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THE APOLOGY  
OF PLATO.

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# THE APOLOGY

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

AND A DIGEST OF PLATONIC IDIOMS,

BY THE

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## ADVERTISEMENT.

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COMPLETE in itself, this volume is yet but a fragment of a larger undertaking. In the Oxford series of Plato's works, which commenced with Mr. Poste's edition of the *Philebus* in 1860, the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Phædo*, and *Symposium* were undertaken by Mr. Riddell. Had he lived, all four would probably have appeared together. The *Digest of Idioms*, founded on an examination of all the writings of Plato, which he had prepared to accompany his edition of these dialogues, would not have seemed out of proportion to the other contents of such a volume. His death on the 14th of September, 1866, left the undertaking incomplete. The preparations which he had made for the *Crito*, *Phædo*, and *Symposium*, though extensive and valuable, had not received their final shape. But the *Apology* seemed to be ready for the press. Its text was settled, a critical and exegetical commentary was written out fair, and a full introduction had been provided, together with an appendix

on the *δαμόνιον* of Socrates. The Digest of Idioms also, to which frequent reference was made in the commentary, appeared to have been transcribed for the printer, although a few pencil notes (which have been printed in this volume at the foot of the pages to which they belong) showed that additions would have been made to it, if the writer had lived to print it himself, and perhaps in some instances a different expression would have been given to the views which it contains. Under these circumstances it has been thought advisable to publish the *Apology* and the *Digest of Idioms* by themselves. My task has been only, in conducting them through the press, to remove clerical errors and to verify references.

It may be convenient to state that Plato is cited in this volume according to the pages of Stephanus. In reference to the *Orators* the sections of Baiter and Sauppe's Zurich edition have been given together with the pages of Stephanus in the minor *Orators* and Reiske in *Demosthenes*. In the *Dramatists* Dindorf's numbers are followed as they stand in the edition of the *Poetæ Scenici* published in 1830. With regard to quotations, the text of the Zurich editions has been used both for Plato and for the *Orators*, the text of Dindorf (from the edition of 1830) for the *Dramatists*. Wherever a reading is quoted which is not found in these editions, I have endeavoured to indicate the source from which it has been derived.

The text of the Apology itself is in the main that of C. F. Hermann. Even the punctuation is his. Some of the brackets found in his edition have been silently omitted: but, with this exception, every instance in which he has not been followed is mentioned in the commentary.

EDWIN PALMER,

BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD,

June 8, 1867.





# INTRODUCTION.

## PART I.

### THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

#### 1. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING.

THE trial of Socrates took place before a Heliastic court, according to the forms of an ordinary *γραφὴ δημοσία*. The indictment (*ἐγκλημα*) is called *ἀντωμοσία* 19 B, 24 B, and *ἀντιγραφὴ* 27 C,—terms which allude to the proceedings of the *ἀνάκρισις* before the Archon Basileus, before whom both the indictment and the plea in answer to it were presented in writing and confirmed severally by oath. And the terms *ἀντιγραφὴ*, *ἀντωμοσία*, proper at first to the defendant, came to be used of the prosecutor, and even were transferred to the indictment (*ἐγκλημα*) itself, thus presented in writing and sworn to.

#### 2. THE ACCUSERS.

The indictment was preferred by Meletus; see below the form preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and compare Plato's *Euthyphro* 2 B. Hence it is Meletus who is called on by Socrates to answer arguments as to its words and meaning in the *Apology*. Hence again Socrates asks why did not Meletus bring witnesses (34 A), and again observes (36 A) that the penalty for not obtaining  $\frac{1}{5}$  of the votes would have fallen on Meletus. Little account can be taken of the statement of Maximus Tyrius, *Disp.* xxxix. p. 228, *Μέλιτος μὲν ἐγράψατο* "Ἄντος δὲ εἰσήγαγε Λύκων δὲ ἐδίωκε. For authors vary on this distinction, and the continuation of the passage—*κατεδίκασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔδωσαν δὲ οἱ ἑνδεκα ἀπέκτεινε δὲ ὁ ὑπέρτης*—shows that these words are, as Stallbaum says, *magis oratorie*

quam vere dicta. See Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Process*, p. 709. n. 19.

No. 7. | Of Meletus, the ostensible prosecutor of Socrates, in reality little more than the tool of Anytus, we only know that he was a young tragic poet. He is characterised by Plato (*Euthyphro* 2 B) as νέος τις καὶ ἀγνός, and is ridiculed as a poet by Aristophanes (*Ran.* 1302). The Meletus (*Andoc. de Myst.* 94. p. 12) who was one of the four who arrested Leon (*Apol.* 32 C) may have been this Meletus' father, who bore the same name, but there is nothing to show it.

Lycon, a rhetorician, is mentioned by Aristophanes (*Vesp.* 1301) with Antipho.

Anytus was by far the most considerable of the three accusers, whence they are described (*Apol.* 18 B) as τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, and Socrates is called by Horace (*Sat.* II. iv. 3) Anyti reus. He was a leather-seller (*Xen. Apol. Soc.* 29), and had been a rich man. As a sufferer and worker for the popular cause he had earned a reputation second only to Thrasylbulus. With Thrasylbulus he had fled from Attica, and the Thirty had confiscated his estates and included him in the decree of banishment (*Xen. Hell.* II. iii. 42). He held a command in the camp at Phyle (*Lys.* xiii. 78. p. 137), and at the restoration was joint author with Thrasylbulus of the Act of Amnesty (*Isocr.* xviii. 23. p. 375). Plato (*Meno* 90 B) represents him as high in popular favour. His was nevertheless (*Athenæus* XII. p. 534 E) not a spotless character. Aristotle moreover (acc. to Harpocration on the word δικάζειν) says that he was the first man who bribed an Athenian court; and Diodorus, who repeats this (xiii. 64), adds that it was on his trial for treason (*Zeller, Philos. der Griech.* II. p. 142 n.). As Anytus was the most influential accuser, so there is reason to think he was the most inflamed against Socrates. Meletus and Lycon were actuated at most by a class-prejudice,—if indeed we should not rather regard them as mere tools of Anytus. All three however belonged to classes<sup>1</sup> which Socrates had offended by his incessant censure

<sup>1</sup> Socrates is made by Plato (*Apol.* 23 E) to represent his three accusers as all actuated by class-feeling in their attack upon him. Ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν

ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων. The contrast which is implied in this sentence between ῥήτορες and πολιτικοὶ shows that the words severally denote definite classes

of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account. Nowhere is this cause of offence traced more connectedly than in the *Apology* itself

of Athenian citizens. There seems no ground for thinking with Wiggers (*Sokrates* p. 97) and others, who have followed in this view Petitus' Comment, in Legg. Attic. Lib. III. Tit. iii, that there was any *order* of *ῥήτορες*, ten in number, appointed yearly, and deriving their origin from Solon. Any such institution could not but have interfered with the *ισσηγορία* which even to the time of Demosthenes was the cherished charter of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, even the precedence which was allowed by Solon in the assembly to speakers above the age of 50 seems to have fallen into abeyance. But we find that in the time of the Orators or earlier (see the latter part of Cleon's speech in Thucyd. III. 40) these *ῥήτορες* had attained a mischievous importance. Æschines speaks of them (iii. 3. p. 54) as *δυναστείας ἑαυτοῖς περποιούντες*, and in Alcib. II. 145 A it is said that *ὅσα δὴ ποτε ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων συμβουλῆς ἅπαντα γίγνεται*. To be a *ῥήτωρ* had become a regular profession. A new art had arisen, designated by the name *ῥητορικὴ*, which is seen to have been itself a new word from the way in which it is used in the *Gorgias* (448 D)—*τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν*. In their capacity of *συνήγοροι* the *ῥήτορες* were brought into prominence (Heeren, *Polit. Hist. of Anc. Greece*, c. 13. p. 232 of Eng. Transl.) by the frequency of state trials in the time succeeding the Peloponnesian war. But it was no less as *σύμβουλοι* to the Assembly that the *ῥήτορες* were in requisition. In all questions of legislation and of policy the debate was mainly in their hands. The epoch of this ascendancy is dated by Isocrates

(viii. 121. p. 183, where he calls it *τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος δυναστείαν*) from the Decelean war, or subsequent to Pericles (ib. 126. p. 184). The two species, *συμβουλευτικὴ* and *δικανικὴ*, of Aristotle's triple division of *ῥητορικὴ* in his treatise correspond with this double scope of the *ῥήτωρ*'s profession. The *πολιτικοὶ* as a class must have emerged at the same time as the *ῥήτορες*. In itself *πολιτικός* means no more than 'Statesman' in the sense in which this term might have been applied to Pericles. But an Athenian of Plato's time, speaking with reference to Athens, would mean by *πολιτικοὶ* that class of men who made public business their profession,—*τοὺς πολιτικούς λεγομένους*, Plat. *Politic.* 303 C. Our conception of the *πολιτικοὶ* will be best completed by comparing them with the *ῥήτορες*. Down to Pericles' time there would be no distinction. He united both characters like the great men before him. But afterwards the debates came into separate hands, and the speakers in the Assembly were for the most part no longer the great commanders in the field and the bearers of the highest offices. The fact and the reasons are stated by Aristotle (*Pol.* V. v. 7), *νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἡδξημένης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν δι' ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται*. At the same time, inasmuch as counsel as well as action was needed for the conduct of the state, those who were engaged in the different branches of this common work were not absolutely contradistinguished: cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 520 A, *Phdr.* 258 B, and the general terms in which the *ῥήτορες* are described—e. g. by Lysias (xviii. 16. p. 150) as *οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες*.

(21 C—22 C). Illustrations occur also abundantly elsewhere. We see from the Ion (533 E) how poets were brought under this censure for parading inspiration as the substitute for reason. The rhetoricians<sup>2</sup> again as in the Gorgias were censured for producing persuasion without knowledge. Yet stronger and yet more incessant was the denunciation of the mischievousness and presumptuousness of undertaking politics ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου (Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 3), or without knowledge of principles (Alcib. I. 113 C). But Anytus was actuated, over and above such a class-feeling, by personal animosity. One ground of this has been said to have been his “amor spretus Alcibiadæ<sup>3</sup>:” so Luzac and Wiggers. Plato further (Meno 94 E) makes him threaten Socrates with mischief in bewilderment and mortification at being told, in effect, that in teaching<sup>4</sup> his son the family business he had done nothing towards his real education. These personal motives, however, remained in the back-ground; and so again, if he entertained yet another grudge against Socrates as the teacher of Critias, the avowal of it was incompatible with the Act of Amnesty. Therefore he made the attack under cover of defending the democracy. The ἐπιείκεια of the restored people did not last long (Plat. Epist. VII. 325 B), and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal for their revived popular institutions.

### 3. NUMBER OF THE JUDGES.

The statement of Wiggers (Sokrates p. 132 note), and of Matthiæ (Miscell. Philol. vol. I. p. 252. note 35), that the number of the judges on Socrates' trial was 556 or 557, has been repeated without question even by Mr. Grote (Hist. Gr. vol. VIII. p. 654, chap. 68). It is, however, as Dr. Cron<sup>5</sup> remarks (in his note on Apol. 36 A), merely an assumption from the false reading *τρεις* in this passage, taken in connection with the

<sup>2</sup> The enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates' death to the Socratists (Luzac de Dig. Socr. Sect. II. § 4).

<sup>3</sup> The story of this “amor Alcibiadæ” rests on the testimony of Plutarch and of Satyrus apud Athenæum, but is unlikely in itself, and because Plato and Xenophon are wholly silent

about it.—Zeller II. p. 141 note.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Xen. Apol. Soc. 29. ἄνυτος ἀπέκτονέ με ὅτι αὐτὸν τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξιούμενον οὐκ ἔφην χρῆναι τὸν υἱὸν περὶ βύρσας παιδεύειν.

<sup>5</sup> Platon's Ausgewählte Schriften erklärt von Christian Cron und Julius Deuschle.—Teubner, 1865.

statement of Diogenes Laertius (II. v. 40), κατεδικάσθη διακοσίοις ὀγδοήκοντα μιᾷ πλείοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολλυνουσῶν, whence the numbers are supposed to have been 281 for condemnation, 275 for acquittal.

There is no reason (as Mr. Grote allows) for mistrusting the precise statement of Diogenes, nor is there any more reason, if we have regard to Greek habits of expression, for doubt that the 281 represented the aggregate majority, not the amount by which it exceeded the minority.

Hence, accepting the reading *τριάκοντα* here, the whole number cannot have been 556 or 557. An independent argument against such a number would be that it resembles no other recorded numbers on trials. Those which we find, such as 200 (Dem. in Mid. 223. p. 585), 500 (frequently), 700 (Isocr. xviii. 54. p. 381), 1000 (Dem. in Mid. 223. p. 585), 1500 (Plutarch. Vit. Periclis, 72), 2000 (Lysias, xiii. 35. p. 133), 2500 (Din. in Dem. 52. p. 96), 6000 (Andoc. i. 17. p. 3), even if they are only approximate, must stand for something near multiples of 100.

Now Pollux (VIII. 48) mentions 401 and 201 as the numbers in two different cases of *φάσις*, and elsewhere 1001 and 1501. This affords the clue to a conjecture of much probability (Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Process*, p. 140), that this was a provision not exceptionally but uniformly for an odd number of judges, (frustrated sometimes, it would appear, by the default of individuals at the last moment), but that the common way of indicating the number was, for brevity's sake, to mention the variable constituent, omitting the invariable 1. And Heffter (Athen. Gerichtsverfassung, p. 55) clenches this by a passage from Ulpian's <sup>6</sup> Commentary on Demosthenes' oration against Timocrates: διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ὁ εἰς προσετίθετο ἀεὶ τοῖς δικασταῖς ἵνα μὴ ἴσαι γένοιντο αἱ ψήφοι. Thus a Heliastic court always consisted of some multiple of 100, + 1.

Accordingly, if we take the total number of Socrates' judges

<sup>6</sup> [Ulpian's note is on the words δικαστηρίον δυοῖν εἰς ἓνα καὶ χιλίους ἐψηφισμένων (Dem. c. Timocr. 9. p. 702) and stands as follows: ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις καὶ ἐσπουδασμένοις πράγμασι συνήγοντο ἐκ δύο δικαστηρίων πλη-

ροῦντες ἀριθμὸν χιλίων καὶ ἑνός. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ὁ εἰς προσετίθετο ἀεὶ τοῖς δικασταῖς ἵνα μὴ ἴσων γενομένων τῶν ψήφων ἐξ ἴσης ἀπέλθοιεν οἱ δικαζόμενοι ἀλλ' ἐκείνος δόξῃ νικᾶν ᾧ ἂν ὁ εἰς προσετίθῃ.]

as 501 (which is also Heffter's conclusion), and the number of those for condemnation as 281, we have 220 for his acquittal. Then 31 exactly, or 30 in round numbers, changing sides, would have effected his acquittal. Cron, not allowing for the odd 1, reckons 219 for acquittal.

#### 4. FORM OF INDICTMENT.

Plat. Apol. 24 B. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείρων καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζων ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινὰ.

Diog. Laert. II. 40. ἡ ἀντωμοσία τῆς δίκης εἶχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρίνος<sup>7</sup>, ἐν τῷ Μητρῷ· Τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιπθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθεν· Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.

#### 5. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. ORDER OF THE PLEADINGS.

From Æschines (iii. 197. p. 82) we learn that in a γραφὴ παρανόμων the time assigned for the trial was divided into three equal lengths: ἐγχεῖται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὕδωρ τῷ κατηγορῷ . . . . τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὕδωρ τῷ τὴν γραφὴν φεύγοντι καὶ τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγουσι (i. e. τοῖς συνηγόροις, not the witnesses whose examination was extra to the time allowed for the pleadings: cf. Lys. xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166, 167, καὶ μοι ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ) . . . τὸ τρίτον ὕδωρ ἐγχεῖται τῇ τιμῇσει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ὑμετέρας (i. e. for the prosecutor to speak *again* on the amount of penalty, and the defendant to reply, and the judges to vote).

The second of these lengths then would be occupied by the defence of the accused and his συνηγόροι, represented by the main part of the Apology, i. e. as far as 35 E. The Xenophontean Apology says (22) that speeches were made ὑπὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ, but the Platonic manifestly would have us think of Socrates defending himself alone.

Then would follow the taking of the votes of the judges, and the announcement of the result, by which the charge is declared proven.

The third length then begins with the second speech of the

<sup>7</sup> [Favorinus wrote a work on Socrates in the time of the Emperor Hadrian.]



prosecutor in advocacy of the penalty he had named; and the remainder of it would be occupied by Socrates' ἀντιτίμησις, where the Apology again takes up the thread (35 E—38 C). It was open to the prosecutor to ask now for a lighter penalty than that which he had named in the indictment. It was in the defendant's speech on the ἀντιτίμησις that he brought forward his wife and children ad misericordiam.

Then would follow the voting of the judges upon the amount of the penalty.

Here the formal trial would end, and the condemned person would be led away by the officers of the Eleven (cf. Apol. 39 E). This is the moment, however, to which the concluding portion of the Apology (from 38 C) belongs. Whether or not the indulgence of such a concluding address was historically conceded to Socrates, there must have existed sufficient precedent for it to give verisimilitude to the ascription of it to him. The Xenophontean Apology (24) agrees here.

The raised platform, called βῆμα, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses, whence the phrase ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, Apol. 34 A, and similarly Andoc. i. 26. p. 4, καὶ σιωπῶ καὶ παραχωρῶ εἴ τις ἀναβαίνειν βούλεται, and Æsch. iii. 165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ βήματος ὥς ἂν εἴπῃς.

## 6. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. SPEECHES OF THE ACCUSERS.

We find that speeches were made by all the three. Compare for Meletus Apol. 34 A, and for the other two Apol. 36 B, ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων. It is implied however that Meletus spoke first.

Grote (VIII. 647. c. 68) conjectures that they made a partition of their topics, "Meletus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lycon would dwell on the political grounds of attack." More accurately, Meletus' business would be to support the indictment proper, while the political charges and insinuations would be dwelt on by Anytus as carrying with him ἡθικὴ πίστις in this topic, and by Lycon as familiar with it in his capacity of ῥήτωρ. The only citation in Plato's Apology which is referable to one accuser rather than another is the saying ascribed to Anytus (29 C), εἰ διαφεύξεται Σωκράτης, ἥδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νῆεις ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασιν διαφθαρήσονται· ἢ οὖν τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ

ἔδει Σωκράτη δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθεν οὐχ οἶόν τέ ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι.

The other citations are general ; e. g. 17 A, χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἔξαπατηθῆτε ὥς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν, and 33 B, καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μὴ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι—an allusion to the alleged deterioration by him of Critias and Alcibiades, which was made much of by the prosecution according to Xenophon.

In the Memorabilia of Xenophon likewise the citations are all ascribed in general terms to ὁ κατήγορος. Mem. I. ii. 9, Ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων ὥς μωρὸν εἶη τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμου καθιστάναι. . . . . τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστώσης πολιτείας καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους. Ib. 12, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὰ γενομένῳ Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποίησάτην. Ib. 49, Σωκράτης. . . . τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε πείθων μὲν τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανοίας ἐλόντα καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι, τεκμηρίῳ τούτῳ χρώμενος ὥς τὸν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμιμον εἶη δεδέσθαι. Ib. 51, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς αὐτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων ὥς οὔτε τοὺς κάμνοντας οὔτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὠφελοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἱατροὶ τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι. ἔφη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὥς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εὖνους εἶναι εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνησονται· μόνους δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι δυναμένους. ἀναπείθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτὸν ὥς αὐτὸς εἶη σοφώτατός τε καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς αὐτῷ συνόντας ὥστε μηδαιμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς αὐτόν. Ib. 56, ἔφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ πονηρότατα καὶ τούτοις μαρτυρίοις χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κτεκούργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικούς, Ἡσιόδου μὲν τὸ

Ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος ἀεργεῖν δέ τ' ὄνειδος·

τοῦτο δὲ λέγειν αὐτὸν ὥς ὁ ποιητῆς κελεύει μηδενὸς ἔργου μήτε ἀδίκου μήτε αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει. . . . τὸ δὲ Ὅμηρον ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος πολλάκις αὐτὸν λέγειν ὅτι Ὀδυσσεὺς

Ὅντινα μὲν βασιλῆα κ. τ. λ.

ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς ἐπαινοῖν παύσθαι τοὺς δημότας καὶ πένητας.

## 7. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. SOCRATES' SPEECH.

### (i.) The defence.

Socrates speaks in presence of a large audience of Athenians over and above his judges (cf. Apol. 24 E, where he speaks of οἷδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ in pointed distinction from οἱ δικάσταί), but he is addressing professedly his judges alone<sup>8</sup> (cf. Apol. 17 C, εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι, 18 A, δικάστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή). It is therefore these alone who are designated by the ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι at the opening and throughout: Steinhart observes that the appellation οἱ ἄνδρες δικάσταί is reserved until the final address to be applied only to the judges who vote for acquittal. For mention of such audiences cf. Lysias xii. 35. p. 123, πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἤκουσιν εἰσόμενοι τίνα γνώμην περὶ τούτων ἔξετε, Æsch. i. 117. p. 16, ὁρῶν πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν νεωτέρων

<sup>8</sup> The δικάσταί were very animated listeners. They answered speakers on being appealed to: cf. Æsch. iii. 202. p. 82; so Andoc. i. 33. p. 5, εἰ μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς περὶ τούτων ἀπολογῆσθαι δηλώσατέ μοι ἵνα προθυμότερον περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολογῶμαι. Or they stopped a speaker to put a question: cf. Andoc. i. 70. p. 10, εἰ τίς τι ὑμῶν ποθεῖ ἀναστὰς ὑπομνησάτω, and Æsch. ii. 7. p. 29. They used the interpellation of κατάβα· Aristoph. Vesp. 979. It seems to have been a common practice not only of political but even of judicial assemblies to express their pleasure or displeasure at what was said. The general word for such expressions of feeling was θόρυβος. That it was a word mediæ significationis we see from Plato, Legg. 876 B, δικαστήρια . . . . ὅταν μηδὲ σιγῶντα ἀλλὰ θορύβου μεστὰ καθάπερ θέατρα ἐπαινοῦντά τε βοῇ καὶ ψέγοντα τῶν ῥητόρων ἑκάτερον ἐν μέρει κρίνη, and Æschines ii. 51. p. 34, θορυβησάντων ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν ὡς δεινός τις εἶη καὶ σύντομος τῶν δὲ πλειόνων ὡς πονηρός καὶ φθονερός. The word occurs in an

unfavourable sense in Plato, Protag. 319 C, καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσι, Andocides ii. 15. p. 21, Lysias xii. 73. p. 126, ἐθορυβεῖτε ὡς οὐ ποιήσοντες ταῦτα, 74. p. 127, εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ μέλοι αὐτῷ τοῦ ὑμετέρου θορύβου. It was unrestrained in its nature: cf. Æsch. i. 83. p. 11, μετὰ γέλωτος θόρυβος, 164. p. 23, πολλὴ κραυγὴ παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσεται, iii. 122. p. 70, κραυγὴ πολλὴ καὶ θόρυβος, Isocr. xv. 272, θορύβου καὶ βοῆς ἅπαν ἐμπλήσῃτε τὸ δικαστήριον. On the other hand it expressed applause unequivocally: cf. Isocr. xii. 264. p. 288, οὐκ ἐθορύβησαν ὁ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν ἐπὶ τοῖς χαρίεντως διειλεγμένοις ἀλλ' ἀνέβύησαν ὡς ὑπερβαλλόντως εἰρηκότος. The θόρυβος which Socrates deprecates was of the unfavourable kind. This is implied by his urging that it is not his fault if the truth is unpalatable. Θόρυβος would thus seem to be confined to the δικάσταί, not joined in by the ἀκροαταί. The word is applied to Meletus in Apol. 27 B merely in the sense of interrupting by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering.

προσεσθηκότας πρὸς τῷ δικαστηρίῳ πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος συνειλεγμένους εἰς τὴν ἀκρόασιν, ii. 5. p. 28, ἢ τῶν ἔξωθεν περιεσθηκότων (σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι τῶν πολιτῶν πάρευσιν) ἢ τῶν δικαστῶν, iii. 56. p. 61, ὅσους οὐδεὶς πώποτε μένηται πρὸς ἀγῶνα δημόσιον παραγενομένους.

#### Production of witnesses.

It has been questioned by C. F. Hermann whether Plato intended the reader of the *Apology* to imagine any introduction of witnesses to take place. It can hardly be doubted that he did: it is part of the verisimilitude which characterises the whole speech. At 19 D Socrates, wishing to appeal to the judges as witnesses, employs the common formula for doing so—*μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι*. Cf. *Æsch.* ii. 122. p. 44, *καὶ τούτων ὑμεῖς οἱ τὴν ψῆφον μέλλοντες φέρειν ἔστέ μοι μάρτυρες*. Similarly, when at 21 A—*καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὐτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε*—he uses the very circumstantial formula commonly in use in such a case, he must intend us to go on to fill up the picture with the actual production of the witness. And at 32 E *καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες* must mean that the production of the witnesses is to follow, coming so near as it does to the common formula *τούτων δ' ὑμῖν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρέξομαι* (cf. e. g. *Antipho* v. 20. p. 131, and *Lysias* x. 5. p. 116). The future consistently used in the two last cases (contrast the present in the first case) would not suit the supposition of mere reference to persons who are not to be produced. Again, 34 A, *τούτου πᾶν τοῦναντίον εὐρήσετε* is very like an implied promise to produce evidence. Lastly, the employment against Meletus of the common topic (34 A)—‘Why did he not call witnesses who if what he said was true could not have failed to establish it?’—and the subjoining of the conventional challenge *εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο νῦν παρασχέσθω· ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ* would be suicidal in a speaker who forbore to call witnesses himself.

#### Interrogation of the accuser.

In accordance with the law (*Demosth.* c. *Steph. B.* 10. p. 1131, *τοῖν ἀντιδίκωιν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή*), and with the common practice (cf. *Lysias* xiii. 30, 32. p. 132, where spaces are left for a

formal ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ, as for ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ elsewhere, and add Lys. xii. 24, 25. p. 122, where a specimen is given at length), Meletus is questioned by Socrates in 24 C and the following paragraphs. In 25 D Socrates himself appeals to the law in support of his right to put such questions—ἀπόκριναι, ὦ γὰθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

(ii.) Ἡ ἀντιτίμῃσις.

In the Xenophontean Apology (23) it is denied that Socrates made any ἀντιτίμῃσις—οὔτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμήσατο οὔτε τοὺς φίλους εἶασεν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογοῦντος εἴη ἀδικεῖν. The Platonic ἀντιτίμῃσις, both of the σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ and of the 30 minæ, is (waiving the question of its being historical or not) wholly ironical: there could be no serious expectation that such an offer would be accepted. Diogenes Laertius says that this ἀντιτίμῃσις turned 80 more of the judges against him—καὶ οἱ θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν προσθέντες ἄλλας ψήφους ὀγδοήκοντα.

(iii.) The last words.

The latter part from τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις (29 E) we are to imagine as spoken ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἤγουν, and only those who chose would hear it (cf. παραμένετε τοσοῦτον χρόνον, ibid.).

## PART II.

### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APOLOGY.

#### I. ITS ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

- i. Its employment of commonplaces (*τόποι*).
  - ii. The "old accusers."
  - iii. The Delphic response.
  - iv. The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.
  - v. Its dramatic framework.
2. HOW FAR CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCRATES.
  3. ITS ADEQUACY AS A DEFENCE.

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#### I. ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

A close examination of the structure of the Apology resolves the question how far it preserves to us the actual defence made by Socrates. The criticism of Wiggers and Schleiermacher, that the Apology is the purest extant relic of Socrates, falls to the ground before the internal evidence which the Apology itself supplies. Xenophon (Mem. IV. viii. 5) tells us that Socrates turned his thoughts away from the preparation of any defence—*ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικάστας ἀπολογίας ἡναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον*. Now the Apology is artistic to the core, whether in respect of the recurrence of received *τόποι* of Attic pleaders, or of the arrangement and outward dress of the arguments (observe especially the artifice of "the old accusers," of which presently), or of the tripartite dramatic arrangement of the whole. The art and the manner, worthy as they assuredly are of Plato, are also distinctively characteristic of him. The subtle rhetoric of this defence would ill accord with the historical Socrates, even had the defence of Socrates been as certainly as we know it not to have been the offspring of study and premeditation.



## (i.) Employment of commonplaces.

We may trace this in detail through the defence or the first of the three parts of the oration.

The exordium may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators. The imputation of conjoint falsity and plausibility, the denial of being *δεινὸς λέγειν* (cf. Lys. xix. 1, 2. p. 152, Isæus x. 1. p. 79), the asking pardon for *λόγους πολλὸν τῶν εἰθισμένων λέγεσθαι παρ' ὑμῶν ἐξηλλαγμένους* (as Isocr. xv. 179 expresses it), the plea of unfamiliarity with law-courts (Isocr. xv. 38. p. 318, *οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ὥς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν*), the begging for an impartial hearing (Lys. xix. 2, 3. p. 152), the deprecation of *θόρυβος* (cf. c. g. Æsch. ii. 24. p. 31, *ἐπαυῶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅτι σιγῇ καὶ δικαίως ἡμῶν ἀκούετε*), the disclaiming a style unbecoming an old man (cf. Isocr. xii. 3. p. 233, *ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ οὐχ ἀρμόττειν*),—these topics, of which the exordium of the Apology is wholly made up, occur continually in the Orators.

Next, in meeting the judges' prejudices, advantage is taken of another common topic—allegation of the existence of *διαβολαί* (cf. Lysias xix. 5. p. 152). The way in which the charge of being a *σοφὸς* is dealt with has many parallels: cf. c. g. Isocr. xv. *passim*. No accusation was more indiscriminately launched than this, and the answers to it assumed consequently, in great measure, the character of commonplaces.

Socrates twits Meletus with having instituted the whole of the proceedings for his own amusement (24 C); so Lysias xxiv. 18. p. 170; and again with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court; cf. Lys. xxvi. 5. p. 175, *ταῦτα χρὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ εὐθελὲς αὐτῷ εἶναι δοκῆτε*.

Socrates alleges (32 A), though in a refined way, the meritorious acts of his past life;—a common *τόπος*. Cf. Lys. xvi. 13, xxi. 1. pp. 146, 161.

Compare again *ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πρόποτ' ἐγενόμην* (33 A) with Isocr. xv. 85, *ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδένα πρόποτε φανήσομαι παρακαλέσας ἐπ' ἐμαυτὸν τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅλην πειρῶμαι πείθειν τοιοῦτοις πράγμασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ τε εὐδαιμονήσουσι κ.τ.λ.*

The answer to the charge about perverting the young is



paralleled by Isocr. xv. 240, τοὺς πατέρας ἂν ἑωρᾶτε τῶν συνόντων ἡμῶν καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους ἀγανακτοῦντας καὶ γραφομένους.

The particular form of challenge is paralleled by Andoc. i. 35. p. 5, τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ μὲν ἤκουσι καὶ εἰσὶν ἔνθαδε τῶν δὲ ἀποθανόντων εἰσὶ πολλοὶ προσήκοντες· ὧν ὅστις βούλεται ἐν τῷ ἑμῷ λόγῳ ἀναβάς με ἐλεγξάτω.

The argument (34 A) καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῶν εἰπεῖν ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα is a stock argument against an adversary who does not produce witnesses. Cf. Arist. Rhet. I. xv. 17. The avowal of disdaining to solicit compassion is to be compared with Isocr. xv. 321. p. 345, and Lys. xviii. 24, xx. 35. pp. 151, 161.

The leaving the event to God (19 A), τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, and (35 D), ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνειν περὶ ἐμοῦ is not characteristic of Socrates, for it occurs in the typical oration of Antipho (i. 20. p. 113, ἡ δ' αἰτία.....ἔξει [τὰ ἐπίχειρα], ἔαν ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ θέλωσιν, and *ibid.* 25, 31. p. 114), though indeed sparingly in the Orators generally. The Gods are invoked at the outset of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown (p. 225).

(ii.) "The old accusers."

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (III. xv. 1.) remarks, περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις ὑπόληψιν δυσχερῆ ἀπολύσαιο· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἴτε εἰπόντος τινὸς, εἴτε μή.

An artifice in the Apology which demands separate notice is the way in which the prejudices of the judges are dealt with. The attack on them is so carefully masked that its point might be missed by a cursory reader. The strength of the prejudice which existed against Socrates demanded that a substantive and prominent portion of his defence should be directed specially against it. He could not hope to combat the charges of his prosecutors on their own merits in presence of a general aversion which was in harmony with these charges. Worst of all, this aversion was too well reflected by the Court itself. It was matter of exigency, therefore, to deal with it at once, and so we find it succeeding the exordium almost hurriedly. But to this was joined the necessity of avoiding both the direct imputation of it to the judges, which would have been to offend

them further, and the designation of it at once as a *vox populi*, which would have been to acknowledge its weight.

It is therefore introduced to the judges under a disguise. Their attention is drawn to it not as the attitude of their own minds, not as matter of common fame, but as emanating from certain individuals who with time and perseverance have done their work. The calumny, now so wide-spread and influential, is all traceable to them. It is not possible to single them out ("except perhaps a certain play-writer"); in default of which,—the only fair method,—they are individualised in imagination. They are marked off by a special designation,—“the original accusers,”—and their calumny is made more tangible by throwing it into the form of a technical indictment supposed to be preferred by them and read before the Court.

Οἱ *πρώτοι κατήγοροι* are but a figure for ἡ τῶν πολλῶν *διαβολή*, and what makes the neutralising of this *διαβολή* at once so necessary and so delicate a matter is that it is that ἡν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε. But these two identifications emerge in one or two places only. Twice only is the reference to the judges pointedly disclosed,—“I hope, if possible, to convert *you* from a prejudice which *you*” (the repeated pronoun is emphatic) “have so long harboured” (19 A, 24 A). Immediately, however, after these disclosures, the argument resumes its disguise. In like manner once only, considerably later (28 A), when he notices the inferior importance of the charges of Meletus, which he has just answered, to the older charges, he acknowledges these as *vox populi*—ἡ τῶν πολλῶν *διαβολή* τε καὶ φθόνος.

The seriousness of tone which marks the answer to “the old accusers,” the ἡθικὴ πίστις which is thrown into it, and the absence of irony, contrast sharply with the banter with which the charges of the real indictment are met immediately afterwards. This earnestness and almost anxiety of tone, the prominent position of this portion of the Apology, the irrelevance of its ostensible reference, the very technicality with which it is drawn up, forbid a more literal acceptance of its drift, and constrain us to find in it a signal exercise of rhetorical art.

### (iii.) The Delphic response.

Again, as the objective prominence given to “the old

accusers" is a rhetorical cloak for an attack on the prejudices of the judges, so the prominence given to the Delphic response (20 E sqq.) is a device of a semi-rhetorical character under cover of which Socrates is enabled to avoid an avowal of the real purpose which had animated him in his tour of examination,—which was to effect an intellectual revolution by substituting a sounder knowledge for the prevalent pretensions to knowledge, of the hollowness of which he entertained the deepest conviction. Such an explanation would, to say the least, not have been appreciated. What is to be noticed is, that he does not plead the oracle, (the authenticity of which there is no ground for doubting), as an after excuse for his necessarily unpopular mission,—which would have been natural enough. But he goes beyond this, and represents the oracle as the cause of his engaging in that mission; whereas (as Zeller observes) he must have already been committed to this and already been a marked person, before any such question as that put to the Pythia by Chærephon could have had any point or elicited any such remarkable answer. The representation of the oracle as giving him the first suggestion of his crusade against fictitious knowledge, as having throughout been the lodestar to which he shaped his course, and as having sustained him in the thankless labour of years, is unhistorical; but Socrates employs it in the exposition of his antecedents in a semi-rhetorical spirit, to bring the audience a certain distance on their way without the offence which a direct avowal of his purpose would have aroused in their minds.

(iv.) The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.

Every care has been taken to marshal the topics of the defence to the best advantage. The answer to the indictment itself is placed in the middle of the speech, where least attention naturally falls upon it. The arrangement is the same as that of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown, but the reasons are different in the two cases. In both the technical argument is introduced, where it will least challenge attention; but there because it is the weak point of Demosthenes' case, here because, though easily established, it is comparatively immaterial to the issue. The real effort of the defence needed

to be exerted first in combating the general prejudices which affected Socrates as a reputed Philosopher and Sophist, and secondly in offering a somewhat more particular personal justification of Socrates. Accordingly the portions of the defence which are concerned with these two points, as they are the fullest and most earnest, are also the most conspicuous by position. The first confronts us at the outset, and the other engages us after Meletus has been dealt with.

(v.) Dramatic framework.

The customary procedure of an *ἀγὼν τιμητὸς* has prompted Plato to crown the Apology of Socrates with a further artistic completeness. The oration becomes a drama. An action in three stages passes before us; the tone changes with the action; there is even some change in the *dramatis personæ*. We take our stand among the listeners who crowd the court. The first Act comprises the defence, with the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus, the voting of the judges, and the declaration of their verdict. The second comprises the *τίμῃσις* of the prosecutor, Socrates' ironical *ἀντιτίμῃσις*, the intervention of Plato and other friends of Socrates, the first suspense, and then the final verdict. In the third Act the judges appear before us distinguished into two separate bodies, addressed separately by Socrates, the one his friends, his true judges, the other divested of the name and doomed to the consequences of their unrighteous deed. The tone of apologetic argument in the first Act is succeeded by dignified irony in the second, and this again in the third by a strain of lofty prophecy.

2. HOW FAR IS THE APOLOGY CHARACTERISTIC OF  
SOCRATES?

Zeller (II. 134. note) insists that there is an absence in the Apology of that free artistic handling which characterises the Dialogues, and claims this as an evidence that Plato has bound himself to follow the line actually taken by Socrates. But the strength of this position is diminished by several considerations. In the first place we have seen how great an amount of art has found its way into the structure of the Apology; we have seen too how that same art has not been

restricted to the arrangement and outward dress of the speech, but so penetrates its very substance, that even here it is impossible to ignore or definitively to limit the rhetorical element. It is only with this considerable abatement that Zeller's assertion of the absence of free artistic handling can be admitted. But, in the second place, so far as the fact remains,—and to a certain extent it does,—it is referable to more obvious causes than that of fidelity to the speech of Socrates. The conditions which Plato had to fulfil were those of a speech in a court of justice, pronounced on a definite historical occasion; he had to consult the exigencies of forensic verisimilitude, and to embody a reply to the definite charges of a well-known indictment. And although with him (as with Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*, though in a different manner,) the main object certainly was the ultimate one of presenting to the world a serious and adequate justification of his adored teacher, yet he was none the less under the necessity of adopting for his framework the circumstances of the actual trial. In the third place,—in presence of little or no independent testimony as to what Socrates actually said,—we have the fact before us that the Platonic Apology was not alone in the field as a professed record of the great teacher's defence. The Xenophontean Apology, devoid as it is of authority, being perhaps a compilation from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* I. i, ii, IV. viii (see Steinhardt's *Anmerkungen* I. 2 in *Platon's Sämmtliche Werke* übersetzt von Hieronymus Müller, Leipzig 1851), is a case in point. Had the Platonic Apology been a record of confessed history, is it possible that the Xenophontean Apology should have been so framed as to differ from it not only as to what was said but as to what was done,—as for instance in the statement (22) that Socrates' friends spoke at the trial as *συνήγοροι*, and again (23) that Socrates refused *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι* altogether, both which statements conflict with the Platonic representation? But there were yet other Apologies extant besides these. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (II. xxiii. 13) quotes from a Socratic Apology of Theodectes, as containing the following passage, *εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἡσέβηκε; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει;* and besides in the same chapter he quotes the following passages without mention of their authors but obviously from similar compositions; *μέλλετε δὲ κρῖναι οὐ*

περὶ Σωκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν (18), and τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον· καίτοι ὅστις οἶεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἶεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι (8). Once more, it is probable enough, that the story<sup>9</sup> of Lysias having offered Socrates for use on his trial a defence of his own composing grew out of his having written an elaborate posthumous Socratic Apology.

It is then too much of an assumption, though countenanced by Zeller and Mr. Grote as well as by many older writers on the subject, that we can rely on the Platonic Apology as a substantial reproduction of the speech of Socrates. Independently of Plato's representation we know not what Socrates said, or whether he said much or little, or how far he concerned himself with a direct reply to the charges laid against him; nor, when we have studied that representation, do we know these things any the better. Even if the studied speech of Plato embodied authentic reminiscences of the unpremeditated utterances of his master, to disengage the one from the other is more than we can assume to do.

Notwithstanding, we can seek in the Apology a portrait of Socrates before his judges and not be disappointed. Plato has not laid before us a literal narrative of the proceedings and bidden us thence form the conception for ourselves: rather he has intended us to form it through the medium of his art. The structure is his, the language is his, much of the substance may be his; notwithstanding, quite independently of the literal truth of the means, he guarantees to us a true conception of the scene and of the man. We see that "*liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam non a superbia*" (Cic. Tusc. I. 29), and feel that it must be true to Socrates, although with Cicero himself we have derived the conception from Plato's ideal and not from history. We hear Meletus subjected to a questioning which, though it may not have been the literal *ἐρώτησις* of the trial, exhibits to us the great questioner in his own element. We discover repeated instances of the irony, which, uniting self-appreciation with a true and unflattering estimate of others, declines to urge considerations

<sup>9</sup> Diog. Laert. II. 40, Cic. de Orat. I. 54, Quintil. Inst. II. xv. 30, XI. i. 11, Valer. Max. VI. iv. 2, Stob. Flor. VII. 56.



which lie beyond the intellectual or moral ken of the judges. Here we have that singularity of ways and thoughts which was half his offence obtruding itself to the very last in contempt of consequences. Here we have that characteristic assertion of private judgment against authority which declares itself in the words ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῶν (29 D). Here we have also his disapproval of the existing democracy of Athens which he rather parades than disguises. And lastly, the deep religiousness which overshadowed all his character breathes forth in the account he renders of his past life, in his anticipations of the future, and in his whole present demeanour.

Thus while the problem of the relation of the Apology to what Socrates actually said must remain unsolved, there is no doubt that it bodies forth a lifelike representation; a representation of Socrates as Plato wished us to conceive of him, yet at the same time as true to nature as the art of Plato could render it.

### 3. THE ADEQUACY OF THE APOLOGY AS A DEFENCE.

That the Apology aims at much more than a refutation of the indictment of Meletus is already sufficiently evident. We have seen that the avowed answer to Meletus is that part of the speech which by its position least challenges attention, and which is least characterised by an air of serious concern. The statement is besides repeatedly made, that the real strength of the prosecution lies outside of the indictment, and requires a commensurately wider effort to meet it.

The worth, then, of the Apology as a defence must be measured, in the first instance, if we will, by its sufficiency as an answer to Meletus, but chiefly and ultimately by its sufficiency as a justification of Socrates' whole manner of life.

It will not much affect our estimate, whether we regard the Apology as no more than a defence adapted to the historical occasion of the trial and to judicial ears, or as a posthumous justification of the great master in the eyes of the Hellenic world. Though the more comprehensive aim is doubtless the real one, yet public opinion had undergone<sup>10</sup> so little change

<sup>10</sup> As a matter of fact, the Athenians never repented of Socrates' death. The story of their passionate remorse being evoked by the repre-



in favour of Socrates since his death, that the justification which was most calculated to satisfy it was identically that which would have been most to the purpose at the trial.

First, then, what sort of an answer is offered to the indictment of Meletus?

That indictment divides itself into two allegations, under the heads respectively (as we should say) of religion and of morality. The mischief to morality is the perversion of the youth; the offence against religion is the setting forth of strange gods in the place of those of the state.

Now though these are put into the form of specific charges against Socrates, they are so (all but that of the *καὶ δαιμόνια*) in appearance alone; they are really selected from the string of imputations currently brought against Philosophers and Sophists. The Philosophers, i. e. Physicists, were popularly associated with atheism, the Sophists with perversion of the youth. The allegations of "the old accusers," to which the Apology first addresses itself, are drawn from the same repertory, and arraign Socrates in like manner under the two heads of religion and morality as Philosopher and Sophist. It is true that the particular complaints there expressed are not the same; but it is not that the charges put forward here are less general than those. They are only omitted there because they were to come under consideration here. In the Clouds both these and those are put forward against Socrates, one after the other. And in the Apology itself (23 C—D) "the old accusers" are represented as eventually appending both "perversion of the youth" and "atheism" to their other charges.

The indictment therefore of Meletus contained no charge, save that of *δαιμόνια καὶ κενά*, which would not be met (so far as might be) by the explanation Socrates had rendered of the deeper and wider and older prejudices, personified in "the old accusers," or by the justification he might be able to offer of the general method of his life.

sensation of Euripides' Palamedes (41 B. n.) is fabulous. Euripides predeceased Socrates by 7 years. Xenophon and Plato would have made the most of any such change of feeling:

whereas we find Xenophon, five years after Socrates' death, dealing with the allegations against Socrates as if still in full possession of the popular mind. See Zeller, II. p. 138. note.

Here therefore Socrates contents himself with a dialectical victory over Meletus; instead of entering into the merits of the question with him, he disposes of him summarily by adding him to the list of pretenders. If the charge of δαιμόνια καὶ ἀ is subjected to the same treatment,—a treatment characterised by Döllinger as little better than sophistical,—it is because that charge is itself a sophistical one. It wrests τὸ δαιμόνιον into δαιμόνια, the divine agency of which Socrates consistently spoke into divine beings. Socrates therefore is only returning Meletus' sophism upon himself, when he treats the δαιμόνια of the indictment as if it had been δαιμόνια πράγματα. His whole dealing with the question of heterodoxy has an observable air of carelessness. Though he explicitly disavows atheism, and calls the sun and moon gods, yet he nowhere commits himself to a distinct recognition of the state gods, any more than he repudiates belief in any others. But it must be remembered that in those days few could have cast a stone at Socrates for such reticence: and that if a man's practice was religious, there was little enquiry into his opinions; and that Socrates' character as a religious man, his strictness and frequency in religious observances, was beyond doubt and made proof superfluous,—though the Xenophontean Apology enters into it at length. From the personal imputation of irreligion, in short, Socrates had little to fear, and he could afford to deal with it lightly; whereas to that of perverting the youth he addresses himself twice elsewhere, in addition to the dialectical refutation of it here.

Thus what was really formidable in the indictment of Meletus resolved itself into the more general imputations which connected Socrates with those two suspected classes of men, the Philosophers and the Sophists; and, keeping in view the fact that the Apology addresses itself elsewhere in full to those imputations, any fuller treatment of them under the head of the indictment can be spared.

The remainder of the defence is taken up with two lines of argument: the first, at the outset of the speech, deals with the general prejudices, which existed against Socrates as Philosopher (Physicist) and Sophist; the other, which follows the special reply to the indictment, offers a particular justification for Socrates' manner of life as a citizen.

In the earlier portion Socrates does what he can, first to separate himself from those two suspected classes, and then to explain how the prejudice arose in the public mind, and how it became strengthened by personal animosity.

It is hardly necessary to show that the imputations of "the old accusers" contain nothing of an individual character, but are (as Socrates alleges) mistakenly transferred from the popular notion of the Philosophers and the Sophists. The title *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ*, which Socrates takes such pains to disclaim, is the appellation originally bestowed on the Ionic philosophers, as men whose speculations had fathomed the universe, and from this association was matured that distinction between it and *φρόνιμος* which we find in Aristotle (*Ethic. Nic. VI. vii. 5, Θαλὴν καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους σοφὸς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὐ φασι εἶναι*). It was in connecting Socrates with a supposed class of speculative men that the force and odiousness of the designation *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ* consisted. The imputation contained in the words *τὰ μετέωρα φροντίζων* or *ζητῶν*, i. e. *τὰ οὐράνια*, is equally general. The Scholiast on Aristoph. *Nub. 96* says, *κοινὸν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀπάντων ἔγκλημα*. In 431 B.C. Diopeithes, a fanatical Rhetor, carried the law *εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας* (Plutarch. *Vit. Pericl. 169 D, Aristoph. Vesp. 380*). Eupolis (*Fragm. Com. ed. Meineke, II. p. 490*) says of Protagoras, *ἀλαζονεύεται μὲν, ἀλιτήριος, περὶ τῶν μετεώρων*. Once more, the reference in *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκων* is palpably general. The earlier Sophists, as teachers of pleading, first incurred and perhaps courted the imputation of *τὸν ἥττω κ.τ.λ.*, and from them the imputation was derived to others. Isocrates (*xv. 15. p. 313*) speaks of the charge being made against himself, *ὥς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἥττους λόγους κρείττους δύναμαι ποιεῖν*, and again (*30. p. 316*), *ὥς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν*. Odium also attached to the profession<sup>11</sup> of an instructor in speaking. Hence Æschines' designation (*i. 94. p. 13*) of Demosthenes as *λογογράφος*, and (*117. p. 16*) *ὁ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγελλόμενος τοὺς νέους διδάσκειν*, crowned by the

<sup>11</sup> *Λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν* (Xen. *Mem. I. ii. 31*) was a law of the Thirty Tyrants against liberty and

freedom of speech. How came the suspicion of *λόγων τέχνη* to survive the Tyranny?

designation σοφιστής (125. p. 17): cf. ii. 165, iii. 173. pp. 50, 78. Hence, weightier for its dispassionateness, a remark of Thucydides (VIII. 68) about Antiphon ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ πλείστα εἰς ἀνὴρ, ὅσοις ξυμβουλευσαίτο τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν. This odium, in which the profession was held, was akin to fear; Isocrates (xv. 230) explains it thus, ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινότης ποιεῖ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἐπιβουλεύειν.

Thus the charges recited present us with nothing individually characteristic of Socrates, but only (as he himself calls them 23 D) τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα. These were the materials for the popular representation of Socrates, which accordingly (like the caricature in the Clouds) is a compound of the conventional lineaments of the Philosopher (Physicist), and of the Sophist. The μετέωρα φροντίζων is due to the Philosopher, and the τὸν ἥττω λόγον κ.τ.λ. to the Sophist, while the title σοφὸς ἀνὴρ stands<sup>12</sup> alike for the one and the other.

To relieve himself from the yoke of these imputations Socrates fairly draws attention to the want of connection between himself and these two suspected classes. Of those speculative studies he<sup>13</sup> denies any knowledge, and as to his having ever discoursed on them to others he courts further the testimony of his judges, of whom many had frequented his society.

The line of argument which he takes in distinguishing himself from the Sophists seems less cogent than it might have

<sup>12</sup> Plat. Apol. 20 A, Evenus is ἀνὴρ Πάριος σοφός, Xen. Mem. II. i. 21, Πρόδικος ὁ σοφός is mentioned; as on the other hand σοφιστής is borrowed to express Philosopher.

<sup>13</sup> There is no want of harmony between Socrates' disclaimer here and what he tells us in the Phædo of his having taken up physical speculation in early life. He had given it up forthwith, on finding no satisfaction in it; and he could truly say (Apol. 19 C), ἐμοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν μέτεστι. Nor again is his disclaimer at variance

with the fact, that he used to call attention to the evidence of design in nature as a help to piety (Xen. Mem. VI. iii. 3 sqq.), that he is in fact (as Zeller remarks, II. p. 117) the parent of the teleological idea which has given unity and ideality to the study of nature ever since his days. This half-religious view of his had nothing in common with those indemonstrable hypotheses, which the Physical Philosophers tried in turn to fit to the universe.

been. He dwells on the most external difference alone. He points to the Sophists giving courses of lectures on various subjects, professing to turn out finished politicians, pleaders, debaters, and the like, pursuing this as a regular trade, and flourishing by it; he flatly disclaims any such characteristics (for even these, it seems, had been attributed to him, *εἰ τινας ἀκηκόατε κ.τ.λ.* 19 D), and so passes on. Here certainly was a sufficiently palpable dissimilitude, demanding no acuteness to appreciate it; but why was it not worth while to clench the argument by going more thoroughly into the contrast? We miss the manifold and deep divergence which might have been traced between a system which relied on the attainment of objective certainty, and one which, while it questioned received opinions, had no interest in either substantiating these, or establishing truer ones in their place; between a system which opened out a method of truth-seeking investigation, and one which, had it prevailed, would have made philosophy thenceforth an impossibility (Zeller, II. p. 130); between a system which proposed to place all human action on an intelligible principle, and one which professed to furnish the intellect alike for any use, regardless of principles. All this and more could have been pleaded in evidence of the wide gulf which separated Socrates from the Sophists; we can only suppose that the Court, or the people of Athens (to which ever we suppose for the moment the justification to be directed), were incapable of appreciating the fundamental unlikeness, and that the dropping of the subject here is at once true to the Socratic irony, and at the same time suggests that the real position of Socrates was never understood by the mass of his countrymen or by their compendious representative the Heliastic Court.

The sequel of this disclaimer of the popular identification is a setting forth of the facts which were the occasion of it. A ✓  
 man who himself exercised no practical profession, was ever ✓  
 showing himself dissatisfied with received empirical rules and ✓  
 maxims, and ever requiring from others a reason forteneets  
 which they had never questioned, while in doing this he  
 evinced matchless dialectical powers and forced a confession of  
 ignorance from men known to be perfectly self-satisfied,—such ✓  
 a man answered sufficiently well the description of Philosopher ✓



and Sophist when once Aristophanes<sup>14</sup> had given the hint. This was the naked explanation of the popular identification, and this it is in fact which lies couched under Socrates' parables of the wisdom which consisted in knowing his own ignorance, the Delphic Response, and the tour of questioning (Apol. 20 D—E, 23 A—B). And this account, which has all the appearance of truth, must stand good, in our estimate of the defence, as a plea which ought to have commanded attention. The speaker himself indeed despairs of its obtaining entrance into minds preoccupied; it was likely, he says (20 D), to sound to them like a jest. But the cause for despair lay not in the insufficiency of the plea, but in the invincibility of the prejudice to be combated. Nor has the whole strength of that prejudice yet been indicated. Had Socrates been really a Philosopher or a Sophist, there would have been nothing to be added; the supposed mischiefs of his teaching would have been alone in the scale. But so far as popularity was concerned, the difference between Socrates and Philosophers or Sophists told against him and not in his favour. The moral suspicion harboured against what he was supposed to be was aggravated by personal animosity against what he was. The ever busy talker, the merciless questioner, who avowed the exposure of self-deceived pretenders to be the mission of his life, and pursued this mission uncompromisingly for a quarter of a century and more in such a narrow society as was comprised within a Hellenic state, without ever even stirring from the midst of them, encountered enmities which never lighted on the head of Philosopher or Sophist; a specimen of which is the individual grudge which Anytus is said to have borne Socrates.

It is then a mistaken moral prejudice, intensified and quickened by the actual smart of personal affronts,—the former refuted to no purpose, the latter absolutely intractable,—which here threatens to overbear the defence. It is this aggravated prejudice, the working of which is foreshadowed in those discerning words (28 A), *καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ*

<sup>14</sup> Zeller remarks that the fact of the Aristophanic caricature having stuck to Socrates to the end of his life shows that Aristophanes hit the

popular conception. May we not rather suppose that he led it, and regard the Apology here as elsewhere as true to facts?

αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.

On Socratic principles, a defence had discharged its office when it had set before the Court not grounds of feeling but rational grounds for its acceptance. Socrates has hitherto disproved (as fully as the range of the popular mind admitted) the mistaken <sup>15</sup> identification of him with Philosophers and Sophists. He has given the explanation of the mistake, and he has pointed out how that very explanation accounts for the confirming of the mistake irrationally through personal animosity. He has exhausted his armoury; against this animosity itself he has no weapons; if his judges or the public will allow it to affect their verdict, it cannot be helped—*ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ ληθῆ, . . . . καὶ τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι* (24 A).

Beyond the reply to Meletus' indictment we find a fresh branch of the defence before us. Socrates is no longer overtly answering charges, old or recent, but rather directly justifying the usefulness of his life. He takes a view of himself, as it were from further off, and reviews his whole attitude as a citizen.

The question arises, how this part of the speech serves any direct purpose of the defence.

Of the strong points on the side of the prosecution, one has remained hitherto almost untouched: it is not one which appears in the indictment proper, or in that of "the old accusers;" nor again has it that stamp of inveteracy which would have marked it had it been part of the Aristophanic caricature. But it was the moving cause of the present indictment being preferred at all.

<sup>15</sup> The mob who in 1791 sacked Dr. Priestley's house at Birmingham in consequence of his espousal of the principles of the French Revolution, of which the news had just reached England, proceeded to threaten all with whom Priestley had been associated not in politics or religion but merely by a common devotion to chemistry and invention. "A common cry among the mob was, 'No

"Philosophers!" 'Church and King for ever!' And some persons, to escape their fury, even painted 'No Philosophers' on the walls of their houses! . . . Boulton and Watt were not without apprehensions that an attack would be made on them, as the head and front of the 'Philosophers' of Birmingham."—Smiles Life of Boulton, ch. 20.



It is tolerably clear from the accounts of the speeches for the prosecution that political charges entered freely into them. See *Xen. Mem.* I. ii. 9, 12, &c. To Socrates was there ascribed the evil done to their country by Critias the oligarch and Alcibiades the demagogue; the strange doctrine that the poorer private citizens were a fair mark for ill usage; the unfriendly criticism on election to offices by lot,—which was probably made use of as a special ground in support of the accusation of perverting the youth, since the ventilation of such doctrines tended to make them disloyal or insubordinate. A line of Hesiod was alleged to have been wrested by him to a like purpose, as countenancing rapacity.

There were indeed independent and domestic proofs alleged for perversion of the youth, but those which have been noticed were political. All these topics had been employed by the prosecution, and it is scarcely likely that in addition to them Socrates' abstinence from public affairs, his relations to Charmides, another of the Thirty, and to Xenophon, the friend of Sparta, and under sentence of banishment at the time, and perhaps his depreciating mention of the tradesmen in the *Ecclesia* (*Xen. Mem.* III. vii. 6), were not also brought up against him. Such charges and insinuations as these were indeed foreign to the indictment, but they were calculated to have considerable weight with the Court.

For one characteristic of the moment was the keen feeling with which since the restoration of the democracy the Athenians cherished their particular conception of political loyalty. That conception was somewhat narrow and exacting. The primary requisite was not only 'assent and consent,' but enthusiasm towards the letter of the constitution; and second only to this, as the natural reaction from the depression which the usurpation had caused, was a devotion to the material interests of the state, and the display of energy in amassing wealth.

The prosecutors, or at least the leading spirit among them, were no doubt actuated in their institution of the proceedings by the same political sensitiveness which they sought to inspire in the judges and betrayed in their speeches. Anytus was a man of strong political convictions; he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom. And if he

was partly animated by a personal grudge against Socrates, he was none the less the person to take up a political grievance against him.

There must have come to the surface some fresh element for the old prejudice so to pronounce itself. As Sophist or Philosopher, Socrates' cup had long been full; nor was there any reason in that point of view for its overflowing now if it had not before. Aristophanes<sup>16</sup> had ceased to attack him. As a mark for personal enmity<sup>17</sup> he had been more prominent and defenceless either in connection with the Hermæ trials or after the battle of Arginusæ. It would be a difficult problem, why the extreme step was taken now and not till now, did we not take into account the<sup>18</sup> political sensitiveness which, as the offspring of the restored democracy, formed a new element in public opinion as it affected Socrates.

We shall not be unprepared, then, to find that the remaining part of the defence is in some sense political,—as much so, as that of a non-political man could be. It is the defence of a reformer, though not of a political reformer. To ignore the political charge altogether in the defence would have been either a confession of weakness or a dangerous oversight, however fully the indictment might have been disposed of. But, moreover, political insinuations had been pressed into the service of the indictment itself in connection with the charge of perverting the youth.

It is obvious, that Socrates was precluded from meeting these charges in the way which would best have pleased his judges. He could have said that he had never transgressed the laws; he could say (as in fact he does say) that he loved his countrymen intensely; but for the existing constitution he could profess no enthusiasm. Yet here we must observe, that his coldness did not arise from frank political dislike of democracy, nor is his dissatisfaction to be measured by the one or two well-known criticisms which he passed upon it. He cared

<sup>16</sup> [So Stallb. Prolegg. ad Plat. Sympos. p. 28. Zeller (II. p. 150) asserts the contrary and appeals to Aristoph. Ran. 1491 sqq.]

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Zeller, II. p. 142.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Zeller, II. p. 152. The usur-

pation of the Thirty lasted from June 404 B.C. to February 403. The Archonship of Euclides began in 403 and ended in 402. In April 399 Anytus brought Socrates to trial.

4 for politics only as involving the interests of the individual (Xen. Mem. III. iv. 12), and it is to his view of individual well-being that we must look, if we would understand the degree or the significance of his reserved attitude towards the constitution. Its faults connected themselves in his mind with other faults at once further from the surface and far graver. To him the alarming symptoms were such as these,—that this system extolled as so perfect could coexist with an utter abeyance of principles; could be carried on by men, who, in knowledge of it, were mere empirical adventurers; that it neither undertook nor directed education; that much might be going wrong within it, without its giving any check or warning; that morality might share the general wreck and not be missed;—and that, all this while, the Athenian mind should throw itself without misgiving into such a system, and find all its wants satisfied, and its self-complacency encouraged; that, while intolerance was stimulated, the belief in any unwritten law of right beyond and above the positive enactments of the state had all but died out, and a belief in divine sanctions was scarcely felt (Apol. 35 D).

It was for these deeper reasons that Socrates was totally out of harmony with the political optimism of his countrymen. Here was the cause of the gravest manifestation of his irony. The discord was the more complete, because it turned upon considerations of the well-being of individuals rather than upon political predilections and fancies. And out of those considerations there rose up before his mind a clear vision of a great need, and of the remedy which would remove it, and of an obligation upon himself to be the applier of that remedy.

The discord had jarred upon the sensitive ear of restored democracy, and filled it with a feeling of offence which presently found interpreters in Anytus and others. The whole deep disharmony did not strike them; but, conscious of its presence, they detected and treasured up superficial results of it, such as the detached adverse criticisms upon the government, and perhaps followed with a like jealousy the abstinence from public life; and they added to these other irrational aggravations, such as the connection with Critias and Alcibiades, and the well-known cry of perversion of the youth. It was the

same offended sense which prompted the decisive step and brought Socrates to trial; and which, while the charges brought were the old and staple cries against the Philosophers and Sophists, aggravated these with a new political stigma.

But it is time to return to Socrates, and to the part of the *Apology* which still remains to be considered. We are now in a position to judge of it as a political defence, if such it shall turn out to be.

Of the particular political charges we find Socrates here only touching upon one, and that allusively,—the charge of being answerable for the misconduct of Critias and Alcibiades and perhaps others (33 B). The line he mainly follows is general.

We have analysed the attitude of Socrates towards the state of which he was a citizen into the following parts;—first, dissatisfaction, chiefly on moral grounds, with the prevalent state-theory; secondly, conception of the remedy to be applied to it; and, thirdly, conviction that the application devolved upon himself. And in a full general justification of himself in a political point of view, he would have had to expound all these points seriatim. We find him however reticent as to the first point: at most he only hints at it in the simile (30 E) of the high-bred horse, whose greatness of frame makes him somewhat sluggish, and who needs some gadfly to stir his spirit, and in the remark (31 A) that it is an extreme boon to be so roused. He interweaves the second point with the third, yet sparingly, and only in the way of explanation. It can hardly be said that the conception of the remedial plan is completely unfolded; though we find notices of it in the doctrine (29 D sqq.) that the care and improvement of the soul, and the pursuit of wisdom, truth, and virtue, are to be ranked infinitely above the pursuit of riches; the doctrine (36 C) of the need of consciously-possessed principles of individual and political action, tested (29 E, also 38 A) by self-examination; and the doctrine (33 A) of the imperative duty of adhering to what is just, alike in public and in private life. It is the third point, the assumption by himself of this mission, into which the speaker throws his strength: with this he starts, and to this he limits his justification. His first and paramount plea in this justification is that (28 B sqq. and 33 C) the work was under-

taken in obedience to the above-mentioned divine call, i. e. was an indefeasible duty, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences, or counter-inducements, or human inhibition (29 D),—the proof of the divine call, i. e. of the reality of the obligation, being that nothing else would have sustained him in such a course of self-sacrifice (31 B). His other plea is that his assumption of this work was an incalculable benefit to his countrymen. In what remains he sets forth, in answer to supposed objections, first, that to have entered public life in preference to dealing with individuals would have been neither a practicable nor an effective method of pursuing this mission (31 C sqq.); and, secondly, the innocent tendency of his work (inculcating righteousness, not training for professions or imparting knowledge, 33 A), excluding the suspicion of perverting the youth,—a suspicion which is also refuted independently (33 C).

To have enlarged upon the first point would obviously have stood Socrates in little stead. He could not have done so without appearing to admit the political allegations of his accusers in their entire force; and thus the vindication of himself as a reformer lacks the support which it would have gained from a premised statement of the need of reform. But, to pass on from this first drawback to its effectiveness, the actual vindication offered must in itself have seemed to the majority of the Athenians partly paradoxical and partly visionary. In representing himself as having done good service by urging on them the care of their souls, by unswervingly insisting on righteousness in them and in himself, Socrates was traversing ground where they could not follow him. These things had for them no meaning. They required devotion to the letter of their constitution, they were on the verge of a panic at the appearance of disaffection; and this was their righteousness. With this they were content, when the substance of the old religion and the old morality were really departed from them. They were necessarily far from believing that it could be any man's duty or mission to set himself up among them as a preacher of righteousness,—as he himself says expressly in the *ἀντιλήμνησις* (37 E—38 A). To us there may seem to be nothing so far out of the common in the moral work of which Socrates claims to be the sole promoter, as to



elevate him to a position of singularity. But it was a novel work enough to his contemporaries. It is a difficulty throughout in the way of appreciating Socrates, that positions, which ever since his time have been household words, not in moral philosophy merely but in common life, were in his mouth, to the men of his generation, original and novel; and that the simple principles he lays down here, so far from being commonplace to his audience, must have rather transcended their moral apprehension.

Nor must it be forgotten that their old distrust of the Sophist came in to the aid of their distaste for the reformer. So far from believing in his principles of moral reformation, they were confusedly identifying these with the old sophistical teaching. Hence it is that the disclaimer ἐγὼ διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς κ. τ. λ. finds place here.

There were ample reasons, then, why this part of the defence should fail. Socrates stood before his countrymen a confessed reformer, and they were strangers to the idea of reformation except in a political sense,—a sense in which the Athens of the day had no room for reformers. ✓

But the failure of the defence here urged by Socrates upon his countrymen is to be laid not to his charge but to theirs. The point upon which our whole judgment must turn is this. Was the need of a reformation so urgent as Socrates supposed it to be? If so, then Socrates was no less in the right, no less a benefactor, because they failed to feel the need, and they in crushing<sup>19</sup> him were no less guilty of a national hypocrisy. ✓

There is no need to sum up at any length the results of our

<sup>19</sup> It is a poor sophism to urge that the stages of an ἀγὼν τιμητός, or the venality of Athenian jailors, made Socrates' death his own act,—an eventuality which his accusers themselves never contemplated. This last assumption (which Köchly espouses) is directly at variance with the Apology, which (29 C) makes Anytus responsible for the argument that it were better Socrates should never have been tried, than that he should escape with his life. To excuse the judges as having been after the first

step unwilling instruments of a legally unavoidable catastrophe, is a plea which we never think of allowing to the eastern despot, who after betraying his righteous minister "laboured till the going down of the sun to deliver him." The justice or injustice of the catastrophe is involved in that of the first step. The whole responsibility fell upon the judges from the moment when, in affirming the accusation Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ κ.τ.λ., they gave their voice against the truth.

inquiry into the worth of the Apology as a defence. Its art is consummate; its statements are (as the exordium promised) unalloyed truth; its reticences are condescensions to the audience with whom it deals. It is exhaustive; it lays open by turns <sup>20</sup> all the motives and influences which were at work against Socrates; and the more pains we are at to represent these to ourselves by means of an independent investigation, the more reason we shall find to acknowledge that the true clue lay all the while close to our hand in the Apology.

<sup>20</sup> That the Sophists had no hand in bringing about the condemnation of Socrates is clear. Anytus was the enemy of Sophists. The Sophists had no political influence, and were them-

selves too much under the same suspicion with Socrates to have dared to inflame that suspicion. Cf. Zeller, II. p. 139.

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#### ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.

V = Vulgar text, settled originally by Stephanus.

B = Bekker.

S = Stallbaum.

Z = Zurich editors.

H = Hermann.

Oxon. = the Bodleian MS. known as 'Codex Clarkianus.'

[Dr. Gaisford first published the readings of this MS. in 1820. Mr. Riddell collated the Apology anew for this edition, and also the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium.]



## ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

I. Ὁ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόν-  
θατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν  
καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν· οὕτω  
πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καί τοι ἀληθές γε, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν,<sup>5</sup>  
οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν  
πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν  
ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὥς δει-  
νοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνηθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα  
ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὅπως -<sup>10</sup>  
τιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν  
αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν κα-  
λοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τᾶληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ  
τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τού-  
τους εἶναι ῥήτῳ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω,<sup>15</sup>

A. The  
Defence.  
Exordium.

5. ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν] This quali-  
fies the οὐδὲν following, making  
it equivalent to ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν  
below.

8. μὴ — ἐξαπατηθῆτε] This  
sentence is not affected by the  
tense of the main construction,  
because the contingency it ex-  
presses remains still future at  
the moment of its being al-

luded to by the speaker. Digest  
of Idioms, § 90.

14. οὐ κατὰ] A thorough  
litotes: 'far above these:' 'a  
far greater orator than they.'  
Cf. Hdt. i. 121, πατέρα καὶ μη-  
τέρα εὐρήσεις, οὐ κατὰ Μιτραδί-  
την τε τὸν βουκόλον καὶ τὴν γυ-  
ναῖκα αὐτοῦ.

ἥ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκού- p. 17.  
σεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ὧ  
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ  
οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμη- c

1. ἥ τι ἢ οὐδὲν] This form of expression we have from Homer, Od. iv. 80, Ἀνδρῶν δ' ἣ κέν τις μοι ἐρίσsetαι, ἥε καὶ οὐκί. So Hdt. iii. 140, ἥ τις ἢ οὐδεῖς. And Eurip. Dan. Fr. vi. Κρείσσων γὰρ οὐ τις χρημάτων πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ, Πλὴν εἴ τις· ὅστις δ' οὗτός ἐστιν οὐχ ὀρώ.

2. οὐ μέντοι] Opposed to ἀκούσεσθε π. τ. ἀλ.—You shall have the truth entire, *but* not drest up. This contrast is only carried as far as ὀνόμασι after which the idea of the contrast between truth and falsehood is resumed (that is, πιστεύω γὰρ κ.τ.λ. gives the rationale of ὑμεῖς δ'—ἀλήθειαν) and continues to εἰσιέναι,—since πλάττονται λόγους refers not to artificial language but to falsification; a μεῖράκιον, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric.

3. ὥσπερ οἱ] The nom. is the regular construction, where the noun brought into comparison can be made the subject of the clause introduced by ὥσπερ. The attracted construction, exemplified by ὥσπερ μεῖρακιῳ below, is less common. Dig. 176.

4. ῥήμασι . . . ὀνόμασι] What do these two terms mean here? For in Sophist. 262 a, b, they distinctly mean 'verb' and 'noun,' in Cratyl. 399 b, c, as distinctly 'expression' and 'word' (Διὶ φίλος is the ῥήμα,

Δίφιλος the ὄνομα). Now the conjoint phrase seems to have had a familiar rhetorical signification; cf. Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων; 199 b, ὀνόμασι καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων, 221 c, τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα whence we may conclude that the association here is similar. And if we compare passages of rhetorical criticism in the Orators, where these words occur, we shall find the meaning approaches to that in Cratyl. rather than that in Sophist.: cf. Æschin. iii. 72, p. 64, οὐ γὰρ ἔφη δεῖν (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥήμα μέμνημαι ὡς εἶπε, διὰ τὴν ἀηδαν τοῦ ὀνόματος) ἀπορρηῆσαι τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν—where the ῥήμα is the whole expression, the ὄνομα is ἀπορρηῆσαι. Further, as Socrates could not speak without 'expressions' and 'words,' it is the artistic use of them he here disclaims; which, in the case of ὀνόματα, would consist in what Æschines—ii. 153, p. 48—calls ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσις, and also in tropes and other figures of speech, and choice of unusual words, cf. Isocr. ix. 9. p. 190, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξενοῖς τὰ δὲ καινοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς while ῥήματα would extend to whole expressions, cf. Æschines' caricature, iii. 166. p. 77, τὰ μωρὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπίθανα ῥήματα.

p. 17. μένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δῆπου πρέποι, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέν- 5  
τοι καὶ πάννυ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούγῃ μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὧνπερ εἶωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, 10  
καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζωιν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγωνὼς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα.

12. πλείω] Hermann's note may satisfy us here: "Πλείω vel contra Oxon. cum VBS retinere quam cum Turicensibus omittere

4. ὥσπερ—εἰσιέναι] Three peculiarities; 1. μειρακίῳ is attracted into the case of πλάττοντι, cf. Dig. 176; 2. πλάττοντι is attracted into the case of ἡλικίᾳ and 3. the gender of πλάττοντι notwithstanding follows the thought, cf. Dig. 184.

5. καὶ μέντοι] A stronger form of καὶ—δέ. Dig. 145.

7. τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] This has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότῳ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. But, as something like this was recognised in ordinary pleadings under the name of ἐρώτησις (see Introd. p. x.), the reference here probably extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 23 c), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled

with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, c).

9. ἀγορᾷ κ.τ.λ.] The passage of Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 10) is well known;—ἐκεῖνός γε αἰεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερώ. πρῶτ' τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦει, καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν αἰεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι. For τράπεζαι as places of resort cf. Lysias ix. 5. p. 114, κάμοι μὲν τὰ προειρημένα διειλεκτο ἐπὶ τῇ Φιλίῳ τραπέζῃ and shops generally, cf. Lys. xxiv. 20. p. 170.

ὑμῶν πολλοὶ] ὑμῶν is emphatic. As Stallb. remarks, the frequenters of the τράπεζαι would be of the richer class.

10. θορυβεῖν] See Introd. p. xvii. note 8.

11. ἐπὶ δικαστήριον] The prep. has the notion of 'presenting oneself to' the court. Cf. Isæus, Fr. vii. 1. l. 15, λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου. The ἀναβέβηκα refers to the βῆμα, cf. Introd. p. xv.

ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ p. 17.  
 οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὦν, ξυνεγινώ-  
 σκετε δήπου ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ p. 18.  
 τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν  
 5 τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν  
 τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔαν' ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως  
 δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ  
 τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ  
 μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ρήτορος δὲ τάληθῇ λέγειν.

First part 10  
 of Defence;  
 —Justifi-  
 cation of  
 himself  
 against the  
 prejudices  
 of the  
 court, and  
 his coun-  
 trymen ge- 15  
 nerally.

II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι,  
 ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῇ κατη-  
 γορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγοροὺς, ἔπειτα δὲ  
 πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ b  
 κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλοι πολλὰ ἤδη  
 15 ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον  
 φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ

malui, quia doctius additamentum est quam quod ad interpolato-  
 rem referamus. Immo facile ejici poterat propter Criton. 52 e,  
 videturque jam Apollodoro ignotum fuisse, qui apud Diog. La. II.  
 § 44. ipso septuagesimo ante mortem anno natum statuit; at  
 duos ut minimum annos adjiciendos esse scite Boeckhii Corp.  
 Inscr. II. p. 341 probavit, nosque mox comparato Synes. Calv.  
 Encom. c. 17 confirmavimus; cf. de theor. Deliac. p. 7." Zeller  
 agrees, but makes 72 years the extreme limit.

5. δίκαιον] 'I request this  
 of you as a piece of justice.'  
 Cf. 41 d, χρῆ . . . τοῦτο δια-  
 νοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, Legg. 795 c,  
 ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτ' . . . ἐν τοῖς ἄλ-  
 λοις πᾶσι χρῆ προσδοκᾶν ὀρθόν  
 'as the right thing.'

6. ἴσως μὲν γὰρ] The reason  
 urged is a general one. The  
 consideration of style, if al-  
 lowed at all, will be operative  
 just in those cases where it  
 is better or worse than the  
 case deserves,—just where it

will interfere with true judg-  
 ment.

9. αὕτη] This represents  
 the preceding clause αὐτὸ—ἢ  
 μή being in fact τοῦτο, at-  
 tracted into the gender of  
 ἀρετή. Dig. 201.

14. καὶ πάλοι] This καὶ only  
 emphasises πάλοι. Dig. 133.  
 And in καὶ οὐδὲν—λέγοντες we  
 have the common καὶ after πολ-  
 λοί.—It was 24 years since  
 the Clouds were represented:  
 Forster.

p. 18. τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι, ὧ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὥς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ 5 τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τῇν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτὰ εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον 10 ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μεिरάκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ

a. Existence of such prejudices, and their nature, viz. that Socrates was, as a Physicist and a Sophist, a subverter severally of religion and of morality.

3. μᾶλλον] BS omit: Z retain, and rightly; for the rhythm would be intolerable without it, or without (which Hermann would prefer) the three words μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές.

2. τοὺς πολλοὺς] Closely with ἐκ παίδων. They ἔπειθον all, but only most, not all, as children. Cf. below c, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.

3. μᾶλλον] With ἔπειθον and κατηγοροῦν just in the same way as πολὺ μᾶλλον [κατηγ.] below, c. Here it is intended to balance the comparative δεινότεροι—'were more busy in accusing me and trying to persuade you.'

4. σοφὸς—ποιῶν] This "accusation," both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. See Introd. p. xxiii. The charges it contains

are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist: the μετέωρα φροντ. points to the Philosopher, the τὸν—ποιῶν to the Sophist. The title σοφὸς ἀνὴρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation,—cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so as distinctly to exclude those of Sophist. See Introd. p. xxxii. n. 12.

13. παῖδες . . . μεिरάκια] We should have reversed the order, and said, 'when you were all of you young, and most of you mere children.'

14. ὁ δὲ—ἔτι] This is not a changed but an abbreviated

πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἶόν τε p. 18.  
 αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδιοποιὸς δ  
 τυγχάνει ὧν· ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι  
 ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους  
 5 πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ  
 ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ'  
 ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκια-  
 μαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀπο-  
 κρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ  
 10 λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς κατηγοροὺς γεγονέναι, ἐτέ-  
 ρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς  
 πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους ο  
 πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων  
 πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον

2. κωμωδιοποιὸς] VH; κωμωδοποιὸς BSZ with 2 MSS. B quotes Fischer mistakenly asserting that at Phædo 70 c all the MSS. have κωμωδοπ.; but this is untrue for Oxon. and 6 others. Morris' assertion that κωμωδοποιὸς is the Attic and the other the common form does not bind us.

construction. In full it would be ὁ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι. Dig. 247.

2. εἴ τις] Aristophanes is named below, 19 c, and is doubtless chiefly meant, but not exclusively. Eupolis had said (Meineke ii. p. 553), Μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην, τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην, ὅς τᾶλλα μὲν πεφρόν-  
 τικεν, ὁπόθεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἔχει τοῦτου κατημέληκεν. And a play of Ameipsias, represented with Aristophanes' Clouds, was called the *Comos*, and the Chorus was of *Phrontistæ* (Athen. v. p. 218). It is likely enough (Zeller, ii. p. 41. note 3), that Ameipsias introduced the same fact, or the same fiction, as

Plato (Menex. 235 e, Euthyd. 272 c), and made the music-master *Connus* Socrates' instructor.

3. ὅσοι δὲ includes all but the εἴ τις· that is, ὅσοι stands for ὅσοι ἄλλοι. Cf. Theæt. 159 b, where πάντα ἄ is equivalent to πάντα τᾶλλα ἄ. This ὅσοι [ἄλλοι] is then subdivided into [οἱ μὲν] φθόνῳ χρώμενοι and οἱ δὲ—πείθοντες. The οἱ μὲν is supplied from οἱ δὲ by anastrophe; Dig. 241. The ἄλλους πείθοντες is put in to make the sense clear, but virtually repeats the idea of ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον· it does not affect the regularity of the construction.



- p. 18. ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον. εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὃ ἄν-  
 p. 19. δρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν  
 διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην  
 ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο  
 οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ 5  
 πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ  
 χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν.  
 ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ  
 πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγο- 10  
 ρία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἥ δὴ καὶ  
 b πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.  
 εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες;  
 ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶ-

3. ἔσχετε] BZH; ἔχετε V. The preposition ἐν would be strange with ἔσχετε if the meaning were 'have entertained *during* so long a time.' ἐν means rather 'within the limits of;,' and so, with respect to the further limit, 'at the distance of.' Thus ἔσχετε exactly falls into its place; 'ye first came to have so long ago.' 4. ἐν οὕτως] Though this collocation is rarer than οὕτως ἐν ὅλῳ, yet it occurs; e.g. below 24 a (where this passage is alluded to); Isæus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, Lysias, xix. 8. p. 152, ἐν οὕτω δεινῷ καθέστηκεν. The rhythm probably determines the order. There is no need for the οὕτως of V.

2. τὴν διαβολήν] Not the name of σοφός (cf. 20 d, τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, and again 23 a); nor 'calumny' simply (cf. below, ἡ κατηγορία . . . ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολή)· but *calumny believed*, i. e. 'prejudice.'

7. οὐ πάνυ here as elsewhere retains its meaning of 'hardly,' 'scarcely;,' but this is to be interpreted as a litotes:—'I can hardly say I do not know.' Dig. 139.

11. ἥ δὴ] The antecedent of ἥ is διαβολή. Cf. 28 a, καὶ τοῦτ'

ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, . . . οὐ Μέλητος, . . . ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή.

13. διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες] This fulness of expression is common in Plato, and gives the air of deliberateness. Dig. 262.

14. ὥσπερ qualifies not only κατηγορῶν but also ἀντωμοσίαν and ἀναγνῶναι. They are *quasi-prosecutors*; it is a *quasi-indictment*; and Socrates *makes believe* to read it.

ἀντωμοσίαν] So 24 b. This



ναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζη- p. 19.  
τῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον  
κρίπτω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων. c  
τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν  
5 τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περι-  
φερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολ-  
λὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα  
οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαῖω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω  
τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων  
10 σοφός ἐστι· μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτρου τοσαύτας

2. καὶ οὐράνια] So Z; VBSH καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια.

8. μικρὸν]

According to Meris, *σμικρὸς* is Attic. Yet in Æschin. and Isocr. *μικρὸς* occurs uniformly. Below, d, all the MSS. have *σμικρόν*. But to press uniformity would be arbitrary. See Lobeck, *Pathol. Pars II. De Orthogr. Gr. inconst.* § 1, who instances passages in which both forms occur in close neighbourhood or even in the same sentence; Dem. Ol. B. 14. p. 22, Arist. Hist. An. II. xv. pp. 506, 507. He quotes from Apollonius (Pron. 63) the general principle οὐκ ἐξωμάλισται τὰ τῶν διαλέκτων καὶ μάλιστα τὰ τῶν Ἀττικῶν. Cf. Phædo, 90 a. Rhythm must be in some degree a guide.

term, like *ἀντιγραφὴ* 27 a, is used to designate the *ἐγκλημα*. Both *ἀντωμοσία* and *ἀντιγραφὴ* were properly said of the *defendant's* plea, presented in writing and sworn to, in the *ἀνάκρισις*, or preliminary proceeding before the Archon Basileus. But as the *ἐγκλημα* was likewise then presented in writing and sworn to, the same words came to be applied to it also. See *Introd.* p. ix.

7. ὧν ἐγὼ] The antecedent of ὧν must be the matters in the *ἀντωμοσία*, not the immediately preceding words.

οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα] Accus. cognate, not accus. of the object; Dig. 6. Ἐπαῖω is intransitive.

8. καὶ οὐχ ὡς—ἐστὶ] This is well-marked irony. Socrates declines here to pronounce, before an audience who would have welcomed it, a condemnation of studies against which at other times he had freely declared himself, on the double ground (1) that *human* nature ought to be studied first, Xen. Mem. I. i. 12, and (2) that the Physicists got involved in questions which were really beyond the powers of the human mind, ib. 11, and arrived moreover at impotent conclusions, ib. IV. vii. 6, 7.

10. τοσαύτας] 'Upon so grave a charge' as that of pronouncing upon things of which he

p. 19. δίκας φύγοιμι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὧ ἄνδρες  
d Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν  
τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους  
διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκη-  
κόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί ἐῖσι· 5  
φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα  
ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγόμε-  
νου· καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ  
τᾶλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὐδέ γ' 10  
εἴ τις ἀκηκόατε ὥς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώ-  
πους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές.  
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἴός  
τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ

3. τοὺς] H. brackets. But if we read αὐτοὺς just before, follow-  
ing the weight of MSS., τοὺς is required by the Greek.

was ignorant,—the fault he  
himself so strongly reprobated  
in others.

1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] 'But the truth  
is.' Dig. 147.

3. τοὺς πολλοὺς] A modest  
way of saying 'all of you.' Cf.  
Isocr. xvii. 23. p. 363, τί ἂν ὑμῖν  
τὰ πολλὰ λέγοιμι; and Rep.  
556 a, τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐκουσίων  
συμβολαίων.

ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φρά-  
ζειν] This is a hysteron pro-  
teron: Dig. 308. With φρά-  
ζειν is to be supplied of course  
ἀλλήλοις, dropped by an idiom  
of abbreviation: Dig. 233.

14. ὥσπερ Γοργίας] Gorgias  
is spoken of by Isocrates as  
having made greater profits by  
teaching than any other man  
of his profession. Yet the sum  
was but small: ὁ δὲ πλείστα  
κτησάμενος ὧν ἡμεῖς μνημονεύομεν,

Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος, though a  
single man and unburdened by  
Liturgies, χιλίους μόνους στατήρας  
κατέλιπε. Isocr. xv. 155. p. 83.  
The ὑποκριταί, he says, ib. 157,  
made much greater fortunes.  
Nor indeed is Socrates saying  
that the profits made by the  
Sophists were great. The sum  
which Socrates mentions below,  
20 b, as Evenus' price, 5 minæ  
(500 francs), seems to have  
been above the average: Iso-  
crates, xiii. 3. p. 291, speaks of  
3 or 4 minæ (3-400 fr.) as a  
common price. Isocrates has  
been said, it is true, to have  
taken as much as 10 minæ for  
his rhetorical course; Gorgias  
and Prodicus even 100. But  
what made the frequenting of  
Sophists' courses expensive was  
that people never thought they  
had had enough of them.

Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. p. 19.  
 τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὃ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν  
 εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν  
 5 ἐαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ὃ ἂν βούλωνται,  
 τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας p. 20.  
 σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα δίδοντας καὶ χάριν προσει-  
 δέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε  
 σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ  
 προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς  
 10 πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου  
 τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε—ὃ  
 Καλλία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου τὸ υἱέε πῶλῳ ἢ  
 μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λα-  
 βεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτὸν καλῶ τε καὶ  
 15 ἀγαθὸν ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἣν δ' ἂν b  
 οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ'  
 ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπι-  
 στάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρω-  
 πίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γὰρ

14. καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ] So Oxon. It seems unnecessary to introduce a synaloepha.

5. τούτους πείθουσι] The construction is changed from the infin. to a finite verb. Dig. 277. The change of construction is not gratuitous, but expresses (ironical) admiration. The passage in Theages, 128 a, is a reminiscence of this passage, including the change of construction.

6. προσειδέναι] The πρὸς stands compounded in its adverbial and not in its prepositional sense. Dig. 129.

7. ἐπεὶ καὶ] The connecting thought is—'and at Athens

there is quite as good a field for professed teachers as elsewhere.'

8. ἐν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην] Socrates implies that he speaks from hearsay when he states ἐστὶν ἐνθάδε.

10. Καλλία] Cf. Cratyl. 391 b, οἱ σοφισταί, οἷσπερ καὶ ὁ ἀδελφός σου Καλλίας πολλὰ τελέσας χρήματα σοφὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι. "Callias fuit omnium Atheniensium suæ ætatis non modo facile ditissimus, ita ut simpliciter ὁ πλούσιος diceretur, sed etiam nequissimus suique peculii maxime prodigus."—Fischer.

p. 20. σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσον διδάσκει; Εὐηνός, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐηνὸν c ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ 5 οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἄν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταῦτα. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ἀλλ' ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί 10 σοι αὐται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττώτερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν, d ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. ταυτί μοι 15 δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε

c. Exposition of the veritable peculiarities in himself, which had been mistaken for those of Physicist and Sophist,—viz. his conviction of the holowness of the prevalent pretensions to knowledge,

6. ἐγὼ οὖν] So Oxon. and 2 other MSS. ἔγωγε is not wanted here.

9. Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν] Here Socrates, though still ostensibly occupied with 'the old accusers,' passes from the denial of the imputations current against him as a reputed σοφός to an account of the personal dislike which had befallen him individually. See *Introd.* p. xxxiv.

10. πρᾶγμα] In the sense of pursuit, or plan of life or study or the like. Cf. *Crito* 53 d, τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα, *Euthyd.* 304 a, τοῦτο τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν, c, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστιν ἡ φιλοσοφία.

The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to

σόν· 'What is it, then, that you (since we are not to identify you with the σοφοί) have been about?'

13. εἰ μὴ—πολλοί] This clause is the double of σοῦ γε—πραγματευομένου an instance of the widely extended idiom which I have ventured to call Binary Structure: *Dig.* 207. Very parallel is *Thuc.* V. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἂν παράσχοιτε . . . , εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε repeats διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι. Cf. also *Hom. Od.* ii. 246, Εἴπερ γάρ κ' Ὀδυσσεὺς κ.λ., ἀλλὰ κεν αὐτοῦ ἀεικέα πότμον ἐπίσποι, Εἰ πλεόνεσσι μάχοιτο.

ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν p. 20.  
 δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν  
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι'  
 οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα.  
 5 ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρω-  
 πίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι  
 σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ e  
 ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί  
 λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις  
 10 φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί  
 μοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν  
 δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν *note point*

1. ὄνομα] Of σοφός. See note on σοφός, 18 b.

5. ἥπερ κ.τ.λ.] 'My wisdom is precisely (περ) that only wisdom, as I believe (ἴσως), which is possible to man:' namely (21 d, 23 b), knowledge of his own ignorance. Socrates speaks of this as *knowledge* because it implies two things;—(1) the possession of a standard or ideal of knowledge, with the conception of a method for attaining it; and (2) self-knowledge, such as would result from the Socratic system of self-examination (cf. 38 a, note), revealing the amount of actual short-coming. This is knowledge until the positive knowledge is attained, and if that never can be, then this is the only knowledge. Socrates' faith, however, in the partial attainableness of positive knowledge never wavered, and his misgiving here must be restricted to the possibility of complete attainment.

8. ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω] 'Or some wisdom that—I know not how to characterise it.' It is some predicate, alternative with μείζω ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον, which Socrates affects to be at a loss for. The idiom is an expedient for abbreviation; the sentence is hurried to its conclusion *after its point has been expressed*, by a clause superseding the enumeration of further particulars: cf. Dig. 257, where the present passage is especially compared with Gorg. 494 d, (A) Φημὶ τὸν κνῶμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιώναι. (B) Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῶ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ;

12. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν] Cf. Symp. 177 a, ἡ μὲν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίπην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμός ὁ μῦθος ἀλλὰ Φαίδρου τοῦδε. Cf. also Alc. I. 113 e. The verse in the Melanippe was Οὐκ ἐμός ὁ μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα. So Eur. Hel. 513, Λόγος γάρ ἐστιν οὐκ ἐμός, σοφῶν δ' ἔπος.

- p. 20. λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιοχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν
- p. 21. Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε πού. οὗτος ἐμός τε (attested by the enigmatical response from Delphi),  
 ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε 5  
 καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κα-  
 τήλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς  
 ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμήσειε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφούς  
 ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καί, ὅπερ  
 λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἰ τις 10  
 ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα

3. μάρτυρα—Δελφοῖς] “There is no need (says Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen* II. p. 45. note 2), to deny the authenticity of the oracle, but we cannot regard it as having given the primary impulse to Socrates’ tour of enquiry. Socrates must have been already a known personage for Chærephon to have put his question to the Pythia, or for her to have taken it up.” It is therefore semi-rhetorically that the oracle is here represented as the cause of Socrates’ eccentric and unpopular proceeding. The Iambic form,—σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς &c.—in which the response appears in *Diog.* II. 37, and *Suid.* σοφός, is a later invention—an expansion of the Pythia’s simple negative recited here.

6. καὶ ὑμῶν—κατήλθε] This allusion to Chærephon’s antecedents is added not without purpose,—to dispose the court to hear more indulgently the story which is to follow.

In detail :—The full point of the phrase πλήθει ἐταῖρος is

to be found in the contrast of the adherents of the Thirty; more especially the ἐταῖροι of the oligarchical clubs, and the body of 3000 hoplites organised by the Thirty from their partisans. φυγὴν refers to the subsequent expulsion of all not included in the 3000 from Athens, and their withdrawal presently after (when they found no safety in Attica) to Thebes, Megara, Oropus, Chalcis, Argos, &c. This flight, as an event still vividly remembered, is called ταύτην, ‘the recent.’ So *Isocr.* matches it with the old troubles under the Pisistratidæ;—τὴν δημοκρατίαν . . . δις ἥδη καταλυθεῖσαν, καὶ τὰς φυγὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα γενομένας, viii. 123. p. 184. With κατήλθε cf. *Lysias*, x. 4. p. 116, ἐξ ὅτου ὑμεῖς κατε-  
 λήλυθατε it is the recognised description of the restoration of democracy and end of the eight months’ reign of the Thirty, signalised by the solemn return of Thrasybulus and the exiles from Piræus to Athens.



σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν p. 21.  
αὐτοῦ οὕτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνος τετελεύ-  
τηκεν.

and the  
course of  
experi-  
ments by  
which he  
had con-  
firmed that  
conviction;

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω b  
5 γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα  
γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτως· τί ποτε λέγει *quiere de*  
ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε  
μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύννοϊδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν· τί οὖν  
ποτέ λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ  
10 δῆπου ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ· καὶ πολὺν  
μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει, ἔπειτα μόγις  
πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμεν.  
ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινὰ τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὥς c  
ἐνταῦθα, εἰ πέρ που, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀπο-  
15 φανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὕτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι,  
σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἐφῆσθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ὀνόματι  
γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν,  
πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὧ ἄνδρες  
'Αθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος  
20 ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς

1. ἀδελφὸς] Chærecrates :  
Xen. Mem. II. iii. 1.

2. μαρτυρήσει] The μαρτυρία  
is to be supposed to follow at  
once. Introd. p. xviii.

10. οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ] Cf.  
Pind. Pyth. ix. 42, τὸν οὐ θεμι-  
τὸν ψεύδει θιγείν.

17. τῶν πολιτικῶν] In itself  
this word means no more than  
'statesman,' in the sense in  
which it might have been ap-  
plied to Pericles, and is applied,  
Legg. 693 a, to the old law-  
givers and settlers of Hellas.  
But an Athenian of Plato's  
time speaking of Athens would

mean by πολιτικοὶ that class of  
men who made public business  
a profession,—τοὺς πολιτικούς  
λεγομένους (Politic. 303 e). As  
distinguished from the ῥήτορες,  
they were men who sought  
appointments to public offices,  
while the ῥήτορες were pro-  
fessional speakers in the Ec-  
clesia. Cf. 23 e, and see Introd.  
p. x. note 1.

19. διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ  
μοι] This inversion of govern-  
ment is of common occurrence  
among the forms of changed  
construction: Dig. 271. ἔδοξε  
is 'I came to think,' as 32 b.



p. 21. ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ· κᾷπειτα  
d ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἶοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός,  
εἶη δ' οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολ-  
λοῖς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλο-  
γίζομην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώ- 5  
τερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν  
καλὸν καγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεταί τι εἰδέ-  
ναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ  
οἶομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ  
τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι 10  
εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δο-  
e κούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτ' αὐτὰ  
ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κακέινῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς  
ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμε- 15  
νος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιὼς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην,  
ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ  
πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι· ἰτέον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησ-  
μόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι.  
p. 22. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς 20  
ὑμᾶς τάληθῇ λέγειν· ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον·  
οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν  
τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν,  
ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπικεκότεροι εἶναι  
ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. ) δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν 25  
ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦν-

20. νῆ τὸν κύνα] What was meant by this oath is clear from Gorg. 482 b, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν,—that is, the dog-headed or, more correctly, jackal-headed Anubis. In Plato this oath is only found in the

mouth of Socrates. In Aristoph. Vesp. 83, a slave, Sosias, uses the same oath.

23. τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς] Cf. Euthyd. 292 e, τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῖν ἐνδεῖ ἢ ἔτι πλείονος.

τος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ p. 22.  
 γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἥα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε  
 τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος  
 5 ἔμαντὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων  
 οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πε-  
 πραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέ-  
 γοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύ-  
 νομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τάληθ' ὅμως δέ  
 10 ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες  
 οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποι-  
 ῆκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ

1. καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος] H's conjecture *κἂν ἐλεγκτὸς* (1) is mere conjecture; (2) would not give the sense he wishes, since *ἐλεγκτὸς* is not 'contradicted' but 'admitting contradiction'; and (3) if it did, would spoil the general meaning, since Socrates' leading principle throughout is that the oracle must be *true*, and that the proof of this would come out simultaneously with the true sense.

12. ἐν ὀλίγῳ] H's conjecture *ἐνὶ λόγῳ* is needless. For *ἐν ὀλίγῳ* means the same, viz. 'in short,' not 'in a short time'; just like *ἐν βραχεί*, Symp. 217 a, *ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ*, Isocr. i. 40. p. 11. Of course *ἐνὶ λόγῳ* occurs also, e.g. Lysias, xiii. 38. p. 133; and H might have argued something from the variation of reading between *κατ' ὀλίγον* and *κατὰ λόγον*, Thuc. vi. 34. med.

1. ἵνα μοι — γένοιτο] 'With the object of finding positively unimpeachable proof of the divine declaration.' A double meaning is wrapped up in *μοι*, —it is both 'by my agency' and 'for my satisfaction.' *καὶ* signifies the superaddition of demonstration, which all the world must accept, to the certainty which had been in Socrates an exercise of faith. *μαντεία* signifies (1) the process by which oracles are obtained, or (2), as here, and 29 a, the fact oracularly communicated. This signification still remains

distinct from that of *μαντεῖον*, which was the *form of words* in which the oracle was given; *μαντεία* is the *meaning* of the *μαντεῖον* — a distinction to feel which we have only to remember that to get at the meaning from the words was in the case of oracles a process involving exactly that degree of difficulty which suited the god or his prophet.

11. οἱ παρόντες] With Stallb. and against Wolf, we must take this to mean 'those present at each several time,' and not 'the present audience.'

p. 22. τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει  
 ἐτινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ  
 χρησμοδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ  
 καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι  
 ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἅμα<sup>5</sup>  
 ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα  
 σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν  
 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι, ὥπερ  
 καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

. VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦα<sup>10</sup>  
 δ ἔμαντῷ γὰρ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὥς ἔπος  
 εἶπεῖν, τούτους δὲ γ' ἦδειν ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ  
 καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην,  
 ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη  
 σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταυτόν<sup>15</sup>  
 μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ  
 οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξερ-  
 γάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σο-  
 φώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην  
 ἐτὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν· ὥστ' ἐμὲ ἔμαντόν ἀνερῶ-<sup>20</sup>

20. ἀποκρύπτειν] This is the reading of one MS. Φ. The  
 dominant reading of the MSS. (including Oxon.) is ἀποκρίπτει.  
 The editors have espoused ἀπέκρυπτεν· but such a text would  
 not account for such a variant as ἀποκρίπτει in the best MSS.  
 Ἀποκρίπτει itself is scarcely possible (on the principle of πεπραγ-

The usage of the orators  
 proves this; cf. Antipho ii. A.  
 a. 9. p. 116, and (esp.) γ. 5.  
 p. 118, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅστις τῶν παρ-  
 όντων οὐκ ἂν ὀκνηρότερος . . . ἦν.  
 Lysias uses in the same mean-  
 ing, but without the same pos-  
 sibility of question, οἱ παραγε-  
 νόμενοι. The expressions used,  
 whether for the audience or  
 for the court, are different;

e. g. Antipho vi. 14. p. 143,  
 πολλοὶ τῶν περιεστώτων τούτων  
 ταῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστανται,  
 Andoc. i. 139. p. 18, οὐδ' ὑμῶν τῶν  
 καθημένων οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπιτρέψειε.

16. ἔδοξαν] The nom. is καὶ  
 οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί. The force  
 of the aor. is, as in 21 c, ἔδοξε,  
 'I came to see.'

18. τὰ μέγιστα] Politics are  
 especially meant.

τᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως p. 22.  
 ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων  
 σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἃ  
 ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ  
 5 τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

which  
experi-  
ments fur-  
ther sup-  
plied the  
key to the  
intensity  
of the  
prejudice  
against  
Socrates  
individu-  
ally, in the  
personal  
enmities  
which  
they had  
excited;

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλὰ μὲν ἀπέχθεται μοι γεγόνασι καὶ p. 23.  
 οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς δια-  
 βολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, *αὐτὸν*  
 10 σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες  
 ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ  
 δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι,  
 καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρω-  
 πίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ  
 15 φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρησθαι  
 δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ b  
 ἂν εἰ εἴποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός  
 ἐστίν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς  
 ἀξίός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ *αὐτὸν*

μάτευμαι, ἀπείρηκα, Phædo 99 d, ὁρῶ ib. 98 b); but points to ἀπο-  
 κρύπτειν, which is to be governed by ἔδοξε understood from ἔδοξαν,  
 which gives also the best sense.

6. ταυτησὶ] The -ι is not always strictly δεικτικόν. Lob. Path.  
 Pars II. p. 230, "Sæpe Oratores, etiamsi de absentibus loquuntur,  
 quos modo designarunt et auditoribus quasi spectandos propo-  
 nunt, iota demonstrativo utuntur, et sæpius etiam negligunt, si  
 de præsentibus." Cf. τουτὶ, 37 e. ἐξετάσεως] We cannot fol-  
 low Oxon. and 3 other MSS. in reading ἔξεως, which is the result  
 of an old contraction misread. 15. τοῦτ' οὐ] This conjecture  
 of F. A. Wolf we must needs adopt for τοῦτον of the MSS.

9. ὄνομα δὲ—εἶναι] Lit. 'and  
 I am called by this name, that  
 I am wise.' The subject of λέ-  
 γεσθαι is [ἐμέ], not ὄνομα. And  
 σοφὸς εἶναι is by attraction for  
 [τὸ] εἶναι με σοφόν.

11. τὸ δέ] Accus. of pronoun  
 neuter, standing for the whole  
 sentence immediately follow-  
 ing: Dig. 19.

14. καὶ οὐδενός· 'or nothing':  
 the καὶ is disjunctive.

p. 23. μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ (κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἶμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολή· γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

c X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμούνται· εἴτ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κᾶπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότες δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώ-  
d τας καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδάν τις

and moreover gave a pretext for fastening on Socrates individually the imputation (previously only a class-imputation) of perverting the youth;

1. μὲν ἔτι] Oxon. gives μὲν ἔχω ἔτι, but in the hand of a restorer, and not on the traces of the old letters. (Gaisf. wrongly represents ἔχων as the reading. ἔχων would be redundant, like ἔχων φλυαρεῖς, &c.) 2. καὶ ξένων] So Oxon. and 3 other MSS. Edd. καὶ τῶν ξένων. But the variation is in the spirit of Plato: cf. Dig. 237, and add Phædo 85 a, αὐτὴ ἡ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ. 11. μιμούνται] So Oxon. &c. μιμούμενοι is a conjecture of Hermann.

4. ὑπὸ ταύτης] Later, 31 c, he gives a second reason for abstaining from public life.

6. ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία] Cf. Legg. 677 c, the beautiful expression μυρίαν τινὰ φοβεράν ἐρημίαν, Rep. 520 c, μυρίῳ βελτίων.

For the fact, with respect to Socrates, cf. with Stallbaum Xen. Econ. ii. 3.

11. καὶ αὐτοὶ—ἐξετάζειν] For-

ster compares Rep. 539 b, οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγον γεύονται, ὡς παιδιὰ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, αἰεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι . . . καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται.

ἐμὲ μιμούνται] By practising upon each other.

αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι p. 23.  
 μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν  
 ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρό-  
 χεῖρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ  
 5 γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον  
 κρεῖττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέ-  
 λοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται προσποιού-  
 μενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἄτε οὖν, οἶμαι,  
 φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντε-  
 10 ταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλή- e  
 κασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς δια-  
 βάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ

and lastly,  
 in com-  
 bination

9. ξυντεταγμένως] So BSZ. H with two MSS. ξυντεταμένως.  
 But ξυντεταγμ. means 'in set array:' cf. Æschin. ii. 74. p. 37,  
 οἱ ξυντεταγμένοι ῥήτορες.

4. ταῦτα] Latin *ista*; idio-  
 matically expressive of con-  
 tempt, Dig. 318.

ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα] Understand  
 ζητῶ or the like, by com-  
 parison of 19 b.

12. ἐκ τούτων] 'It is upon  
 this footing'—namely that of  
 an old general prejudice, ag-  
 gravated by supervening per-  
 sonal animosity,—'that I am  
 now attacked by' &c. The  
 meaning 'in consequence of'  
 would be too strong, both for  
 the sense here, and for the  
 idiomatic use of the phrase;  
 cf. Dig. 116: the meaning  
 'upon the strength of' would  
 also exceed the warrant of the  
 Greek, though not of the sense,  
 cf. 19 a, ἢ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέ-  
 λητος κ. τ. λ.

καὶ Μέλητος — ῥητόρων] For  
 an account of Socrates' three  
 accusers and their motives,

and of the classes of per-  
 sons called here πολιτικοὶ and  
 ῥήτορες, see Introd. p. x.  
 note 1.

The δημιουργοὶ are here joined  
 with the πολιτικοί, because Any-  
 tus represented a trade himself,  
 and herein was but one of many  
 instances of the same conjunc-  
 tion of pursuits in those times  
 at Athens. Socrates was wont  
 to speak slightly of mechan-  
 ical arts (Xen. Econ. iv. 3),  
 —a view which would seem to  
 connect itself with his praise  
 of σχολή (Diog. ii. 31, Æl. Var.  
 x. 14): and a conversation, in  
 which he pressed an uncom-  
 mercial view of education upon  
 Anytus himself with reference  
 to his son, seems to have been  
 among the causes of Anytus'  
 personal hatred of Socrates.  
 (See again Introd. p. xii.)



- p. 23. Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ
- p. 24. τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἷός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν 5 οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. ταύτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθῇ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυσφάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καί τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῇ λέγω 10
- b καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἷτια ταῦτά ἐστι. καὶ εἴαν τε νῦν εἴαν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.
- \* XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγοροῦν αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς 15 πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίων. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς 20
5. 196 τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει c οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος

with the old general prejudice, had inspired the present prosecution.

χείριος  
place

Second part of Defence;—Justification of himself as against the counts of the indictment, separately;—

1. ὑπὲρ] We are to understand, not that the accusers were acting on behalf of their respective classes, but merely that they were to be regarded as representatives of the feelings of those bodies.

9. τοῖς αὐτοῖς] Lit. 'through the same things:' that is, in stating the facts I am virtually reiterating and attesting the

charges.

11. ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ] Emphasis is of course on διαβολή. 'This is,'—i. e. 'in this consists—the prejudice against me.'

16. ἀγαθόν] 'Public benefactor.'

20. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε] See Introd. p. xiv.



a. Perver-  
sion of the  
youth.

ἐν ἑκάστων ἑξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους p. 24.  
ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,  
ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται,  
ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγ-  
5 μάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὃν  
οὐδὲν τούτῳ πρόποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὥς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως  
ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

Two an-  
swers (both  
dialecti-  
cal);  
i. the  
hypocrisy  
of the  
charge;

5 τοῦτους  
(more usual)

XII. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι *name!*  
ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὥς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι d  
10 ἔσονται; Ἐγωγε. Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπέ τούτοις, τίς αὐ-  
τοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ  
σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὥς φῆς,  
ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τούτοις καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελ-  
τίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπέ καὶ μῆνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστίν.  
15 ὅρας, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καὶ  
τοὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον  
οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ,  
ὦ γαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἄλλ' e  
οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος,  
20 ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.  
Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ

3. σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται] Oxy-  
moron: 'is playing off a jest  
under solemn forms.' The  
machinery of the law, with all  
its solemnity of circumstance  
and all its serious consequences,  
is set in motion by him for his  
mere amusement. Cf. χαριεντι-  
ζόμενος in the same sense 27  
a, where it is explained by  
παίζοντας.

8. Καί μοι κ.τ.λ.] The ex-  
amination of Meletus by So-  
crates, which now follows,

though it naturally affords  
scope for exhibiting Socrates'  
characteristic talent, is legally  
speaking the customary ἐρώ-  
τησις, to which either party  
was bound to submit at the  
requisition of the other. In-  
trod. p. xviii.

18. ἀμείνους] 'Better citi-  
zens,'—better toward others:  
whereas βελτίους above means,  
strictly speaking, better in  
themselves.

- p. 24. Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσι; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; Ἄπαντες. Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούν-  
 p. 25. των. τί δὲ δῆ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν, ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κακῆνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Κακῆνοι. Πάν-  
 τες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς καγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατ-  
 ἐγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναί ἢ καὶ περὶ  
 b ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν· οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποι-  
 οῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἰς δέ τις ὁ<sup>15</sup>  
 διαφθείρων; ἢ <sup>τοῦ</sup>ναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ  
 βελτίους οἷός τ' ὦν ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶν ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί·  
 οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ εἰς ἅπαντα ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, δια-  
 φθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ  
 ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων; πάντως δῆ-  
 που, εἴαν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε εἴαν τε φῆτε·  
 πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ  
 εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφε-  
 c λουῖσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι  
 ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς<sup>25</sup>  
 ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέ-  
 ληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

24. ἀλλὰ γάρ] 'But the truth is;' as above 19 c, &c. Dig. 147.

26. ἀποφαίνεις—ἀμέλειαν] Be-  
 tween ἀμέλειαν and μέλητε a

play upon words is doubtless intended; see several instances in Plato collected Dig. 324. In this case the probability is strengthened by the constant

2. the  
stupidity  
of it.

XIII. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπὲ ὧ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, p. 25.  
 πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ  
 πονηροῖς ; ὧ τᾶν, ἀποκρίναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν  
 ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς  
 5 αἰὲ ἐγγυτάτῳ ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι ;  
 Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυ-  
 νόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι ; ἀποκρι- d  
 ναι, ὧ γαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.  
 ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι ; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε  
 10 δῆ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὥς διαφθείροντα τοὺς  
 νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα ;  
 Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὧ Μέλητε ; τοσοῦτον σὺ  
 ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὦν,  
 ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργά-  
 15 ζονται αἰὲ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγα- e  
 θοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκω,  
 ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, εἴαν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω  
 τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐ-  
 τοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὥς  
 20 φῆς σύ ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὧ Μέλητε,  
 οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ p. 26.  
 διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ'  
 ἀμφοτέρα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιού-  
 των καὶ ἀκουσίῳ ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσά-  
 25 γειν ἔστί, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν·

recurrence of the juxtaposition ; see 24 c above, and 26 b below.

1. εἰπὲ—Μέλητε] The address ὧ Μέλητε has suffered tmesis by the interlacing of εἰπὲ πρὸς Διὸς with it : Dig. 288. See also Rep. 332 c, τί

οἶει, ὧ πρὸς Διός, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, and 26 e below.

8. ὁ νόμος] See note, 24 c.

13. τηλικόσδε] Meletus was a very young man : cf. Euthyph. 2 b, c, and below 26 c extr.—Stallb.

p. 26. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν <sup>5</sup>

b δῆλον ἤδη ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτωρ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐς ἡ πόλις <sup>10</sup> νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνν μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ c ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι <sup>15</sup> μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι τινας θεοὺς, (καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ,) οὐ μέντοι οὔσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους· ἡ παντάπασί με <sup>20</sup> φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὥς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις

b. Disbelief of established gods, and setting forth of strange spiritual agencies—answered by reducing Meletus to a contradiction.

2. ἔφυγες] 'Didst decline.' Cf. Ar. Ach. 717, Κάξελαῦνεν χρὴ τὸ λοιπόν, κὰν φύγη τις ζημιούν. With Plato, however, this meaning of the word is more common in the compound διαφεύγειν. Cf. Symp. 174 a. ἔφυγες and οὐκ ἤθ. (form a hysteron proteron, though not a strongly marked one.

7. οὔτε — σμικρὸν] Accus. cognate after ἐμέλησεν, not

nom. to ἐμέλησεν. Dig. 6.

14. ὧν νῦν] 'Whom the argument at present concerns:' equivalent to οὓς λέγομεν as distinguished from περὶ ὧν λέγομεν.—Stallb., rightly. Cf. Soph. 263 a, σὺν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου [ὁ λόγος], Legg. 678 a, πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας περὶ καὶ νομοθεσίας, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρέστηκεν, . . . μνήμην εἶναι.

θεούς. Ὡ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; p. 26.  
οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσ-<sup>d</sup>  
περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί,  
ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην  
5 γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἷε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε,  
καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἷε αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους  
γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξα-  
γόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν  
λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθά-  
10 νουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίστε, εἰ πάνν πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς e

3. Μὰ Δί'] Understand οὐ νομίζει.

5. Ἀναξαγόρου] Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 7, makes Socrates refute the alleged opinion of Anaxagoras, τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι. Anaxagoras' formula was μύδρον διάπυρον, which others took to mean a mass of iron. Of the moon he asserted that it had οἰκήσεις, λόφους, φάραγγας, whence that he believed it to be γῆ was an inference.

8. βιβλία] "Is secundum Laert. II. iii. 8, et Clem. Alex. ibi ab interpp. laudatum, philosophorum primus βιβλίον ἐξέδωκε συγγραφῆς, *librum a se scriptum edidit*. Hoc tamen de Anaximandro alii, alii de Pherecyde Syro dicunt."—Forst.

9. καὶ δὴ καὶ] Ironical: f. 'and so then.'

10. ἃ—πριαμένους] The doctrines, not the books. ἐνίστε that is, if they should happen to see a play in which these doctrines are promulgated, as in Eurip. Orest. 982, μόλοιμι τὰν οὐρανοῦ μέσον χθονός τε τετα-

μένην αἰωρήμασι πέτραι ἀλύσει χρυσέαισι, φερομένην δύναισι, βῶλον ἐξ Ὀλύμπου. Dacier, as Stallbaum observes, curiously mistook the sense of this passage, and imagined that a volume of Anaxagoras might be bought at that time for a drachma. But in fact the price of paper itself was then excessive at Athens. Emile Egger, in a letter to Firmin Didot (Revue Contemporaine du 15 Septembre, 1856), mentions fragments of an account rendered by certain Athenian officers in 407 B.C., in which the price of sheets of paper (χάρται), for writing copies of these accounts (ἀντίγραφα) upon, was 1 drachma and 2 obols each, i. e. 1 fr. 20 cent.—a sum which, according to Boeckh's computation, accepted by Egger, would be equivalent to 4 fr. 80 cent. now.

εἰ πάνν πολλοῦ] 'At the most:' the same expression occurs Alcib. I. 123 c, ἄξιός μιν πεντήκοντα εἰ πάνν πολλοῦ, Gorg. 511 d, ἐὰν πάμπολν, . . . δύο δραχμαὶ ἐπράξατο. The ut-

- p. 26. ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, εἰς προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ, οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί' οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἰ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα 5 μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαντῶ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωςί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινι
- p. 27. καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράφασθαι. εἴοικε γὰρ

4. νομίζειν] Oxon. alone has νομίζω, which, though anacoluthic after δοκῶ, has a vividness of its own, and certainly points to the right way of understanding the sentence as an instance of binary structure: see Commentary. But we cannot claim acceptance for νομίζω with such preponderating authority in favour of νομίζειν.

most the *θεατρώνης* could demand for any place was a drachma; the price for an ordinary place was two oboli. See Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, translated by G. C. Lewis, p. 223. n. 315 of 2nd edition.

2. ἄλλως τε καὶ] Which the youths must know are not mine, 'to say nothing of their singularity,' which would make the theft still more glaring. Steinhart has well observed that the meaning of ἄτοπα is not 'absurd,' but 'uncommon' or 'peculiar;' etymologically, what cannot be assigned to any known place or origin. He further remarks that neither Socrates nor Plato would have rejected these notions as 'absurd.' Cf. the striking passage in Legg. 886 d, where Plato declines to controvert these positions although he

would uphold the gods.

3. οὕτωςί—εἶναι] The two sentences οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ and οὐδένα—εἶναι are both descriptions of the same fact, the re-statement being the more precise; οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ stands by a sort of attraction for οὕτωςί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ, of which the filling up in the re-statement would have been ἐμὲ οὐδένα—εἶναι. Dig. 207, 208.

5. Ἄπιστός κ.τ.λ.] The question Meletus had answered affirmatively was, not whether Socrates was an atheist, but whether it was his opinion that Socrates was an atheist,—οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ; Socrates' comment on this is 'Very well; nobody else will believe that, and I am pretty sure you do not yourself,' i.e. I am pretty sure you are saying what you know to be untrue.



ὥσπερ αἰνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ, ἄρα γνώσε- p. 27.  
ται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ  
ἐναντί' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ  
τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαί-  
5 νεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ,  
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νο-  
μίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καὶ τοι τοῦτό ἐστι  
παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαί-  
10 νεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀποκρίναι, ὦ Μέλητε·  
ὕμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, μέμνη- b  
σθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, εἰάν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς  
λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε,  
ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ  
15 οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ  
ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει  
εἶναι, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει,  
αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν·  
εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς

1. διαπειρωμένῳ] 'He is like one, who, by framing a mock-riddle, is trying (as he says to himself) whether will Socrates,' &c. We have here one participial clause (ὥσπερ—ξυντιθ.) within another (διαπειρ.); as Rep. 555 e, τὸν αἰεὶ ὑπερέχοντα ἐνέοντες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες. Notice, that it is ὥσπερ αἰνιγμα, 'a mock-riddle,' one which has no answer.

2. ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζ.] The use of the genitive, after verbs of knowing, seeing, and shewing, seems to be limited in Attic Greek to a noun joined with a participle. After verbs of men-

tioning, it is not so limited. Dig. 26. Cf. Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 136.

15. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα] Similar expressions are—Euthyd. 273, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες, Phdr. 235 a, ὡς οἶός τε ὢν, ταῦτ' αὐτὸς ἐτέρως τε καὶ ἐτέρως λέγων, ἀμφοτέρως εἰπὲν ἄριστα, 271 d, ἔστιν οὖν εἶδη τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, Legg. 721 b, χρήμασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀτιμίᾳ, Phileb. 24 d, τὸ εἰς αὐθὺς τε καὶ αὐθὺς.

16. θορυβεῖτω] Merely by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering;—brawling, as we might say.



p. 27. ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι·  
 c ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, δαί-  
 μονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; 'Οὐκ ἔστιν.' Ὡς ὠνησας, ὅτι  
 μόγῃς ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν  
 δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' 5  
 οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω  
 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ  
 ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δῆ-  
 που πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτως  
 ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ 10  
 d οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε  
 ἡγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆς ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε.  
 Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὥς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν  
 θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί  
 σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγού- 15  
 μενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ  
 γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές  
 εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ὧν  
 δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας  
 ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἶη, 20  
 e ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ~~καὶ~~ ὄνων

6. δαιμόνιά γε] To make the reasoning sound, δαιμόνια here and δαιμόνια πράγματα above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of δαιμόνια καινὰ was based simply on Socrates' τὸ δαιμόνιον. Now by this Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here

the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adjectival θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον 31 c. See Appendix A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

8. ἀντιγραφῇ] The ἔγκλημα is so called, as it has been already called ἀνωμοσία. See 19 b note.

18. ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων ὧν] That is, ἐξ ἄλλων ὧν τινῶν.

[τοὺς ἡμιόνους], ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. p. 27.  
 ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ  
 ἀποπειρώμενος - ἡμῶν ἐγράψω [τὴν γραφὴν ταύ-  
 την] ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα·  
 5 ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν  
 ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς [οὗ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ  
 δαιμόνια καὶ θεία ἡγείσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε  
 δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή p. 28.  
 ἐστίν.

Third part 10  
 of Defence;  
 —Justifi-  
 cation of  
 the pursuit  
 in which  
 his life had  
 been spent,  
 viz., that  
 of a moral  
 reformer,  
 15 interwoven  
 with no-  
 tices of  
 the reform-  
 atory doc-  
 trine itself.

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν  
 ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς  
 μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὁ  
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέ-  
 χθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς  
 15 ἐστὶ. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἴανπερ αἰρήῃ, οὐ  
 Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή  
 τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγα-  
 θοὺς ἄνδρας ἤρρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ ἡ  
 δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις·

6. πείθοις ἂν ὡς οὐ] The οὐ  
 is not simply pleonastic, as in  
 the case of two negatives in  
 the same clause, but it is irra-  
 tional. It is a confused anti-  
 cipation of the coming negative  
 οὐδεμία. Dig. 264.

18. οὐδὲν—στῇ] 'The rule  
 is in no danger of breaking  
 down in my case.' This use  
 of οὐδὲν δεινὸν is idiomatic:  
 cf. Gorg. 520 d, οὐδὲν δεινὸν  
 αὐτῷ μὴ ἀδικηθῇ, 'we need not  
 apprehend for him any injury,'  
 Phædo 84 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ  
 φοβηθῇ, 'we need not appre-  
 hend that the soul will have  
 to fear.' The 'apprehension' is

supposed to affect the speaker  
 and his hearers, as interested  
 in the contingency under dis-  
 cussion. So here Socrates is  
 speaking half ironically, in-  
 teresting himself, as it were,  
 for the rule, against himself.  
 στῇ is also idiomatically used,  
 as a quasi-impersonal;—that  
 is, a vague nominative, such as  
 'the course of events,' is un-  
 derstood. See Dig. 97; where  
 among other parallels is given  
 Ar. Eth. Nic. VI. ix. 9, στή-  
 σεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. στῇ is literally  
 'come to a stand-still.' Stallb.  
 is wrong here.

p. 28. εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύnei, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντίποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτείνει, θεὸς οὖσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὥς ἐγὼ μαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἐκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγόωρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίνην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἶει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐδ' ἂν τις ἐαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα

a. That first and foremost it was undertaken in obedience to the already mentioned divine call, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences or counter-inducements.

οἶμαι

4. ὑπολογίζεσθαι] See below, d note.

5. ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν] 'A man of any worth at all.' This idiomatic concurrence of καὶ with σμικρὸν τι is frequent: Dig. 132.

10. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος] The same

illustration is used Symp. 179 e. The reference in what follows is to Hom. II. xviii. 90.

23. οὐδ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.] The former ἢ in this sentence is hyperbatically postponed to ἐαυτὸν τάξῃ, which in sense is included under it. Dig. 290\*.

κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε p. 28.  
ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

- x XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὃ  
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, e  
5 οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν  
Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῷ, τότε μὲν οὐδ' ἐκείνοι ἔταπ-  
τον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνεον  
ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾤόμην τε  
καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφούντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετά-  
10 ζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς p. 29.  
ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.  
12v δεινὸν μὲντ' ἂν εἶη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἂν με δικαίως  
εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι  
ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος  
15 σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὢν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὃ  
ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ  
οὔντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε  
μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ  
ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι  
20 δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστί. καὶ b  
τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ

1. ὑπολογιζόμενον] 'Giving any countervailing weight to;' literally, 'reckoning per contra.' The ὑπὸ conveys no image of subtraction, according to our notion of the operation, but the signification of meeting from an opposite direction: see Dig. 131.

5. Ποτιδαία—Δηλίῳ] At Potidaea (see Charm. init., Symp. 219, 220) between 432 and 429 B.C., Socrates rescued Alcibiades but resigned in his favour his claim to the reward of

bravery. Delium, 424 B.C., witnessed his famous retreat, (Symp. 221 a, b, Lach. 181 b). Of his campaign before Amphipolis, 422 B.C., we know less.

10. ἐνταῦθα δὲ] ἐνταῦθα repeats τοῦ θεοῦ τάττοντος κ.τ.λ. — δὲ marks the apodosis.

20. καὶ τοῦτο . . . αὕτη] Not pleonastic; but 'what is this but that very same reprehensible ignorance?' τοῦ οἴεσθαι which follows is a genitive epexegetic of ἀμαθία. Dig. 24.

p. 29. τοῦ οἶεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾿Αίδου οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχροὺν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ με c νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν 10 or human inhibition;— ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὥς, εἰ διαφενξοίμην, ἥδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς

2. τούτῳ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'In this province also [of the unseen] I believe I am distinguished from the mass of mankind herein, and if I were to say I was wiser in any point than any other person, I should say it was herein, that' &c. The former as well as the latter τούτῳ both relate to the same fact, to the same *ὅτι*,—upon which a strong emphasis is thus made to converge. Cf. Gorg. 484 e, λαμπρός τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καπὶ τούτ' ἐπείγεται, Νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος, "Ἦν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὢν. The suppression after τούτῳ ἂν is a graceful evasion of self-assertion. See Dig. 255.

10. ἀπιστήσαντες] 'Disbelieving' the representation urged by Anytus as the reason why Socrates should die; not 'refusing to follow Anytus' counsel' to put Socrates to death.

It is therefore to be connected, not with the words immediately following (*ὃς ἔφη—ἀποκτεῖναί με*), but with those next to them (*λέγων—διαφθαρήσονται*). Stallb. differs.

13. ἥδη ἂν] The construction of the fut. indic. with ἂν is abundantly established. ἂν here belongs to *διαφθαρήσονται*, and to refer it to the part. *ἐπιτηδεύοντες* is a shift which will not apply to other passages (Dig. 58), and dislocates this. Observe, as to *διαφθαρήσονται* itself, that its not being affected by the Oratio Obliqua is to be accounted for regularly; it is because the event it denotes is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by Socrates. Plato is never arbitrarily irregular in this class of constructions: Dig. 90. It might be said here, that *διαφενξοίμην* denotes an event equally in the future. But

ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντά- p. 29.  
 πασι διαφθαρήσονται,—εἰ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· ὦ  
 Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφί-  
 μέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ  
 5 τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλῳς  
 ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, d  
 ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμι ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἔγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ  
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι  
 δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ  
 10 οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν  
 παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ  
 ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε  
 ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ  
 εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν  
 15 οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖ-  
 στα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀλη- e  
 θείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ  
 ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις ; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισ-  
 βητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν  
 20 οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ  
 ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετὴν, φάναι

then it is not an event which is assumed as about to happen at all.

4. ἐφ' ᾧτε . . . . φιλοσοφεῖν.] For constructions of relative pronouns and adverbs with the infinitive, see Dig. 79.

8. ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ] “Ἀσπά-  
 ξεσθαι est aliquem salutare ita,  
 ut eum amplectaris ; φιλεῖν  
 ita, ut eum osculeris.”—Stallb.  
 Here of course both words are  
 used, by transference, for the  
 feelings which those actions  
 betoken. Note too, that the

transference affects both : it is  
 not that φιλῶ already expresses  
 a feeling, and thus gives the  
 turn to ἀσπάζομαι their coor-  
 dination in the phrase requires  
 that they should enter into it  
 homogeneously.

πείσομαι—ὑμῖν] The parallel  
 is striking to the declaration  
 of the holy apostles, Acts v. 29,  
 πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ Θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀν-  
 θρώποις.

14. ἰσχύν] Stallb., after Fis-  
 cher, “de animi magnitudine  
 et fortitudine.”

the plan  
 being, to  
 teach the  
 paramount  
 value of  
 the soul,  
 and the  
 duty of  
 caring for  
 it, and the  
 need of  
 consci-  
 ously-pos-  
 sessed  
 principles  
 of action.



p. 30. δέ, ὄνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἔστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τις μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσουντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλακίς τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, εἰ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε

b. That it was of vital use to his countrymen,—a divine blessing to them,

15. ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη] 'If preaching virtue is perversion, then indeed I am a mischievous person; for I never rest from preaching it.' The ταῦτα is not identical with the ταῦτα of the line before, but is more com-

prehensive; it stands for the whole clause referred to in the phrase ταῦτα λέγων, and means 'this practice of mine.'

24. βοήσεσθε] A stronger expression of feeling than θορυβεῖν.



ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάβῃεν P. 30.  
οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· d  
οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χεί-  
ρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μέντ' ἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξε-  
15 λάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος ἴσως οἶεται  
καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι,  
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἀνδρα  
ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες  
Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολο-  
10 γεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι  
ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ κατα-  
ψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως e  
ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον  
εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ  
15 ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθε-  
στέρω καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος·  
οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι  
τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὅς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνει-  
δίζων ἓνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην P. 31.  
20 πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥα-  
δίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πεί-  
θῃσθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθό-  
μενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες

5. ἀτιμάσειεν] H substitutes a conjecture of his own, ἀτιμώσειεν, quite needlessly; for ἀτιμάω, though it properly means to treat or regard as ἀτιμος, while ἀτιμός is to make ἀτιμος, yet also has this technical sense: cf. Legg. 762 d, περὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ἀρχὰς ἡτιμίσθω πάσας.

23. κρούσαντες] Another unhappy conjectural substitution of H occurs here,—ὀρούσαντες, because (he says)

13. εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον refers not to the words immediately succeeding, namely, προσκείμενον—θεοῦ, but to the simile

which follows them.

23. κρούσαντες] 'With a single tap,'—as you would a μύωψ.

p. 31. ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψει κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὧν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπο  
b τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἑμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ  
μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλανον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβά- 10  
νων ταῦτα παρεκελεύομην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τᾶλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοί  
c τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, 15  
ὥς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ἀληθῆ ὥς λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

as its singularity alone might suffice to shew.

XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ

c. (In answer to a

κρούσαντες is 'debile pulsandi verbum.' Such a word however is just what was wanted.

10. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι] H drops the *τοι*, probably for want of considering that the collocation is hyperbatial for καὶ μέντοι εἴ τι. Cf. 41 e.

14. οὐχ οἰοί τε] They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d: but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it. That is, grammatically speaking, the primary intention of the sentence ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι — μάρτυρα lies in the participial clause, and not in the verb ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι. See Dig. 303.

19. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν] The dominant reason of Socrates' abstinence from public affairs was not so much the impossibility of maintaining himself in a public position without sacrifice of principle or of life; but rather, that he felt his mission to be a moral and an individual one, and that from his point of view it was infinitely less important to rectify a

supposed objection) that to have entered public life, in preference to dealing with individuals, was not a method practically possible for a righteous man,

ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιῶν καὶ πολυ- p. 31.  
πραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ  
πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου  
δὲ αἰτίον ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολ-  
5 λαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνε- d  
ται φωνή, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδῶν Μέλ-  
τος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμε-  
νον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰὲ ἀπο-  
τρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ  
10 οὐποτε· τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ  
πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι·  
εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπε-  
χείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν  
ἀπολώλη καὶ οὐτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἂν e  
15 ἑμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθῇ· οὐ

5. γίγνεται φωνή] All MSS. have this φωνή, and all edd. except V bracket it. Needless; Fischer points out the parallel to the next sentence, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη. 9. τοῦτο ὃ ἂν] Edd. prefer τούτου. But ἀποτρέπει πράττειν τοῦτο is a construction borne out by Theæt. 151 a, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποτρέπει ξυνεῖναι, [Dem.] Proœm. xx. p. 1431, δίδεξας ἃ τότε ἡμάρτετε, νῦν ἀποτρέψω ταῦτα παθεῖν, and analogous constructions such as Xen. An. III. i. 20, πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια κατέχουσιν ἡμᾶς. τοῦτο here is the reading of five MSS. besides Oxon. It is moreover less likely to have been invented than τοῦτο. 15. καί μοι μὴ] H alters this into καὶ μὴ μοι, comparing Phædo 105 b. But καί μοι is a common commencement of a sentence in the Orators.

particular policy, than by laying hold of individuals and making statesmen of them to raise the standard of statesmanship.

2. ἀναβαίνων] To the Pnyx; as in the famous πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἄνω καθῆτο, Dem. de Cor. 169. p. 285.

5. θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον] See Appendix A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

6. ἐν τῇ γραφῇ] When he

spoke of the ἕτερα καὶ δαιμόνια,—a perversion of the truth which Socrates characterises as a caricature by his use of the word ἐπικωμῶδῶν, which seems to mean 'selecting for caricature.' So σκώπτειν is to mock at, ἐπισκώπτειν to mock at some particular trait in a person.

- p. 31. γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε  
 ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ δια-  
 p. 32. κωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει  
 γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ- ὄντι μαχού-  
 μενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον 5  
 σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι  
 τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκού-  
 σατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵν' εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ'  
 ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπείκάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, 10  
 μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορ-  
 b τικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθη-

as expe-  
 rience on  
 two occa-  
 sions of  
 his life had  
 shewn him.

11. ἅμα καὶ] This is Ast's conjecture. MSS. are chiefly divided  
 between ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν (which Oxon. exhibits), ἅμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην,  
 and ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅμ' ἂν ἀπ. Of the edd., VSZ have ἅμα καὶ ἅμ' ἂν,  
 B ἅμ' ἂν ἀπολοίμην, H ἅμ' ἂν καὶ ἀπολοίμην. It seems vain to find  
 more than a shadowy justification for ἅμα καὶ ἅμα. The variants  
 may easily have come from ἅμα καὶ ἂν, in the form ἅμα καὶ ἂν. My  
 friend Mr. Campbell ingeniously proposes ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλ' ἂν ἀπ.,  
 'should be ready to meet death in sundry forms:' cf. Soph.  
 O. T. 661, ὅ τι πύματον ὀλοῖμαν. 12. δικανικά] H conjecturally  
 prefixes οὐ, observing "quis credat, Socratem, qui statim a prin-  
 cipio se ξένως ἔχειν τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως professus est, nunc judicialia  
 verba promittere?" But equally how then should Socrates know  
 that what he was going to say was not δικανικά? Besides, the  
 speech in point of fact betrays abundant knowledge of techni-  
 calities; cf. 34 a, εἰ δὲ τότε κ.τ.λ. See Commentary below.

8. ὁ—ἔργα] 'What your  
 body is wont to appreciate  
 highly, the actions of a life.'  
 ὑμεῖς (says Socrates),—not as  
 individuals, but as represent-  
 ing Athenians generally, when  
 acting as judges in the Ecclesia,  
 or the Heliaea,—'you parti-  
 cularly are susceptible to such  
 appeals.'

Here appears, in a refined  
 form, the common τόπος of  
 rehearsing a man's past ser-  
 vices in his defence; of which

practice Lysias, xii. 38. p. 123,  
 says, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει εἰθισμένον  
 ἐστὶ, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα  
 μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν  
 αὐτῶν . . . ὡς στρατιῶται ἀγαθοὶ  
 εἶσι κ.τ.λ. Whence again So-  
 crates says just below, he is  
 'about to employ a topic of  
 vulgar use, and one that sa-  
 vours of the law-courts.'

11. μὴ ὑπείκων δέ] 'But would  
 be ready to perish at once as  
 the price of not yielding.'  
 φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά] φορτικὰ

ναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πρόποτε ἥρξα ἐν τῇ p. 32. πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ' καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὥς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρφ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότε γὰρ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἡναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς

7. ὑμῖν is retained, in deference to weight of MSS., and with all the edd., against Oxon. and 2 other MSS. : although ἐναντιοῦσθαι does not require a dative of reference, especially in a description of formal proceedings.

stands here in its simple meaning of 'vulgar' in the sense of 'common,' — not as implying (as Fischer and others think) self-assertion or bad taste; a meaning which (1) would make ἐρῶ ὑμῖν sound blunt even to harshness; (2) does not harmonise with δικανικά, for an arrogant tone is not characteristic of persons addressing their judges; and (3) does not suit the parallel passage Gorg. 482 c, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, . . . ἀ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλὰ, νόμῳ δέ. δικανικά is likewise a colourless word; — not 'lawyerlike' in the sense of 'dry,' nor yet 'streitsüchtig' (Steinhart), but simply 'characteristic of speakers in courts of justice.'

3. τοὺς δέκα] Strictly only eight; for Conon was not included, and another of the ten was dead. Xenophon, in one of his accounts (Mem. I. i. 18), speaks with more definite inaccuracy of ἐννέα στρατηγούς.

5. παρανόμως, in two respects; (1) that they were tried ἄθροοι (see Thirlwall, Hist. Gr.

vol. IV. App. 2, where it is shewn that this right of separate trial is not to be traced to the decree of Cammonus); and (2) that they were not heard in their own defence; for in the assembly in which the charge was brought first informally, they only (Xen. Hell. I. vii. 5) βραχεία ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὔτεθ' ἰσχυρὸς λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον' and in that in which they were condemned they were not heard at all.

7. ἡναντιώθην . . . ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην] What is the precise reference of these expressions? Was ἡναντιώθην a refusal to put the question? This is left for uncertain by Mr. Grote, who says that upon Xenophon's shewing 'it can hardly be accounted certain that Socrates was Epistates.' (Hist. Gr. ch. 64.) Again, to what act does ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην refer?

It may be well to give the other accounts of this occurrence at length:—

(a) Xen. Mem. I. i. 18, βουλεύσας γὰρ ποτε, . . . ἐπιστάτης ἐν

p. 32. νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην, καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων

τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγοὺς μὴ ψήφῳ ἀποκτείνειν πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσειν, ὀργιζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων.

(b) Ib. IV. iv. 2, ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἡναντιώθη τοιαύτῃ ὁρμῇ τοῦ δήμου κ.τ.λ.

(c) Xen. Hell. I. vii. 9-15, ἐντεῦθεν ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν, εἰς ἣν ἡ βουλὴ εἰσηνεγκε τὴν ἐαυτῆς γνώμην, Καλλιξένου εἰπόντος, τήνδε . . . τῶν δὲ πρυτάνεων τινῶν οὐ φασκόντων προθήσειν τὴν διαψήφισιν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, αὖθις Καλλιξένος ἀναβὰς κατηγόρει αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτά. οἱ δὲ ἐβόων καλεῖν τοὺς οὐ φάσκοντας. οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις φοβηθέντες ὡμολόγουν πάντες προθήσειν, πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου· οὗτος δ' οὐκ ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ νόμον ποιήσειν.

(d) Axiochus, 368 d. . . . οἱ πρῶν δέκα στρατηγοί· ὅτ' ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἐπηρόμην τὴν γνώμην· οὐ γὰρ ἐφαίνετό μοι σεμνὸν μαυνομένῳ δήμῳ συνεξάρχειν· οἱ δὲ περὶ Θηραμένην καὶ Καλλιξένον τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ προέδρους ἐγκαθέτους ὑφέντες κατεχειροτόνησαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄκριτον θάνατον. The word ἐγκάθετοι is explained by Æsch. iii. 3. p. 54, καὶ ταῦτα ἕτεροί τινες τὰ ψηφίσματα ἐπιψηφίζουσιν, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ δικαιοτάτου τρόπου λαχόντες προεδρεύειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ παρασκευῆς καθεζόμενοι.

(e) Gorg. 474 a, πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχὼν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνει καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλῳτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. For this, as Luzac aptly remarks, is the

historical fact before us disguised by Socratic irony.

That Socrates was Epistates is at least a probable conclusion from (a), (b), and (d), to say nothing of (e); in further support of which, (b) and (d) imply that he carried his point, which he could not have done but as Epistates.

The reference of ἡναντιώθη must therefore be to Socrates' refusal to put the question, which resulted, as (d) credibly relates, in the adjournment of proceedings to the next day, when a more pliable Epistates presided.

The other clause, ἐναντία ἐψηφ., is, equally with ἡναντιώθη, in connection with μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων· the structure of the sentence points to this inevitably. Now against referring this to the eventual voting in the assembly is (1) the unlikelihood that Socrates should be the only one of the prytanes who voted in the minority, when several of them had come to see that the bill was illegal. And (2) what if he had been the only one? it was no marked distinction: the minority was large, and he and the rest of the prytanes would merely vote as individuals. So likewise to refer it to the stages immediately preceding that final voting, would be in contradiction with the mention made in the accounts of the opposition of others beside Socrates. To refer it, again, to the debate on the bill in the council, before it was adopted as a



ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν p. 32.

προβούλευμα, would be to lay the scene of it too far from that of ἡναντιώθην ὑμῖν with which it is coupled, and would make μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων flat, since the πρυτάνεις had no prominent functions in the council. The remaining alternative, and this is in itself a plausible one, is to refer it to the first stage of proceedings in the assembly, where, preparatorily to the προβούλευμα being read out by the κῆρυξ, it was handed to the proedri, who with the nomothetæ had to pronounce whether it contravened any existing law. Here was the precise moment at which legal provision had been made for entertaining the very objection taken by Socrates. We may then, with at least some probability, refer ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην to Socrates' condemning the bill as illegal when it was referred in due course to the joint consideration of the proedri and nomothetæ. The hysteron proteron is on Greek principles natural: ἡναντιώθην—νόμους precedes, because it, and not the earlier opposition, was the conspicuous and crowning act in Socrates' whole proceeding; Dig. 308.

With Socrates' more glorious refusal to put the question may be compared the conduct contemptuously attributed to Demosthenes by Æschines, ii. 84. p. 40, ἀναγνωσθέντος τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ἀναστὰς ἐκ τῶν προέδρων Δημοσθένης οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπιψηφίειν· βοῶντων δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ τοὺς προέδρους ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα κατ' ὄνομα καλοῦντων,

οὕτως ἄκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπεψηφίσθη.

The series of checks which the forms of the Ecclesia imposed on bills in progress, with a view to guard existing laws, was as follows:—1. The προβούλευμα was handed to the proedri, who after conferring with the nomothetæ pronounced whether or not it contravened existing laws; and, if they passed it, it was read out by the κῆρυξ. 2. After this, it was open to any citizen to stop it by lodging an ὑπομυσία in earnest of his intention to bring against its author a γραφή παρανόμων. 3. Or the Epistates might refuse to put the question—under liability, of course, to ἐνδειξις if he refused improperly. 4. Or the rest of the proedri (by a majority, we may suppose,) might in like manner refuse their consent. See Æsch. ii. 65, iii. 39. pp. 36, 59.—Schömann de Com. Ath. ch. xi.

1. ἐνδεικνύναι καὶ ἀπάγειν] 'To procure my suspension or arrest.' The processes of ἐνδειξις and ἀπαγωγή are often mentioned in conjunction, as here, and Dem. c. Timocr. 146. p. 745, Lept. 156. p. 594, Antipho v. 8, 9. p. 130, &c., and in the βουλευτικὸς ὅρκος as it stood after the amnesty. Amid several divergent accounts of these processes, the best is Heffter's (Ath. Gerichtsverf. p. 195). Ἐνδειξις might be instituted, among other cases, against any who should hold an office while he owed public money; or (a luculent



p. 32. *κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ*  
*c* *δικαίου ὄμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ'*  
*ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα*  
*δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρα-*  
*τουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο,*<sup>5</sup>  
*οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμφάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν*  
*εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος*  
*Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵν' ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὲ καὶ*  
*ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταπτον, βουλό-*  
*μενοι ὥς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι*<sup>10</sup>  
*d* *ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ*

instance) against any prytanis or proedrus who in discharge of his function in an assembly of the people should depart from the form of proceeding prescribed by law (Dem. c. Timocr. 22. p. 707). In the latter case, offenders were liable to a fine, *and* to *ἐνδειξις*, which *ἐνδειξις* was not only an expedient for levying the fine, but had the immediate effect of suspending them from office until the fine was paid. The Thesmothetæ had exclusive cognisance of *ἐνδειξις*. The statement of Pollux, that it pertained to the Archon Basileus, is unsupported; likewise his definition of *ἐνδειξις*, on which some writers rely,—that it was *ὁμολογουμένου ἀδικήματος, οὐ κρίσεως ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας δεομένου*,—is called by Heffter 'a mere jingle of words.' 'Ἀπαγωγὴ was of wider application than *ἐνδειξις*. Moreover, its object was the bringing the offender into custody, which in *ἐνδειξις* was not the rule.

*ἐνδειξις* was an interdictory procedure, *ἀπαγωγή* a procedure of summary arrest. To be liable to it, a person must be taken *ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ*, in perpetration of an illicit act. The body which had cognisance in *ἀπαγωγή* was the Eleven, who registered (Heffter p. 210) the apprehension of the criminal and the cause of arrest (Lys. xiii. 86. p. 138), and who further, supposing the arrested person to be already under sentence of law, had charge of the execution of this sentence.

7. *θόλον*] The building where the prytanes, and while they lasted the Thirty, daily banqueted and sacrificed. It was near the council-chamber.

10. *ἀναπλῆσαι*] This word, like *implere* in Latin, is used idiomatically of communicating pollution; whence here 'implicate.' See for example Phædo 67 a; and cf. especially with the present passage Antipho, ii. A. a. 10. p. 116, *συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναίτιους*.

θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' p. 32.  
 ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι,  
 τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ  
 ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὕσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργά-  
 5 σασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν  
 τέτταρες ὄχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα,  
 ἐγὼ δὲ ὥχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτ'  
 ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ e  
 τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

d. (In answer to a supposed objection) that the innocent tendency of the reformatory doctrine, which was simply to teach uncompromising adherence to righteousness, and not to train for professions or impart knowledge, excluded the suspicion of perverting the youth,

10 XXI. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγε-  
 μέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως  
 ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ  
 χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ,  
 ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων  
 15 οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἴ p. 33.  
 πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς  
 οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ  
 δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὐς οἱ δια-  
 βάλλοντές μέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ  
 20 διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τις  
 μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμῇ  
 ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ  
 πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων b

9. ὑμῖν] So MSS. and edd. generally. ὑμῶν is a conjecture of H.

9. μάρτυρες] The μαρτυρίαι are supposed to follow here. Introd. p. xviii.

20. διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς] He means (see b below) that he imparted no μάθημα,—no professional knowledge; even of καλοκαγαθία he never ἐπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι Xen. Mem. I. ii. 3. Cf. his declining ἐπιμε-

λεῖσθαι Nicias' son, Laches 208 d. What he sought to impart was rather a habit of mind; "not to dispense ready-made truth like so much coin, but to awaken the sense of truth and virtue; not to force his own convictions on others, but to test theirs."—Zeller.

P. 33. διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἕαν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μὴ, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μῆτε ὑπεσχόμην· μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μῆτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τις φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτε τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί  
 c τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὧ ἄν- 10  
 δρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον·  
 ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις  
 μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὐσι δ' οὐ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές.  
 ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ  
 θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ 15  
 παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥπερ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα  
 ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὧ  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ καὶ εὐλέγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ  
 d ἐγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφ-  
 θαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι 20  
 γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὐσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν  
 πώποτε τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας  
 ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ  
 ἠθέλον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ  
 ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἶπερ ὑπ' 25

—a sus-  
picion  
which was  
also re-  
futed inde-  
pendently.

11. εἶπον.] So Stallbaum, rightly. εἶπον, Hermann. See Commentary.

2. καὶ ἕαν τις] This is a soft way of saying, 'And I am ready to question him, if he chooses.'

12. ὅτι ἀκούοντες] Stallb. rightly joins this with ἀλλὰ διὰ τί— διατρίβοντες; the ἀκηκόατε—εἶπον·

being interjected. Then ὅτι is 'because.' See the examples which Stallb. quotes—Euthyphro 3 b, Rep. I. 332 a, III. 402 e, 410 d.

ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμ- p. 33.  
 νῆσθαι καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν  
 πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ, οὓς ἐγὼ ὀρώ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων  
 οὔτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου e  
 5 τοῦδε πατὴρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου  
 τοῦδε πατὴρ· ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὔτοσί,  
 Ἐπιγένους πατὴρ· ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὔτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ  
 ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος, ὁ Θεο-  
 ζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος

2. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι] BS om.; VZ retain; H brackets. The likelihood is not great that the words have been inserted from the end of the former sentence (H brackets them *there*, by mistake); the rhythm almost requires them; and there is point in attributing the same vindictive feeling to the kinsmen as to the youths themselves. The repetition is like Brutus' repetition of 'for him have I offended,' in Shakespeare's *Jul. Cæs.* Act III. Scene ii.

4. Κριτοβούλου &c.] With Critobulus Socrates holds conversation in *Xen. Mem.* I. iii, II. vi. He is mentioned also in *Athen.* V. 220a, with Æschines, distinguished from others of the name as ὁ Σωκρατικός, the son of Lysanias (see *Diog. Laert.* II. 60), who afterwards became a teacher for money of the Socratic doctrines, and wrote Socratic dialogues (Schol. in *Menex.*). He was at variance with Aristippus (*Luzac de Dig. Soc.* sect. II. § 2), and there is a fragment of an invective written against him by Lysias, illustrating the enmity of the Orators against the Socratists: he is of the company named in the *Phædo* (59 b). Epigenes is mentioned *Xen. Mem.* III. xii. 1, and *Phædo* 59 b: his father Antipho is not otherwise known. Demo-

docus, the father of Paralus and Theages, is an interlocutor in the *Theages*. Of *Theages* it is said, *Rep.* 496 b, εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου Θεάγους χαλινὸς οἷος κατασχέιν· καὶ γὰρ Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. Adimantus is an interlocutor in the *Rep.* (357-368, 548). Apollodorus appears in the *Phædo* (59 a, 117 d) as passionately attached to Socrates, and in the *Symp.* says of himself (172 e), ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω καὶ ἐπιμελὲς πεποιήμαι ἐκάστης ἡμέρας εἰδέναι ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃ ἢ πράττῃ, and is said (173 d) to have got τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Æantodorus are only mentioned here.

p. 33. τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ κατα-  
 p. 34. δεηθείη—, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν  
 Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος,  
 οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὗτοσὶ Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ  
 Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς 5  
 ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινὰ ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν  
 τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα·  
 εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα-  
 χωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου  
 πᾶν τὸναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ 10  
 βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζο-  
 b μένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ  
 Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν  
 λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσ-  
 βύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα 15  
 ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν  
 ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευ-  
 δομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἰεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' 20  
 ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως  
 c τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀνα-  
 μνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ  
 ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε  
 τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδίᾳ τε  
 αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, 25  
 καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ

Conclu-  
 sion ;—  
 reason for  
 not en-  
 treating  
 the mercy  
 of the  
 court.

1. καταδεηθείη] The κατα-  
 implies absence of all reserve  
 or modification : here in a bad  
 sense it expresses an unprin-  
 cipated act. Dig. 122.

8. ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ] The full  
 expression occurs Æschin. iii.  
 165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ

βήματος, ἕως ἂν εἴπῃς. Note by  
 the way, that the examination  
 of witnesses was extra to the  
 time allowed for the pleadings;  
 cf. Lysias xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166,  
 167, καί μοι ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ.

26. ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρα] 'And then  
 finds that I'

οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, p. 34.  
 ὥς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις  
 ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη,  
 καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς  
 5 τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ d  
 μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικῇ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς  
 τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν  
 πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ  
 'Ομήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέ-  
 10 φυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοι εἰσι  
 καὶ υἱεῖς, ὧ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μενιάρκιον  
 ἦδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν' αὐτῶν δεῦρο  
 ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί  
 δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, e  
 15 ὧ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν  
 θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος  
 λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη  
 τῇ πόλει οὗ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν  
 ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα,  
 20 εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον  
 γέ ἐστι τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν

21. τῷ Σωκράτει] VBS τὸν Σωκράτη, ZH τὸ Σωκράτη, both with some MS. authority. The last is worst; for such an emphatic use of the name Socrates palpably requires the article. And

2. ὥς ἂν δόξαιμι] Refers to κίνδυνον, not to ἔσχατον.—'danger, as he would think it.'

5. οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ] γὰρ refers to εἴ—['I say if,] for though I do not expect it of you, yet [making the supposition,] if it should be so.'

6. ἐπιεικῇ] 'Conciliatory.'

9. 'Ομήρου] Odys. xix. 163.

11. εἷς μὲν] Lamprocles (Xen. Mem. II. ii. 1). δύο· Sophroniscus and Menexenus (Phædo 116 b).

15. εἰ μὲν] 'Whether I can look death in the face or not.'—Whewell.

19. τοῦνομα] The name of σοφός· cf. 20 d, and below, εἴτε σοφία εἴτε κ.τ.λ.



p. 35. ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχυρὸν ἂν εἴη· οἷοςπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὥς δεινόν τι οἰομένους 5 πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἔσομένων, ἔαν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινα καὶ  
b τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναῖον εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἐαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ 10 ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψη- 15

against both this and τὸν Σωκράτη stands the consideration, that the meaning would be 'people have made up their minds that Socrates *is to* differ;' it is the form of a resolution which *is to* take effect; whereas the meaning required is 'they have made up their minds that Socrates differs' now. τῷ Σωκράτει leaves this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.; and in accepting it we follow Bernhardy (Syntax. p. 94), who supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

2. ἀνδρεία] Oxon. here has ἀνδρία, but is not consistent. Dindorf (on Ar. Nub. 510) says ἀνδρεία alone is the true form, —as proved (1) by the Ionic diaeresis ἀνδρηΐη· (2) by the fact that in poetry it never occurs where the metre would require ἀνδρία (except in Eur. Herc. F. 475, πατὴρ ἐπύργου, μέγα φρονῶν ἐπ' ἀνδρία, which Elmsley has emended εὐανδρία); (3) by the testimony of Etym. M. p. 461. 53, that the traditional orthography was ἀνδρεία till Apollonius invented ἀνδρία· (4) by the preponderating adherence of the MSS. to ἀνδρεία.

13. οὔτε ὑμᾶς] VH ὑμᾶς, BSZ (following 2 MSS.) ἡμᾶς. H says "ὑμᾶς commodum sensum præbet; nec plebem, modo aliquo loco haberi velit, facere, nec si singuli faciant, permittere debere."

3. ἔσονται] 'If we are to have such conduct on the part of those,' &c. εἰεν would have

given a different turn to the meaning.

φιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος p. 35.  
καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιούντος ἢ τοῦ ἥσυ-  
χίαν ἄγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ  
5 δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ c  
δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν.  
οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κáθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ κατα-  
χαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα·  
καὶ ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ  
10 δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὐν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς  
ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιорκεῖν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέ-  
\* τεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με,  
ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν,  
ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια,  
15 ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύ- d  
γοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτρου τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ  
πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας,  
θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγείσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ  
ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἑμαυτοῦ ὥς

9. ὁμώμοκεν] Part of the judge's oath was ἢ μὴν ὁμοίως ἀκροάσασθαι τῶν κατηγορούντων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων. Isoer. xv. 21. p. 314.

χαριεῖσθαι] 'That he will not favour whomsoever he feels inclined to favour.'

10. ἡμᾶς] Defendants in general.

11. ἐθίζεσθαι] 'Allow yourselves to be habituated;' an instance of the semi-middle sense. Dig. 88.

15. ἄλλως—καὶ] 'But, by Zeus, especially, when I am on my trial at Meletus' instance for impiety.' A remarkable

hyperbaton. The phrase ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the μέντοι νῆ Δία (which is also a familiar sequence, Phædo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a), which could have found no other convenient place. What makes such a tmesis possible, without prejudice to perspicuity, is the very fact that ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is a sufficiently familiar phrase to admit of this dismemberment and yet be recognised: Dig. 294. Thus Bekker, in reading arbitrarily ἄλλως τε πάντως νῆ Δία μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ, is wide of the mark.

p. 35. θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δέῃ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

5

e XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-  
p. 36. ναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθ-  
μόν. οὐ γὰρ ὥμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ· νῦν δέ, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα

B. The Counter-assessment of the Penalty.

12. τριάκοντα] So ZH ; τρεῖς VBS. Of MSS., Oxon. with five others has τριάκοντα which also approves itself independently.

5. καὶ ὑμῖν] The defence of Socrates, which would occupy the second division of the pleadings, being thus concluded, there would follow here the voting of the judges, and the announcement of their verdict, declaring the charge proven. Then would begin the third division of the pleadings, consisting firstly of a speech on the side of the prosecution in advocacy of the penalty named, and secondly of Socrates' ἀντιτίμησις, where the Apology again takes up the thread. Introd. pp. vi, xi, xvii.

8. καὶ οὐκ—τοῦτο] The halting connection (grammatically speaking) between this clause and the preceding part of the sentence is idiomatic. The shortest way is taken to arrive at the particular which is the

point of the sentence: Dig. 258. It is incorrect to supply, as Stallbaum does, καὶ [δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι] οὐκ, κ.τ.λ. Rather there is a substitution of a shorter form of expression, complete in itself, but not agreeing with the plan on which the sentence set out.

11. οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον] Hyperbatical for παρ' οὕτως ὀλίγον· Dig. 298. Lit. 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared: i. e. 'so close.' Dig. 124.

12. τριάκοντα] The number of condemning votes was 281, out of a court of 501: so 30 in round numbers, or 31 exactly, changing sides, would have effected an acquittal. See, for the fuller discussion of this point, Introd. p. xii sqq.

μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέ- p. 36.  
 λητον μὲν οὖν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα,  
 καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό  
 γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορή-  
 5 σοντες ἐμοῦ, καὶ ὦφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλα- b  
 βῶν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

a. Proposal  
 on the  
 footing of  
 full justice,  
 —ironical.

XXVI. Τιμάται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου.  
 εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὧ ἄνδρες  
 Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός  
 10 εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ  
 ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὥνπερ οἱ πολλοί,  
 χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ  
 δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν

The implication in *μόναι* that the majority was small would recommend the corruption of *τριάκοντα* into *τρεῖς*. In Andoc. iii. 4. p. 23, *πεντήκοντα* is a necessary emendation for *πέντε*. Cf. Taylor, Lectt. Lys. cap. vi.

2. ἀποπέφευγα] Half in jest, in allusion to his accusers being three to one, Socrates represents the majority as obtained by the joint influence of the three: supposing then each accuser represented by one-third of the majority, Meletus gets less than 100, i.e. less than one-fifth of the whole. The indictment stood in Meletus' name, but the really formidable accuser was Anytus: see again Introd. p. x.

6. τὸ πέμπτον μ.] Not 'a fifth,' but 'the' indispensable 'fifth.'

10. παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι] A technical legal expression; ἀποτίσαι applies to a pecuniary penalty, παθεῖν to death, imprisonment, or the like. So Dem. Mid. 47.

p. 529, ὅτου ἂν καταγνῶ ἡ ἡλιαία, τιμάτω περὶ αὐτοῦ παραχρῆμα, ὅτου ἂν δοκῇ ἄξιός εἶναι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι (part of the νόμος ὑβρεως), in Timocrat. 105. p. 733.

8. τι μαθὼν] 'For having taken it into my head, in the disposal of my life, to deny myself rest.' ἐν is not 'during.'

13. ἄλλων] Here is the idiomatic use of ἄλλος for 'besides': Dig. 46. ἄλλων agrees with all three genitives following: 'and what not besides,—magistracies, clubs, and factions.'

ξυνωμοσιῶν] These associations were as rife at Athens under the Thirty as in the Peloponnesian war.

p. 36. καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησά-  
 c μενος ἑμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπικέκιστον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε  
 εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα, οἱ  
 ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἑμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος  
 εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν 5  
 μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα,  
 ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε  
 τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπι-  
 μεληθεῖν, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος  
 ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πό- 10  
 λεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον  
 d ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὢν;  
 ἀγαθόν τι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν  
 ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν  
 τοιοῦτον, ὃ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ 15  
 πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμε-  
 τέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον, ὃ ἄνδρες  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν  
 πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν  
 ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγῃ νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν. 20

5. ἐπὶ δὲ—εὐεργεσίαν] This clause is repeated in the word ἐνταῦθα, and governed by ἦα· and the ἰὼν with εὐεργετεῖν is a redundancy. (At the same time probably another clause is confusing itself with this in the speaker's mind, to which ἰὼν would be essential, namely, οἱ δὲ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἔμελλον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν, i. e. οἱ δὲ ἰὼν ἔμελλον ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον εὐεργετῆσαι.)

14. τιμᾶσθαι] 'That I should lay the penalty.'

16. εὐεργέτῃ] Stallbaum cites Xen. de Vectig. iii. 11, Lys.

xx. 19. p. 159. Add Dem. F. L. 330. p. 446, τί δέ; δοίητ' ἂν ἐν πρυτανείῳ σίτησιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ δωρεάν, αἷς τιμᾶτε τοὺς εὐεργέτας;

17. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὡς] This is the form of comparison with ὡς, complicated by the redundant insertion of οὕτως. Dig. 164.

20. ζεύγῃ] Here this word plainly stands for three or four horses. Hesychius in voc. says καὶ ἐπὶ τριῶν καὶ τεσσάρων ἔτασσον.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν [εἶναι], ἐγὼ p. 36.  
δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ c  
δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τι- p. 37.  
μᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

b. Com-  
promise,—  
ironical  
also.

5 XXVII. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παρα-  
πλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς  
ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ  
Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι  
ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς  
10 τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διει-  
λέγμεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ  
καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν b  
μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπέισθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ  
ῥάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύ-  
15 εσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ  
δέω ἑμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσκειν καὶ κατ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐ-  
τός, ὥς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιοῦτου  
τινὸς ἑμαυτῷ, τί δείσας; ἡ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, οὐ  
Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φῆμι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ  
20 ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι  
ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος;  
πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, c  
δουλεύοντα τῇ αἰὲ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἑνδεκα;  
ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ

12. ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις] The  
Lacedæmonians, for instance.  
See Thucyd. i. 132.

21. ὧν—ὄντων] Genitive of  
a noun with participle after  
verbs of *knowing*, &c.: Dig.  
26. The clause however is  
complicated by the presence  
of ὅτι, indicative of a mo-  
mentary intention to adopt a

finite instead of a participial  
construction: Dig. 279.

23. τοῖς ἑνδεκα] εἰς ἀφ' ἐκάσ-  
της φυλῆς ἐγένετο, καὶ γραμμα-  
τεὺς ('secretary') αὐτοῖς συν-  
ηριθμεῖτο. Poll. viii. 102. They  
had charge of the prisons, as  
well as of the execution of  
sentences.



p. 37. ταυτόν μοί ἐστίν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μὲντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες 5 πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς d διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος 10 εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· καὶ μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς 15 e πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἰσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἰός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον 20 πείσαι τινὰς ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν p. 38. ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποι- 25 εῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε

20. τουτὶ] Cf. textual note on ταυτησί, 22 e.

2. ἀλλὰ δὴ] Introduces the last of a series of suppositions. Dig. 142.

9. ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα] Ironical.

11. ἐξελθόντι] 'If I quit the city:' as below e, ἐξελθὼν ζῆν.

20. τουτὶ] Namely, ὅτι οὐχ οἰός τε ἔσομαι.

διαλεγόμενον καὶ ἑμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁρ. 38.  
δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ'

I. ὁ ἀνεξέταστος—ἀνθρώπῳ]  
 The interrogatory discipline which Socrates thus extols was that to which he sought to bring all with whom he conversed.

The subject, about which the answerer was questioned, was himself: which is the reason why Socrates always identified the process with the carrying out of the Delphic precept, Γνωθὶ σεαυτὸν. The branches of enquiry to which it led were manifold:—

(1) knowledge of one's own natural endowments and position, with a view to living for the greatest good of oneself and others:—ὁ ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος ὁποῖός τις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρεῖαν κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 25:

(2) review of the actual use to which one has been and is putting one's life—Laches 187 e, διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὅντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῇ καὶ ὅντινα τὸν παρέληλυθότα χρόνον βεβίωκεν and below 39 e, διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου.

(3) examination of one's opinions, — their coherence, their consistency, the history of their formation; of which the results are—consciousness of one's own ignorance, and consciousness of the grounds of one's knowledge: Xen. Mem. III. ix. 6, Soph. 230 b—d:

(4) investigation of the principles of human life and action (for which the knowledge of one's own nature is a prerequisite: Alc. I. 133 c, ἄρ' οὐν

μὴ γινώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς . . . δυνάίμεθ' ἂν εἶδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ;)—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16, περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν τί εὖσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μαρία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότες ἡγείτο καλοὺς καγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοούντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλησθαι and here (just above) τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι.

But this examination was not a mere discipline ending in itself, but a preparation to qualify a man for receiving culture and improvement (Alc. I. 124 d, ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, Laches 188 b, ἀξιοῦντα μαθεῖναι ὥσπερ ἂν ζῇ), for attaining connectedness of knowledge and rational method in action, and for doing the best by himself and the state.

Socrates seems to have employed the strongest terms he could find to assert the indispensableness of this discipline:—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16 (quoted above), III. ix. 6, τὸ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἶσθαι γινώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μαρίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι, Soph. 230 d, τὸν δ' ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὢν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδεντόν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν κ.τ.λ., Hip. Ma. 304 e, τὸ καλὸν ἀγνοῶν καὶ ὅποτε οὕτω διάκεισθαι, οἷε σοι

p. 38. ἔτι ἦττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι, ὧ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμ' οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἑμαυτὸν ἀξιῶν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμῆσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεοι.

κρείττον εἶναι ζῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνάναι; and in the passage before us.

And was there not a cause? The current opinions, drawn from men's practical exigencies, imperfect observation, and debased morality, were no sounder than their sources. It was abhorrence of this mass of error and conventionality (which meanwhile the Sophists were accepting as the material of their system), which impelled Socrates to seek to reconstruct human opinion on a basis of 'reasoned truth.'

3. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμ'] A supplementary reason;—'Were silence possible, it would be no less a κακόν' which therefore I should decline imposing on myself.'

6. νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ] This combination of particles occurs always in setting aside a hy-

pothetical case which is the opposite of the existing state of the case. The δὲ and the γὰρ enter simultaneously into the combination, where there is no ellipse nor aposiopesis. Dig. 149.

12. ἐγγυᾶσθαι] Governed by an equivalent of 'they say' contained in κελεύουσι. Cf. Symp. 213 a, πάντας οὖν . . . κελεύειν εἰσιέναι καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν. Dig. 245.

13. ἀξιόχρεοι.] The third and last division of the pleadings being thus concluded, there would follow first the final voting and then the final verdict of the judges: by which the formal trial would be concluded.

After this, however, some 'last words' are still conceded to Socrates, who continues to address those of his judges

C. Last reflections, addressed to the judges :  
a. to those who had voted for his condemnation ;

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὧ ἄνδρες p. 38.  
Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλο-  
μένων τὴν πόλιν λαιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε,  
ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ  
5 καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν· εἰ οὖν  
περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν  
ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι  
πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω  
δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ d  
10 καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς  
τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὧ ἄνδρες,  
ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς  
ἔπεισα, εἰ ὥμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε  
ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία  
15 μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναι-  
σχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα,  
οἷ ἂν ὑμῖν ἥδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνηούντός τέ μου καὶ  
ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιούντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ e  
καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· οἶα δὲ καὶ εἴθισθε  
20 ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ᾤθηθην

who choose to remain and hear him.

Whether such a concession was actually made to Socrates, or whether it was only a sufficiently common practice to give verisimilitude to the fiction, is a question which can hardly be determined. See *Introd.* p. xv.

1. οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου] Socrates is telling the Athenians that they would not have had to wait long to be saved the reproach of putting him to death, by letting nature take her own course. 'It was but

a brief space after all, by forestalling which they were entailing on themselves the reproach.' ἔνεκα marks here the efficient not the final cause; the meaning is not 'you will incur reproach for the sake of taking from me a brief remainder of life,'—but 'a brief space will be the cause of your incurring it.' The 'brief space,' accordingly, is not that between the present moment and his execution, but that between his execution and the moment when he would have died in the course of nature.

- p. 38. δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' Α
- p. 39. ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἅν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπεόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εἴαν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπὸν, ὧ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θάπτον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἑάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ 15 κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας 15

7. τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἅν τις] Before ἅν VH have ῥᾶον· BSZ reject it. H errs in thinking that ῥᾶον exists in Oxon.—no doubt misled by Gaisf. Lectt. Plat., in whom “p. 39 a 3 ῥαῖον” must be an erratum for “ῥαῖον om.”

4. ἐκείνως] Understand ἀπολογησάμενος again.

12. μὴ . . . ἢ] An instance of the *presumptive* variety of the deliberative conjunctive. It is confined to negative sentences. Dig. 59 note.

13. θάπτον γὰρ θ. θεῖ] This refers to the reflex effect of wickedness on the evildoer's soul, which it degrades and ruins. Cf. Crito 47 c, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου (sc. the soul) ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένον, ᾧ τὸ

ἄδικον λωβᾶται κ.τ.λ.; Gorg. 509 a, μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικούντι. Between danger and death there is many a chance of escape, as Socrates has just before said; but none between the evil deed and its internal consequences. Stallb.'s quotation of Odys. viii. 329, Οὐκ ἀρετᾷ κακὰ ἔργα κιχάνει τοι βραδὺς ὥκύν· is not to the point.

18. ὑπὸ—ὠφληκότες] ‘Sentenced by Truth to receive the penalty of.’—Whewell.

ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ p. 39. τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μὲν που ἴσως οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρη-  
 5 σμωδῆσαι, ὃ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γάρ εἰμι ο  
 ἥδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν,  
 ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημί γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες,  
 οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθύς μετὰ  
 τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δί' ἢ οἶαν  
 10 ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι  
 ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ

10. οἰόμενοι] After οἰόμενοι H inserts conjecturally μέν, taking this to be suggested by οἰόμενοί με of some MSS., and by an erased blank in Oxon. The erasure in Oxon. was probably με, for an accent has been erased also from —αι. This however may have been an erasure by the original scribe; such as for instance must have been that at Crito 53 d, where stands δι φθέραν with an erasure between—διφθέραν being plainly the true reading.

1. ἐγὼ τε . . . καὶ οὗτοι] 'I as well as they.' ἐγὼ has the stress, and stands (in accordance with Greek arrangement) first for that reason. Dig. 307.

6. ἐν ᾧ—χρησμοδοῦσιν] The opinion, which connects prophetic enlightenment with the approach of death, has maintained its hold upon mankind in all ages. Patroclus foretells Hector's death, Il. xvi. 851, and Hector the death of Achilles, Il. xxii. 358: instances to which classical writers often appeal; thus Xen. Apol. 30, ἀνέθηκε μὲν καὶ Ὁμηρος ἔστιν οἷς τῶν ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου προ-  
 γινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα, βούλομαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ χρησμοδῆσαι τι, Cic. De Div. I. 30, Facilius evenit appropinquante morte ut animi futura augurentur; ex quo et

illud est Calani, de quo ante dixi, et Homericus Hectoris qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat. So Shakespeare, Rich. II. Act II. Sc. i. (Gaunt) "Methinks, I am a prophet new inspir'd; And thus, expiring, do foretell of him." And Sir H. Davy ("Remains," p. 311) speaks of himself as "looking into futurity with the prophetic aspirations belonging to the last moments of existence"—in a letter dated just two months before his death.

9. οἶαν] Sc. τιμωρίαν. A virtual cognate accusative after ἀπεκτόνατε. Dig. 1.

11. διδόναι ἔλεγχον] Namely, under the process of ἐξέτασις. cf. 38 a note, and esp. Laches 187 e there quoted.



p. 39. ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι. πλεί-  
d οὺς ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον,  
ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἡσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται  
ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.  
εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσαι 5  
τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρ-  
θῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γάρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε  
πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη  
καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολουῖν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν  
παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα 10  
μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος  
e ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν δια-  
λεχθῇν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῖ πράγματος, ἐν  
ὧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὐπω ἔρχομαι 15  
οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες,  
παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει  
p. 40. διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν  
γὰρ ὥς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι  
ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικα- 20  
σταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην  
—θανμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαν-  
τική ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ  
πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰὲ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιου-  
μένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξαι· νυνὶ δὲ 25

b. to those  
who had  
voted for  
his ac-  
quittal.

15. οἱ ἄρχοντες] That is, οἱ  
ἐνδεκα.

20. δικασταί] Steinhart re-  
marks that up to this point,  
where first the true and false  
judges are separated, the form  
of the address used has been  
ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

22. ἡ εἰωθυῖα] 'The direction  
I am wont to receive from the  
divine voice.' See App. A, on  
τὸ δαιμόνιον.

24. πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς] ἐπὶ sepa-  
rates πάνυ from σμικροῖς, to  
which it belongs: Dig. 298.

ξυμβέβηκε μοι, ἅπερ ὁράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἄ γε δὴ p. 40.  
 οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι.  
 ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ b  
 θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ  
 5 δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι  
 ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με  
 ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ· νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύ-  
 την τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ  
 ἡναντιώταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω;  
 10 ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς  
 τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς  
 ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ c  
 τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ  
 γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἡναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς  
 15 σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξιν.

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὥς πολλὴ  
 ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν  
 ἐστὶ τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἶον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἴσθη-  
 σιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ  
 20 λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις

5. μέλλοντί τι] This accurately represents the reading of Oxon.,  
 which stands μέλλοντί <sup>τι</sup> (τί being *prima manu*), importing that *τι*  
 should follow μέλλοντι. Gaisford here is *inexact* in his repre-  
 sentation. 7. ταύτην] So VBH; αὐτήν SZ. It is impossible  
 to find a clear meaning for αὐτήν, which is the reading of Oxon.  
 and five other MSS. Cf. Phædo 60 a, where Oxon. (alone) has  
 ταύτην for αὐτήν.

4. ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικ.] An  
 emphasised equivalent of ἐπὶ  
 τὸδε τὸ δικ. Cf. Legg. 679 d,  
 κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ, equi-  
 valent to κατ' αὐτήν μόνον τὴν  
 πόλιν, Thucyd. vii. 16, τῶν αὐτοῦ  
 ἐκεῖ δύο προείλοντο, viii. 28, καὶ  
 εἰς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον  
 καθιστάσι.

18. οἶον] 'As it were.' Pa-  
 renthetical to the construction.  
 The words which it qualifies  
 are μηδὲν εἶναι. (The subject  
 of μηδὲν εἶναι is τὸν τεθνεῶτα).  
 Dig. 16. Cf. below, οἶον ὕπνος,  
 and again c, οἶον ἀποδημησαι.

19. τὰ λεγόμενα] In the popu-  
 lar religious teaching.

- p. 40. τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον.  
d καὶ εἴ γε μηδεμία αἴσθησις ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἶον ὕπνος,  
ἐπειδὴν τις καθεύδων μὴδ' ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὀρᾷ, θαυμά-  
σιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ  
τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ᾗ οὕτω  
κατέδαρθεν, ὥστε μὴδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας  
νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντι-  
παραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν,  
πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης  
τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ  
e ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμή-  
τους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ  
νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε  
λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται  
οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησαί  
15 ἐστίν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῇ  
ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὥς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθ-  
νεῶτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὃ ἄνδρες  
p. 41. δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄϊδον, ἀπαλ-  
λαγείς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρή-  
20 σαι τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται  
ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς

21. ὡς] So VBS; ZH omit. Oxon. has it above the line but in first hand. The ὡς is constantly added where it is a popular appellation of which the propriety is recognised, and is frequently found after the article, as Phdr. 256 b, τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν, Rep. 345 e, τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, &c., &c.

1. τῇ ψυχῇ] An intensified form of the dative of reference, equivalent nearly to a genitive: Dig. 28.

12. αὐτὸν] A resumption of ἰδιώτην τινά and βασιλέα, after the intervention of εὐαριθμ. ἂν εὑρεῖν.

22. Μίνως τε—ἄλλοι] These nouns are in the nominative by attraction to the interposed relative clause, as the nearest construction: Dig. 192.

Nowhere else does Triptolemus occur as judge of the dead (though in Hom. Hymn.

καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι p. 41.  
 ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ  
 ἀποδημία; ἡ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ  
 καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν  
 5 ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ  
 ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ  
 ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδει b  
 καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν  
 παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλ-

Demet. 153 he sits in judgment on earth). Also Plato is the only Greek who styles Æacus judge of the dead, here and Gorg. 523 e; though many Romans mention him thus. But the same principle accounts for the ascription of such a subterranean preeminence to these two, and to the remaining two more widely recognised judicial personages named here. All four were connected with the secret rites, or mysteries, of their native places; Minos with the Cretan mysteries, which through the Orphic influence were widely known. Rhadamanthus, his assessor, is his countryman. Æacus was the hero of Ægina, where there were (Pausan. II. 30, Origen adv. Cels. vi. 290. c. 22, Lucian, Navig. 15) mysteries of Orphic origin. And Triptolemus was connected, of course, with Eleusis. These judges are an instance of the fact that certain features of the Greek mythology were first the product of the mystery-worship, and thence made their way into the popular mind.—Döllinger, Gent. and Jew, Vol. I.

Bk. iii. p. 175. The same account may be assumed to hold of the ἄλλοι τῶν ἡμιθέων, who are subjoined to these four; for very many places had mystery-rites. Rhadamanthus is mentioned in Homer, (Od. vii. 323), and therefore antecedently to mysteries, as a judge, but on earth and not in the nether world.

6. ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ] I. e. 'I should have a pleasure peculiarly my own.'

7. διατριβή] Cf. Euthyphro sub init., Legg. I. 625 a.

ὅποτε—τέθνηκεν] This depends upon ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι. The whole sentence ὅποτε—ἀηδὲς εἴη is a re-statement more at length of θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβή, which it follows asyndetically, —an instance of Binary Structure: Dig. 207.

9. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι] Socrates' comparison of himself with Palamedes recalls the fable of the representation of the Palamedes of Euripides soon after Socrates' death, when, at the words ἐκάνετε ἐκάνετε τὸν πάνσοφον, ὦ Δαναοί, τὰν οὐδὲν ἀλγύνουσιν ἀηδόνι Μουσᾶν, τῶν Ἑλλάνων τὸν ἄριστον, the whole

p. 41. λοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἔστι δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, 5 δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα τὴν πολλὴν  
c στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δῆπου τούτου γε ἔνεκα οἱ 10 ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἶπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστίν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρῆ, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἔν τι 15  
d τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελείται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγ- 20

6. ἄγοντα] Edd. ἀγαγόντα. But there is strong syntactical justification (besides the weight of Oxon. and five other MSS.) for ἄγοντα. See Commentary.

audience, reminded of Socrates, burst into tears. Cf. *Introd.* p. xxviii. note 10.

6. ἄγοντα] Participle of the imperfect, which gives greater fullness and vividness than the aorist would have given. Cf. *Legg.* 635 a, καθάπερ μάντις ἀπὸν τῆς τότε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὐτά (meaning *Lycurgus* or *Minos*), 677 c, Θῶμεν δὴ τὰς ἐν πεδίῳ πόλεις . . . ἄρδην ἐν τῷ τότε

χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι (meaning at the Deluge).

7. ἢ ἄλλους—εἴποι] The desire for brevity in the summing up of the enumeration breaks off the legitimate plan of the sentence: *Dig.* 257.

16. ἀληθές] 'As a verity.' See 18 a, note.

20. πραγμάτων] The wants and hardships of old age. Cf. *Xen. Apol.* 32, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ

μάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ p. 41.  
 ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισα-  
 μένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω.  
 καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ  
 5 κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς e  
 ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν·  
 τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὧ  
 ἄνδρες, ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύ-  
 πουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του  
 10 πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι  
 εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν,  
 ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονται τι εἶναι ὄντες  
 οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιήτε, δίκαια πεπον- p. 42.  
 θῶς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς.  
 15 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ,  
 ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ  
 ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

6. δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν] Edd. μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι, and so all MSS. except Oxon. But which collocation most exactly suggests the emphasis required? The position of μέντοι has often to be referred to a subtle ear. Cf. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι, and Dig. 294. 17. ἦ] So edd., rightly. The weight of Oxon. with four other MSS., giving εἰ, is diminished by the itacism.

θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι· τοῦ  
 μὲν γὰρ βίου τὸ χαλεπώτατον  
 ἀπέλιπε κ.τ.λ.

3. οὐ πάνυ] Here, as else-  
 where, οὐ πάνυ marks only a  
 bare denial: Dig. 139. So-  
 crates is satisfied with saying,  
 'I have no sufficient cause to  
 be displeased.' His εἰρωνεία  
 would in no case have suffered  
 him to say, 'I am far from  
 being displeased.'

8. ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες] By  
 plying them unweariedly with  
 warning and remonstrance.

17. πλὴν ἦ] This combination  
 is exactly parallel to ἀλλ' ἦ.  
 The two particles enter the  
 combination coordinately, in-  
 troducing the exception to the  
 preceding universal negative in  
 their own several ways. πλὴν  
 implies 'it is known to none,—  
 saving that [in contradiction  
 to this] it is known to God;'  
 ἦ, less harshly, 'it is known  
 to none, or however [only] to  
 God.' See Dig. 148, and cf. Ar.  
 Nub. 360, Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ γ' ὑπ-  
 ακούσαιμεν . . Πλὴν ἢ Προδίκῳ.



## APPENDIX A.

### Τὸ δαιμόνιον.

THE word δαίμων was used to denote either θεός or a spiritual being inferior to θεός. Its distinctive meaning as applied to either class is that it denotes such a being *in his dealings with men*. From Homer to Plato δαίμων is persistently marked by this meaning<sup>1</sup>. Δαιμόνιος therefore denotes a connection with divine agency; and τὸ δαιμόνιον denotes sometimes such an agency, and sometimes the agent itself. So Aristotle (Rhet. II. xxiii. 8), τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ <sup>2</sup> θεοῦ ἔργον, and for this distinction we may compare Plato (Phdr. 242 c), εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὥσπερ οὖν ἔστι θεὸς ἢ τι θείον ὁ Ἔρως. When we read in Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 2), διετεθρύλητο ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν, both senses of the word are exemplified. Socrates meant by τὸ δαιμόνιον a divine agency; Meletus wrested this into the sense of a divine being. In the Apology Socrates marks the position as a caricature by the expression ἐπικωμῶδων, and then gives the interpretation consistent with his own meaning—viz. δαιμόνια πράγματα. That Socrates is not speaking of a being is clear from other passages also, as when he says (Apol. 31 c), ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, or (Phdr. 242 b), τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον γίγνεσθαι, or (Euthyd. 272 e), τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον, or (Theæt. 151 a), τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαιμόνιον. Nor does Plato, who recognises the common notion

<sup>1</sup> In Plat. Symp. 202 d — 203 a, this view of δαίμων appears very distinctly, though there, as the doctrine held is that θεὸς ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται, all μαντικὴ is the province of the

δαίμων.

<sup>2</sup> Whence the phrase of Æschines (iii. 117. p. 70) ἵσως δὲ καὶ δαιμονίου τινὸς ἑξαμαρτάνειν αὐτὸν προαγομένου is indeterminate.

of a personal attendant δαίμων (Legg. 730 a, Tim. 90 a), ever give this name to the phenomenon in question. Even Theages (as Zeller remarks, II. 65. n. 2) gives no personality to τὸ δαιμόνιον. Ἡ φωνὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου (Theag. 128 e) is ambiguous. Plato's use is sometimes adjectival (e. g. τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον), and sometimes elliptically substantival. Grammatically, Xenophon confines himself to the latter use only,—still merely in the signification of a divine agency. Zeller notices that the interpretation of Socrates' δαιμόνιον as a being remained peculiar to his accusers (Cicero translating it by divinum quiddam, Divin. I. 54, not by genius) until it was revived by Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers.

What then were the nature and function of this δαιμόνιον σημεῖον?

Let us first consult Xenophon, in whom the chief passages are these :

Mem. I. i. 2—5, διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαῖν Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καὶνὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρώνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὔτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέειν τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κακέινος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλείστοι φασὶν ὑπὸ τε τῶν ὄρνιθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι Σωκράτης δέ, ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε. τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσσημαίνοντος. καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.

IV. iii. 12—13, Σοὶ δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰόκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι [οἱ θεοί], εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσσημαίνουσί σοι ἃ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μὴ. Ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ σύ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένης ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἔξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς.

IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσσημαίνειν ἃ τε δέοι καὶ ἃ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος.

IV. viii. 5—6, Ἀλλὰ νῆ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενης, ἥδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἡγαντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν, Θαυμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸν δέ, Θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἥδη;

IV. viii. 11, εὐσεβῆς οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν.

Symp. viii. 5, τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγει μοι τοτὲ δ' ἄλλον τοῦ ἐφίεμενος.

To which must be added still from the *Memorabilia*, I. i. 19, *Σωκράτης ἡγείτο πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἶδέναι, τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρῆναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.*

Thus we see that Xenophon tells us nothing as to the nature of Socrates' *δαιμόνιον*, save that it was the instrument through which divine intimations reached him unsolicitedly. He adheres (unless we admit as his the *θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται* in § 12 of the *Xenophontean Apology*) to the expression *σημαίνειν τὸ δαιμόνιον*, meaning by this expression (as already said) that τὸ δαιμόνιον is but the instrument, while it is the gods who are the agents, whence in other passages we have as equivalent expressions [*θεοὶ*] *προσημαίνουσι* (*Mem.* IV. iii. 12), *τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ* (*ib.* viii. 6), *θεῶν γνώμη* (*ib.* 11). Its intimations differ from those obtained by *μαντικὴ* in being given spontaneously. Socrates is represented as having thought himself singular, as a matter of fact, in possessing this gift. He did not urge others to seek for a similar sign. Although he believed (*Mem.* I. i. 19) *πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἶδέναι . . . πανταχοῦ δὲ παρῆναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων*, he seems either to have directed others to *μαντικὴ* (*Mem.* I. i. 6), or the oracle (*Cic. de Divin.* i. 54), or to have given them the benefit of his own divine intimations (*Mem.* I. i. 4). He however believed that if others had not this gift, it was by their own fault (*Mem.* IV. iii. 13).

What its function was according to Xenophon, we gather from the identification of its province with that of *μαντικὴ*, which is defined in *Mem.* I. i. 6–9, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τὰδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἂνπραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσόμενος· ἔπεμπεν εἰ ποιητέα· καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ λογιστικὸν ἢ οἰκονομικὸν ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη αἰρετὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἐάντοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὃν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἔφη δὲ δεῖν ἂ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μανθάνειν, ἂ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ᾧσιν ἵλεω σημαίνειν.*

This accords with Plato, *Apol.* 40 a, *ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου.* It was no such guide in the matter of right and wrong as conscience is; nor yet an universal oracle to reveal truths of science or of futurity. Its function was on the one hand practical

—to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, of which Socrates had cognisance, either as himself a party to it or in the interest of his friends—, on the other hand it pronounced <sup>3</sup>not on the morality but on the expediency (in the Socratic sense of what was really for the best) of the proposed course. This would not exclude from its decision moral questions, where the obligation either was obscure or mainly depended on the consequences. It was not a mere presentiment, a foreboding of chance misfortune or of chance success, the mere reflection of a man's own feelings of happiness or gloom while in spite of them he carries out his course of action. It stamped in Socrates' belief a definite character of expediency or in expediency on the course intended, and he never disobeyed it.

In Plato the notable passages are these :—Apol. 31 c-d, *τούτου δὲ αἵτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκούατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται φωνή, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἥ ὅταν γένηται αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν.* 40 a-b, *ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ συμκροῖς ἐναντιούμενη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιώντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἥνικα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθαῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμῶς μέλλοντί τι εἶρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμῶς περὶ ταύτην τὴν πᾶξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἡναντιώται μοι.*—Euthyd. 272 e, *κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, οὐπερ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ μόνος, καὶ ἤδη ἐν νῶ εἶχον ἀναστῆναι· ἀνισταμένου δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμην.*—Phdr. 242 b, *ἥνικ' ἔμελλον, ὠγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο—αἰεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν—, καὶ τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἣ με οὐκ ἔῃ ἀπίναί πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον.*—Alcib. I. init. 103 a-b, *τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσει. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελήλυθα. εὐέλπιδι δέ εἰμι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό.*—Theæt. 151 a, *ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν*

<sup>3</sup> Wiggers and Zeller have noticed this. Remark the contrast in the Apology. The matter of duty—not to desert the post of preacher to the

Athenian people—is thrown on the divine mission (28 e), the matter of judgment—to abstain from politics—is attributed to the δαιμόνιον (31 d).

μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι ἐνίοις δ' ἐᾷ.—Rep. 496 c, τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον ἥ γάρ πού τιτι ἄλλω ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. The passages in the Theages consist in part of parrot-like repetitions of descriptions of the phenomenon culled from various dialogues, in part of inventions founded on these.

The account in these passages exhibits some additions and variations as compared with that of Xenophon.

As to the nature of the phenomenon, it is explained to be a sign, which consists of articulate words, and the use of which corresponds to the *μαντική* of other men. It is represented as a gift almost peculiar to Socrates, though by him possessed from his childhood upwards.

Its function seems somewhat heterogeneous, compared with what we have found it in Xenophon. Besides giving warnings as to an intended course of action, it reminds of a duty unperformed (Phdr.); or an advantage accrues from obeying it, which has no rational connection whatever with the obedience (Euthyd.). The tales of the Theages dwell on the marvel exclusively; yet, while they leave the *φωνή* unconnected with any act of the judgment, they leave room for supplying such a connection. Plato further tells us that its function was a negative one—*ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε* (Apol.). The importance of this limitation shall be considered presently.

From these data we may now seek to arrive at a conclusion for ourselves. According to both Xenophon and Plato the fact itself, which Socrates accounted for by the *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*, was a sudden sense, immediately before carrying a purpose into effect, of the expediency of abandoning it,—or, Xenophon would add, of prosecuting it. Meanwhile we are not bound to accept Socrates' account of the cause of this sudden feeling; first, because he was no psychologist, and, while in his own belief he was merely describing his own consciousness,—or, as Xenophon says, *ὥσπερ ἐγίνωσκεν οὕτω καὶ ἔλεγε*,—he was really importing into his description an inference of his own; secondly, because he rather diminishes the weight of his own testimony for us, not merely by his attention to dreams (Phædo 60 e), but more by his absolute faith in *μαντική* and its use in obtaining for others the same divine guidance which he obtained unasked through the *σημεῖον*; and, thirdly, because while he believed himself to have detected divine agency here, he was perfectly unconscious of it in its more ordinary province, as the author of "all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works." If, then,

declining Socrates' account, we are disposed to refer the phenomenon to ordinary psychological causes, we can do so satisfactorily, provided we confine our attention to Xenophon's account alone. All Xenophon's notices of it encourage the view, that it was a quick exercise of a judgment informed by knowledge of the subject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect without consciousness of the process. In a mind so purified by temperance and self-knowledge, so single of purpose and unperturbed by lower aims, endowed with such powerful natural faculties, especially those of observation and of causality, the ability to forecast and forejudge might become almost an immediate sense. But it must be confessed that some of the features in Plato's account are a little embarrassing to this view. The singularity ascribed by Plato (Rep. 496 c) to the gift need not rank among these difficulties, since Xenophon mentions it as a *singular* characteristic of Socrates (Mem. IV. viii. 11) that he was φρόνιμος ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω, μηδὲ ἄλλον προσδεῖσθαι ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, which is the rationalised description of this very phenomenon. But the statement that Socrates enjoyed the gift from his earliest days is not fully consistent with the explanation just put forward,—with any consideration, that is, of the effect of observation, experience, moral training, or habit of mind. Again, as we have seen, two of the instances of the occurrence of the σημεῖον which are related in Plato preclude the explanation of an act of judgment. It is no judgment, however penetrating, which recalls Socrates from the stream he had purposed crossing and brings him back to Phædrus, or which forbids him to leave his seat just before the fortuitous entrance of Euthydemus and his companions. If we are to accept these features as historical, we must give up all attempt to rationalise the phenomenon at all, and fall back upon Socrates' own account as final. But, first, we have seen that there are reasons against accepting his account, and, secondly, against the historical probability of these two instances stands the fact that, though paralleled in Plutarch, they are unlike any other instances given by Xenophon and Plato; for (setting aside the Theages as apocryphal) in all the other instances it is implied that the course of action forbidden by the warning is prejudicial, not through its fortuitous consequences, but through something amiss in itself, and that the course upon which the agent is thrown back leads to the good result by a chain of means and not by a chain of accidents.



We must therefore adopt the alternative which involves less considerable difficulties, and regard Plato as less faithful than Xenophon in his illustration of the phenomenon. It is not difficult to suppose that by tracing it back to Socrates' boyhood nothing more may be intended than that his memory did not serve him to indicate the first beginning of those habits of observation and that moral and mental training from which the faculty grew. And as to the heterogeneous instances of warnings given by it, since as individual instances they are certainly inventions, part of the machinery of the dialogues in which they stand, it is doing no violence to Plato's genius to suppose, that as an inventor he has not scrupled to travesty the character which belonged to the actual and serious use of the gift, and to extend its operation playfully into the domain of chance.

There remains to be noticed in Plato's account the well-known restriction of τὸ δαιμόνιον to negative functions. In describing the sign as a voice, Plato adds (Apol. 31 d), αἰὲ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. One difficulty lies in the nature of the case. What kind of divine communication or what kind of judgment could that be which yielded only negative utterances? Certainly no act of judgment could be such: the same penetration which could discern the inexpediency of a course of action would serve for the discerning of the more expedient alternative. A divine communication might be imagined under any self-imposed restriction; still the restriction would, in proportion to its arbitrariness, discredit yet more this hypothesis, which we have already seen reason to abandon. Another difficulty lies in the conflict of testimony as to this peculiarity. Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as disapproving force (Mem. IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἃ τε δέοι καὶ ἃ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν· cf. I. i. 4, as quoted above). Cicero (De Divin. i. 54) simply echoes Plato. Plutarch (De Socr. Dæm. c. 11. p. 1015), agreeing with Xenophon, represents the sign as κωλύον ἢ κελεῖον.

These are the two difficulties which have to be met. No attempt has been made to meet the first: the second has been met by swallowing the first whole, and supposing Xenophon to be in error in not distinguishing the actual communication made by the sign, and the inference which Socrates made from it, and which might (as in Apol. 40 a) be positive. But we shall meet both difficulties by some such explanation as the following. As to the reconciliation of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say αἰὲ ἀποτρέπει με, he

describes it by its most perceptible act, for its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable. It was only when the presentiment ran counter to his will that Socrates became distinctly conscious of it. An illustration of this oversight occurs in the statement of some moderns concerning conscience, that it has only a negative function,—as if there were no such thing as “an approving conscience.” In this case also the origin of the misstatement is the same, the more acute and marked character of the negative function. Thus it is the statement of Plato which needs to be supplemented, while that of Xenophon, so far from needing qualification, is alone commensurate with the common sense of the case. As to the fact to which Plato’s notice points, the words *προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε* would seem not to be an idle tautology, a reiteration of what we have seen to be a defective statement, but to mark another feature in the case. The Voice was no *impulse*; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgment on a purpose already in being. Motives, on the other hand, impel the will always in some direction; they cannot be negative. Thus the setting forth the first part of the statement on the negative side only is justified in a way by the antithesis. And the meaning of the two clauses together is, that the Voice is a reflexive judgment on purposed actions, but does not supply motives of action.

The fact which τὸ δαιμόνιον represented was an unanalysed act of judgment,—not on a principle, but on a particular course of action already projected; not on the morality of this, but on its expediency in the Socratic sense of the term. It was *κριτική*, not *ἐπιτακτική*. Whatever connection it might really have with the springs of the will would certainly be left out of the statement by one who could identify virtue with knowledge. It was Socrates’ substitute for *μαντική*. This implies that in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being (as we have seen) the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.

No Christian would be startled by a view which recognised every

part of his mental processes as performed in dependence on God,—nor on the other hand would he be shocked to hear them spoken of as independently and properly his own. So long as each view reached the whole way, he would be satisfied with it, and would comprehend it. What Socrates did was to halve each of these views, and to speak of his mental processes as human up to the point where he could still follow them,—beyond that as divine.

## APPENDIX B.

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### DIGEST OF IDIOMS.

Idioms of Nouns :—Accusative Case, §§ 1—23.

Idioms of Nouns :—Genitive Case, §§ 24—27.

Idioms of Nouns :—Dative Case, §§ 28—29.

Idioms of the Article, §§ 30—39.

Idioms of Pronominal Words, §§ 40—55.

Idioms of Verbs, §§ 56—110.

Idioms of Prepositions, §§ 111—131.

Idioms of Particles, §§ 132—162.

Idioms of Comparison, §§ 163—178.

Idioms of Sentences :—Attraction, §§ 179—203.

Idioms of Sentences :—Binary Structure, §§ 204—230.

Idioms of Sentences :—Abbreviated Construction, §§ 231—261.

Idioms of Sentences :—Pleonasm of Construction, §§ 262—269.

Idioms of Sentences :—Changed Construction, §§ 270—286.

Idioms of Sentences :—Arrangement of Words and Clauses, §§ 287—311.

Rhetorical Figures, §§ 312—326.

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#### § 1. IDIOMS OF NOUNS :—ACCUSATIVE CASE.

Besides the Accusatives governed by Verbs Transitive, as such, occur the following, of a more Adverbial character.

A. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Cognate Accusative.

*a.* Direct and regular instances of the Cognate Accusative. It will suffice, as a notice of these, to point out that they are of two kinds only, viz.—

*a.* the Accusative of the Act or Effect signified by the Verb.

*β.* the Accusative of the Process indicated by the Verb.

*Virtual* Cognate Accusatives, i. e. such as are cognate in sense only and not etymologically, are intended to be here included.

The "Accusative of the General Force of the Sentence" is really an Accusative of Apposition. See below, F (§§ 10—12).

§ 2. *b.* Accusatives which must be analysed as Adjectives or Pronouns *in agreement with* an unexpressed Cognate Accusative. These are commonly neuter (not always; cf. Hdt. v. 72, κατέδησαν τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ).

Phædo 75 b, ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι—'perform the other acts of the senses.'

Ib. 85 b, ἡγοῦμαι . . . οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν.

Symp. 205 b, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις καταχρώμεθα ὀνόμασιν, i. e. 'in the other cases.' Stallbaum takes this of 'the other (εἴδη) species of things' which have to be named, 'quod ad cæteras attinet formas.' This might be; but the construction of the particular verb χρῆσθαι leads us the other way; cf. Thuc. ii. 15, τῇ κρήνῃ . . . ἐγγὺς οὔσῃ τὰ πλείστου ἄξια ἐχρῶντο, Hdt. i. 132, χρᾶται [τοῖς κρέασιν] ὃ τι μιν λόγος αἰρείει.

Phdr. 228 c, (A) Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν κ.τ.λ. (B) Πάνυ γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.

Theæt. 193 c, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης.

Legg. 792 c, τοῦτ' οὐκέτ' ἂν ἐγὼ ξυνακολουθήσαιμ' ἄν—'this is one step further than I can go with you.' Exactly parallel are the Homeric τόδ' ἰκάνεις, τόδε χάεο, &c.

Crat. 425 c, εἴ τι χρηστὸν ἔδει αὐτὰ διελέσθαι.

§ 3. *c.* Adjectives as well as Verbs are followed by a Cognate Accusative, or by one referable to the same principle.

Apol. 20 b, καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν.

Ib. d, κινδυνεύω [σοφίαν] ταύτην εἶναι σοφός.

Meno 93 b, ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.

Rep. 349 e, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄπερ φρόνιμον ἀγαθὸν [εἶναι λέγεις];—'good at those things *in* which he is wise.'

Ib. 579 d, δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας.

Laches 191 c, τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον ἔλεγον ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος.

So Thucyd. i. 37, αὐταρκῇ θέσιν κειμένη, v. 34, ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν ἀτιμίαν τοιάνδε.

(B, C, and D, which follow, are to be regarded as very near akin to each other.)

§ 4. B. Accusatives of the part to which the action, or characteristic, is limited, as *περᾶν πόδα, βρύχειν ὀδόντας*. (Lobeck). Adjectives as well as Verbs, of course, are followed by this Accusative.

Charmid. 154 c, *θαυμαστὸς τὸ κάλλος*.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 371, *τυφλὸς τὰ τ' ὤτα τὸν τε νοῦν τὰ τ' ὄμματ' εἶ*.

§ 5. C. Accusatives Quantitative (or, in all the instances following, Adjectives in agreement with such Accusatives), expressing how much of the subject is brought under the predication.

Legg. 958 d, *ἀ δὲ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τοῦτ' αὐτὸ μόνον φύσιν ἔχει, . . . ταῦτα ἐκπληροῦν*.

Ib. e, *ὅσα τροφήν . . . ἡ γῆ . . . πέφυκε βούλεσθαι φέρειν*.

Rep. 467 c, *οἱ πατέρες, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἔσονται*—‘to the extent of human capacities.’ It is hard to hit upon the exact ellipse, comparing other instances; but it cannot be wrong to look on the Accusative as quantitative.

Crito 46 c, *σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τάνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον*.

Ib. 54 d, *ἀλλ' ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐάν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς*.

Rep. 405 c, *ιατρικῆς δεῖσθαι ὅ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀργίαν*.

Phdr. 274 a, *οὐ γὰρ . . . ὁμοδόλοις δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετᾶν . . . , ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον*.

Tim. 42 c, *ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾶν ζῶον, ὅ τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον*.

Ib. 69 d, *σεβόμενοι μιαίνειν τὸ θεῖον, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἦν ἀνάγκη*.

Ib. 90 e, *διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμνηστέον, ὃ μὴ τις ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν*.

§ 6. Hither are also to be referred the following instances, with the distinction that here the quantitative accusative is applied *metaphorically*, as the measure of the degree of the act or process.

Legg. 679 a, *οὐδὲ ἐν προσδέονται σιδήρῳ*. As we say, ‘not one *bit*.’

Cf. τί δεῖ; (‘what need?’ not ‘why is there need?’) illustrated by Isæus, ii. 39, *τί ἔδει αὐτοὺς ὀμνύναι . . . ; οὐδὲ ἐν δήπου*.

Phædo 91 d, *σῶμά γ' αἰὲ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται*—‘ceases not one bit.’ To join it with *σῶμα* would ruin the sense. And cf. 100 b, *ἄπερ . . . οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων*, and Euthyphro 8 c, *οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτ' ἀμφισβητοῦντες*.



Phædo 99 c, τὰγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται.

Euthyd. 293 c, ἦττον οὖν τι οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ ;

Charm. 174 c, ἦττόν τι ἡ ἱατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει ;

Crito 47 c, τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων. Note, that ἐπαϊόντων is intransitive (as infra d, εἴ τις ἐστιν ἐπαῖων), and therefore μηδὲν ἐπ. is not 'who understand nothing,' but 'who do not understand one bit.'

Apol. 19 c, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν περί ἐπαῖω.

Ib. 21 b, ἐγὼ . . . οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύννοδα ἑμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν.

Ib. 26 b, Μελήτω τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πόποτε ἐμέλησεν—where, in accordance with the two last instances, οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν is not the Nom. to ἐμέλησεν, nor in regimen with τούτων, but in agreement with the Acc. Cognate after ἐμέλησεν. In Crat. 425 c, οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας, and Legg. 887 e, ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦ κέκτηνται, the case is different.

Crito 46 c, πλείω τῶν παρόντων . . . ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται.

Phileb. 23 e, πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον.

Symp. 193 a, ἅπαντα εὐσεβεῖν περὶ θεοῦς—'in all his acts to act piously towards the gods.'

Apol. 30 c, ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε.

Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάττω δύναται σώζειν.

Cf. Homer's πάντα, as in Od. iv. 654, τῷ δ' αὐτῷ πάντα ἑφείκει, and the common expression τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ.

#### § 7. D. Accusatives of the way, or manner—

Symp. 207 d, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ λόγον, ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ ἀεὶ εἶναι.

Politic. 296 e, τὸν ὅρον . . . ὃν ὁ σοφὸς . . . διοικήσει τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων.

Rep. 416 b, τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένοι—'on a footing of the greatest possible caution.' (τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας like τὴν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς, Thuc. vii. 3, &c.)

Cf. Ar. Pax 232, καὶ γὰρ ἐξιέναι, γνώμην ἐμὴν, μέλλει.

§ 8. Refer to this the common phrase τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, &c.: and, probably, the "Accusative Absolute,"—'on such and such a footing.'

Protag. 314 c, δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ἐπορευόμεθα.

Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ παραχρῆμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρόπον ἂν μὴ δυνάμεθα πάντως ἀποδοῦναι συγγιγνώσκειν χρεῶν.

Phileb. 13 b, τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτόν . . . ἐνόν, πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι

προσαγορεύεις; Cf. Andoc. i. 92. p. 12, σκέψασθε τί αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχον  
ἐτέρων κατηγοροῦσι.

§ 9. E. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Accusative of Time or Space.

To designate them thus is not an idle periphrasis; it seems to include, together with the instances of an Accus. of Time or Space in the literal meaning, those in which the notions of Time or Space are applied *metaphorically*. Only the latter need be noticed here.

Phileb. 59 c, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄρ' οὐ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰς ἐπιχειρητέον;—  
where 'after' means in the order of discourse.

Soph. 259 b, τὸ δὲ . . . μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι—'ten thousand  
times twice told' for 'in so many instances.'

Phdr. 241 d, οὐκέτ' ἂν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ λέγοντος—'saying any-  
thing further' for 'saying anything *more*;'—a real metaphor,  
as discourse only metaphorically takes up *space*. As to the  
construction, τὸ πέρα is not governed, transitively, by ἀκούσας,  
but follows λέγοντος.

Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημά-  
των τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων; τὸ ἐπὶ τελ. is a metaphor from  
space, probably, rather than time. Either way, Stallb. is wrong  
in explaining the construction by his favourite 'quod attinet ad.'

§ 10. F. Accusatives in Apposition with, or standing for, sentences or parts of sentences.

These Accusatives may be either (1) Noun-Phrases; see a below:  
or (2) Pronouns Neuter, agreeing with Nouns understood,—viz.  
either Relative Pronouns; see b below: or Demonstratives, &c.;  
see c below.

The doctrine here advanced asserts two positions, which are  
worthy of notice; viz.

§ 11. (i.) These Noun-Phrases and Neuter-Pronouns are *Accu-*  
*satives*. The prevalence of the Neuter Gender makes this difficult  
to prove; but such instances as are decisive afford an analogy for  
the rest:—

Theæt. 153 c, ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάξω κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 603, Καὶ τῶνδ' ἔλεγχον . . . πεύθου, and the Adverbs  
ἀρχήν, ἀκμήν, τὴν πρώτην, &c.

§ 12. (ii.) They represent, by Apposition or Substitution, *the*  
*sentence itself*. To say, that they are Cognate Accusatives, or in  
Apposition with the (unexpressed) Cognate Accus., would be inade-

quate to the facts. For (1) in most of the instances the sense points out that the Noun-Phrase or Pronoun stands over against the sentence, or portion of a sentence, as a whole; (2) in many of them, not the internal force but merely the rhetorical or logical form of the sentence is in view. It might be said that they are Predicates, while the sentence itself is the Subject.

### § 13. a. Accusative of Noun-Phrases in Apposition—

Legg. 736 a, *τούτοις, δι' εὐφημίας ἀπαλλαγὴν, ὄνομα ἀποικίαν τιθέμενος.*

Crat. 395 d, *ὦν καὶ τέλος, ἡ πατρίς ἀνετράπετο.*

Crito 45 d, *τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο πράξουσιν.*

Soph. 260 a, *τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθεῖμεν.*

Apol. 25 b, *ἡ τοῦναντίον τούτου πᾶν, εἰς μὲν τις κ.τ.λ.*

Legg. 691 a, *τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολὺ, βασιλέων τοῦτο εἶναι νόσημα.*

Politic. 293 a, *ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτῳ, τὴν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν δεῖ ζητεῖν.*

The Accusatives in the instances which follow characterise the logical or rhetorical form—

Symp. 205 d, *τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ . . . ἐπιθυμία . . . ἔρως.*

So 223 d, Critias 108 e, Theæt. 190 b. Cf. Ep. to Heb. viii. 1.

Theæt. 153 c, *ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.*

Phædo 66 e, *δυοῖν θάτερον, ἡ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι, ἡ κ.τ.λ.*

Similarly 68 c (plural), and Charm. 160 b.

Illustrations from other writers begin with Homer: Il. iv. 28, *Λαὸν ἀγειρούσῃ, Πριάμφ κακά, 155, θάνατόν νύ τοι ὄρκι' ἔταμνον, ix. 115, οὗ τι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἄσας κατέλεξας, xxiv. 735, ῥίψει . . . ἀπὸ πύργου, λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον, Od. xxi. 35, ἔγχος ἔδωκεν, Ἀρχὴν ξεινοσύνης. Æsch. Ag. 225, *θυτὴρ γενέσθαι θυγατρός, γυναικοποιῶν πολέμων ἀρωγάν, 1406, νεκρὸς . . . τῆσδε δεξιᾶς χερὸς Ἔργον, Cho. 200, εἶχε συμπεπθεῖν ἐμοί Ἀγαλμα τύμβου, κ.τ.λ., 205, Καὶ μὴν στίβοι γε, δεύτερον τεκμήριον, Ποδῶν ὁμοῖοι, τοῖς τ' ἐμοῖσιν ἐμφερεῖς. Eur. Or. 1105, Ἑλένην κτάνωμεν, Μενέλεω λύπην πικράν. Ar. Acharn. 411, οὐκ ἐτὸς χωλοὺς ποιεῖς. (So Virg. Æn. xi. 383, Proinde tona eloquio, solitum tibi.) Thucyd. iii. 111, *πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχωνισμόν ἐξελθόντες* (and similarly v. 80): cf. the Homeric precedent Il. xix. 302, *ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες, Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κήδε' ἐκάστη* (not, as Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 580, *πρόφασιν in Apposition to Πάτροκλον*). Ar. Vesp. 338, *Τοῦ δ' ἔφεξι, ὦ μίταιε, ταῦτα δρᾶν σε βούλεται; Antipho v. 63, p. 136, ἀλλ', αὐτὸ***

τὸ ἐναντίον, ἐκεῖνος τοῦτο θᾶσσον ἂν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐπείσθη. Add, as above, Soph. O. T. 603, Καὶ τῶνδ' ἔλεγχον . . . πεύθου.

§ 14. The formula of Quotation falls under this head—

Alcib. I. 121 d, ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ κωμφοδοπιου, οὐδ' οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα αἰσθάνονται.

Apol. 34 d, καὶ γάρ, τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρον, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυός κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 77 d, δοκεῖς . . . δεδιέναι, τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος κ.τ.λ.—where τὸ τῶν π. is not connected with δεδιέναι, but refers to the sentence ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν . . . διασκεδάννυσιν that is, does not mean 'to fear, as children fear,' but 'to fear lest it be as children think it is, that the soul goes into the air.'

§ 15. b. Accusative of Relative Pronoun Neuter in Apposition, with a sentence following—

Protag. 352 e, τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττάσθαι—'which is what men describe when they say they are,' &c.

Soph. 217 c, δι' ἐρωτησέων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγώ. The illustration which Socrates means to impress on the stranger is not simply Parmenides' use of ἐρωτήσεις, but the whole scene,—the λόγοι πάγκαλοι in which the ἐρωτήσεις were interwoven, and his own presence on these occasions. Cf. Thucyd. ii. 40, ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει and vi. 55, οὐχ ὡς ἀδελφὸς νεώτερος ὢν ἡγόρησεν ἐν ᾧ οὐ πρότερον ξυνεχῶς ὠμιλῆκει τῇ ἀρχῇ—where ἐν ᾧ is not=ἐν τούτῳ ἐν ᾧ, but=ἐν τούτῳ ὃ, i.e. 'in a predicament which was that of his not having,' &c. And in the common expressions ἀνθ' ὧν=ἀντὶ τῶν, ἄ, and οὐνεκα=ἐνεκα τοῦ, ὅ, the Relatives ἄ and ὅ are instances of the same construction, agreeing with the sentence which they introduce.

Gorg. 483 a, ὃ δὴ καὶ σύ, τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανεοηκώς, κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—'and this is exactly how you, profiting by your knowledge of this subtilty, cheat in argument.'

Theæt. 158 b, (A) ἄρ' οὐν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς . . . ; (B) Τὸ ποῖον; (A) ὁ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι κ.τ.λ.—'that which is expressed by the question, which I dare say you have often heard, what,' &c.

Symp. 188 c, ἃ δὴ, προστέτακται τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν τοὺς ἔρωτας—where ἃ δὴ agrees with the whole of what follows—'And thus it stands, accordingly;—μαντικῇ is charged with the care of,' &c.

Symp. 222 b, ἀ δὴ, καὶ σοὶ λέγω μὴ ἑξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου—‘and thus accordingly, I press upon you also not to be,’ &c.

§ 16. So with the ‘parenthetical’ οἶον,—in Apposition with the entire sentence—

Rep. 615 b, καὶ οἶον εἴ τινες πολλῶν θανάτων ἦσαν αἴτιοι . . . , κομίσαιντο. So Politic. 298 a, Tim. 19 b.

Euthyphro 13 a, λέγομεν γάρ που, —οἶον φαρμέν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 267 e, οἶον οἱ ἔμποροι καὶ γεωργοὶ καὶ . . . διαμάχωντ’ ἂν οὗτοι ξύμπαντες κ.τ.λ.

Or with a portion of a sentence or a single word.

Phdr. 243 d, ποτιμῶ λόγῳ οἶον ἀλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι.

Politic. 277 c, τὴν οἶον τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνάργειαν.

Phædo 64 d, ἥδονὰς τὰς τοιάσδε, οἶον σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν.

Ib. 73 c, (A) πῶς λέγεις ; (B) οἶον τὰ τοιάδε.

Ib. 78 d, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν οἶον ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 83 b, κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν . . . οἶον ἡ νοσήσας ἡ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 40 c, δυοῖν θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι\* ἡ γὰρ οἶον μηδὲν εἶναι . . . τὸν τεθνεῶτα ἡ κ.τ.λ.

All these instances of οἶον show that<sup>1</sup> it stands outside the construction of the sentence. But its being in a particular number and case still requires explanation, and the only explanation is, that it is in Apposition with the sentence or some portion of it. Note, that this οἶον has two shades of meaning, according as it introduces (a) a metaphor, when it means ‘as it were;’ or (b) an instance, when it means ‘for instance.’ A different analysis is required for οἶον δὴ, οἶα δὴ, οἶα, e. g. in

Critias 112 c, οἶα θέρους, κατεχρῶντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα αὐτοῖς.

Symp. 203 b, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαιτήσουσα οἶον δὴ εὐωχίας οὔσης ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία.

Here the same principle so far appears, that the Neuter Antecedent to which the Relative refers is (not a Cognate Accus. but) the whole clause,—viz. in the former instance, κατεχρῶντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα αὐτοῖς, in the latter προσαιτήσουσα. The Relative sentence is elliptical; cf. the use of Relatives generally with δὴ, and the fuller expression in

Phædo 60 a, τοιαῦτ’ ἅπαντα εἶπεν οἶα δὲ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες.

<sup>1</sup> The ὅσον in ὅσον οὐ stands exactly in the same position.

§ 17. c. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (not Relative) standing for a sentence or portion of a sentence, expressed previously or immediately after.

a. For a previously expressed portion of a sentence—

Soph. 238 a, *ἔτι γάρ, ὦ μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτά γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μέγιστη*—where *ταῦτα* is the pronominal substitute for *ἔτι ἔστι*.

Legg. 630 e, *ἀρετῆς μόνιον, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαυλότατον*—where *ταῦτα* is the substitute for *μόριον*.

Euthyd. 299 d, (A) *χρυσίον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν*; (B) *πάνν γε, καὶ ταῦτά γε πολὺ*—where *ταῦτα* is the substitute for *χρυσίον ἔχειν*.

Rep. 341 c, *νῦν γοῦν ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδὲν ὦν καὶ ταῦτα*—where *ταῦτα* = *ἐπεχείρησας*, which thus is brought close to *οὐδὲν ὦν*, with contemptuous emphasis.

Symp. 210 b, *καταστήναι πάντων τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐραστήν, ἐνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι*—where *τοῦτο* stands for *καταστήναι ἐραστήν*, and therefore becomes endued with the capacity of governing *ἐνός* (for which cf. Legg. 723 d, *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν*).

Phileb. 37 d, *μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν ἂν ὀρθότητα ἴσχη*; *ταυτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν*; where *ταυτὸν* stands for *μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν ἐροῦμεν ἂν ὀρθότητα ἴσχη* repeated from the other clause.

Gorg. 524 c, *εἴ τιнос μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρα*.

Phædo 68 c, *καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέρα*.

Hom. Il. iii. 179, *Ἀμφοτέρον βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής*.

§ 18. β. For a previously expressed whole sentence—

Legg. 658 d, *τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἂν νενικηκὼς εἴη*,—*τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο*; ('the next question,'—as Protag. 323 c).

Theæt. 189 e, *λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται . . . τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται . . . , οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι*.

Tim. 27 c, (A) *σὸν οὖν ἔργον λέγειν . . . , καλέσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεός*.  
(B) *Ἀλλ', ὦ Σόκρατες, τοῦτό γε δή, πάντες . . . ἐπὶ παντὸς ὁρμῇ . . . πράγματος θεὸν αἰεὶ πον καλοῦσιν*.

(In the two last instances we have the Neut. Pron. *τοῦτο*, which stands for the previous sentence, connected with a sentence succeeding, in which the Pronoun is virtually restated at large. Thus, as to meaning, *τοῦτο* is placed between the two sentences as a



symbol of equivalence: but as to grammar, its relations to each are different; it *stands for* the sentence preceding, and *is in apposition with* the sentence following. So in the instances which are subjoined)—

Politic. 262 e, (A) κάλλιον δέ που κατ' εἶδη καὶ δίχα διαιροῖτ' ἄν, εἰ κ.τ.λ. (B) Ὀρθότατα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτό, πῶς ἂν τις γένος καὶ μέρος . . . γνοίη;

Meno 90 d, οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως . . . τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι κ.τ.λ. So Symp. 178 e.

Symp. 204 a, οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἀμαθείς . . . ἐπιθυμοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι—where αὐτὸ τοῦτο, standing for the sentence preceding, is in Apposition with τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . εἶναι, which is also, as to meaning, the virtual re-statement of the Pronoun.

As to the construction of this sentence, τὸ μὴ ὄντα—εἶναι evidently contains the reason for ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία· only that it is expressed not in the regular causal form, ὅτι τις οὐκ ὦν . . . δοκεῖ αὐτῷ εἶναι, or παρὰ τὸ μὴ . . . δοκεῖν, but under the form of the Apologetic Infinitive (see § 85).

It follows, that the αὐτὸ τοῦτο introduces the preceding sentence as a reason. In other words, αὐτὸ τοῦτο here stands in three relations; (1) to the sentence preceding it is related Pronominally, as standing for it; (2) to τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . εἶναι it is related Appositionally; and (3) to ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία it is related causally.

The explanation of this last instance will apply to all which follow under this head:—the Neuter Pronoun introduces a preceding sentence in a *causal* relation to the principal construction of the sentence to which the Pronoun is joined. The cause is not necessarily re-stated, but, if it is, the Pronoun is in apposition to it—

Protag. 310 e, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ('this is just what it is') . . . ἤκω παρὰ σέ ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῇς αὐτῷ.

Euthyphro 4 d, ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὁ πατήρ . . . ὅτι ἐγὼ . . . τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι.

Symp. 174 a, ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω.

Cf. Arist. Nub. 335, Ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἐποιοῦν ὑγρὰν νεφελᾶν . . . ὁρμάν, 353, Ταῦτ' ἄρα ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Æschyl. Pers. 165, Ταῦτά μοι διπλῇ μέριμν' ἄφραστός ἐστιν ἐν φρεσὶ, and Eum. 512, ταῦτά τις τάχ' ἂν πατήρ . . . οἶκτον οἰκτίσαιτ' ἐπειδὴ πιτνεὶ δόμος δίκας. Soph. O. T. 1004, (A) Καὶ μὴν χάριν γ' ἂν ἀξίαν λάβοις ἐμοῦ. (B) Καὶ μὴν μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀφικόμην, ὅπως Σοῦ πρὸς δόμους ἐλθόντος εὖ πράξαιμί τι.

Eur. *Androm.* 209, Σὺ δ' ἦν τι κνισθῆς, . . . Μενέλεως δέ σοι Μείζων 'Αχιλλέως' ταῦτά τοί σ' ἔχθει πόσις. 2 St. Pet. i. 5, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέ, σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες, ἐπιχορηγήσατε κ.τ.λ.

§ 19. γ. For a sentence expressed immediately after—

Phædo 105 a, ὅρα δὲ εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείνο,—ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον . . . ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.

Protag. 326 a, οἱ τ' αὖ καθαρισταί, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, σωφροσύνης ἐπιμελοῦνται.

Rep. 334 b, τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 283 d, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο,—μῶν μὴ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Demosth. Cor. 123. p. 268, καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο, in Leocl. 55. p. 1097, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐκείνο, Lys. xiii. 79. p. 137, ἀλλ' ἕτερον.

Soph. 248 d, τὸ δέ, ὡς τὸ γινώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γινώσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ συμβαίνει πάσχειν.

Legg. 630 d, τὸ δέ,—πῶς χρῆν ἡμᾶς λέγειν;

Ib. 803 d, τὸ δ',—ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὐτ' οὖν παιδιὰ πεφικυῖα οὐτ' αὖ παιδεία.

Apol. 23 a, τὸ δέ,—κινδυνεύει . . . τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι.

Cf. St. Paul, 2 Cor. ix. 6, τοῦτο δέ, ὁ σπείρων φειδομένως, φειδομένως καὶ θερίσει, St. Mark ix. 23, τό, εἰ δύνασαι πιστεῦσαι—(the τὸ throws emphasis on the succeeding words). Cf. also the common idiom τοῦτο μὲν—τοῦτο δέ (each a pre-statement of the clause which it introduces).

§ 20. δ. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (generally τις or ἄλλος) standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed—

Phædo 58 c, τί δέ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 204 d, (A) ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾷ; (B) Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ—where τί stands for a whole dependent sentence, thus; 'he who desires things beautiful desires *that they should—what?*' The dependent sentence is thus left unexpressed, but that τί stands for it is proved by the answer, which supplies one.

Exactly parallel is Æsch. Ag. 953, (A) Τί δ' ἂν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος, εἰ τὰδ' ἤνυσεν; (B) Ἐν ποικίλοις ἂν κάρτα μοι βῆναι δοκεῖ. So St. John xxi. 28, Κύριε, οὗτος δὲ τί;—where τί is the implicit completion of the sentence.

On this principle are to be explained the phrases which follow.

Apol. 26 d, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; (similarly Symp. 205 a.)—There is no γένηται to be supplied; τί in itself is the full representative complement of the sentence; the actual complement is of course suspended in the interrogation.

Meno 86 e, εἰ μή τι (similarly Rep. 509 c), and Symp. 222 e, εἰ μή τι ἄλλο. The sentence is complete; the τι and the τι ἄλλο stand for full propositions.

Symp. 206 e, (A) οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως . . . (B) Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; (A) Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. Here the τί refers back to the words τοῦ καλοῦ, and itself stands for a similar phrase; which is proved by the answer Τῆς γεννήσεως. Except on the principle now before us, the phrase would have been variable, and we should in the present instance have found (what Steph. conjectures) ἀλλὰ τίνος μὴν; Similarly 202 d. The phrase may of course equally stand for a whole sentence, as Rep. 362 d, 438 b ('and what then?'). The same explanation holds of the τί in the phrase of polite assent, τί μὴν;<sup>2</sup> (literally 'if not, then what?') The explanation of τί; in the sense of 'why?' is the same; and of the answering particle ὅτι, 'because.'

§ 21. In the following instances the significance of the τί is hinted in a second interrogation following.

Phdr. 234 e, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος;—οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς εἰρησθαι;

Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν τανῦν;—ἦ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει;

Soph. 266 c, τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην;—ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν;

Phædo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἦ κ.τ.λ.; (The genitive τῶν—καλῶν is suspended in a loose construction, which the second interrogation supersedes.)

Phileb. 27 e, τί δὲ ὁ σὸς [βίος] . . . ;—ἐν τίνι γένει ἂν λέγοιτο;

So probably Phædo 64 d, (A) φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιαύδε κ.τ.λ.; (B) Ἥκιστα. (A) Τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; (B) Οὐδαμῶς. (A) Τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας;—δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; See more instances under Binary Structure (§ 207).

Legg. 630 e, οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν μάλιστα βλέπων

<sup>2</sup> Add τί μέλλει; as in Hipp. Mi. invariable, though attracted sometimes into μέλλομεν.

αεὶ θήσει τοὺς νόμους. Here ἄλλο denotes in outline a whole clause, the form of which is revealed to us by the contrasted clause πρὸς—βλέπων.

Rep. 372 d, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες; where τί ἄλλο represents a sentence parallel to the contrasted sentence αὐτὰς ἂν ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες.

Illustrations of this construction abound in Thucydides, e. g. iii. 85, ὅπως ἀπόγνοια ἦ τοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς, ii. 16, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος, 49, μήτ' ἄλλο τι ἢ γυμνοὶ ἀνέχεσθαι, iv. 14, ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ ἐκ γῆς ἐναυμάχουν, v. 98, τί ἄλλο ἢ τοὺς . . . πολεμίους μεγαλύνετε; vii. 75, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένη ἐφέκασαν, viii. 5, ἀμφοτέρων . . . ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων. (Notice the two last, which prove the invariableness of the οὐδὲν ἄλλο.)

§ 22. The Adverbial Interrogatives ἄλλο τι ἢ and ἄλλο τι are instances of the same principle; and may conveniently be discussed here once for all.

They have the following points in common: (1) as to their use, they both expect an affirmative answer: (2) as to their construction, the ἄλλο in both (as in the instances heretofore given) is used proleptically; and (as we have said) both are instances of the Neuter Pronoun Accusative standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed.

But from this point we must investigate them separately.

Ἄλλο τι ἢ challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence. It may be that it sometimes affects the whole; but (unlike ἄλλο τι) it can, and in most instances does, affect a particular portion of the sentence. And the interrogation is, in strictness, limited to the part affected.

Apol. 24 c, ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; The interrogation is made as to περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ.

Rep. 372 a, ἄλλο τι ἢ σιτόν τε ποιοῦντες καὶ ὑποδήματα; The interrogation is made as to σιτόν τε π. κ. ὑποδήματα, to the exclusion of the Verb διαιτῆσονται.

Ale. I. 129 b, τῷ διαλέγει σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοί;

The phrase gets its meaning thus; the speaker, about to name a certain fact or thing, gives it emphasis by first asking whether any other ought to be named instead of it.

Some doubt might be felt whether ἢ is 'than' or 'or.' Certain phrases would point to 'or,' such as

Gorg. 459 b, τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι ;

Politic. 266 b, (A) μὴν ἄλλως πως πέφυκεν, ἢ καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. ; (B) οὐκ ἄλλως.

Legg. 683 e, βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται ἢ καὶ τις ἀρχὴ πάποτε κατελύθη μὴν ὑπὸ τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν ;

Protag. 330 c, τίν' ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο ; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην ;

But more decisive for 'than' are

Protag. 357 e, διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, and the variations,

Soph. 220 c, τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἔρηκ χρὴ προσαγορεύειν ;

Phædo 91 d, ἄρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἂ κ.τ.λ. ; and the common formulae οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ and τί ἄλλο ἢ which are not ambiguous.

Ἄλλο τι challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.

Rep. 337 e, ἄλλο τι οὐν καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις ;—you mean, do 'you, that you will do so ?'

Ib. 369 d, ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἷς, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δέ τις ὑφαντής ;—where the force of the ἄλλο τι cannot stop short of the whole sentence.

Gorg. 467 d, ἄλλο τι οὐν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων,—ἐάν τις τι πράττη ἐνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται κ.τ.λ. ;—where the interrogation must go on to the end ; and, besides, the whole sentence is gathered up in the pre-announcing clause οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων.

Phædo 79 b, (A) Φέρε δὴ, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ ; (B) Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

Symp. 201 a, ἄλλο τι ὁ ἔρως κάλλους ἂν εἴη ἔρως, αἰσχους δ' οὐ ;

(In Euthyd. 286 c, ἄλλο τι ἢ ψευδῆ κ.τ.λ., the interrogation goes through several clauses : but here two MSS. omit ἢ.)

Thus ἄλλο τι affects the whole of the sentence, like the French *n'est ce pas que*. The interrogation it makes is not restricted to any particular portion of the sentence.

But how does it come to have its meaning ? For there is no colour for supposing that it *stands for* ἄλλο τι ἢ.

It represents an unexpressed *sentence* (according to the use of the Neuter Pronoun at present before us) ;—namely, 'any different' proposition from that about to be enunciated. The speaker, by ἄλλο τι, 'puts the question' about this shadow of a proposition, but anticipates the judgment by offering simultaneously for acceptance his own view. Thus the interrogation strictly speaking belongs to

the ἄλλο τι alone, though it spreads from it to the whole sentence beyond.

§ 23. The last use to be mentioned of the Neuter Accusative of ἄλλος as standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed, is in winding up an enumeration.

Symp. 176 a, ἄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα.

Theæt. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν. (I class this passage under the present head, because by the sense πάντα must stand for τὰλλα πάντα. Cf. § 249.)

In neither of these passages can the Accusative be said to be Cognate, as if it were subjoined by καὶ to the unexpressed Cognate Accusatives of ἄσαντας and καθεύδοντα; for it is really other participles that are added, co-ordinate with ἄσαντας in the one case and καθεύδοντα in the other.

Theæt. 145 a, ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται ;

Phdr. 227 c, πένητι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουσίῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ νεωτέρῳ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐμοὶ πρόσσεστι.

Ib. 246 c, τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλὸν σοφὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι τοιοῦτον.<sup>3</sup>

## § 24. IDIOMS OF NOUNS :—GENITIVE CASE.

### A. Genitive of Epexegetis.

Apol. 29 b, ἀμαθία . . . αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν.

Phædo 78 b, τοῦτο τὸ πάθος . . . , τοῦ διασκεδάννυσθαι. [So Oxon. and one other MS.]

Ib. 96 b, ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

Ib. 97 a, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι.

§ 25. B. Genitive of a Substantive with ὥς, loosely, denoting the agent to whom a particular effect is to be referred.

Symp. 212 c, καὶ ἐξαίφνης τὴν αὐλειον θύραν κρουομένην πολλὸν ψόφον παρασχέειν ὥς κωμαστῶν—where ὥς κωμαστῶν does not closely follow ψόφον, but characterises the general effect produced.

<sup>3</sup> [Under these three examples is written in the MS. "Proof to be subjoined that these are Accusatives."]



Cf. Arist. Eth. I. xiii. 18, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς . . . φαρμέν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν—('not in the sense in which mathematicians use the expression.') Æsch. Eum. 628, θανεῖν . . . . Τόξοις ἐκηβόλοισιν, ὥστ' Ἀμαζόνος, Cho. 990, ἔχει γὰρ αἰσχυντήρος, ὡς νόμου, δίκην (the law being personified into an agent, as frequently elsewhere). Soph. Aj. 998, Ὀξεία γάρ σου βάξιν, ὡς θεοῦ τινός, Διῆλθ' Ἀχαιοῦς ('like a θεία φήμη,' that is.) Trach. 768, προσπτύσσεται Πλευραῖσιν ἀρτίκολλος, ὥστε τέκτονος ('like carver's work.') Ib. 112, πολλὰ γὰρ ὥστ' ἀκάμαντος ἢ νότου ἢ βορέα τινε κύματα . . ἴδοι—which points again to the Homeric τὸν δ' οὐποτε κύματα λείπει Παντοίων ἀνέμων, Il. ii. 396.

§ 26. C. Genitive of a Noun with a Participle, after Verbs of *knowing, seeing, shewing*.

Apol. 27 a, ἄρα γνῶσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὲ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένον ;

Ib. 37 b, ὦν ἐδ' οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων.

Crat. 412 a, μηνύει ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς.

Rep. 558 a, ἡ οὕτω εἶδες . . αὐτῶν μενόντων ;

Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 357, Ὡς γυνῶ χωρόμενοιο. Æsch. P. V. 760, Ὡς τοίνυν ὄντων τῶνδ' εἰ σοὶ μαθεῖν πάρα. Soph. Aj. 281, Ὡς ᾧδ' ἐχόντων τῶνδ' ἐπίστασθαί σε χρή. Eur. Med. 1311, Ὡς οὐκέτ' ὄντων σῶν τέκνων φρόντιζε δῆ.

Probably of the use of these Verbs with a Genitive unaccompanied by a Participle there is no clear instance in Plato.

In Charm. 154 e, ἐθεασάμεθα . . . τοῦ εἵδους, the Genitive is very possibly Partitive, as also in

Rep. 485 b, μαθήματος . . ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας.

In Legg. 646 d, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς ὡσαύτως διανοητέον, the Genitive has tacit reference to περὶ in the question previously put, οὐκοῦν χρή καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδεύματων πέρι διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ;

In Rep. 375 d, οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος, κυνῶν is governed by ἦθος.

D. Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after<sup>4</sup> Verbs of *mentioning*.

Meno 96 a, ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁποῦντος πράγματος, οὐ κ.τ.λ. ;—Why

<sup>4</sup> The passage, Rep. 439 b, τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., is to be construed otherwise ; τοῦ τοξό-

του is governed by χεῖρ. See under Binary Structure (§ 225).

this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191.)

Legg. 804 c, καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς εἵπομ' ἂν τοῖτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναίξιν δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1236, Ποῖον κέρραγας ἀνδρὸς ᾧδ' ὑπέρφρονα; and ib. 1257, O. C. 355, Ἄ τοῦδ' ἐχρήσθη σώματος, Trach. 1122, Τῆς μητρὸς ἦκω τῆς ἐμῆς φράσων.

In Homer, Verbs of *knowing* &c. also thus govern a Genitive of a Noun without a Participle.

Il. xii. 229, Εἰδείην τεράων, Od. xxi. 36, Γνώτην ἀλλήλων, and so xxiii. 109, Γνωσόμεθ' ἀλλήλων. Il. xiv. 37, ὀψείοντες αὐτῆς, xvi. 811, διδασκόμενος πολέμοιο.

§ 27. E. Genitive of a Noun placed at the beginning of a construction, for the sake of premising mention of it, without any grammatical justification of the genitive.

Phædo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ; ἄρα κατὰ ταυτὰ ἔχει, ἡ κ.τ.λ. ;

Gorg. 509 d, τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἰδικεῖν ; πότερον . . . ἢ καὶ κ.τ.λ. ;

Legg. 751 b, δῆλον . . . ὅτι . . . τοῦ πόλιν εὖ παρεσκευασμένην ἀρχαῖς ἀνεπιτηδείους ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς εὖ κειμένοις νόμοις, . . . οὐδὲν πλεον εὖ τεθέντων [ἐστί].

Rep. 576 d, ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος, ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις ;

Cf. Æsch. Ag. 950, Τοῦτων μὲν οὕτως; and Eum. 211, Τί γὰρ γυναικὸς ἦτις ἄνδρα νοσφίσῃ; also Arist. Pol. I. iv. 1, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.

The principle seems to be that the intended mention of the thing is regarded from the side of the genitive as limited and occasioned by it. Near this use stands also

Legg. 969 c, τὴν πόλιν ἐατέον τῆς κατοικίσεως.

## § 28. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—DATIVE CASE.

Certain intensified uses of the 'Dative of Reference' are noticeable. a. Where the Dative is only justified by making the notion of Reference concentrated enough to include Possession.

a. Dative of Nouns.

Apol. 40 c, μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ.

Phædo 62 b, ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.

Phileb. 58 e, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν τέχνη διδοὺς πρὸς χρεῖαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν.

Legg. 760 e, τῷ τόπῳ ἐκάστῳ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι τοιάνδε τινά.

Ib. 820 e, ἄστρον . . . τὴν μάθησιν τοῖς νέοις.

β. Dative of Pronouns.

Charm. 157 e, ἡ πατρώα ὑμῖν οἰκία.

Legg. 624 b, ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους.

Theæt. 210 b, ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη.

Phædo 60 e, θεός . . . ξυνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς.

Ib. 72 e, ἣν πον ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ [Oxon.], and ibid. ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις.

Cf. Thuc. i. 6, οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων. Isæus vi. 6.

p. 56, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀδελφῷ αὐτῷ . . . ἐτελετησάτην.

§ 29. b. Where the Dative is justified by making the notion of Reference include that of the Object.

a. In the case of the latter of two Substantives.

Symp. 194 d, ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ Ἐρωτι.

Rep. 607 a, ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

Legg. 653 d, τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς τοῖς θεοῖς.

Ib. 950 e, ἀγώνων τούτοις τοῖς θεοῖς.

β. In the case of the remote Object after a Verb.

This usage is partly owing to the force of Attraction, and the instances are given under that head (§ 183).

§ 30. IDIOMS OF THE ARTICLE.

a. As a Demonstrative Pronoun Antecedent.

Theæt. 204 d, ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί. So Protag. 320 d, Phileb. 21 e.

Soph. 241 e, τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα εἰσί.

Phdr. 239 b, τῆς ὅθεν ἂν κ.τ.λ. (referring to συνουσία.)

Ib. 247 e, ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστὶν ὃν ὄντως.

Phileb. 37 a, τὸ ᾧ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἡδεται.

Tim. 39 e, τῷ ὃ ἐστί ζῶον.

Critias 115 b, τὸν ὅσος ξύλινος (referring to καρπός.)

Legg. 761 e, περὶ τοὺς ὧν ἐπιμελοῦνται.

Ib. 905 b, ἐκείνων τῶν οὗς κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 75 a, ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἐστὶν ἴσον.

Ib. 102 c, τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν.

Jelf, G. G. § 444, notices that "this idiom is peculiarly Platonic," adding however one or two instances from the Orators.

§ 31. b. Prefixed to Personal Pronouns, laughingly.

Theæt. 166 a, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμέ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε.

Soph. 239 b, τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 20 b, δεινὸν προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ.

Ib. 59 b, τὸν μὲν δὴ σέ καὶ ἐμέ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληγον χρηὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἔαν.

Lysis 203 b, παρὰ τίνας τοὺς ἐμᾶς;

Phdr. 258 a, καὶ ὅς εἶπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων, κ.τ.λ.

Jelf, G. G. § 452, says "this construction seems to be confined to the Accusative."

§ 32. c. When the Substantive has a plurality of Adjectives qualifying it, the order is disturbed, with a view of relieving the heaviness of the term, in various ways.

a. By postponing the Substantive, when one of the Adjectives ought to have followed it.

Crat. 398 b, ἐν τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ.

Ib. d, τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν παλαιὰν φωνήν.

Symp. 213 e, τὴν τούτου ταυτηνὴ τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλὴν.

Legg. 732 e, τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν ζῶον.

Phædo 100 a, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὄντων [so Oxon. and seven other MSS.]—i. e. τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων ἀπάντων.

β. By bringing in the Substantive before its time.

Phileb. 43 a, τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον.

Legg. 659 d, τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον.

Ib. 790 c, τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων.

Ib. 793 b, ὁ νῦν δὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπιχυθείς.

§ 33. Upon these principles are to be explained the seeming anomalies which occur, in the Tragic Poets especially, in the collocation of Substantives with a plurality of epithets preceded by the Article.

a. Æschyl. Cho. 496, φίλτατον τὸ σὸν κάρα (for φ. κάρα τὸ σόν), Suppl. 9, αἰτογενῇ τὸν φνξάνορα γάμον (for γάμον τὸν φνξ.). Soph.

Phil. 133, Ἑρμῆς ὁ πέμπων δόλιος (for Ἑ. δόλιος ὁ πέμπων). Thuc. i. 126, ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ. Lysias vii. 24. p. 110, ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἑμοῖς χωρίοις. Ar. Eq. 1323, Ἐν ταῖσιν ἰσοτεφάνουσιν οἰκεῖ ταῖς ἀρχαίαισιν Ἀθήναις (the last three instances from Jelf).

β. Æsch. Agam. 1642, ὁ δυσφιλεῖ σκότῳ λιμὸς ξύνοικος (where λιμὸς is anticipated), Eum. 653, τὸ μητρὸς αἶμ' ὅμαιμον (perhaps, for the αἶμ' ὅμαιμον might otherwise be regarded as virtually a single word, as in Æschin. iii. 78. p. 64, ὁ γὰρ μισότεκνος, καὶ πατὴρ πονηρός, οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο δημαγωγὸς χρηστός, where πατὴρ πονηρός is for the purpose of the sentence a single word), Suppl. 349, τὰν ἱκέτην φυγάδα περιδρομον. Soph. Aj. 134, τῆς ἀμφιρύτου Σαλαμῖνος . . . ἀρχιάλου, ib. 1166, τὸν ἀείμνηστον τάφον εὐρώεντα, Phil. 394, τὸν μέγαν Πάκτωλον εὔχρυσον, O. T. 671, τὸ σὸν . . . στόμα Ἑλεονύ, ib. 1199, τὰν γαμφώνυχα παρθένον χρησμοφδόν. Pind. Ol. V. 4, τὰν σὰν πόλιν . . . λαοτρόφον. Thuc. i. 96, ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεῖς, v. 11, πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὔσης (these two from Jelf).

The anomalies which remain unexplained are those in which a Possessive Pronoun is concerned,—in all the instances ἐμός. Æsch. Agam. 1226, τῷ μολόντι δεσπότη Ἑμῷ. Soph. Aj. 572, ὁ λυμὲν ἐμός, O. T. 1462, Ταῖν δ' ἀθλίαν οἰκτραῖν τε παρθένοι ἐμαῖν. Eur. Hipp. 683, Ζεὺς ὁ γεννῆτωρ ἐμός. All that can be said in explanation of the exceptional form of these passages, is that they are exceptional in meaning. Generally, where there is a Possessive Pronoun attached to the Substantive, it is that which makes it definite; here the Substantive is perfectly defined in its application independently of the Possessive Pronoun.

§ 34. d. Omitted with the former of two Substantives in regimen. Observe, that a different shade of meaning results from this deviation from the common form; a shade of meaning which would be rendered equivalently by attaching the second Noun more loosely to the former.

Rep. 395 c, δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως—‘artificers of freedom for the city.’

Symp. 182 c, συμφέρει . . . φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων—‘that high-spiritedness in the ruled should be strongly developed.’

Ib. 196 b, περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ—‘beauty as attributable to the god.’

Theæt. 175 a, ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς μικρολογίας—‘a marvel in the way of minuteness.’

Crat. 391 b, ὀρθοτάτῃ τῆς σκέψεως—‘truest manner of viewing’—  
ἢ ὀρθοτάτῃ would have been ‘the truest part of the view.’

Hip. Ma. 282 a, φθόνον τῶν ζώντων—‘envy against the living.’

Cf. Thuc. iii. 82, τῶν τ’ ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν  
ἀτοπία, vi. 76, ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρία. Hdt. ii. 19, τοῦ ποταμοῦ  
δὲ φύσις πέρι (φύσις being a topic of enquiry).

Different are addresses, as Legg. 662 c, ὦ ἄριστοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, 817 a,  
ὦ ἄριστοι τῶν ξένων, 820 b, ὦ βέλτιστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, where the Vocative  
supersedes the Article.

§ 35. e. Omitted with the latter of two Substantives in regimen.  
The meaning indicated by this peculiarity is the close union of the  
notions represented by the two Nouns.

Symp. 187 c, ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἀρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 92, τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγῶνος. Hdt. i. 22, τὸ ἔσχατον κακοῦ.

§ 36. Different is the case where the latter Substantive is the  
name of a country or of the inhabitants of a country or city; for  
before such Nouns the Article is habitually omitted. This is worth  
observing, for the sake of precluding misapprehension of the con-  
struction, where there is a concurrence of Genitives.

Phædo 57 a, οὔτε γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν  
Ἀθήνας—‘for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen,’ &c.

That is, Φλιασίον is governed by οὐδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν.

Legg. 625 c, τὴν τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν—where Κρήτης is  
governed by χώρας φύσιν.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 109, τῶν ξυστρατηγῶν Ἀκαρνάνων, vii. 30, διέφθειραν  
... Θηβαίων τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν Σκιρφώνδαν.

§ 37. f. Omitted after οὗτος preceding a Substantive.

Rep. 399 c, ταύτας δύο ἀρμονίας.

Ib. 621 b, οὗτος, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη.

Symp. 179 c, τοῦτο γέρας.

Soph. 237 d, τὸ τί τοῦτο ῥῆμα.

Gorg. 489 b, οὗτος ἀνὴρ.

Ib. 505 c, οὗτος ἀνὴρ.

Phileb. 16 c, ταύτην φήμην.

Tim. 52 d, οὗτος . . . δεδόσθω λόγος.

§ 38. g. Omitted before ἀνὴρ or ἄνθρωπος standing (as Forster  
expresses it) “pronominis loco.”



Phædo 58 e, εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ [so Oxon. and three other MSS.]  
ἐφαίνετο, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες—(ἀνὴρ being the subject.)

Ib. 98 b, ἐπειδὴ προῖων καὶ ἀναγινώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῶ οὐδὲν  
χρώμενον.

Cf. Æschin. ii. 57. p. 35, σκέψασθε δὴ δεινὴν ἀναισχυντίαν ἀνθρώπου·  
also iii. 99. p. 67, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος ἴδιον καὶ οὐ κοινὸν ποιεῖ,  
and 125. p. 71, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τὴν πόλιν ἄνθρωπος οὐκ  
ἡδύνατο σφῆλαι.

§ 39. h. (from Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 459) “ Ταῦτόν, θάτερον, sometimes  
take the Article, as, their original Article being lost in the Crasis,  
they are regarded as simple words :

Tim. 37 b, περὶ τὸ ταῦτόν.

Ibid. ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος.

Ib. 44 b, τό τε θάτερον καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν.”

#### § 40. IDIOMS OF PRONOMINAL WORDS.

Dialogue gives great occasion for the use of Pronouns, and Plato  
has imparted to his use of them a great appearance of freedom and  
variety. It is like a skilful chess-player's use of his pawns.

A. Use of Neuter Pronoun to represent a sentence, or portion  
of a sentence. This has been treated of at length under the Accu-  
sative Case (§§ 15—23).

§ 41. B. Use of Plural Neuter Pronoun to express a singular fact.

This usage contributes to the enrichment of the style; firstly, by  
varying it; and secondly, by representing the fact as a complex  
phenomenon, an aggregate of many parts, the sum of many con-  
stituents, the meeting-point of many relations.

Ταῦτα is so constantly thus used, that it is only remarkable in  
particular juxtapositions:—

Protag. 323 e, ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . ἀποδέχονται κ.τ.λ., ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ  
κ.τ.λ., τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι.

Symp. 173 e, εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι, ταῦτα χρὴ ποιεῖν.

Ib. 198 b, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι οὐδ' ἐγγὺς τούτων—where τούτων=τοῦ  
οἷός τ' εἶναι.

Ib. 204 b, Ἔρωτα . . . μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. αἰτία δ' αὐτῷ  
καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις.

Phædo 62 d, τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου.

Phædo 105 d, τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον . . . τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα [so Oxon. and Ven. II] ὀνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.

Tim. 87 b, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἄλλος λόγων.

Alcib. I. 109 c, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα, τὸ δίκαιον, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσει.

Legg. 864 a, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν, ὅπῃ περ ἂν ἔσσεσθαι τούτων ἡγήσωνται πόλις εἴτε ἰδιῶταί τινες.

Cf. Antipho vi. 1. p. 141, ἡδιστον . . . μὴ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ., καὶ εὐχόμενος ἂν τις ταῦτα εὔξαιτο. Æschin. ii. 166. p. 50, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ πρόδοτης καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια. And primarily Hom. II. viii. 362, Οὐδέ τι τῶν μέμνηται, ὃ οἱ μάλα πολλάκις νῖδον Τειρόμενον σώεσκον.

#### § 42. Αὐτά.

Phædo 60 c, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος.

Τὰ ἕτερα, ἀμφοτέρα, πότερα, &c.

Phædo 68 c, τυγχάνει ὦν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἥτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέρα.

Crito 52 a, δυοῖν θάτερα. So Phædo 76 a [δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα Oxon. and Ven. II].

Legg. 765 d, πατὴρ μάλιστα μὲν νιέων καὶ θυγατέρων, εἰ δὲ μή, θάτερα.

Cf. Isæus i. 22. p. 37, δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντιωτάτοιον θάτερα, iii. 58. p. 43, δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα. Xen. Mem. II. ii. 7, πότερα οἶει θηρίου ἀγριότητα δυσφορωτέραν εἶναι ἢ μητρός; Antipho v. 36. p. 133, ποτέρφ χρήσονται τῶν λόγων; πότερα ᾧ πρῶτον εἶπεν ἢ ᾧ ὕστερον; Lysias iv. 15. p. 102, ἃ μὲν ἐκείνοι ἥδεσαν, ἐλθόντας ἡμᾶς ὡς τοῦτον, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν.

§ 43. The same tendency is observable in the case of Adjectives which admit of it: a chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.

Tim. 69 a, οὐ δυνατὰ [ἐστί].

Alcib. I. 134 e, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα.

Legg. 828 a, ἐχόμενά ἐστι τάξασθαι . . . ἐορτάς.

Menex. 235 b, ἡμέρας πλείω ἢ τρεῖς.

Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάττω δύναται σώζειν.

Apol. 30 c, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε.

Cf. Hdt. vii. 2, ὅτι νομιζόμενα εἶη τὸν πρεσβύτατον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν.

And primarily Homer.

#### § 44. C. Use of Irregular Pronominal Correlatives.

As Pronouns form a prominent feature in contrasted or cor-

relative clauses, so they also contribute their share to the want of symmetry which such clauses often exhibit.

We find *ὁ μὲν—ὁ ἕτερος, τινές—οἱ δέ*, &c. as Correlatives: or by Anastrophe the former Correlative is omitted. For instances at length see below under Abbreviated Construction (§ 241).

§ 45. (The heads which remain treat of the uses of particular Pronouns.)

D. a. Use of *ἄλλος* and *ἕτερος*.

Though these words are not equivalent, they are often interchanged by Plato. Every *ἕτερος* is an *ἄλλος*, though the converse is untrue: and, under this limitation, the words circulate into each other's place in every possible way. Wherever there is question of two parties or things, both words are liable to be called into requisition. Even when the number exceeds two, for the first two of the series either word is used. Or the whole former part of a series is thrown into an aggregate, to justify the use of *ἕτερος* in the latter part.

Legg. 872 a, *ἐὰν βουλεύσῃ θάνατόν τις ἄλλος ἐτέρῳ*: (though equally we have 879 b, *ὅς δ' ἂν ἄκων ἄλλος ἄλλον τρώσῃ*.)

Critias 109 b, *τὸ μᾶλλον ἄλλοις προσήκον, τοῦτο ἐτέροισ αὐτοῖς κτᾶσθαι*.

Euthyphro 2 b, (A) *οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ γε καταγνώσσομαι, ὥς σὺ ἕτερον* [γράφαι]. (B) *Οὐ γὰρ οὖν*. (A) *Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος*; (B) *Πάνυ γε*.

Phileb. 61 d, *ἡδονὴ . . . ἐτέρας ἄλλη . . . ἀκριβεστέρα*.

Politic. 262 a, *τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐτέρα τις εἶναι, τῶν δὲ αὐθιγῶν ἄλλη τροφή*.

Soph. 224 c, *τὸ μὲν . . . ἐτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ . . . ἄλλῳ προσρητέον* [ὀνόματι].

Ib. 232 d, (A) *τὰ . . . περὶ τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν . . .* (B) *Καὶ πολλῶν γε ἐτέρων*.

Symp. 196 e, *ἂ γὰρ τις ἢ μὴ ἔχει ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, οὐτ' ἂν ἐτέρῳ δοίῃ οὐτ' ἂν ἄλλον διδάξει*. Here it is possible that the words would have lost appropriateness by being reversed; because a thing can be given only to one, while it can be taught to any number.

Theæt. 184 e, *ἂ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεσθαι*.

§ 46. β. *ἄλλος*, 'besides.'

Gorg. 473 c, *πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων*.

Apol. 36 b, *χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημιουργιῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνομοσιῶν καὶ στασέων*.

## § 47. E. Uses of αὐτός.

a. Αὐτό. The Neuter Singular of αὐτός is used peculiarly in Apposition to express the essential nature of a thing, sometimes in the Platonic and sometimes in a more popular sense.

Rep. 363 a, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντα. So 472 e.

Phædo 65 d, φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;

Protag. 360 e, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή.

Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ἡ νόσις.

In the more popular sense, but not in the Platonic, αὐτός in Concord, and αὐτὸ τοῦτο in Apposition, are used also. E.g.

Phileb. 62 a, αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης.

Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.

Phædo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο . . . ψυχὴν.

The remaining uses of αὐτός are not exclusively Platonic.

β. αὐτός in the sense of *sponte*.

The most noteworthy instances are with Semi-Impersonal Verbs, and will be found below (§ 99).

γ. αὐτός in the sense of *solus*.

Symp. 179 a, οὐδεὶς οὕτω κακὸς ὄντινα οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ Ἔρως ἔνθεον ποιήσῃε πρὸς ἀρετήν.

Ib. 187 c, ἐν μὲν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἀρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐρωτικά διαγιγνώσκειν.

Ib. 198 d, τὰληθῆ λέγειν . . . , ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκλεγόμενους ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα τιθέναι.

Apol. 21 d, μικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος.

Euthyd. 293 c, (A) οὐκ οὐν ἐπιστήμων εἶ; (B) Πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.

Legg. 836 b, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμέν.

Rep. 437 c, αὐτὸ τὸ διψῆν . . . ἐπιθυμία . . . αὐτοῦ πάματος—'thirst, according to the simple notion of it:—'whence we see how Use a flows from this.

§ 48. δ. αὐτοῦ (Adverbial) in the sense of 'on the same spot as heretofore.'

Symp. 216 a, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγνῶσθω—i. e. not 'here' nor 'there,' but 'rooted to the spot.'

Ib. 220 c, ξυννοήσας γὰρ αὐτόθι ἔωθέν τι εἰσθήκει σκοπῶν. (The order is hyperbatic for ξυννοήσας ἔωθέν τι, αὐτόθι εἰσθήκει σκοπῶν)—'stood without moving from the spot where he was.'

Soph. 224 d, αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει.

Cf. Hom. II. ii. 237, τόνδε δ' ἔωμεν Αὐτοῦ ἐν Τροίῃ γέρα πεσσέμεν, 332, Ἄλλ' ἄγε, μίμνετε πάντες, εὐκνημίδες Ἀχαιοὶ, Αὐτοῦ, εἰσόκεν ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἔλωμεν. Thuc. iii. 81, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκετῶν διέφθειραν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους, viii. 28, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον καθιστᾶσι.

#### § 49. F. Use of *ἐκείνος*.

Instances occur frequently in Plato, in which the same object is designated successively, in the same sentence or contiguous sentences, by *οὗτος* or the oblique Cases of *αὐτός*, &c., and *ἐκείνος*. This mobility of language serves as an index of the onward movement of the thought, and helps and incites the hearer (or us the readers) to keep pace with it. As new objects are brought into the centre of the field of observation, the objects which were just now full in front drop behind.

(Two or three of the following instances are quoted by Stallbaum.)

Phædo 60 d, λέγε τοίνυν αὐτῷ . . . ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος . . . ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα. Here *ἐκείνῳ* is identical with *αὐτῷ*.

Ib. 68 e, φοβούμενοι ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. The *ἐκείνοι* are identically the *ἑτεροι*.

Ib. 73 e, εἰάν τις τι πρότερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας . . . μὴ μόνον ἐκείνο γνῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ.

Ib. 100 b, εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ ξυγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα . . . Σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοισ. Cebes' answer has intervened, and Socrates refers in *ἐκείνοισ* to the same things which he had just called *ταῦτα*.

Ib. 106 b, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἄρτιου, ὥσπερ ὠμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγόναι. The *αὐτοῦ* and *ἐκείνου* both refer identically to τὸ περιττὸν, αὐτοῦ becoming *ἐκείνου* as *ἄρτιον* is brought forward.

Ib. 111 b, τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε—where αὐτοῖς fades into *ἐκείνους* as mention τῶν ἐνθάδε approaches.

Crat. 430 e, δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἃ μὲν τύχη, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα.

Laches 186 b, εἴ τις ἡμῶν . . . ἔχει . . . ἐπιδείξαι τίνες Ἀθηναίων . . . δι' ἐκείνων ὁμολογουμένως ἀγαθοὶ γηγόνασιν.

Politic. 277 e, τῶν στοιχείων ἔκυστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ ῥάσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἱκανῶς διαισθάνονται, καὶ τάληθῇ φράζειν περὶ ἐκείνα δυνατοὶ γίνονται . . . ταῦτα δὲ γε ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις ἀμφιγνοοῦντες

κ.τ.λ. The *ἐκείνα* gives notice that our attention is to be presently turned to *ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις*.

Cf. Ar. Eth. IX. i. 4, *ὃν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, καὶ κείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει*—where *ἐκείνου* is identical in reference with the preceding *τούτοις*,—and more capriciously, X. ix. 16, *ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, καὶ κείνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται, εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι*—where first *ἐκείνο* and then *τοῦτο* refer to *τὸ καθόλου*.

§ 50. G. Uses of *τις* (indefinite).

In the sense of ‘a particular this or that,’ *τις* is made to contribute to give liveliness and variety to the language. Thus

a. In illustrations *τις* gives the force of ‘for instance,’ or rather the French ‘par exemple.’

Symp. 199 d, *εἰ [ἔρως] μητρόσ τινος ἢ πατρός ἐστί.*

Phædo 66 c, *ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν.*

Phdr. 230 d, *θαλλὸν ἢ τινα καρπὸν προσείοντες.*

Hip. Ma. 292 a, *δεσπότης τίς σου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστί;*

§ 51. β. Or it draws the attention away from the particular illustration given to the kind of notion intended by it,—thus softening the effect of it.

Phdr. 261 c, *εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἢ τινα Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.*

Phileb. 16 c, *διὰ τινος Προμηθέως.*

Cf. Æsch. Agam. 55, *ὑπατος δ' αἰῶν ἢ τις Ἀπόλλων ἢ Πᾶν κ.τ.λ.*

Ar. Ran. 912, *Ἀχιλλέα τιν' ἢ Νιόβην κ.τ.λ.*

§ 52. γ. In enumerations it has the force of ‘this or that:’ but, specially, added (capriciously, as one might say) to one member of the enumeration, it serves the purpose of creating variety, which in enumerations Plato specially affects for the purpose of keeping the attention alert.

Symp. 203 a, *ὁ . . . περὶ τέχνας ἢ χειρουργίας τινὰς [σοφὸς] βάνανσος.*

Phædo 65 c, *μήτε ἀκοή μήτε ὕψις μήτε ἀληθῶν μηδὲ τις ἡδονή.* [So Hermann from Oxon.]

Apol. 27 d, *εἰ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσι νόθοι τινες ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων.*

Phdr. 235 c, *ἢ που Σαπφούς . . . ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος . . . , ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν.*

Politic. 305 b, *μήθ' ὑπὸ τινων δώρων μήθ' ἐπὶ φόβῳ μήτε οὔκτων μήθ' ὑπὸ τινος ἄλλης ἔχθρας μηδὲ φιλίας.*



§ 53. H. Uses of *τοιούτος*.

a. Conversationally, for ‘such as I am thinking of,’—but have not yet explained.

Symp. 210 d, ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, ἣ ἐστὶ καλοῦ τοιοῦδε . . . ὅς γὰρ ἂν . . . παιδαγωγηθῇ, . . . κατόψεται τι θανατοῦν τὴν φύσιν καλὸν κ.τ.λ.—the explanation of *τοιαύτην* beginning immediately after it, with ἣ ἐστὶ.

Phædo 73 c, . . . ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγηται τρόπῳ τοιοῦτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε [so Stallb. and Herm.] εἰν τις κ.τ.λ. The *τοιοῦτῳ* expresses that it is such as the speaker has in his mind; his explanation of it to others follows at λέγω δέ.

§ 54. β. As a mere substitute or symbol for a particular *word* preceding, to avoid repetition of the same sound.

Phædo 67 a, καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι . . . μετὰ τοιούτων ἐσόμεθα—i. e. μετὰ καθαρῶν.

Ib. 80 c, εἰ μὲν τις χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ—where *τοιαύτῃ* simply means *χαριέσσει*.

Ib. d, ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ αἰδέες, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον—where *τοιοῦτον ἕτερον* means *αἰδῆ*.

Ib. 84 a, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη . . . οἴεται. . . , ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι—where τὸ τοιοῦτον stands for τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον.

Ib. 79 c, πλανᾶται καὶ ταραττεται κ.τ.λ. ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη—where *τοιούτων* is a substitute for *πλανωμένων καὶ ταραττομένων*.

Symp. 208 d, ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης.

Legg. 723 d, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν—where ἄσματος is actually governed by τὸ τοιοῦτο δρᾶν, because this is the substitute for *προτιθέναι προοίμιον* in the foregoing sentence: cf. Symp. 210 b, quoted above (§ 17).

§ 55. This Idiom extends to other kindred Pronouns.

Rep. 507 b, πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως—where οὕτως personates *πολλά*.

Legg. 853 b, νομοθετεῖν πάντα ὅποσα νῦν μέλλομεν τοῦτο δρᾶν—where τοῦτο δρᾶν represents *εἰς δικαστὰς ἄγειν* or the like, implied from ἦν δεῖ λαμβάνειν αὐτὸ τιμωρίαν καὶ τίνων ποτὲ δικαστῶν τυγχάνειν preceding.

Cf. Hdt. iii. 82, ἀνδρὸς γὰρ ἐνὸς τοῦ ἀρίστου οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ἂν φανείη· γνώμη γὰρ τοιαύτη χρεώμενος—i. e. ἀρίστη. Ar. Eth. I. x. 11, ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος—i. e. εὐδαίμων, and VIII. iv. 1, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί—i. e. χρήσιμοι. Add IX. vii. 6, ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. Thuc. ii. 49, καὶ πολλοὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἔδρασαν εἰς φρέατα—i. e. ἔρριψαν σφᾶς αὐτούς, and iv. 64, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δικαίῳ ταῖτό μοι ποιῆσαι, ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο παθεῖν—i. e. ἡσασθαι. Ar. Eth. IV. i. 11, φιλοῦνται δὲ οἱ ἐλευθέριοι· ὠφέλιμοι γάρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει—where τοῦτο stands for ὠφέλιμοί εἰσι, V. vi. 5, διὸ οὐκ ἔωμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ [sc. ἄρχει], VIII. xiii. 7, ἡ δ' ἡθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται, ἡ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο.

## § 56. IDIOMS OF VERBS.

### A. Mood.

#### a. Indicative Constructions.

a. The meaning assigned to Indicative Imperfects, Aorists, or Pluperfects, with εἰ, depending on a similar Apodosis with ἂν, holds equally (1) when they depend on a simple Infinitive.

Crito 52 c, ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου.

Ib. 44 b, οἷός τ' ὦν σε σώζειν εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμειλῆσαι.

Phædo 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ . . . οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν.

Soph. 246 d, [δοκεῖ δεῖν] μάλιστα μέν, εἴ πη δυνατόν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελτίους ποιεῖν.

Legg. 790 c, οἰκεῖν [ξυμφέρει], εἰ δυνατόν ἦν, οἷον ἀεὶ πλείοντας.

§ 57. (2) In clauses connected by a Relative Adverb or Pronoun with an Indicative of unfulfilled past contingency.—The principle of *Sequence* here illustrated has not been observed except in the case of Indicatives following Relative Adverbs: whereas (besides the other outlying instances which come before us here) the principle applies equally to the Optative (see below, § 72).

Euthyd. 304 c, ἀξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι κ.τ.λ., ἵνα ἡκούσας κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον . . . οἷοί τε εἶναι κ.τ.λ., ἵνα οἷοί τε ἦσαν κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 161 c, τεθαύμακα ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν κ.τ.λ., ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς . . . ἤρξατο κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 378 a, ὥμην [ἴν] δεῖν . . . δι' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν κ.τ.λ., ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι.

Gorg. 506 b, ἡδέως ἂν Καλλικλεί τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμεν, ἕως αὐτῷ . . .  
ἀπέδωκα κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 171 e, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἂν, οὐ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον—'this would have been that of which they had knowledge.'

In the next instance ἵνα heads a second clause in a different meaning.

Meno 89 b, οὐς . . . ἂν ἐφύλαττομεν, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν χρήσιμοι γίνοντο.

In the next, ὅπως loses its power over the second of two clauses, and the meaning is supplied by ἂν.

Legg. 959 c, ζῶντι ἔδει βοηθεῖν, ὅπως ὁ τι δικαιοτάτος ὦν καὶ ὀσιώτατος ἔζη τε ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας ἀτιμώρητος ἂν ἐγίγνετο.

Instances need not be multiplied: as an illustration, we may notice in conclusion the virtually but not formally identical construction in Soph. El. 1022, Εἴθ' ὄφελος κ.τ.λ. πάντα γὰρ κατειργάσω—where consequently we need not suppose an ellipse of ἂν. The usage begins with Homer: cf. Il. vi. 348, Ἔνθα με κῦμ' ἀπόερσε.

#### § 58. β. Future Indicative with ἂν.

Rep. 615 d, οὐχ ἥκει, οὐδ' ἂν ἤξει δεῦρο.

Apol. 29 c, ἥδη ἂν . . . ἐπιτηδεύοντες διαφθαρήσονται.

Symp. 222 a, ἰδὼν ἂν τις . . . εὐρήσει.

Euthyd. 287 d, καὶ νῦν οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ;

Phdr. 227 b, οὐκ ἂν οἶε με καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα ποιήσεσθαι;

The Future exceptionally retains this ἂν in Oratio Obliqua.

Legg. 719 e, τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἐπαινέσοι.

Cf. Isæus i. 32, προσηπεῖλησεν ὅτι δηλώσοι ποτ' ἂν.

#### § 59. b. Conjunctive Potential Constructions.

The Conjunctive Potential has always a *deliberative* meaning, which however admits of further distinctions, according to various kinds of sentences.

a. In matters of abstract opinion, it is <sup>5</sup> *Presumptive*.

In matters in which the will is concerned, it is

β. *Deliberative* (in a more special sense) when the sentence is interrogative:

γ.  *hortatory or dehortatory*, when the sentence is not interrogative.

Only the first of these heads requires illustration by examples here.

<sup>5</sup> This use is confined to negative sentences.

## a. Presumptive use.

With μή.

Gorg. 462 e, μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθές εἰπεῖν.

Rep. 603 c, μή τι ἄλλο ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα;

Symp. 194 c, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὔτοι ἡμεῖς ὤμεν.

Apol. 39 a, μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπόν.

The Indicative is also used with μή and μὴ οὐ similarly: e. g. Euthyd. 298 c, μὴ οὐ λίνον λίνω συνάπτεις; and (not interrogatively) Protag. 312 a, ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις—'but perhaps, then, you do not suppose.'

With ὅπως μή.

Crat. 430 d, ὅπως μὴ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ἢ τοῦτο, . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὐ.

The Indicative is also used with ὅπως μή.

Meno 77 a, ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι.

Phædo 77 b, ἐνέστηκεν ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε . . . , ὅπως μὴ . . . διασκεδάννυται ἢ ψυχή.

## § 60. With οὐ μή.

Passing by the common use (Aorist), we have the Present with οὐ μή in

Rep. 341 c, οὐ μὴ οἷός τ' ἦς.

Phileb. 48 d, οὐ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ.

Cf. Isæus viii. 24. p. 71, οὐ μὴ εἰσίῃς. [So Bekker's edition: the Zurich editors give εἴσει εἰς from Bekker's conjecture.] Xen.

Cyrop. VIII. i. 5, οὐ μὴ δύνηται. Soph. O. C. 1024 (some MSS.) οὐ μὴ ποτε . . . ἐπεύχωνται.

The following is only a variation of the use with οὐ μή, πολλοῦ δεῖ standing as a mere Adverb for οὐ.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ μήποτε τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσῃται.

## § 61. c. Conjunctive Subjunctive Constructions.

The following alone need be mentioned.

a. After σκοπεῖν, ὁρᾶν, and the like, with μή. (This is as it were the Oratio Obliqua of b. a.)

Phdr. 260 a, σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι.

Gorg. 512 d, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἦ.

## § 62. This use is frequent in the Indicative: e. g.

La. 179 b, ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεται τι λέγειν.

Soph. 235 a, *διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ τυγχάνει κ.τ.λ.*

Ly. 216 c, *σκεψώμεθα μὴ . . . λανθάνει κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 218 d, *φοβοῦμαι . . . μὴ . . . ἐντετυχήκαμεν.*

Phædo 84 e, *φοβείσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερον . . . διάκειμαι.*

§ 63. β. After *πρὶν*, without *ἄν*, in negative sentences.

Phædo 62 c, *μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιτέμψῃ.* [So all the MSS.]

Theæt. 169 b, *τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκάσσης . . . προσπαλαῖσαι.* [So all the MSS.]

Legg. 873 a, *οὐδὲ ἔκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίγνεσθαι τὸ μιανθεῖν πρὶν φόνον φόνῳ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον ἢ δράσασα ψυχὴ τίσῃ.*

§ 64. γ. After *σκοπεῖν*, *ὁρᾶν*, and the like with *εἰάν*.

Crito 48 e, *ὄρα τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, εἰάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται.*

Phædo 100 c, *σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις, εἰάν σοι ξυνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί.*

Gorg. 510 b, *σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε εἰάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν.*

Charm. 167 b, *σκέψαι εἰάν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐπορώτερος φανῇς ἐμοῦ.*

Cf. Lysias xv. 5. p. 144, *σκέψασθε εἰάν ἱκανὸν γένηται τεκμήριον.*

Andoc. i. 37. p. 6, *ἀναμνησκεισθαι εἰάν ἀληθῇ λέγω.* And primarily Homer (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 877), Il. xv. 32, *Ὅφρα ἴδῃ, ἦν τοι χραίσμη.*

What is worth noticing upon this usage is, that *εἰάν* gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual *εἰ*. The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas *εἰ* would hint the speaker's foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. *Ἐάν* is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as those just given, which relate to the conduct of the dialogue.

§ 65. δ. With *ὅς ἄν*.

The different shades of meaning presented by *ὅς* with the Indicative and *ὅς ἄν* with the Conjunctive are parallel with those just pointed out in the case of *εἰ* and *εἰάν* after *σκοπεῖν*. The meaning of *ὅς ἄν* bears upon a doubtful reading in Phædo 96 a, presently to be mentioned.

Ly. 217 c, *οἷον ἂν ᾖ τὸ παρόν, τοιαῦτα ἐστί—*where *οἷον ἂν ᾖ* leaves it quite undetermined of what kind *τὸ παρόν* is.

Phædo 98 e, *ἐμοὶ βέλτιον δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιοτέρον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσι.* Here it is not that *ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσι* has any future force, for the penalty had

been awarded: but it gives the meaning 'that it is right to stay and abide the penalty, whatever it be, which they have awarded.'

Phædo 96 a, ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνεται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὧν ἂν λέγῃς χρήσει (taking for granted here<sup>6</sup> the reading ὧν ἂν λέγῃς)—'you can apply it to satisfying yourself with respect to your objections, whatever they be.' It is true that the objections had preceded; but this only makes the instance parallel to the last: and what ὧν ἂν intimates is, that Socrates does not wish to bind Cebes to the precise case he has stated. As just before he had said ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τί τι βούλει προσθῇς ἢ ἀφέλῃς,—to which Cebes had guardedly replied ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὔτ' ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι,—he now, by giving a *general* turn to the sentence, leaves a loophole open for future qualification.

#### § 66. d. Optative Potential Constructions.

a. Without ἄν, expressing simple possibility.

Legg. 777 c, πρὸς ᾧ τις ἅπαντα βλέψας διαπορήσει.

Euthyd. 298 e, (A) Οὐκοῦν τὸν σαντοῦ πατέρα τύπτεις; (B) Πολὺ μέντοι δικαιότερον τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι.

Gorg. 492 b, τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἷσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἶη;

Phædo 88 c, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταί, ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἅπιστα ἦ—where the Optative, as distinguished from the Con-junctive, denotes a transitory as opposed to a permanent contingency.

§ 67. β. Without ἄν, this being understood from a preceding coordinate sentence.

Rep. 360 b, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος. Cf.

Thucyd. vi. 89, δημοκρατίαν . . . οὐδενὸς ἂν χεῖρον [γινώσκοιμι], ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιοι.

Symp. 196 c, κρατοῦντ' ἂν ὑπὸ ἔρωτος, ὁ δὲ κρατοῖ.

Phædo 99 a, εἰ . . . λέγοι, . . . ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι' ὡς μέντοι . . . ποιῶ, . . . πολλή καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἶη τοῦ λόγου. [So Oxon. and three other MSS.]

Charm. 174 e, (A) . . . ὠφελοῖ ἂν ἡμᾶς. (B) Ἡ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν ποιοῖ;

<sup>6</sup> It is the reading of Oxon. and one other good MS. But perhaps the other reading—ὧν λέγεις—ought to be preferred. So Hermann and the Zurich editors.



Rep. 382 d, (A) πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοίων ἂν ψεύδοιτο; (B) . . . (A) Ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἔχθρους ψεύδοιτο;

§ 68. γ. With ἂν in clauses where the ἂν adheres closely to the Verb, and not to the Relative Pronoun or Particle by which the clause is introduced.

Symp. 187 d, ὥς ἂν κοσμιώτεροι γίγνουντο . . . , δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι.

Ib. 190 c, δοκῶ μοι ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὥς ἂν εἶεν κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 230 b, ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἀνθης, ὥς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον.

Gorg. 453 c, ἵνα οὕτω προῆγ, ὥς μάλιστα ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοί.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, οὐχ οἶός τ' ἦσθα πείθειν, ὥς . . . ἂν . . . ἐπιδιδόειν.

Phædo 82 e, δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὥς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ εἴη.

Protag. 318 e, εὐβουλία . . . ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα διοικοί.

Lys. 207 e, προθυμοῦνται ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονοίης.

Crat. 395 a, κινδυνεύει τοιοῦτός τις εἶναι ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων οἷος ἂν δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι.

Ib. 398 e, οὐδ' εἴ τι οἶός τ' ἂν εἴην εὐρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω.

Legg. 700 e, ἡδονῇ δὲ τῇ τοῦ χαίροντος, εἴτε βελτίων εἴτε χείρων ἂν εἴη τις, κρίνονται ὀρθότατα.

Cf. Antipho i. 17. p. 113, ἐβουλεύετο ἡ ἄνθρωπος ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῖς τὸ φάρμακον δοίη, πότερα πρὸ δείπνου ἢ ἀπὸ δείπνου.

It may be noted, that these clauses are not Subjunctive, and that this difference marks off these instances from such as Rep. 412 d, φιλοί, . . . ὅταν οἴοιτο κ.τ.λ., Legg. 661 c, ἔλαττόν [ἐστὶ κακόν] ἂν ὥς ὀλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζῶη, which must be separately accounted for.

§ 69. δ. With ἄν, equivalently for the Future.

(δ<sup>1</sup>) Following a Future in the Protasis.

Phædo 107 c, ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει.

Apol. 35 a, εἰ . . . ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη.

§ 70. (δ<sup>2</sup>) Following a Conjunctive with ἂν in the Protasis.

Rep. 556 a, εἰάν τις προστάτῃ . . . , χρηματίζονται ἄν. So 402 d.

Symp. 200 c, ὅταν τις λέγῃ, εἴπομεν ἄν.

Phdr. 244 b, εἰάν δὴ λέγωμεν . . . , μηχανούμεν ἄν.

Phileb. 55 c, ἄν τις . . . χωρίζῃ . . . , φαῖλον . . . ἂν γίγναιτο.

§ 71. (δ<sup>s</sup>) Following an Indicative, involving a Future meaning.

Symp. 208 c, εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι, θαυμάζεις ἂν . . . ,  
εἰ μὴ ἐννοεῖς κ.τ.λ.—where εἰ ἐθέλεις βλέψαι is a virtual Future.

Apol. 37 c, πολλὴ ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι κ.τ.λ.  
because the fact is not so *as yet*.

Protag. 349 c, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ . . . ἔλεγες—because I do not  
*know* the fact *as yet*.

Crat. 428 b, εἰ μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν  
θαυμάζοιμι.

Laches 186 c, εἰ δὲ Νικίας . . . μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι.

§ 72. e. Optative Subjunctive Constructions.

a. Under principal Optative sentence with or without ἂν (see  
above, §§ 66, 67)—the Subjunctive sentence being

(α<sup>1</sup>) Relative.

Gorg. 512 e, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιώναι ὥς ἄριστα  
βιώῃ;

Meno 92 c, πῶς οὖν ἂν εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος . . . , οὐ  
παντάσῃσιν ἄπειρος εἶη;

Cf. Hom. Od. xiii. 291, Κερδαλέος κ' εἶη . . . ὅς σε παρέλθοι, iv. 222,  
ὁς τὸ καταβρόξειεν . . . οὐ κεν βάλοι, xv. 358, Λευγαλέφ θανάτῳ, ὥς  
μὴ θάνοι ὅστις ἔμοιγε . . . φίλος εἶη.

§ 73. (α<sup>2</sup>) Adverbial.

Legg. 730 c, μετόχος εἶη, ἵνα ὥς πλείστον χρόνον ἀληθὴς ὦν διαβιοί.

Meno 98 c, ὠφελίμοι ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν, . . . εἴπερ εἶεν.

Rep. 541 a, ὥς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς εὖ εἰρηκέναι.

Politic. 295 c, εἴπωμεν . . . ἱατρὸν μέλλοντα . . . ἀπέσσεσθαι . . . συχρόν,  
ὥς οἴοιτο, χρόνον, ἂν ἐθέλειεν κ.τ.λ.;

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 214, ἀπ' ἐμείο κάρη τάμοι ἀλλότριος φῶς, Εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ  
τάδε τόξα φαεινῶ ἐν πυρὶ θείην, Od. xii. 106, μὴ σὺ γε κεῖθι τύχοις,  
ὅτε ῥοιβδῶσειεν, ib. 114, Τὴν δέ κ' ἀμυναίμην ὅτε μοι σίνουτό γ'  
εταίρους, xxi. 114, Οὐ κέ μοι ἀχνημένῳ τάδε δώματα πότνια μήτηρ  
Δείποι ἄμ' ἄλλῳ ἰοῦσ' ὅτ' ἐγὼ κατόπισθε λιποίμην.

§ 74. β. Under principal Indicative sentence, when the dependent  
Verb is intended to belong to all time—the Subjunctive sentence  
being

(β<sup>1</sup>) Relative.

Legg. 759 b, οἷς μὴ καθεστήκοι καταστατέον [ἐστὶν] ἱερέας.

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 407, οὐ δηναίος, ὅς ἀθανάτοισι μάχοιτο, Od. vi. 286, Καὶ δ' ἄλλη νεμεσῶ, ἥτις τοιαῦτά γε ρέζοι, iii. 319, Ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅθεν οὐκ ἔλποιο γέ θυμῷ. Andoc. iii. 1. p. 23, τοῖς ἔργοις ἀφ' ὧν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο ἐναντιοῦνται.

§ 75. (β<sup>2</sup>) Adverbial.

Rep. 410 c, οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκά τινες οἴονται καθιστᾶσιν, ἵνα . . . θεραπεύοντο.

Euthyd. 296 e, οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖν . . . ὅπως οὐ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.

Gorg. 448 e, οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ, ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη. [So most if not all of the MSS.]

Alc. I. 135 a, τυραννοῦντι δέ, ὡς μὴ δὲ ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον;

Cf. Hom. Od. xiv. 374, Ἐλθέμεν ὑτρύνησιν, ὅτ' ἀγγελίη ποθὲν ἔλθοι, xvii. 250, Ἄξω τῇλ' Ἰθάκης, ἵνα μοι βίοντον πολλὸν ἄλφοι.

§ 76. (β<sup>3</sup>) Adverbial with εἰ.

Politic. 268 d, τοῦτο . . . [ἐστὶ] ποιητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλοιμεν κ.τ.λ.

Meno 80 d, εἰ ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσει ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν;

Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὅρα γάρ, εἰ . . . τοῦτο φαίμεν εἶναι καλόν.

Legg. 642 a, ὁρᾶτε τί ποιῶμεν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἑάσαιμεν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 658 c, εἰ . . . τὰ πάνν σμικρὰ κρίνοι παιδία, κρινοῦσι τὸν τὰ θαύματα ἐπιδεικνύντα.

Charm. 173 c, εἰ δὲ βούλοῦ γέ, . . . συγχωρήσωμεν κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 91 a, οὐ γὰρ ὅπως . . . δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμηθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον. Cf. the same phrase, but under an Infinitive sentence, Rep. 411 e; and Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 5, λέγεται ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος.

Cf. Hom. Od. vii. 51, θαρσαλέος γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀμείνων Ἔργοισιν τελέθει, εἰ καὶ ποθεν ἄλλοθεν ἔλθοι. Ar. Eth. Nic. I. iv. 7, εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Lysias xxxiv. 6, τί τῷ πλήθει περιγενησεται, εἰ ποιήσαιμεν κ.τ.λ.;

§ 77. γ. Under an Infinitive sentence—which necessarily leaves the time of the Dependent Verb, as under the last head, undefined.

Charm. 164 a, εἰ δοκεῖ τις ὠφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὃν ἰῶτο.

Lysis 212 d, εἰ ὁ ἕτερος φιλοῖ, φίλῳ εἶναι ἄμφω.

Theæt. 164 a, δεῖ γέ μέντοι [τοῦτο φάναι], εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον.

Phædo 95 d, προσήκειν φῆς φοβείσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότε.

Protag. 316 c, οἴεται τοῦτο γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ ξυγγένοιτο.

Legg. 927 c, τὸν νοῦν, ᾧ καὶ βραχὺς ἐνείη, προσέχοντα εὐεργετεῖν.

Phædo 85 d, κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον . . . διαπορευθῆναι.

Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 262, σὸν δὲ πλείον δέπας αἰεὶ Ἔστηχ', ὥσπερ ἐμοί, πῖεῖν ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνώγει, Od. xxiv. 253, Τοιούτῳ δὲ ἔοικας, ἐπεὶ λούσαιο φάγοι τε, Εὐδέμεναι μαλακῶς. Thuc. i. 120, ἀνδρῶν σωφρόνων ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῦντο ἡσυχάζειν.

§ 78. Note that the principle of the Optatives classified under (β) and (γ) is the same essentially. Hermann (De Part. ἄν) notices the usage under (γ): but the extent of the principle has not attracted attention.

#### § 79. f. Infinitive Constructions.

Infinitive after Relative Pronouns and Adverbs.

Rep. 415 e, εὐνὰς . . . τοιαύτας, οἷας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ἱκανὰς εἶναι.

Gorg. 457 d, εἰπόντες τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι.

Protag. 334 c, χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ . . . ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι.

Theæt. 161 b, οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλεόν, πλὴν βραχείος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν.

Protag. 330 e, φάναι τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα . . . , ὥς οὐκ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 213 a, παραχωρῆσαι τὸν Σωκράτη ὥς ἐκείνον καθίζειν.

Euthyd. 306 c, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ . . . ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, ὥς γε πρὸς σε τάληθές εἰρησθαι.

Apol. 29 c, ἀφίμεν σε, ἐφ' ᾧ τε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν.

Phdr. 269 d, τὸ δύνασθαι ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι.

Protag. 338 c, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα εἶσθαι.

Politic. 295 a, ἱκανὸς γένοιτ' ἂν . . . ὥστε ἐκάστῳ προστάττειν τὸ προσῆκον.

Phædo 103 c, ἔστιν ἄρα περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιούσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 2, νερόμενοι τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι, ὅσον ἀποζῆν. And likewise

Soph. Ant. 303, Χρόνῳ ποτ' ἐξέπραξαν ὡς δοῦναι δίκην, Aj. 378, Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν ταῦθ' ὅπως οὐχ ᾧδ' ἔχειν, 924, Ὡς καὶ παρ' ἐχθροῖς ἄξιος θρήνων τυχεῖν.

### § 80. g. Infinitive Uses.

a. Future following οἶός τε, δυνατός, &c.

Phædo 73 a, οὐκ ἂν οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιήσιν.

Phdr. 277 d, οὐ πρότερον δυνατόν τέχνη ἔσσεσθαι.

Cf. Lysias xxvii. 2. p. 178, ὅποτε ἂν δοκῶσιν αἴτιοι εἶναι ψηφιεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς. Isocr. xiii. 2. p. 291, ἡμῖν ἐνδείξεσθαι βουλόμενος. [The Zurich editors give ἐνδείξασθαι.]

### § 81. β. Aorist equivalent in meaning to Future.

Symp. 193 d, ἐλπίδας παρέχεται [ἡμᾶς] εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι.

Euthyd. 278 c, ἐφάτην ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν.

Protag. 316 c, τοῦτο δὲ οἶεται οἱ μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ ξυγγένοιτο.

Cf. Hom. Il. ix. 230, ἐν δοιῇ δὲ σαωσέμεν ἢ ἀπολέσθαι Νῆας, xiii.

666, Πολλάκι γάρ οἱ ἔειπε γέρων ἀγαθὸς Πολύιδος Νούσῳ ἵπ' ἀργαλή

φθίσθαι, xxii. 119, ὄρκον ἔλωμαι Μῆ τι κατακρύψειν ἀλλ' ἄνδιχα

πάντα δάσασθαι, Od. ii. 171, φημὶ τελευτηθῆναι ἅπαντα, iv. 253,

"Ωμοσα μὴ μὲν πρὶν . . . ἀναφῆναι, ix. 496, φάμεν αὐτόθ' ὀλέσθαι.

Thuc. i. 26, προείπον . . . ὡς πολεμίοις χρῆσασθαι, 81, εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίους . . . μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεύσαι (so with οὐκ εἰκὸς iii. 10, iv. 85,

viii. 46), iii. 46, τίνα οἶεσθε ἦντινα οὐκ ἄμεινον παρασκευάσασθαι;

v. 22, οἱ δὲ . . . οὐκ ἔφασαν δέξασθαι, ii. 3, ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθέμενοι

ῥαδίως κρατῆσαι, iv. 63, τὸ ἐλλιπὲς . . . ἱκανῶς νομίσαντες εἰρχθῆναι,

i. 126, τῷ Κύλῳ . . . ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεός, καταλαβεῖν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν.

Æsch. Pers. 173, ἴσθι . . . μὴ σε δις φράσαι, Agam. 1262, ἐπεύν-

χεται . . . ἀντιτίσασθαι (not 'prays' but 'boasts'). Soph. Phil.

1329, παῦλαν ἴσθι τῇσδε μὴ ποτ' ἐντυχεῖν Νόσου, Aj. 1082, Ταύτην

νόμιζε τὴν πόλιν χρόνῳ ποτὲ Ἐξ οὐρίων δραμοῦσαν εἰς βυθὸν πεσεῖν

(not aor. of *custom*, as Herm. and Linw.). Eur. Andr. 311,

Σὲ μὲν γὰρ ἡχέεις θεᾶς βρέτας σῶσαι τόδε. Hdt. i. 53, προλέ-

γουςαι . . . μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μιν καταλῦσαι, vi. 62, τὰ ἄλλα ἔφη

κατανώσαι. Lysias xiii. 15. p. 131, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἐπιτρέψαι, ib.

32. p. 132, οὐ γὰρ οἶμαί σε ἔξαρνον γενέσθαι, xxxiii. 2, ἡγήσατο τὸν

ἐνθάδε σύλλογον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι. [So Bekker: the Zurich editors

have γενήσεσθαι.] Ar. Nub. 35, ἐνεχυράσασθαι φασιν.

### § 82. γ. Present equivalent in meaning to Future.

Crito 52 c, ὁμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι.

Gorg. 520 e, μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ.

Politic. 264 e, ἡ οὐκ οἶε καὶ τὸν ἀφρονέστατον . . . δοξάζειν οὕτως;

Cf. Thuc. iv. 24, ἤλπίζον . . . χειρώσασθαι, καὶ ἤδη σφῶν ἰσχυρὰ τὰ πράγματα γίνεσθαι, 127, προσέκειντο, νομίσαντες φεύγειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ καταλαβόντες διαφθεῖρην, 27, ὅτι . . . αὐτοὺς ἐνόμιζον οὐκέτι σφίσιν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι. Æsch. Eum. 892, τίνα με φῆς ἔχειν ἔδραν; Antipho ii. A. a. 5. p. 115, τὸν μείζονα ἐπίδοξον ὄντα πάσχειν. Isæus ii. 32, ὠμόσαμεν εὖ ποιεῖν ἀλλήλους. Isocr. vi. 69. p. 130, μὴ γὰρ οἶεσθ' αὐτοὺς μένειν. [So Bekker's edition: the Zurich editors give *μενείν* from Bekker's conjecture.]

§ 83. δ. Infinitives following certain Verbs (of *saying, thinking, &c.*) sometimes contain a *Dictative* force. They are in fact Infinitives Oblique of the Deliberative Potential. In consequence of this force of the Infinitive in these cases, the governing Verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to 'say' becomes to 'recommend' or to 'pray:' to 'think' becomes to 'think fit,' or to 'give counsel.' But it is through the Infinitive, as being an Infinitive of the Potential, that the meaning of the governing Verb is strengthened; and not vice versa.

Protag. 346 b, Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς . . . τύραννον . . . ἐπαίνεσαι—'thought fit'—lit. 'thought it-was-incumbent-on-himself-to-praise.'

Crat. 399 d, ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι.

Hip. Ma. 291 a, ἔμοι δοκεῖ . . . ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι κ.τ.λ.—not 'that we say' but 'that we should say.'

Phædo 83 e, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμοι τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασι. Here the meaning is not 'for the reason which the world attributes to them,' but 'for the reason for which the world says people *ought* to be [temperate].' That is, φασὶ is followed by κοσμίους εἶναι understood, and this εἶναι contains the Dictative force.

Ib. 104 e, ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι—'what I proposed that we should define.'

Cf. Hom. Il. iii. 98, φρονέω δὲ διακρινθήμεναι ἤδη Ἀργείους καὶ Τρῶας ('I think good'). Thucyd. iii. 44, νομίζω περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς βουλευέσθαι, iv. 86, οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, vii. 42, νομίσας, οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι . . . , οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ Νικίας ἔπαθεν (where the Dictative force is possessed by the second Infinitive only), ii. 42, τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγησάμενοι ἢ τὸ κ.τ.λ., v. 40, ἡγούμενοι, ὅπη ἂν ξυγχωρῇ, ἡσυχίαν



ἔχειν, i. 40, ἀντείπομεν, τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν, v. 46, λέγων . . . τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, iv. 99, ἀπεκρίναντο . . . ἀποφέρεισθαι τὰ σφέτερα ('answered, Carry off your dead'), vi. 13, ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς Σικελιώτας καθ' αὐτοὺς ξυμφέρεισθαι. Æsch. Choeph. 143, Λέγω ('I pray') φανῆναι σοῦ, πάτερ, τιμάσπον. Soph. Trach. 543, Ἐγὼ δὲ θυμοῦσθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι ('do not know that one ought to be angry').

§ 84. ε. Infinitive as a Noun Substantive, without the Article.

Symp. 194 d, οὐδὲν διοίσει, ὅπηοῦν ὅτιοῦν γίγνεσθαι. So Rep. 523 e.

In Apposition.

Apol. 23 a, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι.

Protag. 323 b, ὁ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τἀληθὴ λέγειν.

Under government.

Rep. 429 b, κύριοι ἂν εἶεν ἡ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἡ τοίαν.

Symp. 209 b, εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ οἷον χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα.

§ 85. ζ. An Accusative<sup>7</sup> of the Infinitive, with the Article, sometimes occurs subjoined in *justification* of some expression of feeling just preceding. The "τὸ indignantis" is *included* in this use (it is exemplified in the first two passages following); but a more commensurate designation would be the 'Apologetic Infinitive.'

Phædo 99 b, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 177 a, οὐ δεινόν, ἄλλοις μὲν τισι θεῶν ὕμνους κ.τ.λ.; . . . Ἑρακλέους καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους . . . ἅλες ἔπαινον ἔχοντες . . . καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐγκεκωμασμένα. τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.

The speaker justifies the warmth with which he has spoken by subjoining a studiously dispassionate statement of the case.

Compare Eur. Med. 1051, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, Τὸ καὶ προέσθαι μαλθακοὺς λόγους φρενί and, exactly parallel, Alc. 832, ἀλλὰ σοῦ, τὸ μὴ φράσαι κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 60 b, ὥς θαυμασίως πέφυκε [τὸ ἡδὺ] πρὸς . . . τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. The τὸ ἅμα κ.τ.λ. (taking for granted the reading here) is the justification of the expression ὥς θαυμασίως, [τὸ is the reading of Oxon. and one other MS.]

<sup>7</sup> If an opinion must be hazarded as to the force of this Accusative, it must be that it is *Causal*. See § 18 above.

Cf. Antipho i. 28. p. 114, *θανυμάζω δὲ τῆς τόλμης τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ τῆς διανοίας, τὸ διομόσασθαι*. Similarly Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 3, *ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐπαινεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν τῆς προαιρέσεως ἔνεκεν, τὸ προελέσθαι*. Here the Infinitives justify the warmth of the expressions *θανυμάζω* and *ἄξιόν ἐστιν*.

Symp. 204 a, *αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανόν*. Here τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ. contains the reason for *ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία*: but, put as it is not in the common Causal form, but under this apologetic form, it also justifies the tone of impatience in which *ἀμαθία* has been mentioned.

§ 86. η. The Accusative of the Infinitive, expressing the result, in negative clauses, is common.

Apol. 36 a, *τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν . . . ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται κ.τ.λ.*

Phædo 74 d, *ἢ ἐνδέ τι ἐκείνου τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι*; [So Hermann without MS. authority.]

This use would seem to be confined to negative clauses.

Lach. 190 e, *ἐγὼ αἴτιος . . . τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο ὃ διανοούμενος ἡρόμην ἀλλ' ἕτερον*, is no exception, since the negative is but postponed.

The Genitive of the Infinitive expresses the cause or purpose primarily, rather than the result, in both affirmative and negative clauses.

#### § 87. B. Voice.

a. "Third sense of Middle Voice." The ascription to the Middle Voice of this meaning,—‘to get a thing done by another,’—is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (*διδάσκεισθαι*), by some passages in the *Meno*.

*Meno* 93 d, *ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν υἱὸν ἱππεία μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν*; and, just after, *ἐπαιδεύσατο*—where the whole point of the passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself distinctively.

On the other hand, we have

*Meno* 94 c, *Θουκυδίδης αὖ δύο υἱεῖς ἔθρεψε . . . , καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσε τὰ τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαυσαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθία ἔδωκε τὸν δὲ Εὐδώρω*—where the Active *ἐπαίδευσε* is as distinctively used of the father's *getting his sons taught by others*. Similarly ib. b, d, *ἐδίδαξε*.

As the favourite example, *διδάσκεισθαι*, thus<sup>8</sup> falls to the ground, so do the rest. *Δανείζεσθαι*, for instance, is ‘to take a *δανεῖον*,’ as *δανείζειν* is ‘to give a *δανεῖον*’ that is, the general meaning of the Verb being ‘to deal in *δανεία*,’ the Middle means ‘to deal in them for oneself.’ So it is with other Verbs expressing transactions to which there must be two parties: *χρᾶν* and *χρησθαι* express the active and passive side of ‘dealing in oracles.’ So, rather differently, ‘bringing a man to justice’ becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the judge, *κρίνειν*, and, on the interested side, the office of the prosecutor, *κρίνεσθαι*.

The fact is, that the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning ‘to get a thing done by another;’ neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle that “qui facit per alium facit per se.”

Examples of the Active Verb having this meaning may be found in Æsch. Ag. 594, “Ὅμως δ’ ἔθνον,—where Clytæmnestra attributes to herself the same action which was in v. 87 described by the words *περίπεμπτα θυοσκυεῖς*,—in Hdt. iii. 80, [*ἀνὴρ τύραννος*] *κτείνει ἀκρίτους*, &c.

§ 88. b. There is a genuine inherent sense of Verbs, which deserves more distinct notice than it has received. It stands halfway between the Middle and the Passive.

‘To allow oneself to be,’ ‘to expose oneself to be,’ ‘to get oneself,’—subjected to this or that, may be designated the *Semi-Middle* sense. The following are examples.

Crito 48 d, *ἐξάγοντες καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι*—‘allowing ourselves to be carried across the border.’

Phædo 67 a, *ἀναμιμνῶμεθα*—‘allow ourselves to be infected.’ And so Hip. Ma. 291 a.

Soph. 253 b, [*φθόγγους*] *τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μή*—‘which allow themselves to be united’—i. e. ‘which harmonise.’

Meno 91 c, *μηδένα . . . τοσαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι*—‘get himself into disgrace.’

Phileb. 58 c, *ἀπεχθήσει Γοργία*—‘you will incur the hatred of Gorgias.’

<sup>8</sup> *διδάσασθαι* also means ‘to take a pupil.’ So Pind. Ol. viii. 77, *τὸ διδάσασθαι δέ τοι εἰδότε ῥάτερον*, Simonid. ap. Gaisf. Fr. liv. p. 377, *διδασάμενος*

*χορὸν ἀνδρῶν*, Arist. Nub. 783, ‘*Ἰθλαεῖς ἀπὲρρῶ, οὐκ ἂν διδασαίμην σ’ ἐτι* (Socrates speaks.)’

Apol. 35 c, *χρὴ οὕτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίξειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιτορκεῖν, οὐθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίξεσθαι.*

Equally marked is the existence of this use in other authors.

Hom. Od. ii. 33, *ὀνήμενος*—‘one that earns a benefit,’ iv. 373, *ὥς δὲ δῆθ' ἐνὶ νήσῳ ἐρύκειαι*—‘allowest thyself to be detained’ by Calypso. Thuc. i. 77, *ἐλασσούμενοι ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαῖαις δίκαις*, ‘letting ourselves be curtailed of our due,’ similarly iv. 64, *ὅσον εἰκὸς ἥσσαισθαι.* Eur. Phœn. 602, (A) *καὶ σε δεύτερόν γ' ἀπαιτῶ σκῆπτρα καὶ θρόνους χθονός.* (B) *οὐκ ἀπαιτούμεσθα.* Soph. Aj. 217, *νύκτερος Ἀἴας ἀπελωβήθη.* Dem. de Cor. 277. p. 318, *τὴν ἐμὴν δεινότητα . . . εὐρήσετε πάντες ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐξεταζομένην ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀεὶ,* c. Dionys. 14. p. 1287, *ἡγούμενοι δεῖν ἐλαττοῦσθαί τι καὶ συγχωρεῖν.* Add *στεφανοῦσθαι*, so common in Pindar (e. g. Ol. vii. 15, Nem. vi. 19) for ‘winning a crown.’

Hence also the double sense of Verbals in -τός, as *γνωστός*, from *γινώσκειν*, ‘known:’ *γνωστός*, from *γινώσκεισθαι*, ‘capable of being known’ (lit. ‘allowing itself to be known’). And in privatives—*ἄλυστος*, from *λύειν*, ‘unbroken;’ *ἄλυστος*, from *λύεσθαι*, ‘that does not allow itself to be broken,’ ‘unbreakable.’

The same sense extends into Latin. Livy iii. 42, *Natura loci ac vallo, non virtute aut armis, tutabantur*, lit., ‘let themselves be protected by the strength of their position’—i. e. ‘were fain to let their natural and artificial defences protect them.’ So Juv. xv. 157, *defendier isdem Turribus*, Virg. Æn. ii. 707, *cervici imponere nostræ.* So *juris consultus* is ‘one who lets himself be consulted in matters of law.’

### § 89. C. Tense.

A Dependent sentence following a Main Past Construction is not affected (in Tense or Mood) by the Tense of the Main Construction in the following cases.

a. When a fact contemplated in the Dependent clause as already extant continues so at the time of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Phædo 98 b, *ἀπὸ δὲ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος ᾧ χρόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον κ.τ.λ.* The fact of which Socrates had become aware was one which, with its consequence of disappointed hopes, still remained in full force at the time at which he was speaking.

Ib. 99 d, *ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν,*

κ.τ.λ. The pursuit then already renounced had never since been resumed.

Apol. 21 b, ἡπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει. The judgment of the Oracle once uttered is regarded as remaining on record for all time.

Phædo 88 c, ἐδόκουν . . . εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν . . . , μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταί, ἥ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ἦ. There are here two Dependent clauses: the former, expressing a transitory contingency, is affected by the Main Construction and thrown into Oratio Obliqua; the second, expressing a hypothetical fact which if verified must be permanent, is not affected.

Tim. 32 c, ξυνέστησεν ὁ ξυριστὰς . . . τάδε διανοηθείς, πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα . . . τέλειον . . . εἴη, . . . ἔτι δὲ ἵνα ἀγῆρων καὶ ἄνοσον ἦ.

Cf. Lysias i. 6. p. 92, ἐπειδὴ . . . γυναῖκα ἡγαγόμεν . . . ἐφύλαττον . . . ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι παιδίον γίγνεται κ.τ.λ.

§ 90. β. When the event contemplated as future in the Dependent clause is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Apol. 17 a, ἔλεγον, ὥς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε —because the deception threatened was to be looked for in the speech which was now but begun.

Symp. 193 e, πάντῃ ἂν ἐφοβούμεν, μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων . . . νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρῶ. At the moment at which this is said, the point of time when the contingency of ἀπορῆσαι will be decided is still future.

Apol. 29 c, ἔφη . . . λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὥς, εἰ διαφενεξοίμην, ἥδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νείεις διαφθαρήσονται. The reason why διαφενεξοίμην is affected by the Oratio Obliqua, though equally future with διαφθαρήσονται which remains unaffected, is that the Protasis describes an event purely hypothetical, not one assumed as about to happen at all. εἰ διαφεύξομαι would have implied an assumption that Socrates would be acquitted.

Symp. 198 b, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι . . . οὐδὲν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ὀλίγου ἀποδρὰς ῥαχόμεν. He has still the task before him, and still the feeling that he will be unequal to it.

Ib. 198 e, προυρρήθη γάρ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 85. p. 254, ἂ νῦν οὗτος ἔφη συμβήσεσθαι, εἰ ἂν ἐγὼ στεφανώμαι.

§ 91. The use of this construction is in Plato so carefully restricted to the cases just specified, that it would be unjustifiable to confound it with the simple irregular recurrence to the *Oratio Recta*, which is so common in other writers.

Symp. 190 c, ἐβουλεύοντο ὃ τι χρὴ αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι would be an exception to the rule, if χρὴ were an ordinary Verb.

The rule seems to hold in Homer, Il. v. 127, Od. iii. 15, and v. 23, and viii. 44, and xiii. 417, &c. Nitzsch (on Od. iii. 76) denies that the principle here pointed out is the true one. He points out two passages, Il. v. 567 and xv. 596, as refuting it. But in both these (1) the reading varies between Optative and Conjunctive, and (2) in both two purposes are mentioned, so that if the Conjunctive is the right reading it may well have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing the nearer and the remoter purpose.

§ 92. b. Imperfect Tense used for the *Oratio Obliqua* of the 'Prophetic Present.'

Symp. 190 c, οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείναιεν εἶχον . . . , αἱ τιμαὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἱερὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἠφανίζετο—where, just as οὐκ εἶχον is the *Oblique Narration* of *the thought* οὐκ ἔχομεν, 'they could not, they thought,' so ἠφανίζετο represents them thinking αἱ τιμαὶ ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ. ἀφανίζεται. Now ἀφανίζεται would have been a 'Prophetic Present,' and so ἠφανίζετο is the *Oblique Narration* of this.

Cf. Antipho ii. A. β. 9. p. 117, ἀλοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ᾗδεν ἐκστησόμενος, τῆς δὲ πόλεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἔστερούμην—'I felt I could not be.' Andoc. i. 58-60. p. 8, φονεὺς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγινόμην κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα σκοπῶν εὗρισκον κ.τ.λ.—where the σκοπῶν shews that ἐγινόμην means 'I felt I was on the way to become.'

§ 93. c. Aorist.

a. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the construction in which it stands.

Phdr. 249 a, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, ὅταν . . . τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἔτυχον.

Gorg. 484 a, εἰαν . . . φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ, . . . ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος.

Phileb. 17 d, ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένου σοφός.

Lysis 217 d, ὅταν δὴ τὸ γῆρας αὐταῖς ταῦτὸν τοῦτο χρῶμα ἐπαγάγῃ, τότε ἐγένοντο . . . λευκαί.

The Subjunctive construction with ἄν, not admissible with a past

Tense, constrains us to see in the Aorist the expression of an action instantaneously complete, rather than of an action necessarily past.

§ 94. β. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the context.

Phædo 88 d, *πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον*; lit. ‘overtook’ (same metaphor as 89 c, *εἰ . . . με διαφεύγοι* [Hermann from first hand of Oxon.] ὁ λόγος). Cf. Pind. Ol. vi. 62, *μετάλλασέν τέ μιν*. Antipho ii. A. a. 3. p. 115, *ἕως ἂν διωχθῇ*, ‘until he is caught.’

Ib. 108 c, *[ἡ μὲν] φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρόπονσαν οἴκησιν* ἡ δὲ . . . *ῥῆκε τὸν αὐτῇ ἐκάστη τύπον προσήκοντα*—the good soul, without a moment of suspense, or sensible lapse of time, ‘at once finds a home in’ &c.

Symp. 172 a, *οὗτος, οὐ περιμένεις*; *Κἀγὼ ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα*—not ‘waited for him to come up with me,’ but ‘let him come up with me.’

Ib. 173 b, *τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω μοι*; Same phrase Protag. 310 a, ‘why not at once relate it to me?’ So Phædo 86 d, Soph. 251 c, &c. Cf. Arist. Vesp. 213, *τί οὐκ ἀπεκοιμήθημεν*;

Symp. 209 a, *ἂ ψυχῇ προσήκει καὶ κυῆσαι καὶ κυεῖν*. *κυῆσαι* is the first moment of the state *κυεῖν*.

Hence Apol. 21 c, 22 d, *ἔδοξε, ἔδοξαν*, ‘I came to think.’

§ 95. D. Impersonal Verbs.

Impersonal Verbs in the same rigid form as in Latin do not exist in Greek. Even those which express the processes of inanimate nature, as *ἔει, νίφει, ἔσεισε* (Thuc. iv. 52), are only impersonal in that particular use, and not always so even then.

We find, however, in addition to these,

§ 96. a. Passive Impersonals (the nearest approach in Greek to strict Impersonals).

Phdr. 232 a, *οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπόνηται*.

Ib. 261 b, *λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται*.

Politic. 299 a, *ὦν δ’ ἂν καταψηφισθῇ*.

Legg. 914 a, *δηλωθέντων* (Genitive Absolute).

§ 97. b. Quasi-Impersonals (as we may call them), where a vague Nominative, such as ‘the circumstances,’ ‘the event,’ ‘the course of events,’ is understood. The common words *ἐνδέχεται, παρέχει* (Thuc. iv. 85 &c.), the phrase *οὕτως ἔχει*, &c., are such cases. We do not know always whether the vague understood Nominative is Plural or Singular, except where the Verb is represented by a periphrasis



(as Hom. Il. iv. 345, φῶλ' [ῆν], xiv. 98, Τρωσὶ μὲν εὐκτὰ γένηται, xvi. 128, οὐκέτι φυκτὰ πέλονται, xxi. 533, οἷω λοιγὸν ἔσεσθαι, Od. ii. 203, ἴσα ἔσσεται, viii. 384, Ἥδ' ἄρ' ἔτοιμα τέτυκτο, xi. 455, οὐκέτι πιστὰ γυναιξίν, Thuc. ii. 3, ἐπεὶ ἔτοιμα ἦν, i. 102, τοῦτον ἐνδεᾶ ἐφαίνετο, i. 7, πλωῦμωτέρων ὄντων, Hdt. vi. 52, δηλὰ σφι ἔσεσθαι, the common ἀδύνατά ἐστι, &c.), or where (as in several of the following) an Adjective stands in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Rep. 580 d, δέξεται, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐτέραν ἀποδείξω—'the case will admit.'

Ib. 452 d, καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο—'the result made this plain also.'

Phædo 73 b, ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει—'what ensues is proof positive,' &c.

Apol. 28 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ—lit. 'lest the course of events should come to a stand-still.' 'There is no danger of the rule breaking down in my case.' Cf. Ar. Eth. VI. viii. 9, στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ—'for there too demonstration must stop.' Hdt. iii. 82, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φόνου ἀπέβη ἐς μουναρχίην.

Phileb. 25 d, ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτόν δράσει—'perhaps it will do equally well now.'

Phædo 118 a, ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται—'when the action of the poison reaches the heart.'

§ 98. In the next instance, we find an Impersonal clause representing the Verb.

Tim. 24 e, ἐξ ἧς ἐπιβατόν ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας νήσους . . . ἐγίγνετο.

§ 99. In the following instances we find an Adjective or Participle in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Phileb. 20 c, προῦν δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει—'the sequel of the argument will make this yet clearer.'

Phædo 117 b, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει—'the agent left to itself will complete its work.' There is delicacy in the vagueness with which both the deadly agent and its effect are designated.

Theæt. 200 e, ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος ἔφη ἄρα δείξω αὐτό. A man who goes first through a stream, if asked, "How deep is it?", says, "How can I tell beforehand? *we shall see*." From this passage we gather that the expression was in popular use.

Critias 108 c, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οἷόν ἐστιν, αὐτό σοι τάχα δηλώσει.

Hip. Ma. 288 b, ὅτι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσει εὖ οἶδα· εἰ δ' ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος αὐτὸ δείξει—'we shall see by the event.'

Protag. 324 a, αὐτὸ σε διδάξει.

Ib. 329 b, ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὥς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ.

§ 100. Cf. Hdt. v. 78, δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἐν μόνον, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἐστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, vi. 86, οὔτε μέμνημαι τὸ πρῆγμα, οὔτε με περιφέρει οὐδὲν εἰδέναι τουτέων τῶν ὑμεῖς λέγετε. Æsch. Choeph. 993, Φίλον τέως, νῦν δ' ἐχθρόν, ὥς φαίνει, κακόν ('as the event shews.') Æschin. i. 40. p. 6, ὥς αὐτὸ τοῦργον ἔδειξεν. Antipho v. 60. p. 136, αὐτῷ μοι πρόφασιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν ἄνδρα. Lysias x. 20. p. 118, δηλώσει δέ (sc. id quod sequitur δηλώσει) οἰχίσεται γάρ.

§ 101. We find also Non-Impersonal sentences on the model of some of the foregoing, e. g.

Crat. 393 c, τὸ ὄνομα, ὃ αὐτὸ ἡμῶν δηλώσει κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 402 c, τοῦτό γε (τὸ ὄνομα) ὀλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 237 b, καὶ μάλιστά γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἂν δηλώσειε.

Cf. Dem. c. Dionys. 13. p. 1287, ἐδήλωσε δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον. Eur.

Hel. 146 sqq., (A) Συμπροξένησον, ὥς τύχῳ μαντευμάτων Ὅπη νεὼς στείλαιμ' ἂν οὐρίον πτερόν κ.τ.λ.—(B) Πλοῦς, ὃ ξέν', αὐτὸς σημαίνει.

§ 102. E. Intransitive use of Verbs Transitive.

Some Verbs Transitive recede, in particular significations, into Intransitive Verbs. At the same time, they do not cease to be Active; neither do they become strictly Reflexive.

This happens in two cases.

§ 103. a. When that, to which the action was originally represented as passing on, is, or comes to be regarded as, a part of the Agent; and when further the mention of it can be dropped without marring the sense. Ἔχειν, in several of its senses, exemplifies this process.

From ἔχειν governing an Accusative of part of the Subject we have, e. g. Hom. Od. xix. 38, κίονες ὑψὸς ἔχοντες—'holding,' properly not themselves, but their *heads*, or, vaguely, *parts of themselves*, aloft. So Hdt. i. 181, ἀνάβασις ἐς αὐτοὺς ἔξωθεν κύκλῳ περὶ πάντας τοὺς πύργους ἔχουσα πεποιήται—where ἔχουσα has for its Object each part of the ἀνάβασις in succession.

From ἔχειν governing an Accusative of that which comes to be regarded as part of the Subject, we have e. g. Od. iii. 182, αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε Πύλονδ' ἔχον—'held my ship on her course for Pylos;'—the

ship, as following the will of her captain, is, when we are speaking of his movements, virtually part of him ;—whence simply ‘I held on for Pylos.’

On the other hand, in the following passage *κατέχειν* has for its Object that which is literally a part of the Subject.

Phædo 117 c, οἱοί τ' ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύνειν—‘to keep themselves,’—but properly those parts of themselves which had to do with the particular affection in question.

So again the common ἔχε δὴ (Crat. 439 a, Gorg. 490 b, Lach. 198 b, Legg. 639 d) is ‘hold,’ scil. your foot from advancing—your tongue from speaking—your thoughts from running on—(as the case may be).

Gorg. 475 d, τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων—‘offering,’ not strictly oneself, but the particular limb or part needing treatment.

§ 104. Other examples in Plato are

Rep. 388 e, ὅταν τις ἐφίῃ ἰσχυρῷ γέλωτι. So 563 a, ξυγκαθιέναι.

Ib. 422 c, ἀναστρέφειν. So Lach. 191 e.

Ib. 467 b, ἀναλαβεῖν.

Ib. 473 b, μεταβαλεῖν.

Ib. 540 a, 591 e, παρακινεῖν. So 573 c, ὑποκινεῖν.

Phædo 65 a, ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι.

Ib. 98 d, χαλῶντα καὶ ξυντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα.

Phdr. 228 e, παῖε. Jelf instances this also in Hom. Od. i. 340, iv. 659. [In Od. i. 340 the reading seems doubtful.]

Politic. 258 a, Θεωτήτω, . . . ξυνέμιξα.

Phædo 72 b, εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδούη—lit. (as we might say) ‘put in an appearance on the other side.’

§ 105. This Intransitive use of these Verbs becomes so natural, that, after it is established, when in particular cases it is convenient that the Object should be expressed, it is expressed in the Dative.

E. g. Il. xxiii. 686, ἀνασχομένῳ χερσὶ στιβαρῇσι. The language had been accustomed to ἀνασχέσθαι Intransitive for holding up the hands ; so that when, in order to characterise the hands, the poet desires to express the Object, it falls more naturally into the Dative.

So Od. ix. 489, Ἐμβαλέειν κώπης—ἐμβαλεῖν being used alone, e. g. in Aristoph. Ran. 206, for ‘dashing in the oars.’ (An erroneous interpretation of this last passage arises from neglect of the principle we are noticing.)

So Od. x. 140, ἡ κατηγαγόμευθα.

§ 106. b. When the Accusative of the Object, not being in any way referable to the Agent, is nevertheless so natural a sequence to the Verb, that the Verb itself will suggest it if omitted.

Symp. 196 d, *πειρατέον μὴ ἐλλείπειν*—‘to fall short’—lit. ‘to leave a deficiency of so much in a given quantity.’

Phdr. 237 d, *θέμενοι ὄρον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιῶμεθα. ἀναφέροντες*, ‘referring,’ scil. our assertions and reasonings.

Gorg. 512 e, *ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ*—‘entrusting,’ scil. the decision.

§ 107. Some uses of *ἔχειν* illustrate this process also.

We find, Thuc. iii. 89, *τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων*—there is no need to express *what* they pervaded or occupied, since *σεισμοὶ* (so used) must be *σεισμοὶ τῆς γῆς*. Or when *ἔχειν* is used of an army occupying a position, the Verb alone suffices to express this. And (as we have seen in the parallel case) so fixed may this use become, that when the position occupied needs to be expressed, another construction is found for it; cf. Thuc. iii. 34, *ἐν διατειχίσματι εἶχον* so viii. 28. Similarly a general moving his army is said *ἄγειν*, without any Object expressed: whence the next step is that the whole army, which strictly *ἄγεται*, is said *ἄγειν* cf. Thuc. v. 54, *Ἀργεῖοι δ’ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσέβαλον*. [So Arnold: *ἐσέβαλλον* Porpo and Göller].

§ 108. This is the account of a variation, which might else be taken merely for one of government:—

Phædo 58 c–59 a, *οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδεῖον ἔλεος εἰσῆι . . . διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνν μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῆι*. An emotion may be said either to enter the person himself (as in *ἔλεός με εἰσῆι*), or to enter his soul; but in this case if the reference to the person be made clear the mention of the soul may be spared; that is, the Verb becomes Intransitive, and is followed by a Dative of the person (as in the latter sentence of the passage quoted).

§ 109. F. Uses of the Participle.

a. Periphrastically, with Auxiliary Verb Substantive.

Politic. 273 b, *πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας*.

Ib. 274 c, *εἶναι γεγονός*. 289 a, *ἦν ἂν τεθέν*. 308 c, *ἐστὶ τείνοντα*.

Tim. 38 c, *ἐστὶν ὄν*. 68 d, *ἡγνοκῶς ἂν εἶη*. 77 c, *εἶη διαδιδόμενον*.

Soph. 244 c, τὸ ἀποδέχεσθαι . . . [ἐστὶ] λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον.

Legg. 860 c, εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντά ἐστιν.

§ 110. β. Peculiar Intransitive use of ἔχων with Verbs.

Euthyd. 295 c, ἔχων φλυαρεῖς.

Phdr. 236 c, τί δὴτα ἔχων στρέφει;

§ 111. IDIOMS OF PREPOSITIONS.

Ἀνά.

In Composition.

Phædo 87 a, ἀνατίθεται. Of withdrawing any deed or word. Not a metaphor from draughts particularly, though capable of being so applied—as in

Hipparch. 229 c, ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων. Cf. Soph. Aj. 476, Προσθεῖσα κἀναθέῖσα τοῦ γε κατθανεῖν, and Lobeck's note upon it.

Ἀπό.

Of the use of the bodily members.

Rep. 613 b, δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μή—‘who run fairly with their legs, but with the upper part of their bodies (head, neck, arms) in bad form.’ (Even supposing that κάτω could refer to the starting point and ἄνω to the turning point, which can scarcely be supported by instances, the absolute use of τὰ κάτω and τὰ ἄνω in this meaning is inconceivable.)

Legg. 795 b, ὁ τελέως παγκράτιον ἡσκηκὼς . . . οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἀδύνατός ἐστι μάχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 656, λόγισαι φαύλως μὴ ψήφοις ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ χειρός.

§ 112. Διά.

a. With Accusative; ‘by help of.’ This is the use so common afterwards in the Orators.

Rep. 352 c, ἐνῇν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, . . . δι’ ἣν ἔπραξαν ἂ ἔπραξαν.

b. With Genitive.

Phædo 82 e, τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἀναγκαζομένην . . . σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα . . . μὴ αὐτὴν δι’ αὐτῆς—‘acting only by and through itself,’ independently of anything external to itself.

So Rep. 510 b, αὐτοῖς εἶδеси δι’ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη, and similarly 511

Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 14, *ὅταν μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται.*

Rep. 463 e, *εἰ ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φέγγονται.*

Ib. 580 b, *ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτῆς ἀποφαίνεται*—‘the paramount judge decides absolutely.’ An ordinary sense of *διὰ πάντων*, beginning with Homer.

Meno 74 a, *τὴν μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστί*—‘which is out beyond all these,’ i.e. ‘which all these run up to,’ ‘which is paramount to all these.’

Rep. 343 b, *διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας*—‘night after night and day after day.’

Ib. 621 a, *πορεύεσθαι διὰ καύματος τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ.*

Symp. 220 b, *ἀννόδητος διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ἐπορεύετο.* This use of *διὰ* in prose is unique: see Bernhardt's Syntax, p. 234. It obtains in poetry, beginning with Homer's *διὰ νήσου ἰὼν* in Od. xii. 335. Is its employment in the text intended for the sake of grandiloquence?

c. In Composition.

Symp. 221 b, *διαπορεύεσθαι*, and Critias 106 a, *διαπορεία*—of traversing a certain interval of space between two defined points,—‘doing the distance.’ Cf. *διαθεῖν*, Protag. 335 e.

### § 113. *Εἰς*.

a. Of progress along or in a certain route.

Phædo 114 b, *φέρονται . . . εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς*—not ‘into’ but ‘along’ or ‘down’ the rivers<sup>9</sup>.

### § 114. *β*. ‘To the number of.’

Legg. 704 b, *ἀπέχει θαλάττης εἰς τινὰς ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους.*

Cf. Thuc. iv. 124, *ὀλίγου ἐς χιλίους.* So Xenophon and Demosth.

### § 115. *γ*. ‘In regard to,’ ‘in the point of,’ ‘with a view to.’

Symp. 184 b, *ἐνεργετούμενος εἰς χρήματα.*

Ibid. d, *ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ξυμβάλλεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παιδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι.*

Ib. 196 c, *εἰς γε ἀνδρίαν* Ἐρωτι οὐδὲ Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται.

Ib. 219 d, *ἀνθρώπων τοιούτῳ οἷῳ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἂν ᾤμην ποτὲ ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν.*

Theæt. 169 a, *ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ἀστρονομίαν.*

<sup>9</sup> [Under this example is in the MS. “Cf. Odyss.”]

Theæt. 178 e, τὸ περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἐκάστω ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὅστισούν ;

Legg. 635 a, ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως, εἰς ἃ καὶ μηδὲν γε ἀνῆς ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ἡμῶν.

Euthyd. 305 d, τὰ νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἷσεσθαι σοφίας πέρι.

Cf. Hom. Il. iii. 158, Αἰνῶς ἀθανάτησι θεῆς εἰς ὧπα ἔοικεν. Also Andoc. ii. 23. p. 22, πολιτείαν διδόντας τε, καὶ εἰς χρήματα μεγάλας δωρεάς. Lysias xxvi. 21. p. 177, περὶ ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν οὗτος εἰπείν ἔξει εἰς μισοδημίαν.

### § 116. 'Εκ.

a. Euthyd. 282 a, ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρασκευάζεσθαι.

b. Apol. 23 a, ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο—'hereupon : ' the notion is of sequence of time rather than consequence. Cf. Æsch. Eum. 2, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Θέμιν, Choeph. 1055, Ποταίνιον γὰρ αἰμά σοι χερσὶν ἔτι 'Εκ τῶνδ' ἐ τοι παραγμὸς ἐς φρένας πίτνει.

### § 117. 'Εν.

a. 'In the point of.'

Rep. 402 d, ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα—'agreeing in their aspect.'

Symp. 213 e, νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

Theæt. 206 a, τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ὕψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος.

b. Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 457 a, ἐμβραχύ. Cf. the form καθεῖς in St. John viii. 9, ἐξήρχοντο εἰς καθεῖς.

### § 118. 'Επί.

a. With Dative ;—'in connection with'—signifying a more material connection than it signifies with the Genitive.

Rep. 376 e, ἔστι δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.

Ib. 408 b, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν τέχνην δεῖν εἶναι.

Ib. 532 e, ἐπ' ἀδυναμία βλέπειν.

Symp. 186 a, [Ἔρωσ] οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 184 e, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

Ib. 186 b, ἄλλος μὲν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγίεινῳ Ἔρωσ ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσῶδει.

Ib. 210 a, τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὄτφοῦν σώματι.

Ibid. b, τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλόν.

Soph. 247 d, τὸ ἐπὶ τε τούτοις ἄμα καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις ξυμφυεῖς γεγονός.

Politic. 310 a, ἐπὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῦτ' εἶναι τέχνη φάρμακον.



Tim. 48 e, *ικανὰ ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεχθείσιν.*

Cf. Andoc. i. 25. p. 4, *τῶν φευγόντων ἐπὶ τοῖς μυστηρίοις.*

§ 119. b. Adverbially compounded.

Legg. 697 c, *ἐπὶ ἔτι χείρους.*

Cf. Hom. Od. viii. 245, *ἐξ ἔτι πατρῶν.*

§ 120. c. In Composition.

Crito 43 c, *ἐπιλύεται*—‘exempts.’ Perhaps the meaning of *ἐπὶ* is ‘with a further result’ or ‘condition,’ and so *ἐπιλύεσθαι* would be to obtain a man’s release, under the condition of a ransom to be paid. Similarly would *ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι* be ‘to announce so as to bind oneself in time to come,’ and so ‘to offer,’ ‘promise.’

Symp. 172 a, *ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα*. *ἐπιστῆναι* is to stop in the course of progress from one point to another. *σῆναι* is to stop, without any reference to moving again. So *ἐπιλέγεσθαι* is to pick out, e. g. in passing along a line. *ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα* is equivalent to the one word *ἐπέμεινα*. For *ἐπιμένειν* see under *περί*, § 127.

Phædo 62 c, *ὁ Σωκράτης . . . ἐπιβλέψας πρὸς ἡμᾶς*. From the notion of succession here again we should get ‘looking [from Cebes] to us,’—‘turning to us.’ Cf. Apol. 31 d, *ἐπικωμῶδῶν.*

§ 121. *Κατά.*

a. With Accusative.

Legg. 918 a, *ἔπεται κατὰ πόδα*—‘in close succession.’

Soph. 243 d, *κατὰ πόδα γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες*—‘you have caught at once the train of the thought.’ This is of course a pregnant use of the Preposition, implying *κατὰ πόδα ἐπόμενος*.

b. With Genitive, in Attributive sense.

Meno 74 b, *μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων.*

Ib. 76 a, *κατὰ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω.*

Ib. 77 a, *κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι.*

Phædo 70 d, *μὴ τοίνυν κατ’ ἀνθρώπων σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο*—‘consider this not as an attribute of mankind only.’ The *κατά*, in a pregnant use, stands for *ὡς κατ’ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενον*.

Phdr. 260 b, *συντιθεὶς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου.*

§ 122. c. In Composition.

a. Symp. 219 c, *καταδαρθάνειν*—‘to earn by sleeping.’

β. Of doing a thing without regard to other considerations.

Apol. 33 c, οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεθθεῖη—implying the request to be unprincipled or arbitrary.

Legg. 861 b, δούς δὲ οὐδένα λόγον ὡς ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε, κατανομοθετήσῃ.

Cf. Lysias vi. 3. p. 103, ἣ κατελεῆσαι ἢ καταχαρίσασθαι Ἀνδοκίδῃ.

Isæus vii. 38. p. 67, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀποδοῦναι τὰ ὄντ' αὐτῷ καταναγκάσαντες—'peremptorily compelling.'

This κατὰ often, but not always or necessarily (see the last instance), gives an unfavourable meaning to the word.

### § 123. Μέχρι.

Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 487 c, μέχρι ὅποι.

### § 124. Παρά.

a. With Accusative.

a. Soph. 242 a, παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαντόν.

Cf. Pind. Pyth. x. 62, παρ ποδός, and Soph. Phil. 838, παρὰ πόδα.

β. Apol. 36 a, οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον—literally, 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared, i. e. so near it.

γ. In Comparison; signifying not 'beyond' but 'contrasted with' (lit. 'put coordinate with').

Phdr. 276 e, παγκάλῃν λέγεις παρὰ φαύλῃν παιδιάν.

Theæt. 144 a, ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὄντινόν.

For other instances see Idioms of Comparison, § 174. Cf. Thuc. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε.

b. With Dative.

Rep. 366 b, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν—'our dealings both with gods and with men will be what we desire.'

Symp. 188 d, ὁ περὶ τὰγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης . . . ἀποτελούμενος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς [Ἐρως]—'temperance exercised in dealings between ourselves (men) and with the gods.'

§ 125. c. With Genitive;—'obtained from' or 'proceeding from,'—of a sentiment or opinion.

Legg. 733 a, τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρή λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν.

Soph. 226 d, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.

Legg. 692 b, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν γινώσκεισθαι ταῦτα . . . οὐδὲν σοφόν—'that these things should receive recognition from us.'

Crat. 412 e, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται.

Politic. 296 a, λόγον τὸν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον.

Critias 107 b, τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν ῥηθέντα.

Protag. 312 b, ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακλεις τῷ ἐρῶντι παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστή. (παρὰ πάντων follows παρακλεις.)

Cf. Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογουμένως ταῦθ' ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει.

§ 126. In the remaining instances the Preposition has a pregnant force: that is, the fact that an opinion or sentiment is referred to is left to be understood from the *παρά*.

Rep. 362 c, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκεύασθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον.

Ib. 461 e, βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 612 c, μισθοὺς . . . ὅσους τε καὶ οἷους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν.

Ibid. d, ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων.

Tim. 52 d, οὔτος . . . παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς ψήφου λογισθεὶς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δεδόσθω λόγος.

With this use of *παρά* cf. that of *πρός*, Hdt. iii. 137, ἵνα φανῇ πρὸς Δαρείου ἐὼν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐωντοῦ δόκιμος. Antipho i. 25. p. 114, καὶ γὰρ ἂν δικαιότερον καὶ ὀσιώτερον καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένοιτο ὑμῖν.

## § 127. Περὶ.

b<sup>10</sup>. With Dative—‘in the sphere of,’ literally.

Protag. 314 a, ὅρα μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης.

Phædo 114 d, θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα. The feeling is represented as locally watching over its object.

d. In Composition.

Phædo 59 e, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρὸς . . . εἶπε περιμένειν, καὶ μὴ πρότερον παρίεναι κ.τ.λ. The meaning of *περιμένειν* will be elucidated by distinguishing it from *ἐπιμένειν*. *ἐπιμένειν* is to stop in the course of a progress from one point to another until somebody comes or something happens. The *ἐπί*, as in *ἐπιστῆναι*, is local, and it also presumes that the progress is to be resumed. It answers to the Latin *præstolari*. *περιμένειν* is to defer *any* intended proceeding, to remain *in statu quo*, until

<sup>10</sup> [In the MS. the uses of *περὶ* with the Dative are lettered b., its uses in Composition d. Apparently uses with

the Accusative and the Genitive were to have come in, lettered a. and c.]

a certain future moment. The *περὶ* has reference simply to the lapse of the interval of time. Hence *περιμένειν* here is 'to wait a certain time,' which time is specified in the next words. *ἐπιμένειν* would be unsuitable, as the admission of the visitors into the prison could hardly be regarded as a continuation of their walk to the prison.

Symp. 172 a, ὁ Φαληρεὺς, ἔφη, οὗτος Ἀπολλόδωρος, οὐ περιμένεις; Κἀγὼ ἐπιστάς περιέμεινα. Here the addition of the local *ἐπιστάς* in the second sentence shews that *περιμένειν* is not local. οὐ περιμένεις; 'wait a moment' is more civil than 'wait *there*.'

### § 128. Πρὸς.

a. With Accusative. Pregnant force;—i. e. not 'for' but '*in regard of fitness for*': in other words, the Preposition is related to the sentence, in which it stands, not immediately, but through the medium of an unexpressed clause.

Phædo 117 b, τί λέγεις περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πόματος, πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τινι;—'what sayest thou as to this draught admitting of a libation to a deity?' lit. 'in regard of its fitness for a libation.'

Protag. 328 b, νοῆσαι τινα, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καγαθὸν γενέσθαι—'to notice a person [favourably] in regard of his fitness for becoming' &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνῆσαν ἅλες ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν.

Legg. 757 c, νέμει τιμὰς μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν αἰὲ μείζους κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 69 a, ὃ ῥοθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ—lit. 'right in regard of fitness for making men good.'

Rep. 581 e, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἐκάστου τοῦ εἶδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ . . . πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν.

b. With Dative.

Phædo 112 c, ἄναντες γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ρεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος. [So Oxon.]

Ib. 84 c, πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν—'absorbed in.'

Cf. Dem. F. L. 127. p. 380, ἦν ὅλος πρὸς τῷ λόγῳ (Jelf).

§ 129. c. In Composition with a Verb *πρὸς* sometimes has the general meaning of 'additionally,' and therefore rather qualifies the whole sentence than unites with the Verb, and does not affect in any way the meaning of the Verb.

Rep. 521 d, δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα—'to have in addition.'

Ib. 607 b, προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ—'and let us say to her moreover.'

Theæt. 208 c, τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ—‘apprehends in addition its difference from other things.’ So 209 d, προσδοξάσαι.

Apol. 20 a, σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα δίδοντας, καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι.

Phædo 74 a, τότε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν.

Gorg. 516 d, Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτά ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεξήμωσαν.

### § 130. ‘Υπέρ.

‘With a view to.’

Phædo 107 c, ἐπιμελείας δέεται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν.

Protag. 318 d, εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου ἐρωτῶντι.

Cf. Lysias xii. 78. p. 127, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀποθανόντος Θηραμένους ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ πονηρίας.

### § 131. ‘Υπό.

a. Adverbially compounded.

Phdr. 242 d, ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ [λόγον]—‘somewhat impious.’

Gorg. 493 c, ὑπό τι ἄτοπα.

b. In Composition.

a. ὑπολογίζεσθαι.

Apol. 28 d, Crito 48 d, Phdr. 231 b.

Similarly,

Protag. 349 c, ἔγωγε οὐδὲν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι.

Lach. 189 b, λέγ’ οὖν μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος.

Note, that ὑπολογίζεσθαι is not restricted to an unfavourable sense; cf. Lysias xxx. 16. p. 184, οὐδὲν εἰκὸς αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπόλογον γενέσθαι [so Bekker; οὐδένα . . . τούτου Zurich editors]—where αὐτῷ means ‘in his favour,’ and xxviii. 13. p. 180, οὐδὲ ἀδίκως τούτοις φημι ἂν εἶναι ὑπόλογον τὴν ἐκείνων φυγὴν,—not, as Taylor, ‘honestam excusationem in suo exsilio habere,’ but ‘non injuria iis laudi imputandum.’

The word does not mean ‘to subtract,’ according to our notion of the operation; but ‘to reckon against,’ ‘per contra’ :—the same meaning of ὑπό which we get in ὑπαντᾶν, ὑπωμοσία (‘an affidavit to stop’ proceedings), ὑποτιμᾶσθαι (equivalent to ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι).

β. ὑποπίνειν.

Rep. 372 d, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες.

## § 132. IDIOMS OF PARTICLES.

A. καὶ expletive,—preceding and indicating the emphatic word.

a. In Relative Interrogative or Conditional sentences. Here καὶ may generally<sup>11</sup> be rendered ‘at all.’

Phædo 77 b, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι—‘before it came at all.’

Ib. 88 a, πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς—‘before we came into being at all.’

Ib. 110 a, ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ᾖ—‘exists at all.’

Apol. 22 a, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γίγναιτο. Here καὶ fastens itself to the latter portion of the compound ἀνέλεγκτος—‘not to be called in question at all.’

Phædo 66 d, εἰάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται.

Ib. 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην—‘if I even had had the knowledge.’

Ib. 110 b, εἰ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν—‘if it is allowable to narrate a fiction at all.’

Cf. Thuc. i. 15, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο.

This καὶ frequently enters into a set phrase with the Adjective σμικρός.

Apol. 28 b, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν.

Soph. 247 c, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι συγχωρεῖν.

Ib. 261 b, θαρρεῖν χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν τι δυνάμενον.

Phileb. 58 a, ξύμπαντας ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται.

Politic. 278 d, πῶς . . . δύναται ἂν τις ἀρχόμενος ἀπὸ δόξης ψευδοῦς ἐπὶ τι τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ μικρὸν μέρος ἀφικόμενος κτήσασθαι φρόνησιν;

The remaining passages shew the καὶ entering into Interrogative phrases.

Euthyphro 3 a, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;

Ib. 6 b, τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν;

Phædo 61 c, τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιῶι ἄλλο;

Laches 184 d, τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιῶι;

<sup>11</sup> Perhaps it is better to say that the key to these passages is e.g. Thuc. ii. 11, οὐκ οὐν χρὴ, εἴ τῳ καὶ δοκοῦμεν πλήθει ἐπίνειν, τούτου ἕνεκα ἀμελέστερόν τι παρεσκευασμένους χωρεῖν—‘if any one considers that we are a numerous force, as we are,’—or rather ‘if we are

a numerous force, which it might strike any one we were.’ So Arist. Eth. Nic. V. xv. 9, εἰς ἃ δὲ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν—‘upon this view there is, what we are inclined to think there is, injury of oneself.’

There is a latent affirmation in a simple Interrogative sentence with *τί*. The *καί* neutralises this affirmation. 'What have you done?' implies that you have done something: the first instance above shews how this implication is neutralised. It is not so with *πῶς καί*, *ποῦ καί*, &c., where the *καί* affirms the implied Proposition: Æsch. Choeph. 528, *Ποῖ καὶ τελευτᾷ . . . λόγος*; 'what was the issue?'—implying expectation of one. [Dindorf with the MSS. reads *Καὶ ποῖ*. Cf. however Eurip. Phœn. 1354, *Πῶς καὶ πέπρακται διπτύχων παίδων φόνος*;]

β. In Affirmative Independent sentences. Here the force of *καί* is often difficult to render by a word, but it seems to be always identical with the emphasis.

Phileb. 23 a, *παντάπασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη*.

Euthyd. 304 e, *οὕτωςι γάρ πως καὶ εἶπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι*.

Rep. 328 c, *διὰ χρόνον γάρ καὶ ἑωράκειν αὐτόν*.

Ib. 395 e, *πολλοῦ καὶ δείσσομεν*. This phrase often recurs.

Symp. 177 a, *φάναι δὴ πάντας καὶ βούλεσθαι*.

Ibid. b, *καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἦττον καὶ θαυμαστόν*—where Stallbaum well compares Thuc. vi. 1, *ἢ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπέθεντο*, but wrongly joins *καί*, both there and here, with the Adverb. [So Stallbaum, but his reference is wrong. He seems to mean Thuc. iv. 1, where the old editions have *ἢ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπετίθεντο*, Poppo and Göller with most of the MSS. *ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο*.]

Phædo 107 c, *ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι*.

Phileb. 25 b, *σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὥς οἶμαι*.

§ 133. Adverbs of intensity are often thus emphasized.

Apol. 18 b, *καὶ πάλα πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη*.

Rep. 342 c, *συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόγῃς*.

Symp. 189 a, *ἔφη εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μάλ' ἐπαύσατο*.

Ib. 194 a, *εἰ καὶ μάλ' ἂν φοβοῖο*.

Phædo 117 b, *καὶ μάλα ἴλεως*. Ibid. c, *καὶ μάλα εὐχερώς*.

Protag. 315 d, *στρώμασι καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς*.

Legg. 832 a, *καὶ μάλ' ἐνίστε οὐκ ἀφυεῖς ὄντας*.

Phædo 61 c, *καὶ γὰρ ἕως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκέισε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.*

Rep. 404 b, *ἀπλῇ πον καὶ ἐπιεικῆς γυμναστικῇ καὶ μάλιστα ἡ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον*.



Legg. 773 c, ἂ μὴ βουλόμεθα ξυμβαίνειν ἡμῖν, καὶ μάλιστα ξυμβαίνειν ταῖς πλείεσται πόλεσι.

Euthyd. 293 c, (A) 'Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπίστασθον; (B) Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς—'on the contrary.'

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 318, Δῶρον . . . δόμεναι οἰκόνδε φέρεσθαι, Καὶ μάλα καλὸν ἐλὼν, ib. 46, Καὶ λίην κείνός γε εἰκότι κείμεν ὀλέθρῳ, Π. xiii. 638, Τῶνπέρ τις καὶ μᾶλλον ἐέλδεται ἐξ ἔρον εἶναι, Od. viii. 154, Κῆδεά μοι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἤπερ ἄεθλοι. Hdt. ii. 69, οἱ δὲ περὶ Θήβας καὶ κάρτα ἤγνηται αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἱρούς (where of course καὶ κάρτα goes with ἤγνηται). Æsch. P. V. 728, Αἰταί σ' ὀδηγήσουσι καὶ μάλ' ἀσμένως, Choeph. 879, καὶ μάλ' ἡβῶντος δὲ δεῖ, Eum. 373, δόξαι τ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ μάλ' ὑπ' αἰθέρι σεμναῖ κ.τ.λ. Soph. El. 1455, Πάρεστι δῆτα καὶ μάλ' ἄζηλος θέα.

§ 134. Καὶ is subject to Hyperbaton in this use as in others. In the foregoing examples the καὶ indicates the stress laid on the word next following it: but when the word to be emphasized begins the clause the καὶ is sometimes postponed.

Phædo 63 c, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, δυσχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο—where the καὶ emphasizes δυσχυρισαίμην.

Ib. 68 c, ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην—where the stress of καὶ includes ἣν.

Gorg. 620 b, μόνους δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ᾤμην τοῖς δημηγόροις καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχαρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ—where καὶ emphasizes μόνους.

Cf. Hdt. i. 191, ἐς ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸ κάρτα ἐπύθοντο—i. e. (if the order allowed it) τὸ καὶ κάρτα.

### § 135. Μή.

a. In Indicative sentences expressing a negative supposition.

Theæt. 192 c, Σωκράτης ἐπιγιγνώσκει . . . , ὅρᾳ δὲ μηδέτερον—'but sees, by the supposition, neither.'

Phileb. 18 c, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ πῶς ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκότερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα εἰθὺς ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 106 d, σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο. The meaning is not 'of all things that exist scarce anything could be, in such a case, exempt from corruption,' but 'there could hardly exist anything not admitting corruption.' The existence of the whole class 'incorruptible' becomes questionable.

Hip. Ma. 297 c, ὃ ἂν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ποιῇ, μή τι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς—'suppose we say, not.'

Hip. Ma. 299 d, ἄρ' οὖν ἡδὺν ἡδέος . . . διαφέρει τῷ ἡδὺν εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐλάττων.

Politic. 292 e, πεπτευταὶ τοσοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν γένοιτό ποτε, μὴ τι δὴ βασιλεῖς γε—'let alone kings.' Comparing this with the last instance but one, we see how the force of μὴ τι is enhanced by its *following* the clause with which it is contrasted.

Tim. 26 c, λέγειν εἰμὶ ἔτοιμος, μὴ μόνον ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 295 e, μὴ ἐξέστω δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερα προστάττειν; ('is he to be forbidden?')

Cf. Æschin. iii. 21. p. 56, ὅτι ἦρξα, μὴ ἀποδημήσω; ('am I not to' &c.?)

The μὴ in the Brachylogical combination μὴ ὅτι comes under this head; for instances see below, § 154.

§ 136. β. In the Deprecatory form of contradiction.

Euthyd. 294 c, (A) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι ἀκοῦσαι κ.τ.λ.; (B) Μηδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 300 a, (A) τί δέ; (B) Μηδέν.

Protag. 318 b, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν λέγεις· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως.

Meno 75 a, (A) πειρῶ εἰπεῖν. (B) Μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ εἰπέ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 854, (A) Οὐτος σύ, ποῖ θεῖς; ἐπὶ καδίσκους; (B) Μηδαμῶς.

§ 137. γ. In the sense of 'whether.'—For instances see above, § 61.

§ 138. δ. In the sense of 'perhaps'—from which the sense of 'whether' just mentioned flows. See above, § 59.

Euthyd. 298 c, μὴ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις;—'are you perhaps not joining' &c.? i. e. 'perhaps you are not joining.'

Protag. 312 a, ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις—'perhaps, then, you on the contrary do not suppose.'

§ 139. Οὐ πάνν.

The universal meaning of οὐ πάνν is 'hardly,' 'scarcely.'

Theæt. 149 d, οὐ πάνν τοῦτο οἶδα.

Ib. 172 b, οὐκ ἂν πάνν τολμήσειε φῆσαι.

Symp. 180 c, οὐ πάνν διεμνημόνευν.

Ib. 204 d, οὐ πάνν ἔφην ἔτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι.

Phædo 63 a, οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι.

Ibid. c, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ δυσχυρισαίμην.

Ib. 85 d, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρησθαι.

Ib. 100 a, οὐ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ.

Theæt. 145 a, οὐ πάνυ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

Ib. 176 b, οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον πείσαι.

Phædo 59 a, οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῆι.

Apol. 41 d, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω.

The following three instances are decisive for the meaning 'scarcely.'

Euthyphro 2 b, οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γινώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸν ἄνδρα.

Protag. 331 e, οὐ πάνυ οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὥς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἶεσθαι.

Phileb. 41 a, σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς ἂν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλη δὲ ἄλλη καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ.

The following three are to be interpreted on the principle of Litotes.

Symp. 195 e, κρανίον, ᾧ ἐστὶν οὐ πάνυ μαλακά—'skulls, which can hardly be said to be soft things.'

Apol. 19 a, οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν—'I can hardly say I do not know.'

Ib. 41 d, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου . . . οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω—'I can scarcely say I am displeased'—'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.'

Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. II. vii. 3, ἐλλείποντες περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται, IV. i. 30, τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδύζεται.

§ 140. Different is Laches 183 c, οὐ πάνυ ὀλίγοις ἐγὼ τούτων παραγέγονα—where πάνυ goes closely with ὀλίγοις. Quite different also are πάνυ οὐ, παντάπασιν οὐ, &c.

§ 141. Οὐδέ.

The use of οὐδέ for καὶ οὐ in the sense not of 'and not' but of 'also not' is worth pointing out in cases where the οὐδέ qualifies specially not a Substantive (the common case) but some other Part of Speech.

Phileb. 23 b, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ῥάδιον—ἴστω σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ οὐ ῥάδιον.

Legg. 730 d, τίμιος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν· ὁ δὲ μηδ' ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἀδικούσιν ἀδικεῖν πλεόν ἢ διπλασίας τιμῆς ἄξιος ἐκείνου—'but he who *beyond this* does not allow' &c.

Euthyphro 15 b, μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι κ.τ.λ. ἢ οὐδὲ μέμνησαι;—for ἢ καὶ οὐ μέμνησαι; 'or on the contrary,' lit. 'or, which is also an alternative.'

Phædo 72 a, ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὠμολογήκαμεν—i. c. ἰδὲ τοίνυν καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ ἀδίκως ὦμ.

Crito 44 b, ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐδὲ μία ξυμφορὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Taking this reading now for granted [Oxon. and one other MS. have οὐδεμία], it will be explained by resolving the οὐδέ, and attaching the καὶ to ὡς, 'since *moreover* the event of your death is to me not one misfortune, but' &c.

Ib. 45 a, καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τὰργύριον ἐστί—for καὶ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 45 c, ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ δίκαιον—for ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὐ δίκαιον.

Cf. Isocr. xviii. 65. p. 383, ὅτ' οὐδ' οὕτω ῥάδιον ἦν—'when, *besides*, it was not easy.' Ar. Eth. V. viii. 10, ἔτι δὲ οὐδέ—for ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὐ.

## § 142. Ἀλλά.

a. Introducing a supposed objection.

Rep. 365 c-d, we have seriatim ἀλλὰ γὰρ—ἀλλὰ δὴ.

Apol. 37 b-c, we have the series πότερον—ἀλλὰ—ἀλλὰ δὴ.

β. Introducing an instance.

Symp. 196 d—197 a, we have the series πρῶτον μὲν—καὶ μὲν δὴ . . . γε—ἀλλά.

## § 143. Εὐθύς, νῦν, αὐτίκα, πολλάκις, &c.

a. εὐθύς, 'from first to last,' Phdr. 259 c.

β. νῦν, 'as the case now stands,' Crito 54 b, Apol. 38 b.

γ. αὐτίκα, 'for instance,' Theæt. 166 b, Protag. 359 e, Phdr. 235 e, Legg. 727 a, Gorg. 483 a, ὥσπερ αὐτίκα, Laches 195 b, ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα.

δ. πολλάκις, 'perchance,' after μή, Protag. 361 c: after εἰ ἄρα, Phædo 60 e, Laches 179 b, 194 a, Politic. 264 b, εἰ τινων πολλάκις ἄρα διακίκοις, Phdr. 238 d, ἐν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος γένωμαι. And perhaps Phædo 73 d, ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη.

ε. ὅτε, 'whereas.' "Οτ' οὖν δὴ equivalent to ἐπειδὴ οὖν, Soph. 254 b, Tim. 69 a. So ὁπότε, Euthyd. 297 d, Laches 169 d.

§ 144. The remaining heads treat of Particles in combination.

B. In order to understand and to interpret certain combinations of Particles, regard must be had to the fact, that they enter *simultaneously* into the sentence, as it were speaking at once rather than in succession.

a. A familiar instance is the combination καὶ—δέ, e. g.

Rep. 573 b, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης, καὶ μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. The δὲ and the καὶ enter into the meaning abreast of one another.

§ 145. b. Καὶ μέντοι only differs from καὶ—δέ in that the μέντοι is stronger than the δέ, and that the two Particles are not necessarily separated by the intervention of other words.

Symp. 214 c, καὶ μέντοι οὕτωςι ποίησον.

Ib. 222 a, καὶ μέντοι οὐκ ἐμέ μόνον ταῦτα πεποιήκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χαρμίδην κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 17 c, καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι.

Ib. 26 c, ἀπιστός γ' εἶ, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι σαντῶ.

Ib. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλανον κ.τ.λ.

Euthyd. 289 c, καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν θαναμαστόν.

Ale. I. 113 c, καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις.

§ 146. c. Such a combination again is καὶ οὖν καί.

Protag. 309 b, καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε, βροθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι.

d. Such again is δ' ἀλλά.

Soph. 235 d, σὺ δ' ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πρῶτον.

e. And again δὲ—μέντοι.

Phdr. 267 c, Πρωταγόρεια δὲ οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ;

§ 147. f. Ἄλλ' ἂν γάρ.

Here we must observe that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition that, whereas the γὰρ refers to the clause immediately subjoined to it, the ἀλλά belongs either to a clause understood or to a clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such a supposition : for the ἀλλά sits much closer to the clause immediately subjoined than the γὰρ does. Ἄλλ' ἂν γάρ has two meanings : one when it introduces an objection, and is therefore ironical ; the other, which alone needs illustration, when it has the force of 'but be that as it may,' or 'but the truth is.'

Symp. 180 a, Αἵσχυλος δὲ φλυαρεῖ κ.τ.λ.· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 228 a, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἔμμαντοῦ ἐπιέλῃσμαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερα ἔστι τούτων.

Phædo 87 d, μέτρι' ἂν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχροσιώτερον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν . . . ἀναγκαῖον μέντ' ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ.—‘but, he might say, be that as it may,’ &c.

Ib. 95 c-d, μηνύειν . . . ὅτι πολυχρόνιον ἐστὶ ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον.

Meno 94 e, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτὸν ἀρετῇ—‘but the truth is.’

Apol. 19 c, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. So Ibid. d, Ib. 25 c, &c.

Cf. Hom. Il. vii. 237-242, Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εὖ οἶδα μάχας κ.τ.λ.· ‘Ἄλλ’ οὐ γάρ σ’ ἐθέλω βυαλεῖν κ.τ.λ., Od. x. 201, Κλαῖον δὲ λιγέως κ.τ.λ.· ‘Ἄλλ’ οὐ γάρ τις πρῆξις ἐγίγνετο μυρομένοισιν.

§ 148. g. ‘Ἄλλ’ ἦ, πλὴν ἦ.

The joint meaning is ‘except.’ By the ἀλλὰ the exception to the negative which has preceded is stated flatly: the ἦ allows the negative statement to revive, subject to this exception alone.

Symp. 189 e, νῦν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν [ἀνδρόγυνον] ἀλλ’ ἦ ἐν ὀνείδει ὄνομαί κείμενον.

Phædo 82 b, μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ’ ἦ τῷ φιλο—μαθεῖ.

Ib. 81 b, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθές ἀλλ’ ἦ τὸ σωματοειδές.

Ib. 97 d, οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἀλλ’ ἦ τὸ ἄριστον.

Protag. 329 d, οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἀλλ’ ἦ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι.

Ib. 334 c, μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ, ἀλλ’ ἦ ὅ τι σμικροτάτῳ.

Ib. 354 b, ἦ ἔχειε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, . . . ἀλλ’ ἦ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας;—The interrogative is equivalent to a negative; so that the rule stands good that ἀλλ’ ἦ occurs only after a negative in the main construction. The ἄλλο is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.

Apol. 42 a, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἦ τῷ θεῷ—again a virtually negative sentence, the ἄδηλον παντὶ being equivalent to δηλον οὐδενί. The analogy of ἀλλ’ ἦ perfectly justifies, so far as Syntax is concerned, the disputed reading πλὴν ἦ. The πλὴν and the ἦ enter the meaning simultaneously, introducing the exception

each in its own way; *πλὴν* implies 'it is known to none—saving that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God;' *ἢ*, less harshly, 'it is known to none, or however [only] to God.'

Cf. Thuc. v. 60, οὐ μετὰ τῶν πλειόνων βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐνὶ ἀνδρὶ κοινώσας, 80, ἐψηφίσαντο . . . μὴ ξυμβαίνειν τῷ ἀλλ' ἢ ἅμα, vii. 50, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἡγναντιοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἢ μὴ φανερώς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι, viii. 28, οὐ προσδεχομένων ἀλλ' ἢ Ἀττικὰς τὰς ναῦς εἶναι.

§ 149. h. *νὺν δὲ* . . . *γάρ*. This combination is always preceded by a hypothesis of something contrary to facts, and is parallel to the Protasis of that sentence, which it contradicts. The *δὲ* and the *γάρ* exercise a simultaneous force; *δὲ* represents that the condition stands differently in fact from what it is in the supposed case, and *γάρ* further represents that the inference must be different.

The combinations *νὺν δὲ* . . . *γάρ* and *ἀλλὰ γάρ* approach each other in meaning as well as in structure. *Νὺν δὲ* . . . *γάρ* is however only used in contradicting the Protasis of a hypothetical proposition. There is of course no Ellipse to be supplied; that is, we are not to look on to a sentence beyond to supply a clause to the *νὺν δὲ*. The *δὲ* sits as close to the clause immediately subjoined as does the *γάρ*; the *νὺν* ('as the case actually stands') belongs to both Particles equally. Some of the instances which follow would admit of the Elliptical explanation of the *νὺν δὲ*; but none of them necessitate it, and some others do not admit of it.

Euthyphro 11 c, καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὥσως ἂν με ἐπέσχωπτες' *νὺν δὲ* σαὶ γὰρ αἱ υποθέσεις εἰσὶν· ἄλλου δὲ τινος δεῖ σκώμματος.

Ib. 14 c, ὁ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη ἐμεμαθήκη. *νὺν δὲ* ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν· τί δὴ αὖ λέγεις κ.τ.λ.;

Apol. 38 a, εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν· *νὺν δὲ* οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν.

Protag. 347 a, σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικὴ καὶ ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἔψεγον. *νὺν δὲ* σφύδρα γὰρ ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν· διὰ ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω.

Charm. 175 a-b, οὐ γὰρ ἂν που . . . ἀνωφελὲς ἐφάνη, εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν. *νὺν δὲ* πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα.

Laches 184 d, εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθην τῷδε, ἦττον ἂν τοῦ τοιούτου ἔδει. *νὺν δὲ* τὴν ἐναντίαν γὰρ Λάχης Νικία ἔθετο. εὖ δὲ ἔχει ἀκοῦσαι καὶ σοῦ.

Ib. 200 c, εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., δίκαιον ἂν ἦν κ.τ.λ. *νὺν δ'* ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα. τί οὖν ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.;



Legg. 875 c, ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων . . . παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ βραχύ, διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἰρετέον.

Cf. Lysias xii. 61. p. 125, ὅμως δ' ἐγὼ γὰρ δέομαι ἀναπαύσασθαι.

§ 150. i. The cases of οὐ μὴ and μὴ οὐ, when they make *one* negative, must be explained upon this principle of simultaneity of force. The resulting negation, though single, is both subjective and objective.

Of οὐ μὴ a single instance may suffice.

Laches 197 d, καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ μὴ ἡσθῆσθαι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Of the uses of μὴ οὐ Mr. Campbell, *Theætetus*, Appendix B, has given a happy analysis and explanation. But it may be noticed that in a peculiar instance his restriction of μὴ οὐ to a Dependent clause, with the Infinitive or Participle, does not apply.

Phileb. 12 c, πῶς γὰρ ἡδονὴ γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοίωτατον ἂν εἴη;—which however is virtually equivalent to πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο, ἡδονὴν ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι;

§ 151. C. Many combinations of Particles are Elliptical. Such are those of a Negative with ὅτι or ὅπως which follow.

a. Οὐ μόνον ὅτι—‘I was not only going to say’ (parenthetically).

Symp. 179 b, ἐθέλουσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 751 b, οὐ μόνον οὐδὲν πλεον εἶ τεθέντων, οὐδ' ὅτι γέλως ἂν πάμπολυς ξυμβαίνει, σχεδὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 85, καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπίω, ἥσόν τις ἐμοὶ πρόσσεισι.

§ 152. b. Οὐχ ὅπως has a similar meaning in Negative sentences. Whence moreover οὐχ ὅπως is said to be equivalent to οὐχ ὅπως οὐ which means that the Negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the οὐχ ὅπως clause.

Meno 96 a, οἱ φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδασκαλοὶ ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι.

Cf. Thucyd. i. 35, οὐχ ὅπως κωλυταὶ . . . γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . περιόψεσθε (where the Negative is borrowed by κωλυταὶ γενήσεσθε from περιόψεσθε, which being its opposite is a virtual Negative), iii. 42, οὐχ ὅπως ζημοῦν ἀλλὰ μὴδ' ἀτιμάζειν.

§ 153. c. Οὐχ ὅτι—‘not but that;’ lit. ‘I was not going to deny

that' (parenthetically). Occurring in sentences of Negative form, it borrows their Negative. It is quite different from οὐ μόνον ὅτι.

Theæt. 157 b, ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ . . . τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς . . . ἠναγκάσμεθα . . . χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.

Protag. 336 d, Σωκράτη ἐγγνώμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει—'for all it be true that' &c.

Gorg. 450 e, οὐδεμίαν οἰμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες.

Lysis 219 c, πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη σπουδὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐσπουδασμένη . . . οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.

§ 154. d. Μὴ ὅτι—'nedum,' 'much less' or 'much more,' according as the sentence is Negative or Affirmative: 'not to say,' i. e. not supposing us to say.

Symp. 207 e, μὴ ὅτι . . . ἀλλὰ καί. So 208 a.

Apol. 40 d, μὴ ὅτι . . . , ἀλλά.

Protag. 319 d, μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι . . . ἀλλά.

Legg. 799 e, πᾶς που νέος, μὴ ὅτι πρεσβύτης.

Crat. 427 e, ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον.

Phileb. 60 d, καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δὴ γε ἡδονήν.

Phdr. 240 e, ἂ καὶ λόγῳ ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερπές, μὴ ὅτι δὴ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 512 b, ὅς οὔτε στρατηγού, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίστε δύναται σώζειν.

§ 155. D. Elliptical also, but in a still greater degree, are the combinations which now follow.

a. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά—'yet, so far from *the contrary*.' After οὐ μέντοι is to be understood a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἀλλά.

Symp. 199 a, χαίρω δὴ· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐγκωμιάζω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τὰ γε ἀληθῆ . . . ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν—'yet not so that I am unwilling,—on the contrary I am willing,—to utter the truth.'

Meno 86 c, (A) βούλει οὖν κ.τ.λ. ; (B) Πάνν μὲν οὖν, οὐ μέντοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἐκείνο ἂν ἥδιστα σκεψαίμην—'yet not so that it would not,—on the contrary it would,—be most to my taste to' &c.

Crat. 436 d, ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνη ἐπόμενα. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς—'yet I do not mean by this, that I should not wonder,—on the contrary I should wonder,—if' &c.

Cf. Thuc. v. 43, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἡναντιοῦτο.  
So viii. 56, ἐνταῦθα δὴ οὐκέτι ἀλλ' ἄπορα νομίσαντες κ.τ.λ.

§ 156. b. Of οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ the same explanation holds ;—‘ for not *the contrary*, but,’ i. e. ‘ for, so far from the contrary.’

Euthyd. 305 e, τί οὖν ; δοκοῦσί σοί τι λέγειν ; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλ' ὁ γε λόγος ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν—‘ for I must say,’ &c. : more literally, ‘ for, do you know, so far from the contrary,’ &c.

Ib. 286 b, πῶς λέγεις ; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον . . . αἰὲ θαναμάζω—‘ for, do you know, I must say I ’ &c.

Phædo 83 e, κόσμοι τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασιν . . . οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου—‘ for, so far from the contrary,’—i. e. ‘ for, most assuredly.’

§ 157. c. Οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλά.

Phædo 107 b, οὐ μόνον γ' ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εἶ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι. The full construction is οὐ μόνον γε ταῦτα εἶ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εἶ λέγεις καὶ κ.τ.λ.—‘ not only is what you say true, but a further observation in the same direction is true,’ namely τὰς ὑποθέσεις κ.τ.λ.

§ 158. What is to be noticed as to all the three expressions, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά, οὐ γὰρ ἀλλά, and οὐ μόνον γ' ἀλλά, is, that the οὐ is not retrospective but proleptic, referring to a proposition which is not expressed but is indicated by *its contrary* expressed in the ἀλλά clause.

§ 159. E. Other noticeable combinations of Particles are such as follow.

a. Μέν γε answered by δέ, in working out a contrast between two characters.

Symp. 180 d, πῶς δ' οὐ δύο τῷ θεῷ ; ἡ μὲν γε κ.τ.λ. ἡ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 215 b, πολὺ γε θαυμασιώτερος ἐκείνου' ὁ μὲν γε κ.τ.λ. σὺ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 70, οἱ μὲν γε νεωτεροποιοί. Dem. de Cor. 93. p. 257, ὁ μὲν γε σύμμαχος ὢν. [So Bekker: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Zurich ed.] Æschin. iii. 63. p. 62, ὁ μὲν γε τὴν ἐξουσίαν δέδωκε.

b. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ . . . γε.

Legg. 728 d—c, τίμιον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ ἰσχυρὸν κ.τ.λ., καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων γ' ἐναντία, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.

§ 160. The following are various combinations with δὴ, to which γε is often subjoined.

c. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, with and without γε subjoined.

Rep. 409 a, διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐθήεις . . . φαίνονται κ.τ.λ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε αὐτὸ πάσχουσιν.

Symp. 196 e, ᾧ δὴ πρέπει ἡμᾶς μαρτυρίῳ χρῆσθαι, ὅτι ποιητὴς ὁ Ἔρως . . . πᾶσαν ποίησιν τὴν κατὰ μουσικὴν . . . καὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν γε τῶν ζώων ποίησιν τίς ἐναντιώσεται κ.τ.λ.;

Soph. 217 b, καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησιῶν κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 231 d, καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. So 232 b, 233 a.

d. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, without or with γε.

Crat. 428 b, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ—'well, no doubt.'

Crito 48 a, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε—'well, but then' (in the mouth of an objector).

Phædo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε—'but further'—in a consecutive proof.

e. Ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ . . . γε. Politic. 269 d.

f. Ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ὅμως γε. Rep. 602 b.

g. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ . . . γε. Phædo 92 b.

h. Ὡς δὴ τοι—'how true is it that.' Rep. 366 e, Tim. 26 b.

i. Ὡς δὴ σὺ—ironical. Gorg. 468 e, 499 b.

j. Καὶ δὴ καὶ—'then, I suppose,' ironically. Apol. 26 d.

### § 161. F. Correlative Particles.

a. It is worth observing that in the Laws of Plato οὐ has more frequently δὲ contrasted with it than ἀλλά.

b. Instead of the common ἄλλως τε καὶ we find sometimes καὶ ἄλλως καί, as Laches 181 a, 187 c.

c. Irregular Correlatives.

Tim. 20 d, μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς.

Legg. 927 b, ὅξυ μὲν ἀκούουσι, βλέπουσί τε ὅξύ.

Symp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, κ.τ.λ. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 177 b, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἦττον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 38 d, ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων.

§ 162. Note, that μέντοι is used, and not δέ, (1) when particular emphasis has to be given to the opposition; (2) where, as in the instance here quoted, δέ could not be conveniently used; (3) in expressing opposition to a clause which is itself introduced by δέ.

§ 163. IDIOMS OF COMPARISON.

A. Syntax of words of the Comparative Degree.

B. „ „ words of the Superlative Degree.

C. „ „ other Comparative words and formulæ.

A. Comparatives.

a. Ordinary form.

The only case needing remark under this head is that of a clause compared by *ἤ*, while its pronominal pre-statement (see above, § 19) is compared in the Genitive.

Phædo 89 d, οὐκ ἂν τις μείζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι, ἢ λόγους μισήσας.

Crito 44 c, τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν κ.τ.λ. ;

So Lysias xxv. 23. p. 173, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς χαλεπώτερον τούτων, ἢ πυνθάνεσθαι. We trace the Idiom back to Homer, Od. vi. 182, οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦγε κρείσσον καὶ ἄρειον, \*H ὅθ' ὁμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οἶκον ἔχοντο Ἀνὴρ ἠδὲ γυνή. So Hdt. i. 79, ὥς οἱ παρὰ δόξαν ἔσχε τὰ πρήγματα, ἢ ὥς αὐτὸς κατεδόκεε.

§ 164. b. Rarer forms.

a. 'Ὡς as the Conjunction of Comparison.

Rep. 526 c, ἃ γε μείζω πόνον παρέχει οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὖροις ὥς τούτο.

Apol. 36 d, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὥς . . . σιτεῖσθαι.

Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 277, [νέφος] μελάντερον ἤντε πίσσα. So Lysias vii.

12. p. 109, ἡγουμένος μᾶλλον λέγεσθαι ὥς μοι προσῆκε, ib. 31.

p. 111, προθυμότερον πεποίηκα ὥς . . . ἡναγκαζόμεν.

§ 165. β. Comparative followed by Prepositions.

Παρά. Note, that the *παρὰ* in this construction is not 'beyond,' but 'contrasted with' (lit. 'put co-ordinate with.') Cf. Phdr. 276 e, παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν. And Thucyd. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε.

Politic. 296 a, εἴ τις γινώσκει παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν βελτίους νόμους.

Legg. 729 e, ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ξένων καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους ἁμαρτήματα παρὰ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς θεὸν ἀνηρημένα τιμωρὸν μᾶλλον.

Πρό.

Phædo 99 a, δικαιοτέρον . . . εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν . . . ὑπέχειν . . . δίκην.

Crito 54 b, μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου.

Cf. Hdt. i. 62, οἷσι ἡ τυραννὶς πρὸ ἐλευθερίας ἦν ἀσπαστότερον.

Ἄντί.

Rep. 619 c, αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ.

Ἐν.

Enthyd. 303 c, πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.

Κατὰ after ἦ.

Phædo 94 c, πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἀρμονίαν.

§ 166. c. Irregularities.

a. Pleonastic form.

Crat. 433 d, ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίῳ τρόπον . . ἄλλον, ἢ κ.τ.λ. ;

Gorg. 482 b, οἶμαι τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν . . μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐμαντῶ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι.

Charm. 159 c, Politic. 286 a, Tim. 87 c, Legg. 729 c, 854 c ;—all instances of a Comparative Adjective or Adverb with μᾶλλον or ἥττον.

§ 167. β. Comparative in regimen twice over.

Protag. 350 b, θαρράλεώτεροι εἰσὶν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὴν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν.

Symp. 220 e, προθυμότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σεαυτόν. A compendious way of saying two things; one, that Socrates was anxious that Alcibiades should be chosen rather than himself; the other, that, though the generals too were anxious for this, Socrates was more anxious than they. This construction is illustrated by the other simpler instance.

Exactly parallel is Thuc. vii. 66, τό γ' ὑπόλοιπον τῆς δόξης ἀσθενέστερον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ εἰ μὴδ' ᾤθησαν.

§ 168. γ. Case after ἦ assimilated to the Case before it, *by Attraction*.

Phædo 110 c, ἐκ [χρωμάτων] λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων. Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς.

This does not appear to be the regular construction. Compare the constructions with ὥσπερ, §§ 175, 176, below. The Homeric use with ἦ varies: on the one hand we have, Il. i. 260, καὶ ἀρείουσιν ἡέπερ ὑμῖν Ἄνδράσιον ὠμίλησα' on the other hand, Il. x. 557, ἀμείνονας, ἡέπερ οἶδε, Ἰππους δωρήσαιτ', Od. xvii. 417, σὲ χρὴ δόμεναι καὶ λῶτον ἡέπερ ἄλλοι, Il. xxiv. 486, Μνήσαι πατρός σείω . . Τηλίκου ὥσπερ ἐγών. In Demosth. also there are both constructions with ἦ e.g. F. L. 27. p. 349, οὐδὲν ἑλάττωτος ἢ τούτου' but De Cor. 162. p. 281, τῶν πρότερον

ἡ ἐγὼ δοκιμασάντων, ib. 178. p. 287, ἡμῶν ἄμεινον ἢ 'κεῖνοι προορωμένων.

§ 169. δ. Omission of ἡ.

Legg. 956 a, ὑφὴν δὲ μὴ πλέον ἔργον γυναικὸς μιᾶς ἔμμηνον.

Ib. 958 e, ὑψηλότερον πέντε ἀνδρῶν ἔργον.

Phædo 75 a, οὐ περὶ τοῦ Ἰσοῦ . . . μᾶλλον τι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.  
[Oxon. alone omits ἡ here. The other MSS. and the edd. have ἡ καί.]

§ 170. ε. Omission of μᾶλλον.

Rep. 370 a, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὕτω ῥάδιον ἢ 'κείνως.

Meno 94 e, ἴσως ῥάδιόν ἐστι κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ. Cf., as the Zurich editors suggest, Lysias xii. 89. p. 128, Isocrat. v. 115. p. 105, viii. 50. p. 169.

Tim. 75 c, ξυνέδοξε τοῦ πλείονος βίου φιυλοτέρου δὲ τὸν ἐλάττονα ἀμεινόνά ὄντα παντὶ πάντως αἰρετέον.

Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. iii. 9, εἰ ἄρα τι ἔστι τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον ἢ ('other than') ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν. Lysias ii. 62. p. 196, θάνατον μετ' ἐλευθερίας αἰρούμενοι ἢ βίον μετὰ δουλείας, xxi. 22. p. 163, οὐκ οἶδ' οὓς τινας ἢ ὑμᾶς ἐβουλήθη περὶ ἐμοῦ δικαστὰς γενέσθαι.

§ 171. B Superlatives.

a. Ordinary form.

b. Rarer forms—with Prepositions.

Ἐπὶ.

Tim. 23 b, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον γένος ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους.

Perhaps this is consciously Homeric : cf. e. g. Od. xxiii. 124, σὴν γὰρ ἀρίστην Μῆτιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους φάσ' ἔμμεναι.

Periphrastic with ἐν.

Legg. 742 e, τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείστου νομίματος ἄξια κτήματα.

Ib. 892 a, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη.

§ 172. c. Irregularities.

a. Legg. 969 a, ἀνδρείοτατος τῶν ὕστερον ἐπιγιγνομένων. Cf. Phædo 62 a, τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

β. Pleonastic.

Symp. 218 d, τοῦ ὡς ὁ τι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.

Legg. 731 b, πρῶτον ὡς ὁ τι μάλιστα.

Ib. 908 a, ὡς ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος.



Legg. 758 a, ὥς ὃ τι μάλιστ' ὀλιγίστοις.

Cf. Hom. Od. viii. 582, μάλιστα Κήδιστοι.

§ 173. C. Other Comparative words and formulæ.

a. With ἤ.

Rep. 330 c, οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά.

Ib. 534 a, ἵνα μὴ ἡμῶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρεληλυθότες.

Ib. 455 c, διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν.

Phædo 95 c, διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα.

Phdr. 228 d, διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μῆ.

Crat. 435 a, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὁ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι.

Phileb. 35 a, ἐπιθυμῇ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. So Phdr. 275 a.

Gorg. 481 c, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν ἰδίον τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Crito 53 c, τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐχόμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ ;

§ 174. b. With παρά.

Rep. 337 d, ἐτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης, βελτίῳ τούτων.

Phædo 105 b, παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἄλλην.

Laches 178 b, ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν.

Ib. 181 d, ἐὰν δ' ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα.

Legg. 927 c, ποικίλλοντες ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἰδίοις τὸν τῶν ὀρφανῶν βίον παρὰ τὸν τῶν μῆ.

And, with παρὰ *simply*, Theæt. 144 a, ἀνδρείον παρ' ὄντινούν.

§ 175. c. With ὥσπερ and the like Adverbs ; and with correlative Adjectives of likeness.

Phædo 86 a, εἴ τις δισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ.

Ib. 100 c, ἐὰν σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

Gorg. 464 d, ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες.

Apol. 17 b, κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων.

Politic. 274 d, ἔδει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοὺς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καθάπερ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος.

With Adjectives.

Gorg. 458 a, οὐδὲν οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακόν, ὅσον δόξα ψευδής.

Tim. 78 b, πλέγμα ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς οἷον οἱ κύρτοι ξυνωφηνάμενος.

Protag. 327 d, ἄγριοι τινες, οἰοίπερ οὐς πέρυσσι Φερεκράτης ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ἀηναίῳ. So Crat. 432 c.

Cf. Hom. Od. xx. 281, Πὰρ δ' ἄρ' Ὀδυσσῆϊ μοῖραν θέσαν . . . Ἴσῃν ὥς αὐτοὶ περ ἐλάγχανον.

§ 176. Note, that where the Noun brought into comparison by *ὥσπερ* is the Subject of the Relative clause, there is a preference for the Nominative, in spite of such an Ellipse of the Verb as might have led to an Attracted Construction.

Cf. Hom. Il. xxiv. 486, *Μνήσαι πατὸς σείο, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ, Τηλίκον, ὥσπερ ἐγών.* Lysias vi. 32. p. 106, *λυπουμένω ὥσπερ οὗτος.* Isocr. xviii. 47. p. 380, *τοὺς ὥσπερ Καλλίμαχος βεβιωκότας.* This non-admission of Attraction often secures the meaning; as Æschin. ii. 120. p. 44, *τοὺς μικροπολίτας, ὥσπερ αὐτός, φοβεῖν τὰ τῶν μειζόνων ἀπόρρητα.* [So Bekker: αὐτοὺς Zurich ed.] Jelf (Gr. Gr. § 869) notices, as rare instances of Attraction, Thuc. vi. 68, *οὐκ ὑπολέκτους ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς,* Soph. O. C. 869, *δοίη βίον τοιοῦτον οἶον καὶ μὲ γηρᾶναι ποτέ,* Lys. 492. 72, [i. e. xiii. 72. p. 136] *οὐδαμῶ γὰρ ἔστιν Ἀγόρατον Ἀθηναίων εἶναι ὥσπερ Θρασύβουλον.* We may add, however, from Plato, the instance in Apol. 17 c, *οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι,*—where *μειρακίῳ* is affected by Attraction to *πλάττοντι*.

§ 177. d. Comparison of one Sentence as a whole with another.

Symp. 179 e, *διὰ ταῦτα δίκην αὐτῷ ἐπέθεσαν, . . . οὐχ ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλεῖα ἐτίμησαν.*

Ib. 189 c, *δοκοῦσι . . . θυσίας ἂν ποιεῖν . . . , οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τούτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται.*

Ib. 213 b, *ἐλλοχῶν αὐ με ἐνταῦθα κατέκειτο, ὥσπερ εἰώθης ἐξαίφνης ἀναφαίνεσθαι.*

Ib. 216 d, *ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται . . . , καὶ αὐ . . . οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ Σεληνώδες;* This sentence becomes an instance under the present head by the removal of the stop after *τοῦτο*. The liveliness of the passage gains by this, as much as it suffers by the common punctuation. The conversion of a categorical sentence at its close into an interrogative one is natural and common. [The Zurich editors have the common punctuation.]

Theæt. 187 b, *χρή, ὃ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὤκνεῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.*

Apol. 39 c, *τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν . . . χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δί' ἢ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.*

Cf., perhaps, Thuc. i. 19, *ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἦνθησαν*—taking *ὡς* to be not 'when' but 'how;' but

primarily Hom. Od. xxiv. 195-199, ὡς εὖ μέμνητ' Ὀδυσῆος . . .  
 Οὐχ ὡς Τυνδαρέου κόρη κακὰ μήσατο ἔργα.

§ 178. We may notice the graceful use of the vague Comparative expressing a modified degree.

Symp. 176 c, ἥττον ἂν εἶην ἀηδής.

Politic. 286 b, ἔσχε μῆκος πλέον.

Phædo 115 b, ἄπερ αἰὲν λέγω, οὐδὲν καινότερον.

Charm. 174 c, ἥττόν τι, Euthyd. 293 c, ἥττον οὖν τι, in Interrogative sentences, are a soft οὐκ and οὐκοῦν.

Cf. the Latin *si minus*.

### § 179. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—ATTRACTION.

A full scheme of all the varieties of Attraction may be constructed upon the instances found in Plato. The varieties which are treated of here include all but some of the most common.

A. Attraction of Dependent sentences.

a. Infinitival sentences.

a. The ordinary form of Attraction here is that to be seen in Ar. Eth. III. v. 3, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι, or Lysias xxviii. 10. p. 180, τοῖς ἄρχουσιν . . . ἐπιδείξετε πότερον χρηῖ δικαίοις εἶναι,—in distinction from the unattracted form, e. g. Æsch. Choeph. 140, Αἰτῇ τέ μοι δὸς σωφρονεστέραν πολὺ Μητρὸς γενέσθαι.

Crat. 395 c, κατ' ἐκείνου λέγεται οὐδὲν οἷον τε γενέσθαι προνοηθῆναι.

Hip. Ma. 292 c, τὸ καλόν, ὃ παντί, ᾧ ἂν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῶ εἶναι.

It will be seen here that to present an opportunity for Attraction, there must be Ellipse of the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, and moreover its Copula and Predicate must be in distinct words. Where the subject of the Infinitival sentence is also the subject of the principal sentence, Attraction is invariable, and the construction cannot be conceived without it,—as βουλομένων ἡμῶν προθύμων εἶναι, Thuc. i. 71; where notwithstanding there is Attraction (though Lobeck denies it).

β. A form, which in one or two particular Idioms is common, is developed in greater variety in Plato: where the Infinitival sentence is dismembered, and the Subject or some other prominent Noun of the Dependent sentence is placed in advance, under the direct government of the principal sentence.

One common type is (e.g.) Hdt. v. 38, *ἔδεε ξυμμαχίης οἱ μεγάλης ἐξευρεθῆναι*. And primarily Homer, II. xviii. 585, *Οἱ δ' ἦτοι δακέειν μὲν ἀπετρωπῶντο λεόντων*, and vii. 409. Another common, though peculiar, type is *ἐγὼ δίκαιος εἰμὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν* which stands for *δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐμὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν*—the *ἐμὲ* being attracted out of the Infinitival government into that of the principal sentence. Cf. Hdt ix. 77, *ἄξιοι ἔφασαν εἶναι σφέας ζημιῶσαι*.

§ 180. Of the Platonic type only specimens need be given here; for the rest cf. 'Binary Structure,' §§ 214, 220, below.

Symp. 207 a, *εἶπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐαντῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἔρως ἐστίν*—where τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, is separated from it, and placed under the government of *ἔρως ἐστίν* in the principal construction.

In the following it is not the subject, but some other Noun, of the Infinitival sentence, which is attracted.

Rep. 443 b, *ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν*.

Gorg. 513 e, *ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν*.

Legg. 790 c, *τρόπον ὄνπερ ἡργμεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραίνειν*.

§ 181. γ. In the following the two forms above exist together. The Subject of the Infinitival sentence suffers Attraction in the manner just mentioned, and secondly the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence is attracted into agreement with it.

Rep. 459 b, *δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων*.

Euthyd. 282 d, *οἷων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι*.

§ 182. Note, however, that when both constructions have the same Subject, the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence reverts to the main construction.

Legg. 773 b, *τὸν αὐτῷ ξυνειδότα φερόμενον*.

Charm. 169 a, *οὐ πιστεύω ἐμαντῷ ἱκανὸς εἶναι*.

§ 183. δ. In another type, affecting the same class of sentences as the last, we have the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, after *δίκαιόν ἐστιν*, *ἀνάγκη ἐστίν*, *οἶόν τε ἐστίν*, and the like, or after Verbs of *judging*, turned into a forced Dative of Reference after *δίκαιον* &c. Doubtless, the Dative of Reference often finds its place in the meaning as well as the syntax; but this is not always the case,

e.g. in the passages from Hip. Ma. 294 b, Meno 88 c, and Crat. 392 a: whence the true account of it is Attraction.

Rep. 334 c, ἀλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὠφελεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Crito 50 c, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἷε δίκαιον εἶναι;

Phædo 75 c, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.

Hip. Ma. 289 c, τὸ ὁρθῶς λεγόμενον ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχασθαι.

Ib. 294 b, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλους εἶναι.

Charm. 164 b, γινώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἱατρῷ.

Meno 88 c, εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι.

Laches 196 c, ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχασθαι ἀνδρίαν.

Menex. 241 a, οἷόν τε ἀμύνεσθαι ὀλίγοις πολλοῦς.

Phædo 106 b, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Phdr. 242 b, αἴτιος γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

Phileb. 33 a, τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐλομένῳ βίον οἶσθ' ὥς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

Crat. 392 a, ὁρβότερόν ἐστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκὶς κυμίνιδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὀρνέῳ.

Phædo 92 c, πρέπει ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας [λόγῳ].

Soph. 231 c, ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδιῶν μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

Rep. 598 d, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι εὐθήης.

Apol. 34 c, δεδομένον ἐστὶ τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. [So Oxon. See note on the text, p. 90, above.]

Cf. Philolaus ap. Stob. p. 458, οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἦς οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γινωσκομένων ὑφ' ἁμῶν γνωσθῆμεν, and again ib., ἀδύνατον ἦς ἂν καὶ αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆμεν. [Quoted by Boeckh in his Philolaos, p. 62.] Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, τάδε ὑμῖν ἄξιον ἐνθυμηθῆναι.

On the other hand we have, unusually,

Gorg. 458 d, αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν.

§ 184. b. Attraction of Participial clause attached to the Infinitival sentence.

Here the unattracted form would be e.g.

Crito 51 d, προαγορεύομεν Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ . . . ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι.

Cf. Hdt. ix. 78, καὶ τοὶ θεοὶ παρέδωκε ῥυσάμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα κλέος καταθέσθαι, and Hom. Il. x. 187, τῶν ἵππος ὁλώλει Νύκτα φυλασσομένοισι.

Instances of the attracted form are

Apol. 17 c, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ . . . πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι—where πλάττοντι is attracted into correspondence with ἡλικίᾳ though the Gender follows the thought, as in Legg. 933 a, ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δυσωπουμέναις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 101, Εὐχεο . . . ῥέξειν ἐκατόμβην . . . , Οἴκαδε νοστήσας.

§ 185. Reference to the unattracted form explains such places as Symp. 176 d, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐθελήσαιμι ἂν πιεῖν, οὔτε ἄλλω συμβουλευσάμην, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραυπαλῶντα—where κραυπαλῶντα agrees regularly with the subject of the πιεῖν understood after συμβουλεύσαιμι. And somewhat similarly

Phdr. 276 e, τοῦ δυναμένου παίζειν . . . μυθολογοῦντα—this Accusative arising from a mis-recollection of the Infinitive construction last preceding.

§ 186 c. Dependent sentences introduced by Conjunctions or Oblique Interrogatives.

a. Here, too, as in the Infinitival sentence, the sentence is torn asunder, and a portion of it, consisting of a Noun or a Noun-phrase, brought under the direct government of the principal construction.

This Attraction manifests itself in an ordinary type in e. g.

Laches 196 a, τοῦτον οὐ μανθάνω ὃ τι βούλεται λέγειν.

More remarkable Platonic forms are e. g.

Soph. 260 a, δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν—where λόγον has been attracted into the principal construction, although this can supply only a loose government for it.

Phædo 64 a, κινδυνεύουσιν ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λελθῆναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. This is an Attraction for κινδυνεύει λελθῆναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι ὅσοι κ.τ.λ.

§ 187. In the following it is not the Subject, but some other Noun or Noun-phrase, of the Dependent sentence, which is attracted.

Phædo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὥς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθές ἔχειν—where τὸ . . . Σωκράτους is the Accusative attracted under government of ὁμολογεῖς (compare δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, above).

Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἱοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ  
τὰ συμκρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐργάζεσθαι—i. e. δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι οἱ αὐτὰ  
τὰ παρόντα ἐργασάμενοι, οἱ πολλοί, οἱοί τ' εἰσὶν οὐ τὰ κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 82 a, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα οἷ ἂν ἐκάστη ἴοι—i. e. δῆλόν ἐστι δὴ,  
οἷ ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη ἴοι.

For the rest of the instances under this head see 'Binary Structure,' §§ 213, 218, below.

§ 188. β. Comparative sentence introduced by ἤ, attracted, after omission of the Copula, into agreement with the principal construction.

Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς.

(See the remarks under 'Idioms of Comparison,' § 168, above.)

§. 189. B. Attractions involving the Relative.

a. Attraction of Relative to Antecedent.

a. From Accusative into Genitive.

Apol. 29 b, κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν.

Phdr. 249 b, ἀξίως οὗ ἐβίωσαν βίου.

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 265, Τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς, ἥς Τρωῖ περ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς  
Δῶκε.

β. From Accusative into various cases before βούλει<sup>12</sup>, which with the Relative forms almost one word, like Latin *quiniis*.

Crat. 432 a, τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός.

Gorg. 517 a, ἔργα . . . οἷα τούτων ὅς βούλει εἴργασται.

Phileb. 43 d, τριῶν ὄντων ὄντινων βούλει.

γ. From Dative into Genitive.

Legg. 966 e, πάντων ὧν κίνησις . . . οὐσίαν ἐπόρισεν.

δ. From Nominative into

Genitive.

Theæt. 165 e, ξυνεπαδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὗ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενος . . . ἂν  
ἐλύτρου.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 130. p. 270, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὧν ἔτυχεν ἦν—i. e. τούτων  
ἃ ἔτυχεν.

<sup>12</sup> Compare (though these do not involve the Relative)

Rep. 414 c, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δ' οὐ γεγονὸς οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ γενόμενον ἂν.

Symp. 216 d, ἐνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει σαφροσύνης;

Euthyphro 15 a, τί δ' οἶε ἄλλο ἢ τιμὴ τε καὶ γέρα;

Phædo 59 c, τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;



Dative.

Rep. 402 a, ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστι περιφερόμενα.

Phædo 69 a, τοῦτο δ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ᾧ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο.

Accusative.

Cf. Thuc. v. 111, perhaps, περὶ πατρίδος βουλευέσθε [βουλὴν] ἣν μᾶς πέρι . . . ἔσται. (The same interpretation is suggested as "possible" in Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 822 note.)

§ 190. ε. Preposition, by which the Relative is governed, *absorbed* by Attraction.

Rep. 520 d, ἐν πόλει ἣ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν.

Ib. 533 d-e, οἷς τοσοῦτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται.

Laches 192 b, τίς οὔσα δύναμις ἣ αὐτὴ ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀνδρία κέκληται—where οἷς must be for ἐν οἷς.

Crat. 438 e, ἄρα δι' ἄλλου του ἣ οὐπερ εἰκός ;

Gorg. 453 e, πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὧνπερ νῦν δὴ.

Stallbaum (on Apol. 27 d) cites other instances from Plato, but he is not warranted in giving them the same interpretation. Thus

Apol. 27 d, ἣ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται is simply 'or [sprung] from some other beings, whose children accordingly they are called.'

Phædo 76 d, ἐν τούτῳ [τῷ χρόνῳ] ἀπόλλυμεν ᾧπερ κ.τ.λ. Here the best and most MSS. have ἐν ᾧπερ.

Of other writers, cf. Soph. O. C. 748, Οὐκ ἂν ποτ' ἐς τοσοῦτον αἰκίας πεσεῖν ἔδοξ' ὅσον πέπτωκεν. Isæus Fr. a. 8 [ed. Bekker. Is. xii. 7, ed. Zur.], ἄλλοθεν ποθὲν ἣ ἐκ τούτων ὧν, Lysias xiv. 2. p. 139, ἐπ' ἐνίοις [τούτων] ὧν οὗτος φιλοτιμείται τοὺς ἐχθροὺς αἰσχύνεσθαι, xxi. 21. p. 163, δέομαι μὴ ἡγήσασθαι τοσαῦτα χρήματα εἶναι ἃ ('any sum of money *in consideration of* which') ἐγὼ βουλοίμην ἂν τι κακὸν τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι. [So Bekker and the MSS. δι' ἃ ed. Zurich.]

§ 191. b. Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.

Meno 96 a, ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁπουοῦν πράγματος οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι κ.τ.λ. ;

Politic. 271 c, τὸν βίον ὃν κ.τ.λ. πότερον . . . ἦν κ.τ.λ. ;

Meno 96 c, ὠμολογῆκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μὲν δὲ διδασκὸν εἶναι.

Crato 45 b, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη.

The last of these instances is of a peculiar type, though the

former are common, and have their prototypes in Homer: cf. Il. x. 416, φυλακὰς δ' ἄς εἴρειαι, . . . Οὔτις κεκρμμένη ῥύεται στρατόν, Od. viii. 74, αἰδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν, Οἴμης τῆς τότε ἄρα κλέος κ.τ.λ., xxii. 6, σκοπὸν ἄλλον ὃν οὐπω τις βάλεν ἀνὴρ Εἴσομαι αἶ κε τύχωμι, xxiii. 356, Μῆλα δ' ἄ μοι κ.τ.λ., Πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ λήισσομαι, ἄλλα δ' Ἀχαιοὶ Δώσουσ' (where μῆλα represents ἀντὶ μῆλων). On Od. viii. 74 Nitzsch holds οἴμης to be attracted from οἴμη not οἴμην because elsewhere the attracted word is the forerunner of a principal sentence to be completed, whereas here it is in sense but part of the exegetic Relative sentence. Thus the sentence would be one on the model of Od. i. 50, Νῆσφ' ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ . . . Νῆσος δεινδρήεσσα, or Il. vi. 396, Ἡετίωνος Ἡετίων, ὃς ἔναιε κ.τ.λ.

§ 192. c. Construction changed after Relative clause by Attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction.

N.B. This principle, of Attraction to the nearest construction, extends also to other cases where there is no Relative clause. See §§ 201–203, below.

Rep. 402 b, οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὓς φάμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας.

Phaedo 66 c, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ φάμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι φρονήσεως.

Protag. 342 b, σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὓς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, τοὺς σοφιστάς.

Crito 48 c, ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις . . . , μὴ ὥς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέμματα ἢ κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 281 c, ἐκείνοι ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία, Πιττακοῦ κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 200 d, ἐκείνου ἐρᾶν ὃ οὐπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα.

Apol. 41 a, εὐρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστὰς οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Hom. Il. ix. 131, μετὰ δ' ἔσσεται ἡν τότε ἀπηύρων, Κούρην Βρισηὺς.

§ 193. It is not to be supposed that the Nouns which follow the Relative clauses in the first three of these examples are Antecedents to the Relatives. As in the fourth example the Relative has an expressed Antecedent ἐκείνου, so in the others it has one understood; and the Nouns τοὺς φύλακας, τοὺς σοφιστάς, ταῦτα, are respectively exegetic of the understood Antecedent. (Ταῦτα represents a Feminine Noun by another Attraction, which see below, § 201.)

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 69, Κύκλωπος κεχόλωται ὃν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλάωσεν, Ἀντίθεον Πολύφημον. Also Il. xii. 18—20. To this explanation must be also conformed that of Soph. Antig. 404, ὃν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπεῖπας.

§ 194. The same principle accounts for the following also.

Symp. 206 a, οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐ ἐρώσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

Phædo 89 a, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὃ τι λέγει ἐκείνος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον—where ἐκείνος is attracted from ἐκείνον, since it is ἔχειν and not λέγει which requires this Pronoun as its Subject.

Symp. 199 c, καλῶς μοι ἔδοξας καθηγήσασθαι τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δέοι αὐτὸν ἐπιδείξαι ὁποῖός τις ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως, ὕστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ—where we should have had αὐτὸν . . . τὸν Ἔρωτα but for the intervention of ὁποῖός τις ἐστὶν, which prevented recurrence to the Accusative.

The same bias shews itself *abnormally* in Lysias xxv. 18. p. 173, οἵεσθε χρῆναι, οὓς ἐκείνοι παρέλιπον . . . , ἡμεῖς ἀπολέσαι.

§ 195. d. Attraction of the entire Relative clause (i. e. of Subject and Predicate,—Copula having been omitted) to the Antecedent.

a.

Symp. 220 b, ὅντος πάγου οἷου δεινοτάτου.

Phædo 104 a, τοῦ περιττοῦ ὄντος οὐχ οὐπερ τῆς τριάδος.

Soph. 237 c, οἷ γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον.

Legg. 674 c, οὐδ' ἀμπέλων ἂν πολλῶν δέοι οὐδ' ἦτιμι πόλει.

Rep. 607 a, ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν—  
for ὅσον ποιήσεως ἐστὶν ὕμνοι.

Cf. Hom. Od. ix. 321, τὸ μὲν . . . εἴσκομεν . . . Ὅσσον θ' ἰστὸν νηός,  
x. 112, γυναῖκα Εὐρον ὅσσην τ' ὄρεος κορυφήν, 167, Πείσμα δ' ὅσον  
τ' ὄργυιαν. Ar. Eq. 977, πρεσβυτέρων τινῶν οἷων ἀργαλεωτάτων.  
Soph. Aj. 488, πατρὸς Εὔπερ τινὸς σθένοντος, 1416, ἀνδρὶ . . .  
ἀγαθῷ . . . κοιδενί πω λῶοι θνητῶν, O. C. 734, πόλιν . . . σθένου-  
σαν . . . εἴ τιν' Ἑλλάδος μέγα. Arist. Metaph. IX. iii. 1, ἀντί-  
κειται δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ πλείους τρόπους, ὧν ἓνα τὸ ἐν καὶ  
τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διαιρετόν.

§ 196. β. More peculiar (because the Relative is made to agree with the Subject of the Relative clause—contrast οὐχ οὐπερ τῆς τριάδος above) are

Soph. 246 c, ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας—i. e. ὑπὲρ [τοῦ] ὃ τίθενται τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι.

Gorg. 477 a, (A) ὠφελείται ἄρα; (B) Ναί. (A) Ἐπεὶ ἦν περ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν;—i. e. ἄρα [ὠφελείται τοῦτο] ὅπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν εἶναι;

§ 197. γ. In the following the Relative clause is represented by the Relative word only, the Subject being identical with that of the main sentence and being therefore, with the Copula, omitted.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 209, Εὐρύμαχ' ἡδὲ καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι μνηστῆρες ἀγανοί, —i. e. ἄλλοι μνηστῆρες ἀγανοί, ὅσοι ἔστε' and Hdt. iv. 28, ἀφόρητος οἶος κρυμός—'frost which was insufferable,—to such a degree was it;' and ib. 194, οἱ δὲ σφι ἄφθονοι ὅσοι ἐν τοῖς οὖρεσι γίνονται' in all which instances there is no patent Attraction, but it is made possible by the Ellipse, after the Relative, of its Subject and the Copula.

Euthyd. 275 c, σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσην—'inconceivable, so great was it.'

Gorg. 477 d, ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῶ θανατοῖ ὑπερβάλλουσα.

Cf. the common Idiom ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ πλείστα ὅσα—'things *superlatively* many, so many were they'—where ὅσα is doubtless an Accusative.

The same explanation applies, though Attraction does not find place, in the Adverbial expressions ἀμηχάνως ὡς (Rep. 527 e, Phdr. 263 d), ὑπερφυῶς ὡς (Symp. 173 c, Gorg. 496 c), θανατοῦ ὡς (Phædo 92 a, Symp. 200 a).

§ 198. The Homeric Idiom with τοῖος differs—e. g. in Od. i. 209, θαμὰ τοῖον, iii. 321, Ἐς πέλαγος μέγα τοῖον, iv. 371, Νήπιος . . . λίην τόσον, ib. 776 and vii. 30, σιγῇ τοῖον, xi. 134, Ἀβληχρὸς μάλα τοῖος, xv. 450, Κερδαλέον δὴ τοῖον, xx. 302, Σαρδάνιον μάλα τοῖον—'to *that* degree,'—indicating an imagined, and therefore an intense, degree.

Τοῖον expresses the degree of the epithet preceding; our οἶος justifies the epithet being there at all.

§ 199. e. Attraction of the entire Antecedent clause (Copula omitted) to the Relative.

Charm. 175 c, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον. So Protag. 317 c.

Politic. 308 b, οὐδαμῶς ὡς οὐ φήσομεν.

Cf. Hdt. vii. 145, οὐδαμῶν τῶν οὐ μέζω.

§ 200. f. Attraction of the Relative into agreement with the Predicate of its own clause.

Phdr. 255 c, ἡ τοῦ ρεύματος ἐκείνου πηγὴ, ὃν ἕμερον Ζεὺς ὠνόμασε.  
(where the Antecedent of ὃν is ρεύματος.)

Cf. the Homeric ἡ θέμις ἐστίν. Il. ix. 276, &c.

§ 201. C.

a. Attraction of a Neuter Pronominal Subject into agreement with the Predicate.

Apol. 18 a, δέομαι . . . τοῦτο σκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.: δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή  
—where of course αὕτη refers to τοῦτο σκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 240 b, οὐκ ὃν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄντως ἥν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

Crat. 386 c, εἰ . . . ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια (referring to what had just been agreed upon).

Μινος 317 a, πολιτικά ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματα ἐστίν, οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσιν.

Crito 48 c, ἀς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις . . . , μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέμματα ᾗ—where ταῦτα represents τὰς σκέψεις, but has been assimilated to σκέμματα, the Predicate of its own sentence.

Cf. Hom. Il. i. 239, σκήπτρον . . . ὁ δέ τοι μέγας ἔσεται ὄρκος, γ. 305, ἔθα τε μηρὸς Ἰσχύϊ ἐνστρέφεται, κοτύλην δέ τέ μιν καλέουσι. Hdt. i. 86, ἀκροθίνια ταῦτα (sc. τὸν Κροῖσον) καταγιεῖν. Æsch. P. V. 753, Ὅτε θανεῖν μὲν ἔστιν οὐ πεπωμένον· Αὕτη γὰρ ἦν ἂν πημάτων ἀπαλλαγή. So Virg. Æn. x. 828, Si qua est ea cura.

§ 202. b. Attraction of the Copula into agreement with the Predicate.

Μενο 91 c, οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη.

Legg. 735 e, τοὺς μέγιστα ἡμαρτηκότας ἀνιάτους δὲ ὄντας, μεγίστην δὲ οὔσαν βλάβην.

Parmen. 134 b, πάντα, ἃ δὲ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὐσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

Politic. 271 e, θεὸς ἔνεμεν . . . , ζῶν ὃν ἑτέρον θειότερον.

§ 203. c. Attraction of the Article of an Infinitival clause into agreement with a word preceding, with which that clause is in Apposition.

Charm. 173 e, ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως  
ζῶντα.

Legg. 908 c, τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα.

Cf. Hdt. vi. 130, τῆς ἀξιώσιος, τῆς ἐξ ἐμεῦ γῆμαι. Xen. Mem. I.

iii. 3, καλὴν ἔφη παραίνεσιν εἶναι, τὴν καὶ δύναμιν ἔρδειν.

## § 204. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—BINARY STRUCTURE.

Certain Idiomatic affections of the Sentence are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one.

The immediate use of this artifice is to present the conception to the hearer in two parts, which, after entering his mind separately, will there reunite.

The ulterior use is (1) to facilitate a clear expression of a complex conception, and (2) to set before the apprehension two images of the object, as it presents itself at two successive moments ; and by this means to give it the same kind of fullness with which the image of material objects is invested by "binocular vision."

This Idiom has been, in certain of its forms, ranked under Apposition. But it does not resemble it except in a nakedly grammatical point of view. Apposition forms but one description of the object, and therefore is no Binary Structure at all : in other words in Apposition the two representations are simultaneous ; whereas in the Idiom before us they are substitutive ; the thought has moved in the interval between them ; and though the one is in some sort a repetition of the other, they are not identical.

§ 205. Examples of this Idiom in its main forms are to be found in all Greek literature ; but its applications in Plato are preeminently various and subtle. These are embodied in the following classification.

A. When the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact. The mark of the Binary Structure is that the two sentences are grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton.

Note, that the first-placed sentence always contains something which is unfolded more fully, or restated in another way (sometimes with anacoluthic redundancy of construction) in the latter.

B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

Note, that the first-placed expression is sometimes the less emphatic, or at least the more general, and is introductory to the other ; sometimes it is the more emphatic and sufficient, and the other follows epexegetically.

C. When a Dependent sentence has been resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction, and placing in advance of it, a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts coordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.

§ 206. Note, that (1) the forestalled portion thus has a degree of attention ensured to it, which, not being always self-evidently emphatic, it might otherwise fail to obtain : and (2) grammatically, the forestalled portion may be said to suffer Attraction,—Attraction, that is, out of the Dependent construction into the Principal construction.

§ 207. A. Where the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact, and grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton. (Note, that the effect of Asyndeton is always to make the connection closer ; it is its office to denote simultaneity or rapid sequence.)

a. Common type of instances.

Apol. 41 a, θαυμαστή ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι,—ὅποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει κ.τ.λ., ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἔμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη.

Symp. 198 c, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἐπεπόνθη,—ἐφοβούμην κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 67 e, εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη,—εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκέισε ἴοιεν οἱ κ.τ.λ. ;

Ib. 68 d, οὐ ταῦτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν,—ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σῶφρονές εἰσιν ;

Ib. 73 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος,—ἀναμνησθῆναι.

So too 74 a, Gorg. 513 c, 519 b, Phileb. 46 c, Menex. 235 b,—in all of which the first-placed expression is formed with *πάσχειν*.

Ib. 70 a, [ψυχῇ] ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται, ἥ ἂν ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ—εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος . . . οἷχεται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ. Here the sentence *εὐθὺς . . . ἦ* is the complete double of the sentence *ἐκείνη . . . ἀποθάνῃ*.

Ib. 86 b, τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν . . . εἶναι,—ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., κρᾶσιν εἶναι τούτων κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 505 e, ἴνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται,—ἂ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι.

Phileb. 35 e, (A) τί δ', ὅταν ἐν μέσφ' τούτων γίγνηται ; (B) Πῶς ἐν μέσφ' ; (A) Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ κ.τ.λ. ;



Legg. 697 a, τὸ δὲ τριχῇ διελεῖν . . . πειραθῶμεν,—διατεμεῖν χωρὶς τὰ τε μέγιστα καὶ δυνέτερα καὶ τρίτα.

Ib. 708 b, ὅταν μὴ τὸν τῶν ἐσμῶν [ὁ κατοικισμὸς] γίγνηται τρόπον,—ἐν γένος ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἰὼν χώρας οἰκίζηται.

This Idiom begins with Homer : see Od. viii. 339, Αἶ γὰρ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἄναξ ἑκάτηβόλ' Ἀπολλων,—Δεσμοὶ μὲν τρις τόσσοι ἀπείρονες ἀμφὶς ἔχουσιν, . . . Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εὖδοιμι παρὰ χρυσῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ. Cf. Aristoph. Lys. 1219, εἰ δὲ πάνυ δεῖ τοῦτο δρᾶν, Ὑμῖν χαρίζεσθαι, ταλαιπωρήσομεν.

Virtually similar is

1 Apol. 20 c, οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη . . . γέγονεν,—εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί (for σοῦ . . . πραγματευομένου is a virtual protasis, of which εἰ . . . πολλοί is the double.)

Cf. Thuc. v. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἂν παράσχοιτε . . . , εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε.

§ 208. b. <sup>13</sup> Instances involving anacoluthic redundancy.

Phileb. 13 b, οἷοι γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι,—θέμενον κ.τ.λ., εἴτα ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος κ.τ.λ. ;

Crito 45 e, μὴ δόξη ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα . . . ἀνανδρία πεπράχθαι . . . —κακία καὶ ἀνανδρία διαπεφενγῆναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν.

1 Apol. 26 c, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ,—οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι ; [So Oxon. alone. See note at p. 69, above.]

Legg. 859 d, εἶναι τοὺς δικαίους ἀνθρώπους, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνωσι κ.τ.λ.,—κατ' αὐτό γε . . . παγκάλους εἶναι.

Ib. 933 b, ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν, ἂν ποτε ἄρα ἴδωσι κ.τ.λ.,—ὀλιγωρεῖν τῶν τοιούτων διακελεύεσθαι.

§ 209. c. In Similes or Comparisons. In such cases there is great tendency to the Binary Structure: the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it. Note, that in these cases the pre-statement is often broken off or merely hinted at, so that the full sense is first expressed in the re-statement. (This is especially noticeable in expressions involving δοκεῖ or the like.) The instances in other authors begin with Homer : e. g. Il. ix. 13, ἂν δ' Ἀγαμέμνων Ἰστατο δακρυχέων, ὥστε κρήνη μελάνυδρος . . . ,—Ὡς ὁ βαρὺ στενάχων ἔπε' Ἀργείοισι μετηύδα. Cf. also Soph.

<sup>13</sup> [In the margin of the MS. is written—"Quære. Are these really distinct from those given in § 207?"]

Aj. 840, Καὶ σφᾶς . . . Ξυναρπάσειαν, ὥσπερ εἰσορώσ' ἐμὲ Αὐτοσφαγῇ πίπτοντα,—τὼς αὐτοσφαγεῖς . . . ὀλοίατο. CEd. Col. 1239, ὅδ' . . . ὥς τις ἀκτὰ . . . κλονεῖται,—ὥς καὶ τόνδε κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 483 e, οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους . . . —ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπᾶδοντες, καταδουλούμεθα.

Politic. 296 e, τοῦτον δεῖ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὸν ὅρον εἶναι . . . , ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης . . . σώζει τοὺς συνναύτας,—οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 61 a, ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θεοῦσι διακελευόμενοι,—καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν.

Ib. 109 e, κατιδεῖν ἂν ἀνακύψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε,—οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν.

Crito 54 d, ταῦτα ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν,—καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ . . . βομβεῖ.

Politic. 260 c, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδέ πη, καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.,—καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν γένος ἔοικεν ἀφωρίσθαι.

Crat. 417 b, ἔοικεν, οὐχὶ καθάπερ οἱ κάπηλοι αὐτῷ χρώνται,—οὐ ταύτη λέγειν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν.

Ib. 433 a, ἵνα μὴ ὀφλωμεν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιϋόντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ,—καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξωμεν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθῆναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος.

Tim. 19 b, προσέοικε δὲ δὴ τινὶ μοι τοιῷδε τὸ πάθος, οἷον εἴ τις . . . ἀφίκοιτο κ.τ.λ.,—ταῦτὸν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἣν διήλθομεν.

§ 210. As a variation, the Binary Structure is sometimes developed in the illustration, and then there is no re-statement of the illustrated fact,—this being implied sufficiently in the re-statement of the illustration.

Phædo 60 c, ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον' ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ.,—ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθεῖν τὸ ἡδύ.

Charm. 156 b, ἐστὶ γὰρ τοιαύτη [ἡ ἐπωδὴ] οἷα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὕσως ἥδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱατρῶν, ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ.,—λέγουσί που ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

§ 211. d. Pairs of Interrogative sentences, the former of which is partly Pronominal,—a skeleton sentence, which is put forward to arrest attention, and to introduce the re-statement, of which it is

the double. The Pronominal part is the Interrogative τί, which represents the Predicate, or part of the Predicate, of the re-statement. These Binary Interrogative sentences therefore follow the general principle of Double Interrogatives in Greek; which is, that the one introduces the other,—the first-placed being always the less precise and definite.

Phdr. 234 c, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφύως εἰρησθαι;—where τί foreshadows ὑπερφύως εἰρησθαι. (Cf. Symp. 204 d, ὁ ἐρώων τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρά; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ.)

Ib. 269 a, τί δὲ τὸν μελίγηρυν "Αδραστον οἴομεθα ἢ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειαν κ.τ.λ.; πότερον χαλεπῶς ἂν αὐτοὺς . . . εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ.;

Charm. 154 d, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;

Phileb. 27 e, τί δὲ ὁ σὺς [βίος]; ἐν τίνι γένει ἂν λέγοιτο;

Ib. 56 e, τί δὲ λογιστικὴ κ.τ.λ.; πότερον ὡς μία λεκτέον;

Phdr. 277 d, τί δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροὺν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν κ.τ.λ.; ἄρα οὐ δεδήλωκε τὰ λεχθέντα . . . ὡς κ.τ.λ.;—τί foreshadows ὡς κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει;

Soph. 266 e, τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν;

Phædo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἢ κ.τ.λ.; (where the Genitive is suspended in a loose construction, which the re-statement supersedes.)

Gorg. 474 d, τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ κατὰ πάντα εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλὰ; Here the virtual Subject of the re-statement is foreshadowed by τόδε, which therefore is Nominative; and the Predicate by τί, which (as in all the other instances) is Accusative.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 101, τί γὰρ δὴ παῖς ὁ τοῦ Λαερτίου; Ποῦ σοι τύχης ἔστηκεν;

§ 212. The passages also (quoted under 'Accusative Case,' §§ 15-19, above), in which a Pronoun Accusative is in Apposition to a whole sentence following, are *virtually* of Binary Structure: for the Accusative is the shadow of a sentence.

§ 213. B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

a. Where the first-placed expression is the less logically specific, or the less emphatic, and is introductory to the other.

a. Where it is a Noun-phrase.

Apol. 37 c, τῇ αὖ ἐκ καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα.

Phædo 65 d, λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι κ.τ.λ.,—τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν.

Ib. 81 e, τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμία.

Ib. 82 b, εἰς ταῦτόν, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος.

Ib. 113 a, τῶν τετελευτηκότων, τῶν πολλῶν.

Symp. 215 b, τῷ Σατύρῳ, τῷ Μαρσύνῳ.

Euthyd. 274 e, τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὴν ἀρετὴν, μαθητὸν εἶναι.

Crat. 415 a, τὸ ὄνομα ἢ μηχανή.

Ib. 435 c, τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ ξυνθήκῃ.

Protag. 317 b, εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξαρνον εἶναι.

Charm. 173 e, ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα.

Legg. 908 c, τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα.

Gorg. 462 c, οὐκοῦν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι,—χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

§ 214. β. Where it is Pronominal.

Euthyphro 8 e, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

:Apol. 24 e, αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.

Crat. 423 e, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναίτο ἕκαστον, τὴν οὐσίαν.

Gorg. 500 c, οὐ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειε τις, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅτινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν; (the two expressions are οὐ and ἢ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.)

Ib. 518 a, ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς εἶναι, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας.

Phileb. 38 b, ἔπεται ταύταις . . . ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.

Tim. 22 d, οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὅρεσι διασώζονται, βουκόλοι νομεῖς τε.

Protag. 351 a, τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν.

Rep. 396 c, ὁ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνὴρ, ἐβελήσειν.

Legg. 861 d, τοῖν δοῦν το μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐμοί, τό γε μὴ λέγειν κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 198 d, τὸ δὲ ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τὸ καλῶς ἐπαυαίνειν ὅτιοῦν.

Ib. 207 d, δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει.

Ib. 222 a, ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος . . . νοῦν ἔχοντας μόνους εὐρήσει, τῶν λόγων.

Add to these the frequently-recurring expression ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης.

§ 215. Under this head come also the instances of αὐτὸ in its peculiar Platonic meaning.

Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.

Phædo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο . . . ψυχὴν.

Protag. 360 e, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή.

Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ἡ νόσις.

Rep. 363 a, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες.

§ 216. γ. Where it is a Relative clause.

Rep. 402 b, οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὓς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι, τοὺς φύλακας.

Phædo 74 d, οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ἕτοιμοις, Similarly Hip. Ma.

291 e, Gorg. 469 a, Protag. 342 b, Crito 48 e, Legg. 653 e, &c.

Crat. 422 b, ἃ ἐρωτᾷς, τὰ ὀνόματα. Similarly Phileb. 42 e.

Tim. 33 a, ἃ ξυνιστᾷ, τὰ σώματα.

Hip. Ma. 294 a, ᾧ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστι μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι.

Symp. 200 d, ἐκείνου ἐρᾷν, ὃ οὐπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα.

Theæt. 167 b, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα . . . ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν—'and these, I mean their opinions, some call true.'

Tim. 40 b, ἐξ ἧς δὴ τῆς αἰτίας γέγονεν ὅσα . . . ἀεὶ μένει—'and hence, from this cause namely, arise,' &c.

Legg. 647 a, φοβούμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν . . . ὃν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε . . . αἰσχύνην.

Another explanation might have been conceived of some of these passages, that they are simply cases of Antecedent and Relative in reversed order. But this would not apply to the last five; consequently, all must be referred to the principle of Binary Structure. It is to be noticed, that the operation of Attraction, probably in the three last instances, certainly in two of them, complicates the case; i. e. that the Relatives agree not with their Antecedents, but respectively with τὰ φαντάσματα, and τῆς αἰτίας. See 'Attraction,' § 201, above.

Cf., as instances in other authors, Æschin. i. 72. p. 10, ὃν . . . ἡκούσατε τῶν νόμων. And Soph. Ant. 404, θάπτουσιν ὃν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπείπας—'him whom thou forbadeest to bury, namely that corpse' (the order is hyperbatic).

§ 217. Not to be identified with the foregoing are the following, which contain an implicit sentence, though it has been operated on by Ellipse, and in the first two by Attraction also.

Soph. 246 e, ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας—i. e. ὑπὲρ [τοῦ] ὃ τίθενται τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι.

Gorg. 477 a, ἡνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν—i. e. [τοῦτο] ὅπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν εἶναι.

Phædo 78 d, ἥς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι—where ἥς is the Predicate and τοῦ εἶναι the Subject of a sentence of which the Copula is suppressed.

§ 218. b. Where the first-placed expression is the more emphatic and sufficient of the two.

a. Common type of instances.

Gorg. 503 e, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν.

Critias 110 c, πάνθ' ὅσα ξύννομα ζῶα . . . πᾶν δυνατὸν πέφυκεν.

Phdr. 246 c, ἡ δὲ . . . [ψυχῇ] . . . σῶμα γήϊνον λαβοῦσα, ζῶον τὸ ξύμπαν ἐκλήθη.

Phædo 61 b, οὓς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους . . . , τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

Ib. 69 b, χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως, . . . μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή.

Ib. 105 a, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρειν . . . , αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.

Crat. 408 a, τὸ ἐρμηνέα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον κ.τ.λ., περὶ λόγου δυνάμιν ἐστι πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία.

Legg. 668 d, τῶν μεμνημένων ὃ τι ποτέ ἐστιν, ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων.

Ib. 734 e, καθάπερ οὖν δή τινα ξυμφῆν ἢ καὶ πλέγμ' ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οἷον τ' ἐστὶ τήν τ' ἐφυφῆν καὶ τὸν στήμονα ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1062, αὐτὸν . . . σῶμα τυμβεύσαι τάφῳ, 1147, Οὕτω δὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὸ σὸν λάβρον στόμα . . . τάχ' ἂν τις . . . Χειμῶν κατασβέσειε τὴν πολλὴν βοήν.

§ 219. A curious variation occurs in

Protag. 317 a, τὸ ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι . . . , πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος.

Phædo 99 a, εἴ τις λέγοι . . . ὥς διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἢ ποιῶ, . . . πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ραθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγον.

§ 220. β. Where the first-placed expression is collective, the other distributive.

Symp. 178 a, τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἑκάστου τὸν λόγον.

Ib. 190 d, αὐτοὺς διατεμῶ δίχα ἕκαστον.

Tim. 32 b, πρὸς ἄλληλα . . . ἀπεργασάμενος, ὃ τί περ πῦρ πρὸς αέρα τοῦτο αέρα πρὸς ὕδωρ, καὶ ὃ τι αἷρ πρὸς ὕδωρ ὕδωρ πρὸς γῆν.

We may trace this back to Homer: c. g. Od. i. 348, ὅστε δίδωσιν

Ἀνδράσιν ἀλφηστῆσιν ὅπως ἐθέλησιν ἐκάστω, x. 172, ἀνέγειρα δ' ἐταίρους Μελιχίοις ἐπέεσσι, παρασταδὸν ἄνδρα ἕκαστον.

§ 221. γ. Where the latter expression is restrictive of the former, being in fact only a re-enunciation of part of it.

Phædo 64 b, οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . ξυμφάναι ἂν, τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ.

Gorg. 517 e, δόξαί καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότει ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Hdt. viii. 83, καὶ οἱ σύλλογον τῶν ἐπιβατέων ποιησάμενοι προηγόρευε εὖ ἔχοντα ἐκ πάντων Θεμιστοκλέης. Aristot. Eth. VI. xii, ἔπειτα καὶ ποιουσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγεία, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν.

§ 222. δ. Where the latter expression is merely pronominal, and resumptive.

Grammatically, the pronominal resumption is (where no change of construction intervenes) a pleonasm: but rhetorically it is not redundant. Its function is to recal to the thoughts in its proper place an expression which has, for a special purpose, been set in advance of the main portion of the sentence, or which has been held in suspense by the intervention of some Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause, or some change of construction.

Instances of main portion of sentence intervening.

Theæt. 155 e, ἐάν σοι ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστώων τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν.

Apol. 40 d, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας.

Rep. 375 d, οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος.

Legg. 700 c, τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παιδείουσιν δεδογμένον ἀκούειν ἦν αὐτοῖς.

Phileb. 30 d (though the pronoun here has more force), ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφνηαμένοις ὡς αἰεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει ξύμμαχος ἐκείνους.

Rep. 353 d, τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν;

Cf. Soph. O. T. 717, Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι Τρεῖς καὶ νιν κ.τ.λ.



§ 223. Instances of Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause intervening.

Symp. 200 a, *πότερον ὁ Ἔρως ἐκείνου, οὗ ἐστὶν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμῇ αὐτοῦ;*

Similarly Charm. 195 a.

Theæt. 188 b, *ἂ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα;*

Phædo 104 d, *ἂ ὅ τι ἂν κατάσχη, ἀναγκάζει . . . αὐτὸ ἴσχειν*, and similarly in the next sentence.

Ib. 111 c, *τοὺς δέ, βαθυτέρους ὄντας, τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν.*

Alcib. I. 115 e, *τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν . . . , ἥ μὲν καλὸν κ.τ.λ., καλὸν αὐτὸ προσεῖπας;*

Legg. 625 a, *τούτον οὖν φαίμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς . . . , ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν κ.τ.λ., τούτον τὸν ἔπαινον αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι.*

§ 224. Instances of change of construction intervening.

Tim. 37 d, *ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ ξυνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται.*

Phileb. 49 b, *πάντες ὁποῖοι . . . ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἔπescθαι τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 13 b, *κακὰ δέ ὄντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὅμως σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά.* [For it is αὐτῶν, not τὰ πολλὰ, which is represented by αὐτά.]

Hip. Ma. 292 d, *ὃ παντὶ ᾧ ἂν προσγένηται ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῶ εἶναι.*

§ 225. Note, that caution is needed before applying this explanation of the resumptive Pronoun. For instance, in Phdr. 265 c, *τούτων δέ τινων . . . ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν κ.τ.λ.*, the *τούτων . . . εἰδοῖν* is a Genitive Absolute. So Symp. 195 a, *φημὶ οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων Ἔρωτα . . . εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι αὐτῶν*,—*πάντων . . . ὄντων* is a Genitive Absolute. (For the construction, cf. Laches 182 b, *ἐπιτιθεμένου ἄλλου ἀμύνασθαι αὐτόν*.) Again, Laches 182 d, *τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν τοῦτο εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ μάθημα . . . , χρὴ αὐτὸ μαθάνειν*,—*ὀπλιτικὸν* is Nominative. (Cf. a similar construction Symp. 202 b.) Again, Rep. 439 b, *τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνται τε καὶ προσέλκονται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χεὶρ, κ.τ.λ.*,—*τοῦ τοξότου* belongs to the sentence *ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χεὶρ, κ.τ.λ.*

§ 226. C. Dependent sentence resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction and premising a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts co-ordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.

a. The premised expression may be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Euthyd. 294 c, οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον, ὁπόσους ὀδόντας ἔχει;

Hip. Ma. 283 a, τεκμήριον σοφίας τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσον διαφέρουσι.

Phædo 75 b, εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰσου, ὃ τι ἐστίν.

Theæt. 162 d-e, θεοὺς . . . οὐς ἐγὼ . . . ὥς εἰσὶν ἢ ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἐξαιρῶ.

Phædo 86 d, Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι, τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.

Ib. 95 b, ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν Κάδμον λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

Laches 179 e, εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἶη μαθεῖν τὸ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι.

Gorg. 449 e, δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμοντας, ὥς ἂν διαιωμένοι ὑγιαίνουσιν.

Note, that a very loose government suffices for the premised expression, as in the three instances following.

Soph. 260 a, δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

Ibid. d, τὴν εἰδωλοποικὴν . . . διαμάχοιτ' ἂν . . . ὥς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν.

Protag. 354 a, οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τὰ τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας κ.τ.λ.,—ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ;

In the two remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the principal sentence.

Gorg. 448 d, δηλὸς γάρ μοι Πῶλος . . . , ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν . . . μεμελέτηκεν.

Phædo 64 a, κινδυνεύουσιν ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύουσι.

The form illustrated by some of the above examples is of course common enough in all authors, beginning with Homer: cf. Od. xvii. 373, Αὐτὸν δ' οὐ σάφα οἶδα, πόθεν γένος εὔχεται εἶναι, xviii. 374, Τῷ κέ μ' ἴδοις, εἰ ὦλκα διηνεκέα προταμοίμην. The looser governments are illustrated by Thuc. iii. 51, ἐβούλετο δὲ Νικίας . . . τοὺς Πελοποννησίους, ὅπως μὴ ποιῶνται ἔκπλους, Aristoph. Av. 1269, Δεινὸν γε τὸν κήρυκα, τὸν παρὰ τοὺς βροτοὺς Οἰχόμενον, εἰ μηδέποτε νοστήσει πάλιν.

§ 227. β. The Dependent sentence being an Infinitival one.

Legg. 653 a, φρόνησιν δὲ [λέγω, εἶναι] εὐτυχὲς ὄφρ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο.

Crat. 419 d, οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι ῥηθῆναι.

Phdr. 242 b, αἴτιος γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

Symp. 207 a, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐαντῷ εἶναι αἰεὶ ἔρως ἐστίν.

In the remaining instance the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Charm. 153 b, ἡγγέλται . . ἡ μάχη πάνν ισχυρὰ γεγονέναι.

§ 228. Note, that Attraction occurs, where possible, in the residuary Dependent sentence also ; as in the remaining instances.

Phædo 90 b, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινί, ἀληθεῖ εἶναι.

Crat. 425 b, σὺ πιστεύεις σαυτῷ, οἷός τ' ἂν εἶναι—attracted for οἷόν τ' ἂν εἶναί σε.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, ἐφθόνουν τοῖς ἐαυτῶν παισίν, ὡς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι.

Rep. 459 b, δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων.

Euthyd. 282 d, οἷων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι.

§ 229. b. Or the premised expression may not be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

Consequently redundancy, implicit or explicit, often occurs, as in some of the instances which follow, in which † is prefixed to the words in which the redundancy lies.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Phædo 58 e, εὐδαίμων μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα. [ἀνὴρ Herm. with Oxon. and most of the other MMS.]

Crito 43 b, σὲ . . . εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν φέρεις.

Phdr. 264 d, τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἣν ψυχῆς † ἀπορρεῖ.

Symp. 172 a, διαπυθέσθαι τὴν Ἀγάθωνος ξυνουσίαν . . . περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, τίνες ἦσαν.

Euthyd. 272 b, οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ᾖ ;

Politic. 309 d, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν . . . ἄρ' ἴσμεν, ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνατὸν εἶναι τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ † τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν ;

Protag. 318 e, εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν . . . † οἰκίαν διοικοῖ.

Tim. 24 e, τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὥρων ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδούσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἴσῃ—(sc. ὁ τόπος, referred to in αὐτῷ.)

Critias 108 b, προλέγω σοὶ τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου διάνοιαν, ὅτι θαυμαστῶς ὁ πρότερος εὐδοκίμηκεν ἐν † αὐτῷ ποιητής.

Apol. 25 e, ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι † μεμέληκε.

Meno 96 e, ὠμολογῆκαμεν τοῦτό γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι.

Phædo 65 d, τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον † ὂν. (Cf. § 213, above.)

Meno 72 b, μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας, ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστί.

Cf. Thuc. v. 16, Πλειστοάναξ . . . ἐς ἐνθυμίαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀεὶ προβαλλόμενος, ὡς διὰ τὴν †έκείνου κάθοδον παρανομηθεῖσαν ταῦτα ξυμβαῖναι.

In the three remaining instances, the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Phædo 82 a, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα, οἱ ἂν ἐκάστη ἦοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης—which means δῆλον δὴ οἷα καὶ τᾶλλα ἔσται, τούτεστιν οἱ ἂν ἐκάστη ἦοι κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα, ὅτι οἱοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι—which means δῆλον ὅτι οἱοί τ' εἰσὶν . . . ἐξεργάζεσθαι, τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα.

Ib. 45 e, μὴ δόξη ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἵσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς †εἰσηλθες, κ.τ.λ.

### § 230. β. The Dependent sentence being Infinitival.

Symp. 197 a, τὴν τῶν ζώων ποίησιν τίς ἐναντιώσεται, μὴ οὐχὶ Ἔρωτος εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ †γίγνεται τε καὶ φύεται πάντα τὰ ζῶα;

Phædo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους, οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθές ἔχειν.

Legg. 641 d, τὸ ἀληθές δισχυρίζεσθαι, ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.

Rep. 489 e, διῆμυν τὴν φύσιν, οἷον ἀνάγκη φῦναι τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ γαθὸν ἐσόμενον.

Ib. 443 b, ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζουσιν.

Gorg. 513 e, ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν.

Legg. 790 c, ἡργμεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραίνομεν.

Politic. 285 e, τοῖς μὲν τῶν ὄντων, ῥαδίως καταμαθεῖν, αἰσθηταὶ τινες ὁμοιωτῆτες πεφύκασι.

Hip. Ma. 294 e, οἴχεται ἄρ' ἡμᾶς διαπεφευγὸς τὸ καλόν, γινῶναι ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν.

Crito 52 b, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι.

Critias 115 d, ἕως εἰς ἐκπληξιν μεγέθεσσι τε κάλλεσσι τε ἔργων ἰδεῖν τὴν οἴκησιν ἀπειργάσαντο.

Phædo 84 c, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο.

Apol. 33 b, παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

Cf. Hom. Il. vii. 409, Οὐ γάρ τις φειδῶ νεκῶν κατατεθνηῶτων Γίγνεται, ἐπεὶ κε θάνωσι, πυρὸς μελίσσόμεν ὄκα.

Virtually similar is

Phileb. 26 b, ὕβριν . . . κατιδοῦσα ἢ θεός, πέρας, . . . οὐδὲν . . . ἐνόν.

In the remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Apol. 37 d, καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη, ἐξελθόντι . . . ζῆν.

Protag. 313 a, ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ σά, ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν—(sc. σέ.)

Rep. 525 b, προσήκον τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη νομοθετησθαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ † λογιστικὴν ἰέναι.

Gorg. 449 b—c, εἰσὶ μὲν ἔναι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν † τοὺς λόγους ποιέισθαι.

Euthyd. 281 d, κινδυνεύει ξύμπαντα ἃ κ.τ.λ., οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι ὅπως κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. viii. 46, εὐτελέστερα δὲ τὰ δεινά, † βραχεὶ μορίῳ τῆς δαπάνης, καὶ ἅμα μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, αὐτοὺς περὶ ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατατρίψαι.

## § 231. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION.

A. Antecedent and Relative clauses supplying each other's Ellipses.

Symp. 212 c, ὃ τι καὶ ὅπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε—where we must supplement the Antecedent sentence thus—τοῦτο καὶ ταύτη ὀνόμαζε.

Phædo 98 a, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει—where the Relative sentence intended is fully ἃ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ.

Symp. 178 a, ἃ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὧν ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιομνημόνευτον, τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον—where the Antecedent sentence fully is τούτων ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα, ὑμῖν ἐρῶ.

§ 232. B. Ellipses supplied from parallel constructions in co-ordinate clauses.

Phædo 62 a, τυγχάνει . . . ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν. οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν . . . εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὀσιόν ἐστι κ.τ.λ.,—where after οἷς δὲ must be supposed to be repeated καὶ ὅτε, and after τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις similarly καὶ τότε.

Ib. 69 b, τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα . . . μετὰ φρονήσεως—where must be supplied φρονήσεως καὶ before μετὰ φρονήσεως, parallel to τούτου καὶ μετὰ τούτου.

Politic. 258 a, Θεαιτήτω . . . συνέμξα χθὲς διὰ λόγων καὶ νῦν ἀκήκοα, Σωκράτους δὲ οὐδέτερα—where the clauses supply each other crosswise; ἀκήκοα requires the Genitive Θεαιτήτου, and οὐδέτερα implies a Σωκράτει parallel to Θεαιτήτω, as well as a Σωκράτους.

§ 233. C. Dependent Noun silently supplied from one of two co-ordinate clauses to the other, in a new and different government.

Apol. 19 d, ἀξιώ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν—where ἀλλήλοις is to be supplied to φράζειν.

Laeches 187 d, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ' ἀλλήλων—where ἀλλήλοις is to be supplied to διδόντες.

Legg. 934 e, διδασκέω καὶ μανθανέω τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα—to μανθανέω supply παρὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος.

Protag. 349 a, σὲ παρακαλεῖν . . . καὶ ἀνακονοῦσθαι—sc. σοί.

Phdr. 238 e, τῷ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ, δουλεύοντί τε—sc. ἐπιθυμία.

Ib. 278 e, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν—sc. ἀπ' ἀλλήλων.

Symp. 195 b, μετὰ δὲ νέων αἰὲ ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν, i. e. καὶ ἐστὶ τῶν νέων.

Cf. Xen. Hell. I. iii. 9, ὄρκους ἔλαβον καὶ ἔδοσαν παρὰ Φαρναβάζου.

§ 234. D.<sup>14</sup> New Subject in the second of two clauses silently supplied from the former.

Rep. 333 e, ὅταν μὴδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι—sc. αὐτό.

Symp. 212 e, θύραν ψόφον παρασχεῖν, . . . καὶ αὐλητρίδος φωνὴν ἀκούειν—sc. αὐτοῦς, from αὐτοῖς implied by παρασχεῖν.

Ib. 187 e, ὅπως ἂν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καρπώσῃται, ἀκολασίαν δὲ μηδεμίαν ἐμποίησῃ—sc. ἡ ἡδονή.

Rep. 414 d, ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάσχειν τε, καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦς—sc. ταῦτα.

Phædo 58 b, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι—sc. αὐτοῦς.

Ib. 72 e, λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἐνδείξειε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο—sc. Ἐνδυμίων.

Apol. 40 a, ᾧ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι—where the Nominative to νομίζεται is ᾧ supplied from the preceding Accusative ᾧ. (This is an instance of the next head also.)

<sup>14</sup> [Under this section is written in the MS. "Illustr. from Homer:" and so under §§ 235, 269, 300, 301, 308,

"Illustr.:" but the illustrations were never put in.]

§ 235. E. Relative Pronoun, in a new and different government, supplied to the second clause.

Symp. 200 d, ὁ οὕτω ἑτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἔχει.

Ib. 201 a, οὗ ἐνδεὴς ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἔχει.

Phædo 65 a, ὃ μὴδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων, μὴδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.

Gorg. 482 b, ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγόμενοις.

Menex. 243 c, ὧν χρὴ αἰεὶ μεμνησθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.

§ 236. In the following passages, the force of the Relative is still to be supplied, although a Demonstrative Pronoun fills its place in the construction.

Rep. 357 b, ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μὴδὲν διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται.

Ib. 395 d, ὧν φαμέν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι.

Phædo 100 b, ἃ εἰ μοι δίδως τε καὶ ξυγχαρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα.

Virtually similar is Rep. 337 e, πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδώς, . . . ἔπειτα . . . ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἶη, where μὴ εἰδώς is the equivalent of ὅς μὴ εἰδείη.

§ 237. F. Common part supplied from a preceding to a subsequent clause.

#### a. Definite Article.

The brackets indicate where Articles have to be supplied. The complete irregularity with which they are expressed and omitted shews that the object is, next to conciseness, to produce variety of expression and sound.

Rep. 344 c, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείτονος ξυμφέρων τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὧν, τὸ δ' ἄδικον [ ] ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν.

Ib. 438 b-c, τὰ πλείω πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω . . . καὶ αὖ [ ] βαρύτερα πρὸς [ ] κουφότερα καὶ [ ] θάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα.

Ib. 477 a, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνῶσις, ἀγνωσία δ' ἐπὶ [ ] μὴ ὄντι.

Ib. 544 c, ἥ τε . . . ἐπανουμένη, ἡ Κρητικὴ . . . καὶ [ ] δευτέρα . . . καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία.

Ib. 545 a, τὸν φιλόνηκον . . . καὶ [ ] ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὖ καὶ [ ] δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν.

Phædo 67 d, χωρισμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ [ ] σώματος. [So Oxon.]

Gorg. 469 e, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ [ ] τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα. [So most MSS.]

Symp. 186 e, ἥ τε ἱατρικὴ . . . , ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ [ ] γυμναστικὴ καὶ [ ] γεωργία.



Phdr. 253 d, ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἥ [ ] κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείπομεν.

Phileb. 45 a, μείζους γίνονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας . . . , ἢ περὶ [ ] ὑγιάινοντας;

Legg. 789 c, τοὺς μὲν ἐλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, [ ] μείζους δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην.

Ib. 960 c, [ ] Λάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην, [ ] Κλωθῶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν Ἀτροπον δὲ [ ] τρίτην.

§ 238. b. Preposition.

Symp. 209 d, καὶ εἰς Ὅμηρον βλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον.

Apol. 25 b, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. So Phædo 111 d, &c.

§ 239. c. Some larger part of the clause.

Politie. 308 e, τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν . . . ὅσα ἐστὶ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀθεότητα.

§ 240. G. Anastrophe; that is, the supplying of a word from a subsequent to a former clause. The object is, as Dissen (Pind. Nem. x. 38) remarks, to give liveliness to the sentence by strengthening the later clauses of it.

The use of this figure is more extensive in poetry than in prose; the following species of it, however, occur in Plato.

a. Anastrophe of Definite Article. (This is the converse of the usage considered under the last head.)

Rep. 491 d, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων.

Phileb. 35 e, ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν.

Legg. 795 b, διαφέρει μαθὼν μὴ μαθόντος, καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου.

Cf. Hom. Od. xviii. 228, Ἑσθλά τε καὶ τὰ χέρηα. Æschyl. S. c. T. 314, ἀνδρολέτειραν καὶ τὰν ῥίψοπλον ἄταν, Suppl. 194, Αἰδοῖα καὶ γόεδνα καὶ τὰ χρεῖ' ἔπη, Cho. 727, χθόνιον δ' Ἑρμῆν καὶ τὸν νύχιον.

§ 241. b. Anastrophe of Pronouns in Correlative clauses.

Rep. 455 e, καὶ γυνὴ ἱατρική, ἣ δ' οὐ. So 451 e.

Symp. 207 d, νέος αἰὲ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς—where we must supply τὰ μὲν το νέος γιγνόμενος.

Phædo 105 d—e, (A) τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἄν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται [τί ὀνομάζομεν]; (B) Ἄμουσον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον—where before ἄμουσον must be supplied τὸ μὲν. So Soph. 221 e, 248 a, Phileb. 36 e, &c.

Theæt. 191 c, κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, . . . τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου—where before σκληροτέρου must be supplied ἐνίοις μὲν.

Apol. 18 d, ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ . . . χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες—where before φθόνῳ must be supplied οἱ μὲν.

Cf. Hom. Il. xi. 536, ἀφ' ἱππείων ὀπλέων ραθάμιγγες ἔβαλλον, Αἰ δ' ἀπ' ἐπισσώτρων, xxii. 157, παραδραμέτην, φεύγων, ὁ δ' ὕπισθε διώκων, ix. 511, Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δῶρα φέροι, τὰ δ' ὕπισθ' ὀνομάζοι, Od. iii. 33, κρέα ὥπτων ἄλλα δ' ἔπειρον, xiv. 232, Τῶν ἐξαιρέυμην μενοικέα, πολλὰ δ' ὀπίσσω Λάγχανον (i. e. πολλὰ μὲν μενοικέα).

§ 242. c. Anastrophe of Correlative Adverbs.

Theæt. 192 d, ἀκούω, . . . τότε δὲ αἴσθησιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω.

Phædo 116 a, διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τότε δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες—where τότε must be supplied before διαλεγόμενοι. So also Critias 119 d, Phileb. 35 e, Tim. 22 e.

The leaving μὲν to be supplied from an expressed δὲ in the Correlative clause is common: e. g. Rep. 357 c, 358 a, 572 a, Symp. 199 b, 201 e.

Cf. Hom. Il. xxii. 171, [ἄλλοτε μὲν] Ἰδης ἐν κορυφῇσι πολυπτύχου, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε κ.τ.λ., xvi. 689, Ὅστε [ὅτε μὲν] καὶ ἄλκιμον ἄνδρα φοβεῖ . . . ὅτε δὲ κ.τ.λ., and so xx. 52.

§ 243. d. Anastrophe of Correlative Conjunctions.

Soph. 217 e, κατ' ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον.

Gorg. 488 d, διόρισον, ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστι κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 169 d, ἴδωμεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν. So 161 d.

Ib. 173 d, εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς . . . μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 132, Ζῶει ὅγ' ἢ τέθνηκε.

§ 244. e. Anastrophe of Prepositions.

Phileb. 22 c, τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ περί τί δράσομεν.

This kind of Anastrophe is as common in Homer as it is in later poets.

The converse usage is noticeable in peculiar instances: cf. Hom.

Il. xi. 374, Ἦτοι ὁ μὲν θώρηκα Ἀγαστρόφον ἰφθίμοιο Αἴνυντ' ἀπό

στήθεσφι παναίολον ἀσπίδα τ' ὤμων. And Theocr. i. 83, Πάσας ἀνὰ κράνας, πάντ' ἄλσεα, ib. 117, Οὐκ ἔτ' ἀνὰ δρύμωσ, οὐκ ἄλσεα.

§ 245. H. Verb supplied from a co-ordinate clause either preceding or subsequent.

Symp. 213 a, κελεύειν εἰσιέναι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν—in the second clause is to be supplied λέγειν out of κελεύειν.

Apol. 38 b, κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι.

In the following instance the Verb is supplied after an intervening complete clause.

Symp. 183 a, ἡ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρά του λαβεῖν ἡ ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι ἡ τιν' ἄλλην δύναμιν—where to the last clause must be supplied λαβεῖν from the next but one preceding.

In all the following it is the Substantive Verb that has to be supplied.

Symp. 186 a, ὡς μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει—where ἐστὶ is to be supplied to μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός.

Soph. 256 e, ξέμπαντα . . . ἐρούμεν . . . εἶναί τε καὶ [supply 'are'] ὄντα.

Phdr. 234 e, σαφῇ καὶ στρογγύλᾳ καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόρνευται.

Tim. 22 d, ὁ Νείλος εἷς τε τὰ ἄλλα σωτὴρ καὶ τότε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σώζει.

Ib. 56 b, οὕτως ὡς καθ' ἐν ἕκαστον μὲν . . . οὐδὲν ὁρώμενον, ξυναθροισθέντων δὲ . . . ὁρᾶσθαι.

Legg. 872 a, ἐὰν δὲ αὐτόχειρ μὲν μή, βουλεύσῃ δὲ θάνατόν τις ἄλλος ἐτέρῳ.

§ 246. I. Verb or Participle supplied from subordinate construction to main construction, or vice versa.

Phdr. 330 d, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ θρέμματα θαλλὸν . . . προσείοντες ἄγουσι—where to οἱ τὰ θρέμματα must be supplied ἄγοντες.

Phædo 114 b, οἱ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίων βιώναι—where to διαφερόντως must be supplied βεβιωκέναι.

Theæt. 180 a, ὑπερβιάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι—where to τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν must be supplied ἐνεῖναι.

Cf. Isocr. ix. 28. p. 194, παρακαλέσας ἀνθρώπους, ὡς οἱ τοὺς πλείστοις λέγοντες, περὶ πεντήκοντα—where to οἱ . . . λέγοντες must be supplied λέγουσι. (Cf. Epist. ad Hebr. x. 10.) Hdt. ii. 86,

οὕτω μὲν τοὺς τὰ πολυτελέστατα σκευάζουσι νεκρούς. Thuc. ii. 53, ῥᾶον γὰρ ἐτόλμα τις ἂν πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ' ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν—ἐτόλμα sc. καθ' ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν.

§ 247. J.

Apol. 18 c, ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι—which is to be supplemented thus—ὁ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι .κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 183 b, ὁ δὲ δεινότατον, ὥς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὁμύντι μόνῳ συγγνώμῃ.

Still more elliptical is

Phdr. 248 b, οὐ δὲ ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ, ἡ προσήκουσα . . . νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὔσα—i. e. οὐ δὲ ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ ἐστίν, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἡ πρ. κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Xen. Mem. II. vi. 17, ὁ τaráττει σε, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅτι πολλάκις . . . ὀρᾷς κ.τ.λ. Isocr. iv. 176. p. 77, ὁ δὲ πάντων καταγελαστότατον, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Lysias xxx. 29. p. 186, ὁ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. [So Bekker : Zurich edd. omit ὅτι.] We have also the following variations:—Isocr. vi. 56. p. 127, ὁ δὲ πάντων σχετλώτατον, εἰ κ.τ.λ. (and similarly xviii. 18. p. 375), xv. 23. p. 314, ὁ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον, ὅταν κ.τ.λ., Lysias xix. 25. p. 154, ὁ δὲ μέγιστον τεκμήριον· Δῆμος γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

§ 248. K. Of two Nouns in regimen, the governing Noun left to be supplied by the context, while its place in the construction is taken by the governed Noun.

Symp. 214 c, μεθύοντα ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραβάλλειν—where μεθύοντα ἄνδρα stands for μεθύοντος ἀνδρὸς λόγους.

Ib. 217 d, τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ—where ἐμοῦ stands for κλίνης τῆς ἐμῆς.

Protag. 310 e, οὐτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποισι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων.

This natural idiom begins with Homer: cf. Il. xvii. 51, κόμαι Χαρίτεσσιν ὁμοῖαι.

§ 249. L. Complementary ἄλλος omitted.

Theæt. 159 b, καὶ καθέδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἂν νῦν διήλθομεν—where πάντα stands for 'all besides.'

Ib. 145 a, ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς . . . καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται.

Phædo 69 b, τούτου πάντα . . . πιπρασκόμενα—'all other things being parted with for this.'

So τί μὴν; 'what, if not what you say?'

§ 250. M. Contrasted clause to be mentally supplied.

Rep. 475 e, οὐδαμῶς [φιλοσόφους φήσομεν], ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις—sc. φιλοσόφους δ' οὐ.

Theæt. 201 b, οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι [δύνασθαι διδάξαι], ἀλλὰ πείσαι μὲν—sc. διδάξαι δ' οὐ.

Crito 43 d, οὐ δὴ τοι ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν [so Oxon. and two more MSS.] μέν μοι, ἤξειν τήμερον—sc. 'but I am not sure.'

Phdr. 242 c, εἰμὶ μάντις μὲν, οὐ πάνν δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαντῶ μόνον ἱκανός.

Cf. Andoc. i. 22. p. 4, ταυτὶ ἔλεγεν ἄν, ἢ οὐ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι—sc. 'but another might not.' (οἶμαι μὲν ἐγὼ would have been 'I *think*, but am not sure.'

§ 250\*. MM. Disjunctive clause to be mentally supplied.

Crat. 389 e, ἕως ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν ἀποδιδῶ, ἐάν τε ἐν ἄλλῃ σιδήρῳ, [ἐάν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ], ὅμως ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον.

§ 251. N. Protasis of a hypothetical reason left to be mentally supplied.

Symp. 236 b, (A) ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; (B) Οὐ μέντ' ἂν . . . ἐφοίτων παρὰ σέ—i. e. 'No: for else I should certainly not have,' &c.

Phdr. 227 d, εἴθε γράψειεν κ.τ.λ. ἢ γὰρ ἂν ἀστέϊοι καὶ δηωφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι.

Euthyd. 280 a, οὐ γὰρ δὴπου ἀμαρτάνοι γ' ἂν ποτέ τις σοφία . . . ἢ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἴη.

§ 252. O. Hypothetical sentence;—εἴπερ representing the Protasis.

Euthyd. 296 b, οὐκ οὐκ, ὃ γὰρ, προσέχων τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν δρῶ τούτο, εἴπερ.

Rep. 497 e, οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ', εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει.

Legg. 667 a, οὐκ, ὃ γὰρ, προσέχων τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν δρῶ τούτο, εἴπερ.

Ib. 900 e, καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὅποσα φλαῦρα.

Cf. Arist. Eth. VIII. iii, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ; also ib. IX. vii, X. iii. And Aristoph. Nub. 227, "Ἐπειτ' ἀπὸ ταῦτόν τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, εἴπερ.

§ 253. P. Hypothetical sentence;—εἰ δὲ representing the Protasis.

Symp. 212 c, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὥς ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἑρωτα νόμισον εἰρησθαί; εἰ δέ, ὃ τι καὶ ὕπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τούτο ὀνομάξε.

Euthyd. 285 c, εἰ μὲν βούλεται, ἐψέτω, εἰ δ', ὅ τι βούλεται τοῦτο ποιείτω.

Legg. 688 b, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, ὥς παίζων· εἰ δ', ὥς σπουδάζων.

Alc. I. 114 b, τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ· εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξελθε.

This εἰ δὲ does not stand for εἰ δὲ μή, in reference to the βούλει of the former clause; but refers to a βούλει of its own, with reference to the coming clause.

The usage is common in Homer: cf. Π. vi. 376, Εἰ δ', ἄγε, xxii. 381, Εἰ δ', ἄγετε, ix. 46, εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοί, Φεργύωντων κ.τ.λ., 262, Εἰ δέ, σὺ μὲν μεν ἄκουσον.

§ 254. Q. Hypothetical sentence;—suppression of Apodosis.

Rep. 575 d, οὐκουν ἂν μὲν ἐκόντες ὑπέκλωσιν· ἂν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 520 e, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται—  
εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ.

More commonly the form is ἂν μὲν . . . εἰ δέ, as also in Thucydides.

Symp. 185 d, ἂν μὲν σοι ἐθέλῃ παύεσθαι ἢ λύγξ— εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 854 c, καὶ ἂν μὲν σοι λωφῇ τι τὸ νόσημα— εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 325 d, ἂν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθεται— εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 311 d, ἂν μὲν ἐξικνῆται . . .— εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 287 a, ἂν . . . ἀντιλαμβάνωμαι—‘suppose I’ &c.

Symp. 199 e, ἀπόκριναι ὀλίγῳ πλείω, ἢα μάλλον καταμάθῃς ὁ βούλομαι· εἰ γὰρ ἐροίμην κ.τ.λ.—‘suppose I were to ask, now,’ &c.

Rep. 440 d, ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμεῖ . . . , ὅτι κ.τ.λ.—

Symp. 177 b, εἰ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι κ.τ.λ.—

With εἰ βούλει, or εἰ βούλεσθε, the Protasis also is often curtailed.

Symp. 220 d, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις κ.τ.λ.—where εἰ βούλεσθε represents εἰ βούλεσθε σκέψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη ὁποῖος ἐστίν.

Crat. 392 a, εἰ δὲ βούλει περὶ τῆς ὕριθος.

Theæt. 196 e, εἰ δὲ βούλει, . . . κεχρήμεθα.

Cf. Hom. Π. i. 580, Εἴπερ γάρ κ' ἐθέλησιν κ.τ.λ., xvi. 559, ἀλλ' εἴ μιν ἀεικισαίμεθ', κ.τ.λ., xxi. 487, Εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις πολέμοιο δαήμεναι κ.τ.λ.,

Od. xv. 80, Εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις. Suppression of the Apodosis is also common in Homer after ἐπεί,—as Π. iii. 59, Od. iii. 103, viii. 236.

§ 255. R. Form of Apodosis of a Hypothetical represented by ἂν, the Verb or Participle being understood.

Phædo 98 c, ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις . . . λέγοι.

In this common phrase the *ἄν* represents not so much a particular sentence, such as e. g. here *πεποιθὼς ἄν εἴη τις*, but rather a vague sentence such as *τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄν εἴη*.

Apol. 29 b, *τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω . . . , καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαῖν εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν*—sc. *σοφώτερος ἄν φαῖν εἶναι*—but this suppression is a graceful escape from the appearance of self-assertion.

Politic. 308 c, *εἴ τις πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν, . . . κἂν εἰ τὸ φαυλότατον, . . . ξυνίστησιν*. Here the *κἂν . . . φαυλότατον* is exegetic of *ὁτιοῦν*—‘any whatever, so that even if you understood it of the vilest it would mean that.’ The *καὶ* is hyperbatically placed, and belongs to the *εἰ* clause.

Symp. 221 e, *ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἔξωθεν περιамπέχονται, Σατύρου ἄν τινα ὑβριστοῦ δοράν*—‘something [like] what a satyr’s hide would be.’ In this instance, as also in the last, it is a Participle, not a Verb, which is to be understood.

Rep. 468 a, *τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον; πῶς ἐκτέον κ.τ.λ.; Δέγ’, ἔφη, ποῖ’ ἄν;*

§ 256. S. Condition or Reason referring to an *implicit* Proposition.

Phædo 61 b, *Εὐήνῳ φράζε . . . ἄν σωφρονῇ ἐμὲ διώκειν*—‘tell him to follow me,—*which he will do* if he is wise.’

Symp. 173 d, *ὁπόθεν . . . τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες . . . , οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ*—‘I do not know how you came by it, *but at all events it fits you*; for’ &c.

Theæt. 158 a, *ὁκνῶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι λέγω· ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.*

Protag. 333 c, *αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν ἔγωγε τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γέ φασι κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 335 c, *εἴμυι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ’ ἄν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον*.

§ 257. T. Direct conjunction of one or more particulars with a clause covering the rest.

a. In summarily breaking off enumeration of particulars.

Phædo 100 d, *ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη*.

Legg. 834 c, *εἴτε τριετηρίδες εἴτε αὖ διὰ πέμπτων ἐτῶν εἴθ’ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως ἄν . . . διανεμηθῶσι*.

Tim. 48 c, *τὴν μὲν περὶ ἀπάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχὰς εἴτε ὅπη δοκεῖ*.

Crito 50 a, *εἴτ’ ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ’ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο*.

Apol. 41 b, *Ὀδυσσεῖα ἢ Σίσυφον ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι*.



Phædo 70 e, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον [τυγχάνει ὄν], καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. Similarly Phædo 73 d, 94 b, Gorg. 483 d, Legg. 944 b.

Protag. 325 a, δικαιοσύνη, καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν.

The peculiarity of these contracted forms of expression may be appreciated by comparing the following regularly composed sentence:—

Protag. 358 a, εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺν εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὃ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀποκρίναι.

The contracted forms give us always the feeling of abbreviation, as if the speaker was himself impatient of prolixity.

Gorg. 494 d, (A) φημί τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιώναι. (B) Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῶ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ;

Apol. 20 d, οὔτοι δὲ τάχ' ἂν . . . μείζω τινα ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω.

§ 258. b. In summary transitions to one particular.

Legg. 715 c, τοὺς ἄρχοντας . . . ὑπηρέτας . . . ἐκάλεσα οὗ τι καινοτομίας ὀνομάτων ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' ἡγοῦμαι κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν . . . ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο.

Cf. Lysias xxviii. 4–5. p. 179, οἶμαι . . . οὐδένα ἂν . . . ἐπιτρέψαι . . . , ἄλλως τε καὶ Ἐργокλῆς ἔλεγεν. St. Mark vi. 5, καὶ οὐκ ἡδύνατο ἐκεῖ οὐδεμίαν δύναμιν ποιῆσαι, εἰ μὴ . . . ἐθεράπευσε.

Hip. Ma. 281 c, (A) τί ποτε τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ . . . φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι . . . ; (B) τί δ' οἶε ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀδύνατοι ἦσαν;

Phædo 63 d, (A) σκεψώμεθα τί ἐστὶν ὃ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. (B) τί δὲ ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων κ.τ.λ.;

§ 259. U. Use of πολλοῦ δεῖ instead of οὐ.

In the regular or full construction πολλοῦ δεῖ is either interjected parenthetically, or subjoined, to strengthen a negation. But, in the instances which follow, a Negative is dropped out, and the πολλοῦ δεῖ is made to fill the same place in the construction which the Negative filled.

Rep. 378 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ μυθολογητέον . . . , ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 203 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπαλὸς . . . , ἀλλὰ σκληρός. Fully and regularly this would have been οὐχ ἀπαλός,—πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ,—ἀλλὰ σκληρός.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ μήποτε τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσῃται. Fully οὐ μήποτε τις (πολλοῦ γε δεῖ) τοιαῦτα ἐργάσῃται.

§ 260. V. Extension of the government of a Verb, irrationally, so as to admit of the addition of an afterthought to a Participial clause without a new construction.

Politic. 276 e, εἰς ταῦτὸν βασιλέα καὶ τύραννον ξυνέθεμεν, ἀνομοιοτάτους ὄντας αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκατέρου τρόπον—where there is no justification in the sense for bringing τὸν τρόπον under the government of ξυνέθεμεν.

§ 261. W. Two Participles, representing the reciprocal action of two parties, made to agree each of them with both conjointly,—to avoid specification in set terms.

Crito 48 d, ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι—i. e. σύ τε ἐξάγων, ἐγώ τε ἐξαγόμενος.

Cf. Isocr. vi. 47. p. 125, ἀπείπομεν δ' ἂν ἀκούοντές τε καὶ λέγοντες—i. e. ἡμεῖς τε ἀκούοντες, ἐγώ τε λέγων. Somewhat similarly Arist. Categ. vi. 13, ὅρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη, τῷ τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι—where however μείζονα, still more brachylogically, stands for τὴν μὲν μείζω, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον.

## § 262. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—PLEONASM OF CONSTRUCTION.

From instances of Pleonasm must be excluded

1. Cases in which the force of a word has been attenuated by its frequent use in that particular connection ; e.g. εἶναι subjoined to ἐκὼν and the like :

2. All cases in which redundancy has resulted from Change of Construction, or from Binary Structure :

3. Cases of fullness of Construction : e.g.

Phædo 62 a, τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων—which is simply the full form of which μόνον ἀπάντων would have been an abbreviation ; as 'distinct from all the rest' is more accurate than 'distinct from all :'

Or the use of ὥστε with the Infinitive, following δύναμαι &c.

Or the use of a deliberate form of speaking, as in

Apol. 19 b, τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες ;

Ib. 34 d, ἐπεικῇ ἂν μοι δοκῶ . . . λέγειν λέγων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 36 a, οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο.

Legg. 858 a, *τίνα τρόπον ἂν γιγνόμενον γίγνοιτο.*

Phædo 75 d, *καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι.*

Cf. Isæus ii. 22, *οὐκ ἂν ποιησάμενος ἄλλον οἰκειότερον ἐμοῦ ποιήσαιτο ἂν*  
whereby we are reminded of Homer's (Od. xi. 612) *Μὴ τεχνη-*  
*σάμενος μηδ' ἄλλο τι τεχνήσαιτο* Ὅς κεύνον τελαμῶνα ἑῇ ἐγκάτθετο  
*τέχνη.*

Or, in coordinate clauses which have a common part, the expression of this in each clause, as in

Phdr. 255 d, *ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν.*

Rep. 553 b, *πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει.*

Phædo 67 d, *ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμών ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.*

(Compare these with the real Pleonasm of Prepositions below—  
§ 265.)

### § 263. A. Pleonasm of particular words.

a. Of the Negative.

a. In the same clause.

Rep. 339 b, *οὐπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη.*

Ib. 389 a, *οὐκοῦν Ὁμήρου οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδεξόμεθα.*

Crito 43 b, *οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί' οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἦθελον.*

Euthyd. 279 a, *οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνν τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι*  
*ἐμπορεῖν.* So Phædo 115 c.

Politic. 300 e, *μηδὲν πλῆθος μηδ' ἡντινοῦν δυνατὸν λαβεῖν τέχνην.*

Phædo 100 a, *οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐ σφόδρα.*

Hip. Ma. 292 b, *οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἰππία, οὐκ, εἰ ταῦτά γε ἀποκρι-*  
*ναίμην.*

Lysis 221 c, *οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε τὸ κακὸν κ.τ.λ., οὐκ ἂν ἦν κ.τ.λ.*

Crat. 398 e, *οὐδ' εἴ τι οἶός τ' ἂν εἴην εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω.*

Euthyphro 4 d, *οὐτ' εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστ' ἀπέκτεινεν, . . . οὐ δέιν.*

Cf. Hom. Il. i. 86, &c.

The usage is common, of course, where the Negative is distributed to subdivisions of the sentence, as in

Theæt. 163 a, *ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν.*

The object of the Pleonasm is, after premising the Negative as an announcement of the general form of the sentence, to place it also in close contact with the word which it immediately concerns.

§ 264. β. Not in the same clause. In this case the repetition seems almost <sup>15</sup> irrational.

Apol. 27 e, ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν ὥς οὐ, κ.τ.λ., οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστι.

Legg. 747 d, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων, ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ γεννᾶν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους· οἷς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετητέον. οἱ μὲν γέ που διὰ πνεύματα κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Antipho vi. 10. p. 142, οὔτε ὅστις οὐκ ἄλλα κατηγορεῖ ἢ ἃ διώκει ἐν πράγματι τοιούτῳ, πιστεῦσαι δὴπου αὐτῷ ἀξιώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀπιστῆσαι —where οὐκ is irrational.

#### § 265. b. Of Prepositions.

Phdr. 278 a, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις . . . ἐν μόνοις τὸ ἐναργὲς εἶναι.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 53, ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις δεξιόμενοι γενέσθαι ἢ ὑμῖν.

#### § 266. c. Of Conjunctions.

Symp. 210 b, καὶ ἐὰν ἐπικηὲς ὦν τὴν ψυχὴν τις καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ.

d. Of ἂν.

Phdr. 276 b, τῇ γεωργικῇ χρώμενος τέχνη ἂν σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσῆκον ἀγαφῇ ἂν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 31 a, κρούσαντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε.

e. Of ἔφη, &c.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὐδῶ ἂν ἔχοι, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων.

Ib. 190 c, λέγει ὅτι Δοκῶ μοι, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.

#### § 267. B. Resumption of a Noun, where no Change of Construction has intervened, by Oblique Cases of αὐτός.

See under 'Binary Structure,' § 222, above.

#### § 268. C. Pleonasm in sentences of Contrast.

Politic. 262 a, τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίοις τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι.

Legg. 805 a, ἡμίσεια πόλις ἀντὶ διπλασίας.

Tim. 39 c, ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν.

Phædo 58 a, πάλα γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών.

Ib. 7 c, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται.

<sup>15</sup> Cf., perhaps, Thucyd. iii. 36, πόλιν ὕλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους.

Soph. 219 b, ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερόν τις ὄν ὕστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγῃ. So 265 b.

Cf. Lysias xxxi. 24. p. 189, τοιγάρτοι πρότερον βελτίων γενόμενος περὶ τὴν πόλιν, ὕστερον βουλευεῖν ἀξιούτω.

Phædo 64 c, εἰάν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐμοί.

Ib. 76 e, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμέτεραν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

Cf. Xen. Anab. II. i. 22, καὶ ἡμῖν ταῦτα δοκεῖ ἅπερ καὶ βασιλεῖ, Hom.

II. vi. 476, δότε δὴ καὶ τόνδε γενέσθαι Παῖδ' ἐμόν, ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ περ, ἀμυρεπέα Τρώεσσι, (and more in Heindorf, on Phædo 64 c).

§ 269. D. Pleonasm in stereotyped phrases.

Phædo 91 d, πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα.

Ib. 99 b, πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία.

Ib. 79 e, ὄλφ καὶ παντί (perhaps).

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐργηγοροσὶ μήτε εὐδουσι κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν διαπονουμένοις. (This perhaps approaches nearer to Hyperbole—for which see § 317, below.)

§ 270. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.

A. As to Cases of Nouns.

a. Nominative Absolute—in exposition.

Soph. 266 d, τίθημι δύο διχῇ ποιητικῆς εἶδη· θεία μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη κατὰ θάτερον τμήμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

Ib. 218 e, τί δῆτα προταξαίμεθ' ἂν εὐγνωστον καὶ συμκρὸν . . . ; οἶον ἀσπαλιεντής.

§ 271. b. Inversion of government.

Theæt. 192 a, δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους.

Apol. 21 c, διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 811 c, ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τοὺς λόγους . . . , ἔδοξαν . . . μοι . . . εἰρῇσθαι.

Ib. 922 b, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἰπεῖν, βλέψας κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὁπόσοι κ.τ.λ., ἀναγκαῖότατον ἔπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 173 d, σπουδαὶ δ' ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὸς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὅναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

Symp. 208 e, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν—εἰσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—τούτων ὅταν τις κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 474 e, καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους . . . οὐ δῆπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλὰ.

Rep. 565 d—e, ὥς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχχνου . . . ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι.

Euthyd. 281 d, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα . . . οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι.

Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρῆμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἂν μὴ δυνάμεθα πάντως ἀποδιδόναι, συγγιγνώσκειν χρεών.

§ 272. c. Different governments, either of them regular, brought together into one sentence.

Rep. 378 d, τοιαῦτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς καὶ γέρουσι.

Ib. 566 e, ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἕξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῇ τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ.

Symp. 203 a, διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία . . . θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐργηγοροῖσι καὶ καθεύδουσι—the words καὶ ἐργηγοροῖσι καὶ καθεύδουσι referring to ἀνθρώπους.

Phædo 88 c, εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι.

§ 273. d. Change to a previous construction.

Rep. 413 e, τὸν ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα . . . , καὶ τιμὰς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, . . . γέρα λαγχάνοντα.

§ 274. e. Change to a Genitive Absolute.

Rep. 590 d, ἄμεινον παντὶ . . . ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 755 d, τούτους εἶναι στρατηγούς . . . , δοκιμασθέντων καθάπερ οἱ νομοφύλακες.

§ 275. f. The following are simple Anacolutha, reducible to no principle whatever.

Legg. 823 d, εἴθ' ὑμᾶς μήτε τις ἐπιθυμία . . . ποτὲ λάβοι . . . , μήτε ἐργηγοροῖσι μήτε καθεύδουσι κύρτοις ἀργὸν θῆραν διαπονουμένοις.

Critias 116 d, νεὼς ἦν σταδίου μὲν μῆκος, εὖρος δὲ τρισὶ πλέθροισι.

§ 275\*. AA. As to Number of Nouns and Pronouns.

a.

Phædo 62 a, τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον.

Phædo 82 a, οἱ ἂν ἐκάστη ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης.

Symp. 207 b, ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἔτοιμά ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τούτων διαμάχεσθαι—where τούτων = τοῦ γενομένου.

Protag. 345 e, οὐχ ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὰ πονῇ ἐκόν, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι.

Rep. 426 c, ὡς ἀποθανομένους, ὅς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ.

Conversely to the last two instances

Symp. 187 c, προσφέρειν οἷς ἂν προσφέρῃ, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡδονὴν καρπώσῃται.

b.

Rep. 554 a, θησαυροποῖς ἀνὴρ, οὗς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος.

§ 276. B. As to Verbs.

a. Original construction abandoned, after interposed clause, in favour of that of the interposed clause. (For other applications of the same principle, see 'Attraction,' §§ 192–194, above.)

Phædo 107 b, τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσὶν, ὁμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον.

This change is commonest after such interposed clauses as express *saying, seeming, or thinking*.

Crat. 384 c, ὅτι δὲ οὐ φησὶ κ.τ.λ., ὥσπερ ὑποπτεύω, αὐτὸν σκώπτειν.

Phdr. 272 d, παντάπασιν γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἵπομεν, . . . ὅτι οὐδὲν . . . δέοι κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 493 b, τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς με λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

Legg. 728 d, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, πᾶς ἂν τοῦτο νοήσῃς, τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμὴν.

§ 277. b. Construction changing from Infinitive to Finite Verb.

Symp. 177 c, τὸ . . . "Ἐρωτα μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετοληκέναι ἀξίως ὑμῆσαι, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἡμέληται.

Ib. 184 b, ἔστι . . . νόμος, ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἄλλη μία μόνη δουλεία ἐκούσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος.

Apol. 19 c, τούτων ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἕξεσι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 190 d, αἱ μαῖαι δύνανται τὰς ὠδῖνας μαλθακώτερας ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἔαν νέον ὃν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσι.



§ 278. c. Construction begun afresh with Conjunction or Relative, after intervention of a Participial or Adverbial clause.

Legg. 810 d, *κελεύεις γὰρ δὴ με, τῆς αὐτῆς ὁδοῦ ἐχθοδοποῦ γεγонуίας πολλοῖς, ὥς δ' οὐκ ἐλάττωσιν ἑτέροις προσφιλοῦς . . , μεθ' ὧν διακελεύει με κ.τ.λ.*

Crito 44 b, *χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μήποτε εἰρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω κ.τ.λ.*

Gorg. 457 b, *ἐὰν δέ, οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κἄτα ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ.*

Rep. 530 b, *ἄτοπον . . . ἡγήσεται, τὸν νομίζοντα . . . καὶ ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ.*

Critias 114 e, *ἡ νῆσος αὐτὴ παρείχετο . . . τὸ νῦν ὀνομαζόμενον μόνον, τότε δὲ πλέον ὀνόματος ἦν τὸ γένος ἐκ γῆς ὀρυττόμενον ὀρειχάλκου.*

§ 279. d. Construction begun with ὅτι, after Verbs of *knowing* or *saying*, and finished without regard to it.

Gorg. 481 d, *αἰσθάνομαί σου ἐκάστοτε . . . , ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ σοῦ τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν.*

Legg. 892 d, *εἶπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμέ χρῆναι πειραθῆναι κατ' ἐμαυτόν.*

Crito 50 b, *ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι Ἡδίκη γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις ;*

Protag. 356 a, *εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι Ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει.*

§ 280. Often, from the frequency of this use with οἶδα, and with λέγω or εἶπον, ὅτι becomes in such contexts a mere expletive.

Rep. 501 a, *οἶσθ' ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν διενεγκεῖν.*

Apol. 37 b, *ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων.*

Symp. 175 d, *καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὐ ἂν ἔχοι κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 189 a, *εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μάλ' ἐπαύσατο.*

§ 281. C. As to Oratio Obliqua.

a. Change from Indicative to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Gorg. 517 c—d, *σὲ . . . οἶμαι . . . ἐγνωκέναι ὥς . . . ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακομικὴ ἐστίν, ἥ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν κ.τ.λ.*

Rep. 391 c—d, *μηδ' ἐῷμεν λέγειν, ὥς Θησεὺς . . . ὥρμησεν οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγὰς, μηδέ τιν' ἄλλον . . . ἥρω τολμῆσαι ἂν κ.τ.λ.*

Charm. 164 d, *δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακεῖσθαι . . . ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρει, ὥς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προσρήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἀλλήλους.*

Laches 198 b, *ἡγούμεθα . . . δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ., δέος δὲ παρέχει κ.τ.λ., δέος γὰρ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.*

## § 282. b. Change from Indicative to Optative Oratio Obliqua.

Protag. 327 c-d, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μὴ παιδεία ἐστίν, ἀλλ' εἰεν ἄγριοι.

Phædo 95 c-d, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φησ πάντα ταῦτα μνηνεῖν . . . ὅτι πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστι ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ.· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον κ.τ.λ.· καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη . . . ζῶη κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 96 b, ἐμυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν . . . πότερον τὸ αἶμά ἐστιν κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη.

Phdr. 241 b, ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται κ.τ.λ., ἡγνοηκῶς . . . ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἐρῶντι . . . χαρίζεσθαι . . . εἰ δὲ μή, ἀναγκαῖον εἶη κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 301 d, δόξαν εἴχομεν περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, ὡς ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἰς ἐστί, τοῦτο δέ, ὁ ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἶη, οὐκ ἄρα εἶμεν ἀμφότεροι.

Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ εἰ μὲν τις . . . , τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειν.

Phileb. 41 d, [εἴρηται] ὡς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἧττον ἄμφω δέχεσθον, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴτην.

Charm. 156 d-e, Ζάμολξίς, ἔφη, λέγει ὅτι . . . οὐ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἶη κ.τ.λ.

It should be observed, however, that the Optative in these passages is not simply the effect of Oratio Obliqua: for some of the passages are in Present time. The emergence of the Optative marks the transition from fact to inference; it indicates that we are not called upon to accept an additional assertion, but only to follow one step further in the direction already supposed. This is the principal account to be given of this change of construction: it may be, however, that a subsidiary cause is the increasing need, as the sentence unwinds, of marking the dependence upon the main construction of the later and therefore more remote clauses.

## § 283. c. The contrary change, from the Optative Oratio Obliqua to the Indicative, is in Plato very uncommon; such as is found in

Tim. 18 c, ἐτίθεμεν, μηχανώμενοι ὅπως μηδεὶς . . . γνώσοιτο, νομοῦσι δὲ πάντες κ.τ.λ.

## § 284. d. Change from Optative Oratio Obliqua to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Phædo 96 b, ἐμυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν . . . ἄρ', ἐπειδὴν κ.τ.λ., ὡς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα ξυντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. This passage exemplifies b. also (where it

is quoted). The justification of this further change to the Infinitive lies in the parenthetical *ὡς τινες ἔλεγον*, which usurps here the influence properly due to *πότερον*.

§ 285. e. Participial clause, in a sentence of Infinitive Oratio Obliqua, changing into Infinitive.

Phædo 111 c, *τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μάλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ τὸ χάσμα . . . ἔλαττον ἔχειν.*

Politic. 293 e, *λεκτέον μεμιμημένας . . . , ἃς μὲν ὡς εὐνόμους λέγομεν ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίονα μεμιμῆσθαι.*

Cf. Hom. Il. xviii. 535, *Ἐν δ' Ἔρις ἐν δὲ Κυδοιμὸς ὀμίλειον, ἐν δ' ὀλοὴ Κήρ, "Ἄλλον ζῶν ἔχουσα νεούτατον, ἄλλον ἄουτον, "Ἄλλον τεθνηῶτα κατὰ μόθον ἔλκε ποδοῦν, Od. vii. 125, ὄμφακες εἰσὶν "Ἄνθος ἀφιεῖσαι, ἔτεραι δ' ὑποπερκάξουσιν.*

§ 286. D. Inversion of the Antecedent clause, so that the Pronoun in it does not refer to the Relative foregoing, but to some other word in the Relative clause.

Theæt. 201 b, *οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες . . . , τούτους δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ.,* where *τούτους* refers to *τινες*.

Phædo 70 e, *ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ.;—αὐτὸ refers to τι.*

Lysis 219 d, *ὃ ἂν τίς τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆται . . . , ἄρα καὶ ἄλλο τι ἂν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῶτο;*

Phædo 105 b, *ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται;—sc. τὸ σῶμα.*

Symp. 204 b, *ὃν δὲ σὺ φήθης "Ερωτα εἶναι, θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθες.*

## § 287. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—ARRANGEMENT OF WORDS AND CLAUSES.

### A. Hyperbaton.

The displacement of the natural order of words, which is called Hyperbaton, is not of capricious adoption. Its use is 1. to increase the facility of regulating the emphasis; and 2. to enable language to represent, in a degree, the rapidity of thought, by making one expression literally catch up another.

The Hyperbaton which results from the close adherence of Prepositions to their cases (see below, § 298) is to be excepted from the account just given. It is the result simply of a grammatical exigency.

The name Hyperbaton had been given, and the fact recognised, in Plato's own time. Socrates in the Protagoras (343 c), in rectifying the explanation of the passage of Simonides, says *ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως*.

§ 288. a. Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 693 c, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτ' ἂν γίγνηται ῥήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω.

Ib. 860 d, ἀκουσίως δὲ ἐκούσιον οὐκ ἔχει πράττεσθαι ποτε λόγον—where the two clauses οὐκ ἔχει λόγον and ἀκουσίως ἐκούσιον πράττεσθαι are counterchanged.

Apol. 26 a, οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστί.

Instances frequently occur in clauses incidental to the machinery of the dialogue,—as in

Phædo 71 c, ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης.

Symp. 214 c, ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

Apol. 25 c, εἰπέ ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε. Similarly 26 e, Meno 71 d.

Symp. 212 e, ἴνα . . . τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλὴν—ἐὰν εἴπω οὕτωςί—ἀναδήσω—ἄρα καταγελάσεσθέ μου ὡς μεθύοντος ;

Two sentences are here counterchanged. As Alcibiades rehearses the form of words with which he intends to accompany the crowning of Socrates, he interrupts himself to justify them, and does his best to carry on the two sentences together. These, if one had been postponed to the other, would have run—"That from my own head to the head of the wisest and handsomest of men I may transfer this garland—Well! and if I shall say that,—what then? will you make fun of me?" In trying to carry on both together, he breaks and counterchanges them, distinguishing them doubtless by difference of tone.

Even so violent a trajection as this has its parallels in Homer.

§ 289. b. Grammatical governments intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Laches 195 a, πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες βλέψας ;

Symp. 191 d, ἔστιν . . . ὁ ἔρως ἔμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Phdr. 249 d, ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας.

Politic. 309 a, ὑπὸ κακῆς βίᾳ φύσεως ἀπωθούμενα.

Phileb. 19 e, παῦσαι τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον.

Cf. Andoc. i. 30. p. 5, τούτων οὖν ἐμοὶ τῶν λόγων ἢ τῶν ἔργων τί προσήκει; Hdt. ii. 134, ἔτεσι γὰρ κάρτα πολλοῖσι ὕστερον τούτων τῶν βασιλείων τῶν τὰς πυραμίδας ταύτας ἦν λιπομένων Ροδῶπις.

§ 290. c. Pronouns (unemphatic) postponed by Hyperbaton.

Politic. 261 b, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀψύχων γενέσεσιν αὐτοῦ τάσσοντες—where αὐτοῦ belongs to τὸ μὲν.

Theat. 166 d, τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίδωκε—where μου belongs to τὸν λόγον.

Gorg. 469 d, καὶ τινὰ δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέειν δεῖν—where αὐτῶν belongs to τινὰ.

Phædo 60 b, ὡς ἄτοπον . . . ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο—where τι would normally have found its place beside ἄτοπον.

A common type is the postponement of an Antecedent τις.

Theat. 188 a, ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν.

Crito 53 b, ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς.

§ 290\*. cc. Correlative Conjunctions,—the former postponed by Hyperbaton.

Apol. 18 d, ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν.

Ib. 28 d, οὗ ἂν τις ἐαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ.

§ 291. d. Adverbs and Particles displaced by Hyperbaton.

οὕτω.

Legg. 747 b, ἐν οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναμιν ἔχει παιδείον μάθημα μεγάλην—where οὕτω belongs to μεγάλην.

Theat. 169 c, οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυνκε—where οὕτω belongs to δεινός.

§ 292. Ἰσως.

Legg. 640 e, τάχ' ἂν ὀρθῶς ἴσως μέμφοιτο.

Symp. 194 c, τάχ' ἂν αἰσχύνοιο αὐτοὺς εἴ τι ἴσως οἶοιο κ.τ.λ. That this is a trajection of ἴσως we have ground for inferring, 1. from the analogy of the preceding instance, 2. from the familiarity of the combination τάχ' ἂν ἴσως, and 3. from the perfect unfamiliarity of εἰ ἴσως.

§ 293. Ἐτι.

Symp. 187 b, οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐκ διαφερομένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος ἁρμονία ἂν εἴη—where ἔτι is constructed with οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

Crat. 399 a, *κινδυνεύσω ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι*—  
ἔτι with *σοφώτερος*.

Tim. 53 d, *τὰς δ' ἔτι τούτων ἀρχὰς ἄνωθεν θεὸς οἶδε*.

§ 294. *Μέντοι* intrusive, i. e. displacing rather than displaced.

Phdr. 267 c, *Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἅπαντα*;

Apol. 35 c, *μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, . . .*

*ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα*. The

phrase *ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ* is rent asunder to admit the words

*μέντοι νῆ Δία*, which could have found no other convenient

place. It is because *ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ* had become a fixed

phrase that it can suffer this Tmesis without bringing the

sense into doubt. In the disengaged *μέντοι νῆ Δία* another

familiar sequence (as pointed out by the Zurich editors, coll.

Phædo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a,) is to be recognised.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 788, *Τίς ἦν ἐν ἧ ματτόμεθα μέντοι τᾶλφιτα*;

§ 295. *Γε* intrusive.

Crito 48 a, *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ φαίη γ' ἂν τις οἰοί τ' εἶσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ*  
*ἀποκτινύναι*. It might seem at first sight improbable that this

*γε* should not belong to the clause within which it stands.

But we have ground for recognising a trajection here 1. in

the sense, which is not helped by *γε* with *φαίη*. 2. in the

familiarity of the sequence *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε*, coll. Phædo

75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d: and 3. in the con-

sideration that *φαίη ἂν* is not consciously to the speaker a

separate clause; that is, it is a parenthesis so familiar that it

does not interrupt the thought. It is parallel to Phædo 59 c,

*τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι*; Euthyphro 15 a, *τί δ' οἶει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή*;

Symp. 216 d, *πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει . . . σωφροσύνης*; and to the

instance next following. (It is plain that in all these cases

the meaning does not admit of separating off the parenthetic

Verb by commas.) Moreover we find the *ἂν* preceding the

*φαίη*, as in Phædo 87 a, *τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς*;

but *ἂν* could not commence the clause if it were consciously

regarded as distinct.

Gorg. 492 e, *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος*.

§ 296. *Ἄν*, anticipated Hyperbatically with *οἶμαι* and the like.

Apol. 32 e, *ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι*;

Phædo 64 b, *οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . δοκεῖν*.

Soph. 223 a, *τὸ προσήκον ὄνομ' ἂν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτόν*.

Soph. 224 d, οἶμαί σε, κἄν εἴ τις . . . προὔτάξατο, καλεῖν οὐδέν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ. where ἄν belongs to καλεῖν.

Euthyd. 294 d, οὐκ ἂν οἶε ὁμολογῆσαι ἡμᾶς ;

Phdr. 234 e, οἶε ἂν τινα ἔχειν ;

Tim. 26 b, οὐκ ἂν οἶδα εἰ δυναίμην.

Cf. Isæus viii. 20. p. 71, μὴ οἶεσθ' ἂν, εἰ κ.τ.λ., μήτ' ἂν τὸν πατέρα . . . εἰσενεγκεῖν. Thuc. iv. 28, οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενος αὐτὸν τολμῆσαι, vi. 11, Σικελιώται δ' ἂν μοι δοκοῦσιν, . . . καὶ ἔτι ἂν ἦσσαν δεινοὶ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, viii. 103, οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφᾶς λαθεῖν τὸν παράπλουν.

### § 297. e. Prepositions postponed by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 711 e, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ξυμπάσης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτὸς πέρι λόγος.

Soph. 265 a, καὶ τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἴδουσιν.

Phædo 83 e, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασι.

Cf. Andoc. i. 117. p. 15, ὧν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἵνεκα ἐπεβουλευθήν.

§ 298. f. Prepositions intrusive ; that is, retaining their place next to the Adjective prefixed to their Substantive, to the exclusion of Adverbs and the like which qualify that Adjective.

Rep. 391 d, οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγὰς.

Ib. 395 b, ἔτι τούτων εἰς σμικρότερα.

Ib. 397 b, ὀλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν.

Symp. 195 e, ἐξῆς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς—for ἐν ἐξῆς πάσαις.

Theæt. 205 c, ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν.

Phædo 70 c, οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων.

Ib. 110 c, πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων.

Apol. 40 a, πᾶν ἐπὶ σμικροῖς.

Phdr. 245 d, μῆδ' ἐξ ἑνός. So Politic. 310 c.

Gorg. 449 c, ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων.

Legg. 876 b, ὅ τι περὶ σμικρότατα.

Cf. Thuc. i. 63, ὡς ἐς ἐλάχιστον χωρίον, iii. 46, ὅτι ἐν βραχυτάτῳ, ibid. ὅτι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον, i. 23, ἔστι παρ' οἷς, 35, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι αἰτία, vii. 36, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ, 79, οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγων ἀσπίδων, 42, οὐδὲ . . . καθ' ἕτερα, and so 59, μῆδ' καθ' ἕτερα, and on the same principle vii. 72, ἔτι τὰς λοιπὰς for τὰς ἔτι λοιπὰς.

### § 299.

Note, that Plato not unfrequently admits Tmesis : e. g.

Phdr. 230 c, ἐν ἡρέμα προσάπτει.

Hip. Ma. 297 b, ἐν πατρός τινας ιδέα.



Legg. 797 d, ἐν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ' οὐ.

Apol. 19 a, and 24 a, ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ (cf. Isæus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ).

Phileb. 20 b, πρὸς δὲ αὖ τοῖς.

Legg. 666 c, εἰς μὲν γε τὸ προάγειν.

Ib. 729 d, εἰς μὴν πόλιν.

Ib. 832 c, σὺν αἰετινὴ βία.

Phædo 59 a, διὰ δὲ ταῦτα.

Phileb. 35 e, διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος.

Rep. 371 d, ἀντὶ αὖ ἀργυρίου.

Phdr. 238 c, ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν . . . ἐπιθυμιῶν.

§ 300. B. Primary intention of a sentence suspended by interposition of clause of (a) Contrast or (b) Explanation.

a. Clause of Contrast interposed.

Rep. 401 e, καὶ ὁρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων, τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ κ.τ.λ., τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὁρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ—where ὁρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων is continued in τὰ αἰσχροὶ ψέγοι.

Symp. 173 c, ὅπερ ἐδεόμεθά σου, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσης ἀλλὰ διήγησαι.

Ib. 179 c, ἔργον οὕτω καλὸν . . . ὥστε . . . εὐαριθμήτοις δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, ἐξ Αἴδου ἀνείναι πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνείσαν—the ὥστε being continued at τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνείσαν.

Theæt. 145 d, ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ—where ὅμως appertains to σμικρὸν τι ἀπορῶ.

Phædo 69 d, οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὁρθῶς. ὦν δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προϋθυμήθην γενέσθαι—where the construction of ὦν is continued at παντὶ τρόπῳ.

Ib. 87 d, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη, ἐκάστην . . . ἀνυφαίνοι, ἀναγκαῖον μὲν' ἂν εἶη, κ.τ.λ. The objection started by ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη is suspended, while allowance is made for opposite truth, until ἀναγκαῖον μὲν' ἂν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 106 b, τί κωλύει, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίνεσθαι . . . , ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἂν' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγενέσθαι;

Legg. 822 c, ἄρ' οὐκ οἴόμεθα γελοῖόν τε καὶ οὐκ ὁρθόν, ἐκεῖ γιγνόμενον ἦν ἂν τότε, νῦν ἐνταυθοῖ καὶ ἐν τούτοις γίγνεσθαι;

§ 301. b. Clause of Explanation interposed.

Symp. 206 b, οὐ μὲν' ἂν σὲ ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ ἐφοίτων παρά σε—where, in meaning, οὐ μὲν' ἂν goes with ἐφοίτων, the ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ being explanatory.

Protag. 335 e, τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι.

Phdr. 244 d, ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει.

Legg. 648 e, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν ἀπαλλάττοιο πρὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι.

Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ κ.τ.λ.—an elaborate instance.

### § 302. In other writers we have as illustrations

Of a.

Thuc. vi. 68, ἐξ ἧς κρατεῖν δεῖ ἢ μὴ ῥαδίως ἀποχωρεῖν. Xen. Hell.

VII. iii. 7, ὑμεῖς τοὺς περὶ Ἀρχίαν . . . οὐ ψῆφον ἀνεμείνατε ἀλλ' ἐτιμωρήσασθε. Isocr. viii. 85. p. 176, τοσοῦτον δὲ διήνεγκαν ἀνοία πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αἱ συμφοραὶ συστέλλουσιν . . . , ἐκεῖνοι δ' οὐδ' ὑπὸ τούτων ἐπαιδεύθησαν, xii. 118. p. 257, αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰτίαι . . . , διὰ μακροτέρων μὲν αὐτὰς διῆλθον, αὐταὶ δ' οὖν ἦσαν. Dem. de Cor. 289. p. 322, ἀρετῆς καὶ δειμάτος, οὐκ ἐσάωσαν ψυχάς, ἀλλ' Ἀἰδῶν κοινὸν ἔθεντο βραβῆ. Soph. Ant. 21, τάφον . . . , τὸν μὲν προτίσας, τὸν δ' ἀτιμάσας ἔχει.

Of b.

Thuc. i. 39, ἦν γε οὐ τὸν προὔχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον κ.τ.λ., ii. 91, περὶ ἣν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ναὺς φθάσασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα. Hom. Il. x. 307, Ὅστις τε τλαίῃ, οἱ τ' αὐτῷ κῆδος ἄροιο, Νηῶν ὠκυπύρων σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν. Æsch. Pr. V. 331, Πάντων μετασχωὶν καὶ τετολμηκῶς ἐμοί. Soph. Ant. 537, Καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας, 1279, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις Ἔοικας ἤκειν καὶ τάχ' ὄψεσθαι κακά, El. 1154, ἧς σὺ πολλάκις Φήμας λάθρα προὔπεμπες ὡς φανούμενος Τιμωρὺς, O. T. 717, Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι Τρεῖς καὶ νιν ἄρθρα κείνος ἐνξείξας ποδοῖν. Theocr. Id. xxv. 72, τὸν δὲ γέροντα . . . κλάζον τε περισσαινόν τ' [Ἀλὶ κλάζοντε], Epigr. xix. 1, Ἀρχιλοχὸν καὶ στᾶθι καὶ εἴσιδε.

§ 303. C. Primary Intention of a sentence expressed apart from the Verb—(i. e. the virtual Primary Predicate to be sought in some other word, or in a Participial clause.)

Rep. 495 d, οὗ δὴ ἐφίεμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς . . . τυγχάνουσιν—where ἐφίεμενοι is the virtual Primary Predicate.

Theat. 142 c, δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ.

Ib. 173 b, πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες . . . τρεπόμεθα ;

Phædo 63 c, ὅτι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότης πάνν ἀγαθοὺς [ἐλπίζω] ἦξειν . . . δι᾽ ἰσχυρισμὸν ἄν. The virtual Primary Predicate is δεσπότης πάνν ἀγαθούς.

Ib. 63 d, σκεψόμεθα τί ἐστὶν ὃ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάσαι εἰπεῖν. The virtual Primary Predicate is βούλεσθαι, not δοκεῖ.

Ib. 65 b, ἡ . . . καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ . . . ἐρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι . . . ὀρώμεν. The

Primary Intention, with which ἡ connects itself, is in the ὁρώμεν clause.

Ib. 69 c, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι . . . κείσεται. The ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι connects itself with the κείσεται clause.

Ib. 88 b, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν. Of the Infinitival sentence θάνατον . . . θαρρεῖν the virtual Primary Predicate is θάνατον θαρροῦντι—in other words, it would normally be θάνατον θαρρεῖν, but is changed into a Participial clause for the sake of linking a further sentence to it.

Symp. 207 d, οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται. The Primary Intention of the sentence is satisfied at ἔχων.

Soph. 224 d, οἶμαί σε, κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος . . . προυτάξατο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νῦν δῆ.

Apol. 31 b, τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυνητῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα. The οὐχ οἰοί τε connects itself with παρασχ. μάρτ.

In illustration, we have in Thuc. i. 2, ἀδελον ὃν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν, καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἅμα ὄντων, ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται. Hdt. ii. 134, οὐδὲ ὦν οὐδὲ εἰδότες μοι φαίνονται λέγειν, ix. 105, τοῦτον δὲ κατέλαβε ὕστερον τούτων ἀποθανόντα κείσθαι. Hom. Od. iv. 739, Εἰ δὴ πού τινα κείνος ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ὑφήνας Ἐξελθὼν λαοῖσιν ὁδύρεται. Æsch. Ag. 479, τίς ὦδε παιδνὸς . . . , παραγγέλμασιν νέοις πυρῳθέντα καρδίαν, ἀλλαγῇ λόγου καμεῖν; (the virtual Predicate in the Infinitival sentence being πυρῳθέντα), 740, παρ' αὐτὰ δ' ἐλθεῖν ἐς Ἰλίου πόλιν λέγοιμ' ἂν φρόνημα νηέμου γαλάνας ('there came what I should call a spirit' &c.—virtual Predicate not ἐλθεῖν but φρόνημα ν. γ.), 796, οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν ὅμματα φωτὸς τὰ δοκοῦντ' εὐφρονος ἐκ διανοίας ὑδαρεῖ σαίνειν φιλότῃ (where in the Infinitival sentence depending on δοκοῦντα the virtual Predicate is εὐφρονος, not σαίνειν—'which with seeming-kindly heart fawn' &c.). Soph. Aj. 798, τήνδε δ' ἔξοδον Ὀλεθρίαν Δῖαντος ἐλπίζει φέρειν—'he fears that this foray, which [by me his messenger] he interprets, will be fatal to him.' Here ὀλεθρίαν is the virtual Predicate.

§ 304. D. Chiasmus, or Inverse Parallelism of clauses and sentences.

Rep. 438 c, ἐπιστήμη δέ τις καὶ ποιά τις [ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ] ποιῶν τινὸς καὶ τινός.

Ib. 494 c, πᾶν μὲν ἔργον πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας.

Rep. 597 d, ὄντως κλίνης ποιητῆς ὄντως οὔσης· ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνης τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις.

Symp. 186 a, οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς . . . πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ib. 196 b, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖται, οἷθ' ὑπὸ θεοῦ, οὔτε θεόν.

Theret. 173 d, νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα, οὔτε ὀρώσιν οὔτ' ἀκούουσι.

Symp. 218 a, δεδηγμένος τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότατον ὧν ἂν τις δηχθείη, τὴν καρδίαν ἢ ψυχὴν γὰρ δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.

Soph. 231 a, καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ.

Gorg. 474 c, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν.

Phædo 102 c, σμικρὸς τε καὶ μέγας . . . , τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπερέχων, τῷ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον.

Ib. 69 b, τούτου καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα.

§ 305. So in Dialogue.

Gorg. 453 d, (A) πότερον . . . πείθει, ἢ οὐ; (B) Οὐ δῆτα [sc. οὐ πείθει], ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

Ib. 496 d, (A) πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογέεις κ.τ.λ.; (B) Ὅμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

In Dialogue, however, the Parallelism is often Direct, instead of Inverse.

Rep. 337 c, (A) ἄλλο τι . . . ποιήσεις; ὧν ἐγὼ . . . ἀποκρινεῖ; (B) Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι· εἴ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω δέξειε.

Ib. 428 d, (A) τίς, καὶ ἐν τίσιν; (B) Αὔτη, ἢ φυλακική, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν.

Soph. 267 a, (A) Μιμητικὸν δὲ . . . ἀπονεμώμεθα· τὸ δ' ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν κ.τ.λ. (B) Νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω.

Cf. Hom. Od. vi. 170-197, where Odysseus is answered in order by Nausicaa,—170-4, corresponding to 187-190, and the remainder to the remainder. And Æsch. Ag. 622, 623, and ib. 1202-5, ΚΑ. Μάντις μ' Ἀπόλλων τῷδ' ἐπέστησεν τέλει· Προτοῦ μὲν αἰδῶς ἦν ἐμοὶ λέγειν τάδε. ΧΟ. Μῶν καὶ θεὸς περ ἱμέρῳ πεπληγμένος; Ἀβρύνεται γὰρ πᾶς τις εἰ πρᾶσσω πλέον.

§ 306. Often, also, of two points put by A, the former only is taken up by B.

Rep. 341 b, (A) οὔτε γὰρ ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε κ.τ.λ. (B) Οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι.

Phædo 79 b, (A) τί δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ; ὁρατόν, ἢ ἀειδές; (B) Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε.

Hip. Ma. 293 e, (A) τὸ πρέπον ἄρα τοῦτο λέγομεν ὃ παραγενόμενον ποιεῖ ἕκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλὰ, . . . ἢ ὃ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἢ οὐδέτερα τούτων; (B) Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ (sc. ὃ—φαίνεσθαι).

Gorg. 462 b, (A) ἐρώτα ἡ ἀποκρίνου. (B) Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

§ 307. E. Comparative emphasis in co-ordinate expressions marked by the order (which is often the reverse in Greek of what it would be in English).

Symp. 173 e, καὶ δὴλόν γε δὴ ὅτι οὕτω διανοούμενος καὶ περὶ ἑμαντοῦ καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν μαίνομαι. The emphasis is on ἑμαντοῦ, and the ὑμῶν is quite faint.

Ib. 175 b, νῦν οὖν νομίζοντες καὶ ἐμὲ ὑφ' ὑμῶν κεκληῆσθαι ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καὶ τοῦσδε τοὺς ἄλλους, θεραπεύετε—'I your master, as well as the others.'

Ib. 185 c, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινὰ ἢ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ὑπὸ τίνος ἄλλου λύγγα ἐπιπεπτωκυῖαν—'from some cause, *most probably* repletion.'

Ib. 189 e, καὶ εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα—'the class as well as the mere name.'

Euthyphro 3 d, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὥς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι—'for whatever cause, *most probably* for envy.'

Apol. 39 b, καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι—'I as well as they.'

§ 308. F. Hysteron Proteron: where (in other words) the order of expression, following that of thought, reverses the order of occurrence of facts.

Theæt. 162 b, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι.

Apol. 19 d, ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν.

Gorg. 474 a, γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.

Phædo 80 c, συμπεσόν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχυνθέν.

Ib. 100 b, ἐπιδείξιν καὶ ἀνευρήσιν.

Ib. 87 c, πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος.

Symp. 190 c, τὰς . . . ῥυτίδας τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελέαινε καὶ τὰ στήθη διήρθρον.

Symp. 209 c, *τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ*.

Tim. 73 e, *γῆν ἐφύρασε καὶ ἔδευσε*.

Apol. 32 b, *ἡναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην*.

Cf. Hdt. viii. 114, *ὁ δὲ γελάσας τε καὶ κατασχὼν πολλὸν χρόνον . . . εἶπε*.

§ 309. G. Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.

a. With Negative.

Phædo 80 c, *ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται κ.τ.λ.*,—*οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα κ.τ.λ.* ;

Rep. 402 a, *ὥσπερ ἄρα γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἱκανῶς εἶχομεν ὅτε κ.τ.λ.* —*οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας κ.τ.λ.* ;

Ib. 581 e, *τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον ποιῶμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν . . . τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πᾶν πόρρω κ.τ.λ.* ;

Ib. 587 a, *πλείστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμον καὶ τάξεως* ;

Ib. 590 a, *ἡ δ' αἰθάδεια καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντώδες . . . αὔξηται* ;

Legg. 830 d, *καὶ ταῦτα δὴ φοβηθεῖς . . . μὴ φαίνηται τισι γελοῖα, οὐκ ἄρα νομοθετήσει* ;

Protag. 351 c, *ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθὰ* ;

Ibid. d, *ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα* ;

Meno 78 c, *ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειαν κ.τ.λ.* ;

Ib. 88 d, *καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν . . . εἶναι, ἅρ' οὐχ ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ.* ;

Symp. 216 d, *καὶ αὖ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὥς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ σειληνώδες* ; [The Zurich editors give *τοῦτο. οὐ σ.* ;]

§ 310. b. Without Negative.

Soph. 233 c, *δρῶσι δὲ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα, φαμέν* ;

Hip. Ma. 301 c, *ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σου ταῦτα νουθετηθῆναι, ὥς εὐθὺς διεκείμεθα, ἔτι σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω κ.τ.λ.* ;

Gorg. 496 c, *τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀναρὸν εἶναι* ;

Phileb. 44 d, *οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ὥς εἰ βουλευθεῖμεν ὅπου οὐν εἶδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, πότερον κ.τ.λ.* ;

- Politic. 265 e, ὁ πολιτικός ἄρ' ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν φαίνεται πότερα κ.τ.λ. ;  
 Legg. 683 e, βασιλείᾳ δὲ καταλύεται, ὃ πρὸς Διός, ἥ καὶ κ.τ.λ., μὴν  
 ὑπὸ τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν ;  
 Apol. 37 b, πολλοὺ δέω ἐμαντόν γε ἀδικήσῃ κ.τ.λ., τί δείσας ; [So  
 Hermann punctuates.]  
 Crito 53 c, ἡ πλησιάζεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—  
 τίνος λόγους, ὃ Σώκρατες ;  
 Ibid. e, ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων,—τί  
 ποιῶν ; [The Zurich editors give δουλεύων]  
 Cf. Lysias xiii. 64. p. 135, Ἀγόρατος τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ  
 φυγάδας ἐντεῦθεν ἐποίησε,—τίς ὦν αὐτός ;

- § 311. H. Enclitic recommencing, or even commencing, a clause.  
 Phileb. 16 c, θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί,  
 ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη.  
 Ib. 25 b, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὃ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῶν νῦν δὴ  
 γεγονέναι.  
 Ib. 46 c, ὅποταν . . . τις τὰναντία ἅμα πάθῃ πάσῃ, ποτὲ ῥιγῶν θέρηται  
 καὶ θερμαινόμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχεται.  
 Phædo 65 d, τί δὴ οὖν ; πώποτε τι . . . εἶδες ; [So Oxon. But the  
 edd. give ἤδη οὖν πώποτε τι εἶδες ;]  
 Cf. Dem. de Cor. 44. p. 240, περιῶν ὁ Φίλιππος Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ  
 Τριβαλλοὺς, τινὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, κατεστρέφετο.  
 Similarly ἂν commences a parenthetical clause.  
 Phædo 87 a, τί οὖν, ἂν φαίῃ ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς ; (See above,  
 § 295.)  
 Cf. Dem. Olynth. A. 14. p. 13, τί οὖν, ἂν τις εἴποι, ταῦτα λέγεις ;  
 [So one Paris MS. τις ἂν Zurich editors.]

## § 312. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

### A. Metonymy.

- Rep. 497 d, ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβάνόμενοι δεδηλώκατε — ‘ of those  
 [objections], your allegation of which has shewed me that ’ &c.  
 Symp. 177 b, ἐνήσαν ἄλεις ἔπαιων ἔχοντες—equivalent to ἐνήν  
 ἔπαινος ἄλεσι διδόμενος. A strange instance.  
 Ib. 205 b, ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν ἰόντι ὁτφοῦν αἰτία—that is, ἡ  
 τοῦ ἰέναι ὁτιοῦν αἰτία.  
 Theæt. 167 c, ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν  
 εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν.



Theæt. 190 e, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἐπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν—  
‘I should be ashamed at our being compelled’ &c.

Apol. 33 e, χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις εἶναι σοφοῖς.

Phædo 88 d, ὁ λόγος . . . ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέ με ῥηθείς—‘the recital of the argument as it were reminded me.’

Ib. 68 a, τοῦτον ἀπηλλάχθαι ξυνόντος αὐτοῖς—‘be rid of the company of this.’

Charm. 173 b, ἐκ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων. So Legg. 959 c.

Legg. 959 e, καλὸν ἔστω καλῶς καὶ μετρίως τὰ περὶ τὸν τετελευτηκότα γιγνόμενα—‘let it be a credit to have the obsequies handsomely or decently performed.’

### § 313. B. Catachresis.

‘ὑποπτέειν for ‘to expect.’

Theæt. 164 a, καὶ ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτέύω, οὐ μὴν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ.

‘Ἀμήχανος of number.

Phdr. 229 d, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθῃ τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων.

Δαιμόνιος.

Critias 117 b, κάλλος ὕψος τε δαιμόνιον ἔχοντα.

§ 314. Θαυμαστός, θαυμάσιος, has many gradations of Catachrestic meaning.

a. ‘Strange,’ ‘eccentric.’

Symp. 182 e, θαυμαστὰ ἔργα. So 213 d, θαυμαστὰ ἐργάζεται.

β. ‘Incomparable,’ ‘capital;’—only the intention of *superlativeness* being retained.

Apol. 41 b, θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι.

γ. Of a recommendation or a feeling or an assertion,—‘decided,’ ‘emphatic,’ ‘positive.’

Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακέλυσις τῷ ἐρῶντι παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστή—  
‘most positive is the encouragement given by all.’

Tim. 29 d, τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου—‘most decidedly approved.’

Euthyd. 283 c, θαυμαστῶς σπουδάζομεν—‘were particularly anxious.’

Phædo 74 b, (A) φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; (B) Φῶμεν μέντοι νῆ Δία, θαυμαστῶς γε. θαυμαστῶς qualifies φῶμεν not εἶναι—‘say Yes most positively.’

Ib. 92 a, θαυμαστῶς ὥς ἐπίσθην—‘was most decidedly convinced.’

§ 315. Ὑπερφυῶς, καλῶς, σφόδρα, are also in the same way used to express *decided* assertion or assent to an assertion.

Gorg. 496 c, (A) ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; . . . (B) Ἄλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὥς ὁμολογῶ—I agree most decidedly.'

Phædo 76 e, ὑπερφυῶς δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

Phileb. 26 a, (A) ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτα ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα . . . μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσατο; (B) Κάλλιστά γε. Probably an intermediate step to this Catachresis is the use of καλῶς λέγειν for 'to say truly,' e. g. Phdr. 227 b.

Ib. 24 b, (A) ἀτελῇ δ' ὄντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον. (B) Καὶ σφόδρα γε. So 39 e.

Phdr. 263 d, (A) εἰπέ . . . εἰ ὠρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου. (B) Νὴ Δί' ἀμηχάνως γε ὥς σφόδρα—'most decidedly you did.'

### § 316. Μέγας.

Phædo 62 b, ὁ . . . λόγος . . . μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥάδιος διδεῖν, 'cumbersome,' i. e. 'perplexing.'

Euthyd. 275 d, τὸ μειράκιον, ἅτε μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, ἡρυσθρίασέ τε καὶ ἀπορήσας ἔβλεψεν εἰς ἐμέ. So Hip. Ma. 287 a.

### § 317. C. Hyperbole.

Euthyd. 303 b, ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ' ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἤσθησαν.

Hip. Ma. 295 a, ἀκριβέστερον τῆς ἀπάσης ἀκριβείας.

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐργηγορόσι μήτε εὐδουσι κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν διαπονουμένοις—the supposition of the alternative εὐδουσι, in order to make the denial total, is hyperbolical. Cf. Arist. Eth. X. ix. 11, δεῖ . . . μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα. Soph. Antig. 1108, ἴτ' ἴτ' ὀπάονες Οἷ τ' ὄντες οἷ τ' ἀπύοντες.

### § 318. D. Formulæ expressive of Contempt.

a. Οὔτος.

Apol. 23 d, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 296, οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες οἷτοι, 969, τὰς κατὰ Φρῖνιν ταύτας τὰς δυσκολοκίμπτους [καμπύς].

## § 319. b. Ποῖος;

Gorg. 490 d, (A) ἀλλ' ἕως ἱματίων [τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν φῆς]  
 . . . (B) Ποῖων ἱματίων;—'Clothes, forsooth!'

Charm. 174 b, (A) ἄρά γε ἦ [οἶδε] τὸ πεττευτικόν; (B) Ποῖον  
 πεττευτικόν;

## § 320. c. Plural of Singular Terms.

Menex. 245 d, οὐ γὰρ Πέλοπες οὐδὲ Κάδμοι κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 98 c, ἀέρας καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον.

Symp. 218 a, Φαίδρους, Ἀγάθωνας, Ἐρυξιμάχους.

Rep. 387 b, Κωκυτοὺς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας.

Cf. Æsch. Ag. 1439, Χρυσήϊδων μείλιγμα τῶν ὑπ' Ἰλίου. It is frequent in Aristophanes: cf. Ecclez. 1069, ὦ Πᾶνες, ὦ Κορύβαντες, Ach. 270, καὶ Λαμάχων ἀπαλλαγείς, Ran. 963, Κύκνους ποιῶν καὶ Μέμνονας. It is equally used with a sense of dignity,—as in the dithyrambic fragment of Pindar [p. 224 ed. Dissen], γόνον ὑπάτων μὲν πατέρων μελλέμεν γυναικῶν τε Καδυεῖαν ἔμολον, sc. Bacchus the son of Zeus and Semele.

## § 321. d. Periphrasis.

Legg. 953 e, θρέμματα Νείλου—for Egyptians.

§ 322. E. Simile introduced as a Metaphor,—i. e. with the Particle of Comparison omitted.

(See this noticed by Aristotle, Rhet. III. x—xi, where he characterises it as πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖν.)

Euthyphro 11 c, οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 169, μέγαν αἰγυπιὼν δ' ὑποδείσαντες τάχ' ἂν ἐξαίφνης εἰ σὺ φανείης σιγῇ πτήξειαν ἄφωνοι, Æsch. P. V. 856, οἱ δ' ἐπτοημένοι φρένας Κίρκοι πελειῶν οὐ μακρὰν λελειμμένοι ἤξουσιν, Ag. 394, ἐπεὶ διώκει παῖς ποτανὸν ὄρνιν, Eurip. Bacch. 1114, Πρώτη δὲ μήτηρ ἦρξεν ἱερία φόνου.

## § 323. F. Play upon Words.

Rep. 621 b, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν.

Symp. 185 c, Πανσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου,—διδάσκουσι γὰρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὕτως οἱ σοφοί.

Ib. 198 c, Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινοῦ λέγειν.

Ib. 174 b, ὥς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί—in allusion to Agathon.

Apol. 25 c, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, . . . σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαντοῦ ἀμέλειαν.

Theæt. 194 c, κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὀμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα.

Phædo 80 d, εἰς . . . τόπον . . . αἰεidiῇ, εἰς Αἴδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.

Ib. 89 b, εἴνπερ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. The play upon the words lies in their reference to the subject of the discussion.

Ib. 92 c, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας.

Legg. 802 e, δεινὸν γὰρ ὅλη γε ἁρμονία ἀπάδειν ἢ ῥυθμῷ ἀρρυθμεῖν.

Ib. 803 d, ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὗτ' οὖν παιδιὰ πεφυκυῖα οὗτ' οὖν παιδεία.

Cf. Hom. Il. xiii. 773, νῦν τοι σῶς αἰπὺς ὄλεθρος.

### § 324. G. Hendiadys.

The Hendiadys which occurs in Plato (belonging to the last of Lobeck's four kinds,—cf. note on Soph. Ajax, 145) is that where Synonyms are set side by side with the view of expressing the idea more forcibly. This might be called Rhetorical Hendiadys. With Demosthenes it is a favourite instrument of δεινωσις.

Phædo 98 b, τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον.

Ib. 111 d, συντετρῆσθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν.

Crito 47 b, γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων.

Gorg. 472 b, ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

Tim. 87 d, ὦν οὐδὲν σκοποῦμεν, οὐδ' ἐννοοῦμεν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 23 a, τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγοντα.

Legg. 953 a, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τημελεῖν.

### § 325. H. Interrogation answered by the speaker himself.

This may be called Rhetorical Interrogation. Its object is to awaken the attention.

Phædo 73 c, λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε. εἴαν τίς τι κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 360 c, τίς οὖν ἡ διάστασις; ἦδε. μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 34 d, τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ ἀθαδιζόμενος, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 40 b, τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ.

Protag. 343 b, τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; Ὅτι κ.τ.λ. So Gorg. 457 c.

Gorg. 453 c, τοῦ οὖν ἔνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σε ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 458 a, ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 487 b, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰ εὔνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα κ.τ.λ.

Meno 97 e, πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς.

Legg. 701 c, τίνος δὴ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ χάριν ἐλέχθη; δεῖν φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 780 a, τίνος δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἴρηται; τοῦδε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Tim. 31 a, πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἓνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἢν ὀρθότερον; ἓνα, εἴπερ κ.τ.λ.

Critias 111 a, πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτο πιστόν, καὶ κατὰ τί λείψανον τῆς τότε γῆς ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιτο; πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 206 e, πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

[So Hermann punctuates. The Zurich editors give the answer to another speaker.]







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