1.1.2 There is a cessation of each member of the following series- Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Notion- the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it; and this ultimately leads to Final Release.
1.1.3 Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word are the Pramanas.
1.1.4 Sense perception is that cognition (a) which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense organ, (b) which is not expressible (by words), (c) which is not erroneous, (d) and which is well defined.
1.1.5 After Perception comes Inferential Cognition, which is led up to by
Perception; it is of three kinds (1) the P:rvavat, (2) Shesavat
Samanyatodrishta.
1.1.6 Analogy is that which accomplishes its purpose through similarity
to a known object.
1.1.7 The assertion of a reliable person is 'Word'.
1.1.8 The said Word is of two kinds Dristartha, that of which the thing
spoken of is perceived, and Adristartha, that of which the thing is
not perceived.
1.1.9 Soul , Body, Sense -organs, Things, Apprehension, Mind, Activity,
Defect, Re-Birth, Fruition, Pain and Release really constitute the
Objects of Cognition.
1.1.10 Desire , Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the
indicatives of the Soul.
1.1.11 The body which is the vehicle of actions, of sense-organs and of
objects.
1.1.12 The Olfactory, the Gestatory, the Visual, the Cutaneous and the
Auditory Organs, prceeding from material substances.
1.1.13 The Material Substances are Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Akasha.
1.1.14 Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound, which are the qualities of
Earth [ Water, Fire, Air and Akasha], are the Objects of the
aforesaid [sense-organs].
1.1.15 Intellection, Apprehension and Cognition are Synonymous terms.
1.1.16 The Non-Appearence of Simultaneous Cognitions is indicative of the
existance of Mind.
1.1.17 Activity consisits in the operating of speech, of Mind and of Body.
1.1.18 Defects have urging or incting for their distinguishing feature.
1.1.19 Rebirth consists in being born again.
1.1.20 Fruition is a thing produced by Activity and Defect.
1.1.21 Pain is that which is connected with annoyance.
1.1.22 Absolute freedom from the aforesaid ( Pain etc) is Final Release.
1.1.23 Doubt is that wavering judgement in which the definite cognition
of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which
arises either (a) from the Cognition of the Characters Common to the
Objects concerned, or (b) from the Cognition of Characters that serve
to distinguish an object from diverse objects, or (c) from the presence
of Contradictory opinions; and the appearing of such wavering judgements
is due to the uncertainity attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions.
1.1.24 That Object, Aiming at which one acts, is called Motive.
1.1.25 That is 'Example' with regard to which both parties- the ordinary man
and the Trained investigator- entertain Similar ideas.
1.1.26 Doctrine is a theory or conviction in regard to the exact nature of
a thing dealt with by Philosophy.
1.1.27 Doctrine is of four kinds:- (1) Doctrine common to all philosophers,
(2) Doctrine peculiar to one philosophy, (3) Doctrine resting on
implication, and (4) Hypothetical Doctrine.
1.1.28 The 'Doctrine Common to all Philosophers' is that philosophycal
conviction, or theory, which is not incompatible with any philosophy.
1.1.29 That which is accepted by only one Philosophy, and is Not accepted
by any other Philosophy, is called the Doctrine peculiar to one
philosophy.
1.1.30 That is called 'Doctrine on Implication' one the Knowledge or
acceptance of which depends the knowledge or acceptance of another fact.
1.1.31 When a fact is taken for granted without investigation, and thence
proceeds the Examination of its particular details, we have a case
of Hypothetical Doctrine.
1.1.32 (1) Statement of the Proposition, (2) Statement of the Probans,
(3) Statement of the Example, (4) Reaffirmation, and (5) Final Concl-
ution;- These are the Factors of Reasoning.
1.1.33 The 'Statement of Proposition' consists in the assertion of what is
to be proved, the Probandum.
1.1.34 The 'Statement of Probans' is that which demonstrates the Probandum,
through its similarity (i.e property common to it and) to the Example.
1.1.35 And also dissimilarity.
1.1.36 That Familiar instance, - which, through similarity to what is to be
proved (i.e the subject) is possessed of a property of that (Subject)
constitutes the 'Statement of the Example.'
1.1.37 And the other kind of 'Statement of Example' is that which is
contrary to what has been described in the foregoing Sutra.
1.1.38 The 'Statement of the Re-affirmation' is that which, on the strength
of the Example, Re-asserts the Subject, as being 'so' [i.e, as
possessing the character which has been foun, in the Example, to
be concomitant with the Probandum]- or as being 'not so' [ i.e as
not possessing the character which has been found in the Example to
be concomitant with the negation of the Probandum].
1.1.39 The Final Conclusion, which is the re-statement of the Proposition
on the basis of the Statement of the Probans.
1.1.40 When the real character of a thing is not well known, there is put
forward, for the purpose of ascertaining that real character, a
reasoning ( in support of a certain conclusion) which indicates the
presence of proof ( showing the undesirablity or absurdity of a
conclusion);- and this is called 'Hypothetical Reasoning'.
1.1.41 When there is an ascertainment of the real character of the thing
after duly delberating over the two sides of the question- an argument
in favour of a certain conclusion and also that in its confutation-
we have what is called 'Definitive Cognition','Nirnaya'.
1.2.1 Discussion consists in the putting forward of a conception and
counter-conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by
means of proofs and reasoning,- neither of which is quite opposed
to the main doctrine ( or thesis) and both of which are carried on
in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the Five
Factors.
1.2.2 Disputation is that which is endowed with the said characteristics
and in which there is supporting and condemning by means of casuistry,
futile rejoinder and clinches (also).
1.2.3 That same Disputation is Wrangling when there is no establishing
of the counter conception.
1.2.4 (1) The Savyabhichara (Inconclusive), (2) The Viruddha (Contradictory)
(3) The Prakaranasama (Neutralised), (4) The Sadhyasama (unknown),
and the Kalatita (Mistimed)- are the Fallacious Probans.
1.2.5 The Inconclusive is that which is tainted by indecision.
1.2.6 A certain doctrine ( or view) having been accepted, the Probans that
is contradictory to it is called the 'Contradictory'.
1.2.7 The Neutralised Probans is that which is put forward to establish
a definitive conclusion, while it is one that only gives rise to
suspense (and vascillation) in regard to the point at issue.
1.2.8 The Unknown Probans is that which, being still to be proved, is not
different from the Probandum.
1.2.9 The Belated or Mistimed Probans is that which ,as adduced, is behind
time.
1.2.10 Casuistry consisits in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a
meaning other than the one intended.
1.2.11 It is of three kinds- (a) Varkchhala, Verbal Casuistry,
(b)Samanyachchhala, Generalising Casuistry, and (c) Upacharachchhala,
Figurative Casuistry.
1.2.12 (A) Verbal Casuistry consists in assuming a meaning other than that
intended to be conveyed by a word,- when the meaning (intented) is
not definitely specified.
1.2.13 (B) Generalising Casuistry consists in the urging of an absurd
signification, which is rendered possible by the use of a too
generic term.
1.2.14 (C) A Statement being made on the basis of the secondary (figurative)
denotation of words, if it is opposed by a denial of the existense
of what is asserted ( on the basis of their primary denotation),
this constitutes figurative (or shifting) casuistry.
1.2.15 "Figurative Casuistry is only Verbal Casuistry; as it does not differ
from it".
1.2.16 It is not so; as there is a difference in it.
1.2.17 If the two were to be regarded as non different on the ground of
some kind of similarity,-there would be only one kind of Casuistry.
1.2.18 Futile Rejoinder is that objection which is taken on the basis
of mere similarity and dissimilarity.
1.2.19 It is a case of Clinchere when there is misapprehension, as also
when there is incomprehension.
1.2.20 There is a multiplicity of Futile Rejoinders and Clinchers, owing two
there being several and diverse varieties of both.
2.1.1 No doubt can arise either from the certain cognition of properties
common to Several objects, or from the certain cognition of chara-
cters belonging to only one of the objects.
2.1.2 "Nor from the cognition of diversity of opinions or from that of
uncertainity".
2.1.3 "Also becuase in a case of diversity of opinion there is certainity
of conviction".
2.1.4 "Further, becuase uncertainity itself is quite certain in its uncertain
characters [ no doubt can arise from it]".
2.1.5 "Lastly, Doubt would never cease; in as much as the property (whose
cognition gives rise to the doubt) continues to exist.
2.1.6 When doubt is held to arise only from such cognition as has been
described(su 1-1-23) as not as apprehending the specific character
of any one object, there is no possibility of either there is being
no doubt at all, or of there arising a doubt that would be
unceasingly persistent.
2.1.7 Wherever there is a doubt, there is possibility of the aforesaid
questions and answers.
2.1.8 "Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Instruments of
cognition, on account of the impossibility of connecting them with
any of the three points of time."
2.1.9 "If the Pramana exists already before (the object), then perception
cannot be produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object".
2.1.10 "If the Pramana comes into existence after (the object), then the
existance of the Object of Cognition cannot dependent upon Pramans".
2.1.11 "If the two come into existence simultaneously, then, inasmuch as
each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no
sequence among cognitions".
2.1.12 There can be no Denial, as it is impossible to connect it with any
of the three points of time.
2.1.13 Becuase all Pramanas have been denied, the Denial itself cannot be
established.
2.1.14 if the character of Pramana in the case of the reasoning-factors is
admitted,- then your Denial becomes restricted to only a few among
all Pramanas,[which would not be right].
2.1.15 There should be no denial (of Pramanas and Prameysas) in regard to
all three points of time; as their existance ( as cause and effect)
is proved in the same manner as that of the musical instrument is
proved by its sound.
2.1.16 The weighing balance, which is Pramana, [the means of ascertaining the
weight of things], is Prameys also, [as regards its own accuracy].
2.1.17 "if the Instruments of cognition are cognised by means of Instruments
of Cognition, then this involves the possibility of other Instruments
of Cognition".
2.1.18 "If ( in the cognition of the Instrument of Cognition) another
Instrument of cognition is not operative, then, just as the cognition
of the Instrument of Cognition would be accomplished ( without the
operation of an Instrument of Cognition), so would the cognition of
the object of cognition also".
2.1.19 Not so; as the apprehension of the Instruments of Cognition is similar
to that of lamplight.
2.1.20 The statement of the cause of Sense-Perception is untenable, as it is
an incomplete atatement.
2.1.21 Perception cannot be brought abut unless there is contact of the Soul
and of the Mind.
2.1.22 The same might be said of Space, Place, Time and Akasha also.
2.1.23 Cognition forming the characteristic feature of the Soul, there can
be no non inclusion of it.
2.1.24 Nor is there non-inclusion of the Mind, as the non-simultaneity of
Cognition is indicative of it.
2.1.25 Inasmuch as it is only the contact of the Sense organ and the object
that forms the (distinctive) cause ( or feature) of Perception, it
has been mentioned (in the Sutra) by means of words directly
expressing it.
2.1.26 Also becuase, in the case of persons whose Mind is preoccupied,
(Perception is held to be) brought about by means of the contact of
the Sense-organ and the object (only).
2.1.27 And also becuase Individual Cognition are named after these.
2.1.28 "It is not a sound reasoning, as it involves self-contradiction".
2.1.29 There is no self contradiction; as the case we have cited is due
to the special force of a particular object.
2.1.30 Perception is only Inferential cognition, as it is a cognition that
proceeds from the Cognition of a componenet part.
2.1.31 Cannot be; as even that cognition [from which the inference is held
to proceed] is itself perceptional.
2.1.32 Nor is there the cognition of one component part, as the composite
whole is also there [and this also is cognised].
2.1.33 As the composite whole is still to be proved, there must be a doubt
with regard to it.
2.1.34 If there were no Composite, there would be non-apprehension of all
things.
2.1.35 Also as there is possibility of holding and drawing,-
2.1.36 [In answer to what has been just urged by the Siddhantin, the
Purvapaksin might urge that] "the said conception (of 'one' in regard
to the Many) would be similar to the notion that have in regard
to such (collective) things as the 'Army' and the 'Forest'"; but even
so the conception would not be possible; as Atoms are beyond the reach of
the senses.
2.1.37 "Inference cannot be an Instrument of Right Cognition, as [In the
particular instance cited of the three kinds of Inference] the
Premisses are untrue- in vieew of Obstruction, Demolition and
ressemblance.
2.1.38 Not so; becuase [what are the real Probans in the three Inferences
cited] are entirely different from (a) such ( rise of water) as
is restricted to one place, (b) such (running about of ants with
their eggs) as is due to fright, and (c) such (Peacock's scream)
as is a mere resemblance of it.
2.1.39 There is no present time for when an object falls, the only possible
points of time are-that which has been fallen through, and that which
has to be fallen through.
2.1.40 [If there is not present time] the other two ('Past' and 'Future')
also would be inconceivable; as these are relative to that.
2.1.41 As a matter of fact, the conception of 'Past' and 'Future' cannot
be merely relative to each other.
2.1.42 there being no 'Present', there could be no cognition of anything
(by any instrument of cognition), as no 'Perception' would be possible.
2.1.43 We have the conception of 'Has been done' and 'to be done'- it follows
that the idea (of the present) is established both ways.
2.1.44 "There can be no Analogy on the basis of either perfect or semi-
perfect or partial ressemblance."
2.1.45 Inasmuch as Analogy is based upon such resemblance as is actually
recognised, there is no room for the objection that has been urged.
2.1.46 "Because it consists in the cognition of what is not perceived by means
of what is perceived.
2.1.47 In regard to the 'Unperceived' Gavya we do not find any use for the
particular Instrument of Cognition called Analogy'.
2.1.48 Inasmuch as Analogy is always stated in the form as -so it cannot
be regarded as non-different (from Inference).
2.1.49 "'Word' is 'Inference',(I) because its objective is such as is
amenable to Inference only, being (as it is) not apprehended (by
perception)"
2.1.50 II. "Becuase cognition do not involve two diverse processes"
2.1.51 III. "Also becuase of the presence of relation ship."
2.1.52 Right Cognition of a thing arises from Word on the strength of the
assertion of a trustworthy person.
2.1.53 There can be no such relation [between the Word and its denotation]
also becuase we do not find (actual) filling, burning and cutting.
2.1.54 "From the fact of there being a limitation upon the denotation of
Words, there can be no deniel (of relationship between them)"
2.1.55 The reasoning cannot be accepted; as the cognition of the denotation
of a Word is based upon Convention.
2.1.56 Also becuase there is no such limitation (in actual usage) among
different people.
2.1.57 "That (Word) cannot be rearded as an Instrument of right Cognition,
becuase of such defects as (A) falsity, (B) contradiction and (c)
tautology"
2.1.58 Not so; as the failure is due to deficiencies in the Action, the
Agent and the Means.
2.1.59 The deprecatory assertion applies to the changing of a particular time
after having adopted it.
2.1.60 It may be rightly regarded as a usefull reiteration.
2.1.61 Specially as a classification of the texts is accepted on the
basis of purpose.
2.1.62 The texts being employed as (a) 'Injunctions', (b) 'Descriptions'
and (c) Reiterations with a Purpose'
2.1.63 The Injunction is that which prescribes ( a certain act)
2.1.64 The descriptions are Valedictory, Deprecatory, Illustrative and
Narrative
2.1.65 When the Injunction and the Enjoined are mentioned again, it consti
tutes 'Reiteration ( with a purpose)'
2.1.66 "There is no difference between 'Reiteratin' and 'Repetition';
as both consists in the restating of the same word"
2.1.67 [Reiteration is] not the same [as Repetiton], as [in the former] the
re-mention [of the words] is like the exhortation to go 'more quickly'
2.1.68 The trustworthiness of Words (of the Veda) is rased upon the
trusworthiness of the reliable (veracious) expositor, just like the
trustworthiness of Incantations and of Medical Scriptures.
2.2.1 "The number (of Instruments of right Cognition) cannot be four (only)
as Tradition, Presumption, Deduction and Anthesis are also Instruments
of Cognition.
2.2.2 Is not a correct denial; as 'Tradition' is not different from 'Word';
and 'Presumption','Deduction and 'Anthesis' are not different from
inference.
2.2.3 Presumption cannot be a true Instrument of cognition, as it is uncertain
(not always true)
2.2.4 It is on account of what is not Presumption being regarded as
presumption [that there arises the idea of its being not always true]
2.2.5 Further, the denial itself is invalid, - being uncertain (not
universally true).
2.2.6 If the denial is valid, there can be no invalidity in Presumption.
2.2.7 Antithesis cannot be regarded as a valid Instrument of Cognition;
as there is nothing that can be the object of cognition by its means.
2.2.8 Certain things being marked, those not marked, being characterised by
the absence of that mark, come to be regarded as the object of
cognition by the said means (of Antithesis).
2.2.9 If it be urged that-"when the thing is non existant, there can be no antithesis
(or negation) of it" -our answer is that this is not right, as it is
possible for the thing to exist elsewhere.
2.2.10 [Says the opponent]-"The presence of the mark (in the unmarked things)
cannot be the means (of any cognition) in regard to the unmarked
things."
2.2.11 This is not right; as the possibility (of the cognition) is in view
of the actual presence of the marks (elsewhere)
2.2.12 Then again, the Antithesis of a thing is possible before it comes into
existence.
2.2.13 (A) Becuase it has a cause - (b) Becuase it is apprehended through a
sense organ,- and (c) becuase it is (conceived and) spoken of as a
product.
2.2.14 "(A) Becuase the destruction of the jar is eternal, -(B) becuase
Community is eternal,- and (C) becuase even eternal things are
conceived and spoken of as non-eternal,[what has been urged in the preceding
Sutra cannot be accepted as conclusive]"
2.2.15 [answer]- Inasmuch as there is a clear difference and distinction
between the real (direct) and the figurative (indirect) [denotation
of the term 'eternal'], the premises are not untrue.
2.2.16 Inasmuch as this is urged only as leading to the inference of the
series (of sounds),
2.2.17 Becuase what the term 'part' really denotes is the constituent cause;
2.2.18 Before it is uttered; becuase it is not apprehended, and we do not
find any obstruction (that could explain the non apprehension of the sound.
2.2.19 "As there is non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of obstruction,
this proved the existence of the obstruction"
2.2.20 If (as you say), even though there is 'non apprehension of obstruction',
yet this 'non-apprehension of obstruction' exists, - then, in that
case, the mere non-apprehension of 'obstruction' cannot prove the
non-existence of the 'obstruction'".
2.2.21 Inasmuch as the 'non-apprehension (of obstruction)' is of the nature
of 'negation of apprehension (of obstruction)', the reason (put
forward in sut 19) is not true one.
2.2.22 (A). "Becuase of intangibility"
2.2.23 The reasoning is not right, becuase motion (which is 'intangible') is
'non-eternal'.
2.2.24 The reasoning is not right,becuase the Atom ( which is 'tangible')
is 'eternal'
2.2.25 "Becuase of its being imparted"
2.2.26 This also is not a valid reason; becuase sound is not found to exist
in the space intervening between the two persons.
2.2.27 In view of the fact that it (Sound) is taught,(the validity of) the
reason cannot be gainsaid."
In accordance with the two viewa 'being taught' may mean one thing
or another; hence the argument fails to meets the objection (urged by
us)
2.2.28 "Becuase there is repetition"
2.2.29 Tis cannot be right; for the term 'repetition' is used figuratively also,
in cases where the things concerned are different (not the same)
2.2.30 "When a thing is 'different', it is 'different' from something
that is 'different' (from it);- and what is 'different' from the
'different' must be 'non-different';- so that there is nothing that
can be regarded as (purely) 'different'"
2.2.31 If there is no conception of the 'different', there can be non-differe
nce'; as the two conception are mutually relative.
2.2.32 "Also becuase we do not perceive any cause for its destruction"
2.2.33 Inasmuch as we do not find any cause for Sound not being heard, it
would mean that (if sound is eternal) it should be heard always.
2.2.34 But (in reality) we do perceive it (the cause of the destruction of
Sound); so that the said non-apprehension (of such cause) being
false, it cannot be regarded as a valid reason.
2.2.35 Inasmuch the cessation of Sound follows from the touch of such a
cause as the Hand' it is not right to say that there is non-
perception (of the Momentum)
2.2.36 Further, if the mere fact of the cause of its destruction not being
perceived were to prove that a thing still abides, - then that thing
(e.g the audition of sound) also would have to be regarded as eternal.
2.2.37 Inasmuch as (the substratum of Sound) is intangible, the said
cognition (against sound subsisting in Akasha) does not hold.
2.2.38 Becuase , if sound formed as aggregate (along with Colour &c),
-inasmuch as there are also divisions and subdivisions of it,
[Sound could not be regarded as 'manifested']
2.2.39 There arises a doubt, becuase there is mention of both 'modification' and
' substitution'
2.2.40 Becuase the enlargement of the original cause should always involve a
corresponding enlargement in the modification.
2.2.41 [Answer] Inasmuch as there is (in the Opponenets reasoning) neither
of the two kinds of Probans, the mere example cannot prove anything.
2.2.42 It is not right; as 'Modification' always emanate from such original
bases as are unequal [and they are always in confirmity with these
latter]
2.2.43 "Just as there is diversity in the character of the modification
of the modification od Substances, so is there diversity in the
modification of Letters also".
2.2.44 [Answer] That cannot be; as the real character of 'Modification' is
not possible ( in the case of letters).
2.2.45 [As a matter of fact] when things have undergone 'modification', they
cannot revert to their original form.
2.2.46 "Inasmuch as Gold and other things do revert to their original form
the reason urged is not a true reason at all".
There is no analog at all; as in the case of the modifications' of
Gold, the 'Gold'- character is never absent.
But inasmuch as the GeneralCharacter of 'Letter' is never absent
[in either 'i' or 'ya' it is not right to deny the 'Modifiction
of Letters' ".
[Answer]- But a character subsists in that which is endowe with
generality, and not in the generality itself.
2.2.47 If Letters are eternal, they cannot undergo [or become] modifications
if they are non-eternal,they cannot persist (as a constant factor).
2.2.48 "Inasmuch as most eternal things are beyond the reach of the senses,
and yet there are some that are of the opposite character- the denial
of Letter modification is not right".
2.2.49 "Eventhough non-persistent, Letters may undergo modifications, in the
same way as they are apprehended (perceived)".
2.2.50 (1)Inasmuch as, if the Letter is something modifiable, it cannot be
eternal, -and (2) as the ( so called) 'modofication' appears at a
time other than that at which the modifying letter is present, the
objection ( taken in) is not a right one.-
2.2.51 Becuase in regard to letter-modifications, there is no constancy
as to the original base.
2.2.52 "As there is constancy in non-consistancy, it is not right to say
that there is no consistancy."
2.2.53 (A) Inasmuch as 'consistancy' and 'non-consistancy' are contradictory
terms, and (B)as the 'constancy' (put forward by the Opponent)
subsists in the 'non-consistancy', the objection urged is not right.
2.2.54 What appears as the 'modification of letters' involves a change in
(one or the other of) the following forms- (a) the coming in of fresh
properties, (b) suppression, (c) diminution, (d) Increase
(e) curtailment and (f) coalescence.
2.2.55 These same (Letters), when ending in an affix are called 'Word'.
2.2.56 There arises a doubt; becuase the Word is used in reference to the
individual, the configuaration and the generality, as inseprable from
one another.
2.2.57 "It is the individual (that is denoted by the Word); all usage- in
the form of (a) the term 'that which' (b) grouping, (c) giving,
(d) possession (e) number, (f) enlargement (g) contraction (h) colour
(i) compounding and (j) procreation -appertains to the Individual."
2.2.58 This is not right; as there could be no restriction.
2.2.59 In the case of (a)'Brahmana', (b) 'Mancha' (platform) (c) 'Kata' (mat)
(d) 'Rajan' (king) (e) 'Saktu' ('flour) (f) 'chandan' (sandal)
(g) 'Ganga', (h) 'Shataka' (cloth) (i) 'Anna' (food) (j) 'Purusa' (man)
there is secondary (indirect) application, due respectively to -
(a) association (b) loaction (c) purpose (d) behaviour (e) measure
(f) containing (g) proximity (h) connection (i) cause and (j)sovereignty.
2.2.60 "It may be the 'Akriti', 'Configuration',[that is denoted by the world]
as the determining of the exact nature of a thing is dependent upon
that."
2.2.61 "Inasmuch as the 'washing ' etc (laid down as to be done to the 'cow'
of clay, even though it is endowed with individuality and Configuration
-it must be the genrality (that is denoted by the word)"
2.2.62 This also cannot be accepted; becuase (as a matter of fact) the
manifestation (or recognition) of the 'Generality' is dependent
upon 'Configuration' and 'Individuality'.
2.2.63 In reality the Individual, the Configuration and the Generality
-(all three) constitute the denotation of the Word.
2.2.64 The Individual is that composite material body which is the receptacle
of distinctive qualities.[or according to Varthika,-the Individual
consists of the specific Qualities, Actions and the Substance
containing these].
2.2.65 'Confiuration' is that which Indicate the Generality and its
Characteristics.
2.2.66 'Generality' is the cause (or basis) of Comprehensive Cognitions.
3.1.1 Becuase the same thing is apprehended by Sight and Touch.
3.1.2 "What has been put forward in the preceding Sutra is not right;for
there is restriction as to objects.
3.1.3 It is becuase there is restriction as to objects that there must be
a soul; hence this cannot be denied.
3.1.4 [If the body were Soul , then] there would be no sin accruing from
burning (killing) of a living body.
3.1.5 [opponent says]"Even on the burning of that [aggregate of body etc] which is
accompanied by the soul, there could be no sin; as the Soul is
something eternal."
3.1.6 [The answer of the Sdhantin to Purvaprakasha argument in su 5]
Not so; (A) becuase the 'killing' is of the receptacle of effects
and of that which brings about those effects. [ (b) Or becuase
the killing is of the receptacle of effects, which is what brings
about these effects].
3.1.7 Because there is recognition with the other eye of what has been
seen with the left Eye.
3.1.8 [Says the opponenet]- "The above reasoning is not right; for the
Organ (in reality) is one only, and the notion of duality arises
from the one Oragan being divided by the nasal bone.
3.1.9 [Answer]- The Organ cannot be regarded as one only; as (we find that)
when one (Eye) is destroyed, the other is not detroyed.
3.1.10 [The opponents rejoinder]-"The argument put forward has no force;
as even on the destruction of a part the whole is still found
(effective)"
3.1.11 [Answer].-Inasmuch the example cited is not true [or Inasmuch as
the Opponent's view is contrary to perceived facts], the denial
(in su 10) cannot be right.
3.1.12 From the exitation appearing in another Sense organ (than the one that
brought about the preceding perception)
3.1.13 [Objection]- "The above reasoning is not right; Remembrance has for
its object that which is remembered"
3.1.14 [Answer] - Inasmuch as Remebrance is a quality of the Soul,the
denial (of Soul) is not right.
3.1.15 [Says the opponent] - "The conclusion of the Sidhantin cannot be
accepted; as the reasons adduced in support of the notion os 'Soul'
are all applicable to mind.
3.1.16 [Answer]- Inasmuch as the instruments of cognition can belong only
to the Cogniser, it is merely a difference in names.
3.1.17 There is no reason in support of any differentiation.
3.1.18 Becuase the new born infant experiences joy, fear and sorrow,-which
could follwo only from the continuity of remebrance of what has been
repeatedly gone through before.
3.1.19 [Objection]- "What has been put forward is only a variation (of
the transient Soul), resembling the variations of opening and
closing undergone by the Lotus and other flowers."
3.1.20 This cannot be right; becuase as a matter of fact, all variations of
things constituted by the five rudimentary substances are due to
such causes as cold, heat and the rainy season.
3.1.21 The Soul must be regarded as eternal]becuase of the desire for milk
from the mother's breast, which is evinced (on birth) after
death, and which can only be due to repeated feeding (in the past)-
3.1.22 [Objection] "The action of the child is only like the moving of the
iron to the magnet"
3.1.23 It cannot be, becuase there is no such action in any other thing
(except Iron, and that too in the proximity of no other thing
except Magnets).
3.1.24 Becuase persons free from longingd are never found to be born.
3.1.25 [The opponenet asks] "How do you know that the Longing of the new
born child arises from the recalling of previously experienced things
and not That it is produced in the same manner as substances and their
qualities?"
3.1.26 [Answer] It is not so; becuase Longing (and Aversion) are due to
anticipation.
3.1.27 The body must be regarded as composed of the Earth; becuase we find
in it the peculiar quality (of earth).
3.1.28 (A) "The body is made up of Earth, Water and Fire, becuase we find in
ti the distinctive qualities of these,[i.e Odour, Viscidity and Heat]."
(B)-"It is made up of four substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air),
becuase we find in it in-breathing and out-breathing (in addition to the
aforesaid qualities of earth, &c.)"
(C)-"It is made up five substances, earth, Water, Fire, Air and
Akasha, becuase we find in it Odour(of earth) humidity (of Water),
heat (of Fire),breathing (or circulation of the juices) (of Air)
and cavities (of Akasha).
3.1.29 Also becuase of the authority of scripture.
3.1.30 This doubt arises from the fact that there is perception (with the
eye) when the Pupil is there, and there is perception also when
there is no contact with the Pupil.
3.1.31 Becuase there is perception of large and small.
3.1.32 The said apprehension (of large and small things) is due to the
peculiarity of the contact between the light-rays (emnated from the
Visual Organ) and the object (perceived).
3.1.33 Inasmuch as no such thing (as Visual Light rays) is ever perceived,
what has been put forward cannot prove anything."
3.1.34 [Answer for the above objection]- Mere non perception of that which
can be deduced by inference is no proof of its non-existance.
3.1.35 There being no uniformity regarding the character (of perceptibility
or imperceptibility) as belonging to substancrs and qualities, there
can be no certainity in regard to any particular thing being actually
perceived.
3.1.36 Perception of Colour ( and coloured Substance) is the result of the
inherence of several component substances, and of the presence of a
particular character of Colour.
3.1.37 The formation of the sense-organs, being due to Merit and Demerit,
is subervient to the purpopse of man.
3.1.38 Its non-perception is similar to the non-perception of the light
of the stars at midday.
3.1.39 The said assertion cannot be accepted; becuase there is non-perception
(of the Light of Stones) also at night.
3.1.40 The perception of things being broght about by the aid of external
light, the non-perception (of the Visual Light) must be due to non-
manifestation ( of colour).
3.1.41 Becuase there can be suppression (of Colour) only when it is manifest
also.
3.1.42 Also becuase we actually perceive the Light in the eyes of night-
walkers.
3.1.43 "Becuase ( as a matter of fact) there is perception without (the organ)
getting at (the Object); for (we find) that is perception of things
behind glass, vapour and rock-crystal."
3.1.44 [Answer to the above]- The above reasoning has no force against our
doctrine, becuase there is no perception of things behind a wall".
3.1.45 Inasmuch as there is no real obstruction ( by such things as the
Glass &c), Contact does take place (in the cases cited).
3.1.46 Becuase (as a matter of fact) there is no obstruction of the Sun's
rays, - in connection with the object behind a piece of rock-crystal,
and in connection with the object to be burnt.
3.1.47 [Objection]- "The view put forward is not right; because there is
possibility of either of the two characters belonging to either
of the two substances."
3.1.48 [Answer]- Just as there is perception of Colour in the Mirror and
in Water, by reason of these two being, by their nature, bright and
white, - similarity there is perception of Colour (also in the case of
such intervening substances as glass & c., which are by their nature
transparent).
3.1.49 It is not right to question or deny things that are (rightly) perceived
and infered.
3.1.50 The doubt arises- becuas by reason of subsistence in several places,
there should be multiplicity; and yet a single composite actually
subsists in several places.
3.1.51 The sense organ is "The Cutaneous (tactile) only, becuase of
non-absence.
3.1.52 It is not true [that there is only one Snese organ]; becuase (several)
things are not perceived simultaneously.
3.1.53 The cutaneous Organ cannot be the only sense organ; as this would
involve inner contradictions.
3.1.54 Becuase the objects of the Sense organs are five fold.
3.1.55 [Objection] "What is asserted cannot be accepted; becuase the
'objects' are many (and not 'five')".
3.1.56 [Answer]- Inasmuch as (the several kinds of Odour are ) nothing
more than 'odour', there can eb no denial of Odour or the rest
(as constituting the five Sense-organs').
3.1.57 [Says the Opponenet]- "If things can be grouped under a community,
then it follows that all the Sense-Organs "Should be regarded as
'one', their (several) objects being no more than 'object'.
3.1.58 [Answer]- Not so; because of the fivefoldness - (a)of the signs
(or indicatives) in the shape of Perceptions, (b)of the location,
(c) of the process (operation), (d) of the shape (magnitude) and
(e) of the constituents.
3.1.59 The sense -organs are regarded as being of the same nature as the
Rudimentary Substances, becuase there is perception (by their means)
of the specific qualities of these substances.
3.1.60 From among Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound, -those ending
with Touch belong to earth;
3.1.61 And [from among those ending with Touch] excluding from the
beginning, one by one, they belong respectively to Water, Light and
Water; and to Akasha belongs the latter.
3.1.62 "The view expressed cannot be accepted; becuase all the qualities
(attributed to the substances) are not apprehended (by the Sense-
organs constituted by them).
3.1.63 "Inasmuch as each of the qualities subsists, one by one, in each of
the Substances, one after the other, there is no apprehension of
the others."
3.1.64 "Becuase the prededing is permeated by the succeeding"
3.1.65 Not so; because the Earthy and the Aqueous Substances are both
actually perceived [with distinct qualities of their own].
3.1.66 Inasmuch as from among the qualities [of the organ of Olfaction,
Gestation, Vision, Taction and Audition] there is an excess (in
each Organ) of each of the qualities [Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and
Sound], one by one, in the order in which they are mentioned,-each
Organ is regarded as preponderating in that quality.
3.1.67 The restriction [as to one organ being composed of Earth, and so
forth] is due to preponderance [i.e singularity].
3.1.68 Question: Why is it that the sense organs do not apprehend their own
qualities? The answer is the sutra.
Because it is only as endowed with qualities that the Sense organs
are what they are.
3.1.69 If it is held that -"the odour of the Olfactory Organ would itself
be the requisite auxiliary also" then the answer is-
Because a thing cannot be apprehended by itself.
3.1.70 "What is asserted cannot be accepted; becuase the quality of
Sound is Actually perceived"
3.1.71 [Answer] - The said apprehension is due to the fact of the quality
(Sound) and substance (Akasha) being unlike other qualities and
substances.
3.2.1 The sense organs and objects have been fully examined; now it is the
turn of the examination of Buddhi, Cognition. And the first question
that arises is - Is Cognition eternal or non-eternal ? "why there
should be this doubt?"
The doubt arises by Reason of the similarity (of Cognition) to Action
and Akasha.
3.2.2 "Bhuddhi, the eterna;l Organ of man, is eternal;" this is asserted by
the sutra.
"Because there is re-cognition of things."
3.2.3 Inasmuch as what has been put forward is itself still to be proved,
it cannot be accepted as a valid reason.
3.2.4 The view has been held that -"From out os the eternal 'Buddhi', there
go forth, inrefernce to the single object cognised, emanations which
constitute the 'Cognitions' of those objects,- and that the 'Emanation
is nothing different from the Source from which it proceeds." This
however ,
Is not right; becuase there is no simultaneous cognition of things.
3.2.5 [Otherwise] the cessation of the cognition would mean the destruction
(cessation of the existence)[of the Internal Organ, Buddhi].
3.2.6 As a matter of fact , the mind, which is of limited magnitude (not
all prevading) comes into contact with the several sense organs,
one by one (and at distinct points of time) so that-
Inasmuch as the process is gradual, the apprehension is not simultaneous,
3.2.7 The non-apprehension of one thing is due to (the mind) being occupied
with other things.
3.2.8 If the mind were all-pervading, its gradual contact with the Sense
organs, one by one,
would not be possible; becuase there is no motion-.
3.2.9 [The opponent says]- "Even whe the 'Emanation' is identical with its
Source, it cannot be (reasonably) asserted that the Internal Organ is one,
and its Emanations many for
The notion of its being different (diverse) is analogus to the notion of
difference (diversity) in regard to the rock crystal."
3.2.10 "In the Rock-crystall also, there are produced fresh rock-crystals
one after the other; since all individual things are momentary;
hence what has been stated is without reason."
3.2.11 Inasmuch as there is no reason in support of the universal proposition,
we can admit of it only in accordance with our experience.
3.2.12 Some people hold that "Every object consists of a series of entities,
each entity being entirely destroyed and succeeded by an entirely
different entity, without any trace of the former, - and each of these
entities has but a momentary existance;"- but this view
Cannot be accepted; because the cause of production and of destruction
(when present) are perceived.
3.2.13 "Just as in the case of the destruction of milk, and the production
of curd, the cause is not perceived [and is yet admitted], so would it
in the case of the
3.2.14 Inasmuch as there is actual apprehension through indicatives, there
as no non-perception (in the case of milk and curd).
3.2.15 To what the Bauddha Nihilist has urged in su 13, some one (the
sankhya) has offered the following answer.
"Of the milk there is no destruction (when it turns into curd);
for what happens is either transformation or manifestation of new
qualities.
3.2.16 When we perceive a new Substance being produced through a fresh
reconstitution, we infer from this the cessation (destruction) of
the previous substance.
3.2.17 Inasmuch as in some cases the cause of destruction is perceived,
while in some it is not perceived, - what is stated (as the pre
miss) is not universallt true.
3.2.18 Apprehension cannot subsist in the Sense-organ, or in the Object
-since it continues to exist also when these two have been destroyed.
3.2.19 Apprehension cannot be the quality of the Mind, (a) whose existance
is infered from the fact that the appreension of things is not
simultaneous-[or (b),because the apprehension of things is not
simultanious]-[(c) and also because the simultanious cognition
of things actually appearing in Yogis would be inexplicable if
cognition belonged to the mind].
3.2.20 [Objection]-"What has been urged applies equally to the case of
Apprehension being a Quality of the Soul."
3.2.21 [Answer]- The said (simultaneous) appearance of cognition is not
possible; because the contact of the Mind with (all) the Sense-
Organs is not possible.
3.2.22 If it be held that -"The cognition of Odour &c. proceds from the
contact among soul, Sense organ and object only, and the contact
of mind is not essential;[so that even though the contact of mind
and the Sense -organ may be absent, that will not stand in the way
of cognition appearing simultaniously; hence there is no force in
the answer given in su 21 then the answer is:-
This cannot be right; for no proof is adduced in support of such
origin (of Cognitions, without contact of Mind).
3.2.23 "Further if apprehension subsists (in the soul), then, it should have
to be regarded as eternal; since we do not perceive any cause for
its destruction."
3.2.24 Inasmuch as pprehension is (universally) recognised as non-eternal,
its destruction proceeds from another apprehension; just like Sound.
3.2.25 "As a matter of fact, Recollection proceeds from the contact of the
mind with that part of the Soul which is permeated by (the impression
of) the (corresponding) cognition; so that several Recollections
cannot appear simultaneously."
3.2.26 This explanation is not right; because the Mind lies within the body.
3.2.27 The reason put forward is not valid, because it is still to be proved
3.2.28 The above objection is not right; because (in support of our contention)
there is this proof that the recollecting person retains a body.
3.2.29 "What has been urged is not possible; as the Mind is quick in its
motion"
3.2.30 "What has been asserted cannot be; because there is no restriction
as to the time of Recollection.
3.2.31 "The particular kind of contact (of the Mind, with things outside the
Body) is not possible; (a) either by the impelling of the Soul,
or (b) By chance, or (c) by reason of intelligence.
3.2.32 Is similar to that partcular kind of contact which causes pain in the
foot of the person whose Mind is Preoccupied.
3.2.33 Recollection are not simultaneous, because such cause as attension,
Perception of the Sign and the rest are not all present at one and
the same time.
3.2.34 inasmuch as activity and cessation from activity are caused by
Desire and Aversion of a Cognisant Being [Desire and Aversion must
belong to this Cognisant being].
3.2.35 "Inasmuch as the said Activity and Absense of Activity are the sole
indicative of desire and Aversion, these cannot be denied in regard
to the Bodies composed of earth and other material substances."
3.2.36 Since we find Activity and Absense of Activity in such things as the
Axe and the like,-
3.2.37 What differentiates the said Desire and Aversion (from the qualities
of material subsistances, and marks them out as belonging to something
other than material substances) is Universality and absence of
universality.
3.2.38 (A) On account of reasoning explained before,- (b) on account
of thesese being under the control of something else,-and (c) on
account of the contigency, that [if intelligence belonged to
the mind &c) it would mean that the results accruing (to man)
are those of acts done by others (than himself)
3.2.39 (A) Also by reason of 'Elimination' and also (B) Becuase the reasons
adduced before are firmely established .
[Or (B) because of reasons adduced before and (c) by reason of
Reappearance]
3.2.40 Recollection (must belong) to the Soul; for it is the Soul that
is endowed with the character of the 'Cogniser'.
3.2.41 The answer is that Recollection arises-
from such causes as (a)Attension, (b) association, (c) Retentiveness
(d) Indicative (e) Distinguishing feature (f) Likeness, (g) ownership
(h) supporter (i)supported (j) relationship (k) sequence (l) sepera-
tion (m) co-profession (n) enimity (o) superiority (p) acquisition
(q) cover (r) Pleasure and Pain (s) desire and aversion (t) Fear,
(u) need (v) profession (w) affection (x) merit and (y) demerit.
3.2.42 Is apprehension entirely evanescent, like sound? or is it durable
for some time longer,like the jar.
Becuase there is Apprehension of Motion, which is fleeting.
3.2.43 "If Cognition were evanescent, the perception of things would be
always indistinct perception of Colour during lightning-flash"
3.2.44 [Answer] The very reason put forward implies the admission of what
is sought to be denied.
3.2.45 The said perception would be like the distinct perception of the
continuous series of lamp-flames.
3.2.46 As a matter of fact, in substances we perceive their own qualities
as also the qualities of others; so that the matter is open to
doubt.
3.2.47 Sentience is not a quality of the body "Why?"
Becuase Colour and other qualities continue to exist as long as the
Body exists.
3.2.48 This however is not right; because (in the case of the object cited)
there is appearance of another Colour due to baking.
3.2.49 Inasmuch as qualities produced by heat are found to be due to the
presence of counter-active forces, the criticism based upon the
anlogy of these cannot be right.
3.2.50 For the following reason also sentience cannot be a quality of the
body:-Because it pervade over the entire Body.
3.2.51 "It is been said that 'there is no part of the body where sentience
does not appear; but:-
"This is not right; for it is not found in such parts of the body
as hairs and nails."
3.2.52 Inasmuch as the Body extends only so far the skin, there is no
possibility of Sentience appearing in such things as Hairs and Nails.
3.2.53 For the following reason also sentience cannot be a quality of the
body:- Because it differs in character from the qualities of the
body.
3.2.54 "What is urged is not right; as there is difference in character
among Colour and other qualities (belonging to the body)"
3.2.55 [Answer] Inasmuch as Colour and the other qualities (of Body)
are perceptible by the Senses, there is no incongruity in these
(belonging to the body)"
3.2.56 The Mind must be oen only; since there is non-simultaneity of
Cognitions.
3.2.57 "What has been asserted is not right; for as a matter of fact
we do perceive several actions (cognitions) actually appearing
simultaneously"
3.2.58 [Answer]- The said perception is like the perception of the fire
circle; and is due to the rapidity of motion.
3.2.59 For reasons already mentioned, the Mind must be atomic.
3.2.60 The formation of the Body is due to the persistance of the effect
of previous acts.
3.2.61 "The formation of the Body out of material substances is exactly
like the production of material bodies of material substances".
3.2.62 This cannot be accepted; because what is urged is still to be
proved.
3.2.63 What has been urged in regard to the 'production of material
bodies out of material substances' any anlaoy between this and the
case in question
There is none; because Parents are the cause of formation (of the
body).
3.2.64 And also is the food.
3.2.65 Specially becuase, even when physical connection is present, there
is no certainity (in the appearance of the effect)
3.2.66 Just as Karman (Destin) is the cause of the formation of the Body
so is it also of the connection of that body (with a particular
soul).
3.2.67 By what has been said in the preceding Sutra the absence of
universality has been explained [i.e shown to be impossible,
inexplicable under the Purvapaksa.
3.2.68 If it be asserted that- the formation of the Body is due to
adrista [(a) non-perception or (b) unseen quality ]"-then
[our answer is that] in that case, even after final release there
would be likelihood of a Body being produced.
3.2.69 There should be no severance of connection.- this being due to the
action of mind.
3.2.70 Inasmuch as death would not be possible, the body should have to
be regarded as everlasting.
3.2.71 "it would be like the eternality of the dark colour of the Atom."
3.2.72 "That cannot be; as this would involve (A) the admission of what
is not supported (by reasoning or fact) [(b) or , the accruing of
what is not earned].
4.1.1 As Activity has been defined.
4.1.2 So also have the defects.
4.1.3 There are three Groups of Defects; [all -being included under]
Desire, Hatred and Illusion, which are distinct from one another
4.1.4 "What is asserted is not right; becuase all there have one and the
the same thing for their antithesis."
4.1.5 The reason putforward is not valid, as there is no invariable
concomitance.
4.1.6 Of these Illusion is the worser evil; as for one who is not under
illusion the others do not appear.
4.1.7 Inasmuch as (between illusion and the other two) there is the
relation of cause and effect, it follows that 'Illusion' is something
different from the 'defects'.
4.1.8 [Answer]- that cannot be ; as Illusion is included under the
definition of 'Defects.'
4.1.9 Further, since it is quite possible for things belonging to the
same class to bear among themselves the relation of cause and
effect, the objection has no force.
4.1.10 Rebirth is possible only because the Soul is eternal.
4.1.11 The (production) of perceptible things is from perceptable things; as is
clearly proved by Perception.
4.1.12 "What is asserted is not true; as the jar is not produced out of the
jar".
4.1.13 Inasmuch as the jar is actually produced out of a 'perceptable' substa
nce, the objection has no force.
4.1.14 Entities are produced out of a negation; as no object comes into
existance without having destroyed(its cause).
4.1.15 The reasoning put forwarded is unsound as it involves self -contra
diction.
4.1.16 "What has been urged is not right; for as a matter of fact, words
denoting the case relations are applied to past as well as future
things".
4.1.17 "[Even so] the view put forth can not be accepted; becuase as a matter
of fact there is no production out of things destroyed.
4.1.18 In so far as 'Sequence' is mention,-this we do not deny.
4.1.19 God is the cause; because we find fruitlessness in the actions of men.
4.1.20 "It is not so; because as a matter of fact , no fruit appears
without man's action."
4.1.21 Inasmuch as it is influenced by Him, there is no force in the reason
(put forward).
4.1.22 Another philosopher asserts as follows:-
"The production of entities must be without as efficient cause; as we
see such things as the sharpness of the thorn and the like."
4.1.23 [Answer] Since the non-cause is (spoken of as ) the cause the said
production of entities is not 'without cause'.
4.1.24 'Nimitta' (Cause) and 'Animitta' ('non-cause') being two distinct things,
the answer (offered in sut 23) is no answer at all.
4.1.25 "All things must be evanescent; becuase they are liable to be
produced and destroyed."
4.1.26 What is asserted cannot be true; as the 'evanescence' itself is
eternal.
4.1.27 As a matter of fact, the evanscence is not eternal; like the destruction
of fire after having destroyed the thing burnt by it.
4.1.28 The eternal cannot be rightly denied; because the determination (as to
a certain thing being eternal or evanescent) must be in accordance
with what is actually perceived.
4.1.29 "All things must be eternal; because the five elemental substances
are eternal."
4.1.30 What has been asserted cannot be right; as we actually perceive
the cause of production and of destruction.
4.1.31 "Inasmuch as all things posses the characteristics of eternal
substances, the denial is not right."
4.1.32 What has been urged can not be right; for as a matter of fact, the
cause and production are actually perceived.
4.1.33 This cannot be accepted; for (under this theory) there would be
no possibility of differentiation.
4.1.34 "All must be regarded as diverse; because the symbols(names) of
things refer to diverse entities."
4.1.35 What is alleged cannot be accepted; because (as a matter of fact)
several (kinds of) things go to make a single entitity.-
4.1.36 The denial cannot be right, as the symbols(of things) are
restricted in their application.
4.1.37 All things must be non-entities, becuase all things are known to be
mere negations of one another".
4.1.38 What has been alleged is not right , because things are by virtue of
their very nature, actual entities.
4.1.39 "There is no such thing as the character (or individuality) of things
for what is so regarded has only a relative existance."
4.1.40 "What is put forward cannot be right, as it involves a self
contradiction."
4.1.41 Any absolute limitation of number (of things) cannot be established
,either in the event of the means (of proving it) being available, or in
that of its being not available.
4.1.42 What is been urged is not true; as the means (of proving) is only a
part (of what is to be proved)
4.1.43 The reason put forward is no reason at all; as (according to the
Purvapaksa) things can have no 'parts';
4.1.44 There arises a doubt since the accomplishment of the result (of acts)
is found to appear immediately as well as after some time.
4.1.45 The fruition is not immediate; because it is such as can be experienced
only at a later time.
4.1.46 "The fruition cannot appear at another time; as the cause thereof
will have ceased to exist"
4.1.47 "Prior to the actual accomplishment of the fruition there would
be something (in the shape of an intermediary), just as there is
in the case of the fruit of trees."
4.1.48 "Prior to its accomplishment, the accomplished fruition (result)
cannot be either (non-existent, (b) or existant, (c) or existent-
non-existent; because 'existent' and 'non-existent' are totally
dissimilar".
4.1.49 The truth of the matter is that prior to being produced, the
thing to be produced was non-existent - "How so?"
Because we perceive the production as well as destruction (of
things).
4.1.50 "Prior to its production, the product is not non-existent,because
of the restiction in regard to the material cause of things;"
That the product is non-existent is clearly proved by that very
conception.
4.1.51 "The receptacle being different [in the case of the fruition of
acts], it is not right to argue that it is like the fruition
of trees."
4.1.52 Inasmuch as Happiness subsists in the Soul, the objection has no
force at all.
4.1.53 "What has been just said is not true; as [the obtaining of]
Son, Wife,Cattle,Clothing , Gold, Food and such things are
mentioned as the fruits (of acts)".
4.1.54 Inasmuch as the real fruition results from connection with the
things mentioned, it is only indirectly (figuratively) that these
latter are spoken of as the 'fruit'.
4.1.55 The Birth of the Body &c. is only Pain; because it is beset with
Annoyances.
4.1.56 It is not so; Because Pleasure also is accomplished during
intervals.
4.1.57 There is no denial [of pleasure]; because [all that is meant is that]
inasmuch as the Man experiencing pleasure is oppressed with the
frailty of longing there is no cessation of annoyance for him.
4.1.58 Also because there are several kinds of Pain which people wrongly
regard as pleasure.
4.1.59 "Since there is concatenation (a) of Debts, (b) of Abberations
and (c) of Activity, there can be no Release."
4.1.60 Inasmuch as the Word cannot be taken in its primary signification,
the statement must be taken as a description by means of a word used in
its secondary (figurative) signification; specially as it is only
thus that the sense of condemnation and commentation is obtained.
4.1.61 Inasmuch as there is transportation (of the Fires) into the Soul
the denial of (release) cannot be right.
4.1.62 Inasmuch as the 'collecting of the sacrificial vessals'' could not be
possible in their case, the results mentioned cannot pertain to
others (than house holders).
4.1.63 Release is possible; inasmuch as (we find that) there are no abbreations
in the case of the man in deep sleep, who dreams no dreams.
4.1.64 For the man whose abberations have been destroyed, Activity does not
lead to recrudescence.
4.1.65 "What has been just alleged is not possible; as the concatenation
of abbreations is innate (in man).
4.1.66 Just as there is evanescence of negation of things prior to their
coming into existance, so there can be evanascence of innate things
also.'
4.1.67 Or it may be like the evanescence of the dark colour of the Atom'
4.1.68 What has been alleged by the oppenent cannot be right; also because
(a) desire and the rest have their source in misapprehension.
4.2.1 From the true knowledge of the cause of defects' follows the
cessation of the notion of 'I'
4.2.2 Colour and other objects, when they form the subjects of wrong
notion, become the cause of defects.
4.2.3 Regard for the objects as a whole becomes the cause of Defects.
4.2.4 "Apprehension and non-apprehension being two fold, there arises
doubt."
4.2.5 There can be no doubt (in regard to the composite), as its existance
has been established by reasons already explained before.
4.2.6 "In that case (we might as well say that), since the existance(of any
such thing as the composite) is impossible, there can be no doubt
(as to whether it exists or not)".
4.2.7 "Inasmuch as the components cannot beside either in the whole or in
part (of the composite), it follows that there is no composite."
4.2.8 "Inasmuch as it is not possible ( for the composite) to reside in
them ,- there can be no composite."
4.2.9 "And sinse the composite cannot be reside apart from the components
(there can be no such thing as the Composite)"
4.2.10 "Lastly, the Composite cannot be the same as the Components"
4.2.11 Inasmuch as there is no diversity in what is one only, terms
connoting diversity cannot be applied to it; so that there is no
room for the question put by the Purvapaksin.
4.2.12 Even there where other parts (of composite), it could not subsits
(in the components) hence the reasoning is not right.
4.2.13 "The perception of things would be possible; just like the perception
of the mass of hairs by the person of dim vision.
4.2.14 The efficiency (distinctness) and dulness (indistinctness) of the
perception is due to the efficiency and dulness of the sens-organs;
but these never go beyond the range of their respective objects;
and they cannot operate upon what is not their object.
4.2.15 The difficulties in connection With composite and components will
continue till the total negation of all the things.
4.2.16 The total deial of all things cannot be right; for the Atom remains.
4.2.17 Or[the Atom may be defined as] that which is beyond Diad.
4.2.18 "There can be no such thing as indivisible Atom, asit is surely
permeated by akasha.
4.2.19 "Or else akasha would be not all-pervading".
4.2.20 "Inasmuch as the terms 'inside' and 'outside' sre denotative of
other constituent causes of the Product,- they cannot applied to
the case of the atom, which is not a 'product'.
4.2.21 It is by the reason of pervasion of sound and of conjunctions
, that akasha is regarded to all pervading.
4.2.22 Absense of Trasfigurations 'Unobstructiveness' and 'all-percevness'
are the properties of the Akasha.
4.2.23 "But the atom must be made up of component parts ; because it is corporeal
object that have a shape."
4.2.24 "Also they are capable of conjunction [Atoms must be made up of
component parts]".
4.2.25 As regards the arguments "(a) Because it is only corporeal objects
that have a shape (b0 because Atoms are capable of conjunction, atoms must
be reagrded as being made up of componenet parts. these arguments
Cannot be set aside ( the fact of atoms being imparative,because
they lead to infinite regress, and infinite regress cannot be right
4.2.26 "As a matter of fact however, when we come to analyse things by our
reason ,we fail to apprehend their real character; and this non-
apprehension must be like the non-apprehension of the cloth after
the yarn has been abstracted.
4.2.27 The reason propounded is invalid as it involves self contradiction.
4.2.28 The non-apprehension ( of the whole) apart (from its parts) is due
to the fact that it is subsits in these.
4.2.29 In reality things are cognised by means of the Instrument of
right Cognition.
4.2.30 By reason of the possiblity and impossibility of proofs.
4.2.31 the notion of reality in regard to the 'Instruments of Right
cognition' and 'objects cognised (by means thereof) is similar to the
notion of the reality of the dreams and the objects dreamt of.
4.2.32 Or it may be likened to the notion of reality in regard to magical
phenomena, imaginary cites in the air, and the Mirage.
4.2.33 Since there is no reason (in support of it), the Proposition (of the
opponent) cannot be regarded as established.
4.2.34 Like remembrance and Desire the cohgnition of the objects in dream
also.
4.2.35 The Destuction of Wrong apprehension follows from True Knowledge;
just as there is destruction of the conception of things during a
dream, on waking.
4.2.36 In the same manner the existance of the apprehension also (cannot
be denied); because we actually perceive its cause, as also its
real existance.
4.2.37 Wrong Apprehension has a double character, based upon the
difference between the real object and the counterpart.
4.2.38 Ture Knowledge proceeds from the practice of a particular form
of meditation.
4.2.39 "This is not possible (A) because certain objects are extreamely
powerful."
4.2.40 "(b)Also becuase cognitions are brought about bu Hunger &c."
4.2.41 "Meditation would be brought about by the force of the fruit of
what has been prevously accomplished"
4.2.42 There is the advise that yoga should be praticed in forests,
caves and river-banks.
4.2.43 This contingency would arise also upon Final Release.
4.2.44 Not so For Cognition is sure to appear only in the Accomplished
body.
4.2.45 And there is absense of that when final Relaease has been
attained.
4.2.46 For that purpose (there should be ) embellishment of the Soul,
by means of restraint and observances and such ohter mehods
of internal discipline as may be learnt from the Science of Yoga.
4.2.47 [There should also be] repetition of the study of the science,
as also friendly discussion with persons learned in the Science.
4.2.48 That (friendly discussion) should be carried with the pupil,
the teacher, companions in the study, and other well knowned
persons,- who wish well (to the enquiries) and who are not
jelous of him.
4.2.49 Being a seeker (after truth) [the man should carry in it] for the
accomplishment of his purpose, even without putting forward any
counter theories.
4.2.50 Disputation and Wrangling (should be carried on) for the purpose of
defending his determination to get at the truth, just as the hedge
of the theory branches is put up for the protection of sprouting seeds.
4.2.51 Should pick up a quarrel with him and proceed to deal with him
by disputation and by Wrangling.
5.1.1 (1) Parity, per similarity (2) per Dissimilarity, (3) per Augmentation
,(4)per Subtraction, (5) per Uncertainity,(6)per certainity
(7)per Shuffling,(8) per Probandum, (9)per convergence, (10)per
Non-Convergence.(11) per Continued Question (12)per Counter Instance
(13) per Non Generation (14) per Doubt (15) per Vacillation
(16) per non-probativeness (17) per Presumption (18) per non-Difference
(19) per evidence (20) per Apprehension (21)per-nonapprehension
(22) per non-Eternalty (23) per Eternality (24) per Character of
effect.
5.1.2 (1) and (2) - the original proposition having been propounded on the
basis of a similarity and dissimilarity, if the oponent seeks to
prove the contrary of its predicate, also on the basis of similarity
and dissimilarity, we have instances of 'Parity per similarity'
and 'Parity per dissimilarity'.
5.1.3 The proposition would be established in the same manner as the
fact of a certain animal being the 'cow' is established by the
presence in it of the class -character of the 'cow'.
5.1.4 Based upon the difference in the properties of the 'Subject' and
of the 'Example' are the Futile rejoinder named (3) 'Parity per
Augmentation', (4) 'Parity per subtraction', (5) 'Parity per
Uncertainity' (6) 'Parity per Certainity (7)'Parity per shuffling
and based upon the fact of both (Subject and example) being objects
to be proved (by Inference) is the Futile Rejoinder named (8)'Parity
per Probandum'.
5.1.5 Inasmuch as reaffirmation (leading to the conclusion) is only secured
on the basis of a particular similarity (between the subject and
example)',there can be no denial of it on the basis of any mere
dissimilarity.
5.1.6 Further inasmuch as the 'Example' becomes as 'Example' only by reason
of the indication of the actual presence,in it, of the Probandum
[it can never be said to stand on the same footing as the Probandum,
what is still to be proved].
5.1.7 "The Probans (could establish the Probandum) eitherby uniting, or
not-uniting , With the probandum- if it units with it, then it becomes non
different from it; while if does not unit with it, it cannot prove it"
these arguments constitute (9) 'parity per Convergence and (10)
'parity per non-convergence'.
5.1.8 The denials (embodied in the Rejoinders) are not effective;
(a) because we find the Jar and such other objects accomplished
(when their cause are in contact with them), and (b) because
Killing by magic (is accomplished without killer coming into contact
with the killed person).
5.1.9 (a) When the basis of the 'Example' is not mantioned, it is
(11)'Parity per Continued Question' and (b) when the Opposition
is set up through a counter instance, it is (12) 'parity per
Counter instance'.
5.1.10 The continued question could come to an end just as it does in the
case of the Fetching of the lamp.
5.1.11 if the counter instance is an effetcive reason, the Example also
cannot be an effective reason.
5.1.12 "Before the birth (of the subject), since [what is urged as ] the
ground [for the probandum being predicated of it] cannot subsist,
[the argument can prove nothing]" this is 'Parity per Non-generation'
5.1.13 Since it is only when it has been produced that the thing is what it
is, and since what is urged as the ground (for the Proposition)
does then subist in it, the presence of the ground cannot be
denied.
5.1.14 The community and example both being equally perceptible by the
senses,[the opposition] based upon similarity to the eternal as well
as non-eternal' things constitute 'parity per doubt'.
5.1.15 (a) As regard the doubt being raised on the basis of (mere)
'similarity', [our answer is that] there can be no such doubt
when the dissimilairty (to that same thing) has been duly recognised;
(b) if even on both (similarity and dissimilarity) being recognised,
doubts were to arise, then there would be no end to such doubts.-
(c) and since mere 'Similarity' is not accepted as an everlasting
source of doubt,- the opposition set up cannot be right.
5.1.16 "By reason of similarity to both, there arises vacillation", (oppositon)
based upon this reasoning is 'parity per Neutralisation'.
5.1.17 Inasmuch as the said 'vaccillation' can follow only from the counter
-view, there can be no denial of it; specially as that contrary
view must be regarded as established (before the vacillation can
be put forward).
5.1.18 Parity per Non-probativeness' is based upon the contention that
"the Probans as such cannot exist at any of the three points of
time".
5.1.19 It is not true that "the Probans cannot exist at any of the three
points of time" because it is by the Probans The Probandum can be
proved.
5.1.20 Further, [according to the Opponent's reasoning] there can be no
Denial; from which it follows that what has been denied cannot
be denied.
5.1.21 When the contrary conclusion is proved by means of Presumption, it
is 'Parity per presumption'.
5.1.22 If what is not expressly stated can be taken as following by
implication, then renouncing would be taken as following by implication
for the sample reason that such renouncing is not expressly stated;
(B) And further, Presumption would be indesicive.
5.1.23 "If the presence of a single(common) property were to make the two
things non-different,- then all things would have to be regarded
as non-different, becuase of the property of existance is present
in all";- this contention constitutes 'Parity per Non-difference'.
5.1.24 The above denial does not hold; because in the case of some(common
property) the presence of certain other properties of the similar
thing is possible, while in the case of others such presence is
not possible.
5.1.25 'Parity per evidence' is based upon the presence of grounds for both
(views).
5.1.26 This denial has no force; because the presence of grounds in support
(of the original Proposition) is admitted.
5.1.27 'Parity per Apprehension' is absed upon the fact that what is put
forward is found to exist even in the absense of the cause mentioned.
5.1.28 Inasmuch as the property in question may be due to someother cause,-
the denial has no force at all.
5.1.29 "Inasmuch as non-Apprehension of the obstruction is also not
apprehended,- it follows that this Non-apprehension is non-existant
and this proves the contrary conclusion [i.e exisance of the
obstruction]" - the opposition based upon this contention is
'Parity per Non-Apprehansion'.
5.1.30 Since Non-Apprehansion is of the nature of negation of apprehension.
the reason urged is not reason at all.
5.1.31 Further because the presence and absence of one's several cognitions
are clearly perceptible to every person;
5.1.32 "If by reason of 'similarity' two things be regarded as having
analogous properties, then all things should have to be regarded
as 'non-eternal'- this contention constitutes 'Parity per
Non-eternality'.
5.1.33 If rejection can be based upon the similarity there should be rejection
also of the denial( set up by the Opponenet), as there is similarity
between the denial and that which is sought to deny.
5.1.34 What serves as the Probans is that property which is definitely
known to susist in the Example, as being an infallible indicator of
the Probandum; and since such a Pronbans can be of both kinds, there
can be no non-difference (among all things).
5.1.35 "The character of 'non-eternality' being eternal, it follows that
thenon-eternal thing' is itself 'eternal",- based upon this contention
is 'Parity per Eternality'.
5.1.36 Inasmuch as the everlasting character of the 'non-eternality' in the
subject of Denial (Sound) ,[is admitted by the Opponent], the 'non-
eternality' of the non-eternal thing (sound) becomes established; so
that there can be no basis for the Denial.
5.1.37 'Parity per character of Effect' is based on the diverse character
of the products of effort.
5.1.38 Even though there are several Kinds of Products, inasmuch as [in the
other kind of Product] causes of non-apprehension are present, Effort
could not be the cause (of mere 'manifestation' of Sound, in whose cases
there is no cause of non-apprehension.
5.1.39 The same lies with the denial (by the Opponent) also.
5.1.40 The same may be said by the First party in answer to all (Futile
Rejoinders).
5.1.41 "With the contravention of the Denial also would lie the same fault
as that which lies against the Denial itself.
5.1.42 The contingency of the same fault lying with the Contravention of the
Denial is urged (by the Opponent), after admitting the presence
of the fault in his own contention; and this involves 'Confession of
the Contrary Opinion'.
5.1.43 "It is after having admitted what has been urged against his own view
that the first party has urged the presence of the same fault(in the
opponents view), and has put forward reasons for the same;-in so doing
it has admitted the presence (in his own view) of the fault urged
against the Opponent's view; so that the fault of 'Confessing the
contrary opinion' is equally applicable to him also".
5.2.1 (1) Violating the Proposition, (2) Shifting the Proposition, (3)
Contradicting the Proposition, (4) Renouncing the Proposition,(5)
Shifting the probans,(6) Irrelevancy, (7) Meaningless Jargon, (8)
Unintelligibility, (9)Incoherence, (10) Inconseqentiality,(11)
Incompleteness, (12) Redundance, (13) Repetition, (14) Non-Reproduction
(15) Incomprehension, 916) Embarrassment (17) Evasion, (18) Confession
of a Contrary Opinion, (19) Overlooking the Censurable, (20) Censuring
of the non-censurable, (21) Inconsistency, and (22) Fallacious Probans
are the Clichers.
5.2.2 When the property of the 'counter-instance' (urged by the Opponent)
is admitted by one to be present in the example cited by himself,
-it is a case of (1) 'Violating the Propostion'.
5.2.3 The subject of the (original) proposition having been denied, if the
Firts Party finds a diversity in the properties(of the Example and
the counter-instance), and puts it forward with a view to establish
the former proposition,- this is 'Shifting the Proposition'.
5.2.4 When there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Probans,
it is (3)' Contradiction of the Proposition'.
5.2.5 The original thesis having been opposed, if what was formerly affirmed
happens to be retracted,- it is (4) 'Renouncing the Proposition'.
5.2.6 The probans in the unqualified form having been opposed., if the first
party denies to quality it, it is a case of (5) 'shifting the probans'.
5.2.7 The putting forward of statements bearing no connection with the
purpose in hand constitutes(6) 'Irrelevancy'.
5.2.8 That which is like the mere repeating of the letters of the alphabet
is (7) 'meaningless jargon'.
5.2.9 If the assertion made is such that, though stated three times, it
fails to be understood by the audience and the Second Party, it is a
case of (8) 'Un-intelligibility.'
5.2.10 In a case where, there being no connection between the expressions
following one another, they are found to afford no connected meaning,
it is a case of (9)'Incoherence'.
5.2.11 When the factors of reasoning are stated in the reversed order,
it is a case of 'Inconsequentiality.'
5.2.12 That which is wanting in any one of the factors of reasoning is
(1) The 'Incomplete'.
5.2.13 That which contains superfluous 'Probans' and 'Example' is the
(12) 'Redundant'-
5.2.14 The re-statement of Words and Ideas constitutes 'Repetition'-
except in the case of reproduction.
5.2.15 The actual statement by means of directly expressive word of what
is already implied-
5.2.16 If the first party fails to re-state what has been stated (by the
second party0 three times, and duly understood by the audience, it
is a case of (14) 'Non-reproduction'.
5.2.17 When the statement is not comprehended, it is a case of (15)
Incomprehension'
5.2.18 It is (16) 'Embarassment' when the Party does not know the answer.
5.2.19 When the Party breaks off the discussion under the pretext of
business, it is a case of (17) 'Evasion'.
5.2.20 If the Party admits the flaw in his own thesisi, and then urges the
same in that of the Opponent, - this is a case of (18) 'Confessing
the contrary opinion.'
5.2.21 When one party has rendered himself subject to a 'Clicher', if the
other party fails to bring it home to him (by directly charging him
with it), - the latter himself becomes subject to the Clincher of (19)
'overlooking the Censurable'.
5.2.22 When one party urges a 'Clincher' when there is no 'Clincher'
(incurred by the other party),- it is a case of (20) 'Censuring the
Un-censurable.'-
5.2.23 Having taken up one standpoint, if the party carries on the discussion
without restriction, -it is a case of (21) 'Inconsistency'.
5.2.24 The 'Fallacious Probans' also (are Clinchers as they have been already
described.