


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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

THE

PARMENIDES OF PLATO,

WITH

INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND NOTES,

BY

THOMAS MAGUIRE,

LL.D., D.Lit.,

FELLOW AND TUTOR, TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.



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THE following edition is intended chiefly for the Metaphysician. That reading, accordingly, has always been preferred which makes the argument more plain.

I am indebted to PROFESSOR DAVIES, of the Queen's College, Galway, for his careful revision of the proofs.

TRINITY COLLEGE,

January, 1882.

INTRODUCTION.

EXISTENCE is an aspect of thought. All existence is thought—thought either actual or possible. That is to say, every mode of existence, when grasped by cognition, would be found to be a mode of thought. Such is the position of the Idealist.

2. The Idealist thinks his case made out, because all such notions as Matter and Things in themselves, when examined, prove to be figments—figments made up of elements so incompatible, that to affirm the one is to deny the other. So Berkeley disposes of Matter, by the bare statement that what is inactive is not causal, and *vice versa*. The Idealist rejects a monster whose sole function is to fill a gap, where there is no gap.

3. The rejection of a zero, made up of incompatibilities which cancel one another, has nothing to do with the position of Plato and Hegel, that Existence, when analysed, yields opposite moments. This brings us to the question—What is Philosophy ?

4. Philosophy makes explicit to thought what is implicitly contained in thought. Berkeley showed that Sensible Qualities are modes of consciousness. Kant showed that consciousness contained a Necessary and Universal element, meaning by *necessary* what is construed to thought as not possibly otherwise than it is; and by *universal* what is thought as exceptionless. These characteristics, Necessity and Universality, Hegel extended to the object, and so to the universe. Philosophy is thus the explicitness of universal thought.

5. The other day, G. H. Lewes, while showing that Physiology could not supersede Psychology, pointed out that while Force could be translated into Feeling, Feeling could not be expressed in Force. Thus the most advanced Empiricism is idealistic.

6. It may be said that Science will in time express Feeling in terms of Force—that it will translate Psychosis into Neurosis. Granted: it is nothing to the point: Neurosis is the antecedent, and so can never be the consequent. Psychosis—thought—will keep its coin of vantage.

7. According to the Idealist, thought is the only object of thought—thought is the sole instrument of thought; and the product of thought is thought.

8. The instrument of thought is thought only;

that is to say, we analyse a synthesis and reconstruct a synthesis out of our analysis. We do nothing more; yet this process condemns as impossible the prevalent opinion that Psychology is Philosophy.

9. In the *Timaeus*, the Demiurge mixes various ingredients in a bowl. Everyone sees that this is Allegory. But when a Psychologist talks of the interaction of Subject and Object—of the action of the Object on the Subject, he is unconsciously allegorical.

10. The older hypothesis was that of Impulse, e.g. Locke's. Yet impulse implies weight, and weight, or gravity, is the result of the whole universe, and, so, cannot account for it. A billiard player may assume that the weight is in the ball; but a thinker ought to see that weight, or any property of a part, must be the result of the whole, and, so, cannot be prior to it. So of Force: it is another word for Movement, and cannot, therefore, originate.

11. So of Chemical Action: chemical action is only possible, because it is the result of certain conditions, and, therefore, cannot cause them. It is easy to say, let Oxygen represent the Subject, Hydrogen the Object, and Water—the result—Consciousness. But the chemist can retranslate: and the weight of the new product is that of the

old elements. Dewar has shown that old elements will form that new substance which is attended by the greatest evolution of heat. On the other hand, in the mental product the old constituents survive, and so the analogy breaks down on every point.

12. So, Psychology starts with a Subject and an Object; and by bringing the two into combination, and by feigning some reciprocal action—either mechanical or chemical—generates the Universe of Consciousness. As before, Subject and Object are results of consciousness at a certain stage, and, therefore, cannot generate it.

13. Des Cartes assumes an Ego, isolated from the rest of the Universe. It is obvious that the Ego is in contrast to the non-Ego; to evolve the non-Ego from the Ego is to offer a proof of that which the proof pre-supposes, and without which the proof would be unmeaning.

14. Locke's Essay is of value as a reply to the Psychology of Des Cartes. As a piece of philosophy, it assumes that there is a Mind on one side, and a set of Things on the other. It is mere Psychology.

15. Natural Realism is not Philosophy. Natural Realism tells us “that along with the presentation of the Object there is always a simultaneous presentation of the Subject, the two being mutually

related to each other.”* True; but this postulates Subject and Object: that is, a Universe, and that Universe cut in two. It is mere Psychology.

16. Atomic theories cannot be Philosophy: they assume Space and Quantity; that is, from an aspect of the Universe they explain the whole.

17. Molecular theories cannot be Philosophy. To the assumptions of Atomism they add the assumption of Quality, and of Difference of Quality. Quality, like quantity and space, must be a result of the Universe. Clerk Maxwell considers that the family likeness of the molecules is an argument that they are not original.

18. Sir John Lubbock has calculated, on the authority of Loschmidt, Stoney, and Sir W. Thomson, that the molecules of gases are not more than the fifty-millionth part of an inch in diameter. It is obvious that any one of these molecules involves the whole problem of Natural Realism, and of the relation of Psychology to Philosophy. Sorby is of opinion that in a length of 1·80,000 of an inch there would probably be from 500 to 2000 molecules—500, for instance, in albumen, and 2000 in water. The nameless fraction of an inch presents us with space and its contents as surely as the field of the

* Monck's *Hamilton*, p. 83, n.

seventy-five millions of worlds, of one of which our earth is but a fraction.

19. Movement in the line of Least Resistance assumes Space, and a System of Pressures. Granting that Space and Motion are Metaphysical Ultima, Philosophy asks why Space and Motion are found in combination. How did the Atom acquire its tenure of Space, and why did Space tolerate the intrusion?

20. Evolution is not Philosophy. If a thing is evolved from within, the process is more than the mere accretion with which the doctrine starts. If the thing gathers material from without, like a rolling snowball, then the process belongs to Mechanics or to Chemistry.

21. "Life," as Virchow expresses it, "is the sum of the joint action of all parts, of the higher or vital ones as of the lower or inferior. There is no one seat of life, but every truly elementary part, especially every cell, is a seat of life." Granting that this statement gives us the results of Physiology, the philosopher must ask, "What brings 'the parts' into juxtaposition? Is it merely a case of juxtaposition, or how otherwise? What is *a part*? What is *higher*? What is *lower*? What is *joint action*?" Socrates would not have had much trouble with a man who described Life as the action of vital parts.

22. Huxley enunciates the hypothesis of Evolution thus:—"The successive species of animals and plants have arisen, the later by the gradual modification of the earlier." As before, if the modification be from within, the fact explodes the theory: if from without, modification is accretion.

23. Sir John Lubbock tells us that "an astonishing variety of most beautiful contrivances have been observed and described by many botanists, especially Hooker, Axel, Delpino, Hildebrand, Bennett, Fritz Müller, and above all Herman Müller and Darwin himself. The general result is, that to insects, and especially to bees, we owe the beauty of our gardens, the sweetness of our fields. To their beneficent, though unconscious action, flowers owe their scent and colour, their honey—nay, in many cases, their form. Their present shape and varied arrangements, their brilliant colours, their honey, and their sweet scent are all due to the selection exercised by insects. In these cases the relation between plants and insects is one of mutual advantage." A Platonist might put it thus: "Insects select flowers by selection." That is, the idea dominates the process, not *vice versa*. At all events, the process implies prior capacity, and therefore reserves for discussion What is Capacity, What is Relation. That is, Physical Science, as always, owes its existence to notions which its professors discard.

24. Professor Huxley, in referring to the nervous system as "that which co-ordinates and regulates Physiological units into an organic whole," uses more metaphysical terms than Virchow. That is, both use terms borrowed from thought to explain that which, according to them, is the explanation of thought. Neurosis is explained by Psychosis, while Neurosis is the only scientific explanation of Psychosis.

25. Spontaneous generation throws no light on Philosophy. Waiving the decisive objection that it would describe a process which takes place in Time, what does the doctrine amount to, if established ? That a mixture of turnip-juice and cheese is, under certain conditions, an antecedent to life. The doctrine is invested with importance by the ignorant, who persist in obtruding on Science the notion Cause, which Science affects to discard.

26. The Scientist, to set aside Metaphysics, reduces Causation to Sequence. If Causation be Sequence only, Thought is not caused by Neurosis. But, in order to degrade Thought, he invests Neurosis with causal power, so that the destruction of Neurosis involves the destruction of Thought. Thought is the Whole of which Causation and Sequence in time are parts—very small parts, indeed.

27. Professor Williamson, in his opening address, gives a sketch of the theories which guided Chemis-

try fifty years ago, and of the changes wrought in them by fifty years' work. Chemical explanation has got rid of predisposing affinities. "Our present explanation" (of a certain phenomenon) "is a simple statement of the fact that under the conditions described, zinc displaces hydrogen from its sulphate." The statement is anything but simple, as it amounts to this:—zinc—one set of relations—displaces hydrogen—a second set of relations—from its sulphate—a third set of relations. A Hegelian would not ask for a more idealistic position than Professor Williamson's simple statement of the fact.

28. Physical Science is not Philosophy, for it requires antecedence and consequence only as an explicit basis. As an *explicit* basis, for the analysis of antecedence and consequence may lead to a great deal more. In fact, it led to the Idealism of Kant.

29. That Science is apparently content with antecedence and consequence is seen in Professor Burdon-Sanderson's address: "Science can hardly be said to begin until we have by experiment acquired such a knowledge of the relation between events and their antecedents, between processes and their products, that in our own sphere we are able to forecast the operations of Nature, even when they lie beyond the reach of desired observation." That is, we predict consequents, because they are caused.

30. Clifford and Lewes hold that the Uniformity of Nature ought to be expressed as the Law of the Collocations of Changes. That is, they merely postulate Simultaneity, Succession, and Fixed Order. What more could an Idealist require?

31. Herbert Spencer's Heredity may account for Necessity as a fact. It does not explain what the Idealist contends for—not merely that a notion is what it is, but that it is explicitly thought as not possibly otherwise—the Necessity of Leibnitz, Kant, and Hegel.

32. Mr. Whittaker, in the interest of Empiricism, reconciles Empiricism with Idealism: “in the final statement of Empiricism, ‘relations’ are just as fundamental as ‘feelings.’ All that afterwards becomes thought is implicit not in mere feeling, but in the primitive relations between ‘feelings.’”* Feelings are capable of primitive relations, simply because both presuppose one intelligible whole—the position of the Idealist.

33. Taking a portion of the Universe, in order to account for the Universe, is as idle as to suppose that a square on a chess-board is the cause of the board. There can be no fraction outside the whole, and the business of Philosophy must be analysis.

* *Mind*, No. 24, p. 507.

34. Taking analysis as the instrument of thought, Plato, in the *Parmenides*, analyses the Universe into τὸ ἔν and τὰλλα τοῦ ἔνος; the position of τὸ ἔν explaining everything, and its negation nullifying everything.

35. Positing τὸ ἔν, the Universe, as conceived by Plato, may be best described in the words of Hegel :* “Free and infinite Form, as a Totality, involves the principle of Matter in itself”—taking Form in his sense of Complete Whole of Characteristics. Without τὸ ἔν, we may have provisionally an Empiricism like that of Hume and Mill, *Parm.* 164 b ; but this, when examined, will end in Nihilism, *Parm.* 165 e.

36. The intelligible element, vindicated by Kant and elaborated by Hegel, is variously termed Ideas and Numbers. The Ideas and Numbers are substantially identical, but Idea denotes the intelligible in relation to the sensibility, while the Numbers are the movements of the pure, intelligible process.

37. Τὸ ἔν brings the *Parmenides* into close relation with the notices of Platonic doctrine preserved in Aristotle and his Scholiasts, as τὸ ἔν is the formative element in the Idea, and the spring from which the Numbers flow.

* *Logic*, p. 204, Wallace's translation.

38. Xenocrates has given a hypothetic genesis of the Ideas. It is only to assist apprehension, as *γένεσις* implies evolution in time, which of course does not apply to the Ideas. ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἵστασθέντων ἐγένοντο ἄν, εἰ δυνατὸν αὐτὰς ἦν γενέσθαι.—*Schol.* 828 *a*, 1, 2.

39. Tὸ ἔν is neither Number nor Idea, although without it we should have neither Number nor Idea. Number—ἀριθμὸς—is, according to Greek arithmeticians, σύστημα μονάδων.—*Theon Smyrn.*
23. Tὸ ἔν is the ἀρχὴ of Numerables.

40. As τὸ ἔν has for its *contre-coup* τὸ ἄπειρον—indefinite plasticity—the first Number is the Dyad, αὐτοδυάς. That is, The One and τὸ ἄπειρον, as two items, constitute the System of Two Monads—ἡ αὐτοδυάς—the Prime Dyad.—Arist. *Met.* B. iii. The Dyad has for its Material τὸ ἄπειρον, and for its Form τὸ ἔν: αἱ πρῶτον γεγονοῖαι δύο μονάδες ὡς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος, εἴδους δὲ τοῦ Ἀρχικοῦ Ἐνὸς—τοῦ Αὐτοενὸς δηλονότι—αὗται πεποιήκασι τὴν πρώτην Δυάδα.—*Syrianus ap. Schol.* 818 *b*, 46–9.

41. As the Indefinite Dyad is *Majus* and *Minus*—τὸ μέγα and τὸ μικρὸν—each moiety is a monad. These two monads, with τὸ ἔν as unifier and equator, constitute the System of Three Monads—the Prime Triad—ἡ αὐτοτριάς: αἱ δὲ πάλιν δευτέρως γεγονοῖαι τρεῖς μονάδες, ὡς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν καὶ αὗται

τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος, εἴδους δὲ τοῦ Αὐτοενός, πεποιήκασι τὴν Αὐτοτριάδα.—*Syr.* ib. 819a.

42. Lastly, the Indefinite Dyad as plastic, taking on itself the Prime Dyad as formal, constitutes the System of Four Monads—the Prime Tetrad—ἡ αὐτοτετράς: ἐκ τῆς Αὐτοδυάδος καὶ τῆς Ἀρχικοῦ Δυάδος ἦν Ἀόριστον καλεῖ Δυάδα, ἀπετέλουν τὴν Τετράδα· οὐ συντιθέντες αὐτὰς (*sc.* τὰς δυάδας) οὐδὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν αὔξοντες, ἀλλὰ τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος διπλασιάσης τὴν Αὐτοδυάδα, καὶ οὕτως ἀποτεκούσης τὴν Τετράδα.—*Syr.* ib. 819b, 26–31.

43. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δυάς—is no blank infinite. It is plasticity, ἀνεκλειπτός, *Syr.* ib. 907a, 25. Its virtues are best given in the words of Syrianus: κινητικὴν οὖσαν ἀρχὴν πάντα τὰ εἴδη γονίμου πληροῦν δυνάμεως καὶ προάγειν εἰς ἀπογέννησιν τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων ἀύλων εἴδων.—*Syr.* ib. 906b, 30–32. δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων ἀύλων εἴδων are the squares and cubes of the Prime Numbers.

44. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δυάς—is the link between Plato's Physics and Metaphysics. It is Movement both logical and mechanical. All mechanical movement, whether purely mechanical or chemical, is in reality a brief description of relation between two moments. All qualities are relations in disguise. Analysis, therefore, is the supreme organon.

45. The two components of all things, τὸ ἐν
b 2

and τὸ ἀπειρον, are thus Metaphysical Ultima discovered by analysis, and not agents in the mechanical, chemical, or so-called psychological sense.

46. Why did Plato use such barren terms as τὸ ἕν—The One, and τὰλλα—All the rest of it? Τὸ ἕν is the geometrical unit, and Geometry is the medium between Sense and Intellect. Aristotle's usual term for Mathematics, as Plato viewed them, is τὰ μεταξύ.

47. Previous to Plato, the notion The One had been so far developed :—

a. Xenophanes deduced Unity from the theological notion Moral Perfection, making Unity a predicate of Essence :

b. Parmenides, by identifying subject and object, made Unity both the logical and substantive essence of all real existence :

c. Melissus made Unity a predicate, but deduced it from infinity :

d. Zeno defended Unity by proving plurality impossible.

48. In Aristotle's hands the notion Unity became Substance, and in that shape was transmitted by the schoolmen to modern thought. It is obvious that the modern atom is a Lilliputian substance.

49. The One being positive, τὰλλα τοῦ ἔνος is thrown off as its *contre-coup*, by the process which Hegel elaborated.

50. Anti-Platonists, from Aristotle to Jowett, ask—Where are the Ideas? Would a Kantian entertain the question—Where are the Categories, and Ideas, and Forms?

51. According to Hegel, evolution is Specification: according to Haeckel, specification is Evolution. That the road up is the road down must be seen in time.

THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.

THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.

THE philosophical portion of the Dialogue is divided into two parts: the first extends from 127d to 135; and the second from 135 to the end, 166. The first part deals with the question of the relation of the Ideas to sensible things; the second with the relation of the head-Idea—The One—to everything else. The first part discusses generally the relation between the supersensible and the sensible; the second elaborates the relations of the paramount metaphysical entity—The One—to all its subordinates, including sensible things. The second part is thus a particular application of the first; but, as The One is the paramount entity, its relations are all-pervading.

With regard to the first portion, we are told by Mr. Jowett that Plato has anticipated the criticism of all future ages on his Ideas. Mr. Grote declares that there are no dialogues in which the Parmenidean objections to the doctrine of Ideas are elucidated or even recited. But surely all the objections which are urged in the *Parmenides* are

based on an assumption with which the sound doctrine of Ideas has nothing to do.

(1). The Idea is spaceless and timeless. This disposes of the objections illustrated by the day and by the sail: 130e—b 1e, *par.* 6.

(2). The Idea must either admit of finiteness or proceed to infinity. This disposes of the objections urged in 132a b, and in 132d—133a, *pars.* 7 and 9.

(3). The Idea cannot depend for its cognition and existence on man. Its essence cannot be *concipi*: B. 2, b—d, *par.* 8. This to Plato would be a truism.

(4). The Idea cannot exist in total aloofness from man; for this would deprive man on the one hand of all objective knowledge, and God on the other of all knowledge of human knowledge. The obvious conclusions are, that we have a knowledge of the Idea, and that God has so too. These conclusions are quite in accordance with the other Dialogues. It is curious that what Mr. Jowett regards as the true theory of Ideas—that they exist only in the mind—is deliberately rejected by Plato in this Dialogue. If the paramount One does not exist, the result is Phenomenalism and Nihilism. In the same way, Mr. Green, in his introduction to Hume, shows that without Identity and Causation the sensualism of Hume and the phenomenism of J. S. Mill are impossible, and with them untrue.

To moderns, the difficulty is to conceive that the Idea, while timeless and spaceless, is likewise objectively existing. That Plato held the Idea to

be timeless is evident from numberless passages, from the authoritative passage in the *Timaeus*, and the express statement of Aristotle that Plato was the only philosopher who held Time to be the result of what we may call creation. The Idea is likewise *à fortiori* spaceless. Space, according to Plato, is the creature of an illicit process of reasoning, and it is not an object of the senses nor of natural belief. Its double function is to express the apparent but unreal identity of phenomena in a state of flux, and their dependence on the higher essence of the Idea. Aristotle's testimony is conclusive on the point. He asks why Plato does not locate the Idea in space.—*Phys.* iv. ii. 5.

If the Idea be not in time or in space, how does it exist? In the mind, says Mr. Jowett. In what mind? If mind means the human mind, *quâ* human, then we are reduced to individualism. I may infer, or I may not, that there may be some other being with a mind like mine, more or less. If we say in the Divine mind, or in the Universal mind, then the Idea will only be an accident of the higher consciousness. But if we mean by Idea, as Plato did—the Form which perfectly and completely dominates pure thought, and which dominates ours to a smaller extent—then it is true to say that the Idea is not only logically but substantially prior to thought and volition, Divine as well as human, and is therefore independent of both. Surely in a narrower sphere, where a man has consciously grasped the Law of Identity or the

Law of Contradiction, he sees at once that these Laws are something more than the facts of his own brain—something more than actual clearness or passing confusion. But, first, as human thought is dominated consciously or unconsciously by the Laws of thinking, so the Divine Thinking is dominated by the Ideas. To say that Ideas exist in the mind is much the same as saying that the Law of Gravity exists in a man's watch.

The relation of the Idea to sensible things, and of God to both, is somewhat as follows: The Idea consists of two elements, the One and the Indefinite. The Indefinite is pure Passivity. Neither of these elements is created. They are co-eternal with God. God is good. As Aristotle explains it, Goodness is the matter, and One, the form, of the highest Ens. God is also Cause, the notion which brings the One and Goodness into communion. Goodness works through Causality, according to the type set by the Idea of Good. Consequently, the Law which dominates Goodness in its Causal Energy is logically prior to that Energy. On what does the Summum Ens work? On the Indefinite, or the passive element in the Idea, the space, or rather place, of the *Timaeus*. The first causal act of Summum Ens imposes the Law of mere sequence on Passivity. The result is, a chaos of unpredictable sequences, a notion grasped by Milton. The second causal act of Summum Ens is to impose on Chaotic sequence predictable sequence or physical Law, and the result is, the Sensible World. The God of

Plato thus creates nothing, he organises Passivity. Aristotle's question, Why the Idea is not in space, if pressed home, comes to this: Why is the whole Idea, with all its Form and Matter, not in a small fractional result of its Matter misconceived, namely, Place? That Space is not an independent Entity can be proved by other considerations. The non-existence of a Vacuum inside the world is stated positively in the *Timaeus*, where its existence would seem necessary, in the case of one moving body displacing another. This phenomenon Plato explains by the hypothesis of circular motion, a motion which may be exemplified by moving a set of balls round the edge of a "solitaire" board. He has been charged with inconsistency in allowing the structural solids, the Tetrahedron, the Octahedron, and the Icosahedron, to combine in different proportions, all the while he denies the existence of Vacuum. He may easily be defended by the consideration that the complement of the interstices is furnished by $\tau\ddot{o}\ \check{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\nu$ —the element of Passivity or Receptivity in the Idea.

What then is the Sensible Thing, the Sensible Idea of Locke and Berkeley? Relatively to us, it is strictly $\tau\ddot{o}\ \phi\alpha\nu\mu\nu\nu$, $\tau\ddot{o}\ \gamma\iota\gamma\nu\mu\nu\nu$, that which is in course of presentation, and which, therefore, *ex vi termini*, is passing away. Objectively, it is the causal action of God, working through the Idea, on the senses. Logically, and chronologically, it is distinct from the Idea. In essence, it is the contrary of the Idea, as the one is ever abiding and

the other is momentary ; and finally, with regard to theories of perception, the sensible thing bears to its Idea—or rather congeries of Ideas—the relation only of a sign to the thing signified.

“Mind,” says Shelley, “cannot create, it can only perceive.” This is the popular view. It is the usual confounding of Brain and Thought. In the individual, Sensation precedes Thought; Neurosis precedes Psychosis; but Neurosis—Brain—presupposes Space, Time, and all the constituents of Intelligibility.

Everybody agrees that what is in consciousness may be safely dealt with. But the question arises : Is there anything outside consciousness ? In the language of the Dialogue, if $\tauὸ\ \xiν$ is the formative element, what is $\tauἀλλα\ τοῦ\ ἐνός$? In other words, What is $\tauὸ\ ἀπειρον$, which Aristotle represents as the second element in the Idea ? It is food for Form— $\tauὸ\ πέρας$. To alter Clifford’s term, it may be called Form-stuff. And this Form-stuff, at a certain stage of development, is the $\chiώρα$ or space of the *Timaeus*—the only passage in Plato’s writings which Aristotle finds at variance with the official statements in Plato’s lectures.—*Phys.* iv. ii. 5.

To make Space an ultimum in the Platonic Genesis is as preposterous as to make Hegel a Hamiltonian because he allows *Richtigkeit* to the pabulum of the senses. $\Tauὸ\ ἀπειρον$ is not outside consciousness. It is part of consciousness : it is there as $\tauὸ\ ἀπειρον$. The chemical metaphor has taken such hold, that when we talk of an element

of consciousness, we almost *eo ipso* assert that it is not to be found in the mature consciousness, except in a totally different shape. But, in Plato, the original aspect of the element reappears in the compound: $\tauὸ ἀπειρον$ is $\tauὸ ἀπειρον$, and will not be anything else. Plato is thus a thorough-going Idealist: $\tauὸ ἀπειρον$ is part of the domain of thought.

In applying the terms of modern speculation to Plato, it is not meant that he had before him modern problems in their present shape. But the best teaching of our time is the importance of history as a basis of criticism, and this teaching shatters the doctrine that we must read a philosopher by what went before and not by what comes after him.

Hegel allows *Richtigkeit*, but not *Wahrheit*, to the sensible element. Plato is more idealistic; for while in the *Phaedo* he combats the notion that the sensible element is delusive, in the *Republic* he argues that the same volume of raw material may and does admit of opposite relations.

The most striking passage in the Dialogue is where Parmenides rebukes Socrates for withholding ideas from mean objects. This is not really at variance with the passage in the *Timaeus*, 66 d-67 a. There he states that Smells are the result of air and water affecting the organs, and that they are distinguished merely as pleasant or the reverse. In the *Philebus*, Smells are not preceded by any craving, and so far are higher than the plea-

sures of repletion. In our day a great poet has written :—

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies ;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

This is genuine Idealism. What we call a single thing is the concourse of all relations—the complexus of all Ideas—all in all.

ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ,	}	<i>Characters in the Introduction.</i>
ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ,		
ΑΝΤΙΦΩΝ,		
ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ,		
ΠΥΘΟΔΩΡΟΣ,	}	<i>Characters in the Main Discussion.</i>
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,		
ΖΗΝΩΝ,		
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ,		
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ.		

ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

St. III. Ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικό-
p. 126. μεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδειμάντῳ τε καὶ

Introduction.

Γλαύκωνι· καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδεί-
μαντος, χαῖρ', ἔφη, ὁ Κέφαλε, καὶ εἰ τον δέει τῶν
τῆδε, ὃν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί, φράζε. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, εἶπον
ἔγώ, πάρειμι γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.

1. Cepha-
lus relates
his intro-
duction to
Antiphon.

λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν. καὶ ἔγὼ εἶπον, τῷ

b ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ
μέμνημαι. παῖς δέ που ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδή-
μησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν· πολὺς δὲ ἥδη χρόνος
ἔξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης
ὄνομα. πάνυ γε, ἔφη· αὐτῷ δέ γε Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ
τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει; οἴδ', εἶπον ἔγώ, πολῖταί μοι
εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι οὗτος ὁ

c Ἀντιφῶν Πυθοδώρῳ τινὶ Ζήνωνος ἐταίρῳ πολλὰ
ἐντετύχηκε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὓς ποτε Σωκράτης
καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις
ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει. ἀληθῆ,
ἔφη, λέγεις. τούτων τούννυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα δια-
κοῦσαι. ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· μειράκιον γὰρ ὃν
αὐτοὺς ἐν μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν
πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἵππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ
διατρίβει. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ, ἵωμεν παρ' αὐτόν· ἄρτι

γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οίκει δὲ ἔγγὺς ἐν Μελίτη. ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν p. 127. τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι, χαλινόν τινα χαλκεῖ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἱ τε ἀδελφοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὃν ἔνεκα παρεῖμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέ τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ με ἡσπάζετο, καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὕκνει· πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι· ἐπειτα μέντοι διηγεῖτο.

2. Antiphon relates, on the authority of Pythagoras, a conversation between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides; the particulars of the meeting: Zeno is reading aloud his treatise on Existence.

ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν Πυθόδωρον διτὶ ἀφίκοιντό ποτε εἰς Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα b Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὑρίσκομεν μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολιόν, καλὸν δὲ κάγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἔξηκοντα· Ζήνωνα δὲ ἔγγὺς ἐτῶν τετταράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν· καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου γεγονέναι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ τῷ Πυθοδώρῳ ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν Κεραμεικῷ· οἱ δὴ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι c τόν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος γραμμάτων· τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων κομισθῆναι· Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον. ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοὺς τὸν Ζήνωνα αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ Παρμενίδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὅντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, ἥνικα αὐτός τε ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος d ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀριστοτελη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρῳ ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ Ζήνωνος.

τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεῦσαι First part
 τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι,
 καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, πῶς, φάναι, ὁ Ζῆνων, τοῦτο
 εἰ λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἔστι τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ
 ὅμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον
 οὗτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὗτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια
 οὗτον τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; οὕτω, φάναι τὸν
 Ζῆνωνα. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τά τε ἀνόμοια ὅμοια
 εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ
 εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴη, πάσχοι ἀν τὰ ἀδύνατα;
 ἄρα τοῦτο ἔστιν ὁ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ
 ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα,
 ὡς οὐ πολλά ἔστι; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἵει σοι
 τεκμήριον εἶναι ἔκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ
 ἡγεῖται τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὃσους περ
 128 λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά; οὕτω λέγεις,
 ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω; οὐκ, ἄλλα, φάναι
 τὸν Ζῆνωνα, καλῶς συνῆκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὁ
 βούλεται. μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὁ Παρ-
 μενίδη, ὅτι Ζῆνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σοι
 φιλίᾳ βούλεται φέρεισθαι, ἄλλα καὶ τῷ συγ-
 γράμματι. ταῦτὸν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ
 σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἔξαπατάν ὡς
 ἔτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν
 ἢ ἐν φήσις εἶναι Τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει
 καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι,
 τεκμήρια δὲ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέ-
 χεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἐν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά,
 καὶ οὕτως ἑκάτερον λέγειν, ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν
 εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταῦτα, ὑπὲρ
 ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα

First part
 of the
 dialogue:
 preliminary
 discussion,
 the relation
 of Τὰ Εἴδη
 to sensible
 things.

3. Socrates
 criticizes
 Zeno, and
 wishes to
 know if he
 is right in
 the view he
 takes.
 Zeno says
 he is.
 "Then
 you,
 Zeno,"
 says So-
 crates,
 "agree
 with Par-
 menides,
 but you put
 your views
 in the
 negative
 form, that
 Existence
 is non-
 plural,
 while Par-
 menides
 puts his in
 the affir-
 mative,
 that Exis-
 tence is
 one." Zeno
 explains
 that his
 thesis is a
 reductio ad
 absurdum
 of the an-
 tagonistic
 thesis, i.e.
 greater ab-
 surdities
 follow
 from sup-
 posing
 Existence

εἰρήσθαι. ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, ὁ Σώκρατες.
 plural than from sup-
 posing Existence
 one. σὺ δ' οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ παν-
 ταχοῦ γῆσθησαι· καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι ε-
 σκύλακες εὐ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἴχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα·
 ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παν-
 τάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἄπερ
 σὺ λέγεις διανοθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ
 ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὡς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον· ἀλλὰ
 σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τό
 γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ
 Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν
 κωμῳδεῖν, ὡς εἴ ἐν ἔστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμ-
 βαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντι-
 λέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ
 πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ
 πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιό-
 τερα πάσχοι ἀν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἔστιν,
 ἡ ἡ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἰ τις ἰκανῶς ἐπεξίοι. διὰ
 τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονεικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ
 ἐγράφη, καί τις αὐτὸς ἐκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ
 βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο, εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸς εἰς τὸ
 φῶς εἴτε μή. ταύτῃ γ' οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὁ
 Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας οἷει αὐτὸς
 γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας
 ἐπεί, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπείκαστας.

4. Socrates sets forth his theory of Generalization, that the things denoted by general words may participate in opposite
 ήγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸς εἰδός τι Ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὁ ἔστιν Ἀνό- 129 μοιον· τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἄλλα ἀ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν;

καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς Ὄμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια εἴδη, but
γίγνεσθαι ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀν
μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς Ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια,
τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα
ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι
b τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῦ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ
αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά
τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια
ὅμοια, τέρας ἄν, οἶμαι, ἥν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέ-
χοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα,
οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὡς Ζήνων, ἀτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐδέ
γε εἰ ἐν ἀπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ
Ἐνὸς καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ Πλήθους αὖ
μετέχειν ἀλλ' εἰ δὲ ἔστιν Ἐν αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ
c ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὖ τὰ Πολλὰ δὴ ἐν, τοῦτο ἥδη
θαυμάσομαι. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύ-
τως· εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐ-
τοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τάνατία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα,
ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δὲ ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα
καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βού-
ληται πολλὰ ἀποφαίνειν, ως ἔτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ¹
δεξιά μού ἔστιν, ἔτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ
ἔτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἔτερα δὲ τὰ ὅπισθεν, καὶ
ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως· Πλήθους γάρ, οἶμαι,
d μετέχω· ὅταν δὲ ἐν, ἐρεῖ ως ἐπτὰ ἡμᾶν ὄντων εἴς
ἐγώ είμι ἄνθρωπος, μετέχων καὶ τοῦ Ἐνός· ωστε
ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. ἐὰν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα
ἐπιχειρῇ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῦτα ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους
καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ
καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ Ἐν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ
Πολλὰ ἐν, οὐδέ τι θαυμαστὸν λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀπερ

ἀν πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἐὰν δέ τις, ὁ νῦν δὴ ἔγὼ ἔλεγον, πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οἷον Ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ Ἀνομοιότητα καὶ Πλήθος καὶ τὸ Ἐν καὶ Στάσιν καὶ Κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνη, ἀγαίμην ἀν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὡς Ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάνυ ἡγούμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι· πολὺ μέντ' ἀν ὅδε μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην, εἰ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῦς εἴδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὄρωμένοις 130 διήλθετε, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδεῖξαι.

5. Socrates denies the universality of εἴδη. He allows that there are εἴδη of Beauty, Goodness, and such like; he is doubtful about the existence of εἴδη for such things as Man, Fire, and Water; and he is quite positive that there are no εἴδη for such things as Hair, Mud, Filth. Parmenides replies that this is a

λέγοντος δή, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν οὔεσθαι ἐφ' ἕκαστον ἄχθεσθαι τόν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδιάν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ πανσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὡς Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιος εἰ ἀγασθαι τῆς ὄρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· καί μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς δὲ σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; καί τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ Ὁμοιότης χωρὶς ἦς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ Ἐν δὴ καὶ Πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δὴ Ζήνωνος ἥκουες; ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. ἢ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον Δικαίου τι εἴδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ Καλοῦ καὶ Ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων; ναί, φάναι. τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἴδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν ε

οῖοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος Ἀνθρώπου
 ἦ Πυρὸς ἦ καὶ Ὑδατος; ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολ-
 λάκις δῆ, ὁ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα
 χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἦ ἄλλως. ἦ καὶ
 περὶ τῶνδε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἂ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἀν-
 εῖναι, οἷον Θρὶξ καὶ Πηλὸς καὶ Ῥύπος ἦ ἄλλο ὅ-
 τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ
 φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, ὃν
 ἂλλο αὐτῶν ὃν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ
 μή; οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἄλλὰ ταῦτα
 μέν γε, ἀπερ ὄρῳμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ
 τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἦ ἀτοπον. ἦδη
 μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξ μή τι τῇ περὶ πάντων
 ταῦτόν ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ, φεύγων οἰχομαι,
 δείσας μή ποτε εἰς τῷ ἀβύθον φλυαρίαν ἐμπεσὼν
 διαφθαρῶ· ἐκεῖσε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἂ νῦν δὴ
 ἐλέγομεν εἰδῆ ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκείνα πραγματευόμενος
 ε διατρίβω. νέος γάρ εἴ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην,
 ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία,
 ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν
 αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπο-
 βλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

τόδε οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ως φῆς, εἶναι
 εἰδῆ ἄττα, ὃν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς
 131 ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον Ὁμοιότητος μὲν μετα-
 λαβόντα ὅμοια, Μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, Κάλλους τε
 καὶ Δικαιοσύνης δίκαια τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι.
 πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οὐκοῦν ἦτοι δλου
 τοῦ εἶδους ἦ μέρους ἐκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον
 μεταλαμβάνει; ἦ ἄλλη τις ἀν μετάληψις χωρὶς
 τούτων γένοιτο; καὶ πῶς ἀν; εἶπεν. πότερον οὖν

human
way of
thinking,
and that
nothing is
really vile.

6. Parmenides discusses the rationale of Participation: he shows that particular things cannot participate with the *εἶδη* by any mode of Extension, either by way of

whole or
by way of
part, either
simul-
taneously
or succes-
sively, i.e.
the *εἶδος*
is both
spaceless
and time-
less.

δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὅν, ἢ πῶς; τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὁ Παρμενίδη, ἐνεῖναι; ἐν ἄρα ὅν καὶ ταῦτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὖσιν δλον ἄμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν χωρὶς ἀν εἴη. οὐκ ἄν, εἰ γε, φάναι, οἷον ἡ ἡμέρα μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἄμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστιν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἔκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν ἐν πᾶσιν ἄμα ταῦτὸν εἴη. ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῦτὸν ἄμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἴστιώ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον· ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγεῖ λέγειν; ἵσως, φάναι. ἢ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἴστιον εἴη ἄν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ; μέρος. μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἰδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἀν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἑκάστου ἀν εἴη. φαίνεται οὕτω γε. ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ Ἐν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι· καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἐσται; οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν. ὅρα γάρ, φάναι· εἰ αὐτὸν τὸ Μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἔκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει σμικρότερῷ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Μεγέθους μέγα ἐσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται; πάνυ γ', ἔφη. τί δέ; τοῦ Ἰσον μέρος ἔκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει φῶ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰσον τὸ ἔχον ἵσον τῷ ἐσται; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ τοῦ Σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει· τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἐσται ἄτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸν τὸ Σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἐσται· φῶ δ' ἀν προστεθῆ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἐσται ἀλλ' οὐ μεῖζον ἢ

πρών. οὐκ ἀν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτό γε. τίν' οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.

τί δὲ δῆ; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις; τὸ ποῦν; οἷμαί 7. The
132 σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦνδε ἐν ἔκαστον εἴδος οἰεσθαι εἶναι·
ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις
ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι,
ὅθεν ἐν τὸ Μέγα ήγειρε εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.
τί δ' αὐτὸν τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν
ώσταύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης, οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐτῷ
που μέγα φανεῖται, φῶς ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγάλα
φαίνεσθαι; ξοικεν. ἄλλο ἄρα εἴδος μεγέθους ἀνα-
φανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ Μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ
τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν
b ἔτερον, φῶς ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι
δῆ ἐν ἔκαστον σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἄλλ' ἄπειρα
τὸ πλῆθος.

ἄλλα, φάναι, ὁ Παρμενίδης, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ 8. The
τῶν εἰδῶν ἔκαστον ἡ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ
αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἡ ἐν ψυχαῖς·
οὗτῳ γάρ ἀν ἐν γε ἔκαστον εἶη καὶ οὐκ ἀν ἔτι
πάσχοι ἀ νῦν δῆ ἐλέγετο. τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν
ἔκαστον ἔστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός;
ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. ἄλλὰ τινός; ναί. ὅντος ἡ
c οὐκ ὅντος; ὅντος. οὐχ ἐνός τινος, δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν
ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν;
ναί. εἶτα οὐκ εἴδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν
εἶναι, ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; ἀνάγκη αὖ

origin of
the theory
of the
unique
εἶδος: if
the *εἶδος* be
absolutely
distinct
from the
sum of par-
ticulars,
εἶδος in
quantity is
infinite,
which is an
absurdity;
it is there-
fore
unique.

εἶδος per-
haps may
be an intel-
lectual Con-
cept which
exists only
in the mind
of the con-
cipient:
but this
hypothesis
eventuates
in a
dilemma,
and either
alternative
is an ab-
surdity.

φαίνεται. τί δὲ δή; εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τἄλλα φῆς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν, ἢ δοκεῖν σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἔκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὅντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον.

9. *εἶδη*
may per-
haps exist
objectively
as Types to
which sen-
sible things
conform:
but this
hypothesis
would
involve an
infinite
series of
mediating
εἶδη, which
is absurd:
for the
εἶδος is
unique.

ἀλλ', ὁ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὥδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὕσπερ παραδείγματα ἔστανται ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὗτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικε τῷ εἴδει, οὗν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἴδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὅμοιῷ ὅμοιον εἶναι; οὐκ ἔστι. τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὅμοιῷ ἀρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἐνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους μετέχειν; ἀνάγκη. οὐδὲ δ' ἀν τὰ εἶδοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ἦ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα οὗν τέ τι τῷ εἴδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἴδος ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἴδος ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἴδος, καὶ ἀν ἐκεῖνό τῷ ὅμοιον ἦ, ἔτερον αὖ, καὶ 133 οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἀεὶ καινὸν εἴδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἴδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. οὐκ ἄρα ὅμοιότητι τἄλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἄλλα τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ὥ μεταλαμβάνει. ἔοικεν. ὅρᾳς οὖν, φάναι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἡ ἀπορία, ἐάν τις εἴδη ὅντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διορίζηται; καὶ μάλα.

10. If the
εἶδη exist
absolutely,
we cannot
know

εὖ τοίνυν ἵσθι, φάναι, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἄπτει αὐτῆς ὅση ἔστιν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἐν εἴδος ἔκαστον τῶν ὅντων ἀεὶ τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις. πῶς

δή; εἰπεῖν. πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γίγνώσκεσθαι ὅντα τοιαῦτα οἵα φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἰδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἀν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν τύχοι ἔμπειρος ὡν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυῆς, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπίθανος εἴη ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. πῆ δή, ὁ Παρμενίδης; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅτι, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἀν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν ἑκάστον οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογήσαι ἀν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. πῶς γὰρ ἀν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἴδεων πρὸς ἄλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς ἀ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὃν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἔκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ὁμώνυμα ὅντα ἔκείνοις, αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὐτά ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἰδη, καὶ ἔαντῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὗτως. πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οἷον, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλος ἔστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ Δεσπότου δή που, ὃ ἔστι Δεσπότης, ἔκείνου δοῦλος ἔστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ Δούλου, ὃ ἔστι Δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὡν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα ταῦτά ἔστιν· αὐτὴ δὲ Δεσποτεία αὐτῆς Δουλείας ἔστιν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ δουλεία ὥσαύτως, αὐτὴ Δουλεία αὐτῆς Δεσποτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἔκεινα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἔκεινα them, since an absolute object implies as its correlative a faculty of absolute knowledge; and, conversely, Deity, as possessing absolute knowledge, could not have less than absolute knowledge, that is, could not have our knowledge, and therefore would be without some knowledge, which is absurd.

πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ', ὁ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς
αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἔστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὥσαύτως 134
πρὸς ἑαυτά· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὁ λέγω; Πάντα γ',
εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπισ-
τήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὁ ἔστιν Ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὁ
ἔστιν Ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἀν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη;
πάντα γε. ἐκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἢ ἔστιν,
ἐκάστου τῶν ὅντων, ὁ ἔστιν, εἴη ἀν ἐπιστήμη· ἢ
οὐ; ναί. ἢ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ'
ἡμῖν ἀν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὖ ἐκάστη ἢ παρ' ἡμῖν
ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὅντων ἐκάστου ἀν ἐπισ-
τήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά
γε τὰ εἴδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ'
ἡμῖν οἶόν τε εἶναι. οὐ γάρ οὖν. γιγνώσκεται δέ
γέ που ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ τῆς Ἐπιστήμης
αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἀν ἔστιν ἔκαστα; ναί. ὃ γε ἡμεῖς
οὐκ ἔχομεν. οὐ γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγ-
νώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς Ἐπιστήμης
οὐ μετέχομεν. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν
ἔστι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ Καλὸν ὁ ἔστι καὶ τὸ Ἀγαθὸν
καὶ πάντα ἀ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὕσας ὑπολαμβά-
νομεν. κινδυνεύει. ὅρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον
τόδε. τὸ ποῖον; φαίης ἀν ἢ οὐ, εἰπερ ἔστιν αὐτό
τι γένος Ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι
ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην; καὶ Κάλλος καὶ τὰλλα
πάντα οὔτως; ναί. οὐκοῦν εἰπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς
Ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἀν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν
φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην; ἀνάγκη.
ἄρ' οὖν οἶός τε αὖ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν
γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν Ἐπιστήμην ἔχων; τί γάρ οὐ;
ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὃ Σώ-

κρατεῖ, μήτ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἰδη πρὸς τὰ παρ' ήμῶν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ήν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ' ήμῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα. ὡμολόγηται γάρ. οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὗτῇ ἐστὶν ή ἀκριβεστάτη Δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτῃ ή ἀκριβεστάτη Ἐπιστήμη, οὗτ' ἀν ή Δεσποτεία ή ἐκείνων ήμῶν ποτὲ ἀν δεσπόσειν, οὗτ' ἀν ή Ἐπιστήμη ήμᾶς γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ήμῶν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ήμεις τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ήμῶν ἄρχῃ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ήμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοι τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ήμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γιγνώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὅντες. ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη, θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος οὗ, εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι.

ταῦτα μέντοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης,
 135 καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον
 ἔχειν τὰ εἰδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὅντων
 καὶ ὄριεται τις αὐτό τι ἐκαστον εἶδος ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε
 ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴτε ὅ τι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη
 αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα· καὶ
 ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τὶ λέγειν καί, ὁ ἄρτι
 ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσανάπειστον εἶναι· καὶ
 ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνητομένου μαθεῖν
 ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἐκάστον καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ καθ'
 b αὐτῆν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσοντος καὶ
 ἄλλον δυνητομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἵκανῶς
 διευκρινησάμενον. συγχωρῷ σοι, ἔφη, ὁ Παρ-
 μενίδη, ὁ Σωκράτης· πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν
 λέγεις. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἴπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ

11. Without εἰδη,
there can
be no phi-
losophy.

τις δή, ὁ Σώκρατες, αὐτὸν μὴ ἔάσει εἰδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὅριεῖται εἶδος ἐνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἐῶν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν στοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθῆσθαι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

12. Parmenides expounds the Method of philosophizing: every hypothesis should be argued affirmatively, i.e. supposing it to be true, and negatively, i.e. supposing it to be not true, and the consequences negative and positive should be compared. Socrates, continues Parmenides, had rightly conceived that the difficulties arising from Incompatibilities lay in the region of *εἴδη*, and not in the region of

τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; ποιὶ τρέψει ἀγνοούμενων τούτων; οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι. πρῷ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς Καλόν τε τί καὶ Δίκαιον καὶ Ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν· ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρώην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἀνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἵσθι, ή ὁρμή, ήν ὁρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἐλκυστον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἔως ἕτι νέος εἰ· εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ή ἀλήθεια. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὁ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; οὗτος, εἰπεῖν, ὄνπερ ἥκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν τοῦτο γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τούτον ἡγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὅτι οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς εὑρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄλλα περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂ μάλιστά τις ἀν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἰδη ἀν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτη γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὄτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν. καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἕτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἔκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, 136

ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι πῶς λέγεις; φάναι οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἦν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἔστι, τί χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς Πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ‘Ἐν καὶ τῷ ‘Ἐνὶ πρός τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ Πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῦν τί ξυμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ‘Ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς Πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ αὗθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῆ, εἰ ἔστιν ‘Ομοιότης ἡ εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί ἐφ’ ἐκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως ξυμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ Ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ περὶ Κινήσεως καὶ Στάσεως, καὶ περὶ Γενέσεως καὶ Φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ Εἶναι· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἀν δεῖ ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὄτιον ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῦν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ τι ἀν προέληγ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὥσταύτως· καὶ τāλλα αὖ πρὸς αὐτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὃ τι ἀν προαιρῆ ἀεί, ἐάν τε ὡς δὲν ὑποθῆ δὲ ὑπετίθεσο, ἐάν τε ὡς μὴ δὲν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές. ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Παρμενίδη, πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω· ἄλλα μοι τί οὐ διῆλθεις αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός δ τι, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι, ὁ Σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε. ἄλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, Ζήνων, τί οὐ διῆλθεις ἡμῶν; καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι, αὐτοῦ, ὁ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδον· μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον

ἢ ὁ λέγει. η οὐχ ὄρᾶς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἡμεν, οὐκ ἀν αἴξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ επιλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν ἔχειν. ἔγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὁ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.

13. Parmenides consents to argue the question, as to the existence of Unity, affirmatively and negatively: he takes Aristotle, afterwards one of the Thirty, as his assistant.

ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτὸν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὁ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. τὸν οὖν Παρμενίδην, ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καὶ τοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, 137 φῶ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῇ ὅντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφ' ἄρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἔαντὸν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὧν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἴέναι· κάγώ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι, πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὅντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος λόγων· δύμως δέ—δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὁ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοί ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα; η̄ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἀρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἐν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἐν, τί χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα. τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; η̄ ὁ νεώτατος; η̄κιστα γὰρ ἀν πολυπραγμονοῦ, καὶ ἂν οἰεται μάλιστ' ἀν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἄμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλ' ἀν εἴη η̄ ἐκείνου ἀπό-

ε κρισις. ἔτοιμός σοι, ὁ Παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη· ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων· ἀλλ' ἐρώτα ως ἀποκριωμένου.

Εἶεν δή, φάναι· εἰ ἔν ἔστιν, (1) ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἀν εἴη πολλὰ Τὸ Ἐν; πῶς γὰρ ἄν; (2) οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι. τί δή; τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἔστιν. ναί. τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὐδὲν ἀν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῆ, ὅλον ἀν εἴη; πάνυ γε. ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν ἐκ μερῶν ἀν εἴη, ὅλον τε δὲν καὶ μέρη ἔχον. ἀνάγκη. ἀμφοτέρως ἀν ἄρα οὕτως Τὸ Ἐν πολλὰ εἴη, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔν. ἀληθῆ. δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἀλλ' ἔν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δεῖ. οὔτ' ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἔξει, εἰ ἔν ἔσται Τὸ Ἐν. οὐ γάρ. (3) οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ' ἀν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἀν ἥδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη. ὀρθῶς. (4) καὶ μὴν τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἑκάστου. πῶς δ' οὖ; ἀπειρον ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει. ἀπειρον. (5) καὶ εἴ ἀνεν σχήματος ἄρα· οὔτε γὰρ ἀν στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχοι. πῶς; στρογγύλου γέ πού ἔστι τοῦτο, οὐδὲν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἵσον ἀπέχῃ. ναί. καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε, οὐ ἀν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῦ τοῦν ἔσχάτουν ἐπίπροσθεν ἥ. οὕτως. οὐκοῦν μέρη ἀν ἔχοι Τὸ Ἐν καὶ πόλλ' ἀν εἴη, εἴτ' εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές ἔστιν, 138 ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει. ὀρθῶς. (6) καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε δὲν οὐδαμοῦ ἀν εἴη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη. πῶς δή; ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν δὲν κύκλῳ που ἀν περιέχοιτο ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν φῷ ἐνείη, καὶ

14. Second part of the dialogue:
the relation of Tὸ Ἐν
and Τάλλα.

A. The affirmative,
if the One exist:
and
B. The negative,
if the One do not exist.

(A.) The affirmative argument:
(I.) The First Hypothesis:
εἰ Τὸ Ἐν
ἔστιν ἔν, if
the One be
One unconditioned,
the One admits of no predicate whatsoever,
either
(1) Plurality;
(2) Part;
(3) Whole;
(4) Beginning,
Middle,
End; and is therefore
ἀπειρον;
(5) has no Figure,
either curvilinear or
rectilinear;
(6) is not localized
either relatively to
itself or to
anything else;

πολλαχοῦ ἀν αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἐνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῆ κυκλῷ ἄπτεσθαι. ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δὲν κὰν ἑαυτὸν εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη· ἐν τῷ γάρ ^b τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. οὐκοῦν ἔτερον μὲν ἄν τι εἴη αὐτὸν τὸ περιέχον, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταῦτον ἀμα πείστεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω Τὸ "Ἐν οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἔτι ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι που Τὸ "Ἐν, μήτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν. οὐκ ἔστιν. (7) ὅρα δή, οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἶν τέ ἔστιν ἔσταναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι. τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ; ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῦτο ἄν· αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. ναί. ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ ε Τὸ "Ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἐν ἔτι εἶναι. ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται. οὐ φαίνεται. ἀλλ' ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι; ἵσως. καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἦτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἐτέραν ἐξ ἐτέρας. ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· φῶ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε ^a μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; οὐδεμία. ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμεῖβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται; εἴπερ γε δή. οὐκοῦν εἶναι μέν που ἐν τινι αὐτὸν ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; ναί. ἀρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον; οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ. εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ' ἔτι ἐξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴπερ δὴ

(7) has no stationary state, has no motionary state—either by way of—^(α) ἀλλοίωσις, modification, or ^(β) τὸ φέρεσθαι, motion, either circular, or progressive, or qualitative;

έγγιγνεται; ἀνάγκη. εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται
ε τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἀν μόνον πάσχοι οὐ μέρη εἴη· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι αὐτοῦ ηδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἴη
ἄμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἶν τέ που ἔσται
τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἄμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινὸς μήτε
ἔξω. ἀληθῆ. οὐ δὲ μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήθ' ὅλον
τυγχάνει ὅν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαι
που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον;
139 φαίνεται. οὗτ' ἄρα ποι ἴὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ γιγνόμενον
χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὗτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον,
οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον. οὐκ ἔοικεν. κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα
κίνησιν Τὸ "Ἐν ἀκίνητον. ἀκίνητον. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ
εἶναι γέ φαμεν ἐν τινι αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον. φαμὲν γάρ.
οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστιν. τί δή; διτι ηδη ἄν
ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη ἐν φῇ τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστιν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἶν τε ἦν αὐτῷ
ἐνεῖναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἔστι Τὸ "Ἐν
b ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅν οὐθ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὐθ' ἔστηκεν.
οὐ γὰρ οἶν τε. Τὸ "Ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐθ'
ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται. οὐκον δὴ φαίνεται γε.
(8) οὐδὲ μὴν ταῦτον γε οὐθ' ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ
ἔσται, οὐδ' αὐτὸν οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἐτέρου
ἄν εἴη. τί δή; ἐτέρον μέν που ἑαυτοῦ ὅν ἔνδος
ἐτέρον ἄν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἄν εἴη ἐν. ἀληθῆ. καὶ
μὴν ταῦτον γε ἐτέρῳ ὅν ἐκεῖνο ἄν εἴη, αὐτὸ
c δ' οὐκ ἄν εἴη· ὥστε οὐδὲ ἄν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ
ἔστιν, ἐν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρον ἐνός. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ταῦτὸν
μὲν ἄρα ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἐτέρον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται. οὐ
γάρ. ἐτέρον δέ γε ἐτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἄν ἢ
ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἐτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ

(8) has no
Identity,
therefore
no Diver-
sity; no
Similarity,
therefore
no Dis-
similarity;

μόνω ἐτέρῳ, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί. ὁρθῶς. τῷ μὲν
ἄρα ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἐτερον· ἢ οἰει; οὐ δῆτα. οὐ
ἄλλὰ μὴν εὶ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· εὶ δὲ
μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὃν ἐτερον
οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἐτερον. ὁρθῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ταῦτὸν
ἑαυτῷ ἔσται. πῶς δ' οὖ; οὐχ ἥπερ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς
φύσις, αὗτη δήπου καὶ Τοῦ Ταῦτοῦ. τί δῆ; ὅτι
οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ταῦτὸν γένηται τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται.
ἄλλὰ τί μήν; Τοῖς Πολλοῖς ταῦτὸν γενόμενον πολλὰ
ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἄλλ' οὐχ ἐν. ἀληθῆ. ἄλλ' εὶ
Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὸ Ταῦτὸν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὅπότε τι
ταῦτὸν ἐγίγνετο, ἀεὶ ἀν ἐν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὅπότε ἐν,
ταῦτόν. πάνυ γε. εὶ ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταῦτὸν ε
ἔσται, οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· καὶ οὗτος ἐν ὃν οὐχ
ἐν ἔσται· ἄλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον· ἀδύνατον
ἄρα καὶ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἢ ἐτερον ἐτερον εἶναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ
ταῦτόν. ἀδύνατον. οὗτο δὴ ἐτερόν γε ἢ ταῦτὸν
Τὸ Ἐν οὗτ' ἀν αὐτῷ οὗτ' ἀν ἐτέρῳ εἴη. οὐ γὰρ
οὖν. οὐδὲ μὴν ὅμοιον τινι ἔσται οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον
οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ οὐθ' ἐτέρῳ. τί δῆ; ὅτι τὸ ταῦτόν που
πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον. ναί. Τοῦ δέ γε Ἐνὸς χωρὶς
ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν Τὸ Ταῦτόν. ἐφάνη γάρ. ἄλλὰ 140
μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν, πλείω
ἀν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἐν· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ναί.
οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταῦτὸν πεπονθὸς εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν
οὗτε ἄλλῳ οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδὲ ὅμοιον
ἄρα δυνατὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὗτε ἄλλῳ οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐκ
ἔοικεν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν·
καὶ γὰρ οὗτο πλείω ἀν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἐν. πλείω
γάρ. τό γε μὴν ἐτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου
ἀνόμοιον ἀν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταῦτὸν ἢ

πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον. ὁρθῶς. Τὸ δέ γε Ἔν, ὡς ἔοικεν,
οὐδαμῶς ἔτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἐστιν
οὕθ' ἑαυτῷ οὐθ' ἔτέρῳ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα
ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὗθ' ἔτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἀν εἴη
Τὸ Ἔν. οὐ φαίνεται. (9) καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὃν
οὔτε ἵσον οὔτε ἀνισον ἐσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.
πῆ; ἵσον μὲν ὃν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἐσται ἐκείνῳ φῶ
ἀν ἵσον ἥ. ναί. μεῖζον δέ που ἥ ἐλαττον ὅν, οἷς
ε μὲν ἀν ξύμμετρον ἥ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω
μέτρα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω. ναί. οἷς δ'
ἀν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ
μειζόνων μέτρων ἐσται. πῶς γὰρ οὖ; οὐκοῦν
ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ ἥ μέτρων τῶν
αὐτῶν εἶναι ἥ ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν τῶν αὐτῶν; ἀδύνα-
τον. ἵσον μὲν ἄρα οὕτ' ἀν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη,
μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὅν. οὔκουν φαίνεται γε.
ἄλλὰ μὴν πλειόνων γε μέτρων ὃν ἥ ἐλαττόνων,
d ὅσωνπερ μέτρων, τοσούτων καὶ μερῶν ἀν εἴη· καὶ
οὕτως αὖ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐσται, ἄλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ
καὶ τὰ μέτρα. ὁρθῶς. εἰ δέ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἴη,
ἵσον ἀν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον
ἐφάνη, ἵσον τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι. ἐφάνη γάρ. οὔτε ἄρα
ἐνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε
τὸ παράπαν Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ποτε, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ἐσται ἵσον οὔτε ἄλλῳ. οὐδὲ αὖ μεῖζον οὐδὲ
ἐλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὗθ' ἔτέρου. παντάπασι μὲν
e οὖν οὕτως. (10) τί δέ; πρεσβύτερον ἥ νεώτερον ἥ
τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν Τὸ Ἔν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατὸν
εἶναι; τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ; ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν
αὐτὴν ἔχον ἥ αὐτῷ ἥ ἄλλῳ ἵστητος χρόνου καὶ
ὅμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι Τῷ

(9) no mode
of Quan-
tity, either
Equality,
or In-
equality, or
Excess;
therefore
no Defect;

(10) no
mode of
Time;

‘Ενι, οὐθ’ ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἵστητος. ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. πῶς οὖν οἶν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἡ πρεσβύτερον ἡ νεώτερον εἶναι, ἡ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῷ, τοιοῦτον ὄν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἄρ' ἀν εἴη νεώτερον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον Τὸ “Ἐν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύνατ' ἀν εἶναι Τὸ “Ἐν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη; ἡ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἐάν τι ἦν χρόνῳ, ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τό γε πρεσβύτερον ἀεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον; τί μήν; τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἄμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται. πῶς λέγεις; ὥδε· διάφορον ἔτερον ἑτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἥδη ὄντος διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἥδη ὄντος ἥδη εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν, τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλλειν οὔτε εἶναι πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι. ἀνάγκη γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον ειδιαφορότης νεωτέρου ἔστι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. ἔστι γάρ. τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἄμα ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι. ἔοικεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον μήτ' ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι. ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἔστι καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἔκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβύτερόν τε αὐτοῦ ἄμα καὶ νεώτερον

γίγνεσθαι. κινδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ μὴν Τῷ γε Ἐνὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν. οὐ γὰρ μετῆν. οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν τινι χρόνῳ. οὔκουν δή, ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἴρειν. (11) τί οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγίγνετο οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος; καὶ εἰ μάλα. τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἐπειτά που μέλλοντος; ναί. τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν μηδαμῆ μηδενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γεγόνει οὔτ' ἐγίγνετο οὔτ' ἦν ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ' ἔστιν, οὔτ' ἐπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτ' ἔσται. ἀληθέστατα. ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὥπως ἀντι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδὲ ἄρα οὗτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἐν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἀν ἥδη ὅν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικε, Τὸ Ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστω, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν. κινδυνεύει. (12) δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἀν τι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; καὶ πῶς; οὐδὲ ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἰσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδὲ ὄνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἢ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ Τὸ Ἐν ταῦθ' οὗτως ἔχειν; οὔκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

b βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῆ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι. οὔκοντι ἐν εἰ ἔστι,

(11) no
Production, nor
Existence;

(12) no
logical
accident
either of
Name or
Definition;
and no
psycho-
logical
correlative,
either as
Notion,
Perception,
or Concep-
tion. This
conclusion
is rejected.

The meaning of the
Second Hypothesis.

φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποιά ποτε τυγχάνει ὅντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα· οὐχ οὕτως; ναί. ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἀρα οἶόν τε αὐτὸς εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; οὐχ οἶόν τε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία Τοῦ Ἐνὸς εἴη ἄν, οὐ ταῦτὸν οὖσα Τῷ Ἐνί; οὐ γάρ ἀν ἐκείνη ἥν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδὲ ἀν ἐκείνῳ Τὸ Ἐν ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἀν ἥν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἔν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὗτη ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἔν, τί χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἔστιν οὐχ οὕτως; πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἔν; ἀνάγκη. ἀρ' οὖν ἄλλο ἡ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει Τὸ Ἐν, τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδάν τις συλλήβδην εἰπῃ ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν; πάνυ γε.

II. The
Second Hypothesis:
 $\hat{\epsilon}\nu \epsilon\iota \hat{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota$
 $= \epsilon\iota \text{ Tō } ^{\circ}\text{E}\nu$
 $\hat{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota \hat{\nu}$
 $= \epsilon\iota \text{ Tō } ^{\circ}\text{E}\nu$
 $\text{o}\bar{\nu}\text{s}\bar{\iota}\text{as } \mu\bar{\epsilon}\text{-}$
 $\text{t}\bar{\epsilon}\chi\bar{\epsilon}\iota, \text{ Tō }$
 $^{\circ}\text{E}\nu \text{ admits all con-}$
 $\text{tra}r\bar{y} \text{ pre-}$
 dictates.

(1) If the One exist, that is, participate in existence, then the One is infinite in quantity.

Πάλιν (1) δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ ἔστι, τί συμβήσεται. σκόπει οὖν, εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὃν Τὸ Ἐν σημαίνειν, οἷον μέρη ἔχειν; πῶς; ὥδε. εἰ τὸ ἔστι Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὅντος λέγεται καὶ δ Τὸ Ἐν τοῦ ὅντος ἐνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸν Ἡ τε Οὐσία καὶ Τὸ Ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου, οὐδὲ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἐνὸς ὅντος, ἀρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἐν ὃν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια Τό τε Ἐν καὶ Τὸ Εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. πότερον οὖν ἐκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσεροῦμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε μόριον προσρητέον; τοῦ ὅλου. καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἔστιν ὃ ἀν ἐν ἦ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει πάνυ γε. τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τούτων τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὅντος, τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅν, ἀρα ε ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ Εἶναι μόριον ἢ Τὸ Ὁν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μορίου; οὐκ ἀν εἴη. πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τό τε ἐν ἵσχει καὶ τὸ ὅν, καὶ

γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῦ αὐ³ μορίου τὸ
μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὗτως ἀεί, ὃ τί
περ ἀν μόριον γένηται, τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ ἀεὶ ἵσχει·
Τό τε γάρ Ἐν Τὸ Ὀν ἀεὶ ἵσχει καὶ Τὸ Ὀν Τὸ Ἐν·
143 ὥστε ἀνάγκη δύ' ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἐν
εἶναι. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν οὐκοῦν ἀπειρον ἀν τὸ
πλῆθος οὗτω Τὸ Ἐν δν εἴη; ἔοικεν. (2) ἢθι δὴ (2) If the
καὶ τῇδε ἔτι. πῆ; οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν Τὸ Ἐν,
διὸ ἔστιν; ναί. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ Τὸ Ἐν δν πολλὰ
ἔφανη. οὗτως. τί δέ; αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν, ὃ δὴ φαμεν
οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ'
αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἀνευ τούτου οῦ φαμὲν μετέχειν, ἀρά
γε ἐν μόνον φανήσεται ἡ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;
b ἐν, οἷμαι ἔγωγε. ἴδωμεν δή· ἄλλο τι ἔτερον μὲν
ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἔτερον δὲ αὐτό;
·εἴπερ μὴ Οὐσία Τὸ Ἐν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μετέσχεν.
ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἔτερον μὲν Ἡ Οὐσία, ἔτερον δὲ
Τὸ Ἐν, οὔτε τῷ ἐν Τὸ Ἐν Τῆς Οὐσίας ἔτερον οὔτε
τῷ οὐσίᾳ εἶναι Ἡ Οὐσία Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ Τῷ
Ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ Ἀλλῷ ἔτερα ἄλλήλων. πάνυ μὲν
οὖν. ὥστε οὐ ταύτον ἔστιν οὔτε Τῷ Ἐνὶ οὔτε Τῇ
Οὐσίᾳ Τὸ Ἐτερον. πῶς γάρ; τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώ-
c μεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει Τὴν Οὐσίαν καὶ Τὸ Ἐτερον
εἴτε Τὴν Οὐσίαν καὶ Τὸ Ἐν εἴτε Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὸ
Ἐτερον, ἅρ' οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρού-
μεθά τινε ὁ ὄρθως ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω; πῶς;
Ἄδε· ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν; ἔστιν. καὶ αὐθις εἰπεῖν
ἐν; καὶ τοῦτο. ἅρ' οὖν οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῦ
εἴρηται; ναί. τί δ' ὅταν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἐν,
ἄρα οὐκ ἀμφοτέρω; πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν
οὐσία τε καὶ ἔτερον ἡ ἔτερόν τε καὶ ἐν, καὶ οὕτω

(2) If the
One parti-
cipate in
Existence,
Number
must exist.

πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἔκάστου ἄμφω λέγω; ναί. ὁ δὲ ἀν d ἄμφω δρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἅρα οἶόν τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτῷ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή; οὐχ οἶόν τε. ὁ δὲ ἀν δύο ἥτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἔκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἐν εἶναι; οὐδεμία. τούτων ἅρα ἐπείπερ σύνδυο ἔκαστα ἔνυμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἀν εἴη ἔκαστον. φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν ἔστι, συντεθέντος ἐνὸς ὅποιουν γέτινον συζυγίᾳ οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ πάντα; ναί. τρία δὲ οὐ περιττά, καὶ δύο ἄρτια; πῶς δ' οὐ; τί δέ; δυοῖν ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δύο, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ ε ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δὶς ἐν καὶ τῷ τρίᾳ τὸ τρὶς ἐν; ἀνάγκη. δυοῖν δὲ ὄντοιν καὶ δὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δὶς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖτις τρία τρὶς εἶναι; πῶς δ' οὐ; τί δέ; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δὶς ὄντων, καὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ τρὶς ὄντοιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δὶς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς; πολλή γε ἄρτιά τε ἅρα ἄρτιάκις ἀν εἴη καὶ περιττὰ περιττάκις καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττὰ ἄρτιάκις. ἔστιν 144 οὗτος. εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἷει τινὰ ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; οὐδαμῶς γε. εἰ ἅρα ἔστιν ἐν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι. ἀνάγκη. (3) ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πόλλ' ἀν εἴη καὶ πλῆθος ἀπειρον τῶν ὄντων· ἡ οὐκ ἀπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται; καὶ πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἔκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἀν αὐτῆς; ναί. ἐπὶ πάντᾳ ἅρα πολλὰ ὄντα Ἡ Οὐσίᾳ b νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὕτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἡ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἀν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν

(3) If
Number
participate
in Exist-
ence,
Existence
is distribu-
table to
Infinity.

οντων του ἀποστατοῦ; οὐδαμῶς. κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ως οὗν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς οντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, εὶς τι μέρη ἀπέραντα Τῆς Οὐσίας. ἔχει οὕτως πλεῖστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς. πλεῖστα μέντοι.

(4) τί οὖν; ἐστι τι αὐτῶν, διὸ ἐστι μὲν μέρος Τῆς Οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος; καὶ πῶς ἀν τοιοῦτο γέννοιτο; ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεί, ἔωσπερ ἀν ἥ, ἐν γέ τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη. πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἑκάστῳ τῷ Τῆς Οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστι Τὸ "Εν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός.

οὕτως. ἄρα οὖν ἐν δὲν πολλαχοῦ ἄμα ὅλον ἐστί; τοῦτο ἄθρει. ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ, καὶ ὁρῶ δὲν ἀδύνατον. μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον· ἄλλως γάρ που οὐδαμῶς ἄμα ἅπασι τοῖς Τῆς Οὐσίας μέρεσι παρέσται, η ἡ μεμερισμένον. ναί. καὶ μὴν τὸ γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη. ἀνάγκη. οὐκ ἄρ' ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες ως πλεῖστα μέρη 'Η Οὐσία νενεμημένη εἴη. οὐδὲ γάρ πλείω Τοῦ 'Ενὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ' ἵσα, ως ἔοικε, Τῷ 'Ενί· οὔτε γάρ Τὸ *Ον Τοῦ 'Ενὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε Τὸ *Εν Τοῦ *Οντος, ἀλλ' ἐξισοῦσθον δύ' οντε ἀεὶ παρὰ πάντα. παντάπασιν οὔτω φαίνεται. Τὸ *Εν ἄρ' αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ Τῆς Οὐσίας πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος ἐστιν. φαίνεται. οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ δὲν ἐν πολλά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ Τὸ *Εν ὑπὸ Τοῦ *Οντος διανεμημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

(5) καὶ μὴν δὲν γε ὅλον τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένον ἀν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον Τὸ "Εν· η οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια;

(4) If Existence be distributable to Infinity, the One must be distributable likewise.

(5) The One must exhibit Rest and Motion.

ἀνάγκη. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρας ἀν εἴη. 145
 πῶς δ' οὐ; Τὸ "Εν ἄρα δν ἐν τέ ἐστί που καὶ
 πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ
 ἀπειρον πλήθει. φαίνεται. ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπείπερ
 πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; ἀνάγκη. τί δ';
 ὅλον δν οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἀν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτὴν;
 ἡ οἶν τι δλον εἶναι ἀνευ τριῶν τούτων; καν του
 ἐν ὄτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι δλον εἶναι;
 οὐκ ἐθελήσει. καὶ ἀρχὴν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τελευτὴν
 καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἀν Τὸ "Εν. ἔχοι. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε
 μέσον ἵστον τῶν ἔσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γάρ ἀν ἄλλως
 μέσον εἴη. οὐ γάρ. καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς
 ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον δν μετέχοι ἀν Τὸ "Εν, ἥτοι εὐθέος
 ἡ στρογγύλου ἡ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῦ. μετέχοι
 γάρ ἄν. ἀρ' οὖν οὔτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 ἐσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ; πῶς; τῶν μερῶν που ἔκαστον
 ἐν τῷ δλῷ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ δλον. οὔτως.
 πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ δλον περιέχεται; ναί.
 καὶ μὴν τά γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ Τὸ "Εν ἐστι, ο
 καὶ οὔτε τι πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἡ πάντα. οὐ γάρ.
 οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ δλον Τὸ "Εν ἐστιν; πῶς δ' οὐ; εἰ
 ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν δλῷ τυγχάνει ὅντα, ἐστι δὲ
 τά τε πάντα Τὸ "Εν καὶ αὐτὸ Τὸ "Ολον, περιέχεται
 δὲ ὑπὸ Τοῦ "Ολον τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀν
 περιέχοιτο Τὸ "Εν, καὶ οὔτως ἀν ἥδη Τὸ "Εν αὐτὸ^ν
 ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη. φαίνεται. ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε δλον
 αῦ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσίν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε
 ἐν τινί. εἰ γάρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. ἐν
 τινι γάρ ἐνὶ μὴ δν οὐκ ἀν ἔτι που δύναιτο ἐν γε
 ἅπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάντων
 ἐστί, τὸ δὲ δλον ἐν τούτῳ ἔνι, πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς

πᾶσιν ἐνέσται; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὄλον εἴη, τὸ πλέον ἀν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττου εἴη, ὃ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. μὴ δὲν δ' ἐν πλείοσι μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ μηδὲν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὄλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ ε τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν μηδαμοῦ μὲν δὲν οὐδὲν ἀν εἴη, ὄλον δὲ ὅν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι; πάνυ γε. ἦ μὲν ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν ὄλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν· ἦ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὅντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὕτω Τὸ Ἐν ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ. ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς Τὸ Ἐν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι; πῆ; ἐστηκε μέν που, εἴπερ αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν. ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ δὲν καὶ 146 ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀν εἴη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἐστι γάρ. τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ δὲν ἐστὸς δήπου ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι. πάνυ γε. τί δέ; τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀεὶ δὲν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ δὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; οὕτως. ἀνάγκη ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀεὶ δὲν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἐστάναι. φαίνεται. (6) καὶ μὴν ταῦτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτερον b ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις ὡσαύτως ταῦτόν τε καὶ ἑτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν. πῶς; πᾶν που πρὸς ἄπαν ἀδε ἔχει· ἢ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἑτερον· ἢ ἔαν μὴ ταῦτὸν ἦ μηδὲ ἑτερον, μέρος ἀν εἴη τούτου, πρὸς δὲ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὄλον ἀν εἴη. φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν Τὸ Ἐν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδέν ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ ὄλον ἀν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μέρος ὅν. οὐ

(6) The
One must
exhibit
Identity
and Diver-
sity with
regard to—
(α) itself,
and (β)
Τάλλα,
everything
else besides
Τὸ Ἐν.

γὰρ οἶόν τε. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔτερόν ἐστιν ἐνὸς Τὸ "Εν; οὐ δῆτα. οὐδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἔτερον ἀν εἴη. οὐ c μέντοι. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἔτερον μήθ' ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἥδη ταύτον εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; ἀνάγκη. τί δέ; τὸ ἔτέρωθι δὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἔτέρωθι ἐσται; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. οὗτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον Τὸ "Εν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δὲν ἄμα καὶ ἐν ἔτέρῳ. ἐφάνη γάρ. ἔτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ταύτη ἀν ἑαυτοῦ Τὸ "Εν. ἔοικεν. τί οὖν; εἴ τού τι ἔτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἔτέρου d ὅντος ἔτερον ἐσται; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἐν ἐστιν, ἅπανθ' ἔτερα Τοῦ 'Ενός, καὶ Τὸ "Εν τῶν μὴ ἐν; πῶς δ' οὔ; ἔτερον ἄρα ἀν εἴη Τὸ "Εν Τῶν "Αλλων. ἔτερον. ὅρα δή· αὐτό τε Ταύτον καὶ Τὸ "Ετερον ἄρ' οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις; πῶς δ' οὔ; ή οὖν ἐθελήσει Ταύτον ἐν Τῷ 'Ετέρῳ ή Τὸ "Ετερον ἐν Ταύτῳ ποτὲ εἶναι; οὐκ ἐθελήσει. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ "Ετερον ἐν Ταύτῳ μηδέποτ' ἐσται, οὐδὲν ἐστι τῶν ὅντων ἐν φέστι Τὸ "Ετερον χρόνον οὐδένα. εἰ γὰρ ὄντινούν ε εἴη ἐν τῷ, ἐκείνον ἀν τὸν χρόνον ἐν Ταύτῳ εἴη Τὸ "Ετερον. οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτως. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τινι τῶν ὅντων ἀν εἴη Τὸ "Ετερον. ἀληθῆ. οὗτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὔτε ἐν Τῷ 'Ενὶ ἐνείη ἀν Τὸ "Ετερον. οὐ γάρ οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα Τῷ 'Ετέρῳ γ' ἀν εἴη Τὸ "Εν τῶν μὴ ἐν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ 'Ενὸς ἔτερα. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἔτερ' ἀν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα Τοῦ 'Ετερον. πῶς γάρ; εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς 147 ἔτερά ἐστι μήτε Τῷ 'Ετέρῳ, οὐ πάντη ἥδη ἀν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἔτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων; ἐκφεύγοι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Τοῦ Ἐνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἔν· οὐ γάρ ἀν μὴ ἐν ἦν, ἀλλά πη ἀν ἐν ἦν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδὲ ἀν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἔν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν οὗτω μὴ ἐν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμόν γε ἔχοντα. οὐ γάρ οὖν. τί δέ; τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἄρα μόριά ἔστιν; ἡ καν οὗτω μετεῖχε Τοῦ Ἐνὸς τὰ μὴ ἔν; μετεῖχεν.
 b εἰ ἄρα πάντη τὸ μὲν ἐν ἔστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔν, οὗτ' ἀν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν Τὸ Ἐν εἴη οὕθ' ὅλον ὡς μορίων· οὕτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μόρια, οὕθ' ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ Τῷ Ἐνί. οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήθ' ὅλα μήθ' ἔτερα ἀλλήλων ταῦτα ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἔφαμεν γάρ. φάμεν ἄρα καὶ Τὸ Ἐν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὗτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αὐτοῖς; φάμεν. Τὸ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔτερόν τε Τῶν Ἀλλων ἔστι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτὸν ἔκείνους τε
 c καὶ ἑαυτῷ. κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις; ἵστω. ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἔτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων ἔφάνη, καὶ Τἄλλα που ἔτερ' ἀν ἔκείνου εἴη. τί μήν; οὐκοῦν οὗτως ἔτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων, ὕσπερ καὶ Τἄλλα ἔκείνου, καὶ οὕτε μᾶλλον οὕθ' ἥττον; τί γὰρ ἄν; εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήθ' ἥττον, ὅμοίως. ναί. οὐκοῦν ἥ ἔτερον εἶναι πέπονθε Τῶν Ἀλλων, καὶ Τἄλλα ἔκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταῦτη ταῦτὸν ἀν πεπονθότα
 d εἴειν Τό τε Ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις καὶ Τἄλλα Τῷ Ἐνί. πῶς λέγεις; ὠδε· ἔκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸν ὄνομα εἴποις ἀν πλεονάκις ἡ ἄπαξ; ἔγωγε. πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἄπαξ εἴπης, ἔκεινο προσαγορεύεις οὗπέρ έστι τοῦ-
 νομα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἔκεινο; ἡ ἔάν τε ἄπαξ
 ἔάν τε πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸν ὄνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλὴ

ἀνάγκη σε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ λέγειν ἀεί; τί μήν; οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπί τινι; πάνυ γε. ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, ἐάν τε ἄπαξ ἐάν τε πολλάκις, οὐκ εἴπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὄνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὖπερ ἦν ὄνομα. ἀνάγκη. ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἔτερον μὲν Τἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἔτερον δὲ Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων, δις τὸ ἔτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ ἄλλῃ ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν, ἥσπερ ἦν τοῦνομα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἢ ἄρα ἔτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔτερον 148 πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἄλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀν πεπονθὸς εἴη Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις· τὸ δέ που ταῦτὸν πεπονθὸς ὄμοιον οὐχί; ναί. ἢ δὴ Τὸ Ἐν ἔτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἄπαν ἄπασιν ὄμοιον ἀν εἴη· ἄπαν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἔτερόν ἐστιν. ἔοικεν. ἄλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὄμοιον τῷ ἀνομοιώ ἐναντίον. ναί. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον τῷ αὐτῷ. καὶ τοῦτο. ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, ὡς ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις ταῦτόν. ἐφάνη γάρ. τοῦναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταῦτὸ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις τῷ ἔτερον εἶναι Τῶν Ἀλλων. πάνυ γε. ἢ γε μὴν ἔτερον, ὄμοιον ἐφάνη. ναί. ἢ ἄρα ταῦτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἐσται κατὰ τοῦναντίον πάθος τῷ ὄμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὡμοίου δέ που τὸ ἔτερον; ναί. ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα ταῦτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐσται τῷ ἔτερῷ. ἔοικεν. ὄμοιον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἐσται Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις, ἢ μὲν ἔτερον, ο ὄμοιον, ἢ δὲ ταῦτόν, ἀνόμοιον. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δῆ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον. καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει. τίνα; ἢ ταῦτὸν πέπονθε, μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὄμοιον εἶναι· ἢ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ

δν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ταῦτόν τε ἄρα δν Τὸ "Εν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἔτερόν ἐστι, κατ' ἀμφότερα καὶ καθ' ἑκάτερον, ὅμοιον τε ἀν εἴη καὶ δ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις. πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἔαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπείπερ ἔτερόν τε ἔαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτὸν ἔαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ' ἀμφότερα καὶ ἑκάτερον ὅμοιον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται; ἀνάγκη. (7) τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοῦ ἀπτεσθαι Τὸ "Εν αὐτοῦ καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀπτεσθαι πέρι, πῶς ἔχει; σκόπει. σκοπῶ. αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἔαυτῷ ὅλῳ Τὸ "Εν ἐφάνη ὅν. δρθῶς. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις τὸ ἐν; ναί. ^ἢ μὲν ἄρα ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις, Τῶν Ἀλλων ἀπτοιτ' ἀν. ^ἢ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἔαυτῷ, Τῶν μὲν Ἀλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἀπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀπτοιτ' ἀν ἐν ἔαυτῷ ὅν. φαίνεται. οὗτω μὲν δὴ ἀπτοιτ' ἀν Τὸ "Εν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων. ἀπτοιτο. τί δὲ τῆδε; ἀρ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἀψεσθαι τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κεῖσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὖ μέλλει ἀπτεσθαι, ταῦτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἢ ἀν μετ' ἐκείνην ^ἢ ἔδρα, ^ἢ ἀν κέηται οὖ ἀπτεται; ἀνάγκη. καὶ Τὸ "Εν ἄρα εὶ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἀψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μεθ' ἔαυτὸ κεῖσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης, ^ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν. οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν δν Τὸ "Εν ποιήσειεν ἀν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῦν χώραιν ἀμα γένοιτο· ἔως δ' ἀν ^ἢ ἐν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει; οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη Τῷ "Ενὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήθ' ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ. ἡ αὐτή. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν Τῶν Ἀλλων ἀψεται. τί δή; ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἀψεσθαι χωρὶς δν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, οὖ μέλλει ἀψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι. ἀληθῆ. δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ δλύγιστον εἶναι, εὶ μέλλει ἀψις εἶναι. δεῖ. ἐὰν δὲ

(7) The One must be in communion with itself and with *Τάλλα*, everything else; and the One must be out of communion with itself and *Τάλλα*, everything else.

τοῦ δυοῦ ὅρων τρίτον προσγένηται ἔξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἄψεις δύο. ναί. καὶ οὗτο δὴ ἀεί, ἐνὸς προσγιγνομένου, μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾶ ἐλάττους εἶναι. Ὡ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησε τῶν ἄψεων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἡ τὰς ἄψεις, τῷ ἵσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἐπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἄψεων πλεονεκτεῖ. ηδὴ γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἄμα ἐν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄψις εταῖς ἄψεσιν. ὀρθῶς. ὅστα ἄρα ἔστι τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἀεὶ μιᾶς αἱ ἄψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν. ἀληθῆ. εἰ δέ γε ἐν μόνον ἔστι, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄψις οὐκ ἀν εἴη. πῶς γάρ; οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἰπερ ἄλλα ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνεστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις, ἐνὸς μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν αὐτοῖς. πῶς γάρ; οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν ἔστι Τἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν. οὐ. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἔστιν δὲν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἀν εἴη. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστι, δυοῦ μὴ ὄντοιν. οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτ' ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων ἀπτεται οὔτε Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἐπείπερ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ οὖν. οὔτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν τε Ἀλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπτεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἀπτεται. ἔοικεν. (8) ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ισον ἔστι καὶ ἀνισον αὐτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις; πῶς; εἰ μείζον εἴη Τὸ Ἐν ἡ Τἄλλα ἡ ἐλάττων, ἡ αὖ Τἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μείζω ἡ ἐλάττω, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὰ Ἀλλα ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἀν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ἐκάτερα ισότητα ἔχοιεν, οὐταὶ ἀν εἴη πρὸς ἄλληλα·

(8) The One admits of the modes of quantity, Equal, Greater, and Less, both with regard to itself and Τάλλα, everything else.

εὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἡ καὶ
 μέγεθος μὲν Τῷ Ἐν, σμικρότητα δὲ Τάλλα, ὅποτέρῳ
 μὲν τῷ εἴδει μέγεθος προσείη, μεῖζον ἀν εἴη, ὥδε
 σμικρότης, ἔλαττον; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ἐστόν γέ τινε
 τούτω εἴδη, Τό τε Μέγεθος καὶ Ἡ Σμικρότης; οὐ
 γὰρ ἄν που, μὴ ὅντε γε, ἐναντίω τε ἀλλήλου εἴτην
 150 καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐγγιγνοίσθην. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; εἰ
 ἄρα ἐν Τῷ Ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἥτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἀν
 ἡ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη. ἀνάγκη. τί δ' εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ
 ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἡ ἐξ ἵσου ἀν Τῷ Ἐνὶ δι' ὅλου
 αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἡ περιέχουσα αὐτό; δῆλον δή.
 ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἵσου μὲν οὖσα Ἡ Σμικρότης Τῷ Ἐνὶ
 ἵση ἀν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων; πῶς δ' οὐ;
 δυνατὸν οὖν Σμικρότητα ἵσην τῷ εἶναι ἡ μείζω τινός,
 καὶ πράττειν γε τὰ Μεγέθους τε καὶ Ἰσάτητος, ἀλλὰ
 b μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς; ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα Τῷ Ἐνὶ
 οὐκ ἀν εἴη Σμικρότης, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει. ναί.
 οὐδέ γε ἐν παντὶ αὐτῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ταῦτα
 ποιήσει ἀπέρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἵση ἐσται ἡ μείζων τοῦ
 μέρους, ἐν φῷ ἀν ἀεὶ ἐνῇ. ἀνάγκη. οὐδενί ποτε
 ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὅντων Σμικρότης, μήτ' ἐν μέρει
 μήτ' ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένῃ· οὐδέ τι ἐσται σμικρὸν
 πλὴν αὐτῆς Σμικρότητος. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδ' ἄρα
 μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ. μεῖζον γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη
 c ἄλλο, καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ Μεγέθους, ἐκεῦνο ἐν φῷ Τῷ
 Μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὅντος,
 οὗ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ἡ μέγα· τοῦτο δὲ
 ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ Σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἔνι. ἀληθῆ.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ Μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μεῖζον ἡ αὐτῆς
 Σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ Σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἡ αὐτοῦ
 Μεγέθους. οὐ γάρ. οὗτε ἄρα Τὰ Ἀλλα μείζω Τοῦ

Ἐνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε Μέγεθος μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχοντα, οὗτε αὐτῷ τούτῳ πρὸς Τὸ Ἀντίον τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλήλω, οὗτε αὖ Τὸ Ἀντίον τούτοιν οὐδὲ Τῶν Ἀλλων μεῖζον ἢν οὐδὲ ἐλαττον εἴη, μήτε Μέγεθος μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον. οὐκον φαίνεται γε. ἀρ' οὖν εἰ μήτε μεῖζον μήτε ἐλαττον Τὸ Ἀντίον τῶν Ἀλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήθ' ὑπερέχεσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήθ' ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἵσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἵσου δὲ ὃν ἵσου εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ οὖ; καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό εγε τὸ Ἀντίον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὗτως ἢν ἔχοι μήτε Μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον οὕτ' ἢν ὑπερέχοιτο οὕτ' ἢν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἵσου ὃν ἵσου ἢν εἴη ἑαυτῷ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τὸ Ἀντίον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις ἵσου ἢν εἴη. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἢν εἴη ἔξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον ἢν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἐλαττον, καὶ οὗτο μεῖζον ἢν καὶ ἐλαττον εἴη 151 αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ Τὸ Ἀντίον. εἴη γὰρ ἢν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς Τοῦ Ἀντίον τε καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων. πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι που δεῖ τό γε ὃν ἀεί. ναί. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἐν τῷ ὃν ἐν μεῖζονι ἔσται ἐλαττον ὃν; οὐ γὰρ ἢν ἄλλως ἔτερον ἐν ἔτερῳ εἴη. οὐ γάρ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτερόν ἔστι χωρὶς Τῶν Ἀλλων καὶ Τοῦ Ἀντίον, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ηδη ἐν ἄλληλοις εἶναι, Τά τε Ἀλλα ἐν Τῷ Ἀντίον καὶ Τὸ Ἀντίον ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις, ἡ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι; φαίνεται. ὅτι μὲν ἄρα Τὸ Ἀντίον τοῖς Ἀλλοις ἔνεστι, μείζω ἢν εἴη Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἀντίον, περιέχοντα αὐτό, Τὸ δὲ Ἀντίον Τῶν

*Αλλων, περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ Τὰ *Αλλα ἐν Τῷ Ἐνί,
 Τὸ *Ἐν Τῶν *Αλλων κατὰ τὸν ἀντὸν λόγον μεῖζον
 ἀν εἴη, Τὰ δὲ *Αλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἐλάττω. ἔοικεν. Τὸ
 *Ἐν ἄρα ἵσον τε καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἐλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό
 τε αὐτοῦ καὶ Τῶν *Αλλων. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ
 μεῖζον καὶ ἐλαττον καὶ ἵσον, ἵσων ἀν εἴη μέτρων
 καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ Τοῖς *Αλλοις,
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν. πῶς δ' οὖ; ἵσων
 μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὃν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ
 ἀριθμῷ ἐλαττον ἀν καὶ πλέον εἴη αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ
 καὶ Τῶν *Αλλων, καὶ ἵσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς *Αλλοις
 κατὰ ταῦτα. πῶς; ὧνπερ μεῖζόν ἐστι, πλειόνων
 που καὶ μέτρων ἀν εἴη αὐτῶν· ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ
 μερῶν· καὶ ὧν ἐλαττον, ὡσαύτως· καὶ οἵς ἵσον,
 κατὰ ταῦτα. οὕτως. οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ
 ἐλαττον ὃν καὶ ἵσον ἵσων ἀν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειό-
 νων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ
 μερῶν; πῶς δ' οὖ; ἵσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὃν αὐτῷ
 ἵσον ἀν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλέον,
 ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἐλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ. φαίνεται.
 οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς Τἄλλα ὡσαύτως ἔξει Τὸ *Ἐν· ὅτι
 μὲν μεῖζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ
 τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἐλαττον·
 ὅτι δὲ ἵσον μεγέθει, ἵσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι Τοῖς
 e *Αλλοις; ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, Τὸ *Ἐν καὶ
 ἵσον καὶ πλέον καὶ ἐλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε
 αὐτοῦ ἐσται καὶ Τῶν *Αλλων. ἐσται. (9) ἀρ' οὖν
 καὶ χρόνου μετέχει Τὸ *Ἐν, καὶ ἐστι τε καὶ γίγνεται
 νεώτερον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ
 Τῶν *Αλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον
 οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε Τῶν *Αλλων, χρόνου μετέχον; πῶς;

(9) The One admits of the modes of duration, Prior, Simultaneous, and Sub-

sequent,
both with
regard to
itself and
τάλλα,
everything
else.

εἶναι μέν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἐν ἔστιν. ναί. τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἔστιν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρε- 152 ληλυθότος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐσίας ἔστι κοινωνία; ἔστι γάρ. μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; ναί. ἀεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον. ἀνάγκη. ἀρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα, ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται; μεμνήμεθα. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται Τὸ Ἐν, νεωτέρου ἀν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο; ἀνάγκη. γίγνεται μὲν δὴ νεώτερον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὗτοῦ οὗτως. ναί. ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἀρ' οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον, τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πορευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν. οὐ γάρ. ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδὰν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχῃ, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται ἀλλ' ἔστι τότ' ἡδη πρεσβύτερον; προϊὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἀν ποτε ληφθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προϊὸν οὗτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δὲ ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τε ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν. ἀληθῆ. εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὰν κατὰ τοῦτο ἢ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε τοῦτο ὃ τι ἀν τύχῃ γιγνόμενον. φαίνεται. καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύ-

τερον. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν οὗπερ ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ; ναί. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον; ἔστιν. καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἔστιν Τὸν Ἐν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ εὐν. ἀνάγκη. τό γε μὴν οὐν ἀεὶ πάρεστι Τῷ Ἐνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ οὐν ὅτανπερ ἦ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ἀεὶ ἄρα ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον Τὸν Ἐν. ἔστικεν. πλείω δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἦ γίγνεται, ἦ τὸν ίσον; τὸν ίσον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε ίσον χρόνον ἦ γιγνόμενον ἦ ὃν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει. πῶς δ' οὐ; τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὕτε πρεσβύτερον οὕτε νεώτερόν ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ. Τὸν ἄρα τὸν ίσον χρόνον αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὃν οὕτε νεώτερον οὕτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν οὐδὲ γίγνεται. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. τί δέ; Τῶν Ἀλλων; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, εἴπερ ἔτερά ἔστιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔτερον, πλείω ἔστιν ἐνός· ἔτερον μὲν γὰρ ὃν ἐν ἀν ἦν, ἔτερα δὲ ὅντα πλείω ἐνός ἔστι καὶ πλῆθος ἀν ἔχοι. ἔχοι γὰρ ἄν. πλῆθος δὲ ὃν ἀριθμὸν πλείονος ἀν μετέχοι ἦ Τοῦ Ἐνός. πῶς δ' οὐ; τί οὖν; ἀριθμὸν φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἦ τὰ ἐλάττω; τὰ ἐλάττω. τὸ διάγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι Τὸν Ἐν· ἦ γάρ; ναί. πάντων ἄρα Τὸν Ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντων. ἔχει δὲ καὶ Τἄλλα πάντα ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ ἀλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἔστιν. ἔχει γάρ. πρῶτον δέ γε, οἷμαι, γεγονός πρότερον γέγονε, Τὰ δὲ Ἀλλα ὕστερον· τὰ δὲ ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος.

καὶ οὗτος ἀν εἴη Τἄλλα νεώτερα Τοῦ Ἐνός, Τὸ δὲ Ἀν πρεσβύτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων. εἴη γάρ ἄν. τί δὲ τόδε; ἀρ' ἀν εἴη Τὸ Ἀν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη ε γε ἔχον ἐφάνη Τὸ Ἀν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον. ναί. οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου Τῶν Ἀλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τἄλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; τί μήν; καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ' εἶναι πάντα Τἄλλα Τοῦ Ὄλου τε καὶ Ἐνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῦνο ἄμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον. φήσομεν γάρ. τελευτὴ δὲ οἷμαί γε ὕστατον γίγνεται· τούτῳ δ' ἄμα Τὸ Ἀν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι· ὥστ' εἰπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἀν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν ε γίγνεσθαι, ἄμα τῇ τελευτῇ ἀν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἀν Τῶν Ἀλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι. φαίνεται. νεώτερον ἄρα Τῶν Ἀλλων Τὸ Ἀν ἐστι, Τὰ δ' Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα. οὗτος αὖ μοι φαίνεται. τί δὲ δή; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὅτιοῦν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος γέ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὅν; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν Τὸ Ἀν ἄμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἀν καὶ ε ἄμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὃ τι περ ἀν προσγίγνηται ὅτῳοῦν, ἔως ἀν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἐν γένηται, οὕτε μέσου οὕτε πρώτου οὕτε ἔσχάτου οὕτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει. ἀληθῆ. πᾶσιν ἄρα Τοῖς Ἀλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἵσχει Τὸ Ἀν. ὥστ' εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἀν, οὕτε πρότερον οὕθ' ὕστερον Τῶν Ἀλλων γεγονὸς ἀν εἴη, ἀλλ' ἄμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Τὸ Ἀν Τῶν Ἀλλων 154

οῦτε πρεσβύτερον οῦτε νεώτερον ἀν εἴη, οὐδὲ Τάλλα Τοῦ ‘Ενός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ Τάλλα ἐκείνου ώσαύτως. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὗτος ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον Τῶν “Αλλων καὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ ‘Ενός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἀρα ὡσπέρ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὗτο καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἑτέρως; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε, ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστι πρεσβύτερον ἔτερον ἑτέρου, γίγνεσθαι τε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, οὐκ ἀν ἔτι δύναιτο, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ νεώτερον διν ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι· ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἵσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτῳδι, ἵσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὅσῳπερ ἀν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐκ ἀρα τό γε διν τοῦ ὄντος γίγνοιτ’ ἀν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἰπερ ἵσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳν ἀλλ’ ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ’ οὐ. ἀληθῆ. καὶ Τὸ “Εν ἀρα διν Τῶν “Αλλων ὄντων οὗτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὗτε νεώτερον γίγνεται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται. πῆ δή; ἢ Τό τε “Εν Τῶν “Αλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ ‘Ενός. τί οὖν; ὅταν Τὸ “Εν Τῶν “Αλλων πρεσβύτερον ἢ, πλείω που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ Τὰ “Αλλα. ναι. πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἵσον χρόνον, ἀρα τῷ ἵσῳ μορίῳ διοίσει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ; σμικροτέρῳ. οὐκ ἀρα ἔσται, ὅ τι περ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς Τάλλα ἡλικίᾳ διαφέρον Τὸ “Εν, τοῦτο καὶ

εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ῥίσον λαμβάνον χρόνον Τοῖς
 *Αλλοις ἐλαττον ἀεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρό-
 τερον ἢ οὐ; ναι. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἐλαττον διαφέρον
 ἡλικίᾳ πρός τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ' ἀν ἢ ε
 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, πρὸς ἂν ἢν πρεσβύτερον
 πρότερον; νεώτερον. εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ
 ἐκεῖνα αὖ Τἄλλα πρὸς Τὸ Ἐν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρό-
 τερον; πάνυ γε. τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονός πρε-
 σβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ
 πρεσβύτερον ὅν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ
 γίγνεται ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον ἐκεῖνο μὲν γάρ
 ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσι, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον.
 τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γί- 155
 γνεται ὡσαύτως. ίόντε γάρ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον
 τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον
 πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον
 νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἀν οἴω τε
 εἴτην. εἰ γάρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἀν ἔτι γίγνοιντο ἀλλ'
 εἴεν ἄν, νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων
 καὶ νεώτερα· Τὸ μὲν Ἐν Τῶν *Αλλων νεώτερον
 γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὅν καὶ πρότερον
 γεγονός, Τὰ δὲ *Αλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ἡ
 ὑστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ Τἄλλα
 οὕτω πρὸς Τὸ Ἐν ἶσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρε-
 σβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα. φαίνεται
 γάρ οὖν οὕτως. οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτερον ἔτέρου
 πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσω
 ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων ἀεὶ διαφέρειν, οὕτε Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν
 *Αλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ' ἀν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὕτε
 Τἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός· ἢ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἀεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν
 ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ε

ῦστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτη δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι Τά τε Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς καὶ Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα Τὸ Ἐν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτε πρεσβύτερον οὗτε νεώτερον οὗτ' ἔστιν οὗτε γίγνεται οὗτε αὐτοῦ οὗτε τῶν ἄλλων. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει Τὸ Ἐν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἅρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ οὐν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; ἀνάγκη. ἦν ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται. τί μήν; καὶ εἴη ἀν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. πάνυ γε. καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἀν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἰσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ οὐν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράτομεν. ὁρθῶς λέγεις. καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὄνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ Τὰ Ἀλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἔστιν. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὗτος.

ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. (1) Τὸ Ἐν εἰ ἔστιν (III.) *The Third Hypothesis:*
 οὗν διεληλύθαμεν, ἅρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἐν τε ὃν
 καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἐν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον
 χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι
 δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτὲ οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη.
 ἅρ' οὖν ὅτε μετέχει, οὗν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν,
 ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν; οὐχ οὗν τε. ἐν ἄλλῳ
 ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὗτο
 γὰρ ἀν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι.
 156 ὁρθῶς. οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος ὅτε μεταλαμ-

βάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἡ πῶς οἶόν τε ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μή ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀφίγῃ; οὐδαμῶς. τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἀρ' οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἀρ' οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; καὶ πάνυ γε. Τὸ Ἐν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιέν οὐσίαν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται. ἀνάγκη. (2) ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὅν, καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ἀρ' οὐχ, ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἔν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλά, τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε. ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἀρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλή γε. καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὅμοιούσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιούσθαι; ναί. καὶ ὅταν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἵσον, αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι; οὕτως. ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἴστηται καὶ ὅταν ἔστος ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δή που αὐτό γε μηδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. πῶς δή; ἔστος τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἔστάναι, ἀνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν. πῶς γάρ; χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐνῷ τι οἶόν τε ἄμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήθ' ἔστάναι. οὐ γάρ οὖν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἀνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν. οὐκ εἰκός. πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γάρ ἔστος ἀν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλοι, οὕτ' ἐν χρόνῳ ὅν. οὐ γάρ οὖν. ἀρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄποπον τοῦτο, ἐνῷ τότ' ἀν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποιὸν δή; τὸ ἔξαιφνης. τὸ γάρ ἔξαιφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γάρ ἐκ γε τοῦ ἔστάναι

έστωτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλ' ἡ ἔξαιφνης αὕτη φύσις ἀπόπος τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἔστανται καὶ τὸ ἔστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι. κινδυνεύει. καὶ Τὸ Ἀν δῆ, εἴπερ ἔστηκε τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἀν ἐφ' ἐκάτερα· μόνως γὰρ ἀν οὗτως ἀμφότερα ποιεῦ μεταβάλλον δ' ἔξαιφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἀν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινοῦτ' ἀν τότε, οὐδὲ ἀν σταίη. οὐ γάρ. ἀρ' οὖν οὗτως καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ 157 τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; ἔοικε γοῦν. κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἵὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὁμοιον ἵὸν οὔτε ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον. b καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἵσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἵὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἵσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἵσούμενον εἴη ἀν. οὐκ ἔοικε. ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἀν πάσχοι Τὸ Ἀν, εἰ ἔστιν. πῶς δ' οὐ;

τί δὲ Τοὺς Ἀλλοις προσήκοι ἀν πάσχειν, Ἀν εἰ (IV.) *The Fourth Hypothesis: the effect of the existence of the One on Tāllā:*
ἔστιν, ἀρα οὐ σκεπτέον; σκεπτέον. (1) λέγωμεν δῆ, ἐν εἰ ἔστι, Τἄλλα Τοῦ Ἀνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι; λέγωμεν. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἀνὸς ἔστιν, οὔτε Τὸ Ἀν ἔστι Τἄλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἀνὸς

admit contrary predicates.
 (1) If the One exist,
 Τάλλα
 will not be one; but
 (2) Τάλλα
 cannot be altogether
 unconnected with
 the One,
 but
 (3) will
 bear to it
 the relation
 of Fractional
 Parts to an
 Integral Whole;
 and in the
 same way
 (4) each
 Part is
 related to
 Unity as
 the Parts
 of the
 Whole are
 related to
 Unity;
 and, therefore,

ἢν. ὁρθῶς. (2) οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεται γε παντάπασι ε Τοῦ Ἐνὸς Τᾶλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πη. πῆ δή; (3) ὅτι ποῦ Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἀλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἀν ἐν εἴη. ὁρθῶς. (4) μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἀν ὅλον ἔ. φαμὲν γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὗ ἐσται μόρια τὰ μόρια. ἔκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου. πῶς τοῦτο; εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸς εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δή που μόριον ἐσται, ὃ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων δὴ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, εἰπερ καὶ πάντων. ἐνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὃν μόριον, πλὴν τούτου Τῶν Ἀλλων ἐσται, καὶ οὕτως ἐνὸς ἐκάστου οὐκ ἐσται μόριον, μὴ ὃν δὲ μόριον ἐκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἐσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὃν πάντων τούτων τι εἶναι, ὃν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ἀδύνατον εἶναι. φαίνεται γε δή. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινὸς ἴδεας καὶ ἐνός τινος, ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, ε ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἀν τὸ μόριον εἴη. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἄρα Τᾶλλα μόρια ἔχει, καν Τοῦ Ὁλου τε καὶ Ἐνὸς μετέχοι. πάνυ γε. ἐν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός. ἀνάγκη. (5) καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν Τοῦ Ἐνός. εἰ γὰρ ἔκαστον αὐτῶν μόριόν ἐστι, τό γε ἔκαστον εἶναι ἐν δή που 158 σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν Τῶν Ἀλλων, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ ὅν, εἰπερ ἔκαστον ἐσται. ὁρθῶς. μετέχοι δέ γε ἀν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο ὃν ἡ ἐν· οὐ γὰρ ἀν μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀν αὐτὸ ἐν· νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι

(5) as
 Τάλλα
 both in the
 Whole and
 in the Parts
 cannot be
 Unity,
 Τάλλα,
 when con-
 sidered
 alone, can
 only have
 the relation
 of In-
 definite

πλὴν αὐτῷ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀδύνατόν που. ἀδύνατον. μετέ-
χειν δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. therefore
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὅλον ἔσται, οὗ μόρια τὰ μόρια· τὸ
δ' αὖ ἔκαστον ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, οὗ ἀνὴρ μόριον
ἢ ὅλου. οὕτως. (6) οὐκοῦν ἔτερα ὄντα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς Quantity
μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ; πῶς δ' οὖ; τὰ δ' ἔτερα to an index,
Τοῦ Ἐνὸς πολλά που ἀν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ μῆθ' ἐν μῆθ',
ἐνὸς πλείω εἴη Τἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, οὐδὲν ἀν εἴη. οὐ
γὰρ οὖν. ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλείω ἐνός ἔστι τά τε Τοῦ
Ἐνὸς μορίου καὶ Τὰ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὅλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ
ἀνάγκη ἥδη πλήθει ἀπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἔκεινα
τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα Τοῦ Ἐνός; πῶς; ὅδε ἴδωμεν.
ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἐν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐνὸς τότε,
οἵτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει; δῆλα δή.
οὐκοῦν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οἷς Τὸ Ἐν οὐκ ἔνι; πλήθη
μέντοι. τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιού-
των ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἱοί τέ ἔσμεν ὃ τι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ
ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἔκεινο, εἴπερ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς
μὴ μετέχοι, πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἐν; ἀνάγκη.
οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοποῦντι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν
ἔτεραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους, ὅσον ἀν αὐτῆς ἀεὶ ὄρωμεν,
ἀπειρον ἔσται πλήθει; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
καὶ μὴν ἐπειδάν γε ἐν ἔκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται,
πέρας ἥδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ
τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Τοῖς
Ἄλλοις δὴ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ξυμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς
καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔτερόν τι
γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς
ἄλληλα· ἡ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν.
φαίνεται. οὕτω δὴ Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός καὶ ὅλα καὶ
κατὰ μόρια ἀπειρά τέ ἔστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει.

(7) Τάλλα
will admit
of the
opposite
predicates
of Simi-
larity and
Dissimi-
larity, and
of the other
modes of
Quality
above enu-
merated.

πάνυ γε. (7) ούκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια εἰς ἄλληλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς; πῆδή; ἢ μέν που ἄπειρά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα ἀν εἴη ταύτη. πάνυ γε. καὶ μὴν ἢ γε ἄπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτη πάντ' ἀν εἴη ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα. πῶς δ' οὖ; ἢ δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἄλληλοις ὅντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πέπονθεν. ναί. τὰ δ' ἐναντία 159 γε ὡς οὗτον τε ἀνομοιότατα. τί μήν; κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὅμοια ἀν εἴη αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλληλοις, κατὰ δ' ἀμφότερα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα. κινδυνεύει. οὕτω δὴ Τὰ "Ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλληλοις ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀν εἴη. οὕτως. καὶ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἔτερα ἄλληλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὑρήσομεν πεπονθότα Τάλλα Τοῦ 'Ενός, ἐπείπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα. b ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

(V.) *The Fifth Hypothesis :
εἰ εἰ
ἐστι: the effect of the existence of the One on
Τάλλα further considered, i.e.,
Τάλλα owe their contrary and all other predicates to
Τὸ "Εν.*

(1) If
Τάλλα be
distinct
from the
One, and if

ούκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ηδη ἐῶμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπιστοκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἐν εἰ ἐστιν, ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει Τὰ "Ἄλλα Τοῦ 'Ενός ἢ οὕτω μόνον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. λέγωμεν δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ ἐστι, τί χρὴ Τὰ "Ἄλλα Τοῦ 'Ενός πεπονθέναι. λέγωμεν γάρ. (1) ἀρ' οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν Τὸ "Εν Τῶν "Άλλων, χωρὶς δὲ Τάλλα Τοῦ 'Ενός εἶναι; τί δή; ὅτι που οὐκ ἐστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτερον, δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστι Τοῦ 'Ενός, ἄλλο δὲ Τῶν "Άλλων. πάντα γὰρ εἰρηται, ὅταν ρήθῃ Τό τε "Εν καὶ Τάλλα. πάντα γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐτ' ἐστιν ἔτερον τούτων, ἐν φῷ Τό τε "Εν ἀν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ Τάλλα. οὐ γάρ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταῦτῷ ἐστὶ Τὸ "Εν καὶ Τάλλα. οὐκ ἔοικεν. χωρὶς ἄρα; ναί.

(2) οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμέν Tò ὡς ἀληθῶς the One
 ἐν. πῶς γάρ; οὗτ' ἄρα ὅλον εἴη ἀν Tò Ἐν ἐν Toū and Tāllā
 *Άλλοις οὕτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τέ ἔστι Tān be an ex-
 *Άλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει. πῶς γάρ; οὐδενὶ ἄρα ha-
 d τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἀν Tāllā Toū 'Ενός, μήτε κατὰ be no mid-
 μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα. οὐκ de-
 ἔσικεν. οὐδαμῆ ἄρα ἐν Tāllā ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν fore,
 ἑαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδέν. οὐ γάρ οὖν. οὐδ' ἄρα πολλά (2) Tāllā
 ἔστι Tāllā. ἐν γὰρ ἀν ἦν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον can in no
 τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν· νῦν δὲ οὐθ' ἐν οὕτε πολλὰ way admit
 οὐθ' ὅλον οὕτε μόριά ἔστι Tāllā Toū 'Ενός, ἐπειδὴ the One,
 αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῆ μετέχει. ὀρθῶς. (3) οὐδ' ἄρα δύο either frac-
 οὐδὲ τρία οὕτε αὐτά ἔστι Tā 'Άλλα οὕτε ἔνεστι tionally or
 e ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰπερ Toū 'Ενὸς πανταχῇ στέρεται. οὗτος integrally,
 (4) οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὕτε αὐτά ἔστι Tā 'Ενὶ Tāllā, nor can
 'Ενὶ Tāllā, οὕτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ Tāllā
 ἀνομοιότης. εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἴη ἢ admit Plur-
 ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που ality, which is a
 εἶδη ἔναντια ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἀν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς Tā 'Άλλα mode of the
 Toū 'Ενός. φαίνεται. ἦν δέ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῦ
 τινοῦ μετέχειν ἢ μηδ' ἐνὸς μετέχοι. ἀδύνατον.
 οὗτ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὗτ' ἀνόμοια ἔστιν οὗτ' ἀμφότερα
 160 Tāllā. ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἐνὸς ἀν τοῦ
 ἔτερου εἶδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῦ τοῦ
 ἔναντιον· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐφάνη. ἀληθῆ. οὐδὲ
 ἄρα Tā αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἔτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ
 ἔστωτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ
 μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἵσα· οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέ-
 πονθε τῶν τοιούτων. εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι
 ὑπομένει Tā 'Άλλα, καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ δυοῦ καὶ τριῶν καὶ
 περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, διν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον
 The conclusion of the four last hypotheses is: that, if the One exist, the One must exist as all actual individual

existences, and the One, being so far pluralized, cannot be one; and both these propositions hold, with regard to the One when considered both apart from Tállá, and likewise in relation to Tállá (Hypotheses 2 and 3); and both these propositions hold, with regard to Tállá when considered both in relation to the One (Hypothesis 4), and also when considered apart from the One (Hypothesis 5).

ἔφανη μετέχειν, Τοῦ Ἐνός γε πάντη πάντως ὥστε στερομένους. ἀληθέστατα. οὕτω δὴ ἐν εἰς ἔστι, πάντα τέ ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν καὶ οὐδέν ἔστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς Τὰ Ἀλλα ὡσαύτως. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

εἴεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀρότερον μετὰ ταῦτα; σκεπτέον γάρ. τίς οὖν ἀν εἴη αὐτῇ ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; ἀρά τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; διαφέρει μέντοι. διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τούναντίον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστι, τοῦ εἰς ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; πᾶν τούναντίον. τί δ' εἴ τις λέγοι, εἰ Μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ Σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἀρά ἐφ' ἔκαστου ἀν δηλοῦ, ὅτι ἔτερον τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὅν; πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῦ, ὅτι ἔτερον λέγει Τῶν Ἀλλῶν τὸ μὴ ὅν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἐν εἰς μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἵσμεν ὁ λέγει; ἵσμεν. πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἐπειτα ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἐν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν γάρ ἥττον γιγνώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὖ; ἀνάγκη.

(B.) *The negative argument. The meaning of Negation: Negation implies knowledge and difference.*

Ἄδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰς μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι. (1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἐν εἰς μὴ ἔστιν. ἀληθῆ. (2) οὐκοῦν καὶ Τὰ Ἀλλα ἔτερ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἔτερον Τῶν Ἀλλῶν λέγεσθαι; πάνυ γε. καὶ ἔτεροιότης ἄρα ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γάρ τὴν Τῶν Ἀλλῶν ἔτεροιότητα λέγει, ὅταν Τὸ Ἐν ἔτερον Τῶν Ἀλλῶν λέγῃ, ἀλλὰ εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου. φαίνεται. (3) καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου

(VI.) *The Sixth Hypothesis: ἐν εἰς μὴ ἔστι = εἰς τὸ ἔν μὴ ἔστι*

καὶ τοῦ τιὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ δν, if the πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ δν ἐν. οὐ γὰρ One is non-existent— ἀν Τὸ Ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἀν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἔτερα, οὐδ' ἐκείνω ἄν τι ἦν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἄν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τιὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων. ὅρθως. εἶναι μὲν δὴ Τῷ Ἐνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ δεῖστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ Τό γε Ἐν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἐστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε Τὸ Ἐν μήτ' ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἐσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ Τὸ Ἐν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι. καὶ πάνυ γε. (4) καὶ Ἀνομοιότης ἄρ' ἐστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. Τὰ γὰρ Ἀλλα, Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἔτερα ὅντα, ἔτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἄν. ναί. τὰ δ' ἔτεροῖα οὐκ ἄλλοια; πῶς δ' οὐ; τὰ δ' ἄλλοια οὐκ ἀνόμοια; ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοιώ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἄν εἴη. δῆλον. εἴη δὴ ἄν καὶ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἦν Τὰ Ἀλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστίν. ἔοικεν. εἰ δὲ δὴ Τῶν Ἀλλων ἀνομοιότης ἐστιν αὐτῷ, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔαυτοῦ ὄμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; πῶς; εἰ ἔνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἐστι Τῷ Ἐνί, οὐκ ἄν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οἷον Τοῦ Ἐνός, οὐδ' ἄν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἔνος, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἔνος. πάνυ γε. οὐ δεῖ δέ γε. οὐ δῆτα. δεῖ ἄρ' ὄμοιότητα Τῷ Ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἔαυτῷ εἶναι. δεῖ. (5) καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὖ ἵσον ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἵσον, εἴη τε ἄν ἥδη καὶ ὄμοιον ἄν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἴσοτητα· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἐστιν ἐν. ἀδύνατα.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι Τοῦς "Αλλοις ἵσον, ἅρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τἄλλ' ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἵσα εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. τὰ δὲ μὴ ἵσα οὐκ ἄνισα; ναί. τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ Τῷ 'Ανίσῳ ἄνισα; πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ 'Ανισότητος δὴ μετέχει Τὸ "Εν, πρὸς ἣν Τἄλλ' αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἄνισα; δ μετέχει. ἀλλὰ μέντοι 'Ανισότητός γ' ἔστι Μέγεθός τε καὶ Σμικρότης. ἔστι γάρ. ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ Μέγεθός τε καὶ Σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνί; κινδυνεύει. Μέγεθος μὴν καὶ Σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν. πάνυ γε. μεταξὺν ἄρα τι αὐτοῦν ἀεὶ ἔστιν. ἔστιν. ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺν αὐτοῦν ἢ 'Ισότητα; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. ὅτῳ ἄρα ἔστι Μέγεθος καὶ Σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ 'Ισότης αὐτῷ, μεταξὺ τούτοιν οὖσα. φαίνεται. Τῷ δὴ 'Ενὶ μὴ εἴντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ 'Ισότητος ἀν μετείη καὶ Μεγέθους καὶ Σμικρότητος. ἔοικεν. (6) καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πη. πῶς δὴ; ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὗτως ὡς λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὗτως ἔχοι, οὐκ ἀν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες Τὸ "Εν μὴ εἴναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν ἢ οὐχ οὗτως; οὗτω μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδὴ δέ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν. ἀνάγκη. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, Τὸ "Εν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ 162 γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλά τι τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὅμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ δὲν τὸ μὴ δὲν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι γῇ. οὗτως γὰρ ἀν τό τε δὲν μάλιστ' ἀν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ δὲν οὐκ ἀν εἴη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν δὲν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως b

εῖναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὃν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ
ὅν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὃν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν αὐ
τελέως μὴ ἔσται. ἀληθέστατα. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ τῷ
τε ὅντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὅντι τοῦ εἶναι μέ
τεστι, καὶ Τῷ Ἐνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι
ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι. ἀνάγκη. καὶ
οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται Τῷ Ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. φαίνεται.
καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν. πῶς δ' οὖ;
(7) οἵον τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μετα-
βάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἔξεως; οὐχ οἵον τε. πᾶν
c ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἀν οὕτω
τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ. πῶς δ' οὖ; μεταβολὴ δὲ
κίνησις, ἡ τί φήσομεν; κίνησις. οὐκοῦν Τὸ Ἐν
ὅν τε καὶ οὐκ ὃν ἐφάνη; ναί. οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐχ
οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται. ἔοικεν. καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα
τὸ οὐκ ὃν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπείπερ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ
τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον. κινδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ
μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἔστι τῶν ὅντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν,
εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἀν μεθίσταιτό ποθέν ποι. πῶς
γάρ; οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῦται ἄν. οὐ
d γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀν στρέφοιτο· ταύτου
γάρ οὐδαμοῦ ἄπτεται. ὃν γάρ ἔστι τὸ ταύτον· τὸ
δὲ μὴ ὃν ἐν τῷ τῶν ὅντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι. ἀδύνατον
γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν μὴ ὃν στρέφεσθαι ἀν δύναιτο
ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν φῇ μὴ ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ οὖν. οὐδὲ μὴν
ἀλλοιοῦται που Τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὗτε τὸ ὃν οὗτε τὸ
μὴ ὃν. οὐ γάρ ἀν ᾧν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ Τοῦ Ἐνός,
εἴπερ ἡλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τινός.
δρθῶς. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταύτῳ στρέ
e φεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἀρ' ἀν πη ἔτι κινοῦτο; πῶς
γάρ; τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν,

(7) of trans-
ition from
its essence,
Non-exis-
tence, to its
accident,
Existence,
and, there-
fore,

τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἔσταναι. ἀνάγκη. Τὸ Ἀνάγκη. ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὁν ἔστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται. ἔοικεν.
 (8) καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. ὅπη γὰρ ἂν τι κινηθῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον 163 οὐκέθ' ὥσταύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως. οὗτως. κινούμενον δὴ Τὸ Ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται. ναί. καὶ μὴν μηδαμῆ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῆ ἀν ἀλλοιοῦτο. οὐ γάρ. ἢ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὁν ἔν, ἀλλοιοῦται· ἢ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται. οὐ γάρ. Τὸ Ἀνάγκη μὴ δὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται. φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ ἀλλοιούμενον ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἐτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἔξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε γίγνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι; ἀνάγκη. καὶ Τὸ Ἀνάγκη μὴ δὲ μὴν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω Τὸ Ἀνάγκη μὴ δὲ μὴν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

(VII.) *The Seventh Hypothesis: ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι μετέχει οὐσίας: Τὸ Ἀνάγκη admits of no relation or predicate whatsoever.*

αὖθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵωμεν πάλιν, ὀψόμενοι εἰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἀπερ καὶ νῦν, ἢ ἐτέρα. ἀλλὰ χρή. οὐκοῦν ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τί χρὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ ξυμβαίνειν; ναί. (1) τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστι οἵταν λέγωμεν, ἄρα μὴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ φῶς ἀν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. πότερον οὖν, οἵταν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναι φαμεν αὐτό, πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει οἵτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῆ ἔστιν οὐδέ πη μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ δὲν; ἀπλούστατα μὲν οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναιτο ἀν τὸ μὴ δὲν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν. οὐ γάρ. d

(2) τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μή τι ἄλλο partake of Existence, and, therefore,
 ἥ, ἥ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δὲ ἀπολλύναι (2) the non-existent
 οὐσίαν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. φὰ δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτε- One cannot partake of any mode of Quality in the way of Production, Modification, Rest, or Motion, nor
 στιν, οὗτ' ἀν λαμβάνοι οὕτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό. πῶς γάρ; Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῆ ἔστιν, οὕθ' ἔκτεον οὗτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὗτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδα-
 μῶς. εἰκός. οὗτ' ἄρ' ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ δν ἐν οὗτε γίγνεται, ἐπείπερ οὐδαμῆ μετέχει οὐσίας. οὐ φαί-
 νεται. οὐδὲ ἄρ' ἄλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῆ· ἥδη γάρ ἀν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλούοιτο τοῦτο πάσχον. ἀληθῆ.
 εὶ δὲ μὴ ἄλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι;
 ἀνάγκη. οὐδὲ μὴν ἔσταναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ δν. τὸ γάρ ἔστὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινὶ δεῖ ἀεὶ εἶναι.
 τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς γάρ οὐ; οὗτω δὴ αὐτὸ μὴ δν μήτε ποθ' ἔσταναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν. μὴ γάρ οὖν. (3) ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων. (3) of any mode of Quantity by way of Equality, Excess, or Defect, nor (4) of their results—Similarity or Diversity—and, 164 δῆλον. οὗτε ἄρα Μέγεθος οὗτε Σμικρότης οὗτε
 'Ισότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ. (4) οὐδὲ μὴν 'Ομοιότης γε οὐδὲ 'Ετεροιότης οὗτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὗτε πρὸς ἄλλα εἴη ἀν αὐτῷ. οὐ φαίνεται. τί δέ; Τἄλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἀν εἴη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι; οὐκ οὔτε. οὗτ' ἄρ' ὅμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια, οὔτε ταὐτὰ οὔθ' ἔτερά ἔστιν αὐτῷ Τὰ Ἀλλα. οὐ γάρ. (5) τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἥ τὸ ἐκείνω, ἥ τὸ τί, ἥ τὸ τοῦτο ἥ τὸ τούτου, ἥ ἄλλου ἥ ἄλλω, ἥ ποτὲ ἥ ἐπειτα ἥ νῦν, b ἥ ἐπιστήμη ἥ δόξα ἥ αἰσθησις ἥ λόγος ἥ ὄνομα ἥ ἄλλο ὄτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ δν ἔσται; οὐκ οὔται. οὗτω δὴ ἐν οὐκ δν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῆ. οὔκουν δὴ ἔοικε γε οὐδαμῆ ἔχειν. (5) therefore, as a general conclusion the One, as non-existent, cannot exist in any possible way.

ἔτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, Τὰ Ἀλλα τί χρή (VIII.) *The*

Eighth Hypothesis: ἐν εἰ αὐτὰ εἶναι εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀν περὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων λέγοιτο. οὕτως. (2) εἰ δὲ περὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων ὁ λόγος, Τά γε Ἀλλα ἔτερά ἔστιν. ή οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς Τό τε Ἀλλο καὶ Τὸ Ἐτερον; ο ἔγωγε. ἔτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἔτερον εἶναι ἔτέρουν, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου; ναί. καὶ Τοῦς Ἀλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὐ ἄλλα ἔσται. ἀνάγκη. (3) τί δὴ οὖν ἀν εἴη; Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ Ἐνὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὅντος γε. οὐ γάρ. ἄλλήλων ἄρα ἔστι· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται, ή μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις. δρθῶς. (4) κατὰ πλήθη ἄρ' ἔκαστα ἄλλήλων ἄλλα ἔστι. καθ' ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἀν οἵα τε εἴη, μὴ ὅντος ἐνός· ἀλλ' ἔκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὅγκος αὐτῶν ἀπειρός ἔστι πλήθει, καν d τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβῃ τις, ὥσπερ ὅναρ ἐν ὑπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀνθ' ἐνὸς δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παρμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. δρθότατα. τοιούτων δὴ ὅγκων ἄλλα ἄλλήλων ἀν εἴη Τάλλα, εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὅντος ἄλλα ἔστιν. κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὅγκοι ἔσονται, εἰς ἔκαστος φαινόμενος, ὃν δὲ οὔ, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται; οὕτως. (5) καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι e αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἔκαστον, πολλῶν ὅντων. πάνυ γε. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. (6) καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἔκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὅντων. πῶς δ' οὕ; καὶ ἵσος μὴν τοῦς 165 πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἔκαστος ὅγκος δοξασθήσεται

εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἀν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειν ἐλθεῖν· τοῦτο δ' εἴη ἀν φάντασμα ἵστοτητος. εἰκός. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὅγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε πρὸς αὐτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων; πῆ δή; δοτὶ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὡς τι τούτων ὅν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη ἀεὶ φαίνεται
 b ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἐν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνὸς αὐτῶν ἕκαστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνός. ἀλληθέστατα. θρύπτεσθαι δή, οἷμαι, κερματιζό-
 μενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὅν, δ ἀν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ὅγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἐνὸς λαμβάνοιτ' ἀν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
 c (7) οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν δρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ δέξιν νοοῦντι πλήθει ἀπειρον ἐν ἔκαστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται Τοῦ 'Ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος; ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν. οὔτω δὴ ἀπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἔκαστα Τἄλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός. δεῖ γάρ. (8) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι; πῆ δή; οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν
 d εν πάντα φαινόμενα ταῦτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι. πάνυ γε προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἔτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἔαντοῦς. οὕτως. (9) καὶ ὅμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὅγκους αὐτούς τε ἔαντοῦς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις. πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἔαντῶν, καὶ κινουμένους

masses, and
not as
genuine
pluralities;
and, there-
fore,

(6) Number
and its
modes will
only have
an appa-
rent exis-
tence, and,
therefore,

(7) there
will be the
appearance
of a
Minimum,

which in
turn will
appear a
Majus as
contrasted
with a still
smaller
Minus, and

so on to
infinity;
hence,

(8) in the
absence of
real unity,
Unity will

be a mere
confused
view aris-
ing from
imperfect
vision,

closer in-
spection
suggesting
an infinite
Minus as
before;

hence,

(9) Simi-
larity and
Dissimi-
larity, and
the other
modes of

Modifica-
tion and
Quality,
will have

an appa-
rent exis-

tence only,
for there is
no unity to
give them
cohesion.
πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἔστωτας πάντη, καὶ γιγνο-
μένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα
που τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἂ διελθεῖν εὐπετὲς ἥδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ε
ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

(IX.) *The Ninth Hypothesis:* μεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, Τἄλλα δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνός, τί χρὴ
Ἐν εἰ μὴ
ἔστι = εἰ
εἶναι. εἴπωμεν γὰρ οὖν. (1) οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν οὐκ
Τὸ Ἐν οὐ
πηγὸντας
μετρέχει;
the effect of
the non-existence of
Unity on
Τἄλλα,
i.e.,
Τἄλλα
lose their
phenomenal
existence,
and the
result is
absolute
Nothing.
(1) In the
total ab-
sence of
Unity, the
notion of
Unity and
therefore of
Plurality is
impossible,
and, there-
fore,
(2) of Simi-
larity and
Dissimi-
larity, and
of all other
modes of
Quality
and Quan-
tity which
are based
on Unity.

ἔτι δὴ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπω-
μεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, Τἄλλα δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνός, τί χρὴ
Ἐν εἰ μὴ
ἔστι = εἰ
εἶναι. εἴπωμεν γὰρ οὖν. (1) οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν οὐκ
Τὸ Ἐν οὐ
πηγὸντας
μετρέχει;
the effect of
the non-existence of
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Τἄλλα,
i.e.,
Τἄλλα
lose their
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and the
result is
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Nothing.
(1) In the
total ab-
sence of
Unity, the
notion of
Unity and
therefore of
Plurality is
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and, there-
fore,
(2) of Simi-
larity and
Dissimi-
larity, and
of all other
modes of
Quality
and Quan-
tity which
are based
on Unity.

πολλὰ εἰη. ἀληθῆ. μὴ ἐνόντος δὲ ἐνὸς ἐν Τοῖς
Ἄλλοις, οὗτε πολλὰ οὐθ' ἐν ἔστι Τἄλλα. οὐ γάρ.
οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά. τί δή; δτι Τἄλλα 166
τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν
κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ Τῶν
Ἄλλων τῷ ἔστιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἔστι τοῖς μὴ
οὖσιν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ' ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ
Τοῖς Ἀλλοις ἔστιν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξά-
ζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὄν τὸ Τῶν Ἀλλων.
οὐ γάρ οὖν. ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται
τι Τῶν Ἀλλων ἐν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἀνεν γὰρ ἐνὸς
πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. ἐν ἄρα
εἰ μὴ ἔστι, Τἄλλα οὗτε ἔστιν οὗτε δοξάζεται ἐν
οὐδὲ πολλά. οὐκ ἔοικεν. (2) οὐδ' ἄρα δόμοια οὐδὲ
ἀνόμοια. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδὲ ἔτερα,
οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς
πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων
οὗτε τι ἔστιν οὗτε φαίνεται Τἄλλα, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.
ἀληθῆ. οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἴποιμεν, ἐν εἰ ε
μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἔστιν, ὁρθῶς ἀν εἴποιμεν; παντά-
πασι μὲν οὖν.

εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἐν
 εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ Τάλλα καὶ
 πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἔστι
 τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.
 ἀληθέστατα.

The sum of
 the affirmative
 and
 negative
 arguments
 is: affir-
 matively,
 that if the
 One exists,
 the One,
 both in re-
 lation to itself and in relation to Τάλλα, exists in every mode of conditioned existence, and
 in its opposite, and so, the One is not unconditioned or absolute unity, so far as it exists in
 these modes: negatively, if the One does not exist, then all existence both in relation to
 Unity, and in itself, is phenomenal, and this phenomenal existence, when closely scrutinized,
 is entirely destitute of even phenomenal Unity, and therefore of all categories of Quantity
 and Quality whatsoever. The conclusion therefore is: the Universe—Τὸ Πᾶν—is neither
 ἐν alone nor πολλὰ alone, but ἐν-καλ-πολλά.

NOTES.

NOTES.

THE piece is a monologue by Cephalus of Clazomenae. The conversation between the philosophers is supposed to have been originally reported by Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato, and then retailed by Antiphon to Cephalus. Plato, by selecting Antiphon, who is a sporting character, fond of horses (126 c), perhaps wishes to hint that Antiphon has not tampered with the dialogue, *ηκιστα γαρ αν πολυπραγμονοι*, as he says of Aristotle (137 b), and thus offers it as the exposition of his own views. He may also have wished to compliment his half-brother Antiphon, just as he introduces Glauco and Adimantus in the *Republic*. The monologue is thus, on the face of it, a hearsay of a hearsay. Hermann, to get rid of some chronological difficulties, which are insuperable, makes Glauco and Adimantus cousins, and not brothers, of Antiphon. But it is vain to look for the precision of modern history in an ancient imaginative composition. Such exactness is the result of matter-of-fact habits, and of abundant means of verification, such as books of reference, &c. No such habits or means existed till the other day. A strong proof of this is the inaccuracy of quotation, common to all ancient writers, even professed critics.

naturally take an interest in the discussion. The influence of Anaxagoras on Platonic thought is evidenced by the *Phaedo*. To Anaxagoras, Mind owes the recognition of nearly all its metaphysical prerogatives. He set it in a sphere apart, and assigned to it unique properties. Mind alone was strictly infinite, *i.e.* unlimited or untrammelled by anything else, and subsisted by its own inherent strength. Mind was homogeneous, and was the only real existence. Plato is fond of putting doctrines which he adopts into the mouth of a person of the original school. Thus Timæus expounds physics, and the Eleatic Stranger metaphysics, and the more practical Socrates ethics.

126 c.

Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης.

Parmenides and Zeno are described by Strabo as ἄνδρες Πυθαγόρειοι, vi. 1. Their connexion with Pythagoreanism is philosophically real, as one column of the Pythagorean συστοιχία is reducible to τὸ πέρας, and the other to τὸ ἄπειρον.

127 b.

Πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι.

Such a feat of memory, though here a dramatic fiction, cf. *Symp.* 172 a, is rendered plausible by Niceratus's statement that he could repeat the whole *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: Xen. *Conv.* iii. 5. Many rhapsodists could do the same: *ibid.* 6.

127 b.

παιδικά.

.λέγεσθαι γεγονέναι show that Stallbaum's charitable explanation is untenable. There is no doubt suggested of their present friendship: *Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῷ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται φέκεισθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι*, 128 a.

127 e.

εἰ πολλά ἔστι τὰ δύντα.

The argument is as follows :—In the order of Time or subjectivity, the perception of difference between two things A and B precedes the perception of their similarity ; but in the order of existence or objectivity, the differentia of each of the differentia depends on the individual peculiarities of each different. Each of the relatives thus exhibits Identity in relation to itself, and Difference in relation to the other, and so to all other things. If we assume, then, with Zeno, for argument's sake, *τὸ πᾶν*—existence—*τὰ δύντα*—to be plural, each of *τὰ δύντα* is *per se δύοιον* ; but the aggregate is plural, and therefore *τὰ δύντα* being plural are distinct, and therefore *inter se ἀνόμοια*. Zeno accordingly agrees with Leibnitz as to the identity of indiscernibles, thus : Indiscernibles are identical, and therefore non-plural, since primordial things cannot be differenced *inter se* without having been previously differenced *per se*. The Platonist and Hegelian say Plurality is subsumed by Unity without being destroyed by it. The *Aufhebung* settles everything.

127 e.

Τὰ ἀνόμοια.

Stallbaum remarks : Zeno callida conclusione effecit, non esse multa, quum hoc tantum consequatur, non posse huic eidemque rei eadē spectatae ratione plura eaque contraria attribui. To a Greek, the order of Notions would be Motion, Change, Plurality ; Motion denoting not merely physical Motion, *ποθέν ποι*, but the notional movement of Metaphysics. The identity, in the Hegelian sense, of Cause and Effect, is the notion which brings the scientific order of Time into harmony with the order of Logic.

128 d.

εἰ ἔν ἔστι.

Sc. *τὸ Πᾶν*. This is the Subject of the Proposition, for which Philosophy undertakes to find the Predicate :

$\tauὸ πᾶν$ is $\epsilon\nu$, said the Eleatic; it is $\piολλά$, said the Ionic: it is $\epsilon\nu$ καὶ $\piολλά$, said Plato, and to prove this is the gist of the *Parmenides*.

128 d. $\epsilon\iota \piολλά \epsilon\sigmaτιν$: sc. $\tauὸ Πᾶν$.

The gist of Zeno's argument has been perpetually mistaken: Zeno does not deny Motion as a fact, but argues that as implying change, and therefore dissimilarity, it conflicts with the changeless uniformity of the One. In the One there is no contrariety, while contrariety is the essence of Motion. It may be remarked that, if Zeno's two moving bodies be made conscious, one will have double the consciousness of the other. The order of analysis is—Motion implies change, and change plurality. (See Appendix A.)

129 d. $\epsilon\piτὰ \etaμῶν \deltaντων$.

This is irreconcileable with $\alpha\phiικέσθαι τόν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς$, 127 c. If we leave out Cephalus the reciter and Glaucus, who does not speak, we can count up seven persons, viz., Adimantus and Antiphon in the introduction; Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, and Aristotle in the discussion. 'Επτὰ shows that Plato either forgot the original plan or did not care to adhere to it—another proof of the historical unreality of the piece.

130 b. $Xωρίς$.

$Xωρίς$, a notion derived from physical separation: things are properly $Xωρίς$ which are not $\alpha\piτόμενα$, and then the word is applied to things which, as existing under totally distinct conditions, differ in kind. It should be recollected that all notions which differ in any degree are metaphysically distinct, e.g. 3 and 4 are as distinct as 3 and 4 millions.

Moderna look principally to the origin or genesis of things and notions in determining their resemblance or difference, and not to their characteristics when matured.

131 d.

τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ.

With Hermann, I retain the Vulgate *τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ*. Heindorf's *τούτου δὲ αὐτὸ* is plainly wrong. The argument is : If any of us shall have a fragment of smallness, the real smallness will be bigger, because it is the whole, of which the fragment is a part.

131 e.

μεταλαμβάνειν.

μεταλαμβάνειν is a more material expression than *μετέχειν*. Both, however, express the truth, that the Sensible element, in cognition, without the Intelligible, is inconceivable. Professor Huxley invests Sensation with all the Categories, and then tells us we do not want them. Sensibles have, in Hegel's words, *Richtigkeit*, and not *Wahrheit*.

132 a, b.

The unique εἶδος.

This passage gives the reason why the *εἶδος* is unique :— In referring an object to a class we have two things in hand, the particular instance and the genus, *e.g.* the particular man, Socrates, and the genus man, *i.e.* the first and second intentions. Parmenides argues, that to connect the particular with the genus there must be a third concept or notion, and then another to comprehend the three, and so on to infinity. If this be so, *εἶδος* is not unique, but *ἀπειρον*. Now, *ἀπειρον* denotes privation of all *πέρας*, Limitation, therefore of Form, therefore of all Cogitability. But every thing must be either *εν* or *ἀπειρον*, as follows :—In strict logic, the contrary of *τὸ ἀπειρον* is *τὸ πεπερασμένον*; but *τὸ πεπερασμένον* yields on analysis—(1) *τὸ πέρας*; and (2)

something which is not τὸ πέρας, and so ἀπειρον. What is τὸ πέρας, when out of any definite relation to τὸ πεπερασμένον? It must be quantifying power, and we must hold that power to be not plural, but unique; for plural equipollent powers, if adverse, cancel; and if corroborative, result in unity. Τὸ πέρας, therefore, must be ἔν, and therefore Τὸ "Ἐν; for the ultimate Form must be one, and, without τὸ ἔν, as Plato afterwards proves, οὐδὲ φαίνεται τι. The εἶδος, therefore, since it is Form, cannot be ἀπειρον, and therefore must be one. This is Plato's answer to the objections urged in pars. 7 and 9, and known to Greek Logicians as ὁ τρίτος ἀνθρωπος. "We may remark," says Mr. Jowett, "that the process which is thus described has no real existence. The mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end," III. p. 237. Plato, in the *Philebus*, gives the rationale of the Universal. (See Appendix B.)

132 c.

Objection to Conceptualism.

Either each thing consists of νοήματα, i.e. acts of intelligence, and therefore each thing is the being intelligent, i.e. intelligence, or if it be an act of intelligence, it is unintelligent, q. a. e. This argument is a case of the Platonic principle δημοιον δημοίῳ γιγνώσκεται. It is substantially the same as Berkeley's position that mind is mind, that therefore nothing but mind is mind, and, as a further consequence, that nothing but mind can have the properties of mind; it is therefore illogical to ascribe to that which is not mind the properties of mind. Plato does not hold νοῦς to be the ultimate existence either in the moral or in the physical sphere. In the ethical sphere we have Τάγαθόν; *Rep.* vi. 509 b; in the physical, ψυχή: Τούτω δέ [sc. νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε] ἐν φῶ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθον, ἀν ποτέ τις αὐτὸς ἀλλὸς πλὴν ψυχῆν, πᾶν μᾶλλον ἡ τἀληθὲς ἐρεῖ, *Tim.* 36 c; σοφία

$\muὴν$ καὶ νοῦς ἀνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἀν ποτε γενοίσθην, *Phil.* 30 c. M. Ribot overlooks Plato when he says, “Since Will is the centre of ourselves and of all things, we must give it the first rank. It is its due, though since Anaxagoras Intelligence has usurped its place” (*La Philosophie de Schopenhauer*, p. 69, cited in H. Zimmern’s *Sch.* p. 102). The same doctrine is developed as to the priority of ψυχὴ—Motive and Vital Energy—in the *Laws*, written in the “sun-set of life.”—x. 891 e, *sqq.*

133 c.

 $\dot{\alpha}\pi\acute{\iota}\theta\alpha\nu\varsigma = \delta\nu\sigma\alpha\bar{\nu}\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\varsigma$, 135 a.

133 d.

οῦτω and οὔτως.

With regard to the orthography of these words, the insertion of ς before a vowel is plausible. But we must recollect that we can prove that $\tau\acute{i}$ was not elided, and that $\muέχρι$ and $\ddot{\alpha}\chiρι$ had no ς .

134 c. *Objection to the Absolute from the subjective side.*

This brings out the true sense of absolute—Τὸ ἀνυπόθετον, *Rep.* vi.—that which does not depend on anything else for its essence, or outcome, or priority—λόγῳ—in order of thought. Of course, *quā γνωστὸν* to us, it depends on us; but the Absolute may be and is *γνωστὸν* to itself. With regard to us, it is ultimum relatum; with regard to itself, it is not referred to anything else.

135 a. *Objection to the Absolute from the objective side.*

This objection is urged by both Hamilton and Mill, ὅντες ἔχθιστοι τὸ πρίν; but it assumes that because partial knowledge is not plenary knowledge, they therefore contra-

dict each other. How is the geography of Ireland contradictory to the geography of Europe? Plenary knowledge, of course, will correct partial knowledge, and may put it in quite a new light, but the facts on which the partial knowledge is grounded cannot be shaken by the fullest knowledge. Aristotle objects ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ νόησιά. If χωρὶς means that there is a bridgeless chasm between the two, the objection holds—not otherwise. Sense and Intellect are essentially χωρὶς, yet every act of Perception is a blending of both. That the objective sphere, or Things-in-themselves, is unknown and unknowable to us, is held by Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Comte. This doctrine is favoured by the antithesis between phenomenon and reality. As a matter of fact, the Greek word is in the present participle, *i. e.* φαινόμενον, and meant *that which is in the course of appearing*, and not φανέν, that which did appear. In a word, the modern means by φαινόμενον what the Greeks call φάντασμα, a kind of delusive appearance. Carneades distinguishes the act of perception into three parts—τὸ φανταστόν, the object; τὸ φαντασιούμενον, the subject; and φαντασία, the act. Now Plato's meaning is, that τὰ φαινόμενα, or τὰ γιγνόμενα, are possible, because they are produced by permanent reality which is discernible through them. For his conception of genesis of phenomena, see note 154 c.

137 c-143 a.

Τὸ ἐν.

Τὸ ἐν, all through the first proposition, means pure unity prior to all evolution. Like Hegel's *Seyn*, it has not been stripped of attributes, but is prior to all attributes. It is, like the *Seyn*, a postulate of completed thought.

137 d.

πέρας.

Πέρας is the limit *ab intra*: cf. τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἐκάστου: hence, as τὸ ἐν has neither *ab intra*, it is ἄπειρον.

This is taken from Melissus Τὸ δὲ μῆτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον μῆτε τελευτήν, ἄπειρον τυγχάνει τὸν. Fr. 2. Plato does not discuss the other possibility, argued by Melissus, that ἄπειρον could have limits *ab extra*: for there cannot be more than one τὸ ἔν.

137 e.

Plato's right line.

This definition is exact: it is obvious there can only be one such line; and, if it is unique, it follows it is the shortest in *rerum natura*. If Helmholtz's reasoning-beings of two dimensions living on the surface of a sphere understood the definition given by Plato, they would see it to be the shortest possible, and that their own geodetic line was not. If they liked to call the latter straight, of course they might; which is as irrelevant as the entire of Helmholtz's argument.

138 c.

αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.

In the *Laws*—893 b–895—ten modes of motion are specified. Eight of these belong to body: (1), without change of place, *i.e.* on an axis; (2), with change of place—(α), either without change of base, *e.g.* a stone sliding on ice; (β), or with change of base, *e.g.* a ball rolling. The next two are where motion gives rise to—(3), concretion, or (4), decreation. The next two are where concretion is prolonged into (5) growth, or discretion turns into (6) waste. The next is where growth in bulk is prolonged into (7) production of state, and waste into (8) decay. The two movements of mind are (9) to move things other than itself, itself being moved; and (10) to move itself of itself out of a previous state of rest.

The power of transmitting motion as a link in the Chain of Sequence is the only power allowed man by Hume and his followers. The 10th motion includes free-will.

139 b-e.

The One has not Identity with itself or anything else that has distinctness : nor is it distinct from itself or anything else that has distinctness.

That is, the One, being one and nothing else, admits of no relation whatsoever ; if it did, there would be unity and relation, something more than unity, and therefore not unity, *q. a. e.*

It cannot even possess Distinctness, for Distinctness means that A is distinct from B, and so B is in turn distinct from A. If, then, Unity possessed Distinctness, it could only be distinct by means of Unity and not by means of Distinctness; but Unity, *ex vi termini*, is not Distinctness. Therefore Τὸ Ἐν cannot be distinct in itself. A similar argument was urged against St. Anselm, that Unity was not Perfection. The mode of argument is due to the Megarics. The *Aufhebung* is the answer.

139 d.

Source of τὸ Ἐτερον.

I.e. supplying the ellipses εἰ μὴ τούτῳ—τῷ ἐν εἶναι—
ἔσται Ἐτερον, οὐχ ἔαυτῷ ἔσται Ἐτερον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔαυτῷ
ἔσται Ἐτερον, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ ἔσται Ἐτερον. (See note 127 e.)

141 c.

διαφορότης.

διαφορότης was read by Proclus, T. vi. 237, and is supported by *πνιότης*, *Theaetet.* 182 a.

141 e.

γεγόνει.

For *γέγονεν*, Hermann reads *γεγόνει*, as *γέγονεν* has to be taken in two senses, perfect and past.

141 e.

γενηθήσεται.

οὐτ' ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται, will neither come into being, nor be brought into being; will neither come of itself, nor be brought by anything else.

141 e.

Ambiguity of ἐν.

Tὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἐστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, i.e., Tὸ ἐν is neither the relation Unity, nor the quality Existence.

142 a.

ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ.

εἴη ἂν τι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ, would it have any affection resulting to it, or proceeding from it: any income or outcome; i.e. either accident or property.

142 a.

ὄνομα, λόγος, ἐπιστήμη, κ.τ.λ.

Plato gives the following explanation of these terms:—

ὄνομα = the term.

λόγος = definition.

ἐπιστήμη = ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν, φῶ δῆλον ἔτερόν τε δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως τῶν τε λεχθέντων τριῶν, i.e. ὄνομα, λόγος, εἰδωλον.—*Epist.* vii. 342–3.

ἐπιστήμη is the psychical aspect of αὐτό, and is a process of intense activity. Plato objects to the sensible figure of the Circle, that it partakes of the Straight, i.e. is really a zigzag line. *The Circle* then would be the process of describing it without a sensible line (*Epist.* vii.), and in this way ἐπιστήμη resembles the Kantian schema. The *Epistles* are considered genuine by Cobet and Grote, and are very characteristic. At all events, the passage in the 7th could only have been written by a great metaphysician.

δόξα, ἐκ μνήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως.—*Phil.* 38 b.

αἰσθησις = τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει, τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κοινῇ γιγνόμενον, κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι.—*Phil.*, 34 a. This is scientifically true: the sensation lasts only as long as the impressed condition of the nerve is kept up.

142 b—155 e.

Τὸ ἐν.

In the second proposition, Τὸ ἐν is in combination with **ἐστι**. Each element is distinct before combination and in combination; though the combination may and does give rise to new relations.

142 d—e.

Relation of Τὸ ἐν and ὅν.

I. e. τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων Τοῦ Ἐνὸς Ὁντος (Τό τε Ἐν καὶ Τὸ Ὁν), ἀρα ἀπολειπέσθον, ή Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ Ὁντος εἶναι μορίου, ή Τὸ Ὁν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς εἶναι μορίου; i.e. where there is Τὸ Ἐν, Τὸ Ἐν is in combination with Τὸ Ὁν, and Τὸ Ὁν is in combination with Τὸ Ἐν.

εἶναι, c. gen. = to be a property of: cf. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐστι, τούτῳ τῷ μή-ὄντι εἴη ἂν τι, ή αὐτῷ ή αὐτοῦ; 141 a. Can a nonentity have either accident or property?

142 e.

μόριον.

Each one **μόριον**—either **τὸ Ἐν**, or **τὸ Ὁν**—of the two **μόρια τὸ Ἐν and τὸ Ὁν**, holds in combination **Ἐν** and **Ὁν**, and so on, *ad infinitum*.

This is strictly true: the universe has unity, and the universe exists; and each of the motes that people the sun's beam has equally existence and unity. One is Form: Existence is Matter, and to show that the One formulates existence into plurality is the aim of the second part of the *Parmenides*.

143 c.-144 a. *Genesis of Number, i.e. a system of Monads.*

There are three $\sigma\nu\zeta\nu\gamma\iota\alpha$ or pairs, viz. :

$\sigma\nu\sigma\iota\alpha$ and $\xi\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\nu$;
 $\sigma\nu\sigma\iota\alpha$ and $\xi\nu$;
 $\xi\nu$ and $\xi\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\nu$.

Now every pair is $\ddot{\alpha}\mu\phi\omega$, and therefore $\delta\nu\omega$; therefore each member of the pair is $\dot{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{a}\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\nu$, and therefore one: so that in each pair we have two members,

$$2.1 = 2,$$

and each member being unified by the index 1, we have three symbols,

$$3.1 = 3.$$

Now where there is Two, we have $\delta\dot{\iota}\varsigma \xi\nu$, and where there is Three, we have $\tau\dot{\rho}\dot{\iota}\varsigma \xi\nu$; where, therefore, there are three symbols, we have two members

$$(2 \text{ m . } 1 = \delta\dot{\iota}\varsigma \xi\nu \check{\sigma}\nu\tau\omega\nu),$$

and where there are two members we have three symbols

$$(3 \text{ symbols . } 1 = 1 \text{ } \tau\dot{\rho}\dot{\iota}\varsigma \xi\nu \check{\sigma}\nu\tau\omega\nu).$$

Three (symbols) therefore must be two (members), and two (members) must be three (symbols). Therefore $\dot{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota\alpha$ (= $\delta\nu\omega$ = $\delta\dot{\iota}\varsigma \xi\nu$) = $\dot{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota\acute{a}\kappa\iota\varsigma$ (= $\delta\dot{\iota}\varsigma$) $\xi\nu$: and $\pi\epsilon\varrho\iota\tau\tau\acute{a}$ (= $\tau\dot{\rho}\iota\alpha$ = $\tau\dot{\rho}\dot{\iota}\varsigma \xi\nu$) = $\pi\epsilon\varrho\iota\tau\tau\acute{a}\kappa\iota\varsigma$ (= $\tau\dot{\rho}\dot{\iota}\varsigma$) $\xi\nu$: and $\dot{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota\alpha$ (= $\delta\nu\omega$, i.e. members) = $\pi\epsilon\varrho\iota\tau\tau\acute{a}\kappa\iota\varsigma$ (= $\tau\dot{\rho}\dot{\iota}\varsigma$, i.e. symbols; and $\pi\epsilon\varrho\iota\tau\tau\acute{a}$ (= $\tau\dot{\rho}\iota\alpha$, i.e. symbols) = $\dot{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota\acute{a}\kappa\iota\varsigma$ = ($\delta\dot{\iota}\varsigma \xi\nu$) members. From this we have the genesis of every number: for $2 = \delta\dot{\iota}\varsigma \xi\nu$ is $\dot{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota\alpha$ $\dot{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota\acute{a}\kappa\iota\varsigma$, that is even numbers even times; and $3 = \tau\dot{\rho}\dot{\iota}\varsigma \xi\nu$ is $\pi\epsilon\varrho\iota\tau\tau\acute{a}$ $\pi\epsilon\varrho\iota\tau\tau\acute{a}\kappa\iota\varsigma$, that is, odd numbers odd times; and 2 (members) = 3 (symbols) is $\dot{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota\alpha$, even numbers odd times, $\pi\epsilon\varrho\iota\tau\tau\acute{a}\kappa\iota\varsigma$; and 3 (symbols) = 2 (members) is $\pi\epsilon\varrho\iota\tau\tau\acute{a}$, odd numbers even times, $\dot{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota\acute{a}\kappa\iota\varsigma$.

143 d.

οὐδὲ μία.

An instance of Plato's habit of using in the ordinary sense the philosophic word which is under argument: other examples are noticed in note on 157 d.

143 d.

οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ πάντα; i. e. are there not three distinct symbols? lit., are not the distinct things three?

143 d.

Interdependence of 2 and 3.

Let there be two roots, x and y ; let them have a common index, say *e.gr.* 1; and let $x = 1$: then we have x^1 , y^1 .

We have thus three distinct symbols, x , y , and 1; x and y denoting the two roots, and 1 the index common to both. Now, as there are three symbols, the three symbols involve the index twice; that is, x^1 and y^1 ; but x as a root = 1, and y is made one by its index;

$$\therefore x \text{ and } y^1 = 1 + 1 = 2 \cdot 1 = 2.$$

Likewise the two roots x and y , and the identical index 1, require three symbols for their notation;

$$\therefore x \text{ and } y \text{ and } 1 = 1 + 1^1 + 1 = 3 \cdot 1 = 3.$$

To apply this:—Whatever admits of the predicate *both*, admits of the predicate *two*, and the predicate *two* indicates that each of the binaries is one. Now *one* as index being incorporated with each number of each syzygy, each syzygy involves the index twice;

$$\therefore 2 \cdot 1 = 2,$$

and as each syzygy requires, as we have seen, three symbols for its notation, each syzygy involves one thrice,

$$\therefore 3 \cdot 1 = 3.$$

Thus, in Aristotelian language, Three is the Form of Two, and Two is the Matter of Three. Hence, we may see why the Pythagoreans made Two the symbol of indefinite existence, for Matter without Form is indefinite; likewise why they made Three the symbol of definite existence. In the order of existence— $\phi\mu\sigma\epsilon\iota$ —Three is prior to Two, for we require as prerequisites of Three

- (1). The radical 1 ; = 1 $\xi\nu$;
- (2). The other thing ; which= $\Theta\alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\nu$, being unquantified, to be construed to thought requires quantification, and thereto requires
- (3). The index 1.

Without these we cannot have Two, for $2 = 1$ and $1 = 2 \cdot 1$.

143 d-e. *Genesis of all the Numbers from Tò $\xi\nu$ and Tò $\sigma\nu$.*

Supplying ellipses— $\delta\nu o\nu \ddot{\nu} n t o i n$, $o\nu k \dot{\alpha} n \dot{a} \gamma k \eta \varepsilon \dot{i} n a i$ $k a i \ddot{\delta} i \xi \xi \nu$; $k a i \tau r i \omega \ddot{\nu} \ddot{\nu} n t a w n \varepsilon \dot{i} n a i$ $\tau r i \xi \xi \nu$, $\varepsilon \dot{i} p e \rho \dot{\nu} p \dot{\alpha} \rho \chi \varepsilon i$ $T \ddot{\varphi} \tau e \Delta \dot{\nu} o$ $\tau \ddot{o} \ddot{\delta} i \xi - \xi \nu$, $k a i T \ddot{\varphi} \tau r i \alpha \tau \ddot{o} \tau r i \xi - \xi \nu$; *i. e.* :

$$\text{II. } = 2 \cdot 1, \text{ and III. } = 3 \cdot 1.$$

Then, $\Delta \nu o \nu \ddot{\nu}$ $\delta \dot{\varepsilon} \ddot{\nu} n t o i n$ $k a i \ddot{\delta} i \xi - \xi \nu$, $o \dot{\nu} k \dot{\alpha} n \dot{a} \gamma k \eta \delta \dot{\nu} o \ddot{\delta} i \xi \varepsilon \dot{i} n a i$; *i. e.*

$$x^1 + y^1 = 1^1 + 1^1 = 1(1^1 + 1^1),$$

but

$$x \text{ and } y = 2, \text{ and the indices } 1 \text{ and } 1 = 2;$$

\therefore we have $\delta \dot{\nu} o \ddot{\delta} i \xi$ in the notion II.

$$\text{So mut. mut. of } 3 = 1(1^1 + 1^1 + 1^1) =$$

$$1x^1 + 1y^1 + 1 \cdot 1'^1 = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3,$$

but

$$1 + 1 + 1 = 3;$$

and

$$x + y + 1' = 3;$$

and indices

$$1 + 1 + 1 = 3;$$

. . . we have $\tau\rhoία \tau\rhoίς$ in the notion III. That is, each couple is two things; it is also two single things; and the unity of each single thing is a third thing, i. e. x and y and 1.

In Aristotelian language:—Formed Matter contains (1) Form, and (2) Formless Matter = 1 + 1 = II.; but Formless Matter is incogitable; therefore we have Matter unified by Form. But Form = 1; Matter = 1; and Unification = 1; . . . 1 + 1 + 1 = 3. The mote in the sunbeam contains three metaphysical elements—(1) that which unifies; (2) that which is unified; and (3) the unification of 1 and 2, i. e. III. It is a pity the scholastic distinction between *metaphysical* and *physical* is not kept up. Metaphysical entities were those that could not exist separately, e. g. concave and convex: physical, those that could, i. e. λόγω and φύσει.

143 e.

δίς ὄντων.

Τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δίς ὄντων, καὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ τρὶς ὄντοιν. Hermann brackets the second ὄντων and ὄντοιν, but they are right, i. e. *τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δίς ἐν ὄντων* = the symbols are three, and the pairs are two; and *δυοῖν ὄντοιν, καὶ τρὶς ὄντοιν* = *δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ τρὶς ἐν ὄντοιν*, the pairs are two and the symbols are three. It must be recollected that the Greek arithmetic was originally the geometry of rectangles. In the present case, as usual, in place of our abstract multiplication 3×2 and 2×3 , two rectangles are generated. The first has 3 as its base and 2 as its side, and as the base is the more important factor, the plural is used, ὄντων. In the second, 2 is the base and 3 the side; here the base is 2, and is the more important, hence the dual ὄντοιν. The conception is that a rectangle is described on a base, and not on a side. The rectangle 3×2 is quite distinct from the rectangle 2×3 .

144 a.

ἀριθμὸς does not mean a single unit, but a collection of units. Thus one is not ἀριθμός, but two is: ἀριθμός ἐστι πλῆθος ὥρισμένον ἢ μονάδων σύστημα ἢ ποσότητος χύμα ἐκ μονάδων συνκείμενον.—*Nic. Ger.* i. vii. 1.

In speaking of Numbers, both the Platonists and the Pythagoreans meant always whole numbers, and not fractions, the unit being the foot, lineal, square, and cubic. The numbers, or rather rectangles, were ἀρτιοι, an even base by an even side; περιπτοί, an odd base by an odd side; ἀρτιοι περιπτάκις, an even base by an odd side; and περιπτοὶ ἀρτιάκις, an odd base by an even side.

144 e. Τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενεμημένον.

Justifies ὑπὸ in 166 a.

145 c, d.

A part contains the following notions:—

1. Its separate existence;
2. Its own relation to its fellow parts;
3. Its common relation to the whole.

This may be illustrated by a piece of a dissected map. The map is not all the separate pieces one by one—τὰ πάντα—nor any one: yet if any piece did not fit, it would not be in the map when it was put together, τὰ ἅπαντα; but if the piece belong to the map, it must be one of the separate pieces.

Metaphysically, all distinct ideas are equally distinct.

145 c, d.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσίν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί. (εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ. ἐν τινὶ γὰρ ἑνὶ μὴ δύναται εἶναι που δύναται ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι.)

εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ
ἔνι, πῶς ἔτι ἔν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν
τοῖς τῶν μερῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἴη, τὸ πλέον ἀν ἐν τῷ
ἐλάττονι εἴη, ὁ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον.

The Whole is distinct from the parts; for if the Whole is in each quale of the parts, it must be in some one quavis; and if that particular part contains the Whole, that one part cannot be one of the parts.

The argument is: if the Whole is in the parts, it is in all, some, or one; the clause from *ἐν τινι* to *εἴναι* is the converse opposite of the clause *εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνι*. In the clause *τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ [μὴ] ᔹν*, Hermann brackets [μὴ]. I have struck it out, as it spoils the argument, which is: *if the Whole is in each part, it is in some one part.* If so, the part thus specialised is differentiated from its former peers, but it is so differentiated by containing the Whole, not by not containing it.

Hegel says: The relation of the Whole and the parts is untrue to this extent—that the notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony. The notion of the Whole is to contain parts; but if the Whole is taken, and made what its notion implies, i.e., if it is divided, it at once ceases to be a Whole.—*Logic*, p. 211. All through the *Parmenides* it must be kept in view, that any two notions in any degree distinct are totally distinct. “Each thing,” says Butler, “is what it is, and not another thing.”

Tà πάντα is the roll or litany of items; ἄπαντα is the sum total of the same items summed: Tà πάντα are the parts of the sum; ἄπαντα is the sum of the parts. It is a pity that modern English has lost its neuter plural and verb singular: “hot blood begets hot thoughts, and hot thoughts beget hot deeds, and hot deeds is love.”

145 e. *ἢ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν.*

The notion Whole is not the notion Aggregate of items: cf. *ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονός ἐν τι εἶδος ἔτερον*

τῶν πάντων μερῶν; ἔγωγε.—*Theaet.* 204 a, b. The order of notions is—(1) *τὰ μέρη*; (2) *τὰ πάντα*; (3) *τὰ ὑπάντα*; (4) *τὸ ὅλον*; (5) *τὸ πῦν*.

145 e.

κινεῖσθαι.

Zeno's contribution to thinking is, the showing that motion is relative to a something which is not moved. This is well brought out in the Flying Arrow, which at any given moment coincides with its equivalent in the space through which it is passing.

146 a. *μηδὲ ἐστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι.*

By Excluded Middle ; if not the one, it must be the other.

146 a, b.

ἔτερον.

Hegel's view, that Otherness is negation, is supported by the history of the particle *μή*. If *μή* is etymologically *ne*, as Curtius mentions, comparing the Lithuanian *nei* (I. 317), *na* in the Vedas very often means *as*, and the order then would be—assertion, comparison, negation : cf. *āvā* and *ἄλλος*, *ib.* 307.

146 a–148 e.

1. Everything possesses Identity, and, in that respect, it resembles primarily everything else.

2. Everything is distinct from everything else, and, in that respect, it differs primarily from everything else.

3. In being distinct, it, *eo ipso*, resembles secondarily everything else ; and, therefore,

4. Differs secondarily from everything else by the contrary of diversity—identity.

Hence *τὸ εὖ*, in possessing either quality, has resemblances, primarily and secondarily, to

- (a) itself, and to
- (b) *τὰλλα* ; and,

in possessing either quality, has diversities primary and secondary to

- (a) itself, and to
- (b) $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda a$.

In possessing both, $\tau\ddot{\alpha} \xi\nu$

is primarily like itself and $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda a$, and
is primarily unlike itself and $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda a$.

Nothing can be clearer than that Plato held that there were $\varepsilon\delta\eta \tau\ddot{\omega}n \pi\rho\acute{o}s \tau i$. Idealism is only the development of relations.

The One is identical and diverse to itself, and is identical and diverse to $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda a$, *i. e.* all ideas or objects of Reason are equally ideas, and therefore distinct : they all agree in distinctness ; but, being distinct, they differ ; therefore they agree through Difference, they differ through Identity ; and as each has both Identity and Diversity together, each agrees with and differs from itself, and each agrees with and differs from $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda a$. The One agrees with $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda a$ in having both qualities ; and the very having both qualities is the essence of its individuality.

148 c.

The order of notions is—

- (1) $\tau a\nu\tau\acute{o}n$;
- (2) $\mu\dot{\eta} \grave{\alpha}\lambda\lambda o\acute{t}o\acute{n}$;
- (3) $\mu\dot{\eta} \grave{\alpha}\nu o\mu o\acute{t}o\acute{n}$;
- (4) $\grave{\delta}moi\acute{o}n$.

Tò "Ev is $\tau a\nu\tau\acute{o}n$ Τοῖς "Αλλοῖς ;

Tò "Ev is $\xi\tau\varepsilon\varrho\acute{o}n$ Τῶν "Αλλων.

Taking each case separately :—

- (1). Tò "Ev is like $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda a$;
- (2). Tò "Ev is unlike $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda a$.

Taking both together—

$\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$;

and so, by parity of reasoning,

$\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ is like and unlike itself.

148 d-149 e.

Ancient arithmetic was originally geometrical : hence the notions,

Whole and Parts :

Contact.


149 a.

Contact— $\ddot{\alpha}\psi\iota\varsigma$ —presupposes—


1. Something distinct, *e.g.*

a ————— b ; and

2. Something else in immediate contiguity to it; *e.g.*



Here $a b$ is distinct from $b c$, and $b c$ is in immediate contiguity. If to $b c$ we add $c d$,



$\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\mu\in\tau\eta\tau\alpha\varsigma$, $\xi\sigma\tau\alpha\alpha\iota\delta\eta\varsigma$. Hence, *ad fin.*, the things, $\tau\alpha\dot{\alpha}\pi\tau\alpha\mu\eta\tau\alpha$, are always one in advance of $\alpha\iota\ddot{\alpha}\psi\iota\varsigma$. Hence, if $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ be totally devoid of unity, junction between $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ and $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ is impossible, for $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ must be one, before it can combine with $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ to form two.

149 e.

$\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma$, *i.e.* essences, notions, $\dot{\iota}\delta\epsilon\alpha\iota$: cf. *Phaed.* 78 c-d.

$\varepsilon\iota\delta\eta$, Stall.

150 a. τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ισύτητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἔαυτῆς.

τί τινος = attribute.

150 c-d.

Tò "Εν, quā "Εν, is ἐν, and nothing else : τἄλλα quā ἄλλα, is ἄλλα, and nothing else : τὸ μέγεθος, quā μέγεθος, is μέγεθος, and nothing else : and ἡ σμικρότης, quā σμικρότης, is σμικρότης, and nothing else. Tò "Εν therefore cannot be greater than τἄλλα, nor τἄλλα greater than Tò "Εν : in the same way, neither is less than the other : but if neither greater nor less, they are not unequal, and therefore equal.

So it is commonly said, all infinites are equal. Metaphysically, there is only one infinite, that whose essence it is to have no bounds or limit. It is evident there cannot be two of this nature, for each would overlap, and so bound the other. But in mathematical infinites, infinity merely means infinitely divisible or infinitely addible ; i. e. a process which may be worked as long as there is anything to work on. The process is always one and the same, and so infinite : the material is always finite, and may be as different as one pleases.

150 d.

ὑπερέχω takes the genitive ; therefore the vexed passage in the *Phaedo* runs thus, if the ellipses are supplied—one of the surest ways of construing Plato :—Τοῦ μὲν Σωκράτους (τῷ μεγέθει τῷ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Σωκράτους τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπερέχων, i. e., τῷ ὑπερέχειν = cause ; μεγέθει = instrument ; Σωκράτους sub. = gen. on ὑπερέχειν ; and τὴν σμικρότητα = acc. de quo.

151 a. μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἐνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Grote says : “ Both these predicates (One—Many) are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and com-

parisons of our own senses and consciousness. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, self-existent One."—*Plato*, i. 105–6. Here "absolute" is used in the sense of out of all possible range, a sense popularised by the frivolous discussions of Hamilton, Mansel, and Mill.

151 d.

The order of notions is—

1. Magnitude;
2. Measure;
3. Parts.

151 d.

"But that a thing, which bears no relation to any one (eiusvis) given item, should bear any relation to each (cuique) of the sum total of items, to no one of which (cuiquam) does it bear any actual relation either as part or otherwise, is impossible."

151 d–e.

Shadworth Hodgson makes similar remarks on the subjective embracing the objective, and *vice versa*, *Space and Time*, pp. 45, *sqq.*

154 c–d.

Tὸ ἐν does not grow younger or older than τὸ λλα, because it is so already : it has had so much start, and equals added to unequals leave the difference absolutely as before ; but, if we subtract the difference, the residue is always growing larger, and therefore the difference is growing less relatively to the residue : e.g. A is born a year before B; thus A is always a year older than B ; but when A is two years old the relative difference is greater than when A is ninety.

154 c.

γίγνεται, the emphatic word, is not *growing* or *becoming*, because it *is*.

154 c.

γένεσις is explained in the *Laws* thus: *γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις ἡνὶκ' ἂν τι πάθος ἥ;*; δῆλον, ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὐξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἐλθῃ μετάβασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἴσθησιν σχῆ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις, 894 a. The steps are—

1. αὐξη;
2. ἔξις καθεστηκτια;
3. ἔξις μένουσα.

155 c.

μεταλαμβάνειν differs from *μετέχειν*: *μεταλαμβάνω* is to coincide in part with, to have share in; *μετέχειν* is to form one with, to unite with; cf. 158 b.

155 e–157 a.

The One in this hypothesis passes from one state into another, and so do its attributes. The transition takes place through an unextended point: that is, time is cut in two by a timeless point, just as Space is cut in two by a breadthless line. Shadworth Hodgson seems to suppose that Plato held that the point possessed duration. It is well explained by Damascius—ἀμερές ἐστι τῇ ἰδιότητι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρονον.

156 a–157.

The notion is, any one state or condition which passes into a different condition has to pass through an intermediate

state, in which it is neither what it was nor what it is in course of becoming. Anaxagoras, from whom Plato took much of his Physics, says: οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ, Fr. 13 *Mullach*. This joined with his doctrine, adopted by Plato, that there is no minimum, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροῦ γέ ἔστι τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ' ἐλασσον αἰεί, necessitates the presence of τὸ ἐν in and out of Space and Time.

156 d-e.

ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ τότε ἀν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δῆ; τὸ ἐξαίφνης . . . (see 155 e).

157 b-159 b.

Here *Tāllā* owe their predicates to their participation of τὸ ἐν. *Cetera* and *ceterum* are very inadequate renderings of the Greek neuter plural, *Tāllā* expressing neither unity nor plurality, but food for both.

157 b.

Here we have the full phrase *τāllā τοῦ ἐνός*

157 c.

The correlatives are ὅλον and μόρια: now τὸ ὅλον = πολλὰ μόρια, therefore any one μόριον is not μόριον of τὰ πολλὰ μόρια, but of τὸ ὅλον. For unless τὸ μόριον—any given part—be part of itself, there must be one part of the lot of which the given Part is not part. Consequently if the given Part be a part of many parts, it must be a part of the parts minus the given Part. But if it be a part of the other parts, it must be a part of every one of the several parts taken by them-

selves, since *quā* parts the parts are similar, and therefore must be a part of itself : *q. a. e.* *E.g.* a shilling is part of a pound, but a shilling is not a part of the several shillings which make up the pound. For, if it be a part $\tau\omega\nu \pi\omega\lambda\omega\nu$ shillings, it must be either a part of itself, *q. a. e.*, or of the remaining nineteen shillings. But as the other nineteen shillings, when out of relation to the pound, are nineteen totally independent units, the Part must be a part of them *quā* units, and therefore of every one of them (since there is no difference between them *quā* units), and therefore of itself, which is exactly similar to the rest. A Part is correlative to a Whole, but it has no relation whatsoever to any one or all of the other parts, save that of being a fellow-part of the same integer.

In Plato's day, abstract language was taken from Geometry ; perhaps *fraction* and *integer* would be better renderings of $\mu\omega\sigma\iota\omega\nu$ and $\delta\lambda\omega\nu$. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same reasoning is triumphant against Natural Realism, substituting Quality for Part, and Body for Whole. The Natural Realist makes all qualities, minus one, depend on the residual quality ; so that we have either a quality which is more than a quality, or which is not a quality. The same reasoning applies to the Antithesis of Kant's Fourth Antinomy.

157 a.

iōν.

Justifies the vulgate in *Phaedr.*, 249 b.

157 b.

The order of notions in the order of analysis is—

1. *εīναι*;
2. *γίγνεσθαι*;
3. *συγκρίνεσθαι*;
4. *ὁμοιοῦσθαι*.

Order of genesis *e contra*.

157 c.

 $\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{e}\chi\epsilon\pi\eta.$

The Platonic $\mu\acute{e}\theta\epsilon\xi\iota\zeta$ is best illustrated by the *Concret* of Hegel, *i.e.* where an object or thought is seen and known to be the confluence of several elements—to be a process in its own nature, and not a mere stationary point of view; each object to be equal to itself, multiplied into all other things.—Wallace's *Hegel*, clxxvi. Cicero makes use of the same principle: *semper enim ita assumit aliquid (sc. natura) ut ea quae prima dederit, ne deserat.*—*De Fin.* iv. 14. It is the ideal side of the doctrine of Development.

157 c.

Here, c— $\tau\acute{o}\gamma\epsilon\delta\lambda\omega\nu=\hat{\epsilon}\nu\hat{\epsilon}k\pi o\lambda\lambda\tilde{\omega}\nu$ in d, = $\hat{\epsilon}\xi\hat{\alpha}\pi\acute{a}n\tau\omega\nu\hat{\epsilon}\nu\tau\acute{e}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omega\nu\gamma\epsilon\gamma\omega\acute{n}\acute{o}\zeta$.

157 d.

 $\acute{a}\delta\acute{u}n\omega\acute{a}\tau\omega\nu\epsilon\iota\omega\acute{a}$: Sc. $\acute{e}\sigma\tau\iota$.

Plato often uses words both in the ordinary and philosophic sense in the same passage: cf. οὐδὲ μία, 143 d: αὐτοῦ Παρμενίδου, 136 d: ἀπειρον, *Phil.* 17 e: συμφέρεσθαι, *Theaet.* 152 e.

157 e.

$\Tau\acute{a}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ participates in $\Tau\acute{o}\hat{\epsilon}\nu$ through $\tau\acute{o}\delta\lambda\omega\nu$; in modern language, through the notion Law, *i.e.* in the scientific meaning of the term, when “we think of the parts as held together by a certain force.” This is Hamilton’s description of physical unity.—REID, 852.

158 a.

 $\hat{o}\hat{\alpha}\nu\hat{\gamma}\mu\acute{o}\rho\iota\omega\nu\delta\lambda\omega\nu$.

So the MSS., and they are right. The conjecture $\mu\acute{o}\rho\iota\omega\nu\delta\lambda\omega\nu$ is a mere truism, for the notion Whole is the correlation

of the notion Part. But *μόριον ὅλου* is emphatic, that which is a genuine part, and not a part *per accidens*. A shilling is $\frac{1}{20}$ of the amount of silver defined to be a legal pound : it is therefore, *quā* $\frac{1}{20}$, *μόριον ὅλου*, because $\frac{1}{20} \times 20 = 1$: whereas a shilling *quā* shilling is only one amongst any number of shillings, and is only $\frac{1}{20}$ of £1, *per accidens*, just as it is $\frac{1}{100}$ of £5. Each part must be one, because the parts are *πολλά*. Cf. *οὐδὲ ἄρα πολλά ἔστι Τἄλλα*. *Ἐν γὰρ ἀν ἦν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν.* 159. Besides, the proposed change would require *τοῦ μορίου τὸ ὅλον*.

158 e.

The order of notions is—

1. *ἄπειρα καὶ πεπερασμένα* ;
2. *ἐναντία* ;
3. *ἀνόμοια*.


159 a.

Κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον.

- (1). *Τἄλλα quā πεπερασμένα* are similar ;
- (2). *Τἄλλα quā ἄπειρα* are similar ;
- (3). *Τἄλλα quā πεπερασμένα καὶ ἄπειρα* are dissimilar, both *per se* and *inter se*.

ἀμφοτέρως, *i. e.* as uniting two opposite predicates, a double contrariety, *ἐναλλάξ*,

- (1). *πεπερασμένα καὶ ἄπειρα*.



- (2). *πεπερασμένα καὶ ἄπειρα*.

159 b-160 b.

Τἄλλα are capable of no predicates whatsoever, if the One be one in aloofness. The key to this section is the notion

$\chiωρίς$ —aloofness—the negation of actual relation. The One is allowed to be, but is relegated to isolation.

160 a.

Illustrates Hypothesis ii., as the order of Number is

$\epsilon\nu\circ\varsigma$, $\delta\nu\circ\iota\nu$, $\tau\circ\iota\omega\nu$, $\pi\epsilon\varrho\iota\tau\tau\circ\bar{u}$, $\dot{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota\circ\bar{u}$.

The order is objective, $\phi\circ\sigma\epsilon\iota$.

160 b-d.

$\tau\circ\mu\circ\eta\circ\check{o}\nu$.

Negation is considered as relative to knowledge, and thus giving rise to the notion $\tilde{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\circ\bar{o}\nu$ —otherness—distinctness.

160 b.

The order of notions is—

1. $\gamma\nu\omega\sigma\tau\circ\bar{o}\nu$;
2. $\tilde{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\circ\bar{o}\nu$.

The order is subjective.

160 d-163 b.

The One in this section, though non-existent, admits of positive predicates, which are contrary opposites. Here the One is granted what we would call a subjective existence.

160 e.

In scholastic language $\tau\circ\mu\circ\eta\circ\check{o}\nu$ has—

1. Illudditas;
2. Quidditas;
3. Hocceitas.

161 b.

 $\varepsilon i \ \dot{\epsilon}n\acute{o}\varsigma$.

If $T\ddot{o} \ "E\nu$ have unlikeness to one, then the argument will not turn on anything like $T\ddot{o} \ "E\nu$, nor will the hypothesis relate to one, but to something different. That is, $T\ddot{o} \ "E\nu$, the subject of discussion, must have unity for its essence; if not, the hypothesis deals with something else. Mr. Jowett ignores the difference between $T\ddot{o} \ "E\nu$ and $\dot{\epsilon}\nu$.

162 b.

$T\ddot{o} \ \mu\ddot{\eta} \ \ddot{\sigma}\nu$ has $\sigma\acute{u}s\acute{a}$ + $\mu\ddot{\eta}\text{-}\sigma\acute{u}s\acute{a}$; it therefore involves $\mu\acute{e}r\alpha\beta\theta\lambda\acute{\eta}$; and therefore all incompatible predicates. Here we have Hegelianism *in concreto*, as applied to $T\ddot{o} \ \ddot{\sigma}\nu$. Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, in his *Philosophy of Reflection*, attacks Hegelianism on the following grounds, which apply equally to Plato's proposition. It must be premised that Mr. Hodgson uses the term *contradictory* to signify, not the opposition of general and particular, but that between a proposition and its negative, *i.e.* difference of quality only: *e.g.* A is A, A is not A; while by a *contrary* he means that the negative particle joins on to the predicate: *e.g.* A is A, A is not-A. To resume, the objection is as follows: "The evolution of the concrete concept is his (Hegel's) fundamental idea; it evolves itself by Entgegensetzung, a concrete opposition containing undistinguished the purely logical opposition of contradistinction, and the opposition of content, which is contrariety. The former gives the motive power, the latter the order and arrangement, of the evolution. Thus the pure Nothing, *Nichts*, at the beginning is logically opposed to the pure Being, *Sein*; hence the movement between them. There is no opposition of content, no difference of content at all, between them, until they are conceived *together*; then they are perceived to be different in *content*, but at the same time to be a process, a *Werden*, not (either of them) a state or thing. The Whole makes one undistinguishable process of opposition, a becoming, *Entgegensetzung*, a *Werden*. To analyse

this process, to show what is due to perception, what to conception, what part of the opposition is due to content, and what to logical contradiction, would be to destroy it as a theory of the universe."—Vol. I. pp. 384, 5. Again: "Of two wholly contradictory terms, the one is thought as existent, the other as non-existent." "The negative member of a pair of contradictory terms, which is a pure creature of logical method, analogous to imaginary quantities in mathematics, is treated by Hegel as if it were a concept with a perceptual content. The "*Nichts*" at the beginning of the *Logik* is the first instance of it."—p. 382.

The question is, What is the value of a creature of logic? And here comes in the work of Kant. Kant showed that the intelligible element was indispensable. The universe was not a lot of separate things, set in an intellectual substratum, like stars in the heavens. No; the intelligible was required both for the stars and for the space in which they float. Be this theory as it may, it was extended by Hegel to the object; hence, in *rerum natura*, the intelligible element has more reality than its content, so far as that content is sensible. But as logic is the explicit statement of the intelligible, it follows that the logical form has more *Wahrheit* than its sensible padding. As to negation, which is the point of the process, Mr. Hodgson makes it arise from our fixing our attention on some one in a train of differents (p. 376). But surely things are different because they are already differenced, and the logical description of differentiation is Otherness, or Negation. And as before, the Negation of Logic is more real than the same material of sensation.

162 a.

I. e. δεῖ αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι (εἰ μέλλει μὴ-εἶναι), ὅμοίως ὥσπερ δεῖ τὸ ὄν ἔχειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ-μὴ-ὄν δεσμὸν τοῦ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὐτὸν ἔτι.

I. e. Τὸ μὴ-”Ον requires as a security for its existence as μὴ-δν, that the proposition should be affirmative; *i. e.*

Τὸ μὴ-”Ον is μὴ-δν;

and Τὸ ”Ον requires in the same way that the proposition should be negative; *i. e.*

Τὸ ”Ον is not μὴ-δν.

Here Plato apparently regards affirmation and negation as an affection of the copula. The reasoning assumes that *contrariorum eadem scientia*. This is true of reflex, but not of direct consciousness. Of course all Philosophy is reflex.

162 a.

μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὅν οὐσίας (μὲν) τοῦ εἶναι-δν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι-μὴ-δν. μὲν is understood after the first οὐσίας by a common ellipse: cf. τὸ δὲ μὴ-δν, μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι μὴ-δν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ-δν. For sense see preceding note, *i. b.* b.

162 a.

I. e. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ-δν μὴ ἔσται μὴ-δν (ἀλλὰ ἀνήσει τι τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μὴ-δν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ-μὴ-δν), εὐθὺς τὸ μὴ δν ἔσται δν.

ἀλλὰ introduces the same proposition in another form, thus:—

εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ-δν μὴ ἔσται μὴ-δν = the non-existent is non-existent: an affirmative proposition: ἀλλὰ introduces it in another form: if the non-existent gives up its being non-existent, and becomes not being the non-existent, the negatives are cancelled, and the non-existent exists.

It may be rendered, “if it does allow the affirmative essence of the Copula—the *is*—to merge in the negative essence of the

Predicate—the *is not*—the Copula becomes *is not*; and thereby cancels the *is-not* of the Predicate."

ἀνήσει is metaphorically the correlative of δεσμός, *infra*, unless it hold fast by and not let its *is* slip into *is-not*.

163 b—164 b.

In this proposition, τὸ ἔν is totally deprived of ἔστι, and the emphasis is on οὐσίας ἀπουσία.

164 a-b.

This conclusion is apparently the same as that of the First Hypothesis. In reality nothing can be more diverse. In the former case, The One possesses actually no predicate in particular, although, as the second proposition shows, it is capable of combining with all predicates whatsoever. In the latter case, The One has actually no predicate at all, because it is incapable of having any.

164 b—165 e.

In this proposition οὐσία is taken away from the τὸ ἔν, and the effect on τὰλλα is considered. The result is φαίνεσθαι, i.e. a presented unity in things, somewhat like the Cause and Substance of Hume, mere fictions. This is the view set forth by Brown, Lect. V. The emphasis is on φαίνεται.

164 b.

This proposition represents the views held by the majority of British philosophers and scientific men of the present day. Unity exists only in the mind; the object, according to circumstances, is only a majus or a minus in Quantity, Quality, or Degree.

165 e, to end.

δόξα.

In this proposition, *οὐσία* is totally denied of τὸ ἔν : what amount of *οὐσία*, then, can τἀλλα retain? None whatever; not even the impression—δόξα—can be produced by Τἀλλα. That is to say, in The non-existence of The One, Τἀλλα cannot produce in us the idea of quasi-unity allowed in the last hypothesis. Real unity being no more, artificial unity is gone too. Hume's quasi-idea is impossible.

166 a.

MSS. ὑπό, rightly. The meaning is, the δόξα τὸ μὴ ὄν is never produced by τἀλλα. ὑπὸ is applied to the action of a notion, διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ' ἐκείνου, sc., ἐνὸς—πάθος. *Soph.* 245 d, e. δοξάζω is used passively in this dialogue.

166 c.

ἀληθέστατα.

This is the solemn conclusion, the amen of the exposition. Nothing can be in worse taste than to censure the dialogue as ἀπονος. An ethical discourse, which deals with our emotions, may conclude with an allegory; but a discussion like the *Parmenides*, conducted with mathematical formality and colourlessness, would show against the gorgeousness of a Platonic myth, somewhat like the Parthenon in a transformation scene.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

THE fragments of Zeno, which illustrate the notion Τὰ πολλὰ and its results, are as follows:—

1. εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τοσαῦτα εἶναι ὅσα ἔστι, καὶ οὐτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐλάττονα. Εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα ἔστιν ὅσα ἔστι, πεπερασμένα ἀν εἴη. Which conclusion conflicts with Τὸ ἔν.

2. εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἔστιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔτερα μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων ἔστι, καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνων ἔτερα μεταξύ. Καὶ οὐτως ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἔστι. Which conclusion conflicts with the former, and both with Τὸ ἔν.

3. εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ μικρά τε εἶναι καὶ μεγάλα· μικρὰ μέν, ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα δὲ ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι. Zeno here points out the true objection to the atom and space as metaphysical ultima: the atom is all quality, and space is all quantity.

Zeno's arguments against motion bring the fact, when analysed, into collision with Τὸ ἔν. Thus motion takes place from point to point, therefore within determinate limits: therefore, to make motion rational, intelligible things must be πεπερασμένα: *q.a.e.* Again, the space between the points is ἄπειρον: *q.a.e.*

The Flying Arrow is made comprehensible by Mr. Proctor's *Photographs of a Galloping Horse*.* At a given moment, the horse is point-blank to the plate. Professor Monck's objection, that the body might move during the breaks,† would have served Zeno, for it would bring out his point that rest is motion and motion rest.

Plato makes much use of Zeno; for Τὸ δλον, being ἐν ετέρῳ, is on the way to motion.

* *Gentleman's Magazine*, December, 1881.

† Monck's *Hamilton*, p. 98.

APPENDIX B.

ὅ τρίτος ἀνθρωπος.

PLATO'S method of specification is given most fully in the *Philebus*, 14 c-18 d. It has nothing to do with referring, say, an individual man to the class Man, a process which is justly caricatured in ὅ τρίτος ἀνθρωπος. If the man is in the class, why do you take him out of it? If he is not in it, how do you get him into it? By a medium, which must be related, and both; therefore ὅ τρίτος ἀνθρωπος is irrepressible.

The Platonic process states that there is a unity which can be discerned; that such unity is one pole, while the other is lost in indefiniteness, τὸ ἀπειρον; that the investigator must discover and count the varieties which lie between the two limits, and in that way approach real unity; and when such unity is discovered, we may then disregard the endless variety of intermediate details. It is, therefore, a process of positive research, and not a barren negative. The thing is to be found, if we search, εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. The basis of the process is Τὸ ἔν, just as the basis of Aristotle's view is the existence of γένη in nature. Mill, similarly, has to build his logic on causation, as he understands it; but, to the consistant empirical, there can be no basis of logic except τὸ

συμβεβηκός. “All things,” says Hegel, “are a judgment: that is to say, they are individuals, which are a universality or inner nature in themselves. They are a universal, which is individuality. Their universality and individuality are distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other.”* Plato’s process, as well as Hegel’s, is safe against *ὁ τρίτος ἀνθρωπος*, which no empirical logic is.

* Wallace’s *Hegel*, p. 258.

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