάπασιν ἄπορον.

Legg. 674 c, οὐδ' ἀμπέλων ἃν πολλῶν δέοι οὐδ' ἤτιν πύληι.

Rep. 607 a, ὅσον μῶνον ὑμνους ποίησεως παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν—

for ὅσον ποίησεως ἐστιν ὑμεῖς.


§ 196. β. More peculiar (because the Relative is made to agree with the Subject of the Relative clause—contrast οὐχ οἴπερ τῆς τριάδος above) are
§ 197. γ. In the following the Relative clause is represented by the Subject being identical with that of the main sentence and being therefore, with the Copula, omitted.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 209, Ἐὐρύμαχ’ ἤδε καί ἄλλοι ὄσιν μνηστήρες ἁγανοί, —i.e. ἄλλοι μνηστήρες ἁγανοί, ὄσιν ἐστε' and Hdt. iv. 28, ἀφόρητος ὅσος κρυφός—'frost which was insufferable,—to such a degree was it;' and ib. 194, οἱ δὲ σφί ἀφθονοι ὄσιν ἐν τοῖς οὐρέσι γίνονται' in all which instances there is no patent Attraction, but it is made possible by the Ellipse, after the Relative, of its Subject and the Copula.

Euthyd. 275 c, σοφίαν ἀμύχανον ὅσην—'inconceivable, so great was it.'

Gorg. 477 d, ὑπερφνεὶ τιν ἀγι ὅσ μεγάλη Βλάζη καὶ κακῷ δαυμασῖφ ὑπερβάλλουσα.

Cf. the common Idiom ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ πλείστα ὅσα—'things relatively many, so many were they'—where ὅσα is doubtless an Accusative.

The same explanation applies, though Attraction does not find place, in the Adverbial expressions ἀμυχάνως ὅσ (Rep. 527 e, Phdr. 263 d), ὑπερφυῶς ὅσ (Symp. 173 c, Gorg. 496 c), δαυμαστῶς ὅσ (Phaedo 92 a, Symp. 200 a).

§ 198. The Homeric Idiom with τοῖον differs—e.g. in Od.i. 209, θαμά τοῖον, iii. 321, 'Εσ πελαγος μέγα τοῖον, iv. 371, Νήπιος ... Λην τόσον, ib. 776 and vii. 30, σιγῇ τοῖον, xi. 134,'Αδηχρός μάλα τοῖον, xv. 450, Κερδαλέων δῆ τοῖον, xx. 302, Σαρδάνων μάλα τοῖον—'to that degree,'—indicating an imagined, and therefore an intense, degree.

Τοῖον expresses the degree of the epithet preceding; our ὅσ justifies the epithet being there at all.

§ 199. e. Attraction of the entire Antecedent clause (Copula omitted) to the Relative.

Charm. 175 c, οἰδενῶς ὅσον οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον. So Protag. 317 c.

Politic. 308 b, οἰδαμῶς ὅσ οὐ φήσομεν.

§ 200. f. Attraction of the Relative into agreement with the Predicate of its own clause.

Phdr. 255 c, ἡ τοῦ ρεῖματος ἐκείνου πηγή, ὃν ἵμερον Ζεῦς ὄνομασε· (where the Antecedent of ὁν is ρεῖματος.)
Cf. the Homeric Ἡθέμις ἄστιν. II. ix. 276, &c.

§ 201. C.

a. Attraction of a Neuter Pronominal Subject into agreement with the Predicate.

Apol. 18 a, δέομαι . . . τούτῳ σκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.: δικαίου γὰρ αὐτὴ ἄρετὴ
—where of course αὐτὴ refers to τούτῳ σκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.
Soph. 240 b, οὐκ ὡς ἀρα ἐστιν ὄντως ἕν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;
Crat. 386 c, ἐι . . . ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια (referring to what had just been agreed upon).
Minos 317 a, πολιτικὰ ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματα ἄστιν, ὡς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσιν.
Crito 48 c, ὁ δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις . . . , μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέμματα ἡ—where ταῦτα represents τὰς σκέψεις, but has been assimilated to σκέμματα, the Predicate of its own sentence.
Cf. Hom. II. i. 239, σκῆπτρον . . . ὁ δὲ τοῖς μέγας ἐσσεται ὄρκος, ν. 305, ἔνθα τε μηρὸς Ισχὺς ἐνστρέφεται, κοτύλην δὲ τέ μιν καλέουσιν. Hdt. i. 86, ἀκροβίνα ταῦτα (sc. τῶν Κροίσον) καταγείν, Αἰσχ. P. V. 753, "Οτερ βανεῖν μὲν ἐστιν οὐ πεπρωμένον· Αὕτη γὰρ ἦν ἀν πηματῶν ἀπαλλαγῇ. So Virg. Αen. x. 828, Si qua est ea cura.

§ 202. b. Attraction of the Copula into agreement with the Predicate.

Meno 91 e, οὗτοι γε φανερά ἐστι λάβη.
Legg. 735 c, τοὺς μέγιστα ἡμαρτικότατα ἀνάτους δὲ ὄντας, μεγίστην δὲ ὦσαν βλάβην.
Parmen. 134 b, πάντα, ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτάς οὕσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.
Politic. 271 e, θεὸς ἐνεμεν . . . , ζῶον δὲ ἐτέρων θειότερον.

§ 203. c. Attraction of the Article of an Infinitival clause into agreement with a word preceding, with which that clause is in Apposition.

Charm. 173 e, ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐθαίμων εἰναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα.
Legg. 908 c, τῷ δοξῇ, τῷ θεῶν ἔρημα εἰναι πάντα.
§ 204. Idioms of Sentences:—Binary Structure.

Certain Idiomatic affections of the Sentence are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one.

The immediate use of this artifice is to present the conception to the hearer in two parts, which, after entering his mind separately, will there reunite.

The ulterior use is (1) to facilitate a clear expression of a complex conception, and (2) to set before the apprehension two images of the object, as it presents itself at two successive moments; and by this means to give it the same kind of fullness with which the image of material objects is invested by "binocular vision."

This Idiom has been, in certain of its forms, ranked under Apposition. But it does not resemble it except in a nakedly grammatical point of view. Apposition forms but one description of the object, and therefore is no Binary Structure at all: in other words in Apposition the two representations are simultaneous; whereas in the Idiom before us they are substitutive; the thought has moved in the interval between them; and though the one is in some sort a repetition of the other, they are not identical.

§ 205. Examples of this Idiom in its main forms are to be found in all Greek literature; but its applications in Plato are preeminently various and subtle. These are embodied in the following classification.

A. When the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact. The mark of the Binary Structure is that the two sentences are grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton.

Note, that the first-placed sentence always contains something which is unfolded more fully, or restated in another way (sometimes with anacoluthic redundancy of construction) in the latter.

B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

Note, that the first-placed expression is sometimes the less emphatic, or at least the more general, and is introductory to the other; sometimes it is the more emphatic and sufficient, and the other follows epexegetically.
§ 206. Note, that (1) the forestalled portion thus has a degree of attention ensured to it, which, not being always self-evidently emphatic, it might otherwise fail to obtain: and (2) grammatically, the forestalled portion may be said to suffer Attraction,—Attraction, that is, out of the Dependent construction into the Principal construction.

§ 207. A. Where the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact, and grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton. (Note, that the effect of Asyndeton is always to make the connection closer; it is its office to denote simultaneity or rapid sequence.)

a. Common type of instances.

Apol. 41 a, θαυμαστῇ ἄν εἰη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτῶθι,—olesale ἐντύχομι Πα- λαμίδει κ.τ.λ., ἀντιπαραβαίνοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἄν ἄρδες εἰη.

Symp. 198 c, τὸ τοῦ Ὅμερον ἐπετόνθη,—ἐφοβοῦμην κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 67 c, εἰ φοβοῦτο καὶ ἄγανακτοιεῖν, οὐ πολλὴ ἄν ἠλογία εἰη,—εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖστε ίονεν οἱ κ.τ.λ.;

Ib. 68 d, οὔ ταῦτα τοῦτο πεπόθασιν,—ἀκολασία τωι σώφρονές εἰσιν;

Ib. 73 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος,—ἀναμνησθήναι.

So too 74 a, Gorg. 513 c, 519 b, Phileb. 46 c, Menex. 235 b,—in all of which the first-placed expression is formed with πάσχεω.

Ib. 70 a, [ψυχῇ] ἕκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφλεβητᾷ τε καὶ ἀπολλύται, ἡ ἄν ἀνθρωπος ἀποθάνη,—εἰθὲς ἀπαλλαττομένη τῷ σώματος . . . . οἶχηται διαπτωμένη καὶ οἰδήν ἔτι οἴδαμοι ἡ. Here the sentence εἰθὲς . . . . ἡ is the complete double of the sentence ἕκείνῃ . . . . ἀποθάνη.

Ib. 86 b, τοιοῦτον τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν . . . . εἶναι,—οὕσπερ κ.τ.λ., κράσιν εἶναι τούτων κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 505 c, ἢν μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται,—ἀ πρὸ τοῦ δέο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς ὧν ἰκανός γένομαι.

Phileb. 35 e, (A) τί δ’, ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γένηται; (B) Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ; (A) Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀληθῆ κ.τ.λ.;
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 208, 209.

Legg. 697 a, ἃ δὲ τριχῇ διελεῖν ... πειραθῶμεν,—διατεμεῖν χωρὶς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα.

Ib. 708 b, ὅπως μὴ τῶν τῶν ἔσμεν [ὥς κατοικισμὸς] γίγνηται τρόπον,—ἐν γένος ἀπὸ μᾶς ἑνῶν χώρας οἰκίζεται.

This Idiom begins with Homer: see Od. viii. 339, ἄ γὰρ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἂναξ ἐκατησκόλ "Ἀπολλον,—Δεσμοὶ μὲν τρις τόσοι άπείρους ἀρφίς ἔχονεν, ... Αὐτὰρ ἔγων εὐδομὶ παρὰ χρυσῆ 'Αφροδίτῃ. Cf. Aristoph. Lys. 1219, εἴ δὲ πάνω δεῖ τοῦτο δρᾶν, Ὀμίν χαρίζεσθαι, ταλαπωρήσομεν.

Virtually similar is

1 Apol. 20 c, οὐ γὰρ δῆτον σοῦ γένεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἐπεί τοσαίτα φήμη ... γέγονεν,—εἴ μὴ τε ἐπιστευτείς ἄλλοις ἂ οἱ πολλοὶ' (for σοῦ ... πραγματευομένου is a virtual protasis, of which εἰ ... πολλοὶ is the double.)

Cf. Thuc. v. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφήναι ἃν παράσχοιτε, εἴ μὴ περιγίνουσθε.

§ 208. b. 13 Instances involving anacoluthic redundancy.

Phileb. 13 b, οὐκ ἢ γάρ τυν συνχωρήσεσθαι,—θέμενοι κ.τ.λ., εἰτὰ ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος κ.τ.λ.;

Crito 45 e, μὴ δοξῆ ἢ τὸ πράγμα ... ἀναθράπτῃ ... κακία καὶ ἀναθράπτῃ διασφευγόναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν.

1 Apol. 26 e, οὐτωσὶ σοι δοκοῖ,—οὐδένα νομίζω θεόν εἶναι; [So Oxon. alone. See note at p. 69, above.]

Legg. 859 d, εἶναι τοὺς δικαίους ἀνθρώπους, ἃν καὶ τυχχάνωσι κ.τ.λ,—κατ᾿ αὐτό γε ... παγκίλους εἶναι.

Ib. 933 b, ἐπιστειρῶν πείθειν, ἃν ποτε ἄρα ἰδοθεὶ κ.τ.λ,—οἰλεγομένῳ τῶν τοιούτων διακελεύεσθαι.

§ 209. c. In Similes or Comparisons. In such cases there is great tendency to the Binary Structure: the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it. Note, that in these cases the pre-statement is often broken off or merely hinted at, so that the full sense is first expressed in the re-statement. (This is especially noticeable in expressions involving δοκεῖ or the like.) The instances in other authors begin with Homer: e. g. Π. ix. 13, ἂν δ᾿ Ἀγαμέμνων ἢστατο διακρυχέων, ὡστε κρήνη μελάνυθρος ... ὡς ὁ βαρύς στενάχων ἢτε Ἀργείουσι μετηώδα. Cf. also Soph.

13 [In the margin of the MS. is written—"Quere. Are these really distinct from those given in § 207?"]
As a variation, the Binary Structure is sometimes developed in the illustration, and then there is no re-statement of the illustrated fact,—this being implied sufficiently in the re-statement of the illustration.

Plato 60 c, δια τόν ἔτερον παραγένηται ἑπακολουθεῖ ὦστερον καὶ τό ἔτερον ὦστερον ὦν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἑοικεν, ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ.,—ἡκεν δὴ φαίνει τα ἑπακολουθεῖν τό ἡδοῦ.

Charm. 136 b, ἐστὶ γὰρ τοιαύτῃ [ἡ ἐρωτήγ.] οἷα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μοῦν ἐγια ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὦστερ ἢτω ἦδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ.,—λέγουσί ποι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

§ 211. d. Pairs of Interrogative sentences, the former of which is partly Pronominal,—a skeleton sentence, which is put forward to arrest attention, and to introduce the re-statement, of which it is
the double. The Pronominal part is the Interrogative τί, which represents the Predicate, or part of the Predicate, of the re-statement. These Binary Interrogative sentences therefore follow the general principle of Double Interrogatives in Greek; which is, that the one introduces the other,—the first-placed being always the less precise and definite.

Phdr. 234 c, τί σου φαίνεται ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυὸς εἰρήσθαι;—where τί foreshadows ὑπερφυὸς εἰρήσθαι. (Cf. Symp. 204 d, ὁ ἑρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρά; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ.)

Ib. 269 a, τί δὲ τῶν μελέτηρων "Ἀδραστόν αὐτῆσθαι ἢ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσιαν κ.τ.λ.; πότερον χαλεπῶς ἢν αὐτοὺς . . . εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ.;

Charm. 154 d, τί σου φαίνεται ὁ νεωίκης; οὐκ εὑρύσκωσος;

Phileb. 27 c, τί δὲ ὁ σῶς [βίοσ]; ἐν τίνι γένει ἢν λέγοιτο;

Ib. 56 e, τί δὲ λογιστικὴ κ.τ.λ.; πότερον ὠς μία λεκτέων;

Phdr. 277 d, τί β' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλῶν ἡ αἰσχρῶν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν κ.τ.λ.; ἄρα οὖν δεδήλωκε τὰ λεξέστα . . . ὡς κ.τ.λ.;—τί foreshadows ὡς κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἡ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει;

Soph. 260 e, τί δὲ τὴν ἡμέτεραν τέχνην; ἄρ' οὐκ αἰτήν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικὴ φήσομεν ποιεῖν;

Phaedo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . . ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἡ κ.τ.λ.; (where the Genitive is suspended in a loose construction, which the re-statement supersedes.)

Gorg. 474 d, τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάστα εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλὰ; Here the virtual Subject of the re-statement is foreshadowed by τόδε, which therefore is Nominative; and the Predicate by τί, which (as in all the other instances) is Accusative.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 101, τί γὰρ δὴ πάσος ὁ τοῦ Λαερτίου; Ποῦ σοι τύχης ἔστηκεν;

§ 212. The passages also (quoted under 'Accusative Case,' §§ 15–19, above), in which a Pronoun Accusative is in Apposition to a whole sentence following, are virtually of Binary Structure: for the Accusative is the shadow of a sentence.

§ 213. B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

a. Where the first-placed expression is the less logically specific, or the less emphatic, and is introductory to the other.
§§ 214, 215.]  BINARY STRUCTURE.  209

a. Where it is a Noun-phrase.

Apol. 37 c, τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένη ἄρχῃ, τοίς ἐνδεκα.
Phaedo 65 d, λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι κ.τ.λ.,—τῆς
οὕσις, δι’ τυγχάνει ἑκαστὸν ὕπ.
Ib. 81 e, τὸν ἐνυπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμή.
Ib. 82 b, εἰς ταύτων, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος.
Ib. 113 a, τῶν τετελευτηκότων, τῶν πολλῶν.
Symp. 215 b, τοῖς Σατύρῳ, τῷ Μαρσύῳ.
Euthyd. 274 e, τὸ πράγμα, τὴν ἀρετὴν, μαθητῶν εἶναι.
Crat. 415 a, τὸ ὅνομα ἡ μηχανή.
Ib. 435 c, τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρησθαί, τῇ ἐνυθηκή.
Protag. 317 b, εὐλαβείαν ταύτην οὕμα βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολο-
γευν μᾶλλον ἡ ἐξαρφεν εἶναι.
Charm. 173 e, ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ εὐδαιμονια εἶναι τῶν ἐπιστημόνων
ζωντα.
Legg. 908 c, τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ὑρμα εἰναι πάντα.
Gorg. 462 c, οὐκόων καλῶν σοὶ δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι,—χαρίζεσθαι οἷῶν
τ’ εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

§ 214. Β. Where it is Pronominal.

Euthyphro 8 e, τοῦτο μὲν ἄληθες λέγεις, τὸ κεφάλαιον.
:Apol. 24 e, αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.
Crat. 423 c, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μμείσθαι δύναι το ἑκάστου, τὴν ὀνομ.
Gorg. 500 c, οὗ τί ἄν μᾶλλον σπουδάσει τις, ἢ τοῦτο, δύναμι χρὴ
τρόπων εἶν; (the two expressions are o’ and ἡ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.)
Ib. 518 a, ταῦτα μὲν δοιλοπρεπεῖς εἶναι, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας.
Phileb. 38 b, ἔπεται ταῦτας . . . ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἄληθεὶ καὶ
ψευδεὶ δόξῃ λέγω.
Tim. 22 d, οἷ μὲν εὖ τοῖς ὁρεῖ διασώζονται, βουκολοὶ νομεῖ τε.
Protag. 351 a, τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν.
Rep. 396 c, ὃ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἃν’ ὅ’ ἐγὼ, μέτρυοι ἀμὴρ, ἐθελήσειν.
Legg. 861 d, τῶν δυνῶν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐμοί, τὸ γε μὴ λέγεις κ.τ.λ.
Symp. 198 d, τὸ δὲ ἄρα οὐκ οὔτο ἢν, τὸ καλὸς ἐπαινεῖν ὀτιόν.
Ib. 207 d, δύναται δὲ ταύτη μόνον, τῇ γενέσει.
Ib. 222 a, ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενοι . . . νοού ἐχοντας ἔνυσθαι εὐρήσει, τῶν
λόγων.

Add to these the frequently-recurring expression ἡ δ’ ὡς ὅ δ’ ἕως ἡ Ὁκράτης.

§ 215. Under this head come also the instances of αὐτό in its
peculiar Platonic meaning.
Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.
Phaedo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο . . . ψυχήν.
Protag. 360 e, τὸ πορ’ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀρετή.
Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ἢ νόησις.
Rep. 363 a, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες.

§ 216. γ. Where it is a Relative clause.
Rep. 402 b, οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε οὗ φαμεν ἡμῖν παθέντεον εἶναι, τοὺς φύλακας.
Phaedo 74 d, οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ἵσοις. Similarly Hip. Ma. 291 c, Gorg. 469 a, Protag. 342 b, Crito 48 c, Legg. 653 c, &c.
Crat. 422 b, ἀ ἐστή, τὰ ὀνόματα. Similarly Phileb. 42 e.
Tim. 33 a, ἦν ἐνωστι, τὰ σώματα.
Hip. Ma. 294 a, ὃ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχωσι.
Symp. 200 d, εἰκόναν ἔρων, ὃ οὔτω ἐτοιομὸν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῖται εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα.
Theæt. 167 b, ἢ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα . . . ὀληθῆς καλούσιν—‘ and these, I mean their opinions, some call true.’
Tim. 40 b, ἐκ ἡς ἐς ὑής αἰτίας γέγονεν ὅσα . . . ἐς μένει—‘ and hence, from this cause namely, arise,’ &c.
Legg. 647 a, φοβοῦμεθα δὲ γε πολλάκις δοξάν . . . ὅν δὴ καὶ καλούμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε . . . αἰσχύνην.

Another explanation might have been conceived of some of these passages, that they are simply cases of Antecedent and Relative in reversed order. But this would not apply to the last five; consequently, all must be referred to the principle of Binary Structure. It is to be noticed, that the operation of Attraction, probably in the three last instances, certainly in two of them, complicates the case; i. e. that the Relatives agree not with their Antecedents, but respectively with ὃς φάντασμα, and ὑῆς αἰτίας. See ‘Attraction,’ § 201, above.

Cf., as instances in other authors, Ἀσεχίν. i. 72. p. 10, δὲν . . . ἥκουσε τῶν νόμων. And Soph. Ant. 404, βάπτουσαν ὅν σὺ τῶν νεκρῶν Ἀπείτας—‘him whom thou forbadest to bury, namely that corpse’ (the order is hyperbatic).

§ 217. Not to be identified with the foregoing are the following, which contain an implicit sentence, though it has been operated on by Ellipse, and in the first two by Attraction also.
Soph. 246 c, ὑπὲρ ὑς τίθεναι τῆς οὐσίας—i. e. ὑπὲρ [τοῦ] ὁ τίθεναι τῆς οὐσίαν εἶναι.
BINARY STRUCTURE.

Gorg. 477 a, ἀστερ ἑγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὀφέλειαν—i. e. [τοῦτο] ὑπέρ ἑγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὀφέλειαν εἶναι.

Phædo 78 d, ἦς λόγον διδομέν τοῦ εἶναι—where ἦς is the Predicate and τοῦ εἶναι the Subject of a sentence of which the Copula is suppressed.

§ 218. b. Where the first-placed expression is the more emphatic and sufficient of the two.

a. Common type of instances.

Gorg. 503 c, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὡτινα βούλει αὐτῶν.

Critias 110 c, πάνθ’ ὁσα ξύνωμα ζώα ... παν δυνατῶν πέφυκεν.

Phdr. 246 c, ἢ δὲ ... [ψυχή] ... σῶμα γήινον λαβοῦσα, ζώον τὸ εὔμ-παν ἐκλήθη.

Phædo 61 b, οὐς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους ... , τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρώτους ἐνέτυχον.

Ib. 69 b, χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως, ... μὴ σκιαγραφία τὶς ἢ τὴν αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ.

Ib. 105 a, ὃ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ ... , αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν ἐναντίωση η μηδέ-ποτε δέξασθαι.

Crat. 408 a, τὸ ἐρμηνεύει εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἡγελον κ.τ.λ., περὶ λόγον δύναμιν ἐστὶ πᾶσα αὐτῇ ἡ πραγματεία.

Legg. 668 d, τῶν μεμημένων δὲ τοι ποτὲ ἐστιν, ἐκαστὸν τῶν σωμάτων.

Ib. 734 e, καθάπερ ὅν ὅν τινα ξυνυφὴν ἢ καὶ πλέγμ’ ἄλλ’ όσιον οἷκ ἣ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅιν τ’ ἐστὶ τὴν τ’ ἐφυφήν καὶ τῶν στῆμαν ἀπεργαξέσθαι.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1062, αὐτὸν ... σῶμα τυμβεύσαι τάφῳ, Ι 147, Οὗτο δὲ καὶ σε καὶ τὸ σοῦ λάβρον στόμα ... τάχ’ ἂν τὶς ... Χειμῶν κατασβε-σει τὴν πολλῆς βοήν.

§ 219. A curious variation occurs in

Protag. 317 a, τὸ ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδράναι ... , πολλῆ μορία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχείρήματος.

Phædo 99 a, εἴ τις λέγῃ ... δὲ διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἡ ποιῶ, ... , πολλῆ ἄν καὶ μακρὰ ραθυμία εἰπ τοῦ λόγου.

§ 220. β. Where the first-placed expression is collective, the other distributive.

Symp. 178 a, τούτων ἐμῶν ἑρώ ἐκάστον τῶν λόγων.

Ib. 190 d, αὐτοῦ διατείμ δίχα ἐκαστὸν.

Tim. 32 b, πρὸς ἄλληλα ... ἀπεργασάμενος, δ’ τ’ περ πὺρ πρὸς ἄερα τοῦτο ἄερα πρὸς ὑδάρω, καὶ δ’ τ’ ἄτρ πρὸς ὑδαρ’ ὑδαρ’ πρὸς γῆν.

We may trace this back to Homer: e. g. Od. i. 348, οὗτε δίδωσιν
§ 221. γ. Where the latter expression is restrictive of the former, being in fact only a re-enunciation of part of it.

Phædo 64 b, οἵμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . . ξυμφάναι ἂν, τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνδρόπονς καὶ πάνω.

Gorg. 517 ε, δῶξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἶδότι ὦτι κ.τ.λ.


§ 222. ḿ. Where the latter expression is merely pronominal, and resumptive.

Grammatically, the pronominal resumption is (where no change of construction intervenes) a pleonasm: but rhetorically it is not redundant. Its function is to recall to the thoughts in its proper place an expression which has, for a special purpose, been set in advance of the main portion of the sentence, or which has been held in suspense by the intervention of some Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause, or some change of construction.

Instances of main portion of sentence intervening.

Theæt. 155 ε, εὰν σοι ἀνδρὶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀληθείαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν.

Apol. 40 δ, οἵμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἴδιωτῃ τινά, ἄλλα τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐφραυμίτους ἃν εὑρέω ταύτων ταύτας.

Rep. 375 d, οἴσθη γὰρ ποὺ τῶν γενναῖων κυρῶν ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἱθός.

Larg. 700 ε, τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παθεῖσιν δεδομενῶν ἀκούειν ἢν αὐτῶι.

Phileb. 30 d (though the pronoun here has more force), ἄλλ᾽ ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφημαμένοις ὡς ἀρχεῖ ξύμμαχος ἐκείνως.

Rep. 353 d, τὸ ἑπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἐσθ' ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἡ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοθέν; 

Cf. Soph. O. Τ. 717, Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι Τρεῖς καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ.
§ 223. Instances of Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause intervening.

Syrm. 200 a, πότερον ὁ ἄρως ἑκείνου, οὐ ἐστὶν ἄρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτὸν;
Similarly Charm. 195 a.

Theæt. 188 b, ἃ μὴ οδεῖ, ἥγειται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἐτερα;
Phaedo 104 d, ἀ τι ἀν κατάσχη, ἀναγκάζει . . . αὐτὸ ἵσχεν, and similarity in the next sentence.

Ib. 111 c, τοὺς δὲ, βαθύτεροις ὄντας, τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν.
Aleib. I. 115 e, τὸ ἁρα βοσθεῖν . . . , ἤ μὲν καλὸν κ.τ.λ., καλὸν αὐτὸ προσείπασ;

Legg. 625 a, τούτον οὖν φαίμεν ἄν ἡμεῖς . . . , ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν κ.τ.λ., τούτον τὸν ἔπαινον αὐτῶν εἰληφέναι.

§ 224. Instances of change of construction intervening.

Tim. 37 d, ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐναυτοῦ οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν ὄνομαν γενέσθαι, τότε ἄμα ἑκείνῳ ἐξυπνατέμενῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μυχανάτα.

Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὁπόσοι . . . ἀνοήτως δοξάζοντοι, καθύπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαίωτατον ἐπεσθι ποίς μὲν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 13 b, κακὰ δὲ ὄντι αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἁγαθὰ δὲ, ὅμως σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἁγαθὰ αὐτά. [For it is αὐτῶν, not τὰ πολλὰ, which is represented by αὐτὰ.]

Hip. Ma. 292 d, ὃ παντὶ ὧν προσγένηται ύπάρχει ἑκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι.

§ 225. Note, that caution is needed before applying this explanation of the resumptive Pronoun. For instance, in Phdr. 265 c, τούτον δὲ τινῶν . . . ῥήθειν ὄνων εἰδῶν, εἰ αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν κ.τ.λ., the τούτον . . . εἰδῶν is a Genitive Absolute. So Symp. 195 a, φημὶ οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμών ὄντων ἔρωτα . . . εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι αὐτῶν,—πάντων . . . ὄντων is a Genitive Absolute. (For the construction, cf. Laches 182 b, ἐπιτιθεμένων ἄλλου ἀμίνασθαί αὐτὸν.) Again, Laches 182 d, τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν τοῦτο εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ μάθημα . . . , χρῆ αὐτὸ μαθάνειν,—ὁπλιτικὸν is Nominative. (Cf. a similar construction Symp. 202 b.) Again, Rep. 439 b, τοῦ τοῦτον οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὃτι αὐτὸν ἄμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τάξον ἀπωθεώται τε καὶ προσέλκουσι, ἄλλο ὃτι ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθούσα χείρ, κ.τ.λ.,—τοῦ τοῦτον belongs to the sentence ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθούσα χείρ, κ.τ.λ.

§ 226. C. Dependent sentence resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction and premising a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts co-ordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.
The premised expression may be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Euthyd. 294 c, ὅσον ὑπόθεσον, ὥσποσ εἶδον τὸ ἐξεῖ;
Hip. Ma. 283 a, τεκμήριον σοφίας τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, ὡσον διαφέρονσι.
Phædo 75 b, εἰπήφατας ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸν τοῦ ἢςο, τι τι ἐστὶν.
Theæt. 162 d–e, θεών ... ὥσ εὖ ὡς εἰσίν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, ἡξαιρῶ.
Phædo 86 d, Κέθητος ἀκούσα, τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.
Ib. 95 b, ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαμε καὶ τὸν Κάδμον λόγον εἰ πάθει.
Laches 179 e, εἰπήγησάτο οὖν τις ἡμῖν καὶ τούτο τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἰπ μαθεῖν τὸ ἐν ὅπλος μίχεσθαι.
Gorg. 449 c, δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμμοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτῶμεν ὑγαίνοιον.
Note, that a very loose government suffices for the premised expression, as in the three instances following.

Soph. 260 a, δεὶ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, τί ποι' ἐστὶν.
Ibid. d, τὰν εἰδωλοποιήκην ... διαμάχητ' ἀν ... ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἐστίν.

Protag. 354 a, οὗ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγετε, οἷον τὰ τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατεύων κ.τ.λ.—ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ;

In the two remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the principal sentence.

Gorg. 448 d, δήλος γάρ μοι Πώλος ... , ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν ... μεμελέθηκεν.
Phædo 64 a, κατ'υνεύουσιν ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύονοι.

The form illustrated by some of the above examples is of course common enough in all authors, beginning with Homer: cf. Od. xvii. 373, Λεγένδν δ' οὐ σάφει οἶδα, πόθεν γένος εἰχεται εἰναι, xviii. 374, Τῷ κέ μ' ὅϊος, εἰ ἄλκα διηρκεία προταμοίμην. The looser governments are illustrated by Thuc. iii. 51, ἐβούλετο δὲ Νικίας ... τοὺς Πελοποννησίους, ὤτοις μὴ ποιῶνται ἐκπλούς, Aristoph. Αν. 1269, Δεινῶν γε τοῦ κήρυκα, τῶν παρά τοὺς βρατοὺς Οἰχόμενον, εἰ μηδέποτε νοστήσει πάλιν.

§ 227. a. The Dependent sentence being an Infinitival one.

Leegg. 653 a, φρόνησιν δὲ [λέγω, εἰναι] εἴναι εἰτεχεὶς ὅταν καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο.
Crat. 419 d, οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τὸ διῶτι ῥήθηνα.
Phdr. 242 b, ἰδίως γεγενήσθαι λόγῳ τῷ ῥήθηνα.
Symp. 207 a, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἴναι ἄει ἔρως ἐστίν.
In the remaining instance the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Charm. 153 b, ἥγγελται... ἡ μάχη πάνυ ἵσχυρὰ γεγονέναι.

§ 228. Note, that Attraction occurs, where possible, in the residuary Dependent sentence also; as in the remaining instances.

Phædo 90 b, ἐπειδὼ τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινί, ἀληθεὶ εἰναι.

Crat. 425 b, σὺ πιστεύεις σαυτῷ, οἷς ἡ ἀν ἐναι—attracted for οἶνον ἡ ἐναι σε.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, ἐφθάνουν τοῖς ἐαυτῶν παισίν, ὡς βελτίστους γενέσθαι.

Rep. 459 b, δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων.

Euthyd. 282 d, οἶνον ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρηπτικῶν λόγων εἴναι.

§ 229. b. Or the premised expression may not be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

Consequently redundancy, implicit or explicit, often occurs, as in some of the instances which follow, in which ἱ is prefixed to the words in which the redundancy lies.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Phædo 58 e, εὑδαίμων μοι ἀνήρ ἐφαινετο καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἄδεως καὶ γενναίος ἐτελεύτα. [ἀνήρ Herm. with Oxo. and most of the other MMS.]

Crito 43 b, σὲ... εὑδαίμωνα τοῦ τρόπου, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν φέρεις.

Phdr. 264 d, τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποθολῆς, δεὶ ἢν ψυχῆς ἄπορρει.

Symp. 172 a, διαστυβέσθαι τὴν Λαγάθωνος ἐξουσίαν... περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, τίνες ἦσαν.

Euthyd. 272 b, οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἢδη πρεσβύτερος ἦς;

Politic. 309 d, τὸν δὴ πολιτικὸν... ἀρ' ἅμεν, ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνατὸν εἴναι τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μουσῆς ἃ τοῦτο αὐτῷ ἐμποιεῖν;

Protag. 318 e, εὐβοῦλα περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἄν... ὧκιάν διοικοῖ.

Tim. 24 c, τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὀρῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κατεδούσα, ὅτι φρονυμοτάτου ἀνδρᾶς οἶσον—(sc. ὁ τόπος, referred to in αὐτῷ.)

Critias 108 b, προλέγω σοι τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου διάνοιαν, ὅτι θαυμαστῶς ὁ πρότερος εὐδοκίμηκεν ἐν ἃ αὐτῷ ποιητῇ.

Apol. 25 c, ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἁμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδείν σοι ἁμάλληκε.

Meno 96 c, ὄμολογήκαμεν τούτῳ γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος ἔχοι.

Phædo 65 d, τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἐκαστὸν ἂν ὄν. (Cf. § 213, above.)

Meno 72 b, μελίτης περὶ οὐσίας, δὲ τὸ πον ἐστι.
Cf. Thuc. v. 16, Πλευστοίναζ... ἐς εὐθυμίαν τοῖς Λακεδαίμονίων ἀεὶ προσδιάλομενος, ὡς διὰ τὴν ἡ ἐκείνου κάθοδον παρανομηθείσαν ταύτα ἐξυμβαίνοι.

In the three remaining instances, the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Phædo 82 a, δὴ λα δὴ καὶ τάλλα, οἳ ἂν ἐκάστη ἦν, κατὰ τὰς αὑτῶν ὀμοιότητας τῆς μελετῆς—which means δὴλον δὴ ὡς καὶ τάλλα ἐσταί, τούτουσι οἳ ἂν ἐκάστη ἦν. κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δὴλα τὰ παρόντα, ὅτι οἱ τ’ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι—which means δὴλον ὅτι οἱ τ’ εἰσὶν... ἐξεργάζεσθαι, τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἔργον ἐστίν αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα.

Ib. 45 e, μὴ δῦξῃ ἀπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀναθρία τοι τῆ ἡμετέρα πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἰσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς... εἰςήλ-θες, κ.τ.λ.

§ 230. 3. The Dependent sentence being Infinitival.

Symp. 197 a, τὴν τῶν ζώων ποίησιν τὸς ἐναντίωστεσα, μὴ οὐχὶ "Ερωτος εἰναι σοφίαν ἢ ἵγινεται τε καὶ φύεται πάντα τὰ ζῶα;

Phædo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τῶν Συμμιαν ὑπέρεχεν Σωκράτους, οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθές ἔχειν.

Legg. 641 d, τὸ ἀληθὲς δισυχρίζεσθαι, ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.

Rep. 489 e, διῆμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἰοὶ ἀνάγκη φύνα τῶν καλῶν τῆς κάγαθον εὐώμενον.

Ib. 443 b, ἀρχήμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν.

Gorg. 513 e, ἐπιχειρητεύον ἥμιν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν.

Legg. 790 c, ἡγημεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διασπερ-αινειν.

Politic. 285 c, τοῖς μὲν τῶν ὀντων, μαθίως καταμαθεῖν, αἰσθηταὶ ὑπερ ὀμοιότητας πεψύκασι.

Hip. Ma. 294 e, οἴχεται ἃρ ἥμι ἱαπεσεφυγός τὸ καλὸν, γνῶναι ὃ τῇ ποτ’ ἐστίν.

Crito 52 b, οὐδ’ ἐπιθύμησα σε ᾧλλης πόλεως ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι.

Critias 115 d, ἔως εἰς ἐκπληξιν μεγέθεσι τε καλλεστὶ τε ἐργνω ἵδειν τὴν οἰκήσαν ἀπειράσαντο.

Phædo 84 c, ὡς ιδέιν ἐφαίνετο.

Apol. 33 b, παρέχω ἐμαυτῶν ἐρωτάν.

Cf. Hom. II. vii. 409, οὗ γὰρ τις φειδι νεκύων κατατεθηρῶτων Γίγνετ’, ἐπεί κε βάνως, πυρὸς μελισσέμεν ὁκα.
Virtually similar is
Phileb. 26 b, ἢ βρῶν ... κατεδώσα ἡ θεὸς, πέρας, ... οὐδὲν ... ἐκὸν.
In the remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.
Apol. 37 d, καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἰ, ἐξελθόντι ... ζην.
Protag. 313 a, ἐν θεῷ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ σά, ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν—(sc. σε.)
Rep. 525 b, προσήκου τὸ μάθημα ἂν εὖ νομοθετήσαι καὶ πειθεῖν τοῦς
μελλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξειν επὶ † λογιστικὴν ιέναι.
Gorg. 449 b–c, εἰςὶ μὲν ἕναι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀνυγκαίᾳ διὰ μακρὸν
† τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι.
Euthyd. 281 d, κυδωνεύει ἡμιπαντα ἀ κ.τ.λ., οὐ περὶ τοῦτον ὁ λόγος
αὐτοῖς εἶναι ὡσε κ.τ.λ.
Cf. Thuc. viii. 46, εὐτελέστερα δὲ τὰ δεινά, † βραχεὶ μορίῳ τῆς
dαπάνης, καὶ ἄμα μετὰ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, αὐτοῖς περὶ ἐαυτοῦ τοὺς
ἐλληνας κατατρίψαι.

§ 231. Idioms of Sentences:—Abbreviated Construction.

A. Antecedent and Relative clauses supplying each other's Ellipses.

Symp. 212 c, ὅ τι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις ὅνυμάζων, τοῦτο ὅνυμαζε—where we must supplement the Antecedent sentence thus—τοῦτο καὶ
ταύτῃ ὅνυμαζε.

Phædo 98 a, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἂ πάσχει—where the
Relative sentence intended is fully ἂ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ.

Symp. 178 a, ὅ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὅν ἐδοξήσει μοι ἄξιομοσμόνεντο, τοῦτων
ὑμῖν ἐρώ ἔκαστον τοῦ λόγου—where the Antecedent sentence
fully is τοῦτων ἔκαστον τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ταῦτα, ὑμῖν ἐρώ.

§ 232. B. Ellipses supplied from parallel constructions in co-ordinate clauses.

Phædo 62 a, τυγχάνει ... ἐστιν ὅτε καὶ οἰς βελτίων τεθύνατε ἡ ζῆν.
ois δὲ βελτίων τεθύνατε, θαυμάστων ... ei τούτων τοῖς ἄνθρώποις μὴ
ὅσιν ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.,—where after ois δὲ must be supposed to be repeated καὶ ὅτε, and after τούτως τοῖς ἄνθρώποις similarly καὶ τότε.

1b. 69 b, τοῦτον μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ὀνομένα τε καὶ πυπρασκό-
μένα ... μετὰ φρονήσεως—where must be supplied φρονήσεως καὶ before μετὰ φρονήσεως, parallel to τοῦτο καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον.
Politic. 258 a, Θεατήτῳ ... συννέμεια χθες διὰ λόγων καὶ νῦν ἄχικοα, Ἐσωκράτους δὲ οἰδέτερα—where the clauses supply each other crosswise; ἄχικοα requires the Genitive Θεατήτου, and οἰδέτερα implies a Ἐσωκράτει parallel to Θεατήτῳ, as well as a Ἐσωκράτους.

§ 233. C. Dependent Noun silently supplied from one of two co-ordinate clauses to the other, in a new and different government.

Apol. 19 d, ἀξίω ὑπᾶς ἀνελήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν—where ἀνελήλους is to be supplied to φράζειν.

Laches 187 d, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγου παρ’ ἀνελήλους—where ἀνελήλους is to be supplied to διδόντες.

Legg. 934 e, δεδασκέτω καὶ μανθανότω τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα—το μανθανο-νετῶ supply παρὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος.

Protag. 349 a, σὲ παρακαλεῖν ... καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι—sc. σοί.

Phdr. 238 e, τῷ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ, δουλεύοντι τε—sc. ἐπιθυμία.

Ib. 278 e, πρὸς ἀνελήλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν—sc. ἀπ’ ἀνελήλου.

Symp. 195 b, μετὰ δὲ νέων αἰς ξύνεττι τε καὶ έστιν, i. e. καὶ έστι τῶν νέων.

Cf. Xen. Hell. I. iii. 9, ὄρκους ἑλάβον καὶ ἔδοσαν παρὰ Φαρναβάζου.

§ 234. D.¹⁴ New Subject in the second of two clauses silently supplied from the former.

Rep. 333 c, ὅταν μυθέν δη αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ κέισθαι—sc. αὐτό.

Symp. 212 c, δύραν ψόφον παρασχεῖν, ... καὶ αὐλητρίδος φωνήν ἀκούειν—sc. αὐτοῖς, from αὐτοῖς implied by παρασχεῖν.

Ib. 187 e, ὅτως ἀν τὴν μὲν ἡδονήν αὐτοῦ καρπώσηται, ἀκολασίαν δὲ μυθεμίαν ἐμποίησθη—sc. ἡ ἡδονή.

Rep. 414 d, ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάσχειν τε, καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῖς—sc. ταύτα.

Phaedo 58 b, νόμος ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦτο καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτινώναι—sc. αὐτοῖς.

Ib. 72 c, λήρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἐνδείξει καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φαύνωτο—sc. Ἐνδυμίων.

Apol. 40 a, ἄ γε δὴ οὐδέθειν ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται έσχατα κακῶν εἶναι—where the Nominative to νομίζεται is ἄ supplied from the preceding Accusative ἄ. (This is an instance of the next head also.)

¹⁴ [Under this section is written in the MS. "Illustr. from Homer:" and so under §§ 235, 269, 300, 301, 308, "Illustr." but the illustrations were never put in.]
§ 235. E. Relative Pronoun, in a new and different government, supplied to the second clause.

Symp. 200 d, δ' οὖτω ἐτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὔδε ἔχει.

Ib. 201 a, οὗ ἐνδείκτης ἐστιν, καὶ μη ἔχει.

Phædo 65 a, ό μηδὲν ἡδο τῶν τουτών, μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτών.

Gorg. 482 b, ἀ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρήσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένους.

Menex. 243 c, δὲν χρῆ ἀεί μεμνημονὰ τε καὶ ἑπανεῖν.

§ 236. In the following passages, the force of the Relative is still to be supplied, although a Demonstrative Pronoun fills its place in the construction.

Rep. 357 b, ἥδωναί ὅσαί ἀνθρωπεῖς καὶ μηδὲν διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται.

Ib. 395 d, ὃν φαίμεν ἴδεςθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοῦ ἀνδρας ἄγαθον γενέσθαι.

Phædo 100 b, ἀ εἴ μοι δίδωσ τε καὶ ἑγγεχορεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα.

Virtually similar is Rep. 337 ε, πρῶτον μὲν μή εἴδως, ἓπειτα...

§ 237. F. Common part supplied from a preceding to a subsequent clause.

a. Definite Article.

The brackets indicate where Articles have to be supplied. The complete irregularity with which they are expressed and omitted shews that the object is, next to conciseness, to produce variety of expression and sound.

Rep. 344 c, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος ἐξυμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὡς, τὸ δ' ἄδικον [ ] ἐαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν.

Ib. 438 b-c, τὰ πλεῖον πρὸς τὰ ἑλάττω ... καὶ αὗ [ ] βαρύτερα πρὸς [ ] κονφότερα καὶ [ ] βάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα.

Ib. 477 a, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνώσις, ἀγνώσια δ' ἐπὶ [ ] μή ὄντι.

Ib. 544 c, ἥ τε ... ἐπαινομένη, ἡ Κρητική ... καὶ [ ] δεύτερα ... καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία.

Ib. 545 a, τὸν φιλόνεικον ... καὶ [ ] ὀλιγαρχικόν αὐ καὶ [ ] δημοκρατικόν καὶ τῶν τυραννικῶν.

Phædo 67 d, χαρισμός τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ [ ] σώματος. [So Oxon.]

Gorg. 469 c, καὶ τὰ γε Ἀθηναῖων νεώρια καὶ [ ] τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα, [So most MSS.]

Symp. 186 e, ἥ τε λατρική ..., ὅσαῦτος δὲ καὶ [ ] γυμναστική καὶ [ ] γεωργία.
Phdr. 253 d, ἀρετή δὲ τίς τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ, ή [ ] κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείστομεν.
Phileb. 45 a, μείζους γένονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας . . . , ἡ περὶ [ ] ἑγαίνοντας;
Legg. 789 c, τοὺς μὲν ἑλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, [ ] μείζους δ’ ὑπὸ τὴν ἁγάλην.
Ib. 960 c, [ ] Λάξεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην, [ ] Κλαωθόν δὲ τὴν δεύτεραν, τὴν "Ἀτροπον δὲ [ ] τρίτην.

§ 238. b. Preposition.
Symp. 209 d, καὶ εἰς ὁμηρον βλέψας καὶ Ἡσιόδον.
Apol. 25 b, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. So Phædo 111 d, &c.

§ 239. e. Some larger part of the clause.
Politic. 308 e, τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν . . . δόσα ἐστι τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἄλλ’ εἰς ἀθέωτητα.

§ 240. G. Anastroplie; that is, the supplying of a word from a subsequent to a former clause. The object is, as Dissen (Pind. Nem. x. 38) remarks, to give liveliness to the sentence by strengthening the later clauses of it.
The use of this figure is more extensive in poetry than in prose; the following species of it, however, occur in Plato.

a. Anastroplie of Definite Article. (This is the converse of the usage considered under the last head.)
Rep. 491 d, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων.
Phileb. 35 e, ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθορὰν.
Legg. 795 b, διαφέρει μαθών μὴ μαθώντος, καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου.

§ 241. b. Anastroplie of Pronouns in Correlative clauses.
Rep. 455 e, καὶ γυνὴ λατρεῖ, ή δ’ οὖ. So 451 e.
Symp. 207 d, νέος αἰὴ γιγανόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύσ—where we must supply τὰ μὲν το νέος γιγανόμενος.
Phædo 105 d—e, (Ἀ) τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἄν μουσικόν μὴ δέχηται [τὶ δυναμέσομεν]; (Β) "Ἀμουσον, τὸ δὲ δίδικον—where before ἄμουσον must be supplied τὸ μὲν. So Soph. 221 e, 248 a, Phileb. 36 e, &c.
Theaet. 191c, κύριον ἐκμαγεῖον, . . . τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληρωτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ἑγροτέρου—where before σκληρωτέρου must be supplied ἐνίοις μὲν.

Apol. 18d, ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ . . . χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπειράμενοι ἅλλους πείθοντες—where before φθόνῳ must be supplied οἱ μὲν.

Cf. Hom. II. xi. 536, ἃφ' ἵππειων ὀπλέων ραθάμιγγες ἦθαλλον, Αἶ δ' ἀπ' ἐπισημώτερων, xxii. 157, παραδραμέτηρ, φεύγων, ὁ δ' ὡσπερ διόκων, ix. 511, Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δώρα φέρω, τὰ δ' ὠπισθ' ὠνομάζοι, Od. iii. 33, κρέα ὁπτων ἄλλα δ' ἑπειρον, xiv. 232, Τῶν ἐξαιρεύμην μενεικέα, πολλά δ' ὀπίσω Λάγχανον (i. e. πολλὰ μὲν μενεικέα).

§ 242. c. Anastrophe of Correlative Adverbs.

Theaet. 192d, ἀκούω, . . . τότε δὲ αἰσθήσων οὐδεμίαν ἔχω.

Phaedo 116a, διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τότε δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξόντες—where τότε must be supplied before διαλεγόμενοι. So also Critias 119d, Phileb. 35e, Tim. 22e.

The leaving μὲν to be supplied from an expressed δὲ in the Correlative clause is common: e.g. Rep. 357c, 358a, 572a, Symp. 199b, 201e.


Soph. 217e, κατ' ἐμαυτὸν, εἶτε καὶ πρὸς ἔτερον.

Gorg. 488d, διώρισον, ταῦταν ἡ ἔτερον ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.

Theaet. 169d, ἰδομεν, ὄρθως ἡ οὐκ ὄρθως ἐνδοσχεραίμουεν. So 161d.

Hell. 173d, εὖ δὲ ἡ κακῶς . . . μᾶλλον αὐτῶν λέληθεν.


§ 244. e. Anastrophe of Prepositions.

Phileb. 22c, τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητρίων πρὸς τῶν κοινῶν βίων οὖκ ἄμφι-σβητῶ ποι ἐπέρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερεῖων ὀρῶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι τί δράσαμεν.

This kind of Anastrophe is as common in Homer as it is in later poets.

The converse usage is noticeable in peculiar instances: cf. Hom. II. xi. 374, "Ἡτοι ὁ μὲν θώρηκα Ἀγαστρόφου ἢβηίμου Λίντ' αἶτο
H. Verb supplied from a co-ordinate clause either preceding or subsequent.

Symp. 213 a, κελεύειν εἰσίναι, καὶ τὸν 'Αγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν— in the second clause is to be supplied λέγειν out of κελεύειν.

Apol. 38 b, κελεύοντι μὲ τριάκοντα μνών τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ’ εὖ γυν-άσθαι.

In the following instance the Verb is supplied after an intervening complete clause.

Symp. 183 a, ἡ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρα τον λαβεῖν ἡ ἄρχην ἁρξας ἡ τῶν ἄλλων δύναμι—where to the last clause must be supplied λαβεῖν from the next but one preceding.

In all the following it is the Substantive Verb that has to be supplied.

Symp. 186 a, ὅς μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ὀ θεὸς τείνει—where ἐστι is to be supplied to μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός.

Soph. 256 e, ἐξύπαντα... ἐροῦμεν... εἰναὶ τε καὶ [supply 'are'] οὖνα.

Phdr. 234 e, σαφῆ καὶ στραγγύλα καὶ ἀκρίβως ἐκαστα τῶν ὄνομάτων ἀποτελοῦμεντα.

Tim. 22 d, ὁ Νέλος εἰς τα ἄλλα σωτηρ καὶ τότε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σόφει.

Ib. 56 b, οὐτός ὅς καθ’ ἐν ἐκαστὸν μὲν... οὐδὲν ὀρφήμενον, ἐναλβρηθέντων δὲ... ὀράσθαι.

Legg. 872 a, εἰν δὲ αὐτόχερ μὲν μῆ, βουλεύσῃ δὲ θάνατον τις ἄλλος έτέρφ.

I. Verb or Participle supplied from subordinate construction to main construction, or vice versa.

Phdr. 330 d, ὅστερ οἱ τα θρέματα θαλλόν... προσελώντες ἄγουσι—where to οἱ τα θρέματα must be supplied ἄγουσι.

Phædo 114 b, οἱ ἀν δῶξασι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ άσιός βιώναι—where to διαφερόντως must be supplied βεβωκίσαι.

Theaet. 180 a, ὑπερμακείνει το οὐδ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μὴδε σμικρῶν ἐνείναι—where to το οὐδ’ οὐδὲν must be supplied ἐνείναι.

Cf. Isocr. ix. 28. p. 194, παρακαλέσας ἀνθρώπους, ὅς οἱ τοὺς πλεί-στους λέγοντες, περὶ πεντήκοντα—where to οἱ... λέγοντες must be supplied λέγοντες. (Cf. Epist. ad Hebr. x. 10.) Hdt. ii. 86,
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οὕτω μὲν τοὺς τὰ πολυτελέστατα σκέψαψοι νεκροῖς. Thuc. ii. 53, μήν γὰρ ἐτόλμα τὶς ἃ πρῶτερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ’ ἢδονὴν ποιεῖν—ἐτόλμα σε. καθ’ ἢδονὴν ποιεῖν.

§ 247. J.

Apol. 18 c, ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὃτι οἴδῃ τὰ ὄνοματα οἷῶν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι—which is to be supplemented thus—ὁ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐστὶ τούτο, ὥστε .τ.λ. 

Symp. 183 b, ὁ δὲ δεινῶτατον, ὃς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ, ὃτι καὶ ὄμνυτι μόνῳ συγγυνώμῃ.

Still more elliptical is

Phdr. 248 b, οὐ δὲ ἔνεχ’ ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ, ἡ προσήκουσα . . . νομὴ ἢ τοῦ ἐκεί λειμῶνος τυχχίνει οὐσα—ἐ.ε. οὐ δὲ ἔνεχ’ ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ ἐστὶν, ἐστὶ τούτο, ὥστε ἡ πρ. κ.τ.λ.


§ 248. K. Of two Nouns in regimen, the governing Noun left to be supplied by the context, while its place in the construction is taken by the governed Noun.

Symp. 214 c, μεθύοντα ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραξάλλειν—where μεθύοντα ἄνδρα stands for μεθύοντος ἄνδρος λόγους.

Ib. 217 d, τῇ ἔχομενῃ ἐμοῦ κλάσῃ—where ἐμοῦ stands for κλάσῃ τῆς ἐμῆς.

Protag. 310 e, οὔτ’ ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλέπομεν οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων.

This natural idiom begins with Homer: cf. Il. xvii. 51, κόμαι ἀριστεσσαν ὁμοίαν.

§ 249. L. Complementary ἄλλος omitted.

Thetet. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδουσα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν—where πάντα stands for ‘all besides.’

Ib. 145 a, ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς . . . καὶ ὁσα παϊδείας ἔχεται.

Phaedo 69 b, τοῦτο πάντα . . . πιπρασκόμενα—‘all other things being parted with for this.’

So τί μὴν; ‘what, if not what you say?’
§ 250. M. Contrasted clause to be mentally supplied.

Rep. 475 e, οὐδαμῶς [φιλοσόφους φήσομεν], ἄλλ' ὁμοίως μὲν φιλοσό-

φοι—sc. φιλοσόφους δ' οὖ.

Theae. 201 b, οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἷμαι [δύνασθαι διδάξαι], ἄλλα πείσαι

μὲν—sc. διδάξαι δ' οὖ.

Crito 43 d, οὐ δὴ τού ἀφίκτα, ἄλλα δοκεῖν [so Oxon. and two more

MSS.] μὲν μου, θέειν τίμερον—sc. 'but I am not sure.'

Phdr. 242 c, εἴποι μάντις μὲν, οὐ πάντι δὲ σπουδαίος, ἄλλ', ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ

γράμματα φαύλοι, δὸν μὲν ἔμαντὼ μόνον ἰκανός.

Cf. Andoc. i. 22. p. 4, ταύτι ἔλεγεν ἄν, ἦ οὖ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἷμαι—sc. 'but

another might not.' (οἷμαι μὲν ἐγὼ would have been 'I think,

but am not sure.'

§ 250*. M.M. Disjunctive clause to be mentally supplied.

Crat. 389 e, ἔως ἄν τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν ἀποδίδῃ, ἕν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ σειδήρῳ,

[εἰν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ,] ὤμοι ὅρθως ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον.

§ 251. N. Protasis of a hypothetical reason left to be mentally

supplied.

Symp. 236 b, (A) ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; (B) οὐ μὲντ' ἄν . . . εφοίτων πάρα σὲ

—i.e. 'No: for else I should certainly not have,' &c.

Phdr. 227 d, εἴθε γράφειν κ.τ.λ.: ἢ γὰρ ἂν ἀστείοι καὶ δημοφιλεῖς εἶν

οἱ λόγοι.

Euthyd. 280 a, οὐ γὰρ δήσου ἀμαρτάνοι γ' ἂν ποτὲ τις σοφία . . .

Ἡ γὰρ οὐκέτι σοφία εἶπ.

§ 252. O. Hypothetical sentence;—εἴπερ representing the Pro-

tasis.

Euthyd. 296 b, οὐκ' οὖν ἡμᾶς γε [σφαλεὶ], ἄλλ', εἴπερ, σ'ε.

Rep. 497 e, οὗ τὸ μὴ βουλεσθαι, ἄλλ', εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακω-

λύσει.

Legg. 667 a, οὐκ, δ.Second, προσέχων τοῦτο τὸν νοὺν δρῶ τοῦτο, εἴπερ.

Ib. 900 e, καὶ τὸν μὲν προσέχειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὅπτα σφαλαφρά.

Cf. Arist. Eth. VIII. iii, ἄλλ' εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτῶν, ἣν

αὐτῶς ἔχω: also ib. IX. vii, X. iii. And Aristoph. Nub. 227,

'*Επεί' ἀπὸ ταρρύος τοὺς θεοὺς ύπερφονεῖς, 'Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς,

εἴπερ.

§ 253. P. Hypothetical sentence;—εἰ δὲ representing the Pro-

tasis.

Symp. 212 c, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἐγκόμιον εἰς "Ερωτα νόμισον εἰρήσθαι:

εἰ δὲ, δ' τι καὶ δῆτα χαίρεις ὄνομαζον, τοῦτο ὄνομαζε.
Euthyd. 285 c, e1 μὲν βούλεται, ἐψέτω, e1 δ', o τι βούλεται τούτο ποιεῖτω.

Legg. 688 b, e1 μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παίζοντ' e1 δ', ὡς σπουδᾶζον.

Alc. I. 114 b, τι οὖκ ἀπεδείξας, e1 μὲν βούλει, ἑρωτῶν με ὁσπερ ἐγὼ σέ': e1 δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διεξέλθε.

This e1 δε does not stand for e1 δε μή, in reference to the βούλει of the former clause; but refers to a βούλει of its own, with reference to the coming clause.

The usage is common in Homer: cf. Il. vi. 376, El δ', ἄγε, xxii. 381, El δ', ἄγετε, ix. 46, e1 δε καὶ αὐτοί, Φευγώτων κ.τ.λ., 262, El δε, σὺ μὲν μὲν ἀκουσον.

§ 254. Q. Hypothetical sentence;—suppression of Apodosis.

Rep. 575 d, οὕκονν ἐάν μὲν ἐκώντες ὑπείκωσιν—' ἐάν δε κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 520 e, e1 εύ διοίκησας ταύτην τήν εὐεργεσίαν ἄντ' ε6 πείσται—' e1 δε μή, σφ.

More commonly the form is ἐάν μὲν . . . . e1 δε, as also in Thucydides.

Symp. 185 d, ἐάν μὲν σοι ἐθέλη παύσεσθαι ἡ λύγξ—' e1 δε μή, κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 854 c, καὶ ἐάν μὲν σοι λαθή τι τὸ νόσημα—' e1 δε μή, κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 325 d, ἐάν μὲν ἐκών πείθηται—' e1 δε μή, κ.τ.λ.

Il. 311 d, ἄν μὲν ἐξικνηται . . . .—' e1 δε μή, κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 287 a, ἐάν . . . . ἀντιλαμβάνομαι—' suppose I' &c.

Symp. 199 e, ἀπόκριναι ἐλάχι πλείω, ὥς μᾶλλον καταμάθης ὧ βούλομαι—e1 γάρ ἐρούμεν κ.τ.λ.—' suppose I were to ask, now,' &c.

Rep. 440 d, ἀλλ' e1 πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμεῖ . . . . , ὥστε κ.τ.λ.—

Symp. 177 b, e1 δε βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι κ.τ.λ.—

With e1 βούλει, or e1 βούλεσθε, the Protasis also is often curtailed.

Symp. 220 d, e1 δε βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις κ.τ.λ.—where e1 βούλεσθε represents e1 βούλεσθαι σκέψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη ὑπό έστιν.

Crat. 392 a, e1 δε βούλει περὶ τῆς ὀρμοῦσε.

Theaet. 196 e, e1 δε βούλει, . . . . κεχρήμεθα.

Cf. Hom. Il. i. 580, Εἴπερ γὰρ κ' ἐθέλησιν κ.τ.λ., xvi. 559, ἀλλ' e1 μν ἀεικοσωμφόθ', κ.τ.λ., xxi. 487, El δ' ἐθέλεις πυλέμου δαίμονα κ.τ.λ., Od. xv. 80, El δ' ἐθέλεις. Suppression of the Apodosis is also common in Homer after ἐπι, as Il. iii. 59, Od. iii. 103,viii.236.

§ 255. R. Form of Apodosis of a Hypothetical represented by ἂν, the Verb or Participle being understood.

Phædo 98 c, ἔδοξεν ὁμολόγατον πεπονθέναι ὁσπερ ἄν e1 τις . . . . λέγοι.
In this common phrase the ἀν represents not so much a particular sentence, such as e.g. here πεπονθῶς ἀν εἶνας τις, but rather a vague sentence such as τὸ πράγμα ἂν εἴη.

Apol. 29 b, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταὐτὰ ἄσος διαφέρω . . . , καὶ εἶ δὲ τῷ σοφοφερός τοῦ φαίνει εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν—σ. σοφότερος ἂν φαίνει εἶναι—but this suppression is a graceful escape from the appearance of self-assertion.

Polit. 308 c, εἶ τις πράγμα ὁτιοῦν . . . κἂν εἰ τὸ φανερότατον . . . ἐννετησείν. Here the κἂν . . . φανερότατον is exegetic of ὡτιοῦν—'any whatever, so that even if you understood it of the vilest it would mean that.' The κἂ is hyperbatically placed, and belongs to the εἰ clause.

Symp. 221 c, ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἐξωθεν περιαμπέχουσαν, Σατύρου ἂν τινα ἰδίωταν δορᾶν—'something [like] what a satyr's hide would be.' In this instance, as also in the last, it is a Participle, not a Verb, which is to be understood.

Rep. 468 a, τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ τῶν πολεμῶν; πῶς ἐκτέων κ.τ.λ.; Λέγ', ἐφι, ποί ἂν;

§ 256. S. Condition or Reason referring to an implicit Proposition.

Phedo 61 b, Εὐνυφος φιάζε . . . ἂν σοφοφοῦ ἢμε διώκειν—'tell him to follow me,—which he will do if he is wise.'

Symp. 173 d, ὀπόθεν . . . τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἑλαξε . . . , οὐκ οἶδα ἐγώγη ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις αἰὲ τοιοῦτοι εἰ—'I do not know how you came by it, but at all events it fits you; for' &c.

Theet. 158 a, ὅκνῳ εἴπειν ὃτι οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι λέγω' ἐπεί κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 333 c, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἐγώγη τούτο όμολογείν ἐπεί πολλοί γέ φασι κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 335 c, εἰμι' ἐπεί καὶ ταῦτα ἂν ἵνας οὐκ ἀγήδως σου ἦκονον.

§ 257. T. Direct conjunction of one or more particulars with a clause covering the rest.

a. In summarily breaking off enumeration of particulars.

Phaedo 100 d, ἡ ἐκείνων τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία εἶτε ὅπῃ ἰὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη.

Legg. 834 c, εἴτε τριετρίδες εἴτε αὖ διὰ πέμπτων εἶτον εἴδ' ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως ἂν . . . ἐκατερμήσατε.

Tim. 48 c, τὁν μὲν περὶ ἄπαντων εἶτε ἀρχὴν εἶτε ἀρχὰς εἶτε ὅπῃ δοκεῖ.

Crito 50 b, εἴτε ἀποδιδίσκες, εἴδ' ὅπως δεὶ ὀνομάσας τοῦτο.

Apol. 41 b, ὁδυσσέα ἡ Σίδυφον ἡ ἄλλοις μυρίνω ἂν τις εἶποι.
Phædo 70 e, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον [τινὰς ψαυτὰς ἄν], καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. Similarly Phædo 73 d, 94 b, Gorg. 483 d, Legg. 944 b.

Protag. 325 a, δικαιοσύνη, καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλληξίδην ἐν αὐτῷ προσαγορεύου ἐναι ἁνδρός ἀρετήν.

The peculiarity of these contracted forms of expression may be appreciated by comparing the following regularly composed sentence:—

Protag. 358 a, εἰτε γὰρ ἦδο εἰτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἰτε χαρτὸν, εἰτε ὅποθεν καὶ ὅπως χάρεις τὰ τουαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὃ βελπιστεῖ Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὁ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι.

The contracted forms give us always the feeling of abbreviation, as if the speaker was himself impatient of prolixity.

Gorg. 494 d, (A) φημὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἥδεως ἄν βιώναι. (B) Πότερον εἰ τῷ κεφαλῆν μόνον κηνσάω, ἢ ἐτι τί σε ἑρωτῶ; Apol. 20 d, οὕτω δὲ τάχυ ἀν . . . . . . . μειξῶ τινα ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοί εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω.

§ 258. b. In summary transitions to one particular.

Legg. 715 c, τοὺς ἀρχοντας . . . ὑπηρέτας . . . ἐκάλεσα οὐ τι καινοτομίας ὀνομάτων ἕνεκα, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ μια κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὴ ἀγαπατέων . . . ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβαλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἄνεξαπτοτόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο.


Hip. Ma. 281 c, (A) τί ποτε τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι οἱ παλαιὸι . . . φαίνονται ἀπεχώμενοι . . . ; (B) Τί δ’ οὔτε ἄλλο γε ἢ ἡδύνατο ἤσαν;

Phædo 63 d, (A) σκεφώμεθα τί ἐστίν ὁ βουλευσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. (B) Τί δ’ ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ο μέλλον κ.τ.λ.;

§ 259. U. Use of πολλοῦ δεῖ instead of οὐ.

In the regular or full construction πολλοῦ δεῖ is either interjected parenthetically, or subjoined, to strengthen a negation. But, in the instances which follow, a Negative is dropped out, and the πολλοῦ δεῖ is made to fill the same place in the construction which the Negative filled.

Rep. 378 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ μυθολογήτεον . . . . , ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 203 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπαλὸς . . . . , ἄλλα σκληρὸς. Fully and regularly this would have been οὐχ ἀπαλός,—πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ,—ἄλλα σκληρός.
§ 260. V. Extension of the government of a Verb, irrationally, so as to admit of the addition of an afterthought to a Participial clause without a new construction.

Politic. 276 e, εἰς ταῦταν βασιλεά καὶ τύραννον ἐξνέθεμεν, ἀνομοιοτάτους δντας αὑτοὺς τε καὶ τὸν τῆς ἄρχης ἑκατέρου τρόπον—where there is no justification in the sense for bringing τὸν τρόπον under the government of ἐξνέθεμεν.

§ 261. W. Two Participles, representing the reciprocal action of two parties, made to agree each of them with both conjointly,—to avoid specification in set terms.

Crito 48 d, ἐξάγοντες τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι—i. e. σύ τε ἐξάγων, ἔγω τε ἐξαγόμενος.

Cf. Isocr. vi. 47. p. 125, ἀστίπαυμεν δ’ ἄν ἀκούοντες τε καὶ λέγοντες—i. e. ἵμαι τε ἀκούοντες, ἔγω τε λέγων. Somewhat similarly Arist. Categ. vi. 13, ὅροι μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγύλη, τῇ τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι—where however μείζονα, still more brachylogically, stands for τὴν μὲν μεῖζα, τὸ δὲ ἐλαττον.

§ 262. Idioms of Sentences:—Pleonasm of Construction.

From instances of Pleonasm must be excluded

1. Cases in which the force of a word has been attenuated by its frequent use in that particular connection; e. g. εἶναι subjoined to ἐκῶν and the like:

2. All cases in which redundancy has resulted from Change of Construction, or from Binary Structure:

3. Cases of fullness of Construction: e. g.

Phædo 62 a, τοῦτο μὸνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων—which is simply the full form of which μὸνον ἀπάντων would have been an abbreviation; as ‘distinct from all the rest’ is more accurate than ‘distinct from all’;

Or the use of ὅστε with the Infinitive, following δύναμι κ.τ.λ.

Or the use of a deliberate form of speaking, as in

Apol. 19 b, τι δὴ λέγοντες διεξαλλον οἱ διεξαλλοντες;

Πb. 34 d, ἐπιεικὴ ἂν μοι δοκῶ ... λέγων λέγων κ.τ.λ.

Πb. 36 a, οὐκ ἀνεκπιστῶν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο.
PLEONASM OF CONSTRUCTION. 229

Legg. 858 a, τίνα τρόπον ἂν γιγνόμενον γίγνεται.

Phaedo 75 d, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτώτες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρίσεων.

Cf. Isaeus ii. 22, οὶκ ἂν ποιησάμενος ἄλλον οἰκείοτερον ἐμοὶ ποιήσαιτο ἂν whereby we are reminded of Homer’s (Od. xi. 612) Μὴ τεχνη- σάμενος μηδ’ ἄλλο τι τεχνήσαιτο “Oς κείνου τελαμώνα ἐν ἐγκάθευσε τέχνη.”

Or, in coordinate clauses which have a common part, the expression of this in each clause, as in

Phdr. 255 d, ὄσπερ ἐν κατόπτρον ἐν τῷ ἐρωτεῖ ἑαυτόν ὑμῖν.

Rep. 553 b, πταίσαντα ὄσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει.

Phaedo 67 d, ὄσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.

(Compare these with the real Pleonasm of Prepositions below—§ 265.)

§ 263. A. Pleonasm of particular words.

a. Of the Negative.

a. In the same clause.

Rep. 339 b, οὖπω δὴ λον οὐδ’ εἶ μεγάλη.

Hb. 389 a, οὐκοῦν ’Ομήρου οὐδὲ τὰ τωιαύτα ἀποδεξόμεθα.

Crito 43 b, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί’ οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον.

Euthyd. 279 a, οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἄνδρος πάντα τι οὐδὲ τούτο ἕοικεν εἰναὶ εὐπορεῖν. So Phaedo 115 c.

Politic. 300 e, μηδὲν πλῆθος μηδ’ ἡντινοῦ δυνατὸν λαβεῖν τέχνην.

Phaedo 100 a, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐ σφόδρα.

Hip. Ma. 292 b, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὡ ’Ιππία, οὐκ, εἰ ταύτα γε ἀποκρι- νάιμην.

Lysis 221 c, οὐκ ἂν, εἰ γε τὸ κακὸν κ.τ.λ., οὐκ ἂν ἦν κ.τ.λ.

Crat. 398 e, οὐδ’ εἰ τι οἶδα τ’ ἂν εἶπη εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντείνον.

Euthyphro 4 d, οὔτε εἰ ὅ τι μᾶλιντ ἀπέκτεινεν, . . . οὐ δεῖν.

Cf. Hom. II. i. 86, &c.

The usage is common, of course, where the Negative is distributed to subdivisions of the sentence, as in

Theæt. 163 a, ἀλλ’ οὐ δίκαιον οὔτε σὺ οὔτ’ ἂν ἡμείς φαίμεν.

The object of the Pleonasm is, after premising the Negative as an announcement of the general form of the sentence, to place it also in close contact with the word which it immediately concerns.
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§ 264. β. Not in the same clause. In this case the repetition seems almost\(^\text{15}\) irrational.

Apol. 27 ε, ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἂν ὡς οὐ, κ.τ.λ., οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστι.

Legg. 747 d, μηδὲ τοῦθεν ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περί τόπων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλοιν πρὸς τὸ γενόν ἀνθρώπους ἁμένους καὶ χείρους οἴς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετήσουν. οἱ μὲν γέ που διὰ πνεύματα κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Antipho vi. 10. p. 142, οὕτε ὅστις οὐκ ἄλλα κατηγορεῖ ἦ ἀ διώκει εν πράγματι τοιοῦτο, πιστεύσα δῆπον αὐτῷ ἀξιώτερον ἄστιν ἦ ἀπιστήσαι —where οὐκ is irrational.

§ 265. b. Of Prepositions.
Phdr. 278 a, εν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις . . . εν μόνοις τὸ ἐναργές εἶναι.
Cf. Thuc. iii. 53, εν δικασταίσι οὐκ εν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι γενέσθαι ἦ ὑμῖν.

§ 266. c. Of Conjunctions.
Symp. 210 b, καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικῆς ὅν τὴν ψυχὴν τίς καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ.

d. Of ἄν.
Phdr. 276 b, τῇ γεωργικῇ χρώμενος τέχνη ἀν ἄπειρας εἰς τὸ προσήκον ἀγαπόφη ἂν κ.τ.λ.
Apol. 31 a, κρούσαντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι 'Ἀνύτω, μαθίως ἂν ἀποκτείνατε.

e. Of ἔφη, &c.
Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, φίλαι, ὧν Ἀγάθων.
Ib. 190 c, λέγει ὅτι Δοκῶ μοι, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.

§ 267. B. Resumption of a Noun, where no Change of Construction has intervened, by Oblique Cases of αὑτός.

See under 'Binary Structure,' § 222, above.

§ 268. C. Pleonasm in sentences of Contrast.
Politic. 262 a, τὸ ζητούμενον εν διπλασίοισι τὰ νῦν εν τοῖς ἁμέσως εἰς τότε ποιόσθε ζητείσθαι.
Legg. 805 a, ἡμύσεϊα πόλεις ἀντὶ διπλασίας.
Tim. 39 e, ὁλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν.
Phaedo 58 a, πάλαι γενομένης αὐτής πολλός ὑστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανόν.
Ib. 7 e, ἐκ μείζονος οὖστος πρότερον ὑστερον ἑλπτον γενήσεται.

\(^{15}\) Cf., perhaps, Thucyd. iii. 36, πόλιν ὄλην διαφθείραι μᾶλλον ἦ οὐ τοῖς αὑτίοισ.
§§ 269—271.] CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.

Soph. 219 b, ὅπερ ἄν μὴ πρῶτερον τις ἄν ὑστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγη. So 265 b.

Cf. Lysias xxxi. 24. p. 189, τοιγάρτοι πρῶτερον βελτίων γενόμενος περὶ τὴν πόλιν, ὑστερον βουλεύειν ἄξιοντω. Phædo 64 c, έὰν ἄρα καὶ σει ξυνδοκῇ ἄπερ καὶ ἐμοι.

Ib. 76 e, ἀναγκαίοι, οὖν ὅπερ ὁκνεῖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐστιν, οὕτως καὶ τῇ ἡμε-τέραν πυρπην εἶναι.

Cf. Xen. Anab. II. i. 22, καὶ ἡμῖν ταύτα δοκεῖ ἄπερ καὶ βασιλεῖ, Hom. II. vi. 476, δότε δὲ καὶ τόνδε γενέσθαι Παϊδ' ἔμων, ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ περ, ἀμπρετέα Τρώσσεσι, (and more in Heindorf, on Phædo 64 c).

§ 269. D. Pleonasm in stereotyped phrases.

Phædo 91 d, πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις καταστίψασα. Ib. 99 b, πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ ραθυμία. Ib. 79 e, ἔλοι καὶ παντί (perhaps).

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐγγηγοροῦσι μήτε εὐδοκείς κύρτοις ἄργον ὃηραν δια-τυνουμένους. (This perhaps approaches nearer to Hyperbole—for which see § 317, below.)

§ 270. Idioms of Sentences:—CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.

A. As to Cases of Nouns.

a. Nominative Absolute—in exposition.

Soph. 266 d, τίθημι δόσι διχή ποιητικής εἰδής θεία μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη κατὰ βάτερον τμῆμα, κατὰ δὲ βάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὄμοιωμάτων τυχῶν γέννημα. Ib. 218 e, τί δὴτα προτασαίμεθ' ἄν εὐγνωστὸν καὶ σμικρὸν . . .; οἶον ἀσπαλιεύτης.

§ 271. b. Inversion of government.

Theæt. 192 a, δεῖ δὲ λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰς ἄρχης διοριζομένους. Apol. 21 c, διαλεγόμενοι αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέ μοι οὖτος δ ἀνήρ κ.τ.λ. Legg. 811 c, ἀποθέλεας πρὸς τοὺς λόγους . . ., ἐδοξάν . . . μοι . . . εἰρήσθαι.

Ib. 922 b, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἰπεῖν, βλέψας κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὁπόσοι κ.τ.λ., ἀναγκαῖοτατον ἐπεσθαί τοῖς μεν ῥώμην αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 173 d, σπονδαὶ δ' ἐταίρειων ἐπ' ἄρχοι καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δείπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσα κόμωι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.
Symp. 208 e, oí dè katá tìn ψυχήν—εἰσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—τούτων ὅταν τις κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 474 e, καὶ μῆν τά γε κατά τοὺς νόμους . . . οὐ δήπον ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλά.

Rep. 565 d—e, ὅσ αρὰ ὁ γενοάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου σπλάγχνου . . . ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι.

Euthyd. 281 d, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα . . . οù περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι.

Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρήμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρόπον ἂν μὴ δυνόμεθα πάντως ἀποδιδόναι, συγγενώσκειν χρεών.

§ 272. d. Different governments, either of them regular, brought together into one sentence.

Rep. 378 d, τοιαύτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εἰδὼς καὶ γέρουσι.

Ib. 566 e, ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω ἐκθρούς τοὺς μὲν καταλαγὴ τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ.

Symp. 203 a, διὰ τούτου πᾶσα ἐστὶν ἡ ὁμολία . . . θεοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐγγεγυρώσα καὶ καθευδοῦσι—the words and ἐγγεγυρώσα καὶ καθευδοῦσι referring to ἀνθρώπους.

Phaedo 88 c, εἰς ἅπιστιν καταβαλέιν οὐ μόνον τοὺς προερημένους λόγους, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ύστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι.

§ 273. d. Change to a previous construction.

Rep. 413 e, τὸν ἄκιματον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἀρχοῦτα . . . , καὶ τιμᾶς δοτέοι καὶ ζωνὶ καὶ τελεύτησατι, . . . γέρα λαγχάνοντα.

§ 274. e. Change to a Genitive Absolute.

Rep. 590 d, ἀμείνων παντὶ . . . ἀρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 755 d, τούτους εἶναι στρατηγοὺς . . . , δοκιμασθέντων καθάπερ οἱ νομοφύλακες.

§ 275. f. The following are simple Anacolutha, reducible to no principle whatever.

Legg. 823 d, εἴδ᾽ ὡμᾶς μήτε τις ἐπιθυμία . . . ποτὲ λάβοι . . . , μήτε ἐγγεγυρώσῃ μήτε καθευδούσι κύριος ἄργον θήραιν διαπονομένως.

Critias 116 d, νεὼς ἢν σταδίου μὲν μῆκος, εὖρος δὲ τρισὶ πλέθροις.

§ 275*. ΑΑ. As to Number of Nouns and Pronouns.

a.

Phaedo 62 a, τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον.
Phædo 82 a, οὗ ἐν ἐκάστῃ ίοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης.

Symp. 207 b, ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἐτοιμὰ ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τούτων διαμάχεσθαι—where τούτων = τοῦ γενομένου.

Protag. 345 e, οὐχ ὃς ἐν μῆ κακὰ ποιῆ ἐκῶν, τοῦτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἰναι.

Rep. 426 c, ὡς ἀποδανούμενοι, ὃς ἐν τούτῳ θρᾷ.

Conversely to the last two instances

Symp. 187 e, προσφέρειν οἷς ἐν προσφέρῃ, ὡς ἐν τῇ ἡδονῇ καρπώσηται.

b.

Rep. 554 a, θησαυροποιὸς ἀνήρ, οὗ δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος.

§ 276. B. As to Verbs.

a. Original construction abandoned, after interposed clause, in favour of that of the interposed clause. (For other applications of the same principle, see 'Attraction,' §§ 192-194, above.)

Phædo 107 b, τάς ὑποθέσεις τάς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ἕμιν εἰσίν, ὃμοι ἐπισκέπτεαι σαφέστερον.

This change is commonest after such interposed clauses as express saying, seeming, or thinking.

Crat. 384 c, ὃτι δὲ οὗ φησὶν κ.τ.λ., ὡσπερ ὑποπτεύω, αὐτῶν σκώπτεων.

Phdr. 272 d, παντάπασι γάρ, ὅ καὶ κατ' ἄρχας εἴπομεν, . . . ὅτι οὐδὲν . . . δέοι κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 493 b, τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἐφή ὁ πρός με λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἰναι.

Legg. 728 d, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, πᾶς ἐν τούτῳ νόησει, τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἰναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμῆν.

§ 277. b. Construction changing from Infinitive to Finite Verb.

Symp. 177 c, τὸ . . . Ἐρωτα μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι ἄξιος ἔμνησα, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἤμεληται.

Ib. 184 b, ἔστι . . . νόμος, ὡσπερ κ.τ.λ., οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀλλή μία μόνη δουλεία ἐκούσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἐποιεῖσθαι.

Apollo. 19 c, τούτων ἑκαστός οὗς τε ἐστίν ἵνα εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοῖς νέοις, οἷς ἔζηστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προϊκα ξυνεῖσαι οὗ ἀν βουλωταί, τούτως πείθουσι κ.τ.λ.

Theocret. 190 d, αἱ μαία δύνανται τὰς ὁδίνας μαλακετέρας ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὑν δοξῇ ἀμβλύσκειν, ἀμβλύσκουσι.
§ 278. c. Construction begun afresh with Conjunction or Relative, after intervention of a Participial or Adverbial clause.

Legg. 810 d, κελεύεις γὰρ δὴ με, τῆς αὐτῆς ὄντων ἔχοντος συνεργοῦντα
πολλοῖς, ἵστας δὖ οὐκ ἐλάττωσιν ἐτέραις προσφυλοῦσι... μεθ᾽ ὧν δια-
κελεύει με κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 b, χαρίς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερήσατα τουοῦτον ἐπιστηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ
οὐδένα μῆποτε εὑρῆσω, ἐτί δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξῳ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 457 b, εὰν δὲ, οἷμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενόμενος τις κὰτα ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ
ἀδική.

Rep. 530 b, ἀτοποῦ... ἢ ἡγῆσται, τὸν νομίζοντα... καὶ ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Critias 114 ε, ἢ νῦσοι αὐτή παρείχετο... τὸ νῦν ὅνομαξόμενον μόνον,
tότε δὲ πλέον ὄνοματος ἢν τὸ γένος ἐκ γῆς ὄρυπτόμενον ορειχάλκου.

§ 279. d. Construction begun with ὅτι, after Verbs of knowing or saying, and finished without regard to it.

Gorg. 481 d, αἰσθάνομαι σοι ἐκάστοτε..., ὅτι ὅπο σὰν φη σοῦ τὰ
παθικὰ καὶ ὅποι σὰν φη ἔχεις οὐ δυναμένον ἀντιλέγειν.

Legg. 892 d, εἴπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἔμε χρήμα πειραθῆναι κατ᾽ ἐμαυτῶν. ;

Crito 50 b, ἔρωσιν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι Ἡθήκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις ;

Protag. 356 a, εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι Ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει.

§ 280. Often, from the frequency of this use with οἴδα, and with λέγω or εἴπον, ὅτι becomes in such contexts a mere expletive.

Rep. 501 a, οἰδ' ὅτι τοῦτο ἰν διενεγκεῖν.

Apol. 37 b, δὲν εῦ οἴδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὀντων.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἴπειν ὅτι Εὖ ἰν ἔχω κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 189 a, εἴπειν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μάλ' ἐπαύσατο.

§ 281. C. As to Oratio Obliqua.

a. Change from Indicative to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Gorg. 517 c–d, σὲ... οἴμαι... ἐγνωκέω ὅς... ἦ μὲν ἐτέρα διακοινή
ἐστίν, ἦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐκποριζέων κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 391 c–d, μὴ δὲ ἐοίμεν λέγειν, ὅς Θησεῖς... ἀφριμὸς ὅτε ἐοί
dεινὰ ἀρπαγάς, μηδὲ ταῦ ἄλλον... ἦρω τολμήσαται ἀν κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 164 d, δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀπακείσθαι... ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρε, ὅς τούτῳ
μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὀντος τοῦ προσρήματος, τοῦ χαίρει, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο
παρακελεύεσθαι ἄλληλοις.

Laches 198 b, ἡγούμεθα... δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.; δέος δὲ παρέχει κ.τ.λ.;
der 'γὰρ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.
§ 282. b. Change from Indicative to Optative Oratio Obliqua.

Protag. 327 c-d, ei δέοι αὐτῶν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μὴ παρ- 
δεία εστίν, ἀλλ' εἰν' ἄγριοι.

Phædo 95 c-d, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μηρύειν .... ὅτι πολυ-
χρώνιον τέ ἐστιν ψυχή κ.τ.λ.: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἤν ἀδάνατον 
κ.τ.λ.: καὶ ἀλατοπορουμένη .... ζῷη κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 96 b, ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν .... πότερον τὸ αἰμά 
ἔστιν κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη.

Phdr. 241 b, ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται κ.τ.λ., ἠγγοῦκος .... ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει 
pοτὲ ἔρωτι .... χαρίζεσθαι ...., εἰ δὲ μή, ἀναγκαίον εὖ κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 301 d, δόξαν εἴχομεν περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, ὡς ἐκάτερος ἡμῶ 
ine ἐστι, τούτο δὲ, ὃ ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εὖ, οὐκ ἄρα ἐξεύρημεν ἀμφότεροι.

Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ εἰ μὲν τις .... τούτῳ δὲ βιοτέων ἐστι 
καὶ τούτων ὄνομειεν.

Phileb. 41 d, [ἐφιηταί] ὅσ τὸ μᾶλλὸν τε καὶ ἤττων ἄμφω ἰδέασθον, καὶ 
ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴσην.

Charm. 156 d-e, Ζάμολξις, ἐφη, λέγει ὅτι .... οὐ δεὶ κ.τ.λ., ἀλλὰ τοῦτο 
καὶ αὐτίον εὖ κ.τ.λ.

It should be observed, however, that the Optative in these pas-
sages is not simply the effect of Oratio Obliqua: for some of the 
passages are in Present time. The emergence of the Optative marks 
the transition from fact to inference; it indicates that we are not 
called upon to accept an additional assertion, but only to follow 
one step further in the direction already supposed. This is the 
principal account to be given of this change of construction: it 
may be, however, that a subsidiary cause is the increasing need, as 
the sentence unwinds, of marking the dependence upon the main 
construction of the later and therefore more remote clauses.

§ 283. c. The contrary change, from the Optative Oratio Obliqua 
to the Indicative, is in Plato very uncommon; such as is found in 
Tim. 18 c, ἐτίθεμεν, μηχανώμενοι ὅπως μηδεὶς .... γνώσεσθαι, νομίζοις δὲ 
pάντες κ.τ.λ.

§ 284. d. Change from Optative Oratio Obliqua to Infinitive 
Oratio Obliqua.

Phædo 96 b, ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν .... ἄρ', ἐπειδὴ 
k.τ.λ., ὥσ τινες ἐλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ἦν ἑπτάφεσται καὶ πότερα 
k.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, εκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης 
γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. This passage exemplifies b. also (where it
is quoted). The justification of this further change to the Infinitive lies in the parenthetical ὡς τινες ἔλεγον, which usurps here the influence properly due to πότερον.

§ 285. e. Participial clause, in a sentence of Infinitive Oratio Obliqua, changing into Infinitive.

Phædo 111 c, τόπους δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπτυσσόμενος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ὧν ἤμεισε οἰκούμεν, τοὺς δὲ τὸ χάσμα . . . ἐλαττον ἔχειν.

Politic. 293 c, λεκτίων μεμημένα . . ., ὡς μὲν ὡς εἴναμοι λέγομεν ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω, τὰς δὲ ἀλλαὶ ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίνα μεμημέναι.

Cf. Hom. II. xviii. 335, ‘Εν δ’ Ἐρρις ὑν δ’ Κυδομός ὀμιᾶλον, ἐν δ’ ὀλὴν Κήρ, Ἀλλον ἵππων ἔξονοι πεντάτηστον, Ἀλλον ἄντον, Ἀλλον τεθνεῖται κατὰ μᾶθον ἔλκε ποδοῦν, Od. vii. 125, ὄμφακες εἰσίν Ἀνθος ἀφείεσαι, ἔτεραι δ’ ὑποπερκάζουσιν.

§ 286. D. Inversion of the Antecedent clause, so that the Pronoun in it does not refer to the Relative foregoing, but to some other word in the Relative clause.

Theæt. 201 b, ὡς μὴ παρεγένειτο τινες . . ., τοῦτος δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ., where τοῦτος refers to τινες.

Phædo 70 c, ἄρα ἀναγκαίον, ὅσοις ἔστι τι εἰκαστίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γένεσθαι κ.τ.λ.;—αὐτὸ refers to τι.

Lysis 219 d, ὃ ἐν τίς τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσαι . . ., ἄρα καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιύτο; Phædo 105 b, φ’ ἐν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμῶν ἔσται;—sc. τὸ σῶμα.

Symp. 204 b, ὅν δὲ σὺ ψήθης Ἐρωτα ἔιναι, θαυμαστῶν οὐδὲν ἐπάθες.

§ 287. Idioms of Sentences:—Arrangement of Words and Clauses.

A. Hyperbaton.

The displacement of the natural order of words, which is called Hyperbaton, is not of capricious adoption. Its use is 1. to increase the facility of regulating the emphasis; and 2. to enable language to represent, in a degree, the rapidity of thought, by making one expression literally catch up another.

The Hyperbaton which results from the close adherence of Prepositions to their cases (see below, § 298) is to be excepted from the account just given. It is the result simply of a grammatical exigency.
The name Hyperbaton had been given, and the fact recognised, in Plato's own time. Socrates in the Protagoras (343 e), in rectifying the explanation of the passage of Simonides, says ἀπερβατῶν δεῖ θείαι ἐν τῷ ᾗσματι τὸ ἀλαθεῶς.

§ 288. a. Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 693 c, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλά ἡμᾶς τοιαύτ' ἄν γίγνεται ῥήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω.

Ib. 860 d, ἀκούσιως δὲ ἐκούσιον οὐκ ἔχει πράττεσθαι ποτε λόγον—

where the two clauses οὐκ ἔχει λόγον and ἀκούσιως ἐκούσιον πράττεσθαι are counterchanged.

Apol. 26 a, οὐ δεύτερο νόμος εἰςάγειν ἑστὶ.

Instances frequently occur in clauses incidental to the machinery of the dialogue,—as in

Phædo 71 c, ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης.

Symp. 214 c, ἄλλα, φάναι, δ' Ἐρυξίμαχε, τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

Apol. 25 c, εἰπέ ὁ πρὸς Δίῳς Μέλησε. Similarly 26 e, Meno 71 d.

Symp. 212 e, ἵνα . . . τὴν τοῦ σοφοτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλῆν—

ἐὰν εἴπω οὕτωσι—ἀναδήσω—ὁρα καταγελάσασθε μοι ὡς μεθύσωτος;

Two sentences are here counterchanged. As Alcibiades rehearses the form of words with which he intends to accompany the crowning of Socrates, he interrupts himself to justify them, and does his best to carry on the two sentences together. These, if one had been postponed to the other, would have run—"That from my own head to the head of the wisest and handsomest of men I may transfer this garland—Well! and if I shall say that,—what then? will you make fun of me?"

In trying to carry on both together, he breaks and counterchanges them, distinguishing them doubtless by difference of tone.

Even so violent a trajection as this has its parallels in Homer.

§ 289. b. Grammatical governments intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Laches 195 a, πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἴπες βλέψας;

Symp. 191 d, ἐστίν . . . ὁ ἐρως ἐμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Phdr. 249 d, ἐστὶ δὴ οὐν δεύτερο τὸ πᾶς ἤκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τεταρτῆς μανίας.

Politic. 309 a, ἵππο κακῆς βία φύσεως ἀπωθοίμενα.

Phileb. 19 e, παύσαι τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον.

§ 290. c. Pronouns (unemphatic) postponed by Hyperbaton.

Politic. 261 b, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀψίχων γενέσεσιν αὐτοῦ τάσσοντες —where αὐτός belongs to τὸ μὲν.

Theaet. 166 d, τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ρήματι μου διώκει—where μου belongs to τὸν λόγον.

Gorg. 469 d, κἂν τινα δοξῇ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεγέναι δεῖν—where αὐτῶν belongs to τινα.

Phaedo 60 b, ὡς ἄτοπον . . . ἐστὶ εἰναι τοῦτο—where τι would normally have found its place beside ἄτοπον.

A common type is the postponement of an Antecedent τις.

Theaet. 188 a, ἀνάγκη τῶν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ δὲν τι oidev ἢ μὴ oidev.

Crito 53 b, εἰάν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἐλθης.

§ 290*. cc. Correlative Conjunctions,—the former postponed by Hyperbaton.

Apol. 18 d, δόστερ σκαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν.

II. 28 d, οὐ ἂν τις ἐκαίνων τάξη ἡ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἰναι ἡ ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ.

§ 291. d. Adverbs and Particles displaced by Hyperbaton.

ἤτω.

Legg. 747 b, ἐν οὐδὲν οὔτω δύναμιν ἔχει ταίδειον μάθημα μεγάλην—where οὔτω belongs to μεγάλην.

Theaet. 169 c, οὔτω τες ἐρως δεινὸς εὕδεδυκε—where οὔτω belongs to δεινός.

§ 292. ἤσως.

Legg. 640 e, τάχ’ ἄν ὅρθως ἢσως μέμφοιτο.

Symp. 194 c, τάχ’ ἄν αἰσχύνοιο αὐτοὺς εἰ τι ἢσως οἷοι κ.τ.λ. That this is a trajection of ἢσως we have ground for inferring, 1. from the analogy of the preceding instance, 2. from the familiarity of the combination τάχ’ ἄν ἢσως, and 3. from the perfect unfamiliarity of εἰ ἢσως.

§ 293. ἢτι.

Symp. 187 b, οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐκ διαφερομένων ψε ἢτι τοῦ ὀξέως καὶ βαρέως ἁρμονία ἄν εἴη—where ἢτι is constructed with οὐκ ἄν εἴη.
§ 294. Мέντοι intrusive, i. e. displacing rather than displaced.

Phdr. 267 e, Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὥς Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαύτ' ἀττα; Apol. 35 e, μή οὖν ἀξιοῦτε με τοιαύτα δεῖν πρὸς ἓμαι πράττειν, . . . ἄλλως τε μέντοι νὴ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀνατέλλεια φεύγοντα. The phrase ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the words μέντοι νὴ Δία, which could have found no other convenient place. It is because ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ had become a fixed phrase that it can suffer this Tmesis without bringing the sense into doubt. In the disengaged μέντοι νὴ Δία another familiar sequence (as pointed out by the Zurich editors, coll. Phæd. 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a,) is to be recognised.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 788, Τίς ἦν ἐν ἓ ματτόμεθα μέντοι τάλφιτα;

§ 295. Γε intrusive.

Crito 48 a, ἄλλα μὲν δὴ φαίη γ' ἂν τις οἱ οἱ τῇ ἐσίν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτισινενα. It might seem at first sight improbable that this γε should not belong to the clause within which it stands. But we have ground for recognising a trajection here 1. in the sense, which is not helped by γε with φαίη γε; 2. in the familiarity of the sequence ἄλλα μὲν δὴ . . . γε, coll. Phæd. 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d: and 3. in the consideration that φαίη ἂν is not consciously to the speaker a separate clause; that is, it is a parenthesis so familiar that it does not interrupt the thought. It is parallel to Phæd. 59 c, τίνες φης ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; Euthyphro 15 a, τί δ' οἷς ἄλλο ἡ τιμή; Symp. 216 d, πόσις οἰεσθε γέμει . . . σωφροσύνης; and to the instance next following. (It is plain that in all these cases the meaning does not admit of separating off the parenthetic Verb by commas.) Moreover we find the ἂν preceding the φαίη, as in Phæd. 87 a, τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτει ἀποισεῖς; but ἂν could not commence the clause if it were consciously regarded as distinct.

Gorg. 492 e, ἄλλα μὲν δὴ καὶ ὄς γε σῦ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος.

§ 296. Ἀν, anticipated Hyperbatically with οἶμαι and the like.

Apol. 32 e, ἃρ' οὖν ἂν με οἰεσθὲ τοσάδε ἐτη διαγένεσθαι; Phæd. 64 b, οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν ἤ δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . δοκεῖν.

Soph. 223 a, τὸ προσήκον ὅνομ' ἂν ἠγοίμαι καλείν αὐτῶν.
Soph. 224 d, οἶμαι σε, καν ε ITER . . . . προτάξατο, καλείν οὐδὲν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ, where ἄν belongs to καλείν.

Enthyd. 294 d, οὐκ ἄν οἰεί ὀμολογήσαι ἡμᾶς ;

Phdr. 234 c, οἰεί ἄν τινα ἐχειν ;

Tim. 26 b, οὐκ ἄν οἰδα ἐλ ὑπαίμην.


§ 297. e. Prepositions postponed by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 711 e, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ξυμπάσης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτὸς πέρι λόγος.

Soph. 265 a, καὶ τειχὶ ἐν τοιούτοις εἶδεσιν.

Phædo 83 c, οὐχ δὼν οἱ πολλοὶ ἑνεκά φασί.

Cf. Andoc. i. 117. p. 15, δὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἑνεκά ἐπεθυμεύθην.

§ 298. f. Prepositions intrusive; that is, retaining their place next to the Adjective prefixed to their Substantive, to the exclusion of Adverbs and the like which qualify that Adjective.

Rep. 391 d, οὖτος ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἄρπαγάς.

Ib. 395 b, ἐτι τούτων εἰς σμικρότερα.

Ib. 397 b, ὀλγον πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν.

Symp. 195 e, ἐξῆς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς—ἀρ ἐν ἐξῆς πάσαις.

Theaet. 205 c, ὀλγον ἐν τῷ πρῶσθεν.

Phædo 70 c, οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων.

Ib. 110 c, πολὺ ἐτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων.

Apol. 40 a, πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικρῶς.

Phdr. 245 d, μηδ' ἐξ ἐνός. So Politic. 310 c.

Gorg. 449 c, ὅς δια δραυτάτων.

Legg. 876 b, ὁτι περὶ σμικρότατα.

Cf. Thuc. i. 63, ὅς ἐκ ἐλάχιστον χρόνον, iii. 46, ὅτι ἐν δραυτάτῳ, ibid. ὅτι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον, i. 23, ἐστι παρ' οἷς, 35, πολὺ ἐν πλείου αἰτίᾳ, vii. 36, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ, 79, οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλγῶν ἀσπίδων, 42, οὐδὲ . . . καθ' ἐτερα, and so 59, μηδ' καθ' ἐτερα, and on the same principle vii. 72, ἐτι τὰς λοιπὰς for τὰς ἐτι λοιπὰς.

§ 299.

Note, that Plato not unfrequently admits Tmesis: e. g.

Phdr. 230 c, ἐν ἡμέρα προσάντει.

Hip. Ma. 297 b, ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέα.
Legg. 797 d, ἐν, ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν, οὗ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ' οὐ.
Apol. 19 a, and 24 a, ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ (cf. Isæus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πᾶν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ).
Phileb. 20 b, πρός δὲ αὐ τοῖς.
Legg. 666 c, εἰς μὲν γε τὸ προάγειν.
Ib. 729 d, εἰς μὴν πόλιν.
Ib. 832 c, σὺν αἰτὶ των βίᾳ.
Phædo 59 a, διὰ δὴ ταὐτα.
Phileb. 35 c, διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος.
Rep. 371 d, ἀντὶ αὖ ἄργυριον.
Phdr. 238 c, ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν . . . ἐπιθυμίων.

§ 300. B. Primary intention of a sentence suspended by interposition of clause of (a) Contrast or (b) Explanation.

a. Clause of Contrast interposed.

Rep. 401 e, καὶ ὁρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραῖνων, τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἔπαινοι κ.τ.λ., τὰ δὲ αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἐν ὀρθῶς καὶ μετοὶ—where ὁρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραῖνων is continued in τὰ αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι.

Symp. 173 e, ὅπερ ἐδείκμεθα σου, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃς ἄλλα διήγησαι.

Ib. 179 c, ἔργον οὔτως καλῶν . . . ὡστε . . . εἰραθμῆτος δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοίτο γέρας οἱ θεοὶ, ἐξ Λίδου ἀνέκινα πάλιν τὴν ψυχήν, ἄλλα τὴν ἐκεῖνης ἀνέσαιαν—the ὡστε being continued at τὴν ἐκεῖνης ἀνέσαιαν.

Theat. 145 d, ἄλλ' ὄμοις, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρῶν δὲ τι ἀπορῶ—where ὅμοι appertains to ἕμμορ τι ἀπορῶ.

Phædo 69 d, οἱ πεφλασσοφικότες ὁρθῶς. ἦν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δύνατον οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἄλλα παντὶ τρόπῳ προεύθυμηθην γενέσθαι—where the construction of ἦν is continued at παντὶ τρόπῳ.

Ib. 87 d, ἄλλα γὰρ ἂν φαῖη, ἐκάστην . . . ἀνυφάινοι, ἀναγκαῖον μὲντ' ἂν εὖ, κ.τ.λ. The objection started by ἄλλα γὰρ ἂν φαῖη is suspended, while allowance is made for opposite truth, until ἀναγκαῖον μὲντ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 106 b, τί καλλίει, ἁρτίων μὲν τὸ περιτῶν μὴ γίγνεσθαι . . . , ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἂντ' ἐκείνου ἁρτίων γεγονέναι;

Legg. 822 c, ἂρ' οὐκ ὀφείλεται γελοῖον τε καὶ οὐκ ὁρθῶν, ἐκεὶ γεγομένου ἦν ἂν τόσε, νῦν ἐνταύθαί καὶ ἐν τοῖς γίγνεσθαι;

§ 301. b. Clause of Explanation interposed.

Symp. 206 b, οὐ μὲντ' ἂν σε ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφία καὶ ἐφοίτων παρὰ σε—where, in meaning, οὐ μὲντ' ἂν goes with ἐφοίτων, the ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφία being explanatory.
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 302, 303-

Protag. 335 e, τῶν δολιοδορῶν τῷ διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι.
Phdr. 244 d, ἦ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει.
Legg. 648 c, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐνχάστην πόσιν ἀπαλλάττωσιν πρὶν ἀφυκνεῖσθαι.
Gorg. 512 a, λαμβάνεται ὅτι οὐκ κ.τ.λ.—an elaborate instance.

§ 302. In other writers we have as instances.

Of a.

Of b.
Thuc. i. 39, ἦν γε οὗ τὸν προβιοῦντα καὶ έκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον κ.τ.λ., ii. 91, περὶ ἦν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ναις φιλίστασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα. Hom. Il. x. 307, "Ὅστις τέ τιθαίν, οἱ τ' αὐτῷ κύδος ἄριστο, Νηῶν ἄκυπτόνων σχεδὸν ἐλέβης," Đesch. Pr. V. 331, Πάντων μετασχόν καὶ τετολμηκός ἔρως. Soph. Ant. 537; Καὶ ἐξωμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τής αὐτίας, 1279, τά δ' ἐν δόμοις "Εοικα καὶ τάχ' ὄψεσθαι κακά, El. 1154, ἦς σὺ πολλάκις Φήμας λάθρα προβιούμεπες ὡς φανομένοις Τιμωρός, O. T. 717, Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστασε οὐ διέαχη τοῦ ἡμέρας Τρήις καὶ νῦν ἄρθρα κείνος ἐνεκέφαλα ποδοῦν. Theocr. Id. xxv. 72, τὸν δὲ γέραντα.... κλάζον τε περιστανοῦν τ' [Alli klázovte], Epigr. xix. 1, Ἀρχιλοχοὺν καὶ στάθι καὶ εὐσίδε.

§ 303. C. Primary Intention of a sentence expressed apart from the Verb—(i.e. the virtual Primary Predicate to be sought in some other word, or in a Participial clause.)

Rep. 495 d, οὗ δὴ ἐφείμην πολλοί ἄτελεις.... τυγχάνονσιν—where ἐφείμην is the virtual Primary Predicate.

Theact. 142 c, δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι ὄλγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐνυχεῖν αὐτῷ.
Ib. 173 b, πότερον βούλει διελθῆτε ἡ ἐσιάντες.... τρεπώμεθα; 
Plauto 63 c, ὅτι παρὰ θεοῦ δεσπότας πάνω ἄγαθοις [Ἔπιζω] ἥξεν.... διάχωρισμῷ ἂν. The virtual Primary Predicate is δεσπότας πάνω ἄγαθοις.

Ib. 63 d, σκεφώμεθα τι ἐστιν δὲ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. 
The virtual Primary Predicate is βούλεσθαι, not δοκεῖ.

Ib. 65 b, ἦ.... καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ.... ἐφείλουσιν, ὧτι.... ἄρομεν. The
Primary Intention, with which ἥ connects itself, is in the ὄρισμεν clause.

Ib. 69 e, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὶ πάλιν αἰνώτεσθαι διὰ . . . κείσται. The ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὶ connects itself with the κείσται clause.

Ib. 88 b, οὐδὲν προοίηκεν θάνατον βαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως βαρρεῖν. Of the Infinitival sentence θάνατον . . . βαρρεῖν the virtual Primary Predicate is θάνατον βαρροῦντι— in other words, it would normally be θάνατον βαρρεῖν, but is changed into a Participial clause for the sake of linking a further sentence to it.

Symp. 207 d, οἷος μὲν τὸ ὄνομα τὰ αὑτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ ὁμοί ὁ αὑτός καλεῖται. The Primary Intention of the sentence is satisfied at ἔχουν.

Soph. 224 d, οἷοι σὲ, κἂν εἰ τις αὐτοῦ καθαρμένου . . . προϊάζατο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ ἦν δή.

Apol. 31 b, τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυνθῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα. The οὐχ οἷοί τε connects itself with παρασχ. μάρτ.

In illustration, we have in Thuc. i. 2, ἀδηλον ὅν ὀπότε τις ἐπελθὼν, καὶ ἀτεχνήτων ἃμα ὄντων, ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσται. Hdt. ii. 134, οὐδὲ δὲν οὐδὲ εἴδοτε μοι φαίνοντα λέγειν, ἰχ. 105, τοῦτον δὲ κατέλαβε ὑστέρον τούτων ἀποδιοικάτα κείσθαι. Hom. Od. iv. 739, ἔτι δὲν τινα κεῖνος εἰνί φρεσκί μητίν ὑφήμα τε ἔξελθον λαοίσιν ὄντες. Ἀσκ. Ag. 479, τις ὅδε παῦσος . . . , παραγγέλμασιν νέοις πυρωθείτα καρδίαν, ἄλλα γάρ λόγου καμείν; (the virtual Predicate in the Infinitival sentence being πυρωθείτα), 740, παρ' αὐτὰ δ' ἐλείν ἐσ' 'ὕλον πῶλ' λέγομι' ἀν φρώνημα νηρέον γαλάνας (′there came what I should call a spirit′ &c.—virtual Predicate not ἐλείν' but φρώνημα ν. γ.), 796, οὐκ ἕτερ ναθεῖν ὠματα φωτὸς τὰ δοκοῦν' εὕφρωνος ἐκ διανοιᾶς ἴδαρει σαίνεις φιλύτητι (where in the Infinitival sentence depending on δοκοῦντα the virtual Predicate is εὔφρωνος, not σαίνειν—′which with seeming-kindly heart fawn′ &c.). Soph. Aij. 798, τήρον δ' ἔξοδον Ὀλεθρίων Ἀλαντὸς ἐλπίζει φέρειν—′ he fears that this foray, which [by me his messenger] he interprets, will be fatal to him.' Here Ὀλεθρίων is the virtual Predicate.

§ 304. D. Chiasmus, or Inverse Parallelism of clauses and sentences.


Ib. 494 c, πᾶν μὲν ἔργον πᾶν δ' ἐποιος λέγοντας τε καὶ πράττοντας.

R 2
Rep. 597 d, ὡντως κλίνης ποιήσεως ὡντος οὖσης ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνης τινὸς μὴδὲ καλοσκιῶν τις.

Symp. 186 a, οὗ μένον ἐστιν ἐπὶ ταῖς πυχαισ . . . . πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις.

Ib. 196 b, οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ, οὔτ' ἀδικεῖται, οὔθ' ἐπὶ θεοῦ, οὔτε θεόν.

Theocr. 173 d, νῦνοι δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἡ γεγραμμένα, οὔτε ὀρθῶν οὔτ' ἀκύστως.

Symp. 218 a, δεδηγμένος τε ἐπὶ ἀλγευστέρων καὶ τὸ ἀλγευστάτου δὲν ἂν τις δηχθεί, τὴν καρδίαν ἡ πυχὴν γὰρ δηχθεῖ τοῖς ἐν φίλο-σοφίᾳ λόγοι.

Soph. 231 a, καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ.

Gorg. 474 c, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν.

Phædo 102 c, συμκρόσ τε καὶ μέγας . . . , τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχει τὴν συμκρόστητα ὑπερέχων, τῷ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς συμκρόστητος παρέχου ὑπερέχων.

Ib. 69 b, τούτον καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὁνομένα τε καὶ πιπρασκήμενα.

§ 305. So in Dialogue.

Gorg. 453 d, (A) πέτερον . . . πείθει, ἥ αὖ; (B) Οὐ δήτα [sc. οὐ πείθει].

ἀλλὰ πάντων μιλιστὰ πείθει.

Ib. 496 d, (A) πότερον εὖν ἐτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἡ ὁμολογεῖς κ.τ.λ.; (B) 'Ομολογῦ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

In Dialogue, however, the Parallelism is often Direct, instead of Inverse.

Rep. 337 c, (A) ἄλλο τί . . . ποιήσεις; ὃν ἐγὼ . . . ἀποκρινεῖ; (B) Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαμεν: εἰ μοι σκέφτασόν οὔτω δᾶξει.

Ib. 428 d, (A) τίς, καὶ ἐν τίς; (B) Λὔτη, ἡ φυλακική, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἀφικνεῖσαν.

Soph. 207 a, (A) Ἔργατικόν δὴ . . . ἀποκεμώμεθα: τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφόμεν κ.τ.λ. (B) Νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω.


§ 306. Often, also, of two points put by A, the former only is taken up by B.
§§ 307, 308.] ORDER OF WORDS AND CLAUSES. 245

Rep. 341 b, (A) οὖτε γάρ ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε κ.τ.λ. (B) Οἴδε γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαμι.

Phædo 79 b, (A) τί δὲ ἡ συχῆ; ὦρατόν, ἡ ἄδεις; (B) οὐχ ὡπ' ἀνθρώ- 

πον γε.

Hipp. Ma. 293 e, (A) τὸ πρέπον ἄρα τοῦτο λέγομεν ὡς παραγενόμενον 

ποιεῖ ἐκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλά, ... ἡ δὲ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἡ οὐδέτερα τούτων; 

(B) "Εμοιγε δοκεί (sc. δ.—φαίνεσθαι).

Gorg. 462 b, (A) ἐρώτα ἡ ἀποκρίνον. (B) Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταύτα. καὶ 

μοι ἀπόκρυναι, ὡς Σάκρατες.

§ 307. E. Comparative emphasis in co-ordinate expressions marked by the order (which is often the reverse in Greek of what it would be in English).

Symp. 173 e, καὶ δὴ λόγον γε ὅτι οὔτω διανοούμενοι καὶ περὶ ἑμαντο 

καὶ περὶ ἕμων μαύρουμα. The emphasis is on ἑμαντο, and the 

ἕμων is quite faint.

Ib. 175 b, νῦν οὖν νομίζομεν καὶ εἶμεν ὧπ' ἕμων κεκληθοῦσι επὶ δειπνον 

καὶ τούτῳ τούς ἀλλοὺς, θεραπεύετε—'I your master, as well as 

the others.'

Ib. 185 c, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινὰ ἡ ὧπ' πλησιονῆσθαι ἡ ὧπ' τινος ἀλλο 

ἑγγα ἐπιπεπτωκυίαν—'from some cause, most probably reple- 

tion.'

Ib. 189 e, καὶ εἴδος καὶ ὑμόθα—' the class as well as the mere name.'

Euthyphro 3 d, εἰτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δὲ ἄλλο τι—' for 

whatever cause, most probably for envy.'

Ib. 39 b, καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμενίκα καὶ οὕτω—'I as well as 

they.'

§ 308. F. Hysteron Proteron; where (in other words) the order of 

expression, following that of thought, reverses the order of occur- 

rence of facts.

Theæt. 162 b, εἶτερ μέλλοιεν μοι ἐπιτρέψεις καὶ πείσθησαι.

Apol. 19 d, ἄλληλους διδάσκεις τε καὶ φράζεις.

Gorg. 474 a, γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἥπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.

Phædo 80 c, συμπερνό το σῶμα καὶ ταραξενθέν.

Ib. 100 b, ἐπιδείξεις καὶ ἀνευρήσεις.

Ib. 87 c, πολλὰ καταστρίψας τοιαῦτα ἵματα καὶ ἰδρυκόμενος,

Symp. 190 c, τὰς . . . ἤντιδας τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελέαυν καὶ τὰ στήθη 

dιήγησαν.
§ 309. G. Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.

a. With Negative.

Phaedo 80 c, εάν μὲν καθάρα ἀπαλλάττηται κ.τ.λ.—οὐκόν ὁτῳ μὲν ἔχωσα κ.τ.λ.;
Rep. 402 a, ἀστερ πρα γραμματίων πέρι τότε ἰκανός εἴχομεν ὅτε κ.τ.λ. —οὐκόν καὶ εἰκόνας κ.τ.λ.;
Ib. 581 ε, τῶν δὲ φιλόσοφων ποιόμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν . . . .
τῆς ἡδονῆς αὐ τὰν πάρσι κ.τ.λ.;
Ib. 587 α, πλείστων δὲ λόγων ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμον καὶ τάξεως;
Ib. 590 α, ἡ δ’ αἰτήθεια καὶ δυνατία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντώδες . . . .
αξίζεται;
Legg. 830 d, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ φοβηθεῖς . . . . μὴ φαύνηται τοις γελοίοις οὐκ ἀριν κυριοθητήσει;
Protag. 351 c, ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ’ ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἀρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά;
Ibid. d, ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα;
Men. 78 c, ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἶον ἐγγείας κ.τ.λ.;
Ib. 88 d, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τόλλα, ἅ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν . . . . εἶναι, ἀρ’ οὐχ ὀδηστήρ κ.τ.λ.;
Symp. 216 d, καὶ αὖ ἄγνοείς πάντα καὶ υδέθεν οἴδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὖ σειληρώδες; [The Zurich editors give τοῦτο. οὐ σ. ;]

§ 310. b. Without Negative.

Soph. 233 c, δρόσι δὲ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἄπαντα, φαμέν;
Hip. Ma. 301 c, ἐπεί καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σου ταῦτα νουθετήθηκα, ὡς εὐφροσ διεκείμεθα, ἔτι σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω κ.τ.λ.;
Gorg. 496 c, τὸ πειθὴν ἔλεγεν πότερον ἢδ’ ἢ ἀναροῦ εἶναι;
Phileb. 44 d, οἴμαι τοιόνδε τι λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ὡς εἰ βουληθεὶμεν ὅτονον ἐδοὺς τὴν φύσιν ἱδεῖν, πότερον κ.τ.λ.;
§ 311, 312.] RHETORICAL FIGURES.

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Politic. 265 e, ὁ πολιτικὸς ἀρ’ ἐπιμελείαν ἔχειν φαίνεται πότερα κ.τ.λ.; Legg. 683 e, βασιλεία δὲ καταλήπται, ὃ πρὸς Δίος, ἡ καὶ κ.τ.λ., μῶν ὑπὸ τινῶν ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν;

Apol. 37 b, πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσει κ.τ.λ., τί δεῖσιν; [So Hermann punctuates.]

Crito 53 c, ἡ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀνασχυνθήσεις διαλεγόμενοι—τόνα λόγους, ὃ Σώκρατες;

Ibid. e, ἐπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων,—τί ποιῶν; [The Zurich editors give δουλεύων]

Cf. Lysias xiii. 64. p. 135, Ἀγόρατος τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ φυγάδας εὐντεῦθεν ἐποίησε,—τίς ὃν αὐτός;

§ 311. H. Enclitic recommencing, or even commencing, a clause.

Phileb. 16 c, θεὼν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἕμοι, ποθέν ἐκ θεῶν ἔρριψη.

Ib. 25 b, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τίς, ὃ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῶν νῦν δὴ γεγονέναι.

Ib. 46 c, ὅπόταν . . . τίς τάναται ἀμα πάθη πάσχα, ποτὲ μιγών θέρηται καὶ θερμανώμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχηται.

Phædo 65 d, τί δὴ οὖν; πώποτε τι . . . εἴδες; [So Oxon. But the edd. give ἦδη οὖν πώποτε τι εἴδες;]

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 44. p. 240, περιμῶν ὁ Φιλίππος Ἰλλυρίους καὶ Τριζαλλοῦς, τινὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐλλήνων, κατεστρέφετο.

Similarly ἂν commences a parenthetic clause.

Phædo 87 a, τί οὖν, ἄν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἐτί ἀπιστεῖς; (See above, § 295.)


[So one Paris MS. τίς ἂν Zurich editors.]

§ 312. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

A. Metonymy.

Rep. 497 d, ὃν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε — 'of those [objections], your allegation of which has shewed me that' &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνήσαν ἄλλοις ἔπαινος ἔχωντες—equivalent to ἐνῆ ἔπαινος ἄλλοις διδόμενος. A strange instance.

Ib. 205 b, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μή ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἄν ἱστε ὄρφοις αἰτία—that is, ἢ τοῦ ἱέραι ὀρφοῦ αἰτία.

Theæt. 167 c, ἀντὶ ποιηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν.
Theaet. 190 e, αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀναγκαζομένων ἀμολογεῖν—
'I should be ashamed at our being compelled' &c.

Apol. 33 e, χαίροντων ἐξεταζομένως τοῖς οἰόμενοι εἶναι σοφοίς.

Phaedo 88 d, ὁ λόγος . . . . ὡσπερ ἰπέμψει με ῥήθεις—'the recital
of the argument as it were reminded me.'

Ib. 68 a, τούτον ἀπηλλάχθαι ξυνάντωσ αὐτόν—'be rid of the company
of this.'

Charm. 173 b, ἐκ τούτων οὕτως ἔχοντων. So Legg. 959 c.

Legg. 959 e, καλὸν ἐστώ καλῶς καὶ μετρίως τὰ περὶ τῶν τετελευτηκότα
γιγνόμενα—'let it be a credit to have the obsequies handsomely
or decently performed.'

§ 313. B. Catachresis.

'Χποπτείεων for 'to expect.'

Theaet. 164 a, καὶ ἐγώ, νὴ τῶν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἰκανῶς γε συννοώ.

'Αμήχανος of number.

Phdr. 229 d, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλῆθη τερατολόγων τινῶν φυσίων.

Δαιμόνος.

Critias 117 b, κάλλος ἔψος τε δαμόνων ἔχοντα.

§ 314. Θαυμαστός, θαυμάσιος, has many gradations of Catachrestic
meaning.

a. 'Strange,' 'eccentric.'

Symp. 182 e, θαυμαστὰ ἔργα. So 213 d, θαυμαστὰ ἐργάζεται.

β. 'Incomparable,' 'capital;'—only the intention of super-
lativeness being retained.

Apol. 41 b, θαυμαστὴ ἄν εἰη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτῆι.

γ. Of a recommendation or a feeling or an assertion,—'de-
cided,' 'emphatic,' 'positive.'

Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακέλευσις τῷ ἐρωτεῖ παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστὴ—
'most positive is the encouragement given by all.'

Tim. 29 d, τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθα σου—'most
decidedly approved.'

Euthyd. 283 c, θαυμαστῶς σπουδάζομεν—'were particularly
anxious.'

Phaedo 74 b, (A) φώμεν τι εἶναι ἡ μυθέν; (B) Φώμεν μείνοι νὴ Δία,
θαυμαστῶς γε. θαυμαστῶς qualifies φώμεν not εἶναι—'say Yes
most positively.'

Ib. 92 a, θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθηρ—'was most decidedly convinced.'
§ 315. Ἑπερφυός, καλὸς, σφόδρα, are also in the same way used to express decided assertion or assent to an assertion.

Gorg. 496 c, (A) ὠμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; . . . . (B) ἈΛΛ᾽ Ἑπερφυός ὡς ὠμολογῶ—'I agree most decidedly.'

Phaedo 76 e, Ἑπερφυός δοκεῖ μοι ἢ αὐτή ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

Phileb. 26 a, (A) ἢρ' οὐ ταῦτα ἐγγυνόμενα ταῦτα ... μονακίθην ἐὑμπασαν τελεότατα ἐξετῆσατο; (B) Κάλλιστά γε. Probably an intermediate step to this Catachresis is the use of καλὸς λέγειν for 'to say truly,' e. g. Phdr. 227 b.

Ib. 24 b, (A) ἀτελὴ δ' ὄντε δῆμον παντάπασιν ἀπείρῳ γίγνεσθον. (B) Καὶ σφόδρα γε. So 39 e.

Phdr. 263 d, (A) εἰπὲ . . . εἰ ὄρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου. (B) Νὴ Δι᾽ ἀμηχανός γε ὡς σφόδρα—'most decidedly you did.'

§ 316. Μέγας.

Phaedo 62 b, ὥ ... λόγος . . . μέγας τε τὸς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διάδει, 'cumbersome,' i. e. 'perplexing.'


§ 317. C. Hyperbole.

Euthyd. 303 b, ὄλγον καὶ οἱ κλόνες οἱ ἐν τῷ Δυκείῳ ἐθορέθησιν τ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡσθησαν.

Hip. Ma. 295 a, ἀκριβέστερον τὸς ἀπώθης ἀκριβείας.

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐγγυμαχά μήτε εὐβουλεί κύριοτος ἀργῶν θήραν διαπονυμένοις—the supposition of the alternative εὐδοσι, in order to make the denial total, is hyperbolical. Cf. Arist. Eth. X. ix. 11, δεὶ . . . μήτε ἀκούσα μήθε ἐκώντα πράττειν τά φαιλα. Soph. Antig. 1108, οὐ τ' οὐ ὀπάνως Οἴ τ' ὄντες οἱ τ' ἄπειντες.

§ 318. D. Formulæ expressive of Contempt.

a. Οἶτος.

Apol. 23 d, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 296, οἱ πρωγοδαιμονεὶς οἴτοι, 969, τὰς κατὰ Φρύνων ταῦτα τὰς δυσκολοκύμπτους [καμπάς].
§ 319. b. Ποῖος;
Gorg. 490 d, (A) ἄλλη ἵσως ἰματίων [τὸν βελτίων πλέον δεῖν ἐχεῖν ψής]
.... (B) Ποῖον ἰματίων;—‘Clothes, forsooth!’
Charm. 174 b, (A) ἄρα γε ἡ [αὐτῇ] τὸ πεπτευτικόν; (B) Ποῖον
πεπτευτικόν;

§ 320. c. Plural of Singular Terms.
Menex. 245 d, οὐ γὰρ Πέλοπτες οὔδε Κάδμου κ.τ.λ.
Phaedo 98 c, ἄρας καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὃσα άντιμόμενον.
Symp. 218 a, Φαίδρους, Ἀγάθωνας, Ἀρνιθάκους.
Rep. 387 b, Κοκυτοῦς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας.
Cf. Ἀσχ. Ἀγ. 1439, Χρυσήδων μελημα τῶν ὑπ’ Ἁλίφ. It is fre-
quent in Aristophanes: cf. Ecclez. 1069, ὁ Πάνος, ὁ Κορύβαντες,
Ach. 270, καὶ Δαμάχων ἀπαλλαγεῖς, Ran. 963, Κύκους ποίων καὶ
Μέμονας. It is equally used with a sense of dignity,—as in
the dithyrambic fragment of Pindar [p. 224 ed. Dissen], γόνων
ὕπατων μὲν πατέρων μελπέμεν γυναίκων τε Καθυσίων ἐμολον, sc.
Bacchus the son of Zeus and Semele.

Legg. 953 e, θρέμματα Νείλου—for Egyptians.

§ 322. E. Simile introduced as a Metaphor,—i. e. with the
Particle of Comparison omitted.
(See this noticed by Aristotle, Rhet. III. x–xi, where he charac-
terises it as πρὸ δυμάτων ποιεῖν.)
Euthyphro 11 c, οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ ἐνθιεῖς, ἄλλο σὺ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος.
Cf. Soph. Ἀγ. 169, μέγαν αἰγυπτίων ὁ ὑποδεικνύετε τάχ’ ἄν ἐξαίφνης
εἰ σὺ φανεῖς σιγῇ πτήξειαν ἄφωνοι, Ἀσχ. Π. Ρ. 856, οἱ δ’ ἐπτοη-
μέναι φρεῖνας Κίρκου πελειών οὐ μακρὰν δελειμμένου Ἡδονα, Ἀγ. 394,
ἐπεὶ διάκει παῖς ποταμῶν ὄρνων, Ευρίπ. Βακχ. 1144, Πρώτη δὲ μήτηρ
ηρίζει ἱερία φόνον.

§ 323. F. Play upon Words.
Rep. 621 b, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἄν σώσειν.
Symp. 185 c, Παυσανίων δέ παυσαμένου,—διδάσκοσιν γάρ με ἵσα
λέγειν οὐτωσί οἱ σοφοὶ.
Ib. 198 c, Γοργίου κεφαλῆς δεινοῦ λέγειν.
Ib. 174 b, ὁς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἵσαν αὐτόματον ἀγαθοὶ—
in allusion to Agathon.
§§ 324, 325.] RHETORICAL FIGURES.

Apol. 25 c, ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥς Μέλητε, . . . σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαντοῦ ἀμέλειαν.

Theaet. 194 c, κέαρ, ὥς ἔφη Ὁμήρος αἰνεττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιό-

Thædo 80 d, εἰς . . . τόπον . . . ἀειδῆ, εἰς Αἴδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.

Ib. 89 b, ἐὰντέρ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτῶν ἀναβιώ-

σάσθαι. The play upon the words lies in their reference to the subject of the discussion.

Ib. 92 c, πρέπει γε εἰπέρ τῷ ἀλλῷ λόγῳ ξυνωδῇ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἄρμονίας.

Legg. 802 b, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἥρα οὐτε οὖν παιδιὰ πεφυκεια οὔτε οὖν παιδεία.


§ 324. G. Hendiadys.

The Hendiadys which occurs in Plato (belonging to the last of Lobeck's four kinds,—cf. note on Soph. Ajax, 145) is that where Synonyms are set side by side with the view of expressing the idea more forcibly. This might be called Rhetorical Hendiadys. With Demosthenes it is a favourite instrument of δείνωσις.

Phædo 98 b, τῷ μὲν νῦν οὐδὲν χρῶμενον οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτώμενον.

Ib. 111 d, συντετήρησαν τε πολλαχῇ καὶ διεξόδους ἐχειν.

Crito 47 b, γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶττον.

Gorg. 472 b, ἐκδίλλες με μὲ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

Tim. 87 d, ὃν οὔν τοι σκοπούμεν, οὔτε έννοούμεν ὃτι κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 23 a, τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτὴ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ εξέ-

λέγοντα.

Legg. 953 a, ἐπιμελείσθαι καὶ τημελείν.

§ 325. H. Interrogation answered by the speaker himself.

This may be called Rhetorical Interrogation. Its object is to awakken the attention.

Phædo 73 c, λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τοῦτε. εὰν τίς τι κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 360 c, τὶς οὖν ἡ διάστασις; ήδε. μηδὲν ἀφαιρώμεν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 34 d, τὶ δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, δὲ

'Αθηναίοι, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 40 b, τὶ οὖν αἰτίον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὡμίν ἐρώ.

Protag. 343 b, τοῦ δὴ ένεκα ταῦτα λέγω; "Οτι κ.τ.λ. So Gorg. 457 c.
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. 

Gorg. 453 c, τοῦ οὖν ἐνεκα δὴ αὐτῶς ὑποπτεύων σε ἔρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἐνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 458 a, ἔγνο δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἄν ἐλεγχθέντων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 487 b, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰ εὗνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρώμαι; ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα κ.τ.λ.

Meno 97 e, πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθείς.

Legg. 701 c, τίνος δὴ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ χάριν ἐλέχθη; δεῖν φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 780 a, τίνος δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἰρηται; τοῦθε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Tim. 31 a, πότερον οὖν ὀρθὸς ἐνα οὐρανὸν προσευρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἢν ὀρθότερον; ἐνα, εἴσπερ κ.τ.λ.

Critias III a, πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτο πιστῶν, καὶ κατὰ τί λείψανον τῆς τότε γῆς ὀρθῶς ἄν λέγοιτο; πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 206 e, πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφι. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι κ.τ.λ. 
[So Hermann punctuates. The Zurich editors give the answer to another speaker.]