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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

THE

PARMENIDES OF PLATO,

WITH

INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND NOTES,

BY

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The following edition is intended chiefly for the Metaphysician. That reading, accordingly, has always been preferred which makes the argument more plain.

I am indebted to Professor Davies, of the Queen's College, Galway, for his careful revision of the proofs.

Trinity College,

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INTRODUCTION.

EXISTENCE is an aspect of thought. All existence is thought—thought either actual or possible. That is to say, every mode of existence, when grasped by cognition, would be found to be a mode of thought. Such is the position of the Idealist.

2. The Idealist thinks his case made out, because all such notions as Matter and Things in themselves, when examined, prove to be figments—figments made up of elements so incompatible, that to affirm the one is to deny the other. So Berkeley disposes of Matter, by the bare statement that what is inactive is not causal, and vice versa. The Idealist rejects a monster whose sole function is to fill a gap, where there is no gap.

3. The rejection of a zero, made up of incompatibilities which cancel one another, has nothing to do with the position of Plato and Hegel, that Existence, when analysed, yields opposite moments. This brings us to the question—What is Philosophy?
4. Philosophy makes explicit to thought what is implicitly contained in thought. Berkeley showed that Sensible Qualities are modes of consciousness. Kant showed that consciousness contained a Necessary and Universal element, meaning by necessary what is construed to thought as not possibly otherwise than it is; and by universal what is thought as exceptionless. These characteristics, Necessity and Universality, Hegel extended to the object, and so to the universe. Philosophy is thus the explicitness of universal thought.

5. The other day, G. H. Lewes, while showing that Physiology could not supersede Psychology, pointed out that while Force could be translated into Feeling, Feeling could not be expressed in Force. Thus the most advanced Empiricism is idealistic.

6. It may be said that Science will in time express Feeling in terms of Force—that it will translate Psychosis into Neurosis. Granted: it is nothing to the point: Neurosis is the antecedent, and so can never be the consequent. Psychosis—thought—will keep its coin of vantage.

7. According to the Idealist, thought is the only object of thought—thought is the sole instrument of thought; and the product of thought is thought.

8. The instrument of thought is thought only;
that is to say, we analyse a synthesis and reconstruct a synthesis out of our analysis. We do nothing more; yet this process condemns as impossible the prevalent opinion that Psychology is Philosophy.

9. In the *Timaeus*, the Demiurge mixes various ingredients in a bowl. Everyone sees that this is Allegory. But when a Psychologist talks of the interaction of Subject and Object—of the action of the Object on the Subject, he is unconsciously allegorical.

10. The older hypothesis was that of Impulse, *e.g.* Locke's. Yet impulse implies weight, and weight, or gravity, is the result of the whole universe, and, so, cannot account for it. A billiard player may assume that the weight is in the ball; but a thinker ought to see that weight, or any property of a part, must be the result of the whole, and, so, cannot be prior to it. So of Force: it is another word for Movement, and cannot, therefore, originate.

11. So of Chemical Action: chemical action is only possible, because it is the result of certain conditions, and, therefore, cannot cause them. It is easy to say, let Oxygen represent the Subject, Hydrogen the Object, and Water—the result—Consciousness. But the chemist can retranslate: and the weight of the new product is that of the
old elements. Dewar has shown that old elements will form that new substance which is attended by the greatest evolution of heat. On the other hand, in the mental product the old constituents survive, and so the analogy breaks down on every point.

12. So, Psychology starts with a Subject and an Object; and by bringing the two into combination, and by feigning some reciprocal action—either mechanical or chemical—generates the Universe of Consciousness. As before, Subject and Object are results of consciousness at a certain stage, and, therefore, cannot generate it.

13. Des Cartes assumes an Ego, isolated from the rest of the Universe. It is obvious that the Ego is in contrast to the non-Ego; to evolve the non-Ego from the Ego is to offer a proof of that which the proof pre-supposes, and without which the proof would be unmeaning.

14. Locke's Essay is of value as a reply to the Psychology of Des Cartes. As a piece of philosophy, it assumes that there is a Mind on one side, and a set of Things on the other. It is mere Psychology.

15. Natural Realism is not Philosophy. Natural Realism tells us "that along with the presentation of the Object there is always a simultaneous presentation of the Subject, the two being mutually
related to each other."* True; but this postulates Subject and Object: that is, a Universe, and that Universe cut in two. It is mere Psychology.

16. Atomic theories cannot be Philosophy: they assume Space and Quantity; that is, from an aspect of the Universe they explain the whole.

17. Molecular theories cannot be Philosophy. To the assumptions of Atomism they add the assumption of Quality, and of Difference of Quality. Quality, like quantity and space, must be a result of the Universe. Clerk Maxwell considers that the family likeness of the molecules is an argument that they are not original.

18. Sir John Lubbock has calculated, on the authority of Loschmidt, Stoney, and Sir W. Thomson, that the molecules of gases are not more than the fifty-millionth part of an inch in diameter. It is obvious that any one of these molecules involves the whole problem of Natural Realism, and of the relation of Psychology to Philosophy. Sorby is of opinion that in a length of 1.80,000 of an inch there would probably be from 500 to 2000 molecules—500, for instance, in albumen, and 2000 in water. The nameless fraction of an inch presents us with space and its contents as surely as the field of the

* Monck's *Hamilton*, p. 83, n.
seventy-five millions of worlds, of one of which our earth is but a fraction.

19. Movement in the line of Least Resistance assumes Space, and a System of Pressures. Granting that Space and Motion are Metaphysical Ultima, Philosophy asks why Space and Motion are found in combination. How did the Atom acquire its tenure of Space, and why did Space tolerate the intrusion?

20. Evolution is not Philosophy. If a thing is evolved from within, the process is more than the mere accretion with which the doctrine starts. If the thing gathers material from without, like a rolling snowball, then the process belongs to Mechanics or to Chemistry.

21. "Life," as Virchow expresses it, "is the sum of the joint action of all parts, of the higher or vital ones as of the lower or inferior. There is no one seat of life, but every truly elementary part, especially every cell, is a seat of life." Granting that this statement gives us the results of Physiology, the philosopher must ask, "What brings 'the parts' into juxtaposition? Is it merely a case of juxtaposition, or how otherwise? What is a part? What is higher? What is lower? What is joint action?" Socrates would not have had much trouble with a man who described Life as the action of vital parts.
22. Huxley enunciates the hypothesis of Evolution thus:—"The successive species of animals and plants have arisen, the later by the gradual modification of the earlier." As before, if the modification be from within, the fact explodes the theory: if from without, modification is accretion.

23. Sir John Lubbock tells us that "an astonishing variety of most beautiful contrivances have been observed and described by many botanists, especially Hooker, Axel, Delpino, Hildebrand, Bennett, Fritz Müller, and above all Herman Müller and Darwin himself. The general result is, that to insects, and especially to bees, we owe the beauty of our gardens, the sweetness of our fields. To their beneficent, though unconscious action, flowers owe their scent and colour, their honey—nay, in many cases, their form. Their present shape and varied arrangements, their brilliant colours, their honey, and their sweet scent are all due to the selection exercised by insects. In these cases the relation between plants and insects is one of mutual advantage." A Platonist might put it thus: "Insects select flowers by selection." That is, the idea dominates the process, not vice versa. At all events, the process implies prior capacity, and therefore reserves for discussion What is Capacity, What is Relation. That is, Physical Science, as always, owes its existence to notions which its professors discard.
24. Professor Huxley, in referring to the nervous system as "that which co-ordinates and regulates Physiological units into an organic whole," uses more metaphysical terms than Virchow. That is, both use terms borrowed from thought to explain that which, according to them, is the explanation of thought. Neurosis is explained by Psychosis, while Neurosis is the only scientific explanation of Psychosis.

25. Spontaneous generation throws no light on Philosophy. Waiving the decisive objection that it would describe a process which takes place in Time, what does the doctrine amount to, if established? That a mixture of turnip-juice and cheese is, under certain conditions, an antecedent to life. The doctrine is invested with importance by the ignorant, who persist in obtruding on Science the notion Cause, which Science affects to discard.

26. The Scientist, to set aside Metaphysics, reduces Causation to Sequence. If Causation be Sequence only, Thought is not caused by Neurosis. But, in order to degrade Thought, he invests Neurosis with causal power, so that the destruction of Neurosis involves the destruction of Thought. Thought is the Whole of which Causation and Sequence in time are parts—very small parts, indeed.

27. Professor Williamson, in his opening address, gives a sketch of the theories which guided Chemis-
try fifty years ago, and of the changes wrought in them by fifty years' work. Chemical explanation has got rid of predisposing affinities. "Our present explanation" (of a certain phenomenon) "is a simple statement of the fact that under the conditions described, zinc displaces hydrogen from its sulphate." The statement is anything but simple, as it amounts to this:—zinc—one set of relations—displaces hydrogen—a second set of relations—from its sulphate—a third set of relations. A Hegelian would not ask for a more idealistic position than Professor Williamson's simple statement of the fact.

28. Physical Science is not Philosophy, for it requires antecedence and consequence only as an explicit basis. As an explicit basis, for the analysis of antecedence and consequence may lead to a great deal more. In fact, it led to the Idealism of Kant.

29. That Science is apparently content with antecedence and consequence is seen in Professor Burdon-Sanderson's address: "Science can hardly be said to begin until we have by experiment acquired such a knowledge of the relation between events and their antecedents, between processes and their products, that in our own sphere we are able to forecast the operations of Nature, even when they lie beyond the reach of desired observation." That is, we predict consequents, because they are caused.
30. Clifford and Lewes hold that the Uniformity of Nature ought to be expressed as the Law of the Collocations of Changes. That is, they merely postulate Simultaneity, Succession, and Fixed Order. What more could an Idealist require?

31. Herbert Spencer's Heredity may account for Necessity as a fact. It does not explain what the Idealist contends for—not merely that a notion is what it is, but that it is explicitly thought as not possibly otherwise—the Necessity of Leibnitz, Kant, and Hegel.

32. Mr. Whittaker, in the interest of Empiricism, reconciles Empiricism with Idealism: "in the final statement of Empiricism, 'relations' are just as fundamental as 'feelings.' All that afterwards becomes thought is implicit not in mere feeling, but in the primitive relations between 'feelings.'"* Feelings are capable of primitive relations, simply because both presuppose one intelligible whole—the position of the Idealist.

33. Taking a portion of the Universe, in order to account for the Universe, is as idle as to suppose that a square on a chess-board is the cause of the board. There can be no fraction outside the whole, and the business of Philosophy must be analysis.

* Mind, No. 24, p. 507.
INTRODUCTION.

34. Taking analysis as the instrument of thought, Plato, in the Parmenides, analyses the Universe into τὸ ἐν and τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός; the position of τὸ ἐν explaining everything, and its negation nullifying everything.

35. Positing τὸ ἐν, the Universe, as conceived by Plato, may be best described in the words of Hegel:* "Free and infinite Form, as a Totality, involves the principle of Matter in itself"—taking Form in his sense of Complete Whole of Characteristics. Without τὸ ἐν, we may have provisionally an Empiricism like that of Hume and Mill, Parm. 164 b; but this, when examined, will end in Nihilism, Parm. 165 e.

36. The intelligible element, vindicated by Kant and elaborated by Hegel, is variously termed Ideas and Numbers. The Ideas and Numbers are substantially identical, but Idea denotes the intelligible in relation to the sensibility, while the Numbers are the movements of the pure, intelligible process.

37. Τὸ ἐν brings the Parmenides into close relation with the notices of Platonic doctrine preserved in Aristotle and his Scholiasts, as τὸ ἐν is the formative element in the Idea, and the spring from which the Numbers flow.

* Logic, p. 204, Wallace’s translation.
38. Xenocrates has given a hypothetic genesis of the Ideas. It is only to assist apprehension, as γένεσις implies evolution in time, which of course does not apply to the Ideas. έκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἰσασθέντων ἐγένοντο ἂν, εἰ δυνατὸν αὐτᾶς ἦν γενέσθαι.—Schol. 828 a, 1, 2.

39. Τὸ ἐν is neither Number nor Idea, although without it we should have neither Number nor Idea. Number—ἀριθμὸς—is, according to Greek arithmeticians, σὐστῆμα μονάδων.—Theon Smyrn. 23. Τὸ ἐν is the ἀρχή of Numerables.

40. As τὸ ἐν has for its contre-coup τὸ ἀπειρον—indefinite plasticity—the first Number is the Dyad, αὐτοδύας. That is, The One and τὸ ἀπειρον, as two items, constitute the System of Two Monads—ἡ αὐτοδύας—the Prime Dyad.—Arist. Met. B. iii. The Dyad has for its Material τὸ ἀπειρον, and for its Form τὸ ἐν: αἱ πρῶτον γεγονυῖαι δύο μονάδες ὡς εἴς ὑλῆς μὲν τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυνάδος, εἰδοὺς δὲ τοῦ Ἀρχικοῦ Ἐνὸς—τοῦ Αὐτοενὸς δηλονότι—ἀνταί πεποιη-κασι τὴν πρώτην Δυνάδα.—Syrianus ap. Schol. 818 b, 46–9.

41. As the Indefinite Dyad is Μαῖος and Μινός—τὸ μέγα and τὸ μικρὸν—each moiety is a monad. These two monads, with τὸ ἐν as unifier and equator, constitute the System of Three Monads—the Prime Triad—ἡ αὐτοτριάς: αἱ δὲ πάλιν δευτέρως γεγονυῖαι τρεῖς μονάδες, ὡς εἴς ὑλῆς μὲν καὶ αὐταί
42. Lastly, the Indefinite Dyad as plastic, taking on itself the Prime Dyad as formal, constitutes the System of Four Monads—the Prime Tetrad—ἡ αὐτοτετράς: ἐκ τῆς Αὐτοδύαδος καὶ τῆς Ἀρχικοῦ Δυάδος ἤν Ἀορίστου καλεῖ Δυάδα, ἀπετέλουν τὴν Τετράδα: οὐ συνιθέντες αὐτὰς (sc. τὰς δυάδας) οὐδὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν αὐξοντες, ἀλλὰ τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος διπλασιάσθης τὴν Αὐτοδύάδα, καὶ οὕτως ἀποτεκουόσθης τὴν Τετράδα.—Syr. ib. 819b, 26–31.

43. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δύας—is no blank infinite. It is plasticity, ἀνεκλειπτός, Syr. ib. 907a, 25. Its virtues are best given in the words of Syrianus: κυνητικὴν οὖσαν ἀρχὴν πάντα τὰ εἴδη γονύμοιν πληροῦν δυνάμεως καὶ προάγειν εἰς ἀπογέννησιν τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων ἄυλων εἶδων.—Syr. ib. 906b, 30–32. δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων ἄυλων εἶδων are the squares and cubes of the Prime Numbers.

44. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δύας—is the link between Plato’s Physics and Metaphysics. It is Movement both logical and mechanical. All mechanical movement, whether purely mechanical or chemical, is in reality a brief description of relation between two moments. All qualities are relations in disguise. Analysis, therefore, is the supreme organon.

45. The two components of all things, τὸ ἐν
and τὸ ἀπειρον, are thus Metaphysical Ultima discovered by analysis, and not agents in the mechanical, chemical, or so-called psychological sense.

46. Why did Plato use such barren terms as τὸ ἕν—The One, and τὰλλα—All the rest of it? Τὸ ἕν is the geometrical unit, and Geometry is the medium between Sense and Intellect. Aristotle's usual term for Mathematics, as Plato viewed them, is τὰ μεταξύ.

47. Previous to Plato, the notion The One had been so far developed:—

a. Xenophanes deduced Unity from the theological notion Moral Perfection, making Unity a predicate of Essence:

b. Parmenides, by identifying subject and object, made Unity both the logical and substantive essence of all real existence:

c. Melissus made Unity a predicate, but deduced it from infinity:

d. Zeno defended Unity by proving plurality impossible.

48. In Aristotle's hands the notion Unity became Substance, and in that shape was transmitted by the schoolmen to modern thought. It is obvious that the modern atom is a Lilliputian substance.

49. The One being positive, τὰλλα τοῦ ἕνὸς is thrown off as its contre-coup, by the process which Hegel elaborated.
INTRODUCTION.

50. Anti-Platonists, from Aristotle to Jowett, ask—Where are the Ideas? Would a Kantian entertain the question—Where are the Categories, and Ideas, and Forms?

51. According to Hegel, evolution is Specification: according to Haeckel, specification is Evolution. That the road up is the road down must be seen in time.
THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.
THE PARME NIDES OF PLATO.

The philosophical portion of the Dialogue is divided into two parts: the first extends from 127d to 135; and the second from 135 to the end, 166. The first part deals with the question of the relation of the Ideas to sensible things; the second with the relation of the head-Idea—The One—to everything else. The first part discusses generally the relation between the supersensible and the sensible; the second elaborates the relations of the paramount metaphysical entity—The One—to all its subordinates, including sensible things. The second part is thus a particular application of the first; but, as The One is the paramount entity, its relations are all-pervading.

With regard to the first portion, we are told by Mr. Jowett that Plato has anticipated the criticism of all future ages on his Ideas. Mr. Grote declares that there are no dialogues in which the Parmenidean objections to the doctrine of Ideas are elucidated or even recited. But surely all the objections which are urged in the Parmenides are
based on an assumption with which the sound doctrine of Ideas has nothing to do.

(1). The Idea is spaceless and timeless. This disposes of the objections illustrated by the day and by the sail: 130e–b 1e, par. 6.

(2). The Idea must either admit of finiteness or proceed to infinity. This disposes of the objections urged in 132a b, and in 132d–133a, pars. 7 and 9.

(3). The Idea cannot depend for its cognition and existence on man. Its essence cannot be concepi: B. 2, b–d, par. 8. This to Plato would be a truism.

(4). The Idea cannot exist in total aloofness from man; for this would deprive man on the one hand of all objective knowledge, and God on the other of all knowledge of human knowledge. The obvious conclusions are, that we have a knowledge of the Idea, and that God has so too. These conclusions are quite in accordance with the other Dialogues. It is curious that what Mr. Jowett regards as the true theory of Ideas—that they exist only in the mind—is deliberately rejected by Plato in this Dialogue. If the paramount One does not exist, the result is Phenomenalism and Nihilism. In the same way, Mr. Green, in his introduction to Hume, shows that without Identity and Causation the sensualism of Hume and the phenomenalism of J. S. Mill are impossible, and with them untrue.

To moderns, the difficulty is to conceive that the Idea, while timeless and spaceless, is likewise objectively existing. That Plato held the Idea to
be timeless is evident from numberless passages, from the authoritative passage in the *Timaeus*, and the express statement of Aristotle that Plato was the only philosopher who held Time to be the result of what we may call creation. The Idea is likewise à fortiori spaceless. Space, according to Plato, is the creature of an illicit process of reasoning, and it is not an object of the senses nor of natural belief. Its double function is to express the apparent but unreal identity of phenomena in a state of flux, and their dependence on the higher essence of the Idea. Aristotle's testimony is conclusive on the point. He asks why Plato does not locate the Idea in space.—*Phys. iv. ii. 5.*

If the Idea be not in time or in space, how does it exist? In the mind, says Mr. Jowett. In what mind? If mind means the human mind, quà human, then we are reduced to individualism. I may infer, or I may not, that there may be some other being with a mind like mine, more or less. If we say in the Divine mind, or in the Universal mind, then the Idea will only be an accident of the higher consciousness. But if we mean by Idea, as Plato did—the Form which perfectly and completely dominates pure thought, and which dominates ours to a smaller extent—then it is true to say that the Idea is not only logically but substantially prior to thought and volition, Divine as well as human, and is therefore independent of both. Surely in a narrower sphere, where a man has consciously grasped the Law of Identity or the
Law of Contradiction, he sees at once that these Laws are something more than the facts of his own brain—something more than actual clearness or passing confusion. But, first, as human thought is dominated consciously or unconsciously by the Laws of thinking, so the Divine Thinking is dominated by the Ideas. To say that Ideas exist in the mind is much the same as saying that the Law of Gravity exists in a man's watch.

The relation of the Idea to sensible things, and of God to both, is somewhat as follows: The Idea consists of two elements, the One and the Indefinite. The Indefinite is pure Passivity. Neither of these elements is created. They are co-eternal with God. God is good. As Aristotle explains it, Goodness is the matter, and One, the form, of the highest Ens. God is also Cause, the notion which brings the One and Goodness into communion. Goodness works through Causality, according to the type set by the Idea of Good. Consequently, the Law which dominates Goodness in its Causal Energy is logically prior to that Energy. On what does the Summum Ens work? On the Indefinite, or the passive element in the Idea, the space, or rather place, of the Timaeus. The first causal act of Summum Ens imposes the Law of mere sequence on Passivity. The result is, a chaos of unpredictable sequences, a notion grasped by Milton. The second causal act of Summum Ens is to impose on Chaotic sequence predictable sequence or physical Law, and the result is, the Sensible World. The God of
Plato thus creates nothing, he organises Passivity. Aristotle's question, Why the Idea is not in space, if pressed home, comes to this: Why is the whole Idea, with all its Form and Matter, not in a small fractional result of its Matter misconceived, namely, Place? That Space is not an independent Entity can be proved by other considerations. The non-existence of a Vacuum inside the world is stated positively in the *Timaeus*, where its existence would seem necessary, in the case of one moving body displacing another. This phenomenon Plato explains by the hypothesis of circular motion, a motion which may be exemplified by moving a set of balls round the edge of a "solitaire" board. He has been charged with inconsistency in allowing the structural solids, the Tetrahedron, the Octahedron, and the Icosahedron, to combine in different proportions, all the while he denies the existence of Vacuum. He may easily be defended by the consideration that the complement of the interstices is furnished by τὸ ἀπειρον—the element of Passivity or Receptivity in the Idea.

What then is the Sensible Thing, the Sensible Idea of Locke and Berkeley? Relatively to us, it is strictly τὸ φανόμενον, τὸ γιγνόμενον, that which is in course of presentation, and which, therefore, *ex vi termini*, is passing away. Objectively, it is the causal action of God, working through the Idea, on the senses. Logically, and chronologically, it is distinct from the Idea. In essence, it is the contrary of the Idea, as the one is ever abiding and
the other is momentary; and finally, with regard to theories of perception, the sensible thing bears to its Idea—or rather congeries of Ideas—the relation only of a sign to the thing signified.

"Mind," says Shelley, "cannot create, it can only perceive." This is the popular view. It is the usual confounding of Brain and Thought. In the individual, Sensation precedes Thought; Neurosis precedes Psychosis; but Neurosis—Brain—presupposes Space, Time, and all the constituents of Intelligibility.

Everybody agrees that what is in consciousness may be safely dealt with. But the question arises: Is there anything outside consciousness? In the language of the Dialogue, if τὸ ἕν is the formative element, what is τὰλλα τοῦ ἕνος? In other words, What is τὸ ἀπειρον, which Aristotle represents as the second element in the Idea? It is food for Form—τὸ πέρας. To alter Clifford's term, it may be called Form-stuff. And this Form-stuff, at a certain stage of development, is the χώρα or space of the Timaeus—the only passage in Plato's writings which Aristotle finds at variance with the official statements in Plato's lectures.—Phys. iv. ii. 5.

To make Space an ultimum in the Platonic Genesis is as preposterous as to make Hegel a Hamiltonian because he allows Richtigkeit to the pabulum of the senses. Τὸ ἀπειρον is not outside consciousness. It is part of consciousness: it is there as τὸ ἀπειρον. The chemical metaphor has taken such hold, that when we talk of an element
of consciousness, we almost eo ipso assert that it is not to be found in the mature consciousness, except in a totally different shape. But, in Plato, the original aspect of the element reappears in the compound: τὸ ἀπειρον is τὸ ἀπειρον, and will not be anything else. Plato is thus a thorough-going Idealist: τὸ ἀπειρον is part of the domain of thought.

In applying the terms of modern speculation to Plato, it is not meant that he had before him modern problems in their present shape. But the best teaching of our time is the importance of history as a basis of criticism, and this teaching shatters the doctrine that we must read a philosopher by what went before and not by what comes after him.

Hegel allows Richtigkeit, but not Wahrheit, to the sensible element. Plato is more idealistic; for while in the Phaedo he combats the notion that the sensible element is delusive, in the Republic he argues that the same volume of raw material may and does admit of opposite relations.

The most striking passage in the Dialogue is where Parmenides rebukes Socrates for withholding ideas from mean objects. This is not really at variance with the passage in the Timaeus, 66 d–67 a. There he states that Smells are the result of air and water affecting the organs, and that they are distinguished merely as pleasant or the reverse. In the Philebus, Smells are not preceded by any craving, and so far are higher than the plea-
sures of repletion. In our day a great poet has written:

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

This is genuine Idealism. What we call a single thing is the concourse of all relations—the complexus of all Ideas—all in all.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.
TA TOY DIALOYOT PROZO

KEFALOS,
ADEIMANTOS,
ANTIPON,
GLAYKON,

PYTHODOROS,
SKRATHS,
ZHNON,
PARMEMIDEHS,
ARISTOTELES.

Characters in the Introduction.

Characters in the Main Discussion.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

'Επειδή Ἀθήναζε οὐκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικό-
μεθα, κατ’ ἀγορᾶν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδειμάντω τε καὶ
Γλαύκωνι καὶ μον λαβόμενος τῆς χειρός ὁ Ἀδε|
μαντος, χαῖρε, ἐφη, ὃ Κέφαλε, καὶ εἰ τοῦ δεῖ τῶν
τηδὲ, ὅ ἦμεις δυνατοί, φράζε. ἀλλὰ μὲν εἶ, εἰπον
ἐγώ, πάρειμι γε ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δησόμενος ὑμῶν.
λέγοις ἄν, ἐφη, τὴν δέσιν. καὶ ἐγώ εἰπον, τῷ

αδελφὸ ὑμῶν τῷ ὀμομητριῶ τῷ ἴ ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ
μὲμνημαί. παῖς δε που ἴν ὁτε τὸ πρῶτερον ἐπεδή-
μησα δεύρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν πολὺς δὲ ἥδη χρόνος
ἐξ ἐκεῖνον. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρὶ, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης
ὄνομα. πάνω γε, ἐφη’ αὐτῷ δὲ γε Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ
tὶ μάλιστα πυνθάνει; οἶδ’, εἰπον ἐγώ, πολύται μοὶ
εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκώσι τε ὅτι οὐδος ὁ
Ἀντιφῶν Πυθοδάρῳ των Ζήνωνος ἑταῖρῳ πολλά

c ἐντετύχηκε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὐς ποτε Σωκράτης
καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις
ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδάρου ἀπομνημονεύει. ἀληθῇ,
ἐφη, λέγεις. τούτων τῶνν, εἰπον, δεόμεθα δια-
κοῦσαι. ἀλλ’ οὐ χαλεπῶν, ἐφη’ μειράκιοι γὰρ ὧν
ἀυτοὺς εὖ μάλα διεμελήσαν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν
πάπτου τε καὶ ὑμῶνυμον πρὸς ἰστικῇ τὰ πολλὰ
dιατρίβει. ἀλλ’ εἰ δεῖ, ίωμεν παρ’ αὐτὸν’ ἀρτι
2. Antipho relates, on the authority of Pythagoras, a conversation between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides; the particulars of the meeting: Zeno is reading aloud his treatise on Existence.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεύσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρῶτον λόγου ἀναγνώσαι, καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, πῶς, φάναι, ὃ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ὅντα, ὡς ἄρα δεὶ αὐτὰ ὁμοία τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον: οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοία οὔτε τὰ ὁμοία ἀνόμοια οἴον τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὔτω λέγεις; οὔτω, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τὰ τε ἀνόμοια ὁμοία εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁμοία ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι: εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἰη, πάσχοι ἀν τὰ ἀδύνατα; ἄρα τοῦτο ἐστιν ὦ βούλουται σου οἱ λόγοι, οὔκ ἀλλο τι η ἰ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα, ως οὐ πολλὰ ἐστι; καὶ τοῦτον αὐτοῦ οἷοι σοι τεκμηρίων εἶναι ἐκαστὸν τῶν λόγων, ὡστε καὶ ἤγει τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὡςον περ λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ πολλὰ; οὔτω λέγεις, ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὅρθως καταμανθάνω; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὦ βούλεται. μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὃ Παρ- μενίδη, ὃτι Ζήνων ὁδὲ οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται φιλιστήσῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγ- γράμματι. ταῦτων γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ σῦ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ήμᾶς πειρᾶται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἐτερῶν τι λέγον. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν φης εἶναι Τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμηρία παρέχει καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ ὁδὲ ἅδικον πολλὰ φησὶν εἶναι, τεκμηρία δὲ αὐτὸς πάρμολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέ- χεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἐν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὔτως ἐκάτερον λέγειν, ὡστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχέδον τι λέγοντας ταύτα, ὑπὲρ ἣμᾶς τοῦς ἄλλους φαίνεται ἡμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα.

First part of the dialogue: preliminary discussion, the relation of Τά Εἶθη to sensible things.

3. Socrates criticizes Zeno, and wishes to know if he is right in the view he takes. Zeno says he is. "Then you, Zeno," says So- crates, "agree with Par- menides, but you put your views in the negative form, that Existence is non- plural, while Par- menides puts his in the affir- mative, that Exis- tence is one." Zeno explains that his thesis is a reduc- tio ad absurdum of the an- tagonistic thesis, i.e. greater ab- surdities follow from sup- posing Existence.
eirhēthai. nai, φάναι τον Ζήνωνα, ὦ Σωκρατεσ. σὺ δὲ οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ παν-
taχοῦ ἔσθησαι· καίτοι ὦσπερ γε αἱ Δάκαιναι κε
σκύλακες εὐ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἵνευεις τὰ λεχέντα:
ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὦτι οὐ παν-
tάπασιν οὖτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἀπερ
σὺ λέγεις διανοηθέν γραφὴν, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ
ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὡς τί μέγα διαπραττόμενον· ἀλλὰ
σὺ μὲν εἰπές τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τὸ
γε ἀληθὴς βοήθειά τις ταύτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ
Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν
κωμῳδεῖν, ὥς εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ, πολλά καὶ γελοία συμ-
βαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντι-
λέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ
πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταύτα καὶ
πλεῖω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἐτι γελοιο-
tερα πάσχοι ἄν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἔστων
ἡ η τοῦ ἐν εἰναι, εἰ τις ἄιλαν ἐπεξίου. διὰ
tοιαύτην δὴ φιλονεικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμὸν
ἐγράφῃ, καὶ τις αὐτὸ ἐκλειψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ
βουλεύσασθαι ἔξεγένετο, εἰτ’ ἔξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς ὁ
τὸ φῶς εἰτε μὴ. ταύτη γ’ οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ
Σωκρατεσ, ὦτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας οἰεί αὐτὸ
γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας:
ἐπεί, ὀπερ γ’ εἴπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπείκασας.

4. Socrates
sets forth
his theory
of Generali-
zation, that
the things
denoted by
general
words may
participate
in opposite

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καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς Ὅμοιοτήτος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὄμοια γίγνεσθαι ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς Ἀνομοιότητος ἄνομοια, τὰ δὲ ἄμφοτέρων ἄμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἄμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἐστι γάρ ἄμφοι ὄμοια τε καὶ ἄνωμοια αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄμοιά τις ἀπεφαινεν ἄνωμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἄνωμοια ὄμοια, τέρας ἰν, οἶμαι, ἢν εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἄμφοτέρων ἄμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἐμοιγε, ὁ Ζήνων, ἀτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐδὲ γε εἰ ἐν ἀπαντὰ ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ Ἐνὸς καὶ ταύτα ταύτα πολλὰ τῷ Πλήθους αὐτὸ μετέχειν ἀλλ’ εἰ δὲ ἐστιν Ἐν αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὖ τὰ Πολλὰ δὴ ἐν, τούτῳ ἦδη θαυμάζομαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαντῶν ὡσαῦτος; εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἰδὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τάναντια ταύτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἀξίων θαυμάζεων εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφαίνει, ὡς ἔτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου ἐστιν, ἔτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ’ ἀριστερά, καὶ ἔτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἔτερα δὲ τὰ ὑπόσθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαῦτως: Πλήθους γὰρ, οἶμαι, μετέχων ὅταν δὲ ἐν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἐπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἰς ἐγὼ εἰμι ἀνθρωπός, μετέχον καὶ τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὡστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. ἦν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρή πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ταύτα ἀποφαίνει, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φύσομεν αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύω, οὐ ὁ τὸ Ἐν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ Πολλὰ ἐν, οὐδὲ τι θαυμαστόν λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἀπερ
Φ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀν πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἐὰν δὲ τις, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, πρῶτον μὲν διαιρήται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἰδῆ, οἷον Ὁμοιότητα τε καὶ Ἀνομοιότητα καὶ Πλήθος καὶ τὸ Ἐν καὶ Στάσιν καὶ Κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐίτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίη, ἀγαίνην ἢ ἐγώγ', ἐφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὃ Ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρεῖος μὲν πάνω ἥγουμαι πεπραγματεύσθαι· πολὺ μέντ' ἂν διδεὶ μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην, εἰ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἰδεῖσι παντοτοπῶς πλεκομένην, ὧσπερ ἐν τοῖς οραμένοις διήλθετε, οὗτο καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδείξατι.

λέγοντος δὴ, ἐφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν οἶεσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἀχθεσθαι τὸν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνω τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἄλληλους βλέποντας μειδιάν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτην. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ πανσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃ Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιος εἰ ἀγασθαι τῆς ὀρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑφὸ ὅτι δυνηθησάη σὺς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἰδὴ αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ Ὁμοιότης χωρὶς ἢ ἴμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ Ἐν δὴ καὶ Πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὡς ἐν δὴ Ζήνωνος ἦκουν; ἐξοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην. ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον Δικαίον τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ Καλοῦ καὶ Ἄγαθον καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων; ναὶ, φάναι. τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἦμῶν καὶ τῶν ε
οἶοι ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν πάντων, αὐτὸ τι ἔδος Ἀνθρώπου ἢ Πυρὸς ἢ καὶ Ὁδατὸς; ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολ- λάκις δή, ὃ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὡσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως. ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν δέ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ γελοῖα δόξεις ἢ ἔναι, οἶον Ὄριξ καὶ Πηλός καὶ Ὅρυτος ἢ ἄλλο ὃ τι ἀτιμότατον τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἴδος ἔναι χωρίς, ὃν ἢ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ὃν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή; οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Ἴωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν γε, ἀπερ ὅρωμεν, ταύτα καὶ εἶναι· εἴδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἴηθήναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἥδη μέντοι ποτὲ με καὶ ἔθραξε μὴ τή ἢ περὶ πάντων ταύτων ἐπείτα ὅταν ταύτη στῶ, φεύγων οὐχομαι, δεῖσας μή ποτὲ εἰς τὴν ἀβυθόν φλυαρίαν ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ· ἐκείσε ὅ οὖν ἄφικόμενος, εἰς ᾧ νῦν ἡ ἐλέγομεν εἰδὴ ἔχεις, περὶ ἐκείνα πραγματευόμενος ὡς διατρίβω. νέος γὰρ εἰ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντεἰληπται φιλοσοφία, ός ἐτι ἀντιλήπται κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμᾶσεις νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπο- βλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

τόδε οὖν μοι εἴπε. δοκεῖ σοι, ὃς φής, εἶναι εἰδὴ ἄττα, ὃν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ὦς ἱερεῖ, οἷον Ὄμοιοττος μὲν μετα- λαβόντα ὃμοια, Μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, Κάλλους τε καὶ Δικαιοσύνης δίκαια τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι, πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οὐκοῦν ἦτοι ὅλον τοῦ εἴδους ἢ μέρους ἐκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνου μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἄν μετάληψις χωρίς τούτων γένοιτο; καὶ τῶς ἢν; εἴπεν. πότερον οὖν human way of thinking, and that nothing is really vile.

6. Parmenides discusses the ratio- nale of Participation: he shows that particular things cannot partici- pate with the εἴδη by any mode of Extensi- sion, either by way of
δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἀκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὑν, ἣ πῶς; τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὃ Παρμενίδη, ἐνείαι; ἐν άρα ὅν καὶ ταύτων ἐν πολλοῖς χωρίς οὔσιν ὅλον ἀμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὔτως αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ χωρίς ἂν εἰη. οὐκ ἂν, εἰ γε, φάναι, οἴον ἡ ἡμέρα μία καὶ ἡ αὐτῇ οὔσα πολλαχοῦ ἀμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτῇ αὐτῆς χωρίς ἐστι, εἰ οὔτω καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν ἐν πάσιν ἀμα ταύτων εἰη. ἦδεως γε, φάναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταύτων ἀμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἴον εἰ ἱστὶς καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον· ἡ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἥγει εἰ λέγειν; ἵσως, φάναι. ἡ οὖν ὅλον ἔφε ἐκάστῳ τὸ ἱστίου εἰη ἂν, ἡ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ; μέρος. μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχου, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὅλον, ἄλλα μέρος ἐκάστου ἂν εἰη. φαίνεται οὔτω γε. ἡ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ Ἐν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι καὶ ἐτὶ ἐν ἐσται; οὔδαμως, εἰπεῖν. ὃρα γὰρ, φάναι· εἰ αὐτῷ τὸ Μέγαθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει ἀ σμικροτέρῳ αὐτῶν τοῦ Μεγάθους μέγα ἐσται, ἄρα οὐκ ᾧ ἀλογον φανεῖται; πάνυ γ᾽, ἐφη. τί δὲ; τοῦ Ἰσοῦ μέρος ἐκαστὸν σμικρὸν ἀπολαβὸν τι ἔξει ἔλαττον οὔτε αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰσοῦ τὸ ἔχον Ἰσοῦ τῷ ἐσται; ἄδυνατον. ἀλλὰ τοῦ Σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτῶ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἐσται ἄτε μέρους ἐαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὔτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ Σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἐσται· ὃ δὲ ἄν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἐσται ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μεῖζον ἢ ο

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πρώ. οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τούτο γε. τίν' οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.

τί δὲ δή; πρὸς τὸδε πῶς ἔχεις; τὸ ποιῶν; οἴμαι 7. ὁ ὀρισμὸς τους: ὃς ἐκαστὸν εἶδος οὐσίας εἶναι ὅταν πόλλα ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἵσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτῇ εἶναι ἐπί πάντα ἵδοντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ Μέγα ἴγκε εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι. τί δ', αὖτ' τὸ Μέγα ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα, εὖν ὦσαιτός τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης, οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὖ ποὺ μέγα φανεῖται, ὦ ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; εὖκεν. ἀλλ' ἄρα εἴδος μεγέθους ἀναφησεται, παρ' αὖτο τε τὸ Μέγεθος γεγονός καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοὺ' καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν ἐτέρων, ὦ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἐσται καὶ οὐκέτι δή ἐν ἐκαστὸν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἐσται, ἀλλ' ἀπειρὰ τὸ πληθὸς.

ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐκαστὸν ἢ τούτων νόμημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἀλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς' οὖτω γὰρ ἄν ἐν γε ἐκαστὸν ἐη καὶ οὐκ ἄν ἐπὶ πάσχοι ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο. τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῶν νοημάτων, νόμημα δὲ οὐδενὸς; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. ἀλλὰ τινὸς; ναί. οὖντος ἢ

οὐκ ὤντος; ὄντος. οὐχ ἔνος τινος, ὦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόμημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν; ναϊ. εἰτὰ οὐκ εἴδος ἐσται τοῦτο τὸ νοοῦμενον ἐν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ἐν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; ἀνάγκη αὖ

8. The origin of the theory of the unique εἶδος: if the εἶδος be absolutely distinct from the sum of particulars, εἶδος in quantity is infinite, which is an absurdity; it is therefore unique.
9. *εἴδη* may perhaps exist objectively as Types to which sensible things conform; but this hypothesis would involve an infinite series of mediating *εἴδη*, which is absurd: for the *εἴδος* is unique.

10. If the *εἴδη* exist absolutely, we cannot know
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

δή; εἰπεῖν. πολλά μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἰ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γίγνωσκεσθαι ὅντα τοιαῦτα οἶα φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη, τῷ ταύτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ζεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν τούχοι ἐμπειρόσ ὁν ὁ ἅμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυή, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάντα πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀπίθανος εἰά ὁ ἀγνωστὰ ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. πὴ δὴ, ὁ Παρμενίδης; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. ὁτι, ὁ Σωκράτης, οἴμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλου, οὕτως αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογήσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. πῶς γὰρ ἄν αὐτή καθ' αὐτὴν ἔτι εἰή; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ οὕσα τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἄλληλας εἰσίν αἰ εἰσίν, αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν εἰστε ὀμοιώματα εἰτε ὅτι δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, διὸ ζημίωσε μετέχοντες εἰναι ἐκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα. τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ταύτα, ὀμώνυμα οὐτα ἐκείνους, αὐτὰ αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτά ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἴδη, καὶ ἔαυτον ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὐτοῖς μοιΖεῖται οὕτως. πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οἴον, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, εἰ τις ἡμῶν τοῦ δεσπότης ἢ δούλος ἐστών, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου δὴ που, ὁ ἐστὶ δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δούλος ἐστών, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ Δούλου, ὁ ἐστὶ Δούλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρωπος ὁν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα ταύτα ἐστιν. αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς Δουλείας ἐστιν ὁ ἐστί, καὶ δουλεία ὦσαύτως, αὐτὴ Δουλεία αὐτῆς Δεσποτείας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὰ ἦμιν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα them, since an absolute object implies as its correlative a faculty of absolute knowledge; and, conversely, Deity, as possessing absolute knowledge, could not have less than absolute knowledge, that is, could not have our knowledge, and therefore would be without some knowledge, which is absurd.
πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ', ὁ λέγω, αὕτα αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὕτα ἐκεῖνά τε ἔστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὄσαντως 134 πρὸς ἐαυτό: ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὁ λέγω; Πάνυ γ', εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτην, μανθάνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτῇ μὲν ὃ ἐστὶν Ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὁ ἐστὶν Ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἃν ἐκείνης εἰς ἐπιστήμη; πάνυ γε. ἐκάστη δὲ ἀν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἢ ἐστιν, ἐκάστοι τῶν οὖν, ὃ ἐστιν, εἰς ἃν ἐπιστήμην ἢ ὃς; ναι. ἢ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἃν ἀληθείας εἰς, καὶ ἂν ἐκάστη ἢ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν οὖν ἐκάστου ἃν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. ἀλλα μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἰδή, ὡς ὀμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἶον τε εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. γιγνώσκεται δὲ γέ ποι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἰδοὺς τοῦ τῆς Ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἐστιν ἐκαστα; ναι. ὃ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν. οὐ γὰρ. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπὸ γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς Ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἀγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ Κάλλου καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὕσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν. κινδυνεύει. ὃρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε. τὸ ποίον; φαίης ἃν ἢ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐστιν αὐτό τι γένος Ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἡ τήν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην; καὶ Κάλλους καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὕτως; ναι. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς Ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ηθεὶν φαίης ἔχει τήν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην; ἀνάγκη. ἃρ' οὖν οἶος τε ἂν ἐσται ὁ θεὸς τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἃ γιγνώσκειν αὐτήν Ἐπιστήμην ἔχων; τί γὰρ οὖ; ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὀμολογηται ἡμῖν, ὡ Σώ-
κρατεῖ, μήτ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἶδη πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα. ἢμο- λόγηται γάρ. οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτῃ Δεσποτείᾳ καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀκριβεστάτῃ Ἐπιστήμῃ, οὔτ' ἄν ἡ Δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἄν δεσπόσειεν, οὔτ' ἄν ἡ Ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοῖ οὐδὲ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὀμοίως ἡμεῖς τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἄρχῇ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδεὶς τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ Ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκείνοι τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γιγνώσκομεν τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες. ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἐφη, θαυμαστός ὁ λόγος ἦ, εἰ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀπο- στερήσειε τοῦ εἰδέναι.

135 καὶ ἦτι ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖοιν ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσίν αὐτὰ αἱ ἱδέαι τῶν ὑπόνων καὶ ὀριεῖται τις αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκάστον εἴδος· ὡστε ἀπο- ρεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε ἐστὶ ταῦτα, εἴτε ὁ τι μάλιστα εἶη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ ἦναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα· καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τὰ λέγειν καὶ, ὃ ἀρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσανάπειστον ἦναι· καὶ ἄνδρος πάνυ μὲν εὐφυός τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἐστὶ γένος τὸ ἐκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτήν, ἦτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλου δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἰκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον. συγχωρῶ σοι, ἐφη, ὁ Παρ- μενίδης, ὁ Σωκράτης· πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νός λέγεις. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἴπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἰ γέ

11. Without εἰδή, there can be no philosophy.
12. Parmenides expounds the Method of philosophizing: every hypothesis should be argued affirmatively, i.e. supposing it to be true, and negatively, i.e. supposing it to be not true, and the consequences negative and positive should be compared. Socrates, continues Parmenides, had rightly conceived that the difficulties arising from incompatibilities lay in the region of 

\[ \text{εἴναι} \]
not in the region of 

tis δή, δ' Σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἐάσει εἰδὴ τῶν ὄντων ἐίναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέπασ, μηδὲ τι ὤριεῖταί εἰδος ἐνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὥσπερ τρέψει τῇ διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἔων ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τῇ αὐτῇ ἀλήθεια, καὶ οὕτως τῇ e τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιοῦτον μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἁγιοθῆσθαι. ἀλήθειά λέγεις, φάναι.

τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; ποι τρέψει ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορῶν ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι. πρὶ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γνωμασθήναι, δ' Σώκρατες, ὄριζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς Καλὸν τε τί καὶ Δίκαιον καὶ Ἀγαθόν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἑννόησα γάρ καὶ πρῶην σοι ἀκούων διαλεγομένου δὲ ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῶδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἵσθι, ἡ ὀρμή, ἢ ὀρμᾶς ἔπι τοὺς λόγους. ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτόν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκοῦσης ἀχρήστον εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἄδολεσχίας, ἐώς ἐτί νέος εἰ· εἰ δὲ μη, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, δ' Παρμενίδη, τῆς γνωμασίας; οὐτός, εἰπεῖν, ὄντερ ἠκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν τούτο γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἡγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὦτι οὐκ εἶας ἐν τοῖς ὁ ὅρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταύτα τῇ πλάνῃ ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀ μάλιστα τις ἄν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἰδή ἂν ἡγήσαστο εἶναι. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἐφη, ταῦτα γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὀμοία καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν. καὶ καλῶς γ', ἐφη. χρῆ δὲ καὶ τὸδε ἐτί πρὸς τοῦτο ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἑστὶν ἑκάστον ὑποτιθε- μενον σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, 136
Διάφορα και εί μη' εστι το αυτό τούτο υποτίθεσθαι, εί βούλει μάλλον γυμνασθήναι. πώς λέγεις; φάναι. οίνον, ἐφη, εί βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς υποθέσεως, ἂν Ζήμων ὑπεθέτο, εί πολλά ἐστι, τί χρή ξυμβαίνει καὶ αὐτοὶς τοῖς Πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ Ἐν καὶ τῷ Ἐνὶ πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ Πολλά· καὶ αὐ εἰ μῆ ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί ξυμβηγήσεται καὶ τῷ Ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς Πολλοῖς καὶ β πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ αὕθες αὐ ἐὰν υποθῇ, εἰ ἐστὶν Ὀμοιότητις ἢ εἰ μῆ ἐστι, τί ἐφ' ἐκατέρας τῆς υποθέσεως ξυμβηγήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς υποτεθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ Ἁνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ περὶ Κινήσεως καὶ Στάσεως, καὶ περὶ Γενέσεως καὶ Φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Εἰναι καὶ τοῦ μῆ Εἰναι· καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, περὶ ὁτου ἂν ἂεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς ὀυκ ὄντος καὶ ὑποτεθεῖσι τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ Ἁνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ περὶ Κινήσεως καὶ Στάσεως, καὶ περὶ Γενέσεως καὶ Φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Εἰναι καὶ τοῦ μῆ Εἰναι· καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, περὶ ὁτου ἂν ἂεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς ὀυκ ὄντος καὶ ὑποτεθεῖσι τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ Ἁνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ περὶ Κινήσεως καὶ Στάσεως, καὶ περὶ Γενέσεως καὶ Φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Εἰναι καὶ τοῦ μῆ Εἰναι· καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, περὶ ὁτου ἂν ἂεἰ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντως καὶ ὡς ὀυκ ὄντως καὶ ὑποτεθεῖσι τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.
13. Parmenides consents to argue the question, as to the existence of unity, affirmatively and negatively: he takes Aristotle, afterwards one of the Thirty, as his assistant.
κρισις. ἐτοιμός σοι, ὥ Παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων· ἀλλ’ ἑρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινομένου.

Εἰεν δῆ, φάναι: εἰ ἐν ἔστιν, (1) ἀλλο τι οὐκ ἄν εἰῃ πολλὰ Τὸ Ἕν; πῶς γὰρ ἂν; (2) οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι. τί δῆ; τὸ μέρος που ὅλον μέρος ἐστίν. ναί. τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὔχι οὐ ἄν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῆ, ὅλον ἄν εἰῃ; πάνω γε. ἀμφοτέρως ἅρα Τὸ Ἕν ἐκ μερῶν ἄν εἰη, ὅλον τε ὅν καὶ μέρη ἐξον. ἀνάγκη. ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα ὅρως ἄρα οὕτως Τὸ Ἕν πολλὰ εἴη, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἐν. ἀληθῆ. δεὶ δὲ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἄλλ’ ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δεῖ. οὔτ’ ἄρα ὅλον ἐσται οὗτε μέρη ἐξεί, εἰ ἐν ἔσται Τὸ Ἕν. οὐ γάρ. (3) οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἐξεῖ μέρος, οὔτ’ ἄν ἀρχήν οὔτε τελευτήν οὔτε μέσον ἐχοί’ μέρη γὰρ ἄν ἥδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰη. ὀρθῶς. (4) καὶ μὴν τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἐκάστου. πῶς δ’ οὐ; ἀπειρον ἄρα Τὸ Ἕν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἐχεί. ἀπειρον. (5) καὶ καὶ ἀνευ σχήματος ἅρα: οὔτε γὰρ ἄν στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέως μετέχοι. πῶς; στρογγύλου γε ποῦ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, οὔ ἄν τὰ ἐσχάτα πανταχῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ᾴσον ἄπεχεν. ναί. καὶ μὴν εὐθὺ γε, οὔ ἄν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπίπροσθεν ἦ, οὔτως. οὐκοῦν μέρη ἄν ἐχοί Τὸ Ἕν καὶ πόλλ’ ἄν εἰη, εἰτ’ εὐθέως σχήματος είτε περιφερεὺς μετέχοι. πάνω μὲν οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερεῖς ἐστιν.

138 ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἐχεί. ὀρθῶς. (6) καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτον γε ὅν οὐδαμοῦ ἄν εἰη’ οὔτε γὰρ ἄν ἄλλω οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰη’. πῶς δῆ; ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ἄν κύκλῳ ποὺ ἄν περιέχοιτο ὑπ’ ἐκείνω ἐν ὅ ἐνείη, καὶ


A. The affirmative, if the One exist: and B. The negative, if the One do not exist.

(A). The affirmative argument:

(L) The First Hypothesis: εἰ Τὸ Ἕν ἐστιν ἔν, if the One be One unconditional, the One admits of no predicate whatsoever, either

(1) Plurality;
(2) Part;
(3) Whole;
(4) Beginning,
Middle,
End; and is therefore ἁπειρόν;
(5) has no Figure, either curvilinear or rectilinear;
(6) is not localized either relatively to itself or to anything else;
πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἀπτοτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῆς κύκλων ἀπτεσθαί. ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν κἂν ἑαυτὸ εἰς περιέχον οὐκ ἂλλο ἡ αὐτὸ, εἰπὲρ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς· ἐν τῷ γὰρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ, οὐκοῦν ἔτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἁμφότερον ἂμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὔτω τὸ Ἐν οὔκ ἂν εἰς ἐτὶ ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο. οὐ γὰρ οὖν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ ποὺ τὸ Ἐν, μὴτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνόν. οὐκ ἐστίν. (7) ὅρα δὴ, οὔτως ἔχον εἰ οὗν τε ἐστὶν ἐστάναι ἢ κωνεῖσθαι. τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ; ὅτι κινούμενον γε ἢ λέιοντο ἢ ἁλλοιοῖτο ἂν αὐτά γὰρ μόναε κυνήσεις. ναί. ἁλλοιούμενον δὲ c τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατον ποὺ ἐν ἐτὶ εἶναι. ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα κατ’ ἁλλοιωσίν γε κωνεῖται. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄλλ’ ἄρα τῷ λέιοντες· ἵσως. καὶ μὴν εἰ λέιοντο τὸ ἐν, ἢτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέρεσθαι κύκλῳ ἡ μεταλλάττων χώραν ἔτεραν ἐξ ἐτέρας. ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν κύκλω μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσου φερόμενα ἂλλα μέρη ἐχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ὅ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε ά μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τούτω κύκλῳ ποτὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; οὐδεμία. ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμείβου· ἀλλοτ’ ἀλλοθεί γίγνεται καὶ οὔτω κωνεῖται; εἰπέρ γε δὴ. οὐκοῦν εἶναι μὲν ποὺ ἐν τιν αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; ναί. ἀρ’ οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἐτὶ ἀδυνατώτερον; οὐκ έννοοῦ ὅπη. εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε τοῦ ἐν ἑκεῖνῳ εἶναι ἐτὶ ἐγγυνόμενον, μήτ’ ἐτὶ έξω ἑκείνου παντάπασιν, εἰπέρ δὴ.
μόνω ἐτέρῳ, ἀλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί. ὅρθως. τῷ μὲν ἀρα ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἐσται ἑτέρῳ. ἦ δει; οὐ δήτα. δὲ ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἐαυτῷ ἐσται' εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ. αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὑπό ἑτέρων οὐδενὸς ἐσται ἑτέρων. ὅρθως. οὐδὲ μὴν ταύτῳν ἐαυτῷ ἐσται. πῶς δ' οὗ; οὐχ ἦτερ Τοῦ 'Ενὸς φύσις, αὕτη δήτου καὶ Τοῦ Ταύτου. τί δή; οὕτω δὲ τούτῳν γένηται τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται. ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; Τοῦς Πολλοίς ταὐτῶν γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐν. ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' εἰ Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὸ Ταύτον μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὁπότε τι ταυτών ἐγίγνετο, ἀεὶ ἐν ἐν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὁπότε ἐν, ταυτῶν. πάνυ γε. εἰ ἀρα Τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτῳν ε ἐσται, οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐσται' καὶ οὕτως ἐν ὅν οὐχ ἐν ἑσται. ἀλλὰ μὴν τούτῳ γε ἀδύνατον ἀδύνατον ἀρα καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἡ ἑτέρων ἑτερον εἴναι ἡ ἑαυτῷ ταὐτῶν. ἀδύνατον. οὕτω δὴ ἑτέρων γε ἡ ταὐτῶν Τὸ Ἐν οὕτ' ἂν αὐτῷ οὕτ' ἂν ἑτέρῳ εἰ. οὐ γὰρ οὐν. οὐδὲ μὴν ὡμοῖον τιν ἐσται οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ οὐθ' ἑτέρῳ. τί δή; οὕτω δὲ το ταὐτῶν που πεπονθὸς ὡμοῖον. ναί. Τοῦ δὲ γε ΄Ενὸς χωρίς ἐφάνη την φύσιν Τὸ Ταύτων. ἐφάνη γάρ. ἀλλὰ 140 μὴν εἰ τι πέπουθε χωρίς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν, πλεῖω ἂν εἶναι πεπονθου ἡ ἐν ποτέ δὲ ἀδύνατον. ναί. οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν ἂρα ταὐτῶν πεπονθὸς εἴναι Τὸ Ἐν οὕτε ἂλλῳ οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐ τοι. οὐδὲ ὡμοῖον ἂρα δύνατον αὐτὸ εἶναι οὕτε ἂλλῳ οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐκ ἐοικεν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἑτερον γε πεπονθεν εἴναι Τὸ Ἐν καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλεῖω ἂν πεπονθοι εἴναι ἡ ἐν. πλεῖω γάρ. τὸ γε μὴν ἑτερον πεπονθὸς ἡ ἑαυτῶν ἡ ἂλλῳ ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἰ. ἡ ἑαυτῷ ἡ ἂλλῳ, εἰπερ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἃ
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πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον. ὅρθως. Τὸ δὲ γε Ἐν, ὃς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἔτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἔστων οὐθ’ ἑαυτῷ οὐθ’ ἐτέρῳ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὐθ’ ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἀν εἴη.
Τὸ Ἐν. οὐ φαίνεται. (9) καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτον γε ὅν οὔτε ἵσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἐσταί οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἀλλῷ. πη; ἵσον μὲν ὅν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἐσταί ἐκείνῳ ὃ ἀν ἵσον ἢ. ναί. μείζον δὲ ποῦ ἡ ἐλαττον ὁν, οἷς ἦν ἀν ἕξιμμετρον ἢ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείως μέτρα ἔχει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω. ναί. οἷς δὲ ἀν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν συμμετρῶν, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἐσταί. πῶς γὰρ οὖ; οὐκοῦν ἄδυνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ἄντιστοις τῶν αὐτῶν; ἄδυνατον. ἵσον μὲν ἀρα οὔτ’ ἀν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἀλλῷ εἴη, μη τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὁν. οὐκοῦν φαίνεται γε. ἀλλὰ μὴν πλείωνων γε μέτρων ὁν ἡ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσωνπερ μέτρων τοσοῦτως καὶ μερῶν ἀν εἴη’ καὶ οὔτως αὐ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐσταί, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα. ὅρθως. εἰ δὲ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἰη, ἵσον ἄν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ τούτῳ δὲ ἄδυνατον ἔφανη, ἵσον τῷ αὐτῷ εἴναι. ἔφανη γὰρ. οὔτε ἄρα ἐνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐσταί ἵσον οὔτε ἀλλῷ. οὗτ’ αὐ μείζον οὐδὲ ἐλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὐθ’ ἐτέρου. παντάπασι μὲν ὁν οὔν οὔτως. (10) τί δέ; πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τήν αὐτὴν ὑλικίαν ἔχειν Τὸ Ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατῷ εἶναι; τί δὴ γὰρ οὖ; ὅτι ποῦ ὑλικίαν μὲν τήν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἴσοτητος χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, δὲν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι Τῷ
Ἐνὶ, οὖθ᾽ ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἴσοτητος. ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν. καὶ μὴν καὶ οτι ἀνομοιότητος τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὗ μετέχει, καὶ τούτο ἐλέγομεν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν πῶς οὖν οἶδον τε ἐσται τινὸς ἡ πρεσβύτερον ἡ νεώτερον εἶναι, ἡ τὴν αὐτὴν ἥλικιάν ἔχειν τω, τοιούτων όν; οὔδαμῶς. οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἰθ' νεώτερον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἥλικιάν ἔχουν Ὄ ν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύνατ' ἂν εἴναι Ὅ ν, εἰ τοιούτων εἰθ'; ἡ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εὰν τι ἡ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀεὶ αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὕκων τὸ γε πρεσβύτερον ἀεὶ νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον; τί μὴν; τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἐαυτῷ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἐαυτῷ ἀμὰ γίγνεται, εἰτέρ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται. πῶς λέγεις; ὡδ' διάφορον ἐτέρον ἐτέρου οὐδὲν δεὶ γίγνεσθαι ήδη ὄντος διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἡδη ὄντος ἡδη εἴναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν, τοῦ δὲ γεγονόμενον οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλλειν οὔτε εἴναι πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἴναι. ἀνάγκη γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε πρεσβύτερον ὃ διαφορότης νεωτέρου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. ἐστὶ γάρ. τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἀμὰ ἐαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι. ἔστερον, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλεῖο ἐαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον μῆτ' ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐαυτῷ καὶ εἴναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι. ἀνάγκη γάρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔστιν, ὃς ἔστερον, ὥσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἔστι καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιοῦτος, ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτῷ αὐτῷ ἥλικιάν ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβύτερον τε αὐτοῦ ἀμὰ καὶ νεώτερον.
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γίγνεσθαι. κυδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ μὴν Τὸ γε Ἔνι τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετήν. οὐ γὰρ μετήν. οὐδὲ ἀρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ’ ἔστιν ἐν τινι χρόνῳ. οὐκοιν δή, ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ. (11) τί οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγένετο οὔ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος; καὶ μάλα. τί δὲ; τὸ ἐσται καὶ τὸ γενῆσται καὶ τὸ γεννηθῆσεται οὐ τοῦ ἐπειτά που μέλλοντος; ναὶ. τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος; πάνω μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἂρα Τὸ Ἐν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς μετέχει χρόνον, οὔτε ποτὲ γεγόνει οὔτ’ ἐγένετο οὔτ’ ἦν ποτὲ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ’ ἔστιν, οὔτ’ ἐπειτὰ γενῆσται οὔτε γεννηθῆσεται οὔτ’ ἔσται. ἀληθεύτατα. ἐστὶν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; οὐκ ἐστὶν. οὐδαμῶς ἂρα Τὸ Ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδαμῶς ἂρα ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν. οὐ φαίνεται. οὗδ’ ἂρα οὕτως ἐστὶν ὡστε ἐν εἶναι εἰὴ γὰρ ἄν ἢδη ὅν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον. ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔοικε, Τὸ Ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἐστὶν οὕτε ἐστιν, εἶ δεῖ τῷ τούτῳ λόγῳ πιστεύειν. κυν-δυνεύει. (12) δ’ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ οὔντι εἰὴ ἀν τι ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ αὐτοῦ; καὶ πῶς; οὗδ’ ἂρα ὅνομα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη τις οὐδὲ αἰσθησίς οὐδὲ δόξα. οὐ φαίνεται. οὗδ’ ὅνομαξε-ταί ἂρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δαξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνό-σκεται, οὐδὲ τοῖς οὕτως αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἡ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ Τὸ Ἐν ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἐχεῖν; οὐκοῦν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

b βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν εἰς ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, εάν τι ἡμᾶς ἐπανιδούσιν ἄλλους φανῇ; πάνω μὲν οὖν βούλομαι. οὐκοῦν ἐν εἰ ἐστιν,
The meaning of the Second Hypothesis.

II. The Second Hypothesis: eis to 'Enov, deo to 'Evos ontos 'Evos ón tov 'Enov, tov aytou to de ekeínav, oiv upóthesin, eis eis, to chrē súmbaivnei, all' omoiouv apn hyn légein en te einaiv kai en en. vun de oiv e aytih estin h upóthesis, eis en en, ti chrē súmbaivnei, all' eis estin oiv ouwos; panu men ouv. oukouw ws alllo ti sýmáinov to esti tov en; anángkh. ap ouv alllo h oti ouwia metéchei to 'En, touti an eíth to legyómenov, epieidán tis sýl-

ληβδην ειπη ότι en estin; panu ge.

Pálin (1) de légywmen, en eis esti, ti súmbhísetai. skópeie ouv, eis ouv anángkh taúthn tihn upóthesin toioúton in to 'Enov sýmáinew, oivou méthē exein; pws; ἀδε. eis to esti tov 'Evos ontos légetai kai d to 'En tov ontos évos, esti de ou to aytov 'H te ouwia kai to 'En, tov aytou de ekeínov, ou upéthē-

meša, tov évos ontos, ἄρα ouv anángkh to mév olou en en einaiv aytov, toúton de gýnvesthai móría to te eiv kai to 'Eivai; anángkh. póteron ouv ékateron thw moríwv toútwv morión mónon prosopereuven, ἣ tov olou morión to ge morión prosorhten; tov olou. kai olou ἄρα estin o ἄν en ἤ, kai morión éxei. panu ge. ti ouv; thw moríwv ékateron toútwv tov 'Evos ontos, to te en kai to ón, ἄρα e apoleíptesov ἣ to 'Evo tov 'Eivai morión ἢ to 'Ov tov 'Evos morión; ouv ἄν eíth. pálin ἄρα kai thw moríwv ékateron to te en Íσχει kai to ón, kai
γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυνών αὕ μορίων τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἂεί, ὁ τί περ ἃν μόριον γένηται, τούτω τῷ μορίῳ ἂεί ἵσχεν·
Τὸ τε γὰρ Ἕν Τὸ Ὅν ἂεί ἵσχεν καὶ Τὸ Ὅν Τὸ Ἕν·
143 ὅστε ἀνάγκη δ' ἂεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἐν εἴναι. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἃν τὸ πλήθος οὕτω Τὸ Ἕν ὃν εἴη; ἔοικεν. (2) ἵθι δῆ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι. τῇ; οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν Τὸ Ἕν, διὸ ἔστων; ναὶ. καὶ διὰ ταύτα δῆ Τὸ Ἕν ὃν πολλὰ ἐφάνη. οὐτως. τί δὲ; αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἕν, δ δῆ φαμεν οὐσίας μετέχειν, εάν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μονὸν καθ' αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὐ φαμὲν μετέχειν, ἃρα γε ἐν μονὸν φανήσεται ἥ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τούτο; ἐν, οἷμαι ἔγυγε. ὅδωμεν δῆ· ἄλλο τι ἐτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τῇ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἐτερον δὲ αὐτὸ; ἐτερο μὴ Οὐσία Τὸ Ἕν, ἄλλ' ὃς ἐν οὐσίας μετέχειν. ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐτερον μὲν Ἡ Οὐσία, ἐτερον δὲ Τὸ Ἕν, οὔτε τῷ ἐν Τὸ Ἕν Τῆς Οὐσίας ἐτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι Ἡ Οὐσία Τοῦ Ἕνὸς ἄλλο, ἄλλα Τῷ Ἕτερῳ τε καὶ Ἀλλῷ ἐτερα ἄλληλων. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὔτε οὗ ταύτον ἔστων οὔτε Τῷ Ἕν οὔτε Τῇ Οὐσία Τῷ Ἕτερον. πῶς γὰρ; τί οὖν; εάν προελώ

(2) If the One participated in Existence, Number must exist.
πανταχῶς ἐφ’ ἐκάστου ἀμφω λέγω; ναί. ὃ δὲ ἄν ἀμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθων, ἄρα οἰόν τε ἀμφω μὲν αὐτῶ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μῆ; οὐχ οἰόν τε. ὃ δὲ ἄν δύο ήτον, ἐστὶ τις μηχανῇ μὴ οὐχ ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐν εἶναι; οὐδεμία. τούτων ἄρα ἐπείπερ σύνδιο ἐκαστα ξυμβαινει εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἄν εἰη ἐκαστον. φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἐκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ, συντεθεντὸς ἐνὸς ὑποιοιοῦν ἡτυιοιοῦν συνυγια οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ πάντα; ναί. τρία δὲ οὐ περιττά, καὶ δύο ἀρτια; πῶς δ’ οὐ; τί δὲ; δυοῖν ὄντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δῖς, καὶ τρὶῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἰπερ ε ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δῖς ἐν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρῖς ἐν; ἀνάγκη. δυοῖν δὲ ὄντων καὶ δῖς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δῖς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐ τρία τρῖς εἶναι; πῶς δ’ οὐ; τί δὲ; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δῖς ὄντων, καὶ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ τρῖς ὄντων, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δῖς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρὶς; πολλῇ γε. ἀρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ἄν εἰη καὶ περιττά περιττάκις καὶ ἀρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττά ἀρτιάκις. ἔστων 144 οὗτως. εἰ οὐν ταῦτα οὗτως ἔχει, οἴει τινὰ ἄριθμον ὑπολείπεσθαι, δν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; οὐδαμῶς γε. εἰ ἄρα ἐστών ἐν, ἀνάγκα καὶ ἄριθμον εἶναι. ἀνάγκη. (3) ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄριθμοι γε οὗτος πόλλ’ ἄν εἰη καὶ πλῆθος ἀπειρον τῶν ὄντων. ἢ οὐκ ἅπειρος ἄριθμος πλῆθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται; καὶ πάννυ γε. οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἄριθμος οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἐκαστον τοῦ ἄριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἄν αὐτῆς; ναι. ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ οὖντα Ἡ Οὐσία ἐνεμενηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεὶ τῶν ὄντων, οὐτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν καὶ ἀλογον ἑρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἄν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν
ПАРМЕНΙΔΗΣ.

οντων του ἀποστατοῖ; οὐδαμῶς. κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὡς οὖν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχώς οὖντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, ἐκαί ἐστι μέρη ἀπέραντα Τῆς Οὐσίας. ἔχει οὕτως. πλείστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς. πλείστα μέντοι.

(4) τί οὖν; ἐστι τι αὐτῶν, ὁ ἐστι μὲν μέρος Τῆς Οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος; καὶ πῶς ἄν τοιοῦτο γενοιτο; ἂλλ' εἴπερ γε, ὁμια, ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀεί, ἐωσπερ ἄν ἦ, ἐν γε τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη. πρὸς ἀπαντά ἄρα ἐκάστω τῷ Τῆς Οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστι Τὸ Ἔν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμικροτέρον οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός. 

οὕτως. ἄρα οὖν ἐν ὑπο πολλαχοῦ ἀμα ὅλον ἔστι; τοῦτο άθρει. ἂλλ' ἀθρω, καὶ ὁρῶ ὁτι ἀδύνατον. μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον. ἀλλως γὰρ ποὺ οὐδαμῶς ἀμα ἀπασι τοῖς Τῆς Οὐσίας μέρει παρέσται, ἢ μεμερισμένον. ναι. καὶ μὴν τὸ γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὁσαπερ μέρη. ἀνάγκη. οὐκ ἂρ' ἀλήθη ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες ὡς πλείστα μέρη Ἡ Οὐσία νευμιμενή εἰη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πλεῖω

d Τοῦ Ἐνὸς νευμηται, ἂλλ' ἵσα, ὡς ἐοικε, Τὸ Ἐν' οὔτε γὰρ Τὸ Ὀν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀπολειπεται οὔτε Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ Ὀντος, ἂλλ' ἐξισούσθον δῦ' οὔτε ἀεὶ παρὰ πάντα. παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρ' αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ Τῆς Οὐσίας πολλά τε καὶ ἀπειρά τὸ πλήθος ἐστιν. φαίνεται. οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὅν ἐν πολλὰ ἐστιν, ἂλλα καὶ αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν ὑπὸ Τοῦ Ὀντος διανενεμημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. (5) καὶ μήν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένον ἄν εἰη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον Τὸ Ἐν' ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια;
ανάγκη. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε περιέχουν πέρας ἂν εἰη. 145 πῶς δ’ οὖ; Τὸ Ἑν ἄρα ὃν ἐν τὲ ἑστὶ ποι καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἀπειρον πλήθει. φαίνεται. ἄρ’ οὖν οὐκ, ἐπείπερ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἐσχάτα ἔχουν; ανάγκη. τι δ’; ὅλον ὃν οὐκ ἄρχην ἂν ἔχου καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτὴν; ἡ οἷον τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἂνευ τρῶν τούτων; κἂν τὸν ἐν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ, ἐθελήσῃ ἐτί ὅλον εἶναι; οὐκ ἐθελήσῃ. καὶ ἄρχην δὴ, ὃς έουκε, καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον ἔχου ἂν Τὸ Ἑν. ἔχου. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε τὸ μέσον ίσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἴη. οὐ γάρ. καὶ σχήματος δὴ τινος, ὡς έουκε, τουοὺτον ὃν μετέχοι ἂν Τὸ Ἑν, ἦτοι εὐθέος ἡ στρογγύλου ἡ τινος μικτὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. μετέχου γὰρ ἂν. ἄρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἔχουν οὐκ αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλω; πῶς; τῶν μερῶν ποὺ ἐκαστὸν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου. οὕτως. πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχεται; ναὶ. καὶ μὴν τὰ γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτῶ τὸ Ἑν ἔστι, καὶ οὕτε τι πλέον οὕτε ἐλαττον ἡ πάντα. οὐ γάρ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον Τὸ Ἑν ἔστιν; πῶς δ’ οὖ; εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει οὕτα, ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ τε πάντα Τὸ Ἑν καὶ αὐτὸ Τὸ Ὁλον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ Τοῦ Ὁλον τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο Τὸ Ἑν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἠδὴ Τὸ Ἑν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰη. φαίνεται. ἀλλὰ μέντοι τὸ γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστιν, οὕτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὕτε ἐν τυί. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. ἐν ἅ τινι γὰρ ἐνί μὴ ὃν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ποὺ δύναιτο ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἰης. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπαντῶν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ ἐν, πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς
πάσων ἐνεσται; οὐδαμῶς. οὗδὲ μὴν ἐν τις τῶν μερῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τις τὸ ὅλον εἶη, τὸ πλεον ἀν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἶη, δ' ἐστιν ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. μὴ ὃν δ' ἐν πλείοσι μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ μηδ' ἐν ἀπασί τοὺς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι, ἡ μηδαμοῦ ἐτι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκόν μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὃν οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη, ὅλον δὲ ὃν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἑστὶν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι; πάνυ γε. ἢ μὲν ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑστὶν. ἢ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη οὐντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὕτω Τὸ Ἐν ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς Τὸ Ἐν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κωινόθαι καὶ ἑστάναι; πή; ἑστηκε μὲν ποι, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἑστὶν. ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ ὁν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαίνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἑστὶ γάρ. τὸ δὲ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄει δὲν ἑστὸς δήποτα ἀνάγκη ἄει εἶναι. πάνυ γε. τὶ δὲ; τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἄει δὲν οὗ τὸ ἑναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδεποτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδεποτε δὲ δὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἑστάναι, μὴ ἑστὸς δὲ κωινόθαι; οὕτως. ἀνάγκη ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν, αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἄει δὲν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἄει κωινόθαι τε καὶ ἑστάναι. φαίνεται. (6) καὶ μὴν ταύτων γε δὲν εἰναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτερον ἐαυτοῦ, καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις ωσαύτως ταύτων τε καὶ ἑτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν. πώς; πάν ποι πρὸς ἄπαν ὃδε ἐχει. ἡ ταύτων ἑστὶν ἡ ἑτερον. ἡ ἐὰν μὴ ταύτων ἡ μηδ' ἑτερον, μέρος ἂν εἰη τούτου, πρὸς δ' οὕτως ἐχει, ἡ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἰη. φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν Τὸ Ἐν αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἑστὶν; οὐδαμῶς. οὔδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἰη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὅν. οὐ (6) The One must exhibit Identity and Diversity with regard to— (a) itself, and (b) Τέλλα, everything else besides Τὸ Ἐν.
γὰρ οὖν τε. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔτερον ἐστὶν ἐνὸς Τὸ Ἔν; οὐ δὴτα. οὖδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἔτερον ἂν εἰη. οὐ ε μέντοι. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἔτερον μήθ' ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἣδη ταύτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; ἀνάγκη. τί δὲ; τὸ ἐτέρωθι ὁν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἔσται; ἐμοῦγε δοκεῖ. οὖν ἡ μὴ ἐφάνη ἔχον Τὸ Ἔν, αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὁν ἅμα καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ. ἐφάνη γὰρ. ἔτερον ἄρα, ὡς οὕκεν, εἰη ταύτη ἂν ἑαυτοῦ Τὸ Ἔν. οὕκεν. τί οὖν; εἰ τοῦ τι ἔτερον ἐστὶν, οὐχ ἔτερον ἃ ὄντος ἔτερον ἔσται; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ὁσα μὴ ἐν ἐστὶν, ἀπανθ' ἔτερα Τοῦ Ἔνος, καὶ Τὸ Ἔν τῶν μὴ ἐν; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἔτερον ἄρα ἂν εἰη Τὸ Ἔν Τῶν Ἀλλων. ἔτερον. ὁρὰ δὴ' αὐτὸ τε Ταύτων καὶ Τὸ Ἐτερον ἄρ οὐκ ἑναντία ἄλληλοι; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἢ οὖν ἔθελησει Ταύτων ἐν Τῷ Ἐτέρῳ ἢ Τὸ Ἐτερον ἐν Ταύτῳ ποτὲ εἶναι; οὐκ ἔθελήσει. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ Ἐτερον ἐν Ταύτῳ μηδέποτ' ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῇ ἐστὶ Τὸ Ἐτερον χρόνων οὐδένα. εἰ γὰρ οὕτυν ει ἐν τῷ, ἐκεῖνῳ ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν Ταύτῳ εἰη Τὸ Ἐτερον. οὐχ οὕτως; οὐτως. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστὶν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τοῖς τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἰη Τὸ Ἐτερον. ἀληθῆ. οὖτ' ἄρα ἂν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὔτε ἐν Τῷ Ἔνι ἐνείη ἂν Τὸ Ἐτερον. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα Τῷ Ἐτέρῳ γ' ἂν εἰη Τὸ Ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν οὔδε τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἔτερα. οὐ γὰρ. οὔδε μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἐτέρ' ἂν εἰη ἄλληλων, μὴ μετέχοντα Τοῦ Ἐτέρου. πῶς γὰρ; εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς 147 ἔτερα ἐστὶ μήτε Τῷ Ἐτέρῳ, οὐ πάντη ἣδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἔτερα εἶναι ἄλληλων; ἐκφεύγοι.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἐν' οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἐν ἵν, ἀλλὰ πη ἂν ἐν ἵν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ' ἂν ἄριθμος εἴῃ ἃρα τὰ μὴ ἐν' οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἐν ἵν παντάπασιν, ἄριθμον γε ἔχοντα. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. τί δὲ; τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἃρα μορία ἐστίν; ἢ κἂν οὕτω μετέχε Τοῦ Ἐνὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν; μετείχεν.

b εἰ ἃρα πάντη τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν, οὔτ' ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν Τὸ Ἐν εἰῃ οὐθ' ὅλον ὡς μορίων οὔτε αὐτά μὴ ἐν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μόρια, οὐθ' ὅλα ὡς μορίως Τῷ Ἐνί. οὐ γὰρ, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μὴτε μόρια μηθ' ὅλα μηθ' ἐτέρα ἀλλήλων ταύτα ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἔφαμεν γὰρ. φῶμεν ἃρα καὶ Τὸ Ἐν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς; φῶμεν. Τὸ Ἐν ἃρα, ὡς ἔουεν, ἐτέρον τε Τῶν Ἀλλῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ ταύτων εἰκόνισ τε καὶ ἐαυτῷ. κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι εἰκ. γε τοῦ λόγον. ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ὄμοιον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἐαυτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις; ἵσως. ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ Τάλλα που ἐτέρ' ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη. τί μὴν; οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἐτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων, ὡσπερ καὶ Τάλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὐθ' ἢττον; τί γὰρ ἂν; εἰ ἃρα μὴτε μᾶλλον μηθ' ἢττον, ὄμοιως. ναὶ. οὐκοῦν ἢ ἐτερον εἶναι πέπονθε Τῶν Ἀλλῶν, καὶ Τάλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτη ταύτων ἂν πεπονθότα

c εἰν Τὸ τε Ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις καὶ Τάλλα Τῷ Ἐνὶ. ὅς λέγεις; ὃδε' ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὄνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖς; ἐγωγε. τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἰποίς ἂν πλεονάκης ἢ ἀπαξ; ἐγωγε. πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἀπαξ εἰπης, ἐκείνῳ προσαγορεύεις οὔτερ ἐστὶ τοὐνόμα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκείνῳ; ἢ ἐὰν τε ἀπαξ ἐὰν τε πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλῇ
ἀνάγκη σε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ λέγειν ἀεὶ; τί μὴν; οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἐτερον ὄνομα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τιν; πάνυ γε. ὅταν ἀρα αὐτὸ φθέγγη, ἕαν τε ἀπαξ ἕαν τε πολλάκις, οὐκε ἐπ᾽ ἀλλω οὐδὲ ἀλλο τι ὄνομάζεις ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὔτε ἢν ὄνομα. ἀνάγκη. ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὃτι ἐτερον μὲν Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνόσ, ἐτερον δὲ ὁ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων, δίς τὸ ἐτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ᾽ ἀλλη ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνη τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν, ἢσπερ ἢν τούνομα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἢ ἀρα ἐτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνόσ, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐτερον 148 πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἀλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀν πεπονθὸς εἰνὴ Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις· τὸ δὲ που ταύτων πεπονθὸς ὄμοιον" οὐχί· ναὶ. ἦ δὴ Τὸ Ἐν ἐτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων πεπονθεὶ εἶναι, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀπαν ἀπασιω ὄμοιον ἀν εἰνή ἀπαν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἐτερον ἐστίν. ἐοικεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε ὄμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον. ναὶ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἐτερον τῷ αὐτῷ. καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο γ᾽ ἐφανή, ὡς ἀρα Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις ταύτων. ἐφάνη γάρ. τοῦνατίον δὲ γε πάθος ἐστὶ ὁ τὸ εἶναι ταύτῳ Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς τῷ ἐτερον εἶναι Τῶν Ἀλλων. πάνυ γε. ἦ γε μὴν ἐτερον, ὄμοιον ἐφανή. ναὶ. ἦ ἀρα ταύτων, ἀνόμοιον ἐσται κατὰ τοῦνατίον πάθος τῷ ὄμοιοντι πάθει. ὄμοιον δὲ που τὸ ἐτερον; ναὶ. ἀνομιώσει ἀρα ταύτων, ή οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐσται τῷ ἐτέρῳ. ἐοικεν. ὄμοιον ἀρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἐσται Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς, ἦ μὲν ἐτερον, ὃ ὄμοιον, ἦ δὲ ταύτων, ἀνόμοιον. ἤχει γάρ οὖν δὴ, ὡς ἐοικε, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον. καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἤχει. τίνα; ἦ ταύτων πεπονθεῖ, μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὄμοιον εἶναι. ἦ δ᾽ ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

(7) The One must be in communion with itself and with ἔναλλα, everything else; and the One must be out of communion with itself and ἔναλλα, everything else.
(8) The one admits of the modes of quantity, Equal, Greater, and Less, both with regard to itself and 
Τάλλα, everything else.

τῶν δυοὶ οροὺ τρίτον προσγενήται ἔξης, αὐτὰ μὲν ἦν 
τρία ἦσται, αἱ δὲ ἄφεις δύο. ναὶ. καὶ οὖτω δὴ ἂει, 
ἔνὸς προσγεγομένου, μία καὶ ἄφας προσγίγνεται, 
καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄφεις τοὺς πλήθους τῶν ἄριθμῶν 
μιᾷ ἔλαττος εἶναι. φ' γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπελεονεκ- 
τησὶ τῶν ἄφεων εἰς τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι τῶν ἄριθμον ἢ 
tὰς ἄφεις, τῷ ἵσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἐπειτα ἄριθμὸς πᾶς 
πασῶν τῶν ἄφεων πλεονεκτεῖ. ἦδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν 
ἀμα ἐν τῷ ἄριθμῳ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄφας ἐ 
ταῖς ἄφεσιν. ὀρθῶς. ὥσα ἄρα ἦστι τὰ ὀντα τῶν 
ἀριθμῶν, ἂει μιᾷ αἱ ἄφεις ἔλαττος εἰσίν αὐτῶν. 
αληθὴς. εἰ δὲ γε ἐν μόνον ἦστι, δυᾶς δὲ μὴ ἦστιν, 
ἄφας οὐκ ἄν εἶη. πῶς γάρ; οὐκοῦν, φαμεῖν, Τά*Αλλα 
Τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἰπέρ 
ἀλλα ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνσείται ἄριθμὸς ἐν 
Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς, ἔνὸς μὴ ἐνότος ἐν αὐτοῖς. πῶς γάρ; 
οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν ἔστι Τάλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλον ἄριθμοῦ 
ἐχουσα ὄνομα οὐδέν. οὔ. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἦστιν ἢ 
ἐν, καὶ δυᾶς οὐκ ἄν εἰη. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄφας ἄρα 
οὐκ ἦστι, δυῶν μὴ ὀντοι. οὐκ ἦστιν. οὔτ' ἄρα 
Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων ἄπτεται οὔτε Τά Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, 
ἐπείπερ ἄφας οὔτε ἦστιν. οὐ γάρ οὖν. οὔτω δὴ κατὰ 
πάντα ταῦτα Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν τε Ἀλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἄπτε- 
tαι τε καὶ οὐχ ἄπτεται. ἐοικεν. (8) ἂρ' οὖν καὶ 
ἰσον ἦστι καὶ ἀνισον αὐτοῖ τε καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς; πῶς; 
ei μεῖζον εἰη Τὸ Ἐν ἡ Τάλλα ἡ ἐλάττων, ἡ αὐτῇ 
Τοῦ Ἐνός μεῖζῶ ἡ ἐλάττω, ἂρ' οὐκ ἄν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι 
Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὰ Ἀλλα Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός οὔτε τι μεῖζω 
οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἄν εἰη ἂλληλων αὑταῖς γε ταὐταῖς 
tαῖς οὐνίας; ἂλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι 
ἐκάτερα ισότητα ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἄν εἰη πρὸς ἂλληλα;
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν Ὕν, σμικρότητα δὲ Τᾶλλα, ὡστέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἴδει μέγεθος προσεῖ, μεῖζὸν ἀν εἶν, δὲ δὲ σμικρότης, ἐλαττον; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ἔστον γε των τούτων εἰδῆ, Τὸ τε Μέγεθος καὶ Ἡ Σμικρότης; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποὺ, μὴ οὖντε γε, ἐναντίῳ τε ἀλλήλου εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὕσων ἐγγυνοiosisθην. πῶς γὰρ ἂν; εἰ ἀρα ἔν Τῳ Ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγύνηται, ήτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνεί. ἀνάγκη. τὶ δἐ εἰ ἐν ὅλω ἐγγύνουτο; οὐχὶ ἢ εἴ ίσου ἀν Ὅν Ἐνὶ δὶ ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἰή ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό; δὴν δή. ἂρ' οὖν οὐκ εἴ ίσου μὲν οὖσα Ἡ Σμικρότης Τῷ Ἐνὶ ίση ἂν αὐτῷ εἰή, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων; πῶς δ᾽ οὗ; δυνατὸν οὖν Σμικρότητα ἵσην τῷ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν γε τὰ Μεγέθους τε καὶ Ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς; ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἂρα Τῷ Ἐνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰή Σμικρότης, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει. ναι. οὐδὲ γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει εἰ δὲ μὴ, ταὐτά ποιῆσει ἀπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλου' ἵση ἐσταὶ ἢ μεῖζων τοῦ μέρους, ἐν δὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐνῇ. ἀνάγκη. οὐδενὶ ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων Σμικρότης, μήτ' ἐν μέρει μήτ' ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγυνομένῃ οὐδὲ τι ἐσταὶ σμικρόν πλὴν αὐτῆς Σμικρότητος. οὐκ ἐσικεν. οὐδ' ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ. μεῖζον γὰρ ἂν τι εἰή ἄλλο, καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ Μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν δὲ Τὸ Μέγεθος ἑνεί, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὄντος, οὐ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ἢ μέγα τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδή Σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἐνι. ἀληθῆ. ἄλλα μὴν αὐτοῦ Μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μεῖζον ἢ αὐτῆς Σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ Σμικρότης ἄλλου ἐλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ Μεγέθους. οὐ γὰρ. οὔτε ἄρα Τὰ Ἀλλα μεῖζω Τοῦ
'Ενὸς οὖν ἐλάττω, μήτε Μέγεθος μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχοντα, οὔτε αὐτῷ τούτῳ πρὸς Τὸ "Ἐν ἔχετον τὴν ἅ δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλαν, οὔτε αὐ Τὸ "Ἐν τούτων οὖν Ἀλλων μεῖζον ἄν οὐδ' ἐλαττον εἴη, μήτε Μέγεθος μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον. οὐκοῦν φαίνεται γε. ἀρ' οὖν εἰ μῆτε μεῖζον μήτε ἐλαττον Τὸ "Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἑκείνῳ μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήθ' ὑπερέ-
χεσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τὸ γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήθ' ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἴς ἵσον εἶναι, εἴς ἵσον ἰν ἱν ἵσον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ μήν καὶ αὐτὸ θ' 
γε Τὸ "Ἐν πρὸς εαυτῷ οὖτως ἄν ἔχοι· μήτε Μέγεθος ἐν εαυτῷ μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον οὐτ' ἄν ὑπερέχοντο 
οὐτ' ἄν ὑπερέχοι εαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' εἴς ἵσον ἰν ἵσον ἂν εἴη 
εαυτῷ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τὸ "Ἐν ἄρα εαυτῷ τε καὶ 
Τοῖς Ἀλλοις ἵσον ἄν εἶη. φαίνεται. καὶ μήν αὐτὸ 
γε ἐν εαυτῷ ὅν καὶ περὶ εαυτό ἄν εἴη ἔξωθεν, καὶ 
περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον ἄν εαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον 
δὲ ἐλαττον, καὶ οὐτω μεῖζον ἄν καὶ ἐλαττον εἴη 151 
αὐτὸ εαυτοῦ Τὸ "Ἐν. εἶη γὰρ ἄν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε 
ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς Τοῦ Ἐνὸς τε καὶ Τῶν 
Ἀλλων. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἀλλὰ μήν καὶ εἶναι που δεὶ 
τὸ γε ἄν αἰ. ναὶ. οὐκοῦν τὸ γε ἐν τῷ ὅν ἐν 
μεῖζον ἐσται ἐλαττον ὃν; οὐ γὰρ ἄν Ἀλλως ἔτερον 
ἐν ἐτέρῳ εἴη. οὐ γὰρ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐτερόν 
ἐστι χωρίς Τῶν Ἀλλων καὶ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς, δεὶ δὲ αὐτὰ 
ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἦδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, Τά 
τε Ἀλλα ἐν Τῷ Ἐνὶ καὶ Τὸ "Ἐν ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις, 
ἡ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι; φαίνεται. ὅτι μὲν ἄρα Τὸ "Ἐν 
ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις ἐνεστὶ, μεῖζω ἄν εἴη Τά Ἀλλα Τοῦ 
Ἐνὸς, περιέχοντα αὐτὸ, Τὸ δὲ "Ἐν ἐλαττον Τῶν.
"Αλλων, περιεχόμενον ὃτι δὲ ῾ῌλλα ἐν Τῷ Ἐνί, ῾ῌλλων κατὰ τὸν ἄυτὸν λόγον μειζόν ἀν εἴη, ῾ῌλλα ῾ῌλλον Ἐνὸς ἑλάττω. ἐσικεύ. ῾ῌλλων ἀρα ἴσον τε καὶ μειζόν καὶ ἑλλατόν ἐστὶν αὑτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ῾ῌλλων. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μειζόν καὶ ἑλλατόν καὶ ἴσον, ἴσον ἄν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἑλλατόνων αὐτῷ καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν. πῶς δ’ οὖ; ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων δν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἑλλατόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἑλλατον ἄν καὶ πλέον εἴη αὑτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ Τόν Ἀλλων, καὶ ἴσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις κατὰ ταυτά. πῶς; ὃνπερ μειζόν ἐστὶ, πλειόνων πον καὶ μέτρων ἄν εἴη αὐτῶν ὁσον δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν καὶ ἴσον ἑλλατόν, ὡσάυτως καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταυτά. οὔτως. οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μειζόν καὶ ἑλλατόν δν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἄν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἑλλατόνων αὐτῷ ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν; πῶς δ’ οὖ; ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν δν αὐτῷ ἴσον ἄν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλέον, ἑλλατόνων δὲ ἑλλατον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ. φαίνεται. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς Τᾶλλα ὡσάυτως ἔξει ῾ῌλλων ὃτι μὲν μειζόν αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν. ὃτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἑλλατον, ὃτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι Τοῖς Ἀλλοις; ἀνάγκη. οὔτω δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἐοικε, ῾ῌλλον καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλέον καὶ ἑλλατόν τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ ἐσται καὶ Τόν Ἀλλων. ἐσται. (9) ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει ῾ῌλλων Ἐν, καὶ ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ Τόν Ἀλλων, καὶ οὕτω νεώτερον οὕτω πρεσβύτερον οὕτω ἑαυτοῦ οὕτω Τῶν Ἀλλων, χρόνου μετέχον; πῶς;
εἶναι μὲν ποὺ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἐν ἐστὶν. ναὶ.
tὸ δὲ εἶναι ἀλλο τὶ ἐστὶν ἣ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ
χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὡςπέρ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρε-
ληθύθοτος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος
οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία; ἐστὶ γὰρ, μετέχει μὲν ἄρα
χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. πάνυ γε. οὐκὼν
πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; ναὶ. αὖ ἄρα πρεσβύτε-
ρον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον.
ἀνάγκη. ἄρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα, ὅτι νεωτέρου γι-
γνωμένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται;
μεμνήμεθα. οὐκὼν ἐπειδή πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἂ
γίγνεται Τὸ Ἔν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνωμένου ἑαυτοῦ
πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο; ἀνάγκη. γίγνεται μὲν δὴ
νεωτέρον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτοῦ οὕτως. ναὶ.
ἐστὶ δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἄρ' οὖν ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν
χρόνον ἢ γιγνωμένον, τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ
ἐσται; οὐ γάρ ποὺ πορευομένον γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ
eἰς τὸ ἐπείτα ὑπερβῆσται τὸ νῦν. οὐ γάρ. ἄρ'
οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον,
ἐπειδὰν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχῃ, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται ἂλλ' ἐστὶ
tὸ ἄδη πρεσβύτερον; προὶ ἄρ' οὖν ἂν ποτὲ
ληφθεὶ τὸν τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γάρ προὶ οὕτως ἔχει
ὡς ἀμφότερων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τέ νῦν καὶ τοῦ
ἐπείτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δ' ἐπείτα ἐπιλαμ-
βανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφότερων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τέ
ἐπείτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν. ἀληθῆ. εἰ δὲ γε ἂνάγκη μὴ
παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πάν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὰν κατὰ
tοῦτο ἢ, ἐπίσχει αὖ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐστὶ τότε
tοῦτο ὅ ἄν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐστὶ τότε πρεσβύ-

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τερον. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκόν μισέρ εγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτων καὶ ἐστών· εγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ; ναὶ. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρον πρεσβύτερον; ἐστιν. καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἔννυ. ἀνάγκη. τὸ γε μὴν νῦν ἂεὶ πάρεστι Τῷ Ἐν πιὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἂεὶ νῦν ὀταντερ ὑ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἂεὶ ἄρα ἐστὶν τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον Τῷ Ἐν. ἐοικεν. πλείω δὲ χρόνων αὐτὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ γίγνεται, ἡ τὸν ἰσον; τὸν ἰσον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε ἰσον χρόνον ἡ γιγνόμενον ἡ δι τὴν αὐτήν ἡλικίαν ἔχει. πῶς δ’ οὔ; τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτήν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν. οὔ γάρ. Τῷ Ἐν ἄρα τὸν ἰσον χρόνων αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὅν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ ἐστὶν οὔδὲ γίγνεται. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. τί δὲ; Τῶν Ἀλλῶν; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, οὕτι Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, εἰπέρ ἐτερά ἐστιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐτερον, πλειώ ἐστιν ἑνός. ἐτερον μὲν γὰρ ὧν ἐν ἀν ἦν, ἐτερα δὲ ὅντα πλεῖον ἑνός ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος ἀν ἔχου. ἔχου γὰρ ἄν. πλῆθος δὲ ὧν ἀριθμοῦ πλεῖονος ἀν μετέχου ἡ Τοῦ Ἐνός. πῶς δ’ οὔ; τί οὔν; ἀριθμοῦ φησόμεν τὰ. πλεῖον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἡ τὰ ἐλάττω; τὰ ἐλάττω. τὸ ὀλέγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον. τὸ τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ Τῷ Ἐν. ἡ γάρ; ναὶ. πάντων ἄρα Τῷ Ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐχόντων. ἔχει δὲ καὶ Τάλλα πάντα ἀριθμῶν, εἰπέρ ἂλλα καὶ μὴ ἀλλο ἐστίν. ἔχει γὰρ. πρῶτον δὲ γε, οἷμαι, γεγονός πρότερον γέγονε, Τὰ δὲ "Ἀλλα ὑστερον" τὰ δ’ ὑστερον γεγονότα νεωτέρα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος.
καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἰη Τάλλα νεώτερα Τοῦ Ἐνός, Τὸ δὲ Ἐν πρεσβύτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων. εἰη γὰρ ἂν, τί δὲ τόδε; ἄρ’ ἂν εἰη Ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἡ ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη ἐργεῖν οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἄρχη γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ Τοῦ Ἐνός καὶ ἐκάστου Τῶν Ἀλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἄρχην καὶ τάλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; τί μὴν; καὶ μὴν μόρια γε φήσομεν ταῦτ’ εἶναι πάντα Τάλλα Τοῦ Ὁλου τε καὶ Ἐνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἑκείνῳ ἀμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον. φήσομεν γάρ. τελευτῇ δὲ οἶμαι γε ὑστατον γίγνεται τοῦτῳ δ’ ἀμα Ἐν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι. ὅστ’ εἰπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ Ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτὸ τῇ τελευτῇ ἄριστον ἄν γεγονός ὑστατον ἄν Τῶν Ἀλλων πεφυκός εἰη γίγνεσθαι. φαῖνεται. νεώτερον ἀρὰ Τῶν Ἀλλων Ἐν ἐστι, Ἐν ἐστι, Ἐν ὁ Ἀλλὰ Τοῦ Ἐνός πρεσβύτερα. οὕτως αὐθ’ οὐκοῦν φαῖνεται. τί δὲ δή; ἄρχην ἡ ἄλλο μέρος ὅτιοῦν Τοῦ Ἐνός ἡ ἄλλον ὅτονοιν, ἄντερ μέρος ἡ ἄλλα μὴ μέρη. οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἰν εἰναί, μέρος γε ὑν’ ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν Ἐν ἀμα τῇ πρῶτῳ γίγνεσθαι γίγνοντ’ ἂν καὶ εἰ ἄμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γίγνομενων, ὥς τι περ ἄν προσγίγνηται ὅτιοῦν, ἔως ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐσχατον διελθον ὅλον ἐν γένεται, οὐτε μέσου οὔτε πρῶτων οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθέν ἐν τῇ γενέσει. ἀληθῆ. πᾶσιν ἀρα Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς τὴν αὐτὴν ἥλικιαν ἰσχεῖ Ἐν. ὅστ’ εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ Ἐν, οὔτε πρώτερον οὔθ’ ὑστερον Τῶν Ἀλλων γεγονός ἂν εἰη, ἄλλ’ ἀμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τοῦ λόγου Ἐν Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων 154
οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἄν εἰη, οὐδὲ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ Τάλλα ἐκείνου ὁσαύτως. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεώτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων καὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἀρα ὦστερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὔτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἐξε, ἢ ἐτέρως; οὐκ ἔχω λέγεων. ἀλλ' ἔγὼ τοσόνδε γε, ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστι πρεσβύτερον ἐτέρον ἐτέρον, γίγνεσθαι τε αὐτῷ πρεσβύτερον ἐτί, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς γενόμενον διήγεγκῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύνατο, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὃν ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι ἀνίσοις γὰρ Ἰσα προστιθῆμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτιών, ἵσω ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἂεὶ ὀσφύερ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ. πῶς γὰρ οὖ; οὐκ ἀρα τὸ γε ὃν τοῦ ὄντος γίγνοντ' ἂν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἵσω διαφέρει ἂεὶ τήν ἡλικίαν ἄλλ' ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ' οὖ. ἀληθῆ. καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἀρα ὃν Τῶν Ἀλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ὃρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται. πῇ δῇ; ἦ Τὸ τε Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός. τί οὖν; ὅταν Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων πρεσβύτερον ἦ, πλείω ποὺ χρόνον γέγονεν ἦ Τὰ Ἀλλα. ναί. πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέον καὶ ἐλάττων χρόνῳ προστιθομέν τὸν ἵσον χρόνον, ἄρα τῷ ἵσῳ μορίῳ διώσει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἦ σμικροτέρῳ; σμικροτέρῳ. οὐκ ἀρα ἔσται, ἤ τι περ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς Τάλλα ἡλικία διαφέρον Τὸ Ἐν, τούτο καὶ
eis tò èpeita, alla istor larnbánov xronon Toîs Ἄλλων ἐλαττων ἀεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἥ προτερον ἡ οὐ; ναί. οὐκοῦν τὸ γε ἐλαττων διαφέρον ἡλικίᾳ πρὸς τῇ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ’ ἢν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκείνα, πρὸς ἢν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον; νεώτερον. εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκείνα αὐ̂̂ Tάλλα πρὸς Tὸ Ἔν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον; πάνω γε. τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἅρα γεγονός πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὡν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἂεὶ ἐκεῖνο πρεσβύτερον ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσι, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δ᾽ αὐ̂̂ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γύ̄ 155 γνεται ὡσαύτως. ἱόντε γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθων, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβύτερου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἄν οὐ̇̂ καὶ νεώτερα: Tὸ μὲν Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὡν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός, Τὰ δὲ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ὑστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων καὶ Τάλλα οὐ̇̂ τὸ πρὸς Τὸ Ἐν ἵσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα. φαίνεται γὰρ οὐ̄̂ ὡτις. οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν οὐ̇̂ άτερον ἐτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐ̄̂ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἵσχα ἀριθμὸ ἀλλήλων ἂεὶ διαφέρειν, οὐ̇̂ τοῦ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ’ ἢν οὐ̇̂ νεώτερον, οὐ̇̂ Tάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς: ἢ δὲ Ἄλλω ἂεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν υστερῶν γενόμενα καὶ τὰ c
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

υστερα των προτερων, ταυτη δη αναγκη πρεσβυτερα
tε και νεωτερα άλληλων γίγνεσθαι Τα τε Ἀλλα Τοῦ
Ἐνδε καὶ Τὸ Ἕν Τῶν Ἀλλῶν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, κατὰ
dη πάντα ταύτα Τὸ Ἕν αυτό τε αυτοῦ καὶ Τῶν
Ἀλλῶν πρεσβυτερον και νεώτερον ἐστι τε καὶ γίγνε-
tαι, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβυτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ' ἐστιν
οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν Ἀλλῶν. παντελῶς
μὲν οὖν. ἑπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει Τὸ Ἕν καὶ τοῦ
α πρεσβυτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἃρ' οὖκ
ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἐπειτα καὶ
tοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; ἀνάγκη. ἦν ἀρα
Τὸ Ἕν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται
καὶ γενησται. τὶ μή; καὶ εἰ ἂν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ
ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. πάνυ γε. καὶ
ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἰθ ἂν αυτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἰσθησις,
eἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμείς περὶ αυτοῦ πάντα ταύτα πράτ-
tομεν. ὅρθως λέγεις. καὶ ὅνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος
ἔστιν αυτῷ, καὶ ὅνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται καὶ ὀσαπερ
καὶ περὶ Τὰ Ἀλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει οὖντα,
cαὶ περὶ Τὸ Ἕν ἔστιν. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει
ὀυτως.

ἐτι δη τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. (1) Τὸ Ἕν εἰ ἔστιν
οίου διεληλύθαμεν, ἃρ' οὖκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ, ἐν τε δὲ
καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μὴτε ἐν μὴτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχουν
χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι
δ' οὖν ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτὲ οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη.
ἀρ' οὖν ὅτε μετέχει, οίον τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν,
ἡ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν; οὐχ οἴον τε. ἐν Ἀλλῷ
ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν Ἀλλῷ οὐ μετέχει οὐτῶ
γὰρ ἄν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι.

156 ὅρθως. οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὕτος χρόνος ὅτε μεταλαμ-
βάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἃ πῶς οἱ οἱ τε ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μὴ ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτό καὶ ἄφη; οὐδαμῶς. τὸ δὲ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἄρ' οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; ἐγγυε. τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἄρ' οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; καὶ πάνυ γε. Τὸ Ἕν δὴ, ὡς ἐοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφίεν οὐσίαν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται. ἀνάγκη. (2) ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὄν, καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ἄρ' οὐχ, ἂν ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἐν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλά, τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε. ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλή γε. καὶ μὴν ἀνόμωιον γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὅμοιούσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιούσθαι; ναί. καὶ ὅταν μείζον καὶ ἐλαττὸν καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἴσον, καὶ ὅταν ἔστος ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δή ποι αὐτό γε μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. πῶς δὴ; ἐστὸς τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἔστάναι, ἀνεν μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἰόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν. πῶς γὰρ; χρόνος δὲ γε οδύεις ἐστιν, ἐν δὲ τοί οἴσιν τε ἁμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήθ' ἐστάναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἀλλ' οὗτοι καὶ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἀνεν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν. οὐκ εἰκός. πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς ἀν οὔτε κινοῦμενον μεταβάλλειν, οὔτ' ἐν χρόνῳ οὖν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τούτο, ἐν δὲ τῶν ἂν εἴη, οὔτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποίον δὴ; τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τούτῳ τι ἐοικε σημαίνει, ὡς έξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἐκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι

(2) in which, it admits of neither contrary.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

ἐστώτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐξαίφνησ αὐτὴ φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ αὐτῆς, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὔσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὸ τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι. κινδυνεύει. καὶ Τὸ Ἔν δὴ, εἶτε ἐστηκεῖ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἄν ἐφ’ ἐκάτερα· μόνως γὰρ ἄν οὕτως ἀμφότερα ποιεῖ· μεταβάλλον δ’ ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἄν εἰ, οὐδὲ κινοῦ’ ἄν τότε, οὐδ’ ἄν σταίῃ. οὐ γὰρ. ἄρ’ οὖν οὔτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἕκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξὺ των τότε γίγνεται κινήσεων τε καὶ στάσεως, καὶ οὔτε ἐστὶ τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἐστὶ, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; ἐοικε γοὺν. κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ εἷς ἐνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰδον καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ’ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἑστὶν οὔτε πολλὰ, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ εἷς ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμου καὶ εἷς ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὁμοίου ἰδὸν οὔτε ὁμοίου ο变压ομοίου, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον.

καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἱσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἑναντία ἰδον οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἵσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε θύμον οὔτε ἵσομενον εἰθ’ ἂν. οὖκ ἐοικε. ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ’ ἀν πάσχου τὸ Ἔν, εἰ ἑστιν. πῶς δ’ οὐ;

τί δὲ Τοῦς Ἀλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, Ἐν εἰ ἑστιν, ἄρα οὐ σκεπτέον; σκεπτέον. (1) λέγωμεν δὴ, ἐν εἰ ἑστι, Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς τὶ χρὴ πεπονθῆναι; λέγωμεν. οὕκοιν ἐπεῖπερ ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἑστιν, οὔτε τὸ Ἐν ἑστιν Τάλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

admit con-
trary pre-
dicates.
(1) If the
One exist,
Τάλλα
will not be
one; but
(2) Τάλλα
cannot be
altogether
uncon-
ected with
the One,
but
(3) will
bear to it
the relation
of Fra-
cntional
Parts to an
Integral
Whole;
and in the
same way
(4) each
Part is
related to
Unity as
the Parts
of the
Whole are
related to
Unity;
and, there-
fore,

(5) as
Τάλλα
both in the
Whole and
in the Parts
cannot be
Unity,
Τάλλα,
when con-
sidered
alone, can
only have
the relation
of In-
definite

ἡν. ὀρθῶς. (2) οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεται γε παντάπασι ὁ
Τοῦ Ἐνός Τάλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει τη. πὴ δή; (3) ὅτι
ποῦ Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός μόρια ἔχοντα ἀλλὰ ἐστὶν
εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχου, παντελῶς ἀν ἐν ἐη. ὀρθῶς.
(4) μόρια δὲ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἀν ὅλον ἂ.
φαμέν γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε ὅλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν
ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἐσται μόρια τὰ μόρια. ἐκαστον
γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριων χρή εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
δόλου. πῶς τοῦτο; εἰ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς
αὐτὸ εἶη, ἐαυτοῦ τε δὴ που μόριον ἐσται, ὁ ἐστιν ἀ
ἀδύνατον, καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων δή ἔνος ἐκαστον, εἴπερ
καὶ πάντως. ἔνος γὰρ μὴ ὃν μόριον, πλὴν τοῦτον
Τῶν Ἀλλων ἐσται, καὶ οὔτως ἔνος ἐκαστον οὐκ ἐσται
μόριον, μὴ ὃν δὲ μόριον ἐκάστον οὔθεδος τῶν
πολλῶν ἐσταιν. μηδενὸς δὲ ὃν πάντων τούτων τι
εἰναι, δὲν οὔθεδος οὔθεδεν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο
ὅτιον ἀδύνατον εἶναι. φαίνεται γε δή. οὐκ ἄρα
τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριων, ἀλλὰ
μᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἔνος τινος, ὃ καλοῦμεν δόλων, ε
ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἀν
τὸ μόριον εἴη. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἄρα Τάλλα
μόρια ἔχει, καὶ Τοῦ Ὀλοῦ τε καὶ Ἐνός μετέχοι. πάνυ
γε. ἐν ἄρα ὅλου τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι
Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός. ἀνάγκη. (5) καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ
τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστον ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ γὰρ
τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν Τοῦ Ἐνός. εἰ γὰρ ἐκάστον
αὐτῶν μόριών ἐστι, τὸ γε ἐκαστον εἶναι ἐν δὴ που
σημαίνει, ἀφορμισμένον μὲν Τῶν Ἀλλων, καθ’ αὐτὸ
δὲ ὅν, εἴπερ ἐκαστον ἐσται. ὀρθῶς. μετέχοι δὲ γε
ἀν Τοῦ Ἐνός δῇλον ὃτι ἄλλο ὅν ἂ ἐν’ οὐ γὰρ ἂν
μετείχαν, ἄλλ’ ἢν ἂν αὐτὸ ἐν’ νῦν δὲ ἐν’ μὲν εἶναι
πλήν αὐτῷ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀδώνατον που. ἀδώνατον. μετέχειν δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὀλῷ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὠλὸν ἔσται, ὡσ μόρια τὰ μόρια τὸ δ' αὖ ἐκαστὸν ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὠλοῦ, οὐ ἃν ἢ μόριον

ὅλου. οὕτως. (6) οὐκοῦν ἐτερα ὑντα Τῷ Ἐνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχουσα αὐτοῦ; πῶς ἰ' οὐ; τὰ δ' ἐτερα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς πολλά που ἃν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ μηθ' ἐν μηθ' ἐνὸς πλείω εἴη Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς, οὐδὲν ἃν εἴη. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλεῖω ἔνὸς ἐστὶ τὰ τε Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μορίου καὶ Τα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὠλοῦ μετέχουσα, οὖκ ἀνάγκη ἢδη πλήθει ἀπειρα εἶναι αὐτὰ ἅ γε ἑκεῖνα τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς; πῶς; ὡδε ἵδωμεν. ἀλλο τι οὐχ ἐν οὖντα οὐδὲ μετέχουσα τοῦ ἔνὸς τότε,

ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει; δῆλα δή. οὐκοῦν πλήθη οὔντα, ἐν οἷς Τῷ Ἐν οὐκ ἔνι; πλήθη μέντοι. τι οὖν; εἰ ἐθελομεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἄφελειν ὡς οἷοι τέ ἐσμεν ὃ τι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρέθην ἑκεῖνο, εἰπερ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μὴ μετέχου, πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ οὖχ ἐν; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν οὕτως αἰει σκοποῦντι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους, ὡςον ἃν αὐτής αἰε ὀρῶμεν, ἀπειρον ἑσται πλήθει; παντάπασι μεν οὖν. καὶ

μὴν ἐπειδὰν γε ἐν ἑκαστὸν μόριον μόριον γένεται, πέρας ἢδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὠλον, καὶ τὸ ὠλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς δὴ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἐμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς καὶ εξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἐσκε, ἐτερὸν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα' ἢ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν. φαίνεται. οὕτω δὴ Τὰ Ἀλλα. Τοῦ Ἐνὸς καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἀπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει.
Τάλλα will admit of the opposite predicates of Similarity and Dissimilarity, and of the other modes of Quality above enumerated.

Ούκοιν ταύτα μὲν ἢδη ἑώμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἐν εἰ ἑστιν, ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὔτως ἐχει Τά Ἀλλα Τοῦ 'Ενός ἢ οὔτω μόνον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Λέγωμεν δὴ εἰς ἀρχὴς, ἐν εἰ ἑστι, τὶ χρη Τά Ἀλλα Τοῦ 'Ενός πεποθέναι. Λέγωμεν γάρ. (1) ἃρ' οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων, χωρὶς δὲ Τάλλα Τοῦ 'Ενός εἶναι; τὶ δὴ; ὅτι που οὐκ ἑστι παρὰ ταύτα ἑτερον, ὁ ἄλλο μὲν ἑστι Τοῦ 'Ενός, ἄλλο δὲ Τῶν Ἀλλων. πάντα γὰρ εἰρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῇ Τὸ τε Ἐν καὶ Τάλλα. πάντα γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐτ' ἑστιν ἑτερον τούτων, ἐν δὲ Τὸ τε Ἐν ἂν εἰη τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ Τάλλα. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲποτε ἄρα ἐν ταύτῳ ἑστὶ Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τάλλα. οὐκ ἑικεν. χωρὶς ἄρα; ναί.

(V.) The Fifth Hypothesis: ἐν εἰ ἑστί: the effect of the existence of the One on Τάλλα further considered, i.e., Τάλλα owe their contrary and all other predicates to Τὸ Ἐν.

(1) If Τάλλα be distinct from the One, and if
(2) οὐδὲ μὴν μόρια γε ἔχειν φαμέν Τὸ ὡς ἄληθῶς ἐν. πῶς γάρ; οὔτ' ἀρα ὅλον εἰη ἄν Τὸ Ἐν ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τε ἔστι Τῶν Ἀλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχειν. πῶς γάρ; οὔδενι ἀρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἄν Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, μὴτε κατὰ μόριον τι αὐτοῦ μὴτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα. οὐκ ἐσιμεν. οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἐν Τάλλα ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἔχει ἐν ἐαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδέν. οὐ γάρ οὖν. οὔτ' ἀρα πολλά ἐστι Τάλλα. ἐν γάρ ἄν ἦν ἐκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλον, εἰ πολλά ἦν τοῖς ὅλον οὔτε μόρια ἐστι Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει. ὅρθως. (3) οὔτ' ἀρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι Τά Ἀλλα οὔτε ἐνεστω ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ Τοῦ Ἐνός πανταχῇ στέρεται. οὔτως.

(4) οὐδὲ ὁμοία ἄρα καὶ ἁνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι Τῷ Ἐν Τάλλα, οὔτε ἐνεστῶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίότης καὶ ἁνομοίότης. εἰ γάρ ὁμοία καὶ ἁνόμοια αὐτὰ ἐη ἦν ἔχοι ἐν ἐαυτοῖς ὁμοίότητα καὶ ἁνομοίότητα, δύο που εἰδὴ ἐναντία ἄλληλοις ἔχοι ἄν ἐν ἐαυτοῖς Τά Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός. φαίνεται. ἦν δὲ γε ἄδυνατον δυοῦν τινῶν μετέχειν ἃ μηδ' ἔνος μετέχοι. ἄδυνατον. οὔτ' ἀρα ὁμοία οὔτ' ἁνόμοια ἐστιν οὔτ' ἁμφότερα.
εφάνη μετέχειν, Τοῦ Ἔνος γε πάντη πάντως απορρημένοις. ἀληθεστατα. οὔτω δὴ ἐν εἰ ἐστὶ, πάντα τέ ἐστι Τὸ Ἔν καὶ οὐδέν ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς Τὰ Ἀλλα ὡσαύτως. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

εἶν' εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἐστὶ Τὸ Ἔν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἄρ' οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ ταῦτα; σκεπτέον γάρ. τίς οὖν ἂν εἰη αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν μὴ ἐστὶ; ἀρα τι διαφέρει τῆςδε, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἐστὶ; διαφέρει μὲντοι, διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐστὶν εἰσείν, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἐστὶ, τοῦ εἰ ἐν μὴ ἐστὶ; πᾶν τοῦναντίον. τί δ' εἰ τις λέγοι, εἰ Μέγεθος μὴ ἐστὶν ἢ Σμικρότης μὴ ἐστὶν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἀρα ἔφ' ἐκάστου ἄν δηλοὶ, ὅτι ἐτερὸν τι λέγοι τῷ μὴ ὦν; πάνυ γε. οὐκούν καὶ νῦν δηλοὶ, ὅτι ἐτερον λέγει Τῶν Ἀλλων τῷ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν ἐιπη ἐν εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἴσμεν ὅ λέγει; ἴσμεν. πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστὸν τι λέγει, ἐπείτα ἐτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἰπη ἐν, εἰτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθέθης εἰτε τῷ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον γιγανώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, ἢ καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὔ; ἀνάγκη.

(Β) Τhe negative argument. The meaning of Negation: Negation implies knowledge and difference.

(1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὥς ἐοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅ τι λέγεται γιγανώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἰπη ἐν εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν. ἀληθῆ. (2) οὐκοῦν καὶ Τὰ Ἀλλα ἐτερ' αὐτῷ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκείνῳ ἐτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων λέγεσθαι; πάνυ γε. καὶ ἐτεροιότητι ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν Τῶν Ἀλλων ἐτεροιότητα λέγει, ὅταν Τὸ Ἔν ἐτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων λέγῃ, ἄλλα εὐ τὴν ἐκείνου. φαίνεται. (3) καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου

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καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτως καὶ τούτως καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὑν ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Τὸ Ἐν ἑλέγετο οὔτε ἄν Τὸῦ Ἐνὸς ἔτερα, οὔτε ἐκεῖνῳ ἂν τι ἢν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνῳ, οὔτε ἂν τι ἑλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετήν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τοιύτων. ὅρθως. εἶναι μὲν δὴ Τὸ Ἐν ὁθι οὐχ οἷον τε, εἴπερ 161 γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἄλλα καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ Τὸ γε Ἐν ἑκεῖνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε Τὸ Ἐν μὴ ἑκεῖνῳ μὴ ἔσται, ἄλλα περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδὲν. εἰ δὲ Τὸ Ἐν ἑκεῖνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἑκεῖνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετείναι. καὶ πάνυ γε. (4) καὶ Ἀνομοιότης ἃρ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. Τὰ γὰρ Ἀλλα, Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἔτερα ὀντα, ἔτεροια καὶ εἰη ἂν. ναί. τὰ δ' ἔτεροια οὐκ ἄλλοια; τῶς δ' ὅποις οὕτως τὰ δ' ἄλλοια οὐκ ἀνόμοια; ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ Τὸ Ἐν ἀνόμοια ἔστιν, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίω τὰ γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἰη, δῆλον. εἰη δὴ ἂν καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἂν Τὰ Ἀλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἔστιν. ἔοικεν. εἰ δὲ δὴ Τῶν Ἀλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ, ἃρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕαυτοι οἰκονομίατα αὐτῷ εἶναι; πῶς; εἰ ἐνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν, οὐκ ἂν ποιη τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἰη οἷον Τοῦ Ἐνὸς, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἰη περὶ ἐνός, ἄλλα περὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐνός. πάνυ γε. οὐ c δεῖ δὲ γε. οὐ δὴτα. δεῖ ἃρ' οἰκονομίτης Τὸ Ἐν ἐν αὐτῷ ἕαυτῷ εἶναι. δεί. (5) καὶ μὴ οὖν ἂν Ισον ἔστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἰη Ἰσον, εἰη τε ἂν ηθη καὶ ὁμοιον ἂν εἰη αὐτοὶς κατὰ τὴν ἰσοτήτα: ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα ἄδικα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἐν. ἄδικα.
έπειδή δὲ οὔκ ἦστι Τόις Ἀλλοις ἵσον, ἃρ' οὔκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τάλλη ἐκεῖνη μὴ ἵσα εἶναι; ἀνάγκη.
τὰ δὲ μὴ ἵσα οὔκ ἀνίσα; ναί. τὰ δὲ ἀνίσα οὖν 
Τῷ Ἀνίσῳ ἀνίσα; πῶς δ' οὖ; καὶ Ἀνίσοτητος δὴ 
μετέχει Τῷ Ἐν, πρὸς ἣν Τάλλη αὐτῷ ἦστιν ἀνίσα; 
ἀλλὰ μέντοι Ἀνισοτήτος γ' ἦστι Μέγεθος 
καὶ Σμικρότης. ἦστι γάρ. ἦστιν ἄρα καὶ 
Μέγεθος καὶ Σμικρότης ἂεὶ ἀφέστατον 
ἀλλήλου. πάνω γε. μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτῶν ἂεὶ 
ἔστιν. ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ 
αὐτῶν ἣ Ἰσότητα; οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. ὅτι ἃρα ἦστι 
Μέγεθος καὶ Σμικρότης, ἦστι καὶ Ἰσότης αὐτῷ, 
μεταξὺ τοῦτον οὕσα. φαίνεται. 
(6) of Existence, and, therefore,
therefore, Μέγεθος καὶ Σμικρότης. έοικεν. (6) καὶ μὴ 
καὶ οὕσιας γε δεὶ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πη. πῶς δὴ; ἔχειν 
αὐτὸ δεὶ οὕτως ὅσ λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοι, 
οὐκ ἄν ἀληθή λέγουμεν ἥμεις λέγοντες Τῷ Ἐν μὴ 
εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὦτι οὔτα αὐτὰ λέγομεν 
ἡ οὔχ οὕτως; οὕτω μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδή δὲ φαμεν 
ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἥμιν φάναι καὶ οὔντα λέγειν. 
ἀνάγκη. ἦστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, Τῷ Ἐν οὔκ ὦν. εἰ 162 
γὰρ μὴ ἦσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τι τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς 
τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὑρίσκει ἦσται ὄν. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 
δεὶ ἃρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι 
μὴ ὄν, εὶ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὄσπερ τὸ, ὄν 
tο μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἢν τελέως αὖ εἶναι ἢ. 
οὕτως γὰρ ἃν τὸ τε ὄν μάλιστ' ἂν εἰ ἦ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν 
οὐκ ἂν εἰ, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὕσιας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, 
μὴ οὕσιας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως ฿
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὅν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὅν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν αὖ τελέως μὴ ἑσται. ἀληθέστατα. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ τῷ τε ὅντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὅντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ Τῷ Ἐν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετείναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι. ἀνάγκη, καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται Τῷ Ἐν, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἀρα, εἰπέρ μὴ ἔστιν. πῶς δ' οὐ;

(7) οἶδ' τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὖτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἔξως; οὐχ οἶδ' τε. πάντως ἀρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολήν σημαίνει, ὅ ἐν οὖτω τε καὶ μὴ οὖτως ἔχη. πῶς δ' οὐ; μεταβολή δὲ κύνησις, ἥ τι φήσομεν; κύνησις. οὐκοῦν Τὸ Ἐν ὅν τε καὶ οὐκ ὅν ἑφάνη; ναί. οὕτως ἀρα καὶ οὖν οὔτως ἔχον φαίνεται. ἐοικεν. καὶ κινούμενον ἀρα τὸ οὐκ ὅν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπείπερ καὶ μεταβολήν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον. κινδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν οὖτων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰπέρ μὴ ἔστιν, οὖδ' ἀν μεθύσατο ποθέν ποι. πῶς γάρ; οὐκ ἁρὰ τῷ γε μεταβάινειν κινοῖτ' ἂν. οὐ
d' γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν στρέφοιτο· ταῦτοι γάρ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπτεται. ὁν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ταῦτόν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅν ἐν τῷ τῶν οὕτων ἀδύνατον εἶναι. ἀδύνατον γάρ. οὐκ ἁρὰ Τὸ Ἐν μὴ ὅν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύνατο ἐν ἑκεῖνῳ ἐν ὧ μὴ ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ οὖν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται ποιν Τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ δὲ ὅν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὅν. οὐ γάρ ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἐτι περὶ Τοῦ Ἐνός, εἰπέρ ἢλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἄλλα περὶ ἢλλον τινός. ὀρθῶς. εἰ δὲ μὴν ἢλλοιοῦται μῆτε ἐν ταὐτῷ στρέ-

ο φεται μῆτε μεταβαίνει, ἃρ' ἂν πη ἐτι κινοῖτο; πῶς
gάρ; τὸ γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἥσυχιαν ἀγεων;

(7) of transition from its essence, Non-existence, to its accident, Existence, and, therefore,
(8) of all the other predicates of modification, Motion, and Production in either direction.

(VII.) The Seventh Hypothesis: ὄστις ἐὰν τὰ καὶ τὸν ἐπερ ἥμισυ 

αὐτὸν 

τὸ ἀρχὴν ὠμοιούσις, ὅπως ἰσοκεν, οὐκ ἐν ἐπτηκε τε καὶ κυνεῖται. ἐοικεν.

(8) καὶ μὴν ἐπερ γε κυνεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. ὅπερ γὰρ ἂν τι κυνηθῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκέθ᾽ ὡσαυτῶς ἔχει ὡς εἰχεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐτέρως. οὔτως. κινεύμενον δὴ Τὸ Ἅν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται. ναὶ. καὶ μὴν μηδαμὴ γε κινοῦμενον οὔδαμὴ ἄν ἀλλοιοῦται. οὔ γάρ. ἢ μὲν ἀρα κυνεῖται τὸ οὐκ ἄν, ἀλλοιοῦται. ἢ δὲ μὴ κυνεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται. οὐ γάρ. Τὸ Ἅν ἀρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται. χαίνεται. τὸ δ ἀλλοιοῦμενον ἃρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἐτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐξεώς. τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦμενον μήτε ἡ γίγνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι; ἀνάγκη. καὶ Τὸ Ἅν ἀρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιοῦμενον μὲν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιοῦμενον δὲ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται καὶ οὔτω Τὸ Ἅν μὴ ὄν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται. οὐ γάρ οὖν.

αὖθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὠμοιοւσι πάλιν, ὡφόμενοι εἰ ταυτὰ ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἀπερ καὶ νῦν, ἦ ἐτερα. ἀλλὰ χρή. ούκοιν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἐστι, φαμεν, τὶ χρὴ σε περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐξιμβαίνει; ναὶ. (1) τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἃρα μὴ τί ἄλλο σημαινει ὡς συσίας ἀποσύσιαν τούτῳ ὃ ἂν φώμεν μὴ εἴναι; οὔδεν ἄλλο. πρίτην ὁτίν, ὅταν φώμεν μὴ εἴναι τι, πῶς ὁκ εἴναι ψαμεν αὐτό, πῶς δὲ εἴναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἐστὶ λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμὴ ἐστὶν οὔδε τὴ μετέχει συσίας τὸ γε μὴ ὄν; ἀπλούστατα μὲν οὖν. οὔτε ἀρα εἴναι δύνατο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς σύσιας μετέχειν. οὐ γάρ. ἃ
(2) το δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ το ἀπολλυσθαι μὴ τι ἄλλο ἦ, ἦ το μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, το δ’ ἀπολλύσαι οὐσίαν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. δ’ ἐδὲ γε μηδὲν τοῦτον μέτεστιν, οὔτ’ ἄν λαμβάνοι οὔτ’ ἀπολλύοι αὐτό. πῶς γάρ; Τῷ Ἔνι ἁρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὐθ’ ἐκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμώς. εἰκός. οὔτ’ ἂρ’ ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ δὲν ἐν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπείπερ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας. οὐ δὲν ἐπείπερ οὔτε ἂρ’ ἀπόλλυται οὐδαμῇ ἦδη γὰρ ἄν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τοῦτο πάσχοιν. ἀληθῆ; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὔδε μὴν ἔσταναι φήσωμεν τὸ μηδαμὸν ὃν. τὸ γὰρ ἔστοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινὶ δεῖ ἀεὶ εἶναι. τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὔτω δὴ αὐτό μὴ δὲν μητὲ ποθ’ ἔστασιν μητε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν. μὴ γὰρ οὖν. (3) ἄλλα μὴν οὔθ’ ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν οὐντών. ἦδη γὰρ ἀν τοῦ μετέχον οὖντος οὐσίας μετέχοι. ἰδον. οὔτε ἁρα Μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης οὔτε ἴσοτης αὐτῷ ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ. (4) οὔδε μην Ὁμοιότης γε οὔδε Ἐπεροϊότης οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλα εἴη ἄν αὐτῷ. οὐ δὲν. τὰλα ἔστιν ὅπως ἰν εἰη αὐτῷ. εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι; οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔθ’ ἂρ’ ὁμοία οὔτε ἀνόμοια, οὔτε ταῦτα οὐθ’ ἐτερά ἐστιν αὐτῷ Τὰ Ἀλλα. οὐ γὰρ. (5) τὶ δὲ; τὸ ἐκεῖνον ἥ τὸ ἐκεῖνη, ἥ τὸ τί, ἥ το τοῦτο ἥ το τούτου, ἥ ἄλλου ἥ ἄλλω, ἥ ποτε ἢ ἐπείτα ἢ νῦν, ἢ ἐπιστῆμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἰσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὡς οὐντῶν περί τὸ μὴ δὲν ἔσται; οὐκ ἔσται. οὔτω δὴ ἐν οὐκ δὲν οὐκ ἔχει ποιεί οὐδαμῇ. οὔκουν δὴ ἐοικε γε οὐδαμῇ ἐχείν.

ἐτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, Τὰ Ἀλλα τὶ χρὴ (VIII.) The partake of Existence, and, therefore, (2) the non-existent. One cannot partake of any mode of Quality in the way of Production, Modification, Rest, or Motion, nor (3) of any mode of Quantity by way of Equality, Excess, or Defect, nor (4) of their results—Similarity or Diversity—and, (5) therefore, as a general conclusion the One, as non-existent, cannot exist in any possible way.
πέπονθέναι. λέγωμεν γάρ. (1) ἄλλα μὴν ποιν δεὶ ἀυτὰ ἐκεῖνοὶ εἰ γὰρ μὴ δὲ ἄλλα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀν περὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων λέγουτο. οὔτως. (2) εἰ δὲ περὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων ὁ λόγος, Τά γε Ἀλλα ἔτερα ἔστιν. ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς Τὸ τε Ἀλλο καὶ Τὸ Ἐτερον; ὁ ἐγώγε. ἔτερον δὲ γέ ποὺ φαμεν τὸ ἐτερον εἶναι ἔτερον, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου; ναί. καὶ Τοὺς Ἀλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἐστι τι οὐ ἄλλα ἐσται. ἀνάγκη. (3) τὶ δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ Ἐνὸς οὐκ ἐσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε. οὐ γάρ. ἄλληλων ἄρα ἐστι τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις. ὀρθώς. (4) κατὰ πλῆθη ἂρ' ἐκαστα ἄλληλων ἄλλα ἐστί. καθ' ἐν γάρ οὐκ ἂν οἷα τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἐνός ἄλλ' ἐκαστος, ὡς έσοκεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἀπειρός ἐστι πληθεί, καὶ ἂ τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβῃ τις, ὡσπερ ὅναρ ἐν ὑπνῷ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀνθ' ἐνός δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμμέγεθε πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ὀρθότατα. τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἄλληλων ἂν εἴη Τάλλα, εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν. κομμῆδη μὲν οὐν. οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἐσονται, εἰς ἐκαστος φαινόμενος, ὅν δὲ οὐ, εἰπὲ ἐν μὴ ἐσται; οὔτως. (5) καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι ε αὐτῶν δοξεῖ, εἰπὲ καὶ ἐν ἐκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων. πάνυ γε. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἰπὲ ἐν μὴ ἐσται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. (6) καὶ μὴ καὶ σμικροτάτων γε, φαμὲν, δοξεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ένείναι' φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἐκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρών ὄντων. πῶς δ' οὖ; καὶ ἰσος μὴν τῶς 165 πολλοὶ καὶ σμικροῖς ἐκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται
PARIPEIΩHΣ.

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eἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μεῖζονος εἰς ἑλπιττον
φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταέχη δόξεων ἐλθέων τούτο
δ' εἰη ἂν φάντασμα ἱσότητος. εἰκ. οὐκοῦν καὶ
πρὸς ἄλλον ὤγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτὸς γε πρὸς αὐτὸν
οὔτε ἄρχην οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων; τῇ δῇ;
ὅτι ἂει αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὡς τι
τούτων ὃν, πρὸ τε τῆς ἄρχης ἀλλή ἂει φαίνεται

b ἄρχη, μετὰ τε τὴν τελευτήν ἔτερα ὑπολειπομένη
tελευτῆ, ἐν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἀλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου,
σμικρότερα δὲ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνὸσ αὐτῶν
ἐκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἂτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνόσ.
ἁληθέστατα. θρύπτεσθαι δῇ, ὁμοι. κερματιζώ
μενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὃν, ὃ ἂν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ.
ὁγκος γὰρ ποῦ ἄνευ ἐνὸσ λαμβάνοιτ' ἄν. πάνω
μὲν οὖν. (7) οὐκοῦν τὸ γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν
c ὁρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλῦ ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν
δὲ καὶ ὃξν νουοῦντι πληθεὶς ἀπειρον ἐν ἐκαστὸν
φανῆαι, εἰπερ στέρεται Τοῦ ἕνος μὴ ὄντος;
ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν. οὖτω δῇ ἀπειρά τε καὶ
πέρας ἔχουται καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἐκάστα Τάλλα δὲ
φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστων, ἀλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνόσ. δὲ
γάρ. (8) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὂμοια τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει
eῖναι; πῇ δῇ; οὖν ἐσκιαγραφήμενα ἀποστάντι μὲν
ἐν πάντα φανομένα ταῦτην φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι
δ καὶ ὂμοια εἶναι. πάνυ γε. προσελθόντι δὲ γε
πολλὰ καὶ ἑτερα καὶ τοῦ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι
ἑτεροία καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς. οὖτως. (9) καὶ ὂμοίους
dῇ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτοὺς τε ἑαυτοῖς
ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλους. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ
ἀποτελεῖναι καὶ χωρίς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινούμενους
masses, and not as
genuine
pluralities;
and,
there-
fore,
(6) Number
and its
modes will
only have
an appa-
rent exist-
ence, and,
therefore,
(7) there
will be the
appearance
of a
Minimum,
which in
turn will
appear a
Majus as
contrasted
with a still
smaller
Minus, and
so on to
infinity;
hence,
(8) in the
absence of
real unity.
Unity will
be a mere
confused
view arising
from
imperfect
vision,
closer in-
spection
suggesting
an infinite
Minus as
before;
hence,
(9) Simi-
larly and
Dissimi-
larly, and
the other
modes of
Modification
and
Quality,
will have
an appa-
rent exis-
πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἔστωτας πάντη, καὶ γυγνο-
μένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα
ποὺ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθὲῖν εὐπετέσες ἦδη ἤμιν, εἰ ε
ἐνός μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστων. ἀληθεύτατα μὲν οὖν.

Ἐτὶ δὴ ἀπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπι-
μεν, ὡς ἐὶ μὴ ἔστι, Τάλλα δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνός, τὶ χρὴ
eἶναι. εἰπώμεν γὰρ οὖν. (1) οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν οὐκ
ἔσται Τάλλα. πῶς γὰρ; οὐδὲ μὴν πολλὰ γε' ἐν
γὰρ πολλοῖς οὗσιν ἐνείπῃ ἃν καὶ ἐν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν
αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἐν, ἀπαντὰ οὐδέν ἔστων, ὡστε οὐδὲ ἄν
πολλὰ εἰῃ. ἀληθῆ. μὴ ἐνόντος δὲ ἔνος ἐν Τοῖς
'xffffff

(IX.) The Ninth Hyp-
thesis: ἐν εἰ μὴ
ἔστι = εἰ
Τὸ Ἐν ὑ ῖ
τοῦτος ἐὰς
μετέχει; the effect of
the non-
existence of
Unity on
Tάλλα,
ἐκ.,
Tάλλα
love their
phenomenal
existence,
and the
result is
absolute
Nothing.
(1) In the
total ab-
sence of
Unity, the
notion of
Unity and
therefore of
Plurality is
impossible,
and, there-
fore,

(2) of Simi-
larity and
Dissimilar-
ity, and
of all other
modes of
Quality
and Quan-
tity which
are based
on Unity.
The sum of the affirmative and negative arguments is: affirmatively, that if the One exists, the One, both in relation to itself and in relation to Τᾶλλα, exists in every mode of conditioned existence, and in its opposite, and so, the One is not unconditioned or absolute unity, so far as it exists in these modes: negatively, if the One does not exist, then all existence both in relation to Unity, and in itself, is phenomenal, and this phenomenal existence, when closely scrutinized, is entirely destitute of even phenomenal Unity, and therefore of all categories of Quantity and Quality whatsoever. The conclusion therefore is: the Universe—Τὸ Πᾶν—is neither ἐν alone nor πολλὰ alone, but ἐν-καὶ-πολλὰ.
NOTES.
THE piece is a monologue by Cephalus of Clazomenae. The conversation between the philosophers is supposed to have been originally reported by Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato, and then retailed by Antiphon to Cephalus. Plato, by selecting Antiphon, who is a sporting character, fond of horses (126 c), perhaps wishes to hint that Antiphon has not tampered with the dialogue, ἡκιστα γὰρ ἀν τολυπραγμον为了更好, as he says of Aristotle (137 b), and thus offers it as the exposition of his own views. He may also have wished to compliment his half-brother Antiphon, just as he introduces Glauco and Adimantus in the Republic. The monologue is thus, on the face of it, a hearsay of a hearsay. Hermann, to get rid of some chronological difficulties, which are insuperable, makes Glauco and Adimantus cousins, and not brothers, of Antiphon. But it is vain to look for the precision of modern history in an ancient imaginative composition. Such exactness is the result of matter-of-fact habits, and of abundant means of verification, such as books of reference, &c. No such habits or means existed till the other day. A strong proof of this is the inaccuracy of quotation, common to all ancient writers, even professed critics.

126 a. Κλαζομενῶν.

Stallbaum points out that some people in Clazomenae, townspeople, and perhaps followers of Anaxagoras, would
naturally take an interest in the discussion. The influence of Anaxagoras on Platonic thought is evidenced by the *Phaedo*. To Anaxagoras, Mind owes the recognition of nearly all its metaphysical prerogatives. He set it in a sphere apart, and assigned to it unique properties. Mind alone was strictly infinite, *i.e.* unlimited or untrammelled by anything else, and subsisted by its own inherent strength. Mind was homogeneous, and was the only real existence. Plato is fond of putting doctrines which he adopts into the mouth of a person of the original school. Thus Timæus expounds physics, and the Eleatic Stranger metaphysics, and the more practical Socrates ethics.

126 c. *Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης.*

Parmenides and Zeno are described by Strabo as ἄνδρες Πυθαγόρειοι, vi. 1. Their connexion with Pythagoreanism is philosophically real, as one column of the Pythagorean συν-στοιχία is reducible to τὸ πέρας, and the other to τὸ ἀπειρον.

127 b. *Πολὺ γὰρ ἐφη ἐργον ἴναι.*

Such a feat of memory, though here a dramatic fiction, cf. *Symp.* 172 a, is rendered plausible by Niceratus's statement that he could repeat the whole *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: Xen. *Conv.* iii. 5. Many rhapsodists could do the same: *ibid.* 6.

127 b. *παιδικά.*

*λέγεσθαι γεγονέναι* show that Stallbaum's charitable explanation is untenable. There is no doubt suggested of their present friendship: *Ζήνων οὗ ὁ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σοῦ φιλίᾳ βούλεται ψυκεύωσθαι ἄλλα καὶ τῷ συμμαχούσι, 128 a.*
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127 e. εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα.

The argument is as follows:—In the order of Time or subjectivity, the perception of difference between two things A and B precedes the perception of their similarity; but in the order of existence or objectivity, the differentia of each of the differentia depends on the individual peculiarities of each different. Each of the relatives thus exhibits Identity in relation to itself, and Difference in relation to the other, and so to all other things. If we assume, then, with Zeno, for argument's sake, τὸ πᾶν—existence—τὰ ὄντα—to be plural, each of τὰ ὄντα is per se ὄμοιον; but the aggregate is plural, and therefore τὰ ὄντα being plural are distinct, and therefore inter se ἄνομοια. Zeno accordingly agrees with Leibnitz as to the identity of indiscernibles, thus: Indiscernibles are identical, and therefore non-plural, since primordial things cannot be differed inter se without having been previously differed per se. The Platonist and Hegelian say Plurality is subsumed by Unity without being destroyed by it. The Aufhebung settles everything.

127 e. Τὰ ἄνομοια.

Stallbaum remarks: Zeno callida conclusione effect, non esse multa, quam hoc tantum consequatur, non posse huic eidemque rei eadem spectatae ratione plura eaque contraria attribui. To a Greek, the order of Notions would be Motion, Change, Plurality; Motion denoting not merely physical Motion, ποθέν ποι, but the notional movement of Metaphysics. The identity, in the Hegelian sense, of Cause and Effect, is the notion which brings the scientific order of Time into harmony with the order of Logic.

128 d. εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ.

Sc. τὸ Πᾶν. This is the Subject of the Proposition, for which Philosophy undertakes to find the Predicate.
τὸ πᾶν is ἐν, said the Eleatic; it is πολλά, said the Ionic: it is ἐν καὶ πολλά, said Plato, and to prove this is the gist of the Parmenides.

128 d. εἴ πολλά ἐστιν: sc. τὸ Πᾶν.

The gist of Zeno's argument has been perpetually mistaken: Zeno does not deny Motion as a fact, but argues that as implying change, and therefore dissimilarity, it conflicts with the changeless uniformity of the One. In the One there is no contrariety, while contrariety is the essence of Motion. It may be remarked that, if Zeno's two moving bodies be made conscious, one will have double the consciousness of the other. The order of analysis is—Motion implies change, and change plurality. (See Appendix A.)

129 d. ἐπτά ἤμῶν ὄντων.

This is irreconcilable with ἀφικέσθαι τὸν τε ὑγρογένει καὶ ἄλλους τινάκε μετ' αὑτοῦ πολλοῦς, 127 c. If we leave out Cephalus the reciter and Glaucus, who does not speak, we can count up seven persons, viz., Adimantus and Antiphon in the introduction; Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, and Aristotle in the discussion. 'Επτά shows that Plato either forgot the original plan or did not care to adhere to it—another proof of the historical unreality of the piece.

130 b. Χωρίς.

Χωρίς, a notion derived from physical separation: things are properly χωρίς which are not ἀπτόμενα, and then the word is applied to things which, as existing under totally distinct conditions, differ in kind. It should be recollected that all notions which differ in any degree are metaphysically distinct, e.g. 3 and 4 are as distinct as 3 and 4 millions.
NOTES.

Moderns look principally to the origin or genesis of things and notions in determining their resemblance or difference, and not to their characteristics when matured.

131 d.  τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ.

With Hermann, I retain the Vulgate τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ. Heindorf's τούτου δὲ αὐτό is plainly wrong. The argument is: If any of us shall have a fragment of smallness, the real smallness will be bigger, because it is the whole, of which the fragment is a part.

131 e.  μεταλαμβάνειν.

μεταλαμβάνειν is a more material expression than μετέχειν. Both, however, express the truth, that the Sensible element, in cognition, without the Intelligible, is inconceivable. Professor Huxley invests Sensation with all the Categories, and then tells us we do not want them. Sensibles have, in Hegel's words, Richtigkeit, and not Wahrheit.

132 a, b.  The unique εἴδος.

This passage gives the reason why the εἴδος is unique:—In referring an object to a class we have two things in hand, the particular instance and the genus, e.g. the particular man, Socrates, and the genus man, i.e. the first and second intentions. Parmenides argues, that to connect the particular with the genus there must be a third concept or notion, and then another to comprehend the three, and so on to infinity. If this be so, εἴδος is not unique, but ἄπειρον. Now, ἄπειρον denotes privation of all πέρας, Limitation, therefore of Form, therefore of all Cogitability. But every thing must be either ἐν or ἄπειρον, as follows:—In strict logic, the contrary of τὸ ἄπειρον is τὸ πεπερασμένον; but τὸ πεπερασμένον yields on analysis—(1) τὸ πέρας; and (2)
NOTES.

something which is not τὸ πέρας, and so ἄπειρον. What is τὸ πέρας, when out of any definite relation to τὸ πεπερασμένον? It must be quantifying power, and we must hold that power to be not plural, but unique; for plural equipollent powers, if adverse, cancel; and if corroborative, result in unity. Τὸ πέρας, therefore, must be ἔν, and therefore Τὸ Ἐν; for the ultimate Form must be one, and, without τὸ ἔν, as Plato afterwards proves, οὐδὲ φαίνεται τι. The ἐδόθη, therefore, since it is Form, cannot be ἄπειρον, and therefore must be one. This is Plato's answer to the objections urged in pars. 7 and 9, and known to Greek Logicians as ὁ τρίτος ἀνθρωπος. "We may remark," says Mr. Jowett, "that the process which is thus described has no real existence. The mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end," iii. p. 237. Plato, in the Philebus, gives the rationale of the Universal. (See Appendix B.)

132 c. Objection to Conceptualism.

Either each thing consists of νοῦματα, i.e. acts of intelligence, and therefore each thing is the being intelligent, i.e. intelligence, or if it be an act of intelligence, it is unintelligent, q.a.e. This argument is a case of the Platonic principle ὁμοιὸν ὁμοιὸς γιγνώσκεται. It is substantially the same as Berkeley's position that mind is mind, that therefore nothing but mind is mind, and, as a further consequence, that nothing but mind can have the properties of mind; it is therefore illogical to ascribe to that which is not mind the properties of mind. Plato does not hold νοῦς to be the ultimate existence either in the moral or in the physical sphere. In the ethical sphere we have Τάγαθον, Rep. vi. 509 b; in the physical, ψυχή: Τοῦτω δὲ [sc. νοῦς ἑπιστήμη τε] ἐν ὕ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἄν πατέ τις αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ πλῆν ψυχῆν, πάν μᾶλλον ἦ τάληθες ἑρεί, Tim. 36 c; σοφία
NOTES.

φιλ. 30 c. M. Ribot overlooks Plato when he says, "Since Will is the centre of ourselves and of all things, we must give it the first rank. It is its due, though since Anaxagoras Intelligence has usurped its place" (La Philosophie de Schopenhauer, p. 69, cited in H. Zimmern's Sch. p. 102). The same doctrine is developed as to the priority of ψυχή—Motive and Vital Energy—in the Laws, written in the "sunset of life."—x. 891 e, sqq.

133 c. ἀπίθανος = δυσανάπειστος, 135 a.

133 d. οὐτω and οὖτως.

With regard to the orthography of these words, the insertion of c before a vowel is plausible. But we must recollect that we can prove that τι was not elided, and that μέχρι and ἄχρι had no c.

134 c. Objection to the Absolute from the subjective side.

This brings out the true sense of absolute—Τὸ ἀνυπόθετον, Rep. vi.—that which does not depend on anything else for its essence, or outcome, or priority—λόγοι—in order of thought. Of course, quâ γνωστὸν to us, it depends on us; but the Absolute may be and is γνωστὸν to itself. With regard to us, it is ultimum relatum; with regard to itself, it is not referred to anything else.

135 a. Objection to the Absolute from the objective side.

This objection is urged by both Hamilton and Mill, ὅτες ἔχοντοι τὸ πρῶτα; but it assumes that because partial knowledge is not plenary knowledge, they therefore contra-
dict each other. How is the geography of Ireland contradictory to the geography of Europe? Plenary knowledge, of course, will correct partial knowledge, and may put it in quite a new light, but the facts on which the partial knowledge is grounded cannot be shaken by the fullest knowledge. Aristotle objects ἀδύνατον χωρίς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἡ οὐσία. If χωρίς means that there is a bridgeless chasm between the two, the objection holds—not otherwise. Sense and Intellect are essentially χωρίς, yet every act of Perception is a blending of both. That the objective sphere, or Things-in-themselves, is unknown and unknowable to us, is held by Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Comte. This doctrine is favoured by the antithesis between phenomenon and reality. As a matter of fact, the Greek word is in the present participle, i.e. φαινόμενον, and meant that which is in the course of appearing, and not φανέν, that which did appear. In a word, the modern means by φαινόμενον what the Greeks call φάντασμα, a kind of delusive appearance. Carneades distinguishes the act of perception into three parts—τὸ φανταστόν, the object; τὸ φαντασσιούμενον, the subject; and φαντασία, the act. Now Plato's meaning is, that τὰ φαινόμενα, or τὰ γιγνόμενα, are possible, because they are produced by permanent reality which is discernible through them. For his conception of genesis of phenomena, see note 154 c.

137 c-143 a. ἔν

Τὸ ἐν, all through the first proposition, means pure unity prior to all evolution. Like Hegel's Seyn, it has not been stripped of attributes, but is prior to all attributes. It is, like the Seyn, a postulate of completed thought.

137 d. πέρας.

Πέρας is the limit ab intra: cf. τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχῇ πέρας ἰκάστου: hence, as τὸ ἐν has neither ab intra, it is ἀπειρον.
NOTES.

This is taken from Melissus Τὸ δὲ μὴ τελευτήν, ἀπειρον τυγχάνει ἓν. Fr. 2. Plato does not discuss the other possibility, argued by Melissus, that ἀπειρον could have limits ab extra: for there cannot be more than one τὸ ἓν.

137 e. Plato's right line.

This definition is exact: it is obvious there can only be one such line; and, if it is unique, it follows it is the shortest in rerum natura. If Helmholtz's reasoning—beings of two dimensions living on the surface of a sphere understood the definition given by Plato, they would see it to be the shortest possible, and that their own geodetic line was not. If they liked to call the latter straight, of course they might; which is as irrelevant as the entire of Helmholtz's argument.

138 e. αὐταί γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.

In the Laws—893 b–895—ten modes of motion are specified. Eight of these belong to body: (1), without change of place, i.e. on an axis; (2), with change of place—(α), either without change of base, e.g. a stone sliding on ice; (β), or with change of base, e.g. a ball rolling. The next two are where motion gives rise to—(3), concretion, or (4), decretion. The next two are where concretion is prolonged into (5) growth, or discretion turns into (6) waste. The next is where growth in bulk is prolonged into (7) production of state, and waste into (8) decay. The two movements of mind are (9) to move things other than itself, itself being moved; and (10) to move itself of itself out of a previous state of rest.

The power of transmitting motion as a link in the Chain of Sequence is the only power allowed man by Hume and his followers. The 10th motion includes free-will.
The One has not Identity with itself or anything else that has distinctness: nor is it distinct from itself or anything else that has distinctness.

That is, the One, being one and nothing else, admits of no relation whatsoever; if it did, there would be unity and relation, something more than unity, and therefore not unity, q. a. e.

It cannot even possess Distinctness, for Distinctness means that A is distinct from B, and so B is in turn distinct from A. If, then, Unity possessed Distinctness, it could only be distinct by means of Unity and not by means of Distinctness; but Unity, ex vi termini, is not Distinctness. Therefore τὸ ἑν cannot be distinct in itself. A similar argument was urged against St. Anselm, that Unity was not Perfection. The mode of argument is due to the Megarics. The Aufhebung is the answer.

Source of τὸ ἑτερον.

I. e. supplying the ellipses εἰ μὴ τοῦτο—τῷ ἐν εἶναι—ἔσται ἑτερον, οὐχ ἕαυτῷ ἔσται ἑτερον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἕαυτῷ ἔσται ἑτερον, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἔσται ἑτερον. (See note 127 e.)

διαφορότης.

διαφορότης was read by Proclus, T. vi. 237, and is supported by πνεύτης, Theaetet. 182 a.

γεγόνει.

For γέγονεν, Hermann reads γεγόνει, as γέγονεν has to be taken in two senses, perfect and past.
NOTES.

141 e. γενηθησεται.

οὔτε ἔπειτα γενηθησεται οὔτε γενηθησεται, will neither come into being, nor be brought into being; will neither come of itself, nor be brought by anything else.

141 e. Ambiguity of ἐν.

Τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, i.e., Τὸ ἐν is neither the relation Unity, nor the quality Existence.

142 a. ἦ αὐτῷ ἦ αὐτοῦ.

ἐὰν ἢν τι ἦ αὐτῷ ἦ αὐτοῦ, would it have any affection resulting to it, or proceeding from it: any income or outcome; i.e. either accident or property.

142 a. ὄνομα, λόγος, ἐπιστήμη, κ.τ.λ.

Plato gives the following explanation of these terms:—

ὄνομα = the term.

λόγος = definition.

ἐπιστήμη = ἐν ψυχαῖς ἔνων, ὥς ἐνδον ἐπερόν τε ἐν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως τῶν τε λεχθέντων τριῶν, i.e. ὄνομα, λόγος, εἰδωλον.—Epist. vii. 342–3.

ἐπιστήμη is the psychical aspect of αὐτῷ, and is a process of intense activity. Plato objects to the sensible figure of the Circle, that it partakes of the Straight, i.e. is really a zigzag line. The Circle then would be the process of describing it without a sensible line (Epist. vii.), and in this way ἐπιστήμη resembles the Kantian schema. The Epistles are considered genuine by Cobet and Grote, and are very characteristic. At all events, the passage in the 7th could only have been written by a great metaphysician.
δόξα, ἐκ μνήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως.—Phil. 38 b.

αἰσθησις = τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει, τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κοινὴ γιγνώμενον, κοινὴ καὶ κινεῖσθαι.—Phil., 34 a. This is scientifically true: the sensation lasts only as long as the impressed condition of the nerve is kept up.

142 b—155 e. 

Τὸ ἐν.

In the second proposition, Τὸ ἐν is in combination with ἔστι. Each element is distinct before combination and in combination; though the combination may and does give rise to new relations.

142 d—e. 

Relation of Τὸ ἐν and ὁπ.

I. e. τῶν μορίων ἐκατέρων τούτων Τοῦ Ἐνὸς Ὁντος (Τὸ τῇ Ἐν καὶ Τὸ Ὁν), ἅρα ἀπολεπέσθων, ἦ Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ Ὁντος ἔναι μορίου, ἦ Τὸ Ὁν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἔναι μορίου; i.e. where there is Τὸ Ἐν, Τὸ Ἐν is in combination with Τὸ Ὁν, and Τὸ Ὁν is in combination with Τὸ Ἐν.

ἔναι, c. gen. = to be a property of: cf. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τοῦτω τῷ μὴ-ὅντε ἔν ἅν τι, ἦ αὐτῷ ἦ αὐτοῦ; 141 a. Can a nonentity have either accident or property?

142 e. 

μόριον.

Each one μόριον—either τὸ Ἐν, or τὸ Ὁν—of the two μόρια τὸ Ἐν and τὸ Ὁν, holds in combination Ἐν and Ὁν, and so on, ad infin.

This is strictly true: the universe has unity, and the universe exists; and each of the motes that people the sun’s beam has equally existence and unity. One is Form: Existence is Matter, and to show that the One formulates existence into plurality is the aim of the second part of the Parmenides.
NOTES.

143 c.—144 a. *Genesis of Number,* i.e. a system of *Monads.*

There are three συζυγίαι or pairs, viz.:

- οὖσία and ἔτερον;
- οὖσία and ἐν;
- ἐν and ἔτερον.

Now every pair is ἅμφως, and therefore δύο; therefore each member of the pair is ίκάτερον, and therefore one: so that in each pair we have two members,

2.1 = 2,

and each member being unified by the index 1, we have three symbols,

3.1 = 3.

Now where there is Two, we have δις ἐν, and where there is Three, we have τρις ἐν; where, therefore, there are three symbols, we have two members

(2 m. 1 = δις ἐν ὑποτων),

and where there are two members we have three symbols

(3 symbols . 1 = 1 τρις ἐν ὑποτων).

Three (symbols) therefore must be two (members), and two (members) must be three (symbols). Therefore ἄρτια (= δύο = δις ἐν) = ἄρτιακς (= δις) ἐν: and περιττά (= τρια = τρις ἐν) = περιττάκις (= τρις) ἐν: and ἄρτια (= δύο, i.e. members) = περιττάκις (= τρις) ἐν, i.e. symbols; and περιττά (= τρια, i.e. symbols) = ἄρτιακς (δις ἐν) members. From this we have the genesis of every number: for 2 = δις ἐν is ἄρτια ἄρτιακς, that is even numbers even times; and 3 = τρις ἐν is περιττά περιττάκις, that is, odd numbers odd times; and 2 (members) = 3 (symbols) is ἄρτια, even numbers odd times, περιττάκις; and 3 (symbols) = 2 (members) is περιττά, odd numbers even times, ἄρτιακς.
143 d. \( \text{ouδι } \muλα. \)

An instance of Plato's habit of using in the ordinary sense the philosophic word which is under argument: other examples are noticed in note on 157 d.

143 d.

\( \text{oυ } \tau ρλα \gamma ιγνεται τα πάντα; \text{ i. e. are there not three distinct symbols? lit., are not the distinct things three?} \)

143 d. \( \text{Interdependence of 2 and 3.} \)

Let there be two roots, \( x \) and \( y \); let them have a common index, say \( e.gr. 1 \); and let \( x = 1 \): then we have \( x^1, y^1 \).

We have thus three distinct symbols, \( x, y, \) and \( 1 \); \( x \) and \( y \) denoting the two roots, and \( 1 \) the index common to both. Now, as there are three symbols, the three symbols involve the index twice; that is, \( x^1 \) and \( y^1 \); but \( x \) as a root = 1, and \( y \) is made one by its index;

\[ \therefore x \text{ and } y^1 = 1 + 1 = 2. \]

Likewise the two roots \( x \) and \( y \), and the identical index \( 1 \), require three symbols for their notation;

\[ \therefore x \text{ and } y \text{ and } 1^1 = 1 + 1^1 + 1 = 3. \]

To apply this:—Whatever admits of the predicate both, admits of the predicate two, and the predicate two indicates that each of the binaries is one. Now one as index being incorporated with each number of each syzygy, each syzygy involves the index twice;

\[ \therefore 2. 1 = 2, \]

and as each syzygy requires, as we have seen, three symbols for its notation, each syzygy involves one thrice,

\[ \therefore 3. 1 = 3. \]
Thus, in Aristotelian language, Three is the Form of Two, and Two is the Matter of Three. Hence, we may see why the Pythagoreans made Two the symbol of indefinite existence, for Matter without Form is indefinite; likewise why they made Three the symbol of definite existence. In the order of existence—φύσει—Three is prior to Two, for we require as prerequisites of Three

(1). The radical $1; = 1 \xi \nu$;

(2). The other thing; which $= \Theta\alpha\tau\varepsilon\rho\omicron\nu$, being unquantified, to be construed to thought requires quantification, and thereto requires

(3). The index 1.

Without these we cannot have Two, for $2 = 1$ and $1 = 2$. 1.

143 d–e. Genesis of all the Numbers from Τὸ ἔν and Τὸ ὁν.

Supplying ellipses—δυοῖν νοῦν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δῖς ἔν; καὶ τριῶν νοτων εἶναι τρῖς ἔν, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει Τῷ τε Δύο τὸ δῖς-ἔν, καὶ Τῷ Τρία τὸ τρὶς-ἔν; i.e.:

Π. $= 2 \cdot 1$, and ΠΙ. $= 3 \cdot 1$.

Then, Δυοῖν δὲ νοτου καὶ δῖς-ἔν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δῖς εἶναι; i.e.  

$$x^1 + y^1 = 1^1 + 1^1 = 1 (1^1 + 1^1),$$

but

$x$ and $y = 2$, and the indices $1$ and $1 = 2$;

∴ we have δύο δῖς in the notion ΠΙ.

So mut. mut. of $3 = 1 (1^1 + 1^1 + 1^1) =

1x^1 + 1y^1 + 1 \cdot 1^1 = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3$,

but

$1 + 1 + 1 = 3$;

and

$x + y + 1' = 3$;

and indices $1^1 + 1^1 + 1 = 3$;
we have \( \tau \rho \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \varsigma \) in the notion \( \Pi \Pi \). That is, each couple is two things; it is also two single things; and the unity of each single thing is a third thing, i.e. \( x \) and \( y \) and \( 1 \).

In Aristotelian language:—Formed Matter contains (1) Form, and (2) Formless Matter \( 1 + 1 = \Pi \Pi \); but Formless Matter is incogitable; therefore we have Matter unified by Form. But Form \( = 1 \); Matter \( = 1 \); and Unification \( = 1 \); \( . \) \( . \) \( 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 \). The mote in the sunbeam contains three metaphysical elements—(1) that which unifies; (2) that which is unified; and (3) the unification of 1 and 2, i.e. \( \Pi \Pi \). It is a pity the scholastic distinction between metaphysical and physical is not kept up. Metaphysical entities were those that could not exist separately, e.g. concave and convex: physical, those that could, i.e. \( \lambda \gamma \nu \) and \( \phi \varsigma \iota \).

143 e. \( \delta \iota \varsigma \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \).

\( \tau \rho \iota \omega \nu \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \ \kappa \alpha \ \delta \iota \varsigma \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \ \kappa \alpha \ \tau \rho \iota \varsigma \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \). Hermann brackets the second \( \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \) and \( \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \), but they are right, i.e. \( \tau \rho \iota \omega \nu \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \ \kappa \alpha \ \delta \iota \varsigma \ \dot{\epsilon} \nu \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \) = the symbols are three, and the pairs are two; and \( \delta \nu \iota \iota \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \), \( \kappa \alpha \ \tau \rho \iota \varsigma \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \) = \( \delta \nu \iota \iota \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \ \kappa \alpha \ \tau \rho \iota \varsigma \ \dot{\epsilon} \nu \ ) \ \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \, \), the pairs are two and the symbols are three. It must be recollected that the Greek arithmetic was originally the geometry of rectangles. In the present case, as usual, in place of our abstract multiplication \( 3 \times 2 \) and \( 2 \times 3 \), two rectangles are generated. The first has \( 3 \) as its base and \( 2 \) as its side, and as the base is the more important factor, the plural is used, \( \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \). In the second, \( 2 \) is the base and \( 3 \) the side; here the base is \( 2 \), and is the more important, hence the dual \( \dot{o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \). The conception is that a rectangle is described on a base, and not on a side. The rectangle \( 3 \times 2 \) is quite distinct from the rectangle \( 2 \times 3 \).
144 a.

ἀριθμὸς does not mean a single unit, but a collection of units. Thus one is not ἀριθμὸς, but two is: ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶ πλήθος ὁμοιόμενον ἢ μονάδων σύστημα ἢ ποσότητος χύμα ἐκ μονάδων συνκείμενον.—Nic. Gev. i. vii. 1.

In speaking of Numbers, both the Platonists and the Pythagoreans meant always whole numbers, and not fractions, the unit being the foot, lineal, square, and cubic. The numbers, or rather rectangles, were ἀρτιοί, an even base by an even side; περιττοί, an odd base by an odd side; ἀρτιοὶ περιττάκις, an even base by an odd side; and περιττοὶ ἀρτιάκις, an even base by an even side.

144 e. Τὸ ἐν υπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανεμημένον.

Justifies ύπὸ in 166 a.

145 c, d.

A part contains the following notions:—

1. Its separate existence;
2. Its own relation to its fellow parts;
3. Its common relation to the whole.

This may be illustrated by a piece of a dissected map. The map is not all the separate pieces one by one— tà πάντα—nor any one: yet if any piece did not fit, it would not be in the map when it was put together, tà ἐπάντα; but if the piece belong to the map, it must be one of the separate pieces.

Metaphysically, all distinct ideas are equally distinct.

145 c, d.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι τὸ γε ὅλον νῦν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστὶν, οὔτε ἐν πάσιν οὔτε ἐν τινὶ. (εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. ἐν τινὶ γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὅν οὐκ ἄν ἔτι που δύναιτο ἐν γε ὑπάσιν ἐναι.)
The Whole is distinct from the parts; for if the Whole is in each quaque of the parts, it must be in some one quavis; and if that particular part contains the Whole, that one part cannot be one of the parts.

The argument is: if the Whole is in the parts, it is in all, some, or one; the clause from έν τινι to είναι is the converse opposite of the clause έν γάρ εν πάσιν, ἀνάγκη καί ἐν ἐνί. In the clause τὸ δὲ ὄλον ἐν τούτῳ [μὴ] ἐν, Hermann brackets [μὴ]. I have struck it out, as it spoils the argument, which is: if the Whole is in each part, it is in some one part. If so, the part thus specialised is differentiated from its former peers, but it is so differentiated by containing the Whole, not by not containing it.

Hegel says: The relation of the Whole and the parts is untrue to this extent—that the notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony. The notion of the Whole is to contain parts; but if the Whole is taken, and made what its notion implies, i.e., if it is divided, it at once ceases to be a Whole.—Logic, p. 211. All through the Parmenides it must be kept in view, that any two notions in any degree distinct are totally distinct. “Each thing,” says Butler, “is what it is, and not another thing.”

Τὰ πάντα is the roll or litany of items; ἀπάντα is the sum total of the same items summed: Τὰ πάντα are the parts of the sum; ἀπάντα is the sum of the parts. It is a pity that modern English has lost its neuter plural and verb singular: “hot blood begets hot thoughts, and hot thoughts beget hot deeds, and hot deeds is love.”

The notion Whole is not the notion Aggregate of items: cf. ἡ καί τὸ ὄλον έκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονός ἐν τι εἰδος ἐτερον.
NOTES.

τῶν πάντων μερῶν; ἓγουσε.—Theaet. 204 a, b. The order of notions is—(1) τὰ μέρη; (2) τὰ πάντα; (3) τὰ ἅπαντα; (4) τὸ ὅλον; (5) τὸ πᾶν.

145 e. κινεῖσθαι.

Zeno’s contribution to thinking is, the showing that motion is relative to a something which is not moved. This is well brought out in the Flying Arrow, which at any given moment coincides with its equivalent in the space through which it is passing.

146 a. μηδὲ ἦστάναι, μὴ ἦστος δὲ κινεῖσθαι.

By Excluded Middle; if not the one, it must be the other.

146 a, b. ἐπεροῦ.

Hegel’s view, that Otherness is negation, is supported by the history of the particle μή. If μὴ is etymologically ne, as Curtius mentions, comparing the Lithuanian nei (r. 317), na in the Vedas very often means as, and the order then would be—assertion, comparison, negation: cf. ἄνα and ἀλλος, ἰβ. 307.

146 a–148 e.

1. Everything possesses Identity, and, in that respect, it resembles primarily everything else.

2. Everything is distinct from everything else, and, in that respect, it differs primarily from everything else.

3. In being distinct, it, eo ipso, resembles secondarily everything else; and, therefore,

4. Differs secondarily from everything else by the contrary of diversity—identity.

Hence τὸ ἵν, in possessing either quality, has resemblances, primarily and secondarily, to

(a) itself, and to
(b) τὰλλα; and,

146 a–148 e.
in possessing either quality, has diversities primary and secondary to

(a) itself, and to
(b) τάλλα.

In possessing both, τὸ ἐν

is primarily like itself and τάλλα, and
is primarily unlike itself and τάλλα.

Nothing can be clearer than that Plato held that there were εἰδὴ τῶν πρῶτος τι. Idealism is only the development of relations.

The One is identical and diverse to itself, and is identical and diverse to τάλλα, i.e. all ideas or objects of Reason are equally ideas, and therefore distinct: they all agree in distinctness; but, being distinct, they differ; therefore they agree through Difference, they differ through Identity; and as each has both Identity and Diversity together, each agrees with and differs from itself, and each agrees with and differs from τάλλα. The One agrees with τάλλα in having both qualities; and the very having both qualities is the essence of its individuality.

148 c.

The order of notions is—

(1) ταυτόν;
(2) μὴ ἄλλων;
(3) μὴ ἀνομοίον;
(4) ὁμοίον.
Τὸ ᾗ Ἐν is ταυτόν Τοῖς Ἀλλοίοις;
Τὸ ᾗ Ἐν is ἐτερον Τῶν Ἀλλῶν.

Taking each case separately:—

(1). Τὸ ᾗ Ἐν is like τάλλα;
(2). Τὸ ᾗ Ἐν is unlike τάλλα.
NOTES.

85

Taking both together—

Τὸ Ἐν is both like and unlike ταλλα;

and so, by parity of reasoning,

Τὸ Ἐν is like and unlike itself.

148 d-149 e.

Ancient arithmetic was originally geometrical: hence the notions,

Whole and Parts:

Contact.

149 a.

Contact——άψις——presupposes——

1. Something distinct, e.g.
   \[a \quad b\]; and

2. Something else in immediate contiguity to it; e.g.
   \[a \quad b \quad c\].

Here \(a\ b\) is distinct from \(b\ c\), and \(b\ c\) is in immediate contiguity. If to \(b\ c\) we add \(c\ d\),

\[a \quad b \quad c \quad d\],

\[άυτὰ \ μὲν τριά, \ εστὶ \ αἱ \ δὲ \ άψις \ δύο. \ Hence, \(ad\ fin.,\) the things, τὰ ἀπτώμενα, are always one in advance of αἱ άψις. \ Hence, if ταλλα be totally devoid of unity, junction between τὸ Ἐν and ταλλα is impossible, for ταλλα must be one, before it can combine with τὸ Ἐν to form two.

149 e.

άυταίς γε ταύταίς ταῖς οὐσίαις, i.e. essences, notions, ἰδεῖαι:

cf. Phaed. 78 c-d.

εἰδη, Stall.
150 a. τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἴσοτητος; ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς.

tί τινος = attribute.

150 c–d.

Τὸ ᾖ ἑν, ὑπὸ ᾖ ἑν, is ἑν, and nothing else: τὰλλα ὑπὸ ἀλλα, is ἀλλα, and nothing else: τὸ μέγεθος, ὑπὸ μέγεθος, is μέγεθος, and nothing else: and ἡ σμικρότης, ὑπὸ σμικρότης, is σμικρότης, and nothing else. Τὸ ᾖ ἑν therefore cannot be greater than τὰλλα, nor τὰλλα greater than Τὸ ᾖ ἑν: in the same way, neither is less than the other: but if neither greater nor less, they are not unequal, and therefore equal.

So it is commonly said, all infinites are equal. Metaphysically, there is only one infinite, that whose essence it is to have no bounds or limit. It is evident there cannot be two of this nature, for each would overlap, and so bound the other. But in mathematical infinites, infinity merely means infinitely divisible or infinitely addible; i.e. a process which may be worked as long as there is anything to work on. The process is always one and the same, and so infinite: the material is always finite, and may be as different as one pleases.

150 d.

ὑπερέχω takes the genitive; therefore the vexed passage in the Phaedo runs thus, if the ellipses are supplied—one of the surest ways of construing Plato:—Τοῦ μὲν Σωκράτους (τῷ μεγέθευν τῷ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Σωκράτους τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπερέχειν) ὑπερέχων, i.e., τῷ ὑπερέχειν = cause; μεγέθει = instrument; Σωκράτους sub. = gen. on ὑπερέχειν; and τὴν σμικρότητα = acc. de quo.

151 a. μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνὸς τε καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν.

Grote says: "Both these predicates (One—Many) are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and com-
parisons of our own senses and consciousness. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, self-existent One.”—Plato, i. 105–6. Here “absolute” is used in the sense of out of all possible range, a sense popularised by the frivolous discussions of Hamilton, Mansel, and Mill.

151 d.

The order of notions is—

1. Magnitude;
2. Measure;
3. Parts.

151 d.

“But that a thing, which bears no relation to any one (cuivis) given item, should bear any relation to each (cuique) of the sum total of items, to no one of which (cuiquam) does it bear any actual relation either as part or otherwise, is impossible.”

151 d–e.

Shadworth Hodgson makes similar remarks on the subjective embracing the objective, and vice versâ, Space and Time, pp. 45, sqq.

154 e–d.

Τὸ ἑν does not grow younger or older than τὰλλα, because it is so already: it has had so much start, and equals added to unequals leave the difference absolutely as before; but, if we subtract the difference, the residue is always growing larger, and therefore the difference is growing less relatively to the residue: e.g. A is born a year before B; thus A is always a year older than B; but when A is two years old the relative difference is greater than when A is ninety.
NOTES.

154 c.

γίγνεται, the emphatic word, is not growing or becoming, because it is.

154 c.

γένεσις is explained in the Laws thus: γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις ἡνίκ’ ἂν τι πάθος ᾖ; δὴλον, ὡς ὑπόταν ἄρχῃ λαβοῦσα αὖξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἐλθῃ μετάβασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αὔξησιν σχῆ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις, 894 a. The steps are—

1. αὖξη;
2. ἔξις καθεστηκῶνα;
3. ἔξις μένουσα.

155 c.

μεταλαμβάνειν differs from μετέχειν: μεταλαμβάνω is to coincide in part with, to have share in; μετέχειν is to form one with, to unite with; cf. 158 b.

155 e–157 a.

The One in this hypothesis passes from one state into another, and so do its attributes. The transition takes place through an unextended point: that is, time is cut in two by a timeless point, just as Space is cut in two by a breadthless line. Shadworth Hodgson seems to suppose that Plato held that the point possessed duration. It is well explained by Damascius—ἄμερος ἐστι τῇ ἰδιώτητι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ᾧρονον.

156 a–157.

The notion is, any one state or condition which passes into a different condition has to pass through an intermediate
NOTES.

state, in which it is neither what it was nor what it is in course of becoming. Anaxagoras, from whom Plato took much of his Physics, says: οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ, Fr. 13 Mullach. This joined with his doctrine, adopted by Plato, that there is no minimum, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροῦ γέ ἐστι τὸ γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ' ἔλασσον αἰῶ, necessitates the presence of τὸ ἐν in and out of Space and Time.

156 d–e.

ἄφ' οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἄτοπον τούτο, ἐν ὃ τῶν ἐν εἰς ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποιον δή; τὸ ἐξαίφνης . . . (see 155 e).

157 b–159 b.

Here Τάλλα owe their predicates to their participation of τὸ ἐν. Cetera and ceterum are very inadequate renderings of the Greek neuter plural, Τάλλα expressing neither unity nor plurality, but food for both.

157 b.

Here we have the full phrase τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

157 c.

The correlatives are ὅλον and μόρια: now τὸ ὅλον = πολλά μόρια, therefore any one μόριον is not μόριον of τὰ πολλὰ μόρια, but of τὸ ὅλον. For unless τὸ μόριον—any given part—be part of itself, there must be one part of the lot of which the given Part is not part. Consequently if the given Part be a part of many parts, it must be a part of the parts minus the given Part. But if it be a part of the other parts, it must be a part of every one of the several parts taken by them-
selves, since quâ parts the parts are similar, and therefore must be a part of itself: q. a. e. E. g. a shilling is part of a pound, but a shilling is not a part of the several shillings which make up the pound. For, if it be a part τῶν πολλῶν shillings, it must be either a part of itself, q. a. e., or of the remaining nineteen shillings. But as the other nineteen shillings, when out of relation to the pound, are nineteen totally independent units, the Part must be a part of them quâ units, and therefore of every one of them (since there is no difference between them quâ units), and therefore of itself, which is exactly similar to the rest. A Part is correlative to a Whole, but it has no relation whatsoever to any one or all of the other parts, save that of being a fellow-part of the same integer.

In Plato's day, abstract language was taken from Geometry; perhaps fraction and integer would be better renderings of μόριον and δλον. Mutatis mutandis, the same reasoning is triumphant against Natural Realism, substituting Quality for Part, and Body for Whole. The Natural Realist makes all qualities, minus one, depend on the residual quality; so that we have either a quality which is more than a quality, or which is not a quality. The same reasoning applies to the Antithesis of Kant's Fourth Antinomy.

157 a. ἰόν.

Justifies the vulgate in Phaedr., 249 b.

157 b.

The order of notions in the order of analysis is—

1. εἶναι;
2. γίγνεσθαι;
3. συγκρίνεσθαι;
4. ὀμοιοῦσθαι.

Order of genesis e contra.
NOTES.

157 c. \( \text{μετέχε τη} \)

The Platonic \( \text{μιθείς} \) is best illustrated by the *Concret* of Hegel, *i.e.* where an object or thought is seen and known to be the confluence of several elements—to be a process in its own nature, and not a mere stationary point of view; each object to be equal to itself, multiplied into all other things.—Wallace’s *Hegel*, clxxvi. Cicero makes use of the same principle: *semper enim ita assumit aliquid (sc. natura) ut ea quae prima dederit, ne deserat.* —*De Fin.* iv. 14. It is the ideal side of the doctrine of Development.

157 c.

Here, \( \text{c—τό γε ὅλον = ἐν ἕκ πολλῶν} \) in \( \text{d, = ἕξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλειον γεγονός} \).

157 d. \( \text{ἀδύνατον εἶναι: Sc. ἐστι} \).

Plato often uses words both in the ordinary and philosophic sense in the same passage: cf. \( \text{oὐδὲ μία, 143 d: αὐτοῦ Παρμενίδου, 136 d: ἀπειρὸν, Phil. 17 c: συμφέρεσθαι, Theaet. 152 e.} \)

157 e.

\( \text{Ταλλα} \) participates in \( \text{Τὸ Ἐν through τὸ ὅλον;} \) in modern language, through the notion *Law, i.e.* in the scientific meaning of the term, when “we think of the parts as held together by a certain force.” This is Hamilton’s description of physical unity.—*Reid*, 852.

158 a. \( \text{ὅ ἀν ἢ μόριον ὅλον.} \)

So the MSS., and they are right. The conjecture \( \text{μορίου ὅλον} \) is a mere truism, for the notion *Whole* is the correlation.
NOTES.

of the notion Part. But \( \muό\omicron\upsilon \varrho\omicron\upsilon \varrho\) is emphatic, that which is a genuine part, and not a part \( \textit{per accidens} \). A shilling is \( \frac{1}{20} \) of the amount of silver defined to be a legal pound: it is therefore, \( \textit{qua} \frac{1}{20}, \muό\omicron\upsilon \varrho\omicron\upsilon \varrho\), because \( \frac{1}{20} \times 20 = 1 \): whereas a shilling \textit{qua} shilling is only one amongst any number of shillings, and is only \( \frac{1}{20} \) of \( \mathbf{L}1 \), \( \textit{per accidens} \), just as it is \( \frac{1}{10} \) of \( \mathbf{L}5 \). Each part must be one, because the parts are \( \tau\omicron\rho\omicron\lambda\acute{a} \). Cf. \( \omicron\nu\delta' \acute{a} \rho\alpha \tau\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{a} \ \acute{e}\sigma\tauι \ Tau\lambda\lambda\alpha. \ \epsilon\nu \gamma\acute{a}\rho \ \acute{a} \nu \acute{h}ν \ \acute{e}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\nu \ \muό\omicron\upsilon \ \tau\omicron\upsilon \ \circ\kappa\omicron\upsilon\upsilon, \ \epsilon\iota \ \tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\lambda\acute{a} \ \acute{h}ν. 159. Besides, the proposed change would require \( \tau\omicron\upsilon \ \mu\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon \ \tau\omicron\upsilon \ \varrho\omicron\upsilon \). 158 e.

The order of notions is—

1. \( \acute{a}\pi\epsilon\iota\varphiα \ \kappaαi \ \pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{e}\nuα \);  
2. \( \epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\alpha \);  
3. \( \acute{a}\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\etaι\alpha\).  

159 a. \( \kappaα\tau\acute{a} \ \mu\acute{e}ν \ \acute{a}\rhoα \ \acute{e}\kappa\acute{a}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu. \)

(1). \( \ Tau\lambda\lambda\alpha \ \textit{qua} \ \pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{e}\nuα \ \textit{are similar}; \)
(2). \( \ Tau\lambda\lambda\alpha \ \textit{qua} \ \acute{a}\pi\epsilon\iota\varphiα \ \textit{are similar}; \)
(3). \( \ Tau\lambda\lambda\alpha \ \textit{qua} \ \pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{e}\nuα \ \kappaαi \ \acute{a}\pi\epsilon\iota\varphiα \ \textit{are dissimilar, both \( \textit{per se and inter se}. \)} \)

\( \acute{a}\mu\rho\alpha\sigma\epsilon\rho\omicron\nuς, \ \textit{i.e. as uniting two opposite predicates, a double contrariety, \( \epsilon\nu\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{a}ξ, \)} \)

(1). \( \pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{e}\nuα \ \kappaαi \ \acute{a}\pi\epsilon\iota\varphiα. \)

(2). \( \pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{e}\nuα \ \kappaαi \ \acute{a}\pi\epsilon\iota\varphiα. \)

159 b–160 b. \( \ Tau\lambda\lambda\alpha \ \textit{are capable of no predicates whatsoever, if the One be one in aloofness. The key to this section is the notion} \)
NOTES.

χωρίς—aloofness—the negation of actual relation. The One is allowed to be, but is relegated to isolation.

160 a.

Illustrates Hypothesis ii., as the order of Number is ἐνός, ἑνοίν, τριῶν, περιττῶν, ἀρτίου.
The order is objective, φύσει.

160 b–d. τὸ μὴ ὁν.

Negation is considered as relative to knowledge, and thus giving rise to the notion ἐτερον—otherness—distinctness.

160 b.

The order of notions is—

1. γνωστών;
2. ἐτερον.

The order is subjective.

160 d–163 b.

The One in this section, though non-existent, admits of positive predicates, which are contrary opposites. Here the One is granted what we would call a subjective existence.

160 e.

In scholastic language τὸ μὴ ὁν has—

1. Illuditas;
2. Quidditas;
3. Hocceitas.
If ὶ Ἡ Ἐν have unlikeness to one, then the argument will not turn on anything like ὶ Ἡ Ἐν, nor will the hypothesis relate to one, but to something different. That is, ὶ Ἡ Ἐν, the subject of discussion, must have unity for its essence; if not, the hypothesis deals with something else. Mr. Jowett ignores the difference between ὶ Ἡ Ἐν and Ἐν.

To ὶ Ἡ Ἐν has ὰνία + ὦ-ἀνία; it therefore involves μετὰβολή; and therefore all incompatible predicates. Here we have Hegelianism in concreto, as applied to ὶ Ἡ Ἐν. Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, in his Philosophy of Reflection, attacks Hegelianism on the following grounds, which apply equally to Plato’s proposition. It must be premised that Mr. Hodgson uses the term contradictory to signify, not the opposition of general and particular, but that between a proposition and its negative, i.e. difference of quality only: e.g. A is A, A is not A; while by a contrary he means that the negative particle joins on to the predicate: e.g. A is A, A is not-A. To resume, the objection is as follows: “The evolution of the concrete concept is his (Hegel’s) fundamental idea; it evolves itself by Entgegensetzung, a concrete opposition containing undistinguished the purely logical opposition of contradistinction, and the opposition of content, which is contrariety. The former gives the motive power, the latter the order and arrangement, of the evolution. Thus the pure Nothing, Nichts, at the beginning is logically opposed to the pure Being, Sein; hence the movement between them. There is no opposition of content, no difference of content at all, between them, until they are conceived together; then they are perceived to be different in content, but at the same time to be a process, a Werden, not (either of them) a state or thing. The Whole makes one undistinguishable process of opposition, a becoming, Entgegensetzung, a Werden. To analyse
this process, to show what is due to perception, what to conception, what part of the opposition is due to content, and what to logical contradiction, would be to destroy it as a theory of the universe."—Vol. i. pp. 384, 5. Again: "Of two wholly contradictory terms, the one is thought as existent, the other as non-existent." "The negative member of a pair of contradictory terms, which is a pure creature of logical method, analogous to imaginary quantities in mathematics, is treated by Hegel as if it were a concept with a perceptual content. The "Nichts" at the beginning of the Logik is the first instance of it."—p. 382.

The question is, What is the value of a creature of logic? And here comes in the work of Kant. Kant showed that the intelligible element was indispensable. The universe was not a lot of separate things, set in an intellectual substratum, like stars in the heavens. No; the intelligible was required both for the stars and for the space in which they float. Be this theory as it may, it was extended by Hegel to the object; hence, in rerum natura, the intelligible element has more reality than its content, so far as that content is sensible. But as logic is the explicit statement of the intelligible, it follows that the logical form has more Wahrheit than its sensible padding. As to negation, which is the point of the process, Mr. Hodgson makes it arise from our fixing our attention on some one in a train of differents (p. 376). But surely things are different because they are already differenced, and the logical description of differentiation is Otherness, or Negation. And as before, the Negation of Logic is more real than the same material of sensation.

162 a.

I. e. δεί αυτό Τό μη"Ον ἔχειν τό εἶναι-μη-δν δεσμόν τοῦ μη- εἶναι (ει μέλλει μη-εἶναι), ὡμοίως ὡσπερ δει Τό ἩΟν ἔχειν τό μὴ εἶναι Το-μη-Ον δεσμόν τοῦ εἶναι, ίνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι ἡ.
I. e. To μη-"Ον requires as a security for its existence as μη-όν, that the proposition should be affirmative; i. e.

To μη-"Ον is μη-όν;

and To"Ον requires in the same way that the proposition should be negative; i. e.

To"Ον is not μη-όν.

Here Plato apparently regards affirmation and negation as an affection of the copula. The reasoning assumes that contrarium cadem scientia. This is true of reflex, but not of direct consciousness. Of course all Philosophy is reflex.

162 a.

μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν υψίας (μὲν) τοῦ εἶναι-όν, μὴ υψίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι-μη-όν. μὲν is understood after the first υψίας by a common ellipse: cf. τὸ δὲ μη-όν, μὴ υψίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι μη-όν, υψίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μη-όν. For sense see preceding note, ib. b.

162 a.

I. e. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μη-όν μὴ ἔσται μη-όν (ἀλλὰ ἀνύψει τι τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μη-όν πρὸς τὸ μη εἶναι τὸ-μη-όν), εῦθυς τὸ μὴ ὁν ἔσται ἄν.

ἀλλὰ introduces the same proposition in another form, thus:—

εἰ γὰρ τὸ μη-όν μὴ ἔσται μη-όν = the non-existent is non-existent: an affirmative proposition: ἀλλὰ introduces it in another form: if the non-existent gives up its being non-existent, and becomes not being the non-existent, the negatives are cancelled, and the non-existent exists.

It may be rendered, "if it does allow the affirmative essence of the Copula—the is—to merge in the negative essence of the
Predicate—the is not—the Copula becomes is not; and there-
by cancels the is-not of the Predicate."

ἀνήσει is metaphorically the correlative of ἐσμὸς, infra, unless it hold fast by and not let its is slip into is-not.

163 b–164 b.

In this proposition, τὸ ἐν is totally deprived of ἐστὶ, and the emphasis is on ὀσία ἀποσία.

164 a–b.

This conclusion is apparently the same as that of the First Hypothesis. In reality nothing can be more diverse. In the former case, The One possesses actually no predicate in particular, although, as the second proposition shows, it is capable of combining with all predicates whatsoever. In the latter case, The One has actually no predicate at all, because it is incapable of having any.

164 b–165 e.

In this proposition ὀσία is taken away from the τὸ ἐν, and the effect on τὰλλα is considered. The result is φαίνεσθαι, i.e. a presented unity in things, somewhat like the Cause and Substance of Hume, mere fictions. This is the view set forth by Brown, Lect. V. The emphasis is on φαίνεται.

164 b.

This proposition represents the views held by the majority of British philosophers and scientific men of the present day. Unity exists only in the mind; the object, according to circum-
cumstances, is only a majus or a minus in Quantity, Quality, or Degree.
165 e, to end.

In this proposition, ὁνσία is totally denied of τὸ έν: what amount of ὁνσία, then, can τάλλα retain? None whatever; not even the impression—ἐόξα—can be produced by Τάλλα. That is to say, in the non-existence of The One, Τάλλα cannot produce in us the idea of quasi-unity allowed in the last hypothesis. Real unity being no more, artificial unity is gone too. Hume’s quasi-idea is impossible.

166 a.

MSS. ὑπό, rightly. The meaning is, the ἐόξα τὸ μὴ δῦν is never produced by τάλλα. ὑπό is applied to the action of a notion, διὰ τὸ πιπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ’ ἐκεῖνον, sc., ἐνὸς—πάθος. Soph. 245 d, e. ὑπάξαζω is used passively in this dialogue.

166 c.

ἀληθέστατα.

This is the solemn conclusion, the amen of the exposition. Nothing can be in worse taste than to censure the dialogue as ἄπονος. An ethical discourse, which deals with our emotions, may conclude with an allegory; but a discussion like the Parmenides, conducted with mathematical formality and colourlessness, would show against the gorgeousness of a Platonic myth, somewhat like the Parthenon in a transformation scene.
APPENDIX A.

THE fragments of Zeno, which illustrate the notion Τὰ πολλὰ and its results, are as follows:—

1. εἰ πολλὰ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη τοσαῦτα εἶναι ὡσα ἐστι, καὶ οὐτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὐτε ἐλάττονα. Εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα ἐστιν ὡσα ἐστι, πεπερασμένα ἀν εἴη. Which conclusion conflicts with Τὸ ἔν.

2. εἰ πολλὰ ἐστιν, ἀπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔτερα μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ, καὶ πάλιν ἑκεῖνων ἔτερα μεταξὺ. Καὶ οὔτως ἀπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστί. Which conclusion conflicts with the former, and both with Τὸ ἔν.

3. εἰ πολλὰ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ μικρὰ τε εἶναι καὶ μεγάλα· μικρὰ μὲν, ὡστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα δὲ ὡστε ἀπειρα εἶναι. Zeno here points out the true objection to the atom and space as metaphysical ultima: the atom is all quality, and space is all quantity.

Zeno's arguments against motion bring the fact, when analysed, into collision with Τὸ ἔν. Thus motion takes place from point to point, therefore within determinate limits: therefore, to make motion rational, intelligible things must be πεπερασμένα: q.a.e. Again, the space between the points is ἀπειρον: q.a.e.
APPENDIX.

The Flying Arrow is made comprehensible by Mr. Proctor's *Photographs of a Galloping Horse.* At a given moment, the horse is point-blank to the plate. Professor Monck's objection, that the body might move during the breaks,† would have served Zeno, for it would bring out his point that rest is motion and motion rest.

Plato makes much use of Zeno; for Ῥ ὁ ἅλον, being ἐν ἐτέρψε, is on the way to motion.

* Gentleman's Magazine, December, 1881.
† Monck's Hamilton, p. 98.
APPENDIX B.

Plato's method of specification is given most fully in the Philebus, 14 c-18 d. It has nothing to do with referring, say, an individual man to the class Man, a process which is justly caricatured in ὁ τριτος ἀνθρωπος. If the man is in the class, why do you take him out of it? If he is not in it, how do you get him into it? By a medium, which must be related, and both; therefore ὁ τριτος ἀνθρωπος is irrepressible.

The Platonic process states that there is a unity which can be discerned; that such unity is one pole, while the other is lost in indefiniteness, τὸ ἀπειρον; that the investigator must discover and count the varieties which lie between the two limits, and in that way approach real unity; and when such unity is discovered, we may then disregard the endless variety of intermediate details. It is, therefore, a process of positive research, and not a barren negative. The thing is to be found, if we search, εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. The basis of the process is Τὸ ἐν, just as the basis of Aristotle's view is the existence of γένη in nature. Mill, similarly, has to build his logic on causation, as he understands it; but, to the consistent empirical, there can be no basis of logic except τὸ
"All things," says Hegel, "are a judgment: that is to say, they are individuals, which are a universality or inner nature in themselves. They are a universal, which is individuality. Their universality and individuality are distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other."* Plato's process, as well as Hegel's, is safe against ὁ τρίτος ἀνθρωπος, which no empirical logic is.

* Wallace's Hegel, p. 258.
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